



universität
wien

MASTER THESIS

Titel der Master Thesis / Title of the Master's Thesis

**„Political Competition and Nationalistic
Sentiments:
The Breakup of the Swedish-Norwegian Union.“**

verfasst von / submitted by
Gustav Fauskanger Pedersen

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of

Master of Advanced International Studies (M.A.I.S.)

Wien 2020 / Vienna 2020

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt
Postgraduate programme code as it appears on the
student record sheet:

A 992 940

Universitätslehrgang lt. Studienblatt
Postgraduate programme as it appears on the
student record sheet:

Internationale Studien / International Studies

Betreut von / Supervisor:

Professor Thomas Row



diplomatische
akademie **wien**
Vienna School of International Studies
École des Hautes Études Internationales de Vienne

Abstract:

This thesis examines the processes of state and nation building and emerging nationalistic sentiments that led to the breakup of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905. This was the culmination of a 91-year-long process of power-struggles, state and nation building, and democratisation, which had started in full after the affirmation of a Norwegian constitution in 1814. These 91 years saw the Norwegian political sphere grow, as it simultaneously built national institutions in order for the state to function independently from Sweden. This included processes of developing political, economic, and cultural independence, before finally, achieving full-fledged independence in 1905. Throughout this period, the public sphere also became increasingly pro-independence, mainly due to the influence by the academic and literary elites, as well as the general political consensus. The cultural, economic, and political sectors of society gradually aligned behind the idea of Norwegian independence, largely due to the efforts of the elites to garner popular support in order to legitimise their ambitions. This thesis examines a wide variety of theories developed over the last few centuries on state and nation building and nationalism, and relates them to the case study of Norway. These include, but are not limited to Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner's theories on nations and nationalism, Charles Tilly's ideas on the state and state-formation, and Max Weber's thoughts on legitimacy and power-relations. In applying these theories to the case of the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union, the complexities and historical backgrounds behind secession and independence movements are highlighted, and the insufficiencies of individual theories to explain such a complex issue becomes evident. This is of significant importance at a time when regionalism, nationalism, and secession movements challenge the established order both in Europe and beyond.

Abstrakt:

Diese Masterarbeit untersucht die Prozesse des Aufbaus von Staaten und Nationen und die entstehenden nationalistischen Gefühle, die 1905 zum Zerfall der Schwedisch-Norwegischen Union führten. Dies war der Höhepunkt eines 91-jährigen Prozesses der Machtkämpfe, des Aufbaus von Staaten und Nationen, und Demokratie, die nach der Bestätigung einer norwegischen Verfassung im Jahr 1814 vollständig begonnen hatte. In diesen 91 Jahren wuchs die norwegische politische Sphäre, indem sie gleichzeitig nationale Institutionen aufbaute, damit der Staat unabhängig von Schweden funktionieren konnte. Dies beinhaltete Prozesse zur Entwicklung der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Unabhängigkeit, bevor 1905 endgültig die Unabhängigkeit erreicht wurde. Während dieser Zeit wurde auch die Öffentlichkeit zunehmend unabhängig, hauptsächlich aufgrund des Einflusses der akademischen und literarischen Eliten als allgemeiner politischer Konsens. Der kulturelle, wirtschaftliche und politische Sektor der Gesellschaft schloss sich allmählich der Idee der norwegischen Unabhängigkeit an, hauptsächlich aufgrund der Bemühungen der Eliten, die Unterstützung der Bevölkerung zu sammeln, um ihre Ambitionen zu legitimieren. Diese Arbeit untersucht eine Vielzahl von Theorien, die in den letzten Jahrhunderten zum Aufbau von Staaten und Nationen und zum Nationalismus entwickelt wurden, und bezieht sie auf die Fallstudie von Norwegen. Dazu gehören unter anderem die Theorien von Benedict Anderson und Ernest Gellner zu Nationen und Nationalismus, Charles Tillys Ideen zu Staat und Staatsbildung sowie Max Webers Gedanken zu Legitimität und Machtverhältnissen. Bei der Anwendung dieser Theorien auf den Fall der Auflösung der Schwedisch-Norwegischen Union werden die Komplexität und die historischen Hintergründe der Sezession und Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen hervorgehoben, und die Unzulänglichkeiten einzelner Theorien zur Erklärung eines solch komplexen Problems werden deutlich. Dies ist von erheblicher Bedeutung in einer Zeit, in der Regionalismus, Nationalismus und Sezessionsbewegungen die etablierte Ordnung sowohl in Europa als auch darüber hinaus infrage stellen.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
I: Theoretical framework	6
II: Setting the Stage	24
III: 1814: The birth of a nation?	31
Two Princes	35
Two Constitutions	41
Two Armies	46
IV: 1814-1905: Building a Nation State	49
Freedom of religion, assembly, and the press	51
Parliamentarians and power: developing a democracy	58
A symbolic day	64
Poets and academics	68
Building a sovereign state	74
V: The Year 1905	80
Economic Independence	82
Political Independence	84
Against the enemies of the realm	88
Kingmaking	91
Conclusion	92
Bibliography	96
Appendices	101
Pledge of Honesty	109

A Note on Text and Terminology

The majority of the theoretical discussion presented in this thesis is based on the most excellent work “Country, Power, and Feelings: State and Nation Building” (Original title in Norwegian: “Land, Makt og Følelser: Stats- og Nasjonsbygging”) by the highly esteemed Norwegian social scientist and historian Frank Aarebrot together with Kjetil Evjen. Aarebrot and Evjen’s book is an expansive study on the history of the concept of state-and nation building, ranging back to ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, and moving into modern times. The book delves into the concept of state and nation building, aiming to explain why people cannot live in peace within the same territory. It covers the entirety of the history of civilisation, and thoroughly explains the many theories and philosophical thoughts surrounding the topics of state and nation building, nationalism, and centre-periphery relations, just to name a few. Although it may not be the highest authority on these matters internationally, it certainly stands out as the highest Norwegian authority on these topics. As it takes into account theories and examples that might be left out of other such sources, it certainly is a valuable asset to the present discussion. Furthermore, as this thesis is intended as a case study of nationalism, power-struggles, and state formation in Norway from 1814-1905, it makes sense to apply a source that is, although impartial and universal, written from a Norwegian perspective, by Norwegian academics. This is one of many Norwegian sources I will be using throughout this thesis.

A second source written by Frank Aarebrot will also be heavily featured throughout this thesis. In essence these two sources form the narrative and the theoretical frameworks applied here. The first is the aforementioned “Country, Power, and Feelings: State and Nation Building”, and the second is titled “200 Years in 200 Pages: A Cavalcade over Norwegian History After 1814” (Original title in Norwegian: “200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814”) This source, as the title might imply, is far less academic than the former one, but this does not mean that it is valueless. The book is based on a lecture that Frank Aarebrot held in 2014, on the 200 year anniversary of 1814, titled “200 Years in 200

Minutes”. This is in many ways a summary, or a culmination of the thoughts, opinions, and conclusions that Aarebrot developed in his career. As Aarebrot was, especially towards the end of his life, undoubtedly the highest authority on matters of modern history and political science in Norway (the vacuum after his passing is still evident in the public sphere) I find it an apt source to use as a form of narrative framework. It is not a very expansive study at all, being only 200 pages, and it is somewhat akin to popular history, but it makes efficient points and observations, which allows for further sources to fill in the gaps that this source leaves.

It must also be noted that some sources have been chosen mainly for sentimental reasons, specifically *Norsk Litteraturhistorie for Gymnaset* by Johannes Andreasson Dale, which is chosen as the main source for the segment on poets and academics’ influence on the Norwegian nationalistic sentiments, solely because the book in question used to belong to my late grandfather. However, this does not impede on the quality of the sources, no source has been chosen for sentimental reasons if it was not also fitting for the discussion.

The use of both primary and secondary sources in both Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and English, might cause some confusion, especially with terminology. Hence, a short note on the different terminology is necessary, in order to explain some choices that have been made in regards to names of people and concepts. The translation of words and concepts from other languages into English might cause difficulties. “Embetsmenn” is translated to titled officials, but at times referred to as Embetsmen. They were those who had passed an official “embet” exam, meaning they were civil servants or members of the clergy generally. “Odelsbønder” are generally referred to as freeholders or farmers. They were farmers who owned land, not just any person who had farming as a profession. When the farmers parliament is mentioned, this was composed of farmers who owned land. Regarding names of people and places I have simply made choices to make it as simple as possible to read in English. Kristian Fredrik becomes Christian Frederick, Karl Johan becomes Carl John, etc. Carl John is referred to by two names, Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, and Carl John as he changed his name after arriving in Sweden, however, with few

exceptions he is simply referred to here as Carl John. Most names, however, are left with the spelling that was used in the first source in which I encountered them.

Otherwise, names of places are generally the same as they were at the time of which I am writing; Christiania had not yet been renamed Oslo, for instance. Generally the choices in names are intended to be simple and sensible.

Introduction

“If one thinks of a nation as an individual, then the past becomes its childhood memories ... this does not mean that a nation, with stagnation and an unwise attachment to the old, should protect the past and its memories; it is rather by continuously developing and enriching what is received, without losing its origin out of sight, that the descendants can properly honour the memories of the forefathers, which have brought the rich heritage of the past.”

- Henrik Ibsen¹

The year 1814 caused ripples throughout Norwegian history, and the events of that year still follow Norwegians to this day. It was in 1814 that a common understanding of what it was to be Norwegian began to emerge, and some have pinpointed 1814 as the birth year of the Norwegian nation.² Here will be argued that 1814, the year of the conception of the Swedish-Norwegian Union, was also the beginning of the long road towards the dissolution of this same union, and the establishment of Norway as a fully independent nation state. The title of this thesis refers to the definite end of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905, but when talking about the dissolution of this union, this inevitably encapsules a longer process of democratisation, state and nation building, power-struggles, and emerging nationalistic sentiments in the country. This process, as shall be argued here, started in 1814 with the Norwegians led by the Danish prince Christian Frederick, rebelling against the Treaty of Kiel, which stated that Norway should be ceded from Denmark to Sweden, after the Danish-Norwegian Union had been on the losing side in the Napoleonic wars. This rebellion led to the drafting of a Norwegian constitution, which became a catalyst for these developments, which saw their culmination with the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905.

¹ Original quote: “Tænker man sig en Nation som Individ, saa bliver Fortiden dens Barndomserindringer ... Det er ikke herved ment at en Nation ved Stagnation og ufornuftig Fasthængen ved det Gamle skulde værne om Fortiden og dens Minder; det er tvertimot ved stadigen at udvikle og forædle det Modragne, uden nogensinde at tabe dets Udspring af sigte, at Efterkommerne rettlig hædre Erindringen om de Slægter, der have overdraget dem Fortidens rige Arv.” Ibsen, Henrik. *Henrik Ibsens Norske Stilebog fra 1848*. Utg. Gyldendal, Oslo, 1977. P. 29-30

² Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 13

There is little doubt that 1814 was a hugely significant year for the prospect of Norwegian independence, and the foundations for the later breakup of the Swedish-Norwegian Union were laid then, even before the union was properly formed. The Kingdom of Denmark-Norway had sided with Napoleon's France in the Napoleonic wars, and upon their defeat, high-standing Norwegians, as well as the Danish prince Christian Frederick, saw their chance to break out as an independent state. On May 17th 1814, Christian Frederick was elected king of Norway, and he was to rule based on the constitution that was signed that same day. Although Norway shortly thereafter entered, or maybe rather was forced into a union with Sweden, 1814 still clearly marks the beginning of a Norwegian independence movement, as Norway entered the union with Sweden as an independent state, unlike what it had been during the union with Denmark, when it was but a Danish province.

Frank Aarebrot argues that the cradle of Norwegian democracy and independence was located in Eidsvoll in 1814, although admitting that this is a very bombastic way to look at it. However, the Eidsvoll-men, as they are commonly referred to in Norwegian (Eidsvollmennene), did create something significant in 1814, which they concluded on May 17th. Therefore, Aarebrot argues, it is very natural to use Eidsvoll as a starting point when discussing the development of democracy in Norway. However, what transpired in the Eidsvoll-building is only a miniscule part of the history of Norwegian democracy, and it was but a first step towards independence and democracy, the development of which Aarebrot classifies as two "... gigantic projects that were started in 1814."³ Norway declared independence, held a constituent assembly that drafted a liberal constitution and elected a Danish prince as king, fought a short futile war with Sweden, accepted defeat, rewrote the constitution to accommodate a personal union with Sweden and acknowledged the Swedish king as head of state. The outcome of 1814 was very different from what was envisaged at the beginning of the year. Norway was not added to the Swedish realm but retained most of the political framework established by the constituent assembly. Most significantly, Norway was to enjoy full

³ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 17

sovereignty in all domestic questions, including monetary affairs. Foreign policy, however, was to be decided in a Swedish-dominated joint council.⁴

Norwegian independence was, by and large, the result of a long process of both internal and external changes. Historian Ståle Dyrvik, among others, argues that a variation of factors of internal and external nature caused something reminiscent of a revolution in 1814.⁵

The next 91 years were in many ways a period of slow progress towards Norwegian independence, as pro-independence figures from the cultural, academic, and political spheres gradually garnered more and more support from the general population. This effectively constructed an independence-narrative, and a strong nationalistic sentiment among the people. The period from 1814-1905 was a time of immense change both in Norway and in the rest of the world, as Europe was rapidly modernising and the social structures were changing. Norway went from being a Danish province in which the political elite dreamt of an independent country, to leaving the union with Sweden, with an already established constitution and parliamentary system. In these 91 years, a Norwegian cultural sphere gradually emerged, as this had previously been tightly integrated with the Danish one. This was also true for the academic sphere, as Norway had previously not had a university, meaning that Norwegian academics were educated in Copenhagen. Economically, Norway became gradually more independent as well, with the establishment of a national bank, and a sovereign currency. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these 91 years included a process of democratization and political reform, which led Norway to develop a modern parliamentary system even before the breakup of the Swedish-Norwegian Union.

In many ways the union with Sweden was flawed from the start. Hence the title, although referring to the breakup of the union, also encapsulates the entire period 1814-1905, equating the entire duration of The Swedish-Norwegian union, and the development of the Norwegian independence movement. A short war was fought between the two countries in 1814, and in 1905, when a referendum was held

⁴ Eitheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 47

⁵ Dyrvik, Ståle, et al. *Aschehougs Norgeshistorie*. H. Aschehoug & Co, 2007. P. 107-181

to confirm popular support for independence, the two countries were ready to go to war again. In essence the dynamic between the two countries was largely unchanged, and therefore it is seemingly impossible to talk about the process of Norwegian state and nation building, and the breakup of the union, without starting at the very latest in 1814.

In this thesis I intend to look into the nature of Norwegian state and nation building, and the development of Nationalistic sentiments in Norway. I will attempt to answer the following questions: How did the Norwegians go from creating a constitution in 1814, over which they fought, and lost, a war with Sweden, to seceding from the newly formed union 91 years after? What were the relevant factors that caused 99.95% of Norwegian voters to vote in favour of dissolving the union with Sweden in 1905? To what degree was Norwegian independence a result of a process of state and nation building, spearheaded and constructed by the different elites in the country? How is the case of Norway relevant for the study of nationalism, regionalism, and secessionism?

In answering these questions, both long term and short term causes of the Norwegian secession from Sweden will be highlighted, and so will the processes and sentiments that lead to ideas of secessionism. At a time when Europe is torn by nationalism, regionalism, and secessionism, with cases such as Catalonia, Scotland, Flanders, and Brexit, I believe the case of Norway to be of value for understanding the causes of such issues. In answering why the Norwegian voters so overwhelmingly rejected the union, I hope to cast a light on similar cases, both in Europe and beyond. In essence, this thesis is a case study of state and nation building and nationalism. By applying a variety of theories and philosophical thoughts developed over the last few centuries, I hope to make a contribution to the fields of political science, comparative politics, and history alike, by adding to the discussion the relatively rarely discussed case of Norway. As a case study, the separation of Norway from Sweden is incredibly useful for understanding processes of state and nation building and the development of nationalistic sentiments, particularly because of the vast popular support Norwegian independence had in 1905.

The centre argument presented here, is the notion that the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union was the result of a process of state building and a consistent build-up of nationalistic sentiments which were rooted in the Norwegian rebellion against the treaty of Kiel in 1814. Furthermore, it will be argued that no single theory or explanation can sufficiently explain these processes, but rather it will demonstrate the necessity of applying a variety of different theories in order to get the full picture of how such events transpire. In order to demonstrate this, the thesis is divided into five main chapters. The first one is a philosophical discussion of the many theories of state and nation formation and nationalism that will be applied here. Secondly, a short chapter has been dedicated to the leadup to the events of 1814. In the third chapter the beginning of the developments that let Norway become an independent state is determined, and the foundation of these developments is identified. In the fourth chapter, the process of development towards modernisation, democratization, and independence are explored, through focusing on the different aspects of these processes. In the fifth and final chapter, the conclusion of the developments that allowed for Norway to become an independent state is explained.

I: Theoretical framework

When conducting any study on the topics of nationalism, state-formation, and power-struggles, a series of theories developed over the last few centuries, although mainly within the last one hundred years or so, become relevant. These theories vary in their applicability to the present study regarding state and nation building and the breakup of the Swedish-Norwegian Union. However, for a comprehensible understanding of the theories behind the matter it is not sensible to dwell on one specific theoretical framework, but rather conduct a more philosophical approach to the field of study as a whole. Hence, a discussion of several of the main ideas and theories regarding state and nation building will be conducted. This includes discussions of theories on centre-periphery relations, the legitimacy of governments and rulers, power-relations, economic and cultural interests, and nationalistic sentiments. This discussion will include prominent names within the fields of political science, history, and comparative politics, both in Norway, where many of the sources used here are written, and internationally. These include, but are not limited to, Stein Rokkan, Daniel Lerner, Max Weber, Charles Tilly, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, as well as some less recent voices in the field, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Ibn Khaldun.

In the 1300's, the historian and statesman Ibn Khaldun theorised that within a territory, a territorial dynamic involving a centre and a periphery is bound to emerge. The centre is, according to Khaldun, bound to develop a large degree of wealth through taxation and trade. Within this centre, power is centralised and culture grows. Outside of this centre is the periphery, where the population has less wealth and largely funds the centre through hard labour and paying taxes. Ibn Khaldun theorised a circulating dynamic in which the periphery every few generations overtakes the centre or forces it to change.⁶ Although Khaldun's theory on the relation between the centre and the periphery within a territory may seem outdated and simplistic to a modern student of the topic of power-struggles within a state, or

⁶ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 18-19

territory, there certainly is some truth to it, and especially in the present case study, peripheral, or less well-off challengers threaten the centre repeatedly. This centre-periphery faultline is intended by Khaldun to be taken literally, and it talks about a territorial centre and periphery, however, it might be just as sensible to apply it to a case of political centre-periphery relations.

The philosopher, sociologist, and social scientist Stein Rokkan was responsible for founding the subject of comparative politics in Norway, and he is generally considered to have been a central founder of the subject in Europe. One of his areas of expertise was the subject of state and nation-building, in which he differed from many of his colleagues in his ideas, in that he put more value in historical processes for the purpose of enlightening social and societal structures. He theorised that power is a constant but the values on which this power rests vary. Furthermore, he stated that understanding the function of the centre, or the central power, is a vital step in understanding societal cleavages. He also argued that there are three central concepts to take into consideration in relation to the understanding of territorialism, namely culture, power, and economy. These are, according to Rokkan, the three areas that are the very essence of politics, as it is within these areas people attempt to make changes.⁷ These are all three within one of two axes in Rokkan's theoretical model, namely the functional axis, with the second axis being called the territorial axis, which ranges from the centre to the periphery. Rokkan uses this theoretical framework to explain territorial structures and their functions, which are importantly man-made and possible to change.⁸

Daniel Lerner's theory of modernisation, from his study "The Passing of Traditional Society" builds on Rokkan's theories by stating that technological development leads the periphery and centre to be closer together, at least territorially, as the travel-time from point A to point B is reduced, and societal differences disappear. This allows for closer ties from the periphery to the centre, but it also allows for stricter control of the periphery for the centre, hence the significance of

⁷ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 27-29

⁸ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 30-32

territory is pivotal.⁹ Thus we are left with a notion that territory itself is a central factor, and development within said territory is what drives both state and nation building, or at least the building of institutions, and it is what dictates the nature of societal cleavages. These developments mainly surround economic, cultural, and power-centralisation or consolidation. For the sake of the present case study, these notions are of relevance, as the clearly defined territory of Norway was in many ways a peripheral territory of first the Danish-Norwegian Union, and later the Swedish-Norwegian Union, and characteristically proved to oppose the central power. Of course, after the initial revolt against the centre in 1814, a similar dynamic emerged within Norway itself, which makes these ideas regarding territory and political drivers even more interesting.

Another theoretical concept in need of explanation is the concept of legitimacy, or why exactly the inhabitants of a territory should at all let themselves be governed by anyone. What gives a ruler legitimacy to rule? For the philosophers during the enlightenment this was of course a very important topic, as the idea of a ruler governing by the grace of God was becoming less accepted. For instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau looked at political history as a tale of the gradual emergence of oppressive rulers and institutions, limiting humanity's innate need for freedom.¹⁰ The German sociologist Max Weber was very interested in the question of how rulers could legitimize their right to govern, and how and why people accepted being governed. He argued that all people have either symmetrical or asymmetrical relations to one another, with most normal relations being symmetrical. However, relations between someone with authority and power and those without, are asymmetrical. Asymmetrical instances of relations can be between people or institutions, and they can be either economic or cultural. In political settings, asymmetrical relations caused by authority are the most relevant for the present discussion. This is in essence the fact that an authoritative figure or institution can

⁹ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 40-42

¹⁰ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 43

give orders that are followed, solely due to the authority it enjoys. It is based on the legitimacy to give orders, and the ordered subject's duty to comply.¹¹

There are, in essence, two main ways in which the compliance of the subjects in an asymmetrical relation can be ensured: by the use of force, which can make people act independent of, or against their own personal interest, or by enjoying the benefit of legitimate rule when ordering a subject, an example of which being ruling backed by the law. When ruling based on law, the authoritative figure enforcing the law is not the one that has to be legitimised, but rather the law itself.¹² This means that a ruler that is not considered legitimate in one way or another by their subjects, is left with only the option to use force to obtain the compliance of the subjects, which is often an indicator of a totalitarian state. However, in a state where the rule of law is respected, and the ruler rules in compliance with the law, he is legitimised by said law. When 112 men in Eidsvoll named Christian Frederick king and signed a Norwegian Constitution on May 17th 1814, Christian Frederick became regent by law, and the law was legitimized by popular support, albeit only from the Norwegian elite.

Traditional ruling and governance were often hereditary and legitimized by "God". The Feudal system perfectly embodied this, as the nobility enjoyed privileges based on birth and social class, without any other legitimisation being necessary. Titled officials (in Norwegian: embetsmenn) enjoyed legal legitimacy for their heightened position. However the line between titled officials and the nobility was often thin, or even not there at all, as most titled officials came from the nobility. In Norway-Denmark, during the early stages of Norwegian nation-building, this caused an issue, as some were "made noble" through their service to the state, which created tension with those who were hereditarily noble.¹³ Those who believed they deserved their noble title because of their heritage must undoubtedly have felt less special,

¹¹ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 45-49

¹² Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 49-51

¹³ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 57

when someone from what they must have considered the lower classes were lifted to a position equal to their own.

Some gain political power through their charisma, with subjects obeying the leaders orders based on their love or respect for said leader, not the leaders pre-existing legitimacy. Some examples of charismatic leaders winning over subjects may be Adolf Hitler, Vladimir Lenin, Fidel Castro, and others who gained power largely based on their individual persona, which they used in order to consolidate power legitimizing themselves as defenders of the people.¹⁴ Other charismatic leaders who were largely aided by their charismatic abilities in gaining political power are figures like Winston Churchill, Donald Trump, and Jair Bolsonaro. It should be noted that such figures do not need to be universally considered charismatic, but they need to possess the charismatic abilities to convince a sufficient part of the population to approve of their leadership. Two such figures which will be discussed later on are the princes Jean Baptiste Bernadotte and Christian Frederick. The former of these two was charismatic enough to gain support for the development of a new dynasty in Sweden, and the latter managed to convince the Norwegian elite to name him king. Max Weber brings to light the question of whether charismatic governance, or climbing to power based on one's charismatic persona, is a form of governance outright, or rather just a transitional phenomenon when forms of governance alter or regimes change because of a charismatic opposition-leader.¹⁵ The latter of these alternatives seems more likely, as it fits better with the fact that many of these charismatic leaders emerge during, or directly cause huge political shifts, and after these shifts, which may be revolutions, regime-changes, or secession movements, just to name a few, they generally fit into more easily distinguishable styles of governance. After all, measuring charisma is not a very scientific process, but distinguishing the features and style of a specific government or ruler is more straightforward.

¹⁴ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 58-59

¹⁵ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 64

Another concept in need of discussion is the state, the generally acknowledged “birth” of which was in Westphalia in 1648, when the peace treaty signed there ended the 30 years war. It was there established that the ruler decided the religion of his subjects, which served as an international (although the term national might not be appropriate yet) acknowledgement of the supremacy of the ruler over his subjects. However, stating that the concept of the state was actually created, or born, in Westphalia in 1648 only works in the sense of serving as a symbolic “date of birth”, while the entire story of the development of the state started long before, and continued long thereafter.¹⁶ Several other peace treaties between the 1500’s and 1800’s helped strengthen the authority of those who controlled territories, which aided in the formalisation of the modern state’s territorial dominance. But in Westphalia, the sheer amount of represented territories present made it so the signatories of the peace treaty acknowledged one another as states in an international state system. Hence, by the definition from Westphalia, a state was any party with which a formal peace treaty could be agreed on following a war.¹⁷ Of course this is not what the definition of a state, or a nation state would be today, but it is nevertheless an important step towards the modern state, as it stopped the Habsburg dominance in the European state system, and it allowed for the centralisation of power in individual territories, which allowed for what we can describe as a monopoly of violence within a state.

Max Weber theorised that the definition of a state is when a community within a territory successfully establishes and maintains a legitimate monopoly on violence.¹⁸ This, in essence, means that a territory is only a state if the central power maintains a monopoly on the use of violence, meaning the right to enforce one’s will on the subjects through punishment, or the threat thereof, which necessitates authority derived from a central power, which benefits from legitimacy. In a modern, functional state, the police or army may use violence, but only in line with the law,

¹⁶ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 101

¹⁷ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 102

¹⁸ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 104

which is dictated by lawmakers elected by the people. Hence, in a modern democracy, participants in said democracy allow for the state to have a monopoly on violence. For the monopoly on violence to enjoy legitimacy, the potential subjects of this use of violence must accept the monopoly. In some states, such as Ukraine, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, or Latin American countries struggling with powerful cartels, the monopoly on violence is challenged and therefore becomes at risk of being considered illegitimate. The Mafia in Italy is another example of a challenger to the monopoly on violence.

When looking at the monopoly on violence as a core aspect of the modern state, one can also understand the benefits of appointing titled officials who can direct violence on behalf of, and by the legitimacy of the central power. If a local policeman arrests someone (uses violence) he does not do so by his own authority, but by the authority of his employer, the state. This makes apparent the difficulties a state faces when those who may use violence in a province, or region, disobey the state, and prefer to act in line with a regional authority which also disapproves of the state. When the people of Catalonia made a bid for independence in 2017, the Mossos d'Esquadra, the Catalan regional police force, faced a dilemma regarding which authority to obey, the local one that deemed the referendum on October 1st legal, or the central one that deemed it illegal.¹⁹ Similarly, when the Christiania police force failed to stop the 1829 May 17th celebrations, which will be discussed in depth later, this created an issue for the central authority of the Swedish-Norwegian Union, as their representatives were unable, or unwilling to use the necessary violence to enforce the authority's will, hence weakening the legitimacy of Stockholm's monopoly on violence.

Legal authority, according to Weber, replaced the traditional hereditary authority system, which he describes as a very modern concept, that is mainly found in Europe. This made it harder to challenge the monopoly on violence, which the church or nobility might have done before, creating a more stable rule in the territories where a central power managed to maintain a stable monopoly on

¹⁹ Dettmer, Jamie. *In the Eye of The Storm: Catalonia's Police Debate Whom to Obey*. VOA News, 2017.

violence. Only when such a stable monopoly on violence is established, and rests not with an individual, or group of individuals, but rather with an institution, modern politics can emerge. At that point, politics is no longer about controlling or toppling the monopoly on violence, but rather about controlling the institution where the monopoly resides, which practically means that politics becomes a means with which people can fight to partition power, or influence the partitioning of power.²⁰

Joseph Schumpeter presents a somewhat alternative, yet complimentary view on the emergence of modern states, which he connects to a monopoly on taxation, arguing that when the interests of the ruler and the people coincided, taxes would gladly be paid to the rulers for their endeavours, mainly in relation to warfare. The historian Charles Tilly connects these two monopoly theories, arguing that a synthesis of the monopolies on violence and taxation caused the modern state to emerge. He argued that the many wars in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries caused a desperate need for funds among European rulers, which made them cause the beginning of processes, albeit unintendedly, which gradually allowed for the emergence of the modern state, defined as centralised, differentiated, independent, and containing expansive political institutions.²¹ There was a need to finance the monopoly on violence, which was done through creating a monopoly on taxation, as taxing subjects who believed that paying taxes was in their own interest was far more viable than raiding one's own subjects to finance warfare or other activities that the ruler might like to partake in. These processes, revolving around trade and taxation, caused a societal shift that allowed for individuals who were not noble or royal to gain wealth, diversifying the economic elite.

In the 1800s, the differences in forms of governance within emerging modern states became more important, as a central authority was necessary for a state to be a state, but the required nature of this central authority was not strictly defined. The authority could rest with a traditional ruler, or with a parliament, and as long as the central authority was sovereign, a state could be a state. In 1884, when

²⁰ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 105-106

²¹ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 108

parliamentarism was implemented in Norway, and Johan Sverdrup announced that “all power shall derive from this assembly”, that was essentially pronouncing the Norwegian state as sovereign, based on the aforementioned definition of a sovereign state.²²

Historians have for a long time noted that there is an undoubtable connection between European war-making and state-making, and social scientists have often been inclined to argue that this is a more general connection. Charles Tilly is one of these social scientists, exemplified by his very famous quote: “war made the state and the state made war.”²³ This has been of huge influence on a significant number of scholars, both in European studies, which was the area in which Tilly developed his idea, and beyond. The general idea in Tilly’s account is that higher levels of warfare create more centralized, higher-capacity states which in turn are prone to war, as wars, according to the theory, are good for centralizing state power and institutional capacity building.²⁴ This idea seemingly proclaims that more war inevitably equals more state, although this is not necessarily what is intended by Tilly, as there is far more depth and nuance to his argument than can be condensed in one short sentence. Additionally, later work by Tilly, such as “Coercion, Capital, and European States” develop further arguments on state-formation, stating that many explanations of the topic are flawed because they ignore the fact that the viability of a certain kind of state varies throughout history.²⁵ A more sensible explanation may be that war encourages state formation, rather than accelerates state centralisation.

“Nevertheless, the increasing scale of warfare and the knitting together of the European state system through commercial, military, and diplomatic interaction eventually gave the war-making advantage to those states that could field standing armies; states having access to a combination of large rural populations, capitalists,

²² Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 123

²³ Tilly, Charles, and Gabriel Ardant. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton University Press, 1975. P. 42

²⁴ Spruyt, Hendrik. “War and state Formation: Amending the Bellicist Theory of State Making.” *Does War Make States?: Investigations of Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology*. Cambridge University Press, 2017. P. 73

²⁵ Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*. B. Blackwell, 1992. P. 11

and relatively commercialized economy won out. They set the terms for war, and their form of state became the predominant one in Europe. Eventually European states converged on this form: the national state.”²⁶ This quote from Tilly’s “Coercion, Capital, and European States” may seem on the surface like a continuation of the argument that more war equals more state, but in fact it points out that war was a vital part of the process of state formation in Europe. One form of state became the predominant one, not necessarily because of more war, but because it set the terms of war. The relation between warfare, and setting the terms for war, and state formation is very present in the Norwegian state and nation building from 1814-1905.

Tilly looked at states as all organisations that were not households, family groups, tribes, companies, or religious institutions, but which did practice violence with the intent of ensuring dominance over other organisations within substantial territories. Frank Aarebrot adds to this that these states to which Tilly refers would be more aptly described as proto states, which in his opinion would be all entities that had the potential to become a state.²⁷ Hence all empires, theocracies, city states, or other forms of governance, can develop and become modern states, if they monopolise violence and taxation, and apply this monopoly to a specific territory. Over the last millennium these (proto-) states have reduced in numbers leaving only relatively few national states, or nation states, a development that Charles Tilly argues was caused by four distinct activities that an emerging state partakes in, namely war, state building, protection, and extraction of resources. All of these four involve the organised use of violence from a state, or central authority, and they further the establishment of monopolies on violence and taxation. Additionally, all four equally reinforce one another, in the event that they are successful.²⁸

Tilly’s definitions of these four activities are vital to understand in order to comprehend the idea as a whole. He defines war as eliminating or neutralising rivals

²⁶ Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*. B. Blackwell, 1992. P. 15

²⁷ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 111

²⁸ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 126-127

and competitors residing outside of one's controlled territory. State building he defines as eliminating or neutralising rivals or competitors, such as the nobility or religious institutions within one's controlled territory. Protection he defines as eliminating or neutralising competitors to the state's clients or internal allies, whom the state will wish to protect as long as they accept the monopolies of the state. Finally, extraction of resources he defines as the procurement of the resources necessary to uphold the former three activities, which is done through taxation, the establishment of state-owned mines, or state monopolies on the sale of certain goods. For each of these four, Tilly argues, demand the establishment of independent organisations, like the army and navy, the police force, judicial systems, bureaucracy, and other representative institutions.²⁹ Hence, modern states' bureaucracies were the side-effect of war- and state-making.

Frank Aarebrot argues that the process of state building started with the sole purpose of ensuring the survival of a young state, as they grew in competition with one another, and only those with successful monopolies on violence and taxation managed to survive in the long run. Establishing these monopolies laid the groundwork for the next stage in nation building, namely making the state culturally homogenous, through creating a perceived community through defining a "correct" language, religion, and set of cultural traits. Thereafter followed national consolidation, as the state needed to establish legal and territorial structures, hence the nation was built after the state. Stein Rokkan argues that this creates a series of conflicts between the periphery and the central power in which one of two results is reached: the central power establishes complete domination over the periphery, or the periphery breaks out and creates a new state. Both the nation and the state are built on the central power's terms.³⁰ The most important thing to note here, however, is the fact that the quest for cultural homogeneity leads to the creation of perceived, or imagined communities.

²⁹ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 127-128

³⁰ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 189-190

These perceived communities laid the basis for the nation, the national state, or the nation state. The term nation in and of itself is complicated to define, especially because it is often interchangeably used together with the term state to refer to a country. Here has already been thoroughly explained the term state, however, and the nation is certainly not the same, so what is it then? One explanation might be that whereas the state is defined by the monopolies on violence and taxation, the nation is defined by the monopoly on power within a territory. The nation is also a territory within which people possess a common identity. When these overlap, we have a nation state. Hence, the nation, more so than the state, is about feelings and identity, and the separation of “us” and “them”. Some would argue that the very nature of the nation implies that hatred of one’s neighbouring nations is necessary.³¹ This is not strictly true, although there is some truth in it. In forging a perceived, or imagined community, the hatred of the other, the aforementioned “them”, might be helpful, but not necessary. The exclusion of the other is, however, strictly necessary for anyone trying to define who they are, in relation to others. The argument may be, to put it simply, that “we are us, because we are not them”. In this quest to find oneself, to find the nation, ethnicity often plays a role as well. Many might be inclined to trace the descent of a people, an ethnicity, in order to define who they are. This often involves pin-pointing their forefathers’ geographical origin to create an identity bound to this geographical location. In doing so, common traditions, language, history, and memories might be brought up as commonalities in forming such a national identity.³² When Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson wrote poetry about the medieval kings of Norway, or when Ivar Aasen created a “New Norwegian” language to separate it from Danish, what they essentially did was to search for a national identity that could unite the Norwegian people.³³ Sadly, in the quest to forge a homogenous nation state, forced assimilation, moving of peoples, and in some

³¹ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 257-258

³² Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 259-260

³³ It should be noted that “New Norwegian” (Nynorsk) is more of a separating factor in society today, than a unifying one. It is a centre-periphery faultline, as large parts of the Norwegian periphery writes Nynorsk, while the centre(s), Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, and Trondheim, write mainly Bokmål, a written language that is closer to Danish.

cases genocide, were commonplace especially in the 1800s, and beyond. Before the 1800s this was far less commonplace.³⁴ Back then people found other reasons to kill each other.

There are three main ways to look at what a nation is. Perhaps the simplest one of these is to say that the inhabitants in a state's territory make up the nation. This essentially makes the nation territorial, not emotional or sentimental, and it requires state-run processes of nation building. This definition is problematic, however, as it does not account for what happens when the state's territory shrinks or expands, or when inhabitants leave the territory permanently. A second view might be the aforementioned idea of defining "us" and "them", or rather defining who belongs and who does not. This is also problematic as there is no simple way to choose the criteria that should be defining, and those that should not. If you look closely enough, no two people are similar, and if you look too broadly all people are the same. The third way to look at the nation, which is much more modern, is that the nation is voluntary unity between people. People form a nation because they want to. By this definition, the nation becomes a wholly imagined concept.³⁵ No matter what, however, the nation, unlike the state, is dependent upon the population of an area. The population needs to either agree to stay in an area, agree to act in accordance to the criteria deciding if they belong, or agree to believe in the concept of the nation. If the entirety of the population of a territory decided to either leave, disregard all tradition and heritage, or stop believing in the existence of their nation, the nation would simply no longer exist.

Ernest Renan stated that the nation is a daily referendum amongst its members in which they decide whether they still wish to belong to the nation. This also, according to Renan, entailed that those belonging to a nation had a selective understanding of history, allowing them to focus on the grandeur of common ancestors, rather than issues among their common ancestors.³⁶ When those who

³⁴ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 261

³⁵ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 265-266

³⁶ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 267-268

favoured Norwegian independence in the 1800s brought up history in debates and poetry, they chose to focus on Harald Hairfair's unification of the Norwegian kingdom, not the harsh opposition against this unification, and they focused on Olav Haraldsson's christianisation of the kingdom, not the civil war that came with it. These are both excellent examples of a selective understanding of history, which was strikingly present throughout the search for a Norwegian national identity. With the nation, and national identity however, comes nationalism.

Making sense of the term Nationalism isn't easy, as it has many sides and interpretations, both as a theoretical term, and a historical ideology. However, the idea of national sovereignty is ever-present and certainly central in most or all of these sides and interpretations. Øyvind Østerud defined nationalism as "a doctrine that pronounces that the national entity must be politically independent, that the nation's and the state's borders should align, and that the national community has a parent demand for loyalty."³⁷ One therefore has to look at nationalism in relation to the environment in which it emerges, and in this, historical situations, national and international conflicts, the social buildup of a country, and the country's political system are all pivotal. These all lead nationalistic sentiment in different directions, and therefore nationalism can be the root of both democratisation and liberation movements, as well as suppression or aggression of and against others.³⁸ Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* lays out one of the foremost modernist theories of nationalism, and it establishes a connection between egalitarianism and nationalism. Brendan O'leary summarizes that "Ernest Gellner's writings aimed to explain why nationalism has become the key principle of political legitimacy of our times."³⁹ However, O'Leary also argues that Gellner fails to "...emphasize the mutually reinforcing relationships between nationalism, egalitarianism and democratization..."

³⁷ Translated from "en doktrine som hevder at den nasjonale enhet må være politisk uavhengig, at nasjonenes og statenes grenser bør falle sammen, og at det nasjonale fellesskapet har et overordnet krav på lojalitet" in:

Østerud, Øyvind. *Hva Er Nasjonalisme?* Universitetsforlaget, 1994. P. 28

³⁸ Østerud, Øyvind. *Hva Er Nasjonalisme?* Universitetsforlaget, 1994. P. 60

³⁹ O'Leary, Brendan. *On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism*. British Journal of Political Science 27, no. 2, 1997. P. 192

⁴⁰ Nationalism, according to O’leary, is “the most potent principle of political legitimacy in the modern world ... [it] should be collectively and freely institutionally expressed, and ruled by its co-nationals ... [it] retain[s] the capacity to shake states and empires.”⁴¹ Despite these arguable flaws in Ernest Gellner’s theories, however, he remains a prominent voice in the field of nationalism.

Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism* is a sociological empirical display of a typology of nationalism. It argues that nationalism is an unavoidable component in the process of modernization of a society, and it emerges when a society develops the need of producing and maintaining itself as one definable entity.⁴² Gellner claims that the cultures that nationalism supposedly defends and keeps alive are generally inventions, if not modified to a point when it is no longer recognisable from their original forms.⁴³ He then defines nationalism as “... the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases the totality, of the population ... It is the establishment of an anonymous impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomised individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of the previous complex ... But this is the very opposite of what nationalism affirms and what nationalists fervently believe. Nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk culture. Its symbolism is drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants ... There is a certain element of truth in the nationalist self presentation when [they are] ruled by officials of another, an alien high culture, whose oppression must be resisted first by a cultural revival and redfurnation, and eventually by a war of national liberation. If the nationalism prospers it eliminates the alien high culture, but it does not then replace it by the old local low culture; it revives, or invents, a local high (literate, specialist-transmitted) culture of its own,

⁴⁰ O’Leary, Brendan. *On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner’s Writings on Nationalism*. British Journal of Political Science 27, no. 2, 1997. P. 191

⁴¹ O’Leary, Brendan. *On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner’s Writings on Nationalism*. British Journal of Political Science 27, no. 2, 1997. P. 191

⁴² Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Cornell University Press, 1983. P. 39-43

⁴³ Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Cornell University Press, 1983. P. 56

though admittedly one which will have some links with the earlier local folk styles and dialects.”⁴⁴

Gellner is very concerned with the culture, or perceived culture, that a group of people tries to defend or keep alive in the face of an “other”. He also states that this becomes a relevant factor as society is modernising, Max Weber also agrees with this notion, as he presents the nation as a common culture,⁴⁵ hence making nationalism a doctrine defending this culture. Both Gellner and Weber agree, however, that this culture, and the community that embodies the culture, are to some degree made up, or imagined.

Similarly to this, Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* reaches a conclusion stating that modern nationalism, in its essence, only appears where there is the possibility of production of written material in a common language. There is an emphasis on the linguistic aspects of nationalism, as well as the cultural and intellectual backing that a “successful” nationalist movement requires. Anderson’s theories, which are laid out in *Imagined Communities*, has been referred to as the one book all students of nationalism should read,⁴⁶ and “one of the major contributions to theories of nations and nationalism.”⁴⁷ Anderson, in the book, defines the nation as an inherently limited and sovereign imagined community, that is more akin to religion than the many other ideological isms, due to the fact that it generally comes across as destiny rather than choice.⁴⁸ Anderson identifies print and capitalism as the main drivers for “imagining new communities” as they could be used as tools that help to define the nation. Hence, European nationalism was predominantly language-based, as philological studies became precursors to political nationalism. As all who spoke a language could be embraced under a nationalist movement, they

⁴⁴ Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Cornell University Press, 1983. P. 57

⁴⁵ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 269

⁴⁶ Davidson, Neil. *Reimagined Communities - A Review of Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. *International Socialism* 117, 2008.

⁴⁷ Cooper, Luke. *The International Relations of the ‘Imagined Community’: Explaining the Late Nineteenth-Century Genesis of the Chinese Nation.*” *Review of International Studies* 41, no. 3, 2015. P. 477.

⁴⁸ Reid, Anthony. *Review: Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. by Benedict Anderson. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol 58, No. 3, 1985. P.497

became very successful.⁴⁹ Anderson's argument is centred around the fact that towards the end of the 19th century, the development of industry, transport, and communication accelerated exponentially, tying people closer together than ever before. This created ideological parallels, mainly in the form of national ideologies which created imagined communities. Hence, people found that they felt a connection to a social community together with people they had never met, strengthening national identities, and making nationalism a social driving-force, unifying some, but excluding others.

By Anderson's argument, a national community can be based on almost anything as long as the people who make up this imagined community believe in it. The state can then use the education system, media, or institutions to strengthen the common belief in this imagined community, making a stronger nation state.⁵⁰ A weakness with Anderson's reasoning is that there is no precise definition or distinction of what exactly divides one community from another, and that it essentially disregards things like historical or economical differences between communities. It does, however, explain quite a few oddities in the development of the modern world, in regards to how modern nation states formed, with the argument that all nations being imagined by the nationals making at least partial sense.

None of the theories or philosophical thoughts laid out here can be called inherently factual or true, and none of them can be called inherently false or untrue. There is some undeniable truth to each and every one of them, and each and every one of them can be challenged and proven imperfect with specific examples. However, for a study in the fields of nationalism, state-formation, and power-struggles, a thorough assessment of the already developed theories on the matter becomes necessary. Yet, this thesis does not attempt to prove or verify, or for that matter challenge or disprove any of the theories already mentioned. It is rather an independent discussion for which several of these theories bear importance. In order to avoid shoe-horning in a case study to a specific theory, it is far more sensible

⁴⁹ Reid, Anthony. Review: *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. by Benedict Anderson. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol 58, No. 3, 1985. P.498

⁵⁰ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 270-271

to look at all of the aforementioned theories as attempts to understand something that is highly complex and difficult to clearly define and explain. By focusing on one, or just a few of these theories, one would do themselves a huge disservice, as the myriad attempts to define and explain these topics all have some value, albeit none of them are definite or perfect.

II: Setting the Stage

In the words of the highly esteemed late historian and social scientist Frank Aarebrot, the most important task the men who gathered at Eidsvoll in 1814 took upon themselves, as will be discussed in depth later on, was to “... ensure the nation’s independence against the strange and unpredictable land referred to as abroad ...”⁵¹ Additionally, Aarebrot points out that the formation of small states rarely is the result of internal societal changes, stating that “[T]he decisions that allowed for 112 men to author a constitution and elect a king on May 17th 1814 were made in London, St. Petersburg, and Paris.”⁵² These decisions to which Aarebrot refers were of course in relation to the aftermath of the Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars which had harried Europe, and in which the Kingdom of Denmark-Norway had remained neutral until 1807, before joining in on the losing side. Three cities that should undoubtedly be added to Aarebrot’s list are Copenhagen, Stockholm and Kiel, for reasons that will be made apparent presently.

In 1784, Frederick VI was crowned king of Denmark-Norway, to the avail of the many German and Danish aristocrats and ministers who had in essence controlled Copenhagen under Frederick VI’s father, Christian VII, who suffered greatly from mental illness. These ministers and aristocrats had taken full advantage of their influence under Christian VII to obtain personal wealth through manipulating royal contracts, something that the young king Frederick VI strongly opposed, as he set out to modernize politics in Denmark-Norway, by removing monopolies and emancipating farmers, leading him to be considered one of the most liberal regents in Europe at the time.⁵³ However, just after the turn of the century, Frederick VI began claiming more direct power for himself, as well as introducing more restrictions to the media. In many ways he started acting in a manner strikingly resembling 20th century dictators, as he demoted and banished his former advisors, replacing them with military officials. This was largely due to The Battle of Copenhagen in 1801, in which the British Navy led by Lord Nelson dealt significant damage to the

⁵¹ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 17

⁵² Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 9

⁵³ Frydenlund, Bård. *Spillet om Norge: Det Politiske Året 1814*. Gyldendal, 2014. P. 20-22

Danish-Norwegian fleet as well as Copenhagen's defences, gaining the British a quick victory.⁵⁴

The battle of Copenhagen was a result of Denmark-Norway entering a so-called armed neutrality coalition with Russia, Sweden, and Prussia, a neutrality that the British found that Denmark-Norway was breaking by supplying, among other goods, shipbuilding materials to enemy ports. The British therefore began demanding to search Danish-Norwegian trade vessels for contraband, an action that was customary at the time whenever the shipping of illicit goods was suspected, to which Denmark-Norway responded by sending out warships to escort trading vessels, with instructions to use force against anyone attempting to inspect the cargo that the trading vessels carried. This caused two hostile engagements between Danish-Norwegian and British ships, with the results falling mainly in Britain's favour, with Danish-Norwegian ships and crews being captured by the British navy.⁵⁵ As stated in grand nationalistic fervor, although still undoubtedly true, by Alfred T. Mahan on the matter: "Sweden and Denmark were too weak to support their contention against the sea-power of Great Britain."⁵⁶ However, the two nordic powers chose very different paths out of neutrality, which benefited the Swedes far more than the Danish and Norwegians.

When Russia's Tsar Alexander I signed a peace treaty with Napoleon's France in 1807, this put immense pressure on both the Swedes and the British, as both lost an ally in Russia. Britain experienced another power upholding the Continental System, and Sweden was pulled into a two-front war. From 1808-1809 Sweden fought Denmark-Norway in the west, where the Danish prince Christian August dealt significant blows to the Swedish war effort, and they fought Russia in the east, where the Russians quickly took control over Finland from Sweden. This inevitably led to the Swedish king and his family being deposed. An old, childless Karl XIII was briefly king, while the position of crown prince of Sweden was given

⁵⁴ Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain*. Sampson Low, Marston, 1897. P. 92

⁵⁵ Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain*. Sampson Low, Marston, 1897. P. 60

⁵⁶ Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain*. Sampson Low, Marston, 1897. P. 60

to the aforementioned Christian August, who had just beaten the Swedish army in battle and had been a central cause for the end of the former royal house. This series of events must undoubtedly be puzzling to anyone who is not familiar with the intricacies of lines of succession, but it is not the strangest of the monarchical changes that will be touched upon here.

Christian August died shortly after being named crown prince, and the French Field Marshal and former Republican revolutionary Jean Baptiste Bernadotte was offered the throne, which he accepted under the name Carl John, an event that caused a significant shift in Swedish politics, with dominion over Norway becoming a main Swedish aspiration.⁵⁷ A notable piece of information about the later king Carl John is that in Louis-Émile Vanderburch and Ferdinand Langlé's 1833 play "Le Camarade de lit", or in english "The Bedfellow", rumours circulated that he had in his revolutionary years in France gotten tattooed on his torso the motto "Mort aux Rois" ("Death to kings"), or Mort aux tyrans ("Death to tyrants"). In the end the play finally revealed that the tattoo in fact read "Vive la république".⁵⁸ It is very unlikely that the story of this tattoo is in fact true, however, it is a fact that long before becoming crown prince in Sweden, Carl John had written in a letter in 1797 that: "Being a republican both by principle and by conviction, I want to fight all royalists to my death."⁵⁹ More important than this rather amusing change of conviction from the French revolutionary turned king of Sweden and Norway, however, is the foreign policy he would adopt in the later years of the Napoleonic wars, and the role he would later play in the development of Swedish-Norwegian relations.

After the battle of Trafalgar in 1805 had been determinedly won by the Royal British Navy, british eyes fell upon the Danish-Norwegian fleet which was, after the near complete removal of French sea-faring capabilities, the decidedly largest naval force outside of British control. The Great British Empire did not trust Denmark-Norway's neutrality, and on August 16th 1807, the Great British

⁵⁷ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 10-11

⁵⁸ Colburn, Henry. *The Court Journal: Court Circular & Fashionable Gazette, Volumen 5*. Alabaster, Pasemore & sons, Limited, 1833. P. 354

⁵⁹ Skott, Stefan. "Hade Karl XIV en revolutionär tatuering?" *Populär Historia* 6, 1996.

Expeditionary Forces were put ashore in Denmark, and by September 6th, the British had besieged Copenhagen and forced Denmark-Norway to hand over its fleet into British control.⁶⁰ This event is known as “Flåteranet”, translated to The Commandeering of the Fleet, and it constituted a huge loss both for Denmark-Norway, and for Napoleon’s France, although the two were not strictly allied yet. In 1807, the British Navy also occupied the Danish-Norwegian West-Indies,⁶¹ and they captured the Danish-Norwegian colony of Trankebar, in modern day Tamil Nadu, India, both of which they held until 1815.⁶²⁶³ The British had essentially completely incapacitated Denmark-Norway from participating further in the Napoleonic wars, and they had destroyed any hope for Napoleon to challenge Britain at sea. However, they also effectively drove Denmark-Norway into French hands.

The kingdom of Denmark-Norway was in many ways forced into an alliance with Napoleon after the Commandeering of the Fleet. Following these events, the remainder of the Danish-Norwegian fleet that had not been commandeered began harassing and capturing British vessels, aiding in the enforcing of the Continental System. The idea behind the Continental System was to economically cut off Britain from continental Europe, for which the efforts of the Danish-Norwegian navy was vital. This effectively cut off supplies of important goods to Britain, predominantly from Russia, that had used to be shipped through Danish-Norwegian waters.⁶⁴ In response to this, the British Navy enforced a continental blockade from 1807-1814, cutting off Norway from Denmark, which led to many Norwegians having to risk the perilous journey of rowing through the British blockade across the sea to Denmark in search of food, as the then Danish province was not self-sufficient and depended on Danish grain. This is captured excellently in Henrik Ibsen’s famous poem “Terje

⁶⁰ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 9

⁶¹ Holm, Johan. *Nordiske Mønter Efter 1808*. Politikens Forlag. København, 1973. P. 88

⁶² Holm, Johan. *Nordiske Mønter Efter 1808*. Politikens Forlag. København, 1973. P. 102

⁶³ The Danish-Norwegian islands in the West-Indies were sold to the United States some 101 years after being released from British control, and today make up the US Virgin Islands. The Danish-Norwegian colony in Tamil Nadu was sold to the British East India Company in 1845.

⁶⁴ Ryan, A. N. “The Defence of British Trade with the Baltic, 1808–1813.” *The English Historical Review*, LXXIV, no. 292, 1959. P. 444-445

Vigen”, a poem that has carried enormous cultural significance in Norway since it was written in 1862. The story of Terje Vigen is set in a town in southern Norway amidst the Napoleonic Wars, and the story is built around the blockade upheld by the British. The poem describes the highly dramatic story of how Terje Vigen was captured by a young lord when trying to row through the English blockade, and ended up in an English prison. Terje Vigen was on a mission to smuggle food from Denmark back to his starving family in the southern Norwegian town, and upon his release after the Napoleonic Wars had ended, he found that while he had been imprisoned his family had starved to death.⁶⁵ There is much more to the poem, which deals with ethical topics such as revenge and mercy, but its driving factor is unquestionably the matter of the blockade, and the significance the experience of this blockade carried.

*Så lakket og led det til krigens år
i attenhundre og ni.
Ennu går sagn om de trengsels-kår
som folket da stedtes i.
Engelske kryssere stengte hver havn,
i landet var misvekst og nød,
den fattige sultet, den rike led savn,
to kraftige armer var ingen til gavn,
for døren stod sott og død.⁶⁶*

⁶⁵ Moi, Toril. *Henrik Ibsen and the Birth of Modernism: Art, Theater, Philosophy*. Oxford University Press, 2012. P. 175-178

⁶⁶ Ibsen, Henrik. *Terje Vigen ; Brand ; Peer Gynt ; Gengangere*. Utg. Aschehoug. Oslo. 1987. P. 11

In English:

*Thus approached the year of war
in eighteen-hundred and nine.
Tales are still told of how poor
conditions the people were in.
English warships blocked every port,
and on land the crops had failed,
the poor man starved, the rich man went without,
two strong arms would not help out,
as on the doorstep death was about.*⁶⁷

There were many who lived through similar experiences as those described by Ibsen, and one of those who in secret crossed the naval blockade was the young crown prince of Denmark-Norway Christian Frederick. The crown prince had an affinity for Norway from a young age, and he had requested on several occasions that he be sent there. In the spring of 1813 the king allowed it, likely because he wanted to avoid any potential revolts in Norway which was in a very poor economic state due to the war, and many Norwegians questioned the decisions made in Copenhagen, and looked to the much more successful Swedes. Hence Christian Frederick travelled in disguise on a fishing vessel to Norway, in order to avoid being recognised if he was caught by the English blockade. He arrived in the administrative centre Christiania, where he took up the position as “stattholder” (state holder: the king’s envoy to the province).⁶⁸ The cut-off from Denmark had made it necessary to establish a provisional regional government in Christiania, which later allowed for the organisation of government meetings in the would-be capital even before the

⁶⁷ Translated by myself. There are more poetic translations available online, however, here accuracy has been favoured over rhyme.

⁶⁸ Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 34-35

constitution was written on May 17th 1814.⁶⁹ It was this provisional government that Christian Frederick was sent to lead.

When the peace treaty between France and Russia broke apart in 1812, the new Swedish de-facto regent Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, now called Crown Prince Carl John, convinced the Swedish aristocracy that dominion over Norway was a far more attractive prospect than regaining Finland from Russia. Thereafter, the young French crown prince of Sweden travelled to St. Petersburg where he in secrecy concluded a treaty, by which he was promised Russian troops to aid him in his conquest of Norway, in return for subsequent Swedish support against Napoleon. The treaty also saw the two guarantee each others' territories, with Sweden accepting and supporting Russian dominion over Finland, and Russia assuring and supporting Swedish dominion over Norway. These plans were delayed by Napoleon's ill-fated campaign into Russia in June that same year, and in March 1813, Sweden affirmed an alliance with Britain, which also guaranteed support for Swedish acquisition of Norway in return for Swedish support against Napoleon. Later that year Carl John was given command of the allied Northern Army, and he played a decisive role in the subsequent campaign against Napoleon's forces.⁷⁰ Thus, the last major developments were laid on the European stage for the events that would transpire in Norway in 1814. Sweden was now free to fully commit to "the sixth coalition" against Napoleon together with Prussia, Austria, and Russia, which finally dealt a decisive blow to Napoleon's Grand Army at The Battle of Leipzig, before pursuing the remnants of the French army towards Paris.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 10

⁷⁰ Barton, Hildor Arnold. *Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814-1905*. Southern Illinois University Press, 2003. P. 13-14

⁷¹ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 11

III: 1814: The birth of a nation?

After the Battle of Leipzig, the majority of the Swedish army marched with the victors towards Paris, but around one third of the forces, led by crown prince Carl John, turned northwards for a brief detour towards Denmark. There the Swedish forces threatened to take the country by military might and besiege Copenhagen. The Danish-Norwegian forces were not prepared for any large-scale conflict of this sort, and on January 14th, 1814, Swedish and Danish authorities signed the Treaty of Kiel, and Norway was ceded to Sweden.⁷² The Danish-Norwegian dual monarchy was the last remnant of what had once been the Kalmar Union, and it was finally ended with the signing of a peace treaty in Kiel, which effectively ended the Napoleonic wars in the Nordic region. The treaty stated that the Danish King Frederik VI, as one of the defeated parties of the war, was to hand over the region of Norway to Swedish dominion. The Norwegian “notables”, however, chose to disregard the Treaty of Kiel, which became the start of a very turbulent year in Norwegian history.

What was actually decided with the Treaty of Kiel was that Norway was freed from the oath of allegiance that had been sworn by Norwegians to the Danish monarch a century and a half before. However, the Danish king did not have the legal backing to transfer the region of Norway to the custody of another ruler without seeking approval from the Norwegian people. This was a large part of the Norwegian elite’s uproar in light of the treaty of Kiel. Therefore they declared independence, called for a constituent assembly, and elected Christian Frederick king.⁷³ It was essentially a protest against the great powers who met in Kiel, and the protest was backed by the admittedly very undefined and loose legal framework of the *Lex Regia* of 1665, that this ancestral oath of allegiance referred to. A notable fact about the decisions made in Kiel in 1814, is that although the original Article 4 of the treaty stated that Norway should be ceded to Sweden in return for Swedish Pomerania and a significant monetary compensation, Carl John himself made sure that this was

⁷² Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 11-15

⁷³ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 47

changed to make clear that Norway was to enter a union with Sweden as a separate realm in the union.⁷⁴ This was almost undoubtedly done because Carl John expected a revolt, rightly so, from his would-be Norwegian subjects, and it was one of several significantly liberal acts he would commit as de-facto, not yet de-jure, ruler of Sweden.

When word of what had transpired in Kiel reached the young Danish crown prince and regional governor of Norway Christian Frederick on January 24th, things came fully into motion. In the words of Frank Aarebrot, the ceding of Norway to Sweden, combined with the fact that Carl John was traveling with haste to Paris to represent Sweden in the negotiations that would follow Napoleon's defeat, created what he calls " ... a room of opportunity in the spring of 1814."⁷⁵ This room of opportunity was nearly immediately taken by Christian Frederick, who was ready to protest the freshly signed Treaty of Kiel. It also emboldened the Norwegian elite, represented by 112 notables who would gather in grand nationalistic fervor in Eidsvoll. The Danish king had sent his messengers from Denmark to Norway with the news from Kiel on January 17th, carrying the message of the "unfortunate peace treaty" that the Danish king had been forced to sign, with additional details regarding the poor state of the economy, and the impossible political situation that Denmark found itself in. The king never explicitly stated in the letter to Christian Frederick, however, that he had ceded Norway to Sweden, but rather alluding to it by saying that when Swedish forces had taken the Norwegian fortresses, then Christian Frederick's office was over.⁷⁶

The journey itself was also perilous in mid-winter, and between the two messengers who travelled with haste from the king to Christian Frederick, three legs were nearly lost to frostbite.⁷⁷ Despite the details regarding the state the two messengers were in when they reached Christian Frederick, little is known about

⁷⁴ Barton, Hildor Arnold. *Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814-1905*. Southern Illinois University Press, 2003. P. 15

⁷⁵ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 15

⁷⁶ Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 22

⁷⁷ Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 23

what was discussed when they met, and which potential non-written messages had been brought from the Danish king. Endless speculation can be held regarding potential plots between the king and crown prince, and a likely scenario is that the king encouraged Christian Frederick to revolt against the treaty, in hopes of later reuniting Denmark and Norway when the young crown prince would inevitably take the throne. Whether or not this was a coordinated plan between the king and crown prince, however, is not as important as the fact that Christian Frederick did decide to rebel against the treaty of Kiel.

“Stormannsmøtet” in Eidsvoll, directly translated as the “big men’s meeting”, but more accurately translated as the Meeting of Notables, was a gathering of 21 of the most influential men in Norway on February 16th, 1814. They were invited to Eidsvoll by Christian Frederik, and here “the notables” decided to gather a Norwegian Constituent Assembly, “Riksforsamlingen” which would go on to declare Norway an independent country, write a constitution, and declare Christian Frederik King of Norway. The latter was done after a long discussion among the 21 notables regarding whether Christian Frederick should claim a hereditary right to rule Norway, or whether he should claim legitimacy as ruler by popular support as the Danish king had, as previously mentioned, dishonoured the 1665 agreement that bound Norway to Denmark. The latter won out as the better argument, and the constituent assembly was called for the purpose of drafting a constitution and defending Norwegian independence.⁷⁸ Of course there was some disagreement within the constituent assembly, and two parties, the Independence Party and the Union Party formed among the 112 members. The Union Party had significantly less support, and in the end their end goals were very similar, and of course the Union Party won out, albeit after half a year of delays. Both parties, however, fundamentally agreed on the notion of putting the constitution first as the highest authority in Norway, then the king second.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Barton, Hildor Arnold. *Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814-1905*. Southern Illinois University Press, 2003. P. 15-16

⁷⁹ Barton, Hildor Arnold. *Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814-1905*. Southern Illinois University Press, 2003. P. 16

It is notable that straight away, one of the most important issues that “The Notables” and Christian Frederick discussed were matters of legitimacy. As previously explained, Max Weber theorised that there are two ways in which a ruler can ensure his rule, through the use of force, or through acquiring rule by legitimacy deriving from the law. By calling on the most notable public figures in Norway, and later by gathering a constituent assembly and being crowned by a (relatively) democratic process, Christian Frederick certainly achieved a large degree of legitimacy for his rule in the eyes of most Norwegians, as shall be discussed presently. He failed, however, to gain any form of legitimacy in the eyes of foreign powers. In many ways, most of the events that transpired in Norway in 1814 were centred around questions of legitimacy. This involved conflicts between the two princes Christian Frederick and Carl John, differing legitimacy of the two constitutions from May 17th and November 4th, and the legitimacy of the rulers were fought over by two armies in the summer of 1814. Finally this culminated in the formal establishment of a union that legitimized Norway as an independent junior partner to the union.

Two Princes

In the middle of the dramatic events of 1814 were the two princes Carl John and Christian Frederick. Both of them became kings of their respective countries later on, and they both showed a desire to legitimise their respective rules. They both therefore found it prudent to gain the support of the Norwegian people.⁸⁰ In essence, these two princes and their quest for legitimacy drove the majority of the development within Norway in 1814, and they were both pivotal in what would transpire thereafter. Hence, a discussion of these two princes' backgrounds, goals, ambitions, and personalities becomes relevant, in order to fully appreciate their role in this story.

Christian Frederick made himself popular among the Norwegians when he arrived in Norway in 1813 to function as the king's envoy to the province. The young prince travelled around the country, holding parties and cultural events, amassing significant popular support. He made close ties with several of the most notable men in the country, while firing up under what can only be described as nationalistic sentiments among the Norwegians.⁸¹ Although Christian Frederick firmly believed, as did the rest of the Danish royal family, that their line of succession was blessed by God, which granted them legitimacy as rulers, the crown prince undoubtedly saw the benefits of achieving legal legitimacy and popular support. This he gained largely through his unquestionable charisma. As previously discussed, climbing to power based on one's charismatic persona is a common occurrence, especially in turbulent times. Christian Frederick certainly benefited from his charismatic abilities when he travelled around Norway in 1813, at least if his contemporaries are to be believed. He was praised for his gallantry and gentlemanly nature by both the media and by private writings by notable figures. In short, he charmed the Norwegian people into supporting him.

⁸⁰ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 21

⁸¹ Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 35-39

Of course, legitimacy for his rule was not something that Christian Frederick sought alone, and many of his allies in Norway aided him towards that end. Most notably, professor George Sverdrup advised Christian Frederick at The Meeting of the Notables, to ask the Norwegian people to support his claim to the throne, rather than declaring himself regent. George Sverdrup's definition of "the people" was of course not the majority of the population of Norway, but rather the 112 members of the Norwegian elite who would later gather in the constituent assembly, the Eidsvoll-men. When the constituent assembly was called for, one can therefore argue that the Eidsvoll-men were called on to support Christian Frederick's claim to the throne, more so than to write a constitution and declare independence.⁸² By this argument, the legal aspect of the constitution might have been only a means to an end, rather than a goal in itself. By being crowned by law, and on top of that a law that the elite of Norwegian society had written, Christian Frederick was able to claim legitimacy based on law and popular support that resembled revolutionary leaders far more than traditional monarchs.

The French revolutionary turned crown prince of Sweden, Carl John, also wished to govern Norway. He was a military man, and enjoyed a rather successful career in the army, reaching the position of field marshal. He also served as a French ambassador to Vienna, and he ran the ministry of war and controlled the French army in Hannover under Napoleon Bonaparte. He was even made Duke of Ponte Corvo, a small dukedom south of Rome, and he proved himself a highly competent military strategist. Although Carl John developed a very cold relationship with Napoleon, largely due to conflicting ideas regarding warfare, the would-be Swedish crown prince was married to a former fiancée of Napoleon, Désirée Clary, whose sister was married to Napoleon's brother, hence binding the two as brothers-in-law.⁸³

In Sweden, a series of events had led to something reminiscent of a revolution. After losing Finland to Russia, and being defeated in battle upon trying to advance into Norway, the Swedish aristocracy and military officials deposed their

⁸² Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 21

⁸³ Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 41-44

king, wrote a constitution, and reformed Sweden into a constitutional monarchy with a parliament. The new king that was chosen was old and childless, and the crown prince Christian August died shortly after accepting his role. Many in Sweden preferred a French crown prince, as they wished for Napoleon's aid in reclaiming Finland from Russia. Without approval from authorities in Sweden, the lieutenant Carl Otto Mörner met with Carl John in Paris, and asked him if he would like the position of crown prince. He accepted, unknowing of the fact that the position was in the process of being filled by the older brother of the former crown prince. However, when lieutenant Mörner returned to Stockholm and told the members of parliament about Carl John accepting the position, his candidature for crown prince was largely accepted, despite Mörner being banned from parliament and placed in arrest for acting far out of his authority.⁸⁴

Hence, the French revolutionary was given the opportunity to become crown prince due to coincidences, private interests, and happenstance. However, he understood that he would need to win over the Swedish people, and he did so by presenting himself as a strong warrior and strategist, and he promised the Swedes significant sums of money as well as backing from Napoleon himself. He gradually convinced the vast majority of the Swedish elite that he was the best candidate for crown prince, despite them already having another preference.⁸⁵ Historian Karsten Alnæs wrote about Carl John that "[T]he tall, dark-haired athlete charmed everyone ... his knowledge of Sweden impressed the members of the government, his friendliness and chivalrous behaviour seduced the queen, and made the old king reassured."⁸⁶ Much like his Danish-Norwegian counterpart, Carl John clearly understood how to win over those from whom he needed to acquire support. This is yet another example of legitimacy by charisma, although, as in the case of Christian Frederick, charisma was used as a tool to gain legitimacy, rather than the source of legitimacy itself. This perfectly validates Max Weber's idea of charismatic

⁸⁴ Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 46-47

⁸⁵ Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 48

⁸⁶ "Den høyreiste, svarthårete atleten sjarmerte alle ... hans kunnskaper om Sverige imponerte regjeringsmedlemmene, hans vennlighet og sjevalerske atferd forførte dronningen og gjorde den gamle kongen trygg til sinns." Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 51

legitimacy as a transitional phenomenon leading to legal legitimacy benefited by popular support.

Carl John had the overarching goal, at the treaty of Kiel, to have the Norwegian people voluntarily join the union with Sweden, just like Christian Frederick had the goal of having the Norwegians voluntarily crown him king. Carl John was prepared to allow for some Norwegian sovereignty in matters of legal and economic nature, but with executive power resting with the Swedish king, and foreign policy being dictated in Sweden.⁸⁷ Very similarly, Christian Frederick was prepared to take up his kingship over Norway with the Norwegians being granted some liberties previously unheard of in the Danish-Norwegian union, such as a constitution and a parliament. In a sense, the two princes were both very radical for their time, maybe explained by the fact that one was very young, and the other was, at least for a while, a staunch believer in republican ideals. At the Convention of Moss, during what might be described as the culmination of the events of 1814, Carl John allowed for the Norwegian government to negotiate the terms of the union with Sweden based on the constitution. After the initial opposition to his rule, and the settlements from the treaty of Kiel, he undoubtedly deemed this a necessary measure in order to ensure the future compliance of his Norwegian subjects.⁸⁸

There had been some earlier ideas among the Swedish aristocracy to attempt to use the situation caused by the Napoleonic war, and the subsequent starvation in Norway, to try to negotiate a Swedish-Norwegian union, while the Norwegian sentiment towards Denmark was at its worst, and some in Norway mulled the beneficial prospects of ditching Denmark for Sweden. However, the main aspiration for the Swedes was to regain Finland from Russia. Carl John clearly saw the difficulties that such a task would entail, namely defeating a strong military force, only to attempt to rule a people that was rather unruly. Furthermore, Christian Frederick's arrival in Norway in 1813 had considerably warmed relations between the Norwegians and Copenhagen, making the prospect of the Norwegians voluntarily

⁸⁷ Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 22

⁸⁸ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 21

joining Sweden increasingly unlikely. Nevertheless, the prospects of gaining dominion over Norway was much more appealing to Carl John, as this would in his eyes create a lot of economic benefits, if the Norwegian ports could be used for the shipping of Swedish goods to Britain, which was the largest trade-partner for both Sweden and Norway already. He, however, went back on his intentions to gain dominion over Norway by having them voluntarily join, after the revolt led by Christian Frederick in 1814.

Thus, throughout 1814, these two princes stand out as the two most important driving forces behind what happened in Norway in 1814. One enjoyed significant popular support from the Norwegians, and the other from the Swedes, which the both respectably gained largely based on their charisma. They both clearly wanted their prospective rules over Norway to be legitimised, and notably this was likely a result of their shared inspiration from the French Revolution. In a way, one can argue that the two were prime examples of the shifting tendencies in Europe at the time, and that they were both a result of the philosophical and political thoughts that had become popularised during their lifetimes. The most striking difference between the two princes, however, was that one was actively working towards a Swedish-Norwegian union, while the other was working towards Norwegian independence, albeit with possible, if not likely aspirations of re-uniting Norway and Denmark in the future.

Carl John had rapidly worsening relations with Napoleon, as he preferred to rule independently from the French emperor, and he preferred to bind Sweden and Britain closer together. In 1811, while technically still at war with Britain, he invited English diplomats to the Swedish court in order to negotiate peace between the two, and in these negotiations he ensured British support for the Swedish claim to Norway. Meanwhile, the Danish royals were tempted to change sides and ally with the British and the Russians against the French, but without any guarantee to keep Norway in the event of victory, they would not do so.⁸⁹ Here we can see another significant difference between the two princes, one aspired to unite Norway and

⁸⁹ Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 54-61

Sweden for reasons relating to the benefits of trade and prosperity he could achieve after what he almost undoubtedly deemed the inevitable defeat of Napoleon, whereas the other likely aspired to conduct a last-ditch political stunt in order to keep Norway and Denmark tied together in the event of Napoleon's defeat. Largely, they were junior participants in the political games of the great powers of Europe. A final notable fact about the two, however is that they both had aspirations reaching far further than either of them achieved, with evidence suggesting that Carl John in reality hoped to be instated as king of France after Napoleon's defeat, and Christian Frederick wished to be crowned king off all three of the Nordic countries. If Carl John would have returned to Paris to become monarch there, Christian Frederick would have been a likely candidate for the kingship of all three, and although it is impossible to fully prove that either of the two had such aspirations, several historians have argued that they did.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 157

Two Constitutions

The idea that the Norwegian constitution was signed on May 17th 1814, is conveyed in schools throughout the country and fastened in the minds of most Norwegians. May 17th still brings with it grand yearly national celebrations throughout the country. However, Norway got two constitutions in 1814, only one of which would last. The two aforementioned princes were both affirmed regents of Norway by these two constitutions, one affirming Christian Frederick as regent of an independent Norway, finalized on May 17th, 1814, and one affirming Carl John as the regent of the Swedish-Norwegian Union, finalized on November 4th of the same year. The constitutions both drew inspiration from other radical constitutions, and they were for the most part similar, with the very obvious exception of the difference regarding which monarch they legitimized. As previously mentioned, Max Weber theorized that authority, and the right to rule, are either derived from legitimacy, or from the use of force, or threat thereof. The problem with this idea of legitimacy, is that although a ruler can be legitimised by the law, and even by a law that is democratically made, by elected lawmakers, this does not necessarily mean that the ruler needs to enjoy popular support, as shall be seen here. The use of force, and threat thereof were both relevant for the creation of the November 4th constitution, but that did not delegitimize the rule that it instated. Nevertheless, both of these constitutions were steps away from the traditional hereditary legitimacy of authority that rulers were used to, and they paved the way for democratisation in Norway.

Of the 112 men gathered at Eidsvoll to work on the constitution in the spring of 1814, Christian Magnus Falsen stands out as “the father of the constitution”, as the young juror wrote his draft in close cooperation with Christian Frederick. He had extensively studied the U.S. constitution of 1787 and the French one of 1791.⁹¹ There were also some very striking resemblances between Falsen’s constitution draft and the Spanish junta’s Cadiz constitution of 1812, as well as the Swedish constitution of 1809. However, the fresh Norwegian constitution was much more democratic than its

⁹¹ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 21-22

Swedish counterpart, both in franchise and representation, featuring a modified unicameral legislature, which was elected by quite a wide electorate for the time, which included all landowners in Norway. This was undoubtedly done to ensure the largest possible mobilisation for Norwegian independence.⁹² The May 17th constitution was based on what was at the time revolutionary ideas of freedom, equality, and fraternity. These ideas were popularised by the French revolutionaries, and firmly institutionalised by the American declaration of independence and constitution in 1776. It was largely built upon the idea of popular sovereignty and the principle of separation of powers, dividing the state's power into three, namely the judicial, legislative, and executive branches. It also gave some of the most liberal rights to vote in the world at the time to the Norwegian people.⁹³

Many members of the Norwegian elite in 1814, had previously studied in Copenhagen. There the majority of them had likely been a part of "The Norwegian Society" (Norske Selskap), a student society which was very concerned with publishing poems and texts about Norway, and Norwegians. Frank Aarebrot argues that although these people were not really a precursor, or the foundation of the Norwegian national movement, they were concerned with the rights of Norwegians within the Danish-Norwegian union.⁹⁴ When these students represented the Norwegian elite in Eidsvoll, they did so with extensive knowledge of the thinkers and philosophers who had captivated European academia with their ideas of democracy, national sovereignty and liberalism. So did Christian Frederick for that matter. They all subscribed to the idea that the central power, meaning the king, was legitimised by a contract that was agreed upon between the central power and the citizens, which in turn necessitated mutual responsibilities.⁹⁵ These ideas, then, were represented by the two constitutions of 1814, which merit some deeper analysis.

⁹² Barton, Hildor Arnold. *Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814-1905*. Southern Illinois University Press, 2003. P. 16

⁹³ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 23

⁹⁴ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 264

⁹⁵ Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 203

The May 17th constitution included a declaration of independence, the establishment of a government, and the establishment of Norway as an independent state. In the first paragraph it is stated that: “[T]he kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, and inseparable realm. Its governance is restricted and hereditary-monarchical.”⁹⁶ Thereafter, the constitution specifies that the state religion would be evangelical-lutheran, and that Jesuits, Monk-orders, and Jews would not be tolerated in the realm. It stated that executive power was with the king, who is holy, infallible, and rules by the grace of god and the constitution. In fact, the first thirty paragraphs of the constitution are largely centered around the king and his role as head of state. His importance is repeatedly specified, but so are his restrictions. Strict rules regarding the line of succession, and the amount of time any member of the royal family would be allowed to reside abroad are also specified. The fact that Christian Frederick, a prince who came from one of the royal houses in Europe considered most absolute, agreed to such restrictions is significant. However, just as significant is the fact that the 112 Eidsvoll-men were willing to give such an amount of power to the prince. One can only assume that these were concessions made by both parties in order to legitimise the new state in the eyes of as many as possible. By enfranchising as many as they did, which was everyone who owned land or businesses and were above the age of 25, as per paragraph 50, they ensured that a large number of people would be likely to support the constitution. However, by keeping some traditional aspects, specifically relating to the king, the constituent assembly, as well as Christian Frederick, likely hoped to garner support by more conservative forces as well. An overly radical revolt against the treaty of Kiel was guaranteed to be opposed almost universally, but by finding a middle ground, they likely hoped that the new independent state would be accepted internationally, without any significant opposition.

The very end of the May 17th constitution is quite notable, as it contains the main differentiating factor from the November 4th constitution. Following a long list of signature, the last part of the constitution contains the signature of the king, stating

⁹⁶ “Kongeriget Norge er et frit, uafhængigt og udeleligt Rige. Dets Regjeringsform er indskrænket og arvelig-monarkisk.” Appendix 1

as follows: “We Christian Frederick of the grace of God, and after the realm’s constitution king of Norway, prince of Denmark, duke of Schleswig, Holstein, Stormarn, Ditmarsken, and Oldenburg, announce: that We, called to the Norwegian throne by the nation’s decision, have ... taken up the crown of Norway, and today in the constituent assembly solemnly swore to govern the kingdom of Norway in accordance with with this constitution authored by the nation’s appointed men; which hereafter Us on the original constitution’s act affirms.”⁹⁷ In essence, Christian Frederick states that despite his many titles affirmed by the grace of God, it is the nation’s decision, the constituent assembly, and the constitution that gave him the legitimacy and right to govern Norway. In many ways, this is the most significant part of the May 17th constitution, as it is the main factor that sets it apart from other constitutions of the time. However, it was not set to last, and after a turbulent summer, a special parliamentary assembly was called for to alter the constitution to accomodate for a union with Sweden.

The first paragraph of the November 4th constitution states as follows: “The Kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible, and unalienable realm, unified with Sweden under one king. Its governance is restricted and hereditary-monarchical.”⁹⁸ The constitution then goes on to state that the evangelical-lutheran religion would be the state religion, and that Jesuites, monk-orders, and Jews are not permitted in the realm, before explaining the role of the king in detail, much like the May 17th constitution, with some small alterations. One of the most notable paragraphs in the November 4th constitution is number 13, stating that “Without the king’s presence, the realm’s internal governance is granted to the vice-king or the king’s envoy to the province (Stattholder) ...”⁹⁹ This

⁹⁷ “Vi Christian Frederik af Guds Naade, og efter Rigets Constitution Norges Konge, Prinds til Danmark, Hertug til Slesvig, Holsteen, Stormarn, Ditmarsken og Oldenburg, Giøre vitterligt: At Vi, kaldet til Norges Throne ved Nationens Beslutning, have ... antaget Norges Krone, og i Dag høytideligen udi Rigsforsamlingen besvoret at regiere Kongeriget Norge overensstemmende med denne af Nationens udkaarede Mænd affattede Grundlov; hvilket herved saaledes af Os paa den originale Constitutions Akt bekræftes.” Appendix 1

⁹⁸ “Kongeriget Norge er et frit, selvstændigt, udeleligt og uafhængeligt Rige, forenet med Sverige under een Konge. Dets Regjeringsform er indskrænket og arvelig monarkisk.” Appendix 2

⁹⁹ “Under Kongens Fraværelse overdrager han Rigets indvortes Bestyrelse, i de Tilfælde Han selv foreskriver, til Vice-Kongen eller Statholderen” Appendix 2

paragraph would be the root of a significant feud between the two union partners later on. Furthermore, the new constitution specified that the right to conduct and change foreign policy also rested with the king. Finally it should be noted that the November 4th constitution did not have the many signatories that the May 17th one had, and the king did not sign it himself. It did however, contain a segment at the bottom written in Swedish, announcing that Norway from then onwards had a Swedish king.

There is a notable change from the May 17th constitution to the November 4th one, in that the former seemingly made concessions in order to make the constitution acceptable for third parties as well as the Norwegians and Christian Frederick, whereas the latter made concessions in order to appease the ones who rebelled against the treaty of Kiel. In essence it is an attempt to give the Norwegians just the bare minimum of rights and liberties for them to accept the union without further disagreement, and potential rebellions. The reason why this was possible to do rests wholly with the outcome of the war of 1814, and the authority that Sweden gained by use of power, and effectively outmanning and outmaneuvering the norwegian forces. There was no need for the Swedish king and crown prince to legitimise their rule in the same way that Christian Frederick had done, as the Swedes already had international backing from Britain and Russia, as previously discussed. Hence all they needed to do when allowing for the constitution was to appease the Norwegians enough that further use of force would not be necessary. As far as they were concerned, their rule was legitimised by law with the treaty of Kiel, which made the constitution a less significant document for them than it had been for Christian Frederick.

Two Armies

The Swedish crown prince Carl John returned from Paris to Sweden with his army only eleven days after the affirmation of the Norwegian constitution in Eidsvoll on May 17th. He immediately began regrouping his army, and prepared for a potential offensive into Norway, in order to strike down the rebellion against the treaty of Kiel, and by extension, against Swedish rule. For the next few months, diplomatic dialogue ensued, but the staunch believers in Norwegian independence, led by the aforementioned Christian Magnus Falsen, raised concern with the prospect of being governed by a french militaristic despot, as he deemed Carl John. Meanwhile, Sweden's international allies, Austria, Britain, and Russia predominantly, publicly announced support for the Swedish acquisition of Norway. Christian Frederick therefore made it clear that he would be prepared to abdicate in favour of Carl John on the conditions that the constituent assembly sanctioned his abdication, and Norway could remain a separate kingdom and keep its constitution upon entering the union. Swedish forces nevertheless invaded Norway on July 26th, and shortly thereafter Carl John in secrecy offered his conditions for a peace settlement, stating that Christian Frederick would need to both abdicate and leave Norway, and only then would Norway be allowed to keep its constitution, hence completely rejecting the Eidsvoll constitution and causing the necessity for a new one to be made.¹⁰⁰ These demands were undoubtedly made to quell any potential future resurfacing of the rebellion, which Christian Frederick had become the symbol of.

The war of the summer of 1814 was short-lived, as the highly trained veteran Swedish forces both outnumbered, and rapidly outmaneuvered their Norwegian counterparts, and by August 14th the hostilities ended. In invading Norway, Carl John managed to prove to the Norwegians that Sweden's military superiority was not possible to challenge, but he also managed to avoid negotiating with Christian Frederick, a sovereign that most foreign powers considered illegitimate.

¹⁰⁰ Barton, Hildor Arnold. *Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814-1905*. Southern Illinois University Press, 2003. P. 16-17

Additionally, by offering very generous terms at the conclusion of the war, he achieved, at least to some degree, conciliation of the Norwegians, which temporarily quelled further resistance to the union. On October 7th, a new constituent assembly was convened, and they quickly accepted Christian Frederick's abdication, and on October 20th, the new constituent assembly voted in favour of entering a union with Sweden. Thereafter, the lawmakers began the aforementioned process of amending the constitution, finishing a new one on November 4th.¹⁰¹

The war itself, however, is in need of analysis, in order to fully understand its significance for the events that would transpire in its aftermath. Throughout Norway, approximately 32,000 soldiers were stationed, mainly in the country's fortresses, prepared to meet the expected Swedish invasion force. This force measured some 45,000 soldiers, who were highly trained, and many of whom were veterans from the Napoleonic wars. The Norwegian forces were significantly outclassed and outnumbered, and except for one minor victory, the Norwegian army faced a series of defeats and was generally forced to retreat. However, when the Swedes invaded the region of Østfold, although they made significant advances into the country, they also saw far more casualties than expected. The attack was fully condoned by the great powers of Europe, specifically the aforementioned Britain, Austria, and Russia, due to the disagreement caused by the signing of the May 17th constitution. Both Sweden and the great powers of Europe saw this as a gross offense to the treaty of Kiel. Although Carl John would likely have been supported by the great powers in continuing his advances and further cripple the Norwegians' military capabilities he did not do so, likely due to the heavy losses he had faced, and because he did not wish to end up in a situation of guerilla warfare, such as had been seen in Spain while it was under French occupation. Therefore, Carl John sent a letter to Christian Frederick on August 7th, proposing peace negotiations. He allowed that the Norwegians could keep their constitution, but demanded that the Swedish and Norwegian lands would be united in a double monarchy. Due to the losses the Norwegians had faced, Christian Frederick agreed to the terms set by Carl John, and

¹⁰¹ Barton, Hildor Arnold. *Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814-1905*. Southern Illinois University Press, 2003. P. 17

abdicated after calling for an election of an extraordinary parliament, with the purpose of amending the May 17th constitution, in order to make it compatible with the personal union Sweden-Norway.¹⁰²

Hence the war of 1814 was, at its core, a war of legitimacy, and a power-struggle between the aforementioned two princes, who were fighting over the aforementioned two constitutions. This war also fits into several of the theories previously explained. It was in part the result of the periphery (Norway) eyeing a gap in the central powers' (Denmark and Sweden) control, hence making a bid for independence, in what Frank Aarebrot called a room of opportunity.¹⁰³ The distance from the centre to the periphery was relatively far, both physically and metaphorically, and thus Norwegian state and nation building was made possible. Although Christian Frederick managed to legitimize his bid for Norwegian independence domestically, he did not manage this internationally. However, what he did manage to do was to develop a temporary monopoly on violence, legitimised by law, which made it possible for him to muster an army to fight the Swedish forces. By Max Weber's definition, Christian Frederick and the constituent assembly made Norway a state. Finally, when relating the war of 1814 to Charles Tilly's theories and ideas, one can argue that the state was in fact strengthened by the war, as per Tilly's argumentation. Due to the strengthened position that the war of 1814 allowed Norway to have when entering the union with Sweden, further state and nation building was made possible: war made the state.

¹⁰² Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 20

¹⁰³ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 15

IV: 1814-1905: Building a Nation State

“Forwards then, friends, in peaceful strides!” - Ivar Aasen¹⁰⁴

From 1814 to 1905, the Norwegian state and nation building processes saw immense development in almost all sectors of society. Firstly, personal liberties, like the freedom of the press, assembly, and religion were strengthened significantly. Secondly political autonomy slowly increased, the parliament (Stortinget) grew in importance and influence, and slowly the parliament and government structure changed to become an independently functional political entity. During this period several new political forces grew in importance and influence, challenging the former established elite which had previously dominated politics. The very limited political elite was expanded, and the parliament garnered ever more power. Thirdly, the cleavage between the Swedish central power and the Norwegian periphery expanded, which is remarkably evident by looking at the annual celebrations of May 17th, “Constitution Day”, which in 1829 caused one of the most significant events for the popular support of the independence movement, namely *Torvslaget*, or *The Battle of the Square*. Furthermore, the intelligentsia, the academic and cultural elite expanded, influencing the public perception to favour Norwegian independence. Poets and academics saw a steady increase in their influence and importance in society as society itself slowly became more educated. Henrik Wergeland is a prime example of a trend that developed between 1814 and 1905, namely that cultural and intellectual figures, poets and academics, became central in the independence movement. National Romanticism was a huge cultural phenomenon, and Norway and what it meant to be Norwegian became dominant topics in art. Finally, the Norwegian industrial and economical elite became more prominent, as the country was slowly industrialising and modernising. As the country transitioned from an agrarian to a modern society, industry and the economy became significant factors in society to a much larger degree than before. During this period, Norway slowly gained more economical autonomy, notably through the creation of a Norwegian

¹⁰⁴ Original quote in Norwegian: “Fram daa, Frendar, i fredlege Kappstig!” from: Aasen, Ivar. *Skrifter I Andre Utgaava*. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1926. P. 65

Central Bank, and the bricks were slowly laid for the building of a functional and independent nation state. The industrialists and bankers who came with the industry and banks formed a new sort of economic elite in Norway, and they as well were fundamental for the development of the Norwegian secession movement.

In the 1814-1905 period, nationalism became a huge factor in most spheres of Norwegian society. Norwegian nationalism has traditionally been tightly tied to liberal and democratic ideals, as made apparent by the constitutions from 1814. Later demands of democratisation and more influence that were raised against Sweden further proves this point. These union-conflicts had three distinct peaks, namely the “state-holder conflict” in 1859-60 and the question of revising the union, the breakthrough of parliamentarianism in 1884, and the “consulate issue” towards the end of the union in the 1890’s. The Norwegian liberal forces were represented and empowered, especially from 1884 onwards, by the liberal party Venstre, eventually letting this liberal nationalism take the main stage in Norwegian politics. However, the opposition, the conservative party Høyre, also fronted nationalism, nationalistic rethoric, and ideas of national self-determination, although this so called alternative nationalism, which called for the union to be maintained, was deemed un-nationalistic by Venstre.¹⁰⁵ Venstre’s national-democratic project essentially won political hegemony at the time, making it the leader of the project of nation building.¹⁰⁶ There was also an additional cultural and academic component to the political nationalism fronted by Venstre, mainly exemplified through the cultural ties to Denmark and the metric-case. All of this aided in the gradual transformation that Norway went through to become a modern nation state, a development that started with the previously discussed events of 1814, and accelerated thereafter.

¹⁰⁵ Danielsen, Helge. “Nasjonalisme i Høyre før 1905?”. *Jakten på det Norske. Perspektiver på Utviklingen av en Norsk Nasjonal Identitet på 1800-tallet*. (red. Øystein Sørensen), Oslo, Ad Notam Gyldendal, 1998. P. 371-382

¹⁰⁶ Sørensen, Øystein. “Hegemonikamp om det Norske. Elitenes Nasjonsbyggingsprosjekter 1770-1945.” *Jakten på det Norske. Perspektiver på Utviklingen av en Norsk Nasjonal Identitet på 1800-tallet* (red. Øystein Sørensen), Oslo, Ad Notam Gyldendal, 1998. P. 17-48

Freedom of religion, assembly, and the press

Despite what many historians said following 1814, democracy, human rights, and libertarian freedoms were not really ensured in Eidsvoll in 1814. The constitution did allow for limited freedom of the press, limited voting rights, and limited political liberty, but all would be under the oversight and control of the king. There was no real freedom of assembly without the approval of the authorities, and the laws that the courts used immediately after 1814 were still the old laws from the Danish-Norwegian union. In other words, Norway had not gained, nor ensured the future of anything resembling freedom of religion, assembly, or the press. Even these very limited liberties, which as previously discussed were likely permitted to appease the rebellious Norwegians, were seen as too much by Carl John, who regretted the concessions he had made in 1814. Carl John wished to limit the already limited liberties that the constitution guaranteed, and to increase the power of the king. Furthermore, he wished to have direct veto power in all matters brought before the Norwegian parliament, and he wanted to be able to choose the parliamentary president himself. This led to a feud between the king and the parliament, in which the parliamentarians had to continuously argue and fight for their rights.¹⁰⁷ Hence it is hard to argue that anything really was ensured by the constitution.

Frank Aarebrot is especially critical of the notion that freedom of religion was ensured in Eidsvoll, using the example of the case of Hans Nielsen Hauge. Shortly before the end of the year in 1814, on December 23rd, Hans Nielsen Hauge was sentenced to pay a large fine of 1000 silver *riksdaler* for the heinous crime of preaching the word of god without having passed an official theological exam. Interestingly he was judged upon the orders of the Danish king. Although it was allowed to hold private meetings, Hauge became remarkably popular, and wherever he went people flocked around him to hear him speak. He started being an active preacher long before 1814, and his followers, the Haugeians, rapidly became a power-factor. At their meetings, priests and the police were prone to show up to

¹⁰⁷ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 29

disperse the gathered crowds, claiming meetings of that nature were illegal. Hauge himself traveled around the country while running from the law, and preaching to whoever wanted to listen. The rumours say that he knitted while running, as idleness, he claimed, was the root of evil.¹⁰⁸ In a country where someone is punished for preaching, and the second paragraph of the constitution states that the Evangelical Lutheran religion is the state religion, and Jews, Jesuits, and Monk-orders are banned from entering the country,¹⁰⁹ can one in any way claim freedom of religion?

The story of Hans Nielsen Hauge is notable for a few different reasons. For one, he was judged after the affirmation of the November 4th constitution, but judged by laws from the Danish-Norwegian union. However, despite the judgement stating that he was punished for preaching without an official theological exam, what he was in reality punished for was gathering crowds that challenged the elite. One of the most important things that he did, was to bring people out of poverty. He aided people in starting businesses, especially in the region of Sunnmøre, and as people were lifted out of poverty with Hauge's help, they came into confrontation with those who already ran businesses in the region, enjoying the benefits of having royal privilege-letters, allowing them to dominate trade and business in a specific region.¹¹⁰ Therefore, Hauge's followers, the Haugians, challenged the privileged who dominated the areas that Hauge traveled through, and these privileged officials from around the country, were the majority of the ones who in 1814 showed up to Eidsvoll to form a constitution.¹¹¹ Therefore, Aarebrot argues, we can not really claim that the constitution ensured anything like freedom of religion.¹¹² However, his conflict with the elite stands out as far more significant than the religious aspect, as it in many ways resembled a peripheral challenge to the central power. Hence, limiting religious

¹⁰⁸ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 22

¹⁰⁹ Appendix 2

¹¹⁰ Magnus, Alv. *Hans Nielsen Hauge, Mannen som Forandret Norge*. Proklamedia, 2020. P. 109-124

¹¹¹ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 22-23

¹¹² Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 23

freedom and freedom of assembly would have been in the interest of both the elite in Norway, and the central power in Sweden.

Freedom of religion and assembly were essentially two sides of the same coin. After 1814, freedom of assembly was not permitted in Norway, and therefore, opposition to the ruling elite in Norway was near impossible. Hence, the law was for the most part, the remnants of Danish autocratic decrees, despite what had been decided by the constitutions in 1814. The courts largely ruled based on the old laws, and Norway was still far away from having anything like a full-fledged democracy.¹¹³ Paragraph 16 of the constitution stated that “[T]he king controls all public church services, all meetings and gatherings regarding matters of religion, and ensures that public religious teachers follow the written norms.”¹¹⁴ Full freedom of assembly was not ensured until the 1860s, as shall be discussed presently.

Similarly, paragraph 100 of the November 4th constitution states as follows: “Freedom of the press should take place. Nobody can be punished for anything written, no matter the content, which has been published, unless it intentionally and obviously encourages others to disobey the law, dishonour the religion or the constitutional powers, protests the demands of these, or presents false or dishonourable accusations against anyone. Bold opinions of the state’s governance or whichever other object is allowed for everyone”¹¹⁵ So there was freedom of the press, as long as it did not disobey, dishonour, or protest the central power. So despite saying that freedom of the press should take place, this was not really ensured by the constitution either.

¹¹³ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 24

¹¹⁴ “Kongen anordner al offentlig Kirke- og Gudstjeneste, alle Møder og Forsamlinger om Religions-Sager, og paaseer, at Religionens offentlige Lærere følge de dem foreskrevne Normer.” Appendix 2

¹¹⁵ “Trykkefrihed bør finde Sted. Ingen kan straffes for noget Skrift, af hvad Indhold det end maatte være, som han har ladet trykke eller udgive, medmindre kan forsætlig og aabenbare har enten selv viist, eller tilskyndet Andre til, Ulydighed mod Lovene, Ringeagt mod Religionen, Sædelighed eller de constitutionelle Magter, Modstand mod dissers Befalinger, eller fremført falske og ærekrænkende Beskyldninger mod Nogen. Frimodige Yttringer, om Statsstyrelsen og hvilkensomhelst anden Gjenstand, ere Enhver tilladte.” Appendix 2

An excellent example of the limited freedom of the press is the story of Peder Soelvold, the editor of the journal *Statsborgeren* (The Citizen). Soelvold became extremely unpopular during his time as the head of this journal, which was the most radical and controversial Norwegian political paper of the time. In this paper, Soelvold and his colleagues, and whoever they decided to let write in their papers, argued in favour of establishing a stronger political presence of farmers (freeholders) both in parliament and the public sphere. In doing so, the paper targeted the embetsmen, the ruling elite, comprised of civil servants and the clergy. The paper questioned their ability and will to rule justly and fairly. This angered the elite, which began working to exclude such radical and progressive ideas from the public sphere, in order to maintain the political dominance of the embetsmen.¹¹⁶ By 1835, Peter Soelvold was publicly denounced as a bad person, a false prophet, and a rattlesnake that slithered around among humans, and rumours circulated regarding his supposed immoral character.¹¹⁷ All this criticism was based on the fact that Soelvold published lists of parliamentary representatives, assessing their former efforts, while generally strongly favouring any member of parliament who were not of the embetsmen.

The paper published stories purposefully portraying embetsmen in a bad light, and many of these stories were partly, or wholly based on rumours. However, what most of the critics of Soelvold emphasized was the fact that his paper *The Citizen* had been used for “election-agitation” which in 1833 had filled Parliament with “farmers and less insightful men” («Bønder og mindre indsigtsfulde Mænd»), as one writer to the opposing paper *Morgenbladet* had written. Soelvold presented the elections as strict conflicts in which the farmers were the representatives of the people, and the embetsmen represented despots and the aristocracy.¹¹⁸ These embetsmen struggled with accepting criticism from “the lower classes” which created a large hindrance on the path towards free speech and a free public political

¹¹⁶ Nymark, Kristian. “Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse.” *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 327

¹¹⁷ Nymark, Kristian. “Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse.” *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 328

¹¹⁸ Nymark, Kristian. “Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse.” *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 329

debate.¹¹⁹ These embetsmen generally looked at the freedom of the press as serving two functions: primarily, it was intended to ensure the flow of information which was vital for the governance and economy of the state. Secondly, the press should express the will and opinion of the people, so that the people could reprimand the governing forces that were not elected and therefore not subject to acceptance from the voters, ideas that were quite certainly pulled from the ideas of Rousseau and Kant.¹²⁰ However, many of the embetsmen also believed that the same criteria should decide whether or not someone could partake in the public discourse as decided whether one was eligible to vote, meaning one had to be in possession of sufficient wealth and property so that your opinions could not be bought, and one had to have a sufficient education so that one would not be misguided by poor and weak arguments.¹²¹ Soelvold had neither.

Soelvold faced criticism not only from the establishment, but also from members of the political opposition who had seen nothing but praise from *The Citizen*, as they claimed that it was more important to vote depending on the person, not his societal background or class. Soelvold actively tried to hinder this exact sentiment when attempting to make the farmers win as much as possible, and because *The Citizen*, according to some, did more to influence the opinion of the people than to supply the people with information, they opposed his message.¹²² Essentially, the established elite, the embetsmen, had effectively enforced norms regarding public discourse, with a certain tone and language being mandatory, and everything striding too far from the norm would be met with strict public criticism.¹²³ In that manner, differently opinionated individuals who were not of the established elite could easily be discredited without actually having to discuss the matter, if they

¹¹⁹ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 329

¹²⁰ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 330-31

¹²¹ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 331

¹²² Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 338

¹²³ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 333

did not uphold the established standard, which those who were of a different opinion, and of a different class, did of course often not manage to do.

When *The Citizen* then began criticising the embetsmen, and attacking the established system, this did not coincide with the idea that the embetsmen had of themselves, who were forced to defend their leading position in society against what would today likely be called populist rhetoric.¹²⁴ *The Citizen* was unquestionably used to get members of the farming class elected to Parliament, through sowing doubt regarding the integrity of the embetsmen, and their will and ability to work for the common good and not their own benefit. This was done through criticizing and denouncing both individual embetsmen, and the established elite as a whole.¹²⁵ Furthermore, Soelvold called on his readers to vote for independent candidates who loved freedom and the fatherland, and then they would ensure the will of the people and the reduction of taxes, and those members of the government who did not fulfill their responsibilities would be made responsible for it.¹²⁶

It should be noted, however, that *The Citizen* was not wholly partial. Ahead of the 1832 and 1835 elections, it published lists of the candidates that had sat the previous term and who were recommended for the next term. Although farmers were generally praised and embetsmen criticised, there were exceptions, with farmers being deemed useless, and embetsmen being praised for their liberalist ideas and love of the fatherland.¹²⁷ However, for both the elite and the opposition, it became pivotal to show that they did not consider *The Citizen* a legitimate actor in the public sphere, and that what it published did not coincide with the people's opinion. Peter Soelvold did not contribute to a rational discussion, which most believed should have the purpose of reaching a consensus, hence the majority of the public sphere harshly criticized *The Citizen* and Soelvold, to the point where he fled the capital of

¹²⁴ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 333

¹²⁵ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 336

¹²⁶ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 336

¹²⁷ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 336

Christiania, unable to return as a public figure.¹²⁸ The embetsmen must have found it uncomfortable to see their colleagues publicly denounced and in some cases slandered, with the fear of themselves being The Citizen's next target likely being significant.¹²⁹ In some ways Soelvold was ahead of his time, as his harsh political commentary became less unheard of only ten years after his departure from the public debate.¹³⁰

Although Soelvold and The Citizen were equivalent to what one might today call "trash journalism,"¹³¹ he did not do anything but comment on politics and politicians. However, it is hard to argue that there was freedom of the press when a member of the press saw it necessary to flee the capital and the public sphere as a whole, purely based on the reactions to their writings. Hence one can establish that in the immediate aftermath of 1814, despite what the constitution promised, there was no real freedom of religion, no real freedom of assembly, and no real freedom of the press. On top of this, the monarch wished to reduce the limited civil liberties that were already in place, which created an interesting dynamic. Within Norway, there was what can be described as a political centre-periphery cleavage, between the freeholders and the titled officials, while simultaneously a cleavage was growing between the peripheral state of the union, Norway, and the central power, Sweden. However, as the political sphere diversified, and society modernised, these civil liberties and freedoms grew in importance, and gradually became commonplace, after years of power-shifts and power-struggles. All of this would play pivotal roles in the democratisation, and be exemplified by the Battle of the Square, as shall be discussed presently.

¹²⁸ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 340

¹²⁹ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 340

¹³⁰ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 340-41

¹³¹ Some british tabloids come to mind here.

Parliamentarians and power: developing a democracy

Many historians argue that Norway became the most free country in Europe following the affirmation of the constitution in 1814. Frank Aarebrot counters this by referring to the fact that only 45% of men over the age of 25 were allowed to vote, which was far less democratic and free than many of the constitutions that existed 10 years before in revolutionary Europe. However, after the fall of Napoleon, the reactionary monarchs had returned to their thrones and torn apart the many constitutions written across the continent, hence praising how democratic Norway was in 1814 is, according to Aarebrot, “... like saying that among the blind, the one-eyed man is king.”¹³² Of course, Norway was a more free country than it had been, and its new regent Carl John did let the Norwegians keep their constitution, in a first step towards actual democracy. However, as previously mentioned the king regretted this later, and attempted to restrict the level of democracy in the country. This created a lasting power-struggle between the Norwegian politicians and the Swedish central power. As Norway and Sweden were, in name at least, two states with one king, this created issues in regards to authority. If a central authority was necessary for a state to be a state, could Norway really be a state if the central power was in Stockholm?

Paragraph 50 of the constitution of 1814 stated that those eligible to vote were only Norwegian citizens “... who have turned 25 years of age, have been residents in the country for five years, stay there, and either: are, or have been, titled officials; own land, or, over more than five years resided on matriculated land (land granted to a person); or are merchants, or own a business worth at least 300 Rbdlr”¹³³ This enfranchised many more than were initially politically active in Norway. The growing political sphere after 1814 became a problem for the established elite of embetsmen because it challenged the political and moral norms that the elite was

¹³² Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 24

¹³³ “Stemmeberettigede ere kun de norske Borgere, som have fyldt 25 Aar, have været bosatte i Landet i fem Aar, opholde sig der, og enten: ere, eller have været, Embedsmænd; paa Landet eie, eller, paa længre Tid end fem Aar, have bygset matriculeret Jord; ere Kjøbstadsborgere, eller i Kjøbstad eller Ladested eie Gaard eller Grund, hvis Værdi i det mindste er 300 Rbdlr, S.V.1” Appendix 2

used to, and this made the necessity of finding a consensus across the classes cause small disagreements to grow into significant political cleavages. These cleavages were most present in the 1830s, when *The Citizen* brought forth its anti-bureaucratic opinions. *The Citizen* allowed for farmers (freeholders) and the lower classes to publish texts exposing members of the established elite's public and personal misconduct, as previously discussed.

Scholars have debated the nature of the embetsmenn's rule and attitudes after 1814, with some claiming that they were driven by a goal to serve the community, and that they were not driven by personal interests. Others have argued that they certainly acted out of personal interests and power-ambitions, exemplified through introducing norms for political activism which were preferable for themselves. This is especially striking in the election law of 1828, which forbade further forms of direct political agitation in relation to the elections. There was seemingly an elite-driven political sphere characterized by exclusion of those who did not meet the requirements of said elite. Yet, public politically motivated groups did emerge after 1814, often in opposition to the elite. The aforementioned Soelvold is an example of this, as he did, despite his lack of education and property, share several ideals with the embetsman-dominated public, but he wished to reform the very nature of the system, which these embetsmen embodied.¹³⁴ His way of doing that was through attempting to get the farmers (freeholders) elected and increase their influence in parliament.

As early as the winter of 1815, members of the established elite complained about the influence the farmers had gained through parliament. The farmers quickly took their chance to become active members of the public and political spheres, especially after the failed farmers revolt against the monetary policy in 1818,¹³⁵ as will be discussed later on. However, the farmers were not the only ones criticising the establishment, as young and radical members of the elite strongly opposed some

¹³⁴ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 330

¹³⁵ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 333

parts of the establishment, calling for more liberal reforms, more freedom of the press, and most importantly, less Swedish involvement in Norwegian affairs. An example of an oppositional magazine like this is the Norwegian National Paper (Det Norske Nationalblad) which was active from 1815 to 1821, and was in many ways a precursor to and an inspiration for the aforementioned *The Citizen*.¹³⁶ The political elite undoubtedly felt threatened by Soelvold, as their position as the established elite was weakened by his rhetoric and his like-minded colleagues. When the farmer-opposition grew stronger, and eventually in 1833 took the majority in Parliament, this fear of losing their prominence and status only grew stronger.¹³⁷

Many of the problems surrounding *The Citizen* were centred around the fact that the established elite was running parliament based on the idea of consensus, with a very low tolerance for diverting opinions and behaviours, which was undeniably a weak foundation for their ruling. If the embetsmen did not exclude their harshest critics from the public discourse, they risked their entire system breaking down, hence the hatred of *The Citizen* and its publisher were almost ideologically founded.

¹³⁸ However, not long after the harsh public debate centred around *The Citizen*, political activism and interest-politics similar to that of Soevold became more accepted in the Norwegian political sphere, at least among liberal and radical opposition members from both the farmer and establishment classes. This eventually led to very prominent party lines in the Norwegian politics, and in the 1840s the suffrage-movement was fully underway, and the norms were slowly changing, as the country was progressing towards further democratisation. Soelvold and *The Citizen*, and the farmers they favoured, certainly caused a significant blow to the established elite's comfortable role as state-leaders and builders.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 334

¹³⁷ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 340

¹³⁸ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 340

¹³⁹ Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skriqhalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018. P. 340-41

The “farmer-parliaments” (Bondestortingene) of 1833 and 1836, around which a lot of the drama surrounding Soelvold was centred, caused opposition to the king to become far more visible in the Norwegian parliament. The “Farmer opposition” (Bondeopposisjonen) was mainly composed of freeholders (Odelsbønder), and they fought for frugality in state spending, and an expansion of local democracies in the country. In 1837, the farmer opposition managed to force through “The Presidency Laws” (Formannskapslovene), which allowed for municipal self-governance to become commonplace, as every parish (Prestegjeld) would elect individual municipal councils. These laws also allowed for county/regional governments (Amtsting/Fylkesting) which were, and still is to this day, composed of mayors from the municipalities within an Amt (county) as well as other local politicians, and within this regional government structure, a regional presidency was elected. Although these regional forms of governance emerged after 1837, they had very little purpose during their first few decades of existence, and matters like local schooling were not entrusted locally until the 1850s.¹⁴⁰

Frank Aarebrot clarifies that the common notion that the embetsmen universally hindered democratisation while the farmers furthered it, is very flawed. Aarebrot uses an example of how during the Tuberculosis pandemic in Europe, and Norway, when municipal governments made it harder, rather than easier, for poor people to survive.¹⁴¹ Yet, there was an obvious cleavage between the elite and the other members of the expanding political sphere. Based on the theories by Weber, a state is a state when the legal authority no longer is challenged, and politics stop being about controlling or toppling the monopoly on violence, but rather about controlling the institutions where this monopoly resides. However, at this point in the case of Norway this is not really applicable, as domestically politics had become modern and begun to focus on controlling the institutions, rather than the monopoly itself, however the Norwegian politicians, especially the freeholders, still opposed the central power, or the monopoly, making this rather enigmatic. To be a little bit

¹⁴⁰ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 33-34

¹⁴¹ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 34-35

bombastic, it is, by Weber's definition, like a Schrödinger's state - it did exist and did not exist simultaneously. By Joseph Schumpeter's theories, however, it is much more clearly a state, based on the monopoly on taxation, which resided within Norway.

In the 1860s the freedom of assembly was assured, which caused the activation of several societies, primarily religious ones, but later politically centered ones. Frank Aarebrot states that this was the main reason why the democratisation properly accelerated in the 1860s and a modernising democracy began developing.¹⁴² For one, women over the age of 25 began being considered as "myndig", or of age, and this was lowered to 21 in 1869. This is quite a puzzling notion, as before this all women who were not widows were by law considered children. Frank Aarebrot questions how a fully grown man could consider his own mother a child.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, this was a significant step towards a more developed democracy, as although women were not made eligible to vote, they gained a larger, and notably legal place in society, and their voices were heard to a larger degree than before, which will be discussed further in the fifth chapter.

In 1873, the Norwegians got their first prime minister, Frederick Stang, following the removal of the aforementioned "state-holder" position. This allowed for a significant restructuring of the political system in Norway. Until 1884, Norway was governed by the idea of separation of powers, with three power-centres, namely the parliament, the supreme court, and the government, overseen by the king. However, in 1884, parliamentarianism was introduced, which would let the government be overseen by parliament, not the king. Before this, the parliament had been a one-chamber assembly, but this split into a two-chamber solution with two branches of parliament. This allowed for a political coup, which the libertarian party took advantage of in 1882, when they filled both chambers of parliament with their own party members, which led to them having full control over Norwegian politics,

¹⁴² Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 53

¹⁴³ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 57

and allowing them the power to depose any government appointed by the king. Therefore, the members of parliament, who now were mainly liberal parliamentarians, forced the king, through clever political maneuvering, to appoint the leader of the liberal party, Johan Sverdrup, the role of prime minister. He took office on June 26th 1884.¹⁴⁴

This of course also meant that the political unions that had recently been permitted could evolve into political parties, and the two largest ones were Venstre and Høyre, as previously explained. Venstre was in the beginning a significantly larger party than Høyre, and with Venstre's aspirations of forming a British-style parliamentary system, the revisions went in that direction. Høyre called these developments unconstitutional, and strongly opposed them. In essence this was a power-struggle between parliamentarians and republicans (Høyre was more inspired by the American republican system) and parliamentarianism mainly won out because of the aforementioned coup. Diversification of the political sphere quickly became prominent after the introduction of the parliamentary system. The liberal party split into two, and the Labour party was born. The Labour party represented the working class, one branch of Venstre represented the periphery, and the other branch of Venstre, and Høyre represented the political left and right respectively. With this diversification and democratisation, the full enfranchising of all men and women became prominent topics in the political sphere. Furthermore, political activism became far more commonplace, likely because people could sense the beginning of the end of the Swedish-Norwegian union, which emboldened many to use their right to vote.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 46-64

¹⁴⁵ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 59-72

A symbolic day

The significance of the Norwegian celebration of May 17th as the constitutional day, the country's birthday, or its independence days is pivotal for understanding the political situation in Norway following 1814. As previously discussed, Norway did get two constitutions in 1814, the one of May 17th, and the one of November 4th. One can almost say that there was one Danish and one Swedish constitution, in that the first appointed a Danish king, and the second a Swedish one. Furthermore, the first would in all likelihood have brought Norway and Denmark back under the same ruler, just like the second one brought Norway and Sweden under the same ruler. The official constitution on which Norwegian politics and society operated after 1814, however, was the one from November 4th. Nevertheless, the Norwegians annually celebrated May 17th extensively, a tradition that is still ongoing to this day.¹⁴⁶ May 17th celebrations had been an annual occurrence since the beginning of the union, despite not being officially permitted. The king of the Swedish-Norwegian union, Carl John, had been unhappy with the celebrations for a long time, as he believed it was a celebration of his Danish counterpart, Christian Frederick. It is rather unlikely that the celebrations were in any way intended to honour Christian Frederick, but for Carl John the celebrations marked the date that his subjects had rebelled against him and the treaty of Kiel. The Norwegians were celebrating a constitution that named someone else king.

Carl John also likely feared that attention surrounding the national day in Norway would embolden liberal, parliamentary forces in Sweden as well, where many of the liberal concessions that the Norwegians had been granted were still not allowed. In Sweden, the nobility was not disbanded, as it had been in Norway in 1821, and the libertarians were a far less significant force in politics. In 1828, Carl John imposed stricter restrictions than ever on the May 17th celebrations, leading them to be virtually non-existent that year. However, as is customary when an

¹⁴⁶ May 17th was one of two days in the month of May that I took completely off from working on this thesis, due to the celebrations, albeit these were on a smaller scale than normal due to the conditions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

authority that isn't particularly well liked outlaws something that is, many did their best to disregard the fact that celebrations were outlawed. Coincidentally, on the 17th of May the year after, in 1829, a steamboat named "Constitutionen" (The Constitution) arrived in Christiania, and on the pretense of hailing the ship, celebrations started with shouts of "long live The Constitution." The local police force failed, or neglected to stop these celebrations, and eventually Swedish military forces stationed in a fortress outside the city were called in. The Swedish cavalry charged into the significant crowds gathered on the square, and soldiers beat the ones who did not return to their homes with the butts of their guns. Notably no shots were fired despite the Swedish soldiers being armed with sharp ammunition.¹⁴⁷

The Battle of the Square was the result of a series of back and forths between the Norwegian authorities, who wished to celebrate the national day, and the central power in Sweden, which would not permit it. After denying the members of Parliament any form of official celebrations of May 17th, Carl John made an exception in 1827. The exact reason why is unclear, and I have no bloody idea why. The celebrations were again outlawed the subsequent year. The public outrage following the Battle of the Square caused the central power in Sweden to fully allow May 17th celebrations, and in 1830 the celebrations were larger than ever, with a Parliamentary feast being the highlight. On May 17th 1833, a statue of Christian Krohg, who led the opposition against Carl John when the latter tried to take more direct control by the constitution in 1824, was unveiled in Christiania. Eventually May 17th became the official national day in 1836. In other words, after the Battle of the Square, May 17th rapidly became just as much anti-Swedish as pro-Norwegian.

In essence, May 17th became a symbolic day simply because it was outlawed, and its importance only grew by the harsh response to it in 1829. It embodied the continuous opposition to Swedish rule, and it was in many ways a peripheral demonstration of non-allegiance to the centre. Most importantly, however, is the fact that the day served as a catalyst for Norwegian nationalism, which became

¹⁴⁷ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 29-32

pivotal for the state and nation building and democratisation that took place between 1814 and 1905. However, it also created a stronger opposition to the later nationalistic forces that would emerge in Scandinavia.

In the 1880's, Swedish Nationalism became markedly more anti-democratic and anti-Norwegian, fueled by the conservative forces in Sweden at the time.¹⁴⁸ Some even called for forcing a revision of the Swedish-Norwegian Union on the Norwegians through war, or threat thereof, with the goal of assuring Sweden's dominance over Norway, and stopping the Norwegian parliamentarianism in its tracks.¹⁴⁹ This was in essence a continuation of Swedish nationalism as a nostalgic movement looking back at the "Great Swedish Hegemony" of the past, and the greatest enemy for such nationalistic sentiments was the potential of an independent Norway.¹⁵⁰ However, maybe luckily for Norway, a more reform-driven political order gradually replaced the nationalistic conservatives, which made negotiations regarding the dissolution of the union possible some decades later.¹⁵¹

In Denmark, nationalism never gained the same political importance as in Sweden, and even more so in Norway, as the Danish-German relations played a much bigger role in Danish politics, and in the forming of the Danish national identity.¹⁵² Generally, the Danish nationalism was liberal and democratic, however after the loss of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg in 1864, resentment towards the Germans and the so-called "national trauma" aided the nationalistic forces in Denmark in remaining prominent.¹⁵³

Scandinavianism emerged in the 1840's, serving as both competition and an addition for the other nationalistic movements in Scandinavia. The idea of

¹⁴⁸ Elvander, Nils. *Från Liberal Skandinavism till Konservativ Nationalism i Sverige*. Scandia, Bind 27, 1961. P. 377

¹⁴⁹ Elvander, Nils. *Från Liberal Skandinavism till Konservativ Nationalism i Sverige*. Scandia, Bind 27, 1961. P. 378

¹⁵⁰ Østerud, Øyvind. *Hva Er Nasjonalisme?* Universitetsforlaget, 1994. P. 42

¹⁵¹ Terjesen, Bjørn. *Vi Skiltes i Fred: Oppløsningen Av Den Norsk-Svenske Unionen i 1905*. Universitetsforlaget, 2001. P. 89

¹⁵² Bagge, Povl. *Nationalisme, Antinationalisme og Nationalfølelse i Danmark Omkring 1900*. Dansk Identitetshistorie 3. Folkets Danmark 1848.1940. P. 443-467

¹⁵³ Gustafsson, Harald. *Nordens Historia En Europeisk Region under 1200 år*. Studentlitteratur, 2012. P. 196

Scandinavian unity was in many ways a response to the threats of the ever-growing Russia and Prussia/Germany, where notably pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism flourished respectively. This Scandinavianism was divided in two, namely cultural and political Scandinavianism. For the latter, a union between Sweden, Denmark, and Norway was the main goal, in order to stand up to the aforementioned threat of Russia and Prussia.¹⁵⁴ However, in Norway, cultural Scandinavianism was the dominant line of thought, undoubtedly due to the much stronger nationalistic sentiment that flourished in Norway, while political Scandinavianism was at best, not very welcomed.¹⁵⁵ The focus of cultural Scandinavianism was to highlight the similarities of the three countries, emphasising shared language, culture, history, and practical cooperation.¹⁵⁶ However, it must be stated that the line where one form of Scandinavianism began and the other ended is often hard to distinguish, which will be further explored presently.

However, although there was significant support for this Scandinavianism among the academia in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark alike, this quickly faded. In Norway it never really caught on outside of the academia, largely due to the strong nationalistic sentiments that the Battle of the Square and May 17th had catalysed. When looking at the previously discussed theories of nationalism, an important distinction is the concept of defining “us and them”. Although the academia in Norway had not been as thoroughly separated from its Swedish and Danish counterparts, the rest of the Norwegian society had, largely in relation to the symbolism of May 17th. Scandinavianism failed, therefore, largely because of an inability to gather the Scandinavians as an “us” against the foreign “other”, due to the strict “us” and “them” sentiments that already existed between the Scandinavians. However, the notable exception, which is what gave Scandinavianism any sort of prominence at all, were the poets and academics.

¹⁵⁴ Sørensen, Lars Hovbakke. *Slagsbrødre Eller Broderfolk: Nordens Historie Gennem 1300 år*. Aschehoug, 2004. P. 132.

¹⁵⁵ Engman, Max, and Sandström Åke. *Det Nya Norden Efter Napoleon*. Almqvist & Wiksell, 2004. P. 76

¹⁵⁶ Hemstad, Ruth. *Fra Indian Summer Til Nordisk Vinter: Skandinavisk Samarbeid, Skandinavisme Og Unionsøpplosningen*. Akademisk Publisering, 2008. P. 245

Poets and academics

It is quite notable that the separation from Denmark in 1814 was political, not cultural. A cultural elite comprised of academics, embetsmen, and tradesmen who were generally educated in Copenhagen still controlled the cultural and academic spheres. They were bound to Denmark, both in language and tradition, and many were also bound to Denmark by blood. These Norwegians who were educated in Copenhagen often came into conflict with their Danish colleagues due to their patriotic nature, and criticism of Denmark. They also strongly advocated for the establishment of a Norwegian university. A notable publication from one of these Norwegian elites in Denmark was Nicolai Wergeland's "A Truthful Account of Denmark's Political Crimes Against The Kingdom of Norway." This exemplified a belief among many that Norway had lost important institutions and rights during the union with Denmark, like a king, liberty, courts of law, a fleet, a flag, a language, and other political and cultural items. They often looked to the Norwegian past, and the medieval kings in the "viking age" when the kings of Norway rivalled Danish and English kings in power and influence, and the Norwegian longships were dreaded on the European coasts.¹⁵⁷ When relating these sentiments to the previously discussed theories of nationalism, this can be seen as a constructed, imagined heritage. It was in essence a tracing of a national past, in order to pursue a national identity.

In Kiel in 1814, Carl John had promised to let Norway keep its new university that had been established due to the English blockade between Denmark and Norway in the Napoleonic war.¹⁵⁸ A strong reason for why this was permitted by Carl John might have been an idea of hindering close ties between Denmark and Norway from continuing, and from creating a new cleavage between Swedish and Norwegian academics, similar to what had existed among the Danish and Norwegian academics in Copenhagen. In other words, it might have been an attempt at stopping the imagining of a Norwegian identity. However, the academic and cultural

¹⁵⁷ Dale, Johannes Andreasson. *Norsk Litteraturhistorie for Gymnaset*. Cappelen, 1972. P. 88-89

¹⁵⁸ Alnæs, Karsten. *1814: Miraklenes år*. Schibsted, 2013. P. 21

construction of a Norwegian identity continued, as academics soon became central in politics.

The many academic explanations and perceptions of what actually happened in 1814 later influenced the public relation to, and perception of the Swedish-Norwegian Union. Essentially, historians divided themselves into two camps, the “Left-nationals” and the “Conservatives”, and the two carried close ties to the two dominant parties that emerged in Norway, namely “Left” and “Right” (Venstre and Høyre / Liberal and Conservative). The historical interpretations of the year 1814 were suddenly dragged into politics, especially in the debate over the dissolution of the union.¹⁵⁹ A notable fact is that these two parties, at the time of writing, form a government coalition, and one of the two, Høyre, is still one of the largest parties in Norway, while Venstre has dwindled to around 3-4% of the popular vote.

Among Norwegian historians, different interpretations of the events of 1814 emerged in the 1860s, generally split along Liberal and Conservative lines. The Liberal-national tradition was fronted by Ernst Sars, who focused on internal development in explaining the events, and the Conservative argument was fronted by Yngvar Nielsen, who argued external forces as the main cause of the events.¹⁶⁰ Sars argued that there was a Norwegian national continuity stretching back to the eight century, the time of the first kings of Norway. He argued that 1814 was a natural conclusion of a long-lasting evolutionary process among the Norwegian people.¹⁶¹ Sars considered the people, and especially the farmers, to be the ones who truly stood behind the drive for independence that emerged in 1814, and he stated that these farmers’ ancient freedom and right to property, and their fight to keep these rights against the Danes, were the very foundation on which the new Norwegian state rose.¹⁶² Sars also denied the Danish Prince Christian Frederick’s role in the Norwegian national project, as he argued that Christian Frederick was merely a tool for the

¹⁵⁹ Dahl, Ottar. *Norsk Historieforskning i 19. Og 20. århundre*. Universitetsforlaget 1976.

¹⁶⁰ Dahl, Ottar. *Norsk Historieforskning i 19. Og 20. århundre*. Universitetsforlaget 1976. P. 127

¹⁶¹ Sars, J. E. *Historisk Indledning Til Grundloven*. 1882. in J. E. Sars Samlede Værker, Bind III. Kristiania og København, Gyldendal, 1912. P. 431

¹⁶² Sars, J. E. *Historisk Indledning Til Grundloven*. 1882. in J. E. Sars Samlede Værker, Bind III. Kristiania og København, Gyldendal, 1912. P. 541

Norwegians, not the other way around. Furthermore, he argued that 1814 was something like a symbiosis of internal and external forces, with the Treaty of Kiel working as a catalyst.¹⁶³ No matter what, Sars argued, liberty and independence would inevitably be the end result, and 1814 just happened to be the year it broke through.

Sars' main "rival", Yngvar Nielsen, did not share Sars' ideas of collective forces and development in the national project, choosing instead to focus on individual persons and the consequences of "great power politics". Nielsen and Sars agreed on the fact that the Treaty of Kiel was a catalyst for the Norwegian national project, although Nielsen stressed its significance as the very beginning of everything that happened in 1814.¹⁶⁴ Nielsen believed that the ideas of independence and liberty emerged among enlightened citizens and officials, and that the decisions of the great powers of Europe on the eve of the Napoleonic Wars was what truly mattered, both in Kiel, Vienna, and Moss.¹⁶⁵ He also stressed the role of Christian Frederick as a wise tactician who showed considerable abilities in the field of politics, and who was absolutely vital for the Norwegian national project.¹⁶⁶ On top of this, as previously mentioned, Nielsen was politically active in the conservative party Høyre, and a personal friend and advisor to King Oscar II.¹⁶⁷

Of course, the dissolution of the Union in 1905 confirmed Sars' views in most peoples' eyes, and Sars' close ties with the party Venstre made him one of the political victors in 1905, and Nielsen's arguments were largely discredited, in what can be described as pure nationalistic fervor. Of course Nielsen's arguments were not at all without value or merit, and most historians today might be more inclined to agree with Nielsen than Sars on a lot of points. Nevertheless, the two historians became symbolic as leading academics of their respective political camps, and their

¹⁶³ Sars, J. Ernst. *Udsigt over Den Norske Historie, Fjerde Del*. Gyldendal, 1913. in J. E. Sars Samlede Værker, Bind III. Kristiania og København, Gyldendal, 1912. P. 599-612

¹⁶⁴ Nielsen, Yngvar. *Norge i 1814*. Stenersen Forlag, 1904. P. 23

¹⁶⁵ Nielsen, Yngvar. *Norge i 1814*. Stenersen Forlag, 1904. P. 5

¹⁶⁶ Nielsen, Yngvar. *Christian Frederik 1813-1814: Hans Planer Og Maal, Hans Drømme Og Skuffelser*. Gyldendal, 1915. P. 18

¹⁶⁷ Dahl, Ottar. *Norsk Historieforskning i 19. Og 20. århundre*. Universitetsforlaget 1976. P. 138

opposing views became yet another addition to the many power-struggles that happened in the short century from 1814 to 1905. Essentially, the two symbolised the academic construction of a Norwegian national identity, which became intrinsic in politics. Although most agreed that this identity existed, some deemed it to be incompatible with a union with Sweden, whereas others deemed it a benefit that the two union partners had clear identities. Nevertheless, it was a clear display of nationalistic sentiments in the political and academic spheres. These were, however, heavily influenced by the cultural sphere as well.

Henrik Wergeland became a prominent figure in Norway, largely due to his avid patriotic tendencies. He was proud of the independence that Norway had won in 1814, and he worked towards a Norwegian cultural, political, and linguistic renaissance, and he became a symbol of “Norwegianness” within the cultural sphere. He was an avid supporter of the aforementioned freeholder parliament in 1832, and he was chosen to hold a very symbolic speech at the aforementioned unveiling of the statue of Christian Krohg, the man who had defended the constitution from the attempted restrictions that Carl John had tried to implement. Wergeland also fought for the abolishment of the second paragraph of the constitution, the “jew-paragraph” which forbade jews from entering the realm.¹⁶⁸ When this paragraph was abolished, Frank Aarebrot argues, it was likely more out of respect for the then recently deceased Henrik Wergeland, than consideration of the rights of jews.¹⁶⁹ Henrik Wergeland also became a symbol of May 17th, when he during the Battle of the Square was a central instigator of the protest-celebration, and reportedly received a blow by the blunt edge of a Swedish sword.¹⁷⁰ In essence, he became a symbol of nationalism in Norway, as he was directly tied to the nationalistic sentiments in the cultural, academic, and political spheres.

His highly patriotic and nationalistic sentiments, and especially the notion that Norwegians who focused on foreign (generally meaning Danish) academia and

¹⁶⁸ Dale, Johannes Andreasson. *Norsk Litteraturhistorie for Gymnaset*. Cappelen, 1972. P. 90-105.

¹⁶⁹ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 36-38

¹⁷⁰ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 32

culture were essentially, for lack of a better word, idiots, caused Henrik Wergeland to come into feuds with several of his contemporaries, most notable Johan Sebastian Welhaven. Welhaven published harsh criticisms of Wergeland's writing, while sticking to the Danish literary and cultural traditions that he had learned from his Danish professors and teachers. He opposed Wergeland's ideas of a specific Norwegian culture, language, and heritage, and was critical to Wergeland's anti-Danish sentiments.¹⁷¹ These two essentially represented the opposing views in the cultural sphere in Norway after 1814. These were echoed in the later debates within the political sphere regarding whether Norway should be fully independent, or pursue further independence within the Swedish union. It was also echoed by the opposing ideas of Norwegian nationalism and Scandinavianism, the former of which was largely symbolised by May 17th, of which Wergeland himself became a symbol. Hence one can argue that for the development of nationalistic sentiments in Norway, Henrik Wergeland was a central figure.

Another significant person who emerged, and caused significant debate was Ivar Aasen. He was a linguist from the Norwegian west coast, and he knew Latin, German, French, English, and Old Norse, on top of Norwegian and Danish, although the latter two were at the time almost indistinguishable. However, being from the Norwegian west coast, Aasen spoke a dialect which was very different from the formalised Norwegian that was spoken in Christiania, and this inspired him to travel around the rural parts of Norway to study the dialects that were spoken there. This led to him founding a new language, Nynorsk (New Norwegian), which Aasen advocated as a language that should be taught throughout the country. This created a linguistic debate in Norway, in which the language of the periphery was presented as a competitor to the language of the central authority in Christiania. Aasen wished for a specifically Norwegian language, whereas others called for a reformation of the Danish language, and others again wished to just keep Danish as it were.¹⁷² This

¹⁷¹ Dale, Johannes Andreasson. *Norsk Litteraturhistorie for Gymnasiet*. Cappelen, 1972. P. 97-98

¹⁷² Dale, Johannes Andreasson. *Norsk Litteraturhistorie for Gymnasiet*. Cappelen, 1972. P. 114-116

linguistic debate that was started by Ivar Aasen is still relatively active today, and none of the two sides have been successful.¹⁷³

The final cultural personality that is in need of mention, although there are many more that could be mentioned, is Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, who is considered by many as the Norwegian national poet. He is the author of the current Norwegian national anthem, although this was initially written as a Scandinavian anthem, not a Norwegian one. In addition to being a poet, he was an active politician, and he held patriotic speeches which gained him significant popularity. However, he was also a strong believer in Scandinavianism, which led to him being hated and shunned for some time. However, towards the end of his career he went back to his roots of patriotic opposition to Swedish overlordship, and fought for Norwegian independence.¹⁷⁴ Although at times a controversial figure, Bjørnson became a prominent figure both in the cultural and political spheres in Norway, but perhaps more importantly, he became a central figure for Norwegian nationalistic sentiments, and opposition to Swedish rule, and the Swedish union. The ideas and movements that the poets and academics mentioned here represented, are the very core of what allowed for the building of a sovereign Norwegian nation, which was only possible with popular support and a developing idea of who or what the nation was.

¹⁷³ However, strong sentiments in the centres, Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim, call for the abolishment of Nynorsk, which is my personal mothertongue. It is a continuous centre-periphery cleavage.

¹⁷⁴ Dale, Johannes Andreasson. *Norsk Litteraturhistorie for Gymnasiet*. Cappelen, 1972. P. 153-165

Building a sovereign state

In the first couple of years after the breakup of the Danish-Norwegian union, from 1814-1816, all of the main Norwegian national institutions necessary for the development of a sovereign nation state were established. These included the parliament, central government departments, the supreme court, and the central bank, Norges Bank.¹⁷⁵ The pursuit of economic independence was one of the main driving forces in the Norwegian political sphere, as the Eidsvoll-men had included in the constitution several items dealing with economic matters. The constitution dictated that the monetary system should be controlled by the parliament, not the king, and as the parliament met only every third year in the beginning of its existence, the task of controlling the monetary system was delegated to the national bank, which has performed this task ever since.¹⁷⁶ This was highly necessary, as among the policies decided upon in Eidsvoll in 1814, it had been decided to print valueless banknotes in pure nationalistic fervor. This was done as part of an idea to move away from the former currency (spesiedaler) which carried value because it was a silver coin which was worth exactly its own silver-weight (spesie is a weight-unit for silver). They decided to print money, assuming that within fifteen years it would be possible to exchange these banknotes for silver. This proved a failure, as any person who has ever had an economics-class might deduce, and the Ministry of Finance was quickly established to right the economic wrongdoings of the Eidsvoll men.¹⁷⁷ The Ministry of Finance founded The Bank of Norway (Norges Bank) in 1816, although a central bank was not at the time very useful without possessing valuable metals, hence the newly formed bank began attempting to acquire silver in order to give value to its currency. Thus, the idea of demanding a silver-tax emerged, and throughout the country people were forced to scrape up whatever silver they had.¹⁷⁸ This was

¹⁷⁵ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 2

¹⁷⁶ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 2

¹⁷⁷ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 25

¹⁷⁸ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 26

especially difficult for the farmers, who were used to paying taxes in the form of grain and farmed goods, and it resulted in a farmers revolt, led by Halvor Hoel from Hedemarken. A significant number of farmers travelled to Christiania in 1818 in order to protest the silver-tax, for which many of the participants were punished.¹⁷⁹

Evidently, the monetary system in Norway was in a completely chaotic state after 1814, as many of the national institutions that had controlled it during the union with Denmark were no longer applicable, and the looser union with Sweden entailed sovereign monetary institutions.¹⁸⁰ Norges Bank was the real beginning of Norwegian economic independence, and it was set up with its main office in Trondheim, with three regional branch offices in the capital Christiania, in Bergen the largest city at the time, and in Kristiansand, a city in the south of Norway.¹⁸¹ This is significant as it shows an unwillingness to centralise all significant institutions in Christiania, and it may arguably signify that there was an attempt to unite the periphery (Norway) against the central power (Sweden) by dispersing power throughout the peripheral region. It might also have been an attempt to appease the farmers, who generally resided in these peripheral regions, especially in the Trondheim area, and give them more control over the economy which they were essentially funding.

In 1820, another challenge emerged for the Norwegian economy, as Denmark demanded that Norway should pay its part of the war-debt from the Napoleonic Wars. The Norwegians initially refused to pay, and five years of negotiations followed, despite the fact that most foreign powers believed that as Norway had been a part of Denmark it was obvious that the country should pay its share of the debt. However, after long negotiations, Carl John finally gave an ultimatum to the Norwegians, stating that if the Norwegian people wished to remain independent they would have to pay the debt, otherwise the country would be fully subordinated to

¹⁷⁹ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 26

¹⁸⁰ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 1-2

¹⁸¹ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 14

Sweden. This ultimatum quickly ended the negotiations, and the Norwegians paid the debt. Aarebrot argues that accepting this ultimatum and paying the national war-debt was a significant step in the development of Norwegian economic independence, and it certainly aided in legitimising the Norwegian economy in the eyes of foreign rulers.¹⁸² The choice of spending the majority of the money available to the young state and its countrymen, in order to pay off a debt they did not believe they were legally obligated to pay, surely points to the significance that was found in legitimising the independent Norwegian economy, and not to mention to ensure the continued process of making Norway sovereign.

The foundation for the Norwegian mint was laid in the monetary system laws of June 14th, 1816. Here paragraph one stated that the nation's monetary would be the Norwegian Speciedaler, divided into 120 Shillings, with 9 ¼ Daler being equal to one Mark fine silver after Colognian measurements.¹⁸³ The First Norwegian 8-Shilling was published in 1817, and was titled to Carl XIII, King of Sweden and Norway, however, starting on January 18th 1819, all coins made reversed the title to King of Norway and Sweden.¹⁸⁴ This might seem like a rather insignificant change, but for the patriotic Norwegians it must undoubtedly have been a matter of pride. The fact that the Norwegian mint issued coins under the King of Norway and Sweden, not Sweden and Norway, was significant as the latter almost insinuated that Norway was subordinated to Sweden, which any patriotic Norwegian at the time, which was most of them, would pronounce loud and clear that they were certainly not. On June 4th, 1873, gold replaced silver as the monetary system's guarantee of value, and Denmark, Sweden, and Norway agreed to implement a common monetary system, utilising Krone (Crowns) and Øre (Cents) as monetary units, in which 100 Cents was equal to one Crown.¹⁸⁵

The story of the Norwegian mint almost makes it seem like the Norwegian monetary history post 1814 was a success, but this was not true at all. It took until

¹⁸² Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 27

¹⁸³ Holm, Johan. *Nordiske Mønter Efter 1808*. Politikens Forlag. København, 1973. P. 134

¹⁸⁴ Holm, Johan. *Nordiske Mønter Efter 1808*. Politikens Forlag. København, 1973. P. 135

¹⁸⁵ Holm, Johan. *Nordiske Mønter Efter 1808*. Politikens Forlag. København, 1973. P. 136

1842 before Norges Bank could make good on the promises made in 1816, as establishing trust in a new currency and monetary authority took time. Additionally the new monetary authority was cautious to make large changes in fear of depleting the silver reserves in the country.¹⁸⁶ Essentially, the job of policy makers was to achieve near full monetary reconstruction, through installing stability and making the system work. During the years 1816-1822, several measures and revisions were implemented towards this end, and most successful of these was the 1822 decision by the parliament that Norges Bank should finally begin accepting notes in exchange for silver, albeit with a significant premium. This effectively created a limit for bank note depreciation, and in 1842 the premium had been reduced significantly, and bank notes could finally be converted into their face value in silver.¹⁸⁷ This essentially constituted the first phase of monetisation of the new, independent Norwegian economy, and it laid the grounds for the second phase, which entailed the evolution of the banking sector, and the establishment of deposit banking.

By the 1850s, Norway had achieved significant stability in its monetary system, with a firm commitment to currency convertibility. This would stay stable until the international breakdown of the monetary system at the outbreak of the First World War. Norway also saw steady economic growth, fueled by exporting natural resources, which enabled the population to double in the second half of the 19th century, and the economy rapidly modernised, with industry gradually replacing agriculture as the main source of income for the country.¹⁸⁸ This enabled the Norwegian economy to partake in the trend of an expanding international economy towards the end of the 19th century. The Norwegian energy sector, mainly based on hydroelectric power, attracted foreign investment, and allowed for highly efficient factories, which aided the emerging shipping industry, which in turn led to urbanisation, and an increasingly market-oriented economy.¹⁸⁹ This meant that

¹⁸⁶ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 48

¹⁸⁷ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 49

¹⁸⁸ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 113

¹⁸⁹ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 114

Norway became gradually more economically independent from Sweden, and in 1897, after Sweden had opted for a rather protectionist trade policy, while Norway continued to favour generally free trade, Sweden ended the free trade agreement within the union. This effectively ended one of the main arguments for maintaining the union, namely to forming a greater economic entity.¹⁹⁰

Frank Aarebrot argues that the first real phase of state and nation building in Norway began in the 1850s. The central power began constructing roads, lighthouses, railways, and other infrastructure, and the notion of adoring the state became a common principle. The first Norwegian prime minister Frederick Stang was a vital part of this, as helped the way in reforming the infrastructure necessary for the facilitation of transportation of goods and people.¹⁹¹ This rapid modernisation of the country undoubtedly accelerated the aforementioned nationalistic sentiments that grew in Norway in the 19th century. As discussed previously, most theories of nationalism argue that there is a connection between modernisation and nationalism, as an increasingly connected community within a territory under the oversight of a state begins to imagine, or invent a nation.

In the case of Norway, however, the emergence of nationalistic sentiments began before the state and nation building accelerated. In fact, it began before Norway was even a state. It was initially built upon what Ernest Renan called a selective understanding of history, which led some to imagine a Norwegian nation. Thereafter, the clear distinction of “us” and “them” that emerged as a result of the opposition to the union with Sweden accelerated these sentiments. Finally, when national institutions began to form, and Norway became increasingly sovereign, and had a gradually declining dependence on its union partner, the nationalistic sentiments exploded.¹⁹² The processes of democratisation and state and nation building inevitably led to nationalistic sentiments occupying the political, academic,

¹⁹⁰ Eitheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 253

¹⁹¹ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 47

¹⁹² An entire thesis could easily have been written about the nationalistic sentiments that grew towards the end of the Swedish-Norwegian Union.

cultural, and public spheres alike, until these sentiments were ready to topple the very union which initially had accelerated their emergence.

V: The Year 1905

In the spring of 2005, the Norwegian Public Broadcasting Network (Norsk Rikskringkasting: NRK) published a tv-show featuring the beloved comedy trio The Dal Brothers (Brødrene Dal). The series, titled “The Dal Brothers and the Mystery of Carl XII’s gaiters” (Original title in Norwegian: “Brødrene Dal og Mysteriet om Karl XIIIs Gamasjer”) is the story of how the three brothers, on a mission from the Norwegian king and aided by a time-travelling device, need to save Norway from being once again subjugated to Swedish rule on the 100-year anniversary of the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union. In the series, the trio travels through the Norwegian history, back to a series of symbolic dates and events, in order to stop a Swedish plot dating back to 1718 and the death of Carl XII, which aimed to bring Norway under Swedish rule once and for all. Of course the three brothers inevitably stop the plot from coming to fruition, and by the end of the story, Norway remains free, the ones responsible for the plot are incarcerated, and the Dal Brothers become national heroes.¹⁹³ More notable than this tv-series’ amusing and exciting story, however, is the public cultural and historical understanding that it represents.

Although a wholly satirical adventure/comedy show, not unlike Monty Python, and not at all meant to be taken seriously, the show does point out some common tropes that are present in the Norwegian public’s understanding of history. The show points out something akin to an intrinsic mistrust of Sweden, and an idea that Swedish authorities through scheming and manipulation were attempting to subdue and suppress Norway and Norwegians. This is almost certainly an echo from the latter years of the Swedish-Norwegian Union, when relations between the two union partners were turning sour, and the threat of war loomed. This mistrust and dislike of the Swedes, fuelled by a strong Norwegian nationalistic sentiment, is what eventually led to the mass-mobilisation for full Norwegian independence from Sweden towards 1905.

¹⁹³ Søyland, Annelene. *Brødrene Dal og Mysteriet om Karl XIIIs Gamasjer*. NRK, 2004.

Frank Aarebrot argues that when Norway finally became independent in 1905, this was a part of a long historical trend, in which new states emerged in territories that were previously absorbed by empires.¹⁹⁴ Here the case of Norway almost functions as an example in miniature, as it was a small state that emerged from a small territory, exchanged between two of Europe's smallest empires. However, it was also a part of another historical trend, namely the emergence of nationalism as a significant political force, which had "... the capacity to shake states and empires."¹⁹⁵ The case of Norway equally functions as an example in miniature of this trend, whereas other nationalistic movements around Europe, like the Italian and German unifications and pan-slavism, are much larger scale examples. These two trends combined caused the situation that in 1905 ended the Swedish-Norwegian Union.

¹⁹⁴ Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. *Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging*. Fagbokforlaget, 2014. P. 124

¹⁹⁵ O'Leary, Brendan. *On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism*. British Journal of Political Science 27, no. 2, 1997. P. 191

Economic Independence

The Norwegian economy had, as previously mentioned, become rapidly more industrialised throughout the second half of the 19th century. And towards the dissolution of the union with Sweden in 1905, a new stage of industrialisation was beginning, coupled with a significant growth in the financial sector. This would inevitably lead to rapid industrialisation, and economic growth, largely aided by foreign investment and decision-making capabilities previously unheard of.¹⁹⁶ This had caused trade to become increasingly important for the Norwegian economy, as it started producing more goods, as well as needed more goods and equipment from abroad. Shipping and trade both across the Atlantic ocean and to the British isles became fundamental for the growing Norwegian economy. Sweden, however, began to gradually adopt protective isolationist trade policies. Therefore, trade policy became a significant cause of strain between the two union partners in the 1890s, because they disagreed on policies, and because Swedish and Norwegian exporters both competed in the same sectors.¹⁹⁷

From 1814 onwards, the Norwegians had pursued economic independence, and since the 1850s, Norway had enjoyed monetary and economic stability and steady economic growth, fueled by exporting natural resources.¹⁹⁸ The Norwegian economy was part of a trend of an expanding international economy, for which the Norwegian hydroelectric energy sector attracted foreign investment, as this allowed for highly efficient factories around the country, which aided the emerging shipping industry, which in turn led to urbanisation, and an increasingly market-oriented economy.¹⁹⁹ This led to Norway becoming increasingly economically independent from Sweden, and in 1897, after Sweden had opted for the aforementioned

¹⁹⁶ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 219

¹⁹⁷ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 253

¹⁹⁸ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 113

¹⁹⁹ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 114

protectionist trade policy, Norway continued to favour generally free trade. This made Swedish authorities end the free trade agreement within the union, effectively ending the larger economic entity that a union provided, and with that, ending one of the main arguments to keep the union.²⁰⁰ When the threat of war between the two union partners loomed in 1905, the established trust in the monetary institutions in Norway was exemplified by the fact that when Norway and Sweden were at the brink of war in 1905, the demand for liquidity in the form of bank notes increased significantly, but not the demand for securities in gold, which had replaced silver as the source of monetary value.²⁰¹ This essentially symbolised that Norway was fully economically independent, even before the union was broken up.

²⁰⁰ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 253

²⁰¹ Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 254

Political Independence

In the 1860s, a parliament and democracy similar to that of Norway had emerged in Sweden. Despite the fact that both the Swedish and Norwegian parliaments were split between parties with differing political views, the general trend was that in matters regarding their union partner, both parliaments would close their ranks and stand united against the other. Norwegian proposals in parliament were denounced in Sweden just because they were Norwegian and vice versa. This was coupled with a strong trend of democratisation and diversification of the political sphere in Norway, where universal male suffrage had been established, and the fight for women's suffrage was well underway. Furthermore the labour movement was rapidly growing, and civil rights became more dominant issues in the public debate. Perhaps most prominent of these were women's rights.²⁰² Both Norway and Sweden were turning into far more modern democracies, but the Norwegians still lacked some political liberties.

Norway was one of the first countries to sign the metric convention, introducing meters and centimeters as the official form of measurement. It was also one of the first countries to implement the decimal system used in the new currency based on Crowns and Cents. This was due to the fact that the Norwegians were not permitted to conduct foreign policy in the classical sense, but academic, and scientific foreign policy was permitted. The Norwegians essentially made revisions to their system because they could.²⁰³ However, in 1899, plans were made for a separate Norwegian consular establishment, set to have a combined diplomatic staff for the two kingdoms. A joint commission was established, but negotiations soon turned sour, partly due to Norway's construction of border fortifications, and hopes for conciliation were over by November 1904, when Norwegian authorities were

²⁰² Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 73-78

²⁰³ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 54

gravely offended by a series of clauses implemented by the Swedes that essentially confirmed Norway as a junior partner to the union.²⁰⁴

The Norwegians blamed Sweden, maybe rightly so, for the breakdown of negotiations, giving the Norwegian government an easy argument for aggressively fronting anti-Swedish policies and calling for a breakup of the union as a whole. By branding anyone who opposed these sentiments as anti-Norwegian and pro-Swedish imperialist, most of the political sphere was effectively forced to take this same approach. Supporting the dissolution of the union became the only viable move for political survival. When Christian Michelsen became prime minister after the elections in the spring of 1905, his government, supported by parliament, immediately passed a resolution establishing an independent Norwegian consular service. As previously mentioned, foreign policy was the last aspect of politics that was not permitted to the Norwegians. When passing the resolution, they did so fully expecting a veto from the Swedish king, and when this came the new government immediately resigned despite protests from the king, and they did so assured that the king would be unable to form a new government through the legal political means, hence the parliament was left with all political power in Norway, and the king with none.²⁰⁵

On June 7th, 1905, the Norwegian parliament unilaterally called for the dissolution of the union, on the basis of the king being unable to fulfill his function as regent and head of state. Thereafter, parliament called for a referendum, or a people's vote, on the dissolution of the union. On August 13th, a near unified majority voted in favour of the dissolution of the union, with the yes vote winning some 99.6%. Around 85% of those eligible to vote showed up to the polls, and the total tally measured some 371,811 "yes" votes, and 184 "no" votes.²⁰⁶ Additionally, the "Norwegian Women's National Council, an organisation of women who were working towards universal female suffrage, gathered some 244,765 signatures from

²⁰⁴ Barton, Hildor Arnold. *Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814-1905*. Southern Illinois University Press, 2003. P. 77-78

²⁰⁵ Barton, Hildor Arnold. *Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814-1905*. Southern Illinois University Press, 2003. P. 78

²⁰⁶ Appendix 3

women who were in favour of the dissolution of the union, but could not show this at the polls, as they still did not have the right to vote.²⁰⁷ This was of course an incredible show of confidence in the Norwegian parliament, by the public. However, one important factor must be taken into consideration regarding this referendum: The Swedish king had already been deposed by parliament, and independence had been declared. What the referendum actually asked was whether the voters agreed with the affirmed decision that parliament had reached regarding the dissolution of the union with Sweden.²⁰⁸

In an article titled “The Myth of Agreement and 184 Traitors”, Nils Ivar Agøy points out that there is a common misconception that the Norwegian people voted about whether or not they wanted to dissolve the union with Sweden on August 13th 1905, whereas what they actually voted for was whether or not they agreed with the parliament’s decision. Agøy also argues that this referendum was hastily called in order to avoid the potential of a referendum organised by Swedish authorities who deemed the union to be still in effect.²⁰⁹ Hence, the result was likely so wildly in favour of the parliament’s decision because there was nothing to be won by being against it. For the ones who stood behind the dissolution of the union and called for the referendum, it was a way of showing the Swedes that they had the people’s support behind them. As previously mentioned, clever political maneuvering had forced the political sphere to be wholly for the dissolution of the union, and so, in a similar manner, had clever maneuvering caused almost the entirety of the public sphere to state the same. The parliament essentially called for a vote on independence in an already independent nation.

Because of the strong nationalistic sentiment that had flourished in Norway since 1814, a referendum held simply asking the population beforehand whether or not they wanted to dissolve the union with Sweden would almost undoubtedly have come out in favour of the dissolution of the union. However, by doing it in the way

²⁰⁷ Appendix 4

²⁰⁸ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 80

²⁰⁹ Agøy, Nils Ivar. *Myten om Enighet og 184 Svikere*. Dagbladet, 19.07.2005.

that they did, the Norwegian parliament managed to claim unprecedented public support, legitimizing their sovereignty with a success rarely seen anywhere else. This legitimacy was in essence two-sided. It gave the population the notion that nearly everyone shared their belief in the state, and it sent a message abroad that the Norwegian people wanted the union to end, and it was not just the wish of an established political elite, although it was largely the political elite which had managed to make it happen.

Against the enemies of the realm

After the unilateral declaration of independence by the Norwegians in June 7th, 1905, the Norwegian army mobilised along the Swedish border.²¹⁰ This border had been heavily fortified leading up to 1905, as Norwegian authorities had ensured the building of a series of modern concrete forts along the border to Sweden. Several of these forts were built in the Region of Østfold, where most of the decisive events of the war of 1814 had taken place. During an inspection of these fortifications at some point around the turn of the century, together with the Norwegian minister of defence, the Swedish king Oscar II supposedly asked the Norwegian minister against whom these fortifications were built. Weighing his words carefully, the minister of defence supposedly responded “against the enemies of the realm, your majesty!”²¹¹ Although this story is likely nothing more than a story, it perfectly embodies the ice cold relations between Norway and Sweden in the latter days of the union.

In the book *Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815-1915*, Sandi Cooper commends the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union as an amazing example of a peaceful separation. Cooper refers to how some activists both in Sweden and Norway were avidly against any form of warfare against the other, and how a substantial part of Swedes were willing to dissolve the union and recognize Norwegian independence and self-determination. Cooper argues that this was the root of pacifist tendencies in both Norway and Sweden in the 20th century.²¹² Cooper neglects to see how the peaceful dissolution of the union came on the back of a very real threat of war.

At the turn of the century, the Norwegian parliament granted funds to the expansion of Norway’s military capabilities, both by constructing fortifications on the Swedish border, and by expanding the Norwegian fleet with additional iron-clad

²¹⁰ Eitheim, Øyvind, et al. *A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. P. 253

²¹¹ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 75

²¹² Cooper, Sandi E. *Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815-1914*. Oxford University Press, 1991. P. 74

warships. Meanwhile, the Norwegians avidly started to celebrate war-heroes who had defeated Swedish forces in battle in the past.²¹³ As previously mentioned, this military expansion had angered the Swedes already, and while political relations were turning sour, this happened with an emerging threat of armed conflict. Strong nationalistic forces in Norway made sure that the military became prominent, and all negotiation between the two union partners towards the end were done with the backdrop of the escalating tensions, and threat of war.

After the unilateral declaration of the dissolution of the union on June 7th, both sides mobilised their armies and prepared for negotiations. On August 31st, negotiations began at Karlstad, and they were mainly focused on the legality and issues with only one of the two members of the union declaring this dissolution. At these negotiations the threat of war reached its peak, as exemplified by a map that the Norwegian Prime Minister Christian Michelsen had at the negotiations, showing the positions of the troops along the Swedish-Norwegian border.²¹⁴ Over the summer, Swedish diplomats had attempted to garner support from the great powers of Europe, much like Carl John had done in the leadup to 1814. However, the Swedish diplomats were met with the message that the great powers, which were concerned with forming alliances and ramping up their own militaries preparing for the looming Great War, were not interested in participating in a war on the Scandinavian peninsula, and advised recognition of Norwegian independence sooner rather than later. The Norwegian diplomat Fritz Wedel Jarlsberg, however, was more successful in his diplomatic mission that summer and returned to Norway with the message that the Great British Empire under King Edward would support Norwegian independence.²¹⁵ Although it is unlikely that the British would have done much in the case of a Swedish offensive into Norway, their support for Norway must undoubtedly have been as big of a deterrent for Sweden as it was a confidence boost for the Norwegians.

²¹³ Bomann-Larsen, Tor. *Haakon & Maud*. Cappelen, 2006. P. 230

²¹⁴ Appendix 5

²¹⁵ Bomann-Larsen, Tor. *Haakon & Maud*. Cappelen, 2006. P. 339-340

War was avoided in 1905, but likely only narrowly. If further great powers would have decided to involve themselves in the conflict between the two, this might have easily replaced the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the history books. However, the two opposing armies nevertheless exemplified how far both sides were willing to go, in the event that the negotiations at Karlstad were to break apart. The peaceful resolution was undoubtedly a welcome one, but the situation in 1905 perfectly showed how little the dynamics between the two union partners had changed since 1814. However, in 1905, Norway had done what Christian Frederick failed to do, namely garner support from one of the great powers.

Kingmaking

On November 25th, 1905, the Danish prince Carl arrived in Christiania with his English wife Maud. They were met by Prime Minister Christian Michelsen, and Carl changed his name to the more traditional Norwegian name Haakon VII. Frank Aarebrot jokingly comments one of the main benefits of electing a Danish king was that he barely needed any language training. However, Aarebrot argues, an even bigger advantage was his wife, whose father was king Edward of England. This confirmed the Norwegian alliance with the British Empire, and guaranteed Norwegian independence and sovereignty.²¹⁶ As previously stated, the majority of Norwegian trade relations were to the British isles, and stronger political ties were undoubtedly a welcome sight for the Norwegian politicians who were about to take on the task of governing an entirely independent nation state.

The decision to elect prince Carl of Denmark for the Norwegian throne was affirmed by the second referendum of 1905, held on November 12th-13th. This referendum was not as successful as the first, although it still carried a significant majority. Around 75% of those eligible to vote met up to the polls, and of those some 78,9% voted in favour of crowning Carl as regent, and making Norway a constitutional monarchy.²¹⁷ With this referendum, the new regency was legitimized to a large degree, just like independence was legitimized by the other referendum of the same year. By tying Norway, Denmark and Britain together politically through the regent, the Norwegians achieved what they hadn't managed in 1814, namely ensuring the support of a great power, and legitimizing the new state abroad as well as domestically. When prince Carl became king Haakon VII this was the culmination of a long process towards full Norwegian independence as a constitutional monarchy and nation state.

²¹⁶ Aarebrot, Frank. *200 År På 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814*. Kagge, 2014. P. 80-81

²¹⁷ Appendix 3

Conclusion

In the introduction to this thesis, the following questions were posed: How did the Norwegians go from creating a constitution in 1814, over which they fought, and lost, a war with Sweden, to seceding from the newly formed union 91 years after? What were the relevant factors that caused 99.6% of Norwegian voters to vote in favour of dissolving the union with Sweden in 1905? To what degree was Norwegian independence a result of a process of state and nation building, spearheaded and constructed by the different elites in the country? How is the case of Norway relevant for the study of nationalism, regionalism, and secessionism? Throughout this thesis, the answers to these questions have been thoroughly discussed, and a few conclusions surface.

In 1814, Christian Frederick and the Norwegian elite saw a chance to vastly increase their personal political power by rebelling against the Treaty of Kiel and breaking out as an independent kingdom. Hence, from the onset, the Norwegian independence movement, as well as the anti-Swedish sentiments, were spearheaded by the country's elite. This sparked several processes that developed and became dominant factors in Norwegian society over the next 91 years. These processes were divided between the three central concepts of power, culture, and economy.

Despite what can be described as a failed revolution in 1814, the Norwegians did manage to lay the basis for democratisation and state building in the country. The revolt against the treaty of Kiel failed even though Christian Frederick was legitimised by law through the constitution. Here it was proven that a ruler being legitimized does not equate a successful rule, unless he is able to maintain and control a monopoly on violence. Christian Frederick's counterpart, Carl John, did not have the same legitimacy as a ruler from the Norwegian people, but in the eyes of the great powers of Europe he was legitimized by them, and by the treaty of Kiel, which arguably mattered far more. This allowed the French field marshal turned crown prince to challenge and overtake the monopoly on violence, and by granting the

Norwegians a constitution after winning the war of 1814 he was legitimized by law, as well as by his own projection of power through military might.

The constitution allowed for some basic civil liberties in Norway, but nothing was really guaranteed by the constitution. As the established elite was afraid of losing their spot at the head of society in Norway, developments in most areas were slow and limited at first. However, democratization and diversification of the political sphere quickly led to a wider political elite forming, which in turn led to more radical ideas being fronted in parliament. This deepened the political cleavage between the two union partners, which in turn caused further agitation, and therefore a widening of this cleavage. Towards the end of the union, the only remaining political power that the Norwegian parliament lacked was the ability to conduct foreign policy, which became a central feud leading to the dissolution of the union.

Growing political independence, and a growing political sphere also led to poets and academics taking a more prominent role in society, especially those who wrote positively about the Norwegian national project. These poets and academics often fronted radical and nationalistic sentiments and policies which made them hugely popular and symbolic of their time. As the cultural, academic, and political spheres were generally very closely related, developments in one often also drove developments in the other. Hence when one of these started favouring nationalistic sentiments the others followed, until nearly all aspects of society were fuelled by a strong and deep-rooted sense of nationalistic pride.

Of course no state can run without an economy, hence economic independence was a central pursuit of Norwegian politicians from 1814 onwards. This was a gradual process, which culminated shortly before the end of the union, when differences in trade policy and trade competition between Norway and Sweden became another central cause behind the dissolution of the union.

By establishing what is here referred to as monopolies on violence and taxation, meaning in reality state sovereignty or supremacy, the groundwork was laid for making the state culturally homogenous. By creating a perceived community in

the public consciousness, through defining a “correct” language, religion, and set of cultural traits, nationalism emerged as a central force of destabilisation in the Swedish-Norwegian Union. This led to large-scale national consolidation, as the state established legal and territorial structures.

In creating such a “belonging” to the nation through the imagining of a community, political homogeneity was effectively reached. By essentially making the only viable political stance one based on nationalistic pro-independence sentiments, political competition to the dissolution was eliminated domestically, allowing for the political elite to ensure foreign support for Norwegian independence as a final step towards dissolving the union.

In essence, Norwegian state and nation building and the growth of nationalistic sentiments in Norway was the result of processes that started in 1814, with the affirmation of the union, and accelerated in all sectors and spheres of society towards its culmination in 1905. These processes were largely top-down and dictated, or at least ignited by the established elite, and as the elite was diversified, the processes were accelerated even further.

Many of these processes fit into ideas and theories developed on these topics over the last decade. However, one can conclude that none of these theories perfectly explain such complicated processes as those explored here. This does not of course delegitimize or denounce these theories, but it rather proves the necessity of looking at an event, process, or situation from several angles and apply several interpretations in order to fully understand the issues at hand.

Although Anderson’s and Gellner’s ideas of nationalism somewhat correspond to the development of nationalistic sentiments in Norway from 1814 to 1905, they do not do so flawlessly, and one would need to aggressively shoehorn the case study into the theoretical framework for it to fit. Similarly, Tilly’s idea of the state and power-relations are largely applicable in some ways, but falls short in others. Hence one must value the theories for what they are, but add further value to

them by showing their insufficiencies, for which the case study of Norway has been of great help.

Finally, the central factor that caused the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union was the emergence of Norwegian nationalistic sentiments which emerged as a result of political competition and the processes of state and nation building and democratisation that political competition brought with it. Hence nationalism was not a root cause from the beginning, but it gradually became the main tool with which the Norwegians broke the union in 1905.

Bibliography

Aarebrot, Frank. 200 år på 200 Sider: En Kavalkade over Norges Historie Etter 1814. Kagge, 2014.

Aarebrot, Frank H., and Kjetil Evjen. Land, Makt Og Følelser: Stats- Og Nasjonsbygging. Fagbokforlaget, 2014.

Aarebrot, Frank H. Regional Differences in Political Mobilization in Norway: Local Infrastructure Development, Political Polarization and Suffrage Extension, 1868-1897. International Political Science Association, 1973.

Aasen, Ivar. Skrifter I Andre Utgaava. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1926

Agøy, Nils Ivar. Myten om Enighet og 184 Svikere. Dagbladet, 19.07.2005.

Alnæs, Karsten. 1814: Miraklenes år. Schibsted, 2013.

Bagge, Povl. Nationalisme, Antinationalisme og Nationalfølelse i Danmark Omkring 1900. Dansk Identitetshistorie 3. Folkets Danmark 1848. 1940.

Barton, Hildor Arnold. Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814-1905. Southern Illinois University Press, 2003.

Bomann-Larsen, Tor. Haakon & Maud. Cappelen, 2006.

Colburn, Henry. The Court Journal: Court Circular & Fashionable Gazette, Volumen 5. Alabaster, Pasemore & sons, Limited, 1833.

Cooper, Luke. The International Relations of the 'Imagined Community': Explaining the Late Nineteenth-Century Genesis of the Chinese Nation." Review of International Studies 41, no. 3, 2015.

Cooper, Sandi E. Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815-1914. Oxford University Press, 1991.

Dahl, Ottar. Norsk Historieforskning i 19. Og 20. århundre. Universitetsforlaget, 1976.

Dale, Johannes Andreasson. Norsk Litteraturhistorie for Gymnaset. Cappelen, 1972.

Danielsen, Helge. "Fædrelandssind" Og "Fosterländskhet": Nasjonsoppfatninger i De Norske Og Svenske Høyrebevegelsene, 1885-1905. Unipub, 2004.

Danielsen, Helge. "Nasjonalisme i Høyre før 1905?". *Jakten på det Norske. Perspektiver på Utviklingen av en Norsk Nasjonal Identitet på 1800-tallet*. (red. Øystein Sørensen), Oslo, Ad Notam Gyldendal, 1998.

Davidson, Neil. Reimagined Communities - A Review of Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. International Socialism 117, 2008.

Dettmer, Jamie. In the Eye of The Storm: Catalonia's Police Debate Whom to Obey. VOA News, 2017.

Available at:

<https://www.voanews.com/europe/eye-storm-catalonias-police-debate-whom-obey>

Dyrvik Ståle, et al. Aschehougs Norgeshistorie. H. Aschehoug & Co, 2007.

Eitrheim, Øyvind, et al. A Monetary History of Norway, 1816-2016. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Elvander, Nils. Från Liberal Skandinavism till Konservativ Nationalism i Sverige. Scandia, Bind 27, 1961.

Engman, Max, and Sandström Åke. Det Nya Norden Efter Napoleon. Almqvist & Wiksell, 2004.

Frydenlund Bård. Spillet Om Norge: Det Politiske året 1814. Gyldendal, 2014.

Gustafsson, Harald. Nordens Historia En Europeisk Region under 1200 år. Studentlitteratur, 2012.

Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Cornell University Press, 1983.

Hemstad, Ruth. Fra Indian Summer Til Nordisk Vinter: Skandinavisk Samarbeid, Skandinavisme Og Unionsøpplosningen. Akademisk Publisering, 2008.

Holm, Johan. Nordiske Mønter Efter 1808. Politikens Forlag. København, 1973.

Ibsen, Henrik. Henrik Ibsens Norske Stilebog fra 1848. Utg. Gyldendal, Oslo, 1977.

Ibsen, Henrik. Terje Vigen ; Brand ; Peer Gynt ; Gengangere. Utg. Aschehoug. Oslo. 1987.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain. Sampson Low, Marston, 1897.

Magnus, Alv. Hans Nielsen Hauge, Mannen som Forandret Norge. Proklamedia, 2020

Moi, Toril. *Henrik Ibsen and the Birth of Modernism: Art, Theater, Philosophy*. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Moore, Margaret. "Liberal Nationalism and the Challenge of Essentialism." *Liberal Nationalism and Its Critics*, 2019, pp. 188–202., doi:10.1093/oso/9780198842545.003.0011.

Nielsen, Yngvar. *Christian Frederik 1813-1814: Hans Planer Og Maal, Hans Drømme Og Skuffelser*. Gyldendal, 1915.

Nielsen, Yngvar. *Christian Frederik 1813-1814: Hans Planer Og Maal, Hans Drømme Og Skuffelser*. Gyldendal, 1915

Nielsen, Yngvar. *Norge i 1814*. Stenersen Forlag, 1904.

Nymark, Kristian. "Om Klapper-Slanger Og Statsborgerlige Skrighalse." *Heimen*, vol. 55, no. 04, 2018, pp. 328–342., doi:10.18261/issn.1894-3195-2018-04-04.

O’Leary, Brendan. "On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner’s Writings on Nationalism." *British Journal of Political Science* 27, no. 2, 1997.

Reid, Anthony. "Review: Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism." by Benedict Anderson. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol 58, No. 3, 1985.

Ryan, A. N. "The Defence of British Trade with the Baltic, 1808–1813." *The English Historical Review*, LXXIV, no. 292, 1959, pp. 443–466.

Sars, J. E. *Historisk Indledning Til Grundloven*. 1882.

Sars, J. Ernst. *Udsigt over Den Norske Historie Tredie Og Fjerde Del*. Gyldendal, 1913.

Skott, Stefan. "Hade Karl XIV en revolutionär tatuering?" *Populär Historia* 6, 1996.

Spruyt, Hendrik. "War and State Formation: Amending the Bellicist Theory of State Making." *Does War Make States?*, pp. 73–97.

Sørensen, Lars Hovbakke. *Slagsbrødre Eller Broderfolk: Nordens Historie Gennem 1300 år*. Aschehoug, 2004.

Sørensen, Øystein. "Hegemonikamp om det Norske. Elitenes Nasjonsbyggingsprosjekter 1770-1945." *Jakten på det Norske. Perspektiver på Utviklingen av en Norsk Nasjonal Identitet på 1800-tallet* (red. Øystein Sørensen), Oslo, Ad Notam Gyldendal, 1998.

Søyland, Annelene. *Brødrene Dal og Mysteriet om Karl XII's Gamasjer*. NRK, 2004.

Terjesen, Bjørn. *Vi Skiltes i Fred: Oppløsningen Av Den Norsk-Svenske Unionen i 1905*. Universitetsforl., 2001.

Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1992*. Blackwell, 2015.

Tilly, Charles, and Gabriel Ardant. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton University Press, 1975.

Østerud, Øyvind. *Hva Er Nasjonalisme?* Universitetsforlaget, 1994.

Appendices

1. The May 17th constitution

§ 1. Kongeriget Norge er et frit, uafhængigt og udeleligt Rige. Dets Regjeringsform er indskrænket og arvelig-monarkisk.

“Vi Christian Frederik af Guds Naade, og efter Rigets Constitution Norges Konge, Prinds til Danmark, Hertug til Slesvig, Holsteen, Stormarn, Ditmarsken og Oldenburg, Giøre vitteligt: At Vi, kaldet til Norges Throne ved Nationens Beslutning, have i Overensstemmelse med den Os underdanigst overrakte Adresse af Rigsforsamlingen paa Eidsvold den 17de May 1814, antaget Norges Krone, og i Dag høytideligen udi Rigsforsamlingen besvoret at regiere Kongeriget Norge overensstemmende med denne af Nationens udkaarede Mænd affattede Grundlov; hvilket herved saaledes af Os paa den originale Constitutions Akt bekræftes.”

Here are only the parts relevant to this thesis. The full transcript is available at the following website:

<https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Lover-og-instrukser/Grunnloven-fra-1814/>

2. The November 4th constitution

§ 1. Kongeriget Norge er et frit, selvstændigt, udeleligt og uafhængeligt Rige, forenet med Sverige under een Konge. Dets Regjeringsform er indskrænket og arvelig monarkisk.

§ 2. Den evangelisk-lutherske Religion forbliver Statens offentlige Religion. De Indvaanere, der bekjende sig til den, ere forpligtede til at opdrage deres Børn i samme. Jesuiter og Munkeordener maae ikke taaes.

Jøder ere fremdeles udelukkede fra Adgang til Riget.

§ 13. Under Kongens Fraværelse overdrager han Rigets indvortes Bestyrelse, i de Tilfælde Han selv foreskriver, til Vice-Kongen eller Statholderen, tilligemed i det mindste fem af Statsraadets Medlemmer.

Disse skulle føre Regjeringen i Kongens Navn og paa Hans Vegne. De skulle ubrødelig efterleve, saavel denne Grundlovs Bestemmelser, som de særskilte dermed overensstemmende Forskrifter, som Kongen i Instruction meddeler dem. Om de Sager, de saaledes afgjøre, have de at indsende en underdanig Indberetning til Kongen.

Forretningerne afgjøres ved Stemmegivning, hvorved, i Tilfælde at Stemmerne ere lige, Vice-Kongen eller Statholderen, eller, i deres Fraværelse, det første Medlem af Statsraadet, har tvende Stemmer.

§ 16. Kongen anordner al offentlig Kirke- og Gudstjeneste, alle Møder og Forsamlinger om Religions-Sager, og paaseer, at Religionens offentlige Lærere følge de dem foreskrevne Normer.

§ 50. Stemmeberettigede ere kun de norske Borgere, som have fyldt 25 Aar, have været bosatte i Landet i fem Aar, opholde sig der, og enten:

- a. ere, eller have været, Embedsmænd;
- b. paa Landet eie, eller, paa længre Tid end fem Aar, have bygslet matriculeret Jord;

- c. ere Kjøbstadsborgere, eller i Kjøbstad eller Ladested eie Gaard eller Grund, hvis Værdi i det mindste er 300 Rbdlr, S.V.

§ 100. Trykkefrihed bør finde Sted. Ingen kan straffes for noget Skrift, af hvad Indhold det end maatte være, som han har ladet trykke eller udgive, medmindre kan forsætliggen og aabenbare har enten selv viist, eller tilskyndet Andre til, Ulydighed mod Lovene, Ringeagt mod Religionen, Sædelighed eller de constitutionelle Magter, Modstand mod disses Befalinger, eller fremført falske og ærekrænkende Beskyldninger mod Nogen. Frimodige Ytringer, om Statsstyrelsen og hvilkensomhelst anden Gjenstand, ere Enhver tilladte.

Here are only the paragraphs relevant to this thesis. The full transcript is available at the following website:

<https://www.nb.no/baser/1814/4nov2.html>

3. Referendum results from 1905


	1905			1905		
	Oppløsning av unionen med Sverige			Prins Carl av Danmark til norsk konge		
	Stemme-berettigede	Deltakelse, -prosent	Antall- nei-stemmer	Stemme-berettigede	Deltakelse, prosent	Ja-stemmer, prosent
Hele landet	435 376	85,4	184	439 718	75,3	78,9
Østfold	25 095	89,5	10	25 281	83,1	88,1
Akershus	23 502	89,2	8	23 684	82,0	85,9
Oslo	38 395	84,3	40	39 927	75,3	80,1
Hedmark	24 940	92,9	3	25 034	80,4	76,8
Oppland	23 724	92,1	15	23 779	81,3	88,3
Buskerud	22 760	87,8	3	22 912	81,4	89,0
Vestfold	20 552	79,2	5	20 829	76,4	93,4
Telemark	19 553	89,9	16	19 886	78,0	58,9
Aust-Agder	15 274	75,9	6	15 909	66,6	76,1
Vest-Agder	16 439	83,0	9	15 964	73,8	59,6
Rogaland	24 278	88,0	8	24 391	76,6	79,6
Hordaland	27 121	88,7	7	27 296	77,1	77,8
Bergen	13 184	86,9	3	13 372	79,7	70,2
Sogn og Fjordane	18 190	92,5	3	18 278	79,0	80,4
Møre og Romsdal	28 308	91,4	4	28 467	73,7	79,6
Sør-Trøndelag	27 402	81,8	11	27 666	70,7	73,8
Nord-Trøndelag	17 120	83,8	9	17 165	67,7	63,3
Nordland	28 949	74,3	7	29 117	65,2	83,8
Troms	14 438	69,4	1	14 570	62,1	72,0
Finnmark	6 152	67,8	16	6 191	61,8	76,2
Finnmárku						

Numbers from the Central Bureau of Statistics showing the results of the two referendums in 1905. First, the referendum on dissolution of the union with Sweden to the left shows that 435,376 persons were eligible to vote, of which 85,4% (371,811 persons) voted in favour, and 184 persons voted against dissolution. Second, to the right are the results of the referendum on whether Prince Carl of Denmark should be appointed regent, in which 439,718 persons were eligible to vote, of which 75,3% voted, and 78,9% voted in favour of crowning Carl, making Norway a constitutional monarchy.

Available here:

<https://archive.is/20120526231552/http://www.ssb.no/aarbok/2004/tab/t-000130-015.html>

4. Results from the women's signature campaign from 1905




Women did not yet have suffrage in Norway in 1905, but in a signature campaign, female activists gathered 244,765 signatures from women in favour of the dissolution of the union, and the complete list was handed over to parliament to demonstrate the support for the dissolution.

Available here:

<https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Historikk/kvinnestemmerett/underskriftsaksjonen1905/>

5. Map of the Position of the Troops 18. September 1905



«Troppenes stilling 18. sept. 1905»

Map by Christian Michelsens from the Karlstad negotiations.

When negotiations continued on September 13. After some time off, soldiers mobilised on both sides of the Swedish/Norwegian border.

Photo: Riksarkivet, Forsvarets krigshistoriske avdeling, eske 107, legg

«Troppedisposisjoner 1905»

(The Royal Archive, The Army's war-history department, box 107)

Available at the following website:

<https://www.norgeshistorie.no/industrialisering-og-demokrati/1517-unionsoppløsning-og-saret-1905.html>

[illegible]

<https://www.arkivverket.no/utforsk-arkivene/nyere-historie-1814-/kongevalget-1905>

7. Telegram from Prince Carl to the Norwegian parliament.

Statstelegrafen.

Ktr. J. Nr. _____

Telegram

Til: *Stortingets President*

Fra: *Carl*

Dato: *18/11 1905*

Telegrams Adresse og Tekst:

Stortingets President
Christiania

Med Hans Majestet Kongen min Aie bestefaders
Tilladelse agter jeg at modtage Valget til
Norges Konge idet jeg antager Navnet
Haakon den VII og tillægger min Søn Navnet
Olaf.

Guds rigeste Velsignelse nedbeder mine Hustru og
jeg over det norske Folk. Dets Aie og Lykke-
ville vi vie vort fremtidige Liv.

Carl

Admistrations Adresse: _____

From the Norwegian archive, translated from the official Norwegian transcript.

“Parliamentary President

Christiania

With His Royal Majesty the King my exalted grandfather’s permission I intend to accept the nomination as King of Norway and in doing so I take the name Haakon VII and give my son the name Olaf.

God's greatest blessings do I and my wife wish for the Norwegian people. Its glory and happiness will be the focus of our lives.”

Available here:

<https://www.arkivverket.no/utforsk-arkivene/nyere-historie-1814-/kongevalget-1905>

Pledge of Honesty

*On my honour as a student of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, I submit this work
in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized
assistance on it.*

Gustav F. Pedersen