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How's chances for one of those glances:

INTRA-PARTY RULES AND WOMEN'S PROBABILITY OF
WINNING PARLIAMENTARY SEATS

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Abstract

english. Political parties are the gatekeepers to political office and affect who runs for legislative seats and who gets a spot on viable list positions. In placing candidates on these positions, the party does also determine the representation of women in parliament. The decision which runs for legislative office, how many women or men, and on which position falls in the candidate selection process preceding the election. Therefore, the following thesis seeks to answer the question of which candidate selection mode increases the nomination of women to viable list positions. I argue that it depends on whether responsibility for insufficient female representation is concentrated or diffused. If a single party leader or a limited number of party elites conduct candidate selection, responsibility concentrates on an identifiable actor. Hence, the main hypothesis is that less inclusive (smaller) candidate selectorates lead to more women on viable list positions. Two further interaction hypotheses state that this effect increases when an interest group (women's sub-organisation or voters) pressures the selectorate for female representation. Using an original dataset of 9000+ candidates of 38 parties in six countries, I investigate the effect of candidate selection procedures. Results provide evidence that more inclusive (larger) selectorates lead to a higher share of

women on viable list positions. Moreover, the effects are positively moderated by the pressure of parties' voters.

german. Politische Parteien bestimmen welche Kandidaten unter ihrer Liste für Sitze im Parlament kandidieren und ob auf vielversprechenden Listenplätzen. Durch diese Platzierungen bestimmt die Partei auch die Repräsentation von Frauen im Parlament. Die Entscheidung darüber wer für einen Sitz im Parlament kandidiert, wie viele Frauen und Männer, und auf welcher Platzierung findet im Zuge des Kandidatenselektionsprozesses statt. Diese Masterarbeit untersucht welche Kandidatenselektionsprozesse die Platzierung von Frauen auf vielversprechenden Listenpositionen erhöht. Die Arbeit folgt der Annahme dass es darauf ankommt ob die Verantwortung für die unzureichende Repräsentation von Frauen klar erkennbar oder diffus ist. Wenn ein einzelner Parteichef oder mehrere Parteieliten über die Kandidatenselektion und Platzierung entscheiden, liegt die Verantwortung bei einem eindeutig zu identifizierenden Akteur. Die erste Hypothese dieser Arbeit ist daher dass weniger inklusive (und daher kleine) Selektorate mehr Frauen auf vielversprechenden Listenpositionen platzieren. Zwei weitere Interaktionshypothesen stellen die Erwartung auf, dass sich der positive Effekt von kleineren Selektoraten verstärkt, wenn eine Interessensgruppe Druck auf das Selektorat ausübt und Frauenrepräsentation fordert. Ich teste diese Erwartungen anhand eines selbstständig gesammelten Datensatzes, der Informationen zu 9000+ Kandidaten von 38 Parteien in sechs Ländern enthält. Die Resultate zeigen das inklusive (größere) Selektorate zu einem höheren Anteil von Frauen auf vielversprechenden Listenpositionen führen. Zuletzt finde ich Evidenz für die Hypothese dass der Druck von Wählern diese positiven Effekte verstärkt.

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I Introduction

Political parties vary to a large extent on the number of women they send to parliament. As a gatekeeper to political office, parties play a crucial role when it comes to the explanation of equal and unequal representation in parliament. We can find some explanatory power in the candidate selection mode, which precedes the parliamentary election. Within the candidate selection, it depends strongly on the party, which candidates run for legislative seats. Consequently, the party affects the degree of representation of diverse societal groups on electoral lists (Aldrich, 2018). Nonetheless, equal representation on these lists explains only to a limited extent future descriptive representation in parliament. The *placement* of candidates on particular positions on the party's list can be crucial for his or her election. If the parties place women on those positions which are not very promising, the degree of representation on lists does not have much explanatory power for the representation in parliament after the election (Htun et al., 2002; Schmidt, 2009). This is true, not only for closed but also for flexible and open list systems. The process in which every party determines who may run for legislative seats and on which position is the candidate selection mode. The organisation of the candidate selection mode varies from party to party. Therefore, the following thesis seeks to answer the question of which candidate selection mode increases the nomination of women on *viable* positions (Luhiste, 2015). Viable positions are those positions with promising prospects on the election. While the party may not be able to affect who will receive a seat in parliament directly, it indeed affects directly which candidates they place on viable list positions.

I argue that it is a question of whether responsibility for insufficient female representation can be allocated to specific actors of the board, which decides over candidate selection. Placing women on viable positions is what the responsible actor can most directly affect. As a result, when there exists a directly identifiable actor responsible for candidate selection and therefore for the insufficient representation of women within the parliament, I expect the number of women on viable positions to rise. Moreover,

I argue that there exists an identifiable responsible actor within the party when the party leader or some party elites conduct the candidate selection and placement. In contrast, a higher number of people who decide over candidate selection blurs the identification of a responsible actor. For example, a congress of party members which decides over candidate selection makes the allocation of responsibility for insufficient female representation less clear. Therefore, I expect a candidate selection conducted by one or some identifiable actors to have a positive effect on the percentage of women on viable positions, compared to more inclusive boards as such a congress. Furthermore, I argue that the size of this effect depends on the pressure of a demanding group in favour of more female representation, which holds the selectorate accountable. In case such a demanding group may put pressure on the selectorate, I expect the positive effect of an identifiable and responsible actor to increase. Therefore, I formulate two additional expectations on the moderating effects of first, women's sub-organisation and second, the voters' position on gender roles to increase the positive effect of exclusive candidate selection modes.

To investigate this relationship is important for several reasons. First of all, for academic purposes, it helps to understand how the candidate selection process itself determines the descriptive representation of women in parliaments. The candidate selection process, also known as the 'secret garden of politics' (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988), is a decisive stage in the process which leads to the outcome of descriptive representation in parliament. However, studies which investigate the effects of candidate selection on political representation are limited (e.g. Aldrich 2018, Luhiste 2015). This master thesis will shed light on this yet understudied relationship. Furthermore, to understand the relationship is crucial, also beyond academia, as it may have implications for the substantive representation of women. Still, the question of how descriptive representation enhances substantive representation is somewhat controversial (Pitkin, 1967; Mansbridge, 1999; Young, 2002; Childs, 2006). Studies which have investigated the effect of descriptive representation on substantive representation reveal that positive effects occur more likely when the amount of women in parliament meets a certain

threshold (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Furthermore, Atkeson and Carrillo (2007) find that increasing descriptive representation has a positive effect on female citizen's external efficacy. This means that with more women as representatives in parliament, women within society have increasingly the feeling that political actors are responsive to their demands.

Second, this study is further important as it should offer explanations on how more 'democratic' candidate selection modes affect representation. Introducing more 'democratic' modes within parties, in terms of candidate selection could lead to more diversity among the selecting board. One might assume that diversely assembled selecting boards to encourage lists which are more representative. However, so far, research suggested that inclusive candidate selection procedures and representation are negatively correlated (Rahat et al. 2008; Shomer, f.). Also, this study's theory suggests a negative relationship. If this is the case, parties need to start thinking about the consequences of transforming candidate selection procedures into more 'democratic' ones. Those parties which seek to open their candidate selection mode, e.g. the party members, also need to consider the possible consequence of decreasing descriptive representation of diverse societal groups among their members of parliament. If those parties would like to mitigate this effect, they might consider implementing quotas that ensure a certain degree of descriptive representation, as a control mechanism.

This master thesis uses an originally assembled dataset with the data of more than 9000 candidates on the lists of 38 different parties in Iceland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain to investigate the effect. As a first step, I predict which positions on parties' lists are most viable. As a second step, I calculate the share of women on these viable positions, which serves as the dependent variable. Afterwards, I show, in bivariate and multivariate analyses, using a linear regression model, that in fact, inclusive candidate selection modes show a higher share of women on viable positions. Consequently, this master thesis provides evidence that the trends towards more democratisation of candidate selection procedures (Sandri et al. 2015), which means that they involve more decision-makers, does not have a negative effect on the share

of women on viable positions. Therefore, parties may extend their candidate selection procedures and include more decision-makers without the constraint that this measure may have decreasing consequences for the representation of women. Furthermore, I find that while women's sub-organisations do not increase the effect of any candidate selection mode, an egalitarian position of the party's voters on gender roles does.

The following sections provide the literature review, theoretical argument, research design, analysis and conclusion. In the literature review in section [III](#) I will summarise how scholars so far have explained what affects the degree of female representation and how the candidate selection mode served as an explanatory variable. Furthermore, section [III](#) will specify the theoretical argument on how a lower number of actors deciding over the candidates (exclusive selectorate) provides clear identification of the responsible actor for female representation and therefore may increase the representation of women on viable list positions. Section [IV](#) explains which cases I include in the analysis, the measurement of all variables and the collection and structure of the original dataset. The analysis in section [V](#) provides some descriptives as well as the results, conducted in an ANOVA-test and a linear regression model. Lastly, the conclusion in section [VI](#) provides a summary and further implications.

II Literature Review

Scholars increasingly addressed the question of which factors on the country-, party- and individual-level enhance or attenuate representation of women ([Wängnerud, 2009](#)). Several studies investigated how macro-level variables are affecting the representation of women on party lists and later on in parliament. Most importantly, among them are characteristics of the electoral system. Proportional vs. plurality rules, district magnitude as well as the ballot type affect representation of women. With an increasing district magnitude, the nomination of women is more likely. As the winner takes it all in single-member districts, parties build on the male candidate who is more likely to own the resources to run a campaign and win the single-seat ([Lawless and Fox, 2010](#)). In

comparison, multi-member districts allow the nomination of female candidates, as the constraint of the nomination of only one person is not present. However, an expected positive effect of district magnitude has yet revealed little evidence (Matland 1993; Welch and Studlar 1990).

Moreover, a proportional electoral system provides a more beneficial ground for the representation of women compared to majoritarian systems. For the latter, the same argument applies as it does for smaller districts. Most of the time, majoritarian systems consist of Single Member Districts, the competition in these small districts is higher. Therefore, the party goes for the person it may consider with higher chances of winning, the man. As already mentioned, male candidates are more likely to have the resources to run a successful campaign, their success is more likely (Lawless and Fox, 2010). Comparatively, in proportional systems with larger districts parties have several positions to fill and may easily place women on the list, along with men, with a high chance to get into parliament. As a result of this opportunity, parties are under higher pressure to nominate women who get elected (Rule 1987; Matland, 2005; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Krook 2010; Luhiste 2015). Furthermore, within majoritarian systems, women are more likely to be chosen to run for significantly less winnable seats than men. Especially in conservative parties, women need to prove their ability to face competition before the party considers them as a capable politician (Ryan et al., 2010). Lastly, ballot structures within which voters may choose among the candidates, such as open lists, attenuate female representation in the interaction with traditional cultural norms which do not see women in political office (Valdini, 2012). Furthermore, it also depends on other system-level factors, such as women's increasing achievements in education, their participation in the workforce or cultural norms, how far women take part in political offices (Kunovich and Paxton, 2005).

Apart from country-level factors, party-level variables explain the variance of female representation among parties. Scholars investigated the effects of party ideology (Caul, 1999; Kittilson, 2006), gender quotas (Studlar and McAllister 2002) or how the party organises in terms of candidate selection. The candidate selection mode is a decisive

process for the nomination of women for legislative office. The body within the party who decides over candidate selection is the gatekeeper to political office. More importantly, this selecting body decides who may run on which positions (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). As some positions are more viable than others, the selecting board also decides who will finally receive a seat in parliament. Based on this decisive role of the selecting board, it may be crucial on which characteristics they vary in order to explain the nomination of women on viable positions. Rahat and Hazan (2001) have defined the group within the party that decides over the nominations for the party's list as the 'selectorate'. Within their categorisation, the authors also provide a scheme which makes the candidate selecting boards of parties comparable across parties and countries. One of the dimensions is the in- or exclusivity of the selectorate, which categorises whether the amount of individuals the party includes in the selection process is high (inclusive) or low (exclusive).

In this thesis, I argue that the in- or exclusivity of the parties' selectorates may explain the variation of women on viable list positions. This dimension defines how the selectorate varies in the number of individuals it includes to decide over candidate selection. It ranges from most exclusive to very inclusive with possible extensions to even further inclusivity. A decision made by the party leader displays the most exclusive procedure possible since there is only one person, the leader, who decides. Meanwhile, when several party elites decide on the selection, this is considered to be also an exclusive process but moves beyond more exclusivity on the spectrum as more actors take part in the decision of candidate selection. Furthermore, a candidate selection decided by party delegates, which are representatives selected by party members, includes further actors again and therefore finds itself at the middle of the in- and exclusive spectrum.

Further on the spectrum, party primaries display very inclusive selection modes (Sandri et al., 2015). Research has grouped party primaries in those including members and those including voters. They are 'closed' primaries when they include the party members and open primaries when they include voters. The probably most prominent example of open primaries takes place in the United States, where the parties' registered




Figure 1 – Categorisation of In- and Exclusive Selectorates

voters decide who will run, e.g. legislative seat in the House of Representatives. Although candidate selections held in open primaries are one of the most inclusive procedures in use, parties may further extend the number of people who participate in the selection mode (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). Parties may not just include their sympathizers, but all voters in the selection process. For example, the Austrian liberal party (NEOS) goes further. It allows not only all eligible voters but also all inhabitants with main residence in Austria to participate in their open primaries. Residents without Austrian citizenship do not have the right to vote in the national elections according to Austrian law. However, the party includes them in their candidates' selection¹ Figure 1 shall visualize the in- and exclusivity dimension, as developed by Hazan and Rahat (2010, 35). It ranges from most exclusive, including only the party leader on the right side. Advancing further to the left, it includes more and more participants. Finally, as just outlined with the example of the Austrian liberal party and as also illustrated in the dimension of Hazan and Rahat (2010), the inclusivity of the candidate selection mode may even go beyond the inclusion of voters and also let residents, without a right to vote, participate.

The effect of the in- and exclusivity of candidate selection on the representation of women has been studied explaining women's share on candidate lists. Scholars expected the in- or exclusivity of the selection process to have a significant effect on the outcome in representation on candidate lists (Kittilson, 2006; Cross, 2008; Rahat et al., 2008; Indriðason and Kristinsson, 2015; Pruyssers et al., 2017). Previous research investigated how the degree of in- and exclusivity of the candidate selection board conditions the effects of the electoral system on the share of women on candidate lists (Aldrich, 2018).

¹This open vote counts on third in a three step selection procedure, which is followed by the vote of the party leadership and another vote by the party members (these count one third each).

However, rising representation on candidate lists does not ensure the same degree of descriptive representation in parliament if women are not placed on list positions which are very likely to get a seat in parliament, by those who select them for candidacy. And still, what interests us as scholars and what has most implications for the substantive representation of women is descriptive representation in parliament and not on lists. Therefore, the question emerges how in- and exclusivity affect women's chances to get into parliament.

Scholars dedicated considerably less attention to the effect of the in- or exclusivity of candidate selection modes on the placement of women on viable positions. So far, this relationship has been mainly investigated in case studies and revealed no clear findings. Rahat et al. (2008) examined, in bivariate analysis that the most inclusive candidate selection in Israel (the selection by a group of party members) produces the least representation of women on 'safe' positions. The authors defined those positions which received a seat in parliament in the end as 'safe'. Contrary to these findings, another case study which investigated the effect of primaries in Iceland, found no significant relationship between very inclusive modes and the representation of women in parliament and on positions which were also 'promising' (Indriðason and Kristinsson, 2015, 572). Moreover, a recent case study (Shomer, f.), on the Israeli case, shows that there is indeed a positive effect of the closed primaries on the representation of women. However, this effect disappears when the model controls for protective mechanisms, such as gender quotas. Therefore it turns out that the effect of primaries on the representation of women is not significantly positive if no gender quotas exist. Parties, which decide on candidate selection in closed primaries, implement gender quotas to mitigate the potentially negative effects of this selection mode.

Moreover, Luhiste (2015) investigated the relationship between candidate selection and the viability of women's list positions for the elections of the European Parliament with data of the European Candidate Survey. In this survey, candidates themselves estimate how viable their position on the ballot is. Luhiste then uses the candidates individual estimation as the dependent variable and found no significant negative

relationship between an inclusive selection process and women's candidacy on viable positions as she expected. I argue that this approach suffers from two shortcomings. First, candidate surveys may not be the most appropriate data source to estimate the relationship due to their sample bias among those candidates with limited prospects to get into parliament. Second, when candidates themselves estimate the winning chances of their ballot position, they may evaluate these chances differently, which leads to no consistent measurement in viability.

This thesis aims to extend our knowledge on the relationship between the candidate selection mode and women's chances of winning parliamentary seats by compensating for some shortcomings of previous studies. First, I will provide a reliable measure of the viability of list positions, using the predicted probability of each position to be elected. Second, I will conduct a cross-national analysis, including six European democracies. Third and lastly, I aim to extend the knowledge on the effect of candidate selection modes on the representation of women on viable list positions by how the pressure of interest groups who demand female representation moderates the relationship. In the following, I specify the theory on the relationship between the candidate selection mode and the placement of women on viable seats. Furthermore, I outline how I expect that interest groups moderate the relationship.

III Theoretical Framework

To answer the research question which candidate selection mode increases the nomination of women on viable list positions, I formulate one baseline hypothesis (H1) and two interaction hypotheses (H2a-b) on the expected effect of the in-/exclusivity of candidate selection modes. I expect that exclusive candidate selection modes increase the nomination of women on viable positions. I base this expectation on the argument that in the case of exclusive selectorates, the responsible actor for insufficient female representation may be easily identified. Furthermore, I expect this effect to increase if there exists a demanding group in the party which holds the selectorate accountable. I

will elaborate on the theoretical mechanism in the following two subsections.

III.I Hypothesis 1: Exclusive vs. Inclusive Selectorates

I argue that it is the clarity of responsibility for the degree of representation in parliament, which explains the relationship between the selection process and the placement of women on viable positions. As the selectorate is the gatekeeper to the political office, it is accountable for not ensuring sufficient descriptive representation of women in parliament. The selectorate can ensure or at least manipulate whether women receive a seat in parliament by placing them in viable positions. I argue that in the allocation of responsibility, it makes a difference whether the accountable actor is identifiable (Pruysers et al., 2017). When the responsible actor may be clearly identified, also the allocation of responsibility for insufficient female representation is apparent. Furthermore, I argue that in the case of exclusive selectorates, the responsible actor is easy to identify as it only consists of one or several actors (as the party leadership or some party elites). As a result, exclusive selectorates are a clear target as responsible decision-makers that are in charge of female representation in parliament. On the contrary, I argue that increasing inclusivity blurs the identification of the responsible actor. The more individuals the selectorate includes in the decision-making process, and the less is it clear who is responsible for candidate selection. As a result, when inclusive selectorates can not be held accountable, they feel fewer pressures in ensuring sufficient female representation. So, for instance, while candidate selection driven by stereotypes may be punished in the case of exclusive selectorates, it is less likely to be punished in the case of inclusive selectorates, such as closed or open primaries (Niven, 1998; Hinojosa, 2012).

Why exclusive selectorates are also more identifiable as responsible actors may also find further reasoning in the decision making process. In exclusive selectorates, it is not only clear who is responsible for the decision, but also who can guide the outcome of the decision. Exclusive selectorates such as a small group of party elites are, to a greater extent able to control the degree of representation on viable positions. They

can communicate and compromise over a balanced representation of societal groups on these viable positions. According to Rahat et al. (2008, 666), this compromise is more likely to happen in exclusive selectorates for several reasons. First, within small groups, regular communication over the composition of an equally representative list is much more likely to happen than within a large group of party members or voters. Second, even though large groups arrive at a compromise, there is a limited possibility to monitor whether each member of the inclusive selectorate stays within this compromise, due to the sometimes performed anonymity of the ballot. Third, within the context of an inclusive selectorate, it is hard to predict who is likely to win and receive the candidacy. Hence, it may also be hard to counteract within the selectorate towards a trend of less female representation. Consequently, as an exclusive selectorate can compromise, the responsibility for a not representative list lies more clearly with them than within an inclusive selectorate. The latter is less likely to find this compromise.

Therefore, I formulate the following baseline hypothesis (H1) and expect a positive effect of exclusive selectorates on the placement of women on viable positions:

H_1 : A more exclusive candidate selection mode increases the share of women on viable list positions.

III.II Hypotheses 2: Interest Groups' Pressure, Inside & Outside

Furthermore, selectorates may receive pressure from interest groups who hold them accountable for the insufficient representation of women on viable list positions (Matland and Studlar, 1996; Caul, 1999). I argue that their pressure moderates the effect of the in-/exclusivity of the candidate selection mode on the share of women on viable positions. Scholars have found that there is an increase of groups within the electorate and parties that demand for equal representation of women (Luhiste, 2015; Caul, 1999; Wäckerle, 2019). I argue that when these groups are in the position to punish the selectorate for not keeping up with their expectation of sufficient female representation, their pressure may increase the share of women on viable list positions. Furthermore, I

argue that it depends on the in-/exclusivity of the selectorate, whether these interest groups can exercise their pressure. In the case of an exclusive selectorate, there exists an identifiable responsible actor the interest group can directly address. In the meantime, as already elaborated, in the case of inclusive selectorates responsibility gets blurred (Pruysers et al. 2017). As a result, the interest group may not be able to address their demand for female representation directly. Therefore, I expect that the positive effect of exclusive selectorates increases if an interest group demands an equal representation of men and women.

I assume such demanding interest groups to be women's activists and factions inside the party or the party's voters, demanding from outside the party organisation. I define these two kinds of pressure as 'inside' and 'outside' pressure. These two interest groups may have different opportunities for putting pressure on the selectorate. In the following, I specify the theoretical framework of when and how these two groups may put pressure on the selectorate that leads to a higher share of women on viable list positions. Furthermore, I argue how their opportunity to exercise pressure depends on the type of selectorate.

III.II.I Inside the Party: Women's Sub-organisation

First, I expect a women's sub-organisation within the party to positively moderate the effect of the in-/exclusivity of the candidate selection mode. I assume that with the establishment of a women's sub-organisation within a party, women's interests have become a salient issue for the party. Therefore, I assume that with the establishment of an organisation, women demand their representation within the party organisation and political office. Kittilson (2011) has found that there is an increasing emergence and influence of women's organisations within parties, which also increases the representation of women. Such a sub-organisation provides an actor within the party that may act as representative of women or all members of the party who emphasise women's interests and acts on their behalf. As they are part of the organisation, they have the opportunity to address their demand, for what they consider as sufficient female representation,

directly to the selectorate. If their demand is not filled, they may put pressure on the selectorate to deliver the representation of female candidates they are expecting.

Furthermore, for women's sub-organisations inside the party, an exclusive selectorate (party leader or elites) is easier to identify as a responsible actor. Therefore, they are more likely to be able to hold an exclusive selectorate accountable. Meanwhile, an inclusive selectorate (party members or voters) is harder to identify as a responsible actor. As a result, the sub-organisation may be less likely to know towards whom they should address the demand for equal representation of women. In the case of an exclusive selectorate, this demand may be allocated quite directly to an identifiable actor who can guide the decision towards increasing female representation (Rahat et al., 2008). Therefore exclusive selectorates might be under higher pressure than other selectorates to be responsive to the demand.

Therefore, I expect the positive effect of an exclusive selectorate to increase when there exists a women's organisation within the party.

H_{2a} : The positive effect of an exclusive candidate selection mode on the share of women on viable list positions increases if there exists a women's group in the party.

III.II.II Outside the Party: Voters' Demand

The second interest group I expect to have a moderating effect on the relationship between the in-/exclusivity of the candidate selection mode and the share of women on viable list positions is the party's voters. When voters demand equal female representation, I argue that they put pressure on the selectorate, which, if it does not already, follows this demand. Otherwise, the party might face the consequence that voters re-evaluate their voting decision. Research has shown that voters indeed value equal representation of women and men on lists and in parliament (McIlveen, 2009; Wäckerle, 2019). I argue that voters' demand for female representation rises with the position they allocate to women within society. When voters hold the opinion that women should receive an equal position next to men within society and therefore be visible in the public sphere (e.g.

take part in the workforce and be represented in parliament) I define their position as a *libertarian*. In contrast, if voters hold the stance that women should be not allocated a visible position in the public sphere, I define their position to be *authoritarian*. In the latter case, their demand for female representation is lower. As a result, I argue that with a more libertarian position on gender roles, voters also demand equal female representation. If the party, or the selectorate, does not supply the representation of women they are expecting, they might be disappointed and confront the party with a declining vote share. This mechanism displays the instrument of pressure the selectorate may face when they do not supply the appropriate share of women on viable positions.

Similarly, as for women's sub-organisations, I further argue that also when it comes to voters' demand, it is easier for them to hold an exclusive selectorate accountable. Following the same argument, in the case of inclusive selectorates responsibility for female representation gets blurred while it is quite evident in the case of exclusive selectorates. Exclusive selectorates may be under higher pressure than other selectorates to be responsive to the voters' demand as responsibility can be directed clearly to them.

Therefore, I expect the positive effect of an exclusive selectorate to increase when voters who hold libertarian views hold the selectorate accountable.

H_{2b} : The positive effect of an exclusive candidate selection mode on the share of women on viable list positions increases the more libertarian the party's voters' positions on gender roles are.

IV Research Design

This section covers the case selection, the operationalisation of the main and control variables and the data in use. First, I explain in the case selection in subsection IV.I which cases on the country and party level I have included and on which criteria I have made the inclusion. The case selection on the country level follows three criteria:

proportional, closed-list and single-tier electoral systems. I have selected these cases to hold several characteristics constant, which might have an effect on the proportion of women on viable list positions and as these cases provide a favourable ground to test the theory. As I have already elaborated in section II on page 10, proportional electoral systems have a positive effect on the representation of women in parliament. Therefore, I will hold this variable constant. Furthermore, closed-list systems provide the opportunity to define which list positions are viable and which are not, based on the results of previous elections. As a further step, it allows me to estimate which candidates run on viable positions and how many of them are women. Finally, as in single-tier electoral systems, candidates may run on only one tier it is easier to track a candidate's chances to get into parliament. Electoral systems with more than one tier, provide the candidates with the opportunity to run on positions in different tiers, which may be unequally viable. As a result, this may skew the shares of women, respectively men, on viable list positions. Therefore I exclude multi-tier systems. I will explain why I have limited the case selection to these electoral systems in more detail the subsection IV.I

Second, regarding the operationalisation of the variables, subsection IV.II will outline the measurement of the dependent and the three independent variables. Furthermore, I specify the control variables included in the multivariate analysis and explain their measurement. I provide in debt explanation, especially for the dependent variable, the share of women on viable positions, as the measurement requires several steps. First, I estimate the predicted probability of each list position to get elected. I define positions with an election probability higher than 80% as viable. As a final step, I calculate the share of women on viable positions for each party. This share serves as the dependent variable in the final analysis in section V

Lastly, I describe in subsection IV.II the sources I have used to collect and assemble the dataset for the analysis. As there exists no consistent dataset, to test the theory I have originally collected and composed it. First, I have gathered the candidate lists of 38 parties in six countries and automatically coded the gender of the 9061 candidates on these lists based on their first names. For each position on the lists, I have predicted

its election probability based on the results of previous elections. This step required the data of the results of earlier elections. After providing the predicted probabilities for each position, I have aggregated the share of women on positions with an election probability higher than 80% for each party. Lastly, I have added the relevant party data on candidate selection mode (H1), the existence of a women's organisation (H2a), their voters' position on gender roles (H2b) and the control variables. I will refer to each source I used for the data composition in more detail in subsection **IV.II**.

IV.I Case Selection

IV.I.I Country-Level: Proportional, Closed-List and Single-Tier

While **Rahat et al. (2008)**, as well as **Indriðason and Kristinsson (2015)** investigated the relationship between the selection processes and placement of women on viable positions as a side note of their single-case studies, the following thesis aims to investigate the relationship in a cross-country analysis in more detail. The cases included are Iceland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. This selection follows three criteria the analysis aims to hold constant, which are 1. proportional, 2. closed-list and 3. single-tier electoral environments. I will outline in the following, why I chose these criteria to determine the case selection.

First of all, the analysis holds constant the electoral system in terms of proportionality. Mixed, as well as majoritarian systems, are not included. As already summarized in the literature review, proportional systems have a positive effect on the representation of minorities compared to mixed and majoritarian systems. In majoritarian systems parties, often go for men to run in SMDs because they presume that men have higher chances to win the districts. Meanwhile, in PR-systems parties may nominate several candidates on their lists as competition for the seats is not that high (**Rule, 1987; Matland, 2005; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Krook, 2010; Luhiste, 2015**). As a result, the nomination of women on viable positions is more likely in proportional systems. Therefore, the analysis will hold this characteristic constant.

Second, I limit the case selection to closed-list systems, for two specific reasons. First, closed-list systems, in general, have a positive effect on the representation of women (Luhiste, 2015). To control for this effect, I will hold this factor constant. Second, closed-list systems provide a favourable environment to estimate the viability of list positions. The ballot structure of closed-list systems does not allow any change of the order of the list by the voter. As a result, the order of the list fully determines the viability of a list position. Positions at the top are consistently more viable than positions at the end of the list. Which candidates receive a very viable position and will probably enter parliament is therefore mainly a decision made by the selectorate. I assume that based on parties' gained seats in previous elections, it is possible to estimate which positions at the top of the list are the most viable, which are the so-called 'contested' ones further down the list and which are without hope at the bottom. Hence, as a pre-procedure, I will estimate the election-probability of the positions on the parties' list. I base this estimation on whether these positions have been elected in the elections before. I will explain this procedure in more detail when it comes to the operationalisation of the dependent variable on page 26

Third, the analysis includes only single-tier electoral systems. I limit the cases to single-tier systems for to reduce the complexity of the data structure and analysis. The tier defines the level on which seat allocation takes place. Some electoral systems have only one tier on which this seat allocation takes place, and others have two or more. In electoral systems with more than one tier, the running parties create lists for each of these tiers. In electoral systems with more than one tier, candidates are allowed to run on more than one or all of these tiers. In doing so, they try to secure their entry into parliament. As a result, parties may place candidates on non-viable positions on the list of one tier but a somewhat viable position on the list of another tier. Not taking this multiple candidacies into account may skew the results of the analysis without notice. It is possible to address this problem with two approaches. First, I may use the list of only one tier. In this way, it could not control for double candidacy and ignore possibly skewed results. As the thesis aims to avoid this kind of skewed results, taking only one




Figure 2 – Case Selection based on Electoral System Characteristics

list into account is no option. Second, I may use the lists of all tiers. In this case, it would be possible to track the candidates, indicate whether they run more than one tier and control for multiple candidacies. However, tracking and controlling for this double candidacy would still increase the complexity. Furthermore, as there are indeed single-tier cases available, which make a less complex analysis feasible, the analysis will focus on them.

Figure 2 provides a map of the cases considered for the case selection and illustrates once again how I arrived at the final selection. The colours indicate why I selected Iceland, Israel, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands and why I excluded other cases. I coloured the excluded cases in grey. The different shades of grey indicate the reason why I excluded these cases. I shaded the selected cases in beige. Furthermore, I also included the Netherlands and Iceland (shaded in dark beige), as two electoral systems with an open-list ballot structure. These two cases are characterised by a weak preferential vote system which does only alter the order of the candidates to a minimal extent (Andeweg and Van Holsteyn, 2011; Kristinsson and Indriðason, 2016). Therefore,

Iceland and the Netherlands follow the criteria for which I stayed with closed-list systems. The order of the list fully determines the viability of the list position and is not altered to a large extent by voters at election day. Beyond the scope of the map in figure 2 there would further be Canada, the United States of America, Australia, and New Zealand to consider. However, as these systems provide either a majoritarian or a mixed electoral system, I did not take them into account. I base the selection following these criteria on the data of Pilet et al. (2016) and Gallagher and Mitchell (2005). For detailed information, table 8 in the Appendix shows all cases of western democracies listed with characteristics of their electoral system.

As a result, the cases of Iceland, Italy, Israel, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain appear to be most appropriate to test the hypotheses. Table 1 lists all selected cases again, with the election under investigation. In most cases, I chose the recent election, mostly due to data availability. Candidate information and lists are available most of the time only for the last election. Furthermore, although, Italy changed its electoral system to a mixed type before the election in 2018, the country had a proportional system until the election 2013. Therefore, I used the data of the 2013 Italian national elections.

Table 1 – Case Selection: Country Level

Country	Election
Iceland	October 2017
Israel	September 2019
Italy	February 2013
Spain	April 2019
Portugal	October 2015
The Netherlands	March 2017

IV.I.II Party-Level

Table 2 shows the party abbreviations and names of the 38 parties that I have included in the sample. Moreover, the column on the very right shows the kind of selectorate of the respective party which decides over candidate selection for national elections. I provide further information on the selectorates, the measurement of in-/exclusivity as

well as the data sources for candidate selection modes in subsection [IV.II.II](#). To use the data of as many parties as possible I have sought to collect the necessary data of all parties represented in parliament and running for legislative seats in the election listed in table [1](#). However, as the necessary data was not available for every party represented in parliament and running for office, I could not include these cases [2](#).

IV.II Method & Data

In this subsection, I elaborate on the operationalisation and measurement of the dependent, all independent variables and the control variables. Additionally, I provide reasoning why I include certain control variables. Furthermore, as I have originally collected the dataset for the analysis, I will further refer to the specific sources of data I used.

IV.II.I Dependent Variable: Share of women on viable positions

The dependent variable is the share of women on viable list positions, which displays a continuous variable ranging from 1 to 100%. In order to estimate this percentage for every party, it is crucial to define which positions are viable and which are not. I define those positions with an election probability higher or equal to 80% as viable. I have calculated this election probability for each position on the party's lists based on the results the party achieved in the elections before. Furthermore, I assume that selectorates take the results of previous elections into account when they assemble their parties' lists ([Frech 2016](#)). Based on earlier election results, they are likely to consider the fact that some positions are viable, some are risky and some without a chance [3](#). Selectorates may

²Parties which could not be included: Blue & White, United Torah Judaism, United Right, Kulanu, United Arab List and Kadima in Israel; VOX, United Left, Convergence and Union, Basque National Party, Galician Nationalist Bloc, Union Progress & Democracy, Citizens and Partido Animalista in Spain.

³Beyond the usage of previous elections results, parties may also calculate with published polls before the election. I also considered to take this source into account and use it to estimate the prospects for each position of getting elected. However, I did not use poll results for several reasons. First, parties do not always reveal at which point in time they assemble their list. Therefore, it is not clear which polls at which time the selectorate considers when the candidate selection procedures take place and not clear which poll results to use. Second, polls are not available for the constituency level. Therefore, it was not accessible to know which positions in which constituencies have high prospects of being elected.

Table 2 – Case selection: Party Level

Country name	Party abbreviation	Party name	Selection mode
Iceland	F	Progressive Party	Voters
	S	The Alliance	Voters
	Sj	Independence Party	Voters
	VGF	Left Green Movement	Voters
Israel	HaAvoda	Israeli Labour Party	Party Members
	Likud	The Consolidation	Party Members
	MERETZ	Meretz	Party Delegates
	Shas	Sephardi Torah Guardians	Party Leadership
	YB	Yisrael Beiteinu	Party Members
Italy	CD	Democratic Center	Party Leadership
	FDI-CDN	Brothers of Italy	Party Leadership
	LN	Northern League	Party Leadership
	M5S	Five Star Movement	Voters
	PD	Democratic Party	Voters
	PdL	People of Freedom	Party Leadership
	RC	Civil Revolution	Party Leadership
	SC	Civic Choice	Party Leadership
	SEL	Left Ecology Freedom	Voters
	UdC	Union of the Center	Party Leadership
Netherlands	50PLUS	50 Plus	Party Leadership
	CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal	Party Members
	CU	Christian Union	Party Delegates
	D'66	Democrats' 66	Party Members
	GL	Green Left	Party Members
	PvdA	Labour Party	Party Delegates
	PvdD	Party for the Animals	Party Members
	PVV	Party of Freedom	Party Leadership
	SGP	Reformed Political Party	Party Leadership
	SP	Socialist Party	Party Delegates
	VVD	People's Party	Party Members
Portugal	BE	Left Bloc	Party Members
	PàF	Portugal Ahead	Party Leadership
	PCP-PEV	Joint: Communist & Ecologist Party	Party Members
	PS	Socialist Party	Party Leadership
Spain	PNV/EAJ	Basque Nationalist Party	Party Delegates
	Podemos	We Can	Party Members
	PP	People's Party	Party Leadership
	PSOE	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	Party Members

therefore calculate whom to place on each position and how high the chances are that the candidate gets into parliament. When it comes to representation, viable positions are crucial as the share of women on these positions will very likely be the share of women in parliament. As the theoretical argument states, those selectorates which consist of an identifiable actor may be held accountable and therefore keep an equal representation of women in mind when they nominate candidates for viable positions.

To define viable positions based on the calculated election probability of each position, I rely on recent research in the field of legislative behaviour. So far, political science research made several attempts to estimate the re-election prospects of members of parliament in closed-list PR-systems, based on their list position (Frech 2016), to predict their behaviour in campaigns and parliament (André et al. 2015 Jun and Hix 2010; Manow 2015). My approach is, similarly to adopt this calculation of re-election prospects and use it as viability measure for the diverse positions on a parties' lists. However, in contrast, this thesis measures the prospects of the diverse list positions of being elected. It does not measure the prospects of specific MPs of being re-elected. Therefore, I estimate the election probability of each position on the party list in the upcoming election.

I follow the proposition of (Stoffel 2014), (Stoffel and Sieberer 2018) and (Frech 2016) to use the election probability as a measure of election prospects. The probability measure results in a common scale (0, 1) I can apply a cross-country comparison. According to the authors, the estimation of the election probability in closed-list PR-Systems consists of two steps 1) model the probability and 2) use the estimated coefficients to predict the election probability. Step 1 requires the estimation of the model below. Where i indicates each candidate and j each party/constituency combination. Moreover, Y is the binary election outcome and X the list position. This model follows the assumption that the numerical list position is a robust predictor for its electoral success. Finally, after estimating the coefficients based on the model, I use them to predict the election probability of the list position in step 2.

$$\Pr(Y_{ij} = 1) = \phi(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot X_i)$$

Table 3 shows the data structure required for the probability estimation defined in the equation above. The explanatory table only shows a short section of the dataset for the 2017 national election in the Netherlands. The exemplary table is part of a dataset of the dutch national election for the ‘Tweede Kamer’ with 2373 observations. The data covers the elections 2017, 2012, 2010, 2006 and 2003. The Dutch national election council provides the data. Stoffel (2014) stresses that for an estimation of the election probability for each position, we require the data of at least three elections. Stoffel (2014) argues that this amount of data is enough to estimate the election probability of each position validly. ‘N’ indicates an observational ID of the ‘Position’, at ‘Election’, of ‘Party’ in ‘Constituency’. ‘Elected’ shows whether the position was elected or not.

Table 3 – Exemplary Table of Data Structure

N	Election	Party	Position	Elected	Constituency	Country
1	2017	VVD	1	1	1	NL
2	2017	VVD	2	1	1	NL
3	2017	VVD	3	1	1	NL
4	2017	VVD	4	1	1	NL
5	2017	VVD	5	1	1	NL
6	2017	VVD	6	1	1	NL
...	...	...	...	...	...	...
78	2017	VVD	78	0	1	NL
79	2017	VVD	79	0	1	NL
80	2017	VVD	80	0	1	NL
81	2017	PVV	1	1	1	NL
82	2017	PVV	2	1	1	NL
83	2017	PVV	3	1	1	NL
...	...	...	...	...	...	...
129	2017	PVV	49	0	1	NL
130	2017	PVV	50	0	1	NL

After providing this data structure for each of the countries, I estimate the logit model and predict the election probability for each position of election $t + 1$ (listed for each country in table 1) which serves as viability measure of the specific position on a party’s list. The distribution of the 9061 candidates on the probability of being

elected was strongly skewed towards 0. While about 1000 of the positions had a 100% probability of being elected, about 7000 had a 0% chance of election. The approximately remaining 1000 positions find their election probability equally distributed between 10 and 90%. For the collection of the data, I required information on the electoral outcomes of the previous elections in each country for the last (at least) three elections for all constituencies. The national election councils provided this data.

After providing an estimator for each position how viable it is or, put differently, likely to get into parliament I merged this data with the candidate lists of the parties for the respective election (again, table [1](#)). I have obtained the data from the website of the electoral commission of the respective country. I collected both, the election results and the candidate lists, manually or using web scraping tools with the statistical software R and applicable web scraping packages as RSelenium ([Harrison 2019](#)) or rvest ([Wickham, 2019](#)). Furthermore, I individually collected the data on the candidate lists of the various parties, again, using the statistical software R and web scraping tools. As a further step, I automatically coded the gender of the candidates based on their first names. Unfortunately, the candidate lists of most cases (except for the Netherlands) did not provide the gender of the individual candidate. Therefore, I additionally collected the lists of female and male names common in the specific country. I applied these lists of names as a dictionary to detect the gender of the candidate. Furthermore, I validated the dictionaries several times, in case some names were common for both genders. I applied this method, again, using the statistical software R.

As last step, I have classified positions which showed an election probability of equal to or higher than 80% as viable and aggregated the share of women on these viable positions for each party. In the end, the result was a dataset of 38 parties in six countries with their share of women on viable list positions. I further merged this dataset with the data of the independent and control variables. In subsection [V.I](#) I provide a descriptive graph for the dependent variable.

IV.II.II Independent Variables

In-/Exclusivity The in- and exclusivity of the selection mode displays a categorical variable that distinguishes between ‘party leader’, ‘party elites’, ‘party delegates’, ‘party members’ and ‘voters’. The more individuals are involved in the selection process, the more inclusive it gets. Therefore, Hazan and Rahat (2010) have ordered these groups which decide over candidate selection on an ex-/inclusivity spectrum. When the party leader decides, only one person rules over candidate selection. Therefore a decision by the party leader displays the most exclusive candidate selection. When someone goes further on the spectrum, selectorates include several party elites, then more individuals participate in the process, and therefore it is more inclusive. As the selection by party members or voters involves far more individuals, these modes are on the inclusive end of the dimension. This dimension was already illustrated in figure 1 on page 13. However, although it is possible to categorize these groups into more and less in- or exclusive, it is first not clear how many individuals exactly participate and what is the actual difference to another selection modes in the number of individuals. For example, in the case of party elites, it is not clear how many party elites, so how many individuals, participate in the selection board and what is the numeric difference in individuals to those selectorates which consist of party delegates. Furthermore, when it comes to data, there is only data available on whether the selectorates consist of leaders, elites, delegates, members or voters. To the best of my knowledge, there is no data available how many individuals the selectorate consists of. As a result, the in- and exclusivity of the selectorate is a categorical variable and not continuous. As already mentioned, party leaders and several party elites display exclusive selectorate, as they include only the party leader or some party elites.

Meanwhile, it is less clear whether to consider party delegates as inclusive or exclusive. Hazan and Rahat (2010: 36) define it as the ‘in-between’ selectorate, which is composed of representatives delegated by party members of regional- or some other sub-organisations of within party. I argue that it is crucial whether these delegates act as agents or trustees

when they are representing the interests of the party members who sent them from regional- or other sub-units. In case they are acting as agents of the party members, one may assume that the categorisation should consider them as rather inclusive, as they are representing the interests of a very inclusive group of party members. In case they are acting as trustees, the distinction is less clear. As trustees, they may act as, again, rather exclusive board, which only consists of several party elites and does not consider the opinion of the broad mass of party members. As I lack the information on whose behalf party delegates decide, I would need to make very ambitious assumptions about their behaviour in order to categorise them as ex- or inclusive. As a result, regarding the clarity of responsibility argument, it is not clear whether party delegates may be seen as such a clear target of responsibility as the party leader or elites are. Therefore, the analysis does not provide a clear expectation for the group of parties which select their candidates by the decision of party delegates, and I define this group as ‘in-between’.

Moreover, decision boards consisting of party members or voters and selecting candidates are inclusive. [Sandri et al. \(2015\)](#) summarise both candidate selections as primaries, while the authors distinguish between ‘closed’ primaries which include party members and ‘open’ primaries which include voters. As the number of individuals who participate in the selection process increases, we may define them as inclusive. Selectorates consisting of party members display an inclusive selecting body that may involve, depending on the respective party, several hundred or thousand participants. In the meantime, when voters decide over candidate selection, this may comprise, up to from several ten thousand to million people. However, it depends on whether the selectorate consists of all eligible voters or the registered voters of the party. Lastly, although there might be potentially even more inclusive boards, as illustrated with the example of the NEOS in section [III](#) the most inclusive selection mode within the party sample is the decision by eligible voters.

Table [4](#) lists the modes of candidate selection by their in-/exclusivity. The ‘Code’-column indicates a numeric value ranging from 1 ‘most exclusive’ to 4 ‘most inclusive’. Unfortunately, due to a lack of data, I can not distinguish between the party leader

or party elites as selecting body. Therefore, I sum them up in the exclusive category ‘party leadership’ in table 4. I collected the data for the in-/exclusivity variable of the main hypothesis (H1) from several sources. In the lack of a consistent data source for candidate selection procedures, I used diverse datasets of information, such as the Comparative Candidate Selection Survey, where candidates answer the question ‘Who made the decision about your nomination?’ and made use of some of the existing literature on candidate selection (Hazan and Rahat, 2010; De Lange et al., 2014; CCS, 2016; Cordero et al., 2016; Shomer, f.; Sandri et al., 2015). In case these two sources did not provide any information on the party, I coded the selection procedures from the statutes of the different parties manually⁴.

Table 4 – Categorisation: candidate selection

Code	Selection by:	In-/Exclusivity
1	Party Leadership (Leader or Elites)	exclusive
2	Party Delegates	in between
3	Party Members	inclusive
4	Voters	inclusive

Interest Group Hypotheses 2a-b test whether the pressure of interest groups has an increasing effect on the relationship between candidate selection mode and the share of women on viable positions. I distinguish the pressure interest groups may put on selectorates in ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ pressure. While inside pressure stems from inside the party organisation, outside pressure comes from the party’s voters.

First, I operationalise inside pressure in the party organisation with the existence of a women’s faction within the party. This variable is dichotomous and codes 2 for ‘not existing’ and 1 for ‘existing’ women’s faction within the party. As data source I use the party statute coding of the political party database (Scarrow, 2017). The

⁴Moreover, the differences in party system provided some difficulties for the data collection. In some cases, as in Portugal and Israel, it is quite usual and beneficial for some parties to converge to electoral alliances for elections. As a result, they have joint lists, where the question raised which candidate selection procedure they follow. Fortunately, the parties of joint lists always had the same selection procedure. Furthermore, in this case, I predicted the election probability based on previous election results of both parties in the coalition.

political party database codes whether the party's statute refers to any women's faction as sub-organisation within the party. Additionally, as the database did not provide data for the parties in Iceland and Italy, I coded the missing parties manually.

Second, I operationalise outside pressure in the position of a party's voters on gender issues. I argue that voters who hold libertarian views on gender roles demand female representation. I expect that the effect of the selection mode on the percentage of women on viable positions increases the more libertarian the party's voters' average position on gender roles are. I use the International Social Survey 2012 on gender role attitudes (ISSP, 2014) to measure how authoritarian or libertarian the party's voters position on gender attitudes are. More specifically, I use the voters' position on gender roles. I created an index out of six items in the survey which asked respondents on their attitudes towards the role of women as a housewife or working mother. These items measure whether the respondents perceive it as harmful to family life when the mother works full-time. I list the specific six items in table 9 on page 75 in the appendix. After creating the index that measures the voter's position on gender roles, I calculated the mean position of the voters who intend to vote for the respective party. Unfortunately, the ISSP (2014) does not include the case of Italy, but considering the alternative datasets available to measure attitudes towards gender roles, it was the best source available. Finally, the average voters' position on gender issues displays a continuous variable ranging from 0 - *authoritarian* to 1 - *libertarian* views on gender roles.⁵

IV.II.III Control Variables

The analysis will also include several control variables on the country and party level, which I expect to affect the positioning of women on viable positions.

CV: Country-Level To control for country-specific factors which may affect the share of women on viable list positions I will include country fixed effects. Several

⁵The original data of the six items for Iceland, Israel, Portugal and the Netherlands was coded on a scale from 1 to 5. However, the items in the dataset for the case of Spain were coded on a scale from 1 to 4. Therefore, I have harmonised the items of all countries to a scale ranging from 0 to 1.

factors are varying on the national level, which may increase or decrease the share of women on viable list positions. First, as already elaborated in section II, district magnitude may account for the variation between countries in female representation in national parliaments. Increasing district magnitude has a positive effect on the share of women nominated for viable positions (Matland, 1993; Welch and Studlar, 1990). Where a small number of seats is to win, parties are more likely to nominate men. In these small districts, parties rely on the performance of one or a few candidates. Therefore, Lawless and Fox (2010) argue that parties are more likely to nominate men on viable positions as they are more likely to own the resources to run a successful campaign. Comparatively, in large districts, the constraint of only one or several candidates is not given. As a result, the nomination of women on viable positions is more likely. District magnitude varies considerably among the selected cases. On the one side, Spain contains 52 electoral districts with a minimum of 1, and a maximum of 37 seats to win. The country assembles of several small districts compared to the others (Pilet et al., 2016). On the other side, the Netherlands and Israel each have one large electoral district within which the allocation of all parliamentary seats takes place. For example, the electoral district of the Netherlands has a magnitude of 150 seats (Pilet et al., 2016). As increasing district magnitude may have a positive effect on the share of women on viable positions, I will control for this potential effect by using country fixed effects.

Second, countries vary on structural characteristics, such as the number of women which are in high education and workforce. These differences among countries may affect the placement of women on viable positions. Parties usually recruit their candidates disproportionally among the highly educated (Paxton, 1997; Tripp, 2001). For several decades women have not been as highly educated as men and especially not represented among lawyers, a profession parties are likely to pull their candidates from (Kunovich and Paxton, 2005, 513). Therefore, parties were less likely to nominate them for political office. However, as women are increasingly catching up or even overtake men in their education, more and more women are making them eligible for political office. Among the selected cases, there also exists some considerable timely variation when women from

25 to 34 years old were catching up with men at the same age in their mean years in school. While in Iceland, women were equalising with men in 1979, in the Netherlands women caught up with men in 2010 (see [IHME \(2015\)](#) accessed through [Gapminder \(2020\)](#)). This timely variation in the closure of the gap in education may affect on the number of women who are in the pool of eligible candidates and nominated for viable positions.

Third, countries may also vary in ideological factors; specifically, ideas about the role of women within society may affect the share of women nominated for viable positions. [Kunovich and Paxton \(2005, 518\)](#) stress that female politicians mostly refer to negative attitudes towards the participation of women in politics as the main reason why women are less likely to gain office. Research has also found that attitudes on gender roles have a strong effect on the number of women in the legislative office ([Paxton and Kunovich, 2003](#); [Norris and Inglehart, 2001](#)). In countries with lower support for women entering the public sphere, parties may be less likely to nominate them for viable positions. I find some cross-country variation in gender role attitudes in the cases I selected. People living in Iceland hold, on average a more libertarian view on gender roles than people living in Israel. While Iceland shows a value of 0.62 on a 0-1 scale (0 authoritarian, 1 libertarian), Israel shows a value of 0.49 ([ISSP, 2014](#)). This variation may affect the number of women nominated for viable list positions.

Lastly, some countries introduced legal gender quotas which aim to increase the share of women in parliament after their implementation. With a gender quota for candidate lists, viable list positions or seats in legislatures, parties are under pressure to convert their candidate selection in order to provide the share of women on lists or in parliament as the law is demanding ([Schwindt-Bayer, 2009](#)). Otherwise, they may face the consequences. For instance, in Spain or Greece parties may face the consequence that the electoral commission does not approve their lists if they do not provide a minimum share of candidates of either sex on their lists. Furthermore, there might be financial sanctions, such as the reduction of public funding as in Portugal or Ireland. Meanwhile, the Netherlands or the Czech Republic do not have any quota laws

(IDEA 2019). Research has shown that gender quota laws have a positive effect on the descriptive representation of women in parliament implementation (e.g. Schwindt-Bayer, 2009 Paxton and Hughes, 2015). Schwindt-Bayer (2009) furthermore argues that a positive effect of gender quotas depends on the share of the quota, on whether it accounts for lists, viable positions or parliaments as well as on the consequences parties face. These aspects vary widely over countries, as the examples just given should underline. Therefore, I expect that the different thresholds to reach in the diverse countries and the varying degrees in hardship the parties face as consequences have an effect on the share of women parties nominate for viable positions. Finally, to account for the cross-country variation in gender quotas, district magnitude and structural as well as ideological factors, I control for country fixed effects.

CV: Party-Level The party level provides three variables which I expect to affect the placement of women on viable list positions. Some parties provide voluntary gender quotas which should ensure that women form at least a ‘critical minority’ of seats within parliament or more (IDEA, 2019). These quotas may take two different forms. Parties may have a gender quota in percentages for their lists. For example, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) introduced a first gender quota in the year 1988 of 25%. Later, in 1997 they introduced a quota of 40% for either sex (IDEA, 2019). Research has provided evidence for a positive effect of such percental gender quotas on the descriptive representation of women in parliament (Verge and De la Fuente, 2014). As the quota size increases in percentages, the share of women in parliament does as well. Moreover, recent research even suggests that party gender quotas unveil the effect of candidate selection procedures (Shomer, f.). When parties introduce inclusive candidate selection modes and this decreases the representation of women on list positions and in parliament, quotas can prevent this negative effect. I expect such quota to have a positive effect on the share of women on viable list positions. I control for this variable using the percentage the parties introduced as list quota. It is a numerical variable with a mean of 8.9% among parties. Second, instead, other parties keep positions on their lists reserved

for women. For example, the Israeli party Likud has reserved the list positions 10, 20, 24, 29 and 34 for female candidates (IDEA, 2019). Naturally, this measure will have a positive effect on the share of women on viable list positions if the positions which are reserved are likely to get into parliament. Therefore I control for the share of viable seats reserved. The Gender Quota Project (IDEA, 2019) provides the relevant data of percentage values and reserved list positions for the analysis.

Third, apart from these two types of party quotas, I expect the ideological position of the party to affect the placement of women on viable positions. The effect of ideological positions on the representation of women in parliament was already theorized with the expectation that rightist parties are less likely to encourage the representation of women in parliament. The argument is that rightist parties hold on to a traditional role of women in the society, which do not emphasize that women may enter the political space which has yet been dominated by men. Meanwhile left parties to acknowledge the right of representation of women as marginalized groups. Therefore, scholars have argued that parties located on the left of the left-right scale are more likely to nominate women for legislative office (Matland and Studlar, 1996; Caul, 1999; Wängnerud, 2009; O'Neill and Stewart, 2009). However, the authors provided mixed evidence for this hypothesis. Meanwhile, Caul-Kittilson states that the traditional left-right uni-dimension may be too simplistic in order to find the effects of the ideological positions of parties on the representation of women (Caul, 1999; Kittilson, 2006). She argues that looking independently at cultural issues on a left-right dimension may reveal more evident findings for the relationship between the ideological position and the representation of women. Her analysis shows that parties, who are emphasizing cultural values of 'New Left' politics, such as alternative lifestyles and minority rights, would encourage the need to promote under-represented groups. As a result, these parties are more likely to promote the representation of women in parliament. To fulfil their demands they are more likely to nominate women on viable list positions. Therefore, I expect more culturally left positions of parties have a positive effect on the dependent variable.

Furthermore, I also expect the ideological position of the party to affect the indepen-

dent variables of hypotheses 2a and b. Parties which are holding culturally left positions are also more likely to be responsive to women's interests and therefore to establish a women's sub-organisation within their party (H2a) (Kittilson, 2011). Additionally, I expect parties which are holding culturally left positions to approach to voters which hold non-traditional stances on gender roles (H2b).

I measure parties' positions towards cultural issues using data of the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volgens et al., 2018)⁶. By doing so I follow the example of Kim and Fording (2003) and De Lange (2016) who use CMP data to create a scale of positions on a cultural dimension. The authors generate a scale by using the pairs of items on cultural issues provided in the dataset and compare the difference in their salience (Kim and Fording, 2003). To create a scale which measures positions on alternative lifestyles and minority rights, as Caul-Kittilson emphasizes, I use two pairs of variables in the CMP dataset. First, the positive and negative pair of the item 'Multiculturalism' (per607 & per608) and second, the positive and negative pair of the item 'Traditional Morality' (per604 & per603). I assume that to pay more attention on the positive item of 'Multiculturalism', and the negative item on 'Traditional Morality' than its particular counterpart states a *libertarian* position, which supports alternative lifestyles and the implementation of minority rights. The other extreme, an *authoritarian* position, encourages the preservation of traditional cultural values in, for example, restricting the right to marry to heterosexual couples and opposing the implementation of minority rights. To generate the positions, I subtract the libertarian from the authoritarian item and divide it by the sum. The result is a value between -1 and 1. While a negative value indicates a more authoritarian stand and a positive value indicates a more libertarian stand. Figure 12 shall indicate the distribution of this variable among parties. The mean of this variable shows a value of 0.1.

Finally, table 10 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics of all control variables listed above.

⁶I will use CMP data as an alternative to Chapel Hill Expert Survey Data (which would be the better option as it provides the GALTAN dimension), as the latter does not provide data on all cases included in the analysis.

V Analysis

In this section, I present descriptive statistics in subsection [V.I](#) and the results of the relationship between candidate selection mode and the share of women on viable list positions in a bivariate and a multivariate analysis in subsection [V.II](#). The bivariate analysis in subsection [V.II.I](#) provides a visualisation of the relationship a one-way ANOVA-Test and a Tukey-Honest-Significant-Difference-Test (THSD). Meanwhile, the multivariate analysis in subsection [V.II.II](#) contains a linear regression model which includes, besides the independent variables, also the control variables. Furthermore, I provide visualisations of the effects. Moreover, although a sample size of 38 parties is low to infer statistical significance, the results provide some essential insights. I will mainly focus on the effect sizes in the interpretation of the results. The results do not provide evidence for hypotheses 1 and 2a, but some evidence for hypothesis 2b. For inclusive selectorates, the analysis predicts higher shares of women on viable positions. Furthermore, while the existence of women's sub-organisations increases the effect of candidate selection modes, voters' positions on gender roles do.

V.I Descriptives

V.I.I Dependent Variable

Figure [3](#) shows the distribution of parties over the share of women they have placed on viable list positions in the respective election. The figure displays a boxplot in a horizontal position where the axis on the bottom is the y-axis, which indicates the percentage of women on viable positions. Additionally, to the boxplot which, shows the distribution of the dependent variable, I plotted the values of the individual cases (38 parties) over it in a jitter plot. The randomly spread allocation of positions of the data point in the jitter plot allows easy reading of dots that might otherwise overlap. Therefore, the position on the x-axis (axis on the left) does not indicate a scale in this case. Meanwhile, the critical information is the position of the dots on the y-axis (on the bottom). The small black dots indicate the exact position of the party on the y-axis




Figure 3 – Percentage women on viable positions

with the label, the party abbreviation, next to it. Table 2 on page 27 and table 12 on page 77 in the appendix list all the parties with their abbreviations and give more detailed information on them. I defined those positions with an election probability higher or equal to 80% as viable. The figure illustrates that most parties provide a share of less than 50% female candidacy on viable positions. The dashed, red colour indicates the 50% mark. Four parties do not place any women on a viable position. Meanwhile, six parties provide precisely 50% of female candidates on those positions with high chances to get into parliament. Overall, five parties show a percentage of women higher than 50% on viable positions. One of them, the dutch PvdD (Partij voor de Dieren) as the only outlier, placed only female candidates on their viable positions. Moreover, the average share of women on viable positions of the 38 parties is 35.9%, the median 33.3%, while the standard deviation shows a value of 21.1%. The boxplot shows an interquartile range of 24.6%, from about 25 to 50%.




Figure 4 – Candidate Selection Procedures

V.I.II Independent Variables

The histogram in figure 4 on page 42 shows how the 38 parties are distributed across different candidate selection procedures, which serves as the main independent variable. The x-axis shows the selection modes, ordered from most exclusive on the left (party leadership) to most inclusive on the right (voters). Meanwhile, the y-axis indicates how many parties possess of which candidate selection process. The legend refers to the country. The bar on the very left illustrates that candidate selection controlled by the party leadership is most common among the parties in the sample with 14 cases. This group displays the most exclusive gremium, as it only includes the party leader or a group of party elites. Meanwhile, the selection made by party delegates, which is comparatively to the leadership decision a more inclusive selection mode that includes party delegates from regional or other sub-organisations, is the least common, with 5 parties using it. Moreover, candidates selected by party members is second common among the included parties. 12 parties of the 38 parties in the sample let their party members decide. Lastly, in the cases of 7 parties, voters decide over which candidate

run for legislative seats. In sum, 19 parties in the sample decide over candidate selection in procedures that follow the definition of inclusive, while 14 parties decide in clearly exclusive boards.




Figure 5 – Existence of Women's Organisations within Parties

Furthermore, figure 4 also visualises country-specific patterns. Parties in Iceland, for instance, decide over their candidates running for legislative office only by open primaries (voters' decision) (Indriðason and Kristinsson, 2015). Moreover, in Italy parties practice selecting their candidates either in selectorates containing the party leadership or in open primaries. Meanwhile, in Israel, the Netherlands and Spain parties provide inclusive as well as exclusive selection modes. Selecting boards in these countries are assembled of the party leadership, party delegates or party members.

Furthermore, figures 5 and 6 illustrate the distribution of the two independent variables for the hypotheses 2a and 2b, the existence of a women's organisation within the party and its average voters' gender attitudes. First, figure 5 illustrates how many parties have a women's faction within their party organisation. The figure displays data of the political party database (Scarrow, 2017) and additional manual coding of party statutes. The x-axis indicates the existence of such a sub-organisation (1 - 'Yes' and 2 - 'No'). The legend again refers to the countries. The barplot shows that far more parties do not have a women's sub-organisation within their organisation. Of the 38 parties, in 11 parties such a sub-organisation exists and in 26 there does not.⁷ Finally, the barplot also shows that in Spain no party possesses of

⁷In case of the Israeli Labour Party (HaAvoda) it was not possible to code the existence of a women's organisation as I was not able to read or translate the hebrew party statute. Therefore, the data on women's organisation contains one missing.

a women's organisation. In Iceland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal there exists at least one party with a women's sub-organisation.

Figure 6 shows the distribution of the average voters' position of 26 parties on gender attitudes. Similar to figure 3, it is a boxplot in a horizontal position where the axis on the bottom is the y-axis. The y-axis indicates the dimension of the party's voters' position on gender roles from an authoritarian to a libertarian position. A value of 0 indicates an authoritarian stance on gender roles that emphasises that women should stay at home and care for household and children. Meanwhile, a value of 1 indicates a libertarian position on gender roles that points out that women and men should equally contribute to household work. At the same time, they should both seek for their accomplishment at work. In this figure, as no parties show values over or below, the scale goes from 0.2 to 0.8. I created this scale with six items of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2014) which are listed in table 9 on page 75 in the appendix. Unfortunately, the ISSP (2014) does not provide data for Italy. Therefore the testing of H2b has to get on without the data of the Italian parties. The mean and median, which are indicated by the red dashed line, of the average voters' position on gender roles, are about 0.54. This value lies slightly over the centred positions at 0.5.

Beyond the distribution of the second independent variable of H2b, displayed by the boxplot, the figure shows the individual values of the 26 parties in a jitter plot. The randomly spread allocation of the positions of the data points makes the individual values and their labels better readable. Therefore, the position on the x-axis (axis on the left) does not indicate a scale or anything similar. The small black dots indicate the exact position of the party on the y-axis with the label, the party abbreviation, next to it. The distribution of the values in 6 further illustrates that the variation in average attitudes towards gender roles among parties is limited. The standard deviation of the variable shows a value of 0.08. The interquartile range is about 0.1, ranging from about 0.5 to 0.6. The more salient is the position of the Dutch party SGP (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, English name: Reformed Political Party). With a value of 0.28 and a rather authoritarian stance the party, that according to its website emphasises




Figure 6 – Voters' Position on Gender Roles

politics ‘following biblical values’, displays an outlier among the 26 cases.

Moreover, apart from these visualisations, I provide a table with descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and control variables in table [10](#) in the appendix.

V.II Results

V.II.I Bivariate Relationship

The following subsection provides an analysis of the bivariate relationship between candidate selection mode and the share of women on viable list positions, so far without controls. Figure [7](#) shows the distribution of parties' percentage of women on viable positions across the four selection modes. The x-axis indicates the selection mode, from the most exclusive (left) to most inclusive (right). The y-axis indicates the share of women on viable list positions (with 80% election probability). The dots present the value of each party. Please find a list with all parties, their abbreviation and full name in table [2](#) on page [27](#). Moreover, the width of the boxes is proportional to the square




Figure 7 – Bivariate Relationship: Boxplots of percentages of women placed on viable positions by selection mode

root of the number of observations in the group of the selection mode. Additionally, I drew a red line on the y-axis at a value of 50%. The share of women a party provides on viable positions is also very likely to be the share of women in parliament. A party that provides 50% women and 50% men on viable positions is most likely to display descriptive representation in parliament. The dashed red line indicates this value. While five parties show values over 50%, eight parties show a value of approximately 50%. The remaining 25 cases show a value of less than 50% of women on viable positions. Four parties have no women, and one party has no men on a viable position.

Figure 7 further shows that selecting candidates in an exclusive board (party leadership), does not lead to more women on viable positions in contrast to inclusive selection modes. Compared to the three other selection modes, the group of parties which select candidates by party leadership show the lowest median value in the share of women on viable list positions (about 27%). Parties in which delegates decide over candidate selection show a median value of 48%. As elaborated in subsection IV.II.II I classify party delegates neither as exclusive nor as inclusive. Meanwhile, selectorates classified as inclusive show a median value of about 37.5% for closed primaries (party members) and

44% for open primaries (voters). Furthermore, the parties in which the leadership selects the candidates shows the lowest interquartile range (about 8 – 35%). Meanwhile, the group selecting with party delegates show an interquartile range of 37 to 50% and the group selecting by party members 27 to 50%. Besides, the cases in which party members decide over candidates selection show values ranging from 0% (Yisrael Beiteinu) women on viable list positions to 100% (PvdD). Lastly, the interquartile range of the voters' group shows an interquartile range of 37 to 60%. Therefore, this graph indicates that candidate selection in inclusive modes leads to a higher percentage of women on viable list positions compared to candidate selection in exclusive modes. Consequently, this first visualisation does not support the expectation of hypothesis 1.

Furthermore, table 5 shows the results of a one-way ANOVA-test which show whether there is a statistically significant difference between the four selectorate groups in their percentage of women on viable positions. The p-value of 0.086 indicates no statistically significant difference between the four selection modes in the sample. Nevertheless, although the differences between the groups may not show a significant level, I will provide an additional pairwise comparison of the groups to show where strong differences lie.

Table 5 – One-way ANOVA-Test

	Difference	Sum Sq	Mean Sq	F-value	P-value
Selection Mode	3	2,876.090	958.697	2.388	0.086
Residuals	34	13,652.300	401.538		

To provide a more precise picture of the differences between the selection modes, table 6 shows the results of a THSD, which performs pairwise comparisons between the means of the four selection modes. As the first column suggests, the test compares the mean of the share of women on viable list positions for each selection mode with each other. The column 'Differences' shows the difference in the means between the modes in the first column. So, for example, the first row compares selection by party delegates with selection by party leadership. The value in the second column indicates that party

delegates show a 16.865 higher average share of women on viable list positions than party leadership. Columns three to five then show whether the difference is significant. While the third column shows the lower limit of the confidence interval, the fourth column shows the upper limit. In the case of the first row, the confidence interval does not include the value 0. Therefore the difference is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the fifth column shows the p-value. In the first row, it shows a value of 0.384, which also does not suggest statistical significance. Still, considering the sample size, insignificant results are not surprising.

Table 6 – Tukey Honest Significant Difference

Comparison: selection modes	Difference	CI lower	CI upper	P-value
party delegates-party leadership	16.865	-11.331	45.061	0.384
party members-party leadership	15.294	-5.996	36.585	0.231
voters-party leadership	21.616	-3.437	46.668	0.111
party members-party delegates	-1.571	-30.378	27.237	0.999
voters-party delegates	4.751	-26.938	36.440	0.977
voters-party members	6.322	-19.418	32.061	0.910

The THSD further shows that inclusive selection modes show a higher average share of women on viable list positions than the exclusive selection mode. The selection by party members appears to lead to a 15.294 higher share of female candidates on viable list positions than selection by the party leadership. Similarly, candidate selection by voters leads to an average 21.616 higher share of women on viable positions compared to selection by the party leadership. Meanwhile, candidate selection by voters shows a higher average share of female candidates compared to all other candidate selection modes. It leads to a 4.751% higher share of women on viable positions than candidate selection by party delegates and a 6.322% higher share than candidate selection by party members. However, lastly, selection by party delegates shows a higher average value than selection by party members. Party delegates nominate an average 1.571% higher share of female candidates on viable list positions than party members. Although none of the differences in table 6 is statistically significant, which can be explained by the small sample size, I argue that the average differences between the selection modes leave

leeway for a first interpretation. These differences in shares of female candidates on viable positions lead to the interpretation that inclusive selection modes lead to higher shares of women on viable positions than exclusive ones. Therefore, the first bivariate analysis provides no evidence for hypothesis 1.

Moreover, as figures 3 and 7 have illustrated, the dutch PvdD displays a crucial outlier among the group of parties which select by ‘party members’. The PvdD (Partij voor de Dieren, english name: Party for the animals) places 100% women on viable positions in the Dutch election in 2017. Before these elections, the party had held 2 seats in the dutch tweede kammer since 2006. Therefore, holding 100% of women on viable seats means placing women on the party’s first to about the third position on the list. In order to know whether this outlier skews the results substantially, I reran the THSD, excluding the PvdD. This exclusion altered the results for the comparison of the selectorate party member with other selectorates, so the results of line two, four and six to some extent. First, in row two, comparing party members with party leadership, the value changes from 15.294 to 9.856%. As a result, selection by party members still appears to lead to a higher share of female candidates. However, the share slightly decreased due to the exclusion of the outlier.

Second, in row four, due to the exclusion of the outlier among the party members selectorate, the value changes from an average 1.571% higher share of party delegates to a 7.009% higher share. Third, in row six, with the excluded outlier voters are nominating an average 11.760% higher share compared to party members, which slightly increased to 6.322% before. However, although the results changed to some extent, the overall conclusion stays the same. The direction of the differences between exclusive and inclusive selectorates does not change. Party members are on average still nominating more women than viable positions than the party leadership, and they are nominating less than voters. Furthermore, the exclusion of the outlier did not change the significance levels somehow. Therefore, overall, I may still conclude that inclusive selection modes lead to a higher share of women on viable list positions, and there is still no evidence for hypothesis 1.




Figure 8 – Bivariate Relationship moderated by existence of women's organisation (2a) and voters' position on gender roles (2b)

Moreover, the plots in figure 8 give a first impression of how the relationship between selection mode and percentage of women on viable positions is moderated by the existence of a women's sub-organisation (H2a) and the average voters' position (H2b). First, plot 2a shows the distributions of the percentage of women on viable positions (y-axis) for the different selection modes (x-axis) and grouped by those parties which possess of a women's sub-organisation and those not. The light grey dots display those cases without a women's sub-organisation and the dark grey dots those with such a sub-organisation. Again, the dashed red line indicates a 50% threshold. Unfortunately, the number of parties with a women's sub-organisation is with eleven cases very small. However, this plot shows one party with a sub-organisation, the progressive party in Iceland, to have a percentage of women on viable positions of equal to or higher than 50%. Moreover, the average percentage of women on viable positions for parties with a sub-organisation is 26.9%, while it is 40.0% for parties without. However, there exists a prominent outlier among the parties without a women's sub-organisation with 100%

women on viable positions, the dutch PvdD. When I exclude the outlier, the average share of parties without a women's organisation shows a value of 37.5% and therefore remains almost at the same level. These numbers give the first impression that the pressure a women's sub-organisation may put on the selectorate is limited. Furthermore, this might even mean that a women's sub-organisation within a party functions as compensation for the unequal representation of women among political offices. However, it may less function as an achievement of female party members that acts as an interest groups within the party that can successfully put pressure on the selectorate in favour of women's demands.

Looking specifically at every selection mode, the average values show a similar picture. When the party leadership decides over candidate selection, women's sub-organisation do not seem to make much of a difference. The mean of the dependent variable for those parties which possess of a women's sub-organisation is 15.7%, while it is 28.6% for parties without. So although, the assumption is that the party leadership is a better identifiable actor for women's sub-organisations to put pressure on to the demand for women's representation, the effect of their existence is limited. Unfortunately, the sample includes no data of parties with a candidate selection conducted by party delegates and with a women's sub-organisation. However, also in the case of party members, the existence of women's sub-organisation does not seem to have a positive effect on the percentage of women on viable positions. The mean of the dependent variable for those parties selecting by party members and which possess of a women's sub-organisation is 23.9%, while for those without it is 47.7%. The difference between them is more prominent than in the case of the party leadership group. However, if I again exclude the prominent outlier PvdD the average of those parties without a women's sub-organisation decreases to 40.3%. Lastly, when voters decide over candidate selection, the mean for those parties which possess of a sub-organisation is 40.5, while it is 54.5 for those party who do not. In all three cases, those parties without a women's suborganisation seem to nominate more women on viable positions. However, the difference between those parties who possess of a women's sub-organisation and those who do not is smaller in

the case of parties selecting by leadership. In table 12 on page 77 in the appendix, I provide information on which party possess a women's sub-organisation (1) and which not (0).

Second, plot 2b shows the relationship between selection mode and the percentage of women on viable positions moderated by the voters' position on gender roles. The x-axis indicates the voters' position from 0 (authoritarian) to 1 (libertarian). Again, the y-axis shows the percentage of women on viable positions, and the red dashed line marks a 50% threshold. The black line on the x-axis marks the centre value 0.5 on the scale of voters' position on gender roles. The values of 26 parties are plotted on these two dimensions. The legend indicates which selection mode the respective party implements. The correlation between the average voters' position on gender roles and the percentage of women on viable positions is moderately high with 0.54. This correlation allows for the preliminary and general conclusion that the party's voters' libertarian position on gender roles has a positive effect on the percentage their party nominates on viable list positions. Those parties whose voters hold somewhat authoritarian views on gender roles nominate fewer women on viable positions. Meanwhile, those parties whose voters hold libertarian stances nominate more women on viable positions. Parties may take the possibility into account that their voters will punish them if they do not supply a sufficient number of women on viable list positions.

When interpreting plot 2b in figure 8 for each selection mode separately, it reveals different conclusions for each group. First, for the group of party leadership as selectorate, the correlation between voters' position and the share of women on a viable position is quite high with 0.71. The more libertarian voters' positions are, the more women exclusive selectorates put on viable spots on the lists. The dark grey diamond-shaped points indicate this group. Meanwhile, for the group of party delegates, the correlation is moderately to strongly negative with -0.62. Therefore, the more libertarian voters' stances are on gender roles, the lower is the share of women party delegates put on viable list positions. The grey circles indicate this group. Furthermore, the correlations for inclusive selection modes are also positive. First, the correlation coefficient between

voters' position on gender roles and the share of women on viable positions is 0.60 for parties which select by party members. The more libertarian views voters hold on gender roles, the more women party members as selectorate put on viable positions. Light grey triangles indicate this group. Lastly, the correlation for the second inclusive selection mode, the voters is positive but small to moderate with 0.32. Therefore, voters seem to put more women on viable positions when their views on gender roles are more libertarian. In a first interpretation, I may conclude that exclusive selectorates appear to take possible consequences from voters more seriously and therefore put a higher share of women on viable positions. However, this interpretation is, of course, preliminary as these simple correlation coefficients do not control for further influential factors. Furthermore, as plot 2b shows, parties whose voters have somewhat libertarian views on gender roles are also more likely to have implemented inclusive selection modes or vice versa.

Lastly, I would like to address two crucial points the two plots in figure 8 show. First, plot 2a shows that among the parties who select by voters there are four cases which possess a women's sub-organisation. At the same time, the other selectorate categories have none or three parties who possess a women's sub-organisation. This is mainly because four Icelandic parties are part of the sample. In Iceland, all parties select their candidates in open primaries (inclusive selection by voters). Furthermore, three of the four Icelandic parties possess of a women's sub-organisation. In the country, where the first movements demanding for women's suffrage emerged in the beginning of the 20th century, some parties, like the 'The Alliance' (S) have been partly founded by feminist organisations (as WA - Alliance of Women's List) (Lansford, 2017, 657). I assume that this development makes it likely that some form of women's sub-organisation persists within the party. Three parties of those which have a women's sub-organisation are Icelandic and therefore are automatically selecting parties in open primaries. Second, plot 2b also shows that parties whose voters have somewhat libertarian views on gender roles are also more likely to have implemented inclusive selection modes (selection by party members or voters) or vice versa. However, it goes beyond the scope of this master

thesis to answer which of these factors predicts the other.

In sum, the data visualisation in figure 7 as well as the THSD, did not show that exclusive selectorates show higher values of women on viable positions compared to inclusive modes. Furthermore, for hypothesis H2b, plot 2b in figure 8 implies that the pressure voters may put on the selectorate affects the share of women parties place on their viable positions and that this relationship is especially crucial in the case of exclusive selectorates. However, so far, I have not controlled for other possibly influential factors, such as the ideological position of the party, any type of quota for women or potential country-specific effects. Therefore, subsection V.II.II provides a linear regression model, including these variables.

V.II.II Multivariate Analysis

Table 7 shows the linear regression output of Model 1, 2, 3 and 4, where the dependent variable is the percentage of women on viable positions. Model 1 only includes the coefficients for the selection modes and no control variables. The models 2-4 include all control variables: the different types of gender quota as well as parties' positions on libertarian-authoritarian dimension and country fixed effects. Apart from the control variables, model 2 includes the effect of the selection modes. Figure 9 provides a visualisation of the effects. Model 3 adds the interaction of the existence of a women's sub-organisation with the selection mode. Lastly, model 4 adds the interaction of the voters' position on gender roles (GR) with the selection mode. Figures 10 on page 58 (Model 3) and 11 on page 60 (Model 4) provide the visualisations of both interaction effects.

First, model 1 solely provides the coefficients for the selection modes that allow the first interpretation that inclusive selection modes lead to higher percentages of women on viable positions. The category 'party leadership' is the baseline for the coefficients of 'party delegates', 'party members' and 'voters'. This leaves the opportunity to compare the 'in-between' and 'inclusive' categories with the exclusive selection mode.

Table 7 – Results: Linear Regression Model

	Dependent Variable			
	Percentage of women on viable positions			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Party delegates	16.865 (10.440)	10.418 (13.150)	14.453 (14.244)	162.291* (77.988)
Party members	15.294* (7.883)	16.855 (10.377)	24.232* (13.009)	−97.375 (83.637)
Voters	21.616** (9.276)	27.149* (14.372)	32.547* (16.063)	56.288 (181.869)
Ex. Women's org.			−3.961 (12.914)	
Voters' position on gender roles (GR)				161.773* (82.569)
Party's position on cult. dim.		−4.191 (7.365)	−8.225 (8.303)	−23.927* (11.538)
List quota: percentage		0.075 (0.239)	0.135 (0.251)	0.401 (0.280)
Percentage of viable positions reserved		1.099 (1.048)	0.558 (1.182)	1.103 (0.850)
Party delegates * Ex. Women's org.				
Party members * Ex. Women's org.			−16.920 (19.086)	
Voters * Ex. Women's org.			−11.099 (21.289)	
Party delegates * Voters' position on GR				−275.882 (155.421)
Party members * Voters' position on GR				216.743 (171.414)
Voters * Voters' position GR				−106.916 (296.217)
Constant	24.882*** (5.355)	17.186 (17.037)	23.317 (18.970)	−46.839 (39.843)
Country Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	38	38	37	26
R ²	0.174	0.415	0.473	0.748
Adjusted R ²	0.101	0.167	0.138	0.475

*Note:**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard Errors in Parantheses

The coefficients give, logically, the same values as the THSD in table 6 on page 48. The first coefficient of the ‘party delegates’ appears to be positive with a value of 16.9. Furthermore, also the two inclusive selection modes, party members and voters, provide positive coefficients. Selectorates which are assembled by party members show a 15.3% higher share of women on viable list positions compared to selectorates which contain of the party leadership. Furthermore, selectorates which are assembled by voters deliver a 21.6% higher share of women on viable list positions compared to voters. Despite the small sample size, both coefficients are statistically significant. However, the interpretation of models 2-4 will show how these coefficients change when including control variables and interaction effects.

Second, model 2 adds all control variables to the model, the party’s position on an authoritarian-libertarian dimension, gender quotas (list quota and reserved seats) as well as country fixed effects. The coefficient of the selectorate party delegates decreases, including the controls. However, compared to party leadership, party delegates supply 10.4% more women on viable positions. Furthermore, the coefficient of party members increases with including the controls. In comparison with party leadership, party members provide 16.9% more women on list positions with an 80% election probability, holding everything else constant. Lastly, the coefficient for the inclusive selectorate assembled of voters shows a positive and significant value of 27.1%. Therefore, compared to selectorates, including the party leadership, those selectorates including voters provide 27.1% more women on viable positions. Still, with the controls, the coefficients of the selection modes lose some of their significance. The only coefficient that maintained some significance is the coefficient of the selection mode voters. Figure 9 shows a visualisation of these effects. The y-axis gives the percentage of women on viable positions, and the x-axis indicates the selection mode. The large and dark grey point display the predicted value on the y-axis for the respective selection mode. Moreover, the smaller, transparent points indicate the actual data points for the groups. Comprehensively, the figure shows that the percentage of women on viable list positions increases with inclusive selection modes. In the case of voters, the predicted share of women on viable positions reaches




Figure 9 – Effect of candidate selection mode on percentage of women

on viable positions in model 2 of table [7](#)

almost 50% and would, therefore, most likely provide descriptive representation of the population. These results allow the first interpretation that exclusive selection modes do not provide higher shares of women on viable list positions, holding all controls constant. Therefore, based on these results, I need to reject hypothesis 1. For further information, table [11](#) in the appendix on page [76](#) also shows the coefficients for the country fixed effects.

Third, model 3 interacts the selection mode with the existence of a women's organisation. As the coefficients of interaction are hard to interpret, figure [10](#) provides a visualisation of the interaction effect. The y-axis again shows the percentage of women on viable positions. The x-axis indicates the selection mode. Unfortunately, the sample does not provide one or more cases of selectorates assembled of party delegates and with a women's sub-organisation. Therefore, the axis does not include the factor level 'party delegates'. However, it is possible to interpret the coefficients for the interaction of the selection modes party leadership, party members and voters with the existence




Figure 10 – Interaction effect of the selection process and the existence of a women's sub-organisation in model 3 of table [7](#)

of a women's sub-organisation. The legend indicates the effects of the two categories 'No existing women's organisation' and 'Existing women's organisation'. The graph does not show the confidence intervals of the effects. Nonetheless, none of the effects is statistically significant, and as I already mentioned, I am focusing on effect sizes rather than on significance levels. The graph shows quite clearly that the existence of a women's sub-organisation does not increase the effect of any selection mode.

The effect of the selection mode party leadership is lower when there exists a women's sub-organisation within the party. Holding everything else constant, the predicted percentage of women on viable positions is for parties selecting by party leadership and with a women's sub-organisation is about 20%. In comparison it is about 23.3% for these parties without a women's sub-organisation. As a result, I will also reject hypothesis 2a on the interaction effect of women's sub-organisations. Meanwhile, in the case of inclusive selection modes of party members and voters, women's sub-organisations also do not increase the effect of these selection modes. For inclusive selection modes,

I assumed that women's sub-organisations would less likely be able to identify the responsible actor for candidate selection and hold it accountable. However, in this case, I would expect women's organisations to make no difference. The results show that with an existing women's sub-organisation, the predicted values of the dependent variable are also lower than without a women's sub-organisation. This allows the conclusion that women's sub-organisations either do not have the instruments to put pressure on the selectorate to increase female representation or are not in the organisation of the party to act as an interest group that demands female representation.

Fourth, model 4 includes the interaction effect of the selection mode with the voters' position on gender roles. Unfortunately, the data I use for this model only consists of 26 parties. Therefore it is smaller than in models 1-3. The coefficients in model 4 show quite large values for the interaction effects. The voters' position on gender roles variable may take a value between 0 and 1. Therefore, the coefficients show a in- or decrease of the share of women on viable positions when voters positions on gender roles increase from the minimum (0) to a maximum (1). For simplification, I will interpret the coefficients by a 0.1 unit increase on the voters' position on gender roles and therefore divide the coefficients by 10. The results show that with a 0.1 increase in the voters' position on gender roles towards a more libertarian stance (1) parties which select by the party leadership nominate 16.2% ($161.7/10$) more women on viable positions. Moreover, those parties selecting by party delegates show a negative effect on the share of women on viable positions with voters moving towards a more libertarian stand. A 0.1 increase in voters' position leads to a -11.4% ($((161.8 - 275.9)/10)$) decrease in the share of women on viable positions. The interactions with both inclusive selection modes, party members and voters, have a positive effect on the share of women on viable list positions. With a 0.1 increase towards libertarian gender roles party members nominate 37.9% ($((161.8 + 216.7)/10)$) more women on viable list positions. Finally, voters nominate 5.5% ($((161.8 - 106.9)/10)$) more women on viable positions. Figure 11 provides a visualisation of these slopes. The x-axis indicates the degree of the outside-pressure of voters, their position on gender roles. The legend shows the effect of the specific selection mode.




Figure 11 – Interaction effect of the selection process and voters' position on gender roles in model 4 of table [7](#)

The graph does not show the confidence intervals of the interactions as they would be too large. However, apart from the effect of party leadership none of the interaction coefficients is statistically significant. I will again interpret effect sizes rather than significance levels.

In sum, a moving voters' position on gender roles towards more libertarian stances leads to higher shares of women on a viable list position in 3 of 4 selection modes. First, in the case of the party leadership the increase in the share of women on viable list positions depends on voters' pressure. The coefficient of the interaction is positive, despite the small sample size. Therefore, I may partly confirm hypothesis 2b that the effect of an exclusive candidate selection mode on the share of women on viable list positions increases the more libertarian the party's voters' positions on gender roles are. I can only partly confirm this hypothesis as the selection mode party leadership does not have a positive effect on the share of women on viable positions compared to the other selection modes. Moreover, also in the cases of inclusive selection modes (party

members and voters) voters position on gender roles show an increasing effect. For party members, the slope is with 37.9% $((161.8 + 216.7)/10)$ even more substantial than for the other selection modes. Meanwhile, the slope for voters is quite small, with 5.5% $((161.8-106.9)/10)$. Although these effects are not statistically significant, the conclusion lays at hand that voters pressure is crucial for the number of women placed on viable list positions. However, in the case of party delegates, the results provide a contradiction to this conclusion.

Moreover, as already elaborated when interpreting the THSD results on page 49 the outlier PvdD (illustrated in figures 3 and 7) may crucially affect the results of the linear regression models. After running the regression without this outlier it turns out that this slightly changes the effect sizes for the variables in the models. In model 1, as already suggested by the THSD, the coefficient changes from 15.3% to 9.9%. Furthermore, the effect loses its statistical significance when excluding the outlier. The exclusion also means a similar change in models 2-4 as for model 1. In model 2, which includes all controls, the coefficient for party members changes from 16.9 to 10.9% when excluding the outlier. Furthermore, the effect party delegates increases (11.1%) and for voters decreases 26.0% slightly. However, the effect of the category voters keeps its statistical significance. Moreover, the effect sizes of the control variables stay about the same in model 2 without the outlier. However, again, the exclusion of the outlier does not change the overall conclusion that inclusive selectorates are nominating more women on viable positions. Although the effects slightly change, the direction of the effects stays the same.

The conclusion made regarding the interaction effects also holds in model 3 and 4, when excluding the outlier. In the case of party members, parties without a women's sub-organisation still nominate more women on viable positions than with. However, the difference between those parties with a sub-organisation and those without decreases. Finally, also in case of the interaction effects in model 4, the direction of the effects sizes stays the same. With a 0,1 increase towards libertarian gender roles party members nominate 19,9% $((149.6 + 49.0)/10)$ more women on viable list positions. Therefore, the

slope for party members, as in figure 11 is not as steep any longer when excluding the outlier. However, the direction of the interaction effect stays the same. Moreover, also the other coefficients in model 4 stay about the same. Therefore, also after exclusion of the outlier PvdD and a slight alteration of the effect sizes, the overall conclusion stays the same. Inclusive selectorates lead to a higher share of women on viable list positions and parties' voters' position on gender roles positively moderates the effects for the categories party leadership, party members and voters.

Interpretation CV coefficients Lastly, the control variables on party level do not always show the expected effects. First, the party's position on a cultural dimension, ranging from -1 (authoritarian) to +1 (libertarian) shows throughout the models 2-4 a negative effect on the percentage of women on viable positions. As discussed at the beginning of the analysis with such a small sample size, significant coefficients are very unlikely. Therefore, I focus on the effect sizes when interpreting the coefficients. In model 2, that does not control for the interaction effects (H2a-b) the coefficient shows that with a one-unit increase on a cultural dimension (so with a move towards more libertarian stances) parties are placing about 4% fewer women on viable positions. In model 3, this coefficient shows a value of -8.2, which also means a decrease of women on viable positions of about 8%. These two coefficients do not show statistically significant values. Meanwhile, the coefficient for the authoritarian-libertarian position of model 4, which includes the interaction of the selection mode with voters' position on gender roles, shows a statistically significant value of -23.9. This means that with a one-unit increase on the cultural dimension, parties are placing 23.9% fewer women on viable positions. These results suggest an overall negative effect of a culturally left-wing ideological position. Without the other variables in the models, the correlation between the cultural position and the percentage of women on viable list positions is positive but small with 0.18. The regression output suggests that including all the variables in the models leads to a negative correlation between the cultural position and the share of women on viable list positions.

Second, in sum, the variables controlling for gender quotas show positive coefficients throughout the models 2-4. The list quota is a variable which measures the percentage of the list quotas, which takes a value between 0 and 50% (max). The coefficient of the variable gives a value of 0.075 in model 2. A one percentage increase in list quota would, therefore, lead to 0.075% increase of women on viable positions. This effect is marginal and insignificant. In model 3, that includes the interaction between the selection mode and the existence of a women' sub-organisation, this coefficient takes a value of 0.1 and therefore slightly increased compared to model 2. Moreover, in model 4, the coefficient takes a value of 0.4. Consequently, with a one percentage increase in list quotas the share of women on viable list positions increases by 0.4%. I need to take into account here that list quotas have the purpose of increasing the average share of women on lists, not on viable positions. Hence a one percentage increase in list quota is likely to lead to a one per cent increase of women on lists. This has according to these coefficients also some effect on the share of women on viable positions. However, these effects always come with the constraint that they are not significant due to the small sample size.

Apart from the list quota in percentages, I control for reserved seats for female candidates with the variable 'percentage of viable positions reserved'. The continuous variable gives the share of viable list positions that is already reserved for women. Since with reserved seats not any position on the list goes to a woman but a promising one I expect a larger effect on the percentage of women on viable list positions than of list quotas. The coefficient of this variable in model 2 gives a value of 1.1. This would mean that with a one-unit increase in the percentage of viable list positions that are reserved for women, the percentage of women on viable positions increases by one per cent. This effect would be quite accurate to what the measure intends to do. This variable gives about the same values in model 3 and 4. According to the coefficient in model 3, a one per cent increase leads to 0.6% more women on viable positions. In model 4, again, a one per cent increase in reserved seats for women leads to a one per cent increase in women on actual viable positions.

Finally, for further information on the country fixed effects, table [11](#) on page [76](#)

provides the coefficients for each country for model 2,3 and 4. The reference category for the country effects is the alphabetically first country, Iceland. Compared to Iceland, Israel provides negative effects throughout model 2-4. In model 4 the negative coefficient (-38.49) is also statistically significant. The rest of the countries provide positive coefficients compared to Iceland in model 2 and 3. However, they are turning negative when I control for the party's voters' position on gender roles in model 4.

VI Conclusion

This master thesis has addressed the question of which candidate selection procedure provides a higher share of women on viable list positions. I have formulated a baseline hypothesis (H1) which states that exclusive candidate selectorates are leading to a higher share of women on viable list positions. The theoretical argument behind that expectation is that in the case of exclusive selectorates when the selecting body consists of a few actors, the actor who is responsible for female representation is easy to identify compared to inclusive selectorates. Additionally, I formulate two further interaction hypotheses (H2a-b), which state that the effect of an exclusive candidate selectorate increases if an interest group demands female representation and is able to put pressure on the selectorate. These two interest groups are women's sub-organisation within the party or the party's voters.

To test the theory, I use an original dataset that I have assembled for this master thesis. I have collected the candidate lists of 38 parties in elections in six countries: Iceland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. To define which of the positions on these lists have been viable, I estimated their election probability based on the results of the three elections in advance. As a further step, I have defined those positions with an election probability of over 80% as viable. Finally, I estimated the share of women on these viable list positions and used that value as the dependent variable in the analysis. Using a linear regression model I have estimated the effect of candidate selection mode on the share of women on promising positions (H1) as well as

the interaction effects with the existence of a women's sub-organisation within the party (H2a) and the position of the party's voters' on gender roles.

Results do not provide evidence for hypothesis 1. In fact, inclusive selection modes (conducted by party members and voters) have shown to provide a higher percentage of women in viable list positions. Despite the small sample size of 38 parties, the coefficients of these selection modes show significant results in model 1 and 3 in table 7 in the analysis on page 55. These results are not consistent with Rahat et al. (2008) who have found a positive effect for exclusive selection modes. Furthermore, they are also not consistent with more recent research by Indriðason and Kristinsson (2015) and Luhiste (2015). They have found no effect of the selection mode on the placement of women on promising positions on the list. However, I argue that the results of this analysis might be more reliable. In contrast to Rahat et al. (2008) and Indriðason and Kristinsson (2015) the analysis includes several control variables and goes beyond a bivariate analysis. Furthermore, in contrast to Luhiste (2015) it relies on actual candidate list data rather than the data of the comparative candidate survey that suffers from a bias towards candidates on unpromising positions.

Moreover, there is also no support for hypothesis 2a and the moderating effect of women's sub-organisations. The existence of a women's sub-organisation does not increase the effect of any selection mode, as illustrated by figure 10 on page 58. Those parties with women's sub-organisations do show lower predicted percentages of women on viable list positions. This result is not consistent with the findings of Kittilson (2011) who provides findings for a positive effect of women's sub-organisation on the representation of women. Lastly, the analysis has shown some support for hypothesis 2b. With a more libertarian stand of the party's voters towards gender roles, the percentage of women on viable list positions increases. Still, this effect is not only appearing for exclusive selection modes, but also inclusive selection modes. Illustrations of the interaction effects are in figure 11 on page 60.

These results have important implications for the consequences of candidate selection

modes on the representation of women in parliament. As the trend in candidate selection moves towards more democratisation (Sandri et al., 2015), which means that they are involving more decision-makers and are becoming more inclusive, parties may consider possible negative effects of this development on female representation as expected (Rahat et al., 2008). In contrast, this master thesis provides evidence that these developments towards more inclusive candidate selection have a positive effect on the representation of women. Therefore, parties may extend their candidate selection procedures and include more decision-makers without the constraint that this measure may have decreasing consequences for the representation of women.

Future research may extend the analysis to other contexts of electoral systems. I have tested the theory in proportional, closed-list and single-tier systems. This limitation comes from the motivation to hold several characteristics of the electoral systems constant, which might affect the share of women on viable list positions. Furthermore, this limitation made it also easier to test the theory. I elaborate on this more broadly in subsection IV.1. However, this limitation does not mean that the results of this study do not have implications for other electoral contexts where future research may test for the relationship.

Furthermore, hopefully, future research might also have access to cross-time and -country data sources on candidate selection modes. So far, the accessible data on candidate selection, which scholars have also described as the ‘secret garden of politics’, has been scarce (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). This circumstance has limited research to single-case studies. This study aims to go beyond this regional limitations and includes the candidate data of six different countries. However, unfortunately, the master thesis is still limited by the constraint that I do not have access to more detailed information on candidate selection modes. For instance, the main independent variable, the candidate selection mode, is a categorical one grouped in ‘party leadership’, ‘party delegates’, ‘party members’ and ‘voters’. First, the data sources did not make it possible to distinguish exclusive modes into ‘party leader’ and ‘party elites’. Second, these categories do not provide information on how many actors are in fact participating in the selection process.

This information would make it possible to treat the variable as a continuous one. This option would provide the opportunity to interpret the rise in the percentage of women on viable list positions with the increase of one actor additionally participating and research would no longer rely on these categories. Third, interesting questions may be answered with more detailed information on demographic characteristics of the selectorate. For instance, if there is data available on how many women are among the selectorate, it would be crucial to know whether a rising number of women deciding over candidate selection would also lead to more women on viable positions.

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
VII Appendix

Table 8 – Characteristics of Electoral Systems

	Country	Electoral System	Nr. of Tiers	Type of Ballot Structure
1	Australia	majoritarian	1	closed
2	Austria	proportional	3	flexible
3	Belgium	proportional	1	flexible
4	Bulgaria	proportional	1	flexible
5	Croatia	proportional	1	closed
6	Cyprus	proportional	2	open
7	Czech Republic	proportional	1	flexible
8	Denmark	proportional	2	flexible
9	Estonia	proportional	2	open
10	Finland	proportional	1	open
11	France	majoritarian	1	closed
12	Germany	mixed	2	closed
13	Greece	proportional	2	flexible
14	Hungary	mixed	3	closed
15	Iceland	proportional	1	flexible
16	Ireland	proportional	2	STV
17	Italy	proportional	1	closed
18	Israel	proportional	1	closed
19	Latvia	proportional	1	open
20	Lithuania	mixed	2	open
21	Luxembourg	proportional	1	open
22	Malta	proportional	2	ordinal
23	New Zealand	mixed	2	closed
24	Poland	proportional	1	open
25	Portugal	proportional	1	closed
26	Romania	mixed	3	closed
27	Slovakia	proportional	1	flexible
28	Slovenia	proportional	2	open
29	Spain	proportional	1	closed
30	Sweden	proportional	2	flexible
31	Switzerland	proportional	1	open
32	The Netherlands	proportional	1	flexible
33	UK	majoritarian	1	closed
34	US	majoritarian	1	closed

Table 9 – ISSP 2012 Items used for Libertarian/Authoritarian Position of Party's Voters

ID	Question	authoritarian	libertarian
Q1a	A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. (recoded)	0 - Strongly disagree	1 - Strongly agree
Q1b	A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.	0 - Strongly agree	1 - Strongly disagree
Q1c	All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.	0 - Strongly agree	1 - Strongly disagree
Q1d	A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children.	0 - Strongly agree	1 - Strongly disagree
Q2a	Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income. (recoded)	0 - Strongly disagree	1 - Strongly agree
Q2b	A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home.	0 - Strongly agree	1 - Strongly disagree

**Figure 12** – Parties' Position on Libertarian - Authoritarian Dimension**Table 10** – Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Perc. of women on viable positions	38	35.912	21.136	0	25.3	50	100
Selection mode	38	2.316	1.165	1	1	3	4
Women Sub-Organisation	37	1.703	0.463	1.000	1.000	2.000	2.000
Left-right position	38	-1.403	27.339	-49.032	-19.285	8.056	91.892
Libertarian-authoritarian position	38	0.122	0.598	-1.000	-0.422	0.500	1.000
Quota on List: Percentage	38	8.947	18.127	0	0	0	50
Perc. reserved seats	38	1.363	4.972	0	0	0	25
Voter's position on gender roles	26	0.537	0.084	0.282	0.488	0.602	0.673

Table 11 – Results II: Linear Regression Model

	Dependent Variable			
	Percentage of women on viable positions			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Party delegates	16.865 (10.440)	10.418 (13.150)	14.453 (14.244)	162.291* (77.988)
Party members	15.294* (7.883)	16.855 (10.377)	24.232* (13.009)	−97.375 (83.637)
Voters	21.616** (9.276)	27.149* (14.372)	32.547* (16.063)	56.288 (181.869)
Ex. Women's org.			−3.961 (12.914)	
Voters' position on gender roles (GR)				161.773* (82.569)
Party's position on cult. dim.		−4.191 (7.365)	−8.225 (8.303)	−23.927* (11.538)
List quota: percentage		0.075 (0.239)	0.135 (0.251)	0.401 (0.280)
Percentage of viable positions reserved		1.099 (1.048)	0.558 (1.182)	1.103 (0.850)
Israel		−25.006 (22.478)	−25.960 (24.640)	−38.498** (14.578)
Italy		4.866 (15.373)	−1.285 (17.001)	
Netherlands		15.192 (19.324)	5.857 (21.051)	−20.965 (13.980)
Portugal		7.999 (20.207)	5.651 (21.890)	−3.435 (12.715)
Spain		20.333 (20.553)	10.930 (22.355)	
Party delegates * Ex. Women's org.				
Party members * Ex. Women's org.			−16.920 (19.086)	
Voters * Ex. Women's org.			−11.099 (21.289)	
Party delegates * Voters' position on GR				−275.882 (155.421)
Party members * Voters' position on GR				216.743 (171.414)
Voters * Voters' position GR				−106.916 (296.217)
Constant	24.882*** (5.355)	17.186 (17.037)	23.317 (18.970)	−46.839 (39.843)
Observations	38	38	37	26
R ²	0.174	0.415	0.473	0.748
Adjusted R ²	0.101	0.167	0.138	0.475

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard Errors in Parantheses

Table 12 – Case selection of parties (Extended Table)

Country name	CMP Party code	Party name	Party abbreviation	Selection mode	Women's organisation
Iceland	15111	Left Green Movement	VGf	Voters	2
	15328	The Alliance - Social Democratic Party of Iceland	S	Voters	1
	15620	Independence Party	Sj	Voters	1
	15810	Progressive Party	F	Voters	1
Israel	72323	Israeli Labour Party	HaAvoda	Party Members	NA
	72326	Meretz	MERETZ	Party Delegates	2
	72533	Sephardi Torah Guardians	Shas	Party Leadership	1
	72622	The Consolidation	Likud	Party Members	2
	72625	Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel is our Home)	YB	Party Members	1
Italy	32021	Civil Revolution	RC	Party Leadership	2
	32061	People of Freedom	PdL	Party Leadership	2
	32230	Left Ecology Freedom	SEL	Voters	2
	32440	Democratic Party	PD	Voters	1
	32450	Democratic Centre	CD	Party Leadership	2
	32460	Civic Choice	SC	Party Leadership	2
	32530	Union of the Center	UdC	Party Leadership	1
	32630	Brothers of Italy - National Centre-right	FDL-CDN	Party Leadership	2
	32720	Northern League	LN	Party Leadership	1
	32956	Five Star Movement	M5S	Voters	2
Netherlands	22110	Green Left	GL	Party Members	2
	22220	Socialist Party	SP	Party Delegates	2
	22320	Labour Party	PvdA	Party Delegates	2
	22330	Democrats'66	D'66	Party Members	2
	22420	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	VVD	Party Members	2
	22521	Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA	Party Members	1
	22526	Christian Union	CU	Party Delegates	2
	22722	Party of Freedom	PVV	Party Leadership	2
	22951	Party for the Animals	PvdD	Party Members	2
	22952	Reformed Political Party	SGP	Party Leadership	2
	22953	50Plus	50PLUS	Party Leadership	2
Portugal	35060	Portugal Ahead	PaF	Party Leadership	2
	35211	Left Bloc	BE	Party Members	2
	35311	Socialist Party	PS	Party Leadership	1
	35220 & 35110	Joint: Port. Comm. and Ecologist Party	PCP-PEV	Party Members	1
Spain	33210	We can	Podemos	Party Members	2
	33320	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	PSOE	Party Members	2
	33610	People's Party	PP	Party Leadership	2
	33902	Basque Nationalist Party	PNV/EAJ	Party Delegates	2