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Abstract

This thesis will analyse the changing character of organized violence, war, in times of globalization, focusing on Mary Kaldor's new wars theory and the Syrian conflict that started in 2011. In the first part her elaborated categories, in which changes in the character of warfare occur, will be presented. In the political field legitimation strategies changed, with an emphasis upon identity politics, because of a shifting structure of societies due to globalization. In the economic sphere shifts occurred in the composition of fighting units, how they fight, their methods of financing and that new wars were not bound to territorial borders. In the second part these categories will be compared to the Syrian civil war. This analysis will show that, Syria nearly perfectly match Kaldor's elaborated categories. In the matter of identity politics the picture presented itself a bit ambiguous. The Syrian regime and the regional powers depended on the introduction of an us versus them rhetoric for mobilization reasons, docking to their establishment in their colonial past. Whereas individual reasons to join the fighting had a wide variety. In the economic sphere Syria showed that war in the globalized era will mainly be fought by networks of fighting units, remnants of armies, paramilitaries, militias, mercenaries and foreign regular troops. As tax based financing is nearly impossible these new networks were highly depended on external assistance and the redistribution of resources via different asset transfers. This scarce resource situation impacted the way they fought, as displacement methods and sieges got the preferred methods. By displaced people and by being integrated into war economies neighbouring countries got sucked into the conflict. The changing character of war in globalized times showed that solely political answers will not be enough to end them, but a framework of political, economic and social solutions may will do.

Diese Arbeit analysiert den sich verändernden Charakter organisierter Gewalt, Krieg, in Zeiten der Globalisierung, mit dem Fokus auf Mary Kaldors New Wars Theory und den 2011 begonnenen Syrienkonflikt. Im ersten Teil werden ihre erarbeiteten Kategorien, in denen es zu einer Änderung in der Kriegsführung kam, präsentiert. Im politischen Bereich änderten sich auf Grund der Globalisierung die Legitimationsstrategien, mit einer Betonung von Identitätspolitiken, sowie die Sozialstrukturen von Gesellschaften. In der ökonomischen Sphäre kam es zu Veränderung in der Zusammensetzung der Kampfeinheiten, wie diese kämpfen, deren Finanzierungsmethoden und dass New Wars nicht an Territorialgrenzen gebunden sind. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wer-

den diese Kategorien mit dem syrischen Bürgerkrieg abgeglichen. Diese Analyse zeigt, dass Syrien fast perfekt mit Mary Kaldors ausgearbeiteten Kategorien übereinstimmt. In der Sache Identitätspolitik präsentierte sich ein unklares Bild. Das syrische Regime und die Regionalmächte waren aus Mobilisierungsgründen abhängig davon eine wir gegen sie Rhetorik einzuführen, mit Andockpunkten zu deren kolonialer Vergangenheit. Hingegen gab es verschiedenste individuelle Gründe sich den Kämpfen anzuschließen. In der ökonomischen Sphäre zeigte Syrien, dass Krieg in der globalisierten Zeit vor allem von Netzwerken von Kampfeinheiten, Überbleibsel von Armeen, Paramilitärs, Milizen, Söldnern und ausländischen Streitkräften, ausgetragen wird. Da steuerliche Finanzierung fast unmöglich ist waren diese neuen Netzwerke auf Außenhilfe und einer Ressourcenumverteilung durch verschiedene Vermögensübertragungen angewiesen. Die knappe Ressourcenlage hatte Auswirkungen auf die Art zu kämpfen, mit Vertreibungen und Belagerungen als präferierten Methoden. Durch Vertriebene und durch Integration in die verschiedenen Kriegsökonomien wurden benachbarte Länder in den Konflikt gezogen. Durch den veränderten Charakter von Krieg durch die Globalisierung werden politische Antworten allein nicht genug sein um diese zu beenden, aber ein Rahmen aus politischen, ökonomischen and sozialen Lösungen kann dies vielleicht.

1. Introduction

> "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.
>
> This world in arms is not spending money alone.
>
> It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.
>
> The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities.
>
> It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals.
>
> It is some fifty miles of concrete pavement.
>
> We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat.
>
> We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people."[1]

Dwight D. Eisenhower "The Chance for Peace Speech" April 16, 1953.

When Eisenhower gave his speech in 1953 the world was recovering from two of the most devastating wars humanity ever saw. There was a pious hope in many that a transition to a more peaceful world was needed and possible. The near disappearance of inter-state wars during the second half of the last century could lead to the assumption that the globe indeed became a more peaceful place. But did it or did the "chameleon" war, like Clausewitz called it, just change its colour once again? Mainly in the West, the Cold War clouded the perception of systematic violence as war. The many proxy wars fought by the superpowers were just small moves on the big chess board of world politics, never addressing the political motivation behind them. This is where the New Wars Theories begin.

Quite a few New Wars Theories appeared over the past decades. Although differing in their argumentation they do have similarities as well. As worked out by Patrick Mello[2] these are: The erosion of the state's ability to use violence; a new political economy in wars; asymmetry of new wars; an identity-based approach; and the use of terrorism as a weapon. Of all the New Wars

[1] *Eisenhower* Dwight D., The Chance for Peace, April 16 1953., online at: <http://www.edchange.org/multicultural/speeches/ike_chance_for_peace.html> (12.12.2019).

[2] *Mello* Patrick A., In Search of New Wars: The Debate About a Transformation of War. In: European Journal of International Relations 16th, 2 (2010) 297–309.

Theories it is Mary Kaldor's interpretation on which the focus lays in this work. She derived a new logic of warfare deeply connected with the impacts of globalization.

It is this new logic of warfare that led Kaldor to name her theory as "new", a name not cast in stone but an eyecatcher to start a debate about the different forms of organized violence that exist. Further it is a try to tackle the common tendencies in conflict studies to see war either as interstate warfare or, where this model does not fit, as anarchy, barbarism or ancient hatreds that lead to the breakout of violence.

That interstate warfare has a primary role in conflict studies is partly an inheritance of Carl von Clausewitz's oeuvre and especially of his book "On War"[3]. For example, his finding that an overwhelming force is necessary in war was ground-breaking for his time. Essential was the role the state played in warfare, as war, for him, was a violent action putting one's will upon a foe. He formulated a trinitarian concept of state/army/people uniting in war, always driven by an "us versus them" school of thought and in need of a unifying factor, like patriotism, in order to unleash violence. As an enlightened child of his time, and as Prussian officer, it comes as no surprise that Clausewitz allows the institutions of the modern nation state a primacy in war. The evolution of the modern nation states indeed played a crucial role in the European perception of war and its legitimization. It was the time when legitimate warfare became a state activity, with codifications and containments for the fighting to hold onto a last sense of rationality for killing people.

But the military set up of states and societies massively changed over time. For example, during WWII and the Cold War the armies of different countries merged their capacities leaving a situation in which effectively only the superpowers, along with their proxies, were able to start a big conventional war. Nowadays, to a high degree helped by globalization, the erosion of state infrastructure accelerated. Budget cuts intensified the fragmentation of many armies in autocratic states; another reinforcement was the delivery of resources to units favoured by power wielders.

For Mary Kaldor these shifts mark the beginning of her new logic of warfare deriving from globalized networks. It is an attempt to answer the questions of who, how, and why wars are waged in a different way than they used to previously in conflict theory. How has organized violence in contemporary times changed? Has it just become a mixture of war, crime and human rights violations? Is what Kaldor formulated really "new" and really "war"? Do Kaldor's quantifiable claims fit with the available data?

[3] *Clausewitz* Carl von, *Werner* Helmut (ed.), Vom Kriege. (Hamburg 2011).

Globalization, nowadays an omnipresent term, had tremendous effects on the way of life, that had established itself over centuries. It fundamentally changed the social, economic and political organization and, since the 1980s, was mostly accompanied by a neo-liberal narrative of the primacy of the private over the public; with, for example, devasting effects on the public health care systems. But what does this mean for the social activity called war?

For Mary Kaldor it is the fragmentation of the legal bearer of arms which foreshadows a reprivatisation of violence. But it is not to be compared to pre-Westphalian times of non-existing statehood where various actors fought for state formation, but more connected to the dissolution of states into global structures. War changed from an act of putting one's will upon an enemy to mutual enterprises profiting in various ways of organized violence. These criminals or power wielders need a political narrative for legitimization, which for Kaldor is represented in identity politics. Their content is the claim of power in the name of the own group; religious, national or tribal. It is a new phenomenon rooted in the challenges of globalization, a reassurance of a group's glorious past or its ill-treatment by others, which disguises the real aims of self-enrichment and exploitation. In the political agendas of these actors "us" versus "them" occurs in a central role throughout the discourse.

But are identity politics really a contemporary phenomenon emerging with the challenges of globalization? In a broader analysis of how war shaped societies it can be helpful to look at the work of Michel Foucault. In "society must be defended"[4] it becomes clearer that the war of "us" versus "them" has a long tradition in the modern European nation state. It further is the quintessence of the state. For Foucault war is *the* state activity. It is not a real war; it is a war fought in the sphere of discourse; a discourse that for Foucault is historically anchored and politically motivated, and therefore a historico-political discourse. It started in the 17th century as a discourse against the monarchy and was adopted over centuries to fit new times, always accompanied by historicism as explanation and justification principle. Though the intellectual elite framing a perpetual "us" and "them", however such groups are interpreted, was small, their powerful positions in the new political entities let this thinking seep into the institutions. Such institutions are for example barracks, schools or hospitals, that formed and disciplined societies as well as individuals to obey every order the powerful give in the name of "our" survival. In that reading we can argue that contemporary identity politics are rather a new justification method of the existing balance of power and not something that is actually new.

[4] *Foucault* Michel, *Bertani* Mauro, *Fontana* Alessandro, *Ewald* François, et al. (eds.), Society must be defended: lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76. (1st ed, New York, NY 2003).

War, as seen by Clausewitz and Foucault, is deeply linked to the state and its institutions, either as state activity or as *the* state activity. But what happens to organized violence if these structures start to crumble? Does the way violence is organized change in the aftermath of globalization?

Mary Kaldor derived from her research about the Bosnian War that there were changes. The fragmentation of states is not limited to social security systems, for example budget cuts in the military weakened capabilities to wage a war, in theory the military's sole purpose. In many instances these cuts led to a situation where already favoured units got even more of the share, and the rest of the soldiers needed different forms of income. In case of a conflict remnants of these armies unite with criminal gangs and paramilitaries to establish patterns of exploitation of civilians, leaving a situation in which it could be more profitable to prolong a war than to end it; this is what Kaldor calls mutual violent enterprises. Further external assistance is of high importance for violent actors. Here, somehow, the political can return as these actors see their moves as necessary in a greater quarrel with an enemy. But, none the less, if violent outbreaks occur the aggressors mostly do not follow a path of revolution, with the intention to change the political system, but they rather seek political legitimization for their criminal behaviour.

These new networks of fighters adapted the way they fight to the availability of resources. As the former ways of financing, taxpayer money distributed by a government, broke off new forms of transaction found their way into conflict zones. These new forms rest on three pillars: the civilian population, the diaspora community and external sponsors. It is estimated that these groups either send money or goods which are recycled, via various asset transfers, for the use of fighting units. Because there is a high number of new military units the fruits of exploitation are not enough to buy heavy weaponry for large scale operations, which is one of the reasons why big revolutionary movements are less likely to emerge. But the population still can be controlled with light weapons, making this strategy the preferred method of new wars. Population control means insecurity, intimidation and exploitation of the ones not matching the label the fighting unit prefers at the moment, and a fear of revenge of those currently favoured in the area controlled by a group. This effectively means that in the case of an all-out war the ones not having the right label are free to kill. And therefore massacres, ethnic cleansing or sexual abuses are not mere side effects of a conflict but a key tool to spread fear.

But fear is not the only thing spreading. Conflicts and their different consequences have the potential to cross borders. Neighbouring countries are the hubs for conflict actors, and the civilian population, to participate in the international financial markets. From these hubs couriers bring goods (not only money, but also other valuables or people) to their designated destinations. Being a financial hub is only one way these countries are involved. Even more essential is the effort

of these countries to provide a more or less safe haven for refugees and displaced persons. The bordering states are first responders for the humanitarian consequences of conflicts and while in many cases this task would require a lot more resources, they usually try their best.

But how has the situation changed since the 1990s and the Bosnian War? The Syrian War, which has been going on for nine years now, allows us to draw some conclusions.

In the Global North the Syrian war is perceived as a civil war. In many instances the media and policy makers portrayed it as the resurrection of ancient hatreds between Sunnis and Shia, with other groups trapped between them, fighting for the superiority in the state. The preferred way for resolving the conflict were political negotiations, like the Geneva or Astana (Nur-Sultan) processes. But the question of why these processes were not fruitful remains. Is it only because actors still try to alter their negotiation position on the battlefields? Or is something else and new going on in Syria?

As usual, the answers to these questions are complex. The Arab Spring of 2011 inspired the people of the Middle East to demand freedom. The hope for transformation in many countries was soon beaten down by security forces, with devastating consequences. Syria, Libya and Yemen witness bloody wars; Egypt, was on the brink of civil war, but ended up only changing its Pharaoh; only in Tunisia the democratization process seems to have been successful. In 2019 the people of Iraq decided to participate in the global revolution for dignity and self-determination, along with the people of Algeria, Lebanon, Hong Kong, Latin America or Catalonia, among others. Though there are certainly grievances unique to every situation there are some common traits: economic inequality, corruption, a desire for political freedom and the impacts of climate change.

Such grievances were well known by the people of Syria in 2011. But is it a harbinger of what to expect for the years to come in the hotspots of protests? How the war is fought and how it developed can maybe teach us a lesson of how to deescalate the situation before the outbreak of violence. Unfortunately, it is to fear that either none or the false lessons will be learnt from Syria.

Economic inequality was a main driving force for Syrians to participate in the revolution. Globalization, as organized today, mainly benefits only a small circle of people. They cream off profits of labour and services which are, euphemistically speaking, underpaid. This signified a massive decline of the working class and made people susceptible for the ideas of identity politics. This system was backed by massive corruption, on higher and lower levels of administrations, with an enormous loss of confidence in the governing bodies, which are the very same bodies that should provide solutions for these problems. It is hard to imagine upcoming fundamental

changes to the system as the ones in charge of reformations are amongst those most profiting from it.

Pre-war Syria represents a perfect example of how opening to globalization and distributing thus gained benefits only to a small circle of individuals formed a framework for conflict. Bashar al-Assad changed his father's nuanced power system, distributing more wealth into the hands of less people and partly turning his back on the old elites. The power vacuum left behind soon was filled by new actors. As the conflict lasted, they increasingly relied on falling back upon appealing to ancient hatreds to foster violence. But Syria also has the potential to show us that identity politics is a common tool power wielders use to justify their political system. Unforeseeable is the damage such identity politics will have on a post-war Syria; reconciliation, as major task, will rely upon the will of the different groups to overcome their longstanding believe systems and their mutual hatred.

Besides economic inequality, it was the desire for political freedom that motivated many to join the protests in the streets. This pattern established in Syria at the breakout of the revolution, resembled the one we witnessed 2019. At demonstrations people articulated what, in their eyes, went wrong in the country; and on many occasions the answer of the government was violence. As a consequence of the use of violence, the existing wall of fear crumbled. Many Syrians were fed up with the regime and no longer afraid to say so. But the devastating effects of the conflict hit the population hard and worsened the situation. Networks of cooperation between various fighting units developed throughout the country, and distinguishing between friend and foe was not the most important issue. The main target of their exploitation and terror was the civilian population, driving many people across borders. Overall, neighbouring countries and regional powers had a big share in the war. Without international help the Syrian actors would not have been able to prolong the conflict for such an absurdly long time. The various suppliers of weapons and recruits to Syria only intensified the brutality of the war. What they hoped to be a short-term investment for a regime change backfired and became a catastrophe. It is the way war is waged in Syria that leaves one speechless: the deliberate choice to ignore and breach principles of international and humanitarian law and the rules of war.

Syria, after the war, has the potential to transform statehood as we know it. In the outcome that is most likely, a win of the regime, it is to be expected that the most gruesome actors of the war will benefit the most and be able to form a society shaped by their conveniences. Such an outcome would mean that the rights of the individual will count nothing, and people will have to be influenced by propaganda to accept their faith. The one's not accepting the new order will either

be eliminated or not allowed to return to the place they once called home, which signifies drastic change to for example citizenship as we know it

As already mentioned, Mary Kaldor's new wars theory was not the only one developed in the recent decades. Therefore, a very short overview of different new wars' theories, their similarities and the critique of their attempt to change the perceptions of organized violence, will follow in the upcoming chapter. This will be followed by an in-depth analysis of Mary Kaldor's concept, focusing on her analysis of why conflicts occur and how they are shaped in the era of globalization. Additionally, an attempt to locate identity politics in the new wars theory in a broader historical frame is attempted, linking the theory to the thinking of Michel Foucault. By comparing various secondary sources and documents the fourth chapter tries to shed a little more light on the connection between the New Wars theories and the Syrian war. This is not done by a chronological retelling of the war, the focus rather is on applying the New Wars categories elaborated by Mary Kaldor to the gruesome war in the Middle East and analysing if this is helpful for grasping the conflict as a whole.

2. A Very Short Introduction to New Wars Theories

Wars always were, and are, part of humanity. So is their theorization, or perhaps the need to understand them to end them, by force or negotiations. From the starting points in the early advanced civilisations to todays globalized world, unfortunately wars are still an endless resource for study.[5] Since the end of the Cold War era, and the unfulfilled hope of a peaceful globe, a change in the dynamics of war is observed and examined by a wide array of researchers in different scientific fields.

A popular categorisation of war is the distinction between inter-state wars, civil wars and non-state wars.[6] It is a comprehensible distinction albeit with some flaws. One of the biggest is the lack of a common definition for war. When do we talk about war, conflict, or something else? This points to the problem of gathering data. Three databases have been established for collecting information on the number of wars, each having its own way of counting and categories. These are the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP); used for example by the World Bank, the Correlates of War Project at the University of Michigan and the biennial "Peace and Conflict Survey" by the Center for Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland.[7] This already indicates that a clear distinction between inter-state, civil, or non-state war is hardly possible and depends on actors, methods, goals and financing. What complicates the matter further is that the three categories can intertwine, meaning that an inter-state war can have non-state accents, or a civil war can have inter-state characteristics.

The categorization in inter-state, civil and non-state wars comes with another problem, as inter-state war was prioritised in research, indeed for centuries it was perceived as "real war".[8] It is the conceptualization of war developed after the Thirty Years' War, the fight between sovereign states. This somehow neglects, or degrades, other forms of violence committed in the past and present, as well as the intertwining problem. But does data support the claim? Examining the three databases Mary Kaldor worked out some general points, especially looking into the time

[5] For a short overview of the history of war theories see: *Münkler* Herfried, Über den Krieg: Stationen der Kriegsgeschichte im Spiegel Ihrer Theoretischen Reflexion. (6. Aufl, Weilerswist 2011) ; *Jäger* Thomas, *Beckmann* Rasmus (eds.), Handbuch Kriegstheorien. (1. Aufl., Wiesbaden 2011) ; *Hildebrandt* Jens, *Wachter* David (eds.), Krieg: Reflexionen von Thukydides bis Enzensberger. (St. Ingbert 2014).

[6] *Herberg-Rothe* Andreas, Der Krieg: Geschichte und Gegenwart. Eine Einführung. (Frankfurt am Main ; New York, NY 2017).

[7] *Kaldor* Mary, In Defence of New Wars. In: Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2nd, 1 (2013) 1–16. 7.

[8] *Herberg-Rothe*, Der Krieg. 28.

frame between the end of the Cold War and today. Firstly, it indicates that inter-state wars virtually disappeared. Secondly, there is a decline in wars with more than 1000 battle deaths, so called high intensity wars. Thirdly, a decline in the deadliness of war measured in terms of soldiers dying on the battlefield is observable. Fourthly, an increase in the duration and reoccurrences of war can be seen. At last she observed that proximity is a risk factor for other wars, conflicts and states in the region.[9] The findings are supported by John Mueller in his book "The remnants of war"[10]. Still some questions need to be asked: Why do we witness such an intensification of new conceptualisations of war? Are there bigger patterns to observe? It is impossible to give simple answers to that, but the 2011 World Development Report of the World Bank states that "21st-century conflict and violence are a development problem that does not fit the 20th-century mold".[11] The system of the 20th-century was designed to tame inter-state wars, and partly civil wars. These two kinds of warfare follow a given logic, or at least a sequence of events. The actors in such conflicts, may it be states or clearly defined rebel movements, are known. If there is no possibility for a peaceful solution of conflicts, hostilities break out. Hostilities can be ended either by victory of one side, or through negotiations. The end of fighting marks the "post conflict" phase leading back to peace. Keeping these observations in mind, it comes to no surprise that theories about non-state wars, or conflicts, are blooming. For example Martin van Creveld's "low-intensity-conflicts"[12], or John Keegan's "primitive warfare"[13], or Frank Hoffman's "hybrid wars"[14], or Zygmut Bauman's "wars of the globalization era"[15], besides others.

Political scientist Mary Kaldor worked out similarities between the forms of organized violence we are witnessing today. Based upon her personal experiences in 1990s Bosnia-Hercegovina and Nagorno-Karabakh, at the border region of Armenia and Azerbaijan, she formulated her "new wars" theory.[16] At first Kaldor thought what she witnessed was only true for the former Soviet States, but then she

> "embarked on a research project of the character of the new type of wars and I discovered from my colleagues who had first-hand experience of Africa that what I had noted in Eastern Europe shared

[9] *Kaldor*, Defence. 8.

[10] *Mueller* John, The Remnants of War. (Ithaca, NY 2013).

[11] *World Bank* (ed.), Conflict, Security and Development. (World development report 33.2011, Washington, D.C. 2011) 2.

[12] *van Creveld* Martin, The Transformation of War. (New York, NY ; Toronto 1991).

[13] *Keegan* John, A History of Warfare. (London, UK 2004).

[14] *Hoffman* Frank, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. (Arlington, VA 2007).

[15] *Bauman* Zygmunt, Wars of the Globalization Era. In: European Journal of Social Theory 4th, 1 (2001) 11–28.

[16] *Kaldor* Mary, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. (3rd, Chichester, UK 2012).

> many common features with the wars taking place in Africa and perhaps also other places, for example South Asia."[17]

One main point is that the boundaries between inter-state, civil and non-state wars become even more blurred. An aspect which itself is not new, but due to the transnational connections of the globalized era leads to a new style of organized violence. Describing them as new can be misleading, but as Kaldor herself points out "[…] the term 'new' [is] to distinguish such wars from prevailing perceptions of war […]." Especially the perception of policy makers is targeted, as Kaldor "[…] wanted to emphasize the growing illegitimacy of these wars and the need for a cosmopolitan political response […]."[18] The theory should be seen as a guide for policy makers for a better understanding of conflicts in a globalized world.

Her findings reflect that wars in the age of globalization are highly connected to the weakening of authoritarian states during the process of opening up to the world. Consequently, most of them take place in such regions. By comparing actors, goals, methods, and forms of financing between "new" and "old" wars, the dominant perception of war in the 19th and 20th century[19], Kaldor derived a new logic of war. Instead of regular armed forces, wars are more and more fought by networks of state and non-state actors[20]. But that does not mean that inter-state warfare is off the table. A shift occurred in the justification of wars; were old wars fought for geopolitical reasons or in the name of an ideology, nowadays warfare's most recognizable characteristic is identity politics. Particular groups are seeking to gain access, or more influence, in state institutions. Such groups define themselves by ethnicity, religion, or tribal membership and not exclusively by their nationality; as result they can be local and/or transnational. New communication technologies fuelled the rise of identity politics, together with an increase in migration from rural areas to urban and across borders, and the decline of more inclusive political ideologies, like state-based socialism. The change occurring is that political mobilization around one's own identity is the aim of war rather than just an instrument of it. Understandably the methods need to adapt as well. Battlefields were the scenes of old wars, cities, as metaphor for the population, will frame the new wars. Territorial gains in new wars are only possible by controlling the population, through displacement, terror, and oppression. At last the forms of financing changed. Tax based

[17] Ibid., 1.

[18] Ibid., 1ff.

[19] Old wars in her sense are rooted in the thinking of the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz and his unfinished book "On War": *Clausewitz, Werner* (ed.), Vom Kriege.

[20] Militias, warlords, terrorists, etc.

state financing of old wars gets replaced by new forms of predatory private finance; a war economy establishes, fed by looting, pillaging, "taxation" of humanitarian aid, smuggling and other forms of money grabbing more associated with organized crime. It is almost impossible to say how much of this finances political activities and what is driven by economic reasoning. Wars adapt to an open globalized decentralized economy, where revenue is higher if conflicts last on and on and on. They become violent enterprises justified by political reasoning.[21] It is the mixture of these factors that made new wars spread, persist, or recur as the sides gain political or economic influence through violence itself, rather than winning the war.[22] As theories are formulations of ideal types of war, it is unlikely that any conflict ever fits like a glove into the categories of old or new wars.

The new wars are embedded in and deeply linked to the process of globalization[23], to be more precise, the intensification of political, economic, military and cultural contacts, occurring after the fall of the Soviet Union. But such intensification is accompanied by contradictions, between integration and fragmentation, homogenization and diversification, globalization and localization. The Cold War contributed in two ways to the new wars. The first is linked to the power vacuum[24] left behind, typical for transition periods in world politics; additionally the surplus of weapons in the arsenals of the superpowers and their proxies were now sold on the market. The second, a more historicistic point of view, emphasizes the inevitability of the integration of the former Eastern Bloc into the globalized system. That globalization contributes to wars already can be traced in the actors[25] present in war zone around the globe.

A further change happens in the conception of statehood,[26] which appears with the intensification of global interconnectedness. A great number of new wars can be connected to the erosion of the autonomy of the state or, in extreme cases, its disintegration. The dispute is mainly centred

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[21] *Kaldor*, Defence. 2f.

[22] *Keen* David, Useful Enemies: When Waging Wars Is More Important Than Winning Them. (New Haven, CT 2012).

[23] *Beck* Ulrich, What is Globalization? (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA 2000) ; *Guttal* Shalmali, Globalisation. In: Development in Practice 17th, 4–5 (2007) 523–531. ; *Lang* Michael, Globalization and Its History. In: The Journal of Modern History 78th, 4 (2006) 899–931. ; *Held* David, *McGrew* Anthony G. (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate. (2nd ed, Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA USA 2003).

[24] An availability of arms surplus, the discrediting of socialism as alternative to the capitalistic system, the disintegration of authoritarian states and the withdrawal of support for client regimes clearly helped spreading the forms of violence described in the new wars.

[25] . International reporters, mercenaries, military advisers, diaspora volunteers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and a variety of international and supranational organisations.

[26] *Baylis* John, *Smith* Steve, *Owens* Patricia (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. (7th, Oxford, UK ; New York, NY 2017).

around the monopoly of legitimate organized violence, which is under attack from above and below. The trans-nationalization of armies, starting in WWII and intensified in the Cold War period, eradicates the monopoly from above. Further the international system, as developed in the 19th and 20th century, has done its bit in taming war between states. The cooperation of armies, international arms trade and production, or arms control agreements made it complicated for nations to declare unilateral war. Additionally, due to the destructiveness of modern arsenals[27], a large-scale war would be disastrous for any state participating. On the other side the eradication from below is linked to the privatization of violence. Disappearing state structures, can be linked to a spread of criminality, corruption and inefficiency of the administration. Therefore, it becomes more and more likely that criminal organizations or paramilitaries provide security, or insecurity, for the people. It can be argued that in new wars the territorially based sovereignty[28] is questioned.

Undoubtedly such an attempt of a paradigmatic change in perceiving wars offers a variety of critique. It is mainly framed around four arguments: The first line of argumentation is, whether new wars are really new. The second circles around the question, whether new wars are really wars. And the third argument, already touched on above, pursues the discussion about the reliability of gathered data. At last a debate is unfolding about the claim of the new wars theory of being post-Clausewitzean.

The most cited criticism is centred around the "newness" of new wars. On the one hand the arguments point to the fact that the East-West conflict overshadowed the ability to analyse the many small conflicts during that era, which to a high degree were asymmetrical or low-intensity wars. On the other hand, the critics argue that the tactics used in such conflicts, like banditry, mass rape, population displacement, and many other atrocities committed during conflict are nothing new and used since the dawn of humanity. Following that, for example Sven Chojnacki[29] or Errol Henderson and J. David Singer[30], call the new wars theory too fuzzy and not easily integrated into contemporary conflict studies, with an already big variety of categorizations for warfare. It is true that new wars do not fit contemporary conflict analyses, but that to a great extent is owed

[27] How war could be waged in the 21st century see: *Singer* Peter W., Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. (New York, NY 2010).

[28] For a view of how 21st century sovereignty looks, see: *Hardt* Michael, *Negri* Antonio, Empire. (Cambridge, MA 2000) ; *Mbembe* Achille, Necropolitics. In: Public Culture 15th, 1 (2003) 11–40.

[29] *Chojnacki* Sven, Anything New or More of the Same? Wars and Military Interventions in the International System, 1946–2003. In: Global Society 20th, 1 (2006) 25–46.

[30] *Henderson* Errol, *Singer* J. David, 'New Wars' and Rumors of 'New Wars'. In: International Interactions 28th, 2 (2002) 165–190.

to the fact that there never was an attempt to do so. What Kaldor tried to do is to shape a new model of war, reflecting a new political, economic, and military logic; distinguishable to prevailing models for understanding conflict. Others focus their critic on one aspect of the theory, like Mats Berdal[31] or Siniša Malešević[32], who both point out that identity politics are also formed around political ideas. And again, that is true, but what they indicate with their criticism, that identity politics is a mask for economic gain, is not. In the new wars logic identity politics are centred around "[…] the right to power in the name of a specific group."[33] The competition for power is based around the group and not an ideology. This, to a certain point, explains military tactics used in new wars, like forced displacement, and the persistence of such conflicts, as fear and xenophobia are necessities for long-term identity politics.[34] In other words, identity is the key for mobilization in new wars.

Regarding the points of critique whether new wars can be called wars, in the focus is the dichotomy between privatized, or criminal, and state violence. As John Mueller claims in "Remnants of War" the violence we are witnessing today is mostly brought upon the world by thugs and therefore should be categorized as criminal activity and not as war, which becomes obsolete. In his point of view the thugs are masking their economic interest with political or identity claims. A similar point of view is presented by Martin Shaw's "degenerate warfare".[35] Yet again this type of criticism makes some sense but is partly ignoring the logic of new wars. They are a mixture of war, organized violence for political means, crime, organized violence for private interests, and human rights violations, violence against civilians. It is true that many, or most, participants in the new wars are private actors, but the political should not be underestimated. The criminals need identity politics to legitimate their violence, additionally to its function as fear factor. Stathis Kalyvas[36] supports the viewpoint that fear is actually the intended state of society, it makes winning elections and mobilizing support easier. A terminological discourse, regarding

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[31] *Berdal* Mats, *Strachan* Hew, *Scheipers* Sibylle (eds.), The 'New Wars' Thesis Revisited. In: The Changing Character of War (Oxford, UK ; New York, NY 2011) 109–133.

[32] *Malešević* Siniša, The Sociology of War and Violence. (Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY 2010).

[33] *Kaldor*, Defence. 5.

[34] For a better understanding of the relationship between sovereignty, in Foucault's sense, and racism see: *Foucault* Michel, In Verteidigung der Gesellschaft: Vorlesungen am Collège de France (1975 - 76). (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 1585, 1. Aufl., Nachdr., Frankfurt am Main 2009) 282–319.

[35] *Shaw* Martin, War and Genocide: Organised Killing in Modern Society. (Hoboken, NJ 2015).

[36] *Kalyvas* Stathis N., The Logic of Violence in Civil War. (Cambridge studies in comparative politics, Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY 2006).

new wars, is conducted about the word "conflict". The legal difference between an armed conflict and war is that the latter needs a formal declaration.

The third big section of criticism circles around the gathered data. Already mentioned above is the discussion about the numbers of war. A further problem of gathering data is regarded to the causalities in war, or the ratio of civilian to military deaths. The difficulties of the calculation are three-fold[37]. The only accurate figures for losses of one side are provided by the national armies. They know how many soldiers they sent and how many returned. Unfortunately we lack data about the victims of conflicts and wars, therefore numbers in this regard can only be estimated. Different is the situation for the statistics of refugees and displaced persons. Data regarding these people is provided by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and, additionally since 1998 for internal displaced persons, the Norwegian Refugee Council's Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC).

Central for the debate about Clausewitz is his trinitarian conception of war (the distinction between the state, the army and the people), the primacy of politics and the role of reason. In Clausewitz argumentation it is war that unites the Trinity of state, army, and people; an observable characteristic of nation-building processes in his time. Martin van Creveld[38] and John Keegan[39], both see the concept of trinitarian unity as no longer relevant. But Hew Strachan[40] formidably points out that the trinity refers more to motivations than empirical categories, and therefore it is more a matter of how one interprets Clausewitz. It is true that in new wars the trinity is even more blurred, due to the fact that the relevant actors are organized in networks. This means that the Trinitarian concept, in an institutional sense of state, army and people cannot apply. "But if", as Kaldor points out, "we think of the trinity as a concept for explaining how disparate social and ethical tendencies are united in war, then it clearly is very relevant."[41]

The discussion about the primacy of politics spins around the translation of the German word "Politik", which can either mean politics or policy. It is possible that it means both if one refers to policy as external, regarding the relationship to foreign states, and politics as internal, the domestic process of meditating the different opinions in one country. Clausewitzean thinking sees

[37] First, statistics of civilian casualties are notoriously inaccurate. Secondly, it gets harder to distinguish between civilian and combatant. At last, it is hard to tell if the cause of a civilian death is a side effect of battle, deliberate violence or the result of indirect effects of war.

[38] *van Creveld*, Transformation.

[39] *Keegan*, Warfare.

[40] *Strachan* Hew, Clausewitz's On war: A Biography. (1st American ed, New York, NY 2007).

[41] *Kaldor*, Defence. 11.

war as an instrument of foreign policy, to force one's own will upon the foe. Therefore, the aim of old wars is an external policy and politics, mostly around the idea of the state, its mobilization factor. Whereas new wars turn this upside down: The mobilization around a political narrative is the aim of war, and external policy against a proclaimed enemy, even one in the own state, is its justification. Such thinking integrates war into the domestic field of politics. The polarisation of us versus them becomes the motivating force of war. In old and new wars political narratives are shaped, Clausewitz speaks of patriotism as unifying element of the trinity, the new wars identities are formed by fear and hate among different groups.

If wars are an instrument of politics, how does the role of reason fit in? It's necessary to look at Clausewitz's interpretation of reason in a governmental sense, formed in accordance to the Enlightenment of his time and strongly influenced by Hegel's view on history. For Clausewitz the state identifies itself with universal values and represents the interests of the public opposed to private ones. Therefore, the cabinet, beside the private interests of its members, needs to act according to simple logical rules in the best interest of the people. A point against this thinking is made by Martin van Creveld: "[it would be] preposterous … to think that just because some people wield power, they act like calculating machines that are unswayed by passions."[42] On the other hand, new wars are characterized by a sense of instrumental rationality. The political narratives used are more exclusivist than universal, a deliberate violation of rules and norms of war occurs. Their rationality lays in their instrumentality.

Another argument that New Wars are post-Clausewitzean is connected to his ideal version of warfare derived from his definition of war, that war is the sum of all the duels on the battlefield: "*War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.*"[43] It is only the one who uses extreme, unsparingly violence that must obtain superiority; for a complete subjugation of the enemy any concessions or disarmament by negotiations were an error for Clausewitz. This follows the logic that the winner dictates the laws to the defeated, and for the own best outcome the position of the other must be at worst. The inner nature of war, for him absolute war, follows from tending to extremes by the participating parties. Real war depart for a variety of reasons from this ideal conception, but the core of Clausewitz definition of war is the logic of extremes. Mary Kaldor questions if this logic of extremes still applies in contemporary

[42] *van Creveld*, Transformation quoted in: *Kaldor*, Defence, 11.

[43] *Kaldor*, Defence. 12.

wars. For the New Wars she reformulated the definition of war to "[…] an act of violence involving two or more organised groups framed in political terms."[44] In the logic of this definition war either can be a Clausewitzean contest of wills or as proposed by Kaldor a mutual enterprise, for her the scenario to expect in contemporary conflicts. While in the contest of wills the other side needs to be eliminated in a mutual enterprise the sides are dependent of each other by creating self-perpetuating interests.[45]

A newer set of criticism is concerned with the historical perspective of the new wars' theory[46], it is entangled in a broader debate[47] about history being a part of social science, particularly political science and international relations (IR) studies. In his critique Edward Newman points to the fact that "[…] some claims are problematic, especially when juxtaposed with historical sources of information concerning armed conflict."[48] And that a tendency to find bigger patterns in contemporary conflict, to a degree, neglects the differences of conflicts, for example their historical socio-economic roots. In general, he sees the distinction to war in former times as overdrawn, but he adds that some points of the theory are valuable for understanding and interpreting todays civil wars. His plead to political scientists is to embrace historical narratives and theories. This stance is shared by George Lawson who sees a two folded misinterpretation of history by international relations scholars. On the one hand history, in the more mainstream positions of IR, is seen as a means to empower their theories, or as a sequence of abstract lessons. On the other hand many post-positivist IR scholars see history as a "pick and mix of contingent hiccups", a "butterfly" of what-ifs and maybes.[49]

In the years since Kaldor first published her book, her theoretical framework was adopted, by her and a broader field of researchers. One who prominently represents the thinking of the theory is Herfried Münkler[50]. An exceptional overview on the literature on new wars is presented by Patrick Mello[51], from a broader set of literature he derived five common features in contemporary conflicts: The erosion of the state's ability to use violence; a political economy of new wars; the

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[44] Ibid., 13.

[45] Ibid., 12–14.

[46] *Newman* Edward, The 'New Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed. In: Security Dialogue 35th, 2 (2004) 173–189.

[47] *Lawson* George, The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations. In: European Journal of International Relations 18th, 2 (2012) 203–226.

[48] *Newman*, The New Wars Debate. 174.

[49] *Lawson*, Eternal Divide. 203.

[50] *Münkler* Herfried, *Camiller* Patrick, The New Wars. (Oxford, UK 2005).

[51] *Mello*, Search of New Wars.

asymmetry of new wars; that they are identity based; and terrorism as a weapon. Finally, the ongoing debate about the nature of war at least contributed to the perceptions of war, not only in the scientific field, but also by the intended audience of policy makers.

Up to now there are few studies on the Syrian war and the new wars theory in its totality.[52] In a short paper, testing the analytical categories of the new wars theory in connection with Syria, Artur Malantowicz derived that

> "[…] the 'New Wars' discourse [is] right in most of its basic assumptions about actors, methods applied, spread of violence and war economy typical for the new types of conflicts. The only point of disagreement was found in relation to the objectives of new wars […] the Syrian conflict in particular and other contemporary wars in general still have a deep ideological and political background."[53]

In a second analysis Shaib Jamal Rifqi Ali[54] applied several theories of war in International Relation (IR) studies[55] onto the Syrian conflict. He concluded that:

> "[…] the Syrian conflict, if analysed in the ambit of the International Relations theories regarding wars and new wars does not fit within the patterns of any previous war […] the peculiarities of the conflict in Syria might set out a new pattern for armed conflict, and ultimately statehood. […] [I]n Syria, where the central state continued to operate, albeit at a different scale and quality, and, though fragmented, it is likely to continue to do so in the near future."[56]

For him points that proof the uniqueness of Syria in modern wars, firstly were the participation of almost all regional powers, to a high degree responsible for the militarization of the opposition. Secondly, the militaries machineries of the US and Russia, although with no major direct clashes, were operating in the same territorial unit. Thirdly, after a win by Bashar al-Assad's side, the most likely outcome of the conflict, any concessions to power sharing models, like constitutional amendments, will be out of international pressure and not because the ruling elite wished the participation of the people in the political process. Lastly, that the war was fought by networks of state and non-state actors, in fast changing coalitions, not only furthered the fragmentation of the country but also prevented the formation of a bigger insurgency organization. This indicates that there is a change in why wars are fought. Actors eager to transform the state

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[52] Tough there already are many surveys looking into special aspects of the war. To give an example, the connection of crime and civil war in Syria was researched by: *Steenkamp* Christina, The Crime-Conflict Nexus and the Civil War in Syria. In: Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 6th, 1 (2017) 11.

[53] *Malantowicz* Artur, Civil War in Syria and the 'New Wars' Debate. In: Amsterdam Law Forum 5th, 3 (2013) 52–60. 60.

[54] *Ali* Suhaib Jamal Rifqi, The New Patterns of War in the 21st Century: The War in Syria as a Case Study. (Tesi di dottorato di ricerca, Università di Pisa 2019).

[55] Among them various New Wars theories, but not Mary Kaldor's as a whole.

[56] *Ali*, War in Syria. 246.

were tamed by regional or superpowers, others like Hezbollah experienced a major revaluation and/or a boost of their war mongering abilities.

These two contributions already point out that Syria has the potential to change the perceptions of war as fought in the framework of states. But is the phenomenon of varying parties fighting for the upper hand/influence of the balance of power and institutions new? How does it compare to the times before the consolidation of power in a centralized state? Can a bigger pattern in history be worked out? Are we returning to times where day-to-day violence will reappear in the midst of society or is there finally the chance to fulfil the pious hope for a perpetual peace by transforming statehood?

3. New Wars and Old Wars. A Convergence

3.1 Kaldor's Interpretation of Old Wars

Perceptions of war are formed by societies. This means that every culture, its people, policy makers and military leaders, define war. This makes war itself a social activity, a point made by Clausewitz. The dominating concept of war, as proposed by Clausewitz, is rooted in the founding period of the modern European statehood between the 15th and 18th century. In his idealistic conception of war, Clausewitz mainly speaks about interstate war, though some of his writings are dedicated to small wars. Kaldor made out several phases of transformation of warfare, important to note is that we are discussing a predominantly European phenomenon spreading over the globe via colonialism and later globalisation.

3.1.1 The Formation of the Modern European State and Warfare

The idea that war is a state activity was finally realized at the end of the 18th century. But, why then and not with proto-state structures like the Roman Empire or the feudal states of the Middle Ages? In the Antiquity and the Middle Ages[57] the separation of society and state was not notable enough to call the conflicts, war.[58]

The early stages of the European state formation marked the first phase in, what Kaldor calls, the evolution of old wars. Initial point was the consolidation of the territory by monarchs, against a variety of actors, but mostly against feudal barons. The monarchs were increasingly able not only "[…] to consolidate their territorial borders", but further managed "to centralize power by using their growing economic assets […]."[59] Such assets were gained by customs duty, taxation, and as a newer feature, by borrowing money from a growing bourgeoisie. But money can only buy mercenary armies, who had a reputation of being unreliable and expensive. Monarchs sought

[57] This is formidably illustrated by Martin van Creveld who argues that, for the example of the Greek city-states, the separation of society, the citizens, and the state was not notable enough to call it state warfare. The historians of the antiquity referred to war as happening between "Athenians" and "Spartans", and not between Athens and Sparta. The wars of the Roman Empire also cannot be seen as state wars, even though Rome distinguished between society and the state, its foes lacked this distinction and therefore fighting had an asymmetrical character. What followed until the late Middle Ages were wars fought by a variety of actors, the church, monarchs, city-states, tribes, among others, each with their own characteristics of military formations, but again with the absence of the separation of state and society. *van Creveld*, Transformation.

[58] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 15–18.

[59] Ibid., 18.

for a replacement of the mercenaries and discovered what they were looking for in standing armies. Another effect, beside establishing the states monopoly on violence through standing regiments, was the setting up of garrisons in some towns, which became, as Keegan puts it, "the schools of the nation".[60] The introduction of uniforms helped to establish a separation of civil and military people.

The distinction of the civil and the military sphere became an essential part of society, as it defined the legitimate use of violence. The registered and controllable soldier was confronted with the criminal bandit. From then on, only state interest justified the use of force, eradicating a just cause argumentation for violence by non-state actors. This needs to be understood in the bigger pattern of secularization during that time, or an emancipation from the church by states, changing the fundaments of society from formerly theological conceptions to Enlightenment ones. This shift marks a tremendous turning point in the legality of killing, the thin line of killing as an act of crime and the socially allowed act defined by the sovereign. It was completed by a change in the rules of warfare, the *ius in bello* and the *ius ad bellum* or laws of war; before it was derived from papal authority, but its regulation and codification became a matter of states.[61]

The establishment of standing armies further had enormous implications for the evolution of capitalism. It was the necessity to finance armies, which led to a regularization of the administration, taxation and borrowing of money. To extend the borrowing it was essential that the king's and the state finances were separated and that a banking system, including a central bank, was established.[62] At the same time the process of internal pacification, as it is called by Anthony Giddens[63], established law, order, and justice in one's own territory. By an implicit contract, the king offers protection for funds, eradicating private ways of offering "protection". This led to the distinction of the domestic police force, holding the monopoly on violence within the state borders, and the military protecting it from outside threats.[64]

It was by the end of the 18th century that the socially organized activity we perceive as war finally emerged, significantly coined by many distinctions: "These included:

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[60] *Keegan*, A History of Warfare, 12; quoted in: *Kaldor*, New and Old Wars, 18.

[61] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 18–20.

[62] Ibid., 20; Here it is only possible to scratch the surface of how standing armies contributed to the making of capitalism, for a more detailed account see: Charles *Tilly*, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, Rev. pbk. ed, Studies in Social Discontinuity (Cambridge, MA 1992); Michael *Mann*, States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford UK ; New York, NY 1988).

[63] *Giddens* Anthony, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. Vol. 2: The Nation-State and Violence. (Reprint, Cambridge, UK 2002).

[64] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 20f.

- the distinction between public and private, between the sphere of state activity and non-state activity;
- the distinction between internal and external, between what took place within the clearly defined territory of the state and what took place outside;
- the distinction between economy and the political which was associated with the rise of capitalism, the separation of private economic activity from public state activities, and the removal of physical coercion from economic activities;
- the distinction between the civil and the military, between domestic non-violent legal intercourse and external violent struggle, between civil society and barbarism;
- the distinction between the legitimate bearer of arms and the non-combatant or the criminal.

Above all, there emerged the distinction between war and peace itself."[65] Security, domestic peace, respect for law and justice were manifested in society. This process was neither smooth nor uninterrupted, stretched over nearly two centuries, differed from state to state, and never followed this schematic description.[66]

3.1.1.1 Foucault's Historico-Political Discourse. The Introduction of "Us" Versus "Them"

But were the societies of the modern era of nation states really that coined by such distinctions? Are military thinking, its institutions and agencies, at the core of political institutions? Was war the underlying theme of society?[67] Such questions were asked by Michel Foucault when discussing war and its relation to power and societies. He derived that the public discourse changed during the 17th and 18th century towards a warmongering historico-political discourse of "us" versus "them", overlapping the philosophic-juridical discourse.

During the transformation period of the states in the late middle ages and early modern time, "[t]he state acquired a monopoly on war."[68] To establish order day-to-day violence was pushed out of the societal body and bound to the states frontiers, manifesting as battles and hostilities with other nations. For this nationalization and professionalisation of war the state needed a controlled military apparatus; these military institutions "[…] replace[ed] both the day-to-day and generalized practice of warfare, and a society that was perpetually traversed by relations of war."[69] After taming the violence a paradoxical situation erupted, while violence nearly disappeared on a daily basis a certain discourse, the historico-political, in society appeared. Its main proponents were sophisticated people while popular speakers spread and mainstreamed their

[65] Ibid., 22.

[66] Ibid., 20–23.

[67] *Foucault*, *Bertani*, *Fontana*, *Ewald*, *Macey* (eds.), Society. 47f.

[68] Ibid., 48.

[69] Ibid., 49.

ideas, exemplified by its earliest proponents the 17th century British bourgeois and French aristocracy and their demands brought up against monarchy. It marked the start to perceive war as

> "[…] the uninterrupted frame of history that takes a specific form: The war is going on beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode, is basically, a race war."[70]

In the 19th century a twofold redraft of the idea of race happened. To justify colonialism a biological component was added, the birth of race theory in a historical-biological sense. And to justify capitalism and its exploitation patterns, a social component was added opening the path for class struggle. Finally evolving out them both was biological-social racism, in which

> "[…] the other race is basically not the race that came from elsewhere or that was, for a time, triumphant and dominant, but that it is the race that permanently, ceaselessly infiltrating the social body, or which is, rather, constantly being re-created in and by social fabric."[71]

What started as a discourse against the monarchy evolved via new mechanisms and techniques and left the idea that war was not a clash between distinct races, but an inner social conflict between a superrace and a subrace.[72] The powerful positions of the proponents of such a discourse let it seep into societies and its institutions.

The historico-political discourse further is framed around some basic assumptions. Firstly that "[n]o matter what philosophico-juridical theory may say, political power does not begin when war ends."[73] Even further the philosophico-juridical discourse, and with it moral as benchmark, as a whole was disregarded.[74] Secondly, war itself never ends, it is a permanent social relation and cause of every balance of power, agencies, laws and peace; war brought states forth, out of real battles and blood and not idealistic ones.[75] Thirdly, this war only ends if the other side is eliminated; a battlefront is drawn between "us" and "them", there are no neutral subjects "[w]e are all inevitably someone's adversary."[76] Therefore pacification is no possibility, not by law as beneath it "[… the] war continues to rage in all the mechanisms of power, even the most regular […]; peace itself is a coded war."[77] This reflects in the assertion and demand of rights in that

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[70] Ibid., 59.

[71] Ibid., 61.

[72] Ibid., 48–50, 59–61.

[73] Ibid., 50.

[74] Ibid., 57f.

[75] Ibid., 49f.

[76] Ibid., 51.

[77] Ibid., 50.

context, as proponents of the historico-political discourse say: "We have a right[s]."[78] As there are only extreme positions such rights can only be granted to the own group, e.g. ones family or race, and are marked by relations of property, conquest, nature, superiority, invasions or occupations. "[… I]t is a right that is both grounded in history and decentred from a juridical universality."[79] Their thinking generates a truth only perceptible for their own side, where it becomes a combat position for demanding such rights. By this change of perception of subject and truth, the discourse becomes historically anchored and politically decentred.[80]

A main reason why the societal organization imagined in the historico-political discourse superseded other conceptions of society, for example the pyramidic society model of the Middle Ages, laid in its connection to the explanation and justification model of historicism. It replaced former thinking of history as a given superficial surrounding few basic principles; where it was tried to explain right and history by a lasting and fundamental rationality, bound to fairness and universality, eclipsing all the coincidences of life. But historicism has no interest in historically judging unjust governments, crimes or acts of violence and comparing them to an ideal schema:

> "[…] it is interested in defining and discovering, beneath the forms of justice that have been instituted, the order that has been imposed, the forgotten past of real struggles, actual victories, and defeats which may have been disguised but which remain profoundly inscribed. It is interested in rediscovering the blood that has dried in the codes, and not, therefore, the absolute right that lies beneath the transience of history; […] in discovering, beneath the stability of the law or the truth, the indefiniteness of history. It is interested in the battle cries that can be heard beneath the formulas of right, in the dissymmetry of forces that lies beneath the equilibrium of justice. Within a historical field that cannot even be said to be a relative field, as it does not relate to any absolute, it is the indefiniteness of history that is in a sense being "irrelativized." It is the indefiniteness of its eternal, the eternal dissolution into the mechanisms and events known as force, power, and war."[81]

The intertwining of physico-biological facts, accidents as well as psychological and moral elements constitutes the permanent web of histories and societies and by applying the own truth a new fragile and superficial rationality can be deducted. This abstract, fragile, illusory, cunning and malicious rationality, developed by temporary victors, uses calculations, strategies, ruses and technical procedures to foster the balance of power in their favour.[82]

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[78] Ibid., 52.

[79] Ibid., 52.

[80] Ibid., 53.

[81] Ibid., 56.

[82] Ibid., 54–56.

The consolidation of the European nation state and the accompanying secularisation were crucial for the transformation of the social perception of war. Military institutions secured the monopoly of violence (Kaldor) or war (Foucault). For Kaldor they were necessary for the pacification of society with its many distinctions, where in the end war was established as a state activity; solemnly the state was the entitled actor to legitimately use violence. For Foucault the change in discourse to a historico-political one was crucial that militarism and war became the underlying themes and motivational forces of society. War became *the* state activity. Society got divided into a binary model with a perpetual war running through where institutions were set up by victors to tame the losers, where pacification was only possible by elimination of the other. This never-ending war served as justification for every abuse of power, as the acts of violence were legitimized by history; the own position was the only one that counts and was in the possession of the real truth. This legitimization pattern for organized violence was deeply intertwined with the European model of sovereign nation states and their monopoly on violence; a political security system that more and more gets questioned by the challenges of globalization. But for both theories the work of Carl von Clausewitz played an important role.

3.1.2 Clausewitz Enters the Discourse. 19th Century Warfare

Carl von Clausewitz's personal experiences in the Napoleonic Wars significantly influenced "On War". His thinking of war was shaped by this first people's war as due to conscription Napoleon was able to raise the biggest army Europe had ever seen.

The first chapter of his book includes his central thesis, that war tends towards extremes. It further is a social activity uniting different and differing emotions and tendencies "- reason, chance and strategy, and passion that can be linked, respectively, to the state or the political leaders, the army or the generals, and the level of the people."[83] This trinitarian depiction is the basis for his ideal concept of absolute war. It needs to be put in the context of his time and should be understood as a Hegelian abstract; generating an inner tendency of war deriving from the logic of three different tendencies.

The logic is described in terms of three "reciprocal actions". At a political or rational level, the state needs to push harder when meeting resistance in achieving its objectives. At a military level, the opponent needs to be disarmed to achieve the political object, otherwise there is always

[83] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 23.

a possibility of a counterattack. The strength of the will rests upon popular feelings and sentiments, war has the potential to unleash uncontrollable passion and hostility. But for Clausewitz war was a rational activity, though emotions help with mobilization.

The difference between real and abstract wars is mainly found in the political and military fields. The political objective may be limited and/or lacks the backing of the public.[84] In the military area the problems, between real and abstract war, are characterized by Clausewitz as "friction"[85]. "Real war is the outcome of the tension between political and practical constraints and the inner tendency for absolute war."[86] This predicts the uncertainty during war, the best paper plan could be overthrown by reality.

With the increasing size of armies, it became a necessity to optimize the communication within their structures for organizational and commanding purposes.[87] Clausewitz built the fundament for strategic theory, which further developed, got adapted and refined during the 19th and 20th century. In *On War* Clausewitz first describes the two main theories of warfare, attrition[88] and manoeuvre[89] theory; as he saw them as complementary. Further he discusses offence and defence, concentration and dispersion.

But what makes Clausewitz's work ground-breaking, more than anything else, was his finding that the importance of an overwhelming force and the readiness to use it are decisive for victory in war.[90] To win, a combination of physical and moral forces was needed. This point seems obvious nowadays but was new in the 19th century. For him battle was the "single activity of war"; it is the decisive moment when the mobilization and application of force meet.

> "As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the cooperation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application. The former then dictates

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[84] *Clausewitz, Werner* (ed.), Vom Kriege. 42.

[85] These are problems of logistics, poor information, uncertain weather, indiscipline, difficult terrain, inadequate organization, etc.

[86] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 24.

[87] A "jargon" was established to guide common military doctrines, later becoming known as standard operational procedures. Richard E. *Simpkin*, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, (Future Warfare Series v. 1, London, UK ; Washington, D.C. 1985); quoted in: *Kaldor*, New and Old Wars, 24.

[88] In attrition theory victory is achieved by imposing a higher casualty rate or "attrition rate" upon one's enemy; mainly associated with defensive strategies and a high concentration of forces.

[89] In manoeuvre theory surprise and pre-emptive attacks are the basic components; mobility and dispersion are the driving forces to achieve uncertainty and the required speed.

[90] In the times before Clausewitz a main strategy was to avoid battle, mainly to conserve one's professional forces, a defensive siege was preferred to assaults, campaigns were halted for winters and strategic retreats were often the norm.

> the law to the latter and both proceed to extremities to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counteracting force on each side."[91]

The Napoleonic levée en masse, that all citizens were mobilized for war was not repeated until the First World War. But several developments during the 19th century helped realize the Clausewitzean version of modern war. They are deeply connected to the Industrial Revolution, especially the use and adaption of invention for military purposes. To highlight two: the expansion of the railway and telegraph networks. Military use of technologies played a huge role in the extension of state activity into the industrial sphere, leading to the -build-up of military-industrial complexes in some countries.[92] A second change for the intensification of war was the growing necessity of alliances; to reach the overwhelming force needed to subjugate the foe. A third indicator for Clausewitzean war was the progress of the codification of the laws of war.[93] Though not followed in every war and by every party, it needs to be understood as means "[…] to preserve the notion of war as a rational instrument of state policy […]" in times where the possible destructiveness of wars increased dramatically.[94]

> "To sum up, modern war, as it developed in the nineteenth century, involved war between states with an ever-increasing emphasis on scale and mobility, and an increasing need for 'rational' organization and 'scientific' doctrine to manage these large conglomerations of force."[95]

Further, Clausewitz work is characterized by tensions, between reason and emotion, art and science, attrition and manoeuvre, defence and offence, instrumentalism and extremism. Significant for war theory are his most important conclusions, the instrumental nature of war, the importance of scale, and the necessity of an analytical conceptualization of war.[96] The tensions worked out by him again point to his Hegelian world view.

For Mary Kaldor Clausewitz description of war, as a contest of wills tending toward extremes to compel the opponent to fulfil ones will, is no longer fully applicable in contemporary wars; the efforts of organized violence more and more get undertaken by mutual enterprises dependent on each other to sustain. For Foucault the Clausewitz thesis that war is the continuation of politics

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[91] *Clausewitz*, Vom Kriege, 24; quoted in: *Kaldor*, New and Old Wars, 25.

[92] Kaldor, as example, points to the naval arms race between Britain and Germany at the End of the 19th century and the connection to the development of such complexes in these countries.

[93] It defined legitimate warfare and how it is conducted; who is a participant, how to treat sick and wounded, outlawing some tactics and so on. An overview of constraints in war from antiquity to nowadays is presented by: *Howard* Michael, *Andreopoulos* George J, *Shulman* Mark R, The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World. (New Haven, CT ; London, UK 1997).

[94] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 26.

[95] Ibid., 27.

[96] Ibid., 23–27.

by other means was central, though he examined the origin of its turnaround. The importance of Clausewitz in Foucault's theory became more evident when comparing Clausewitz main points about absolute war, his ideal version, and Foucault's description of the historico-political discourse. In both an inner tendency for violence runs through society, or there always is an ongoing war. Pacification and concessions are not an opportunity as violence is the means and only its extreme and unsparingly use really leads to the wished result, or the perpetual war ends when the other side finally is eliminated. In this regard the winner dictates the laws to the defeated to reassure that the compelled will stays implemented. A first convergence of Clausewitz ideal concept could be found in the two great wars of the first half of the 20th century.

3.1.3 Slaughtering on a New Level. 20th Centuries Total Wars

The great wars of the first half of the 20th century come as close as possible to Clausewitz description of absolute war. But, "Clausewitz could not possibly have envisaged the awesome combination of mass production, mass politics and mass communication when harnessed to mass destruction."[97] Notable in the First and Second World War were vast mobilization of whole nations to fight and support the fighting. The development of nuclear weapons allowed, in theory, complete destruction without "friction". Nevertheless, the two great wars foreshadowed some characteristics of new wars. In a total war the whole society needs to participate to win, the distinction between the private and the public sphere blurs. Furthermore, the distinction between the military and the civil, the combatants and non-combatants, breaks down. Justifications for the bombing of economic targets, in WWI, or whole cities, in WWII, were sought and found in the term "military necessity".

Interestingly a shift in the justification of war occurred. The "state interest", as driving force for young men to go to war, was losing its justifiability. There is a wide variety of reasons for people to serve during a war - adventure, honour, fear, or defence, just to name a few. "[…] [S]ocially organized legitimate violence needs a common goal in which the individual soldier can believe and which he shares with others."[98] It is true that patriotism was the major driving force for young people[99] to volunteer, and die, for king and country in WWI. But as the horrific experiences of the battlefields led to disillusion about the just causes for war, a more abstract reasoning

[97] Ibid., 27.

[98] Ibid., 28.

[99] Kaldor herself only speaks of young men volunteering and by that neglecting the participation of half the population, women, whom played a crucial role during the war. For an small overview of women in WWI see: *Asselin* Kristine Carlson, Women in World War I. (Minneapolis, MN 2016).

was sought. It was found in what Gellner calls secular religions.[100] The Allied forces in WWII justified the war as fighting against evil itself, the mobilization of whole societies was necessary to save and defend their own ways of life. "They fought in the name of democracy and/or socialism against fascism."[101] In the Cold War the same justification was used to defend the necessity of the ongoing arms race. Furthermore, the trauma of the two World Wars helped to delegitimate warfare as an "instrument of policy" except in cases of self-defence or when sanctioned by the international community.

An additional shift appeared in the techniques of modern war, due to their ineffectiveness in the light of new weapons emerging. WWI started as a defensive war of attrition, where young men were sent in lines into the fire of machine guns, in accordance to 19th century strategies, and got mowed down within seconds, it became clear that what matters is mass firepower. The introduction of tanks and aircrafts, and their en masse usage, enabled a switch to a more offensive manoeuvre warfare, characteristic for WWII. The revolutions in electronics in the post-war period, while increasing accuracy and lethality of munitions, made weapon systems more vulnerable. This led to the situation that the weapon platforms mainly used in WWII, tanks, aircrafts, and so on, became complex and expensive, diminishing their utility.[102]

> "The problem of mobilization and inflexibility, and the risks of attrition, have been magnified in the post-war period, making it almost prohibitive to mount a major operation against a symmetrical opponent."[103]

The climax of the technological trajectory of modern war are weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. A nuclear war means the possible utmost destruction within minutes. What rational purpose can ever justify such application of force? Or, "[d]o not nuclear weapons nullify the premise of modern warfare- state interest?"[104]

A last shift occurred regarding the distinction between what is internal and what is external, due to the rigidification of alliances. Profoundly observable by the setting up of NATO and the Warsaw pact, WWII made clear that nation states do not have the abilities to fight wars unilaterally. During the Cold War integrated command systems and a military division of labour between the parties guaranteed that only the superpowers had the ability to launch a full-scale war. Outside of

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[100] *Gellner* Ernest, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals. (Penguin history, London, UK 1996).

[101] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 28.

[102] This argument is carved in: *Kaldor* Mary, The Baroque Arsenal. (London, UK 1982).

[103] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 29.

[104] Lawrence *Freedman*, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Repr (New York, NY 1983); quoted in: *Kaldor*, New and Old Wars, 30.

the European alliances looser networks of military cooperation were shaped, for arms trade, support and training, and a creation of patron-client relationships with the superpowers emerged, inhibiting the capacity for unilateral warfare. This point is proven by the fact that three[105] of the four big inter-state wars of the post-war period were ended by superpower intervention. The fourth, the Iran-Iraq war, could be fought unilateral due to their oil revenues. But after eight years both parties saw the disutility of conventional modern warfare.[106]

With the erosion of the distinction between public and private, military and civil, internal and external, the distinction of war and peace itself was questioned. "The Cold War kept alive the idea of war while avoiding its reality."[107] The maintenance of large standing armies integrated in alliances, a still ongoing technological arms race with spending budgets[108] never seen before in peacetime, led to the deceptive perception that the second half of the 20th century was a peaceful one; also due to the fact that no stylized "old" war occurred on European soil. But around the globe a lot of wars took place, they were mostly discounted for not fitting into the common Western perception of war.

> "The irregular, informal wars of the second half of the twentieth century, starting with the wartime resistance movements and the guerrilla warfare of Mao Tse-tung and his successors, represent the harbingers of the new forms of warfare. The actors, techniques and counter-techniques which emerged out of the cracks of modern warfare were to provide the basis for new ways of socially organised violence."[109]

3.1.4 The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). 21st Century Old Wars?

The Cold War is to be understood as an imaginary war.[110] The two superpowers behaved like they were at war all the time, which made it easier to argument the big military budgets. New technologies developed in the 1980ies led to a first debate about the future of armed forces.[111]

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[105] India and Pakistan, Greece and Turkey, Israel and the Arab states.

[106] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 30f; *van Creveld*, Transformation. 16.

[107] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 31.

[108] *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. (2018).

[109] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 31.

[110] *Kaldor* Mary, The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict. (Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, MA 1990).

[111] The idea that future wars are technology intense, carried out by pre-emptive strikes with precision guided conventional weapons on the basis of gathered information to reduce casualties, emerged in the Soviet Union and was formulated by Marshal Nikolai Orgakov. In the US the new doctrine focussed on deep strikes, carried out by the new Tomahawk cruise missiles; their armament possibilities included nuclear warheads. *Gregory* Derek, War and

But what was to be done after the big enemy had fallen? How could the enormous amount of money spent for armament be justified? In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the US military cut its cost by nearly a third, mainly effecting the employed personnel and less effecting the research budget. This partly explains why the emphasis was laid on the improvements of traditional weapon platforms and the development of new ones, which is now known as Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) replacing the Air-Land Battle strategy. "RMA is a spectacle war; it is war carried out at long distance using computers and new communications technologies."[112]

The American-led RMA is a mixture of sciences; engineering, computer science and management science are the more prominent proponents, but anthropology or psychology also found their way in. This reflects in the two expert languages appearing in it. The language of science[113] helps to develop new technologies and to legitimize the "result", the death of a human being. The second is the language of corporations.[114] In the military jargon these languages got radicalized to underline the promise "[…] to fight present and future wars with fewer ground troops through the intensive use of high technology."[115] This led to new recruitment methods and perception of war by soldiers. Wars are more and more imagined as videogames; soldiers can fly their drones from bases around the world, staring at a screen, control them with a gamepad, and in the evening go home to their families. Additionally, media outlets and movie makers produce war propaganda, in what James Der Derian calls the "Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network (MIME-NET)".[116] But the methods used, especially seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, have not much changed since WWII; they included a combination of aerial bombardment and rapid offensive manoeuvres. Peter Singer[117] shows that the upcoming evolutions of RMA will be highly influenced by robotics and autonomy and their shaping of conflicts.

The US campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq marked the biggest adaptions of the RMA, from an old war style to a new war approach. This was necessary as they won the old wars, but failed to

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Peace. In: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 35th, 2 (2010) 154–186. ; *Romjue* John L., From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982. (Fort Monroe, VA 1984).

[112] *Freedman* Lawrence, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs. (Adelphi paper 318, London, UK ; New York, NY 1998) ; *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 153.

[113] A bold scientific language is used to define killing as an objective to achieve, trying to avoid naming the bloody business they develop for.

[114] For organizational purposes and to guarantee an economic efficiency, emphasis is laid upon the cost-efficiency of killing.

[115] *Gregory*, War. 160.

[116] *Der Derian* James, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network. (Boulder, CO 2001).

[117] *Singer*, Wired for War.

control the insurgencies arsing with the change of perception by the people, as they realised that the Americans, coming as liberators, showed more and more tendencies to behave like an occupational power. Speaking in a broad sense the Americans changed their counterinsurgency strategy to winning over the minds and hearts of the population, by providing "human security". Firstly, they set up Joint Security Stations, manned by American soldiers and Iraqi security forces. It was a two-folded strategy, to gain security, by changing the way American troops saw the Iraqi population, and simultaneously training the Iraqi troops. Such attempts were accompanied by setting up self-defence units/militias, closely working together in intelligence matters, but these local neighbourhood watch organizations also partly took over police tasks. All of this, and local negotiated ceasefires with militias, were effective in reducing the violence, where the main efforts for reducing violence were undertaken by the Iraqis themselves. On the higher military levels, an intensification of drone strikes and the use of robots could be observed. Singer explains their increased use as an answer to suicide bombers. They carry out cost-effective attacks by reducing the own (human) casualties to zero.[118] Unforeseeable are the implications on the own population if war disappears out of the collective memory of a nation as something that asks for their sacrifices. No additional war taxes are introduced, in contrary, wars were accompanied by tax cuts. The horror of war is even further removed from people's mind, when no coffins return home. Now to comply with the MIME-NET: "All the American public is asked to do is to watch television an applaud."[119]

3.2 New Wars

3.2.1 New Wars and Politics

The politics of new wars are embedded in the bigger processes of globalization, as it breaks up cultural and socio-economic divisions developed with the formation of the modern European nation states and defining the political landscape for centuries. It manifests in the political goals of new wars, the claim to power based on seemingly traditional identities – tribal, religious, national. An increase of the politics of particularistic identities appear in the bigger context of a "growing cultural dissonance" between "globalists", people being part of transnational networks, and "local territorially tied inhabitants", who are excluded from global processes; the two have to

[118] For some implications robots will bring to warfare see: *United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs*, Perspectives on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems. (UNODA Occasional Papers No. 30, New York, NY 2017).

[119] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 180.

be seen as extremes on a scale with countless possibilities in between. It is necessary to understand the new type of warfare in this rising phenomenon of global dislocation.

> "New forms of power struggle may take the guise of traditional nationalism, tribalism, or religious fundamentalism, but they are, nevertheless, contemporary phenomena arising from contemporary causes and displaying new characteristics. Moreover, they are paralleled by a global consciousness and sense of global responsibility among an array of governmental and non-governmental institutions as well as individuals." [120]

3.2.1.1 Globalization and New Wars Politics

The starting point of Kaldor's globalization characteristics is Ernest Gellner's portrayal of the association between nationalism and industrialization. He analyses the emergence of vertically organized secular national cultures[121] superseding horizontal high cultures.[122] It is created by a new intelligentsia, which established hand in hand with printing, the publication of secular literature, and the expansion of primary education.[123]

In the process of globalization[124] such new horizontal cultures emerge out of new transnational networks; characterized by the lingua franca English, combined with a myriad of national, local, and regional cultures, as new assertions of local particularities. The spread of new information and communication technologies in the past decades marked "[…] a qualitative deepening […]"[125] of globalization. The current state of the process is further shaped by the post-war international system and the deregulatory market policies of the 1980ies and 1990ies.[126] Some trends are relevant to understand this evolution of political and social values, actions and forms of organization.

Economically, the significance of territorially based mass production declines, as the globalization of finance and technology, specialisation and the diversity of markets increases. It is a transformation of the techno-economic paradigm, "[…] the prevailing way in which the supply of

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[120] Ibid., 71f..

[121] Based on vernacular languages, helping people to manage their everyday life in their encounters with the industry and the government. Acquiring verbal and writing common language, as well as standardized skills, became a requirement to manage the phenomena of replacing varied rural occupations by factory production.

[122] Based on religion and not inevitably on a state, intertwined with a variety of low folk cultures.

[123] *Gellner* Ernest, *Breuilly* John, Nations and Nationalism. (Ithaca, NY 2009).

[124] A process marked by dichotomies: Globalization and localization, integration and fragmentation, homogenisation and differentiation.

[125] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 74.

[126] *Guttal*, Globalisation. ; *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 73f.

products and services is organized to meet the prevailing pattern of demand."[127] It is a twofold process, on the local level the production of goods can be adapted to the different markets, and on the global scale economic organization more and more tends to only consist of a few players, due to the global character of finance and technology.

Such a colossal paradigmatic change has consequences in the political sphere, as globalization involves a trans-nationalization and regionalization of governance. On an international level more and more of the decision-making process is directed at and regulated by international agreements or transnational institutions. Simultaneously a reassertion of local and regional politics happened, like rediscovering municipal traditions.[128] This is accompanied by a growth of informal non-governmental transnational networks, partly overtaking functions formerly done by governments or campaigning on global issues. Robert Reich points out that the established networks have to be imagined like a spider's web[129]; contrary to Nikolai Bukharin's "monism of architecture"[130]. Similar processes happen to the governmental and non-governmental organizations, as their horizontal transnational links deepen; as government activities increasingly get contracted out by private and semi-private arrangements. New vertical networks, where political leaders act more like corporate executives coordinating the different points in a web, increase in relevance to the old horizontal organization forms, like political parties.[131]

These fundamental changes in the economical and politic sphere restructured society as a whole. The decline of territorially based mass production is accompanied by the decline of the traditional working class, nowadays with a vast majority either working in the service industry or being unemployed. On the other side are ever-growing employment opportunities in the new trans-

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[127] Christopher *Freeman*, John *Clark*, Luc *Soete*, Unemployment and Technical Innovation: A Study of Long Waves and Economic Development (Westport, CT 1982); quoted in: *Kaldor*, New and Old Wars, 74.

[128] Margit *Mayer*, The Shifting Local Political System in European Cities, In: Cities and Regions in the New Europe: The Global-Local Interplay and Spatial Development Strategies, Mick *Dunford*, Grēgorēs *Kaukalas* Ed. (London, UK ; New York, NY 1992); Manuel *Castells*, Peter *Hall*, Technopoles of the World: The Making of Twenty-First-Century Industrial Complexes (London, UK ; New York, NY 1994); quoted in: *Kaldor*, New and Old Wars, 75.

[129] Where power is in the hands of those possessing technical and financial know-how spreading around the contact points of the web *Reich* Robert B., The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism. (1st Vintage Books ed, New York, NY 1992).

[130] Marked by vertical forms of hierarchical organization in the state, the military and enterprises exemplary for the modern European state. See: *Bukharin* Nikolai, The Politics and Economics of the Transition Period. (Hoboken, NJ 2013).

[131] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 75f.

national networks, where know-how is the key to success; exemplified by Robert Reich "symbolic analysts", or Alain Touraine "information workers".[132] Growing income disparities cement the new social structure, few on the top and many at the bottom. This divergence reflects geographically, within continents, countries, regions and even cities. "Everywhere, boundaries are being drawn between protected and prosperous global enclaves and the anarchic, chaotic, poverty-stricken areas beyond."[133] It is a worldwide competition to become, or stay, an industrial powerhouse, capitalizing on one's capabilities, and the rest, neither participating in production nor consumption.

For now, the new emerging global groups are not, or hardly, politicized, in a sense that "[…] they do not form the basis of political communities on which new forms of power could be based."[134] Exemplary figures for the political vacuum are Reich's laissez-faire cosmopolitan, seceded from nation states and following individualistic consumerists interest, and restless young criminals, as new adventurers in the zones of exclusion. This by far does not mean that there is no seed for politization in these groups. The cosmopolitan politization on a global level manifests in transnational NGOs, social movements, international institutions, and on the individual level in belief systems centred around a commitment to human values and a notion to a transnational civil society. Contrary, the new politics of particularistic identities can be interpreted as a form of political mobilisation of those left behind in the face of a growing impotence of the nation state, in response to the global processes.[135]

3.2.1.2 "Us" Versus "Them". Identity Politics and New Wars

Movements shaped by "identity politics" mobilize around an ethnic, a racial or a religious identity, for the purpose of claiming state power[136]. In these instances, the term identity is a form of labelling. Tribal, religious or national conflicts have a common factor in which labels are used to undermine political claims; most of such labels are treated as something one is born with and cannot be acquired through assimilation or conversion, although some have a more inclusive thinking. Furthermore, tribal, religious and nationalist identities can overlap, and in extreme

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[132] *Reich*, The Work of Nations; Alain *Touraine*, The Post-Industrial Society: Tomorrow's Social History: Classes, Conflicts and Culture in the Programmed Society, 1st American ed. (New York, NY 1971); quoted in: *Kaldor*, New and Old Wars, 77.

[133] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 77.

[134] Ibid., 78.

[135] *Kaldor* Mary, Nationalism and Globalisation. In: Nations and Nationalism 10th, 1–2 (2004) 161–177. ; *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 72–79.

[136] This definition is mainly brought up by Radha Kumar in: *Kaldor* Mary, *Kumar* Radha, New Forms of Conflict. In: Conflicts in Europe: Towards a New Political Approach (Helsinki Citizens' Assembly Publication Series 7, Prague 1993).

cases morph into fundamentalism.[137] In the name of identity the claim to political power arises. "Identity politics is a form of communitarianism that is distinct from and may conflict with individual political rights."[138] Identity politics[139] are best compared to politics of ideas[140]. The rise of identity politics is connected to the disintegration or erosion of the modern state structures, especially centralized authoritarian states. Two main sources, linked to globalization, can be traced for the new identity politics.

The first is a reaction to the growing impotence and declining legitimacy of the established political classes, as politics fostered from above, marked by politicians playing with popular prejudices to remain in power on a national level. The second is seen in the development and growing importance of parallel economies - "new forms of legal and illegal ways of making a living that have sprung up among the excluded parts of society"[141]- and the aim to legitimize these shadow activities. Illustrated by the short post 1989 transition phase in Eastern Europe, where the forces of globalization, undermining the nation-state and introducing new economical forms, meet a stirred-up nationalism from above and below to an explosive mixture of venture capitalism and national prejudices.[142]

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[137] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 79f; *Kaldor* Mary, *Muro* Diego, Religious and Nationalist Militant Networks. In: *Kaldor* Mary, *Anheier* Helmut, *Glasius* Marlies, *Centre for Civil Society (London School of Economics and Political Science)*, Global Civil Society 2003 (Oxford, UK 2003).

[138] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 80.

[139] Characterized by fragmentation, backward looking, and exclusiveness; imagining and glorifying events, battles or injustices, of the past. "They acquire meaning through insecurity, through rekindled fear of historic enemies, or through a sense of being threatened by those with different labels." It is the exclusiveness necessarily creating minorities, which can be divided and subdivided into either more groups. Ibid., 80f.

[140] They propagate forward-looking projects and are conceived as ways of welding together diverse groups of people, by claiming an imagined inclusive supportable community. They centre around a nation, the purpose of modernization, or in more recent times around secular ideas, like socialism or environmentalism. Indisputable is that such universalistic ideas can serve as justification of totalitarianism and authoritarianism.

[141] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 81.

[142] Those tendencies intensified by the economic short coming of planned economies; they eliminate competition for markets but in the meantime open the competition for resources. A plan is built up by bureaucratic pressure just to be removed later, in which individual enterprises always must invest more than anticipated. The result is a vicious circle where enterprises and ministries competing for resources. Given that context nationality becomes a dangerous tool in the competition for resources. Already in the early 1970ies the first authors attested the Soviet Union a potential nationalist explosion, in what Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone called "new nationalism". Soviet policy included setting up a hierarchical administrative structure of nationalities, where their status depended on territorially based units. In these units, or titular nations, the indigenous language and cultures were promoted, and the people were prioritized in local administration and education. It led to what Victor Zaslavsky called an "explosive division of labour", where a local elite presided over a, partly imported, Russian working class and an indigenous rural population. The system was used by this elite to promote a national consciousness to deepen the autonomy, especially in the economic sphere. See: Ibid., 82.; *Rakowska-Harmstone* Teresa, The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR. In: Problems of Communism 23rd, 1 (1974) 1-22 ; *Verdery* Katherine, *Hann* C. M. (ed.), Ethnic Relations, Economies of Shortage and the Transition in Eastern Europe. In: Socialism: ideals, ideologies, and local practice (ASA monographs 31, London, UK ; New York, NY 1993). ; *Zaslavsky* Victor, *Bremmer* Ian, *Taras* Ray (eds.), Success and

Nationalism serves as a continuity with the past, while denying the complicity of the past and it fits smoothly, as a replacement, of the Cold War ideologies. Especially in the former communist states' nationalism helped to negate what came before, e.g. by portraying the communist regimes as occupants. Similar processes are observable in the post-colonial regions;

> "States in Africa and Asia were having to cope with the disillusion of post-independence hopes, the failure of the development project to overcome poverty and inequality, the insecurity of rapid urbanization and the break-up of traditional rural communities, as well as the impact of structural adjustment and policies of stabilization, liberalization and deregularization."[143]

The decline in the importance of the non-aligned movement led to the loss of an international identity, which opened the gates for ruling politicians and oppositionist to play upon particularistic identities; either to justify their policies, create scapegoats, or mobilize support trough fear and insecurity. These trends, of politics in the name of a tribe, clan, religious or linguistic groups, intensified with the missing of legitimate emancipatory movements replacing the colonial order[144]. During the post-independence phase ruling parties commonly appealed to secular national identities, to unite different groups in the mainly artificial borders of the European colonial system. As hope faded that this model would succeed politicians turned to particularism, where affiliation matters the most. The competition for resources grew in two ways, one from the outside[145] and the other from inside[146].

Advanced industrial countries are not immune to the trends of particularism, accompanying the eroding legitimacy of the nation-state and the transformation of social and administrative structures. Post 1989 the special Western identity of promoting and living democracy declines, as its counterpart, communism, fell. Arguable is if the rhetoric of the "War on Terror" is the reinvention of a distinctive Western identity.[147] Furthermore, nationalism or seeds of it are more and more exploited by political parties, such as through asylum laws or anti-immigrationism, as only

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Collapse: Traditional Soviet Nationality Policy. In: Nation and politics in the Soviet successor states (Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY 1993).

[143] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 84.

[144] The pre-colonial loose sense of ethnic identity was transformed by the Europeans and their obsession for classification imposing rigid ethnic categories, thus many times being far removed from the realities of the societal organization; an idea that spread along the frontiers of the European colonial project.

[145] With the end of the Cold War, foreign aid dropped, foreign debt mounted, and structural adjustment programs were imposed.

[146] Domestic pressure arose with the upcoming of democratization movements, sometimes leading to desperate fights for power, mostly accompanied by identity politics.

[147] The connections of the state of exception in the making and perception of Western law and sovereignty is examined by: *Agamben* Giorgio, *Müller-Schöll* Ulrich (tran.), Ausnahmezustand. (Deutsche Erstausgabe, 7. Auflage, Frankfurt am Main 2017) ; *Agamben* Giorgio, *Thüring* Hubert (tran.), Homo Sacer: Die Souveräne Macht und das Nackte Leben. (Erbschaft unserer Zeit Band 16, 10. Auflage, Frankfurt am Main 2015).

real differentiations in a system built to protect budgetary discipline and the control of inflation, narrowing the leeway of economic and social reforms/ideas in the era of globalization.

The second factor shaping new identity politics is the insecurity associated with globalization, in the form of rapid urbanization and parallel economies. To a large extent the neo-liberal policies[148] of the 1980ies and 1990ies accelerated globalization. Consequences of these policies were higher unemployment, resource depletion, rising income disparities and migration from rural areas to cities and across borders. The rapid changes[149] contributed to the spread of criminal activity, creating networks of corruption and black markets. A new kind of primitive accumulation, a grab for land and capital, is fostered by new transnational networks, represented by "shady" businessmen linked to circuits of illegal goods, and sometimes diaspora communities. They use identity politics to legitimize their activities and to build alliances. Such networks can often be linked to wars and the disintegration of the military-industrial complex in the post-Cold War period. Additionally, austerity politics led to the situation that nationalist or religious groups have built up the only social safety networks for arriving immigrants, from the countryside or abroad; sometimes effectively driving them into the hands of extremists.

In identity politics the two sources of particularism vary in their mutual relationship.

> "Former administrative or intellectual elites ally with a motley collection of adventurers on the margins of society to mobilize the excluded and abandoned, the alienated and insecure, for the purposes of capturing and sustaining power. The greater the sense of insecurity, the greater the polarization of society, the less is the space for alternative integrative political values. In conditions of war, such alliances are cemented by shared complicity in war crimes and a mutual dependence on the continued functioning of the war economy."[150]

In Rwanda, the Hutu elite made sure that the whole population participated in the mass genocide to hold their grip on power. It is what Bauman calls an "original crime"[151], constructing a community by participating in a crime, either directly by actively killing, or indirectly by letting it happen. Important is that every individuum of a society is affected by the crime.

It appears that the new kind of identity politics is a throwback to the past, the good old days of pre-modern identities which temporally got displaced or suppressed by modernizing ideologies.

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[148] Macro-economic stabilization, deregulation, and privatization.

[149] In formerly largely state controlled economies, the lack of self-controlling market mechanisms, in the transition period, meant the absence of any kind of regulation; opening the "market" for corruption, speculation and crime and not new autonomous productive enterprises, as intended.

[150] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 87.

[151] *Bauman*, Wars.

But what really matters is the most recent past, and the impact globalization had on the erosion of nation-states. Making the new politics an entirely new contemporary phenomenon.

"First of all, it is horizontal as well as vertical, transnational as well as national."[152] In many of the new nationalisms the diaspora communities become more important, due to the increased speed of communication. Overall there are two types of diaspora.[153] Diaspora networks provide those who stayed at home with ideas, money, arms and know-how, often accompanied by lop-sided effects, sometimes providing them with disproportionate power at home. Furthermore, the information technology revolution combined with the spread of education among the diaspora, created new "imagined communities"[154]. Newly literate urban classes, supplied with communitarian newspapers from home and excluded from political participation, are recipients of particularism promoting messages, and thanks to the new communication technologies their political mobilization capacity accelerates with the speed of light.[155]

At the beginning of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the individual motivations to join the insurgency were broad. In Iraq more common ones were to defend one's own power position, or to take revenge for being humiliated by Americans, during raids or at checkpoints. In Afghanistan the Taliban recruited from the poor displaced young people learning in the madrassahs in Pakistan, as they offered an income or food for the families and were joined by others suffering under the "occupation". "In both cases, whatever the individual motivation, the narrative that unites them […] is a blend of Salafi Islam and nationalism."[156] A narrative already propagated by Al Qaeda, on a global scale as struggle/fight against the West. Unsurprisingly, the involvement of Al Qaeda fomented the sectarian violence in Iraq and helped to transform the insurgency into civil war. The coalition forces played their part to intensify sectarian violence, by mainly operating in Sunni neighbourhoods in the "War on Terror". "Like other new wars, the violence represented a form of political mobilization, a way of constructing Sunni and Shi'ite identities, which were less clearly delineated before the war."[157]

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[152] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 88.

[153] Firstly, minorities living in the near abroad, mostly exposed to local nationalism and with more extreme tendencies in their positions than their counterparts at home. Secondly, disaffected groups living far away, often in the new melting-pots of the globe, with just a vague imagination of their origins and the living conditions at home which never meet reality.

[154] *Anderson* Benedict R. O'G, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (Revised edition, London, UK ; New York, NY 2016).

[155] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 79–90.

[156] Ibid., 164.

[157] Ibid., 165, 164–166.

We will later see that Syria is a bit different. As the peaceful protests started the main mobilization was the difficult, mainly economic, situation of a majority of the people. In the years prior to the conflict the country witnessed an opening up to globalization; accompanied by all the side effects, like the eradication of state-run social security networks or budget and subsidies cuts because of austerity. This framework was met by an ever-increasing rural area to city migration, with little to none economic perspective. An ever-growing control gap was filled by a variety of actors, some of them sectarian. Where violence became more important than non-violent conflict resolution, it was in many instances fuelled by those sectarianists. The situation in Iraq, where the "ancient hatreds" of Sunnis and Shia were resurrected to mobilize, started to spread to Syria. But still as sectarianism grew in importance to choose a side, individual factors[158] played a more important part.

3.2.1.3 What the Future Could Hold

It is likely that the new particularistic identities, as the expression of a new post-modern cultural relativism are here to stay. As they tackle the main implication of globalization, that territorial sovereignty is no longer viable. "Rather, it is a recipe for new closed-in chaotic statelets with permanently contested borders dependent on continuing violence for survival."[159] As globalization is global, profiteers and the excluded share the same territories; a formidable help for particularists to capitalize on.

As Anthony D. Smith[160] argues, the global classes likewise need to feel the sense of community and identity based on "ethnies" to pass the alienation their technical scientific universalizing world brought. He criticizes a modern kind of thinking seeing nation-states as artificial and temporary polities on the way to a global society; for him the new nationalisms are evidence of the persistence of ethnies. But he adds a positive perspective on cultural separatism, that nation-states can build up around a dominant ethnie while at the same time embracing civic ideals.

In a cosmopolitan sense a new assertion of regional and local politics on a global level is envisaged, embedded in a cosmopolitan political consciousness. To succeed, a claim for a greater democratic accountability on a local and regional level, needs to involve greater access, and openness towards global levels of governance. Democratic accountability needs to be put upon all inhabitants of a territory, and not only the ones with just the right particular label. The term

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[158] Economic opportunities, opportunism, patronage are more prominent ones.

[159] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 91.

[160] Anthony D. *Smith*, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge, UK 1995); quoted in: *Kaldor*, New and Old Wars, 90f.

cosmopolitanism[161] brings together universalism and diversity. But, as Kwame Anthony Appiah shows, cosmopolitanism is distinguishable from universalism:

> "[…] cosmopolitanism is not just the feeling that everybody matters. For the cosmopolitan also celebrates the fact that there are *different* local human way of being; humanism, by contrast, is consistent with the desire for global homogeneity." [162]

On the meta level a cosmopolitan political consciousness develops out of two sources.[163] During wars the difference of cosmopolitanism and particularism profoundly manifests. Particularisms need each other to sustain their exclusive identities. In this connection of war itself becomes a form of political mobilization, as nothing is more polarizing than violence, in which an environment of permanent insecurity is constructed. Cosmopolitans undermine the appeals of particularism as representatives of humane civic values, or in other words they create the vision of an inclusivist peaceful political project. To a point the representation of the possibility of a different project makes them deliberate targets in crisis areas.[164] The question that needs to be asked in the end is: How do we as human beings envisage our future? As politics are never determined, the future is a matter of choice.

3.2.2 The New War Economy

"War economy" used to refer to a centralized, totalizing and autarch system, mainly associated with the total wars of the 20th century. It was characterized by involving as many people as possible, to maximise the use of force, on the battlefield and in the factories, to defeat the enemy.

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[161] It does not deny identities, but instead celebrates the diversity of global identities, acceptance and enthusiasm for multiple overlapping identities, a commitment to the equality of all human beings and the respect of human dignity. Rooted in Kant's notion of cosmopolitan right combined with recognising separate sovereignties, it tries to bring together universalism and diversity.

[162] Kwame Anthony *Appiah*, Cosmopolitan Patriots, Critical Inquiry 23, no. 3 (04/1997) 617–639. quoted in: *Kaldor*, New and Old Wars, 91f.

[163] On the one hand it is established from above by a growing number of international organizations. Characterized by their inner logics and structures; enabling activities rather than undertaking them through their own resources, partly owed to the lack of such resources; their functioning is based on complex partnerships, cooperation agreements, negotiations and mediation between a variety of actors, state and private with many times unsatisfying outcomes for the idealistic officials, often seeking alternative sources of legitimacy to their "frustrating national masters", working there. On the other hand, it is established from below, by new social movements and NGOs. The early stages of the new movements were marked by a growing consciousness for global issues in the 1980ies, an intensification of the movements was visible the past years in the context of the financial crisis and the crisis of authoritarianism in the Middle East. It needs to be recorded that not everyone participating in such movements is a cosmopolitan, many opponents of globalization share a common cause with groups advocating for a return to the nation-state and are more associated with identity politics. *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 92f.

[164] Ibid., 90–93.

> "The new type of war economy is almost totally the opposite. The new wars are 'globalized' wars. They involve the fragmentation and decentralization of the state. Participation is low relative to the population both because of lack of pay and because of lack of legitimacy on the part of the warring parties. There is very little domestic production, so the war effort is heavily dependent on local predation and external support. Battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians, and cooperation between warring factions is common."[165]

It's the underlying vested interest in the political and economic sphere, which continues the war.[166] When these wars are perceived in traditional Clausewitzean terms, with mainly geopolitical goals, a political solution for conflicts comes to mind, underestimating the economic and political logic of new wars. There is no political solution without addressing the underlaying political, social and economic problems. Some writers, aware of these problems, tend to describe the new violence as anarchy; but their solution simply tries to treat symptoms with humanitarian assistance and is not tackling the foundation. The problem with such well-meaning efforts is that they sometimes contribute to keeping the war economy alive and enhance the legitimacy of the warring parties. Though economy, like war, is a social activity it is necessary to look at who is fighting and profiting from the new wars, to get a better understanding of the vested interests.

3.2.2.1 The New Fighters. Privatizing the Military

The situation in which the new wars take place is crucial to the question of who is fighting in them. Mainly fought in countries with a weak or non-existing central authority, so called "failed states", they reveal the loss of control or fragmentation of the instruments of physical coercion and the uprising of a variety of actors.[167] A disintegrative circle forms: "A downward spiral of loss of revenue and legitimacy, growing disorder, and military fragmentation […]."[168] An ever-growing privatization of violence led to a huge variety of fighting units, a mixture of public and private, state and non-state, or both at the same time. Categorially there are five major groups:

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[165] Ibid., 94.

[166] For David Keen the economic perspective is the prime mover for wars. See: *Keen* David, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. In: Adelphi Papers 38th, 320.

[167] Arguable, especially for African states, is that some nations never had any state sovereignty in the modern sense, the "unquestioned physical control over the defined territory, but also an administrative presence throughout the country and the allegiance of the population to the idea of the state." *Daase* Christopher, Kleine Kriege, Grosse Wirkung: Wie Unkonventionelle Kriegführung die Internationale Politik Verändert. (Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert Bd. 2, 1. Aufl, Baden-Baden 1999) ; *Herbst* Jeffrey, Responding to State Failure in Africa. In: International Security 21st, 3 (1997) 120–144. ; qutoed in: *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 96; *Münkler* Herfried, Die Neuen Kriege. (rororo sachbuch 61653, 6. Auflage, Reinbek bei Hamburg 2015) ; *van Creveld*, Transformation.

[168] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 96.

regular armed forces or remnants thereof[169]; paramilitary groups[170]; self-defence units[171]; foreign mercenaries[172]; and regular foreign troops[173].

Except for regular foreign troops, the units in new wars have a small-scale war character more associated with guerrilla warfare. Their lack of hierarchical structures and vertical command systems complicates their cooperation.

> "What appear to be armies are actually horizontal coalitions of breakaway units from regular armed forces, local militia or self-defence units, criminal gangs, groups of fanatics, and hangers-on, who have negotiated partnerships, common projects, divisions of labour or spoils."[174]

Is this applicable to conflicts? The cases of Afghanistan and Iraq showed that those wars were mainly fought by networks of state and non-state actors, categorizable in three main groups: insurgents, autonomous militias, and coalition and government forces. There appears to be big differences to former times, for the insurgents it was their formation as social movements and not as

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[169] In the environment of spending cuts military capacities in many countries are in decline. So, many of the young men look around for other income sources, a consequence is the breakup of the military hierarchy. This can evolve to situations where the military system fragments and local army commandants soar up as, in a vague sense, warlords. Fragmentation leads to competition for resources between military units, intensified by the fact that many security apparatuses of regimes were already divided as a follow up of mistrust and power sharing. In many cases authoritarian rulers only have direct power over a small contingent of troops, like a presidential guard, but due to their exclusive access to resources they are the best equipped and trained forces. On the individual level a soldier's income may be boosted by criminal activity. The main consequence is that the regular armed forces lose their legitimacy as the rightful bearers of arms, up to a point where the distinction to paramilitary units becomes hardly traceable. Ibid., 96f.

[170] The most common fighting units in new wars are autonomous gangs of armed men often centred around an individual leader. In many cases they are established by governments to do the "dirty work" and cement the status quo, while maintaining a sense of distance from the extreme forms of violence used. Commonly they are associated with particular extremist parties or political factions. Their composition mostly includes redundant army units or defected soldiers; joined by common criminals, sometimes deliberately released from prisons for this purpose, or recruits were found among the many unemployed. But their most gruesome recruitment pool are children; regularly found in African conflicts, but unfortunately a global phenomenon. In most instances these units replaced uniforms with symbols of the global material culture, like jogging suits or wearing a certain brand; it complicates the distinguishing process to non-combatants. Ibid., 97–99.; *Eppler* Erhard, Vom Gewaltmonopol zum Gewaltmarkt? Die Privatisierung und Kommerzialisierung der Gewalt. (1. Aufl., Originalausg, Frankfurt am Main 2002) ; *Russmann* Paul, Kindersoldaten. In: Der Bürger im Staat 54th, 4 (2004) 205–209.

[171] To defend their localities some inhabitants join their forces. Their major problem in many occasions is inadequate funding and in consequence their inability to sustain themselves. This makes them vulnerable and quite often their only chance to survive is cooperation with others, e.g. paramilitary, groups. *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 99.

[172] No new feature in war, but in contemporary conflicts experiencing a somehow renaissance, are (foreign) mercenaries. In a way to positively rebrand their business they now call themselves private security companies. They are normally engaged by governments or multinational companies for a variety of tasks, with emphasis laid upon personal and infrastructure security. Money is not the only reason for foreign fighters to join conflicts, jihadist have a similar recruitment method but offer the possibility of life in paradise instead. For an overview of topics concerned with private security companies see: Ibid., 99f.; *Chesterman* Simon, *Lehnardt* Chia (eds.), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies. (Oxford, UK ; New York, NY 2007).

[173] Usually sent with the mandate of an international organization. Their sphere of activity is highly regulated through the mandate they receive; in general, they mainly focus on peacekeeping, though not seeking to participate in combat. *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 100.

[174] Ibid., 101.

vertically organized guerrilla forces, the coalition forces on the other side had a high degree of private security contractors, establishing a hybrid network; in both countries involving ordinary criminals, in Afghanistan it was drug and in Iraq oil revenue that attracted them. An additional force in both wars was the affiliation of Al Qaeda.[175]

In Syria, the actors resemble this ideal description. The reorganisation, through budget cuts, of the Syrian army under Bashar provided only loyal troops with sufficient funding; these were the ones who got deployed first and the most often. Support to fight the war was provided by paramilitary groups and self-defence units, internal[176] and external[177]. On side of the opposition a variety of militias and self-defence units are fighting; partly formed by defected soldiers, situated on a wide scale of views. The broad variety of actors attracted international mercenaries and Jihadists to Syria; who are partly "employed" by one of the many foreign states involved in the conflict.

3.2.2.2 Fighting in the New Wars. Violence is the Means

Lacking the necessary resources, cost, logistics, infrastructure, and skills, the new "armies" hardly use heavy weapons; where they are used, they have devastating effects. But in most instances light weapons are preferred, often described as "low-tech", indeed they are a product of a long and sophisticated development process. The spread of such weapons, on the one hand can be explained with the surplus of weapons available from stockpiles of the cold war arsenals; on the other hand arms enterprises, having lost state markets, find profit compensation in these new demand markets. Additionally, the communications revolution made coordination between the different units easier. In the last decades new tactics were developed as well, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or suicide bombers.

This equipment situation is the starting point for the adaption of tactics of Revolutionary Warfare[178], as promoted by Mao Tse-tung or Che Guevarra.[179] Their success highly depends on the

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[175] For an in depth overview of participating parties see: Ibid., 161–164.

[176] The Shabiha is the most feared acting on behalf of the regime.

[177] Hezbollah or different Iraqi Shia militias.

[178] *Sarkesian* Sam C. (ed.), Revolutionary guerrilla warfare. (Chicago, IL 1975).

[179] Their tactics were designed to avoid battle with large conventional forces. Central to revolutionary warfare is the winning of the heart and minds of the population, or to gain territory by popular support and not winning it in battles. Basic elements are surprise and mobility. The remote areas of a country host their operational camps, from where they set stitches, recently embodied by suicide bombers or other forms of terrorist attacks. Yassef Saadi, part of the FLN in Algiers said after his arrest: "I had my bombs planted in the city because I didn't have the aircraft to transport them. But they caused fewer victims than the artillery and air bombardments of our mountain village. I'm in war, you cannot blame me." quoted in: *Trinquier* Roger, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era, Westport, CT 2006) 21.

support of the local population, in their "own" territory and in the territory under the enemy's control. The strategy developed against that type of warfare was counterinsurgency, classified in a direct and indirect approach.[180] Until today the direct approach experienced adaption, e.g. in South America where it first was exported to, or in more contemporary times by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The methods, aims, and ideas of new wars borrow from Revolutionary Warfare and counter-insurgency theories. Their strategy of controlling the territory through the population, is as crucial as in Revolutionary Warfare; another feature is the avoidance of battles. In many occasions the different factions cooperate in dividing up the territory. It is the method of political control in which revolutionaries and the new warriors contrast the most. For revolutionaries building model societies in territories under their control is elemental, to provide a countermodel of governance. The new warriors instead establish political control through their particular label; in a demand for a homogenous population based on an identity. Anyone not matching this label needs to be eliminated.

This explains why the main method of territorial control in new wars is population displacement; more cynically expressed, the aim is to get rid of one's opponents by any means. Instead of withdrawing the support of the population for the insurgents, the new warriors try to create an unfavourable environment for the people they cannot control. Control depends on continuing fear and insecurity and the perpetuation of hatred of others. Furthermore, the biggest involvement in the committed atrocities is needed to sustain the power through a shared complicity in crime. The techniques of population displacement can be categorized in three groups. Firstly, systematic murder of those labelled different. Secondly, ethnic cleansing in the form of forcible population expulsion. Lastly, rendering an area uninhabitable; either physically, by scattering mines or bombing civilian targets, or economically, by depriving people of the possibility to make a living. Further, psychological pressure is put upon the people by instilling unbearable memories of what once was home, this can be accompanied by the physical destruction of the historical and

[180] The indirect approach aims to win the hearts and minds of the population through good governance and effective security. The direct approach seeks a military solution to destroy the insurgent organization. It is characterised by forcible replacement, destruction of whole areas and villages, and regional and countrywide military operations. The theoretical framework is provided by Roger Trinquier and consists following features: the build-up of an inhabitants self-defence organisation providing the army/security forces with intelligence about the insurgents, a comprehensive network of military outpost for surveillance of the population, and a political component consisting of justifying the used methods to the population and to proclaim a state of exception to legitimize the use of extreme force, among them torture and arrests without warrants. In Algeria he proofed the effectiveness of his thinking; during the battle of Algiers 1954. See: *Chenoweth* Erica, *Pinckney* Jonathan, *Wright* James, Insurgency. In: *Wright*, James, International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Amsterdam [2], 2015) 221–227.; *Horne* Alistair, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962. (London, UK 1977) ; *Trinquier*, Modern Warfare.

cultural heritage of other identities. On an individual level physical destruction appears in the forms of systematic rape or sexual abuse.[181]

What unites the methods of population control are their violation of international law. The once considered undesirable and illegitimate side-effects of old wars have become the main methods of the new wars. For Kaldor, it is neither primitivism returning to the battlefields, nor that these wars lack any kind of rationality, as they "[…] apply rational thinking to the aims of war and refuse normative constraints."[182] Contrary is the thinking of the proponents[183] of the "barbarism thesis", the gruesomeness of today's conflicts arises out of the irrationality and existential warfare.

These new patterns of violence directed against civilians[184], are supported by data. [185] There is general agreement about a decline of battle-related deaths to overall deaths in conflict, or the number of military and civilian casualties in direct fire of the warring parties is tiny compared to the numbers killed by so-called one-sided violence against civilians and other war related deaths.[186] The greater debate in this context is about the accuracy of the data.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as fought by the coalition forces contributed as a main factor to the use of violence by the other side. In their attempt to crush the insurgency old war tactics were

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[181] *Heupel* Monika, *Zangl* Bernhard, Von „Alten" und „Neuen" Kriegen - Zum Gestaltwandel Kriegerischer Gewalt. In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 45th, 3 (2004) 346–369.; *Münkler*, Neuen Kriege.

[182] *Daase* Christopher, *Hasse* Jana, *Hasse-Müller-Schneider* (eds.), Das Humanitäre Völkerrecht und der Wandel des Krieges. In: Humanitäres Völkerrecht: politische, rechtliche und strafgerichtliche Dimensionen (Demokratie, Sicherheit, Frieden Frieden durch Recht 133 1, Baden-Baden 2001) 132–157.; *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 106; *Münkler* Herfried, Der Wandel des Krieges: Von der Symmetrie zur Asymmetrie. (2. Aufl, Weilerswist 2006) ; *Münkler*, Neuen Kriege.

[183] *Holsti* K. J., The State, War, and the State of War. (Cambridge studies in international relations 51, Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY 1996) ; *Kaplan* Robert D., The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War. (1st Vintage Books ed, New York, NY 2001) ; quoted in: *Mello*, Search of New Wars. 299; *van Creveld*, Transformation.

[184] *Münkler* Herfried, *Geis* Anna (ed.), Was ist Neu an den Neuen Kriegen? - Eine Erwiderung auf die Kritiker. In: Den Krieg überdenken: Kriegsbegriffe und Kriegstheorien in der Kontroverse (Schriftenreihe der Sektion Politische Theorien und Ideengeschichte in der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft Bd. 6, Baden-Baden 2006) 133–147.

[185] There is evidence that population displacement is used as a weapon of choice in the new conflicts. The long-term figures, according to UNHCR, generally show an increase in the overall numbers of registered refugees. In 1975 2.4 million people were refugees. The number rose to 10.5 million in 1985 and 14.4 million in 1995, a decrease, due to an intensified repatriation, to 9.6 million in 2004 is observable. Followed by an increase to 15.4 million in 2010 and to 19.9 million in 2017. These are just the figures for refugees, crossing international borders, and do not include internally displaced persons (IDPs). These figures according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) generally increased as well, from 17 million in 1998 to 27.5 million in 2010 and to 39.9 million in 2017. *Smawfield* Matthew, *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, UNHCR Statistics - The World in Numbers., online at: <http://popstats.unhcr.org> (2019).; *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, Global Report 2017. (2017) ; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre., online at: <http://www.internal-displacement.org/> (22.5.2019).

[186] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 106; *Lacina* Bethany, *Gleditsch* Nils Petter, Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths. In: European Journal of Population / Revue européenne de Démographie 21st, 2–3 (2005) 145–166.

used by the military, staying in its bases and venturing out to attack the enemy. It is nearly impossible to win the hearts and minds of the population when their only contact with the forces consists of raids, arrests and torture. An emphasis by the commanding officers is laid on kill-or-capture missions, trying to limit civilian casualties. These operations proofed efficient, hundreds of insurgents were captured, killed or fled, but the coalition forces were unable, or did not even try, to defeat the insurgent's organization. Captured commanders of the insurgents got replaced by newer, mostly more radical, brutal and less locally rooted ones, fuelling the spiral of violence. The example of Afghanistan showed that:

> "It is the continuing military attacks, the night raids, and the detention of young men, where their dignity is undermined and where they often get recruited to armed groups, that contribute to and/or provide a justification for the intensification of other attacks by the Taliban or by local warlords."[187]

But how did these new recruits fight? In both wars, Afghanistan and Iraq, the insurgents used methods associated with new wars. Through fear and intimidation, they tried to control the population, neighbourhood by neighbourhood. In the case of Iraq sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing intensified after 2005.[188] This contributed to the establishment of a shadow market in control of the new fighters, in what can be described as a toxic mixture of politics and criminal activities.

In Afghanistan small groups of insurgents, mainly Taliban, crossed the border from Pakistan to collect taxes or donations from people. In some cases, they worked as mobile courts and hired the clergies, which was quite essential in rural parts of the country where no central authority was present. The people of the local communities in opposition to the Taliban got killed or expelled, sometimes helped by criminals who only got freed for the purpose of destabilizing societies. In a last step the Taliban constructed a shadow administration with parallel structures to the state, up to the level of governors. Favoured by the Taliban to spread fear were the use of suicide bombers, targeted killings, explosives and the recruitment of children.

In both wars the main victims were civilians, killed as collateral damage of the coalition forces, in insurgent attacks and ambushes on the coalition forces, as victims of human rights violations and ethnic cleansing in the efforts of the warring parties to control the population. An instance that shows that civilians as victims are still underrepresented in the perception of warfare from

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[187] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 169.

[188] Sunni radicals bombed Shi'ite areas and monuments, many times in suicide attacks, the Shi'ites preferred death squads to liquidate Sunni leaders and to take control of areas by expelling residents. First, they seized the Sunni properties and then either rented them to Shi'ites or looted them. To fasten their grip on the areas the militia extorted money from local merchants and infiltrated, co-opted or replaced the local police. In Iraq essential was control over petrol stations and products related to crude oil, like petrol or kerosene. Ibid., 169f.

policy makers is that there are no accurate data about the total number of dead civilians in both conflicts.[189]

Civilians being the main victims is also true in the Syrian case. As the fighting actors try to control the population and avoid battle; this shows in the excessive use of the proposed techniques in new wars. Massacres, population expulsion, bombing areas until they become uninhabitable, propaganda, the destruction of cultural heritage, rape and other forms of abuse are part, and sometimes aim, of the conflict. Throughout the country, networks of cooperation established between actors generating a comforting environment for the committers of atrocities. As proposed heavy weapons, when used, made a difference; most exemplified in the shattering of cities, done by aircraft, missiles and artillery; when the funding for heavy weapons was missing by mortars, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or suicide bombers.

3.2.2.3 Financing the New Wars. Who Pays the Piper Plays the Tune

In the framework of extreme globalization where "[t]erritorially based production more or less collapses […]"[190], contributed to by liberalization, the withdrawal of state support or physical destruction, markets got cut off by the disintegration of the state, fighting or sanctions and blockades are imposed by outside powers or units on the ground; spare parts, raw materials or fuel are hard to acquire. Where it is possible the production of luxury commodities, e.g. oil or diamonds, continues as a source of income for the ones protecting it. The unemployment rate is very high and if the government continues spending money inflation skyrockets, in extreme cases leading to the collapse of currencies. The downfall of production and difficulties in collecting shrink the tax base, forcing governments and privatized military groups to seek alternative sources of funding to sustain their violent activities. Their main sources are either external assistance[191], or what

[189] Ibid., 169–172.

[190] Ibid., 108.

[191] There are four forms of external assistance. Firstly, are remittances from abroad to individual families, that money can be converted in commodities via asset transfers. Secondly, direct assistance from the diaspora living abroad, this includes money or material assistance. Thirdly, assistance from foreign governments. Fourthly, humanitarian assistance can be diverted in many ways by governments or other warring factions. Ibid., 108.

Mark Duffield calls "asset transfer"[192], the redistribution of existing resources to favour fighting units; either as money transfer or imported goods.[193]

Fragmentation and informalization appears as the national formal economies get replaced by "[…] a new type of globalized informal economy […] in which external flows […] are integrated into a local and regional economy based on asset transfer and extra-legal trading."[194] What does a typical model of resource flow look like in the new wars? The assumption is that there is neither production nor taxation, or that both merely exist on a very small scale. Instead the external support of ordinary people is recycled for military resources, via asset transfer and black-market trading. Additionally, the income from direct assistance by foreign governments, protection money and assistance from the diaspora enhance the capabilities of the fighting units to exploit the population and sustain their military efforts. To no surprise there are many cases of economic cooperation between the different fighting units.

[192] These "transfers" can take direct forms like looting, robbery, extortion, pillage or hostage-taking. Or indirect forms, like market pressure. At numerous checkpoints the fighting units control the supply of food and necessities. While splitting up the territories between factions, they effectively share the power to control the market prices in their own. "War taxes" and "protection" money from the production of primary commodities and various forms of illegal trading build a third big pillar of asset transfers. Though they need a higher degree of organization, for sanction-busting and smuggling, their possible huge revenues contributed to their popularity among various military groups. *Duffield* Mark R, *Macrae* Joanna, *Zwi* Anthony B. (eds.), The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies and International Aid. In: War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies (London, UK ; Atlantic Highlands, NJ 1994). quoted in: *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 108.

[193] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 109f; *Jean* François, *Rufin* Jean-Christophe (eds.), Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege. (1. Aufl, Hamburg 1999).

[194] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 110.



Figure 1: Resource flows in new wars[195]

The debate in the scholarly world about the economic motivation in new wars is discussing greed versus grievance.[196] David Keen arguments that there is a rationality behind the exploitation on unarmed civilians for monetary gain, instead of risking death for a bigger idea, like a nation-state.[197] But is it economic motivation alone that can explain the scale, brutality and viciousness of the new wars?

> "No doubt some join the fighting as a way of legitimizing criminal activities, providing a political justification for what they do and socially sanctioning otherwise illegal methods of financial gain. No doubt there are others – rational power-seekers, extreme fanatics or victims intent on revenge – who engage in criminal activities to sustain their political military goals. Yet others are press-ganged into the fighting, propelled by fear and hunger."

All this happens in the breaking down of the dialectic of political and economic, private and public and military and civil.

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[195] Ibid., 111.

[196] *Collier* P., *Hoeffler* Anke, Greed and Grievance in Civil War. In: Oxford Economic Papers 56th, 4 (2004) 563–595. ; quoted in: *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 113; *Berdal* Mats R., *Malone* David, *International Peace Academy* (eds.), Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. (Boulder, CO 2000).

[197] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 113; *Keen* David, When War Itself is Privatized. In: The Times Literary Supplement (1995).

> "Political control is required to embed the new coercive forms of economic exchange, which in turn are required to provide a viable financial basis for the new gangsters/powerholders in the context of state disintegration and economic marginalisation. A new retrograde set of social relationships is being established in which economics and violence are deeply intertwined within the shared framework of identity politics." [198]

The interplay of these factors lets us categorize the new type of warfare as a predatory social condition.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, the insurgents, besides receiving external assistance, relied on one additional major source of revenue: drugs and oil. Iraq was an oil war in the sense that the oil rents contributed to the fighting and in many cases access to such rents became the main motivation for fighting.[199] Afghanistan supplies the world with over 90 per-cent of the poppy used for the production of heroine.[200] In both cases, besides the main sources of income, drugs and oil, a variety of other criminal activities contributed to the 'insurgents abilities to wage war against the coalition forces; in many cases the revenues even became their main aim.[201]

In Syria the framework of extreme globalization was already establishing itself, when the conflict hit the country even harder. The neo-liberal liberalization reforms of Bashar al-Assad laid the fundament for a pullback of state and party institutions, in times of an already rising unemployment rate and growing dissatisfaction with the regime. The introduction of a globalized informal economy, and its legitimation of criminal behaviour only accelerated. This of course is influenced by regional differences. The many forms of direct and indirect asset transfers are practised throughout the country and by every party involved. But the main driver that makes this conflict last for such an absurdly long time is external assistance in all its varieties; money, from an increasing number of refugees in the diaspora, foreign sponsors, goods, mostly arms; providing the opposition with a gigantic amount of weapons was just one reason that they switched their strategy to violence.

3.2.2.4 It is a Bigger Problem. Proximity Factors of New Wars

Unlike people or goods, it is nearly impossible to control the spread of a social condition. This implies that neighbouring countries are most effected by a spill-over effect of wars, but they are

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[198] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 113.

[199] *Kaldor* Mary, *Karl* Terry Lynn, *Said* Yahia (eds.), Oil Wars. (London, UK 2007).

[200] *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018. (2018), online at: <https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2018.pdf> (6.2.2019).

[201] *Kaldor*, New and Old wars. 172–175

not the only ones. The refugee situation affects them, also the loss of trade and production, due to blockades and sanctions. They are key factors in the black-market structures, and sometimes as host for minorities who are part of the conflict as targets of the identity politics introduced.[202] Refugees have a big impact on these countries as well. They are an enormous economic burden for the, mostly already, poor countries, additionally they are a permanent source for tensions; economically by competing with the host population for resources, politically as pressure group on the host governments to take action so they can return, and for security reasons because refugee camps are often used as recruitment grounds for various radical factions. As hubs, neighbouring countries, play a crucial role in the establishment and spread of the war economy. The vanishing of legal trade opportunities leads to illegal circuits of trades, as the potential markets for the traded goods, e.g. drugs or diamonds, lay on the other side of the border. The new identity politics has the same tendency to spread transnationally, as identity-based groups usually already live across borders; a majority in one country is a minority in another, this heterogeneity of identities marks the opportunity to promote various forms of exclusivism.[203]

Syria, before its own war, witnessed how violence can spread to neighbouring countries. The years prior the turmoil it saw an inflow of refugees from the many conflicts of the region; hosting Palestinians for a longer time and Iraqi refugees from the 2003 conflict and the following civil war. Eight years into the conflict and the words Syria and refugees have another connotation entirely; as nearly a fourth of the population is registered as refugees, many hosted by the neighbouring countries Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. But not only refugees left Syria, foreign fighters found their way in via the bordering countries as well. These countries further play a crucial part by being the contact points for legal and illegal trade in Syria. The often-exploited animosities between Sunnis and Shia experienced a renaissance during the Iraq civil war, spread by extremist's propaganda via cable tv to the Arab speaking world. A breeding ground of hate wilfully exploited by a variety of actors in Syria.

3.2.3 The Historico-Political Discourse and New Wars

Now having an idea of Mary Kaldor's theory, how does Foucault fit in? In that regard the changing character of statehood in the globalization era is crucial.

[202]The NGO Saferworld has calculated the cost of conflicts on neighbouring states in many cases, e.g. Mozambique, or the Balkans, see: Saferworld., online at: <https://www.saferworld.org.uk/> (24.5.2019).

[203] *Kaldor,* New and Old wars. 113–116.

Regarding globalization and its consequences - economic, political and social - generating a new transnational elite, with a new clerisy, reminiscenting the intellectual elite, Foucault described, who started the historico-political discourse. This is the most important point discussing new wars and Foucault. The erosion of the state and its beginning disbanding into new agencies of power has the quality to bring back day-to-day violence, from the frontiers into society just transferring the historico-political discourse to a new time; but it further has the quality to bring back a debate if we accept the historico-political discourse, and with it war as *the* social activity, as a whole. Exemplified by Kaldor's view on what to expect: Either particularism, as continuation of historicism, or cosmopolitism, as a return to a philosophico-juridical worldview.

Identity politics is just another form of justification for Foucault's perpetual war. The development of these politics, the growing impotence of the ruling political classes and the growing importance of parallel markets and its profiteers. Their docking to nationalisms as continuation with the past, or their turning to particularities, created a new truth for their side. For Kaldor it is not a throwback to pre-modern identities, but a contemporary phenomenon rising with the erosion of the states; in a Foucauldian sense these identities are the continuing narrative in the new principle of history to continue, the underlying theme of society, binary warfare and therefore cannot be called something new. But the erosion of the monopoly on violence brings a new quality to change the discourse, as for the first time the big enabler of the historico-political discourse, the consolidation of the nation state, starts to disappear.

In the new wars economy Foucault's ideas helped for a better understanding of the how and why. It were the used methods in new wars, displacement and its aim to get rid of the opponent, that match with Foucault's described aim of the perpetual war, the elimination of the subrace; or they are the attempt by the power wielders to continue to impose the historico-political discourse, disguised as war, upon society and its institutions. As there are no neutral subjects, there are also no innocent bystanders, but as long as they are not eliminated the war must continue. This explains the targeting of civilians and the deliberately breaching of international law. It is the return of day-to-day violence partly caused by the fragmentation of militaries and privatization of violence; two tendencies that were present in pre-conflict Syria.

4. Syria

The since March 2011 ongoing conflict in Syria is one of the greatest human catastrophe of the 21st century; until today the estimated death toll passed 500,000, additionally 5.6 million people are registered refugees by the UNHCR and another 6.1 million are believed to be IDPs. In 2013, after two years of conflict, an UN report figured that Syria regressed 40 years of its human development. The indiscriminate bombings and shelling of cities robbed the lives of countless civilians as well as their ways to make a living and critical infrastructure. This intensified the impoverishment, with an estimated 80% of Syrians living in poverty. The lack of medical infrastructure, accompanied by the deliberate bombing of hospitals, brought a comeback of long absent diseases, like measles or typhoid. Overall the life expectancy in Syria dropped from seventy to fifty-five years.[204]

During the course of the war Syria fragmented, where the Syrian regime gave up its positions a varying degree of opposition forces took authority, challenging the regime and each other. That foreign sponsors mainly spent their money along sectarian lines contributed to the perception of the war as primarily fought along religious lines, but at the beginning the demand for the release of political prisoners and reforms were the main driving force for peaceful protesters.

No one believed that what started with small demonstrations in front of the Omari Mosque in Dara'a, after teenaged boys had sprayed an anti-regime slogan and were subsequently arrested and tortured, will become a full-blown civil war. As the demonstrations in Dara'a grew from day to day, the Ides of March 2011 marked the first major gatherings of demonstrators in Damascus and Aleppo. Inspired by the uprisings of the Arab Spring the wall of fear put up by the Assad-Makhlouf clan began to crumble, with people demanding mostly one thing: Freedom.[205] In the

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[204] *Associated Press*, Aid Agencies Slam UN Security Council over Syria., online at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/03/war-plunged-syrians-poverty-150312022852894.html> (21.6.2019).; *Internal Displacement Monitor Centre*, Syria., online at: <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria> (21.6.2019).; *Phillips* Christopher, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East. (1st pbk edt, New Haven, CT 2018) 1.; *The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights*, More than 570 Thousand People were Killed on the Syrian Territory Within 8 Years of Revolution Demanding Freedom, Democracy, Justice, and Equality. The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights. online at: <http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=120851> (21.6.2019).; *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response., online at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria> (21.6.2019).

[205] *BBC*, Mid-East Unrest: Syrian Protests in Damascus and Aleppo, online at: < https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12749674> (21.6.2019) ; *Fahim* Kareem, *Saad* Hwaida, A Faceless Teenage Refugee Who Helped Ignite Syria's War. In: The New York Times (2013) ; *Oweis* Khalid Yacoub, Fear Barrier Crumbles in Syrian 'Kingdom of Silence', online at: < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-fear-idUSTRE72L3ME20110322> (21.6.2019) ; *Public Radio International*, Syria: How it All Began., online at: <https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-04-23/syria-how-it-all-began> (21.6.2019).

current state of the conflict, it seems that the pre 2011 socio-economic and climate background of the conflict have been forgotten.

The grievances of the Syrian population resembled the ones of other countries of the Arab spring, like Egypt, Tunisia or Libya; but why did the situation escalate into a civil war? There are multiple answers to that question, but many are to be found in the regime's decisions, its build-up and the early responses to protesters.

What the Mukhabarat did to the teenage boys because of their graffities was nothing new to Syrians, the big difference was the reaction of their relatives. After days of pleading for the release of the boys, on March 15 they decided to protest at the Omari mosque and where dispersed by live fire, killing four. The following day, at the funeral of the killed, more people gathered to mourn and protest, now with anti-regime slogans and attacking symbols of the hated rulers; this pattern got repeated throughout Syria. On March 23 the regime surrounded the city, cut off its electricity and telecommunication channels; but it was too late messages and more important videos of Dara'a already were spread across the country.

Dara'a were not the first Arab spring inspired protests in Syria, February saw some minor protests in Qamishli, Damascus, and other cities. What made Dara'a an unique case were not the grievances brought up; it was poor and agrarian, it suffered under the neo-liberal reforms and the impacts of the drought, additionally it was relatively homogenous Sunni and tribal, while the head of the Mukhabarat was an Alawi outsider. It was the indiscriminately killing of protesters that somehow made Dara'a an unique case, while in places like Qamishli or Damascus arrests were done. As the news of the murders spread across the country so did protests; on March 18 Homs, Banias and parts of Damascus protested, followed by Latakia, Tartous, Idlib, Qamishli, Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa and Hama on April 8. The protests were united and inspired by the Arab spring and the long-standing economic and political marginalisation, but from the beginning local motivations were a high recruitment factor, but still a majority of Syrians did not join. From the start the protests were an illusion. What looked like a national uprising were local grievances expressed in a political climate where the regime, as many others in the region, feared to lose control of the people. Additionally, the regime's structure, its *divide et impera* policies and coup proofing, worked very different than the set ups in Egypt, Tunisia, or Libya.[206]

It was the proposed set up of Kaldor's new wars that made Syria an interesting case for testing. The opening up of an authoritarian state, in this example Bashar al-Assad liberalization reforms,

[206] *Droz-Vincent* Philippe, "State of Barbary" (Take Two): From the Arab Spring to the Return of Violence in Syria. In: The Middle East Journal 68th, 1 (2014) 33–58. ; *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 48–50.

accelerated the decline of traditional power bases. Which further intensified the daily struggle for survival of many Syrians, whom started to protest on the streets. After the intimidation campaign of the protests was successful by the regime, a narrative of war replaced the hopes of the people for change. The crusade of violence that evolved needed fighters, financing and a political legitimization strategy; a strategy that did start with the arrival of European colonial powers superseding the political and social practices of the Ottoman Empire.

4.1 New Wars Politics in Syria: Background of the Conflict

While hosting two of the oldest continuously inhabited cities, Damascus and Aleppo, the history of the modern state of Syria starts with its independence in 1946. The people of the MENA-Region saw a variety of empires deciding their fate.[207] The root for the struggles started in the final days of the Ottoman Empire as the colonial powers France and Great Britain drew artificial borders across the region.[208]

The heterogeneity of the population echoes in the different religions practiced and founded in the Middle East; their geographical division in Syria, with many sects living in remote defensible areas[209], is still a reminder of the Ottoman Empire and the periodical prosecution of non-Sunni Muslim sects. A majority of 87 percent of the population are Muslim, with Sunnis representing 74 percent and Alawi, Ismaili and Shia 13 percent; ten percent are Christian, Orthodox, Uniate

[207] But they were only seldomly given the right of an opinion and when voiced they just were ignored. An example for this is the King-Crane Commission established during the Paris Peace Talks by US President Woodrow Wilson. From the beginning it was meant to fail as other negotiating parties, to highlight France and Britain, withdrew from the Commission. An excellent overview is presented by: *Patrick* Andrew, America's Forgotten Middle East Initiative: The King-Crane Commission of 1919. (International Llibrary of Twentieth Century History 80, London, UK 2015).

[208] Ties, established over centuries, were cut between interest spheres of foreign powers; ancient trade routes, connecting oasis of human prosperity in the desert, from Mosul to the Mediterranean Sea, were now divided by the borders of three new states; but also within the new mandates the administrative boundaries destroyed long term relationships, as Beirut, Damascus' former main port, became the capital of a new administrative unit, Lebanon. The population of the territory of today's Syria reflects the diverse history of the Levante; with 90 percent Arabic is the main language, the other ten percent are Kurdish speaking, further exist tiny enclaves of Turkmen and Aramaic speakers among others. *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 10f.

[209] The coastal western mountains are Alawi dominated, the mountains in the south have the highest population of Druze; other Shia sects were isolated in remote villages. The Christians lived as second-class citizens under the Ottomans, but prosecution was hardly against them and they thrived in certain businesses in the cities. See: *Abboud* Samer Nassif, Syria. (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA 2015) ; *Batatu* Hanna, Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics. (Princeton, NJ 1999).

and Nestorian; three percent are Druze; and there are few remaining Jews in Damascus and Aleppo.[210] This presents a formidable breeding ground for the exploitation of sectarianism.

The time of the French mandate[211] marked the start of pitting the different sects against each other. The biggest impact on the French attitude towards Syria had the revolt of 1925.[212] "As their knowledge of Syria became more complete, however, the French launched a policy of satisfying different interest groups which met with varying degrees of success."[213] The Millet system, for centuries regulating society and defying the status of a subject, got replaced by the Western idea of Syrian citizenship. [214] This was the time when the sects became politicized by the elites, either in Arab nationalism or pan-Syrianism, ultimately united in the wish for independence from the French. Only over time a sense of a Syrian nation developed, but it was always overshadowed by encouraging different sects.[215] In this unstable environment "[t]he French left a weak parliamentary system and a powerful military that swiftly undermined it."[216]

After Syria's independence national politics solidified, but it was far from being a stable country. Between 1949 and 1970 the Syrian population witnessed eight successful coups, partly explainable by the powerful politized military. An inheritance of the French mandate was a high degree of minorities within the army. Syrians and especially minorities were open for parties with an in-

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[210] *Central Intelligence Agency*, Middle East : Syria - The World Factbook -., online at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html#Econ> (21.6.2019).

[211] *Fieldhouse* D. K., Western Imperalism in the Middle East 1914-1958. (Oxford, UK ; New York, NY 2006) ; *Khoury* Philip Shukry, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945. (Princeton, NJ 2016).

[212] The revolt of 1925 was by far not a nationalist uprising by all the Syrian people, it was a localised power struggle between different groups with just one common goal, the French must go. As an outcome of the failed revolution the local power structures were even more undermined by the colonial power. All it helped was the understanding by the French of the Syrian society and their pacification of the mandate "[b]y balancing interests, making moderate concessions, and inaugurating political reforms […]." *Bou-Nacklie* N.E., Tumult in Syria's Hama in 1925: The Failure of a Revolt. In: Journal of Contemporary History 33rd, 2 (1998) 273–289. ; *Miller* Joyce Laverty, The Syrian Revolt of 1925. In: International Journal of Middle East Studies 8th, 4 (1977) 545–563. 549.

[213] *Miller*, Syrian Revolt. 550.

[214] *Abu Jaber* Kamel S., The Millet System in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire. In: The Muslim World 57th, 3 (1967) 212–223. ; *Lefèvre* Raphaël, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. (New York, NY 2013) 13f.

[215] *Gelvin* James L, Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire. (Berkeley, CA 1998) 51–86.; *Neep* Daniel, Occupying Syria Under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation. (Cambridge Middle East Studies, Cambridge, UK 2012) 20–39.; *Phillips* Christopher, Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria. In: Third World Quarterly 36th, 2 (2015) 357–376. 363f.; *White* Benjamin Thomas, *Eskind Biomedical Library*, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria. (Edinburgh 2012) 44, 112.

[216] *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 11.

clusive ideological agenda and national election platforms. The parties of the old elites got replaced by new ones, such as the Ba'ath party[217] with a national populist language. Under the surface of nationalist chatter, sub-state ties of sect, tribe or region continued. That high rank Alawis in the Ba'ath party, like Hafez al-Assad, set up sect-based networks to gain power was in the end out of opportunism, and not sectarian prejudices. Now that minorities possessed the most powerful positions of the state a "fear of sectarianism" emerged.[218] "While a national political consciousness may have developed, it interacted with and was conscious of a developing politicised sect identity."[219] This process, of minorities getting into power, started in 1963 when Ba'ath seized power and climaxed in November 1970 when Hafez Al-Assad became president.[220]

4.1.1 Hafez's Authoritarianism: Stabilize the Country, Get Rid of Your Opponents, Build a Power Base and Coup Proof Your Regime

Hafez al-Assad knew he had to restructure the country, if he wants to stay in power. He built institutions to ensure the support of the people, while simultaneously tighten the state's grip on them. Through a heavily controlled economy, by providing jobs and subsidies, he built a bond with peasants and workers. In his socialism Hafez al-Assad was not as radical as his predecessors, which gained him the support from many within the merchant class; an example of balancing the different interests in his country, from patronising key tribal leaders to co-operation with trade unions.[221]

From the beginning Hafez al-Assad cemented his presidency in two ideas: "[T]he first was that he would allow no challenge to his rule, the second that wide popular backing for his policies

[217] The "Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Syria Region", as it is called since 1966 when the Military Committee took power, understands itself as anti-imperialist, Arab nationalist, anti-Zionist, pan-Arabic and new-Ba'athist. *The Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party National Leadership*, The Constitution Of The Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party., online at: <http://www.baath-party.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=307&Itemid=327&lang=en> (23.6.2019).

[218] *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 364; *van Dam* Nikolaos, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba'th Party. (London, UK ; New York, NY 1996) 29.

[219] *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 365.

[220] *Seale* Patrick, Asad - The Struggle for the Middle East. (Berkeley, CA 1989) 162–164.

[221] *Abboud*, Syria. ; *Alianak* Sonia, Middle Eastern Leaders and Islam: A Precarious Equilibrium. (Studies in international relations 2, New York, NY 2007) 127–148.; *Freedman* Robert Owen, *Baltimore Hebrew University, Center for the Study of Israel and the Contemporary Middle East*, The Middle East Enters the Twenty-First Century. (Gainesville, FL 2002) 179.; *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 11f; *Seale*, Asad. ; *Reich* Bernard (ed.), Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary. (New York, NY 1990) 51–64.

was nevertheless necessary."[222] After eliminating the support of his challengers at the base, he started to convert[223] the country to strengthen his hold on power.

He transformed the presidency from a solemnly representative position into a powerhouse. Syria transmuted into a country where Hafez al-Assad had the final say on everything; fostering nepotism and corruption, as fidelity to the leader was the key feature to keep a high rank job, or a head. High rank Sunnis in his government got their posts mainly because of personal patronage, this further assured that no challengers can rise.[224] He placed himself in the centre of the state, portraying himself as stability factor and creating a cult of personality[225]. As Hafez al-Assad strengthened the presidential authority, formerly important institutions lost their influence.[226] To generate consent for his policies among Syrians he started to promote, a deliberately left ambiguous, Syrian Arab national identity. Developed and passed on to the people through state institutions, education and his personality cult. The ambiguity allowed the different groups in Syria to pick the message suiting them best to support the national idea. [227] A further acceptance was bought by keeping communitarian practices; which were not granted to all groups, e.g. the Kurds. But the legal classification of the subjects continued along religious lines.[228] Overall, he

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[222] *Seale*, Asad. 172.

[223] Hafez al-Assad built a power pyramid. He resided on top, here the general direction of the policies and the questions crucial to the regime, like security, intelligence, military matters or foreign policy, were shaped, "[…] on this uppermost level he possesses sole and undisputed authority." Followed by the unpublicized chiefs of the intelligence and security networks, it is assured that they function independently of each other. On the same level are the Commanders of the elite armed forces, like the Republican Guard, who underpin his power and are the only troops allowed in the capital. They are, like the security and intelligence networks, to a certain degree pluralized, but more importantly they are balanced against each other, so that no new power stronghold can arise. Beneath them, on the third step, is the Ba'ath party Command, a consultative body which oversees the implementation of the policies on the fourth level, the ministers, regional governors, higher bureaucrats and so on. *Batatu*, Syria's Peasantry. 206f; *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 365; *van Dam*, Struggle for Power in Syria. 15.

[224] *Batatu*, Syria's Peasantry. 226.

[225] Just to name a few instances: Pictures of Hafez al-Assad became obligatory in many public places, sometimes with a divine touch. Teachers began the lessons by singing the song "Our Eternal Leader, Hafez Al-Assad". He named places and streets after his family members, and after the death of his mother she sometimes got portrayed with a halo. Syrian officials had to address him as "al-Muqqadas (the sanctified one)". See: *Pipes* Daniel, Syria Beyond the Peace Process. (Policy Papers no. 40, Washington, DC 1996) 15f.

[226] *Hinnebusch* Raymond A., Syria: Revolution From Above. (The Contemporary Middle East 1st, London, UK ; New York, NY 2001) 63–74.; *Seale*, Asad. 173–177; *Reich* (ed.), Political Leaders. 57f.

[227] "Arab nationalism against Israel, Greater Syrian identity to justify military intervention in Lebanon, and Islam after the failed Muslim Brotherhood uprising." *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 365.

[228] *Anderson* J. N. D., The Syrian Law of Personal Status. In: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 17th, 1 (1955) 34–49. ; *Maʿoz* Mosheh, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus. A Polit. Biography. (London, UK 1988) 193.; *Phillips* Christopher, Everyday Arab Identity: The Daily Reproduction of the Arab World. (Routledge studies in Middle Eastern politics 47, New York, NY 2013) 40–48.; *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 365; *Wedeen* Lisa, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria. (Nachdr., Chicago, IL 2007) 1.; *Yildiz* Kerim, *Kurdish Human Rights Project*, The Kurds in Syria: The Forgotten People. (London, UK ; Ann Arbor, MI 2005) 91–93.

demonstrated that he was the only leader of Syria, and everything depended on him, almost regardless of which religion one practiced.

The established wall of fear and Syrian Arab Nationalism were the ideological house in which he gathered the different groups of the country; but the fundament for staying in power was the same as in so many autocratic regimes: the security services, the army, the party and other institutions. He surrounded himself with a circle of privileged individuals, mostly Alawis of his family and clan but, to demonstrate the national idea, also Sunnis, Druze and Christians.

> "Those outside these privileged circles soon learned they could go about their business without undue fear and constraint so long as they accepted that politics was not their domain. In such circumstances the only resource of his opponents was silence or, in the case of the last-ditch enemies like the Muslim Brothers, riot, revolt and assassination."[229]

In this autocratic bargain with the population, Hafez al-Assad established multiple buy-ins for Syrians to be involved in the regime structures. These buy-ins prevented many Syrians to join the uprisings in the early stages.[230] With Hafez al-Assad, a small part of, the Alawi minority became the new ruling elite. But it effected the rest of the Alawi community too; the ones, not in the privileged circles, were encouraged to downplay their cultural separateness, a consequence for example was that the Islam taught in school was Sunni. This provided a sense of superiority for Sunnis; but it also was a contact point for ethnic entrepreneurs, like the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).[231] In general, the life of Alawis at the bottom of society got a bit better, but they were politically as marginalised and oppressed as the other subjects. To better counter eventual rises of Sunnis, the resource distribution was in favour of the Intelligence services. After the "time of trouble" 1976-1982, where Sunni uprising shocked the regime, Sunnis in the military counted

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[229] *Seale*, Asad. 179, 177–179.

[230] Economic benefits are a buy-in for the merchant and middle class. Many in the Syrian middle-class later profited from Bashar al-Assad's neo-liberal economic reforms; infrastructural projects, greater trade and new private schools and universities for the parvenus led to a relatively passiveness of them in the beginning of the conflict. Similar is the situation for the remaining government workers. Patronage is another buy-in, important for the Syrian tribes. Ideology was another key buy-in, after decades of propaganda it sounded reasonable to Syrians that the uprising was started by Western and Israeli-led conspiracies; others still believed in Bashar al-Assad, the reformer. Sect was another buy-in. It was fear and uncertainty of what will follow Assad that tied many Shia and Christian Syrians to the regime, a latent anxiety of Sunni revenge was hammered into the minority's heads via propaganda. Sectarianizing the conflict, and not addressing the social, political and economic grievances, was one of the regime's biggest wins at the start of the conflict. The last buy-in for the regime was the promise of stability; the examples of chaos in Iraq and Lebanon were a good reminder that there is only one guarantee for stability: The Assad's. *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 51f; *Wieland* Carsten, Syria at Bay: Secularism, Islamism and 'Pax Americana'. (London, UK 2006).

[231] *Haddad* Bassam, The Syrian Regime's Business Backbone. In: Middle East Report 42nd, 262 (2012) 26–27. ; *Khatib* Line, Islamic Revivalism in Syria: The Rise and Fall of Ba'thist Secularism. (Routledge studies in political Islam 7, Milton Park, UK ; Abingdon, UK ; New York, NY 2011) ; *Landis* Joshua, Islamic Education in Syria., online at: <http://joshualandis.oucreate.com/Islamic%20Education%20in%20Syria.htm> (26.6.2019).; *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 365f; *Seale*, Asad. 177–179.

less and less, either got replaced by Alawis or in many instances their posts were degraded to a ceremonial nature.[232]

The general significance of sects during the time of Hafez al-Assad is best described with the words of Christopher Phillips: "[The Alawi-Sunni] division should not be overstated" but "[t]he significance of the sect should not be diminished."[233] This shows how paradox the years of Hafez al-Assad were, as sects were officially replaced by an inclusive Syrian Arab nationalist rhetoric; but in reality politicized sect identities were reproduced, either by the regime or its internal and external enemies. Hafez al-Assad accomplished that enough Syrians believed in the inclusivity of the regime or were bound to the regime by one of the many buy-ins.[234] Under Bashar al-Assad another restructuring of the state led to a framework in which the civil war, we witness today, was able to develop.

As proposed in the new wars theory they are framed by authoritarian states opening up to globalization. What Hafez al-Assad established was a power construct with a tight grip of the state on the people; they depended on him to survive. He complied as long as they did not interfere in any political matters. His narrative and the one of the Ba'ath party to stay in power was an inclusivist, forward looking, but deliberately left ambiguous Syrian Arab nationalism, with ever present sub-ties to sects or tribes to summoned for mobilization when needed. Pitting the different sects against each other was by far no invention by Hafez al-Assad; he just further developed the strategies and techniques the French colonial power previously used for control; including a powerful military composed of a high degree of minorities. The French mandate and the post-independence phase marked the beginning of identity ties as a background noise in Syrian political institutions and society.

Combined with Foucault's ideas, it can be argued that the superseding of the Millet system by an European sense of nationalism, shaped by the French colonial power, was the entry point of the historico-political discourse, the thinking that a perpetual, binary race war reigns society, into Syria. In such a constructed framework of prejudices, illusions, lies and subjective truths pitting out different groups became an easy task to remain in power. Hafez al-Assad, after the eight coups that Syria witnessed, was the first who was finally able to consolidate power like the French had been able to, and therefore managed to be in charge of the discourse and institutions.

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[232] *Batatu*, Syria's Peasantry. 226–230; *Hinnebusch*, Revolution. 65f.

[233] *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 48.

[234] *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 366.

His power was built on popular consent, no source of challenge for his power, and subsidies; a basis his son Bashar al-Assad, and globalization, would later challenge.

4.1.2 Bashar al-Assad Takes Office: Globalization Conquered Syria

Hafez al-Assad died on June 10 2000. His initial choice as successor, his son Bassel al-Assad, perished in a car accident in 1994. So, his second son Bashar al-Assad, from 1994 onwards, was built up as heir to the throne. Educated as an ophthalmologist in London, he was pushed through the ranks of the military, was elected president and took over the regime on July 17 2000, at the age of 34.[235] To prevent a power struggle the Ba'ath party and the army accepted this inheritance system; but Bashar al-Assad built his own reformist faction, abandoned Ba'athist ideology and weakened the party's control of the country. An identity vacuum popped up, which soon got filled by neo-liberalism and Islamism.[236]

The domestic and international hopes that he would loosen the tight grip of the regime on the country were soon disappointed. The short time of political liberalization, the so called "Damascus spring"[237], was snuffed out by autumn 2001. Economic reforms were at the heart of Bashar al-Assad's project to "modernize authoritarianism"[238], started by his father and a concept widely spread among leaders in the Middle East at that time.[239] Authoritarian power was used to rigorously liberalize and privatize the economy, shifting the generated assets from the public to crony capitalists in "networks of privilege".[240]

Bashar al-Assad's economic and social reforms were introduced in the spirit of the time: Globalization. They were short term investments with long term costs. Economic liberalization, in the early stages, bound Syria closer to Western Europe, the main trading partner after the fall of the Soviet Union. Bashar al-Assad's foreign policy[241], to back the resistance during the insurgencies

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[235] *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 13f.

[236] *Hinnebusch* Raymond A., Syria: From 'Authoritarian Upgrading' to Revolution? In: International Affairs 80th, 1 (2012) 95–113. 98.

[237] *George* Alan, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom. (London ; New York : New York 2003).

[238] Cit. in: *Hinnebusch*, Syria. 95; *Perthes* Volker, Syria Under Bashar al-Asad: Modernisation and the Limits of Change. (1, 2014).

[239] *King* Stephen J., The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa. (Indiana series in Middle East studies Bloomington, IN 2009) ; *Guazzone* Laura, *Pioppi* Daniela (eds.), The Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalization: The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East. (1st ed, Reading, UK 2009).

[240] *Heydemann* Steven, Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: the Politics of Economic Reform Revisited. (New York, NY 2006).

[241] After succeeding his father, he faced "[…] a confrontation with the neo-conservative administration of US President George W. Bush." Driven by the fear that a successful regime change in Iraq and the establishment of a pro-

in Iraq, came with economic costs. The US imposed sanctions discouraged western investment, a gap that the Arab states, Turkey, Iran, Russia or China were eager to fill; "[N]ew laws liberalized trade and foreign exchange, reduced tax rates, opened most fields to private investment, allowed capital repatriation and relaxed labour protections."[242] More notably among the reforms were the establishment of private banking and a stock exchange. Syria's foreign direct investment (FDI) skyrocketed from $111 million in 2001 to $1.6 billion in 2006.[243] A boom in the tertiary sector in the mid-2000s came at the cost of lower investments in manufacturing and affordable housing, eroding the former base of the regime. The Gulf money's emphasis in luxury, an end of rent controls and a flood of Iraqi and climate refugees out of Syria's rural parts transformed the housing market into a ticking time bomb; families evicted from the properties became homeless, while state owned land was sold cheaply to investors with no intention for affordable housing. [244]

> "In principle, the regime sought a 'middle' way, expanding the private sector while reforming rather than privatizing the public sector, and maintaining social protection during economic liberalization, as embodied in the slogan of the 'social market' economy adopted in 2005."[245]

This strategy was a complete and utter failure; expanding one's power base, in Bashar al-Assad's case a bourgeois merchant class, and trying to satisfy old supporters with less resources, in the end weakened his stand in the country and made him more dependent on the Assad-Makhlouf

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Western government there, could give the US the idea that something similar could be possible in Syria, Bashar al-Assad supported non-state militias in Iraq and made it easier for Jihadists to enter Iraq via Syrian territory. The Bush administration's answer hit the regime hard, in September 2004 UN Resolution 1559 called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops in Lebanon, where Syria still had an estimated 14.000 soldiers and intelligence officers deployed after the Lebanese Civil War. Further sanctions were imposed on Syria, but only after the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri and the huge demonstrations that followed, in April 2005, Syria withdrew its troops. The inflow of weapons and fighters into Iraq continued, the US administration called for a diplomatic boycott of Syria. Facing the cutting of markets and isolation, the regime in Damascus came closer with Iran forming the "Axis of Resistance", including Hezbollah and Hamas, in opposition to Bush's promoted "Axis of Evil". In 2008 the situation started to normalize while many countries, among them Russia, Qatar, Turkey and France, lifted their boycotts. *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 14, 13–15.

[242] *Hinnebusch*, Syria. 100.

[243] The focus of the al-Assad clique laid upon making Syria a centre of banking, tourism and cross-regional trade. Cit. in: Ibid., 100.; *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*, World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services. (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report (WIR) 2006) ; *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*, World Investment Report 2005:Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization of R&D. (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report (WIR) 2005, New York 2005) ; *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*, World Investment Report 2006: FDI from Developing and Transition Economies-Implications for Development. (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report (WIR) 2007).

[244] *Goulden* Robert, Housing, Inequality, and Economic Change in Syria. In: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38th, 2 (2011) 187–202.

[245] *Hinnebusch*, Syria. 98.

family clan; accompanied by patronage, corruption, and a shift in whom is given economic opportunities.[246] The old guard got retired and/or replaced by his loyalists. Giving up the ideal of a social market economy, by emphasizing capital accumulation and growth over equality and wealth distribution, led to a nearly complete restructuring of society as a whole. As the managers in the new businesses earned high salaries, a regressive taxation and a loss in income tax revenue was compensated by cuts in subsidies for the ordinary population, which were introduced to prevent them from falling into extreme poverty. Most affected was the Sunni peasantry[247], the cuts in subsidies worsened their suffering after the drought and the accompanying side effects.[248] Fiscal austerity in the form of budget cuts, left an investment and employment gap which the private sector was not able to fill. What should have been a reformation of the public sector turned out to be its privatization; partly veiled and only enriching the crony capitalists on the regime's side, exporting their gained wealth instead of reinvesting it in the country and people.

> "The regime coopted a new alliance of reforming technocrats and the business class, a powerful social force which, dependent as it was on the state for opportunities (contracts, licences) and for disciplining the working class and rolling back populism, had no interest in a democratization which could empower the masses to block economic liberalization."[249]

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[246] *Ismail* Salwa, The Syrian Uprising: Imagining and Performing the Nation. In: Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11th, 3 (2011) 538–549. ; *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 367.

[247] The former pillar of the Ba'ath Party became impoverished and resentful. An indicator for this is that the early protests were dominated by recent Sunni rural-urban migrants and targeted the elite and not Alawis in general.

[248] The 2006-2011 multiseason, multiyear drought in the fertile crescent was the most intense in Syria ever recorded. Confronted with widespread crop failures and increased food prices, many rural families saw their only chance to find an income in the cities; further supplying an already tight job market with more work force. To exemplify this: "Between 2006 and 2009, around 1.3 million inhabitants of eastern Syria were affected by agricultural failures. An estimated 800 000 people lost their livelihoods and basic food support." The regime worsened the situation by water management decisions, poor planning, and policy errors. The regime's subsidies for water-intensive crops, like wheat or cotton, and that the Syrian agricultural sector is still highly relying on inefficient flood irrigation results in dropping groundwater levels and rising production costs. Seeking to bring benefits to the rural communities and to expand agricultural production the al-Assads improved access to water and were building water infrastructure. The well-meant efforts worsened local water shortages, the privatization of farmland in the follow up of economic reforms ended customary law at many places and exacerbate local tensions, urban unemployment, economic dislocations and social unrest. *Breisinger* Clemens, *Zhu* Tingju, *Riffai* Perrihan Al, *Nelson* Gerald, *Robertson* Richard, *Funes* Jose, *Verner* Dorte, Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Syria. In: Climate Change Economics 04, 01 1350002. ; *De Châtel* Francesca, The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution. In: Middle Eastern Studies 50th, 4 (2014) 521–535. ; *Femia* Francesco, *Werrell* Caitlin, Syria: Climate Change, Drought and Social Unrest. The Center for Climate & Security. online at: <https://climate-andsecurity.org/2012/02/29/syria-climate-change-drought-and-social-unrest/> (17.4.2019).; *Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations*, Syrian Arab Republic Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment (JRFSNA), online at: < http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/emergencies/docs/JRFSNA_Syrian2012.pdf>. ; *Gleick* Peter H., Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria. In: Weather, Climate, and Society 6th, 3 (2014) 331–340. ; *Solh* Mahmoud, Tackling the Drought in Syria. In: Nature Middle East (2010) ; *Worth* Robert F., Earth is Parched Where Syrian Farms Thrived. In: The New York Times (2010).

[249] *Hinnebusch*, Syria. 103f.

The insufficient funding of former powerhouses, like worker or peasant unions, led to a nearly complete retreat of the party's influence among the people, leaving a control gap.[250] This contributed to a tangle of political, economic and social shifts and factors, where Bashar al-Assad and his new, but weak, power base were not able to balance the diverse interests in the country, like the French or his father had managed to do, with an increased potential for sectarian resentments; a sectarianism fuelled by the environment of the 2000s and easily exploitable by a variety of actors, paving the way for today's chaos.

The reforms, especially the economic ones, introduced by Bashar al-Assad marked the opening of his father's authoritarian structures to globalization. While hoping to prevent a power struggle, and furthermore to stay in power, the Ba'ath party accepted this inheritance system; but was this not just delay of the inevitable, another continuation of the perpetual war under new circumstances? The formation of a new elite, out of a technocratic, reformist faction and the al-Assad-Makhlouf clan, with a shift in the balance of power contributed to a change in the base of power. By undermining and underfinancing the necessary power institutions, like worker and peasant unions, this new privileged circle surrounding the president managed to destroy the population's confidence in the politics of ideas of the Ba'ath party, and of it being a warrantor of stability. It was this shift in the balance of power, from the old elites, the party, to a small circle of transnational profiteers; a follow up of the attempt to legitimize their criminal behaviour in connection with the "reformation"/privatization/liberalization of the state economy, where they grabbed the biggest shares only enriching themselves. Over the course of the war, this new circle of power wielders more and more fuelled the left-behinds and marginalized, the unemployed and fearful, or simply the ones outside the privileged circle, with propaganda, hate and fear, for the matter to die on their behalves on the battlefields. Up to the point where the main driver for recruitment of the regime, and many foreign actors, were identity politics; or the underlying background noise of power struggle, the binary perpetual war popped up again. In Syria's case it was the "eternal war" of Shiites against Sunnis that was evoked again.

[250] Partly filled by the security services, delicate for corruption because of their underpayment, with more repression and to another part it was occupied by sub-actors; for example by establishing private schools, hospitals or universities, mostly done by the rich but some Islamic. Another manifestation that the regime lost its stand among the people was that citizens with complaints increasingly sought help from their tribal, sectarian or religious leaders, and not the party or union officials. Budget cuts at the last remaining big power base, the army, weakened the regimes ties to it; another hard hit for the army after the retreat and loss of its economic opportunities in Lebanon 2005. *de Elvira* Laura Ruiz, *Zintl* Tina, The End Of The Baʿathist Social Contract In Bashar Al-Asad's Syria: Reading Sociopolitical Transformations Through Charities and Broader Benevolent Activism. In: International Journal of Middle East Studies 46th, 2 (2014) 329–349. ; *Hinnebusch*, Syria. 98–105.

4.1.3 Sectarianism in Syria: Ancient Hatred or Mobilization When it Suits Best?

The prevailing narrative in most Western countries of the Syrian War as sectarian was highly influenced by the 2003 Iraq War and the reviving of the "ancient hatred" of Sunnis and Shia. But as Christopher Phillips pointed out this was based upon false assumptions: The first was that the existence of sub-state identities was a failure of Syrian nation building and that they cannot exist simultaneously. Secondly, that sectarianism was cohesive and widely accepted among the groups instead of ambiguous and fluid. Lastly that ethno-sectarian political models could solve sectarian violence. Indeed, this did not mean that there were no sectarian elements in the conflict, but the politicisation of sectarian fault lines and their mobilization was a more modern phenomenon; further long- and short-term factors played their part in provoking them.[251] For Phillips the term "semi-sectarian" describes best what we face in Syria.

As complex as the conflict was, so was the share of sectarianism in it. At the beginning the opposition was decentralized and local, but with national demands. The regime's answer was ambiguous, it promoted and adopted a sectarian narrative alongside a nationalist agenda. This reflected, for example, in inclusive names of fighting groups that were set up later, on the opposition side the Free Syrian Army (FSA) or on behalf of the regime the National Defence Force (NDF). But both used identity politics to mobilize and years of propaganda massively contributed to the willingness of the people to believe in the drawn sectarian lines. As the conflict lasted ethno-sectarian actors got involved, e.g. the Kurds, or foreign actors, like Iran, Saudi Arabia or Hezbollah, or Jihadist groups, who set themselves sectarian goals or recruited along sectarian lines. This contributed to a rise in ethnical motivated violence. But still political ideology, sub-state identity, economic benefits or motivation and patronage were the bigger divides and mobilizers for the Syrian people. Exemplary for this is the division of Aleppo in 2012 along economic lines.[252]

The degree of influence of sectarianism in Syria varied in the different regions. Places far from the frontline who had seen only minor fighting, like Latakia or Tartous, established as safe havens for refugees of all confessions. Homs on the other hand had seen a major outbreak of sectarian violence; mainly due to three factors: Firstly, the local "state collapse" in Homs accelerated ethnic violence. Secondly, it had seen a shorter period of coexistence between the different

[251] *Haddad* Fanar, Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity. (Oxford, UK 2014) 37.; *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 358; *Wolff* Stefan, Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective. (Oxford, UK ; New York, NY 2006) 1–8.

[252] *Chatty* Dawn, The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control. In: The Middle East Journal 64th, 1 (2010) 29–49. ; *Haddad*, Sectarianism in Iraq. 31–38; *International Crisis Group*, Israel, Hizbollah and Iran: Preventing Another War in Syria. 182 (2018), online at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/182-israel-hizbollah-and-iran-preventing-another-war-syria>.; *Ismail*, Syrian Uprising. ; *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 359–361; *Starr* Stephen, Revolt in Syria: Eye-Witness to the Uprising. (London, UK 2012) 120.

groups. Thirdly, as battlefront Homs attracted many sectarian actors. A deadly pattern evolved, that got repeated throughout Syria.[253] The "opportunity to mobilize" to drive multi-ethnic states into violence, as proposed by Kaufman or Dodge[254], was the main driver of sectarianism. In Syria such an opportunity differed from region to region, in battlegrounds it was more likely to recruit along sectarian lines. In areas where the regime lost control full state collapse emerged as recruitment factor, but not all of the new emerging actors were sectarian; and where the government forces remained in control fear of regime change mobilized its supporters.[255] Three main actors developed who gave the war a sectarian narrative: the regime, external actors/elites, and Western media and policy makers.

By far the greatest responsibility for sectarianizing the conflict had the regime. Its answer, excessive force, to peaceful protests provoked parts of the opposition into war. The manipulation of sectarian identities was used to retain sufficient support among Syrians. During the beginning of the conflict the propaganda revived the "old fears" of sectarianism, binding many minorities to the government. As the conflict lasted and the regime suffered its first territorial losses and military defections sectarianism was used more explicitly. It helped to attract troops with sectarian agendas, like Iraqi Shia militias or Hezbollah. The reorganisation of the military and the forming of the NDF encouraged sect-based units to form, but again the sect symbols proliferated alongside national ones, to not over emphasize sectarianism. But still material gain and crime were main driving factors for recruitment.[256]

Another layer of sectarianism was brought into Syria by external actors[257]. The money and arms suppliers favoured supporting militias who adopted their sectarian agendas, leading to a competition of who had the most sectarian components between the various fighting groups for the funds provided. Gulf governments fuelled the use of sectarian language via their transnational news

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[253] *International Crisis Group*, Syria's Metastasising Conflicts. 143 (2013), online at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/syria-s-metastasising-conflicts>.; *Khaddur* Kheder, *Mazur* Kevin, The Struggle for Syria's Regions. In: Middle East Report 43rd, 269 (2013) 2–11. ; *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 361.

[254] *Dodge* Toby, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied. (London, UK 2003); *Kaufman* Stuart J, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. (Ithaca, NY 2015).

[255] *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 369.

[256] *Abouzeid* Rania, The Jihad Next Door. In: POLITICO Magazine (2014), online at:< https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214.html> (24.9.2019) ; *Al-Tamimi* Aymenn Jawad, The Druze Militias of Southern Syria., online at: <http://www.aymennjawad.org/14038/the-druze-militias-of-southern-syria> (24.9.2019).; *Berti* Benedetta, *Paris* Jonathan, Beyond Sectarianism: Geopolitics, Fragmentation, and the Syrian Civil War. In: Strategic Assessment 16th, 4 (2014) 21–34.; *Lesch* David W., Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad. (New updated edition, New Haven 2013) 211.; *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 369; *Salih* Yassin al-Haj, The Syrian Shabiha and Their State. In: Heinrich Böll Stiftung - Middle East Office (2012).

[257] Such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Hezbollah, Qatar, or Turkey.

networks, in a nuanced way they revived the propaganda of ancient hatred between the groups.[258] Western media and policy makers broadly accepted this narrative by reinforcing a sectarian reading of the conflict. Additionally, western perception was influenced to a degree by "Iraq contagion", meaning that trends were projected from Iraq onto Syria, neglecting the unique development of the conflict and the country.[259]

As the case of Syria shows, identity politics as new contemporary motivational factor was a more complex issue than proposed by the new wars theory. It is undeniable that the perception of a sectarian undertone intensified during the conflict, mainly contributed to by the regime, external actors and Western media and policy makers. The development of sect-bound ties in Syria, and with it the possibility of exploitation, was, however, already introduced during the French mandate. Through the beginning of deliberately propagated sub-state identities alongside a nationalist inclusive agenda. The rise of appealing to specific labels in contemporary Syria fits into the new wars theory's model and its connection to globalization. The established political classes were in decline and with a growing importance and a need for legitimization of parallel markets these actors intensified their identity politics. The new wars theorists see this as a more recent phenomenon, but in connection with Foucault's ideas of perpetual war and its propaganda, this might be not the case in Syria.

The consolidation of power along sectarian lines started with the French colonial administration, as it pitted the different sects against each other, and thus in the end "pacified" Syrian society. But as we learnt that pacification is not possible, the retreat of the French colonial system meant that a power struggle emerged, exemplified by the eight coups in post-independence Syria. Out of this struggle, or maybe out of the competition of the sects for power, Hafez al-Assad emerged as the victor, with an inclusivist Ba'ath language but sectarian undertones and the help of a powerful sectarianized military left by the French. Tough sectarianism was not his preferred tool for control, it was an always present theme in society; or in other words he was able to tame the perpetual war in a new balance of power between the sects. When his son Bashar al-Assad started his succession, a new shift in power occurred, away from Ba'ath to a new elite of crony capitalists. Unsurprisingly, he fell back upon sects and sectarian lines as a tool. He just continued the course of Syrian history, or the historico-political discourse the French left behind. Reassuring sect identity was a necessity for Bashar al-Assad to remain power. It grew out of contemporary

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[258] *Phillips* Christopher, *Turner* Mandy, *Kühn* Florian P. (eds.), Intervention and Non-Intervention in the Syria Crisis. In: The Politics of International Intervention: The Tyranny of Peace (2015) 251–271.

[259] *Phillips*, Sectarianism. 370; *Visser* Reidar, The Western Imposition of Sectarianism on Iraqi Politics. In: Arab Studies Journal; Washington, D.C. 15/16, 2/1 (2007) 83–99.

challenges associated with globalization, but provoking identity politics to ensure one's power is absolutely nothing new in Syrian history.

A further interesting point was that the ones who had vocation for identity politics are the ones in the most powerful positions, the regime, external elites and Western media and policy makers; or the institutions that evolved out of the historico-political discourse as the ones holding the power and the ones who wish to continue these relations of power and their economic advantages.

4.2 The New Wars Economy in Syria

The regime was surprised when protests started, Bashar al-Assad deeply believed in the exceptional position of his government, compared to his Middle East counterparts who were wiped away by the people. From the beginning the propaganda machinery framed the peaceful demonstrators as 'armed gangs' or terrorists. Only over time the regime started to talk about a civil war and no longer about an insurgency. As the wording changed so did the strategy, the first year of the conflict was marked by a counterinsurgency approach of the regime which, as the opposition received more resources, transformed into military strategies.

In the formative stage of the conflict a pattern developed at demonstrations: "demonstrators protested about earlier deaths, more were then killed, initiating larger protests the next day."[260] The violence of the military and security forces was gruesomely supplemented by the Mukhabarat or the Shabiha. However, as complex as Syria was, the regime's answers to protests differed regionally, Homs and Dara'a were hit hard, while places like Hama were dealt with using a lighter approach. In some cases, it was a strategical decision, but often local governors or notables decided that violence was not the right choice in tackling the demonstrations. There was just one thing the regime wanted to avoid at any costs, a Tahir Square style protestor camp in Damascus.[261]

Though the regime was successful in preventing a set-up of a such a major symbol for a revolution, the conflict intensified. The strategy of blaming the protesters as sectarian inspired terrorists or criminals and the excessive use of force to disperse demonstrations helped to radicalize the opposition. Through the existing geographical diversions of the sects in Syria "state failure" was a regional phenomenon. The regime concentrated its forces on the highly populated West and

[260] *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 53.

[261] *Hokayem* Emile, Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. (Adelphi series no. 438, Abingdon, UK 2013) ; *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 53f.

South[262], leaving a power vacuum in parts of the North[263] and East[264]. The regional fragmentation of conflict intensity led to differing war experiences; elimination for the foe, fear and insecurity for the own group. Cooperation between the warring parties created an environment favourable for the many types of asset transfer, as civilians as targets were integrated into the military thinking of all parties. These parties had ever-growing recruitment opportunities; for many of the unemployed they provided a chance for an income, for others the promises of martyrdom.

4.2.1 Fighters in Syria. Legitimate Bearers of Arms, Rebels or Criminals?

Bashar al-Assad's budget cuts, and the loss of economic opportunities in Lebanon, in the years prior to the conflict foreshadowed the fragmentation of the Syrian Army; but to keep the appearance of old times the official number of personnel, in 2011 with an estimated number of 220.000 soldiers, was high. The distribution of funds, between conventional and special forces, led to an imbalance in their fighting abilities. The regime's *praetorian units*[265], the 4th Armored Division[266], the Republican Guard[267] and the Special Forces Regiments[268], were favoured; so that they could be deployed at full strength; out of the conventional forces only the most trusted ones were deployed and supported. The Air Force, the Missile Command[269] and the Chemical Weapons

[262] Especially Damaskus, Latakia and Tartous were of high importance.

[263] Aleppo and the Kurdish areas.

[264] Mainly the Ar-Raqqa and Deir e-Zor provinces.

[265] "[…] [B]est armed, best trained and best paid units in the Syrian Army." Quoted in: *Holliday* Joseph, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency To Civil War. (Middle East Security Report 8 Washington, D.C 2013) 44.; *Seale*, Asad. 319.

[266] The regime's protection force for inside and outside threats. That it is kept at full strength is represented by their deployment rate during the beginning of the conflict. It almost consists entirely of career soldiers and approximately 80% of them are Alawite.

[267] Mainly introduced to protect the regime of internal threats, it is always well equipped. Though it ranks are nearly completely Alawite, Sunnis in leadership positions were not uncommon.

[268] Regime protection and national defence forces, their elite status is in relation to the conventional armed forces; more to be understood as conventional light units, and not special forces in a Western style. The persistency of defections in the first conflict years points to a higher number of Sunnis than in the other two.

[269] Syria's arsenal is a mix of Russian, North Korean, Iranian and self-constructed surface-surface and long-range missiles and is highly depend of foreign supply. In December 2012 the regime began to attack rebel headquarters and overrun bases, but it soon started to fire the weapons on rebel-held neighbourhoods.

Program[270] were other competitors for governmental funding. The most trusted pillar for remaining in power for Bashar was the Security apparatus[271], the widely feared Mukhabarat.[272] The competition for resources only intensified with the conflict leading to large scale defections of soldiers and commanders over time. Some of them founded the Free Syrian Army (FSA)[273], and the name refers a national inclusive agenda and the wish to fill the legitimacy gap left by the regular forces in parts of Syria; but in the end it was just another merger of many militias fighting in Syria.

This web of myriads of militias undertook most of the war efforts. In Syria militias could roughly be divided into four groups. First, there are *katibas* (battalions) and *liwas* (brigades)[274] mostly associated with the opposition; why they were founded and what their composition looks

[270] The regime was/is in possession of five types of nerve gas; chlorine gas, mustard gas, cyanide gas, sarin nerve agent, and VX nerve agent. From December 2012 reports appeared that the regime used chemical weapons.

[271] Four agencies kept a balance of power: The Department of Military Intelligence (Shu'bat al-Mukhabarat al-Askariyya) for the Army, the Air Force Intelligence Directorate (Idarat al-Mukhabarat al-Jawiyya) for surveillance of the other services, the General Intelligence Directorate (Idarat al-Mukhabarat al-Amma) for external intelligence, the Political Security Directorate (Idarat al-Amn al-Siyasi) for monitoring internal threats. The Director, or at least the deputy director, is always Alawi. Their structures are in many instances overlapping as they are designed to watch over the people and each other.

[272] *Arms Control Association*, Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2019., online at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity> (3.10.2019).; *Droz-Vincent* Philippe, *Albrecht* Holger, *Croissant* Aurel, *Lawson* Fred H (eds.), The Syrian Military and the 2011 Uprising. In: Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring (Philadelphia, PA 2016) 168–182. ; *Holliday*, Assad Regime. 42–47, 54f., 56–59; *Internation Institute for Strategic Studies*, The Military Balance 2011. (London, UK 2011) ; *Neistat* Anna, *Solvang* Ole, "By All Means Necessary!: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria. (New York, NY 2011) 82, 88.; *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, Syria., online at: <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/syria/> (3.10.2019).; *UN News*, Both ISIL and Syrian Government Responsible for Use of Chemical Weapons, UN Security Council Told., online at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/11/570192-both-isil-and-syrian-government-responsible-use-chemical-weapons-un-security> (3.10.2019).

[273] Founded on July 29 2011 by recently defected soldiers and officers in Turkey. The plan was to provide an alternative military structure to the regime, and to present themselves as the legal bearer of arms. They even used the Syrian flag of 1932-58 and 1961-63. In reality it was a loose band of militias, cooperating under the banner of the FSA, either for military campaigns or to get more funds from foreign sponsors. *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 126–129.

[274] Many were spontaneously founded in the first days of the protest as protection units for the demonstrators and therefore were locally rooted and perceived themselves as self defence units. Others had idealistic or spiritual reasons for their formation, or local strongmen grasp the opportunity to build a power base. Criminal gangs saw the possibility to legitimize their illegal work. As the number of defections in the regular forces arose, many of the katibas were joined by soldiers and commanders. This hotchpotch meant that it was useful to join forces in bigger brigades or similar units, like the FSA. The decentralization and localisation of many of the katibas partly explains why they were unable or unwilling to form a powerful insurgent's organization, like the FLN in Algeria. Additionally, the lack of a Syrian wide political opposition organization played a crucial role. Ibid., 126–129.; *Al-Tamimi*, Druze Militias. ; *Wehrey* Frederic, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Armies, Militias and (Re)-Integration in Fractured States., online at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/30/armies-militias-and-re-integration-in-fractured-states-pub-77604> (2019).; *White* Jeffrey, *Tabler* Andrew J, *Zelin* Aaron Y, Syria's Military Opposition How Effective, United, or Extremist? (Policy Focus 128, 2013).

like is widely varied. Second, are the two big Kurdish militias[275], affiliated with political parties and the Kurdish identity. Jihadists[276] established themselves as a third large opposition group, with an undeniably high degree of sectarian extremism. At last, the regime from the beginning on closely operated with internal militias; the long established "Shabiha"[277], for doing the "dirty work"; the National Defence Force (NDF)[278], integrated as a brand into the Syrian army in 2013; and external ones[279], mainly sectarian, paramilitary organisations, like the Hezbollah or Iraqi Shia militias. The Syrian Army, in the eyes of the Iranians and Hezbollah, was unreliable, Quds Brigades commander, Major General Qassem Soleimani, in early 2013 helped the regime to restructure its forces. The NDF served as an umbrella organisation for the many pro-Assad katibas/liwas to supplement and support the armed forces; getting resources from the government but being trained by Iran and Hezbollah.[280]

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[275] The, Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) aligned Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) and its militia the People Protections Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG); and the Kurdish National Council (Encûmena Niştimanî ya Kurdî li Sûriyê, KNC), affiliated with the Iraqi Kurds, and its militia the Rojava Peshmerga. *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 133f.

[276] From the beginning Islamist groups participated in the conflict, over time their importance has increased massively. Islamism as a vague term is not able to adequately describe the variety of religious actors in the conflict; as some only use the label 'Islamist', for example to receive more funds, but others are convinced that theocratic rule will redeem them. Further three sub-groups emerged: Salafists, ultra-conservative and trying to emulate the life of "the pious forefathers" (salaf as-salih); Jihadists, pursuing a global jihad like Nusra and Daesh; and "Moderate" Islamists, who have a broad range of views but are not as radical as the other two groups. That militias are fluid with their labels is shown by the fact that many of them suddenly changed their identities, loyalties and believes; in many cases accompanied by getting a new foreign donor. In the starting phase of the conflict, to brand the opposition as terrorists, the regime purposely released known Muslim Brothers and Islamists from prisons around the country to join the protests. Ibid., 129–133.

[277] Prior to the conflict, in the predominantly Alawi neighbourhoods of the coastal region, shabiha gangs formed themselves, often around a charismatic leader with bonds to the al-Assad/Makhlouf Clan, in the 1970s with the economic opportunities, like smuggling, the Lebanon intervention brought. A legend tells that their name derives from their preferred car model, the Mercedes *Shabah*. They quickly achieved a reputation as brutal and cruel, directing all forms of violence against civilians. They operated with the benevolence of the state who turned a blind eye on their activities, even cooperating in many areas; but when there is an interest conflict, they fight each other. The many varieties of gangs have four essential characteristics: Bonds of blood and sect; predisposition to be hostile towards society; obedience to their leaders; a powerful economic motive. The high recruitment numbers during the conflict made the shabiha a more cross-sectarian group, showing their economical character. They terrorize the population by dispersing demonstrations, sexual abuse, arresting, interrogating and torturing of people, massacres and much more; in many instances on behalf of the regime. Ibid., 53f.; *Salih*, Shabiha.

[278] A Iranian construct for the regime supporting Local Popular Committees, a set-up of militias mostly centred around neighbourhoods, thus often with a sectarian touch. The reasons why the militias fight vary: the defence purpose, former shabihas legalizing their business models, cementation of the status quo. But for many sectarianism was a decisive factor. *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 161–163; *Khaddur* Kheder, Syria's Troublesome Militias. By integrating pro-regime armed groups into state structures, the Assad regime has created a hybrid military order., online at: <https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/77635> (2019).; *Wehrey*, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Armies and Militias.

[279] Mainly deployed on Iranian advice to enforce more manpower. Their high Shia character contributed enormously to the sectarianizing of the conflict and its perception as so. *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 156–159.

[280] Ibid., 161–167.

The geopolitical importance of Syria reflects in the foreign regular troops deployed throughout the conflict. On the regime's invitation, after getting under massive pressure by the opposition, Iran[281] and Russia[282] joined the fighting; with Russia also using private security companies.[283] The strengthening and conquering of large parts of Syria and Iraq of Daesh led to the formation of an international coalition[284] to support the fight against them. Turkey[285], as a neighbouring country, experienced massive impacts by the conflict, from terror-attacks in its cities to the huge inflow of refugees, which encouraged the government to act in Syria. Another neighbour involved is Israel[286], mainly flying attacks on Iranian facilities in Syria in the greater context of their conflict.

As proposed in the New Wars theory the major war efforts are undertaken by coalitions of armies, or their remnants, paramilitaries and other militias, and external actors.

The regime fell back upon its most feared instruments of power; the security apparatus, their praetorian units, with a high share of Allawi's, and paramilitary formations, official militias in the framework of the NDF and lawless gangs of thugs, like the Shabihas. Motivation for joining

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[281] Facing an uprising on its own in 2009, the "green revolution", Iran had an expertise in tackling demonstrations. In the first year Iran delivered riot gear, part of the Quds Force as security advisers and instructors, and they assisted in cyberwarfare. The involvement of Iran is connected to the broader conflict with Saudi-Arabia, Israel and the West. When the conflict escalated in late 2012, more was needed to safe the regime from collapse. Economic material and military support intensified. As already mentioned, Iran oversaw the restructuring of the Syrian Army and the inflow of foreign militias. Due to the militias used and that official numbers are not published; it is hard to tell how many Iranian soldiers are deployed in Syria. Ibid., 67f., 82, 147–156, 159–161.

[282] The Russian-Syrian ties date back to the Cold War, when Russia established its port for its Mediterranean Navy in Tartous. From the beginning of the conflict Russia supported the regime, mostly in joint action with Iran. Its official campaign started in September 2015, providing air support for regime troops. What on paper appeared as a plan to attack Daesh, shortly turned into the bombardment of other Anti-Assad rebels. Russia boosted the war efforts of the regime with its military tactics: frontal aviation, cauldron battles and the possibility for simultaneous and successive operations. The Russian intervention completely reset the military balance in the civil war. Ibid., 68,82, 147–151, 217–223.

[283] *Avramov* Kiril, *Trad* Ruslan, An Experimental Playground: The Footprint of Russian Private Military Companies in Syria., online at: <https://thedefensepost.com/2018/02/17/russia-private-military-contractors-syria/> (3.10.2019).; *OMRAN for Strategic Studies*, Profiling Top Private Security Companies in Syria., online at: <https://omranstudies.org/publications/reports/profiling-top-private-security-companies-in-syria.html> (3.10.2019).

[284] Five years after its foundation in September 2014 it consisted of 81 countries and five international organizations, prominent are the US, Saudi-Arabia, and France. In Syria it mainly provided air-support for ground troops tackling the "caliphate", accompanied by the deployment of special forces. Further its mandate included tackling Daesh globally on every front, to drain their funding, to stop the inflow of fighters, or to counter their propaganda. Their "army" on the ground were the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). *The Global Coalition Against Daesh*, The Global Coalition Against Daesh., online at: <https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/> (7.10.2019).

[285] Skirmishes along the Turkish Syrian border appeared from the beginning of the conflict, which resulted in direct involvement of the Turkish army in 2016, legitimized with claims of self-defence. But from the beginning Turkey supported rebel groups with money, arms, training, and by offering a safe haven. Its campaigns are mainly focused on the Kurds and Daesh, and the border region. *Phillips*, Battle for Syria. 172–175.

[286] Ibid., 172–175.

varied from economic reasons, like legitimizing criminal behaviour, to identity reasons, connected to the fear of regime change These factors hugely contributed to the mobilization for the regime. Partly institutionalizing the beginning fragmentation and delegitimization of the institution of the army/state, shifted the balance to wage war to the new elite surrounding the regime. With the support by the major powers Iran and Russia, and their geopolitical motivations, the regime again seized the military power necessary to become the most powerful factor in Syria.

There were a big variety of units on the opposition side, but all more or less with militia character. Some had more inclusivist ideologies, others, like many jihadist groups, relied upon identity politics to mobilize their forces. As the brutality of the regime's answers to protests grew, more demonstrators were ready to fight the regime with violence. Temporarily they joined forces in bigger brigades, like the FSA, but out of them no challenger for the regime arose, partly because they lacked the political will to form an effective insurgent organization. In order to even have the possibility to fight a war against the regime, all the different group were highly dependent on external support.

4.2.2 Fighting in Syria. Shattering a Country into Pieces

The weapons used in the Syrian War reflected the internationality of the conflict. The way they were acquired and which ones were used differ from actor to actor. The Syrian Armed Forces[287] were mainly supplied by Russia and Iran. For the opposition and jihadists groups, either a foreign sponsor supplied weapons, mainly light ones, or they seized them on battlefields or overrun regime bases, including some heavy weaponry. But overall both sides were highly dependent on foreign support. The communication revolution, and especially mobile phones, made it easier to coordinate the different groups lacking an established communication pattern; additionally, they can be used as detonators of IEDs. Further the use of suicide bombers was a spread tactic among various groups in the conflict.[288] Throughout the war tactics were adopted many times, depending

[287] *Army Recognition*, Syria. Syrian Army Land Ground Armed Forces Military Equipment Armored Vehicle Intelligence Pictures., online at: <https://www.armyrecognition.com/syria_syrian_army_military_land_ground_forces_uk/syria_syrian_army_land_ground_armed_forces_military_equipment_armored_vehicle_intelligence_pictures.html> (7.10.2019).; *Pike* John, Syria - Army Equipment., online at: <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/syria/army-equipment.htm> (7.10.2019).

[288] *Conflict Armament Research*, Weapons of the Islamic State. A Three-Year Investigation in Iraq and Syria. (2017), ; Weaponry Used by Different Factions in the Syrian Civil War. Syrian Civil War Map - Live Middle East Map/ Map of the Syrian Civil War. online at: <https://syriancivilwarmap.com/weaponry-used-different-factions/> (7.10.2019).

on the conflict party, though a pattern evolved of all conflict parties committing atrocities that can be regarded as war crimes.[289]

In a first phase Bashar al-Assad adopted his father's strategy during the insurgencies 1979-1982. It rested upon three pillars: selective deployment of loyal troops; relying on paramilitaries to compensate the shortages of armed men; and clearing major population centres and holding them with high garrisons of troops. Selective deployment was introduced to prevent large scale defections, but also the regime relied on indoctrinated units to "brutalize the opposition" to present themselves as terrorism slayers. Basically, it meant that politically reliable and mostly Alawite units[290] were deployed. The tasks of conventional forces were to establish checkpoints, barricades and heavy fire support; the special forces leveraged the capacities of weapons and vehicles with a minimum risk of defections and were accountable for the most brutal forms of repression. The security apparatus tackled early signs of defections in the troops and commanding staff. As a result, no defections of entire units and their commanders were observable in the first year. Soldiers who refused to shoot at civilians were shot, detained and/or tortured by the Mukhabarat.[291] For many civilians, not only the ones engaged in the protests, detention and the connected abuses became a daily routine.

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[289] *International Crisis Group*, Rigged Cars and Barrel Bombs: Aleppo and the State of the Syrian War. 155 (2014), online at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/rigged-cars-and-barrel-bombs-aleppo-and-state-syrian-war>.; *International Crisis Group*, Metastasing Conflicts. ; *International Crisis Group*, Syria's Mutating Conflict. 128 (2012), online at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/syria-s-mutating-conflict>.; *United Nations Human Rights Council*, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (2011), online at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/170/97/PDF/G1117097.pdf?OpenElement>.; *United Nations Human Rights Council*, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. A/HRC/37/72 (2018), online at: <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-37-72_EN.pdf>.; *United Nations Human Rights Council*, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. A/HRC/23/58 (2013), online at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13/156/20/PDF/G1315620.pdf?OpenElement>.; *United Nations Human Rights Council*, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. A/HRC/40/70 (2019), online at: <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_40_70.pdf>.; *United Nations Human Rights Council*, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. Advance Edited Version. A/HRC/31/68 (2016), online at: <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-31-68.pdf>.

[290] For example, in Dara'a in 2011 a network of elite units and conventional forces were deployed to clear the city. Parts of the 35th, 41st and 47th Special Forces Regiments and the conventional 5th Mechanized Division's 132nd Mechanized Brigade and 65th Armoured Brigade. *Holliday*, Assad Regime. 12.

[291] Ibid., 10, 12f.; *Neistat, Solvang*, By All Means Necessary. ; *United Nations Human Rights Council*, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1. 8.

Detention centres, official and makeshift ones, were popular with all the warring parties, and tens of thousands of Syrians experienced them first-hand. A wide variety of reasons[292] led to them being held without due process, legal representation or contact with their families. Through various forms of brutal torture[293] and inhume conditions in these centres many died or were executed, with their bodies not returned to their families and the whereabouts of many remain unknown.[294] The treatment of detainees by various armed rebel groups led to "[…] the war crimes of murder, torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and also constituted violations of due process principles […]."[295] In the case of the regime the atrocities committed in such facilities

> "[…] amount to the crimes against humanity of extermination, murder, rape or other forms of sexual violence, torture, and imprisonment in the context of widespread and systematic detentions […] and the war crimes of murder, cruel treatment, torture, rape, sexual violence, and outrages upon personal dignity […]."[296]

Once the opposition was brutalized, and provided with enough arms by foreign sponsors, military strategies became more important than crushing protests. With territorial gains of rebels, as they were capturing districts and cities, a gruesome tactic to suit the new battlefields regularly appeared in Syria: the siege.[297]

A horrific pattern established where sieges were used as means to compel the ones in control of an area to give up and it "[…] remained the primary method of warfare employed by the parties to the conflict."[298] Towns, districts or cities were encircled, the population now trapped was prevented from leaving. Even in cases where the besieger would have allowed the more vulnerable

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[292] E.g. the support of a certain party, being insufficient loyal to another, a family member being on the wrong side, infracting religious codes, conscription, hostage taking, ransoms, prisoner swaps or internment.

[293] The ones used the most are beatings, dulab, placing detainees inside a wheel prior to beating them, shaheb, hanging them from the ceiling by their wrists, and electrocution.

[294] Thanks to a regime's photographer "Caesar" and his defection there is a deeper insight to this facilities. *Motaparthy* Priyanka, *Houry* Nadim, If the Dead Could Speak: Mass Deaths and Torture in Syria's Detention Facilities. (New York, NY 2015).

[295] *Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*, Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic: A Way Forward, 08/03/2018, 2.

[296] *Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*, Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic: A Way Forward, 08/03/2018, 2.

[297] *Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*, Sieges as Weapon of War. Encircle, Starve, Surrender, Evacuate. (2018).

[298] Ibid., 3.

people to leave they were forced to stay by the defending side to be used as human shields.[299] Attackers bombarded the besieged areas indiscriminately[300], mostly through airstrikes, including the use of chemical weapons, cluster munition or barrel bombs, or through artillery; sowing terror and desperation among the besieged, under already harsh living conditions, such as starving to death, routinely being denied medical evacuation, the delivery of food and other necessities to survive. It was these shortages of food, water and medicine that lead to more suffering and dying; many times intensified by the armed groups confiscating supplies and distributing them among their own fighters, families and supporters. Sieges could last months or even years, with the longest in eastern Ghouta from 2013-2018. The United Nation Human Rights Council Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic described the acts committed as

> "[…] egregious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and, in some instances, [to] war crimes. […] carried out in a deliberate, coordinated, and systematic manner, in further violation of prohibitions established under customary international law."[301]

The suffering did not end with the sieges as they often ended with truces and evacuation agreements.[302] Such agreements resettled thousands to mostly predetermined areas, in many occasions already overcrowded camps for DPs with a lack of basic services; the ones who stayed had to fear the wrath of the winner. As a manner of cooperation these truces are negotiated between the parties and finalized in written or oral form. Though the terms of each one is unique, numerous similarities[303] could be traced. Medical facilities and personnel had become the focus of the warring parties; hospitals were primary targets in besieged areas. Additionally the hospital staff, as providers of a last sense of human dignity, often have been targets of revenge by the besieging

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[299] *Grover* Sonja, Child Soldiers as Victims of 'Genocidal Forcible Transfer': Darfur and Syria as Case Examples. In: The International Journal of Human Rights 17th, 3 (2013) 411–427. 420f.

[300] *Pinheiro* Paulo Sérgio, The Use of Barrel Bombs and Indiscriminate Bombardment in Syria: The Need to Strengthen Compliance with International Humanitarian Law. (Presented at a Side Event Hosted by the Permanent Mission of Austria 2015).

[301] E.g. intentionally attacking civilians, not distinguishing between combatants and civilians, the use of starvation as method of warfare, collective punishment, attacks on medical facilities and personal, or forced displacement. *Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*, Sieges as Weapon of War. Encircle, Starve, Surrender, Evacuate., 29/05/2018, 3f.

[302] Ibid., 6–8.; *Amnesty International*, Syria: 'We Leave or We Die': Forced Displacement under Syria's 'Reconciliation' Agreements. (2017), online at: <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2473092017ENGLISH.pdf>.

[303] The departure of fighters and several civilians, exchange of prisoners and corpses, the release of detainees, the surrender of heavy weapons and the destruction of tunnels leading into the besieged area. *Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*, Sieges. 7f.

forces. Medical professionals tried to be the first evacuated, but their proposals were often denied by the besieger.[304] This

> "[…] pattern of evacuations occurring countrywide appears intended to engineer changes to the political demographies of previously besieged enclaves, by redrawing and consolidating bases of political support."[305]

Changes further implemented and strengthened through legislation, for example the infamous Presidential Decree no. 10[306] making it nearly impossible to return to what once was home. Though sieges were a horrible way of intertwining displacement methods, they were applied individually as well throughout Syria by all parties involved. As sectarianizing the conflict became a successful strategy to instil fear, the inhibition level for massacres lowered, often accompanied by rape and other forms of sexual abuses. Only one word is enough to remind us of the destructions of heritage sites, by bombardment or intentionally: Palmyra.[307]

Unfortunately for the Syrian civilian population, main target of the warring parties, the proposed techniques and methods of the new wars theory were used throughout the conflict. Varying actors tried to control the population and maximize their assets, by displacing people unwilling to cooperate in these networks, and eliminating those with a different label, by putting unfavourable living conditions upon them. The arsenals of the fighting coalitions varied, the foreign sponsors of the regime provided, and helped, them with enough heavy weapons to shatter whole cities into pieces. The opposition got mainly provided with light weapons by their foreign sponsors, many times distributing these resources to sectarian actors, like jihadists; that the international support was split-up was a consequence of failure to form a functioning insurgency organization with a political arm.

But what united all warring parties was their deliberate breach of international and humanitarian law; or the reintroduction of methods to the "battlefield" once sought to be banned. That these methods became a driver of the conflict coincides with the regime's success in brutalizing the

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[304] *United Nations Human Rights Council*, Assault on Medical Care in Syria. A/HRC/24/CRP.2. (2013).

[305] *Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*, Sieges. 8.

[306] *Haugbolle* Sune, Law No. 10: Property, Lawfare, and New Social Order in Syria. SyriaUntold | انحكت ما حكاية. online at: <https://syriauntold.com/2018/07/26/law-no-10-property-lawfare-and-new-social-order-in-syria/> (9.10.2019).; *Human Rights Watch*, Q&A: Syria's New Property Law., online at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/29/qa-syrias-new-property-law> (9.10.2019).

[307] *United Nations Human Rights Council*, "I Lost My Dignity": Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Syrian Arab Republic. Conference Room Paper of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. A/HRC/37/CRP.3. (2018), online at: <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-37-CRP-3.pdf>.; *United Nations Human Rights Council*, A/HRC/23/58. ; *United Nations Human Rights Council*, A/HRC/31/68.

opposition; greatly contributed to by Bashar al-Assad's adoption of his father's counter-insurgency strategy. Detention centres provided an excellent form of control and spread fear and insecurity, accompanied by the many war crimes committed in such facilities. The legitimization because of the brutalization transformed the conflict from an insurgency into a civil war. What followed was a moving of battle lines, until the positions were settled; then one of the most gruesome war instruments returned to the face of earth: the siege. It was a permanent, physical and psychological terrorization of the population, an ultimate weapon of displacement; a legitimization process that climaxed in evacuation agreements and a legislation fostering new property rights and criminal behaviour.

4.2.3 Financing in Syria. A Crashed Economy and Contributions from Abroad

Before the conflict, Syria already had developed to a paradise for crony capitalists due to the liberalization of markets and the withdrawal of state support, which the private sector was eager to fill. The conflict though destroying a lot of infrastructure opened the way for further "privatization" of properties and services, or the legitimization of criminal behaviour, and worsened the situation for regular Syrians. Helpful for a better understanding of how informal markets thrived because of the conflict is a look at the official markets and their development during that time.

Overall physical destruction and sanctions have had a tremendous impact on the Syrian economy. In 2016 the Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCRP) estimated that 3.5 million people were unemployed, correlating to 60% of the labour force; It is likely that about 3 million lost their job due to the conflict. Such a devastating employment rate, the loss of government subsidies and property had effects on the poverty rate. In 2014 an estimated 83% were affected by poverty. But as so many things in this conflict it depended in which region one was living, where sieges were laid destruction was higher. The UN estimated 2.1 million destroyed homes in the first four years of conflict. Between 2010 and 2015 the Syrian economy contracted in real terms by 57%[308] due to destruction and loss of output and markets.[309]

The destruction of farmland, irrigation systems, mills, or farming equipment, problems with transportation systems and shortages of imported goods, like seeds or fertilizers, led to signifi-

[308] 2011-2015 the non-oil real GDP declined on average by 14%, oil and gas related real GDP by 28%.

[309] *Gobat* Jeanne, *Kostial* Kristina, *International Monetary Fund IMF*, Syria's Conflict Economy. WP/16/123. WP/16/123 (2016), online at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Syrias-Conflict-Economy-44033>.; *Syrian Centre for Policy Research SCPR*, Alienation and Violence Report 2014. (2015), online at: <https://www.scpr-syria.org/scpr-alienation-and-violence-report-2014-2/>.

cant losses in the primary sector, intensifying the severe food situation in Syria. The service industry, mainly because of the sanctions but also due to destruction, had witnessed significant losses; especially hard hit were tourism, trade, and banking, but due to no accurate available data only an overall statement can be made here. The manufacturing sector[310] tremendously suffered from the conflict, the main manufacturing hubs of Syria, Aleppo, Homs and the suburbs of Damascus were hotspots of war. Effects for the population can be measured by looking at the cumulative consumer price index (cpi), still published on a monthly basis, between March 2011 and May 2015 alone it had risen by 300%.[311]

Such devastating effects on the economy reflected in the external sector too. Trade embargos, mainly targeted crude oil production and government owned businesses, led to an external current account of an estimated 13% of GDP in 2015 (0.6% in 2010). Exports, between 2010 and 2015, collapsed by about 70% to $4 billion and during the same time frame imports declined by roughly 40% to $10.5 billion. The income and service balance had worsened too, effectively meaning that it was more expensive for Syrians to trade internationally; though transfers had held up, as the Syrian expat community found informal ways to send money. But overall it is highly likely that a major capital flight began with the conflict and inflow was limited, the only official financial assistance for the Syrian state were credit lines by the Iranian government.[312]

Regarding the fiscal sector, scattered data paints a dark picture. In 2015 the deficit widened over 20% of the GDP (8% in 2010), the real term budget was 40% lower and revenue lowered to 6% of GDP (21% pre crisis). Public debt skyrocketed from 31% in 2009 to an estimated over 100% at the end of 2015. Conflict geography can be observed again as the regime focussed the delivery of public services to areas under its own control, and in 2015 it announced the opening of public services, like the management of assets and the properties owned by the cities, to the private sector; intensifying the grip of the crony-capitalists on the country.[313]

As Syrian banks were largely isolated from the international markets the financial system changed. Assets, in countries sanctioning the regime, were frozen; additionally, the outflow of

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[310] Hard hit was the pharmaceutical production, before the conflict Syria produced 80% of its drug consumption rate in around 70 private owned plants; in 2016 the UN estimated that the production rate fell by 90%.

[311] *Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations*, Syrian Arab Republic. ; *Gobat, Kostial, International Monetary Fund IMF*, Conflict Economy. 10–13.

[312] There are reports that the Russian and Chinese governments had granted loans as well. *Butter* David, Salvaging Syria's Economy. (Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme, 2016), ; *Gobat, Kostial, International Monetary Fund IMF*, Conflict Economy. 13–16.

[313] *Gobat, Kostial, International Monetary Fund IMF*, Conflict Economy. 16–18; *World Bank*, Syria Economic Monitoring Note: Fall 2015. (2015).

deposits, the collapse of economic activity and non-performing loans (NPLs) impacted the system fundamentally to a point where it eroded; accompanied by a rise in financial crime activities and terrorist funding.[314] In such a devastating state the formal economy was, unsurprisingly it "[…] disintegrated into multiple war economies."[315]

Such a war economy was formed by Daesh in its occupied territories in Syria and Iraq. Income was mainly generated through five avenues: Firstly, illicit proceeds from the occupation of territory, setting up extortion patterns by looting, robbing or selling economic resources of the areas captured. The justification for this was the provision of services or "protection", mainly achieved by threats or use of violence. In the case of Daesh bank looting[316], extortion and human trafficking[317] were major forms of generating income. Further, Daesh knew about the importance of energy assets, like oil and gas fields, and other natural resources or production facilities.[318] Knowing that they provide a reliable and sustainable source of income, they mainly tried to capture such assets and tried not to destroy them; the extracted oil and refined products were either for their own use and refining or to sell and swap[319] at local and regional markets. Similar was the situation in the agricultural sector; they exploited[320] farmers and took control of the distribution and food saving facilities[321] giving Daesh the market control for such products. Market control led to another form of income: "Taxation" of goods and cash transiting Daesh controlled areas; including a road tax or custom duties.[322] The long history of humanity in this world region meant

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[314] *Gobat, Kostial, International Monetary Fund IMF*, Conflict Economy. 18f.

[315] Ibid., 10.

[316] Controlling banks in the captured territory meant getting a big share of the money stored there. A difference was made between state-hold accounts and banks, which were declared Daesh properties, and private ones, mainly left to the people who owned them just to be taxed at withdrawal. Bank managers were appointed, to profit from transactions while ensuring that business still went on. *Financial Action Task Force (FATF)*, Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). (2015), 12f.

[317] Daesh specifically targeted women and children, mostly of minority groups, to later sell them at their slave auctions. Ibid., 13.

[318] In Daesh case for example: a phosphate mine, various manufacturing, cement and sulphur extraction plants. Beside cement, which can also be used for own purposes, they are harder to monetize because they highly depend on international markets. Ibid., 13–15.

[319] To get the products to the end users in their own and nearby territories, Daesh heavily relied on the established smuggling networks, and the willingness of others to buy products of them. In Syria such networks had a long history, being highly autonomous, in many cases linked to a prominent family clan, and with a high economic motivation and no care about with whom they deal. Ibid., 14f.

[320] They forced farmers to give a share of their crops to Daesh or confiscated machinery and rent them back to their previous owners. Ibid., 15.

[321] Often Daesh further employed the people working there to not interrupt production and distribution, but now to their parameters. Ibid., 15f.

[322] Ibid., 16f.

that another black-market income source was also available to Daesh: the sale of cultural artefacts.[323] Secondly, Daesh kidnapped hundreds of individuals in order to demand ransom money.[324] The third large pillar of income were donations.[325] The collected money was sent, via wire transfer or in cash, into a nearby area, brought in by couriers; a method used by many other fighting units or aid organizations.[326] Fourthly, foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) were an additional income source. This mainly meant material support, including "[…] financial assets, economic resources, property of every kind."[327] The FTFs did not only brought foreign currencies, they also established networks and hubs along their routes for easier transportation; further they were leaving behind a diaspora community as a possible donation source.[328] At last, in accordance to the communication revolution, crowdfunding projects were started, a phenomenon appearing early in the Syrian civil war. Being just another form of donations, it provided everyone with the possibility to support the cause, making the warring parties less reliable of big donors.[329]

Generating an income was only one side of economic activities, the other is the movement and use of such funds. In Daesh controlled territory four main methods of distribution and use could be traced. Firstly, financial institutions[330] were taken over and basically provided the same business just under a new auspices and rules. The second were money and value transfer services (MVTS)[331] playing a bigger part, as in so many countries where a majority of the people have no bank account. Many of the remitters ran their services in neighbouring countries and were using couriers to bring the money to its destination. Thirdly, money was not the only thing transported by such couriers; also gold or other valuables were smuggled.[332] At last all this contributed to the

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[323] Ibid., 16f.

[324] They kidnapped local and international people. If no money could be expected, or to deliver a political message, those "prisoners" were brutally executed. Ibid., 18.

[325] Either by Non-Profit Organizations, set up intentional or hiding their real purposes collecting money for humanitarian issues. Or by other organizations, like jihadists groups whom pledged allegiance to the "caliph" and donated their resources and fighters to the bigger cause. Or by individuals. Ibid., 18–20.

[326] Ibid., 19f.

[327] Ibid., 20.

[328] Ibid., 20–23.

[329] Ibid., 24–26.

[330] They provide groups to participate at the international financial market or with cash when robbed. The Iraqi government took steps that banks held in Daesh areas were cut off the central system/market, but services in the neighbouring regions still continued and were used by Daesh couriers as access hubs to the international financial system. In Syria the situation presented itself a bit different, the international sanctions already prevented full participation of Syrian banks in the global market. Ibid., 27f.

[331] Either in the form of well-known global players or unregulated regional companies, they are very important to finance trade or pay remittances and other financial services. Again, they are not only used by fighting parties, but are also an important service for civilians. Ibid., 28.

[332] Ibid., 29.

need of financial management and expenditure of funds and assets, in Daesh's case to fund its state like structures for six million people, when it reached its territorial peak. Though their income was quite high, their expenses were too, either to pay their fighters or their bereaved families or to keep basic services and infrastructure operational to improve their popularity among the people.[333] The Daesh case shows that, by using existing structures, their exploitation model was integrated into the regional economies and spread globally.

The conflict in Syria nearly perfectly represented financing of new wars as worked out by Mary Kaldor. Bashar al-Assad's liberalization processes opened up the authoritarian system his father introduced; his reforms accelerated the decline of the working class and the following rise in unemployment and poverty. The war only intensified the beginning erosion of the formal economy, as sanctions and destructions had tremendous consequences. Via various asset transfers Syrians found ways to undermine sanctions, which was useful to minimize formal trade with conflict areas, setting up informal war economies, which trough black market structures with neighbouring countries established hubs in the international financial system. The Daesh conflict economy was just one of many examples of how such an economy could work and that justification for extortion patterns was part of the new fighting networks to generate a kind of consent with the population; a consent that could only be reached through fear, insecurity and intimidation.

4.2.4 Spread of the Conflict. What About the Neighbourhood?

As shown on the last few pages the Syrian conflict was by no means bound to its territorial boarders; as Mary Kaldor's new wars theory proposes. Black market structures to neighbouring countries were set up or the already well-established smuggling networks created a huge new revenue source; such hubs and networks were also used to bring in fighters, weapons and other goods. That parties in the conflict mainly targeted the civilian population, reflects in the development of the biggest refugee crisis of the 21st century. A big share of the handling of this crisis was done by the neighbouring countries, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, putting an economic burden upon these countries but also providing the opportunity for growing income resources.[334] Daesh even went a step further by exporting the conflict to neighbouring Iraq. This spread was

[333] Ibid., 29–31.

[334] In 2014 Syrians found 26% of new businesses registered in Turkey, and in the same year the exports from Turkey to Syria reached their pre-crisis level. *Gobat, Kostial, International Monetary Fund IMF*, Conflict Economy. 12.

supported by propaganda, though used by all sides, it found resonance in the whole region, intensifying the resurrected imaginal conflicts between Sunnis and Shia. After the conflict the question will be where the weapons and fighters of the Syrian war spread, and not if they do so.

5. Conclusion

This work looked into the matter of changing warfare in the era of globalization, with a focus on Mary Kaldor's new wars theory. The theory is put in relation to the thinking of Carl von Clausewitz, and his idealized version of war, and wants to adjust the perception of warfare in contemporary times by emphasizing changes in the political and economic spheres of war. In a final step Kaldor's findings on new wars were compared to the tragedy that evolved in Syria since March 2011.

Mary Kaldor proposed that new wars were likely to take place in autocratic states opening up their closed systems to globalization. Liberalization and reforms in the form of privatization disrupt a well-balanced system of subsidies for political non-intervention, with devastating consequences for the population trapped in a circle of unemployment and poverty. Further, these changes, like budget cuts, hit military institutions in such countries to a point where we no longer can talk about armies but instead see networks of breakaway units, paramilitaries, criminals, mercenaries and foreign regular troops. These elaborated points match the Syrian conflict quite well. It was the reforms and their effects that induced the crumbling of the wall of fear to speak out before the revolution started. Hafez al-Assad's autocratic system was gradually replaced by his son's Bashar al-Assad's globalization inspired kleptocracy with many having family ties to the regime. The conflict further intensified the fragmentation/disintegration of the Syrian army. The regime's praetorian units were already favoured financially and paramilitary units, like some shabihas, experienced a revaluation and legitimization as conflict actors.

To unite such mutual enterprises of violence, as Kaldor called them, and to hold on to a last sense of political legitimization political actors use identity politics to remain in power. This form of politics is obsessed with the past and tells its own narrative: The tribe, nation or religious group needs to return to a glorious past or take revenge for real or imagined wrongdoings. The only possibility to do so is claiming the power in the name of their group and to get rid of others; it is a war "us" versus "them". In the post-colonial world, for Kaldor, these narratives were an answer to the broken promises of inclusive development projects; fear, hate and propaganda were the fuel of identity entrepreneurs. Their rise was, for Mary Kaldor, a contemporary phenomenon in connection to the uncertainties of globalization. In Syria the picture presented itself slightly differently. The management of relationships between the sects, and more the pitting of them against each other, for the purpose of staying in power was already introduced by the French colonial administration. When they succeeded the Ottomans they also exported European

thinking, especially in regard to how states work, to their colonies. The French laid the foundation of a politized and minority filled military as most influential power factor. Hafez al-Assad consolidated his power also along sectarian lines within the military institutions, while promoting a deliberately left ambiguous Syrian national identity with contact points to sectarian actors, to exploit these ties when needed. A strategy his son imitated during the course of the conflict: when standing with the back against the wall the regime intensified its sectarian propaganda. A big help in the sectarian framing process were the involved regional powers, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, following the path of mobilization used in Iraq. Their sectarianism trickled down to the many Syrian militias which were competing for the resources of the big donors. That these units employed identity narratives somehow clouded the fact that individual reasons for Syrians to join the fighting were the same as in many other conflicts: economic, political and social. In order to simplify the conflict Western policy makers and media fall back upon the narrative of ancient hatreds as justification of the war.

Identity politics and the scarce resource situation lead to changes in the methods used in new wars. The power wielders using identity politics as a legitimization strategy describe an eternal war with another group in their narrative and claim that this war can only end if the others are eliminated. Additionally, due to a bad supply situation, the potential for violent clashes is minimal, therefore new warriors try to avoid battles to spare their resources, with severe consequences for the civilian population. The latter are the focus group of fighting units, either targeted through economic exploitation or by physical and psychological violence. What was once unwanted side effects, violations of international law, sought to be minimized or banished, returned as main methods of fighting. Ethnic cleansing, massacres, sexual abuse, or torture are used to impose unbearable memories of what once was home. It is the violent attempt to get rid of the ones not matching the right label. In Syria the conflict, for now, can be divided into two phases. The first phase was when the regime still had a counterinsurgency approach to the protests. Especially during the first year the conflict was characterized by peaceful protests[335] against the regime. These protests were intimidated and brutalized, up to the point where the opposition and especially deserters of the military saw their only option in a violent overthrow of the regime. Also helpful for brutalizing the opposition were the many foreign sponsors and their weapons. After this strategy of brutalization proved fruitful, full war was unleashed. For waging

[335] Some examples for peaceful forms of protests at the beginning of the revolution are found in: *Gamblin* Guillaume, *Sommermayer* Pierre (eds.), Teil I: Gewaltfreiheit in der syrischen Revolution (2011-2013). In: *Gamblin* Guillaume, *Sommermayer* Pierre, *Marin*, Lou, Im Kampf gegen die Tyrannei: Gewaltfrei-revolutionäre Massenbewegungen in arabischen und islamischen Gesellschaften: der zivile Widerstand in Syrien 2011-2013 und die 'Republikanischen Brüder' im Sudan 1983-1985 (Heidelberg 2018) 8–95.

this war the regime also relied on its foreign sponsors Iran and Russia. These sponsors were to the highest degree responsible for the regime's capabilities to eliminate their foes. In that manner sieges were just an outrageous example of unifying various displacement methods, or more cynically expressed sieges were a military necessity to eliminate the foe justified by terms of "realpolitik", used by all parties to the conflict and with no international consequences so far and in the foreseeable future.

Not only actors and methods changed, but also the way organized violence is financed differs from former times. External support, either from diaspora communities, organizations or foreign governments or individuals, is of utmost importance. There is a claim that states on the brink of new wars are cut off from the international finical markets and confronted with the consequences of economic reforms paralyzing their formal economy. Therefore the various new fighting networks establish their own war economies. In these, remittances and donations to the people are recycled via different asset transfers for the armed group. It is a system where it can be more productive to exploit the civilian population than to fight a revolutionary war. In Syria many of these assumptions proved to be true, as the reforms of the regime pressured an already tight labour market. Many Syrians depended on state subsidies for many products, but because austerity was the mantra of the neo-liberals these subsidies were cut and the people left behind formed an immense pool of recruits for the many factions. Further sanctions imposed in the beginning of the conflict cut Syria off the international market, the regime compensated this through its allies. Daesh proved that these war economies somehow work like formal ones, with an income and expenses though their way of generating these differs.

In a last step Kaldor pointed to the proximity factor of such conflicts. Not only are neighbouring countries important finical hubs for the set-up of war economies, if they have access to international markets, they are also highly likely sharing the biggest part of the humanitarian burden of conflicts, by hosting most refugees. A situation we know all too well from Syria and its neighbours.

Overall it can be said that Mary Kaldor's new wars theory was right in regard to many crucial points and right in proposing that warfare has changed. But especially when it comes to identity politics a broader historical approach could be useful to refine the new wars theory and its claim that this is a new form of identity politics inspired by globalization. When considering identity politics in connection with Michel Foucault it becomes clearer that the foundations of this phenomenon are intrinsic to the balance of power in European statehood. The discourse of "us" versus "them", started in the 17th century with opposition against the monarchy and culminated in the still ongoing biological-social racism of the 19th century and its assumption of a parasite

group within the societal body. Through permanent public use of their war narrative, this thinking shaped political institutions in Europe and the colonies.

Because of colonialism the European phenomenon, the historico-political discourse in politics, was important for Syria. As shown, it was the French who introduced the pitting of the sects against each other for the purpose of staying in power, a practice the new rulers of Syria were happy to adopt. In this reading it can be argued that the setup of sect-based networks by Hafez al-Assad was really out of opportunism or that he just inherited a ruling system already focused on a minority, recruiting his partners in crime from a circle of already privileged people. In Syria the most powerful actors of the region, the regime and its Iranian supporters on the one side and Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey amongst others on the other side, propagated identity matters. They knew about the potential behind the mobilization of ancient hatred, a strategy already adopted in Iraq. So, in connection with their transnational news networks they were able to frame the conflict as an inevitable clash. A narrative wilfully latched onto by European policy makers and media. This might indicate that Europe still sees the globe through a historico-political, or colonial, lens. But beside these powerful actors everyday Syrians had many motivations, economic and political, to either join the fighting or flee the country.

In that sense maybe the new identity politics become a way for the powerful to justify a new balance of power in a globalized world, or their try to win over the marginalized they created as consequence of their economic liberalization. And when ordinary people finally protest this unjust system the answer by the power wielders is extreme violence, to stay in or grasp power.

The war in Syria indicates that many presumptions of a changing character of organized violence will happen in the globalized era. Mary Kaldor's claims appeared throughout the conflict, especially the actors, methods, financing and proximity of the conflict nearly perfectly match the described patterns. Though identity politics were an important mobilization tool for the powerful actors, though, as shown, their contemporariness can be questioned when approached within a broader historical view. Maybe Syria further helps to overcome the primacy of interstate warfare in conflict studies, that we do not witness a completely new kind of warfare must be clear also from Kaldor's proposal that the theory should help to change the perception of organized violence in these days. Therefore political solutions will not be enough in Syria, as it is not a classic civil war, any solution will need to address the deeper issues fuelling the conflict, like inequality or a lack of freedom of the people.

As long as states are the favoured political entity Clausewitz is of importance. His trinitarian conception understood in an institutional sense of state/army/people united for war did not apply

in Syria, as the line between civilians and military could no longer be drawn. But if interpreted as disparate social and ethical tendencies which come together in war, like Kaldor did, Clausewitz's ideas still applies in Syria. In Syria we, in part, saw an old war of geopolitics fought by proxies of the regional and superpowers, but also elements of new wars like identity politics and the intent to include civilians in military and economic strategies. In this matter it is arguable, with Foucault, that with the erosion of the military apparatus, the legitimate guarantor of security, the return of day-to-day violence into society in Syria was inevitable. But this by far is a too historicistic point of view. After a year of peaceful protests, it was the regime itself that massively contributed to bring violence back by brutalizing the opposition, firstly through intimidation and later through militarization, which changed the narrative of the conflict. It was the militarization that gave the rulers a free hand to use any means to crush the insurgency. For the international community this more or less justified the use of violence as an act of defence against the, in the regime's version by outside powers orchestrated, revolution. Domestically it escalated the conflict until it nearly matched the Clausewitzean description of absolute war; leaning towards extremes where the one using extreme violence in abundance in the end can dictate the laws to the defeated. But simultaneously many individuals in the ranks of the regime profited from the war economies, either by setting up their own enterprises or by cooperating with one of the many that sprang up all round Syria. Among the opposition some surly believed that a real revolution, another society, was possible; though others had proven that mobilization around a sect, may it be Shiism or Sunnism, was a welcome support for establishing violent enterprises to exploit the population and to legitimize their rule through a political narratives. An implementation of hate between "us" and "them" was an important factor to motivate people to commit atrocities and to justify the use of force. A wilful helper in that regard was the international community, using the term "realpolitik" to justify most of its actions, of either direct or indirect support of any faction or by denying adequate help for the Syrian population. Unfortunately it is this community of politicians, who now establish new security patterns. It is doubtful that they will provide "security" for as many people as possible and not only for them and their beneficiaries.

To sum up the tragedy in Syria was a new war as proposed by Mary Kaldor, regarding her elaborated categories. But it was not a post-Clausewitzean war, mainly because the theory never claimed to describe a post-Clausewitzean future.

The years to come will show if societies around the world will accept the challenge to replace war as *the* social activity of our lives by thinking of other security concepts envisaging a more just and peaceful world; finally fulfilling Dwight D. Eisenhower's pious hope of a disarmed

world. Most probably such a dream can only be realized if dramatic changes in the perception of statehood will appear.

Considerations of Kaldor's quantitative claims about data, that battles are rare or the ratio of military to civilian deaths, are hard to determine in the Syrian war. This has many reasons, for example we lack accurate data especially of civilian deaths[336], complicated by the problem of how civilians and fighters in the new wars can be distinguished. Different is the situation for the other data claim by Kaldor. She stated that the main targets are civilians, a claim that can be measured by a rise of displaced people. In Syria roughly half of the pre-conflict population of 22 million became either refugees or internally displaced persons. To understand conflicts better it is important to collect accurate data about all deaths, not only those of military personnel, as well as plans to reduce the suffering of displaced persons, like providing the necessary accommodations or strengthening the rights of such people.

Only in hindsight, once a final resolution of the conflict is reached and the necessary sources and political changes are done, it will be possible to make a verdict if Syria was the beginning of the end of perceiving war, or organized violence, through a state based lens. As we have seen the transformation of modern nation states took place over decades and centuries, and with it the perception of war as state activity. For the moment we are only at the beginning of the dissolution of such structures. For Syria, at the moment, it is to fear that the wounds inflicted in nearly nine years of conflict, between the different groups within the state, but also to and by neighbouring countries, will only heal slowly. Further the reintegration of various conflict economies into, firstly, the Syrian and later the global market should not be at the expense of the population if the aim is a long-lasting solution. And it is also well worth remembering that the millions of people who fled the country did not only leave because of the war, but were also motivated by political and economic circumstances in Syria, which have only gotten worse during the war.

What we are currently experiencing shows us that dramatic changes in statehood are not limited to wars alone. Unpredictable are the consequences the Covid-19 pandemic will have on states and the globalized international system as a whole; where particularism or cosmopolitanism as guiding principles are just two examples for new patterns of coexistence. But maybe understanding and analysing conflict in a contemporary fashion, as Mary Kaldor proposed and as this work tries to do in the case of the war in Syria, can provide a foundations for decisions made to actively shape what this new form of coexistence might look like.

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[336] For an overview about the numbers see: *The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights*, 570 Thousand People were Killed.

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7. List of Abbreviations

CPI	Consumer Price Index
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale
FSA	Free Syrian Army
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighter
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internal Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
JRFSNA	Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment
KNC	Kurdish National Council (Encûmena Nişţimanî ya Kurdî li Sûriyê)
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIME-NET	Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network
MVTS	Money and Value Transfer Services
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDF	National Defence Force
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPL	Non-Performing Loan
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê)
PYD	Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat)
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SCRP	Syrian Centre for Policy Research
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US	United States
WIR	World Investment Report
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II
YPG	People Protections Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel)

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Figure 1: Resource flows in new wars……53