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„The Indonesian Mass Killings of 1965-1966.
Key Moments from an Austrian Perspective"

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I wish to dedicate this thesis

To all my friends in Indonesia.

Abstract

During 1965-66, one of the largest mass killings of the twentieth century was committed in Indonesia. More than half a million people died, and many more were persecuted, arrested, or tortured. Although the Indonesian mass killings deserve special reappraisal due to their intensity, this has not been done to a sufficient extent so far, especially where bilateral perspectives are concerned. While there are a few studies on the involvement of large countries such as the US, the USSR, China, and Japan, there is a lack of detailed studies on many European countries. Therefore, this master's thesis argues that looking at the Austrian perspective on the Indonesian mass killings and the associated events of 1965-66 provides us with important new insights.

The starting point for the analysis is three key moments and the subsequent narratives that were circulated during the Suharto regime, which are still controversial in the research literature. These are, first, the declining health of Indonesian President Sukarno. Second, related to this, are the actions of the September 30th Movement (G30S), in which six Indonesian generals were assassinated, and for which the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) was blamed by General Suharto. And, third, the subsequent mass violence and killings, which were allegedly caused by a spontaneous outburst of populist anger against the PKI.

This raises questions as to what extent the Austrian authorities were aware of these key moments and if their records are consistent with the narratives of the Suharto regime. To answer these questions, files from the Austrian Foreign Ministry and the Austrian Ministry of the Interior from the years 1956-66 serve as the basis for the analysis.

The document analysis results show that the narratives constructed by the Suharto regime cannot be confirmed for the most part by the Austrian files. Rather, they support the existing thesis that the mass killings were not so much a rampage by the population as a coordinated action by the Army. Second, although the masterminds of G30S can also not be clearly identified on the basis of the Austrian files, there is a new piece of evidence that supports the existing thesis that General Suharto knew in advance about the plans of G30S and thus played a larger role than previously assumed. Moreover, the planned groundbreaking of the Bung Karno Tower – just days after G30S – casts even more doubt on Sukarno's involvement. Third, the results show that Sukarno did have health problems and therefore also had regular examinations and operations in Austria, but that these were by no means as serious as has been claimed. And, finally, the results also allow an explanation as to why, other than that he was involved in G30S, Sukarno did not seek further treatment in Austria in September 1965.

Abstract (German)

In den Jahren 1965-1966 wurde in Indonesien einer der größten Massenmorde des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts verübt. Dabei starben mehr als eine halbe Million Menschen und viele weitere wurden verfolgt, festgenommen oder gefoltert. Obwohl die indonesischen Massenmorde aufgrund ihrer Intensität in der Aufarbeitung eine besondere Beachtung verdienen würden, ist dies bislang nicht in ausreichendem Maße betrieben worden, gerade was die bilaterale Perspektive betrifft. Während es zwar vereinzelte Studien über die Beteiligung großer Länder wie etwa USA, UdSSR, China und Japan gibt, fehlen detaillierte Studien, vor allem bezüglich vieler europäischer Länder. In dieser Masterarbeit wird daher gezeigt, dass die Betrachtung der österreichischen Perspektive auf die indonesischen Massenmorde und die damit verbundenen Ereignisse von 1965-1966, wichtige neue Erkenntnisse liefert.

Ausgangspunkt für die Analyse sind drei Schlüsselmomente und die darauf folgenden Narrative, die während des Suharto-Regimes verbreitet wurden und in der Forschungsliteratur immer noch umstritten sind. Diese sind erstens, der schlechter werdende Gesundheitszustand des indonesischen Präsidenten Sukarno. Zweitens, damit verbunden, die Aktionen der Bewegung 30. September (G30S), bei denen sechs indonesische Generäle ermordet wurden, und wofür die Kommunistische Partei Indonesiens (PKI) von General Suharto verantwortlich gemacht wurde. Und drittens, die darauffolgende Massengewalt und die Massenmorde, welche angeblich durch einen spontanen Wutausbruch der Bevölkerung gegen die PKI verursacht wurden.

Es stellen sich dabei die Fragen, inwieweit die österreichischen Behörden über diese Schlüsselmomente informiert waren und deren Aufzeichnungen mit den Narrativen des Suharto-Regimes übereinstimmen. Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen dienen als Datengrundlage für die Analyse Akten des österreichischen Außenministeriums sowie österreichischen Innenministeriums der Jahre 1956-1966.

Die Ergebnisse der Dokumentenanalyse zeigen dabei, dass die vom Suharto Regime konstruierten Narrative sich größtenteils nicht durch die österreichischen Akten bestätigen lassen. Vielmehr stützen diese die bestehende These, dass es sich bei den Massenmorden weniger um einen Amoklauf der Bevölkerung, als vielmehr um eine koordinierte Aktion der Armee gehandelt hat. Zweitens, dass die Hintermänner von G30S sich zwar auch anhand der österreichischen Akten nicht eindeutig ermitteln lassen, es aber ein neues Indiz gibt, welches die vorhandene These stützt, wonach General Suharto vorab von den Plänen von G30S gewusst hat und somit eine größere Rolle als bisher angenommen gespielt hat. Zudem stellt die geplante Grundsteinlegung des Bung Karno Turms – nur wenige Tage nach G30S – eine Involvierung Sukarnos noch stärker in Frage. Drittens zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass Sukarno zwar gesundheitliche Probleme hatte und sich deshalb auch regelmäßig in Österreich untersuchen und operieren ließ, diese aber bei Weitem nicht so schwerwiegend waren, wie behauptet wurde. Und abschließend erlauben die Ergebnisse auch eine andere Erklärung als die Involvierung Sukarnos in G30S, warum er sich im September 1965 nicht mehr in Österreich behandeln ließ.

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List of Key Persons

AIDIT, Dipa Nusantara	Chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), 1951-1965
FELLINGER, Karl	Austrian doctor of Sukarno's in Vienna
FÖRSTER-ROMSWINCKEL, Willhelm Otto	Honorary Consul in Bandung, 1962-2001; area of competence: West-Java
HOHENBÜHEL, Friedrich	First Austrian Ambassador to Indonesia, 1964-1968
KAUTSKY, Christian	Austrian Embassy Secretary in the Austrian Embassy in Jakarta, 1961-1966
KREISKY, Bruno	Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1959-1966; Chancellor of Austria, 1970-1983
LATIEF, Abdul	Officer in the Jakarta Military Command; one of the ringleaders of G30S
LINTL, Hannes	Austrian architect who was supposed to build different buildings for President Sukarno
MALIK, Adam	Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1966-1977
NASUTION, Abdul Harris	Indonesian Army Chief of Staff from October 1955; Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Armed Forces from 1963; Minister of Defense and National Security until March 1962; thereafter Deputy First Minister and Coordinator for Defense
OTTO, Alexander	First Austrian Enjoy in Jakarta, 1961-1964

SELZER, Edgar	Austrian Embassy Secretary in the Austrian Embassy in Jakarta, 1965-1966; Fourth Austrian Ambassador to Indonesia 1980-1983
SUBANDRIO	Secretary General of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 1956-1957; Minister of Foreign Affairs 1957-1965; First Deputy Prime Minister, 1964-1965
SUHARTO	Commander of the Indonesian Army's Strategic Reserve Command in 1965; Second President of Indonesia, 1967-1998
SUKARNO	First President of Indonesia, 1945-1967
TONČIĆ -SORINJ, Lujo	Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs,1966-1968; Secretary General of the Council of Europe, 1969-1974
UMAR Wirahadikusumah	In 1965, Military Commander in Jakarta; Vice President, 1983-1988
UNTUNG	Lieutenant Colonel of the Presidential Palace Guard; one of the ringleaders of G30S
YANI, Achmad	Indonesian Army Commander; murdered with five other leading generals during G30S

Glossary and List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

abangan	nominal Muslim, Java
ABRI	*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
aksi sepihak	unilateral action, land reform program undertaken by the PKI and affiliated organizations
BMAA, BMfaA	*Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten* (Austrian Foreign Ministry); the abbreviation for the Austrian Foreign Ministry after 1959 was initially BMAA and was later renamed to BMfaA
BMI	*Bundesministerium für Inneres* (Austrian Ministry of the Interior)
BTI	*Barisan Tani Indonesia* (Indonesian Peasants' Front)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (US)
Dwikora	*Dwi Komando Rakyat* (People's Double Command: to crush Malaysia and defend the Revolution)
G30S	*Gerakan 30 September* (September 30th Movement)
Gerwani	*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia* (Indonesian Women's Movement)
h.o.	*auf der hierortigen Dienststelle* (at the local office/department)
IPKI	*Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (League of Supporters of Indonesian Freedom)
KAMI	*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* (Indonesian Student's Action Front)
KAPPI	*Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia* (Indonesian Youth and Student Action Front)
konfrontasi	Confrontation; the Indonesian campaign to oppose the formation of Malaysia, 1963-1966
Kopkamtib	*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban* (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
Kostrad	*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat* (Army Strategic Reserve Command)

KOTI	*Komando Operasi Tinggi* (Supreme Operations Command)
manipol	*Manifesto Politik* (Political Manifesto)
MI6	Military Intelligence, Section 6; Secret Intelligence Service (UK)
NASAKOM	*Nasionalisme, Agama, Kommunisme* (Nationalism, Religion, Communism); a political slogan created by Sukarno to try to unite various factions during the Guided Democracy era
NU	*Nahdlatul Ulama*, Council of Islamic Scholars
ÖVP	*Österreichische Volkspartei* (Austrian People's Party)
Pemuda Rakyat	People's Youth; the youth wing of the PKI
Pepelrada	*Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah* (Regional Authority to Implement Dwikora)
PKI	*Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesian Communist Party)
PNI	*Partai Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Party)
RPKAD	*Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat* (Army Paracommando Regiment)
santri	student at an Islamic school, also refers to a devout Muslim
SPÖ	*Soziale Partei Österreichs* (Social Democratic Party of Austria)
supersemar	*Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret* (Order of March 11)
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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1 Introduction

1.1 The Problems and Research Questions

October 1, 1965: Six generals and one lieutenant are kidnapped and murdered, and their bodies are thrown into a well in the village of Lubang Buaya ("Crocodile Hole") in Jakarta, Indonesia. The perpetrators themselves, also from the military, called themselves the September 30th Movement (G30S). They were led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, head of President Sukarno's bodyguard. According to their statements, they acted to forestall a coup by right-wing generals against the then head of state, President Sukarno (Baskara[1] 2015: 17). Whoever was behind this secretly planned operation was still unclear at that time. However, what followed was the seizure of power by the Army (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat*, TNI-AD) under the leadership of General Suharto, who blamed the Communist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI) for the act. In the weeks and months that followed, one of the most horrific crimes of the 20th century occurred. All those suspected of being members or sympathizers of the PKI were persecuted, arrested, tortured, or killed (Baskara 2015: 17). From October 1965 onwards, witch hunts took place on the various islands (first and foremost Java and Bali). The exact numbers of victims have not been fully clarified to this day. Estimates typically range from 500,000 to one million victims, with some estimates going as high as three million victims (Cribb, 2001a, 2001b; Kammen & McGregor, 2012, p. 10).

Although the Indonesian mass killings – which more and more researchers now refer to as genocide (cf.: McGregor et al., 2018b; Melvin, 2018a; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019) – deserve attention due to their intensity, the appreciation of the significance of these events has been very modest, both at the national and international level.

Recent decades have seen an increased recognition within Indonesia of its turbulent past, particularly after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998.[2] And in 2008, an ad hoc team from the Indonesian human rights commission (*Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia*, Komnas HAM) was set up to investigate that issue.[3] However, the political imperative to come to terms with the past on a large scale has so far been lacking – and that continues to be the case

[1] In many regions of Indonesia, there is no distinction between first and surname; many Javanese, for example, have only one name. Therefore, respective references refer to the first name and are used in this way in the bibliography.
[2] Some initiatives from Indonesian organizations can be found in Kellers's book *Indonesien 1965ff.* (2015).
[3] See Chapter 1 KomnasHAM (2014).

even under Joko Widodo (better known as Jokowi), who is the first president who does not come from the military.

On an international level, the increasing awareness in recent years of the mass killings of the time – for example, through the publication of various documentaries and books, and even through the establishment of a People's Tribunal[4] – has unfortunately not yet helped to achieve a significant breakthrough for reappraisal of the mass killings.

A similar picture can be drawn in the scientific research on that topic. Early research was often related to the local context and characterized by cultural reductionism, for example, by speaking of a particular Indonesian culture, society, or politics (Robinson, 2018, p. 138). Since the 2000s, more and more studies have been published that have increasingly encompassed the international setting, emphasizing the Cold War context (see, e.g., Baskara, 2007; Schaefer & Baskara, 2013a; Simpson, 2008). While acknowledging that the mass killings took place at the local level, these studies have highlighted the international actors behind them who joined forces with the respective Indonesian parties to the conflict. However, although there has been an increase in publications and thematic expansion in recent years, the breakthrough for the reappraisal process has so far been limited for two reasons.

First and foremost, many countries still keep sensitive state files secret. Second, although there are isolated country studies, primarily on the large countries such as the US, USSR, China, and Japan (Baskara, 2007; Boden, 2007, 2013; Kurasawa, 2016; Nishihara, 1976; Simpson, 2008; Singh, 1994; Zhou, 2019), there is a significant lack of detailed studies on the involvement of many European countries.[5] This is all the more true for the so-called 'neutral' countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria, where there are still no studies at all. However, it is precisely from these countries that one could expect to have easier access to files so that some light could be shed on Indonesia's turbulent history with its allies.

Therefore, this master's thesis aims, based on the Austrian files, to close this research gap – at least to a certain extent. However, since the Indonesian mass killings are quite complex due to the national and international dimensions, both temporal and substantive delimitations need to be made for this master's thesis. Thus, temporally, this master's thesis deals with the period 1956-1966; and thematically, it orients to the common narratives that were widely

[4] For the footage of that tribunal, see https://www.tribunal1965.org [accessed February 4, 2021].
[5] With a few exceptions such as Germany (Tömmel, 2018), and to a limited extend France (Schütte, 2013).

used during the Suharto regime and are still widespread in Indonesian society today, and in some cases still have major contradictions and inconsistencies in the research literature. These are in particular that:

(i) the Indonesian mass killings were a spontaneous action or outburst of anger by the Indonesian people against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI);
(ii) the Communist Party of Indonesia had organized and planned G30S;
(iii) G30S was planned to take place at that time because President Sukarno's health had deteriorated significantly, and thus it was considered quite likely that he would be incapacitated or even deceased at that time.

Based on these aspects, the following concrete topics and research questions emerge for this master's thesis:

1. *Sukarno's health*: To what extent did the Austrian authorities know about President Sukarno's health, and what information can be found about Sukarno's medical visits to Austria?
2. *September 30th Movement*: To what extent did the Austrian authorities know about G30S?
3. *Mass violence and mass killings*: To what extent did the Austrian authorities know about the mass violence and mass killings?

Therefore, the primary goal of this master's thesis is to examine *what* file material is available and *what* precisely the Austrian authorities knew about the topics mentioned above. Because only when we have learned what exactly the authorities in the different countries knew, can we clarify in further research what role they might have played and better understand *how* and *why* these tragic events happened.

1.2 Outline of this Thesis

Since the focus of the analyses is primarily based on documents and files from Austrian officials, Chapter 2 first discusses the source material used and the methodological approach on which this master's thesis is based. Chapter 3 briefly presents the structural and institutional framework of the Austrian Foreign Ministry since most of the files are from this ministry. Chapter 3 goes on to explain the actors of this ministry and further key figures whose roles in events will be described in the course of this master's thesis. Chapter 4 then provides the necessary historical background to understand better the events surrounding Sukarno's health, G30S, and the mass violence and mass killings that followed.

Building on this structural and historical background, the results of the analysis are presented with the three main themes (Sukarno's health, G30S, mass violence/mass killings) presented qualitatively one at a time in the analyses of Chapters 5 through 7 in response to the above research questions. In each of the respective analysis chapters, current inconsistencies and contradictions in the research literature are presented for a better understanding. These are followed by the substantive findings from the archives and a discussion of the major points. In Chapter 8, a conclusion is drawn about the results of the research. This includes a general assessment of the available file material and a summary of the most important findings of this study.

1.3 Translation Criteria, Features of the Indonesian Language, and Formal Notes

This master's thesis is based on literature and sources in the German, English, and Indonesian language. Quotations from German and Indonesian were translated by this author. The original quotations relevant to the analysis were additionally placed in the footnote. Sometimes, original quotations contain words that the authors had crossed out. In some cases, the original words were considered necessary; thus, the original words have been added in brackets and crossed out. For instance:

> "At the beginning of this year, Mayor Jonas, accompanied by two city councilors, paid an official visit to Indonesia, which could be considered a great (~~extraordinary~~) success."

Additionally, Austrian officials sometimes handwrote extra words or phrases on report pages. In these cases, such words and phrases are placed in curly brackets to distinguish them. For example:

> "He underwent an operation at Prof. Hamburger {in Paris}."

In this example, therefore, "in Paris" was added later by the Austrian officials.

Where possible, I have attempted to use modern spelling[6] except when quoting from sources or when modern spelling has never been applied to a particular name. Thus, I use 'u' and not 'oe', as in Sukarno[7], 'j' not 'dj', as in Jakarta, and 'y' not 'j' as in Yogyakarta. There is also a

[6] In 1972, a spelling reform replaced the Republic Spelling System (also known as *Soewandi* Spelling System) with the Enhanced Spelling System (*Ejaan Yang Disempurnakan*, EYD). For further information, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_Spelling_System [accessed July 13, 2021].

[7] An important note about President Sukarno's name, as it is often misused and misunderstood. Sukarno had no first name (given name). His birth name was 'Kusno', but later his father changed his name to 'Karna' (Hindu name). In Javanese, the 'A' sound becomes 'O' and so the name became 'Karno', and the prefix 'Su' means good, and so Sukarno means the best hero. He is often referred to with the first name Achmed, which is

peculiarity to mention about Indonesian names, as they do not follow the Western pattern of first name and last name. Sometimes people in Indonesia have only one name, and sometimes they have two names. Consequently, in the bibliography and references, I have generally tried to list persons and authors by their surnames, except where those surnames are rarely used or rarely used alone.

This master's thesis follows the APA referencing style. However, since most of the analysis material is composed of files that require more detailed referencing, the primary documents are referenced in the footnotes. The same applies, for two reasons, to newspaper articles that were attached to the files. First, as we will see in the course of this master's thesis, they cover part of the research question, such as when it comes to showing the extent to which the authorities and the media knew about Sukarno's visits to Austria and his state of health. Second, the newspaper articles were not cross-checked in the newspaper archives. For most of the newspaper articles, therefore, the dates refer to the notes that were recorded alongside them, and it cannot be assumed that these are always the actual publication dates.

Finally, in both Indonesia and Austria, informants and interviewees asked that they remain anonymous. Moreover, in some cases, I use the phrase "as I have learned from a well-informed source" to express that I have sufficient knowledge, but I have been asked not to name those sources at this time.

common in European and US accounts – also in the Austrian documents – but he had only one name, which is not uncommon in Indonesia (Dahm, 1966, p. ix; Sukarno, 1965a, p. 26).

2 Methodological Approach, Data Collection, and Data Analysis

In this chapter, the methodological approach will be explained in more detail. Methodologically, this work is located at the intersection between the broad fields of qualitative social research and the historical sciences. After a brief overview of the selection criteria for the research material, the remainder of the chapter is devoted to the qualitative research design and the individual research steps of this master's thesis.

2.1 Data Sources and Description of the Source Material

The following sources serve as the data basis for this master thesis (see Figure 1): At the center of the study are files and documents of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, as these reflect not only the official policy and position of the Austrian government in Vienna, but also the Austrian representatives in Indonesia at that time (cf. Burnham et al., 2008).[8] In some cases, however, it was necessary to use files and documents from the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, as there are almost no files from the Foreign Ministry on particular topics, such as the state visits of President Sukarno. In addition to the files from the archives, autobiographies and newspaper articles were used where necessary. On the one hand, some of these newspaper articles were directly attached to the files; on the other hand, online newspaper archives (e.g., *Arbeiter-Zeitung*) or city archives (e.g., City Archive Krems) were also used. Furthermore, for a better understanding of events during the period under study, interviews with various contemporaneous witnesses and experts in Europe and Indonesia were conducted and included in this master's thesis.



Figure 1: Data Sources

The relevant files for this master's thesis are accessible from the Austrian State Archives.[9] In particular, the files are the records of the Austrian Foreign Ministry (*Bundesministerium für*

[8] For further benefits of using official files for research, see, for example, Burnham et al. (2008, p. 201).
[9] https://www.oesta.gv.at/ [accessed November 18, 2020]

Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, BMAA) on Indonesia for the years 1956, 1960-1966 (a total of about 114 files), the political embassy reports (*Berichte in politischen Angelegenheiten*, POL-reports) on Jakarta for the years 1961-1966 (about 205 files), and the records of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior (*Bundesministerium für Inneres*, BMI) on President Sukarno for the years 1956, 1961, 1963, and 1964 (about 154 files).[10] The files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Austrian State Archives are in their folders and arranged according to container (*liasse*).[11] Unfortunately, these are by no means correctly filed or sorted. For this reason, all files were first digitized, and each file was recorded in a table to sort them according to their *liasse*, basic number, case number, and date.[12] Based on this first quantitative examination, the following findings could be made.

Embassy reports (POL/RES/RES-A-reports)[13]

A striking feature of the existing embassy reports is that, while the political reports (POL-reports) have been archived in their entirety, the administrative (*Berichte in administrativen Angelegenheiten*, A-reports), and, above all, the confidential (*Vertrauliche und geheime Berichte in administrativen Angelegenheiten*, RES-reports) are almost entirely missing. The year 1965 can be cited as an example: based on the few A- and RES-reports available, the sequence number indicates that at least 1,944 A-reports and 314 RES-reports were sent from

[10] The files of the Austrian Foreign Ministry are located in the Austrian State Archive, Section II-POL (ÖSTA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol). The abbreviation for the Austrian Foreign Ministry after 1959 was initially BMAA and was later renamed to BmfaA. In the remainder of this master's thesis, I will use the shorter notation BMAA. The embassy reports are located in the Austrian State Archive, II-POL Political/Embassy Reports (*Politische Berichte*), Djakarta. It was not until 1965 that the honorary consulate in Jakarta was turned into a full-fledged embassy. Before that, however, there were already reports from the honorary consulate in Jakarta from 1961. Some files on diplomatic staff were provided directly by the Austrian Foreign Ministry upon request. In the course of this master's thesis, these have been referenced under the inquiry number BMEIA-I GZ. BMEIA-AT.90.13.02/0017-VI.2.f/2019, even if the first reply email had not yet been given this inquiry number. The files of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior are located in the Austrian State Archive under ÖSTA/AdR, BMI. These are state police files on President Sukarno. There is no index of persons, rather they are found via personal or sometimes subject index cards. In my case, the files were kindly made available by Dr. Jeřábek (head of the Department of the Interior and, since 2021, head of the Archives of the Republic). In order to make it more comprehensible which files are referred to, the name of the person (Sukarno) will be added in the course of this master's thesis, for example: *Information*, 24 October 1961, in ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno.

[11] The *liasse* keys are in the Appendix A1.

[12] Every official file in the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a basic number, business number and date field.

[13] Austrian diplomatic reporting distinguishes between three different types of reports: reports on administrative matters (A-reports); confidential and secret reports on administrative matters (A/Res. or RES reports); and reports on political affairs (P- or POL- reports). For further information on the Austrian diplomatic reporting regulations see Agstner (2011). In the remainder of this master's thesis, I will use the notion A-RES, RES, and POL, to refer directly to those embassy reports (e.g., POL-5, Djakarta).

Jakarta by the end of the year – of which just five A-reports and seven RES-reports are archived and accessible.[14]

It is also striking that just one report from the honorary consulate in Bandung is accessible. However, based on the sequence number, at least in October 1965, 35 reports were already written.[15]

The time intervals between individual POL-reports are, in most cases, one week (see Figure 2). However, longer time intervals were also observed. On the one hand, this could be explained by possible ambassadorial trips to other countries or (home) vacations. On the other hand, it is evident that longer intervals also occurred during the period of volatility in Indonesia – around the beginning of October 1965 (G30S) and in March 1966 (*supersemar*[16]). The exact reasons for some of these longer intervals are discussed in more detail in section 6.3; yet, it should be noted here that the Austrian ambassador was, according to this evidence, absent from both significant events such as G30S and *supersemar*.

[14] The last existing reports are *Bung Karno Tower*, October 29, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/49, Gzl. 135216-MH/65 Zl. 314-RES/65 and *Heiliger Stuhl; Erhöhung der beiderseitigen Vertretungen in den Rang einer Apostolischen Nuntiatur respektiven Botschaft.* December 20, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 147213-6/65 Zl. 1944-A/65.

[15] The report dated October 7, 1965, entitled *Vereitelter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 7, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 35-A/65 is the only one still available.

[16] The Indonesian acronym for *Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret*, or 'Order of March 11'. This order contained President Sukarno's instructions to Lieutenant General Suharto, "to take all measures considered necessary to guarantee security, calm and stability of the government" (Suripto cited in Crouch, 1978, p. 189). The document marked the beginning of Sukarno's loss and power shift towards Suharto.



Figure 2: Number of Days between the Political Reports for 1965-1966 (Own compilation)

Files of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BMAA files)

Among the available files are 'confidential' (*vertraulich*), 'strictly confidential' (*streng vertraulich*), 'secret' (*geheim*), and 'classified' (*verschluss*) files.[17] What is striking about the existing BMAA-files is that the available documents are in large part merely enclosed embassy reports from various countries. BMAA files in the narrower sense, i.e., those that would show the Foreign Ministry's communication, are mostly missing. Again, the year 1965 is given as an example: Of the approximately 126 documents, just 14 are BMAA files; the rest are embassy reports or dispatches. However, that there must have been more files is clear from two considerations. First, it is hardly conceivable that there would have been a special unit for Far East Asia (Indonesia) – with a person specifically responsible for it (as will be shown in the next chapter) – that would have only produced 14 files in the entire year. Second, it is also clear from the existing files that there must have been others, because the texts of these files refer to other documents that are not available.[18]

If one looks at the designations of the existing folders in which the documents were grouped, it becomes apparent that there are many documents for G30S (most of them were filed under "Indonesian KP" ["*Indonesische KP*"[19]]).[20] However, there is no folder on the subsequent mass killings, and almost none on the subject of Sukarno's visits to Austria or his state of health during his time in power.

2.2 Research Design: Document Analysis and Data Evaluation

Since this master's thesis analysis focuses primarily on documents, the document analysis approach of Noetzel et al. (2018) was the most suitable methodological approach. Their approach is fundamentally characterized by three phases: exploratory phase, main investigation, and evaluation phase.

[17] I could not find a legal provision on the various levels of secrecy from these years. However, according to Hochedlinger (2009, p. 73), there were already provisions on classification levels ('confidential', 'secret', 'top secret', 'classified') at the end of the 18th century. According to Jeřábek, in the 1960s they might have been regulations rather than legal provisions (email correspondence with Dr. Jeřábek, April 15, 2021, see also Hochedlinger (2009) and Berwinkel (2020)). The most recent legal provisions on access to classified information are now in §2 of the *Informationssicherheitsgesetz* (InfoSiG) and currently consist, in a similar way, of 'restricted', 'confidential', 'secret', and 'top secret'– see https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20001740, [accessed April 16, 2021]).

[18] See, for instance, the radio telegram from Jakarta to the Austrian Foreign Ministry on May 14, 1963, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 24194-6/63 Zl. 28005.

[19] See the folder entitled *Indonesische KP*, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65.

[20] According to Lautner from the Austrian State Archives, some files – such as files from the International Law Office – are still only accessible at the Austrian Foreign Ministry. Therefore, there might still be at least the possibility that further files can be found there.

2.2.1 Exploratory Phase

According to Noetzel et al. (2018, p. 373), the *exploratory phase* comes first in the document analysis procedure. During this phase, the researcher obtains an initial overview of the documents relevant to the research question and accessible to the researcher and gains a general factual knowledge relevant to the subject matter. For this master's thesis, the first acquisition of expertise began retrospectively in 2015. In my bachelor's thesis (Gorski, 2015), I dealt with the Indonesian mass killings of 1965-1966 for the first time. The focus of research at that time, however, was on the representation of these events in Indonesian textbooks.[21] This study was followed by my research work in 2015, during which I also turned to the Austrian embassy reports for the first time. In addition to the Austrian State Archives' work, a self-financed research trip in Indonesia in 2016 followed. Thereby, on the one hand, I was able to conduct initial research in the Indonesian state library. On the other hand, I was able to establish initial contacts with Indonesian researchers, who were then able to support me in the research work for this master's thesis.[22]

According to Noetzel et al. (2018, p. 373), the first phase should also serve to get to know the actors, structures, and processes of the field of investigation in more detail in order to be able to access documents in a more targeted manner in the main investigation phase. Since the research focuses primarily on the Austrian Foreign Ministry's documents, the focus of the structural, actor, and process analysis was placed entirely on this ministry. For this reason, to gain a better general understanding of the ministry, I first determined the responsible actors and the organizational structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on the Austrian Officials Directory (*Österreichischer Amtskalender*)[23] and conducted interviews with former employees or their relatives in Europe, and Indonesia. In parallel, I also took a closer look at the formalities and structure of embassy reports, which constituted a good part of my analysis's source material.

[21] Based on a textbook analysis, I was able to prove that the specifically military narrative of history has not changed and can still be found in Indonesian textbooks after 1998 – and thus many years after the end of the Suharto regime. In 2016, I was able to present my findings at the international conference *Reconciling Indonesian History with 1965: Facts, Rumours and Stigma*, entitled *The Representation of the 30th September Movement in the Indonesian School Textbooks*.

[22] The research results of that time were presented in 2016 at the international colloquium in Paris *Le rôle des puissances étrangères dans les violences de masses en 1965- 1966 en Indonésie* under the *title Indonesia 1965-66: An analysis on diplomatic correspondence of Austrian Ambassador Hohenbühel*.

[23] The Austrian *Amtskalender* is a book where all Austrian officials are recorded.

Research trip to Indonesia

Based on the exploratory phase, I identified two difficulties. First, I came across missing files in the Austrian State Archives. At that point, I was advised by the Austrian State Archives that I should contact the Austrian Embassy in Jakarta to find the missing files in Jakarta. However, according to the Austrian embassy staff, there are no more files on-site in Jakarta from this period.[24] Second, the exploratory phase results also showed that, for clarification and better understanding of various Indonesian places, banks, military personnel, and the like, additional material from Indonesia would be necessary, as I could not find any relevant literature on this in Austria.

Therefore, to address this problem and to make it possible to conduct research in Indonesia, I successfully applied for a short-term research grant (*Kurzfristige wissenschaftliche Auslandsstipendien*, KWA) from the University of Vienna. Therefore, by means of the subsequent research trip to Indonesia from May to July 2019, it was possible for me to conduct intensive literature research and thus include Indonesian literature in this master's thesis. Furthermore, the research trip also allowed me to exchange ideas with Indonesian researchers and conduct interviews with experts, which could ultimately be incorporated into this master's thesis.[25]

Two aspects of my research trip to Indonesia are particularly noteworthy, as they shaped my research process and the subsequent analysis. First, the fact that I was a *white* European conducting research in Indonesia certainly played a role. Anyone who has ever been to Indonesia knows the kindness shown to a white person by the vast majority of Indonesians. Being white in Indonesia is still often associated with being 'beautiful' and 'rich'.[26] Therefore, besides my knowledge of the Indonesian language, this was undoubtedly also a reason I could obtain access to Indonesian institutions, professors, political personalities, and businesspeople more quickly and at shorter notice than would have been the case in Austria. Second, I found it challenging to initially adopt a critical stance towards the Indonesian

[24] Email communication with the Deputy Head of Mission in Jakarta Joško Emrich, April 23, 2019.

[25] The guidelines for the expert interviews were compiled on the basis of the exploratory phase with the open questions and topics, following Helfferich (2011), and Goldberg and Hildebrandt (2018). The interviews were conducted by me personally either in English or Indonesian, and, as far as the interviewees allowed it, recorded and partially transcribed.

[26] I believe that, to a large extent, this reflects the underlying position of power. Many Europeans may be wealthy compared to Indonesians. However, in their own countries, these people are by no means rich. Nevertheless, due to the privileges created by a European passport and the euro, many Europeans can travel to Indonesia. Yet, the other way around is very challenging. Therefore, further research on the construction of 'race', 'gender', and 'color' (cf. Quijano, 2007) in Indonesia would be very interesting.

experts, as some have an enormous amount of knowledge about this topic. However, it became apparent that there are quite a few different opinions on specific topics, which were then also considered in my analysis.

After returning from Indonesia, the second phase began for me: the main investigation.

2.2.2 Main Investigation

According to Noetzel et al. (2018, p. 374), *the main investigation* involves selecting specific documents that seem suitable for refining the description or for an alternative examination of the initial question. Also, relevant experts can be contacted in order to obtain further documents. In my case, I also made use of relevant experts in the Austrian State Archives – for example, I was in close contact with Dieter Lautner (responsible for foreign affairs) as well as occasionally with Dr. Rudolf Jeřábek (head of the Department of the Interior and, since 2021, head of the Archives of the Republic). Thanks to their expertise, it was possible for me to access additional files and include, for instance, files from the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, above all the State Police.

The main focus of the document analysis, however, is the 'external' and 'internal' critique, such as can also be found in contemporary historical research (cf. Lengwiler, 2011). The *external* criticism is aimed at verifying the authenticity and credibility of the documents. To this end, the text type, text origin, text producers, and addressees must be examined. Especially in the case of copies with different versions, the researcher must be ready to question which material is still authentic and which is not.[27] Therefore, Noetzel et al. (2018, pp. 374–375) recommend that, for the authorship verification process, these questions, among others, should be considered:

> Under what external conditions was the document created, what do we know about the situation and intention of the author at the time of writing? Is there evidence from the context that the document may have been altered at the time of writing or before official publication, perhaps due to the intervention? (Translated by S.G.)

Apart from verifying authorship, researchers in the field of document analysis also recommend adhering to other criteria so that quality assurance can be maintained when working with documents (J. Scott, 2006; see also Burnham et al., 2008, pp. 208–212; Harrison, 2001, pp. 129–132). These essentially include the following points, and were therefore also examined:

1. *Authenticity*. Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin?

[27] One example is the embassy reports, some of which are original and some of which are only copies.

2. *Credibility*. Is the evidence free from error and distortion?
3. *Representativeness*. Is the evidence typical of its kind, and, if not, is the extent of its untypicality known?
4. *Meaning*. Is the evidence clear and comprehensible?
(J. Scott, 2006, pp. 8–9, italics in original)

Therefore, while *external* criticism is primarily concerned with the classification of formal characteristics, *internal* criticism focuses on content analysis and interpretation of the document (Noetzel et al., 2018, p. 375). Since my focus was on the factual evaluation of the text content, in particular on text statements and text passages on a specific topic, and less on the analysis of linguistic peculiarities, the content-analytical technique was oriented towards the structuring analysis according to Mayring, who differentiates between four different forms (formal, content, typifying, scaling). For this analysis, therefore, content structuring was most suitable, as "[it] extract[s] and summarize[s] material on specific topics, on specific content areas" (Mayring, 2015, p. 99, translated by S.G.).

The content to be extracted from the material is determined by theoretical categories (Mayring, 2015, p. 103). Therefore, in order to be able to define these categories for this master's thesis, the first step was to divide the complex topic surrounding the Indonesian mass killings of 1965-1966 into three phases, following Wieringa and Katjasungkana (2019, p. 22): Pre-G30S, G30S, and Post-G30S.

In a further step, building on the theoretical foundation and the initial examination of the source material, a system of categories and a list of questions was developed, which was further revised and adapted based on the existing data material.[28] As a basis for the question catalog, the focus was on open questions and contradictions from the existing literature and the expert interviews. In yet another step, this one inductive and based on the documents themselves, essential topics were included in the range of the three phase categories. After the category system was prepared, the text corpus for the evaluation phase was created. To facilitate this, the relevant documents and interviews were digitized and, in a further step, thematically coded with CAQDA software[29] (Friese et al., 2018).

2.2.3 Evaluation Phase

In the third and final phase, the *evaluation* phase, the extracted content was then discussed in the broader context of the research question and the existing literature on the respective topic.

[28] The category system and the questionnaire can be found in the Appendix A2.
[29] CAQDAS stands for *C*omputer *A*ssisted *Q*ualitative *D*ata *A*nalysis *S*oftware. This is a program that is used to support qualitative research (content analysis, discourse analysis, etc.). Essential parts are digital coding, network analysis, annotation tools and the like. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer-assisted_qualitative_data_analysis_software [accessed July 12, 2021].

Noetzel et al. (2018, p. 375) recommend at this stage that an overall assessment of the yield of the documents should be made and, for instance, the following questions should be addressed:

> Are there any contradictions in the document, and how can they be explained? Are possible criticisms and counter-positions addressed? Which interests and (impact-) intentions of the text producer are likely? What unintended effects could the document trigger? Does the document seem appropriate to the context? What significance does the document have for the research question? What does it contribute to clarifying the initial question? (Noetzel et al., 2018, p. 379, translated by S.G.)

Therefore, these questions were finally examined in more detail in the last step. Moreover, this thesis also examined to what extent the initial assumptions and contradictions from the existing literature and the expert interviews could ultimately be confirmed or not confirmed.

2.3 Summary

Since the focus of this master's thesis was on government documents, the methodological approach of document analysis, according to Noetzel et al. (2018), was the most appropriate. To this end, the following three phases were followed: exploratory phase, main investigation, and evaluation phase. Since the focus of the evaluation was less on the texts' linguistic specificity and more on the factual assessment, Mayring's (2015) structuring of the content was used for the methodological evaluation. The results obtained in the study are presented in Chapters 5 to 7 following a brief historical and structural/institutional background.

3 Austrian Structures, Institutions, and People

The analysis in this master's thesis is mainly based on files from the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and reports from the Austrian embassy in Jakarta. Therefore, it is essential for this analysis to familiarize oneself first with Austrian institutions, structures, and people of the period of investigation. Consequently, the first section of this chapter briefly describes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its staff in general. Moreover, it will also clarify the organizational structure and, in particular, the 'Special Unit for East Asia', which was responsible for Indonesia. The chapter will go on to examine in more detail the Austrian institutions and persons in Indonesia, such as the Austrian embassy and its honorary consulates, and the Austrian chamber of commerce with its trade commissioners (*Handelsdelegierte*). Yet, besides these institutions, there were other important Austrian personnel in Indonesia, such as businessmen, scientists, doctors, and journalists, who were also in regular contact with the Austrian and Indonesian authorities. As we will see in the analysis chapters, they were sometimes mentioned directly or indirectly in the reports. For this reason, these individuals are also briefly introduced in the final sub-chapter.

3.1 The Austrian Foreign Ministry and the 'Far-East Special Unit' for Indonesia

During the early years of the Second Republic[30], the Austrian Foreign Office was not an independent ministry but an integral part of the Federal Chancellery (*Bundeskanzleramt*, BKA). Karl Gruber (1945-1953), and subsequently, Leopold Figl (1954-1958) led the political agendas. However, they were ministers in name only (Gehler, 2005, p. 31). Only in 1959, under Bruno Kreisky, was a separate Foreign Ministry (*Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten*, BMAA) established (Gehler, 2006, p. 59; Kramer, 1997, p. 721).

This institutional configuration also reflected the traditional link between state leadership and foreign policy. Foreign policy issues and the decision process were hardly a matter of parliamentary debate at that time (Gehler, 2005, p. 32). According to Gehler (2005, p. 32), this was not only because the National Council (*Nationalrat*) lacked transparency with respect to foreign policy, but also because parliamentarians, for their part, had relatively little

[30] With the end of the war in 1945, and the defeat of the Greater German Empire, Austria was restored as an independent state. With the signing of the Austrian State Treaty on May 15, 1955, and with the formally independent commitment to neutrality (October 26, 1955), and the obligation not to seek a renewed annexation to Germany, the Republic attained again full sovereignty. For further information, see Rathkolb (2010), and Suppan et al. (2005).

interest in or comprehension of foreign policy. Moreover, according to Rudolf Kirchschläger, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry at that time, it was a tradition that, during the working period, essential matters were deliberately not dealt with in the National Council, so as not to draw the attention of the Allies (notably the Soviet occupying power), who had the right to appeal decisions (Gehler, 2005, p. 31; cf. Kramer, 1997, p. 717). Even after the State Treaty of 1955[31], and thus the independence of Austria, this remained common practice for a long time (Gehler, 2005, p. 31).[32]

In the 1960s, foreign policy in Austria was a matter reserved for a small class of 'elites', which consisted primarily of civil servants, diplomats, academic experts, and a small circle of party officials and politicians (Gehler, 2006, p. 59). The recruitment of the personnel for the Foreign Ministry followed the consideration of the modern Austrian federated multiparty state. The state succeeded in structuring the Foreign Ministry proportionally according to party affiliations (*paritätisch-proporzmäßig*) (Austrian People's Party, ÖVP; or Social Democrats, SPÖ) (Gehler, 2006, p. 59). Members of the so called 'blood type zero' ('*Blutgruppe Null*'), meaning non-party members, were in the minority. With a few exceptions, party affiliations within the Foreign Ministry were in any case secondary to a *esprit de corps* (*Korpsgeist*) (Gehler, 2005, p. 32).

The Structure of the Austrian Foreign Ministry and the 'Far-East Special Unit' for Indonesia

In the mid-1960s, the Austrian Foreign Ministry was structured as follows (see Figure 3). From 1959 until March 1966, Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ), who is well known, for his international role in the East-West conflict,[33] headed the Foreign Ministry. However, after the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) won the National Council elections in March 1966, Kreisky was

[31] The Austrian State Treaty was signed on May 15, 1955, in Vienna by representatives of the Allied occupying powers of the United States, Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain, and the Austrian Federal Government. The subject of the treaty was the restoration of Austria as a sovereign, independent and democratic state after the National Socialist rule in Austria (1938-1945), the end of the Second World War, and the subsequent period of occupation (1945-1955). On October 26, 1955, Austria declared itself as a neutral country. For further information see Suppan et al. (2005), and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_State_Treaty, http://www.staatsvertrag.at, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1955_152_0/1955_152_0.pdf [accessed July 15, 2021].

[32] This is probably one of the reasons why there is almost nothing in the National Council protocols on Indonesia during the period of the 1965 tragedy.

[33] Kreisky acted as a political communicator between East and West and passed on, "to the U.S. and other Western countries, confidential assessments from sources in the Soviet Union and in Communist satellite states, to which he appended his own interpretations and analyses" (Rathkolb, 2010, p. 176). Most importantly, he became a broker in the hot phase of the Cold War during the Cuban crisis of 1962, "when he relayed a Soviet proposal aiming at de-escalation – that the Americans forgo the option of stationing Pershing missiles in Turkey in exchange for the Soviets giving up the stationing of nuclear missiles on Cuba. The proposal was accepted." (Rathkolb, 2010, p. 177)

replaced by Lujo Tončić-Sorinj (ÖVP) as Foreign Minister. Both foreign ministers were advised by State Secretary Carl Bobleter and the Cabinet of Ministers including Rudolf Kirchschläger, Ernst Illsinger, Heribert Tschofen, Dietrich Bukowski, and Heinrich Matous. Erich Bielka-Karltreu was Secretary General and highest official at that time.

In 1965, the protocol department, which is particularly important for state visits, included Rudolf Ender, Georg Hohenberg, Josef Ranger, Wilhelm Weinand, Walter Swatosch, and Harald Miltner. One year earlier, during the state visit of President Sukarno (see more on this later in section 5.2.1), Friedrich Hohenbühel and Erich Kristen were also staff members of the protocol department – both of them were later sent to Indonesia (see below). The protocol department was in frequent contact with the State Police of the Ministry of the Interior and the Vienna Police, mainly to ensure the safety of the state guests. The leading figures during Sukarno's visit were Oswald Peterlunger as the head of the Vienna State Police and Josef Holaubek as the Chief of the Vienna Police. Both policemen were awarded an Indonesian police medal by Sukarno for their excellent service in Austria.[34]

Below these ministerial division, the Foreign Ministry was divided into separate sections, which themselves were subdivided into their own departments and specialized units. Most interestingly, in the years 1964-1967, there was under Section II (department 6) also a 'Far-East Special Unit' (*Fernost-Sonderreferat*), whose remit included the following countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, Republic of China[35], Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. From September 14, 1964, until March 31, 1967, it was headed by Anton Mayr-Harting, who had previously served as Ambassador to Thailand (Bangkok) and was also accredited in Jakarta from April 1, 1958, until May 23, 1964. In 1964, he was then convened by the Foreign Ministry to lead the 'Far-East Special Unit' (ÖZA, 1964, p. 253).[36] In 1967 it was most likely dissolved,[37] at which point Anton Mayr-Harting became Ambassador in Bogotá, Columbia (ÖZA, 1967, p. 222).

[34] For the award, see the report *Besuch Peterlunger in Indonesien*, November 24, 1961, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/49, Gzl. 35567-6/61 Zl. 1726-A/61, confidential. Both later took up positions in the Ministry of the Interior (Department of Public Security (*Öffentliche Sicherheit*)) (Sabitzer, 2007, p. 73; Weiss, 2009, p. 28).

[35] In the Austrian *Amtskalender* (Austrian officials directory), it is written Rep. China which most likely refers to Republic of China.

[36] The exact date is not clear, but it has to have been between June 1 and July 31, 1964; interestingly, around the same time, the first Austrian envoy in Jakarta, Alexander Otto, was transferred to the embassy in London (ÖZA, 1964, p. 253).

[37] From the Austrian *Amtskalender* (Austrian officials directory) of 1968, at least, it no longer exists. Unfortunately, even after consulting the Foreign Ministry and a former Foreign Ministry official, no further information about the Far-East Special Unit could be obtained. Furthermore, it is interesting that this special unit does not appear in the Austrian yearbooks either, where changes are usually noted. For instance, the 'Special



Figure 3: Cabinet of the Federal Ministry and Department Six of the Austrian Foreign Ministry 1965-1966 (Own presentation based on Österreichischer Amtskalender [Austrian officials directory] 1966)

Unit for Afro-Asian Cooperation' (established in 1965) has been recorded (cf. ÖJB, 1966, p. 13). The 'Special Unit for Afro-Asian Cooperation' also appears in Section II of the official calendar, but should not be mistaken for the 'Far-East Special Unit'. Both existed at the same time in the year 1965 (cf. ÖAK, 1966). Therefore, unfortunately, the question of why this 'Far-East Special Unit' does not appear in the yearbook remains unsolved even today.

3.2 Austrian Representatives in Indonesia

One of the most urgent concerns of the first government in the Second Republic was the establishment of Austrian representatives (*Vertretungsbehörden*) abroad, not least so as to be able to nail its colors to the mast internationally again (Agstner, 2009, p. 71). To that end, a dense network of representative offices abroad was established. During Gruber's term as Foreign Minister, 46 consular representatives, diplomatic representatives, and observer missions to international organizations were opened (Agstner, 2009, p. 72). Under his successor, Foreign Minister Figl, there were expansions of representative offices, especially in Northern and Southern Europe and overseas (Agstner, 2009, p. 72). Thus, in 1954, an Austrian Embassy was established in Bangkok, which was also in charge of bilateral relations with Indonesia (BMEIA, 2020). Arno Halusa was commissioned to run the embassy (for the full list of representatives in Indonesia, see Table 1).[38] He was succeeded from 1958 to 1964 by Anton Mayr-Harting, who – as we have seen before – was then later in charge of the Far-East Special Unit in Vienna. A few months after the start of Mayr-Harting's tenure, in June 1958, Walter Nesselberger was assigned to him as secretary.[39]

From 1959 to 1966, during Kreisky's term as Foreign Minister, Austria established representative posts, particularly in 'Third World'[40] countries that at the time had just gained independence (Agstner, 2006, p. 53). Thus, in March 1961, Austria established a legation (*Gesandtschaft*) in Jakarta at the urgent request of the Indonesian government (ÖJB, 1962, p. 22; Samodra, 2004, p. 29). In February, Alexander Otto was sent to Indonesia as envoy. Otto had worked as secretary of the Federal President and thus had known Sukarno well from his visits to Austria (see section 5.2). One month later, in March 1961, Christian Kautsky joined Otto as his assistant (*Amtsassistent*).[41]

[38] *Gesandter HALUSA - Mitakkreditierung in Indonesien*, August 24, 1954, Gzl. 181807-7/54 Zl. 226151-7/54, BMEIA-I, GZ. BMEIA-AT.90.13.02/0017-VI.2.f/2019.
[39] BMEIA-I, GZ. BMEIA-AT.90.13.02/0017-VI.2.f/2019.
[40] The term 'Third World' is understood here in its original designation, namely the collective name that was originally used for those states in the Cold War that saw themselves as non-aligned states between the military blocs of the Western (parliamentary-democratic) and Eastern (communist) world of states. Indonesia was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement and hosted the first Asian-African Conference in 1955 in Bandung – see G.M. Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung* (1956). In the further course of this master's thesis, the term 'Third World', 'West', and 'East' will therefore not be understood in today's primarily developmental sense, but rather in the context of the Cold War and the original alliance-political sense of the 1960s. On the origin of that term, see Komlosy (2010).
[41] BMEIA-I, GZ. BMEIA-AT.90.13.02/0017-VI.2.f/2019.

Three years later, in 1964, the legation was turned into a full-fledged embassy. Friedrich Hohenbühel[42] became the first Austrian Ambassador to Jakarta. In June 1964, he was entrusted with heading the Austrian Embassy in Jakarta.[43] A few weeks before Hohenbühel's inauguration on November 7, 1964, Alexander Otto was withdrawn from Jakarta and was transferred to the embassy in London (ÖZA, 1964, p. 253).[44] The extraordinary aspect of Hohenbühel's tenure was that he was probably one of the few ambassadors in Jakarta (especially from the Western countries) who had an excellent relationship with President Sukarno. One example of this can be seen from the fact that Sukarno often invited Hohenbühel to his palace and the Bogor Garden. Another example is that, in 1965, Sukarno took part in celebrations of the Austrian National Day[45] at the Austrian embassy – at that time it was rare for Sukarno to participate in the national celebrations of a foreign embassy (Anonymous 1, personal communication, May 21, 2019).[46]

One month after G30S in November 1965, Edgar Selzer, another embassy secretary, was sent to the Austrian embassy in Jakarta (ÖZA, 1965, p. 419). Interestingly, he did not even stay for one year. In October 1966, he had to leave the country quite quickly under somewhat mysterious circumstances, and was sent to Japan (Wurzer, 2010, pp. 154–155).[47] However, Selzer returned to Indonesia during the Suharto regime several years later in 1980, this time as Austria's fourth Ambassador (ÖZA, 1980, p. 236).

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[42] After studying law as a prisoner of war in the US, Hohenbühel completed a PhD in political science. Afterward he worked in Upper Austria before he entered the Austrian Foreign Ministry. His first assignment abroad was as secretary under Ambassador Bernhard Joseph Kripp in the Vatican. After that he came back to Vienna and worked in the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry (Anonymous 4, personal communication, June 5, 2020). See also https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_von_Hohenb%C3%BChel [accessed June 8, 2020].

[43] *HOHENBÜHEL DDr. Friedrich, Leg.Rat; Betrauung mit der Leitung der Österr. Botschaft in Djakarta als ao.u.bev.Botschafter*, Juni 2, 1964, Gzl. 14449-1/64 Zl. 14.623-1a/64, BMEIA-I, GZ. BMEIA-AT.90.13.02/0017-VI.2.f/2019. In addition, he was officiated as Austrian Ambassador to the Government in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

[44] BMEIA-I, GZ. BMEIA-AT.90.13.02/0017-VI.2.f/2019.

[45] The Austrian National Day was celebrated in 1965 on May 15 ('Flag Day') and then moved to October 26 (resolution of the Federal Constitutional Law on Austrian neutrality). See https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationalfeiertag_(Österreich) [accessed June 3, 2020].

[46] The good relationship and closeness of Ambassador Hohenbühel to Sukarno did not go unnoticed by the other ambassadors of the diplomatic corps. In particular, the US Ambassador Marshall Green and the British Ambassador Gilchrist, repeatedly tried to establish good relations with Hohenbühel (Anonymous 4, personal communication, June 5, 2020). In addition to the various official events, they also met again and again privately – for example at Christmas or on various occasions at a weekend-bungalow at the Puncak-Pass in Cipanas (Anonymous 4, personal communication, June 5, 2020). It is reasonable to assume that they made an effort to extract some details of Sukarno from the ambassador during these meetings.

[47] The Austrian trade commissioner Günther Wurzer wrote two interesting points about Selzer's departure. First, two weeks before Selzer's departure, cash, jewelry, radio, audio, etc. were stolen from his house. Second, Selzer was taken to the port under the escort of army vehicles with a crew ready to fire (Wurzer, 2010, p. 155). Since this was in October 1966, the 'protectors' must most likely have been troops loyal to Suharto.

Back in June 1966, and thus a few months before Selzer had to leave Indonesia, embassy secretary Christian Kautsky left Indonesia as well. In April 1967, both were then succeeded by embassy secretary Erich Kristen, who had previously served at the embassy in Tokyo (Eiselsberg, 1997, p. 286). In June 1968, the term of office of ambassador Hohenbühel in Indonesia concluded, at which point he was sent to Chile.[48] His position as ambassador was then taken over by Gerhard Gmoser, making Gmoser the second Austrian ambassador in Jakarta.[49]

From – until	Name	Role
1954 – 1958	HALUSA Arno	Envoy in Bangkok; Area of competence: Indonesia
Apr 1, 1958 – Mai 23, 1964	MAYR-HARTING Anton	Envoy in Bangkok; Area of competence: Indonesia
Jun 24, 1958 – Jul 12, 1961	NESSELBERGER Walter	Arev.
Feb 25, 1961 – Jun 10, 1964	OTTO Alexander	1st Envoy in Jakarta/Indonesia
Mar 15, 1961 – Jun 9, 1966	KAUTSKY Christian	Office Assistant (Aass.)
1962 – 2001	FÖRSTER-ROMSWINCKEL Wilhelm Otto	Honorary Consul in Bandung; Area of competence: West-Java
Nov 7, 1964 – Jun 29, 1968	HOHENBÜHEL Friedrich	1st Austrian Ambassador in Indonesia
Nov 17, 1965 – Oct 7, 1966	SELZER Edgar	Embassy Secretary (second-class)
Apr 26, 1967 – Sept 10, 1969	KRISTEN Erich	Embassy Secretary (third-class)
1967-1972	NASUTION Patras	Honorary Consul in Medan; Area of competence: Sumatra
1967 – 1971	MUSSRY Charles	Honorary Consul in Surabaya – Area of competence: East-Java
Dec 7, 1968 – Feb 28, 1973	STERN Cyrill	Office Assistant (AAss.)
Dec 28, 1968 – Mar 19, 1974	GMOSER Gerhard	2nd Austrian Ambassador in Indonesia

Table 1: Austrian Diplomatic Representatives in Indonesia (1954-1974)
Source: BMEIA-I, GZ. BMEIA-AT.90.13.02/0017-VI.2.f/2019; Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik by *Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Außenpolitik und internationale Beziehungen, Österreichische Jahresbücher* by Bundespressedienst, *and Österreichische Amtskalender* by Österreichische Staatsdruckerei *(own compilation).*

In addition to the Austrian embassy in Jakarta, various Austrian honorary consulates had been established over the years. Already in 1962, an honorary consulate for the province of West Java was opened by the envoy Alexander Otto in Bandung (ÖAK, 1963, p. 79). It was subsequently headed by Wilhelm Otto Förster-Romswinckel, who was born in Austria but had taken Dutch citizenship for many years due to the consequences of the First World War. In 1928, he came to a Dutch sugar company in Banyuwangi (East Java) after studying

[48] Interesting, but probably just a coincidence, is that Hohenbühel later served as Austrian ambassador in Chile until 1972, just one year before the Chilean coup d'état in 1973 occurred. Therefore, it would be highly interesting to read the political reports from Chile, not only to get further information about this coup d'état, but also to find out if there are any points of comparison to the case of Indonesia.
[49] BMEIA-I, GZ. BMEIA-AT.90.13.02/0017-VI.2.f/2019.

chemistry. However, in 1958, when all Dutch people had to either become Indonesian citizens or leave the country, he returned to Austria where he again became an Austrian citizen. After getting married in Vienna, he returned with his wife to Indonesia. They also ran a food distribution business (*Lebensmittelvertrieb*) in addition to heading the honorary consulate. In the end, he was in charge of the honorary consulate for about 39 years. Only in 2001 did he and his wife return to Austria. Due to their extended stay in Indonesia, as well as their involvement in different networking clubs, such as Rotary Club[50] or Women's International Club (WIC)[51], they were able to get to know Indonesian politicians and military personalities. Among them were, for instance, the various mayors of Bandung, but also A. H. Nasution, Dharsono (commander of West Java), and Mashudi (governor of West Java). (Anonymous 5, personal communication, August 13, 2019)

Five years after the first honorary consulate was established, two were opened in 1967. One was established in Medan for the Sumatra region under the leadership of Patras Nasution. Another was opened for the East Java region in Bandung, headed by Charles Mussry.[52] However, neither carried out their duties for a significant period of time (Anonymous 5, personal communication, August 13, 2019).

The Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (formerly known as *Bundeswirtschaftskammer*, and, since 1995, *Wirtschaftskammer,* WKO) had its own trading office in Jakarta in addition to the Austrian embassy and the honorary consulates (see Table 2). Unlike in other countries, in Austria the activities of a commercial attaché are carried out by 'trade commissioners' (*Handelsdelegierte*) of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (Leuchtenmüller, 1995, p. 50).[53] Because of this distinction, Austrian trade commissioners were present in many countries around the world well before any diplomatic missions had been established. Thus, in Indonesia, Georg Schmidt was elected the first trade commissioner for Jakarta as early as 1953.[54] However, he was only able to fill this job for a few years because he died unexpectedly in the garden of his residence (Wurzer, 2010, pp. 136–137). Thereupon, Hans Brändle took over as a trade commissioner in Jakarta from 1958 to 1963. Brändle was

[50] https://rotaryclubjakarta.org/ [accessed June 3, 2020]
[51] https://wic-jakarta.or.id/ [accessed June 3, 2020]
[52] *Honorarkonsulat Surabaja (Indonesien); Aufnahme der Amtstätigkeit*, January 23, 1967, Zl. 87251-1a/66, BMEIA-I, GZ. BMEIA-AT.90.13.02/0017-VI.2.f/2019. In fact, the honorary consulate in Medan started operating in December 1966.
[53] For the historical development of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber and in particular their Foreign Trade Offices, see the theses by Leuchtenmüller (1995), and Jiresch (1995, Chapter 7).
[54] The trade agreement between Austria and Indonesia was signed in 1949 (ÖJB, 1967, p. 374) .

succeeded by Alexander Dürer, who only remained in Jakarta for two years from 1963 to 1965.

Trade commissioner Günther Wurzer was posted to Indonesia for the years most relevant to this study. Before coming to Indonesia, he was assigned in Istanbul from 1960-1962 and Sri Lanka (Ceylon) from 1963-1965. He then became the trade commissioner for Indonesia and Cambodia from 1965 to 1970. He documented his experiences as a trade commissioner in his autobiography (Wurzer, 2010). Roderich Vizenetz succeeded Wurzer in 1970. However, in 1973 he died of poisoning for reasons that remain unknown (Wurzer, 2010, p. 137).

From – until	Name
1953 – 1957	Georg Schmidt
1958 – 1963	Dr. Hans Brändle
1963 – 1965	Dr. Alexander Dürer
1965 – 1970	Dr. Günther Wurzer
1970 – 1973	Dkfm. Roderich Vizenetz

Table 2: Austrian Commercial Attachés in Jakarta (1953-1973)
Source: Leuchtenmüller (1995, p. 39)

Aside from these officials, there were many other Austrians in Indonesia who were of interest to the Austrian embassy due to their proximity to the Indonesian government and Indonesian military circles.

3.3 Key Austrian Companies and Individuals in Indonesia

Together with the trade commissioner Georg Schmidt and the honorary consul Förster-Romswinckel, the Austrian geology and mining expert Rudolf Osberger[55] was probably one of the first Austrians to work in Indonesia after the Second World War. After he had completed his studies at the University of Vienna, he received an assistant position with a teaching assignment at the Geological Institute of the University of Bandung in 1952 (Lein & Lieberman, 2017, p. 172; Plöchinger, 1971, p. 244). From 1955 onwards, he dedicated himself to tin exploration and worked as a geologist at the tin company of Bangka (Sumatra) – which later became widely known as the 'El Dorado' of tin (BGR, 2017).[56] In 1958, he took a position as chief geologist of the geological department of the BHP Billiton[57], where he was entrusted with the planning and management of exploration of land and offshore tin placer deposits. In 1966, the Austrian company Böhler[58] delivered the excavation buckets for

[55] For more details on Osberger, see, for instance, Plöchinger (1971), Lein and Lieberman (2017), and Hadrbolec (2014).
[56] For a good overview of the history and adverse consequences of tin mining, see Erman (2008), and Abresch (2015).
[57] https://www.bhp.com [accessed June 3, 2020]
[58] https://www.bohler.at/austria/en/ [accessed June 3, 2020]

the tin mining taking place on the tin islands. The Austrian businessman Max Schrems, together with the chief of the tin islands General Subroto, were responsible for handling the business deal (Wurzer, 2010, pp. 139, 163). In the same year, Osberger asked for a leave of absence, left the Indonesian tin industry and joined the United Nations in New York in May 1967 (Plöchinger, 1971, p. 244). In 1972, during home leave, Osberger died at a quite young age (Plöchinger, 1971, p. 245).

In addition to Böhler, two other Austrian companies had their representatives in Indonesia. One of them was the company Voest who cooperated with Ferrostaal in Indonesia (Anonymous 5, personal communication, August 13, 2019). The second company was Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG, which at that time had a good reputation in Indonesia because of its Puch-Haflinger vehicles. However, Steyr-Daimler-Puch also produced trucks, off-road vehicles, tractors, motorcycles, bicycles, firearms, and heavy weapons (cf. Seper, 1964; Pilz, 1982). In Indonesia, Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG was represented by the very talented businessman and technician Gerhard Ortner. After working at the Steyr-Daimler-Puch factory in Graz-Thondorf and for the British Haflinger importer Ryder's in England, he took over the tasks of setting up an assembly factory in Indonesia and providing the Indonesian military personnel with the necessary training (Anonymous 3, personal communication, October 24, 2019; Kiesling, 2006).[59] Once the individual parts had been transferred from Austria to Indonesia, they were assembled in the factory and delivered.[60] The people responsible for the granting of public contracts were usually senior civil servants or high-ranking military officers. One had to have excellent networking skills to do business in Indonesia. Ortner managed this quite skillfully because he was able to establish contacts up to the highest circles. Thus, he and his wife Evelyn had contact with General Abdul Haris Nasution, General Yani, General Surio, General Sarwo Edhie, but also with Ibnu Sutowo and Adam Malik. After working for Steyr-Daimler-Puch, Ortner moved to work for the Indonesian company Wijaya Kusuma, which cooperated with Voith. Ortner and his wife remained in Indonesia until he died in 2003. After that his wife returned to Austria (Anonymous 3, personal communication, October 24, 2019).

[59] See also the very interesting homepage http://tdc.haflinger-4wd.com/countries/indonesia.php [accessed June 3, 2020] of Constantin Kiesling.
[60] The arrangement and processing of the deal in Austria was led by two Indonesian military personnel, one of them most likely still lives in Austria (Anonymous 7, personal communication, May 20, 2019).

Apart from these successful businesspeople,[61] there were two very successful photographer and filmmaker brothers in Indonesia. Their names were Emil and Nikola Drakulić. Both were born in Yugoslavia. After the Second World War, Nikola fled from the Tito regime and went to Indonesia to open a photo and film studio in Surabaya. After some years, his brother joined him due to a unique business situation. Both became stateless, but as Emil Drakulić had an Austrian wife, they stayed in contact with Austrian officials. In Indonesia, the brothers were one of the first to produce colored photos, postcards, and films.[62] In fact, both were able to meet Sukarno several times through their work as photographers and filmmakers. Both were present at almost every major event, such as state visits and site visits of Sukarno. Therefore, the Austrian embassy most likely called them the Austrian 'house- and court photographers' (*Haus- und Hoffotografen*). In the 1960s, Nikola sold his shares to Emil and went to the US. However, Emil remained in Indonesia until he passed away in Jakarta many years later. (Anonymous 9, personal communication, September 25, 2019)

Besides the two brothers, there were two Austrian journalists (former Nazis) in Indonesia during that time.[63] One of them was Louis Barcata[64], who was able to secure an interview with Sukarno and had informal interviews with Foreign Minister Subandrio and General Suharto, both with the help of the Austrian embassy. Then he published his experiences in Indonesia in 1966 in the book *In Asien wächst der Krieg* (*War is growing in Asia*) (Barcata, 1966). Although it is not entirely clear when he was in Indonesia, it must have been in early 1966.[65] The second author was the Austrian journalist Kurt Ziesel[66], who had been in

[61] In fact, besides the mentioned businesspeople, there was also a very successful businessman with the name Benedikt in Indonesia at that time. However, unfortunately, there are no further details in Wurzer's book (2010) about him, nor could the interviewees remember for which company he had been working.

[62] See, for example, the documentation of Drakulić Nicola *Gods of Bali* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e5ZcdtxwRRQ (Drakulić, 1951) [accessed June 3, 2020].

[63] Apart from the two journalists, the authors and behavioral scientists Hans Haas and Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt were in Indonesia in the years 1965-1966. This was presented by a TV documentary series *Wir Menschen* (1966) and a companion book *Wir Menschen. The secret of our behaviour* (1968).

[64] The journalist Louis Barcata worked under Joseph Goebbels as a foreign correspondent for the weekly newspaper *Das Reich* (Abel, 1968, p. 90).

[65] Besides describing the political situation in Indonesia, he also reported about a meeting with Sukarno on the day the new cabinet was to take a pledge of loyalty to Sukarno. At that time, General Ibrahim Adjie, General Suharto, and the Foreign Minister Subandrio were also present in the presidential palace. Subandrio was ousted from power in March, so it must have been February 1966. Moreover, he mentioned student protests against inflation and the ill-prepared currency reform, which resulted in the devaluation of the Indonesian rupiah (Barcata, 1966, p. 97). Furthermore, in his book, he gave a concise description of the mass murders that took place. According to him, on the one hand, these were happening due to deep-seated racist (anti-Chinese) and ideological (anti-Communist) motives. Having said that, he also stressed other contributing factors, such as the religious resentments of the Muslims against the materialistic atheists and the raging social upheaval of the hopelessly poor against the more affluent (Barcata, 1966, p. 95).

Indonesia in 1965 and probably 1966. In 1966, he published a book entitled *Die Sensation des Guten* (*The Sensation of the Good*) (1966). In his book, he described how he discussed Indonesia's political situation with diplomats in Bangkok based on the following questions:

> Will there be a Communist overthrow, or will the nationalistically minded Muslims take the helm under the Army's leadership? Will Sukarno be stripped of power, or will the Communists unleash a revolution? (Ziesel, 1966, p. 97, translated by S.G.)

However, he did not go into further detail. Nonetheless it does convey very well the political escalation taking place before G30S, as we will see in section 4.1. Elsewhere in his book, Ziesel deals with an introduction to the country and the Catholic Church's missions to Indonesia.

In the period under discussion, Austrian Catholic missionaries lived and worked widely across Indonesia.[67] Many of them had been working previously in China but had had to flee from religious persecution under Mao Tse-tung (see, e.g. Strong, 2018). One of the earlier representatives was the Steyler Mission in Flores. It was founded in 1913 and had about 22 monks and nuns in the 1960s (Samodra, 2004, p. 20). There were also nuns of the monastic Ursuline Order (*Ursulinen Orden*) who worked all over Indonesia (Anonymous 5, personal communication, August 13, 2019).

Missionaries were also to be found in the capital Jakarta. Three Austrian Jesuits were particularly renowned: Father Braumandl, Father Rudolf Villavicenzio, and Father Karl Staudinger (Wurzer, 2010, p. 138; Anonymous 1, personal communication, May 21, 2019). In Jakarta, they mainly ministered to Chinese and European Christians.[68] They were also invited to numerous events as religious figures. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they were always well informed about the political situation, which would have made them a useful source for Austrian political reporting.[69]

Two people who did not reside in Indonesia but who were in close contact with Sukarno should be mentioned here as they will be mentioned later in this study. One of them was the

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[66] According to records, Ziesel worked for the German foreign secret service *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND). His code name was Zöllner (Schmidt-Eenboom, 1998, p. 245). See also Kurt Ziesel in Hillesheim and Michael (1993, pp. 465–474) https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurt_Ziesel [accessed June 3, 2020].

[67] On the Catholic Church in Indonesia, see, for example, Steenbrink (2015).

[68] In addition to them, Hohenbühel also mentioned Pater Penninger, who was born in Austria (Mistelbach) and who was entrusted by the Bishop of Jakarta with the promotion and care of the Catholic missions (see *Antikatholische tendenz gewinnt Boden*, April 12, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol, Djakarta, Zl. 18-POL/65).

[69] Their presence at various events is documented in several photos in the possession of the author. In addition, according to well-informed sources, Father Beek was among the guests.

Austrian architect Johannes (Hannes) Lintl.[70] After studying at the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna, he found his own firm in Vienna in 1957. As part of joint ventures, he planned and built projects such as offices and administrative buildings, hospitals, and industrial plants. However, his most famous building is undoubtedly the more than 250-meter high *Donauturm* (Danube Tower), which is located in the 22nd district of Vienna. The construction of this tower began in 1961, and the opening took place in 1964. The opening coincided with a visit by President Sukarno to Vienna (see more details on this visit in section 5.2). After seeing the Danube Tower, he decided to construct a replica of it in Jakarta in the Ancol area – the Bung Karno Tower (Anonymous 5, personal communication, August 13, 2019). For this reason, President Sukarno invited Lintl to Indonesia several times. However, contrary to what was written in books and articles after Lintl's death in 2003 (see e.g., Redaktion, 2003; Weihsmann, 2005, p. 228), this tower was never built because of the events of G30S and the subsequent disempowerment of Sukarno.

Lastly, Prof. Dr. Karl Fellinger should be mentioned here.[71] He was an Austrian internist from Vienna best known as a doyen for internal medicine. He was also called the 'King of Doctors', since his clientele included international personalities such as Sheikh Reza Pahlewi, King Ibn Saud, and President Sukarno. From his autobiography entitled *Arzt zwischen den Zeiten* (*Doctor between the times*) (Fellinger, 1984), it is apparent that he was in close contact with President Sukarno. The major part of his chapter on Sukarno deals with a personal description of him. Yet, from his autobiography it is also clear that Sukarno came to Fellinger for a general examination of his health the first time in the year 1963 (Fellinger, 1984, p. 114). After this, Sukarno invited Fellinger to Indonesia, whereupon he visited Jakarta and Bali.[72]

3.4 Summary

In this chapter, the various Austrian structures, institutions, and persons were outlined. One remarkable aspect is that there was even a special unit for the Far-East in the Austrian Foreign Ministry in the 1960s, where Indonesia was listed first. On the ground in Jakarta,

[70] See also Weihsmann (2005) and https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hannes_Lintl [accessed June 3, 2020]. Unfortunately, the homepage of Lintl's architecture office is no longer available. But there is a saved version in the Internet Archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20050209015025/http://www.lintl.at/ [accessed June 3, 2020].
[71] See also https://www.geschichtewiki.wien.gv.at/Karl_Fellinger; https://austria-forum.org/af/AEIOU/Fellinger,_Karl ; https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Fellinger [accessed February 27, 2020].
[72] An exact date of his visit was not in his memoirs. Yet a meeting with the Austrian envoy Dr. Alexander Otto was mentioned in his memoirs. Consequently, Fellinger's visit to Indonesia must have taken place between 1963 and July 1964.

Austria was initially represented by an honorary consulate, which only became a fully-fledged embassy in 1964. However, before the honorary consulate, the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber already had its own foreign trade office in Jakarta since 1952. Apart from these official representatives, various Austrian businesspeople, researchers, journalists, and religious representatives were present. Furthermore, there were two people in Austria who maintained a close relationship with President Sukarno. These were the architect Lintl, who was at one stage chosen to build a replica of the Danube Tower in Jakarta for Sukarno, and the medical doctor Fellinger who examined Sukarno on his visits to Vienna. Therefore, both also played a notable role in this research - as we will see in more detail in the further course of this thesis.

4 Historical Background

Since the topic of the Indonesian mass killings of 1965-1966 is very complex, this chapter will first provide the necessary historical background. According to the Indonesian historian Baskara (2015, p. 19), the outbreak of violence in 1965 did not occur spontaneously; instead, one must observe the events in the light of the international context and domestic political developments in Indonesia.[73] Therefore, the first part of this chapter is devoted to the political and economic situation prior to the events of G30S and the mass violence and mass killings that followed, which was characterized by an economic deterioration and a political escalation, especially between the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the Indonesian Army. The second part of this chapter then takes a closer look at the international context. According to Feilmair (1991, p. 37), this was shaped by three main issues. First, the struggle over West Irian (West Papua) determined Indonesian foreign policy, and when this was supposedly resolved in 1963, the confrontation with Malaysia determined foreign policy. Both conflicts also impacted Sukarno's visits to Austria, as we will see in section 5.2. The third foreign policy focus was related to the Cold War and the pivot of the PKI and Sukarno toward Beijing, coming at a time of a cooling of relations with the United States and Moscow. Nevertheless, they all competed to exert influence over Indonesia, as shown in this chapter's last part.

4.1 Domestic Political and Economic Escalation

Since the 17th century, the Netherlands had gradually taken control of the Indonesian archipelago. The rule of the colonial power for the Netherlands ended during the Second World War when Japanese troops occupied Indonesia in 1942. Following Japan's capitulation after the devastation of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Sukarno proclaimed independence on August 17, 1945. However, the Netherlands refused to recognize the nascent republic and sent soldiers again. Only in December 1949, after four more years of war, did the Netherlands finally recognize Indonesia's independence (Baskara, 2015, p. 22).

A few years later, on September 29, 1955, the young Republic of Indonesia held its first democratic elections. The Communist Party of Indonesia achieved a respectable fourth place with 16.4%, behind Indonesian National Party (Sukarno's party, PNI, 22.3%), Masjumi (20.9%), and Nahdatul Ulama (NU, 18.4%) (Robinson, 2018, p. 38). That the PKI gained so

[73] Even though in this chapter the domestic background has been separated from international context for the sake of simplicity of presentation, they should not be understood as independent. Rather, this international foreign policy naturally played a very large role in shaping domestic conditions, as we will see in this chapter.

much popularity, particularly among the landless population, worried large landowners and entrepreneurs, who benefited from the country's still strongly feudal social structure (Baskara, 2015, p. 19). The PKI's electoral gains were also a cause for concern among the military, who ran with their own party, the League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence (*Ikatan Perintis Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, IPKI), but received only 1.5% support (Baskara, 2015, p. 19).

In 1959, Sukarno considered parliamentary democracy no longer suitable for Indonesia and introduced the so-called 'Guided Democracy'[74] (Feilmair, 1991, p. 27; Robinson, 2018, p. 39; see also Lev, 1966/2009). Consequently, he dissolved the National Assembly, reinstated the constitution of 1945[75], and advocated the formation of a new cabinet of 'Mutual Aid' (*Gotong Royong*), in which all essential parties and groups would be represented (Feilmair, 1991, p. 27). The military, which had promoted this move, welcomed it, hoping it would give them more influence and power (Robinson, 2018, p. 39).

Although this meant that no further democratic elections could take place, the PKI continued to grow in popularity, and the party leadership gained greater self-confidence and support at the grassroots level. This popularity led to an increasing ideological sympathy from Sukarno, especially when it came to the interests of the ordinary people (Baskara, 2015, p. 19). In his political speeches *(Manifesto Politik*, Manipol), Sukarno increasingly distanced himself from the Western countries, which he disparagingly called 'neo-colonialists' and 'neo-imperialists' (Baskara, 2015, p. 19). This ideological sympathy became particularly evident with the coalition of *NASAKOM* (*Nasionalism* [Nationalism], *Agama* [Religion], *Kommunisme* [Communism])[76], which meant that, for the first time, the Communists were officially acknowledged as a central power in the state, alongside the Army and political Islam (Feilmair, 1991, p. 35). However, as the coalition grew increasingly fragile, a kind of peculiar "political triangle" (H. Rosihan Anwar, as cited in Baskara, 2013, p. 11) emerged gradually

[74] According to Zhou (2014, p. 32, FN. 15), the idea of Guided Democracy was probably inspired by Sukarno's visit to China in 1956, during which he was greatly impressed by the progress in China and the effectiveness of the highly centralized political system there.

[75] In 1949, a new constitution replaced the authoritarian 1945 presidential constitution (UUD'45), which was more consistent with liberal postwar sentiment (Robinson, 2018, p. 37). In 1955, the Constituent Assembly was entrusted with drafting a new constitution to replace the interim one enacted in 1950. However, in 1959, Sukarno called for an end to 'liberal' democracy and a return to the 1945 presidential constitution (Robinson, 2018, pp. 37–39).

[76] Pils (1984, p. 32 fn. 2) and also Dahm (1966, p. 51), point out that already in the article *Nationalism, Islam and Marxism* by Sukarno, he based the ideology of NASAKOM, among others, on Otto Bauer, whose 'historical community of destiny' (*historische Schicksalsgemeinschaft*) accommodated his populist views (tradition of seeking and harmony).

in Indonesia, consisting of Sukarno, the Army, and the Communist Party. Sukarno needed the Army to keep the Communists in check. At the same time, he also needed the Communists to act as a countervailing force against the Army's desire for power. The PKI, in turn, needed the president because it felt threatened by elements within the Army, and the Army itself, which felt threatened by the PKI's influence, sought proximity to Sukarno (Baskara, 2015, pp. 19–20).

At the beginning of 1965, however, this balanced political power structure became unstable. Knowing that the president was in favor of the PKI, but also with the knowledge that the PKI's influence in the Armed Forces was limited, the PKI launched an offensive designed to curb the power of opponents in the military in order to guarantee the continued existence of the party, even in the event that Sukarno were no longer alive (Crouch, 1978, p. 86). Therefore, in addition to intensifying their propaganda campaign against the 'bureaucratic capitalists'[77], they introduced two proposals to position themselves more strongly against the Army, and on which they seemed certain to have the president's support (Crouch, 1978, pp. 86–87). Thus, in January 1965, in the wake of the Malaysia confrontation (see next section), the PKI proposed that organized workers and peasants form an armed militia ('fifth force'), alongside the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police. Aside from this, they demanded that, as part of the NASAKOM doctrine, there should be 'Nasakomization in all fields', including the military (Robinson, 2018, p. 50). This would have meant that 'advisory teams' would have been sent to these organizations to work with the commanders of all four services (Crouch, 1978, p. 87). As such, the PKI hoped to gain more influence, or at least to open up the possibility for them to be informed about developments within the armed forces (Crouch, 1978, p. 87). Opinion within the armed forces on these proposals was divided. While parts of the Armed Services – most notably the Air Force, which maintained good relations with the PKI and the president – welcomed these initiatives, it was viewed with skepticism and disapproval by the Army (Robinson, 2018, p. 50).

Moreover, the precarious balance of power was further destabilized by other events in early 1965. At that time, rumors began to circulate that a 'Council of Generals' (*dewan jenderal*)[78] assisted by foreign secret services was planning to overthrow Sukarno (Baskara, 2015, p. 20;

[77] "The PKI referred to the 'bureaucratic-capitalist' as '*kapbir'* with its suggestion of '*kafir*' (infidel) for Muslims. The *Kapbir* were army officers and their associates in the state corporations." (Crouch, 1978, p. 86, fn. 43)

[78] See further details on the discussion of the 'Council of Generals' in Crouch (1978, pp. 106–107), and May (1978, pp. 125–128).

Maryati, 2015, p. 113; Robinson, 2018, p. 50). Therefore, Sukarno summoned the Army commander General Yani so that he could ask him directly about the rumors. Although Yani did admit that Army commanders met now and then, he denied that there was a Council of Generals or a plot to overthrow Sukarno (Robinson, 2018, p. 51).[79] Despite the denials of Army leaders and foreign diplomats, the rumors did not stop.

Furthermore, in May, a document appeared that seemed to show that the UK and the US government, together with Indonesian Army officers, were planning some secret action (Robinson, 2018, p. 50). The document, which became later known as the 'Gilchrist Letter', was a draft message from then British Ambassador Andrew Gilchrist in Jakarta to the Foreign Office in London. The telegram mentioned a joint action between the US, the UK, and their Indonesian "local army friends" (Maryati, 2015, p. 113, fn. 6; Robinson, 2018, p. 50).[80] While the Army and most foreign embassies insisted that the letter was a forgery, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, Sukarno, and the PKI saw it as evidence of an imperialistic interference in Indonesian affairs (Robinson, 2018, pp. 50–51).

In addition to these rumors in Jakarta, the increasing political tension spread to the streets and lands throughout the country. For example, bolstered by anti-imperialist rhetoric, PKI-affiliated unions led the seizures of US and UK properties and plantations in January and February 1965, provoking a furious reaction from the Army and anti-communist parties (Robinson, 2018, p. 51). Far from dismissing the takeovers, Sukarno told these companies' executives that the government would temporarily take administrative control of them (Robinson, 2018, p. 51). More than that, he also supported the idea of taking over other Western holdings – such as the foreign oil companies, Caltex, Stanvac, and Shell Oil – which caused serious alarm among the executives of those companies (Robinson, 2018, p. 51).

Meanwhile, the PKI now demanded that the land reform laws, which had already been passed in parliament, must be implemented (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 10; Robinson, 2018, p. 51).[81] In some parts of the country, this political demand was closely connected with unilateral land seizure actions (*aksi sepihak*) by the *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (Indonesian Peasant's Front, BTI), which led to conflicts with the NU, PNI, and their respective mass organizations,

[79] Robinson additionally notes that there are reports that "General Yani told the president that a Council of Generals of sorts did exist, but that it was simply a forum for discussing personnel issues" (Robinson, 2018, pp. 323–324, fn. 67). He further notes that "some observers have speculated that the whole idea of a Council of Generals was a deliberate provocation, set in motion by Kostrad Intellegence office Ali Murtopo to provide a pretext for Kostrad to strike against the PKI" (Robinson, 2018, pp. 323–324, fn. 67).
[80] See further details on the 'Gilchrist Letter' in May (1978, pp. 125–126).
[81] On the various legal regulations and the PKI's related demands, see Pelzer (1982, Chapter 3).

sometimes resulting in violence (Robinson, 2018, p. 51). The actual number of people killed or injured in these incidents was quite small, according to Robinson (2018, pp. 51–52), but these clashes fueled hostility between the groups and brought about conditions conductive to the mass violence that followed the alleged coup of October 1, 1965.[82]

Besides these political tensions, a rapidly deteriorating economic situation further exacerbated the situation.[83] While Indonesia's economy had already been suffering by the war years, it declined rapidly in the 1950s. According to McGregor et al. (2018a, pp. 7–8), this was due to Sukarno's poor economic planning and the high debt repayment obligations that the Dutch had imposed on Indonesia as the price for its independence. Moreover, efforts to rehabilitate the economy had foundered in the face of the escalation of the confrontation with Malaysia (see the section below) in the 1960s, and inflation was rising out of control (Crouch, 1978, p. 95).[84] For instance, if Indonesia tried to import rice and other goods from abroad in the 1950-1960s (on the import of goods from Austria, see section 5.2.1), this became more and more difficult as the illiquidity rose. President Sukarno, therefore, proclaimed the principle *berdikari* (*berdiri di atas kaki sendiri*, standing on owns' one feet), after which the import of rice and textiles was stopped (Crouch, 1978, p. 96). Therefore, Indonesia's economic outlook shortly before the alleged coup was anything but good: there was the threat of mass starvation, reduced rice production, and triple-digit inflation rates; which led the prices of goods to rise quickly, while the wages and salaries for the population remained stagnant or declined (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 8; Robinson, 2018, p. 52).

These deteriorating economic conditions also fostered corruption among government and military officials and politicians, and contributed to an atmosphere of insecurity and anxiety (Robinson, 2018, p. 52). Against this backdrop, the PKI's campaigns, which on one hand opposed corruption and price controls, and on the other supported collective bargaining and wage increases, naturally found support among large segments of the population (Robinson, 2018, p. 52). According to Robinson, it is, therefore, no wonder that "so many teachers, civil

[82] An example that has found its way into many Indonesian history and school textbooks is the violent incident on May 16 at the Bandar Betsy plantation in Simalungan, North Sumatra. "There, a retired army warrant had been killed while trying to force BTI members off plantation land that they claimed. His death became a rallying point for the army and parties on the right in their campaign against the PKI after October 1965." (Robinson, 2018, p. 52; see also Crouch, 1978, pp. 87–88)

[83] For more details on the increasingly dire economic situation and particularly of the deeper socio-political rifts, see e.g., McGregor et al. (2018a, pp. 7–10), Hadiz and Bourchier (2003), Cribb (2001b), and Crouch (1978).

[84] "Inflation of 119 percent in 1963 and 134 percent in 1964 was followed by a 50 percent rise between January and August 1965." (Crouch, 1978, p. 95)

servants, university professors, writers, and even some soldiers began to lend their support to the PKI and its affiliated organizations" (Robinson, 2018, p. 52).

Though these tensions had already laid the foundations for G30S and the subsequent violence, the course of events reached a point of inflection in August 1965 and gathered momentum thereafter (Robinson, 2018, p. 52). On August 4, Sukarno had a severe collapse while receiving an official delegation (Crouch, 1978, p. 96; Fic, 2006, p. 68; Robinson, 2018, pp. 52–53).[85] It was not long before rumors of his illness were widespread, and though these rumors were light on detail, they were heavy on portent, even going so far as to suggest that Sukarno would not live much longer (Robinson, 2018, p. 53). Thus, this situation would probably have meant the collapse of the uneasy coalition keeping Sukarno in power. The news caused unrest among the various parties and personalities, prompting them to plan for the event of his death (Robinson, 2018, p. 53). The PKI and its allies, in particular, feared that in the event of Sukarno's death they would lose their most important patron, and they therefore considered how best to prepare for Sukarno's passing (Robinson, 2018, p. 53). At the same time, the Army prepared to use Sukarno's death or departure from power to stop the country's left tendencies, by taking power if necessary (Robinson, 2018, p. 53).

Under these political conditions, the alleged coup and the subsequent actions of October 1, 1965, seem almost a "logical consequence" (Baskara, 2015, p. 20). However, Baskara (2015) and other historians (McGregor et al., 2018b; Robinson, 2018; Schaefer & Baskara, 2013a) point out that the subsequent mass killings of hundreds of thousands of civilians cannot be explained by this alone. Instead, it must also be understood in the broader international and foreign policy contexts.

4.2 International and Foreign Policy Context

Foreign policy in the Guided Democracy was mainly characterized by three main issues (Feilmair, 1991, p. 37). Indonesia's foreign affairs were shaped by the struggle for West Irian, and when this was believed to be resolved in 1963, the confrontation with Malaysia. The third key foreign policy issue was related to the Cold War and with it the subsequent pivoting of the PKI and Sukarno towards Beijing at a time when relations with the US and Moscow were cooling. Yet all of these competed for influence on Indonesia, as we will see in the following sections.

[85] It seems there are some differences concerning the dates. Crouch (1978, p. 96), Fic (2006, p. 68), Robinson (2018, pp. 52–53), and the authors of the official Indonesian version (Sekneg RI, 1995, p. 66) write August 4; yet, Feilmair writes August 5, 1965 (1991, p. 58), and Hunter (2007, p. 138) writes the evening of August 3.

4.2.1 West Irian (West Papua)

As we have seen in the previous section, only after four years of war had passed did the Netherlands, in 1949, recognize Indonesia's independence. However, this did not apply to West Irian (later called West Papua) – the western part of New Guinea, as the Netherlands continued to claim it as a colony (Baskara, 2015, p. 22). At first, there were still attempts to solve the conflict with the Netherlands by diplomatic means, but when this could not be achieved, Indonesia began to arm itself militarily (Feilmair, 1991, p. 38). The conflicting perspectives were marked on the one side by Indonesia, which saw in the Netherlands a latent danger of 'neo-colonialism-imperialism', and on the other side by the Netherlands, which in turn regarded West Papua not as part of Indonesia because of its ethnic differences[86] with the rest of the former Dutch East Indies (Feilmair, 1991, p. 38; cf. Singh, 2017). Sukarno's endeavors to integrate all islands of the former Dutch East Indies into Indonesia were increasingly supported by the Communists, which endeared them to Sukarno (Baskara, 2015, p. 22).[87]

The beginning of 1962 saw the first armed conflicts between Indonesia and the Netherlands (Feilmair, 1991, p. 38). For the US, a breakout of open war, would have posed a dilemma, as they would have been obligated to support the Netherlands as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner. This in turn would encourage Moscow to provide military support to Indonesia (Baskara, 2015, p. 22). Additionally, they feared that this matter regarding West Papua could be used by the PKI to increase its influence in Indonesian politics and push Sukarno even deeper into Communist hands (Baskara, 2013, p. 13). In addition, US-American companies had their own interests at that time in the region's barely explored mineral resources. In 1960, for example, the Freeport mining group confirmed what the Dutch had known since the 1930s, that there were large quantities of gold-bearing copper in the Jayawijaya mountains (Baskara, 2015, p. 22; Simpson, 2008).

For these reasons, the US was interested in a prompt settlement. Therefore, the US government under President Kennedy began to put pressure on the Dutch to leave the region (Baskara, 2015, p. 23). In 1962, the time had come. The Dutch government gave the Indonesians the administration of the territory, which at that time was overseen by the United

[86] The Dutch tried to stress that there exists "racial differences between Indonesians of Java or Sumatra and the Melanesian inhabitants of West New Guinea" (Mackie, as cited in Singh, 2017, p. 62).
[87] See also the saying and national song *Dari Sabang sampai Merauke* (From Sabang to Merauke), which is supposed to show the unity of Indonesia from the most northwestern part in Sumatra to the most eastern part in Papua.

Nations (UN) (Baskara, 2013, p. 13). In 1969, a UN referendum on West Papua's independence was scheduled. However, not all the inhabitants of West Papua, but just over a thousand selected representatives, were allowed to decide on whether to retain sovereignty or remain in Indonesia (Baskara, 2015, p. 23). Since then, West Papua belongs to Indonesia, but the conflict has remained unresolved up to this day. The Indonesian historian Baskara, therefore, correctly notes: "Political pressure triumphed over international law" (Baskara, 2015, p. 23, translated by S.G.). With that political move, however, the US hoped it would be able to pursue its interests in the country, including minimizing communist influence in Indonesia (Baskara, 2013, pp. 13–14).

4.2.2 Confrontation with Malaysia (*konfrontasi*)

In April 1959, Malaya signed a treaty of friendship with Indonesia, but a policy of confrontation developed only three years later (Feilmair, 1991, pp. 39–40). The reason for that was the plan carried out by the British to create a Federation of Malaysia that was to include Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei, and Singapore (Baskara, 2015, p. 23; Feilmair, 1991, p. 40). The Federation was supposed to protect the territories primarily from "kommunistischer Infiltration" (communist infiltration) (Manullang, as cited in Feilmair, 1991, p. 40), which were barely viable on their own. For Indonesia, however, the planned Federation meant a "neokolonialistisches Machtwerk" (neocolonialist power structure) (Dahm, as cited in Feilmair, 1991, p. 40), against which it was resolutely opposed after the end of the West Irian conflict (Feilmair, 1991, p. 40). Initially, President Sukarno had no objections when the idea of forming the Federation was announced (Baskara, 2013, p. 14). However, when British soldiers bloodily put down an attempted coup in Brunei in 1962, Jakarta's attitude toward the Federation's plans changed (Baskara, 2015, p. 23). The effort was now seen by Indonesia as a sign that Britain wanted to continue to dominate its former colonies, and as a sign of the West's goal to 'encircle' Indonesia (Baskara, 2015, p. 23). After all, Indonesia was already flanked in the North by the pro-American Philippines and in the South and Southeast by two capitalist nations, Australia and New Zealand (Baskara, 2013, p. 14).[88]

Nevertheless, at the peace talks in Manila in July 1963, Indonesia declared that it would accept the Federation – on the condition that the majority of the inhabitants of Sabah and Arawak would vote for it (Baskara, 2015, p. 23). However, even before the official result of

[88] According to Feilmair (1991, p. 40), however, there was another reason for Indonesia's extreme involvement: the foreign policy issue came in handy to distract attention from the country's own economic misdeeds.

the vote was known (and there were numerous complaints of fraud), the announcement of the formation of the federation in Northern Borneo triggered strong reactions in Indonesia, and Sukarno announced a policy of *konfrontasi* (Confrontation) against the formation of the Federation of Malaysia (Baskara, 2013, p. 14; Feilmair, 1991, p. 41).[89] Demonstrations broke out, the British embassy was set on fire, and British businesses were occupied (Feilmair, 1991, pp. 41–42). Moreover, numerous Indonesian volunteers were sent to the Kalimantan (Indonesian part of the island of Borneo) conflict border. Meanwhile, Britain reinforced its troops in the vicinity of this region, and soon the first armed clashes occurred (Feilmair, 1991, p. 42). Various attempts to resolve the disputes failed. In fact, by the beginning of 1965, the opposing factions had become even more entrenched: the U.S government backed Malaysia and provided substantial financial aid (Feilmair, 1991, p. 42). Thus, Indonesia had a new enemy against whom it acted by confiscating companies (Feilmair, 1991, p. 42).

The political climax of the confrontation was reached in January 1965. Malaysia became a (non-permanent) member of the United Nations Security Council. In response to this, Indonesia withdrew from the UN, thus becoming the first state ever to announce its withdrawal from the UN (Baskara, 2015, p. 23).[90] As a result, Indonesia became increasingly isolated, as many potential allies among the Afro-Asian states rejected the decision to withdraw (Feilmair, 1991, p. 42).

While the *konfrontasi* campaign was initially supported by all parties and factions (Feilmair, 1991, pp. 40–41), the demand for a fifth force, in particular, was a thorn in the side of the Army. They suspected that the PKI was planning to use the campaign and the fifth force to challenge their monopoly on the use of armed force (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 10; c.f. Melvin, 2018a). Therefore, they took some measures to advance their own interests. For instance, they used the *konfrontasi* campaign to prepare civilians who were favorable towards them for a possible move against the PKI (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 10; c.f. Melvin, 2018b; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019). They also used it as a pretext to build up parallel command structures within the military – which were then used against the PKI and Sukarno after October 1, 1965 (Melvin, 2018b, pp. 54–57).[91] However, the Indonesian Army was not

[89] See Subritzky (2000), and Easter (2004) for more details on the *konfrontasi*.
[90] After the change of power from Sukarno to Suharto, Indonesia was readmitted to the UN in 1966.
[91] After Sukarno had proclaimed the *Dwikora* (from *Dwi Komando Rakya*, Double Command of the People: to crush Malaysia and defend the Revolution) concept in May 1964 to intensify the *konfrontasi* campaign, new military chains of command were established, such as KOTI ("Supreme Operations Command"), and Kolga ("Military Area Command"), up to the local level of Pepelrada (*Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah*

alone in making preparations. They received support from Western countries, above all the US, who promoted training for anti-communist members of the Army, and fostered support for weakening Sukarno and the PKI (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 10; Roosa, 2006, p. 193; Simpson, 2008). This support was part of a broader Cold War strategy against communism.

4.2.3 Cold War

The tensions between the Eastern and Western Blocs took place not only in Europe and America, but also above all, in the newly liberated states of Africa and Asia (Baskara, 2015, p. 20; Robinson, 2018, p. 84; cf. Latham, 2010; McMahon, 2013). Some of these countries, including Indonesia, did not want to commit themselves to one of these two blocs and decided to create a 'Non-Aligned Movement'[92]. However, Indonesia's geopolitical importance and the country's plentiful natural resources caused the Eastern and Western blocs to vie for influence on Indonesia (Baskara, 2015, p. 20; McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 9; Robinson, 2018, p. 88; Simpson, 2008). Thus, the US wanted to integrate Indonesia into the Western Bloc in order to prevent the communists' supremacy. They were afraid that Indonesia would become a 'domino' whose fall to communism would sweep away the Southeast Asian states allied with the West (Baskara, 2015, p. 21; McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 9).[93] This fear was all the more alarming as the US did not seem to be making significant progress in the Vietnam War, despite significant and escalating troop deployment (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 9).

The Soviet Union was also aware of Indonesia's strategic importance and wanted to win the country as an ally (Baskara, 2015, p. 21; Boden, 2013; see also Singh, 1994). With the promotion of communist ideas as well as giving plenty of development and military aid (Baskara, 2015, p. 21; Boden, 2013, p. 21; McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 9; Robinson, 2018, p. 113; Simpson, 2013, p. 52), the USSR hoped that Sukarno would show 'positive' neutrality towards the Communist Bloc, thus granting them a foothold in their influence on the Non-Aligned Movement (Boden, 2013, p. 87). Moreover, the Soviet officials hoped that they would gain access to the country's natural resources (Baskara, 2015, p. 21). At first, these hopes seemed to be fulfilled by the increasing shift to the left, which emerged from Sukarno's

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[Regional Authorities to Implement Dwikora]) – see also Crouch (1978, p. 76). Outwardly, these commands lent their support to Sukarno, but inwardly, they undermined him (Melvin, 2018b, p. 55).

[92] Indonesia was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement and hosted the first Asia-Africa Conference in 1955 in Bandung – see G.M. Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung* (1956).

[93] See also *Prospects for and strategic implications of a communist takeover in* Indonesia, FRUS Foreign Relations 1964-1968, Document 137, dated September 1, 1965 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d137 [accessed March 24, 2021].

speeches. However, Sukarno invested the money primarily in prestige projects and in the end, he and the PKI gradually distanced themselves from Moscow (Baskara, 2015, p. 21).

Aside from these two superpowers, China was regarded as another influential factor. At the beginning of the Guided Democracy, there were still anti-Chinese riots[94] that negatively affected bilateral relations (Feilmair, 1991, p. 43). However, shared interests in the Malaysia conflict and Indonesia's ambitions for more autonomy from Third World countries in the bipolar world structure brought about a change in relations between Indonesia and China (Feilmair, 1991, pp. 43–44). From 1960 onwards, cooperation between these two countries expanded steadily. For instance, Beijing supported PKI leader Aidit's plan on the 'fifth force', along with a possible transfer of nuclear technology to Indonesia so that they could build a nuclear bomb (Feilmair, 1991, p. 44; Robinson, 2018, p. 113; c.f.: Zhou, 2014, 2015, 2019). In addition, Chinese doctors turned out to be crucial in providing medical aid to President Sukarno (Zhou, 2014), as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Particularly after Indonesia withdrew from the UN in 1965, Sukarno entered into even closer foreign policy ties with China (Feilmair, 1991, p. 44). High-level visits and cultural, educational, and economic exchanges increased drastically (Zhou, 2014, p. 32). Furthermore, on August 17, 1965, in Sukarno's last independence speech before the alleged coup, he declared a plan of allegiance with China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cambodia for an anti-imperialist axis (Feilmair, 1991, p. 44; Zhou, 2014, p. 32).

With this increasing alignment of Sukarno with China, a simultaneous accord with the PKI went hand in hand, which in the end affected the political balance of power between the Army, Sukarno and the PKI (as shown previously in section 4.1) (Feilmair, 1991, p. 44). Moreover, the PKI had become the largest Communist Party outside China and the USSR (Robinson, 2018, pp. 42–43).[95] Thus, it was obvious that for Beijing the PKI was of the greatest interest, especially in the context of the Sino-Soviet split[96] (Feilmair, 1991, p. 44).

[94] In the era of the Guided Democracy the ethnic Chinese who were living in Indonesia had to choose between Chinese or Indonesian citizenship. Those who had not renounced their Chinese nationality were seen by Indonesian law as 'non-citizens' or 'aliens'. But although many of them became Indonesian citizens, their loyalty to the Indonesian nation continued to be called into question. Thus, these issues led to a series of attacks on ethnic Chinese across West Java – for more details, see Purdey (2006, pp. 10–15).

[95] "In 1963, it claimed to have some 3.5 million card-carrying members and another 20 million who belonged to affiliated organizations." (Robinson, 2018, pp. 42–43)

[96] The Sino-Soviet split was the breakdown of political relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It began in the late 1950s, peaked in 1969, and continued until the late 1980s. The dispute was caused by doctrinal divergences arising from their different interpretations and practical applications of Marxism-Leninism – for further information, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_split [accessed July 15, 2021], Radchenko (2010), and Lüthi (2008).

Aidit initially tried to remain impartial regarding this rift, mainly because of Sukarno's Moscow-friendly attitude and the ongoing financial support from the USSR (Feilmair, 1991, pp. 44–45). However, in the course of the *konfrontasi* policy, Aidit and the PKI shifted more and more to the Chinese side, which ultimately ended with an open break in relations with Moscow (Feilmair, 1991, p. 45; Zhou, 2014, p. 32).

4.2.4 Foreign Influence and 'Western Plans'

The shift towards communism was viewed with nervous eyes by the British government and the US. They started to think about how to curb the power of Sukarno and the Communists in Indonesia (Baskara, 2015, p. 24). However, for a long time there was controversy as to what extent foreign states, and particularly the Western powers, were involved in the overthrow of Sukarno and the Communists. According to Robinson (2018, p. 82), there are three commonly held positions in this regard. The first position is that the US and its allies, in cooperation with key Army officers, brought down the G30S operation. The response to G30S was then used to justify a crackdown on the PKI and removal of Sukarno from power (cf. P. D. Scott, 1985; Wertheim, 1970). The second position is that the US and its allies had nothing at all to do with the alleged coup d'état and, in fact, were entirely taken by surprise (cf. Brands, 1989; Green, 1990). The third position, which is mainly favored by the Army and some foreign observers – and which is still the dominant official position in Indonesia – claims that G30S was the product of the Chinese government's interference in Indonesia's internal affairs (cf. Fic, 2006).

The fact that important official files in the archives of the different countries are kept locked away until today makes it impossible to establish definitively whether the US and its allies planned the affair (Robinson, 2018, p. 82; Simpson, 2008, p. 174), nor is there any evidence that Beijing planned the alleged coup. However, to say that foreign powers did not *plan* the events around October 1, 1965, does not mean that they played no role in them. On the contrary, in Schaefer and Wardaya (2013a), various scholars examined the role of different nations in the events of 1965-1966. They concluded that "the foreign countries were anything but passive onlookers: they sided with Indonesian conflict parties and staked out their own claims" (Schaefer & Baskara, 2013b). Furthermore, they emphasized that, although the killings in Indonesia were domestic by execution, they were "committed under auspices and guidance of international actors that viewed Indonesia as a vital pawn in the Cold War" (Schaefer, 2013a, p. 6, see also previous chapter).

In the last decade, more and more new studies support this claim (e.g., Baskara, 2015; Henry, 2019; Millott, 2014, 2016; Robinson, 2018; Roosa, 2006; Schaefer, 2013b; Schütte, 2013; Simpson, 2008; Tanter, 2013). Thus, the Indonesian historian Baskara T. Wardaya stated in 2015 quite clearly:

> As far as we know today, the USA and Great Britain were actively involved in the plans to eliminate the PKI and to depose President Sukarno, and they were well aware that a direct coup against Sukarno, who was extremely popular among the people, would not have been successful. (Baskara, 2015, p. 24, translated by S.G.)

Baskara justified his statement at that time by referring to, among other sources, the study of the US historian Bradley Simpson, who examined in his work *Economists with guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968* (2008) the US-Indonesian relations during that time. Simpson came to the assertion that "the United States and Britain unquestionably sought to entice the PKI into a coup attempt or some other rash action in the hopes of provoking a violent response by the army" (Simpson, 2008, p. 174). Moreover, he also showed that various secret operations and propaganda efforts were made to support the aim of the West to lead Indonesia on the path of liberal capitalism (Simpson, 2008). Therefore, as early as the end of the 1950s, thousands of military men and economists[97] were trained with the aim of shaping the country's (economic) order, in anticipation of regime change (Baskara, 2015, pp. 24–25; May, 1978, p. 126; Roosa, 2006, pp. 182–188; Simpson, 2008, 2013).[98] Yet, the US and Great Britain were not alone. Numerous studies (Henry, 2019; Millott, 2016, 2014; Schaefer, 2013b; Schütte, 2013; Tanter, 2013) showed that to a certain extent other Western countries, such as Australia, France, and West Germany were also involved. They either supported the propaganda efforts or helped the Indonesian military by their efforts to track down and kill actual and alleged communists in the country.

On the other hand, there were claims by the Indonesian Army that China interfered in Indonesia's internal affairs, and that this led to the alleged coup. For a long time, there was insufficient evidence to evaluate this claim. But then, in 2008, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released documents from 1961-1965 for a short period. The Chinese scholar Tamou Zhou examined these documents and came to the conclusion that "Beijing's actual impact on

[97] Later they were pejoratively referred to as the *Berkeley Mafia*; on that, see May (1978, p. 338), and Simpson (2008).

[98] Immediately after the elimination of the PKI and only a few days after Suharto came to power, the US company Freeport began to mine for gold and copper in West Papua. Numerous other companies followed and made considerable profits from Indonesia's mineral resources (Baskara, 2015, p. 26; c.f. Simpson, 2008).

political developments in Indonesia in 1965 was very limited" (Zhou, 2014, p. 58). However, she did find documentary records that showed that in early August 1965, Aidit or the PKI had worked out a plan that bore similarities with the events of October 1st. She also noted that "it is unlikely […] that Beijing knew of the exact timing of G30S or participated in the planning" (Zhou, 2014, pp. 50–51). Therefore, for the US historian Robinson (2018, p. 114), there is nothing that suggests that the plan was already being instigated. It could just as well have been the case that Aidit saw this plan for a later point in time, for instance, after the death of Sukarno. Consequently, for him as well as Zhou, it is apparent that the current documents show nothing that would support the Indonesian Army's claim that China had led the movement or took part in planning the movement (Robinson, 2018, p. 114; Zhou, 2014, p. 58).

4.3 Summary

As shown in this chapter, the historical context of the events of 1965-1966 is quite complex and involved many factors. Starting with the independence of Indonesia, a phase of liberal democracy followed, which then was replaced by the Guided Democracy of Sukarno. In the wake of NASAKOM, and amidst the conflicts of West Papua and Malaysia, Sukarno moved closer to the PKI. The domestic power relationship became a "political triangle" (H. Rosihan Anwar, as cited in Baskara, 2013, p. 11) between Sukarno, the Army, and the Communists. In 1965, this balance of power came to an end. It was preceded by an escalation of tensions, especially between the Army and the PKI. The demands of the PKI, such as the Nazakominisation into the areas of the Army, the arming of large parts of the population, and the demand for land reforms, had induced a strong reaction from the Army and the political right. In addition to these political tensions, a rapidly deteriorating economic situation further aggravated matters. Moreover, starting in 1965, various rumors, such as those of the Council of Generals, the Gilchrist document and, above all, Sukarno's alleged deteriorating health, further fueled the tense situation. Although these power dynamics and the poor economic performance explain G30S to a certain extent, it can in no way explain the subsequent mass killings. These can only be understood in the context of the Cold War and with the direct and indirect influence of major foreign powers on Indonesians domestic policy, and above all the 'Western plans' against communism in South-East Asia.

5 Analysis I: Sukarno's Illness and Austria's Medical Aid

One of the most crucial turning points in the events leading up to G30S was the decline of Sukarno's health in August 1965 and, with this, the reported deterioration of his related, chronic kidney disease. While the last official account of the Suharto regime attributed the decreasing health of Sukarno as one of the main factors as to why G30S happened, some researchers stress that the health of Sukarno was not nearly as alarming as it was believed to be, and therefore cannot have played such a significant role. Thus, Sukarno's illness, and, particularly, events related to his health in 1965, are still disputed in the literature.

Therefore, this chapter begins with a brief discussion of the different accounts on Sukarno's health in August 1965, and the contradictions between them. Interestingly, as will be shown, the literature on this subject is quite limited, despite its great significance for the events surrounding G30S. Furthermore, it is particularly important to note that Sukarno's illness was also very strongly connected with Austria, since, in addition to the Chinese doctors so often cited, Austrian doctors treated Sukarno for many years. However, since the existing literature provides hardly any information about Sukarno's travels to Vienna, the first part of the analysis section is devoted to the general background of his trips to Vienna, before going into more detail about what the Austrian authorities knew about Sukarno's health, particularly in 1965. Finally, this chapter concludes with empirical findings and discusses these results along with the different positions in the research field.

5.1 Conflicting Accounts of Sukarno's Health in the Existing Literature

One of the last official accounts of G30S issued by the Suharto regime is the so-called 'White Book'. It was published in 1994 by the Suharto regime under the Indonesian title *Gerakan 30 September. Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia* (1994), and one year later under the English title *The September 30th Movement. The attempted coup by the Indonesian Communist Party* (1995). The book provided the latest narrative of the background and actions of G30S from the perspective of the Suharto regime. In one section, the book discussed Sukarno's health problems in August 1965 (Sekneg RI, 1995, pp. 65–70). This section stated that Sukarno became ill after his overseas trips in July 1965. To restore his health, an Indonesian and Chinese team of doctors treated Sukarno. However, on August 4, 1965, his condition declined drastically. He vomited and fainted. A few days later, the Chinese doctors informed the PKI leader Aidit about Sukarno's poor health. The Chinese doctors treating Sukarno concluded that there were two possibilities concerning his illness:

> a. Judging from President Soekarno's worsening health, there was a possibility he might die.
> b. If in fact President Soekarno should recover, there was a chance that he could be paralyzed.
> (Sekneg RI, 1995, p. 66)

Therefore, according to the book, Aidit organized several meetings with the PKI Central Committee Politburo to discuss the critical state of Sukarno's health. At these meetings, it was noted that if President Sukarno's leadership ceased to exist, the Army would have the capability to defeat the PKI. Consequently, they concluded that they would need "to take steps to immobilize the Army" (Sekneg RI, 1995, p. 66), and "prepare steps to organize an armed force for the purpose of a first strike at the Army" (Sekneg RI, 1995, pp. 66–67). These discussions ultimately led – as we know – to G30S.

This specific narrative has been repeated by the Suharto regime in Indonesia since the 1960s, not only in history and school books but also in films, museums and monuments (McGregor, 2007; Roosa, 2012; Wijaya, 2015). Moreover, it was also used repeatedly by English-language writers. One of the latest accounts was, for instance, the book by Helen-Louise Hunter entitled *Sukarno and the Indonesian coup* (2007).[99] In this, she likewise highlights "Sukarno's sudden illness, which was thought at the time to be very serious", and might "have spurred Aidit to immediate action" (Hunter, 2007, pp. 137–138). Furthermore, she makes two interesting points. Firstly, she highlights that there was at least a cause to worry that his sudden illness was related to this chronic kidney disease (Hunter, 2007, p. 138). Consequently, "Sukarno's doctors immediately got in in touch with the Viennese kidney specialist, Dr. Fellinger" (Hunter, 2007, p. 138), to seek advice from him regarding Sukarno's illness.

Secondly, and this is very important, she argues that Sukarno even had "made plans to travel to Vienna in September for a medical check-up by the Austrian kidney specialist Dr. Fellinger" (Hunter, 2007, p. 154). Yet, according to Hunter, Sukarno canceled these plans, "claiming that internal policy developments would not allow him to do so" (Hunter, 2007, p. 154). The fact that Sukarno apparently considered it impossible to leave the country in September makes Hunter believe that there is almost no doubt that "it was the plans for the coup that forced the cancellation of his trip" (Hunter, 2007, p. 154). Consequently, she concludes: "If he [Sukarno] had not ordered the coup in the first place, he clearly knew of PKI planning for it by this time, presumably approved of it, and wanted to be in Djakarta to

[99] Although this book offered some interesting insights, it has to be read with caution for two reasons: first, Hunter did not give any references in her book; second – and probably related to it – much of the text in her books was a copy from the CIA report *Research Study - Indonesia 1965, The Coup That Backfired* (1968).

keep in close touch." (Hunter, 2007, pp. 154–155)

Yet, other researchers, such as Anderson and McVey (1971/2009), did question this narrative of the Suharto regime very early on. However, the subject of Sukarno's health condition in 1965 was rarely brought up. Only in recent years, mainly through the comprehensive studies of the Chinese historian Taomo Zhou (2014, 2019), have new insights been gleaned on that topic. After researching the Chinese archives, the conclusion drawn by her was that two widely circulated assertions of the Suharto regime are flawed: the claim that Beijing smuggled arms to the PKI and ordered it to carry out an attempted coup; and the claim that Chinese doctors predicted the imminent decline in Sukarno's health (Zhou, 2019, p. 153).

Countering the latter claim, she argues that the Chinese doctors observed that Sukarno's health condition was certainly not well, but "not as critical as had been rumored" (Zhou, 2019, p. 153). Therefore, she stresses that it was not the Chinese doctors who spread false information about Sukarno's health, but instead, it

> was disclosed secretly to media by doctors in Vienna, who discovered stones in the president's right kidney and determined that he would die within the next three months if these stones were not removed via surgery. (Zhou, 2014, p. 47)

Thus, the Chinese doctors did not believe the diagnosis by their counterparts in Vienna, but instead saw a cardiovascular problem as the cause of Sukarno's illness in August 1965. Consequently, they advised Sukarno not to undergo any surgery (Zhou, 2014, p. 47). Probably as a result of this unauthorized disclosure to the media, the US historian Robinson even concluded that Sukarno "had come to mistrust the Western doctors he had previously consulted" (Robinson, 2018, p. 88).

Several points are relevant to discussions of Sukarno's health during the period leading up to G30S: the timing of his visits to Austria for medical reasons, his plans to visit Vienna in late 1964 and 1965, and the identity of the doctors mentioned by Zhou. However, the existing literature gives us only limited information on that subject. For instance, in Sukarno's book *An Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams*, he mentions only twice about his trips to Austria in 1960 and 1961 (Sukarno, 1965b, pp. 6, 11). Yet, for his trip in 1961, he also mentions that he had undergone medical treatment: "In 1961 I was seriously ill. In Vienna, they removed a stone from my kidney" (Sukarno, 1965b, p. 11). After Sukarno's death, Cindy Adams, the aforementioned ghostwriter of Sukarno's autobiography, published *My friend the dictator* (1980). In this book, she described her experience in writing the biography of Sukarno, though she did not discuss his trips to Vienna. Her only remarks regarding Sukarno's health

were that Sukarno had to drink a considerable amount of water to flush out his kidneys, which led to frequent toilet visits (Adams, 1980, pp. 160–161).

Besides these books from Cindy Adams, there are five other biographies on Sukarno by non-Indonesian authors.[100] Unfortunately, two of these five biographies do not discuss events after Indonesian's independence in 1945. The remaining three do mention Sukarno's health issues (Giebels, 2015; Legge, 1972, pp. 385–386; Penders, 1974, p. 76,185,187,189), but only *Sukarno – A Political Biography* by J.D. Legge (1972) hints at the treatment of Sukarno in Vienna. Legge pointed out that Sukarno had refused

> the advice of his **Viennese doctors that his kidney ailment required an operation.** His reluctance was said to be due to his having been advised by a *dukun* (traditional soothsayer) that he would die by the knife. (Legge, 1972, pp. 385–386, emphasis added, italics in original)

Similarly, Sukarno's medical treatment in Austria was rarely mentioned by Indonesian authors. One of the few comes from the Indonesian historian Asvi Warman Adam in his book *Bung Karno – Dibunuh Tiga Kali?* (2010).[101] In one chapter of that book, he mentions that Sukarno had been treated two times in Vienna – 1961 and 1964 (Asvi, 2010, p. 183). He further clarifies that during Sukarno's first visit, a peanut-sized kidney stone had been removed and that Sukarno's left kidney was dysfunctional. According to Asvi, the Austrian doctor Karl Fellinger suggested at that time that the left kidney should be removed. However, Sukarno refused, as he still had to work on the West Irian conflict. On Sukarno's second visit in 1964, a suctioning operation (*operasi penyedotan*) on his kidney was performed, which led to the removal of a crystal stone (*batu krisal*). After this, Sukarno refused to have further operations, and therefore he proceeded with traditional Chinese treatments such as acupuncture, given by doctors from China (Asvi, 2010, p. 183).

Similarly, Austrian literature on Sukarno rarely mentions his health or his visits to Austria. One of the few books that touches on that topic is the previously mentioned Austrian doctor Karl Fellinger's own autobiography (1984), in which he even dedicates one of his chapters to Sukarno. Most of the chapter, however, deals only with the personal description of Sukarno, along with Fellinger's journey to Indonesia.[102] Yet, two essential passages reveal Sukarno's

[100] The first was published in 1966 by the German author Bernhard Dahm (1966); this was followed with biographies by J.D. Legge (1972) and C. L. M. Penders (1974); and later by Dutchman Bog Hering (2002), and L.J. Giebels (2015).

[101] According to Dr. Asvi Warman Adam, there is most likely no other book that mentions Sukarno's trips to Austria, except his and probably Asvi et al. (2014) (Personal communication in Jakarta, February 23, 2020).

[102] An exact date of his visit was not in his memoirs. Yet a meeting with the Austrian envoy Alexander Otto was mentioned in his memoirs. Consequently, Fellinger's visit to Indonesia must have taken place between 1963 and July 1964.

health and his visits to Austria. The first indicates that Sukarno came to Fellinger for a general examination of his health the first time in 1963 (Fellinger, 1984, p. 114). The second discusses more precisely his health status and how Sukarno died:

> Of course, the president came for an examination to the clinic on each of his visits to Vienna. At that time, he was still in very good health. Sukarno died, as is known, after a stroke in Djakarta. Unfortunately, I was not able to help him at his sad end, because he had been strictly isolated after his ousting and the generals' seizure of power. However we did have the opportunity to meet his charming widow, Dewey Sukarno, who now lives in Paris, getting together often and talking about the great days of the past. (Fellinger, 1984, p. 120, translated by S.G.)

Another Austrian account of Sukarno's visits to Austria can be found in the study written by Mehdi Fallah-Nodeh in 1993 entitled *Österreich und die OPEC-Staaten 1960-1990* (*Austria and the OPEC-countries 1960-1990*) (1993). Although Indonesia was not his sole focus, it still has some chapters on Austrian-Indonesian relations. Additionally, he provides an analysis of the official diplomatic visits between those two countries based on official Austrian sources. According to Fallah-Nodeh's study, there were only two official visits from Indonesia to Austria between 1960 and 1973. Specifically, he stated that in "1963 Sukarno stayed in Vienna as a state guest, and nine years later his successor Suharto was in Vienna" (Fallah-Nodeh, 1993, p. 28, translated by S.G.). Consequently, that would mean that Sukarno visited Austria only once in 1963 for an *official* visit. However, as we know already from Sukarno's biography and the other literature, Sukarno was in Austria at least in the years 1960, 1961, 1963 and 1964. Therefore, it seems that either Fallah-Noden or the Austrian yearbooks are wrong. As it turns out both have some issues. On the one hand, Fallah-Nodeh had most likely mixed up official with unofficial visits for Indonesia. Because, although he discussed 'official' visits, the Austrian year book for 1963 clearly states: "For *unofficial* visits, King Saud came to Austria from 13 May to 14 September and President Sukarno from 2 to 10 June" (ÖJB, 1964, p. 4, translated by S.G., emphasis added). On the other hand, the Austrian authorities did not record any further official or unofficial visits from Sukarno between 1956 and 1965 in the Austrian annual books. Consequently, we cannot rely on them unquestioningly for this study.

Lastly, another account of the trips by Sukarno to Austria can be found in the book *50 Tahun Hubungang Diplomatik Indonesia-Austria 1954-2004* (*50 years diplomatic relations between Indonesia-Austria 1954-2004*). It was written in 2004 by the former Indonesian Ambassador

T. A. Samodra Sriwidjaja for the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations.[103] Samodra provides much relevant information on the bilateral relation between Austria and Indonesia and also includes some testimonies from previous Austrian ambassadors.[104] Besides that, he discusses Sukarno's trip to Austria and his medical treatment in Vienna. According to Samodra, Sukarno visited Austria *ten* times (Samodra, 2004, p. 38). According to Samodra, the first visit was in the year 1956. It was at that time when Indonesia was in conflict with the Netherlands over West Irian (see section 4.2). As a result of that, the Netherlands sent a protest note to Austria, and thus the Austrian officials declared Sukarno's journey as merely a 'private' visit (Samodra, 2004, p. 35). After this first visit in 1956, Sukarno, according to Samodra, concluded that Austria was the ideal country for recreation and health care. Consequently, after October 1961, Sukarno came a few times to Austria as a 'private' person (incognito) to be treated by Dr. Fellinger and his team for kidney and gall stones (Samodra, 2004, p. 37). Interestingly, Samodra also states that Sukarno's physician certified posthumously that one of Sukarno's kidneys was removed during a surgery at Fellinger's private clinic (Samodra, 2004, pp. 36–37).[105]

To conclude this section regarding the existing literature on Sukarno's health, the following important points can be made for the analysis in the next chapters. Firstly, while there is a reasonable consensus that Sukarno's health did decline in August 1965, there is none concerning his precise state of ill health. Some authors argue that Sukarno's health was critical and alarming and therefore sufficient grounds to explain the PKI's action against the Army (Sekneg RI, 1995; Hunter, 2007), while others asserted that Sukarno's health was not

[103] One year later, in 2005, there was also a German version by the Indonesian embassy in Vienna published under the German title *50 Jahre Diplomatische Beziehungen Indonesien-Österreich 1954-2004*. However, it is interesting that no such book exists in any of the Austrian libraries.

[104] Unfortunately, despite the essential information, it has several issues. First and foremost, this book was not written as an academic text and therefore had almost no citations/references for its sources. Second, some topics were left out entirely; for instance, the whole matter of the Indonesian mass killings were missing. Additionally, the overthrow of Sukarno occupied only half a page. Third, besides the lack of references, the exact dates, duration, and reason for Sukarno's visits were not mentioned. For instance, it was not traceable when exactly Sukarno underwent the medical examination or operation in Austria. Lastly, there was a significant difference between the German- and Indonesian-language versions in regard to the years on which Sukarno visited Austria (c.f.: Samodra, 2004, p. 112, 2005, p. 113). In the German version, it was written that Sukarno visited Vienna during the time of the following Indonesian ambassadors: Max Marimis (1956-1957), Soebagio (1957-1958), R. Soesman M Djajakusuma (1958-1962) and Busono Darusman (1962-1967). However, in the Indonesian version it is written that Sukarno came to Vienna during the time of Max Marimis (1956-1957), Soebagio (1957-1958), and R. Soesman M Djajakusuma (1958-1962) but not when Busono Darusman (1962-1967) was ambassador in Vienna. Therefore, it is not feasible to glean reliable information on Sukarno's visit to Austria and his medical examination from this book. However, it provides a good background and gives an orientation for the later analysis.

[105] In his book, he refers to the magazine *Majalah D&R*, 26 September 1998, which I sadly could not access.

that bad (Zhou, 2014, 2019). The latter perspective holds that misinformation was spread, specifically from the Austrian physicians treating Sukarno, and not from his Chinese doctors.

Secondly, there are contradictions regarding Sukarno's intended 1965 visit to Vienna. Some authors have suggested that Sukarno canceled the trip to Vienna for medical examination because he had planned or at least had known about the upcoming G30S in September 1965. In contrast, opponents of this perspective argue that Sukarno simply did not trust his Western doctors anymore, and that it was for this reason that Sukarno did not visit Austria.

Lastly, it is not clear whether Sukarno had indeed planned a trip to Vienna in 1965. Insights from the literature commenting on these visits of Sukarno are very modest. According to this literature, Sukarno did visit Austria a few times, for medical reasons among others. However, the exact dates, durations, and reasons are unknown.

This raises the following points. First, there is a need to clarify the time in which Sukarno traveled to Austria and particularly for his medical examination. Second, there is a need to further explore how ill Sukarno was and how ill he was believed to be. Finally, there is a need to examine the media's awareness of Sukarno's visit to Austria as well as his health status. To address these points and provide context for these analyses, the following section will give a short general background of Sukarno's visits to Austria.

5.2 Sukarno's Illness and his 'Private' Visits to Austria

> There is a reason why I travel. I want to make Indonesia known. I want the world to see what Indonesians look like, and to see that we are no longer 'a stupid nation of toads,' as the Dutch repeatedly told us we were; that no more are we 'dumb natives good only to spit on,' as they told us over and over; that no more are we second-class citizens who slink around in sarongs with handkerchiefs on our heads perpetually bowing as our former colonial masters demanded. (Sukarno, 1965b, p. 6)

> The friendly relations between the two countries can be seen among others (~~also~~) from the mutual visits by leading public figures. Thus, President Sukarno never misses an opportunity to visit Austria in private. (Translated by S.G.)[106]

5.2.1 General Background of Sukarno's Visits to Austria

According to the records of the Austrian State Archive, President Sukarno visited Austria altogether eight times between 1956 and 1964 (see Table 3). All of Sukarno's journeys to

[106] "*Die freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Ländern äussern sich u.a. (~~auch~~) in gegenseitigen Besuchen führender Persönlichkeiten des öffentl. Lebens. So lässt Staatspräsident Sukarno keine Gelegenheit vorübergehen, um Österreich privat zu besuchen.*" (*Neuer Missionschef in Indonesien*, September 24, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/8, Gzl. 76971-6/64 Zl. 76971-6(POL)64).

Austria took place as 'private' or unofficial visits – there was not a single official state visit among them. The reason for that is twofold. On one hand, most of his visits had indeed been for private reasons; Sukarno used his visits either as stopovers and to recuperate from his annual trips, or for medical treatment. On the other hand, the visits of Sukarno to Austria took place at a time when Indonesia was in constant conflict with other nations – including Western European countries such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Consequently, these countries tried to interfere with the Austrian officials even before Sukarno arrived. For instance, they reaffirmed the positions of the Dutch and British in the conflict with Indonesia, or at least requested that Austrian officials treat Sukarno with only the courtesy that was absolutely necessary.[107]

Visit	Year	Duration	Medical Treatment	Highlights of the Visiting Program
1	1956	Sep 18, 1956 – Sep 22, 1956	*No medical treatment*	• September 19: Meeting between the Austrian Foreign Minister Figl and Indonesian Foreign Minister Rulsam Abdulgani.
2	1960	Apr 17, 1960 – Apr 22, 1960	*No medical treatment* However, information was reported that he might take some consultations with medical specialist in Austria (reported by Jami'at al Islam).	• April 19: Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio meets the Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky. • April 20: Sukarno meets with Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky. • April 21: Sukarno meets with Austrian president.
3		Oct 11, 1960 – Oct 14, 1960	*No medical treatment*	• October 13: Reception in the Indonesian residence.
4	1961	May 20, 1961 – May 25, 1961	*No medical treatment* Sukarno's doctors advised him to rest for a few days in Europe before returning to Jakarta.	• May 21: Sukarno meets with the Dutch oil experts Cornelienburg and Scholte. • May 23: Sukarno visits the nuclear reactor Seibersdorf. • May 24: Meeting with the Austrian President and lunch with Austrian officials.
5		Sep 8, 1961 – Sep 10, 1961	*No medical treatment*	• September 9: Sukarno and Subandrio meet with the West-German Minister Hans Joachim von Merkatz. • September 10: Courtesy visit from Austrian Vice Chancellor Pittermann to Sukarno. • September 11: Indonesian Foreign Minister meets with Austrian Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky. • September 12: Sukarno pays a courtesy visit to the Austrian president.

[107] See, for example: *Besuch des indonesischen Präsidenten SUKARNO*, September 12, 1956, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 512313-POL/56 Zl. 517904-POL/56 and *Intervention der britischen Botschaft in Wien betreffend Soekarno – Besuch*, September 30, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 69412-4/64 Zl. 445-RES/64, secret, classified.

6		Oct 20, 1961 – Oct 31, 1961	***Medical treatment*** • October 20: Sukarno underwent the first preliminary examination. • October 23: President Sukarno was recommended by the doctors to undergo kidney surgery. • October 24: Operation - kidney stone removed.	• October 31: President meets Austrian President Adolf Schärf for luncheon.
7	1963	Jun 2, 1963 – Jun 10, 1963	***Medical treatment*** • Medical consultation with Dr. Fellinger.	• June 4: Sukarno made a courtesy visit to the federal president. • June 4: Sukarno met with Dr. Karl Fellinger and Ibn Saud in the Vienna hospital. • June 7: Sukarno visits with Mayor Jonas at the municipal reserve garden in Hirschstetten. • June 8: Sukarno meets with the Dutchman Emile van Kanijnenburg. • June 8: Sukarno meets the Russian ambassador Avilov.
8	1964	Sep 20, 1964 – Sep 29, 1964	***Medical treatment*** • Daily consultation at the Fellinger clinic. • September 25: Operation - kidney stone was removed.	• September 21: Sukarno pays a courtesy visit to the Austrian President. • September 21: Sukarno visits the WIG exhibition - Danube tower.

Table 3: Sukarno's Visits to Austria *Source: ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno; own compilation*

Therefore, such intervention was very likely also the reason why the only intended *official* state visit was canceled. Back in 1956, the Austrian President Theodor Körner invited Sukarno to Vienna for an official state visit. However, after only a few weeks, this invitation was canceled and postponed. The official reason given by the Austrian authorities at the time was that the Austrian president could not receive state visits for health reasons.[108] Nevertheless, a few weeks later, after Sukarno decided to come to Vienna – but as a private guest – President Körner was healthy again. This situation thus led to speculation as to whether the cancelation was due to political pressure from the Netherlands.[109]

As a result of those political conflicts, Austria found itself repeatedly caught in the middle. On one side were the West European countries that Austria did not want to alienate. On the other side were the new nations of the 'Third World' – including Indonesia – that Austria wanted to support through international solidarity (Petritsch, 2010, p. 126).[110] In

[108] *Indonesischer Staatsbesuch verschoben*, August 31, 1956, in Wiener Zeitung, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno.
[109] *Besuch Präsident Sukarnos in Oesterreich; niederländische Pressestimmen*, September 27, 1956, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 514129-Pol/56 Zl. 3038-A/56.
[110] Also, one interviewee emphasized that Austria supported the Non-Alignment Movement during the interview (Anonymous 10, personal communication, July 8, 2019).

consequence, the Austrian Foreign Ministry did not know precisely how to deal with Sukarno (Anonymous 6, personal communication, September 20, 2019). Therefore, this also might have been one of the reasons why Sukarno's visits to Austria were always designated as unofficial visits. Yet in practice, a visit by Sukarno triggered a nontrivial formal protocol. For instance, in his 'private' visits, Sukarno was usually welcomed by senior officials, such as state secretaries, the foreign minister, or even the president. The visiting program and the security arrangements were already planned weeks or even months before Sukarno's arrival. Furthermore, the 'private' visiting program was not exclusively devoted to private events, such as shopping tours, museum visits, and nightclub visits. On the contrary, it included such things as the obligatory courtesy visits to the Austrian president, official invitations to the opera, dinner galas, and political breakfasts.

Moreover, Sukarno was usually accompanied by a large delegation when he came to Vienna. Sometimes they even reached up to 50 people and included senior political officials and ministers.[111] Therefore, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from both countries met each other for discussions on almost every visit. The focus of these meetings was mainly on the general political situation in the world and the bilateral affairs of both countries. However, from time to time, economic topics were also discussed. At one of these meetings, for example, Austria offered to help build up Indonesian industry by supplying goods and machinery for industrial and chemical production.[112] Therefore, we can observe that during this time, Austria provided stainless steel products, pharmaceuticals, paints, papers, pumps, aluminum coins, and wagons for Indonesia (Wurzer, 1970).[113] During the same period, Austrian companies provided extraordinary supplies to the Indonesian military, such as steel helmets, vehicles, and ships (Wurzer, 1970). Moreover, according to independent accounts, the Indonesian military sourced landing crafts and weapons from Austrian companies.[114]

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[111] In 1960 and 1961, also, two FBI agents were probably part of Sukarno's travel entourage. The names of those agents were McNamara and Spillum. C.f *S.E.Dr.Sukarno;indones. Ministerpräsident, Einreise aus Budapest*, April 17, 1960, in ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno, Zl. 374/60; *Daftar Pengikat Rombongan*, 1961, in ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno.

[112] *Unterredung des Herrn BM f.d.A.A., Dr. Kreisky mit dem indonesischen Aussenminister Subandrio*, April 20, 1960, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 75846-6/60 Zl. 75846-6(Pol)60.

[113] Some interesting transports included excavator shovels for the Bangka tin islands and deliveries for the Jatilahur hoover dam (Wurzer, 2010; Anonymous 5, personal communication, August 13, 2019).

[114] The official statistics do not include weapons. However, three independent persons have confirmed that to me; yet all of them would like to stay anonymous. Most likely the products to the military have been delivered by these companies: Steyr-Daimler-Puch, Hirtenberger, and Heinrich Ulbricht's Wwe. (also known as Assmann & Söhne). Some interviewees also told me that tanks were transported during Sukarno's time. Another one has told me that they also delivered walkie-talkies. However, neither of these could be confirmed. Furthermore, Samodra (2005, p. 46) believes that some of Steyer-Puch's ammunition and vehicles were used during the West-

Furthermore, cultural topics were also on the agenda. The officials of both countries discussed the deployment of Austrian medical doctors and technical professors to help build up the medical service and technical universities in Indonesia.[115] Additionally, Indonesian nurses were to be sent to Austria for training. Moreover, per Sukarno's request, different Viennese sights were to be built in replica in Indonesia. The most famous one was the 'Bung Karno Tower' – a copy of the Vienna Danube Tower designed by the Austrian architect Hannes Lintl. Unfortunately, the tower never was built because of G30S, as we will see in Chapter 6.

Although Sukarno's visits thus included political and economic meetings, in fact, he had different reasons to come to Vienna: mainly because of stopover and medical treatment.[116] It can be seen from Table 3, Sukarno used four out of eight trips as stopovers in Austria to recuperate from a world tour or after conferences. Three other visits were specifically for medical treatment, as he had been suffering from kidney problems already since the 1950s. Since there is almost nothing known about these medical visits, the next section will discuss them in more detail. The following two questions will guide the analysis. What and when did the media and the Austrian officials know and report about the upcoming visit of Sukarno? What reason was given by Sukarno, and what precisely did Sukarno do in Austria?

5.2.2 Sukarno's Visits to Austria for Medical Reasons (1961-1964)

Sukarno paid three visits to Austria that were primarily for medical reasons, in 1961, 1963 and 1964.

Sukarno's Visit in October 1961: His First Operation

Sukarno's first visit to Austria for medical reasons took place from October 20 to 31, 1961. The first information regarding this visit had already been published in a press release by the Indonesian officials on October 17, 1961. After hearing of this press release, Austrian diplomatic representative in Jakarta, Alexander Otto, immediately sent a cable to the Austrian Foreign Ministry to inform them about this announcement. In this report, he explained that Sukarno had been suffering from kidney problems for a long time. And despite having

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Irian conflict. Whether the weapons and vehicles were also used during the 1965-1966 mass killings could not be confirmed. However, it is most likely the case, because it seems some of the staff members of these companies had good relations with the Suharto supporters.

[115] *Unterredung des Herrn BM f.d.A.A., Dr. Kreisky mit dem indonesischen Aussenminister Subandrio*, April 20, 1960, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 75846-6/60 Zl. 75846-6(Pol)60.

[116] According to an interviewee, Austria was considered one of the best places for medical treatment in Europe during that time. Therefore, Sukarno decided to travel to Austria (Anonymous 10, personal communication, July 8, 2019).

discharged nine gallstones, Sukarno was still experiencing pain. Sukarno's team of doctors concluded that "Sukarno should go abroad immediately for 'thorough examination and treatment'" (Translated by S.G.).[117] As a consequence, Sukarno decided to submit to the necessary treatment without delay and chose Vienna as the place for treatment. Sukarno would travel to Vienna on the 19th of that month "to undergo a thorough examination 'for a more precise diagnosis and the necessary medical treatment'" (Translated by S.G.).[118]

Only three days later, on Friday, October 20, 1961, Sukarno landed in Vienna in the company of 20 party officials. Since it was a private visit, all formalities were left out and Sukarno was welcomed only by the Austrian police chief Josef Holaubeck, by the Indonesian Ambassador to Vienna Rusuma Djajakusuma and the Indonesian Police Chief Subkanro, as well as the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio who had come one day earlier from the U.N. in New York.[119] After arriving at the Bristol Hotel, Subandrio reported to Sukarno concerning the latest developments in the Indonesian-Dutch dispute over New Guinea (West Irian).[120] Yet on the evening of the same day, three members of the Austrian medical team and an X-ray expert visited Sukarno for consultation at his hotel. The three doctors were Prof. Dr. Karl Fellinger, head of the internal department of the Vienna University Hospital, Prof. Dr. Terberbert Hemminger, a urologist, and Prof. Dr. Paul Kylre, head of surgery at the Rudolfiner Hospital.[121] Since it was not clear whether Sukarno was suffering from kidney or gall bladder disease, the doctors first wanted to get to know his general condition and the precise state of his illness.[122]

On Monday, October 23, Viennese physicians examined Sukarno further and disclosed that he was suffering from kidney stones. Subsequently, five leading urologists consulted with

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[117] "*Wie soeben offiziell bekanntgegeben wurde, fährt Staatspräsident Sukarno am 19.d.M. nach Wien, um sich einer gründlichen Untersuchung 'zwecks genauer Diagnose sowie der notwendigen ärztlichen Behandlung' zu unterziehen, da er seit längerer Zeit unter Nierensteinen leidet.*" (*Staatspräsident Sukarno; ärztliche Behandlung in Wien*, October 17, 1961, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 32049-Pol/61 Zl. 1487-A/61)

[118] "*Das bisher behandelnde Ärzteteam, welches in der Zeit vom 19. November 1958 bis 7. Jänner 1959 zu dem Ergebnis gekommen, dass Staatspräsident Sukarno unverzüglich sich ins Ausland begeben sollte zur 'gründlichen Untersuchung und Behandlung'.*" (*Staatspräsident Sukarno; ärztliche Behandlung in Wien*, October 17, 1961, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 32049-Pol/61 Zl. 1487-A/61)

[119] *Präsident Sukarno in Wien. Operation noch nicht entschieden*, October 19, 1961, in Presse, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno.

[120] *Good Condition*, October 23, 1961, in Indonesian Observer, ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 32049-Pol/61.

[121] *Pres. Enters Private Clinic*, October 23, 1961, in Indonesian Observer, ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 32049-Pol/61.

[122] *Five-man Team Attend Pres.*, October 21, 1961, in Indonesian Observer, ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 32049-Pol/61.

Sukarno to determine which method of treatment should be used for him.[123] Furthermore, they discussed whether it would be better to treat Sukarno's condition with medication or a surgical operation for the removal of the stones. It was agreed that if an operation were found necessary, Prof. Dr. Henninger would perform the surgery,[124] and it would take place at the private clinic of Professor Leopold Schönbauer.[125]

The next day, on October 24, Sukarno underwent an operation, as the report of the Ministry of Interior shows:

> The Indonesian President Dr. Sukarno underwent an operation on 24.10.1961, during which a kidney stone was removed. The aforementioned would have to undergo one or two further operations, as two stones still remained in the body. The operation took its normal course. (Translated by S.G.)[126]

Although the Austrian report used the German word 'operation', which would imply a surgical procedure, this was not the case. Because only one day later, on October 25, the Austrian newspaper *Wiener Zeitung* disclosed further details on this operation. They reported that Sukarno's "state of health has generally improved", and that he "had a bladder stone removed by a *bloodless* method" (Translated by S.G., emphasis added).[127] Also, the *Indonesian Observer* reported that "one of the kidney stones" of Sukarno's "had been removed on Tuesday by *way of the bladder*", and that Sukarno's "condition after his first operation […] was good under the circumstances" (Emphasis added).[128]

From these newspaper articles, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Sukarno's operation was a bloodless procedure. Nevertheless, on October 25, the team of doctors recommended that Sukarno undergo a *surgical* kidney operation, as there were still kidney stones left, with his left kidney being particularly affected. Yet it was not exactly clear to the

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[123] *President Soekarno's Illness*, October 25, 1961, in Djakarta Daily Mail, ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 32049-Pol/61.
[124] *President Soekarno's Illness*, October 25, 1961, in Djakarta Daily Mail, ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 32049-Pol/61. On a different occasion, it was mentioned that the operation would be done by Professors Martin Kyrle and Paul Fuchsig see *Pres. Enters Private Clinic*, October 23, 1961, in Indonesian Observer, ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 32049-Pol/61.
[125] *President Arrives In Vienna, October 20, 1961*, in Djakarta Daily Mail, ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 32049-Pol/61.
[126] "*Der indonesische Staatspräsident Dr. Sukarno wurde am 24.10.1961 operiert, wobei ein Nierenstein entfernt wurde. Der Genannte muß sich einer oder zwei weiteren Operationen unterziehen, da noch zwei Steine im Körper blieben. Die Operation hat normalen Verlauf genommen.*" (*Information*, October 24, 1961, in ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno)
[127] "*Der indonesische Staatspräsident dessen Aussehen darauf schließen läßt, daß sein Gesundheitszustand sich weitgehend gebessert hat, ließ sich in Wien auf unblutigem Wege einen Blasenstein entfernen.*" (*Sukarno von Wien abgereist*, November 1, 1961, in Wiener Zeitung, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno)
[128] *President To Undergo Kidney Operation?*, October 26, 1961, in Indonesian Observer, ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 32049-Pol/61.

public whether Sukarno agreed to this additional surgery, as Indonesian officials refused to give any further information about it.[129]

However, Sukarno is unlikely to have undergone this additional surgery for two reasons. First, the Austrian *Wiener Zeitung* reported that the remaining two stones were "hoped to be removed with medication" (Translated by S.G.).[130] Also in the case that this would not succeed, Sukarno would "again come to Vienna and undergo an operation at the end of December or at the beginning of January" (Translated by S.G.).[131] Second, this newspaper report is backed up by the fact that Sukarno left only a few days after the non-surgical operation. Already on Monday, October 31, after visiting the Austrian President for luncheon, Sukarno left Vienna to return to Indonesia.[132] If Sukarno had undergone this additional surgical operation, he would have probably had to stay much longer in the hospital than was the case. As it turned out, it took two more years until Sukarno came to Austria again.

Sukarno's Visit in June 1963: Medical or political visit?

Sukarno's second visit to Austria for medical reasons took place from June 2 to June 10, 1963. The visit was preceded by different pieces of information about Sukarno's travel plans. As early as January 11, 1963, the Austrian representative in Jakarta, Alexander Otto, informed the Austrian Foreign Ministry that Sukarno would like to visit Austria after a potential visit in the Netherlands.[133] However, just one month later, Otto sent another report. This time he reported Sukarno's state of health. In this strictly confidential report, the Austrian envoy stated that an Indonesian doctor told him in the strictest confidence that "President Soekarno, contrary to the official version that he has been cured of kidney stones without surgery by the Chinese medical team, is still suffering badly" (Translated by S.G.).[134]

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[129] *President To Undergo Kidney Operation?*, October 26, 1961, in Indonesian Observer, ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 32049-Pol/61.

[130] "*Zwei weitere hofft man durch Medikamente beseitigen zu können.*" (*Sukarno von Wien abgereist*, November 1, 1961, in Wiener Zeitung, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno)

[131] "*Sollte dies nicht gelingen, wird Doktor Sukarno Ende Dezember oder Anfang Jänner neuerlich nach Wien kommen und sich einer Operation unterziehen.*" (*Sukarno von Wien abgereist*, November 1, 1961, in Wiener Zeitung, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno)

[132] *President Leaving Vienna Today*, October 31, 1961, in Indonesian Observer, ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 32049-Pol/61.

[133] *Reise Staatspräsident Sukarnos nach Europa im Sommer 1963*, January 11, 1963, Jakarta, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 21667-6/63 Zl. 109-RES/63.

[134] "*Wie die Gesandtschaft streng vertraulich von einem indonesischen Arzt erfährt, soll Staatspräsident Soekarno entgegen der offiziellen Version, er sei von seinen Nierensteinen durch das chinesische Ärzteteam ohne operativen Eingriff völlig geheilt worden, nach wie vor schwer leidend sein.*" (*Gesundheitszustand des Staatspräsidenten SOEKARNO*, February 20, 1963, Jakarta, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 24194-6/63 Zl. 131-Res/63, strictly confidential, classified)

Furthermore, he reported that the Minister of Health of the People's Republic of China paid a visit to President Sukarno. The Minister was accompanied by a team of ten to twelve Chinese doctors who were currently treating Sukarno. After the first check-up, they would decide on further treatments. Thus, Otto concluded that the skepticism of the Indonesian doctor supported his impression of Sukarno's ill health.[135]

On May 14, the Austrian embassy in Jakarta sent a cable to inform the Austrian Foreign Ministry about the upcoming visit by Sukarno. They stated that Sukarno would arrive in Vienna from Tokyo and that he would stay in Vienna for about a week before leaving for Rome. A clue to Sukarno's plans in Vienna is provided by the last sentence of the cable: "For the *medical examination* a supplementary report will follow" (Translated by S.G., emphasis added).[136] Unfortunately, this additional report cannot be found in the Austrian State Archive. Nevertheless, it shows that Sukarno's initial intention for a stopover had changed, or at least then included a medical examination.

Meanwhile, the Austrian newspapers reported about the forthcoming visit of Sukarno. However, they also suggested two different reasons for Sukarno's stopover. On one hand, the newspaper *Neues Österreich* reported on May 18 that Sukarno would set off for a European tour from Jakarta, during which Sukarno would also spend a one-month recreational holiday in Austria and Italy. Sukarno was going to take this recreational holiday on the advice of his doctors, who thought that he needed a rest.[137] On the other hand, the newspaper *Wiener Montag* reported a week later, on May 27, that, this time, politics were another motive for Sukarno's visit, since high-ranking Indonesian diplomats had already arrived to prepare for it. Therefore, the newspaper presumed that a prearranged meeting between Sukarno and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands could be on the agenda.[138]

On June 2, 1963, Sukarno landed in Vienna with his 28-strong entourage. Even though the visit was again declared as private, Sukarno was welcomed, this time, at Vienna International Airport by Austrian President Adolf Schärf, Austrian Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky, and

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[135] *Gesundheitszustand des Staatspräsidenten SOEKARNO*, February 20, 1963, Jakarta, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 24194-6/63 Zl. 131-Res/63, strictly confidential, classified.

[136] "*Wegen der ärztlichen Untersuchung folgt ergänzender Bericht.*" (Dispatch from Jakarta to BmfaA, Mai 14, 1963, Jakarta, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 24194-6/63 Zl. 28005)

[137] *Sukarno kommt nach Österreich*, Mai 18, 1963, in Neues Österreich, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, 1963. There are two date notes on this record: May 19, 1960, and May 22, 1963. The newspaper article only noted May 18 - so it is likely to be May 18, 1963.

[138] *Sukarno kommt Anfang Juni nach Wien. Zusammenkunft mit Prinz Bernhard?*, Mai 27, 1963, in Wiener Montag, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, 1963. There are two date notes on this record: May 19, 1960, and May 22, 1963. The newspaper article only noted May 18 - so it is likely to be May 18, 1963.

other senior officials.[139] Prof. Dr. Karl Fellinger also came to the airport on the request of Sukarno.[140] On the same day, after Sukarno arrived at the Bristol hotel, he and Dr. Fellinger met for the first confidential (medical) consultation.[141] On the next day, Sukarno had a meeting with Dr. Fellinger and Prince Ibn Saud – who was also Fellinger's patient at that time – together at the Vienna General Hospital.[142] Some days after that, it is likely that Sukarno received medical treatment.

Besides these medical treatments, Sukarno used his visit for political meetings and excursions. On May 4, for example, he made a courtesy visit to the President of Austria, and, later, he went for an excursion tour to visit different mass-produced construction houses and the newly built Danube Tower.[143] Three days later, on May 7, Sukarno visited the municipal reserve garden in Hirschstetten and the area of the Vienna International Garden Show in the Danube Park with the Viennese Mayor Jonas (Galeta, n.d.). Moreover, one day later, on May 8, Sukarno met up with the Dutchman Emile van Kanijnenbug for one hour and afterward with the Russian Ambassador Avilov.[144] After nine days in Vienna, Sukarno left Austria on June 10, 1963, for Indonesia via Rome and Belgrade.

Sukarno's Visit in September 1964: His Second Operation

The third medical visit of Sukarno to Vienna took place from September 20 to 29, 1964. However, unlike his previous visits, the reason for Sukarno's intended trip to Austria was not known for a long time, either by the media or by Austrian officials in Jakarta and Vienna. Although Indonesian officials had informed the Austrian Foreign Ministry in March about Sukarno's upcoming visit that June, Austrian officials did not receive any further information about Sukarno's plans.[145] It was only in September 1964 that the Austrian embassy secretary Christian Kautsky suspected that an intended visit of Sukarno to Austria must be imminent,

[139] *Das Bundespolizeikommiseriat Schwechat berichtet*, June 4, 1963, in ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno.
[140] *Seit Sonntag abends: Sukarno in Wien. Prof. Fellinger zum Flugplatz gebeten*, June 4, 1963, in Wiener Montag, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno.
[141] *Sukarno studierte den Donauturm*, June 4, 1963, in Kurier, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno. Unfortunately, the name of the newspaper could not be identified exactly from the enclosed newspaper article, but it was probably the 'Kurier'. Also Fellinger himself wrote that Sukarno first came to him for a general observation in 1963 (Fellinger, 1984, p. 114).
[142] *Sukarno entging Attentat in Wien*, June 5, 1963, in Volksblatt, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno.
[143] *Amtsvermerk*, June 4, 1963, in ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno; *Sukarno studierte den Donauturm*, June 4, 1963, in Kurier, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno. Unfortunately, the name of the newspaper could not be identified exactly from the enclosed newspaper article, but it was probably the 'Kurier'.
[144] *Amtsvermerk*, June 8, 1963, in ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno. The question of whether Sukarno met on that occasion the Dutch Prince Bernhard – as previously rumored – was neither denied nor confirmed by the Indonesians.
[145] *Besuch des H. Vizekanzlers in Indonesien; Besuch Präs. Sukarno's in Wien*, March 31, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 69412-6/64 Zl. 69412-6/64.

based on two observations. First, Indonesian officials applied for diplomatic visas, which also included three people from the inner circle of President Sukarno. Second, Kautsky had been asked by other diplomats if he was aware of anything about it, since rumors were circulating in Jakarta that Sukarno was preparing to travel to Austria.[146]

As it turned out, Kautsky was right. Only a few days later, on September 14, Legation Council Friedrich Hohenbühel[147] from the Austrian Foreign Ministry – after receiving another telex from the Austrian Embassy in Jakarta - informed the Ministry of Internal Affairs about the upcoming visit of President Sukarno.[148]

Moreover, on September 15, the Austrian daily newspaper *Die Presse* reported on Sukarno's forthcoming visit to Austria. However, the newspaper only mentioned that Sukarno would stay in Vienna for one week from September 19, before joining the Cairo Conference of Nonaligned Nations.[149] They did not mention anything about a possible medical consultation. Meanwhile, the officials of the Austrian Ministry of Interior began to make preparations for Sukarno's visit. Yet they were still in the dark regarding his exact intentions. However, they remarked that a "daily consultation at the FELLINGER clinic" (Translated by S.G.) was intended.[150]

On Sunday, September 20, 1964, Sukarno landed in Vienna from Cairo. Even though his visit was officially declared as a private visit, Sukarno was again picked up at the airport by Austrian officials. Among those present were the Austrian State Secretary Bobleter, Zedtwitz representing the Austrian Foreign Ministry, Cabinet Deputy Director Korab, the Austrian police director Holaubeck, and the Mayor of Vienna Jonas, as well as the City Councilors Jaccobi and chief physician Dr. Glück.[151]

The next day, Monday, September 21, Sukarno made a courtesy visit to the Austrian President Adolf Schärf and afterwards visited the Vienna International Garden Show (WIG)

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[146] *Eventuell beabsichtigter Besuch Staatspräsident SOEKARNO's in Österreich*, September 9, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 69412-6/64 Zl. 207-Res/64.

[147] A few weeks later, on November 7, 1964, he became Austrian Ambassador in Jakarta; see also Chapter 3.

[148] *Information*, September 14, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno.

[149] *Sukarno mobilisiert gegen Malaysia*, 15 September 1964, in Die Presse, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno. The Cairo Conference was the second held by the Non-Aligned Movement, following the Belgrade Conference of September 1961, and took place in Cairo on October 5–10, 1964. See more on the Cairo Conference and some statements of President Sukarno in *Cairo Conference of Nonaligned Nations* (1965).

[150] "*Ein Programm für den Aufenthalt ist ho. nicht bekannt. Vorgesehen ist eine tägliche Konsulation in der Klinik FELLINGER.*" (*Indonesien; SUKARNO Dr. Achmed; Aufenthalt in Wien*, September 17, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno, I-Pos 414 b/64 res)

[151] *Präsident Sukarno privat in Wien*, September 22, 1964, in Wiener Zeitung, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno; *Malaysia warnt Wien vor Sukarno*, September 22, 1964, in Arbeiter-Zeitung, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno.

in the Danube Tower area.[152] On the same day, Sukarno visited Prof. Dr. Karl Fellinger, who carried out an initial medical examination of Sukarno.[153] Further treatments were administered, and, on September 25, Sukarno underwent his second operation. This time the Ministry of the Interior reported:

> State President Dr. Achmed S U K A R N O underwent a small operation this morning at 08.00 hours. A kidney stone about the size of a heart cherry was removed. The operation was performed by Univ. Prof. Dr. ÜBELHÖR and Univ. Prof. Dr. FELLINGER. The operation went well. (Translated by S.G.)[154]

Similar to his first operation in 1961, this 'small operation' was most likely a bloodless procedure. Four days later, on September 29, Sukarno left Austria. Sukarno's visit in 1964 thus marked his last visit ever to Austria, although another visit was planned for December 1964, as shown in the next section.

5.2.3 Sukarno's Intended Visit in 1964-1965

Sukarno's visit to Vienna from 20 until 29 September 1964, turned out to be his last, but another visit was planned. As seen in the literature review on Sukarno's illness and medical aid in section 5.1, some authors argued that Sukarno canceled a planned trip to Vienna in September 1965 and that therefore he must have had planned or at least known beforehand about G30S. Although two reports[155] from the Austrian State Archive do not necessarily confirm this, at least they suggest an intended visit. Both reports were sent from the newly appointed Austrian Ambassador in Jakarta, Friedrich Hohenbühel, on December 9, 1964, to the Austrian Foreign Ministry. In the first political report, entitled *Sukarnos Gesundheitszustand* (Sukarno's state of health), Hohenbühel wrote:

> Although President Sukarno looks relatively fresh thanks to the acupuncture method of the Chinese medical team, surely this cannot hide the fact that the Indonesian head of state is suffering from severe kidney disease. Allegedly even the Chinese doctors have advised him this time to visit Prof. Fellinger. The second kidney is said to also have been affected. It remains to be seen whether the president, who informed the signatory on the occasion of his inaugural visit, that he intends to travel to Vienna this month – the Austrian visa for three accompanying attendants was requested today for one month – finally decides to do an

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[152] *Präsident Sukarno privat in Wien*, September 22, 1964, in Wiener Zeitung, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno. It was after that visit that Sukarno wanted to build the 'Bung Karno Tower' in Jakarta. See more about the Vienna International Garden Show also in ÖJB (1965, pp. 548–549).

[153] *Malaysia warnt Wien vor Sukarno*, September 22, 1964, in Arbeiter-Zeitung, ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno.

[154] "*Staatspräsident Dr. Achmed S U K A R N O unterzog sich heute vormittag um 08.00 Uhr einer kleinen Operation. Es wurde ein etwa herzkirschengroßer Nierenstein entfernt. Den Eingriff führten Univ. Prof. Dr. ÜBELHÖR und Univ. Prof. Dr. FELLINGER durch. Der Eingriff ist gut verlaufen.*" (*INDONESIEN; Staatspräsident Dr. SUKARNO; Aufenthalt in Wien*, September 25, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BMI, Sukarno, I-Pos 414b/64 res)

[155] *Sukarnos Gesundheitszustand*, December 9, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 82179-6/64 Zl. 20-POL/64; *Wienreise Präsident Sukarnos*, December 9, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 82179-6/64 Zl. 272-RES/64.

> operation and thus at last disregards the warnings of his fortune-teller 'that he runs the risk of dying from a knife in his back'. (Translated by S.G.)[156]

There are two relevant points that can be gleaned from this report. Firstly, it is interesting to see Hohenbühel's general assessment of Sukarno's health, which he described as 'serious' at that time. Secondly, Hohenbühel wrote that Sukarno decided to finally do an operation, which implies a 'first-time' operation in Vienna. Therefore, this raises the question of why Hohenbühel did not mention anything about the previous operations in 1961 and 1963. There are three plausible answers for that. First, since the files were classified and he had just arrived as Ambassador in Indonesia, he was not aware of the details of Sukarno's previous medical treatments in Vienna. Second, he did not want to reveal any further information in the cable about it. Third, and the most likely one, there was a distinction between surgical and non-surgical operations.

The second report did not mention any details on Sukarno's past operations either, but at least it provides further information in regard to the date of the intended visit. Hohenbühel wrote:

> Today, with a corresponding note from Indonesian Foreign Ministry, three diplomatic passports for accompanying attendants of President Sukarno were submitted with the request to issue a one-month Austrian visa from 11 December 1964. Since President Sukarno already told the signatory during his inaugural visit that he intends to visit Vienna this month and since his personal physician is among the accompanying persons, it is to be expected that the Indonesian head of state will visit Prof. Fellinger between *11. December 1964 and 11. January 1965*. As soon as more detailed information is available, reports will be given accordingly, by telegram, if necessary. (Translated by S.G., emphasis added)[157]

This additional report clearly shows that the expected date of Sukarno's intended visit was between December 11, 1964, and January 11, 1965. Thus the date of Sukarno's planned visit would have been before the September 1965 trip posited by Hunter (2007, p. 154). However,

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[156] "*Obwohl Präsident Sukarno dank der Akupunkturmethode des chinesischen Ärzteteams rein äußerlich einen verhältnismäßig frischen Eindruck macht, kann dies doch nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, daß das indonesische Staatsoberhaupt an einem schweren Nierenleiden laboriert. Angeblich hätten diesmal sogar die chinesischen Ärzte zu einem Besuch Prof. Fellinger geraten. Es soll auch die zweite Niere angegriffen sein. Abzuwarten bleibt, ob sich der Präsident, der den Gefertigten anläßlich seines Antrittsbesuches mitteilte, daß er beabsichtige, noch in diesem Monat nach Wien zu reisen - der österreichische Sichtvermerk für drei Begleitpersonen wurde heute für einen Monat beantragt - nun doch zu einer Operation entschließt und damit die Warnungen seines Wahrsagers 'er laufe Gefahr durch ein Messer im Rücken zu sterben' endlich in den Wind schlägt.*" (*Sukarnos Gesundheitszustand*, December 9, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 82179-6/64 Zl. 20-POL/64)

[157] "*Am heutigen Tage wurden mit einer entsprechenden Note des indonesischen Aussenministeriums drei Diplomatenpässe der Begleitung Präsident Sukarnos mit der Bitte um Erteilung eines 1 Monat gültigen österreichischen Sichtvermerkes ab 11. Dezember 1964 eingereicht. Da Präsident Sukarno dem Gefertigten bereits bei seinem Antrittsbesuch erklärte, er beabsichtigte Wien noch in diesem Monat zu besuchen, und sich sein Leibarzt unter den Begleitpersonen befindet, ist damit zu rechnen, daß das indonesische Staatsoberhaupt in der Zeit zwischen dem 11. Dezember 1964 und dem 11. Jänner 1965 Prof. Fellinger besuchen wird. Sobald genauere Informationen vorliegen, darf entsprechend, allenfalls telegraphisch, einberichtet werden.*" (*Wienreise Präsident Sukarnos*, December 9, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 82179-6/64 Zl. 272-RES/64)

what makes the second report even more interesting is that on December 15 an official in the Austrian Foreign Ministry wrote a note on it that would indicate an even later date for Sukarno's intended visit:

> Ac. [According] to confidential information from Prof. Fs [Fellinger] a decision is probably to be expected within the next few days, as to whether President S. [Sukarno] will come to Vienna in *January or only in March*, to undergo a kidney stone operation. Prof. F. [Fellinger] will inform me. (Translated by S.G.)[158]

This last note, unfortunately, marks the latest record in the Austrian State Archive. Surprisingly, no further documents are available mentioning the postponement or cancelation of this intended visit. Therefore, it is not possible to evaluate Hunter's (2007, p. 154) claim that there was a visit that had been canceled; nor is it possible to evaluate Robinson's (2018, pp. 87–88) claim that Sukarno did not trust Western doctors (Fellinger) anymore, raising the possibility that no trip had been planned for September 1965. Nevertheless, there are some further documents available that at least describe the state of Sukarno's health in 1965, as shown in the next section.

5.2.4 Sukarno's Health in 1965 According to Austrian Officials

The existing information in the Austrian State Archive on Sukarno's state of health in 1965 is unfortunately minimal. It is further important to note that the information available on this subject relates to files written at the beginning and end of the year. One of these early reports was sent on January 5, 1965, by Austrian Ambassador Hohenbühel to the Austrian Foreign Ministry. After Hohenbühel met Sukarno at his New Year's speech, he reported that "despite all the rumors about his health, Sukarno distinguished himself by his particular cheerfulness" (Translated by S.G.).[159] Only a few days later, on January 14, Hohenbühel sent another report where he stated that Sukarno was then being treated with the acupuncture method by Chinese doctors.[160] However, further details on this treatment were not mentioned. After these reports in January, no further documents are available in the Austrian State Archive until November – only after the events of G30S. On November 30, however, the officials in the Foreign Ministry of Austria wrote a classified file with the subject of *Sukarnos Gesundheitszustand*

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[158] "*Lt. vertraulicher Mitteilung Prof. Fs ist wahrscheinlich in den nächsten Tagen eine Entscheidung zu erwarten, ob Präs. S. im Jänner oder erst im März nach Wien kommen wird, um sich einer Nierenstein-Operation zu unterziehen. Prof. F. wird mich verständigen.*" (Additional handwritten note on December 15, in *Beabsichtige Wienreise Präsident Sukarnos*, December 9, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 82179-6/64 Zl. 272-RES/64)

[159] "*Sukarno zeichnete sich aller Gerüchte um seine Gesundheit zum Trotz durch besondere Heiterkeit aus.*" (*Neujahrsempfang bei Sukarno*, January 5, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 130491-6/65 Zl. 3-RES/65)

[160] *Indonesische Freundschaftsdelegation in die Volksrepublik China*, Jakarta, January 14, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 130837-6/65 Zl. 4-POL/65.

(Sukarno's state of health).[161] From this it becomes apparent that Austrian officials were worried about Sukarno's health, as rumors about it had lately repeatedly arisen in various reports. One of these early reports, for instance, was sent from the Austrian ambassador Karl Hartl in Belgrade, on October 7, 1965, just a few days after G30S. In this report, he informed the Foreign Ministry of Austria that "the Yugoslavs do not seem to see clearly into the Indonesian turmoil", as their representative in Jakarta received "various conflicting information from Indonesian officials" (Translated by S.G.).[162] Furthermore, and more crucially, he explained the opinion of the Yugoslavs about why G30S was happening now:

> The Yugoslavs believe that they know – according to their reports from Beijing – that *the Chinese doctors, who treated Sukarno, do not give the President of Indonesia more than six months to live*. This circumstance might have prompted the Chinese-oriented Communist Party, to resort to a coup before Sukarno's death, because the death of Sukarno would have automatically mobilized the enemies of PKI. (Translated by S.G, emphasis added)[163]

This report is interesting as it marks one of the first accounts that represented the later widespread claim that it was the Chinese doctors who did not give the President much longer to live (see section 5.1). However, despite such reports, the Austrian officials in Vienna were not really convinced by the rumors about Sukarno's critical health status. Therefore, they asked the ambassador secretary Edgar Selzer, who was in Vienna at that time, to inform Austrian ambassador Hohenbühel after he was back in Jakarta, that Hohenbühel should report on the health condition of Sukarno. Later, Hohenbühel informed the Foreign Ministry of Austria about his thoughts on Sukarno's health. Due to its crucial importance, the whole response is quoted:

> P.S. As I learned from the Legation Secretary Selzer who has just arrived, we are apparently concerned at the highest level about Sukarno's health. For this just the following: Already a year ago, when I arrived in Jakarta, I was told in the utmost confidentiality that the days of Sukarno were numbered. He was not expected to make it much longer with only one functioning kidney. In the meantime, a year has passed in which I have met not only once but at least twenty times with the President of Indonesia. This also recently. Last week I was with him for breakfast, two days ago for dinner and yesterday again for breakfast. From my own perception I can only say that he does not exactly give me the impression of a casus ex [case

[161] *Gesundheitszustand Sukarnos,* November 30, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 145752-6/65 Zl. 145.752-6(Pol)65, classified.

[162] "*In die indonesischen Wirren scheinen die Jugoslawen, ungeachtet die sehr reiche Berichterstattung ihres Geschäftsträgers, auch nicht klar zu sehen. Sie erklärten, dieser bekäme verschiedentlich diametral entgegengesetzte Unterrichtung durch indonesische Offizielle, so sei zur Stunde, es war zwölf Uhr Mittag heutigen Tages, nicht auszumachen gewesen, welche Stellung die Luftwaffe in dem Konflikt bezogen hatte.*" (*Asiatisches in Belgrader Sicht,* October 7, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol, Belgrad, 44-POL/65)

[163] "*Die Jugoslawen glauben zu wissen – und dies nach ihren Berichten aus Peking – dass die chinesischen Ärzte, in deren Behandlung sich Sukarno begeben hat, dem indonesischen Staatspräsidenten nicht mehr als noch sechs Monate Lebensdauer zumessen. Dieser Umstand hätte die chinesisch ausgerichtete Kommunistische Partei vielleicht dazu veranlasst, noch vor dem Versterben Sukarnos zum Putsche zu greifen, denn der Tod Sukarnos würde die Gegner der K.P. automatisch mobilisiert haben.*" (*Asiatisches in Belgrader Sicht,* October 7, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol, Belgrad, 44-POL/65)

> of death]. Although I know that the volume of urine[164] of the healthy kidney is constantly increasing and that *due to my confidential intervention at Prof. Fellinger*, Sukarno underwent an examination this summer with his colleague, the kidney specialist *Prof. Hamburger* {in Paris}[165]. At that time there was also talk of a kidney transplant. (Translated by S.G., emphasis added)[166]

This answer from Hohenbühel makes it clear that he had revised his initial assessment of Sukarno's state of health: if Hohenbühel still believed at the beginning of 1965 that Sukarno's health was 'critical', at the end of 1965 he came to a different conclusion. Furthermore, Hohenbühel's answer reveals that Sukarno had an examination in Paris by a 'Western' doctor.[167] Hence, this opposes the assumption from Robinson (2018, pp. 87–88), who argued that Sukarno did not consult Western doctors anymore. Officials in the Foreign Ministry of Austria, therefore, followed his assessment by concluding that "a panicked assessment of the state of health of Sukarno does not seem to be justified at the present time" (Translation by S.G).[168]

5.3 Summary and Discussion

According to the documents of the Austrian State Archive, President Sukarno visited Austria *eight* times between 1956 and 1964 (see Table 3). However, this number contradicts Samodra's opinion that Sukarno visited Austria ten times (Samodra, 2004, p. 38). This could be because Samodra miscounted the visits of Sukarno, the Ministry of Interior did not record every visit, or Austrian Ministries did not transfer all the documents to the Austrian State

[164] There was a spelling problem and probably the officials in Austria changed ur**e**ne into ur**i**ne.
[165] Was added handwritten by the officials in the Austrian Foreign Ministry.
[166] "*P.S. Wie ich von dem soeben eingetroffenen Legationssekretär Selzer erfahre ist man bei uns scheinbar an höchster Stelle über den Gesundheitszustand Sukarnos besorgt. Hiezu nur folgendes: Bereits vor einem Jahr, als ich in Djakarta ankam, teilte man mir vertraulich und höchst wichtig mit, daß die Tage Sukarnos gezählt seien. Er werde es mit seiner einzigen noch funktionierenden Niere nicht mehr lange machen. Inzwischen ist nun ein Jahr vergangen, in dem ich nicht nur einmal sondern mindestens zwanzigmal mit dem indonesischen Staatspräsidenten zusammengetroffen bin. So auch in letzter Zeit. Vorige Woche war ich bei ihm zum Frühstück, vorgestern zum Abendessen und gestern wieder beim Frühstück. Aus eigener Wahrnehmung kann ich nur sagen, daß er mir nicht gerade den Eindruck eines casus ex macht. Ich weiß zwar, daß der Uri(**e**)n-Gehalt der gesunden Niere ständig steigt und daß auf Grund meiner vertraulichen Intervention bei Prof. Fellinger, sich Sukarno heuer im Sommer bei dessen Kollegen, dem Nierenspezialisten Prof. Hamburger, {in Paris} einer Untersuchung unterzogen hatte. Es war damals auch die Rede von einer Nierentransplantation. Eine panikartige Beurteilung des Gesundheitszustandes des Präsidenten scheint mir nach all dem nicht begründet.*" (*Gesundheitszustand Sukarnos*, November 30, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 145752-6/65 Zl. 145.752-6(Pol)65, classified)
[167] Although his examination cannot be proven, during that time he was definitely in Paris. See for example: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8HULVKUwFN0 [accessed March 4, 2020]. Furthermore, Sukarno told the Austrian Ambassador after the independence speech: "To his regret he [Sukarno] would have been in Paris instead of Vienna this year" (Translated by S.G.). (*20. Jahrestag der Unabhängigkeitserklärung Indonesiens*, August 24, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 139565-6/65 Zl. 33-POL/65).
[168] "*Eine panikartige Beurteilung des Gesundheitszustandes des Präsidenten scheint mir nach all dem nicht begründet.*" (*Gesundheitszustand Sukarnos*, November 30, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 145752-6/65 Zl. 145.752-6(Pol)65, classified)

Archive. Furthermore, none of these eight visits were declared as *official* visits.[169] Three of his eight trips to Austria were for medical purposes, with two of those being primarily to treat his chronic kidney disease. On October 24, 1961, and on September 25, 1964, he underwent operations in Vienna for his kidney stones. Whether he also underwent a treatment for gallstones on those occasions is not clear. Furthermore, it is still in question whether Sukarno had a kidney removed during one of his visits, as Samodra (2005, p. 38) claimed. Two observations would undoubtedly speak against it. Firstly, the Austrian ambassador had mentioned in one of his reports in December 1964 that Sukarno had not undergone any (surgical) operation yet.[170] Secondly, the two most prolonged visits of Sukarno in Vienna were only twelve days in 1961 and ten days in 1964. Consequently, Sukarno would have had to stay longer in the hospital in the course of such kidney surgery was the case.[171]

Besides that, the Austrian and Indonesian media were mostly well informed about Sukarno's trips and his state of health. Sukarno's health issues were thus not kept secret. Sometimes, the public was informed even before Sukarno visited Austria.[172] For most of his visits, therefore, there exist documents from Austrian officials and even newspaper articles. However, for his last trip in 1964 and his intended trip in 1965, less information found its way to the media and the Austrian officials. Consequently, it is difficult to establish whether the Austrian doctors passed on Sukarno's health status to the press, as Zhou (2014, p. 47) had claimed. Also, Hunter's (2007, p. 154) claim that Sukarno had canceled the trip to Vienna in 1965 can only be answered to a certain extent. On one hand, it is clear that an additional trip to Austria was planned after Sukarno's last visit in 1964. Yet, the travel arrangements for this already began as early as December 1964 and then were subsequently postponed – first to January 1965 and then to March 1965. However, it is difficult to analyze from the existing documents if this intended visit later was really again rescheduled all the way through September 1965 and then canceled as Hunter (2007, p. 154) claims. Also, whether Sukarno lost trust towards Western doctors, as Robinson (2018, pp. 87–88) claims, cannot be fully clarified. A resolution of this question would require more information about the canceled visit of Sukarno. Yet, what speaks definitively against Robinson's claim that he had lost trust in

[169] The question why not all of Sukarno's visits were recorded in the Austrian year books, except the one in 1963, unfortunately, remains unanswered.
[170] *Sukarnos Gesundheitszustand*, December 9, 1964, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 82179-6/64 Zl. 20-POL/64.
[171] I have discussed this with some Austrian doctors (Personal conversation with Dr. Djavan, December 12, 2019, and E-mail conversation with Dr. Kusrini, April 4, 2020).
[172] According to an interviewee, there was a rumor that Sukarno even announced the trips to Austria sometimes in stadiums (Anonymous 2, personal communication, September 16, 2019).

'Western' doctors is the fact that Dr. Hamburger examined Sukarno in France as late as July 1965.[173] Furthermore, this trip could have also been the reason why Sukarno did not come to Austria in 1965 as originally planned.

Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, it is at least possible to establish how ill Sukarno was and how ill he was believed to be. As we have seen from the reports of the Austrian representative Otto and later Austrian ambassador Hohenbühel, Sukarno was constantly suffering from his kidney disease. However, as we saw from Hohenbühel's latest report, he was definitely made to believe that Sukarno's health was more critical than it ultimately transpired to be.[174] The spread of this incorrect information started already in December 1964 and found its height in reports shortly after G30S. The report by the Austrian ambassador to Yugoslavia is again particularly noteworthy here, because he was the one who reported that the Yugoslavians thought they knew – based on the reports from Beijing – that the Chinese doctors would not give Sukarno much longer to live.[175] The questions at stakes are as follows. If the Chinese doctors had not revealed this confidential information about Sukarno's health, as Zhou (2014, p. 47) argues, who then had spread that incorrect information? If not the Chinese, maybe some informants in between or the Yugoslavs themselves?

Nevertheless, after the Austrian ambassador had informed the Foreign Ministry of Austria about the inaccurate information about Sukarno's health, G30S had already happened, as shown by the analysis in the next chapter.

[173] *Gesundheitszustand Sukarnos*, November 30, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 145752-6/65 Zl. 145.752-6(Pol)65, classified.
[174] *Gesundheitszustand Sukarnos*, November 30, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 145752-6/65 Zl. 145.752-6(Pol)65, classified.
[175] *Asiatisches in Belgrader Sicht*, October 7, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol, Belgrad, 44-POL/65.

6 Analysis II: The September 30th Movement (G30S)

The mysterious events on the night of September 30 to October 1, 1965, are among the most critical points surrounding the Indonesian mass killings. While the official version in Indonesia to this day sees the events connected with a possible seizure of power by the PKI, many researchers see these events instead as a pretext for taking action against the PKI. Thus, the exact background of G30S is still disputed in the research literature. Therefore, the first two parts of this chapter are devoted to the course of events, background and interpretations of G30S in more detail. Based on the literature review in this thesis, the results of the analysis of the Austrian archival files are presented. Given that there are only limited records available and that most files are one-sided reports mostly unaccompanied by records of the deliberations or responses of Austrian government officials, an attempt was made to focus the analyses on the narratives of the events, the reasons and timing of G30S, and the involved actors. Finally, the last part of this chapter discusses these results, along with the different position in the research field.

6.1 The Course of Events

In the early morning hours of October 1, 1965, small military units attempted to abduct seven high-ranking Indonesian Army generals from their homes (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 22). Three of the generals resisted and were killed on the spot, while three more were taken alive. All of them were trucked to the Halim Air Force Base on the outskirts of Jakarta, where those still alive were also killed (Crouch, 1978, p. 99; Robinson, 2018, p. 54; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 23). The seventh and highest-ranking general, Defense Minister Nasution, escaped the kidnappers to the Iraqi ambassador but was injured, while his adjutant was murdered (Robinson, 2018, p. 54; Roosa, 2006, p. 37). Then all seven bodies were thrown into a dried-up well called *Lubang Buaya* (Crocodile Hole) (Crouch, 1978, p. 99; Robinson, 2018, p. 54). The group that carried out the abduction and assassination of the generals called itself the *Gerakan 30 September* (September 30th Movement) (Robinson, 2018, p. 55). They were led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung (Battalion Commander of the Presidential Guards) and Colonel Abdul Latief (Officer in the Military Command of Jakarta) (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 22).[176] In addition to this military leadership, the group

[176] Other prominent officers who were involved were Air Force Mayor Suyono and General Supardjo. It is important to note that both Untung and Latief were connected to the Strategic Army Service (*KOSTRAD*), which was under the command of Suharto and the military commander of Jakarta, General Umar Wirahadikusumah (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 22).

also included civilian members (Sjam, Bono, and Pono)[177] who were members of a secret Special Bureau and reported directly to Aidit, the leader of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (Kasenda, 2013, p. 61; Roosa, 2006; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 23).

At the same time as the kidnappings took place, other military forces associated with G30S took control of the Presidential Palace, the Merdeka Square (Jakarta's Freedom Square) and the national radio station Radio Republic of Indonesia (RRI) (Robinson, 2018, p. 55; Roosa, 2006, p. 35). Shortly after 7 a.m., a statement by Untung was broadcast on RRI. It was announced that "a military move took place *within the Army* in the capital city of Djakarta, which was aided by troops from other branches of the Armed Forces" ("Selected Documents Relating to the 'September 30th Movement' and Its Epilogue," 1966, p. 134, emphasis added).[178] The announcement revealed that G30S was supposedly led by Colonel Untung and directed against generals who were members of the Council of Generals[179]. The announcement also stated that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sponsored the subversive movement of the Council of Generals, which had been very active, mainly in the period since President Sukarno had been seriously ill in the first week of August. As their hope for the passing of President Sukarno had not come about, they planned to stage a coup prior[180] to the Armed Forces Day, on October 5. The announcement conveyed that it was for this reason that Lieutenant Colonel Untung had launched G30S ("Selected Documents Relating to the 'September 30th Movement' and Its Epilogue," 1966, p. 134). The statement also mentioned that President Sukarno was safe under the protection of the movement[181], and

[177] All three were members of the PKI. However, it seems at least Sjam had worked as a spy for the Army (Wertheim, 1979). More on this later in this chapter.

[178] Another English version of the announcement can also be found in Sekneg RI (1995, pp. 173–175).

[179] The Council of Generals was a group of right-wing generals that were not satisfied with President Sukarno. Whether they really planned to overthrow Suharto is still subject to dispute (Crouch, 1978, pp. 106–107). Nonetheless, it is clear that there existed a group of generals who were not satisfied with Sukarno. For more on this, see previously in section 4.1.

[180] There might be a different understanding when exactly the counter-revolutionary coup was expected to happen. In the English translation of the document, it is written: "With this large concentration of military power the Council of Generals had even planned to carry out a counter-revolutionary coup *prior* to October 5, 1965" ("Selected Documents Relating to the 'September 30th Movement' and Its Epilogue," 1966, p. 134, emphasis added). However, in the secondary literature it is usually stated that the coup was expected to take place on Armed Forces Day *on* the October 5th. See, e.g., Wieringa and Katjasungkana, who wrote: "which aimed to remove President Sukarno on Armed Forces Day, held *on* October 5" (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 22, emphasis added), see also Robinson (2018) or Roosa (2006). The coup might have already been planned before October 5th. Moreover, a later analysis of the events in the *Marxist-Leninist Group of the Communist Party of Indonesia* wrote: "Some believed that the anniversary of the Armed Forces should be the date (October), others were inclined to fix a later date in the belief that the Armed Forces Day should be turned into a show of force, so as to prevent the formation of the Gotong-Royong Cabinet" (Marxist-Leninist Group cited in Fic, 2006, p. 269).

[181] Again, there is an essential difference between the original and Robinson's interpretation. Robinson wrote: "President Sukarno was safe *and* under the movements protection" (Robinson, 2018, p. 56, highlighted by S.G.); whereas in the official, they stated: "while President Sukarno is safe *under* its protection" ("Selected Documents

that an Indonesian Revolution Council would be established. This Revolution Council would consistently implement the *Pantja Azimat Revolusi*[182] and the legislature's various decisions and would not change Indonesian foreign policy ("Selected Documents Relating to the 'September 30th Movement' and Its Epilogue," 1966, p. 135). President Sukarno went to the Presidential Palace and then to the Halim Air Force Base after he had heard about the morning's events. After being informed that the generals had been killed, he ordered the action to stop, but no public statement was made for a long time (Robinson, 2018, p. 56).

After the first radio announcement, G30S remained silent for some time. It was not until midday on October 1 that further decrees were broadcast, and the situation became even more fraught due to the different messages. On the one hand, 'Decree 1' made clear again that G30S was an internal military affair to "put an end to the arbitrary actions of Generals who were members of the Council of Generals and other Officers who were henchmen and sympathizers of members of the Council of Generals ("Selected Documents Relating to the 'September 30th Movement' and Its Epilogue," 1966, p. 136). On the other hand, it was declared that from that point on the government authority would fall into the hands of the newly formed 'Indonesian Revolutionary Council' and Sukarno's existing cabinet would "automatically [assume] a decommissioned status" ("Selected Documents Relating to the 'September 30th Movement' and Its Epilogue," 1966, p. 136).[183] Therefore, the difference from the first announcement a few hours before was remarkable. While the initial announcements spoke of protecting the president, the later decrees left the impression that the movement would have acted against the president or at least without his full consent. This impression was further reinforced by the silence of President Sukarno (Robinson, 2018, p. 56).

Relating to the 'September 30th Movement' and Its Epilogue," 1966, p. 134, highlighted by S.G.). Thus, Robinson's interpretation would indicate that Sukarno was safe without G30S.

[182] The *Pantja Azimat Revolusi* translates imperfectly as 'the five charms of the Revolution'. As designated by President Sukarno in June 1965, these are the following Indonesian ideological concepts: *Nasakom* – nationalism, religion, and communism – Sukarno viewed this as the major streams making up Indonesia's political culture; *Pancasila* - the 'five principles' of Indonesian state ideology: belief in the one supreme God; just and civilized humanitarianism; Indonesian unity; sovereignty governed by wise policies arrived at through deliberation and consensus; social justice for the entire Indonesian people; Sukarno formulated the Pancasila on June 1, 1945, and it is until today part of the constitution; the *Political Manifesto* – Sukarno called for social justice, a return to the spirit of the Revolution, and a 'retooling' of state organs, *Trisakti* - (Three Power Principles) approach – "make Indonesia sovereign in its politics, independent in its economy and distinct in its cultural character" (Shekhar, 2018, p. 16), and *berdikari – berdiri atas kaki sendiri* (to stand on one's own feet) ("Selected Documents Relating to the 'September 30th Movement' and Its Epilogue," 1966, p. 135). See Sukarno's Independence Speech on August 17, 1965.

[183] Another English version of 'Decree 1' can also be found in Sekneg RI (1995, pp. 177–179).

Suppression of the Movement and the Main Events Immediately Following the Failure of G30S

On the morning of October 1, General Suharto, the commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, Kostrad*) in Jakarta, had placed himself as the head of the actions against G30S. Interestingly, although he commanded the Kostrad, he was not targeted by G30S. Thus he was able to mobilize his own troops, *RPKAD* (*Resimen Parakomando Angakt Darat,* Army Paracommando Regiment), against the movement (Robinson, 2018, p. 56). His troops quickly gained the upper hand and forced the soldiers who occupied the Merdeka Square and the radio station to give up. Shortly after Suharto's recapture, the Army commander for Jakarta, General Umar Wirhadikusuma, closed most of the essential media except the two Army-controlled newspapers, *Angkatan Bersendjata* and *Berita Yudha* (Robinson, 2018, p. 57).

Thus, at 7 p.m. Suharto controlled every place that had been previously occupied by forces of G30S. Therefore, at 9 p.m., together with Defense Minister Nasution, he issued a decree. It was announced over the radio that he was now in command of the Army and that he would destroy the counter-revolutionary forces and also save Sukarno (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 25). He also threatened to use troops in case the military units present at Halim Air Force Base would not surrender until the next day, and Sukarno did not leave the base (Robinson, 2018, p. 57). Therefore, by the morning of October 2, most of the forces of G30S had been routed or detained, and most of the key players had departed, with Aidit and Untung having gone to Central Java, and Sukarno having gone to the presidential palace in Bogor (Robinson, 2018, p. 57).

The next day, in the early morning hours, Sukarno gave a short radio address. In it, he announced that he was "safe and well" and "continued to hold the top leadership of the state and the top [leadership] of the government and the Indonesian Revolution" ("Selected Documents Relating to the 'September 30th Movement' and Its Epilogue," 1966, p. 152). Moreover he appealed to "all the Indonesian people to continue to remain calm and to all ministers and other officials continuously to carry out their respective duties as before" ("Selected Documents Relating to the 'September 30th Movement' and Its Epilogue," 1966, p. 153).

On October 4, the remains of the assassinated generals were found (Baskara, 2013, p. 8). The exhumation of the bodies was delayed until a large number of journalists, photographers, and

television cameramen were present (Crouch, 1978, p. 138). Several high-ranking generals also accompanied the exhumation, including Suharto. Afterward, Suharto gave a speech, in which he indicated for the first time the complicity of the Air Force and the Communists (*Gerwani* and *Pemuda Rakyat*)[184] in the killings (Crouch, 1978, p. 138; Robinson, 2018, p. 58; cf. "Selected Documents Relating to the 'September 30th Movement' and Its Epilogue," 1966, p. 159). In the following days, the only newspapers who were allowed to publish – the Army's *Angkatan Bersenjata* and *Berita Yudha* – reported that the PKI leaders and members were responsible for the planning and assassination of the generals (Baskara, 2013, p. 8; Crouch, 1978, p. 140). Afterward, further rumors circulated that the members of the women's organization Gerwani had performed 'immoral acts' on the assassinated generals. According to the rumors, some women of that organization had castrated and gouged out the generals' eyes (Baskara, 2013, pp. 8–9; Crouch, 1978, p. 140; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 26). On October 5, the assassinated generals were buried in a funeral ceremony. Almost the entire non-Communist elite was present. However, President Sukarno did not attend, aware that the generals at the funeral could use the opportunity to link him to their demand for revenge (Crouch, 1978, p. 139).[185]

6.2 Background and Interpretations of G30S

Many scholars have attempted to elucidate the background of the mysterious events of October 1, 1965. The monographs by Roosa (2006), Robinson (2018), and Wieringa and Katjasungkana (2019) represent the current state of the research. The interpretations of G30S can be summarized as follows:[186]

1. One interpretation suggests that G30S was a failed coup by the PKI and its affiliated organizations to seize state power. This version further insinuates that the PKI acted at

[184] *Gerakan Wanita Indonesia* (Gerwani) was a left-wing women's movement founded on June 4, 1950. The movement's primary goal was to lobby for women's interests in the government. After March 1954 it became increasingly close to the PKI. Although the *Gerwani* organization is often seen as a 'communist' organization, it was actually independent. See further, Wieringa and Katjasungkana (2019, pp. 105–107). *Pemuda Rakyat* (People's Youth) was a youth organization affiliated with the PKI. It used educational and social activities to attract the interest of young people (A. Kahin, 2015, p. 366). According to the official version by the Indonesian Army, Gerwani is said to have been actively involved at Lubang Buaya where some of the generals were killed. However, it seems that although they were really present at Lubang Buaya, they were only witnesses of the events (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, pp. 25–26).

[185] The scholar Kurasawa Aiko interviewed Dewi, one of Sukarno's wives. According to Dewi, Sukarno did not attend the funeral of the assassinated generals 'for reasons of security' following the advice of Subandrio and Leimena (Kurasawa, 2016, p. 94). Allegedly Sukarno wrote to her "*Nobody can be sure of what can happen in such an emotional ceremony*" and also "*your feelings are correct: Gold is a spy*" (Dewi cited in Kurasawa, 2016, p. 94, italics in original). However, it is not clear whom he meant by 'Gold' (Kurasawa, 2016, p. 94)

[186] For a detailed description of the different interpretations, see also Crouch (1978, pp. 101–134). Some of the most recent outlines of these interpretations were done by Robinson (2018), Tömmel (2018), and Wieringa and Katjasungkana (2019). The following pages are therefore based on it.

the behest of China and its Communist Party (Robinson, 2018, p. 66). General Suharto and his allies took on the mantle of national saviors to prevent the PKI seizure of power (Robinson, 2018, pp. 66–70). This account is the official version of Suharto's 'New Order', and until today, it is widely repeated in large parts of democratic Indonesia.[187]

2. The first alternative account on those events was written by Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey in the so-called *Cornell Papers* (1971/2009). Their account questioned the previous representation of the military. Instead, they saw at the center an 'internal military conflict': "a move by a group of disgruntled middle-ranking army officers against an army high command they viewed as corrupt, disloyal to the president, and in the CIA's pocket" (Robinson, 2018, p. 70). In this version, the PKI had only a secondary role (Robinson, 2018, pp. 70–72; cf. Anderson & McVey, 1971/2009).
3. A third interpretation suggests that the action of October 1 was the product of a covert operation of foreign intelligence services, particularly by the CIA and MI6, in cooperation with Indonesian allies (Robinson, 2018, p. 76). The aim was to provide a pretext for anti-communist forces to crush the PKI and ease Sukarno from power (Robinson, 2018, pp. 76–78; cf. P. D. Scott, 1985).
4. Another interpretation placed President Sukarno at the center of events for G30S. According to this account, Sukarno himself initiated the generals' kidnapping or at least knew that some plot against them was underway. However, he turned a blind eye to it in the expectation that he would have a free hand for his leftist domestic and foreign policy (Robinson, 2018, pp. 72–74; cf. Dake, 2006; Said, 2015).[188]
5. A thesis represented in different versions sees G30S as a *joint enterprise* between middle-ranking officers and parts of the PKI leadership. According to this thesis, the intention of G30S was to eliminate the pro-Western generals, but a complete takeover of power was not the aim. The background and the process of these accounts are a complex interaction of different actors. Once the movement had failed, the Army

[187] This account can be found, for example, in various history and schoolbooks but also in other artifacts (c.f. McGregor, 2007).

[188] Interestingly, in Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung's book *Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy 1945-1965*, which was typed in Vienna in 1973, there is also an introduction page by the first vice-president Mohammad Hatta. On G30S, Hatta stated: "Not long after Soekarno was deposed *for his complicity in the G.30S/P.K.I Affair*, Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung was deservedly reinstated by Foreign Minister Adam Malik as a high official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was followed by his appointment as Indonesia's Ambassador to Austria by President Suharto" (Agung, 1973, p. 11). This would indicate that Hatta too saw the complicity of Sukarno in the G30S affair.

around Suharto took the opportunity to eliminate the PKI and to overthrow Sukarno (Crouch, 1978; Robinson, 2018, pp. 78–80; cf. Roosa, 2006).

6. Lastly, there is also the thesis that the Indonesian Army itself staged G30S. In the center of this theory is General Suharto; the degree of his alleged involvement varies between a passive and an active role. In the first role, he was aware that G30S would happen, but he did nothing against the kidnapping and assassination. In the latter case, he deliberately brought about the failure of G30S, thus giving the Army the pretext to take comprehensive measures against the PKI and Sukarno (Robinson, 2018, pp. 74–76; cf. Wertheim, 1979; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019).

The account propagated by the Indonesian Army about a planned coup by the PKI, attempted with China's help, is hardly tenable anymore. Several problems speak against it. First, the Army leadership has never presented convincing evidence of authorship of the entire PKI leadership, and indeed not of the whole PKI (Roosa, 2006, pp. 65–67, 2012; Tömmel, 2018, p. 226).[189] Second, there is no indication that the PKI was preparing to take over power – for example, there was no formation of any larger, military, armed units (Tömmel, 2018, p. 226). Third, it raises the question of the plausible motive for the PKI to stage a coup. What motivated the PKI or the PKI leadership in their actions? As we have seen before, in section 4.1, the PKI had been steadily gaining popularity and had achieved almost unimagined political success through its strategy of lawful political activity. Thus, Robinson (2018, p. 67) correctly posed the questions:

> Why [would the PKI] have risked all it had gained by trying to seize power. And why especially it would have opted for a strategy of armed insurrection – a strategy it had explicitly eschewed for fifteen years and for which it was utterly unprepared – when such a move would almost certainly have provoked an angry and violent reaction from the army.[190]

[189] In 1970, Suharto said in an interview with *Der Spiegel* that 5,000 prisoners were actually involved in the coup attempt ("WIR HABEN 58 000 POLITISCHE GEFANGENE," 1970). The US historian John Roosa has pointed out that the Suharto regime has presented in total three different accounts of the coup attempt, each with different explanations, which led to inconsistencies and contradictions (Roosa, 2012). Moreover, the US historian Robinson has pointed out that the evidence used by the Army is very questionable, as they refer to controversial newspaper articles, as well as witness statements and confessions made by prisoners under torture or extreme duress (Robinson, 2018, p. 69).

[190] Until recently, the motive of the PKI or the PKI leaders was still unclear. Since then, Wieringa and Katjasungkana (2019, p. 27), building on the research of Zhou (2014, 2019), and the *Institut Studi Arus Informasi* (ISAI), have tried to find two possible answers to this question. According to them, one motive could have been that Aidit had chosen a shortcut in order to move forward more quickly through democratic channels, as the burden on anti-PKI generals would have increased the pro-PKI element in the military (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 27). Another explanation, which is based on the ISAI suggests that Aidit acted rashly and unilaterally because there was a serious conflict within the PKI between Aidit and Second Deputy Chairperson of the PKI Nyoto (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 27). Yet, for Wieringa and Katyasungakan, this second explanation seems rather unlikely.

Fourth and lastly, the idea of the perpetration of G30S as a PKI action is questionable as well. The interpretation of a communist coup d'état, as propagated by the New Order, cannot address the fact that it was conducted by regular soldiers under the command of uniformed Army officers, who carried out the abduction and assassinations of the generals (Robinson, 2018, p. 68).[191] One can add to this the fact that in its public statements G30S had consistently spoken of an internal military issue (see, e.g., the first announcement in section 6.1).

Likewise, the thesis that it was solely a military conflict is no longer tenable. The possible participation of the PKI was neglected. For example, this thesis does not account for the fact that the PKI-affiliated organizations, such as *Gerwani* and *Pemuda Rakyat*, were present at the Halim Air Force Base during the assassinations (Robinson, 2018, p. 71).[192] More importantly, the role of Sjam, the Special Bureau, and the role of Aidit was underestimated (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 29). However, the converse proposition that the Army had nothing to do with it would also be wrong. As Robinson concluded:

> There is no doubt at all that army officers and soldiers played key roles both in its planning and execution […] Any explanation that obscures or denies the role of military officers and soldiers and underplays the existence of tensions within the army in triggering the action is simply misleading and must be regarded as a deliberate deception. (Robinson, 2018, p. 72)

The thesis that the action on October 1st was a covert operation of international secret services – above all the US – was debated quite early. However, this was repeatedly and emphatically denied by US and Indonesian government officials. The US ambassador at that time, Marshall Green, for instance, wrote in his memoirs that "the event of October 1, 1965, came as a complete surprise to us" (Green, 1990, p. 63). Also, General Suharto insisted that "the operation to destroy the PKI was totally and successfully done by Indonesians alone [….] There was not one grain of aid from the CIA" (Jakarta Post, cited in Robinson, 2018, p. 76).[193] However, documents that have been released in the US archives paint a somewhat different picture. Among these documents, there is, according to Robinson (2018, p. 77), also a strategy paper that presents the events in advance as they occurred. For instance, it states

[191] Although PKI-related organizations such as *Pemuda Rakyat* and *Gerwani* were present at the Halim Air Force Base, their role was marginally small (Robinson, 2018, p. 68).
[192] Although it seems that they played only a minor role (Robinson, 2018, p. 68; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, pp. 25–26).
[193] In 1970, Suharto answered in an interview with *Der* Spiegel, to the question of whether the thwarted seizure of power was due to the US presence: "Absolutely not. The Communist uprising was solely and exclusively stifled by the Armed Forces and the people of Indonesia. The stability we have achieved since then is the result of our own unceasing efforts, although we are grateful to the United States and other countries for the assistance we have received." ("WIR HABEN 58 000 POLITISCHE GEFANGENE," 1970, translated by S.G.)

that the PKI should be exposed to treason in order to create a pretext for the Army to take action against them (Robinson, 2018, p. 77). It further states that, in order to set such a chain of events in motion, the best mechanism would probably be to initiate a provocation in the form of a rumor or document referring to a possible plan for a right-wing coup (Robinson, 2018, p. 77). The Gilchrist document and the rumors about the Council of Generals, as mentioned in section 4.1, thus takes on a new meaning. Although it cannot be ruled out that the secret services planned the action, according to Robinson (2018, p. 78), the available evidence does not provide compelling support for the idea that the whole affair was only the result of a foreign conspiracy. Yet, it should not be overlooked that the foreign actors had indeed played a critical role before the events of October 1st. Thus, the available US documents show, for instance, that US government officials encouraged the Army to take action against the PKI and Sukarno already before G30S (Robinson, 2018, p. 83). Additionally, they showed that the US officials had already identified Suharto by 1965 as one of the possible anti-Communist military officers who might be relied upon to operate jointly against the PKI (Robinson, 2018, pp. 77–78).

The thesis that the G30S was a 'presidential coup' may have a certain plausibility regarding the possible motives of Sukarno, although the evidence is somewhat questionable. The primary evidence of Sukarno's involvement in the alleged coup is, according to Robinson (2018, p. 73), based almost exclusively on his actions and movements before and after the abduction began. For example, his accusers claimed that Sukarno had a meeting with Untung in August to discuss the kidnapping plans. It is also alleged that Sukarno signed the order to dismiss Yani as Army commander on September 30, 1965 (Robinson, 2018, p. 73). Besides that, Sukarno's accusers pointed out the fact that Sukarno was driven to Halim Air Force Base early in the morning of October 1 and that he stayed there until late in the evening. Thus, Sukarno's presence in Halim was seen by his accusers as evidence that he had collaborated with G30S (Robinson, 2018, p. 73).

Furthermore, Sukarno's statements about the movement were cited as evidence of his alleged involvement in the conspiracy. As an example, it was repeatedly cited that he described the events of October 1 as "a ripple in the ocean of the Indonesian revolution" (Robinson, 2018, p. 73; see, for example, Soeharto, 1995, p. 114). Finally, some advocates of this thesis also pointed out that Sukarno canceled a planned trip to Austria in September 1965. They concluded from this cancellation that Sukarno must have given the order for G30S, or at least known about it beforehand (Hunter, 2007, p. 154) (see previous chapter).

However, there are at least four issues with this version. The first one is related to Sukarno's actions and statements. According to Robinson (2018, pp. 73–74), they admit of alternative interpretations; for instance, Sukarno's remarks about the movement could also be understood as statements to appease and end the violence (Robinson, 2018, p. 74). Second, the relevant evidence was often based on statements made under torture (Robinson, 2018, p. 73). This is also true in the case of one of the most critical claims, namely that Sukarno allegedly demanded the removal of General Yani. However, later, Bambang Widjanarko, who gave this testimony, stated that he had been tortured while in military custody (Robinson, 2018, p. 73). Third, one critical aspect of this theory can also be seen clearly if one considers when precisely the claim that Sukarno participated in G30S became relevant. According to Robinson (2018, p. 72), this was in late 1965 and early 1966 and as a part of a concerted effort to undermine Sukarno's legitimacy and to ease him from power. State resources were exploited for the campaign to achieve that aim. This included the secret service apparatus and quasi-judicial bodies set up by Suharto after October 1, which then ultimately led to Sukarno's impeachment by parliament in 1967 (Robinson, 2018, p. 72). Furthermore, the campaign necessary for the transfer of power was also supported by Western powers, who already had a negative image of the 'pro-communist' Indonesian head of state (Tömmel, 2018, p. 225). Consequently, they immediately assumed that Sukarno must at least have known about G30S (see also the Austrian Ambassador Hohenbühel, later in this chapter). Finally, Sukarno's motive remains an unresolved question. He had already become president. Wieringa and Nursyahbania, therefore, correctly ask: "Why would President Sukarno stage a coup against himself?" (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 28)

Having reviewed various other interpretations, let us turn to the most recent and probably most widely accepted interpretation in the academic community. Historian John Roosa has outlined this in his work *Pretext for mass murder* (2006) and in an updated version with his latest views presented in Saskia Wieringa and Nursyahbania Katjasungkana's book *Propaganda and the Genocide in Indonesia* (2019).[194] According to Roosa, G30S was a kidnapping mission prepared by the officers around Lieutenant Colonel Untung and some PKI leaders (including Secretary-General Aidit) against pro-Western and conservative generals. The background of G30S can best be explained as follows. By January 1965, a group of generals wanted to end Sukarno's Guided Democracy. In the light of his expensive

[194] Therefore, the following description corresponds to the latest version in Wieringa and Katjasungkana (2019, pp. 29–30).

campaign against Malaysia (*konfrontasi*) and his alignment with the PKI, the US and its allies (above all the UK and Australia), and the Indonesian economic elites, agreed to this (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 29). Therefore, Western-oriented officers started a psychological war, trying to convince the PKI that they were planning a coup against Sukarno. This action aimed to provoke the PKI into a rash action so that a crackdown could be justified (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 29). The plan entailed that Sukarno would continue as figurehead president in order to be able to take action against the PKI, and at the same time allowed for Sukarno to be gradually stripped of his power (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 29). Thus, by mid-1965, the PKI Politburo had to decide whether to pre-empt the expected Army coup or resist after the coup had happened (Roosa, 2006, p. 210). The Politburo decided to allow Chairman Aidit to evaluate the possibility of mobilizing the pro-PKI military personnel in order to stage a pre-emptive strike against the Western-oriented Army generals (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 30). Aidit and the Special Bureau developed a plan for the so-called September 30th Movement (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 30). As documents from China showed, this plan was then also explained to Mao Zedong in Beijing on August 5, 1965 (Zhou, 2014, 2019). However, it was neither discussed nor agreed upon by the Indonesian PKI Politburo (Roosa, 2006, p. 213; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 30).[195]

Roosa's work is interesting, incorporating several previous theories and theses, while also refuting some existing hypotheses. For example, he stressed that Aidit, as well as Sjam, were involved in the planning of G30S. According to Robinson (2018, p. 79), this challenges the assertion that it was exclusively an internal Army affair. Moreover, Roosa also argued that these plans were not shared by Aidit with the PKI Politburo or Central Committee. Thus, his work also challenges the official version of the Army, which establishes the entire PKI leadership and party as the sole mastermind (Robinson, 2018, p. 79; Roosa, 2006, pp. 203, 213).

Another interesting point is Roosa's explanation of why the G30S movement failed. According to Roosa, the action was not planned from the outset by Suharto (as we will see later) but rather collapsed due to poor planning, poor implementation, and rapid countermeasures by Suharto (Robinson, 2018, p. 78; Roosa, 2006, pp. 215–219). This was

[195] "Sudisman, the only survivor of the Communists Party's top leaders admitted during his trial that he was involved as an 'individual' but denied that the Party, as a whole, was involved, arguing that the matter had never been discussed at a full session of the Party's central committee." (Polomka, 1971, p. 76)

made possible by the assistance of the US and other foreign governments, who had already encouraged the Army leadership before 1965 to prepare themselves for a possible takeover of power (Robinson, 2018, p. 78; Roosa, 2006).

Roosa's theory is still undoubtedly one of the most detailed and coherent interpretations of the events surrounding G30S. However, it is not without shortcomings. Robinson (2018, p. 80), for instance, noted that it was not clarified what motives had driven Aidit. For Robinson, it is not apparent why Aidit would have taken it upon himself to bring about such actions as abduction or assassination. Would he have been so politically careless? Robinson (2018, p. 80) also raised the question of the obscure figure Sjam, who might have collaborated with the Army, this would suggest that it was a deliberate provocation of the Army and its allies, as we have seen in the previous interpretation (see also Hartanto, 2011).

In a contrasting viewpoint, Wieringa and Katjasungkana (2019, p. 30) criticized Roosa's version for not sufficiently exploring the role of Suharto. For instance, his book does not clarify why the groups of Untung supporters who occupied the Merdeka Square had no self-protection against Suharto's troops, who were stationed just next to the square. More importantly, they also point out that Roosa does not explore to what extent Suharto had foreknowledge of G30S (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 30). Therefore, in recent years, the question of Suharto's role in these events has again gained more attention (Holtzappel, n.d.; Melvin, 2018a; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019). One of the first theses that posits Suharto's involvement as an instigator of events was written by Wertheim as early as 1970. According to Wertheim (1970, 1979), Suharto played a key role in G30S. In this account, he allowed the actions of G30S to go ahead, then used them as a pretext for the Army to take comprehensive punitive measures against the PKI and Sukarno. This was, according to Wertheim, made possible by Suharto through double agents, most notably Sjam. Sjam not only infiltrated the Army and initiated contact with Untung and Latief but also acted as an Army spy (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 30). Thus for Wertheim, contrary to the allegedly failed coup, the 'real' coup was very successful (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 30).

Although there is as yet only limited documentary evidence to support this interpretation, plenty of evidence has raised serious questions about the role of Suharto. For instance, why was Suharto, as commander of the Strategic Reserve Command, not on the list of generals to be kidnapped? More importantly, to what extent did Suharto know about G30S in advance?

Robinson offers three possible answers to those questions. First, he points out that the chief military conspirators – Untung and Latief – had long-standing personal and professional connections to Suharto. Thus, they probably had reason to believe that Suharto would support their initiative (Robinson, 2018, p. 74). Second, Robinson (2018, p. 75) noticed a possible involvement of Suharto on account of the fact that he had a rivalry with General Yani and also a deep resentment against General Nasution, who had punished him for corruption. Therefore, the elimination of the six generals of the high command would have resulted in fewer rivals for Suharto, leaving him as one of the highest-ranking Army officers in the country.

Third, and certainly one of the most important aspects, is the fact that Colonel Latief had been at Suharto's house a few days before G30S to inform him about the Council of Generals and the plan to thwart them (Kasenda, 2013, p. 60; Robinson, 2018, p. 75; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 30). Moreover, Colonel Latief also met Suharto on the eve of October 1st – just a few hours before G30S was launched. It is undisputed that this meeting took place on the eve of October 1st in a military hospital in Jakarta, where Suharto's youngest son had been treated for burns a few days earlier (cf. Soeharto, 1995, p. 99). However, as there is no available record of this meeting, its purpose remains unsettled. Later, when asked, Suharto gave two different reasons. In his first interview, given to Arnold Brackman, shortly after the fall of G30S, Suharto said that Latief came to see him in the hospital not because of his concern for his son but rather to check on him. This implied that Latief wanted to observe any signs that might indicate that his preoccupation with his son would leave him unable to intervene in the planned actions of G30S ("The Latief Case," 1979, p. 249; Fic, 2006, p. 146; Wertheim, 1970, p. 56). In his second interview, given to *Der Spiegel* at the end of June 1970, when asked if he had been spared due to his *guru*'s warning, Suharto said that Latief came to see him in the hospital in the evening at around 11 but was obviously hesitant to murder him there ("WIR HABEN 58 000 POLITISCHE GEFANGENE," 1970)**.**[196] However, Latief contended that the purpose of his hospital visit

[196] Since most scholars usually cite *The Latief Case: Suharto's Involvement Revealed* (1979; e.g. Fic, 2006, p. 146), but because this translation does not quite match the original, I am quoting this important passage in full length: "*SPIEGEL: Herr Präsident, in der Putschnacht haben die Kommunisten sechs Ihrer Generalskameraden umgebracht. Sie selbst verdanken, so heißt es, Ihr Leben der Warnung eines Gurus, eines weisen Mannes … SUHARTO: Kein Guru hat mich gewarnt. Ich verbrachte die Putschnacht am Bett meines Sohnes, der sich mit einem Teller Suppe verbrüht hatte, im Krankenhaus. Gegen elf Uhr kam der Oberst Latif von den Putschisten ins Hospital,* scheute sich aber offenbar, mich dort zu ermorden. *Kurz nach Mitternacht ging ich heim, wurde aber bald geweckt und vom Morden und Kidnappen unterrichtet.*" ("WIR HABEN 58 000 POLITISCHE GEFANGENE," 1970, emphasis added) "SPIEGEL: Mr. President, during the coup d'état, the Communists killed six of your fellow generals. You owe your life, it is said, to the warning of a guru, a wise man ...

was simply to apprise Suharto of the situation, so as to appeal for his support in the event of a coup by the Council of Generals (Robinson, 2018, p. 75; Kasenda, 2013, p. 59). Moreover, at his trial, Latief expressed his disappointment that Suharto turned his back on them, despite having been informed and agreeing to such action (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 30; cf. "The Latief Case," 1979, p. 250). The crucial question is, therefore, how much did Suharto know in advance about G30S?

In 2019, Wieringa and Katjasungkana, tried to answer this question in their book *Propaganda and the Genocide in Indonesia*. Based on the research of Holzappel (n.d.) and the special issue of *Tempo* magazine on the events of 1965[197], they came to the following conclusion. The exact role of Suharto remains unclear. However, whether Suharto knew about it is not the question, but instead, to what extent was he actively involved? Therefore, they worked out two possible roles for Suharto's involvement in G30S. On the one hand, Suharto could have played a *passive* role. Meaning, he would have been part of the Council of Generals and was well informed about G30S by Untung, Latief, and his secret agents.[198] Nevertheless, he did not inform his superiors Yani and Nasution about the upcoming plans (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 37). On the other hand, they suggested that Suharto could have played a more *active* role, in which he had controlled both Sjam and Latief and planned the assassination of the generals as well as the destruction of the PKI (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 37).

Yet, many questions remain, and it will only become more apparent in the future, when more files become accessible, which of the two roles Suharto had played. Thus, in the analysis in the next section, it will be important to examine the extent of Austrian officials' awareness of the events of G30S. Moreover, it will be instructive to assess to what extent they provide further evidence for either theory on G30S, particularly the extent to which there is evidence that would show that Suharto was aware of G30S in advance.

SUHARTO: No guru warned me. I spent the night of the coup at the bed of my son, who was scalded with a plate of soup in the hospital. At about eleven o'clock Colonel Latief of the coup group came to the hospital, but apparently was *hesitant (scheute) to murder me there*. I went home shortly after midnight, but was soon awakened and informed about the murder and kidnapping." ("WIR HABEN 58 000 POLITISCHE GEFANGENE," 1970, translated by S.G., emphasis added)

[197] See https://magz.tempo.co/edisi/1100/2015-10-06 [accessed April 19, 2021].

[198] This is similar to what Latief wrote: "We have to observe […] that General Suharto, too, '*possessed foreknowledge*', and had information both about the existence of a generals' council and about the *existence of a movement which was intended to thwart the plan of the general's council for a coup d'etat*" (Latief cited in "The Latief Case," 1979, p. 250 italics in original).

6.3 Austrian Foreign Ministry Records of G30S

The first reports directly from Jakarta on the alleged coup attempt events reached officials in the Austrian Foreign Ministry only after more than ten days had elapsed. This rather late reporting had two reasons. First, on the night of the incident, from September 30 to October 1, the Austrian ambassador Friedrich Hohenbühel and his wife were not in Indonesia but in New Zealand.[199] The second reason was that on the night of October 1st, all telephone and cable connections in Jakarta were cut off. Moreover, after the suppression of G30S, a news blackout was imposed, and all long-distance telephone connections were controlled by the military.[200] Thus, shortly after G30S, there was neither a telephone and cable connection between the honorary consulate in Bandung to the Embassy in Jakarta, nor a radio link from Indonesia to Austria.[201] Direct reporting from Jakarta to the Austrian Foreign Ministry about the events on-site was, therefore, more difficult.[202] Consequently, when more than ten days had passed since the alleged coup attempt, with communication still impossible with the Austrian embassy in Jakarta, Foreign Minister Kreisky issued a decree to send a wire to other European embassies asking them "to report immediately by wire, whether and how the foreign office there has been in communication with its representative authorities since the beginning of the unrest in Indonesian and whether reports on their situation are available" (Translated by S.G.).[203]

On the same day, the Austrian ambassadors from Bonn, Bern, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Prague replied. In hindsight, these responses show that by no means all countries were cut off

[199] Hohenbühel was represented on that occasion by the secretary of the embassy, Christian Kautsky. However, there are no records available from Kautsky of an earlier date. After being informed of the alleged coup attempt from Jakarta, they headed straight back to Indonesia via Australia. One reason for this quick return was certainly also the fact that their four children were in Jakarta (Anonymous 4, personal communication, June 5, 2020). Interestingly, German Ambassador Werz was also reportedly not in Indonesia at the time of the events (Tömmel, 2018, p. 230).

[200] See the assumption of the Austrian ambassador in Bonn (*Zur Lage in Indonesien; Verfolg: FS 25059 vom 11. Oktober 1965*, October 11, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-MH/65 Zl. 958-Res/65), and the reporting of Honorary Consul Förster-Romswinckel in Bandung (*Vereitelter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 7, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 35-A/65).

[201] Although on October 7, 1965, the honorary consul in Bandung was assured that the disconnected cable traffic with foreign countries would be made possible for service telegrams from foreign missions, in reality things looked different. As I was able to find out from a well-informed source, acid was allegedly poured over the telephone lines so that no connection was possible. In addition, the airport in Jakarta was closed.

[202] However, the Austrian newspaper *Arbeiter-Zeitung* – which the Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky allegedly daily read – reported as early as October 2, 1965, in an article entitled *Putsch und Gegenputsch in Indonesien* (*Coup and counter-coup in Indonesia*) from this event (Arbeiter-Zeitung, October 2, 1965, Nr. 229). It can therefore be assumed that they may very well have been informed about it earlier.

[203] "'*Botschaft wolle umgehend drahtberichten, ob und wie dortiges Aussenamt seit Beginn der Unruhen in Indonesien in Nachrichtenverbindung mit seinen dortigen Vertretungsbehörden steht und ob Berichte über deren Lage vorhanden sind.*'" (*Post- und Telegrammverbindung mit der österr. Botschaft in Djakarta*, October 11, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/8, Gzl. 143495-6/65 Zl. 143495-6/65).

from communication with their embassies. Although some of these countries, such as Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia, also no longer had a direct connection to their representative authorities in Indonesia, they were at least able to obtain information about the political situation and their embassy very quickly via representative authorities of other countries, unlike the Austrians.[204] In addition, the files show that some countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany and almost certainly also England, the US, and the Netherlands, succeeded in maintaining a daily exchange with their local authorities in Indonesia despite the existing telephone connection problems.[205] Therefore, in retrospect, it is striking, but probably no coincidence, that these countries were precisely those that are said to have played an active role in the events on the ground (cf. Schaefer & Baskara, 2013a).

Although the officials of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, therefore, had no direct connection to the Austrian Embassy in Jakarta for a long time, they had to deal with the issue in more detail as early as October 4. As the files show, a groundbreaking ceremony for the Bung Karno Tower in Jakarta was supposed to have taken place in the presence of Sukarno, the Indonesian government, and the entire diplomatic corps on October 7, 1965. However, due to the events of G30S, the Austrian architect in charge, Lintl, was unable to leave for Indonesia on October 4. After Lintl could not obtain more detailed information about the situation from the Indonesian Embassy in Vienna, he turned to the Austrian Foreign Ministry. Consequently, Austrian officials were concerned about the extent to which the possible absence of the Austrian architect would also impact political relations between Indonesia and Austria.

At this point, they came to the following assessment: While they believed that the groundbreaking ceremony would most likely not take place, they could not rule it out either, so they felt that if the ceremony did take place, it would present itself as a "welcome opportunity" for Sukarno to "show Indonesia and the surrounding world that he is once again in command of the situation" (Translated by S.G).[206] The absence of the Austrian architect,

[204] In the case of the Swiss authorities, for example, this was achieved through the British, and the Yugoslav authorities made use of information from the Soviet side.

[205] For example, Swiss officials pointed out that the British Embassy in Jakarta has a radio link with London; and Danish authorities advised Austrian officials that they were most likely to receive political messages through the foreign ministries in The Hague, London, and Washington (see Dispatch from Bern to BMAA, October 11, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/8, Gzl. 143495-6/65 Zl. 25092 and Dispatch from Kopenhagen to BMAA, October 11, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/8, Gzl. 143495-6/65 Zl. 28003).

[206] "*Es liegt nämlich im Bereich der Möglichkeit, dass ein Anlass nach einer allfälligen erfolgreichen Niederwerfung des Aufstandes durch das Sukarno-Regime dem indones. Staatsoberhaupt die willkommene Gelegenheit geben würde, Indonesien und der Umwelt zu zeigen, dass er wieder Herr der Situation ist.*" (*Indonesien - Errichtung eines Turmes durch Architekt Hannes Lintl im Auftrag der indones. Regierung -*

however, was seen by them thus not only as unfavorable to the project – which would have generated considerable revenue – but also generally as "disadvantageous for Austrian interests in Indonesia" (Translated by S.G.).[207]

On October 5, 1965, Austria's authorities received a visit from the Iraqi chargé d'affaires, El Nqib, who visited them on routine matters. However, he also reported on the events of G30S and the current situation in Jakarta. The file written by the Austrian authorities shows that, according to El Nqib, the Indonesian Communist Party had attempted a coup against the will of Sukarno, who had not taken the Communist plans seriously.[208] Aside from this, he reported to the Austrian authorities that the Army, or at least parts of the Army, had already been prepared when the coup took place. The Army had, therefore, put down the coup and, in his view, they would now also take political control of Indonesians into their own hands, and President Sukarno would therefore probably have to do what the Army told him to do.[209]

Approximately one week after this meeting, the Austrian Foreign Ministry officials now received the first Austrian reports directly from Indonesia. Both the Austrian ambassador in Jakarta and the Austrian honorary consul Förster-Romswinckel in Bandung, probably due to the telephone and cable connection problems, reported separately to the foreign ministry on the events around G30S.[210] On October 7, 1965, Förster-Romswinckel reported to Kreisky that he had not noticed the G30S coup and its suppression in Bandung. He had only heard about it via radio.[211] Not a single shot was fired in Bandung, and only silence fell on the streets, he reported. However, he continued to report that after the state funeral (which had

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Anfrage betr. die geplante Grundsteinlegung am 7.10.1965, October 4, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/49, Gzl. 135216-6/65 Zl. 143102-6/65)

[207] „*Ein Fernbleiben des österr. Architekten aber, der den Turm in Djakarta erbauen soll könnte sich aber nicht nur für die Durchführung dieses Projektes, sondern {ganz} allgemein nachteilig für die österr. Interessen in Indonesien auswirken.*" (*Indonesien - Errichtung eines Turmes durch Architekt Hannes Lintl im Auftrag der indones. Regierung - Anfrage betr. die geplante Grundsteinlegung am 7.10.1965*, October 4, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/49, Gzl. 135216-6/65 Zl. 143102-6/65)

[208] *Zur Lage in Indonesien - Mitteilungen des irakischen Geschäftsträgers vom 5.10.1965*, October 5, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 143.192-6(Pol)65.

[209] *Zur Lage in Indonesien - Mitteilungen des irakischen Geschäftsträgers vom 5.10.1965*, October 5, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 143.192-6(Pol)65.

[210] The background for the report directly from Bandung was that on October 7, 1965, there was still no telephone or cable connection from Bandung to Jakarta, whereupon the Austrian honorary consul sent a report on the situation directly to Foreign Minister Kreisky. It is interesting to note that there is not a single other report from the honorary consul in the archives. One interviewee told me that honorary consuls do not write (political) reports to the Foreign Ministry (Anonymous 5, personal communication, August 13, 2019). However, the sequence number of the existing report indicates that there were at least 35 previous reports. Although it is not entirely clear whether these went directly to Foreign Minister Kreisky, or perhaps first to the embassy in Jakarta, which is probably more likely.

[211] *Vereitelter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 7 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 35-A/65.

taken place on October 6), there had been isolated actions by Islamist student organizations against communist associations, which included tearing down their advertising posters and chants demanding the dissolution of the Communist Party. However, according to him, these were relatively tame and did not repeat the next day.[212]

On October 8, 1965, the Austrian Ambassador Hohenbühel also wrote two reports concerning G30S.[213] In the first, a relatively brief report, he reported to Foreign Minister Kreisky that "all members of the Austrian colony in Djakarta and in Bandung have not been affected by the recent events and are well" (Translated by S.G.).[214] In the second report, entitled *Mißglückter Putsch in Indonesien* (Failed Coup in Indonesia)[215], he explained the events and the situation in Indonesia at that time. A qualm of faintness by President Sukarno during a speech delivered on September 30 had been the cue for the movement to break loose for G30S action, according to Hohenbühel. Among those involved, he saw Lieutenant Colonel Untung at the front of the group of subversives. However, he also saw the coup itself as inspired by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI).

Hohenbühel saw evidence of PKI's involvement by two points: on the one hand, by the fact that the (communist) *Antara* newspaper had already included long hagiographies about the rebel leader Untung in its morning edition after the night of September 30; and on the other hand, by the fact that the PK leader Aidit had suddenly gone into hiding. In addition to Untung and the PKI, however, Hohenbühel also saw the Air Force's involvement as given, contrary to any protestations by President Sukarno. Moreover, he implicitly suggested Sukarno's connivance, writing for instance, that "many colleagues in the CD [diplomatic corps], including the Italian ambassador[216], who had already been in place for six years and

[212] However, it is questionable to what extent this reported 'peacefulness' of Förster-Romswinckel had really been true. Because on the one hand it was the Siliwangi Division that was stationed in Bandung and marched from there in the direction of Jakarta to put the September 30th Movement out of action. On the other hand, it was reported in an interview to me that there had been violent clashes in Bandung, although it was not quite clear whether this had taken place before October 7, 1965, or afterwards (Anonymous 5, personal communication, August 13, 2019).

[213] *Indonesische Ereignisse der letzten Tage; österreichische Kolonie in Djakarta*, October 8, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-MH/65 Zl. 1524-A/65 and *Mißglückter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 8, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 39-POL/65.

[214] "*Die Botschaft beehrt sich zu berichten, daß sämtliche Mitglieder der österreichischen Kolonie in Djakarta und in Bandung durch die kürzlichen Ereignisse nicht in Mitleidenschaft gezogen wurden und wohlauf sind.*" (*Indonesische Ereignisse der letzten Tage; österreichische Kolonie in Djakarta*, October 8, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-MH/65 Zl. 1524-A/65)

[215] *Mißglückter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 8, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 39-POL/65.

[216] At that time, the Italian ambassador was Fulconni. In several reports, the Austrian ambassador repeatedly mentions that Fulconni and his wife had very good relations with Sukarno and Sukarno's fourth wife Ibu Dewi.

was always very well informed, think that it is almost impossible that Sukarno did not know about the whole thing" (Translated by S.G.).[217]

Unlike in Bandung, where according to Förster-Romswinckel, not a single shot was fired, Jakarta's situation was different. Here, Hohenbühel reported that there had been shootings near his ambassador's residence in Jakarta.[218] However, according to Hohenbühel, they were quickly brought under control by the military, after which fierce fighting only continued in Central Java, especially in the region around Madiun (where the Air Force's large military airfield was located) and in Yogyakarta, between subversive parts of the division and loyal government troops.[219] What is striking about Hohenbühel's report is that he probably took some of his remarks uncritically from press reports of the time.[220] For instance, he introduced his report by saying that the press had already described the 'actual events'. Furthermore, at another place in his report, he also described the false rumor that was spread by the Army and the media that the "attacked [generals] were mutilated beyond recognition and chopped into small pieces" (Translated by S.G.).[221]

In addition to Hohenbühel's reports from Jakarta, further reports on G30S from the Austrian embassies in Belgrade, Helsinki, Bonn, Canberra, and Tokyo reached the Foreign Ministry in October 1965.[222] Except for the report from Helsinki, all of these reports were based on an assessment of the events and contexts from their respective countries' perspectives.[223]

In general, these reports show in regard to the perpetrators of G30S that the European countries were quick to hold the Indonesian Communist Party responsible for G30S, or at least suspected them. In contrast, Japan and Australia were far more cautious about making

[217] "*Viele Kollegen aus dem CD, darunter der bereits sechs Jahre am Platz befindliche und immer bestens informierte italienische Botschafter meinen, daß es beinahe ausgeschlossen ist, daß Sukarno von dem Ganzen nichts gewußt habe.*" (*Mißglückter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 8, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 39-POL/65)

[218] Hohenbühel did not provide more detailed information about the shootings. However, as I have learned from a well-informed source, these shootings are actually supposed to have taken place between the Istana palace guard and the military, with the ambassador's residence just in between.

[219] Hohenbühel did not specify who was meant by these subversive parts of the division. However, since he mentioned the airport and believed that the Air Force was involved, he likely meant parts associated with this unit.

[220] *Mißglückter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 8, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 39-POL/65.

[221] "*Wie man erst nachträglich erfuhr wurden die Überfallenen bis zur Unkenntlichkeit verstümmelt und in kleine Stücke zerhackt.*" (*Mißglückter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 8, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 39-POL/65). The rumor was soon to be proved wrong, since the autopsy reports of the medical examiners who had examined the murdered generals on Suharto's instructions had found that the dead showed no traces of torture or mutilation (Tömmel, 2018, p. 230).

[222] *Asiatisches in Belgrader Sicht*, October 7, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol, Belgrad, Zl. 44-POL/65.

[223] The report from Helsinki, however, did not refer to Finland itself, but dealt with the USSR's relationship with Indonesia from the Finnish point of view.

such statements – at least officially. The Austrian ambassador in Belgrade, for instance, reported as early as October 7, 1965, that even the Yugoslavs were unable to see clearly into the "Indonesian turmoil […] despite the very rich reporting of their chargé d'affaires" because they received "various conflicting information from Indonesian officials" (Translated by S.G.) and it was impossible to tell what position the air force had taken in the conflict.[224] However, on the cause, timing and perpetrators of G30S, he noted that,

> the Yugoslavs believe that they know – according to their reports from Beijing – that the Chinese doctors who treated Sukarno do not give the President of Indonesia more than six months to live. This circumstance might have prompted the Chinese-oriented Communist Party, to resort to a coup before Sukarno's death, because the death of Sukarno would have automatically mobilized the enemies of the PKI. (Translated by S.G)[225]

Also, the Austrian ambassadors in Helsinki and Bonn reported very quickly that the PKI were the perpetrators of G30S. On October 9, 1965, for instance, the Austrian ambassador in Helsinki reported that the "Communist Party [PKI], or at least a significant part of it, was actively engaged in trying to overthrow President S u k a r n o and seize power" (Translated by S.G.).[226] In rationalizing the coup attempt, he argued that it was "part of the officially declared tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party that communists everywhere in the world should exploit every opportunity to seize power by force" (Translated by S.G.).[227] On October 11, 1965, the Austrian ambassador from Bonn reported to Foreign Minister Kreisky, after he had gained insight into the German cipher radio transmissions, that G30S had been a "coup staged by the Communists" (Translated by S.G.).[228] He intimated that the coup was supported "by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, chief of Sukarno's palace guard, and smaller

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[224] "*In die indonesischen Wirren scheinen die Jugoslawen, ungeachtet die sehr reiche Berichterstattung ihres Geschäftsträgers, auch nicht klar zu sehen. Sie erklärten, dieser bekäme verschiedentlich diametral entgegengesetzte Unterrichtung durch indonesische Offizielle, so sei zur Stunde, es war zwölf Uhr Mittag heutigen Tages, nicht auszumachen gewesen, welche Stellung die Luftwaffe in dem Konflikt bezogen hatte.*" (*Asiatisches in Belgrader Sicht*, October 7, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol, Belgrad, Zl. 44-POL/65)

[225] "*Die Jugoslawen glauben zu wissen – und dies nach ihren Berichten aus Peking – dass die chinesischen Ärzte, in deren Behandlung sich Sukarno begeben hat, dem indonesischen Staatspräsidenten nicht mehr als noch sechs Monate Lebensdauer zumessen. Dieser Umstand hätte die chinesisch ausgerichtete Kommunistische Partei vielleicht dazu veranlasst, noch vor dem Versterben Sukarnos zum Putsche zu greifen, denn der Tod Sukarnos würde die Gegner der K.P. automatisch mobilisiert haben.*" (*Asiatisches in Belgrader Sicht,* October 7, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol, Belgrad, 44-POL/65)

[226] "*Die Geschehnisse am 30. September haben gezeigt, dass diese kommunistische Partei oder doch zumindest ein bedeutender Teil von ihr, sich aktiv am Versuch beteiligte, Präsident S u k a r n o zu stürzten und die Macht an sich zu reisen.*" (*Das Verhältnis der Sowjetunion zu Indonesien in finnischer Sicht*, October 9, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 85-Pol/65)

[227] "*Es gehört schliesslich zur offiziell erklärten Taktik der indonesischen kommunistischen Partei, dass die Kommunisten überall auf der Welt jede Gelegenheit ausnützen sollten, um mit Gewalt an die Macht zu gelangen.*" (*Das Verhältnis der Sowjetunion zu Indonesien in finnischer Sicht*, October 9, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 85-Pol/65)

[228] "*Der von den Kommunisten inszenierte Putsch wurde in der Nacht vom 30. September auf den 1. Oktober gestartet.*" (*Zur Lage in Indonesien; Verfolg: FS 25059 vom 11. Oktober 1965*, October 11, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428 Zl. 958-Res/65)

military units, such as the Air Force units stationed at Halim Airport near Djakarta and a division in Central Java" (Translated by S.G.).[229] However, the question of Sukarno's involvement remained open for the Austrian ambassador in Bonn because the uprising would have gone over Sukarno's head, which was according to him proven by the following facts: that Sukarno did not appear among the 45 members of the Revolutionary Council; that the insurgents had demanded from their followers an oath of allegiance only to the Revolutionary Council, but not to Sukarno; and that the insurgents had taken Sukarno into 'protective' custody.[230]

In contrast to the reports of the European ambassadors, the reports of the Austrian ambassadors in Tokyo and Canberra did not explicitly mention the involvement of G30S and thus also of PKI. On October 14, 1965, for instance, the Austrian ambassador in Canberra even reported that

> the roles of various personalities, such as the foreign minister and even the Indonesian head of state himself, and the degree of complicity of the communist leaders in the coup, as far as this can be judged from Canberra, [are] by no means clear. (Translated by S.G.)[231]

On October 21, 1965, in another report, he gave a possible reason for that cautious attitude of the Australian government, according to which it had just "not yet gained clarity about the background and the involvement of various actors around the failed coup d'état of September 30" (Translated by S.G.).[232] Also, in his report of October 15, 1965, the Austrian ambassador in Tokyo did not elaborate about the possible participation of the PKI. He only wrote that the revolt under Lieutenant Colonel Untung had failed because "the city commander of Djakarta [...] did not participate, contrary to expectations" and that "the deputy prime minister and

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[229] "*Die Aufständischen konnten mit der Unterstützung durch Oberstleutnant Untung, Chef der Palastwache Sukarnos und sowie kleinere Militäreinheiten, so der auf dem Flughafen Halim bei Djakarta stationierten Luftwaffeneinheiten und einer Division in Mitteljava rechnen.*" (*Zur Lage in Indonesien; Verfolg: FS 25059 vom 11. Oktober 1965*, October 11, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428 Zl. 958-Res/65)

[230] *Zur Lage in Indonesien; Verfolg: FS 25059 vom 11. Oktober 1965*, October 11, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428 Zl. 958-Res/65.

[231] "*Gegen diesen Optimismus, der, wenn auch vorsichtig formuliert, verfrüht erscheint, ist vor allem einzuwenden, daß die Rolle verschiedener Persönlichkeiten, wie des Außenministers und sogar des indonesischen Staatschefs selbst, und der Grad der Mitschuld der kommunistischen Führer an dem Putsch, soweit dies von Canberra aus beurteilt werden kann, keineswegs geklärt sind.*" (*Australien und die politischen Auseinandersetzungen in Indonesien*, October 14, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 43-Pol/65)

[232] "*Ein Grund für diese vorsichtige Einstellung dürfte der Umstand sein, daß die australische Regierung noch nicht Klarheit über die Hintergründe und die Beteiligung verschiedener Akteure an dem mißglückten Staatsstreich vom 30. September gewonnen hat.*" (*Außenminister Hasluck über Indonesien*, October 21, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 44-Pol/65)

foreign minister Soebandrio, who was not in Djakarta during the coup but on the island of Sumatra [...] waited [...] to join the winning party" (Translated by S.G.).[233]

However, from November 1965 onward, further speculation followed about Sukarno's and China's involvement. The Austrian ambassador in Belgrade, for example, reported to Kreisky that the Cambodian ambassador believed that "Sukarno was deeply involved in the failed coup" (Translated by S.G.) and that this fact must have been known to the military, but that they would probably not draw further consequences on their own because Sukarno still had strong popular support.[234] Moreover, after a regional Indonesian meeting in November, to which Indonesian Foreign Minister Suwito Kusumowidagdo had invited Indonesian ambassadors to Bangkok, Indonesian Ambassador to Bangkok Diah confidentially told the Austrian ambassador in Bangkok that the "analysis of the events around September 30 [...] revealed with some certainty that the coup in Indonesia [had] been instigated by the PRC" (Translated by S.G.).[235] However, more exact details in this regard were not mentioned. Diah only proffered as the reason for China's involvement that China had been trying already for centuries to advance into the Southeast Asian region as far as Indonesia.[236]

In 1966, increased mutual accusations of involvement in G30S followed. Hohenbühel, for instance, reported on the trial of the September 30 actors, in which Njono[237] defended himself by saying that he had attended the Politburo meetings only because Aidit had informed him of a planned coup attempt by the military and that he, therefore, had participated out of concern for the Sukarno regime.[238] Furthermore, the Indonesian ambassador in Havana emphasized the involvement of the military. After he was removed as ambassador, he publicly announced that the "power in Indonesia is currently in the hands of 'fascist military'

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[233] "*Der Stadtkommandant von Djakarta habe entgegen den Erwartungen nicht mitgemacht, der stellvertretende Ministerpräsident und Aussenminister Soebandrio, der während des Coups nicht in Djakarta, sondern auf der Insel Sumatra war, habe abgewartet, um sich der Siegerpartei anzuschliessen.*" (*Japanische Ansichten zur Lage in Indonesien*, October 15, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 39-POL/65)

[234] "*Zwänglich kam das Gespräch auf den indonesischen Trubel und hier erklärte Herr Wick mit erstaunlicher Dezidiertheit, daß seiner Meinung nach Sukarno in dem gescheiterten Staatsstreich zutiefst verwickelt sei.*" (*Ein Cambodaner zu Indonesien*, November 12, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 50-POL/65)

[235] "*VR CHINA: Die Analyse der Ereignisse um den 30. September haetten mit einiger Sicherheit ergeben, dass der Staatsstreich in Indonesien von der VR China angezettelt worden ist.*" (*Regionalbesprechung der indonesischen Botschafter in Bangkok*, November 18, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 145746-6/65 Zl. 34-POL/65, confidential)

[236] *Regionalbesprechung der indonesischen Botschafter in Bangkok*, November 18, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 145746-6/65 Zl. 34-POL/65, confidential.

[237] Njono was the First Secretary of the Jakarta City Committee of the PKI. He should not be confused with Njoto.

[238] *Prozeß gegen die Akteure des 30. September*, Februar 16, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 30137-6/66 Zl. 7-POL/66.

and 'Trotskyists' supported by 'backward religious groups and directed by General Nasution working on behalf of the CIA of the USA" (Translated by S.G.).[239]

In contrast, Nasution told Dr. Sukimans[240] in a conversation, subsequently relayed by Sukimans to Hohenbühel, that Sukarno had stood behind G30S. In this conversation, he even went so as far as saying that Sukarno not only had been jointly responsible for G30S but that he even had "planned and organized it [G30S] himself, however leaving the realization to UNTUNG, the Communist Party and parts of the Air Force and the Army" (Translated by S.G.).[241] According to this conversation, Nasution would have had some evidence of it, but it would not have been sufficient to publicly accuse the president at that time.[242]

Finally, however, the Austrian diplomatic cables also contain information about the possible involvement of General Suharto. On November 2, 1966, Hohenbühel reported to Austrian Foreign Minister Tončić-Sorinj that he had learned from a well-informed source that "the Suharto regime [had] chances to consolidate further", but that not all crises had yet been overcome, since "the greatest danger [...] was posed by the Navy and the Air Force in particular" (Translated by S.G.).[243] According to this well-informed source, Suharto, however, would have commented,

> that he would rather let things get to him. A preemptive solution á la September 30 of last year, when the PKI was very cleverly told that *the Army knew of the imminent coup plan* and thus *provoked* the premature, ill-prepared coup, was rejected by Suharto in any case. (Translated by S.G., emphasis added)[244]

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[239] "*Herr Hanafi gab in diesem Zusammenhang in Habana eine öffentliche Erklärung ab, in welcher er feststellte, dass sich die Macht in Indonesien derzeit in den Händen von 'faschistischen Militärs' und 'Trotzkisten' befinde, welche von 'rückständigen religiösen Gruppen unterstützt und von General Nasution, der im Auftrage der CIA der USA arbeite, geleitet' werde.*" (*Indonesischer Botschafter in Habana; Polemik gegen Regierung Soharto*, August 5, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 34597-6/66 Zl. 2074-A/66)

[240] Although Hohenbühel does not elaborate on the person, it is likely to have been Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, who was a member of the Masyumi Party and Indonesian prime minister from 1951 to 1952.

[241] "*Der im Hintergrund agierende Exverteidigungsminister habe SUKIMAN gegenüber geäußert, er sei überzeugt, daß Sukarno für den mißglückten Staatsstreich im vergangenen Herbst nicht nur mitverantwortlich sei, sondern diesen selbst geplant und organisiert, die Realisierung jedoch UNTUNG, der kommunistischen Partei und Teilen der Luftwaffe sowie des Heeres überlassen habe.*" (*Sukarno Beschneidung der Macht?*, Mai 4, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 30425-6/66 Zl. 20-POL/66)

[242] *Sukarno Beschneidung der Macht?*, Mai 4, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 30425-6/66 Zl. 20-POL/66.

[243] "*Wie ich von gut unterrichteter Seite erfuhr, habe das Regime Suharto zwar Chancen, sich weiter zu festigen, hätte aber bei weitem noch nicht alle Krisen überstanden. Die größte Gefahr drohe insbesondere von der Marine und der Luftwaffe.*" (*Regime Suharto kämpft um Stabilisierung*, November 2, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 30137-6/66 Zl. 35-POL/66)

[244] "*Der starke Mann Indonesiens, General Suharto, soll jedoch geäußert haben, daß er die Dinge lieber an sich herankommen ließe. Eine Präventivlösung a la 30. September vorigen Jahres, zu welcher Zeit man der PKI sehr geschickt zuspielte, daß die Armee vom bevorstehenden Umsturzplan wisse, und so den vorzeitigen, schlecht vorbereiteten Putsch provozierte, lehne Suharto jedenfalls ab.*" (*Regime Suharto kämpft um Stabilisierung*, November 2, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 30137-6/66 Zl. 35-POL/66)

If this statement by Suharto is true, this would confirm the assumption that the PKI was provoked into executing the coup and also confirm the thesis that Suharto had known about G30S in advance, as claimed by Wieringa and Katjasungkana (2019) and others (Holtzappel, n.d.; Melvin, 2018a; Wertheim, 1979).

6.4 Summary and Discussion

In this section, the previous findings with the existing theories will be discussed. To clarify at the outset: It is unfortunately not possible to make a clear assessment of the masterminds of G30S based on Austrian reports. The reasons for this are that, on the one hand, as we saw in the previous section, the files are unfortunately very limited; and, on the other hand, interestingly, there are remarks and indications supporting almost all five theories surrounding G30S, which makes a clear assessment of events and decisions surround G30S all the more difficult. Nevertheless, based on the available files, some trends and important points can still be determined.

Firstly, available files make it quite clear that both the Austrian ambassador in Jakarta and the Austrian ambassadors in other European countries were relatively quick to hold the PKI responsible for G30S. For example, the authorities in Australia – at least officially – by no means put forward such a clear statement, particularly when it came to assessing the possible perpetrators and the involvement of the PKI leaders. Therefore, it is not entirely clear why the Austrian authorities in the European countries were so quick to blame the PKI in Jakarta, but it is probably related to the subsequent campaign against the PKI and the anti-communist position of the Western powers (cf. Tömmel, 2018, p. 225).[245]

Secondly, whether Sukarno was involved in G30S cannot be clarified based on the Austrian files. The existing files contain contradictory information. Some initial statements in the files indicate that G30S acted against Sukarno's will, but later reports seem to indicate that Sukarno was probably involved after all. One interesting aspect of the initial statements is that speculation about Sukarno's involvement began already a few days after G30S, well in advance of the end of October, when the defamation campaign against Sukarno was already underway in an attempt to remove him from office (cf. Robinson, 2018, p. 72). In connection with Sukarno's possible involvement, another essential point should be noted. It shows a relation to the construction of the Bung Karno Tower and brings further questions into this

[245] Western powers had already a negative image of the 'pro-communist' Indonesian head of state (Tömmel, 2018, p. 225). According to Rathkolb (2010, p. 176), the Austrian Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky was also a dyed-in-the-wool anti-Communist, but one who looked for a peaceful erosion of the Communist Bloc system.

subject. As we have seen earlier in the chapter, the groundbreaking ceremony for this tower should have taken place on October 7, 1965. The Austrian architect should have arrived for it already on October 4, 1965. However, the events surrounding G30S made this impossible. Therefore, the question arises, if Sukarno had known about G30S in advance, would he still have planned this event at that time?[246] Therefore, looking at G30S from this perspective, everything indicates that both the Austrian authorities and Sukarno himself were surprised by the timing of G30S.

Concerning the CIA/MI6 theory, it can be stated that it would have been surprising if the existing files had also included intelligence material. Therefore, even if this was not the case, there is at least one report among the files in which the Indonesian ambassador in Havana mentions CIA involvement. Remarkably, however, is that in addition to the CIA, he also speaks of the 'Trotskyists' who were in power together with the 'fascist military'.[247] Indeed, after his deposition, this must have been a very emotional speech. The Austrian ambassador, therefore, entitled the report even as "Polemic against government Soharto [sic!]" (Translated by S.G.)[248], but further research should certainly examine this connection in more detail, as there has not been adequate research done on it so far.

Finally, regarding the joint venture theory, some aspects can be confirmed. First, the Austrian files also suggest that G30S was neither a purely military nor an exclusively PKI endeavor. Rather, after reviewing the files, the conclusion must be drawn that parts of both organizations were involved. Second, it is apparent from the files that PKI may indeed have been provoked into rash action. However, unlike the joint venture theory from Roosa (2006) – which did not show that Suharto and the military had prior knowledge of G30S – the Austrian files support the positions of those researchers who suggest a more substantial involvement of Suharto (cf. Holtzappel, n.d.; Melvin, 2018a; Wertheim, 1970; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019), as Suharto and elements in the Army might have not only provoked the PKI into instigating G30S but also prepared in advance for the counterattack. This would also explain why Suharto and groups within the Army could act quite quickly and violently against the PKI, as the analysis about the mass violence and mass murders in the next chapter will show.

[246] Here my greatest thanks go to Dr. Baskara with whom I discussed this (Baskara, personal communication, July 24, 2019).
[247] *Indonesischer Botschafter in Habana; Polemik gegen Regierung Soharto*, August 5, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 34597-6/66 Zl. 2074-A/66.
[248] *Indonesischer Botschafter in Habana; Polemik gegen Regierung Soharto*, August 5, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 34597-6/66 Zl. 2074-A/66.

7 Analysis III: Mass Violence and Mass Killings

> So, while the cleansing of the little ones goes on day by day behind Sukarno's back – in Bali around 30,000 communists have been killed in the past few weeks, and in East Java, stakes with spiked heads line the streets – one only wants to cut off the big ones when the president is absent, so that he can wash his hands in innocence afterward. (Translated by S.G.)[249]

> "Couldn't the police and the army do anything against this spontaneous people's rage?" we asked an Indonesian diplomat in Krems. "The army?" he asked back. "But they were always there." (Translated by S.G.)[250]

To date, the exact circumstances and explanations for the outbreak of mass violence and mass killings in Indonesia have not yet been clarified. However, five explanatory approaches have emerged in the scientific discourse. Therefore, after presenting some background information, these five approaches are briefly presented and discussed. This is followed by the results of the analysis of the Austrian files, which will first focus on Austrian reporting and perception of mass violence and mass executions in 1965 and 1966, then on some specific points of diplomatic reports such as the number of casualties and the exact timing of reports. Finally, in the last part of this chapter, the insights gained will be discussed with the theoretical explanatory approaches.

7.1 Background of the Mass Violence and Mass Killings

In the weeks and months following the events of G30S, one of the most terrible crimes of the 20th century occurred. Anyone suspected of being a member or sympathizer of the PKI was persecuted, arrested, tortured, or killed. The exact number of casualties is not clear. Estimates range between 500,000 and one million, although some even talk of three million victims (Cribb, 2001b, p. 233; Kammen & McGregor, 2012, p. 10).[251] The *Oxford Handbook of*

[249] "*Während also die Säuberung von den Kleinen tagtäglich hinter dem Rücken Sukarnos fortschreitet – in Bali wurden in den letzten Wochen an die 30.000 Kommunisten getötet und in Ostjava säumen Pflöcke mit den aufgespießten Köpfen die Strassen – will man die Großen nur bei Abwesenheit des Präsidenten absägen, damit er nachträglich seine Hände in Unschuld waschen kann.*" (*Indonesien; Aspekte für 1966*, January 3, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 30425-6/66 Zl. 1-POL/66)

[250] "*'Konnten den Polizei und Armee nichts gegen diese spontane Volkswut tun?' fragten wir in Krems einen indonesischen Diplomaten. 'Die Armee?' fragte er zurück. 'Die war doch immer dabei.*" (*Indonesien: Ein Amoklauf vernichtete die KPI*, Arbeiter-Zeitung, September 15, 1966)

[251] An Indonesian official Fact-Finding Mission in late1965 put the figure at 78,000, but the killings were still underway (Cribb, 1990, p. 12). The publicist Guy J. Pauker, who was closely related to the Suharto regime, puts the number of deaths in February 1967 at 150,000 - 200,000 people (Pauker, 1967, p. 141). One of the leaders of the Army groups – Sarwo Edhie – is alleged to have said on his deathbed, "that during this period some three million people had been killed, and most of them on his orders" (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 44). For a more detailed analysis, see Cribb (2001a, 2001b, 2002). For an overview of different approaches to counting casualties, see also Asvi (2016, pp. 107–108); and for a recent new approach of estimating the total numbers, see the analysis of the demographer Chandra (2017a, 2017b).

Genocide Studies of 2010, as well as most other scholars, have estimated the death toll at around 500,000 victims (Barth, 2006, p. 163; Cribb, 2010, p. 453). However, more recent literature suggests an even higher number (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 1; Robinson, 2018, p. 121; Wieringa et al., 2019a, p. 12; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 44). For instance, Robinson stresses that "the figure of 500,000 dead must be regarded as a conservative estimate" (Robinson, 2018, p. 121). Also, Wieringa and Katjasungkana assume that it was around one million victims, including those who died in prison in later years and those who were murdered in remote places (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 44).

Furthermore, hundreds of thousands more were sent to prisons and labor camps, often for over a decade without trial. In 1969, more than ten thousand prisoners were counted just on the island of Buru (Maluku) (Baskara, 2015, p. 18; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, pp. 47–49; see also Asvi, 2019; Robinson, 2018, Chapter 8; Taufik, 2012; Wieringa et al., 2019b).[252] Moreover, the family members of those arrested or murdered were marginalized, stigmatized, and discriminated against, and among other things they were forbidden positions in the civil service (Baskara, 2015, p. 18; Cribb, 2010). Further, many of those who happened to be outside of Indonesia at the time had their Indonesian citizenship revoked because they were alleged to be communists (Saptari, 2019).

Victims and Perpetrators

According to Robinson (2018, p. 121; see also Cribb, 2001b, p. 235, 2002, p. 557), a widespread misconception is that ethnic or racial hostility is what drove the killings and that many victims were ethnic Chinese.[253] However, most victims were in fact killed because of their political beliefs, activities, and associations rather than their ethnicity (Jarvis & Wieringa, 2019, p. 218; Robinson, 2018, p. 121).[254] Consequently, the victims were mainly leaders of the PKI, and members of its affiliated organizations (Robinson, 2018, p. 121).[255]

[252] In 1970, Suharto said in an interview with *Der Spiegel* that Indonesia has 58,000 political prisoners. Of these, around 5,000 prisoners were actually involved in the coup ("WIR HABEN 58 000 POLITISCHE GEFANGENE," 1970). According to Wieringa and Katjasungkana, referring to Fealy's (1995) estimation, between 1-1.5 million people were detained at any one time between 1965 and 1979 (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 132).
[253] For a discussion of this misconception see Cribb and Coppel (2009).
[254] Although, in some regions, ethnic motives did play a role, for instance, in Medan, Makassar, and Lombok (Jarvis & Wieringa, 2019, p. 218).
[255] In particular, *Pemuda Rakyat* (People's Youth), *Gerwani (*Indonesian Womens' Movement*)*, the BTI (Indonesian Farmers' Union), the Unified Movement of Indonesian University Students, LEKRA (Institute of People's Culture), the Indonesian Association of University Graduates, and the League of Indonesian Youth and High School Students (Robinson, 2018, pp. 121–122).

Furthermore, women were not spared from violence, especially if they were actual or alleged members of the women's organization *Gerwani* or any other PKI-affiliated organization (Robinson, 2018, p. 132). Several were subjected to rape and mutilation, before ultimately being murdered (Robinson, 2018, p. 132). Also, other forms of sexual violence such as forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and sexual slavery were imposed on them (Robinson, 2018, pp. 130–131; Pohlman, 2017, 2019; Wandita et al., 2019, p. 63; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, pp. 49–50).

Like the victims, ethnicity or religion did not primarily define the perpetrators of these killings, but rather their political and institutional affiliation and ideological position (Jarvis & Wieringa, 2019, p. 218; Robinson, 2018, p. 132). Thus, according to Robinson, the striking thing about the Indonesian mass killings compared to so many other cases of mass killings is "that the perpetrators and their victims were almost always of the same ethnic and religious group, [… and] they were often from the same village, the same neighborhood, and sometimes even the same family" (Robinson, 2018, p. 132).[256]

The arrests and killings were committed by the Indonesian Army, aided by civilians mainly from the ranks of religious, student, and nationalist organizations with anti-communist leanings (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 15; Robinson, 2018, pp. 132–134; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019; Wieringa et al., 2019b). Only a few days after General Suharto had effectively seized command of the Army on October 1, he set up a new strategic organization, the 'Command for the Restoration of Security and Order' (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*, Kopkamtib). This new command effectively allowed Suharto and his inner circle to extend his power over the entire military command structure, and with time, over the body politic too (Crouch, 1978; McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 14; Melvin, 2018a, 2018b, 2019). Moreover, Suharto assigned a special unit, the Army Paracommando Regiment (*Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat*, RPKAD), a task to organize the killings in Java and Bali (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 14). The RPKAD began their task right away when they were sent to the provinces of Central and East Java under the command of Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo in October 1965. Often, they recruited and trained civilian militias first, before they worked closely with them to capture and execute alleged PKI members (Cribb, 2001b, p. 233; Jenkins & Kammen, 2012; McGregor et al.,

[256] "Thus, Javanese Muslims killed Javanese Muslims, Balinese Hindus killed Balinese Hindus, Protestant Bataks killed Protestant Bataks, Florense Catholics killed Florenese Catholics." (Robinson, 2018, p. 132).

2018a, p. 14).[257] Military youth groups with religious or anti-communist links were among the more zealous of the vigilante groups (Robinson, 2018, p. 133). For instance, NU's (*Nahdlatul Ulama*) *Ansor* and *Banser*, PNI's *Pemuda Demokrat* and *Pemuda Marhaen*, IPKI's *Pemuda Pancasila* (Pancasila Youth), and *Partai Katolik's Pemuda Katolik* (Catholic Youth) (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 15; Robinson, 2018, pp. 133–134, 157,159). Although sometimes these groups acted independently, they mostly acted at the order of the Army when it came to the use of lethal force (Robinson, 2018, p. 134).

The Acts of Killing

The killing was largely done with stabbing and striking weapons such as knives, sickles machetes, swords, and other everyday tools; only a few were killed with automatic weapons or other firearms (Cribb, 2001b, p. 233; Robinson, 2018, p. 123). According to McGregor et al. (2018a, p. 14), the types of killings that took place fall generally into two main categories. Firstly, there were *public* killings, which were recorded by the military and often carried out by civilians acting under military command (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 14). Secondly, there were *systematic mass* killings, which comprised the majority of killings and were carried out at military-controlled killing sites, which were typically at a secretive and isolated location, resulting in a limited number of witnesses (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 14).

In many cases, the killings were preceded by arrest, in which victims had to report to the local military commands (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 14). In detention, they were often subjected to torture and abuse, followed either by transportation and execution in a remote location, or by imprisonment for months or even years (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 14). However, sometimes this process took place very quickly, with suspects being rounded up at night, tied up and blindfolded, and then being transported in trucks to the killing sites, where they were executed en masse (Jenkins & Kammen, 2012; McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 14; Robinson, 2018, pp. 123–124).

The patterns of how the mass arrests and killings were conducted varied both temporally and spatially across the islands (McGregor et al., 2018a, pp. 13–14; Robinson, 2018, pp. 134–135). While the killings were mostly concentrated in the densely populated provinces such as Central Java, East Java, and Bali, as well as Aceh, North Sumatra, and parts of East Nusa Tenggara, other parts of Indonesia, such as the capital Jakarta and the province of West Java,

[257] For an insight into training, see the account from Yoso Dumeri Faizin in the special Tempo magazine *Sarwo Edhie* (Tempo, 2016, pp. 20–21). Some of the groups had been already trained since the 1950s (see Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, pp. 124–125).

experienced a significantly lower density of killings (Robinson, 2018, p. 134). According to Robinson (2018, p. 134), there was also variation in the timing of the events. The earliest killings, such as in Aceh, began within days of the alleged coup d' état. In other places, they were postponed for several weeks or even months (Robinson, 2018, p. 134). The majority of the killings took place between October 1965 and March 1966. However, in some areas they continued until 1968 (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 13; Robinson, 2018, p. 134). Based on these geographical and temporal variations, Robinson suggests that the violence "was not rooted in purely local conflicts or personal animosities" and was not a spontaneous reaction by the people but instead must have been depended "on some external stimulus" (Robinson, 2018, p. 135).

7.2 Explanatory Approaches for Mass Violence and Mass Killings in Indonesia

Reasons for the mass violence and mass killings have been sought by scholars, government officials, and journalists in various ways over the past decades. In general, five paradigmatic explanatory approaches have emerged:[258] Firstly, that they occurred as a consequence of a specific 'culture of violence'; secondly, that they resulted from personal and psychological motives; thirdly, that they were due to religious and ethnic tensions; fourthly that they were a manifestation of socio-economic and political conflicts; and finally, that they took place under the guidance of the Indonesian military.

The first-mentioned, and for a long time, most popular explanatory approach suggests that the killings should best be understood in terms of certain essential characteristics of *the* Indonesian culture (Robinson, 2018, p. 138). A particularly persistent variant of this assertion advocates that the killings were one instance of the specifically inherent Indonesian 'amok culture' (Robinson, 2018, p. 138). According to this, the killings of 1965-66 were simply an amok on a grand scale.[259] This assertion was accompanied by the claim that the killings were a 'spontaneous reaction' to the destructive and dangerous behavior of the PKI and its members. This explanatory approach is also the approach advocated by the Indonesian authorities (Robinson, 2018, pp. 138–140; Cribb, 2002, pp. 556–557). However, according to Robinson, the following problems arise with it. Firstly, this approach is obviously a cultural reductionism, suggesting that all Indonesian people are like that; yet, it cannot explain even

[258] Some of the latest outlines of the explanations are done by Robinson (2018, pp. 135–147), and Tömmel (2018, pp. 243–247); see also Roosa (2016). The following pages are based on these. The following explanations have to be understood in an ideal-typical way and they are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they are also supplemented and used in combination by some authors.

[259] For instance, Suharto said on rare occasions when he mentioned the killings, that the civilians were running amok (Roosa, 2008, p. 140).

the most basic factors of violence, such as why the killings took place, or when and where they took place (Robinson, 2018, p. 138). Secondly, this approach can by no means explain the systematic quality of this violence, its geographical distribution or its long duration (Robinson, 2018, p. 139).

The second approach, which occurs mainly in popular scientific and literary accounts, focuses on the personal and psychological motives of the perpetrators and the bystanders of the 1965-1966 killings (Robinson, 2018, pp. 136–137). In these accounts, whether autobiographical or fictional, the perpetrators gave the main reasons for their actions as the pressure to adapt and the obligation to obey orders, as well as the fear of the consequences if they had not obeyed (Robinson, 2018, p. 136). On the other hand, there were also other motivations, such as compelling patriotism, in which there is a need to defend the state, or to break out from everyday life and gain power that would otherwise not have been possible.[260] According to Robinson (2018, p. 137), the pressure to conform and other such personal motivations did undoubtedly exist. However, he emphasizes that these were certainly not the determining factor for the outbreak and the general course of the violence. In any case, they were shaped by other social, economic, and political factors at the national and international levels (Robinson, 2018, p. 137).

Other accounts suggest that the killings could be understood best in terms of religious and ethnic tensions (Robinson, 2018, pp. 141–144). According to Robinson (2018, p. 141), such accounts often refer to the fact that there were tensions between those Muslims who regarded themselves as believers (*santri*) and those whom the *santri* communities regarded as less believers (*abangan*) because the latter mixed Islam with a variety of pre-Islamic Javanese beliefs and practices (Robinson, 2018, p. 141). These religious differences often intersected with political and class identities. Conservative religious parties like the NU drew much support from *Santri* communities, which were often led by wealthy landowners (Robinson, 2018, p. 141). In contrast, *abangan* communities tended to be poorer, and many adherents were landless or tenant farmers (Robinson, 2018, p. 141). Because of these overlaps, religious and cultural tensions often spilled over into the political sphere, and political rivalries were portrayed as conflicts over religious identity and practice (Robinson, 2018, p. 142). For instance, it was commonplace for the NU to accuse PKI members of being atheists, while the PKI, for their part, were not averse to accusing the NU and conservative parties of corruption,

[260] The two films by Joshua Oppenheimer *The Act of Killing* (2012) and *The Look of Silence* (2014) are good examples where this becomes very clear.

exploitation, and religious fanaticism (Robinson, 2018, p. 142). According to Robinson (2018, p. 142), these tensions explain, at least in some ways in the case of some parts of Java, why such intense hostility was raised toward the PKI in the weeks and months after the events of October.

Moreover, as we have seen in the previous section, for a long time the claim had been made that the killings had taken place on grounds of ethnicity, particularly against the ethnic group of Chinese Indonesians (Cribb, 2002, pp. 557–559; Robinson, 2018, pp. 141–144). However, both Robinson (2018, p. 144) and Cribb (2002, p. 557) point out that this was not the case. According to them, indeed, religious factors and ethnicity had played a role in some regions. However, the vast majority of the victims were killed not because of their ethnicity, but rather because they were members or leaders of left-wing parties or associations. Robinson (2018, p. 144), therefore, concludes that, while the underlying religious and ethnic tensions point to some acts of violence, they cannot explain why and how these tensions escalated into mass killings, nor can they account for why they took place at a specific time and place.

Some scholars point to the significance of the socioeconomic conflicts behind the violence and killings of G30S, particularly the conflicts over land and working conditions, as well as rivalries between local elites (Cribb, 2002, pp. 553–554; McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 8; Robinson, 2018, pp. 144–146). According to these accounts, the worst killings had taken place where land reform had previously been carried out or planned by the PKI. Besides, the authors of these accounts emphasize the extreme political polarization and economic decline in Indonesia during that time. According to Robinson (2018, p. 146), indeed, socio-economic conflicts seem to correlate with the patterns of mass violence of 1965-1966, with the worst violence in Central Java, East Java, and Bali (where conflicts over land were most intense), and in the plantation belt of North Sumatra (where tensions between labor and capital reached their critical peak in 1965). However, Robinson (2018, p. 146) also stresses the caveat that this approach cannot shed light on why these widespread acts of violence did not occur before October 1965, nor can it explain why there were such differences in the widespread outbreaks of violence.

Lastly, the role of the Indonesian military is increasingly being discussed in the more recent literature on mass killings (McGregor et al., 2018b; Melvin, 2018a; Robinson, 2018; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019; Wieringa et al., 2019b). Although there is a consensus today that the Army played a central role (cf. Cribb, 2010; Gerlach, 2010; Robinson, 2018;

Wieringa et al., 2019b), the question of the exact scope of military involvement remains controversial. This is because the proposition that the massacres were exclusively done at the behest of the Army has so far not provided an exhaustive explanation for the extent of the violence, or for the obviously willing participation of many non-soldiers (Tömmel, 2018, p. 244; cf. Cribb, 2010; Gerlach, 2010). Therefore, the historian Gerlach, for instance, agrees that "without the Indonesian armed forces, the killings of 1965-66 could not have happened on anything like the same scale" (Gerlach, 2010, p. 22). However, he also questions how the military was able "to *comprehensively plan* and *control* the violence that fully ensued within three weeks of the coup" (Gerlach, 2010, p. 31, emphasis added), considering the fact that the Indonesian Army, despite its indispensable role, had many substantial limitations at that time, such as internal division and limited manpower. Moreover, he also stresses that their knowledge about the situation was limited. Therefore, in regard to G30S, he concluded that it might be true that the Army had possessed some information about G30S in general and most likely prepared itself for it, but certainly "not in any systematic way" (Gerlach, 2010, p. 30).

In contrast, the studies written by Melvin (2018a, 2018b, 2019), and Robinson (2018) paint a different picture. Melvin, in her study on Aceh (2018b), proved that the military indeed intended to annihilate the PKI in a centralized and organized extermination campaign.[261] Based on 3,000 classified military documents, she was able to create a chronology of events in Aceh, as well as the responsible chain of command. Based on her study, the massacres took place in four phases: "an initiation phase, a phase of public violence, a phase of systematic mass killings and a consolidation phase" (Melvin, 2018a, p. 290).[262] Moreover, Melvin (2018a, pp. 112–113) was able to show that Suharto had already reported a 'coup movement' to the military commander of North Sumatra, even before the first 'Decree 1' had been announced (see section 6.1) – which is, according to Wieringa and Katjasungkana, usually "seen as the first indication of what Suharto and his allies later called a 'coup' or a 'coup attempt'" (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, p. 41). The existence of this earlier order supports her notion "that the military acted in a coordinated manner from the morning of 1 October and that the military under Suharto acted in a pre-emptive manner to claim that the

[261] The military described the killings as an "'Annihilation Operation' (*Operasi Penumpasan*), which it launched with the stated intention to 'annihilate down to the roots' (*menumpas sampai ke akarakarnja*) its major political rival, the Indonesian Communist Party" (Melvin, 2018a, p. 1).

[262] According to Wieringa and Katjasungkana (2019, p. 41), a similar sequence can also be found in East Java, although within a different time frame – where the preparation phase took longer. Moreover, they suggest that a fifth stage should be added: shaming, terrifying and humiliating whole families. Because even after the PKI was destroyed, the surviving family members were (systematically) deprived of their property rights and stigmatized for life (Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019, pp. 41–42).

30 September Movement was a coup attempt" (Melvin, 2018a, p. 112). Therefore, Melvin suggests that the massacres were anything but 'spontaneous'. Instead, she concludes that the centralized order and nation-wide extermination campaign took place under the order of Suharto. He was the one who "controlled its attack against the PKI through three major command structures: the KOTI Command (Sumatra), the Kopkamtib (Kalimantan and Eastern Indonesia) and the RPKAD (Java and Bali)" (Melvin, 2018a, p. 300).

Moreover, Robinson (2018) also points to the Army's crucial role in the Indonesian mass killings. According to him, the crucial role of the Army can be demonstrated based on four points (Robinson, 2018, pp. 148–176). Firstly, the Army encouraged and carried out the mass killings by mobilizing the population, particularly civilian youth groups and death squads, and encouraged them to identify, detain, and kill members of the PKI and their allies (Robinson, 2018, pp. 149, 157–163). Secondly, the Army provoked and legitimized the mass killings by launching a sophisticated media and propaganda campaign that blamed the PKI for the kidnapping and murder of the generals, and called for the party and its affiliates to be physically annihilated (Robinson, 2018, pp. 149, 163–171). Thirdly, and in relation to this polarization and propaganda campaign, the Army engaged with religious and political leaders who repeated these statements. This lent considerable authority to the campaign of violence (Robinson, 2018, pp. 149, 171–176). Fourthly and most importantly, the pattern of mass killings in different regions depended closely on the varied political disposition and capacity of Army commanders in a given locale (Robinson, 2018, pp. 149–157). The most crucial factor in this regard was the Army's logistical and organizational leadership. They provided the weapons used in the killings, the trucks for the transport of soldiers, vigilante killers, and victims; and also accounts of lists naming people to be arrested or killed (Cribb, 2001b, p. 233; Robinson, 2018, pp. 152–157; Simpson, 2013, p. 19). Therefore, he concluded that

> without the army's orchestrated campaign to cast the PKI as evil, without the conscious decision to effect its physical annihilation, and without the mobilization of the army's considerable organizational and logistical capacity to carry out that decision, it is unlikely that any of those long-standing tensions or external influences would ever have given rise to violence of such staggering breadth and brutality. (Robinson, 2018, p. 176)

Thus, based on this background, the analysis in the next section will examine the extent to which Austrian officials knew about the mass violence and mass killings taking place in Indonesia. Moreover, it will be instructive to assess when and what exactly they reported of the atrocities, how many victims they reported, and what exactly they wrote about the victims and perpetrators.

7.3 Austrian Perception of the Mass Violence and Mass Killings

The first Austrian reports of mass violence and mass killings were transmitted in the first two weeks after the G30S incident. They were initially characterized by the mass demonstrations and the increasing violence against the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Thus, the Austrian honorary consul in Bandung, Förster-Romswinckel, reported to Foreign Minister Kreisky as early as October 7, 1965, that in Bandung one day earlier there had been isolated actions by Islamist student organizations against Communist associations, during which they also demanded the dissolution of the Communist Party.[263] One day later, Hohenbühel, the Austrian ambassador in Jakarta, reported that mass demonstrations had taken place in Jakarta, whereby the protestors demanded the PKI's dissolution and the hanging of their leader.[264] Although neither wrote who precisely called for these demonstrations, it is likely to have been the Indonesian Army. On October 11, 1965, the Austrian ambassador, who was stationed in Bonn and had partial access to West German radio communications, reported to Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky that the Army had already "on October 2 [...] ultimately urged" Sukarno to "speak to the people", but that the Army had been "gravely disappointed" (Translated by S.G.) when Sukarno had not condemned G30S.[265] When Sukarno then considered the whole matter to be settled at a cabinet meeting on October 6 and wanted to move on to the agenda, the Army then "seized the initiative and called for anti-communist demonstrations" (Translated by S.G.), whereby, according to the Austrian ambassador, they found support particularly among Muslims and Christian groups.[266]

However, the Army did not only call for demonstrations, as further reports from Jakarta show. On October 8, 1965, Hohenbühel reported to Kreisky that in Jakarta during the day "everything seems to take its ordinary course", but that he had heard from various eyewitnesses that "the urban area of Jakarta is searched kampung[267] by kampung

[263] *Vereitelter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 7, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 35-A/65.
[264] *Mißglückter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 8, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 39-POL/65.
[265] "*Am 2. Oktober hat die Armee Sukarno ultimativ aufgefordert, zum Volk zu sprechen. Sie war aber schwer enttäuscht, da er den Aufstand nicht verurteilt hat.*" (*Zur Lage in Indonesien; Verfolg: FS 25059 vom 11. Oktober 1965*, October 11, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428 Zl. 958-Res/65)
[266] "*Als Sukarno auch bei der Kabinettssitzung am 6. Oktober die ganze Angelegenheit als erledigt betrachtet und zur Tagesordnung übergehen wollte, hat die Armee, die den Aufstand unter anderem zur Rettung der Stellung Sukarnos niedergeschlagen hatte, die Initiative an sich gerissen und zu anti-kommunistischen Demonstrationen aufgerufen. Dabei hatte sie vor allem bei den Moslems und auch bei den christlichen Gruppen im Land Widerhall gefunden.*" (*Zur Lage in Indonesien; Verfolg: FS 25059 vom 11. Oktober 1965*, October 11, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428 Zl. 958-Res/65)
[267] *Kampung* generally refers to a (traditional) village. For further information, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kampung_(village) [accessed July 14, 2021].

[*kampungweise*] for weapons, and those still in possession of them are beaten up extensively by the military" and that "the cries for help from these people" were "the only thing heard during the 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew" (Translated by S.G.).[268] Interestingly, in this report, he already anticipated the subsequent increasing violence and mass killings. Thus, in the same report, he wrote that "the real clash is yet to come, especially when the military, which has been reluctant until now, […] takes action against the Communists with undiminished ferocity" (Translated by S.G.).[269]

A few days later, a similar assessment of the situation was sent by the Austrian ambassador in Canberra to the Austrian Foreign Ministry. On October 14, 1965, he wrote to Kreisky that the Army had now "seized the initiative against the communists" and that, given the numerical size of the PKI and the fact that it was an organization that formed an essential part of the Indonesian revolution, it was unlikely that the communist danger in Indonesia was resolved by a "mere surgical intervention to remove top PKI officials by arresting and eviction" (Translated by S.G.)[270].

Both ambassadors were accurate in their assessment, as the first wave of mass killings was already underway at that point. On October 15, Hohenbühel wrote to Kreisky from Jakarta that "the military involved in the suppression of the revolt […] could not get hold of the communist ringleaders, but they would cut off all the roots of the PKI to the people" – and this cutting off happened in the "truest sense of the word", because

> night after night, the communist neighborhoods of Djakarta are raided and searched for weapons. Since the deadline for their delivery has already expired, numerous executions are taking place. Well over *3,000 communists*, as I learned from a very well-informed source, are said to have been executed in the last few days, or rather nights. Unfortunately, this would not happen without torture either: stretching and chopping off the legs. All this does not take place in Djakarta, but in *Tangerang*, a city 30km west of here, where many Chinese and Dutch were

[268] "*Während bei Tag alles seinen normalen Lauf zu nehmen scheint, wird in der Nacht, wie ich von verschiedenen Augenzeugen hörte, kampungweise das Stadtgebiet von Djakarta nach Waffen abgesucht und die noch im Besitze solcher befindlichen Personen vom Militär ausgiebig verprügelt. Die Hilferufe dieser Leute sind das einzige, was man während der Ausgangssperre von 18 Uhr bis 6 Uhr früh hört.*" (*Mißglückter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 8, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 39-POL/65)

[269] "*Allgemein ist man der Meinung, daß der eigentliche Clash erst noch kommt, vor allem dann, wenn sich das bis jetzt noch etwas zögernd verhaltende Militär, das sich jedoch besonders seit Bekanntwerden der meuchlerischen Hinmetzelung seiner Generale immer zusehender empört, nicht mehr von Sukarno beschwichtigen läßt, und mit ungeminderter Schärfe gegen die Kommunisten vorgeht.*" (*Mißglückter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 8, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 39-POL/65)

[270] "*Es ist auch fraglich, ob die Armee, die heute die Initiative gegen die Kommunisten an sich gerissen hat, ein politisches Konzept besitzt, mit den Kommunisten fertig zu werden. Ihre zahlenmäßige Größe, ihr Einfluß und der Umstand, daß es sich um eine Organisation handelt, die einen wesentlichen Bestandteil der indonesischen Revolution bildet, lassen es als unwahrscheinlich erscheinen, daß durch den bloßen chirurgischen Eingriff der Entfernung von Spitzenfunktionären der PKI durch Verhaftung und Vertreibung die kommunistische Gefahr in Indonesien erledigt ist.*" (*Australien und die politischen Auseinandersetzungen in Indonesien*, October 14, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 43-Pol/65)

> slaughtered at that time. Since the raids and removals always take place exclusively at night, the Indonesian capital presents a quiet and peaceful picture during the day, apart from the strategically positioned tanks and armored reconnaissance vehicles. (Translated by S.G., emphasis added)[271]

Moreover, a week later, the Austrian ambassador again reported about acts of violence in Jakarta.[272] This time, however, the violence was directed against the PKI but also against the Chinese embassy and Chinese students. Hohenbühel reported to Kreisky that members of the Army had used force to gain access to the hermetically sealed Chinese embassy to search for documents related to the September 30 coup, whereby they also treated the commercial attaché rudely and damaged the office building and office furniture. Moreover, at the same time, the Chinese University had also become the target of "enraged Indonesians", whereby, according to Hohenbühel, "the latent anger and jealousy against the socially better-off Chinese minority (2 ½ million) [may have been] a further incentive" (Translated by S.G.).[273] Typical of this action, according to Hohenbühel, was that the police did not intervene against the rioting mob but against the Chinese students. Aside from this, he reported that the people's outburst of anger on the same day had also been directed against the Communists. Thus, all the houses of the Communist leaders in Jakarta and all party buildings had been burned down and demolished. Moreover, he reported that the military commander of Greater

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[271] "*Nacht für Nacht werden die Kommunistenviertel von Djakarta zerniert und nach Waffen durchsucht. Da die Frist für deren Ablieferung bereits abgelaufen ist, kommt es zu zahlreichen Exekutionen. Weit über 3000 Kommunisten sollten bereits, wie auch aus sehr gut informierter Quelle erfuhr, in den letzten Tagen, besser gesagt Nächten, hingerichtet worden sein. Bedauerlicherweise ginge es auch hier nicht ohne Folterungen ab: Dehnen und Abhacken der Beine. Dies alles findet aber nicht in Djakarta, sondern in Tangerang, einer Stadt 30km westlich von hier, statt, wo seinerzeit schon viele Chinesen und Holländer hingemetztelt wurden. Da die Razzien und Abtransporte immer nur bei Nacht erfolgen bietet die indonesische Hauptstadt tagsüber ein ruhiges und friedliches Bild, wenn man von den strategisch postierten Panzern und Panzerspähwagen absieht. Nach außenhin merkt man überhaupt sehr wenig von allem. Auch der anti-westliche Ton, in dem nunmehr unter Militärverwaltung stehenden kommunistischen Erzblatt ANTARA hat sich nicht geändert. Die Armee ist schon wegen des bestehenden Vorurteiles der Reaktion tunlichst bestrebt, bis auf das unumgänglich Notwendige jedes Aufsehen zu vermeiden und die Bevölkerung nicht aus der eingetrichterten Leider aufzurütteln. […] Die mit Die mit der Niederschlagung der Revolte befaßten Militäre haben erklärt, daß sie zwar nicht der kommunistischen Rädelsführer habhaft werden könnten, sie aber dafür alle Wurzeln der KPI zum Volk abkappen würden. Dieses Abkappen geschieht scheinbar im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes durch die bereits eingangs erwähnte Hinrichtung aller unteren kommunistischen Mittelmänner.*" (*Langsame Konsolidierung der Verhältnisse in Indonesien*, October 15, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 133428-6/65 Zl. 40-POL/65)

[272] *Der Boumerang,* October 22, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 41-POL/65.

[273] "*Armeenagehörige drangen am vergangenen Samstag mit Gewalt in die hermetisch abgeschlossene Botschaft ein und wühlten, offenbar nach Dokumenten über den Putsch vom 30. September suchend, in sämtlichen Akten herum, wobei der Handelsattaché selbst nicht gerade sanft angefaßt und das Amtsgebäude sowie Büromobiliar beschädigt wurden. Mehr oder weniger zur selben Zeit war die hiesige chinesische Universität das Angriffsziel der aufgebrachten Indonesier, wobei die latente Wut und Eifersucht gegen die sozial viel besser gestellte chinesische Minderheit (2 /1/2 Millionen) ein weiterer Ansporn waren. Typisch ist, daß die Polizei nicht gegen den randalierenden Mob, sondern gegen die chinesischen Studenten einschritt.*" (*Der Boumerang,* October 22, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 41-POL/65)

Jakarta Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah[274] had banned the PKI and eight of its affiliated organizations, including *Pemuda Rakjat* (youth organization) and *Gerwani* (women's organization), disregarding the Indonesian constitution.[275]

Then, for several weeks, there were no more official political reports on mass violence and mass executions. It was not until December 1965 that two further reports followed, which again revealed the extent of the enormous violence. On December 10, 1965, Hohenbühel reported to Kreisky that he had learned from his new consul aspirant in Surabaya that they were proceeding "very thoroughly in cleansing East Java of Communists" (Translated by S.G.).[276] Within the same report, Hohenbühel gave a more detailed account of the course of events and the background of the killings:

> Since there is neither enough space nor enough rice in the prisons, the suspects are simply handed over to the *lynch law of the respective villages*, who do a good job. That way, they would run less risk of people going underground. Otherwise, the whole thing would remain nothing more than an academic ban. No fewer than *17,000 people* have already died in the course of these 'purges'. Even the fish in the rivers are poisoned as a result of the large number of corpses since mass graves created by the communists themselves at the time are no longer sufficient to accommodate the dead. This slaughter, which continues unabated, takes place behind the back of Sukarno, to whom only the official results are reported. (Translated by S.G., emphasis added)[277]

A week later, the final report of 1965 was issued. From this dispatch, the scale of violence became evident. On October 16, Hohenbühel reported to Kreisky that the purges continued "in all parts of the archipelago, with mass executions and personal revenge still occurring in

[274] Wirahadikusumah was subsequently promoted by Suharto and became Indonesia's fourth vice president from 1983-1988. To what extent he was responsible for the atrocities committed as military commander in Tangerang at that time has not been researched to date.

[275] According to Hohenbühel, only President Sukarno was allowed to ban a party (see *Der Boumerang*, October 22, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 41-POL/65).

[276] "*Wie ich von meinem neuen Konsularaspiranten in Surabaya, einem versierten indonesischen Großkaufmann armenischer Herkunft, der über sehr gute Informationen verfügt, erfuhr, geht man bei der Säuberung Ost-Javas von den Kommunisten sehr gründlich vor.*" (*Die politische Säuberung bei näherer Hinsicht*, December 10, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/66 Zl. 48-POL/65)

[277] "*Da in den Gefängnissen weder genügend Platz noch genug Reis vorhanden ist, werden die suspekten Personen einfach der Lynchjustiz der jeweiligen Dorfbevölkerung übergeben, die ganze Arbeit leistet. Man würde auf diese Weise auch weniger Gefahr laufen, daß die Leute in den Untergrund gehen. Andernfalls bliebe das Ganze doch nur bei einem akademischen Verbot. Nicht weniger als 17.000 Personen sind im Zuge dieser 'Säuberungen' bereits ums Leben gekommen. Sogar die Fische in den Flüssen sind infolge der vielen Leichen vergiftet, da die von den Kommunisten selbst seinerzeit angelegten Massengräber zur Aufnahme der Toten nicht mehr ausreichen. Dieses Gemetzel, das noch unentwegt weitergeht, erfolgt hinter dem Rücken Sukarnos, dem nur die offiziellen Ergebnisse gemeldet werden. Bei drei Millionen kommunistischer Parteimitglieder denkt man lieber nicht weiter darüber nach.*" (*Die politische Säuberung bei näherer Hinsicht*, December 10, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/66 Zl. 48-POL/65)

Central and East Java" (Translated by S.G.).[278] However, there were no further detailed remarks as in the previous reports.

Not until January 3, 1966, did Hohenbühel send his next report to Kreisky, in which he informed him about the mass killings. Thus, Hohenbühel reported from Jakarta that while

> the cleansing of the little ones goes on day by day behind Sukarno's back – in *Bali* around *30,000 communists* have been killed in the past few weeks, and in *East Java*, stakes with spiked heads line the streets – one only wants to cut off the big ones when the president is absent so that he can wash his hands in innocence afterward. (Translated by S.G., emphasis added)[279]

Although the dispatch does not provide more specific details about how the crimes occurred, this report is of the utmost importance for two reasons. First, it contrasts with Hohenbühel's earlier assessment of Bali's political situation a few months earlier. In mid-November 1965, despite the general travel ban at that time, Hohenbühel still traveled to the island of Bali utilizing a personal decree from President Sukarno. Interestingly, his subsequent report from this trip does not mention any demonstrations or shootings between PKI supporters and the military.[280] More than that, he even emphasized a complete harmony between the representatives of the Army and the PKI. And this harmony he attributed to the following two reasons: first, the Balinese did not have a strong affinity towards the Javanese and particularly the government in Jakarta; second, the Balinese have a different religion than the Javanese, and therefore they would have given preference to their own religion. Thus, on November 18, 1965, his final assessment at the time was that "armed conflicts between the right and the left in Bali therefore seem unlikely […], unless they are de facto outbreaks of tribal feuds" (Translated by S.G.).[281] However, this was a misjudgment, as we have seen previously because only a few weeks later, the mass executions also began in Bali at the beginning of December.[282]

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[278] "*Gleichzeitig gehen die Säuberungsaktionen in allen Teilen des Archipels weiter, wobei es in Mittel- und Ostjava noch zu Massenexekutionen und persönlichen Racheakten kommt.*" (*Störrische Haltung Sukarnos*, December 16, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/66 Zl. 49-POL/65)

[279] "*Während also die Säuberung von den Kleinen tagtäglich hinter dem Rücken Sukarnos fortschreitet – in Bali wurden in den letzten Wochen an die 30.000 Kommunisten getötet und in Ostjava säumen Pflöcke mit den aufgespießten Köpfen die Strassen – will man die Großen nur bei Abwesenheit des Präsidenten absägen, damit er nachträglich seine Hände in Unschuld waschen kann.*" (*Indonesien; Aspekte für 1966*, January 3, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 30425-6/66 Zl. 1-POL/66)

[280] *Indonesienkrise - von Bali aus*, November 18, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 45-POL/65.

[281] "*Bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen zwischen rechts und links erscheinen mir daher, soweit sie nicht de facto Austragungen von Stammesfehden sind, auf Bali unwahrscheinlich.*" (*Indonesienkrise - von Bali aus*, November 18, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 45-POL/65)

[282] In the research literature, it has not been conclusively clarified to what extent the Army units of Bali itself played a crucial role in the killings, or if the perpetrators were instead the troops of Java (cf. Jenkins &

Secondly, this report from January is the last report in the Austrian State Archives in which mass violence and mass executions are mentioned so directly. This is very surprising since the wave of violence and mass executions had by no means ended at that time (cf. McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 13; Robinson, 2018, pp. 134–135). Regarding the few available files, it should also be noted that there is not a single file (!) in the Austrian State Archives that would show the perception and assessment of the atrocities in Indonesia from the Austrian Foreign Ministry's perspective. And this although – as I would like to emphasize once again – there even existed a special unit for Southeast Asia (Indonesia) at that time (see section 3.1). Therefore, although no direct conclusions can be drawn on the position of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, a certain tendency can at least be discerned from Hohenbühel's reporting. And this tendency shows that Hohenbühel commented on the mass violence and mass murders in a rather serene manner, and at some points, even gave the impression of indirect approval. In no way did Hohenbühel condemn the mass violence and mass killings; rather he tried to justify the events in various ways. For instance, in the report of October 8, 1965, in which he reported on the first wave of mass violence, he justified it by writing that "a postponed decision would have even more disastrous consequences for the country than one brought about now" (Translated by S.G).[283] And even when it was clear that there had already been mass executions on a grand scale, with more than 17,000 deaths in East Java, Hohenbühel only remarked:

> With three million Communist Party members, it is better not to think about it further. This may all sound very bloodthirsty and cruel, but even experienced Indonesia experts are of the view that merely banning the party is an entirely ineffective measure and that the military runs the risk of the events of September 30 happening again sooner or later; but then better prepared. (Translated by S.G)[284]

Furthermore, in the last report from which the mass violence and mass murders were clearly evident, that of January 1966, the Austrian ambassador, after reporting on the murders of

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Kammen, 2012). As I learned from a well-informed source, the Army had allegedly already arrested PKI members at that time. However, I could not verify this otherwise.

[283] "*Eines jedoch ist allen mehr oder weniger klar, daß eine hinausgeschobene Entscheidung für das Land noch wesentlich katastrophalere Folgen hätte, als eine jetzt herbeigeführte.*" (*Mißglückter Putsch in Indonesien*, October 8, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 39-POL/65)

[284] "*Bei drei Millionen kommunistischer Parteimitglieder denkt man lieber nicht weiter darüber nach. Dies mag alles sehr blutrünstig und grausam klinken, aber selbst erfahrene Indonesienkenner sind der Ansicht, daß ein bloßes Verbot der Partei eine völlig wirkungslose Maßnahme darstellt und die Militärs Gefahr laufen, daß sich die Ereignisse des 30. September früher oder später wiederholen; dann aber besser vorbereitet.*" (*Die politische Säuberung bei näherer Hinsicht*, December 10, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/66 Zl. 48-POL/65)

30,000 communists in Bali, and writing about a comeback of the US, concluded only with the words: "All in all, quite optimistic aspects for 1966" (Translated by S.G.).[285]

Two other points stand out in the Austrian reporting from Jakarta to the Austrian Foreign Ministry. First, Hohenbühel reported on the mass violence and mass executions quite early, namely within the first two weeks. In contrast, the West German ambassador reported "for the first time about the lethal violence against PKI supporters" (Tömmel, 2018, p. 248, translated by S.G.) only very late, apparently only on October 27, 1965.[286] Second, it is surprising that, based on the available documents, it appears that the Austrian ambassador in Jakarta never reported an overall estimate of the number of dead to the Austrian Foreign Ministry. The numbers that have been mentioned before – 3,000 dead in Jakarta, 17,000 dead in East Java, and 30,000 dead in Bali – are the few that can still be found in the existing files. This is very unexpected, since ambassadors from other countries did make such estimates, some of them quite early (see, e.g., Robinson, 2018, pp. 340, FN. 6; Tömmel, 2018, pp. 248–249).[287]

Nevertheless, it is hardly conceivable that the Austrian authorities did not know about the atrocities' enormous scale, especially in light of the fact that in November 1966 the Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik came to Austria for a convened ambassadorial conference to Vienna and Krems, where he also met with the Austrian Foreign Minister Tončić-Sorinj (ÖVP) and the Austrian Chancellor Klaus (ÖVP) (ÖJB, 1967, pp. 231–232).[288] Although the precise records of the meeting are missing, files in the archive show that, during the ambassadors' conference in Krems, the Austrian Communist Party (*Kommunistische Partei Österreich*, KPÖ) demonstrated against this conference, holding up banners with the inscriptions: "Foreign Minister MALIK – stop the murder" and "400,000 murdered people in

[285] "*Alles in allem recht zuversichtliche Aspekte für 1966.*" (*Indonesien; Aspekte für 1966*, January 3, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/1, Gzl. 30425-6/66 Zl. 1-POL/66). However, even beyond the Austrian authorities, the destruction of the PKI was seen with confident eyes, as files in the archive show. The Austrian ambassador to Yugoslavia, for instance, reported to the Austrian Foreign Minister on April 5, 1966, that the events were being followed closely here and that the "pogroms against the Indonesian communists [were] received here with quite great equanimity […], an equanimity that almost turns into satisfaction when assessing Sukarno's increasing disempowerment" (*Eventuelle aussenpolitische Neuorientierung Indonesiens und Hoffnungen Belgrads*, April 5, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 31355-6/66 Zl. 30-POL/66, translated by S.G.).

[286] It is possible that the West German ambassador knew about it earlier and also reported it, especially due to the fact that the West German authorities could fall back on an existing radio connection in the first days after G30S (see section 6.3). However, most likely some West German files may also be (no longer) accessible.

[287] The West German ambassador, for example, wrote a detailed report to the Foreign Ministry as early as December 14, 1965, from which it emerged that the total number of dead was well over 120,000 (Tömmel, 2018, pp. 248–250).

[288] The Conference of Indonesian Ambassadors to Europe, chaired by Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, was held in Krems from September 7-9, 1966; see ÖJB (1967, pp. 225, 301).

Indonesia" (Translated by S.G.)[289]. Moreover, during Malik's stay in Austria, he also gave an interview to the Austrian daily newspaper *Arbeiter-Zeitung* in which he spoke of "some hundred thousand" dead and explained that the mass murders were "a spontaneous action of the people" (Translated by S.G.).[290] Consequently, even if there are only sporadic files from the Foreign Ministry available, one thing is clear: the extent of the atrocities was known to the Austrian officials.

7.4 Summary and Discussion

The enduring popular explanation that it was a specifically Indonesian 'amok culture' cannot be confirmed in any way based on the available Austrian files. Also, the explanatory approach according to which the acts were mainly due to personal, religious, ethnic, or socio-economic backgrounds can only be determined to a limited extent. Moreover, the version of events favored by the Indonesian authorities, according to which the mass killings were a 'spontaneous reaction' of the people against the PKI, cannot be confirmed on the basis of the existing Austrian files. Although the Austrian ambassador in Jakarta reported twice that there had been an 'outburst of rage' by the population against the PKI and that there had also been latent anger and resentment among the population against the ethnic Chinese Indonesian community, in comparison to the frequent mention of the military, respectively the Army, this is relatively marginal in the files that are still available.

Therefore, based on the Austrian files, everything indicates that the military, and in particular the Army, played a central role. It was the Army that took the initiative and called for anti-communist demonstrations. It was also the Army that declared martial law at the local administrative level in order to take action against PKI and its sub-organizations. And finally, it was the Army that organized the tracking down of the PKI party members and handed them over to the village lynch law.[291] However, the Army did not act alone in the mass violence

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[289] *Information*, September 9, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 43452-6/66; for the demonstrations see also the newspaper articles *Indonesische Diplomatenkonferenz im Kremser Parkhotel* Kremser Zeitung, September 13, 1966, and *Krems im Blickfeld der Weltpolitik*, Land-Zeitung, 15 September 1966.

[290] "'*Wie aber', fragten wir Malik in unserem Interview, 'war es möglich, daß die indonesische KP so plötzlich vernichtet wurde?' 'Es war eine spontane Aktion des Volkes, eine ganz spontane Erhebung', antwortete er. 'Und ist es richtig, daß dabei hunderttausend Indonesier getötet wurden?' fragten wir weiter. 'Yes, some hundred thousands have been killed', entgegnet Malik.*" (*Ein Amoklauf vernichtete die KPI*, in Wiener Arbeiter-Zeitung, September 15, 1966). After his stay in Krems, Malik traveled on to Belgrade. The Austrian ambassador there noted in his report on Malik's visit that people there spoke of the murders as "oriental cruelty" and put "the number of those liquidated at 800,000". Moreover, he noted that at a meeting "Malik [...] is said to have expressed to Nikezic with great candor: 'It was not a choice, us or them!'" (*Zu dem Besuch Herrn Maliks*, September 21, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 38433-6/66 Zl. 67-POL/66).

[291] Hohenbühel referred to the so-called 'Pepelradas' (*Penguasa Pelaksanaan Dwikora Daerah*, 'execution administrators'), which, according to him, were nothing more than 'flying inquisition tribunals' and were

and mass killings. The available reports also show that they were actively supported by religious associations such as Muslim and Christian groups and their related student groups such as Indonesian Youth and Student Action Front (*Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia*, KAPPI) and Indonesian Student's Action Front *(Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*, KAMI).[292] Notably, General Suharto used these student groups as a vanguard against the PKI and subsequently against Sukarno. However, these groups themselves may have become more and more violent in course of events, and even acted independently in some cases.[293]

Thus, due to the rather clear files on the perpetrators, it is interesting to ask to what extent the military or the Army proceeded in an organized manner from the start and whether they had the necessary strength and power to organize the mass violence and mass killings, which is judged differently by various researchers (cf. Gerlach, 2010; Robinson, 2018). The Austrian ambassador in Bonn, who often had access to the German reports, reported to Foreign Minister Kreisky at the beginning of October that "the Army [...] had the necessary strength and organization" to "seize the leadership" (Translated by S.G.).[294] However, in the same report, he also pointed out that "due to the assassination of the 6 generals", there was also "a lack of political leadership" (Translated by S.G.).[295] Moreover, the Austrian ambassador in Tokyo referred to the fact that the "anti-communist military factions […] were divided in two camps" (Translated by S.G.), namely, on the one hand, those who believed that they could withstand a war against the PKI; and on the other hand, those who held the view that a civil

supposed to have stood under the command of senior officers (*Die politische Säuberung bei näherer Hinsicht*, December 10, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/66 Zl. 48-POL/65); for Pepelrada see also Crouch (1978, p. 76).

[292] KAMI was founded on October 25, 1965, to spearhead the suppression of the PKI and the left in general following G30S. It was sponsored by and worked closely with anticommunist Brigadier General Kemal Idris and Colonel Sarwo Edhie. In much of its action, it cooperated closely with the *Komando Aksi Pemuda dan Pelajar Indonesia* (KAPPI) representing school children, and the *Komando Aksi Sarjana Indonesia* (KASI) representing graduates (A. Kahin, 2015, pp. 239–240).

[293] Hohenbühel, for example, reported to Kreisky on June 2, 1966, that "the completely wild hordes of students [...] no longer knew any authority" and that these groups had thus "robbed, 'confiscated' and terrorized" the population (*Indonesien-Malaysia; Beendigung der Konfrontationspolitik*, June 2, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 38821-6/66 Zl. 24-POL/66, translated by S.G.). Moreover, from another report by Hohenbühel to Kreisky, it is clear that the student groups were deliberately used by the Army. Thus, he reported that the Soviet Union must have already known that "behind these cheeky children's voices [students and student groups] is the anti-communist Army and behind this again the Americans" (*Maliks Gang nach Canossa*, October 28, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 47926-6/66 Zl. 34-POL/66, translated by S.G.).

[294] "*Die Armee hatte die notwendige Stärke und Organisation, um die Führung an sich zu reissen.*" (*Zur Lage in Indonesien; Verfolg: FS 25059 vom 11. Oktober 1965*, October 11, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428 Zl. 958-Res/65)

[295] "*Es fehle ihr aber, durch die Ermordung der 6 Generäle, an einer politischen Führungspersönlichkeit.*" (*Zur Lage in Indonesien; Verfolg: FS 25059 vom 11. Oktober 1965*, October 11 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428 Zl. 958-Res/65)

war was not likely during Sukarno's lifetime, since this faction questioned whether President Sukarno would unconditionally support the military.[296]

Hohenbühel in Jakarta came to a similar conclusion about the Army's actions in early December 1965, reporting to Kreisky that the "clever actions of the Army" would speak for it,

> that they proceed according to a precisely devised plan, constantly adapted to the situation at hand. But this is not quite the case. The officers' cautious behavior is also due to their weakness. Thus, the Air Force's posture since the events of September 30, regardless of any protestations of loyalty, remains ambiguous. (Translated by S.G.)[297]

Although these excerpts show that the military by no means formed a cohesive unit, one should not make the mistake of viewing this division as a reason for the peripheral role of some parts of the military. However, it shows quite well why for many researchers, the Army's central role is still not so evident and thus is still the subject of such intense debate even today (cf. Gerlach, 2010; Robinson, 2018).

A similar picture emerges with the mistaken belief that the victims were mainly ethnic Chinese (see, for that discussion, Cribb, 2002, pp. 557–559; Robinson, 2018, pp. 141–144). Indeed, violent acts were committed against Chinese nationals and Chinese Indonesians, as we have seen in this chapter. However, Hohenbühel reported them less frequently. Rather, from his reports, everything indicates that the violence was primarily directed against the PKI and its communist associations and sub-organizations.[298] In the reports of the Austrian ambassadors, this is illustrated by such terms as "anti-communist purge wave" (Translated by S.G.)[299] or "pogroms against the PKI" (Translated by S.G.)[300]. Consequently, these

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[296] "*Die Führer der anti-kommunistischen Militärfraktion sind in zwei Lager gespalten. Die Einen verfechten die Ansicht, dass das Militär dem Bürgerkrieg gewachsen sei und die Auseinandersetzung gewagt werden müsse. Die Anderen sind zur Überzeugung gekommen, dass es verfrüht wäre, die Frage von Soekarnos Nachfolge zu stellen. Ein Bürgerkrieg zu Lebzeiten Soekarnos könnte nicht unternommen werden, da es fraglich sei, ob der Präsident das Militär vorbehaltlos zu unterstützten bereit ist.*" (*Japanische Ansichten zur Lage in Indonesien*, October 15, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 132428-6/65 Zl. 39-POL/65)

[297] "*Dieses kompromißbereite, kluge Handeln der Armee würde dafür sprechen, daß sie nach einem genau ausgeklügelten, ständig der jeweiligen Situation angepaßten Plan vorgeht. Dem ist aber nicht ganz so. Das vorsichtige Verhalten der Offiziere ist auch durch die eigene Schwäche bedingt. So ist die Haltung der Luftwaffe seit den Ereignissen des 30. September, ungeachtet aller Loyalitätsbezeugungen, immer noch zweideutig.*" (*Vorläufiges Zusammengehen der beiden Kräftegruppen*, December 2, 1965, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol, Djakarta, Zl. 47-POL/65)

[298] Apart from these victims, the reports also describe that violent students themselves became victims of violence – for example, by being arrested by Subandrio's private police, or bayoneted and shot by the military and its soldiers (*Prozeß gegen die Akteure des 30. September*, Februar 16, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 30137-6/66 Zl. 7-POL/66).

[299] „*antikommunistischen Säuberungswelle*" (*Probleme des neuen Teams*, May 11, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/3, Gzl. 30137-6/66 Zl. 21-POL/66).

diplomatic reports appear to lend credence to the researchers, such as Robinson (2018), who suppose that religious or ethnic tensions and also acts of revenge played a role but were certainly not the decisive reason for the acts. Moreover, it is more likely that most people were victims because of their (perceived) political orientation (see Robinson, 2018, p. 144).

Finally, it is worth mentioning the Austrian authorities' knowledge of the extent of mass violence and mass murder. Although there are no longer any files in the archives that show a total number of those murdered, the few files that do exist show that the Austrian authorities were well aware of the extent of the atrocities in Indonesia. Nevertheless, they did not protest against them but 'simply' took note and cooperated with the nascent Suharto regime even during the Sukarno period. Unfortunately, the reason for the indifference exhibited by the Austrian authorities towards the victims of atrocities can no longer be determined due to the lack of files. However, based on the existing files, it is reasonable to assume that Austria took a similar view to the countries that did not see any problems with the many dead, as long as they were communists.

[300] „*Pogrome gegen die indonesische Kommunisten*" (*Eventuelle aussenpolitische Neuorientierung Indonesiens und Hoffnungen Belgrads*, April 5, 1966, in ÖStA/AdR, BmfaA, II-Pol/2, Gzl. 31355-6/66 Zl. 30-POL/66).

8 Conclusion

This master's thesis has examined the extent to which the Austrian authorities knew about Sukarno's medical condition, G30S, and the mass violence and mass killings that followed. Therefore, based on the existing literature, thematic categories and open questions were developed, which were examined using the Austrian files from the Austrian Foreign Ministry and, in some cases, from the Interior Ministry. The analysis of the Austrian files has thereby shown that the different files do not, for the most part, contain any significant contradictions. However, the analysis has also shown that the existing accessible file stock is incomplete. This was especially evident concerning files from the Austrian Foreign Ministry – despite the fact that, as we have seen, there was even a separate special unit for Far-East (Indonesia) in the Ministry. Therefore, it is most unlikely that there were no more files at that time. Consequently, most of the existing files in the analyses were embassy reports and thus represented one side of the communication process. Nevertheless, even based on the limited number of files, it was possible to gain essential insights into the relevant topics.

Sukarno's Health

The analysis of Sukarno's health could reveal, for instance, that President Sukarno was often in Austria – eight times in total. Although most of his visits were stopovers and to recover from his travels, sometimes he received medical treatment for his kidney stone problems in Austria. During two of his visits, Sukarno even underwent minor operations. Nevertheless, from the existing files, it could not be revealed if he had a kidney removed as was proposed by Samodra (2004, p. 37). Given Sukarno's very short stays in Vienna, it is more likely that Sukarno had simply had his kidney stones removed. The analysis further has shown that the Austrian and Indonesian media and the Austrian officials knew very well about Sukarno's health and travels, particularly before 1965. Yet, unfortunately, from March 1965 onwards, the files on Sukarno's health were very limited. For that reason, neither the thesis of Zhou (2014, p. 47) – according to which Austrian doctors allegedly had disclosed the state of Sukarno's health to the press; nor Hunter's thesis (2007, p. 154) – according to which Sukarno had canceled the trip to Vienna at short notice in September 1965; nor the thesis of Robinson (2018, pp. 87–88) – according to which Sukarno no longer trusted Western doctors – could be confirmed or refuted. However, the analysis revealed that another visit of Sukarno's was planned in December 1964, but that this planned trip was repeatedly postponed until March 1965. From then on, much less information was available about it.

Yet, the analysis has shown that Sukarno most likely received medical treatment in Paris in July 1965. Therefore, this could be one possible explanation why Sukarno then did not come to Austria in September 1965. Finally, the analysis has also shown that attempts have been made from various sides to make Sukarno's state of health look much worse than it may ultimately have been. In retrospect, there is a high possibility that this was intentionally done to intensify tensions between the Army and the PKI, which ultimately led to G30S.

The September 30th Movement (G30S)

The analysis on G30S has brought the following essential findings to the fore. First, the study has shown that the Austrian authorities were relatively quick to hold the PKI responsible for G30S, even before it was really clear whether they were the possible masterminds. Second, speculations about Sukarno's possible involvement in G30S were already circulating just a few days afterwards in Jakarta – thus even before the major defamation campaign against Sukarno began (cf. Robinson, 2018, p. 72). In this regard, the analysis of the Austrian files has also raised a new aspect that has not yet been addressed in the research literature: The analysis has shown that the laying of the foundation stone for the Bung Karnow Tower was scheduled for October 7, 1965; thus, only a few days after G30S happened. Therefore, the question arises, if Sukarno had known about G30S in advance, would he still have planned this event at that time? Looking at G30S from this perspective, everything indicates that both the Austrian authorities and Sukarno himself were surprised by its timing. Third, the analysis of G30S has also shown that Suharto might have had foreknowledge of it. Although the evidence rests only on one statement within the Austrian files, it still supports the latest findings from those researchers who not only assume that the PKI was provoked into G30S but who also assume that Suharto knew about G30S and played a more active role (cf. Holtzappel, n.d.; Melvin, 2018a; Wertheim, 1970; Wieringa & Katjasungkana, 2019).

Mass Violence and Mass Killings

Analysis of Austrian files on Indonesian mass violence and mass killings has yielded the following significant findings. First, no information could be found in the Austrian files according to which the mass violence and mass killings had taken place due to a specific 'amok culture' of the Indonesians. Moreover, only limited support could be found for the thesis that the mass killings were spontaneous outbursts of rage by the population against the PKI. In fact, based on the Austrian files, everything points to the Indonesian Army as the main organizer of the mass violence and mass killings. The Army initiated the anti-

communist demonstrations and declared martial law to take action against the PKI; and the Army also set up inquisition tribunals to hand over arrested persons to the lynch law of their respective villages.

However, two points must be mentioned in this regard. First, the Army did not act alone; they were supported by Muslim and Christian/Catholic groups and their student organizations. Second, the Army was by no means a cohesive force. On the contrary, as the Austrian files showed, they were divided into two factions: those who believed that they could withstand a war against the PKI; and those who believed that such a war could not be won during Sukarno's lifetime, since they thought that President Sukarno would not give the military the unconditional support that they would have needed. That division most likely also explains to a certain extent why different actions were taken in the various regions of Indonesia, as stressed by Robinson (2018, pp. 150–152). However, unlike Gerlach (2010, p. 31), who argued that the action was not a 'comprehensive plan' by the Army, the analysis has shown that at least some elements of the Army, particularly those with prior knowledge of G30S, may have been preparing systematically for the destruction of the PKI (see also Melvin, 2018a).

Finally, I would like to address a few points that could not be dealt with in more detail in this master's thesis but that would be worthwhile to consider in further research. Such research should expand the time of investigation for two reasons. First, while the most extensive wave of mass violence and mass killings occurred from December 1965 to March 1966, they nevertheless continued in some parts of Indonesia until at least 1968 (McGregor et al., 2018a, p. 13; cf. Hearman, 2012). Thus, it would be necessary to take a closer look into the mass violence and mass killings of that later time period. Second, further research should also analyze the transition from the old government to Suharto's 'New Order'. Most importantly, this should include the s*upersemar*[301] document, which marked the beginning of Sukarno's loss of power and is regarded as one of the most important and unresolved issues in Indonesia's recent history even today (Baskara, 2017, p. 51).

In addition to these temporal and thematic expansions, it would also make sense for future research to explore other archives. Among the most important of these would be archives of political parties active during the period in question: First and foremost, those of the then

[301] The Indonesian acronym for Surat Perintah Seblas Maret, or 'Order of March 11'. This order contained President Sukarno's instructions to Lieutenant General Suharto, "to take all measures considered necessary to guarantee security, calm and stability of the government" (Suripto cited in Crouch, 1978, p. 189).

Austrian Foreign Ministers Kreisky (Social Democrats, SPÖ) and Lujo Tončić-Sorinj (Austrian People's Party, ÖVP). Moreover, this should include an analysis of additional files from the international law office, which continue to be accessible only at the Austrian Foreign Ministry. Moreover, since Austria already had an economic delegation at that time in Indonesia, a closer look at the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (*Wirtschaftskammer Österreich*) Archive would also be worthwhile. Finally, in further research, various Austrian people with whom Sukarno was on excellent terms, such as the Austrian ambassador, architect Lintl, and doctor Fellinger, should be researched more and included in further studies.

Although these points have shown that much remains to be done and many questions remain unanswered, it is hoped that this master's thesis will make a contribution – albeit a modest one – which helps to shed light on the dark past of Indonesia and its allies.

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Appendixes

A1 Liasse Keys

1	Head of State / Head of Government
2	Foreign Policy (Foreign Ministry, Diplomatic Relations, Diplomatic Missions)
3	Domestic Policy
4	Church
5	Military Affairs
6	Media (Press, Broadcasting, Publications)
7	Personnel
8	Finance (Finance, Compensation)
9	Borders
10	Minorities
11	Refugees
12	Congresses
13	Restitutions
14	Societies and Assoziations
15	Troop Withdrawal
16	Peace Treaty
17	Property Issues
18	Foreign Debts, German Property, Bonds
19	Austrian Foreign Representations
20	Sport
21	Speeches
22	Unions
23	Various

Table 4: Liasse Keys

A2 Category and Questionnaire System

CATEGORY	CODE	QUESTIONS
Sukarno's Health and Visit to Austria (SKV 00)	**SKV GIV General Information of his Visit**	• What were the first indications of Sukarno's visit? • When did Sukarno arrive? • When did Sukarno leave? • Where did Sukarno travel from? • Where did Sukarno travel to afterwards? • Who picked Sukarno up? • Where did Sukarno stay? • Who came with Sukarno? • Who was present when Sukarno left?
	SKV ROV Reason of Visit	• What was the official reason given? • Why did Sukarno come to Austria? • What did Sukarno do in Austria? • What kind of medical treatment did Sukarno receive? • What did the Austrian officials report of Sukarno's health in 1964 and 1965? • What did the Austrian officials report of Sukarno's health and his intended trip in 1965?
	SKV ACT Actors	• Who did Sukarno meet? • With whom did other personnel of Sukarno meet?
	SKV MED Media	• What did the newspapers write about the upcoming visit? • What did the newspapers write about the visit? • What did the newspapers write about Sukarno's medical treatment/illness?
	SKV OTH Other important information	• Were there any important incidents? • What other important information can be found?
September 30th Movement (G30S 00)	**G30S 01 Events**	• Why did the coup fail? • What is reported about the exact events of G30S? • When and what did the Austrian officials initially report of G30S? • What was the Austrian official's judgement of G30S?
	G30S 02 Reason/Point in time	• Why did G30S take place at that time? • What reasons were given for the formation of G30S and the alleged coup?
	G30S 03 Perpetrators/main actors	• Who was involved in plotting this alleged coup attempt? • Who was involved in the G30S movement?
	G30S 04 Sukarno's Role	• Was Sukarno himself involved? • What is reported about Sukarno's involvement?
	G30S 05 Diff. Interpretations	• What do the documents say about the official military version of events? • What do the documents say about the different interpretations of G30S (Official military version, Cornell papers, secret

		services, Sukarno's involvement, joint enterprise, Suharto)?
	G30S 06 Immediate situation after G30S	• What and how was the first reaction to G30S?
	G30S 07 Other special information	• What other relevant information can be found? • Did the Austrian embassy 'fall into' the propaganda story? ('psychological warfare campaign/Gerwani')
Mass violence/Mass killings (MAK 00)	**MAK 01 Numbers**	• How many were killed? • What numbers are given for mass violence and mass murders?
	MAK 02 Victims	• Against whom was the mass violence directed? Which people are mentioned as victims? • What information is there about the mass killings against the Chinese population? • How were they arrested? • How were they killed?
	MAK 03 Chain of events/time/location	• What is reported about the perpetration of mass violence and mass killings? • Where and how did the mass killings happen? • When did mass violence begin in each locality and province? • Why did mass arrests take place in some regions, whereas in other regions mass killings took place?
	MAK 04 Perpetrators	• Who were the perpetrators of the mass violence and mass killings? • What role did the military play?
	MAK 05 Explanatory approaches	• Which explanatory approaches are provided/confirmed (Cultural-amok-approach, personal/psychological motives, religious/ethnic tensions, socio-economic/political conflicts, military/army)?
	MAK 06 Others	• When and how did the Austrian government describe the mass killings? When did they initially report about it? How did they justify it?

Table 5: Category- and Questionnaire System

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