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1 Introduction

Starting from the 1990s, electoral success by populists as different as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Jörg Haider in Austria, or Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands fueled an influx of research into populism and its protagonists (Hawkins, 2010; Mudde, 2013). However, the preoccupation with populism has since not abated. In the European Union, populist parties were long mobilizing against European integration (De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Taggart, 1998). In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the ensuing Great Recession, some established Eurosceptic populist parties then gained new traction. At the same time, new populist movements such as Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, or the Five Star Movement in Italy emerged (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016; Pappas & Kriesi, 2015). Although far from being a new phenomenon in 2016, the interest in populism exploded after the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom (Iakhnis et al., 2018) and Donald Trump’s election to President of the United States (Hawkins & Littvay, 2019), both in academia and the general public. The vote gains by populist radical right actors in Europe, such as Marine Le Pen in France, Matteo Salvini in Italy, and Norbert Hofer in Austria, further fueled interest in populism (Goodwin, 2019).

Figure 1.1 illustrates this explosion of interest in populism around 2016. Both the general and the academic interest have grown substantially since 2016. People increasingly began searching for “populism” on Google in 2016. This public interest spiked in 2017 and has since remained at higher levels than pre-2016. Figure 1.1 also shows that from 2016 onwards, a rapidly growing number of academic publications has been dedicated to the topic of “populism.” In 2000, only 0.02 percent of all publications listed in the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) were concerned with the topic of populism. In 2017, this number already went up to 0.09 percent; and for 2020 it was 0.19 percent.

However, what populism exactly means or which actors are populist remains contested

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


Figure 1.1. Academic publications and general Google search trends on “populism.”

in the academic literature and vague in public discourse—journalists and pundits often attribute the label to politicians perceived as opportunists or demagogues who employ simplistic and emotionalized discourses. In contrast, most academic definitions of populism focus on the relationship or divide between “the people” and “the elites” (Mudde, 2004). In political science and neighboring disciplines, while far from being the only approach (see Chapter 2), the ideational approach (Hawkins et al., 2019; Mudde, 2004) has gained immense popularity, particularly for empirical and comparative analysis.

According to ideational definitions, what unites otherwise diverse populist actors is a limited set of ideas. Populism “considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and [...] argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). This tension between the decent people and the corrupt elites has a moral or Manichean quality, and populists claim to be the only ones genuinely representing the people (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013b).

Populism has long been considered a characteristic of political parties and candidates (i.e., the *supply side* in electoral politics). Only recently, political science has also addressed to which degree regular citizens (i.e., the *demand side*) share populist beliefs (Akkerman et al., 2014; Hawkins et al., 2012). Such populist attitudes, as defined in this

dissertation, reflect the ideational definition of populism cited above (Mudde, 2004). Thus, populist attitudes comprise (Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2018):

1. positive evaluations of the people,
2. negative assessments of the elite,
3. approval of wide-ranging popular sovereignty, and, conversely, disapproval of mechanisms that hinder the expression of the people's general will.

These populist attitudes represent the key variable in my dissertation. I look into the causes and consequences of such populist beliefs among the electorate. Hence, my dissertation seeks to add to the following overarching research questions, which I differentiate further in the next chapter on this dissertation's theoretical framework (see Chapter 2).

What determines populist attitudes among citizens?

How, then, do these populist attitudes influence people's political behavior and sentiments?

Directly measuring populist attitudes allows us to distinguish populism from other political preferences and beliefs. Most of the previous research on support for populism at the demand side explored support for specific populist parties, particularly populist radical right parties (e.g., Mudde, 2016, 2007). Europe's populist radical left (March, 2011; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015) and populists in Latin America (Hawkins, 2010) also drew some attention. However, these populist parties are never just populist. Radical right populists such as the French Front National, for example, propagate populist ideas but also oppose immigration. Does supporting such a party express voters' support for populism, or are voters concerned with, for instance, immigration issues? By analyzing support for particular parties—without including populist attitudes—the role of populism per se remains in the dark because supporting populist parties might always be confounded by many aspects other than populism (for a similar argument, see Spruyt et al., 2016).

Thus, by directly studying populist attitudes among the electorate, I am able (a) to analyze why citizens adopt populist beliefs in the first place and then (b) look at the

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consequences of populism on the demand side. However, a comprehensive theory of how citizens adopt populist attitudes and how such attitudes affect political behavior and sentiments would have to combine elements on different levels and theorize the complex interplay between them (see Figure 1.2). Considering all aspects (e.g., macro-level context, the information environment, individual-level differences) at once is hardly feasible, especially within the limited scope of a dissertation project.




Figure 1.2. Schematic overview of populist attitude formation and populist attitudes' role for political behavior.

The four papers (see Table 1.1), therefore, tap into different aspects, with each piece explaining segments of the bigger picture (see Figure 1.2). In the first paper, I explore a potential source for populist beliefs among voters: social media. Foremost, it makes a methodological contribution by developing an automated measurement for populist content on social media. Paper 1 also discusses social media's role in spreading populist beliefs (see also Section 8.1). In Paper 2, I then consider how populist beliefs, and populist communication, relate to feelings of anger about politics. The third paper is concerned with psychological differences as a possible explanation for different levels of populist attitudes. More specifically, I analyze how individual differences in how people

deal with uncertainty are related to support for populism and the populist radical right. Finally, in Paper 4, I study populist attitudes' importance for party choice in Austria's recent elections in 2017 and 2019. In the four papers, the dissertation connects insights from different fields in political science and, overall, my dissertation contributes in several ways to existing research on populism:

1. According to many scholars, media (e.g., Esser et al., 2017; G. Mazzoleni, 2008; Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016) and, more recently, social media (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, et al., 2017; Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017) play a crucial role in the emergence and the success of populists. Thus, my first paper makes a significant methodological contribution. It provides a new dictionary-based automated approach for analyzing populism on social media, available as a package for R. The developed procedure facilitates further research on social media's role in support for populism. It also allows exploring the prevalence of populist messages on social media accounts by Austrian, German, and Swiss parties and politicians.
2. Despite the supposed importance of social media for populism, studies directly analyzing the consequences of populist content on social media remain rare (Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; P. Jost et al., 2020). While not the primary focus, Paper 2 also investigates how exposure to populist communication on social media might affect anger about politics. Furthermore, I provide data on the link between exposure to populist ideas on social media and populist attitudes in a supplemental analysis (see Section 8.1). Overall, my dissertation, therefore, also makes a contribution to understanding the hitherto "understudied" role of the media for populism by illuminating social media (Mudde, 2016, p. 12).
3. Populism is very much an emotional endeavor (Canovan, 1999). In Paper 2, my dissertation adds to our understanding of populist attitudes by taking emotions—more specifically, anger about politics—as a possible consequence of populist beliefs into account. Paper 2 discusses how populist beliefs fit the appraisal patterns associated with getting angry about politics. Furthermore, I develop arguments concerning how a populist worldview might lead to anger in combination with economic and immigration grievances.
4. Only a few studies look upon populism from a political psychology perspective

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(Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; B. N. Bakker et al., 2016). By contributing to this line of research, this dissertation provides valuable insights into how the adoption of populist beliefs is related to individual-level psychological differences (see Paper 3). It also embeds populist attitudes in the broader field of political ideas by matching both populist and right-wing beliefs with personality factors.

5. Finally, my thesis adds to an emerging strand of research that studies populist attitudes (i.e., adherence to the ideas of populism) rather than support for populist parties. Consequently, analyzing the importance of populist attitudes in voting for populist parties allows me to disentangle the diverse factors for populist support and examine whether populist attitudes drive this support (see Papers 3 and 4).

The next chapter discusses the definition of populism that bridges all four papers. It also entails a detailed overview of the existing literature and describes each paper's aims. Chapter 3 introduces the methodological approaches employed in this thesis and provides some background on the studied cases. Chapters 4 to 7 contain the final manuscripts (i.e., the versions submitted to publishers) for the four papers, which together make up this paper-based dissertation (see Table 1.1). The first paper (see Chapter 4) develops a new measure for populist communication on social media and applies it to political content on Facebook and Twitter from German-speaking countries. It appeared in *New Media & Society* (Gründl, 2020a). Paper 2 (see Chapter 5) scrutinizes how populist attitudes and anger about politics are connected (Gründl, 2021). I submitted it to a political science journal in March 2021. Paper 3 (see Chapter 6), on the role that individual-level differences in uncertainty avoidance play for populist and radical right convictions, is co-authored with Julian Aichholzer and published in *Political Psychology* (Gründl & Aichholzer, 2020). The fourth paper (see Chapter 7) is a German-language book chapter¹ on electoral behavior—and also the role of populist attitudes in it—co-authored with Patricia Oberluggauer (Gründl & Oberluggauer, in press). It was accepted for publication as part of a collected volume edited by Roland Verwiebe and Laura Wiesböck.

Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the dissertation project's main findings, and Chapter 9 provides overarching conclusions. The Appendix includes additional information that

¹An extended summary in English, including translated figures and tables, is available in Appendix H.

Table 1.1. Overview of publications included in this dissertation.

Title	Co-Author	Final draft	Publication	State
Populist Ideas on Social Media: A Dictionary-Based Measurement of Populist Communication	–	12 November 2020	<i>New Media & Society</i>	Published
Getting Angry About Politics: The Role of Populist, Economic, and Sociocultural Grievances	–	6 March 2021	–	Submitted
Support for the Populist Radical Right: Between Uncertainty Avoidance and Risky Choice	Julian Aichholzer	29 November 2019	<i>Political Psychology</i>	Published
Das Wahlverhalten der Mitte: Ein Rechtsruck in Folge der Fluchtbewegung? [The Voting Behavior of the Middle Classes: A Shift to the Right in Response to the Refugee Crisis?]	Patricia Oberluggauer	7 April 2020	<i>Mittelschicht unter Druck: Dynamiken in der österreichischen Mitte</i> (edited by Roland Verwiebe and Laura Wiesböck)	Accepted

might be interesting to some readers. Furthermore, all appendices and online supplements that accompanied the individual papers are also included (see Appendices C–G).

2 Theoretical Framework

This dissertation is rooted in the ideational approach to populism. All four papers adhere to an ideational definition of populism or, more specifically, populist attitudes and communication. The ideational approach posits that populism is best defined as a set of only a few core ideas (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Mudde, 2004, 2017; Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016): A homogeneous and virtuous majority exists within society, “the people” (*people centrism*). The people represent the hard-working, ordinary citizens. They all share common interests and wisdom; a “general will” of the people exists. Populists demand that the elites should listen to the people; politics should simply execute the people’s will (*demand for popular sovereignty*). However, the good people are confronted with a malicious, corrupt, and often incompetent elite. The elites are antagonists of the people, and they deprive them of their right to unfettered rule (*anti-elitism*). In a similar conception, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2019) also highlight the *Manichean quality* of the struggle for sovereignty between the elites and the people as a defining feature of populism: Politics becomes a struggle between good and evil.

In this struggle, populist politicians side with the good people. They claim to be the only ones who honestly speak in the people’s name and pledge to fulfill their will. Populists present themselves as the “true” democrats (Canovan, 1999). And indeed, populists might lend a voice to groups and interests previously not well represented in the political arena. Thus, populism could act as a corrective to the failings of representative politics. However, populism at the same time threatens public contestation and constitutionalism (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Populism’s monist conception of the people does not allow for a plurality of voices. In the populist vision of democracy, opposition to the people’s proclaimed will is anti-democratic because it undermines popular sovereignty. Those who do not share the people’s view are either part of the elite or outsiders in cahoots with

it. Furthermore, populism despises representation, compromise, and power-sharing mechanisms because they limit the unhindered expression of the *volonté générale*. Hence, populist beliefs are inherently at odds with liberal democracy (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013b).

Mudde's minimal definition cited in the Introduction proved very authoritative for the ideational approach. Initially, Mudde (2004; see also Canovan, 2002) defined populism as a "thin-centered ideology" (following Freedman, 1998, p. 750). As a thin ideology, populism does not offer the same conceptual depth and scope that full-fledged ideologies such as socialism or liberalism offer. Instead, populism is often complementary to full ideologies (Stanley, 2008). The ability to be attached to various full-fledged host ideologies also gives populism its "chameleonic" nature (Taggart, 2002). Populist radical right parties such as the French Front National or the Austrian Freedom Party combine populist ideas with authoritarian and nativist stances (Mudde, 2007). Others combine populism with a left-wing host ideology (e.g., SYRIZA in Greece; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), environmentalism, or more centrist ideas (Havlík & Voda, 2018; Mudde, 2004; van Kessel, 2015). While there might be huge differences between such variations of populism, the ideas presented above unite all populist parties.

Not all researchers adhering to a minimal ideational definition of populism necessarily share the notion of populism as an ideology. Critics have argued that populism lacks the conceptual scope, clarity, and coherence to be considered an ideology (for a detailed discussion, see Aslanidis, 2016). The, often subtle, differences between populism as a thin-centered ideology (Canovan, 2002; Mudde, 2004), communication style (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), discourse (Hawkins, 2009), or discursive frame (Aslanidis, 2016) are part of an ongoing theoretical debate and have implications, for example regarding the question whether populism should be treated as a binary or a continuous variable. However, for many research questions, the differences are negligible because substantially, within the ideational approach, populism is operationalized in very similar ways (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Mudde, 2017): Populism comprises a set of ideas centered around the political struggle between "the good people" and "evil elites." Ideational approaches further agree that populist ideas can be found across the political spectrum and that it is in tension with principles of liberal democracy that hinder the

implementation of the people's will.

Populism was long a contested concept; its divergent usage and politicized nature led some even to question if it is a useful category at all (Brubaker, 2017). These debates have somewhat abated in favor of ideational approaches, particularly in quantitative social sciences. However, the presented minimal definition of populism is not the only way to approach the subject. Laclau's prominent post-structuralist theory of populism describes it as a discourse centered around the construction of "empty signifiers" such as the people. Here, populism becomes an inherent logic of democracy and an emancipatory force that brings neglected conflicts and groups back into the political process (Laclau, 2005; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013b; Stavrakakis, 2004). The theory remains influential in political philosophy but also informs approaches within the ideational camp (e.g., Aslanidis, 2016).

Outside of political philosophy and post-structuralist circles, two other approaches garnered the most attention: populism as a "strategy" and a "style." The strategic approach sees populism as a political strategy employed by charismatic leaders to foster and maintain support among broad, unorganized electorate segments (Weyland, 2001). Work that sees populism as a style focuses on how politicians talk and act in public. Stylistic features associated with populism might range from simple clothing to colloquial language to bad manners. Through such performative acts, populist politicians portray themselves as political outsiders close to the people and credible champions for the people's goals (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Ostiguy, 2009).

While these different attempts highlight features that often co-occur with populism, such as charismatic leaders who display a particular political style, these features are not necessarily present with all populist movements (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013b). Populism comes in different organizational forms and, at times, does not even require a charismatic leader at all. Ideational approaches allow studying populism among leaderless movements (e.g., the Tea Party or Occupy Wall Street), movements tailored to a specific person (e.g., Pim Fortuyn), or traditional political parties (e.g., the Austrian Freedom Party or the Swiss People's Party).

Furthermore, it is doubtful whether some of the proposed features alone, without reference to the people-elite divide, are sufficient to constitute populism. For example,

some communication styles such as emotionalized or simplified language or stressing negativity and crises might well be common among but not restricted to populist actors; others might just as well use similar communication styles to gain attention (Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016). The ideational definition is minimal because it provides us with the features that are necessary to label a phenomenon populist; at the same time, these features alone are sufficient to apply the populism label (Sartori, 1984). This focus on only the core characteristics of populism has allowed ideational approaches to study populism over time and in different regions. Besides facilitating comparative research, its “operational virtues” have also stipulated a lot of quantitative empirical research (Aslanidis, 2016).

Another advantage of the ideational approach is also significant for this dissertation: It is more versatile than other approaches. By defining populism as a set of ideas, it is not bound to the electoral process’s supply side. As with strategic or stylistic aspects, the group of ideas along the people-elite divide can, of course, be studied in parties and politicians. However, they can also be explored on the demand side—among regular citizens (Akkerman et al., 2014; Castanho Silva et al., 2020). Finally, the very same ideas might also be present in various communication forms such as social media posts, press releases, or news reports (Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017). This strength of the ideational approach facilitates integrated research designs and brings together research on populist parties, populist attitudes, and populist communication (e.g., Carlin et al., 2019; Hawkins et al., 2019; Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016).

Originally, populism as a thin ideology has represented a dichotomous concept; parties or politicians are either populist or not (Mudde, 2017). Empirically, however, the measurement is often gradual (e.g., R. Bakker et al., 2018; Polk et al., 2017). For example, if conclusions are drawn from manifestos, they may contain more or less populist statements or paragraphs (e.g., Aslanidis, 2018; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). This fact is even more evident in the case of populist attitudes measures where citizens can express more or less agreement with populist ideas. Conceptually, it is essential to keep in mind that some support for a single anti-elitist statement does not make one a populist. Also, occasional people-centered messages are not enough to identify a politician as populist (Mudde, 2017; for a discussion on populist attitudes, see Wuttke et al., 2020).

If the goal is to classify populists based on gradual measurement, it must be clearly defined which elements need to be present to which degree (i.e., where is the cut-off point) to label an actor populist (see the discussion on this aspect in Sections 4.1 and 4.5 in Paper 1). However, for many research questions, binary classification is not the primary goal. It then makes sense to understand populism as a matter of degrees (i.e., the presence of more or less populist ideas). Furthermore, conceptualizing populism as a matter of degrees also allows examining the interesting borderline cases (Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2017).

In this thesis, both populist communication and populist attitudes are defined as gradual concepts, and both are rooted in the ideational approach. The subsequent sections introduce and detail populist communication and attitudes and present the general themes and research questions studied in the four articles.

2.1 Populist Communication

Donald Trump's Twitter usage in his successful 2016 US presidential campaign (e.g., Gerbaudo, 2018; Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017) and, more generally, populist's reliance on Twitter and Facebook in Europe (e.g., Bobba, 2019; Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, et al., 2017) brought social media to the center of attention in populism research. While already the traditional media have long been attributed with a crucial role for populists' success (e.g., Esser et al., 2017; G. Mazzoleni, 2008; Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016), this applies even more to social media (Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017; Krämer, 2017). As I have argued in my first paper, "populists are drawn to social media because they provide an ideal opportunity structure for populist communication" (Gründl, 2020a, p. 1).

On social media, populists can circumvent journalistic gatekeeping and filtering, directly address their supporters, and portray themselves as being in touch with regular citizens (Jungherr et al., 2019; Krämer, 2017). Tendencies toward echo chambers and the capability for the administrators of social media accounts to suppress unwanted opinions create a homogeneous environment (Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017; Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017). For populist supporters, this could reinforce the impression of a homogeneous popular will, and the communities evolving around populists' social

media accounts allow them to feel part of a larger group, “the people.” Furthermore, social media’s algorithms might favor populists because their often controversial and emotional content gathers attention and user reactions (Breeze, 2020; P. Jost et al., 2020). The populists’ controversial and high-reach content and their supporters’ sometimes outrageous reactions might, then again, also get picked up by traditional news media—and, thus, be further disseminated (Jungherr et al., 2019).

This importance of social media for current populist movements makes studying populist communication on social media worthwhile. However, doing so remains challenging. Political social media accounts produce a tremendous amount of content. Careful manual content analyses can provide us with insights but require well-trained coders. Thus, manual analyses are often limited to only a sample of the available material because they are time-consuming and costly. Automated approaches could remedy this situation. Nevertheless, few attempts have been made to identify populist ideas in text through automatic coding. Hawkins and Castanho Silva (2016), for example, reported mixed results with machine-learning approaches based on human-coded texts—others aimed at developing dictionary-based techniques to measure populism (e.g., Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011).

Such dictionaries list terms that might be indicators for a proposed concept (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013; Rauh, 2018). If the terms included in a dictionary are encountered in texts, these texts score higher on the studied concept. For example, terms such as *bureaucrat*, *establishment*, or *people’s will* might be indicators for populism. This approach’s rationale is straightforward: Higher frequencies of *populist terms* indicate more populist communication. Rooduijn and Pauwels’ (2011) dictionary for populism in manifestos represents the most extensively tested contribution.¹ While most dictionaries are only available in English, they even provided a German version—however, it performed worse than the other translations. The authors also concluded that their dictionary should best not be used as a standalone measure but in combination with manual coding.

Hence, overall, no successfully validated automated measurement has been available for German-language content so far. Thus, in my first paper, I build upon Rooduijn

¹Other attempts (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016a, 2016b; Pauwels, 2011, 2017) lack extensive validation and only one other dictionary (Pauwels, 2017) is available in German.

and Pauwels' work and develop an automated measure of populist ideology in texts. The expanded dictionary should improve previous efforts because, first, I raise concept validity by analyzing populist ideology as a whole—including people-centrism and the demand for people's sovereignty. Previous attempts mostly focussed on the anti-elitism dimension. Second, I build an extensive dictionary. Dictionaries tend to underestimate the prevalence of a concept. They will never include all possible terms used to, for example, convey populist messages. Therefore, one should strive to make the dictionary as encompassing as possible (Rauh, 2018). Third, I thoroughly validate the dictionary. Consequently, the following methodological question is addressed in Paper 1 (see Chapter 4 in this dissertation):

RQ1.1: How well does a dictionary approach allow us to assess the degree of populist ideas in German-language social media texts?

The measurement developed in the first paper aims at capturing the populist content of communication (Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017). The employed definition of populist communication (for a detailed discussion, see Section 4.1 in Paper 1) closely follows the ideational approach introduced above. I study populist communication as the textual representation of the described core ideas: the good people are forced to deal with malicious elites; the people are entitled to unlimited sovereignty, and the ill-meaning elites deprive them of their right to rule.

Thus, the dictionary does not aim to capture stylistic features of how populists might often communicate (Ernst et al., 2019). Instead, the focus lies on populist messages that are either advocative for the people or conflictive against the elites (Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016; Wirz, 2018). For example, advocative messages on social media emphasize the people's positive characteristics and stress their unity (*people centrism*). They might also announce the people's common will and demand that they be heard more (*demand for people's sovereignty*). Conflictive messages, on the other hand, attack the elites. The elites are accused of malice, failure, collusion, and incompetence (*anti-elitism*). Furthermore, messages that are conflictive toward the elites might call to limit the elite's power, usually in favor of more sovereignty for the people (for examples of message types, see the Online Appendix for Paper 1 in Section C.2).

2 Theoretical Framework

As with the idea of populism as a thin ideology (Mudde, 2004) that can easily be attached to various political ideologies, populist communication provides a kind of “master frame, a way to wrap up all kinds of issues” (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 322). Thus, using populist messages on social media is also not limited to certain parties (e.g., radical right parties) or issues (e.g., immigration). Instead, we should expect to find populist messages more or less across the whole political spectrum (Engesser, Ernst, et al., 2017). However, we would expect populist actors to also communicate populist ideas on social media more frequently and consistently.

While the measure developed in the first paper focuses on social media content by political actors, the minimal definition of the ideational approach would also be applicable to other domains: For example, news media might also introduce populist ideas in their reporting, a phenomenon dubbed *media populism* (Hameleers et al., 2017; Krämer, 2014; Rooduijn et al., 2014). By tying the developed social media dictionary to the ideational definition, it could serve as a starting point for developing dictionaries for other domains of political communication.

Overall, having the measure from the first paper at hand allows us, first, to explore populist communication on social media. During designing and validating the dictionary, I have studied Facebook posts by Austrian, German, and Swiss parties and politicians. Thus, besides its methodological contribution, Paper 1 also aims at providing insights into the prevalence of populist ideas on social media. Second, the dictionary also facilitates further research into political communication and social media’s role in the support for populism.

At the beginning of this project, only a few studies had looked at the direct effect of populist communication on citizens’ perceptions and political behavior (Hameleers et al., 2016; P. Müller et al., 2017), despite its assumed importance. While more studies followed since, most of them employed experimental designs (e.g., Hameleers et al., 2018b; Wirz, 2018). Research designs that link content analysis with responses from large surveys could offer higher external validity but require extensive, rarely completely available data (de Vreese et al., 2017; Scharkow & Bachl, 2017). On the survey side, comprehensive measures on people’s media exposure are necessary—ideally in a panel design that allows one to isolate causal relationships. On the media side, one then needs

to analyze a lot of communication content over lengthy periods.

The proposed dictionary facilitates this step. It allows analyzing large amounts of content such as the communication produced by political actors' social media accounts. The results could then be linked to respondents who follow these actors. Furthermore, it could serve as a starting point to extend the automated analysis to news media outlets to better assess people's complete media repertoires. I illustrate how the dictionary could be employed to study communication effects by linking results from the dictionary with survey data in such a way in my second paper (see also Section 2.2.1 below) and in the supplemental analysis presented in Section 8.1. The supplemental analysis contributes to the following research question:

RQ1.2: How do populist messages on social media affect citizens' populist attitudes?

Previous research could experimentally show that populist, mostly anti-elite, messages might indeed affect populist attitudes among citizens (Hameleers et al., 2018a, 2016, 2018b; Hameleers & Fawzi, 2020; Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017). In an observational study, populism in news media reporting did also affect populist attitudes (P. Müller et al., 2017). However, the effects of populist communication on populist beliefs were often small and contingent on prior convictions (Hameleers et al., 2018a; P. Müller et al., 2017) or support for the message source (Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017).

I address this link between populist communication on social media and populist attitudes² using three-wave panel data and the dictionary approach from Paper 1 in the supplemental analysis presented in Section 8.1. At the beginning of this dissertation project, it was planned that these analyses would be part of a standalone paper. However, populist attitudes have been very stable, and therefore changes due to social media content could not be explored in the intended detail. Furthermore, more research has been published on this subject since the initial planning period of this thesis, and the focus of the second paper has also shifted due to theoretical considerations.

Overall, this dissertation aims to contribute to understanding the hitherto understudied role of the (social) media for populism (Mudde, 2016, p. 12). The main contribution

²For details on populist attitudes, see the following Section 2.2.

is methodological; I develop an automated measure for populist ideas in social media content (see Paper 1). However, I also present findings on parties' social media communication in German-speaking countries. The presented results also help us corroborate the classification of parties as populist in these countries because "as an expression of the populist ideology, populist communication strategies may be used to identify the populist ideology empirically" (Kriesi, 2014, p. 364). Finally, I also provide novel findings on the effects of exposure to populism on social media in the second paper and in the supplemental analysis in Section 8.1.

2.2 Populist Attitudes

Populist attitudes represent a key concept for this dissertation. In general, "an attitude is an evaluation of an object of thought. Attitude objects comprise anything a person may hold in mind" (Bohner & Dickel, 2011, p. 392). Accordingly, populist attitudes—which reflect the ideational definition of populism above—are a set of positive evaluations of the people, negative assessments of the elite, approval of wide-ranging popular sovereignty, and, conversely, disapproval for mechanisms that hinder the expression of the people's general will (Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2018). They also entail the unambiguous attribution of morality; the regular people are good, and the political elites are evil. Hence, populist attitudes involve a Manichean view of politics (Akkerman et al., 2014; Castanho Silva et al., 2019; Mudde, 2004).

At the beginning of this dissertation project, political science has only been starting to address the degree to which regular citizens share populist beliefs (Akkerman et al., 2014; Hawkins et al., 2012; Stanley, 2011). The seminal papers concentrated on how to measure the concept³ and often concluded that populist attitudes are widespread among the general public (Akkerman et al., 2014; Hawkins et al., 2012). Based on these early papers, a growing body of research on antecedents and consequences of populist beliefs among regular citizens has emerged. Populist attitudes have been studied more

³Since then, a vast debate also enfolded around the question of how to best measure populist attitudes at the individual level (see Castanho Silva et al., 2020, 2019; Rovira Kaltwasser & van Hauwaert, 2020; Schulz et al., 2018; van Hauwaert et al., 2019; Wettstein et al., 2020; Wuttke et al., 2020). Appendix A includes an overview of the items included in populist attitudes measures proposed by various scholars (see also van Hauwaert et al., 2019). Chapter 3 then discusses the measure used in this dissertation.

extensively, research projects (e.g., Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016) and collaborations (e.g., Hawkins et al., 2019) have focused on such attitudes, and measures were also included in comparative surveys such as the The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (2020).

This dissertation project also adds to this strand of research. In three papers, populist attitudes play a central role. First, I study how populist attitudes might affect anger about politics (see Section 2.2.1 below and Paper 2 in Chapter 5). Second, Paper 3 (see Chapter 6 and Section 2.2.2 below) contributes to our understanding of how psychological differences in individuals' personalities might favor populist beliefs. The supplemental analysis in Section 8.1 in the summary chapter deals with how populist attitudes are related to exposure to populist content on social media. Finally, I also analyze the role of populist attitudes in voting behavior and support for populist parties (see Section 2.2.3 in this chapter, Paper 3 in Chapter 6, and Paper 4 in Chapter 7). Thus, populist attitudes are key to this dissertation. Three papers are directly concerned with populist attitudes, and the first paper studies a possible source of populist beliefs among the general public.

2.2.1 Populist Beliefs and Emotions

My second paper deals with how populist beliefs relate to a specific emotion, anger about politics. In general, populists often appeal to voters' emotions (Canovan, 1999; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). Scholars talk of populism as “emotionalized blame” (Hameleers et al., 2016), “the politics of fear” (Wodak, 2015), or “the politics of hope” (Spruyt et al., 2016). Recent research highlights the significant importance of anger in connection with populism (Rico et al., 2017, 2020) and populist communication (Hameleers et al., 2016; P. Jost et al., 2020; Morisi & Wagner, 2020). Appraisal theory (Roseman & Smith, 2001) offers a compelling explanation for the specific importance of anger (see also Rico et al., 2017).

According to appraisal theory, distinct emotions result from the appraisal of the situation one faces (Lazarus, 2001; Roseman & Smith, 2001; Scherer, 1999). If an individual faces a situation that is consistent with its motives, it is appraised with positive feelings; if it is inconsistent, it is appraised with negative feelings. Which discrete emotion is elicited depends on the situation. If one's well-being is threatened, the source of the

threat is unclear, and the situation is not controllable, people experience fear. If, on the contrary, the source of the threat is known and the situation is controllable, one experiences anger. Based on this reasoning, Paper 2 (see Chapter 5) explores what elicits anger at politics. It adds to this dissertation by providing answers to the following research question:

RQ2: Which role do populist attitudes play in experiencing anger about politics?

Following appraisal theories, being angry about politics requires citizens to negatively assess a political or societal situation. Politics itself might be a possible source of such discontent with the political situation. Populist beliefs express such grievances with the political system. They entail the belief that politics is a mess, the political elites are incompetent or malicious, and regular citizens are no longer represented in politics. Discontent might, however, also arise from other grievances. Two sources for grievances feature prominently in the literature: the economy and immigration (e.g., Betz, 1994; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Kitschelt, 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006; Oesch, 2008). Worries about economic hardship and immigration also reflect two political conflict dimensions that many populist and radical parties compete on (van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009). Populist left-wing parties tend to speak to concerns about economic inequality (March, 2011), while right-wing populists emphasize worries about immigration and cultural identity (Mudde, 2007).

Thus, in my second paper, I analyze the theoretical model depicted in Figure 2.1. I argue that grievances about economic inequality and immigration may be the grounds for anger at politics (see Paper 2 for a detailed discussion). However, citizens especially develop anger in tandem with populist beliefs. Citizens concerned with a (perceived) crisis, economic hardship, or identity loss might experience fear as long as the situation and the responsibility remain uncertain. Populists often depict such negative situations (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Taggart, 2002). However, they do not leave it at picturing a catastrophic situation. Populism always offers the culprits, the elites who have betrayed the good people. According to appraisal theory, if populists are successful in attributing blame for citizens' concerns to elites, thus dissolving uncertainty, those citizens will experience more anger.




Figure 2.1. Basic theoretical model for Paper 2: How populist attitudes affect anger.

Studying anger as the dependent variable is particularly relevant because it entails a series of consequences for political behavior. First of all, anger has been linked to support for populists (Bernecker et al., 2019; Magni, 2017; Marcus et al., 2019; Oliver & Rahn, 2016; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019). In general, anger favors political participation (Best & Krueger, 2011; Valentino et al., 2011). Angry individuals also tend to support more authoritarian stances (Kühne et al., 2015; Kühne & Schemer, 2015; Marcus et al., 2019; Petersen, 2010). They perceive risks as smaller and are often more optimistic (Huddy et al., 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Finally, angry citizens tend to avoid incongruent information, are less open to reconsidering their position, and process information in a biased manner (Huddy et al., 2007; McLaughlin et al., 2019; Redlawsk et al., 2007; Suhay & Erisen, 2018; Weeks, 2015; Wolak & Marcus, 2007; Wollebæk et al., 2019). Despite its behavioral relevance, research on what causes anger about politics is scarce (for exceptions, see Brader, 2005; Wagner, 2014).

With the second paper, this dissertation addresses research gaps in our understanding of how political anger arises. Mainly, the article addresses the critical role of populist beliefs. Consistent with the causal direction suggested by appraisal theories of emotions, it studies anger as a possible consequence of populist convictions (cf. Rico et al., 2017) and analyzes the interplay with grievances stemming from thick ideologies.

Finally, the paper also demonstrates how the measure developed in the first paper

could be utilized to link populist communication on social media with individuals' media usage. Previous research also asserted that populist communication might trigger emotional reactions (P. Jost et al., 2020; Wirz, 2018; Wirz et al., 2018). Especially, anti-elite messages are prone to trigger angry responses in the audience. Thus, exposure to populist messages might also prime anger about politics. This aspect is therefore included in the statistical models and shortly discussed in Paper 2 (see Section 5.4).

2.2.2 Personality and Populist Beliefs

Some authors have suggested that populist beliefs are rooted in individual psychological differences such as authoritarianism or personality traits that foster a dualistic cosmology (Hawkins et al., 2012, 2020). However, hitherto, there is little empirical work on the matter (for a recent addition, see Fatke, 2019), and existing work has focused on the psychological roots of populist voting rather than populist beliefs per se (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; B. N. Bakker et al., 2016). Thus, it is confined to certain populist parties and their specific blend of populism and other ideas stemming from the “thick” ideologies they adhere to. Hence, in my third paper, my co-author Julian Aichholzer and I contribute to the question of why citizens develop populist attitudes based on their personalities.

More precisely, we relate *uncertainty avoidance*, a key personality factor in ideological divisions, to populist attitudes. Uncertainty avoidance (sometimes also *intolerance of uncertainty*) describes people's deep-rooted tendencies to deal with complexity and uncertainty. Individuals that are intolerant toward ambiguity exhibit a heightened epistemic need to reduce uncertainty (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; J. T. Jost et al., 2007). It is related to measures of need for closure, cognitive rigidity, and dogmatism (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). In our paper, we identify a deep-rooted desire to avoid uncertainty as a possible source for supporting populist radical right parties (PRR). These parties, such as the Austrian Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ), fuse populist ideas with a radical right core ideology consisting of nativism and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2007).

However, we do not consider a personality trait such as uncertainty avoidance to affect the PRR vote directly. Instead, we argue that certain traits entail the adoption of specific

beliefs. By adopting populist and radical right beliefs, uncertainty avoidance might then favor voting for the PRR. Thus, in the paper, we disentangle how populist attitudes and right-wing convictions relate to uncertainty avoidance and political behavior, instead of just studying the association between a personality trait and support for PRR parties (see the theoretical model in Figure 2.2). By tackling the following research questions, the third paper (see Chapter 6) provides valuable insights into populist beliefs and voting behavior's psychological roots.

RQ3.1: How do personality differences affect the adoption of populist beliefs?

RQ3.2: How are deep-rooted individual differences related to PRR voting?

But why should certain personality traits lead to the adoption of populist beliefs? Research on personality differences often lacks clear theoretical arguments for why certain traits should favor certain beliefs (and, as a consequence, behavior). In this dissertation's third paper, we carefully craft such an argument based on the idea of ideology as motivated social cognition (see Section 6.1 in Paper 3). This theory postulates that our belief systems serve basic psychological needs (J. T. Jost et al., 2003). Accordingly, intolerance for uncertainty should favor right-wing convictions (i.e., attitudes that desire to preserve the status quo, retain order, and eliminate threats) because they serve a deep-rooted desire to reduce uncertainty (Hibbing et al., 2014; J. T. Jost, 2017; J. T. Jost et al., 2007, 2003).




Figure 2.2. Basic theoretical model for paper 3: How intolerance for uncertainty affects populist attitudes.

Populist beliefs might, in a similar way, serve heightened needs to reduce uncertainty. Populism simplifies societal complexities (Bischof & Senninger, 2018; Oliver & Rahn, 2016). With its Manichean outlook—politics is divided into the good people and the evil elites—it offers clear distinctions and simple explanations on how the political world operates (Mudde, 2004). Furthermore, the identification with an in-group (“the people”) might also aid in reducing uncertainty (Hogg, 2000).

However, populism, at the same time, shows proximity to radicalism (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). Its anti-elitism represents an attack on the status quo, and it often demands wide-ranging changes in how the political system should work. This ambiguity of populist beliefs—they, on the one hand, might provide a means to reduce uncertainty, but on the other hand, also contain a desire for change and an attack on the status quo—should, however, be less of an issue for right-wing populism. The radical right’s attack on the status quo is usually backward-looking—alluding to a glorious past (*the heartland*; Taggart, 2002) and promoting the restoration of normality.

Based on these arguments on how people adopt certain beliefs depending on differences in deep-rooted desires to avoid uncertainty, we propose and test various hypotheses (see Figure 6.1 and Section 6.3 in Paper 3). The basic theoretical model in Figure 2.2 also depicts the studied associations. We expect that uncertainty avoidance favors the adoption of radical right core beliefs. For populism, we suspect a somewhat more ambivalent relationship with desires to reduce uncertainty. However, we anticipate a positive indirect association between uncertainty avoidance and populist attitudes through adopting radical right beliefs. Finally, the third paper also goes a step further by studying how such convictions translate to actual voting behavior and support for populist radical right parties (see the next section).

2.2.3 Populist Beliefs and Voting

Finally, this dissertation’s third and fourth paper deal with how populist attitudes might shape voters’ party choice at elections. Paper 3 studies how personality differences lead to the adoption of populist attitudes and right-wing stances (see previous section) and how these convictions then affect citizens’ voting behavior. The fourth paper has been developed with my co-author Patricia Oberluggauer as a contribution to an edited

volume on the Austrian middle class. It takes a closer look at the political preferences and voting behavior of different social classes in Austria in the national council elections from 2008 to 2019. Regarding this dissertation, both the third and the fourth paper contribute to answering the following research question:

RQ4: Which role do populist attitudes play for people's vote choice?

In general, three strands of reasoning dominate the discussion about the electoral success of populists (see, e.g., Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018): First, the rise of populist actors is often linked to *economic hardship and crisis* (Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Pappas & Kriesi, 2015). Second, at least for the populist radical right, *identity-related and sociocultural concerns* play a crucial role (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Ivarsflaten, 2008). Lastly, *discontent with politics* offers a third explanation for voters turning to populist parties (Rooduijn et al., 2016). This last aspect is sometimes also discussed with regard to corruption, especially in Latin America (Hawkins, 2016).

Explanations focusing on economic hardship are often closely related to the losers of globalization thesis, which argues that broad societal transformations that could be subsumed under globalization or de-nationalization have produced—and still produce—winners and losers. Open markets and international competition have increased pressure and decreased job security for poorly educated parts of the workforce. Furthermore, low-skilled employees are also in direct competition for jobs with immigrants entering the workforce. Thus, these parts of the electorate should be more susceptible to populist actors who claim to represent their interests against the established parties who have let them down (e.g., Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008).

While not necessarily limited to radical right parties, these economic explanations mostly revolved around the success of the populist radical right in Western Europe. Here, the observation that a significant portion of populist radical right voters is working-class (Betz, 2004; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; McGann & Kitschelt, 2005; Oesch, 2008) fueled the idea that populism thrives on economic hardship and job insecurity. However, the discussion about economic concerns is not limited to the populist right. Newer research has highlighted that concerns about inequality, austerity, and redistribution represent a significant driver of electoral support for populist left parties (Akkerman et al., 2017;

2 Theoretical Framework

Marcos-Marne, 2020; Rooduijn, 2018).

Empirical support for economic hardship as the primary source for the electoral success of populists is limited (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The electorate is not limited to the low-skilled working-class (e.g., Norris, 2005). Also, at least for the populist radical right, other factors such as opposition to immigration are often of greater significance (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008). If economic well-being plays a role for populists' electoral fortune, it is usually more a relative feeling of deprivation rather than objective economic hardship that causes support for populist parties (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018; Spruyt et al., 2016).

For the populist radical right, the rejection of immigration was always a staple in their overall ideology (Heinisch et al., 2020). Thus, the electorate's anti-immigrant attitudes represent key predictors for populist radical right support (Aichholzer et al., 2014; Ivarsflaten, 2005). Economic grievances might still drive such attitudes: The populist radical right's voters experience growing pressure on the labor market, feel economically disadvantaged, and identify immigrants as one—or the main—reason for their grievances. However, research has repeatedly shown that anti-immigrant attitudes are elicited by cultural or identity concerns rather than economic concerns (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008). Again, on a macro-sociological level, the far-reaching societal changes described above (i.e., globalization and modernization) could have contributed to increased insecurity, which might then have led to an invigorated desire for (a return to) cultural homogeneity and strengthened national identity (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, 2016; Ivarsflaten, 2005). Through this lens, support for populism represents a cultural “backlash against rapid cultural changes” (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 452).

Discontent with politics offers a third explanation for populist support (e.g., Rooduijn et al., 2016), besides economic and cultural grievances. Populists argue that the elites have betrayed the people and do not represent their interests anymore. On the demand side, this populist criticism of the elites should fall on fertile ground with those who do not feel represented by current political elites (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). In Europe, skepticism toward the European Union also taps into this perspective. Discontent with the European Union is shared by populist parties and their supporters on the left and the right, albeit not necessarily for the same reasons (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016; van Elsas

et al., 2016).

These differing explanations are not mutually exclusive. In fact, popular accounts of the rise of populism, such as the cultural backlash or the losers of globalization thesis, usually acknowledge these differing causes, although with differing emphasis. For example, explanations based on the argument that broad economic and cultural changes qua globalization have reshaped political conflicts in European countries are not limited to economic hardship (Kriesi, 2014; Kriesi et al., 2006). Accordingly, populist parties appeal to those who perceive themselves as the losing end of these transformations because of increased *economic insecurity* but also *fear for one's cultural identity* and way of living. Subsequently, they successfully mobilize along these lines because their potential supporters *no longer feel represented* by established conservative or social-democratic parties and are therefore *dissatisfied with current politics*.

However, these arguments have been developed mainly as explanations for the success of specific parties or party families, not populism per se. Moreover, much scientific debate has surrounded one particular party family, the (populist) radical right in Western Europe (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). More recently, the populist left also came into focus (Marcos-Marne, 2020; Pappas & Kriesi, 2015). However, particular parties or party families offer specific electoral platforms. Populism is only part of their overall ideology and electoral appeal and not necessarily the most important one (e.g., Mudde, 2007). Thus, studying support for specific populist parties without taking populist attitudes into account entails the risk of confounding support for populism with the backing of other factors stemming from these parties' host ideologies.

As argued before, by studying populist attitudes among citizens, we can directly explore voters' support for populist ideas. Furthermore, introducing populist attitudes in models of vote choice allows us to disentangle the role of populism from other known explanations for people's voting behavior. Altogether, research on populist attitudes' role in explaining voting behavior was still scarce at the beginning of this project. However, early on, it was clear that populist attitudes explain populist voting only in part. They correlate with electoral support for populists, but they are not identical (Akkerman et al., 2014).

In one of the early studies, van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018) incorporated populist

attitudes in populist voting models. They found populism to be an essential element in individuals' voting behavior; populist citizens were more likely to vote for populist parties, be it left-wing or right-wing parties. Stanley (2011), in contrast, did not detect significant contributions of populist attitudes to populist voting in Slovakia. Van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018) highlighted that while attitudes toward specific issues (e.g., income redistribution or immigration) explain voting for left- or right-wing populist parties, populist attitudes represent an alternative route to supporting populist parties. Thus, through promoting populism, parties might reach populist voters that do not fully agree with their other ideological stances.

Hawkins et al. (2020) have offered an alternative explanation for how populist attitudes affect vote choice. They agree that there is no straightforward relationship between populist attitudes and voting for populist actors. Instead, populist attitudes are more widespread than support for populist actors. These attitudes represent latent dispositions, which are the breeding ground for populist support. However, there needs to be a context in which these attitudes can be activated. Activation is easiest when “failures of democratic representation” can be attributed directly to intentional elite behavior. In economically developed countries, deficits in the programmatic representation of voters or specific electorate segments might provide such a context. Similarly, but more relevant in less developed countries, widespread corruption might enable populists to claim that the elites have failed the people. If populists successfully and credibly blame a perceived crisis or policy failure on elite behavior and collusion, populist attitudes become more relevant for citizens' vote choice (Hameleers et al., 2016, 2018b; Hawkins et al., 2020; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019).

My dissertation project contributes to this emerging strand of research by studying the effect of populist attitudes on vote choice in Austria in Papers 3 and 4. The third paper focuses on support for the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), a typical populist radical right party (Heinisch, 2008; see Section 3.1 in the next chapter for more background on the Austrian case). The paper discusses how differences in the need for certainty might affect populist radical right support by adopting populist and right-wing core beliefs. In our model (see Figure 2.2 and Figure 6.1 in Paper 3), we expect that sharing the two ideational components of the PRR's overall ideology—populism and the radical right

core—favors voting for such parties. Apart from these positional aspects, we argue that voting for a PRR party might still represent a “risky choice” (see Section 6.1.3 for more details; also see Steenbergen & Siczek, 2017). Thus, to account for (at least some) of these concerns, we also included the assessment of the PRR’s capability to perform in government as a factor likely affecting vote choice. Overall, in Paper 3, we assess how strongly populist attitudes, along with right-wing convictions and performance aspects, affect PRR support in the Austrian national election of 2017.

Finally, Paper 4 (see Chapter 7) delivers an account of how important social class still is in shaping voting behavior in Austria. In this paper, we illustrate how populist attitudes, as well as economic and sociocultural attitudes or issue salience, vary across different social strata. Regarding voting behavior, we argue that social class and other sociostructural characteristics play only a subordinate role. Instead, voting behavior has become more heterogeneous, and explanations need to integrate other factors such as attitudes toward specific issues, populist attitudes, or the salience of issues (Giebler & Regel, 2018; Weißels et al., 2014). Overall, we propose an integrative theoretical model (see Figure 2.3) that includes many established explanatory factors in electoral research. In addition to answering the question of social class’s role in Austrians’ voting behavior, Paper 4 also contributes to research question *RQ4* postulated above. More generally than Paper 3, the fourth paper assesses how important populist attitudes are for vote choice and party support, compared to other well-established explanations.




Figure 2.3. Basic theoretical model for Paper 4: Populist attitudes and vote choice.

3 Data and Methods

In this dissertation, I mainly worked with two types of data: survey data from the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES, <https://www.autnes.at>) and social media content from political parties and politicians in German-speaking countries. The first paper relied on automated content analysis of social media data. And while the three papers focusing on populist ideas among regular citizens (Papers 2, 3, and 4) all employed survey data, the used datasets and panel waves vary. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the data used in this dissertation. I will now outline in more detail how the four papers used different data. In this chapter's following subsections, I will then portray the studied cases and provide some contextual background, discuss the core measures for populist communication and populist attitudes used in this dissertation, and finally layout the various statistical analysis carried out.

Paper 1 develops a measure for populist communication on social media for German-language content. The paper used Facebook posts and Twitter messages published by political parties and leading politicians in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. Social media data were downloaded and continuously updated through the self-developed and freely available R package *socmedhelpeRs* (Gründl, 2017/2020). In the paper, I used content published by 82 Facebook accounts ($n = 109206$ posts) and 83 Twitter accounts ($n = 284783$ Tweets) between January 2014 and February 2020 (see Section 4.3.1 for more details). Based on this dataset, I developed and employed a measure for populist content in these messages (see Paper 1 and Section 3.2). I also compared the findings to parties' degree of populism according to expert ratings. Herefore, I relied on the PopuList classifications (Rooduijn et al., 2019), the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) from 2014 and 2017 (R. Bakker et al., 2018; Polk et al., 2017), and on the macro-level data provided by CSES module 5 (The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 2019).

Table 3.1. Overview of data used in this dissertation.

Main Datasets	Type	Case	Paper	Source
Own collection of Facebook posts and Tweets	Text for content analysis	Political communication in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland	1	Gründl (2020a)
AUTNES Online Panel 2017	Online panel survey	Austrian national elections in 2017	2 & 3	Wagner et al. (2018)
AUTNES Multi-Mode Panel Study 2017	Online/phone panel survey	Austrian national elections in 2017	4	Kritzinger et al. (2018)
AUTNES Online Panel 2017–2019	Online panel survey	Austrian national elections in 2017 and 2019	4	Aichholzer et al. (2020)
Supplemental Data				
PopuList (v1.0)	Expert assessment	European populist, radical, or Eurosceptic parties	1	Rooduijn et al. (2019)
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2014	Expert survey	Party positions in 2014 in Europe	1	Polk et al. (2017)
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2017	Expert survey	Party positions in 2017 in Europe	1	Bakker et al. (2018)
CSES module 5 macro level data (first adv. rel.)	Expert survey	Party positions in election campaigns between 2016 and 2018	1	The CSES (2019)
AUTNES Post Post Election Study 2009	Face-to-face survey	Austrian national election in 2008	4	Kritzinger et al. (2014)
AUTNES Pre and Post Panel Study 2013	Face-to-face/phone panel survey	Austrian national election in 2013	4	Kritzinger et al. (2016)

The second and third paper used the AUTNES Online Panel Study 2017 (Wagner et al., 2018). This six-wave online panel focuses on the Austrian national parliamentary election in 2017. The first four waves were conducted before the election on 15 October 2017; the last two waves were fielded after the election. Populist attitudes measures (see Section 3.2) were included in the first three waves and again in the sixth wave. Paper 2 made use of the measures from all three pre-election waves, while Paper 3 relied on the populist attitudes measure from the third wave. Overall, the second paper (see Section 5.3 for details) used all available variables of interest from the first four waves; the third paper (see Section 6.2 for details) used specific items from various waves (i.e., Wave 1, 3, 4, and 5). In a supplemental analysis for Paper 3, additional data from a new wave of data collected in February/March 2019 were included to test an additional concept and to assess the stability of effects over longer periods. This new data has been a continuation of the AUTNES Online Panel from 2017 and is now published as the AUTNES Online Panel Study 2017–2019 (Aichholzer et al., 2020).

In Paper 4, we studied attitudes and voter behavior in four National Council elections between 2008 and 2019. We relied on different AUTNES datasets for the four elections. AUTNES collected data for the 2008 election in the AUTNES Post Election Survey 2009, a post-election survey conducted in 2009 via computer-assisted personal interviewing (Kritzing et al., 2014). For 2013, the AUTNES Pre and Post Panel Study 2013 was used. This study was conducted in 2013 (Kritzing et al., 2016) and combined pre-election face-to-face interviews with a post-election wave conducted by telephone. The 2017 election was covered by the AUTNES Multi-Mode Panel Study 2017 (Kritzing et al., 2018), which includes three online and telephone-based data collection waves. Finally, for the 2019 snap election, the data came from the AUTNES Online Panel Study 2017–2019 again (Aichholzer et al., 2020).

All survey and expert data used in this dissertation are publicly available. Surveys conducted by the Austrian National Election Study are stored with the Austrian Social Science Data Archive (AUSSDA, <https://www.aussda.at>). The social media content analyzed in the first paper could not be published due to copyright reasons. However, the scripts used to access and download Facebook and Twitter data have been published as an R package (*socmedhelpeRs*; Gründl, 2017/2020).

3.1 Background on Studied Cases

The first paper studies political social media content in German-speaking countries. Its main contribution lies in developing an automated measurement for populist ideas in German-language social media communication. As I have argued in Paper 1 (see Chapter 4), this endeavor is relevant for three reasons: First, social media provide an ideal opportunity for populist communication. Second, methodological insights for the development of dictionary approaches for similarly complex or even more complex languages than German could be gained from the paper. Third, the three German-speaking countries under scrutiny represent a fascinating site for populism research. Austria, Germany, and especially Switzerland, with its unique system of direct democracy and federalism (Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2016), vary not only substantially regarding their political system and culture. What is more, having a German-language populism dictionary at hand, enables researchers to study very different populist parties.

All three countries feature a populist radical right party (Rooduijn et al., 2020; van Kessel, 2015): the Austrian Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ), the Alternative for Germany (*Alternative for Deutschland*, AfD), and the Swiss People's Party (*Schweizerische Volkspartei*, SVP). The Swiss People's Party has been the largest party in the National Council for more than 20 years; as such, it was part of the government (the *Bundesrat*) for most of the time (O. Mazzoleni, 2014). Austria hosts a well-established populist radical right party as well. The Austrian Freedom Party has represented a typical populist radical right party since Jörg Haider took over the party in 1986 (Heinisch, 2003; Heinisch & Hauser, 2016). An established force within the Austrian party system, the Freedom Party has joined the government twice since then. In Germany, we could observe a relatively young populist radical right party. The Alternative for Germany started as a Eurosceptic party in 2013, but quickly evolved into a populist radical right party (Franzmann, 2016; Lewandowsky et al., 2016). While their Austrian and Swiss counterparts are, to some degree, established political parties, the Alternative for Germany faces a *cordon sanitaire* declared by all other major German parties. Finally, the German party The Left (*Die Linke*) is often considered a left-wing populist party (e.g., Rooduijn et al., 2019). However, the party offers an interesting case as some have

described it as a borderline case instead (Fawzi et al., 2017; Lewandowsky et al., 2016).

Austria and the Elections of 2017 and 2019

The subsequent papers (Papers 2, 3, and 4) in this project deal with Austrian data, mainly collected around the elections to the Austrian National Council in 2017 and 2019. While the second paper deals with citizens' attitudes surrounding the 2017 election, the last two papers also focus on vote choice. In Paper 3, we specifically studied support for the populist radical right in 2017, which the already mentioned Freedom Party represents. Paper 4 more broadly analyzes party support in the 2017 and 2019 elections.

In 2017, Sebastian Kurz took over the Christian democratic Austrian People's Party (*Österreichische Volkspartei*, ÖVP) and shortly after that dissolved the grand coalition with the Social Democrats (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs*, SPÖ). The subsequent snap elections held on 15 October 2017 were dominated by the aftermath of the European migrant crisis of 2015 and, thus, immigration. By taking a tough stance on immigration and running a professional campaign tailored to him as the leading candidate, the People's Party emerged as the winner. The Social Democrats could not increase their vote share and lost their spot as the largest party in parliament to the People's Party. Due to its stricter course on immigration issues and by promoting Sebastian Kurz as a renewal after years of grand coalition politics, the People's Party also appealed to an electorate that might have leaned toward the Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ) otherwise (Heinisch et al., 2020). Nevertheless, the Freedom Party achieved the second-best result in its history and, as the junior partner, joined a government with the People's Party (for more details on the 2017 election, see Bodlos et al., 2018; Bodlos & Plescia, 2018; Eberl et al., 2017; Plescia et al., 2020; also see Section 7.1.2).

The newly formed government was controversial because it again involved the radical right Freedom Party. However, the protest was not nearly as loud as in 2000, when the Freedom Party under Jörg Haider joined a government led by the Christian Democrats for the first time (Heinisch, 2003; Luther, 2003). The Freedom Party was already in government with the Social Democratic Party from 1983–1987; however, this was before Haider took control of the party and, thus, less controversial. Under Haider, the Freedom Party adopted pronounced populism, anti-immigration stances, and Euroscepticism

(Luther, 2007). The Freedom Party became a long-standing “prototypical example” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013a, p. 148) of the populist radical right party family prevalent in Western Europe (Heinisch, 2008; Mudde, 2007). Under Haider’s successors, Heinz-Christian Strache (2005–2019) and Norbert Hofer (since 2019), the Freedom Party maintained populist ideas, anti-EU sentiment, and anti-immigration stances (Heinisch et al., 2020). Under Strache, due to its nativist ideology, the party also increasingly promoted welfare chauvinism (Aichholzer et al., 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; Heinisch et al., 2020).

Thus, as a case, Austria could be characterized by the long-lasting presence of a successful populist radical right party and the absence of a populist left party. In 2017, commentators highlighted that the Pilz List might fill this void. The party led by Peter Pilz, a former Green politician, appealed to Green voters but also a more populist left-wing segment of the electorate (Aichholzer & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018; Eberl et al., 2017; Plescia et al., 2019). While the new party made it into parliament in 2017, it failed to make a lasting impact on the political landscape and could not repeat this success in 2019. In 2017, in the face of the new competition, the Green party did not meet the electoral threshold to enter parliament for the first time since 1983. Finally, the liberal NEOS, who first entered parliament in 2013, established themselves as a persistent opposition party (Bodlos & Plescia, 2018).

However, this new composition of the parliament did not last long. After a scandal that became known as the “Ibiza scandal” involving vice-chancellor Strache from the Freedom Party, snap elections were called in May 2019 and held on 29 September 2019. Under its new leadership, the Freedom Party lost a substantial share of its vote, while their senior partner in government, the People’s Party, increased their vote. Former Freedom Party voters, disappointed by their party, appeared to have refrained from voting in 2019 or switched to the People’s Party (Partheymüller et al., 2020). The People’s Party repeated its successful 2017 campaign by staying tough on immigration and focusing the campaign on its leader Sebastian Kurz. Overall, however, the 2019 campaign was dominated less by immigration than by climate change and environmental concerns. This change in the issue agenda and the collapse of the Pilz List allowed the Greens to make a successful comeback in parliament and even brought them into a coalition gov-

ernment with Kurz' People's Party (Gahn & Partheymüller, 2020). The Social Democrats lost votes (Partheymüller et al., 2020), while the NEOS were rewarded for their work as a parliamentary opposition party and gained votes. The remainders of the Pilz List (this time called *JETZT*, meaning "now") could not gain enough votes to enter parliament (for more details on the 2019 election, see Eberl, Huber, & Plescia, 2020; Eberl et al., 2019; also see Section 7.1.2).

3.2 Core Measures

Two measures are central to this dissertation. The first is the measure of populist ideas in text on social media developed in Paper 1. The second is populist attitudes as measured by the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES). For details on other measures used in the different papers see Section 5.3.2 for Paper 2, Section 6.2.2 for Paper 3, and Section 7.2.1 for Paper 4.

Measure for populist communication. To start addressing a possible source for populist beliefs among regular citizens, I developed an automated dictionary-based measurement of populist ideas in political social media communication. The dictionary has been distributed as an R package (*popdictR*; Gründl, 2019/2020). From the dictionary, different measures could be derived. The package provides functions to measure the count, the binary presence, or the proportion of populist terms at different levels. The two variables used in Paper 1 measured the presence of at least one indicator for populism (i.e., a populist term) at the sentence level and the level of Facebook posts or Tweets. Thus, the respective parties' scores represent the overall percentage of populist sentences among all sentences published by this party; and, alternatively, the percentage of populist posts or Tweets (see Sections 4.3.4 and 4.4 in Paper 1 for details).

Measure for populist attitudes. Populist attitudes were measured by agreement with six items. These items were used in all AUTNES surveys (Aichholzer et al., 2020; Kritzingner et al., 2018; Wagner et al., 2018). Respondents were able to state their view using a fully-labeled five-point agreement scale (1 = *completely agree*; 5 = *completely disagree*).

Overall, respondents had to assess the following items (see, e.g., Aichholzer et al., 2020):

1. When talking about “compromises” in politics, one actually means that one is betraying one’s principles.
2. Most politicians only care about the interests of the rich and powerful.
3. Most politicians are trustworthy.
4. The parties are the main problem in Austria.
5. The people should take important political decisions, not politicians.
6. I would prefer an independent citizen as a deputy in parliament instead of a party member.

The original German questionnaire items in AUTNES were the following (see, e.g., Aichholzer et al., 2020):

1. Wenn in der Politik von “Kompromissen” gesprochen wird, meint man eigentlich, dass man seine Prinzipien verkauft.
2. Die meisten Politiker kümmern sich nur um die Interessen der Reichen und Mächtigen.
3. Die meisten Politiker sind vertrauenswürdig.
4. Die Parteien sind das Hauptproblem in Österreich.
5. Das Volk, und nicht die Politiker, sollte unsere wichtigsten politischen Entscheidungen treffen.
6. Als Abgeordneten hätte ich lieber einen unabhängigen Bürger als ein Parteimitglied.

The six items were adapted from the items used in Module 5 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES; Hobolt et al., 2016). However, instead of the repetitive item “Most politicians do not care about the people,” which is similar to Item 2 in the scale above, an item from Akkerman et al. (2014) was adapted (“I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician”) and added as Item 6. Items 1 and 5 are present in the Akkerman et al. scale as well. For a comprehensive list of items used in the literature, see Appendix A, which also highlights the overlap between different scales.

The employed scale was intended as a unidimensional measure of populist attitudes. Thus, the populist attitudes measure used in Papers 2 and 4 was computed by taking the mean of all answers. The resulting scale runs from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating the highest degree of populist attitudes. In Paper 3, populist attitudes were added as a latent variable into the structural equation models.

Unfortunately, many populist attitude scales (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2018) feature no negatively worded items. The employed scale includes at least one such item (Item 3), which is probably still not ideal regarding acquiescence bias (Castanho Silva et al., 2020). Internal coherence was satisfactory (see also Castanho Silva et al., 2020 for an analysis of the related CSES scale). Cronbach's Alpha was between 0.76 and 0.81 during the first three waves of the AUTNES Online Panel 2017 (see Section 5.3.2 in Paper 2), and all items had loadings above 0.5 in the latent construct included in Paper 3 (β ranged from 0.53 to 0.71; see the Online Supplement in Section F.3).

The measure taps into various aspects of populist beliefs described previously in Section 2.2. Items 2–4 express anti-elitism, the first item taps into a Manichean view of politics. The final two items pit the people against the elites. However, they could hardly be distinguished as separate dimensions. While two statements indicate the superiority of the people and highlight their right to rule, they, at the same time, also reference the elites as their antagonists. Therefore, the scale might overall emphasize anti-elitism (Castanho Silva et al., 2020), but certainly, also address the essential antagonism between the people and the elites.

3.3 Analysis

Finally, due to the varying research questions and different datasets available, the four papers also followed different analytical strategies. All four papers used statistical methods to explore the data and to test different explanations. In the first paper, I mainly relied on descriptive statistics. Visualization and correlation measures helped in assessing the developed dictionary's congruence with existing expert ratings. To illustrate the internal coherence of the developed measure, I computed split-half reliability estimates for a thousand random splits (see Section 4.4.2 in Paper 1).

3 Data and Methods

Paper 2 utilized the panel structure of the data from the AUTNES Online Panel 2017 (Wagner et al., 2018). I employed two modeling strategies by running lagged dependent variable models (de Vreese et al., 2017) and, additionally, estimating random effects within-between models (A. Bell et al., 2019). Both types of models focused the analysis on the change in the dependent variable (i.e., feelings of anger) and allowed me to estimate how populist beliefs are linked with anger (see Section 5.3.1 in Paper 2 for more details).

In Paper 3, the theoretical expectations were studied with structural equation models using the R package *lavaan* (Rosseel, 2012). In the Online Supplement (see Section F.4), we also tested how robust our findings were against violations of the “sequential ignorability” assumption (Imai et al., 2011) by performing “causal mediation analysis” using the *mediation* package in R (Imai et al., 2011). Finally, Paper 4 relied on multivariate regression models with the propensity to vote for different parties in the Austrian national elections of 2017 and 2019 as the dependent variable.

After Chapter 2 has introduced this dissertation’s theoretical framework and this chapter has now laid out the basic methodology, the subsequent chapters (Chapters 4 to 7) present the four papers that constitute this dissertation. Each chapter contains the respective final manuscript submitted to the publishers. Afterward, I will summarize (see Chapter 8) and discuss (see Chapter 9) the main findings.

4 Paper 1: Populist Ideas on Social Media

Title	Populist Ideas on Social Media: A Dictionary-Based Measurement of Populist Communication
Final draft:	12 November 2020
State:	Published on 19 December 2020
Type:	Peer-reviewed journal article
Publication:	<i>New Media & Society</i>
Citation:	Gründl, J. (2020). Populist ideas on social media: A dictionary-based measurement of populist communication. <i>New Media & Society</i> . Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444820976970

Abstract. This paper presents a dictionary-based measurement of populist communication that reaches citizens directly through social media in German. The studied populist messages reflect ideational definitions of populism. Thus, populist messages appeal to the people, dismiss the elites as appalling, or highlight the people's right to unfettered rule. Despite German-speaking countries offering a variety of populist parties, existing automated approaches are rarely applicable to German texts. Furthermore, they are not tailored to social media and often focus only on anti-elitism. I vastly improved existing dictionaries by analyzing populist ideology in its entirety, including people-centrism and the demand for people's sovereignty. The paper showed how known populist parties in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland spread these messages to a great extent on social media. Furthermore, I was able to highlight intra-party differences. Finally, the paper discusses different aspects of validity and shows that the proposed approach offers high convergent validity and split-half reliability.

Keywords. Automated content analysis, automated measurement, dictionary, Facebook, Germany, political communication, populism, populist communication, social media, Twitter.

Populists are drawn to social media because they provide an ideal opportunity structure for populist communication (see Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017; Krämer, 2017). On Facebook and Twitter, politicians express populist ideas that directly reach their supporters (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, et al., 2017; Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017). Following

ideational definitions, populism revolves around the ideas that society is ‘ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”’ and that ‘politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 543).

By directly promoting these populist ideas to their supporters on social media, politicians circumvent traditional media outlets and present themselves as close to the people (Jungherr et al., 2019; Krämer, 2017). Social media’s tendency towards homophily allows populists and their supporters (i.e., ‘the people’) to strengthen their ties while shielding themselves from divergent opinions (Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017; Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017). Furthermore, social media’s algorithms favor controversial content. Such content then often also provokes traditional news media to spread populist messages (Jungherr et al., 2019).

Thus, social media are of utmost relevance when it comes to studying populist communication. However, reliably measuring populist ideas on social media remains challenging. Political actors produce a great wealth of social media content every day. To understand populist social media communication’s importance and its potential effects on citizens, we need to analyze large amounts of data; thus, manual coding often becomes unfeasible. Therefore, in this paper, I develop and validate an automated dictionary-based content analysis approach to measure populism on social media.

Existing dictionaries provide a starting point but aim at manifestos (Pauwels, 2017; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011), party member magazines (Pauwels, 2011), or speeches (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016b). In contrast to these approaches, I intend to capture populist messages that reach citizens unfiltered and directly on social media. What is more, these attempts to measure populism leave ample opportunity for improvements:

First, available dictionaries lack conceptual scope (see Online Appendix A in Section C.1 for terms included in existing dictionaries). They mostly rely on one populist message: *the elites are corrupt and blameworthy*. This message reflects only one side of the coin (Mudde, 2004): The dictionaries neglect the antagonists of the elites, *the good people*, and the populist call for *absolute adherence to the people’s will*.

Second, by relying on a few words only, the dictionaries at hand lack reliability. They fail to capture much populist messaging that uses other words. Identifying populism

in small amounts of text (e.g., for analyzing short periods or change over time) could become overly dependent on the presence of a few words.

Third, despite the longstanding presence of populist parties in German-speaking countries, most dictionaries are only available in English. If German dictionaries are provided, they lack successful validation (Pauwels, 2017; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). A dictionary tailored to the German-speaking context allows the study of a variety of populist parties. In Austria and Switzerland, established populist right-wing parties exist, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Swiss People's Party (SVP). In Germany, with the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a new party appeals to a populist right-wing electorate (Siri, 2018). The Left (*Die Linke*) is often considered a left-wing populist party (e.g., Rooduijn et al., 2019) or at least a borderline case of populism (Fawzi et al., 2017). However, compared to English, developing dictionaries for languages with more inflections and long compound words not separated by spaces, such as German, is more complicated. The presented approach should, thus, also provide insights for endeavors to develop dictionaries in similar or more complex languages.

Overall, the paper's main contribution lies in developing and validating a proper measure for populism in social media content. Additionally, the prevalence of populism in politicians' and parties' communication on Facebook and Twitter in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland is explored. I validated the dictionary against other measures of populism and assessed its split-half reliability. The paper shows that the dictionary is a vast improvement over previous measures: It offers more conceptual breadth, better convergent validity, and improved split-half reliability. Descriptive results highlighted that the right-wing populist parties (SVP, FPÖ, and AfD) were also the ones most frequently spreading populist ideas on social media; results for The Left were more ambiguous. In general, populist ideas were more prevalent on Facebook than Twitter.

The dictionary presented in this paper is provided as an R package (Gründl, 2019/2020), which allows its easy application to German-language communication by politicians and parties that addresses citizens directly. Functions to assist similar undertakings are also provided as R packages (*multidictR*, *regexhelfeR*). The dictionary enables researchers to study the role of populist communication on social media and its consequences for citizen's attitudes and political behavior.

4.1 Populism in Communication

Populist communication was defined in various ways (for detailed discussions, see, e.g., Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017; Reinemann et al., 2017; Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016). There is work that approaches populism as a set of *ideas* or an *ideology* (Mudde, 2004). Other popular definitions characterize populism as a *style* (Moffitt, 2016) or a political *strategy* (Weyland, 2001). These approaches provide different perspectives on populist communication (Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017): A focus on strategy contributes to our understanding of *why* politicians employ populist communication; regarding populism as a style focuses research on *how* populists communicate. Research following the ideational approach, as in this paper, looks at *what* is said.

In recent years, much empirical research adhered to the ideational approach, which posits that populism is best defined as a set of specific ideas. Mudde's (2004) widely cited definition describes populism as a thin ideology. Others disagree with this conceptualization as an ideology (for a detailed critique, see Aslanidis, 2016) or use different terminology when dealing with populist communication. However—be it a 'discourse' (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018), 'discursive frame' (Aslanidis, 2016), the 'content of populist communication' (Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017), or 'populist messages' (Reinemann et al., 2017)—most definitions of populist communication rooted in the ideational approach share these three core notions (Mudde, 2004; Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016, p. 2):

First, populist communication appeals to the good people (*people centrism*). The people share common wisdom, preferences, and worries. Second, it argues that politics should be an unhindered expression of the people's general will (*people's sovereignty*). Third, it depicts an ill-disposed, corrupted elite in power who betrays, exploits, and patronizes the people. The elite neglects the people's interests and deprives them of their right to rule (*anti-elitism*). This tension between the decent people and the corrupt elites has a moral or Manichean quality.

In this view, the monist conception of the people does not allow for a plurality of voices. In the populist vision of democracy, a politician's duty is to recognize and fulfill the people's true will. Populists, thus, claim to be the ones genuinely representing the people. By demanding a voice for 'the people,' populists claim to be the true democrats

(Canovan, 1999). Indeed, populism could be a reaction to failings in representative politics because it gives a voice to groups previously not represented by the political elites (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). However, it also represents a threat to liberal ideas of democracy because the populist vision of democracy despises compromise and power-sharing mechanisms. Instead, populism favors purely majoritarian democracy: Nothing should limit the unhindered expression of the *volonté générale* (Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004).

In this paper, communication is considered populist if it conveys the populist ideas mentioned. Since populist communication then is about what is said and not about who said it, populism becomes a feature of the political message rather than the communicator. Broadly, such populist messages are either *advocative* towards the people or *conflictive* towards the elites (Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016; Wirz, 2018).

Conflictive messages (a) attack the elites and (b) demand to limit their power. These anti-elite messages discredit the elites and detach them from regular citizens. In advocative messages, communicators express (a) people-centric ideas and (b) demand for more popular sovereignty. Such messages stress the people's virtues and achievements, highlight their monolithic character, and announce their collective will. Advocative messages might also demand that the elites should listen to the people or that the majority's power should be increased. Besides, speakers often place themselves close to the people (see Online Appendix B in Section C.2 for examples of different populist messages). The distinction between conflictive and advocative populist messages highlights that a focus on conflictive anti-elitism (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011) or blaming elites (Hameleers et al., 2016) does not offer the full picture. Anti-elite messages are central to populism, but populism is also about giving a voice to the people (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012).

Some definitions of populist communication based on the ideational approach go beyond the presented minimal definition and introduce the exclusion of certain groups (e.g., immigrants) from *the people* as an element of *full* or *thick* populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Reinemann et al., 2017). Every form of populism excludes a part of the population, the elites and their allies. However, an exclusionary stance towards, for example, immigrants is characteristic of a specific type of populist party, the populist radical right (Mudde, 2007). It is inherent to the minimal definition of populism that

it usually appears connected with other host or thick ideologies such as socialism or nativism (Mudde, 2004, 2007; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Nevertheless, the set of ideas mentioned above is what unites all populist parties. By tying this paper's definition of populist communication to the minimal ideational definition of populism, it captures the populist essence in communication irrespective of the left-wing, right-wing, or other ideological messages it comes along with.

According to definitions of populism as a style, certain stylistic features of political messages might also indicate populist communication. Populist messages, for example, often incorporate colloquial and emotional language or incivility (e.g., Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Ernst et al., 2019; Moffitt, 2016). However, these features are not necessarily present with each populist actor or in every populist message (Mudde, 2017). Also, communicators might not necessarily use specific communication styles (e.g., emotionalized language) as populist appeals but for other reasons (e.g., to raise attention, see Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016).

Relying on the ideational approach provides some advantages, besides being able to identify the ideational populist core (Aslanidis, 2016; Mudde, 2017). The approach provides a framework to study populism as a political actor's ideology or, as in this paper, populist communication on social media (e.g., Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, et al., 2017). The prevalence of the same populist ideas can also be studied in media reporting (e.g., P. Müller et al., 2017). Recently, also measures for populist attitudes among the general public were derived from the ideational approach (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014; Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016). This versatility allows applying the proposed measurement in integrated research designs such as linkage studies where citizens' attitudes (expressed in surveys) could be related to populist communication exposure. Furthermore, the ideational approach's minimal definition of populism facilitates comparative research across different contexts and cases. The approach's popularity in communication and political science makes the proposed measure connectable to existing research results and questions.

Finally, measuring populism in political communication also provides a way to identify populist actors empirically (Kriesi, 2014). In doing so, populist messages become indicators of the communicator's populist ideas. However, while the ideational approach

commonly categorizes political actors as non-populist or populist (i.e., they share all the core ideas), populist appeals in communication are not restricted to populists (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016). Populist messages are used across the whole political spectrum (Rooduijn et al., 2014). Nevertheless, populists should rely on populist messages more often and consistently than other actors. Empirically, such a measure of populism becomes a matter of degrees (Mudde, 2017). To identify an actor as populist or not based on the prevalence of populist ideas in its political communication, researchers have to choose cut-off points (i.e., which amount of populist ideas is enough to classify someone as populist).

4.2 Measuring Populist Ideas in Text

Jagers and Walgrave were among the first to use content analysis and manual coding to study populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Several studies followed in their wake, using different approaches such as holistic grading (i.e., coding whole manifestos or speeches; Hawkins & Castanho Silva, 2019; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018), coding paragraphs of manifestos (Rooduijn et al., 2014; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011), or coding statements or semantic clauses (Aslanidis, 2018; P. Müller et al., 2017). These approaches might provide reliable insights. However, they require extensively trained coders, are time-consuming, and, thus, often require limiting oneself to a sample of all available communication.

Computerized content analysis has the potential to overcome these limitations. However, few attempts have been made to identify populist ideas in a text through automated coding. Hawkins and Castanho Silva (2019) report mixed results with supervised machine-learning approaches. In a seminal paper, Pauwels (2011) applied a dictionary approach to party manifestos; Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) refined this approach further (see also Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016a, 2016b). Applying dictionaries follows a basic bag of words approach (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). Then, the presence of certain words (e.g., ‘establishment’) indicates populism. This approach’s rationale is simple: Across large amounts of text, higher frequencies of *populist words* indicate more populist messages.

As mentioned in the introduction, the existing dictionary approaches for measuring

populism are often limited in theoretical and quantitative scope: theoretically, because they mostly rely on words that indicate *anti-elitism* and quantitatively because they rely on only a few, sometimes very infrequent (e.g., ‘anti-grass-roots’ [*anti-basisdemokratisch*]), words. The limited scope poses a few problems: The dictionaries miss out on populist messages not captured by the words included. Furthermore, the results based on such narrow dictionaries are contingent on a few words and, considering the rareness of many included words, very few occurrences. This narrowness produces shaky results. On the one hand, populist communication might not be recognized as populist because similar words are used more often than those in the dictionary. On the other hand, communication that uses one of the included words a few times in a non-populist context will quickly be labeled populist. Nevertheless, the existing dictionaries provide a good starting point for developing a broader dictionary.

Although the German-speaking countries host various parties often considered populist, only two German translations of dictionaries exist. Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) provided a German translation. Pauwels (2017) provides a second German dictionary based on his work with Rooduijn (and also considering Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016b). However, both existing dictionaries seem not fully capable of capturing populism reliably and making valid inferences on how populist text is. Therefore, the authors recommend using the dictionaries only in the first step and then manually checking the identified text passages.

4.3 Dictionary Development

Dictionary approaches follow a deductive logic; terms are included in the dictionary because they are, supposedly, indicators for a theoretical concept. This logic makes dictionaries an attractive choice for measuring complex social science concepts such as populism (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013; Rauh, 2018). Useful dictionaries provide a very efficient way to reliably code large amounts of text (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013).

Two concepts describe the quality of a dictionary: recall and precision (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013; Stryker et al., 2006). For this dictionary, *recall* describes how good the dictionary is in capturing all populist texts (i.e., *avoiding false negatives*)—it should miss

out on as little populist communication as possible. *Precision* describes how good the dictionary is in only capturing texts that are indeed populist (i.e., *avoiding false positives*). The two concepts conflict: If more (or more general) terms are included, the recall will increase, but at the same time, precision would suffer. If only a single word is included that is solely used for populist messages, precision will be high, but the dictionary would, at the same time, miss out on a lot of other populist messages.

I developed and improved my dictionary by (1) expanding the lists of possible terms (i.e., improving recall and theoretical breadth) and (2) selecting or modifying terms to retain high precision. The next sections describe both steps in detail. In developing a dictionary, the two steps are repeated multiple times and often go together. The second step is particularly important because expanding the dictionary involves the risk of sacrificing too much precision. Consequently, the approach would label too many statements populist. Online Appendix C in Section C.3 displays the result of these endeavors, a German dictionary for populist communication on social media.

4.3.1 Social Media Data

To test, develop, and validate the dictionary presented in this paper, I relied on Facebook and Twitter data from Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. Facebook is the most widely used social media platform in all three countries. Twitter usage is less common among the general public (Newman et al., 2019); however, its frequent use by politicians and pundits makes it an essential part of the political social media sphere (Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013).¹ The dataset includes accounts by parties as well as parties' leaders, parliamentary leaders (in Austria and Germany), the highest government officials, and members of the Federal Council in Switzerland. However, in Austria and Germany, party leaders often fulfill multiple roles simultaneously (e.g., leading the party and the parliamentary group). Only content published while political actors were active in leading roles was included (see Online Appendix D in Section C.4 for details on used data).

Facebook and Twitter data were accessed through these platforms' application

¹For more details on the adoption of social media by political actors see, for example, Quinlan et al. (2018) for Germany, Dolezal (2015) for Austria, or Rauchfleisch and Metag (2016) for Switzerland.

programming interfaces with the self-developed R package *socmedhelpeRs* (Gründl, 2017/2020). Data collection started in June 2017. For Facebook, all available data on public pages at this point was downloaded. Twitter allowed downloading the latest 3200 messages per account. From 2017 on, the data was regularly updated. The analysis in the next section relies on data from 2014 to February 2020.

4.3.2 Broadening the Pool of Dictionary Terms

Building on existing German and English dictionaries, I improved the recall of the dictionary. The aim was to develop a dictionary that is as encompassing as possible (Rauh, 2018). I translated words from available English dictionaries. The semantic network BabelNet (Navigli & Ponzetto, 2012) assisted in identifying related concepts. Furthermore, for all terms, synonyms were looked up automatically through the freely available German-language thesaurus OpenThesaurus.de (<https://www.openthesaurus.de>).

Moreover, I added terms out of theoretical considerations to also capture advocative messages which express people-centrism and demands for popular sovereignty. Depictions of advocative populist messages and references to ‘the people’ in the literature (e.g., Ernst et al., 2018; Mudde, 2004; Wirz, 2018) served as a starting point. Having advocative populist ideas in mind while developing the dictionary increased the content validity of the measurement (Adcock & Collier, 2001) by fully capturing the concept of populism in texts.

Through looking at the surrounding words where a dictionary term was detected (i.e., looking at the *keywords-in-context*/KWIC), I identified further possibly populist terms. The term ‘bureaucrat’ (*Bürokrat*) might, for example, bring up this sentence: ‘Schulz is a bureaucrat, far removed from the people—an EU apparatchik.’ Out of theoretical considerations, I would also add the terms ‘removed from the people’ (*bürgerfern*) and ‘apparatchik’ (*Apparatschik*) as well as their synonyms to the list of possibly populist terms.

Newly added dictionary terms were not confined to single words. It is often useful to include multi-word expressions (e.g., at the ‘expense of the majority’) instead of just one word (‘majority’ or ‘expense’). Furthermore, regular expressions were introduced

to allow more flexible terms. Like the better known glob-style wildcards (e.g., * or ?), specific patterns act as placeholders for different expressions. For example, ‘expense (*) majority’ would capture ‘expense of the poor majority’ as well as ‘expense of a majority.’ Regular expressions have the advantage of offering more control compared to wildcards; ‘(crooked|dishonest) politic(s|ian|ians),’ for example, captures ‘crooked politicians’ as well as ‘dishonest politics’ (see Online Appendix E in Section C.5 for explanations on all used regular expressions).

Using regular expressions allowed me to refrain from stemming the texts. Through stemming, inflected words are reduced to their word stem. Stemming often eases working with texts because one does not have to account for various possible inflections. However, I encountered difficulties regarding some German words. For example, the words *Bürger* (citizen), *bürgen* (to vouch), and *Burg* (castle) would be indistinguishable in their stemmed form *burg*.

Furthermore, keeping the texts in their original form also allows differentiating between plurals and singulars, which might sometimes be useful. For example, *Menschen* (people, humans) is different from *Mensch* (person, human). Therefore, I opted to retain as much control and precision as possible by using regular expressions for capturing different grammatical variations.

Finally, I created a vast amount of new patterns by combining terms that might refer to elites (e.g., elites, politicians) with according adjectives or actions (e.g., dishonest, have betrayed) and terms that might refer to the people (e.g., people, citizens) with the respective descriptions (e.g., ordinary, have had enough). With all these measures, the list of possibly populist terms now includes 12,943 terms. The provided R package also includes this full list of words.

4.3.3 Selecting the Relevant and Precise Terms

In the next step, I kept only relevant and precise terms. Most of the created terms, especially the more complex combinations, rarely or never appear in the available social media corpus. Thus, I could safely exclude them. Next, I strengthened the dictionary’s precision by eliminating terms that lack discriminatory power (i.e., are not precise enough).

Terms were validated by looking at the posts and tweets identified by these terms. I excluded words that, more often than not, did not indicate populist messages. For example, the term ‘the system’ (*das System*) did very often not indicate opposition to the current political system or establishment. Instead, politicians across the ideological spectrum used it to discuss specific policies such as systems for retirement, the health system, or systems for financing public service media. Overall, I kept terms used for populist messages roughly at least eight out of ten times.

Multi-word terms are another meaningful way to increase precision. These patterns allowed the inclusion of precise variations (e.g., ‘so-called experts’) of otherwise too general terms (e.g., ‘experts’). Thus, multi-word dictionary terms help increase recall while still retaining precision (or in regaining precision, without sacrificing much recall).

Further steps helped in evaluating dictionary terms. Terms that are more often used by parties generally not considered populist (e.g., Rooduijn et al., 2019) might not precisely capture populist messages—though they still might. Furthermore, if single terms strongly drive the results of particular parties, this could mean that they are frequently used for specific purposes (e.g., in a policy proposal) and not necessarily indicate populism. Furthermore, based on comparison to expert ratings (see Results section), I computed the correlation between the usage of single dictionary terms by parties with existing measures of how populist these parties supposedly are. These scores also allow an evaluation of individual terms. However, these inductive approaches only highlighted terms to look at more closely; the final decision to include terms was always guided by theoretical considerations.

After selecting the relevant and precise terms, 238 terms remained as indicators for advocative or conflictive populist messages (see Online Appendix C in Section C.3). The full list of terms is still provided with the R package and could serve as a starting point for the application to different contexts (e.g., media reports).

4.3.4 Applying the Dictionary

The social media texts from Twitter and Facebook were combined to form a large corpus. I used *R* (version 3.6.3) and *quanteda*² (version 1.5.2; Benoit et al., 2018) to apply the dictionary. To facilitate the application of the dictionary, I developed the *R* package *popdictR* (Gründl, 2019/2020), which is freely available on GitHub. The package allows applying the dictionary to new texts quickly. Apart from functions to work with the dictionary, it also includes the dictionary itself, the full list of possible terms, and information collected during dictionary development such as term frequency or categorizations.

The search patterns included in the dictionary are applied at the sentence level. Otherwise, regular expressions such as ‘.’ (i.e., any number of any characters) might match a whole paragraph or document. The resulting scores are binary measures that indicate if a sentence contained a populist term.

Aggregated populism scores per party (see Table 4.1) are percentages of sentences containing a term that indicates populism. For easier comparison and to account for country-level differences in language usage and expert ratings, all measures reported in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 were standardized within countries. An alternative operationalization reports the proportion of posts and tweets that include at least one dictionary term. However, this measure does not take differences in the length of posts into account. For example, the German AfD publishes very long texts, making it more likely that a dictionary term (i.e., a populist message) is included in the post.

4.4 Results and Validation

Each of the three included countries is home to a populist radical right party. The Swiss People’s Party (*Schweizerische Volkspartei*, SVP) has become the largest party in Switzerland. Despite taking governmental responsibilities, it preserved its populist rhetoric (Ernst, Engesser, & Esser, 2017). Austria’s Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ) is another ‘prototypical’ populist radical right party (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser,

²Unfortunately, *quanteda* does not support regular expressions (or wildcards) that could match multiple words. Thus, I developed the *R* packages *multidictR* and *regexhelpeR* to overcome these limitations. They are also available on GitHub under <https://github.com/jogruue>.

2013a, p. 155). In late-2017, the FPÖ even joined a conservative-led government. In 2019, however, they were ousted from the government in the wake of a scandal (Eberl, Huber, & Plescia, 2020). In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) was founded in 2013. While less evident in its beginnings, it quickly developed a populist radical right stance (Fawzi et al., 2017; Siri, 2018). All three parties are also regularly classified as populist, for example, in the PopuList project (Rooduijn et al., 2019).

These three parties are also the most populist parties on social media in their countries. Table 4.1 shows the proportion of populist sentences for all Facebook posts and tweets published by the parties and the respective leading party officials. It also shows the proportion of posts or tweets with at least one populist term. Across the whole corpus spanning from 2014 to February 2020, these parties communicated populist ideas most frequently on Facebook and Twitter.

According to the dictionary, 3.7% of all sentences published by the SVP, the most populist party in Switzerland, included at least one populist term. This result is in line with previous research on populist social media communication by parties that identified the SVP as the Swiss party relying most heavily on populist communication strategies (Ernst, Engesser, & Esser, 2017; Ernst et al., 2018). In Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) had the highest proportion of populist sentences (2.2%). For the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the dictionary identified 4.4% of all their sentences as populist.

Results were similar for the proportion of posts or tweets. The right-wing populist parties were again the most populist parties on social media. 10% of the Swiss SVP's posts on Facebook included a populist term; for the Austrian FPÖ, it was 6.4% of all Facebook posts. The proportion of populist posts is exceptionally high for the AfD. Roughly a third of the Facebook posts by the AfD and its officials classified as populist. Their proponents often published lengthy posts on Facebook that included at least one populist term. This higher-than-average length of the AfD's posts made it also more likely to detect a populist message. Weighing the populist sentences by the total number of sentences takes this into account.

In general, populist messages were more prevalent on Facebook than on Twitter across all parties and countries. This result ties nicely with previous findings (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, et al., 2017). Facebook offers unlimited space to make populist arguments, while

Table 4.1. Populist messages by parties on social media (2014–2/2020).

Party	PopuList	Percentage of sentences			Percentage of posts/tweets		
		Facebook	Twitter	Combined	Facebook	Twitter	Combined
Austria							
FPOE	1	2.31	1.86	2.23	6.42	3.32	5.54
NEOS	0	1.32	0.74	0.93	4.68	1.50	2.12
PILZ	0	0.78	0.90	0.86	2.55	1.99	2.14
SPOE	0	0.70	0.70	0.70	1.97	1.53	1.68
Gruene	0	0.64	0.52	0.55	1.96	1.10	1.27
OEVP	0	0.46	0.36	0.40	1.16	0.73	0.86
Germany							
AfD	1	5.05	2.68	4.42	33.98	7.31	17.91
Linke	1	1.92	1.22	1.54	8.68	3.05	4.72
Piraten	0	1.42	0.67	0.77	3.75	1.42	1.64
CSU	0	0.93	0.59	0.75	2.36	1.51	1.91
FDP	0	0.82	0.53	0.65	2.71	1.33	1.82
Gruene	0	0.72	0.46	0.58	2.46	1.11	1.62
SPD	0	0.86	0.41	0.55	3.36	0.98	1.45
CDU	0	0.47	0.27	0.33	1.49	0.65	0.85
Switzerland							
SVP	1	3.88	3.34	3.70	10.01	6.83	8.75
EDU	0	1.75	1.32	1.54	4.62	2.36	3.12
SP	0	1.30	1.05	1.14	3.74	2.09	2.54
EVP	0	1.53	0.78	1.04	2.83	1.36	1.81
BDP	0	0.85	1.09	1.03	1.62	1.75	1.72
Gruenliberale	0	1.09	0.99	1.02	3.35	2.21	2.45
CVP	0	1.04	1.00	1.01	2.96	2.09	2.25
Gruene	0	0.60	0.65	0.64	1.55	1.48	1.50
FDP	0	0.57	0.51	0.53	1.57	1.10	1.23

Twitter limits space and is geared more towards journalists and pundits who use it for exchange and research (Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013). Thus, politicians in the three countries appeared to prefer Facebook over Twitter to spread populist ideas.

In Germany, the party with the second-highest score was The Left (*Die Linke*; 1.5%). It is often considered a populist party (e.g., Rooduijn et al., 2019). However, others raised doubts about this verdict (Fawzi et al., 2017). Based on the prevalence of populism on their social media accounts, this paper's results favor the treatment of The Left as a borderline case rather than a fully populist party. The Left was more populist than other parties; however, they communicated not nearly as much populist messages as the right-wing AfD.

One reason for different perceptions of The Left might lie in intra-party variation (see Online Appendix G in Section C.7 for details). Sahra Wagenknecht, one of the leading candidates in 2017 and a prominent proponent of the more left-wing factions within the party, used way more populist messages than all other actors. 4.4% of all sentences on her Facebook page contained populist messages. On the Facebook pages of the party (0.6%) and its other officials (1.3–1.5%), populism was a lot less prevalent. Thus, a very prominent figure such as Sahra Wagenknecht might drive perceptions of The Left as populist. In contrast, the party as a whole was less populist than, for example, the Alternative for Germany. While there is also variation within the AfD, all studied AfD accounts showed high proportions (at least 3.9%) of populist sentences.

4.4.1 Comparison to Expert Surveys

The proposed dictionary improved the validity of previous measures by including all relevant aspects of populist communication. Concept validation (Adcock & Collier, 2001) happened through careful examination of texts identified as populist. That way, I also ascertained that indeed different types of populist messages were spotted, and other, non-populist, types of statements were not. Furthermore, I also looked for congruence with other measures of populism. A dichotomous categorization of parties was already introduced in Table 4.1. The parties considered populist on the PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2019) turned out to also use more populist messages on Facebook and Twitter.

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

(CSES) include ratings on parties' degree of populism based on expert surveys. The CHES 2017 includes anti-elitism and a measure on where parties stand on the people/elite divide, but only for German parties. The 2014 CHES includes information on the salience of anti-elitism for all three countries (Polk et al., 2017). The first release of the CSES Module 5 (The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 2019) includes expert ratings on parties' populist stance for the Austrian and German national elections in 2017.

For this analysis, I compared the proportion of populism (at the sentence level) on Facebook and Twitter with how different expert ratings evaluated these parties' populist ideology. Therefore, I analyzed social media data from the periods the corresponding surveys aimed to capture. For the CHES 2014, the analysis considered all Facebook posts and tweets from 2014; for the CHES 2017, it included all texts from 2017. The CSES ratings aim to cover the election campaigns. Accordingly, I included posts and tweets published from the elections' announcement up to the day before the election (May 15 to October 14, 2017, in Austria and January 26 to September 24, 2017, in Germany).

Overall, Figure 4.1 shows that the dictionary picked up on populist ideas in a way that correlated with experts' assessments of how populist or at least anti-elite these parties were. The correlation between all available expert ratings and the dictionary results was $r = 0.83$. Thus, in addition to face validity and increased concept validity, considerable convergent validity for the proposed approach was established. Results for 2014 varied a little more because less data was available for 2014. Social media played a lesser role back then. Also, data collection started in 2017; therefore, not all content from 2014 was still accessible. However, even given these circumstances, the dictionary approach identified the three populist radical right parties as the most populist party on social media in each country.

Compared to pre-existing dictionaries, my dictionary performed better than the suggestions made by Pauwels (2017) or Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011). According to Pauwels' (2017) dictionary, the FPÖ, for example, was not the most populist party in Austria overall (see Online Appendix F in Section C.6 for descriptives from these dictionaries). It also failed to identify the FPÖ as populist in 2014 and during the election campaign in 2017 (see Figure 4.2). The Swiss SVP had about the same score as the Social Democrats (SP). Rooduijn and Pauwels' (2011) dictionary appeared to do a better job than Pauwels'.




Figure 4.1. Populism on social media according to the dictionary compared to expert ratings.

However, it also did not undoubtedly identify the Swiss SVP as the most populist party in Switzerland and failed to capture its populism in 2014. At the same time, it attributed the highest score to the Swiss Greens. Altogether, convergent validity regarding the included expert surveys was considerably lower with both pre-existing dictionaries (for Pauwels, $r = 0.63$; for Rooduijn & Pauwels, $r = 0.74$; compared to $r = 0.83$ for the dictionary proposed in this paper).

4.4.2 Split-Half Reliability

Finally, similar to Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), I assessed my dictionary's split-half reliability. Split-half reliability helps assess the internal coherence of the dictionary (i.e., are the included terms indicators for the same theoretical concept). It also provides a means to assert that the dictionary does not overly rely on only a few frequent terms. I split the dictionary into two parts containing a random half of all dictionary terms. Similar to the results in Table 4.1, a score for each half of the dictionary was computed for every party. Based on the correlation between the party results obtained by the two halves of the dictionary, I computed the split-half reliability using the Spearman–Brown




Figure 4.2. Populism on social media according to Rooduijn & Pauwels (2001) and Pauwels (2017) compared to expert ratings.

formula.

Moreover, I did not rely on a single random split (cf. Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). Instead, I generated a thousand random splits and computed the according split-half reliability. This step allowed me to also make conclusions about the certainty of the split-half reliability estimates. The dictionary achieved an average split-half reliability score of $r = 0.94$, which is highly satisfactory (above .8). Even the worst random split indicated satisfactory reliability ($r_{min} = 0.73$).

Figure 4.3 depicts the split-half reliability and compares it to the results achieved by previously suggested dictionaries on the same sample. It also depicts intervals for 90% and 95% of the obtained reliability scores. Of all thousand random splits, 95% (or 90%) of all values lie within these intervals. Compared to reliability scores reported in Rooduijn & Pauwels (2011) and the results from the two existing German dictionaries on the same data (Pauwels, 2017; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011), the split-half test highlights the improvement the proposed dictionary offers over previous suggestions. Rooduijn and Pauwels' (2011) dictionary only had a score of $r = 0.68$ ($r_{min} = 0.39$), Pauwels' (2017) dictionary performed worse ($r = 0.58$; $r_{min} = 0.13$).




Figure 4.3. Split-half reliabilities of my dictionary and existing dictionaries by Rooduijn & Pauwels (2011) and Pauwels (2017)

4.5 Discussion

In this paper, I developed a dictionary-based measurement for the prevalence of populist messages on German-language social media accounts by political actors. Previously, such a dictionary was not available to researchers. Existing approaches (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016a, 2016b; Pauwels, 2011, 2017; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011) aimed at different types of text or speech, and where German versions exist, they have not been validated successfully. The presented dictionary is released in the R package *popdictR* (Gründl, 2019/2020), which allows applying and adapting it to different texts quickly.

The dictionary was developed with high concept validity in mind. Thus, it includes terms to reflect the theoretical concept of populism fully. It captures conflictive (i.e., against the elites) and advocative (i.e., for the people) populist messages and overcomes severe limitations of previous attempts, which mostly focused on anti-elite messages.

Applied to social media content from Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, the dictionary identified populist messages by different parties in all countries and across the political spectrum. For instance, the dictionary detects populist messages by the

left-wing German Linke and the right-wing AfD. These results provide face validity and—considering the dictionary’s aim to measure a minimal set of populist ideas rather than one of its variations (e.g., nativist populism)—confidence that the dictionary is agnostic towards thick ideologies.

Results showed that populist radical right parties were using populist messages most frequently on Twitter, and even more so on Facebook. Accounts by the German AfD, the Swiss SVP, and the Austrian FPÖ showcased the highest proportions of populist messages in each country. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) was found to spread populist ideas exceptionally frequently on social media.

The findings also highlighted how the left-wing party The Left in Germany should probably be best considered a borderline case of populism (Fawzi et al., 2017). While some consider The Left to be a populist party (Rooduijn et al., 2019), such a binary classification diminishes noticeable differences in the degree of populism between The Left and, for example, the right-wing AfD. The Left relied on populist messages more often than other parties; however, it did so far less than the AfD. What is more, there were remarkable differences within The Left. Sahra Wagenknecht, a prominent proponent of left-wing factions within the party, communicated more populist messages than other party officials or the official party account. For The Left, public perceptions of the party’s populism might, thus, depend on whom people were listening to. For the AfD, in comparison, populist messages were very prevalent in all studied accounts.

While the case of The Left emphasized the advantages of being able to assess degrees of populism rather than just classifying it as populist or not, it remains unclear at which level of populist communication on social media parties should be considered populist. For example, a threshold stating that at least 2% of all sentences on Facebook (or a slightly lower number on Twitter) have to encompass populist ideas in order to classify a party as populist would appear to be a sensible choice. It places all parties in the populist camp, which are undisputedly populist. Furthermore, it highlights the Left’s status as a borderline case (1.9%) and unambiguously labels Sahra Wagenknecht, its most populist proponent (4.5%), as populist. However, such cut-off points always represent arbitrary decisions by the researcher, which require thorough justification. Nevertheless, the proposed measurement is well-suited to provide assistance and additional validation

for such classification tasks.

Convergent validity of the presented dictionary was successfully demonstrated by comparing the results with expert surveys. The dictionary also showed high split-half reliability. Thus, it provides a definite improvement over previous dictionaries available. The presented dictionary, however, also comes with limitations. Unfortunately, it is only available in German. However, the procedures described in the paper and the functions provided in the R packages *popdictR* and *multidictR* should allow researchers to develop similar dictionaries for other languages—especially for languages facing similar difficulties (e.g., long compound words and inflections). Aside from that, validation with human-coded material could further increase trust in its results.

Some limitations of the proposed measure are inherent to the dictionary approach. First, dictionaries usually ignore irony; negations might also be challenging (Rauh, 2018). However, in the context of populist messages, irony and negations did not appear to cause significant problems. Second, precise dictionaries will likely underestimate the number of populist messages. I aimed at including as many words as possible to build an encompassing dictionary. However, it is impossible to capture all instances of populist ideas in text through dictionary terms, at least without sacrificing precision. Third, dictionary approaches are limited to textual representations of populist ideas. Much communication on social media also includes visual or audio-visual content. It is difficult to assess how much information is lost by not including visual content because we lack research on the prevalence of visual representations of populist ideas on social media. At least on Twitter and Facebook, visual content is usually accompanied by textual elements. However, the need for more research into visual and audio-visual content becomes apparent when turning towards platforms such as Instagram or Snapchat (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2019).

Future research might also want to explore different populist messages, such as conflictive and advocative messages. Another exciting avenue for further research would be adjusting and applying the dictionary to other types of text, such as news media. Because the dictionary has been developed for texts authored by political actors, it includes terms that capture populist messages if the speaker is a politician. However, in news articles, some of these terms (e.g., ‘established parties’) might not be precise

enough (i.e., they might often capture non-populist statements).

Overall, the dictionary developed in this paper and the *popdictR* (Gründl, 2019/2020) package for its application to new texts should facilitate studies on populism on social media. It enables researchers to study the role and possible consequences of populist messages directly addressed at citizens.

5 Paper 2: Emotional Consequences

Title	Getting Angry About Politics: The Role of Populist, Economic, and Sociocultural Grievances
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Type:	Peer-reviewed journal article
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Abstract. Anger is a highly consequential emotion in politics. However, we know little about what evokes anger about politics among citizens. This paper tackles the role of populist as well as economic and sociocultural grievances. The grievances' effects are discussed based on appraisal theories of emotions and following the ideational approach toward populism. The paper used panel data collected in the Austrian national election campaign 2017. Findings from panel models highlighted the role of populist attitudes and blame attribution for the emergence of anger about politics. Immigration and economic inequality played a lesser role. Populist beliefs also strengthened the effect of immigration grievances; thus, I argue that populist beliefs represent a lens through which issues are interpreted.

Keywords. Political anger, anger about politics, populist attitudes, grievances, immigration, inequality, emotions.

Angry voters are at the heart of many narratives surrounding recent elections. In general, anger constitutes an intense emotion people experience when they face an adverse situation for which someone or something is clearly responsible (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Marcus et al., 2019; Petersen, 2010). Political anger then describes anger directed toward the political system and politicians because people feel they intentionally failed them. Populists and radical parties across the globe appear to profit from citizen's rage and anger about politics. Research has linked forms of anger to support for Donald

Trump (Bernecker et al., 2019; Oliver & Rahn, 2016), the British National Party as well as UKIP (Ford & Goodwin, 2010; Magni, 2017), the French Front National (Marcus et al., 2019; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019), and populist ideas in general (Rico et al., 2017, 2020).

Furthermore, research on the effects of distinct emotions has repeatedly pointed out that anger is highly consequential for political behavior. Anger supports preferences for punitive measures and more authoritarian stances (Kühne et al., 2015; Kühne & Schemer, 2015; Marcus et al., 2019; Petersen, 2010). Angry individuals perceive risks as smaller and are often more optimistic (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Underestimating the risks associated with war might, for example, lead to more support for military interventions among angry individuals (Huddy et al., 2007). Angry citizens are also more likely to become active and participate in politics (Best & Krueger, 2011; Valentino et al., 2011). However, they are also less open to re-evaluating their beliefs, compromising, or voting for candidates not from their party. Instead, angry citizens avoid disconfirming information and process information in a partisan or biased way (Huddy et al., 2007; McLaughlin et al., 2019; Morisi & Wagner, 2020; Redlawsk et al., 2007; Suhay & Erisen, 2018; Weeks, 2015; Wollebæk et al., 2019).

Given the significance of angry feelings for cognition and political behavior, it is surprising how little we know about the sources of political anger. So far, most research was concerned with the behavioral consequences of anger, and significantly fewer resources were spent on its sources (although, see, for example, Brader, 2005; Wagner, 2014). In this paper, I contribute to the question of what makes citizens angry about the political situation by studying two possible sources of such feelings: (1) populist attitudes and (2) grievances about economic inequality or immigration. Following appraisal theories of emotions (Roseman et al., 1996; Scherer, 1999), these grievances might elicit political anger because they entail a negative assessment of the societal situation and the attribution of responsibility that fit the appraisal patterns associated with anger.

Populist attitudes represent populist beliefs on the demand side (Akkerman et al., 2014); they contain grievances regarding the political system and elites that might facilitate anger (Rico et al., 2017). Second, grievances about economic inequality and immigration represent two dimensions of political conflict, the economic and the socio-

cultural dimension (Kriesi et al., 2006; van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009). Furthermore, they were regularly discussed and identified as sources for discontent and populist support among voters (e.g., Betz, 1994; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Ivarsflaten, 2008). In this paper, I also argue that economic and sociocultural grievances might unfold their full potential to elicit anger only in combination with populist attitudes, largely because populism entails a clear blame attribution toward the current political system (Hameleers et al., 2016).

The analysis presented in this paper employed a four-wave panel survey in the context of the Austrian national election in 2017. The panel data provides two advantages over cross-sectional data: It allowed me to ensure temporal order between independent and dependent variables. More importantly, panel data helps in eliminating unobserved heterogeneity between respondents (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Thus, causal claims about the studied relationships are more plausible than with cross-sectional designs. Results indicated that populist attitudes are indeed a significant factor in experiencing anger when thinking about politics. Grievances concerning immigration might also increase anger; especially, if people at the same time also share populist beliefs. Concerns about economic inequality, on the other hand, played a lesser role.

5.1 What Is Political Anger?

According to appraisal theory, our feelings and emotions result from the appraisal of situations (Roseman et al., 1996; Scherer, 1999). If people face a situation consistent with their motives, they appraise it with positive feelings; if it is inconsistent, they experience negative feelings. Which discrete positive or negative emotion is elicited depends on the situation. If, for instance, one's well-being is threatened, the source of the threat is not obvious, and the situation is not controllable, people experience fear. If, on the contrary, the situation is clear, and the source of the threat is known, one tends to experience anger (Roseman et al., 1996). Thus, anger about politics describes a feeling that follows from the appraisal of the current political situation. People experience political anger if they perceive that politics has effects that are motive-inconsistent, where there is clear responsibility, and where politicians have high control potential (Roseman, 2018).

Affective intelligence theory (AIT; Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993) offers an alternative view on how emotions emerge. While it is also based on how people react to their environment, it criticizes cognitive appraisal theories for neglecting that emotions do not necessarily follow from cognitive appraisals. Instead, AIT posits that emotions are immediate bodily reactions to the environment. AIT has long focused primarily on anxiety and enthusiasm—only recently, AIT also considered anger as a discrete and politically relevant emotion (Marcus et al., 2019; Valentino et al., 2011). Importantly, while cognitive appraisal theories and AIT differ in the mechanisms of how emotions emerge, the situations (i.e., the appraisal patterns) that might arouse anger are described in very similar terms. AIT also expects anger to arise in negative situations where there is little uncertainty and where normative violations by others are evident (Marcus et al., 2019).

To some degree, AIT's criticism was also incorporated in newer formulations of cognitive appraisal theories. In the theory's traditional form, cognitive appraisal patterns were conceptualized as causes for emotions such as anger (Roseman & Smith, 2001). However, newer research highlights that the connections between experiencing an emotion and cognitive appraisals are recursive (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Spezio & Adolphs, 2007). Thus, emotions not only result from cognitive appraisals but also other non-cognitive sources such as bodily reactions or subconscious priming. However, once the emotion occurs, the corresponding appraisals will also be experienced (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Roseman, 2018).

This paper follows appraisal theories in how emotions are conceptualized because they offer a very clear theoretical framework to explain the emergence of distinct emotions such as anger about politics. Cognitive appraisal theory also reflects well on how emotions are measured in surveys. Survey measures are usually not concerned with immediate bodily reactions but rather cognitive appraisals of how one feels about a described situation (Brader, 2011).

In summary, following appraisal theories of emotions, political anger describes an emotional reaction toward the political situation. Cognitive appraisal theory, and affective intelligence theory, lead to the following predictions regarding political anger: Anger is a reaction to a political situation individuals evaluate negatively and for which

someone is clearly responsible. For someone to be responsible, the situation must be under human control (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Roseman et al., 1996; Roseman, 2018). In other words, an unfavorable political situation should, at least in part, be perceived as controllable by political actors to become a source of political anger. The blame attribution for negative political situations that elicit anger usually also involves perceived social norm violations (Marcus et al., 2019). These normative violations by political actors and elites constitute their blameworthiness and are especially prone to arouse anger if they appear to be inflicted intentionally (Petersen, 2010).

5.2 Causes of Political Anger

As discussed in the previous section, anger arises if adverse political situations or outcomes are perceived as controllable and caused by others (Lerner et al., 2015; Marcus et al., 2019; Roseman, 2018). If citizens' perceptions of politics and the societal situation entail such an unfavorable situation or clear attribution of responsibility toward politics, they should be angrier at politics. In this paper, I focus on three grievances as possible sources of political anger—populist grievances derived from a populist worldview and economic and immigration grievances. In addition, I control for citizens' information environment as a possible source of anger (van der Bles et al., 2017).

At its core, *populism*—following ideational approaches (Hawkins et al., 2019; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016)—encompasses a few ideas: First, there are the good, honest, and homogeneous people (*people centrism*). The people share common insights and wisdom: There is a general will of the people. Politics should, second, be an unhindered expression of this general will (*people's sovereignty*). Third, an ill-disposed, corrupted elite betrays, exploits, and patronizes the people and deprives them of their rights (*anti-elitism*). Populism involves a dualistic and moral (or *Manichean*) view of politics; there is good, the ordinary citizens, and evil, the establishment and its allies (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013b).

One merit of Mudde's ideational definition of populism (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013b) is that it can be applied to, also comparatively, study parties, citizens' beliefs, and also communication. While initially populism was described as a thin-

centered ideology that political parties put forward (Mudde, 2004), regular citizens can share the very same set of beliefs (Akkerman et al., 2014; Castanho Silva et al., 2020; Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016). Thus, citizens with *populist attitudes* share the described populist notions of politics and the political elites.

Populist beliefs among citizens match political anger's appraisal structure for two reasons (see also Magni, 2017; Rico et al., 2017): First, populist beliefs represent citizens' discontent with and negative assessment of the political situation (Akkerman et al., 2014; Castanho Silva et al., 2020). According to populism (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018), politics is clearly in a bad state; the elites are corrupt and incompetent, regular people are not heard, and they have no say in political matters. Thus, the populist grievance entails a negative assessment of the political system and establishment where ordinary citizens are perceived as disadvantaged vis-à-vis the political elites.

However, populist attitudes involve not only a negative view of the political situation but, second, also the attribution of blame. In the populist view, it is clear who causes the populist grievance: the political system and its proponents (Hameleers et al., 2016). There is clear responsibility, and the situation does not need to be that way—the establishment and the political elites cause it. The elite violates social norms because they lie to the people, fail to represent them, and conspire against ordinary people's interests. They even act against the will of the people on purpose because they only pursue their self-interest and the interests of the establishment (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018).

Indeed, some empirical research has shown that populist attitudes correlate with angry feelings. However, the studied emotions were not about politics directly but about the state of the economy (Rico et al., 2017, 2020). Further research also highlighted that angry voters are more likely to vote for populist right-wing parties such as the British UKIP (Magni, 2017; see also Bernecker et al., 2019). Exposure to populist messages on social media also led to angry feelings in experimental research (Wirz, 2018) and was associated with more angry reactions on Facebook (P. Jost et al., 2020). Thus, based on these findings and appraisal theories of emotions (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Roseman, 2018), I expect people who appraise the political situation in a populist way will very likely react with anger when inquired about how they feel about the current political

situation:

Hypothesis 1: Higher populist attitudes increase anger about politics.

For citizens to experience anger, they need to assess aspects of politics or society negatively. However, worries about the representation of the ordinary people versus elite interests—reflected in populist attitudes—are not the only possible source of anger. Regarding dissatisfaction with democracy, alienation from mainstream parties, or support for populist and radical parties, extant literature has discussed two possible grievances for citizens: *economic inequality* and *immigration* (e.g., Betz, 1994; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Kitschelt, 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006; Oesch, 2008). These two possible sources of discontent also reflect two dimensions of political conflict, the traditional economic left-right divide and a new sociocultural dimension (Kriesi et al., 2006; van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009). Grievances regarding these aspects might as well ignite political anger.

Both economic and immigration grievances feature prominently in popular explanations of the rise of populist parties (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The “losers of globalization” thesis (Betz, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2006) argues that globalization and transnationalization processes produced winners and losers. The loss of jobs in industrial production, increasing international competition, and welfare retrenchment policies increased economic pressure on parts of the electorate. At the same time, immigration grew—increasing labor market competition and economic insecurity for some and raising the salience of issues surrounding integration and cultural conflicts (Ivarsflaten, 2008). In a similar vein, the “cultural backlash” thesis argues that worsening economic circumstances and a rise in immigration also invoked a backlash against cultural change and Postmaterial values. This backlash manifests itself in anti-immigrant sentiment and populist support (Inglehart & Norris, 2017).

Thus, broad societal transformations such as globalization and modernization have made these two grievances salient in Western democracies in the last decades. In recent years, two crises increased and highlighted grievances regarding both the economy and immigration (Brubaker, 2017). The Great Recession starting in 2007 and its consequences such as, especially in Europe, austerity programs, highlighted economic grievances (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). The European refugee crisis of 2015 made grievances about

immigration more salient (Brubaker, 2017; Gründl & Oberluggauer, in press). These grievances might not only affect electoral behavior, negative assessments of either immigration or economic inequality could also represent the negative appraisals of the political situation associated with getting angry (Ford & Goodwin, 2010). Therefore, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2: More negative assessments of immigration increase anger about politics.

Hypothesis 3: More negative assessments of economic inequality increase anger about politics.

According to the ideational approach, populism is a *thin-centered ideology* or a minimal set of ideas. Hence, empirically, populism comes in many forms because parties combine it with various more substantial host ideologies, such as socialism for the populist left or nationalism for the populist right (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Mudde, 2004). The economic and sociocultural grievances studied in this paper stem from the two most common *thick* or *host ideologies* that populist parties in Western democracies adhere to (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017; Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). Populist radical left parties combine populist ideas with economically left-wing ideas. Growing inequality and the feeling that politics should do more to mitigate inequality are at the heart of these parties' agenda (March, 2011). The populist radical right at the same time fuses populism with nativist and authoritarian ideas, with immigration being the dominant concern of these parties (Mudde, 2007).

I have argued that the thin set of populist ideas represented in populist attitudes matches the appraisal pattern for political anger very well. Furthermore, grievances stemming from thick ideologies might, as a negative appraisal of the current societal situation, fuel political anger to a degree. However, more than alone, populism might evoke the strongest anger only in combination with immigration and economy-related grievances. These grievances might provide the necessary substance for the populist belief that the political elite has failed ordinary people (Taggart, 2002).

In a similar vein, research has argued that populism often mobilizes on the grounds of perceived crises—be they related to the economy, immigration, or political repre-

sensation (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Rooduijn, 2014; Taggart, 2002). Regarding the support for populists, empirical findings have confirmed that a combination of populist attitudes with a sense of societal crisis increases support (Giebler et al., 2020). Similar to arguments about the importance of, real or proclaimed, crises for populism (Rooduijn, 2014; Taggart, 2002), substantial grievances about economic inequality and immigration might amplify the anger-eliciting aspects of populist attitudes.

Furthermore, from an appraisal perspective, seeing immigration or inequality as a problem alone does not necessarily entail the perception that someone (e.g., politics, the government) has had control over the issue in the first place and has then also failed citizens. Thus, without clear attribution of responsibility, such grievances do not inevitably lead to political anger. However, holding someone accountable provides the basis for anger toward those responsible for economic or sociocultural grievances (Wagner, 2014). Populist ideas entail a clear attribution of responsibility for citizens' woes to malevolent elites or the political system (Hameleers et al., 2016). Along these lines, populist attitudes could be seen as a "frame in thought" (Chong & Druckman, 2007, pp. 105–106) that makes certain, in this case populist, interpretations of a political situation more salient. Thus, populist beliefs might provide the necessary clarity and accountability for people to become angry about grievances regarding sociocultural or economic aspects.

In summary, negative assessments of immigration or economic inequality might, as a negative appraisal of the current societal situation, fuel political anger to a degree. However, I hypothesize that such grievances elicit more anger if people at the same time also hold strong populist beliefs:

Hypothesis 4a: Negative attitudes toward immigration increase anger about politics when respondents also hold strong populist beliefs.

Hypothesis 4b: Negative attitudes about inequality increase anger about politics when respondents also hold strong populist beliefs.

Populist, economic, and immigration grievances, while at the focus of this paper, might not be the only source of political anger. Citizens' information environment could

also be a source of discontent and evoke or prime anger about politics (van der Bles et al., 2017). Citizens' information environment is diverse; they encounter information through various channels, especially during election campaigns (Van Aelst et al., 2017). Thus, in this study, I also control for traditional news media reporting, content on social media, political discussions with peers, or direct contact with campaigns. Two elements in citizens' information environment might be especially prone to trigger political anger: tabloid-consumption and social media exposure.

Tabloid-style news media are a likely source of anger because they rely on scandalization and emotionalization (Esser, 1999). Such reporting on politics might evoke a sense of crisis about politics (van der Bles et al., 2017) and highlights misdemeanor by political actors. Thus, tabloid consumption could contribute to citizens' political anger. Social media's role in spreading populism and fueling anger is increasingly discussed (e.g., Bernecker et al., 2019; Breeze, 2020; Gerbaudo, 2018), at least since the Brexit referendum and Trump's election win. Through social media, populists spread their message and continuously attack mainstream politicians. Their supporters and social media followers might, therefore, not only become more cynical and discontent with politics (Rooduijn et al., 2016; van der Brug, 2003), but also angrier (P. Jost et al., 2020; Wirz, 2018).

5.3 Data and Methods

This paper makes use of panel data collected in the context of the Austrian parliamentary election campaign in 2017 (Wagner et al., 2018). Data comes from an online access panel, and the sample was a priori quoted to match known population distributions. The survey consists of six waves from June to December 2017. For this study, I use the first four panel waves (see Table 5.1), which took place before the snap election on 15 October.

Austria offers an interesting case to study how populism, as well as economic and immigration grievances, relate to political anger. With the Freedom Party (FPÖ), there is a longstanding and successful populist radical right party (Heinisch & Hauser, 2016). Thus, the salience of populist and immigration grievances should make it likely to find an effect of these considerations on political anger. This is especially true for the 2017

election (Bodlos & Plescia, 2018; Gründl & Oberluggauer, in press), where immigration became the dominant issue and dissatisfaction with it was channeled not only by the Freedom Party but also by the conservative People's Party (ÖVP). On the other hand, Austria is a somewhat unlikely case for anger about economic issues. Austria was less affected by the Great Recession than other European countries (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015), and its well-developed welfare state dampens the salience for economic and inequality concerns (Johann et al., 2014; Obinger et al., 2010).

5.3.1 Analytical Strategy

To test the formulated hypotheses, I take advantage of the data's panel structure (see Table 5.1). The presented models predict respondents' anger about politics in the fourth wave. To account for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level (i.e., unmodeled differences between subjects), I included respondents' anger at the beginning of the panel study (wave 1) as a lagged dependent variable. This approach then also focuses the analysis on the change in the dependent variable political anger rather than its absolute levels (de Vreese et al., 2017). Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity between subjects represents a massive advantage over cross-sectional designs. Employing the panel data in such a way allowed me to make more substantiated claims about causal relationships (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Furthermore, the independent variables were mostly measured before the fourth wave to ensure chronological sequence.¹ Only control variables concerned with previous behavior were taken from the same wave as the dependent variable. For example, which newspapers respondents read reflected their news consumption prior to answering how they felt about politics in wave four.

In the presented models, I combined various data waves to include all theoretically exciting variables in the model. Modeling anger across all four available waves would need alternative panel model specifications such as fixed-effects or random effects within-between models (A. Bell et al., 2019). However, most variables are not included in all data waves. Thus, unfortunately, these models would be limited to specific data waves and the limited number of independent variables included in them (see Table

¹Because not all respondents took part in all waves, where available, missing information was completed with data from previous waves (see Table 5.1 for details).

5.1). For example, the three main independent variables—attitudes about populism, immigration, and inequality—were only asked together in wave one and could therefore not be studied together in one model with these approaches.

Nevertheless, I ran random effects within-between panel models to test the robustness of the main models' findings (see Online Appendix C in Section D.3). These models did not fully replicate the presented lagged dependent variable models. However, they provide an alternative estimation of what leads to changes in citizen's anger and utilize all available data points. Their advantage lies in splitting the variation in the dependent variable into variation within and between subjects. The within effects are based on changes within subjects over time (i.e., what leads to shifts in political anger) and are equivalent to estimates from fixed-effects models. However, the between effects also allow analyzing variance between subjects simultaneously (i.e., what explains differences in how angry citizens are about politics).

5.3.2 Instruments

The following section gives an overview of all measures used in this study. Online Appendix A in Section D.1 shows the questionnaire's item wordings, and Online Appendix B in Section D.2 presents basic descriptives. All continuous independent variables were mean-centered before running regression models.

Anger. Feelings of anger regarding politics are measured through two items (see also Morisi & Wagner, 2020). Respondents are asked to think about the current political situation and then rate on an 11-point scale how *upset* or *angry* they feel about the political situation (0 = *not at all*, 10 = *very much*). The two items correlate well and the mean score of the two descriptions is used (standardized $\alpha_{t1} = 0.87$; $\alpha_{t2} = 0.87$; $\alpha_{t3} = 0.89$; $\alpha_{t4} = 0.87$). Using at least two cognate terms to assess anger and asking about the intensity follows recommendations in the literature (Brader & Marcus, 2013). The measure also reflects well how emotions are conceptualized in cognitive appraisal theory. Answers are interpretable as the consequence of how respondents appraise the subject addressed in the question (i.e., the political situation). Although they often use the same survey measures, other concepts such as AIT see emotions as unconscious and

Table 5.1. Available variables in AUTNES Online Panel.

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4
Field period	6 June– 14 June	26 July– 10 Aug.	30 Aug.– 14 Sept.	2 Oct.– 13 Oct.
n	4020	3141	2998	3166
Dependent variable				
Anger about politics	x	x	x	x _a
Anger about politics (t-1)	x _a	x _b	x _c	
Independent variables				
Populist attitudes	x _c	x _b	x _a	
Grievance: immigration	x _b		x _a	x
Grievance: inequality	x _a			x
Controls				
Social media usage			x _b	x _a
Exp. to pop. on soc. media	x _a	x _a	x _a	x _a
Campaign contact			x _b	x _a
Political discussion		x _b		x _a
News consumption	x _b			x _a
Political interest	x _a			x
Age	x _a			
Gender	x _a			
Education	x _a			
Federal state	x _a			

Note:

x = Variable was available in this wave.

x_a = Variable from this wave was used in the main model.

x_b = If information was missing in x_a, data from this wave was used in the main model.

x_c = If information was missing in x_a and x_b, data from this wave was used in the main model.

immediate affective reactions toward individual-level stimuli (Brader, 2011; Redlawsk et al., 2007). These would be better captured through, for example, measuring immediate bodily reactions.

Populist attitudes. A set of six Likert-items (adapted from Hobolt et al., 2016; see also Akkerman et al., 2014) is used to capture populist attitudes (e.g., “Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful”). All items could be answered on a fully labeled 5-point rating scale (1 = *completely agree* to 5 = *completely disagree*). For the overall score for populist attitudes the arithmetic mean was taken for each timepoint in the panel ($\alpha_{t1} = 0.76$; $\alpha_{t2} = 0.77$; $\alpha_{t3} = 0.81$).

Economic and sociocultural grievances. Economic and sociocultural grievances are addressed through items that express attitudes toward economic inequality and immigration. Both constructs measure sociotropic grievances. Literature has highlighted that they are more consequential than egotropic concerns (Giebler et al., 2020). The measure on how respondents perceived inequality is based on two items (e.g., “Income differences are too large in Austria”; standardized $\alpha_{t1} = 0.64$; $\alpha_{t4} = 0.71$). Another six items (e.g., “Crime rates increase in Austria because of immigrants”) measure participants’ attitude toward immigration ($\alpha_{t1} = 0.83$; $\alpha_{t3} = 0.83$; $\alpha_{t4} = 0.83$). Respondents could give their opinion about these items on the same 5-point agreement scale as above. Again, the scores are mean scores.

Control variables for social media exposure to populism. Respondents were asked which parties they follow on Facebook. For Twitter, respondents could indicate for which parties they get information there. These questions stem from the third and fourth waves. Based on which parties respondents followed, I computed scores for each respondent’s potential exposure to populist messages on Twitter and Facebook prior to their interviews. Populism is measured as the proportion of sentences containing populist terms in parties and their leading candidate’s social media content (using the approach developed in Gründl, 2020a). An individual’s exposure score is computed by multiplying each party’s proportion of populist sentences with the individual’s usage (0 or 1 for each

party and each social network) and then dividing it by the overall number of parties followed on Twitter and Facebook. Respondents who took part in the respective waves but stated that they do not follow any party on social media were assigned zero.

Other controls for the information environment. Six items measured direct contact with the parties' election campaign. Talking to party workers or being visited by a politician was coded as personal campaign contact. Receiving phone calls, letters, freebies, or info material was coded as impersonal contact (Johann et al., 2018). Both variables are dichotomous, capturing whether respondents had personal or impersonal contact with political campaigns. Furthermore, people could state with how many people they discuss politics in a regular week. This variable was included as the logged number of people to account for some participants stating very high numbers. The tabloid usage sums up the days per week people used tabloid news outlets (*Kronen Zeitung*, *Österreich*, *Heute*) in print or online.

Further controls. Political interest was dummy coded (1 = at least fairly interested), and these sociodemographic variables were included: age (in years), gender (1 = female); formal education (1 = upper secondary school-leaving certificate or *Matura*, 0 = lower education), and the Austrian province in which respondents reside (included as dummy-coded variables).

5.4 Results

Overall, Austrians were most angry about politics during the first survey wave. In wave one, shortly after the announcement of snap elections, average anger was at 6.3 ($SD = 2.7$) on a scale ranging from zero to ten. During the four survey waves, anger declined somewhat. It was at 5.7 ($SD = 2.8$; see Online Appendix B in Section D.2 for more descriptive statistics) in wave four. Especially voters of the former government parties, the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Christian Democrats (ÖVP), appeared angrier right after the announcement of snap elections in wave one. Throughout the entire period, voters of the populist radical right Freedom Party (FPÖ) were by far the angriest about

the current political situation (see Figure 5.1). Voters of the Pilz List, a split-off from the Green party, also appeared slightly angrier than other parties' voters. List Pilz focused mainly on corruption and harnessed disappointment among former Green party voters (Bodlos & Plescia, 2018). Compared to the Greens, the party also promoted more populist ideas and a stricter approach to immigration. Voters of other parties were, on average, less angry and did not differ from each other systematically.




Figure 5.1. Mean anger across waves by vote choice (incl. the 95% CIs).

Table 5.2 presents the models predicting political anger in wave four. Models 2–4 also include anger in the first wave as a lagged dependent variable (LDV), with the last two modeling the interactions between *thin* populist attitudes and the *thick* grievances. According to Model 1, populist attitudes correlated strongly with angry feelings about politics ($b = 1.23$). Furthermore, having a negative view on immigration ($b = 0.61$) and, to a lesser degree, economic grievances ($b = 0.2$) were also connected to feeling angrier.

Due to the inclusion of an LDV, in all other models, the remaining coefficients then

explain changes between anger in the first wave (the LDV) and the dependent variable, anger in the fourth wave. In this model (see Model 2 in Table 5.2), negative assessments of inequality did not significantly affect the level of anger anymore (offering only limited support for *Hypothesis 3*). However, populist attitudes continued to have a significant impact on how angry people were about politics. An increase of one point on the five-point populism scale was associated with a 0.69 increase on the eleven-point anger scale (supporting *Hypothesis 1*). While the effect was smaller ($b = 0.26$), attitudes toward immigration also remained a significant predictor of anger. Thus, there was also support for *Hypothesis 2*.

Regarding controls for the information environment, exposure to populist messages on social media was a significant predictor for heightened anger about politics. A one percentage point increase in the proportion of populist sentences in followed parties' social media content led to an increase of 0.07 to 0.08 points on the anger scale in the LDV models. This result ties well with other findings that suggested a link between populist social media communication and anger (P. Jost et al., 2020; Wirz, 2018). Discussing politics with more people was also linked to more angry feelings about politics. Personal campaign contact might decrease anger somewhat; yet, the effect was small and not statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). Similarly, tabloid usage had no significant effect.

Furthermore, as predicted in *Hypothesis 4a*, there was a significant interaction effect between attitudes toward immigration and populist attitudes (see Model 3 in Table 5.2). Since all variables were mean-centered, the main effects reflect the effect size at the mean of the other interaction variable. Thus, for citizens with average populist attitudes, a one point increase in anti-immigration attitudes increased anger by 0.26 points. If populist attitudes were one point above the average as well, the effect of anti-immigration attitudes would additionally increase by 0.26 (i.e., the total effect of immigration attitudes at populist attitudes increased by one point is then 0.52). No significant interaction effect was found for inequality-related grievances and populist convictions (see Model 4 in Table 5.2).

Figure 5.2 allows a more intuitive interpretation and illustrates the interactions from Model 3 and 4 by plotting the effects of the *thick* grievances at different levels—the minimum, arithmetic mean, and maximum—of populist attitudes. For people with

Table 5.2. Regular OLS and LDV models explaining anger about politics.

		Incl. lagged DV		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Main effects				
Populist attitudes (1-5)	1.23*** (0.07)	0.69*** (0.07)	0.70*** (0.07)	0.69*** (0.07)
Grievance: immigration (1-5)	0.61*** (0.07)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.06)
Grievance: inequality (1-5)	0.20** (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)
Interactions				
Immigration x pop. att.			0.26*** (0.07)	
Inequality x pop. att.				−0.01 (0.07)
Controls				
Exp. to pop. on soc. med. (% of sentences)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Personal campaign contact (0/1)	−0.12 (0.14)	−0.10 (0.13)	−0.11 (0.13)	−0.10 (0.13)
Impersonal campaign contact (0/1)	−0.01 (0.10)	0.04 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)
Pol. discussions/week (log)	0.28*** (0.07)	0.20** (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)	0.20** (0.06)
Tabloid usage (online + print; 0–42)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Political interest (0/1)	0.16 (0.11)	0.03 (0.10)	0.02 (0.10)	0.03 (0.10)
Age (years)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Gender (1 = female)	0.13 (0.10)	0.16 (0.09)	0.17 (0.09)	0.16 (0.09)
Education (1 = Matura)	−0.10 (0.11)	−0.08 (0.10)	−0.08 (0.10)	−0.08 (0.10)
Anger (t-1)		0.48*** (0.02)	0.48*** (0.02)	0.48*** (0.02)
(Intercept)	5.53*** (0.26)	5.62*** (0.23)	5.56*** (0.23)	5.62*** (0.23)
Adj. R ²	0.24	0.39	0.40	0.39
Num. obs.	2678	2678	2678	2678

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Note. The dependent variable in all models is anger about the current political situation (on a 0-10 scale). All continuous independent variables were mean-centered. Dummies for Austria's nine provinces are also included in the models as controls. Models are based on the first four waves.

very low populist attitudes, more negative attitudes toward immigration even decreased anger, while immigration grievances were significantly linked to more anger for citizens with heightened populist attitudes. Concerns about economic inequality per se or in combination with high populist attitudes did not affect how angry people became about the political situation (i.e., not finding support for *Hypothesis 4b*).




Figure 5.2. Interaction between populist attitudes and grievances about immigration and inequality.

Finally, I utilized an alternative modeling approach for the available data and ran within-between random effects models (A. Bell et al., 2019) to assess the findings' robustness. Although these models could not fully replicate the model above, they corroborated the main models' findings. Regarding variation between subjects, all models highlighted that populist attitudes were strongly linked to angry feelings. Also, people with more negative attitudes toward immigration were angrier about politics, and to a lesser degree, this also applied to more negative attitudes regarding economic inequality. These findings were comparable with Model 1 in Table 5.2 (i.e., the model without an LDV).

However, these models also estimated within-subject changes equivalent to estimates from fixed-effects models. Here, populist attitudes were again the clearest predictor of anger at politics. A change in populist attitudes by one point led to an increase in anger about the current political situation by 0.47 points (see Table D.2 of Online Appendix C in Section D.3). Findings likewise confirmed that immigration grievances led to changes in political anger—however, less unequivocally than populist beliefs. As in the main model above, there was also evidence for an interaction effect between populist beliefs and immigration grievances. Overall, the alternative modeling approach corroborated the essential findings presented here (see Online Appendix C in Section D.3 for more details on the within-between random effect models).

5.5 Discussion

This paper contributes to our understanding of anger about politics. The analyses used panel data from the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES), which provided a massive advantage over cross-sectional data. Unobserved individual-level differences were considered, at least to some degree, in the estimated models. Thus, causal claims are more plausible. Based on these data, I analyzed how populist, economic, and sociocultural grievances affect angry feelings about the current political situation.

Consistent with the theoretical expectations based on appraisal theories of emotions and the literature on populism and political discontent, I found that populist attitudes are strongly linked to anger about politics. A negative perception of immigration and, to a lesser degree, economic inequality was also somewhat related to political anger. However, these links were not as robust and strong as the relationship between populist beliefs and anger. Finally, I also tested interactions between immigration or economic grievances and populist attitudes. As expected, results highlighted that negative immigration perceptions primarily led to anger when heightened populist attitudes accompanied them. Grievances regarding economic inequality only had a minor effect on political anger, and there was also no significant interaction with populist attitudes.

The findings indicate that populist beliefs indeed fit the appraisal pattern for anger (Lerner et al., 2015; Roseman, 2018), thus confirming previous research (Magni, 2017;

Rico et al., 2017). Adverse situations or circumstances trigger anger when someone is responsible, and the circumstances are controllable and certain. Populism describes politics as having detrimental effects on the people and also pinpoints the culprits: the elites, often parties and politicians. Consequently, the conviction that politicians do not act in ordinary citizens' interest proved to be essential for anger about politics, even more so than specific woes regarding immigration or economic inequality.

The more substantial or thick grievances also provide a basis for being angry at politics, albeit to a lesser degree. Here, the findings clearly showed that immigration grievances played a more crucial role than concerns about inequality in society which were only weakly correlated with anger, if at all. One reason might be that the issue of immigration is more emotionalized compared to economic issues. However, prior research has shown that citizens could get angry about economic issues, at least regarding the financial and economic crisis of 2008 (Magni, 2017; Wagner, 2014).

Thus, reasons related to the studied case might contribute to the imbalance between the two issues. First, in 2017 immigration was the most salient issue among voters and parties in Austria (Bodlos & Plescia, 2018; Gründl & Oberluggauer, in press). Hence, it is more likely that one's attitude toward immigration also impacted the feelings expressed when thinking about politics. Second, Austria is an economically developed country with a healthy welfare state and was less affected by the Great Recession than other countries (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Obinger et al., 2010). Thus, it is less likely that economic inequality represents a crucial concern for voters.

Third, research has shown that populist parties not only profit from discontent among the electorate; they also fuel discontent with politics by blaming political elites for citizens' woes (Rooduijn et al., 2016; van der Brug, 2003). In the Austrian party system, there is no left-wing populist party. At the same time, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) is an established populist radical right party that has been lamenting for years that politics has failed on immigration (Heinisch & Hauser, 2016). Thus, the presence of populist right-wing and the absence of left-wing discourse might, in part, explain why voters are not as angry about economic inequality as about immigration. Comparative research could in the future provide insights into which more substantial grievances elicit political anger across different contexts.

This study also highlights that the combination of immigration grievances (i.e., a thick ideology aspect) and the thin-centered set of populist ideas culminates in the highest political anger levels. Populism's ideational thinness might explain this finding (Mudde, 2004). From this perspective, concerns such as immigration might provide a necessary sense of crisis that is important for the populist idea that ordinary people are threatened by the political elites (Rooduijn, 2014). In other words, the populist appraisal of the situation might have to be substantiated by immigration grievances to unfold its full anger-eliciting potential.

However, this finding could also be explained the other way around. Immigration grievances alone might not necessarily evoke anger about politics. However, if people at the same time adhere to populist ideas, they interpret their concerns about immigration as an intentional failure of the political elite. The populist worldview and blame attribution (Hameleers et al., 2016) adds the necessary clarity and responsibility to immigration grievances for political anger. In this view, populist beliefs represent a "frame in thought" (Chong & Druckman, 2007, pp. 105–106) that shapes citizens' perception of politics.

This paper's results are inclined toward the second explanation; I found that immigration alone plays a significantly smaller role than populist beliefs. Only when augmented by populist ideas do they result in intense anger toward politics. Therefore, I argue to also consider populist attitudes as a lens through which individuals interpret their political surroundings. In this vein, recent research has, for example, shown that populist attitudes affect how citizens perceive coalition bargaining (Plescia & Eberl, 2021) or think about climate change (Huber, 2020). Still, this study does not draw definite conclusions about whether populist beliefs reinforce the importance of immigration grievances for political anger or the other way around. Future research should fill these gaps by utilizing experimental designs.

Finally, this paper treated political anger as the dependent variable (cf. Magni, 2017; Rico et al., 2020). This conceptualization follows the theory, which proposes that emotions result from the appraisal of situations (Lerner et al., 2015; Roseman, 2018). When people are asked how they feel about the current political situation, they appraise the political situation and experience distinct emotions that match these appraisals. Thus,

rather stable grievances and attitudes could be the basis on which more short-lived emotions occur. While the panel analysis provided strong evidence for a causal relationship between specific grievances and political anger, even carefully implemented panel analysis does not easily establish the causal direction. Thus, additional, mostly experimental, research could further explore to which degree these grievances indeed causally affect anger and to which extent feeling angry might also implicate expressing more populist views.

In summary, I have argued for taking political anger seriously and, given the substantial behavioral consequences of anger, stressed the importance of studying its sources. In part, anger about politics apparently stems from different grievances but is most obviously connected to populist attitudes. Populist beliefs might even play a significant role in provoking political anger about other, more substantial, grievances such as immigration. This finding also points at an important implication for understanding the success of the populist radical right. These parties combine anger-evoking anti-immigration sentiments and populism in their overall ideology and political communication (Mudde, 2007). If these messages stick, supporters of these parties should become angrier, and they will want to eliminate those from office that they perceive as the cause for their malaise. Anger about politics, thus, might play a vital role in mobilizing voters to turn out for these parties (Magni, 2017).

6 Paper 3: Psychological Roots

Title	Support for the Populist Radical Right: Between Uncertainty Avoidance and Risky Choice
Co-author:	Julian Aichholzer
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Abstract. The last several decades have witnessed a structural change in politics toward cultural and identity conflicts, accompanied by the rise of populist radical right (PRR) parties. However, we know surprisingly little about the psychological or cognitive-motivational factors underlying PRR support. We claim that uncertainty avoidance (UA)—an epistemic avoidance motivation—represents a central motive because UA resonates with the PRR platform and precedes common predictors of PRR voting. Using data from the 2017 Austrian National Election Study, we found that UA was indeed indirectly associated with a higher likelihood of PRR voting. This association is because greater UA fostered right-wing sociocultural views, whereas associations with populist attitudes or expected government competence were more ambiguous. PRR parties appear to offer “certainty,” but as extreme parties, they also remain a “risky choice.” We conclude by discussing the contribution of a cognitive-motivational account to explain PRR voting.

Keywords. Uncertainty avoidance, populist radical right, motivated cognition, political behavior, ideology.

Recent years have witnessed the rise of populist parties and like-minded leaders across the globe (e.g., J.-W. Müller, 2016). In Western Europe, the rise of the *populist radical right* (PRR), which is characterized by a strict right-wing agenda fused with populist ideas (Mudde, 2007), has become of particular interest. These parties’ electoral success

is often attributed to broader societal transformations that can be subsumed under globalization and a shift towards more liberal values. In summary, those who perceive these transformations as disadvantageous or threatening make up the core of the PRR's constituency (Kriesi et al., 2006). PRR parties attract these voters by campaigning on a new or transformed sociocultural cleavage dimension that comprises divisions in values (authoritarian/traditionalist versus libertarian/progressive), identity (national versus trans-national), and political issues (such as immigration or European integration; see Kriesi et al., 2006; van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009). Eventually, PRR parties often portray themselves as the only ones representing the ordinary people and their interests against the proponents of globalization and cultural liberalism.

In this line of reasoning, support for PRR parties might be considered a psychological response to the instability, uncertainty, and complexity that arise from these societal transformations (see Hogg et al., 2013). At the same time, PRR parties also represent "risky prospects" (Steenbergen & Siczek, 2017, p. 123) because they challenge the status quo and might lack the capability to form a stable and competent government. While support for the PRR has received extensive scientific scrutiny, knowledge is limited about the cognitive-motivational processes underlying PRR support.

In this study, we examine the potentially ambiguous relationship between individual psychological differences in how people deal with uncertainty and voter support for the PRR. We maintain that *uncertainty avoidance* (UA) represents aspects of personality that pertain to epistemic needs to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity and argue that the PRR and its ideology matches these needs. This conjecture rests upon theories suggesting that people's political belief systems serve basic psychological functions, such as the need to attain epistemic *certainty* (J. T. Jost et al., 2003) as well as *approach* and *avoidance* motivations (Janoff-Bulman, 2009). We thus contribute to a growing literature on psychological motives underlying political orientations more generally and factors underlying populism and PRR voting in particular.

We based our analysis on a large-scale election study in Austria, home to a prominent PRR party: the Freedom Party of Austria (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ). Our data provide us with measures on epistemic avoidance motivations and populist beliefs previously unavailable to researchers. Overall, our results revealed that UA is indeed as-

sociated with voting for PRR parties. The radical right ideological core—authoritarianism and nativism—clearly resonated with needs to manage (i.e., reduce) uncertainty. In contrast, the association between UA and populist attitudes as well as party competence turned out to be more ambiguous. We then discuss the implications of our results for research on PRR support and motivated social cognition.

6.1 Uncertainty Avoidance and the Populist Radical Right's Promise

While every individual seeks to reduce states of uncertainty, people differ in the degree to which uncertainty is accepted or avoided. We describe *uncertainty avoidance* (UA) as deep-rooted individual differences in people's needs for certainty (J. T. Jost et al., 2003). UA is also referred to as (in)tolerance of uncertainty or ambiguity (see Budner, 1962; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949), the need to manage uncertainty, such as the need for cognitive closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), the need for order or low openness to experience (J. T. Jost et al., 2007). UA manifests in preferences and behavioral patterns: a desire for predictability and familiarity (e.g., regarding life events and social situations), preference for structure and repetitive tasks (e.g., in work tasks), and preference for simplicity and decisiveness in contrast to extended rumination (see Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).

So far, there is limited evidence on associations between personality traits, such as UA, and PRR voting. Existing studies on the Big Five traits suggest that, apart from *agreeableness*, low *openness to experience* (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; B. N. Bakker et al., 2016) and high *conscientiousness* (Aichholzer et al., 2018)—both related to needs for certainty and conformity—predict PRR voting in Europe. Chirumbolo and Leone (2008) further suggest that *cognitive closure* might be consequential for right-wing party preferences more generally. A study on voting for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), however, does not find any link with *risk aversion* (Steenbergen & Siczek, 2017). Overall, research in this field still lacks consistent hypotheses on how personality traits resonate with PRR beliefs and support.

We follow the literature on ideology as motivated social cognition, which suggests that our belief systems serve deep-rooted epistemic, existential, and relational needs (J. T. Jost, 2017; J. T. Jost et al., 2007). For PRR parties, Mudde (2007) identified three ideological

features that might serve such needs: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (i.e., PRR parties represent a form of “exclusionary populism;” see Betz, 2004). Based on the conjecture of motivated social cognitions and prior evidence, we argue that UA comprises two important and intertwined motivations regarding PRR voting:

(a.) UA is an *epistemic avoidance motivation* that represents people’s preference for predictability and familiarity, simplicity and structure, and a heightened status quo bias. Furthermore, *avoidance* and *approach* are said to be central psychological motivations for adopting certain beliefs and behaviors (Janoff-Bulman, 2009). The core idea is that, as an epistemic avoidance motivation, UA resonates with ideological platforms that offer a way to reduce societal or political uncertainty and complexity. Indeed, a vast body of evidence suggests that right-leaning or conservative ideologies might represent a means of uncertainty reduction (Hibbing et al., 2014; J. T. Jost, 2017; J. T. Jost et al., 2007, 2003).

(b.) UA entails the development of an *exclusive identity*, higher preference for a closed and homogeneous in-group, and possible derogation of out-groups. This is an essential conjecture of uncertainty-identity theory, which states that social category-based self-conceptualization, in-group preference, and inclusive-exclusive intergroup attitudes are motivated by uncertainty reduction (see Hogg, 2000). This idea is supported by research showing that UA (or need for closure), as well as situational factors that induce the need for certainty (e.g., stress), go hand in hand with heightened group-centrism (Kruglanski et al., 2006). In a nutshell, developing an exclusionary social identity also represents a means to deal with uncertainty.

We, therefore, hypothesize that UA entails two motivations that ultimately favor voting for PRR parties (*Hypothesis 1*): epistemic avoidance and affinity for an exclusive identity. In the following sections, we detail our theoretical framework depicted in Figure 6.1 by (a) analyzing how the PRR’s ideological core resonates with UA, (b) exploring the more ambiguous relationship between UA and populism, (c) discussing the PRR as a risky prospect, and (d) considering behavioral consequences.

6.1.1 The Populist Radical Right’s Ideological Core

Nativism and *authoritarianism* represent the two ideological building blocks that constitute the PRR party family’s right-wing core. Their *authoritarianism* manifests in the

6.1 Uncertainty Avoidance and the Populist Radical Right's Promise




Figure 6.1. Analytical model.

promise of a return to traditional values, a desire for law and order, and preferences for punitive measures for criminals or deviants. *Nativism*, a form of exclusionary nationalism, comprises an exclusive and pronounced national identity, the protection of the nation's cultural identity, and policy preferences that express this exclusive and xenophobic nationalism (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007). As will be argued below, this ideological core serves an epistemic avoidance motivation and the formation of exclusive identities.

Nativist, especially anti-immigrant, sentiments serve as a mental reduction of societal complexity by applying (prejudiced) abstractions of social out-groups (Allport, 1954). Furthermore, as argued by Steenbergen & Siczek (2017), people seeking to avoid uncertainty are more likely to frame immigration as a challenge rather than an opportunity. UA also favors the development of an exclusive identity, which the PRR's national identity (e.g., Hooghe & Marks, 2004) provides. The PRR's agenda does not necessarily include support for leaving the European Union, but their nativism is often expressed in preferences for strong and sovereign nation-states as well as less European integration (Mudde, 2007). Because European integration brings about increasing political and

cultural complexity, the PRR's focus on sovereign nation-states should add to its appeal for citizens who long to reduce uncertainty.

The PRR's *authoritarian* stance blends into the nativist worldview (Mudde, 2007) and appeals to individuals with greater UA in various ways. First, an individual's (right-wing) authoritarianism as an ideological attitude (RWA; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010) or "status quo conservatism" (Stenner, 2009) follows from motivations to seek group security, stability in societal order, and resistance to social change. These motivations are responsible for "intolerance of difference" and the goal to "minimize diversity" (Stenner, 2009) and, hence, favor an exclusionary social identity. Second, authoritarianism can be described as an avoidance- or prevention-based motivation in the interest of protecting one's group from harm (Janoff-Bulman, 2009). Third, facets of cognitive closure that tie in with the concept of UA, namely, the need for simple structure and predictability, relate very clearly to RWA (Cornelis & van Hiel, 2006; van Hiel et al., 2004).

Overall, this ideological core represents the sociocultural dimension along which PRR parties mobilize voters (Kriesi et al., 2006; van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009). We, therefore, hypothesize that individuals scoring high in UA will more readily adopt radical right core beliefs (*Hypothesis 2*).

6.1.2 The Role of Populism

Populism is the second building block of the overall ideology, complementing the right-wing core beliefs (i.e., the thick ideology). Following Mudde's (2007, p. 23) now famous definition, populism is a "thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people." The populist message thus offers clear distinctions and simple explanations of how the political world operates (Mudde, 2004)—often also in simple language (Bischof & Senninger, 2018).

There are good reasons to believe that populism adds to the attractiveness of the PRR. First, its simplicity should speak to people high in UA. Furthermore, populism is in large part a story about group-centrism: it emphasizes the people as a collective, their homogeneity, and the paramount importance of their views (Mudde, 2004; J.-W. Müller,

2016). By allowing social identification with and assimilation to a group (“the people”), populism might offer a psychological means for uncertainty reduction.

However, populism is also a challenge to the status quo. By demanding wide-ranging sovereignty for the people, populism challenges established institutions in liberal democracy. Furthermore, disregard for political or societal elites is inherent to populist ideas (Mudde, 2004). This characteristic might dampen populism’s appeal to individuals high in UA because they disproportionately prefer the status quo over the uncertainty of change, a form of “status quo bias” (e.g., Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). In summary, the role of populism is ambiguous. Due to its simplicity and group-centrism, we expect populism to resonate with UA (*Hypothesis 4a*), whereas its challenge to the status quo could alienate individuals longing for certainty (*Hypothesis 4b*).

Now, how are the PRR’s ideological components—the radical right core and the populist beliefs—connected? In case of the PRR, populist attacks on the status quo often allude to a return to an idealized past, which is centered around nativist and authoritarian ideas and contrasts an “uncontrollable” present (Rydgren, 2017). Therefore, the adoption of populist beliefs might be contingent on the adoption of the PRR’s radical right core ideology. There is no contradiction between UA and the radical right’s populist demands for change. We, therefore, expect that UA is at least indirectly associated with more populist attitudes—as far as they are driven by the radical right core ideology (*Hypothesis 6*).

6.1.3 The Populist Radical Right as a Risky Prospect

Voters seeking certainty might be less willing to support parties characterized by uncertainty and change (Kam & Simas, 2012). As argued by Steenbergen and Siczek (2017, p. 123), PRR parties, although appealing to citizens’ feelings of uncertainty, represent somewhat “risky prospects” that could repel people high in UA. As mentioned before, these parties’ populist stance is an attack on the political status quo and, therefore, might be a source of uncertainty. The specific radical and populist stance of the PRR often makes them succeed in opposition to other parties, while these features might make their long-term success in government questionable (Heinisch, 2003). Therefore, uncertainty might also stem from worries about their ability to deliver stable and competent

government because of their perceived inexperience, lack of expertise and qualified personnel, or radicalism—especially in coalition governments.

Voters usually consider the past or anticipated performance, alongside positional aspects, when forming party preferences (Sanders et al., 2011). This approach, however, is commonly neglected in cognitive-motivational models that focus exclusively on ideological congruence with parties. While it is open to debate whether voters' assessment of party competence is endogenous to their party preference or vice versa, it is important to note that voters might see positional distance and (possible) performance as related but distinct assessments. We might, thus, find a negative direct relationship between UA and the assessment of PRR parties' competence (*Hypothesis 3*) when, at the same time, considering ideological closeness (*Hypothesis 5*).

In summary, we would assume that voters high in UA favor PRR parties because their core ideology provides a means to deal with uncertainty. Following our argument that PRR parties also represent somewhat “risky prospects,” higher UA, at the same time, might be a hindrance to voting for PRR parties. Thus, voters face a tradeoff between uncertainty reduction by PRR parties and the risks associated with them.

6.1.4 Behavioral Consequences: Populist Radical Right Voting

We argue that UA not only favors the adoption of the PRR ideology but eventually becomes consequential for people's voting behavior. Nonetheless, we expect UA to act only indirectly, mainly through ideological attitudes that are essential predictors for PRR voting (for similar models see, e.g., Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Chirumbolo & Leone, 2010; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010).

Extant literature quite unequivocally shows that the most consistent predictors of PRR voting are perceived threats by immigrants or disapproval of immigration (e.g., Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Oesch, 2008; Rooduijn, 2018) and exclusive nationalism (Dunn, 2015; Lubbers & Coenders, 2017). Furthermore, it has repeatedly been shown that authoritarianism is—at least indirectly—consequential for PRR voting (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Dunn, 2015). In Europe, the rejection of the EU is also a common denominator of the PRR vote choice (Hobolt, 2015; Werts et al., 2013). In sum, these ideological core beliefs make voting for

the PRR more likely and ultimately mediate the effect of UA (*Hypothesis 7*).

Research on the consequences of individuals' populist beliefs for their voting behavior is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, it has shown that populist ideas, anti-elitism, and distrust in politicians matter because they represent a common denominator that drives voting for any populist party (Rooduijn, 2018; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018). Even though populism might play a subordinate role in the PRR's overall ideology, we expect it to be consequential for vote choice and to mediate the effect of UA as well (*Hypothesis 9*).

Apart from these positional aspects, a positive assessment of the PRR's capability in government should enhance the likelihood of voting for the PRR (*Hypothesis 8*). Alternative explanations for PRR support, such as generational differences, formal education, a gender gap, or economic pressures, are accounted for by including sociodemographic and socioeconomic aspects as controls in our analytical model (see again Figure 6.1).

6.2 Data and Methods

We test our model with voter data collected in the context of the Austrian parliamentary election campaign in 2017. Austria hosts a very successful and "prototypical" PRR party (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013a, p. 155), the Freedom Party of Austria (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ). Starting in the mid-1980s, the FPÖ has built a strong populist stance (Luther, 2007). It now relies increasingly on nativist anti-immigrant sentiments and welfare chauvinism (Aichholzer et al., 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016).

6.2.1 Sample

The survey was conducted by the Austrian National Election Study and is available online (Wagner et al., 2018). Respondents were recruited using a commercial online access panel. The sample was a priori quoted to match known population distributions from census data in 2016. Hence, the sample was heterogeneous regarding age ($Min = 16$, $Max = 85$, $Mean = 42$, $SD = 15$), gender (49% male), and formal education.

6.2.2 Measures

The survey was designed as a panel study. Sociodemographic variables were collected in the first wave of the panel or upon panel (re-)entry for fresh respondents. Vote choice for the FPÖ was measured shortly after the election on October 15, 2017 (fifth wave); all other variables stem from the third and fourth wave. Supplemental analysis also made use of variables from waves six and seven (see Appendix E.1 for the questionnaire items on uncertainty avoidance; Online Supplements S1 in Section F.1 and S2 in Section F.2 provide further details on all other measures and the panel waves).

Uncertainty avoidance (UA). To measure uncertainty avoidance, we applied a rating scale format that avoids the commonly used agree/disagree Likert-type format, because it is known to be prone to response biases. Portions of items were selected from established German ambiguity intolerance and cognitive closure scales (Dalbert, 1999; Schlink & Walther, 2007). The items describe very general behavioral tendencies and preferences unrelated to political beliefs. Each item uses directly opposed statements (e.g., “I can deal very well with unknown and unpredictable situations” vs. “I prefer situations that I am familiar with, that I know well”). Overall, respondents were presented with six sets of oppositely worded self-descriptions and had to place themselves between them using a 6-point rating scale (see Appendix E.1).

Radical right ideological core. We estimated radical right core attitudes as a second-order factor, which summarizes authoritarianism, anti-immigrant attitudes, rejection of European integration, and exclusive nationalism as first-order factors in a structural equation model.

Authoritarianism. Five Likert items were selected from a short German scale that taps into social attitudes described as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Aichholzer & Zeglövits, 2015), such as “Our society has to crack down harder on criminals for once.”

Anti-immigration attitudes. We use six commonly used Likert items to measure anti-immigration attitudes (e.g., “Immigrants should adapt to Austrian customs and tradi-

tions”).

Anti-EU attitudes. We make use of a standard survey question, asking whether unification *should be pushed further* (0) or *has already gone too far* (10) ($Mean = 6$, $SD = 3.2$).

Exclusive nationalism. We measure exclusive nationalism by taking the simple difference of the strength (4-point scale) of attachment with the nation and Europe (i.e., $exclusive\ nationalism = attachment_{nation} - attachment_{Europe}$). High scores, thus, represent exclusive national attachment ($Mean = .6$, $SD = 1$).

Populist attitudes. Our populist attitude measure aims at capturing three interrelated subdimensions of populist attitudes: anti-elitism, belief in the homogeneity and virtuousness of the people, and a preference for wide-ranging popular sovereignty (Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2018). A set of six Likert items (adapted from Hobolt et al., 2016) was selected (e.g., “The people should make important political decisions, not politicians”). All items could be answered on a fully labeled 5-point rating scale (1 = *agree completely*, 5 = *disagree completely*).

Government competence. People’s expectations regarding the parties’ performance in government was captured on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 = *would do a very bad job* to 10 = *would do a very good job in government* ($Mean = 4.8$, $SD = 3.4$).

Support for a PRR party. As our dependent variable, we use actual vote choice for the Freedom Party (1 = FPÖ, 0 = *other*; including all respondents who cast a valid vote). Of the respondents in the final sample, 32% reported a vote for the FPÖ. Second, we investigated the propensity to vote (PTV) for the FPÖ before the election, which is measured on an 11-point scale ranging from *highly unlikely* (0) to *very likely* (10) ($Mean = 4.1$, $SD = 4$).

Controls. In addition, we included the following sociodemographic variables as controls: *age* (in years), *gender* (1 = *female*), *formal education* (1 = at least upper secondary school-leaving certificate or *Matura* in Austria), and *subjective income situation* (1 = *get along [very] well*, 0 = *get along with [great] difficulty*).

6.2.3 Analysis

We analyzed our data using structural equation modeling, which, on the one hand, allows taking measurement errors that disturb the associations between the constructs into account and, on the other hand, allows studying the effect of UA on and mediation through ideological variables. Identifying mediational patterns is generally tricky; it relies upon the assumption of “sequential ignorability” or, in other words, no problems due to unmeasured confounding (Imai et al., 2011). We, therefore, first, included variables known to drive populist support as well as sociodemographic controls in our models to make these assumptions more plausible. Second, sensitivity analyses proposed by Imai et al. (2011) were conducted, which lend support to the robustness of our main findings towards violations of these assumptions (see Online Supplement S4 in Section F.4).

For our analysis, we used the software R (version 3.6) with the lavaan package (version 0.6-3) and calculated diagonally weighted least squares (DWLS) estimation for vote choice as the dependent variable and maximum likelihood (ML) estimation for PTV. Both models were computed with robust standard errors and mean-and-variance adjusted test statistics (Rosseel, 2012).

6.3 Results

We examined the impact of differences in UA on voting for a PRR party and how this effect is mediated by ideological core beliefs and populist attitudes as well as performance considerations. Figure 6.2 illustrates the structural equation model we used to test our hypotheses (for more detailed results, see Online Supplement S3 in Section F.3). According to the CFI and RMSEA fit statistics, our specifications indicated a good fit to the data.

Our results suggested a significant overall effect of UA on PRR voting ($\beta_{\text{total}} = .11$), thus corroborating *Hypothesis 1*. This *total* effect is distinct from the *direct* effect ($\beta_{\text{direct}} = .06$, n.s.) because it additionally includes *all indirect* effects ($\beta_{\text{indirect}} = .18$; see Table 6.1). Regarding specific indirect effects, the association between voting for PRR parties and UA ran mainly through radical right core attitudes rather than populist attitudes (see Table 6.1).




Figure 6.2. Structural equation model for PRR vote choice. PRR Government Competence and Populism are allowed to covary, the correlation ($-.14^{***}$ $[-.21, -.07]$) is not depicted. Entries are standardized regression coefficients. R^2 represents proportions of the outcome variables' variation explained by the model. The arrows' thickness in the structural model visually represents the effect size. 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. Two-tailed significance levels: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

The substantial indirect effect through radical right core attitudes resulted from both our *Hypotheses 2* and *7* being confirmed by our model. The radical right core—consisting of authoritarianism and nativism—was associated with the need to deal with uncertainty ($\beta = .29$). Furthermore, such attitudes were also highly consequential for PRR voting ($\beta = .35$).

As projected, voters' expectations about the FPÖ's performance in government were a strong predictor for people's vote choice ($\beta = .51$), thus confirming *Hypothesis 8*. In part, these performance expectations also mediated the effect of UA on voting. However, this happened mainly through the affinity for ideological core beliefs ($\beta_{\text{indirect}} = .11$), which were associated with a better assessment of the FPÖ's prospects in government ($\beta = .74$; supporting *Hypothesis 5*). In turn, the direct effect of UA on the evaluation of government competence was negative ($\beta = -.08$; supporting *Hypothesis 3*). Controlling for ideological closeness, UA increased a person's doubt about the PRR party's ability to deliver a good and stable government.

Based on our model and consistent with *Hypothesis 9*, populist attitudes were somewhat consequential for PRR voting in Austria ($\beta = .12$). However, the effect is small compared to people's right-wing beliefs and anticipated government performance. In line with our expectations, the way populist attitudes reflected individuals' needs to deal with uncertainty is more ambiguous (see *Hypothesis 4*). Overall, our model yielded only a small positive but not statistically significant effect of UA on the adoption of populist attitudes ($\beta_{\text{total}} = .06$). However, looking at the direct effect estimates, higher UA lowers the appeal of populist beliefs ($\beta_{\text{direct}} = -.12$). Instead, a positive association between UA and populist attitudes was contingent on the connection with right-wing beliefs ($\beta_{\text{indirect}} = .18$; confirming *Hypothesis 2*).

Since a binary measure of vote choice might blur certain associations, we reran our model with a larger sample predicting the propensity to vote (PTV) for the FPÖ instead (see Figure 6.3). Overall, the PTV model corroborates our findings for vote choice, although subtle differences exist. The model lends no support to *Hypothesis 9*; populist attitudes are not significantly associated with PTV ($\beta = .02$). Compared to actual vote choice, ideological core beliefs appeared less consequential, whereas performance expectations were more influential for PTV. Furthermore, the variables we included

Table 6.1. Direct and indirect effects of uncertainty avoidance.

Effect of UA on populism	Vote for PRR party					PTV for PRR party				
	β	p	SE	95%-CI		β	p	SE	95%-CI	
				Lower	Upper				Lower	Upper
UA → populism (total)	0.06	0.054	0.03	-0.001	0.12	0.02	0.58	0.03	-0.04	0.07
UA → populism (direct)	-0.12	<.001	0.03	-0.18	-0.07	-0.13	<.001	0.03	-0.18	-0.08
UA → RR core → populism	0.18	<.001	0.02	0.14	0.23	0.15	<.001	0.02	0.11	0.19
Effect of UA on gov. compet.										
UA → gov. compet. (total)	0.14	<.001	0.03	0.08	0.19	0.1	<.001	0.03	0.04	0.15
UA → gov. compet. (direct)	-0.08	0.001	0.02	-0.12	-0.03	-0.07	0.002	0.02	-0.11	-0.02
UA → RR core → gov. compet.	0.21	<.001	0.02	0.17	0.26	0.16	<.001	0.02	0.12	0.21
Effect of UA on PRR support										
UA → PRR support (total)	0.11	0.003	0.04	0.04	0.19	0.09	<.001	0.03	0.04	0.15
UA → PRR support (direct)	-0.06	0.057	0.03	-0.13	0.002	-0.02	0.209	0.02	-0.06	0.01
UA → PRR support (all indirect)	0.18	<.001	0.03	0.12	0.23	0.11	<.001	0.02	0.07	0.16
Indirect effects of UA on PRR support										
UA → RR core → PRR support	0.1	<.001	0.02	0.06	0.14	0.05	<.001	0.01	0.03	0.08
UA → RR core → populism → PRR support	0.02	0.004	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.003	0.445	0.004	-0.004	0.01
UA → RR core → gov. compet. → PRR support	0.11	<.001	0.01	0.08	0.14	0.1	<.001	0.01	0.07	0.13
UA → RR core → PRR support (total incl. → populism & gov. compet.)	0.23	<.001	0.03	0.18	0.28	0.16	<.001	0.02	0.12	0.2
UA → populism → PRR support	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.003	-0.002	0.449	0.003	-0.01	0.004
UA → gov. compet. → PRR support	-0.04	0.001	0.01	-0.06	-0.02	-0.04	0.002	0.01	-0.07	-0.02

Note. Coefficients (β) are standardized regression coefficients from DWLS estimation (vote choice) or ML estimation (PTV). PRR = populist radical right, PTV = propensity to vote, UA = uncertainty avoidance, populism = populist attitudes, RR core = radical right ideological core, gov. compet. = (expected) competence of PRR party in government.

fully mediated the effect of UA on PTV ($\beta_{\text{direct}} = -.02$, n.s.), for vote choice a small direct effect remained ($\beta_{\text{direct}} = -.06$, $p = .06$).

6.3.1 Supplemental Analysis

Using an additional panel wave more than sixteen months after the election (wave seven, conducted February/March 2019) allows us to, on the one hand, scrutinize how stable the effect of UA on PRR support is over time and, on the other hand, compare the impact of UA to respondents' risk-taking propensity (see, e.g., Steenbergen & Siczek, 2017). The measure for UA is the same as before (wave three), whereas the measure for risk-taking propensity was included in the sixth panel wave (December 2017); all other indicators and the dependent variables stem from wave seven. Detailed results from this supplemental analysis are presented in Appendix E.2.

The supplemental analysis proved that the association between UA and PRR support remained relatively stable over time. Even with data collected about 18 months later, those high in UA in wave three were, on average, more likely to express support for




Figure 6.3. Structural equation model for the propensity to vote for a PRR party. PRR Government Competence and Populism are allowed to covary, the correlation ($-.16^{***}$ $[-.23, -.09]$) is not depicted. Entries are standardized regression coefficients. R^2 represents proportions of the outcome variables' variation explained by the model. The arrows' thickness in the structural model visually represents the effect size. 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. Two-tailed significance levels: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

the PRR ($\beta_{\text{total}} = .13$ for prospective vote choice; $\beta_{\text{total}} = .10$ for PTV). At this point, the FPÖ had been in government for more than a year. Two additional observations can be made from this fact: no significant association between UA and the assessment of the *actual* government competence existed when controlling for right-wing beliefs, as compared to how well the party *might* do in government. Also, populist (or anti-elite) attitudes were less intertwined with right-wing ideological beliefs (i.e., the proposed indirect pathway for UA was less important), whereas the direct association between UA and populist attitudes was still negative (see the PTV model).

Finally, the inclusion of risk-taking propensity in the model did not impair UA's explanatory power. Although risk-taking propensity correlated strongly with UA ($r = -.51$ in vote choice model; $r = -.48$ in PTV model), it did not significantly affect any of the outcomes.

6.4 General Discussion

This study was interested in individual differences regarding the need to deal with uncertainty in life, from which differences in the support for populist radical right (PRR) parties may arise. That is not to say that every person is born as a right-wing populist or not, but certain predispositions, such as uncertainty avoidance (UA), make it more likely for an individual to lean toward a specific ideology. In particular, we hypothesized that these voters face a tradeoff between reducing uncertainty through the PRR's ideological stance and the potential political risk that comes with these parties.

Our results indeed suggested that scoring higher on UA makes it more likely for the individual to vote for a PRR party, although our measure captured very general epistemic motivations unrelated to politics. We could also show empirically that the more fundamental concept UA goes beyond a mere willingness to take risks (cf. Steenbergen & Siczek, 2017). Our findings thus add to the literature on psychological antecedents of PRR voting, which thus far has focused mainly on the Big Five personality traits (see Aichholzer et al., 2018; Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; B. N. Bakker et al., 2016). Our results further suggested that people who tend to avoid uncertainty were, on average, significantly more inclined to embrace radical right beliefs. The PRR's ideological core

provides a clear match (elective affinity; see J. T. Jost, 2017) with the motives of this personality trait. Consequently, people high in UA were also (indirectly) more likely to support the PRR party FPÖ. Overall, these findings fit well with the literature on ideology as motivated social cognition, which suggests that right-wing ideology fulfills deep-rooted epistemic and existential needs (J. T. Jost, 2017; J. T. Jost et al., 2007).

It is quite surprising to see that, considering the commotion around populism in recent years, populist attitudes generally had only minimal impact on voting for the Austrian Freedom Party in 2017 and no direct association with its PTV (contrary to van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018; but cf. Stanley, 2011). While the decision to vote for a certain PRR party might be affected by a variety of context-specific factors such as campaign dynamics, this finding also reminds us that PRR parties such as the FPÖ should be considered foremost radical right parties that are also populist—and not the other way around (Mudde, 2007, p. 26).

Individuals high in UA were not significantly more likely to exhibit populist attitudes, at least when the total effect is considered. Nonetheless, this association was more ambiguous. The reason for this ambiguity is that populism not only simplifies politics and provides a group identification via the “people,” it also challenges the status quo and established authorities. People longing for certainty might be deterred from populist or radical ideologies that make a “demand for major transformation of the society, either toward some future vision or back to an idealized past” (Powell, 1986, p. 358). This concern could explain the finding that UA *decreases* populist attitudes when taking peoples’ proximity to the radical right core ideology into account. Hence, the association between UA and populist attitudes appears to be strongly contingent on the adoption of the radical right host ideology. Seemingly, *only* the radical right’s populist demand for change, which is presented as a restoration of order and return to traditional values, might provide means to deal with uncertainty, whereas radicalism or populism *per se* do not.

Nevertheless, there are some limitations to this study. Using data from Austria allowed us to study a prototype case for PRR parties, whereas the Austrian party system lacks actual left-wing populist parties. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise to find a powerful connection between populism and genuine rightist attitudes. It might be

worthwhile to compare our results to other countries where being ideologically left-wing is generally associated with more populist attitudes, such as Spain (Rico et al., 2017) or Greece (Tsatsanis et al., 2018). Nevertheless, we believe that associations between UA and voting for a populist party are less plausible in party systems where populism connotes left-wing beliefs.

Given our results, we consider it worthwhile to further investigate the ambiguous prospects of PRR parties. On the one hand, they pretend to offer certainty in a complex and globalized world and, on the other hand, they remain a risky choice. Considering our findings on the role of *anticipated* government competence assessment and its negative direct association with UA, PRR parties' ability to reduce worries regarding their performance if elected into government might, in part, explain differences in their success.

Regarding the role of populism, future work should consider that it might attract voters looking for certainty as a communication style or framing strategy rather than as an ideology. According to extant research, UA is generally connected with individual differences in the preference for "simple" over "complex" things, such as text or art (see, e.g., Hibbing et al., 2014). Populist communication might, hence, be attractive to people high in UA through its use of easy (i.e., less complex) language (Bischof & Senninger, 2018) and frames. These issues thus deserve to be studied further.

Research on the endorsement of PRR parties and its association with personality traits has been very scarce so far. By showing that individuals with higher needs for UA tend to gravitate toward PRR parties rather than to other parties, we provide a novel contribution to understanding the rise of PRR populist parties and like-minded leaders. We can only speculate that adopting the PRR's ideological agenda in some way offers a way to deal with developments such as loss of national sovereignty or increasing cultural variety in a globalized world.

7 Paper 4: Electoral Behavior¹

Title	Das Wahlverhalten der Mitte: Ein Rechtsruck in Folge der Fluchtbewegung?
Title (engl.):	The Voting Behavior of the Middle Classes: A Shift to the Right in Response to the Refugee Crisis?
Co-author:	Patricia Oberluggauer
Final draft:	7 April 2020
State:	Accepted on 16 April 2020
Type:	Peer-reviewed book chapter
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German Abstract. *Dieser Beitrag gibt auf Basis von AUTNES-Befragungsdaten einen Überblick, wie die österreichische Mittelschicht seit 2008 – mit besonderem Fokus auf 2017 und 2019 – bei Nationalratswahlen gewählt hat, welche politischen Positionen sie vertrat und welche Themen wichtig für sie waren. Empirisch ließen sich nur geringfügige soziostrukturelle Unterschiede feststellen. Die Ergebnisse zeigten vielmehr, dass die ökonomische Mitte kein eindeutiges politisches Profil aufweist und dass individuelle Einstellungen und Themenagenden wichtiger für das Wahlverhalten waren als die Schichtzugehörigkeit.*

English Abstract. *Based on AUTNES survey data, this chapter provides an overview of how the Austrian middle class has voted in National Assembly elections since 2008. A particular focus lies on the elections of 2017 and 2019. The contribution also analyzes the middle class's political positions and what issues were important to it. Empirically, only minor sociostructural differences could be identified. Instead, the results showed that the economic center does not have a clear political profile. Individual attitudes and issue agendas were more important for electoral behavior than class affiliation.*

¹This chapter has been submitted in German. An extended summary in English, including translated figures and tables, is available in Appendix H.

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German Keywords. *Wahlverhalten, Mittelschicht, Wahlforschung, Sozialstruktur, Einstellungen, Themensalienz, Populismus.*

English Keywords. *Electoral behavior, middle class, electoral research, social structure, attitudes, issue salience, populism.*

Die jüngsten österreichischen Nationalratswahlen 2017 und 2019 haben für viel Gesprächsstoff gesorgt, national sowie auch international. Die starken Zugewinne der Österreichischen Volkspartei (ÖVP) unter Sebastian Kurz, die seit dem Wahlkampf 2017 verstärkt auf eine strengere Immigrations- und Zuwanderungspolitik setzte sowie der Wahlerfolg und die anschließende Regierungsbeteiligung der rechtspopulistischen Freiheitlichen Partei (FPÖ) im Herbst 2017, stellte viele Beobachter*innen und Politikwissenschaftler*innen vor die Frage, inwieweit die Mehrheit der österreichischen Wähler*innenschaft in den vergangenen Jahren nach rechts gerückt war. Zuvor wurde das Land fast 30 Jahre lang mehrheitlich von einer großen Koalition zwischen Sozialdemokratie (SPÖ) und Volkspartei regiert und meist standen die klassischen ökonomischen Themen wie Arbeitsmarkt, Wohlfahrtsstaat und Wirtschaft im Vordergrund. Im Wahlkampf 2017 hingegen wurde erstmals das Thema Migration zu dem dominierenden Wahlkampfthema bei einer österreichischen Nationalratswahl (Bodlos et al., 2018; Bodlos & Plescia, 2018; Plescia et al., 2020). Bis dahin galten vor allem Wähler*innen unterer Einkommensschichten als Unterstützer*innen einer repressiven Zuwanderungspolitik und als Kernwähler*innen der rechtspopulistischen FPÖ, aber spätestens 2017 schienen diese Forderungen auch in der Mitte der Gesellschaft angekommen zu sein.

Die auf die Nationalratswahl 2017 folgende Regierungsbeteiligung der FPÖ endete jedoch aufgrund eines politischen Skandals, des sogenannten Ibiza-Skandals, bereits 2019 in Neuwahlen. In diesem Wahlkampf waren nun erstmals für breite Schichten der Gesellschaft Umwelt und Klimawandel die brennendsten politischen Themen. Das Wahlergebnis führte zu einer weiteren Umwälzung der politischen Kräfteverhältnisse in Österreich. Den Grünen gelang nach ihrem Ausscheiden aus dem Nationalrat 2017 sehr erfolgreich der Wiedereinzug und sie beteiligten sich nach der Wahl 2019 erstmals an einer Regierung mit der ÖVP auf Bundesebene.

Dieses Kapitel beschäftigt sich näher mit dem Wahlverhalten und den parteipolitischen Präferenzen der österreichischen Mitte bei den Nationalratswahlen von 2008

bis 2019. Wem hat die Mitte ihre Stimme gegeben? Welche Parteien können als politische Repräsentant*innen der Mitte gesehen werden? Und welche Themen waren für Wähler*innen der Mittelschicht besonders relevant? Ist die Mitte der österreichischen Wähler*innenschaft tatsächlich zunehmend negativ gegenüber Zuwander*innen eingestellt – wie vielfach vermutet – oder spielte 2017 vor allem die Salienz des Themas im Lichte der großen Fluchtbewegung nach Europa seit 2015 eine entscheidende Rolle? Stellte die Wahl 2019 diesbezüglich eine Rückkehr zur Normalität dar?

Als Mittelschicht wird dabei in diesem Beitrag jener Teil der Gesellschaft verstanden, der ein mittleres Einkommen zur Verfügung hat. Die Abgrenzung zu Ober- und Unterschicht erfolgt daher nach ökonomischen Gesichtspunkten (Niehues, 2018). Im Folgenden werden wir zunächst auf die Bedeutung von Sozialstrukturen für das Wahlverhalten der österreichischen Wähler*innenschaft eingehen, insbesondere darauf was wir bis dato über das Wahlverhalten der Mitte wissen. Anschließend untersuchen wir anhand der Daten der Österreichischen Nationalen Wahlstudie (AUTNES), wie die Mittelschicht im Vergleich zu den unteren und oberen Einkommensschichten bei den Nationalratswahlen von 2008 bis 2019 gewählt hat, welche politischen Positionen diese Schicht vertrat und welche Themen wichtig waren. Anschließend widmen wir uns den Parteipräferenzen bei den Nationalratswahlen 2017 und 2019 im Detail und analysieren dabei die Frage nach der Rolle von Schichtzugehörigkeit in Österreich, vor allem auch im Vergleich zu anderen bekannten erklärenden Faktoren aus der Wahlforschung.

7.1 Politische Konfliktlinien in Österreich

Wie in anderen europäischen Ländern, war und ist die österreichische Wähler*innenschaft von mehreren sozialen Konflikten (sog. *cleavages*) geprägt, die sich sodann auch im österreichischen Parteiensystem niedergeschlagen haben (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Die zwei zentralen Konflikte, die die österreichische Gesellschaft und das parteipolitische Angebot hierzulande seit Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts am nachhaltigsten prägten, sind der Konflikt zwischen Arbeit und Kapital, auch als *class cleavage* bekannt, sowie der Konflikt zwischen Staat und Kirche (*religious cleavage*; Kritzinger et al., 2013). Ein Großteil der österreichischen Wähler*innenschaft hat seine bzw. ihre Parteiwahl lange

Zeit hauptsächlich basierend auf der Zugehörigkeit zu einer sozialen Klasse oder der religiös-konfessionellen Überzeugungen getroffen. Von diesen beiden Konflikten profitieren viele Jahrzehnte lang vor allem die Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) sowie die Sozialdemokratische Partei (SPÖ). Die ÖVP repräsentierte dabei in erster Linie die politischen Anliegen der christlichen Landbevölkerung sowie der mittelständischen Unternehmer*innen, wohingegen die SPÖ die Interessen der städtischen Arbeiter*innen vertrat (Kritzinger et al., 2013; Plasser & Ulram, 2008).

Spätestens aber mit dem *Ausbau des Sozial- und Wohlfahrtsstaates* in der Nachkriegszeit der 1950er Jahre, den damit einhergehenden monetären Transferleistungen und sozialen Dienstleistungen, verlor der ökonomisch bedingte, traditionelle Klassenkonflikt zwischen Arbeit und Kapital auch in Österreich zusehends an gesellschaftlicher und politischer Bedeutung (Clark & Lipset, 1991; Flanagan & Dalton, 1984; Kritzinger et al., 2013; Manza et al., 1995; Plasser & Ulram, 2008). Gleichzeitig markiert die Institutionalisierung eines weitreichenden Sozialstaates die Geburtsstunde der Mittelschicht, wie wir sie heute kennen (vgl. Niehues, 2018). Der Ausbau eines feinmaschigen sozialstaatlichen Netzes schützte unter anderem einen großen Teil der Arbeiter*innen vor einer Reihe arbeitsbedingter Risiken und folglich vor Armut und Krankheit. Der Ausbau des Sozial- und Bildungssystems ermöglichte außerdem vielen Bürger*innen soziale Mobilität und so einen sozialen und ökonomischen Aufstieg (Bacher & Moosbrugger, 2019). Parallel dazu wurde das starke Anwachsen einer breiten Mittelschicht durch das Entstehen einer neuen Serviceklasse in Folge der Expansion des tertiären Dienstleistungssektors verstärkt. Infolgedessen schrumpfte auch in Österreich – so wie in vielen westlichen Industrienationen – der Produktionssektor und ergo, auch die traditionelle Arbeiterklasse (D. Bell, 1973; Verwiebe & Bacher, 2019).

Beide diese Entwicklungen mündeten sodann nicht nur in der Entstehung einer umfangreichen Mittelschicht, sondern resultierten spätestens in den 1970ern auch im Aufkommen eines fundamentalen *Wertewandels* (Inglehart, 1977, 1997; Klages, 1984; Schwartz, 1992; Verwiebe & Bacher, 2019). Im Zentrum dieses Wandels steht in erster Linie die zunehmende Bedeutung des Individuums bzw. der individuellen Selbstverwirklichung (Inglehart, 1977, 1997; Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987; Klages, 1984). Dieser tiefgreifende Wertewandel begrenzte sich auch nicht auf einzelne Lebensbereiche (Verwiebe et

al., 2019; Verwiebe & Bacher, 2019), sondern umfasste weitreichende Bereiche von Familie und Geschlechterrollen (vgl. Berghammer & Schmidt, 2019) bis hin zur Arbeits- und Berufswelt (vgl. Verwiebe & Seewann, 2019). Indem sie vor allem den Prozess der Säkularisierung verstärkten, waren die Folgen auch und besonders für religiöse Institutionen wie beispielsweise die Kirchen spürbar (Höllinger & Janschitz, 2019). Der Wertewandel wirkte sich daher auch auf die Bedeutung des zweiten wichtigen *cleavages* in Österreich aus, dem kulturell-religiösen Konflikt zwischen Kirche und Staat. Auch dieser Konflikt verlor seit den 1980er Jahren zunehmend an gesellschaftlicher und politischer Intensität.

Die beiden bis dahin so bedeutenden Konfliktlinien wurden daher zunehmend unschärfer und verloren für nachkommende Generationen an Bedeutung. Eine unmittelbar daraus resultierende Folge war dann auch, dass die ursprünglich starken Parteibindungen in Österreich, basierend auf Zugehörigkeit zu einer sozio-strukturellen Gruppe wie Klasse oder Konfession, schwächer wurden und die Wahlentscheidungen der Österreicher*innen am Wahltag zunehmend volatiler wurden (Hofinger et al., 2008). War die österreichische Wählerschaft bis in die späten 1970er Jahre äußerst stabil in ihrer Parteiwahl, so setzte spätestens in den 1980er Jahren auch hierzulande der sogenannte Prozess des *dealignments* (Dalton, 1984), also der abnehmenden Bedeutung von Parteiidentität, ein (Haerpfer & Gehmacher, 1984).

Die sozioökonomischen und kulturellen Transformationen schlugen sich konsequenterweise auch auf der *politischen Angebotsseite*, also dem programmatischen Angebot der Parteien, nieder. Als Reaktion auf eine schrumpfende Kernwähler*innenschaft im Verlauf der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts fußte die Strategie der etablierten Parteien SPÖ und ÖVP in der sukzessiven Transformation ihres programmatischen Angebots und in der Anpassung an die veränderten Interessen ihrer Wähler*innen. Die Auflösung der traditionellen Wähler*innenschaft führte dazu, dass etablierte Parteien verstärkt um die Gunst des/der sogenannten Medianwähler*in kämpften, welche*r stellvertretend für die Interessen der neuen Mittelschicht stand (Kirchheimer, 1965). Zu diesem Zweck rückten SPÖ und ÖVP ideologisch weiter in die ideologische Mitte (W. C. Müller, 1992; W. C. Müller & Steininger, 1994). Diese Strategie steht ganz im Zeichen des sogenannten Medianwähler*in-Theorems (Downs, 1957; Meltzer & Richard, 1981), das unter anderem besagt, dass wer die Wahl gewinnen will, die Interessen der Mitte

vertreten sollte. Seither steht der Begriff „Mitte“ politisch stellvertretend für moderate beziehungsweise gemäßigte Präferenzen und vor allem für die politischen Interessen der gesellschaftlichen Mehrheit. Nicht zuletzt deswegen werben vor allem die etablierten Parteien in Wahlkampagnen so häufig und gerne um die Stimme der „Mitte“. Hinzu kommt, dass ein Eintreten für die Mitte strategisch attraktiv ist, da sich ein sehr großer Teil der Bevölkerung der Mittelschicht zurechnet (Evans & Kelley, 2004; Hout, 2008). Auch jene, die aufgrund ihres Einkommens nicht unbedingt zur Mittelschicht gehören, sondern zu den oberen oder unteren Einkommensschichten, neigen dazu, sich selbst der mittleren Schicht zuzurechnen (Evans & Kelley, 2004; OECD, 2019). Parteien können also viele Wähler*innen erreichen, wenn sie sich an die Mittelschicht wenden – und dabei auch eine Abgrenzung nach oben oder unten vornehmen, im Wissen, dass die angesprochenen Wähler*innen sich nicht diesen Gruppen zurechnen.

7.1.1 Neue Konflikte, neue Themen und neue Parteien

Nebst der schwindenden Bedeutung alter Konflikte und rückläufigen Parteimitgliedschaften, brachen in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten parallel *neue Konfliktlinien* in der österreichischen Gesellschaft auf. Einerseits entstand, wie bereits erwähnt, im Zuge der 68er-Bewegung ein neuer Werte-Konflikt innerhalb der österreichischen Gesellschaft (Verwiebe & Bacher, 2019) und andererseits brachte die Globalisierung einen neuen Konflikt zwischen Gewinner*innen und Verlierer*innen der Globalisierung hervor (Kriesi et al., 2008). Mit dem Entstehen dieser neuen Konfliktlinien wurden in Folge auch neue Themen für die Wähler*innen relevant. Dominierten zu Beginn und Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts noch vor allem sozialpolitische und ökonomische Themen die politische Agenda und den öffentlichen Diskurs, so wurden in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten vor allem Themen wie Migration, Identität, Umweltschutz und Geschlechtergleichstellung bedeutend.

Entlang der zwei neuen Konfliktlinien gründeten sich sodann auch *neue politische Parteien*, am relevantesten in diesem Zusammenhang sind vor allem 1986 die Gründung der Grünen Partei sowie die programmatische Neuausrichtung der FPÖ unter Jörg Haider und 2012 die Gründung von NEOS zu nennen. Wo der programmatische Fokus der Grünen vor allem auf den Themen Umweltschutz, Gleichstellung und einer

progressiven Zuwanderungspolitik liegt, ist die FPÖ in erster Linie für die Forderung einer restriktiveren Zuwanderungspolitik bekannt. Die NEOS hingegen vertreten liberale Positionen sowohl im ökonomischen als auch gesellschaftlichen Sinn. Insgesamt ist das parteipolitische Angebot in Österreich damit in den vergangenen Jahren wesentlich heterogener geworden.

Die *politikwissenschaftliche Wahlforschung* hat auf diese Entwicklungen ebenfalls reagiert. Etablierte Modelle auf Basis von soziostrukturellen Merkmalen (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944) und starker Bindung an und Identifikation mit politischen Parteien (Campbell et al., 1960) konnten das Wahlverhalten in diesem volatileren Umfeld immer schlechter erklären. Themen (*issues*) kehrten zurück in den wissenschaftlichen Fokus, es werden also jene Parteien gewählt, denen Wähler*innen thematisch am nächsten stehen (Downs, 1957; Enelow & Hinich, 1984; Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989). Wobei Wähler*innen dabei nicht stets alle Themen im Blick haben müssen, sondern basierend auf persönlicher Themenrelevanz (Krosnick, 1988) wählen. Die Salienz einzelner Themen kann von Wahl zu Wahl variieren. Die Parteien können ebenfalls ihre Positionen anpassen oder Themen unterschiedlich gewichten (De Sio & Weber, 2014). Auch lässt sich der entstandene politische Raum weniger gut durch eine ökonomische Links-Rechts-Dimension alleine beschreiben. Die Fragen von Interventionen in die Wirtschaft und Redistribution waren lange prägend, inzwischen gilt es zumindest eine weitere Achse zu berücksichtigen. Neben der ökonomischen Dimension gibt es auch eine soziokulturelle, diese umfasst die Sicht auf gesellschaftspolitische Themen und vor allem auch das Thema Zuwanderung (Kriesi et al., 2008; van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009).

Mit dem Aufkommen neuer Parteien, Themen und Konflikte erwächst auch *neues Interesse an soziostrukturellen Grundlagen des Wahlverhaltens*. Auf der einen Seite stehen junge, mobile, meist weibliche und hochgebildete Teile der Gesellschaft, die sehr stark Grün-Parteien ihre Stimme geben (Dolezal, 2010). Ihnen gegenüber stehen jene Gruppen, die von Veränderungen durch die Globalisierung bedroht sind oder sich bedroht fühlen. Diese Gruppe ist stärker männlich geprägt (Spierings & Zaslove, 2017), weniger gut ausgebildet und beruflich häufig in Produktion und Industrie tätig. Sie würden sich zunehmend von den etablierten Parteien abwenden, durch die sie sich nicht mehr vertreten fühlen, und, vor allem rechten, populistischen Parteien zuwenden (Kriesi et

al., 2008). Eine wesentliche soziostrukturelle Grundlage für diese neue Spaltlinie scheint hier nicht mehr Schicht- oder Klassenzugehörigkeit, sondern Bildung zu sein (Stubager, 2010). Folglich geht diese Spaltung quer durch die Mittelschicht. Während Teile davon gemeinsam mit oberen Schichten stärker gesellschaftsliberalen und grünen Parteien zuneigen, wird zunehmender ökonomischer Druck auf Teile der Mittelschicht gleichzeitig häufig als Erklärung für die Erfolge von globalisierungskritischen populistischen Parteien herangezogen (Dallinger, 2018; Dolezal, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2008).

Die empirischen Befunde zeigen hier aber ein komplexeres Bild. Wichtiger als ökonomische Interessen ist für die Unterstützung rechtspopulistischer Parteien etwa der Wunsch nach kultureller Abschottung und Bewahrung der eigenen nationalen Identität (Oesch, 2008; für Österreich siehe auch Gründl & Aichholzer, 2020; vgl. etwa auch Diskussionen um die Wähler*innenschaft der deutschen AfD bei Lengfeld, 2017; Rippl & Seipel, 2018). Es sind auch weniger tatsächlich ökonomisch Schwache oder Bedrohte, die populistischen Parteien zuneigen; vielmehr scheint subjektiv empfundene Schwäche oder wahrgenommene Benachteiligung ein Faktor zu sein (z. B. Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018; Spruyt et al., 2016).

7.1.2 Die Nationalratswahlen 2017 und 2019

Möglicherweise ist es zu früh, um von einem kritischen Moment in der österreichischen Politik zu sprechen, aber das Wahlergebnis der Nationalratswahl 2017 hat, wie es scheint, die österreichische Politik nachhaltig verändert. Noch nie zuvor wurde ein österreichischer Wahlkampf so stark vom Thema Migration und Zuwanderung dominiert (Bodlos et al., 2018; Bodlos & Plescia, 2018). Auch mussten die SPÖ (26,8 %) und die Grünen (3,8 %) jeweils ein historisch schlechtes Wahlergebnis verbuchen. Die SPÖ unter Kanzler Christian Kern setzte thematisch zwar auf ihre Kernkompetenzen, nämlich auf die Themen Arbeit und Wohlfahrtsstaat, konnte ihren ersten Platz von 2013 jedoch nicht verteidigen. Die Grünen wiederum scheiterten an der 4%-Hürde aufgrund parteiinterner Differenzen und der daraus resultierenden Abspaltung von Peter Pilz, welcher infolgedessen erfolgreich mit einer eigenen Liste kandidierte (4,4 %). Einen leichten Zugewinn – im Vergleich zur Nationalratswahl 2013 – konnten hingegen NEOS verbuchen (5,3 %). Äußerst positiv verlief die Wahl für FPÖ und ÖVP. Die FPÖ konnte das

zweitbeste Wahlergebnis (26 %) ihrer Geschichte bei einer Nationalratswahl einfahren und gehörte zusammen mit der neuen ÖVP, angeführt von Kanzler- und Spitzenkandidat Sebastian Kurz zu den großen Gewinnern dieser Wahl (31,5 %). Im Gegensatz zur SPÖ lag der Kampagnenschwerpunkt der ÖVP nicht auf den traditionellen inhaltlichen Kernkompetenzen der Partei wie Wirtschaft und Unternehmertum, sondern konzentrierte sich fast ausschließlich auf das Thema Migration.

Die Neuwahl im September 2019, ausgelöst durch den Ibiza-Skandal, veränderte das politische Kräfteverhältnis allerdings schon früher als gedacht. Zwar konnte die ÖVP abermals einen starken Stimmen-Zugewinn verbuchen (37,5 %), ihr Junior-Koalitionspartner für knapp zwei Jahre, die FPÖ, verlor hingegen drastisch (16,2 %). Äußerst positiv verlief die Wahl dieses Mal für die Grünen: Mit 13,9 % aller Wähler*innenstimmen schaffte die Partei nicht nur den Wiedereinzug in den Nationalrat, sondern gehörte nebst der ÖVP auch zu den klaren Gewinnern dieser Wahl. Für die SPÖ und ihre neue Spitzenkandidatin Pamela Rendi-Wagner verlief die Wahl abermals nicht wie gewünscht. Konnte die SPÖ 2017 noch von zahlreichen enttäuschten Grünwähler*innen profitieren, so gelang es der Partei dieses Mal kaum mehr über die eigenen Grenzen hinweg Wähler*innen für sich zu gewinnen (SORA Institut, 2019). NEOS schafften zum wiederholten Mal in Folge Stimmen dazuzugewinnen und erhielten 8,1 % aller Stimmen. Thematisch stand die Wahl 2019 ganz im Zeichen von Umwelt- und Klimaschutz (Eberl, Huber, & Plescia, 2020; SORA Institut, 2019). Das Thema Zuwanderung und Migration war für das Mehr der österreichischen Wähler*innen zwar nach wie vor relevant, so wahlentscheidend wie bei der Wahl zwei Jahre zuvor schien es allerdings nicht mehr gewesen zu sein.

Was lässt sich nun zusammenfassend für das Wahlverhalten der Mittelschicht erwarten? Tendenziell geht die Wahlforschung davon aus, dass die Sozialstruktur, insbesondere auch die Schichtzugehörigkeit, an Bedeutung verloren hat. Am ehesten sollte die Mittelschicht wohl immer noch den beiden traditionellen Großparteien SPÖ und ÖVP zuneigen. Wichtiger als die Schichtzugehörigkeit sind politische Einstellungen und Themen geworden und hier lassen die Entwicklungen der letzten Jahrzehnte erwarten, dass Themen wie Zuwanderung, Umwelt oder Geschlechterrollen im Vergleich zu ökonomischen Themen (etwa staatliche Interventionen oder Umverteilung) an Bedeu-

tung gewonnen haben. Des Weiteren könnte sich eine gewisse Unzufriedenheit mit der langjährigen Politik und den Proponent*innen der großen Koalition in populistischen Überzeugungen in der Wähler*innenschaft zeigen. Im nächsten Abschnitt wollen wir uns nun empirisch der Frage widmen, wie die österreichische Mitte politisch tickt, wen sie wählt und ob wir ab 2017 tatsächlich einen Rechtsrucks in großen Teilen der Bevölkerung erlebt haben.

7.2 Daten und Methode

Wir widmen uns unserer Fragestellung auf Basis der Daten, die von der Österreichischen Nationalen Wahlstudie (AUTNES) seit der Nationalratswahl 2008 zu Einstellungen und Wahlverhalten der österreichischen Wähler*innen erhoben werden. Dies erlaubt uns, die Nationalratswahlen von 2008, 2013, 2017 und 2019 zu vergleichen. Mit Ausnahme von 2008 (nur Nachwahlbefragung) handelt es sich bei den Befragungen um Panelbefragungen mit zumindest zwei Wellen (Vorwahl- und Nachwahlbefragung). Die Daten wurden mittels persönlicher Interviews (Wahl 2008), einer Mischung aus Telefon- und Face-to-Face-Interviews (2013), Telefon- und Onlinebefragung (2017) oder über ein reines Online-Access-Panel (2019) erhoben. Tabelle 7.1 gibt einen Überblick über die vier Datensätze und die jeweilige Stichprobe.

In der Analyse wurden im ersten Schritt deskriptive Vergleiche zwischen der Mittelschicht und den unteren und oberen Einkommensschichten gezogen. Im nächsten Schritt wurden Regressionsmodelle für die Nationalratswahlen 2017 und 2019 gerechnet, die Auskunft über die Parteipräferenzen der Wähler*innen geben. Die metrischen unabhängigen Variablen wurden dabei um das arithmetische Mittel zentriert und auf zwei Standardabweichungen standardisiert, was die Koeffizienten vergleichbar macht und auch zu vergleichbaren Effektgrößen für die metrischen und die binären unabhängigen Variablen führt (Gelman, 2008).

7.2.1 Verwendete Variablen

Zur *Mittelschicht* gehören jene Personen deren angegebenes Netto-Äquivalenzeinkommen zwischen 70 und 150 Prozent des Medianäquivalenzeinkommens innerhalb der

Tabelle 7.1. Überblick über die Stichproben aus den AUTNES-Befragungen.

Variable	Nationalratswahl			
	2008	2013	2017	2019
Durchschnittsalter (SD)	51,5 (17,7)	45,4 (19,5)	47,9 (19,3)	43,4 (15,3)
Soziodemografie (in %)				
Geschlecht: Frau	54,5	50,9	52,6	50,7
Bildung: zumindest Matura	28,0	30,6	45,2	34,9
Bekenntnis: katholisch	70,7	68,2	66,4	55,5
Gewerkschaftsmitglied	17,0	18,6	22,9	27,1
Schicht (in %)				
Unterschicht	21,7	20,3	19,3	22,5
Mittelschicht	58,2	63,6	64,4	64,0
Oberschicht	20,1	16,1	16,3	13,4
Wahlentscheidung				
SPÖ	35,7	27,9	27,1	19,9
ÖVP	33,4	22,9	30,9	27,6
FPÖ	13,8	16,0	18,6	20,8
Grüne	7,9	15,8	6,3	17,1
NEOS/LIF	6,7	6,0	8,6	9,1
Studieninformationen				
Name	AUTNES Post Post Election Survey 2009	AUTNES Pre and Post Panel Study 2013	AUTNES Multi-Mode Panel Study 2017	AUTNES Online Panel Study 2017–2019
Modus	Face-to-Face	Face-to-Face + Telefon	Telefon + Online	Online
Quelle	(Kritzinger et al., 2014)	(Kritzinger et al., 2016)	(Kritzinger et al., 2018)	(Aichholzer et al., 2020)
N (vor Wahl)		3266	3846	3012
N (nach Wahl)	1165	1504	1910	3098

jeweiligen Befragung lag. Die Grenzen von 70 und 150 Prozent entsprechen einer gängigen Definition der Mittelschicht im deutschsprachigen Raum (z. B. Goebel et al., 2010) und werden in Österreich etwa auch vom Österreichischen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO) herangezogen. Das Einkommen wurde in allen AUTNES-Befragungen als Nettohaushaltseinkommen auf einer 20-stufigen Skala abgefragt. Dieses angegebene Einkommen wurde durch die Wurzel aus der Anzahl an Personen im Haushalt dividiert, um das Äquivalenzeinkommen des Haushalts zu erhalten (OECD, n.d.).²

Die *Wahlentscheidung* wurde jeweils nach der entsprechenden Wahl abgefragt. Für die Regressionsmodelle wurde auf die von Befragten angegebene *Wahrscheinlichkeit, jemals für einzelne Parteien zu stimmen* (*propensity to vote*, PTV) zurückgegriffen. Diese PTVs erleichtern die Analyse kleinerer Parteien mit wenigen Wähler*innen und bieten mehr Informationen, da die Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit für jede Partei angegeben werden kann und so für alle Respondent*innen auch Informationen für die nichtgewählten Parteien vorliegen (van der Eijk et al., 2006). Die Fallzahl für die Analysen bleibt durch Verwendung von PTVs außerdem stabil, da Nichtwähler*innen nicht ausgeschlossen werden müssen und häufigere Antwortverweigerung bei der Wahlentscheidung als auch die Nichtteilnahme an der Nachwahlbefragung in den einzelnen Panels keine Rolle spielt.

In der Analyse werden drei Variablen auf der Einstellungsebene näher betrachtet: *ökonomische*, *sozio-kulturelle* (hier *Anti-Zuwanderung*) und *populistische Einstellungen*. Alle drei Variablen basieren auf Aussagen zu denen die Befragten ihre Zustimmung auf einer fünfstufigen Skala ausdrücken konnten („stimme gar nicht zu“ bis „stimme voll und ganz zu“; siehe Anhang G für die genauen Formulierungen der verwendeten Aussagen). Ökonomische Einstellungen werden dabei über drei Aussagen wie „die Politik soll sich aus der Wirtschaft heraushalten“ abgefragt. Aus der Zustimmung zu diesen Aussagen wurde ein Mittelwertindex gebildet, höhere Werte stehen dabei für ökonomisch rechtere

²Da keine exakten Einkommensdaten für das jährliche Haushaltseinkommen (Abfrage in Kategorien, unklar ob Befragte Sonderzahlungen berücksichtigen etc.) vorliegen, Befragte zur Unterschätzung des Einkommens neigen und für 2017 und 2019 keine Daten zum Medianeinkommen auf Basis der verwendeten OECD-Äquivalenzskala vorliegen, wurde die Mittelschicht in dieser Studie auf Basis des empirischen Medianeinkommens innerhalb der einzelnen Befragungen bestimmt. Resultate auf Basis der Median-Äquivalenznettoeinkommen laut EU-SILC/ECHP (Eurostat, 2019) und auf Basis einer abweichenden Mittelschichtsdefinition (mittlere drei Einkommensquintile; z. B. OECD, 2015) unterscheiden sich nicht signifikant von den hier vorgestellten Ergebnissen.

Positionen. Sozio-kulturelle Einstellungen wurden mittels zwei Aussagen zum Thema Zuwanderung abgebildet (z. B. „die Zuwanderung nach Österreich soll gestoppt werden“). Befragte haben hier höhere Werte, je ablehnender sie Zuwanderung betrachteten. Insbesondere in der Befragung zur Wahl 2008 weichen die Formulierungen der Aussagen stärker von den später verwendeten Formulierungen für Einstellungen zu Zuwanderung und Ökonomie ab, direkte Vergleiche zwischen den Wahlgängen sind daher mit Vorsicht zu betrachten (siehe Anhang G für Details). Populistische Einstellungen wurden ab 2017 erhoben. Sie umfassen sechs Aussagen, wie sie auch im Rahmen der Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Hobolt et al., 2016) erhoben wurden (z. B. „die meisten Politiker kümmern sich nur um die Interessen der Reichen und Mächtigen“). Auch hier stehen höhere Werte für stärker populistische Einstellungen.

Neben Einstellungen zu Themen wie Wirtschaft und Zuwanderung wurde in den einzelnen Befragungen auch nach dem jeweils *wichtigsten Thema* gefragt. In den Daten zu 2013 und 2017 wurden offene Antworten auf die Frage nach dem wichtigsten Thema nach demselben Codierschema codiert. 2008 wurden ebenfalls offene Antworten kategorisiert, im Online-Panel zur Wahl 2019 hatten die Befragten die Möglichkeit aus 21 vorgegebenen Themen zu wählen. Für die Analysen wurden die jeweils genannten Themen auf möglichst vergleichbare Weise und auf Basis des Codierschemas von 2013 und 2017 zu vier Themenblöcken zusammengefasst: Wirtschaft & Wohlfahrtsstaat, Zuwanderung, Umwelt und sonstige Themen. Auch hier sind daher direkte Vergleiche zwischen 2008 und den späteren Jahren bzw. zwischen 2019 und den vorhergehenden Wahlen mit der notwendigen Vorsicht zu betrachten.

Weitere Variablen dienen vor allem als *Kontrollvariablen* in den Modellen. Hierzu gehören das politische Interesse (dichotom; 1 = eher interessiert), das Alter (in Jahren), das Geschlecht (1 = weiblich), die höchste abgeschlossene formale Bildungsstufe (1 = mindestens Matura), das Religionsbekenntnis (1 = römisch-katholisch) und die Mitgliedschaft in einer Gewerkschaft (1 = ja).

7.3 Ergebnisse: Die Mittelschicht im Vergleich

Für die Mittelschicht zeigte sich bezüglich ihrer Parteipräferenz bei den Wahlen 2008 bis 2019 kein klares Bild. Systematische Abweichungen von der Ober- oder Unterschicht über mehrere Wahlgänge hinweg waren kaum auszumachen (siehe Abbildung 7.1). Unterschiede zwischen den Einkommensschichten gab es aber durchaus. So konnte die SPÖ 2008 noch in allen Einkommensschichten, auch den unteren, punkten. Ab 2013 war es vor allem die FPÖ, die tendenziell stärker von unteren Einkommensschichten gewählt wurde und weniger von den mittleren und oberen. NEOS schienen eher die Oberschicht anzusprechen – auch mit Ausnahme von 2008, als aber noch die Vorgängerpartei Liberales Forum (LIF) angetreten ist. Durchgängig stark vertreten war in der Mittelschicht die ÖVP. Insgesamt zeigte die Mittelschicht, trotz Unterschieden bei einzelnen Wahlgängen, im Vergleich zu den Einkommensschichten darüber und darunter kein systematisch anderes Wahlverhalten. Wie sah es aber mit den Einstellungen zu bestimmten Themen oder der Salienz von Themen aus?



Abbildung 7.1. Wahlverhalten bei Nationalratswahlen 2008–2019 nach sozialer Schicht.

7.3.1 Positionen und Themensalienz

Abbildung 7.2 zeigt politische Einstellungen der unterschiedlichen gesellschaftlichen Schichten in Österreich. Auch hier zeigte sich, dass die einzelnen Schichten sehr ähnlich über politische Fragen dachten. Tendenziell standen Befragte aus der oberen Einkommensschicht ökonomisch weiter rechts und in sozio-kulturellen Fragen wie beim Thema Zuwanderung weiter links. 2008 wurden allerdings nicht die identen Aussagen für die Erhebung von politischen Einstellungen verwendet, weshalb direkte Vergleiche mit den späteren Jahren nur schwer möglich sind. Insgesamt zeigte sich aber jedenfalls, dass von 2013 auf 2017 vor allem die unteren Einkommensschichten in Zuwanderungsfragen nach rechts rücken. 2017 sahen wir die größte Polarisierung in dieser Frage zwischen Ober- und Unterschicht, mit der Mittelschicht dazwischen. 2019 bewegte sich aber auch die Mittel- und die Oberschicht in Zuwanderungsfragen nach rechts, gerade die Mittelschicht unterschied sich in dieser Frage 2019 nicht mehr von Personen mit niedrigerem Haushaltseinkommen.




Abbildung 7.2. Einstellungen der Wähler*innenschaft nach sozialer Schicht (gewichtet nach soziodemografischen Merkmalen).

Als eine Erklärung für die Erfolge von populistischen Akteuren gilt häufig, dass untere Schichten, aber auch die Mittelschicht, in der globalisierten Welt zunehmendem ökonomischen Druck ausgesetzt sind und nicht mehr das Gefühl haben, dass die Politik ihre Interessen repräsentiert. Populistische Einstellungen drücken eine solche Sicht auf die Politik aus. In der Tat zeigte sich 2017, dass die Unterschicht am stärksten populistische Einstellungen aufweist. Hier herrschte am ausgeprägtesten das Bild einer abgehobenen politischen Elite vor, die nicht mehr die Interessen der Bevölkerung vertritt. Die Mittelschicht lag hier deutlich unter diesem Niveau und näher an der Oberschicht. 2019 schob sich dies wieder zusammen – hier hatten wir aber eine diffuse Situation. Einerseits war mit der FPÖ eine populistische Partei in der Regierung. Für einige populistische Wähler*innen, waren „die da oben“ also zumindest eine Zeit lang deren gewünschte Vertreter*innen. Andererseits war nach dem Ibiza-Skandal und der daher ausgerufenen Neuwahl auch eine breitere Unzufriedenheit in allen Schichten mit den Regierenden naheliegend.

Abbildung 7.3 verdeutlicht die dramatische Verschiebung der Themensalienz von 2013 auf 2017 und noch einmal von 2017 auf 2019. Die Abbildung zeigt das von den Befragten als für sie wichtigstes politisches Thema oder Problem in Österreich genannte Thema. Insgesamt hatten 2013 nur knapp 7 % der Wähler*innen Zuwanderung als wichtigstes Thema genannt. Als Folge der Fluchtbewegungen ab 2015 wurde vor der Nationalratswahl 2017 von fast 39 % der Wähler*innen Zuwanderung als wichtigstes Thema genannt. Hier zeigte sich wieder, dass diese Verschiebung in der Themensalienz von allen Gesellschaftsschichten getragen wurde, besonders ausgeprägt war sie aber innerhalb der Mittelschicht. Mehr als die geringfügige Verschiebung bei den Positionen, dürfte die Veränderung der Themenstruktur 2017 den Ausschlag für den Wahlerfolg von ÖVP und FPÖ gegeben haben. 2019 wiederum wurde Zuwanderung deutlich weniger oft als wichtigstes Thema genannt. Das Bild entsprach wieder den früheren Wahlgängen, mit einem gravierenden Unterschied: Umwelt war 2019 für einen beträchtlichen Teil der Wähler*innenschaft das wichtigste Thema – eine Themenlage von der besonders die Grünen mit dem erfolgreichen Wiedereinzug in den Nationalrat profitieren konnten. Auch hier zeigte sich, dass die Mittelschicht kein eigenständiges Profil aufwies und in der Themenstruktur den anderen Schichten ähnelte. Nur 2017 fiel auf, dass die Mittel-

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schicht besonders deutlich Zuwanderung als wichtigstes Thema wahrgenommen hat. Insgesamt verdeutlichen diese deskriptiven Ergebnisse, dass die Mittelschicht sowohl nach oben als auch nach unten anschlussfähig für klassenübergreifende Koalitionen ist. Die Präferenzen dieser Schicht, oder großer Teile davon, können sich je nach Situation stärker mit denen der unteren oder oberen Einkommensschichten decken (Dallinger, 2018).




Abbildung 7.3. Wichtigstes politisches Thema nach sozialer Schicht (gewichtet nach soziodemografischen Merkmalen).

7.3.2 Wie wählen die Österreicher*innen?

Im nächsten Schritt wollen wir nun die Parteipräferenzen bei den Nationalratswahlen 2017 und 2019 im Detail analysieren. Welche Parteien waren für die Mittelschicht besonders attraktiv und spielte die Schichtzugehörigkeit überhaupt eine wichtige Rolle? Zu diesem Zweck analysieren wir jeweils in fünf Modellen als abhängige Variablen die angegebene Wahrscheinlichkeit (von 0 = gar nicht wahrscheinlich bis 10 = sehr wahrscheinlich) jemals die jeweiligen Parteien zu wählen (siehe Tabellen 7.2 und 7.3). Alle

Tabelle 7.2. Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit für Parteien bei der Nationalratswahl 2017.

Grundmodell	Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit 2017				
	ÖVP	SPÖ	FPÖ	Grüne	NEOS
Konstante	5,57*** (0,08)	4,99*** (0,08)	3,02*** (0,08)	3,43*** (0,07)	2,99*** (0,06)
Mittelschicht ^a	0,40 (0,22)	0,47* (0,21)	-0,72*** (0,22)	0,27 (0,20)	0,04 (0,17)
Oberschicht ^a	0,19 (0,29)	0,30 (0,28)	-0,89** (0,29)	0,51 (0,27)	0,40 (0,23)
Alter	0,32 (0,16)	0,18 (0,16)	-0,56*** (0,16)	-0,85*** (0,15)	-0,67*** (0,13)
Geschlecht (weiblich)	0,13 (0,16)	0,36* (0,16)	-1,03*** (0,16)	1,01*** (0,15)	-0,26* (0,13)
Bildung (zumind. Matura)	-0,24 (0,17)	0,36* (0,16)	-1,63*** (0,17)	1,71*** (0,16)	1,37*** (0,14)
Römisch-katholisch	1,60*** (0,17)	-0,48** (0,17)	-0,07 (0,17)	-0,51** (0,16)	0,08 (0,14)
Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft	-0,68*** (0,19)	1,42*** (0,18)	-0,29 (0,19)	0,24 (0,17)	-0,57*** (0,15)
Korr. R ²	0,06	0,05	0,09	0,14	0,10
Vollständiges Modell					
Konstante	5,57*** (0,08)	4,99*** (0,07)	3,02*** (0,07)	3,43*** (0,06)	2,99*** (0,06)
Mittelschicht ^a	0,39 (0,21)	0,43* (0,20)	-0,54** (0,19)	0,16 (0,18)	0,01 (0,17)
Oberschicht ^a	0,17 (0,28)	0,25 (0,26)	-0,60* (0,25)	0,38 (0,24)	0,32 (0,23)
Einstellungen					
Anti-Zuwanderung	1,04*** (0,19)	-1,27*** (0,17)	2,91*** (0,16)	-2,72*** (0,16)	-1,11*** (0,15)
Ökonomisch rechts	1,11*** (0,16)	-1,17*** (0,15)	0,02 (0,14)	-0,56*** (0,14)	0,22 (0,13)
Populist. Einstell.	0,12 (0,18)	-0,92*** (0,16)	1,10*** (0,15)	-0,53*** (0,15)	0,04 (0,14)
Wichtigstes Thema ^b					
Zuwanderung	0,36 (0,21)	-0,64** (0,20)	0,59** (0,19)	-0,22 (0,18)	-0,17 (0,17)
Umwelt	-0,32 (0,58)	-0,16 (0,54)	-1,25* (0,51)	1,36** (0,49)	-0,10 (0,47)
Anderes/keines	0,08 (0,20)	-0,39* (0,19)	-0,24 (0,18)	0,22 (0,17)	0,09 (0,16)
Kontrollvariablen					
Politisches Interesse	-0,15 (0,19)	-0,30 (0,18)	0,16 (0,17)	-0,36* (0,16)	0,27 (0,15)
Alter	0,24 (0,16)	0,23 (0,15)	-0,82*** (0,14)	-0,51*** (0,14)	-0,56*** (0,13)
Geschlecht (weiblich)	0,36* (0,16)	0,12 (0,15)	-0,89*** (0,14)	0,74*** (0,14)	-0,25 (0,13)
Bildung (zumind. Matura)	0,04 (0,18)	-0,11 (0,17)	-0,30 (0,16)	0,75*** (0,15)	0,91*** (0,15)
Römisch-katholisch	1,45*** (0,17)	-0,36* (0,16)	-0,23 (0,15)	-0,31* (0,14)	0,17 (0,14)
Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft	-0,44* (0,18)	1,10*** (0,17)	0,09 (0,16)	-0,09 (0,15)	-0,66*** (0,15)
Korr. R ²	0,11	0,15	0,34	0,33	0,14
N	1696	1696	1696	1696	1696

*** p < 0,001; ** p < 0,01; * p < 0,05

^a Die Basiskategorie ist hier Zugehörigkeit zur unteren Einkommensschicht.^b Die Basiskategorie ist hier „Wirtschafts- und Wohlfahrtsstaats Themen“.

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Tabelle 7.3. Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit für Parteien bei der Nationalratswahl 2019.

Grundmodell	Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit 2019				
	ÖVP	SPÖ	FPÖ	Grüne	NEOS
Konstante	4,43*** (0,08)	4,08*** (0,08)	3,37*** (0,09)	3,41*** (0,08)	3,36*** (0,07)
Mittelschicht ^a	0,66** (0,22)	0,39 (0,21)	-0,17 (0,23)	0,35 (0,20)	0,69*** (0,18)
Oberschicht ^a	0,87** (0,30)	0,47 (0,29)	-0,49 (0,31)	0,25 (0,28)	1,08*** (0,25)
Alter	0,39* (0,17)	-0,10 (0,17)	-0,38* (0,18)	-0,60*** (0,16)	-0,75*** (0,14)
Geschlecht (weiblich)	-0,38* (0,17)	0,22 (0,16)	-0,49** (0,18)	0,42** (0,16)	-0,28* (0,14)
Bildung (zumind. Matura)	-0,11 (0,18)	0,51** (0,17)	-1,55*** (0,19)	1,78*** (0,17)	1,45*** (0,15)
Römisch-katholisch	1,22*** (0,17)	-0,26 (0,16)	0,16 (0,17)	-0,13 (0,16)	0,36** (0,14)
Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft	-0,77*** (0,19)	1,20*** (0,18)	0,07 (0,19)	-0,17 (0,17)	-0,45** (0,15)
Korr. R ²	0,04	0,03	0,04	0,07	0,09
Vollständiges Modell					
Konstante	4,43*** (0,07)	4,08*** (0,07)	3,37*** (0,07)	3,41*** (0,06)	3,36*** (0,06)
Mittelschicht ^a	0,47* (0,20)	0,44* (0,18)	-0,20 (0,18)	0,33* (0,16)	0,58*** (0,17)
Oberschicht ^a	0,60* (0,27)	0,34 (0,26)	-0,21 (0,26)	-0,14 (0,22)	0,64** (0,23)
Einstellungen					
Anti-Zuwanderung	2,01*** (0,17)	-2,66*** (0,16)	3,83*** (0,16)	-3,65*** (0,14)	-1,93*** (0,15)
Ökonomisch rechts	1,23*** (0,16)	-1,21*** (0,15)	0,39** (0,15)	-0,71*** (0,13)	0,64*** (0,14)
Populist. Einstell.	-2,15*** (0,16)	0,11 (0,15)	-0,43** (0,15)	0,03 (0,13)	-0,38** (0,14)
Wichtigstes Thema ^b					
Zuwanderung	-0,28 (0,26)	-1,45*** (0,24)	2,21*** (0,24)	-0,38 (0,21)	-0,50* (0,22)
Umwelt	-0,90*** (0,20)	-0,21 (0,19)	-0,73*** (0,19)	1,49*** (0,17)	0,44* (0,17)
Anderes/keines	-0,22 (0,20)	-0,55** (0,19)	0,68*** (0,19)	-0,14 (0,17)	0,09 (0,17)
Kontrollvariablen					
Politisches Interesse	-0,17 (0,17)	0,50** (0,16)	0,25 (0,16)	0,58*** (0,14)	0,38* (0,15)
Alter	0,41* (0,16)	0,04 (0,15)	-0,84*** (0,15)	-0,21 (0,13)	-0,46*** (0,14)
Geschlecht (weiblich)	-0,18 (0,16)	0,04 (0,15)	-0,13 (0,15)	0,31* (0,13)	-0,22 (0,13)
Bildung (zumind. Matura)	-0,03 (0,17)	-0,08 (0,16)	-0,66*** (0,16)	0,79*** (0,14)	0,74*** (0,14)
Römisch-katholisch	1,03*** (0,15)	-0,26 (0,14)	0,16 (0,14)	-0,09 (0,12)	0,33* (0,13)
Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft	-0,70*** (0,17)	1,11*** (0,16)	0,03 (0,16)	-0,14 (0,14)	-0,33* (0,14)
Korr. R ²	0,22	0,25	0,37	0,43	0,22
N	1979	1979	1979	1979	1979

*** p < 0,001; ** p < 0,01; * p < 0,05

^a Die Basiskategorie ist hier Zugehörigkeit zur unteren Einkommensschicht.

^b Die Basiskategorie ist hier „Wirtschafts- und Wohlfahrtsstaats Themen“.

Variablen wurden für die Vergleichbarkeit standardisiert, anschließend wurde für alle fünf Parteien ein Grundmodell auf Basis sozio-demografischer Variablen gerechnet und danach ein vollständiges Modell, das auch Einstellungen und Themensalienz beinhaltet.

Ein Blick auf das einfache Grundmodell (siehe Tabelle 7.2) zeigt, dass Schichtzugehörigkeit 2017 kaum eine Rolle für die Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit spielte. Im Vergleich zu Wenigverdiener*innen bzw. der Unterschicht konnten sich Angehörige der Mittelschicht eher vorstellen, die ÖVP, SPÖ oder die Grünen zu wählen. Für die Oberschicht waren hingegen die Grünen und NEOS eher eine Option. Statistisch signifikant ($p < 0,05$) war die Schichtzugehörigkeit aber nur für die Wahrscheinlichkeit jemals für die SPÖ ($b = 0,47$) oder für die FPÖ zu stimmen. Die Bereitschaft die FPÖ zu wählen war dabei in der Unterschicht deutlich höher als in der Mittelschicht ($b = -0,72$) oder der Oberschicht ($b = -0,89$). Mit Blick auf die Vorzeichen der Effekte bot 2019 ein ähnliches Bild (siehe Tabelle 7.3). Allerdings hatten bei dieser Wahl die Befragten der Mittel- und Oberschicht eine statistisch signifikant höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit angegeben für die ÖVP oder NEOS zu stimmen. Die Unterschiede zwischen den Schichten in der Wahrscheinlichkeit der FPÖ die Stimme zu geben fielen nicht mehr signifikant aus.

Insgesamt zeigte sich aber, dass die einkommensbasierte Schichtzugehörigkeit eine geringe Erklärungskraft für die Unterschiede in der Wahlabsicht hatte. Die gesamte Varianzaufklärung blieb im Vergleich zu den vollständigen Modellen gering (korrigiertes R^2 zwischen 0,03 und 0,14). Und auch in diesen sehr einfachen Modellen spielten andere soziostrukturelle Faktoren eine deutlich größere Rolle. Für die ehemaligen Großparteien spielten etwa alte Konfliktlinien immer noch eine signifikante Rolle. Wie auch in früheren Befunden (z. B. Kritzinger et al., 2013) galt hier: Wer römisch-katholisch war, wählte in beiden Wahlgängen eher die ÖVP ($b_{2017} = 1,6$; $b_{2019} = 1,22$) und zumindest 2017 eher nicht die SPÖ ($b = -0,48$); Gewerkschaftsmitglieder wählten hingegen wahrscheinlicher die SPÖ ($b_{2017} = 1,42$; $b_{2019} = 1,2$) und weniger die ÖVP ($b_{2017} = -0,68$; $b_{2019} = -0,77$). Bei den anderen Parteien offenbarte sich Bildung als das zentrale soziostrukturelle Merkmal entlang dessen sich die Präferenzen der Befragten ausdrückten. Bildung war damit auch in den analysierten Wahlgängen in Österreich eine Grundlage für die erwähnte neue Konfliktlinie, die sich vor allem in unterschiedlichen Werthaltungen und Präferenzen auf der sozio-kulturellen Dimension äußert (Dolezal, 2010; Stubager, 2010). Höhere

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formale Bildung (Matura und höher) erhöhte etwa signifikant die genannte Wahrscheinlichkeit für die Grünen zu stimmen, und zwar um 1,7 (2017) bzw. 1,8 (2019) Skalenpunkte. Auch für die Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit von NEOS hat Bildung einen signifikanten, stark positiven Effekt ($b_{2017} = 1,37$; $b_{2019} = 1,45$). Bei der FPÖ ist es hingegen umgekehrt ($b_{2017} = -1,63$; $b_{2019} = -1,55$). Auch das Alter und das Geschlecht spielten bei FPÖ, Grünen und NEOS eine größere Rolle.

Das vollständige Modell (siehe Tabelle 7.2) beinhaltet neben den soziostrukturellen Faktoren auch die politischen Einstellungen und Themenpräferenzen der Wähler*innen. Dabei blieben die zuvor geschilderten wesentlichen soziostrukturellen Grundlagen der Parteipräferenzen erhalten. Auch die Befunde zur Schichtzugehörigkeit ließen sich für das vollständige Modell aufrechterhalten. Im Vergleich zur Referenzkategorie – der Zugehörigkeit zu den unteren Einkommensschichten – wirkte sich Zugehörigkeit zur Mittelschicht leicht positiv auf die Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit für alle Parteien mit Ausnahme der FPÖ aus. Signifikant blieb der positive Effekt von Zugehörigkeit zur Mittelschicht für die SPÖ 2017 ($b = 0,43$), 2019 waren die positiven Effekte für alle Parteien außer die FPÖ signifikant ($p < 0,05$). Die FPÖ konnte vor allem 2017 stärker die unteren Einkommensschichten und weniger die Mittel- ($b = -0,54$) und Oberschicht ($b = -0,60$) von sich überzeugen. 2019 äußerten die Respondent*innen aus der Oberschicht außerdem eine etwas höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit für die ÖVP ($b = 0,6$) und für NEOS ($b = 0,64$) zu stimmen. Diese fast durchgehend höheren Wahlwahrscheinlichkeiten der Mittelschicht im Vergleich zur Unterschicht lassen auch die Spekulation zu, dass die unteren Einkommensschichten nicht nur eine höhere Neigung zur FPÖ-Wahl hatten, sondern, besonders 2019, auch tendenziell eher dazu neigten, für gar keine Partei zu stimmen. Insgesamt blieben die Effekte auf die geäußerte Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit für spezifische Parteien aber, vor allem im Vergleich zu anderen Faktoren in den Modellen, gering.

Besonders relevant war 2017 die Einstellung zur Zuwanderung (siehe Tabelle 7.2). Dies traf nicht nur für die höheren Wahrscheinlichkeiten die FPÖ ($b = 2,91$) oder die ÖVP ($b = 1,04$) zu wählen zu, sondern auch für die Wahl der anderen Parteien, wo eine ablehnende Haltung zur Zuwanderung mit geringeren Wahlwahrscheinlichkeiten – oder umgekehrt Offenheit für Zuwanderung mit erhöhter Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit – zusammenfiel. Während sich dieses Resultat mit der erhöhten Salienz des Zuwande-

rungsthemas bei der Wahl 2017 erklären ließe, zeigt der Blick auf die Ergebnisse für 2019 (Tabelle 7.3), dass die starke Polarisierung über das Zuwanderungsthema auch 2019 noch eine zentrale Rolle spielte. Auch hier waren es wieder die ÖVP ($b = 2,01$) und die FPÖ ($b = 3,83$), die von zuwanderungskritischen Positionen besonders stark profitieren konnten. Umgekehrt führte eine offenere Haltung der Respondent*innen zu Zuwanderung auch 2019 zu höheren Präferenzen für die anderen Parteien. Besonders stark traf das bei den Grünen zu. Da die unabhängigen Variablen auf zwei Standardabweichungen standardisiert wurden, bedeutet dies etwa für die Grünen, dass Menschen, die Zuwanderung um zwei Standardabweichungen kritischer betrachteten als alle Befragten im Mittel, die Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit für die Grünen 2019 auf der 11-stufigen Skala um 3,65 Punkte niedriger angaben. Weniger stark als bei den Grünen, aber in der Richtung gleich, war der Effekt in beiden Wahlgängen für die SPÖ ($b_{2017} = -1,27$; $b_{2019} = -2,66$) und NEOS ($b_{2017} = -1,11$; $b_{2019} = -1,93$).

Wirtschaftliche Ansichten spielten vor allem für Präferenzen für die ÖVP und die SPÖ eine Rolle. Wer in wirtschaftlichen Fragen weiter rechts stand, wählte eher die ÖVP ($b_{2017} = 1,11$; $b_{2019} = 1,23$), bei der SPÖ ($b_{2017} = -1,17$; $b_{2019} = -1,21$) war es umgekehrt. Wirtschaftlich linke Ansichten förderten auch die Präferenz für die Grünen ($b_{2017} = -0,56$; $b_{2019} = -0,71$). Für die Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit für die FPÖ und NEOS spielten wirtschaftspolitische Präferenzen 2017 keine signifikante Rolle. 2019 gaben ökonomisch weiter rechts stehende Wähler*innen auch etwas höhere Präferenzen für die FPÖ ($b = 0,39$) und NEOS ($b = 0,64$) an. In Summe zeigte sich aber, dass wirtschaftliche Überzeugungen, also die traditionelle Links-rechts-Dimension des politischen Spektrums, in beiden Wahlgängen eine deutlich weniger ausgeprägte Rolle spielten als das neue sozio-kulturelle Cleavage, dass sich vor allem in der Frage der Zuwanderung äußert (Kriesi et al., 2008; van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009).

Populistische Einstellungen – also die Ablehnung von Kompromissen, von Berufspolitiker*innen und den Regierenden, in Verbindung mit dem Wunsch nach mehr politischem Einfluss der „einfachen“ Bürger*innen – stärkte 2017 vor allem die Unterstützung für die FPÖ ($b = 1,10$). Umgekehrt senkten diese populistischen Einstellungen die Wahrscheinlichkeit die SPÖ ($b = -0,92$) und die Grünen ($b = -0,53$) zu wählen. Die SPÖ wurde von Bürger*innen mit populistischen Einstellungen mutmaßlich als Vertreterin

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des Systems gesehen bzw. bekundeten eher diejenigen Sympathien für die SPÖ, die mit „der Politik“ zufrieden waren. Für die ÖVP, obwohl seit 1987 in der Regierung – meist gemeinsam mit der SPÖ – gab es diesen Effekt nicht. Hier gelang es Sebastian Kurz anscheinend, dass viele Wähler*innen die ÖVP unter seiner Führung 2017 nicht (mehr) als Teil der regierenden Elite betrachteten, sondern als etwas Neues. Insbesondere die Unterstützung der FPÖ als prototypische rechtspopulistische Partei (z. B. Gründl & Aichholzer, 2020) durch Wähler*innen mit starken populistischen Einstellungen war zu erwarten. Interessanterweise drehte sich dieses Bild bei der Nationalratswahl 2019. Wer die Eliten grundsätzlich kritischer sah, äußerte eine geringere Wahrscheinlichkeit für die ÖVP ($b = -2,15$) und die FPÖ ($b = -0,43$) zu stimmen. Dafür sind zwei Erklärungen denkbar: Wer 2017 mit Wut auf „die da oben“ für die FPÖ oder ÖVP stimmte, fühlte sich 2019 von den nun regierenden Parteien besser vertreten und äußerte sich nicht mehr so elitenkritisch – umgekehrt sahen wohl die Wähler*innen anderer Parteien, die herrschende politische Elite nun kritischer. Es ist außerdem denkbar, dass Teile der populistischen Wähler*innenschaft sich aufgrund des Ibiza-Skandals stärker von ÖVP und FPÖ abwandten und eventuell auch eine stärkere Neigung aufwiesen, dieses Mal gar nicht zu wählen.

Auch die individuelle Themensalienz spielte eine gewisse Rolle. Für die Unterstützung der SPÖ war 2017 und 2019 Wirtschaft und Wohlfahrtsstaat das wichtigste Thema. Personen, die ein anderes Thema (Zuwanderung, Umwelt, sonstige) als wichtigstes Thema genannt hatten, gaben eine geringere Wahrscheinlichkeit an, für die SPÖ zu stimmen. Insbesondere traf dies auf die zu, die das Thema Zuwanderung ($b_{2017} = -0,64$; $b_{2019} = -1,45$) genannt hatten. Zumindest 2019 galt selbiges auch wieder für die ÖVP. Jene, die andere Themen als Wirtschaft und Wohlfahrtsstaat als wichtigstes politisches Thema genannt hatten, wiesen eine geringere Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit für die ÖVP auf. Signifikant war dieser Unterschied aber nur für jene, die stattdessen Umwelt als wichtigstes Thema nannten. Sie gaben, im Vergleich zu jenen, die Wirtschaft und Wohlfahrtsstaat genannt hatten, die Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit ÖVP zu wählen um 0,9 Punkte niedriger an.

Wer Zuwanderung als wichtigstes Thema nannte – im Vergleich zu jenen, die Wirtschaft und Wohlfahrtsstaat genannt hatten, gab 2017 eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit ÖVP ($b = 0,36$; nicht signifikant) und vor allem FPÖ ($b = 0,59$) zu wählen an. 2019 wurde

das Thema sehr viel seltener als wichtigstes Thema genannt (siehe Abbildung 7.3). Jene die es allerdings auch 2019 noch taten, neigten sehr stark der FPÖ zu ($b = 2,21$). Wer Umwelt als wichtigstes Thema empfand, hatte sowohl 2017 ($b = 1,36$) als auch 2019 ($b = 1,49$) eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit die Grünen zu wählen. Der Unterschied hier: 2019 hatte das Thema Umwelt im Vergleich zu 2017 eine sehr viel größere Bedeutung (Eberl, Huber, & Plescia, 2020).

7.4 Schlussfolgerungen

Insgesamt zeigte sich, dass sich die Mittelschicht hinsichtlich Ihrer Parteipräferenzen und Einstellungen nicht systematisch von den anderen Schichten unterscheidet. Häufig lag sie in ihrer politischen Orientierung zwischen den stärker polarisierten Unter- und Oberschichten – teilweise, etwa in Fragen der Zuwanderung, näher an der Unterschicht. Dies ist wenig verwunderlich, denn die Mittelschicht stellt auch in Österreich eine heterogene Gruppe dar, die von Facharbeiter*innen, über junge Akademiker*innen oder Kleinunternehmer*innen bis zu leitenden Angestellten sehr verschiedene Berufsgruppen und Interessenlagen vereint (vgl. Dallinger, 2018; Oesch, 2006). Sie weist daher auch kein eigenständiges oder gänzlich anderes politisches Profil im Vergleich zu anderen Schichten auf. Im Gegenteil, Angehörige der Mittelschicht bleiben je nach Interessenslage anschlussfähig für schichtübergreifende Koalitionen mit den oberen und den unteren Einkommensschichten (Dallinger, 2018).

Die Modelle zu den Wahlwahrscheinlichkeiten für die einzelnen Parteien zeigten, dass die Sozialstruktur immer noch eine wichtige Rolle spielte. Einige der bekannten alten Konfliktlinien (Kritzinger et al., 2013; vgl. auch für Deutschland Weißels, 2019) spiegelten sich in der österreichischen Wähler*innenschaft auch 2017 und 2019 noch wider. Das religiöse Bekenntnis ist etwa für die Wahl der ÖVP nach wie vor wichtig, während gewerkschaftlich organisierte Arbeitnehmer*innen immer noch stärker der SPÖ zuneigen. Dazu kommen allerdings Faktoren wie die Bildung und das Alter, die vor allem bei den weniger etablierten Parteien relevante Faktoren darstellten. Die einkommensbasierte Schichtzugehörigkeit war auch in diesen Modellen von geringerer Bedeutung. Es zeigte sich vor allem, dass die unteren Schichten eine, 2017 auch signifikant, höhere

Wahrscheinlichkeit aufwiesen, FPÖ zu wählen. Die Mittel- und Oberschichten äußerten tendenziell hingegen eine höhere Bereitschaft, bei anderen Parteien ihr Kreuz zu machen.

Diese Ergebnisse stützen damit teilweise auch die These der Modernisierungs- oder Globalisierungsverlierer*innen als Kernwähler*innen rechts-populistischer Parteien (Kriesi et al., 2008; Rippl & Seipel, 2018). Ähnlich zu bereits bekannten Befunden zur Wahl rechtspopulistischer Parteien wie der FPÖ (z. B. Aichholzer et al., 2014; Gründl & Aichholzer, 2020; Oesch, 2008) wirkten sich aber die Einstellung gegenüber Zuwanderung, und 2017 auch Unzufriedenheit mit den politischen Eliten, stärker auf die Unterstützung für die FPÖ aus als die Sozialstruktur.

Ganz generell hatten Themen – vor allem neue Themen – eine größere Bedeutung als die Sozialstruktur. In der Tat lässt sich das Wahlergebnis 2017 deutlich besser durch die Einstellung gegenüber Zuwanderung und allgemein durch die Salienz des Themas erklären als durch Schichtzugehörigkeit. Die Bedeutung des Themas Zuwanderung stieg im Vergleich zu 2013 sprunghaft an, auch und vor allem in der Mittelschicht. Profitiert scheinen davon, mit Blick auf das Wahlergebnis, die FPÖ und die ÖVP zu haben. Für die FPÖ stellt Zuwanderung schon lange das Kernthema dar, die ÖVP konnte unter neuer Obmannschaft von Sebastian Kurz hier anscheinend glaubhaft einen Kurswechsel vollziehen und ebenfalls zuwanderungskritische Wähler*innen ansprechen (siehe auch Plescia et al., 2020). Umgekehrt erhöhte Offenheit für Zuwanderung die Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit für die anderen Parteien.

2019 ließ sich Ähnliches in kleinerem Ausmaß wieder beobachten. Das Thema Umwelt gewann an Relevanz für die Wähler*innen, davon profitieren konnten vor allem die Grünen (siehe auch Eberl, Huber, & Plescia, 2020), die zu den Gewinnern der Wahl 2019 gehörten und danach auch in die Regierung einziehen konnten. Die Polarisierung der Wähler*innen und Parteien entlang des Themas Zuwanderung blieb aber auch 2019 erhalten und wirkte teilweise sogar noch stärker auf die Parteipräferenzen. Menschen, die restriktive Zuwanderungspolitik befürworteten, stimmten eher für ÖVP und FPÖ und umgekehrt führte größere Offenheit bei Zuwanderung auch 2019 wieder zu höherer Präferenz für Grüne, SPÖ und NEOS.

Neben dem Thema Zuwanderung bestimmte auch die Einstellung zum politischen

System bei der Nationalratswahl 2017 wesentlich die Parteipräferenzen, vor allem für die FPÖ und die SPÖ. Menschen, die die politischen Eliten als abgehoben betrachteten und diese ablehnten, wählten eher die FPÖ. Umgekehrt wurde die SPÖ von vielen anscheinend als Vertreterin des etablierten politischen Systems gesehen, die Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit war daher höher, je weniger populistisch Menschen dachten. 2019 konnte dies in der Form nicht mehr beobachtet werden. Im Gegenteil; im Gesamtmodell, das heißt auch unter Berücksichtigung soziostruktureller und ideologischer Überzeugungen, hatten höhere populistische Einstellungen sogar einen negativen Effekt auf die Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit für die FPÖ und die ÖVP. Neben höherer Zufriedenheit mit der regierenden ÖVP/FPÖ-Koalition bei Wähler*innen, die sich 2017 noch sehr populistisch geäußert hatten und umgekehrt größerer Unzufriedenheit mit den politischen Eliten bei Wähler*innen der anderen Parteien, könnte sich dies auch zum Teil dadurch erklären, dass stark populistische Wähler 2019, in Folge des Ibiza-Skandals, eher geneigt waren, gar nicht zu wählen.

Überhaupt wäre die Neigung zum Nichtwählen eine spannende Frage, auch aus Perspektive der sozialen Schichten. Sie stand aber nicht im Fokus dieses Beitrags, der sich vor allem mit der Parteiwahl und politischen Überzeugungen der sozialen Schichten auseinandersetzt. Wichtig zu berücksichtigen ist, dass die Analysen die Mittelschicht auf der Basis des Einkommens definiert haben. Abweichende Definitionen (z. B. nach Bildung oder beruflicher Tätigkeit; vgl. Niehues, 2018) könnten zu anderen Resultaten führen. Eine Schwierigkeit bei Einkommensvariablen ist auch, dass Befragte nicht immer in der Lage sind, das monatliche Haushaltseinkommen akkurat zu beziffern und ein Teil der Befragten häufig auch verweigern, Angaben zu ihrer finanziellen Situation zu machen.

Abschließend lässt sich festhalten, dass die Wähler*innen – gerade auch die, die der Mittelschicht angehören – bei der Nationalratswahl 2017 in Zuwanderungsfragen weniger klar nach rechts gerückt sind. Vielmehr dürften aufgrund der Salienz des Themas die Präferenzen in Migrationsfragen größeres Gewicht für die Wahlentscheidung gehabt haben. Am weitesten nach rechts gerückt waren 2017 noch die unteren Einkommenschichten. 2019 zeigte sich aber, dass auch die Mittel- und Oberschicht im Durchschnitt nachgezogen und nach rechts gerückt sind. Für die Parteipräferenzen hatte die Einstel-

lung zu Zuwanderung dann auch 2019 immer noch große Bedeutung und überlagerte etwa die Sicht auf wirtschaftliche Fragen klar. Dies war der Fall, obwohl sich 2019 die Themenagenda erneut sehr stark wandelte. Einerseits gab es so etwas wie eine Rückkehr zur Normalität. Das heißt, Fragen der Wirtschaft und des Sozialstaats wurden wieder am häufigsten als das wichtigste Thema genannt. Andererseits stand für viele Wähler*innen dieses Mal das Thema Umwelt ganz oben auf der Agenda, wovon sehr stark die Grünen profitieren konnten. In diesem Themenumfeld konnten sie erfolgreich wieder in den Nationalrat einziehen und schließlich auch Teil der neuen Regierung werden.

Unser Beitrag bestätigt wesentliche, etablierte Erkenntnisse der empirischen Wahlforschung. Parteibindungen auf Basis der Zugehörigkeit zu ökonomischen Klassen oder einkommensbasierten Schichten sind nicht mehr so stark ausgeprägt. Das heißt nicht, dass Schichtzugehörigkeit und Sozialstruktur irrelevant für das Wahlverhalten sind. Vielmehr zeigt sich, dass neue Kriterien, wie vor allem Bildungsabschluss, zunehmend an Bedeutung gewinnen. Die Wähler*innenschaft ist aber in Summe volatiler geworden. Klar ist auch, dass neue Themen und Trennlinien wie das Umwelt- oder das Zuwanderungsthema an Bedeutung gewonnen haben. Dies gilt auch für das Wahlverhalten der Mittelschicht. Sie stellt aber eine sehr heterogene Gruppe dar und hat daher keine klaren entsprechenden gruppenspezifischen politischen Präferenzen. Die Mitte wird dennoch auch weiterhin ein wichtiger Faktor in der politischen Auseinandersetzung bleiben, als Kampfbegriff, Schlagwort und Zielgruppe politischer Botschaften. Wer behauptet, Politik für die Mitte zu machen, möchte damit signalisieren, Politik für die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung zu machen. Und da die Mitte nicht nur einen großen Teil der Bevölkerung umfasst, sondern sich ein noch größerer Teil dort verortet, fühlen sich potenziell auch sehr viele Wähler*innen davon angesprochen.

8 Summary of the Main Findings

In the beginning, I formulated two broad questions guiding this dissertation project:

What determines populist attitudes among citizens?

How, then, do these populist attitudes influence people's political behavior and sentiments?

The following sections present the main findings of the four research papers that make up this paper-based dissertation. In each section, I discuss findings concerning the more specific research questions posed in the theoretical framework. While each paper has had its own focus, which might go beyond this dissertation's primary scope, they all have contributed to our better understanding of the above questions. Overall, the subsequent sections deal with populist ideas on social media, anger as a possible consequence of populist beliefs, individual differences as a source for populist attitudes, and finally, the consequences of populist beliefs for voter behavior.

8.1 Populist Ideas on Social Media

In the first paper (see Chapter 4), I developed a new automated measurement for populist communication on social media. Thus, first and foremost, the paper has made a methodological contribution to populism research by tackling the following research question:

RQ1.1: How well does a dictionary approach allow us to assess the degree of populist ideas in German-language social media texts?

The resulting dictionary was published as the R package *popdictR* (Gründl, 2019/2020). Along with functions to easily apply the dictionary, the package also provides a complete

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list of all terms considered for inclusion as indicators for populist messages on social media. Thus, it might provide a starting point to tailor the dictionary to different platforms or types of communications. Finally, Paper 1 documents the steps taken to develop the dictionary; therefore, it should provide a helpful reference to develop dictionaries in other languages or for other concepts. To assist such endeavors, I compiled two more R packages, *multidictR* (Gründl, 2020b) and *regexhelpeR* (Gründl, 2020/2020), that offer functions to facilitate working with more complex dictionary patterns and regular expressions (see Section 4.3.4 in Paper 1).

The methodological contribution made in Paper 1 was highlighted by illustrating the significant improvements over two previous attempts at developing German populism dictionaries (Pauwels, 2017; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). Compared to the two pre-existing dictionaries, I could show that my dictionary better detected populism on the Facebook and Twitter accounts of Austrian, German, and Swiss parties often labeled populist (e.g., Rooduijn et al., 2019). Furthermore, the correlation between expert ratings of these parties' populism and the degree of populism in their communication on social media was clearly higher when measuring populist ideas using the newly developed dictionary compared to the two existing ones. Finally, the average split-half reliability, which helped assess the dictionaries' internal coherence, was also significantly ($p < 0.001$) improved.

The paper has also presented descriptive results on how prevalent populist messages were on Austrian, German, and Swiss political Facebook and Twitter accounts. Social media such as Facebook and Twitter have come under scrutiny because populists appear to be particularly drawn to these channels, which allow them to spread their message (Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017; Ernst et al., 2018; Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017). Indeed, the results highlighted that the populist radical right parties and their leading personnel spread most populist content in their respective countries. Between 2.2 to 4.4 percent of all sentences published by the studied accounts belonging to these parties included a populist message. This result also means that for the Alternative for Germany, 18 percent of all Facebook posts and Tweets between 2014 and February 2020 included at least one populist sentence. This was by far the highest proportion of populist messages of all studied parties, the Swiss People's Party (8.8% of all posts and Tweets) and the

Austrian Freedom Party (5.5%) followed next (for details, see Section 4.4 in Paper 1).

In general, results also showed that populist messages were more prevalent on Facebook than on Twitter. Furthermore, The Left (*Die Linke*) had the second-highest score in Germany (1.5% of all sentences on Facebook and Twitter); however, it was considerably lower than the populist radical right parties' scores in all three countries.¹ Thus, these results confirmed that the German party The Left (*Die Linke*) is a less clear-cut case of populism than the radical right parties. While the Left is often considered a far-left populist party (e.g., Rooduijn et al., 2019), others have argued that it is best viewed as a borderline case of populism (Fawzi et al., 2017).

The dictionary also showed its potential to study interesting borderline cases such as The Left. By studying the different politicians, it became evident that the perceptions of The Left's degree of populism might depend on whom one listens to. While the degree of populism on Sahra Wagenknecht's Facebook account (4.4% of all sentences) was at the same level with some of the populist radical right accounts, other prominent figures in the party or even the main party account shared substantially less populist content on Facebook (0.6–1.5%). Thus, as in Sahra Wagenknecht's case, prominent proponents of the Left might more clearly qualify as populist—at least with regards to social media. However, this is less obvious for other proponents or the party's general account (see Paper 1's Online Appendix G in Section C.7).

Paper 1 has illustrated how dictionaries for a complex concept such as populism could be improved. The results underscored that the proposed dictionary is well-suited to measure populist ideas on social media. Beyond this methodological contribution, the dictionary also enables researchers to study the potential effects of populist social media communication on the recipients. Paper 2 includes a possible approach; I have linked survey responses on which social media accounts people followed during the campaign with the content published on these accounts. This measure of (potential) exposure to populist communication was then included as a control for possible effects on citizens'

¹The national-conservative Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland (*Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union*, EDU) showed a similar proportion of populist messages on Facebook and Twitter. In Switzerland, it was the party with the second-highest proportion of populist messages on social media. Again, the minor party might represent a less clear case of populism than other parties. While it was not included as a populist party in the first version of the PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2019)—which was used when writing Paper 1—it is listed as populist now in the second revision (Rooduijn et al., 2020).

anger about politics. The same approach as in Paper 2 (for details, see Section 5.3) was employed for the supplemental analysis below.

Supplemental Analysis on Populist Communications' Effects

As mentioned in the theoretical framework (see Section 2.1), I intended to explore how exposure to populist messages on social media affects populist attitudes in a separate paper. However, in the course of the project and also in response to newly published papers on the topic, the focus has changed. Thus, the following research question is now addressed in this supplemental analysis:

RQ1.2: How do populist messages on social media affect citizens' populist attitudes?

The models in Table 8.1 tested a simple expectation: If people are more regularly exposed to populist ideas on social media, they should also show heightened populist attitudes. Such a change in populist attitudes based on the exposure to information constitutes a cognitive communication effect. In general, encountering populist messages should make populist arguments and beliefs more available and, through repetition, more readily accessible and relevant to individuals (Arendt & Matthes, 2014; Chong & Druckman, 2007). However, given that populist attitudes are already widespread among citizens, exposure to populist communication should mainly activate these already existing ideas in people's minds (Hameleers & Fawzi, 2020; Hawkins et al., 2020).

However, the results in Table 8.1 provided little support for this hypothesis. Despite the buzz surrounding populism on social media, I could not identify a clear and robust link between exposure to populism on social media and populist attitudes. In Model 1, populist messages on social media were significantly linked to higher populist attitudes ($p < 0.001$). However, the association was weak. A one percentage point increase in the proportion of populist sentences in one's social media diet was linked to an increase of 0.03 points on the 5-point populist attitude scale. Moreover, this was only the case in a model without extensive controls (such as attitudes toward immigration or economic inequality; see Models 1 and 2 in Table 8.1). By including a lagged dependent variable

(LDV), I then focused the analysis on the change in populist attitudes and accounted for (some) of the unobserved heterogeneity between subjects (de Vreese et al., 2017).

In the LDV models, exposure to populism on social media barely led to a change in populist attitudes ($b = 0.01$; $p < 0.05$) and effects were again indistinguishable from zero, when relevant controls were included (see Models 3 and 4 in Table 8.1). Similar to the analysis in Paper 2, I also computed within-between random effects models (A. Bell et al., 2019). These estimations confirmed the results from the LDV models in Table 8.1. A small association between exposure to populism on social media and populist attitudes existed (between subjects). However, changes in the exposure did not significantly affect changes in populist attitudes (see Appendix B).

So, much ado about nothing? Do these results imply that claims about social media as an important source of populist beliefs and, overall, an essential factor for populists' success are exaggerated? Not necessarily—methodologically, it is challenging to detect media effects in linkage studies (Scharkow & Bachl, 2017); this might be especially true for populist attitudes. Effects are generally underestimated in linkage studies because we introduce measurement error at two stages: the self-reporting of media usage and the content analysis. Also, the exposure measure is rather a measure of potential exposure because citizens who said they follow a particular politician have had the chance to see specific (populist) posts. However, we cannot know for sure which posts they saw precisely. Moreover, in the first three waves, the AUTNES panel survey asked questions on social media behavior only in wave three. Thus, changes in the exposure to populism only reflected changes in the content published by the followed parties and not when people started or stopped following these parties.

Finally, the fact that populist attitudes are relatively stable (Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; Hawkins et al., 2020) and have not changed a lot over three waves (between June and September 2017; see also Figure 8.1) also made it less likely to spot media effects. In general, one should keep in mind that people did not encounter populist messages for the first time in the studied periods but have potentially been subjected to populist communication for a long time already. Thus, identifying populist social media communication's lasting effects might also require studying extended periods.

While I did not unquestionably find that populist communication substantially and

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Table 8.1. Regular OLS and LDV models explaining populist attitudes.

	Model 1	Model 2	Incl. lagged DV	
			Model 3	Model 4
Exp. to pop. on soc. media (% of sentences)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Basic controls				
Age (years)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Gender (1 = female)	0.01 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Education (1 = Matura)	−0.28*** (0.03)	−0.13*** (0.03)	−0.07*** (0.02)	−0.04* (0.02)
Political interest (0/1)	−0.16*** (0.03)	−0.10** (0.03)	−0.07*** (0.02)	−0.06** (0.02)
All controls				
Grievance: immigration (1–5)		0.32*** (0.02)		0.08*** (0.01)
Grievance: inequality (1–5)		0.21*** (0.02)		0.06*** (0.01)
Personal campaign contact (0/1)		0.02 (0.04)		0.01 (0.03)
Impersonal campaign contact (0/1)		−0.08** (0.03)		−0.04 (0.02)
Pol. discussions/week (log)		0.02 (0.02)		0.01 (0.01)
Tabloid usage (online + print; 0–42)		0.01** (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)
Lagged dependent variable				
Pop. attitudes (t-1)			0.74*** (0.01)	0.71*** (0.02)
(Intercept)	3.44*** (0.08)	1.60*** (0.13)	0.88*** (0.07)	0.48*** (0.09)
Adj. R ²	0.08	0.25	0.58	0.63
Num. obs.	2696	2241	2687	2239

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Note. The dependent variable in all models is populist attitudes (on a 1–5 scale). All continuous independent variables were mean-centered. Dummies for Austria's nine provinces are also included in the models as controls. Models are based on the first three waves.

significantly affected populist attitudes directly, being confronted with more populist messages on social media did affect the anger about politics. The models in Paper 2 included exposure to populist ideas through social media as a control variable. In these models (see Table 5.2 in Paper 2), exposure to populism on social media entailed a more substantial effect on anger about politics than we have seen for populist attitudes. A one percentage point increase in populist sentences led to an increase in anger about politics of around 0.08 points on the eleven-point anger scale, even in models that included populist attitudes and prior levels of anger (i.e., an LDV).

8.2 Anger as a Consequence of Populism

As argued in Paper 2 and in the theoretical framework in Section 2.2.1, anger is a highly consequential emotion for political behavior (e.g., Best & Krueger, 2011; Huddy et al., 2007; Valentino et al., 2011) and likely linked to populist narratives (Hameleers et al., 2016; Rico et al., 2017; Roseman & Smith, 2001). In Paper 2, I studied political anger, that is, anger about the current political situation. The paper has provided an important contribution to this dissertation by answering the following research question:

RQ2: Which role do populist attitudes play in experiencing anger about politics?

Following appraisal theories of emotions (Roseman & Smith, 2001), I have argued that political anger arises if situations are perceived as unfavorable and if such negative situations are then attributed to the failings of the political system and the political elites. The failing of the political class is a core idea in populism; thus, I studied heightened populist attitudes as a possible source of such political anger. In the negative assessment of politics and the political elites that populist attitudes entail, they could provide a basis for being angry about politics. However, politics itself might not be the only part of society that is perceived negatively. Therefore, I analyzed two possible grievances relating to the economic and the sociocultural dimension of politics (Kriesi et al., 2006; van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009). More specifically, discontent with or worries about economic inequality and immigration might also provide a basis for angry feelings because they entail the negative assessment of a situation.

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Nonetheless, populist attitudes might be essential for eliciting anger, also in combination with grievances about immigration or the economy. While all three factors include a negative assessment of a situation, only populist attitudes entail an attribution of blame to the political elites (i.e., “politicians,” “the government,” or “the parties”). These arguments developed in Paper 2 (see Section 5.3) were tested with panel data. Thus, I was able to make more substantial claims about the causal nature of the relationship between these variables because I could control for unobserved heterogeneity among respondents by including a lagged dependent variable (LDV) and, in thorough robustness checks, also by estimating models focussing on within-subject changes (equivalent to fixed effects models). The robustness of the identified relationships was also assured by including a variety of control variables. These controls focused on taking the respondents’ information environment into account because such external sources might prime anger about politics (also see the previous Section 8.1).

The results (see Section 5.4 in Paper 2) supported most of these claims (and, thus, the hypotheses formulated in Paper 2). Populist attitudes were strongly linked to feeling angrier about politics. A one-point increase on the five-point populist attitude scale led to an increase of 0.47 to 0.7 points (depending on the model) on the eleven-point anger scale. Similarly, worries about immigration were also significantly associated with more anger about politics; this effect, however, was substantially smaller. Grievances pertaining to economic inequality were also correlated to more anger about politics; however, this effect disappeared after the inclusion of the LDV. Finally, for immigration grievances, a significant interaction effect with populist attitudes was identified (see Figure 5.2 in Paper 2). While worrying a lot about immigration without sharing populist beliefs at all might even result in less anger, such worries led to angrier feelings toward politics for those who were more populist. No such interaction was observed between economic grievances and populist attitudes.

Thus, the findings from Paper 2 (discussed in more detail in Section 5.4) highlighted that populist attitudes might elicit anger about politics because they entail the depiction of politics as a mess and the attribution of blame toward the political elites. Immigration represented another potential source for anger at politics. Yet, such grievances about immigration enfolded their full potential to elicit anger only in combination with populist

beliefs. Thus, populist beliefs might assist in mobilizing existing grievances.

Such an effect was not visible for grievances about economic inequality. This might be due to the specifics of the Austrian case. Austria was less affected by the Great Recession than other countries (Kriesi et al., 2008; Luther, 2015). Its well-developed welfare state (Obinger et al., 2010) also makes it less likely that people will become angry at politics because of economic inequality. Furthermore, from a supply-side perspective, no populist party mobilized on economic inequality while the Freedom Party has been stressing the issue of immigration for decades (Heinisch et al., 2020; Heinisch & Hauser, 2014).

8.3 Individual-Level Differences and Populist Attitudes

Already some of the early work on populist attitudes suspected that they were related to deep-rooted individual differences in individuals' personalities (Hawkins et al., 2012). However, until recently, most research focused on the relationship between personality and support for populist parties (e.g., Ackermann et al., 2018; Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; B. N. Bakker et al., 2016). Thus, we know little about personality's role in "populist attitudes per se and not just behavioral outcomes" (Hawkins et al., 2017, p. 280). Our study in Paper 3 has helped to reduce this gap in research by tackling the following two questions:

RQ3.1: How do personality differences affect the adoption of populist beliefs?

RQ3.2: How are deep-rooted individual differences related to PRR voting?

More specifically, we addressed individual differences in people's need for certainty (see Section 6.1 in Paper 3). We argued that deep-rooted desires to reduce uncertainty might be crucial in supporting populist radical right (PRR) parties by facilitating the adoption of specific beliefs. Specifically, desires for uncertainty avoidance (UA) might be related to attitudes reflecting the two main components of the populist radical right's overall ideology—populism (i.e., populist attitudes) and the radical right core (i.e., nativism and authoritarianism). By adopting such attitudes, people high in UA would become more likely to vote for the PRR.

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Following theories of ideology as motivated social cognition, we expected the radical right core to resonate well with needs to reduce uncertainty. For populist attitudes, we expected a more ambivalent picture. At first sight, these attitudes might seem attractive to voters looking for certainty. Populism's simplicity and certainty about who is good and evil should speak to needs to dissolve uncertainty. However, at the same time, it also entails an attack on the political status quo and usually demands wide-ranging changes that could alienate voters longing for certainty. In the case of the populist radical right, the attack on the status quo alludes to the restoration of a just order and a glorious past (e.g., Rydgren, 2017). Thus, we expected a positive relationship between needs to avoid uncertainty and populist attitudes if people also held right-wing ideas (see Section 6.1.2 in Paper 3).

The structural equation modeling results clearly showed that uncertainty avoidance (UA) tendencies were strongly associated with adopting right-wing ideas. The expected complicated relationship with populist attitudes was also confirmed. Overall, UA did not affect, or at least not significantly affect, populist attitudes in the models. However, there was a positive indirect association via the radical right core (standardized coefficient $\beta = 0.15$ to 0.18) whilst the direct effect was even negative ($\beta = -0.13$ to -0.12). That is, a positive effect of UA on populist attitudes depended on the adoption of right-wing ideas; otherwise, populist beliefs were less attractive for those seeking certainty. Lastly, we showed that UA is indeed associated with voting for the populist radical right ($\beta = 0.09$ to 0.11). However, this association was mainly mediated through the adoption of radical right core beliefs and not populist attitudes. The main findings in Paper 3 were also corroborated by running causal mediation analysis as a robustness check (see the Online Supplement for Paper 3 in Section F.4).

8.4 Populist Attitudes and Voting

Finally, Papers 3 and 4 were, among other aspects, concerned with the role populist attitudes play in people's voting behavior. As discussed in the theoretical framework (see Section 2.2.3), populist attitudes allow us to study the role of populism per se in support for (populist) parties. Previous studies about support for populism mostly explained

support for certain populist parties. However, only the inclusion of populist attitudes measures allows us to disentangle the role of populist beliefs from other factors affecting vote choice on the demand side. Thus, Papers 3 and 4 have contributed to answering the final research question raised in the theoretical framework:

RQ4: Which role do populist attitudes play for people's vote choice?

In Paper 3, we have studied electoral support for the populist radical right Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ) in 2017. In Paper 4, we have analyzed the propensity to vote for five Austrian parties in the 2017 and 2019 national elections: the conservative Austrian People's Party (*Österreichische Volkspartei*, ÖVP), the Social Democratic Party of Austria (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs*, SPÖ), the Freedom Party, the Greens (*Die Grünen*), and the liberal *NEOS*. In both studies, populist attitudes were included in integrative models that considered various known voting behavior explanations. Data came from the AUTNES Online Panel Study 2017 for Paper 3 and the AUTNES Multi-Mode 2017 as well as the AUTNES Online Panel Study 2017–2019 for Paper 2 (for details see Chapter 3).

Figure 8.1 displays the populist attitudes among voters of different Austrian parties. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the parties' longstanding populist stance, voters of the Freedom Party showed the highest populist attitudes in 2017. They were followed by non-voters and voters of the Pilz List, a more populist split-off of the Green party that only succeeded in 2017. After the 2017 election, the Freedom Party joined a government led by Sebastian Kurz's People's Party; Social Democrats were ousted from the government. Thus, among voters of the Social Democratic Party in 2019, populist attitudes appeared more prevalent than in 2017.

On the contrary, while still characterized by high populist attitudes, Freedom Party supporters appeared less populist than before the 2017 election—or maybe mostly less critical of the political system and the ruling elites since their party was now in government. However, after the Freedom Party caused a major scandal (the “Ibiza scandal”), the government was dissolved, and the party lost more than a third of its voters from 2017. In January 2020, after the election in September 2019, the Freedom Party's (remaining) voters were again the most populist group of voters—on a par with the non-voters who

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now included a large group of former Freedom Party supporters (Partheymüller et al., 2020).




Figure 8.1. Populist attitudes among Austrian voters (AUTNES data; weighted by demographic and, for the online panels, political criteria).

If supporters of the “prototypical” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013a, p. 155) populist radical right Freedom Party are the most populist voters in Austria, were their populist beliefs also a cause for supporting the party? Yes, to a degree, at least in 2017, but neither were they the only factor nor the most important one. In fact, in Paper 3, support for the

populist radical right was mainly explained by supporting their radical right core ideas and believing in their capability to deliver in government—and only to a minor degree by sharing populist beliefs. Paper 3 shows that sharing the party's populist ideas was considerably less influential on voting for the Freedom Party (standardized coefficient $\beta = .12$) than sharing their radical right core ($\beta = .35$). In the structural equation model that explained how uncertainty avoidance might have been related to the propensity to vote (PTV) for the Freedom Party—instead of the actual vote choice—not even a significant association between populist attitudes and the PTV for the Freedom Party was found (see Section 6.3 in Paper 3 for details).

In Paper 4, we explored how political preferences, including populist attitudes, were distributed among social classes. Here we found that populist attitudes were not distributed equally among social strata. Instead, the lower-income classes were more prone to display populist attitudes. The middle classes showed lower populist attitudes, and populist beliefs were on average lowest among the higher economic classes (see Section 7.3.1 in Paper 4). We then ran regression models on the PTV for different Austrian parties; the continuous independent variables were standardized to two standard deviations to allow easy comparison between effect sizes (Gelman, 2008).

We could show that potential voters of the populist radical right were more likely coming from a lower-income class background. The Freedom Party was the only party where belonging to the middle or upper classes harmed the PTV to vote for the party; however, the effect was only significant in 2017. Also, the electorate parts with lower formal education expressed a higher willingness to vote for the Freedom Party. In contrast, the Greens and the still relatively new liberal party NEOS appealed more to highly educated voters. Thus, the findings provided some support for the winners and losers of globalization thesis (Kriesi et al., 2008; Rippl & Seipel, 2018). Nonetheless, more than these sociostructural factors, issue-related attitudes explained party preference.

Economic attitudes proved to be a relevant division for supporting the two traditional major parties; right-wing economic attitudes increased support for the conservative People's Party in 2017 and 2019. Left-wing economic preferences increased the expressed PTV for the Social Democrats. Naming the environment as the most important political issue at hand substantially increased the PTV for the Green party. However, this only

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paid off in 2019 because then a lot more people than in 2017 considered the environment the most important issue. In 2017, the issue of immigration dominated the debate and, consequently, also voting behavior. Attitudes toward immigration divided the electorate. Voters who were more open toward immigration had an increased PTV for the Greens, the Social Democrats, and the NEOS. Those with anti-immigration attitudes reported a greater tendency to vote for the People's Party and the Freedom Party. While some of the other factors differed across elections, the immigration divide remained a stable and essential predictor for party preferences in the 2019 election. Also, in accordance with previous results on voting for the populist radical right (e.g., Aichholzer et al., 2014; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008; Rippl & Seipel, 2018), anti-immigration sentiments were particularly powerful predictors of the PTV for the Freedom Party.

While less important than immigration, populist attitudes were also a significant predictor of the PTV for the Freedom Party and the Social Democratic Party in the 2017 National Council election. People who regarded the political elites as aloof and rejected them in favor of the ordinary people were more likely to vote for the Freedom Party. An increase in populist attitudes by two standard deviations led to an increase of 1.1 points on the 11-point PTV scale (cf. $b = 2.9$ for anti-immigration attitudes). Conversely, the social democrats were apparently viewed as representatives of the established political system. Thus, the expressed probability of voting for them was lower for people who shared more populist convictions. In 2019, these effects had changed. In the overall model (i.e., also taking other factors such as sociostructural differences and political preferences into account), higher populist attitudes even hurt the PTV for the Freedom Party and also the People's Party. One reason might be that populist considerations did not play such an important role for some of the Freedom Party's voters of 2017 because they were now more satisfied with politics and the ruling coalition between the Freedom Party and the "new" (Bodlos & Plescia, 2018) People's Party. In addition, this could, in part, also be explained by the fact that strongly populist Freedom Party supporters had many reasons to be disappointed by their party because of the Ibiza scandal and thus express a lower PTV for it.

9 Discussion

This dissertation has been concerned with the rise of populism in Western Europe and across the globe. I have been particularly interested in the role of populism on the demand side, that is, populist beliefs among the electorate. In four research papers, I explored the causes of such populist attitudes and which consequences they entail for political sentiment and behavior—or at least certain aspects of it (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1). When I began working on this project, the study of populist attitudes among ordinary citizens was still in its infancy, and populist attitudes measures only started to be included in election studies and research projects. The last four years have witnessed an increase in research and knowledge about populist attitudes to which this dissertation project has also contributed.

The results obtained in this paper-based thesis encompass a broad range of topics (also see the previous Chapter 8). In Paper 1, I have shown how prevalent populist ideas are in the communication of political parties on social media in German-speaking countries. In particular, the populist radical right made widespread use of populist messages. The results have also shown that in Austria, the Freedom Party clearly used populist ideas the most. This finding also underscores the classification as a populist party made in later papers. Finally, the methodological contribution of Paper 1 also represents an essential contribution of my dissertation. The developed dictionary approach is now freely available to other researchers as an R package (Gründl, 2019/2020).

While experimental studies have shown that populist attitudes can very well be influenced by political communication (Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017), at least in the short term, this effect could not be shown in this dissertation using data from a panel survey. It should be noted that the approach of linking survey data with the results of content analysis—in this case, automated via the developed dictionary—generally tends to have

minimal effects. Besides, populist attitudes are relatively stable beliefs (Hameleers & Fawzi, 2020; Hawkins et al., 2020). In Austria, in particular, only minor changes can be expected over a few weeks or months since corresponding ideas are established in the political discourse due to the longstanding presence of a populist radical right-wing party such as the Freedom Party (Heinisch & Hauser, 2016; Luther, 2007). This finding also does not imply that populist communication on social media has no impact on voters at all. As the findings in Paper 2 indicate, shorter-term emotional responses such as anger at politics are related to exposure to populist ideas on social media. However, in contrast to the fuss surrounding social media (Engesser, Fawzi, et al., 2017; Gerbaudo, 2018; Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017), political communication on Facebook and Twitter also does not seem to represent a hypodermic needle that strongly and uniformly affects all recipients.

In addition to social media as a potential source of populist thought, I have also addressed personality differences as a basis for populist attitudes in my dissertation. In Paper 3, my co-author and I have made a theoretical contribution by discussing populist attitudes as motivated social cognition. For individual differences in needs to avoid uncertainty, the association with populist beliefs turns out to be ambivalent. On the one hand, populism may provide a means of uncertainty reduction by providing straightforward explanations (Bischof & Senninger, 2018) and positive group identification (Hogg, 2000). On the other hand, populism entails an attack on the status quo (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). Therefore, no simple direct relationship between populist beliefs and uncertainty avoidance could be confirmed. Only in combination with right-wing beliefs, where the attack on the status quo is directed toward returning to an idealized past or “natural” order of things (Rydgren, 2017; Taggart, 2002), did uncertainty avoidance lead to heightened populist attitudes.

Here, our findings also confirm similar considerations on risk propensity (Steenbergen & Siczek, 2017). However, we could also show that the general inclination to uncertainty avoidance has more substantial explanatory power than mere risk propensity. Research on the Big 5 Personality Traits (Fatke, 2019) has since also confirmed that personality traits related to uncertainty avoidance—openness to experiences and conscientiousness—do not clearly promote populist attitudes. In general, our results,

but also those of other studies, show that the relationship between personality traits and populist attitudes is not straightforward and requires careful theoretical consideration.

In my dissertation, I have not only been interested in why people develop populist attitudes in the first place, but I also investigated how these attitudes then affect their party preferences in elections. Overall, in the Austrian election of 2017, populist attitudes contributed to a preference for the populist radical right Austrian Freedom Party. However, considering the hype about populism, their effect on citizens' party preferences was less evident than one might have expected. Considerably more than by sharing their populist stances, voting for the Freedom Party was driven by sharing their radical right views, especially on immigration. Furthermore, populist beliefs' effect on party preference might quickly dissipate if voters are disappointed by the populists, as was the case after the Ibiza scandal in 2019. These findings highlight that, while studying populism is worthwhile, we should not forget that populist parties at the same time are, among others, also left- and right-wing parties. In the case of the populist radical right party family, these parties are foremost radical right (i.e., nativist and authoritarian) parties and only then also populist parties.

Moreover, the same appears to be true for populist voters, or at least for supporters of the populist radical right in Austria. Their vote choice was mainly driven by their rejection of immigration and only secondarily also by populist convictions. While I did not test a mechanism of activation for populist attitudes (see Hawkins et al., 2020; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019), these findings tie in nicely with arguments that populist attitudes are not on a par with traditional issue positions and ideologies but rather complementary to them (Hawkins et al., 2020).

The Austrian 2017 election also presents an interesting case for how a major party could appeal to a populist electorate, or at least not deter it from voting for it—even without firmly engaging in populist discourse. In May 2017, Sebastian Kurz took over as leader of the People's Party. Shortly after that, he ended the ten-year grand coalition with the Social Democrats. The party went into the following snap elections under a new name (The New People's Party, *Die neue Volkspartei*) and a new color (turquoise instead of black). Although the People's Party had previously been in government without interruption for over thirty years, often as a junior partner in grand coalitions,

it succeeded in presenting itself as something “new” and different. With a campaign professionally executed and tailored to Sebastian Kurz and by adopting a stricter stance on immigration, the party succeeded in the 2017 election (Bodlos & Plescia, 2018).

The Social Democrats, however, felt dissatisfaction with the stagnant grand coalition. Consequently, voters with more populist attitudes also showed a significantly lower propensity to vote for the Social Democrats. No such effect was seen for the (new) People’s Party, which was apparently not identified with the ruling elites. Although it has never taken a more populist approach, which also became apparent in the analysis of their social media communication in Paper 1, it could cater to voters who wanted a break with the status quo.

Finally, I have also considered another potential consequence of populist attitudes besides voting behavior. Since populist ideas clearly entail a negative assessment of the current political situation and blame attribution toward the political elites (or the “political system” as a whole), I have argued that they should elicit angry emotions toward politics. Findings from Paper 2 confirmed a strong effect of populist beliefs on anger about politics. I have also discussed how grievances about immigration and economic inequality might evoke anger toward politics. The results from my second paper point at immigration-related grievances as a significant driver of the wrath over politics while economic concerns played an insignificant role in Austria. The critical importance of populist beliefs for anger toward the political system was further emphasized by their potential to amplify the anger-eliciting effect of immigration concerns.

These findings are consistent with other studies that have found a link between anger—mostly about economic crises—and support for populist parties (Magni, 2017) or populist beliefs (Rico et al., 2017, 2020). However, what sets this work apart from others is that it does not discuss populism as a consequence of anger. Instead, taking appraisal theories seriously, I argue that a populist outlook on politics evokes anger. More generally, given that anger leads voters to become less open to considering new, unfamiliar information and instead more motivated to take action, this dissertation’s results could also be interpreted as a hint toward a mobilization mechanism through populist attitudes. Populist ideas evoke anger—by themselves and also by mobilizing people’s grievances. Through eliciting anger, populist beliefs can then also reinforce action tendencies such as voting

out a supposedly feckless government.

My dissertation, thus, also contributes to a different perspective on populist attitudes. Populist attitudes are not only an expression of support for populist ideas; they might also constitute a distinct way of looking at the world. Consistent with ideas within the ideational approach of seeing populism more as a discursive frame than an ideology (Aslanidis, 2016; Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2017), it may be fruitful to see populist attitudes among citizens as a “frame in thought” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, pp. 105–106). Recent studies have already shown that populist beliefs could be studied as a lens through which people look at the world around them. Accordingly, populist attitudes not only facilitate the increase of anger toward politics in people, but they also shape, for example, how people judge government coalitions (Plescia & Eberl, 2021), how susceptible they are to conspiracy theories (Castanho Silva et al., 2017; Eberl, Huber, & Greussing, 2020), or how they view climate change (Huber et al., 2020; Huber, 2020).

The observed changes in populist attitudes between the Austrian national elections of 2017 and 2019 also raise the question of how stable populist attitudes in the electorate actually are. Apparently, they not only capture latent beliefs (Hawkins et al., 2020) about the relationship between the people and the elites but are also affected by who is currently in power or how the populists in whom voters have placed their trust behave. However, it seems reasonable to assume that this context-dependence does not equally affect all sub-dimensions of populist attitudes. Thus, one might expect that the anti-elitist dimension, in particular, is also shaped by who the currently ruling elite is. At the same time, the Manichean component and the general conviction that ordinary people should be entitled to unrestricted sovereignty are likely more durable components within the whole construct.

Overall, the ideational approach has proved its versatility in my dissertation. It allowed to operationalize populism on the supply side (i.e., the parties), but in a comparable manner also as populist attitudes on the demand side (i.e., the voters) and as populist communication on social media. The approach also facilitates using the measurement for populist communication developed in Paper 1 to inform the assessment of how populist political parties are or to directly relate populist content on the media side

to populist beliefs on the demand side. Moreover, this dissertation's results, which are based precisely on an ideational definition of populism, are connectable to a lot of research operating within the same paradigm.

Nevertheless, there are, of course, also limitations to the research conducted in this dissertation. For all four papers, specific limitations and suggestions for further research have been discussed already in the four papers (see Section 4.5 for Paper 1, Section 5.5 for Paper 2, Section 6.4 for Paper 3, and Section 7.4 for Paper 4). Thus, at this stage, I will only point out two overarching limitations.

The first limitation concerns the measurement of populist attitudes. Like other established measures (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2018), the items in the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES) are predominantly positively poled. While, unlike others, the adopted scale contains at least one reversed item, this is still not ideal regarding acquiescence bias (i.e., respondents' tendency to agree with statements). Furthermore, the employed scale has been intended as a uni-dimensional scale; therefore, it did not allow to explore sub-dimensions of populist attitudes or to apply alternative, more recently proposed scaling methods (Wuttke et al., 2020). Future research might rely on newly developed scales (e.g., Castanho Silva et al., 2020, 2019), which do not suffer from these drawbacks. However, the research community would also be well advised to agree on certain measures to facilitate comparative research.

Second, three of the studies were conducted in Austria. Austria provides an interesting case because, with the Freedom Party, it features an established, prototypical radical right party that has been injecting populist ideas into the political discourse for many years now (Heinisch & Hauser, 2016; Luther, 2007; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013a). The Freedom Party even joined the government after the 2017 election. However, Austria at the same time lacks a populist counter-part on the left of the ideological spectrum. While the Pilz List was considered a somewhat populist left-wing party by some (Aichholzer & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018; Eberl et al., 2017), it could not establish itself as a permanent political force. Therefore, its influence on the political discourse and voters has likely been neither particularly pronounced nor long-lasting. Given the Austrian case's specifics, it should therefore not come as a surprise that populist attitudes are correlated with right-wing beliefs. Thus, it would be interesting to test some of the

arguments in countries where populism is more associated with the left, such as Spain (Rico et al., 2017) or Greece (Tsatsanis et al., 2018).

These limitations already point to further research possibilities. Studying populist attitudes in greater detail by focusing on the concept's sub-dimensions might be particularly interesting for research on how populist attitudes correlate with certain individual personality traits. Presumably, populist attitudes are not as clearly related to certain personality traits as one might expect (see Paper 3 in this dissertation, and also Fatke, 2019). However, distinguishing sub-dimensions might help in theorizing these relations. For example, while ideas about the good people and populism's Manichean outlook might appeal to people looking for certainty, this might not necessarily be true for the challenge to the political status quo inherent in populism's anti-elitist ideas.

Measurement-wise, a distinction between sub-dimensions could also improve the developed dictionary approach and enable its application to new research questions. Nevertheless, the dictionary from Paper 1 should provide a good starting point for any future attempts to improve and develop measures for populism on social media and in text, more generally. Translating the approach to other languages would be a way forward. Another promising avenue could also lie in combining the dictionary approach with word embedding techniques (Garten et al., 2018)—this should facilitate developing measures for different contexts and languages. Moreover, while the developed dictionary approach makes a crucial methodological contribution, I am convinced that I have not yet fully exploited its potential to study the effects of populist communication on social media in this dissertation.

Research has just begun to study how populist beliefs might affect information processing, attitudes, and behaviors beyond electoral choice. Thinking about populist attitudes as a “frame in thought” strikes me as a very productive approach for further research on some of the consequences of populist attitudes. In studying populist attitudes' effect on vote choice, future research might also do well following Hawkins et al. (2020) and treating populist attitudes as a complementary construct to other ideological preferences (such as anti-immigration attitudes or preferences for economic policies). They furthermore argue that populist attitudes need to be activated to affect vote choice. Others have treated populist attitudes as an alternative route to voting for certain parties

(van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018). As I have hinted at in Paper 2, populist attitudes might also affect voting behavior by mobilizing specific grievances (e.g., about immigration or inequality). However, the exact mechanisms behind such considerations on how populist attitudes affect vote choice need further empirical testing.

More fundamentally, further experimental research would be desirable to precisely identify the causality of some of the proposed mechanisms (e.g., to which degree do populist attitudes elicit anger and to which degree angry individuals are more susceptible to populist ideas). Thus, in the field of research on populist attitudes, there is still much to be done—theoretically, methodologically, and empirically. This dissertation has contributed to all three aspects. It has been dedicated to populist ideas on social media and within the electorate and delivered insights into the causes and consequences of populist beliefs among ordinary citizens. While we could conclude from some of the findings that populist attitudes should not be the only factor to consider when looking into the success of populism, they appear nevertheless very consequential for how people see politics and democracy. Further research on populist attitudes, therefore, remains crucial for our understanding of political behavior. And if the last thirty years are any indicator, populism—and with it populist views among citizens—will not go away anytime soon.

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Appendix

A Populist Attitudes Measures

Table A.1 gives an overview of different items used to measure populist attitudes in the literature. It summarizes measures developed and used by Hawkins et al. (2012), Akkerman et al. (2014), Spruyt et al. (2016), the Swiss NCCR Democracy project (Schulz et al., 2018; Wirth, Schemer, et al., 2016), Anduiza & Rico (2016), the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Hobolt et al., 2016; The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 2020), and Castanho Silva et al. (2019). In my dissertation, I used six of the populist attitudes items included in AUTNES (*Austrian National Election Study*, <https://autnes.at>) surveys. They are based on the CSES measures (and on Akkerman et al., 2014; see Section 3.2 for more details). I excluded the “strong leader” item because it was the worst indicator (see also Castanho Silva et al., 2020) and arguably captures authoritarianism rather than populism.

Table A.1. Comparison of different items in populist attitudes measures.

Item	Hawkins et al. (2012)	Akker- man et al. (2014)	Spruyt et al. (2016)	Schulz et al. (2018)	Anduiza et al. (2016)	CSES (2020)	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	AUTNES
Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.	◆							
The politicians in [parliament/Congress/country/...] need to follow the will of the people. Politicians should follow only the will of the people.	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆			
The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress.	◆							
The people, [and] not [the] politicians, should make [the/our] most important policy decisions.	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆		◆
The political differences between the elite and the people are [much] larger than the differences among the people. The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people.		◆	◆	◆	◆			
I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a [specialized/professional] [politician/party member].		◆	◆		◆			◆
Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.		◆	◆		◆			
What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out one’s principles.		◆	◆		◆	◆		◆
Established politicians who claim to defend our interests, only take care of themselves.			◆					
The established elite and politicians have often betrayed the people			◆					
MPs in parliament very quickly lose touch with ordinary people.				◆				

Table A.1. (continued)

Item	Hawkins et al. (2012)	Akker- man et al. (2014)	Spruyt et al. (2016)	Schulz et al. (2018)	Anduiza et al. (2016)	CSES (2020)	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	AUTNES
People like me have no influence on what the government does.				◆				
Politicians talk too much and take too little action.				◆				
The people should have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums.				◆				
The people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken.				◆				
Ordinary people are of good and honest character.				◆				
Ordinary people all pull together.				◆				
Although the [British/...] are very different from each other, when it comes down to it they all think the same.				◆				
Ordinary people share the same values and interests.				◆				
The particular interests of the political class negatively affect the welfare of the people.					◆			
Politicians always end up agreeing when it comes to protecting their privileges					◆			
Most politicians do not care about the people.						◆		
Most politicians are trustworthy.*						◆		◆
[Politicians/parties] are the main problem in [country].						◆		◆
Having a strong leader in government is good for [country] even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.						◆		◆
Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.						◆		◆

Table A.1. (*continued*)

Item	Hawkins et al. (2012)	Akker- man et al. (2014)	Spruyt et al. (2016)	Schulz et al. (2018)	Anduiza et al. (2016)	CSES (2020)	Castanho Silva et al. (2019)	AUTNES
Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the people.							◆	
Politicians don't have to spend time among ordinary people to do a good job.*							◆	
The will of the people should be the highest principle in this country's politics.							◆	
The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.							◆	
Government officials use their power to try to improve people's lives.*							◆	
Quite a few of the people running the government are crooked.							◆	
You can tell if a person is good or bad if you know their politics.							◆	
The people I disagree with politically are not evil.*							◆	
The people I disagree with politically are just misinformed.							◆	

Note. The * indicates a negatively worded item (i.e., the statement is not populist). Square brackets contain alternative wordings and || separate two very similar statements.

B Within-Between Random Effects Models for Populist Attitudes

The models in Table B.1 tested the same expectation as the models presented in Table 8.1 in Section 8.1: If people are more regularly exposed to populist ideas on social media, they should also show heightened populist attitudes. Similar to the research strategy in Paper 2, I did not only compute lagged dependent variable (LDV) models (de Vreese et al., 2017) but also within-between random effects models (A. Bell et al., 2019). These models represent a robustness check to the analysis in Section 8.1. They provide coefficients for within-subject changes that are equivalent to estimates from a fixed-effects panel model. At the same time, they also model the between-subject variation. However, I could not precisely replicate the LDV model because not all data were available in all waves (which is why I relied on the LDV estimation in the first place).

Results in Table B.1 confirmed the findings presented in the main part of the dissertation. They also provided little support for the mentioned hypothesis. Using three panel waves, changes in the exposure to populism on social media did not lead to a change in populist attitudes ($b = 0.00$). In contrast to these within-subjects effects, the between-subjects effects do not focus on changes. Nor are unobserved time-constant differences between subjects, which might explain both populist attitudes and exposure to populism on social media, eliminated from the model.

Nevertheless, between-subject differences (i.e., not changes) in the exposure to populist messages on social media between subjects were significantly linked to higher populist attitudes ($p < 0.001$). The association, however, was weak and not very robust. A one percent increase in the proportion of populist sentences in one's social media diet was linked to an increase of 0.03 points on the 5-point populist attitude scale, but only in a model without more extensive controls (see Model 1 in Table B.1). As soon as

B Within-Between Random Effects Models for Populist Attitudes

further controls (such as political interest, attitudes about immigration and inequality, and tabloid news usage) were included in the model, the association between populism exposure on social media and populist attitudes became indistinguishable from zero again (see Model 2 in Table B.1).

Table B.1. Within-between random effects models explaining populist attitudes.

	Populist attitudes (1–5)	
	Model 1	Model 2
Within effect		
Exp. to pop. on soc. media (% of sentences)	–0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Between effect		
Exp. to pop. on soc. media (% of sentences)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Controls (time-constant)		
Age (years)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Gender (1 = female)	0.02 (0.02)	–0.02 (0.02)
Education (1 = Matura)	–0.28*** (0.02)	–0.09*** (0.03)
Political interest (0/1)	–0.14*** (0.02)	–0.09*** (0.03)
Grievance: immigration (1–5)		0.37*** (0.02)
Grievance: inequality (1–5)		0.21*** (0.01)
Personal campaign contact (0/1)		0.05 (0.04)
Impersonal campaign contact (0/1)		–0.07** (0.03)
Pol. discussions/week (log)		0.01 (0.02)
Tabloid usage (online + print; 0–42)		0.01*** (0.00)
Waves		
Wave 2 (0/1)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Wave 3 (0/1)	–0.01 (0.01)	–0.01 (0.01)
(Intercept)	3.85*** (0.06)	3.82*** (0.06)
AIC	14985.70	10528.27
BIC	15120.98	10700.12
Log Likelihood	–7473.85	–5239.13
Num. obs.	9137	7145
Num. groups: id	3307	2395
Var: id (Intercept)	0.37	0.26
Var: Residual	0.14	0.13

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Note. The dependent variable in all models is populist attitudes (on a 1–5 scale). All continuous independent variables were mean-centered. Dummies for Austria's nine provinces are also included in the model as controls. Models are based on the first three waves.

C Online Appendix for Paper 1

This is the Online Appendix to my paper “Populist Ideas on Social Media: A Dictionary-Based Measurement of Populist Communication.” The main paper presents a dictionary-based measurement of populist communication that reaches citizens directly through social media in German. The Online Appendix includes examples for types of populist messages, information on pre-existing dictionaries by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) and Pauwels (2017), an overview of all terms used in my dictionary, a detailed summary of all available data that was used for dictionary building, a short description of regular expressions used in the dictionary, and an exploration of intra-party variation in the level of populism on Facebook for the Alternative for Germany and the Left.

C.1 Online Appendix A: Existing Dictionaries

Table C.1. Existing German dictionaries for populist communication.

Dictionary	Terms
Rooduijn & Pauwels (2011)	elit*; konsens*; undemokratisch*; referend*; korrupt*; propagand*; politiker*; täusch*; betrüg*; betrug*; *verrat*; scham*; schäm*; skandal*; wahrheit*; unfair*; unehrlich*; establishm*; *herrsch*; lüge*
Pauwels (2017)	Gier*; Grosskonzern*; Imerialismus*; Imperialistisch*; Internationalismus*; Kapitalisten*; Lakai*; Monopol*; Oligarch*; Oligarchie*; Plutokratie*; abgehoben*; anti-basisdemokratisch*; anti-demokratisch*; antibasisdemokratisch*; antidemokratisch*; aristokrat*; aufhals*; aufzwing*; ausbeuter*; autokrati*; elite*; elitär*; eurokraten*; eurokratie*; geldadel*; herrschend*; internationalistisch*; kooptier*; korrupt*; kumpanen*; plünder*; propagand*; technokrat*; ungewählt*; unterjochen*

Note. The * represents a wildcard, it matches any number of any character (or number).

C.2 Online Appendix B: Types of Populist Messages and Examples

Table C.2. Classification of types of populist messages (Ernst et al., 2019; Wirth, Esser, et al., 2016; Wirz, 2018) and examples (translated from German).

Message type	Populist idea	Populist messages	Examples
Advocative	People-centrism	people are virtuous; people are beneficial; people are homogeneous; populist represents the people	“[...] respect for the life’s work of hard-working people” – Martin Schulz (SPD), Facebook, 14 September 2017 “It is the brave entrepreneurs & hard-working employees who create jobs in our country” – ÖVP, Twitter, 13 October 2018 “The will of Austrian voters for change is clear” – Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ), Twitter, 21 October 2017 “If you want policies for the vast majority of the people in this country, you have to choose DIE LINKE on September 24th!” – Sahra Wagenknecht (Die Linke), Facebook, 29 August 2017
	People’s sovereignty	people are or should be the sovereign	“Politics for the people and more direct democracy!” – Frauke Petry (AfD), Facebook, 15 June 2015 “Direct democracy and binding referendums ...”
Conflictive	People’s sovereignty	elites deprive people of their sovereignty	“... instead of an EU diktat” – Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ), Facebook, 8 April 2016 “Act against the diktat of corporations” – Gregor Gysi (Die Linke), Facebook, 13 February 2015
	Anti- elitism	elites are corrupt; elites are harmful; elites do not represent the people anymore	“Against [...] corrupt parties in parliament” – Peter Pilz (Liste PILZ), Twitter, 29 September 2017 “For decades, the SPÖ [social democrats] establishment has been getting more than it is entitled to” – FPÖ, Facebook, 13 August 2017 “He demonstrates how out of touch the self-proclaimed political elite is” – Frauke Petry (AfD), Facebook, 24 February 2017

C.3 Online Appendix C: Proposed Dictionary

Table C.3 on the next page lists all dictionary terms used in the described dictionary approach in the paper.

Table C.3. Proposed German populism dictionary.

Dictionary Terms
(a ä)ngst(e)? (de(s r) eine(s r) unsere(s r)) bürger(s innen in)?; (a ä)ngst(e)? (de(s r) eine(s r) unsere(s r)) deutsche(n r); aberwitzig(e er es en em)?; abgehoben(e er es en em)?; alt(-)?partei(en)?; an der nase herumführ(t en); angeblich(e er en)? ([-[:space:]]*)partei(en)?; anma(ß ss)end(e er es en em)?; anständig(e er es en em) bürger(s n innen in)?; anti(-)?demokratisch(e er es en em)?; apparatschik(s)?; (*)arbeitend(e er en) bevölkerung; (*)arbeitend(e er en em) bürger(s n innen in)?; arrogant(e er es en em)?; arroganz; auf kosten der allgemeinheit; auf kosten de(s r) beschäftigten; auf kosten de(s r) bürger(s innen in)?; auf kosten de(s r) deutsche(n r); auf kosten de(s r) österreich(er ers erinnen erin ischer ischen); b(a ä)nk(i)?er(*)?; belehre(n t)?; (*)belehrung(en)?(*)?; berufspolitiker(s n innen in)?; bevölkerung (*)?; wei(ß ss); bevormunde(t n); bonze(*)?; bosse(n)?; bürgerfern(e er es en em)?; bürger(innen in)? (*)?(die nase die schnauze satt genug dicke)(*)? (haben hat); bürger(innen in)? (haben hat) (*)?(die nase die schnauze satt genug dicke); bürger(innen in)? (*)? (will (ein)?fordert möchte mag verlangt beansprucht wünscht); bürger(innen in)? (*)? (wollen (ein)?fordern möchten mögen verlangen beanspruchen wünschen); bürger(s n innen in)? (von auf) der stra(ß ss)e; bürgerwille(n ns)?; bürokrat(en in innen)?; (*)desaster(s); deutsche(n r)? tradition(en)?; diktat(e s es)?; dilettantisch(e er es en em)?; dilettantismus; direkt(e er)? (lang t reicht); (*)establishment(s); etabliert(e er en) ([-[:space:]]*)partei(en)?; eurokrat(*)?; fälschlich(erweise)? (für als) (eine(n)?)?; filz; finan(c z)ier(s e)?; frechheit; fremdherrschaft; frühstücksdirektor(s en innen in)?; für (das unser) (*)?volk; für die ([-[:space:]]*)?mehrheit; für (die unsere) (kleinen normalen einfachen)?leute; gängelung(en)?; gegen (das unser) (eigene(s)? deutsche(s)? schweizer schweizerische(s)? österreichische(s)?)?volk; geiselhaft; gemein(e es en em) volk(s es e)?; geschacher(e)?; gesunde(m n r)? menschenverstand(s es)?; gierig(e er es en em)?; globalist(en in innen)?; (grund)?anständig(e er en em) bürger(s n innen in)?; (grund)?anständig(e er es en em) mensch(en)?; (grund)?vernünftig(e er es en em) mensch(en)?; günstling(s e en)?; (haben hat) (*)?bürger(innen in)? (*)? (die nase die schnauze satt genug dicke); hausverstand(s es)?; hirnverbrannt(e er es en em)?; hochmütig(e er es en em)?; irrsinn; irrwitz(*)?; kanzler(innen)?darsteller(s n innen in)?; (*)kapitalist(en in innen)?; konzernlobbyist(*)?; korrumpier(*)?; korrupt(e er es en em)?; kreisen; kuhhandel(s)?; (*)kugel(*)?; lebensfern(*)?; lebensfremd(*)?; lug; machthunger(s)?; machthungrig(e er es en em)?; machtversessen(e er es en em)?; machtversessenheit; mafia; manipuliert(en); ma(ß ss)(t en) (*)?sich; mauschelei(en n)?; mehrheit (der im in der unter den aller); mehrheit (der unter den aller) bürger(n innen)?; mehrheit (des im) volk(s es e)?; mehrheitsmeinung(en)?; nimmersatt(e er es en em)?; nomenklatura; normal(e er en em) bürger(s n innen in)?; normalsterblich(*)?; oberlehrerhaft(e er es en em)?; oberlehrer(s n in innen rolle)?; Oberschicht; ohne (*)?rückgrat; opportunist(en in innen)?; österreichische(n r)? tradition(en)?; (*)partei(en)? (*)?(be an)?lüg(t en); (*)partei(en)?(-)?kartell(*)?; partei(-)?system; pfünde; plebiszitär(e er es en em)?; pöbel(s)?; politiker(-)?kaste(n)?; politikversagen(s)?; politische(n m s)? versagen(s)?; politische(r n) klasse; politische(r n m s)? kaste(*)?; postengeschacher; (prinzipien gesinnung überzeugung(en)? grundsätze) (über bord we j r f en t verr(a ä)t(en)? verg(e i ss(en t)änder(t n) wechsel(t n) tausch(t en)); prinzipienlos(*)?; propagand(*)?; pseudo(-)?(*)partei(en)?; raubritter(*)?; realitätsferne; realitätsfern(e er es en em)?; realitätsfremd(e er es en em)?; rechtschaffen(e er en em) bürger(s n innen in)?; rückgratlos(*)?; sagen dürfen; schäm(t en); schande; schickeria; schreiberling(*)?; schweigend(e er en) mehrheit; schweizer tradition(en)?; selbstgefällig(e er es en em)?; selbstherrlich(*)?; selbstzufrieden(e er es en em)?; sich (*)?bürger(innen in)? (*)?(wehr widersetz verteidig(t en); so(-)?genannt(e er en) ([-[:space:]]*)medien; so(-)?genannt(e er es en em)?; spekulant(en in innen)?; staatsversagen(s)?; standhaft(e er es en em)?; steuernzahlend(e er en em) bürger(s n innen in)?; steuerzahler(innen in)? (*)? (wollen (ein)?fordern möchten mögen verlangen beanspruchen wünschen); stimmvieh; strippenzieher(s n in innen)?; system(-)?partei(en)?; täusch(t en); täuschung; technokrat(*)?; teil des systems; tradition(en)?; tricks(t en); überheblich(e er es en em)?; undemokratisch(e er es en em)?; unehrlich(*)?; unehrlich(e er es en em)?; unmut; uns(er e er en)? bürger(n innen)?; uns(er e er en)? steuerzahler(n innen)?; unters volk; unverfrorenheit; wohnschäm(e er es en em)?; verhöhnt(t en)?; verkrustet(e er es en em)?; verlogen(e er es en em)?; versagend(e er es en em)?; vetter(n li les)wirtschaft; volk (ab)?stimm(t en); volksabstimmung(en)?; volksauftr(a ä)g(s e en)?; volksentscheid(s e en)?; volksnähe; volksouveränität; volksverr(a ä)t(*)?; volkswille(n ns)?; volk (*)?(will (ein)?fordert möchte mag verlangt beansprucht wünscht); von oben herab; wähler(innen in)? (*)? (die nase die schnauze satt genug dicke)(*)? (haben hat); wähler(innen in)? (haben hat) (*)?(die nase die schnauze satt genug dicke); wählertäuschung; wahlvieh; wahnwitzig(e er es en em)?; wei(ß ss) (*)?bevölkerung; weltfremd(e er es en em)?; wendeh(a ä)ls(e)?; (will (ein)?fordert möchte mag verlangt beansprucht wünscht) (*)?allgemeinheit; (will (ein)?fordert möchte mag verlangt beansprucht wünscht) (*)?bevölkerung; (will (ein)?fordert möchte mag verlangt beansprucht wünscht) (*)?bürger(innen in)?; (will (ein)?fordert möchte mag verlangt beansprucht wünscht) (*)?volk; wir (als)?bürger(innen)?; wir (als)?steuerzahler(innen)?; (wollen (ein)?fordern möchten mögen verlangen beanspruchen wünschen) (*)?arbeiter(innen)?; (wollen (ein)?fordern möchten mögen verlangen beanspruchen wünschen) (*)?bürger(innen)?; (wollen (ein)?fordern möchten mögen verlangen beanspruchen wünschen) (*)?steuerzahler(innen)?; (wunsch wünsche anliegen ansuchen verlangen) (der einer unserer) bevölkerung; wut de(s r) bürger(s innen in)?; zentralist(en in innen)?; zentralistisch(e er es en em)?; zugeben; zu()lasten de(s r) deutsche(n r); zu()lasten de(s r) österreich(er ers erinnen erin ischer ischen); zu()lasten de(s r) steuerzahler(s innen in)?; zum schaden de(s r); zum schaden de(s r) bürger(s innen in)?; (a ä)ngst(e)? (de(s r) eine(s r) unsere(s r)) österreich(er ers erinnen erin ischer ischen); angeblich(e er en em)? (*)?journalist(en in innen)?; (*)arbeitend(e er es en em) deutsche(n r s m)?; (*)arbeitend(e er es en em) österreich(er ers ern erinnen erin ische ischer isches ischen ischem); (*)arbeitend(e er es en em) schweizer(s n innen in ische ischer isches ischen ischem)?; auf kosten de(s r) schweizer(s innen in ischer ischen)?; durchschnitts(-)?österreich(er ers ern erinnen erin ische ischer isches ischen ischem); (grund)?vernünftig(e er en) leute(n)?; hochnäs(e er es en em)?; lakai(e en)?; (*)partei(en)?(-)?diktatur; politische(s n m)? theater(*)?; polit(-)?theater(*)?; (a ä)ngst(e)? (de(s r) eine(s r) unsere(s r)) schweizer(s innen in ischer ischen)?; (aus)?verkauf(t en) ([-[:space:]]*)partei(en)?; durchschnittlich(e er en em) bürger(s n innen in)?; durchschnittlich(e er es en em) schweizer(s n innen in ische ischer isches ischen ischem)?; durchschnitts(-)?schweizer(s n innen in ische ischer isches ischen ischem); redlich(e er en em) bürger(s n innen in)?; schmierfink(*)?; zu()lasten de(s r) schweizer(s innen in ischer ischen)?

Note. The search terms include regular expressions.

C.4 Online Appendix D: Details on Used Data

Table C.4 provides an overview of the included data; Table C.5 goes into more detail by giving account level information. Variation in the amount of data for the three countries arises due to differing numbers of accounts and divergent social media usage by actors. While Austria and Germany represent most similar cases when it comes to the political and media system and the adoption of social media by politicians (Magin et al., 2017), there are still differences in the number of accounts because of the accumulation of roles or more frequent dual leadership arrangements in Germany. Switzerland differs substantially from the other two countries (Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2016). Direct democracy and extensive federalism decrease the importance of the Federal Assembly and parties and politicians at the national level. This difference, as well as several small parties and semi-professional politicians, might contribute to lower social media activity of Swiss politicians and parties at the national level.

Table C.4. Overview of used data.

Social Media	Country	Parties	Accounts	Posts	From	To
Facebook	Austria	OEVP, Gruene, PILZ, FPOE, SPOE, NEOS	23	40568	2014-01-01	2020-02-29
Facebook	Germany	SPD, AfD, Linke, Gruene, FDP, Piraten, CDU, CSU	42	49281	2014-01-01	2020-02-29
Facebook	Switzerland	EVP, SVP, Gruenliberale, BDP, FDP, CVP, Gruene, EDU, SP	17	19357	2014-01-01	2020-02-29
Twitter	Austria	NEOS, Gruene, OEVP, SPOE, FPOE, PILZ	20	94743	2014-01-06	2020-02-29
Twitter	Germany	Gruene, AfD, SPD, Linke, Piraten, FDP, CDU, CSU	41	133220	2014-01-02	2020-02-29
Twitter	Switzerland	SP, Gruene, SVP, Gruenliberale, FDP, EVP, CVP, BDP, EDU	22	56820	2014-01-02	2020-02-29

C.4 Online Appendix D: Details on Used Data

Table C.5. Detailed overview of used data.

Country	Party	Soc. Media	ID	Account	From	To	Sentences
Austria	FPOE	Facebook	169051073236170	FPÖ	2012-11-15	2020-03-10	14066
Austria	FPOE	Facebook	74865038590	HC Strache	2009-04-30	2019-05-18	18975
Austria	FPOE	Facebook	1977684662509834	Herbert Kickl	2019-05-27	2020-03-10	4323
Austria	FPOE	Facebook	1650580648552563	Norbert Hofer	2019-05-19	2020-03-09	3754
Austria	FPOE	Twitter	117052823	HCStracheFP	2016-04-25	2019-05-12	7311
Austria	FPOE	Twitter	333606989	norbertghofer	2019-05-19	2020-03-08	218
Austria	Gruene	Facebook	105852816136687	Albert Steinhäuser	2017-05-25	2017-11-09	383
Austria	Gruene	Facebook	21759893033	Die Grünen	2008-08-11	2020-03-10	19434
Austria	Gruene	Facebook	130004393706621	Eva Glawischnig	2010-07-07	2017-05-17	7084
Austria	Gruene	Facebook	952904854849325	Ingrid Felipe	2017-06-25	2017-10-14	555
Austria	Gruene	Facebook	46239976233	Ulrike Lunacek	2017-05-19	2017-10-15	811
Austria	Gruene	Facebook	133612666671985	Werner Kogler	2017-10-21	2020-03-09	3915
Austria	Gruene	Twitter	316488595	Gruene_Austria	2016-02-08	2020-03-10	24863
Austria	Gruene	Twitter	182404196	UlrikeLunacek	2017-05-19	2017-10-15	1547
Austria	Gruene	Twitter	154096311	WKogler; wkogler	2017-10-18	2020-03-09	23280
Austria	Gruene	Twitter	153134633	a_steinhauser	2017-05-24	2017-11-09	1667
Austria	Gruene	Twitter	716072149	dieingrid	2017-06-25	2017-10-16	1041
Austria	Gruene	Twitter	22000071	sigi_maurer	2020-01-07	2020-03-09	511
Austria	NEOS	Facebook	243225039137708	Beate Meinel-Reisinger	2018-06-23	2020-03-10	3195
Austria	NEOS	Facebook	201760779962914	Matthias Strolz	2012-10-27	2018-06-22	16381
Austria	NEOS	Facebook	327450964017497	NEOS	2012-10-22	2020-03-10	17849
Austria	NEOS	Twitter	444969570	BMeinl	2018-06-23	2020-03-10	8254
Austria	NEOS	Twitter	141570744	matstrolz	2016-07-01	2018-06-22	16638
Austria	NEOS	Twitter	819698388	neos_eu	2017-01-09	2020-03-10	43006
Austria	OEVP	Facebook	151876981526792	August Wöginger	2017-12-19	2019-10-19	1699
Austria	OEVP	Facebook	927205870682630	Reinhold Mitterlehner	2015-03-10	2017-05-12	1673
Austria	OEVP	Facebook	105151752909840	Sebastian Kurz	2017-05-14	2020-03-10	5068
Austria	OEVP	Facebook	15078244418	ÖVP; Volkspartei	2009-01-04	2020-03-09	11757
Austria	OEVP	Twitter	2245627458	MitterlehnerR	2014-11-07	2017-05-12	1915
Austria	OEVP	Twitter	46623193	sebastiankurz	2017-05-14	2020-03-10	10731
Austria	OEVP	Twitter	11043512	volkspartei; oevp	2016-04-07	2020-03-10	17615
Austria	PILZ	Facebook	833013456857401	LISTE PILZ; NR KLUB JETZT	2017-07-25	2019-01-31	3139
Austria	PILZ	Facebook	709246016127897	Partei JETZT; JETZT - Liste Pilz	2019-02-01	2020-02-04	1042
Austria	PILZ	Facebook	127399223970566	Peter Pilz	2017-07-27	2017-10-28	799
Austria	PILZ	Twitter	985802783977824257	KLUB_LISTE_PILZ; NR_KLUB_JETZT	2018-06-09	2019-01-31	4318
Austria	PILZ	Twitter	755820843276574720	Maria__Stern	2018-08-20	2020-03-09	2343
Austria	PILZ	Twitter	168482405	Peter_Pilz	2017-07-25	2017-11-03	1903
Austria	SPOE	Facebook	603996709755642	Christian Kern	2016-05-17	2018-09-21	7240
Austria	SPOE	Facebook	1673371229636129	Pamela Rendi-Wagner	2018-09-25	2020-03-10	4218
Austria	SPOE	Facebook	77393060080	SPÖ	2009-03-19	2020-03-09	15080
Austria	SPOE	Twitter	270564264	KernChri; kernchri	2016-06-02	2018-09-21	4128
Austria	SPOE	Twitter	26750370	SPOE_at	2011-07-26	2020-03-10	28446
Austria	SPOE	Twitter	3058262529	rendiwagner	2019-03-21	2020-03-10	1662
Germany	AfD	Facebook	540404695989874	AfD	2013-03-07	2020-03-10	51683
Germany	AfD	Facebook	1061322973878937	Alice Weidel	2017-04-23	2017-09-24	1629
Germany	AfD	Facebook	751083248248265	Bernd Lucke	2014-06-12	2015-06-29	987
Germany	AfD	Facebook	782456275140355	Dr. Frauke Petry	2014-08-19	2017-09-29	14720
Germany	AfD	Facebook	554345401380836	Prof. Dr. Jörg Meuthen	2015-12-01	2020-03-10	36655
Germany	AfD	Facebook	1592161514425449	Tino Chrupalla	2019-11-30	2020-03-10	417
Germany	AfD	Twitter	844081278	AfD	2018-03-09	2020-03-10	23177
Germany	AfD	Twitter	833398209053605888	Alice_Weidel	2017-04-23	2017-09-24	1782
Germany	AfD	Twitter	1356973704	DrKonradAdam	2013-04-16	2015-05-12	28
Germany	AfD	Twitter	1273010575	FraukePetry	2015-09-18	2017-09-28	3949
Germany	AfD	Twitter	710201540116652033	Joerg_Meuthen	2017-02-19	2020-03-10	7952
Germany	AfD	Twitter	797137333820784640	Tino_Chrupalla	2019-11-30	2020-03-10	321
Germany	CDU	Facebook	59788447049	Angela Merkel	2009-03-04	2018-12-01	3189
Germany	CDU	Facebook	166021496808171	Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer	2018-12-07	2020-03-08	913
Germany	CDU	Facebook	78502295414	CDU	2009-05-04	2020-03-10	13276
Germany	CDU	Facebook	586378098123212	Ralph Brinkhaus	2018-09-25	2020-03-09	216

Table C.5. (continued)

Country	Party	Soc. Media	ID	Account	From	To	Sentences
Germany	CDU	Twitter	2631881902	AngelaMerkelCDU	2014-06-22	2017-01-17	24
Germany	CDU	Twitter	20429858	CDU	2017-10-18	2020-03-10	28586
Germany	CDU	Twitter	47620601	akk	2018-12-07	2020-03-08	2611
Germany	CDU	Twitter	38001527	rbrinkhaus	2018-09-27	2020-03-09	1620
Germany	CSU	Facebook	62772136958	Alexander Dobrindt; Alexander Dobrindt MdB	2017-10-24	2020-03-04	763
Germany	CSU	Facebook	81386795687	CSU (Christlich-Soziale Union)	2009-05-26	2020-03-10	12682
Germany	CSU	Facebook	43761823033	Horst Seehofer	2009-05-20	2019-01-11	2571
Germany	CSU	Facebook	366343133439370	Markus Söder	2019-01-19	2020-03-09	1803
Germany	CSU	Twitter	21107582	CSU	2017-09-11	2020-03-09	14946
Germany	CSU	Twitter	793778228	Markus_Soeder	2019-02-03	2020-03-10	1212
Germany	CSU	Twitter	1042347501695762432	der_Seehofer	2018-12-07	2018-12-07	3
Germany	FDP	Facebook	143504445664134	Christian Lindner	2013-12-07	2020-03-10	11718
Germany	FDP	Facebook	21289227249	FDP	2009-02-28	2020-03-10	17838
Germany	FDP	Twitter	122104353	c_lindner	2017-05-11	2020-03-10	16917
Germany	FDP	Twitter	39475170	fdp	2017-08-04	2020-03-10	17871
Germany	Gruene	Facebook	1675394899406675	Annalena Baerbock	2018-01-27	2020-03-07	806
Germany	Gruene	Facebook	598216760241817	Anton Hofreiter	2013-10-08	2020-03-09	7877
Germany	Gruene	Facebook	47217143218	BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	2008-11-28	2020-03-08	10737
Germany	Gruene	Facebook	36379612880	Cem Özdemir	2017-01-18	2017-09-24	1229
Germany	Gruene	Facebook	80635590663	Claudia Roth	2009-04-04	2013-10-12	2651
Germany	Gruene	Facebook	87410317539	Jürgen Trittin	2012-12-04	2013-09-22	522
Germany	Gruene	Facebook	60074915591	Katrin Göring-Eckardt	2012-11-10	2013-09-22	1234
Germany	Gruene	Facebook	1381574718760756	Simone Peter	2013-10-20	2018-01-26	3920
Germany	Gruene	Twitter	2179010672	ABaerbock	2018-01-27	2020-03-10	5251
Germany	Gruene	Twitter	14553288	Die_Gruenen	2017-05-04	2020-03-08	10464
Germany	Gruene	Twitter	17519322	RobertHabeck	2018-01-27	2019-01-07	2830
Germany	Gruene	Twitter	442678902	ToniHofreiter	2013-10-29	2013-10-29	2
Germany	Gruene	Twitter	19108766	cem_oezdemir	2017-04-28	2017-09-24	3474
Germany	Linke	Facebook	1533185586760485	Amira Mohamed Ali	2019-11-12	2020-03-09	607
Germany	Linke	Facebook	151260125059312	Bernd Riexinger	2012-06-02	2020-03-09	17978
Germany	Linke	Facebook	47694585682	DIE LINKE	2009-01-06	2020-03-09	14321
Germany	Linke	Facebook	135751919841485	Dietmar Bartsch	2016-12-05	2017-09-24	2252
Germany	Linke	Facebook	77067914982	Dr. Gesine Löttsch	2010-05-16	2012-04-04	399
Germany	Linke	Facebook	42497482692	Gregor Gysi	2008-12-02	2015-10-12	5585
Germany	Linke	Facebook	214211071944227	Katja Kipping	2012-06-03	2020-03-09	15547
Germany	Linke	Facebook	86704161022	Klaus Ernst	2010-05-21	2012-06-01	1689
Germany	Linke	Facebook	206307219386683	Sahra Wagenknecht	2016-12-04	2017-09-24	2133
Germany	Linke	Twitter	934029228886065152	Amira_M_Ali	2019-11-12	2020-03-09	214
Germany	Linke	Twitter	2320519958	DietmarBartsch	2016-12-04	2017-09-24	1857
Germany	Linke	Twitter	888289790	GregorGysi	2012-10-22	2015-10-12	2430
Germany	Linke	Twitter	47375691	SWagenknecht	2016-12-04	2017-09-23	621
Germany	Linke	Twitter	849012308	b_riexinger	2015-04-13	2020-03-10	12063
Germany	Linke	Twitter	44101578	dieLinke	2018-05-26	2020-03-10	28035
Germany	Linke	Twitter	64994645	ernst_klaus	2011-03-01	2012-05-22	340
Germany	Linke	Twitter	28066013	katjakipping	2016-06-18	2020-03-10	12032
Germany	Piraten	Facebook	330467037371980	Anja Hirschel	2017-05-18	2017-09-21	58
Germany	Piraten	Facebook	149871337782	Piratenpartei	2009-09-08	2020-03-09	15051
Germany	Piraten	Facebook	1500896459954783	Sebastian Alscher	2018-11-18	2020-03-09	195
Germany	Piraten	Twitter	3172111173	AnjaHirschel	2017-08-16	2017-09-24	1851
Germany	Piraten	Twitter	405424021	PiratSued	2018-01-26	2018-11-17	6261
Germany	Piraten	Twitter	14341194	Piratenpartei	2018-06-27	2020-03-10	47031
Germany	Piraten	Twitter	232760709	renepickhardt	2017-03-25	2017-09-13	210
Germany	Piraten	Twitter	50774056	sebulino	2018-11-18	2020-03-10	15388
Germany	SPD	Facebook	161929783920704	Andrea Nahles	2018-04-24	2019-06-02	1430
Germany	SPD	Facebook	1402857076602559	Malu Dreyer	2019-06-03	2019-12-05	258
Germany	SPD	Facebook	195950842440	Manuela Schwesig	2019-06-03	2019-09-08	336
Germany	SPD	Facebook	75969208461	Martin Schulz	2017-03-19	2018-02-09	2415
Germany	SPD	Facebook	104145414310	Olaf Scholz	2018-02-13	2018-04-20	137
Germany	SPD	Facebook	51978265372	Peer Steinbrück	2012-09-28	2013-09-22	938
Germany	SPD	Facebook	148837415153421	Rolf Mützenich	2019-06-04	2020-03-08	115

C.4 Online Appendix D: Details on Used Data

Table C.5. (continued)

Country	Party	Soc. Media	ID	Account	From	To	Sentences
Germany	SPD	Facebook	47930567748	SPD	2009-02-01	2020-03-08	17889
Germany	SPD	Facebook	410100252391597	Saskia Esken, SPD	2020-01-23	2020-03-08	86
Germany	SPD	Facebook	104493292916735	Sigmar Gabriel	2010-06-04	2017-03-18	16123
Germany	SPD	Facebook	171274572931194	Thomas Oppermann	2013-12-16	2017-09-24	2483
Germany	SPD	Facebook	34299468079	Thorsten Schäfer-Gümbel	2019-06-23	2019-08-12	18
Germany	SPD	Twitter	792459864312274944	AndreaNahlesSPD	2018-11-23	2019-06-01	1267
Germany	SPD	Twitter	1423622834	EskenSaskia	2019-12-06	2020-03-09	1868
Germany	SPD	Twitter	1627905570	ManuelaSchwesig	2019-06-04	2019-09-08	578
Germany	SPD	Twitter	17675072	MartinSchulz	2017-03-19	2018-02-09	1157
Germany	SPD	Twitter	706536761279782912	NowaboFM	2019-12-06	2020-03-09	568
Germany	SPD	Twitter	38150247	OlafScholz	2018-02-13	2018-04-16	236
Germany	SPD	Twitter	293066780	ThomasOppermann	2013-12-19	2017-09-26	2362
Germany	SPD	Twitter	569832889	sigmargabriel	2012-05-03	2017-03-17	4894
Germany	SPD	Twitter	26458162	spdde	2018-03-14	2020-03-10	47505
Germany	SPD	Twitter	18528543	tsghessen	2019-06-03	2019-08-15	662
Switzerland	BDP	Facebook	128506967229819	BDP Schweiz	2011-07-19	2020-03-02	4385
Switzerland	BDP	Twitter	226841200	BDPSchweiz	2010-12-15	2020-03-10	5129
Switzerland	BDP	Twitter	761741430	LandoltMartin	2013-08-30	2020-03-10	5990
Switzerland	CVP	Facebook	174006745983411	Bundesrätin Viola Amherd	2019-08-25	2019-08-25	2
Switzerland	CVP	Facebook	169510248558	CVP / PDC / PPD	2010-05-03	2020-03-02	10607
Switzerland	CVP	Twitter	172375021	CVP_PDC	2016-06-20	2020-03-10	10334
Switzerland	CVP	Twitter	72560162	Violapamherd	2019-01-01	2020-03-08	513
Switzerland	CVP	Twitter	3291242279	gerhardpfister	2017-11-17	2020-03-10	19980
Switzerland	EDU	Facebook	216444012216	EDU - UDF (Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union)	2010-01-27	2020-03-09	4922
Switzerland	EDU	Twitter	297862387	EDUSchweiz	2011-07-01	2019-08-30	4250
Switzerland	EVP	Facebook	110533229026103	EVP / PEV	2011-03-19	2020-03-10	2139
Switzerland	EVP	Facebook	233039246707590	Nationalrätin Marianne Streiff	2015-01-29	2019-09-04	61
Switzerland	EVP	Twitter	2226700633	MarianneStreiff	2014-04-05	2020-03-04	684
Switzerland	EVP	Twitter	50961230	evppev	2009-06-26	2020-03-09	3585
Switzerland	FDP	Facebook	15733998334	FDP	2009-01-07	2020-03-10	7413
Switzerland	FDP	Facebook	486301424808499	Ignazio Cassis	2017-12-17	2020-03-08	470
Switzerland	FDP	Facebook	196797474077015	Petra Gössi	2016-10-24	2020-02-18	775
Switzerland	FDP	Twitter	39250641	FDP_Liberalen	2014-10-18	2020-03-10	10675
Switzerland	FDP	Twitter	365423665	PetraGoessi	2017-06-14	2020-02-11	988
Switzerland	FDP	Twitter	2965582641	_BR_JSA	2015-01-13	2018-12-31	1639
Switzerland	FDP	Twitter	270609583	ignaziocassis	2017-12-13	2020-03-10	1643
Switzerland	Gruene	Facebook	194790813901953	Grüne Schweiz; Grüne Les Verts	2011-06-22	2020-03-10	6535
Switzerland	Gruene	Twitter	240161502	GrueneCH	2015-04-03	2020-03-10	10324
Switzerland	Gruene	Twitter	1530247224	RegulaRytz	2017-01-23	2020-03-10	11718
Switzerland	Gruenliberale	Facebook	126289610761942	Grünliberale	2010-11-07	2020-03-08	5722
Switzerland	Gruenliberale	Facebook	158812054205402	Martin Bäuml	2011-09-23	2015-08-04	42
Switzerland	Gruenliberale	Twitter	463149099	Juerg_Grossen	2017-08-26	2020-03-10	2929
Switzerland	Gruenliberale	Twitter	3221526790	Martin_Baeumle	2015-04-30	2017-08-20	902
Switzerland	Gruenliberale	Twitter	22799864	grunliberale	2009-03-05	2020-03-10	9873
Switzerland	SP	Facebook	407144292661516	Alain Berset	2012-11-27	2020-03-09	2909
Switzerland	SP	Facebook	97220294896	SP Schweiz	2009-05-19	2020-03-10	10990
Switzerland	SP	Twitter	40872955	ChristianLevrat	2013-05-24	2020-03-10	7513
Switzerland	SP	Twitter	214032204	alain_berset	2012-08-16	2020-03-08	2196
Switzerland	SP	Twitter	40681558	spschweiz	2013-10-24	2020-03-10	9017
Switzerland	SVP	Facebook	122996304433025	Albert Rösti	2016-04-23	2020-03-08	1963
Switzerland	SVP	Facebook	162373287239957	SVP Schweiz	2012-10-26	2020-03-09	6424
Switzerland	SVP	Facebook	1448793608722196	Toni Brunner	2014-07-09	2016-04-20	148
Switzerland	SVP	Twitter	1072443638930726913	ParmelinG	2019-02-28	2020-03-10	477
Switzerland	SVP	Twitter	61431883	SVPBrunner	2009-07-30	2011-08-06	36
Switzerland	SVP	Twitter	168790724	SVPch	2013-03-03	2020-03-09	3572

C.5 Online Appendix E: Regular Expressions in the Dictionary

Table C.6. Explanation of regular expressions used in the dictionary.

Expression	Meaning	Example	Matches
.	. is a wildcard that matches any character (even spaces).	m.n	man, men, min, ...
?	? is a quantifier that indicates that the preceding element might appear zero or one times.	use.?	use, uses, used, user, ...
*	* is a quantifier that indicates that the preceding element might appear zero or more times.	use.*	use, uses, used, users, use use case, use this, ...
	is a boolean OR indicating that either the preceding or the succeeding element might appear.	man men	man, men
()	Brackets group expressions, expressions in the brackets are evaluated first.	m(a e)n	man, men
[^[:space:]]	This expression matches any character that is not (^) a whitespace character, i.e., all characters that are not space, tabulator, or linebreak.	use[^[:space:]]*	use, uses, used, users, ... (but not: use case, ...)

C.6 Online Appendix F: Descriptives for Rooduijn & Pauwels (2011) and Pauwels (2017)

Table C.7. Descriptive results for social media (2014–2/2020) for Rooduijn/Pauwels (2011).

Party	PopuList	Proportion of sentences			Proportion of posts/tweets		
		Facebook	Twitter	Combined	Facebook	Twitter	Combined
Austria							
FPOE	1	2.06	1.78	2.01	5.92	3.20	5.15
PILZ	0	1.37	1.56	1.49	4.09	3.35	3.56
NEOS	0	1.24	1.23	1.23	4.39	2.48	2.86
Gruene	0	0.97	0.94	0.95	3.05	1.99	2.20
SPOE	0	0.84	0.91	0.88	2.44	1.99	2.15
OEVP	0	0.40	0.49	0.46	0.99	0.97	0.98
Germany							
AfD	1	2.83	1.56	2.49	22.70	4.25	11.58
Linke	1	1.85	1.19	1.50	8.40	2.97	4.58
Piraten	0	1.54	0.91	0.99	4.23	1.88	2.10
FDP	0	1.02	0.61	0.79	3.33	1.49	2.14
Gruene	0	0.88	0.61	0.74	2.83	1.46	1.97
SPD	0	0.80	0.59	0.66	3.08	1.40	1.73
CSU	0	0.46	0.39	0.42	1.13	0.98	1.05
CDU	0	0.43	0.32	0.35	1.35	0.80	0.93
Switzerland							
SVP	1	1.98	1.91	1.96	5.20	3.77	4.64
EDU	0	2.30	1.44	1.88	6.77	2.63	4.03
SP	0	1.50	1.43	1.46	4.28	2.76	3.18
EVP	0	1.53	1.23	1.34	3.17	2.21	2.51
Gruene	0	1.12	1.11	1.11	2.96	2.56	2.64
Gruenliberale	0	1.17	0.75	0.87	3.48	1.64	2.02
CVP	0	0.43	0.87	0.77	1.31	1.87	1.77
BDP	0	0.42	0.65	0.59	0.81	1.08	1.02
FDP	0	0.38	0.34	0.35	1.03	0.76	0.84

Table C.8. Descriptive results for social media (2014–2/2020) for Pauwels (2017).

Party	PopuList	Proportion of sentences			Proportion of posts/tweets		
		Facebook	Twitter	Combined	Facebook	Twitter	Combined
Austria							
FPOE	1	0.24	0.36	0.26	0.73	0.63	0.70
PILZ	0	0.54	0.59	0.57	1.68	1.31	1.41
NEOS	0	0.50	0.39	0.42	1.83	0.79	1.00
Gruene	0	0.36	0.31	0.32	1.19	0.65	0.76
SPOE	0	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.52	0.40	0.44
OEVP	0	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.18	0.16	0.17
Germany							
Linke	1	0.58	0.32	0.44	2.64	0.82	1.36
AfD	1	0.47	0.32	0.43	4.79	0.89	2.44
Piraten	0	0.32	0.14	0.17	0.78	0.30	0.34
SPD	0	0.20	0.09	0.12	0.85	0.21	0.34
CSU	0	0.06	0.13	0.10	0.15	0.34	0.25
Gruene	0	0.11	0.08	0.10	0.39	0.19	0.26
FDP	0	0.12	0.05	0.08	0.40	0.12	0.22
CDU	0	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.09	0.09
Switzerland							
SVP	1	0.36	0.37	0.36	1.04	0.77	0.93
SP	0	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.89	0.61	0.69
EDU	0	0.25	0.12	0.19	0.75	0.22	0.40
Gruene	0	0.12	0.18	0.17	0.32	0.42	0.40
CVP	0	0.05	0.14	0.12	0.16	0.30	0.28
BDP	0	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.12
Gruenliberale	0	0.11	0.04	0.06	0.32	0.08	0.13
FDP	0	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.11	0.07	0.09
EVP	0	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.11	0.00	0.03

C.7 Online Appendix G: Intra-Party Variation

Table C.9 examines the Facebook communication on accounts of the AfD and The Left as well as their party leaders and leading candidates during the last German national

election campaign in 2017. As stated in the paper, Sahra Wagenknecht, one of two leading candidates and a prominent proponent of the more left-wing factions within her party, used more populist messages than all other actors. 4.4% of all sentences she published on Facebook contained a populist message. On the Facebook pages of the party (0.6%) and its other officials (1.3–1.5%), populism was a lot less prevalent. Thus, a very prominent figure such as Sahra Wagenknecht might have driven perceptions of The Left as populist. In contrast, the party as a whole was not as clearly a populist party compared to, for example, the Alternative for Germany.

Nevertheless, variation in populism on Facebook existed within the AfD, too. Jörg Meuthen’s account showcased an exceptionally high proportion of populist sentences (7.1%). Meuthen, one of the AfD’s two party leaders, often indulges in lengthy Facebook posts that are spiked with populist narratives. However, while not as high as on Meuthen’s Facebook page, all other studied AfD accounts also showed high proportions (3.9–4.1%) of populist sentences.

Table C.9. Accounts by German parties Die Linke and AfD in the election cycle 2017.

Party	Account	Role	Populism (% of sentences)
AfD	AfD	Party account	3.89
AfD	Alice Weidel	Leading candidate	3.62
AfD	Frauke Petry	Party leader	4.17
AfD	Jörg Meuthen	Party leader	7.09
Linke	Die Linke	Party account	0.59
Linke	Bernd Riexinger	Party leader	1.51
Linke	Dietmar Bartsch	Leading candidate	1.34
Linke	Katja Kipping	Party leader	1.39
Linke	Sahra Wagenknecht	Leading candidate	4.48

D Online Appendix for Paper 2

This is the Online Appendix for my paper *Getting Angry About Politics*. The paper tackles the role of populist as well as economic and sociocultural grievances. The grievances' effects are discussed based on appraisal theories of emotions and following the ideational approach toward populism. The paper used panel data collected in the Austrian national election campaign 2017 to tackle these issues. Findings from various panel models highlighted the role of populist attitudes in the emergence of anger about politics. Immigration and economic inequality played a lesser role. Populist beliefs also strengthened the effect of immigration grievances. In this Appendix for the paper, I present the employed measures, descriptive statistics, and an alternative statistical modeling approach.

D.1 Online Appendix A: Measures

D.1.1 Emotions Toward Politics

When you think about the current political situation in Austria, how much do you feel ...

1. confident
2. worried
3. upset
4. anxious
5. hopeful
6. angry

(0 = *not at all*, 10 = *very much*)

D.1.2 Populist Attitudes

Please indicate whether you completely agree, somewhat agree, partly agree, partly disagree, somewhat disagree or completely disagree with the respective statements.

1. When talking about “compromises” in politics, one actually means that one is betraying one’s principles.
2. Most politicians only care about the interests of the rich and powerful.
3. Most politicians are trustworthy.
4. The parties are the main problem in Austria.
5. The people should take important political decisions, not politicians.
6. I would prefer an independent citizen as a deputy in parliament instead of a party member.

(1 = completely agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = partly agree/disagree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5 = completely disagree)

D.1.3 Economic Grievances

One can have different opinions about different political topics. Do you completely agree, somewhat agree, partly agree, partly disagree, somewhat disagree or completely disagree with each of the statements?

Item 1: Politics must fight social inequality.

Item 9: Income differences are too large in Austria.

(1 = completely agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = partly agree/disagree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5 = completely disagree)

D.1.4 Sociocultural Grievances

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Item 1: Immigrants should adapt to Austrian customs.

Item 2: Immigrants enrich Austrian culture.

Item 3: Immigrants are generally good for the Austrian economy.

Item 4: Immigrants take jobs away from Austrians.

Item 5: Crime rates increase in Austria because of immigrants.

Item 6: Immigrants pay more into the Austrian social security system than they take out.

(1 = *completely agree*, 2 = *somewhat agree*, 3 = *partly agree/disagree*, 4 = *somewhat disagree*, 5 = *completely disagree*)

D.1.5 Social Media Usage

It is also possible to get information directly from parties and candidates during the electoral campaign. How is this with you? Have you ...

Item 1: ... visited websites of parties?

Item 2: ... visited or subscribed to Facebook sites of parties or candidates?

Item 3: ... used Twitter to get information about parties and candidates?

(*yes, no*)

And from which parties? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES]

(*SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, The Greens, NEOS, List Peter Pilz, other party*)

D.1.6 Direct Campaign Contact

There are several ways in which parties and candidates can contact citizens during an electoral campaign. When you think about the electoral campaign for the national parliamentary election on 15 October so far – have you ...

Item 1: ... received a letter, flyer or an E-mail from parties or candidates during the electoral campaign?

Item 2: ... received a phone call or a text message from parties or candidates during the electoral campaign?

Item 3: ... received info material or a freebie from an information stand or during a

D Online Appendix for Paper 2

pre-election party from parties or candidates during the electoral campaign?

Item 4: ... talked to party workers at an information stand or during a pre-election party from parties or candidates during the electoral campaign?

Item 5: ... been visited by politicians at work or at home?

(yes, no)

D.1.7 Talkin About Politics

How many people do you discuss politics with or have a serious conversation about in a normal week?

(number of people)

D.1.8 News Media Usage

Below you will find a list of different daily newspapers. On average, on how many days in a regular week do you read the printed version these newspapers?

Item 1: Kronen Zeitung

Item 2: Der Standard

Item 3: Die Presse

Item 4: Österreich

Item 5: Kurier

Item 6: Heute

Item 7: Salzburger Nachrichten

Item 8: Kleine Zeitung

(7–1 days, less often, never)

Below you will find a list with different news websites. On average, on how many days in a regular week do you visit these websites?

Item 1: orf.at

Item 2: derstandard.at

Item 3: krone.at

Item 4: oe24.at

Item 5: kurier.at

Item 6: kleinezeitung.at

Item 7: diepresse.com

Item 8: heute.at

Item 9: salzburg.com

(7–1 days, less often, never)

D.2 Online Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

Table D.1. Descriptive statistics

	n	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Anger (t1)	4027	6.27	2.69	0.00	10.00
Anger (t2)	3145	5.87	2.77	0.00	10.00
Anger (t3)	3004	5.83	2.74	0.00	10.00
Anger (t4)	3173	5.72	2.78	0.00	10.00
Pop. attitudes (t1)	3942	3.58	0.72	1.33	5.00
Pop. attitudes (t2)	3043	3.60	0.75	1.33	5.00
Pop. attitudes (t3)	2923	3.57	0.75	1.00	5.00
Grievance: immigration (t1)	4002	3.68	0.82	1.00	5.00
Grievance: immigration (t3)	2950	3.70	0.83	1.00	5.00
Grievance: immigration (t4)	3104	3.62	0.83	1.00	5.00
Grievance: inequality (t1)	3953	4.09	0.82	1.00	5.00
Grievance: inequality (t4)	3068	4.13	0.85	1.00	5.00
Pop. in Soc. Med. (t1)	4473	0.71	2.17	0.00	10.70
Pop. in Soc. Med. (t2)	4391	0.89	2.86	0.00	14.61
Pop. in Soc. Med. (t3)	4480	0.57	1.65	0.00	9.56
Pop. in Soc. Med. (t4)	4480	0.87	2.72	0.00	13.46
Personal campaign contact (t3)	2799	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Personal campaign contact (t4)	2980	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
Impersonal campaign contact (t3)	2734	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00
Impersonal campaign contact (t4)	2930	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00
Pol. discussions: people/week (t2)	3145	4.17	90.34	0.00	5000.00
Pol. discussions: people/week (t4)	3173	2.34	4.95	0.00	150.00
Pol. discussions: people/week (log; t2)	3145	0.88	0.74	0.00	8.52
Pol. discussions: people/week (log; t4)	3173	0.88	0.73	0.00	5.02
Tabloid usage (t1)	4480	5.85	7.88	0.00	42.00
Tabloid usage (t4)	4480	4.57	7.29	0.00	41.00
Pol. interest (t1)	4027	0.64	0.48	0.00	1.00
Pol. interest (t4)	3173	0.69	0.46	0.00	1.00
Age	4162	42.31	14.75	16.00	85.00
Gender (female)	4447	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
Education (Matura)	4401	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00

D.3 Online Appendix C: Random Effects Within-Between Models

I ran random effects within-between panel models (A. Bell et al., 2019) to test the main models' robustness. The models presented in the paper included a variety of theoretically interesting variables. However, not all variables were measured repeatedly in all waves (see Table 5.2 in the paper in Chapter 5). Thus, the panel models presented in this Appendix could not fully replicate the lagged dependent variable models in the paper. In contrast, the models presented here, in Table D.2, are limited to specific data waves and the variables included in these waves.

However, they provide an alternative estimation of what leads to changes in citizens' anger and use all available variance across panel waves. In general, within-between models offer a huge advantage. They split the dependent variable's variation into within and between subjects variation. The within effects are then based on changes within subjects over time (i.e., what leads to changes in political anger). Any unobserved time-constant heterogeneity among individuals is eliminated from the models. Thus, these within coefficients are equivalent to those from fixed-effects models (A. Bell et al., 2019). Nevertheless, the between subjects effects are also estimated and allow analyzing the variance between subjects simultaneously (i.e., what explains differences in how angry citizens are about politics). All estimations were done in R; the random effects within-between models were fitted with the *panelr* package (Long, 2018/2020).

Overall, as stated in the paper, the panel models corroborate the main models' findings (see Table D.2). Regarding variation between subjects (i.e., effects comparable to a simple cross-sectional OLS regression), all models highlighted that populist attitudes were strongly linked to angry feelings, with coefficients ranging from 1.2 to 1.6. Also, people with more negative attitudes toward immigration were more angry about politics ($b = 0.2\text{--}0.7$). To a lesser degree, this also applied to more negative attitudes regarding economic inequality ($b = 0.3$). Following parties that promote more populist content on social media also went hand in hand with heightened anger at politics. Furthermore, those who used tabloid news outlets more often and those who were, in general, more interested in politics were also slightly angrier (see Table D.2).

Turning toward the within-subject changes, which also offer stronger evidence for

a causal relationship, populist attitudes were again the clearest predictor of anger at politics. A change in populist attitudes by one point led to an increase in anger about the current political situation of 0.5 (see Model 1 in Table D.2). The same strong effect was found in Models 4 and 5 (see Table D.2). These models, thus, also strongly support the finding that populist attitudes and anger are closely related.

Respondents who became more critical of economic inequality between the first and fourth wave also became slightly angrier ($b = 0.3$; see Model 3). Here, however, it was not possible to control for simultaneous changes in populist attitudes. Changes in respondents' attitudes on immigration were also accompanied by increased anger (see Models 2 and 3 in Table D.2). However, in Model 4 (see Table D.2), no significant effect could be established. In this model, only changes between the non-consecutive waves one and three were analyzed. Therefore, the panel models offer some, but not full, support for the anger-evoking capacity of substantial grievances about inequality and immigration. Effects were certainly not as substantial as with populist attitudes.

While changes in immigration attitudes were not significantly linked to a change in anger about the political situation in Models 4 and 5, there was still evidence for an interaction effect (see Figure D.1). Between wave one and three, an increase in anti-immigration sentiment did not lead to more anger for individuals with unchanged populist attitudes. However, if at the same time also populist attitudes increased, respondents became angrier ($b = 0.2$). For respondents with decreased populist attitudes, more worries about immigration even led to less anger. This finding offers again strong support for the proposed interaction between immigration and populist grievances. The interaction between populist and economic grievances could not be tested with these models because the two concepts were only measured together in wave one.

D.3 Online Appendix C: Random Effects Within-Between Models

	W. 1–3	W. 1, 3 & 4	W. 1 & 4	W. 1 & 3	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Within effects					
Populist attitudes (1–5)	0.47*** (0.06)			0.47*** (0.08)	0.47*** (0.08)
Grievance: immigration (1–5)		0.29*** (0.07)	0.54*** (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)
Grievance: inequality (1–5)			0.28*** (0.06)		
Immigration x pop. att.					0.17* (0.08)
Exp. to pop. on soc. media (% of sentences)	−0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.06 (0.06)	−0.06 (0.06)
Between effects					
Populist attitudes (1–5)	1.59*** (0.06)	1.47*** (0.06)	1.25*** (0.06)	1.51*** (0.06)	1.51*** (0.06)
Grievance: immigration (1–5)	0.69*** (0.05)	0.66*** (0.05)	0.64*** (0.06)	0.73*** (0.05)	0.73*** (0.05)
Grievance: inequality (1–5)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.05)	0.33*** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.05)	0.26*** (0.05)
Exp. to pop. on soc. media (% of sentences)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
More controls (time-constant)					
Tabloid usage (online + print; 0–42)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.02** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)
Political interest (0/1)	0.32*** (0.07)	0.32*** (0.08)	0.32** (0.10)	0.32*** (0.08)	0.32*** (0.08)
Age (years)	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Gender (1 = female)	−0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.08)	−0.04 (0.07)	−0.04 (0.07)
Education (1 = Matura)	−0.04 (0.07)	−0.06 (0.07)	−0.06 (0.09)	−0.07 (0.08)	−0.07 (0.08)
Waves					
Wave 2 (0/1)	−0.46*** (0.04)				
Wave 3 (0/1)	−0.49*** (0.04)	−0.50*** (0.04)		−0.52*** (0.05)	−0.52*** (0.05)
Wave 4 (0/1)		−0.61*** (0.05)	−0.60*** (0.05)		
(Intercept)	6.09*** (0.17)	6.19*** (0.17)	6.19*** (0.21)	6.14*** (0.19)	6.18*** (0.08)
AIC	39244.59	38047.97	23834.07	24660.08	24660.93
BIC	39415.35	38217.87	23992.07	24819.44	24826.93
Log Likelihood	−19598.29	−18999.98	−11893.04	−12306.04	−12305.46
Num. obs.	9091	8773	5342	5654	5654
Num. groups: id	3285	3168	2671	2827	2827
Var: id (Intercept)	2.18	2.36	2.41	2.11	2.11
Var: Residual	2.89	2.89	3.11	2.86	2.86

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Note. The dependent variable in all models is anger about the current political situation (on a 0–10 scale). All continuous independent variables were mean-centered. Dummies for Austria's nine provinces are also included in the model as controls. Models are based on the first four waves.

Table D.2. Within-between random effects models on anger about politics.




Figure D.1. Interaction between populist attitudes and immigration attitudes (within-subject change).

E Appendix for Paper 3

E.1 Appendix A: Uncertainty Avoidance Measure

Respondents were presented with the following question (translated from German; for the original questionnaire see Wagner et al., 2018):

“Below, you will find contradictory statements which can be used for describing people. Which of these statements applies to you personally? The further you click on the left or the right, the more the statement applies to you.” [FIXED ORDER OF ITEMS]

		1	2	3	4	5	6	
Item 1	I can deal very well with unknown and unpredictable situations.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	I prefer situations that I am familiar with, that I know well.
Item 2	I prefer steady tasks.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	I prefer tasks that change frequently.
Item 3	I can deal very well with people who are complete strangers.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	I feel uncomfortable in the presence of unfamiliar people.
Item 4	I prefer to know what life brings for me.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	I like the unexpected in what life brings.
Item 5	I like tasks that are ambiguous in how they should be done.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	I prefer tasks that are clear-cut and unambiguous.
Item 6	I deliberately seek conversations about controversial and sensitive issues.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	I try to avoid controversial and sensitive issues in conversations.

E.2 Appendix B: Supplemental Analysis

Supplemental analyses makes use of wave seven in the panel, which was conducted more than sixteen months after the election. An important ingredient of the ideological core, the RWA measures, were however only included in wave three of the survey. So we had to rely on a single item on law and order, which was included in wave seven. The reason is that UA as well as risk-taking propensity (measured in wave six) are considered to precede ideological attitudes. Yet, robustness checks with the wave three measure of RWA did not differ substantially from the presented models. Figure E.1 displays results on prospective vote choice in wave seven; Figure E.2 displays the same model with PTV. Online Supplement S5 in Section F.5 provides detailed results as well as direct and indirect effect sizes.




Figure E.1. Structural equation model for PRR vote choice in wave 7 (supplemental analysis). PRR Government Competence and Populism are allowed to covary, the correlation ($-.34^{***}$ $[-.41, -.27]$) is not depicted. Entries are standardized regression coefficients. R^2 represents proportions of the outcome variables' variation explained by the model. The arrows' thickness in the structural model visually represents the effect size. 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. Two-tailed significance levels: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.




Figure E.2. Structural equation model for the propensity to vote for a PRR party in wave 7 (supplemental analysis). PRR Government Competence and Populism are allowed to covary, the correlation ($-.43^{***}$ [$-.49, -.37$]) is not depicted. Entries are standardized regression coefficients. R2 represents proportions of the outcome variables' variation explained by the model. The arrows' thickness in the structural model visually represents the effect size. 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. Two-tailed significance levels: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

F Online Supplements for Paper 3

F.1 Online Supplement S1: Further Measurements

Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)

1. The age in which discipline and obedience for authority are some of the most important virtues should be over.
2. Our society has to crack down harder on criminals for once.
3. It is important to also protect the rights of criminals.
4. This country would flourish if young people paid more attention to traditions and values.
5. Our country needs people who oppose traditions and try out different ideas.

(1 = *completely agree*, 2 = *somewhat agree*, 3 = *partly agree/disagree*, 4 = *somewhat disagree*, 5 = *completely disagree*)

Anti-Immigration Attitudes

1. Immigrants should adapt to Austrian customs.
2. Immigrants enrich Austrian culture.
3. Immigrants are generally good for the Austrian economy.
4. Immigrants take jobs away from Austrians.
5. Crime rates increase in Austria because of immigrants.
6. Immigrants pay more into the Austrian social security system than they take out.

(1 = *completely agree*, 2 = *somewhat agree*, 3 = *partly agree/disagree*, 4 = *somewhat disagree*, 5 = *completely disagree*)

Anti-EU Attitudes

Some say that European unification has already gone too far, others say that European unification should be pushed even further. Where would you place yourself on that scale?

(recoded to: 10 = *already gone too far*, 0 = *should be pushed further*)

Exclusive Nationalism

Do you feel very strongly, strongly, less strongly or not connected at all to...?

...Austria/...Europe

(recoded to: 4 = *very strongly connected*, 3 = *strongly connected*, 2 = *less strongly connected*, 1 = *not connected at all*)

Populist Attitudes

1. When talking about “compromises” in politics, one actually means that one is betraying one’s principles.
2. Most politicians only care about the interests of the rich and powerful.
3. Most politicians are trustworthy.
4. The parties are the main problem in Austria.
5. The people should make important political decisions, not politicians.
6. I would prefer an independent citizen as a deputy in parliament instead of a party member.

(1 = *completely agree*, 2 = *somewhat agree*, 3 = *partly agree/disagree*, 4 = *somewhat disagree*, 5 = *completely disagree*)

Government Competence

In your opinion, would the following parties do a good or a bad job in government?

[FPÖ]

(0 = *very bad job*, 10 = *very good job*)

Propensity to Vote (PTV)

Using the scale of 0 to 10, how likely is it that you would ever vote for each of the following parties? [FPÖ]

(0 = *highly unlikely*, 10 = *very likely*)

F.1.1 Measures for Supplemental Analysis

Risk-Taking Propensity (Wave 6)

In general, how willing are you to take risks?

(0 = *not at all willing*, 10 = *very willing*)

Government Competence (Wave 7)

How competent do you think has the FPÖ managed government affairs?

(0 = *not at all competent*, 10 = *very competent*)

Authoritarianism (Wave 7)

Authorities of the police have to be enhanced in order to guarantee law and order.

(1 = *completely agree*, 2 = *somewhat agree*, 3 = *partly agree/disagree*, 4 = *somewhat disagree*, 5 = *completely disagree*)

F.2 Online Supplement S2: Description of Panel Waves and Collected Variables

Table F.1. Description of panel waves and collected variables.

Wave	Fieldwork Period	Variables
Wave 1	Jun 6 – Jun 14, 2017	Sociodemographic controls
Wave 3	Aug 30 – Sep 14, 2017	Uncertainty avoidance, right-wing authoritarianism, anti-immigration attitudes, exclusive identity, anti-EU attitude, populist attitudes
Wave 4	Oct 2 – Oct 13, 2017	Government competence assessment, propensity to vote
Wave 5 (post-election)	Oct 17 – Oct 27, 2017	Vote choice
Wave 6	Dec 14 – Dec 29, 2017	Risk-taking propensity
Wave 7	Feb 25 – Mar 12, 2019	Authoritarian stance, anti-immigration attitudes, exclusive identity, anti-EU attitude, populist attitudes, government competence assessment, propensity to vote, prospective vote choice

Note. Measures from wave 6 and 7 were used in the supplemental analysis.

F.3 Online Supplement S3: Details on Structural Equation Models

The following Tables were provided as Online Supplement S3 with my third paper. Tables F.2 and F.3 show details for the structural equation model on voting for a populist radical right (PRR) party presented in the paper. Tables F.4 and F.5 contain the same extensive information for the structural equation model on the propensity to vote for the PRR.

Table F.2. Structural equation model on voting for a PRR party (regression coefficients, direct and indirect effects).

Structural model		Unstandardized					Standardized				
		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p	
RR core ←	UA	.156 [.112, .2]	.022	6.996	.000		.288 [.228, .347]	.03	9.456	.000	
Populism ←	UA	-.081 [-.12, -.043]	.02	-4.147	.000		-.124 [-.179, -.069]	.028	-4.399	.000	
	RR core	.772 [.632, .912]	.072	10.793	.000		.636 [.59, .682]	.024	26.882	.000	
Gov. compet. ←	UA	-.284 [-.459, -.109]	.089	-3.175	.002		-.077 [-.123, -.031]	.024	-3.254	.001	
	RR core	5.027 [4.249, 5.805]	.397	12.664	.000		.738 [.699, .778]	.02	36.815	.000	
Vote ←	UA	-.072 [-.146, .003]	.038	-1.89	.059		-.062 [-.127, .002]	.033	-1.9	.057	
	RR core	.734 [.496, .972]	.121	6.05	.000		.347 [.246, .449]	.052	6.688	.000	
	Populism	.207 [.073, .341]	.068	3.019	.003		.119 [.042, .196]	.039	3.032	.002	
	Gov. compet.	.159 [.139, .179]	.01	15.437	.000		.513 [.444, .583]	.035	14.532	.000	
Covariance											
Populism ↔ gov. compet.		-.15 [-.223, -.077]	.037	-4.033	.000		-.144 [-.214, -.075]	.035	-4.067	.000	
Effect of UA on populism											
UA → populism (total)		.039 [-.001, .079]	.021	1.894	.058		.059 [-.001, .119]	.031	1.925	.054	
UA → populism (direct)		-.081 [-.12, -.043]	.02	-4.147	.000		-.124 [-.179, -.069]	.028	-4.399	.000	
UA → RR core → populism		.12 [.086, .155]	.018	6.871	.000		.183 [.141, .225]	.022	8.478	.000	
Effect of UA on gov. compet.											
UA → gov. compet. (total)		.5 [.277, .723]	.114	4.394	.000		.135 [.079, .192]	.029	4.726	.000	
UA → gov. compet. (direct)		-.284 [-.459, -.109]	.089	-3.175	.002		-.077 [-.123, -.031]	.024	-3.254	.001	
UA → RR core → gov. compet.		.783 [.571, .996]	.108	7.238	.000		.212 [.165, .259]	.024	8.814	.000	
Effect of UA on vote											
UA → vote (total)		.13 [.043, .218]	.045	2.921	.003		.114 [.039, .189]	.038	2.994	.003	
UA → vote (direct)		-.072 [-.146, .003]	.038	-1.89	.059		-.062 [-.127, .002]	.033	-1.9	.057	
UA → vote (all indirect)		.202 [.136, .268]	.034	5.995	.000		.176 [.124, .229]	.027	6.575	.000	
Indirect effects of UA on vote											
UA → RR core → vote		.114 [.07, .159]	.023	5.057	.000		.1 [.064, .136]	.019	5.389	.000	
UA → RR core → populism → vote		.025 [.008, .042]	.009	2.81	.005		.022 [.007, .037]	.008	2.857	.004	
UA → RR core → gov. compet. → vote		.125 [.088, .161]	.019	6.737	.000		.109 [.081, .137]	.015	7.498	.000	
UA → populism → vote		-.017 [-.03, -.004]	.007	-2.548	.011		-.015 [-.026, -.003]	.006	-2.567	.010	
UA → gov. compet. → vote		-.045 [-.073, -.017]	.014	-3.15	.002		-.039 [-.064, -.015]	.012	-3.215	.001	
Controls											
UA ←	Age	-.001 [-.005, .003]	.002	-.585	.559		-.017 [-.075, .04]	.029	-.585	.558	
	Gender (female)	.222 [.111, .334]	.057	3.9	.000		.12 [.062, .178]	.03	4.042	.000	
	Education (Matura)	-.242 [-.363, -.12]	.062	-3.901	.000		-.127 [-.188, -.066]	.031	-4.065	.000	
	Inc. situation	.004 [-.109, .116]	.058	.064	.949		.002 [-.056, .06]	.03	.064	.949	
RR core ←	Age	.003 [.001, .005]	.001	2.675	.007		.071 [.02, .121]	.026	2.714	.007	
	Gender (female)	-.039 [-.091, .013]	.027	-1.453	.146		-.038 [-.09, .013]	.026	-1.463	.143	
	Education (Matura)	-.227 [-.29, -.164]	.032	-7.086	.000		-.22 [-.272, -.167]	.027	-8.246	.000	
	Inc. situation	-.121 [-.177, -.064]	.029	-4.182	.000		-.115 [-.166, -.063]	.026	-4.334	.000	
Populism ←	Age	0 [-.002, .002]	.001	.027	.978		.001 [-.047, .049]	.025	.027	.978	
	Gender (female)	.006 [-.052, .063]	.029	.192	.848		.005 [-.042, .052]	.024	.192	.847	
	Education (Matura)	-.108 [-.172, -.044]	.033	-3.308	.001		-.086 [-.136, -.036]	.026	-3.364	.001	
	Inc. situation	-.218 [-.281, -.155]	.032	-6.801	.000		-.171 [-.218, -.124]	.024	-7.153	.000	
Gov. compet. ←	Age	-.013 [-.023, -.003]	.005	-2.624	.009		-.051 [-.089, -.013]	.019	-2.642	.008	
	Gender (female)	-.125 [-.393, .144]	.137	-.91	.363		-.018 [-.057, .021]	.02	-.912	.362	
	Education (Matura)	-.131 [-.42, .158]	.147	-.89	.374		-.019 [-.06, .022]	.021	-.891	.373	
	Inc. situation	-.013 [-.297, .271]	.145	-.09	.929		-.002 [-.041, .038]	.02	-.09	.929	

F.3 Online Supplement S3: Details on Structural Equation Models

Table F.3. Structural equation model on voting for a PRR party (continued; latent constructs and model summary).

		Unstandardized					Standardized			
Controls (cont.)		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p
Vote ←	Age	-.01 [-.013, -.006]	.002	-4.899	.000		-.123 [-.171, -.074]	.025	-4.964	.000
	Gender (female)	-.011 [-.115, .092]	.053	-.215	.830		-.005 [-.054, .043]	.025	-.215	.830
	Education (Matura)	-.063 [-.179, .053]	.059	-1.067	.286		-.029 [-.082, .024]	.027	-1.074	.283
	Inc. situation	-.144 [-.252, -.036]	.055	-2.606	.009		-.065 [-.113, -.017]	.025	-2.633	.008
Latent variables										
UA →	UA 1	1 [1, 1]	0				.631 [.571, .69]	.03	20.768	.000
	UA 2	.866 [.715, 1.017]	.077	11.25	.000		.578 [.521, .634]	.029	20.003	.000
	UA 3	.753 [.622, .885]	.067	11.259	.000		.497 [.435, .559]	.032	15.724	.000
	UA 4	.849 [.704, .993]	.074	11.529	.000		.612 [.552, .672]	.031	19.993	.000
	UA 5	.809 [.673, .944]	.069	11.676	.000		.514 [.452, .577]	.032	16.094	.000
	UA 6	.561 [.444, .677]	.06	9.417	.000		.379 [.318, .439]	.031	12.27	.000
Populism →	Pop. attitudes 1	1 [1, 1]	0				.574 [.528, .62]	.023	24.597	.000
	Pop. attitudes 2	1.01 [.871, 1.15]	.071	14.204	.000		.595 [.549, .64]	.023	25.581	.000
	Pop. attitudes 3	.919 [.786, 1.052]	.068	13.523	.000		.57 [.523, .616]	.024	24.141	.000
	Pop. attitudes 4	1.391 [1.213, 1.569]	.091	15.34	.000		.712 [.672, .752]	.02	35.147	.000
	Pop. attitudes 5	1.467 [1.274, 1.661]	.099	14.867	.000		.75 [.711, .789]	.02	38.028	.000
	Pop. attitudes 6	1.027 [.874, 1.18]	.078	13.147	.000		.55 [.503, .598]	.024	22.651	.000
RWA →	RWA 1	1 [1, 1]	0				.462 [.416, .509]	.024	19.532	.000
	RWA 2	1.396 [1.2, 1.592]	.1	13.929	.000		.767 [.731, .802]	.018	42.214	.000
	RWA 3	1.2 [1.018, 1.382]	.093	12.94	.000		.559 [.518, .601]	.021	26.367	.000
	RWA 4	.915 [.773, 1.057]	.073	12.603	.000		.442 [.396, .488]	.024	18.768	.000
	RWA 5	1.206 [1.041, 1.37]	.084	14.383	.000		.616 [.577, .655]	.02	30.973	.000
Anti-immigr. →	Anti-immigr. 1	1 [1, 1]	0				.61 [.576, .643]	.017	35.687	.000
	Anti-immigr. 2	2.081 [1.842, 2.321]	.122	17.062	.000		.742 [.71, .774]	.016	45.861	.000
	Anti-immigr. 3	1.928 [1.709, 2.147]	.112	17.277	.000		.735 [.705, .765]	.015	48.246	.000
	Anti-immigr. 4	1.586 [1.384, 1.787]	.103	15.404	.000		.6 [.563, .637]	.019	31.547	.000
	Anti-immigr. 5	2.103 [1.886, 2.319]	.11	19.063	.000		.804 [.775, .833]	.015	54.381	.000
	Anti-immigr. 6	1.589 [1.395, 1.783]	.099	16.075	.000		.602 [.563, .64]	.02	30.549	.000
RR core →	RWA	1 [1, 1]	0				.896 [.871, .921]	.013	70.781	.000
	Anti-immigr.	.82 [.693, .947]	.065	12.651	.000		.928 [.908, .948]	.01	91.359	.000
	Anti-EU	4.67 [3.978, 5.363]	.353	13.216	.000		.719 [.685, .752]	.017	41.609	.000
	Excl. national ID	1.088 [.927, 1.248]	.082	13.264	.000		.552 [.514, .59]	.019	28.458	.000
Model summary		n	1546	CFI	.972					
		Chi ² (df)	1197 (402)	RMSEA [95%-CI]	.036 [.033, .038]					
		p	< .001	SRMR	.043					

Note. The results are based on DWLS estimation with robust standard errors and mean-and-variance adjusted test statistics. RR core is a second-order factor. Manifest variables are described in detail in the Online Supplement. RR core = radical right ideological core, UA = uncertainty avoidance, gov. comp. = (expected) competence of PRR party in government, inc. situation = income situation, pop. attitudes = populist attitudes, RWA = right-wing authoritarianism, antiimmigr. = anti-immigration attitude, excl. national ID = exclusive national ID.

Table F.4. Structural equation model on PTV for a PRR party (regression coefficients, direct and indirect effects).

Structural model		Unstandardized					Standardized				
		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p	
RR core ←	UA	.104 [.074, .134]	.015	6.788	.000		.228 [.17, .286]	.03	7.696	.000	
Populism ←	UA	-.071 [-.101, -.042]	.015	-4.713	.000		-.13 [-.182, -.077]	.027	-4.859	.000	
	RR core	.77 [.653, .888]	.06	12.83	.000		.641 [.594, .689]	.024	26.559	.000	
Gov. compet. ←	UA	-.205 [-.337, -.072]	.068	-3.03	.002		-.067 [-.11, -.024]	.022	-3.042	.002	
	RR core	4.763 [4.227, 5.298]	.273	17.421	.000		.714 [.679, .75]	.018	38.995	.000	
PTV ←	UA	-.081 [-.206, .045]	.064	-1.254	.210		-.022 [-.055, .012]	.017	-1.255	.209	
	RR core	1.948 [1.345, 2.55]	.308	6.331	.000		.239 [.171, .307]	.035	6.856	.000	
	Populism	.127 [-.197, .451]	.165	.767	.443		.019 [-.029, .066]	.024	.768	.442	
	Gov. compet.	.771 [.718, .825]	.027	28.449	.000		.631 [.586, .676]	.023	27.635	.000	
Covariance											
Populism ↔ gov. compet.		-.164 [-.237, -.092]	.037	-4.441	.000		-.157 [-.227, -.087]	.036	-4.408	.000	
Effect of UA on populism											
UA → populism (total)		.009 [-.023, .041]	.016	.553	.580		.016 [-.042, .074]	.03	.553	.580	
UA → populism (direct)		-.071 [-.101, -.042]	.015	-4.713	.000		-.13 [-.182, -.077]	.027	-4.859	.000	
UA → RR core → populism		.08 [.057, .104]	.012	6.741	.000		.146 [.106, .186]	.021	7.117	.000	
Effect of UA on gov. compet.											
UA → gov. compet. (total)		.291 [.127, .455]	.084	3.473	.001		.095 [.042, .149]	.027	3.504	.000	
UA → gov. compet. (direct)		-.205 [-.337, -.072]	.068	-3.03	.002		-.067 [-.11, -.024]	.022	-3.042	.002	
UA → RR core → gov. compet.		.496 [.359, .632]	.07	7.125	.000		.163 [.119, .206]	.022	7.352	.000	
Effect of UA on PTV											
UA → PTV (total)		.348 [.151, .544]	.1	3.472	.001		.093 [.041, .146]	.027	3.495	.000	
UA → PTV (direct)		-.081 [-.206, .045]	.064	-1.254	.210		-.022 [-.055, .012]	.017	-1.255	.209	
UA → PTV (all indirect)		.428 [.256, .601]	.088	4.862	.000		.115 [.069, .161]	.023	4.926	.000	
Indirect effects of UA on PTV											
UA → RR core → PTV		.203 [.124, .282]	.04	5.02	.000		.054 [.033, .075]	.011	5.086	.000	
UA → RR core → populism → PTV		.01 [-.016, .036]	.013	.763	.445		.003 [-.004, .01]	.004	.763	.445	
UA → RR core → gov. compet. → PTV		.382 [.274, .49]	.055	6.938	.000		.103 [.074, .131]	.014	7.131	.000	
UA → populism → PTV		-.009 [-.032, .014]	.012	-.757	.449		-.002 [-.009, .004]	.003	-.757	.449	
UA → gov. compet. → PTV		-.158 [-.26, -.056]	.052	-3.035	.002		-.042 [-.07, -.015]	.014	-3.051	.002	
Controls											
UA ←	Age	0 [-.004, .004]	.002	-.094	.925		-.002 [-.053, .048]	.026	-.094	.925	
	Gender (female)	.328 [.213, .443]	.059	5.586	.000		.148 [.096, .199]	.026	5.625	.000	
	Education (Matura)	-.245 [-.367, -.123]	.062	-3.94	.000		-.107 [-.16, -.054]	.027	-3.985	.000	
	Inc. situation	-.029 [-.151, .094]	.063	-.456	.648		-.012 [-.066, .041]	.027	-.456	.648	
RR core ←	Age	.003 [.002, .005]	.001	3.782	.000		.093 [.046, .141]	.024	3.861	.000	
	Gender (female)	-.021 [-.069, .026]	.024	-.878	.380		-.021 [-.068, .026]	.024	-.88	.379	
	Education (Matura)	-.242 [-.301, -.184]	.03	-8.118	.000		-.232 [-.282, -.182]	.025	-9.138	.000	
	Inc. situation	-.138 [-.189, -.088]	.026	-5.366	.000		-.131 [-.178, -.084]	.024	-5.446	.000	
Populism ←	Age	0 [-.002, .002]	.001	.361	.718		.008 [-.037, .054]	.023	.361	.718	
	Gender (female)	.015 [-.037, .067]	.027	.565	.572		.012 [-.03, .055]	.022	.566	.572	
	Education (Matura)	-.079 [-.14, -.018]	.031	-2.543	.011		-.063 [-.111, -.015]	.025	-2.561	.010	
	Inc. situation	-.2 [-.256, -.143]	.029	-6.969	.000		-.157 [-.2, -.115]	.022	-7.245	.000	
Gov. compet. ←	Age	-.017 [-.026, -.008]	.005	-3.806	.000		-.07 [-.106, -.034]	.018	-3.811	.000	
	Gender (female)	-.021 [-.268, .226]	.126	-.165	.869		-.003 [-.04, .033]	.019	-.165	.869	
	Education (Matura)	-.141 [-.415, .133]	.14	-1.006	.314		-.02 [-.06, .019]	.02	-1.007	.314	
	Inc. situation	.027 [-.242, .297]	.137	.2	.842		.004 [-.034, .042]	.02	.2	.842	

F.3 Online Supplement S3: Details on Structural Equation Models

Table F.5. Structural equation model on PTV for a PRR party (continued; latent constructs and model summary).

		Unstandardized				Standardized			
Controls (cont.)		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p	Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p
PTV ←	Age	-.03 [-.038, -.022]	.004	-7.265	.000	-.1 [-.128, -.073]	.014	-7.264	.000
	Gender (female)	-.23 [-.448, -.012]	.111	-2.071	.038	-.028 [-.054, -.001]	.013	-2.071	.038
	Education (Matura)	-.232 [-.47, .006]	.121	-1.91	.056	-.027 [-.055, .001]	.014	-1.91	.056
	Inc. situation	-.3 [-.536, -.064]	.12	-2.488	.013	-.035 [-.062, -.007]	.014	-2.489	.013
Latent variables									
UA →	UA 1	1 [1, 1]	0			.753 [.719, .787]	.017	43.295	.000
	UA 2	.621 [.55, .692]	.036	17.09	.000	.492 [.443, .541]	.025	19.688	.000
	UA 3	.586 [.513, .658]	.037	15.807	.000	.459 [.41, .508]	.025	18.464	.000
	UA 4	.588 [.521, .654]	.034	17.318	.000	.502 [.453, .551]	.025	20.222	.000
	UA 5	.844 [.767, .921]	.039	21.465	.000	.625 [.582, .667]	.022	28.737	.000
	UA 6	.531 [.46, .601]	.036	14.732	.000	.422 [.372, .472]	.025	16.564	.000
Populism →	Pop. attitudes 1	1 [1, 1]	0			.57 [.529, .611]	.021	27.219	.000
	Pop. attitudes 2	1.149 [1.037, 1.261]	.057	20.047	.000	.654 [.619, .689]	.018	36.211	.000
	Pop. attitudes 3	.851 [.752, .95]	.051	16.818	.000	.527 [.482, .572]	.023	22.855	.000
	Pop. attitudes 4	1.385 [1.258, 1.511]	.065	21.417	.000	.71 [.678, .742]	.016	43.667	.000
	Pop. attitudes 5	1.327 [1.202, 1.452]	.064	20.773	.000	.681 [.649, .713]	.016	41.979	.000
	Pop. attitudes 6	1.138 [1.017, 1.258]	.061	18.54	.000	.61 [.571, .648]	.02	30.998	.000
RWA →	RWA 1	1 [1, 1]	0			.461 [.418, .504]	.022	21.164	.000
	RWA 2	1.345 [1.198, 1.492]	.075	17.927	.000	.719 [.687, .751]	.016	43.765	.000
	RWA 3	1.187 [1.048, 1.325]	.071	16.8	.000	.547 [.506, .588]	.021	26.189	.000
	RWA 4	.956 [.837, 1.076]	.061	15.724	.000	.459 [.416, .502]	.022	20.838	.000
	RWA 5	1.203 [1.072, 1.335]	.067	17.969	.000	.603 [.566, .639]	.019	32.188	.000
Anti-immigr. →	Anti-immigr. 1	1 [1, 1]	0			.546 [.505, .586]	.021	26.486	.000
	Anti-immigr. 2	2.307 [2.103, 2.51]	.104	22.255	.000	.775 [.75, .8]	.013	60.483	.000
	Anti-immigr. 3	2.151 [1.958, 2.344]	.098	21.85	.000	.769 [.744, .793]	.012	61.994	.000
	Anti-immigr. 4	1.781 [1.598, 1.963]	.093	19.078	.000	.62 [.587, .653]	.017	36.631	.000
	Anti-immigr. 5	2.202 [2.021, 2.384]	.093	23.76	.000	.786 [.76, .812]	.013	59.569	.000
	Anti-immigr. 6	1.707 [1.541, 1.873]	.085	20.133	.000	.608 [.566, .65]	.021	28.553	.000
RR core →	RWA	1 [1, 1]	0			.91 [.886, .935]	.013	71.524	.000
	Anti-immigr.	.73 [.637, .822]	.047	15.481	.000	.894 [.875, .914]	.01	90.117	.000
	Anti-EU	4.564 [4.062, 5.066]	.256	17.816	.000	.705 [.675, .736]	.016	45.327	.000
	Excl. national ID	1.083 [.947, 1.219]	.069	15.638	.000	.554 [.518, .59]	.018	29.99	.000
Model summary		n	1829	CFI	.901				
		Chi ² (df)	2159 (402)	RMSEA [95%-CI]	.049 [.047, .051]				
		p	< .001	SRMR	.042				

Note. The results are based on ML estimation with robust standard errors and mean-and-variance adjusted test statistics. RR core is a second-order factor. Manifest variables are described in detail in the Online Supplement. Manifest variables are described in detail in the Online Supplement. RR core = radical right ideological core, UA = uncertainty avoidance, gov. comp. = (expected) competence of PRR party in government, PTV = propensity to vote, inc. situation = income situation, pop. attitudes = populist attitudes, RWA = rightwing authoritarianism, anti-immigr. = anti-immigration attitude, excl. national ID = exclusive national ID.

F.4 Online Supplement S4: Sensitivity Analysis

To reliably identify causal effects, the assumption of “sequential ignorability” has to be met (Imai et al., 2011). First, there must not be any unobserved variables confounding the relationship between the independent variable and the mediator as well as the dependent variable. Second, no unobserved confounder should affect the relationship between the mediator(s) and the dependent variable. The *mediation* package for R allows running sensitivity analyses for the stability of the results towards violations of these (otherwise untestable) assumptions (Tingley et al., 2014). In addition, the *mediation* routines estimate the average causal mediation effect (ACME) and the average direct effect (ADE).

Thus far, however, only simple models, including one mediator, can be tested. Since we include multiple mediators and serial mediation as well, we run sensitivity analyses for separate parts of our model. In each case, a model for the mediator and the dependent variable was estimated and used as input for the estimation of the mediation. To obtain comparable coefficients, all variables were centered; continuous variables were standardized by dividing through two standard deviations (Gelman, 2008). The models use OLS or probit estimation in case of vote choice (0/1).

The sensitivity analyses are presented in Table F.6 and show parameter ρ (ρ), which indicates the (simulated) error correlation between the mediator and the outcome model. Table F.6 shows an estimate based on 10,000 draws (nonparametric bootstrap with bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals). For each coefficient, Table F.6 gives the value of ρ where the ADE and ACME would become zero. The control condition for the independent variables uncertainty avoidance (UA) and radical right (RR) core was zero (i.e., the mean), the treatment conditions were set to one. For binary outcome models, effects in Table F.6 are an average of the estimates in the control and the treatment condition. Figures F.1 to F.14 show the effect sizes as a function of the sensitivity parameter ρ .

Since the full model presented in our paper could not be estimated using the *mediation* package, a direct comparison between the coefficients and results with the full model is difficult. For example, the model on how anticipated government competence

mediates the effect of UA on populist radical right (PRR) support does not account for the confounding of competence with ideological proximity to the PRR. However, these mediation models also identified the main effects: positive *indirect* or *total* effects of UA on populism as well as competence assessments rely on the adoption of the PRR core beliefs. More importantly, the remaining *direct* effect in both cases is negative, which we tried to explain with populism's challenge to the status quo and the "risky choice" argument. As noted in the main models, UA's effect on PRR support is largely mediated by the adoption of the PRR's core beliefs and not by populist attitudes.

In summary, the main effects are all rather robust towards violations of the sequential ignorability assumption. For example, an unobserved variable would have to account for a considerable part of the unexplained variance in the relationship between UA, the RR core, and populist attitudes to see none of the identified effects ($\rho = .73$ for the ACME and $\rho = .67$ for the ADE in the PTV model). The same is true for the other substantial effects discussed in our paper.

Table F.6. Results from sensitivity analysis on some of the mediation effects.

	PTV models (n = 1829)			Vote models (n = 1546)		
	<i>b</i> [95%-CI]	<i>p</i>	ρ	<i>b</i> [95%-CI]	<i>p</i>	ρ
UA → RR core → populism						
ACME	.19 [.16, .23]	<.001	.73	.24 [.21, .28]	<.001	.72
ADE	-.17 [-.2, -.14]	<.001	.67	-.16 [-.19, -.12]	<.001	.55
Total	.03 [-.02, .07]	.206		.09 [.04, .14]	<.001	
UA → RR core → gov. compet.						
ACME	.21 [.17, .24]	<.001	.73	.27 [.23, .31]	<.001	.75
ADE	-.1 [-.13, -.06]	<.001	.44	-.11 [-.14, -.07]	<.001	.41
Total	.11 [.06, .16]	<.001		.16 [.11, .21]	<.001	
RR core → populism → PRR support						
ACME	-.14 [-.18, -.11]	<.001	-.2	-.01 [-.03, .02]	.475	-.03
ADE	.89 [.84, .93]	<.001	-.78	.83 [.78, .87]	<.001	-.86
Total	.74 [.72, .77]	<.001		.82 [.79, .85]	<.001	
RR core → gov. compet. → PRR support						
ACME	.44 [.4, .47]	<.001	.58	.28 [.22, .34]	<.001	.37
ADE	.31 [.27, .35]	<.001	-.45	.54 [.46, .62]	<.001	-.7
Total	.74 [.72, .77]	<.001		.82 [.78, .85]	<.001	
UA → RR core → PRR support						
ACME	.2 [.17, .24]	<.001	.72	.22 [.19, .26]	<.001	.61
ADE	-.09 [-.13, -.06]	<.001	.44	-.09 [-.12, -.05]	<.001	.54
Total	.11 [.06, .15]	<.001		.13 [.08, .19]	<.001	
UA → populism → PRR support						
ACME	.01 [-.01, .03]	.205	.41	.04 [.02, .06]	<.001	.43
ADE	.1 [.05, .14]	<.001	-.96	.07 [.02, .11]	.003	-.77
Total	.11 [.06, .15]	<.001		.11 [.06, .16]	<.001	
UA → gov. compet. → PRR support						
ACME	.09 [.05, .12]	<.001	.8	.1 [.07, .13]	<.001	.58
ADE	.02 [-.01, .05]	.144	-.3	.01 [-.02, .06]	.463	-.21
Total	.11 [.06, .15]	<.001		.11 [.06, .16]	<.001	

Note. ρ indicates the value of ρ at which effects would become zero. All mediation models are estimated as separate models. Included controls are gender, age, education, and income situation. Where PRR support is a binary outcome (vote choice models), the average between the control and the treatment condition is reported. ACME = average causal mediation effect, ADE = average direct effect, gov. compet. = expected government competence, RR core = radical right core beliefs.

Sensitivity Analysis for PTV Models




Figure F.1. Sensitivity analysis of the ideological core's effect on the PTV for the FPÖ through government competence.




Figure F.2. Sensitivity analysis of the ideological core's effect on the PTV for the FPÖ through populist attitudes.




Figure F.3. Sensitivity analysis of uncertainty avoidance's effect on government competence through ideological core beliefs (PTV model).




Figure F.4. Sensitivity analysis of uncertainty avoidance's effect on populist attitudes through ideological core beliefs (PTV model).




Figure F.5. Sensitivity analysis of uncertainty avoidance's effect on the PTV for the FPÖ through ideological core beliefs.




Figure F.6. Sensitivity analysis of uncertainty avoidance's effect on the PTV for the FPÖ through government competence.




Figure F.7. Sensitivity analysis of uncertainty avoidance's effect on the PTV for the FPÖ through populist attitudes.

Sensitivity Analysis for Vote Choice Models




Figure F.8. Sensitivity analysis of the ideological core's effect on voting for the FPÖ through government competence.




Figure F.9. Sensitivity analysis of the ideological core's effect on voting for the FPÖ through populist attitudes.




Figure F.10. Sensitivity analysis of uncertainty avoidance's effect on government competence through ideological core beliefs (vote model).




Figure F.11. Sensitivity analysis of uncertainty avoidance's effect on populist attitudes through ideological core beliefs (vote model).




Figure F.12. Sensitivity analysis of uncertainty avoidance's effect on voting for the FPÖ through ideological core beliefs.




Figure F.13. Sensitivity analysis of uncertainty avoidance's effect on voting for the FPÖ through government competence.




Figure F.14. Sensitivity analysis of uncertainty avoidance's effect on voting for the FPÖ through populist attitudes.

F.5 Online Supplement S5: Details on Structural Equation Models (Wave 7)

The following tables were provided as Online Supplement S5 with my third paper. These tables provide detailed information on the supplemental analysis with new data from wave seven that we presented in the paper. Table F.7 shows the direct and indirect effects for the supplemental models, similar to the table included in the paper. Tables F.8 and F.9 present details for the additional structural equation model on voting for a populist radical right (PRR) party. Tables F.10 and F.11 show the same information for the structural equation model on the propensity to vote for the PRR.

Table F.7. Direct and indirect effects of uncertainty avoidance in wave 7 models.

Effect of UA on populism	Vote for PRR party					PTV for PRR party				
	β	<i>p</i>	SE	95%-CI		β	<i>p</i>	SE	95%-CI	
				Lower	Upper				Lower	Upper
UA → populism (total)	-.02	.708	.05	-.11	.08	-.07	.115	.04	-.15	.02
UA → populism (direct)	-.08	.117	.05	-.18	.02	-.12	.006	.04	-.2	-.03
UA → RR core → populism	.06	<.001	.01	.03	.09	.05	<.001	.01	.03	.08
Effect of risk on populism										
Risk → populism (total)	-.002	.956	.04	-.08	.08	-.04	.328	.04	-.12	.04
Risk → populism (direct)	-.01	.852	.04	-.09	.07	-.04	.292	.04	-.12	.04
Risk → RR core → populism	.01	.554	.01	-.01	.02	.003	.745	.01	-.01	.02
Effect of UA on gov. compet.										
UA → gov. compet. (total)	.15	<.001	.04	.07	.23	.12	.003	.04	.04	.19
UA → gov. compet. (direct)	-.03	.371	.03	-.1	.04	-.03	.346	.03	-.1	.03
UA → RR core → gov. compet.	.18	<.001	.03	.11	.25	.15	<.001	.03	.09	.21
Effect of risk on gov. compet.										
Risk → gov. compet. (total)	.05	.151	.03	-.02	.12	.04	.313	.04	-.04	.11
Risk → gov. compet. (direct)	.03	.228	.03	-.02	.08	.03	.344	.03	-.03	.09
Risk → RR core → gov. compet.	.02	.55	.03	-.04	.07	.01	.744	.03	-.04	.06
Effect of UA on PRR support										
UA → PRR support (total)	.13	.024	.06	.02	.25	.1	.007	.04	.03	.18
UA → PRR support (direct)	-.04	.406	.05	-.14	.06	-.03	.201	.02	-.08	.02
UA → PRR support (all indirect)	.17	<.001	.04	.1	.24	.13	<.001	.03	.07	.2
Effect of risk on PRR support										
Risk → PRR support (total)	-.001	.979	.05	-.1	.1	.001	.984	.03	-.07	.07
Risk → PRR support (direct)	-.03	.426	.04	-.11	.05	-.02	.244	.02	-.07	.02
Risk → PRR support (all indirect)	.03	.284	.03	-.03	.09	.02	.385	.03	-.03	.08
Indirect effects of UA on PRR support										
UA → RR core → PRR support	.11	<.001	.03	.06	.16	.07	<.001	.02	.04	.1
UA → RR core → populism → PRR support	.01	.067	.003	-.0004	.01	-.001	.534	.001	-.004	.002
UA → RR core → gov. compet. → PRR support	.08	<.001	.02	.04	.12	.08	<.001	.02	.05	.12
UA → RR core → PRR support (total incl. → populism & gov. compet.)	.19	<.001	.04	.12	.27	.15	<.001	.03	.09	.21
UA → populism → PRR support	-.01	.211	.01	-.02	.004	.002	.54	.003	-.004	.01
UA → gov. compet. → PRR support	-.01	.373	.02	-.04	.02	-.02	.346	.02	-.05	.02
Indirect effects of risk on PRR support										
Risk → RR core → PRR support	.01	.552	.02	-.02	.04	.004	.744	.01	-.02	.03
Risk → RR core → populism → PRR support	.0005	.563	.001	-.001	.002	.	.773	.0002	-.0004	.0003
Risk → RR core → gov. compet. → PRR support	.01	.552	.01	-.02	.03	.005	.744	.01	-.02	.03
Risk → RR core → PRR support (total incl. → populism & gov. compet.)	.02	.551	.03	-.04	.08	.01	.744	.03	-.04	.06
Risk → populism → PRR support	-.001	.852	.004	-.01	.01	.001	.595	.001	-.002	.003
Risk → gov. compet. → PRR support	.01	.236	.01	-.01	.04	.02	.346	.02	-.02	.05

Note. Coefficients (β) are standardized regression coefficients from DWLS estimation (vote choice) or ML estimation (PTV). PRR = populist radical right, PTV = propensity to vote, UA = uncertainty avoidance, populism = populist attitudes, RR core = radical right ideological core, gov. compet. = competence of PRR party in government.

F.5 Online Supplement S5: Details on Structural Equation Models (Wave 7)

Table F.8. Structural equation model on prospective voting for a PRR party in wave 7 (regression coefficients, direct and indirect effects).

Structural model		Unstandardized					Standardized				
		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p	
RR core ←	UA	.225 [.132, .318]	.047	4.763	.000		.242 [.154, .329]	.045	5.407	.000	
	Risk taking	.009 [-.019, .037]	.014	.599	.549		.022 [-.05, .094]	.037	.598	.550	
Populism ←	UA	-.049 [-.109, .012]	.031	-1.561	.119		-.078 [-.175, .02]	.05	-1.566	.117	
	Risk taking	-.002 [-.023, .019]	.011	-.187	.852		-.008 [-.089, .073]	.041	-.187	.852	
	RR core	.166 [.108, .223]	.029	5.625	.000		.247 [.173, .322]	.038	6.503	.000	
Gov. compet. ←	UA	-.106 [-.339, .127]	.119	-.894	.371		-.03 [-.097, .036]	.034	-.895	.371	
	Risk taking	.047 [-.029, .123]	.039	1.204	.228		.032 [-.02, .084]	.027	1.206	.228	
	RR core	2.821 [2.43, 3.212]	.2	14.13	.000		.754 [.709, .798]	.023	33.073	.000	
Vote ←	UA	-.047 [-.159, .064]	.057	-.829	.407		-.042 [-.14, .057]	.05	-.83	.406	
	Risk taking	-.015 [-.053, .022]	.019	-.797	.426		-.032 [-.112, .047]	.041	-.796	.426	
	RR core	.542 [.373, .711]	.086	6.272	.000		.446 [.317, .576]	.066	6.754	.000	
	Populism	.155 [.001, .308]	.078	1.975	.048		.085 [.002, .169]	.043	2.002	.045	
	Gov. compet.	.143 [.108, .178]	.018	8.031	.000		.441 [.327, .554]	.058	7.601	.000	
Covariances											
Populism ↔ gov. Compet		-.414 [-.528, -.299]	.058	-7.077	.000		-.338 [-.411, -.265]	.037	-9.079	.000	
UA ↔ risk taking		-1.039 [-1.258, -.82]	.112	-9.293	.000		-.513 [-.567, -.46]	.027	-18.741	.000	
Effect of UA on populism											
UA → populism (total)		-.011 [-.07, .047]	.03	-.376	.707		-.018 [-.112, .076]	.048	-.375	.708	
UA → populism (direct)		-.049 [-.109, .012]	.031	-1.561	.119		-.078 [-.175, .02]	.05	-1.566	.117	
UA → RR core → populism		.037 [.017, .058]	.01	3.604	.000		.06 [.03, .089]	.015	3.997	.000	
Effect of UA on gov. compet.											
UA → gov. compet. (total)		.529 [.22, .838]	.158	3.354	.001		.152 [.069, .235]	.042	3.584	.000	
UA → gov. compet. (direct)		-.106 [-.339, .127]	.119	-.894	.371		-.03 [-.097, .036]	.034	-.895	.371	
UA → RR core → gov. compet.		.635 [.367, .903]	.137	4.651	.000		.182 [.114, .251]	.035	5.219	.000	
Effect of UA on vote											
UA → vote (total)		.149 [.017, .281]	.067	2.211	.027		.131 [.017, .246]	.058	2.254	.024	
UA → vote (direct)		-.047 [-.159, .064]	.057	-.829	.407		-.042 [-.14, .057]	.05	-.83	.406	
UA → vote (all indirect)		.196 [.109, .283]	.044	4.418	.000		.173 [.101, .245]	.037	4.732	.000	
Indirect effects of UA on vote											
UA → RR core → vote		.122 [.062, .182]	.031	3.992	.000		.108 [.058, .158]	.026	4.218	.000	
UA → RR core → populism → vote		.006 [0, .012]	.003	1.813	.070		.005 [0, .011]	.003	1.833	.067	
UA → RR core → gov. compet. → vote		.091 [.046, .135]	.023	4.01	.000		.08 [.043, .118]	.019	4.21	.000	
UA → populism → vote		-.007 [-.019, .004]	.006	-1.249	.212		-.007 [-.017, .004]	.005	-1.251	.211	
UA → gov. compet. → vote		-.015 [-.049, .018]	.017	-.89	.373		-.013 [-.043, .016]	.015	-.892	.373	
Effect of risk taking on populism											
Risk taking → populism (total)		-.001 [-.022, .021]	.011	-.055	.956		-.002 [-.084, .079]	.042	-.055	.956	
Risk taking → populism (direct)		-.002 [-.023, .019]	.011	-.187	.852		-.008 [-.089, .073]	.041	-.187	.852	
Risk taking → RR core → populism		.001 [-.003, .006]	.002	.589	.556		.005 [-.013, .024]	.009	.592	.554	
Effect of risk taking on gov. compet.											
Risk taking → gov. compet. (total)		.071 [-.026, .168]	.05	1.432	.152		.049 [-.018, .115]	.034	1.437	.151	
Risk taking → gov. compet. (direct)		.047 [-.029, .123]	.039	1.204	.228		.032 [-.02, .084]	.027	1.206	.228	
Risk taking → RR core → gov. compet.		.024 [-.055, .104]	.041	.597	.551		.017 [-.038, .071]	.028	.597	.550	
Effect of risk taking on vote											
Risk taking → vote (total)		-.001 [-.046, .045]	.023	-.026	.979		-.001 [-.098, .095]	.049	-.026	.979	
Risk taking → vote (direct)		-.015 [-.053, .022]	.019	-.797	.426		-.032 [-.112, .047]	.041	-.796	.426	
Risk taking → vote (all indirect)		.015 [-.012, .042]	.014	1.074	.283		.031 [-.026, .088]	.029	1.072	.284	
Indirect effects of risk taking on vote											
Risk taking → RR core → vote		.005 [-.011, .02]	.008	.595	.552		.01 [-.023, .042]	.017	.594	.552	
Risk taking → RR core → populism → vote		0 [-.001, .001]	0	.579	.563		0 [-.001, .002]	.001	.578	.563	
Risk taking → RR core → gov. compet. → vote		.003 [-.008, .015]	.006	.595	.552		.007 [-.017, .031]	.012	.594	.552	
Risk taking → populism → vote		0 [-.004, .003]	.002	-.187	.852		-.001 [-.008, .006]	.004	-.187	.852	
Risk taking → gov. compet. → vote		.007 [-.004, .018]	.006	1.186	.235		.014 [-.009, .038]	.012	1.185	.236	

Table F.9. Structural equation model on prospective voting for a PRR party in wave 7 (continued; controls, latent constructs, and model summary).

		Unstandardized				Standardized			
Controls		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p	Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p
UA ←	Age	-.005 [-.01, 0]	.003	-1.785	.074	-.068 [-.141, .006]	.037	-1.806	.071
	Gender (female)	.245 [.102, .388]	.073	3.357	.001	.128 [.055, .2]	.037	3.455	.001
	Education (Matura)	-.258 [-.412, -.103]	.079	-3.267	.001	-.132 [-.208, -.056]	.039	-3.39	.001
	Inc. situation	-.052 [-.204, .1]	.078	-.673	.501	-.025 [-.098, .048]	.037	-.675	.500
Risk taking ←	Age	-.005 [-.016, .006]	.005	-.933	.351	-.03 [-.093, .033]	.032	-.932	.351
	Gender (female)	-1.108 [-1.388, -.828]	.143	-7.761	.000	-.241 [-.298, -.183]	.029	-8.227	.000
	Education (Matura)	.127 [-.186, .44]	.16	.797	.426	.027 [-.04, .094]	.034	.797	.426
	Inc. situation	.108 [-.202, .418]	.158	.681	.496	.022 [-.041, .084]	.032	.681	.496
RR core ←	Age	-.001 [-.005, .003]	.002	-.522	.602	-.017 [-.081, .047]	.033	-.522	.601
	Gender (female)	.032 [-.083, .146]	.058	.541	.589	.018 [-.046, .082]	.033	.542	.588
	Education (Matura)	-.551 [-.689, -.413]	.07	-7.816	.000	-.302 [-.367, -.238]	.033	-9.203	.000
	Inc. situation	-.144 [-.269, -.018]	.064	-2.249	.025	-.074 [-.138, -.01]	.033	-2.277	.023
Populism ←	Age	-.002 [-.006, .001]	.002	-1.492	.136	-.055 [-.127, .017]	.037	-1.499	.134
	Gender (female)	-.022 [-.107, .063]	.043	-.505	.614	-.018 [-.089, .053]	.036	-.505	.613
	Education (Matura)	-.106 [-.201, -.012]	.048	-2.215	.027	-.087 [-.164, -.011]	.039	-2.241	.025
	Inc. situation	-.233 [-.326, -.14]	.047	-4.907	.000	-.179 [-.246, -.113]	.034	-5.275	.000
Gov. compet. ←	Age	.001 [-.011, .013]	.006	.176	.860	.004 [-.045, .054]	.025	.176	.860
	Gender (female)	-.199 [-.526, .128]	.167	-1.193	.233	-.03 [-.078, .019]	.025	-1.195	.232
	Education (Matura)	-.022 [-.364, .32]	.175	-.125	.901	-.003 [-.053, .047]	.026	-.125	.901
	Inc. situation	.532 [.171, .892]	.184	2.892	.004	.073 [.024, .122]	.025	2.926	.003
Vote ←	Age	-.007 [-.012, -.001]	.003	-2.35	.019	-.085 [-.155, -.015]	.036	-2.37	.018
	Gender (female)	-.146 [-.292, 0]	.075	-1.961	.050	-.067 [-.134, 0]	.034	-1.97	.049
	Education (Matura)	-.114 [-.274, .045]	.081	-1.402	.161	-.052 [-.123, .02]	.036	-1.422	.155
	Inc. situation	-.134 [-.284, .016]	.076	-1.75	.080	-.057 [-.12, .007]	.032	-1.758	.079
Latent variables									
UA →	UA 1	1 [1, 1]	0			.639 [.577, .7]	.032	20.277	.000
	UA 2	.793 [.64, .947]	.078	10.124	.000	.538 [.474, .603]	.033	16.386	.000
	UA 3	.689 [.552, .827]	.07	9.839	.000	.464 [.397, .53]	.034	13.666	.000
	UA 4	.777 [.638, .916]	.071	10.931	.000	.563 [.499, .626]	.032	17.397	.000
	UA 5	.921 [.766, 1.075]	.079	11.67	.000	.6 [.538, .661]	.032	18.997	.000
	UA 6	.628 [.497, .758]	.067	9.426	.000	.442 [.376, .509]	.034	13.071	.000
Populism →	Pop. attitudes 1	1 [1, 1]	0			.552 [.497, .608]	.028	19.651	.000
	Pop. attitudes 2	.87 [.712, 1.027]	.08	10.83	.000	.489 [.429, .549]	.03	16.031	.000
	Pop. attitudes 3	.647 [.513, .78]	.068	9.524	.000	.394 [.331, .457]	.032	12.252	.000
	Pop. attitudes 4	1.244 [1.043, 1.445]	.102	12.143	.000	.634 [.58, .688]	.028	22.826	.000
	Pop. attitudes 5	1.448 [1.221, 1.675]	.116	12.504	.000	.745 [.696, .794]	.025	29.748	.000
	Pop. attitudes 6	1.294 [1.075, 1.513]	.112	11.6	.000	.654 [.603, .706]	.026	24.913	.000
Anti-immigr. →	Anti-immigr. 1	1 [1, 1]	0			.605 [.566, .643]	.02	30.858	.000
	Anti-immigr. 2	2.122 [1.848, 2.397]	.14	15.131	.000	.795 [.763, .828]	.017	48.103	.000
	Anti-immigr. 3	1.945 [1.705, 2.184]	.122	15.909	.000	.797 [.769, .826]	.015	54.939	.000
	Anti-immigr. 4	1.517 [1.298, 1.735]	.111	13.605	.000	.621 [.582, .66]	.02	31.087	.000
	Anti-immigr. 5	2.209 [1.944, 2.475]	.135	16.311	.000	.849 [.818, .879]	.016	54.426	.000
	Anti-immigr. 6	1.783 [1.534, 2.032]	.127	14.021	.000	.68 [.636, .723]	.022	30.846	.000
RR core →	Authoritarianism	1 [1, 1]	0			.68 [.635, .724]	.023	29.98	.000
	Anti-immigr.	.506 [.429, .582]	.039	12.961	.000	.942 [.917, .967]	.013	74.748	.000
	Anti-EU	2.586 [2.232, 2.941]	.181	14.301	.000	.713 [.671, .754]	.021	33.762	.000
	Excl. national ID	.762 [.664, .86]	.05	15.243	.000	.636 [.595, .677]	.021	30.337	.000
Model summary		n	1005	CFI	.937				
		Chi ² (df)	1085 (311)	RMSEA [95%-CI]	.049 [.047, .053]				
		p	< .001	SRMR	.057				

Note. The results are based on DWLS estimation with robust standard errors and mean-and-variance adjusted test statistics. RR core is a second-order factor. Manifest variables are described in detail in the Online Supplement. RR core = radical right ideological core, UA = uncertainty avoidance, gov. comp. = (expected) competence of PRR party in government, inc. situation = income situation, pop. attitudes = populist attitudes, anti-immigr. = anti-immigration attitude, excl. national ID = exclusive national ID.

F.5 Online Supplement S5: Details on Structural Equation Models (Wave 7)

Table F.10. Structural equation model on PTV for a PRR party in wave 7 (regression coefficients, direct and indirect effects).

Structural model		Unstandardized					Standardized				
		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p	
RR core ←	UA	.173 [.103, .243]	.036	4.834	.000		.213 [.131, .295]	.042	5.077	.000	
	Risk taking	.005 [-.023, .032]	.014	.327	.744		.012 [-.058, .082]	.036	.327	.744	
Populism ←	UA	-.064 [-.11, -.018]	.024	-2.704	.007		-.119 [-.204, -.034]	.043	-2.739	.006	
	Risk taking	-.011 [-.03, .009]	.01	-1.054	.292		-.041 [-.118, .036]	.039	-1.053	.292	
	RR core	.161 [.107, .216]	.028	5.763	.000		.244 [.17, .318]	.038	6.448	.000	
Gov. compet. ←	UA	-.093 [-.287, .101]	.099	-.942	.346		-.031 [-.096, .034]	.033	-.942	.346	
	Risk taking	.041 [-.044, .126]	.043	.947	.343		.029 [-.031, .089]	.031	.947	.344	
	RR core	2.57 [2.334, 2.806]	.12	21.37	.000		.7 [.654, .747]	.024	29.378	.000	
PTV ←	UA	-.118 [-.298, .063]	.092	-1.278	.201		-.031 [-.079, .017]	.024	-1.279	.201	
	Risk taking	-.043 [-.116, .03]	.037	-1.164	.244		-.024 [-.065, .017]	.021	-1.165	.244	
	RR core	1.497 [1.123, 1.87]	.191	7.857	.000		.323 [.245, .401]	.04	8.158	.000	
	Populism	-.119 [-.483, .245]	.186	-.64	.522		-.017 [-.069, .035]	.027	-.639	.523	
	Gov. Compet.	.697 [.614, .78]	.042	16.456	.000		.552 [.485, .618]	.034	16.308	.000	
Covariances											
Populism ↔ gov. compet.		-.546 [-.654, -.437]	.055	-9.835	.000		-.431 [-.494, -.368]	.032	-13.449	.000	
UA ↔ risk taking		-1.123 [-1.301, -.944]	.091	-12.339	.000		-.479 [-.538, -.419]	.031	-15.689	.000	
Effect of UA on populism											
UA → populism (total)		-.036 [-.081, .009]	.023	-1.576	.115		-.067 [-.15, .016]	.042	-1.576	.115	
UA → populism (direct)		-.064 [-.11, -.018]	.024	-2.704	.007		-.119 [-.204, -.034]	.043	-2.739	.006	
UA → RR core → populism		.028 [.013, .043]	.008	3.638	.000		.052 [.025, .078]	.014	3.834	.000	
Effect of UA on gov. compet.											
UA → gov. compet. (total)		.351 [.121, .581]	.117	2.991	.003		.118 [.041, .194]	.039	3.022	.003	
UA → gov. compet. (direct)		-.093 [-.287, .101]	.099	-.942	.346		-.031 [-.096, .034]	.033	-.942	.346	
UA → RR core → gov. compet.		.444 [.263, .626]	.093	4.8	.000		.149 [.09, .208]	.03	4.914	.000	
Effect of UA on PTV											
UA → PTV (total)		.39 [.102, .678]	.147	2.656	.008		.104 [.028, .179]	.039	2.675	.007	
UA → PTV (direct)		-.118 [-.298, .063]	.092	-1.278	.201		-.031 [-.079, .017]	.024	-1.279	.201	
UA → PTV (all indirect)		.508 [.267, .748]	.123	4.138	.000		.135 [.072, .198]	.032	4.201	.000	
Indirect effects of UA on PTV											
UA → RR core → PTV		.259 [.141, .377]	.06	4.303	.000		.069 [.038, .099]	.016	4.368	.000	
UA → RR core → populism → PTV		-.003 [-.014, .007]	.005	-.622	.534		-.001 [-.004, .002]	.001	-.622	.534	
UA → RR core → gov. compet. → PTV		.31 [.177, .442]	.068	4.571	.000		.082 [.048, .117]	.018	4.653	.000	
UA → populism → PTV		.008 [-.017, .032]	.012	.612	.540		.002 [-.004, .008]	.003	.612	.540	
UA → gov. compet. → PTV		-.065 [-.2, .07]	.069	-.942	.346		-.017 [-.053, .019]	.018	-.943	.346	
Effect of risk taking on populism											
Risk taking → populism (total)		-.01 [-.029, .01]	.01	-.981	.327		-.038 [-.115, .039]	.039	-.979	.328	
Risk taking → populism (direct)		-.011 [-.03, .009]	.01	-1.054	.292		-.041 [-.118, .036]	.039	-1.053	.292	
Risk taking → RR core → populism		.001 [-.004, .005]	.002	.325	.745		.003 [-.014, .02]	.009	.326	.745	
Effect of risk taking on gov. compet.											
Risk taking → gov. compet. (total)		.053 [-.05, .155]	.052	1.008	.314		.037 [-.035, .109]	.037	1.008	.313	
Risk taking → gov. compet. (direct)		.041 [-.044, .126]	.043	.947	.343		.029 [-.031, .089]	.031	.947	.344	
Risk taking → RR core → gov. compet.		.012 [-.058, .081]	.035	.327	.744		.008 [-.041, .057]	.025	.327	.744	
Effect of risk taking on PTV											
Risk taking → PTV (total)		.001 [-.12, .123]	.062	.02	.984		.001 [-.067, .069]	.035	.02	.984	
Risk taking → PTV (direct)		-.043 [-.116, .03]	.037	-1.164	.244		-.024 [-.065, .017]	.021	-1.165	.244	
Risk taking → PTV (all indirect)		.045 [-.056, .145]	.051	.869	.385		.025 [-.031, .081]	.029	.869	.385	
Indirect effects of risk taking on PTV											
Risk taking → RR core → PTV		.007 [-.034, .047]	.021	.327	.744		.004 [-.019, .026]	.012	.327	.744	
Risk taking → RR core → populism → PTV		0 [-.001, .001]	0	-.289	.773		0 [0, 0]	0	-.289	.773	
Risk taking → RR core → gov. compet. → PTV		.008 [-.04, .057]	.025	.327	.744		.005 [-.023, .032]	.014	.327	.744	
Risk taking → populism → PTV		.001 [-.003, .006]	.002	.532	.595		.001 [-.002, .003]	.001	.532	.595	
Risk taking → gov. compet. → PTV		.029 [-.031, .088]	.03	.943	.346		.016 [-.017, .049]	.017	.943	.346	

Table F.11. Structural equation model on PTV for a PRR party in wave 7 (continued; controls, latent constructs, and model summary).

		Unstandardized				Standardized			
Controls		Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p	Coef. [95%-CI]	SE	z	p
UA ←	Age	-.004 [-.009, .001]	.003	-1.626	.104	-.053 [-.116, .011]	.032	-1.627	.104
	Gender (female)	.275 [.136, .415]	.071	3.871	.000	.126 [.063, .189]	.032	3.907	.000
	Education (Matura)	-.237 [-.38, -.093]	.073	-3.232	.001	-.106 [-.17, -.042]	.033	-3.257	.001
	Inc. situation	-.062 [-.215, .09]	.078	-.803	.422	-.027 [-.092, .039]	.033	-.804	.422
Risk taking ←	Age	-.009 [-.019, 0]	.005	-1.885	.059	-.053 [-.108, .002]	.028	-1.894	.058
	Gender (female)	-.984 [-1.235, -.734]	.128	-7.71	.000	-.213 [-.266, -.16]	.027	-7.881	.000
	Education (Matura)	.074 [-.182, .33]	.13	.568	.570	.016 [-.039, .07]	.028	.568	.570
	Inc. situation	.101 [-.17, .373]	.139	.732	.464	.021 [-.035, .076]	.028	.733	.464
RR core ←	Age	0 [-.003, .004]	.002	.162	.871	.005 [-.051, .061]	.029	.162	.871
	Gender (female)	.028 [-.072, .128]	.051	.548	.583	.016 [-.04, .072]	.029	.549	.583
	Education (Matura)	-.55 [-.666, -.434]	.059	-9.308	.000	-.303 [-.362, -.244]	.03	-10.079	.000
	Inc. situation	-.166 [-.277, -.056]	.056	-2.947	.003	-.088 [-.146, -.03]	.03	-2.958	.003
Populism ←	Age	-.001 [-.003, .002]	.001	-.373	.709	-.012 [-.077, .052]	.033	-.374	.709
	Gender (female)	-.017 [-.089, .055]	.037	-.456	.648	-.014 [-.076, .047]	.031	-.456	.648
	Education (Matura)	-.091 [-.175, -.006]	.043	-2.106	.035	-.076 [-.146, -.006]	.036	-2.119	.034
	Inc. situation	-.251 [-.33, -.171]	.041	-6.19	.000	-.2 [-.259, -.141]	.03	-6.659	.000
Gov. compet. ←	Age	-.003 [-.014, .008]	.006	-.56	.576	-.013 [-.059, .033]	.023	-.559	.576
	Gender (female)	-.114 [-.41, .182]	.151	-.756	.450	-.017 [-.063, .028]	.023	-.756	.449
	Education (Matura)	-.054 [-.381, .272]	.167	-.327	.744	-.008 [-.057, .041]	.025	-.327	.744
	Inc. situation	.665 [.336, .993]	.168	3.961	.000	.096 [.048, .143]	.024	3.957	.000
PTV ←	Age	-.023 [-.034, -.013]	.005	-4.288	.000	-.075 [-.109, -.041]	.018	-4.279	.000
	Gender (female)	-.505 [-.792, -.218]	.146	-3.45	.001	-.061 [-.096, -.026]	.018	-3.449	.001
	Education (Matura)	-.392 [-.706, -.078]	.16	-2.444	.015	-.047 [-.084, -.009]	.019	-2.442	.015
	Inc. situation	.018 [-.29, .327]	.158	.117	.907	.002 [-.033, .037]	.018	.117	.907
Latent variables									
UA →	UA 1	1 [1, 1]	0			.741 [.699, .783]	.021	34.65	.000
	UA 2	.66 [.574, .747]	.044	14.973	.000	.513 [.455, .57]	.029	17.594	.000
	UA 3	.587 [.499, .674]	.045	13.14	.000	.45 [.392, .508]	.029	15.332	.000
	UA 4	.613 [.53, .696]	.042	14.442	.000	.514 [.455, .573]	.03	17.111	.000
	UA 5	.835 [.747, .922]	.045	18.679	.000	.612 [.563, .661]	.025	24.515	.000
	UA 6	.553 [.467, .638]	.044	12.667	.000	.435 [.376, .495]	.03	14.325	.000
Populism →	Pop. attitudes 1	1 [1, 1]	0			.541 [.486, .595]	.028	19.412	.000
	Pop. attitudes 2	1.185 [1.032, 1.339]	.078	15.125	.000	.648 [.603, .693]	.023	28.104	.000
	Pop. attitudes 3	.855 [.728, .983]	.065	13.154	.000	.515 [.461, .569]	.028	18.672	.000
	Pop. attitudes 4	1.359 [1.19, 1.527]	.086	15.781	.000	.675 [.631, .719]	.022	30.069	.000
	Pop. attitudes 5	1.19 [1.039, 1.34]	.077	15.501	.000	.611 [.563, .659]	.024	25.066	.000
	Pop. attitudes 6	1.25 [1.084, 1.416]	.085	14.736	.000	.635 [.588, .682]	.024	26.442	.000
Anti-immigr. →	Anti-immigr. 1	1 [1, 1]	0			.557 [.511, .602]	.023	23.855	.000
	Anti-immigr. 2	2.343 [2.12, 2.567]	.114	20.551	.000	.819 [.792, .846]	.014	58.798	.000
	Anti-immigr. 3	2.115 [1.907, 2.323]	.106	19.914	.000	.813 [.79, .835]	.012	70.156	.000
	Anti-immigr. 4	1.73 [1.534, 1.926]	.1	17.281	.000	.639 [.602, .677]	.019	33.119	.000
	Anti-immigr. 5	2.267 [2.063, 2.471]	.104	21.78	.000	.819 [.793, .844]	.013	62.773	.000
	Anti-immigr. 6	1.852 [1.652, 2.051]	.102	18.183	.000	.665 [.621, .71]	.023	29.311	.000
RR core →	Authoritarianism	1 [1, 1]	0			.669 [.628, .709]	.021	32.382	.000
	Anti-immigr.	.448 [.398, .498]	.025	17.724	.000	.908 [.884, .932]	.012	73.837	.000
	Anti-EU	2.549 [2.328, 2.771]	.113	22.522	.000	.703 [.666, .739]	.019	37.452	.000
	Excl. national ID	.749 [.672, .825]	.039	19.207	.000	.63 [.592, .668]	.019	32.625	.000
Model summary		n	1262	CFI	0.895				
		Chi ² (df)	1523 (311)	RMSEA [95%-CI]	.056 [.053, .058]				
		p	< .001	SRMR	.051				

Note. The results are based on ML estimation with robust standard errors and mean-and-variance adjusted test statistics. RR core is a second-order factor. Manifest variables are described in detail in the Online Supplement. RR core = radical right ideological core, UA = uncertainty avoidance, gov. comp. = (expected) competence of PRR party in government, PTV = propensity to vote, inc. situation = income situation, pop. attitudes = populist attitudes, anti-immigr. = anti-immigration attitude, excl. national ID = exclusive national ID.

G Appendix for Paper 4: *Items zu Einstellungen*

The following Table G.1 was included as an Appendix with Paper 4. It offers an overview of the items used to measure anti-immigration, economic right-wing, and populist attitudes. Like the main chapter, the table is in German.

Tabelle G.1. Genaue Itemformulierungen für Einstellungs-Items.

Index	Item	Wahljahr	Aussage	Polung
Ökonomisch rechts	1	2008	Der Staat soll nicht Eigentümer von Unternehmen sein.	+
		2013, 2017, 2019	Die Politik soll sich aus der Wirtschaft heraushalten.	+
	2	2008	Es ist wichtiger die Arbeitslosigkeit zu bekämpfen, als gegen die Inflation anzukämpfen.	-
		2013, 2017, 2019	Die Arbeitslosigkeit muss bekämpft werden, auch wenn das hohe Staatsschulden bedeutet.	-
	3	2008	Es sollten größere Anstrengungen unternommen werden, um Einkommensungleichheiten auszugleichen.	-
		2013	Die Politik soll Unterschiede zwischen großen und kleinen Einkommen ausgleichen.	-
		2017, 2019	Die Einkommensunterschiede in Österreich sind zu groß.	-
Anti- Zuwanderung	1	2008	Zuwanderinnen und Zuwanderer sollen verpflichtet werden, sich der österreichischen Kultur anzupassen.	+
		2013	Die österreichische Kultur wird durch Zuwanderung bereichert.	-
		2017, 2019	Zuwanderer bereichern die österreichische Kultur.	-
	2	2008	Die Zuwanderung nach Österreich sollte bedeutend eingeschränkt werden.	+
		2013	Die Zuwanderung nach Österreich soll gestoppt werden.	+
		2017, 2019	Zuwanderung nach Österreich sollte nur in absoluten Ausnahmefällen möglich sein.	+
Populistische Einstellungen	1	2017, 2019	Wenn in der Politik von „Kompromissen“ gesprochen wird, meint man eigentlich, dass man seine Prinzipien verkauft.	+
	2	2017, 2019	Die meisten Politiker kümmern sich nur um die Interessen der Reichen und Mächtigen.	+
	3	2017, 2019	Die meisten Politiker sind vertrauenswürdig.	-
	4	2017, 2019	Die Parteien sind das Hauptproblem in Österreich.	+
	5	2017, 2019	Das Volk, und nicht die Politiker, sollte unsere wichtigsten politischen Entscheidungen treffen.	+
	6	2017, 2019	Als Abgeordneten hätte ich lieber einen unabhängigen Bürger als ein Parteimitglied.	+

H Extended English Summary of Paper 4

Abstract. Based on AUTNES survey data, Paper 4 provides an overview of how the Austrian middle class has voted in National Assembly elections since 2008, with a strong focus on the elections of 2017 and 2019. The contribution also analyzes the middle class's political positions and what issues were important to it. Empirically, only minor sociostructural differences could be identified. Instead, the results showed that the economic center does not have a clear political profile. Individual attitudes and issue agendas were more important for electoral behavior than class affiliation.

Keywords. Electoral behavior, middle class, electoral research, social structure, attitudes, issue salience, populism.

This summary provides an overview of the German paper “Das Wahlverhalten der Mitte: Ein Rechtsruck in Folge der Fluchtbewegung?” that is included in this dissertation as Paper 4 (in Chapter 7). The German title translates to “The Electoral Behavior of the Middle Classes: A Shift to the Right in Response to the Refugee Crisis?” This summary outlines the general idea of the article and presents the findings in more detail. All tables and figures from Chapter 7 were also translated into English.

Paper 4 was prepared as a chapter in an edited volume on the Austrian middle class. In our contribution, the distinction between classes is made according to economic criteria, and the middle classes enjoy a medium income (Niehues, 2018). The chapter takes a closer look at the Austrian middle class's voting behavior and political preferences in the National Council elections from 2008 to 2019. It explores a series of questions: Who did the middle vote for, and which parties could be seen as political representatives of the middle classes? Furthermore, which issues were particularly relevant for middle-class voters? In light of the recent 2017 and 2019 elections (see Section 3.1 for more details), the chapter explores the popular assumptions that the middle classes increasingly vote for populist radical right parties and are increasingly hostile toward immigrants. Here, we raise the question if the salience of the issue did not play a more substantial role in

2017, especially in light of the large refugee movements in Europe since 2015? Moreover, did the 2019 election then represent a return to normal in this respect?

H.1 Political Conflict and Electoral Behavior in Austria

What can we expect from the voting behavior of the middle class? Election research tends to assume that social structure, especially social class, has become less crucial. As in other European countries, broad transformation such as the expansion of education and the welfare state as well as the decline of jobs in manufacturing led to the emergence of today's middle classes (D. Bell, 1973; Niehues, 2018; Verwiebe & Bacher, 2019). Together with a shift toward more postmaterial and secular values (Inglehart, 1997), this led to a loss of significance of *traditional cleavages* based on class and religion. These changes also became visible in less stable party affiliations and more volatile voting decisions (Haerpfer & Gehmacher, 1984; Hofinger et al., 2008). The established parties—the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the People's Party (ÖVP), which long represented the two sides of these cleavages—reacted by increasingly catering toward the so-called median voter who represented the new middle class (Downs, 1957; W. C. Müller, 1992). The middle classes or the “center” became synonymous with the moderate preferences of the majority.

In addition to the dwindling importance of old conflicts and declining party membership, *new lines of conflict* have emerged in Austrian society. Globalization brought about a new conflict between winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008). Another conflict line encompasses the mentioned value change, most visible in the emergence of the 1968 movement (Verwiebe & Bacher, 2019). While economic and social policy issues dominated the political agenda and public discourse in the early and mid-20th century, issues such as migration, identity, environmental protection, and gender equality have become important for voters in recent decades. Along the new lines of conflict, *new political parties* emerged. In 1986 the Greens were founded. In the same year, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) under Jörg Haider started to develop into a populist radical right party, and in 2012 the liberal NEOS emerged.

Electoral research responded by focusing on issues and less on sociostructural factors to explain the more volatile voter behavior. Voters would vote for the parties thematically

closest to them (Downs, 1957; Enelow & Hinich, 1984; Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989). However, they decide not based on all available issues but on the personal relevance of issues (Krosnick, 1988). The salience of issues can vary from election to election, with parties also adjusting their positions (De Sio & Weber, 2014). Furthermore, the political space that has emerged could not be easily described by the traditional economic left-right axis (about, e.g., interventions in the economy and redistribution) anymore. At least one other axis needs to be considered, the sociocultural dimension, which encompasses social issues such as gender equality, same-sex marriage, and, above all, the topic of immigration (Kriesi et al., 2008; van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009).

With the emergence of new parties, issues and conflicts, there was also *renewed interest in the sociostructural foundations* of voting behavior. On the one hand, young, mobile, mainly female, and highly educated segments of society vote for Green parties (Dolezal, 2010). On the opposite are those who feel threatened by changes due to globalization. This group is predominantly male (Spierings & Zaslove, 2017), less educated, and often working in manufacturing. They would increasingly turn away from the established parties, from which they no longer feel represented, and turn toward populist radical right parties (Kriesi et al., 2008). However, a fundamental sociostructural basis for this new cleavage no longer seems to be class affiliation but education (Stubager, 2010).

Consequently, this cleavage cuts across the middle class. While parts of it, together with the upper classes, are more inclined toward socially liberal and Green parties, increasing economic pressure on other parts of the middle class is at the same time often used as an explanation for the successes of anti-globalization *populist parties* (Dolezal, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2008). However, for the support of populist radical right parties, the empirical findings show a more complex picture. More important than economic grievances are the rejection of immigration and a desire to preserve one's national identity (Oesch, 2008). It is also not so much the truly economically vulnerable who lean toward populist parties; instead, subjectively perceived weakness or disadvantage seems relevant (e.g., Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018; Spruyt et al., 2016).

In summary, since social structure and class should play a subordinate role in voting behavior, we do not expect a huge effect of social class. However, the middle class is probably still most likely to vote for the two traditional parties, the SPÖ and the ÖVP.

Instead, political attitudes and issues might have become more important than class. Here, the developments of recent decades suggest that issues such as immigration or the environment have gained importance compared to economic issues. Furthermore, dissatisfaction with the long-standing grand coalition and its proponents could be reflected in populist beliefs among voters and also drive support for the populist FPÖ (Gründl & Aichholzer, 2020).

H.2 Data and Methods

We addressed our questions with data by the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES). Table H.1 provides an overview of the four data sets (see also Chapter 3 on methods). Our analysis consists of descriptive statistics (for 2008–2019) and regression models for party preferences in the 2017 and 2019 elections.

Measures. The *middle classes* include those who reported a net equivalent income between 70 and 150 percent of the median equivalent income within the respective survey. The limits correspond to a common definition of the middle class in German-speaking countries (e.g., Goebel et al., 2010). The dependent variable for the regression models was the *propensity to vote* (PTV) for parties (van der Eijk et al., 2006). The analysis also took a closer look at three attitudinal variables: *economic*, *sociocultural* (here *anti-immigration*), and *populist attitudes*. All three variables were based on the mean agreement to a set of statements (see Appendix G for the German items and Section 3.2 for details on populist attitudes). In the survey for the 2008 election, the wording of the statements differed somewhat from the later years (populist attitudes were only included from 2017 on); direct comparisons between the elections should, thus, be made with due caution. Finally, the surveys also asked about the *most important topic*. For 2013 and 2017, open-ended responses to this question were coded using the same coding scheme. For 2008, the scheme differed again, and in 2019, respondents only had the option to choose from 21 given topics. The mentioned topics were summarized in four broader and comparable categories: economy and welfare state, immigration, environment, and other issues.

Table H.1. Overview of samples from AUTNES surveys.

Variable	National election			
	2008	2013	2017	2019
Average age (SD)	51,5 (17,7)	45,4 (19,5)	47,9 (19,3)	43,4 (15,3)
Sociodemographics (%)				
Gender: female	54,5	50,9	52,6	50,7
Education: <i>Matura</i>	28,0	30,6	45,2	34,9
Confession: Catholic	70,7	68,2	66,4	55,5
Union member	17,0	18,6	22,9	27,1
Social class (%)				
Lower class	21,7	20,3	19,3	22,5
Middle class	58,2	63,6	64,4	64,0
Upper class	20,1	16,1	16,3	13,4
Vote choice (%)				
SPÖ	35,7	27,9	27,1	19,9
ÖVP	33,4	22,9	30,9	27,6
FPÖ	13,8	16,0	18,6	20,8
Greens	7,9	15,8	6,3	17,1
NEOS/LIF	6,7	6,0	8,6	9,1
Study description				
Dataset	AUTNES Post Post Election Survey 2009	AUTNES Pre and Post Panel Study 2013	AUTNES Multi-Mode Panel Study 2017	AUTNES Online Panel Study 2017–2019
Survey mode	Face-to-face	Face-to-face + telephone	Telephone + online	Online
Reference	(Kritzinger et al., 2014)	(Kritzinger et al., 2016)	(Kritzinger et al., 2018)	(Aichholzer et al., 2020)
<i>N</i> (pre election)		3266	3846	3012
<i>N</i> (post election)	1165	1504	1910	3098

H.3 Results

Figures H.1, H.2, and H.3 depict how the income strata differed in their vote choice, their political attitudes, and the issues important to them. The data was rather volatile regarding vote choice, and the middle classes did not show a consistently distinct pattern. Concerning political attitudes, respondents from the higher income classes tended to be further to the right economically and further to the left on the sociocultural issue of immigration. We also found that primarily the lower-income strata had moved to the right on immigration issues in 2017. In 2019, however, the middle and upper classes also followed (see Figure H.2).

A popular explanation for populists' success is that the lower and, increasingly, the middle classes are exposed to growing economic pressure in the globalized world and no longer feel that politics represents their interests. Populist attitudes express such a view of politics where elites work against ordinary citizens. Indeed, in 2017, the lower class had the strongest populist attitudes. The middle class was significantly below this level and closer to the upper class. In 2019, the groups moved closer together again.

Figure H.3 illustrates the dramatic shift in issue salience from 2013 to 2017 and again from 2017 to 2019. In 2013, only just under 7% of voters had named immigration the most critical issue. Immigration became more salient and was named the most important issue by almost 39% of voters in 2017—presumably, due to the refugee movements in 2015. This increase in issue salience was shared by all social classes but was particularly pronounced among the middle class. In 2019, immigration was again mentioned less often. The picture corresponded to the earlier election rounds, with one significant difference: The environment was now the most crucial issue for a considerable part of the electorate.

In the next step, we analyzed party preferences in the 2017 and 2019 national elections in detail. Tables H.2 and H.3 show models for the propensity to ever vote (PTV) for certain parties. The continuous independent variables were standardized to two standard deviations to allow easy comparison of the coefficients (Gelman, 2008). For both elections, a basic model based on sociodemographic factors was estimated for all five parties, followed by a full model including attitudes and issue salience.




Figure H.1. Vote choice in National Council elections 2008–2019 by social class.

A look at the simple basic models reveals that class affiliation hardly played a role in the PTV for certain parties in 2017 (see Table H.2) and 2019 (see Table H.3). Voters from lower-income classes appeared to have a higher PTV for the populist radical right FPÖ (statistically significant only in 2017). For all other parties, belonging to the middle or upper classes had a positive effect—significant only in some instances. Overall, however, the variance explained by sociodemographic factors remained low compared to the full models (adjusted R^2 between 0.03–0.14 compared to 0.11–0.43). Moreover, even in these basic models, other sociostructural factors played a much larger role. For the two former major parties, for example, old conflict lines still played a significant role. As in earlier findings (e.g., Kritzing et al., 2013), Roman Catholics were more likely to vote for the ÖVP; trade union members were more likely to vote for the SPÖ. For the other parties, education emerged as the central sociostructural characteristic. Higher formal education, for instance, significantly increased the stated PTV for the Greens and the NEOS. For the FPÖ, it was the opposite.

The complete models (see Table H.2 for 2017 and Table H.3 for 2019) include not




Figure H.2. Attitudes of the electorate by social class (weighted by sociodemographic characteristics).



Figure H.3. Most important political issue by social class (weighted by sociodemographic characteristics).

only sociostructural factors but also voters' political attitudes and issue preferences. The main sociostructural foundations of party preferences found in the basic model were also confirmed in the comprehensive model. Except for the FPÖ, middle and upper-class voters consistently reported higher PTVs. This allows us to speculate that the lower-income strata not only had a higher PTV for the FPÖ but also tended more to abstain—especially in 2019, where they were also not significantly more inclined to vote for the FPÖ anymore.

Overall, other factors in the models proved to have greater relevance for the PTV for parties. Attitudes toward immigration were particularly relevant in 2017. This applied not only to the substantially increased PTV for the FPÖ ($b = 2.91$) but also to the other parties. The ÖVP likewise profited from anti-immigrant sentiments ($b = 1.04$), while for all other parties, a negative attitude toward immigration coincided with lower PTVs. While this result could be explained by the salience of the issue in the 2017 election, a look at the 2019 results shows that the intense polarization over the immigration issue still played a vital role in 2019 and followed the patterns in 2017.

Above all, economic views played a role in preferences for the ÖVP and the SPÖ. Those who had more right-wing economic attitudes were more likely to vote for the ÖVP ($b_{2017} = 1.11$; $b_{2019} = 1.23$), and the reverse was true for the SPÖ ($b_{2017} = -1.17$; $b_{2019} = -1.21$). Left-wing economic views also promoted a Greens preference and did not play a significant role in the PTV for the FPÖ and NEOS in 2017. In 2019, economically more right-wing voters also indicated slightly higher preferences for the FPÖ ($b = 0.39$) and NEOS ($b = 0.64$). Overall, however, economic convictions, i.e., the traditional left-right dimension of the political spectrum, played a much less prominent role than the sociocultural cleavage manifested in immigration attitudes (Kriesi et al., 2008; van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009).

Populist attitudes, i.e., the rejection of compromises, professional politicians, and elites in general—combined with the desire for more political power for *ordinary* citizens—strengthened support for the FPÖ in 2017 ($b = 1.10$). Conversely, these populist attitudes lowered the probability of voting for the SPÖ ($b = -0.92$) and the Greens ($b = -0.53$). The SPÖ was presumably seen as a representative of the established political system by citizens with populist attitudes. Those who were satisfied with current politics

were more likely to express sympathy for the SPÖ. This effect did not occur for the ÖVP, although it had been in government since 1987, mainly with the SPÖ. Here, Sebastian Kurz apparently succeeded in portraying the ÖVP under his leadership as something new rather than a part of the ruling elite in 2017.

The support of populist voters for the populist radical right FPÖ was to be expected. However, this picture shifted in 2019, with those who were more populist expressing a lower PTV for the ÖVP ($b = -2.15$) and the FPÖ ($b = -0.43$). Two explanations are plausible: Those who voted for the FPÖ (or the ÖVP) in 2017 because they were angry at the political establishment felt better represented by the ruling parties in 2019 and were no longer as critical of the political elite—conversely, voters from other parties might have become more critical. It is also likely that parts of the populist electorate turned away from the FPÖ and the ÖVP due to the Ibiza scandal and possibly showed a stronger inclination toward abstaining in 2019.

Individual issue salience also played a certain role. For support of the SPÖ, the economy and welfare state was the most important issue in 2017 and 2019. Those who identified immigration as the most important issue—compared to those mentioning the economy or the welfare state—were more likely to vote ÖVP ($b = 0.36$; not significant) and FPÖ ($b = 0.59$) in 2017. In 2019, the subject was much less likely to be cited as the most important issue (see Figure H.3). However, those who still did so in 2019 leaned very strongly toward the FPÖ ($b = 2.21$). Those who perceived the environment as the most critical issue were more likely to vote Green in 2017 ($b = 1.36$) and 2019 ($b = 1.49$). The difference here: In 2019, the environment was much more salient (Eberl, Huber, & Plescia, 2020).

H.4 Conclusions

Overall, we found that the middle class did not systematically differ from the other strata regarding their party preferences and attitudes. Regarding their political orientation, they were often located between the more polarized lower and upper classes—in some cases, for example, on immigration issues, closer to the lower classes. This is hardly surprising, as Austria's middle class is a heterogeneous group, combining very different

Table H.2. Propensity to vote for parties in the 2017 National Council elections.

Basic model	Propensity to vote in 2017				
	ÖVP	SPÖ	FPÖ	Greens	NEOS
Intercept	5,57*** (0,08)	4,99*** (0,08)	3,02*** (0,08)	3,43*** (0,07)	2,99*** (0,06)
Middle class ^a	0,40 (0,22)	0,47* (0,21)	-0,72*** (0,22)	0,27 (0,20)	0,04 (0,17)
Upper class ^a	0,19 (0,29)	0,30 (0,28)	-0,89** (0,29)	0,51 (0,27)	0,40 (0,23)
Age	0,32 (0,16)	0,18 (0,16)	-0,56*** (0,16)	-0,85*** (0,15)	-0,67*** (0,13)
Gender (female)	0,13 (0,16)	0,36* (0,16)	-1,03*** (0,16)	1,01*** (0,15)	-0,26* (0,13)
Education (> Matura)	-0,24 (0,17)	0,36* (0,16)	-1,63*** (0,17)	1,71*** (0,16)	1,37*** (0,14)
Roman Catholic	1,60*** (0,17)	-0,48** (0,17)	-0,07 (0,17)	-0,51** (0,16)	0,08 (0,14)
Union member	-0,68*** (0,19)	1,42*** (0,18)	-0,29 (0,19)	0,24 (0,17)	-0,57*** (0,15)
Adj. R ²	0,06	0,05	0,09	0,14	0,10
Complete model					
Intercept	5,57*** (0,08)	4,99*** (0,07)	3,02*** (0,07)	3,43*** (0,06)	2,99*** (0,06)
Middle class ^a	0,39 (0,21)	0,43* (0,20)	-0,54** (0,19)	0,16 (0,18)	0,01 (0,17)
Upper class ^a	0,17 (0,28)	0,25 (0,26)	-0,60* (0,25)	0,38 (0,24)	0,32 (0,23)
Attitudes					
Anti-immigration	1,04*** (0,19)	-1,27*** (0,17)	2,91*** (0,16)	-2,72*** (0,16)	-1,11*** (0,15)
Economic right-wing	1,11*** (0,16)	-1,17*** (0,15)	0,02 (0,14)	-0,56*** (0,14)	0,22 (0,13)
Populist attitudes	0,12 (0,18)	-0,92*** (0,16)	1,10*** (0,15)	-0,53*** (0,15)	0,04 (0,14)
Most important issue ^b					
Immigration	0,36 (0,21)	-0,64** (0,20)	0,59** (0,19)	-0,22 (0,18)	-0,17 (0,17)
Environment	-0,32 (0,58)	-0,16 (0,54)	-1,25* (0,51)	1,36** (0,49)	-0,10 (0,47)
Other/none	0,08 (0,20)	-0,39* (0,19)	-0,24 (0,18)	0,22 (0,17)	0,09 (0,16)
Controls					
Political interest	-0,15 (0,19)	-0,30 (0,18)	0,16 (0,17)	-0,36* (0,16)	0,27 (0,15)
Age	0,24 (0,16)	0,23 (0,15)	-0,82*** (0,14)	-0,51*** (0,14)	-0,56*** (0,13)
Gender (female)	0,36* (0,16)	0,12 (0,15)	-0,89*** (0,14)	0,74*** (0,14)	-0,25 (0,13)
Education (> Matura)	0,04 (0,18)	-0,11 (0,17)	-0,30 (0,16)	0,75*** (0,15)	0,91*** (0,15)
Roman Catholic	1,45*** (0,17)	-0,36* (0,16)	-0,23 (0,15)	-0,31* (0,14)	0,17 (0,14)
Union member	-0,44* (0,18)	1,10*** (0,17)	0,09 (0,16)	-0,09 (0,15)	-0,66*** (0,15)
Adj. R ²	0,11	0,15	0,34	0,33	0,14
N	1696	1696	1696	1696	1696

*** p < 0,001; ** p < 0,01; * p < 0,05

^a The base category is the lower-income class.^b The base category is the "Economy and welfare state" issue.

Table H.3. Propensity to vote for parties in the 2019 National Council elections.

Basic model	Propensity to vote in 2019				
	ÖVP	SPÖ	FPÖ	Greens	NEOS
Intercept	4,43*** (0,08)	4,08*** (0,08)	3,37*** (0,09)	3,41*** (0,08)	3,36*** (0,07)
Middle class ^a	0,66** (0,22)	0,39 (0,21)	-0,17 (0,23)	0,35 (0,20)	0,69*** (0,18)
Upper class ^a	0,87** (0,30)	0,47 (0,29)	-0,49 (0,31)	0,25 (0,28)	1,08*** (0,25)
Age	0,39* (0,17)	-0,10 (0,17)	-0,38* (0,18)	-0,60*** (0,16)	-0,75*** (0,14)
Gender (female)	-0,38* (0,17)	0,22 (0,16)	-0,49** (0,18)	0,42** (0,16)	-0,28* (0,14)
Education (> <i>Matura</i>)	-0,11 (0,18)	0,51** (0,17)	-1,55*** (0,19)	1,78*** (0,17)	1,45*** (0,15)
Roman Catholic	1,22*** (0,17)	-0,26 (0,16)	0,16 (0,17)	-0,13 (0,16)	0,36** (0,14)
Union member	-0,77*** (0,19)	1,20*** (0,18)	0,07 (0,19)	-0,17 (0,17)	-0,45** (0,15)
Adj. R^2	0,04	0,03	0,04	0,07	0,09
Complete model					
Intercept	4,43*** (0,07)	4,08*** (0,07)	3,37*** (0,07)	3,41*** (0,06)	3,36*** (0,06)
Middle class ^a	0,47* (0,20)	0,44* (0,18)	-0,20 (0,18)	0,33* (0,16)	0,58*** (0,17)
Upper class ^a	0,60* (0,27)	0,34 (0,26)	-0,21 (0,26)	-0,14 (0,22)	0,64** (0,23)
Attitudes					
Anti-immigration	2,01*** (0,17)	-2,66*** (0,16)	3,83*** (0,16)	-3,65*** (0,14)	-1,93*** (0,15)
Economic right-wing	1,23*** (0,16)	-1,21*** (0,15)	0,39** (0,15)	-0,71*** (0,13)	0,64*** (0,14)
Populist attitudes	-2,15*** (0,16)	0,11 (0,15)	-0,43** (0,15)	0,03 (0,13)	-0,38** (0,14)
Most important issue ^b					
Immigration	-0,28 (0,26)	-1,45*** (0,24)	2,21*** (0,24)	-0,38 (0,21)	-0,50* (0,22)
Environment	-0,90*** (0,20)	-0,21 (0,19)	-0,73*** (0,19)	1,49*** (0,17)	0,44* (0,17)
Other/none	-0,22 (0,20)	-0,55** (0,19)	0,68*** (0,19)	-0,14 (0,17)	0,09 (0,17)
Controls					
Political interest	-0,17 (0,17)	0,50** (0,16)	0,25 (0,16)	0,58*** (0,14)	0,38* (0,15)
Age	0,41* (0,16)	0,04 (0,15)	-0,84*** (0,15)	-0,21 (0,13)	-0,46*** (0,14)
Gender (female)	-0,18 (0,16)	0,04 (0,15)	-0,13 (0,15)	0,31* (0,13)	-0,22 (0,13)
Education (> <i>Matura</i>)	-0,03 (0,17)	-0,08 (0,16)	-0,66*** (0,16)	0,79*** (0,14)	0,74*** (0,14)
Roman Catholic	1,03*** (0,15)	-0,26 (0,14)	0,16 (0,14)	-0,09 (0,12)	0,33* (0,13)
Union member	-0,70*** (0,17)	1,11*** (0,16)	0,03 (0,16)	-0,14 (0,14)	-0,33* (0,14)
Adj. R^2	0,22	0,25	0,37	0,43	0,22
<i>N</i>	1979	1979	1979	1979	1979

*** $p < 0,001$; ** $p < 0,01$; * $p < 0,05$ ^a The base category is the lower-income class.^b The base category is the "Economy and welfare state" issue.

occupational groups and interests, from skilled workers to young academics or small business owners to executives (Dallinger, 2018; Oesch, 2006). Therefore, it does not have an entirely different political profile compared to other strata. On the contrary, middle-class members remain capable of joining cross-class coalitions with the upper and lower-income strata, depending on their interests (Dallinger, 2018).

The PTV models showed that some of the well-known cleavages (Kritzinger et al., 2013; Weißels, 2019) were still reflected in the Austrian electorate in 2017 and 2019. Religious affiliation is still important in voting for the ÖVP, while unionized workers still lean toward the SPÖ. Education was a significant division for the parties that established themselves around a new line of conflict on values and sociocultural issues (Dolezal, 2010; Stubager, 2010). The income-based class affiliation was of lesser importance. Above all, it was found that the lower strata exhibited a higher PTV for the FPÖ (significant only in 2017). These results also somewhat support the thesis of modernization or globalization losers as core voters of populist radical right parties (Kriesi et al., 2008; Rippl & Seipel, 2018). However, in line with previous findings (e.g., Aichholzer et al., 2014; Gründl & Aichholzer, 2020; Oesch, 2008), attitudes toward immigration, and in 2017 also populist attitudes, had a more substantial impact on support for the FPÖ than social structure.

Quite generally, issues—especially immigration and environmental issues—had greater significance than the social structure. Indeed, the 2017 election results can be explained much better by attitudes toward immigration and, more generally, by the issue's salience than by class affiliation. Voters—especially those belonging to the middle class—did not obviously move to the right on immigration in the 2017 election. Instead, the importance of the immigration issue jumped compared to 2013, also among the middle class. Due to the issue's salience, preferences on migration issues may have had greater importance for electoral decisions. Given the election results, the FPÖ and the ÖVP seem to have benefited from this. For the FPÖ, immigration has long been a core issue. At the same time, the ÖVP, under its new leader Sebastian Kurz, seems to have been able to also credibly appeal to voters critical of immigration (see also Plescia et al., 2020). Conversely, openness to immigration increased the PTV for other parties.

In 2019, issues relating to the economy and the welfare state were again most often named as the most crucial topics—a return to normality in some regard. However, for the

first time, the environment was now also at the top of numerous voters' agendas (see also Eberl, Huber, & Plescia, 2020). The Greens benefitted and could successfully re-enter the National Council and eventually become part of the new government. Nevertheless, even though the issue agenda changed, voters and parties remained polarized about immigration, with similar but even more pronounced patterns than in 2017.

In addition to these issues, populist beliefs were also a significant factor for party preferences in the 2017 election. People who perceived the political elites as out of touch and treacherous were more likely to vote for the FPÖ. In 2019, this could no longer be observed. Also taking sociostructural differences and other ideological beliefs into account, higher populist attitudes even harmed the PTV for the FPÖ and the ÖVP. Higher satisfaction with the ruling ÖVP/FPÖ coalition among voters who had previously expressed rather populist views might explain this change. However, after the government fell apart due to the Ibiza scandal and snap elections were called, heightened populist attitudes were detectable across all income strata. Moreover, since the FPÖ caused the scandal, some populist voters might have been particularly fed up with the party.

Linked to these findings, but also in general, the tendency to abstain from voting would be an interesting question from the social class perspective. However, it was not the fourth paper's focus. It is also important to note that this contribution defined the middle class based on income. Divergent definitions (e.g., by education or occupational activity; Niehues, 2018) could lead to different results.

In summary, our paper confirmed key assumptions of electoral research. Social class or belonging to certain strata was not very influential for party preferences. The electorate has become volatile, and other sociostructural factors and new divisions had greater importance. Overall, the middle class describes a very heterogeneous group without explicit group-specific political preferences. Nevertheless, it will continue to be an essential factor in political debate—as a contested term, buzzword, and target audience for political messages. Those who claim to make politics for the middle want to signal that they are making politics for the majority of the people. And since the middle class not only comprises a large part of the population but an even larger part feels like a part of it, a vast number of voters potentially feel addressed by appeals to the middle.

Abstracts

English Abstract

The global rise of populists has sparked interest in the causes and consequences of populism. However, only recently, political science also has begun to address populist beliefs among regular citizens. My dissertation contributes to this emerging strand of research. The guiding questions are: What determines populist attitudes among citizens, and how do they affect political behavior and sentiments?

This paper-based thesis consists of four research papers that follow the ideational approach toward populism. Thus, populism is defined as a minimal set of ideas: people centrism, anti-elitism, a demand for unrestricted popular sovereignty, and a Manichean view of politics. In my *first article*, I studied a likely source for populist beliefs—populist communication on social media. The paper made a methodological contribution by developing a dictionary-based measurement of populist messages in text. In *paper two*, I studied the role of populist beliefs in developing angry feelings toward politics. The *third paper* focused on the role of individual psychological differences for developing populist attitudes, radical right beliefs, and then also supporting populist right-wing parties. My *fourth paper* dealt with populist beliefs and their role for party support vis-a-vis other important socioeconomic and issue-based explanations.

Methodologically, the papers used different data sources—foremost survey data from the Austrian National Election Study and social media content by Austrian, German, and Swiss parties. In analyzing the data, various quantitative techniques were employed: from automated content analysis, over multi-variate regression models, to more complex structural equation modeling and panel analysis.

With this dissertation, I underline a strength of the ideational approach: its versatility. The same minimal set of ideas informs the classification of parties, the measurement of populist communication, and populist beliefs among the electorate. Although certain parties heavily rely on populist messages on social media, the reception of such content was not clearly linked to populist attitudes. Psychological differences in the need to avoid uncertainty had an ambiguous relationship with populist attitudes. Nevertheless, such beliefs play some role in voting for populists, although immigration issues appeared more consequential. Finally, populist attitudes are crucial in evoking anger about politics among citizens and could, therefore, play an essential role in mobilizing voters.

German Abstract

Der weltweite Aufstieg von Populist*innen hat starkes Interesse an den Ursachen und Folgen von Populismus hervorgerufen. Doch erst seit kurzem beschäftigt sich die Politikwissenschaft auch mit populistischen Überzeugungen bei Wähler*innen. Meine Dissertation trägt zu diesem wachsenden Forschungsfeld bei. Die leitenden Fragen lauten: Was verursacht populistische Einstellungen unter Bürger*innen und wie beeinflussen sie politisches Handeln und Denken?

Diese kumulative Dissertation besteht aus vier Papieren, die dem ideellen Ansatz zu Populismus folgen. Populismus wird darin über einige wenige Ideen definiert: Volkszentrismus, Anti-Elitismus, die Forderung nach uneingeschränkter Volkssouveränität und eine manichäische Sichtweise auf die Politik. In meinem *ersten Artikel* untersuche ich eine mögliche Quelle für populistische Überzeugungen – populistische Kommunikation in sozialen Medien. Das Paper leistet einen methodologischen Beitrag, indem es eine wörterbuchbasierte Messung populistischer Botschaften in Texten entwickelt. In *Beitrag zwei* untersuche ich die Rolle von populistischen Überzeugungen beim Entstehen von Wut auf die Politik. Das *dritte Paper* beschäftigt sich mit der Rolle individueller psychologischer Unterschiede für die Entwicklung populistischer und rechtsradikaler Überzeugungen und für die Unterstützung rechtspopulistischer Parteien. Der *vierte Beitrag* befasst sich mit populistischen Überzeugungen und ihrer Bedeutung für die Wahlentscheidung im Vergleich zu anderen relevanten sozioökonomischen und themenbasierten Erklärungen.

Methodisch nutzten die vier quantitativen Papiere unterschiedliche Datenquellen – vor allem Umfragen aus der Österreichischen Nationalen Wahlstudie und Social-Media-Inhalte von österreichischen, deutschen und Schweizer Parteien. Bei der Datenanalyse wurden verschiedene Verfahren eingesetzt: von der automatisierten Inhaltsanalyse über multivariate Regressionsmodelle bis hin zu komplexeren Strukturgleichungsmodellen und Panel-Analysen.

Diese Dissertation hat eine Stärke des ideellen Ansatzes unterstrichen: seine Vielseitigkeit. Die gleiche Definition wird für Parteien, populistische Kommunikation und populistische Überzeugungen in der Wähler*innenschaft herangezogen. Obwohl populistische Botschaften von einigen Parteien auf Social Media stark verbreitet werden,

hat sich kein klarer Zusammenhang zwischen dem Konsum dieser Botschaften und populistischen Überzeugungen gezeigt. Psychologische Unterschiede im Bedürfnis, Unsicherheit zu vermeiden, wiesen einen ambivalenten Zusammenhang mit populistischen Einstellungen auf. Bei der Wahl von populistischen Parteien spielen entsprechende Überzeugungen eine Rolle; wichtiger waren aber noch Themen wie Immigration. Populistische Einstellungen sind jedoch entscheidend dafür, wie verärgert Bürger*innen über die Politik sind. Darüber könnten sie auch eine wesentliche Rolle bei der Mobilisierung von Wähler*innen spielen.