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Content

1. Introduction	3
2. Group agency and group identification	5
2.1 <i>Collections, groups and group agents according to List and Pettit</i>	5
2.1.1. Mere collections.....	5
2.1.2 Groups.....	6
2.1.3 Group agents	7
2.2 <i>Group identification</i>	12
2.2.1 Identification avoids breakdowns in rationality.....	12
2.2.2 Identification gap	14
2.2.3 Spontaneous alignment	15
2.2.4 Different ways of saying “We”	18
2.2.5 From distributed to corporate ways of saying “we”	18
2.2.6 Two types of identification?	19
2.3 <i>Two different types of identification: The real identification gap</i>	20
2.3.1 Coming together to... ..	21
2.3.2 The autonomous “group mind”	22
2.3.3 The reasoning “group mind”.....	24
2.3.4 The crumbling group agent and a sense of collectiveness.....	26
2.3.5 “We” form joint intentions.....	27
2.3.6 Circular joint intentions?.....	29
2.3.7 Common awareness and identification	30
2.3.8 <i>Coawareness</i> as a corporate form of consciousness	31
3. A convergent route to group identification? Schmid’s account of plural self-knowledge	34
3.1 <i>Plural self-knowledge</i>	34
3.1.1 Mode becomes the plural subject.....	34
3.1.2 Pre-reflective plural self-awareness/self-knowledge: The precondition of joint intention.	36
3.2 <i>Characteristics of plural self-knowledge</i>	37
3.2.1 Ownership and identification.....	37
3.2.2 Shared perspective	38
3.2.3 Plural validation	38
3.2.4 Plural commitments	39
3.2.5 Plural self-authorization.....	40
3.3 <i>A participatory way of saying ‘we’</i>	41
3.3.1 Shared feelings.....	41
3.3.2 Participatory sharing of feelings and intentions.....	42
4. A thesis of convergence: Comparing the accounts of List and Pettit to Schmid	44

4.1 Identification and pre-reflective plural self-knowledge	44
4.2 Rationality	46
4.3 Types of collectives	48
4.4 Joint intentions	49
5. The decisive subject.....	50
5.1 Reification of subjectivity	51
5.2 Parallel conceptions of subjectivity.....	51
5.3 Primary subjectivity.....	53
6. Conclusion.....	55
7. Attachments	57
7.1 Abstract.....	57
7.2 Abstract (German).....	57
8. References	58

1. Introduction

Consider a day in your daily life. You get up and during your first coffee you hear news about the United States opting out of the Paris Agreement. A devastated expert is interviewed, stating that climate change is a global phenomenon that has to be faced by some sort of collective effort. Afterwards you go to work. Today there is an important meeting for you and your team. You worked hard to get that project and put a lot of shared effort into it. Luckily your department is successful, and so you go and have lunch together. After work you meet up with your best friend and go for a run, he or she invites you to have dinner with some other folks. You agree, and in less than no time you're home late and having a discussion with your partner about what it means to make reliable agreements, because you forgot that you had promised to come home early.

Reviewing this day one could make it all about yourself. You did your part in getting your project accepted, you did something for your fitness, you had a good time, you do not know where to start slowing down climate change and you forgot to come home early. But this would give a somewhat incomplete picture, as others were also involved in all that you did. Regarding this generic day it becomes clear that doing things with others is pervasive. So, you would more likely describe your day in terms of “we”. *We* got the project accepted and *we* had dinner together. Looking more closely, we can see that there are different ways of doing things together and so quite possibly different ways of saying “we”. There are highly organized forms such as working together with your team, there are looser forms like small talk with acquaintances at dinner, and there is a more intimate discussion between you and your partner trying to create a shared understanding of what it means to have an agreement. So, one does not have to look at almost impalpable collective efforts like slowing down climate change to realize that doing something together as “we” is a major part of our daily lives.

Looking into this issue from a philosophical perspective is therefore promising because it helps us understand and lay the theoretical foundations of a highly practical and concrete phenomenon. To do this I chose to refer to two recent conceptions that are concerned with collective actions and more precisely identification in groups. One is put forward by Philipp Pettit¹, the other by Hans Bernhard Schmid. In this thesis I will examine and compare both accounts in order to determine if they are convergent ways

¹ The account put forward by Pettit also includes writings with Christian List and David Schweikard.

of describing the phenomenon mentioned above. The overall aim of this thesis is to show that these accounts are fundamentally different, and to show in what respects they are different.

Doing this I will take Philipp Pettit's and Christian List's work on group agency as a starting point. In chapter 2 I will describe the classification of three basic types of collectives: mere collections, groups and group agents. As group agents are the most complex form of collectiveness, I will give a rough overview of the basic conditions a collective needs to satisfy. In a second step, group-identification is described as one characteristic of group agents. Towards the end of section 2.2 I will identify two inconsistencies in Pettit's and List's conception of group identification. First, it remains unclear how unification from distributed to corporate joint intentions comes about, and second, it seems that there is more than one kind of identification present in Pettit's and List's work.

The purpose of section 2.3 is to look beyond List and Pettit's work on group agency, and to formulate some first major insights concerning Pettit's thought. I will show that there are two types of identification present in Pettit's work. One of them is explicitly found in group agents. The other is an implicit sense of collectiveness that is present in mere collections, groups without agential status and more importantly in any form of joint intention. I will argue that Pettit cannot account for the latter form of identification, and that this leaves an explanatory gap in his account of collective action. In chapter 3 I will describe Schmid's conception of plural-self-knowledge. Starting with some basic characteristics I will then turn to elaborating its more specific features in section 3.2. I will conclude the chapter by referring to shared feelings and show that joint intentions are shared in the same way Schmid suggests for feelings: in a participatory manner.

In chapter 4 the accounts of Schmid and Pettit will be compared. I will do so with respect to identification, rational performance of collectives, different types of collectives and joint intentions. Except for some minor convergences in identification I will show that their accounts are very different in each of the characteristics I compare. I will argue that Pettit's account only provides reflective ways of incorporation whereas according to Schmid incorporation is pre-reflective from the very start.

Concluding this thesis in chapter 5 I will briefly refer to conceptions of subjectivity. According to Schmid subjectivity and plurality are adverbial features of the mind.

Pettit's understanding of subjectivity has to be somewhat reconstructed. Here I will argue that Pettit and Schmid have roughly the same understandings of subjectivity except for one crucial difference: Pettit does not think of subjectivity as an adverbial feature of the mind.

2. Group agency and group identification

2.1 Collections, groups and group agents according to List and Pettit

In this chapter I will describe three different kinds of collectives as presented in List and Pettit's book on group agency. Those are mere collections, groups and group agents (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 31ff). In a first step I will describe the most important features of each collective, starting with mere collections, groups and finally group agents. In doing this I will elaborate on the differentiating factors between each collective. I will conclude this section by pointing to the role identification is playing in the emergence of group agency which marks the transition to the next section.

2.1.1. Mere collections

List and Pettit point out that there are different types of collectives, the loosest form of them being *mere collections* (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 31). Examples are people in a bus or subway carriage. Those collections change their identity with every change of membership (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 31). The collection of people in a bus changes as soon as someone leaves or enters the bus. Another characteristic of a mere collection is that they can perform joint actions (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32). If, for example, people at a beach spontaneously organize to help a swimmer in need, this is called a joint action. What a joint action explicitly consists of will be made clear in the section on group agents. But organization in mere collections does not go any further than this. This is why they cannot become group agents.

2.1.2 Groups

In contrast to mere collections, groups are able to organize further than mere collections and thus could possibly become group agents (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32). Also, they have a more enduring identity than mere collections. This means that the identity of a specific group endures changes of membership (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 31). It has to be made explicit that one differentiating factor between mere collections and groups is identity, or more precisely the stability of identity. Groups have a somewhat stable identity, whereas mere collections have a very unstable one that varies with every change of membership.

Furthermore groups are united by certain properties. Those properties might be salient and behavior affecting (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32). If someone belongs to a certain religious group, this person might wear certain religious signs of belonging (a cross or a kippah) and follow certain traditions on Sundays, etc..

List and Pettit point out that sharing a certain property can be a matter of common awareness (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32). This would mean that sharing the property of being religious and therefore belonging to one certain religious group might come with a common awareness among group members. Alternatively a shared property might be established by members who sign up “to some commitment” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32). The unifying property would then become manifest if people somehow commit to being members of this or that group. List and Pettit draw attention to the fact that members construe their identities around that property, which does not imply though that they exclude their other identities (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32). As these few remarks show, groups are a much more complex phenomenon than mere collections. Before I describe the characteristics and differentiating factors of group agents, I will describe some observations which will contribute to my main argument. As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, groups can be more organized than mere collections. What this organization consists of will be shown in the section on group agents. But for now, there is no characteristic named – besides identification – that could account for a greater organizational capability in groups. Sharing certain properties seems to contribute to the stability of identification in groups, but it seems questionable if those properties alone can account for this increase of organizational ability in groups. It is not clear at first sight, for example, why all the third born members of families are a group that has a more stable identity than a collection of people who saved a child from

drowning. If what List and Pettit argue is true, all third born members of families are a group because they share that property, and so have the ability to become a group agent (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32). In contrast, the random collection of 10 people who together save a child from drowning at a beach is not a group, because they do not share a property, but have only performed a joint action (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32, fn. 18). According to List and Pettit the identity of that collection changes as soon as the first person leaves after the incident (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 31). At this point it remains difficult to see why there is such a significant difference in the stability of the identity in these types of collectives. I will pick up these observations later, but before that I will elaborate on the main characteristics of group agents.

2.1.3 Group agents

As we have seen, mere collections cannot be group agents, but groups can (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 31). What differentiates a group agent from a group? Put bluntly defining this difference is the whole purpose of the book, which is why I will only mention the most important conditions that that allow List and Pettit to elaborate on the obstacles and possibilities of group agency. Later, I will come back to some of their more technical discussions for the purpose of my argument. Beyond that I will leave aside most of their deliberations concerning the aggregation of individual views into a group view and the criteria this aggregation has to meet. But let us focus on the main question for this section: What is needed for a group to become an agent?

Joint intentions

First of all, a group agent has to be able to form joint intentions. List and Pettit focus on group agents with joint intentions, even though there is the possibility of group agents without joint intentions (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 33). Joint intentions are understood in line with Michael Bratman (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 33), who argues that a joint intention has to have:

1. A shared goal: Every member of a group promotes a given goal.
2. Individual contribution: Every member intends to do their part to achieve that goal.

3. Interdependence: Every member forms their intention based partly on the belief that others formed such intentions too.
4. Common awareness: Every member believes that conditions 1 - 3 are met (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 33).

According to this definition joint intentions could form as follows: Assume a group of craftsmen want to build a house. Every member of that group has to promote the goal of building a house (condition 1). Additionally every member has to intend to do their part to build the house (condition 2). The intention of each craftsman is formed partly because they believe that others formed such intentions too (condition 3). Last but not least, every craftsman believes that conditions 1 - 3 are met (condition 4).

I will refrain from any attempt to assess whether or not these are sufficient conditions for a collective to share an intention. But it is important to stress once more that even groups and mere collections could form joint intentions such as these. Being able to form joint intentions is not a capacity that is reserved for group agents only.

The conditions of agency

Besides forming joint intentions a group agent has to meet the following conditions of agency (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32):

- a) It has to have representational states. Those states depict how things are in the environment.
- b) It has to have motivational states. Motivational states specify how it – the group – requires things to be in the environment.
- c) It has to have the capacity to process its representational and motivational states. This process should then lead it to intervene in the environment whenever its representational states fail to match its motivational states (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 20).

List and Pettit stress that each and every agent has to meet these three conditions in order to be considered an agent (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 20). Let me illustrate these conditions of agency with another example:

Assume I sit at a table and I see that my laptop is on it along with a glass of water, this can be considered a representational state (condition a). I always like to have sweets on the table – this would be a motivational state (condition b). Finally I realize that what I see – a table without sweets on it – does not match what I want – a table with sweets on it. This mismatch finally leads me to get up, buy some sweets and put them on the table (condition c). Having these states and then intervening in my environment would satisfy the conditions of agency.

This example can be extended to group settings: Let us assume that it is not only me sitting at the table, but five other persons as well. Let us further assume that this collective has a somewhat consistent experience of seeing that there are laptops and glasses of water on the table, but no sweets (condition a). Furthermore the persons collectively have the urge to always have sweets on the table (condition b). They realize that what they see does not match what they want. So someone gets up, buys some sweets and puts them on the table (condition c). This illustrates that these conditions can be applied in individual cases as well as in collective ones.

Standards of rationality

As we have seen, group agents have to be able to form different kinds of attitudes. They form representational attitudes if they depict how things are in their environment. They form motivational attitudes if they define how they require things to be. If they process these attitudes and take measures to attain a match between the two they might do this by forming joint intentions, which are intentional attitudes.

However, group agents must show a minimum of rationality (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 36). Therefore the formation of different kinds of attitudes has to satisfy the following standards of rationality: attitude to fact, attitude to action, and attitude to attitude standards of rationality (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 36).

The attitude to fact standard of rationality specifies that the group must ensure that its beliefs are true and its desires are at least realizable. This is based on member input because members are the eyes and ears of a group agent (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 36). The second standard of rationality is the attitude to action standard. Here groups have to be organized in a way that if action is required the appropriate enactors are selected and authorized (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 37). The third standard is the attitude to attitude standard of rationality, requiring that the group's beliefs and desires form a coherent

whole (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 37). This attitude to attitude standard of rationality seems of utmost importance because it raises a question about the relation between individual attitudes and group attitudes. List and Pettit discuss the aggregation function in the following chapter in order to clarify this relation (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 37ff).

Aggregation functions

As described in the section above, group attitude formation as a whole has to meet the standards of rationality. An aggregation function is one way that the aggregation of individual attitudes into group attitudes could be conceived (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 42, 48). Any aggregation function has to satisfy certain conditions in order to be a candidate for attitude aggregation that is adequate for agency.

“Collective rationality” is one of those conditions that is focused on the output of an aggregation function. It requires that an aggregation function has to have complete and coherent group attitudes as its output (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 49). The condition of “universal domain” demands that any possible individual attitude is admitted as input. The condition of “anonymity” demands that each individual attitude has the same weight. The fourth condition is concerned with the dependency of group attitudes. “Systematicity” and “neutrality” demand that the group attitude always depends only on the relevant individual attitude and that this relation is guaranteed for all group attitudes (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 49).

If there is such thing as the *perfect* aggregation function, then it aggregates individual attitudes in a way that satisfies all the conditions and forms a single coherent system of collectively held beliefs and desires (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 34). But List and Pettit argue that there is no such aggregation function – this is what is then coined the “impossibility theorem” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 50). I will not go into a detailed discussion of this topic, but the impossibility theorem triggers a lengthy discussion by the authors about which conditions of aggregation function should be relaxed. One important insight is that collective rationality is not a possible candidate for relaxation because this would lead to inconsistent attitudes and inconsistent actions. None of which is a characteristic of agency (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 52).

In their discussion List and Pettit seem to opt for a premise based procedure. In this procedure a majority vote is taken on the individual attitudes towards the premises and the group attitude is derived from this (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 56). Later List and Pettit

clarify that they did not intend to argue for a procedure like this (List and Pettit, 2012, p. 1). Rather they opt for a heuristic method that determines group attitudes from proposition to proposition (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 62). This would entail the group forming an attitude towards a certain proposition and then determining whether or not this attitude is coherent with attitudes formed in the past (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 62).

Holistic supervenience

Obviously, group attitudes depend on individual attitudes (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 65). We saw that individual attitudes are pooled by aggregation functions which then form a group attitude. Concerning the overall relation between individual attitudes and group attitudes List and Pettit argue for a relation of supervenience (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 65). This means that if individual attitudes – lower level properties – are fixed, then group attitudes – higher level properties – are fixed as well, but not vice versa (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 65ff). This entails the possibility that a certain group attitude could be formed by several different configurations of individual attitudes, which is why aggregation functions and organizational structures (the implementation of a certain aggregation function) play an important role, since they serve as interfaces between individual and group attitudes (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 65). The authors argue for a relation of holistic supervenience, because it is consistent with group rationality (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 69). How can a relation of holistic supervenience be brought about? This question points back to the question of which aggregation function best qualifies a group to be considered an agent. A promising candidate, according to List and Pettit, is the “distributed premise based procedure” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 71). Here, different group members play different roles in determining the group attitude, because specialists in subgroups form the group attitude for specific propositions. Therefore only a few individuals determine what the group attitude will be and each individual contributes only one or a few attitudes to the group attitude (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 71). By this group attitudes gain a certain autonomy towards individual attitudes, since it is possible that not every individual, maybe not even a majority, shares the group attitude.

That being said List and Pettit go on and show in multiple cases that – given certain conditions, like collective rationality – it is almost impossible to find an aggregation function that satisfies all conditions of group agency (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 50, 58,

114, 138, 141ff). After all a group could (or should) be a unified agent which functions as a center of attitudes and intentions. This raises the possibility of a self-identification becoming manifest by saying “we” in a corporate way (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194). The role that self-identification plays for group agency and how saying “we” is constituted will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

2.2 Group identification

Among other conditions that have been named above, identification with a group is one important feature of group agents. In List and Pettit’s book it is described in chapter 5 and in chapter 9 (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 104, 186ff). I will reconstruct the role identification has in chapter 5 and will then go into a detailed discussion of its further characteristics that come up in chapter 9. But two remarks have to be made in advance.

First, I want to refresh memory about the fact that there is identification in mere collections too. There is identification on that specific level of collectiveness even though it is an unstable one: “Some [collectives] change identity with any change of membership.” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 31). This means that List and Pettit do not claim that there is no identification in mere collections but only in groups or group agents. On each level of collectiveness there is identification, but seemingly of a different kind or quality.

Second, the analysis and description of group identification is not as straightforward as the rest of List and Pettit’s analysis of group agency. This is why I will try to reconstruct List and Pettit’s account on identification and directly comment on some of its fundamental characteristics. The aim of this section is to give an overview of what List and Pettit conceive of identification, and to indicate further lines of investigation by raising some fundamental questions.

2.2.1 Identification avoids breakdowns in rationality

Group-identification is first mentioned in chapter 5. Here the so called “incentive compatibility desideratum” is discussed. Incentive-compatibility is something an organizational design has to generate (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 104). It has to deal with the fact that what seems rational from an individual’s perspective might not be rational or at least beneficial from the group’s perspective (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 104). So,

incentive-compatibility is concerned with situations in which an individual is presented with a choice of possible actions. One example for this is the tax-system in which individuals have a choice between cooperating – that is paying taxes – and declining to pay taxes (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 105). An action is incentive-compatible if it is rational for the individual to take the action that would also be rational from a group perspective (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 105). List and Pettit argue that what is incentive-compatible not only depends on the specifics of a situation but also on individual preferences (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 107ff). In the case of the tax system this means that someone who is interested in contributing to a common good is more likely to choose cooperation in a tax-system than someone who is only interested in their own benefit. The authors go on and give a lengthy discussion on how the incentive-compatibility desideratum could be satisfied (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 109). Satisfaction in this context would require an aggregation function that gathers individual attitudes in such a way that what is rational from the individuals' point of view is also rational from a group point of view. Beyond that an organizational structure – that is the implementation of an aggregation function – has to satisfy the incentive compatibility desideratum as well (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 60, 109). However, the fact that individual preferences are changing makes it impossible to only change the aggregation function and organizational structure. The only feasible result of this would be a degenerative aggregation function, such as dictatorship where one person determined every attitude and intention of the group (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 124ff).

A more favorable route might be to change individual preferences. This change of preferences might only happen if group members identify with a group in such a way that they set aside their own judgments and preferences and act on those of the group (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 127). In this case a group starts to think in a “we-frame” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 128). Identification could fail for some reason resulting in members who do not identify with the group. In this case the group might suffer a rationality breakdown – just as an individual would (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 128)

At this point it becomes clear that identification can have a very important function in the emergence of group agents. It can have the result that group members set aside their individual preferences and align them with the group's point of view. Furthermore identification can avoid a rationality breakdown. How should we conceive of such a rationality breakdown?

In an individual case, a rationality breakdown means that I stop identifying with the beliefs and desires I seemed to have. I am not aware of them as mine, which would entail that intentional attitudes are alien to me and I might not act on them. In situations like this I could experience myself as irrational or insane even. In the case of a group this can mean that beliefs and desires of the group become alien to its members, which could result in group intentions no longer being enacted. But intentions not being enacted mark a break of one standard of rationality (attitude to action) and as we have seen, group agents have to satisfy all standards of rationality. I will come back to this later in terms of the “identification gap”

Looking back to the relation of holistic supervenience between individual and group-attitudes shows how this breakdown might happen. There is a tension between group rationality and individual attitudes that is seemingly only resolved by identification. As I described earlier holistic supervenience includes the possibility that group attitudes are different from individual attitudes. They might even contradict attitudes held by the majority of members (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 71). So it seems that it would allow for members to experience group attitude formation as alien, or as attitudes they cannot act upon. At this point a rationality breakdown becomes possible. Following this train of thought, one could argue that only identification prevents this breakdown from happening, because members set aside their own preferences and adopt the group view – or a “we-frame” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 128). By this, group-attitudes might not seem alien anymore and identification could be considered the only way out of the dawning impossibility of group agents. Having this effect, group-identification could make an important contribution to the emergence of group agents.

Until now we only know about possible effects of identification, but nothing about its characteristics. In chapter 9: *Identifying With Group Agents*, List and Pettit dive deeper into the topic and elaborate it in more detail (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 186ff).

2.2.2 Identification gap

To get a grip on one characteristic of identification List and Pettit take a detour and define ways in which identification might go wrong, and in particular the possibility that the “identification gap” might open. This is described as a logical possibility for both individuals and groups (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 186ff). For reasons of simplicity I will only explain how this happens within groups.

Intuitively, it is perfectly conceivable that if I am sitting at a table with other persons and someone says “We should close the window,” I may not respond because I do not identify with this collection of people. Maybe I do not know who the group is and thus do not know who “we” is. In this case, the identification-gap is open, because I failed to identify with the group. To prevent this gap from opening there has to be some sort of spontaneous alignment of individual attitudes and group attitudes (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 191). What the group requires has to be in direct alignment with an individual’s preferences, who then acts without further deliberation. Therefore we can state that one major characteristic of identification is that it provides direct and spontaneous alignment between individual preferences and group attitudes. This alignment does not need any further deliberation on the individual’s part about who the group is (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 192). Having said this, it is worthwhile taking a closer look at the spontaneous alignment between individual and group attitudes.

2.2.3 Spontaneous alignment

The before mentioned alignment between individual attitudes and group attitudes cannot be a cognitive process of figuring out who the group is, what its attitudes are and who is about to enact them, as it has to be more spontaneous (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 191). List and Pettit describe two possible ways of achieving this alignment:

The alignment may be achieved either through explicitly adopting the group's viewpoint – that is, adopting the group's attitudes as our own – or through an incentive structure that guarantees that alignment by appealing to our self-interest, such as when the group agent is internally organized in such a way as to meet the incentive-compatibility desideratum [...]. In either case, the group effectively connects its beliefs and desires directly to action without letting any identification gap open. (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 192)

The first form of alignment consists of adopting the group’s viewpoint explicitly. Regarding the fact that alignment needs to be spontaneous, explicitly adopting a group’s viewpoint does not satisfy the condition of spontaneity. The second option described in the quote can be considered as a by-product of a group design that addresses my self-interest and creates alignment in this way. This is the attempt to construct an organizational structure that guarantees that what is rational from an individual perspective is also rational from a group perspective (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 192). Rational action in this context means that I act only with the aim of furthering my own

interests. However, the discussion on satisfying the incentive compatibility desideratum has shown that only changing the organizational design is not a viable way to achieve this alignment. The fact that preferences change from individual to individual makes it impossible to create this form of spontaneous alignment by changing organizational structure only. At this point none of the options above seem to bring about the form of spontaneous alignment List and Pettit are searching for.

The authors then bring up the example of a pilot as an analogy (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 192). A beginner pilot might use the instruments as indicators to get an impression on the situation at hand. This information might be weighed against the pilot's own senses, since the latter might be misleading in certain situations (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 192). The beginner pilot offers us an analogy to a case in which the identification gap has opened up.

Referring to the previous example, I might be sitting at the table with others while someone is saying that "we" should close the window. Here I might take the presence of others at the table as an indicator that there is a group. The fact that someone says "We should close the window" could be an indicator that the group has the desire to close the window. If no one said: "We: that is everyone at this table except for you, Sascha," this could be considered an indicator that I am part of this group. The utterance "We should close the window," should activate me as it does anyone else at the table. In this case the identification gap is open insofar as I could easily be mistaken in my assumptions. I might infer that because no one explicitly stated: "Sascha, you are part of this group," that I am not part of the group. Beyond that there are plenty of conceivable ways in which identification might go wrong. This is why I can never be entirely sure if the information I have is sufficient to identify with the group. Furthermore, alignment should be spontaneous, so that enactment of group attitudes does not require further deliberation. If I have to figure out who the group is and if I am a part of it, I am not undergoing a spontaneous alignment at all.

But in the pilot-example a more spontaneous form of identification is described. A more experienced pilot connects directly to the instruments in the cockpit and over time does not look directly at them or think about their evidence. This pilot is somewhat guided by the instruments (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 192).

Transferring this analogy to groups, and to the example already mentioned, it can be explicated as follows: Sitting at the table I do not need to look for evidence that the

people around me form a group. Nor do I need to interpret information to conclude that this group wants to close the window and that I am part of this group. In analogy to the experienced pilot I am directly connected to the group and thus activated to close the window. List and Pettit would formulate this as follows:

Rather, their [the member's] individual attitudes are under the automatic guidance of the group, so that they can respond as spontaneously as pilots do when they take their cue from the panel before them (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 192).

The two different types of alignment in the pilot example seem to refer to certain ways of being aware of something. The unexperienced pilot is explicitly and rationally referring to the outside world, the more experienced pilot is aware of his surroundings in what could be described as a semi-conscious way of connecting to the outside world. Spontaneous alignment – identification – can therefore be described as individual attitude formation that is under automatic guidance by the group's point of view and which is spontaneously reacting to the dynamics of it.

List and Pettit claim that if identification comes about without an incentive structure, the propositional expression of the attitudes of the group take the form of “we” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 192). A group-mind is thereby instantiated in the individual (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 193).

This form of identification however, is not necessarily of enduring stability. At some point we might still fail to identify with the group. This fading of identification highlights the role of activist members within the group. These members may raise “group consciousness” by reminding others of their group identity and reintegrating them in we-modes of attitude forming and enacting (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 193).

This remark points to one further characteristic of identification. It can slowly fade out or it can be forgotten and has to be revived from time to time. It seems to be a special characteristic of groups, since we usually do not face that problem individually. I do not have to be reminded that I am myself.

Summarizing the most important characteristics of identification so far, it can be stated that identification is a spontaneous form of alignment of individual attitudes with group attitudes. Individual attitudes are formed with respect to group attitude formation. This alignment has the effect that individuals can spontaneously react to changes in group attitude formation. It also offers the possibility of group attitudes being formed in the

first person plural. Furthermore identification with a group can be forgotten by the individual members, but it can be revived by others.

2.2.4 Different ways of saying “We”

As already mentioned, successful group agents self-identify as “we” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 193). This identification as “we” is the same as individual self-identification as “I” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 193). Plural self-identification enables the group to be a unified agent and use the indexical “we”. Saying “we” however can be of different kinds (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194), and there are cases of joint intentions and cases of group agency in which “we” is used differently.

In cases of joint intentions – like carrying a piano – saying “we” is a distributed kind of “we”. It addresses me as an individual doing something with someone else, like saying: “I intend that ‘we’ carry the piano.” This form allows for a reduction of “we” to “he, she and I intend to x” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194). There is no unification here because “we” is reducible to individuals.

In cases of group agency, self-identification in the form of “we” is of a corporate kind. A corporate joint intention is formed like this: “We intend to carry the piano.” It addresses us as a group, as a center of attitudes and intentions. Contrary to cases of distributed joint intentions, a corporate “we” cannot be reduced to its individuals (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194). To quote List and Pettit on this: “But the ‘we’ involved in such joint intentions is usually the distributed ‘we’, not the corporate one that arises when joint intentions lead to a self-identifying group agent.” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194) Let us take a closer look at this quote and relate it to what we already know about the emergence of “we” and identification through mere collections, groups and group agents.

2.2.5 From distributed to corporate ways of saying “we”

In some cases of joint intentions there is only a distributed “we” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194). Following the quote above, these joint intentions “lead” in different possible ways (which are discussed in the book) to self-identification and give – at some point – rise to a group agent that might use the corporate kind of “we” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194). Therefore it can be stated that identification in terms of saying “we” is distributed

until individual intentional attitudes are merged and united into a more stable form of saying “we”, the “corporate ‘we’”. This form of identification makes the group the center of attitudes and intentions. Therefore a group agent is established, given that other conditions of group agency are satisfied.

At this point, one thing becomes apparent: As I mentioned in section 2.1, mere collections can form joint intentions but they cannot become group agents (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32). So, if somehow joint intentions lead to group agency – given that certain conditions like group rationality are satisfied – mere collections could become group agents as well, because they can perform joint intentions.

Furthermore it needs to be asked what makes the shift from a distributed to a corporate “we” possible. What brings about this merging and unification of individual attitudes?

As we have seen, aggregating individual attitudes into group attitudes by aggregation functions is – given certain conditions – almost impossible to achieve (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 50). So we can acknowledge the fact that this is not a promising way to go. Another possible way of explaining how a distributed “we” merges into a corporate “we” is to point to identification. The corporate “we” could emerge because a group becomes a self-identifying group. However, this would make for a circular explanation. If the question is how individual attitudes merge into group attitudes which bring about a self-identifying agent, then we cannot explain the question by identification itself.

For now, it seems that the question of how a distributed “we” transforms into a corporate “we” leads into a dead end because it seems that there is no satisfactory answer to it. Unfortunately in List and Pettit’s (2011) book on group agency there are no further explanations given. Leaving this insight aside for now, there is something else worth mentioning while analyzing distributive and corporate forms of saying “we”.

2.2.6 Two types of identification?

As we have seen self-identification in terms of a group using the first person plural in a corporate way might arise from joint intentions (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194). According to the quote above a corporate “we” “arises when joint intentions lead to a self-identifying group-agent” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194). This would entail that joint intentions change considerably in quality, because at some point they change from being distributed to being corporate. This might be due to changes in quantity, the frequency of joint intentions, or due to other circumstances that bring about a change in

quality. In any case, this means that self-identification emerges from joint intentions. As mentioned above, it remains an open question what the reasons for this are.

If we take this insight seriously and look back to mere collections, this would also mean that there are no identifications in mere collections that do not perform joint intentions. Put differently: some weak forms of identification emerge in mere collections as soon as they form a joint intention. Thus, when there is no joint intention – as in case of the subway carriage – there should be no identification whatsoever. However, this line of reasoning contradicts one major insight from previously: mere collections seem to identify even if this identification is unstable (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 31). It is as if List and Pettit refer here to two different kinds of identification, an unstable one in mere collections that changes with every change of membership and one raised by joint intentions (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 31, 194).

So far we have seen that identification can have fundamental impacts on the formation of group agents. Spontaneous alignment between individual attitudes and group attitudes can prevent a rationality breakdown from happening. Furthermore, it can make a group self-identifying, unifying individual attitudes into its central attitudes and desires. Identification in group agents might be brought about by joint intentions, but it remains unclear how a change of quality emerges in the joint intentions of mere collections and group agents respectively. Beyond that there seem to be two kinds of identification assumed by List and Pettit. An unstable form of identification in mere collections that does not form joint intentions, and identification that is raised by joint intentions. Even though the former is unstable because it changes with every change of membership, it nevertheless seems to be a form of identification. At this point it is not clear how unstable identification in mere collections without joint intentions is related to the form of identification that arises from joint intentions.

2.3 Two different types of identification: The real identification gap

In this section I will go through various writings by Pettit and others to investigate the questions raised in section 2.2. I will show that there are two types of identification present in Pettit's work. One type is present in group agents and evolves from joint intentions, the other can be described as a certain sense of collectiveness that forms the very possibility of joint intentions and thus group agency. Beyond that I will also argue that it remains unclear how joint intentions constitute group identification in group

agents. Concerning the implicit sense of collectiveness, I will argue that Pettit does not make its foundations explicit nor does he relate it to identification that is present in group agents. The overall point of this section is to show that there is an explanatory gap between the presupposed sense of collectiveness and identification found in group agents.

The questions raised in section 2.2 were the following: Given that joint intentions are the driver that raises group identification so that a corporate “we” evolves, we have to look at how exactly they constitute identification. And: How does identification that is present in mere collections relate to identification raised by joint intentions? Are those two different forms of identification? Let us take a closer look at the first question and see if we can find an answer in List and Pettit’s book on group agency (List and Pettit, 2011).

2.3.1 Coming together to...

In their book on group agency List and Pettit claim that the difference between joint intentions and a group agent is that in the former case people come together to perform a common action and in the latter people come together to form a unified group agent (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194). What does this imply?

In cases of joint intentions people come together and perform a common action like saving a swimmer at a beach. People might be sunbathing, playing ball or going for a swim, at some point they realize that there is a swimmer in need. Those people then organize with the goal of saving the person in the water. Once they realize there is someone in need, they come together – they organize – to perform the common action of helping the person in need. This case of joint action seems quite plausible.

In case of group agents, individuals come together to form a unified agent. This is more difficult to comprehend. From a first person perspective, I need to come together with others first and then form a unified agent. There are two parts here that are of concern for us: “coming together” and “forming a unified agent”.

If I only form an intention to form a unified agent, then this lacks others with whom I intend to form a unified agent. So “coming together” necessarily precedes forming a group agent. This issue will be discussed in sections 2.3.3 – 2.3.8.

The part of “forming a unified agent” could manifest like this: “I intend to form a unified agent with you” or “I intend that we form a unified agent.” Considering its form

this would be a joint intention (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194). So we can state that, if conceived like this, forming a unified agent would presuppose a joint intention to form a unified agent. This can be read parallel to an objection that is also made by Hans Bernhard Schmid whose account will be discussed later (Schmid, 2014b, p. 10).

Beyond that, if coming together to form a unified agent is a joint intention that has a specific goal, then it remains unclear in which respect it is different from a joint intention that has a specific goal like saving a swimmer in need. It seems that forming a group agent is a joint intention like other joint intentions. However, we have seen that joint intentions unify at some point and become one corporate intention, instead of many distributive joint intentions (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194).

For now it seems that the joint intention of helping someone and the joint intention to form a unified agent are formally identical in their first occurrence. Since mere collections could form joint intentions too they should also be able to form the joint intention of becoming a group agent (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32). It is therefore not clear why a self-identifying group agent could not evolve from mere collections. More importantly, there is still an open question about how distributive joint intentions unify into a corporate joint intention, held by a self-identifying group agent.

2.3.2 The autonomous “group mind”

In his 2006 paper written with Schweikard, Pettit argues that groups can form a single group intention, but only if a group agent is present (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 30). As we already know, joint actions in mere collections are based on several intentions that are reducible to individual intentions. These are therefore different from the joint action of a group agent that is based on a single group intention.

In the discussion of holistic supervenience in List and Pettit’s book on group agency it is argued that forming single group intentions means that a group agent has a “mind of its own” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 65; Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 34). This means that group attitude formation has to show some degree of autonomy from members’ attitude formation. The following quote shows what degree of autonomy a group mind can have according to Schweikard and Pettit:

Such an agent will have to espouse an intentional profile that marks it off on some issues from the profile, not just of a minority of members, and not just of a majority of members, but even of every single individual in the group. (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 35)

As we have seen in section 2.2 there is a tension between individual attitude formation and the somewhat autonomous attitude formation in group agents. The quote shows that this can result in group intentions that are not shared by any member of the group. At this point a rationality breakdown becomes possible because members might neither share nor enact what the group intends. In their book on group agency List and Pettit state that only group identification can resolve this tension because it prevents a rationality breakdown (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 128).

Following Schweikard and Pettit it becomes clear that group agents showing this kind of autonomy can be the result of a special form of joint action (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 35). Those joint intentions in the form of joint actions are special insofar as they satisfy the following three conditions: The collective sets suitable ends, it shows a suitable body of judgments for guidance in reaching these ends and it displays a structure of agency to enact its intentions. If this is the case group agents will certainly evolve (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 35).

But regarding its form, saving a swimmer in need also seems to satisfy the above conditions, yet it does not give rise to a group agent (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 34). Saving a person's life can be considered a suitable end. Furthermore, it rests on a suitable body of judgments like "there is someone in the water who needs help" and "help might be provided by x" etc.. And finally, it can be argued that there is some structure of agency to enact the intention. Someone might take the lead, saying what has to be done, while others join in and delegate who does what in order to save the person in the water. In this case it seems there is no fundamental difference between the form of joint intentions or joint actions that do not give rise to group agency, and the form of joint intentions or joint actions that give rise to a group agent. Pettit and Schweikard claim, however, that at some point those numerous joint intentions unify into a single group intention that shows some autonomy towards the attitudes of its members (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 35). Unfortunately, the postulated differences between joint actions that give rise to group agents and those joint actions that do not give rise to group agents seem negligible or non-existent, making it very difficult to see how this

unification of joint intentions and the evolving autonomy of the group-mind could be explained.

What can be said is that group agents form a group mind that shows some degree of autonomy towards the attitudes held by group members. The possible mismatch between group attitudes and member attitudes has already been pointed out, and that it poses a potential rationality breakdown. In their book on group agency (2011) List and Pettit can only dissolve this tension by pointing to how identification avoids this possibility. At this point the question remains unanswered as to what brings about the shift from many joint intentions formed by mere collections to a single group intention formed by a group agent. As argued above, there does not seem to be a major difference between those forms of joint intention. Regarding identification we can state that it is given in group agents and – as is argued in List and Pettit’s book on group agency – that it is the precondition for avoiding the rationality breakdown of a “group mind” (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 128). What remains unclear is how this form of identification is constituted. Beyond that it is questionable whether it is constituted by a special form of joint intentions, or if it is the reason why a group can even form a self-identifying group mind in the first place.

2.3.3 The reasoning “group mind”

Groups having a “mind of their own” show certain characteristics in how they deal with attitude formation and the body of collectively formed attitudes (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 34). In *Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency* (Pettit, 2007) Philip Pettit elaborates on the way a group can deal with attitude formation and the body of previously formed attitudes.

Pettit claims that sophisticated agents like a group agent show two characteristics: rationality and the ability to reason (Pettit, 2007, p. 498). First, rationality consists in the satisfaction of three standards that are quite similar to the ones named in section 2.1 (Pettit, 2007, pp. 496ff). Reasoning, on the other hand, is taking intentional steps to raise the chance of satisfying those standards. This consists in asking questions about propositional properties, and their relations. By taking these steps an agent can increase the rationality of their attitudes (Pettit, 2007, p. 499). For groups to be considered an agent this means that their members have to be coordinated in such a way as to replicate the performance of an individual agent that is showing rationality and the ability of

reasoning (Pettit, 2007, p. 504). Later Pettit gives an example of how this could be achieved and opts for the so called straw-vote procedure, which is a voting procedure that goes as follows.

Each member of a group votes on every issue, then the group judgment is checked for consistency. If there are inconsistencies then the respective issue or any other prior judgment is revised via voting until consistency is restored (Pettit, 2007, p. 512). By this, feedback is incorporated into group attitude formation and can ensure group rationality. A crucial characteristic of the straw vote procedure is that it is a form of group reasoning because it requires paying attention to the relations of attitudes. But not only this, the group also has to respond to inconsistencies, while respecting the constraints of rationality. So following the straw-vote procedure makes a group a reasoning subject (Pettit, 2007, p. 513). For a group to be considered an agent members will have to act together to form and enact attitudes while they consider the group as a unified center of attitude formation and enactment (Pettit, 2007, p. 514).

The fundamental assumption that is implied in the straw-vote procedure is that group members are committed to the procedure and agree on what propositions to revise. Otherwise the group would be subject to weakness of will or akrasia (Pettit, 2007, p. 515).² This shows that it is important that members break out of their individual encapsulation. The group has to discipline the members into only accepting certain patterns of judgment. If this is the case, members will be willing to put their views aside and identify with the group. This might happen by incentive or spontaneously (Pettit, 2007, p. 516).

So, for a group to become a group agent they must form a consistent set of answers to logically interconnected issues, while being sensitive to the overall evidence available. This is a long way of saying that a group agent has to be rational and it has to have the ability to reason. One way is the straw vote procedure (Pettit, 2007, p. 518).

This could mark a tangible difference between groups or mere collections that form joint intentions and group agents that might also form joint intentions. Joint intentions of a group agent form a consistent set of attitudes concerning logically interconnected issues. But it has to be pointed out that this difference relies heavily on the assumption

² In his 2015 paper *How to Tell if a Group is an Agent* Pettit makes roughly the same point when he argues that group agents have to form a coherent whole that shows internal and situational robustness. The main difference is that this is mostly argued from an exterior perspective that asks if one could ascribe agency to a group (Pettit, 2015, p. 110).

that group members “break out of their capsules” and are “willing to put their own views aside and identify with the group as a whole” (Pettit, 2007, p. 516).

The quoted passages show how important identification is for Pettit’s view on group rationality, group reasoning and hence the possibility of group agency. It can be argued that the very possibility of forming a group agent relies on this assumption. If no group member would be willing to put aside their own judgments, beliefs and desires then no group agency would be possible.

Unfortunately, Pettit does not make explicit what he means by this assumption, and it remains unclear what group members “breaking out of their capsules” could mean (Pettit, 2007, p. 516). Going forward it becomes more and more obvious that Pettit fails to clarify how group identification is constituted and more importantly he does not make explicit if identification is a precondition of group agency or if group agency is the precondition of identification. For now, this seems to be a chicken or egg kind of dilemma.

2.3.4 The crumbling group agent and a sense of collectiveness

In this section I would like to focus on a remark Pettit makes in *Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency*. What if a certain group agent does not get its act together (Pettit, 2007, p. 516)? It is argued that this group is not just crumbling into a mere collection of individuals, such as people living in the same zip-code area. Rather it is a group agent that just fails to live up to the conditions of consistency and rationality (Pettit, 2007, p. 516). Let me elaborate on that thought.

This means that if a group does not show the identification it needs to attain agential status, then it does not crumble into a mere collection of people that show no stable form of identification whatsoever. It still remains a group. So there is some form of identification left, yet not of the kind with which members set aside their own attitudes and identify with the group. It could be described more fittingly as a remaining sense of collectiveness in collectives that do not meet the conditions of agency. Once more it seems that Pettit does assume more than one kind of identification.

There is one kind of identification in group agents, which I have described above (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 186ff). But beyond that there is another kind of identity in groups that do not meet the conditions of agency that was mentioned in the discussion of mere collections (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32; Pettit, 2007, p. 516). Beyond the two quoted

passages, there are no additional remarks about any form of identification being present outside of group agents. Additionally, none of the given quotations explicitly states that there *is* identification outside of group agents. I will therefore consider both remarks as hints to what I will call an *implicit sense of collectiveness* that is not only found in mere collections or non-agential groups, but also in Pettit's account of joint intentions.

2.3.5 "We" form joint intentions

In their paper on *Joint Actions and Group Agents* by Schweikard and Pettit (2006) some relevant insights can be found that support the hypothesis about an implicit sense of collectiveness found in Pettit's account. Let us start with a more elaborate analysis of joint actions. The analysis here is in many respects parallel to the definition of joint intentions in List and Pettit's work on Group Agency (2011). For reasons of clarity I will refer to the five conditions named in the 2006 paper on *Joint Actions and Group Agents*.

The conditions of joint action are:

1. *they each intend that they enact the performance;*
 2. *they each intend to do their bit in this performance;*
 3. *they each believe that others intend to do their bit; and*
 4. *they each intend to do their bit because of believing this.*
- [...]
5. *they each believe in common that the other clauses hold.* (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, pp. 23ff)

The first requirement entails that each of the persons involved intend to enact the performance together (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 21). Schweikard and Pettit make clear that each individual who does not have this intention is cut out from the action. That means if none of us had the intention, there is no action to cut anyone out of (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 22).

Here we can find an interesting use of "of us". "Us" seems to be necessary to even form any such intention. Imagine there would be no "us", then there would most likely be no joint intention. The necessity of "us" for joint action creates the impression that there is some sense of collectiveness implied here. Based on this one could hypothesize that there is some underlying sense of collectiveness that precedes any possible joint

intention. This hypothesis grows even stronger when looking at the remaining four conditions.

For me to intend something two conditions must be fulfilled: I must want it to happen and I must be in a position to do something about it. If I am in a position to do 100% of the intended action it would be the action of an individual, myself in this case. In the case of a joint intention my ability to do something about the intended action can only be a contribution. This is why there is condition 2 in the analysis of joint action, that each person intends to contribute their bit to the joint performance (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 22). But to be conceivable as a contribution my actions presuppose others, because I could not form this thought without in some way being aware of others that might contribute to the action I intend. To apprehend my action as a contribution requires that there is something or someone else who contributes too, otherwise my action would only be that of an individual.

The third condition added entails that every person contributing to a joint action believes that others intend to do their bit. The point here is that each person acknowledges the others as equal agents (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 22). Put differently I cannot think of myself as the only proper “intentional agent involved”. I cannot see others as zombies who automatically do what is required of them (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 22). So, condition 3 demands that I acknowledge that there are other intentional agents and that they intend to do their bit in bringing about a joint performance.

However, at this point it is incomprehensible how I could even acknowledge anyone as a proper intentional agent without being in some way related to them. Schweikard and Pettit argue that this condition prevents that the persons involved see each other as some kind of cooperative zombies and regard themselves as the only proper intentional agent (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 22). But even if they were zombies then I would need to be in some way aware of the fact that there are others with whom I intend to perform a joint action. Down the line I might figure out that they are some kind of cooperative zombies that automatically do what is demanded, but even here I am still in some way related to others before I can form a joint intention with them. For the point I am trying to make here it does not matter if those others are proper agents or if they are zombies, all that needs to be shown is that I am in some way related to them. This does not deny that a proper joint intention might only be formed if others are considered as proper

agents but it seems that if joint actions are formed in the way described by Schweikard and Pettit, then there is one key element missing in their definition: a basic sense of relatedness to others with whom I jointly intend to do something.

2.3.6 Circular joint intentions?

Later, Schweikard and Pettit consider the previous suggestion that there is a joint intention preceding a joint performance (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 28). To refute this objection they argue that “1. they each intend to enact the performance” is implied in “2. they each intend to do their bit,” and explain why this holds (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 28). They claim that there is no circularity in play here, and that what is intended by a joint intention is the realization of a pattern of behavior. There is no preceding joint intention formed when I first intend that we lift the table independently and then realize that we each have the intention to lift the table (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 29).

This section is important because Pettit and Schweikard argue that I independently intend a certain pattern of behavior. A joint intention only comes about when I realize that others have the same intention, because it seems that no sense of collectiveness is necessary for me to intend something that – if it is enacted – would materialize as a joint intention. This implies that there is no sense of collectiveness whatsoever as long as I do not see all of us lifting the table or realize in some way that others have the same intention to lift the table.

This is an odd thought that has to be considered in more detail. Imagine that the joint intention “to lift a table” is formed as Pettit and Schweikard suggest here. According to this, it would only be noticeable as a joint intention when I realize that others share the same intention. That might be when I grab the edge of the table to lift it and realize others are doing the same, or when I am about to step towards the table and others do so as well.

Pettit and Schweikard point out however, that I know a priori that lifting the table – if this happens – can only be the result of a joint intention (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 29). The question is: What kind of a priori knowledge do they have in mind? It is a priori but we do not know what it refers to. Before being manifest as a joint intention it seems that I have no awareness that there are others with whom I might lift a table. So, maybe the others are implied by this a priori knowledge. But if this is true, then my

intention is not formed independently any more. Or the a priori knowledge I have is only referring to my – independently formed – joint intention, and does not relate to any other person as long as the joint intention does not materialize. Following the latter thought, I argue that the form of a priori knowledge that Pettit and Schweikard present here is essentially singular.

It almost seems as if I was blindfolded and then independently form an intention to lift a table with others, while knowing a priori, that this can only materialize as a joint intention. I then take a step towards the table and grab the edge of it. It appears as if the blindfold was lifted, the joint intention manifests and with it there are others who formed the same joint intention and we miraculously lift the table together. This example is obviously exaggerated but it serves as an analogy because the moment that my blindfold is lifted describes the point at which a joint intention materializes, and more importantly at which some sense of collectiveness is constituted. But conceiving joint intentions like this seems rather odd, so the question remains: How can I form any joint intention without some sense of collectiveness preceding it? My a priori knowledge about our joint intention is essentially singular in its form so it does not refer to some sense of collectiveness that precedes joint intentions. It does seem, however, that this sense of collectiveness figures as the precondition for joint intentions to become possible, but this importance is not addressed nor is it explained in any satisfactory way.

2.3.7 Common awareness and identification

In his 2017 paper *Corporate Agency: The Lesson of the Discursive Dilemma* (2017) Pettit describes an example of joint action (Pettit, 2017, p. 250). Once more sunbathers help a person with difficulties in the water. In his analysis of joint action Pettit states that there is a single goal that each individual pursues (Pettit, 2017, p. 250), and that persons pursuing this goal share it “as a matter of common awareness, or something approaching common awareness” (Pettit, 2017, p. 250). Common awareness was already mentioned in List and Pettit’s definition of joint intention, but what exactly is meant by it (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 33)?

Could common awareness be the sense of collectiveness that has not yet been described in Pettit’s work? Pettit defines common awareness as given if people involved in a joint action “each target it [the goal], they each believe that they each target it, they each

believe that they each believe this, and so on in the usual hierarchy” (Pettit, 2017, p. 250). Based on this shared goal which is a matter of common awareness, they can form a joint intention. But this definition is not very satisfactory either. I might believe that others target the same goal as I do and I might believe that others believe this too, and so on, but this is simply a propositional analysis of a common awareness of the form “I believe x”. It still presupposes that I somehow know that there are others, and that I need to have some awareness of those others with whom I share the same goal.

The analysis of common awareness fails to give an explanation of the preconditions of joint intention, which is spelled out in almost the same way as joint intentions are, and so faces the same objections as the analysis of joint intentions. Joint intentions and even common awareness are inconceivable without the assumption of some preceding sense of collectiveness (List and Pettit, 2011; Pettit, 2007, 2017; Pettit and Schweikard, 2006). Furthermore it remains unclear at this point how common awareness is related to the forms of identification that are shown by group agents. Pettit’s concluding remarks about group agents show this very clearly. He refers again to the straw-vote-procedure as a means to ensure groups create a unified voice (Pettit, 2017, p. 257). According to Pettit “members construct a suitable agential voice *because* they seek to satisfy the conditions of group agency” and by doing this members “establish their identity as a functioning agent” (Pettit, 2017, p. 257), they construct a group with a mind of its own, an “identity of its own” (Pettit, 2017, p. 257).

The quoted passages show very clearly that identity is established at a higher level of the process forming group agency. More precisely, this happens when a group establishes its own identity and members set aside their own attitudes and speak with the unified voice of a group agent. Common awareness on the other hand, is already present at the level of mere collections, but it does not seem to be a fitting candidate for explaining the sense of collectiveness that precedes joint intentions.

2.3.8 Coawareness as a corporate form of consciousness

The concluding section of this chapter is concerned with Pettit’s 2018 paper *Consciousness Incorporated*. Here, Pettit focuses on the question of whether incorporation in a group introduces a new collective sort of consciousness as well as a new level of intentionality (Pettit, 2018, p. 14). For this Pettit introduces the concept of “coawareness” which comes in three different forms: propositional, perceptual and

apperceptive coawareness (Pettit, 2018, p. 14). I am coaware of my attitudes while reasoning and deliberating (Pettit, 2018, p. 17). Reasoning – as we have seen earlier – is defined as intentional steps to increase or ensure rational performance (Pettit, 2007, p. 513). When I reason, I attend to the content of my beliefs (Pettit, 2018, p. 17). I will not give a detailed discussion of propositional coawareness and perceptual coawareness but only of the third form of coawareness, apperceptive coawareness.

“Apperception” in the case of an individual means that while deliberating or reasoning about what to do I become aware of my “self” in an important way (Pettit, 2018, p. 30). On the one hand this “self”, my “self”, is the addressee of deliberation, which I cannot misidentify (Pettit, 2018, p. 31). On the other hand, I cannot look at it nor can I perceive it from a different perspective. I *apperceive* my “self” (Pettit, 2018, p. 31). Pettit compares this to a photo of a landscape. It might pick out a landscape, but the position from where the photo was taken cannot be seen in the same way as the landscape. It can only be apperceived (Pettit, 2018, p. 31). In analogy to this the “self” can only be apperceived in deliberation (Pettit, 2018, p. 31).

Apperceptive coawareness is however, not the same as self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is described as an awareness of myself among other subjects. I understand that I am Sascha, a person others might talk about and that I am situated amongst others, etc. (Pettit, 2018, p. 31).

Pettit points out that in groups apperceptive coawareness appears in deliberation as well (Pettit, 2018, p. 31). As in the case of an individual it points to a deliberating subject – the group (Pettit, 2018, p. 31). It is suggested that incorporation might trigger a new form of apperceptive coawareness, namely the subject the group refers to while deliberating as “we” (Pettit, 2018, p. 31). In doing this members take the perspective of a corporate agent (Pettit, 2018, p. 32). They need to set aside their individual self and instead “apperceptively target the self of the agent they constitute together” (Pettit, 2018, p. 32).

Cases of joint action – even when group agency is absent – require apperceptive coawareness as well (Pettit, 2018, p. 32). While saving the person in the water for example, I apperceive the “we” that marks the standpoint from which “we” jointly act to save the person (Pettit, 2018, p. 32).

Compared to joint intentions apperceptive coawareness in incorporated groups is deeper, since the subject that appears in group deliberation is one that is unified by a

shared body of attitudes, by the kinematics of how those attitudes could evolve and who enacts them (Pettit, 2018, p. 32). The “we” targeted in group agents is more enduring than that of a temporary coalition in joint intentions because group members in group agents identify with it in a more stable way (Pettit, 2018, p. 32).

Regarding the as yet unexplained implicit sense of collectiveness, I don't think that coawareness is a promising explanation. As I argued earlier joint intentions presuppose a sense of collectiveness. Pettit, however, states that apperceptive coawareness is “required” in joint intentions (Pettit, 2018, p. 32). If coawareness were to account for an implied sense of collectiveness it would need to be clearly shown that it is the *precondition* of joint intention. What coawareness seems to contribute is a dimension of collective consciousness that is present in joint intentions, but this appears to be a less important derivative of the “real” and stable apperceptive coawareness which is only found in group agents. Thus, it fails to account for the preconditions in joint intentions that still remain to be explained.

Concluding this section let me summarize what has been shown so far. We have seen that one differentiating factor of group agents is that they show a somewhat autonomous mind that cannot be found in mere collections or groups. An autonomous group mind can be the result of certain forms of joint intentions, yet it remains unclear how those distributive joint intentions unify into corporate joint intentions.

Another differentiating factor of a group-mind is that it shows the ability of reasoning. It intentionally takes steps to increase or ensure the rational performance of an agent. Identification – as I made clear – forms the very possibility of reasoning because it ensures that members set aside their own views and identify with the group. The group having an autonomous group mind can only show a stable rational performance if there is enough identification to prevent a rationality breakdown. But I have also shown that it remains an open question how identification is constituted and at which level of collectiveness it comes in. We have seen that Pettit indirectly refers to what I called an implicit sense of collectiveness, but that he does not offer an explanation for it.

Besides the lack of clarity concerning the unification of joint intentions I have also argued that there is some sense of collectiveness that necessarily precedes them. It seems that in Pettit's account there is more than one type of identification present: group identification that can be found in group agents, and an implicit sense of

collectiveness that precedes joint intentions but which can also be found in mere collections or groups without agential status. I argue that this marks an explanatory gap in Pettit's view because he does not relate the two nor does he give a satisfactory explanation for the implied sense of collectiveness. As we have seen, the newly introduced concept of apperceptive coawareness fails to close this gap because it cannot account for the presupposed sense of collectiveness in joint intentions, and merely offers a new form of consciousness that is *introduced* by incorporation (Pettit, 2018, p. 14).

While describing apperceptive co-awareness Pettit remarks in a footnote that there is a convergent view put forward by Hans Bernhard Schmid (Pettit, 2018, p. 32, fn.27). After having identified some major inconsistencies in Pettit's account, I will now turn to Hans Bernhard Schmid's writings and check if both accounts are similar and if they show the same inconsistencies.

3. A convergent route to group identification? Schmid's account of plural self-knowledge

In this chapter I will describe Hans Bernhard Schmid's account of plural self-knowledge. In a first step I will mention some general characteristics of plural self-knowledge that become more explicit in the second section of this chapter. Concluding this chapter I will pick up Schmid's conception of the participatory sharing of feelings and relate this to shared attitudes or joint intentions.

3.1 Plural self-knowledge

3.1.1 Mode becomes the plural subject

In his 2018 paper *The subject of 'We intend'* Schmid points to what could be seen as a change in his theoretical position concerning the analysis of collective intentionality. Referring to the Stanford Encyclopedia article on collective intentionality Schmid roughly sketches the landscape of the debate (Schmid, 2018, p. 232). The discussion mainly unfolds along differentiations between intentional content, intentional subject

and intentional mode. According to this an intention like “we intend x” can be taken apart into its content “x”, its subject “we” and its mode “intend”. The actual controversy unfolds around the question: What is collective? Only the content, or the subject and the mode as well (Schmid, 2018, p. 232)?

The so called content account claims that only the content is collective and nothing else. This means that every individual intends a collective x-ing. Objections against this view claim that intention is self-referential action. Each individual can therefore only intend his or her own action, which is why I cannot intend your action, nor can you intend mine. So, neither of us can intend our action of x-ing because the intended action necessarily refers to the intending subject. But if there is no plural subject, then no joint action could be intended (Schmid, 2018, p. 232).

A different position worth taking might be that of the subject account. If the content account is not a promising candidate for the analysis of joint action one might figure that a collective subject (“we”) could collectively intend our x-ing (content). The idea of a collective subject has, however, always been portrayed as metaphysically dubious. If you and I are intentionally walking together, there is no additional subject “we” that comes along. The only intending subjects here are you and me (Schmid, 2018, p. 232).

A third viable option is the mode account, where collectivity is brought in by the mode. That means that each individual forms a “we”-intention of the form “we we-intend x”. Since the mode includes the collective subject, each individual can intend collectively in an unproblematic way (Schmid, 2018, p. 233). In his 2014 paper *Plural self-awareness*, Schmid argued for such a view (Schmid, 2014b, p. 11).

Most recently, however, Schmid has pointed out that the mode-account is really a subject-account, which is why he finally aims to develop a positive subject-account (Schmid, 2018, p. 233). It is important to see the change in Schmid’s conception: Turning away from a mode-account and towards a subject-account of collective intentionality. Independently of this change Schmid’s argumentations remain relevant for this work. We only need to keep two things in mind.

a) We need to read his mode-account as a subject-account arguing for a plural subject in joint intentions, which is not problematic in my opinion because mode-accounts seem to merge into subject-accounts anyway.

b) The focus on joint intentions is important for this work because joint intentions are a key element in Pettit's work on group agents as well. This makes joint intentions a promising starting point for my further argument.

3.1.2 Pre-reflective plural self-awareness/self-knowledge: The precondition of joint intention.

With reference to John Searle, Schmid argues that there is a "sense of us" that has to be taken for granted in joint intentions (Schmid, 2014b, pp. 7ff), and that this sense of us is plural self-awareness (Schmid, 2014b, p. 12). What is self-awareness? Let me first roughly sketch the concept and describe its more specific characteristics afterwards.

First of all self-awareness has to be differentiated from self-reflection. In self-reflection the subject makes itself the object of its cognitive, affective or practical considerations (Schmid, 2014b, p. 13). With self-awareness one does not thematically turn to oneself. Furthermore self-awareness is not an intentional act rather it is a component or part of an intentional act. It is immediate and non-inferential (Schmid, 2014b, p. 13). In *The subject of 'We intend'* Schmid argues that self-knowledge is an umbrella term which includes self-awareness, self-consciousness, etc. – which is why I will only use self-knowledge as a term referring to self-awareness (Schmid, 2018, p. 234). Self-knowledge has features which are at the heart of what it means to be an individual intentional subject (Schmid, 2018, p. 235)

In the case of the plural Schmid points out that there is plural self-knowledge as well. The most important point being made is that without plural self-knowledge there could never be something done *together*, a joint intention or joint action. No dance could be performed together, it would be just me doing my part and you doing yours. The same goes for conversations, it is never one conversation that we both have, it is only me saying the things I want to say and you saying the things you intend to say. To avoid this reduction of joint intentions to singularism, a moderate alternative of pluralism is argued for. Schmid claims that there is plural self-knowledge, but of a different kind than in the singular case (Schmid, 2018, p. 238).

Some general advantages of this view are that it does not require participants to think about the "us" or figure out whether or not there is a group (Schmid, 2014b, p. 12). This route seems promising, as individuals might share intentions without ever thinking about whether or not they are a team. Beyond that there is no communicational

procedure needed to constitute a group, nor is there any kind of agreement needed (Schmid, 2014b, p. 12).

How could this be the case? Remember, with self-knowledge the individual does not thematically turn to itself (Schmid, 2014b, p. 13). This points to the most crucial characteristic that individual and plural self-knowledge share. The difference previously mentioned between self-knowledge and self-reflection is highly important here (Schmid, 2014b, p. 14). With self-knowledge I do not have to think about seeing a tree as “me seeing a tree”, I do not have to think of it “as mine”. I do not make myself the object of my observations, because that would be self-reflection. Instead I just see the tree without thinking what or who this “I” is (Schmid, 2014b, p. 14). That is why self-awareness is pre-reflective in both singular and plural cases (later this is also called pre-conceptual, or pre-intentional) (Schmid, 2014b, p. 14, 2018, pp. 231, 238). The following section will help us get a grip on what pre-reflective plural self-knowledge is.

3.2 Characteristics of plural self-knowledge

3.2.1 Ownership and identification

One more specific characteristic of plural self-knowledge is that it creates common ownership (Schmid, 2014b, p. 17). We might share attitudes with others because we copied them or share them coincidentally. In those cases attitudes are shared distributively (Schmid, 2014b, p. 17). I have the same intention as you, but we may have formed each of our intentions independently and thus only share the content of our individual intentions. In fact both intentions have nothing to do with each other since they have not been formed together.

But sharing an intention can be different if my individual perspective and your perspective are parts of a shared whole. Together we form the intention to go for a walk not only because of our individual cognitive attitudes, but also because you and I understand ourselves as “we” or “us” (Schmid, 2014b, p. 17). Plural self-knowledge makes those attitudes transparent as “ours”, it is a particular way in which we are conscious of those attitudes (Schmid, 2014b, p. 17).

Plural identification is phrased differently but points in the same direction as common ownership. In plural identification there is no individual first, who then goes looking around for someone else, and then forms the thought “we intend x” (Schmid, 2018, p.

238). The same goes for cases of individuals, I do not need to check if it is really me who has this or that intention, I just know that it is my intention. So just as in the individual case there is some identification in the thought “we intend” (Schmid, 2018, p. 239).

What is different to the singular case however, is that identification can go wrong (Schmid, 2018, p. 239). I might be mistaken as to who “we” is. I can even assume that it is “we” who intend x, but then find out that there is no one else besides me. But according to Schmid the possibility of mistake does not rule out the possibility of plural identification. Sometimes we even misidentify the subject of the action the other way around (Schmid, 2018, p. 239). Assume my partner and I agree to go for a walk on Saturday afternoon. If I forget about that agreement and just go by myself, then I misidentified the subject of that action, which would have been “we” not “I”.

3.2.2 Shared perspective

Plural self-knowledge also introduces a shared perspective. Common ownership and identification involve the idea that there is some sort of shared perspective. This means that there is awareness of how “we” see things and how things are (Schmid, 2014b, p. 17).

For individuals perspective introduces the distinction between what is “self” and what is not, and having a perception of the world implies that this distinction is already at work (Schmid, 2014b, p. 15). Following Schmid, the same is true for a plural perspective, from which “we” see things being so and so. This is one reason why Schmid argues that in some respects plural self-knowledge plays the same role in the integration of a group as individual self-knowledge plays for the integration of the individual mind (Schmid, 2014b, p. 17).

3.2.3 Plural validation

If I form an intention like “I intend to go for a walk” this is self-validating, I just know that “I intend x” (Schmid, 2018, p. 236). The same goes for the plural. If I am part of a group and we formed the intention that “we intend to go for a walk” I do not have to watch the others in order to find out what it is that we are intending. I do not have to speculate here, or at least no more than I might speculate about my own future thoughts

(Schmid, 2018, p. 239). I might be wrong in assuming that I am deeply in love, for example, because a few days later I realize that I was only temporarily infatuated (Schmid, 2014c, p. 11). There are cases in which I am wrong about my own feelings or attitudes.

The point being made here is that the way in which “we intend” involves what the others are up to, is the same as the sense of what I am up to in my intention. In virtue of the sense that “I intend” is self-validating, “we intend” is self-validating too (Schmid, 2018, p. 239). My access to our intentions is not observational once we intend to x together. We just know that “we intend to go for a walk” (Schmid, 2018, p. 240).

3.2.4 Plural commitments

Sticking to the example above: If I form the intention that “I intend to go for a walk” I claim that I know best what it is that I am intending. I also grant others that privilege in communicative practices (Schmid, 2014a, p. 1689). I would need very strong reasons for telling someone that he or she thinks different from what he or she says. I claim and grant respectively what is called “first person authority” (Schmid, 2014a, p. 1689).

In the plural case this is different because we have already seen that we-talk may go wrong, I might mistake who “we” is (Schmid, 2014a, p. 1694), even in the case of plural validation as described in the section above. It is still plausible that I would need to present some evidence that “we intend x” (Schmid, 2014a, p. 1695). So there are less privileges in claiming “we intend x” compared to claiming “I intend x”. Schmid points out that first person authority in the plural is somewhat thinner and different from the singular case (Schmid, 2014a, p. 1700).

But by saying “we together intend x” there are the same first person commitments as in the singular case. Those are: Commitment to attitudes, commitment to consistency and commitment to action (Schmid, 2014a, p. 1700).

Commitment to attitudes: When saying “we” one does commit to the group’s attitudes. Contrary to the singular case, in a group the options: “p is wrong” and “We want p” are possible, but the individual uttering this or being confronted with this potential conflict is under normative pressure to act against her will or to change the group attitude (Schmid, 2014a, p. 1700, 2014b, p. 18, 2018, p. 240).

Commitment to consistency: As an individual I am subject to critique if my attitudes are inconsistent. In the group case this is the same, but here those inconsistencies are easily

explained. Maybe a majority decision was made and I was a part of the minority (Schmid, 2014a, p. 1700).

Commitment to action: Expressing a joint intention comes with a binding force to commit to the formed intention to go for a walk, for example. In the case of an individual, if I do not commit to my intention I can just say “I changed my mind” (Schmid, 2014a, p. 1700). But expressing a joint intention is something that cannot be unilaterally removed, and if I do so that makes me subject to critique (Schmid, 2014a, p. 1701). Still, there can be a mismatch between group attitudes and what the individual thinks is the group’s attitude, which is why sometimes those attitudes do not affect behavior. But the critique in this case is still valid because the individual did not commit to the joint intention.

3.2.5 Plural self-authorization

Further important features of plural self-knowledge are that it is more volatile and transitory than individual self-knowledge and that it can differ in depth (Schmid, 2014b, p. 22). For an individual self-knowledge is not exposed to circumstances or other similar changes. Those characteristics and the ones named above show why there is not the same first person authority in the plural case as in the individual case (Schmid, 2014a, p. 1694ff, 2014b, p. 23, 2018, p. 240).

But Schmid argues that first person authority in plural and singular cases works differently (Schmid, 2018, p. 240). First person plural authority is democratic whereas first person singular authority is autocratic in nature. Democratic implies that members participate in jointly accepting whatever authority structure exists, and that this joint acceptance is an attitude of which the members are co-authors. So, Schmid argues, there is some first person authority in the plural case (Schmid, 2018, p. 240). This is why we ask a group member if we want to know what a group intends, not because we think he or she is the better observer but because he is a participant in the making of the group mind. So, “we intend” is self-authorizing in a participatory sense whereas “I intend” is self-authorizing in an autocratic sense (Schmid, 2018, p. 240).

3.3 *A participatory way of saying ‘we’*

In this section I will turn to Schmid’s conception of shared feelings. In doing so I will present how feelings are shared according to Schmid, before showing that collective attitudes or joint intentions are shared in the same way as feelings, in a participatory manner.

3.3.1 Shared feelings

Schmid argues that shared feelings are really shared, meaning that the feeling is not only mine, or yours *it is ours* (Schmid, 2014c, p. 9). The question however, is: If feelings are shared, how are they shared?

A shared feeling or experience is compared to a performance of an orchestra (Schmid, 2014c, p. 12). In this case we can identify different roles in and different contributions to the performance. There is a conductor, some violin players, drum players, etc.. Intuitively one would assume that playing one’s part in an orchestra by only focusing on one’s own part would not necessarily make for a good performance (Schmid, 2014c, p. 12). Schmid makes clear that this would be an incident of distributive sharing. The whole performance is somewhat picked apart because each person is focused on his or her part only. It would be like sharing a cake, each person gets a piece, and in that way the whole is divided until there is no cake left (Schmid, 2014c, p. 12).

People interested in sports might have seen similar examples with football teams. Some clubs sign a number of world class athletes, but sometimes it becomes apparent that focusing on individual performance alone does not make a good team. At first sight one might assume that having the best of the best players is a guarantee for success, but in reality some of those elite teams fall short of public expectations. In those cases commentators are keen to claim that “the team is just not playing *together*”.

The point Schmid is making here is that sharing experiences does not consist of each person’s part only. Instead, one has to focus on the whole as well, that would be participatory sharing (Schmid, 2014c, p. 12). This type of sharing does not pick apart but strengthens the whole (Schmid, 2014c, p. 13). In the case of the orchestra they might share a feeling of enthusiasm at the end of a concert.

One could still argue however, that because each contribution is different there cannot be a shared feeling of enthusiasm after a successful concert (Schmid, 2014c, p. 12). But just because the conductor shows his joy by explicit enthusiasm and the audience in

silent contentment, this does not mean that there is no shared feeling of joy. The ways their feelings differ show the particular concern each participant had, the particular taking-part of each individual. The conductor was concerned with conducting, whereas the audience was concerned with listening. Schmid claims that concerns have a part-whole structure: I am concerned with my part of the whole, without destroying or picking apart the whole. Shared feelings have a part-whole structure too because I experience the feeling respective to my concern (Schmid, 2014c, p. 12). I am participating in the whole – the concert for example – by contributing my part to *our* performance. In this way feelings are shared in a participatory rather than a distributive way.

A few things need to be remarked though. The part-whole structure does not mean that one merges into a collective singular, and forgets what one feels individually (Schmid, 2014c, p. 10). Just as in the concert, even if it appears as a whole we can still pick out the individuals who participate in it. There is still room for interpersonal differences (Schmid, 2014c, p. 10).

Beyond that I might be wrong (in my pre-reflective plural self-knowledge) that an emotion is shared (Schmid, 2014c, p. 11). Maybe I am very happy with the concert and talk to my colleague Peter about it. But it becomes obvious that he is absolutely unsatisfied with the concert because he made a mistake in his violin part. I assumed that others share the feeling of satisfaction and are affected by it, but I was wrong. This relation to others however, is no different than the self-relation I have when I predicate certain emotions to myself. According to Schmid one might be wrong in assuming that one is deeply in love because a few days later one realizes that it was only a temporary infatuation (Schmid, 2014c, p. 11). The source of error here is not structurally different from assuming that others might share a certain feeling. Just because we can get it wrong here does not mean we are not sharing any feelings at all (Schmid, 2014c, p. 12).

3.3.2 Participatory sharing of feelings and intentions

As I showed above, Schmid argues for a position according to which groups can share feelings. It is often claimed however, that groups cannot be conscious in the phenomenal sense (Schmid, 2014c, p. 5), including the feeling to have or be in an intentional state (Schmid, 2014c, p. 6). The argument is that individual minds have unconscious states, so a group mind might be of that sort, and so lacks consciousness.

Following Schmid's argumentation this is not convincing. For an individual there can only be unconscious intentional states because we assume consciousness. So claiming that a group mind is not partially unconscious but a-conscious is not plausible.

But how could we conceive of a conscious group mind? In the case of individual emotions there are instant connections to self-knowledge (Schmid, 2014c, pp. 6ff). Being afraid makes it clear for me "that I think x" – which points to ownership or identification. That "x is important or relevant for me" refers to my perspective, and that I am ready to treat that fear as a commitment so that I will act based on that feeling (Schmid, 2014c, p. 7). Groups might not experience a sudden burst of emotion like individuals but they can experience comparably slow emotions. Anger might evolve due to a careful thought-process (Schmid, 2014c, p. 8). Those feelings are connections to plural self-knowledge because they are not only mine, or yours, *they are ours* (Schmid, 2014c, p. 9). The subjective aspect of those feelings is plural. It is something that "we" feel or something feels a certain way "for us" (Schmid, 2014c, p. 9). And as we have seen those feelings are shared in the participatory way that I just described. Why could the debate about whether a group might be conscious be of concern for this paper?

Because the discussion of how feelings could be shared can be read almost parallel to the discussion about joint intentions and corporate intentions (Schmid, 2014c, p. 13). Schmid refers to List and Pettit, who among others argue that joint intentions are held by individuals who share the same intention distributively. Corporate intentions on the other hand are held by a group that has a group mind showing a certain degree of autonomy towards individual attitudes (Schmid, 2014c, p. 13). According to List and Pettit group intentions and attitudes can be incorporated into individual deliberation in the same way as one's own attitudes (Schmid, 2014c, p. 14). This is only conceivable if one presupposes identification, and identification according to Schmid is plural self-knowledge³ (Schmid, 2014c, p. 14). Plural self-knowledge provides a "we" so that affective concerns or shared feelings are not something individuals have distributively, but rather they have it together, in a collective and participatory manner (Schmid, 2014c, p. 14). Feelings that are shared in a participatory way as "ours" are a matter of plural self-knowledge. So from here it is only a small theoretical step to state that if attitudes are shared as "ours" due to plural self-knowledge, then they are shared just like feelings: in a participatory way.

³ Changed from "plural self-awareness" (Schmid, 2014c, p. 14).

4. A thesis of convergence: Comparing the accounts of List and Pettit to Schmid

In Pettit's description of apperceptive coawareness he refers to Schmid's account of plural self-knowledge as a "convergent" account (Pettit, 2018, p. 32 fn. 27). After giving an outline of both accounts I will now compare them with respect to identification, rationality in joint action, types of collectives and joint intentions. I will argue that beside some minor overlaps in terms of identification, these accounts are not convergent. The aim of this chapter is not only to refute Pettit's thesis of convergence but also to show that these accounts are fundamentally different in essential respects for what it means to act together.

4.1 Identification and pre-reflective plural self-knowledge

As I have shown in section 2.3 there is more than one type of identification in Pettit's view. It is explicitly present in group agents (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194 see also section 2.3). It can be argued that identification in group agents is somewhat pre-reflective in the sense Schmid is suggesting. List and Pettit emphasize that it cannot be a cognitive process and that it has to be some sort of spontaneous alignment between member attitudes and group attitudes (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 191 see also section 2.1). The analogy between experienced pilots and self-identifying group agents whose members are under automatic guidance by the group points in the same direction. Those examples suggest that there is some pre-reflective or semi-conscious sense of collectiveness present in group agents. Concerning this aspect both accounts can be seen as convergent.

However, Pettit's account of apperceptive coawareness reveals some of the more prevalent differences. Apperceptive coawareness is most stable in group agents but it can also be found joint intentions (Pettit, 2018, pp. 31ff). So one might argue that there is some pre-reflective sense of collectiveness found in joint intentions, but this is not the case. One reason for this is that coawareness is only present in deliberation. Deliberation is in itself a reflective process, so it seems that "we" only comes up in reflective processes (Pettit, 2018, p. 31). More importantly, apperceptive coawareness is

triggered by incorporation, and processes of corporation consist first of all in satisfying conditions of agency and rationality (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 32, 36). Those are clearly reflective processes, which is why I claim that collective consciousness as Pettit presents it here is reflective. One argument for this can be found in the practice of reasoning. Reasoning is put forward as a reflective practice that should contribute to the appearance of identification (Pettit, 2007, pp. 498, 512, 515). I will elaborate more about the rational performance of a plural subject in section 2.3.3.

The point being made here is that if identification is attained it comes as a result or by-product of reflective processes of incorporation. At the same time however, some sense of collectiveness is assumed to precede those processes. Pettit fails to acknowledge that this sense of collectiveness is implied in his conception of joint intentions and group agents (Pettit, 2007, p. 515). So we have to assume that identification is no precondition of incorporation but a result of it, a result of reflective processes of incorporation. One difficulty this view creates is the explanatory gap I described in Chapter 2.3.

Contrary to that, Schmid's conception of plural self-knowledge is described as a fundamental feature of consciousness in individuals and groups (Schmid, 2018, p. 235). Plural self-knowledge is defined as pre-reflective, which means that no reflective process whatsoever is necessary to identify the subject of joint intentions as "we" (Schmid, 2014b, p. 14). Instead plural self-knowledge is present and constitutes a "we" in every joint action or joint intention. It makes attitudes transparent as "ours" and is self-validating in the sense that I just know that "we intend" (Schmid, 2014b, p. 17, 2018, pp. 238ff). I know this not as a result of being a group agent that needed reflective processes of incorporation or by observation, I know it because I am pre-reflectively aware of who is part of "we" and that I took part in forming "our" joint intention. Beyond that this also creates a normative pressure for rational performance. By this Schmid argues for a sense of collectiveness that is missing in Pettit's conception.

Schmid equates self-knowledge to the identification that is put forward by Pettit, but this equation is only valid in cases of group agents in which some sort of pre-reflective plural self-knowledge could be found (Schmid, 2014c, p. 14). In other cases of joint intention or joint action this equation does not fit, because according to Pettit's view there is no identification in joint intentions as long as they are not formed by group agents or come as a result of the highly reflective constitutive processes of

identification. Contrary to this, pre-reflective plural self-knowledge can differ in timespan and depth, and this does not link it to a particular form of joint intention or a certain type of collective like group agents (Schmid, 2014b, p. 22). Even in loose forms of joint intentions there is plural-self-knowledge.

Finally I argue that according to Pettit's account group-identification is a result of joint intentions or reflective processes of incorporation. This creates an explanatory gap because this view ignores a sense of collectiveness that can already be found in looser forms of collective action. On the contrary, Schmid claims that self-knowledge or identification is a prerequisite of joint intentions, making joint intentions and joint actions a result of self-knowledge, rather than the other way around. Consequently, Schmid offers an account that can close the explanatory gap found in Pettit's conception, because plural self-knowledge does not require any reflective processes at any stage of collective action. Pre-reflective plural self-knowledge simply changes in terms of depth and timespan. There is no question then, of how something like a corporate agent might evolve from loose forms of joint action, or how joint intentions are possible in the first place, because their possibility can be accounted for by pointing to pre-reflective plural self-knowledge.

4.2 Rationality

In Pettit's view a group is an agent if it satisfies the standards of rationality. Those standards are: attitudes have to be true, attitudes have to be enacted and attitudes have to form a coherent whole (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 36ff). In being considered an agent a group not only has to satisfy the standards of rationality, it also has to show the ability to reason (Pettit, 2007, p. 498). As I have already argued, reasoning is a highly reflective process. One compelling argument for this is the straw-vote-procedure that Pettit suggests (Pettit, 2007, pp. 498ff). Following this procedure a group is paying attention to and asking questions about the relations of its attitudes (Pettit, 2007, p. 512). This includes that the standards of rationality are reflectively present and reasoning is clearly a reflective practice. If this is not achieved by the group it cannot be considered an agent. In this case there is no "we" talk because we have seen that only group agents show identification that allows for "we" talk (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 128; Pettit, 2007, p. 516).

However, in section 2.2.1 it has also been shown that identification prevents a rationality breakdown, and I have also emphasised the fact that in Pettit's view all reasoning and rational performance relies on identification (see: section 2.3.3). So, on the one hand identification is achieved by rational performance (among other conditions) but this very feature relies on the assumption that members identify with the group.

Plural commitments as Schmid describes them can be seen in analogy to the standards of rationality. Standards of rationality include three directions of fit that can also be found in plural commitments. Commitment to attitudes mirrors the attitude to fact direction of fit, requiring that attitudes have to be somewhat aligned with facts. Commitment to consistency is equal to attitude to attitude direction of fit, requiring that attitudes form a coherent and consistent whole. Commitment to action is the same as attitude to action, because forming a joint intention commits members to enact it (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 36ff; Schmid, 2014a, pp. 1700ff).

But despite all similarities there is one major difference in both accounts. According to Schmid in joint intentions there is a "we" as a matter of plural self-knowledge, and by saying "we" the collective commits to something like a rational behavior. Pre-reflective plural self-knowledge creates a normative force that drives us towards "a unified shared perspective with a coherent set of attitudes" (Schmid, 2014b, p. 18). This commitment and its normative force come as parts of pre-reflective plural self-knowledge.

In Pettit's view a group becomes an agent because it satisfies the standards of rationality. Group members set aside their own beliefs and only then the group can reflectively pursue a rational performance. In Schmid's approach saying "we" pre-reflectively implies satisfying the standards of rationality, because plural-self-knowledge comes with commitments that ensure a somewhat rational performance. So according to Schmid one commits to a rational group-performance because one says "we", whereas according to Pettit one says "we" because one performs rationally. Finally it can be stated that from the perspective of rational performance there is no convergence between accounts because in Pettit's case saying "we" is the result of satisfying standards of rationality, whereas in Schmid's view satisfying the standards of rationality is a result of saying "we".

4.3 Types of collectives

One differentiating feature between both accounts can be found in their different types of collectives. In Pettit's conception there are not only different kinds of identification but also different types of collectives, looser forms called mere collections that cannot become group agents, and more sophisticated collectives that are groups or group agents (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 31). If a group is considered an agent it constitutes a plural subject (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 192ff). As seen in Chapter 2, there are a number of differentiating factors between these types of collectives, with one of the most important being the way something is jointly intended (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 193). List and Pettit differentiate between distributive and corporate ways of intending. Corporate joint intentions can only be formed by plural subjects like group agents and are not reducible to individual attitudes (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 193ff; Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, pp. 29ff). Every other case of joint intention that is not formed by a group agent is a distributive joint intention that can be reduced to individual attitudes. However, the different nuances of collectives result in a contradiction. List and Pettit claim that mere collections cannot become group agents (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 31ff). But if the difference between collectives is brought about by joint intentions, then mere collections should become group agents too.

In comparison, Schmid promotes a subject account in which every joint intention constitutes a plural subject (Schmid, 2018, p. 232). The only evidence for different grades of collectives can be found in his remark that plural self-knowledge can differ in timespan and depth (Schmid, 2014b, p. 22). Schmid's account does not offer definitions of different levels of collectivity. Instead he promotes a view in which every joint intention constitutes a plural subject. If we follow Schmid in this, we can find group-identification even in the loosest forms of joint intentions. But this group-identification is the very same that Pettit reserves for sophisticated collective action performed by group agents.

Schmid's emphasis on the preconditions of joint intentions is a very plausible starting point which has the benefits of not having to account for the specific thresholds between different types of collectives. Intuitively however, Pettit's approach is also convincing. We should try to get a grip on the different forms of collectives we are confronted with every day, because it is quite plausible to assume that there is a difference between people helping an elderly person over the street and a corporation that has existed for 20

years with only minor changes in staff. Schmid's account is very sparse in offering an analysis of different types of collectives, whereas Pettit's view leaves important questions unanswered concerning the transitions between each type of collective.

4.4 Joint intentions

As I have already mentioned concerning the different types of collectives one major factor in causing group identification are joint intentions. At some point they change from distributive (reducible to individuals) to corporate (not reducible to individuals) (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194). Joint intentions then unify and give rise to a plural subject – a group agent. I have shown earlier that this unification has not been explained sufficiently (see: section 2.3.1, 2.3.2). I have also reconstructed how, according to Pettit, joint intentions raise group-identification and why this has far reaching consequences such as a group agent having a group-mind that shows some degree of autonomy, or the group agent being able to reason (List and Pettit, 2011, p. 194; Pettit, 2007, pp. 512ff; Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 35). However, Pettit did not explicate how this unification is constituted.

One further difficulty found in Pettit's account is that regardless of the kind of joint intentions their sense of collectiveness is not made sufficiently explicit. I have shown that neither a priori knowledge nor common awareness nor apperceptive coawareness could account for the implied sense of collectiveness (see sections: 2.3.6 – 2.3.8).

According to Schmid's account joint intentions are always corporate, they rely on a *sense of us* that constitutes a "we" (Schmid, 2014b, p. 17). This assumption is made explicit as a pre-reflective plural self-knowledge that is always taken for granted in joint intentions (Schmid, 2014b, p. 17). If this is taken for granted joint intentions become transparent as "ours" because intending something in plural is already identifying a "we" (Schmid, 2014b, p. 17, 2018, p. 239).

Beyond this I argued that joint intentions as Schmid conceives them are shared in a participatory manner. They have a part-whole structure in which individual attitudes participate in group attitudes (Schmid, 2014c, p. 12, 2018, p. 240). Accordingly, I contribute to a joint intention by participating in forming and sharing this intention rather than fragmenting it.

We have seen that the way joint intentions are formed has a major influence on whether or not identification can be found in shared action. Differentiating between different

ways that intentions are shared raises the question of what brings about the change from one type of joint intention to another. This has not been answered by Pettit. Furthermore Pettit's differentiation between the types overlooks preconditions of shared action in cases of loosely organized collectives.

In Schmid's conception joint intentions are based on a plural subject. Beyond that he describes a mode of sharing intentions that is the same for all types of collectives: participatory sharing. Schmid makes the implications of joint intentions explicit and comprehensible in a way that is missing in Pettit's view. By pointing to participatory sharing he offers a possible mode of sharing that is fitting in loose cases as well as more enduring cases of joint action.

Due to the differences I have presented above I argue that there is only a minor convergence to be found when the accounts of Pettit and Schmid are compared, and the differences between both are much more prevalent than the similarities. I have shown that Schmid's view is different at the very outset in analyzing joint intentions and joint action. In Schmid's case individuals are pre-reflectively related to others whereas in Pettit's view collectiveness is always mediated by some form of reflective practice. The resulting explanatory gap found in Pettit's account can be closed by referring to Schmid's concept of pre-reflective plural self-knowledge. Yet, it might be interesting to see a more detailed analysis of more sophisticated forms of group action following Schmid's view.

5. The decisive subject

In the concluding chapter of this work I will refer to Schmid's remarks about subjectivity and its effects on how an individual relates to others. Intuitively it seems plausible to assume that the way subjectivity is conceptualized may have an impact on how an individual can relate to others. I will first sketch Schmid's argumentation, and then I will argue that both Schmid and Pettit have similar accounts of subjectivity in many respects. Finally I will show that there is one characteristic that marks off Schmid's understanding of subjectivity in a very important way.

5.1 Reification of subjectivity

In his concluding remarks, Schmid elaborates the resistance that exists in accepting a plural subject. He claims that this is due to metaphysical concerns (Schmid, 2018, p. 241). Those concerns entail that if you and I go for a walk together, there is no third subject – *the we* – that is coming along. The only subjects present are you and I. According to Schmid those worries arise from the mistaken view that the mind is singular only (Schmid, 2018, p. 241). But the reasons for being suspicious about the plural subject are the same as those that should make one suspicious about the singular subject. If you and I go for a walk there is no “we” coming along, but if I go for a walk by myself, so Schmid claims, there is no “I” coming along either (Schmid, 2018, p. 241).

This misconception comes from a reification of subjectivity (Schmid, 2018, p. 242). Talk of “the self” or “the subject” suggests that saying “I” is referring to an entity. In his analysis Schmid points to philosophers like Hume, Fichte, Husserl and Sartre who criticized this conception of the subject (Schmid, 2018, p. 242).

An alternative conception of subjectivity is that the subject is adverbial in nature. This means that saying “I” does not pick out an entity, it is a feature of intention rather than an object (Schmid, 2018, p. 242). As a result, x-ing is intended subjectively, not intended by *the subject*. With reference to his concept of self-knowledge Schmid argues that self-knowing is a verb. So, subjectivity is an adverbial feature of self-knowing (Schmid, 2018, p. 242). Self-knowledge is not something *the subject has*, instead it is something that is self-known subjectively. Following this train of thought Schmid states that if subjectivity is an adverbial feature of the mind, so is plurality (Schmid, 2018, p. 242). This is why neither saying “I” nor “we” picks out an entity. Thus, one can easily argue that saying “we” does not create an additional subject (Schmid, 2018, p. 242). Saying “I” or “we” is much more a *change of mindset* in the most literal sense of the word.

5.2 Parallel conceptions of subjectivity

Following this previous section one might speculate that a reified subject underlies Pettit’s conception of group agency. I claim however, that subjectivity in Pettit’s view is in many ways identical to Schmid’s. Subjectivity according to Pettit comes with certain characteristics that can also be found in Schmid’s conception of self-knowledge. In

Pettit's description of apperceptive coawareness any individual deliberation or reasoning about what to do brings up the self in an important way (Pettit, 2018, p. 30). Deliberations like "I think I should do x" therefore involve an indexical self-reference. I am aware of myself but this "I" is not an object of perception, and even more important: I cannot misidentify myself, and this marks a special connection I have to my beliefs and desires (List and Pettit, 2011, pp. 188ff; Pettit, 2018, pp. 30ff). This characteristic of subjectivity is very close to self-identification or ownership in Schmid's conception of self-knowledge (Schmid, 2014b, p. 15, 2018, p. 234).

Furthermore, in his definition of perceptual coawareness Pettit gives an indirect hint of what Schmid calls "perspective" (Pettit, 2018, p. 26; Schmid, 2014b, pp. 15ff). Pettit describes how human beings can reason about how things seem to be or how something looks (Pettit, 2018, p. 26). But it is important to note that we cannot, beyond that, inspect how that look looks or that sound sounds (Pettit, 2018, p. 27). This description could be seen as the necessary difference between self and world that is at work in Schmid's description of perspective (Schmid, 2014b, pp. 15ff). In his analysis Pettit seems to take into account that there is an inevitable perspective from which I see how things are.

Beyond that, subjectivity is described as claiming a certain epistemic and practical authority. When I speak for myself claiming that I have a certain desire I rule out the possibility that I got my mind wrong (Pettit, 2018, p. 19). This formulation can be seen in close proximity to what Schmid describes as "self-authorizing" (Schmid, 2018, p. 235).

One final characteristic of Pettit's account of subjectivity is that if I said I made up my mind this entails a certain normative pressure to act as if what I was thinking was true. The only excuse for not acting as if my thought was true is claiming that I changed my mind (Pettit, 2015, p. 107). Being an individual agent others will have expectations of me. Those include that I commit myself to a belief, act as if it was true and apologize if I fail to live up to those expectations. The expectations I face as an agent can be read parallel to the commitments found in Schmid's approach (Schmid, 2014b, p. 16, 2014c, pp. 1690ff). Regarding those characteristics I argue that subjectivity in Pettit's and Schmid's accounts are identical for the most part. Subjectivity according to Pettit comes with the same sort of characteristics that Schmid describes in his conception of self-knowledge. There is an unmistakable identity and a distinctive perspective from where I

see the world. Beyond that in saying “I”, I claim a certain authority and face a certain normative pressure to commit to my attitudes in different ways. Considering those similarities, I also argue that Pettit’s view of subjectivity does not contain a reification of subjectivity as speculated above.

5.3 Primary subjectivity

Notwithstanding the similarities, a closer look at those passages in which Pettit talks about subjectivity brings a crucial difference to light. Deliberating on how collectives and individuals relate in the psychology of an individual member, Pettit maintains that natural persons are always primary (Pettit, 2003, pp. 189ff). Individuals have an inescapable priority – so they will decide if they further the collective goal or their own priorities (Pettit, 2003, p. 190).

First of all this might suggest that there is a subjective priority of interest and not a priority of experience. But the fact that I – as an individual – can decide whether or not to further a collective goal actually implies that subjective experience is always primary. This is not necessarily different in Schmid’s view, since he argues that a plural subject is not a collective singular that subjective experience simply merges into (Schmid, 2014c, p. 10). But the important insight is actually a different one.

Pettit goes on and states that natural persons constitute and enact collectives in an intentional manner, as individuals are mostly free to choose if they are a member (Pettit, 2003, p. 190). The important aspect here is that choice is in most cases a conscious decision possibly accompanied by deliberation and reasoning, and this impression grows even stronger when Pettit states that it might be rational for an individual to act in the name of a collective if this is maximizing the natural person’s preferences. This is why natural persons are always primary (Pettit, 2003, p. 190).

Pettit might be right in assuming that the individual is central, but he ignores the fact that his view of subjective primacy also implies some troubling consequences. Making intentional conscious decisions to act or not collectively presupposes that subjective experience is primary. This sense of subjective primacy also implies that for an individual there is seemingly only one way to relate to others, namely by reflective, conscious processes.

In 2006 Pettit and Schweikard ask the same question: Can it be rational for an individual to think in terms of a collective (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 24)? They

claim that people often go for cooperative solutions and often see joint action as an option (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 25). Therefore it should be considered as rationally unproblematic to think of individuals in joint action, especially once it is recognized that there are benefits that individuals can achieve only when they act jointly (Pettit and Schweikard, 2006, p. 26). It might be rational for individuals to join in on actions without calculating each and every single action with respect to the returns they expect only for themselves. In joint action rationality means that individuals monitor if the cooperation is damaging their own interests overall.

Those deliberations contribute to the growing impression that for individuals joint intentions are a choice and therefore a conscious decision. Even though I choose a cooperative route, choosing to act together with others is still mediated by my conscious and deliberate calculation of my own benefits. This, however, suggests a view of the subject that cannot be pre-reflectively aware of others. To act jointly is a reflective and conscious decision – the route to saying “we” has to be described as a reflective one.

As mentioned previously, being a subject means that I am confronted with certain expectations from others, and from the opposite perspective this means that I have certain expectations of others as well (Pettit, 2015, p. 108). When Pettit describes how one can detect agency in others this comes up in a striking way. The expectations I have (and that I have to live up to) will show very quickly if someone is an agent or not (Pettit, 2015, p. 109). For detecting agency I need induction, but the induction involved here is “induction from interpersonal interaction rather than induction from impersonal interaction” (Pettit, 2015, p. 109). I can interact with a personal agent or see him or her interacting with others, meaning that I can weigh up the evidence and see if he or she is an agent (Pettit, 2015, p. 109).

But the fact that I would have to detect if someone is an agent supports the point I was making above. Considering that I have to think inductively, observe and weigh up evidence in order to detect if someone is an agent really makes it obvious that my relation to others is mediated by highly reflective processes. It appears as if an individual has to get “out there” to check and see if there are other individuals who are agents too. And the only means I have to do this as an individual are reflective processes.

Beyond all similarities between Schmid’s and Pettit’s conception of subjectivity these passages show a very crucial difference. Schmid conceives of the relation between an

individual and a collective as pre-reflective self-knowledge, a self-knowledge that I have pre-reflectively which can change from singular to plural because subjectivity and plurality are adverbial features of the mind (Schmid, 2018, p. 242). Even though Pettit's conception of subjectivity does allow for a pre-reflective relation to myself, it does not allow for a pre-reflective relation to others. One cannot argue that Pettit reifies subjectivity, but one can most certainly argue that Pettit thinks of the relation between individuals as a reflective one. This is a) important for this work because relating to others is a major stepping stone for joint actions and the possibility of group agency, b) it is in line with what I have shown in Chapter 4, that group-identification or saying "we" according to Pettit might be a pre-reflective plural self-knowledge, but saying "we" can only be constituted via reflective processes of incorporation, and c) this would also explain why Pettit cannot account for a sense of collectiveness in joint intention, because if the only possible way of individuals relating to each other is via reflective processes, then there is no room nor necessity for any pre-reflective sense of collectiveness in joint intentions or any loose form of shared action.

Concluding this chapter, I argue that Pettit does not conceive of subjectivity as an adverbial feature of the mind. As a result, his conception does not allow for any pre-reflective relation between individuals. This can also be considered the main reason why there is an explanatory gap in his conception, the one I have described above. On the other hand Schmid offers a more plausible explanation that starts with the mind which can be either subjective or plural, and by this laying the foundation for pre-reflective plural self-knowledge and an explanation of joint action that makes shared action much more conceivable on its basic level.

6. Conclusion

In summarizing this thesis let me make a few remarks about what it should have conveyed. Besides a detailed depiction of the accounts put forward by Philip Pettit and Hans Bernhard Schmid it offers three major insights. The first concerns what I have been calling the explanatory gap in Pettit's account. I have shown that there is an implicit sense of collectiveness present in loose forms of joint action and any form of joint intention, while on the other hand there was a more explicit form of group-

identification found in group agents. Concerning this explanatory gap my argumentation lead to two important points: Pettit cannot sufficiently explain how distributive joint intentions unify into the corporate intentions that bring about group-identification, and he cannot account for the implicit sense of collectiveness that I have shown to be necessary for his account.

Second, the comparison of both accounts has shown that contrary to Pettit's claim they are quite different with respect to identification, collective rational performance, types of collectives and joint intentions. There was only a marginal convergence found in identification.

Finally it became clear that the characteristics responsible for the divergence in both accounts can be found in the fact that Schmid argues for plural self-knowledge as pre-reflective, and for subjectivity and plurality as adverbial features of the mind. I argued that neither characteristic can be found in Pettit's conception, which renders the relation between individuals and collectives as reflective processes, because Pettit's view of subjectivity does not provide plurality as an adverbial feature of the mind.

Going back to concrete manifestations of the phenomenon, we quickly realize how familiar we are with the fact that we oftentimes do not have to think about how to relate to others. You do not have to think if there is a group while having lunch with your colleagues. Helping someone who fell crossing a street, we usually do not think about if there is some other agent, and if this agent is sharing the intention that I have. "We" just go and help without even consciously realizing that there was someone else, as soon as we step towards the person in need we know that "we help". Coming home late, it just needs a glance from your partner or some subtle changes in his or her body-language and you realize that: "We need to talk." There is no conscious thought going on in your mind: "There is this person I call my partner," or "He or she looks angry." Every day we relate to other persons so easily that we oftentimes do not even think about it. All these examples show that there cannot be some reflective process at the foundation of doing things together. I therefore conclude that Schmid's view offers a more fitting explanation of the phenomenon because it captures the way we actually do things together in a more comprehensible and convincing way.

7. Attachments

7.1 Abstract

If you and I go for a walk, what makes you and me say that “We go for a walk” rather than each of us saying “I go for a walk”? What is it that makes us identify as a group? Discussing those questions might not only be relevant from a theoretical point of view. A profound conception of group identification might also be help to understand the practical phenomena of collective action that we experience on a daily basis.

Christian List and Philip Pettit’s work on group agency and more specifically the chapter on group-identification figure as a starting point into this debate (List and Pettit, 2011). In this thesis I will show that their account of group-identification leaves crucial questions unanswered. Further elaborations by Philip Pettit show that the constitution of group identification is explained unsatisfyingly. Beyond that I will argue that not only group-identification but also joint intentions which figure as drivers for group-identification presuppose a sense of collectiveness that Pettit cannot account for. This leaves an explanatory gap in Pettit’s conception.

Afterwards, I will present Hans Bernhard Schmid’s conception of *plural self-knowledge* as a potentially convergent conception (Schmid, 2018). Comparing Schmid’s understanding of group-identification to that of Pettit, I will argue that both accounts are fundamentally different. It will become clear that Schmid’s conception of plural self-knowledge can close the explanatory gap in Pettit’s account of group-identification. Finally it will be shown that there is one characteristic in Schmid’s conception of subjectivity that can account for the varying answers concerning the question of group-identification.

7.2 Abstract (German)

Wenn ich mit einer anderen Person spazieren gehe und man mich fragt was ich mache, dann antworte ich mit: „Wir gehen spazieren.“. Warum aber sage ich „wir“? Könnten nicht beide beteiligten Personen genauso gut antworten mit: „Ich gehe spazieren.“? Was braucht es also, damit *wir* uns als Gruppe identifizieren und als solche begreifen? Die Beantwortung dieser Fragen ist nicht nur aus theoretischer Perspektive relevant. Eine

umfassende Theorie von Identifikation in Gruppen hilft beim Verständnis kollektiver Handlungen, einem Phänomen mit dem wir uns täglich konfrontiert sehen.

Christian List und Philip Pettits Buch *Group Agency* und vor allem das Kapitel über Gruppen Identifikation fungiert als Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen (List and Pettit, 2011). In dieser Arbeit werde ich zeigen, dass List und Pettits Konzeption von Gruppen Identifikation wichtige Fragen unbeantwortet lässt. Anhand weiterer Schriften Pettits wird deutlich, dass die Art und Weise wie sich Gruppen Identifikation konstituiert, unzureichend geklärt ist. Darüber hinaus werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass nicht nur Gruppen Identifikation, sondern auch geteilte Absichten, welche Gruppen Identifikation mit konstituieren, eine Art kollektive Bewusstheit voraussetzen, welche von Pettit nicht adressiert wird. Hierdurch entsteht eine Erklärungslücke in Pettits Konzeption.

Anschließend werde ich Hans Bernhard Schmid's Konzeption des pluralen Selbstbewusstseins vorstellen und prüfen ob beide Konzeptionen konvergent sind (Schmid, 2018). Vergleicht man die Konzeptionen von Schmid und Pettit wird deutlich, dass beide Ansätze fundamentale Unterschiede aufweisen. Ein wesentlicher Schritt meiner Argumentation besteht darin zu zeigen, dass Schmid's Konzept des pluralen Selbstbewusstseins die Erklärungslücke in Pettits Ansatz schließen kann. Abschließend werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass es vor allem eine Charakteristik in Schmid's Verständnis von Subjektivität ist, welche die Unterschiede in beiden Theorien hervorbringt.

8. References

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