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The EU's Mobility Partnership with Jordan”

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Abstract

Mobility Partnerships represent an EU policy instrument that aims to facilitate opportunities for migration and mobility between an EU member state and a partner country by integrating development policy measures into migration policy. The partnerships constitute an attempt to create a counter-narrative to the image of the EU as a fortress, in which migration policy is only addressed in terms of control, isolation and security. To examine security, development, migration and mobility in the context of the EU policy instrument of Mobility Partnership, this Master's Thesis follows a Qualitative Content Analysis guided by the concepts of Philipp Mayring. Further, by using the Mobility Partnership with Jordan as a case study, the thesis uncovers the European Union's partnership approach as a strategy to introduce and enforce an EU policy of migration management in a region marked by crisis and flight. The intended change and the supposed paradigm shift of EU migration policy towards a mobility, opportunity and development oriented external migration cooperation is thereby called into question. A shift towards a more comprehensive approach to migration policy is only taking place in a way where security- and control-oriented practices in terms of technology, knowledge and actors are already embedded and thus constitute a foundation, while only limited, temporary and highly selective forms of mobility are allowed into the EU. Following this, within the framework of the EU-Jordan Mobility Partnership, the developmental approach and the goal of creating actual migration and mobility opportunities continue to take a back seat, while priority is given to projects that aim to increase control and governance mechanisms and reduce migration to Europe.

Zusammenfassung

Mobilitätspartnerschaften sind ein politisches Instrument der Europäischen Union, welches darauf abzielt, durch die Integration entwicklungspolitischer Maßnahmen in die Migrationspolitik Migration und Mobilität zwischen einem beteiligten EU-Mitgliedstaat und einem Partnerland zu erleichtern. Die Partnerschaften stellen dazu einen Versuch dar, eine Gegennarrative zum Image der EU als Festungsmacht zu schaffen, innerhalb derer Migrationspolitik nur im Sinne von Kontrolle, Isolation und Sicherheit thematisiert wird. Die Auseinandersetzung mit den Konzepten Sicherheit, Entwicklung, Migration und Mobilität im Kontext des EU-Politikinstruments der Mobilitätspartnerschaft erfolgt in dieser Masterarbeit anhand einer Qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse, die sich an den Konzepten von Philipp Mayring orientiert. Anhand des Fallbeispiels der Mobilitätspartnerschaft mit Jordanien wird zudem der partnerschaftliche Ansatz der Europäischen Union als eine Strategie zur Einführung und Durchsetzung einer EU-Politik der Migrationssteuerung in einer von Krise und Flucht geprägten Region beleuchtet. Der angestrebte Wandel und der vermeintliche Paradigmenwechsel der EU-Migrationspolitik hin zu einer mobilitäts-, chancen- und entwicklungsorientierten externen Migrationszusammenarbeit wird dadurch in Frage gestellt. Ein Wandel hin zu einem umfassenderen Ansatz in der Migrationspolitik erfolgt lediglich dort, wo sicherheits- und kontrollorientierte Praktiken in Form von Technologien, Wissen und Akteuren bereits verankert sind. Diese Praktiken bilden damit ein Fundament für die Migrationspolitik und führen dazu, dass nur begrenzte, temporäre und sehr selektive Formen der Mobilität in die EU zugelassen werden. Im Rahmen der Mobilitätspartnerschaft zwischen der EU und Jordanien stehen demnach der entwicklungspolitische Ansatz und das Ziel, tatsächliche Migrations- und Mobilitätsmöglichkeiten zu schaffen, weiterhin im Hintergrund, während Projekte, die das Ziel verfolgen, die Kontroll- und Steuerungsmechanismen zu erhöhen sowie die Migration nach Europa zu reduzieren, Priorität haben.

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List of Abbreviations

DOS	Departement of Statistics - Jordan
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EC	European Commission
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ETF	European Trading Foundation
EU	European Union
EU-Jordan MP	Joint Declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the European Union and its participating Member States
EUROSUR	European External Border Surveillance System
EUROSTAT	Statistical Office of the European Union
FRONTEX	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
GAM	Global Approach to Migration
GAMM	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GiZ	(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) German Society for International Cooperation
ICM	Erasmus+ International Credit Mobility
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
JEMPAS	Support to the Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
MENA	Middle East and North Africa Region
MISMES	Migrant Support Measures from an employment and skills perspective
MP	Mobility Partnership
MOL	Ministry of Labor - Jordan
NRP	National Resilience Plan – Jordan
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
RDPP	Regional Development and Protection Programme
QCA	Qualitative Content Analysis
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNHCR	The UN Refugee Agency
UNRWA	United Nations relief and works agency for palestina refugees in the near east
VFA	Visa Facilitation Agreement

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1. Introduction

The context following the uprisings in the Arab world in 2010 and 2011 has brought the issue of migration, and especially the importance of mobility and migration matters in the relations between the European Union (EU) and the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), very much back into focus. Media coverage of the war in Syria and the dangerous and life-threatening journeys along the central and eastern Mediterranean routes put pressure on the EU that fundamentally lacked a unified approach to migration and asylum. At the same time, the subject of migration is also at the centre of intra-European dynamics and tensions, such as Brexit or the rise of populist parties (Abderrahim 2019: 7). The dramatic increase of sea crossings and the inability or unwillingness of the EU to prevent the deadly shipwrecks in the Mediterranean Sea have become prominent within the so-called migration and refugee crisis in 2015/2016¹. Up until now, the Union has not been able to agree on a unified approach to the issue of refugee reception and distribution. This context seemed to provide further momentum for the EU to seek closer cooperation with countries in its southern neighbourhood as part of its migration policy. Soon after the start of the uprisings in 2011, the EU presented its first proposals for a “Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security” to initiate talks with the southern partner countries within the framework of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) and to conduct a structured dialogue on migration, mobility and security with each country (COM(2011) 743; COM(2011) 292). These dialogues ultimately aim towards developing Mobility Partnerships (MPs) with these partner countries, both to cooperate in managing international migration and mobility and to facilitate mobility and migration between the partner country and the participating EU member states (Abderrahim 2019: 11). One important partner country selected for a MP is Jordan. Jordan is not only the most important destination and transit country especially for people from Syria who had to leave their country following the war in their homeland. Jordan has been characterised by strong mobility to, from and through the kingdom ever since its independence. Not least due to the ongoing unrest in the Middle East region. Bordering Israel, Palestine, Syria and Iraq, the EU considers Jordan to be an elementary partner country for *stability* in the region. However, cooperation on migration policy, which is also intended as a means of facilitating mobility and migration to the EU, appears to be a new approach. Since mobility and migration between Jordanian citizens and citizens of EU member states did not seem to have played a major political role up to the time

¹ The term ‘migration and refugee crisis’ is based on socially constructed meanings and connotations. To illustrate that this is a problematic expression that itself has the power to shape realities, I will put the term ‘migration and refugee crisis’ in single quotation mark in the following thesis. However, because the narrative of a ‘migration crisis’ has significance for the work, the term will not be dispensed with entirely.

of the MP negotiations, the consideration of the background, opportunities and actual implementation is particularly interesting and deserves closer examination.

In addition to the crucial role to be played by increased cooperation with non-EU partner countries, there was a commitment expressed by the EU to overcome the predominant security focus in migration policy. The European Commission (EC) describes the policy instrument of MPs as the “most innovative and sophisticated tool” (SEC(2009) 1240: 4) of EU migration policy, offering benefits in terms of a triple-win situation for the European states as well as for the third countries involved and the migrants themselves. The triple win situation is to be achieved by exploiting development advantages as part of a more comprehensive migration and mobility policy (COM(2011) 743: 2).

1.1. Research Question

The aim of this thesis is to identify to which degree the policy instrument of the MP represents the intended shift from a security to a comprehensive approach regarding migration in terms of a special focus on mobility and development. Therefore, the following research question was raised:

To what extent does the Mobility Partnership represent a shift from a securitizing focus to a development and mobility focus in EU Migration Policy?

The research draws its epistemic assumptions from a social constructivist point of view, which influences the choice of methodology. Therefore, a comprehensive examination of the concepts underlying the thesis is essential. A critical analysis is especially called for regarding the way in which different policy areas focusing on development, security and migration are interlinked. By combining the goals of migration and development policy in one policy instrument, MPs attempt to bring together two opposing meanings of migration. Thus, the first concern of my research is to gain an understanding of the Union-European discourse on the nexus of migration, security and development. Accordingly, a first subordinate research question is:

How are the concept of ‘security’ and ‘development’ constructed in the framework of the Nexus between Security-Development-Migration?

In order to examine the concepts that shape this discourse, I use the approaches of Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA), based on ideas of Philipp Mayring (2010). QCA offers potentially beneficial tools in order to expand our understanding of the role of discourse in the construction of the social (Hardy et al. 2004: 20).

The main research question will further be addressed with the help of the specific case study of the MP between the EU and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Jordanian case has received rather little attention in research to date. This may be due to the fact that only a comparatively short time has passed since the partnership was concluded and that it is still in the process of implementation; in addition, the lack of access to current documents often makes comprehensive analysis difficult. In view of the special relevance of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as a migrant² receiving and sending country, it seems particularly interesting to look at the EU's cooperation with the kingdom. The MP between Jordan and the EU is the first MP in the Middle East, a region of great importance for the EU's migration management due to several crises affecting population movements, potentially making the partnership a model for future MPs with states in the Middle East. By taking a perspective on the EU-Jordan MP in its specific context, I will examine success in terms of a shift from an approach characterised by security concerns to one committed to development and mobility opportunities. Consequently, a second subsidiary research question was raised:

What role do mobility-enhancing efforts play in achieving the anticipated opportunities of the Development-Migration Nexus in the EU Mobility Partnership with Jordan?

The second subsidiary research question is addressed through a case study on the EU-Jordan MP and further analysed in terms of its focus on development and more specifically mobility and people-to-people contacts. It is worth noting that I will not attempt to assess the overall impact of the MP. Given that multiple contextual factors and a number of other migration-related instruments besides the MP influence development and mobility dynamics in Jordan, measuring direct impact remains a difficult task. However, a contextual consideration migration and mobility dynamics is helpful in gaining an understanding of Jordan's role as a mobility partner country of the EU.

This paper aims to contribute to the rather limited research on the EU-Jordan MP by looking at the partnership in its context at the time of negotiation and signing post-2011. The specific political and social position in which the EU and Jordan find themselves at the time of negotiating their partnership plays an important role in the MP's consideration of any mobility-enhancing efforts. Moreover, the deep-rooted security concerns related to migration and mobility agendas need to be analysed in detail before addressing the question of a 'new focus'

² In the following, I will use the concept 'migrant' as a general category including 'immigrants', 'asylum-seekers', or 'refugees'. As Morice and Rodier (2005) argue, the classification of 'migrants' and 'refugees' creates a detrimental distinction in the context of a state's attempt to control migration movements from the perspective of national security; such a form of classification process is thus not neutral. I acknowledge that the term 'migrant' is not free from discriminative ascriptions (see Morice, A. and Rodier, C. (2005): *Classer-trier migrants et réfugiés: des distinctions qui font mal*. Hommes et Libertés - Revue de la Ligue des Droits de l'Homme 129 (Mars): 58-61.)

in EU migration policy. This thesis will further contribute to the discourse on securitization of migration by examining EC documents underpinning the MP, for their underlying, often unobtrusive, control and security practices.

Despite the EC's enthusiasm for a new approach to migration policy and a partnership framework that manages to look at migration in its entirety, that moves beyond the security and control perspective and focuses on development and mobility opportunities rather than on threats and compartmentalization, numerous authors question the EU's implementation of its promises. Some authors have already addressed how the attempt to harness migration for development goals runs up against heavily securitized European migration policies (Seeberg 2017; Lavenex and Kunz 2008), and what implications this may have for the partner countries' negotiating leverage (Tittel-Mosser 2020; Reslow 2010, 2012). While other research focuses on a power-critical discursive examination of the policy instrument of the MP. MPs, in this view, despite their seemingly consensual and technical nature, are sites of intense discursive struggles drawing a particular picture of the 'migration problem' and forming a solution that corresponds to the ideological dimension underlying the very approach (Maisenbacher 2015; Kunz und Maisenbacher 2013; Schwiertz 2011).

1.2. Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured as follows. In a first step, I will outline the methods chosen to answer the research question. The combination of methods should help to gain an understanding of the concepts underlying the research question and at the same time illustrate arguments to answer the research question by means of a context-specific case study. Following on from this, the ideas of the theory on securitization will be discussed in a broader way, before analysing the concrete EU discourse regarding the nexus of security, development and migration. The combination of inductive and deductive categorization helps to decipher the way in which the concepts of security and development are integrated in the EC papers under consideration. Considering the fact that the policy instrument of interest in this thesis is called 'Mobility Partnership', the discussion of the EU's inherent meaning of security and development in chapter 4.1 and 4.2 is followed by a critical examination of the concept of mobility and its distinction from the concept of migration. To conclude chapter 4.3, the EU visa regime provides an illustration of how power and mobility are linked at an international level.

Section 4.3 is followed by the case study on the EU-Jordan MP. In chapter 5.1 and 5.2, the policy instrument of the MP is being introduced along with the political context, both with regard to Jordan and the EU, in which the negotiation and signing of the partnership took place.

Chapter 5.3 subsequently considers the mobility dynamics. These include, on the one hand, historical outward and inward migration in Jordan, and on the other hand, the current significance of cross-border mobility between the EU and Jordan. Lastly the specific initiatives and projects that are being implemented under the umbrella of the EU-Jordan MP are considered in section 5.4. Particular attention is placed on the role of projects and initiatives that promote mobility and development.

As a final step, the conclusion allows me to bring together the findings regarding the two subsidiary research questions in order to ultimately provide an answer to the main research question and further provides space to reflect on research limitation, as well as future research potential.

1.3. Self-positioning

I strive for a reflective and critical approach to my research topic, which makes it necessary to address the issue of research objectivity as a quality criterion. As my situatedness in researching and writing is based on social and moral values that I hold based on my experience, education, gender and socialisation, the object of my research can also only be viewed through my subjective context. My own background inevitably plays a role in my argument and subsequently in my findings. The intention is not to ignore or disregard the entire concept of research objectivity, but to open up space for the question of whether objective truths can exist at all. In a scientific research process there always has to be a starting point, and thus certain basic ontological and epistemological assumptions initially have to be believed and presupposed. Although subjective values stand in contrast to the general understanding of objectivity, for me an absolute neutrality and distance to the object of research cannot exist. I am a German national and a citizen of the EU and I recognise that my socialisation in Western society, as well as in Western academia, influences my view of the processes and phenomena I research. Therefore, while in the realm of my research, I am engaging with theory-based knowledge and epistemic values, social, moral, and political values do play an essential role in my scientific reasoning and practice.

Being critical also implies recognizing oneself as shaped by those regimes of truth, concepts, theories and ways of thinking that make criticism possible in the first place (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006: 476). I consider a reflection on how my work itself contributes to the reproduction of security knowledge, in a way that it renders migration problematic from a security perspective, as essential. This “normative dilemma” as Jef Huysmans calls it, refers to the question whether there is even a possible way to speak or write about securitization without reproducing this

knowledge itself (Huysmans 2002: 43). In my approach to migration, I do not seek to remedy the undesirable effects of security discourses by presenting the concept of migration in a different, or even a 'correct' way. I assume that discursive formation is constitutive of the social emergence of my research subject (Huysmans 2002: 48), which is why the discursive emergence of the concepts relevant to this work is subject to close scrutiny. Therefore, to deal with the problem of the "normative dilemma", in the first part of the thesis I address comprehensively the question of what happens when the concepts of security or development are combined with the concept of migration and in what way this nexus materializes. This way, relations of power and symbolic dimensions in the discourse become an important part of the analysis. Moreover, during my research process it is essential for me to constantly reflect on the fact that my point of view is not meant to be an omniscient view of the research question from the outside, but merely an attempt to conduct scientifically relevant research from my own critical position.

2. Research Method

To address the research question, the analysis is conducted at two different levels. The first concern of my research is to gain an understanding of the Union-European discourse on the nexus of migration, security and development. In order to examine the concepts that shape this discourse, I use the approaches of QCA. With the caveat that all textual analysis is also an exercise in interpretation, QCA can play a potentially useful role in expanding our understanding of the role of discourse in the construction of the social (Hardy et al. 2004: 20). In a second step, the case study analysis sought to provide empirical insight into the topics examined, especially the significance of the mobility aspect within the EU-Jordan MP.

The methods complement each other in a way that allows for a comprehensive examination of the underlying research question. Before considering the specific case study of the EU-Jordan MP and, in this context, the shift from a security focus on migration to a focus on mobility and development opportunities, a critical consideration of the terminology underlying the analysis was necessary.




Figure 1: Combination of Methods: own representation

2.1. Qualitative Content Analysis

In the first part of the analysis, I adopt a content analysis approach with regard to the four EC papers selected for this thesis in order to gain a deeper understanding of the relevant concepts. The methodological tool of QCA is used to adopt a critical perspective on the discourse on the role and meaning of the terms ‘security’ and ‘development’ within the EC’s papers on EU migration policy with neighbouring countries. The QCA used is based on ideas of Philipp Mayring (2010), who has fundamentally contributed to the development of QCA, especially in German-speaking contexts. The use of an appropriate category system is the underlying instrument of the analysis. It serves the purpose of processing the material and considering only text passages that relate to the categories (Mayring and Fenzl 2019: 634). While categories were generated deductively in the analysis of the concept of securitization, when dealing with the concept of development the focus has been put on inductive reasoning.

One reason for this approach lies in the fact that it is not the primary interest of this work to examine whether or not there has been a securitization of European migration policy. This question has already been addressed by numerous scholars through a multitude of analyses and publications (int. al. Buzan et al. 1998; Bigo 2001, 2014; Huysmans 2000, 2011). Rather, this thesis seeks to analyze how the securitizing phenomena, which have been identified in theory, are expressed within the more recent EC papers on the EU’s external migration policy, which the instrument of MPs is drawing upon. The theoretical ideas on the politics of security form the basis for the main deductive categories of *securitizing practices* and *securitizing knowledge*. The categories represent the less obvious, sometimes already institutionalized security concerns that have found their way into migration policy issues over the past decades. Text material categorized as *securitizing practices* refers to technological and institutional instruments that

frame migration as a dangerous challenge to social stability. The category *securitizing knowledge* helps to identify the discourse fragments in which a certain type of technocratic knowledge and know-how is endorsed. In this context, it is significant to consider who has the power to define threats and policy problems, and what knowledge and professional experience lies behind this definition.

In order to gain insight into the assumptions underlying the Migration-Development Nexus and the understanding of development in the context of the EU's migration cooperation with its neighbours, I have opted for an inductive approach. For this purpose, the categories were developed from the text, i.e., the data material. The main categories developed in the context of evaluating and interpreting data material are *migration management* and *development as individual responsibility*.

Through the observations made during the analysis of the text material, in a second step, existing theoretical concepts could also be derived. The category of *migration management* helps reveal the discourse segments that represent depoliticizing affects that often underlie the goal of making migration work for development. Statements under the category of *migration management* seek to combine both mobility opportunities and the retention of restrictions regarding irregular migration. The category *development as individual responsibility* accounts for statements that portray migrants as responsible for development in their countries of origin. Once these categories could be extracted from text material, it was also possible to establish a link to existing theoretical considerations regarding the nexus between migration and development (see Figure 1).




Figure 2: Category Formation: own representation

Selection of Text Material

The textual data used for the analysis includes the four most relevant documents in the field of externalisation of EU migration policy published by the EC in the period of the signing of the EU-Jordan MP.

Document	Publication date
The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (COM[2011] 743)	18.11.2011
The European Agenda on Migration (COM[2015] 240)	13.5.2015
The Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (JOIN[2015] 50)	18.11.2015
The New Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration (COM[2016] 385)	7.6.2016

Table 1: Documents selected for QCA

The focus had been on documents in the area of EU migration cooperation with neighbouring countries, which were published after the popular uprisings in 2011 but especially following the ‘migration and refugee crisis’ that the EU has been addressing intensively.

These documents were selected for several reasons. First, they were published during the period when negotiations and also agreements of MPs with countries of the southern neighbourhood were very prominent (Morocco in 2013, Tunisia and Jordan in 2014). Second, they are part of the ‘new strategy’, which is to foster “mutually beneficial partnerships” and to consider migration policy with respect to its contribution to mobility and development (COM(2020) 609: 17). This ‘new strategy’ is characterised by its external aspect, which aims to help third countries address root causes of migration or asylum seeking within the framework of the Migration Development Nexus (COM(2020) 609: 19). Further, an analysis of the joint declaration on the MP itself provides little insight into the partnership’s underlying understanding of the concepts of security, development and their connection with migration policy, as they are kept quite brief and vague. MPs are considered as a practical instrument for the implementation of the objectives defined in the cited EC’s papers. The analysis aims to examine these objectives and their underlying premises. In this context, it demonstrates where and how securitizing as well as developmentising tendencies of migration are incorporated in

the EC papers that form the basis for the policy instrument of MPs. From this point of view, the case study of the MP between the EU and Jordan was considered.

2.2. Case Study

The Case Study on the EU-Jordan MP was considered in terms of its focus on development and more specific on mobility and people-to-people contact. I have opted for the method of a single case study in the second part of the thesis because it allows me to integrate contextual conditions extensively as part of the analysis (Ridder 2017: 282). In contrast to comparing multiple cases, in addition to providing a contextual description, the single-case design also allows me to consider a larger number of intervening variables (George and Bennett 2005: 86). Typical for case study research is non-random sampling, i.e., in contrast to quantitative logic, a specific case is chosen based on its particular interest (Ridder 2017: 282). The analysis of the MP instrument is particularly interesting when considering the dynamics of European migration policy. An important reason being that MPs capture both security and development aspects, both of which are critical in the externalization of EU migration management policies. I chose the specific case of the MP between the EU and Jordan. There are several reasons for the special interest in this case. First, the EU-Jordan MP is the first MP in the Middle East, a region of great importance for EU foreign policy due to several crises affecting population movements. Moreover, migration movements in Jordan constitute an important part of its history from the ground up. Since 2011, the enormous increase in the number of Syrian refugees has put considerable pressure not only on the economy but also on the country's vital resources. In addition to maintaining economic and political stability in the Kingdom, the EU also seems to recognise Jordan as a fundamental partner in migration management. Especially when it comes to refugees from the region. In this light, it is interesting to consider Jordan's role as a form of EU buffer zone to reduce migratory pressure on the southern border. Precisely because Jordan already holds a similarly important role in the issue of Palestinian refugees, in this case not so much on behalf of the EU as of Israel. A successful partnership and cooperation with Jordan, especially in the area of migration, is therefore extremely important for the EU, as the Kingdom absorbs a lion's share of crisis-related migration in the region, which European countries would otherwise to some extent have to accommodate.

This thesis aims to gain an understanding of the evolution in EU migration policy through the specific case of the EU-Jordan MP. The study does not attempt to draw generalizations to other cases. In fact, as it will also be demonstrated, the context of the partnership in both the EU and Jordan is unique in many ways, and the conclusions, cannot be readily

generalized to other partnerships. By studying a specific case intensively, compromises must be made between achieving high internal validity and good historical explanations of individual cases and making generalizations and judgments regarding the representativeness of the case (George and Bennett 2005: 93). However, based on the findings of this work, future research may well draw a comparative reference to other MPs operating in their specific contexts.

Definition of Sample

Data collection for the case study came from qualitative and quantitative data sources. The migration dynamics between member states of the EU and Jordan were examined using different mobility indicators. These indicators include the historical development of immigration of different population groups to Jordan, as well as the current population structure with a focus on the proportion of foreign population and their countries of origin. Moreover, the historical development of emigration of Jordanian citizens and the main destinations of Jordanian emigrants in the past and present were analyzed. Lastly, mobility indicators of recent cross-border mobility between Jordan and the EU include first residence permits by reason, EU Blue Cards, mobility enabled by Erasmus+ and total visas issued to Jordanian nationals.

In addition to providing an overview of previous mobility between the two signatories of the MP, these data also allow for a preliminary conclusion regarding the mobility-enhancing potential of the EU-Jordan MP. For this purpose, I rely on different data sources. These data sources include Jordanian Department of Statistics (DOS), the Ministry of Labor (MOL), the Arab Barometer, as well as the Statistical Office of the EU (Eurostat), the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA); additional data was collected from the World Bank and the International Labor Organization (ILO).

Difficulties in data collection relate on the one hand to the fact that data on Jordanians abroad are generally scarce and incomplete, including the fact that Jordan's neighbouring states, which are important destinations for emigration, do not disseminate data on population by nationality. On the other hand, definitional difficulties arise. The mobility indicators can only provide information on the mobility of Jordanian citizens, which excludes a large part of the Palestinian population. The question of who is considered a migrant and, in this context, whose mobility is measured at all, may also have an impact on the data material. For example, the national census conducted by Jordanian authorities only records migrants who have been abroad for less than a year, which underestimates migration figures. I am aware of these shortcomings in the area of

the data material. These difficulties are therefore being addressed through a broad and comprehensive analysis that includes quantitative data as well as an in-depth literature research and the examination of the concrete projects planned and implemented under the EU-Jordan MP. The source used for the examination of the MP projects is the EU-Jordan MP scoreboard. The scoreboard is a tool for monitoring the partnership and contains information on the initiatives that have been and are being implemented under the MP, as well as responsible partners, contact points, indicators for evaluation, the implementation period of the initiatives, and their sources of funding. The scoreboard, through systematization and grouping, aims at presenting the concrete activities under the umbrella of the MP and allowing reflection and evaluation of the ongoing, completed and planned initiatives/projects under the EU-Jordan MP (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova 2021). The scoreboard is not publically available, and was therefore obtained from the EC in December 2020.

The initiatives/projects listed in the scoreboard were divided into five groups according to their thematic focus (foster mobility and legal migration, migration and development, promoting border management, preventing and combating irregular migration, international protection, cross-cutting initiatives). This grouping is based on the “four equally important pillars” of the GAMM (COM(2011) 743). When examining the projects/initiatives, all information was drawn directly from the scoreboard; if the scoreboard did not provide enough information, I tried to overcome this limitation by searching online for the missing information on the official websites of implementing agencies.

3. Theoretical Framework

In the following section, theoretical concepts relevant to the analysis of the Union-European discourse on mobility and migration will be presented. Since security as well as development represent concepts that have expanded considerably over the past decades, a comprehensive theoretical examination of these concepts is imperative.

3.1. Securitization Theory – Copenhagen School vs. Paris School

The concepts of migration and mobility take on different meanings, if they are positioned in different discourses. The meaning of migration, is always contestable and can be conceptualized in different ways, depending on which aspect of migration is given more priority. Especially relevant for this thesis is the examination of the construction of the concept of migration and mobility as a security problem. With reference to Jef Huysmans, whose research focuses on

International Political Sociology, I assume, that the meaning of concepts such as security, development, migration and mobility does not only depend on the specific analytical question, but is also articulated through the specific context, as well as through certain views on our relationship to nature, to other people and to the self (Huysmans 1998: 228). While social relations *make* or *construct* people, people *make* the world what it is by doing or saying certain things (Onuf 2013: 4). This also means that reality is constantly being re-constructed, which certainly opens up the prospect of change and transformation. Meanings are thus not fixed, but can change over time, depending on the ideas, beliefs and goals of the agents. The constructivist view of the securitization of migration can be traced back to the theory of the so-called Copenhagen School under international relations theorist Barry Buzan and former senior research fellow at Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Ole Waever. The Copenhagen School defines security as a speech act and in doing so examines how security problems arise, develop and dissolve (Balzacq 2010: 59; CASE 2006: 448). According to Waever „security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering ‘security’, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.” (Waever 1995: 55, emphasis i.o). The idea of securitization defines processes in which socially and politically successful speech acts refer to a topic as a security issue, thus removing it from the realm of normal day-to-day politics and presenting it as an existential threat that requires and justifies extreme measures (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006: 453).

A social constructivist view has become established within the theoretical debate on the securitization of migration issues and is considered by scholars who deal with the nexus of migration and security as “(...) so obvious that it borders on the trivial.” (Huysmans 2006: 2). Regarding migratory movements this implies that even if one accepts that the arrival of large groups of external people can be disruptive to the established community, the definition of the situation and the way in which one tries to control it depends on political and social processes (Huysmans 2006: 2). The theory of speech and thus the analysis of speech acts inevitably played a fundamental role in the development of Securitization Theory and introduced the function of the agent performing the speech act into focus of the analysis. In this context, the question ‘who can successfully and legitimately express a topic as a security issue?’ refers not so much to the individual subject as to the social position of the agent (Huysmans 2002: 53).

Another strand of scholars who advocate a constructivist stance but put a focus on analyzing policy *practices*, the formation of an internal security field in Europe and the securitization of

migration from a more political sociological perspective were, with the exception of Jef Huysmans, most working with Didier Bigo and the French journal *Cultures et Conflits*, and thus labelled as the 'Paris School' (C.A.S.E Collective 2006: 448f.). These researchers established an agenda that emphasizes security professionals, the governmental rationality of security, and the policy structuring implications of security technology and knowledge (C.A.S.E Collective 2006: 449).

I base my theoretical and analytical assumptions on the work of Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans, whose analysis focuses on the sociology of power and its institutionalisation in discourse. In contrast to the approaches of the Copenhagen School, Bigo and Huysmans do not solely focus on speech acts, even though they recognize that language can play a central role in the design of security domains. They also reject the idea that international security pursues a particular agenda that concerns the concept of survival and that security can be conceptualized as a 'policy of exception'. Instead, they argue, the process of securitization has to do primarily with more mundane bureaucratic decisions of everyday political life, with routines of rationalization, with the management of numbers instead of people, and with the use of technologies that allow for communication and surveillance at a distance (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008: 5). Accordingly, it is possible to securitize certain issues without language or discourse. Bigo emphasizes, „(t)he practical work, discipline, and expertise are as important as all forms of discourse.” (Bigo 2000: 347). Thus, securitization is not a simple rhetoric or ideology, but the result of protracted mobilization work. It is based on the ability of agents or security experts, who do not necessarily have to be equivalent to heads of state, to compile statistics on their goals and to empirically evaluate them under their own assumptions and categories in order to produce their own *truth*. The prerequisite is that this *truth* is congruent with current knowledge about the world (Bigo 2000: 347). Huysmans states in this context that “(a)sylum does not have to be explicitly defined as a major threat to a society to become a security question.” (Huysmans 2006: 3). A security policy approach to migration issues can also result from the context in which these issues are embedded. Accordingly, without being defined directly as a threat, migration can be well treated as a security problem if it is integrated institutionally and discursively in a political framework that focuses, for example, on police and defense. It is therefore necessary to go beyond the assumption that the definition of threat is the very core of the security framework. Securitization is not a mere speech act, but a multidimensional process in which certain skills, expert knowledge, institutional routines and threat discourses are combined (Huysmans 2006: 150; 153).

If we consider the emergence of a security problem as a social phenomenon, migration as a security problem is not a natural occurrence. In other words, it does not simply emerge as a new threat that manifests itself and triggers a security policy. The transformation of migration issues into a security issue requires the mobilization of certain institutions (e.g., the police) as well as a certain type of knowledge (security knowledge) (Huysmans 2002: 42).

3.2. Securitizing Mobility

The securitization of the cross-border movement in Europe is linked to a redesign of the borders, which is inseparable from the process of European integration. The abolition of identity checks at the internal borders was accompanied by a series of compensatory security measures aimed at strengthening controls at the external borders, promoting cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and setting up a system for the exchange of information on inadmissible or undesirable third-country nationals (Carrera and Hernandez 2015: 71). When talking about securing borders, this has a direct impact on migration and mobility between the EU and its neighboring countries. In this thesis, the terms migration and mobility are not used randomly. According to the EC, the term mobility refers to any kind of movement of people and is, thus, “a much broader concept than migration” (COM(2011) 743: 3). Within official EU documents as well as between EU delegates, the decision as to when which of the two terms is used is not completely consistent, which I will come back to later on in this thesis. Nevertheless, in this thesis, I try to follow the EC’s understanding of the concept of mobility, which “applies to a wide range of people, e.g. short-term visitors, tourists, students, researchers, business people or visiting family members” (COM(2011) 743: 3). In contrast, based on the EC’s definition of migration, I am referring to the intention of a person to establish “their usual residence in the territory of an EU/EFTA member state for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another EU/EFTA member state or a third country” (European Commission 2020a).

It would not make sense to isolate the securitization of migration and the securitization of mobility from each other, since they are connected and mutually dependent. This is based on the underlying apprehension of EU member states representatives that any non-EU citizen entering the EU could potentially remain in the respective member state *illegally* and become a *potential threat*. A particularly important focus in the public and academic debate has been and still is the role, the ambitions and the actual capacities of the EU in the securitization and control of unwanted migration, which is generally referred to as ‘irregular’ migration (Carrera and Hernandez 2015: 69). Over the past decades, instruments for migration control have been

developed in ‘Schengen Europe’, which encompass a number of exclusionary discourses, laws, institutions, technologies and practices (Carrera and Hernandez 2015: 69).

In this context Bigo introduces ‘the field of professionals of the management of ‘unease’’ (Bigo 2008: 23). This field refers to the agents’ ability to make statements about the unease and to present solutions that facilitate the management of the unease, creating a new balance between threat, freedom and security, justifying increased surveillance and restrictions on individual freedom (Bigo 2008: 23; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008: 2). In reference to Michel Foucault, he describes securitization techniques as a part of a contemporary form of Governmentality of liberal regimes, which he refers to as the *ban-opticon dispositif* (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008: 2). This *dispositif* is characterized by a reality in which profiling technologies are used within the politics of migration and mobility, utilizing routines and practices to decide who should be under constant surveillance and who should be able to move freely (Bigo 2008: 32). When referring to the surveillance and control of borders, it is important to not only consider territorial borders. The core of the new securitization is to draw new borders (physical, social and identity borders) that are different from the national borders (Bigo 2000: 320). Globalization and the international mobility and movement of the population has made the relationship with the territory more complex. Therefore, „(t)he notion of citizenship has supplanted a purely territorial logic. Security can no longer be conceived as protection behind state borders: borders that they have tried to make as impermeable as possible” (Bigo 2000: 332).

In addition to the term *techniques*, emphasizing the reference to the technocratic and technological handling of mobility and migration, I use the term *practices* in this thesis in order to emphasize that the processes dealing with security technologies of human movements not only have social effects, but have also emerged in and through social processes. The concept of practices used in this thesis has its roots in French sociology and has been considerably shaped by authors such as Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault. According to these author’s understanding, practices can be described as forms of social interaction that need to be neither directly visible nor conscious (Balzacq et al. 2010: 1). This understanding of practices enables me to grasp the basis of securitization in the field of migration and mobility policy in today’s world politics, which, according to Huysmans, is largely characterized by unspectacular processes of technologically driven monitoring, risk management and precautionary control and governance of mobility (Huysmans 2011: 375).

4. Migration – Security – Development Nexus

The connection between migration and security issues is always completely and directly political. Both migration and security are controversial concepts, and they are used to mobilize political responses rather than to explain anything (Bigo 2002: 71). Migration has been problematized over the last decades in the context of the EU in a way that goes far beyond a mere distinction between citizens and foreigners (Bigo 2002: 71). The political construction of migration as a security issue can already be traced back over four decades, but it certainly received an upswing as a result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the developments in the ‘war against terror’. In the European context, migration policy was integrated into a framework of internal security with the *Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985*, which entailed the removal of internal borders. The regulation of migration was thus placed in an institutional framework that is primarily concerned with maintaining internal stability and protecting internal security. The process of European integration was inevitably accompanied by the assumption that a dismantling of internal European borders was only possible by strengthening the EU’s external borders, and thus led to the development of a restrictive migration policy and the social construction of migration as a threat to security (Huysmans 2000: 751; 757). The privileging of nationals of member states in the European market, as well as a policy that often directly or indirectly supports the expressions of welfare chauvinism and the idea of cultural homogeneity in need of protection, also contributed to the negative politicization of migrants (Huysmans 2000: 770). This negative politicisation of migration is directly related to the determinants of race and religion. This thesis focuses on migration and mobility dynamics in the Jordanian context, which as an Arab country is connected deeply to the construction of Islam and Muslim society as a security threat. When addressing migration policy, it is of fundamental importance to emphasise the context of race and religion, having an institutionalised influence on individual migration and mobility. The fact that race as a social construction has become a ‘real’ categorical division when it comes to mobility opportunities, makes it impossible to deal with the discourse on the securitization of migration without also taking into account a racial discourse (Ibrahim 2005: 165). As Nicholas De Genova (2017) points out in his discussion of the ‘migration crisis’ as a racial crisis, the mutually constituting crises of European borders and European identity, are accompanied by a pervasive and deeply rooted ‘anti-Muslim racism’ (4). In this context, the constructed figure of the ‘Muslim’ is particularly suspicious and requires anti-terrorist surveillance and special focus in security police border control to identify potential ‘extremists’. In this manner, the European racial order

in border management produces and maintains a permanent suspicion towards ‘Muslims’ (De Genova 2017: 12).

The nature of the political within security studies is highlighted in migration becoming an overarching theme of the EU’s identity policy. One consequence of this development is an inevitable contradiction between the EU’s general image of liberalization and its repressive migration policy (Buzan 2006: x). The pragmatic significance of the securitization of migration becomes particularly clear when one considers the underlying structure of social and political relations. The embedding of flight in a humanitarian context entails different relations with migrants than the same embedding in a security framework. While the former allows for compassion and an understanding of migrants as holders of rights, the latter reinforces the fear of outsiders and a policy of territorial and administrative exclusion (Huysmans 2006: xii). These political developments contributed to the widespread external perception that the EU was trying to build a ‘Fortress Europe’³. This negative external image contributed to the growing notion in Brussels to overcome the traditional security centered framework of EU migration policy. This ambition particularly became evident in the development of the 2008 *Global Approach*:

“The Global Approach reflects a major change in the external dimension of the European migration policy over recent years, namely the shift from a primarily *security-centred approach* focused on reducing migratory pressures, to a more transparent and balanced approach guided by a better understanding of all aspects relevant to migration, improving the accompanying measures to manage migratory flows, making migration and mobility *positive forces for development*, and giving greater consideration to decent work aspects in policies to better manage economic migration.” (European Commission 2008: 3; emphasis added).

This *statement by the European Commission on Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration* makes very clear how there has been a discursive attempt to introduce a new narrative into European migration policy, in which the construction of migration as an opportunity for development should replace the construction of the migrant as a security issue. This attempt became manifest in the elaboration of MPs, as important instruments for the practical

³ See for example: Andrew Geddes (2000): *Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?* Manchester: Manchester University Press

implementation of the rhetorical goal of considering migration issues in all their complexity and the exploitation of the development potential of migration and mobility.

In addition to the conceptual examination of the securitisation of migration, an approach to the understanding of the concept of development is indispensable. In this regard, I would like to adhere to some assumptions of the post-development author Wolfgang Sachs, who takes a growth-critical approach to the concept of development. According to Sachs, development can mean just about anything, he therefore, further describes it as „a concept of monumental emptiness, carrying a vaguely positive connotation.” (Sachs 2010: x). For this reason, it can take on different and sometimes even contradictory meanings and perspectives. In the widespread perception, development is inevitably seen as a positive change, as a step from the simple to the complex, from the inferior to the superior, from the bad to the better (Esteva 2010: 6). Or, according to post-colonial theorist Aram Ziai, as a bundle of interconnected and normatively positively charged processes that took place in some regions while not taking place in others (Ziai 2010: 400). In International Politics, the concept of development as (primarily economic) growth has consistently prevailed. This understanding has also been present in International Relations for a long time, together with the call to every nation to follow the path of the hegemonic perspective of development. According to Sachs, development provides the basic framework for the combination of generosity, bribery and oppression that has so fundamentally shaped ‘the North’s’⁴ political relationship toward ‘the South’. Development is thus much more than just a socio-economic phenomenon; it is a perception that shapes reality (Sachs 2010: xv; xvi)⁵. This recognition is particularly important when considering the specific conceptions of the world and their resulting effects on the actors involved that are conveyed through the nexus of migration and development. As such, the relationship between migration and development implies a number of beliefs that are currently shared not only by people but also by institutions such as the EU, development agencies, IOs and NGOs (Geiger and Pécoud 2013: 373). Thus, the focus of the analysis will not be on how or to what extent migrants can be a resource for development, but rather on revealing the realistic biases that characterize the Migration-Development Nexus, as well as on considering the consequences these biases have for the way migration and development are thought - and thus governed (Geiger and Pécoud 2013: 373).

⁴ The use of exclamation marks is intended to draw attention to the fact that the use of the word is not a neutral geographical attribution, but automatically implies certain attributions (i.e. modernity, superiority, progressiveness). In the following thesis, the term is always used critically.

⁵ In this thesis, the subject area ‘development’ will only be considered in the context of European migration policy. Aram Ziai (2010) e.g. further provides a critical overview of the development discourse.

Considering migration as a tool for development also creates an avenue for migration cooperation between states. Cooperation in the area of migration is of great importance for the EU. First, migration is seen as the result of powerful economic and demographic factors that are an inevitable consequence of globalization. At the same time, migrants, especially coming from ‘the South’, are perceived as a problem or often even as a threat to security and stability in Europe. If migration cannot be prevented, policy makers want to adopt some kind of migration management to better control movements and to maximize the benefits of migration for the receiving countries. However, in order to successfully *manage* migration, partner countries must pursue the same goals and cooperation will only take place if migration appears to be beneficial to both parties.

4.1. Securitization within EU Migration Policies

"We need to know who is crossing our borders. By November, we will propose an automated system to determine who will be allowed to travel to Europe. This way we will know who is travelling to Europe before they even get here." – President Jean-Claude Juncker, 2016 State of the Union Address

Within the two following subchapters, I would like to use the selected EC papers to examine in more detail how we can identify institutionalized securitization processes on the basis of securitizing practices, knowledge and actors rather than on speech acts. The Copenhagen School had already pointed out that there are cases where a security logic prevails even without a public discourse on justification (Buzan et al. 1998: 28). The context of the EU can be described as such a case because of its specific political and institutional characteristics. The EU is obviously not a state, which means that there is not necessarily one president who can deliver dramatic speeches on the subject of security, as it can often be identified in a national context (Léonard 2010: 236). Furthermore, in some cases a clear definition of a subject as a security threat is no longer necessary, since securitization has already been institutionalized (Buzan et al. 1998: 28). Looking at the development of the EU's common migration policy, which is embedded in broader social, political and professional processes that for decades have defined migration as a destabilizing or dangerous challenge for European societies, it is reasonable to assume that an institutionalization of securitization has already taken place (Huysmans 2000: 753). As Huysmans emphasizes, in an environment of economic and financial globalization and the resurgence of racist and xenophobic parties and movements, migration

was increasingly presented as a threat to public order, cultural identity and the stability of the domestic and labor market (Huysmans 2000: 752).

The production of a discourse that links migration and security can thus be seen as deeply embedded in the politics of *Western* democracies. It is not only populist parties, but also important sources of authority such as international organizations that have given these discourses the status of *truth* and are contributing to the construction of what security actually means. In this way, securitization also enters into various humanitarian discourses. Views on concrete political solutions may well differ, but there seems to be an agreement that migration is a challenge to internal and external security. This development can be observed at the international level as well as in many European countries where governments and a variety of political parties have been developing a rhetoric of insecurity (Bigo 2001: 122). This kind of consensus is reflected, for instance, in the view that border control is fundamental to national sovereignty, even if this is not reflected in border practice. This leads to a situation in which politicians are confronted with the limits of their effective power because they do not have control over migratory movements (Bigo 2001: 124). The national governments in the EU have considered border controls to be an outstanding security problem in connection with the establishment of the internal market. This reflects the immediate assumption that there must be a deep structural connection between increasing freedom of movement and growing security concerns (Huysmans 2006: 87). This assumption is the result of a politically successful application of the security discourse to the area of freedom of movement (Huysmans 2006: 90). This development can certainly also be traced back to the disrupt events and developments that have put the sense of belonging and the 'European identity' within the EU to a lasting test. In addition to the European financial and economic crisis, the loss of trust between the member states and in the EU institutions and the rise of populist and EU-critical parties, the 'migration and refugee crisis' in 2015-16 has put considerable pressure on the EU as a political entity. By focusing on border control and the instability of the immediate neighbourhood, securitization protects the unity of the EU from being called into question. The problem is thus no longer the identity and autonomy of the political unit, but the 'migration and refugee flows' that threaten it (Huysmans 2006: 49). In his article on the EU and the securitization of Migration, Huysmans draws a clear connection between the support of the political construction of migration as a security issue and the comprehensive politicization in which migrants are presented as a challenge for the protection of the 'European identity' and the 'European idea' (Huysmans 2000: 751). Bigo adds that the identification of 'the migrant' is also a consequence of the vagueness of the definition of collective political identities in Europe, which results in

Europeans being defined as a homogenous body only in relation to ‘third-country nationals’ or ‘migrants’ (Bigo 2002: 80).

It can be concluded, that within the EU the view that migration has become a political and social meta-theme and thus a phenomenon that is described as the cause of many problems has become firmly established. Different social actors use concepts and terms such as *migrant*, *foreigner*, *asylum seeker* and *refugee* to link a number of different political issues in their struggle for power, resources and knowledge (Huysmans 2000: 761f). Technological and institutional practices and instruments that frame migrants as a dangerous challenge to social stability play an important role in linking these different issues. They underline the rather technocratic, ordinary, less existential and less transparent character of the political framework of uncertainties compared to the political discourse, which depends on its visibility in the public sphere in order to shape opinions (Huysmans 2006: 92; Huysmans and Buonfino 2008: 782). Due to the major impact of institutionalized political frameworks and expert knowledge on the definition of a policy issue, a certain policy decision is not necessarily an instrumental response to a specific problem, or as Virginie Guiraudon, Research Professor at the Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics at Sciences Po in Paris, put it in her analysis of the migration policy domain at the European level in the 1990’s: “‘Solutions’ had been devised before ‘problems’ had been defined. The solution was police cooperation and reinforced controls.” (Guiraudon 2003: 268; emphasis i.o.).

In the following analysis of the selected EC papers, I am examining the ways in which practices of securitization may be identified within instruments of EU migration policy. If securitization is considered to result from specific practices and knowledge of certain security actors, the binary question: „Has migration been securitized at the EU level?” fails to recognize the complexity of both securitization processes and migration policy (Baele and Sterck 2014: 1124). Securitization is not a binary process, but can be of varying degrees of intensity or less intensity in different contexts. The large number of more or less legally binding documents that make up the EU’s migration policy illustrates this complex reality.

4.1.1. Securitizing Practices and Border Technologies

Securitizing Practices and Border Technologies, in connection to the theoretical framework of this thesis, incorporate unspectacular processes of technologically driven monitoring, risk management and precautionary control and governance of mobility (Huysmans 2011: 375).

These kinds of processes are less concerned with rhetorically declaring a territorial enemy, but rather with promoting certain techniques for managing security and mapping dangers as precisely as possible (Huysmans 2011: 375).

The EU has adopted a strong focus on the technologization of mobility processes, which is clearly reflected in the examined EC papers on migration policies: “(...) cooperation and information exchange can be developed further in the mutual interests of the EU and its partners. Technological development, notably biometrics and digital identification, can act as a practical tool to bring migration management services together.” (COM(2016) 385: 8). In order to embed these new technological opportunities in migration policy “(t)he Commission will provide (...) guidance to facilitate systematic fingerprinting (...) and will also explore how more biometric identifiers can be used through the Eurodac⁶ system (such as using facial recognition techniques through digital photos).” (COM (2015) 2040: 13). A further development and thus an increased use of biometric identification should also represent one of the “Key Actions within the chapter of common asylum policy” (COM (2015) 2040: 14).

Speaking of technologization does not refer to security technologies, as externally generated phenomena, influencing migration policy from outside. The reference to newer, more advanced technologies, as can be seen in the EC’s quotes, gives the impression that a new objective approach to the controversial issue of dealing with migration movements is being sought. It remains important to note that technological developments and information systems have also emerged in social contexts, are linked in social processes and in social relationships, and are embedded in larger social, economic, cultural and subjective structures of lived experience and of the prevailing system within which we exist and operate.

Furthermore, it is not a new insight that security tools based on the use of new technologies and the global profiling and surveillance of individuals can lead to practices that are incompatible with respect for EU-defined human rights and civil liberties - even if the EU repeatedly refers to its protection of fundamental rights. In debates on new technologies in the area of migration and border management, human rights and civil liberties are thus usually set against security concerns and necessary measures to defend internal security. Nevertheless, technology is generally presented as the means by which security can be better achieved. In order to examine the impact of these technological practices on the connection between migration and security, I would like to take a closer look at the following excerpt from the *European Agenda on Migration*, published by the EC in 2015:

⁶ Eurodac is an EU-wide biometric database containing fingerprints of asylum applicants and non-EU nationals for comparison between EU countries (Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 on Eurodac. Retrieved 19 April 2021 from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:230105_1)

“Managing our borders more efficiently also implies making better use of the opportunities offered by IT systems and technologies. The EU today has three large-scale IT systems, dealing with the administration of asylum (Eurodac), visa applications (the Visa Information System), and the sharing of information about persons or objects for which an alert has been created by the competent authorities (Schengen Information System). The full use of these systems can bring benefits to border management, as well as to enhance Europe's capacity to reduce irregular migration and return irregular migrants. A new phase would come with the ‘Smart Borders’ initiative to increase the efficiency of border crossings, facilitating crossings for the large majority of ‘bona fide’ third country travellers, whilst at the same time strengthening the fight against irregular migration by creating a record of all cross-border movements by third country nationals, fully respecting proportionality.” (COM(2015) 240: 11, emphasis added)

Technological development in migration and border management and the resulting acceleration and potential minimization of border controls at the common external borders is, according to the official narrative of the EC, aimed at facilitating the mobility of cross-border persons, who they describe as ‘bona fide’. Through this emphasis, the EC deliberately tries to move beyond deadlocked debates on police surveillance of migration or control of irregular migration and to refocus its attention on describing the EU as welcoming to the world and as an attractive destination also for travellers from non-EU countries. Migration control is based on a direct link between the determinants of race and religion and the possibilities of mobility, or the possibility of achieving a status called ‘bona fide traveller’. Within the documents, it is made to appear that surveillance and control at border entry have a universal validity for all non-EU states. This is not the case. There is a structural and institutionalised securitisation of travellers from Arab and predominantly Muslim countries, compared to travellers from North America or China. The fact that this inequality is not mentioned in the documents leads to the assumption that this underlying discrimination is increasing, rather than decreasing, as a result of expanded, technologised migration control.

The European Agenda on Migration cites three major European databases dealing with third-country nationals and their mobility to and within Europe. These are Eurodac, the Schengen Information System and the Visa Information System. Eurodac is the oldest large-scale

biometric information database in Europe. Its original purpose was to facilitate the application of the Dublin Regulation, which determines which Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application submitted in the EU (Tsianos and Kuster 2016: 6). In their analysis of the Eurodac system, Tsianos and Kuster (2016) point out that Eurodac is de facto a migration management tool, which as such aims to “politically control and exclude an irregular population within Europe through re-identifying irregular migrants within the Schengen zone.” (1). In this context, the authors emphasize the problematic situation when a procedure is set up for a specific purpose but then used for other purposes (Tsianos and Kuster 2016: 6). Big data processing within European data information systems is not only about increasing the amount of data, but also about a qualitative shift in the function of data from content to metadata and its use, such as cross-referencing data (Tsianos and Kuster 2016: 6). The processing of big data, however, usually refers to data traces left behind by users of social media and intelligent technological devices. In this example of the EU information sharing systems and the surveillance of the European digital border, the issue of data collection and processing has a very clear scope, namely effective and feasible border control and monitoring of migrants’ mobility practices in general (Tsianos and Kuster 2016: 10). Modern surveillance technologies that use biometrics in conjunction with databases, such as Eurodac, the Schengen Information System or the Visa Information System, are effective instruments for drastically restricting the freedom of movement of third-country nationals and, inevitably, the freedom aspirations of people who have had to flee their countries of origin.

The development and implementation of technological knowledge that is used in big data collection and processing is fundamentally political because each type of technological security practice embodies a specific image of what is considered a threat and, moreover, it provides an answer to the question of what is supposed to be done to combat it. The primary goal of border management as a security technology is to prevent unwanted or not yet wanted persons from entering the territory of the EU (Huysmans 2006: 96). This goal is underpinned by the ‘Smart Borders’ initiative to enable the filtering of people who cross borders through profiling. This supports the differentiation of EU citizens, for whom borders will always be open and fast as long as they accept to pre-register their own personal data in order to benefit from the fast access of technology (Bigo 2014: 218). So, on the one hand we have European citizens and people whose mobility is certainly appreciated and on the other hand we have the ‘suspects’ who are almost constantly under data surveillance and subject to numerous control measures. The largest group, however, are probably the people who are excluded by the profiling logic, and will likely never get the chance to register their data in the first place. By institutionalizing

profiling within migration policy, virtual profiles of ‘dangerous’ or ‘unwanted’ people are created, who must be prevented from entering the EU (Bigo 2014: 219). Individuals whose data closely match such profile data are then rejected from the outset, even before they are allowed access to the consulate, not because they have already been to the EU or have been expelled from the EU, but because people ‘like them’ with very similar profiles, meaning also having the same race or same religion, have done so (Bigo 2014: 219). Within the logic of the ‘intelligent’ biometric border, there is a danger that ‘the migrant’ will be perceived as a potential threat to internal security in the acute and absolute sense, especially if he or she has no papers (Amoore 2006: 348; Bigo 2014: 219). This is also where the main technique of securitization can be found, namely to transform structural difficulties and transformations into elements that make it possible to blame certain groups even before they have actually done anything, simply by categorizing them, anticipating risk profiles from previous trends and projecting them by generalizing them to the potential behavior of each individual in relation to the risk category (Bigo 2002: 81).

Technological methods for virtual migration and border management not only control freedom of movement, but also create conceptual barriers that reproduce the dynamics of territorial power. An important system in which this power manifests itself is the visa regime. The Schengen visa and the standardization of the visa procedure according to a profiling and categorization system based on the definition of risk groups according to nationality and status criteria reinforce this logic of systematic suspicion regarding the migrating person (El Qadim 2017: 290). Although visa restrictions are imposed on specific countries, a person’s social, financial or political status is a decisive criterion in determining entry and exit and the anticipated risk profile. There are countries that have the possibility to choose who should enter and who shouldn’t, as well as to define what are considered legitimate reasons for crossing the border. This creates specific hierarchies when it comes to the freedom of mobility. These hierarchies are based on a person’s race and religion, but are also linked to a person’s social and financial status. Freedom of mobility for people originating from countries that are similar to European countries, be it politically or religiously, is very different from the freedom of mobility for people whose country of origin differs socially, religiously or politically from the ‘EU norm’. The negative hierarchisation of Arab countries in terms of migration policy is deeply rooted in political decision-making, as has to be taken into account in the specific case of Jordan. In addition to a person’s race, nationality, origin or religion, in a globally operating EU, a person’s reason for entering the EU and, closely related to this, his or her financial background also play a decisive role in determining whether that person is treated as a risky or

a bona fide traveller. Although this is not a new phenomenon, modern border control systems make a significant contribution to the consolidation of this power imbalance.

The need to improve border control through technological practices, within the official EC papers, is often reinforced by reference to criminal networks of smugglers of migrants. The clear dominance of a particular security-oriented policy preference becomes apparent as the arrival of migrants is immediately (on the first pages of the papers) set in reference to criminal networks. Both human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants are generally understood as ‘organized crime’, which leads to a situation where the field of possible measures to control migration is being extended to include the fight against crime (Schwartz 2011: 130). *The Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration* opens its first paragraph with a reference to the “unprecedented migratory flows, driven by geopolitical and economic factors that (...) are fuelled by unscrupulous smugglers who seek to benefit from the desperation of the vulnerable.” (COM(2016) 385: 2). Therefore: “The criminal networks which exploit vulnerable migrants must be targeted.” (COM(2015)240: 3) and in order to do so “(t)he High Representative (HR/VP) has already presented options for possible Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to systematically identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers.” (COM(2015)240: 3). If the ultimate objective is an increasingly controlled mobility in which identities are continuously monitored, smuggled migrants in particular represent an unpredictable and unidentifiable category that poses a ‘threat’ to the EU. The catastrophic boat accidents in the Mediterranean as well as the conditions in the detention camps at the European border, however, are putting the EU under pressure and calling for humanitarian solutions. The response to intensify the ‘fight’ against smuggling emphasizes the further criminalization and punishment of the so-called smuggler networks instead of ensuring the protection of migrants, for whom human smugglers often remain the only way to find some kind of protection. In contrast to the portrayal of human smuggling as overarching distinct criminal networks, most scientific contributions on this topic indicate that the market for human smuggling services is hardly ever structured by hierarchical mafia-type organized crime groups (Van Liempt 2016: 6; see also Neske 2006; İçduygu and Toktas 2002).

Considering the continuous focus on criminal networks of smugglers in official EU documents, the vicious circle in which the EU is caught becomes particularly clear. The increasing number of deaths at the borders leads to calls to combat or fight smuggling and to increase border patrols, forcing migrants to use even more dangerous and longer routes, which leads to more

people being injured or dying when crossing the border, leading to public outrage and calling for even stricter border controls. The European policy of focusing on smugglers and blaming them for the deaths in the Mediterranean creates a distraction from the fact that smuggling is first and foremost a reaction to the militarisation of border controls and not caused by irregular migration.

In a certain sense, these are indeed discursive associations between migration and criminal smuggling networks, but I do not see the focus on the fight against criminal networks of smugglers at the borders as pure rhetoric, but as an important security practice. If we want to examine securitizing practices, Huysmans emphasizes, we must focus our attention on the process of “technological, institutional and linguistic intertwining” of political issues (Huysmans 2006: 150). As the technologization of mobility and migration illustrates, border control has become a huge industry, an industry that regards the solution to the ‘migration and refugee crisis’ primarily in the digitalization of border control and the fight against migrant smugglers (Van Liempt 2016: 7).

The focus on criminal smuggling networks has concrete political implications, what becomes evident in the growth of the border control industry, but it also leads to security techniques and social practices that are less direct or visible. It creates problems for migrants who have arrived in Europe through the services of smugglers and for whom it then often no longer matters whether they are legally entitled to e.g., apply for asylum. Migrants who agree to paying human smugglers and who do not attempt to reach Europe through ‘legal routes’ are guilty until proven innocent. As long as no greater focus is placed on these ‘legal routes’ and as long as violent conflicts continue in the European neighbourhood, people will continue to try to reach Europe using these means. Politicians who argue that increased border controls could stop this are selling an illusion. This is where the question of power within the border controls becomes very clear. Assuming smugglers being the ones who created the opportunities for migration means they undermine the power of nation states as well as the EU’s to decide who can and cannot cross the borders. Human smugglers, therefore, have become “the literal embodiment of a failing border regime” (Van Liempt 2016: 7).

4.1.2. Securitizing Knowledge and Frontex

In the ongoing public debate on the nexus between migration and security issues, the focus is often directed at critical speeches or actions of a few actors, such as extreme right-wing parties in some European nation states. Yet, as already highlighted, the process of securitization has

become much more subtle and has involved a wide variety of actors and security experts (Huysmans 2000, 2006; Bigo 2002, 2014). The legitimacy and authority of security actors derives from the production of a specific type of professional security knowledge, which collects data, creates categories of analysis and is particularly targeted at specific populations (Balzacq et al. 2010: 10; Huysmans 2002: 57). In this context, it is important to look closely at who has the power to advocate the definition of a threat and political problems, and what knowledge and professional experience lies behind this definition.

When examining the relevant EC papers on migration policy, the significance of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), as a crucial EU agency that has been playing an increasingly important role in managing migration since its foundation in 2004, is emphasized strongly. In all four EC papers analyzed, Frontex is assigned a fundamental role in the exchange of information and expertise on migration and mobility issues. This fundamental role is set to expand even further in the future. The most recently published *Pact on Migration and Asylum* also stresses that “(s)ystems of quality control related to management of migration, such as (...) the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) vulnerability assessments, will play a key role” in the new asylum and migration management regulation (COM(2020) 609: 6). Frontex’s main task is to protect border security in Europe, by coordinating and supporting the border security efforts of EU member states, partly through joint operations at sea. The key function here is to control and combat crime in connection with the European border areas. “Frontex (...) will also develop profiles of vessels which could be used by smugglers, following patterns to identify potential vessels and monitor their movements.” (COM(2015) 240: 4). “In the Aegean Sea and the Central Mediterranean, Frontex cooperates with NATO and Operation EUNAVFORMED Sophia, bringing together their different roles in terms of managing migration, gathering intelligence on smuggling, exchanging information, coordinating patrols, and working together on disembarkations. This should be taken one step further in the Central Mediterranean by sharing assets in real time and establishing a common risk assessment on threats to maritime security and border security (...)” (COM(2016)385: 4). Over the years, the role of Frontex in managing migration, e.g., in the collection of relevant data, the exchange of information or in the area of repatriation of migrants to origin countries, has steadily increased: “On the basis of the ongoing evaluation to be concluded this year, the Commission will propose to amend the Frontex legal basis to strengthen its role on return.” (COM(2015) 240: 10). The growing relevance of Frontex will be expanded not only in the field of repatriation of migrants, but is also reflected in its active role in the militarization of EU border security. Some of the actors involved in Frontex joint operations have a (semi)military status in their country, such

as the Guardia Civil in Spain or the Guardia di Finanza in Italy (Lutterbeck 2006: 65). Given the traditional role of the military in managing security issues, it is likely that these joint operations, which aim to contain migration flows, will also play a significant role in the (semi)militarization of border controls and thus in the securitization of migration flows (Léonard 2010: 241). Frontex is e.g., cooperating with Operation European Union Naval Force Mediterranean, which was launched as a result of the shipwrecks of Libyan migrants in April 2015, and has been renamed Operation Sophia a short time later. Operation Sophia was the first naval military mission and aimed to combat the business model of migrant smuggling and human trafficking in the Mediterranean (Bevilacqua 2017: 16). Operation Sophia ended in March 2020 and limited its last year to air surveillance, which leads to the assumption that a situation of encountering refugee boats, which none of the EU member states will eventually want to accept, should be avoided.

Similarly, operations conducted directly by Frontex prioritize border surveillance over search and rescue operations. The Frontex Operation Triton, which was to replace the Mare Nostrum sea rescue mission in 2014 remained, contrary to the vision of the EC, who was hoping that Triton could contribute to Frontex fulfilling “(...) its dual role of coordinating operational border support to member states under pressure, and helping to save lives of migrants at sea.” (COM(2015) 240: 3), in practice primarily a border control operation, while rescue operations remained a secondary task of the mission (see Cusumano 2019). With Operation Themis, which finally replaced Operation Triton in February 2018, the link between migration and the associated security concerns is further strengthened. Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri also emphasizes the security focus of Themis and the threats that migration may pose to internal European security: “Operation Themis will better reflect the changing patterns of migration, as well as cross border crime. Frontex will also assist Italy in tracking down criminal activities, such as drug smuggling across the Adriatic. (...) We need to be better equipped to prevent criminal groups that try to enter the EU undetected. This is crucial for the internal security of the European Union” (Leggeri 2018).

As Frontex is often the first European actor to deal with migrants trying to reach Europe by sea, the agent’s underlying knowledge about migration and security is of fundamental importance. As Julien Jeandesboz (2017) describes in his analysis of EUROSUR⁷ and the European border

⁷ The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) establishes a common framework for the exchange of information and for the cooperation between EU States and Frontex to improve situational awareness and to increase reaction capability at the external borders for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating irregular immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants (Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013. Retrieved 19 April 2021 from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3A230103_1).

police, knowledge inevitable becomes social power (3). This power includes the definition of policing in a way that territorial demarcation takes a diminished role behind data processing and the handling of information flows (Jeandesboz 2017: 3). Frontex plays a fundamental role in collecting, analyzing and providing knowledge. The joint border control operations coordinated by Frontex are considered ‘intelligence-led’, as they are based on Frontex’s internal risk analyses. Frontex risk analyses have developed into a separate category of knowledge about the EU’s external borders, which has become an important source of information not only for statistical purposes but also for real political decision-making (Jeandesboz 2017: 13). Frontex’s knowledge producing processes also influence migration policy indirectly through the training of migration and border control officials in member states and partnering countries. Frontex develops training curricula together with member states, but also provides its own training to ensure that border guards are adequately prepared in the event of a joint operation. The knowledge behind and the content of training activities organized by Frontex, e.g., on the detection of false documents and on-air force cooperation in surveillance operations, reinforces the assumption that the external borders of EU member states are in fact threatened by irregular migration and mobility patterns and need to be protected by the use of developed technological means (Léonard 2010: 241). The training programmes are managed by actors who have from the very beginning the highest level of specific security-focused expertise and have already specialized in tackling particular types of border threats, which also leads to a general increase in the perception that the EU’s external borders are under serious threat (Léonard 2010: 242). According to the EC documents, Frontex training programmes and exchange of knowledge should also play an increasing role in migration cooperation with neighbouring countries. „Proactive engagement with partners in the neighbourhood in the field of border management is necessary to better manage migratory pressures. Together with interested partner countries, the EU will further intensify work on information exchange, administrative capacity and operational and technical cooperation. This could be done via training, research, capacity building projects and pilot projects with partner countries, notably working through relevant EU Agencies, including FRONTEX (...)” (JOIN(2015) 50: 17). Within the framework of cooperation with third countries, the EU is also reformulating the concept of the border region through its policy of externalizing borders. The border is not a mere demarcation of territory, but extends to third countries in the form of bilateral agreements, through, in this case, Frontex (Akkerman 2018: 31). In order to manage migration flows, “(t)he capability of FRONTEX to work in partnership with non-EU authorities should be fully utilised” (COM(2011) 743: 19). The documents show a strong emphasis towards cooperation with Frontex, while Frontex places

places its priority on police and security operations. Knowledge on the EU external borders based on Frontex risk analyses providing information for statistical purposes as well as for effective decision-making will be integrated into the EU mobility partnership with Jordan. Such an integration may lead to a situation where partnering third countries have to establish policies based on the needs and requirements of the EU, such as accepting the return of migrants, tightening border controls or training their security forces and border guards according to the expertise of Frontex officials.

The increasing role that Frontex is to continue to play in the future is also demonstrated by the establishment of the first European uniformed service with its own border guards on the ground. This will provide Frontex with the means to build up its own pool of equipment and thus contribute to the development of integrated border management in Europe (Frontex 2019). Frontex border guards carry a service weapon and have executive powers, which means that the officers will be able to carry out tasks such as checking the identity and nationality of a person, allowing or refusing entry into the EU and patrolling between border crossing points (Frontex 2019). The know-how and knowledge that Frontex requires for its Frontex Border Guard Officials has its roots in police and military expertise. As it says on the Border Guard recruitment page: “We seek applicants with experience in the law enforcement field (such as police, customs, border and coast guard), emergency services, civilian crisis management, military or equivalent (active and retired)” (Frontex 2019). If one considers the various experts and actors within migration policy, the politics of knowledge and the respective views on migration policy issues also differ. Migrants can be interpreted in different ways: as an economic resource, as a threat to social stability, as equal human rights holders, as a real or perceived threat to society, etcetera. These interpretations, which play an important role in the current debate on migration and asylum policy, are not of a purely academic nature, but arise in a struggle over which interpretation and thus which type of knowledge should be incorporated into migration policy (Huysmans 2006: 53).

In countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Iceland and Norway, the police are the main or only competent authority for border protection (Carrera and Hernanz 2015: 73). The police are consequently at the very core of current border control practices in Schengen Europe. It is therefore not surprising that the linking of border controls with the police since the establishment of the Schengen area has led to an underlying assumption in the EU border system that the movement of non-EU citizens is a suspicious activity linked to criminality

(Carrera and Hernanz 2015: 73). This policing approach has put certain individuals, especially those referred to as ‘irregular migrants’, at the center of discourses on internal insecurity (Carrera and Hernanz 2015: 73). It affects the way migration and mobility are problematized when experts with a background in the police force play a prominent role in their regulation. For the police it is part of their job to impart security knowledge. They have a professional disposition to represent and categorize a political concern in a security discourse and to propose security measures to deal with it (Huysmans 2000: 757).

The last chapters have dealt with the securitizing processes in the European migration policy and have shown, that underlying security practices and knowledge structures still play an elementary role in official EU documents and the EU’s migration policy framework. Since the EU has called for a stronger focus on the development perspective of migration in its Global Approach and more particularly in its policy instrument of MPs, the next step will be to examine the understanding of the link between migration and development on which this endeavor is based on.

4.2. The Migration – Development Nexus in EU Discourses

“Development is, from this moment on, the magic word with which we will solve all the mysteries that surround us or, at least, that which will guide us towards their solution” –
Ernst Haeckel in Sachs 2010

Especially following the ‘migration and refugee crisis’ 2015/16, within the EU voices have grown louder around the debate to address the ‘root causes’ of migration through development assistance (Angenendt et al. 2016: 29). This discourse is often based on the widespread idea that less development leads to more migration and that income inequality constitutes an important push factor on its own. The linkage and integration of the two policy areas has met with much approval in European countries, as many donor countries are looking for ways to curb migration and consider the nexus an opportunity to make development funds serve the interest of migration control. As development, however, does not automatically and especially not directly lead to a reduction in migration (Tocci 2018), it constitutes a particularly important task to make the supposed benefits of the Migration-Development Nexus tangible for all parties involved.

Behind the optimism regarding the Migration-Development Nexus there lies the hope of political institutions, such as the EC of the EU, that long-term economic growth, supported in

part by financial, knowledge and social transfers, will reduce migratory pressure in origin countries (Faist 2009: 40). The core of the relationship between migration and development was summarized in the academic field by Dimitri Papademetriou and Philip Martin in the early 1990s as the concept of the ‘three R’s’: recruitment, remittances, and return (Papademetriou and Martin 1991: 2). These ‘three R’s’, which are supposed to enable a so-called triple-win situation for sending and receiving countries, as well as for the migrating person, are also reflected in the EC papers examined. In the area of recruiting migrant workers, receiving countries benefit from migration by increasing the number of employable workers and professionals. Economic development and growth within the EU require a certain type of labor migration, which involves cheap labor in the low-wage sector as well as highly skilled professionals to counteract skills shortages. Therefore, almost all industrialized countries have made it easier for foreign highly skilled workers to enter the country (Martin 2006: 15).

“Europe is competing with other economies to *attract workers with the skills it needs*. Changes in the skills required by the EU between 2012 and 2025 are expected to show a sharp increase in the share of jobs employing higher-educated labour (by 23%). Shortages have already been seen in key sectors such as science, technology, engineering and healthcare. *Europe needs to build up its own skills base and equip people for inclusion in today's labour market.* (...)

The EU is also facing a series of *long-term economic and demographic challenges*. Its population is ageing, while its economy is *increasingly dependent on highly-skilled jobs*. Furthermore, without migration the EU's working age population will decline by 17.5 million in the next decade. Migration will increasingly be an important way to enhance the *sustainability of our welfare system and to ensure sustainable growth of the EU economy*” (COM(2015) 240: 14; emphasis added).

The EC emphasizes the opportunities that migration and mobility offer to overcome the economic and demographic difficulties facing all countries of the EU. The first ‘win’ thus affects the EU and its member states themselves, which try to support a certain type of labor migration through special recruitment strategies and an active selection of migrant workers who are most likely to be successfully integrated in EU labor markets.

Another element of the Migration-Development Nexus is the belief that migration and mobility cause the transfer of financial and social remittances (Glick Schiller and Faist 2009: 6). Financial remittances are international financial transfers from individuals to individuals, for example from migrants to their family members at home. Remittances are considered to be the

most stable source of external financing and therefore, provide important social insurance in many countries affected by economic and political crises (Kapur 2004: 1). The resurgence of the migration and development optimism in European migration policies can certainly be attributed in large part to the remittance boom. “The EU is widely recognised as a leading stakeholder at international level with regard to facilitating cheaper and more secure private remittance flows to developing countries while adding to their impact on development” (COM(2011) 743: 23).

To varying degrees not only the EU but also other international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) view remittances as an essential instrument for the development of ‘underdeveloped’ countries (Delgado Wise et al 2013: 430). Remittances flows to low and middle-income countries have reached a record high with approximately USD 554 billion in 2019 (World Bank 2020a). Remittances have thus three times exceeded official development assistance (Jordan, for example, has in 2019 received USD 4.5 billion in remittances, which accounts for 10.2% of the country’s GDP (World Bank 2020b)). Remittances are considered a miracle cure for promoting economic development since they may be used not only for family maintenance and private consumption, but also for investment purposes. Remittances therefore, seem to strike all the right cognitive chords. As previously mentioned, the Migration-Development Nexus has a strong ideological dimension. Kapur (2004) points in his G-24 research paper to the fact that the concept of remittances can be very well integrated into a communitarian approach, which illustrates the principle of self-help, resilience and self-reliance (7). „Immigrants, rather than governments, then become the biggest provider of ‘foreign aid’” (Kapur 2004: 7, emphasis i.o.). In addition to financial remittances, social remittances and knowledge transfer are considered an important aspect of the Migration-Development Nexus. The discourse here deals both with individuals who remit resources and with settled migrants in the diaspora who participate in collective financial transfers to selected development projects and facilitate social remittances, such as the transfer of human rights, gender justice and democracy from ‘North’ to ‘South’ (Glick Schiller and Faist 2009: 5).

Return and hence a form of temporary migration is regarded as a main prerequisite for avoiding the process known as brain drain, which is caused by a permanent outflow of highly skilled workers. The developmental effect of return is released through money and skills accumulated by the migrant in the destination country and invested in the home country. Rather than to the concept of return, within the context of linking migration and development, the EC refers to concepts such as ‘circular migration’ or ‘circular mobility’. ‘Circular migration’ can be defined

as a form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries (COM(2007) 248: 8). According to the EC, “(c)ircular migration could create an opportunity for persons residing in a third country to come to the EU temporarily for work, study, training or a combination of these, on the condition that, at the end of the period for which they were granted entry, they must re-establish their main residence and their main activity in their country of origin. Circularity can be enhanced by giving migrants the possibility, once they have returned, to retain some form of privileged mobility to and from the Member States where they were formerly residing, for example in the form of simplified admission/re-entry procedures” (COM(2007) 248: 8). “Circular mobility has been encouraged by a number of national and EU legislative measures and by specific projects” (COM(2011) 743: 24). In this regard the EU intends “(...) to provide capital to promote ‘brain circulation’” (JOIN(2015) 50: 16) in order to “support migrants returning to their countries of origin after their stay in the EU, so they can reintegrate and contribute, with the acquired skills and knowledge, to local economic and societal development.” (JOIN(2015) 50: 16). Return policy is an elementary part of European migration policy, whether through readmission agreements or, as is emphasized here in the above quotes from the EC, through specific projects to integrate former migrants into the domestic economy and society. Readmission agreements are agreements between the EU and/or an EU member state with a third country that provide for ‘rapid and effective procedures’ for the identification and ‘safe and orderly return’ of persons who do not, or no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry or presence or residence on the territories of the third country or one of the member states of the European Union (EMN n.d.). To counteract a permanent loss of ‘human capital’, the concept of temporary migration or ‘circular mobility’ is presented as a migration policy measure. The legal limitation of residence can accordingly be conceived as a development policy measure and return migration can in the broadest sense be understood as a means of development aid (Schwartz 2011: 120).

4.2.1. Economic Development and Migration Management

It is not a surprising observation that the conceptualization of the Migration-Development Nexus reflects the prevailing development paradigms, with economics being the leading and most prominent discipline in the conceptualization of development (Faist 2009: 41).

This understanding is based on the fundamental assumption that development can be initiated and promoted directly or indirectly by external actors or a specific type of policy. Some developing countries are experiencing ‘development’ in the mainstream sense, which may well result in an excessive improvement in their living conditions (Geiger and Pécoud 2013: 371).

However, as Geiger and Pécoud (2013) have pointed out, “(...) even if there are countless reasons that support the desirability of such ‘development’, this does not necessarily reflect the ability of external actors (such as developed states, International Organisations, non-Governmental Organisations, or private foundations) to successfully trigger ‘development’” (371, emphasis i.o.). The concept of development and the primarily economic and growth-oriented interpretation of development goals have been the subject of considerable criticism inspired by theories such as postcolonialism, Marxism and structuralism. To a certain extent, the introduction of migration into development thinking addresses some of these criticisms and the perceived shortcomings of earlier paradigms (Geiger and Pécoud 2013: 371). For example, the ‘civil society’, and more precisely migrant communities and social initiatives, play an increasingly important role in promoting development ‘from below’, without displacing the role of the ‘market’ (Geiger and Pécoud 2013: 371; Faist 2008: 23). Moreover, official development aid is intended much more to simply leverage private financing so that investments are made in developing countries to promote economic growth and job creation. Not only are issues of migration and economic development firmly connected, but also the policy area of labor migration is linked to what is referred to as combating irregular migration. “Without well-functioning border controls, lower levels of irregular migration and an effective return policy, it will not be possible for the EU to offer more opportunities for legal migration and mobility” (COM(2011) 743: 5). The underlying assumption is that increased legal migration channels will reduce illegal migration and a high number of irregular migration has a negative impact on labor migration. Labor migration programs that were once associated only with the needs of the labor market thus become part of migration control strategies (see Walters 2010).

The consideration of development from predominantly economic points of view, as well as the link between migration and (economic) development is manifested in the idea of migration management, which is a key element of EU migration policy. “(...) In deploying existing financial instruments, special attention will be given to projects aimed at *improving migration management* and prioritizing those projects enabling third countries to fulfil their obligations to readmit their nationals” (COM(2016) 385: 9, emphasis added). Here one area of the comprehensive approach to migration management becomes clear, namely cooperation with partners outside the EU. Behind this approach lies the commonly accepted goal of ‘tackling the root causes of migration’. The underlying recognition is that although the “link between development and migration are much broader and more complex than the policy area addressed so far” (COM(2011)743: 24) and thus migration may not automatically lead to positive

development successes in both the sending and receiving countries, if managed correctly, migration has the potential to have a positive impact on a country's growth and development. Migration management implies both a 'regulated openness' to economically necessary and beneficial migration and the retention of restrictions regarding undesired migration and irregular migratory pressure (Geiger and Pécoud 2010: 3). This way, an attempt is made to combine restrictive and liberal positions on the topic of migration in a 'rational way'. This is based on the realization that migration cannot be completely prevented, nor is there any economic or demographic desirability in preventing it. A comprehensive approach to migration management therefore means not only that 'positive' measures of migration control seem possible, but also that they make a restrictive migration policy a precondition (Schwartz 2011: 134). The long-term goal is a comprehensive and internationally closely coordinated regulation of migration. The advantages and disadvantages of migration are measured in terms of the assumed interests of sovereign nation-states and their populations. The unit of measurement is economically defined benefit. Irregular Migration as a social movement that actively circumvents state controls and laws in the search for a better life is "the antithesis of the self-interested and power-based policy of migration control" (Georgi 2007: 6).

In liberal democracies, there are various political, legal, financial and ethical constraints that limit the ability of political decision-makers to regulate mobility within and across borders. Therefore, European governments have been trying to stop incoming migrants *before* they reach Europe and ultimately their final destination (Zaiotti 2016: 4). The EU has made greater efforts to integrate sending and transit countries into properly managing and controlling migration. In partnerships consisting of a combination of threats and incentive measures, the EU is trying to convince both sending and transit countries to fight irregular migration on their territory. "The EU and its member states should combine their respective *instruments and tools to agree compacts with third countries in order to better manage migration*. This means, for each partner country, the development of a mix of positive and negative incentives, the use of which should be governed by a clear understanding that the overall relationship between the EU and that country will be guided in particular by the *ability and willingness of the country to cooperate on migration management*" (COM(2016) 385: 17; emphasis added).

In this last sentence, it is emphasized once again that the entire relationship, and especially cooperation on development issues, depends on the commitment of the partner country to contribute towards the reduction of migration to Europe. The best way to implement this commitment is then mainly defined by the EU within the framework of migration management.

The externalization of border controls and migration management has not only expanded geographically, but has also become more professional in its formulation and implementation. There is an increased emphasis on management techniques borrowed from the security sector, such as risk analysis. This development is also reflected in the large number of intelligent border technologies discussed above, which have been introduced or improved in this area in order to increase the reliability and efficiency of control measures at national borders (Zaiotti 2016: 6).

The use of the term ‘management’ instead of, ‘politics of migration’ reinforces the technocratic character of many measures in migration policies and has in itself depoliticizing effects. Accordingly, the decision on a particular policy would not result from political opinions, but from ‘technical’ considerations, based on accurate data and expertise, as well as informal decision-making processes on the most appropriate and successful way to deal with migration related issues (Geiger and Pécoud 2010: 11). This approach makes it quite difficult to question these decisions (Geiger and Pécoud 2010: 11). Migration and development-related issues in particular conceal extremely heterogeneous phenomena that often have much to do with international and historic power relations, privileges and exclusion. These are covered up by the use of seemingly ‘neutral’ terms. It is implied that migration and development issues can be solved by appropriate technical, non-political interventions. Terminology plays a very important role, the use of the ‘management’ term emphasizes that there actually are policies that work and policies that do not work (Geiger and Pécoud 2010: 11).

As mentioned in chapter 4.1.1, EU policies addressing the link between security concerns and migration focus on a kind of migration management that is based on regulating the entry and exit of different categories of migrants. Here, the increasingly important role of technocratization and technologization becomes apparent. Technocratic and technological practices are ought to support the EU’s efforts to regulate and control migration effectively. Within the framework of a holistic pursuit of development and migration goals, they should also make a contribution through the instrument of MPs “(...) to ensure that the conditions necessary for well-managed migration and mobility in a secure environment are in place” (COM(2011) 743: 11). The aim of the Migration-Development Nexus is to have development goals taken into account in the migration policies of the EU and partner countries. At the same time, the migration dimension should play an equally important role in development strategies (COM(2011) 743: 23). The risk the EU is facing however, is that development is just another means towards reaching the goals of migration management and, ultimately, migration control. Against this background, it is particularly interesting to consider who should take responsibility

for making migration work for development. In the following chapter, I will regard the role that diaspora communities and migrants themselves are given in realizing the benefits of the Migration-Development Nexus.

4.2.2. Development as Individual Responsibility

In the public debate, the link between international migration and development mainly refers to circular migration or circular mobility concepts and the potential of financial, social capital and skills transfers by migrants that can be enabled from it. This optimistic view of migration joins a development discourse that Mark Duffield (2010) identifies as the “liberal way of development” (61). An essential characteristic of this discourse is that development should be based on the adaptive personal responsibility of individuals and households (Duffield 2010: 61). In the broadly known and accepted concept of liberalism, the individual has the potential to become an empowered citizen and, together with other rational, self-interested citizens, can contribute to directing the community toward peace and economic success (Mac Ginty 2012: 25). In transferring this view to the field of migration, migrants are thus portrayed as responsible for development in their countries of origin. In this context, their responsibility is not only to provide financial remittances, but also to collect and use new ideas and entrepreneurial skills, as well as to provide access to transnational social networks (COM(2011) 743: 6).

“Evidence shows that migrant households can increase their well-being thanks to opportunities abroad to acquire new skills and work experience. Migration and mobility can also foster more foreign direct investment and trade links, especially *bearing in mind the role of diaspora communities*. It is thus in the interest of the migrant source countries, as well as of the destination countries, to work together to *ensure maximum development benefits from the transfer of remittances, know-how and innovations*.” (COM(2011) 743: 6; emphasis added).

The expectation for migrants thus refers not only to economic support, but also to the transfer of useful knowledge and social contacts that they supposedly acquired in the destination country. Giving migrants the power or responsibility to overcome structural deficiencies that hinder development highlights the exaggerated priority given to the migrating person or migration communities over structures and policies in addressing critical developmental factors. Much of the European debate on the link between migration and development as well as the related policies is limited to the economic and financial sphere and promotes a utilitarian

view of specific subgroups (such as diasporas or other local development actors) as a resource to be exploited. An efficient and successful integration into the labor market being “the key to ensuring that both migrants and receiving societies can benefit from the potential of migration, including via *stronger diaspora communities and migrant entrepreneurs* (COM(2011) 743: 13; emphasis added). Integration into the labor market and debureaucratization and facilitation of job opportunities for migrants is a very important area of European migration policy. This certainly includes support for entrepreneurship, but it does say something when the possibility of self-employment is emphasized as a way into the labor market. In turn, it stresses personal responsibility and the supposed opportunities of the market that are available to everyone.

The incomparable emphasis on the potential of remittances, which is regarded as elementary for development in the country of origin, illustrates the responsibility that is attributed to migrants in the realization of the Migration-Development Nexus. One of the main reasons for the great hope and expectation in financial remittances is that they are likely to be more stable than private capital flows and less vulnerable to changing economic cycles. It is quite plausible that remittances have a very strong regularity and reliability due to the family ties that motivate them. Nevertheless, it remains important to note that not only are migrants not immune to economic change, but they are also usually very much at risk because of their marginal social and economic position. Since they often work in economic niches or in some cases informally without having the benefit of a social safety net, they often experience the effects of economic downturns even harsher. The discourse on development opportunities through remittances usually does not sufficiently recognize the vulnerability of migrants in their working environment (Isotalo 2009: 75). The broader social forces and institutional power structures that created the structural adjustment and the neoliberal environment and its instabilities usually no longer find a place in the analytical framework. Duffield (2010) also points out, that it is not surprising that global social inequalities are often answered with reference to the historical, liberal assumption that people are essentially dependent on themselves for their basic economic and welfare needs (65). The informal livelihoods of family and community are then considered a substitute, so to speak, for the high level of formal social protection to which people from European welfare states have access to (Duffield 2010: 65). If diaspora actors are expected to provide crucial assistance, be it financial, infrastructural or technical, they are expected to perform a task that is normally carried out by governments. As a result, they are to some extent accountable to and bound by the citizens of their country of origin. Responsibilities in the event of failure are blurred when the development of a country is attributed to migrants and not to politicians or fundamental structures. However, as Françoise de Bel-Air points out in his

CARIM Research Report on the *Politics and the Migration-Development Nexus between the EU and the Arab SEM Countries*: “Sharing or conversely, ‘diluting’ responsibilities actually fits current policies run by the EU, as exemplified in the process of border control and the containment of illegal migrants and refugee flows’ externalization” (De Bel-Air 2011: 19).

Another point that is closely related to liberal individualism and has received much attention in both theoretical and political discourse is the focus on what is called *strengthening resilience*.

“The EU has a long-standing tradition of *support to refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities* (...). But the scale of global needs has put the onus on being more targeted and effective, with investment which has a real impact on migration, tailored to the needs and circumstances of each country. The Commission has set out its strategic vision on how EU external action can *foster the resilience and self-reliance of forcibly displaced people as close as possible to refugees’ country of origin*.” (COM(2016) 385: 4; emphasis added).

The concept of resilience supports the idea of the subject as autonomous and responsible and thus serves as a tool for creating adaptable individuals and also societies who are not only able to adapt to situations of radical insecurity, but are also able to effectively use these situations to their advantage. Reflection on resilience fits into a social ontology that helps to move from concerns about the outside world and external events to concerns about one’s own adaptability, risk assessment and responsible decision-making (Joseph 2013: 40). The EC’s reference to the resilience and self-reliance of people in desperate situations, who should stay as close as possible to their country of origin if they have to leave their home country, demonstrates a form of European foreign policy that operates from a distance and lowers expectations of what the EU is prepared to do. Policies that aim to improve the autonomy of migrants and strive for partnerships that promote real empowerment and free choice and generally move away from top-down aid certainly have great potential. What is problematic is a form of governance that controls from a distance through the use of power, without helping to create an environment in which free decisions can actually be made and holistic development can take place. A balanced view of the Migration-Development Nexus must not focus solely on economic factors and individual capabilities, but must also take into account the structural characteristics on a micro-level as well as on a macro-level, underlying political and economic power dynamics within and between states.

By returning to the Migration-Development Nexus, different policy fields, such as migration, mobility, development, labor market, economy and security are being influenced and put in relation to each other in a way that supports the control policies of the EU. Despite this, or perhaps precisely because development as an object of discourse remains diffuse, different thematizations and prioritizations become possible. It becomes evident, however, that in order to derive developmental benefits from migration, the EU emphasizes on circular or short-term mobility opportunities. For this reason, the following chapter will consider this understanding of mobility, in terms of the discursive, linguistic use of the term as well as of the realpolitik meaning of mobility in the Schengen-European visa regime.

4.3. The Concept of Mobility and Social Inequality in the European Visa Regime

Having discussed the concepts of security, development and migration and their interconnectedness, I will now return more specifically to the use of the terminology or concept of mobility within the policy instrument of the MP. In doing so, it is assumed that the EC does not randomly choose the term mobility over migration, when introducing a new policy instrument in the context of migration cooperation, but that this term also goes hand in hand with certain associations.

According to the Oxford Learner's Dictionary mobility is defined as 1) "the ability to move easily from one place, social class, or job to another" as well as 2) "the ability to move or travel around easily" (Oxford University Press n.d.). Considering the securitizing practices in terms of the evolution of modern surveillance technologies and the implementation of technological knowledge that is used in big data collection and processing prior to and upon entry into the EU, the fundamental question arises as to whether this understanding of mobility has thus found its way into the EU MP, to which conditions it is linked, and to whom this understanding of mobility applies. For this purpose, the following chapter will first examine the criteria the EC applies in the GAMM and the Joint declaration establishing the EU-Jordan MP when referring to the concepts of mobility and migration. Subsequently, a closer focus will be put on the current EU's mobility regime through visa formalities. Entry visas have a major impact on the ease of mobility and to some extent reflect the structural inequality in terms of entry into EU member states and the freedom of movement.

4.3.1. Mobility Partnerships and the concepts of ‘migration’ and ‘mobility’

In his speech at the High-level Conference on Legal Immigration on September 13, 2007, Franco Frattini, former EU Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security, underlined the importance of introducing a new expression: “EU mobility” (Frattini 2007). Frattini explained the use of a new terminology by noting that “immigration is and will remain a far too (negatively) loaded term, in part because the dark side of the phenomenon is still alive”. By the so-called dark side, he referred to “illegal immigration”, which he described along with the desirable and in some cases, much needed “legal immigration” as “two sides of the same coin” (Frattini 2007). This new terminology seemed to have taken hold in official EC papers as with the renaming of the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), following its evaluation in 2011, which emphasized the need to further strengthen external migration policy. Reflecting the general shift in the official language of the EU, the term mobility has been preferential to migration in several areas.

In the following, the GAMM and the Joint declaration establishing the EU-Jordan MP are examined in more detail with regard to the use of the terminologies mobility and migration to gain an understanding of what constitutes the difference between these two terms. In reviewing these two EC papers, some schematics in the use of the two terms stood out that are relevant to this thesis. According to the GAMM mobility is a “much broader concept than migration” and also applies to a wider “range of people, e.g. short-term visitors, tourists, students, researchers, business people or visiting family members” (COM (2011) 743: 3). The first remarkable aspect of the terminological use of the terms mobility and migration is the duration of stay that seems to underlie the mobility of third-country nationals to the EU, as well as the target group that seems to be addressed by mobility-enhancing efforts. A key objective, as highlighted in the EU-Jordan MP, is „to manage more effectively the mobility of persons *for short periods*” (Commission 2014: 3; own emphasis), serving the fast-moving rather short-term, transient nature of mobility. As a consequence, there seems no relevance whatsoever to show possibilities for a permanent (or at least semi-permanent) form of migration. The group of people to whom the possibility of mobility should be granted is highlighted in several parts of both documents. According to the GAMM, there should be “dedicated mobility offers for *young people, students, artists and cultural workers, researchers and academics*” (COM (2011) 743: 15; own emphasis). The MP also emphasizes the necessity to “make it easier for Jordanian vocational *trainees, students, academics, researchers, artists, culture professionals, government officials and business people* to enter and stay in the EU Member States” (Commission 2014: 4; own emphasis). The freedom of movement within the EU also meets the

concept of mobility, primarily for EU citizens, but within the framework of the facilitation of residence permits for third-country nationals also for this aforementioned “key groups”, contributing to “the EU’s future innovation capacity and competitiveness (COM (2011) 743: 12). At this point, it is important to address the question of the extent to which the EU has already integrated a concept of social inequality into its mobility strategies with third countries. The special mobility offers of the EU under the MP are based on the filtering of people who cross borders. The social inequality that results becomes apparent when considering the criteria according to which cross-border mobility is facilitated. The invisibility of borders and the ease of mobility increasingly depend on the social, professional and financial status of the person entering the country. Mobility is mainly reserved for people who enter the EU to engage in business or research or who are wealthy enough to make economic contributions. The possibility to be mobile in the first place depends on a number of important preconditions. Beginning with obtaining information about the requirements for entry into the EU and extending to a large number of financial and bureaucratic barriers. This creates specific hierarchies when it comes to the freedom of mobility.

A second noticeable aspect related to the use of the concepts of migration and mobility relates in some way to what Franco Frattini was referring to when he described migration as a negatively associated term. This is a defining argument because, as shown in detail in section 4. of this thesis, the EU has for decades contributed to the securitization of migration and the definition of migration as a threat to the European community. Consequently, when introducing a new policy tool that addresses this very sensitive issue, the narrative in which this is done and its plausibility is of great importance.

Within the GAMM, the concept of mobility is associated with a “secure environment” (COM (2011) 743:3) and the need for “safe mobility” (COM (2011) 743: 7). The use of terms such as ‘secure’ and ‘safe’ already provide a counternarrative to the dangers often associated with (irregular) migration. Some kind of juxtaposition takes place between, on the one hand, the desired possibilities of free, secure mobility for some and, on the other hand, the management of control and security mechanisms.

“The aim is to ensure that *before visa obligations are facilitated or lifted*, a number of specific benchmarks are fulfilled by the partner countries, including in areas *such as asylum, border management and irregular migration*. This process can ensure *mobility in a secure environment*” (COM (2011) 743: 3; own emphasis)

“Without well-functioning border controls, lower levels of irregular migration and an effective return policy, it will not be possible for the EU to offer more opportunities for legal migration and mobility” (COM (2011) 743: 5; own emphasis)

These two text segments also show how, when the EC documents address migration, there seems to be a need to distinguish between ‘legal’ and ‘irregular’ migration. Such a distinction is not made when it comes to the concept of mobility. Even though, both, “(m)igration and mobility are embedded in the broader political, economic, social and security context” (COM (2011) 743: 15), it is noteworthy that with regard to the EU-Jordan MP for instance, the term mobility is not mentioned in connection with specific security issues, in contrast to the term (irregular) migration (see European Commission 2014: 2). The assumption that borders can be successfully closed and made impermeable had to be abandoned, which in a way supported the concept of mobility. Thus, the EU’s external borders must be managed in an open but at the same time ‘secure’ way in order to provide “opportunities for mobility while safeguarding security and reducing risks of irregular migration” (COM (2011) 743: 16). At first impression, the term mobility is perceived as more neutral. At the same time, it is also seen as a broader and more inclusive term, but one that has already internalized the nexus between migration, security and development in a very self-evident way.

While there were some specifics to be emphasized in an attempt to draw a distinction between the concepts of migration and mobility, it must be noted that, within the EC documents that were examined, there are by no means very clear patterns as to when the term mobility and when the term migration is used. When it comes to freedom of movement based on remunerated activities reasons, the MP still refers to circular migration as well as labor migration, while the GAMM mainly uses the term labor mobility. The concepts of circular migration and circular mobility can both be found in the GAMM, however it remains unclear whether, and/or how, these two concepts may differ. Although the EC insists that mobility is a broader phenomenon than migration, and thus the concept of mobility should actually include migration, in the documents it is noticeable that the terms are very often used in conjunction with each other⁸. It has become established practice to refer to migration *and* mobility, which suggests that these

⁸ Within the GAMM, the term migration is used 181 times, the term mobility is used 97 times and the two terms are used 52 times in conjunction. Within the EU-Jordan MP, the term migration is used 35 times, the term mobility is used 20 times and the two terms are used 6 times in conjunction.

terms must constitute two different concepts. Where however the exact differences lie, besides in the differentiation of mobility opportunities based on a classification of individuals and groups according to perceived threats and risks as well as economic benefits, remains to be unraveled. What became clear, however, is that mobility is always conditional in order to be considered safe. These conditions are manifested in practice by the requirements that many third-country nationals must fulfill in order to be mobile and to be granted entry into the EU. The key element of the MPs is to provide easier entry into the EU through visa facilitation granted in exchange for readmission agreements. Since the negotiations on visa facilitation and thus the inclusion of the partner countries in the European area of free mobility is such a sensitive topic and yet plays such an elementary role, it is worth taking a closer look at the EU visa regime.

4.3.2. The EU-Visa Regime

Citizenship and identity documents have a major impact on mobility and ease of movement. Facilitating mobility for some goes hand in hand with impeding and deterring mobility for others. It is not necessarily the passport as such, but the visa restrictions imposed according to nationality that are one of the most important mechanisms of the nation states, or in this case the EU as an association of states, to control entry (Neumayer 2006: 6). According to the online 'Passport Index', the most 'powerful' passport is the one with the highest mobility value, i.e., the one that allows you to travel to a majority of countries without strict visa restrictions. It is not coincidental that the categorization for this index is carried out according to the 'Passport Power Rank' (Arton's Capital Passport Index 2021). Visa policies are tied closely to the attempts of governments to control, and eventually prevent, the migration of certain groups of people and are always embedded in a context of broader international relations and power asymmetries (Neumayer 2006: 6; Czaika et al. 2018: 590). Visas represent, to a certain extent, a visible expression of power. Not only do they represent an instrument for regulating entry and controlling mobility, but by visibly favoring own nationals and nationals of befriended or cooperating nations and thus also discriminating against travelers who require visas, they add an important symbolic dimension to border controls. These visa controls constitute one of the most visible means of migration control by which states exercise their sovereignty and reassure citizens that borders are indeed under control (Czaika et al. 2018: 593).

When considering visa policy, it is important to understand that while visa-free mobility at the global level has increased in recent decades, visa inequality has also increased. In other words, while one segment of the population (often from OECD countries) has gained mobility rights,

for other regions these rights have stagnated or even decreased in some cases (Salter 2006: 177). The issue at stake is however not so much the general increase or decrease in mobility, but how this mobility is shaped, regulated and distributed through the EU visa regime.

The term visa can be derived from French, where *visé* literally translates into *having been seen*. In terms of today's understanding, the visa refers to the pre-screening of travelers and provides a *prima facie* reason for entry (Salter 2006: 175). However, the issuance of a Schengen visa or a national visa issued by one of the EU member states does not guarantee actual entry. The final decision is made at the border police's entry control into the Schengen area (Deutsche Botschaft Amman 2018). The visa regime enables the EU and its member states to shift the border function, so that a kind of pre-sorting can already take place before arriving at the EU's physical border (Salter 2006: 175). As already discussed in detail, the securitization of migration has intensified the use of filtering processes and profiling practices. Visas have been central instruments in this system and have become a fundamental part of European systems for controlling migration and international human mobility (El Qadim 2017: 281). The EU also uses visa regulations as leverage in international negotiations seeking to secure cooperation with countries of origin and transit on border and migration control, for instance in the form of readmission agreements (El Qadim 2017: 283). In this case, visa facilitation for a particular third country requires the conclusion of readmission agreements that allow for the deportation of irregular migrants to the territory of the signatory country, regardless of whether they originate from that territory or were merely in transit (Jeandesboz 2007: 20). As it is also reflected in the policy instrument of MPs, the facilitation of visa requirements and offerings for enhanced mobility are embedded in a system of differentiated controls based on the distinction between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' mobility (Jeandesboz 2007: 19).

The EC itself describes the visa policy as "a vital tool in preventing irregular migration towards the European Union and potential threats to its security." (SEC(2009) 1041: 3). I will briefly explain how this understanding translates into practice by referring to the visa example of the application procedure for Jordanian citizens, using the information provided by the Austrian as well as the German embassy in Amman for illustrative reasons. The subject of interest lies in the application for the Schengen visa, given that the focus in this chapter is primarily on the EU visa regime and less on national visa regulations. In February 2020, a number of important modifications to the Schengen Visa Code became effective, which were designed to ensure that visa processing contributes to the realization of greater cooperation among third countries on

readmission. The EC intends to regularly review the cooperation of third countries with regard to readmission. In cases where the EC considers that a third country is not cooperating sufficiently, nationals of that country may face longer visa processing times and higher visa fees. Countries that do cooperate on these matters receive shorter visa processing times, lower visa fees, and visas with longer validity (Schengenvisa.info 2019). In order to apply for a Schengen visa as a Jordanian citizen at the German or Austrian Embassy, a personal appointment must be made for an interview at the embassy. At this appointment, the fee for the visa has to be paid, questions about the planned trip have to be answered and photo and fingerprints are taken. The visa fee has increased from 60€ to 80€ under the renewed Schengen Visa Code. Information and documents to be submitted to the respective mission abroad include financing of travel and accommodation expenses (salary account statements), confirmation of employment, business license/extract from the employer's commercial register, proof of family/professional roots in the home country, information about the duration and purpose of the stay, a written letter of invitation from the host or hosting company in Germany or Austria, as well as travel health insurance with a minimum coverage amount of 30,000€ (Österreichische Botschaft Amman n.d.; Deutsche Botschaft Amman 2019). The German Embassy in Amman also states that additional documents may be required and that a second interview may be necessary (Deutsche Botschaft Amman 2019). Both the Austrian and the German diplomatic missions emphasize that a visa is generally only issued if the documents submitted show a credible prospect of return. A sufficient probability of the willingness to return is supposed to result from the objective personal circumstances, but ultimately lies within the assessment framework of the officials of the respective embassy (Österreichische Botschaft Amman n.d.; Deutsche Botschaft Amman 2018). In comparison, travelers with German or Austrian citizenship can apply for their visa directly upon entry at the airport in Jordan and do not require an extensive visa application and screening process in advance (Auswärtiges Amt 2021; BMEIA 2021). This example demonstrates how visa restrictions and complicated visa application procedures act as a deterrent for potential migrants. This includes the additional financial costs and effort required to apply for the visa, which usually requires a trip to the embassy. As a result, a number of applicants disqualify themselves in advance. Knowing the difficulty of the procedure and knowing that once an application for a visa is rejected, this information remains in the Visa Information System, which allows Schengen countries to exchange visa data (Neumayer 2005: 8; El Qadim 2017: 291). A Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA), as envisaged in the MP with Jordan, can reduce the burden, cost and waiting time in the visa application process. However, as Nora El Qadim (2017) has described in her discussion of

EU-Morocco negotiations on visa facilitation, the impact of such potential agreements would apply primarily to privileged citizens, and so-called “bona fide travelers”, who are already highly internationally mobile (El Qadim 2017: 288; COM(2015) 240: 11). People with limited means, who would really benefit, for example, from a waiver of the financial resources requirement for family visits abroad are not mentioned in the relevant official EC documents. In other words, the EU visa regime is characterized by a classification and selectivity of third-country nationals (Nicolosi 2020: 476). The MP revisits this criticism by focusing on the incentive of visa facilitation. The following chapters will discuss the extent to which the MP between the EU and Jordan contributes to a more equal distribution of mobility opportunities or whether this constitutes a goal at all. Before analyzing the mobility and migration dynamics between the two signatories, the first step is to give an overview of the policy instrument of the MP and its negotiation context with regards to the Case Study.

5. Case Study: EU-Jordan Mobility Partnership

“Through this partnership the EU and Jordan agree to ensure that the movement of persons is managed as effectively as possible, allowing for concrete actions to further improve the situation in the way migration, asylum and borders are dealt with. Strengthening efforts to derive all the potential benefits from migration and linking them to development is a key feature of the Partnership” – European Commission 2014b

The MP with Jordan is the first of its kind to be implemented with a country in the Middle East region (European Commission 2014b). This constitutes one of the reasons for selecting the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as a case study for this thesis. This is compounded by Jordan’s particular and unique geopolitical role in the region, which can be interpreted as both pragmatic and contradictory. The EU maintains close ties with Jordan, as the Kingdom is an important partner in the volatile Middle East region. There is interest on the part of the EU in supporting Jordan as much as possible in order to contain the crisis in the countries on the eastern Mediterranean. Especially as fears are growing stronger in Brussels that in the long run the Jordanian government would not be willing to maintain the high level of acceptance regarding the number of Syrian refugees who have been seeking protection in Jordan since the beginning of the civil war in 2011. According to the EC, “Jordan has remained politically and socially stable in the face of persistent economic, social and security challenges” (SWD(2019) 383). However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Kingdom to withstand internal and

external pressures in the face of multiple crises. Besides the conflict in Syria, an important foreign policy priority for Amman, as the most affected third country with the largest Palestinian community in the world, is the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Samaan 2012: 18). The EU is well-aware of its ties with a key strategic ally such as Jordan and therefore stresses the importance of a stable and secure Jordan. Therefore, security relations between the EU and the Kingdom, including the Middle East Peace Process, with the aim of regional stability in the Middle East, go back a long way.

However, instead of solely focusing on security issues, the MP is now supposed to take a different approach to cooperation by concentrating on facilitating mobility and migration between Jordan and the member states of the EU, as well as on the developmental opportunities that are to be realized from that.

5.1. Jordan: Dialogues and signing of the MP at a critical time in an ongoing crisis

Cooperation between the EU and Jordan in the area of migration has been at least until 2011 very limited. In the second EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan, formally adopted in 2012, the topic of migration, asylum and border management was included in the Justice and Home Affairs section for the first time and illustrates the attempt to fit migration management into the framework of the ENP (EEAS 2013: 12).

The proposal to hold a “dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the countries of the Southern Mediterranean” (COM(2011) 292) represents a more flexible and informal level within the existing framework of the revised ENP. Since, on the one hand, high-level meetings did not deliver the expected results, especially with regard to readmission agreements, and, on the other hand, intergovernmental solo efforts by some EU member states blocked the achievement of common political goals, the MP was initially to be discussed at the level of senior officials in order to avoid political and institutional battles (Seeberg and Zardo 2020: 9). The “Joint declaration establishing a MP between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the European Union and its participating Member States”, namely Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Sweden, was subsequently signed in October 2014 (European Commission 2014a). In the Joint Declaration, four different migration-related dimensions can be identified. The first dimension under the heading “Mobility and legal Migration” refers, among other things, to the issuance of visas. In this regard, the effort “to make it easier for Jordanian vocational trainees, students, academics, researchers, artists, culture professionals, government officials and business people to enter and stay in the EU Member States”, is expressed (European Commission 2014a: 4). The second

dimension deals with “promoting border management” as well as “preventing and combating irregular migration” (European Commission 2014a: 5). This section highlights the need for the exchange of both technical information and knowledge in the field of border management as well as the exchange of information and so-called “awareness-raising” about the dangers of irregular migration. A key word and arguably one of the most critical points in this section is readmission, especially in relation to third-country nationals. In addition, this part of the document focuses on capacity-building as well as supporting Jordanian efforts “to prevent illegal migration and fight transnational crime networks involved in the smuggling of migrants” (European Commission 2014a: 5). The third dimension relates to “migration and development”. For one, this dimension aims at reaching out more to the diaspora community located outside of Jordan to encourage investment in their country of origin and to promote circular migration in order to better manage the brain drain phenomenon (European Commission 2014a: 6). Another point is the facilitation of “the social reintegration of migrants and their families voluntarily returning to Jordan and to enable them to derive the maximum benefit from the skills acquired during their time abroad” (European Commission 2014a: 6). The fourth and final dimension refers to Jordan’s challenges and tasks as one of the main host countries for refugees from the region. Under the caption “International Protection”, it is mentioned that the agreement aims at “strengthening the Jordanian legislative and institutional framework for asylum” and a “close cooperation with the relevant agencies and bodies of the EU and its Member States, and with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)” (European Commission 2014a: 7). The document also mentions the different EU agencies involved in the implementation of the partnership, including, i.a. Frontex, CEPOL (European Police College), Europol (European Police Office) and Eurojust (The European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit) (European Commission 2014a: 8).

Decisive for the dialogues that preceded the signing of the MP were certainly the birth of new political opportunities, on the one hand, and, on the other, the migration related security concerns that the EU perceived after the unprecedented political upheavals in the southern Mediterranean countries after 2011. The Arab uprisings can be described as a crisis of legitimacy in which the regimes lost the support of their populations (Köprülü 2014: 111). This was also the case in Jordan, although the pressure on the Hashemite regime was never as intense as in Tunisia, Egypt or Syria. As the uprisings dragged on and revolutions in some neighbouring countries turned into civil wars and terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida or the Islamic State gained a foothold in neighbouring areas, Jordan’s concerns about regional Arab wars and ensuring its external security seemed to outweigh or also overshadow the domestic reform and

change efforts of the Arab Spring. Despite its diversified demography and deep-rooted internal divisions, Jordan has up until now not experienced revolution, civil war or regime change (Ryan 2018: 14 ff). The Kingdom represents one of the few hybrid regimes in the Middle East; according to Nur Köprülü (2014), Jordan finds itself “between a policy of elections and de-liberalization” (113). Protesters of the Arab Spring in Jordan primarily called for further political reform and efforts to alleviate unemployment and corruption, rather than questioning the legitimacy of the monarchy itself (Köprülü 2020: 221).

With the arrival of people fleeing the civil war in Syria, Jordan is becoming the country hosting the largest number of refugees. In Jordan, the security dimension of refugee movements has been highlighted several times, with reference to the need for increased controls to ensure that problematic radical organizations do not hide members of their network among refugees as they cross Jordanian borders (BBC 2016). The reference to the security component, however, does not explain why Jordanian border officials encouraged Syrians entering the country to use informal border crossings along the eastern border (Tsourapas 2019: 469). Those who enter Jordan through these informal border crossings are automatically recognized as ‘refugees’ under the memorandum of understanding between UNHCR and Jordan and are sent directly to the Za’atari refugee camp (Tsourapas 2019: 469). The emphasis on the security issue seems to come up especially when the Jordanian government directly addresses the international community, indicating an orientation toward a European or *Western* narrative in migration policy. This orientation is also evident in the encampment policy. With the beginning of the arrival of Syrian refugees, Jordan originally showed no interest in setting up camps for refugees, but eventually established six camps along similar lines to those of the EU. These camps took in almost one-fifth of all refugees (İçduygu and Nimer 2019: 421). At the same time, encampment policies also increase the visibility of refugees in the country and provide an opportunity to negotiate for further support from international donors. Jordan has obviously incurred enormous costs associated with hosting refugees, and faces significant resource related challenges. As King Abdullah highlights in a February 2016 interview with BBC, the Kingdom can only contribute to regional stability if the international community provides the required (financial) support. King Abdullah emphasizes further that *western* countries know, „that if they don’t help Jordan it is going to make it more difficult to them to deal with the refugee crisis. And (...) by helping Jordan, they are actually helping themselves more” (BBC 2016).

The Jordanian government’s National Resilience Plan (NRP) 2014-2016 also points out that “Jordan has shared significantly in bearing the brunt of the crisis and in shouldering its burden

on behalf of the international community” (MPIC 2014: 13). Jordan’s role as a host country confronts the Kingdom, and thus their social, economic, institutional, and natural resource systems, with enormous challenges. The NRP also underlines the pressure that the hosting of Syrian refugees has put on the performance on the kingdom’s economy in general, and the health of public finances, and on the local job markets, in particular (MPIC 2014: 13 ff).

In the NRP published in 2014, the Jordanian government directly addresses the international community several times, emphasizing that the country’s resources and capacities are in fact already exhausted, “appealing to the international community at this particular juncture to increase the levels and accelerate the rates of aid to assist it address the multifaceted challenges” (MPIC 2014: 15). It is in this very critical Jordanian context, between increasing securitization of migration and flight, the fear of radicalization at home and the social and economic pressure of rising unemployment, putting downward pressure on local wages, that the MP between the EU and Jordan has been signed.

The EU certainly considers Jordan as an important partner in creating a security environment in the Middle East, and is definitely interested in Jordan remaining stable and at least relatively safe in order to continue to fulfill its role as a host country for refugees, which had had a great impact on the dialogues on the MP.

5.2. The Introduction of the Mobility Partnership tool

The concept of the MP tool was first formally introduced by the EC in its Communication “on circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries” in 2007, representing another attempt to integrate third countries more effectively into European migration policy (COM(2007) 248). The ambitious goal was to upgrade and promote the MP as “the principal framework for cooperation in the area of migration and mobility” between the EU and its neighboring countries (COM(2011)743: 10). The central idea is to offer the option of “visa facilitation based on a simultaneously negotiated readmission agreement” (COM(2011)743: 11), meaning that non-EU countries be offered legal migration opportunities in return for their cooperation in keeping irregular migration at bay. There is, therefore, a clear element of conditionality in the MP; moreover, the fact that the Communication introducing the concept of the MP also addresses circular migration seems to underline the centrality of mobility to this policy instrument (Reslow 2015: 118). A special emphasis is put on the mutual benefits that the partnership offers to all parties involved, as the instrument is supposed to be tailored to the interests and concerns of the partner countries as well as the participating EU member states (COM(2011)743: 11). MPs represent a non-legally binding form of political

declaration of intention. This non-binding nature is intended to ensure that the partnership can be set up quickly and that MPs are and remain flexible instruments that can be adapted and changed according to current needs. The EC therefore qualifies this instrument as „the most innovative and sophisticated tool to date of the Global Approach to Migration” (SEC(2009) 1240: 4).

The idea of partnerships and agreements with third countries covering migration-related policies and providing legal channels for labor mobility goes back several decades (Carrera and Hernandez i Sagrera 2009: 11). The concrete concept of EU partnerships offering circular migration programs to third countries was already taken up in 2006 by Nicolas Sarkozy and Wolfgang Schäuble (at that time Ministers of the Interior of France and Germany), and were introduced as an attractive policy tool to reduce irregular migration to the EU. Therefore, the actual origins of the MPs as a further management tool in the service of EU migration policy can be found in the Franco-German initiative for a „New European Migration Policy” of October 26th 2006 (Carrera and Hernandez i Sagrera 2009: 11; Lavenex and Stucky 2011: 127). The Franco-German initiative had the distinct political priority of controlling what was perceived as ‘migratory pressure’ from the Mediterranean region (Carrera and Hernandez i Sagrera 2009: 12). In particular with regard to the phrasing of temporary and circular migration opportunities, the 2007 Communication introducing the instrument of MPs was inspired by the Franco-German initiative. A main emphasis and a prerequisite for the possibility of legal migration routes to the EU was to ensure the effective return of migrants after their stay. Thus, the EC adopted the wording of the Franco-German initiative, which explicitly made the success of the circular migration model dependent on “migrants returning to their home country after their residence permits expire” (COM(2007) 248: 11).

The first MPs were signed in the year 2008 with the Republic of Moldova, a country that is located on an eastern migration route to the EU and the Republic of Cape Verde, situated on a West African migration route to the EU (Parkes 2009: 327). The criteria for the selection of potential partner countries, as well as the content of the agreements, is quite standardized. The Council usually initially identifies the third countries that would be eligible for a partnership. The selection of potential candidates was based on criteria such as “the importance of migration flows from or through the country to the EU, the readiness to cooperate on readmission and fight against illegal migration, the interest of EU Member States to cooperate with the country in question and its interest to enter such a partnership” (COM(2009) 1240: 3). The EC then begins, on the basis of the Council’s initiative, by identifying relevant migration issues that

would be of interest to the third country. The EC also approaches the EU member states, which could be involved in the concrete actions of the partnership, be it through liberalization of their labor market access or operational support for migration management in the partner country. Without a formal mandate, the EC then adopts a coordinating negotiating role (Parkes 2009: 331).

MPs consist of the text of the Joint Declaration and an annex, referred to as the scoreboard, which contains a list of projects that serve to implement the MP. The topics of the MP projects are directly related to the different pillars of the GAMM (which cover mobility, legal migration and integration; cooperation on border management, combating irregular migration and the trafficking in human beings; international protection as well as migration and development) (Tittel-Mosser 2020). Projects included in the scoreboard can be proposed by any of the parties participating in a MP (the EC, the non-EU country, or the participating member states). The scoreboard typically includes, in addition to regularly updated information on projects or other initiatives, the participating partners (including their contact information), the funding, and the main milestones related to the implementation and evaluation of projects. The number of projects and the number of member states participating in a MP varies, which can lead to different participatory patterns of member states, while for example France participates in all of the existing partnerships, Austria has not yet signed any partnership (Reslow 2015: 118).

In addition to the two pilot partnerships with Moldova and Cap Verde, other MPs signed to date include Georgia (2009), Armenia (2011), Morocco (2013), Azerbaijan (2013), Tunisia (2014), Jordan (2014) and Belarus (2016). Egypt initially rejected the opening of negotiations twice, but later participated in exploratory talks, which have not yet resulted in a MP, and a dialogue with Lebanon started in December 2014 (Seeberg 2017: 92). In July 2017, discussions with a view to signing an MP with Lebanon were launched at the EU-Lebanon Association Council, but no signature has yet been reached (European Parliament 2021). It becomes apparent that it is definitely in the EU's strong interest to conclude further MPs with countries in the MENA region, but the EU seems to have difficulty doing so with some countries in the southern and eastern Arab Mediterranean. This growing interest in and emphasis on MPs was sparked by the initial euphoria of the Arab Spring in 2011. After the EU had originally been quite committed to alliances with autocratic leaders, focusing on energy and security and turning a blind eye to abuses, the EU now sought a new start with its southern neighbourhood (Dennison 2013: 123). Developments in the region were also followed very closely because of the potential threat related to migration, namely the unrest in several Middle Eastern states leading to large-scale

population movements (Seeberg 2017: 92). Since 2011, migratory movements via irregular and often extremely dangerous routes to Europe have steadily increased, and the situation worsened in October 2013, bringing the EU's failure in dealing with differentiated migratory movements once again to the attention of the debate (Wiesner 2013). In response, Commissioner Cecilia Malmström accelerated parliamentary negotiations with MENA countries, such as Tunisia and also Jordan (Seeberg and Zardo 2020: 7). Moreover, the newly appointed executive in 2014 under President Jean-Claude Juncker, whose Vice President Federica Mogherini has also become the new High Representative at the head of the European External Action Service (EEAS), sought to re-legitimize the supranational level in the area of migration (Carrera et al 2015: 2). The architecture for the first time then included a Vice-President who coordinates the two Commissioners for 'Justice' (DG JUST) and 'Home Affairs' (DG HOME), thus directing their work, including on migration policy (Seeberg and Zardo 2020: 8; Carrera et al 2015: 2). This context in which the EU operates at the time of the signing of the EU-Jordan MP explains the EU's reliance on quick, flexible and pragmatic policy instruments. The pragmatism in the MPs is evident. By giving in to political realities, the partnerships largely sacrifice the effort to formulate a common approach. In attempting to develop a common European migration policy, member states have long found it difficult to agree on sensitive migration issues, including opportunities for legal migration. In the few areas of the external dimension of migration policy where the European Community has clear competence (e.g., parts of visa policy), EC has succeeded in forging a common European component to the partnerships (Parkes 2009: 330 ff). The element of labor migration is in fact the elementary core of the MP, especially with regard to the strategy of convincing non-EU countries to sign readmission agreements. And indeed, in the field of EU external relations, circular migration and mobility have been considered from the very beginning as possible answers and even alternatives to the phenomenon of irregular migration (Carrera & Hernandez i Sagrera 2009: 36).

5.3. Migration Dynamics

As has been pointed out, an important part of the analysis of the EU-Jordan MP is the location of mobility within the partnership. Given the importance attached to the concept of mobility, at least terminologically, it is useful to assess MPs in terms of their contribution to mobility. Mobility is considered a key priority for a "well-managed" (COM(2011) 743 final: 11) movement of people between the southern neighbouring countries and the EU as well as for the goal of facilitating "people-to-people contacts" (COM(2011) 743 final: 5). Institutional

cooperation between Jordan and the EU on mobility took a major leap forward with the signing of the MP Agreement in October 2014 (Seeberg 2017: 101).

As will be illustrated in the following chapters, mobility from Jordan to Europe has been and still is limited, which is why little emphasis has historically been placed by the EU on intensive cooperation in this area. However, with the outbreak of the war in Syria in 2011, which became a critical point in the relations between Jordan and the EU, the situation changed significantly and Jordan increasingly came into focus as an important immigration, emigration and transit country.

Even though various forms of migration from, to, and through Jordan have continuously played a key role in the country's history, data on Jordanians abroad are scarce and incomplete (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2010: 1). In the following sections, the data presented is based on statistics provided by international organizations such as the United Nations and the statistical office of the EU Eurostat, and official statistics from Jordanian ministries. Using statistics provided by other major migration destination countries would understate the number of Jordanian emigrants, since the Gulf States for example, as the main destination of Jordanian emigration, do not disseminate data on population by nationality (Di Bartolomeo et al 2010: 1). In addition, the national census conducted by Jordanian authorities only includes migrants who have been abroad for less than a year, which underestimates migration figures. The data is intended to provide an overview of migration dynamics, therefore a likely variation in actual numbers is taken into account.

5.3.1. History of Jordan's immigration patterns

In the last census undertaken by the Jordanian Department of Statistics (DOS) conducted in 2015, the total population in the Kingdom comprised 9,531,712. By 2,918,125, non-Jordanians represented 30.6% of the total population, which makes Jordan one of the most important host countries for migrants (DOS 2015: c, Sassoon 2009: 33). In the capital city of Amman, which is home to 42% (4,007,526) of the country's total population, the non-Jordanian population has been almost at 50% (1,453,603), according to the General Population and Housing Census 2015 (DOS 2015: 13). Jordan can historically be described as a regional migration crossroad. Throughout its development, both its sociopolitical history and its geopolitical ambitions have determined the country's political approach to migration movements. Under British colonial rule, the Emirate of Transjordan, or what came to be called the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan after its independence in 1946, was established on April 11, 1921 under the leadership of Emir

Abdullah, striving, as ‘the land bridge connecting Palestine and Iraq’, to bring the Arab nation closer to unity (Méchouchy et al 2013). The openness to Arab immigrants initially supported the Hashemite dynasty’s pan-Arab aspirations for unity, but has been, since the beginning, linked to a promotion of the migrants’ right to return to their homeland. The first very substantial immigration wave to Jordan comprised refugees from Palestine who were forced to flee as a result of the Nakba (the Catastrophe), the Israeli-Arab War and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 (De Bel-Air 2016: 1). Due to the immigration of Palestinian refugees and, since Jordan granted all Palestinians the right to automatically acquire citizenship as of December 1949, the population of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan increased by threefold and at that time included approximately one and a half million people⁹ (Government Jordan n.d.; De Bel-Air 2016: 1). Following the second Arab-Israeli war and the occupation of the West Bank in 1967, this number increased by another 300,000 Palestinian Arab refugees who fled to Jordan (El-Abed 2014: 81).

At this point, it is necessary to mention that there is no clear distinction between migration and asylum policies in Jordan, nor is the Kingdom a member of the 1951 Geneva Convention for the Legal Status of Refugees (Limam 2020: 9). The UN Refugee Agency UNHCR and, in the case of Palestinian refugees, the United Nations relief and works agency for Palestine refugees in the near east UNRWA, in cooperation with the government, handle the establishment of asylum procedures. While Jordan pledges in its 1952 constitution not to extradite political refugees for their political beliefs or defense of their freedom and agrees to respect the principle of nonrefoulement, there is no legal definition as who is referred to as ‘refugee’¹⁰ (Sassoon 2009: 34).

In addition to refugees and migrants displaced by conflict, with the economy growing in the 1970s, migrant workers make up an important part of Jordan’s immigration history. The economy was boosted to a considerable extent by remittances from Jordanian emigrants in the Arab Gulf states. The impact of these emigrations to neighboring oil-exporting countries was offset by an influx of migrant workers from surrounding Arab states, especially Egypt, and from Southeast Asia (Kirwan 1981: 677). The migration dynamics were characterized by the emigration of often highly skilled and educated Jordanians and the immigration of less educated non-Jordanians (Razzaz 2017: 6).

⁹ As part of Jordan’s geopolitical ambitions and claims to territorial control over the West Bank, which was annexed to Jordan from 1950 to 1988, Palestinian refugees were granted Jordanian citizenship, making their legal status much easier than in other countries in the region, yet they were often not treated as equal citizens; they faced and still face various forms of discrimination and exclusion (see Lenner, K. (2020): “Biting Our tongues”: Policy Legacies and Memories in the Making of the Syrian Refugee Response in Jordan. In: *Refugee Survey Quarterly*. 39/3. p. 281; Gandolfo, L. (2012): *Palestinians in Jordan: The Politics of Identity*, London, I.B. Tauris)

¹⁰ In the context of the assessment of Jordanian migration dynamics, the use of the concept ‘refugee’ is useful due to, but not limited to, the partially divergent data situation and definitional differences between international and Jordanian authorities. Refugees in this context include people registered as refugees with either UNHCR or UNRWA.

Due to regional political events in the early 1990s (First Gulf War), approximately 350,000 ‘returnees’¹¹, who had previously emigrated to the Gulf states, returned to Jordan and increased the population by 10%. A large number of these ‘returnees’ were Palestinians who had been naturalized after 1948 and thus held Jordanian citizenship (El-Abed 2014: 92; De Bel-Air 2016: 1). Refugees, displaced persons and ‘returnees’ have from the very beginning played an essential role in the Jordanian nation-building process. The Kingdom’s open-door migration policy has had a significant impact not only on Jordan’s demography and economy, but also on its political influence and resilience (De Bel-Air 2016: 1).

This open-door migration policy also played an important role for the second large group of refugees, the Iraqis seeking protection in Jordan between 1991 and 2008 (Kelberer 2017: 151). During the 1991 Gulf War and the U.S. sanctions imposed until 2002, mainly better-educated, middle-class Iraqis migrated. The majority used Jordan as a transit country to emigrate to a third country in the *West*. However, about 200,000 of the Iraqis who came to Jordan at this time, stayed in the country and were thus overstaying their entry visas and being considered ‘irregular migrants’, while about 30,000, partly because they benefited from the fairly easy and tolerant immigration policies, managed to build an established life in Jordan (El-Abed 2014: 93). At that time, there was a broad consensus on the Jordanian government’s decision to adopt a no-camp migration policy (Kelberer 2017: 151).

By 2003, it was estimated that between 250,000 and 300,000 Iraqis were living in Jordan (Sassoon 2009: 33). With the U.S. attack on Iraq in April 2003 and the toppling of Saddam’s regime, a new chapter of Iraqis fleeing to Jordan began, resulting in these numbers more than doubling by 2006, reaching almost 750,000 Iraqis, according to UNHCR as well as Jordanian figures (El-Abed 2014: 94). The Jordanian government was referring to the Iraqis as ‘guests’ rather than migrants or refugees, in order to emphasize that their stay in the country was only temporary. However, the UNHCR and the government in Amman signed a Memorandum of Understanding, reaffirming Jordan’s commitment to the principle of non-refoulement and granting temporary asylum to refugees for a maximum of six months, renewable at the discretion of Jordanian authorities (Sassoon 2009: 35). Until 2005, Jordan took a *laissez-faire* approach to dealing with Iraqi refugees. On behalf of the idea of hospitality, which also included historically important Pan-Arab and Islamic dimensions, they were allowed to attend public schools as well as to work and participate in the economy (El-Abed 2014: 84, 95). The relatively open and loose policy changed into much more restrictive measures against migrants from 2005

¹¹ The term ‘returnee’ is put in quotation marks because it is misleading. A large number of people of Palestinian origin who had to return to Jordan were people who, although holding Jordanian passports, were already second or third generation residents of the Gulf States. Some of them or their families had already experienced displacement in 1948 and/or 1967, therefore a return to Jordan often did not mean a returning to their homeland (see Chatelard 2010)

onwards, following on the one hand the attacks on three hotels in Jordan, allegedly perpetrated by Iraqis, causing the deaths of 60 people, and on the other hand the execution of Saddam Hussein in 2006. At this point, a shift can be observed in which Iraqis coming to Jordan were no longer seen as ‘guests’, but rather as a potential security threat. Jordanian authorities imposed stricter measures on Iraqis seeking to cross the border and, for the first time, imposed entry visas on Iraqis seeking to enter Jordan. The events within the kingdom as well as in its immediate neighborhood may certainly have had an influence on these immigration measures, but it also remains important to emphasize that Jordan has also been part of the United States’ ‘war on terror’ at the time and has therefore been engaged in the securitization of migrants at the local level as well (El-Abed 2014: 89, 95). This may also have had an impact on Jordan’s response to the third major movement of refugees from Syria beginning in 2011.

During the first two years of the Syrian civil war, Jordan again pursued a relatively welcoming and accommodating policy of solidarity towards Syrian ‘guests’ seeking protection in Jordan from the Assad regime (Kelberer 2017: 152). However, with the exponential rise in refugee numbers, the border crossings to Syria were controlled more tightly and many people seeking protection were denied entry. From the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Jordan’s migration and asylum policy approach has been strongly influenced by the demands of the international market for humanitarian and development funding. That said, since Jordan considers itself only a temporary host country, policies and programs that suggested the long-term stay of a supposedly temporary population have been problematic throughout the ‘Syrian refugee crisis’, in part also because of Jordan’s experience hosting Palestinians and Iraqis (Kelberer 2017: 150). Official data from the Department of Statistics in Jordan counts about 1.3 million Syrians in the country at the time of the last 2015 census, while the UNHCR recorded 628,200 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan in 2015 (DOS 2015: c; UNHCR 2015). This implies that more than 600,000 Syrians were in Jordan as non-refugees, which could be due to several different reasons, including the fact that they had already been in Jordan before the conflict began or because they did not officially register. However, Oroub El-Abed (2014) as well as Gerasimos Tsourapas (2017), among others, have provided yet another explanation for the often divergent figures. The mobility of people and the funds generated by their inflow represent an important source of revenue for Jordan and its political economy (El-Abed 2014: 87), encouraging policymakers in the specific example of Syria to make refugees as visible as possible to the international community, “... while also aiming to inflate their numbers” (Tsourapas 2017: 469). The more recent data also falls far short of the 1.3 million figures. UNHCR data put the number of Syrian refugees registered with the United Nations at 660,262 in September 2020,

of whom about 17% live in refugee camps (mainly Zaatari, Azraq and Emirati Jordanian Camp) and 83% live dispersed in host communities, concentrated around Jordanian urban centers (UNHCR 2020)¹². With 750,195 refugees in 2020, the Kingdom has the second highest percentage of refugees per capita in the world (UNHCR 2020). In 2021, 2,206,736 Palestinian refugees¹³ were registered with UNRWA in Jordan, of whom approximately 17% (~ 370,000) are resettled in the ten recognized Palestine refugee camps in the country. However, the majority have full citizenship and are therefore counted as Jordanians (UNRWA 2021).




Figure 3: Distribution of refugees registered by UNCHR
Source: UNHCR (2020)

As shown in Figure 2, Syrians make up the vast majority of refugees in Jordan, in addition, UNHCR counted 66,835 Iraqi refugees, 14,640 from Yemen, 6,098 from Sudan and 749 from Somalia (UNHCR 2020). As a comparison, Figure 3 shows the number of migrants with non-Jordanian citizenship according to the 2015 General Population and Housing Census.

¹² The figure of 1.3 million is also challenged by the results of urban verification, a process of registering all Syrians living in the country (i.e., not just refugees) that has been conducted by the Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD) in cooperation with UNHCR since the beginning of 2015. Within this process, the total number of Syrians registered with SRAD (which is a prerequisite for accessing government services) never exceeded the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR (see Lenner, K. (2020): "Biting Our tongues": Policy Legacies and Memories in the Making of the Syrian Refugee Response in Jordan. In: Refugee Survey Quarterly. 39/3. p. 284-287).

¹³ Palestinian refugees are those who were born in Palestine or whose normal residence was in Palestine for at least two years prior to 1948 and who lost both their homes and livelihoods as a result of the events of 1948, including their descendants. Many registered refugees have stopped registering their newborns with UNRWA, so not all descendants of registered refugees are counted as registered refugees in this definition (see Al-khatib, B. and Lenner, K. (2015): Alternative Voices on the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan: An Interview Collection. RLS Regional Office Palestine. p. 54).




Figure 4: Distribution of Non-Jordanians from Main Nationalities 2015
Source: DOS (2015)

In order to get a more comprehensive view of migration dynamics, it is worth taking a look at the situation of current labor immigration in Jordan. Nevertheless, given the Jordanian context and the aforementioned migration trends and policies, it would not be useful to develop a strict analytical framework that distinguishes between forced or voluntary migration or population movements driven by economic or political causes (Chatelard 2010). That being said, also including on work permits issued to foreign workers provides further insight into migration data collected by Jordanian authorities.

In 2019, according to the Ministry of Labor (MOL), the number of registered labor migrants was 348,736 and the number of work permits granted to foreign workers registered with the Ministry of Labor was 434,908 (MOL 2020: 38ff). Figure 4 shows the distribution of work permits issued by the MOL to foreign workers in 2019. The clear majority of work permits were issued to Egyptian workers at 52% (225,689). The second largest group is Bangladeshi workers who received about 13% of all work permits, reaching a number of 55,194 permits in 2019. Syrian workers follow in third place with 47,766 work permits (MOL 2020: 39). The number of these work permits experienced a sharp increase after the signing of the Syria refugee national response plan in accordance with the Jordan Compact between Jordan and the EU¹⁴. The Jordan Compact is primarily intended to place the creation of an additional 200,000 jobs for Syrian refugees at the center of its vision and is thus additionally anchored in Jordan's growth agenda, aiming to turn the Syrian refugee crisis into a development opportunity (ILO

¹⁴ Cf. 5,552 work permits in 2015 (MOL 2020: 39)

2017: 7). To meet its commitments to create more jobs for Jordanians and Syrian refugees, the Jordanian government changed work permit procedures and regulations and agreed to issue work permits to Syrian refugees free of charge for a certain period of time. As a result of these and other measures, the number of Syrians with work permits increased drastically from about 4,000 in 2015 to 47,000 in 2020 (ILO 2017: 8; MOL 2020: 39).




Figure 5: Number of work permits granted to foreign workers
Source: Ministry of Labor (2020)

In 2019, the vast majority of Non-Jordanian workers has been according to the Jordanian Ministry of Labor working in manufacturing (96,453), agriculture, forestry, and fishing (80,691) and personal services, including domestic work (62,057) (MOL 2020: 37). Finally, it is important to mention that these figures are based on registered work permits and therefore do not include foreign labor migrants working without formal work permits.

As already mentioned with regard to the new regulations for work permits for Syrians, agreements and political partnerships play a major role in organizing the residence or access to employment and education of Syrian refugees. In general, it can be observed that Jordan, maybe also in the absence of its own clear and coherent framework for migration policy, is being guided by international donors, including the EU (Limam 2020: 8). The integration of Syrians into local structures supports the possibility that refugees will not return to Syria even after the conflict ends, which would contradict Jordan's original temporary 'guest'- welcoming policy. However, this integration allows the Jordanian government to channel international aid funds directly to the state, where they can thus be used to help achieve the country's overall economic

development goals, rather than directing aid to humanitarian organizations and refugee camps. While Jordan enjoys good diplomatic relations with its neighbours and holds a strategically favorable geopolitical location in the Middle East, the country nevertheless suffers from a high shortage of natural resources, making it highly dependent on international funds and foreign trade.

5.3.2. History of Jordan's emigration patterns

Since the Kingdom's independence, Jordan has had a long history of immigration and emigration. The rapid growth of the population described in the previous chapter, initially caused primarily by the influx of migrants displaced by the first Arab-Israeli war, represented a major challenge for the kingdom. Therefore, the Jordanian government began to promote the export of labor, especially to the Arab Gulf states, in the early 1950s. This labor mobility had been partially organized through agreements between Jordan and countries in need of qualified personnel, and in the early years was mainly directed to Kuwait, Dubai, and Saudi Arabia (Chatelard 2010; DOS 2016: 4). These movements were largely dominated by the migration of highly educated Jordanian citizens, who were often male and of Palestinian origin (MPC 2013: 1; Chatelard 2010). At that time, emigrants from Jordan were substantially involved in the development of infrastructure as well as public services and institutions in the destination countries. Due to the expansion of the oil-based economy in the Gulf states and the resulting economic opportunities in the growing private sector, emigration from Jordan to oil-producing countries surged once again after 1973 (Nimeh et al. 2018: 18). From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, an average of 42% of Jordan's labor force was sent abroad, bringing the domestic unemployment rate down to a record low of 2% in 1986 (Chatelard 2010). In 1985, approximately 235,000 Jordanian nationals were working in Arab oil-producing countries, accompanied by around 427,000 family members (DOS 2016: 5).

The open-door policy toward emigration was primarily intended to alleviate the pressure of high unemployment in Jordan and thus to prevent political tensions. Especially in its early days, it was also framed by the ideology of pan-Arabism, as Jordan's contribution to Arab unity and economic integration (Chatelard 2010). However, one of the most important reasons for the strong support of labor migration was the continuous source of revenue for the Jordanian state through remittances (Chatelard 2010). Jordan has been referred to as the world's only non-oil oil economy, meaning, a state that is highly dependent on foreign aid from oil-producing states and on remittances from its nationals working in oil-producing countries (Chatelard 2010).

Indeed, the growth of the Jordanian economy between the 1970s and 1980s was driven to a large extent by remittances sent into the country; in 1984, at USD 1.2 billion, personal remittances accounted for about 25% of Jordan's GDP (World Bank 2021a). Up until today, remittances account for a significant share of the Kingdom's revenues. In 2018, personal remittances reached USD 4.5 billion, accounting for 10.2% of the country's GDP (World Bank 2020). In comparison, Figure 5 shows the net inflows of foreign direct investment (in 2018: USD 954 million) and those of official development assistance (in 2018: USD 2.5 billion) (World Bank 2021b; World Bank 2021c). Remittances also played their part in the immigration of cheaper workers from abroad by raising the reservation wages of low-skilled Jordanians. This contributed to the particular structure of the Jordanian labor market, in which the outflow of highly skilled Jordanians and the inflow of low-skilled foreign labor are more or less balanced in almost equal numbers (ETF 2017: 3). Although Jordan appears to be a net immigration country, outward remittance flows exceed inward remittance flows significantly (Wahba 2014: 172). As also shown in Figure 5, a decline in remittances can in fact only be observed in the early 1990s. By 1991, remittances had declined to the point where at USD 448 million they accounted for no more than 10% of the kingdom's GDP (World Bank 2021). This development can be partly attributed to the return of emigrants due to the economic depression following the sharp drop in oil prices in the 1980s, however, the decline in remittances can be mainly attributed to the 1990-1991 Gulf War, which forced hundreds of thousands of emigrants back to Jordan (DOS 2016: 5).




Figure 6: Financial Flows to Jordan
Source: World Bank (2021a,b,c)

As a result of the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel, emigration increased significantly again in the mid-1990s and became also directed to countries such as Canada, the USA, Germany or Great Britain for purposes such as employment or education (Nimeh et al. 2018: 18; DOS 2016: 5). After 9/11, emigration to Western countries became increasingly difficult, which is why especially the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) once again became the preferred destination for Jordanians.

As illustrated in Figure 6, this migration dynamic continues into recent years, largely due to a high level of unemployment in the kingdom. According to official data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), an estimated 744,582 Jordanian emigrants lived abroad in 2017, with most of them residing in countries in the Gulf, followed by North America, more specifically the United States and Canada, or in countries in Western Europe (UN DESA 2017). However, these data may exceed the actual number, especially in the GCC countries, because unlike the U.S., there is no *jus soli* or birthplace principle when it comes to naturalization. In many GCC countries, the issue of citizenship and naturalization is a particularly sensitive topic, resulting in very restrictive laws. “In countries where citizenship is conferred on the basis of *jus sanguinis*, people who were born in the country of residence may be included in the number of international [Jordanian] migrants even though they may never have lived in [Jordan] (...).” (UN 2019: 3; emphasis i.o.).




Figure 7: Distribution of total migrant stock in GCC countries, Europe and North America
Source: UN DESA (2017)

As François De Bel-Air (2010) points out in his CARIM analysis on highly-skilled migration from Jordan, migration dynamics in the kingdom can be explained by the young demographic structure, the relatively high turnover in positions, and, most importantly, the fact that the Jordanian population as a whole, gender-insensitive, is providing a kind of social capital that is

more negotiable abroad than in Jordan (5). Young Jordanians in particular often argue that “labour has become devalued in the context of Jordan’s massive liberalisation and deregulation policy” (De Bel-Air 2010: 5). According to the Jordan Household and International Migration Survey of 2014, around 63% of Jordanians currently residing abroad have a university degree and are therefore better educated than the average population (DOS 2016: 33).

The preferred destinations for migration are still mainly in the GCC countries. As shown in Table 1, the most important destination countries for these emigrants were Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America, while countries of the EU played an almost negligible role (UN DESA 2017).

Rank	Country	Number of migrants	% of total migration stock
1	Saudi Arabia	217.904	29.27
2	United Arab Emirates	161.143	21.64
3	USA	74.138	9.96
4	State of Palestine	55.322	7.43
5	Kuweit	54.923	7.37
6	Qatar	32.861	4.42
7	Lybia	20.865	2.80
8	Oman	19.108	2.57
9	Bahrain	14.874	2.00
10	Germany	12.704	1.71

Table 2: Top 10 destination countries for Jordanian emigrants, 2017
Source: UN DESA (2017)

As already mentioned, Jordanian emigrants tend to be highly educated. In particular, selective migration policies in North America are increasingly leading well-educated and young highly skilled professionals to choose their destination even much further from home. Since 2003 more and more Jordanians have moved their residence to the U.S., where the largest community of Jordanian emigrants outside the Gulf region is now located.

The migration of skilled people results mainly from the mismatch between the high career ambitions of Jordanian professionals and the lack of adequate and rewarding employment opportunities in the national labor market (ETF 2017: 10). Since the majority of jobs in Jordan tend to be low-skilled and low-paid, the motivation to migrate remains high: Survey data from the 2019 Arab barometer show that 45% of Jordanians would like to leave their home country, which represents an increase of 23 percentage points compared to surveys conducted in 2016 (Arab Barometer 2019). The vast majority (83%) cite mainly economic reasons, such as a lack of employment opportunities or insufficient income in Jordan. The most popular destination country for potential emigrants, according to the 2019 Arab barometer surveys, is North

America (40%), followed by GCC countries with (31%), while 16% of respondents said they would like to relocate to Europe (Arab Barometer 2019). Mobility to the EU is therefore not very high on the list of priorities, but a partnership dedicated to facilitating mobility could change that.

Migration movements have had a profound impact on the history of Jordan and have played an essential role in the development of the political, economic and social structure of the Kingdom. The country has been characterized by being a land of emigration, immigration and transit at the same time (ETF 2017: 8).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Jordan considers its role, especially in recent refugee movements, as a ‘shelter-giving host’ but not as an ultimate destination country, which is reflected in the rights and opportunities granted to refugees. Many migrants therefore continue their journey, especially to Europe. That is why there has been increased pressure on Jordan by European countries for several decades, along with financial incentives to control migratory movements. The MP, as a relatively new instrument of cooperation on migration issues, with the appropriate measures, could be a way not only to financially support Jordan in addressing migration challenges, but also to allow more options for secondary migration and freedom of mobility. For this reason, the next chapter deals with cross-border mobility between Jordan and the member states of the EU since the signing of the partnership.

5.3.3. Cross border mobility to the European Union

In the following, current figures on the mobility of Jordanian citizens to the member states of the EU and in particular to the signatories of the EU MP will be examined. Besides the purpose of getting an insight into the relevance of EU-Jordanian mobility, a preliminary assessment should be made whether there has already been an increase in mobility and migration related indicators since the beginning of the MP.

Looking at mobility data from 2010 to 2019, the 27 EU member states issued in total 27,559 first residence permits to Jordanian nationals during that period. Germany, Hungary, and Sweden issued the most permits within this timeframe. Other major destination countries were Italy, France, Spain, and Romania, all of which are also countries that signed the MP with Jordan in 2014. A majority of these member states were already among the important destination countries for Jordanian nationals prior to the signing of the partnership, which explains their willingness to join the partnership in the first place. Hungary, however,

experienced a very sharp increase in first-time residence permits from 77 permits in 2013 to 272 permits in 2014 and 474 permits in 2019 (Eurostat 2021).

From 2010 to 2019, 44% of first residence permits were issued for family reunification, 11% were issued for work-related reasons, and 32% were issued for educational purposes; the remaining 13% fell into the ‘other’ category, including permits for international protection status, refugee status, and other humanitarian reasons (Eurostat 2021).




Figure 8: First residence permits issued to Jordanian migrants by EU 27 member states
Source: Eurostat (2021)

As Figure 7 illustrates, the main legal migration channel for nationals from Jordan to the EU is family reunification (Eurostat 2021; Alcidi et al. 2019: 8). However, in 2019, the number of permits issued for educational reasons exceeded the number of permits issued for family reasons for the very first time (Eurostat 2021). The number of permits issued for family reasons remained stable during the analyzed period, with slight continuous growth. Although family reunification is not directly related to labor migration, economic opportunities, both in the country of origin and destination, also play a role in the decision to migrate as a family migrant. In the context of generally restrictive immigration policies, family reunification often remains the only legal way for nationals from the southern neighbourhood to enter and reside in the EU (Alcidi et al. 2019: 8). As mentioned above, educational reasons are another important way mainly for students¹⁵, who are “admitted to pursue a course of study at an establishment of

¹⁵ “‘Student’ means a third-country national accepted by an establishment of higher education and admitted to the territory of a Member State to pursue as his/her main activity a full-time course of study leading to a higher education qualification recognized by the Member State, including diplomas, certificates or doctoral degrees in an establishment of higher education, which may cover a preparatory course prior to such education according to its national legislation” (Eurostat 2020: Statistics of Resident Permits: The main definitions and methodological concepts).

higher or professional education”, to move to the EU (Eurostat 2020). In addition to studies, 13% of other educational reasons account for people who are not considered students, such as unremunerated trainees and volunteers. Taking a closer look at authorizations for broader study and research purposes in the EU by reason, it is striking that in 2019 only 2 people of Jordanian nationality, one in Spain and one in France, were granted authorization for reasons of job-searching or entrepreneurship (Eurostat 2021b).

As also illustrated in Figure 7, residence permits issued to Jordanian nationals for work purposes accounted for a very small share of all first residence permits issued by EU member states between 2010 and 2019. Although facilitating access to employment opportunities and circular migration is one of the main objectives of the MP in order to achieve the benefits of the Migration-Development Nexus, no real increase in residence permits based on work purposes can be observed until 2016. In contrast, in the years from 2017 to 2019, a stronger increase can be noticed, which could be attributed to the fact that the EU and Jordan started to hold dialogues on visa facilitation in the framework of the MP. The most important destination countries in the area of residence permits for remunerated activities reasons in the years 2017 to 2019, were Germany issuing 340 permits over these three years, Poland issuing 196 and Sweden issuing 109 permits, which are all signatories of the MP (Eurostat 2021a).

While Article 79(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU reserves to member states the right to determine the number of third-country nationals who come to work in their territory, the EU takes on the task of defining the “conditions of entry and residence” and the “definition of rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State”¹⁶. Thus, the EU cannot directly decide how many migrants are admitted for work purposes, but it has legislated the conditions under which this occurs (Alcidi et al. 2019: 11).

As the EC papers on migration cooperation stress, the EU attaches particular importance to improving and facilitating the “entry and residence of highly qualified third-country nationals in the EU” (JOIN (2015) 50: 16). In this context, the EU Blue Cards are supposed to be of special importance, in order to “put in place pathways for people to come to the EU legally”. (COM (2016) 385: 5). In absolute terms, the number of Jordanian migrants benefiting from EU Blue Card schemes was very low. On average, only about 180 Blue Cards were issued to Jordanian nationals in the years between 2013 and 2019, with almost all of them issued by Germany (Eurostat 2021c). The EU Blue Card Directive determines the regulations for the entry and residence of highly qualified individuals. Compared to other immigrant groups, Blue Card holders and their family members benefit from a greater number of rights and fewer

¹⁶ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (2012), Art. 79(2.a & 2.b; 5.), C 326/77.

bureaucratic formalities (Alcidi et al. 2019: 13). While such a system seems theoretically attractive to both professionals from the southern neighbourhood and companies in EU member states, the scope of the Blue Card program has been overall limited. Between 2011 and 2017, a total of 2,505 Blue Cards were issued to nationals of southern Mediterranean countries, with 75% of Blue Cards issued by Germany and 12% by France (Alcidi et al. 2019: 13).

Similar to the Blue Cards, only a limited number of first permits were issued to skilled individuals (on average 70 permits a year) and researchers (on average 15 permits a year) during the time period between 2013 and 2019 (Eurostat 2021d). Nevertheless, a small surge in the number of first permits for highly-skilled workers can again be observed from 2016 to 2017, as can be seen in Figure 8. In absolute terms, the numbers of residence permits for highly skilled workers and researchers, including EU Blue Card holders, have been low, however, in relative terms they account for nearly 82% of all work permits issued in the period between 2013 and 2019, and thus, at this stage, constitute the most important possibility for Jordanian nationals for work-related mobility to the EU (Eurostat 2021a,c,d).




Figure 9: First permits for professional workers from Jordan
Source: Eurostat (2021c,d)

An important EU program in the field of mobility for educational reasons is the Erasmus+ program with Jordan in the fields of education, training, youth and sport for the period 2014-2020. Mobilities for staff and students from Europe to Jordan and from Jordan to Europe¹⁷ that have been granted under the International Credit Mobility (ICM) Calls between 2015 and 2019 have been increasing. While in 2015 403 students or staff members were moving from Jordan to Europe, the number increased to 628 in 2019. Compared to other South Med countries,

¹⁷ Including all 27 member states as well as Great Britain, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, North Macedonia, Turkey and Serbia.

Jordan, having a relatively large proportion of young people enrolled in universities, accounts for 9% of the mobility enabled by the Erasmus+ ICM program (European Commission 2020b).




Figure 10: Students and staff mobility to Europe
Source: European Commission (Fact Sheets: 2020a, b)

In addition to the Erasmus+ program for higher education within the context of ICM, there is a large number of projects, for example, in the area of capacity building at universities, mobility for young people within the framework of Youth Exchange or Youth Worker Mobility and Refugee Education Support in MENA countries. Erasmus+ programs are also included among the concrete measures listed in the MP scoreboard, which will be examined in more detail in chapter 5.4. However, it is important to mention that not all initiatives under the guise of the Erasmus+ initiative actually increase mobility between Jordan and the EU, some programs only take place in-country in order to modernize and reform higher education institutions, develop new curricula or to improve governance (European Commission 2019a).

Finally, the EU-Jordan MP proposes changes in visa policy to improve mobility in the short term, with steps towards visa liberalization envisaged in the longer term (European Commission 2014a: 4). Although there has been a general increase in the number of visas¹⁸ issued to Jordanian citizens since 2013, there is no evidence of a connection with the MP dialogues on visa facilitation that began in 2016. On the contrary, from 2017 to 2018, the number of visas issued by EU member states decreased from 47,488 to 44,969, before increasing again to 51,493 visas in 2019. Between 2013 and 2019, Germany issued the most visas (64,700), followed by Spain (50,181) and Italy (44,662) (DG Migration and Home Affairs 2019).

¹⁸ Total number of visas include uniform visas, multiple entry visas (MEVs) and short stay visas with limited territorial validity (LTV).




Figure 11: Total visas issued to Jordanian nationals
Source: DG Migration and Home Affairs (2019)

The indicators of mobility and migration to the EU are certainly strongly dependent on restrictive legal migration channels and work permits policies in the member states. In almost all member states, there is a strong party that voices severe criticism against liberal migration policies, which makes dialogues on visa facilitation and more legal migration and mobility channels difficult. That being said, facilitating legal mobility is stated as a clear goal to enable development benefits from migration cooperation in the context of the MP.

The MP between the EU and Jordan has a special character by the fact that migration and mobility from Jordan to the EU was and is very limited. That suggests that the main interests of the MP is focused on other aspects, such as “the specific characteristics of Jordan as a major hosting country for refugees in the region” (European Commission 2014a: 2), as well as Jordan’s role in controlling transit migration and in this context ensuring efficient “border management, the detection and dismantling of networks involved in transnational organized crime including smuggling of irregular migrants and forging of documents as well as prevention of the terrorist threat.” (European Commission 2014a: 5).

5.4. Project implementation under the umbrella of the EU-Jordan MP - shifting from security concerns to development opportunities?

According to the EC, an important foundation in developing the policy instrument of MPs has been the shift from a primarily security-oriented approach focused on reducing migration to a more transparent and balanced approach in which migration and mobility become positive forces for development (European Commission 2008: 3). The conceptions underlying such a security-oriented or development-oriented approach have been analyzed in the first part of this

thesis and are of fundamental importance when examining what might constitute such a change and to what extent the MP succeeds in reflecting this change. This analysis revealed that security policy practices may be less visible, but are deeply rooted in the techniques (e.g., surveillance technology) and actors (e.g., Frontex) that play an elemental role in migration policy. Moreover, the understanding of development opportunities does not seem to be ostensibly based on the creation of mobility opportunities, but rather on cooperation regarding migration management according to EU conception.

The following chapter takes a closer look at the concrete initiatives and projects that are being implemented within the framework of the MP between the EU and Jordan. These initiatives and projects are considered against the background of the analyzed concepts of security and development. In the context of creating development opportunities, projects that promote mobility play a central role. Given the social inequality of international mobility, it is also important to keep in mind the basis on which this mobility takes place and for whom exactly, if anyone, more mobility opportunities are to be created.

To provide an overview of the various initiatives and projects of the MP, the so-called scoreboard of the EU-Jordan MP was drawn upon. The scoreboard is a tool for monitoring the Partnership and contains information on the initiatives that have been and are being implemented under the MP. The scoreboard, through systematization and grouping, aims to present the concrete activities under the umbrella of the MP and to allow reflection and evaluation of the ongoing, completed and planned initiatives/projects under the EU-Jordan MP (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova 2021). Unless otherwise stated, all information about the projects is taken from the scoreboard document provided by the EC.

There has been no intention to carry out an extensive analysis to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the initiatives and projects under the umbrella of the EU-Jordan MP. Evaluating the success of the projects carried out in the name of a MP faces significant challenges, as Natasja Reslow (2017) noted in her assessment of EU external migration policy: “The extent of goal achievement cannot be established because it is not clear which of the multiple objectives should be the basis for measurement, nor if any of these objectives are more important. Goal achievement also requires the definition of some benchmarks of reference values against which progress can be measured, something which EU documents concerning the Mobility Partnerships fail to provide.” (Reslow 2017: 6).

Following on from the previous part of this thesis, the subsequent chapter will focus particularly on the potential contribution of projects to promoting development opportunities through cross-border mobility and legal migration. Based on the assumption that the objectives and contents of the projects listed in the scoreboard tell something about underlying security and development conceptions, as well as the underlying approach and ambitions to be achieved by the MP, illustrated table shows the balance of topics in the EU-Jordan MP. The themes are based on the pillars of GAMM, which are supposed to form the basis of all measures of the MPs and are listed as ‘GAMM Pillar 1-4’ in the scoreboard. While the initiatives are presented by theme, there are some projects that cover multiple GAMM pillars and are described as ‘cross-cutting initiatives’¹⁹.

Theme	N° of Projects
Foster mobility and legal migration	6 (18%)
Migration and Development	2 (6%)
Promoting border management, preventing and combating irregular migration	5 (16%)
International Protection	15 (47%)
Cross-cutting initiatives	5 (16%)
Total	32

Table 3: Number of Projects according to theme in the EU-Jordan MP (completed and ongoing projects)

Table 3 describes the breakdown of the total of 32 projects according to the thematic areas to which they are assigned. Six projects can be assigned to the thematic area of foster mobility and legal migration, in other words, 18% of the projects fall into this category. Only 2 projects, accounting for 6% of all projects, are assigned to the thematic area of migration and development. Five projects fall into the category of promoting border management, preventing and combating irregular migration, i.e. 16%. The majority of the projects, namely almost 15, and thus about half of all projects, deal with the topic of international protection.

¹⁹ What in this context is referred to as ‘cross-cutting initiatives’ is listed in the scoreboard under the term ‘horizontal activities’.

5.4.1. Foster mobility and legal migration

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Project	Implementing bodies	Source of funding	Budget	Timeframe
Erasmus + (education)	European Commission, Nationale Erasmus+ Office Jordan	EU budget	EUR 14.7 billion (for whole Erasmus+ programm in the period between 2014-2020)	2014-2020 (extended)
Study/training cooperation Romania and Jordan (education)	Government of Romania and the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	n.i.	n.i.	2013-2018
Erasmus + study opportunities Romania and Jordan (education)	Romania bilateral	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.
MISMES Jordan (focus labour migration)	Ministry of Labour Employment Directorate and labour consulates in the GCC; Ministry of Labour Inspection Directorate; Private recruitment agencies association (ORCA); ANIMA Investment Network; International Centre for Migration Policy Development; other implementers: ILO, IFC, national and local partners, Ministry of Labour, local NGOs (such as Tamkeen)	depending on the specific project (EU,USAID,SDC,DFID and more)	depending on the project (on labour migration: EUR 40.000 between 2016-2017)	launched 2014-15
Visa Facilitation Agreement	Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the European Union and its participating Member States	n.i.	n.i.	negotiations started 2016
Qualification for the Mediterranean (building job qualifications)	ETF + Itlay, Spain, France (Ministries of Labour) + EuroMED Strategic Committee, EMSC members in Jordan: Centre of Accreditation and Quality Assurance, Jordanian Chamber of Industry, Confederation of Trade Unions, Higher Education Accreditation Commission, Jordanian Construction Contractors Association, Ministry of Labour, Jordan Hotels Association + Ministry of Education, Confederation of Trade Unions, Al Balqa Applied University, Jordan Armed Forces, Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities	n.i.	n.i.	2010-2015

Table 4: Projects foster mobility and legal migration

The projects under the first theme *foster mobility and legal migration* are oriented towards the pillar of the GAMM that deals with the organization and facilitation of legal migration routes and mobility opportunities to the EU. By specifically emphasizing circular or temporary migration and the return of migrants who spend a period of time in the EU for job-related or educational reasons, the benefits resulting from the Migration-Development Nexus should be realized.

²⁰ n.i.: no information to be found

In the area of education, the scoreboard lists the Erasmus+ program, which is designed to enhance the skills and employability of foreign professionals, with the goal of achieving a correspondence in the field of education and the work environment, in order to eliminate the skills gaps that Europe is facing. Therefore, Erasmus+ projects intend to support mobility of students, (higher) education staff, young people and youth work professionals, along with adult education, as well as strategic partnerships and capacity building in higher education (European Commission 2019b). Erasmus+ aims to promote exchanges and academic cooperation with all countries in the world, and therefore has programs with many countries in the southern neighbourhood, whether or not a MP has been established. On this account, it does not seem to be a condition for the inclusion of a project in the scoreboard that the project has been created as a result of the MP. The inclusion of any thematically relevant project in the scoreboard would constitute a weakness in the attempt to address the content and emphasis of the MP. As Sarah Langely and Clara Alberola (2018) have pointed out in their evaluation of the MPs between the EU and Cape Verde, Georgia and Moldova, there is “a lack of clarity in terms of what the overarching goal of the scoreboard is documenting (the impact of the MPs or providing an overview of all work in the field of migration)” (30). Nevertheless, the scoreboard offers a way to gain deeper insight into the EU-Jordan MP, as official EC papers are often rather vague and have a clear predefined narrative and rhetorical focus.

The Erasmus+ initiative enables additional mobility for Jordanians to the EU and for EU citizens to Jordan. Nevertheless, in the case of all partner countries that are not members of the EU (CBHE Eligible Partner Countries), a special priority is given to capacity building activities through “curriculum development”, “improving management and operation of Higher Education Institutions” as well as “developing the Higher Education sector within society at large” (National Erasmus+ Office Jordan n.d).

In the main area of education, in addition to the Erasmus+ initiative, the scoreboard lists a bilateral cooperation program between Romania and Jordan in the fields of education, culture, tourism and media. There are a total of three education-related projects under the pillar of mobility and legal migration, two of which are bilateral programs between Romania and Jordan.

It is astonishing that circular migration initiatives are almost absent under this first pillar which is supposed to focus on *fostering mobility and legal migration*. One project, which can be regarded as dealing with a future facilitation of circular migration schemes is the initiative ‘Qualifications for the Mediterranean’ (Q4M). This project, with a duration of almost 6 years (2010-2015), aimed to increase the quality of qualifications and qualification systems in order

to better adapt them to the needs of the labor market. Through regional cooperation, the participating partner countries, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and later Algeria, as well as the interested EU countries, France, Italy and Spain, were to achieve an increased level of transparency and mutual understanding of each other's professional qualifications and qualification systems (ETF 2016: 5). The goal of the project was therefore not the direct promotion of labor migration opportunities, but the establishment of a network for the comparability of professional qualifications in certain sectors. The sectors selected under the Q4M were tourism and construction, as they are both characterized by a high degree of geographic mobility and internationalization. In addition, recruitment difficulties in the two sectors can and already are being influenced by migration flows (ETF 2016: 5). After the development of the operational network, the European Trading Foundation gave up its management of the project in 2015 and handed it over to the participating partner countries. The project is therefore considered completed in the EU-Jordan MP scoreboard, subsequent evaluations or initiatives under the Q4M are not listed. Since the Q4M project had already been running for several years when the EU-Jordan MP was signed and the initiative is labelled closed, the question arises again whether the signing of the MP had any effect at all on this project. In addition, it is questionable whether the Q4M project, which is one of the few projects that deals with the issue of mobility and circular migration at all, had the goal of actually leading to more mobility. As Sarah Langley and Clara Alberola (2018) have pointed out, it is not uncommon that projects in the framework of the MPs deal with the analysis of migrant qualifications as well as with information campaigns or trainings for migrants, giving the impression that after the completion of this project an actual migration to the EU would take place, although this was ultimately not the case (33).

Another project is listed in the scoreboard under the main area of labor migration and will therefore be examined in more detail. The project Migrant Support Measures from an employment and skills perspective (MISMES) contains a variety of measures to support migrants, which are to be implemented in the sending countries and have the goal of facilitating labor mobility and increasing the development effect of migration and mobility (ETF 2017: 2). Among the overall 35 measures of the MISMES, five measures are targeted at Jordanian emigrants who are going abroad. There are two measures targeting expatriates, referring to Jordanians already living abroad, and three measures targeting potential migrants, referring to future cross-border mobility of Jordanians (ETF 2017: 29). The remaining 30 measures partly address foreign labor migrants coming to Jordan to work, but the majority of initiatives target

the employment conditions of Palestinian, Iraqi, or Syrian refugees (ETF 2017: 30). Since MISMES activities are listed in the scoreboard under the main area of labor migration, and therefore in the context of this thesis they fall under the sub-heading of legal migration and mobility, only activities related to Jordanians going abroad will be considered.

The first measure on the agenda is called *supporting/regulating the emigration of Jordanians abroad by the Ministry of Labor* (ETF 2017: 32). Since the start of 2016, the role of the Ministry of Labor has involved encouraging the emigration of workers against a backdrop of rising unemployment. The ministry has appointed so-called labor attachés to proactively pursue job vacancies in Gulf countries. These complement labor agreements signed with several Arab countries in the late 1990s to facilitate the migration process (ETF 2017: 32). Facilitation of mobility to countries of the EU is not mentioned among this topic.

The second measure refers to the process of *verifying/guaranteeing diplomas and work experience by the Ministry of Labor* (ETF 2017: 33). In order to increase foreign employers' confidence in Jordanian workers, this element supports the Inspection Directorate's verification of the accuracy of job seekers' information, qualifications, and data. The Ministry acts as a guarantor for Jordanian expatriates in terms of their education, skills and work experience by certifying the accuracy of the information they provide to potential employers. Again, this element is mainly related to the main destination countries, the GCC countries, which is evident from the fact that the Ministry does currently not see the need to develop orientation or training services for job opportunities in the EU (ETF 2017: 33). The third MISMES measure, relating to potential emigrants, is titled *support for job searching and job placement abroad by the private sector*. As part of this project, licensed agencies match job seekers with potential employers and ensure that qualifications and career aspirations are aligned. These agencies are involved in the contractual arrangements, and continue to accompany the expatriates during their first year abroad. In return, newly hired employees pay a one-time fee, which accounts for 7% of their annual salary. According to the owners of these recruiting agencies, more than 90% of their clients are Jordanians employed in the Gulf States, the promotion of cross-border mobility to Europe is once again insignificantly low (ETF 2017: 33).

Measures four and five refer to EU-funded initiatives aimed at strengthening expatriates' ties to their home country and fostering links between Jordanians and its diaspora. The Med-Generation project for Jordanian expatriates focuses on outreach to Jordanian expatriates in OECD countries to promote expatriate investment and mentoring initiatives. Over the course of the project, 53 highly qualified Jordanian 'talents' residing in Europe were identified and several workshops were organized in Amman to strengthen the links between the expatriates as

well as between them and their Jordanian counterparts. However, the ‘mentoring’ dimension of the Med-Generation project, in which these ‘talents’ due to their experience and international networks were to coach local Jordanians, could not be implemented (ETF 2017: 35). The fifth and final project of the MISMEs activities relevant to this thesis is the JEMPAS project, which is considered the flagship project of the EU-Jordan MP. JEMPAS, a technical assistance project with the overall objective of supporting the implementation of the MP between the EU and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, is one of the core projects of the EU-Jordan MP. The JEMPAS project has had a duration of 36 months starting in January 2016 and aimed to support Jordanian government to develop capacities to implement two priority areas of its national migration policy, cooperation with Jordanian expatriates and preventing the trafficking in human beings. Under the MISMEs, component I, the Diaspora component of the original JEMPAS project, is considered a relevant activity. The main objective is to better identify the profiles of expatriates and strengthen their links with Jordan through various means, including an IT platform, as well as to improve the services Jordan offers to its expatriates. For this purpose, the project was to encourage the engagement of expatriates in Jordan’s development, mainly through mentoring programs (ETF 2017: 35). In the scoreboard the MISMEs initiative is listed under pillar 1, referring to the agenda of *fostering mobility and legal migration*. With regard to the GAMM priorities on which the MP builds, the diaspora component of JEMPAS is yet also listed under the priority of exploiting the positive impact of migration on development. In fact, this is quite comprehensible, as the different priorities are mutually dependent and supportive, and a strict distinction is therefore neither possible nor useful. The JEMPAS project further plays a role in the context of promoting border management, preventing and combating irregular migration as well as in the area of international protection, and will therefore be revisited in subsequent chapters. It is important to note, in the context of promoting diaspora exchange, that the project started in January 2016 and had a duration until June 2019; in the follow-up project JEMPAS II, there no longer seems to be a particular focus on the diaspora component.

The last but probably most fundamental initiative listed in the scoreboard in the pillar *foster mobility and legal migration* is the VFA. The possibility of visa facilitation represents the proverbial carrot of the MP, and should serve as the main incentive to convince partner countries to sign readmission agreements. In 2016, the EC did receive negotiating mandates for readmission agreements with Jordan and initial consultations took place, however, no such negotiations are currently in progress (Deutscher Bundestag 2020: 4). The VFA ultimately aims to introduce special entry regulations for Jordanian nationals. However, visa facilitation does not mean visa liberalization, which, as noted above, effectively creates a selective visa policy

that also entails increased social inequalities among the population living in Jordan. Another potential risk posed by the integration of the VFA into the policy instrument of MPs is the creation of a complex coexistence of different systems within the EU visa policy, where the entry and stay of third-country nationals in the EU depends mainly on the political relations between the EU and the third countries (Nicolosi 2020: 482).

5.4.2. Promoting border management, preventing and combating irregular migration

Project	Implementing bodies	Source of funding	Budget	Timeframe
Border Management (enhancing Jordanian authority's capacity in border management through equipment, expertise, best practices)	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.
Readmission	Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the European Union and its participating Member States	n.i.	n.i.	negotiation started 2016
Jempas component 2 (enhance the effort of relevant authorities to prevent trafficking in human beings)	ICMPD; in Jordan government institutions and civil society organisations; Tamkeen, Jordanian Women's Union	EU (DCI)	EUR 2.5 Mio (for both priorities of the JEMPAS project)	2016-2018
Development of Standard operating procedures for dealing with victims of human trafficking	ICMPD, Ministry of Social Development Jordan	EU (MIEUX)	EUR 119.504	n.i.
Support the Jordanian Law Enforcement in combating smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons	Italy bilateral	Italian Funding	EUR 500.000	2015-2016

Table 5: Projects promoting border management, preventing and combating irregular migration

To proceed with the subject the last chapter ended with, readmission agreements are listed as an important issue within the theme of *promoting border management, preventing and combating irregular migration*. Readmission agreements, placing a crucial role in the EU's return policy, aim to facilitate the return of people residing irregularly in a country to their country of origin or to a transit country (European Parliament 2015). In the past, the European Parliament has expressed concerns about a lack of focus on human rights in EU readmission agreements to ensure the protection of returnees at all times, and the EU also generally seems to have difficulty concluding readmission agreements with countries in the MENA region (European Parliament 2015; Cassarino 2010: 25). Part of the reason for this could be that all EU readmission agreements concluded to date apply to both the country's own nationals and to third-country nationals (Cassarino 2010: 14). Especially in the Jordanian case, as an important transit country for refugees from the region, this would impose a readmission obligation on migrants who have resided in Jordan before entering the EU. The EU's attempt to link MPs with cooperation on readmission highlights the extent to which readmission has become a

central element of the externalization process of European migration policy. This plays a significant role especially in light of the fact that the EU and Jordan not only have very different migration histories, but also take different approaches to their migration and entry policies. While Jordan largely allows migrants from the region to enter, but usually does not grant them any status so that they have to continue their journey eventually, the EU restricts access to its territory and mainly relies on readmission agreements when it comes to migrants who have made it to the EU.

Another EU-funded project within this second pillar relates to the provision of equipment, expertise and best practice to enhance the Jordanian authorities' capacity in border management. In the thematic area of *promoting border management, preventing and combating irregular migration*, this measure, which according to the scoreboard is still in consideration, is the only one that specifically deals with increasing the capacity of border control. The three other projects listed as part of the second pillar deal with the issue of smuggling and trafficking of human beings. These measures include an Italian-funded project to assist Jordanian law enforcement in combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and an EU funded project addressing the enhancement of staff operations and services for two centers in Amman for victims of human trafficking, through development of standard operation procedures.

One of the core projects of the EU-Jordan MP, JEMPAS, has a major focus on human trafficking. One of the two priority areas of the project refers to enhancing the effort of relevant authorities to prevent trafficking in human beings, and increasing the prosecution of traffickers and provide protection and assistance to victims of trafficking (ICMPD 2018). Assistance was to be realized through the development of a training curriculum to identify indicators of trafficking in human beings, capacity building in law enforcement, and the development of standard operating procedures for dealing with victims of trafficking (ICMPD 2018). The project was to be completed by the end of its term in December 2018. However, there is a follow-up project that aims to build on the relationships established during the first phase and includes redefined priorities. These new priorities will continue to include support for the development of Jordan's anti trafficking institutional capacity. Dealing with and combating human trafficking and smuggling thus appears to be of particular importance in the area of *promoting border management, preventing and combating irregular migration*, both from the Jordanian and the EU side (ICMPD n.d).

As already determined in the analysis of the EC papers, the need to improve border control, is consistently reinforced by reference to criminal networks of human smugglers and traffickers.

It is important to note here what is implied when anti-trafficking measures are listed under the heading of irregular migration. By subsuming trafficking under the concerns of illegal or irregular migration, it illustrates how the security discourse in the EU has also permeated the debate on the victims of trafficking. People migrate because they want or need to improve their economic, social, and political position or that of their families, and victims of trafficking are no exception (Chou 2008: 90). The debate on human trafficking and smuggling, in its criminalization of trafficking networks, often overlooks the fact that for some migrants it is the only way to leave their home country and improve their living-situation. Placing the focus away from the sole criminal and security aspect should not in any way trivialize the physical and psychological abuse to which victims of human trafficking and smuggling are subjected. Instead, it is intended as an attempt to challenge the binary perception in political discourse of irregular migrants as both victims and criminals (Chou 2008: 89). The discourse on EU anti-trafficking measures also needs to open up to the possibilities of mobility and legal migration channels, recognizing that restrictive border regimes have caused migrants to use the services of traffickers (Chou 2008: 88). The creation of legal migration channels through which third-country nationals can legally enter the EU is an important element in the fight against human trafficking, but does not receive attention in the related activities.

5.4.3. Link migration and development

Project	Implementing bodies	Source of funding	Budget	Timeframe
JEMPAS (component 1: diaspora)	ICMPD, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, in Jordan: MoFAE, MOL and Jordanian embassies	EU (DCI)	EUR 2.5 Mio (for both priorities of the JEMPAS project)	2016-2018
Development of Northern Governorate of Jordan (local/regional support)	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.	n.i.

Table 6: Projects link migration and development

Linking migration and development is an important goal of the MPs in their effort to achieve a ‘win-win-win’-situation for the EU member states, the partner countries and the migrating person. Especially because this goal has been repeatedly emphasized and there have been great efforts on the part of the EC to bring the developmental benefits of migration to the fore, it is interesting that the scoreboard lists only two initiatives under this third pillar of the Migration-Development Nexus. These include the regional project “Development of Northern Jordan Program” for capacity building and to enhance the growth prospects of Jordanian Northern Governorates in the current challenging environment. The further goal is to improve the overall welfare of the population, contributing to ease the pressures generated by the large influx of refugees into these areas. In addition, the diaspora component of JEMPAS mentioned earlier is

listed under this theme. Cooperation with diaspora communities represent an important core in linking migration and development. For this reason, component I of the JEMPAS project aimed at strengthening the capacities of Jordanians to more effectively reach out and engage with Jordanian expatriates. This goal should be achieved by developing an expatriate profile with information on Jordanian expatriates, their geographic distribution, socio-demographic profile, skill level, capital, type of migration, etc. and strengthening the government's capacity to collect data and information on expatriates (ICMPD n.d.). Further, an online platform and communication plan was developed for better communication with Jordanian expatriates (ICMPD n.d.). After the end of this project, the objectives were evaluated and new priorities were formulated. The priorities of the follow-up project JEMPAS II were supplemented to support the Jordanian legal and institutional framework for asylum and to establish an EU-Jordan cooperation framework on migration, with a particular focus on the difficulties of dealing with large numbers of refugees. There seems to be a stronger emphasis on migration management including administrative and institutional capacity building in dealing with migrants and refugees, while an elaboration of the diaspora component has not been included in JEMPAS II.

In the way the nexus between migration and development is framed in the MP, initiatives in the other thematic pillars mentioned are also expected to make a positive contribution to development in partner countries. In particular, circular and temporary migration opportunities are intended to prevent the negative effects of brain drain and promote increased expertise and investment in partner countries. However, while the MP was intended in part as a development tool, specific projects in this regard are lacking under the pillar *foster mobility and legal migration* and are also not listed under the pillar *linking migration and development*. In fact, the link between migration and development is often interpreted as using development initiatives, programs, and funding to tackle so-called root causes and to prevent emigration, especially in countries of origin and transit with high emigration to Europe. In Jordan, given the great tradition of emigration, the importance of the Migration-Development Nexus is undeniable. Remittances have played and still play a significant role in the country's development, and Jordan continues to rely on mobility as a driver for development in the country. Nevertheless, the issue of remittances, as one of the most visible links between migration and development, hardly receives any attention under this third pillar.

5.4.4. International protection

Project	Implementing bodies	Source of funding	Budget	Timeframe
Civil society Action for promoting human rights of migrants	International Federation of Red Cross; Jordanian civil society organizations (Justice Center for Legal Aid)	GPGC Migration Asylum Programme	EUR 451.682	2015-2017
Sustaining Quality Education and Promoting Skills Development Opportunities for Young Syrian Refugees in Jordan	UNESCO	EU (ENPI)	n.i.	2015-2016
Support to the Emergency Education and Promotion Skills Development Opportunities for Displaced Syrian Children and host communities in Jordan	UNICEF	EU (ENPI)	n.i.	2012-2017
HOPES - Higher and Further Education Opportunities and Perspectives for Syrians	DAAD	MADAD Fund (EU Trust Fund for Syria)	EUR 12.000.000	2016-2019
LEADERS - Promoting inclusive local economic empowerment and development to enhance resilience and social stability (improvement of situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan)	Danish refugee Council, CARE; Save the Children; ACTED; Oxford Committee for Famine Relief	MADAD Fund (EU Trust Fund for Syria)	EUR 7.000.000	2016-2018
Regional Partnership for Education (improvement of situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan)	UNICEF	MADAD Fund (EU Trust Fund for Syria)	EUR 90.000.000	2014-2018
Strengthening resilience for refugee hosting countries in the Syrian Crisis	GiZ	MADAD Fund (EU Trust Fund for Syria)	EUR 70.600.000	2016-2019
Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP)	Danida; local organisations (Jordan River Foundation)	EU (DCI) + DK, IE, CH, UK, NO, NL, CZ	EUR 41.600.000	2014-2019
Financial support to the "Peace Oasis" Youth and Education Center in Za'atari refugee camp	n.i.	HU, CZ, PL, SK	EUR 80.000	2016
210 scholarships for Syrian refugees living in Jordan	UNHCR	German Funding	EUR 1.740.000	2016-2021
15 scholarships for Syrian refugees and Jordanian nationals to access courses at the German Jordanian University in the framework of the project "Die Stunde Null"	German Academic Exchange Service	German Funding	EUR 1.400.000	2016-2019
20 scholarships for Syrian refugees and Jordanian nationals to access MA courses at the German Jordanian university	German Academic Exchange Service	German Funding	EUR 1.500.000	2016-2019
Program of resettlement to Italy of Syrian refugees	Italian government in cooperation with UNHCR	AMIF (50%) and national (Italy)	n.i.	2016-2017
Program for resettlement to Italy of Syrian refugees via private sponsorship	n.i.	national (Italy)	n.i.	2016-2017
Support to the Syrian refugees living in Jordan (improvement of health status of the Syrian refugee population in Za'atari Camp)	UNHCR	national (Italy)	EUR 987.400	2015

Table 7: Projects International Protection

Comprising 15 initiatives, most of the EU-Jordan MP projects fall under the last final pillar of *international protection*. This thematic area deals with Jordan's role as one of the main host countries for migrants and refugees from the region, especially from Syria. In order to obtain an overview of the projects in this context, the initiatives were once again assigned to three different focus areas. The first focus area accounts for initiatives enhancing *human rights and living conditions of migrants* living in Jordan. These include an already terminated initiative funded by the Italian government, which aimed at improving the health status of the Syrian refugee population in Za'atari refugee camp. The second project in this field addresses the protection and promotion of human rights of migrants in destination and transit countries, through a globally coordinated civil society action. The civil society action project to promote the human rights of migrants in Jordan has a special focus on migrant workers and victims of human trafficking (IFRC n.d.).

A majority of the *international protection* projects fall under the focus area of the *promotion of educational opportunities*. These include eight projects, most of which aim to enable young Syrian refugees in Jordan to gain access to education and further training. In this context, three German initiatives aim to provide scholarships to Syrian refugees, and in some cases Jordanian nationals, at universities in Jordan. Three other projects focus on securing education for Syrian refugees in Jordan, with a particular emphasis on vulnerable Syrian children but also on children in the Jordanian host society. The last two projects in this context are financed by the Madad Fund, that was created to alleviate the consequences of the ongoing crisis in Syria and support post-war reconstruction. The EU-UNICEF partnership helps addressing learning and protection needs of children and youth affected by the Syria crisis. Similarly, the HOPES project aims at giving Syrian refugees access to higher education and in an effort to contribute to the resilience of the host country, also concludes some Jordanian students (DAAD n.d.).

The remaining five projects were assigned to the focus area that deals with the *support and enhancement of resilience of migrant hosting countries*. Two of these resilience-building projects are also Madad-funded, with one initiative, implemented by GiZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), seeking to strengthen the resilience of host communities and refugees primarily through improved infrastructure in schools, job-related skills training, and the promotion of cross-regional dialogue between refugees and host communities (GiZ n.d.). The LEADERS project is intended to make its contribution to the economic self-reliance, resilience, and social stability of displacement-affected populations in Jordan by supporting locally-driven solutions to the economic and social challenges faced by refugee host communities (European Commission n.d.). Resilience plays a significant role in the EU's

concept of development. In the context of the Migration-Development Nexus within the MP, resilience building mainly refers to exploiting migrants as a development resource by integrating them into the Jordanian economy. It is not to question that the large number of migrants can be a positive driver for the Jordanian economy, but resilience-building measures in the host community do not contribute to increased mobility.

In addition to two initiatives aimed at enabling the resettlement of Syrian refugees to Italy, the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) for refugees and host communities in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq is listed under this last pillar of *international protection*. The RDPP was launched in 2014 as a European initiative that combines humanitarian and development resources to help Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq “better understand, plan, and mitigate the impact of the forced displacement of Syrian refugees on host communities” (RDPP 2019). This project is intended to fulfill the ambitious goal of ensuring that refugees and host populations living in communities affected by displacement have access to their rights, are safe, can live independently, and that refugees have the chance for a permanent solution, may it be voluntary repatriation, resettlement in a third country, or local integration in the country of asylum (RDPP 2019).

Taking the number of projects assigned to each thematic pillar as an indicator of which thematic areas are attributed particular importance within the EU-Jordan MP, the area of *international protection* stands out in particular, as the most initiatives were realized for this pillar. As the main refugee host country, Jordanian interests lay in receiving support to deal with the effects of the crises in the immediate neighborhood, especially the Syria crisis. Initiatives undertaken in the area of *international protection* have largely focused on the issue of integrating Syrian migrants into the host society, and in particular younger migrants into the Jordanian education sector. As has been pointed out, the long-term integration of migrants is a sensitive issue within Jordanian society, therefore, focusing on initiatives that concentrate on children and youth as well as their educational opportunities seems to be more easily accepted than projects that concentrate, for example, on integration into the labor market, which, in Jordan, is characterized by high unemployment. The official Jordanian discourse problematizes the strong arrival of Syrians not only as an enormous economic burden, but also as a “major danger to [the kingdoms] national security” (BBC 2016). Especially since the begin of the civil war in Syria, when it comes to cooperation on migration policy Jordan and the EU both seem to assign elementary importance to the issue of security, be it social or economic security, resulting in migrants and refugees arriving in Jordan playing a central strategic role in negotiating the MP.

5.4.5. Cross-Cutting initiatives

Project	Implementing bodies	Source of funding	Budget	Timeframe
EUROMED Migration IV	ICMPD	EU (ENPI)	EUR 6.870.000	2015-2019
MEDSTAT IV	n.i.	EU (ENPI)	EUR 4.700.000	2016-2019
Mediterranean City to City	ICMPD	EU (DCI)	EUR 2.000.000	2015-2017
Action Jordan II: Increase capacity of the Department of Statistic	ICMPD, UCLG, UN-HABITAT	EU (Mieux); Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation	EUR 54.000	2015-2018
Promoting the participation of Jordan in the work of EASO and Frontex	EASO, Fontex, EU Member States, EU delegations, DG Migration and Home Affairs, DG Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, DG International Cooperation and Development and in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organisation for Migration and other international organisations and non-governmental organisations	EU (ENPI)	EUR 1.000.000	2014-2016

Table 8: Cross-Cutting Initiatives

There are five ‘cross-cutting initiatives’ that deal with the areas of monitoring and managing migration flows and strengthening capacity building of institutions dealing with migration.

The EUROMED Migration IV project is concerned with the strengthening of mechanisms and capacities to develop and implement evidence-based and coherent migration and international protection policies and to develop a common approach to EU and partner country (in this case Jordan) cooperation in the area of migration, mobility and international protection and asylum. Closely related are two additional projects that focus on promoting evidence-based policy-making processes and reliable migration-related data. These projects relate to the overall goal of an ‘orderly and effective migration management system’. This migration management system is then to include the implementation of a EU-like asylum procedure, the protection of the rights of migrants as well as the strict fight against cross-border crime and irregular migration, in order to ultimately achieve more opportunities for free mobility. Thus, projects to promote integrated and effective migration management are likely to be subordinated under ‘cross-cutting initiatives’. Indeed, it is not surprising that projects that aim to increase efficiency by standardizing and technologizing migration policies put a frame around the entire MP by being considered ‘cross-cutting’ or ‘horizontal’ initiatives. Thereby, it is assumed that mobility and thus development opportunities can only be realized once the basis of the partnership, cooperation in the field of EU migration management, has been achieved.

Another project, that is listed in the scoreboard as a ‘cross-cutting initiative’ is the promotion of Jordan’s participation in the work of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and Frontex to familiarize participating countries with the agencies as well as EU policies in the

areas of migration, asylum, and border management. Cooperation with Frontex is a prerequisite for being considered as a potential partner for a MP (Brouillette 2018). While Frontex, in its role as a distinct security actor at the European external border, is responsible for transferring capabilities and capacities to curb irregular migration and strengthen integrated border management, cooperation with EASO focuses on assisting with asylum capacity building in Jordan. Cooperation between, in this case, Jordan and specific EU actors or agencies influences politics of knowledge when addressing migration-related issues. Since EU agencies, were established to ensure a more proper uniform implementation of EU law, the EU agencies essentially have an inward-looking function (Chamon et al 2019: 1). However, many EU agencies are involved in the externalization of migration policy and play an increasingly important role at the international level, as it has become clearer that they need to cooperate with third countries and other non-EU organizations to fulfill their mandate (Chamon et al 2019: 5). In addition to the role of the EU agencies that are involved in the implementation of the EU-Jordan MP (such as Frontex, EASO, ETF), it should also be noted that the majority of initiatives are implemented and coordinated by implementing partners such as ICMPD and IOM. Other institutions and organizations (such as UNHCR or GiZ) usually implement projects together with the EC and member states. With regards to the scoreboard, there is no concrete information regarding specific partners on the Jordanian side, such as local NGOs, etc., although some projects make specific reference to working with local and civil society institutions.

Although this chapter did not present an in-depth analysis of EU-Jordan MP implementation projects, it is evident that in MP implementation, different levels of importance are assigned to the four GAMM thematic priorities. 47% of all projects under the EU-Jordan MP fall under the pillar of *international protection*. In the area of legal migration and mobility, a number of projects are listed, but they do not really amount to the creation of substantial new channels of mobility. Considering that the instrument is indeed called MP, this finding is quite surprising. As already mentioned, migration management is given a great importance in the activities of the EU-Jordan MP, and as such, in all pillars of the GAMM, and also in the area of *international protection*. The thematic area of *international protection* and the issue of ‘improving asylum and migration policy’, which is a subset of this thematic area, are closely linked to the fight against irregular migration. In its Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, the EC has emphasized the importance of the “commitment to strengthen the external dimension of asylum policy” (COM(2011) 743: 6). In this sense, a ‘functioning asylum and migration policy’ in Jordan is of fundamental importance in the EU’s fight against irregular migration and in order

to achieve an effective migration management policy aimed at the transnational regulation of the movement of people (Georgi 2007: 5). The issue of externalization of border control, as an integral part of such regulation, is reflected predominantly in the cross-cutting initiative, referring to Jordan's cooperation with EU agencies and the application of EU policies in the areas of migration, asylum and border management. Improving border management with special emphasis on the danger associated with human trafficking and human smuggling, presents in this case an obligation for the partner country to reduce security risks associated with international migration. A final observation with regard to the MP projects is that the implementing actors are mostly international organisations as well as member states and institutions from the EU in cooperation with Jordanian authorities. Jordanian non-governmental organisations are partly integrated into the implementation, but the actual integration of Jordanian civil society in particular remains very limited. This leads to a situation where projects, funds and also important participation opportunities are negotiated without civil society cooperation. If, above all, information and opportunities for participation in the projects are lacking, the likelihood that the projects will trigger actual mobility and development opportunities is low.

6. Conclusion

The MP between Jordan and the EU is an important example of the external dimension of the Union's migration policy, which seems to be gaining more and more importance in the face of multiple (especially intra-European) crises. Within this thesis, the MP has been considered both in terms of the attributed meaning of its underlying concepts and in terms of the efforts to create development and mobility opportunities and to overcome security and control mechanisms. This contributed to the theoretic discourse on linking the concept of migration with security and with development, as well as to research on the evolution of EU-Jordanian migration and mobility policies. Further, this thesis aims to make a practical contribution to the discussion on political decision-making regarding the involvement of neighbouring countries in a selective and control-oriented European migration policy. The intended shift away from security concerns towards mobility opportunities could not be confirmed. As mobility between Jordan and the EU was and is very low and selective, it appears that the partnership is part of a migration cooperation in which Jordan, as a kind of buffer state, is supposed to intercept refugees from the region before they try to reach the EU.

6.1. Summary and Interpretation

The aim of this thesis was to identify to which degree the policy instrument of the MP represents the intended shift from a security to a comprehensive approach regarding migration in terms of a special focus on mobility and development. To answer this overarching research question, two additional research questions were raised, and addressed in the several sections of this thesis. The first, covered in Chapters 3 and 4, aimed to decipher how the concepts of security and development are constructed within the nexus between security, development and migration. For this purpose, the historical construction of the Migration-Security Nexus and its implications were analysed. Drawing on EC papers dealing with the external component of EU migration policy, this thesis further analysed how the securitization of migration has manifested itself concretely in practices and in the involved actors' knowledge. The second point of interest was the conceptualization of development within the EU discourse on the nexus between migration and development. In this regard, examination should not merely focus on the problem of the marginal position of development concerns in addressing migration issues, but rather on the way development is perceived within the nexus. Comprehensive and inclusive conceptualizations of development in EU discourse are very much dominated by a narrower economic understanding of development with a particular focus on effective migration management and a resilience and ownership-based approach to development. As part of the examination of conceptualizations, a more detailed look was then taken at the concept of mobility. In comparison with the concept of migration, it became particularly clear that mobility is strongly associated with privileges for certain groups of people and thus with social inequality, as demonstrated by the EU visa regime. Visa regimes also play an elementary role within MPs, as visa facilitation represents the carrot for partner countries cooperating with the EU on readmission agreements.

The second subordinated research question relates to the overall role of mobility-enhancing efforts in achieving the opportunities of the Migration-Development Nexus in the context of the EU-Jordan MP. Before conducting a comprehensive analysis of mobility dynamics in the Jordanian-European context, the first step was to consider the specific background at the time of the signing of the EU-Jordan MP. The EU-Jordan MP was signed at a time marked by the impact of the 2011 Arab uprisings. Jordan, occupied by its role as one of the most important destinations for Syrian migrants in the region, remained politically quite unaffected by the upheavals. At the same time, as migratory movements in its southern neighbourhood increased, so did European concerns about the 'migration and refugee crisis' 2015-16, which ultimately unfolded as a comprehensive crisis of European migration policy. The MP as a policy

instrument in the framework of the EU's external relations is part of the Union's attempts to effectively regulate irregular migration through controlled and managed mobility opportunities. In the context of the case study on Jordan, different mobility indicators were considered in order to gain an insight into the historical and current significance of cross-border mobility between the EU and Jordan. The analysis of mobility dynamics in Jordan showed that although Jordan is an important country of emigration, especially for work-related reasons, and immigration, especially for those seeking protection in the region, mobility between Jordan and the EU represents an extremely small percentage both historically and currently. An increased number of residence permits or visas for citizens from Jordan could indicate the impact of the MP, but external and structural factors, which may be unrelated to the MP policy instrument, also play an important role. Therefore, a consideration of these indicators alone is not sufficient to actually be able to make a statement about the mobility-enhancing efforts. To address this limitation, the specific initiatives and projects under the EU-Jordan MP, which are listed in the Annex to the Joint Declaration (the scoreboard), were considered. These projects and initiatives are mainly concerned with capacity building of national authorities responsible for migration and employment policies, dealing with and combating human trafficking and smuggling, resilience building of Jordanian society in dealing with Syrian migrants, but not with actual commitments to mobility opportunities and legal migration channels, neither for Jordanian citizens nor in the context of secondary migration opportunities. Although the name of the partnership implies the implementation of mobility, mobility to the EU is still far away for the majority of the population living in Jordan, especially for the large percentage of the non-Jordanian population. Given the focus of the projects/initiatives within the EU-Jordan MP, the EU's strategic interests mainly concern refugees and irregular migrants coming to Jordan mainly from Syria, rather than the outflow of Jordanians who have a limited goal of reaching Europe.

The analysis of the selected EC papers in general and the analysis of the EU-Jordan MP in particular has shown that in the context of achieving the goal of a more comprehensive approach to EU migration policy, a linkage of different policy areas, such as labour market policy, development policy and security policy, can indeed be observed. This linkage occurs in a way in which security and control-oriented practices, in terms of technology, knowledge, and actors, are already entrenched and therefore form a foundation, while only limited, temporary, and highly selective forms of mobility are allowed into the EU. The origin and still prevailing core of the MP is dominated by a security approach, as reflected in efforts to control migration

through readmission agreements, visa security, information exchange between law enforcement agencies, and capacity building in migration management. This approach then also forms the prerequisite in a cooperation with the partner country when it comes to mobility opportunities. The concept of mobility within the MP only finds its place as long as it is kept temporary and selective, reinforced by the regular emphasis on 'return' in official EC documents. Circular labour migration and cross-border mobility are primarily reserved for groups of people who are beneficial to the financial and labour market interests of the member states. The relationship between the partnership and mobility is ambiguous, as a transition from a security focus to a focus on development opportunities through mobility offers is hard to discern. The main difficulty in creating actual migration and mobility opportunities is that the EU has de facto no influence on the political facilitation of the issuance of residence permits or visas in its member states. The ultimate decision on entry and residence rests with the EU member states. Although initiatives such as the Blue Card scheme represent an attempt to establish a cross-EU regulation for third countries in the field of labor migration, the number of Blue Cards actually issued has remained negligible over the past years. One reason being that the Blue Card scheme is only aimed at highly qualified workers. The requirements on which this regulation is based can hardly be met by, for example, asylum seekers. There is no promotion of legal migration for people seeking asylum. In the context of legal migration and the promotion of mobility, the MP is no more than a framework that attempts to establish guidelines for mobility with third countries, but it remains heavily dependent on the willingness to cooperate of the member states, which for the most part pursue a restrictive migration and mobility policy, especially with countries in the southern neighbourhood. The analysis of Jordanian mobility dynamics has shown that there is a great willingness to migrate and participate in international mobility opportunities among the Jordanian population. However, since the MP, as it is currently set up, does not facilitate entry and residence in EU countries, the existing MP does not create an exchange of civil society between Jordan and the EU. Except for the Erasmus+ scheme, there is no mobility exchange whatsoever in terms of projects focusing on increasing the mobility of EU citizens to Jordan. For EU citizens, entering and staying in Jordan is less of a challenge than the other way round, but it is nevertheless significant that the issue of mobility is viewed in a very one-sided way. Promoting mobility from the EU to Jordan would also have a positive impact on the Jordanian economy and society, e.g., in terms of promoting the tourism sector as well as cultural, economic and scientific exchange.

Since visa facilitation is strictly linked to cooperation on readmission agreements, progress in this area is rather unlikely in the short-term term. It is not surprising that negotiations on VFAs

and readmission agreements are currently on hold, considering that Jordan would have to conclude the agreement with all member states and not with just one country as is the case with national agreements, which have indeed already been concluded in some cases. In this respect, VFAs in return for readmission agreements represent another attempt by the EU in the framework of the MP to establish a common approach in terms of facilitating mobility and migration, which, however, proves to be hardly feasible in practice.

These findings and the specific context in which the EU-Jordan MP was concluded allow certain conclusions to be drawn about the underlying intentions of the partnership. As explained above, the negotiation and signing of the EU-Jordan MP took place at a time when the EU had to fundamentally reconsider its cooperation with states in the southern neighbourhood following the Arab uprisings. Until 2011, many regimes in the region had largely prevented the transit of migrants on their way to Europe, mostly based on (financial) agreements with European states. No unified EU migration and asylum policy has been in place, and a consensus among member states seemed to be utopian. For instance, it proved impossible to negotiate a distribution among EU states of migrants arriving from 2014 on, mainly on the islands of Lampedusa, Lesbos or Ceuta and Melilla, which led to further tensions between member states. The policy instrument of the EU-Jordan MP follows a trend of addressing the internal crisis of the Union in a way of externalizing migration policy and basically turning partner countries into service states whose main task is to absorb migratory pressure towards Europe. As a consequence, not only are human rights violations routinely tolerated, but security and control policies in dealing with mobility and migration are also shifted to the partner country.

6.2. Limitations and further research

Future research could follow up on this transfer of the securitization of migration to cooperation partners in the context of externalizing EU migration policy by examining how narratives, concepts, and practices underlying a nexus of development, security, and migration are being mainstreamed in the third country. As Oroub El-Abed (2014) has described in her work on the discourse of guesthood in Jordan, one can also observe that the Bedouin, Islamic, and Arab dimensions of unconditional hospitality have given way to a distrustful attitude towards migrants and a concept of the 'other'. This trend is evident, for instance, in the visa regulations for Iraqis entering Jordan, which have been in place since 2008. Further, especially with the onset of the Syrian crisis, people arriving at Jordan's official borders are strictly controlled, while mobility within the country's borders is also monitored (El-Abed 2014: 89).

In this context, it would be interesting to research the extent to which cooperation in the field of migration between the EU and its neighbouring countries, favour or perhaps even cause such a trend. This would require a more intensive examination of the Jordanian position in the negotiation and implementation of the MP, as well as extensive engagement with the migrant and national society in Jordan, which would represent a limitation of this work. To overcome this limitation, future research would require examining relevant literature and sources in Arabic and address any shortcomings in data collection through fieldwork.

A further important consideration to be emphasised when discussing the limitations of research is the influence of my subjective perception as a researcher, as well as my cultural, social and academic background. I started from the assumption that the terms and concepts I have dealt with in this thesis only acquire their meaning from the social context in which they are formed, shaped and developed. In other words, the meaning of migration and cross-border mobility is not a static concept, rather it is socially constructed and subject to changes. My perception of security and development is also shaped by my socialisation and my *western* academic education. The concepts of migration and mobility have a very special meaning for me as a citizen of the EU, which do not apply to a large part of the world's population. By clearly pointing out these subjective influences and constantly reflecting on the concepts that seem to have a self-evident meaning, an attempt is made to address this limitation.

MPs must recognise and in the long-term overcome the different meaning and different obstacles to mobility of EU citizens on the one hand and non-EU citizens on the other.

At this point, the EU-Jordan MP seems to represent little more than a component of the pragmatic agenda that the EU is pursuing in the MENA region. This includes securing (relative) stability in dealing with predominantly Syrian migrants on the part of the Jordanian government in return for financial support from the EU. The development policy approach remains on the back burner. The Development-Migration Nexus results in development cooperation focusing on countries that are strategically relevant for the EU in terms of migration policy. For Jordan, in practice, this implies that within the framework of the MP, projects are implemented and funds are acquired that ultimately pursue the prioritised goal of reducing migration to Europe, especially of people seeking protection in Jordan. The problems of high unemployment, the lack of natural resources, and the quality of housing and living in Jordan itself take a back seat. In addition, the partnership implies that Jordan has to promote knowledge and information technologies according to EU standards, which the Kingdom can use positively for its development in certain areas, but which also entail control and monitoring mechanisms in addition to further financial dependency on EU institutions. It is important to fundamentally

question the policy instrument of the MP, not only in its security- and control-promoting role, but also with regard to the EU's attempt to use MPs to circumvent internal tensions regarding a unified migration policy and further shifting responsibility when it comes to responding to migratory movements.

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Appendix

Table of the Category System for Qualitative Content Analysis:

1. QCA: Securitization of Migration

Category	Theoretical reference	Examples from sample	Interpretation
COM(2015)240			
Technological processes as securitizing practices (deductive)	“Securitizing in contemporary world politics develops significantly through unspectacular processes of technologically driven surveillance, risk management and precautionary governance.” (Huysmans 2011: 375).	“Member States must also implement fully the rules on taking migrants’ fingerprints at the borders. Member States under particular pressure will benefit from the Hotspot system for providing operational support on the ground (see above). The Commission will provide, by the end of May, guidance to facilitate systematic fingerprinting, in full respect of fundamental rights, backed up by practical cooperation and exchange of best practices. The Commission will also explore how more biometric identifiers can be used through the Eurodac system (such as using facial recognition techniques through digital photos)” (p.13). “Key Actions within the chapter of common asylum policy: More biometric identifiers passed through Eurodac” (p.14).	security instruments, based on the use of new technologies and global profiling can lead to practices that are incompatible with respect for human rights more technology of surveillance and coercion is perceived as the only positive value/solution capable of addressing our current problems and fears? → can lead to creating more insecurity in European societies

	“(…) (the) modulation of insecurity domains (…) crucially depends on technological and technocratic processes. The development and implementation of technological artefacts and knowledge, such as diagrams, computer networks, scientific data, and even the specific forms that need filling in do more than simply implementing a policy decision that arose from a particular discursive framing of events(…)” (Huysmans 2006: 8).	Managing our borders more efficiently also implies making better use of the opportunities offered by IT systems and technologies The EU today has three large-scale IT systems, dealing with the administration of asylum (Eurodac), visa applications (the Visa Information System), and the sharing of information about persons or objects for which an alert has been created by the competent authorities (Schengen Information System). The full use of these systems can bring benefits to border management, as well as to enhance Europe’s capacity to reduce irregular migration and return irregular migrants. A new phase would come with the "Smart Borders" initiative to increase the efficiency of border crossings, facilitating crossings for the large majority of ‘bona fide’ third country travellers, whilst at the same time strengthening the fight against irregular migration by creating a record of all cross-border movements by third country nationals, fully respecting proportionality (p.11).	Migration as a management issue that must be addressed by security technology and risk filtering mechanisms Smart Borders which can be open and secure all at the same time → but for who? Hierarchies according to social, financial status, as well as to origin or religion
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	“The securitization of migration is a structural effect of a multiplicity of practices. If one wishes to interpret how this structural effect has been produced by the political, professional and social actors involved, one has to focus on the relation between the positions of these actors and the practices they perform.” (Huysmans 2000: 758).	(...) the Commission will set up a new ‘Hotspot’ approach, where the European Asylum Support Office, Frontex and Europol will work on the ground with frontline Member States to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants (p.6).	Cooperation with Frontex and Europol seems to be essential → borders must be monitored more closely; Technological methods are indispensable
	„The concept of ‘domains of insecurity’ was introduced with that purpose in mind. It is an analytical tool that emphasizes that security framing is a multidimensional process of interconnecting diverse policy issues through institutional codifications (...), the application of certain skills and routines, the use of particular technologies, and the dominance of particular policy orientations and method.” (Huysmans 2006: 150).	The High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) has already presented options for possible Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations to systematically identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers. (p. 3).	A clear dominance of particular policy orientations → on the first page of the paper
‘Fight’ against smugglers as securitizing practices (inductive)		The criminal networks which exploit vulnerable migrants must be targeted (p.3). The journey is often far more dangerous than expected, often at the mercy of criminal networks who put profit before human life (p.7). Action to fight criminal networks of smugglers and	Started on the first page with a security related issue → Criminal networks and need for Common Security and Defence Policy operations oversimplified narrative of migrants falling into the trap of smugglers. What is the role of the EU?

		traffickers is first and foremost a way to prevent the exploitation of migrants by criminal networks (p.8).	
		More will be done to pool and better use information to identify and target smugglers. Europol will immediately strengthen its recently established joint maritime information operation (JOT MARE) – and its focal point on migrant smuggling (p.3). Frontex and Europol will also develop profiles of vessels which could be used by smugglers, following patterns to identify potential vessels and monitor their movements. Finally, Europol will identify illegal internet content used by smugglers to attract migrants and refugees, and request its removal (p.4).	Smugglers represent the enemy of the state; what does that mean for people using their services?
Securitizing knowledge/actors (deductive)	“(…) politics of insecurity is not only a contest of identifying threat relations and of methods of managing them. It is also a politics of knowledge(…)“ „, (….)which kind of knowledge should inform migration policy. Social movements, political parties and professional agencies, such as immigration officials, police, custom and the military, compete	The development of high standards inside the EU will also make it easier for Europe to support third countries developing their own solutions to better manage their borders. Initiatives in key African and neighbourhood countries could be supported by Frontex as well (p.11).	Knowledge transfer to third countries; what role should Frontex play in third countries? further attempts to keep migrants away from Europe at all costs?

	over and coordinate between different ways of knowing migration and its relation to the established. The politics of insecurity is then a contest of the legitimacy of using a particular kind of security knowledge in migration policy.“ (Huysmans 2006: 53).		
	“The concept of ‘security experts’ refers to professionals who gain their legitimacy of and power over defining policy problems from trained skills and knowledge and from continuously using these in their work” (Bigo 2000, 2002; Huysmans 2006).	(...) migration will become a specific component of ongoing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (p.5).	Knowledge and know-how within CSDP focus on security
	„Turning immigration issues into a security question involves a mobilization of certain institutions (e.g., the police), a particular kind of knowledge (security knowledge) (...)” (Huysmans 2002: 42).	Frontex can only coordinate return missions but not initiate its own. On the basis of the ongoing evaluation to be concluded this year, the Commission will propose to amend the Frontex legal basis to strengthen its role on return (p.10).	Frontex is gaining more and more responsibility and power within the European Migration and Border Management
	“The reasons for a discourse on ‘regulation’ and the shift from a protective, enabling discourse to one about a rise of insecurity that is intended to be disturbing and worrying needs (...) a detailed analysis of the positions of authority of those who promote a threat definition in each bureaucracy (...). The consequences of the existence beyond the national of such a	Regulation 1052/2013 of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR): an information-exchange system designed to improve management of the EU external borders, OJ L 295, 6.11.2013, p. 1 EUROSUR enables near real-time sharing of border-related data	Eurosur for monitoring mobility and migration from the air → if Frontex is no longer directly on site, it cannot be blamed for not saving people

	transversal and transnational field of unease management linking the practices and the knowledge of the diverse agencies in Europe also needs to be analyzed. This analysis, based on sociological constructivism, requires a reflection about discursive interaction—about the positions of authority of the enunciators, the spokespersons, of the institutions. It must analyze the internal logic of the field of professionals in the management of unease (...)” (Bigo 2002: 85).	between members of the network, consisting of Schengen countries and Frontex (p.11).	
	COM(2016)385		
Technological processes as securitizing practices (deductive)	“(…) (the) modulation of insecurity domains (...) crucially depends on technological and technocratic processes. The development and implementation of technological artefacts and knowledge, such as diagrams, computer networks, scientific data, and even the specific forms that need filling in do more than simply implementing a policy decision that arose from a particular discursive framing of events(…)” (Huysmans 2006: 8).	„Finally, cooperation and information exchange can be developed further in the mutual interest of the EU and its partners. Technological development, notably biometrics and digital identification, can act as a practical tool to bring migration management services together.“ (p. 8).	biometric identification as a possibility to finally determine all risks? Risk categories are directly linked to factors such as race or religion dangerous effects on unidentified migrants
	„The concept of ‘domains of insecurity’ was introduced with that purpose in mind. It is an analytical tool that emphasizes that security framing	“To ensure that third countries fulfil their obligations to readmit their nationals, the following elements need to be prioritized and secured: (...) The	The EU is trying to establish its own ideas on the management of social relations and the technological regulation of mobility also in third countries

	is a multidimensional process of interconnecting diverse policy issues through institutional codifications (...), the application of certain skills and routines, the use of particular technologies, and the dominance of particular policy orientations and method.” (Huysmans 2006: 150).	facilitation of the identification of irregular migrants in view of their readmission by strengthening third countries’ capacity to ensure functioning civil registries and fingerprint or biometrics digitalisation, as well as capacity building on border and migration management.” (p.7).	
‘Fight’ against smugglers as securitizing practices (inductive)		“EU Cooperation Platforms on migrant smuggling should be launched (...)” (p.8).	Reference to smugglers on the first pages dangerous consequences for the handling of migrants who become involved in ‘criminal’ networks
Securitizing knowledge/actors (deductive)	“(…) politics of insecurity is not only a contest of identifying threat relations and of methods of managing them. It is also a politics of knowledge(...)“ „ (...)which kind of knowledge should inform migration policy. Social movements, political parties and professional agencies, such as immigration officials, police, custom and the military, compete over and coordinate between different ways of knowing migration and its relation to the established. The politics of insecurity is then a contest of the legitimacy of using a particular kind of security knowledge in migration policy.“ (Huysmans 2006: 53).	The European Border and Coast Guard will bring consistency and robustness to the external border, notably at times of high pressure, with security a key consideration. A reformed Common European Asylum System will remedy the existing system which was unable to cope with people effectively ignoring the rules and travelling to their country of choice. Restoring order in these areas will drastically reduce the incentives for irregular entry but will also require sufficient EU funding to reflect the common responsibility. Effective action on migrant smuggling inside the EU – centred on the new European Migrant	Robust borders, with security being a key consideration. What knowledge is needed for such ‘robust borders’ ?

		Smuggling Centre in Europol – is a prerequisite for successful practical cooperation with third countries (p.5)	
	“The concept of ‘security experts’ refers to professionals who gain their legitimacy of and power over defining policy problems from trained skills and knowledge and from continuously using these in their work” (Bigo 2000, 2002; Huysmans 2006).	“In the Aegean Sea and the Central Mediterranean, Frontex cooperates with NATO and Operation EUNAVFORMED Sophia, bringing together their different roles in terms of managing migration, gathering intelligence on smuggling, exchanging information, coordinating patrols, and working together on disembarkations. This should be taken one step further in the Central Mediterranean by sharing assets in real time and establishing a common risk assessment on threats to maritime security and border security (...)” (p.4).	What are the implications if Frontex exchanges know-how with NATO, <i>the</i> securitizing actor?
	„Turning immigration issues into a security question involves a mobilization of certain institutions (e.g., the police), a particular kind of knowledge (security knowledge) (...)” (Huysmans 2002: 42).	“At the core of the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March was the interlocking of migration management on both sides of the Aegean Sea, with an unprecedented degree of cooperation between the EU and an external partner. In full accordance with EU and international law, the aim was to remove the incentive to seek irregular routes.	NATO as <i>the</i> security actor; what kind of profession does Frontex need to recruit in order to professionalize border management practices?

		Together with the work of NATO and Frontex, its implementation, including on readmission of all arriving third country nationals, had an immediate impact on crossings from Turkey into Greece. It showed that international cooperation can succeed – in saving lives at sea and breaking the business model of smugglers.” (p. 3).	
JOIN(2015) 50			
Technological processes as securitizing practices (deductive)	“Securitizing in contemporary world politics develops significantly through unspectacular processes of technologically driven surveillance, risk management and precautionary governance.” (Huysmans 2011: 375).	The EU should increase support for efforts to devise national and regional strategies addressing migrant smuggling and to build integrated border management standards (p.17).	These management standards entail securitized practices
	“(…) (the) modulation of insecurity domains (…) crucially depends on technological and technocratic processes. The development and implementation of technological artefacts and knowledge, such as diagrams, computer networks, scientific data, and even the specific forms that need filling in do more than simply implementing a policy decision that arose from a particular discursive framing of events(…)” (Huysmans 2006: 8).	Where necessary, the EU will seek to improve the legal framework for judicial and police cooperation with partner countries and work towards its implementation. With Interpol, the need should be examined to build further law enforcement capacity in neighbouring countries and work on facilitating information exchanges with EU Member States and Europol. With Eurojust, the EU will promote a stronger engagement and cooperation in order to ease judicial	European juridical and police practices should be promoted in partner country

		cooperation on all serious crimes investigations (p.13)	
	„The concept of ‘domains of insecurity’ was introduced with that purpose in mind. It is an analytical tool that emphasizes that security framing is a multidimensional process of interconnecting diverse policy issues through institutional codifications (...), the application of certain skills and routines, the use of particular technologies, and the dominance of particular policy orientations and method.” (Huysmans 2006: 150).	„The measures set out in this Joint Communication seek to offer ways to strengthen the resilience of the EU’s partners in the face of external pressures and their ability to make their own sovereign choices.“ (p.4).	Emphasis on security cooperation and border control, the impact of a crisis increases the threat perception of decision-makers. instead of openly emphasizing the renewed prioritization of security cooperation, → the phrase resilience has been adopted (bridging the gap between the universal values it has long promoted and its crisis-oriented responses to security threats)
‘Fight’ against smugglers as securitizing practices (inductive)		“More than ever after the November 13th terrorist attacks in Paris, intensified cooperation with our neighbours is needed in these areas. Safe and legal mobility and tackling irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling are also priorities.” (p. 3).	There is a direct link between terrorist attacks, human smuggling and irregular migration
		“The EU should increase support for efforts to devise national and regional strategies addressing migrant smuggling and to build integrated border management standards, working with relevant EU agencies” (p.17)	Addressing migrant smuggling as a priority when it comes to mobility and migration policies
Securitizing knowledge/actors (deductive)	„(...) the process (of securitization of migration) has included multiple actors such as	“The consultation showed a very widespread wish to see security given a stronger place in	National governments have already undertaken their own processes of securitization and saw an

	national governments, grass roots, European transnational police networks, the media, etc.” (Huysmans 2000: 758).	the ENP, in order to make partner countries more resilient against threats they currently experience. (...) Proactive engagement with partners in the neighbourhood is necessary to address root causes of cross-border threats and to contribute to securing common borders.” (2015: p.13).	urgent need to review the ENP The neighbourhood is seen as a possible source of instability and, hence, can endanger the EU’s internal status quo
	„Turning immigration issues into a security question involves a mobilization of certain institutions (e.g., the police), a particular kind of knowledge (security knowledge) (...)” (Huysmans 2002: 42).	„Proactive engagement with partners in the neighbourhood in the field of border management is necessary to better manage migratory pressures. Together with interested partner countries, the EU will further intensify work on information exchange, administrative capacity and operational and technical cooperation. This could be done via training, research, capacity building projects and pilot projects with partner countries, notably working through relevant EU Agencies, including FRONTEX and EUROPOL“ (2015: p.17).	Agencies like Frontex should share their knowledge with third countries
COM(2011) 743			
Technological processes as securitizing practices (deductive)	“The securitization of migration is a structural effect of a multiplicity of practices. If one wishes to interpret how this structural	“The following tools can be applied within the various stages of dialogue and operational cooperation (...) and will find their	Usage of specific knowledge tools supports technocratic approach, statistics, profiles and studies appear to be objective even though they are not; discriminating

	effect has been produces by the political, professional and social actors involved, one has to focus on the relation between the positions of these actors and the practices they perform.” (Huysmans 2000: 758).	place in the MP/CAMM framework: (1) Knowledge tools, including migration profiles, mapping instruments, studies, statistical reports, impact assessments and fact-finding missions; (2) Dialogue tools, including migration missions, seminars and conferences; (3) Cooperation tools, including capacity-building, cooperation platforms, exchanges of experts, twinning, operational cooperation and targeted projects and programmes.” (p.12).	certain groups of people (e.g. arab countries → deep-rooted securitization)
‘Fight’ against smugglers as securitizing practices (inductive)		“Migration and mobility are embedded in the broader political, economic, social and security context. A broad understanding of security means that irregular migration also needs to be considered in connection with organised crime and lack of rule of law and justice, feeding on corruption and inadequate regulation.” (p.15).	irregular migration directly linked to organized crime
Securitizing knowledge/actors (deductive)	“The concept of ‘security experts’ refers to professionals who gain their legitimacy of and power over defining policy problems from trained skills and knowledge and from continuously using these in their work” (Bigo 2000, 2002; Huysmans 2006).	“However, the EU’s external migration policy also builds on (...) operational support and capacity-building (including via the EU agencies such as Frontex, the EASO and the ETF and technical assistance facilities such as MIEUX	Capacity building as part of management approach, usage of technical assistance facilities technical and technocratic approach supports the view that apolitical solutions are sought for rational problem definitions

		and TAIEX) (...)” (p.10).	
	“The reasons for a discourse on ‘regulation’ and the shift from a protective, enabling discourse to one about a rise of insecurity that is intended to be disturbing and worrying needs (...) a detailed analysis of the positions of authority of those who promote a threat definition in each bureaucracy (...). The consequences of the existence beyond the national of such a transversal and transnational field of unease management linking the practices and the knowledge of the diverse agencies in Europe also needs to be analyzed. This analysis, based on sociological constructivism, requires a reflection about discursive interaction—about the positions of authority of the enunciators, the spokespersons, of the institutions. It must analyze the internal logic of the field of professionals in the management of unease (...)” (Bigo 2002: 85).	“The EU should continue to give priority to transfers of skills, capacity and resources to its partners, in order to prevent and reduce trafficking, smuggling and irregular migration, and to strengthening integrated border management.” (p.15).	Also questions of power need to be dealt with → skill and knowledge transfer appears to be a one way street
	“Securitisation rests on the capacity of actors to constitute statistics about their aim and under their own categories, to put them in series, to be able to submit them to examinations, to protocols of research, with empirical checks, in short, to produce ‘a truth’ on	“The capability of FRONTEX to work in partnership with non-EU authorities should be fully utilised. (...) There is a need for closer cooperation between the relevant EU agencies which would allow better	Frontex’s role in capacity building and knowledge transfer in transit and origin countries → border management und securitization?

	these statements. Truth which needs to be congruent with what is the current knowledge about the world. This of course is given only to the security professionals. Only they may impose a hierarchy of threats, rendering certain phenomena not only dangerous but more dangerous than others.” (Bigo 2000: 347).	exchanges of information on migration and organised crime. Relevant agencies are FRONTEX, EUROPOL, EUROJUST (...)” (p.16).	
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2. QCA: Developmentization of Migration

Category	Example from Text	Interpretation
COM(2015)240		
Recruitment (deductive 3R)	“It (the EU) must also recognise that the skills needed for a vibrant economy cannot always immediately be found inside the EU labour market or will take time to develop” (p. 7).	Economic development within the EU calls for a specific kind of labour migration (cheap labour in low skill professions and skills shortages) → developmental benefits for EU (vibrant economy)
Other	“The EU must continue engaging beyond its borders and strengthen cooperation with its global partners, address root causes, and promote modalities of legal migration that foster circular growth and development in the countries of origin and destination” (p. 7).	‘win-win’ for countries of origin and destination if migration is efficiently and ‘root causes’ of migration are tackled → development is something that can be achieved through a specific kind of policy (Underlying notion of development)
Other	“Many of the root causes of migration lie deep in global issues which the EU has been trying to address for many years. Migration should be recognised as one of the primary areas where an active and engaged EU external policy is of direct importance to EU citizens. Civil war, persecution, poverty, and climate change all feed directly and immediately into migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of	‘root causes’ of migration? EU external policy focusing on migration (especially preventing migration) when talking about migration it usually means a movement from the South to the North in the search of development and prosperity → EU has been trying to address root causes and has not been

	primary importance for the migration debate” (p. 7).	successful; development problems or root causes (civil war, persecution, poverty) are heterogeneous phenomena whose causes and contexts often have much to do with power relations, privileges and exclusion (Underlying notion of development)
Other	“EU external cooperation assistance, and in particular development cooperation, plays an important role in tackling global issues like poverty, insecurity, inequality and unemployment which are among the main root causes of irregular and forced migration. This includes support in regions of Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe where most of the migrants reaching Europe originate from. As well as addressing long-term root causes, the EU helps to mitigate the impact of crisis at a local level” (p. 8).	Poverty, insecurity and unemployment as ‘root causes’ of migration; so that are the areas development cooperation should focus on.
Recruitment (deductive 3R)	“Europe is competing with other economies to attract workers with the skills it needs. Changes in the skills required by the EU between 2012 and 2025 are expected to show a sharp increase in the share of jobs employing higher-educated labour (by 23%). Shortages have already been seen in key sectors such as science, technology, engineering and healthcare. Europe needs to build up its own skills base and equip people for inclusion in today’s labour market (...) The EU is also facing a series of long-term economic and demographic challenges. Its population is ageing, while its economy is increasingly dependent on highly-skilled jobs. Furthermore, without migration the EU’s working age population will decline by 17.5 million in the next decade. Migration will increasingly be an important way to enhance the sustainability of our welfare system and to ensure sustainable growth of the EU economy” (p. 14).	Skill shortages in Europe → need for highly skilled migrants. Economic growth calls for highly skilled professionals and a younger work force in general due to demographic developments in Europe (in order to sustain the welfare system) There is a distinction between ‘needed’ or ‘wanted’ migration and ‘irregular’ or ‘unwanted’ migration Development = Growth, growth can only be assured when need of highly-skilled workers is matched and when working age population is kept on a high level. Underlying notion of development
Recruitment (deductive 3R)	“Decisions on the volume of admissions of third country nationals coming to seek work will remain the exclusive	EU has no influence on simplifying or supporting ‘regular’ labour migration because labor

	competence of Member States” (p. 14).	migration is in the competence of Member States.
Recruitment (deductive 3R)	“The next step should be an attractive EU-wide scheme for highly qualified third-country nationals. The Blue Card Directive already provides such a scheme, but in its first two years, only 16,000 Blue Cards were issued and 13,000 were issued by a single Member State. By the end of May, the Commission will launch a public consultation on future of the Blue Card Directive. A review of the Directive will look at how to make it more effective in attracting talent to Europe. The review will include looking at issues of scope such as covering entrepreneurs who are willing to invest in Europe, or improving the possibilities for intra EU mobility for Blue Card holders” (p. 15).	‘wanted’ migrants are highly qualified third-country nationals → concrete plan is introduced on how to attract ‘talents’
Recruitment (deductive 3R)	“Another sector with important economic impact is services. The services sector includes well-trained, highly-skilled foreign professionals who need to travel to the EU for short periods in order to provide services to businesses or governments. The Commission will assess possible ways to provide legal certainty to these categories of people, also in order to strengthen the EU’s position to demand reciprocities when negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)” (p. 15).	‘wanted’: high-skilled professionals who travel to the EU for short periods (who won’t stay there, therefore who don’t migrate?) to provide services to business or governments.
Recruitment (deductive 3R)	“The EU’s legal migration policy should also support the development of countries of origin. The United Nations will shortly adopt the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and migration-related targets should be included, alongside targets in areas such as promoting decent work, youth employment, wage and social protection policies which can help countries of origin to create better economic opportunities at home. The EU will continue to actively support migration-related targets as part of the final overall framework, and to emphasise the importance of harnessing the positive effects of migration as a horizontal means of implementation for the post-2015 development agenda. This would	If migration cooperation and migration per se is seen as development efforts, what does that mean for actual development investments? depoliticising the question of migration by treating it as a question of mobility Mainstreaming migration issues into key development sectors → development is not an end goal itself

	complement the work of the EU's Mobility Partnerships and our efforts to mainstream migration issues into key development sectors" (p.16).	
Development as Individual Responsibility (inductive) → interlinked with theory remittances 3R	"One way in which the EU can help to ensure that countries of origin benefit from migration is through facilitating cheaper, faster and safer remittance transfers" (p.17).	Remittance is emphasised in many EU policy papers. Is the impact of remittances overestimated? What does the reliance on remittances mean for migrants? → they are responsible for development issues?
Recruitment (deductive 3R)	"This would use verifiable criteria to automatically make an initial selection of potential migrants, with employers invited to identify priority applicants from the pool of candidates, and migration taking place after the migrant is offered a job. This would allow for the creation of an "EU-wide pool" of qualified migrants, accessible to both employers and Member States' authorities – but with the actual selection and the admission procedure remaining national, based on Member States' actual labour market needs" (p.18).	'admission procedures' of migrants based on the actual labour market needs of the Member States
COM(2016) 385		
Development as Individual Responsibility (inductive)	"The EU and Member States are the world's largest development and humanitarian donor, with an increasing financial commitment to immediate humanitarian support to refugees and more structural support on migration. The EU has a long-standing tradition of support to refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities (...). But the scale of global needs has put the onus on being more targeted and effective, with investment which has a real impact on migration, tailored to the needs and circumstances of each country. The Commission has set out its strategic vision on how EU external action can foster the resilience and self-reliance of forcibly displaced people as close as possible to refugees' country of origin" (p.4).	EU as largest donor of development and humanitarian aid and refugee support Investments need to have real impact on migration, tailored to the needs and circumstances of each country → EU wants to strengthen the resilience and self-confidence of forcibly displaced persons and promote that refugees stay as close as possible to their country of origin. Resilience = development? Principle of self-reliance: Immigrants, instead of governments, then become the largest provider of foreign aid
Migration Management (inductive)	"Experience has shown that migration policy inside and outside the Union has a direct link. The reality of the past year on all migratory routes has been that when border and migration management were seen to fail, this became a pull factor" (p.5).	Open borders as a pull factor? → depoliticizing migration narratives

Other	“In the long term, the EU should continue to increase its efforts to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and to provide capacity building to the host communities and relevant institutions. The compacts will benefit from synergies with all policies, initiatives and processes that are aimed at addressing the long-term objectives, such as the political, social, economic and environmental factors that constitute the root causes (including through the facilitation of economic, social and cultural investments of the diaspora in countries of origin)” (p.6).	Targeting ‘root causes’ It is not questioned to what extent external actors/actions can trigger development at all → Underlying notion of development
Migration Management (inductive)	“Increasing coherence between migration and development policy is important to ensure that development assistance helps partner countries manage migration more effectively, and also incentivises them to effectively cooperate on readmission of irregular migrants. Positive and negative incentives should be integrated in the EU's development policy, rewarding those countries that fulfil their international obligation to readmit their own nationals, and those that cooperate in managing the flows of irregular migrants from third countries, as well as those taking action to adequately host persons fleeing conflict and persecution. Equally, there must be consequences for those who do not cooperate on readmission and return. The same should be true of trade policy, notably where the EU gives preferential treatment to its partners: migration cooperation should be a consideration in the forthcoming evaluation of trade preferences under “GSP+”” (p.9).	‘helping’ partner countries to manage migration more effectively and (or which equals) cooperation on readmission agreements. EU wants to provide management policies and expertise, but otherwise ignores its own role in power and inequality issues at global, national or local level → trade benefits when cooperating on readmission agreements → development is seen as something than can be given to a country; it is used as a leverage so the EU can either give it or take it away (probably development funds, still a very simplified notion about how development can be triggered) → Underlying notion of development
Migration Management (inductive)	“First, in deploying existing financial instruments, special attention will be given to projects aimed at improving migration management and prioritising those projects enabling third countries to fulfil their obligations to readmit their nationals” (p.9)	Financial support in development project, only if readmission takes place? Development as a leverage? Are development projects chosen with regards to which project serve migration interests?
Migration Management (inductive)	“Third, programming of aid by the EU and Member States should be even more targeted. Recently, Official Development Aid (ODA) from the EU and its Member	ODA only if positive impacts on migration flows and management will be maximized (means: if migration will be reduced, but there is no empirical evidence that

	States to the key priority countries averaged EUR 4.4 billion per year. To deliver the compacts, the Commission will continue to ensure that in the design and implementation of all programmes under all focal sectors chosen in a country, positive impacts on migration flows and management will be maximized” (p.9).	more development = less migration)
Other	“In the long term the EU will continue to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. This will require fundamentally reconsidering the scale and nature of traditional development cooperation models. A much greater role must be given to private investors looking for new investment opportunities in emerging markets. Instead of letting irregular migrants risk their lives trying to reach European labour markets, European private and public resources should be mobilised for investment in third countries of origin” (p.11).	Development cooperation should be fully reconsidered with regards to ‘root causes’ of migration Underlying notion of development: private investments from the EU in third countries can prevent migration to the EU
Other	“A particularly important role should thus be played by the full range of innovative financing mechanisms that can be deployed and developed to leverage loan and grant financing, encourage public-private partnerships and crowd in private investment. If deployed intelligently, leveraged use of the limited budget resources available will generate growth and employment opportunities in source as well as transit countries and regions. The removal of bottlenecks to investment in SMEs and sustainable infrastructure should address some of the root causes of migration directly, given the high impact of such investments in terms employment and inequality reduction” (p.11).	It is not questioned to what extent external actors can trigger development at all Private investments will lead to inequality reduction → Underlying notion of development
Other	“The Commission therefore sees the need for an ambitious External Investment Plan that would tackle the root causes of migration, while contributing to the achievement of other development goals. Drawing on the experience and expertise of the European Investment Bank (EIB), as in the case of the successful 'Investment Plan for Europe', such a plan would be based on three pillars. The first pillar would enable using scarce	It is not questioned to what extent external actors can trigger development at all → Underlying notion of development Depoliticizing narrative

	public resources in an innovative way to mobilise private investment by offering additional guarantees and concessional funds. The second pillar would focus on technical assistance, helping local authorities and companies develop a higher number of bankable projects and make them known to the international investor community. The third pillar would target the general business environment by fostering good governance, fighting corruption, removing barriers to investment and market distortions. It would do so building upon current efforts and lessons learned” (p.11).	
Migration Management (inductive)	“The EU and its Member States should combine their respective instruments and tools to agree compacts with third countries in order to better manage migration. This means, for each partner country, the development of a mix of positive and negative incentives, the use of which should be governed by a clear understanding that the overall relationship between the EU and that country will be guided in particular by the ability and willingness of the country to cooperate on migration management” (p.17).	The overall relationship between the EU and the respective neighboring country is determined in particular by the country’s ability and willingness to cooperate in migration management.
JOIN(2015) 50		
Other	“The EU cannot alone solve the many challenges of the region, and there are limits to its leverage, but the new ENP will play its part in helping to create the conditions for positive development” (p.2).	EU bringing development into neighbouring countries EU may not be able to bring developmental change to different regions, but it can at least help
Migration Management (inductive)	“More effective ways will be sought to promote democratic, accountable and good governance, as well as to promote justice reform, where there is a shared commitment to the rule of law, and fundamental rights. Open markets and growth, inclusive economic development, and in particular the prospects for youth, is highlighted as a key to stabilising societies in the neighbourhood. There will be greater attention to the energy security and climate action both of the EU and of the partners themselves” (p.3).	Democratic, accountable and good governance is prerequisite for migration cooperation?

Migration Management (inductive)	“The incentive-based approach ("More for More") has been successful in supporting reforms in the fields of good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, where there is a commitment by partners to such reforms” (p.5).	On the one hand promotion of European values, on the other hand ownership, resilience
Other	“As the recent refugee crisis shows, addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement is central to stabilisation in the Neighbourhood” (p.15).	‘refugee crisis’ brought development migration nexus back in focus
Recruitment (deductive 3R)	“In March 2016, the Commission intends to present a revision of the EU Blue Card Directive, to improve and further facilitate the entry and residence of highly skilled third-country nationals in the EU. The EU should facilitate the extension of academic mobility and improve the legal framework for conditions of entry and residence in the EU applicable to ENP nationals for the purpose of research, studies, pupil exchange, training and voluntary service” (p.16).	There are certain reasons, that have been identified as legitimate reasons for migrations → these reasons overall should benefit the EU
Recruitment (deductive 3R)	“In cooperation with Member States, we will promote a skilled labour migration scheme, including the possibility of offering preferential schemes for nationals of the ENP countries willing to engage on further cooperation on migration with the EU. A platform of dialogue with businesses, trade unions and social partners will be established in order to better assess labour market needs and the role that migration could play in that respect” (p.16).	Migration in order to address labour market needs; The EU is trying to optimize its selection criteria for who can and who cannot migrate.
Development as Individual Responsibility (inductive) → interlinked with theory (return 3R)	“In the same vein, more effective ways of building links with diaspora communities, of reinforcing regional mobility schemes, including South-South mobility, and of working on circular migration will be sought, including through identification of schemes in relevant sectors” (p.16).	Diaspora communities and circular migration as reasons for the benefits of the migration development nexus
Development as Individual Responsibility (inductive) → interlinked with theory (return 3R)	“The EU should also look at allowing people temporarily residing in the EU to engage in a business, professional or other activity in their country of origin, while maintaining their main residence in one of the Member	Remittances as another buzzword; all these strategies lay responsibility for positive development in the country of origin in the hand of the migrant

	States. Issues related to efficient transfer of remittances should also be addressed” (p.16).	
Return (deductive 3R)	“We will create a new start-up (Startback) fund to provide capital to promote "brain circulation". This Fund will support migrants returning to their countries of origin after their stay in the European Union, so they can reintegrate and contribute, with the acquired skills and knowledge, to local economic and societal development” (p.16).	Underlying assumption: required skills and knowledge for positive development can be acquired in the EU; development based on the model of the EU
Return (deductive 3R)	“All tools will be mobilised to increase cooperation on return and readmission, thus giving readmission a central place in all dialogues with countries of origin and transit of irregular migrants” (p.16).	Key focus should be placed on the readmission of irregular migrants
COM(2011) 743		
Recruitment (deductive 3R)	“Migration and mobility in the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy aim to contribute to the vitality and competitiveness of the EU. Securing an adaptable workforce with the necessary skills which can cope successfully with the evolving demographic and economic changes is a strategic priority for Europe. There is also an urgent need to improve the effectiveness of policies aiming at integration of migrants into the labour market. Policies in place need to be reviewed and strengthened as the Union faces pressing labour market challenges, particularly shortfalls in skill levels and serious labour mismatches” (p.4).	Migration that benefits the EU should be promoted; high-skilled workers can contribute to Europe’s competitiveness and economic and demographic development.
Migration Management (inductive)	“The GAMM should establish a comprehensive framework to manage migration and mobility with partner countries in a coherent and mutually beneficial way through policy dialogue and close practical cooperation. It should be firmly embedded in the EU’s overall foreign policy framework, including development cooperation, and well aligned with the EU’s internal policy priorities” (p.4).	when talking about migration it usually means a movement from the south to the North in the search of development and prosperity
Migration Management (inductive)	“With an increasingly global labour market for the highly skilled, there is already strong competition for talent. Dialogue and cooperation with non-EU countries should also place	‘talented’ people are welcomed within the EU, but border controls need to be effective in order to prevent ‘non-talented’ people from entering the EU, readmission cooperation need to be in place

	migration and mobility in the perspective of the need to maintain orderly movements. Without well-functioning border controls, lower levels of irregular migration and an effective return policy, it will not be possible for the EU to offer more opportunities for legal migration and mobility” (p.5).	Labor migration to tackle irregular migration
Migration Management (inductive)	“Good governance of migration will also bring vast development benefits” (p.6).	There are instruments that work and instruments that don’t work
Development as Individual Responsibility (inductive)	“Evidence shows that migrant households can increase their well-being thanks to opportunities abroad to acquire new skills and work experience. Migration and mobility can also foster more foreign direct investment and trade links, especially bearing in mind the role of diaspora communities. It is thus in the interest of the migrant source countries, as well as of the destination countries, to work together to ensure maximum development benefits from the transfer of remittances, know-how and innovations” (p.6).	migrants sending money back, transferring know how, innovations; from the EU to the country of origin The problem is that the responsibility to make a positive impact on the development of the country of origin lies in the hand of the individual and in some way leads to a situation where the EU does no need to take responsibility for structural historical inequality
Migration Management (inductive)	“The MP will help to ensure that the conditions necessary for well-managed migration and mobility in a secure environment are in place. Provided legal instruments (visa facilitation and readmission agreements) and political instruments (policy dialogue and action plans) are implemented effectively, the EU would be able to consider taking gradual and conditional steps towards visa liberalisation for individual partner countries on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the overall relationship with the partner country concerned” (p.11).	Visa facilitation in exchange for readmission agreements seems to be one of the essential legal instruments of the development migration nexus
Development as Individual Responsibility (inductive)	“Effective integration, in particular in the labour market, is the key to ensuring that both migrants and receiving societies can benefit from the potential of migration, including via stronger diaspora communities and migrant entrepreneurs. The Communication on the European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals suggests new approaches and areas for action. Dialogue with EU partners should further explore the role of diaspora	Responsibility → migrant entrepreneurs and diaspora communities

	communities and transnational networks in this context, e.g. in preparing migrants better for residence in the Member States” (p.13).	
Migration Management (inductive)	“Linking readmission agreements to visa facilitation agreements as part of the EU’s external migration policy can be of benefit to non-EU countries by providing opportunities for mobility while safeguarding security and reducing risks of irregular migration” (p.16).	Focus on the security component of migration and migration control
Development as Individual Responsibility (inductive) → interlinked with theory (remittances 3R)	“The EU and the international community have made great strides to promote the beneficial development outcomes of migration. Much progress has been made on facilitating the positive impact of remittances and voluntary initiatives by the diaspora” (p.18).	Responsibility on migrants sending remittances and diaspora communities Principle of self-reliance: Immigrants, instead of governments, then become the largest provider of foreign aid
Return (deductive 3R)	“The EU can help migrants to move in orderly fashion and take back home the resources and skills their countries of origin often badly need” (p.19).	resources and skills that can be acquired in Europe → then need to be brought back home
Other	“Successful mainstreaming of migration in development thinking requires making it an integral part of a whole range of sectoral policies (on agriculture, health, education, etc.). In parallel, targeted migration-related initiatives should be promoted. The often still limited awareness, amongst practitioners, of the relevance of migration issues to development should be addressed, both in the EU and in its partner countries” (p.19).	Migration as integral part of development policy
Development as Individual Responsibility (inductive)	“Policy coherence can also be facilitated by Extended Migration Profiles, which are increasingly being used to produce a better and more sustainable evidence base on the migration and development nexus. They bring together all stakeholders in a country-specific process in order to identify and address data gaps and needs regarding current migration patterns, labour market trends, legislation and policy frameworks, information on remittance flows, diasporas and other development-related data. Ownership should be in the hands of the partner country, and sustainability should be	disciplining of human mobility and the establishment of an ideal mobility regime; focus on ownership

	ensured through adequate capacity-building” (p.20).	
Migration Management (inductive) → interlinked with theory (recruitment 3R)	“To make the EU more prosperous, it needs to become more competitive, attracting talent and investments. To manage mobility in a secure environment, the EU needs to continue its prioritised dialogue and cooperation with partner countries in the EU Neighbourhood and further afield. To offer international protection to those in need, and to improve the development impact of migration and mobility for its partners, the EU must be a leading actor in global governance” (p.21).	EU as the leading actor in global governance can contribute to development Underlying notion of development
Other	“Maximising the positive impact of migration on development of partner countries (both of origin and destination) while limiting its negative consequences will remain a key priority (...)” (p.23).	win-win-win situation negative consequences (skill shortages in country of origin? Negative consequences for EU countries?)
Other	“Development objectives are being taken into account more and more in the EU and partner countries’ migration policies. At the same time the migration dimension is increasingly being taken into account within development strategies” (p.23).	The renewed optimism on the migration development nexus → idea of the migration development nexus is not new Migration has a positive impact on development and development has a positive impact on migration
Development as Individual Responsibility (inductive) → interlinked with theory (remittances 3R)	“The EU is widely recognised as a leading stakeholder at international level with regard to facilitating cheaper and more secure private remittance flows to developing countries while adding to their impact on development” (p.23).	High hopes in remittance flows
Return (deductive 3R)	“Circular mobility has been encouraged by a number of national and EU legislative measures and by specific projects” (p.24).	High hopes also in circular mobility
Migration Management (inductive)	“Migration has a significant impact on the development of non-EU countries. Several governments have based their economic development model partly on immigration or emigration, without taking into account either the economic and social costs and consequences or the expected contribution to growth and sustainable development” (p.24).	The renewed optimism on the migration development nexus: Migration has a significant impact on the development of non-EU countries Effective migration management in country of origin → decreasing social and economic costs
Other	“There is a growing need to promote migration governance from a development perspective at	The renewed optimism on the migration development nexus is somewhat surprising, as it

	all levels and to improve the understanding of the development and migration nexus, be it in migration/asylum government policies or in other sectors that may impact on or be impacted by migration” (p.25).	contrasts with the difficulties or even failure of the EU, both in promoting development and in regulating migration
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3. QCA: Mobility and Migration

Category	Examples from text	Interpretation
COM[2011] 743		
Mobility (97)	“However, it is at regional, national and local levels that each individual and each stakeholder will seize the opportunities brought by <i>migration and by mobility</i> ” (p.2)	There seem to be different opportunities arising from migration and mobility Used simultaneously
	“Mobility of third country nationals across the external EU borders is of strategic importance in this regard. It applies to a wide range of people, e.g. short-term visitors, tourists, students, researchers, business people or visiting family members. It is thus a much broader concept than migration” (p.3)	Broader concept, do people looking for refuge and fleeing their country belong in that concept?
	“The aim is to ensure that before visa obligations are facilitated or lifted, a number of specific benchmarks are fulfilled by the partner countries, including in areas such as <i>asylum, border management and irregular migration. This process can ensure mobility in a secure environment</i> ” (p.3)	Mobility should not entail the ‘negative’ aspects of migration; mobility is supposed to be a new term that entails only the positive advantage arising from the movement of people Mobility is referred to in the same sentence as secure → security context
	“(…) addressing migration and mobility issues in a comprehensive and balanced manner” (p.5).	Must be different concepts that require different approaches Used simultaneously
	“Without well-functioning border controls, lower levels of irregular migration and an effective return policy, it will not be possible for the EU to offer more opportunities for <i>legal migration and mobility</i> ” (p.5)	Difference between legal and circular migration and mobility? It stands against the term of irregular migration, irregular migration must stop, ‘unwanted’ migrants must be sent back → then mobility starts Used simultaneously In a broader security context → in the same sentence
	“(…) legal migration and mobility, irregular migration	Migration and mobility are most of the time used in the same

	and trafficking in human beings, international protection and asylum policy, and maximising the development impact of <i>migration and mobility</i> (...)” (p.6)	sentence, but it migration is specified, legal migration and mobility are used together <i>Used simultaneously</i>
	“The GAMM should be migrant-centred. It is to be based on the principle that the migrant is at the core of the analysis and all action and must be empowered to gain access to <i>safe mobility</i> “ (p.7)	Migrant can be mobile <i>Security context, emphasize in safe mobility</i>
	“The MP provides the comprehensive framework to ensure that movements of persons between the EU and a partner country are well-governed. The MP brings together all the measures to ensure that <i>migration and mobility</i> are mutually beneficial for the EU and its partners, including opportunities for <i>greater labour mobility</i> ” (p.10)	Difference labour migration and labour mobility is not clear, maybe the duration of the stay: In the GAMM labour mobility is used, In the MP labour migration is used. <i>Used simultaneously</i>
	“Possible revisions of the Directives on researchers and students could further facilitate admission, residence and <i>intra-EU mobility</i> of these key groups for preserving the EU’s future innovation capacity and competitiveness” (p.12)	Movement inside the Schengen Area is mobility
	“As mobility of third country nationals is closely interlinked with the common EU visa policy for short stays, all the possibilities under the Visa Code should be used to simplify procedures and increase transparency” (p.14)	Supports the assumption that mobility is more concern with shorter ‘visits’ of the EU
	“ <i>Greater mobility for students and researchers</i> from third countries could also be a promising path towards catering for labour market needs in Europe if some students were to be able to work after completing their studies. This issue could be further explored, taking into account Member State competence and measures to combat brain drain, e.g. <i>through circular migration</i> . This could be done, in particular, by making better use of existing Mobility Partnerships to enhance and facilitate exchanges, of current international mobility programmes and, from 2014 on,	Students, researcher, other professionals are targeted by mobility programmes; closely interlinked with circular migration

	of the future single programme for education, training and youth, and Horizon 2020” (p.14)	
	“Dedicated mobility offers for young people, students, artists and cultural workers, researchers and academics in the form of additional scholarships, fellowship and trainee programmes and youth mobility agreements. Commitments to apply fully and, if appropriate, possibly amend the Directives on students and researchers” (p.15)	It becomes apparent that mobility has a clear target group
	“Linking readmission agreements to visa facilitation agreements as part of the EU’s external migration policy can be of benefit to non-EU countries by <i>providing opportunities for mobility while safeguarding security and reducing risks of irregular migration</i> ” (p.16)	Choosing process for the kind of migration the EU accepts Security context wobei "legitime" Mobilitäten wie Freizeit und Geschäft von "illegitimen" Mobilitäten wie Terrorismus und illegaler Einwanderung getrennt werden (Amoore 2006: 336).
	“Circular mobility has been encouraged by a number of national and EU legislative measures and by specific projects. Greater portability of social security rights should be promoted as a key incentive to <i>circular migration and, more generally, to legal labour mobility</i> ” (p.24)	Circular migration as a specific kind of legal labour mobility? Why is there a need for a new term anyway? Couldn’t just terms such as circular or temporal migration represent the same meaning? When it comes to regular forms as labour migration or circular migration, the difference to mobility is even unclearer
Migration (181)	“The dialogues allow the EU and the partner countries to discuss in a comprehensive manner all aspects of their possible cooperation in <i>managing migration flows and circulation of persons</i> with a view to establishing Mobility Partnerships” (p.2).	Aim of the MP is still managing migration → migration is great concern
	“This is the context in which the EU’s Global Approach to Migration has evolved since it was adopted in 2005. It was designed to address <i>all relevant aspects of migration</i> in a balanced and comprehensive way, in partnership with non-EU countries” (p.3)	Global Approach to Migration became Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
	“The aim is to ensure that before visa obligations are	The term migration is needed to separate between regular and

	facilitated or lifted, a number of specific benchmarks are fulfilled by the partner countries, including in areas such as asylum, border management and irregular migration . This process can ensure mobility in a secure environment” (p.3).	irregular migration. There isn’t supposed to be such a terminology with the word mobility (it is supposed to be always managed and thus always regular)
	“Without well-functioning border controls, lower levels of irregular migration and an effective return policy, it will not be possible for the EU to offer more opportunities for legal migration and mobility ” (p.5).	The term migration is needed to separate between regular and irregular migration. There isn’t supposed to be such a terminology with the word mobility (it is supposed to be always managed and thus always regular)
	“ <i>Good governance of migration</i> will also bring vast development benefits. Evidence shows that migrant households can increase their well-being thanks to <i>opportunities abroad to acquire new skills and work experience</i> . Migration and mobility can also foster more foreign direct investment and trade links, especially bearing in mind the role of diaspora communities (...) If the EU is to engage more systematically in facilitating and managing migration and mobility , this latter aspect should be visible in the pillars on legal migration and on migration and development“ (p.6)	It is not very clear and coherent when migration and when mobility is used; generally, more short-term mobility opportunities should decrease great irregular migration flows Still migration and development linkage, not mobility and development linkage..
	“ <i>Effective integration</i> , in particular in the labour market, is the key to ensuring that both migrants and receiving societies can <i>benefit from the potential of migration</i> , including via stronger diaspora communities and migrant entrepreneurs” (p.13)	Supports the assumption that migration is a long-term concept, with individuals not planning on returning any time soon
	“The legitimacy of any framework for migration and mobility depends on effectively <i>addressing irregular migration</i> . Safe and secure migration is undermined by those who operate outside the legal framework. Intra-EU cooperation is essential, and so is the goal of reinforcing partnerships with non-EU countries in order <i>to ensure that mobility and migration can be organised in an orderly fashion</i> .	Irregular migration is regarded in a context of organized crime, maybe that’s the reason a new concept and a new terminology is needed, in addition to just adding ‘legal’ or ‘circular’ in front of migration

	<i>Migration and mobility are embedded in the broader political, economic, social and security context. A broad understanding of security means that irregular migration also needs to be considered in connection with organised crime and lack of rule of law and justice, feeding on corruption and inadequate regulation” (p.15)</i>	
	“The EU and the international community have made great strides to promote the beneficial development outcomes of migration. Much progress has been made on facilitating the positive impact of remittances and voluntary initiatives by the diaspora. However, the downsides, such as brain drain, social costs and dependence on foreign labour markets, also need to be tackled jointly in partnerships” (p.18) “Successful mainstreaming of migration in development thinking requires making it an integral part of a whole range of sectoral policies. The often still limited awareness, amongst practitioners, of the relevance of migration issues to development should be addressed, both in the EU and in its partner countries” (p.19) “Migration is now an integral part of a number of national and regional development Strategies” (p.23)	Development migration Nexus and not development mobility nexus: even though shorter visits would counter brain drain
	“The EU and its Member States should continue to establish legal frameworks that provide for multiple entry permits and periods of absence from the country of temporary residence so that the benefits of migration can be maximised, for the migrants, source countries and destination countries alike” (p.24)	Also supports the assumption that migration → supposedly forever?
	<i>“Migration has a significant impact on the development of non-EU countries”.</i> (p.24)	Maybe migration becomes less relevant if efficient mobility schemes are put into place
	“There is a growing need to promote migration governance from a development perspective at all levels and to improve the understanding of the	Development and migration nexus; why not development and mobility nexus? What are development opportunities arising from mobility?

	<i>development and migration nexus</i> , be it in migration/asylum government policies or in other sectors that may impact on or be impacted by migration“ (p.25)	
Migration and mobility used together (52)		
Joint Declaration on MP EU Jordan		
Mobility (20)	“(…) to manage more effectively the <i>mobility of persons for short periods</i> and legal and labour migration, taking into account, with regard to the latter, the labour market of the signatories” (p.3)	Mobility of persons is only meant to be for a short period of time
	“(…) To negotiate an agreement to facilitate the issuing of visas between the EU and Jordan, in order to ensure <i>more fluid mobility</i> between the sides” (p.4)	Fluid mobility, less barriers → but for whom? Mobility is most of the time only used in the same sentence as migration or in the context of MP
	“To improve synergies between policies promoting mobility of persons and other areas of sectoral cooperation (trade, education, research, culture) in order to make it easier for <i>Jordanian vocational trainees, students, academics, researchers, artists, culture professionals, government officials and business people</i> to enter and stay in the EU Member States” (p.4)	There is a clear definition for whom mobility should be ensured
	“To stimulate <i>mobility towards the EU for the purpose of acquiring vocational or academic skills</i> that will enable Jordanian nationals to develop viable economic activities and improve their employability within the global labour market” (p.4)	There are skills inside the EU that the Jordanian society needs to require in order to employability in the global labour market → they can come to the EU learn and go back
Migration (35)	“EMPHASISING Jordan's continued efforts to <i>fight irregular migration</i> and combat cross-border networks involved in trafficking and smuggling of human beings” (p.2) “REAFFIRMING that the <i>prevention and control of irregular migration</i> must be reinforced comprehensively and cooperatively by all parties involved and RECOGNISING that poverty and socio-economic imbalances are among the	Whenever migration is used alone not in the same sentence with mobility it needs specification → irregular migration and a relation to crime/human trafficking Goal: perfect management of migratory movements, perfect predictability

	fundamental causes of migratory movement” (p.2) “AWARE that the <i>management of migration flows cannot be achieved solely by means of monitoring measures</i> but also requires concerted action to tackle the root causes of migration” (p.2)	
	“(…) to strengthen <i>cooperation on migration and development</i> in order to exploit <i>the potential of migration and its positive effects on the development</i> of Jordan and the participating EU Member States” (p.3)	Migration development Nexus
	“To better inform Jordanian citizens about the options for <i>legal migration to the EU</i>, including the entry conditions and the rights and duties arising from these” (p.4)	Will there be any opportunities on long-term, legal migration if mobility schemes are preferred?
	“To implement policies to prevent and manage the "brain drain" phenomenon, including by promoting circular migration and the mobilisation of skills, and to address the mismatch between skilled unemployed Jordanians and the Jordanian labour market offer” (p.6)	Difference between circular migration schemes and mobility schemes?
	“To increase the capacities of civil society players to contribute to the improvement of migration management in Jordan, in particular by promoting their activities and cooperation with national authorities to assist migrants and refugees, protect their rights and raise awareness about the risks they may face” (p.7)	Mobility within Jordan? Jordan views all migrants, refugees etc. as guests → fits better with terminology of mobility Still migration management and no mobility management
Migration and mobility used together (6)		