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„Institutional Overlap & the 21st Century Evolution of the
Grand Transatlantic Strategic Debate”

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Pledge of Honesty

“On my honour as a student of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.”

Electronically signed, Lena Dodakian Krikorian

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Abstract

This thesis discusses the evolution of the current grand strategies of NATO, and the EU in the international affairs *i.e.* its strategic studies discipline. It hypothesizes that although security threats are becoming more challenging and diverse, the transatlantic grand strategies have evolved with increased coordination between NATO and the EU in formulating their respective yet shared security threats and objectives. This thesis also finds that the grand strategic debate has not been implicated, despite the uncertainties presented by this decade. In order to portray this, it analyzes the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, the 2003 European Security Strategy, and the 2016 EU Global Strategy with a net assessment approach: a modern approach to analyzing security strategy versus a historic one. In order to provide further insight on the evolution of the grand strategic debate, this thesis provides a positive comparative assessment of the discourse available on NATO, the EU, and the U.S. By applying the theory of institutional overlap to the current grand strategic discourse provided by NATO, and the EU, readers can gain a deeper understanding of the European and grand transatlantic strategic security objectives and approaches utilized throughout the 21st century. This is significant because it shows that despite the uncertainties and myriad security threats of today's world, the evolution of the grand transatlantic strategic debate yields increasingly coordinated grand strategic discourse. It also argues that the transatlantic security debate, in the context of each actors' current grand strategy, has not been implicated despite raising concerns over how effective NATO and the EU are in providing transatlantic, and moreover, international security.

Keywords: *grand strategy debate, transatlantic security, NATO, EU, US, institutional overlap*

Kurzfassung

Die vorliegende Arbeit diskutiert die Entwicklung der gegenwärtigen *Grand Strategies* der NATO, der EU und der Vereinigten Staaten in den internationalen Beziehungen, sodass sie den Strategischen Studien zuzuordnen ist. Sie analysiert das *Strategische Konzept (Strategic Concept)* der NATO aus 2010, die *Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie* aus 2003 und die *Global Strategy* der EU aus 2016, sowie auch die US-amerikanische *Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie (National Security Strategy)* aus 2017 mithilfe eines Netzbewertungsansatz: ein moderner Ansatz, der aktuelle Sicherheitsstrategie historischen gegenüberstellt. Um einen weiteren Einblick in die Entwicklung der Debatte rund um *Grand-Strategy* zu gewährleisten, nimmt diese Arbeit eine vergleichende Bewertung des bestehenden NATO-, und EU Diskurses vor. Indem in ihr die Theorie der institutionellen Überlappung auf den aktuellen *Grand-Strategy*- Diskurs der NATO, und der EU zur Anwendung kommt, können LeserInnen ein tieferes Verständnis der europäischen und transatlantischen strategischen Sicherheitsziele und -zugänge gewinnen, die im 21. Jahrhundert Verwendung finden. Dies ist insbesondere significant, da es zeigt, dass die Entwicklung der transatlantischen strategischen Debatte trotz der Unsicherheiten und Bedrohungen der heutigen Welt in der Globalisierung einer ansteigenden Koordinierung unterworfen war.

Schlagwörter: *Große Strategiedebatte, transatlantische Sicherheit, NATO, EU, USA, institutionellen Überlappung*

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I. Introduction

Multilateral diplomacy is being challenged by conventional and unconventional security threats posed by uncertainty, questionable leadership, health and pandemic issues, transnational phenomena, and unwarranted risks in the international system day-by-day. In addition to national actors, international organizations have been traditionally charged to mitigate the effects of political, social, and economic global crises and conflicts. As globalization and perceptions of globalization are changing, international organizations are forced to adjust. For major players in the global arena, domestic politics are having an outsized impact. This working assessment holds true when discussing the current status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and their evolving strategic partnership, which is significantly impacted by the U.S. and its national interests and strategic priorities. The major global powers have provided invaluable resources in defense, foreign policy leadership, and moreover, transatlantic security in a world that is continuously unpredictable. Particularly, in the past ten years, new and hybrid security threats that are conventional, unconventional, or both, require evolving strategic approaches to keeping its' citizens and the world safe.

NATO, the EU, and their increased cooperation strive to provide this. Those leaders who remind audiences that the U.S. bears the majority of the burden in transatlantic security costs cannot be ignored. Yet NATO, the EU, and the U.S. outline the national, regional, and international security climate and goals to promoting democracy, freedom, and peace and stability in their separate yet similarly-written grand security strategies. Reductions in leadership by NATO, the EU, or the U.S. have not only diluted progress toward these goals, but opened the door to others who oppose them.

Therefore, this thesis will pose the following research questions: *(1) How has the transatlantic grand strategic discourse evolved throughout the 21st century, and (2) Has the grand strategy debate implicated the NATO-EU relationship of institutional overlap?*

To address these layered questions, it is critical to consider if and how these security strategies align and evolve within and between these two different institutions. The existing NATO Strategic Concept was implemented in 2010 to endure for ten years, the EU's Global Strategy has not changed since 2016, and the U.S. releases its grand strategy every four years (*i.e.* per presidential administration).¹ With a world full of more security threats that are also

¹ US NSS Archive Homepage.

increasingly diverse, it is undoubtedly significant to explore this debate in the existing literature on the topics of strategic studies, the role of NATO and the EU as major institutional bodies in transatlantic relations, and how its members can maintain a stronger and adaptable grand strategic framework that guides foreign, security, and defense policy practice.

First, this thesis will review literature on topics relevant to NATO and the EU, the evolution of strategic studies, and transatlantic relations in order to shed light on what the discourse offers. Then, it will outline a theoretical framework mainly drawing from the international relations discipline in order to explain the theory of institutional overlap, the contributions of European, U.S., and strategic studies to security, defense, and foreign policy, and how these are linked and are understood. Next, it will explain the methodology to be used in the analytical portion of this paper – chiefly consulting secondary sources and the current NATO and EU grand strategies. Then, it will assess the most recent grand strategic documents of the 21st century offered by NATO, and the EU, namely by highlighting possible areas of increased coordination over the course of the 21st century brought on by institutional overlap between NATO and the EU. NATO and the EU have a cooperative partnership agreement in place – the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership – of which both international institutions aim to strengthen in order to provide stability to transatlantic and global security. While sometimes overlooked, it is critical to consider how the U.S. values the EU-NATO relationship and NATO's indispensable role. NATO has provided the overarching transatlantic security network – an alliance – on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean for the past 71 years. The Trump Administration National Security Strategy can be considered in context of traditional U.S. grand strategies and the prospect that the U.S. may return to a traditional approach or develop a new approach when administrations change. However, the main focus of this thesis is to discuss and analyze the NATO-EU grand strategic debate.

Finally, it will conclude with analytical insights on how European security strategy has evolved, and how to define the current transatlantic grand strategic debate. This is critical because both the EU and NATO share a majority of Member States. Both the EU and NATO are by-in-large in favor of reducing and eliminating the same security threats. The U.S. also has a strong shared strategic interest in ensuring that Europe and its surrounding regions are secure and should be willing to collaborate and cooperate on protecting the region. By applying institutional overlap and a net assessment approach to the current grand strategic discourse provided by

NATO and the EU, readers can gain a deeper understanding of the European and transatlantic strategic security objectives and approaches utilized of today.

II. Literature Review

NATO, the EU, and the interplay of these institutions and their members are not novel topics in security studies, transatlantic relations, political science, history, and international affairs and international law; nor is institutional overlap and the concept of security strategy and how it is to be formulated and implemented in order to generate the best results. As such, in the past ten years, several works such as Seth Johnson's *How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950*, indicate that the question as to how NATO still exists as a major body of transatlantic relations and how it strategically adapts in the face of new security threats is still left unanswered and is important as ever.² Johnson also considers what type of institution, according to history and international law, NATO truly is in practice: a formal organization (according to the traditional academic conception of institutionalization) that manifests informal bodies. This is important to keep in mind through the analytical portion of this thesis because unlike other transatlantic bodies and security organizations.

To this end, there is also an abundance of literature discussing NATO's political implications in its inception and its existence as a transatlantic security alliance created in the wake of the Cold War. Understanding how the historical evolution of NATO is often explored through the perspectives of those who are not members of NATO and moreover, actors that oppose NATO such as Russia and have formed alliances in response to NATO. For example, Richard Staar's book, *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe* discusses the USSR's ostensible response to West Germany joining NATO, where Moscow established a multilateral military alliance system as a means of legal justification for placing troops in Central and Eastern Europe, called the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact).³ Some scholars such as Forsberg & Haukkala even directly address the controversial Russian annexation of Crimea and its larger security problems with Ukraine, and assess that although NATO and the EU have imposed sanctions on Moscow, the West's questionable relationship with Russia is still problematic in terms of how Western institutions can provide European security.⁴ The scholars also recognize

² Johnston, 2.

³ Staar, 213.

⁴ Tuomas Forsberg & Hiski Haukkala, "The End of an Era for Institutionalism in European Security?" *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 23, no. 1 (March 2015): 1-5.

and analyze the role of the OSCE as an additional European security provider, finding that the OSCE mainly played the role of monitoring elections and protecting minorities, and that while Russia is a member of the OSCE and has a special relationship in the form of a partnership with the EU and NATO, NATO and the EU still face the challenge of engaging Russia while working with other eastern European countries in efforts of providing European security.⁵ While it is important to consider NATO's profound role as a transatlantic security provider in the 20th century, the wake of the Cold War brought about new foreign and defense challenges that are more recent and relevant to NATO's and the EU's grand strategic frameworks at present.

Published in 2011, Ivanov unpacks NATO's post-Cold War transformation as interconnected and in in threefold: "the incorporation of new allies, the implementation of new missions, and the development of new allied capabilities between the early 1990s and late 2000s."⁶ His two main theoretical bodies that he draws upon throughout his book are (1) the club goods framework, which assumes that alliances function similarly to clubs that are responsible for providing their members with public goods, and are inclusive or exclusive in nature (in the NATO case, the public goods rest in its principle and provision of collective defense, the concept of voluntarism on joining and participating in Alliance actions, and are heterogenous or homogenous depending on size, wealth, defense expenditure, and overall capabilities.)⁷ Ivanov's other theoretical pillar lies on (2) the concept of complementarities, which means that if two goods are complementary – meaning that good A is typically consumed with good B – then if one is in high demand (say A,) so will its corresponding complementary good (in this scenario, good B.)⁸ The author applies this theory to NATO's post-Cold War transformation by explaining how decision-making and compromises are reached within the Alliance, finding that the concept of complementarities holds if NATO members are successful in combining their military forces, then each members' capabilities will improve, thereby enhancing the Alliance overall.⁹

In order to efficiently and effectively combine the resources provided by NATO Members, scholars have explored the implications of specific types of strategies on international organizations' internal and external affairs. One strategy in particular is known as bargaining,

⁵ Ibid., 4.

⁶ Ivanov, Ivan Dinev. *Transforming NATO: New allies, missions, and capabilities*, (Lexington Books, 2011), xiv.

⁷ Ivanov, xv.

⁸ Ivanov, xvi.

⁹ Ivanov, xvi.

which has been applied to studies on NATO by numerous scholars and interlocutors. Ivanov explains that under the rationalist approach, “bargaining is optimal when allies commit to managing their resources efficiently and to the exclusive development of the capabilities that are needed for overseas operations.”¹⁰ Published in 1996, Richard Ned Lebow’s *The Art of Bargaining* clearly defines and discusses the nature of bargaining based on his years of experience working for the U.S. government, NATO, and for various European and American businesses.¹¹ Bargaining as a strategy is a three-phase, multi-step process that can take various forms such as explicit or tacit bargaining: it is a significant strategy that exists and is shaped in a broad and deeply socially embedded process because it ultimately involves the exchange of or agreement in negotiation processes in international, regional, national, and local fora.¹²

As new security threats emerge, new operations and capabilities become necessary, resulting in NATO’s horizontal and vertical evolution of its institutional structure and missions.¹³ Thus, the author finds that under the rationalist approach and the aforementioned theoretical frameworks,

- (1) each Member-state operates where it has comparative advantage, and
- (2) there is a direct relationship between NATO membership and the advancement of member-specific capabilities as demonstrated in regional blocs such as SEE BRIG, BALTBAT, and CBRN Defense.¹⁴

Ivanov’s contribution to the theoretical literature on NATO is significant to address because as an alliance, members are expected to deliver their promises set forth in the commitments they sign up to meet. Whether a NATO member’s commitment to the alliance is out of self-interest in defending its partners, or because NATO membership can be viewed as a means of maximizing the net benefits from defending and preserving the alliance, or a combination thereof, certainly explains why NATO still exists and expands since its inception in 1949.¹⁵ By unpacking specific NATO missions and approaches throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and highlighting which cases were successful in terms of the club goods framework and the concept of complementarities, Ivanov concludes that the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept –

¹⁰ Ivanov, xvi.

¹¹ Richard Lebow, *The Art of bargaining*, (JHU Press, 1996), Front Cover.

¹² Ibid., Introduction.

¹³ Ivanov, xvi.

¹⁴ Ivanov, xvii.

¹⁵ Ivanov, 10.

NATO's current grand strategy – addresses the vital role of financial, military, and human resources in the rest of the 21st century, finding that because similar internal and external barriers persist, NATO can be viewed as a heterogeneous club with immense challenges in its bargaining strategy.¹⁶ These challenges stem from the post-September 11th security threats and environment, resulting in NATO's:

- (1) revitalization as a relevant international alliance in its shift from peacekeeping missions and territorial defense approaches to stability operations and counterinsurgency, and
- (2) the larger argument that despite the new and “numerous challenges NATO faces in integrating new allies, managing new missions, and promoting new capabilities, the neo-realist skepticism that the Alliance will become peripheral and eventually fade away seems unwarranted.”¹⁷ Therefore, based on Ivanov's rationalist approach and application of the club goods theory and the concept of complementarities, NATO, under its 2010 Strategic Concept, should be able to utilize its comparative advantage of its heterogeneity in order to achieve its goals in the scope of the international community, and enhance its member states' national interests.¹⁸

On the EU side, scholars have analyzed the EU's CSDP and its Global Strategy with a strategic perspective in mind, and have raised the point that it is important to study the EU with a strategic studies approach because it can provide clarity in analyzing the EU by assessing policymaking and highlighting how the Union perceives its best interests.¹⁹ For example, Biscop and Norheim-Martinsen find that by studying the EU and its decision-making on foreign and security policy from a strategic lens, it is beneficial because by “...focusing on the relationship between the ends and means rather than the character of the means (i.e. civilian or military) as the defining element of the EU as an international actor, the categorization, and hence the problems of accommodating different forms of power projection inherent to the ongoing debates on what kind of actor or power the EU is or should be, are avoided.”²⁰ Furthermore, as the authors put forth, the shifted focus from character to the relationship between means and ends removes the military bias that has emanated from previous assessments of the EU from a

¹⁶ Ibid., 244.

¹⁷ Ivanov, 244.

¹⁸ Ivanov, 244.

¹⁹ Sven Biscop and M. Norheim-Martinsen, "CSDP: The Strategic Perspective." In *Explaining the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy*, 63-85. (London, 2012), 67.

²⁰ Ibid., 67-68.

strategic approach because its effectiveness is the chief focus rather than how the EU and its institutions developed over time and what their nature is today.²¹ Thus, the authors clearly define their variables under what they coin as three central elements – strategy, actorness, and culture – to conduct their assessment in applying the strategic perspective to the EU.²²

On strategy, they find that the European Security Strategy – the 2003 ESS – is only partial, charging that its holistic approach to addressing its threats and challenges is vague, and only explains *how* to act without explaining *what* to actually do in a given scenario: while the ESS states its objectives clearly, – ‘addressing the threats,’ ‘building security in our neighborhood,’ and ‘effective multilateralism’ – its scope is too broad and this approach does not clearly explain the values and interests of those in need of the EU’s defense.²³ From this analysis, the scholars also find that “A grand strategy must necessarily be translated into sub-strategies and then policies for it to be put into action, but the three objectives have proved too broad, and member states far too hesitant to act upon the strategy that they have adopted, to generate clear priorities. Without clear objectives, strategic actorness is difficult to achieve.”²⁴

This finding underscores the importance of sub-strategies in the evolution of EU grand strategy, and while it applies to the 2003 ESS, this is also a recurring theme in assessments of the current EU grand strategy: the 2016 EU Global Strategy. For example, in her article titled “The construction of ‘European security’ in the European Union in a changing global environment: a systemic analysis,” Dr. Sabine Selchow explores the evolution of the EU grand strategic debate by empirically assessing and analyzing the discourse in the document released by former High Representative Frederica Mogherini, titled “The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex world.”²⁵ She finds that this document laid the foundation for the current EU grand strategy: the EU Global Strategy, but that the EU Global Strategy will serve many purposes besides being a general policy guideline.²⁶ The author puts forth that the “web of meanings” of commonly used terms in the grand European security strategic discourse (i.e. in the European Security Strategy and in Mogherini’s document) sheds

²¹ Ibid., 68.

²² Ibid., 69.

²³ Ibid., 70.

²⁴ Ibid., 70-71

²⁵ Sabine Selchow, “The construction of ‘European security’ in *The European Union in a changing global environment: a systemic analysis*,” *European Security* 25, no. 3 (July 2016): 281.

²⁶ Ibid., 283-284.

light on how the EU has tried to adapt its grand strategy to modern times, and that the concept of European integration is explicitly understood as a foreign policy and security strategy.²⁷

Selchow concludes that EU Global Strategy is part of a “never-ending social reproduction of ‘European security,’²⁸ and it serves as a greater discursive outlet for how the EU in its internal – namely how governmental bodies intend on improving themselves and the livelihood of the broad EU citizenry – and its external – meaning how to enhance its presence as a global actor – elements.²⁹ Selchow’s findings are significant because she defines and explains the recurring phrases and variables, and provides great insights into how the EU, in formulating its Global Strategy, can preserve yet undergo the evolution of its institutions and foreign and security policy decision-making instruments; another example of this is that in response to Mogherini’s claim that the EU is facing an existential crisis, unpacking the international security climate should not undermine the EU as a global actor.³⁰

Defining the EU as a strategic global actor, often known as its ‘actorness,’ is also a recurring theme in the literature available on the grand strategy debate in European and transatlantic security studies. In direct reference to the EU Global Strategy, Michael E. Smith assesses the EU’s ‘actorness’ in terms of its hard versus soft power tools in the context of the grand strategy debate.³¹ Smith notes that the EU is an ‘aspirational actor’ according to its grand strategy because it seeks to maintain the status quo within the international world order along the principles and priorities of the United Nations system, using mostly soft power.³² Written in 2011, Smith examines the EU grand strategy at the time – the 2003 European Security Strategy – in order to gain a deeper understanding of the EU’s global ‘actorness’ and how it projects power and acts ‘strategically’ and ‘normatively.’³³ Smith notes that grand strategy has been traditionally applied to individual states only, but he explains that in the EU’s case, since it meets the criteria of grand strategy as addressing physical security, economic prosperity, and value projection, it is therefore valid to say the EU is capable of developing and implementing a grand strategy.³⁴

²⁷ Ibid., 296.

²⁸ Ibid., 301.

²⁹ Ibid., 295.

³⁰ Ibid., 301.

³¹ Michael E. Smith, “A liberal grand strategy in a realist world? Power, purpose, and the EU’s changing global role,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 18, no. 2 (March 2011): 144-163.

³² Smith, 148.

³³ Smith, 145.

³⁴ Smith, 146.

Indeed Smith explains that EU grand strategy is “a general plan for, or process of, integrating the policies and resources of the EU to protect and advance its core and vital interests.”³⁵ He argues that under a collective approach, the EU grand strategy provides ‘value-added’ in a ‘positive sum’ approach to how EU Member States can conduct the EU grand strategy.³⁶

Smith assesses that the EU is operating under a more liberal approach to security rather than a realist one that is mainly concerned with the balance of power and traditional threats.³⁷ This prompts readers and interlocutors to attempt to broaden the notion of ‘security’ beyond conventional, military threats, which may lead one to argue that the purpose of EU grand strategy is to make war unnecessary, and provide safety in a world that is aligned with EU interests and values.³⁸ Ultimately, Smith finds that the 2003 ESS identifies threats that are mostly unconventional, and that the collective defense role lies within NATO rather than the EU Member States.³⁹ He assesses that preferences for trade liberalization and the intra-EU values are being projected to EU partners in the east and south.⁴⁰ Smith concludes that:

(1) many EU policies can be seen as an expression of its grand strategy, and
(2) its ‘actorness’ can be seen in its unique character and push for multilateral, and more liberal approach for achieving its internal and external strategic goals, and promoting good global governance.⁴¹ Smith also offers that grand strategy and grand strategic debate will become more salient over time, which can explain why exploring transatlantic grand strategy is significant.⁴²

From the U.S. perspective on grand strategy, two prominent yet different views come to the fore on how to assess Washington’s National Security Strategy. One is that of Barry Posen, who offers a grand strategy of Restraint – meaning the U.S. should pull back from some of its security projects as opposed to its previous grand strategy of liberal hegemony from the wake of the Cold War.⁴³ Like Michael E. Smith, Posen assesses grand strategy through a realist point of view, and he charges that a grand strategy should be concerned with traditional and conventional security threats because pursuing one of liberal hegemony is ‘costly, inherently expansive and

³⁵ Smith, 147.

³⁶ Smith, 146.

³⁷ Smith, 146.

³⁸ Smith, 146.

³⁹ Smith, 151.

⁴⁰ Smith, 153.

⁴¹ Smith, 161.

⁴² Smith, 161.

⁴³ Barry R. Posen, *Restraint: A new foundation for US grand strategy* (Cornell University Press, 2014), 27.

difficult as it is bound to military action.’⁴⁴ Posen recommends that the U.S. should practice Restraint instead of its continued practice of liberal hegemony since the end of the Cold War, finding that with less external costs, the U.S. can improve internally and be more cost-effective.⁴⁵ In his application of Restraint to Eurasia, Posen addresses that although a power vacuum could be created with a U.S. departure from its security commitments in Europe, and that the U.S. does have a strong strategic interest in remaining engaged in European security affairs, he argues that between NATO and the EU, Washington should not have to bear the burden of the transatlantic security costs.⁴⁶ Posen thus advises that the U.S. pursue a balance-of-power national security strategic direction, rather than that of the continued grand strategy of liberal hegemony.⁴⁷

In 2018, Posen revisited this grand strategic assessment and applied it to the Trump Administration, finding that the current U.S. grand strategy resembles that of “Primacy without a Purpose,” and is essentially exporting a foreign and security policy package of “Illiberal Hegemony.”⁴⁸ Posen assesses that although the Trump Administration is practicing Restraint in some of its’ policies, the current U.S. grand strategic direction does not match what Trump does in practice because Trump has removed the ‘liberal’ out of ‘liberal hegemony.’⁴⁹ He concludes that the grand security strategy in the Trump era is not as reflective of U.S. foreign and security policy as Trump’s speeches and press releases.⁵⁰ Posen elaborates that the current U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) from 2017 does emulate the grand strategies of Trump’s presidential predecessors; indeed the U.S. NSS still supports liberal hegemony and highlights similar threat-areas and strategic goals, however it provides that the U.S. should continue to be the world’s policeman, which is the opposite of a grand strategy of Restraint.⁵¹ Posen also highlights that the evolution of grand strategic debate is significant for the U.S. in search of a strategic direction.⁵²

In addition to Posen’s contribution, authors and professors Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth unpack the grand strategic debate in the U.S. through a systemic, counterfactual approach by posing a counterfactual question of how would the world operate if the U.S.

⁴⁴ Posen, 24-27.

⁴⁵ Posen, 25.

⁴⁶ Posen, 69.

⁴⁷ Posen, 96.

⁴⁸ Barry R. Posen, "The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony: Trump's Surprising Grand Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 20 (March/April 2018), 20-25.

⁴⁹ Posen, 2018, 20.

⁵⁰ Posen, 2018, 21.

⁵¹ Posen, 2018, 25.

⁵² Posen, 2018, 25.

retrenched at the end of the Cold War.⁵³ The authors argue that the U.S. should continue to pursue a grand strategy of deep engagement in foreign and security affairs because they prove that Washington's actions and what happens in the U.S. play a significant role in shaping the international system and global environment.⁵⁴ Written in response to Posen's prescription of Restraint, Brooks and Wohlforth find that the term 'Restraint' should be replaced with either 'disengagement' or 'retrenchment' because 'Restraint' implies that the current grand U.S. strategy – that of deep engagement – is inherently 'unrestrained' in its' decisions and actions pertaining to the use of force.⁵⁵ More importantly, they insist that the U.S. should continue to pursue its' grand strategy of deep engagement since it is eloquently defined, and although the U.S. has acted out of self-interest and has been involved in overseas affairs pertaining to human rights and democracy-promotion, the key tenets of the U.S. grand strategy in this decade still uphold the core principles of conflict prevention and interstate cooperation.⁵⁶ This book is significant because it generates a positive net assessment, which resulted in a conclusion that “a globally engaged America remains the wisest choice.”⁵⁷ It also includes in-depth analyses on specific regions that the U.S. is engaged in, of which in its' relations with Europe (*i.e.* NATO and the EU), the U.S. grand strategy should remain committed to its' indispensable European allies because the U.S. has a strong vested interest in ensuring European and transatlantic security and prosperity.⁵⁸ These authors remind audiences that deep engagement is in fact a grand strategy because it is “truly grand in scope and temporal scale,” and should be further discussed in the larger U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy debate.⁵⁹

III. Theoretical Framework: Institutional Overlap & Security Strategy

Some scholars find that many contributions to NATO scholarship does not incorporate enough theory in the existing literature, especially from the end of the Cold War to present-day.⁶⁰ While this thesis will cite theoretical and atheoretical works relevant to NATO, the EU, and transatlantic relations throughout the 21st century, the theoretical framework to be utilized in the

⁵³ Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, *America Abroad: Why the sole superpower should not pull back from the world.* (Oxford University Press, 2016), 2.

⁵⁴ Brooks & Wohlforth, 2.

⁵⁵ Brooks & Wohlforth, 4.

⁵⁶ Brooks & Wohlforth, 9.

⁵⁷ Brooks & Wohlforth, 10.

⁵⁸ Brooks & Wohlforth, 12.

⁵⁹ Brooks & Wohlforth, 9.

⁶⁰ Webber, 2.

grand strategic discourse assessment and analysis will draw from the concept of institutional overlap, and approaches to formulating and implementing a grand security strategy. Thus, this thesis will hypothesize that the link between these two frameworks – institutional overlap and security strategy – can shed light on the evolution of the transatlantic grand strategic discourse, and moreover, it can help establish whether or not the grand strategic debate implicates transatlantic relations can be enhanced in the new decade.

Institutional Overlap

Institutional overlap is a useful theoretical concept when discussing EU-NATO relations, capabilities, and moreover, how to answer the posed research question, part one, regarding the role of NATO and the EU in one another's respective searches for a new security strategy. Author Stephanie Hofmann's definition of institutional overlap can be understood in three ways: (1) *membership* (which constitutes all members of formal international organizations), (2) *mandate* (namely all the functions and tasks outlined in a given institution's treaties, strategies, and other operational texts), and (3) *resources* (this entails the common resources of each institution, emphasizing the concept that having numerous organizations in one policy area raises the scarcity of pooled resources.)⁶¹ Published in 2009 and 2011, Hofmann addresses the gap in the literature on institutional overlap, namely in that she provides cumulative theoretical insights on the impacts on and of institutional overlap in the complex European security architecture.⁶² The theoretical framework of institutional overlap is significant and applicable here because it insists that NATO and the EU's security can not only overcome the collective action problem of having too many institutions in the same policy arena – security and defense – but also has the potential to enhance both organizations' institutions in meeting its strategic goals and priorities.⁶³

Institutional overlap exists between NATO and the EU, as both organizations share 22 members, have had an institutionalized relationship since the early 2000s, and have agreed on a plethora of agreements and arrangements to enhance their institutions and reach their strategic goals within the many challenges in international security.⁶⁴ However, Hofmann herself

⁶¹ Hofmann, 103-104

⁶² Hofmann, 104.

⁶³ Ibid., 105.

⁶⁴ NATO Website, "Relations with the European Union," Note, Full Quote: "30 NATO member countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 28 EU member countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,

addresses a key pitfall of institutional overlap in its theoretical backing, finding that it is a vague concept that still lacks theoretical clarity.⁶⁵ She cites that while scholars have worked on theoretical approaches towards inter-institutional dynamics, previous works usually focus on one dimension of an institution (whether that be institution-building, or on the impact of institutional overlap on the policy field), but provides an explanation as to why governments or pre-existing institutions seek to create more institutions rather than working from within the existing structures they already have: in order to overcome a collective action problem that cannot be resolved in institutions that already exist.⁶⁶ Hofmann also points out that creating new institutions cannot be done without drawing from institutional bodies and structures that already exist; this results in three interrelated propositions, (1) policymakers trying to create new approaches and frameworks will be influenced by pre-existing institutions in the policy domain that they operate, (2) if states agree on the establishment of new institutions but do not reach an agreement on its purpose, the functionality of the new institutions will be ambiguous, and (3) if existing institutions are understood as ‘operational,’ then they will be perceived as merely a template to design a new institution, which is reductive in terms of efficiency.⁶⁷

Thus, since the EU had no defense body prior to the creation of the CSDP, the pre-existing institutions that were similar in purpose and functionality were the Western European Union (WEU,) NATO, the OSCE and the UN: this resulted in national actors having to select which platforms for design to implement from these institutions in order create the CDSP.⁶⁸ NATO has been in existence for 71 years, while the EU was not formally established until 1992 under the Maastricht Treaty, and the body within the EU dealing with security in its current state was founded in 1999 as the European Security and Defense Policy; this was updated in 2009 under the Treaty of Lisbon, and is currently known as the CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy).⁶⁹ As such, the interlocutors responsible for kickstarting the CSDP knew that it would overlap with NATO; the British and German governments foresaw the CSDP as a set of policies embodied in a newly-formed institution that would be supportive of NATO, while the French

Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.”

⁶⁵ Hofmann, 102.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 105.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 105.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 106.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 106.

pushed for CSDP autonomy.⁷⁰ In order to compromise varying views on what the EU's security apparatus should include, collective defense was not incorporated in the CSDP mandate due to heated debates on the EU's functionality in this capacity, and because EU members that are not a part of NATO such as Austria deemed the concept of collective defense as being superfluous and out of the EU's scope.⁷¹ Nevertheless, the structure of the main institutional bodies of the CSDP emulated branches of NATO such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).⁷²

Thus, institutional overlap most certainly exists and helps explain some of the challenges faced by the EU and NATO in their respective searches for a grand strategy in this decade. NATO and the EU overlap in their membership (22 shared members), mandate (security competencies and strategic goals,) and resources (by default, members of NATO and the EU pool their resources to remain engaged in both institutions.)⁷³ It can be hypothesized that under Hofmann's definition of institutional overlap as applicable to the EU and NATO, while assessing the EU and NATO grand strategic discourse, that areas of increased coordination are expected. This is because with the creation of the CSDP, the Lisbon Treaty, and the EU Global Strategy, applying institutional overlap to the EU and NATO grand strategies should reveal more space for the two organizations to increasingly coordinate their grand strategic goals and actions.

Strategy, Strategic Theory, & Grand Strategy in Security Studies: Historic vs. Modern Approach

In order to attempt to answer the layered research questions, the theoretical concept of strategy in the historical and modern approaches as applied to security studies will be unpacked to complement institutional overlap. For the historic approach, Carl von Clausewitz defined strategy, strategic theory, and the strategist as "the use of engagement for the purpose of war," "[Strategic theory must therefore study] the engagement in terms of its possible results and of the moral and psychological forces that largely determine its course...[Strategic theory, therefore,] deals with planning; or rather, it attempts to shed light on the components of war and their interrelationships, stressing those few principles or rules that can be demonstrated," and [The

⁷⁰ Hofmann, 107.

⁷¹ Ibid., 108.

⁷² Ibid., 108.

⁷³ NATO (website), "Relations with the European Union," accessed 23 March, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm#:~:text=Close%20cooperation%20between%20NATO%20and,22%20member%20countries%20in%20common.

strategist must therefore] define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose...draft the plan of war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it...shape the individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual engagements...[The strategist, in short,] must maintain control throughout,” respectively.⁷⁴ Strategy, strategic theory, and the strategist under Von Clausewitz’s definitions have been applied to strategic dilemmas in national and international security for over a century, belongs to the historical school of strategic thought.⁷⁵

Similarly, the working definition of grand strategy to be used in this thesis is informed by Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis who, like Clausewitz, uses a historic approach to security strategy. He defines strategy as not always a rational enterprise; emotions of strategists and abstractions of strategy can never be separated, they can only be balanced.⁷⁶ Gaddis also puts forth that strategy requires “a sense of the whole that reveals the significance of respective parts.”⁷⁷ While no strategy can predict every contingency, and that every solution has the potential to cause new problems, having a good strategy – one where aspirations and capabilities are proportionate – does provide stability.⁷⁸ Thus, Gaddis defines grand strategy as “the alignment of potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities.”⁷⁹ Gaddis unpacks this concept further by explaining that if one has an end-goal that requires more means to meet it, then scaling back both variables is inevitable in order to find a balanced solution.⁸⁰ He provides examples of grand strategists throughout numerous points in history from as early on as 480 B.C.E. to the present in order to demonstrate the gap between theory and practice, as evidenced by the works of Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*, and Carl von Clausewitz, the author of *On War*, which are referenced throughout every chapter of Gaddis’ book and many strategic scholars and key decision-makers base security strategy and strategic studies on in conjunction.⁸¹ Gaddis finds that based on Clausewitz’s claim that temperament and intellect determine how strategies are, “no grand strategy will remain unaffected by the unforeseen.”⁸² In other words, uncertainties

⁷⁴ Clausewitz, 177.

⁷⁵ Gray, 1

⁷⁶ Gaddis, John Lewis. *On grand strategy*. Penguin Books, 2019. 55.

⁷⁷ Gaddis, 58.

⁷⁸ Gaddis, 175.

⁷⁹ Gaddis, 21.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 21.

⁸¹ Gaddis, 186.

⁸² Gaddis, 308.

arise and not all strategies will be able to predict them. Nevertheless, by having a grand strategy, as Gaddis demonstrates through historical examples, proportionality is omnipresent: capabilities that are necessarily limited are aligned with aspirations.⁸³ Under these definitions, the concept of grand strategy from a historic approach is crucial to address when analyzing strategic documents.

However, the modern approach to strategy as outlined by Colin S. Gray, draws from strategic history *and* policy science; it centers around the “modern expression of the ageless phenomena of strategy.”⁸⁴ Thus, Gray claims that despite the advancements in military establishments and modern technology, strategic success is as challenging to achieve today (written in 1999) as it was in 1900.⁸⁵ Like Clausewitz, Gray also finds that strategy is about finding a common understanding between the capabilities of military power, and policymaking and political goals.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, Gray does provide that strategy and the numerous forms of war – “conflict on land, at sea, in the air, and in space and cyberspace” – is complex in its varied dimensions, based on his in-depth analysis of the political ramifications of weapon technologies that become new throughout the 20th century.⁸⁷ While Clausewitz defined strategy in security studies, the concept of strategic effect, which is “the impact of strategic performance [which can be measured descriptively and judgmentally] upon the course of events – is useful to measure when discussing theory versus practice in the modern approach to strategy.”⁸⁸ Thus, this thesis will draw from both approaches to analyzing strategy – historical and modern – in analyzing the current NATO Strategic Concept (2010), the European Security Strategy (2003), and the EU Global Strategy (2016). In application to the aforementioned modern strategic discourse, it will utilize the net assessment approach based on an in-depth comparison between the NATO and EU grand strategies and their respective expert recommendation and implementation reports.

Net assessment approach

Referenced as the ‘modern term for sketching in strategy,’ Paul Bracken’s explanation of the net assessment concept is a principal framework used in analyzing security strategy.⁸⁹ Developed by founder and former Director of the Office of Net Assessment in the U.S.

⁸³ Gaddis, 312.

⁸⁴ Gray, 3.

⁸⁵ Gray, 5.

⁸⁶ Gray, 5.

⁸⁷ Gray, 7.

⁸⁸ Gray, 19.

⁸⁹ Gaddis, 214.

Department of Defense Andrew Marshall, net assessment has been applied to the United States National Security Strategy for many years. According to Bracken, net assessment is a practice; it is a way of addressing problems from particular and differing perspectives using skills which can be improved.⁹⁰ Net assessment originated from the necessity of the U.S. having to connect defense policies with expected reactions of its' opponents; it differs from more formal approaches to strategic thinking such as game theory because it characterizes strategic interactions as formulated by complicated organizations (usually larger organizations such as corporations or militaries) that break down large challenges into smaller, more manageable ones.⁹¹

Since the 1950s and 1960s in the U.S. case, smaller entities (*i.e.* internal departments within the U.S. government) were established in order to break down how to address national security problems between the military and the civilian intelligence community.⁹² When discussing national security problems through the news cycle or changes in a political administration, one is limited in scope in terms of time (*i.e.* the news is instantaneous and election cycles are limited to their constitutional prescriptions, respectively), whereas looking at strategy through net assessment allows for the continuous thinking over time; the net assessment framework firstly and correctly identified the East Asian region as strategic competition for the U.S. from as early on as the 1980s.⁹³ While net assessment is not perfect, it is successful in that it provides for estimates to be made in national security scenarios that are usually overlooked but are crucial.⁹⁴ It vehemently opposes strategies that neglect the value of time and result in short-term decisions such as “muddling through,” because small choices add up, resulting in unmanageable scenarios in the future.⁹⁵

Applied to strategy-making and analysis, net assessment does not plan strategy nor does it instruct policymakers on what strategy they should use; rather, it addresses strategic asymmetries in several competition areas such as nuclear weapons programs, and provides the definitive features of what a good strategy should possess.⁹⁶ The methodology of net assessment

⁹⁰ Bracken, 91.

⁹¹ Bracken, 92.

⁹² Bracken, 92.

⁹³ Bracken, 94.

⁹⁴ Bracken, 95.

⁹⁵ Bracken, 96.

⁹⁶ Bracken, 97-98.

studies and analyses can take the form of scenarios, war games, or trend analysis, but it is usually qualitative and tries to “model simple and think complex.”⁹⁷ It uses data to create strategic insights that result in decisive advantage, and offers a path to addressing national security problems.⁹⁸ If done well, net assessment will address the following variables to consider:

- (1) the “knowns,” which are ones’ own capabilities and sought-out objectives,
- (2) the probabilities, which can be factors such as cultural constraints, the capacity to endure adversity, the reliability of allies, or the goals of adversaries, and
- (3) acknowledge the so-called “unknowns,” which are bound to intertwine with the aforementioned variables.⁹⁹

By applying this model to the grand strategies to be assessed – the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, the 2003 European Security Strategy, and the current 2016 EU Global Strategy – this thesis hypothesizes that while different in nature as the EU can be viewed as *sui generis*, and NATO is a military alliance, they are two European organizations that have increasingly coordinated their grand strategies in order to meet their shared security priorities. Prior to the release of and implementation of these strategic documents, the Berlin Plus agreement was established at the Cologne European Council in 1999; under certain conditions, it gives the EU access to NATO resources and capabilities.¹⁰⁰ More recently, on July 8, 2016, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization signed a Joint Declaration in Warsaw “giving new impetus and new substance to the EU-NATO strategic partnership.”¹⁰¹ Two years later, NATO and the EU signed a second Joint Declaration strategic partnership agreement, which outlines their shared unconventional threat assessments and strategic objectives and principles.¹⁰² While these developments further indicate increased coordination between the two organizations, it is still worth testing whether or not their grand strategic discourse has also evolved over time.

⁹⁷ Bracken, 100.

⁹⁸ Bracken, 100.

⁹⁹ Gaddis, 214.

¹⁰⁰ EEAS homepage, CSDP, “Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy.”

¹⁰¹ EEAS (website), “EU-NATO Cooperation Fact Sheet,” accessed June 11, 2020, 1 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-nato_cooperation_factsheet_june_2019.pdf

¹⁰² EEAS (website), 2.

IV. Methodology and Disciplines

This research will mostly utilize a net assessment approach and consult secondary sources for the analysis to be conducted. Several scholars, analysts, practitioners, former and still-serving politicians, and other relevant stakeholders have analyzed the evolution of transatlantic grand strategy. It has been referred as a useful exercise for those interested and involved in assessing security strategies.

In addition to drawing from secondary sources, this paper will highlight the major tenets of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2016 EU Global Strategy, and has provided an overview of some of the literature of the U.S. National Security Strategy to shed light on the transatlantic strategic evolution. It will also reference relevant implementation and recommendation reports, and studies pursuant to the evolution of the transatlantic grand strategic debate in order to support the highlights that show how the EU and NATO have increasingly coordinated their grand strategies.

By comparing and contrasting the major themes, threat assessments, and the strategic objectives of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, the 2016 EU Global Strategy, and referencing its predecessor – the 2003 European Security Strategy, – this research intends to highlight the areas of increased cooperation as evidenced by institutional overlap between NATO and the EU in the context of the grand strategic debate. In doing so, it puts forth the hypothesis that NATO and the EU have increasingly coordinated their grand strategies throughout the course of the 21st century, allowing for more cooperation.

The major disciplines to be consulted in this research are international relations and strategic studies. It is worth noting that bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, transnational and national security, military and strategic thinking and practices, and all other concepts to be explored in this paper are undoubtedly can also be analyzed through other types of strategies such as sub-strategies, techniques, and disciplines. Furthermore, this research deals with transatlantic relations and regionalism on a shorter-term basis due to the 21st-century scope of the study in comparison to previous works conducted on this topic. However, the chief disciplines this paper draws from are international relations and strategic studies because the existing literature deals with these fields of study in the NATO, EU, and transatlantic security context. It also consults grand strategic documents because these are organizations with several smaller bodies and sub-strategies that are shorter-term whereas grand strategies reveal long-term goals.

V. Grand Strategy Assessment

5.1 NATO Strategic Concept Recommendations Report 2010

Prior to releasing the current NATO Strategic Concept (2010), a broad-based group of experts prepared a comprehensive report in May 2010 titled “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a new Strategic Concept for NATO.”¹⁰³ The Group of Experts, chaired by Madeline Albright and vice chaired by Jeeroen van der Veer, laid out the groundwork for the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept; starting in September 2009, they launched a series of dialogues, seminars, and consultations with military and civilian scholars and officials.¹⁰⁴ This report first outlines their findings, then it provides a detailed discussion of security issues and recommendations to help the Secretary General in creating the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept to be approved by member states’ heads of government in November 2010 at the NATO summit in Lisbon.¹⁰⁵

Titled “New Perils, New Resolve,” the first section of this report underscores that the Cold War and its threats – such as denuclearization of former Soviet countries – associated with its immediate aftermath is over, but NATO continues to attempt to provide security, unity, and freedom of the Euro-Atlantic region.¹⁰⁶ However, it puts forth that NATO needs a new strategic concept in light of new dangers on the horizon from 2010-2020; at this time, the security climate dramatically shifted as a result of 9/11, revealing how technology and terror are interconnected and that timely intelligence-sharing is necessary.¹⁰⁷ The global challenges of nuclear non-proliferation, energy and environmental security, and the 2008 financial crisis were also demonstrative of the newly emerging security threats to the transatlantic space.¹⁰⁸ During the early 2000s, NATO also acquired new members, capabilities, and commitments through enlargement, bringing it to 28 members by adding Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,

¹⁰³ NATO 2020, Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, Title Page.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 4. Note, full group of experts: The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright (U.S.), Mr. Jeroen van der Veer (The Netherlands), Ambassador Giancarlo Aragona (Italy), Ambassador Marie Gervais-Vidricaire (Canada), The Rt Hon Geoff Hoon (United Kingdom, MP until March 24, 2010), Ambassador Ümit Pamir (Turkey), Ambassador Fernando Perpiñá-Robert Peyra (Spain), Ambassador Dr. Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz (Germany), Mr. Bruno Racine (France), Ambassador Aivis Ronis (Latvia, until 5 May 2010), Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland), Ambassador Yannis-Alexis Zepos (Greece)

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 5.

Slovakia, Slovenia in 2004, and Albania and Croatia in 2009.¹⁰⁹ Thus, the group of experts found that NATO's new Strategic Concept must also ensure that each member will renew their vows to uphold NATO's values and not let new threats and historical differences interfere with each Ally's commitment to each other and to NATO.¹¹⁰

This report also recalls NATO's historical legacy of success in defending from the communist bloc and keeping the West united until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, charging that throughout the 1990s, NATO's chief goal – in tandem with the European Union – was to organize and manifest a whole and free Europe; the Alliance intervened in the Balkans to stop the ongoing violence and ethnic cleansing, it established a partnership with former adversary Russia, and admitted new members committed to democracy and collective security, resulting in a more democratic, united, and peaceful Europe than ever before.¹¹¹ However, it also addresses that its previous strategy – one of deterrence with mass troops along borders to halt disputes to prevent regional conflict – is still of major concern, but that NATO must also deal with new security challenges that take various forms and are often unpredictable and volatile such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation and advanced weapons technologies, cyberattacks, and energy pipeline and maritime supply route disruptions, calling for defense against these threats beyond the Alliance's territory.¹¹² Indeed the 2000s brought NATO assistance to the Afghan and Iraqi governments in combating violent extremism in Afghanistan and equipping forces in Iraq, respectively, fighting against piracy in the Gulf of Aden to protect Mediterranean security, and helping Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo with rebuilding and stabilizing their societies.¹¹³ The chief lesson in the 1990s and 2000s was that “A new Strategic Concept must recognize the urgency of further change while remaining true to the founding ideals that bind the Alliance together and that have earned for it a positive international reputation. This calls for a blend of reaffirmation and renovation aimed at creating the optimum mix of old and new.”¹¹⁴

Under this recommendation, the Group of Experts reflect on previous findings in formulating past Strategic Concepts, finding that certain building blocks from the 1999 Strategic Concept should be included in the 2010 one, such as its Open Door Policy, its purpose to provide

¹⁰⁹ Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association, [“NATO Member States.”](#)

¹¹⁰ NATO 2020, Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, 6.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 6.

¹¹² Ibid., 7.

¹¹³ Ibid., 7.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 7.

freedom and security to all its members, its characterization and embodiment of a transatlantic link permanently tying the security of Europe and North America, the indivisibility of all Allies' security as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty i.e. an attack on one is an attack on all, the Alliance's combined military forces must be able to deter and help promote the territorial integrity of its members, equal division of responsibilities, risks, roles, and benefits, further utilize its links with other countries and organizations to prevent and manage crises, arms control and non-proliferation agreements that aid NATO's political and military efforts to reach its strategic objectives, and fulfill NATO's purpose and necessary security tasks by respecting others' security interests to support the search for peaceful dispute resolution as found in the UN Charter.¹¹⁵ However, the Group of Experts also determined that adhering to NATO's core principles will require a change in approach because the requirements of meeting its vital commitments have shifted based on the changing nature of security threats.¹¹⁶ To meet this, the Group of Experts recommends that the 2010 Strategic Concept should provide an agreed-upon set of core tasks by all Alliance members, these recommendations are as follows:

“(1) ability to deter and defend member states against any threat of aggression: reaffirm Art.5 while recognizing that sources of Article 5 threats have expanded and are beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, so NATO must be prepared to defend and deter against these threats;
(2) contribute to the broader security of the whole Euro-Atlantic region: the 2010 Strategic Concept must clarify NATO's role as a defensive body and protector of its own interests and as a contributor to peace in the region as a whole (an example of this is NATO's close collaboration in the Balkans with the EU, the UN, and the OSCE, and be open to partnerships and engage in diplomatic partnerships with non-member states such as Russia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus;
(3) serve as a transatlantic means for security and crisis management along all issues the Alliance faces: NATO must continue to improve its crisis management capabilities such as risk identification and assessment, member-state reassurance, and crisis response within, along, and/or beyond its borders; and
(4) enhance the scope and management of partnerships to meet its vital goals.”¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 7-8.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 8.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 19-21.

The fourth recommendation called for an entire chapter of the Group of Experts Report, finding that NATO should assess its partnerships and arrangements with other countries and institutions comprised of groups of countries in order to establish if there is room for improvement.¹¹⁸ For future missions (as what is happening in Afghanistan: NATO's current largest ongoing mission ensuring the safety and prevention of terrorist activity from harming the country and its people), the report recommends that NATO should function as a member of a broader security network that operates on a comprehensive approach because security is a multidimensional subject – one of political, military, economic, and social character.¹¹⁹ According to this section, the EU's role in NATO is that of a partnership; it finds that while both NATO and the EU share members, interests, the two institutions work side-by-side on their joint and separate missions (i.e. the EU collaborates with and works on the significant majority of NATO operations), and have produced cooperation mechanisms with great detail, there is still room for improvement as the previous set of cooperation mechanisms did not work as well as planned and hoped.¹²⁰

Thus, the authors find that full complementarity between NATO and the EU is essential in formulating a cost-effective and comprehensive approach to security and providing stability in areas and missions of mutual action; they also put forth that enhanced cooperation between NATO and the EU can help in dealing with what they categorize as unconventional threats, i.e. terrorism, cyber-attacks, and energy vulnerabilities.¹²¹ Indeed they also establish that the EU oftentimes has more background and expertise in dealing with non-military threats despite how risks and dangers emanating from non-military threats versus those of a military nature are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish.¹²² To reach this, the group of experts recommend the following:

“1. The new Strategic concept should recognize that the EU's Treaty of Lisbon is designed, among other purposes, to strengthen Europe's military capabilities and command structures. Allies should welcome this development and use the Strategic Concept to affirm NATO's desire for a truly comprehensive partnership with the EU, one that is cost-effective, that

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 23.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 22.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 23.

¹²¹ Ibid., 24.

¹²² Ibid., 24.

is based on the principle of reciprocity, and that encompasses the entire range of the institutions' mutual activities.

2. In its contacts with the EU, NATO leaders should avoid the trap of categorizing all threats and responsibilities as distinctly "military" or "non-military." Instead, they should nurture the habit of thinking on these issues as developing along a continuum. Many situations will require a response that includes both forceful and non-coercive elements; NATO, the EU, and others should bring to bear the capabilities that add the most value in finding a solution. Accordingly, NATO should seek to agree with EU leaders on a plan for regular joint participation in meetings, fuller communications between military staffs, and more extensive coordination with respect to crisis management, threat assessments, and sharing assets.

3. NATO and EU leaders should do everything possible to prevent disagreements from interfering with effective cooperation between the two organizations."

Per these recommendations, it is evident that a broad-based, long-term approach to this component of NATO's grand strategy intends to benefit both institutions and moreover, continue to increase coordination by collaborating on enhancing, creating, and implementing new mechanisms that support three key principles of NATO: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security between NATO and the EU. In the first recommendation, the group of experts explain how the Lisbon Treaty – the key document that outlines the EU's security and defense capabilities – should be recognized and applauded in the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept because it underscores the EU's commitment to similar principles pertaining to protecting and defending Europe's territorial integrity and safety within and beyond its borders. The second recommendation addresses how previous miscalculations and misinterpretations of what constitutes a military versus a non-military threat can result in ambiguity, as seen in the early 2000s before the EU clearly established its foreign policy goals and strategic objectives; this is critical because it prescribes the increased cooperation through more EU participation in NATO meetings and communications, and vice versa, rather than simply stating the issue at hand. Thirdly, the final recommendation is arguably the most challenging to deliver on: despite the mutual respect, trust, and cooperation from both the EU and NATO, and the presence of institutional overlap, issues regarding non-Member states that pose direct political tensions – such as that of Cyprus being an EU Member, but not a NATO one because Turkey does not recognize Cyprus as its own state – that have the capacity to produce instability in the

Mediterranean impacting neighboring and other countries in the region and moreover, on the European continent.¹²³ Nevertheless, these three recommendations uphold the values of both institutions and are clearly yet broadly explained on how to be executed to produce a safer, freer, and more unified Europe. Therefore, if published in the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept, this net assessment finds that NATO and the EU are increasing in coordination in these areas.

The remainder of the Group of Experts' chapter on partnerships unpacks the relationship between NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the UN, and the OSCE in a similar light as that of its EU recommendations: fostering more cooperation, negotiations, and improve institutional links and confidence-building measures, emphasizing that enhancing these partnerships are in NATO's best interest in attaining its core principles.¹²⁴ However, it also discusses the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), finding that the Alliance's partnership with Russia is in a league of its own because despite the differences and skepticism of Russia viewed by Alliance members, NATO strives to engage with Russian leaders to prevent future harm and misunderstandings, and to reach common goals such as arms control, counterterrorism, crisis management, and non-proliferation.¹²⁵ Indeed at the time that this report was published, Russia's 2010 military doctrine enshrined a "strictly defensive" character, which the group of experts highlight as "a good starting point for cooperation."¹²⁶ While it condemns Russia's involvement in the 2008 conflict in Georgia resulting in violent clashes between two Alliance partners, it also recommends that the 2010 Strategic Concept underscore NATO's push for an improved relationship with Russia under its Open Door strategic direction.¹²⁷

Under this Open Door principle, the report also recommends that NATO should deepen its partnerships and expand its projects with non-member states outside the Euro-Atlantic region, finding that "The Strategic Concept should go further and outline ways to give NATO's operational partners a regular and meaningful voice in shaping strategy and decisions on missions to which they contribute."¹²⁸ As the report suggests, the Alliance can do this in conjunction with exploring new partnerships in new regional subgroups such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Shanghai Cooperation

¹²³ Janigian, v.

¹²⁴ NATO 2020, Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, 23-25.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 26.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 27.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 28.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 30.

Organization.¹²⁹ According to the Group of Experts, the strategic directive of more cooperation and enhanced partnerships is in the specific EU-NATO relationship, as well as in the context of the Alliance's relationships with other regional bodies and international organizations, should be founded on equality, and mutual trust and benefit.¹³⁰ It is also in NATO's best interest to foster enhanced cooperation based on these values because it can improve its military operations as learned in its ongoing mission in Afghanistan from 2003: known as ISAF, it is NATO's largest operation and is calling for more specific and streamlined communications in its chain of command, of which the authors recommend a comprehensive civilian-military approach to protect non-combatants and realign their objectives to build trust on the ground and be organized.¹³¹ The lesson of Afghanistan also highlights challenges posed by decision-making mechanisms within the Alliance, to which the North Atlantic Council serves as its main decision-making body per the approval of the Secretary General; to prescribe this, "NATO decision-making can only be made on a case-by-case basis."¹³²

Because there are a plethora of security issues and types of threats, and that the Alliance operates under a consensus-based voting system, there should be clear guidelines and a statement of defense priorities in the 2010 Strategic Concept to ensure that NATO does not overreach in its role as a regional actor, – to protect the Euro-Atlantic area – but that it also has enough resources to protect the people and the areas in and surrounding its territory.¹³³ While still in favor of the Open Door policy as enshrined in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, the authors of the report put forth that the 2010 Strategic Concept should further direct NATO's defense capabilities to be flexible, well-networked, and have a sustainable and deployable military force posture that is not at an unaffordable cost.¹³⁴ NATO faces challenges with the lack of European defense spending:

The primary limiting factor hindering military transformation has been the lack of European defence spending and investment. Today, only six of twenty-six European Allies spend 2 percent or more of GDP on these purposes; only about a dozen have met goals for making military forces deployable and sustainable. The Alliance benchmark of 20 percent of military spending allocated to investment has been achieved by less than half of NATO nations (though

¹²⁹ Ibid., 30.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 30.

¹³¹ Ibid., 32.

¹³² Ibid., 33.

¹³³ Ibid., 34.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 38.

the trend is slowly improving). The gap is especially large between U.S. capabilities and the rest of NATO, an imbalance that if left unchecked could undermine Alliance cohesion. Contributing to the problem is the fact that, in the past twenty years, European defence spending has been consumed disproportionately by personnel and operational costs. As a result, European national forces generally do not have nearly enough transformed forces.”¹³⁵

This quotation demonstrates the imbalance of resources and contributions amongst NATO member states, which remains as a pressing issue by all; the prescription for this is to incorporate updated guidelines that establish agreed-upon benchmarks for capabilities and military reforms and priorities from the 1999 Strategic Concept.¹³⁶ It also serves as a means to meeting the NATO objectives set forth in its previous Strategic Concepts and in its founding treaty such as the pillars of crisis management, collective defense, and deterrence.

In order to uphold its conventional defense capabilities, the authors recommend that NATO should address inefficiencies and implement reforms in its national defense spending, finding that if the Alliance wants to succeed in its missions, it must reaffirm its Article 5 commitments, meet its deployability (via strategic lift) and sustainability goals, expand the breadth of missions (Article 5 and non-Article 5) that the NATO Response Force participates in, find areas of commonality between Article 5 and expeditionary missions by providing well-prepared forces, strengthen NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities, and upgrade and transform Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and NATO Education and Training by holding simulations to sharpen strategic and operational skills.¹³⁷

Additionally, NATO remains committed to nuclear nonproliferation and arms control efforts under its deterrence strategy, and the report recommends that NATO should keep its nuclear capabilities as long as nuclear weapons and arms exist in and around its neighborhood, and it should engage in further dialogues with Russia and reestablish its own internal dialogue to discuss the wide range of nuclear issues.¹³⁸ On Ballistic missile defense, it is suggested that NATO should enhance its Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense System, and find its role in adapting a NATO-wide version of the U.S. phased approach to ballistic missile defense;

¹³⁵ Ibid., 38.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 38.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 39-40.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 41.

this would strengthen deterrence and transatlantic responsibility-sharing.¹³⁹ These threats are not new, albeit they are expanding in some areas of the world that concern NATO territory, so the business-as-usual approach is largely implied by these recommendations to conventional threats. However, as previously mentioned, the security threats from today versus that of 2009 when this report was written vary greatly, particularly in terms of terrorism, cybersecurity, energy security, climate change, and hybrid threats. Nevertheless, unconventional threats are still acknowledged.

Also referred as unconventional threats or dangers, the authors recognize the presence of these new threats, and outline recommendations for the 2010 Strategic Concept. For responding to terrorism, NATO's Defence Against Terrorism Programme should include other subjects besides its ten areas of technology-related work: NATO military forces are active in Afghanistan to fight violent extremism following its invocation of Article 5 following 9/11.¹⁴⁰ On matters pertinent to cybersecurity, the report finds that cyber-attacks are of high priority.¹⁴¹ To address this, the group of experts recommend that NATO should acknowledge the rising threat of cyber-attacks as they can lead to cyberwarfare; to do this, they suggest that NATO should host more trainings in their cyber defense programs, enhance and increase their ability of early-warning sign detection, and should invest in a long-term cyber defense network.¹⁴² Similarly, the authors recommend that matters pertinent to threats to energy security – an increasingly interdependent network and a requirement for modern states to have in order to have functional infrastructure – should be taken seriously despite it being a domestic issue area that the EU and the International Energy Agency offer remedies and services to because NATO's strategic assessment and contingency planning activities depend on having access to energy supply sources.¹⁴³

The remaining unconventional threat mentioned in this report is climate change, and to this end, the authors suggest that although NATO does not have a formal role in controlling factors that contribute to global warming such as the emission of greenhouse gasses, NATO should be prepared to provide assistance to those impacted by security threats emanating from climate change such as the melting of the Arctic and polar ice cap, and the omnipresence and continual rise of natural disasters.¹⁴⁴ The conventional and unconventional security threats in all

¹³⁹ Ibid., 44.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 44-45.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 45.

¹⁴² Ibid., 45.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 46.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 46.

shapes and sizes are of NATO's concern, and the publication of this report demonstrate the significance of the implementation of NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept because its common mission – to protect and safeguard liberty from traditional and new security threats, to promote the rule of law, and its embrace for democracy and peace.¹⁴⁵

5.2 NATO Strategic Concept 2010

Herein referred to as the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, titled “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” was adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010.¹⁴⁶ The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept outlines NATO's core tasks and principles, the security environment, and its cornerstone strategies such as collective defence, deterrence, crisis management, and promoting international security through cooperation on security matters such as arms control, unconventional threats, disarmament, and non-proliferation.¹⁴⁷

Like the Group of Experts Report, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept reaffirms the collective security provision from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and acknowledges that NATO will evolve by continuing to protect its territory and civilians from ongoing security crises and conflicts, as well as build its capabilities to prevent and eliminate new threats in a constantly changing world.¹⁴⁸ It also reiterates its commitment to its Open Door Policy, allowing new European democracies who prove to carry the same democratic values based on mutual trust and fair responsibility-sharing.¹⁴⁹ It states:

*“While the world is changing, NATO's essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security, and shared values.”*¹⁵⁰

This mission is enshrined in NATO's distinct core tasks and principles that define NATO's purpose as a protector of security and freedom by both political and military means; it also restates its commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and its founding Washington Treaty which give the UN Security Council primary responsibility to uphold international peace and security, and continues to serve as a strong transatlantic link since 1949 which speaks volume to its indivisible nature, and that the Alliance will continue to fulfill its collective

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 47.

¹⁴⁶ NATO, Strategic Concept, 2010. Title page.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., Table of Contents.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 4.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 5.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 5.

defence, crisis management, and cooperative security objectives set forth in order to serve its vast and significant purpose.¹⁵¹ Indeed the 2010 Strategic Concept recommits NATO to continue its modernization and necessary reforms in its missions and efforts in providing transatlantic security, territorial integrity, and discuss all issues that impact NATO's ability to safeguard and transform conflict and post-conflict threats and situations in and along its borders.¹⁵²

To this end, the 2010 Strategic Concept characterizes conventional and unconventional attacks and threats as of critical concern for NATO in the security environment, finding that while the risk of a conventional attack on NATO territory is low, it is still crucial to monitor and take necessary precautions and be prepared as a global security challenge.¹⁵³ The manifestation of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction remains as a longstanding conventional threat with unconventional qualities and moreover, with major consequences to Euro-Atlantic security and to the international security climate.¹⁵⁴

Similarly, terrorism and violent extremist groups and activities still threaten the Alliance's ability to provide safety and stability to the transatlantic region; the ongoing development of modern technology also places an unconventional label on what constitutes terrorism and its' risks.¹⁵⁵ As elaborated in the 2010 Strategic Concept, extremist groups and terrorist attacks are likely to have greater and more dangerous impacts on and around NATO's borders because modern technology poses new possibilities for adversaries to spread to, particularly in scenarios of acquiring nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.¹⁵⁶ These transnational activities present direct risks to NATO's security, and can manifest into intensified extremism and terrorism, and actions such as trafficking of arms, people, and narcotics.¹⁵⁷ Cybersecurity is also of huge importance as cyber-attacks are increasing in frequency, cost in the damages they bring, and are more organized; these trends apply to the public and private sector, and can undermine Euro-Atlantic security.¹⁵⁸

Cyber is not the only infrastructure threatened by the rise in modern technology and extremism: the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare, and blocked access to space

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 8.

¹⁵² Ibid., 9.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 10-13.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 10.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 11.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 11.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 11.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 11.

also pose a major set of challenges to NATO and its military operations and planning.¹⁵⁹ Environmental, trade, and energy security issues are also greatly exacerbated by resource limitations and technology-related trends.¹⁶⁰

It is this security climate that the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept is based on, and the strategy of deterrence – having a balanced mix of nuclear provided by the independent strategic forces of the U.S., the U.K., and France (these forces also serve as a deterrent contribution) and conventional capabilities – remains at NATO’s core overall strategy.¹⁶¹ Per a strategy of deterrence, NATO seeks to mitigate its conventional threats by:

- (1) sustaining its major joint operations and its range of smaller ones,
- (2) maintaining its conventional capabilities to be able to respond to its Article 5 and expeditionary missions,
- (3) providing training, exercises, and contingency planning and information exchange,
- (4) offering as many Allies to participate in collective defense planning on nuclear assignments,
- (5) and by capacity-building on collective defense of NATO territories and populations against ballistic missile attacks.¹⁶²

On its unconventional threats, the Strategic Concept outlines its’ strategic goals as:

- (6) increasingly build NATO’s defense capabilities against biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear threats and weapons of mass destruction,
- (7) further develop the ability to “prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyberattacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;”
- (8) improve mechanisms of detecting and defending against terrorism that has an in-depth analysis of the threat based on consultations with NATO partners which help empower and train local forces to combat terrorism themselves,
- (9) innovate the ability to provide and protect energy security and its vital transportation elements, and consult and cooperate with partners in assessing appropriate strategic contingency planning,

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 12.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 13.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 14.

¹⁶² Ibid., 16.

- (10) “ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;”
- (11) affirm and maintain that there are sufficient resources to sustain defense spending for NATO’s armed forces, and
- (12) resume assessing NATO’s general stance in its deterrence and collective defense platforms in a constantly changing international security environment.¹⁶³

This comprehensive list of strategic objectives is met with a crisis management approach; this draws from the experiences from NATO’s missions in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, where the lesson learned was that conflict prevention is the best way to manage conflicts to ensure they will not happen.¹⁶⁴ To successfully provide crisis management, the Strategic Concept recommends that in order to better predict when a crisis may take place, NATO will improve its internal intelligence sharing, training and integrate specialists and NATO-personnel and NATO partners, and strengthen its political discussions among Allies and partners regularly and in every stage of a crisis i.e. the before, during, and aftermath.¹⁶⁵

The NATO 2010 Strategic Concept puts forth its continued dedication to supporting a strategy of cooperation to promote international security in the realms of arms control, non-proliferation, arms control, and working with Alliance members and NATO partners such as Russia.¹⁶⁶ It also reiterates its commitment to the Open Door policy, finding that the enlargement strategy has been successful in its goal of protecting a whole and free Europe with shared values in a cooperative security format.¹⁶⁷ This applies for NATO’s openness to establishing and building partnerships with non-member states as it expresses that NATO aims to engage in cooperation and form more strategic relationships with its partners such as the UN. On its EU strategic objectives, the 2010 Strategic Concept states:

“An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore, the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organizations share a majority of members, and all members of both organizations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European

¹⁶³ Ibid., 17-18.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 19.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 21-22.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 24-25.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 25.

*defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU's capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security.*¹⁶⁸

To achieve this, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept recommends that NATO should strengthen its strategic partnership with the EU based on transparency, complete mutual openness, and complementarity and respect for both organizations' institutional autonomy and integrity; it should also try to minimize redundancies brought on by overlap and be as cost-effective as possible in building cooperative planning and operations with the EU.¹⁶⁹ This discourse indicates a willingness to increase coordination and cooperation, and states the "knowns and unknowns" in its' threat assessment. It also warmly accepts the Lisbon Treaty, which gives the EU more capabilities in conducting its' defense and security strategic goals.

The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept also outlines NATO's aim to build a true reciprocity-based strategic partnership with Russia by maximizing the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council; this strategic goal is based on the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration with regard to territorial integrity and the respect of democratic values such as sovereignty and freedom, despite NATO-Moscow past tensions that are still present on certain issues in the Black Sea basin and in the South Caucasus.¹⁷⁰

In addition to enhancing its partnerships such as those with the EU and the UN, it also seeks to further develop its regional partnerships such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, its Gulf partners, the Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, of which the NATO strategy is to remain open to new partners.¹⁷¹ To conclude, building partnerships, crisis management, and ensuring streamlined communications, sufficient resources, and maximizing deployability and coherence in defence planning are key takeaways from the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept: NATO's grand strategy for 2010-2020.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 28

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 28-29.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 30.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 31-32.

¹⁷² Ibid., 33-35.

The discourse provided and assessed indicates that NATO is inclined to increase coordination and cooperation with the EU and its partners, while adhering to its principles and strategic interests that are commonly shared by the EU and the U.S. While written in 2010, this document still serves as the backbone for guiding NATO strategy throughout this decade. By definition, it meets the criteria to be an effective and comprehensive grand strategy because it deals with old and new potential security threats, outlines its' economic interests, and projects its' values and strengths to the transatlantic space it seeks to protect. The highlighted items reiterate NATO's purpose, strategic objectives, and do not make promises that outweigh its' capabilities. While security threats have changed, this document is still majorly reflective of the security climate of the past ten years. It also still serves as a support mechanism for the EU's evolution of its' grand strategic discourse to be unpacked below.

5.3. European Security Strategy (2003)

The first grand strategy released by the Council of the European Union was released and adopted by the European Union in December 2003, titled "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy."¹⁷³ It acknowledges the latter half of the 20th century as formative for European peace and prosperity following the violent first half, in which enlargement, integration, and partnerships with the U.S. through NATO were paramount in the eventual democratization process in previously unstable and some authoritarian regimes.¹⁷⁴ The previous century and the 1990s brought about armed conflict in namely every region of the world, and the onslaught of wars in the Balkans served as a heavy reminder that violence can still be rampant on the European continent.¹⁷⁵ Indeed the post-Cold War world has brought about a death toll of nearly 4 million people (90% of which were civilians) from 1990-2003, which demonstrates that globalization has allowed for the spread of democratic values and increased interconnectedness, but it also has created vulnerability in Europe.¹⁷⁶ When this strategic document was released, the EU was comprised of 25 Member States, over 450 million people, and it accounted for 25% of the world's GNP: it was (and still is) a major global actor with increasingly shared values and

¹⁷³ European Security Strategy, 27.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 27.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 28.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 29.

interests across Europe.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, according to the 2003 European Security Strategy, security threats and complex problems still persist.

The European Security Strategy outlines the global challenges and the EU's key security threats as cyclically linked to economic and political development, stipulating that conflict is destructive to social, economic, and physical infrastructure and promotes criminal activity.¹⁷⁸ The 2003 Strategy lists poverty, hunger, pandemics, competition for natural resources such as water, and notably energy dependence as issue areas of major concern for European security as Europe imports nearly 50% of the world's energy consumption; this is expected to rise to 70% by 2030.¹⁷⁹ Although this assessment puts forth that large-scale attacks against any member state are unlikely if not impossible, the key strategic security threats in this timeframe are less transparent and difficult to predict.¹⁸⁰ These threats include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime; it is also noted that Europe and European interests are at risk due to these state-level, global, and regional security challenges.¹⁸¹ While different in nature, the ESS highlights the possibility that these security phenomena have the potential to work in tandem, which would cause novel, and more radical threats.¹⁸² For example, Europe is a target and base for terrorism rooted in violent extremism, posing a growing strategic threat across all of Europe because terrorist movements are well-connected and resourced via technological links: Al Qaeda bases were found in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Belgium.¹⁸³ On weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Strategy presents a terrifying yet plausible security threat in which terrorist groups could acquire weapons of mass destruction, and the increased probability of terrorists and terrorist groups launching a WMD arms race: a high-risk security threat for humankind and major global actors such as the EU.¹⁸⁴ Thus, the call for unified European involvement in mitigating and eliminating conventional *and* unconventional, and in direct *and* indirect threats is indispensable.¹⁸⁵

Under this set of threats, there are three major strategic objectives of the 2003 ESS:

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 28.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 29.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 30.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 30.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 30-32.

¹⁸² Ibid., 32.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 30.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 31.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 31.

(1) counterterrorism efforts and cooperation with Washington in light of 9/11,
(2) non-proliferation policies, stricter export controls, and agreements in order to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency and global adherence to multilateral treaty institutions, and
(3) state-building and promoting democratic values in the Balkans to prevent organized crime and failed statehood.¹⁸⁶

To meet these goals, the ESS prescribes conflict and threat prevention, and using mixed methods such as intelligence or economic instruments rather than purely military means to find solutions to ongoing crises and new threats.¹⁸⁷ It finds that the EU is prepared and qualified to address the wide variety of security issues on regional and transnational levels.¹⁸⁸

On a regional level, the ESS supports that good governance is vital in preventing and addressing ongoing conflicts in neighboring areas of the South Caucasus, the Mediterranean, and the Arab-Israeli conflict as of strategic priority to the European Union because other threats can arise that have the potential to impact Europe such as population growth and organized crime.¹⁸⁹ Through its strategic approaches of enlargement, integration, engagement, and cooperation, the European perspective presents an additional incentive for neighboring countries to work with the European Union to end conflict because the EU offers economic, social, and political benefits to interested states in the region.¹⁹⁰

Institutions are vital in order to meet this arduous task, and the ESS emphasizes the goal of expanding its membership while meeting its obligations and standards.¹⁹¹ Particularly, on its assessment of transatlantic relations and the importance of regional institutions in promoting good global governance, the ESS states the following with special reference to NATO:

*“One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship. Regional organizations also strengthen global governance.”*¹⁹²

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 33-34.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 34.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 34.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 35.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 35.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 37.

¹⁹² Ibid., 37.

On both regional and international levels, the ESS reaffirms the EU's commitment to strengthening and maintaining a rules-based, multilateral international order under the framework of the UN Charter.¹⁹³ Globally, it also prioritizes the support of good governance and the rule of law, spreading democracy, combatting corruption and lowering the abuse of political power in states seeking systemic change, and serving to protect human rights.¹⁹⁴

The EU is the world's largest official development assistance provider and facilitator of trade, making the Union and its member states equipped to work toward and eventually attain these strategic goals in the international system.¹⁹⁵ To achieve these objectives, the ESS puts forth that the EU should be more active internally, meaning that it should enact more active policies in order to respond and protect its population from new and mixed threats.¹⁹⁶ Under a developed and more active strategic culture, the EU can respond and in certain cases, intervene efficiently.¹⁹⁷ Indeed it is possible that the EU can pursue its strategic objectives *and* can respond to numerous issues and crises simultaneously.¹⁹⁸

Externally, further cooperation with international actors such as NATO and the UN, preventive engagement as a response to starting signs of proliferation and humanitarian emergencies, and establishing a defense agency are some of the other grand strategic mechanisms in which the EU can realize its potential in meeting its strategic objectives.¹⁹⁹ The ESS stipulates that a systematic approach to utilizing pooled and shared assets within the EU would increase its capabilities and reduce duplications.²⁰⁰ The reasoning behind this is that by operating under “a system that combines the resources of individual Member States with those of EU institutions,” it is possible to more effectively understand future challenges by having improved and clear communication on such issues.²⁰¹

In a system of enhanced exchange of ideas and more resources, common threat assessments with improved shared intelligence capacities amongst Member States and their

¹⁹³ Ibid., 36.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 37.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 38.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 39.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 39.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 39.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 40.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 40.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 40.

partners are more equipped to react, respond, and reduce existing and new threats.²⁰² An example of this can be found in:

*“the EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.”*²⁰³

Not only does it formally establish the EU-NATO strategic partnership, the ESS also addresses how cooperation generates stronger results as enshrined in both the Common Foreign and Security Policy and in the European Security and Defence Policy.²⁰⁴ Since the implementation of these frameworks, several policy instruments have been created under a strategy of cooperation, but the challenge of uniting these structures in a coherent and streamlined fashion remains.²⁰⁵

Thus, in addition to being more active, the ESS puts forth that the EU and its numerous instruments and partnerships should provide and implement more coherent and coordinated (1) diplomatic efforts, (2) crisis management and response both domestically and beyond the European Union’s borders in light of terrorism and organized crime, and (3) economic (*i.e.* development and trade) and environmental policies.²⁰⁶

Regionally, as seen in the Western Balkans and Africa, there is a strong need – especially in conflict situations – for coherent EU strategy and policies.²⁰⁷ To this end, working more closely with partners such as Russia and strengthening transatlantic relations by maintaining a balanced and efficient relationship with Washington are of key importance for the European Union.²⁰⁸ Globally, the European Security Strategy finds that adhering to and voicing its objectives via multilateral cooperation and developing new strategic partnerships with countries such as China, India, Japan, and other countries that share its values and priorities are also a strategic priority.²⁰⁹ The ESS concludes that despite the threats presented by the geopolitical

²⁰² Ibid., 40.

²⁰³ Ibid., 41.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 41.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 41.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 41.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 42.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 42.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 42.

situation at the time (2003), the EU can contribute to making the multilateral system operate more effectively, and in turn, make the world more secure, united, and fair.²¹⁰

5.4. 2008 European Security Strategy Implementation Report Overview

Five years later, the former Secretary-General of the Council of the EU/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana presented a report on how the European Security Strategy has been implemented; it assesses how the ESS has worked in practice, and it offers recommendations for improvement.²¹¹ Released in December 2008, the ESS Implementation Report highlights that the EU's strategies of enlargement and neighborhood policy have brought increased stability and democracy promotion across all of Europe; it also indicates that complex threats and security challenges still exist, and that the European Union must continue to implement strategic thinking more in achieving its objectives worldwide.²¹²

In its relationship with NATO, the ESS Implementation Report finds that:

*“For Europe, the transatlantic partnership remains an irreplaceable foundation, based on shared history and responsibilities. The EU and NATO must deepen their strategic partnership for better cooperation in crisis management.”*²¹³

Considering this assessment, and that at the global level, the EU's grand strategy and policies pertaining to security are aligned with the principles and goals of the UN, the report finds that implementing the ESS is incomplete, and that in order to achieve the strategic objectives outlined in the European Security Strategy, the EU must remain more coherent and active.²¹⁴

The chief purpose of the ESS Implementation Report is to reinforce the principles and strategic objectives that were established in the ESS.²¹⁵ Indeed the security challenges outlined in the ESS still exist and have increased in the five years from when the ESS and this Report were initially published.²¹⁶ These threats include (but are not limited to): proliferation, terrorism and organized crime, cyber security, energy security, and climate change.²¹⁷ The strategic prescription to addressing these issues of increasing concern are also aligned with the ESS, as

²¹⁰ Ibid., 43.

²¹¹ Solana, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy,” Foreword.

²¹² Ibid., 7-8.

²¹³ Ibid., 9.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 9.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 10.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 11.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 11-15.

these challenges impact all EU Member States and the international system.²¹⁸ The approaches taken by the EU include those of enhancing multilateral cooperation within the framework of the United Nations and through deepening partnerships, spreading awareness on growingly complex security threats, tightening coordination arrangements on global challenges, and continuing these strategic approaches with political and financial support and action.²¹⁹

In Europe and its neighborhood, the ESS Implementation Report assesses that the EU's enlargement strategy has served as a stabilizing and peaceful force, especially in the Western Balkans.²²⁰ Similarly, under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU was successful in spearheading democratic reforms and good governance in all of its eastern neighbors (except Belarus at this time of publication) such as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.²²¹

The EU's goal within the Eastern Partnership is to upgrade development and promote stability and prosperity in these countries.²²² To address frozen conflicts in eastern Europe as seen in conflict between Russia and Georgia in the South Caucasus, the EU has led mediation efforts, humanitarian and civilian monitoring assistance and missions, and moreover, it provides financial support.²²³ To the south, the EU has been collaborating with countries in the Mediterranean such as Israel and Morocco to address issues of conflict-areas, political reform, and illegal migration.²²⁴ The EU continues to play a uniquely vital role in promoting a settlement between the state of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and is in full support of a two-state solution.²²⁵ Additionally, the EU engages in the dynamics and processes associated with other Middle Eastern countries such as Lebanon and Iraq because conflicts and developments in these countries can potentially threaten European and international security.²²⁶

Similarly, Iran and its nuclear program are of vital concern to the EU because of its nuclear buildup, and in order to deal with this, the EU has spearheaded a dual-track approach – a combination of dialogue and more pressure – with the U.S., China, and Russia.²²⁷ On a bilateral level, the ESS Implementation Report finds that from 2003 when the ESS was published, the EU

²¹⁸ Ibid., 11-15.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 11-15.

²²⁰ Ibid., 16.

²²¹ Ibid., 16.

²²² Ibid., 23.

²²³ Ibid., 17.

²²⁴ Ibid., 17.

²²⁵ Ibid., 18.

²²⁶ Ibid., 18.

²²⁷ Ibid., 18.

improved and fostered deep relations with individual countries in the ENP.²²⁸ As seen in the ESS, the Implementation Report reemphasizes the importance of multilateralism as a strategy, and it reiterates the longstanding and important role of its partnership with the U.S.²²⁹ An example of this is its' continued push for increasing cooperation with NATO, as seen below:

*“The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced. We need to strengthen this strategic partnership in service of our shared security interests, with better operational cooperation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organization, and continued work on military capabilities.”*²³⁰

Furthermore, the Report establishes that the EU has expanded its relations with regional organizations such as the OSCE, the African Union, and with larger multilateral organizations such as the UN where the EU supports all of the UN's peacekeeping operations and human rights efforts, and the two international organizations have a formal partnership – the Joint EU-UN Declaration.²³¹ However, the ESS Implementation Report concludes that decision-making, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the world's international institutions must be improved, and decisions should be shared more frequently, and that two additional strategic goals – climate change and completion of the Doha Round in the WTO – must be highly prioritized.²³² This Report ultimately outlines that the EU must (1) preserve public support for the EU's participation in global affairs, (2) sustain and protect its commitments abroad, and (3) act now in order to shape phenomena that impact European and global security.²³³

5.5 2016 EU Global Strategy Assessment

Titled “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy,” this document was published in 2016 and still serves as the current grand EU strategy.²³⁴ The context of releasing the EU Global Strategy is key to consider: at the time, EU leaders and interlocutors found that the EU as a Union was

²²⁸ Ibid., 23.

²²⁹ Ibid., 24.

²³⁰ Ibid., 24.

²³¹ Ibid., 24.

²³² Ibid., 25.

²³³ Ibid., 26.

²³⁴ EEAS, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy,” Cover Page.

mitigating internal and external crises, resulting in common questioning of the EU's purpose.²³⁵ Thus, the need for the EU Global Strategy, according to former High Representative Frederica Mogherini, is to combine the Union's shared principles, interests, and priorities in to one common vision that is translatable into action.²³⁶ It is also meant to provide a framework and guidelines for meeting its citizens' needs on a daily basis.²³⁷

In formulating this strategic document, Mogherini and many others understood that the world is a complex and risk-prone place, which further emphasizes why the EU Global Strategy is of utmost importance in order to strengthen Europe and European security.²³⁸ Indeed this context of an existential crisis – rather than that of the 2003 ESS which was delivered out of the geopolitical context of the 2003 Iraq War – can explain *why* the EU decided to reemphasize the importance of grand strategy in foreign and security policy decision-making.²³⁹

According to the EU Global Strategy, the EU aims to provide internal and external security and prosperity for EU citizens and territory under the EU's shared interests and clear principles of principled pragmatism and unity, and to fulfill the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).²⁴⁰ In order to promote this, there are five priorities outlined for the EU's External Action to work towards:

- (1) security at home via a balanced amount of strategic autonomy and ambition in promoting peace and stability in Europe, namely by increasing its contributions to collective security and working closely with partners such as NATO;
- (2) invest in neighboring state and societal resilience to the East and South, by targeting on a case-by-case basis, the EU seeks to promote the benefits of EU Membership to attract neighboring countries under enlargement and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP);
- (3) engage in integrated approaches to conflicts and peacebuilding to provide human security, here the concept of 'integrated approaches' is defined as to reaffirm the importance of being completely comprehensive and coherent in all stages and levels of conflict cycles, namely by working with international partners and acting swiftly and responsibly on conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization;

²³⁵ Ibid., Mogherini, 3.

²³⁶ Ibid., Mogherini, 3.

²³⁷ Ibid., Mogherini, 5.

²³⁸ Ibid., Mogherini, 5.

²³⁹ Tocci, "Towards an EU global strategy.," 116.

²⁴⁰ EEAS, EU Global Strategy, 8.

(4) collaborate and mobilize regional partnerships and networks in a clear and structured way; regionalism and regional dynamics are vital to consider and draw from because regional organizations are beneficial to more effectively provide security and manage concerns while enjoying the benefits of economic integration and cultural expression via globalization, and the EU within this priority aims to support cooperative regional orders globally via specific goals; (5) promote good global governance for the 21st century by remaining committed to a strong United Nations as the foundation for a just, rules-based multilateral world order, and by developing coordinated policies and responses on an international level with states and non-state actors.²⁴¹

To meet these five ambitious strategic priorities outlined in its Global Strategy, the EU strives to build its' credibility and responsiveness by further investing in all foreign policy realms, with particular importance and urgency in defense and security cooperation in order to create a reliable European defense industry: a key component in Europe's decision-making and eventual actions.²⁴² The mechanisms in which the EU can reach its goals can be seen in its internal and external security elements because globalization has further interconnected the world and its security challenges.²⁴³ For example, internally, in order to provide prosperity for EU citizenry, the EU Global Strategy puts forth that the EU should promote economic growth, employment, equality, and healthy and safe environmental conditions.²⁴⁴ It also provides that the EU should adhere to its clear principles of democracy, and multilateralism, where the UN and its goals are also supported by the EU and serves its best interests.²⁴⁵

On an external level, in order to protect Europe, the EU will still pursue a strategy of enlargement and bolster its partnerships and their defense capabilities via increased engagement in order to properly and strategically address hybrid and new security threats.²⁴⁶ For the EU, this translates to meeting its commitments and collaborating with partners and organizations.²⁴⁷ Achieving this objective can also be understood as a means of promoting collective defense, and improving European security and transatlantic relations:

²⁴¹ Ibid., 9-10.

²⁴² Ibid., 11.

²⁴³ Ibid., 14.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 14.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 15.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 20.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 20.

“When it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework for most Member States. At the same time, EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO. The EU will therefore deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two. In this context, the EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO. A more credible European defence is essential also for the sake of a healthy transatlantic partnership with the U.S.”²⁴⁸

This passage highlights the goals and conditions that the EU should promote in order to provide a solid European security network, of which NATO and its embodiment of collective defense and transatlantic security and partnership remains essential. To achieve this, the mechanisms that the EU can use are:

- (1) further investment and development of defense capacities via increased and deeper cooperation,
- (2) more assistance for Member States to enhance the Union’s overall contribution to European security and defense as found in the Treaties,
- (3) implement measures to bolster strategic convergence between Member States such as gradual synchronization and mutually adapted national defense planning cycles and developed practices,
- (4) and fully utilize the potential of the European Defense Agency in order to strengthen the European security and defense industry.²⁴⁹

While ambitious, this strategy of bolstering European security with NATO and within Europe is aligned with the EU’s principles and concisely explains how transatlantic security strategy should be more coordinated via multilateral cooperation.

The EU Global Strategy also succinctly identifies the realms of security threats of 2016 and onward as counterterrorism, cyber security and intelligence, energy security, resilience-building in and surrounding Europe, strategic communications, migration, conflict settlement and crisis management, climate change, gender and racial equality, regional issues, peacekeeping and stabilization operations and investment, and defense cooperation within existing and new

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 20.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 20-21.

partnerships.²⁵⁰ The EU Global Strategy outlines ways in which the EU can reduce all of the aforementioned threat-areas, and how to address the challenges associated with them.²⁵¹ For example, on a regional level, the EU seeks to strengthen its transatlantic partnership:

*“The EU will invest further in strong bonds across the Atlantic, both north and south. A solid transatlantic partnership through NATO and with the United States and Canada helps us strengthen resilience, address conflicts, and contribute to effective global governance. NATO, for its members, has been the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security for almost 70 years. It remains the strongest and most effective military alliance in the world. The EU will deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated defence capability development, parallel and synchronized exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions to build the capacities of our partners, counter hybrid and cyber threats, and promote maritime security. The EU will deepen cooperation with the U.S. and Canada on crisis management, counterterrorism, trade, cyber, migration, energy, and climate action.”*²⁵²

In this case and in many others, the EU Global Strategy emphasizes the importance of cooperative partnerships, the shared responsibility in its commitments, and building its regional relationships as critical to mitigating crises and problems that arise from the aforementioned security threat areas and to fostering a freer and safer, world order.²⁵³ Understanding regional dynamics, experiences, and political cleavages is useful for the EU in how it attempts to promote cooperation, peace, and security.²⁵⁴ The EU Global Strategy outlines a detailed prescription of how the EU can deepen its partnerships, and create and widen new regional partnerships on all seven continents, while simultaneously adhering to its internal and external values.²⁵⁵

To the east, the EU continues to work with ENP members, and with countries independent from the EU and its partnership agreements such as Russia because Moscow’s actions impact how events unfold in countries in the Black Sea Region and the South Caucasus, which undermine stability and peace on the European continent, as seen in Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea.²⁵⁶ Similarly, in order to address the threats associated with terrorism,

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 21-39.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 21-39.

²⁵² Ibid., 36-37.

²⁵³ Ibid., 33-39.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 32.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 33-38.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 33.

organized crime, energy security, cyber-attacks, proliferation, and illegal migration, the EU seeks to resolve conflicts and advocating for human rights and development by working with partners to the south and in the Mediterranean.²⁵⁷ For example, in the Middle East, the EU continues to collaborate with the Arab League and the Quartet to find solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and seeks to promote dialogue and negotiations over regional conflicts in Syria and Libya.²⁵⁸ Balanced engagement, deepening sectoral cooperation, and promoting democracy and other EU principles and values are key strategic tools that the EU uses in order to facilitate conflict settlement and peacebuilding in regions that are impacted by conflict.²⁵⁹

On both a regional and a global level, the EU will collaborate further with like-minded strategic partners, non-state actors, and civil society.²⁶⁰ Internationally, the EU Global Strategy also places importance on widening its reach in spreading good governance and international norms, regimes, and institutions that seek to eliminate security threats and promote prosperity.²⁶¹ For instance, as the world's largest trader of manufactured goods and services, the EU can promote a rules-based trading system based on the principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and comprehensive free trade agreements in order to promote global free trade.²⁶² It will also push for a more unified and increasingly recognized representation of the euro area in the International Monetary Fund (IMF).²⁶³ It can invest in continents such as Africa by working with and supporting the African Union in order to create more jobs and economic growth.²⁶⁴

The EU will resume using its trade advantages to deepen its relations with powerful global actors such as China, which is important because the EU can foster a balanced playing-field for trade while advocating for China to cooperate on economic reform, maritime security, human rights, and climate action via increased dialogue.²⁶⁵ The EU also prioritizes addressing these issue-areas with other countries in Asia such as Japan, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, where it continues to push for non-proliferation of the Korean peninsula.²⁶⁶

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 34.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 34.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 35.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 43.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 41.

²⁶² Ibid., 41.

²⁶³ Ibid., 40.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 36.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 38.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 38.

In the case of Afghanistan, the EU works with its regional and international partners in order to promote state-building and reconciliation.²⁶⁷ In areas of minimal turbulence or post-conflict distress such as the Arctic states, the EU's strategic interest of maintaining peace and stability in the region also serves to promote awareness on climate change, bringing local, regional, and international interlocutors together to promote environmental protection and sustainable development.²⁶⁸ In these examples, the EU collaborates with the UN – the core institution of multilateralism and the international system – and with its strategic and regional partners such as NATO in order to address issues with maritime security, cybersecurity, energy security, climate change, counterterrorism, and how to help countries develop after a conflict or crisis ends.²⁶⁹

By maintaining its regional and international credibility, and working collectively, the EU Global Strategy finds that although the EU has achieved many foreign policy successes, soft power is not enough to address the myriad of security threats and challenges.²⁷⁰ The EU Global Strategy proposes that the EU should develop and enhance its security and defense capabilities and credibility, which requires an increased budget and the most efficient way for resource allocation.²⁷¹ Indeed it finds that Member States should meet the collective commitment of 20% of defense budget spending, and devote more to Research and Technology.²⁷² Also known as a sectoral strategy – which is especially important in the context of EU Member States that are also members of and supporting NATO, the UN, and other multinational efforts – the EU Global Strategy suggests that capabilities and common resources should be further developed and made more readily available.²⁷³ Improved intelligence-sharing and cybersecurity measures, as well as having full access to land, air, space and maritime capabilities, are a strategic necessity; however, the EU defense programs fall short on meeting their collective benchmarks because the voluntary approach to security cooperation should translate into coherent action and actually meeting budgetary commitments.²⁷⁴

To solve this, the EU Global Strategy states:

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 38.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 38.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 43.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., 44.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 44.

²⁷² Ibid., 45.

²⁷³ Ibid., 45.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 45.

*“An annual coordinated review process at EU level to discuss Member States’ military spending plans could instill greater coherence in defence planning and capability development. This should take place in full coherence with NATO’s defence planning process.”*²⁷⁵

Here, a more-coordinated approach to defense planning with NATO, and a stronger interface presented by the European Defense Agency (EDA) can remind Member States that a sustainable and more robust European defense industry is vital for a strategically autonomous Europe; economically, it can also boost industrial innovation, employment via job creation, and increased participation across the private and public defense sector.²⁷⁶ Having fair rules and a structured dialogue on enhancing the European defense program is also of key strategic importance, as it can allow for rapid and improved responses to today’s security challenges.²⁷⁷

The EU Global Strategy reminds readers and interlocutors that “EU foreign policy is not solo performance: it is an orchestra which plays from the same score. Our diversity is a tremendous asset provided we stand united and work in a coordinated way.”²⁷⁸ This assessment implies that cooperation and unity amongst Member States, *and* with regional and multilateral partners is essential in order for the EU to meet its strategic objectives.²⁷⁹ It also reaffirms the EU’s commitment to the Lisbon Treaty, finding that by enhancing the responsiveness of CSDP through a more streamlined institutional structure, the EU can further develop its planning of operations and civilian missions.²⁸⁰ The EU Global Strategy finds that with more flexibility, development will be increasingly aligned with the EU’s strategic priorities.²⁸¹ Thus, the EU will (1) review its sectoral strategies and update them along the lines of the EU Global Strategy, (2) provide an annual report on the grand Strategy and identify areas that require further implementation and improvement, and (3) engage in short, medium, and long-term strategic reflection in order to meet its strategic objectives and charter the world’s uncertainties.²⁸²

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 46.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 46.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 46.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 47.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 47.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 47.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 48.

²⁸² Ibid., 51.

VI. Conclusion

The most recent grand strategic documents for NATO and the EU generate similar results, indicating that the hypothesis posed at the beginning of this thesis holds true. Despite the emergence of unconventional security threats, the evolution of the transatlantic grand strategic debate indicates that NATO and the EU have increased coordination and cooperation over the past decade. Furthermore, despite the uncertainties presented by the current U.S. situation, the 2017 U.S. grand strategy also reveals that increased cooperation and strengthening NATO, the EU, and transatlantic security is in Washington's best strategic interest. In order to clarify this analysis, this conclusion will further unpack the core analytical arguments for and against this hypothesis with a net assessment approach while applying the theory of institutional overlap.

In the NATO context, the evolution of the grand strategic discourse as found in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept and the 2009 Group of Experts Report – where the latter greatly influenced the former – it is clear that the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership and its survival is of key importance to both institutions' and their member-states' interests. The Group of Experts Report provided great insight on *how* this strategic partnership should recognize each other in order to more effectively plan and execute future projects, partnerships, and moreover, protect and support its population and shared territory. The strategic elements outlined in both the Group of Experts Report and the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept overlap. Both documents call for increased coordination with the EU and its' other partners, as well as expanding its Open Door and Enlargement policies in order to further project its' values and encourage non-NATO Member States to follow suit.

However, the emphasis on monitoring and preventing unconventional threats in the Group of Experts Report is stronger than in the Strategic Concept. By consulting NATO's grand strategy pertinent to unconventional threats i.e. cyber, energy security, terrorism, and how the rise in modern technology exacerbates these threat-areas, there is potential room for the EU and NATO to further collaborate in mitigating these risks. Nevertheless, the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership and first and second Joint-Agreements clarify that these unconventional threats are being addressed on a regular basis as part of NATO's grand strategy. While some argue that NATO needs a new Strategic Concept in light of the new decade, NATO, like many other institutions, is currently navigating the uncertain times of the Covid-19 Pandemic. This can potentially influence whether or not NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept should be revisited.

Meanwhile, the EU in its 2003 ESS gave further impetus to keep strengthening its' strategic partnership with NATO despite internal disagreements brought on by the geopolitical situation at the time (*i.e.* September 11th and the beginning of the never-ending Afghanistan and Iraq Wars.) As seen in the assessment of the 2003 ESS, the EU was placing great strategic importance on NATO's collective defense provision, while looking inward at how it can engage and expand its' projects and partnerships with soft power tools, namely through economic means and value projection. The ESS discourse established that Europe had never been so free, prosperous, or secure. However, the 2008 ESS Implementation Report and the EU Global Strategy address the previous issues with the ESS, in that it did not consider as many unconventional or global security threats of the most recent decade as the EU Global Strategy does. In 2008 when this report was released, the EU did not have the Treaty of Lisbon and the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, which are worth noting when discussing the evolution of the EU's grand security strategy.

The context of how the EU Global Strategy was created is also significant because as assessed, global politics and the EU's role in it in 2016 was characterized by Mogherini as an "existential crisis," reminding its' audiences that in its' own grand strategic discourse. Leading up to 2016, the EU was facing internal challenges such as Brexit, the Migration Crisis, financial crises, the rise of populism and the extreme right putting forth Euroscepticism. It was also dealing with external challenges presented by changes in its' neighborhood with Russia's questionable actions in Ukraine and Georgia, and to the international system such as the rise of China, the unpredictability of the future of U.S. politics, and climate change. As a result, the EU Global Strategy extends its' reach in terms of its' strategic objectives in a balanced yet ambitious way, and is significant nor implicated in the grand strategic transatlantic debate because it serves as an overarching framework for mitigating its' internal and external challenges. By addressing the conventional and unconventional security threats, and increasing coordination with NATO and the U.S. via its' transatlantic strategic partnership, the analysis of the EU Global Strategy is a positive net assessment in its' collective strategic approach to internal and external challenges. It would be useful to conduct a net assessment of the EU Grand Strategy Implementation Reports, however since this is a grand strategic discursive analysis, the net assessment on the NATO and EU grand strategies proves that their strategies are increasingly coordinated. This because both documents address the "knowns," the probabilities, and the "unknowns" as seen in the discourse.

The grand strategic discourse of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, *and* of the 2016 European Union Global Strategy reaffirm the strong commitment that NATO and the EU share in order to defend Europe's territorial integrity and safety. They also mutually support the spread of democratic values to further foster a unified Europe: something both the EU and NATO, and the U.S. seek to promote. An updated assessment on the specific unconventional threats and the corresponding sub-strategies by the EU and NATO can reveal possible mechanisms to further collaborate and cooperate because their goals in these security capacities are so similar. Nevertheless, this thesis is primarily focused on whether or not the transatlantic grand strategic debate is implicated.

Thus, this thesis finds that the grand strategic debate has not been implicated because NATO and the EU continue to cooperate despite growing concerns of unconventional security threats and uncertainties presented by globalization and the U.S. executive. By assessing the evolution of the grand transatlantic strategic discourse used in practice today, this thesis shows that despite obstacles such as the EU's search of its' security and defense capacities, the EU is still very committed to NATO in terms of hard power. On grand strategic interests, NATO, the EU, and the U.S. embody similar principles such as crisis management, conflict prevention, and a safe and free international system for transatlantic security. The EU provides an additional economic incentive that is not as convincing in the NATO grand strategic debate, but in terms of security provision, the grand strategic security packages of EU and NATO generate increasing coordination. According to the grand strategic discourse, both European security bodies use coordinated strategic objectives to guide foreign policy and defense tools as they embody transatlantic security. Therefore, this discursive analysis reveals that the grand transatlantic strategic debate has increased in coordination through institutional overlap, and modern strategic studies. This is significant because as unpredictable as our world can be, an increasingly coordinated, and cooperative transatlantic grand strategy can guide decision-makers on how to address conventional and unconventional threats.

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