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Economy versus Security
The Essence of Alignment under the Regional Anarchy:
A Comparative Case Study of the Armenian and Azerbaijanian
Alliance Formation after the Cold War

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FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have interests in the political science and particularly in the international affairs since I entered in the gymnasium. I always aspired to improve my academic skills and my expertise in IR. When I was appointed to an OSCE post in Vienna in 2011, I had the opportunity to make my aspiration real. After the intense two years of study to fulfill the academic requirements, I have chosen to research the alliance behavior of Armenia and Azerbaijan with the advice and consent of my supervisor Prof. Dr. Heinz Gärtner.

This study is a small step in the vast alliance literature to advance the knowledge on a rarely examined subject: The role of the ideational factors in the alignment and alliance formation. Even though the number of the constructivist studies increases in the last 20 years, there is a few constructivist research on alignment and alliance formation. Therefore, this study aims to advance and refine the present knowledge on that subject. In this regard, this research focuses on the refinement of the Balance of Threat Theory on the constructivist ground.

The research and writing processes were a long journey as well as a challenge. I had encountered many difficulties. First, I had not enough background in the field of survey. Thus I had to fulfill many requirements and improve my skills at the research methods and advance my information background in political science. Second, my full-time occupation, intensive work conditions, and real-life situations put many obstacles on my way to complete this study. However, I followed my aspiration to overcome these barriers. Therefore, this study is a product of a deep passion for achieving a true academic work, which lasted six years. The quality of this study is subject to the assessment of the readers; however, they shall be confident on my intention to contribute to the literature by offering new insights.

The research and writing periods contributed a lot to my personal and academic development and widened my vision in IR. It was a constructive process in which I learned much, and new information initiated new insights.

After an intensive period of six years, today is the day to write this note of thanks. I would like to thank the people who have supported and helped me so much throughout this period.

I would first like to thank my supervisor Mr. Prof. Dr. Heinz Gärtner, who accepted and supported me in the conduct of my research and the further development of my dissertation.

Also, I would like to thank the excellent teaching team in the faculty of political science and staff in the doctoral studies department for their valuable guidance and assistance. I would

also like to thank my family for their support and understanding. I could not care for them many weekends and evenings.

Finally, I dedicate this work to them who died for their country, flag, honor, and dignity. Rest in peace.

İlhami Binali DEĞİRMENCİOĞLU

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Chapter I

Introduction

Alliance formation is one of the central issues in international politics. There are extensive researches and contradicting hypotheses on this topic. However, the present research on alliances is not able to explain **the essence of the alliance formation and alignment**. Because;

- They fail to comprehend the role of societal factors,
- They emphasize some aspects of the alliance formation and fail to employ a holistic approach.

In this context, the most advanced and accepted theory of the alliance literature is **the theory of the Balance of Threat (BoT)**, which was developed on a neorealist ground by Walt. This theory offers rich analytical tools to understand and explain the motives of the alliance formation based on four variables: *aggregate power*, *proximity*, *offensive capability*, and *offensive intentions*. The first three variables rest on the material interpretation of the attributes of an object, whereas the last variable requires an ideational interpretation since we cannot measure “intentions.” Therefore, the theoretical tools of this theory fail to analyze and to explain the construction of intention, because Walt rests only on a realist paradigm and avoids of working on the ground of ideational paradigm, although he makes numerous ideational references and explanations.

The starting point of this study is to improve the explanatory power of BoT theory by focusing on the construction and the perception of intention. The analysis of the intentions requires using constructivist tools since they offer more insights to explain the construction of the social issues. The constructivist premises suggest that “*identities and interests are socially constructed*” (Wendt, 1999: 248, 314). It opens new avenues to go further. Thus, this study will use the constructivist analytical framework to enhance our knowledge of intention and perception of threat.

The constructivist premise explains the construction of the social issues through the past and present interactions. It underlines the role of learning and internalization. In this context, **the learning theory** developed by Reiter provides useful information regarding the effect of the past events and the derived lessons on the foreign policymaking. The proposition of this theory seems promising to analyze some facets of the intent formation.

Since this study will focus on the role of the past, the empirical part was structured on two case studies, where actors and space are the same, but the period changes. The design of the cases in this way allows us to compare the effect of the time on the construction of beliefs. Moreover, it serves to understand the role of social context at that moment. The selection of the South Caucasus rests on two reasons. First, it is a region where various identities emerge. These identities have conflicting inner components and create a different social context that makes easy to discern the effect of culture. Second, the region displays a geopolitical importance due to being a bridge between Asia and Europa. This position initiates the operation of the extra-regional dynamics that make the region unstable and volatile. Therefore, security concerns transcend over the other concerns and make possible the entertainment of the propositions of various theories.

1.1. Central Research Question

Armenia and Azerbaijan are small states and ancient neighbors. Their cultures have many similarities, and they encountered with the similar challenges in the past such Russian invasion and mutual atrocities. However, after they regained their sovereignty, the two states followed opposite foreign policies: Armenia oriented itself with Russia, whereas Azerbaijan took a pro-western orientation. This outcome contradicts the major premise of the Balance of Threat Theory, which puts at its core the following proposition: alignment against a major threat.

Armenia abruptly decided to join the Russia-led Customs Union in 2013. With this decision, Armenia revealed her side, even though she was exercising “*complementary policy*” between the West and Russia until the time of decision. Her decision caused a political shock in the domestic and foreign political arenas in the last months of 2013, because Armenia was also negotiating with the EU on the trade agreement (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements-DCFTA) under the Eastern Partnership Program.

Some experts think that this decision erodes the sovereignty and statehood of the nation. In fact, they believe that the Customs Union cannot provide any prospect for the economic and social development of Armenia due to its composition and values. According to them, the decision was made under the firm pressure of Moscow and based on the security and domestic political concerns, rather than economic benefits.¹

¹ “In 2012, Armenian exports to the European Union (\$560.3 million) were nearly double the value of exports to Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus (\$290.7 million). Trade in the first six months of 2013 shows

This interesting incident induced us to ask the following question: ***why do Armenia and Azerbaijan follow a different pattern of external cooperation?***

To answer this question, we need to understand the motives and rationality behind the policy of actors. The briefest examination of the relations led us to think about the role of the past and culture. Therefore, I formulated my central research question and sub-questions as follows:

What rationale drove Armenia and Azerbaijan to make different alliance formations after the end of the Cold War?

Sub-questions:

- What is the role of **the past** in the foreign policy exercise of Azerbaijan and Armenia?
- How do affect the **societal factors** their external cooperation?
- How were their identities constructed?
- What are the links among the identity, threat construction, and alignment behavior?

It is assumed that the past lessons and societal factors are the main drivers of the alignment. The identification of their role might suggest an explanation to the shortcomings of the major theories that fail to explain the logic of the alignment in the South Caucasus.

Although the contemporary literature encompasses a vast array of studies, there are still gaps in the literature concerning the social dimension of the alliance formation. Since this study will rest on the constructivist ground, the central question will focus on “*the conditions that make something what it is or give it the causal power*” (Wendt, 1999: 373).

Map 1 The South Caucasus, source: Caucasus Research Center



In this regard, the selection of the Caucasus for the case study yields numerous advantages. It is a borderland between different civilizations and an area over which “*the historical Tsarist, Safavid, and Ottoman empires as well as also between the regional powers of the late twentieth century: Russia, Iran, and Turkey*” have competed (Cornell, 2001: 18).

a similar pattern, according to the National Statistical Service-\$250.6 million worth of goods went to the EU versus \$149.6 million to the Customs Union troika.” (<http://www.eurasianet.org>).

The ethnic diversity offers more possibility to uncover the effect of societal issues such as identity, culture, embedded enmity, and deep hatred. The existence of “*fault lines*,” various conflicts, strategic resources, and the interests of the intra-regional powers make the region “*an apple of discord between great powers*” (Nation, 2007: 3). Therefore, it constitutes a security complex, which enables to conduct regional and system level analysis simultaneously (Cornell, 2001: 24).

The selection of Armenia and Azerbaijan as the subject of the case study rests on some similarities of their behaviors. Both societies lived in the region for centuries as neighbors, and they share many common traditions due to intense interactions. However, the fraternal nations evolved into primordial enemies under the effects of various dynamics. The identification of this transformation through the analysis of the past formative events can offer some evidence for the essence of their behaviors.

The effect of the formative events can be best identified through focusing on the eras they occurred. In this regard, I will examine the events in two distinct periods: 1878-1921 and 1988-1994. Both periods have particular importance since the shaping incidents such as war, mass killings, and immigrations occurred during these periods. The comparison of the two periods and their effects on the societies will serve us to disclose some dynamics that operate independently and shape the social context, identity, interests, perceptions and the behaviors of the actors.

1.2. Aim and contribution of the study

Since the end of the Cold War, it became more evident that the mainstream theory of international relations (IR), realism, cannot explain some anomalies of the alliance formation. The dramatic shift of the paradigm in IR from a power-centric thinking to a more society-centric thinking led realism to confront by many puzzles.

Its emphasis on the system level and negligence of the regional, as well as unit level interactions and dynamics, undermines the explanatory capacity of the realist theory. Reiter (1996:3) points out this aspect as follows: “*realism sees alliances as a response to the international threat; when a state is more threatened it should be more likely to ally, and when it is less threatened it should be less likely to ally. In the twentieth century, however, some states have chosen alliance when relatively unthreatened, and some have remained neutral even when facing serious international dangers. There seems to be a gap between realist explanation and the historical record.*”

Dingman (1979: 245) emphasizes that the study of the alliances is a challenging issue thus he indicates the need for the development of a “*conceptual understanding of alliances*” by using “*various methods for analyzing alliances*.”

Furthermore, Dingman (1979: 247, 248) explains the major problems in the alliance literature as follows: “*They (theorists) dealt with alliances in two ways. At the bilateral level, they tried to quantify the closeness or distance between states. While information of this sort might be useful, it seems only secondarily important... On another level, contemporary theorists wrestled with the old problem of the relationship between alliances and the international system. They addressed themselves to the **formation, termination, purposes, and performance of alliances**. Then they posed correlative questions: Did alliances correlate to war? Were there recurrent patterns of alliance distribution in the international system? Was alliance formation random and ahistorical, or did preferred combinations recur? In trying to answer these questions, quantitative theorists made use of ever more sophisticated statistical and mathematical models... Moreover, **these theorists sidestepped the complex issues of causation to deal only with correlations.***”

In this context, this research aims to **explain the mechanism of alignment through advancing Balance of Threat Theory by including ideational factors into the analysis**. It is intended to explore the role of the ideational factors, which also constitute the source of anarchy (the distribution of ideas in system forms anarchy) and their effects on the decision-making process.

Walt (1988, 281) emphasizes the significant role of the threat perception (the distribution of threats). However, he fails to explain **how are the threat and intention constructed by society**. Therefore, I aspire to advance the Balance of Threat Theory by employing constructivist concepts, to overcome the indeterminism of the present theory and to promote a better understanding of the alignment behavior. **The clarification of the link between threat perception and identity is the chief aim of this study**. As a theoretical goal, I aim to systematize the variation (contrast) in the investigated cases through a comparative design.

In this regard, the South Caucasus is an essential region to investigate alliance formation. Due to historical and geographical reasons, this region, which was less studied by scholars, offers a perfect test pad to research the alliance formation and alignment. A deep analysis of the political behaviors in this region may serve to improve our knowledge on the alliance formation in general.

Even though there are structural and societal similarities, the regional interactions generate different political behaviors such as balancing and bandwagoning. This contrast enables us to

conduct deep analysis that will discover the constructive effects of the relevant aspects. A temporal comparison of the alignment behaviors of Armenia and Azerbaijan may increase the possibility to disclose the role of the societal factors. Therefore, this study may provide more insights through a comprehensive framing of the investigated issue. Furthermore, as stated in many research (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2000: 11), *“ideas and material incentives to work together in complex ways, and their interaction varies across cases,”* therefore, I aspire to study this complexity by elucidating the effects of both factors. In the end, this study will contribute to the progress of the constructivist approach and alliance literature by employing a rarely used method.

The advancement of BoT Theory through the explanation of the formation of “intentions” will increase the explanatory power of BoT Theory and our knowledge of “intent.” The examination of the intentions needs the study of other issues such as past interactions, identities, perceptions, unit-regional-system level cultures, interests, and material factors.

The lessons derived from the past affect the collective memory of society and policy makers' subjective assessment. It provides “data” contributing to the definition of the other group and the threat (Barnett, 1996: 446). Therefore, this study will consider past interactions and derived lessons as the primary factors affecting the formation of intent and alliances.

The past interactions create many knowledge structures such as narratives, myths, analogies, fear, enmity/amity, hatred, and roles. These structures shape the perception of the societies on the other societies. By focusing on them, this study will systemize the existing knowledge (Reiter, 1996; Khong, 1992) and link them to alliance literature.

Most of the present research ignores the role of identity in alliance formation, although there are some useful attempts (such as Barnett, 1996). The employment of the constructivist approach will serve to identify the effects, fluidity, and multiplicity of identities as a factor in the formation of threat and alliances (Suny, 2000: 139).

We cannot understand the essence of conflict without studying the identity. As Jackson (2009: 186) contends, the role of *“identity in conflict are particularly salient to constructivist approaches, and further research is required in this important area.”* We need to explain the following aspects: a. the social and historical process of the identity construction, b. the transformation of identity types (through the internalization of culture), c. the link among identity, threat construction, and alignment d. the impact of ideas on foreign policy behavior (Goldstein, & Keohane, 1993: 28).

The domestic setting and decision-making unit play a key role in threat construction. In this regard, this study will advance our knowledge on the role of analogies, metaphors, and

schemas in the process of decision-making. This study also aims to enhance our knowledge on “*the link between objective material power capabilities and policy makers' subjective assessment*” (Rose, 1998:168).

The states operate in the regional and systemic cultures; therefore, cultures exert certain influences on the political behavior of the states. The type of the cultural security paradigm and its internalization make radical differences in the threat perception and alignment decision. This study will contribute to our knowledge on the effect of regional/systemic cultures.

The theoretical perspective of this study suggests that interests are the reflection of beliefs (Goldstein, & Keohane, 1993: 13), which are the key function of the various identities and an important component of the intent formation. In this regard, this study will enhance the present theoretical development on the motives of alliance formation and alignment.

This study will employ a holistic approach to deal with the multi-causality that includes underlying factors.² Therefore, it departs from the mainstream of works³ by aspiring the development of a hybrid analytical framework that uses hermeneutical-constructivist reading to explain the origins of the alliance formation and alignment. In this context, this study does not concern on the validation of a proposition rather; it seeks to explain a part of the causality systemically by employing an alternative paradigm.

In sum, this study aims to contribute to the international relations literature in three ways:

- Firstly, by exploring the role of the past and its effects on societal context and identity.
- Secondly, by discovering the link between identity, interests and threat perception.
- Finally, by generating a hybrid analytical framework that grasps the essence of alignment by uniting the ideational and material factors.

In the end, this attempt will contribute to the improvement of the explanatory power of the BoT Theory by explaining intent formation. Therefore, it will fill the void in the alliance literature by using a new method that analyzes the social aspects through deductive reasoning.

² “*norms, culture, and other social structures have causal force and that these structures are not simple reflections of hegemonic state interests.*” (cited in Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 397)

³ They deal with the subjects such as impact of alliances on the international system, the relationship between alliances and the international system, the closeness or distance between states, the formation, termination, purposes, and performance of alliances.

1.3. Methodology

Having made explicit what I aspire to achieve, I will next discuss the method. The methodology applied in this study is qualitative. It consists of three steps and grounds on the knowledge from the followings: a. literature research, b. case study, c. expert interviews, d. field study.

The study has been conducted in three intersected stages: a. information gathering, b. case study, c. analysis and interpretation. I employed constructivist approaches since they fit my purpose.

In the first stage, I researched the literature on the alliance formation to understand the scope of the present composition of the knowledge and to get some insights that would be useful in the further analysis. After that, I focused on the research offering necessary tools to establish an analytical framework to conduct a discursive analysis of the past events. This research included constructivist, cognitive and security studies.

In this regard, I examined the role of the past using the premises of the works of Reiter (1994, 1996) and Khong (1992). Khong provides necessary knowledge about the analogies and their use in the decision-making at the strategic level by individuals. As Kegley (1987: 249) rightly argued that “*in theorizing about the sources of foreign policy behavior, we should begin with individuals, because only persons think, prefer and act.*” Focusing on the past lessons helps us to understand the effects of past events on the perception of the individuals and on the decision-making process.

Since I aimed to study the unit and regional level security dynamics, the analytical framework of the Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan and Wæver, 2003) appeared as the most suitable approach to analyze the interactions at the regional level. The traditional alliance studies usually employ military-centric approaches, which focus on the system level. This shortcoming prevents us from conducting comprehensive security analysis at the regional level. However, the social constructivist approach of the Copenhagen School considers security, in a broad sense, as a socially constructed issue. Thus, I conducted the security analysis based on the framework proposed by this approach, which is a mixture of the constructivist and realist assumptions.

As a part of the primary accounts, first, I conducted expert interviews with officials, regional experts, politicians, and academics to get more insights on the investigated phenomenon, the

social context, and decision-making process (see annex interview).⁴ Second, I conducted a content analysis of the official public statements and official documents to understand beliefs.⁵ Third, I also referred to some available quantitative data for the complementary purposes. The survey results conducted by Caucasus Barometer, an independent research organization, were useful to reveal tendencies and to confirm the validity of my basic findings. Finally, yet importantly, I conducted a field survey in Azerbaijan to get more insights into the local culture and regional dynamics through interaction with people and interviews with experts.⁶

In the second stage, I conducted a case study, which had been designed on the temporal basis. In this context, the two periods between the years 1878-1921 and 1988-1994 constitutes my temporal focal points.

My research strategy rests on a focused comparative case study. The case study intends to understand the construction of the various identities and the link among identity, threat perception, and alignment under the conditions determined by domestic, regional and systemic settings.⁷ As Barnett (1996), I examined various moments of the Turkish and Armenian relations in these two periods, which offer more possibility to conduct a deep survey since they are full with many formative events (war, invasions, mass killings, the collapse of empires, ethnic cleansing, migrations, and independence) that made profound impact on the societies and induced cultural and identity changes.

Moreover, the existence of several structural similarities and mirror events in both periods (such as the collapse of Tsarist Empire in 1917 and collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991) provided some measure of control over the investigated dependent variables (social context and identity). I recognized that the major events (independent variables) affect material and ideational elements (dependent variables) in both states through internalization.⁸ The study of these formative events with the help of **constructivist approaches** enabled to identify the link between identity and threat perception, which is a theoretical puzzle in IR that cannot be

⁴ I conducted ten interviews with selected experts from all related countries. Since, the majority of interview partner are officials, I did not reveal neither the identity nor the affiliation of the partners according to the Chatham House Rule.

⁵ "One must use contextual clues to infer what purpose the subject was pursuing through language in that situation, and discount his words accordingly." (Larson, 1985: 60).

⁶ I conducted my field survey only in Azerbaijan lasted 10 days. Due to security concerns, I could not travel to Armenia.

⁷ Barnett (1996: 401) points out the critical mechanism among identity, the construction of the threat and alignment. According to him. "It is the politics of identity rather than the logic of anarchy that often provides a better understanding of which states are viewed as a potential or immediate threat to the state's security."

⁸ "The notion of internalization is viewed as the causal mechanism." (Sjöstedt, 2013: 147).

explained by realist theories.⁹ In this context, the **Learning Theory** (Reiter, 1996) was used to interpret the effect of the formative events. The other purposes of the case study are mentioned in the followings:

- To illuminate the role of nationalism, religion, and Great Powers in the construction of the domestic and regional culture,
- To demonstrate how societies transformed (internalized) the past incidents into analogies (and metaphors/schemas), and how they used them in the second period,
- To explore the effects of the social context on the formation of identity, enmity, and securitization process through analysis of interactions at state, regional and system level.¹⁰

In the third stage, I analyzed and interpreted the inferences from the case study through investigation of the contemporary relations. This stage consisted of three steps: a. the analysis of the security constellations of actors, b. the study of the contemporary relations, c. the interpretation of the findings.

In the first step, I aspired to study domestic, regional, and intra-regional dynamics by using the analytical framework of the Regional Security Complex Theory. The ultimate goal of this step was the definition of the dynamics of threat perception and alignment behavior.

In the second step, the security, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan with other actors had been examined using the indicators derived from the alliance literature. Thus, I aimed to understand the extent and quality of these relations, whether they pose an alignment quality or not. For that purpose, I used some quantitative methods to assess the value of indicators. By doing so, I expected to discover **an association between the present threat perception** (formed through past lessons) **and present-day alignment behavior.**

In the third step, I interpreted the findings and sought to synthesize them under a holistic approach with the help of constructivist approaches. My goal here was to develop a holistic analytical framework that integrates the material and societal factors at various levels and inherits more explanatory power. The framework can be used as a tool to disclose **the causal and constructive link among identity, threat perception, and alignment.**

⁹ Constructivist approaches (Wendt, 1999; Barnett, 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1993) suggest more insights to capture international systems outside the present Westphalian order and assume that the regional culture shapes and forms actors' identities.

¹⁰ "Constructivists agree that state identities were constructed within the social environment of international and domestic politics." (cited in Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 399).

The concept of the research was depicted in the model below. The model assumes alignment behavior as a function of corporate and type identities that is under the constitutive effect of the domestic, regional and systemic cultures. According to the model, when identities encounter with each other, they evaluate other's behaviors in respect to "the standards" that were devised by the past lessons and own culture. The evaluation generates positive or negative role identities. If a positive role identity emerges, both identities tend to form a collective identity that might forge an alignment that depends on the strength of the emerged collective identity. In contrast, a negative role identity induces various alliance strategies depending on the degree of the perceived threat.




Figure 1 The Research Model

In this context, the way I used in this study differs from the previous research in some respects: First, it takes a holistic approach by adding the constructivist concept into the (neo) realist concept (BoT Theory). Second, it employs identity, subjective security interests, social context and relative power as the explanatory dependent variables of the causality. Third, it conducts a constructivist security analysis in the explanation of alliance formation. Fourth, it puts identity at the center of the analysis.

Finally, this study engages in attempts at "Verstehen" and seeks to interpret the meaning of the events through the analysis of their patterns. Thus, it aims to generate hypotheses (hybrid analytical framework) rather than generalization (Goldstein, & Keohane, 1993: 27).

1.4. Limitations of the research

The study of alliances and alignment is a challenging task. Dingman (1979: 245) points out this challenge as follows:

“The Question of How to Study Alliances does not lend itself to an easy answer. Although I have spent some years in doing so, I cannot provide a checklist of what one should do in analyzing either alliance in general or a particular alliance.”

In this context, I encountered with a framing problem of the study boundaries, since it has an extensive scope. Therefore, I limited myself to the core of the problem and did not focus on the secondary aspects.

The conduct of this study faces the following difficulties that limit its validity:

First, the language problem emerges a major challenge. This constraint limits my access to the documents in the Armenian language. The translations of these documents do not represent the original content. Moreover, since I deal with societal factors, I have to be able to read documents in the Armenian language to conduct a better content analysis; however, this lack prevented me to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the Armenian culture and discourses.

Second, I got the possibility to travel Azerbaijan for the field analysis. During this visit, I conducted several interviews with officials, academics, and politicians. However, I could not get permission from the Turkish authorities to travel Armenia due to security concerns. Moreover, only some Armenian politicians were welcomed my request to conduct interviews with them that also made a possible the visit non-sense.

Third, I needed carry out interviews with officials from both sides. However, due to the sensitiveness of the subject, many politicians and public servants declined my request for an interview. Furthermore, the interview partners, who accepted my proposals, subjectively articulated the facts. Therefore, I had to be more careful to assure objectivity. In this context, I conducted interviews with senior officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Russia, and OSCE. During my field survey, I conducted interviews with a staff member, academics, and politicians from Azerbaijan as well as by an official from the OSCE. Unfortunately, U.S. officials declined my proposals, and I was able to conduct an interview only with an academic from the USA.

Fourth, my profession and full-time employment prevented me from conducting a more comprehensive study such as collecting the opinion of some academics to test the validity and objectivity of my findings. I had to suspend my study several times due to time limitation and professional activities. Furthermore, I had difficulties accessing academic documents due to my unsuitable location.

Fifth, the space limitation prevented me from conducting a more detailed interpretation of the issues.

1.5. Chapter overview

Having explained the purpose and basic logic of the, I would like to explain the structure of it. In chapter II, I review the major theories in the literature to comprehend their assumptions and to identify their strengths and flaws. In chapter III, the theoretical validity of the selected theories had been analyzed by applying to the region of the case study.

To frame the theoretical area of movement, I focused on the role of analogies, schemas, and metaphors in the decision-making process. Furthermore, I examined various factors such as identity, culture, enmity, fears and securitization through the constructivist viewpoint. The case study starts with a brief study of the regional history and contemporary setting that will serve to a better understanding of the region and its context. After that, I conducted the case study in two different periods with the following sequence: a. the study of major events in two periods, b. their implications on identity, enmity pattern, and securitization process.

In chapter V, I examine the domestic, regional, and intra-regional dynamics to disclose the security dynamics and to explain the threat construction process.

Chapter VI helps us to recognize the actual alignment patterns through the help of various indicators. In this chapter, I test the compliance of my findings in chapter V with the actual alignment picture studied in chapter VI. This comparative test served to increase the reliability of my analysis and interpretation done in the last chapter.

In the closing chapter, I analyze and interpret the findings of chapter V and VI. Based on the analyses and interpretation, I proposed a hybrid an analytical framework to study alignment behavior.

Chapter II


Theoretical Analysis Framework

2.1. Alliances and Alliance Theory: Wind of Change?

The prominent and pioneer scholar of alliance literature George Liska (1962: 3) writes that “*it is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances.*” In this context, alliances are the central element of international relations and the backbone of the international theory. Thus, the analysis of alliance theory is closely related to the theories of IR.


Without considering the recent structural changes in IR, we cannot advance the present theoretical foundation on alliances. The paradigm shift in IR necessities the examination of the essence of alliance formation as explained below (Oest, 2007:8):

Figure 2 Territorial Changes by Type 1825-2014, Source: Correlates of War Database, Doc-37



First, the end of the Cold War changed the concept of the traditional threat calculation and diminished the threat perception. The distribution of power/capabilities and,

therefore, threat perception of the world changed. Walt (2009:86) points out that “*uni-polarity*



has had profound effects on the nature of contemporary alliances.” The newly emerged system structure “*uni-polarity*” changed the nature of alliance formation (Campbell, 2004: 160; Tertrais, 2004: 147-48; Menon, 2003: 2).

Figure 3 Total Armed Conflicts by Type 1946-2014, Source: UCDP/Armed Conflict Dataset (v4), Doc-37

Second, after the WWII, the states tend to operate more collectively, and we witnessed the emergence of the regional collective identities such as the EU. The nations seem to overcome the difficulties of the past. The character of conflict transformed from extra-systemic and interstates into an internal one. Furthermore, the states left the old military aggressive methods

such as conquest and annexation others territory. Instead, secessionist territorial changes prevailed in the system as indicated in the figures 2 and 3.

Third, the intensified interactions of the nations through the means of highly developed transportation and communications systems altered the dynamics of the international system. Namely, the new phenomena globalization added additional variables into the security analysis. Globalization also signified the role of collective actions against the asymmetric threats such as international terror and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Tertrais, 2004: 137; Campbell, 2004:158, 161; Neuman, 2010: 310). Globalization led to the alignment in the economic sector more than that in the political and military sectors. Furthermore, the world witnessed dramatic reductions in the defense expenditures after the Cold War (Figure 4). This tendency affected alliance formation behavior profoundly (Sandler, 1993: 448).




Figure 4 Military Expenditure as a % of GDP and Total Armed Services Personnel 1995-2012, Source: World Bank/SIPRI, Doc-37

Fourth, as direct consequences of the changes mentioned above, states preferred “ad-hoc coalitions”

to long-term alliances. Coalitions became a new tool to deal with the threats of the 21st Century (Campbell, 2004: 151, 160-61, Tertrais, 2004: 138; Menon, 2003: 4). The states seem to be less prone to aggravate their powers through the formation of alliances.

Fifth, the international organizations and non-governmental organization started to play decisive roles in the international arena. The emergence of the failed states and the relinquishing of some elements of national sovereignty also changed the character of the international politics, which has to be considered in any analysis on alliances. Moreover, the weight of the societal elements in policy making became more visible and tended to transcend over the material elements.

In accordance with the paradigm shift in the international system, some scholars argue that the traditional alliance concept not valid (Menon 2003). The other scholars claim that the concept is only transforming, to explain the new phenomenon (Campbell 2004).

The test of the validity of these arguments needs a comprehensive study of the alliance literature. However, as Fedder (1968:85) rightly articulated, it is a challenging task, since the study of alliance obliges to work in “*the twilight area*” of IR.

2.2. Literature

The main questions raised in the present literature are that why do states form alliances, what keeps alliances together, and what factors affect their survival. In the existing literature, scholars answer these questions based on different ontologies and changes in the international system. Therefore, we cannot mention about a consensus among academics and practitioners for the basics of the alliance formation. Thus, Holsti (1985:11) characterizes the literature “*by a marked absence of agreement on many issues.*”

The contemporary alliance literature also constitutes a broad scope by marking various aspects of alliances such as their formation, dissolution, purpose, function, operation, the level of commitments, type of engagement, and characters of the cooperation. Another remarkable issue of the alliance literature is the existence of the competing explanations, none of which appears sufficient for the building a general theory (Holsti, 1985: 41; Harknett, 1997: 116).

The course of the development of the alliance literature kept pace with the changing context of the world politics. The major attempt to study alliances started in 60’s. In 60’s and 70’s, initially, the focus of the scholars was in the formation, the rationale, sizes, and limits of the alliance. The empirical data collected mainly from the alliance formations of the European Great Powers. Consequently, the scholars developed their theories and concepts in alliance formation by employing euro-centric and multipolar (until the WWII) and bi-polarity oriented (during the Cold War period) approaches.

After a brief stoppage in 80’s, the development of the literature accelerated after the Cold War. The bulk of alliance theories was developed in this period and scholars, mainly focused on the non-traditional subjects such as the effect of internal factors, the role of the social and cognitive factors. The idealist approaches challenged the propositions of the traditional realist dominance because the structure of the international system changed dramatically after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Two major works study alliances comprehensively: first, the work (1985) of Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan, which focuses on the various study approaches in alliance literature, second, the work (1987) of Stephen Walt on alliance formation that reveals valuable theoretical insights. Except these two, the other works focus on specific aspects of alliance formation (Snyder, 1997: 2).

Holsti (1985: 53) labels the mainstream studies in two broad categories: a. the expediency theory that consists of the power and security centric approaches, b. the principal theory that consists of ideological, cultural approaches

Walt (2009:89,90) points out the following aspects as the main focal area: first, the distribution of burdens within an alliance. Second, alliance cohesion and leadership. Third, the concern of abandonment and entrapment. Fourth, the impact of norms and institutions on alliance dynamics.

Russett (1970: 244) highlights the lack of a cohesive general theory of alliance formation by pointing out the necessary task aiming to combine many elements through "*contributions of some researchers over a period of years.*" In this context, the examination revealed that the existing literature is not sufficient to shed light on the essence of alliance formation and it explains only certain aspects of the issue. The research on alliances consists of three study subjects: a. the relationship between alliances and wars (timing problem), b. the motives of the alliance formation, c. the size, reliability, cohesion, and sustainment of alliances (Smith, 1995: 405).¹¹ The mainstream approaches fail to focus on the root causes of the alignment dynamics.

In the next section, I will point out the significant issues in the alliance literature, then, I will study the definitions and typologies, which are necessary for a better understanding of alliances.

2.2.1. Alliance

It is challenging to find an agreed definition of the alliance in the vast alliance literature. Scholars define alliances according to their place where they stay. Fedder (1968: 70) underlines this fact as follows: "*the concept of the alliance in the literature of international relations is ambiguous and amorphous.*" In this context:

Morgenthau (1960) sees the alliance as "*a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state system.*" Liska (1968: 24) classifies the functions of alliances as "*aggregation of power, inter-allied control, and international order or government.*" According to Osgood (1968: 21), "*there are four principal functions of alliances, and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive: accretion of external power, internal security, restraint of allies, and international order.*"

11

Fedder (1968: 68) points out that *“alliance as a process or a technique of statecraft or a type of international organization.”* He (1968:67) describes the functions of alliances as follows: *“augmentative, preemptive, and strategic.”*

Friedman (1970: 4) defines the alliance as a relationship between two or more nation-states to cooperate against a mutually perceived problem, to aggregate their capabilities, to pursue national interests, and to assist each other. He underlines power aggregation in his definition as in the followings: *“alliance combines the capabilities of nation-states not simply for the sake of forming associations, but essential to preserve, magnify, or create positions of strength for diplomacy or war.”*

According to Holsti (1985: 5), *“alliance is a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues.”*

Stein (1990: 154) defines that *“alliances are more than collaborative regimes-they are arrangements for joint decision making in which states care about the joint power of the alliance and in which they attach weights to their allies’ interests.”*

Snyder (1997: 4) also regards alliances as *“formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified.”* He (1997: 4) limits his definition as in the followings: *“alliances are associations with a military or security purpose.”* According to him (1997: 8), alliances shall have a formal form to *“add elements of specificity, legal and moral obligation, and reciprocity that are usually lacking in informal alignments.”*

Wendt (1999: 299) refers to the social aspects and define it as follows: *“An alliance is a temporary, mutually expedient arrangement within rivalry, or perhaps enmity, and so allies expect to eventually revert to a condition in which war between them is an option and will plan accordingly.”*

Walt refers to the aspects of security and commitment. He defines (2009:86) alliance as *“a formal (or informal) commitment for security cooperation between two or more states, intended to augment each member’s power, security, and/or influence.”*

The Alliance is generally defined as a relation at least between two states. The common point in all definitions is the aspect of security. The majority of scholars bring to the foreground the aspect that alliances are established to ensure security to the cooperating states through power aggregation. The other key issues in definitions are the form of the cooperation, commitment, and motives.

The form of the cooperation: This refers to the types of cooperation. States can cooperate formally or informally. Likewise, they can offer their commitments in an institutionalized or ad hoc format. In this sense, cooperation can be defined as a military (NATO, CSTO), collective security (OSCE) or economic (NAFTA, MERCOSUR) cooperation.

Commitment: The commitment means the promises of states to the other state or states. The commitment of the states can vary from friendship to active intervention in the case of war. The duration of the apportioned commitment is also an important factor to consider.

In this context, Wolfer (1968: 268) defines alliance as “*a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states.*”

Motives: Scholars define different motives for alliance formation. According to Liska (1962: 12, 13), “*alliances are primarily the result of concerns for security and do not result from a sense of community.*” Morgenthau (1959: 197) indicates “*common interests*” as the root cause of alliance formation, whereas Snyder (1992: 87) regards “*systemic anarchy*” as the major stimulus to ally.

Liska (1968: 27, 30) considers security, protection, and stability as the major motives of small states for alliance formation. On the other hand, he indicates “*the aggregation, diversion, and disguise of power*” as the major motives for great powers. Liska (1962: 11-12) conceived security as a primary factor in alliance formation and denied other factors: “*Alliances are formed primarily for security rather than out of a sense of community.*” (cited in Siverson & Emmons, 1991: 290)

Osgood (1968: 22, 23, 24) counts the following considerations as the motivating determinants: the pattern of conflicting and converging interests and the distribution of military power.

According to McGowan and Rood (1975:860), alliance formation rests on “*present state interest and current threats to the balance of power and it is not related to ideology, cultural affinities.*”

Holsti (1985: 4), as a realist scholar, claims that the structure, the distribution of power, and the state of relations among nations in the international system are the main motives for alliance formation. However, he argues that “*power is not the sole consideration in alliance formation; ideological factors play an important, perhaps crucial-role, especially in maintaining an alliance.*” He also adds (1985: 17, 32, 33, 36, 54, 57) that leadership needs, general domestic needs, internal stability, and economic interests are other important factors for alliance formation.

Snyder (1997: 12) points out security against external attacks as the main motive. He mentions internal security and political stability as well as the control of the ally as other motives. According to him (1997: 16), the alliance is a “*basic systemic processes*,” and the motives emerge from the context of the international system, which consists of “*four analytic entities: structure, relationships, interaction, and units*.”

Gibier and Wolford (2006: 145) list the following issues as the predictors of a possible alliance formation based on results of their study: a. distance and past relationships, b. the culture.

Many political scientists who study alliances (such as Gärtner, Reiter, and Rothstein) claim that a common foreign policy view is the primary motivation for countries (especially for small countries) to form alliances.

2.2.2. Definitions

One of the problematic areas in this discipline is the misclassification. There is no clarity about the terminology used in the literature. For example, the distinction alliances from coalitions and ententes are ambiguous, or the terms of alignment and alliance are frequently used interchangeably (Dingman, 1979: 246; Holsti, 1985: 3). Therefore, I would like to underline this problem and try to put boundaries in the next part.

Most of these definitions consider alliances as a way of power accumulation against a threat. They denote the power-centric aspect of the alignment and focus on mutual assistance and commitments. According to them, these alliances will dissolve after the common threat vanished.

After a comprehensive study of the alliance literature, Ward (1982b: 5) indicates the followings as the characteristics of the alliance definitions:

- A collaborative relationship between at least two nation-states,
- Aggregation of military forces,
- Commonality of national security interests and existence of a mutually perceived threat,
- Transcend of the collective action over the individual action.

The majority of academics agree on the point that alliances are a stronger and intensive form of cooperation. For example, Friedman suggests (1970:5) the following factors to distinguish alliances from the ordinary forms of collaboration:

- Existence of an enemy or enemies, actual or anticipated,
- Contemplation of military engagement and the risk of war,

- Mutuality of interest in either the preservation of the status quo or aggrandizement about territory, population, strategic resources, and so forth.

One can witness that there are narrow or wide definitions in the literature. The narrow approaches consider formal engagement; focus on the military cooperation and the defensive or offensive commitments against other states and alliances. On the other hand, wide approaches do not explicitly distinguish the type of engagement, the format of cooperation and level of commitments.

Stephan Walt uses a broad definition that I consider suiting my purpose in this study. According to him (1987: 12), alliance and alignment is “*formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.*” I align myself with this definition since it best meets the needs of the contemporary changes in alliance formation, which were explained earlier.

2.2.2.1. *Alignment*

Alignment¹² constitutes an extensive concept (Snyder, 1997: 6) than alliance. It is not limited to the cooperation in a specific field such as military and does not seek to achieve specific goals as alliances do. Alignment refers to the predisposition or orientation of a state to a state or states. Alignment does not occur because of formal treaties since it is a traditional and historical posture of a country that is reflected in behavioral actions. The extent of alignment is determined by many factors such as culture, history, religion, geography and may change over the time on slow paces. The past experiences and collective memories of a nation shape its perceptions and, therefore, its political motivation and orientation (Ward, 1982b:7). Thus, alignment is a state of behavior that facilitates the establishment of alliances.

In this context, we should distinguish alignment from the alliance (Dingman: 1979) since the existence of alignment does not require threat or any other conditions (McGowan & Rood, 1975:860). It is already there and does not necessitate formal treaties (Morrow, 2000: 63; Chidley, 2014:14), and it does not focus exclusively on the military dimension of international policies, rather it encompasses a broad range of cooperation in cultural, economic, political, and military aspects (Campbell, 1967 cited in Wilkins, 2012:56).

¹² According to Chidley (2014:7), the term alignment comes from the old French alignier (and the modern French aligner) derived from ‘to’ + lignier ‘to line,’ or ‘to range (things) into a line’.

However, as Snyder contends (1992: 85), alignments are also subject to change in line with *“changes in states' interests, domestic political configurations, and perceptions of other states' behavior.”*

Alignment was mistakenly used as synonymous of alliances or cooperation, which are narrow concepts. In contrast, the concept of alignment shall be considered as an *“umbrella concept”* (Chidley, 2014:1, 7) and the result of past interactions and common bonds.

2.2.2.2. *Entente*

Entente reflects the stance for a possible cooperation among states against a threat in future. However, it does not base on firm commitments. The states will operate together as long as it serves to their interests. An entente may transform into an alliance in future and by signing a formal treaty; however, the treaty does not necessarily delineate excessive commitments and provide more flexibility (Kann, 1976: 611, 612, 615; Snyder, 1997: 246).

The major difference between alliance and entente is that Entente's existence rests on the expectation of a continuing relationship based on a mutual interest and promise (Morrow, 2000: 64; Snyder, 1997: 11).

2.2.2.3. *Coalitions*

The coalition is relative a new form of cooperation in the international system. This phenomenon is extensively studied in the alliance literature. However, there is no a common agreed definition so far (Ward, 1982: 7). As the usage of alignment, many scholars use “coalition” and “alliance” interchangeably.

Snyder differentiates between alliances and coalitions. According to him (1990: 106), alliances are formed in peacetime and coalitions are often found during the war. Coalitions lack many of the political functions, such as deterrence of attack, preclusion, and restraint of the ally. It consists of many weak links (Dibb, 2002:136). Fedder (1968: 80) defines coalition as *“a set of members acting in concert at x time regarding one to an issue.”* Nitze (1959: 22) underlines the short-term and specific purpose character of coalitions by wording: *“a consensus of attitude and approach to a set of common problems.”* Nitze (1959: 22) also highlighted *“the inner-community aspects they include common religion or ideology, common cultural heritage, common interests in security and economic progress, or common political aspirations and a concept of world order.”*

As explained above, scholars agree that coalitions have a short time span and specific purposes and they will dissolve after they achieved their goals (Wilkins, 2012: 63). Accordingly, the duration and the purpose of the coalition constitute major distinctions from alliances.

Another dissimilarity from the alliance is that alliances are formed to meet future threats, whereas, coalitions are established against the current temporary threats.

Considering the differences from alliances, we cannot define coalitions in a wide form as we did in alliance definition. In this regard, Oest describes (2007: 21) coalition as; *“formal and informal non-institutionalized ad hoc cooperation on security between two or more sovereign states formed as a response to a specific situation to perform a specific task.”* I regard his definition as a valid formulation to apply in this study.

2.2.2.4. Strategic Partnership

The strategic partnership is the most recent form added to the repertoire of alignment archetypes. Even the members of an alliance call each other as a strategic partner to attribute particular importance to their relations in the selected fields of cooperation.

Some scholars use the term instead of the coalition and other forms of alliances. However, it differs from the coalition and other classical forms of alliances in the following respects: a. it is established to realize primarily common interests no matter having shared values, b. The major motives are the materialization of specific objectives rather than an aggregation of power against threats, c. Parties make some formal agreements only to reach the common goals without undertaking costly commitments, d. The cooperation does not need formal organizations, e. Security concerns seem less relevant. It shall be noted that a strategic partnership might evolve to coalition or alliance in the future.

2.2.2.5. Security

Realists consider security as a vicious cycle, and they define it is free from threats. However, they believe in the fact that states are not completely secure or insecure that depends on structural conditions. This fact was called in alliance literature as *“security dilemma.”* Snyder (1997: 17) contends that *“alliances intended for mutual defense are seen as potentially aggressive by their apparent targets; these states then seek security by forming a counter-alliance, which is perceived in turn by members of the first alliance as possibly aggressive. As with the arms race version of the dilemma, the parties gain little or no security while taking on substantial costs.”*

The concept of security is still in progress according to the spirit of the time. During the Cold War era, security was defined based on military and state-centric terms. After the dissolution of Soviets, the traditional definition and the concept had been extended with the inclusion of the human security, economic, environmental, and social issues (Chidley, 2014:4).

Constructivists offered a non-traditional view to security and argued that security be a socially constructed phenomenon. It is constituted through an intersubjective practice and sense of threat, which is not the same across community and different sectors. The threat is objectively present or absent depends on the conditions, which is formed through the perceptions of communities (Buzan & Wæver & de Wilde; 1998: 27, 57).

2.2.2.6. *Security Community*

Karl Deutsch studied the concept empirically in 1957 and proposed the following definition: *“as a group of people that had become integrated to the point that there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way”* (Adler, 1998: 6).

According to Adler (1998: 8), community formation serves to the peaceful change states system at the international level, while it alters the identities of peoples at the individual level through the creation of *“we-feeling, trust, and mutual responsiveness.”*

Realist explains the absence of the war by the presence of balances-of-power and alliances, on the other hand, constructivist point out the pluralistic security communities formed by the integration of the states as the reason of the avoiding of violence. In this regard, regional organizations such as EU and OSCE are the significant example of the security communities.

2.2.2.7. *Balancing*

Balancing is a strategy of cooperation to secure the interests and survival of a state. There are different methods of balancing. The most common forms of balancing are internal and external balancing (Waltz, 1979). Internal balancing means to aggregate state's resources to encounter an external threat. In the external balancing, states, mainly other great powers, join their resources against a hegemonic power. Wendt (1999) argues that the sense of threat prompts the balancing behavior rather than the sole power. The balancing strategies depend on many conditions; thus, we observe the different form of balancing in IR. Balancing emerges at higher threat levels, and balancing alliances are more cohesive than other forms of alliances.

2.2.2.8. *Bandwagoning*

There is no clear-cut definition for bandwagoning. Schweller advanced the most acceptable form. According to him (1994: 19, 93), *“bandwagoning refers to joining with a rising state, either from fear or greed.”*

Schroeder (1994: 430) contends that bandwagoning is a result of the systemic failure of balancing and, therefore, states seek to ally with the strongest power for the sake of protection at the expense of their independence. Contrary to Schroeder, Walt (1987: 17) claims that

bandwagoning is “*alignment with the source of danger.*” Walt (1988: 279) continues to argue that bandwagoning requires certain conditions under which weak states incline to the bandwagon since they are not capable of defending their interests or deter their rivals. Bandwagoning constitutes asymmetrical relationships that make the weak state vulnerable to the demands of the dominant power. Therefore, bandwagoning should be rare in the system (Walt, 1988: 282).

Scweller (1994: 93) discerns various forms of bandwagoning based on its purpose, which I will elaborate in the next sections. In conclusion, bandwagoning does not necessitate similar identities, whereas balancing forms a kind of collective identity. Bandwagoning alliances emerged when small states exposed serious threats that cannot be overcome through balancing strategies.

2.2.2.9. *Chain-ganging*

When the states perceive that being on the side of offensive nations is more advantageous than being neutral or inert, they might decide to support their allies actively and involve in war. This behavior is termed chain-ganging (Christensen & Snyder, 2003: 73).

2.2.2.10. *Buck-passing*

The Buck-passing behavior occurs when states are not willing to balance against a rising power since states believe in the advantage of defense over offense. If this behavior dominates the system, then the rising state might become hegemon (Christensen & Snyder, 2003: 73; Haas, 2003:50).

2.2.2.11. *Hedging*

At low threat levels, states make only minor commitments to maintain flexibility. This behavior is called as hedging. It means implementing “*a set of strategies*” aimed at having freedom of maneuver among more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality (cited in Foot, 2006: 88). Hedging alliances tend to be less cohesive.

2.2.2.12. *Tethering*

Tethering differs from bandwagoning due to the motivation behind the behavior. Bandwagoning is a consequence of weak state behavior such as capitulation, or appeasement. However, tethering is a behavior of a strong state that implies conciliation or compromises under certain settings (Weitsman, 1997:162). Tethering alliances are formed under moderate threat levels with a rival to prevent its cooperation and forging alliances with others against

actor's self since these kinds of alliances do not rest on trust, they do have little or no cohesion (Weitsman, 1997:19, 21, 24, 27, 189).

2.2.3. Typology

Another useful step to comprehend the alliance formation is the recognition of the typologies of alliances. The typology below made by Singer and Small (1966) is well-known and commonly accepted one. Their typology rests on the aspect of commitment:

a. Defense Pact: Intervenes militarily on the side of any treaty partner that is attacked militarily.

b. Neutrality and Non-Aggression Pact: Remains militarily neutral if any co-signatory is attacked. (The neutrality pact is usually more specific than the more sweeping non-aggression pact.)

c. Entente: is a formation for consulting and/or cooperation in a crisis, including armed attack.

Other scholars made various classifications:

Morgenthau (1959: 188) distinguishes alliances as in the following: identical, complementary, ideological, mutual and one-sided, general and limited, temporary and permanent, operative and inoperative alliances.

Sullivan (1974) distinguishes alliances in term of cooperative behavior, and he identifies four types of alliances: a. formal alliances, b. coalitions, c. informal alignments, d. behavioral alignments (cited in Duncan & Siverson, 1982: 518).

Holsti (1985:11) also classifies military alliances by four criteria:

“a. the nature of the casus foederis (the situation in which mutual commitments are to become operational); b. the type of commitments undertaken by the treaty signatories; c. the degree of cooperation or military integration of the military forces of the alliance partners; and d. the geographic scope of the treaty.”

Finally, Oest (2007:17) advances Singer and Small's typology by adding “*aggression pacts*,” which aim aggressive military intervention to the Singer and Small's typology.

I consider that Singer and Small's typology is still a valid typology. Hence, I will stick to Singer and Small's typology in this study.

2.3. Evaluation of Alliance Theories

Alliances are the admiral ship of IR theory. Without exploring this central part of IR comprehensively, we will not be able to analyze the relations among states and predict the outcomes correctly. Alliances are significant since they allow us to study security and cooperation, which are fundamental issues in IR. Thus, academics put always the main emphasis on the alliances studies. Consequently, many academics have been vastly studied this field of IR by applying various methods. They put their focus on different aspects of alliances; as a result, we have a wide-ranging spectrum of alliance theories.

To analyze alliance theories necessitates a broad classification of them. In this context, Holsti, Hopmann, Sullivan (1985: 220) classifies alliance theories under three categories: a. affiliation theories¹³, b. the balance of power theories, and c. minimum winning coalition theories.

Walt (1987:6) also developed three categories: a. the balance of power theories, b. expected utility theories and c. game theories.

Harknett and Vandenberg (1997:113) divided alliance theories into two broad categories: Systemic approaches and society- and state-centered approaches. According to them, the theories, which focus on the distribution of capabilities and threats across the international system as the primary explanatory variable, are called systemic theories like those of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt. However, if we explain this phenomenon with the help of domestic structures and societal systems, then these theories are called Society- and state-centered approaches, such as proposed by Peter Katzenstein and G. John Ikenberry.

In the next part, I will try to categorize the alliance theories. The study of literature across a time span showed me that alliance theory was developed in the spirit of the time and have many similarities with the progress of IR. Therefore, classification alliance theories by the developments in IR will be very beneficial for my study and fit my purpose in this work. These categories are; a. classical realist theories b. structural realist theories and c. society centered approaches.

2.3.1. Classic Realist Theories

The bulk of alliance theories was developed during the Cold War era. These theories derived their empirical data from the international order/system established after the Westphalia peace (emergence of sovereign states), Congress of Vienna (Conservative order), nineteenth-century

¹³ They write (1985:220) “*affiliation theories stipulate that alliances are often the political reflection of common culture, values, institutions, and the like.*”

European international politics, and World War I/II as well as the Cold War. Therefore, their core assumptions base on realist explanations and balance of power concept.¹⁴ During this period, a few scholars emphasized the role of other aspects such as social factors, shared values, ideology in alliance formation and duration.¹⁵ The dominance of the alliance literature of the Cold War affected the perceptions and the approaches of many scholars, which is still in effect today to a certain degree, although the security paradigm has been shifted radically (Wilkins, 2012: 57). In sum, as Walt (2009:90) contended, the present classical works are “a product of the past bipolar and multipolar eras and inevitably reflects both past policy concerns and the available historical evidence.”

In the next part, I will briefly study some major theories under three sub-categories.

2.3.1.1. Game Theoretic Approaches

Scholars (Riker, 1962; Russett, 1968, Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Snyder, 1984) applied the assumptions of the game theory to alliance theories to understand the formation of alliances. They tried to formulate the relationship between the distribution of benefits and contribution of members to the coalition. Riker was the pioneer scholar to formulate the well-known theory “*Political Coalitions*” from which “*size principle*” was garnered. According to this principle, nations will seek the “*minimal winning coalition*” in the formation of the alliance, to maximize their profits. Sandler and Cauley (1975) also contributed to this approach by studying “*optimal membership size*” in their works. Sandler (1999: 746) contends that “a country's size, location Vis-a'-Vis potential allies, and border attributes matter for alliance formation and the distribution of gains if an alliance were to form.” (cited in Ward, 1982b: 29).

In this context, Snyder (1984:463) argues that states have two main aims in the formation of alliances: “to be in the most powerful coalition, and to maximize its share of the alliance's net benefits.” Allying with a state or states or determining the level of support/contribution in the case of a conflict with an adversary follows the logic of “*N-person prisoner's dilemma*,” or “*security dilemma*” (Synder, 1984: 465, 466).

Russett (1970: 238, 240, 247) criticizes “the size principle” of Riker to form alliances by arguing “It may be useful to approach the study with a kind of marginal utility analysis, asking what the trade-offs cost and benefit are for violating the size principle under different circumstances.”

¹⁴ See for more details: Liska 1962; Morgenthau 1959; Kaplan 1964; Rothstein 1968; Rosen 1970; Holsti, Hopmann & Sullivan 1985; McGowan and Rood 1975; Job 1976; Walt 1987; Altfeld 1984; Snyder 1984; Sorokin 1994.

¹⁵ For example: Dinerstein, 1965; Osgood 1968; Russett, 1968; Holsti, Hopmann & Sullivan, 1985.

However, it fails to “*calculate the weight of different states*” to determine “*the smallest winning coalition in international politics.*”

The other flaw of this theory is its logic of assessing of the international politics that considers it constant. However, as Russett (1970: 256) wrote it is a continuous game, in which resources are redistributed at frequent intervals. Thus size principle should take into consideration of the **relative power positions** of the member that might shape their alignment behavior.

2.3.1.2. *Utility Expected Approaches (public goods approach):*

Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) originally developed this theory (economic theory of alliances) and later other scholars such as Morrow (1991) and Sandler (1999) extended it. The central aspect of the theory is “*burden sharing.*” According to this theory, states are inclined to free ride on the military expenditures of the alliance, and they will be reluctant to share the costs of war unless the outcome of fighting exceeds their costs for fighting (Morrow, 1994:272; Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966: 278). As a result, the military burden is shared unequally in alliances, and the major part of the costs are borne by the strongest members (Olson & Zeckhauser 1966; Olson and Zeckhauser: 1970,175, 185; Sandler 1993).

This theory has a close relationship with the rational-choice theory. In this context, Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979, 1981) developed a theory to understand how decision makers choose sides, or neutrality, in ongoing wars. The theory focuses on “*expected utility from the war’s possible outcomes and available strategies.*” The rational-actor approach offers valuable insights to estimate the action of third states. The theory offers a new approach from the perspective of decision makers, who is regarded as “*rationally expected utility maximizers*” (Ward, 1982b: 49).

With the aim to test the effects of alliance formation (types) on the polarization in the system and its relation to war, Singer and Small (1970) classified the characteristics of the alliance formation in the period of 1815-1939. After coding all alliance formations, they figured out the war performance of each type. However, they could not find any obvious and consistent relation between alliance activity and war (Singer & Small, 1970: 130, 135, 158).

Deutsch and Kaplan studied (1970: 278, 281) the limits of a coalition which is established in the loose bipolar system. They argue that there are some reasonable limits of expanding a bloc because a newly joined state creates some costs besides its addition to the current capabilities of a bloc. They claim that the establishment of a coalition rests on the principle “*strategic rationality*” that helps to distinguish “*between profitable and unprofitable investments*” and provides a “*realistic calculation of when to advance and when to retreat.*”

2.3.1.3. *Affiliation Approaches*

A few scholars put forth social perspectives to explain the alliance formation during that period. Russett (1968b) has firstly investigated the role of social, political, and cultural similarities among states in forming of alliances. He researched the conditions under which similarities influence alliance formation between nations through the premises of social psychology. Then, Rosen indicated the role of the non-material factors in alliance formation (Friedman 1970: 229). Furthermore, Holsti (1985: 12) highlighted the role of similarities and differences as a factor that facilitates alignment. Ward (1982b: 17) also articulated that “*similarities provide the context within which alliances can and do form.*” Morgenthau and Thompson (1985: 204) also highlighted the manifesting and dominant role of ideological solidarity over the material interests in alliance formation.

One can consider these studies as early attempts and an indication of the identification of other determinant factors.

2.3.1.4. *Balance of Power (BoP)*

Neoclassical realism rests on the understanding and logic of the system: balance of power. Numerous approaches can be studied under this rationale. Here, I would like to explain the traditional concept of the balance of power.

Although many scholars attribute Balance of Power theory to Kenneth Waltz, the development of this theory goes beyond the Waltz's systematization. It is the oldest and most comprehensive concept in IR. Most scholars (Morgenthau, 1970; Liska, 1962) regarded alliances as the natural outcome of the balance of power and called it “*iron law of politics*” (Levy, 2004: 29).

The balance of power is a pure reflection of the classical realist ontology. Realism is principally concerned with the protection and the survival of the state. Consequently, states aspire for power to maintain or overthrow the status quo. A political entity seeks “*either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power*” (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985: 52). Therefore, the balance of power is a configuration to regulate the power position among states. The states choose to align either with a powerful state to assure protection and to acquire a share of the spoils or against it with other states to increase their power.

As Morgenthau (1970: 89) wrote, the era of balance of power was amoral rather than immoral. A dominating Hobbesian culture in international relations was ignorant of any moral considerations, such as good faith and loyalty.

Concerning the Balance of Power concept, the following studies are regarded as the milestone in the development of the alliance theory:

George Liska's study "*Nations in Alliance*" focuses on the issues that how do alliances emerge and function as well as on the duration and dissolution of them based on the data derived from the European diplomacy starting from the 16th century. He (1970) also investigated the consequences of neutralism, non-alignment, and strategic deterrence.

He provides abundant information about intra-alliance relations and interactions as well as about the restraints of alliances. However, he fails to provide some quantitative information on alliances such as the frequency, average duration and the rate of failure and success. He analyzes the research problems under the assumptions of realism and, especially, the balance of power doctrine. He also distinguishes alliances from ententes (Modelski, 1970: 63-65).

Osgood (1968) focuses on the operational system of alliances by studying NATO's strategic problems. In this study, an alliance is defined as a formal agreement that pledges states to cooperate by using their military resources against a specific state or states. Usually, it obligates one or more of the signatories to use force or to consider (*unilaterally or in consultation with allies*) the use of force in specified circumstances. He clarifies the logic of the balance of power and collective security. This distinction helps us to understand the motives of alliance formation.

Furthermore, Morgenthau (1970) discussed the balance of power in a multipolar system. In his study, Morgenthau (1970:81) contends that alliances are the necessary function of the balance of power and their formation requires a community of interests. He does try to answer the questions that under what conditions, then, does an existing community of interests requires the explicit formulation of an alliance? What is it that an alliance adds to the existing community of interests? He (1970: 81) argues that alliances serve for the identical, complementary, and ideological interests and policies. Morgenthau (1970:92) articulates that "*the respect for the moral and legal obligation to consider as the organizing principle of collective security, whereas power is the organizing principle of balance of power.*" Morgenthau and Thompson (1985: 204) deny a purely ideological formation of alliances, and they argue that ideological factor, "*when superimposed upon an actual community of interests,*" might serve to strengthen the alliances.

Robert Rothstein studies (1970) small state behaviors in the international system since 1815 and the dynamics and rationale behind the non-alignment motivation of small powers. Rothstein (1970) argues that the newly established balance-of-power system provide more security, in comparison with the balance-of-power system in the nineteenth century. He claims

that subsystem level (regional) became critical due to the stalemate at the system level. Under these conditions, the unaligned Small Powers enjoy the maneuverability to achieve their interests by profiting from the antagonism between two poles.

Rosen (1970, 215) studies the alliances to understand whether they are a functional device for purposes of war or not. He analyzes the social dimension of war and then the necessary factors to decide for war. He claims that war “*power ratio*” and “*willingness to accept harm*” are decisive factors for the outcome of the war. According to him, there are two types of alliances concerning the goals in the war: “*devoted to redistribution or the existing distribution of values.*”

Holsti, Hopmann, Sullivan (1985) study the major propositions regarding alliance formation, duration, cohesion, and disintegration in alliance literature. They also focus on the effect of the dominant system structure on the alliances. After the rigorous tests of various hypotheses with the data about the alliance formation derived from the period of 1815-1939, they conclude the followings without claiming a generality:

- a. Several factors such as national, alliance, and system structure affect alliance formation and performance (1985: 84).
- b. Various systems’ structures create various effects on alliance behavior (1985: 224).
- c. There is a relationship between the degree of conflict in alliance systems and the cohesion within them (1985: 143).
- d. Loosening polarity in the international system over time is associated with reduced cohesion in alliances (1985: 145).
- e. There is a moderate tendency for nations that shared an ideological viewpoint to undertake commitments, which are more binding. However, international alignments based on ideological or institutional similarities appear to be of limited validity (1985:220, 221).
- f. The motives underlying the nature and performance of alliances are more complex and varied than those envisaged in many balance of power formulations (1985:221).
- g. Nations with authoritarian and pluralistic political systems are likely to cope with intra-alliance conflicts in entirely different ways (1985:222).

So far, I tried to frame basic concepts in the classical realist literature. The scholars developed their theories through the analysis of the alliance formations emerged from 16th to 20th centuries. According to them, European Great Powers demonstrate a strong propensity to balance if there are higher concentrations of power. However, balancing is not always a natural outcome, since it is “*a probabilistic tendency*” (Levy, & Thompson, 2005:1).

Taking into consideration of the state system (monarchies), interactions among states, moral conduct, the conduct of diplomacy, the rule of law, and the traits of kings/emperors at these centuries, we cannot consider their alliance behaviors as certain foreign policy rules that are still valid in the modern times. Consequently, a new paradigm emerged towards the end of the Cold War.

2.3.2. Structural Realist Theories

Neorealist structuralism emerged as an advanced form of realism that also based on the materialist philosophy. According to this philosophy, distribution of material capabilities constitutes the structure of the international system that, therefore, has an anarchic logic. Individualism, materialism, and absence of interaction are the core features of the Neorealist structuralism. The effects of the loosening bipolar system and the end of the Cold War has been strongly influenced Neorealism. During this period, the balance of power approaches also played a most significant role. However, the changing paradigm affected the worldview of many scholars that led to the developments of the new theories.

2.3.2.1. Balance of Power (BoP)

The most influential and widely accepted work on alliance formation is Waltz's systematization of the balance of power concept. Waltz argues that alliances are the outcome of the international system and serve as a mechanism to re-distribute capabilities, to prevent any hegemonic emergence in the system and to stabilize the system. Waltz (1979: 127) claims that *"if secondary states are free to choose they flock to the weaker side for it is the stronger side that threatens them."*

BoP theory predicts that states ally to avert imbalances of power. He claims that the logic of the international system is similar to the logic of a market. States operate like firms (Waltz's microeconomic analogy) and competing in the international system. In anarchy, states cannot trust each other since they are interest-oriented and *"self-help"* is the principal ordering rule of the system. Under such conditions, the state survival depends on power maximization either by *"building up one's power (internal balancing) or, if this is not enough, by recruiting allies (external balancing)"* (Waltz, 1979: 102,128).

The main contribution of Walt to the Balance of Power concept is its explanation of the rational behavior of states in an anarchic system. He defines (2001: 44-45) the contemporary international system as *"an unbalanced multipolarity"* which provides different prospects for interpretation. Thus, his propositions made an enormous impact on the development of the alliance theories.

In this context, the primary proposition of this theory is that states establish alliances against the strongest power. However, this assumption has shortages because of the following anomalies: a. the empirical basis of this argument is ambiguous (*we should witness that the EU, China, and Russia will align to counterbalance U.S. at the system level, or Canada and Mexico will ally with the U.S. in the regional level, which is not the case*). b. possessing superior capabilities do not make a state always a threatening power (*for example, the U.S. does not constitute a threat for the majority of the world*), c. his theory does not cover the dynamics of the unipolar international system, which has been prevailing since the end of the Cold War, d. he considers the system level solely and puts his focus on the strongest states; therefore, he fails to explain the alliance formation at the regional level.

The other major problem with the Balance of Power theory is its assumption that all states behave similarly and have a "*constant mobilization capacity*" through exploiting the available national resources. However, an actual state capacity is more than it, and it is a function of the state organization that may differ from state to state (Schweller, 2004: 200).

Its ultimate generalization does not rest on abundant empirical tests, and many scholars had confirmed its weakness in general (Wohlfarth, 2003: 263) through the development of a variety of balance of power theories to increase the explanatory power of it (Levy, 2004: 31). Thus, there is no single balance of power theory.

2.3.2.2. *Balance of Threat (BoT)*

Stephan Walt's **the Origin of Alliances** opened a new era in the alliance literature and established a milestone. It is a comprehensive work consisting of case studies from the Middle East. Fundamentally, his theory has also realist logic, despite it challenges some basic concepts of the realist understanding. The Balance of Threat Theory expanded the explanatory range of Balance of Power concept by adding new notions. Thus, it affected the succeeding studies, which were developed after the end of the Cold War. Hence, many scholars followed the assumptions of it, and they developed new concepts and theories to address the shortcomings of the Balance of Threat Theory.

Stephan Walt offers "*threat*" as the main factor to consider in the alliance formation. According to him (1987: 21), "*although power is an important part of the equation, it is not the only one. It is more accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the greatest threat.*" He formulates (1987: 148) threat as the function of the following factors:

aggregate power¹⁶, proximity¹⁷, offensive capability,¹⁸ and offensive intentions.¹⁹

According to Walt, the alliance is the result of the interaction of the factors mentioned above. Therefore, the alliance is a dependent variable as it is in the Balance of Power theory. However, Walt focuses on the behaviors of the states by applying a hybrid analysis framework that consists of realist and perceptual (cognitive) elements. This point is the most interesting issue in his theory. Because, he must also have realized the weakness of power (materialist) oriented concept of Waltz's theory and, therefore, he added a cognitive element to increase its explanatory power.

In this regard, the first three factors (*distribution of capabilities, geographic proximity, and offensive capabilities*) are the measurable facts-to the certain extent- through the use of various indicators. However, the last factor (*perceived aggression*) is a cognitive element, and it is constructed socially. Therefore, this cognitive element might vary from states to states.

He asserts (1987: 148) that external threats are the determinant factors and balancing is more common than bandwagoning.²⁰ He argues that states form alliances to balance against the most serious threat. This proposition explains the fact that why did most of the nations align with the U.S., although the U.S. was stronger than Soviets at that time. Without considering the sensed threat from the Soviets, this fact cannot be explained by the Balance of Power Concept.

The most significant contribution of Walt's theory is its touch to cognitive factors. This attempt is a breakthrough in the alliance literature. Although this theory focuses on material power as a key determinant in the world politics, it shows the necessity to add perceptual factors, which stem from assessments of intentions and ideology to Waltz's theory (Wendt, 1999: 19).

¹⁶ "All else being equal, the greater a state's total resources (e.g., population, industrial and military capability, and technological prowess), the greater a potential threat it can pose to others." (Walt, 1987: 22).

¹⁷ "Because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away." (Walt, 1987: 23).

¹⁸ "Specifically, offensive power is the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost." (Walt, 1987: 24)

¹⁹ "Perceptions of intent are likely to play an especially crucial role in alliance choices." (Walt, 1987: 25).

²⁰ According to Walt (1987:29), "balancing should be preferred for the simple reason that no statesman can be completely sure of what another will do. Bandwagoning is dangerous because it increases the resources available to a threatening power and requires placing trust in its continued forbearance. Because perceptions are unreliable and intentions can change, it is safer to balance against potential threats than to rely on the hope that a state will remain benevolently disposed."

The other contribution of this theory is its testing the ideological link, the role of foreign aids, and political penetration. Walt argues that ideology, foreign aid, and political penetration are the weaker causes of alignment.

Walt's theory cannot adequately explain the alliances formed after the Cold War era, due to the following limits: a. he established his theory considering the bipolar setting in the international system, which is not valid anymore after the end of the Cold War. b. the development of military technology such as global power projection assets, long distance strike systems, and space surveillance systems lessened the effect of geographic proximity. c. his theory put too much emphasis on military aspect and neglected the other aspects that form a state. d. how he did derive the four variables from his empirical work (studying cases from the Middle East) is not clear and elusive.

The second problem with Walt's theory is its negligence of unit level analysis and, therefore, it focuses on the external threats only. The third and major problem is that Walt does not explain how states construct the aggressive intentions. The ontological and epistemological ground of realism (and neorealism) could not permit him and his successors to focus on cognitive processes. He does not provide insights concerning the origin of intentions. Therefore, one cannot easily code the available data to understand that why do nations construct different perceptions of other's intention, despite the aggregate power, offensive power, and geographic proximity are the same.

The Successive Theories of Balance of Power Concept

As argued earlier, the explanatory power of the Balance of Threat Theory also can be strengthened only through the elaboration of the construction of intentions. The following theories attempt to supplement BoP or BoT by applying various methods and adding different aspects. I will summarize the basics of the most influential theories and concepts hereunder:

2.3.2.3. *Offensive Realism*

Mearsheimer (2001b: 32, 33) argues that states prefer to maximize their power to become a global or regional hegemon. Hence, this belief prevents states from cooperation. If states are not able to maximize their power directly, they, then, seek to maximize their power indirectly with the strategies of buck-passing or balancing. Thus, alliances are a vehicle for the implementation of these strategies. He argues that although alliances are providing deterrence, they are ineffective in a confrontation with adversary powers.

He seeks to reformulate Kenneth Waltz's structural realist theory through the logic of aggressive anarchy. According to him (2001b: 156,157), alliances are useful for sharing the

burden, but, their formation is difficult, and they are inefficient due to the collective action problems.

Contrary to Waltzian neorealism, offensive realism offers intermediary variable at the unit-level such as the region of the state and explains some anomalies, which cannot be explained by defensive structural realism such as why states strive for hegemony and why conflict prevails in the system.

In this context, he claims that regional countries worry about the power of rivals in the same region more than the power of an extra-regional balancer. Thus, states tend to have the support of an extra-regional balancer against their regional rivals. Consequently, he argues that “*offshore balancers do not provoke balancing coalitions against themselves*” (cited in Levy, & Thompson, 2010: 11). Hence, offensive realism suggests that states are more motivated to exercise competitive policies and they are interested in bandwagoning and buck-passing.

Mearsheimer applies a narrow definition of alliance due to his focus on military cooperation. He is not clear about the type of engagement, while he regards the character of the alliance as the military with low-level commitments.

2.3.2.4. *Balance of Interests*

Randall Schweller (1994, 1998, and 2006) developed this theory. He argues (1998: 188) that states are motivated to realize their interests and, therefore, states cooperate with other states in respect to their interests. He formulates (1994:88) his Balance of Interest Theory as in the followings: “*Satisfied powers will join the status-quo coalition, even when it is the stronger side; dissatisfied powers, motivated by profit more than security, will bandwagon with an ascending revisionist state.*” He (1994:88; 1998, 189) contends that the compatibility of the political goals is the most important driver in alliance formation rather than imbalances of power or threat. Consequently, alliances are formed not only against threats but also for profit.

In this regard, this theory departs from Walt’s BoT in respect to the incidence of bandwagoning and balancing in the system. He (1994: 93) articulates that balancing is costlier than bandwagon; hence, the bandwagon is more common.

Schweller (1998: 84-89) classifies the states as revisionist (“*wolves*” and “*jackals*”) and status-quo (“*lambs*” and “*lions*”) states (figure 5). Thus, he (1994:93) defines sub-forms of bandwagoning based on the motivation of states. According to him, “wolves” and “jackals” bandwagon for profit through forming “*minimum winning coalitions*” with a rising expansionist state that seeks to overthrow the status-quo; while “lambs” and “lions” seek to balance against threats with an overwhelming power to assure system stability.

Moreover, Schweller (1994, 95) contends that “*piling on bandwagoning occurs when the outcome of the war has already been determined. States typically bandwagon with a victor to claim an unearned share of the spoils.*”




Figure 5 The Classification of Bandwagoning, Source: Schweller (1994: 100)

After studying the alliance formation of Great Powers from 1816 to 1992, Sweeney and Fritz (2004:428) also agree with Schweller on the proposition that interests play a decisive role in forming of alliances.

Furthermore, Siverson and Starr (1994) show the link between state interests and regime. They argue that the change of the regime often leads to the end of the alliances since the new regime constructs different interests.

This approach draws our attention to the state preferences rather than the material capabilities. According to him, states adjust their power based on their interests and preferences. This proposition contradicts the realist assumption that the distribution of power stimulates state behaviors. Thus, he suggests evolving Balance of Power and Threat Theories to “*Balance of Interest Theory.*” This step is the essence of Schweller's theoretical contribution (Legro, & Moravcsik, 1999: 30).

Glaser (2003: 272) criticizes Schweller that he exaggerates the greedy behavior of states and ignored security dilemma by assuming that greed and neoclassical realism can explain all rational competition.

Schweller is not clear in his definition of alliances and does not suggest anything about the alliance commitments. Focusing only on the interests of states is misleading, and its generality is uncertain due to the lack of the empirical test.

2.3.2.5. *Underbalancing*

This theory offers an emphasis on domestic factors to explain the alignment behavior of states (Schweller, 2004: 166). Schweller's proposition rests on the unit-level variables such as elite consensus, government or regime vulnerability, social cohesion, and elite cohesion (Schweller, 2004: 169). Schweller claims (2004: 170, 200) that incoherent, fragmented states are not capable of allying against external threats due to domestic risk and low-level mobilization capacity.

According to Schweller (2006: 9-10), states exercise four-type of behaviors: a. underbalancing (not balancing or ineffective balancing), b. non-balancing (behave in the manner of buck-passing, bandwagoning, appeasement), c. proper balancing (active military engagement), d. overbalancing (balancing based on miscalculation).

Schweller (2006: 38) categorizes threat as actual, potential, or imaginary. He uses (1998: 9-10) a semi-wide definition of the alliance, and according to him, the character of the cooperation can be military or non-military as well as the engagement can be formal or informal.

In this context, Larson (1991) studies the bandwagoning behavior of states during the interwar period in Europe, and she challenges the realist proposition that holds the distribution of power or threat as the major determinant. Larson states (1991: 86) that the balance of power theory cannot account for the alignment pattern of small states²¹ and, therefore, she argues that "*states with weak domestic institutions are likely to align with a threatening power.*" Moreover, she (1991: 103) points out the decisive role of domestic level in the alliance formation of the small states.

Similarly, Zakaria (1998) highlights the neorealist anomaly that excludes the state apparatus and society (nation) in the calculation of power. According to him, domestic setting controls the maximization of the state power that is a combination of the external and internal power of the state (Legro, & Moravcsik, 1999: 28).

The contribution of Schweller's underbalancing theory to the alliance literature is its adding of the domestic aspect and focus on the states' interests in alliance formation. However, testing any case, according to the assumption of this theory, is difficult, because one cannot precisely

²¹ Larson (1991:87) tries to understand that why third world states bandwagoned with the Soviet Union or the United States in the postwar period, despite the fact that these states have not been threatened by the other.

differ the four-type of state's behavior and operationalize the variables of domestic aspects such as elite cohesion and consensus.

2.3.2.6. *The Alliance Security Dilemma*²²

This theory suggests that states in an alliance experience opposite fears: "*the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment*" (Snyder, 1997: 307). These fears lead to the different construction of the vicious cycle of security risks and countermeasures.

He (1984:461) defines the security dilemma as uncertainty in which states are not sure of the other's intention. Therefore, each state must aggregate its power by various methods such as by armament, territorial aggrandizement, and alliance formation. He argues (1997: 21-22) that alliances have little effects on the anarchy and polarity in the system.

Snyder (1997: 28-30) has a relational concept of power, and this concept rests on power relation between states rather than on the capabilities of states. In this context, Snyder accounts the followings as the reasons of the threat construction: a. conflict of interest, b. the intent of use of force, and c. the relative military capability of parties (1997: 35).

The significant contribution of this theory is that alliance security dilemma provides a useful analytical framework to study intra-alliance cooperation. He (1997: 16) systematizes the context of alliances with four analytical terms: structure, units, relationships, and interaction.

Although he provides a holistic approach to alliance formation and management, he neglects the effects of the domestic variables by focusing only on external variables. The other problem with this theory is his attempt to synthesize many approaches in one theory that complicates the operationalization of the theory. Finally, we know that there is no pure security dilemma since the aims of states such as revisionist or status-quo can be recognized through the analysis of their policies and past interactions.

2.3.2.7. *Game Theory*

Smith developed Game theory. It focuses on the causal effect of alliances on war. He (1995) studies in his model the alliance reliability, the effect of the alliance on the occurrence of war, and alliance formation. Smith (1995, 405) reaches to several conclusions mentioned in the followings: a. alliances increase the likelihood of war among the members of the international system, b. alliance reliability affects the behavior of nations. In this regard, nations with

²² John Herz (1951) first used the concept of the security dilemma in his book *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (University of Chicago Press), and later Jervis advanced it.

unreliable alliances are more vulnerable to be attacked than those with reliable alliances, c. nations, which have a commonality of interests, form costly alliances (1995, 419).

His variables are internal and cognitive conditions. He tries to predict mainly the third party's behavior in the logic of Nash equilibrium²³ in the event of escalation between two other states.

Among the other scholars, who applied game theory to alliance literature, are Sandler and Horowitz. Sandler (1999) attempted to explain alliance formation by using spatial and locational aspects,²⁴ whereas Horowitz (2001) reformulated the balance of power concept on the ground of game theory. According to Horowitz (2001:717), "*country preferences, over resource gains and risk, are crucial in assessing the stability of any given international system.*"

2.3.2.8. Trade-off Model

James Morrow (1991) studies the alliance formation by focusing on the trade-off between security and autonomy.²⁵

Morrow (1991: 908) contends that states also seek to gain more autonomy and, therefore, they utilize alliances as an asset to materialize their goals. He distinguishes the motivations of small and major states in alliance formation.

Morrow (1991: 904, 914) emphasizes that the distribution of capabilities in an alliance be different, which creates asymmetry. Alliances advance diverse interests of its members different, i.e., one ally gains more security whereas other gains more autonomy. In this regard, one member receives autonomy benefits (*symmetric alliance*), and the other gets security benefits (*asymmetric alliance*) from the alliance. The theory emphasizes a trade-off between autonomy and security.

Altfeld (1984:526) agrees with Morrow and articulates that powerful states compute the costs of the alliance regarding the autonomy. Similarly, Conybeare (1994) establishes a relationship between the undertaken risk and armament. According to him (1994: 232), "*countries in high-risk international military environments will find it costlier to raise debt-type capital and will seek more equity financing through allies.*"

²³ Nash equilibrium is a central concept in the game theory. It is widely applied to predict the outcome of the interplay among actors. Players (actors), available actions (strategies), and outcome (gain or loss called as payoff functions) are the elements of a game. According to the Nash equilibrium, no player can obtain an advantageous position by a unilaterally change of his/her strategy.

²⁴ Gains from an alliance are shared among allies in respect to the size, location, and border attributes of each member.

²⁵ According to Morrow (1991: 908), autonomy is the ability to maintain own policy and the degree of the freedom to realize state's interests.

Wendel (2001) develops a three-dimensional model in which security, autonomy, and political system structure interact and affect the choices of states. He (2001:29) argues that “*two states are more likely to share alliance membership the more symmetrical they are in security and autonomy considerations and the more similar they are in political system structure.*”

According to Morrow (1991: 907), alliances are formal engagements and their character is military. Additionally, he classifies alliances as asymmetrical and symmetrical. He applies a narrow definition of alliances by portraying alliances as an establishment of the “*coordination of the state’s actions.*”

The main contribution of this theory to the alliance literature is its focus on the division among states (e.g., *small and major*) and configuration of the alliance such as symmetric or asymmetric. The theory assumes that “*alliances between large and small nations are more stable and durable than alliances between nations of similar size and capability.*” This approach provides more insights than Waltz’s concept²⁶ to explain inter-alliance relations. Accordingly, the Morrow’s model adds two extra layers to Waltz’s concept. However, his security definition²⁷ is very narrow and difficult to code. He limits the role of alliances based on a narrow security definition.

2.3.2.9. Model of Unipolarity

After the end of the Cold War, some scholars²⁸ studied the theoretical power of realism to explain the newly established unipolar system and states’ behaviors in the new world order. In this context, Hansen (2000b) developed a model of unipolarity. According to this model, under the bipolarity, states will behave as a free rider; however, if security concerns increase then they will ally (*flocking*) with unipole.²⁹ He argues (2000b: 54-57) that only asymmetric alliances will occur in a unipolar system because the main security provider is the unipole and the distribution of capabilities in the system will not allow other powers to balance against unipole.

²⁶ Waltz focuses only on great powers and thus symmetrical alliances.

²⁷ “*Security is the state ability to maintain the current resolution of the issues that it wishes to preserve.*” (Morrow 1991: 908).

²⁸ See also Nye (1992); Kapstein & Mastanduno (1999) for more on unipolarity.

²⁹ Hansen argues (2000b: 54-55) that bandwagoning is a behavior seen in symmetrical alliances whereas “*flocking*” is seen in asymmetrical alliances. He calls the alignment of small states with major states (asymmetrical alignment) as polarization and symmetrical alignment as balancing.

Walt (2009:94) indicates that weaker states have the following options in a unipolar world: a. align with each other to try to mitigate the unipole's influence, b. align with the unipole to support its actions or exploit its power for their purposes, c. remain neutral.

According to Hansen (2000b: 69), the alliance is a "*formal guarantee of security cooperation or other different kinds of support which is thereby provided with the means to enhance its position vis-à-vis others.*" He applies a wide definition and, therefore, the commitment as well as the character of alliances has a broad range of cooperation.

This theory contributes to the theoretical ground of neorealism by explaining the behaviors of states under unipolarity. However, it contradicts the basics of the Waltz concept of Balance of Power by arguing that symmetrical balancing cannot occur under Unipolarity.

2.3.2.10. *Soft and Asymmetric Balancing*

This approach implies that under unipolarity the character of cooperation and level of commitments, as well as the form of engagement, evolved from hard balancing to soft balancing. The proponents of this approach claim that hard balancing is not a sound strategy to pursue, due to the asymmetrical distribution of power. The intensified interaction with the global economy, the emergence of transnational threats, and changing mindsets of states regarding military power give rise to soft balancing.

T.V. Paul (2004:3) provides a brief definition of this approach: "*soft balancing involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances. It occurs when states generally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft balancing is often based on a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes threatening.*"

Paul developed his concept by analyzing the empirical data gathered from the contemporary international system established after the end of the Cold War. He (2005:47) pointed out that major powers such as China, France, Germany, India, and Russia left the traditional "*hard balancing*," since they do not worry about their existential security. However, these nations endeavored to limit the US unilateral interventions through forming diplomatic coalitions or ententes, in that, these activities are labeled as "*soft balancing*."

In this context, Pape (2005: 36-37) developed four indicators to measure soft balancing: a. use of territorial denial, b. the formation of the exclusive economic clubs, c. the announcement of the resolution for diplomatic cooperation, d. the exercise of the entangling diplomacy.

Lieber and Alexander (2005:126) point out four efforts of weak states to soft balance the dominant state: a. entangling the dominant state in international institutions, b. exclusion of the dominant state of regional economic cooperation, c. undermining the dominant state's ability to project military power by restricting or denying military basing rights, d. offering relevant assistance to dominant state's adversaries such as rogue states.

This theory also contributes to the inadequacy of Waltz's concept that fails to address the behavior of states (particularly small states) under unipolarity. The chief critics to be raised are that the lack of the empirical studies and its ambiguity to distinguish diplomatic discourses from other issues such as bargaining. The soft-balancing argument rose to prominence only in the past several years and has not yet been fully fleshed out theoretically (Wohlforth & Brooks 2005: 106). Additionally, applying the criterion to detect soft balancing is not clear, because distinguishing soft balancing from diplomatic friction is not simple (Lieber & Alexander, 2005:132).

2.3.2.11. *Learning Theory*

Dan Reiter (1994, 1996) studied the behaviors of the minor powers in Europe and the Middle East.³⁰ He tried to explain the learning process behind the decisions of the minor powers to remain neutral or align with great power. The central argument of the theory is that *"decision makers look to past experiences for guidance when they make foreign policy."*

Reiter (1996:2, 3) applies some propositions of the social psychology studies and the organization theory to his theory and makes three assumptions: *"lessons are infrequently drawn; they are most often taken from high-impact, politically significant events; and when drawn, lessons reflect the desire to repeat past successes and avoid past failures."*

He rejects (1994: 515) the assumptions of Balance of Power Theory and Balance of Threat Theory³¹ and suggests that *"regardless of the level of external threat, a state is likely to choose an alliance if its lesson advocates alliance and likely to choose neutrality if its lesson advocates neutrality."* Reiter (1996:12, 95) argues that states' beliefs about balancing, bandwagoning, buck-passing, and chain-ganging constituted through their past lessons.

³⁰ He analyzes the alignment behaviors of minor powers from 1921 until 1967 in six-year periods with the help of a model. In a data set of 127 observations of small power alliance choices, 87 percent were correctly predicted by the learning proposition (Reiter, 1996:203). Therefore, he claims that *"systemic variable can be misleading, since, if decision makers learned only according to their own lessons and not at all by systemic lessons."*

³¹ Balance of Threat Theory suggests that there is a relation between the level of threat and the choice of a state whether being neutral or aligning regardless of its lesson.

He (1994: 505; 1996: 60) regards the systemic wars such as WWI and WWII as the formative events that make a significant impact on the belief system of the European states and, hence, they generally draw lessons from these events.

The theory suggests that minor powers learn about specific nations concerning their previous achievements. According to Reiter (1994: 524), *“they would want to ally with the victors, would shun alliance with the losers, and would prefer an alliance with the victors to neutrality.”*

He considers decision makers and their lessons as the decisive element of the political orientation of a state. Due to this proposition, the system has only limited effects on the behavior of a state (Reiter, 1994: 516).

According to him (1996:58), *“alliance is a formal and mutual commitment to contribute military assistance in the event one of the alliance partners is attacked.”* This alliance definition is narrow, and its character is military that envisages a formal engagement. Although he emphasizes the importance of the commitment, he is not explicitly clear.

The strong empirical results of the Reiter’s study indicate the role of past lessons and the importance of beliefs in the alliance choices of minor powers in the twentieth century. This approach is a radical departure from the classical alliance theories and a breakthrough in the alliance literature, which had been dominated by realist approaches. Its importance lies in its innovative advancement of the alliance literature. It provides a different viewpoint that enables us to assess the effects of the invisible factors such societal and cognitive. This theory prioritizes beliefs rather the threat and as the major determinant in alliance choices. This approach also proposes that states behave differently than others under the same circumstances.

The main critic, which would be raised, is its additional limitation of past events. Calling the WWI and WWII as the only formative events to draw lessons limits the explanatory power of this theory. The second problem with this theory articulated by Levy (1994: 312) that this theory does not provide *“complete explanations for foreign policy change, because it fails to explain how and under what conditions individual learning is translated into policy change.”*

2.3.2.12. Power Transition Theory

It was first presented by Organski (1958), advanced by Kugler (1980), and elaborated by Lemke (2004).

The main hypothesis of the power transition theory suggests that a discontented great power aims to achieve parity with the dominant power to change the status quo. Thus, this motivation increases the likelihood of international war (Lemke, 2004: 57).

This theory differs from the traditional balance of power theory in respect to its preposition that satisfied states do not compete with other satisfied states, and therefore, they do not strive to constrain their rise. Because the satisfied states will benefit from the system and they feel to be confident on the intentions of the dominant power. However, when states differ in their perception of the status quo, then the security dilemma will arise like claimed in the balance of power theory (Lemke, 2004: 58, 65).

The main problem with this theory is that it does not provide us the criterion how to label a state whether a state is satisfied or revisionist (Lemke, 2004: 72).

Successive Theories of Balance of Threat Theory

The balance of Threat Theory is the fundamental theory in alliance literature. Naturally, many scholars advanced various theories to either supplement or refine it. They aimed to address the weaknesses in this theory through focusing on the other variables. In the following section, I will study the main works briefly in this regard.

2.3.2.13. *Theory of Balancing External Threats*

Weitsman focuses on the threat concept in Walt's theory. He (2004: 3-4) explicitly classifies the behaviors of state under the different degree of external threat. Therefore, he adds additional layers that explain the motives of alliance formation. He argues that the purpose of alliances not only to increase the capacity, but also to reconcile the rivals.

He (2004: 33) contends that the threat is a perceptual issue and its magnitude changes in line with the capabilities of the adversary. Thus, he (2004: 4, 20) conceptualizes the nonlinear nature of the correlation between threat and alliance formation. In this sense, states exercise four types of cooperation strategies depending on the extent of threat: a. hedge, b. tether, c. balance, and d. bandwagon.³²

His alliance definition is wide by including all kinds of cooperation, and it has a military character and envisages all forms of engagement. This theory is useful in distinguishing the state's behavior under different threat levels. Therefore, this approach helps us to understand the relations among allies and adds new vision into the balance of threat theory. However, its empirical ground is not so comprehensive to generalize it.

³² Under low-level threat, states will take some preventive measures (hedge). When the level of threat increases, the states establish linkages with the enemies of their enemies (tether). When the degree of threat goes beyond the capacity of the states, they will balance. When it comes to the existence of a state, it will align itself with the major threat i.e. bandwagon (Weitsman, 2004: 20).

2.3.2.14. *Theories of Balancing Internal Threats-Omnibalancing*

Steven David (1991) first introduced the theory that focuses on the internal threats contrary to the theories of external balancing. The inner component of threat consists of all types of threats such as the elimination of leaders through assassination and overthrows, as well as rebellion, civil war and secessionist movements. According to David (1991:236), the Third World leaders prioritize the threats against themselves. Thus, the most powerful determinant of alignment is the political survival of the regime in the Third World (David, 1991: 244). He calls this behavior of the leaders as “*omnibalancing*.”

He argues (1991: 233) that the interplay between internal and external threats shape the decision of states for the alignment. According to him, the third world has different dynamics than those in the states such as the U.S., Russia, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, EU, and China. The third world states are lacking good governance due to the legitimacy problem of leaders and internal turmoil risk.

Miller and Toritsyn (2005) applied David's theory to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), to explain the question, why some members of CIS do not balance against the Russia (as the main power or threat). They (2005: 325) claim that the political survival of elites in those states plays a determinant role rather than the survival of the state. They (2005: 334-335) enhanced David's theory by providing additional layers such as “*galvanizing opposition*” and “*revolutionary tide*” into the internal threat concept. Miller and Toritsyn define alliance in a narrow format with a military character and formal engagement.

Harknett and Vandenberg (1997) examine a set of conditions and motivations as the determinants of the security cooperation and coordination. They argue that external and internal threats are interrelated; therefore, alignment is a “*strategy of combined response to internal and external factors*.” After studying the alignment behavior of Jordan during the Persian Gulf conflict in 1990-1991, they refined the theory of Stephan David “*omnibalancing*” by adding additional layers. They argue (1997:120) that leaders align with the outside power to deal with a primary internal, external, or interrelated threat. The critical determinant of alignment is the security of their regime. According to them (1997:124), omnialignment occurs in four forms: a. double balancing, b. double bandwagoning, c. balance-bandwagon, and d. bandwagon-balance.

Larson (1991: 87) also agrees with other proponents of omnibalancing theory and explains the bandwagoning of small states with the variable of domestic political stability, particularly with incentives of elites: “*Elites bandwagon not to protect their state's territorial integrity or to enhance its power, but to preserve their rule.*”

David (1991: 234) applies a wide definition of the alliance since he refers to all types of cooperation to ensure security. Therefore, the character of the cooperation rests on security. He does not specify the form of engagement and the level of mutual commitment.

The omnibalancing concept is also a useful approach to study the motivation for an alliance of the third world states and the intra-alliance interaction. By adding an internal component of threat, David expands the explanatory power of the Balance of Threat Theory.

The theory prioritizes the internal threats as a major source of motivation and undermines the role of external threats. Its theoretical assumptions about the kinds of threats and leaders' reactions against these threats are indistinct. Furthermore, the universality of this theory is skeptical since it focuses on certain states (two cases from the third world) under the dynamics of bipolarity. Under the dynamics of unipolarity, the third world leaders have not many options to profit from the competition between two poles.

2.3.2.15. *Theories of Balancing Multifaceted Threats, National economy, and domestic stability*

Barnett and Levy (1991: 378) examine the role of external security threats, the domestic economy, and concerns about domestic political stability in the formation of the international alignments and alliances. They studied the alignment behavior of Egypt competitively from 1962 to 1973 and identified the firm impact of domestic economic and political variables in the external alignment pattern. They (1991: 374) concludes that "*states make between the pursuit of external alliances or alignments and the mobilization of internal resources as alternative strategies for dealing with external security threats in the context of internal threats to social welfare and political stability.*"

They apply (1991: 370) a wide definition of an alliance that refers to a formal or informal relationship, which is characterized as security cooperation.

This theory adds a new aspect of analysis to the Balance of Threat Theory, which is the impact of the national economic development on the political stability and, therefore, on the alignment of the third world states. They underline the link between economic development and internal stability. Accordingly, they assert that the internal stability of the third world states, which is related to the economic development, comes into prominence, due to the lessening risk of external threat.

The main problem with this theory is its complex coding of variables due to its epistemological ground between neorealism and constructivism. This theory cannot qualify as general theory applicable to other states except the third world, because of its methodology.

2.3.3. Society Centered Approaches

The role of the societal factors and ideas in the international politics is not new. In recent times, the Neoliberals, who agree with Waltz on the definition of structure, realized the role of ideas as intervening variables. However, they do not see that the power and interest are the functions of ideas (Wendt, 1999: 19). Furthermore, enlightened versions of realist theories accepted more and more the importance of the beliefs and perceptions in the world politics (Reiter, 1994: 526). Finally, the emergence of the constructivists understanding affected the course of the alliance literature. Accordingly, many scholars advanced new theories or approaches to refine realist theories that cannot explain some phenomenon with realist premises. I will briefly study these theories/approaches in the next section.

2.3.3.1. *The Clash of Civilizations*

Huntington (1993)'s approach is a radical departure from the main realist stream in IR. His hypotheses that "*the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural*" and in the future "*the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.*" He offers interesting aspects for the study of alliance formation. One can reinterpret his claim that "*the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future*" as follows; the new alliances will be formed consistent with the fault lines and within civilizations.

Huntington (1996: 125, 126) claims that "*cultural identity is the central factor shaping a country's association and antagonisms*" and he articulates the role of affinities as in the following: "*People rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones.*"

Moreover, he (1996: 131) argues that the basis of military alliances and economic associations is "*trust*" and "*trust most easily springs from common values and culture.*" He explains balancing and bandwagoning concerning the cultural affinities. According to him (1996: 155), "*countries tend to bandwagon with countries of similar culture and to balance against countries with which they lack cultural commonality.*"

The Clash of Civilizations Theory is useful for adding additional layers such as identity and culture to the Balance of Threat concept. The basic premise of this theory is that the sense of threat will be prevalent on the fault lines among civilizations; therefore, we can infer that the nations with the same culture and a common civilization align against the other camp of civilizations. This deduction is particularly very relevant to the culturally mixed region such as the South Caucasus. It might explain the alignment behavior in those regions. The explanatory variable of the theory is "*identity*" and "*culture,*" which is a major contribution to the alliance literature.

However, it is hard to derive from this theory when and under which conditions the cultural factors become the major determinant in alliance formation.

2.3.3.2. *The role of Perceptions in Alliance Formation*

Jervis (1976) shows the significant role of misperceptions in the international relations. By utilizing the propositions of psychology on cognitive processes, he puts forth that past lessons and beliefs are crucial of importance in decision making. He strives to answer the following questions, which are not adequately answered in IR according to him (1976: 3):

“How are beliefs about politics and images of other actors formed and altered?”

“How do decision-makers draw inferences from information, especially information that could be seen as contradicting their own views?”

Jervis demonstrates how we process available data from the past lessons in line with our perceptions and indicates that political psychology plays a central role to analyze the behaviors of actors and the dynamics of world politics. Although this study is not on alliance or alignment, it provides a different viewpoint for comprehending the dynamics of the formation, duration, and disintegration of alliances.

His psychology-based explanation seems promising to help us to analyze the construction of threat and inferring the intention of others, which are fundamental factors in forming of alliances. Particularly, we can conduct further analysis of the last variable of the Balance of Threat Theory, namely, *“perceived aggression intentions”* with the help of Jervis’s propositions. Thus, his work opens a new avenue to refine BoT, since it does not explain the construction of intention.

Barnett (1996: 400-447) contends that Balance of Threat Theory fails to explain from where the threat comes. Based on his study of Arab politics, he claims that *“threat comes from their mutual conception of identity and not power.”* According to him, threat perception rests on ideas and social constructions rather than material factors.

Gause (2003) also tests the threat perceptions of Middle East leaders to understand how leaders prioritize among the potential threats. He (2003: 303) concludes that *“identity and ideas are as important as material power in driving international politics.”*

Christensen (1997:66) investigates the effects of perceptions and misperceptions of the balance-of-power and security dilemma of politics of the great powers. He claims that the cases from the nineteenth century can be fully understood only by adding the variable of perception. According to Christensen (1997:68), if leaders misperceive the distribution of capabilities, they may stand aside at crucial junctures in a conflict and overreact to insignificant.

This approach fully departs from the realist paradigm and offer new insights about the construction of aggressive intention. However, he could not advance an operative concept, an additional layer concerning the formation of intention, yet, which would be useful to refine BoT Theory.

2.3.3.3. *Learning and Foreign Policy*

Levy (1994) studies the foreign policy learning. He argues (1994: 287) that organizations learn through the encoding of individual experiences. He (1994: 289) asserts that governmental learning is similar to the organizational learning; however, it is more complex, due to multiple organizations within the government.³³

He also focuses on the answer to the following question: *“From what types of events do political leaders learn?”* He contends (1994: 311) that the answer can only be found through a holistic approach combining social psychology and organizational theory and considering the social and political context. Therefore, he proposes (1994: 312) to identify the conditions and mechanisms that explain the causal relationship between learning and foreign policy change.

This approach made a significant contribution to the research on the decision-making unit, which plays a decisive role in the formation of the state’s interests and formulation foreign policy options. Thus, the premise of this approach might serve to the advancement of the BoT Theory.

2.3.3.4. *Democracy and Alliance Formation*

Siverson and Emmons (1991) study the role of democracy in alliance formation. They claim that democracies are prone to ally with each other more likely than to ally with non-democratic states.

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992: 151) also test the proposition of the Democratic - democratic alliance, and they found no significant evidence to accept its validity.

Later, Simon and Gartzke (1996) also showed that there is a strong relationship between the type of regime and alliance formation, however, by challenging the results of Siverson and Emmons. They (1996: 617) conclude to the contrary that dissimilar regimes prefer to ally with each other by studying data derived from the alliance formations between 1816 and 1992.

³³Levy (1994:298): *“Neorealist emphasize the rational and efficient adjustment to changing structural incentives, whereas learning theorists emphasize significant variations in individual responses to structural changes deriving from variations in cognitive structures, beliefs, and processes.”*

Werner and Lemke (1997) also reach the same conclusion that the political system structure is an important determinant of alignment behavior because similar political systems share similar threat perceptions.

Mousseau (1997:84) also argues that democratic states incline to cooperate with each other in militarized interstate conflicts than the states with a different regime system.

Lai and Reiter (2000) also investigate the correlation between democracy and alliance formation using the same temporal data used by Simon and Gartzke (1996). They confirmed the results found by Simon and Gartzke and showed an affirmative correlation between regime similarity and alliance formation.³⁴

Wendel (2001), however, argues that similar regimes own identical state apparatus and share same values to protect. Accordingly, it is expected that similar regimes prefer to ally with each other.

Gibier and Wolford (2006: 131) investigate the role of the defense pacts in the democratization, and they purport that a defense pact among different regimes “*increases the probability of transitions to democracy.*” They also claim that democratic dyads show a tendency to cooperate and ally rather than to form alliances.

This approach constitutes a milestone to understand the relation between type identity and alignment. However, as Haas (2003:41) rightly articulated, this approach remains incomplete, and it ignores other factors such as leaders’ ideological beliefs. Sweeney and Fritz (2004:436) criticize this approach since it puts its emphasis on security reasons of alignment and neglects non-security interests. Nevertheless, it offers valuable insights to advance the existing theoretical foundations on the relation between identity and alignment, and it is promising to contribute to the further development of the alliance theories.

2.3.3.5. *The Balance of Identity Theory*

Barletta and Trinkunas (2004: 334) attempt to develop a theory in which they propose that the security concerns of the states rest on the political actors’ identities rather than the distribution of military capabilities among states. They called it as the theory of “*balance of identity.*”

This theory incorporates David’s assumptions concerning the interests of domestic power centers. Furthermore, it suggests that the threat perception of the state is a function of the

³⁴ According to them, similar regime type is more likely to ally with each other, however, democratic states are not more likely to ally than autocratic states and they pointed out the role of “*distance, learning, threat, and common culture*” in alliance formation.

state's identity (Barletta, & Trinkunas, 2004: 336,337). They (2004: 337) propose that the identity operates such as a prism, which identifies other's role identities. Accordingly, identities play a causal role in the construction of interests and threats, since it orients the mindset of actors and attribute various labels to themselves and the surrounding world.

Moore and Davis (1997) study the impact of transnational ethnic alliances on the international relations of the states. They (1997:172) tested the linkage between "*the ethnic structure of states and international hostility*" and argued that "*a transnational ethnic alliance is said to exist when two states contain members of the same ethnic group.*"

Finally, Haas investigated the role of ideological similarities in the alliance formation. He (2003:35) examined two aspects: the effect of the ideological link between states' leaders on their domestic threat perceptions and the influences of the ideological context of the leaders' perceptions. After studying the decisions of British and French leaders between two world wars, he reaches to the conclusion that although the material context is influential on the leaders' perceptions, which led them to external balancing, the ideological variables are far more explanatory for their motivation rather than material variables. Haas argues that the stronger is the ideological link between two actors, the greater is the likelihood of their alliance formation.

In sum, this approach purports that similarities in identity are functioning as a catalyzer to facilitate cooperation among the states, therefore, the formation of alliances. Thus, this approach enables us to look at alignment motivation from a different angle. Moreover, it offers great prospect to enhance the ideational part (*aggressive intention*) of BoT Theory.

2.4. Measuring Alignment/Indicators

How can we assess the extent of the relationship between two states and label it as something? It is not an easy task to do. We need reliable indicators to conduct an assessment. In this regard, Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt (1970:316) aim to identify reliable and valid indicators that help to determine the scope of any international alignment. They (1970: 316, 321, 326) count the following as the indicators:

"(1) Military commitments, (2) votes in the United Nations, (3) diplomatic recognition patterns, and (4) diplomatic visits by heads of state and of government and other important persons. To a lesser extent economic aid indicates alignment, but cultural exchange agreements, treaties signed and anti and pro riots do not clearly support the alignment patterns as judged by the experts."

Teune and Synnestvedt (1970:331) provide additional indicators such as the degree of saliency,³⁵ the extent of psychological penetration, economic dependence the nature of a country's political structure, political history and the level of confidence a state maintains in its projected course of action.

Miller (2004: 241) also suggests that balancing at the regional level occurs by forming an alliance with great powers and obtaining diplomatic support, financial aid, and military assistance. In this respect, by examining these issues, one can assess the sort and the extent of the ties in a dyad.

Considering the work of Teune and Synnestvedt, I will use the following indicators to test the alignment behavior of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the next chapters.

a. Indicators to test the security alignment: Defense treaties or formed defense organizations (*CSTO*), military cooperation agreements, military bases, military training, arms sales.

b. Indicators to test the diplomatic alignment: Membership and cooperation in non-military treaties (*CIS*, *GUAM*), cooperation in the multilateral organizations (*UN*, *OSCE*), foreign aid.

c. Indicators to test the economic alignment: Unions based on economic relationships (*customs union*), energy resources and transportation (*pipelines*), trade volumes, visa regimes.

d. Indicators to test the cultural alignment: Agreements based on cultural cooperation, joint cultural events, exchange of students, media presence (*TV serials*), religious relations.

2.5. Overview and Conclusion

The alliance literature is extensive, and the progress of this literature can be studied in two distinct periods: a. the Cold War period and b. the Post-Cold War period (see Annex B).

The Cold War period literature was dominated by realist explanations, which rest on power-centric causal relations. Most of the existing research developed at that time deal with the causal relations between war and alliance formation and estimation of the likelihood of alliance formation with mathematical models based on the distribution of gains and losses. Generally, they fail to explain why the alliances were formed. The studies also do not provide systematic tests of general hypotheses except the works of Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan (1973).

³⁵ "Saliency could be measured by some of the following kinds of data: books translated, professors and students exchanged, number of hours of radio broadcasts received and amount of money spent on propaganda." (Teune and Synnestvedt, 1970: 331).

As Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan wrote (1973:42), the examination of the present literature discloses that there are many areas which are not comprehensively researched. The other problem in the literature is the concept of the alliance. As Fedder articulates (1968: 70), “*most of the writers discuss alliances as processes or as institutions. Some discuss alliances under the rubric of an international organization; others see alliances as techniques of statecraft. While most conceive of the alliance as the regulating mechanism of a balance of power system.*” Also, he (1968: 72) argues that “*alliance in the post-World War II period is a different sort of phenomenon than alliance in earlier periods of history.*”

The study of Ward (1982b) is one of the comprehensive works that aims to discover the problems and gaps in alliance literature. Together with Ward, the other scholars presented the following issues as the main shortages and problems:

- The quality and quantity of existing empirical or an analytic study to explain why alliances form (Ward, 1982b:15, 16). According to him, the explanations of alliance formation in literature rest upon speculations and case-by-case historical evidence.
- The time frame (typically several decades) of examination is not enough to provide a comprehensive explanation (Ward, 1982b:25; Altfeld, 1987: 523).
- One of the major problems with the realist assumptions is that they regard the international system as composed of the Great Powers and neglect the role of minor powers in the system (Morrow, 1991: 927). Levy (2004: 38) also underlines “*the great-power bias*” and the failure of accepting the balancing proposition in the Balance of Power Theory as pervasive. Schroeder (1994) showed with the help of the empirical data derived from the period 1648 to 1945 that the states do not always balance in a law-like manner. On the contrary, they used different policy options such as hiding, bandwagoning or transcending. His findings falsify the basic generalizations of Waltz (cited in Vasquez, 2003: 38).
- Levy (2004: 39-41) underlines “*the Eurocentric bias in the balance of power theory,*” which conceptualizes power as a combination of land-based military capability, financial and commercial strength and its measurement with the terms of gross national product.³⁶ He argues (2004: 45) that any explanation through the Eurocentric view does not provide enough insights and we need additional theoretical categories and approaches.

³⁶ “*Even recent critics of balance of power theory focus almost exclusively on the European system. A problem with nearly all empirical studies of balancing—by both proponents and critics of the balancing proposition—is that they focus on major wars and ask whether states balance against or ally with the strongest or the most threatening state. They do not examine periods of peace and ask whether the absence of war might result from the anticipation of balancing.*” (Levy, & Thompson, 2010:15).

- There are numerous versions of the Balance of Power Theory since every single school of realism produced its conception to interpret the world politics through competing hypotheses. However, they lack comprehensive empirical Foundation (Paul & Wirtz & Fortmann, 2004: 368). According to Vasquez (2003: 34), the findings of succeeding scholars under different labels (versions) are strong signs for the lack of the Balance of Power concept, therefore, the lack of the neorealist paradigm. Each new approach degenerates the concept of the Balance of Power, instead of confirming it.

- The neorealist theories fail to predict when or how states will act. The action of the state depends on various considerations such as; the level of perceived threat, the worldview of the decision makers, economic and the military capacity, and other power arrangements. Power and capacity are not the only factors to decide as Neorealist argued.

- Most of the theories cannot provide any satisfying explanation for the dynamics of alliance formation at the unit level (Morrow, 1991:904). The general approach in the realist literature depicts states as a unitary actor that “*act in rational ways based on national rather than individual interest*” (Miller & Toritsyn, 2005: 332).

- These theories fail to provide insights into the balancing behavior under the unipolar setting since they cannot answer the question of Levy (2004: 30; “*Why the other leading states in the international system have not balanced against the United States?*”³⁷ Similarly, we cannot explain with the traditional power and threat-based alliance theories the numerous settings under the unipolarity such as; G20, CSTO, and GUAM.³⁸ As Wilkins (2012:76) contends, we have to “*revise our analytical and theoretical frameworks accordingly.*”

- As Barnett (1991:370) writes, the realist perspective dominates the alliance literature that undermines the role of the state-society relations, which influence the state's security policies and attaches a secondary role to the ideological and domestic interests.

³⁷ “*That the United States, which is generally regarded as the ‘greatest superpower ever,’ has not provoked such a balancing coalition is widely regarded as a puzzle for balance of power theory. Fareed Zakaria asks, ‘Why is no one ganging up against the United States?’ G. John Ikenberry asks why, despite the unprecedented concentration of U.S. power, ‘other great powers have not yet responded in a way anticipated by balance-of-power theory.’*” (Cited in Levy, & Thompson, 2010:7)

³⁸ “*The group was created in October 1997 as a way of countering the influence of Russia in the former Soviet area. Subsequently, the grouping received backing and encouragement from the USA. In 1999, the organization was renamed GUUAM due to the membership of Uzbekistan. After heavy criticism by the West on crushing an uprising in Andijan, Uzbekistan withdrew from GUUAM in May 2005 to rejoin the CSTO in Russia's camp the following year.*” (De Haas, 2010: 60).

- Reiter (1994: 526), points out the lack of realism that does not recognize the role of the decision-makers' beliefs and their origin.³⁹ There is little work to shed light on “*black boxes*” of the decision-making process regarding alliance formation (Ward, 1982b:25; Altfeld, 1987: 523). Furthermore, Oest (2007: 63) identified following problematic issues in the alliance theory developed after the end of the Cold War:

- Scholars developed new theories by applying traditional definitions of threat, security, and power,

- Lack of investigation of intra-alliance cooperation on ad hoc coalitions,
- Inattention of the dynamics of unipolarity,
- Lack of extensive research on holistic theories,
- Overlooking of the cohesion of alliances.
- Overemphasize on the distribution of capabilities,
- Downplaying the role of societal factors,
- Old fashioned threat conceptualization,
- Focusing on the outcomes rather than causes and construction,
- Scholars interpret the results using the logic of the dominating system at that time-

Lack of Universalism,

- The lack of systemic tests of hypotheses.

In this context, the theory of the Balance of Threat is a substantial departure from neorealism, since it puts “*emphasis on threat perception,*” conducts analysis at “*the systemic level*” by focusing societal factors (the importance of ideology in the threat perceptions of state) except material capabilities (Katzenstein, 1996: 27).⁴⁰ However, it sustains neorealist framework. It does not explain the construction of threat through the logic of anarchy rather through the ideational world “*Arabs.*”

The other major problem with the theory of the Balance of Threat is its inattention to explain, “*How do states identify threats when choosing alliance partners?*” Walt does not provide sufficient insights to explain how states identify the source of threat and determine the other’s intentions as threatening (Gause, 2003: 273, 280, Vasquez, 2003b: 247). The theory fails to

³⁹ “*Decision makers intervene in several ways in the working of the balance of power mechanics. They perceive (or not) a growing power differential, they define it (or not) as a threat, and they chose to act on it (or abstain from doing so).*” (Paul & Wirtz & Fortmann, 2004: 365).

⁴⁰ Walt (1987: 263) insists that balance of threat “*should be viewed as a refinement of traditional balance of power theory.*” However, a theory consisting of a non-material variable such as intentions cannot be regarded as a refinement due to anomalous (Vasquez, 2003: 32).

develop an analytical framework to understand how states make the cost calculations considering material and ideational factors (Katzenstein, 1996: 28).

The versions of the Balance of Threat Theory exclude intentions from their assessment. According to Wohlforth (2004: 215), these scholars believe that “*threat inheres in power alone, and large concentrations of material capabilities should spark balancing behavior regardless of intentions.*” Also, Walt and Schweller explained several balancing strategies of the states explained with respect to the sensed threat and interests. However, they failed to show us how threat and interests are constructed.

The theories studied in these works also reflect the divergence in the alliance literature since scholars applied various lenses. The scholars attempt to refine the available theories or develop new theories, to offer alternative accounts. However, they created sets of discrete hypotheses that resulted in the expansion of the confusion (Chidley, 2014: 2).

Furthermore, the conventional alliance theories lack to identify and to incorporate the contextual and situational variables, which are in many cases major factors to affect the motivation for alignment (Miller & Toritsyn, 2005: 358).

The contemporary literature tries to explain the alliance formation by either material or ideational variables, however, as Gause (2003: 283) claimed: “*both are important explanatory variables, though with different causal weights at different historical moments.*” I have also noticed in my study that the extensive alliance literature consists of a few holistic approaches, which are conceptualized the threat in an old fashion.

After the World War II, a culture of cooperation emerged among the North Atlantic states that were labeled by Wendt (1999: 297) as “*a state beyond Lockean culture.*” However, the contemporary literature fails to recognize the newly emerged alignment determinants, which become predominant in the culture of cooperation (Harknett and Vandenberg, 1997:113). The centrality of perceptions and beliefs in the shaping of the state behavior become more prevalent. Thus, we should recognize that not real power, but perceptions of power play a vital role in making decisions (Legro, & Moravcsik, 1999: 38, 39).

Although, some scholars challenged the power-centric explanations through focusing on perceived intentions, and widened them by adding other aspects, presently, no theory can explain the role of societal/ideational factors adequately by employing them as an independent variable. We need a breakthrough to overcome the stalemate in the literature.

The study of the extensive body alliance literature disclosed the need for the integration of theories into a well-developed theory. This theory should encompass the effects of intervening

variables and use a holistic approach to explain the role and effects of the material and emotional factors (Holsti, Hopmann, Sullivan, 1985:226). In this context, further research should aim to enhance the analytical framework of the Balance of Threat Theory by adding concepts from possible theories. The challenge is to find a way to comply with different concepts that base on the different ontologies and epistemologies.

Chapter III

Application of the Major Alignment Theories to the Study Cases

3.1. General

In this chapter, I aspire to assess the applicability of the major alignment theories to the alignment behavior of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Demonstrating their applicability will help me to find a right pathway that goes to the heart of the problem mentioning in the following question: why do the states subject to similar conditions (*region, threat, history*) behave differently?

3.2. Balance of Power Theory

Traditional Balance of Power Theory purports that the states form alliances to maintain the balance among powers and prevent any actors to dominate the international system. According to Waltz (1979: 127), “*secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side, for it is the stronger side that threatens them.*” If we test the validity of this argument in the South Caucasus, we might expect to observe that three nations (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) align against the major power in the region, which is Russia. However, this is not the case. In contrast, three nations followed different alignment patterns. Thus, it fails to explain the alignment behavior in South Caucasus, because:

First, Waltz’s concept analyzes at the systemic level. System level analysis is suitable to predict the behaviors induced by the effects of the system. However, the dynamics of the regional level and unit level poses a unique impact on the states’ behaviors. This region constructed different “*anarchy*” that it is immune, or vulnerable to the effects of system culture. Furthermore, these states do not represent a unitary form; each has different capacity, political history, and background as well as state apparatus. Thus, one cannot expect similar political outcomes.

Second, Waltz’s concept posits a power-centric approach. Nevertheless, the structure and operation of the international system cannot be explained only based on material factors as implied by Waltz. It neglects domestic, societal, and ideational variables. Armenia and Azerbaijan developed a distinct social context that affects the political behaviors; therefore, the outcome differs.

In sum, BoT Theory cannot fully explain the regional alignments and small state behaviors due to its lack of regional and unit level conceptions.

3.3. Balance of Threat Theory

There are four major premises of this theory. We will briefly test these premises in respect with the contemporary context of the South Caucasus.

- a. *"States ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone, therefore, states form alliances to **balance against threats** rather than bandwagon with them."*

The powerful nation in the South Caucasus is Russia,⁴¹ and historically Russia was regarded as the source of the threat in the region due to her imperial status and expansionist policy exercised in the past. According to this proposition, the nations of the South Caucasus might form an alliance with Russia. However, the prediction of this theory is not valid in the South Caucasus, since the three nations never established an alliance against Russia. In contrast, Armenia bandwagons traditionally with Russia,⁴² whereas other states prefer to balance Russia.

At first sight, Armenia's bandwagoning with Russia can be explained with the prediction of Walt (1987:173) that *"weak states are more likely to bandwagon than strong ones,"* since they are more vulnerable to pressure, and they can do little to determine their fates. However, the Armenia is the only nation in the region, which is never threatened by Russia and has no common borders with her. Moreover, the other two nations (Azerbaijan and Georgia) are historically and factually more vulnerable, but they did not choose bandwagoning.

- b. *"The level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions."*

Walt contends (1987: 23, 24) that *"states are more likely to make their alliance choices in response to nearby powers than in response to those that are distant"* and *"small states bordering a great power may be so vulnerable that they choose to bandwagon rather than balance."* If one considers these two assumptions, he or she expects whether Azerbaijan and Armenia will seek to form alliances with other powers to balance Russia or they will

⁴¹ *"Based on its aggregate power, geographic proximity, ability to engage in offensive military operations (including its direct military presence in some states), and inclination to act on its 'neoimperial' ambitions, Russia would be depicted as the greatest source of threat. In such an 'anarchic' environment, traditional realist theories suggest that CIS members are likely to balance Russia by forming alliances with other states."* (Miller & Toritsyn, 2005:327).

⁴² *"Armenia is a prime example that accords with the theory's expectations."* (Wohlforth, 2004: 232).

bandwagon with Russia, since both nations are vulnerable against the power projection of Russia. However, the outcome is contradicting, because, Armenia, which is geographically less vulnerable to the threats imposed by Russia, always sought to secure the Russian support and never aligned with other powers. On the other hand, although bordering with Russia, Azerbaijan never intended to bandwagon with Russia.

Walt (1987: 24) explains the offensive power as *“the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost.”* Regardless the expansionist policy of Russia (as either Empire or the Soviet Union) in the past, the Russia’s attack on Georgia launched in 2008, and the recent annexation of Crimea in 2014 are the obvious signs of the Russian offensive capabilities. Considering this fact, Armenia and Azerbaijan are expected to align with other powers to balance Russia. However, as Walt (1987: 25) explicitly emphasized, the states, which located in the spheres of influence of an offensive power may see little hope in balancing and, consequently, they will consider bandwagoning as a rational policy. Once again, we see that Walt’s predictions are consistent with neither Azerbaijan’s contemporary policy is nor Armenian’s policy. As this study will explain and show in detail in the next chapters, the bandwagoning behavior of Armenia has nothing to do with the fear of Russia; rather it rests on the various dynamics peculiar to the region.

According to Walt (1987: 25), *“perceptions of intent are likely to play an especially crucial role in alliance choices.”* Moreover, he (1987: 26) continues to argue that *“intention, not power, is crucial.”* In this regard, one can infer from the explanations in the preceding section that the first three variables such as aggregate power, geographic proximity, and offensive capabilities are not explanatory for the contemporary alignment behavior of Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the last variable aggressive intentions seem promising to provide a better explanation for the phenomenon, since this variable might explain uncovered deep structures contrary to the first three material variables. The perception and the construction of a cognitive variable such as intention vary from nation to nation. Thus, the sensed threat might vary from nation to nation despite encountering with the same power and capabilities.

Accordingly, the magnitude and direction of the threat perceived from Russia are different for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although the rationale behind it is questionable, Armenia senses the greatest threat to her existence from Turkey rather than from Russia. Therefore, she seeks to balance the threat coming from Turkey by aligning with Russia. On the other hand, Azerbaijan regards Russia and Armenia as the sources of existential threat and aligns with Turkey to balance them. Azerbaijan believes that Russia is an unalterably aggressive power and Russia’s intentions cannot be changed by aligning with her (she is not sure about the true intention

of Russia as Walt wrote). Therefore, Azerbaijan hesitates to bandwagon with Russia (Walt, 1987:26).

c. *“Ideology is a weaker cause of the alliance formation.”*

Walt hypothesizes (1987: 33) that ideology and similarities between two nations play a significant role in alignment. However, its effect on alignment depends on certain conditions:

- States prioritize security concerns over the ideological preferences in forming alliances. Ideology becomes necessary if states feel secure (1987: 38).
- The regimes suffering internal instability tend to form alliances with ideologically similar states to strengthen its legitimacy (1987: 39).

After the dissolution of the Soviets, Armenia, and Azerbaijan cut off their ideological link with Russia. However, Armenia traditionally continued to regard Russia, as her protector against the Muslim states surrounding her. This belief rests on a religious construction. Namely, the current link between Armenia and Russia is not ideological; rather it is cultural. This cultural link plays certainly a significant role in her alignment with Russia. However, at this point, it is too early to ascertain whether a cultural link or security or economic concerns play a major role in her alignment.

Similarly, the operating link between Turkey and Azerbaijan also seems to be cultural that rests on kinship. Azerbaijan preferred to align with Turkey, which is less powerful than Russia, instead of bandwagoning with Russia. Accordingly, this behavior of Azerbaijan explicitly contradicts Walt's assumption, since the cultural link takes precedence over the security considerations (Walt, 1987:38).

d. *“The instruments of foreign aid and penetration are by themselves weak determinants of alignment.”*

Walt (1987:41) argues that the hypothesis *“the more aid, the tighter the resulting alliance”* is not a valid one. He claims (1987:42-44) that the assistance relation is the result of alignment rather being the cause of it and lists some conditions which allow suppliers to enjoy an effective political leverage:

- Being a monopoly for some assets which are essential for client country,
- If client country is facing an external threat,
- If there exists asymmetrical dependence in which one party does not need the other party,

The preliminary study the current relations between Russia (patron) and Armenia (client) demonstrate that aid relation is a result of alignment rather it is the cause of the alignment. In

1991, there was hardly any alignment between Russia and Armenia. Russia exploited the emergence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, to keep Armenia in the sphere of the Russian influence (through “the Near Abroad” policy). The conditions asserted by Walt exist in the Armenian case, and their existence provided tremendous political leverage for Russia to manipulate the foreign policy of Armenia and, therefore, forced Armenia to align with her. The isolation of Armenia in the region, severe economic conditions, and political instability made Armenia vulnerable for Russian penetration.

As for Azerbaijan, Russia used its monopoly in supplying military hardware to keep Azerbaijan in CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) during the war over the Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the bitter experience of the past, the kinship with Turkey, and the existence of energy resources enabled Azerbaijan to evade from the sphere of influence of Russia at the expense of defeat in the war.

On the one hand, the USA provided significant financial aid to Armenia, on the other hand, she exerted weapon sales embargo on Azerbaijan. These two distinct policies did not the outcome the expected benefits. Neither the aid persuaded Armenia to exert a pro-western policy, nor the embargo harmed the Azerbaijan’s pro-western orientation.

Regarding the manipulation of the state internal political system (penetration), Walt suggests (1987: 46-47) the following issues as the factors to consider:

- Officials may behave in favor of a nation due to their ties with it,
- Lobby activities may affect the decision makers and public perceptions,
- Foreign propaganda may be used to create favorable conditions.

He asserts (1987:48) that these factors can only be effective if the targeted state has an open society and there are other significant incentives for the alliance.

The initial examination shows that there exist a significant number of the pro-Russian officials in Armenia, who tend to strengthen the alignment with the Russia. Furthermore, the Armenian Diasporas in Russia and USA play a significant role in the political system of Armenia, and they exert some influences on Russia’s and U.S.’s foreign policies. It is a must for the Armenian Diaspora to keep Armenia countering Turkey, which necessities a strong Russian support. Thus, the Armenian Diaspora feverishly supports the Russo-Armenian alignment.

The other interesting observation is the attitude of the USA against Azerbaijan. It is usually expected that the USA might exert much more supportive policy towards Azerbaijan due to her orientation to the West. However, the US policy in the region is observed as entirely different, and sometimes it was conducted in favor of Armenia. We might explain this anomaly

with the substantial influence of the Armenian Diaspora in the USA to alter U.S.'s political priorities.

This brief survey demonstrates that the Balance of Threat Theory is also not fully capable of explaining the alignment behavior of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Its distinguished variable "*aggressive intentions*" offer some insights, however, as I mentioned earlier, the conception of "*aggressive intentions*" cannot explain the construction of "intention" and thus, the source and reasons of sensing various threats by Armenia and Azerbaijan.

3.4. Omnibalancing/Regime Survival

This theory focuses on both external and internal threats. Steven David (1991: 235, 238) contends that leaders in the third world motivated to secure their regime through forming alliances. Accordingly, these leaders align their states with the powers, which will help them to stay on the power. His assumptions correspond with the state system and political conditions of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Therefore, we can apply it to our case.

The leaders in both states encountered with severe domestic instabilities. In line with David's assumptions, in the first part of 90's, the leaders are expected to align with the external actors. However, the actual outcome does not correspond with the predictions of the omnibalancing theory. For instance:

In Azerbaijan, although the first President Ayaz Mutallibov aligned Azerbaijan with Russia by signing CIS Treaty in 1991, this choice could not help him to keep himself in power, and he has been forced to resign by public pressure due to the territorial losses in the war. Contrary to the assumption of omnibalancing theory, Mutallibov's alignment with Russia rests on the belief that Russia would support Azerbaijan militarily, in case Azerbaijan signs CIS Treaty. His concern was the survival of Azerbaijan, rather than personal survival. Afterward, the successive leaders also did not follow a pro-Russian pattern.

Similarly, the successive Armenian leaders also aligned Armenia with Russia; however, their motive was similar to the motive of Ayaz Mutallibov, which is getting more military and political support from Russia. Especially, Levon Ter-Petrossian was explicitly against the Russian dominance in his country, but he strived to maintain the delicate balance with Russia to ensure her continuous support.

This theory fails to identify the entire scope of the domestic factors and limits itself to the leader's behavior (Miller and Toritsyn, 2005: 359). Therefore, Azerbaijan and Armenian cases also not fit neatly with the propositions of this theory.

3.5. Balance of Interest Theory

Randall Schweller (1994) suggests that states join in alliances not because of the fear of power and threat, but because of the use of the bandwagoning advantage to gain power. According to him, bandwagoning is a rational behavior of revisionist states. The chief motive for revisionist States is to regain territory and power, rather than achieving security. Therefore, they will ally with revisionist powers, which will help them to realize their interests.⁴³ In this context, he (1994:88; 1998, 189) contends that the compatibility of the political goals is the most important driver in alliance formation rather than imbalances of power or threat.

In our case, both nations are in a state of war because of contested territory of the Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan lost Karabakh and adjacent territories at the end of a full-scale war. In this regard, Azerbaijan is expected to exercise as a revisionist state, while Armenia is expected to exercise as a status quo state.

At the system level, we can also regard the western nations as status quo states (winner of the Cold War) and Russia as a revisionist state, which seeks to gain her great power status at the times of the Cold War. In accordance with the assumptions of Balance of Interest Theory, we expect that Azerbaijan (as a revisionist state) will continue bandwagon with Russia, while Armenia will align with the West to maintain the current status quo. However, the outcome is quite contrary to the assumptions of the Balance of Interest Theory, since this theory does not consider the regional dynamics and assumes that states uniformly seek to realize any specific goal.

3.6. The Clash of Civilizations

Samuel Huntington (1996) provides a distinctive perspective by suggesting that alignment of states occurs along the lines of civilization. He argues that the main driver in the establishment of civilizations is religions. Although his arguments viewed as controversial and contradictory by many academics and politicians, his proposition regarding the alignment pattern in the South Caucasus necessitates a brief analysis.

Huntington (1996: 278) argues that the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh emerged on the Orthodox-Muslim fault line. Thus the alignment of Armenia with Russia is a natural course

⁴³ Revisionists, he argues, “*bandwagon for profit*” and thus seek “*minimum winning coalitions*,” while status quo states seek to balance only against threats and are comfortable with overwhelming power.

since both nations belong to the Orthodox Civilization. Similarly, Azerbaijan aligned with Turkey because of her religious affiliation.

This explanation of the outcome seems to be true in the first sight. However, if we analyze specific issues, one can comprehend that Huntington's accounts are not entirely valid because Russia supports both sides interchangeably depending on the military and political conditions. The Russian motive did not emerge primarily from religious affiliation; her major aim was to limit Turkish influence in the region.

It is true that Turkish support to Azerbaijan was motivated by kinship rather than material gains in the South Caucasus. However, Turkey could not actively support Azerbaijan, when faced with the Russian threat. In this regard, we observe that the kinship and religious affiliation do not always lead to a tangible alliance formation.

In respect to the assumptions of the theory, we can expect that Azerbaijan also aligns with Iran (or vice-versa) as a Shi'a state (belongs to the Shiite sect of Islam) if religion were the determinant factor. However, this is not the fact. On the contrary, Iran established close economic relations with Armenia due to her concern of Turkish domination in the region and the fear of insurgency of the Azeri minority in the northern part of the country.

This brief survey shows that the Clash of Civilizations theory is also not fully capable of explaining the outcome, due to its partial focus on the problem. It explains only some aspects of phenomena.

3.7. Learning Theory

Dan Reiter (1996) focuses on the role of past lessons in the decision-making process and, therefore, in the alignment of states. His departure from the other theories is his emphasis on the cognitive factors and the role of beliefs that are shaped by experiences.

Reiter argues (1996: 3) that *"small powers learn lessons about alliance and neutrality from their past experiences in world wars, and these lessons determine their alliance choices in the peacetime years that follow these wars."* Accordingly, he hypothesizes that small powers either align with the great powers or remain neutral based on their experiences, which were learned during the system-level wars.

We cannot test the basic premise of this theory through studying the research cases because Azerbaijan and Armenia had never been an independent state during the both World Wars. Therefore, both states were not in a position to draw lessons, which will affect their future alignment behaviors. As part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the communities in both states might share some collective memories of two great wars. However, we cannot say

whether these collective memories shape their contemporary foreign policy or not due to the lack of empirical evidence.

The theory suggests that minor powers learn about specific nations concerning their past achievements. According to Reiter (1994: 524), *“they would want to ally with the victors, would shun alliance with the losers, and would prefer an alliance with the victors to neutrality.”* This proposition also is not valid in the South Caucasus, because, the lessons drawn from the experiences of Turkey (Ottoman Empire) and Russia during the WWI are almost the same. Both states were the loser of the war. Accordingly, we expect that both Azerbaijan and Armenia do not align with Turkey and Russia after the war. However, both states strived to align with the losers during the short period of the independence between the years 1918-1921.

The premise of this theory is useful to analyze the behaviors of states; however, its fix concept regarding *“formative events”* limits its applicability. Rather, if we assume that *“great power crises can serve as formative events for minor powers,”* despite their *“effect is not nearly as large as it is for world wars as formative events,”* then we can expand the explanatory coverage of this theory (Reiter, 1994: 525).

In this regard, this theory can be partially applied to our cases, since both states should have drawn some lesson from their experiences in the short period (1918-1921) of independence. During this period, two incidents made an enormous impact on the collective memories of both nations. First, Turkey’s attack on the Armenia as a retaliation of the Armenian atrocities in the Eastern Anatolia and the annexation of both states to the Soviet Union in 1921 by Bolsheviks. Consequently, the first incident strengthened once again the negative image in the minds of Armenians and the second incident reinforced the Azerbaijan’s fear from Russia and traumatized them.

Although Reiter (1994: 526) claims that his theory is an enlightened form of realism, which recognizes the vital role of beliefs in decision-making, this theory sounds like a constructivist approach due to its reference to the cognitive learning process. If the assumptions of this theory are supplemented with some constructivist tools, it seems promising to advance BoT Theory.

3.8. Chapter Conclusion

The brief examination of the validation of the major theories in the South Caucasus demonstrates that they are not fully capable of explaining the alignment behaviors in the Region. This fact needs to conduct context-specific research to explore the other explanatory

variables. We would like to summarize the fundamental implications of the validity problem as follows:

- Based on the study of Wohlforth (2004: 230), the table 1 below depicts the present alignment indicators. We depicted the bandwagoning indicators on the left side and external balancing indicators on the right side of the yellow column. As seen, Armenia's behavior seems to be a strong bandwagoning while Azerbaijan tends to show a weak balancing behavior. Hence, we realize that Armenia's bandwagoning has two aspects such as security and economic, which we will investigate comprehensively. As for Azerbaijan, she exercises a symbolic balancing through GUAM and alignment with Turkey. Azerbaijan alignment behavior cannot be explained in a clear-cut manner. It is complicated and needs deeper analysis that will be done in the next chapters.

High trade dependence on Russia	High energy dependence on Russia	Dependent on Russian energy transport infrastructure	Russian military base or troops stationed in the territory	Member CIS, CSTO	States	Ambition to join NATO	Western troops on territory
-	x	x	x	x	Armenia	-	-
-	-	x	-	-	Azerbaijan	x	-

Table 1 Alignment Indicators

- The Balance of Power and the Balance of Threat theories focus on the external aspects that lead to overlooking internal aspects. Due to the internal problems and regional social context, the question of hegemony is not the priority for both states (Wohlforth, 2004: 233). In this regard, the assumptions of both theories do not operate in the South Caucasus, namely, at the regional level.

- This examination also showed that Walt's theory seems more promising than Waltz's Balance of Power theory to explain the alignment pattern of Armenia and Azerbaijan, because of its cognitive variable "*aggressive intentions*." It adds value to the Balance of Threat Theory that increases the likelihood the depiction of reality. However, the analysis should be conducted at the unit level, to comprehend the essence of the problem. Accordingly, the dissimilarity between alignment patterns can be understood through the analysis of the construction of aggressive intentions. The brief survey shows that Armenia and Azerbaijan **materialize the threat differently**. Hence, Armenia sees Turkey, which has less material capacity than Russia, as the main threat. Thus, she aligns with Russia to balance Turkey. In contrast, Azerbaijan sees Russia as the greatest threat and strives to align with Turkey and the West. The construction of **aggressive intentions** will be elaborated in the next chapters, to understand this disparity.

- It seems that the explanation of the construction of **aggressive intentions** needs a comprehensive approach. I regard the theoretical embedment of the Balance of Threat Theory appropriate to combine the useful elements from idealist theories to explain the construction of the intent. In this context, the enhancement of this theory with the help of the Learning Theory and constructivist assumptions seems promising to develop a more comprehensive approach.

- The last important inference from this analysis is that we should overcome the problem of working on different levels (system and unit). A comprehensive theory should permit to operate at both levels. Otherwise, it is not possible to address the context-specific issues with a theory operating at the system level.

Chapter IV:

Case Studies

The aims of this chapter are first, to frame a theoretical space where I want to analyze the problem, second, to define the cases, which I would like to study and third, to derive some inferences in the end. Accordingly, in the first section, I will focus on the present literature to gather some tools for analysis of the present behaviors of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the second section, I will analyze the historical information to conduct the empirical test. In the last section, I will aspire to show the implications of both periods on the formation of identity, on the construction of enmity, and on the conduct of security discourses.

4.1. Theoretical Embedment

I aspire to enhance the explanatory capacity of the Balance of Threat Theory in this study. To do this, I need to use the premises of constructivism and the Learning Theory. Furthermore, I have to improve my theoretical competence through studying the role of the past and experiences in the decision-making process. That will help me analyze the historical incidents and their effects on the societies. Hence, in the following sections, I will successively examine the research on analogies, schemas and the role of the past as well as ideas in the literature.

4.1.1. Analogies, Schemas, and Metaphors

It is a well-known issue that policymakers occasionally use lessons drawn from the historical events in making their decisions. This attempt is called as "*learning from history*" in the international politics (Khong, 1992: 6).

According to Khong (1992: 6), learning from history is a process to find a solution for a present problem with the help of past, in which historical analogies are used as the primary device.⁴⁴By controlling the characterization of the incoming data, postulating the causal relationships among variables, and predicting the outcomes, analogies play a crucial role in processing the incoming information (Khong, 1992: 220; Mefford, 1991: 191). However, "*analogies impose certain options while masking others*" (Mefford, 1987: 230).

⁴⁴ "For example, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is compared with Nazi German threats against Czechoslovakia in the late 1930s because both involved a stronger aggressor threatening a weaker neighbor, from which it is inferred that appeasement of Saddam Hussein would lead to further Iraqi aggression since the appeasement of Hitler led to further Nazi aggression." (Reiter, 1996:22).

At the core of this process lays “*analogical reasoning*.” Analogical reasoning⁴⁵ helps decision makers to “*cope with the enormous amount of information they encounter through reliance on ‘knowledge structures’ such as analogies or schemas*” (Khong, 1992: 13). Johnson (1962) proposes two elements of the analogical reasoning: **induction** and **deduction** (cited in Shimko, 1994: 662). The idea behind this approach is that since the cognitive capacity of Human beings is limited; we need a “*simplifying mechanisms*” to process the available information in the limited time.

Furthermore, individuals use certain cognitive shortcuts and schemata,⁴⁶ to facilitate comprehension. In this regard, Larson (1985: 51) describes schema as “*a generic concept stored in memory, referring to objects, situations, events, or people*.” Individuals use them as a comparison vehicle to make correct decisions. They provide many advantages in the decision-making process: a. simple interpretation, b. generalization, c. rapid processing, d. hasty reaction, e. mental economy (Larson, 1985: 52). According to Rumelhart (1980: 33, 34), “*they are the fundamental elements upon which all information processing depends*.” These shortcuts and schemata help individuals to use past experiences, code information and recall memories (Reiter, 1996: 21, 24). In this context, individuals operate as “*categorizer*” and “*Labeler*” striving to classify incoming information according to their experiences (Larson, 1985: 50).

Larson (1985: 54) distinguishes three types of schemas: scripts,⁴⁷ metaphors, and personae.⁴⁸ Khong (1992: 26) articulates that “*the difference between a schema and an analogy is that analogy is specific and concrete, while a schema is abstract and generic*.”

Wendt (1999: 122) points out that identities constitute the schemas and, in fact, identities are schemas about the Self. His argument highlights the other aspect of the relationship between identity and schema.

Once schemata are constructed in mind, it is hard to erase even in the face of contrary evidence (Khong, 1992: 223). In this regard, leaders tend to attach great importance to their adversaries’ attitudes and neglect to recognize the objective situation, since their belief

⁴⁵ “Robert Sternberg’s theory of analogical reasoning proposes a mechanism to map out logically the component mental operations that sustain a series of related information processing tasks.” (cited in Hybel, 1991: 216).

⁴⁶ “...cognitive heuristics-shortcuts in information processing to make sense of the world and the situation at hand as well as manage uncertainty” (Rosati, 2000:57, 59).

⁴⁷ According to Robert Abelson, “a cognitive script is a stereotyped sequence of events characterizing a well-known situation.” (cited in Larson, 1985)

⁴⁸ According to Nisbett and Ross, “Personae are cognitive structures representing the personality characteristics and typical behaviors of certain stock characters.” (cited in Larson, 1985: 55).

systems, which are manipulated by cognitive biases, affect the perceptions of them.⁴⁹ The cognitive biases are the primary causes of the threat misperception of the leaders since they distort making sense of our environment⁵⁰ (Larson, 1985: 53).

Emotions and fears reinforce the effect of the cognitive biases in the decision-making (Stein, 1988: 249, 256, 257). Reiter (1996: 26) underlines that some “*vivid*” events such as “*emotionally interesting, concrete and imagery-provoking, and proximate in a sensory*” are more influential in creating schemata. Crawford (2000: 144,145) underlines that “*individuals who belong to generations with direct experience of an event used in the analogy, or who have had contact with those who experienced the event, will likely have a greater emotional reaction.*” Thus, if an incident matches to a past incident in term of some aspects, it triggers an emotionally persuasive analogy. For example, many world politicians used Munich and Pearl Harbor analogies to connect and interpret a contemporary incident.

Like emotions, a high-rate match of an analogy with the personal experiences, shared goals, and values of the decision-makers increase the acceptability and persuasiveness of an analogy (Breuning, 2003: 231). Thus, certain analogies get more acceptance and politicians refer to them very often.

Steinbruner (1974: 91) developed a cognitive approach and concluded the following findings: a. the human mind consists of central beliefs, other beliefs surrounding the central beliefs and many mental representations, b. the memory of the people operates selectively, c. human beings also perceive selectively, d. we tend to derive inferences from the events, e. the human mind intends to maintain core beliefs.

Policymakers are prone to overestimate or underestimate the causes of behaviors and their effects. This tendency is reinforced “*by the halo effect: the tendency to see friends (and oneself) in a positive light and those that we dislike in a negative light*” (Rosati, 2000: 61; Jervis, 1976).

Finally, Jervis outlines four sets of determinants, which affect the perceptions of individuals: “*a. firsthand experiences, b. early personal and career experiences, c. generational effects, and d. major events*” (cited in Rosati, 2000: 63).

⁴⁹ “*The concept of the image of the enemy helped to explain and sustain international conflict and war during the Cold War. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s hostile image of the Soviet Union resisted change, regardless of changes in Soviet behavior.*” (Rosati, 2000:60).

⁵⁰ “*The experience of falling dominoes in Eastern Europe predisposed American decision makers to see falling dominoes in Asia as well.*” (Snyder, 1991: 9).

4.1.2. The Type of Decision-Making Unit and the Role of the Past in the Decision-Making Process

It is necessary to ask how decision makers decide between the positive and negative incentives of foreign policy options. To answer this question, one needs, as Kegley (1987: 249) pointed out, to examine the sources of foreign policy behavior through understanding individuals' motives for preferences and action.

Wendt (1999:197) argues that "*we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and intentionality*" to states; hence, they behave like human beings in many ways. Likewise, Rosati (2000: 53) points out the psychological aspect and contends that "*international actors, such as states, should be considered cognitive actors.*"

Levy (1994:287) also claims that "*organizations or governments can be treated as organisms that have goals, beliefs, and memories is not analytically viable.*" As human beings, each state consists of a body (state apparatus), brain (decision-making unit) and, soul (culture). Consequently, states learn, memorize, and act through individuals serving in the state apparatus. The study will briefly explain these elements in the next paragraphs.

4.1.2.1. State apparatus

States are large organizations, and a management apparatus controls it. State apparatus consisting of people learn from individually learned experiences and transfers the inferences into organizational routines such as doctrine, structures, decision-making procedures, personnel systems, and organizational commitments (Levy, 1994: 288). Thus, the behavior of states is determined like the other small organizations by their standard operating procedures, experiences (past lessons) and mission.

People working in the state apparatus use past as a vehicle to interpret the present events and find solutions to the encountering problems, according to their "*ideological world-views or belief systems.*" This situation creates a biased interpretation of the events (Houghton, 1996: 549). Another problem with the interpretation is the group subjectivism. The elites prefer a working power, which consists of people with the similar worldview and shared understanding (Reiter, 1996: 32) since it facilitates easy and rapid decision-making. This widespread fact leads to a more subjective assessment of the political problems by states.

Furthermore, sharing the same worldview and interests leads to the emergence of the "*interest groups*" around the top political elites. In this regard, Synder (1991b: 31) emphasizes the impact of "*interest groups*" on the decision-making. He argues that interest groups "*propagate*

*the myth*⁵¹ of security through expansion to advance their parochial interests in the guise of the general interests of the whole society.” According to him (1991b: 32, 35), these groups hijack state policy by selling “*Imperial myth*”⁵² to national leaders using Information monopolies and other propaganda advantages. These groups have strong ties to the state apparatus. They are represented in the highest state apparatus and govern legitimate state power. As a result, the interests of these groups are presented as if they were the interests of the state.

4.1.2.2. *Decision-making Unit*

The decision-making unit is the major element in the design and exercise of the states’ foreign policy. It has the following aspects to consider; a. political leadership, b. the type of decision unit.

The political leadership determines and exercises the policies by the changes in the external and internal environment. The beliefs and conceptions of politicians “*about policy goals or the optimal means to achieve them*” play a significant role in the foreign policy making (Jervis, 1985: 29; Walker, 1987: 275; Levy, 1994:289; Haas, 2003: 48). Moreover, the personal characteristics of a leader affect the state’s internal and external behaviors directly (Hermann & Hermann & Hagan, 1987: 313).⁵³

The type of decision unit is a significant factor in the decision-making. Snyder (1991b: 54) suggests three types of domestic structure: unitary, cartelized, and democratic. The study of domestic structures is important to understand the decision-making process of a state and, therefore, to explain the foreign policy behavior. Without analyzing structures, the explanation of alliance behavior will be less likely to depict the reality. Each domestic structure tends to generate various decision-making units depending on social context, and power constellation. Therefore, the exercise and the outcome of the foreign policy will vary based on the type of decision unit. For example, a democratic decision unit would face many challenges to make a rapid decision; on the contrary, an autocratic unit would make easy, but most likely wrong decisions due to weak political participation.

⁵¹ “A belief held in common by a large group of people that gives events and actions a particular meaning.” (Kaufman, 2001:16).

⁵² An example: “...Near Eastern experts, who literally conspired to oversell the Russian threat to India and the Turkish Straits, thus are propelling themselves into high parliamentary, military, and diplomatic positions.” (Snyder, 1991b: 36).

⁵³ Jervis (1976: 121) has also argued that “leaders ‘like’ or ‘dislike’ another state depending on their beliefs about the degree of conflict between that country and their own.”

4.1.2.3. *Culture and the Past*

As Houghton (1996:545) rightly puts forth that attending to the past is a habit of human beings to comprehend present problems. Thus, the past and the societal context directly affect the belief system of politicians and policy circles around them. Accordingly, the past is matter and deserves special attention (Wendt, 1999: 109). In this regard, many scholars studied the relationship between lessons derived from past events and the interpretation of the present events (Hybel, 1991: 215).⁵⁴

Snyder and Diesing (1977: 28) argue that perceptions are conditioned by international system and domestic structures. States' apparatuses and politicians regard history and culture as a tool for developing collective mindsets. The collective mindsets generate standard patterns of perception, which play a significant role in the decision-making process.

There is a direct relationship between state's interests and derived lessons. According to Snyder (1991b: 308) "*people drew different lessons from similar experiences if their interests were different. They switched their preferred historical analogies when their policy preferences changed.*"

State apparatus focuses on the lessons, which they can use for the mobilization of the society. In this context, states are prone to promote the manufacture of myths from the historical events and perseverance of these myths even in the face of disconfirming evidence (Reiter, 1996: 30, 31). At this point, Khong (1992: 32) rightly asks: "*From where do policymakers get their historical lessons?*" Alternatively, as Herrmann (1988: 180) wonders: "*How do political leaders construct a picture of reality in which to make foreign policy decisions?*" Khong answers that the experiences derived from "*wars, revolutions, and other crucial political events*" make a significant impact on the future decisions of the leaders.

How policymakers use past experiences? Khong (1992: 34, 35) articulates that we have "*a repertoire of analogies*" and the generations share some of them. Furthermore, personal and career experiences create others. When policymakers face a problem, they turn to the repertoire of analogies and use the most fitting analogy that presents superficial similarities with the current problem. In this regard, Stein (1988: 249) indicates that recent events and own experiences are more influential in shaping leader's beliefs.

Some scholars such as Wendt (1987), Levy (1994) and Reiter (1996) underline the role of "*social learning*" in policy-making. The social learning serves to transfer the patterns of

⁵⁴ Richard Neustadt, Deborah Larson, Richard Ned Lebow, David Reiter and Robert Jervis.

perception, experiences, and past lessons from generation to generation (Vasquez, 1987: 375).

According to Reiter (1996: 1, 35) and Levy (1994:279), history and Inferences from experience are the most determinant factors shaping the international political actions and rhetoric. Thus, over the year, these inferences (sometimes false views) have acquired the power of myth, which generated implications for the conduct of the contemporary state foreign policies (Hunter, 2006: 14).

4.1.2.4. *Approaches*

Concerning the role of the past lessons, numerous approaches are presenting the different dimensions of the problem.

In this context, The Prospect Theory focuses on the framing of the decision under the implications of norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker. It purports that decision-maker uses decision frames to outweigh outcomes (potential losses vs. potential gains) and contingencies to make a particular choice (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981: 453). Moreover, it posits that individuals tend to value “*loss aversion*” more than gaining attainment. Thus, they make riskier choices.

Mercer (1995) advanced the Attribution Theory, which was developed by Heider (1958) and Jones (1972).⁵⁵ It examines causal reasoning in the assessment of the success and failure and inferences about the causes of events and outcomes. Accordingly, it explains the individual attribution of a label to others for a negative or positive event.

Alstein (2009: 304, 305) suggest the following considerations as a factor in the shaping of the foreign policy decisions: a. the domestic sphere and the ideas of the political leaders, b. the position of the state and the setting (international security, geopolitics, material resources, the relative distribution of wealth and military strength) of the international system, c. the ideological visions of the elites, d. the collective memories of the elites, e. the embedded social context of the state (the way of interpretations, discourses, and practices as well as ethnicity, race, gender, religion).

To predict the behavior of states, scholars conducted many studies. For instance, Allison developed several conceptual models⁵⁶ and argues that “*professional analysts of foreign*

⁵⁵ See the books: *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relationships* (Heider, 1958) and *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior* (Jones et al., 1972).

⁵⁶ See for further details: Rational Actor Model, Organizational Process Model, and Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model. “*Each conceptual framework consists of a cluster of assumptions and*

affairs (as well as ordinary laymen) think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the content of their thought" (Allison, 1971: 3, 4).

Skidmore and Hudson (1993: 9-11) study the influence of the societal groups in foreign policy-making through following frameworks: a. the weak statist approach, b. the societal approach, c. the transnational approach. According to the second model called "*social bloc analysis*," political leaders consider the opinions of their supporters at home in making decisions. In this model, internal considerations outweigh the external ones.

Snyder and Diesing (1977: 355) advanced "*the Bureaucratic Politics Theory*" to explain why the political leaders cannot develop strategies to deal with the external problems rationally. The theory purports that their obsessive focus on the internal political imperatives constraint their policy options. The Bureaucratic Political Theory plainly supplements rather than competes with the utility-maximizing and bounded-rationality theories. It concentrates on the internal political imperatives of maintaining and increasing influence and power rather than on the purely intellectual problem of choosing a strategy to deal with an external opportunity or threat.

Muller and Risse-Kappen (1993: 26) suggest that a comprehensive study of international politics requires analyzing three distinct levels: society, political system, and international environment. In this respect, they (1993:48) emphasize especially to research the role of ideology, belief systems, and cultural phenomena, which are called "*the soft side of domestic politics*."

Crawford (2000: 142) highlights the effects of emotions on the decision makers. According to him, if one developed positive feelings towards a situation in the past, he will probably consider the similar present situation also positively or vice versa.

Realism does not entirely take into consideration the impact of the past on politics since it regards the states as unitary units and, therefore, they should react in the same manner (Levy, 1994: 297). However, the precise theoretical development in the area of decision-making explicitly revealed that "*how various psychological, ideational, and cultural factors affect*" the decision-making process and "*how political actors perceive their own and others' capabilities and how such perceptions are translated into foreign policy*" (Rose, 1998: 168). Therefore, it is of paramount importance that scholars should understand the role of the past in the

categories that influence what the analyst finds puzzling, how he formulates his question, where he looks for evidence, and what he produces as an answer." (Allison, 1971: 4, 13, 71, 144, 245).

decision-making process and profit from them to advance and refine the contemporary alliance theories.

4.1.3. Ideas versus Power

The realists and Neo-realists think that knowing the structure is enough to predict the behavior of the states. They largely omit the role of the societal factors in explaining an actor's strategic behavior (Chaudhuri, 2009: 844) and they do not consider the effect of history on the behaviors of states (Reiter, 1996:10). According to the idealist, this kind of approach is problematic, because it is hard to explain how the entire states, which constitute the structure, behave in the same manner and hold similar beliefs (uniform beliefs) (Reiter, 1996: 6). States exposed to the effects of different conditions. Therefore, it is expected that states may build different domestic organizations, structures, and codes of conduct. Accordingly, idealist argues that predicting the behavior necessitates analyzing not only the material factors but also ideas (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993).

The brief analysis in Chapter III obviously reveals the inability of the realist alliance theories to explain the alliance behaviors of the states in the South Caucasus. We need additional tools to conduct further analysis, to understand the essence of the issue. To achieve this, we need to identify the root causes of alliance decisions. In this regard, the following brief studies in the next sections aim to construct necessary ground that will allow us to conduct deeper analysis in chapters V, VI, and VII.

4.1.3.1. *A General Overview: Constructivism*

Recognizing the incapability of realism (including neo-realism) in political science, some scholars⁵⁷ attempt to develop alternative approaches. Constructivism is one of these mainstreams. Towards the end of 80's, it started to appear as a distinct discipline via the work of Onuf (1989).

Scholars define constructivism as “*an approach to social analysis that deals with the role of human consciousness in social life. It asserts that human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones...*” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 391).

Constructivism provides alternative insights to analyze anarchy, security dilemma, the balance of power, the balance of threat, and the relationship between state identity and interest. Including identity as a new variable, which was formed through historical events, cultural,

⁵⁷Deutsch (1957); Jervis (1976); Adler (1997); Wendt (1999); Finnemore (1996); Katzenstein (1996b); Kratochwil (1989); Tannenwald (1999); Risse (1995).

political, and social context, enriches our tools of analysis. The other distinction of constructivism is its understanding of the material and discursive power.⁵⁸ According to constructivists, both are important in the explanation of state behavior (Hopf, 1998: 172, 176, 177; Wendt, 1999: 23, 27, 190; Snyder, 2002:15; Adler and Barnett, 1998a: 10), because, constructivists claim that the structures are man-made, which are “*determined primarily by shared ideas and identities and interests are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature*” (Wendt, 1999:1).⁵⁹ Constructivists argue that “*invisible structures working behind the backs of the actors*” and the international system is not limited to states (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994: 222).⁶⁰

In this context, as Katzenstein (1996b: 520) asserted that “*an analytical focus on social effects of culture and identity permits us to examine international politics not only along dimensions of power, (but also) types of alliances, or geography.*” Furthermore, constructivism provides us necessary tools to analyze national society, culture and their effects on the state identity (Hopf, 1998: 194).

The Constructivists assume that interactions and process might change identities and interests help us to analyze the role of the learning from the past lessons (Mercer, 1995: 231). In this context, constructivist approaches offer insights to understand the formation of the state identity and the construction of interests.⁶¹ The identity of the state is a determinant factor in the threat construction.⁶² For example, Wendt (1999: 106) argues that if states form a collective identity, they will not regard each other as military threats. Therefore, they will not attempt to balance each other.

How states or communities form their identities? Wendt (1999: 82) indicates “*socialization*” as “*a causal process of learning identities.*” Socialization is an unavoidable process, in which the

⁵⁸ “*The material polarity of the international system matters, for example, but how it matters depends on whether the poles are friends or enemies, which is a function of shared ideas.*” (Wendt, 1999:27).

⁵⁹ “*Realist claim is the materialist hypothesis that the effects of power are constituted primarily by brute material forces. The rival idealist hypothesis is that power is constituted primarily by ideas and cultural contexts.*” (Wendt, 1999:97).

⁶⁰ Wendt (1999), for example, is one of the few authors that explicitly link identity and power in a model of systemic conflict and cooperation. While power tends to dominate considerations in a Hobbesian world and identity dominates calculations in a Kantian world, Wendt claims that both power and identity influence state assessments.

⁶¹ “*Therefore, identities become crucial in constructivist analysis because they provide the basis for interests. States do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations.*” (Wendt, 1992: 396).

⁶² Hopf (1998: 187) explains threat construction of U.S. with the identities of U.S. and the Soviet Union. According to him, the United States balanced against the Soviet Union because of the latter's communist identity that poses threat to the identity of the United States. The U.S. formed an identity that regards itself as the protector of the set of the anticommunist values both at home and abroad.

members of society were shaped by many central societal beliefs, which are constructed using collective memories, ideologies, goals, myths, and so forth. These central societal beliefs function like “*a prism through which society members view their world and relate to it*” (Bar-Tal, 2001: 606; Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998: 765; Anderson, 2000: 27).⁶³

Goldstein and Keohane (1993:7) distinguish three types of beliefs: a. worldviews, b. principled beliefs, c. causal beliefs. According to them (1993: 8, 9, 10), worldviews are the most critical views and integral part of one’s identity. These views such as religion and nationalism evoke deep emotions and loyalties. Principled beliefs offer norms to distinguish right and wrong. For the sake of principled beliefs, people risk their material possessions and even their lives. Causal beliefs provide codes of conduct, standards to keep up life. Contrary to worldviews and principled beliefs, changes in this belief system occur frequently and do not make a significant impact on the behaviors.

People stick fanatically to their beliefs. Such preoccupation results in some consequences such as a. biased selection of information, b. biased interpretation, and c. biased elaboration (Rouhana, & Bar-Tal, 1998: 766).

Group beliefs are constructed through “*collective memory*,” which stores myths, narratives, and traditions and provides necessary ground for the formation of the collective identity.⁶⁴ The effects of the collective memory on the behaviors of states cannot be easily suppressed, although some of them had been forgotten in the past (Wendt, 1999:163; Ross, 2006: 213).

Constructivist theory purports that states act based on the meanings of the objects for them (Wendt, 1992: 397). The meanings are constructed through “*social interactions taking place in a specific social and historical context*.” In this regard, the social and historical context plays a significant role in shaping and constraining “*all forms of human agency*” (Alstein, 2009: 304).

Each actor in the system owns various and different knowledge, which were generated through past interactions, of others. Knowledge is also an important determinant in the establishment of the relationship among states.⁶⁵ The states manage their interactions with other states based on their previously held beliefs for each other (Wendt, 1999: 140,141; Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 40). In this context, figure 6 depicts the mutual construction agent and

⁶³ “*Beliefs define and direct material needs... they are learned through socialization to culture.*” (Wendt, 1999:123).

⁶⁴ “*Constructivists propose a more open view of national history in which human actions and interventions have made the world the way it is today.*” (Sunny, 2001: 896).

⁶⁵ Wendt (1999:161) defines the common knowledge as a “*shared mental models*.”

structure. According to this model, each state interprets others' actions through the knowledge developed during the past processes.

Constructivists agree that interests play a significant role in the distribution of power in the international politics. However, they argue that *"the content of interests is constituted in important part by ideas,"* and a considerable amount of *"state action can be explained by ideas and institutions,"* therefore, according to Wendt (1999: 135), *"the distribution of ideas in the system"* is matter. The national interests of a state can be classified into four broad categories:⁶⁶ **a. physical survival, b. autonomy, c. economic well-being, and collective self-esteem** and these interests are affected by states' **type, role, and collective identities** (Wendt, 1999: 234, 235).




Figure 6 The mutual constitution of agents and structure, Source: Flawith (2011: 266)

In this regard, the magnitude of anarchy in the system is directly related to the beliefs⁶⁷ of states (Wendt, 1999: 146).⁶⁸ The context of the system and structure defines the attributed meaning of the beliefs. Although the content of beliefs is similar, the meaning of a belief may vary. For example, the support of a dominant power to a weak state can be regarded as *"interference"* or as *"assistance"* pending on the dominant security paradigm (cooperative or

⁶⁶ Snyder (1984:464) argues that states have two types of interests: *"general and particular"* interests. According to him, general interests stem from the anarchic structure of the system and the geographic position of the state. Whereas particular interests of states stem from ideological, ethnic, economic, or prestige values.

⁶⁷ *"Once the cultural formation known as the 'Cold War' was in place, the US and Soviets had a shared belief that they were enemies which helped constitute their identities and interests in any given situation, which they in turn acted upon in ways that confirmed to the other that they were a threat, reproducing the Cold War."* (Wendt, 1999:187).

⁶⁸ *"Agents and structures are themselves processes...Ultimately this are the basis for the claim that anarchy is what states make of it."* (Wendt, 1999:313).

conflictual) in the system (Wendt, 1999:176).⁶⁹ Constructivist analysis of anarchy provides us new and beneficial visions. The keystone of this analysis is the classification of the structure concerning the dominant role identity such as **enemy**, **rival**, and **friend** in the system. Wendt (1999: 247, 250) calls these structures as **Hobbesian**, **Lockean**, and **Kantian** cultures respectively (table 2). The prevailing culture defines the context of a political system and structure because it gives meaning to the beliefs, power, and interests. The culture has both causal and constitutive effects on the identity (Wendt, 1999: 274; Hall, 1998: 147).

Culture	Role structure	Logic/ Paradigm	Tendencies	Internalization Degrees	Constitutive effects
Hobbesian	enmity	- war of all - against all - self-help - zero-sum	- endemic and unlimited warfare - elimination of unfit actors - power balancing - making non-alignment or neutrality very difficult. - constitutive wars	- low compliance, - self-regulatory compliance, - full compliance	identity is an effect of culture. Mechanisms for enemy construction: - the military-industrial complex and domestic interest groups - in-group solidarity/discourse of danger - projective identification
Lockean	rivalry	- by the live and let live - self-restraint - sovereignty - collective action	- warfare is simultaneously accepted and constrained. - low death rate over time - balancing is not essential for survival - threats are not existential, - rivals will limit their own violence - non-alignment becomes a recognized status - configurative wars	- forcibly compliance with the sovereignty - interest-centric compliance with the norms due to culture - defining one's interests in terms of the norms	the culture affects all four kinds of identities - criteria for membership in the system, - certain kinds of type identities get recognized as individuals - If fully internalized and, then, get a social identity in common sense
Kantian	friendship	- rule of non-violence - rule of mutual aid/generalized reciprocity - open-endedness of collective action	- pluralistic security communities, - collective security	- compliance due to deterrence/ sanctions/ the expected costs - impoverished conception of friendship, it is a strategy to obtain benefits - full compliance due to super-ordinate identity and collective interests	- less national habitus - the emergence of collective identity, common fate - collective action habitus is predominant - decentralized authority

Table 2 The Culture Types, Source: Wendt (1999: 257, 300)

The causal and constitutive effects of the structure are evident. Today, Great Powers, despite their overwhelming material power, do not consider attacking weaker states, due to the constructed norms (for example; sovereignty) in the system and their identity that internalized the norms of the Lockean culture (Wendt, 1999: 289).⁷⁰ In the Kantian logic, coercion is totally excluded from the policy options list, and conflicts are subject to be solved with other nonviolent methods, rather than war.

⁶⁹ "...Five hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than five North Korean ones because of the shared understandings..." (Wendt, 1999: 255).

⁷⁰ "Today even 'failed states' survived for social not material reasons, because potential predators let them live. This indicates a world in which the weak are protected by the restraint of the strong, not a survival of the fittest." (Wendt, 1999: 284).

Knowing the role of the system culture and the degree of its internalization by units facilitate explaining the dynamics of alliance formation. In this context, if the Hobbesian culture prevails in a system, then we can expect to see short-term, unorganized, interest oriented and war-centric alliance formation (as we witnessed more frequently before the establishment of the Westphalian system) since the self-help logic dominates the system. Under this logic, each state forms alliances to carry out own interests without any moral consideration. This logic explains the emergence of the Balance of Power concept.

If the Lockean culture dominates the system, then collective security will be the norm, and organizing principle is collective action. Therefore, the interests of a group will be the primary determinant. A group will defend its interests collectively against other/s. In this culture, different forms of the balancing and bandwagoning strategies may prevail depending on the strength of collective identity and sensed a threat from the other's material capacity (Wendt, 1999: 300).

If Kantian culture dominates the system, then states do not require establishing an alliance, since the shared knowledge, beliefs and common interests eliminate the logic of self-help and collective action. Adler and Barnett (1998b: 50) indicate the three steps to reach a security community: a. phase 1: nascent,⁷¹ b. phase II: ascendant,⁷² and c. phase III: mature.⁷³ These steps are relevant to the internalization of the norms by the units. Internalization is a crucial step of the socialization within a culture.

Frederking (2000: 368) asserts that the interaction among actors is governed by the dominant logic of the system and illustrates the typical rules of the socially constructed security in table 3. According to Frederking (2000: 363), we can determine constitutive social rules through the analysis of speech acts, since they construct and reconstructs social rules.⁷⁴ Constructivist analysis requires focusing on assertions, directives, and commitments to analyze world politics (Onuf, 1989).

⁷¹ "...a security-Organization is virtually indistinguishable from a strategic alliance, and there is no expectation that people of these states will have a shared identity or knowledge of the other." (Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 50).

⁷² "...increasingly dense networks; new institutions and organizations that reflect either tighter military coordination and cooperation and/or decreased fear that the other represents a threat." (Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 53).

⁷³ "...At this point, regional actors share an identity and, therefore, entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change and a security community now comes into existence." (Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 55).

⁷⁴ "The premises of the speech act theory developed by John Austin (1962), help us to comprehend how people invent things by wording." (cited in Bernshausen and Bonacker, 2011: 27; Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 491).

Table 3 Social Arrangements of Security, Source: Frederking (2000: 368)

	War	Rivalry	Collective Security	Security Community
Rule 1—Identity	We are enemies	We are rivals	We are fellow citizens	We are friends
Rule 2—Autonomy	We do not recognize the autonomy of others	We recognize the autonomy of others	Autonomy is limited by obligations to follow and enforce the community's rules	Autonomy is limited by obligations to follow the community's rules
Rule 3—Security	Survival is based on relative (alliance) military capability	Security is based on relative (alliance) military capability	Security is based on a multilateral commitment to use military capability	Security is based on political relationships
Rule 4—Deterrence	You must surrender	Do not attack me	Do not break the rules of our community	Do not break the rules of our community
Rule 5—Enforcement	We will attack until you surrender	We will retaliate if you violate our sovereignty	We will retaliate if you break the rules of our community	We will resolve conflicts peacefully
Rule 6—Use of force	The use of force is always necessary to resolve conflicts	The use of force is sometimes necessary	The use of force is sometimes necessary	The use of force is not acceptable

Taking into account the constructivist explanation of anarchy above, we can revise Walt's Balance of Threat Theory. As it is mentioned before,

this theory differentiates from the Balance of Power Theory due to its account for perceived hostile intention. At this point, constructivist approaches provide useful theoretical tools to explain the construction of threat where Walt and other realist theories fail to unveil the dynamics of threat construction. The study in the next section aims to gain necessary ground to explain this phenomenon.

4.1.3.2. *The Basement: Identity*

In the literature on ethnic identity and ethnic conflict, identity is defined according to three mainstreams: primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism.⁷⁵ The study will focus on the constructivist definition in this study since it fits my purpose.

Hopf (1998: 193) rightly contends that identities are much more than just a label. According to him, identity functions like a placeholder in the international system that defines self and others. Owing to its key role, a substantial body of research (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Mercer, 1995; Druckman, 1994; Volkan: 1988, 1999, 2005, 2009; Horowitz, 1985) was conducted on identity. Two major approaches come to the foreground in social psychology, known as “*social identity theory-SIT*,” and “*self-categorization theory-SCT*” (Haas, 2003:35).

SIT (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), and SCT (Turner, 1987) provide ideational explanations for the construction of identity and threat as well as they identify the process of making cognitive differentiations experimentally. Both theories are applicable to states since the political leaders represent them (Larson and Shevchenko, 2003: 91). Both theories were developed to explain

⁷⁵ Primordialism defines identity as common features in a group are acquired at birth; Instrumentalism regards identity as subjective, symbolic or emblematic label and claims that having some features from birth does not define a group's identity, and Constructivism claims that ethnic identities are socially constructed.

prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior towards members of the out-group. In this regard;

SIT focuses on the group to predict the social identity of individuals (Mercer, 1995: 241, 251). A strong group identity eliminates in-group egoism and evokes competition among various groups through categorization. SIT (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) begins with the assumption that individuals automatically sort themselves into categories. According to Brewer and Brown (1998), *“this is a natural cognitive process that occurs in any social setting. Although the speed of the sorting and salience of the categorization can vary (e.g., high salience when you are a very distinct minority on a sorting dimension), the placement of objects into categories always occurs and the placement of the ‘self’ in one category immediately creates an ‘other.’”*

On the other hand, SCT shed light on the process of categorization, which induces a motivation to favor for the own group. Categorization process helps people to simplify the conception of the world by overemphasizing similarities and exaggerating differences (Rousseau and Retamero, 2007: 747; Larson and Shevchenko, 2003: 88; Mercer, 1995: 242). SCT emphasizes the cognitive aspect of identity construction rather than the motivational aspect.

According to Mercer (1995: 243, 247), the need for a positive social identity generates competition which might lead to intra-group conflicts pending on political, economic, or historical factors. In this regard, as Murray (2010: 661, 663) expressed that state identity is formed through the external relations with others and *“material practices are an effective expression of an identity.”* Consequently, Hall (1998: 147, 194) relates interests to identity, since it establishes *“a link between environmental structures and interests”* (Cho, 2012: 301).

Volkan (2005: 34) points out the role of *“core identity”* and explains the construction of core identity through two processes: *“othering”* and *“integration.”* According to him, each society creates and sustains some distinct core identities and interprets the events and interactions with the help core identity.

By arguing that *“identities are constituted by both internal and external structures,”* Wendt (1999: 198, 224) offers four kinds of identity: a. corporate, b. type, c. role, and d. collective.⁷⁶ In this regard, each person or state has an *“unshaped- base”* identity (corporate), this identity

⁷⁶ *“Personal/corporate identity is a site or platform for other identities. Type identity is a social category and corresponds to regime types or forms of state. Role identities are not based on intrinsic properties and as such exist only in relation to others. Collective identity is a distinct combination of role and type identities.”* (cited in Wendt, 1999: 225, 227, 229).

is shaped through the dynamics of the internal or external context and retains some characteristics called as “*type identity*.” When the shaped identity interacts with another shaped identity from a dissimilar social context, both identities undertake different roles such as “*friend*” or “*enemy*.” This new identity is called “*role identity*.” If both identities share some similar characteristics (similar type identities such as democratic or capitalist states) or belief system, then they may construct similar role identities and merge them into one identity, which is called as “*collective identity*.”

According to constructivists, national identity is neither fixed nor infinitely malleable concept. It is constantly reproduced through the interpretation of internal and external events by succeeding generation (Valdez, 1995: 86). Identity changes through reconstructions over the time and might be constructed differently for different actors depending on the kind and extent of the interactions (Sjöstedt, 2013: 152, 153).

Hence, the formation of identity is a dynamic process, and three determining factors affect this process: a. myths, symbols, and invented traditions, b. the imagination of a nationality, and c. structural realities (Panossian, 2002:123; Smith, 1992: 438). Myths and symbols serve to define the group and its boundaries (Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 47). Anderson (1983) argues that communities are “*imagined*” and the emergence of the national identity is closely linked to economic, societal, and linguistic developments in the recent century. In this regard, Ringmar (1996: 79) emphasizes the role of “*constitutive stories*” in the construction, preservation, and transformation of the identities. He (1996, 128) argues that the stories are a predominant factor to construct “*self*” and “*other*.” These stories help states to generate their “*ontological security*” (Green, & Bogard, 2012: 281).

Wendt (1999: 338) argues that any change in the international system will lead to a change of the identity. In this context, Larson and Shevchenko (2003: 77) show empirically that “*the new thinking*,” on which Gorbachev revolution rests, is an outstanding example of state identity change (reformulation of Soviet identity) through a set of new ideas. In this regard, Kowert and Legro (1996: 473) claim that external shock causes the change of identity, thus we can argue that the new ideas of Soviet elites were a consequence of exposed external shock (western superiority).

Constructivist scholars provide us very striking examples of dynamic identity construction. For instance; Green and Bogard (2012: 285, 286) ask “*why Russia represented a threat to U.S. only five years later, although she was a solid ally of U.S. against Nazi Germany? And how did this remarkable and remarkably swift transition occur?*” He articulates that realist would indicate the diverging material and security interests as well as the threat posed by communist

Soviets to the capitalist USA as a reason. However, a brief constructivist analysis evidently shows that the rhetoric (speech acts) of U.S. and British Foreign Affairs on Soviets affected the mindsets⁷⁷ of their societies in reshaping the (role) identity of Soviets and Germany.⁷⁸ This “*typification process*” redefined the USSR and American identities and engendered the birth of the Cold War (Green & Bogard, 2012: 286, 288).

As a component of corporate identity, we should put special emphasis on religion⁷⁹ since it plays a key role in the formation of group identity (Volkan, 2005: 25). Although the significance of the religion in the conflict is often minimized by contemporary scholars (Gorder, 2006: 174), Anderson (2000: 24, 26) emphasizes that ethnic interest groups use religion as a catalyst to prompt their members and he adds that religious and ethnic identities are mutually reinforcing. Herzig (2000: 87) points out also the role of the religious character and religious links in the identification of interests.

Religious and national identities strengthen each other and empower a uniform identity such as Catholic Poland, Jewish Israel, Muslim Turkey, and Orthodox Greece. When both types of identities incorporate against other incorporated identity, we witness powerful patterns of fear, mutual hatred, and insecurity,⁸⁰ for example; Christian Armenians versus Islamic Azerbaijanis (Waeber, 1993: 23).⁸¹ Huntington (1996: 272) argues that especially religious identities came to the foreground where the fault lines were established since two different religious identities or cultures come to encounter.

Identity, if shared, makes an impact on the policy of actors in the system (Jepperson, & Wendt & Katzenstein, 1996: 51). For instance, U.S. prefers to establish close relations with Israel rather than Arab states, because of the shared type identity (democratic and liberal) of former. As Barnett (1996: 446) claims, “*identity potentially signals whom to balance against and whom to bandwagon with.*” The quality and the form of interaction is determined partially by their perception of others, whether they are regarded as a friend, foe, or rival (Green, & Bogard, 2012: 277).

⁷⁷ “Asked in 1939 to identify their least liked European country, 58 percent chose Germany and only 8 percent chose Russia. Asked a January 1947 survey, whether they felt friendly or unfriendly toward Germany, 45 percent chose the former and only 28 percent the latter.” (Green and Bogard, 2012: 296).

⁷⁸ Remember Winston Churchill’s conversation that brought into public the powerful image of an “*iron curtain*” on March 5, 1946, in a famous speech in Fulton, Missouri (Green, & Bogard, 2012: 286).

⁷⁹ “*Millennia of human history have shown that religion is not a small difference’ but possibly the most profound difference that can exist between people.*” (Huntington, 1996: 254).

⁸⁰ “*Identities which had previously been multiple and casual become focused and hardened; communal conflicts are appropriately termed ‘identity wars.’*” (Huntington, 1996: 266).

⁸¹ “*Feelings of cultural similarity or difference (and therefore possibly feelings of trust or distrust) between citizens of different nations may be particularly salient.*” (Green, & Bogard, 2012: 283).

In this regard, the anarchy/culture prevailing in the system or affecting the relations is of paramount of importance. An actor, despite its unchanging corporate identity, can share various cultures with different actors.⁸² These relations can be labeled as **identity links** that are very malleable and subject to constant change. Thus, the actors may have several co-existing identity links with various actors and exercise diverse policies depending on the internalization degrees.

The constructivist explanation of identity offers us new insights to analyze the role of the identity in the construction of threat and formation of the alliances.

4.1.3.3. *An Identity Former: Culture*

Wendt (1999: 141) defines “*culture*” as “*socially shared knowledge*” that bonds individuals. Faure (2009: 507) defines culture as “*a set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behavior.*” Adair and Brett define culture as follows: “*Culture is a distinct group construct. Individuals have personalities; groups have cultures*” (cited in Faure, 2009: 507).

Culture is not only a pod of knowledge, but also it is a combination of societal structures and symbols that regulate the public life and meet needs for socialization and ontological security through the causal and constitutive effects on agents. These effects are exerted and transferred by social learning, socialization imitation or some other similar process (Wendt, 1999: 164, 165, 187, 324). Socialization means to learn the elements of corporate and type identities by individuals. It is a process of identity formation (Wendt, 1999: 170). In this context, the members of a group internalize the values and norms of a society that regulate their behaviors (Wendt, 1999: 82).

Kaufman (2001:24) emphasizes the role of “*myth and symbol*,” which are central aspects, in the transfer of cultural knowledge. According to him, the “*myth-symbol complex*” constitutes the core of ethnic identity.

Culture is the major determinant in the formation of identity. Corporate identity of an actor is a function of the culture, and it determines the adoption of other identity types such as type and role identities. Namely, we adopt a type identity suiting to our corporate identity and define ‘others’ according to what we are. In this regard, “*cultural intimacy*” is a central factor in the establishment of relationships among states (Subotic and Zarakol, 2012: 915). Cultural

⁸² For instance; Europe shares a Kantian culture with the U.S., Canada and Israel, while she shares a Lockean culture with most states of the world.

similarity allows the states not to compete for power maximization and help them to establish collective identity through the formation of the positive role identities (Kupchan, 2010: 65).⁸³ On the contrary, cultural differences emancipate negative effects on organizational behaviors, and thus they affect the exercise of the national foreign policy (Sampson, 1987: 384). Hence, as Katzenstein (1996: 2) rightly articulates that culture plays a decisive role in the definition of the actor's security interests.

The culture we embedded affects our perception of reality since we tend to behave according to our belief system, which is largely an outcome of the culture. Culture affects not only the behaviors or beliefs of individuals about the environment, but also it defines "*who they are or what they want*" (Wendt, 1999, 250). Culture affects individuals through **internalization**. It means that "*how individuals gain new information through observations or experiences and thereby may change, modify, or reverse their views on a particular situation or issue.*" It is simply can be defined as learning from the past interactions and fabrication of a "*belief system*" that serves to select and evaluate many inputs from the structural environment to decide (Sj  stedt, 2013: 156). The internalization has, according to Wendt (1999: 268, 271, 273) three different degrees based on the compliance with shared understanding of the culture: a. in the first-degree actor modifies his behaviors by force (the traditional Realist hypothesis), price (Neoliberal or rationalist), or legitimacy (Idealist or constructivist), b. in the second-degree actor modifies his behaviors by its self-interest ("*internally driven or self-regulating- raison d'e  tat*"), c. in the second-degree actors modify his behaviors by identification others' expectations as a part of themselves. The discovery of the internalization degree is a key factor in the prediction of the actor's behaviors.

The beliefs are the attributed meanings of the objects learned through interaction and socialization in a culture (Wendt, 1999: 123). The more a culture attaches importance to an object, the stronger interests it constructs. Consequently, different cultures usually generate unique interests, since they construct various beliefs.

Culture also affects the type of decision-making unit in a state (Crawford, 2000: 139). Some cultures tend to generate "*predominant decision maker*," whereas other cultures tend to generate "*single-group decision maker*" (Sampson, 1987: 404). If a culture has a chauvinist tendency, then the decision-making unit will produce a more assertive foreign policy or vice versa.

⁸³ "*Britain successfully pursued lasting rapprochement with the United States rather than with Japan in part because of the ready availability of a narrative of Anglo-Saxon unity.*" (Kupchan, 2010: 65).

Finally, we shall notice that actors operate under various cultures such as unit, regional and systemic. Their mutual interplays create numerous effects on the actors. Without understanding these effects, we cannot analyze the alignment behavior of the states.

4.1.3.4. *An Identity Sharpener: Nationalism*

As we discussed in the preceding sections, societies form type and role identities concerning their own culture. The basic form of corporate identity is called generally “*ethnicity*” and societies incline to differ themselves from other societies through the imagined communal labels, such as Arab, Russian, and German. The term of “*ethnicity*” implies a kinship among members, “*a fictive super-family*” which originates from a common ancestor.⁸⁴ The concept of ethnicity tends to exclude other members of the society, who do not carry the same blood (racial understanding).⁸⁵ However, the nation is regarded as the political form of ethnicity with a territory and institutions.⁸⁶ In this regard, Laitin (1997: 12) defines the nation as an imagined and socially constructed issue. Similarly, Benedict Anderson argues also that nation is an imagined political community and primarily symbolic reality (Waeber, 1993: 31).

A nation may have more than one ethnic group (sub-nations) (Volkan, 1999: 34) and it forms the cultural basis of nationalism (Valdez, 1995: 86). Therefore, we can consider nationalism as the crystallized form of the communal identity with less racial understanding than ethnicity.

Nationalism rests on national identity, which is constituted by the followings: “*a shared past or common story of the nation; a strong, current commitment to the group; and a shared goal for the future*” (O’Lear, 2011:274).

Smith (1992: 438) articulates that nationalism is “*a doctrine of autonomy, unity, and identity for a group whose members conceive it to be an actual or potential nation that extends outwards in space and down the generations in time.*” Kaufman (2001:16) contends that nationalism is a belief that aims to realize the following self-esteem need: “*one’s own nation should take its rightful place among the nations of the world.*”

Nationalism creates a shared understanding of the world that bases “*on their perceived history of victories, losses, trauma, and victimization*” and it reduces the interaction costs (Subotic

⁸⁴ “...ethnic feeling is a descent-oriented, quasi-kinship sense of belonging, incorporating a sense of shared blood... it is strong and persistent precisely because it is a sociopsychological fact that kinship and blood-ties tend to produce strong, intense, and long-lasting bonding...” (Ruane & Todd, 2004: 210).

⁸⁵ “...tribal loyalty tends to be strongest when members share a collective identity narrative that I term the myth of common bloodlines. This shared narrative binds people together through the belief that they are of the same stock, linked by a common lineage and destiny.” (Shapiro, 2010: 638).

⁸⁶ “...there can be no identity without memory, no collective purpose without myth, and identity and purpose of destiny are necessary elements of the very concept of a nation.” (Smith, 1986: 2).

and Zarakol, 2012: 919; Shapiro, 2010: 638). Its logic leads the societies to reinforce old myths with new political meanings to keep the national coherence against outsiders (Smith, 1992: 449, 451). In this context, nationalists frequently refer to kinship images such as “*blood, family, brothers, sisters, mothers, ancestors, and home*” to incite ethnonational sentiments (Garb, 1997: 40), even though a nation may consist of different ethnics.

Societies attribute foremost importance to “*myth-symbol complexes*” and develop “*master narratives*” to mobilize the “*nation*” (Kaufman, 2001:24). The mobilization and politicization of ethnic group by elite necessities “*an underlying core of memories and experiences,*” which are embedded in “*group traumas*” (Anderson, 2000: 27; Ringmar, 1996:70; Jones, 2000:34).

National collective identity sets up the ground for national sovereignty and legitimizes the action of elites.⁸⁷ Thus, the role of nationalism is not deniable in the international politics. In this regard, Lebow (2008) has developed “*a Cultural Theory of International Relations*” that suggests a model for the study of the international relations and political order. He (2008: 224) argues that the grand theories fail to explain anomalies and inconsistencies in the International Relations because they do not consider the spirit of the societies.

4.1.3.5. *Fear Construction*

Fear plays a major role in the construction of the foreign policy. Major theories such as Balance of Power and Balance of Threat Theories have a fear-driven concept. Therefore, without understanding the construction of fear, we cannot conduct through analysis to comprehend the true motives of the state behavior in IR.

Scholars explain fear as a “*combined physiological and psychological reactions programmed to maximize the probability of surviving in dangerous situations in the most beneficial way*” (Bar-Tal, 2001: 603). According to Wendt (1999: 132), it is also a “*socially constructed*” phenomenon.

A long-lasting expose to fear effects in many ways the cognitive process of individuals and the behaviors of societies. Bar-Tal (2001: 604, 608) observes the following effects: “*a. it sensitizes attention to threatening cues, b. it causes overestimation of dangers and threats, c. it facilitates the selective retrieval of information related to fear, d. it causes overestimation of dangers and threats, e. it increases expectations of threat and danger, and f. it increases accessibility of procedural knowledge that was effective in coping with threatening situations in the past.*” The

⁸⁷ “...modern nationalism was initially an intangible change in the way people thought and felt, and this in turn undermined the legitimacy of the dynastic order.” (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994, 237).

long duration of fears cause societies to develop a “*collective fear orientation*” with the contribution of the collective memories, myths, and symbols, (Kaufman, 2001:31).

The most significant side effect of fear on a society is the “*freezing of beliefs*.” Societies exposed to prolonged fear fail to entertain alternative ideas that cause some “*political blindness*” to find different solutions. The collective fear orientation diminishes the ability of a society to interpret the cues and information appropriately and leads to mistrust and de-legitimization of others as well as making society members “*prisoner of past*” (Bar-Tal, 2001: 609).

Fear disseminates very fast through narratives within society, since it is contagious. Thus, it leads society to increase its solidarity, and it mobilizes group members to cope with the threat. Fear fuels threat perception and functions such as the engine of the security dilemma that leads states to balance or bandwagon with other countries. Therefore, fear is more than an attribute of an agent; it is an institutionalized feature of the world politics (Crawford, 2000: 119).

4.1.3.6. *Hatred*

Knowing the construction of hatred is important to interpret the securitization process of the states, because, it prepares the ground for enmity by creating stereotypes and de-legitimization.

The amount of the research in the literature on hatred is not much. Among these, we can count the work of Allport (1954), Bar-Tal (2007) and Halperin (2008). Scholars provide various definitions. The common points of these definitions are: a. aggressive impulses against someone, b. the desire to harm, humiliate or even kill c. hostile feeling directed towards someone or group (Halperin, 2008: 717).

The study of Halperin (2008) offers some insights to understand specific characteristics and features of “*group-based hatred*.” In this regard, Hatred is constructed through the cognitive process in which ideological, moral, and cultural differences are outperformed, and this leads to generate negative feelings towards the out-group (Halperin, 2008: 719). Hence, we can assert that existence of different corporate and type identities triggers the construction of hatred.

Hatred is different from anger and fear. A person or group, who get alarmed by fear, aspires to take some measures to overcome it. However, measures are not enough for hater; he or she wishes to harm the person or group (Halperin, 2008: 729).

There is a direct relationship between hatred and societal beliefs, thus, culture. The negative beliefs constructed through interactions are the most important factors for the formation of

hatred (Bar-Tal, 2000). Larson emphasizes (1985:39) that people do not use negative information properly. Therefore, this cognitive shortcoming manipulates our understanding of the world. The crisis, conflicts and other major events of the past deeply affect the “*psychology of a society or culture*.” These effects create traumas that shape the future behavior of a society. Negative self-images are significant consequences of the traumatized interaction between states or societies.

Humiliation and perception of disregard induce a society deeply since each society’ self-esteem seeks to have a respected status and tends to disregard negative self-images (Wendt, 1999:236). Similarly, the Symbolic Politics Theory of Kaufman (2001: 26, 29) suggests that “*people make political choices based on emotion and in response to symbols*.” Thus, disrespecting national symbols induces strong emotional responses and the misconducts in the past pave the way for the construction of hatred by a humiliated society.

One of the most significant consequences of hatred is the de-legitimization of the adversary. According to Bar-Tal (2000), the de-legitimization process creates stereotypes and puts the opponent into a negative position where the opponent is not regarded as human being (Halperin, 2008: 732; Orena and Bar-Tal, 2007: 112; Herrmann, 1988: 185). The de-legitimization process takes place in two steps. First, the opponent is put into the category of evil; second, the opponent is transformed into a non-human category, who must be destroyed.

Hatred is transferred to other generations by myths and narratives which are renewed following the spirit of time to produce new messages. The exploitation of myths-symbol complexes reinforces negative feelings between two groups that pave the way for the emergence of hatred, therefore, enmity (Kaufman, 2001:11, 12). In this regard, Volkan (1999: 30) articulates that hatred induces enmity between two neighboring states.

4.1.3.7. *Enmity*

Since the Waltzian concept operates at the system level, it omits the unit level analysis. However, the constructivist concept offers us some tools to analyze at the unit level that reveals the construction of amity and enmity between two units (Wendt, 1999: 252). To understand the formation of enmity and amity is also another important step to interpret the foreign policy behavior of the states.

In the earlier sections, the research tried to show constructivist assumptions regarding fear and hatred. Enmity can be regarded as a culmination point of the negative feelings between two societies. Classification or categorization of society as “*enemy*” justifies the full spectrum of the hostile attitudes towards other group and even destruction of it.

Societies continue to categorize each other in relation to their identity shaped by past interactions and culture. Accordingly, each society developed different perceptions (positive or negative) on another society. These perceptions take a concrete form by the use of the different labels (stereotypes) such as “*barbarians*,” “*infidels*,” “*torturer*.” Such labeling is a clear sign of the long-lasting and even embedded hatred transformed into enmity (Wendt, 1999: 261; Orena and Bar-Tal, 2007: 114).

Wendt (1999: 262) indicates four implications of the durable enmity between two states: “a. *states will exercise revisionist policies*, b. *worst-case orientation in the decision-making*, c. *exercising military-centric approach in policy making*, d. *conducting the war with all means, without limitation*.” Hobbesian culture promotes the formation of enmity through facilitating the emergence of “*the domestic interest groups*,” “*in-group solidarity*,” “*discourse of danger*,” and “*in-group bias*,” which provide “*a cognitive resource*” for enmity (Wendt, 1999: 275, 276).

Accordingly, when entrapped in enmity pattern, the interpretation of other’s capacity will be threatening, due to attributed negative meaning. Mutual negative impulses create “*a self-fulfilling prophecy*” that constitutes the core of realpolitik (Wendt, 1999: 262, 263).⁸⁸ The enemy image of another group soon becomes a public discourse and part of the culture by dissemination of different cultural products such as “*leaders’ speeches, media news and analyses, literary books, theatrical plays, films, and even in school textbooks*” (Orena and Bar-Tal, 2007: 115).

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) developed by Buzan and Wæver (2003) also offers additional insights by propositioning a regional look at the problem of “*enmity*.” It regards amity and enmity “*as essentially independent variables*” in its analytical framework. They claim that the pattern of enmity and amity is important at the regional level because their analysis helps us to interpret the actions of actors (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:40).

Regions are not only made up of material factors but also of “*the fears and aspirations of the units*.” In this regard, security constellations of the units can be best comprehended by analyzing the dynamics of the region. Accordingly, the intervention of external powers and balancing/bandwagoning behaviors of small powers can be explained through an understanding of enmity and amity patterns in a region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:43).

The analysis of enmity and amity pattern necessities the inclusion of the regional, global, and domestic factors and their effects on each other. The construction of fears, hatred, and threat

⁸⁸ “*Realpolitik, in short, is a self-fulfilling prophecy: its beliefs generate actions that confirm those beliefs*.” (Wendt, 1999: 263).

usually rests on the regional factors such as common past, interactions, the impact of formative events and material distribution (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:47). In this context, traumas experienced in the region play a special role, because they are “*historical memories of a nation*” (Wiberg, 1993: 97) and affect the exercise of the foreign policy.

Finally, we should pay special attention to “*trust*” among actors in a region, since its lack fosters the formation of enmity. In the Hobbesian culture, mistrust is used as a pretext to defend state’s interests against other actors and realists regard trusting others as a “*naïve act*” (Ziegler, 2012:5).

4.1.3.8. *Threat Construction*

Proponents of realism in international relations (Grieco, 1988; Waltz, 1979) and realistic Conflict Theory in psychology (Campbell, 1965; Levine and Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966; Sherif and Sherif, 1953) predict that asymmetries in power will automatically trigger perceptions of threat and intergroup conflict. In contrast, social constructivists in international relations (Hopf, 2002; Wendt, 1999) and Social Identity theorists in psychology (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Bar-Tal, 1998) argue that a shared sense group of identity can reduce the threat.

Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, 1987) provide a constructivist explanation for the construction of the threat perception. According to the main proposition of SIT, the categorization automatically triggers a threat perception due to the motivation for the protection of the in-group members. On the other hand, SCT emphasizes that individuals behave with respect to behaviors, schemas, which evokes prejudicial attitudes and discrimination against the out-group. Consequently, the discriminated group starts to develop a threat perception.⁸⁹

Rousseau and Retamero (2007:744) conducted laboratory experiments in two countries (Spain and the United States) to test the role of power and identity in the threat construction. They attained four conclusions: “(1) *a weak position in terms of military power increases threat perception, as realists predict; (2) shared identity decreases threat perception as constructivists predict; (3) ideas and power both influence threat perception in a systematic*

⁸⁹ The literature on the threat construction counts the followings as the central aspects of the threat construction: asymmetries in power (Campbell, 1965), identity and its types (Sjöstedt, 2013; Stein, 1988), categorization (SIT; Tajfel and Turner, 1979), behaviors schemas (SCT; Turner, 1987), the combination of power and identity (Rousseau & Retamero, 2007), cognitive processes: other actor’s intention based on the stereotypes (Knorr, 1976; Crawford, 2000), dominant system culture (Stein, 1988), decision making unit (Jervis, 1978).

manner; and (4) shared identity increases cooperation in economic policy areas” (Rousseau & Retamero, 2007:744).

As depicted in figure 7, the Construction of Threat Theory advanced by Rousseau and Retamero proposes that the perception of threat is only constructed after the formation of the corporate and type identities between the self and the other (Rousseau & Retamero, 2007:749). In this regard, Stein (1988: 264) claims that the perception of threat is subject to change over time and space in line with the changes of identities and dominant culture.




Figure 7 the Aggregation of Latent and Salient Identity Dimensions, Source: Rousseau & Retamero (2007:750)

The heuristic model of the Threat Construction Theory depicted in figure 8 shows the role and effect of power and identity. According to it, despite different identities, an actor will construct low-level threat as long as there are low power asymmetries and non-aggressive intent. On the contrary, the actor will construct high-level threat in case of the existence of power asymmetries and aggressive intentions, although both actors have same identities (Rousseau & Retamero, 2007:760).

The Construction of Threat Theory proposes a mechanism that explains the interaction of power and identity at the individual level, which might be applied to the unit level (Rousseau & Retamero, 2007:765). The model purports that the degree of the combination of power and identity plays the major role in the calculation of threat. However, this model fails to explain how the aggressive intention is constructed. In this regard, we need further research to develop a model or conception to explain the construction of intention with respect to power and identity.




Figure 8 Simple Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity, Source: Rousseau & Retamero (2007:760)

Sjöstedt (2013: 148, 153) points out the two functions of identity in the threat construction: a. being the source of a threat image (identity itself can be regarded as a threat), b. the identity constructions of actors operate “a catalyst or gate-keeper in accepting a particular idea as a threat.”

Snyder (1997: 31) suggests the followings as the necessary conditions for threat construction: a. conflicting interests, b. perception of intention to use force, c. military capacity. In this context, Buzan & Waever & de Wilde (1998: 58) claim that actor only remarks the posed threats and his vulnerabilities through calculation of the military capabilities when the dynamics of securitization starts to operate. Rousseau and Retamero (2007:745) points out the multidimensional aspects of threat and classify them into three categories: a. military threats, b. economic threats, c. cultural threats.

Knorr (1976: 79, 100) points out the fact that stereotypes formed through historical experiences are the significant factor in the estimation of the other actor’s intention (whether it is a bluff or precise and substantive). According to him (1976: 84), threat is a “*cognitive construct*” and its construction is “*conditional, potential, and hypothetical*,” because threat perception is made through the assessment of information pieces gathered from the past and present experiences, however, it envisages a possibility in the future for which we do not have reliable information at the moment of the estimation.⁹⁰

Threat perception rests on a hypothesis concerning the intention of an adversary, therefore, the building a hypothesis (assumption) necessities to omit some information. Our predispositions push us to defend our assumptions by neglecting or selecting some part of information about the reality. In this context, schemata and analogies play a particular role in

⁹⁰ Crawford (2000: 136) also asserts that threat construction is a cognitive process and its meaning is constructed socially.

the processing of the available information and the generation of the hypotheses. Furthermore, negative feelings, hatreds, and enmity emancipating from ethnic, religious, and ideological identifications often drive us to the misperception of the other's intention (Knorr, 1976: 113).

Another important aspect of the threat construction is the deliberate misrepresentation of foreign threats.⁹¹ The domestic dynamics such as struggles for political power, lobbies of weapon industry and power/interest centers⁹² might lead to deceitful collective threat construction at the unit level (Knorr, 1976: 114). In this context, Jervis (1978:174, 175) underlines the "*subjective security demands*" of decision-makers in the assessment of the objective situation on the basis of his or her subjective perception of threat and vulnerability. The subjective security demands of elites rest on a set of beliefs, which was formed with the help of subjective experiences. Hence, while some elites are more prone to construct excessive threat through assessment of other's behavior, the other is not. The personality traits and his or her beliefs, as well as the composition of the decision-making unit, play a decisive role in the interpretation of the environment, thus in the estimation of threat (Sjöstedt, 2013: 155). In the ideology-led states, state apparatus tends to construct threats in line with the official ideology due to built-in perceptual constraints (Knorr, 1976: 115).

Crawford (2000: 136) indicates that misperception of threat might also occur at the structural level because of the institutionalized tensions such as arms races and military cooperation. Similarly, Stein (1988:251) suggests that "*ideological, political, or cultural differences in cognitive contexts*" might cause miscalculation of the threat.

The prevailing culture in the system is the most significant factor in perceiving and assessing the threats. Each culture has various security paradigms such as self-help and collective action. Actors regulate their political behaviors in line with the dominant security paradigm. For example; any power shift in Hobbesian and Lockean cultures inflicts the sense of vulnerability and fear that promote an overestimation of threat (Stein, 1988:260). However, any power shift in a Kantian culture generates less tension due to the pluralistic security paradigm.

Finally, the interplay of the past lessons, culture, and identities generates standardized **perception pattern**, which is made by schemas, narratives, and myths, to assess others' intentions in a prejudicial manner. The use of this pattern is subject to the regional and

⁹¹ According to Karsten (1976: 120), misperception has two forms: a. "*manufactured, contrived, purposive 'perception' of a nonexistent threat,*" b. Incorrect perception of a threat.

⁹² Stein (1988:261) provides an example on the different threat calculation of CIA and US Military during the Cold War. According to him, "*civilian and military officials responsible for defense often unwittingly exaggerate threat to increase the size of budgetary allocations.*"

systemic security paradigms and domestic settings. It is always available in the collective mind of the societies, however, when and how it will be applied to an interaction may vary.

4.1.3.9. *Securitization*

Until the end of the 70s, Traditional Security Studies (TSS) were conducted under a narrow and objectivist understanding of security⁹³(Buzan & Waever& de Wilde; 1998: 203)⁹⁴which was military-centric and aimed to ensure the survival of referent object (Buzan&Waever&de Wilde; 1998: 21). According to TSS, securitization means to present an issue as a threat directed to the existence of the object and that necessitates taking extraordinary measures, which may be out of the normal political procedures (Buzan & Waever& de Wilde; 1998: 23; Oelsner, 2007: 261). According to Buzan (1998: 25), it consists of three components: “a. *the claim of a threat to survival and a demand for extraordinary measures*, b. *the adoption of emergency action*, c. *the effect on the relations between the affected units by violating rules that are otherwise binding*” (cited in Bernshausen and Bonacker, 2011: 27).

With the beginning of the 80s, security studies evolved into a wider and deeper concept by including additional dimensions of security other than the military dimension and different referent objects other than the state. Furthermore, the new studies envisaged a holistic view to analyze individual, state, and international system simultaneously (Monteleone & Rossi, 2008: 52) and started to rest on the social construction of threats (Buzan & Waever & de Wilde; 1998: 207).

According to constructivist, securitization is an intersubjective process, and it is socially constructed (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 245)⁹⁵ by attributing meaning to the past events, capacities of the armed forces, and geography (Buzan & Waever & de Wilde; 1998: 57, 59). Thus, constructivists assume that a threat is recognized as a real threat when it is presented as a threat. Accordingly, security is a “*self-referential practice*” (Buzan &Waever& de Wilde; 1998: 24).⁹⁶

⁹³ The traditional and objectivist security studies define security as follows: “*security is about what is a threat, and the analyst can tell whether something really is a security problem and for whom.*” (Buzan &Waever& de Wilde; 1998: 204).

⁹⁴ Murray (2010: 686) underlines the narrow assumptions of TSS and claims that they ignore the motives of state behavior.

⁹⁵ A general accepted constructivist definition of securitization is as follows: “*the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.*” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 491).

⁹⁶ As an example, we may remember of the metaphor “*axis of evil*,” which shifted the conflict between the Bush administration and countries like Iran and North Korea to a securitized discourse resting on existential threats.

In this context, constructivists value ideas as a distinct sector to consider the security analysis that is called societal security. This sector is subject to analyze, “*when societies perceive a threat in identity terms*” (Waever, 1993: 23). As Kelman (1997b) rightly indicates, identity is among the most important factors that lead securitization (d’Estrée, 2008:157). The constructivist securitization concept demonstrates how other identities are transformed into threatening identities through discourses.

If two distinct identities are constructed based on the competing elements, then the sense of threat arises in both societies, because, societies show strong motivation to defend and protect the components of their identities such as language, religion, and local cultural traditions. The identity conflicts based on the subjective security demands often lead to securitization (Wiberg, 1993: 107). In contrast, the identical identities reduce threat perception by generating shared ideas, interests and attributing positive meaning to the destructive capabilities of the others.

As a central aspect of identity, religion operates as a multiplier, when it interplays with other factors (Buzan & Waever & de Wilde; 1998: 59, 60) and any manipulation of it may cause securitization (Buzan & Waever & de Wilde; 1998: 124), particularly, in the Hobbesian culture (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:472).

On the other hand, a new definition of existing identities may trigger the de-securitization process. For instance, the EU is an “*outstanding example of a de-securitization process that resulted in a tremendous reordering of state identities and relationships*” (Green, & Bogard, 2012: 281).

The constructivist securitization process considers the political structure and the role of elites as the other key factors in the analysis besides identity. In this context, a politically weak state structure will be more vulnerable against an ideological divergence than a politically strong state structure. Therefore, weak states will sense more threat in the case of any challenge towards their political institutions (Buzan & Waever & de Wilde; 1998: 146, 150, 156).

Jackson (2009: 178) underlines the role of elites, who use the identity in the securitization process to mobilize their societies by playing “*on fear, threat, hatred, victimhood, and dehumanization of the other.*” As the Symbolic Politic Theory predicts, elites make extreme symbolic appeals that fuels the securitization process between two societies, when there exist hostile myths, fears, and hatred (Kaufman, 2001:33). Therefore, the speech act of elites is a critical issue to focus on. The speech acts of elites, which promote either trust or distrust of other societies, affect both the formation of identities and the construction of the regional culture (Ziegler, 2012:5).

In this regard, trust is a decisive factor in the securitization process. Trust has strong relations with identity. The formation of a collective identity among societies requires a high level of trust. Similar corporate identities have faith in each other due to kinship, ethnicity, and shared culture since they developed similar beliefs and values. According to Ziegler (2012: 6, 9), trust arranges the emotional dimension of interaction and past lessons play a major role in its reinforcement or erosion.⁹⁷ The lack of trust increases unpredictability (Ziegler, 2012:15) that fosters the securitization process negatively.

Past traumas, collective memories, and fear orientation often lead to exercise a paranoid foreign policy, since their existence usually indicates the existence of conflicting corporate and type identities, as well as radicalized elites (Guzzini, 2011: 330). Securitized relationships lead to an environment, where “*negative peace*” and distrust dominates and determines the conduct of the foreign policy (Oelsner, 2007: 263).

Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998: 35) indicates three focal points in the security analysis: a. referent objects (things threatened), b. securitizing actors (actors who securitize issues), c. functional actors (the actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security).

In this regard, the referent objects in the military sector is the state itself and the survival of its sovereignty (Buzan & Waever & de Wilde; 1998: 58), while the referent objects are the nation, civilizations, religions, and race in the societal sector (Buzan & Waever & de Wilde; 1998: 36, 123).

According to Frederking (2000: 365), “*beliefs, norms, and identities are types of social rules that constitute and regulate world politics.*” Wendt (1999, 261, 281) rightly claims that culture determines the expected level of violence from the other and, therefore, provides reliable inferences about other's intentions. In this context, the table 4 below shows the construction of beliefs and interests as well as resulting securitization process and behaviors with respect to the systemic culture. The regional and systemic cultures and the dominant security paradigm are the key factors in the securitization process. A Hobbesian culture or less internalized Lockean culture tends to create necessary conditions for the securitization. A good example is the emergence of the Cold War. The year 1947 marked a shift from “*cooperation paradigm*” to “*hostility paradigm*,” when the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, as well as Andrei Zhdanov's “*two camps*” Doctrine, were introduced. Both blocks framed their

⁹⁷ For example, the Russian experiences formed after the collapse of communism evoked a high level of mistrust in Russia against the West. Consequently, Russia formed a defensive, confrontational, and increasingly nationalistic identity, which was searching for a new identity since the collapse of Soviets (Ziegler, 2012:15).

referent objects (the liberty of the West and the western imperialism) that played a determinant role in the activation of securitization process (Alstein, 2009: 304, 311).

Culture	Hobbesian	Lockean	Kantian
Dominant Belief	Hatred, fear, and enmity.	Mistrust and caution.	Trust and cooperation.
Shared Ideas (norms)	Conflictual/norms of realpolitik	Institution of sovereignty	Cooperative/ non-violence/ mutual aid
Interest	Revisionist Aggregate power to survive.	Status quoist Increase security through joining alliances.	Cooperative Disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war.
Securitization under	Security dilemma	Security regime ⁹⁸	Security community ⁹⁹
Alliance Behavior	Power balancing	Balancing is not essential for survival	Collective security is neither threat-nor time-specific.
Estimation of other's intention	Self-help/Worst Case	Other-help/Common sense	Common-help/ the rule of law

Table 4 The relationship between Culture and Securitization, Source: Wendt, 1999

The table 4 also implies that alliance behavior is an outcome of the securitization process (Alstein, 2009: 304, 311) and the type of alliance depends on the dominant culture. This argument helps us to understand the logic of alliance formation and the degree of the securitization. For instance, the dynamics of military balancing do not operate in the Kantian culture, since the actors developed different beliefs, ideas, and interests that prevent securitization and create a collective identity, which estimates others' intention through the logic of common-help (Katzenstein, 1996b: 521).

Sjöstedt (2013: 144) advances an analytical framework to focus on the questions “*how, why, and when a securitization process is initiated*” (figure 9). He aims to analyze “*ideas and identity at the international and domestic levels, as well as the internalization processes of the central decision-making unit.*” He (2013: 145,146) claims that “*national security is a discursive construction rather than a mirroring of an objective reality*” and the identity of decision-makers affect securitization process “*by framing of an issue as a threat.*” According to him, securitization process follows a pattern comprising of “*framing, declaration, presentation an*

⁹⁸ A pattern of security interdependence still shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of violence in political relations, but where those fears and expectations are restrained by agreed sets of rules of conduct, and expectations that those rules will be observed.

⁹⁹ A pattern of security interdependence in which the units do not expect or prepare for the use of force in their political relations with each other.




Figure 9 Figure 5 Threat Construction Framework, Source: Sjöstedt (2013: 148)

action plan."¹⁰⁰ His analytical framework suggests ideas and identity as explanatory factors and internalization as causal mechanism operating between ideas and identity (Sjöstedt, 2013: 147).

Mirzoyan (2010: 8) claims that securitization is the reflection of enmity through foreign policy acts and, therefore, can be best comprehend by focusing on the regional level. However, the traditional mainstream theories tend to think at the system level by positioning states as great, middle, or small powers

and the scholars mostly ignore other levels, despite their case studies (like Walt, 1987) focus on regional issues. According to Buzan and Wæver (2003, 27), these theories "*overplay the role of the global level, and underestimate the role of the regional one.*" They suggest that IR shall consider regional level to conduct a comprehensive security analysis since regions link states and "*their securities cannot be considered separate from each other*" (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, 43). Respectively, Buzan and Wæver advanced a theory called as "*the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)*" resting on the regional security complexes (RSCs).¹⁰¹ RSCT proposes that "*conflict stems from factors indigenous to the region,*" namely, the analysis of the securitization shall be conducted by shed light on the pattern of rivalry, enmity and balancing among the regional actors considering the effects of an external penetration of other great powers (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, 47).

The study of the security discourses and security practices of the actors in a region enables us to identify the power relations and patterns of amity and enmity (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:48, 49). Therefore, one has to understand the factors in the background such as "*history, culture, religion, and geography*" (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:50) to interpret the securitization process in a region. In this context, Buzan and Wæver (2003:51) suggest an analytical framework to analyze the securitization process that combines unit, region, and system levels Buzan and Wæver (2003:491) assert that the interplay of these levels forms the security constellation of the actors:

¹⁰⁰ Monteleone & Rossi (2008: 55) also underlines this point by asserting; "*a problematic issue becomes securitized when it is presented as an existential threat to the specific referent object.*"

¹⁰¹ RSC is "*a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.*" (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, 44).

- Domestically generated vulnerabilities,¹⁰²
- State-to-state relations,
- The region's interaction with neighboring regions,
- The role of global powers in the region.

The proposed analysis framework by Buzan and Wæver (2003) resembles the framework proposed by Sjöstedt (2013) above in term of its logic. In sum, the scholars believe in the advantage of the three-level analysis, which seems promising to capture the essence of securitization and alignment, to understand the operation of the securitization process.

4.2. Case Study

This study aims to infer some conclusions from the past under the light of theoretical embedment framed above. Accordingly, it is necessary to focus on the past events to understand the dynamics of the long-lasting conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this regard, two periods deserve particular attention: a. the first period between the years **1878-1921** and the second period of the years **1988-1994**. This research aspires to show the striking similarities between two periods and their effects on the foreign policy behaviors of two states. To achieve this, we should gather some historical information on the major events in the past that shaped both societies. Therefore, in the next sections, we will focus on the brief history of both states and contemporary setting in these states.

4.2.1. Brief History

The history of both states can be traced to the 4th century BC. There are controversial claims regarding the roots of both communities. Some historians claim that both communities originate from the Caucasian Albanian. These historians, mainly Soviet scholars, referring to the Greek and Roman sources write that Albania was a state located in the region between the Caspian Sea and Iberia (Georgia). According to some sources, Albania survived until the 9th century, although they lost some territories in the 7th century to Muslim Arabs (Altstadt: 2, 3).

Although scholars provide some proofs regarding the states of Armenia until the 12th century, they indicate some elements of Azerbaijan statehood only after weakening of the Islam Empire starting from the 9th century. The arrival of Turkish tribes under the dynasty of Seljuks in the

¹⁰² "The specific vulnerability of a state defines the kind of security fears it has and sometimes makes another state or group of states a structural threat even if it or they have no hostile intentions." (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:51)

11th century led to the Turkification of the region until the 13th century (Forsyth, 2013: 92, 95; Altstadt:7).

The defeat of the Byzantine army by Alp-Arslan's army of the Seljuks Turks in 1071 near Manazkert opened the door of Anatolia and brought Armenia under the rule of Seljuks Turks (Forsyth, 2013: 105).

After the dissolution of the Seljuks, the South Caucasus became a subject of the rivalry between the Ottoman and Persian Empires throughout 200 years. In 1555, both empires agreed on the division of the Caucasus (Forsyth, 2013: 187; Leeuw: 86).

The control of the territory in the north of the lower Araxes interchanged several times due to frequent wars between the Ottoman and Persian Empires. The conflict between two empires lasted until 1639. After the peace agreement, which is even valid today, Armenia and Azerbaijan became the provinces of both Empires (Forsyth, 2013: 184, 195; Leeuw: 87).

Russia, under the rule of Great Peter, started its expansion towards the Caucasus in 1722. After a series of indecisive battles against the Ottoman and Persian Empires, Russia advanced in Caucasus gradually. The Turco-Russian Treaty of "*Kiichiik Kainarji*" was signed in 1774 and the Ottoman Empire left some territory in the north Caucasus to Russia (Forsyth, 2013: 224; Leeuw: 94).

During the military campaigns of Russia, local Armenians served in the Russian Army against the Ottomans until the 1830s to regain their independence. Armenians' efforts were supported by Russia, since she was following a policy of Catherine's "*Greek Project*," which aims to expel the Turks from Europe and restore the Byzantine Empire (Forsyth, 2013: 262, 265, 266).

The official Russian policy was to act as a protector of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, since Russian elites strived to form a chauvinist identity that assumes the role of "*protector*" as a historical task (Forsyth, 2013: 268).

After the defeat of Napoleon in 1812, Russia was allowed by the western powers to conquer the Caucasus because of her participation in the anti-French alliance. Russia invaded the Persian territory in the north of the Araxes River, and she marked her domination by imposing the treaty of "*Gulistan*." The Iranian efforts to regain the lost territory were useless and renewed war came to an end in 1828 by signing "*the Turkmanchay Treaty*." It confirmed the total annexation of the Northern Azerbaijan and the Khanate of Nakhichevan as well as Yerevan to Russia (see map 2).



Map 2 The South Caucasus in the 18th Century, Source: www.karabakh.org.

The consequences of the war made an enormous impact on the future of the region. Firstly, historic land of Azerbaijan was divided into two parts, and they remained under the Russian and Persian control. Secondly, Russia was perceived by Armenians as “*their liberator*” from the Persian and Ottoman Empires and thousands of Armenians from Anatolia and northern Persia moved into the new Russian territory, including Karabakh (Leeuw, 2000: 96; Forsyth, 2013: 276, 307, 308).

The Russian military success fostered new Russian attacks into the neighboring region of the

Ottoman Empire. The successive Turco-Russo wars in 1829, 1856, and 1877 changed the demographic structure and social life in the Caucasus due to the

	Azerbaijani Turks	Russians	Armenians	Total Population ^b
<i>Baku guberniia</i>	485,146	77,681	52,233	826,716
Baku	63,415	45,510	22,583	182,897 ^a
Gökchay	92,962	2,475	12,994	117,705
Jevad	84,054	4,635	699	90,043
Kuba	70,150	3,971	1,191	183,242 ^a
Lenkoran	84,725	9,728	483	130,987
Shemakhi	89,840	11,362	14,283	121,842
<i>Elizavetpol guberniia</i>	534,086	17,875	292,188	878,415
Ganje	103,970	10,428	43,040	162,788
Aresh	47,133	162	13,822	67,277
Jebrazil	49,189	893	15,746	66,360
Jevanshir	52,041	208	19,551	72,719
Zangezur	71,206	1,006	63,622	137,871
Kazakh	64,101	3,444	43,555	112,074
Nukha	83,578	230	18,899	120,555
Shusha	62,868	1,504	73,953	138,771
<i>Erevan guberniia</i>	313,176	15,937	441,000	829,556
Erevan	77,491	3,713	58,148	150,879
Aleksander	7,832	6,836	141,522	165,503
Nakhjiran	64,151	1,014	34,672	100,771
Novobayazit	34,726	2,716	81,285	122,573
Surmalinsk	41,417	1,361	27,075	89,055
Sharur-Daralagez	51,560	122	20,726	76,538
Echmiadzin	35,999	175	77,572	124,237

Table 5 Imperial Census of 1897, Source: Altstadt, 1992:100)

mutual mass migrations.¹⁰³ According to the Russian Imperial surveys conducted in the 1860s, the proportion of total Russians and Armenians in the Baku “*Guberniia*” was less than 7% of the population (Altstadt, 1992: 28). Thousands of Muslims in the occupied areas of the Caucasus moved into remaining Turkish territories in the Balkans and the South Caucasus.¹⁰⁴

Harsh measures were taken by the Ottoman Empire to suppress the riots in the Eastern Anatolia also caused an influx of Armenians. The mutual migrations led to the emergence of the Armenian majorities in some regions of the South Caucasus (Forsyth, 2013: 290; Hovannisian, 1967: 8; Swietochowski, 1995: 12).¹⁰⁵ The table 5 above shows the ethnic composition of in the South Caucasus as of 1897. As we will study in the next sections, the developments and incidents during the pre-WWI and post-WWI made great impacts on the societies living in the region and paved the way for the mutual mistrust and enmity that shape the contemporary political scene in the region.

4.2.2. Contemporary Setting

Armenia, Azerbaijan, which experienced a brief statehood after WWI, gained their independence in the wake of the Soviet Union's disintegration in 1991. However, Armenia and Azerbaijan were not prepared for the sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union. Both states had to face with many uncertainties. One can list the followings as the security challenges of these states faced at the beginning (Rondeli, 2000: 48, 49; Hunter, 2000: 25; Jones, 2000: 4; Leeuw, 2000: 178; Shaffer, 2002: 141):

- a. The absence of real nation-state,
- b. Unexperienced state apparatus,
- c. Leadership problems, authoritarian administration style, Lack of democracy,
- d. Lack of international political experience and strategic culture,
- e. Corruption and existence of the criminal organizations, dominance of oligarchs,

¹⁰³ “By the end of 1830, approximately one hundred thousand Armenians from the plains of Erzerum and Lasher followed the example of those who had emigrated from North Persia to Transcaucasia. Most of these Turkish Armenians settled in the abandoned Moslem areas of Akhalkalak, part of the former phthalic of Akhaltsikh.” (Hovannisian, 1967: 9).

¹⁰⁴ “Russia consistently tried to alter the demographic conditions in the South Caucasus, by inciting Muslim Azeris to leave, and welcoming Christian Armenians in great numbers.” (Cornell, 2001: 35).

¹⁰⁵ “Recent research by George Bournutian confirms that prior to the Russian conquest the Armenians accounted for some 20 percent of the total population of Eastern Armenia, and the Muslims 80 percent; following the Russian annexation, 57,000 Armenian immigrants arrived from Persia and the Ottoman Empire and 35,000 Muslims emigrated from Eastern Armenia. By 1832, therefore, the Armenians formed half of the population. Another area of Armenian concentration where they had formed for centuries a substantial part of the population was Karabakh. The Russian figures from the 1830s put the number of Armenians at approximately 19,000, against 35,000 Muslims. The Armenians inhabited the mountainous portion of the former khanate.” (Swietochowski, 1995: 11).

- f. The problems of refugee and internally displaced persons,
- g. Deficient redistribution of wealth,
- h. Dependence on the old Soviet infrastructure,
- i. Underdeveloped sense of national identity,
- j. Undefined national interests,
- k. Different security visions among elites,
- l. Lack of regional cooperation,
- m. Great Powers involvement,

Some of these problems still last today, and they affected the domestic and external policy exercise of both states tremendously. Moreover, the dominance of these issues in the regional politics shapes the regional culture/anarchy and paves the way for the securitization.

Taking into account these challenges, scholars suggested two theories regarding the future political direction of both states. First, both states would go under the sphere of influence of Russia, due to material constraints. Second, because of cultural linkages, Turkey and Iran would compete for regional influence, and dominant position of Russia and Russian influence would fade. Both of these theories failed to predict the outcome. Today, we witness an outcome that is a mix of both theories. Because, in this region, geography, history, and culture affect the policies of both states in a complex way (Hunter, 2000: 25-27).

Both states seek security, but, due to historical reasons and threat perception, their conception of security differs, which leads them to the different directions (Rondeli, 2000: 49). Jones (2000: 8) underlines the role of identity problem with the rise of ethnic tension that leads to the regional conflicts. Moreover, the strategic location of the South Caucasus and its rich energy resources makes this region a subject of the competition among the regional and Great Powers that fuels the fire of conflicts. In the next paragraphs, I will examine these issues in detail for both states and their related political behaviors.

4.2.2.1. *Armenia*

Armenia voted her secession in a referendum on 21 September 1991 from the Soviet Union and two days later; she proclaimed independence. Ter-Petrossian was elected as the first president in 1991 (Forsyth, 2013: 668).

The president faced with many challenges to cope with. These challenges include economic depression, poverty, political extremists and isolation of the country due to Nagorno Karabakh

Conflict as well as demographic problems (Forsyth, 2013: 669, 670).¹⁰⁶ The Karabakh question got Ter-Petrosyan into trouble with his political opponents, as he sensibly refused to let the Armenian Republic accord Highland Karabakh formal recognition as an independent republic before foreign countries did so.¹⁰⁷

The declaration of the independence and the program of the Armenian National Movement (ANM) had two premises, which constitute the conflicting dynamics of the Turkish-Armenian relationship. As cited by Bölükbaşı (2011: 121), both documents called for: “a. *the struggle to convince the United Nations to recognize the 1915 genocide, b. international recognition of the injustice done to Armenia through its loss of territory to Turkey and Azerbaijan, c. the annulment of the March 16, 1921, Russo-Turkish treaty, which recognized the territorial losses (of) the Armenian side incurred up to then.*”

Ter-Petrosyan was blamed for his radical thoughts regarding the improvement of the relationships with Turkey and Russia as well as for the solution of the conflict. Hunter (2000: 31) defines the new policy of the government as follows: “(1) *the inadequacy and unrealistic nature of the policy of relying on a third power, which traditionally has been Russia; (2) the abandonment of excessive affinity for Russia and unrealistic expectations regarding what Russia can or would be willing to do for Armenia; and (3) the need to end Turkish-Armenian animosity.*”

Explicitly, Ter-Petrosyan stated that Armenia should play a more conciliatory role in the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. Therefore, he made clear his intent to withdraw the Armenian troops from the occupied Azeri territories, according to the peace plan proposed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The aim of Ter-Petrosyan was to end the isolation by compromising. However, his radical ideas were not welcomed by nationalist, and he was accused of selling the country (Forsyth, 2013: 774).

The political crisis forced the President to resign in February 1998, and Robert Kocharyan was elected as the President of the Republic on May 30, 1999. Meanwhile, Karen Demirchyan, the President of the National Assembly, and Vazgen Sargsyan, Prime Minister were assassinated in the terrorist attack in parliament on October 27, 1999.

The present president, Serzh Sarkisian, who led the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Self-Defense Forces Committee from 1989 to 1993 and served as the defense minister of Armenia

¹⁰⁶ After the independence, almost 18% of the population, who were well educated, left the country and the population dropped under 3 million.

¹⁰⁷ The most popular Dashnak insisted the ruling party to claim Karabakh and the eastern territory of Turkey in the declaration. However, Ter Petrosyan suspended it in 1994 (Forsyth, 2013: 670).

from 2000 to 2007, came to power after the 2008 elections. He consolidated his rule by exerting oppressive policies on the opposition. Under his rule, the transition of Armenia to democracy was slowed.

The other relevant issues on Armenia are listed below (Doc-44, 2016):

- The total population is about 3 million.
- Armenia has a highly homogeneous society.
- Armenia deprives of poverty. It is estimated that more than 1.2 million Armenians are living on approximately \$3 a day.
- The Armenian Apostolic Church holds exerts a strong influence on the Armenian society.
- In 2016, Armenia ranked 84th in the Human Development Index. The official GDP per capita comprised around \$8189 in that year.
- Armenia is a partly free democracy, according to the Freedom House Report 2016.
- Military expenditure was 4.3% of GDP in 2014.

4.2.2.2. Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan declared the Independence in August 1991, and the communist Mutalibov became the first president. He was forced to resign in March 1992, because of his incompetence in the war. Elchibey, the candidate of the popular front, was elected as the president in June 1992. Russia was upset with him because of his pro-Turkish policy. He explicitly stated that “*he desired a confederation between Turkey and Azerbaijan in 20 or 30 years*” (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 155).

Although he was successful in regaining some lost territories during the first months of his term, however, he later failed to sustain this success. Many arising problems in the economy and politics led to the loss of the public support and made him the target of a military coup designed, according to some claims,¹⁰⁸ by Heydar Aliyev, a former member of Soviet Supreme, and Colonel Surat Huseynov. After throwing Elchibey, Aliyev had been appointed as the president and Huseynov as the prime minister (Forsyth, 2013, 2013: 660). Aliyev was an experienced politician knew very well how to cope with the internal and external dynamics. Hence, he left pro-Turkish policies exercised by Elchibey and approached to Russia by signing

¹⁰⁸ Bölükbaşı (2011: 202, 203) cites that “*there are some allegations that Huseynov was an agent of Russian military intelligence. These claims indicate the Russian military support to Huseynov before and during his successful attack to Samyang and Agdere (Martakert) in June 1992 as well as the timing of coup are meaningful, when Azerbaijan was about signing a grandiose oil contract with a Western consortium.*” Leeuw (2000:186) also supports this claim and indicates the Russian role in the military coup.

the CIS agreement, which was refused by Elchibey. However, his flirt with Russia was a part of the game, and Aliyev demonstrated within several years his political talent to manipulate other actors to realize the interests of Azerbaijan (Jones, 2000: 62; Forsyth, 2013, 2013: 659).

The prudent policies of Aliyev brought stability to Azerbaijan. He achieved the realization of the so-called Contract of the Century, which contributed to the politic and economic development of the country.

When Aliyev died in 2003, his son Ilham Aliyev took power. He succeeded to amend the constitution in 2009 by lifting two-term limit on the presidency. Consequently, he was re-elected in 2013 for the third term. The other relevant issues on Azerbaijan are listed below (Doc-43, 2016):

- The total population is about 9.8 million.
- 17% of its territory is under the invasion of Armenia.
- The presence of ethnic minorities poses the risk of destabilization of Azerbaijan.
- Religious radicalism has a potential to become a risk.
- Azerbaijan's democratic progress is slow, and Azerbaijan is not a free democracy, according to the Freedom House Report 2016.
- The Azerbaijani government promotes the loyalty to state identity as part nation building.
- Heydar Aliyev is presented as a symbol of national unity.
- The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict poses major threats to the nation-state identity.
- In 2016, Azerbaijan ranked 78th in the Human Development Index. The official GDP per capita comprised around \$16413 in that year.
- Military expenditure was 4.8% of GDP in 2015.

4.2.2.3. *Other Actors*

Since we will conduct a more comprehensive study concerning the role of other actors in the next chapters, we can very briefly summarize the interests of other actors here:

Russia regards the region as her backyard. The Russia's political obsession with this region dictates her to put great emphasis on the developments in the region. Her obsession has two foundations: first, the protection of the ethnic Russians, second, the control of the energy resources in the region. To achieve these goals, as some scholars write, Russia shows a tendency to monitor the developments in the region by using her overwhelming resources, such as energy and manipulating the conflicts. Russia tries to restore her hegemony using Russia-led international organizations such as CIS, CSTO, and the Eurasian Union. However, Russian efforts initiate counterweights against her attempts (Jones, 2000: 14, 15; Hunter, 2000: 27-29).

Turkey has interests in the region due to her historical and cultural ties with the newly founded states. Turkish politicians regarded the collapse of the USSR as an opportunity to restore her linkages and to minimize Russian influence. To achieve this goal, Turkey presented itself as a model for the state building. However, it became soon clear that Turkey's economic, political, and military assets are not capable of conducting this ambitious policy without the support of the West. Presently, Turkey strives to carve out stable economic and political relationships with Turkic-speaking states and Georgia as well as to seek ways of establishing relationships with Armenia (Jones, 2000: 17).

Iran also welcomed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and sought to establish strong links with these states to create a buffer zone in the North against its traditional enemy Russia. Iran also had not much to offer the new states and her religious link with Azerbaijan did not operate as Iran expected. Accordingly, Iran started to follow a balancing policy against the Turkish influence in the region. Although Iran seems to keep her neutrality in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, she supports Armenia indirectly through the financial and energy resources (Jones, 2000: 18).

The United States follows a delicate policy in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many observers expected the U.S. to exercise an aggressive policy towards the region, which would complete the containment of Russia; however, U.S. limited her engagement to the economic and humanitarian interests. As Jones (2000: 18) rightly describes, U.S. focuses on four interests in the region: "*a. strengthening regional economic mechanisms, b. developing East-West energy and transportation processes, c. nonproliferation, and d. providing support to conflict resolution efforts.*" The present U.S. policy caused disappointment in Azerbaijan and forced her to follow a balancing policy in the recent years.

The EU is also an important actor in the region, concerning state building, good governance, and conflict resolution. EU aspires to diminish her energy dependence on Russia through differentiating the gas sources. In this context, the rich Caspian energy resources draw the EU's attention to the South Caucasus. Thus, the EU developed some master programs such as Neighborhood Policy reinforced with some economic and diplomatic measures to keep the regional states in her political orbit. However, since the EU does not offer any security assurance to the regional states, her "soft-power" policies do not address the security needs of the regional actors and seem to fail in the long-term.

Since regional and great powers do not allow each other to exert its influence in the region, OSCE emerged as the most influential international organization in the region. In this regard, OSCE plays a key role in the conflict resolution, democratization, and good governance.

However, its structural incompetence emerging from the multifaceted interests of the members harmed the credibility of OSCE in the region.

NATO seeks to develop its relationships with two states under the pretext of Partnership for Peace program (PfP). Azerbaijan seems more willing to enhance her relationships with NATO, whereas Armenia keeps herself more restraint. The invasion of Georgia in 2008 by Russia diminished NATO's expansionist ambition and Azerbaijan's aspiration to join NATO.

The prospect of both states is closely related to the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and the exploitation of the energy resources in the region. The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict affects the foreign policy of both states and the prospect of the regional cooperation negatively. This conflict can be regarded as a present-day reflection of the past problems, and without understanding its dynamics, all other attempts will be in vain to comprehend present behaviors of both states.

The second determinant of the foreign policy is the energy resources and access to these resources. Particularly, energy plays a vital role in the Azerbaijan's economy. Azerbaijan strives to improve her infrastructure and upgrade her military capacity with the help of oil and gas revenues. Azerbaijan strives to divert the interests of the EU and USA through pipeline projects to the region, to gain advantage for the solution of the conflict in her favor. In contrast, Armenia is a landlocked country and poor at the energy resources. Armenian economy heavily depends on the external support that means Russia and, thus, Armenian elites do not see any other prospect that might offer new horizons for the country and regional cooperation.

In this context, this region and the relations among internal and external actors perfectly reflect many dynamics and aspects of the alignment behaviors. Thus, the special context of the region allows us to entertain various alliance theories and analyze their assumptions.

4.2.3. The First Period: 1878-1921

The first period is important because we witness the first indications of the present animosity in this period. This period consists of the awakening of the Armenian nationalism, the peak of the Russian chauvinism, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the devastating WWI, and the foundation of the first republics of both states.

The Russian invasion of the South Caucasus affected the life of the ordinary Armenians in the eastern Anatolia extremely. Because the Armenians living in the South Caucasus under the Russian Empire developed a nationalistic sense that seeks to establish an independent

Armenia in the eastern territory of the Ottoman Empire with the support of Russia.¹⁰⁹ Trusting on Russia's "*protector-liberator*" role, the first rebellion took place in 1862 at Zeitun, and in Van. These attempts were only the early warning signals of the much bigger and deadly incidents of the future.

During this period, the Ottoman Empire was on the way to collapse. The Ottoman elites were trying to save the empire against the harmful effects of nationalism and self-determination arising among her millets (unity of nations).¹¹⁰ Moreover, the Ottoman Empire was under the pressures of the European Great Powers concerning the reforms for non-Muslims of the empire.

In this context, particularly, the years between 1878 and 1921 require particular attention to focus, and many major events make these years a subject of this case study. Hence, I will study in the next paragraphs these major events, to identify the conflict dynamics, their construction, and impacts on the societies.

4.2.4. Major Events

4.2.4.1. 1877-78 Ottoman-Russo War

The first major event that made an enormous impact on the life of the ordinary people is the so-called Turko-Russo war lasted more than one year. The consequences of this war affected the course of the future events.

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Russia imposed harsh conditions in the Treaty of San Stefano, including provisions for the reform in Armenian populated regions. However, the European major Great Powers exerted excessive pressure on Russia to revise the treaty, since they feared from the shift of balance of power in Europe in favor of Russia. Consequently, both sides signed the Berlin Treaty with the participation of the European Great Powers. The Berlin Treaty provisioned the return of some occupied territories to the Ottomans, in return, the Ottoman Empire had to allow Great Britain to establish a military base in Cyprus and account to Great Powers for the progress of the promised reforms undertaken by Sultan (Libaridian, 2004: 91).

¹⁰⁹ In this regard, the Union of Salvation founded in 1872 is regarded as the first Armenian organization and basis of the later nationalist parties such as Hnchak (the Bell) and Dashnaktsutyun (Revolutionary Union) (Forsyth, 2013: 305).

¹¹⁰ Greece was the first independent nation which had become in 1829 and after the treaty of San Stefano in 1878, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria gained their self-determination right either as autonomous or as independent state (Melson, 1982: 499).

The year 1878 marked as the turning point of the destiny of the Ottoman Empire. Russia's military success on the western and eastern fronts put the Ottoman Empire in a desperate situation. The collapse of the Empire became much more visible. Ottomans lost vast territories in the west and east. The control of the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire by Russia caused great concerns for Great Britain, which wants to maintain the control of the routes to India. Russian military success and the poor social and economic conditions in the eastern Anatolia fostered the Armenians' desire to separate from the Ottoman Empire and encouraged the Armenians to rebel against the local authorities (Forsyth, 2013, 2013: 339). The article 61 of the Berlin Treaty, which provisioned the right of third-party intervention in the internal affairs of Ottomans to investigate the reforms held for the Armenian minority, played a special role to encourage the Ottoman Armenians to rebel (Ishkhanian, 1991: 16).

Millions of people changed their living places. Enormous migrations caused many social and economic problems and prepared the necessary ground for the rise of future atrocities. As Gorder (2006: 186) underlined that, *"the 1878 Berlin Treaty fueled such resentment and animosity toward Armenians, in such a way that its net effect was negative."* Furthermore, this war and successive treaties affected negatively the collective memory of the Turks, who experienced dislocations and severe sufferings (Bloxham, 2005: 47). Turks and Muslims started to see Armenians as traitors and spies of the external powers.

4.2.4.2. 1905 Crisis

The second significant event that made a vast impact on the social life is the societal crisis of 1905. The oil boom started in the mid of the 19th century in Baku caused social fragmentations due to the uneven distribution of wealth. The Russian and Armenian business persons were controlling the oil industry, and the majority of workers belonged to both ethnicities.¹¹¹ This situation together with the market's instability made a devastating effect on the labor and consumer markets as well as led to a social unrest among Azeris. It gave rise to the Azeri Nationalism (Leeuw, 2000: 105) since the Azeris considered themselves weak in the competition with the vigorous Armenian merchants and Russian rulers (Altstadt, 1992: 43).

Regarding the root cause of the war, Altstadt (1992:42) claims, *"the Azerbaijani Turks were the chosen target because they were the largest group in Caucasia. If they could be defeated, no other group would stand in the Armenians' way... The Dashnaksutiun regarded an 'armed*

¹¹¹ According to the records, 48% of the industrial workers in Baku by 1907 were Russians, Armenians, only 10% were Azeris, and the remaining 42% were other ethnics such as Iranians, and Dagestanis (Leeuw, 2000: 104).

struggle' as necessary and terror as a political tool" to establish an Armenian State (Libaridian, 2004: 83; Salt, 2003: 20; Sonyel, 1987: 282). Furthermore, Altstadt (1992: 43) points out the Russian colonial policies as the secondary cause of the conflict that evoked enmity, even violence among ethnics through the manipulation of differences to control them. Azeris regarded the Armenians as the spearhead of tsarist tyranny and, therefore, abhorred them. In return, Armenians humiliated the Azeris as "*unskillful farmers*" that must not serve in the state apparatus.

This crisis paved the way for the establishment of the various ethnopolitical groups to materialize specific national interests. Both communities aspired to alter the status quo through different methods. Azeris wished to expel Russians, while Armenians wished to expel Azeris with the help of Russia. All that developments incited the idea of self-determination in the minds of people.

4.2.4.3. 1917 Revolution

As is explained in the previous paragraph, 1905 crisis made an enormous impact on the political thinking of the people. It reinforced the "*self-determination*" wills that were widespread among the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. Lenin adopted the self-determination as a strategy to materialize communist revolution, although he did not believe in the content of self-determination concept (Forsyth, 2013, 2013: 347).

Following the revolution, the major cities in the Caucasia and the Eastern Turkey felt in turmoil. All communities had organized armed national units ready to fight for their national goals. Sonyel (1987: 307) portrays these days as in the followings: "*This led to an orgy of unprecedented savagery and atrocities by the Armenian soldiers of the Russian army, and irregulars, who joined forces with other Armenians and Greeks. The aim was to exterminate the Muslims. The drama enacted in Eastern Turkey in those days was too horrible.*"

In March 1918, the Soviet forces reinforced with Dashnaks troops attacked and captured Baku and brought it under the Bolshevik control. Thousands of Azeris fled the city, and according to some estimations, Bolsheviks killed 3000 Azeris before and even after the capitulation of Azeri forces. Azeri figures reach a death toll of 12000 Muslims (Forsyth, 2013, 2013: 371; Altstadt, 1992: 83, 86).

The armistice signed after the Bolshevik Revolution in December 1917 allowed Ottomans' to move into the Caucasus. Thus, the Ottoman Caucasus Army¹¹² started its advance toward the Caucasus with the intend to retake the lost territories during the war of 1878 and restore peace and stability. The Ottoman Army had captured Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi ¹¹³ suppressed the Armenian insurgency in Karabakh and arrived in Baku. According to the Armenian sources, the Ottoman Army killed many Armenian rebels during its advance. The pressure of the Ottoman Army led to the formation of the Transcaucasian Federation¹¹⁴ on 9/22 April 1918, which separated from the Bolshevik Russia (Altstadt, 1992: 87; Bölükbaşı, 2011: 33, 34; Forsyth, 2013, 2013: 376).

4.2.4.4. *Independence and its Loss*

The reluctant union of three states dissolved on May 26, 27 and 28 subsequently, the republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were proclaimed (Leeuw, 2000: 112; Altstadt, 1992: 89; Libaridian, 2004: 21).

After the evacuation of British troops from Baku on September 14, the civilian Armenians became defenseless. To revenge the incidents in March, irregular Azeri troops attacked civilians (Kazemzadeh, 1951: 226). The number of killed people reportedly reached up to 9000,¹¹⁵ until when the regular Turkish troops restored the order (Leeuw, 2000: 115; Bölükbaşı, 2011: 34; Altstadt, 1992: 92).

Armenia played a spoiler role in the cooperation of three states and paved the way for the Soviet's invasion. In this regard, after the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, Armenian troops occupied Lori, which is today a contested district between Armenia and Georgia. This situation led to a brief war between Armenia and Georgia (Forsyth, 2013: 382). Armenia refused to sign Azerbaijani-Georgian defense treaty in June 1919, made excessive demands from Turkey, and involved in a conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabakh. Moreover, the excessive trust in Russia led to the isolation of Armenia in the region and created favorable conditions for the invasion of the Soviets in the next years (Forsyth, 2013: 404; Kazemzadeh, 1951: 215).

The Ottoman Empire signed the Mudros armistice on October 30, 1918. Again, Armenian government considered this development as an opportunity to invade the eastern part of the

¹¹² It was called as "*the Army of Islam*" and established with the participation of irregular forces from Azerbaijan and Dagestan (Altstadt, 1992: 90; Leeuw, 2000: 113).

¹¹³ Ottomans re-gained these cities through the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 34).

¹¹⁴ Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia formed the independent "Transcaucasia," that lasted only a month, due to the fundamental political differences among members (Forsyth, 2013: 372).

¹¹⁵ According to the Armenian National Council, 5248 Baku Armenians were massacred (Kazemzadeh, 1951: 143).

Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, Armenian politicians encouraged by the victorious powers demanded that “*the Armenian question*” would be settled during the peace talks. This situation led Armenians to the illusion of “*Greater Armenia*,”¹¹⁶ therefore; they made unrealistic demands of the Allies. However, the Allies had never tried to materialize Armenian demands at the expense of their interests (Kazemzadeh, 1951: 213).

The treaty of Batumi (on June 4, 1918) provisioned that Armenia would cease her claims to the six eastern cities of Anatolia; in return, the Ottoman Empire had recognized Armenia. However, after the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire, Armenia abandoned her commitments in the treaty and demanded more than before. The treaty of Sevres, which the Allies, Armenia, and the Ottoman Empire signed in August 1920, produced new hopes for Armenia to realize the dream of “*Greater Armenia*” (Libaridian, 2004: 22). As a result, Armenia announced the annexation of some cities of the Eastern Anatolia, which means a renewing war with the Turks.

At the same time, The Turkish nationalists were fighting against the western invaders to establish a new state in Anatolia. Denouncing the treaty of Sevres and forming friendly relationships with the Soviet Russia, Turkish nationalist attacked Armenia on September 1920. Armenia did not receive any expected support from her western partners and Russia. Accordingly, on 7 November the Turkish troops reached to Alexandropol (Gyumri) and, meanwhile, Red Army pressed from the direction of Azerbaijan. Under these circumstances, Armenia had no other options, but surrender. Armenia accepted the terms of Turks and both sides concluded an armistice on 18 November in Alexandropol (Kazemzadeh, 1951: 287, 288; Bölükbaşı, 2011: 37).¹¹⁷

The British occupation of the South Caucasus ended by August 1919. The departure of the occupying forces from Baku paved the way for the Bolshevik invasion. In January 1920, Azerbaijan had to fight on two fronts against Red Army in the North and Armenians in the West. The conflict over Karabakh turned into a war in 1920 and weakened the Azerbaijan army that facilitated the Russian invasion (Kazemzadeh, 1951: 227). The Soviets made all necessary arrangements to invade Azerbaijan. Under the pretext “*fraternal assistance*” to the request of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (AzCP), Red Army crossed the undefended border at the end of April (Altstadt, 1992: 96-98; Leeuw, 2000: 119; Bölükbaşı, 2011: 37). The Red Army using the same pretext as it did in the case of Azerbaijan, entered in Armenia on 28

¹¹⁶ Greater Armenia depicts a country stretching from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and from the Black Sea to the Caspian.

¹¹⁷ Today, some Armenian elites state that they do not recognize this treaty and it constitutes a major dispute between Turkey and Armenia.

November with the covert support of the Armenian Military Revolutionary Committee (Kazemzadeh, 1951: 288; Forsyth, 2013: 420).

Turkey, which was fighting against the western invaders, overlooked the invasion of Azerbaijan, while Russia disregarded Turkey's suppression of Armenia at the end of 1920.

4.2.4.5. Nagorno Karabakh-Formation of a Conflict

Once Karabakh was an Island of stability during the First World War, the situation changed in March 1918 due to a general strike. Consequently, Armenian militias expelled over 100000 Azeris from their villages and killed at least a thousand of Azeris during the duration of unrest. After the breakup of the Transcaucasian Federation, Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed its sovereignty, which was an autonomous entity ruled by a joint Armenian-Muslim Council under Transcaucasian Federation (Leeuw, 2000: 150; Forsyth, 2013: 40). Azerbaijan claimed the whole of the former Elizavetpol province, including Karabakh (Forsyth, 2013: 405). This incident was the first fire of the future conflict.

The British occupation administration decided to subordinate Karabakh under the Azeri rule in January 1919, due to reports from allied observers in the field (Leeuw, 2000: 151; Forsyth, 2013: 407; Altstadt, 1992:102).

After the invasion of Armenia and Azerbaijan by Soviet Russia in the end 1920, the newly founded Armenian SSR did not consider Karabakh in her unity. In fact, denoting Bolshevik brotherhood, Azerbaijan proposed that Zangezur and Nakhichevan should be part of Armenian SSR. However, the Soviet supreme did not grant full possession of Karabakh and Nakhichevan to the Armenian SSR in December 1920 (Forsyth, 2013: 426; Altstadt, 1992: 116). Thus, it subordinated Karabakh as an autonomous republic of Azerbaijan.¹¹⁸ However, Soviets subordinated Zangezur under Armenian SSR with intending to cut the link to Turkey and facilitate ethnic discontent through partition (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 40). The partition of the territory of nations served to the interests of Soviet administration and to the formation of future ethnic conflicts that would arise in the last years of Soviets.

4.2.4.6. Sovietization

Red Army had gradually invaded Azerbaijan and Armenia between April and December 1920 respectively, and both states disappeared within months from the international scene without the notice of the western powers (Kazemzadeh, 1951: 285). Although particularly in Ganja, Azerbaijan army fought against the Red Army and Azeri people defended their cities, they

¹¹⁸ For that decision, Soviets considered field reports and surveys (Altstadt, 1992: 116).

could not escape from their destiny that was the submission under the communist rule. After controlling insurgency in Azerbaijan through fierce fighting and massacres, Lenin retaliated with the execution of hundreds (Forsyth, 2013: 420; Leeuw, 2000: 125).¹¹⁹

Both states subordinated under the Transcaucasian Soviet Federation (along with Georgia) that survived until the promulgation of the Stalin constitution in 1936 (Libaridian, 2004: 22).

Soviet elites advertised communism as the salvation of the Caucasus people and promised on many issues. For example, they promoted Sovietization as a shield against Pan-Turanism and expansionist ambitions of the Armenia's neighbors, whereas they promoted it as a guarantee of the territorial integrity in Azerbaijan.¹²⁰ However, the Soviet rule was not friction-free. It provided a temporary solution to the problems between two states and partly prevented states from pursuing their national interests.¹²¹ The inability of the communist governments in solving economic problems caused many sufferings in both communities. Consequently, ethnic disputes came to foreground many times (Kazemzadeh, 1951: 293). Furthermore, the Soviet way of life affected the culture and social life of both societies (Libaridian, 2004: 25) profoundly.

4.2.4.7. *Mutual Atrocities*

Towards the end of the 19th century, external and internal dynamics put the Ottoman society into turmoil. The ethnic friction became visible and very sensitive because of the intervention of the external powers in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Their conflicting interests regarding the territory and population of the Ottoman Empire and the weak economy of the Empire as well as migrations/displacements were the primary causes of the clashes between Armenians and Muslims in the Eastern part of the Empire. In the following sections, the study will briefly examine the major atrocities that can be considered as "*formative events*."

4.2.4.8. *1894-6 Uprisings (Flare up)*

Armenian revolutionary activities were first witnessed between 1878 and 1883 in Bitlis, Erzurum, Zeytun, and Van.¹²² The goal was to attract the attention of the European Great

¹¹⁹ Leeuw (2000: 125) depicts the ferocity of Red Army and Soviet Administration as follows: "*In Baku, persecutions unseen since the days of Timur were carried out. According even to the most conservative estimates, over 100000 Azeri citizens perished in the purges between 1920 and 1925 alone.*"

¹²⁰ After the immediate control of Azerbaijan by communists, Azerbaijan government sent an ultimatum to the Armenian government to withdraw her troops from Karabakh and Zangezur (Leeuw, 2000: 124).

¹²¹ After controlling Armenia, Lenin disregarded his promises concerning the unity of the east and west Armenia. Moreover, the Soviet government even omitted the territories that were formerly under the control of the Republic (Libaridian, 2004: 23).

¹²² Young Armenians had established underground organizations in some cities (Erzurum and Van) even in 1872 that were devoted to the salvation of Armenia (Libaridian, 2004: 18).

Powers and form an independent state with the support of them.¹²³ The Armenian revolutionaries intensified their activities in 1893, and the first serious incident took place in 1895.¹²⁴ The “*Bab-ı Ali*” demonstration in 1895 and the seizure of the “*Ottoman Bank*” in 1896 were the most challenging terrorist attacks since they performed in the capital of the Ottoman Empire against the authority of Sultan. The aim was to advertise the Armenian question and get external support (Dadrian, 1995: 138, 141, 144).

The Sultan Abdulhamit was suspicious on Armenians since he experienced that many Armenian para-troopers had fought actively under the Russian army against the Ottoman army during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and the Armenian organizations such as Hinchakian¹²⁵ and the Dashnaktsutun parties were receiving support from Russian authorities.¹²⁶

The attempt to assassinate Sultan by Armenian terrorists in 1895 aimed to manipulate the perception of Sultan negatively. As a result, Sultan degraded “*the loyal Armenian Millet*” to a disloyal society (Melson, 1982: 501; Gorder, 2006: 180). Accordingly, he exerted harsh measures to suppress the Armenian insurgency (Dennis, 2011: 273, 274).

The riots and uprisings lasted chain-like two years in different time and places (Dadrian, 1995: 156). The figures of killed people vary between 50000 and 300000 Armenians (Melson, 1982: 489). The Muslims, who had experienced massacres in Crete, Crimea, North Caucasus, and in the Balkans at the hand of Christians, had been settled in eastern provinces. Thus, some of them participated in massacres for revenge that increased death toll (Melson, 1982: 507). During the continuation of the incidents, many Muslims also was a victim of the brutal atrocities. When local authorities finally took the incidents under control in 1996, the Dashnak elites, who were responsible for the provocation, fled to Russia. The incidents and mutual atrocities in this period led to the first exodus of many Armenians from Turkey into various countries (Leeuw, 2000: 145).

¹²³ At that time, there were Russian, France, and Great Britain consulates in Van city (Dadrian, 1995: 131).

¹²⁴ In the early 1890s, the Dashnaks had started to conduct assassination of government officials in the Eastern Anatolia (Leeuw, 2000: 144).

¹²⁵ The Hinchakian and Dashnaktsutun parties have same political agenda and aim to defend Turkish Armenians and restore ancient Armenia through “*revolution*” supported by European diplomacy. They called their manifest as “*people's war*” and the “*Sacred Task*” (Minassian, 1996: 149, 151).

¹²⁶ Salt (2003: 33) indicates the perception of Abdulhamit as follows: “*such an ethno-religious Armenian enclave would be a stepping stone first to autonomy (along the lines of the autonomy granted, under European pressure, to the Maronites of Mt Lebanon in 1864 and the Bulgarians in 1878 under European pressure) and finally independence.*”

4.2.4.9. 1905-7 "Tatar -Armenian War" (Spill out)

We can mark this incident as the first major atrocity between Armenians and Muslims that took place outside of the Ottoman territory. At the center of the crisis were many issues. However, the uneven distribution of the labor force (less than one-sixth of the labor force in Baku's oil industry were Azeris) and confiscation of the possessions of the Armenian Church by Russian authorities can be regarded as the major causes of the conflict (Swietochowski, 1996: 214).¹²⁷ The simmering antagonism between the two communities for a long time turned into full-scale fighting when a Muslim business person was murdered by Dashnak militiamen. In the first phase of the conflict, the numbers of killed Azeris and Armenians were 126 and 218 respectively, according to Leeuw (2000: 145, 146).

For the first time, the fighting took place in the rural areas, particularly; Armenian gangs caused much harm to the Azeri farmers in Shusha (Leeuw, 1998: 70). The other important aspect of this conflict was that the Armenians were playing the leading role in the exercise of violence.¹²⁸

During the two-year ethnic clashes, 128 Armenian and 158 Azeri settlements were destroyed by gangs, and death toll estimations vary between from 3100 to 10000 (Leeuw, 2000: 149; Swietochowski, 1996: 215).

Leeuw (1998: 70) indicates the role of the Tsarist authorities in the escalation and their indifference in the appeasement of sides. Some academics regarded the Dashnaksutian as the chief responsible for the organization of bands formed by the Armenian refugees from the eastern Anatolia (Leeuw, 2000; Swietochowski, 1996; Kazemzadeh, 1951). These bands attacked to the Azeri villages with the motivation of revenge killed unorganized masses (Kazemzadeh, 1951: 19).

The major consequences of this conflict were, on the one hand, the rise of the Azeri nationalism. Azeris blamed Russia for their pacifism and their inability to suppress the Armenian gangs. Consequently, Azeris abandoned their passive stance against Russian rule (Swietochowski, 1995: 41). On the other hand; it disclosed the question of political and economic oppression of the Armenians under the Tsarist rule.¹²⁹ Many Armenian elites

¹²⁷ Armenians considered Azeris as unskilled "Tatar" laborer. The hostility had been arisen among the predominantly rural Muslims, most of who immigrated recently to Azerbaijan, against the urbanized and merchant Armenians (Swietochowski, 1996: 214).

¹²⁸ Swietochowski (1996: 215) quotes from an Armenian-American publication that *"the view of the Armenians as harmless sheep uncomplainingly stretching their necks to the slaughter is not borne out by the facts ...It is also untrue that the Armenians have always been the chief sufferers."*

¹²⁹ Tsar ordered to edict the expropriation the properties of the Armenian Church in 1903. This incident also paved way to the formation the socialist aspect of the ARF ideology (Libaridian, 2004: 108).

realized that Russia would protect Armenia as long as it suits her interests (Libaridian, 2004: 96). Therefore, it served also to strengthen the Armenian nationalism.

4.2.4.10. 1915 Events (Burning)

The Armenians had been continuously requesting Russia's intervention in the Ottoman's internal affairs under the pretext of reforms (Minassian, 1996: 185). In this regard, the Dashnaks and the Hinchaks had seen WWI as an opportunity to retake their historic lands.

Armenians trusted, not only on the Russia's support but also on the support of Britain and France. The secret Sykes-Picot agreement signed by Britain and France in 1916 stipulates the establishment of an independent Armenian state (Sonyel, 1987: 306).¹³⁰ Armenians started to believe in the realization of an Armenian state. Consequently, the rapid advance of the Russian troops in the eastern front excited some radical Armenians that led them to mobilize¹³¹ in the South Caucasus and to a general uprising throughout the Eastern Anatolia in January 1915 (Leeuw, 1998: 91).¹³²

For the first time, the Armenian insurgents in Van massacred at least 9000 Muslim on May 1915 to take revenge of the incidents took place in 1896. The uprisings followed each other and outspread in the whole region. The Armenian terror exerted in the rear area of the Ottoman Army, which fights against the Russian, British and the Allied armies in the Caucasus, Basra, Suez and the Dardanelles respectively, caused great tension and concerns in the Ottoman government, ruled by Enver Pasha.¹³³ Consequently, the Russian Army had advanced very rapidly with the help of the local Armenian para-troopers, since the devastated communication

¹³⁰ The secret plan, signed by the French representative, Georges Picot and the British representative, Sir Mark Sykes, in London in 1916, envisages partition of Turkey and the formation of the western Armenia that would be set up to fight against the Turks (Sonyel, 1987: 306).

¹³¹ Citation of Samson Harutunian's speech, the President of the National Bureau, by Hovannisian (1967: 45) shows the level of the Armenian enthusiasm at that time: *"From all countries, Armenians are hurrying to enter the ranks of the glorious Russian Army, with their blood to serve the victory of Russian arms ... Let the Russian flag wave freely over the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Let, with your will, great Majesty, the peoples remaining under the Turkish yoke receive freedom. Let the Armenian people of Turkey who have suffered for the faith of Christ receive resurrection for a new free life under the protection of Russia."*

¹³² After the Russian declaration of war on Turkey, Armenian Catholics expressed their loyalty to the Empire and the Tsar. In this context, Armenian National Bureau established in Tiflis organized the volunteers to conduct auxiliary military works in order to serve the Russian army (Kazemzadeh, 1951: 26). Armenians considered fighting against Muslim as a holy task. Therefore, Armenians had voluntarily served under the Christian Russia's Army since the 1827-1828 Russo-Persian War (Ishkhanian, 1991: 15).

¹³³ Sonyel (1987: 298) describes the activities of the Armenian gangs as in the followings: *"Under the circumstances, with the Russians advancing along a wide front in the East, with the Armenian guerrillas spreading death and destruction while at the same time attacking the Ottoman armies from the rear, and with the Allies invading the Empire along a wide front from Galicia to Iraq, the Ottoman Government had to do something about what it considered to be 'Armenian treachery'."*

lines and huge casualties inflicted by the Armenian guerillas diminished the resistance of the Ottoman Army (Leeuw, 1998: 92; Gorder, 2006:180; Mazinani, 2013:32, 33).¹³⁴

Under these circumstances, the Ottoman government decided to deport Armenian population into other provinces of the Empire to secure the rear area of the army. However, the implementation of the executive order of the Ottoman government was problematic. During the transfer of the Armenian masses, thousands of deportees died because of “*contagious diseases, hunger, long marches, and attacks by the Kurdish tribes as well as misconduct of some state officials*” (Mazinani, 2013:32, 33; Libaridian, 2004: 138). The deportees usually transferred to Syria and some of them emigrated to Europa and USA, which constituted, today, the core of the Armenian diaspora around the world (Leeuw, 2000: 137).

Regarding the number of killed Armenians and Muslims, the various sources provide different figures pending on their political origin. The Armenian sources report that “*by the end of the war at least one million Armenians had been killed or had perished otherwise*” (Libaridian, 2004: 21, 140). Leeuw (1998: 93) estimates the numbers of killed Armenians between 50000 and 80000, while Turkish sources cite the figure of the perished Armenians between 100000 and 300000.¹³⁵

Today, the discussion revolves around the number of deaths and the responsibilities of the Ottoman government. Armenian scholars claim that these “*pogroms were coordinated and followed a predetermined course, and could not have been realized without the knowledge and resources of the Turkish government*” (Libaridian, 2004: 21, 129). In contrast, Turkish side blames Armenians for their separatist and criminal attitudes and relates the outcome of the war conditions.

No matter, how this tragedy took place, it made a tremendous impact on the Armenian people around the world (Hunter, 2000: 30) and it became a “*chosen trauma*” in the collective minds of the Armenian and Turkish societies.

4.2.5. The Second Period: 1988-1994

The second period is strikingly similar to the first period in term of the occurrence of the events. As depicted in table 6 below, the existence of similar events enables us to compare events

¹³⁴ The following scholars and sources depict the Armenian atrocities at that time: B. A. Borian, Kazemzadeh, the Shaws, Toynbee, Cemal Pasha, the Harbord Report, the letters of Russian officers such as Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Khleboff, Lieutenant Nicholas.

¹³⁵ McCarthy (1983, 1995); Gürün (1985)

and derive some implications concerning the role of the past in the exercise of the foreign policy and the formation of alliances by Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Periods	1st Period	2nd Period
Formative Events	The collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917	The disintegration of Soviets 1991
	The Revolution of 1917	Glasnost/Perestroika 1986-1991
	Independence 1918-20 and Isolation of Armenia	Isolation of Armenia lasting from 1991 up to date
	The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict 1918-20	The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict is starting from 1988 up to date.
	The Mutual atrocities: 1894-96, 1905-07, 1915	The mutual atrocities: Baku, Sumgait, and Khojaly
	Sovietization, 1920	Customs and Eurasian Union+ CSTO

Table 6 Comparison of the Formative Events in both Periods

4.2.6. Major Events

4.2.6.1. *Disintegration of the Soviet Union*

The disintegration of Soviets prevailed that the underlying problems existing since 1919 were not solved, but simply repressed in the past 70 years. Ethnic conflicts surfaced as more complicated than these occurred in the first period (Forsyth, 2013: 637, 640).

By the end of 1991, all but two of the union republics had proclaimed their independence from Moscow. Russian led Soviets did not welcome their decisions, and they threatened the separatist states as the Russian Provisional Government did in 1917. (Forsyth, 2013: 644, 646). However, the central government was on the verge of collapse and was not able to hinder the progress of independence.

The disintegration of Soviets created many economic, social, and political problems as we observed in the first period. Consequently, the chaotic situation immediately brought security concerns under the daylight. However, this time, the newly added dynamics transformed these problems into more complicated forms.

In the first years of independence, Russia was indifferent to the developments in the region. However, starting from 1995, she increased her influence gradually and manipulated the external policy of the small states through various tactics. Moreover, the aspirations of intra and extra-regional actors made the situation more complex, as did the aspirations of Great Powers in the first period. Thus, we shall study the following events under the light of that fact.

4.2.6.2. *Nagorno Karabakh- deepening of the conflict*

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the revival of ethnic conflicts made a similar impact on Azeris as did the Tatar-Armenian War lasted from 1905 to 1907 by awakening once again the national feelings of Azeris (Swietochowski, 1995: 194). The political environment in the Caucasus was similar to the political atmosphere in 1917 (Forsyth, 2013: 647).

Under the Soviet rule, the first signs of conflict emerged in 1963, when Armenia sent a petition to the Soviet supreme (Forsyth, 2013: 592). However, the violence broke out in 1988, when the Armenian provincial council members voted for the union with Armenia (Forsyth, 2013: 650).

The revitalization of the conflict made soon Azeris in Armenia and Karabakh the subjects of the Armenians' atrocities. The Armenian bands attacked Azeris' villages and forced them to leave Armenia and Karabakh by exercising brutal tactics.¹³⁶ Consequently, 200000 Azeris and Muslim Kurds had fled Karabakh (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 86). Armenian gangs continued to kill Azeris¹³⁷ living in the region controlled by Armenians. As a part of its ethnic cleansing policy, Armenia expelled most of its Azerbaijani inhabitants in late 1988 (Forsyth, 2013: 653; Libaridian, 2004: 207; Walker, 2000: 170).¹³⁸ Thus, Armenian politicians completed the ethnic cleansing throughout Armenia as happened during the construction of the first independent Armenian republic (1918-20) (Dudwick, 1996: 438). By the end of 1989, about 160000 refugees were living in Azerbaijan (Altstadt, 1992: 203). Similarly, Armenians in Azerbaijan suffered the same fate, and about 300000 Armenians became refugees (Libaridian, 2004: 207; Leeuw, 2000: 156).

Frequent clashes between two ethnics intensified due to the illegal support of both governments. The mutual hatred reached to the point that Azerbaijani and Armenian factories fired workers from the other ethnic group.

The conflict escalated gradually due to the mutual ferocity of both communities. The street fights turned out into armed clashes. Both communities resorted guerrilla tactics such as ambushes and bomb attacks on troop convoys (Forsyth, 2013: 654). The clashes took place in Khojaly village on September 19, 1988, was an indicator of the danger that "*inter-communal fighting was getting out of control*" (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 102; Altstadt, 1992: 207).

¹³⁶ Initially, the Armenian armed gangs murdered 127 Azeris (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 86; De Waal, 2003: 63).

¹³⁷ De Waal (2003: 63) states the total Azerbaijani death toll reached to 216.

¹³⁸ According to Panossian (2006: 230, 231), the number of the expelled Azerbaijani population (including Muslim Kurds) from Armenian SSR reaches to 167000 people and homogenization of Armenia changed from 90 percent to 98 percent.

By February 1989, the number of murdered persons rose to 90 and wounded to 1650 in both sides. Armenians started to cross the border and attack Azeri villages as well as they smuggled weapons to arm Armenian paramilitary units even by airlifting. The declaration of secession of Karabakh Armenians from Azerbaijan in August 1989 and Armenian decision to annex Karabakh in December 1989 made the dispute more complicated. Well-organized Armenian terrorist groups infiltrated into Azerbaijan and conducted massive terrorist attacks in some cities (Forsyth, 2013: 655; Altstadt, 1992: 203, 207, 210; Leeuw, 2000: 159).

During the weekend of 13-14 January 1990, extremist Azeris and refugees from Armenia attacked to Armenians in Baku. According to the reports, the number of the murdered Armenians was between 32 and 56, whereas the number of killed Azeris was not clear (Altstadt, 1992: 216; Bölükbaşı, 2011: 131).

To suppress the ethnic unrest, Red Army and MVD troops entered Baku on 20 January 1990 and conducted a so-called “security” operation that turned into a massacre, which laid many deaths of civilians behind (Leeuw, 2000: 162; Forsyth, 2013: 657-658). The APF claimed that in Baku alone the death toll approached 300, including many civilians (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 135).¹³⁹ Azeris called this incident as “*Black January*” that tremendously affected their subconscious.

In April 1991, the disobedience of the Karabakh Armenians led to the operation of Soviet MVD troops together with Azerbaijani Interior Ministry Forces (OMON) in Karabakh called “*operation ring*.” This incident also like “*Black January*” caused a lot suffering, but this time on the Armenian side and led the Armenian leaders to reconsider Armenia’s relationships with Russia (Libaridian, 2004: 208; Bölükbaşı, 2011: 166; Forsyth, 2013: 667).

On January 26, 1992, the conflict turned into a full-scale fighting, when Azerbaijan’s Army started its offensive near Dashalty (Leeuw, 2000: 170). Russia started to play a double game when the war erupted. According to the various reports, Russian mercenaries provided military service to Azeris at the beginning of the war, when Azeri offensive seemed to be successful; they started to help Armenians by employing air attacks to stop Azeri assaults (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 195; Leeuw, 2000: 167; Cornell, 2001: 356, 357).¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ The Soviet official figure varies between 69 and 120 civilians’ deaths. Azeris claim that 180 were killed and 498 wounded (Leeuw, 2000: 162; Forsyth, 2013: 657-658).

¹⁴⁰ Bölükbaşı (2011: 189) claims that “*in 1992 six Russian servicemen were captured by Azeri villagers near Kelbejar, and confessed that they were from a 7th Army base in Armenia and were allowed by their commander to serve in the NKAO as mercenaries. While the 366th Regiment was working for the NKAO Armenians, the 23rd Division in Ganja began cooperating with Azerbaijani forces in late 1991.*”

After two year-long fighting, both sides finally agreed to sign cease-fire effective on May 12, 1994, which became permanent agreement on July 27, 1994. Although Russia insisted on deploying Russian peacekeeping forces under the pretext of CIS, Azerbaijan refused the Russian proposal (Walker, 2000: 169, 170).

The consequences of the war were tremendous. According to various reports, the death toll varies between 15000 and 25000 people and wounded up to 50000. The conflict and war resulted in deep humanitarian crisis. The number of Armenian displaced persons (DPs) is estimated 345000, whereas the number of Azerbaijani displaced persons is estimated 732000.¹⁴¹ Presently, the negotiation continues between two states through various formats under the supervision of the OSCE. The UN condemned the Armenian occupation with several resolutions (822, 853, 874, and 884), called for the withdrawal from the occupied Azeri territories, and confirmed the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (Walker, 2000: 172).

We can best define the present situation as a stalemate and an intractable conflict (Forsyth, 2013: 652), since none of the sides are willing to compromise (Walker, 2000: 179). Since the ceasefire up to date, both sides have been violating it occasionally that increases a number of the casualties on the line of contact and deepen the enmity between two societies.

4.2.6.3. *Isolation*

As it happened during the period between the end of WWI and the Soviet occupation in 1920, once again Armenia faced with isolation in the region.

The end of the Soviet rule exacerbated the economic conditions, which were already worse. Azerbaijan blockade of Armenia aims to force Armenia to cease her support to the Karabakh Armenians. Cutting off the railway (87% of Armenia's supplies were normally brought through Azerbaijan) and a gas pipeline coming from Russia paralyzed the Armenian economy and affected social life tremendously. The Armenian state came to the verge of total bankruptcy.

The advance of the Armenian forces in the Azerbaijan's territory forced Turkey to change her initial neutral position in favor of Azerbaijan due to the increasing public pressure. Turkey

¹⁴¹ Leeuw (2000: 183) gives the figures as follows: "One of the more or less independent surveys, carried out in spring 1994, put the number of casualties as registered on January 1, 1994 on both sides of the front together at 10,600 (4,000 Armenians, 6,600 Azeris) and the number of injured at 44,000 (14,000 Armenians, 20,000 Azeris). As for the number of war refugees, between 300.000 and 350.000 people had been forced to leave Azerbaijan, most being Armenians as a result of the 1988 events, whereas the number of homeless Azeris both within and outside the republic was estimated at 750.000 altogether. According to the report, the occupied territory totaled 12.520 square kilometers or 14.5 per cent of the Azeri republic's entire territory."

closed her border with Armenia to convince Armenia to cease her offensives (Libaridian, 2004: 226; Jones, 2000: 62).¹⁴²

Presently, the collective blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey lasts, and its lifting depends on the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. In accordance with the same policy, Azerbaijan seeks to exclude Armenia from the regional projects such as pipelines and railways.

As a result, the isolation pushed Armenia to corporate with Iran (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 130). More importantly, the isolation of Armenia served to the augmentation of the existing hatred and enmity between two states and constituted an obstacle in front of the regional cooperation.

4.2.6.4. *Mutual Atrocities*

The second period is also full of pogroms similar to them exercised in the first period. However, this time, the brutal atrocities show some spatial distinctions. In this section, the study will examine these atrocities to derive some insights, which will be useful for the further analysis in the next chapters.

4.2.6.5. *Sumgait Pogrom*

Many scholars consider Sumgait pogrom as the climax of the escalation occurred between two conflicting societies. The incident took place in the city called Sumgait where several thousand Azeri refugees expelled from Armenia and Karabakh were living at that time.

Some successive incidents accelerated the escalation. On February 22, 1989, Armenian gangs operating in Karabakh attacked several Azeri villages and killed two Azeris. Accordingly, thousands of Azeris left their villages, and most of them arrived in Sumgait (Leeuw, 2000: 156).

The inter-communal violence flamed up on February 27 in Sumgait because of the rumor that an Armenian raped an Azeri girl. The crowd was out of control and attacked to Armenians' houses and murdered innocent people for revenge. Police only could take the violence under control after three days. The result was terrific: The number of murdered Armenians and Azeris was 26 and six respectively (Leeuw, 2000: 156; Forsyth, 2013: 651; Altstadt, 1992: 197). Moreover, Azerbaijani authorities had taken out 14000 Armenians from the city for security

¹⁴² However, Turkey opened the border to allow humanitarian aid. For example, in November 1992, Turkey had supplied 300 million kilowatt hours of electricity to Armenia and allowed transit flights carrying wheat to Armenia in order to prevent humanitarian disaster.

reasons, and around 350000 Armenians from different regions of Azerbaijan left the country (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 88; De Waal, 2003: 40).¹⁴³

The official reports prepared after investigations indicate the passive stance of the police.¹⁴⁴ This pogrom initiated widespread consequences by evoking unpleasant experiences of the past and by inciting nationalistic feelings of Armenian people.¹⁴⁵ It served for “*hardening of each side's disposition*” and for the further escalation of the conflict in the upcoming days. It undermined the credibility of the Soviet government as the guarantor of Armenian security (Croissant, 1998: 28; De Waal, 2003: 40, 44; Libaridian, 2004: 206). Armenian elites presented it as a renewed “*Pan-Turkish threat to the whole nation.*” It reinforced the analogy of “*cruel Turks*” and therefore, Armenians juxtaposed the Soviet Azerbaijan with the Ottoman Turkey (Kurkchiyan, 2005: 154).

4.2.6.6. Khojaly Pogrom

On February 26, 1992, the Karabakh Defense Forces attacked Khojaly, a small town on the road between Stepanakert and Agdam. The Azeri population, most of them was women, children, and elderly, were tortured, and slaughtered. The number of the murdered civilians is estimated up to one thousand. Additionally, many civilians were reported as missing (Leeuw, 2000: 171).¹⁴⁶ Armenian side later accepted their responsibility and blamed irregular troops for the atrocity (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 182).

The remaining population of the town fled to Agdam. The impact of Khojaly was tremendous in the Azeri population residing in the other parts of Karabakh by initiating an Azeri exodus towards the east that completed ethnic cleansing (Cornell, 2001: 95).

¹⁴³ Police arrested 86 persons but only four young Azeris were prosecuted in Russia. Two of whom were sentenced to death and had been executed (Leeuw, 2000: 156).

¹⁴⁴ De Waal (2003: 41) writes some allegations regarding the role of KGB: “*Many people have pointed a finger at the central KGB, alleging that it organized the violence. One version has it that the KGB organized the violence to ‘frighten the Armenians’ and make them back away from their protests; another, that it was done in order to sow ethnic discord and maintain Moscow’s iron grip on both Azerbaijan and Armenia. A third version was that the KGB staged Sumgait in order to discredit Gorbachev and perestroika.*”

¹⁴⁵ In March 1988, during the mass demonstrations in Yerevan, demonstrators compared the Sumgait massacre to the 1915 massacres. Karabakh Armenians characterized it as a sign of “*a new genocide*” (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 90).

¹⁴⁶ Bölükbaşı (2011: 182) reports the death toll as 485 based on an Azerbaijani parliamentary investigation.

The date of the atrocity was coincident with the date of Sumgait pogrom had taken place four years ago. According to some eyewitnesses, the Soviet 366th Regiment supported the Armenian forces by encircling the town (De Waal, 2003: 170; Bölükbaşı, 2011: 182).¹⁴⁷

According to De Waal (2003: 171), the Khojaly massacre seems to be a deliberate act of the Armenian elites to revenge Sumgait pogrom and intimidate the Azeri population in Karabakh.¹⁴⁸

4.3. Inferences from two Periods

As readers will notice, both periods have many similarities with each other. It is so because both periods are the functions of the same dynamics operating for two hundred years. Therefore, this study will try to identify these dynamics in this section.

Hunter (2000: 29) counts the followings as the shaping forces of the internal and external policies: *“geographic location, ethnic, religious, and cultural composition, the degree of national unity, historical experience, ideological tendencies, worldview, nature and personal qualities of the leadership.”* Thus, understanding these dynamics necessitates the knowledge of the regional context, history, and geography as well as the objective and subjective security interests of inter and intra-regional actors.

Only when we infer insights from both periods, we can explain the generation of the collective memories, identity formation, and the construction of the securitization process. In this regard, any study that examines the past interactions of Azerbaijan and Armenia should comprehend the historical course of the Turkish-Armenian relationship, since; it constitutes the core of the interactions in the first period. The explanation of the events in the second period needs a deep comprehension of the first period. This fact also stated by (Libaridian, 2004: 195) with an example that *“Nagorno Karabakh and the Genocide have their points of intersection.”* The preparation and exercise of the pogroms in both periods are strikingly similar that indicates the effectiveness of same dynamics. The following sections will examine the emergence of nationalism, the role of religion, the impact of the Great Powers, and the politicization of the

¹⁴⁷ Cornell (2001: 355) cites the interpretation of the Khojaly made by Thomas Goltz: *“According to a German-Armenian photographer who had travelled with Armenian units prior to and during the events, the participation of dozens of tanks and APCs from the 366th in their attacks on Khojaly had been a welcome surprise.”*

¹⁴⁸ De Waal (2003: 172) refers to the statement of an Armenian police officer, Major Valery Babayan who suggested revenge as a motive: *“He told the American reporter Paul Quinn-Judge that many of the fighters who had taken part in the Khojaly attack originally came from Sumgait and places like that.”*

past to understand the formation of the identities, negative perception patterns, and securitization processes.

4.3.1. Emergence and collision of two nationalisms

Both societies have a common and interwoven past. However, fictionalized narratives, different perceptions of realities and recreation of the past through imagination forced both societies to believe “*in the nation-state model and nationalism as absolute values*” (Libaridian, 2004: 185). To understand the rise of the nationalism in both societies, we should study the conditions before and during the first period.

The past interactions and tragic incidents created a distinct culture consisting of myths, symbols, and narratives. The use of these social structures by elites to strengthen national coherence cultivated the national consciousness of the societies. Particularly, the 1877-78 War, the tragic events of 1915, Sumgait, and Khojaly massacres made a tremendous impact on the societies and paved way to the rise of symbolic nationalism.

The ruling elites of the Ottoman Empire considered nationalism as the only way to save the empire. They invented a peculiar kind of nationalism, which was not matching with the major principles of the Empire. The heavy burden of the Western imperialism also played a major factor in the rise of the Turkish nationalism. The Armenians, on the other hand, also regarded nationalism as a strategy to unite the people who were deprived of the worst conditions in the Eastern Anatolia. Armenians projected themselves as the vanguards of the western enlightenment to secure the intervention of the Great Powers, which was regarded by the Turks as a Trojan horse of the Western imperialism to weaken the Empire (Libaridian, 2004: 188, 189). Azeri nationalism was the weakest one and developed gradually. The incidents in both periods contributed to the development of the Azeri nationalism.

The Armenian invasion of some territories and bloody suppression of the nationalist riot by Red Army in January 1990 strengthened the enmity between two states through the perception that Russia mistreats Azerbaijan while she protects Armenia (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 145). The loss of the Soviet control in the final years, allowed Azerbaijan to revival the Azeri nationalism. Accordingly, Azeris disclosed the “*suppressed aspects of national history*” and started to rewrite it in a nationalist sense that contributed to foster the enmity towards the Armenians (Forsyth, 2013: 658).

The multiplicity of ethnic, religious, cultural, social, and historical factors drove the societies to develop conflicting nationalisms. Particularly, Armenians feverishly sought to establish an Armenian state on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. After the WWI, the Wilsonian Principles

fostered the Armenian ambitions and caused many sufferings due to mutual atrocities. However, during the Soviet era, societies of the region suspended their wills until the end of the Cold War. The disintegration of the Soviets brought the differences to the foreground once again and fueled unsettled nationalism based on the primordial interpretation that significantly affected the regional relations. In this regard, the Armenian policy experienced a. full nationalistic politics between 1988-1994, b. balanced nationalistic politics between 1994-2001, c. post-nationalist politics after 2002 (Panossian, 2006:242).

Therefore, symbolic and past-oriented nationalism became a vicious cycle that served to revitalize the existing enmity and set off a “zero-sum” game in the region.

4.3.2. Religion as a factor

Since it occurred on the borderland between the Christian and Muslim worlds, many scholars underline the religious aspect of the Armenian and Azeri conflict (Brzezinski, 1997; Gorder, 2006; Gabrielian & Nedolian, 1997; Herzig, 2000; Nation, 2007). Herzig (2000: 86) states that religion plays some role in the shaping of the international relations in the Caucasia by giving the following examples: First, the orientation of the Christian Armenians and Georgians to Russia for protection before the WWI. Second, the increasing Russian and western sympathy for the Armenians after the Sumgait pogrom. Third, the use of the Afghan mujahedin in the fighting against Armenians by Azerbaijan during the Karabakh War. Fourth, the mobilization of support to Azerbaijan through the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

Alieva (1995: 305) explains the western sympathy for the Armenian by referring to the “*Christian solidarity and by the powerful Armenian lobby in the largest European states and the United States.*” According to him, the West ignores the consolidation of the Russian influence in the region through the Russian-Armenian alliance, because of the Christian solidarity.

According to Gorder (2006: 183), religion is an inseparable part of the Armenian culture and Armenians refer to religious symbols more than Azeris does.¹⁴⁹ The Armenian Apostolic Church is considered as the defender of the Armenian identity and cultural norms. The Church exercises a certain influence on the Armenian internal and external policy as did in the past (Doc, 44, 2016: 6). The Church fashioned and nurtured the myth that Anatolia is the cradle of the Christianity. Therefore, the loss of the predominantly Christian territories in Anatolia

¹⁴⁹ According to the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) 2013 survey, over 70% of Armenia’s population attends religious services only on special holidays or less often (Doc-44, 2016: 6).

caused a profound impact on the Armenian society and paved the way for the future unrest (Bloxham, 2005: 63).

The examination of the past incidents reveals that both societies referred to the religious aspects to ensure national unity. As seen during the 1905-7 crises and the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict in the second period, Russia supported Armenia because of the religious affiliation, since (Imperial and Soviet) Russia had a special aversion to Islam and prejudiced against Muslims (Herzig, 2000: 8). Likewise, the European Great Powers' efforts for holding reforms by the Ottoman Empire for the Armenian minorities rest also on the religious affiliation. The biased attitude of the western powers to Azerbaijan during the independence period and the Karabakh War can also be regarded as a reflection of the religious affiliation. On the other hand, Turkey's support to Azerbaijan seen in both periods also bases on the religious affiliation beside ethnic linkages.

In sum, considering Cornell (2001: 55)'s contention that "*the polarization of the parties is not underpinned primarily by religious identity*," we can conclude that the security problem between two states does not rest on the religious factors. However, religion is a significant component of their corporate identities and affect their overall beliefs and interests.

4.3.3. The role of the Great Powers

The examination of the Armenian and Turkish relations requires focusing on the role of the third actors which are Great Powers, i.e., imperialist powers. The competition among the super-states played a decisive role in the destiny of the small powers. As Libaridian (2004; 187) rightly pointed out that Great Powers became individually and collectively an integral part of the historical process in the South Caucasus.

The policies of the Western Powers and Russia towards the Ottoman Empire and the region affected greatly the regional actors especially Armenia. The Western Powers and Russia intervened in the domestic affairs of the Ottomans through various methods such as exerting political pressure, imposing economic sanctions, manipulating minorities through missionaries¹⁵⁰ and employing oil companies.¹⁵¹ The Great Powers encouraged Armenian elites to establish their own states on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. In reality, they aspired to put Ottomans under pressure to secure economic and political capitulations. The

¹⁵⁰ The missionaries operating in the eastern part of Turkey enabled to channel the Armenian cultural renaissance at the turn of the century (Bloxham, 2002: 43).

¹⁵¹ In the first period, the oil companies controlled by their own governments also played significant role to manipulate small nations in to strengthen their positions in the countries and to gain more profits (Leeuw, 2000: 123).

course of the events obviously showed that the Great Powers only follow their own agenda rather than the realization of the Armenians' aspirations.

The religious affiliation with Armenia put Russia in a particular position in the eyes of the Armenians. However, Russia never fully committed to keeping her promises. For example, the confiscation of the Armenian Church properties in 1903 by the tsarist government awakened Armenians from the illusions "*regarding tsarist sympathies for Armenians and their struggle*" (Libaridian, 2004: 20). Consequently, the General Congress of Dashnaktsutun in 1904 declared the Russian challenge (Hovannisian, 1967: 180).

Armenians felt betrayed by Russia and later by the western Great Powers in 1918, 1920 and, 1923, since they abandoned Armenia in their struggles against Muslim neighbors.¹⁵² For example, after the formation of the Soviet Union, Russia forced Armenia to sign the Kars Treaty in 1921, which assures the acquisition of Kars and Ardahan by newly founded Turkey and the Nakhichevan by Soviet Azerbaijan. These bitter experiences reinforced the Armenians' feeling of "*isolation and defenselessness*" (Hunter, 2000: 30).

As for Azerbaijan, Russia was seen as a biased power that discriminates Muslims. Furthermore, the Sovietization made an enormous impact on the collective minds of Azeris, and they consider Russia as a source of the existential threat that might arise at any time. The newly established Turkey also overlooked the seizure of Azerbaijan by Bolsheviks in exchange for the material and political support of the Soviet Union (Leeuw, 2000: 123). That reinforced the sense of vulnerability of Azeris.

The Great Power policies drove to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, Turks developed "*the Sevres Syndrome*" in their collective minds (Libaridian, 2004: 196).¹⁵³ It is a fear of disintegration. Today, Turks use this syndrome as a schema to interpret the behaviors of the European states. In this context, this syndrome created enormous distrust against Armenia. Thus, it constitutes a major factor spoiling the relations.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² Armenians served in large numbers in the Russian armies during the First World War. However, when Russia agreed with the western Powers on the secret Allied plan (Sykes-Picot) in 1916, she forgotten the promises given to Armenians regarding the occupied Turkish territories (Hovannisian, 1994: 263).

¹⁵³ It is a peace treaty that provisions the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire among ethnics.

¹⁵⁴ "*The importance of the centrality of Great Power threat to the Ottoman state cannot be underestimated; nor can one underestimate the role of that threat in the rise of the modern Turkish state and in Turkish perceptions of the past.*" (Libaridian, 2005:3)

During the second period, the Soviet Union made every effort to reinforce artificial lines among ethnics in the Union.¹⁵⁵ Particularly, the Soviets started to manipulate anti-Turkish feelings in the mid of 1965 that paved way to the pogroms started after 1988 (Libaridian, 2004: 203). The passive stance of the Soviet authorities during the first stage of the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict and their material and political support to both sides, which served to the Russian interests, showed once again the dilemma of the trust on a Great Power (Hovannisian, 1994: 265).

Today, as Mirzoyan (2010: 46) stated, Russia controls Armenian political elites through various methods and imposes “*energy imperialism*” on the country to keep her in her backyard. Furthermore, Russia exploits the security vulnerability of Armenia through economic sanctions and political manipulations.

In this context, ANM realized the Armenia’s own interest concerning the relations with Turkey. ANM sought to discern their material interests from the Armenian political thought based on the traumatic collective minds. Accordingly, ANM aspired to improve the ties with Turkey and to lessen Armenian dependency on Russia. However, ARP defended the traditional policy towards Turkey as an enemy and Russia as a protector (Libaridian, 2004: 203, 267).

As seen in many examples, Great Powers’ support was always conditional and temporary to the sides and subject to last as long as it suits the interests of these powers (Hovannisian, 1994: 264).

4.3.4. Politicization of the Common Past

The past has a special place in the Armenian culture. According to Jones (2000: 162, 163), “*it is only one aspect of Armenian life and culture.*” They believe that history repeats itself and the present developments are the continuation of the past. As a result, they tend to establish similarities between two events occurred at different times; therefore, Armenians build a connection between The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and the tragic event of 1915. In this regard, the pogrom in Sumgait in 1989 served to the reinforcement of this connection (Jones, 2000: 162).

Based on his personal experiences, Jones (2000: 199) points out the Armenians’ obsession with past (as a cultural peculiarity) and contends that Armenians frequently refer to the past by using the phrases very such as: “*never forget the past*” and “*we are today, what we were in*

¹⁵⁵ Suny (2000: 166) defines this fact as follows: “*One Central Asian people blend into another, sharing much in common-religion, language, culture, and sense of place. What distinguishes them most clearly from one another are the Soviet-constructed identities listed in their passports and the Soviet-made republics in which they live.*”

the past.” Consequently, he explains that this behavior created “*a complex collective identity that makes understanding Armenian culture challenging for an outsider*” and adds, “*Armenians focus more on the self-proclaimed glory of their religion, strength of the family, traditional values, unique alphabet and language, and Mount Ararat than on past monstrous grievances.*”

This cultural peculiarity serves to create many myths. In the course of the history, the tendency of myth-making is used to the politicization of the past. According to Jones (2000: 201), their obsession with the past prevents them “*to stake a better, progressive future.*”

After the independence in 1991, Armenians considered the independence as a revival of the nation that made them more sensitive to the past incidents (Suny, 2001: 885). Furthermore, they strive to transfer past lessons to the new generations with the help of the collective memory. Particularly, Armenians started to develop a public conscious of the massacres and deportation after 1950. Consequently, the tragic events of 1915 became an important aspect of the collective and political identity of the most Armenians (Libaridian, 2004: 190) and Armenian elites strived for the politicization of the tragic events of 1915 with the full support of the church and Diaspora. In the mid-1970s, as the Turkish Armenians did in the 1890s, Armenians in Diaspora started to conduct terrorist attacks against the Turkish targets until 1983 to appeal the attention of the international community regarding recognition of the so-called genocide by Turkey.

Politicization of the past constitutes the main driver of the “genocide”-recognition campaign conducted by the Diaspora and Armenia. The Turkish denial of it is regarded as a manifestation of the “*evil nature of Turks*” and prevents Armenians assess the past objectively (Libaridian, 2004: 191).

Similarly, Azeris developed a strong attitude towards the past and made every effort to politicize it. This attitude serves to the unity of the nation, which is relatively a new aspect of the Azeri identity. Compared with the efforts of Armenians, Azeris are less preoccupied with the past. They also derived some lessons from the past events, such as the adverse effects of Sovietization and loss of ancient Azeri territories. These lessons make Azeri society more resistant to the further loss of land. Thus, they feverishly politicize the Karabakh issue and its retake.

The past plays a significant role in both societies, and the elites are prone to use the collective minds and myth-symbol-complexes of their societies whenever they need to mobilize the masses. Thus, they exercise a foreign policy based on the politicization of the past events and lessons.

4.3.5. Identity Formation

The events occurred in the past 200 years made certain impacts on the cultures of the Armenian and Azeri societies and, therefore, on the formation of their identity types. Shaffer (2002: 13) formulates this fact as follows: *“The identity of any people is influenced by its historical myths more than by concrete facts; the uncovering of new archives does not usually alter group identity. The significance of historical events is generally measured by their impact on future developments. When examining the ethnic and national identity of a group, we must look at their perceived view of history to understand history's impact.”*

Consequently, in the next sections, it is aspired to demonstrate the effects of the past events in the formation of both nations' identity throughout the common past.

4.3.5.1. Armenia

The key aspects of the Armenian culture are religion, nationalism (territory, language, and family), and past events, which form the Armenian identity (Johnson, 2000:134). Armenians have a strong culture, which was influenced by the historical and contemporary events and interactions with other actors. They have a deep sense of *“mythological heroism of ancient Armenia, the holiness of religion, a prized language, and the strength of Armenian families”* (Johnson, 2000:121).

The Armenians are generally very proud of being *“descendants of Noah”* and to be the first state-recognized Christianity as its official religion. It constitutes a major pillar of the Armenian identity (Leeuw, 2000: 41; Panossian, 2002:126; Jones, 2000:121; Barseghyan, 2004:7). Armenians assign themselves a unique and significant role: *“the first Christian nation, defenders of Christianity at the frontiers of Islam”* (Suny, 2001: 885).

The territory is an indissoluble part of the Armenian identity and an essential component of the Armenian ethos. The defense and love of homeland are a distinct nature of the Armenian society constituting the source of the Armenian mythology and the ideologies of the Armenian nationalism (Libaridian, 2004: 35; De Waal, 2003: 192). Stories and songs of heroes and legends link the Armenians to the land on which they lived. The traditional interpretation of land nested with history is not subject to change by political coercion (Libaridian, 2004: 65).

Armenians associate themselves with the eastern part of Anatolia, which they called as *“Western Armenia”* and regarded as their historic land. Therefore, they attached great

importance to this region, where their culture was flourished (Libaridian, 2004: 19).¹⁵⁶ Dudwick (1996: 434) explains the Armenian concept of the homeland as follows: “(it is) *not simply the territory, a nation inhabits at any given time, but is that territory that contains the nation’s history. In Armenian terms, the “homeland” consists of all the territories in Eastern Anatolia Nakhijevan (now a part of Azerbaijan), and Karabakh, which they inhabited over two millennia ago, and in which stone monuments provide evidence of their historical presence.*”

Karakashian (1998: 387) outlines the influence of the territory on the character of the Armenians and underlines the strength of the family ties of the people as well as the role of these ties in the surviving of the Armenian society. The type of the family and rearing of the children are other significant factors in formation and preservation of their identity. The extended family type facilitated the transfer of the traditions and culture to children by the availability of support networks and “*close-knit social structure.*” In this regard, Hunter (2006: 25) points out the strong side of the Armenian identity as follows: “*homogeneity and its tragic experiences have endowed it with considerable strength, which has enabled it to cope with an adverse environment better than have the other two Transcaucasian countries.*”

The Armenian identity formation became solid through the emergence of the Armenian nationalism. The key milestones will be explained in the following paragraphs:

Russia’s annexation of the Caucasus in 1828 transformed the way of life in the region and made it more receptive for the European mentality, culture, and politics. That created suitable conditions for “*cultural renaissance*” that led the Russian Armenians to intervene in the Ottoman politics (Libaridian, 2004: 13, 14; Croissant, 1998: 5). Armenians viewed Russia as “*an advanced civilization and society, a champion of Christendom against Islam and the hope for emancipation,*” thus, they feverishly supported and even participated in the Russian invasion between 1828 and 1878 (Croissant, 1998: 5).

Armenian authors living in Venice and Vienna fostered the rise of the Armenian nationalism and cultural awakening.¹⁵⁷ They depicted a glory past full of heroes and villains that constituted examples to follow by politicians and as a source of pride for readers.¹⁵⁸ Libaridian (2004: 53-

¹⁵⁶ Armenians regard the Eastern Anatolia as the cradle of their culture and holy land and they attach great importance to this region. The exodus from Anatolia made deep impact on their collective conscious (Dadrian, 1995: 131).

¹⁵⁷ According to Hovannisian (1967: 16), the Lazarian Academy in Moscow, the Nersisian in Tiflis, and later the Gevorgian in Etchmiadzin also served to indoctrinate nationalism into the young authors.

¹⁵⁸ An example is in the followings (from the Istanbul newspaper Hayastan published in 1846): “*Wake up, Armenian nation, from your death-inviting slumber of ignorance; remember your past glory, mourn your present state of wretchedness and heed the example of other enlightened nations: take care of your*

55) clarifies the reason so: “*Acts of heroism, self-sacrifice, and courage were introduced as manifestations of spiritual values rather than tactical means to resolve a political crisis.*” Hence, the authors fueled the fire of a special nationalism built on “*hayrenasirutune*” (love of fatherland or patriotism) that emanated the concepts of “*the fedayee*” or guerrilla fighter (Libaridian, 2004: 76) and paved the way for a more dynamic Armenian nationalism.^{159 160}

The liberation of the Balkan nations from the Ottoman rules also inspired the Armenian nationalists (Walker, 1980: 66). Armenians realized that they could liberate their homeland also by rebellion. Hence, Armenian nationalism sought to form a strong linkage between people and land.

The books and newspapers, published in Europa, served to the revitalization and the formation of the Armenian identity. Newspapers created or developed past narratives and revived old myths. These efforts provided a model to the Armenian youth to impersonate. This new identity necessitated devotion for the liberation of the country and its people (Libaridian, 2004: 77-79).¹⁶¹ Furthermore, Armenians preserved their identity through the different products of literature such as novels, poems, and songs. Armenian poets and authors of novels served as a bridge to transfer knowledge and experiences to the next generations. To achieve this goal, they frequently referred to the symbols. For example, many poets and authors put the Mt. Ararat, which symbolizes the glorious past, unity, freedom, and independence of Armenia, at the center of their works to strengthen their messages (Karakashian, 1998: 385; Johnson, 2000:128; Barseghyan, 2004:7).

The rebellion and heroism of the Armenian fighters produced new narratives, songs, and stories that created a new genre of literature. New literature was promoting fighting, participation in the revolution, and the insurgency. Revolutionaries were in the pursuit of reshaping the Armenian identity, which suggested that being an Armenian was not a birthright rather it entailed devotion for “*Holy Task*.” The main motivation of this movement against Ottoman “*millet*” system rested on the two pillars of the Armenian identity: being Armenian and Christian (Libaridian, 2004: 81-83). Thus, the Armenian nationalism dominantly refers to “*the*

schools, cultivate the Armenian language, learn other useful languages and liberal sciences [professions] ... only then can you reach the goal of happiness.” (Cited in Libaridian, 2004: 56).

¹⁵⁹ The Pashtpan Hayreniats (Defenders of the Fatherland) is the first nationalistic organization established in 1881 in Erzurum (Libaridian, 2004: 83).

¹⁶⁰ The ethnic identity resting on “*the shared memory of an ancient Armenian nation-state, the distinctive nature of its people, and the collective traumatic memory of the Armenian genocide*” nurtured Armenian nationalism (Anderson, 2000: 28).

¹⁶¹ The liberation movement was called as the “*Holy Task*” (Surb Gordz) and the followers were called as the devoted “*disciples*” (arakyalner) (Libaridian, 2004: 80).

perennial and primordial dimensions of identity” by linking race, religion, and past traumas (Panossian, 2003: 5).¹⁶² In this regard, the definition of the Armenian identity is “*blood-based*,”¹⁶³ and three strands of the Armenian Flag reflect the components of the Armenian collective identity: religion, nationalism (nourished by “Anti-Turkishness” and internalization of the indispensability of Russia), and the past traumas (Panossian, 227).¹⁶⁴

As explained in the preceding section, the third factor affecting the formation of the Armenian identity is the past traumas. Past lessons play a major role in the definition of the national interests and way of their materialization (Johnson, 2000:127). Gorder (2006: 177) explains that the Armenians emphasize their past tragedies so strong because it is a way of the assertion of their present identity.

In this context, the tragic events of 1915 have particular importance, since it became “*an organizing principle*” or “*root paradigm*” (Libaridian, 2004: 192; Abrahamian, 1998: 13; Panossian, 2002:126; Görgülü, 2008: 139; Manukian, 1991: 73; Suny, 2001: 891). It turned into the most significant “*myth-symbol-complex*” of the Armenian identity. According to Panossian, “*post-Genocide Armenian identity consists of four major themes: ‘we are a victim nation,’ ‘we are still suffering,’ ‘we have lost our homeland,’ and ‘pahanjatirutyun’ - ‘we should demand justice, revenge, and retribution.’*” (Cited in Barseghyan, 2004:10).

The second phase of the Armenian identity formation started in 1960 by revitalizing the tragic events of 1915. That was an ARF (Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Dashnaktsutjun) policy initiated in the mid of 1960s. These efforts of ARF were supported by the activities of the Armenian diaspora throughout the world, since, as Gabrielian and Nedolian (1997:104) expressed, “*the Diaspora needs a strong nationalist ideology to preserve its identity.*” Soviet and Armenian politicians needed to mobilize the masses, therefore, they referred once again to the central aspect of the Armenian identity (Libaridian, 2004: 267). Suny (1993: 162-187) points out the manipulation efforts of USSR in the revitalization of the problem. USSR deliberately encouraged Armenian society to re-focus on the tragic events of 1915 to devise a political tool against Turkey (Barseghyan, 2004:12).

As it happened before the WWI, the Armenian literature served to foster nationalism after 1965 (Dudwick, 1997: 480; Saroyan, 1996: 410). In this regard, the Jon Kirakosyan’ books “*The*

¹⁶² According to Panossian (2002:134), the term “*Nzhdehiansim is more than nationalist commitment. It introduces a racial element into Armenian nationalism which goes beyond the primordial notions of nationhood.*”

¹⁶³ Volkan (2005: 100) explains that in many societies blood is regarded as equal to identity.

¹⁶⁴ Dudwick (1996: 433) explains that the Armenian national character is “*shaped by genetically inherited characteristics that are in the blood.*”

First World War” and *“The Western Armenians”* published in 1965.served to the revitalization of the past traumas (Dudwick, 1997: 480).

Later, the demise of the Soviets initiated the last phase of the Armenian identity formation. The NK Conflict played a shaping role in this phase. The success in the war and severe economic conditions (and isolation) strengthened the Armenian identity. Armenians maintained their coherence by referring to their survivals from the past difficulties.¹⁶⁵ Presently, this phase is still in effect.

In the last phase, Anti-Turkishness emerged a strong part of the Armenian corporate identity. Barseghyan (2004:3) underlines this fact so: *“Until the 1990s, partly due to the history and partly due to the power of discursive articulation, the image of the Turkey-enemy had an unbelievably important role in the construction of Armenian national identity and was the clue of its whole mythical system.”*

The Armenians use Turk and Azeri interchangeably. Hence, they interrelate Turks with Azeris. Their hatred of Turks constitutes the root causes of the conflict over the Nagorno Karabakh. It is portrayed by Diaspora as *“a new genocide,”* if Karabakh is not defended against Azeris and Turks (Barseghyan, 2004:11). Therefore, Armenians established a link between past and present through the help of *“myth-symbol complexes.”* In this regard, Karabakh became a symbol of the myth that *“Turks seek to wipe all Armenians from the earth.”* The Karabakh conflict activated the submerged dynamics of the Armenian identity and revitalized the past traumas (Panossian, 2002:137, 139). In this context, the restoration of the Armenian self-esteem considers the unification of Karabakh with Armenia as a rectification of the *“historical injustice”* (Dudwick, 1996: 427).

The isolation of Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan remind Armenians the cooperation of both states after WWI and perpetuates their perceptions as well as reinforces the enemy image of Turks that constructed during the first period (Mirzoyan, 2010: 55).¹⁶⁶

The analysis of the present Armenian identity formation shows us the powerful influence of the Russianness. In this regard, the common religion and cultural similarities established an identity link between the two nations. Moreover, successive incidents such as the Armenian exodus to the Russian Transcaucasia, the pogroms of the first period, and the subordination

¹⁶⁵ Karakashian (1998: 385) indicates the comments such as, *“Armenians have always survived adversities; we will survive this one too.”*

¹⁶⁶ Armenians perception of the life: *“God created the perfect man, and put it around devils. Who are these devils? Turks and Azeris which share a kinship. In spite of their perfection, they live an awful life, they are miserable and they are trying to continue their existence”* (Interview-VII; 3).

under the Bolshevik rule has transformed the image of Russia into the protector of the Armenian existence despite some disappointments in the past (Mirzoyan, 2010: 22).

Armenians' affiliation to Russia, which was best depicted by Armen Garo, Armenia's former ambassador to the United States in 1921, as follows:

"Without Russia's active assistance, we will not have the opportunity to realize half-way our national ideal: to have our homeland, independent or even semi-independent, where our people will have the chance to live and work, away from the Turkish sword. From this perspective, 'our red brothers' in Yerevan are standing on the more realistic ground." (cited in Mirzoyan, 2010: 24).

Religion constitutes the basis of the Armenian affiliation to Russia. It was revealed in many cases by Armenian elites to ensure Russian support against Turkey and Azerbaijan. For example: Zori Balayan, an influential Armenian politician, underlined religious link in his letter to Yeltsin as follows: *"Now when Russia is making a choice towards her salvation, Christian Karabakh... will continue its struggle for its survival as a part of the historical Armenia, included into Russia, and as its reliable outpost"* (cited in Mirzoyan, 2010: 25).

This affinity dimension of the Armenian identity helped the Russian Empire and Soviets to manipulate Armenian polity in many cases. Although Armenian elites several times experienced their victimization for the Russian imperial ambitions,¹⁶⁷ they considered their subordination to the Russia as a natural outcome and the only way to survive *"amid the hostile Turkic World"* (Mirzoyan, 2010: 25).

According to constructivists, identity is subject to change. In this context, Armenia's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and the control of Karabakh led some changes in her corporate identity and diminished the sense of victimization (Panossian, 2002:125). Similarly, due to the changes of the culture at the structural level, the Armenians' corporate identity altered to some degree.

Today, some elites and scholars in Armenia emphasize the need of identity change due to economic, cultural, intellectual, and administrative evolution. They advocate for the mentality change, which would not stick to the past and the fear of pan-Turkism.

¹⁶⁷ Armenian historian M. Nersisyan states the common explanation of the Russian affiliation by the Armenian historians as follows: *"Despite the despotic nature of the Russian state and the imperial policies of the czars, the Russian orientation of Armenians is a historically justified necessity, for it sprang from the national interests of the Armenian people."* (cited in Mirzoyan, 2010: 28).

As constructivists argued, interests are the functions of identity. In this regard, Nasıblı (2008: 143) depicts the followings as the contemporary interests emancipating from the Armenian national ideology: “a. *return of the lost territories, the formation of the united Armenian nation state (Great Armenia)*, b. *return of globe-scattered Armenians to the united nation state*, c. *the building of a justice-based nation state*.” These interests can be considered as the reflection of the components of the corporate identity.

4.3.5.2. *Azerbaijan*

The development of the Azeri identity is a historically controversial issue. Thus scholars brought different explanations (Leeuw, 2000: 25). Some twentieth-century non-Azerbaijani scholars claimed that throughout the history, Azerbaijan had never existed in the present region. Therefore, Azeri State and Nation is an artificial creation (Altstadt, 1992:2).

On the contrary, other scholars argue that the Azeri Nation had existed there as an ancient society. The first Turkish flux (Oghuz tribes) was seen in 463, and the Turks started to dominate the region by the 10th century. The Seljuks were the first organized Islamic Turkish state established in this region and extended towards the west and south directions (Leeuw, 2000: 58-60).

The rule of the Seljuks Empire lasted for 128 years in the western and central parts of Azerbaijan. During that period, the culture and literature of Seljuks affected the people in the region. Among these, the book of “*Dede Korkut*,” called “*Destan*”¹⁶⁸ in Turkish, was the most influential one and later became an example for masters of literature such as Nizami and Fizuli in Azerbaijan (Leeuw, 2000: 66).¹⁶⁹

Most of the scholars and historians accept that the Azeris originate from the Seljuks. The similarities between the past (Fuzuli and Shah Ismail) and contemporary languages are regarded as the evidence of the historical continuity (Altstadt, 1992:12).

However, we do not have records concerning the fate of the indigenous Caucasian peoples. Therefore, the reality should be somewhere between two arguments (Leeuw, 2000: 69).

The Turkic identity of the Azeris was formed during the domination of the Seljuk and Atabek (Leeuw, 2000: 77). Further, the Persian and Russian cultures put in additional layers in the Azeri identity (Leeuw, 2000: 91).

¹⁶⁸ Destans play the role of the “*principal repository of ethnic identity*” (Altstadt, 1992:13).

¹⁶⁹ The other important literati are: “*Khagani Shirvani (1126 -1199)*, *Nizami Ganjevi (1141-1209)*, *Nasimi (1369 -1417)*, *Shah Ismail Safavi (“Khatar”) (1486-1524)*, and *Fuzuli (1494-1556)*” (Altstadt, 1992: 11).

The scholars write that Turkish-Azeri affiliation did not prevail until the 20th century since Azeri identity was not well developed. Thus, Azeris had even fought against the Ottomans several times under the Imperial Russian Army (Leeuw, 2000: 96). Furthermore, Azeri elites admired Russian culture, and they opposed to being a part of the Ottoman Empire during the brief independence period in 1918. Since, they regarded their civilization was superior to the Ottoman civilization (Swietochowski, 1996: 221, 223). Similarly, the Ottomans did not show intense interest for its relatives in the Caucasus, because they turned their faces to the Balkans and considered Azeris as a different group due to sectarian division. This fact is an evidence of the non-existence of the concept of the nation at that time, which was not constructed socially yet even in Europa.

Russian authorities intentionally called Turks living in their territories as “*Tatar*” to preclude the development of the Turkish identity by creating cognitive boundaries between Ottomans and other Turkic communities. This strategy contributed to the delay of the formation of the Turkish identity to a certain degree (Suny, 2000: 166; Leeuw, 2000: 145).

Furthermore, the Russian imperial policies discriminated Muslims in the Central Asia and treated them as “*undeveloped, unskilled communities*.” In contrast, the preferential treatment of Armenians by the imperial authorities evoked negative feelings towards Armenians among Azeris (Shaffer, 2002: 34).

Moreover, the Russian imperialism, political and economic oppression sparked Azeri nationalism by making a profound impact on the Azeri subconscious.¹⁷⁰ The oil boom in the late of 1800s triggered the social fragmentation among the various segments of the society, due to the increasing perception of injustice. It intensified the contacts among the Azeris that accelerated the rise of the Azeri nationalism. The civic unrest started to form the Azeri collective identity (Shaffer, 2002: 25, 28). In this context, Tbilisi played a special role of being home for the awakening of the Azeri nationalism. Particularly, the formation of the native language press¹⁷¹ in the 19th century fostered the Azerbaijani nationalism (Shaffer, 2002: 23).

The crisis of 1905 and “*Armeno-Tatar War*” of 1905-1906 initiated a fundamental change in the Azeri identity. Both incidents served to the construction of the ethnic enemy, enmity, and a more modern nationalism (Bölükbaşı, 2011:26; Hovannisian, 1967: 21). Thus, Azeris comprehended the prominence of the concerted efforts to cope with threats directed to the

¹⁷⁰ According to Leeuw (2000:98), Azeris took only 13 % of the Azeri oil industry by the end of the 1870s.

¹⁷¹ The first Azeri-language journal was Ziyae Gafgaziyye printed in Tbilisi by the end of the 1870s (Leeuw, 2000: 101).

Azeri society. The successive traumas led to the adoption of the new political orientations such as Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism among the Azeris (Swietochowski, 1996: 211, 213). Accordingly, the Pan-Turkism, invented by the British intelligence, started to pervade in the Azeri societies (Leeuw, 2000: 102).¹⁷²

The period from 1907 to 1917 was full of the opportunities for the development of Azeri collective identity (Shaffer, 2002: 15, 32). The events were marked by the organized armed confrontation between the two communities that led to “*the development of a self-aware Azerbaijani nation*” (Cornell, 2001: 70). The brief period of independence (1918-1920) helped to build the concept of the Azerbaijani nationhood (Mehdiyeva, 2003:275) based on Turkism as part of the Azerbaijani identity (Shaffer, 2002: 140).

We witness that major development of the Azeri nationalism took place in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as well as during the Soviet period. However, Soviets regarded the existence of the national republics as a “*fundamental social categories*” and prevented the further development of the Azeri nationalism (Mehdiyeva, 2003:278).¹⁷³ The lack of “*an indigenous tradition of statehood*” also retarded the formation of the Azeri national conscious (Dudwick, 1996: 438).

The incidents, which prompted the Azeri nationalism, took place successively in the late of 80s and the beginning of 90s. First, the forcible displacement of Azeris from Armenia between the years 1988 and 1989 was an alarm that activated the national conscious and resumed old enmities (Suny, 2000: 157). Second, the Red Army’s bloody suppression called “*Black January*” influenced the younger generation profoundly and ignited the fire of the independence from Soviets. Third, the massacre on February 26, 1992, at Khojaly rocked the entire nation. It opened a new era in the Azeri history, in which the antagonism reached its climax. These three events are formative moments in the development of the Azerbaijani corporate identity (Diuk, 2012: 72).

Also, the Conflict over Nagorno Karabakh continues to shape the present-day corporate identity of Azerbaijan. Azeris regarded this conflict as a threat to their territorial integrity, and it reinforces the cohesion of the Azeri identity in three ways: first, the displaced Azeri population caused significant concerns, hatred, and anger in the Azeri society. Second,

¹⁷² According to Altstadt (1992:70), Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanism means the political unity of all Turks “*from the Bosphorus to the Chinese wall*” and was formulated in the 1860s by Arminius Vambery, a Hungarian orientalist.

¹⁷³ The Soviet policies such as “*sblizheniye*” (merging) and “*sliyaniye*” (fusion) impeded the progress of the Azeri nationalism (Mehdiyeva, 2003:278).

Moscow's inability to cope with the Armenian irredentism led Azeris to rely on its own national power. Third, Karabakh became a symbol, which served to unite the various segments of the Azeri community (Shaffer, 2002: 130).

In the post-Soviet period, the most prominent political figure in the transformation process of the society into a more nationalist one was the Elchibey, and his movement called "*Popular Front*." He aimed to develop the Azeri national conscious and mobilize them to defend the nation's interests (Leeuw, 2000: 159).

Elchibey pursued the political line of the nationalistic party Musavat, founded in 1917, which adopted the maxim of the Turkish nationalists: "*Turkization, Modernization, Islamization*" (Alieva, 1995: 289). Elchibey endeavored to revitalize the Turkish aspect of the Azeri identity. For that purpose, his government made some legislative changes in 1992 such as adoption of the Roman alphabet and naming the Azeri language as "*Turkish*" (Forsyth, 2013: 663). After Elchibey, Aliiev sought to mold the amorphous nature of the Azeri corporate and type identities. However, the weak cohesion of Azerbaijani society hampered the progress (Sunny, 2000: 162).

Azeri corporate identity has three elements: a. ethnically Turk, b. religiously Shiite Muslim (mostly), c. culturally a mixture of the Turkish, Persian, and Russian societies (Sunny, 2000: 160). It is a fact that the hybrid composition of the Azeri society and culture constituted an obstacle that impedes the development of a distinct Azeri national identity (Croissant, 1998: 7; Hunter, 2000: 37) and leads to a possible identity crisis (Mehdiyeva, 2003:274). As Shaffer (2002: 23) articulated, "*Azerbaijanis could consider themselves as both Turks and Iranians, or Russian subjects, with little conflict.*" Today, most of Azeris are aware of their Turkish identity. However, some elites try to create a combined "*Azeri Turk*" identity as a part of the state policy (Altstadt, 1992: 70). However, there is not a consensus among the elites concerning the further development of the Azeri identity.

Azeris are the most secular nation in the Islamic world because the repressive Soviet policies weakened the ties of Azeris to Islam through banning of religious activities (Shaffer, 2002: 65). However, the secular state now confronts with the Islamic radicalism that might transform the nation into a more religious one than ever (Diuk, 2012: 69).

The concept of territory and homeland differ from the conception of Armenians. Contrary to Armenians, for Azeris, the territory has a practical meaning in daily life, rather than historical meaning (Dudwick, 1996: 436). However, the loss of Karabakh strengthened the love of the land in Azeri population. Like Armenians, Azeris also started to attribute symbolic meaning to land to unite the society. For example, Azeris call the city Shusha as "*the cradle of Azerbaijan's culture,*" which's invasion by Armenia caused a deep sensation (De Waal, 2003: 185).

Akin to Armenians, Azeris also refer to the past to justify their nationalistic arguments (Shaffer, 2002: 13). Azeris also use historical grievances as a vehicle to survive. Thus, the "*monstrous*" past constitutes a component of the Azeri corporate identity.

Today, the notion of the nation is still evolving in Azerbaijan, although loyalty to family, kinship group, and region are regarded as the most significant indicators of patriotism. However, the present identity of Azerbaijan differs radically from its identity in the Soviet period, since the Turkic and religious aspects came to the foreground, whereas Russian influences started to disappear.

4.3.6. Construction of the Negative Perception Pattern

In the preceding section, it is aspired to frame identity formation of both states by shed light on the effects of the past incidents. This section will demonstrate how these events occurred in both periods contributed to the construction of negative perception patterns, which serve, today, as the basis of threat construction.

Before moving into further details, I would like to underline one significant issue that Armenians juxtapose Azerbaijanis with the Anatolian Turks, who had "*wiped out*" historical Armenia (Sunny, 2001: 884). Therefore, they identify Azeris as the enemy, although the majority of traumatic events did not occur between Azeris and Armenians. In this context, the readers shall consider this fact while reading the further parts of this study.

4.3.6.1. *Effects of Events*

It is a well-known fact that people tend to remember negative events more than the positive events and these events are influential on the "*evaluation, judgment, and action tendencies*" (Bar-Tal, 2001: 608). Volkan (2009: 211) indicates that large-group processes are similar to the individual processes. Accordingly, we can expect that the incidents examined in this study must create certain psychological effects on both communities. Large groups refer to "*chosen traumas*"¹⁷⁴ of past to activate the dynamics of their identities when they encounter with conflicts. Within time, groups transform chosen traumas into myths that serve to deepen the enmity between two groups (Volkan, 2005: 52, 55).

There are many events in our case, which function as chosen traumas. These magnified events (myths) such as the mass massacre in 1915 tilted the existent discontent between two

¹⁷⁴ "A chosen trauma is the shared mental representation of an event in a large group's history in which the group suffered a catastrophic loss, humiliation, and helplessness at the hands of its enemies." (Volkan, 2009: 211,212).

groups towards enmity. The following paragraphs will analyze the effects of these formative events.

The first events were the pogroms of 1894-6, which affirmed the discontent initiated by the Ottoman-Russo War in the period of 1877-78. The letter of Hallward, writing from Van on 2 February 1895, explicitly reflects the first signs of the civic unrest: *"On their Christmas it is the custom of the Armenians to exchange visits among themselves and to receive visits from the Turks, but this year the Turks, in general, abstained from paying them any visits"* (cited in Walker, 1980: 150).

The pogroms of 1894-6 swelled the scratch into a wound among ethnics in the Eastern Anatolia by triggering mass movements. The exodus of Armenians from the Eastern Anatolia towards the Caucasus and Turks from the Caucasus towards the Eastern Anatolia deteriorated Muslim-Armenian relations in both regions (Arkun, 2005: 68). The mutual immigration intensified the existing tension and gave way for further pogroms that fueled the antagonism.

The wound got bigger and deeper

The second formative event was the so-called 1905-7 Tatar (Azeris) -Armenian War. At that time, the severe economic and humanitarian conditions strained the relationships between Armenians and Azeris.¹⁷⁵ This event deepened the enmity between two groups by shaping the national consciousness.¹⁷⁶ This event served to the evolution of the 75 years-old antagonisms¹⁷⁷ into a deadly conflict by the de-legitimization of the other group.

Furthermore, the following traumatic incidents fostered enmity between two societies (Hovannisian, 1994: 243): a. Armenians' pogroms conducted during the Russian invasion of the Eastern Anatolia between 1915 and 1917, b. Armenians' atrocities and the revenge of the Turkish Army in March 1918 that took place after the withdrawal of the Russian troops,¹⁷⁸ c.

¹⁷⁵ "Ronald Suny attempted an analysis of the sociological makeup of both Turks and Armenians and suggested that the existence of an Armenian upper class in control of many critical sectors of the economy might in fact have accentuated antagonisms." (Libaridian, 2004: 143).

¹⁷⁶ "The explosion of 1905 was largely the product of class divisions reinforced along national lines and accentuated by czarist policies. Aside from being the first case of large-scale blood-letting between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, one of the major, though perhaps indirect, results of 1905 was the addition of a territorial dimension to the two peoples' enmity." (Croissant, 1998: 9).

¹⁷⁷ "Armenian and Russian and generally looked down upon the Muslims as 'dark,' 'inferior' people. In 1905 and again in 1918, Baku's Muslim poor turned on the local Armenians as the most convenient target. Social, religious, and cultural differences, resentments, and memories of past violence kept these two Caucasian peoples distant from each other." (Suny, 2000: 160, 161).

¹⁷⁸ The disintegration of the Russian army in the Caucasian front in 1918 brought Armenians to confront with the Turkish army alone. This led a quick loss of the occupied Ottoman territories, which initiated a fear of nation existence in the Armenian collective memory (Libaridian, 1991: 115).

armed clashes between Muslim detachments and the Baku Soviet-led by Armenian forces, d. Turkey's invasion of the Caucasus in 1918 and Muslim's atrocities. During that period (1914-1918), the mutual hatred reached its climax. Worse than that was the active participation of some officials in the violence, whether by ignoring or supporting the illegal actions. It created a vicious cycle in which officials made irrational decisions due to the magnitude of the enmity.¹⁷⁹

The paramount moment and the most important formative event was the mass massacre of Armenians in 1915. The intense military collaboration of the local Armenians with Russia was perceived by the Turks as "*the fifth column*" activity, which stirred up the animosity between two societies. The Ottomans started to think the deportation of the Armenian population from the Eastern Turkey as a legitimate measure (Cornell, 2001: 34; De Waal, 2003: 78; Bloxham, 2005: 68; Somakian, 1995: 119).

Today, deportation and its consequences function as a chosen trauma and a myth that symbolizes the victimhood of a nation. From that moment on, the enmity between two groups became irreversible. This event marked as the central trauma in the Armenian history that paralyzed the collective psyche of the Armenian people (Libaridian, 2004: 202) and created a belief of insecurities sensed from Turkey and Azerbaijan. Therefore, it increased Armenia's submissiveness to Russia (Mc Ginnity, 2010:22).

The Sovietization suspended the progress of enmity for a while. However, in 1965, the fiftieth anniversary of the tragic events of 1915 was used as an opportunity to revitalize the old antagonism encouraged by Diaspora (Cornell, 2001: 78).¹⁸⁰

Towards the end of Soviets, elites mobilized two nations once again using symbols and myths such as Nagorno Karabakh. The first sign of an approaching danger was the pogrom of Sumgait. This event served as a reminder of the painful memories of past. It caused a great upsurge of sorrow and irritation. Armenians identified it as a reoccurring of the mass massacre

¹⁷⁹ "When voices were raised in Armenia against this murderous policy, many of the leaders of the Government answered: 'The Turks have always looted the Armenians; so why is it so strange if the Armenians should for once loot the Turks?'" (Kazemzadeh, 1951: 214).

¹⁸⁰ "On April 24, 1965, as public officials, representatives of the Armenian Apostolic Church, and delegates from the diaspora gathered to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Armenian genocide, an estimated 100,000 people demanded the return of Armenian lands seized by the Turks and asking for Soviet assistance." (Dudwick, 1997: 481).

of 1915¹⁸¹ and encouraged separatist Karabakh Armenians¹⁸² to fight against Azerbaijan for the independence (De Waal, 2003: 44). The self-confidence based on national identity led to a full pledge war with Azerbaijan that paved the way for the new atrocities and antagonism.

During the escalation period of the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, it took place many atrocities. The pogrom of Baku in January 1990 operated the same dynamics of identities as the clashes did in 1905. Hovannisian (1994: 242) indicates the interracial or inter-religious aspects of the fighting, which led to the ultimate form of enmity. Armenians associated their immigration from Baku with the deportation of 1915 and Azeris with the Anatolian Turks (Croissant, 1998: 8; Zagorski, 1999: 103).¹⁸³

The pogrom of Khojaly functioned akin to the pogrom of Sumgait. Nevertheless, it initiated the dynamics of the Azeri identity by triggering mass fear of extermination (Cornell, 2001: 96). The extermination of innocent peoples refreshed the memories of Azeris regarding the atrocities of Armenians committed in 1905 and 1918 in Azerbaijan. Azeri elites called the pogrom of Khojaly intentionally as “*genocide*” to accelerate the formation of the Azeri national consciousness that will facilitate the mobilization of the dormant Azeri masses. These efforts of elites turned Khojaly into a myth that further nourished the enmity.

The myths of Sumgait and Khojaly facilitated the de-legitimization of both groups. The result was the slaughter of the opponent in masses and mercilessly.¹⁸⁴ For example, the Azeri Army launched the so-called GRAD rockets at Stepanakert indiscriminately for the retaliation of the Khojaly massacre (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 183). Similarly, Armenian Army attacked several times in the inhabited areas without discriminating civilians. These behaviors show the level of hatred towards “*the other.*” In this regard, Hovannisian (1994: 244) points out that the war was a

¹⁸¹ “The terms ‘massacre,’ ‘pogrom,’ and even ‘genocide’ became current, and immediate, spontaneous associations with 1915 were made everywhere. The Azerbaijanis, related by race, language, and culture to the Turks, became in Armenian minds the same heartless people who had participated in the genocide of 1915.” (Hovannisian, 1994: 241).

¹⁸² “Arkady Gukasian, now elected leader of Nagorny Karabakh, says that Sumgait made eventual conflict with Azerbaijan ‘inevitable.’ After Sumgait, we began to think about where all this was leading, but the wheel had already started turning. Sumgait was an attempt to frighten us, to say, ‘Look the same thing will happen to you.’” (De Waal, 2003: 44).

¹⁸³ “Armenians inevitably associated Azerbaijanis with the Turks who had massacred Armenians in the past.” (Forsyth, 2013: 652).

¹⁸⁴ The leaders intentionally allowed the exercise of many crimes. For example, Serzh Sarkisyan statement indicates this fact as follows: “We do not speak loudly about these things...Before Khojaly, the Azerbaijanis thought that they were joking with us, they thought that the Armenians were people who could not raise their hand against the civilian population. We were able to break that [stereotype]. And that’s what happened. And we should also take into accounts that amongst those boys were people who had fled from Baku and Sumgait.” (cited in De Waal, 2003: 172).

continuation of the incessant clashes of 1918-20, and was an ultimate expression of the incessant antagonism between two nations by military means.

The isolation of Armenia by Azerbaijan before, during, and after the War was another source enmity. The cut off Armenian supply routes brought the Armenian masses to starvation, which reminded once again the vivid experiences of 1915 (Hovannisian, 1994: 242).¹⁸⁵ The profound effects of isolation led to resentment by Armenians and affirmed their negative feelings towards Turks and Azeris. Moreover, the constant refusal of the responsibility by Turkey strengthens the antagonism towards Turkey (Johnson, 2000:137).

The similarities of both periods lead Armenians to think that historical discourse¹⁸⁶ continues unchanged (Barseghyan, 2004:14; Anderson, 2000: 29). Papazian (2001:79) elaborates those mentality of Armenians in the construction of enmity as in the followings: *“under the Ottoman rule and their familiarity with Azeri violence before and during Sovietization, explained this enmity and accounted for Armenian tenacity and the intensity of violence. The deep-seated hatred emanated from the Armenian memory of being victims of Turkish and Azeri resentment, persecution, and massacres. The presence of this hatred and the determination not to be vulnerable to such humiliations produced bullish Armenian behavior and increased the level of violence.”* Accordingly, even today, many studies¹⁸⁷ reveal the deep resentment, hatred, and rage among the new Armenian generations.

According to Hovannisian (1994: 238) *“train years of hatred, distrust, trauma, and enervating sentiments of betrayal and injustice”* is the real source of animosity. The special character of the South Caucasus’ culture and its emotionally driven social structure amplified the hatred through unforgotten memories.

4.3.6.2. *Effects of Great Power Policies*

The examination of the root causes of the 200 years old antagonism explicitly shows us the role of Great Powers’ interventions in the construction of negative perception patterns. The Great Powers influenced both nations either by discrimination or by encouraging.

After the occupation of the South Caucasus, the Russian imperial policies applied selectively to the ethnic communities based on their religious origin. This discriminatory approach produced tension among ethnics.

¹⁸⁵ *“The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict emerges as an organic extension of Armenian-Turkish conflict of the 1894-1923 period rather than an isolated historical phenomenon.”* (Mirzoyan, 2010: 13).

¹⁸⁶ Similar discourses: Tanzimat with Perestroika, Ittihad ve Terakke with Musavat and Popular Front.

¹⁸⁷ Kalayjian & Shahinian & Gergerian, Edmund & Saraydarian (1996).

The Imperial Russia used all opportunities to foster the animosity among locals. For example, after the Russia's conquest of the Caucasus, Russian Commander, Niarquis Philippe Paulucci, issued the guidelines for his troops to follow when dealing with the natives. He advises them to "*maintain a continuous state of dissension among their diverse nations,*" and he warns that "*their unity could be fatal for us*" (cited in Cornell, 2001: 31).

Imperial Russia exerted such policies that sought to manipulate the Armenians in the Eastern Turkey. In this context, she strived to keep alive the Armenians discontents with Muslims to deepen mutual hatred between two societies. Moreover, Russia also strived to trigger a Kurdish uprising against the Ottoman government, which would create unrest in the Eastern Turkey and serve as a pretext for Russia to intervene militarily (Somakian, 1995: 50). Fomenting discord between the Armenians and Muslims by Russia resulted in the massacre of the Armenian population in the Eastern Turkey in the upcoming years (Somakian, 1995: 63; Swietochowski, 1995: 39).

The Armenian exodus to the South Caucasus after the incidents in the 1890s deepened this tension by creating "*an ethno-psychological gap between Armenians and Azeri Turks*" (Leeuw, 2000: 145).

Before the invasions of the Eastern Turkey in 1878 and 1915-17 Russia pumped vague hopes to get the active support of the Armenian volunteer corps against the Ottoman Army.¹⁸⁸ However, Russia ignored to grant autonomy to the Armenians after the occupation of the Eastern Turkey (Somakian, 1995: 106).¹⁸⁹ Manukian (1991: 54) also underlines this fact by asserting that "*a united and independent Armenia was conflicting with the interests of Russia.*"

Like Imperial Russia, Soviet elites continued to manipulate ethnic groups by exercising the strategy of "*divide and rule.*" Many scholars indicate this strategy as the primary cause of the conflicts emerged after the dissolution of Soviets (Hunter, 2006: 14).

The Imperial Russia and Soviet Russia had defended the Armenian interests as long as they complied with the Russian Grand interests. Otherwise, Armenians experienced deep disappointments.¹⁹⁰ For example, Soviets preferred Turkish interests to Armenia's interests in

¹⁸⁸ Russia pledged to defend "*the right of the Armenian people to free self-determination in Russian occupied 'Turkish Armenia,' including even total independence*" with the decree of December 31, 1917 (Libaridian, 2004: 23).

¹⁸⁹ After the conquest of Turkish Armenia, Russian military authorities issued an order asserted that Armenians should "*not be allowed to settle*" in the occupied territories (Somakian, 1995: 107).

¹⁹⁰ Swietochowski (1995: 37, 38) explains this point as follows; "*The great imbalance between the power of Russia and that of Armenian nationalism flawed their alliance. Russia's far-flung interests and commitments often did not coincide with Armenian aspirations, and during times of trial Russia was unwilling, unable, or just too distant to come to the aid of its small ally.*"

1921 by awarding Sharur Nakhichevan to Soviet Azerbaijan rather than awarding to Armenia (Hovannisian, 1994: 248). However, their faith in the Russian protector role prevented them from capturing the reality; even they were deceived by Russia several times. They explained this psychology with the same clichés each time: *“Azerbaijanis have bribed the Kremlin,” “The wives of politburo members are Tatars and Turks, that is why the Politburo members do not defend us”* (cited in Ishkhanian, 1991: 32). Despite many betrayals, Armenia never abandoned to link her security to Russia even after 1991 (Goldenberg, 1994: 63). Ishkhanian (1991: 21) explains this fact as follows: *“Armenians’ reliance on the third force had become a part of the Armenians’ instincts.”*

The advocates of Russophile foster continuously the threat of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism (Croissant, 1998: 8). Their purpose is to make the Armenians believe in the propaganda that *“without Russia, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism will swallow Armenia”* (Ishkhanian, 1991: 26). Armenian nationalists took this threat seriously and utilized it in the construction of an enemy picture. At the end of the 1910s, Enver Pasha, head of the Young Turk triumvirate, exercised dubious policies that were regarded as Pan-Turkist policies, which affirmed Armenians concerns (Altstadt, 1992: 70).

Akin to Russia, the West also exercised controversial policies. In many cases, the western states did not keep their promises many. The Treaty of Sevres envisaged establishing an Armenian state on the eastern territory of the Ottoman Empire. However, Allied Powers never attempted to deploy military force to prevent Turkish nationalists from attacking to Armenia, let alone founding Armenian state (Hovannisian, 1994: 240). Moreover, the West did not attempt to keep its promises by adding a clause in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 regarding the interests of the Armenians (Somakian, 1995: 257).

The West also exercised a biased policy towards Azerbaijan. In the first period, the West did not react to the Bolshevik’s control of Azerbaijan. In the second period, the western media coverage championing the Armenian arguments led Azerbaijan to feel desperate in their struggle to retake the occupied territories. The West overlooked the sufferings of the displaced persons and refugees in Azerbaijan (Altstadt, 1992:198; Bloxham, 2002: 43). For example, the West, which feverishly supported the independence of the Baltic States, tolerated with a general silence *“the Red Army’s suppression of Azeri independence movement in the 1990s”* (Altstadt, 1992: 217; Leeuw, 2000: 162).

The traumas and the mutual animosity between two societies can be considered as the results of the adverse Great Power politics (Somakian, 1995; Johnson, 2000: 163; Mirzoyan, 2010). However, many Armenians and Azeris continue to blame other society for their grief. In this

regard, the Great Power Politics shall be seen as a significant factor in the construction of the negative perception pattern between two societies.

4.3.6.3. *Public Discourses*

The politicians and elites played a non-negligible role in the nourishing the enmity between two nations. The contagious ideas affected the masses through the textbooks, papers, and ceremonies. These ideas make up the official version of history and reflect another side as evil and troublemakers. In this regard, the narratives of 1915 are highly different in both Armenia and Turkey. For example, Bilali (2013: 19) examined the narratives of Armenian massacres in the Turkish history books and concluded that *"interpretations exemplify how moral disengagement mechanisms operate at the level of collective narratives. Three targets of attribution can be readily identified: the in-group (i.e., denial of responsibility), the out-group (i.e., blaming the victim), and situational factors (i.e., blaming third parties or circumstances)."*

Both sides used every opportunity to humiliate the other through nationalist propaganda. Authors from both sides published books that fostered enmity. For instance, the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences led by Zia Buniatov re-published the book of Russian racist Vasil Velichko. The book, *"Caucasus"* published in 1904, humiliates Armenians, whereas it praises Azeris. On the other hand, Zori Balayan's book *"Ochag"* (The Heart), published in 1984, in which he depicted *"Turks - implying Azeris - as enemies of Russia and Armenia"* (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 65).

On the Armenian side, Armenians started to commemorate the tragic event of 1915 after 1965. The memories of the past have been kept fresh through monuments, sculpture, painting, drama, and poetry. The names of the sites in the lost homeland in the Eastern Turkey were given to the scores of villages, city quarters, and districts in Armenia (Hovannisian, 1994: 251; Dudwick, 1997: 482).

Mount Ararat symbolizes the ancient Armenian land. Mount Ararat reminds Armenians continuously the pogroms of the past, their inability to free the homeland and the destruction of their culture (Hovannisian, 1994: 251). This psychology of victimhood manipulates their perception of the present and creates a cumulative antagonism towards Turks and Azeris.

In the recent years, the Diaspora has attempted to influence the world public through movies. In this context, the movie *"Ararat"* (Atom Egoyan-2002) aims to portray the tragic event of 1915 (based on the story of the siege of Van) through the stories of the survivors. It unveils *"the ways in which traumas of the past shape collective and individual identities in the present"* (Markovitz, 2006: 235).

The contemporary discourses held in Armenia evidently disclose the hatred towards Turkey. Johnson (2000) explains his experiences on Armenians made during his extended stay in Yerevan in 1995. He (2000: 160) points out that the “*collectively self-serving interpretation*” of the past events by Armenians rests on the deep hatred towards the Turks. He (2000: 161) articulates that they relate all evil things to the Turks.¹⁹¹ According to them, establishing any relationship with Turkey is treasonous. The following paragraph derived from his book perfectly depicts the mentality of the Armenians and their social construction of the hostility:

“Most said they could not stand to hear the Turkish language. They hate them with all of their souls. They now say that even an official apology by Turkey will not settle the account. Most I met say they are in favor of their government's recent open trade policy with the Turks- “We have to eat” but would rather have nothing to do with a Turk personally.

...The most overriding theme of this conversation was that the 1915 Genocide is the most important event in the life of an Armenian. It defines them, and it is a contemporary issue as well as a historical one. It cannot, ‘will not’ go away, lest it was to happen again, according to the group. It is in their hearts, minds, and daily conversations today. One member stated-and all others agreed-that the Genocide has, in fact, never stopped.

Even when we discussed the Nagorno-Karabakh question, participants talked about Turkey. No matter which question I asked, the discussion moved from war to the Turks. While almost everyone agreed the Nagorno Karabakh situation was the most immediately threatening question, they discussed it in the context of hostility towards Turkey. Obviously, I still was not making the connection between the War and Genocide. So, I asked the inevitable question:

Ok, so that's the Turks. But your war is with Azerbaijan. I don't understand the connection, other than the Turks and Azeris are allies. It is the Azeris who killed Armenians in Sumgait. What have the Turks got to do with it?” Johnson (2000: 160) concludes that Armenians created a “*self-serving ideological view of history, mixing fact and fiction.*”

The most important analogy used by Armenians to interpret the present-day developments is the tragic events of 1915. The other relevant analogy is the Pan-Turkism that constitutes an analogical reasoning for the Armenian politics to interpret the interactions with Turkey and Azerbaijan. In this regard, Zori Balayan defined Pan-Turkism as the greatest threat to Armenia as well as to Russia in his speech during the June 23-25, 1989, session of the Armenian

¹⁹¹ According to Armenians, “*a genocidal tendency is in the Turks' blood.*” They also even claim that “*Iraq's attack on the Kurds after the Gulf War was aided and abetted by the Turks.*” (Johnson, 2000: 160).

Supreme Soviet: *"Karabakh is not just a geographic spot on the map. Karabakh is a provocation, an obstacle to the Pan-Turkic goal of reaching Turan, or Russia's underbelly"* (Cited in Libaridian, 1991: 154). In the same way, the following citation of De Waal (2003: 275) from Aram Sarkisyan, the former first party secretary of Armenia, indicates another cause of the problem: *"Today Armenia is simply a small barrier on the road of Turkey's hopes for a unification of the Turkish-speaking states because we do not allow them to unite with Azerbaijan."*

Many Armenian elites strived to reinforce the positive emotion about Russians and nurture the animosity towards Turks. According to them, *"the patriotism of Armenians is the love of Russians and hatred of Turks"* (cited in Ishkhanian, 1991: 5). The signs of enmity noticeably are seen in the anti-Turkish writings and publications, which diffused into the brains of Armenians the slogan: *"Turkey is our enemy, and Russia is our permanent friend"* (cited in Ishkhanian, 1991: 12). They use stereotypes to define Azeris as similar to the Ottoman Turks. Moreover, they strive to create a stereotype of the victim through public discourses in order *"to prove the aggressive nature of the Azerbaijanis and to assert the non-stop genocide of the Armenian people"* (Mazinani, 2013:35).

Armenian elites also used many religious motives to portray Turkey and Azerbaijan as the enemy of the Christian Russia to ensure her protection. Armenian Academy of Science's petition in 1987 addressed to Gorbachev explicitly shows this motive as follows: *"They are not only kicking out the Armenians, and Russian inhabitants from Nakhjivan and Karabakh, but also, by realizing the plans of NATO member Turkey, they have created a string of Muslim villages which consider themselves Turkish along Soviet frontier"* (Kaufman, 2001:55).

Many narratives entered in the school textbooks as the biased version of the history (De Waal, 2003: 274). The narratives of each society portray themselves as a victim and create negative stereotypes concerning other society. Accordingly, the past traumas and the pattern of enmity are transferred from generation to generation through propaganda and socialization of children in schools (Goldstein, & Keohane, 1993: 6).

The findings of the media monitoring conducted in Armenia and Azerbaijan during three months in 2008-2009 revealed many stereotypes in both countries. Armenian media describe Azeris with the stereotypes such as *"vandals," "barbarians," "impudent," "dishonorable," "rough-mannered people," "murders,"* and *"genocidal"* (Doc-28, 2009: 28, 31, 92). It cultivates

stereotypes fostering enmity by referring to past traumas such as 1915, Baku, and Sumgait.¹⁹²

¹⁹³ Armenians represent Azeris as the ancient Armenian enemy and executor of anti-Armenian policies.¹⁹⁴

In the same manner, Azerbaijani media use clichés like “*Armenian brutalities/Armenian barbarities*,” “*Armenian band/bandit groups*,” and “*Armenian terrorists*.” On the other hand, they describe themselves as “*victim of aggression*” (Doc-28, 2009: 36). These clichés stimulate and strengthen the mutual hostility and the enemy image¹⁹⁵ by remembering the war, since Azeri elites and society concern that “*the younger generation may forget about Nagorno Karabakh and hatred toward Armenians*” and, therefore, they insist that media should put more focus on the Karabakh’s occupation (Web-23).¹⁹⁶

The analysis of the public discourses proves the existing negative perception pattern and conflicting cultural context governing both societies’ political behaviors.

4.3.7. Construction of Armenian and Azerbaijani Securitization Process

Guzzini (2011: 334) writes that securitization is a mechanism. Under the light of this proposition, the examination sought to reveal, how to operate this mechanism in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. To achieve this aim, the study will refer to the premises of constructivism. The constructivist assumptions offer that securitization is an intersubjective process and it is constructed socially. Accordingly, we realize the prominent position of identity and the role of negative perception pattern constituted by past interactions and domestic settings in the securitization process. It has been strived to explain these issues in the previous sections. Now, I would like to demonstrate how both nations securitized their relationship.

¹⁹² Examples from the newspaper “*Golos Armenii*,” September 16, 2008: “*Mass crimes against Armenians in Sumgait, Baku, Kirovabad, and massacre in Maraga (1992) - Armenian diplomats even do not try to use these incontestable arguments as acts of ethnic purges and Genocide. Events in Khojaly prove them to be crimes of Azerbaijan against its own citizens.*” (Cited in Doc-28, 2009)

¹⁹³ “*Aravot*,” September 18, 2008, and October 25, 2008: “*none can give his enemy a motherland liberated with blood, “if we lose even a centimeter of territories, we will lose everything.*” (Cited in Doc-28, 2009)

¹⁹⁴ “*ALM*,” “*Day by Day*,” October 5, 2009: “*Audience is said that the main aim of Azerbaijan is not to search possible ways of reconciliation but to annihilate all Armenian nation.*” (Cited in Doc-28, 2009)

¹⁹⁵ “*525-ci Gazet*,” October 16, 2009: “*The author quotes an episode about a little boy pointing his toy gun at him and saying ‘I come from Karabakh. I shall be killing Armenians with this gun.’ “One cannot be friends with a country that has drunk the blood of Turks, with an aggressor country until territories remain occupied.*” (Cited in Doc-28, 2009: 103).

¹⁹⁶ A male Azeri states that “*the responsibility or role of the national media is to report such news that young people become even more patriotic when reading them, and have a sense of vengeance and bellicosity.*” (Cited in Web-23).

The literature on the securitization suggests that security is a “*self-referential practice*” (Buzan & Waever & de Wilde; 1998: 24). To understand the operation of this process, one shall examine the effects and role of identity, past interactions of actors, fears, elites’ behaviors, and geography, which determine the dimensions, extent, and magnitude of this process (Buzan & Waever & de Wilde; 1998: 57, 59). Therefore, in the next sections, these factors and their relations with the securitization process will be examined in detail.

4.3.7.1. Past Lessons from the Formative Events

Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998: 59, 60) underline the adverse effect of the conflicting past with a neighbor in the construction of threat. Bilali (2013: 21) articulates that “*historical memories serve to identify one’s current foes and allies, as well as identify and anticipate future threats.*”

Events	Drivers of the Armenia’s Securitization Process	Drivers of the Azerbaijan’s Securitization Process
1877-78	Worse social and economic conditions led to the awakening of the Armenian Nationalism	Loss of lands and resulted to the resentment of immigrating Muslims.
1894-6	• Independence of the Nation, • The rise of hatred towards Turks and sense of existential threat.	Deterioration of the Turkish society’s political and economic status.
1905 Armeno-Tatar clashes	• First confrontation with Azeris • Formation of enmity	• Awakening of the Azeri nationalism • Rise of hatred towards Armenians • Sense of the economic and political threat from the Armenian dominance
1915-18	• Traumatization of the entire nation • Existence of the nation	The rise of hatred towards Armenians
Independence	• Formation of the vulnerability sense, • Fear of the Turkish occupation	Rise of Armenian threat to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity
Disintegration	• The renewal of the vulnerability fears from the imagined attack of Turkey	• The renewal fear of Russian occupation, • The fear of the loss of territorial integrity
NK Conflict	• Fear of the renewal of “genocide.” • Fear of being besieged by Turks/Muslim.	Fear of losing the symbolic territory and territorial integrity.
Isolation	• Identification of the present-day Turkey with the Ottoman Empire • Rise of the siege mentality	The increase of the belief of injustice and discrimination among Azeris
Sumgait	• Renewed fears of a new massacre • Recall of memories of the tragic events of 1915	Resentment resulting from the exodus from Armenia
Khojaly	• Formation of deep animosity, • Desire for revenge of past atrocities	Unity of nation and deepening of the enmity

Table 7 Formative Events driving to Securitization

In this regard, the past traumas enable the production of the negative images and perception patterns, which amplify the threat perception.

The past events shown in Table 7 constitute the formative moments for Armenians and Azerbaijanis that led to the construction of their security discourses. It depicts the conversion of discourses depending on the change of the formative events.

The special culture of the Caucasus forces the societies to put particular emphasis on the memories that complicate the mutual relations (Zarifian, 2008:150).¹⁹⁷ The lessons derived from the successive formative events fomented a biased collective memory (Lebow, 2008: 480). Therefore, the collective memories of the societies are the most significant driver of the securitization process, since they shape the corporate identity and produce narratives, myths, and analogies.¹⁹⁸ Both societies developed a collective memory full of prejudices, which produces negative analogies and schemata. The availability of the negative analogies and schemata activates negative perception patterns, which leads to the securitization of the problems.

4.3.7.2. *Collective Fear Orientation*

The negative perception patterns lead to a collective fear orientation in both societies. As Bar-Tal (2001: 612) indicates, the best way to examine the collective fear orientation is *“to look at the cultural, educational, and political mechanisms as well as mass media channels, which both reflect the fear orientation and disseminate it.”*

Suny (2000: 140) suggests the investigation of fears and anxieties of states to analyze their threat construction. In this regard, the major Armenian collective fear is the recurrence of the mass massacres. After conducting interviews with some members of the Diaspora, Anderson (2000: 38) concludes that *“the genocide is important because the events in Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh arouse fear in Armenians that the events of 1915 could be repeated.”*

De Waal (2003: 78) also underlines the decisive role of the tragic event of 1915 in the fear construction. He quoted from Lyudmila Harutiunian, a well-known Armenian sociologist, the following interesting passage: *“Fear of being destroyed, and destroyed not as a person, not individually, but destroyed as a nation, fear of genocide, is in every Armenian. It is impossible*

¹⁹⁷ Mirzoyan (2010: 175, 176) underlines the paramount importance of the history and points out that Armenians remained *“handcuffed”* to history, which is the essence of the post-Soviet Armenian identity.

¹⁹⁸ According to an Armenian official, Armenian nation senses threat from Turkey because of experiences (Interview-I; 6).

to remove it.” In this regard, the tragic event of 1915 is a clear example of the formative events used as an analogy in the societal securitization (Terzioglu, 2008: 26-45).

When the pogrom of Sumgait occurred in 1989, Armenians started to think that “*Turks*,” namely, Azeris would slaughter them once again. Armenians constructed a belief that “*it could reoccur at any moment, either in Karabakh before the settlement or after a settlement*” (Johnson, 2000: 163). The pre-war atrocities and the war itself rekindled old tragic memories and triggered the fear of a new massacre.¹⁹⁹

The second driver of the collective fear is the sense of vulnerability. Armenians collectively believe that they are alone in the region and the Turks are looking for an opportunity to wipe out them from the region.²⁰⁰ The adverse politics and the betrayal of Great Powers, as well as present isolation by Azerbaijan and Turkey, lead the Armenians to think in this way. Johnson describes this feeling as “*an example of the fatalistic worldview most Armenians have about the war, and life.*” He cites the fears of an Armenian as follows:

“There is no solution to the Karabakh question. If Karabakh is left with Azerbaijan, Armenians will be persecuted. If it is left alone as an independent state, the Armenians will feel persecuted because they are sure the next genocide is coming, and they will demand protection from outside. If Karabakh is given to Armenia, they believe they will be attacked and slaughtered, and because of world politics, nobody will help them like in 1915” (Johnson, 2000: 163).

A high-level OSCE diplomat defined the fears of the Armenians as follows: “*Their fear is that if they give up some territories, then they would lose their defensive positions that they have been creating for years. Then they would be at the mercy of states that would guarantee their security. And they are not sure that these states can really fulfill their promises. So, in the minds of Armenians, they should be able to protect themselves by themselves basically. And then comes from some alliance*” (Interview-V; 4).

The anecdote quoted from the Moscow journalist Viktor Loshak, who was sent to the earthquake zone in 1988, shows the magnitude of the collective fear emanated from an awful state of ‘psychosis.’ He explains:

¹⁹⁹ “*For most Armenians, Turkey remains the genocidal regime par excellence. It eliminated entire ethnic groups and confiscated their personal and collective wealth without any subsequent recompense or acts of contrition.*” (Hovannisian, 1994: 251).

²⁰⁰ “*Most of the Armenian population saw in the Turkish strategy the logical continuation of the long-term policy to keep Armenia helpless and vulnerable and perhaps, at the convenient moment, to seize upon an excuse to eliminate the little that is left of historic Armenia.*” (Hovannisian, 1994: 251).

“What did these people speak about to me, a journalist, and to each other? Not about death, not about their loved ones, not about forecasts for a new earthquake. They spoke about how the Azerbaijanis had sent them a consignment of medicine-they had sent a few wagons of medicines because they were very near and the Central Committee had helped them to do so-the Azerbaijanis had sent them medicine, and they believed of course that the Azerbaijanis wanted to poison them. It was already on the level of an absolute psychosis” (cited in De Waal, 2003: 64).

Libaridian (2004: 193, 194) provides another striking example of the obsession of the Armenian Diaspora with Turkey. According to him, Diaspora was striving to deter Armenians from proclaiming the independence by raising the fear of a new genocide and Pan-Turkism in the 1990s. They advocated the belief that Turkey would attack and Armenia could not defend herself, in the case of independence. This example shows once again the irrational role of the Diaspora in the manufacturing the collective fear even it contradicts the interest of the Armenian nation. Jenny Phillips, who studies Armenians living in Boston, suggests that Armenians have developed *“a root paradigm of an endangered people.”* Hence, they perceive, as individuals and a group, a permanent threat (cited in Pattie, 2005: 128).

Even there exists no material threat to the Armenian sovereignty, Armenian elites and politicians also exploit the animosity towards Turkey to produce fear as a mean of gaining public support, masking domestic economic and political problems such as the absence of democracy and the perilous dependence on Russia. The collective fear orientation is a useful tool in their hand. The selected part of the speech made by Gerard Libaridian, the national security adviser to President Ter-Petrossian, at the Second Congress of the Armenian National Movement in 1990 explicitly underlines the efforts and motives of the elites and Diaspora to promote fears:

“... The Genocide has become a negative form of self-definition. To paraphrase a friend, our death certificate has become our flag.

Both in Armenia and in the diaspora, participation in that fear and hatred came to replace participation in collective thinking and decision-making. Reactions were confused with principles; promoters of fear and hatred became the strategists and perpetuated the collective paralysis. What was there to participate in, after all? If the question facing our nation is how to keep bloodthirsty and irrational Turkey and Turks from killing more of us, then the answer would be to seek a protector. The price of that protection is the loss of all other rights, including the right to question authority.

... To a nation turned refugees and denied its past, inducing an abdication of history and a denial of a future seemed almost a natural progression based on a strategy of fear and hatred.

Did a strategy of liberation based on anti-Turkism and anti-communism, on fear of Pan-Turkism and hatred of the Turk, cause the return of an inch of Western Armenian territory or bring us any closer to Turkish recognition of the Genocide? Did conditions in the Soviet Armenia lead to the resolution of the outstanding issues on the national agenda?" (cited in Libaridian, 1991: 160, 161,162).

Pan-Turkism constitutes the be a source of the fear disseminated among Armenians. It is the driver of the anti-Turkish policies in Armenia. However, as APNM's ideologists Rafayel Ishkhanian wrote, this fear is baseless.²⁰¹ Nevertheless, many Armenians continue to believe it.

A long-lasting fear affects the behaviors of the societies. In this regard, the long-lasting fear freezes the beliefs of the societies. Libaridian, explains the effect of the fear on the behaviors of the Armenian society as follows:

"For too long the fear of neighbors has been the most dominant factor in determining the answer to the question of Armenian independence. Endangered by a series of massacres and a genocide in the twentieth century, strengthened by the imagery of the brutal Turk, nurtured by the surviving specter of Pan-Turkism, internalized as the psychology of the victim and the colonized, manipulated by Armenia's self-appointed protectors that fear has, in fact, distorted the perception of national interests, and has been confused with strategic thinking." (cited in Mirzoyan, 2010: 63).

As for Azerbaijan, the most significant fear is the return to the Russian domination. Like the Armenians, Azerbaijani society also feels that their independence is vulnerable (De Waal, 2003: 97). The politicians and scholars frequently remind the population the experiences of the first republic. The other significant fear is the multi-ethnic structure of the Azerbaijani society and weak identity. In this context, the NK Conflict inflicts the fear of breaking up the fragile state. The Russian manipulation of the Lezghin minority in 1993 was a proof of the fear of Azerbaijani politicians. However, both fears never became a decisive collective fear to orient entire nation as happened in the Armenian case.

²⁰¹ "I was curious whether today foreign sources are writing about the existence of contemporary Pan-Turkism and about its plan to annihilate Armenia. I could not come across any information." (Cited in Astourian, 2000: 26).

Armenians and Azerbaijanis pervasively regard Turks and Russians as the threatening societies respectively (De Waal, 2003: 274). Therefore, production and dissemination, as well as the promotion of the fears concerning these societies, became a state policy in Armenia and Azerbaijan. These fears also affect the formation of the state's interests. The sense of a constant threat leads to an irrational decision-making process and the distortion of the national interests (Libaridian, 1991: 1).

4.3.7.3. Identity

We know that if two distinct identities consist of competing components, then we may expect the formation of an identity conflict. In our case, Armenian and Azeri identities consist of many competing elements in their cultures. Our study of identity formation conducted in the earlier sections shows us that both actors formed different and contradicted corporate and type identities. The significant and sometimes conflicting aspects of their corporate and type identities have been outlined in table 8 below:

Nation	Corporate Identity	Type Identity ²⁰²
Armenia	• First Christian nation, Orthodox sect • Consist of the east and west Armenia (in Turkey) • Root-oriented • Reference to the historical territories of Armenia • Humiliation or threatening of a large-group identity • Affection of Russia • Fear of Turkey	• Partly free Democracy • Supremacy of the Nagorno-Karabakh clan • Influence of Diaspora and religion • Military intervention in domestic politics • Past-oriented political leadership • A little resentment of the Russian dominance • Submissive to Russia
Azerbaijan	• Muslim, Shiite sect, consist of the northern and southern Azerbaijan (in Iran) • Rich and complex cultural legacy, but very recent notion of Azerbaijani nationhood (Mehdiyeva, 2003:275) • Weak sense of identification with the Azeri nation (Suny, 2000: 159) • Fear of Russia	• Secular state system • Not free Democracy • Dominant Military • Leader-centric regime • Deep resentment from being under the Russian rule

Table 8 The Aspects of the Corporate and Type Identities

These identity aspects mentioned above create opposite ideological poles and stimulate the formation of different and contradicting role identities. Furthermore, they generate a negative

²⁰² <https://freedomhouse.org>

perception potential for actors to securitize any matter. In this regard, Jackson (2009: 178) contends that the Armenian and Azeri large-group identities (Volkan, 2009: 207), which were nurtured through fear, threat, hatred, victimhood, and dehumanization of the other, initiate the securitization process.

In this context, Armenians regard the past massacres and the loss of an ancient land as the humiliation of their self-esteem exerted by the Turks.²⁰³ Therefore, Armenians consider the liberation of the Turkish Armenia and the retake of Karabakh as a rectification of the historical injustices. This belief is a reflection of the subjective security needs of the Armenian corporate identity, which is expressed by the discourse of Genocide (Marzipan, 2010: 13; Barseghyan, 2004:7; Panossian, 2003: 1). Consequently, the unfilled security needs of the Armenian corporate identity promote an intractable securitization process.

As for Azerbaijan, the Armenian atrocities in the first and second period, as well as the loss of 15-20% of the Azeri land in the war (1992-1994), accelerated the development of the Azeri nationalism, which is relatively weak compared with the Armenian nationalism. The past traumas became a part of the Azeri corporate identity. The self-esteem of Azeris aspires to rectify the misconducts of the past and to recover its losses in the past. Thus, Azeri corporate identity puts the recovery of the lost territories at the core of its subjective security needs. Furthermore, the fears such Russian dominance and the fragmentation of the state operate as other drivers of the securitization process.

The dominant security paradigm of the region, which emancipating from the regional Lockean culture (internalized 1st degree), offers no more option to both societies than exercising a military and power-centric policy. Accordingly, the “*discourses of danger*” logic leads the states to form type identities that lack democratic institutions and exercise non-cooperative regional policies.

4.3.7.4. *Speech Acts and Contemporary Events*

Elites in both societies show a tendency to promote nationalist identity formation (Iskandaryan, 2008: 9). Therefore, they referred frequently to the myth-symbol complexes in their public speeches. These speeches reinforced the security concerns. For example, after the Khojaly massacre, the Turkish President Özal stated that “*Armenians should be frightened a little.*” It

²⁰³ De Waal (2003: 192) cites his experience with an Armenian priest, which shed light on the psychology of the Armenian society: “*The priest explained that he was not only a priest but a ‘son of the Armenian people.’ ‘All of our territories will be liberated,’ he said. ‘Look at the map.’ He pointed to a map of Greater Armenia on the wall, in which landlocked Armenia had burst its bounds and spread out across Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan to three seas. ‘I don’t know if I’ll see it or not, if my son will see it or not. It will be up to my grandson.’*”

was an example of this kind speech, which reinforced other's threat perception (Jones, 2000: 61).

In the early years of the newly independent Armenia, the tone of the statements of the Turkish politicians was quite threatening (Hunter, 2006: 166).²⁰⁴ Although the majority of this kind speeches were made for public consumption, they incited fears among Armenians. Moreover, Turkish authorities alleged that Armenia provided a haven for the rebels of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Armenia (Masih & Krikorian, 1999: 101). Armenians perceived this allegation as a pretext that Turkey would use to attack Armenia.²⁰⁵

The military exercises conducted near the Armenian border in 1992 and 1993 reinforced the effect of the threatening statements.²⁰⁶ During one of these exercises, Turkish Army threatened Armenia by shelling, in the case of any Armenian threat to Nakhichevan (Mirzoyan, 2010: 74). However, Russia showed a clear stance to deter Turkey from any intervention.²⁰⁷ The threatening statements of the Turkish politicians "*unleashed the historically rooted Turkophobia*" (Mirzoyan, 2010: 74) and helped to the extremist securitizing actors in Armenia, who regarded Turkey as an ancient foe and aspired to orientate Armenia towards Russia. As a consequence of the bellicose speeches, Russia strengthened its "protector" role and exploited the proper conditions to deploy once again her troops on the Turkish border in 1992 (Masih & Krikorian, 1999: 102).

Also, the mutual hate speeches of Armenian and Azeri elites fostered security dilemma. These speeches generally targeted the survival of other's sovereignty and identity.²⁰⁸ Naturally, sovereignty and identity turned into the referent objects, which were exploited by securitizing actors on both sides.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁴ For example, The Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller stated that Turkey would go to war, "*if the Treaty of Kars would be violated through the invasion of Nakhichevan.*"

²⁰⁵ Tchantouridzé (2008: 7) describes the Armenian political atmosphere in 1993 as follows: "*Ter-Petrossian was convinced that Turkey would take advantage of serious unrests in Russia, and occupy Armenia using a pretext of either the Kurdish question or the protection of Nakhichevan. President of Armenia had intelligence reports that Ankara was considering such a course of action, and his suspicions were further confirmed by Turkish armed forces penetration on October 5 into Iraq in hot pursuit of PKK guerillas.*"

²⁰⁶ "*The Armenian offensive against Kelbajar produced a Turkish show of force along the Armenian frontier, intense Turkish diplomatic activity abroad, and threats of unilateral intervention in the conflict.*" (Hovannisian, 1994: 254).

²⁰⁷ Marshal Shaposhnikov, the head of the CIS Armed Forces, warned Turkey "*that any intervention in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict could cause World War III.*" (Mirzoyan, 2010: 31).

²⁰⁸ As Kaufman (2001:55) purports, some Armenian politicians like Zori Balayan always sought to promote the fear of genocide to realize a larger Azerbaijani plan to revive the pan-Turkic union that would terminate Armenian sovereignty.

²⁰⁹ As seen in the following statements of some Azerbaijani officials (Cited in Suny, 2010: 19);

During the Declaration debate of the Independence in the Armenian Supreme Soviet (in 1990), Armenian politicians strived to securitize the “*genocide*” by adding a clause to the declaration. Despite the opposition raised by Ter-Petrossian, the majority of deputies voted in favor of adding a paragraph, which stipulates that Armenia would seek to achieve international recognition of the Armenian “*genocide*.” Furthermore, the parties²¹⁰ even wanted to mention the recovery of “*the western Armenia*” as a task in the declaration. Edmond Azadian, the party leader, stressed this point as follows (Astourian, 2000: 20):

“We have always maintained that the territory of the this Republic of Armenia is the nucleus of tomorrow’s Greater Armenia. In this respect, we expect the newly formed government to commit itself to the restoration of our historic rights. More specifically, the new Republic must include in its on-going agenda the recognition of the Armenian genocide and our historic territorial claims by the international community. But the ways mean, and the opportune time to pursue those goals must be left to the best judgment of our far-sighted leader.”

This statement reflects the worldview (central/core belief) of some Armenian politicians, who securitized the “*genocide*” and the “*lands*” lost centuries ago without considering other relevant beliefs and Armenian interests. The revitalization of the traumatic memories through threatening speeches addressed in the last 25 years served only to the materialization of the securitization process.²¹¹ In this regard, Armenia joined in the Russia-led security organizations and allowed the deployment of the Russian troops in Armenia (Suny, 2010: 18). The advertising of the Pan-Turkish threat produced tangible results such as the building of a stronger axis of cooperation²¹² among Russia, Armenia, and Iran.

Defense Minister General Safar Abiyev: “*Armenia must always remember that what Azerbaijan accepted yesterday will not be accepted today and tomorrow. Azerbaijan will not want to have a separated state, meaning Nakhichevan, cut from the mainland Azerbaijan. This issue will be raised tomorrow.*”

Col. Ramiz Melikov, The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry spokesperson: “*In the next 25–30 years there will be no Armenian state in the South Caucasus...Present-day Armenia was built on historical Azerbaijani lands. I believe that in 25–30 years these territories will once again come under Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction.*”

²¹⁰ These parties were the Armenian Communist Party (ACP), the nationalistic ARF, and the bourgeois conservative Armenian Democratic Liberal Organization (ADL).

²¹¹ Even today, the Armenian elites and society is highly sensitive to the statements and actions of Turkey. For example, when Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated the expulsion of the approximately 100000 Armenians working illegally in Turkey in 2010, it was also considered by Armenian elites as the continuation of Turkey’s genocidal intention (Ambrosio, 2011: 105).

²¹² The Armenian foreign policy advisor Aram Sarkisyan explicitly proposed the establishment of a “*geostrategic axis of stability*” in the South Caucasus and adjacent areas in November 1998. (Cornell, 2001: 305).

4.3.7.5. *The Role of the Socially Constructed Geography*

Geography also plays a significant role in the securitization process, since “*it cuts the world into distinct chunks so that the actors in a given region share the properties of their region as a structural context*” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:482). In this regard, geography shapes our perception of threat through two factors: distance and terrain. Short distance and flat terrain affect the sense of threat and lead states to aggregate their capacity (Buzan & Wæver & de Wilde; 1998: 59).

Contrary to the “*old-style essentialist geopolitics*,” new geopolitics offers a new concept of the interaction between politics and geography that underlines the “*socially constructed nature of geographical space*” (Tsygankov, 2003: 105). This concept purports that the society attributes different meanings to territory based on past interactions, narratives, and, myths. Usually, the myth-symbol complexes consist of a geographical spot with symbolic importance. Thus, geography turns into a part of corporate and type identities.

In this regard, for both nations, territory constitutes an indispensable part of their identities since they link all components of their identity such as race, religion, and culture to the land on which they inhabited. Karabakh constitutes a symbol of the Armenian existence and Azerbaijan's unity. Therefore, both nations attach immense importance to Nagorno Karabakh, which represents “*the last bastion*” to defend their identity (Croissant, 1998: 69).

We should also take into consideration the low degree internalized Lockean culture prevailing in the region, which attaches exclusive importance to the land and control of the land.²¹³ Thus the territorial boundaries are not vanishing in the South Caucasus, on the contrary, they continue to be the driver of the securitization process. In this respect, Armenians and Turks (Azeris) considered the Caucasus as “*a frontier between Islam and Christendom*” (Nuriyev, 2000: 142) and the land must be defended against the other (infidel) at all cost. This core belief leads to an automatic process of securitization.

The politicians define geographic areas of objective and subjective security interests. Such definitions make the land as referent object and part of the securitization process. For example, on the one hand, Armenia's geostrategic thinking considers Karabakh as a “*Christian outpost*” preventing the Pan-Turkist expansion that aims to unite the entire Turkic nations (Gabrielian & Nedolian, 1997: 108). On the other hand, Azeri politicians consider Karabakh as “*the cradle of Azeri culture*” and should be retaken. Therefore, the Armenian and Azeri politicians attribute

²¹³ We can define the Hobbesian meaning of territory as follows: “*walls of exclusion to be policed and defended at all costs.*” (Wendt, 1999: 212).

special meaning to Karabakh, which is, maybe, not consistent with the objective reality. This fact reflects another aspect of the socially constructed nature of geography.

Similar corporate identities generate a similar definition of the geography, which facilitates the alignment and diminishes threat perception. In this regard, the former Turkish President Demirel defines the Turkey's geographic area of interests as follows: "...stretching from the northern Caucasus to the Persian Gulf and from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China" (Hunter, 2006: 163). This definition rests on the historical narratives and on the subjective security needs of Turkey, which aspires the exclusion of Russia from this defined space. It complies with the Azeri definition of geography and contradicts with that of Armenia and Russia. Accordingly, the subjective definition of geography is a subject (as referent object) of the securitization process.

Soviet policies such as "*divide and rule*" promoted the territorialization of ethnicity. This policy envisaged that each ethnicity must be linked to a territory. This policy was regarded as one of the principal causes that led to the ethnic conflicts emerged in the post-Soviet period (Masih & Krikorian, 1999: XXVIII).

Another implication of the land in the securitization process is its physical proximity (Hunter, 2006: 24). The physical proximity works in two ways: It leads either to form an alliance with a nearby power or to balance against a nearby power.²¹⁴ Walt (1987: 158) highlighted the effects of geographic proximity that states are more sensitive to threats from the regional states due to the perception that threats travel rapidly and easily in proximity.²¹⁵ As Walt (1987: 23) argued that states tend to form alliances with nearby powers rather than distant powers, Armenia and Azerbaijan prefer Russia and Turkey respectively as the balancer and protector because of their physical proximity to them.

This brief analysis shows that geography represents various subjective meanings for each society, depending on the past interactions and culture as well as how societies use geography as a referent object in the securitization process.

²¹⁴ According to Buzan & Wæver (2003: 45), "*the impact of geographical proximity on security interaction is strongest and most obvious in the military, political, societal, and environmental sectors.*"

²¹⁵ Simple physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction among neighbors than among states located in different areas is also a point emphasized by Walt (1987: 276-7).

4.4. Chapter conclusion

As it was stated at the beginning of this chapter, the aim of this study is to enhance the explanatory capability of the Balance of Threat Theory by using the premises of the Learning Theory and constructivism. Because; the major weakness of BoT is its incompetence to explain how actors construct their “*aggressive intentions*.” One, who aspires to advance the BoT, should demonstrate the construction of intent and the role of the past in this process with the help of constructivist assumptions.

To reach this goal, I studied the formative events in two distinct periods in a comparable manner. Comparison served to get meaningful inferences from the events. This research strategy helped me to recognize their effects on the contemporary policy behaviors on both sides.

I realized that experiences and analogies used by elites in the decision-making processes are of paramount importance to the understanding of identity and enmity formation as well as the dynamics of the securitization process. Hence, I will summarize my findings in this section.

First, I studied the role of analogies, schemas, and metaphors. The study of contemporary literature helped me to understand how elites from Armenia and Azerbaijan utilized “*analogical reasoning*” in their decision-making process. The study revealed that many politicians from both countries refer to the past events to interpret the present-day events. For example, the Sumgait pogrom was interpreted under the light of past analogies such as tragic events of 1915. I also realized that both sides charge analogies with emotion in many cases, which strengthens its effect.

- Armenian and Azeri politicians make use of analogies publicly to influence the mindset of the masses, which deeply entrenched with the negative historical memories. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, for instance, recreated the conditions of fear and mistrust through the transfer of past narratives from generation to generation on both sides. It is evident that the deep insecurity of both sides rests on their perceptions formed by a spiral of animosity. In this context, Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan’s statement indicates undoubtedly this impact and the connection of two different issues: “... *recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the NK conflict are connected with each other.*” ²¹⁶ Similarly, Souren Zolian, a former member of the Karabakh Committee, stated in an interview that “*Karabakh was initially an*

²¹⁶ Interview with the Russian Izvestia magazine, on 27.11.2012, <http://times.am/?l=en&p=15356>, 30.11.2012, 23:45

abstract notion, and people said Karabakh, but what they really meant was “genocide” (Astourian, 2000: 22).

- Both states are “*handcuffed to history*,” thus; the past dominates the foreign and domestic policy exercises of both states. They usually draw parallels between the past and present-day events to generate new policies (Mirzoyan, 2010: 14). For example, Kocharyan once mentioned that Armenia had to find common ground with Turkey, but “*not at the expense of our historical memory*” (Mirzoyan, 2010: 41). The role of the past is so strong that leads both states’ decision-making units to make irrational decisions.

Second, I studied the type of decision-making unit and the influence of past lessons on it. This study revealed the following conclusions: a. the working power in the top decision-making circles generally share the same world-view, b. the type of decision-making units are unitary and cartelized by some interest groups, c. the benefits of the interest groups holding the state apparatus surpass many times the state interests, d. both states are operating as cognitive actors, and they learn from the past in line with the lessons derived from the past, e. the lessons arising from the past are the most determinant factors in shaping the actions and the rhetoric of international politics, f. the beliefs of elites make a profound impact on the decision-making process.

Third, I examined the constructivist literature on the construction of identity, fear, hatred, enmity, threat, and securitization to understand the mechanism of the formation of aggressive intentions. I inferred the followings: a. identity functions like a placeholder in the international system that defines self and others, b. the identity of states or leaders is the major determinant in the conduct of the foreign policy, c. “*material practices are an effective expression of an identity*” (Murray, 2010: 663), d. internal and external structures affect the identity formation, e. culture is the major factor in the formation of identity and belief system as well as determining group interests with the help of “*myth-symbol complexes*,” f. nation is an imagined political community and primarily symbolic reality and constitutes the unique source of political power, g. fear leads society to increase its solidarity. However, it causes “*political blindness*” by “*freezing of beliefs*,” h. the negative beliefs constructed through interaction are the most important factors for the formation of hatred, and it leads to de-legitimization, i. enmity prevails in the system, if the past interactions, culture, and domestic setting generate a negative perception pattern, j. the intervention of external powers and balancing behaviors of small powers can be explained through an understanding of enmity and amity patterns, k. “*the perception of threat is a function of the line drawn between the in-group and the out-group*” (Rousseau & Retamero, 2007:749), l. security is a “*self-referential practice*,” and securitization

is a socially constructed process, m. alliance behaviors can be regarded as an outcome of securitization.

Fourth, this study disclosed striking similarities between two periods that proves the following contention of Krikorian (2001: 106): *“There are several areas in which it appears that history has repeated itself.”* For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 paralleled with the demise of the Imperial Russia in 1917, which eroded the control of the periphery by the center. Mirzoyan (2010: 13) also establishes linkage between the present-day Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Armenian-Turkish conflicts of the 1894-1923 period and underlines that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is just an *“organic extension.”* In this context;

- The existence of some similarities allows us to compare the events in term of derived lessons from the past. The major events in both periods represent the formative moments, which set up the necessary conditions led to massive social, political and economic changes in societies. These changes prepared the battlefields for mutual atrocities. Subsequently, successive mutual atrocities made a profound influence on the consciousness of both societies, and the spiral of animosity caught them. Furthermore, mutual atrocities fostered the development of a peculiar nationalism, which served to the rise and sustainment of enmity.
- The analysis of two periods indicated the critical role of religion, particularly in Armenian society; however, we do not have enough evidence to conclude that the religion is one of the leading causes of the conflict and alliance formation.
- Great Power Policies exercised in the region caused many sufferings in both societies. It incited and strengthened the animosity among nations. Consequently, nations developed many syndromes such as the Turkish Sevres syndrome, Armenian third power syndrome, and Azerbaijani insecurity syndrome. Great Power Policies prepared the conditions for the lack of trust that impedes cooperation and compromise.
- Both nations own similar cultural peculiarities that attribute special importance to myths, past glories, and memories. Inevitably, this tendency leads to the politicization of the past by elites to mobilize the masses.

Fifth, I realized the essentials and the process of the identity formation in both societies. Their identities were constructed in direct opposition to another. Both corporate identities consist of many conflicting elements such as religion, territorial disputes, myths, and narratives, which paved the way to the flourishing of the aggressive nationalism. As Mazinani (2013: 37) rightly emphasizes, Armenian society constructed a genocidal identity. The images of Armenians as victims evolved through the long history of victimization that left its mark on the Armenian self-perception and imprinted the Armenian ethos (Rouhana, & Bar-Tal, 1998: 766; Henze,

2000:31). The study evidently affirmed that the Nagorno Karabakh is a symbol²¹⁷ for both identities endeavoring to preserve itself by the acquisition of self-determination or territory (O'Lear, 2011:271).²¹⁸

- The study underlined once again the prominence of a coherent national identity (ethnically homogeneous) in the maintenance of the efficiency of the state apparatus (Suny, 2000: 175). It also indicated that the corporate and role identities play a crucial role in the definition of the foreign policy and interests. In this regard, in Azerbaijan, the advocates of Turkism want to establish a firm and close relations with Turkey and demand the even formation of a political union between two states (Hunter, 2000: 38). However, in Armenia, the advocates of Russianism consider Russia religiously and culturally identical (corporate identity) and want her support against Turkic “enemies.”

- This study of major events affirms that role identity changes over “time” and “space.” It means that formative events and the dominant culture of the time may reshape the role identity (Sjöstedt, 2013: 153). The table 9 below shows identity changes over time:

Periods and Culture Actors	1877-1904 Hobbesian Culture	1905-1921 Hobbesian Culture	1922-1988 Mixture of Lockean and Hobbesian Cultures	1989-1994 Mixture of Lockean and Hobbesian Cultures	1995-2016 Mostly Lockean Culture
Armenia	Az: Friend Tu: Rival Ru: Friend	Az: Rival to Enemy Tu: Enemy Ru: Friend to Rival	Az: Friend Tu: Rival Ru: Ally	Az: Enemy Tu: Enemy Ru: Friend	Az: Enemy Tu: Enemy Ru: Ally
Azerbaijan	Ar: Friend Tu: Friend Ru: Rival	Ar: Rival to Enemy Tu: Friend to Ally Ru: Enemy	Ar: Friend Tu: Friend Ru: Ally	Ar: Enemy Tu: Ally Ru: Rival	Ar: Enemy Tu: Ally Ru: Rival

Table 9 The Role Identity Change over the Time

- The last important aspect concerning the formation of identities is the role of elites (Suny, 2000: 139). Elites in both societies affected the formation of type and role identities through emphasizing past traumas, symbols, and myths. Their decisions based on their personal belief system (worldview and principles) created short and long-term consequences that affected the further development of the identities.

²¹⁷ “For Armenians, Karabakh is the last out-post of their Christian civilization and a historic haven of Armenian princes and bishops before the eastern Turkic world begins. Azerbaijanis talk of it as a cradle, nursery, or conservatoire, the birthplace of their musicians and poets.” (Cited in De Waal, 2003: 3).

²¹⁸ “In a survey of 1,200 adults across Azerbaijan, nearly 90 percent of the respondents ranked the Karabakh conflict as a major area of concern for Azerbaijan, even above material well-being, unemployment, access to healthcare, and crime.” (O'Lear, 2007:271).

Sixth, I aspired to understand the construction of the perception and enmity patterns. I argued that past events, great power politics, and public discourses be influential in the generation of the perception patterns of ordinary peoples. Particularly, the collective memory and the belief system function such a prism regulating the perception of the societies (Bilali, 2013: 18).

- We acknowledge that Armenian collective memories developed a “*siege mentality*,” which makes Armenians very sensitive in the interpretation of the external effects. According to Armenians, they were exposed to continuous Turkish and Muslim threats, and they try to survive in the mid of Muslim Ocean. Armenian collective memory purports that “*Turkey represents everything that is opposite to the essence of Armenia*” (Mirzoyan, 2010: 57). As a result, contemporary Armenians obsessed with an animosity towards Turkey and Turks since the elements of the Armenian identity are nurtured with the hatred towards Turkey.²¹⁹ In this context, for Armenians, “Turk” (Azeri) is a conception in their mind, which expresses “*the invader, the killer, and denier*,” therefore; an Armenian must hate Turks and others relating to the Turks.

- On the other hand, for Azeris, Armenians are the number one agents of the Imperial and Soviet Russia, who ceased their sovereignty in 1828 and 1920 (Kaufman, 2001:56). “Armenians” represents the following stereotypes for Azeris: “*troublemaker, slanderer, and terrorist*” (Libaridian, 2005:4) and an Azeri must not trust on the Armenians. Contrary to Armenians, Azeris became hostile to Armenians due to the resentment from their high social and economic status at the beginning of the 20th century. Simultaneously, the increased taxation and conscription as well as Christian advancement resented²²⁰ the Muslim population in the Eastern Turkey and promoted enmity (Bloxham, 2005: 41). Under these conditions, the Pan-Turkist ideas found acceptance and accelerated the anti-Armenian sentiments (Walker, 1980: 71).

- For the Turks, the Armenians’ behaviors under the Ottoman rule fit to “*Trojan horse dilemma*.”²²¹ Because, they betrayed Turks by backfiring during the wars against Russia (1877-8 and 1914-18) and, therefore, they are regarded as “*traitors*” or “*inner enemy*” (Salt,

²¹⁹ Johnson (2000: 160) underlines this fact, as the followings: “*Armenian ideology is self-serving... while serving to make some local sense of this senseless historical event. From an Armenian perspective, if the Turks are naturally predisposed to genocide, they should be hated and ultimately destroyed.*”

²²⁰ Christian advancement destroyed the Muslim belief of Muslim superiority of over Christians.

²²¹ Alon Peled contends that “*when subjugated minority groups oppose the state in principle and assume the role of disloyal opposition, the state and the general public confront a will ethnic soldiers with kin in an enemy country turn their guns against their fellow soldiers and citizens or fight for their country.*” (cited in Schweller, 2004: 179).

2003: 20; Bloxham, 2005: 68). Today, the Turkish society use these stereotypes to imply their distrust of Armenians.

- The bitter memories of the past served in the construction of many stereotypes nurturing hatred towards to the other. The existing public discourses, which use stereotypes, negative images, and destructive rhetoric, play a significant role in the sustainment of enmity and negative perception patterns. Thus, the attitudes of elites continue to poison the next generations and lead to an eternal enmity (Kazemzadeh, 1951: 18).

- The controversial politics of the Great Powers sowed seeds of hatred between societies, and its negative consequences are still effective. The study showed that Armenia is extremely submissive to Russia that allows Russia to continue to manipulate Armenian domestic and foreign policy.

- To test the arguments above, I examined some survey results. The chart one below shows the Azerbaijani attitude towards neighboring nations. Strikingly, only 1% of Azeris consider being a friend, doing business and marrying Armenians, whereas the percentages are very high for Turks and Russians (Quoted from Doc-30, 2008: 11).





Chart 1 Azerbaijan: Attitude towards Neighbors (CRRC DI 2007)

Chart 2 Armenia: Attitude towards Neighbors (CRRC DI 2007)



The chart 2 indicates that the majority of Armenians approve of being a friend, doing business and marrying other nationalities, however, only one of four Armenians approves of friendship Turks and Azerbaijanis. Remarkably,

Armenians show greater tendency to befriend with Russians at a rate of 94% (Quoted from Doc-30, 2008: 11).

Table 10 depicts the results of the second survey conducted by CRRC in 2009. It indicates the negative attitudes towards other ethnics. The majority of Armenians approves of being friendly with the Russians. However, they disapprove of being friend with Azeris and Turks. On the other hand, nearly all Azerbaijanis disapprove of being friend with Armenians whereas 82% of them is approving of friendship with the Turks. Interestingly, more than half of Azerbaijanis favor friendship with Russians.

	Approve				Disapprove			
	Ru	Tu	Az	Ar	Ru	Tu	Az	Ar
Armenians	93	32	28		6	66	70	
Azeris	52	82		1	45	16		97

Table 10 Being Friend with Other Ethnic, Source: CRRC DI 2009





Chart 3 General Attitude of Turks towards Armenians

Similarly, the CB (Caucasus Barometer) survey conducted in 2010 reveals once again the negative attitude (69%) of the Turkish society towards Armenians (chart 3).

Finally, the survey' results conducted by CB in 2013 support the previous results.

Chart 4 The Perception of Actors' Role Identities by Armenia and Azerbaijan



identity) of their countries. In the second line, Turkey (28%) and Russia (7%) constitutes the enemies of Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively. In contrast, 83% of Armenians consider

According to the survey results, Azerbaijanis perceived Armenia and Armenians perceived Azerbaijan as the main enemy (role

Russia as Armenia's biggest ally, whereas 91% of Azerbaijanis view Turkey as an ally (chart 4).

These results confirm that the Armenian and Azeri societies see each other as the main enemy. The results point out the existing enmity and negative perception pattern between two ethnics, which impedes dialogue, mutual understanding, and cooperation, but leads to confrontation.

Seventh, I tried to understand the operation of the security dynamics that lead to the securitization. In this context, the study affirmed that fears lead both societies to produce "frozen beliefs," since they become a prisoner of the past events, old analogies, and schemas. Exposing too much time fear diminishes the ability of the societies to entertain alternative ideas and generate new beliefs. They turn into a "*political blind*," which cannot generate different solutions. These societies interpret every development biased, unfair, and selectively (Rouhana, & Bar-Tal, 1998: 766). Fears produce a distorted view of the past and future and prevent the appraisal of the present realities (Libaridian, 1991: 3). Our case study provides many examples that Armenians and Azeris adhere to certain beliefs despite the existence of much-contradicting evidence.

- In this regard, the examination of both sides' fears showed that fear fuels threat perception and functions such as an engine of the security dilemma that leads Azerbaijan and Armenia to balance or bandwagon. In this context, Armenia encircled by "hostile" Turkic people senses an immense threat from Turkey and Azerbaijan. Thus, Armenia needs to align with a powerful partner, which is the Orthodox kin-country: Russia (Huntington, 1996: 279).

- Azerbaijan's loss of sovereignty in 1920, the secession of Zangezur district to Armenia and Kazak district to Georgia during the Sovietization made Azerbaijan sensitive to her territorial integrity. The perception of "*lack of Azeri solidarity*" reinforced this sensitivity. Accordingly, the fear of further participation of country forces Azerbaijan obsessively to liberate Nagorno

Karabakh. Azeris fear that the loss of Karabakh will lead to the full destruction of Azerbaijan (Kaufman, 2001:56).

Identities	Role	Collective
Armenia	Ru : Ally Az : Enemy Tu : Enemy	Alignment with Russia
Azerbaijan	Ar: Enemy Ru: Rival Tu: Ally	Alignment with Turkey

Table 11 The Present State of the Role and Collective Identities

- As mentioned before, identity is the prime factor when we conduct a societal security analysis. In this regard, the table 11 above shows the present state of the role and collective identities.

The construction of role and collective identities rest on the components of the corporate and type identities (depicted in table 8) as well as in the dominant culture and security paradigm. Armenian corporate and type identities share many components with the Russian corporate and type identities, while Azeri, Turkish corporate, and type identities share many similar components. Furthermore, the dominant culture is a mixture of Hobbesian and Lockean cultures (or a first degree internalized Lockean Culture) in the South Caucasus. It means that an actor identifies the other automatically as an enemy or rival due to non-cooperative security paradigm and conflicting corporate and type identities.²²² Consequently, for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey play the “enemy” roles, while Russia plays the “ally” role. For Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia stand for “enemy” and “rival” respectively, while Turkey has an “ally” role identity. The emergence of opposite role identities foments the threat perception. Accordingly, considering these role identities, both states formed collective identities with other states. In this context, Armenia allies with Russia, while Azerbaijan chooses Turkey.

- The combination of fear and hatred in a society generates mistrust and enmity. The existence of a “*hate dynamic*” constituted the basis of “*security dilemma*” between two states (Huntington, 1996: 266). The lack of factual knowledge of each other leads societies to make false assumptions about the other actions. Consequently, societies reproduce self and enemy images in relation to their identities (Rother, 2012: 58). In this context, the Armenians defined themselves as a “*martyr nation*” devoted to the Christian faith (Kaufman, 2001:53) and constructed an “*eternal enemy*” image for Turkey and Azerbaijan. Considering these images, Armenia interprets the actual developments and categorizes them as a threat or not. For example; they called the damage to the ancient Armenian monuments in Karabakh as “*cultural genocide*,” the decrease of the Armenian population in Karabakh as “*white genocide*,” and the air pollution in Erevan as “*ecological genocide*” (Kaufman, 2001:55).

- The present threat perceptions of both sides operate mutually reinforcing, and their entertainment creates the security dilemma.²²³ Cornell (1998: 56) underlines this point by contending that “*the main determinant of the conflicts is a security dilemma based on fear; or one could say, on the development of nationalisms mirroring each other, fueling and directed against each other, and scarcely able to develop without each other.*” Accordingly, both sides exaggerate and misjudge the real situation. Therefore, we can call the Armenian and

²²² According to Buzan and Wæver (2003:472), the Lockean culture dominating culture in CIS area. However, the analysis of the historical contexts and external security environment indicates us that a mixture of Hobbesian and Lockean cultures prevail the region (Ter-Matevosyan, 2013: 327).

²²³ The Armenian NSS and leading Armenian politicians clearly securitizes Azerbaijan as an acute existential threat and justify the war against the neighboring country.

Azerbaijan security dilemma occurred in the second period as a “*perceptual security dilemma*” (Stein, 1988:259).

- Both sides have quite the opposite myth-symbol complexes. Kaufman (2001:49) points out that “*Armenian myth-symbol complex focused on fears of genocide and Azerbaijani one emphasizing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan.*” The opposing myth-symbol complexes pave the way for the emergence of the overlapping security dilemmas.

- This study shows that the societal securitization triggers the securitization in the military and political sectors, Armenian elites, who cultivated the Turkish enmity and harbored many anti-Turkish analogies, schemas, and metaphors in their minds, perceive that Armenia’s survival is in danger.²²⁴ This perception leads them to a security dilemma. The collaboration of Turkey and Azerbaijan, the bellicose statements and actions of Turkey and Azerbaijan force Armenian decision makers to improve and strengthen the existing military and political cooperation with Russia. Accordingly, Armenia considers the Russian military presence a key component of the country’s national security, as stipulated in the National Security Strategy (German, 2012: 1661). Likewise, Azerbaijan feels insecure because the existing perception patterns produce negative estimation concerning the intentions of Armenia and Russia. Moreover, the Armenian-Russian military alliance (CSTO) reinforces her fear and affirms the negative estimation. The combination of ideational (negative estimation of intention) and material factors (CSTO) makes Azerbaijan handcuffed to a perpetual security dilemma. Therefore, she seeks to form a tacit military alliance with Turkey and increase her defense spending.

- While the security dilemma in the military and political sectors resulted in a boost of the military expenditure and intense cooperation with other intra-regional actors,²²⁵ it obligated actors also to cooperate with the extra-regional actors (penetration), which interconnected the regional dynamics with the systemic dynamics (Cornell, 2001: 53).

- Like political and military sectors, the driver of the economic securitization is the societal securitization. In this context, the very dependence of Armenia on the energy and transportation routes makes her vulnerable to any isolation. However, “*the siege mentality*,” an aspect of Armenian corporate identity and developed throughout the last 200 years, makes her vulnerability more sensitive. Consequently, energy dependency becomes a referent object in the economic securitization process. It operates in two ways: first, her energy needs make

²²⁴Armenian elites use some schemas to visualize easily the problem such as: “*We are a small, Christian nation surrounded by an ocean of Muslims hostile to us.*” (Libaridian, 1991: 41, 43).

²²⁵ Azerbaijan military expenditure has grown from 170 million U.S. dollars in 2003 to over 3 billion in 2015. The growth has been almost twentyfold. (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/>)

Armenia more submissive to Russia, which supplies Armenia with relatively cheap energy, second, energy dependency and isolation compel Armenia to maintain her political and military ties with Russia and to cooperate with Iran. Similarly, for Azerbaijan, the chief referent object in the economic sector is the free and continuous export of her rich natural resources to the outside of the region. Consequently, Azerbaijan considers her relationship with Turkey and Georgia vital to have free and secure export routes. This need forces Azerbaijan to cooperate with Turkey and Georgia.

- In table 12 below, I depict the elements of the securitization processes in various sectors, according to the security analysis model of Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998). It shows the effect of the formative events in the construction of the securitization process.

Elements Events	Armenian Securitization Process			Azerbaijan Securitization Process		
	Referent object/s	Securitizing actor/s	Sector/s	Referent object/s	Securitizing actor/s	Sector/s
1877-78 War	Independence of Armenia	Armenian revolutionaries	Political	-	-	-
1894-6 Pogroms	Building of the Independent state	Hunchakian and Dashnaktsutiun Parties	Political	-	-	-
1905 Armeno-Tatar clashes	Confiscation the possessions of the Armenian Church	Church and Dashnaktsutiun Party	Political and Societal	Life conditions of Azeri Society	Refugees and labor force	Societal and Economic
1914-18 WWI	Survival of Armenians and revival of "Greater Armenia."	Hunchakian and Dashnaktsutiun Parties	Political and Societal	State and territory	Musavat Party	Political
Independence	Independence of the State	Dashnak Government	Political and Societal	Independence of the State	Politicians	Political and Societal
NK Conflict	Identity/ Symbols	Politicians and Diaspora	Political, Societal	Territorial integrity and Sovereignty	Elites and Politicians	Societal and Political
Isolation	Armenian Economy	Politicians	Military, Economic	-	-	-
Sumgait	Pan-Turkish Threat to the Corporate Identity	Politicians and Diaspora	Societal	-	-	-
Khojaly	-	-		Corporate Identity	Elites and Politicians	Societal

Table 12 Formative Events and their impact on securitization

- As seen in the table, the societal securitization emerges as the most important sector to focus in the South Caucasus. The empirical findings show that "identity," which is the referent object of the societal securitization, give the meaning to material needs. Namely, identity

determines which material element should be prioritized, protected, and pursued. In this regard, we know that various securitization processes operate and interplay in a region as exemplified in figure 10. Since the identity is the chief factor, the societal securitization functions like a propeller which brings the other securitization processes in motion.




Figure 10 The Predominant Role of Societal Securitization

Finally, based on the analysis above, we can define the mechanism of the societal securitization as follows: a. the formative past events and interactions produce a kind of collective memory, belief system, and norms, b. These products, called culture, shape the corporate identity and affect the formation of type identity, c. the interplay of corporate/type identities with the past lessons, hatred, fears and enmity/amity generates various standards for each actor called as a perception patterns, d. the perception patterns contain analogies, schemas, narratives, and myths about the others. e. the actors use them to estimate others' intention as positive (friend) or negative (foe), f. the activation of perception and its outcome (positive or negative) depends on the type of dominant culture and security paradigm, g. the emergence of the negative perception pattern may lead to security dilemma and securitization.

- The identities, the perception patterns, and military capacity are the major elements of the threat formula. The figure 11 below depicts the relations among these elements of threat formula. As seen in figure 11, shared identities, and positive past lessons generate positive perception pattern that produces a positive estimation of intent and "friend" role identity. Based on the positive intent and friend role, actor assesses other's offensive capacity. If actor's own capacity is more or less than the capacity of other, actor sense secure or negligible threat respectively. On the other hand, different identities and negative perception patterns generally

lead to a high-level threat estimation depending on the culture, security paradigm, past lessons, and material capacity.²²⁶




Figure 11 The Threat Estimation Model

²²⁶ International politics consists of many social constructions, formed through the interactions of societies in past, and their interplays determine the foreign policy outputs (Monteleone & Rossi, 2008: 58).

Chapter V: Security Constellations of Actors

5.1. Overview

In the previous section, we recognized the superior role of the societal securitization in the South Caucasus. Therefore, we can expect that it plays a chief role in the in the formation of alliances. As Mirzoyan (2010: 3) rightly underlines, we can analyze the security dynamics by regarding this region as “*a separate regional security complex*,” since these dynamics base on the lasting enmity and amity patterns. In the following sections, I will try to find empirical evidence for the societal basis of alliance formation through discovering the dynamics evolved in the region after the demise of the Soviet Union. To achieve this aim, I will examine these dynamics at three levels as it is framed by Buzan and Wæver (2003:397): **domestic, regional, and global**.

The Caucasus links Asia to Europa and north to south. It was/is the cradle of different civilizations (Islam and Christendom) and, thus, had/has a turbulent history. This region deserves special attention since it offers many insights for the societal security studies (Nuriyev, 2000: 140). As to material aspects, the Caucasus played a decisive role throughout the last two centuries in the so-called “*great game*” between the great powers (Rondeli, 2000: 51). Today, the region continues to draw the attention of the great powers because of its geo-economic importance. The examination of the events in two periods explicitly disclosed the adverse effects of the external actors’ policies on the societies of the region.

Both states seek security, however, with a different interpretation of the reality. For Azerbaijan, Russia constitutes the major threat, whereas she considers Armenia as an immediate threat and as a proxy warrior of Russia. On the other hand, Armenia interprets political and economic realities through a prism of historical enmity (Rondeli, 2000: 49). In this regard, the states exchanged their pre-war roles. Today, Azeri political identity took a revisionist posture to return to the status quo of pre-war, while Armenian political identity strives to maintain her territorial gains and she became a status quoist. This situation leads to a conflict of identities on many stages.

As some scholars (Rondeli, 2000; Buzan and Wæver, 2003) argued that small states prioritize regional interests and security concerns rather than global ones since regional dynamics shape their identity and interests as explained in the previous chapter. We can argue that the global factors affect the identity formation of regional actors only to a certain extent.

At first sight, one can assess the alignment motives of the regional states as materially oriented.²²⁷ However, our thorough investigation of two periods proved the validity and effect of ideational factors. Today, we witness the emergence of two opposite alignment patterns in the S. Caucasus. The first group consists of Russia, Iran, and Armenia, whereas the USA, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia constitute the second group (Cornell, 1999: 5). The major driver of the first group is the fear of pan-Turkism and western penetration; therefore, this group aspires to hinder or limit the Turkish influence.²²⁸ ²²⁹ The second group aims to restrain the Russian influence and to spread out the western values. I will explain the alignment dynamics in the next paragraphs.

We can count the followings as the major determinants of the Armenian foreign policy: a. past lessons, b. siege mentality (due to landlocked geography), c. perception of vulnerability (due to a sense of ethnically and religiously dissimilarity) (Hunter, 2000: 29).

These determinants generate the following interests: a. establishing and maintaining good relations with Russia, Georgia, Iran, and the Middle East, b. weakening Turkish influence. In accordance with these interests, Armenia exercised the following policies: a. being a member of CIS and the Eurasian Union, b. maintaining Russian bases on her soils, c. establishing economic cooperation with Iran, d. conducting and supporting anti-Turkey campaign (Mirzoyan, 2010: 150), and e. improving the relations with the West.

We can examine the recent Armenian political history in two periods: a. 1988-1992, idealistic/ideological (high-level nationalist consideration) period, b. 1994-2016, low-level nationalist period.²³⁰

The examination of the Armenian relations with the West reveals a paradox. Regarding material aspects, the interests of both sides collide and lead them to diverge. The main conflicting points are the role of western-oriented Turkey in the region and the close relations of Armenia with Iran. However, because of the cultural and religious affinity and Diaspora's role, the West shows astonishing sympathy to Armenia and tolerates her regional policies harming the interests of the West (Hunter, 2000: 33). Classical Armenian strategic thinking puts the survival of Armenia at the core. Own weakness leads Armenia to secure the

²²⁷ Brzezinski (1997) defines the Russian interests regarding the Caucasus in material terms.

²²⁸ "The collapse of the Soviet Union suddenly made pan-Turkism a more viable prospect. Certainly, Iran and Armenia have been skeptical of claims that pan-Turkism is dead." (Goldenberg, 1994: 49).

²²⁹ For example, Armenia's geographical location is vital for Russia and Iran, since it wedges the (socially constructed) "Turkic chain" stretching from Istanbul to Chinese Xinjiang (Cornell, 1999: 9).

²³⁰ "The assassination of Vazgen Sarkisyan, Karen Demirchian, and the six other parliamentarians was the final blow, killing the spirit of nationalism aroused in 1988." (Panossian, 2006: 243).

protection of Russia through an exploit of the enmity patterns and the regional equilibrium (Libaridian, 2004: 289; Gabrielian & Nedolian, 1997: 115).²³¹

As to Azerbaijan, a. historical experiences, b. perception of the Russian assertiveness, c. enmity towards Armenia, d. leader centric state apparatus, e. weak coherence of national identity, f. the influence of domestic groups can be regarded as the main determinants of the Azeri foreign policy. In this regard, Azerbaijan seeks to realize the following interests: a. cooperating with Turkey, b. orienting to the West, c. weakening the Russian sphere of influence, d. empowering state apparatus, e. improving national coherence, f. isolating Armenia.

In the light of these interests, Azerbaijan exerts following policies: a. creating alternative energy export routes through pipelines (Ipek, 2009: 229), b. strengthening her defense capability, c. participating in the counterbalancing efforts of Russia and Iran, d. consolidating the regime power and ensuring domestic stability.

We witness the following changes in the Azerbaijanian foreign policy (Alieva, 2000:36): a. 1992-1993, idealistic/ideological period, b. 1994-1999, pragmatic period, 1999-2016, multi-balancing period.

In the recent years, because of the well-developed state self-conscious, Azerbaijan started to exercise a multidimensional foreign policy that is oriented to both east- and westwards.²³² Azerbaijan's utmost principles are maintaining the regional balance and ensuring independence. Therefore, Azerbaijan prudently balances Russia, the West, and Turkey in line with her interests.²³³

Iran regards Turkey and Russia as a rival because of the common traumatic past but senses less threat. However, Iran perceives more threat from Azerbaijan to her territorial integrity and seeks to limit that threat as well as the western influence. Accordingly, Iran major interests are (Cornell, 1999: 6): a. balancing and weakening the Turkish influence, b. protecting internal

²³¹ Gabrielian & Nedolian (1997: 115) explain this policy as such: "*Balancing Turkey's potentially destructive influence by preserving the permanent collective security arrangement with Russia and balancing the Russian influence by active involvement in a larger set of relationships, including developing relations with Turkey and other regional powers such as Iran and Europe, and seeking continued economic support from the US.*"

²³² The key goals of Azerbaijan's multidimensional and balanced' foreign are defined as in the followings: continuing integration with NATO and the EU, enhancing military cooperation with Russia and strengthening energy cooperation with Turkey (German, 2012b: 144).

²³³ Since independence, the foreign policy of Azerbaijan has focused on two threats: "(1) the attempt by Russia to retain the Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, in its sphere of influence by using ethnic conflicts as a means of pressure on the 'insurgent' republics, and (2) the territorial claim of the Armenian Republic." (Alieva, 1995: 289).

and external stability, c. excluding the West from the region. Therefore, Iran supports Armenia and cooperates with Russia to stop the western penetration. Her alignment with Armenia against a Muslim state implies that religion is not a major determinant of the Iranian foreign policy, contrary to arguments of some western scholars.

Turkey considers Russia as a major rival in the region and protector of Armenia. Turkey sees Armenia as an outpost of Russia to carry out her historical interests and a threat to her territorial integrity. Iran and Turkey have an “*old fellow*” relation, which fluctuates between rival and enemy roles depending on the temporal conditions. In this regard, the main interests of Turkey are the followings: a. weakening the Russian influence in the region, b. supporting Azerbaijan sovereignty (Nuriyev, 2008: 163,164), c. containing Armenia and Iran.

Turkey exerts following policies to realize her interests: a. supporting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, b. strengthening the independence of the regional states from Russia and improving the cooperation among post-Soviet states (such as GUAM), c. increasing the Turkish economic and political presence in the region, d. ensuring energy transportation via Turkey.

Russia considers Turkey as a major historical rival in the region and Armenia as a wedge between Turkey and Azerbaijan.²³⁴ In the long term, Russia believes that Turkey might constitute a serious threat to her territorial integrity, due to her influence on “*the numerous Turkic and Muslim nations living in the North Caucasus, along with the Volga River, in the southern Urals, and in Siberia*” (Zagorski, 1999: 63). For Russia, Iran is a temporary ally to limit the western and Turkish influence in the region, even though her Islamist role identity.²³⁵ Russia aspires to realize the following interests: a. weakening Turkish influence, b. keeping Armenia in her sphere of interest, c. cooperating with Iran to contain Turkey and diminishing the western influence, d. countering and suppressing fundamentalism, separatism, and terrorism, e. ensuring energy dominance f. preventing the emergence of military cooperation (Tsantoulis, 2009: 251; Abushov, 2009: 204). Consequently, Russia exercises the following policies to materialize her interests: a. establishing economic and political dependency, b.

²³⁴ “For Russia, Armenia's position in the Caucasus is crucial. It is the only wedge between Turkey and Azerbaijan and the rest of the Turkic world. ... its central location in the Caucasus gives it great geopolitical value for Russia.” (Masih & Krikorian, 1999: 108).

²³⁵ “Moscow considers the South Caucasus to be a sphere of its exclusive influence or, as former Russian President Dimitrii Medvedev has put it, Russia's ‘zone of privileged interest’.” (German, 2012: 1650).

forming Russia-led regional organizations (Customs Union), c. deploying troops in the Caucasus, d. conducting the ad-hoc military operation.²³⁶

As I mentioned in the previous sections, two schools of foreign policy called Eurasianists and Atlanticists emerged in the Russian foreign policy circles.²³⁷ The idea of the “*near abroad*” became the official policy, after the control of the foreign policy by Eurasianists (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:404).²³⁸ The National Security Strategy stipulates that Russia should protect her interests in the former Soviet republics under the pretext of protecting Russian minorities. To protect her interests, Russia employs various policy options such as military intervention (as seen in the Georgia and Crimea cases), manipulation of the domestic politics (in Azerbaijan),²³⁹ exploitation of the dependencies on Russia (Armenia, Moldavia) by implementation of economic sanctions and embargos, as well as manipulation of the gas prices. Accordingly, many former republics of the Soviet Union, consider Russia as a threat. However, only some states can dare to balance Russia. In this respect, GUAM emerged as a cooperative organization against Russia (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:409).

5.2. Domestic Dynamics

5.2.1. Armenia

Nationalism, a central concept in the understanding of nineteenth-century Armenian political thought, affected Armenian securitization processes and foreign policy (Libaridian, 2004: 51). Today, elites and politicians employ “*national ideology*” as a tool of oppressive politics to control the opposition (Libaridian, 2004: 212). In this respect, Karabakh became a taboo and an instrument in the hand of the elites (Panossian, 239). It is difficult to raise different voices against the foreign policy of the governments concerning Turkey and Azerbaijan since one

²³⁶ “*After the ‘Five-Day War’ in August 2008, Moscow demonstrated its willingness to play the role of a revisionist state for the first time since 1991. Before 2008, Russia’s foreign policy was motivated primarily by the country’s top priority: the maintenance and defense of the existing regional status quo.*” (Markedonov, 2013: 32).

²³⁷ After the dissolution of Soviets, two schools of foreign policy called Eurasianists and Atlanticists competed to dominate the Russian foreign policy. Eurasianists maintained the idea that Russia should preserve her dominating role in its neighborhood, whereas Atlanticists aspired to have close relations with the West. By 1993, Eurasianists ensured their domination in Russian foreign policy leading to the policy of “Near Abroad.” (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 204).

²³⁸ “*The ‘near abroad’ policy aims to establish exclusive rights in guarding borders, in mediating conflicts and providing peace-keepers, in economic relations, and in protecting the rights of Russian- speakers. The structural framework to achieve this was intended to be the CIS.*” (Herzig, 2000: 106).

²³⁹ “*Russia concerned that the southern arc of the CIS would become a Turkish sphere of influence, cutting Russia off from its diaspora population and the rich resources of the area. Not surprisingly, Elchibey’s removal was applauded as a major achievement for Russian policy.*” (Chen, 1999: 34).

might be called as a traitor.²⁴⁰ The most decisive dynamic in the Armenian foreign policy is the Karabakh clan (natives of Nagorno-Karabakh), which champions the Karabakh conflict and pushes Armenia to the sphere of Russia.²⁴¹ Therefore, Russia strived to bring Karabakh leadership to power in Armenia, since “*they are more Russophile by tradition*” (Minassian, 2008: 10). The Karabakh clan forced, which embodied by Robert Kocharian in 1998, the president Ter-Petrosian to resign (Suny, 2000: 158). Gradually, this clan gained more prominence in the Armenian politics (Mirzoyan, 2010: 40).²⁴²

Suny (2000: 159) indicates the powerful impact of Karabakh since it represents the images of genocide and the coherence of the Armenian national identity. The Conflict over the Nagorno Karabakh constituted the core of the Armenian national security; thus, it strengthens the position of this clan and provides the necessary ground for the intervention of Russia (Herzig, 2000: 97; German, 2012b: 144; Interview-III, Hopmann; 4). The Karabakh clan obsessed with the imagined “Pan-Turkish” threat; hence, they exert a foreign policy nourished by the Turkish enmity (Zarifian, 2008:141).

The second important dynamic is the intervention of diaspora in the Armenian politics (Nasibli, 2008: 142). Diaspora insists on making the recognition of “genocide” by Turkey as the official state policy, whereas the APNM rejects its politicization for the sake of stability in the region and long-term interests (Astourian, 2000: 19). Anti-Turkishness is the chief motive of the diaspora’s existence. The concept of “*Hay Tad*” (The Armenian Cause) advocated by diaspora comprises both “genocide” recognition and territorial claims from Turkey (Astourian, 2000: 20). To achieve these goals, Diaspora “*organized public demonstrations, erected memorial monuments, made anti-Turkish propaganda through various publications and approached the diplomatic missions of various countries and international agencies regarding moral, financial, and above all territorial reparation by the Republic of Turkey*” (Libaridian, 2004: 41).

Due to the political and financial aid of Diaspora, the Armenian government covertly supports the policies and efforts of Diaspora. However, she exerts a sensitive strategy not to strain the relations with Turkey (Görgülü, 2008: 133; Valigholizadeh & Zaki & Barani, 2013: 200,201).

²⁴⁰ “Many of the opposition parties preferred to speak in slogans and extol ‘national ideals’ and nationalist ideology rather than confront complex realities.” (Libaridian, 2004: 236).

²⁴¹ “The Karabakh-clan, personified by the elite who have been in power since 1998, including former-President Robert Kocharian and current President Serzh Sargsyan, controls the political and economic life in Armenia; privileges close relations to Russia due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and therefore pursue a traditional approach to the maintenance of power.” (Freire and Simão, 2013: 180).

²⁴² “Prime Minister Kocharian engineered the opposition in the Cabinet-especially of the defense and security ministers and a sufficient number of deputies to compel the president to resign in 1998.” (Libaridian, 2004: 215).

The third dynamic affecting Armenian foreign policy is the Russia-centric forces. Russia has many leverages in hand to manipulate the internal politics of Armenia. Russia exploits energy and security dependency of Armenia as a weapon to hijack Armenian foreign policy.²⁴³ The last decision of the Armenian government to join the Russian-led Eurasian Union in September 2013 should be considered as a result of this policy. Manukian (1991: 84) underlines an interesting socially constructed belief of Armenians that Russia will one day recapture the land, which is presently under the Turkish “occupation,” and then they will return it to Armenians. This belief, which was gradually constructed throughout the last two centuries, stimulates the interest that Armenia should establish close relations with Russia. Thus, Armenia seeks to materialize this interest through alignment with Russia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union strengthened the sense of Armenia's vulnerability and isolation, because of the loss of common borders with Russia (Hovannisian, 1994: 262). Moreover, the ineffective policy of the West during the first years of the independence inflicted a belief that the West would not guarantee Armenian sovereignty.²⁴⁴

The dependency on Russia in energy and defense sectors pushes Armenian government to make incompatible decisions with the long-term interests of the country. For example, Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian unexpectedly extended the leasing period of the Gyumri base to 2044 in 2010, which had to last until 2020. This example shows once again the tendency of the Armenian government to comply with the Russian interests (Mc Ginnity, 2010:27).²⁴⁵ There are arguments that Russia even uses hard forces to design Armenian polity.²⁴⁶ It is a well-known fact that Russia supports the pro- Russian Armenian politicians. Some high-level Armenian officials owe strong relations with Russia as Serzh Sarkisian, who is known as “*Moscow's man in Yerevan*” (Mirzoyan, 2010: 48). We witness that ardent

²⁴³ As the Armenian newspaper Aravot [Morning] writes, “*If Armenia's president declares tomorrow that we have an intention to join NATO, then the next day Russia will avenge our audacity and encourage an Azerbaijani attack on Karabakh by moral and military means.*” (Cited in Suny, 2010: 19)

²⁴⁴ Suny (2010: 19) explains it as follows: “*Long before the Russo–Georgian War of August 2008, Armenians, perhaps reluctantly, made a pragmatic choice: once straddling West and East became impossible, they sided with the Russians.*”

²⁴⁵ Mc Ginnity (2010:27) depicts the conditions of the lease as follows: “*the Russian government will continue not to pay for the base's upkeep and its utilities, despite the base's growing strategic significance to Russia. Conversely, the Armenian government will continue to take on the full financial responsibilities of the base. This arrangement is highly unusual, as global powers such as the US or Russia usually offers lucrative contracts to station their troops on foreign soil.*”

²⁴⁶ “*On 27 October 1999, terrorist firing machineguns stormed the parliament building and killed the prime minister, Vazgen Sarkisyan, the speaker, Karen Demirchian, and the others. Some argued that this event was plotted by Russia.*” (Forsyth, 2013: 775).

Armenian nationalism does not produce a counter-argument, when it comes to the denial of the Russian domination (Forsyth, 2013: 777).

The fourth dynamic of the domestic setting is the elites' attitudes. The lack of state tradition, political culture, and democratic institutions cultivate the necessary conditions for the manipulation of elections, endemic corruption, suppression of opposition and bad governance.²⁴⁷ The elites and political actors disagree with the assessment of the actual or potential threats, consequently, on the external orientation of Armenia, namely, there is no consensus concerning the future relations with Russia and Turkey (Hunter, 2006: 30).²⁴⁸ The major political actors are Armenian National Movement (ANM), Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), known as the Dashnak Party (Hunter, 2006: 31). ANM maintains to establish constructive relations with Turkey without preconditions. However, ARF advocates for the idea of *"third force,"* which is Russia, to safeguard Armenia from the Turkic (both Azeri and Turkish) threat.²⁴⁹ Correspondingly, there are rifts among the sub-ethnic groups (Eastern or Russian Armenians and western or Turkish Armenians) about the major foreign policy challenges such as the solution of the Karabakh Conflict (Gabrielian & Nedolian, 1997: 103).

The pro-Russian politicians consider isolation from the regional cooperation as a vehicle to ensure the sovereignty of the country. According to them, good relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan might harm the future of the nations and degrade the national coherence (Libaridian, 2004: 300).

The fifth dynamic is the strongly entrenched position of the Armenian Apostolic Church within the Armenian society. The church affects Armenian polity due to its powerful position in the religious society. Armenian politicians prefer to have close relations with the church that endows them legitimacy and public support. The church pressures on politicians to practice

²⁴⁷ "In April 1997, two Karabakh Armenians took over top posts: Robert Kocharian became prime minister and Serge Sarkisyan, already minister of national security, acquired the interior portfolio. The Karabakh mafia was already well established, distributing Karabakh's budget, including subventions from Armenia and diaspora Armenians." (Herzig, 2000: 21).

²⁴⁸ The following statement was read by Levon Ter Petrosian as a respond to Zari Balayan's speech on the in the Armenian Supreme Soviet: "Despite our bitter experience, and disregarding the many disappointments our people have suffered, some of our intellectuals are still feverishly preaching the politically bankrupt and dangerous mentality according to which Armenia, being surrounded by enemy peoples of another religion, can survive only when it is under the protection of a powerful state. This mentality is leading our people to moral bankruptcy and denying it the opportunity to become a political partner, which is the only guarantee of success in political life. The concept of Armenia as an obstruction of Pan-Turanic plans and, therefore, as the political factor serving Russia's interests, pushes the Armenian question into the complex sphere of international relations, which has always been pregnant with dangerous consequences for our people." (cited in Libardian, 1991: 155).

²⁴⁹ "Opposition voices in Armenia have frequently rallied together around their criticisms of Armenia's one-way dependent relationship with Russia." (Markedonov, 2014: 10).

more conservative policies concerning cultural issues, education and external problems (Doc-44, 2016: 6).

This brief analysis shows that the domestic dynamics, particularly, elites and Russia-centric forces play a decisive role in the exercise of the security policy and, thus, in the orientation of the country. We see that the past lessons were not so influential on the political orientation of the country in the first years of the independence, however, later, the revisionist thinking became a central aspect of the Armenian foreign policy nourished by bitter memories of the society (Hunter, 2000: 30). At the beginning of the 2000s, Armenian polity developed a multi-vector foreign policy called “*complementary*” to relieve her dependency on Russia (Priego, 2008: 55).²⁵⁰ Shugarian (2003) explains the logic of this policy as so: “*complementarity can be also accounted for by the country’s survival instincts and the experience accumulated during the centuries of man-made disasters and the stateless existence. This is a desire to keep an active security, political and economic balance in the relationship with the world powers*” (cited in Barseghyan, 2004:23). However, the high dependency on Russia and Russia-centric domestic forces diminish the expected outcome of the “*complementary*” policy.

5.2.2. Azerbaijan

Contrary to Armenia, the Azeri nationalism is still in progress. As Suny (2000: 160) called, Azeri nationalism is “*an articulate nationalism*” exercised by the urban intelligentsia. Akin Armenia, elites frequently refer to the myth - symbol-complexes to secure the stability of the regime. In this regard, Karabakh, as it is the case in Armenia, is a political symbol exploited to exert pressure on the opposition. Particularly, the period between 1991 and 1993 was the turbulent years when we observed three regime changes.²⁵¹

The most decisive domestic dynamic is the Karabakh Conflict. This conflict affects foreign and internal decisions wholly or partially. Azerbaijan elites exploit the Karabakh Conflict to increase their political profile in the domestic power struggles (Chen, 1999: 30). Because of its pivotal position in Azerbaijan’s domestic and foreign policy, Azerbaijan developed and exercised an anti-Armenian policy discourse (Musabayov, 2008:73).

²⁵⁰ The concept advanced by the then Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian and it emphasizes “*the importance of equally balanced relations with all its regional and international partners, avoiding full dependence on one major state.*” (Freire, & Simão, 2013: 183).

²⁵¹ “*The first President of independent Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutalibov, had to resign in March 1992 following public protests against the Khodjaly massacre in February, while Abulfaz Elchibey was elected in June 1992. However, President Elchibey had to leave Baku on June 21, 1993 following an anti-government insurgency that started on June 4 and resulted in Haydar Aliyev’s taking power and becoming President on June 25.*” (Ipek, 2009: 229)

The second chief dynamic is the weak organization of the state apparatus and leader-centric administration.²⁵² Due to 2009 constitutional amendment, in which the number of presidential terms became limitless, the same president can be elected for several times.²⁵³ Because of this kind of authoritarian governance, certain interest groups emerged around Aliyev and became more influential in the exercise of the domestic and foreign policy. Aliyev shares some state power with the oligarchs (high ranking officials) through assigning them to ministerial positions in “a well-functioning informal hierarchical system” (Doc-43, 2016: 9). Meritocracy and family ties are the efficient ways to access in the bureaucratic system instead of qualification. Two regional groups exercise influence on the regime (Nakhichevanis and ethnic Azerbaijanis from occupied territories) and in the last years, the president’s wife became a most potent political figure in the state system (Doc-43, 2016: 11).

The weak democracy, repression of opposition and channeling oil revenues to certain power centers turned Azerbaijan into one of the most corrupted states in the world.²⁵⁴ Another implication of the leader-centric administration is the increasing likelihood of the radical foreign policy changes.

In this context, Hunter (2006: 64) distinguishes three periods in Azerbaijan's political development between 1989 and 1994: a. pro-independence tendencies, cultural Turkism (from 1989 to 1992), b. ultra-nationalist tendencies (from June 1992 to June 1993), and c. balanced policy due to disappointment with nationalist’s policies (from June 1993 to spring 1994). Elchibey's endeavored to build an Azeri state a-la-Turkey. He attempted to exclude Russia as possible as he can, to strengthen the ties with Turkey and the West, as well as to reunify with Iranian Azerbaijan (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 196). However, during the tenure of Aliyev, Azerbaijan developed a more balanced policy based on the realities of the region rather than shared identity (Shaffer, 2013: 237).²⁵⁵

The weak national coherence is the third dynamic that is influential in the decision-making process. The development of internal and external policies has strong relationships with the development of the Azeri corporate identity. Azerbaijan consists of some diverse ethnics and

²⁵² “Azerbaijan the upper echelons are reputedly dominated by members of the Aliyev family.” (Herzig, 2000: 21).

²⁵³ “Azerbaijan joined the other post-Soviet states, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, in which the same person can hold office for more than two.” (Markedonov, 2014: 11).

²⁵⁴ According to the data of Transparency International and Control Risks Group, corruption level of Azerbaijan ranked as the 123rd corrupt country among 176 countries in 2016 (<https://www.transparency.org/>).

²⁵⁵ Aliyev returned Azerbaijan to CIS, as a part of his grand strategy, however, he kept the cooperation at a certain level (Nuriyev, 2000: 143).

various religious sects. This divergence prevents the foundation of a coherent corporate identity. Accordingly, the structure of the society creates sensitive conditions for the external manipulation.²⁵⁶ In this context, the Turkification efforts in the early years of the republic generated many ethnic challenges (Mehdiyeva, 2003:274). Thus, Aliyev and his successor strived to keep some distance between Turkey and Azerbaijan due to the fear of ethnic discontent and “*possibility of Turkey is becoming a new elder brother*” (Alieva, 1995: 297).²⁵⁷

Geoeconomic and Geo-cultural profiles of Azerbaijan are the fourth dynamic effective in the securitization process. These profiles delineate the high-level interests of external actors (Hunter, 2000: 28). In this context, Azerbaijan seeks a cautious policy in her relations with Russia and Iran. Particularly, during the term of Elchibey, Azerbaijan took a pro-Turkish foreign policy, which resented and antagonized Russia and Iran. However, presently Azerbaijan follows a more balanced foreign policy, due to the economic, military, and political as well as geographic reasons (Goldenberg, 1994: 57).

Hunter (2000: 37) counts the followings as the factor affecting Azerbaijan's foreign policy: “*determining Azerbaijan's cultural identity; the construction of a history that can help sharpen the sense of national identity and enhance national cohesion; the ethnocultural and ideological heterogeneity and fierce intraelite struggle for power; the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; the intense interest of external powers.*” In sum, the interplays of these dynamics generate the security and foreign policy.

5.3. Intra-regional Dynamics

To understand the overall security constellations of the actors, one should also examine the intra-regional dynamics in addition to the domestic dynamics. In this regard, I will study their relations with the regional and intra-regional states.

The South Caucasus consists of three regional states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and three neighboring states are historically influential on the developments in the region: Iran, Russia, and Turkey. Moreover, EU and USA are considered as the global actors being able to exert influence in the region.

²⁵⁶ “*Russia and Iran succeeded in using the country's heterogeneity and fragile national identity to their own advantage.*” (Mehdiyeva, 2003:275).

²⁵⁷ Tokluoglu (2012: 323) contends that “*there are two major competing political discourses in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, namely the opposition's ideology of Turkism and the government's ideology of Azerbaycancilik (Azerbaijanism), which includes all ethnic and religious groups.*”

Having explained the positions of the actors and taking into account of their influences, my aim in this section is to comprehend the security dynamics that determine the alignment motives of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this context, this analysis will rest on the findings of the previous chapter. We can define the security constellations in the South Caucasus with the help of the following dynamics such as the pattern of enmity, the lack of cooperation, the ambitions of regional powers, and the penetration of external powers.

As revealed in the preceding chapter, the pattern of enmity constitutes the chief dynamic among the adjacent states such as Iran, Turkey, and Russia. The regional actors share a conflicting past, which leads them to compete for the domination of the region. A brief examination of the actors' positions in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict discloses their enmity and amity patterns.²⁵⁸

The second dynamic is the lack of cooperation and constructive politics. Many scholars (Libaridian, 2004; Henze, 2000; Hunter, 2006) underline the lack of cooperation in the region and account the following as the reasons for that problem: a. different security constellations, b. lack of economic and political capacity, c. existing conflicts, d. Russian ambition to dominate the region, e. internal resistance.

The existing Lockean culture (1st degree internalized and it shows temporal regression to Hobbesian culture) undermines cooperation since actors consider each other as a rival. Thus they align with others consistent with the role identities.²⁵⁹ For example, GUAM is a case of that kind formation, in which two regional countries Azerbaijan and Georgia aligned with other non-regional countries (Ukraine and Moldavia) against Russia.²⁶⁰

Turkey introduced some projects to ensure the stability and to improve economic welfare. In this context, Turkey proposed "*the Stability Pact for the Caucasus*" and "*the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform*" in 2000 and 2008 respectively (Fotiou, 2009: 3).²⁶¹ The lack of

²⁵⁸ "Since, the Karabakh issue is tied up with geopolitical games of big regional and extra-regional power, the issue has encountered with more complexity." (Valigholizadeh& Zakie& Barany, 2013:205).

²⁵⁹ An interview (Interview-II, 2) partner explains the logic of the societies in the region: "If we were located somewhere in the hearth of Europe in Vienna we could have been such cooperation. But, our neighborhood does not share the values that we have and the lack of this approach of these shared values ... therefore we do not have common objectives. And the interest is different...disregarding security situation disregarding the threats to stability of our state we have to keep an eye with the risks... the risks of security."

²⁶⁰ "These four states all resist any further strengthening of the CIS at the expense of the sovereignty of member states. They see the CIS chiefly as an instrument of Russian influence over the republics, and want to broaden their international contacts westward and seek their security through western security mechanisms—mainly NATO." (Cornell,1999:4).

²⁶¹ Armenia and Azerbaijan also mentioned other options of cooperation. In this regard, Azerbaijan's President Heydar Aliyev suggested a pact for security with a 3 + 3 + 1 structure that would include the

constructive concept, cooperation mentality, and broad-based consensus prevented the realization of these projects. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey formed a successful example of the regional cooperation (German, 2012b: 145) by constructing the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) running parallel to the BTC and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway (German, 2008: 68).²⁶²

The existence of the conflicts affects the regional stability in the South Caucasus, which reinforces Armenia's political and military dependency on Russia and prevents the possibility of Armenia's involvement in the regional projects, thus cooperation (Larrabee, 2009: 311). Moreover, Russia exploited the regional problems to control the actors. Any initiative to solve these problems, which would foster cooperation, usually bears the possibility of the political cost and encounters with domestic resistance (Fotiou, 2009: 18).

The third dynamic is the ambitions of the regional powers to dominate the region. The South Caucasus policy of Russia rests on three pillars: political, economic, and military. In this context, the main goal of Russia is to reassert its influence and stop the perceived western penetration (NATO enlargement and operation of the western energy companies) into the region (German, 2012: 1652). The Foreign Policy Concept (2008) depicts the western efforts as a "*violation of equal security*."²⁶³ Therefore, Russia considers Turkey's initiatives regarding the region as dubious and perilous for her security, since Turkey is a NATO member and her ethnic relatives are under the Russian rule.²⁶⁴ Russia strives to influence the political orientation of the former Soviet republics through the Russia-led military organizations such

South Caucasus states, Iran, Russia, Turkey and the United States. On the other hand, Armenian President Kocharian proposed a security pact involving all states in the region, based on a 3 + 3 + 2 structure: The South Caucasus states, Iran, Russia, Turkey and observers from the EU and United States. **Other proposals:** Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested the Russian-led initiative, the "Caucasus Four," in 2000. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi proposed the realization of a regional security system resting on a "3 + 3" formula (*Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, together with the three major powers in the region, Iran, Russia and Turkey*) in 2003 (German, 2012b: 146, 147).

²⁶² The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) was built to export Shah Deniz Stage 1 gas from Azerbaijan to Georgia and Turkey. The pipeline has been operational since late 2006. The length of the pipeline is 691km. The SCP Co. shareholders are: BP, operator (28.8 per cent), AzSCP (10.0 per cent), TPAO (19 per cent), Petronas (15.5 per cent), Lukoil (10 per cent), NICO (10 per cent) and SGC Midstream (6.7 per cent). (www.bp.com).

²⁶³ This concern was reflected in major Russian strategic documents such as the Foreign Policy Concept (2008), NSS (2009) and Military Doctrine (2010).

²⁶⁴ Moscow disturbance of Turkey's ethnic and linguistic ties with Azerbaijan and Central Asian republics, drove Russia to deploy its troops on the Turkish borders (Abushov, 2009: 202).

as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty (CST)²⁶⁵ promulgated in 1992 and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) founded in 2002.²⁶⁶

To reinforce her own position in the region and to gain leverage, Russia manipulates ethnic conflicts, supports ultra-nationalist and employs various strategies such as arms embargo or sales and control of energy prices.²⁶⁷ These efforts galvanize the old antagonism among the regional actors, particularly, between Armenia and Turkey (Minassian, 2008: 17).

Iran competes against Turkey for the cultural domination of the region, since each regards Turkey as a threat to its culture and religious sect. The western orientation of Turkey constitutes the second problem for Iran and impedes close cooperation (Hunter, 2006: 174). After the demise of Soviets, both states feared that the other could fill the vacuum, which the USSR had left (Libaridian, 2004: 243).

Turkey seeks to improve the integration of the region to the West via implementation of the energy and transportation projects. She believes that a highly interconnected region will increase Turkey's influence, while it will diminish Russia's and Iran's influence.

The fourth dynamic is the penetration of the external powers. After the demise of the Soviets, the western penetration caused excessive concern among the "Eurasianist" elites of Russia. They quickly securitized this issue and took various measures. In this context, Russia established the CSTO as a barrier against the NATO expansion,²⁶⁸ Euro-Asian Economic Community (EurAsEC: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) as a political platform in 2000 and Eurasian Customs Union (EACU: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia) effective from 2012 as a multilateral economic cooperation against EU (Saivetz, 2012: 406). Russia employed various strategies to increase the attractiveness of the membership in these organizations such as the lifting of migration quotas, offering oil and gas for privileged prices, and selling the military hardware at domestic market prices.

²⁶⁵ "The treaty reaffirmed the desire of all participating states to abstain from the use or threat of force. Just as NATO, the CSTO has a military assistance provision (Article 4), which states that aggression against one party will be considered as an attack on all parties." (De Haas, 2010: 40).

²⁶⁶ Present members are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and Tajikistan (Nichol, 2013: 10).

²⁶⁷ "Russia has also aggressively pursued blocking potential natural gas export competitors from entering the European market, such as Iran, Azerbaijan and producers in Central Asia, and works assertively to retain control over Central Asian export." (Kakachia, 2011: 18).

²⁶⁸ The CSTO established Collective Operational Reaction Force (CORF) in 2009. Presently, a Rapid Reaction Force is operational and composes a force of 16000 troops, including 8000 troops from Russia, 4000 troops from Kazakhstan, 1000 troops from each of Tajikistan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia (Aris, 2010: 2, 3).

Russia also opposed the first international oil agreement concluded by Azerbaijan in 1994, which enterprises to develop the Azeri offshore fields in the Caspian Sea (German, 2008: 66). However, the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline in 2005 undermined the Russian domination of energy supply to Europe.²⁶⁹

The reach resources of the Caspian region attract the non-regional actors, and this situation resents Russia and Iran.²⁷⁰ The systemic political, economic and military penetration of the West initiated the traditional dynamic of the Russian security thinking based on the fear that enemies encircle Russia (De Haas, 2009: 4).²⁷¹ Gradually, Russia reached a point, where she had to show her resolution to secure her grip in the region. Russia's intervention in Georgia enabled her to reach this goal and ensured her military presence in the region (German, 2012: 1656).

Having explained the basic dynamics of the region briefly, in the next sections, I will study in detail their effects on the bilateral relations.

5.3.1. Armenia-Azerbaijan

Presently, Armenia and Azerbaijan do not have any diplomatic relations. However, they have opportunities to contact through the OSCE, BSCO (Black Sea Cooperation Organization), and CIS. Azerbaijan refuses any official relations with Armenia because of the Karabakh Conflict and occupied territories (Libaridian, 2004: 286).²⁷²

For both countries, the Karabakh Conflict constitutes the main obstacle that prevents the development of the bilateral relations. As it mentioned in the previous chapters, Karabakh is a symbol for both nations that represent their corporate identities. Even though Karabakh is not so important considering its geography, both nations conceive the loss of this land fatalistic. The reconciliation depends on the peaceful solution of the conflict. However, both sides refuse any compromise since they constructed conflicting interests evoked by contradicting corporate identities. Furthermore, domestic settings also prevent elites to exercise rational policies.

Thus, both states follow irrational policies, even though they endanger their material interests. In this regard, the fraternal relations of Azerbaijan with Turkey, which is Armenia's ultimate

²⁶⁹ The shareholders: Iran 10%, BP 25.5% (UK), Statoil 25.5% (Norway), Lukoil 10% (Russia), Elf 10% (France), TPAO 9% (Turkey), and SOCAR 10% (Azerbaijan). (Cited in Ipek, 2009: 235).

²⁷⁰ According to the latest estimation, the Caspian region could hold as much as 162 billion barrels of crude oil (Cohen, 2013: 58,59).

²⁷¹ Russia was very upset with the so-called "*colored revolutions*" (*Serbia, 2000; Georgia, 2003; Ukraine, 2004; and Kyrgyzstan, 2005*), which reinforced the Russian fear of encirclement (Suny, 2010: 13).

²⁷² However, on the grass-root level, the merchants from both countries trade through indirect methods. The Georgian town of Sadakhlo is the center of these commercial relations.

enemy, make Armenia more resistant to any reconciliation with Azerbaijan. Armenia constructed a belief that Azerbaijan and Turkey intend to cease her sovereignty. This belief emancipates from the traumatic past interactions and great power manipulations. It is so strong and leads to a collective fear orientation that freezes rational thinking and leads to cognitive distortion in decision-making. Consequently, Armenian politicians employ some tactics and strategies to exploit the collective fear orientation by referring to the abstract concepts such as “Pan-Turkism” and “genocide.” This attitude manipulates the collective mind of the Armenian society and causes misperceptions.

On the other hand, Azerbaijan rejects any cooperation with Armenia as long as she goes on occupying the Azeri territory. Azerbaijan constructed a belief in the recent years that she can solve the conflict through building a strong army with the help of the increasing oil revenues (Cornell, 1999: 2). This belief activates the security dilemma, makes both nations more vulnerable to the manipulations of the external powers, and hinders cooperation.

The prevailing of these beliefs strengthens the self-help logic in the region and reflects the extent of the enmity entrenched in both cultures.

5.3.2. Armenia-Iran

Armenia and Iran established diplomatic relations in 1992. Although Iran supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, she never joined in the efforts of Azerbaijan and Turkey to isolate Armenia.²⁷³ This behavior made Iran as a reliable partner for Armenia.²⁷⁴ In this regard, both states developed the economic, cultural, and political relations based on mutual benefits.

For Armenia, Iran is a valuable partner by alleviating the pressure exerted by Turkey and Azerbaijan. Also, she provides gas and electricity to Armenia. Both nations do not have traumatic past and negative images.²⁷⁵ These two positive conditions relive any threat sense because of the emerged positive perception pattern (Valigholizadeh& Zaki& Barani, 2013:203). Moreover, both states worry about the emergence of the Turkic element in the region.²⁷⁶

²⁷³ “Iran declared her readiness to expand relations with Armenia in every respect.” (Hunter, 2006: 49).

²⁷⁴ “Ter Petrossian admitted that Iran had remained neutral on the Karabakh issue, even though its Shi’ a population sympathized with Azerbaijan, and characterized Iran as a friendly country.” (Hunter, 2000: 32).

²⁷⁵ “The history of Armenian-Iranian relations has not been marred by any traumatic experiences. The overall balance of the three-thousand-year history of Armenian- Iranian interaction has been positive.” (Hunter, 2000: 32).

²⁷⁶ Iran fears from the unity of the northern and southern Azerbaijan, which is presently the northern province of Iran. Iran also fears from the cooperation among Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Israel.

Accordingly, they construct same interest, which is the diminishing the effect of Turkish thrust into the region.

The emergence of an independent Azerbaijan concerned Iran very much since her twenty million ethnic Azeri citizens would unite with Azerbaijan in the future (Cornell, 1999: 7). Moreover, Azerbaijan's economic and political power rise creates tension in Iran (Gresh, 2006: 2). Since the Karabakh conflict distracts the Azerbaijan attention from Iranian Azeris and it attires Azerbaijan's power, the perpetuation of the conflict serves to the interests of Iran. In this regard, even Iran did not recognize the tragic events of 1915 officially as genocide, some Iranian NGOs recognize it as genocide.

Armenia is a valuable partner for Iran since she provides economic and financial means to Iran, which relieve the negative effects of the western embargo (Gabrielian & Nedolian, 1997: 109). Iran also exploits the enmity between Turkey and Armenia to reinforce the wedging role of Armenia between Turkey and Turkic world.²⁷⁷

As explained above, both nations have similar dynamics that affect the securitization process. Consequently, these common dynamics (fear of potential pan-Turkism) lead two states to counterweight Turkish domination in the region (Markedonov, 2013: 48).²⁷⁸ Therefore, Iran, "*an ideologically driven Islamic state,*" behaves "*as a rational state actor*" and supports a Christian state (Masih & Krikorian, 1999: 117). This point leads us to think that material interests transcend ideational interests. On the contrary, Iran behaves so, since she senses a cultural threat from the Turkish corporate identity to her corporate identity. The disclosure of this fact allows us to comprehend the logic of indirect Iranian support to Armenia.²⁷⁹

The subjective security interests of both nations emancipating from their corporate identities led to the formation of a North-South axis (*Armenia-Iran backed by Russia*) to counterbalance the East-West axis (*Turkey- Azerbaijan supported by U.S.*) (Libaridian, 2004: 243; Hunter, 2000: 30; Gresh, 2006: 6).²⁸⁰ In this context, we can conclude that the security interests of both actors are identity-centric rather being material-centric.

²⁷⁷ "Armenia and Iran also have some common strategic and security concern, notably a fear of potential pan-Turkism and Azerbaijani irredentism." (Hunter, 2006: 47).

²⁷⁸ The level of the fear from the Turkish domination in the region is so high that even the shoot down an Iranian military plane in March 1994 by Armenian separatist did not ruin the mutual relations between two states.

²⁷⁹ "After a period of neutrality, Iran moved closer to Armenia and has become that country's main economic provider." (Cornell, 1999:7).

²⁸⁰ "Thus, one outcome of this emerging Turkish-Israeli-Azerbaijani axis has been a greater degree of consultation and cooperation among Armenia, Iran, and Greece." (Hunter, 2000: 32).

5.3.3. Armenia-Turkey

To understand the present Azerbaijan and Armenian relations and their behaviors, one must examine the dynamics of the Armenian and Turkish relations.

Turkey was among the first states, which recognized the independence of Armenia. Initially, she exercised a neutrality policy and acted as an impartial mediator between the parties (Jones, 2000: 61). However, (after the massacre of Azeri civilians in Khojaly in early 1992) Turkey started to adopt a pro-Azerbaijan policy, due to the public pressures on the politicians because of ethnic affinities.²⁸¹ Accordingly, in April 1993, Turkey closed her border with Armenia and participated in the isolation efforts of Azerbaijan (Hovannisian, 1994: 252).

The post-independence foreign policy of Armenia rests on the past lessons. They construct following beliefs; first, Turkish influence in the region will be detrimental to the Armenian sovereignty, second, only Russia can protect Armenia from the Turkish threat, third, the loss of Karabakh will give way to another “genocide” (Hunter, 2000: 30).

The diaspora's territorial claims generate massive concern in Turkey and serve to recall the activities of the Armenian insurgents to devastate the Ottoman Empire.²⁸² In the recent years, the terrorist attacks conducted by Armenian terrorist organizations²⁸³ also renewed the old memories and reinforced the effects of the past narratives regarding the Armenian cruelty.

The following factors affect the Turkish-Armenian counter-securitization process: a. Armenia's insistence on recognizing the tragic incidents of 1915 as a “genocide,”²⁸⁴ b. Armenian territorial claims towards Turkey,²⁸⁵ c. Turkey's effort to be influential in the region, d. Turkey's alignment with Azerbaijan, e. the pro-Russian Armenian leaders, f. Turkish claims on Armenian support of PKK (Jones, 2000: 62).

²⁸¹ “The Turkish government knows that strengthening its ties with Armenia would strain relations with Baku and potentially discredit any Turkish government in the eyes of Turkish public opinion.” (Jones, 2000: 65).

²⁸² “For Turkish leaders overly sensitized to the role of the Great Powers in the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and the use of reforms in the Armenian provinces to extract concessions and weaken the state, such a campaign seemed like a repetition of a part of history they knew and accepted.” (Libaridian, 2004: 193).

²⁸³ Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide's and ASALA.

²⁸⁴ “After Robert Kocharian's election as the President, Armenia decided to integrate the ‘genocide’ issue in the governmental agenda. In this context, it can be argued that the Armenian government has perceived the ‘genocide’ issue as an important asset for its international communications strategy.” (Görgülü, 2008: 133).

²⁸⁵ “The Declaration of Independence adopted on 23rd August 1990 by the Supreme Council of the Socialist Republic of Armenia, refers to the Eastern part of Turkey as ‘Western Armenia’ and Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Armenia depicts Mount Ararat, which is situated in Turkey, as a part of the coat of arms of Armenia.” (Görgülü, 2008: 129).

Turkish society identified the Azeri territorial losses in the war as their losses and bear a resemblance to Armenian irredentism during the last years of the Ottoman Empire, which might later turn against Turkey itself (Libaridian, 2004: 270).²⁸⁶ Moreover, the territorial claims²⁸⁷ supported by diaspora and the efforts for the international recognition of “genocide” lead Turkey to take countermeasures since it invites the Turkish securitization process,²⁸⁸ which exercises Sevres Syndrome²⁸⁹ as an analogy to interpret the present day Armenian behaviors.²⁹⁰ For example, it is a widespread belief in Turkey that Armenia harbors PKK on its soil, to support Kurdish separatists, which aim to cease Turkey’s territorial integrity.

Another threat perception emerges from the Russian presence in Armenia. The more is Armenia submissive to Russia, the more Turkish threat sense upsurges. The Russian military bases located on the Turkish border and joint exercises cause great security concern in Turkey (Allison, 1999: 35).

In contrast, Armenia regards the Turkish support to Azerbaijan and the denial of the recognition of “genocide” as a remainder of Pan-Turkism and the indication of a new Turkish atrocity. The threatening statements of the high-level Turkish politicians concerning the military success of Armenia in Karabakh caused grave concern in Armenia since Turkey might use her guarantor role concerning Nakhichevan’s status (according to the 1921 Soviet-Turkish Treaty) as a potential pretext for intervention (Herzig, 2000: 52).²⁹¹ Moreover, the Turkish accusation of Armenia to support PKK was identified as an implicit military threat (Adalian, 1995: 317). Thus, these perceptions strengthened the hand of pro-Russians in Armenia and compelled Armenia to the Russia’s subordination (Astourian, 2000:33).²⁹²

Both sides intensified the mutual threat perception through hate speeches. The construction of the Turkish threat turned into hysteria. For example, in 1993, the Armenian elites started to

²⁸⁶ “Turkey insists that Armenia should officially rule out any irredentist claim and specifically recognize the current Turkish-Armenian border.” (Görgülü, 2008: 129).

²⁸⁷ “In a memorandum submitted to the United Nations in 1975, and in other related documents, the three demanded the return of Turkish-held Armenian territories to their rightful owner-the Armenian people.” (Libaridian, 2004: 40).

²⁸⁸ “The entire process of the formation of modern Turkish identity was based on the erosion of the traditional Ottoman millet system and on the imagining of Armenians as first “others” due to their earlier claims to historical homeland.” (Mirzoyan, 2010: 101).

²⁸⁹ It is the source of the fear of being dissolution.

²⁹⁰ “The summer of 2000 was marked by the introduction of House Resolution 296 on the Armenian Genocide in the U.S. Congress. The campaign to recognize the genocide caused extreme alarm among the Turkish elite and was placed high on the national security agenda.” (Mirzoyan, 2010: 92).

²⁹¹ Turkey hinted to engage militarily in 1992 and 1993, when fighting erupted along the Armenian-Nakhichevan border and after the massacre of Azeri civilians in Khojaly (Herzig, 2000: 52).

²⁹² “The disappointing results of Ter-Petrosian’s initiative relating to Turkey have again turned many Armenian leaders toward Moscow.” (Hovannisian, 1994: 266).

think that Turkey would attack Armenia in hot pursuit of PKK terrorists by exploiting the turbulences in Russia and the withdrawal of Russian units from the border.²⁹³ The threatening speeches of Turkish politicians fueled Armenians' threat perception and harmed the efforts of Ter-Petrosian. However, if Turkey might behave a little bit flexible to encourage Ter-Petrosian, who intended to enhance relation with Turkey by taking the high political risk, he would succeed to conduct his pro-reconciliation policies (Astourian, 2000:32).

Ter-Petrosian sought to improve the relations between two states. Some intellectuals such as Vazgen Manukian advocated the maxim that '*states have neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies*,' implying the development of the strong relations with Turkey (Gabrielian & Nedolian, 1997: 96).²⁹⁴ Ter-Petrosian and some of his key advisers advocated the view that "*modern Turkey has abandoned the late Ottoman ideas of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. Instead, it has adopted a European vocation and orientation, factors which, they maintained, should facilitate Turkish-Armenian reconciliation*" (Hunter, 2000: 31). Based on this idea, they strived to revise the old political clichés lasting for the last two centuries.

Nevertheless, during the tenure of Kocharian, who was a pro-Russian politician, the relations became tense. Kocharian raised the "genocide" issue for a tactical reason. He expected that in exchange for the withdrawal of the Armenian precondition (genocide), Turkey might cease her support to Azerbaijan (Libaridian, 2004: 275).

Presently, the huge lack of trust between two states prevents reconciliation, and they continue to see each other as a threat. The Armenia's NSS (2007:17) stipulates the threat perception as follows; "*unnatural character of bilateral relations and the closed border with Turkey threaten the Armenian security and hamper its lasting development.*"

5.3.4. Armenia-Russia

The major motive of the relation is the mutual interests and security concerns. Adalian (1995: 320) formulates this motive as follows: "*Russia wants a presence in the Caucasus. Armenia needs that presence in the Caucasus.*" The following quotation of Suny (2010: 18) from Aleksei Arbatov, reflects the dimension of the mutual dependency: "*Armenia is our only classic military political ally. Armenia will not survive without Russia and, without Armenia; Russia will lose all*

²⁹³ "According to Ter-Petrosian, French intelligence sources informed that there had been an agreement on Armenia between a leader of the Russian coup, Chairman of Russia's Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, and Ankara. Reportedly, Khasbulatov promised Turkish leaders that he would allow Turkish incursions of limited nature into Armenia, to round up PKK guerillas, and into Georgia to secure Abkhazia." (Tchantouridzé, 2008: 7).

²⁹⁴ The article published in the opposition newspaper "Haik." Manukian articulated that Armenians should relinquish the idea, which defends the unity with Russia and enmity with Turkey.

its important positions in the Caucasus. Even though Armenia is a small country, it is our forepost in the South Caucasus.”

Ter-Petrossian had shown his intention to distance Armenia from Russia. The Soviets troops (23rd Division) in Karabakh conducted an operation called “*Operation Ring*” against the local Armenian insurgents in Karabakh,²⁹⁵ to convince Ter-Petrossian to abandon anti-Russian policies. Consequently, Armenia joined in the Russia-led Commonwealth of the Independent States and its Collective Security Treaty in 1991 and 1992 respectively (Hovannisian, 1994: 266; Hunter, 2000: 35; Cornell, 2001: 354).²⁹⁶ Subsequently, Karabakh Armenians got military and political support from the Russian administration (Abushov, 2009: 196).

The Russian elites constructed a belief that the South Caucasus was of vital interest and if Russia failed to control this region, other nations, which are ethnically and religiously different, might exert some detrimental policies to the Russia’s interests. Accordingly, the main idea behind the “near abroad” policy is to keep external powers out of the South Caucasus and to firm her presence there. Therefore, Russia needs an ally to extend her sphere of influence and to counter the penetration of the U.S., EU, and Turkey into the region (Fotiou, 2009: 14). Based on this belief, Russia needs to have friendly nations in the South Caucasus, which will serve as an outpost. Armenia fits culturally and historically to this profile to a friend.²⁹⁷ In this context, Suny (2010: 18) defines Armenia as “*the Russia’s Israel in the Caucasus.*”

As explained in the previous chapter, Armenia considers Russia as “*a fellow Christian state-a protector*” (Croissant, 1998: 71, 114) and Russia considers itself as “*the Armenia’s defender against its Muslim neighbors.*” These two constructed roles rest of the religious fraternity. Furthermore, Armenia senses less threat from Russia, since she “*has had no experiences of Russian manipulation of internal conflicts, and has no common border with Russia*” (Herzig, 2000: 51). The similarity of the corporate identities converges their strategic interests (Huntington, 1996: 164). As Brzezinski (1997: 142) stated, Russia legitimated her military

²⁹⁵ According to Astourian (2000:32, 33), “*more than 20,000 Armenian villagers to become displaced people, and many others were brutalized and killed. It was also a clear message of warning from Moscow, a reply to the anti-Russian and anti-Soviet rhetoric of the APNM.*”

²⁹⁶ Nikolay Hovhannisyan explains the policy change of Armenia as follows: “*...The geopolitical situation of Armenia differs principally from that of Azerbaijan, as well as of Georgia. In this situation to continue to distance Armenia from Russia and to remain vis-a-vis with Turkey, who does not conceal its hostility towards us could mean great danger to the national security of Armenia.*” (Cited in Cornell, 2001: 354).

²⁹⁷ “*Aliev returned to a basically pro-Western, pro-Turkish, and to some degree anti-Russian posture. This development convinced Russia that Armenia was only country in the 'Transcaucasia that could be relied upon as an ally.*” (Hunter, 2000: 35).

presence in Armenia by exploiting Armenia's security interest.²⁹⁸ Thus, being an ally with Russia offers “a *deterrent shield*” to Armenia (Nation, 2007: 19).²⁹⁹ The protection from the threats of Turkey and Azerbaijan constitutes the biggest security concern of Armenia; therefore, Armenia pays even the costs of the Russian troops on her soils “*in exchange for national peace of mind*” (Mc Ginnity, 2010:26).³⁰⁰

Russia seeks to establish dependency by controlling of energy production and transportation in the region to have leverage over the foreign policies of the regional states (Kakachia, 2011: 18). In this regard, Russia controls the Armenian economy and energy sector.³⁰¹ Thus, Armenia does not have freedom of movement in the foreign policy. The best evidence of this argument is the Armenia's abrupt decision to join the Customs Union, although she was also negotiating with EU on the trade agreement (*Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements-DCFTA*) under the Eastern Partnership Program. According to experts, Russia forced Armenia to join the Customs Union by threatening³⁰² to increase gas prices³⁰³ (Doc-34, 2014: 2) and to breach military balance³⁰⁴ in the region.³⁰⁵ Armenia's decision rests on the

²⁹⁸ “Medvedev argued during a September 2010 visit to Azerbaijan that the accord was not aimed against Azerbaijan.” (Nichol, 2013: 10).

²⁹⁹ “In the basing accord of 2010, Russia also pledged that its forces would help safeguard Armenia's national security and that it would supply more modern weaponry for Armenia's armed forces.” (Nichol, 2013: 10).

³⁰⁰ “The terms of the military pact do not explicitly assure Russian intervention in the event of full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.” (McGinnity, 2010:30, 31).

³⁰¹ “In January 2014, Gazprom acquired an additional 20 percent of the Armenian natural gas monopoly and in June 2015 took over ownership of the pipeline section that takes Armenian natural gas to the Iranian border.” (Web-10).

³⁰² Some of other threats are the resume of the war with Azerbaijan, the ban on export to Russia, the deportation of Armenian emigrants, the transfer of offensive weapons to Azerbaijan, destabilization of Armenia through economic sanctions and the regime change.

³⁰³ Gazprom raised the gas price by 50% in April 2013. After the Armenia's decision to join Customs Union, Energy and Natural Resources Minister Armen Movsisian told reporters on 8.10.2013 that “the export taxes levied in Russia would no longer be applied to the natural gas supplies to Armenia and therefore, the natural gas imported to Armenia will have the same price as the natural gas in Russia plus transportation costs.” (<http://asbarez.com/114797/>, 16.11.2013).

³⁰⁴ In June 2013, Russia delivered up to \$1 billion worth of military equipment to Azerbaijan including tanks, artillery systems, and infantry fighting vehicles. (http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20130618/, 16.11.2013).

“The sale of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Azerbaijan sends mixed messages to the Armenian government about the sincerity of Russia's security assurances.” (McGinnity, 2010:30,31).

³⁰⁵ According to the report of international Crisis Group, Deputy Foreign Minister Sharvash Kocharian stated that Armenia concerned with Russia's arms supply to Azerbaijan and a prominent Yerevan-based political analyst said that Moscow was openly manipulating the conflict with Azerbaijan for its own purposes. (<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/south-caucasus/b071-armenia-and-azerbaijan-a-season-of-risks.aspx>, 04.10.2013).

political and security concerns,³⁰⁶ rather than economic benefits. The already well-developed cooperation between Russia and Turkey and the emerging Russo-Azeri rapprochement imposed Armenia to make that hasty decision (Laruelle, 2012: 10). According to Markedonov (2014: 9), the domestic power struggles and the cultural affiliation of the society also played a role in making such a decision.³⁰⁷ When asked the reasons for this decision to an interview partner, who is a high-level official and a specialist on the region, he explained as follows: “So it is not surprising to me that Armenia refuses to sign the association agreement with NDCFDA with EU. We have seen that on many occasions ... They are not allowed by Moscow. That is the reality, and they need to continue probably as long as Karabakh people are governing Armenia. They also rely on Russia for military aid in the conflict they also rely on Russian support to safeguard Armenia” (Interview-IV; 13).

The other strategy of Russia to control former republic is to exert “no war, no peace” policy in the South Caucasus.³⁰⁸ The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict provides suitable conditions for Russia (Valiyev, 2013: 137; Cornell, 2013: 212) to keep both sides under her control by various strategies such as providing military hardware to both sides to tilt the delicate military balance.³⁰⁹ Under these conditions, Armenia has no other options except allying with Russia.³¹⁰

There are other dimensions of the relations between Russia and Armenia except for military and political dimensions. Armenia needs the assistance of Russia in various fields such as finance, energy supply, markets for goods and labors.³¹¹ These dimensions of dependency

³⁰⁶ In August 2013, the first secretary of the Russian Embassy, Alexandr Vassilyev made public statements by threatening words: “economic, mental, and psychological problems awaiting in case Armenia signed the EU Association Agreement.”

Similarly, Moscow State University Professor “Eurasianist” Alexander Dugin threatened as follows “Any anti-Russian sentiments in the post-Soviet area will sooner or later result in an outcome similar to Georgia’s and Ukraine’s. [...] there is an alternative for Armenia: Customs Union membership or bloodshed and disappearance from the map.” (Grigoryan, 2014: 106).

³⁰⁷ Eighteen percentages of Armenians believe that deeper integration with the European Union would lead to the loss of national identity, while only 2 percentages responded the same concern when integrated with the ECU. (Web-21).

³⁰⁸ As Cornell (1999: 2) describes, “Russia supports centrifugal forces in the region to weaken the states and making them more malleable to Russian influence. In the Armenian-Azerbaijani case, Russia seems to have followed a policy of weakening both parties by lending them both different degrees of support at different times.”

³⁰⁹ “Moscow is suspected of playing the roles of arsonist and fireman, that is, deliberately provoking conflicts and instability so as to claim a mandate to maintain and extend its influence over the ‘near abroad’.” (Chen, 1999: 25).

³¹⁰ “Moscow already enjoys powerful influence in Armenia due to the latter’s political and economic isolation from its neighbors.” (Cohen, 2013: 68).

³¹¹ “Armenia also depended on that country for the sustenance of its energy sources-natural gas and the nuclear plant-and on the remittances of a very large number of Armenian citizens working in that

increase Russia's economic and political control over Armenia and strength the present pro-Russian orientation in spite of the past disappointments (Mc Ginnity, 2010:18; Libaridian, 2000:37, Conference Note such as Henze).

Moreover, the most significant political leverage of Russia is her mediator role in the Minsk Troika, since Armenia's political strategy in the Conflict Resolution rests on the Russian political and military support.³¹² In this regard, contrary to the popular expectation, Russia supported the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement in 2008, because she envisioned that this process would harm the strong relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The immediate consequences of this rapprochement effort proved the accuracy of the Russia's strategy.³¹³

Russia ensures her control over Armenia through supervising politicians. Mirzoyan (2010: 46) argues that Russia benefited Armenian elites economically. Today, there are some high-level officials in the Armenian government, who owes Russian nationality. For example, *"the first minister of Armenia is a Russian national. He has a wife whose sister is a major general in the Russian military intelligence and Russia in very much in for hold"* (Interview-IV; 12). Another interview partner underlined another aspect of the Armenia's political dependency on Russia as follows; *"Armenia cannot adequately sort out and absorb its advantages of the regional competition only by own. It has to discuss it with its masters in Moscow..."* (Interview-II: 3, 4).

Russia always strives to hold back Armenian efforts to lessen the dependency to her. For example; Russia threatened Armenia by ending gas subsidies if Armenia continued to construct Tabriz-Yersakh pipeline (Mc Ginnity, 2010: 16; Minassian, 2008: 8).³¹⁴

The energy imperialism of Russia and her relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan resents some elites in Armenia. Therefore, in the recent years, many Armenian elites started to criticize the *"third power"* position of Russia. They think that *"being Russia's most reliable ally in the South Caucasus, Armenia has received the least attention and very little real support from Moscow"* (Baev, 2001: 102). These thoughts imitated political backbiting and increased skepticism about Russian intention (Mirzoyan, 2010: 47).³¹⁵ Moreover, the steadfast support of Moscow

country to their families. Moreover, Russia constituted the main market for a number of goods still being produced in Armenia." (Libaridian, 2004: 244).

³¹² *"As the story of Levon Ter-Petrosyan's presidency demonstrates, Russia's withdrawal of political support may have been an important factor in his eventual fall."* (Mirzoyan, 2010: 22).

³¹³ Russia supported strongly the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement that had a potential to strain the relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, which would help Russia to secure her position in the Caucasus. (Valiyev, 2013: 140).

³¹⁴ Due to Russia's pressure, the diameter of the Tabriz-Yersakh pipeline was slashed from 1,420 millimeters to 250 millimeters (Mc Ginnity, 2010:17; Minassian, 2008: 8).

³¹⁵ Minassian (2008: 18) explains the betrayal of Armenia by Russia as follows: *"Armenia is like Russia's devoted spouse; you can cheat on her, without her complaining"*

for the repressive regimes leads to the emergence of the opposition movement, which is a critical development for the future of the relationship with Russia (Markedonov, 2014: 10).

5.3.5. Azerbaijan-Iran

It is expected, that Islamist Iran would align with Azerbaijan in her war against a Christian state. However, the reality contradicts this expectation, although they share a common culture, literature, and sect (Shiite of Islam). Cornell (2001: 318) depicts this interesting phenomenon as follows; *“Iran has had a very ambivalent and, at first sight, illogical policy towards the conflict. Actually, given the militant Islamic rhetoric and policy of the country, Iran could have been thought to be the first country to rush to the support of the Azeris, fellow Shiite Muslims, in their confrontation with the Christian Armenians. On the contrary, Iran has constantly sought to cultivate and improve its relations with Armenia.”*

In this regard, the relations between Azerbaijan and Iran are a phenomenon that has to be examined. Gresh (2006: 4) brings the following reason for the Iranian political behavior; *“Siding with Azerbaijan would produce unnecessary domestic pressures from the rich upper Armenian elite in Iran... On the other hand, the radical Islamic government would not support a Christian actor fighting against a Muslim republic. Neutrality was, therefore, the safest reality.”*³¹⁶

Following the dynamics of the securitization process can explain this phenomenon; a. Azeri irredentist tendencies towards the Southern Azerbaijan, b. Armenian and Iranian cooperation on the economic, energy and finance sectors, c. Azerbaijan cultural and ethnic affinities with Turkey, d. The U.S.’ embargo on Iran and penetration into the region backed by Azerbaijan,³¹⁷ e. the conflict over the share of the Caspian Sea natural resources, f. Azeri dependency on Iran in term of supply routes to Nakhichevan transient Iran.

Presently, Azeris’ antagonism rests on the belief that Iran is hostile to her independence and she supplies weapon to the Karabakh Armenians (Herzig, 2000: 53). Therefore, some elites in Azerbaijan do not see any problem to discuss the integration openly with the Southern Azerbaijan in Iran.

The myth of the Greater Azerbaijan consists of the Southern Azerbaijan (defining the northwestern part of Iran, where living more than approx.20 million Azeris) and the Northern

³¹⁶ “Public opinion in Iran called for the government to support the Azerbaijani side against the Armenian ‘infidels,’ but the government refused to take sides citing security concerns.” (Gresh, 2006: 4).

³¹⁷ “Azerbaijan was forced to withdraw its offer of a 10 percent share for Iran in the international consortium to develop part of its oil fields because of U.S. opposition. This 10 percent was divided between Turkey (3 percent) and the Exxon Corporation (7 percent).” (Hunter, 2000: 41).

Azerbaijan. The Soviets invented this myth to construct Azeri antagonism towards Iran.³¹⁸ After the independence, this myth was politicized through the efforts of former president Elchibey, since he aimed Azerbaijan to unify with the Southern Azerbaijan.³¹⁹ The agenda of the Azeri nationalists makes Iran fearful of disintegration,³²⁰ since *“the rise of the national feeling among the Azeri community in Iran resulted in the creation of the National Liberation Movement of South Azerbaijan (NLMSA)”* (Moniquet, & Racimora, 2013: 36). Due to the fear of destabilization, Iran set up refugee camps for the fled Azeris on the Azeri territory during the war (Cornell, 2001: 323).³²¹

Iran’s response to Elchibey’s policy was the manipulation of Talysh separatist movement, an ethnic minority with a strong Persian identity, to encourage separatist sentiments among them³²² and supported the Karabakh Armenians covertly.³²³ In this context, Cornell (2001: 328) argues that Iran provided electricity and goods to Armenia, which suffered from the Turkish-supported Azeri blockade. Moreover, based on the reports, Iran established a transit route for weapons en route to Armenia and trained Armenian fighters in Iran. In the recent years, Iran also sought to destabilize Azerbaijan by supporting Islamic parties in Azerbaijan and achieved some progress (Sadegh-Zadeh, 2008: 38; Herzig, 2000: 53).^{324 325}

³¹⁸ Croissant (1998: 61) explains the origin of the myth as follows: *“Due to Soviet-era historical revisionism and myth-building intended to denounce imperialism, the notion of a ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ Azerbaijan was created and propagated throughout the USSR...it became the basis for irredentism among Azeri nationalists in the closing years of Soviet rule.”*

³¹⁹ *“The former Azeri President Abulfaz Elchibey declared he would not recognize Iran’s territorial integrity, propagating the united Azerbaijan slogan. At the same time, it became apparent that a map of the Azerbaijan Republic published in Azeri schoolbooks included Iran’s provinces of west and east Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Hamadan, Zanjan, Qazvin and Gilan.”* (Koolaei & Hafezian, 2010: 399, 400).

³²⁰ *“In January 1990, the Popular Front-PFA nationalist campaign had proved so effective that thousands of Soviet Azeris rioted near the Iranian border, harassed Soviet and Iranian border guards, and illegally crossed into Iran, avowedly to see relatives and have free trade. The incident became a source of serious concern to the Rafsanjani administration.”* (Mehdiyeva, 2003:280).

³²¹ As Dilip Hiro has noted in his excellent book *Between Marx and Muhammad*, Iran became aware of the Azerbaijani threat: *“Rafsanjani realized that in the long run, Azeri nationalism would prove as problematic for the Islamic regime in Tehran as it was proving then for the Communist administration in Moscow ... The emergence of a strong, independent Azerbaijani republic-whether Islamic or not would fan the flames of Azeri nationalism within Iran.”* (Cited in Cornell, 1999: 59).

³²² *“In June 1993, the Talyshs, under the leadership of Alikram Gumbatov, proclaimed the formation of an autonomous Talysh-Mughan Republic, which was widely regarded as an Iranian puppet regime.”* (Mehdiyeva, 2003:281; Tchantouridzé, 2008: 9).

³²³ *“Volunteers from Iran helped Armenians fight in the Karabakh war.”* (ibid: 9).

³²⁴ Azerbaijani elites concerned Iranian support to Islamic extremism. Thus, Baku banned the pro-Iranian Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA) in 1995. (Nichol, 2013: 15).

³²⁵ In 2007 and 2012, Azerbaijani authorities convicted 15 persons for spying and recruiting Azerbaijani nationals and 22 persons arrested allegedly trained in Iran to carry out an attack in Baku (Moniquet, & Racimora, 2013: 53).

The other problematic issue is the division of the Caspian Sea. Iran and Azerbaijan disagree on the method of the division. According to the Iran's proposal, she claims 20% of the Caspian Sea. In reality, this problem is a political reflection of the mutual enmity. Iran escalated the problem through some military means (by holding large-scale military maneuvers) and violated Azerbaijani territorial waters and airspace several times (Nuriyev, 2008:157; Tchantouridzé, 2008: 9).

A further annoyance for Tehran is Azerbaijan's close ties with the West. The strong ethnic and cultural ties of Azerbaijan with Turkey and her orientation with the West made Azerbaijan "*the object of combined Russian and Iranian pressures to restrict her relations with the West*" (Brzezinski, 1997: 129; Herzig, 2000: 53). The strong relations between Azerbaijan and Israel cause grave concern in Iran. Iran considers Azerbaijan as the trojan horse of U.S. interests in the region. Some reports claim that Azerbaijan will help Israel for a possible attack on Iranian nuclear facilities by providing air bases to Israel (Moniquet, & Racimora, 2013: 56).

As we explained in the section of "Armenia-Iran relations," their identities are the chief driver of the Azeri and Iranian policies rather than seemingly materialist needs. For example; the APF government adhered to the "*Kemalist form of secularism*" as a type identity; therefore, her type identity distanced Azerbaijan from Iran. Moreover, based on the memories of 1921, Azeri elites constructed a belief that "*Russia had conspired with Iran to divide Azerbaijan and had prevented the flourishing of its Turkic culture*" (Hunter, 2000: 40). This belief operates as an element of the Azeri corporate identity that reinforces the present type identity and the construction of the "rival" role identity for Iran.

On the other hand, Iran political siding with Armenia can be explained by the fear of the representation of the Azeri corporate and type identities, which is seen as a threat to Iranian corporate and type identities (Cornell, 2001: 322). The differences of corporate and type identities cultivate the necessary conditions for threat perception.

5.3.6. Azerbaijan-Russia

Valiyev (2013: 135, 136) studies the relations between Azerbaijan and Russia in three stages: a. 1992-2000 period (the escalation of enmity), b. 2000-2008 period (the rise of pragmatic relations),³²⁶ c. 2008-2016 period (the rise of renewed fears).³²⁷

During the first period, the “*Turkification*” policy of the Elchibey government upset Russia very much. Russia started to concern on the southern flanks, which is sensitive to irredentist movements. Moreover, the Azerbaijanian refusal of joining in the CIS and the CIS Collective Security Pact antagonized Russia towards Azerbaijan. Consequently, Russia manipulated the Azerbaijani Lezghin and the Talish communities (Mehdiyeva, 2003:282; Nuriyev, 2000: 144). Furthermore, she plotted, arguably, the overthrow of Elchibey (Cornell, 2001: 102) and supported Armenia’s advance during the Karabakh War with direct and indirect ways (Mehdiyeva, 2003:283). Therefore, when Aliiev took power, he strived to restore the relations and joined in CIS immediately.

In the second period, Russia had taken a more pragmatic attitude towards Azerbaijan and left her imperial policies. Similarly, Azerbaijan wanted to strengthen the relations with Russia (Nuriyev, 2008:157). Accordingly, some problems (such as the delimitation of the Caspian Sea and BTC pipeline) were resolved, but many problems have been forgotten or swept under the rug. In addition, the western negligence of the Azeri political and security concerns led Azerbaijan to follow a more balanced policy against Russia.

During the third period, after the Five-Day War (Georgia-Russia) and the annexation of Crimea, Azerbaijan realized the inability of the West to protect the vulnerable states in the sphere of Russian influence. Accordingly, the fear of a renewed Russian occupation led Azerbaijan to behave more cautiously concerning her aspirations for membership in either NATO³²⁸ or integration with the EU and chosen neutrality as the direction of foreign policy.³²⁹

The study of the relations indicates the following issues as the driver of the securitization process: a. the Turkish and Muslim identity of Azerbaijan, b. the Russian Imperial past and

³²⁶ “Azerbaijan moved away from ‘fearing’ an ‘unpredictable’ and ‘unstable’ Russia, which instead began to acquire the image of a pragmatic and constructive partner.” (Markedonov, 2014: 10).

³²⁷ “Georgia-Russian Five-Day War and recognition of Abkhazia and Ossetia represents a critical stage in Azerbaijan’s policy toward Russia. For the Azerbaijani public, it was shocking to see acts of aggression against an independent neighboring state.” (ibid: 10).

³²⁸ “Unlike in the case of Georgia, Baku does not force the question of its membership of NATO into its relations with Russia, and is interested in some form of cooperation with Moscow.” (ibid: 10).

³²⁹ “Akin to the Finnish pursuit of neutrality after the World War II called Finlandization.” (Valiyev, 2013).

present-day implications, c. exploiting and marketing of energy resources, d. the western orientation of Azerbaijan, e. military cooperation with Armenia.

As we explained in the earlier section, Russia exerted discriminating policies against her Muslim population. These policies caused tension between Armenian and Azeri societies and nurtured mutual animosities. As a contemporary reflection of that policy, Russia supported Armenia during the war on Karabakh. On the other hand, Russia claimed that Azerbaijan harbored Chechen rebels and supported them. Thus, Russia imposed an embargo for three years (Kelkitli, 2008: 83).

In the minds of the ordinary Azeris, Russia generally represents the cruel power, which ceased the Azerbaijan's sovereignty in 1921 and crushed the innocent masses in 1990.³³⁰ Today, Russia represents the protector of Armenian invaders and a spoiler in the region. According to the popular Azeri belief, Russia instrumentalizes the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as well as manipulates pro-Russian forces and ethnic discontent in Azerbaijan.³³¹ The following policies of Russia reinforced the spreading of that belief among Azeris: a. striving to deploy the Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh and Russian troops on the Azerbaijani-Iranian borders, b. objecting the construction of the BTC pipeline and forcing Azerbaijan to compliance with the Russia's plan on the status of the Caspian Sea (Alieva, 1995: 303; Hunter, 2006: 92).³³²

Russia is a significant economic and trade partner of Azerbaijan. Akin to Armenia, Russia plays a decisive role in Azerbaijan's economic and political life. In this regard, Russia is the second largest trade partner of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan exports significant labor power (*about 2 million*) to Russia (Valiyev, 2013: 146). Contrary to the western politicians, Russia supports Aliyev's reelection and does not criticize the human right accord of Azerbaijan, which is welcomed by Aliyev regime.³³³

Russia considers Azerbaijan as a player in the gas production and supplement of the West. Therefore, Russia sought to impede Azeri attempts to export her gas production by employing various tactics (Hunter, 2000: 41). She conducted an economic warfare against Azerbaijan to convince her to cooperate with Russia and to denounce the contract. According to Alieva

³³⁰ "The suppression operation of Soviet troops in Baku in January 1990 evoked strong anti-Russian sentiment among a large number of Azeris." (Hunter, 2000: 40).

³³¹ "The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is, beyond any doubt, a major factor in the Russian pressures on Azerbaijan." (Nasibli, 2008: 136).

³³² "Kremlin often suggests that rejection of its demands will lead to continued war and further Azeri territorial losses." (Blank, 1995: 372).

³³³ "Vladimir Putin's first official visit to the South Caucasus, following his re-election for a third term in March 2012, was to Azerbaijan in September 2013 in the midst of the electoral campaign." (Markedonov, 2014: 11).

(1995: 302), Russia organized the coup against Elchibey to secure a significant share (10 %) in energy consortium for the Caspian Sea.³³⁴

Similarly, Russia refused Azeri plan, which envisages dividing the seabed and the surface into five pieces determined according to the length of each country's shoreline, on sharing the Caspian energy resources.³³⁵ She threatened Azerbaijan to bring the case to the United Nations if Azerbaijan not to cease her effort for the contract (Blank, 1995: 377). Azeri government gave concessions to Russian oil and gas companies, which worked well and lessened Russian pressure.

The bitter experiences forced Azerbaijan to distance from Russia and get the support of the West. Azerbaijan society shows little interest for the Russian led Eurasian integration.³³⁶ Her reluctance and close cooperation with the West resent Russia, which regards Azerbaijan as a facilitator of the western penetration into the region.

On the other hand, Azerbaijan sees Russia's support to Armenia as a continuum of her past imperial policies. By supporting Armenia, Russia sought to have a leverage that would convince Azeri politicians to accept Russian conditions such as the deployment of Russian troops and guard of Azerbaijan's borders with Turkey and Iran (Abushov, 2009: 196). Additionally, Russia aimed to keep Azerbaijan in her sphere of interest through the transfer of some hi-tech military hardware such as S-300 advanced anti-aircraft missile systems (Cornell, 2013: 209). By doing so, Russia seeks to build a kind of dependency and prevent Azerbaijan to purchase military hardware from other countries (Israel, Turkey, and South Korea.) and to have leverage on Armenia.

Based on her different identity, Russia exerted numerous strategies under various pretexts, either by employing covert threats or by allegations that Azerbaijan supports Chechen insurgents or by mentioning intervention in the war in the case of a resumed war. On the other hand, she follows a pragmatic policy backed by entrepreneurs in energy and financial circles (Nasibli, 2008: 133). Consequently, both states have formed a strategic partnership since

³³⁴ "In the final analysis, it seems doubtless that Russia-whether the government as a whole or only certain state structures-was actually involved in the overthrow of Elchibey. Husseinov was Russia's man, and either coveted the presidency for himself or was prepared to share power with Mutalibov in Moscow." (Cornell, 2001: 102).

³³⁵ "The Russians countered with a 'diplomatic offensive' claiming the extraction of oil and gas in the Caspian Sea further than 45 miles offshore was 'illegal' without the agreement of all coastal states since the area in question consisted of international waters." (Leeuw, 2000: 188).

³³⁶ Azerbaijan does not show any intent to join the Customs Union or the Eurasian Union, since Armenia is a member of these organizations and there is no need for any specific regional framework whiles the bilateral economic relations with Russia develops progressively (Laruelle, 2012: 10).

2004. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict impedes the further development of the relations and Azerbaijan never showed an interest to bandwagon with Russia for profit or security. Thus, the Azeri and Russian relations are a clear-cut example of the assumption that ideational interests transcend over material interests in the case of choosing one of them.

5.3.7. Azerbaijan-Turkey

The abrupt demise of the Soviet Union was not an expected development for the Turkish politicians; therefore, they had no proper strategies at hand to tackle the newly emerging situation. In the beginning, they used nationalist discourses with the aim to keep Turkic states in the political sphere of Turkey and to diminish Russia's influences on these states. However, Turkish economic and political power was limited to achieve this goal.

Turkey wanted to play a decisive role in the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict due to the domestic political pressure.³³⁷ Oppositions and other political bodies in Turkey blamed the government for standing *"idle while their Azeri brethren were being massacred."* Opposition parties proposed to intervene in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a guarantor over the Nakhichevan (Jones, 2000: 61).³³⁸ However, the firm Russian threat deterred Turkey from any direct intervention.³³⁹ Thus, Turkey could support Azerbaijan through closing her Armenian border, supplying some military hardware, and sending military advisers. Obviously, this level of assistance evoked disappointment in Azerbaijan. It is witnessed that the perception of "big brother" role of Turkey faded within time.

The second president Elchibey followed pro-Turkish policies. He wanted to establish robust and close relations with Turkey. However, contrary to the label of Pan-Turkist, he honestly clarified that his policies were not Pan-Turkist and Azerbaijan had to determine her future as follows: *"Turkey is the window of all the Turkish peoples in Central Asia opening onto the Western world...We believe that economic cooperation will form the basis of our relations with Turkey. Of course, this will lead to a political rapprochement. However, we do not have a pan-Turkic approach. Each side must own its own homeland and territory. The nations must always have the right to determine their own future. We do not want much from Turkey in this difficult*

³³⁷ "Large-circulation newspapers in Ankara and Istanbul declared their sympathy and moral support for the indestructible ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey based on common race, language, and culture." (Swietochowski, 1995: 208).

³³⁸ Turkey owes the guarantor right on Nakhichevan stipulated in Moscow and Kars Treaties signed in 1921(Öztarsu, 2011: 7). In this context, "Head of the Motherland Party, Mesut Yilmaz, who argued for troops to be deployed along the Armenian border." (Jones, 2000: 61).

³³⁹ "Ankara also feared that the war in Nagorno-Karabakh might be converted from a territorial dispute into a wider Christian-Muslim conflict. Such a religious polarization would be particularly difficult for officially secular Turkey." (Goldenberg, 1994: 53).

struggle. Turkey's moral support will be enough for us. The Turkish Nation of Azerbaijan is robust enough to resolve its problems by itself" (cited in Shaffer, 2002: 130).

Turkey was supportive of Elchibey. The overthrow of Elchibey in 1993 was seen as the success of Russia's covert operation and, initially, Aliiev, his successor, was regarded as "*the man of Moscow*."³⁴⁰ His eagerness to sign the CIS agreement reinforced the Turkish perception and caused serious concern that Turkey was going to lose once again a brotherly nation. The anti-Aliyev statement of some Turkish politicians forced Aliiev to annul some agreements signed between the Azerbaijan and Turkey before Aliiev.³⁴¹

Later, it became clear that initial concerns of Turkey concerning Aliiev were wrong. He was a pragmatic politician and played his cards in consistent with the Azeri interests. In 1994, the relations between two countries started to develop gradually with the initiative of Aliiev.³⁴² There were some reasons for this policy change. Firstly, Aliiev was aware of the Turkey's influence, which rests on the warm feelings between two nations and, thus, had the potency to manipulate his constituency and to undermine his power.³⁴³ Secondly, he needed Turkey to isolate Armenia, balance Iran and Russia. Finally, Turkey serves as a model for Azerbaijan to build and modernize the old state system as well as a gateway to the western world (Hunter, 2000: 43).³⁴⁴

In the first years of independence, Azerbaijan had no other practical options to sustain close and intense relations with Turkey in economic, political and the military fields. However, after Azerbaijan had developed his economy and improved state apparatus, she left her submissiveness to Turkey and behaved as an equal partner (Musabayov, 2008: 85).

³⁴⁰ In 1993, "*the Turkish foreign minister, Hikmet Cetin, in a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, stated that his country intended to support the 'lawful authorities of Azerbaijan' and had described Surat Husseinov's rebellion, which catapulted Aliiev into power, as an army mutiny aimed at overthrowing the lawful government.*" (Hunter, 2000: 43).

³⁴¹ "*Aliiev ordered Turkish nationals to seek visas before entering Azerbaijan, and dismissed 1,600 Turkish military experts serving in the country.*" (Jones, 2000: 62).

³⁴² The Turkish foreign minister visited Baku on September 19, 1993 to revitalize the relations. During this trip, Aliiev assured Turkey that oil would be exported through Turkish route and Turkey would continue to train Azerbaijani military personnel. In addition, Aliiev visited Turkey in February 1994 and stated that "*Turkey and Azerbaijan were two states but one nation.*" (Hunter, 2000: 43)

³⁴³ "*Heidar Aliiev escaped two more coup attempts in the following months. The first took place from March 15 to 17, 1995, during which Deputy Interior Minister Rovshan Javadov's Interior Ministry troops (OPON) rebelled against Aliiev. The mutiny was rumored to have been supported by rogue elements of Turkey's Interior Ministry and Intelligence Service, although their involvement was neither fully investigated nor openly acknowledged by Baku or Ankara.*" (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 207).

³⁴⁴ "*The preferences and orientations of the population of Azerbaijan at that period were confirmed by numerous sociological surveys, which showed that more than 70 percent of Azerbaijanis preferred the Turkish model of development, whereas only 5 percent favored the Iranian model.*" (Aliieva, 1995: 297).

Today, Turkey and Azerbaijan declared themselves as a strategic partner and they cooperate in many fields. However, the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement created some friction between two kin-countries. The Azerbaijan showed a strong reaction to the Protocols as stated by the Azeri foreign ministry:

“The normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia before the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied Azerbaijani territory is in direct contradiction with the interests of Azerbaijan and casts a shadow over the spirit of brotherly relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey, built on deep historical roots...Azerbaijan believes that the unilateral opening of the Turkish–Armenian border calls into question the architecture of peace and stability in the region.” (cited in Ambrosio, 2011: 103).

Although one of the motives of Turkey to sign the protocols was to alleviate Armenian firm stance in the negotiation process with Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan regarded the attempt of Turkey as “betrayal.” Despite the announcement of Turkish side that the approval of the protocols depends on the progress in the reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey remained tense.³⁴⁵

H. D. S. Greenway has developed the “*kin-country*” syndrome, which postulates that kinship constitutes the basis of the cooperation and coalitions instead of the paradigm of the balance of power (cited in Huntington, 1993:7). In this context, the Turkish and Azerbaijan relation is an outstanding example of this approach. The advance of the Armenian Army in Karabakh war evoked sensation within Turkish society due to religious, ethnic, and linguistic affiliations, which put unbearable pressure on the Turkish politicians. As a result, Turkey left his neutral position and threatened Armenia with military intervention occasionally. This policy change was a natural outcome of the Turkish corporate identity aiming to create a strong relationship with the Turkish speaking states in the Central Asia. Otherwise, Turkey would harm the credibility of her “big brother” role attributed by the Turkic states.

In this regard, the essence of the relations rests on the similar corporate identity as well as on the endeavors to form similar type identity (secular, modern, and democratic) with Turkey (Alieva, 1995: 289).

³⁴⁵ “For example, in March 2009 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan asserted that a ‘solution of problems between Azerbaijan and Armenia will help to overcome the difficulties in relations of Turkey and Armenia’ (Ambrosio, 2011: 104). And, in April 2010, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan stated that ratification would first require a settlement over Nagorno Karabakh.” (O’lear, 2011; 272).

5.3.8. Turkey-Russia

The relation between Russia and Turkey constitutes the cardinal issue and source of security dynamics in the region. Starting from the 16th century, both nations competed in the region for dominance. Both nations are considered to be “*arch rivals*,” and their competition affected the security perceptions as well as the conception of the other nations in the region.

The Bolshevik revolution in 1917 ceased this competition for a while, until when Stalin annulled the treaty of friendship and neutrality with Turkey in 1945, which was in power since 1925. Russia led by Stalin demanded a revision of the Montreux Convention³⁴⁶ in favor of Russia and returned to some territories³⁴⁷ given to Turkey after the revolution by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in 1918 (Libaridian, 2004: 24). This attempt was a sign of Soviet self-confidence gained after the WWII and a maneuver to provoke Turkish-Armenian enmity.

In the mid of the 1960s, Soviet Russia made decisive policy changes because of the Caribbean crisis and Turkish intention to intervene in Cyprus crisis. According to a prominent American scholar, Russia exerted the following policies against NATO member Turkey to destabilize her: a. erecting the genocide monument for the fifth anniversary of 1915 to revitalize past traumas of Armenians, b. sponsoring and running ASALA, which conducted terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomats in abroad, c. forming and running (by KGB) PKK under the control of Syrian Intelligence Service “*Muhaberat*” to conduct terrorist attacks in the Southeastern Turkey in the mid of 1970s (Interview-IV; 7-9).

After the demise of the Soviets, Russia and Turkey followed a more cooperative relation until Euroasianist came to power in Russia in 1993. The preliminary result of this cooperation was to form the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992. The main idea behind this formation was to establish stability in the Black Sea region through economic cooperation and development.³⁴⁸

Later, as explained in the previous sections, Russia started to follow a more assertive foreign policy, to lessen the Turkish influence in the Turkic states of former Republic of the Soviet Union, which rests on a common culture, religion, and linguistic ties (constitutes the source of Russian fears). Russia regards the Turkish penetration and her intensive cooperation with the

³⁴⁶ It stipulates the regulation of the sea traffic on the Turkish Straits since 1936.

³⁴⁷ These territories, taken from the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) by Russia, are the cities Kars and Ardahan considered by Armenians as their native lands.

³⁴⁸ “*This organization established a permanent secretariat in Istanbul in 1994 and developed many institutional branches such as the BSEC Business Council, Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), the International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), and the Parliamentary Assembly.*” (Aktürk, 2006: 340).

Turkic states as a fatal risk for her territorial integrity.³⁴⁹ This belief constitutes the basis of the Russian security dynamics driving securitization process in the Caucasus. Russia also considers the Turkish military power, which is the only capable power to operate in the region, as a threat to their interests in the region (Cornell, 2001: 341). The strong relations between Turkey with the West reinforce Russia's sense of threat emanating from Turkey. Moreover, Turkey's effort to become an energy hub of the Caspian and Middle East oil and gas production created another economic security concern for Russia.³⁵⁰

Russia sees her existence in the South Caucasus as a necessary counter-measure to neutralize the sensed Turkish threat. In this context, first, Russia sought to re-deploy her troops in the South Caucasus; however, she was not successful in convincing the regional states except Armenia. Second, she enhanced her relations with Iran to contain Turkey from the east. Third, she intensified her economic and trade relations with Turkey to have leverage on Turkey in the case of any conflict (Blank, 1995: 374).³⁵¹

Turkey perceives Russia as a historical rival, protector of Armenians and supporter of the separatist movements emerged in Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey wanted to exploit the weakness of Russia after the demise of the Soviet Union. Therefore, Turkey attempted to transform the already existing cultural ties with the Turkic states into the tangible formation, which would serve to contain Russia from the south and to establish a buffer zone. However, the own economic and military limitation of Turkey restricted the realization of these strategic ambitions.

In the recent years, Turkey and Russia enhanced their relations in term of economic cooperation. The volume of the trade turnover exceeded \$30 billion, and Russia became the major gas provider of Turkey. Even, in the political arena, Turkish politicians asserted their willingness to join the Russia-dominated organizations such as Shanghai Cooperation and the Eurasian Union. Some political circles in Turkey advocated for the alignment with Russia,

³⁴⁹ Turkish policy and politic discourses concerning the emergence of a gigantic Turkish world at that time irritated Russia. Russia feared that *"Tatarstan and Bashkortostan coming under the influence of Islamic fundamentalism and separatism, which could split Russia in two along the Volga."* (Aktürk, 2006: 342).

³⁵⁰ After signing Azerbaijan's first major oil contract in September 1994, Moscow intensified her covert support to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). According to Croissant (1997: 357), *"Russia hopes that an intensification of the Kurdish problem will force international companies to drop plans for a Caspian pipeline through eastern Turkey."* However, Russia lifted her objection to the construction of BTC with the Lukoil's announcement in 2001 that it intended to join the BTC consortium with a 7.5 percent share (Aktürk, 2006: 357).

³⁵¹ Russia imposed severe sanctions on the Turkish export to Russia, after the shot down a Russian fighter in 2015, which confirmed this point.

because of the frustration emerged from the controversial policies of EU and U.S. towards Turkey.³⁵² We can consider the following issues as the major factors contributed to the reduction of threat perceptions; a. the acknowledgment of the cooperation opportunities, including in military field ³⁵³(Fotiou, 2009: 14), b. relative decrease of the Russian military power,³⁵⁴ c. waning ambition of NATO to expand in the region, d. increasing trust between two nations³⁵⁵ e. opposing together against the US-led military campaign in Iraq, f. resemblance of the governing style of Putin and Erdogan.

However, the relations did not follow a smooth course. The competing elements of corporate identities of both states brought them to the verge of severe crisis. For example, the Russian aggression in Georgia, Crimea and her support to Syrian regime compelled Turkey to reconsider her political relations with Russia once again. The shot down of a Russian fighter at the Syrian border by Turkish Air forces strained the relations more than ever. However, both sides recovered the damaged relations very quickly because of the mutual economic interests and geopolitical concerns. As Cornell (1999:10) rightly underlined, the economic links between two countries are major determinant and thereby play a significant role in the formation of the foreign policies of both states.

The relation of both nations is a clear-cut example of the identity conflict. We can assess the dynamics of this relationship operates in two layers. The bottom layer consists of ideational dynamics, which were formed by past lessons and cultures. On the other hand, the upper layer consists of material dynamics, which were formed by contemporary interactions and short-term interests. The bottom layer exerts a substantial degree of control over the top layer. Therefore, the relations of both countries fluctuate between good and bad depending on the impact of the material interest due to the lack of genuine mutual trust. A Turkish proverb used

³⁵² “General Tuncer Kılınç, Secretary General of the Turkish National Security Council, said that Ankara needed to start looking elsewhere for new allies. He singled out Russia as Turkey’s potentially most strategic partner and proposed to form an alliance with this country.” (Aktürk, 2006: 337).

³⁵³ “In April 2001, Turkey, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia formed a joint naval task force by the name of the Black Sea Force. This task force holds annual maneuvers in the Black Sea. This is the first time Turkey and Russia are participating as part of a joint military contingent in 500 years of relations.” (Aktürk, 2006: 345).

³⁵⁴ “Continued demobilization of the Russian army brought the Russian army down to 1.5 million in 1995, while the Turkish army remained at about a half a million, establishing a 1:3 ratio. In the mid-1990s, and especially in 1995/1996, Russian demobilization sped up, while Turkish manpower increased by 20 percent in absolute terms, so that the Russian and Turkish armies had 1.27 million and 630,000 soldiers, respectively, revising the Turkish–Russian ratio to 1:2. Turkish manpower as a percentage of Russian manpower never again declined below 50 percent, thus stabilizing the Turkish–Russian ratio at 1:2.” (Aktürk, 2006: 348).

³⁵⁵ “Turkish PM Ecevit announced that Turkey would extradite a Chechen terrorist to Russia. Similarly, Russia closed down the office of the PKK in Moscow, and forced the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan out of its territory when he sought refuge in Russia.” (Aktürk, 2006: 345).

to stress the mistrust and enmity between the Turks and Russians best reflects this fact at best: *“It is not possible to manufacture coat from the fur of a bear, thereby, a Russian has never become a real friend.”*

5.3.9. Turkey-Iran

Both states consider themselves as the “gateway” to the Caucasus and a “model” to be adopted by small states of the region (Özcan & Özdamar, 2010: 101). Accordingly, both nations compete for the domination of the region (Ayman, 2014: 23). The behaviors of two states are not new; on the contrary, it is the continuation of a historical rivalry between two nations.

The long-lasting fight between two nations settled down with the adoption of the Kasr-i Sirin Treaty in 1639, which is still in effect today. Their conflicting corporate identities drove them to get the support of external powers, and they formed short-term alliances with other states. However, to the limited extent, they also cooperated to eliminate external power domination the region (Ayman, 2014: 7).

Throughout the history, both rivals strived to diminish the other’s influence by exerting various strategies to get an advantage in the identity competition. For example, after the Turkish-Russian War in 1877 and WWI, Iran wanted to intervene in the peace conferences (Berlin, Paris, and Sevres conferences) to demand certain territories from the defeated Turkey and to assure Armenian independence (Çetinsaya, 2003: 8; Özcan & Özdamar, 2010: 103). On the other hand, towards the end of the 19th century, Ottomans employed Pan-Islamism to curtail Iranian support to Russia and the Armenian separatist (Ayman, 2014: 9).

The relations flourished in the era of Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah, who aimed to form the same type identity with Turkey.³⁵⁶ Therefore, old rivals strived to foment a collective identity against the imperialist powers. Consequently, both states formed Saidabad Pact in 1937 with the participation of Iraq and Afghanistan (Çetinsaya, 2003: 10). However, the importance of that pact diminished due to structural changes in the system and regional levels and more than this due to the transcending of the conflicting elements of the corporate identities over the material interests.

In the recent years, although, both sides underlined their willingness for cooperation at the official level, they could not produce tangible results because of the mutual mistrust

³⁵⁶ Turkey supported Reza Khan Coup in 1921 and Shi’i ulama’s supported the Turkish republican project and the abolishment of the Caliphate by the Kemalist regime (Ayman, 2014: 9).

emancipating from the covert operations of the other side.³⁵⁷ In this context, the Iranian Islamic Revolution strained the relations more than ever. It caused significant concerns in secular Turkey, because of the fear that Iran might export her Islamist ideology to Turkey. On the other hand, Iran claimed that Turkey harbored elites and factions belonging to the previous regime and supporting opposition forces in Iran.³⁵⁸

In the mid of 80s, Turkey argued that the territory of Iran next to border become safe havens for the PKK, which were launching terrorist attacks in the Eastern Turkey (Ayman, 2014: 8; Stein & Bleek, 2012: 138). During this period, Iran also viewed Turkey as a western outpost materializing western interests and a barrier stopping the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism (Aras, 2000: 159). As a result, Iran sought to form an alternative political mechanism to curtail the West and Turkish influences in the region by enhancing her relations with Syria, Russia, and Armenia (Özcan & Özdamar, 2010: 105).³⁵⁹ Moreover, Turkish-Azeri cooperation on energy sector created tension (loss of market share) in Iran. Allegedly, Iran supported the PKK to conduct sabotages to Baku-Ceyhan pipelines (Özcan & Özdamar, 2010: 107), which would harm the international credibility of this supply line.

After the election of an Islamist government (Refah Party) in 1996, Turkey sought to enhance her relations with Iran (Ayman, 2014: 10). In this brief period, Turkey signed some agreements with Iran, including purchasing natural gas from Iran.³⁶⁰ The Turkish military operation in the northern Iraq to stop PKK attacks in 1997 impeded the progress in the bilateral relations until another Islamist government came to power.

The election of the Islamist AKP government in 2003 thawed the relations with the political necessity to collaborate against the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Both states supported the territorial integrity of Iraq due to the fear of the Kurdish separatist in their countries, and both were critical of Israel's policies against the Palestinian. Indeed, Turkey enthusiastically strived to prevent the U.S. and Israel from attacking Iran by engaging mediation activities on nuclear negotiation

³⁵⁷ Both sides attempted to cooperate through the Saidabad Pact, the Baghdad Pact, CENTO, and ECO. However, fears emancipating from the support of minorities (Kurds, Azeris, and to some extent Armenians) and opposition forces (generally Iranians living in Turkey) prevented the efficiency of these establishments (Çetinsaya, 2003: 14).

³⁵⁸ *"Fearing Turkey's support of Iranian dissidents, Iranian intelligence utilized Turkish Islamists to target foreign diplomats and assassinate prominent Turkish secularists."* (Ayman, 2014: 9).

³⁵⁹ *"From the early 1990s, Iran ceased the 'small-Satan' rhetoric against Russia and developed closer ties with it against Turkey and the United States. This shifted the focus of Turkey-Iran competition from south to north."* (Özcan & Özdamar, 2010: 106).

³⁶⁰ The agreement provisions *"natural gas purchase of 10 million cubic meters (worth \$23 billion) effective until 2002."* (Özcan & Özdamar, 2010: 108).

among sides in 2010 (Ayman, 2014: 12). The efforts of Turkey were so intense at that time that some western states interpreted the behavior of Turkey even “as a *shift of axis*.”

However, after this peak in the relations, the contradicting interests of both sides regarding the Iraq and Syria spoilt the relations very quickly starting from 2011. The competition experienced in the Caucasus and the Central Asia renewed once again over Iraq and Syria due to the ideological differences. However, this time the competition turned into a visible rivalry (Ayman, 2014: 18). Particularly, Iran harshly criticized the deployment of a missile early warning radar at Kurecik near Malatya in 2011 as a part of NATO's missile defense shield. Iran securitized the issue by arguing that Israel would also use the radar in the case of any attack on Iran. Moreover, Iran blamed Turkey for her intervention in the domestic affairs of Syria, while Turkey blamed Iran for the deployment of Iranian paramilitary troops fighting against the Sunni rebels.

In 2016, both states reconciled once again with the help of the improved relation of Turkey with Russia. Turkey's estrangement from the West due to the U.S. support for the PYD (Syrian branch of PKK) and EU's criticism of the human rights abuses (after the Gulenist attempt of the coup) in Turkey changed the perceived role identity of Turkey in the eyes of Iran. This alteration decreased the threat sense perceived from Turkey (an outpost of the western penetration) and facilitated the cooperation on the regional matters.

Turkey and Iran share a long history full of rivalry. As Cornell (1999:11) contends, both states never became an enemy. However, any change of the role and type identities led to either improve or spoil of the relations for a certain time while as it experienced in the era of Atatürk and Reza Shah, after the Islamic Revolution and during the tenure of Islamist governments in Turkey.

We see that the stark identity conflict (Islamist/Shiite versus Secular/Sunni) between the two states leads to a zero-sum game, in which the gain for one is regarded as the loss of the other (Stein & Bleek, 2012: 148). Interestingly, similar elements of their identities and shared culture do not allow for a total fail on the other. In this regard, neither side wants to see the rise of the other side in the Caucasus. Major concerns are not economic but political and rest on the expansion of the other's ideational influences (Kakachia, 2011: 18). In this regard, the geography (non-existence of geographical connection) and Turkey's traumatic relations with Armenia serve to the interests of Iran in curtailing the influence of Turkey in the Caucasus.

5.3.10. Russia-Iran

Iran and Russia also share an antagonist past. Iran lost her vast northern territory to the Imperial Russia in 1828, and Russian expansion pushed Iran to the South. Until the Islamic Revolution, Iran followed a strong pro-western policy and actively participated in the U.S. effort (i.e., the formation of CENTO in 1955) to contain Russia from the southern flank. However, after the revolution, Islamists regime changed the political course of the state and taken an anti-western posture. Nevertheless, Iran kept also distance from the communist Soviet Union, and even she supported the Afghan rebellion.

After the Cold War, Iran conceived the diminishing of the communist threat and welcomed the formation of a buffer zone between Russia and Iran through the newly emerged republics in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

The U.S. engagements in the Gulf, Israel invasion of Palestine and Turkish penetration towards the Caucasus and Central Asia forced Iran to collaborate with Russia (Cornell, 2001: 54). Russia and Iran realized the common threats such as keeping out the West from the region and marginalizing the Turkic influence.³⁶¹

Having good relations with Russia offers many advantages for Iran. In this regard, Russia and Iran share the same view on the demarcation of the Caspian Sea. Furthermore, Russia provides Iran high-tech military hardware and technical assistance as well as allowing technology transfer to a certain extent. Such assistance of Russia help Iran to alleviate the impact of the western embargo (Abushov, 2009: 203).³⁶²

Although Iran's political discourses based on the Islamic rhetoric such as "*enemy of Islam*, the *supremacy of Islam*, etc.," Iran never took any serious initiative against Russia's violation of the Muslim populations' rights (i.e., Muslim Chechens) in Russia (Cohen, 2013: 56). Similarly, Iran kept political silence in the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict in order not to offend Russia's ally Armenia.

Iran's pragmatism is the major driver of her political behavior, which is dictated by the economic, political, and national security concerns, rather than by religious ideology (Gresh, 2006: 1). Although both states have different corporate identities (Christian Orthodox and Muslim

³⁶¹ Moreover, both states share the same concerns such as the economic (energy companies) and military (the enlargement of NATO and military presence of the US in Georgia) penetration of the West as well as "Turkish engagement along Russia's Muslim's periphery" (Croissant, 1998: 59).

³⁶² "*Iran and Russia, even plan a joint naval task force in the Caspian Sea, which is going to be established after a successful resolution of the status of the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan remains to be the prime target of Iranian and Russian build-ups in the Caspian.*" (Tchantouridzé, 2008: 10).

Shiite) they have similar type identities, which were shaped initially by the Lockean cultures of the region. Therefore, these similarities facilitate cooperation against the common threats.

5.4. External Dynamics

In the previous sections, I tried to explain the domestic and intra-regional dynamics as well as the significance of the region. The geography and its energy sources attract great powers to the region. Nuriyev (2000, 141) resembles the present competition of the great powers in the region to the “*Great Game*” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries among Russia, Britain, and Germany. The competition of Great Powers caused many tragic incidents in the region and constituted the basis of enmity among native nations in the region (Rondeli, 2000: 51).³⁶³

Today, bipolar dynamics prevail in the region similar to that of the Cold War (Weaver, 2011:9). The U.S. and EU constitute a pole against the pole consisting of Russia, and Iran (Libaridian, 2004: 294). However, the concept of polarity does not resemble the realist explanation of it. Rather, I will try to show how external and regional actors constructed their interests under structural and regional cultures.

The actors behave differently under the influence of different cultures. The West, which generally operates under the Lockean and partially Kantian cultures, constructs various interests and employs cooperative methods to realize them. However, the regional actors such as Russia and Iran, which operate under Lockean culture (sometimes regressed to Hobbesian culture), reacts against the western penetration into the region with assertive methods, since they consider western penetration as a threat to their existence.

Russia strives to retake the control of the region through forming a new security system (CSTO), and integration project (EurAsEC), while the West strives to keep away small states from the Russian domination by forming partnerships and implementing programs (Kakachia, 2011:16).

The difference between two cultures at the structural and regional levels leads to the generation of conflicting concepts and strategies concerning the exploitation and transfer of the Caspian Sea energy resources.³⁶⁴ In this regard, the West ambitiously supported the

³⁶³ According to De Wall (2012:1719), “*the last example of the great power’s intervention is the Karabakh conflict.*”

³⁶⁴ “*The Caspian is set to become an important source of oil and gas both for EU member-states and Asian countries as they seek to diversify sources to secure supply and avoid over-reliance on any one country.*” (German, 2008: 65).

construction of the BTC pipeline, which bypasses Iran and Russia. The materialization of BTC provided Azerbaijan and Georgia additional room to escape from the Russian domination. Therefore, it altered the traditional security dynamics of the region (German, 2008: 70).

The growing western interests and the incidence of “*Color Revolutions*” resented Russia very much and paved the way for a more cohesive collaboration between Russia and Iran. Russia quickly securitized³⁶⁵ U.S. cooperation with Azerbaijan and NATO’s engagement³⁶⁶ with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.

Accordingly, Russia, which was dismayed with the western interventions, wanted to show her resolve by exercising coercive methods such as crushing Georgian sovereignty in 2008 (Abushov, 2009: 201). The 2008 War generated certain consequences in the mindsets of the small states regarding the cooperation with the West. It revitalized Russian self-image as a great power (Abushov, 2009: 205). Small states realized; a. the substance and extent of the western guarantees in the case of any Russian threat (Kakachia, 2011:17), b. The risks to sustain the energy projects (Cohen, 2013: 65).

Cohen (2013: 53) classifies U.S. interests in the South Caucasus into three broad categories: security, energy, and democracy. Regarding security, the South Caucasus does not constitute a vital role for the U.S.’s global security policy. The U.S. wants to see friendly states to contain anti-American regimes. Moreover, the U.S. aims to improve her relations with Russia, since she aspires to get her help in the global war on terrorism and to safeguard arms control in the region (Cohen, 2013: 52).

The second U.S. interest is the control of the energy resources. The U.S. strongly backed the Caspian oil extraction and its transportation through pipelines to alleviate her allies’ energy dependency on Russia and to diversify energy supplier bypassing the Persian Gulf. Additionally, U.S. aimed to exclude Iran from the project as a part of her containment policy (Cornell, 2001: 374; Rasizade, 2003: 361). Moreover, the global war on terrorism and the subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq entailed additional the U.S. focus on the South Caucasus (Markedonov, 2013: 38).

³⁶⁵ After the visit of U.S. defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld to Baku in 2003, Andrei Ryabov, Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan, declared, “*There has not been and there will not be any kind of American presence in the Caspian. We will not allow it; they have nothing to guard here*” (cited in Blank, 2008: 40).

³⁶⁶ At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO declared the South Caucasus as a priority zone (Minassian, 2008: 13).

The promotion of the democracies in the region is also a central U.S. interest. The U.S. believes that the more democracy prevails in the region, the more the region will be freed from the control of Russia. The interconnection of such states to the outside world would bring many benefits to the West (Croissant, 1997: 355) and these states would help the U.S. to contain Iranian “*anti-Western extremism*.” It may constitute a basis for spreading out the freedom and democratic ideals in the region even into Asia (Cornell, 2001: 384).

The U.S. policy towards the region developed in three phases; In the period of 1991 and 1994, the U.S. failed to exert a vibrant policy, in the second phase (1994-1996), U.S. formulated a cautious policy and in the last phase (after 1997), she actively engaged in the region. The U.S. increased her influence in the region gradually through the following mechanisms regulated by Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999:³⁶⁷ a. military training programs, b. partnerships formations under the umbrella of NATO, c. backing the opposing forces within CIS (color revolutions), d. offering financial and diplomatic aides, e. conducting support programs.

Although the U.S. has announced that the Caucasus plays a vital role for the U.S. interests (Cornell, 1999:10), she was not so keen to confront with Russia on the security matters. Furthermore, the U.S. had a false strategic view of the region due to little experience about the social context of the region. This disadvantage impeded the effectiveness of the U.S. engagement (Libaridian, 2004: 246).

Suny (2010: 14, 17) describes U.S. perceptions of the regional actors as follows: “*Russia is constructed as materialistic, venal, self-interested, anti-democratic, naturally authoritarian and expansionist – an international mischief maker. Armenia is a kind of mafia-state in which politicians and plutocrats share the spoils of a privatized economy and are confident enough to use force and low-level terror to restrain their opponents. Each of the South Caucasian republics has a distinct and different relationship with Russia. Armenia is an ally; Azerbaijan is wary, cautious, and pragmatic; and Georgia is openly confrontational.*”

Nation (2007: 30) asserts that Russia perceives American policy in the Caucasus as revisionist aiming to alter the geostrategic balance in favor of the U.S.. This perception creates a security dilemma in the Region, where Russian pressure on Azerbaijan and Georgia pushes both countries to the West, and in return, the increasing Western engagement compels Russia to exert more pressure on these states (Abushov, 2009: 201). Russia saw the U.S. support to GUAM as an offense against the Russian influence in the region.

³⁶⁷ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the “New Silk Road Strategy” in 2011 to establish transport links between Central and Southeast Asia via Afghanistan (Doc-35, 2015: 31).

In this context, the U.S. promoted Turkey as a model for the regional countries concerning market economy and democracy. By encouraging Turkey, the U.S. expected that ethnic solidarity of the Turkic states would facilitate the promotion of western values in the region (Libaridian, 2004: 294). This strategy initiated the cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey (Fotiou, 2009: 19; Kakachia, 2011:19) and, thus, reinforced the Russian and Iranian perception of Turkey as a forerunner of the western interests.

In sum, U.S. followed a twofold strategy such as alignment and containment. The U.S. sought to align with Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, whereas she aimed to contain Russia and Iran (Tsantoulis, 2009: 250). This strategy initiated a strategic cooperation framework among U.S., Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. In fact, it evoked a counter-formation made up of Russia, Iran, and Armenia (Markedonov, 2013: 37).

The proximity, being a passageway connecting Central Asia and Europe as well as its fossil resources made the region compelling also for EU and led to establishing more intense cooperation with the regional states. In this context, the interests of the EU can be studied under three interrelated categories: energy, security, and promotion of the democracy.

The EU is highly dependent on the energy supplied by Russia. To curtail her dependency on Russia, EU desires to diversify the energy suppliers and the routes. In this regard, the South Caucasus with its rich energy resources offers an alternative for Europa. Moreover, the EU wants to develop alternative transit routes to central and Eastern Asia. Thus, the Caucasus's geography, as a bridge between Europa and Asia, fits perfectly for the EU. These efforts of EU cause tension in Russia and Iran, as well as they, create regional frictions (Moga, 2012:390).

The EU believes that unresolved conflicts might spill over and the encouragement the intra and inter-regional cooperation might serve to the resolution of conflicts, thus, to the stability of the region, which can facilitate EU's accession into the region (Fotiou, 2009: 16). In this regard, EU perceives the resolution of the protracted conflicts as the first step to initialize the regional stability. The EU actively takes the initiative in the conflict resolution and is engaged in the region through participation in the peace processes. She implements various policies and programs such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP),³⁶⁸ TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia) and INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to EU). As a sign of her

³⁶⁸ ENP resembles to the Russian "Near Abroad" policy in term of its purposes, therefore, the interests of EU and Russia contradict each other in the controlling the overlapping neighborhood areas.

resolution, EU assigned a special representative to the region in 1996.³⁶⁹ EU encouraged the three South Caucasian countries to join in the ENP in 2004. Accordingly, they signed Action Plans in 2005. Furthermore, Azerbaijan and Armenia were invited to participate in the Eastern Partnership in 2008.

The EU seeks to promote new democracies in the “*Near Abroad*” of Russia. After Georgia’s peaceful “*Rose Revolution*,” EU aspired to help Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in enhancing their democracies. Thus, the Council of the EU accepted the membership of three states in 2001 (Moga, 2012:386). The operation of the EU in the “*Near Abroad*” upsets Russia and creates tension since Russia perceives the EU’s action as a threat to her traditional sphere of influence and considers EU as “rival.”³⁷⁰

In general, the European Neighborhood Policy and the European Common Energy Policy outline the implementation of EU’s interests and regulate her relations with the region. The European Neighborhood Policy can be defined as a security concept, but not in the realist terms (Lordkipanidze, 2008: 92), because ENP envisages a cultural change from the 1st degree internalized Lockean culture into a 3rd degree internalized Lockean culture or Kantian culture.

EU’s security capacity and internal inconsistency (Doc-36, Paul: 78) restricted her effective penetration into the region. The special social context of the region, which attaches great importance to hard power, makes the soft power EU an unattractive partner in security matters. Moreover, EU’s political failures harm the credibility of the EU and its mechanisms. The lack of coherent policies and coordinated efforts impeded the implementation of EU’s strategies to bind the regional countries economically and politically.

Another problem diminishing EU’s policy effectiveness is the lack of the well-defined membership perspectives. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) do not provide any prospect that will motivate candidate states to do homework. Therefore, EU succeeded little to transform the type identities of the regional countries.

In the following parts, I will examine the essence of the western interests in the region by focusing on the relations between the U.S. and EU with Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively.

³⁶⁹ Although EU itself is not represented as an independent actor, the Minsk Group mostly consists of EU member states.

³⁷⁰ Russia describes TRACECA as an initiative, which aims “*the integral inclusion of the Southern Caucasus in the American sphere of control*” (Nation, 2007: 30).

5.4.1. European Union-Armenia

Armenia has limited room to maneuver to enhance her relations with EU due to the fear Russian embargos. Although, Armenian politicians advocate for the “*policy of complementary*,” they can move only within limits determined by Russia.

In the early days of the independence, Armenia sought to establish firm relations with EU, since she deemed that being a part of the EU would assure the security and prosperity in the South Caucasus. The cultural and historical ties as well as the existence of the Armenian diaspora offered many advantages for Armenia and facilitated the European support to Armenia (Libaridian, 2004: 245).

The EU stands for soft power for Armenia and its economic, political, and intellectual power attracts Armenia. However, the lack of its security pledges makes up a limitation for Armenia, which was obsessed desperately with the existential threats.

The lack of a clear membership perspective leads Armenia to pursue a controversial policy between economic and security interests. She uses her relations with the EU to lessen her economic dependency on Russia and as a trump card to influence Russia to the certain extent.³⁷¹

For EU, Armenia does not offer any strategic weight. However, after the post-9/11 and the Rose Revaluations, EU advanced a financial reward mechanism to promote the democracy and the liberal reforms as well as to secure Armenian cooperation with the EU. Nevertheless, the EU failed to apply this mechanism systematically because of the EU's internal political considerations. Therefore, EU exerted a restrained policy to criticize the Armenian political leadership for their poor efforts for democratization, pro-Russian attitudes, and its stance in the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict (Freire, & Simão, 2013: 178-181).

In this context, some EU member states provide enormous political support to Armenia by issuing “Genocide Bill”³⁷² to punish the denial of the Armenian “genocide” and by recognizing the tragic events of 1915 as “genocide.”³⁷³ Although these efforts contradict the material interests of EU, which aspire to profit from the Azeri natural energy resources and the

³⁷¹ “*Armenia’s attitude towards greater integration with Europe is best characterized as enthusiastic pragmatism: relations with European organizations must be balanced against its strategic partnership with Russia and membership of either the EU or NATO is not a priority.*” (German, 2012b: 144).

³⁷² Germany, France, Switzerland Greece, Italy, Slovakia and Austria banned Holocaust denial.

³⁷³ Some of the EU countries formally recognizing the Armenian Genocide are as follows: Cyprus (1975), Belgium (1998), France (1998), Greece (1999), the Vatican (2000), Italy (2000), Switzerland (2003), Slovakia (2004), the Netherlands (2004), Poland (2005), Lithuania (2005), Sweden (2010), Bulgaria (2015), Austria (2015) and Germany (2016).

advantages of her geographic location, in the region by creating tension with Turkey and Azerbaijan, those EU states continued to support Armenia politically and economically.

Considering this fact, we can conclude that the cultural and religious ties play a major role in the EU's motivation to enhance her relations with Armenia. In this context, one can get easily the impression that EU indirectly supports Armenian position in the NK Conflict by analyzing her passive stance and selective criticism in the IO's. EU exerted little effort to convince Armenia to comply with the UN resolutions concerning the occupation of Azeri territories and overlooked her principled stand regarding the territorial integrity.

5.4.2. European Union-Azerbaijan

Contrary to Armenia, Azerbaijan presents certain strategic importance for the EU, because of her rich energy resources and geopolitical location. The EU regards Azerbaijan as an alternative energy supplier to Russia and Gulf countries (Nuriyev, 2008:158). Accordingly, many European companies³⁷⁴ have invested in the Azerbaijan's energy sector.

Azerbaijan calculated and expected that the cooperation with the EU in the energy sector would lead to get political support from the EU in the Conflict over Nagorno Karabakh and to foster the economic relations with the West (Nuriyev, 2008:161). However, Azerbaijan realized quickly that the EU was not a proper partner, which would channel political support in exchange for the economic benefits.³⁷⁵

The other problem undermining the EU's credibility is the lack of the security pledges to Azerbaijan. It was reflected in the Araz Azimov's speech, the Deputy Foreign Minister Azerbaijan, that *"We do not want artificial relationships. You are encouraging Georgia for years, giving them promises of giving membership action and membership in a little time. Saakashvili believed in you and started acting like those promises can be true. You trained them, gave them arms. And, so what? They cannot even withstand for 36 hours (against Russia). We do not want that kind of relationships"* (Interview-VII; 3).

These shortcomings of EU push Azerbaijan to follow a more balanced policy against Russia after 2008. She paid attention not to confront with Russia. Otherwise, Azerbaijan feared that

³⁷⁴ These western companies are British Petroleum, Total, Fina, Elf, and Statoil.

³⁷⁵ *"While Azerbaijan's political elites clearly see the resolution of the frozen conflicts on their territories as an important issue that Brussels should address EU as a security actor plays no role in the Karabakh conflict and clearly signals it will refrain from doing so in the future, so that resulting political advantages are absent"* (Mayer, 2014: 1696).

the excessive pro-western orientation might lead Russia to increase her support to Armenia and manipulate domestic problems.

The EU also acts very cautiously in managing her relations with Azerbaijan due to the concern of the Russia's reaction and well-organized Armenian Diaspora in EU. The main problem that impedes the further improvement of the relations is the EU's failure to recognize Azerbaijan's territorial integrity explicitly as she did in the case of Moldova, Georgia and, Ukraine, which have territorial disputes. Naturally, Azerbaijan considers the stance of the EU as a double standard, and it creates friction between two actors. Moreover, EU exerts a selective policy in criticizing actors' efforts for the good governance and democratization. In this regard, EU criticizes the poor progress of democratization and record of human rights in Azerbaijan severely, while she criticizes Armenia more prudently.³⁷⁶ Azerbaijan regards this situation as a biased approach that harms the mutual trust between two actors.³⁷⁷

It is expected that the EU provides more support to Azerbaijan than that to Armenia due to the mutual dependency in the energy and security sectors. However, the reality differs from this expectation. The relations between Azerbaijan and EU became problematic and inflicted Azerbaijan to lose her trust on the EU to some extent. EU's policy towards Azerbaijan rests on socially constructed biases rather than material considerations. Otherwise, the EU would follow a more pro-Azerbaijan policy instead of a pro-Armenian policy, if EU's material interests transcended over the ideational interests.

5.4.3. USA-Armenia

USA-Armenia relations need special focus. Because, despite her alignment with Russia and Iran, the USA tolerated and continued to support Armenia financially, even it contradicts the U.S. material interests concerning Azerbaijan and Turkey. A brief analysis of American political culture explicitly reveals that the Armenian Diaspora is the driving force behind the American policy towards Armenia.

In the early years of the independence, the USA supported Armenia's independence and provided humanitarian assistance to her, to lessen the adverse effect of the isolation. Later,

³⁷⁶ It is my observation during the assignment in OSCE between 2011-2014.

³⁷⁷ "Azerbaijan is generally very discontented with regard to issues it considers domestic, such as human rights, democratisation, or press freedom." (Mayer, 2014: 1698).

USA provided technical and immense financial aid to Armenia (Libaridian, 2004: 246).³⁷⁸ In this context, Diaspora played a major role in channeling U.S. aides to Armenia.

Although the U.S. supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan officially and cooperated in energy and security sector, the diaspora succeeded the legislation of the section 907 Freedom Support Act stipulating tight control over the military hardware sales and financial aids to Azerbaijan. The U.S. pledged to exercise this law as long as the blockade of Karabakh and Armenia lasts (Cornell, 2001: 368,369). This section remained in effect until 2002 and was suspended by the Bush administration due to the need of Azeri air bases for the operation called “*global war on terrorism*” (De Waal, 2003: 234).

Until 2008, Armenia flirted with the USA even in the security matters, although she had an intense military, economic, and political relations with Russia. In this context, Armenia became a part of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which was developed for the countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia at NATO’s Prague summit in 2002. Thus, Armenia hosted a NATO-led Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercise in 2003. Moreover, in 2004, Armenia assigned peacekeeping troops to the U.S. command in Kosovo.³⁷⁹

The U.S. represents a positive image in the minds of the Armenian society. The survey results reveal that 62 percent thought that the USA plays an active role in the Armenia’s economic development, 60 percent in the provision of security, and 56 percent in the country’s democratic development. However, the same survey shows the division in the Armenian society regarding their security perceptions. According to the survey results conducted by CRRC in 2010, 37 percent of respondents support the NATO membership while 21 percent opposed it and the remaining 42 percent advocates for neutrality (Web-24, Caucasus Barometer 2010).³⁸⁰

The intense U.S. support for Georgia and Azerbaijan during the Afghanistan Operation led Armenia to reconsider her relations with the West, in order not to be isolated from the West. Armenia sought to improve her relations with NATO and the USA. However, her membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Pact of the Commonwealth of Independent States imposed an obstacle for the further development of the relations.

³⁷⁸“*Armenia is actually the second per capita recipient of US aid in the world after Israel.*” (Cornell, 2001: 370).

³⁷⁹ “*Sargsian formally presented de Hoop Scheffer with his country’s so-called Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) as well as a personal letter from President Kocharian.*” (Suny, 2010: 17).

³⁸⁰ As for 2013, only 9% of the Armenians **fully support** the membership to NATO, which was 14% in 2010 (Caucasus barometer).

The Russian pressure compelled Armenia to make her position clear: Accordingly, President Kocharian stated in 2006 that “*Armenia is not going to join NATO*” (Suny, 2010: 19). The Georgian War in 2008 diminished the Armenian political aspiration to become a part of the West (Priego, 2008: 55). Subsequently, her relations with the USA worsened gradually (Cornell, 2001: 389). Accordingly, USA heavily criticized the conduct of the 2008 election in Armenia and her violation of the sanctions imposed on Iran. Most likely, due to the political power of the Armenian Diaspora, USA did not punish Armenia through imposing some financial sanctions or suspension of aids.

Since 1992, USA has sought to bring Armenia into the Western orbit through the promotion of democracy with the help of the aid mechanism regulated by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). However, such U.S. efforts did not meet the expectations and quite contrary, Armenia followed a more pro-Russian policy line. As we mentioned in the previous sections, the lack of coherent regional policies and inconsistent approaches undermined the credibility of the USA and played a major role in the failure. The clash of U.S. material (energy resources) and ideational interests (Christian solidarity) generated these inconsistent approaches and caused a political dilemma.

5.4.4. USA-Azerbaijan

Brzezinski (1997: 46) describes the geopolitical significance of Azerbaijan as follows: “*It is the cork in the bottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. The independence of the Central Asian states can be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fully subordinated to Moscow's control. Azerbaijan's own and very significant oil resources can also be subjected to Russian control, once Azerbaijan's independence has been nullified. An independent Azerbaijan, linked to Western markets by pipelines that do not pass through the Russian-controlled territory, also becomes a major avenue of access from the advanced and energy-consuming economies to the energy rich Central Asian republics.*”

After reading this realist definition concerning Azerbaijan's importance, one expects to see close relations between USA and Azerbaijan.³⁸¹ However, the outcome differs from that, and we should explain the reasons. Interestingly, and contrary to realistic explanations, USA hesitated to establish firm relations with Azerbaijan, despite Azerbaijan's strategic importance and converging interests (Croissant, 1997: 364). According to De Waal (2003: 276), “USA

³⁸¹ “Similarly, the 1999 Silk Road Strategy Act defined the Caucasus as an ‘important geopoliticalisthmus’ in conjunction with its energy potential, and supported the effort to reconstruct a Europe-Asia transport corridor that would bypass Russia to the south.” (Nation, 2007: 10).

policy in the region has been distorted by narrow domestic interest groups who have all but privatized USA policy toward Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Armenian lobby in Congress was responsible for one of that body's most anomalous pieces of foreign policy legislation: Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act." The U.S. policy towards Azerbaijan fluctuates in line with the changes in the U.S. administration. The Democrat presidents followed a cautious policy not to disturb Russia, whereas Republicans exerted more aggressive and supportive policy towards Azerbaijan (Ambrosio, 2011: 108).

Azerbaijan always sought to get U.S. support to balance Armenian-Russian alliance.³⁸² Consequently, Azerbaijan strived to converge the interests of the two states through the implementation of the energy projects, the provision of the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign by providing air bases, and participation in the U.S. led operations.³⁸³ Furthermore, she enthusiastically demanded to become a NATO member until 2008.³⁸⁴

However, some U.S. policies such as U.S. Congress's direct financial aid to the separatist regime of the Nagorno-Karabakh and U.S. double-standard approach to her territorial integrity resented Azerbaijan. Moreover, USA sustained to aid Armenia financially, whereas she exerted sanctions on Azerbaijan, where approximately one million refugees live. This policy aroused the emotion of "*deceit and humiliation on the popular level*" in Azerbaijan and negatively affected the image of the USA (Cornell, 2001: 370).³⁸⁵ Therefore, such partial and biased policies caused great disappointment in Azerbaijan.³⁸⁶ Because of that, Azerbaijan lost her confidence in the neutrality of the USA and sought to reassess her relations with the West and to improve the relations with Russia. Especially, the prudence of the new Azeri policy became apparent after the Russian invasion of Georgia.

Under these conditions, Azerbaijan conceived that "*Peace in exchange for neutrality*" would serve much more in the interests of the nation (Hajizadeh, 2008: 30) than a full orientation to

³⁸² President Aliyev aimed to use relations with Western oil companies to exert pressure on Western governments.

³⁸³ The USA considered the Shiite element of The Azeri corporate identity as a tool to appease Southern Iraq by deploying the Azerbaijani troops in the Shiite holy and historical places such as Nayaf and Kerbala.

³⁸⁴ "*In 1999, Azeri Foreign Minister Vafa Guluzade had called for the United States and Turkey to take the initiative to create a NATO-run military base on Azerbaijan's territory, and in 2002 Azerbaijan formally announced its candidacy to join the Alliance.*" (Nation, 2007: 16).

³⁸⁵ "*Its actual effect, however, has been to deprive nearly 1 million Azeri refugees of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from receiving USA humanitarian aid. Ironically, no law bans humanitarian assistance to such avowed USA adversaries as North Korea, Cuba, and Iraq.*" (Croissant, 1997: 364).

³⁸⁶ "*The exclusion of Azerbaijan from the Obama-hosted nuclear summit in Washington DC in April 2010, to which Armenia was both invited and scheduled to meet with the president one-on-one, insulted Azerbaijan deeply.*" (Ambrosio, 2011: 108; Cornell, 2001: 370).

the West.³⁸⁷ Another reason that led to the lack of enthusiasm for Euro-Atlantic integration is the burdens of that cooperation. The integration with West requires the change of type identity through the implementation of many reforms on human rights, the rule of law, free market and social justice (Hajizadeh, 2008: 30), which is considered as a threat to the existence of the present regime and type identity of the state.

On the other hand, the U.S. failed to recognize the internal dynamics of Azerbaijan and her security concerns related to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Thus, and contrary to the realist expectation, which champions Washington's fundamental motives such as securing access to energy resources and containing Iran, the U.S. ignored the deviation of Azerbaijan from the West. In this context, the U.S. maintained itself from a strong commitment to Azerbaijani security due to the pressure of the Diaspora on the Congress (De Waal, 2003: 234; Cornell, 1999: 10). The U.S. also worried about the risk of the direct involvement in the Conflict over Nagorno–Karabakh that might bring the USA to a confrontation with Russia in the South Caucasus and increase Armenia's dependence on Russia (Larrabee, 2009: 310).

Finally, we can argue that U.S. corporate and type identities are so distinct from those of Azerbaijan that U.S. material interests in the region cannot drive U.S. to make firm commitments.

5.5. Chapter Conclusions

5.5.1. Overview

In this chapter, I sought to understand the basic dynamics of the relations among all relevant actors. To achieve this, I studied these dynamics under three categories or levels: domestic, intra-regional and external. We realized that these levels interact reciprocally and the corporate and type identities of actors construct various roles and collective identities when they interact with other actors. It means that we can consider the present role and collective identities as the products of past interactions and domestic/regional cultures. In this context, the analysis of the regional interactions revealed the dominant role of the cultural security paradigm in the formation of identities and the shaping of relations.

³⁸⁷ In an interview with Interfax Azerbaijan on March 20, 2008, President Ilham Aliyev stated that “*We are satisfied with our current level of cooperation with the NATO ... Therefore, based on today's situation, accession to the NATO is not on the agenda.*” (cited in Hajizadeh, 2008: 30)

5.5.2. Domestic

As Buzan and Wæver (2003: 404) stated, the domestic level is critical to understand the security paradigm of the region, thus the pattern of alignment. The case study explicitly revealed the leading role culture (1st-degree Lockean cultures) in the formation and exercise of the internal and external policies.

This kind of culture facilitates the creation of “*domestic interest groups who profit from the arms race and therefore lobby national decision-makers not to reduce arms spending*” in both countries and these groups institute “*a state identity that depends for its existence on an enemy*” (Wendt,1999:275). This analysis also disclosed that these groups incline to employ “*discourse of danger,*” to invent or to exaggerate the threats to create “*in-group solidarity,*” which serves to the division of the societies. In this context, the interest groups in Armenia including the diaspora exaggerate the alleged threat of Pan-Turkism intentionally, to create internal solidarity and to get external supports against this threat (Cornell, 2001: 305).³⁸⁸

The study showed that Azerbaijan identity was defined under the Soviet regime and re-defined once again after the demise of the Soviets. The past constituted the basis of the new definition (Tokluoglu, 2012: 337). The corporate and type identities of Azerbaijan set up the present Azeri perception of the world. The domestic power setting based on the interpretation of the Azeri corporate identity is the major driver of the foreign relations. The APF under the rule of Elchibey, which belongs to the “*Turkish school*” of Azeri identity, followed a far more radical foreign policy against Russia and Armenia. On the contrary, Aliiev exerted a more balanced foreign policy, because of his prudent approach to nationalism.

Azerbaijan's present type identity is subject to change due to interaction with the West. However, because of the dominant regional culture and security paradigm, Azerbaijan considers the western promotion of democracy as a threat to her corporate and type identities.

The Armenian corporate and type identities were defined through antagonism lasting for about 200 years. The sustainment of these identities needs an enduring Turkish threat. After the demise of the Soviets, the succeeding negative developments revitalized the sense of the Turkish threat and Armenian elites viewed keeping the Turkish threat alive as a vital issue to maintain the cohesion of the Armenian corporate and type identities.

³⁸⁸ “*The more one fears Pan-Turkism, the more strategic significance this border assumes.*” (Libaridian, 2004: 294).

Like Azerbaijan, Armenian elites hold the western pressure for human right, good governance, and democratization as a threat to their corporate and type identities, since they believe that any change of type identity might inflict the change of the role identity through intensifying interactions and cooperation. The alteration of type and role identities might transform the regional culture and its security paradigm into a collective one, which constitutes a risk for the Armenian self-esteem aspiring for the rectification of the historical injustice. Therefore, we witness different interpretation of the past and its effect on the foreign policy by various leaders. For example, Ter-Petrosian considered the historical understanding of the past as the weakness and vulnerability, whereas Kocharian used history as a resource to fuel enmity (Mirzoyan, 2010: 176).

In this context, the present regimes of both states reinforce the enmity pattern among regional actors by refreshing old memories to empower themselves. As a result, they seek to block any external and internal attempts aspiring to change the regional culture. Elites are advertising the efforts for identity changes as a weakness and a threat to the existence of the nation. We can conclude that domestic setting plays a primary role in the formation of external relations and the course of interaction.

5.5.3. Intra-Regional

The domestic setting and its representation through foreign policies define the scope and magnitude of the regional relations. As Libaridian (2004: 286) asserts, actors tend to form relations with the actors, which has identical identities.

The present regional culture shapes the dynamics of the regional cooperation. The interactions in the region can be best characterized as short termed, interest oriented and mistrust centric. They comply with the rules and norms selectively or by force since they did not internalize these norms. Under this logic, states tend to balance each other rather than to cooperate.

Azerbaijan shares an identical corporate identity with Turkey and both attribute “friend” role identity to each other, which facilitates to form a collective identity. The strong ethnic ties and components of type identities (secular and western orientation) excluded the sectarian differences that could constitute an obstacle.

Azerbaijan shares some common elements (religion and same sect) with Iran in term of corporate identity; however, the ethnic differences transcend over the other components of the corporate identity. Moreover, they have different type identities due to the secular orientation of Azerbaijan. Consequently, both sides attribute different labels of identity (such

as a rival and enemy in any situation) to each other except the label of a friend. As it is expected, both sides are far away from forming a collective identity. This fact constitutes the core of the present-day discontent and fear of Azeri irredentism.

Azerbaijan and Russia do not share any common components in their corporate identities. The similarities of their type identities (common communist past, the use of Russian language and some cultural similarities) facilitate the establishment of the relations; however, Azerbaijan attributes the role identity of “rival” to Russia due to bitter past experiences. Azeris collective mind harbors the narratives of the resentful and unpleasant incidents of the past. The expansionist elements (such as claiming to be the successor of the Byzantines Empire) of the Russian corporate identity form and shape the contradicting material interests. As a result, Azerbaijan strives to keep distance with Russia to evade from the renewal of the past. Thus, this social instinct prevents the formation of a collective identity with Russia.

In reality, the essence of Armenian attitudes towards Azerbaijan rests on the Armenian and Turkish identity conflict. Thus, understanding this conflict is necessary for our analysis. In this respect, the corporate identities of Armenia and Turkey are not identical and consist of many contradicting elements such as religion, disputed territories, and bitter memories. Particularly, Armenian elites deliberately exploited these differences to strengthen the coherence of their corporate identity. Accordingly, Turkish corporate identity produced counter interests to protect itself from the perceived Armenian political aggression and campaign for the recognition of the self-claimed “genocide.” Therefore, both identities attribute each other the role identity “rival” or “enemy,” which makes impossible to create a collective identity and serves to a protracted conflict. The dominant internal dynamics of Armenia and Turkey foster the identity conflict and leave less space for reconciliation.

Armenia and Russia have same corporate and type identities. They have a common religion, similar culture, ancient friendship, and similar governance traditions, as well as an immature democracy. Accordingly, they developed similar belief system and interests regarding Turkish identity and attributed to each other the label of “ally” as a role identity that facilitated the formation of a collective identity. The “victimization” sense of the Armenian identity ushered the protection of a similar corporate identity, which is Russian identity. In this context, we can explain the reasons for the abrupt decision of Armenia to join the Customs Union in 2013 instead of signing the Association and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) Agreements with the EU. They prioritized security concerns (resting on ideational factors) rather than the economic considerations (Interview-III, Hopmann; 4).

Although Armenia and Iran do not have a same corporate identity, their corporate identities share similar elements such as animosity towards Turks and fear of the Turkish domination of the region. Moreover, the common past under the same empire (Iranian), which was not full of bitter experiences as being under the rule of the Turks, enabled cultural intimacy. Their type identities also have some common elements such as low-level democratic culture and autocratic decision makers. These similarities also lead both sides to consider each other as “friend” and facilitate the establishment of a collective identity. Therefore, Iran indirectly supports Armenia in the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict and conducts intensive economic relations with her. However, the present cooperation has little prospect for further development, due to the weakness of the shared culture (Henze, 2000:31).

Russia and Turkey also have conflicting corporate identities. The Turkish corporate identity rests on the master narrative that “*Turks are the defender and spearhead of Islam*,” whereas Russian corporate identity uses the maxim of “*the last bastion and spearhead of Orthodox Christianity, and Moscow as a Third Rome*” (cited in Abushov, 2009: 190). Consequently, they shaped different and contradicting interests and struggled to realize them throughout history. Today, Russia sees the ethnic and linguistic ties with Turkey with the Turkic states of the CIS as a threat to her corporate identity (due to the risk of disintegration), whereas Turkey considers Russian support to her enemies (Armenia and separatist fractions in Turkey) as a threat to her corporate identity.³⁸⁹ Accordingly, both states antagonized each other, regarded as “enemy” or “rival” and remained in the opposite camps.³⁹⁰ Russia and Turkey can establish only tactical relations, which cannot survive too long when their type identities share some common elements as it was in the periods of 1921-1939.

Turkey and Iran have many similar elements in their corporate identity such as religion and a shared past. However, religion also divides both identities due to the sectarian differences. Two centuries ago, before the entry of Russia in the region, Iran and Turkey were the main actors in the region, and they competed and fought for centuries because of sectarian division, although a Turkish Dynasty ruled the Iranian Empire at that time. Thus, both nations developed narratives regarding other’s cruelty and betrayals. After the Islamic Revolution, Turkey’s secular and Iran’s Islamist type identities became another conflicting issue between two

³⁸⁹ “*The Russian and Armenian alliance was based as much on religious affinity as on long-range political calculations regarding the restoration of Armenia in some form, at the expense of Turkey.*” (Swietochowski, 1995: 37, 38).

³⁹⁰ “*Proclaiming the Soviet Union’s collapse as ‘the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century,’ Putin expressed nostalgia for it and its values, and even chose the melody of the Soviet anthem for the new Russian anthem and adopted the emblem of the Russian Empire.*” (Abushov, 2009: 190).

nations. All these differences led Turkey and Iran to challenge each other and prevented to form a genuine cooperation.

The pragmatic reasons led to the improvement of the relations between Iran and Russia since both corporate identities share the same fear of Pan-Turkism and the containment by the West. Both states also sense a threat from the Turkic minorities. They believe that any manipulation of these minorities might lead to the disintegration of both states. Therefore, the common sense of threat forces two states to cooperate. Moreover, the type identities of two states resemble each other, since both states have autocratic systems. In this context, Russia and Iran regard each other as “tactical friend,” and common threats to their corporate and type identities serve to the formation a kind of (temporary) collective identity.

The figure 12 below depicts the basic mechanism of the formation of the roles and relations in the region. We can call enmity as the dominant factor regulating the relations. Amity prevails under certain conditions between certain actors such Turkey-Azerbaijan and Russia-Armenia. The enmity pattern creates negative conditions, under which actors fail to produce constructive policies, thus securitize many referent objects (mainly ideational objects), and come to a confrontation.




Figure 12 The Basic Mechanism of the Formation of the Roles and Relations

Based on this analysis, two counter patterns of alignment emerged in the region; Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran axis and Ankara-Baku-Tbilisi axis (Cornell, 1999: 6). In this context, the external penetrations reinforce enmity and increase mutual distrust, therefore, exacerbate the already negative conditions.

5.5.4. External

The western focus on the region has three dimensions: sovereignty and security; energy and trade; democracy and good governance. In reality, these dimensions are the reflection of the corporate and type identities of the West.

The corporate and type identity of the West requires similar corporate or, at least, type identities (sovereign and democratic states) to achieve her material interests such as energy and trade. In this context, the West constructed a belief that if the western values (shaped partly by Kantian, mostly by Lockean cultures) prevail in the region. Then the democratic regimes (change of type identity) would arise that might facilitate the penetration (trade, pipelines, investments) of the West into the region. Especially, the EU believes in the decisive role in the creation of similar type identities that might serve to the formation of similar role identities.

In the past, the West considered Russia as an “enemy” aiming to spread out communist values throughout Europa, now, it sees Russia as a “rival” seeking to curb western influence in the region. In contrast, Russia constructed a belief (on the ground of the past lessons) that envisages the West in a realm from a rival to the enemy (role identities). Accordingly, Russia seeks to diminish the western influences (democracy promotion, integration into Euro-Atlantic security and economic systems with guaranteed sovereignty and modernization) in the region that would transform the type identities of the small states. Moreover, the formation of the similar type identities might serve to the redefine the existing role identities and to a radical change in the regional culture (remember the effect of “*colored revolutions*” on Russia).

The transformation of the regional culture into a more cooperative one might weaken the Russian dominance in the region since Russia would lose many advantages provided by the existing culture. Otherwise, Russia would not exert hard-power policies such as “*military presence, manipulation of ethnic conflicts, control over energy supplies, taking over bankrupt industries through debt-assets swaps, and support for Moscow-oriented political forces*” to materialize her interests (Doc-36, Chiragov & Karimov, 2015: 98).

In this context, Turkey feverishly supported the western penetration in the region, since the similarities of her corporate and type identities necessitated and facilitated the cooperation with the West to counteract Russia. On the contrary, Iran, which has conflicting corporate and type identities with those of the West, opposed of the western penetration that might affect her type identity. Therefore, she aligned with Russia to stop the diffusion of the western ideals.

Under this anarchy (culture in the constructivist terminology), the conflicting parties Armenia and Azerbaijan seek to cooperate with the actors, which have identical identities. They perceive the actors as a threat if their identities consist of conflicting elements. In this regard, Armenia

considers Turkey and Azerbaijan as a threat to her existence. This perception pushes her to collaborate with Russia and Iran, whereas Azerbaijan's fear of Russia (restoration of the imperial ambitions) and hate of Armenia push her to collaborate with Turkey and to orientate towards the West.

Due to the regional anarchy, Russia tends to use hard power to materialize her interests. The norm of sovereignty has little impact on the Russian foreign policy since she did not fully internalize it. Against this tendency of Russia, the West lacks a cohesive and lasting strategy (Doc-36, Chiragov & Karimov, 2015: 95) and commitments to alleviate the concerns of the regional states. This dilemma creates the following consequences:

-Due to the corporate identity constraints, the West applies different principles to similar situations, which undermines the credibility of the West. The unmatched responses of the West to the Crimea Crisis and the NK Conflict revealed the double standard and the lack of a reliable policy once again. Taking into account the material interests of the West, one can expect that it would support Azerbaijan. However, the examination of the present relations discloses an opposite fact: a visible biased policy towards Azerbaijan. In this context, Azerbaijan faces with harsh critics of the West about the internal problems³⁹¹ and many difficulties in purchasing of the western arms and technologies (Interview-II; 4). This failure of the West damages the credibility and impartiality of the West; moreover, it encouraged the covert Russian-centric forces in the region (Doc-35, 2015: 36).

-The West cannot influence conflict resolution process in the region, since it did not recognize the central role of the conflicts in ensuring the stability in the region and, thus, attached less importance. Therefore, it did not show a genuine willingness and cooperation to resolve the conflicts. Azerbaijan believes that the West does not exert pressure on Armenia to withdraw her forces from the occupied part of Azerbaijan and, in fact, it encourages Armenia through financial and political support.

-Despite its financial and political support, the West cannot diminish the Russian influence on the Armenia. Because the West cannot provide a clear membership vision that would lessen the security concerns of Armenia. The dominant regional culture prioritizes the hard power applied by Russia over the soft power exercised by the West. Accordingly, Armenia considers

³⁹¹ American and European observers have little knowledge on the political and social context of Azerbaijan; they generally assumed that *"President Aliyev exercises autocratic power. On this basis, they pay little attention to intra-government politics. But closer study of Azerbaijan's politics reveals that the government itself consists of autonomous freedoms"* (Doc-35, 2015: 35).

allying with Russia as a viable and rational option to ensure her security in exchange of sovereignty.

-The West cannot comprehend the significant role of the special social context and the interconnection between security and democratic development. Traditionally, the West interprets the political developments in the region according to “*government versus opposition*” logic. However, this issue is much more complicated and necessitates deep knowledge of the social context to avoid of misjudgments,³⁹² which cause skepticisms about the motives of the Western policies (Doc-35, 2015: 37). Instead of paying much attention to democracy promotion, the West shall exert a balanced policy among democracy promotion, security, and economy (Doc-35, 2015: 40). The stance of the West in the crisis of Georgia and Crimea, as well as the western unwillingness to grant Membership Action Plans for Georgia and Ukraine after the Bucharest NATO Summit in 2008, was interpreted by Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan as a sign of the western irresolution, which eroded the credibility of the West.³⁹³

-The West is not able to identify and implement her interests in an efficient way through the synchronization of the agencies’ efforts and the harmonization of her interests. Thus, the West exerts its foreign policy on an ad hoc basis. Hopmann (Interview-III; 15) underlined this fact as follows:

“I don’t think that the US has any strategic plan about the South Caucasus it has individual interests, it has specific interest in Armenia, it has certain specific interests in Azerbaijan, it has certain specific interests in Georgia, and they do not necessarily consist of one another they are not part of any grand strategic design. Nobody in the US cares enough about the South Caucasus. ... I mean for Russia, it is still part of their historical theater. Therefore, they would have more grand design as that of the US. And (Russia) has a more rational idea about short and long-term strategies in how things fit together. I think (that) much of US policy in the South Caucasus is decided almost on a random basis.”

The existence of the different cultures in the system and regional level generate the preceding consequences. The 3rd degree internalized Lockean culture or 1st degree internalized Kantian culture prevails in the western world that is incompatible with the dominant culture in the region, which is 1st and 2nd degrees internalized Lockean culture. Therefore, the actors operate under

³⁹² “*Lacking ‘in-house’ capabilities, western governments trust on the reports issued by independent interest groups and lobbying organizations. However, these reports cannot be verified and evaluated independently and officially.*” (Doc-35, 2015: 40).

³⁹³ Sarkisyan’s following statements implies the importance of the social context knowledge: “*Armenian cognac can’t really be sold in Paris. But, it does well in the Russian Federation.*” (Web-11).

different security paradigm; accordingly, they conceptualize different beliefs and threat perception. Table 13 summarizes the basic foreign policy orientation of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Clear foreign policy orientation?	No (pro-Russian, increasingly multi-vectoral)	No (pro-Turkey, increasingly multi-vectoral)
Relationship with Russia	Perceived as a strategic security ally	Perceived as (indirect) threat
Aspiring to become an EU member? CIS membership?	No Yes (since 1991)	No Yes (since 1991)
CSTO/CIS Collective Security Treaty membership?	Yes (since 1994)	No (joined 1994, withdrew 1999)
Perception of the EU and its rules as legitimate	Weak	Weak
Aspiring to become an NATO member?	No (since 2006) Member of PfP Program (since 1994)	No (since 2008) Member of PfP Program (since 1994)
Security dependence on the EU/U.S.	Low/Low	Low/Low

Table 13 Regional Security Governance in The Southern Caucasus-Policy Orientations, Institutional Obligations, Memberships, and Alliance Commitments, Source: (Mayer, 2014: 1688)

Both nations consider external influences as a serious threat to their cultures. In this regard, Azerbaijani society seems more conservative and rejects all other three cultures nearly in the same percentages, however, due to religious similarities, Armenia is less conservative, and only 17% of Armenians are strongly against Russian influence. These results also offer some evidence for perception patterns of both nations.

	Strongly Agree on %			Rather Agree on %		
	EU	Russia	USA	EU	Russia	USA
Armenia	26	17	30	29	20	26
Azerbaijan	35	32	37	28	31	28

Table 14 our way of life needs to be protected against external influences, Source: CRRD DI 2009

5.5.5. Understanding the Formation of Threat Perception and Alignment Dynamics

Walt formulates (1987: 148) threat as the function of the following factors: *aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions*. We know that the first three factors could be measured through some indicators. However, the last factor (perceived aggression) is a cognitive element and constructed socially. The sense of this element varies from society to society, depending on identity, culture, and past interactions. Unfortunately, we do not have any device to measure other's perception or another's intentions. In chapter IV, I studied the

securitization processes among actors and tried to understand the major drivers of these processes. It has disclosed once again that “identity” and “past interactions” are the major drivers in the region. The examination of the internal, regional, and external dynamics in this chapter demonstrates us the role of the various types of the “identities” in the construction of the relations and their quality.

I summarized the analysis of the preceding chapters in table 15 below, according to the premises of Wendt (1999: 225, 227, 229). Table 15 explains the present identities of the actors. Identifying the sort and function of the identities will help us to comprehend the scope of the interactions and the construction of the threat perceptions.

Identities	Corporate	Type	Role	Collective
Armenia	- First Christian nation, Orthodox sect - Consist of the east and west Armenia (in Turkey) - Root-oriented - Reference to the historical territories of Armenia - Humiliation or threatening of a large-group identity - Affection of Russia - Fear of Turkey	- Partly free Democracy - Supremacy of the Nagorno-Karabakh clan - Influence of Diaspora and religion - Military intervention in domestic politics - Past-oriented political leadership - A little resentment of the Russian dominance - Submissive to Russia	Ru : Ally Az : Enemy Tu : Enemy Ir : Friend EU: Friend US: Friend	Alignment with Russia and Iran.
Azerbaijan	- Muslim, Shiite sect, consist of the northern and southern Azerbaijan (in Iran) - Rich and complex cultural legacy, but very recent notion of Azerbaijani nationhood (Mehdiyeva, 2003:275) - Weak sense of identification with the Azeri nation (Sunny, 2000: 159) - Fear of Russia	- Secular state system - Not free Democracy - Dominant Military - Leader-centric regime - Deep resentment from being under the Russian rule	Ar : Enemy Ru: Rival Tu: Ally Ir : Rival EU: Friend US: Friend	Alignment with Turkey.
Turkey	- Muslim, Sunni sect, - Imperial past, Regional power, - Western orientation, - Deep resentment of the Great Power politics, - Hatred towards Armenians	- Secular state system, - Partly free Democracy, - Instable domestic political setting, - Leader-centric governance.	Ar: Rival Az: Ally Ru: Rival Ir : Rival EU: Friend US: Friend	Alignment with Azerbaijan and the West.
Iran	- Radical Muslim, Shiite sect, - Imperial past, regional power, - Fear of disintegration, - Fear of the West and Turkish influence.	- Islamist, - Not free Democracy.	Ar: Friend Az: Rival Tu: Rival Ru: Friend EU: Rival US: Enemy	Alignment with Russia and Armenia.
Russia	- Christian, Orthodox sect, - Imperial past, global power,	- Not free Democracy, - Excessive military capacity,	Ar: Ally Az: Rival	Alignment with

	• Fear of disintegration.	• The oligarch control of state system, • Leader-centric governance.	Tu: Rival Ir : Friend EU: Rival US: Rival	Armenia and Iran.
EU	• Christian, Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox sects, • Imperial past, soft power at global level.	• Free Democracy, • Gigantic Economic power, • Lack of cohesive security policy, • Lack of cohesive internal polity.	Ar: Friend Az: Friend Tu: Ally Ir : Rival Ru: Rival US: Ally	Alignment with Turkey.
USA	• Christian, Catholic and Protestant sects, • Super power at global level.	• Free Democracy, • Gigantic economic power, • Gigantic military power, • The influence of interest group on the state system.	Ar: Friend Az: Friend Tu: Ally Ir : Enemy EU: Ally Ru: Rival	Alignment with Turkey.

Table 15 The Construction of Identities by Actors

I will use the table 15 above to simulate the threat construction of the actors in the region, according to the premises of the Balance of Threat Theory. I developed the following calculation formula to estimate the threat perception based on the variables of the BoT.

$$(AP+PX+OC) *OI$$

In this context, first, I attributed a degree to each measurable variables of BoT according to the following scale: none, low, moderate, and high. The scale represents the degree of each variable sensed by an actor (table 16). Second, I did line up the variables according to the importance of the factor as delineated in the Balance of Threat Theory (table 16). Third, after lining up, I assigned a constant value to each variable considering its degree in table 16. Fourth, I considered offensive intentions (OI) as a multiplier based on the assumption of Walt³⁹⁴ and rated it in a curve linear manner. Fifth, in table 18, I attributed a degree (None-N, low-L, Moderate-M, and High-H) to the variables in each dyad (cells) based on the empirical findings of the study and the data given in table 17 that implies some information concerning their aggregate power and offensive capacity. Sixth, I calculated threat perception using the values in table 16 and applying the formula. Finally, I depicted the results under each cell in table 18.

Table 16 Scale of the Constant Values for the Calculation in table 17

Scale Level of impact	AP Aggregate power	PX Proximity	OC Offensive Capability	OI Offensive Intention (multiplier)
None	0	0	0	0
Low	4	5	6	7
Moderate	7	8	9	14
High	10	11	12	21

As an example, we can interpret the upper left cell (first column and

second row) of the table-17 as follows: For Azerbaijan, Armenia represents low-level (**L**) aggregate power (AP) in comparison with the aggregate power of Azerbaijan depicted in table 16. Armenian geographic location presents high-level (**H**) proximity (PX) due to their neighborhood and Armenia possesses a medium level (**M**) offensive capability (OC) when compared with the offensive capacity of Azerbaijan. Finally, our study shows that Armenia might have high-level (**H**) offensive intentions (OI) against Azerbaijan, because, as depicted in the table-14 above, she attributes “enemy” role identity to Azerbaijan. The calculation figures out the strength of the Azerbaijan’s threat perception from Armenia as “378” according to the formula above. However, for Armenia, the magnitude of her threat perception from

³⁹⁴ Walt (1987: 26) argues that “*intention, not power, is crucial.*”

Azerbaijan is “462,” which means that Armenia’s mutual threat perception is higher than that of Azerbaijan.

Actors	Economy GDP/GDP per Capita (2014)³⁹⁵	Population ³⁹⁶ (million)	Geographic size (Squad kilometer)	Military expenditures, % of GDP, Per Capita (2015)³⁹⁷	Military Ranking³⁹⁸
Armenia	11,644,438,423 / \$3,875	3	29,800	447,000,000 4,5%/ \$150	94
Azerbaijan	75,198,010,965 / \$7,886	9,7	86,600	3,021,000,000 4,6%/ \$321	60
Iran	425,326,068,423 / \$5,443	78,5	1,650,000	10,265,000,000 2,5%/ \$131	21
Turkey	798,429,233,036 / \$10,515	78,2	783,562	15,275,000,000 2,1%/ \$196	8
Russia	1,860,597,922,763 / \$12,736	144,3	17,075,200	66,421,000,000 5,4%/ \$454	2
EU³⁹⁹	13,957,518,900,000 / 27,500 Euro	510	4,324,782	Euro 203.000,000,000 %1,5 /398 Euro	3
US	17,419,000,000,000 / \$54,629	321,2	9,161,923	596,000,000,000 %3,3/ \$1854	1

Table 17 Power and Capacity of the Actors

I portrayed the results of the calculations in the table17. We can interpret the results as follows; Armenia considers Turkey as the major threat (630 points) and Azerbaijan on the second line. For Azerbaijan, Russia constitutes the major threat (420 points), and Armenia follows Russia. For Turkey, Russia represents the major threat (420 points), and Armenia follows her (196 points). Iran regards the USA as the major threat and Turkey at the second level. Russia senses the main threat from USA and EU. Similarly, both USA and EU consider Russia and Iran as the main threats.

As it will be noticed, whatever the values of the first three factors have, the threat perception only occurs, if the last factor, offensive intentions (OI), has a value. Moreover, the magnitude of the sensed threat depends on the degree of the intention. Therefore, this model proves that the sense of threat is a function of the perceived intention.

³⁹⁵ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries>

³⁹⁶ http://www.prb.org/pdf15/2015-world-population-data-sheet_eng.pdf

³⁹⁷ <http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>, Web-36, European defense spending 2015

³⁹⁸ <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>

³⁹⁹ <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/>

Actors	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Turkey	Iran	Russia	USA	EU
Armenia		AP: M PX: H OC: M OI : H	AP: H PX: H OC: M OI : H	AP: H PX: H OC: M OI : N	AP: H PX: M OC: H OI : N	AP: H PX: L OC: H OI : N	AP: H PX: M OC: M OI : N
Points		462	630	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	AP: L PX: H OC: M OI : H		AP: H PX: M OC: M OI : N	AP: H PX: H OC: M OI : L	AP: H PX: H OC: H OI : M	AP: H PX: L OC: H OI : N	AP: H PX: L OC: M OI : N
Points	378	0	0	210	420	0	0
Turkey	AP: L PX: H OC: L OI : M	AP: L PX: L OC: L OI : N		AP: H PX: H OC: M OI : L	AP: H PX: H OC: H OI : M	AP: H PX: L OC: H OI : N	AP: H PX: M OC: M OI : N
	196	0		182	420	0	0
Iran	AP: L PX: H OC: L OI : N	AP: M PX: H OC: L OI : L	AP: M PX: H OC: M OI : L		AP: H PX: L OC: H OI : N	AP: H PX: L OC: H OI : M	AP: H PX: L OC: M OI : L
Points	0	126	154		0	308	126
Russia	AP: L PX: L OC: L OI : N	AP: L PX: M OC: L OI : L	AP: M PX: L OC: M OI : L	AP: M PX: L OC: L OI : N		AP: H PX: M OC: H OI : L	AP: H PX: H OC: M OI : L
Points	0	70	98	0		182	182
USA	AP: L PX: L OC: L OI : L	AP: L PX: L OC: L OI : N	AP: L PX: L OC: L OI : N	AP: L PX: L OC: M OI : M	AP: M PX: M OC: H OI : L		AP: H PX: L OC: M OI : N
Points	42	0	0	140	154		0
EU	AP: L PX: L OC: L OI : L	AP: M PX: L OC: L OI : N	AP: M PX: M OC: M OI : N	AP: M PX: L OC: M OI : L	AP: M PX: H OC: H OI : L	AP: H PX: L OC: H OI : N	
Points	42	0	0	98	182	0	0
aggregate power (AP), proximity (PX), offensive capability (OC) and offensive intentions (OI)							

Table 18 Quantitative Analysis of the Threat Perception according to BoT

In this context, the chart five below portrays the results of table 18 and visualizes the present-day threat perceptions (who do consider whom as a threat) and its magnitude in the South Caucasus. It shows explicitly that the magnitude of the Armenian threat perception from Turkey ranks as the highest threat in the region, which is followed by that sensed from Azerbaijan. The chart 5 also points out an interesting finding that although they attribute “friend” role identity to Armenia, the EU, and the USA sense some threat from Armenia because the collective identity established with Russia triggers the threat perception of EU and the USA. In this context, this analysis proves once again that the Turkish-Armenian

negative perception pattern (enmity) is the primary source of the perceived aggressive intention and, thus, threat perception. This simulation shows that the negative perception pattern is an ordering element of the regional cooperation and threat perception.




Chart 5 Threat Perceptions of the Actors

Once again, this study showed evidence that the identities and cultural context of the South Caucasus define the dimension and the extent of the relations. One of the results is that there is little evidence for a regional identity and, so, the regional cooperation is too weak. In contrast, regional states follow the pattern of enmity and behave according to the idiom of “*the enemy of my enemy is my friend*.” Thus, the region splits into two camps of enemies and their intra-regional supporters (Web-23).

The study confirmed the significant role of the variables of BoT and offered insights to grasp the essence of the intent construction. Although the aggregate power, proximity, and offensive capacity are concrete material factors, they pose different meanings for different actors. Thus, actors tend to securitize objects and issues, only when they consider the others as “rival” or “enemy.” The actor instinctively thinks that rival or enemy has a potential to attack or harm his/her interests. How do we know that enemies hold potential to attack? As we explained in chapter IV, the Threat Estimation Model (figure 11, chapter IV) explains the process of the formation of intention and threat. The examination of the domestic, regional and systemic relations confirms the logic and process depicted in the model.

The regional states regulate their behaviors in respect to their past lessons, and they construct “friend” and “enemy” role identities for each other. Accordingly, they assess others’ military capacity as aggressive or non-aggressive. In this regard, the following examples particularly

specify the roots of intention that its formation rests more on the historical lessons rather than on actual developments (Cornell, 2001: 395).

Turkey's support to Azerbaijan, her border closure and accusation Armenia of sheltering Kurdish separatists activated the negative perceptions of Armenia on Turkey and confirmed her "enemy" role identities in the eyes of Armenians (Mirzoyan, 2010: 31). The actual actions and interventions of Turkey (Cyprus, the Aegean islands, Iraq) strengthened the fears of the Armenians' and intensified the sense of insecurity (Gabrielian & Nedolian, 1997: 105).⁴⁰⁰ Then, Armenia attributes a meaning to the military capacity of Turkey, which is superior to that of Armenia, as aggressive and threatening. Considering the protection of her sovereignty (main objective security interest), Armenia's state apparatus (type identity) generates various subjective security interests in military, political and economic sectors. Finally, the state apparatus securitizes the objects of these interests and takes extraordinary measures. Thus, Armenia seeks security guarantees against the perceived "*genocidal intentions*" of Turkey.

This example points out that learning from the past incidents generates positive or negative perception patterns. In general, the confrontation of opposite corporate and type identities triggers negative perception patterns, while the confrontation of the similar identities triggers positive perception patterns. However, sometimes, negative past lessons might activate negative perception pattern, even though actors share the similar corporate identities. Based on the type of the perception patterns, actors attribute various role identities to others, whether the other accept it or not. Based on the examination and findings, we can define threat as the function of the combination of intent (I) and capacity (C) that can be formalized as follows:

Threat $f(x) = I + C$.

Similarly, the intent can be formulized as follows:

Intent $f(x)$ = Corporate identity + Subjective security needs + Perception pattern + Role identity + Regional and Systemic setting.

Finally, perception pattern rests on the interplay among the followings:

Perception Pattern $f(x)$ = Past lessons + Domestic dynamics + Type identity

⁴⁰⁰ On the other hand, the political campaign of the Diaspora and Armenia for the recognition of the tragic events of 1915 as "genocide" as well as the rise of territorial claims against Turkey also activated Turkey's negative perception pattern (primordial enemy of Turks) on Armenia and confirmed the "ancient enemy of Turks" role identity attributed by Turkey during the first period.

In this context, the case study explicitly and evidently revealed the decisive role of identities in the conception of the intentions. As we explained previously, similar identities generate similar understanding/view of the world. Thus, for the estimation of the intentions we shall, identify regional and intra-regional identity links. Accordingly, I identified the identity links based on the study of the regional and systemic relations. Figure 13 depicts the corporate and





Figure 13 The Identity Layout

The roles are the fundamental properties of the structure (Wendt, 1999). Our corporate and type identities tell us the position (role) of the others and our position to them in the structure. The figure 14 below depicts the layout of the role identities and their strength in the South Caucasus based on the identity layout illustrated in figure 13 and on the past interactions.

Figure 14 The Emerging Role Identities




The construction of the role identities is strongly related to the existence of the corporate and type identity links and their strength. A strong corporate identity link will generate strong "friend" role identity as long as the past lessons are positive. In contrast, the existence of the negative past interactions will drive to the construction of "rival"

role identity, even though both actors have a strong corporate identity link. The strong corporate and type identity links generate strong friend role identities, while the weak corporate or moderate and weak type identities generate weak friend or rival role identities. The

existence of negative perception pattern may lead to the enemy and strong rival role identity formation, even though actors have corporate and type identity links as seen between Russia and the USA. On the other hand, actors may form weak friend role, even though they do not have corporate and type identity links due to the existing positive perception pattern as seen between Azerbaijan and the EU as well as between the USA.

As seen in figure 14, Azerbaijan and Armenia attribute “enemy” role identity to each other, since they have not any identity link (see figure 13) and they share a negative common past. On the other hand, Azerbaijan and Turkey consider each other’s position as “friend” with strong internalization, since they have strong corporate and type identity links (see figure 13) and they share a positive past.

Figure 15 The Alignment Patterns and Collective Identity Formation



The illustration in figure 15 shows the alignment patterns and the driver of the emerging collective identity (CI), namely, it implies the link, on which alignment and CI are constructed. An alignment can emerge on ideational, material links or both. In this regard, if two actors attribute to each other a strong “friend” role, they will be highly

prone to construct a collective identity based on the ideational link. A “friend” role identity based on the type identity and material link might also lead to form a collective identity as seen between Turkey and EU, Turkey and U.S. and as well as between Russia and Iran. The weak “rival” role identities or material link lead generally to form “ad-hoc” alliance formation based on short-term interests as the cooperation seen between Turkey and Iran as well as between Russia and Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the strongest collective identity will emerge when actors have both ideational and material links concurrently as seen between Armenia and Russia as well as between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

The study leads us to conclude that there are four types of alignment behaviors in general (figure 16):


-First (upper right cell), if ideational (corporate and type identity) and material links both are strong between two actors, they will attribute to each other strong “friend” role identity and form a strong collective identity. It can emerge in the Kantian culture, or 3rd degree internalized

Lockean culture. This kind of collective identity leads to the formation of a security community, in which collective action is a norm. This type of alignment is a true alignment and lasts long despite some flaws in relations. It might have the institutionalized forms such as pact and coalition to exert various alliance strategies. A further degree of this kind of alignment is integration.

-Second (upper left cell), if only actors have a strong ideational link (corporate and type), but a weak material link, they will attribute to each other “friend” role identity and form a moderate collective identity. It can flourish under the 2nd degree internalized Lockean culture. This kind of collective identity generates various alliance strategies, and members might institutionalize their cooperation in diverse forms, which has little prospect to survive.

-Third (lower right cell), we can see the emergence of weak collective identity, when the actors share a strong material link, but a weak ideational link. This type of collective identity emerges under the Hobbesian or 1st degree internalized Lockean cultures and actors attribute to each other weak or strong “rival” role identity. Since it has not been internalized, its motives rest on the realization of any direct material and temporary interests, and thus, it disappears when the threat or motives vanish.

Figure 16 Alignment Types



-Fourth (lower left cell), the weak ideational and material links between two actors generate ad-hoc collective identity. Like the previous one, this type of collective identity emerges under the Hobbesian or Lockean cultures, and actors might attribute to each other “rival” or “friend” role identities. Thus, we can expect an

ad-hoc cooperation based on the material link that aims to achieve a specific purpose over limited time and space.

The empirical findings of this chapter indicate that there are not certain borders among communal, regional, and structural cultures, rather they overlap each other and create intersections. The interplay between identity and culture creates a constructive effect on each other. It is a continuous process. Furthermore, each actor has a different internalization degree of the culture, even at the same intersections. This situation generates various security

dynamics. It means that each interaction in each intersection shall be analyzed distinctly, and we cannot generate iron laws to explain the actors' alignment behaviors. For example, Turkey, which internalized Lockean culture to the second degree, can exercise a different foreign policy towards Europa, which internalized the Lockean culture to the third degree, while she simultaneously can operate in the South Caucasus, where actors internalized the Lockean culture to the 1st degree. Therefore, the prediction of alignment behavior is not a simple task and needs analysis of the many and complicated factors.

Chapter VI: Analysis of the Alignment Patterns

Having analyzed the security dynamics, threat construction and alignment dynamics in the previous chapter, I would like to test the validity of the findings in this chapter. I will test them through the analysis of the contemporary pattern of their cooperation in the region with the help of selected indicators in the following fields: Security, Diplomatic, Economic, and Cultural. This attempt will help me to figure out and analyze the present-day alignment behavior of Armenia and Azerbaijan based on the findings of the fifth chapter.

6.1. Armenia

6.1.1. Russia

6.1.1.1. *Security alignment*

After the independence, Armenia turned once again to Russia to get security guarantees. Depending on the escalation of the fears, Armenia deepened her relations with Russia. In this regard, Armenia was among the first republics, which signed the Tashkent agreement on May 15, 1992, that encompassed a collective security arrangement for the CIS states (Masih & Krikorian, 1999: 105).

Armenia obsessed with the Turkish threat wanted to secure her western border while she was focusing on the Nagorno Karabakh War. Accordingly, Armenia signed an agreement with Russia on September 30, 1992, which allowed the return of the Russian troops to Armenia to defend the Turkish border (Masih & Krikorian, 1999: 105).

The military agreements regarding the stationing of the Russian troops near the city Gyumri were signed on June 6, 1994, and on March 16, 1995, for 25 years (Zagorski, 1999: 70; Masih & Krikorian, 1999: 107).⁴⁰¹ According to the agreement, Armenia would pay the operational expenditures of the base, in return, Armenia would send officers to the Russian military training facilities.

In 1996, the military cooperation between both sides advanced through the provision of the protocols on military projects (Masih & Krikorian, 1999: 107).⁴⁰² In 1997, both sides signed the

⁴⁰¹ "...Russia had approximately 4,300 troops, 80 tanks, and over 100 pieces of artillery at the 102nd Russian military base" (McGinnity, 2010:25, 26).

⁴⁰² "a. Protocol on bilateral military cooperation, b. Intergovernmental protocol on equipment deliveries, c. Protocol on radar and electronic systems, d. Protocol on air defense cooperation, Protocol on training and joint operations, e. Protocol on organizing coalition forces in the Transcaucasia, f. Protocol on local recruiting for combined forces, g. Protocol on military-technical cooperation, h. Protocol on Armenian and Russian unit interaction, i. Protocol on military training and research, j. Protocol on military research."

“Treaty on Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia” (Hunter, 2000: 35). The agreement stipulated further cooperation in the military and economic matters, including the clause that both countries would assist each other in the case of an armed aggression by a third party outside of CIS (Walker, 2000: 173).

After the year 2000, the relations between two nations gained a strategic character gradually (Minassian, 2008: 5). Accordingly, in 2010, Armenia extended the 1995 agreement until 2044 maintaining the same conditions (McGinnity, 2010:27; Cohen, 2013: 68).⁴⁰³ This extension encompassed the broadening of the operational scope⁴⁰⁴ of the Russian troops, the establishment of an anti-missile defense command center in Armenia and advanced the cooperation between two air forces. Additionally, this agreement allowed the supply of modern weapons to Armenia (German, 2012: 1660, 61; Saivetz, 2012: 404).⁴⁰⁵

Presently, Armenia is an active member of the CSTO and considers it a real guarantee of the Armenian territorial integrity. Armenian politicians rely on the support of CSTO, in the case of a renewed war with Azerbaijan.⁴⁰⁶

The other relevant agreements between two states are the agreement of *“Military and Technological Cooperation”* and the agreement of *“Joint Regional Missile Defense System”* signed in 2013 and 2015 respectively.

There are controversial figures on the number of the Russian troops based in Armenia. The number varies between 3300 (Nichol, 2013: 10) and 20000 thousand (Nuriyev, 2000: 57; Minassian, 2008: 11). Reportedly, Russia deployed about 300 tanks (The Adelphi Papers, 2001: 36) and S-300 air defense system (Jones, 2000: 57) on the 102nd Military Base located in Gyumri. Furthermore, she deployed a squadron of MiG-29 fighters and various attack military transport helicopters in the Soviet-era Erebuni air base (Web-8). Moreover, Russian

⁴⁰³ *“According to the conditions in the new military pact, the Russian government will continue not to pay for the base’s upkeep and its utilities, despite the base’s growing strategic significance to Russia.”* (McGinnity, 2010:27).

⁴⁰⁴ *“The original treaty included a commitment by Russia to come to Armenia’s defense if the country was attacked ‘by a state outside the CIS,’ however, the amended treaty included no such clause.”* (Cornell, 2013: 209).

⁴⁰⁵ *“In the basing accord, Russia also pledged that its forces would help safeguard Armenia’s national security and that it would supply more modern weaponry for Armenia’s armed forces.”* (Nichol, 2013: 10).

⁴⁰⁶ *“In January 2013, President Sargisyan stressed that the strategic partnership between Armenia and Russia is ‘the nucleus of Armenian security,’ and that membership in the CSTO also is the real guarantee of Armenia’s security. The CSTO has refused to state what it would do in case of the escalation of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”* (Nichol, 2013: 10).

Army trained 94% of the Armenian Officer in Russian military academies (Minassian, 2008: 11).

Russia transferred numbers of military equipment's to Armenia whether free of charge or for reasonable prices. It was the year 1997 in which the extent of the arms transfer was disclosed. According to the report, prepared for the Duma, Armenia received 84 tanks, 50 armored fighting vehicles, 8 SCUD-B ballistic missile launchers, and 32 SCUD-B missiles in the years between 1995 and 1996 (Masih & Krikorian, 1999: 108; De Waal, 2003: 199).⁴⁰⁷ The worth of the shipment was approx. \$1 billion (Walker, 2000: 172; Tchantouridzé, 2008: 9; Nasibli, 2008: 132; Mehdiyeva, 2003: 283).⁴⁰⁸ Ter-Petrosian explained the story of the Russian hardware transfer as follows (cited in De Waal, 2003: 199):

"It turned out that there were three times more weapons in Azerbaijan than in Armenia. And when we talked to the Russian side, we came to the conclusion-and I managed to get them to agree to this-that we should be compensated for this. And Yeltsin agreed to this and agreed that the balance had to be preserved. No more than a balance. In the following years-1992, '3, '4-we were almost completely compensated for the gap between us and Azerbaijan. And in 1994, we were on the same level. That means equipment, tanks, artillery, APCs, hand-held weapons."

Allison (1999: 42) argues that the large-scale military hardware transfer between the years 1994 and 1996 is an indicator of the Armenian dependency on Russia to maintain the military balance with Azerbaijan.

There are numerous arguments regarding the active military support and engagement of Russian troops to the Armenian Army during the Nagorno Karabakh War. These arguments rest on the statements of eyewitnesses and declarations of Russian officials.⁴⁰⁹ Some witnesses claimed that they saw Russian military personnel as crews of tanks and armored fighting vehicles (De Waal, 2003: 201). As many scholars (De Waal, 2003: 202; Huntington, 1996: 280) claimed that the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Soviet 7th Army assisted directly Armenian insurgents against Azerbaijanian Army.

⁴⁰⁷ The report prepared by the Russian general Lev Rokhlin, member of the security committee, because of the violation of the Yeltsin's directive of September 1993 banning arms sales to either Armenia or Azerbaijan pending a settlement in Karabakh.

⁴⁰⁸ "Armenian defense minister Vazgen Sargsian later boasted that Armenia's defense capability had doubled in the past two years at no cost to the budget." (Walker, 2000: 173).

⁴⁰⁹ "In the wake of Armenia's seizure of additional land corridors in the spring of 1993, the Russian Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev, stated that Azerbaijan should accept the military and political realities and grant the NKAO its independence." (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 196).

6.1.1.2. *Diplomatic alignment*

Armenia and the Russian Federation established diplomatic relations on April 3, 1992. The Azerbaijanian political crisis during the Elchibey's tenure provided an opportunity for Armenia to exploit. Starting from 1992, Armenia strived to revitalize the old relations between two countries (Herzig, 2000: 97). Accordingly, both sides signed a series of bilateral agreements, including the agreements signed within the framework of the CIS (Gabrielian & Nedolian, 1997: 106).

The relations developed gradually and crowned in 1997 by signing the Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia (Libaridian, 2004: 244).

Both governments have a similar approach to the internal problems by putting the focus on security matters, which strengthens their cooperation. They established inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary committees to harmonize their policies (Minassian, 2008: 10).

In 2013, Armenia announced that she would join the Customs Union instead of signing the Association Agreement with the European Union and became an official member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) on 2 January 2015 consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Russia supported Armenia in the international arena on various political issues. For example, Russia is one of the three members of Minsk Process, which mediates the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.⁴¹⁰ The Russian Duma also recognized "the genocide" by passing a resolution in 1995 (Gabrielian & Nedolian, 1997: 105; Bloxham, 2005: 223).

In return, Armenia supports Russia in many international disputes such as Crimea Crisis. Armenia was among the few nations, which voted against the UN resolution condemning Russia's violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity in 2014.

Presently, both sides conduct intense diplomatic relations based on over 200 interstate, intergovernmental and interagency treaties and agreements since 1992 (Web-6). Regarding the high-level official visits, Armenian presidents visited Russia 45 times, in exchange, Russian presidents visited Armenia 4 times between the years of 2000-2012 (Doc-16, 2012:1).

⁴¹⁰ "In a poll conducted by the Armenian Academy of Sciences early in 1996, majority of respondents preferred Russian peacekeeping forces and mediation to the OSCE." (Mirzoyan, 2010: 38).

6.1.1.3. Economic alignment

In comparison with the security needs, economic needs played the secondary role in the development of the Armenian and Russian relations. “The Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation on the long-term economic cooperation until 2010” and “the Program of long-term economic cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation for the period of 2001 and 2010” signed in 2001 and extended until 2020 constitute the core of the economic cooperation (Doc-16, 2012:8).

According to Libaridian (2004: 245), the end of Ter-Petrossian era paved the way to the deep economic penetration of the Russian companies, which created high dependency on Russia. “*The asset-for-debt agreement*” signed in 2001 allowed Russia to control strategic assets of Armenia.⁴¹¹ As a result, Russia took the Armenian economic assets under her control through debt deleting.⁴¹² Russia continued to gain the control of the Armenian energy sector through further operations based on the same tactics.⁴¹³

Russia also controls the Armenian economy through investments that reached to \$4 billion totally in 2015 (Web-5). This is a huge amount when compared with the \$9.9 billion GDP of Armenia in the same year. Almost, half of all foreign investment in Armenia originates from Russia (Markedonov, 2014: 9).⁴¹⁴ The other biggest investors in Armenia’s economy are France (\$727 million), Greece (\$479 million), and U.S. (\$378 million), in 2011 (Web-14). Presently, Russia dominates 25% of the Armenia’s trade turnover on a country-by-country basis. (Nichol, 2013: 13; Doc-27, 2013: 6).

⁴¹¹ According to Libaridian (2004: 289) Russia owned “some of the most important industrial plants in Armenia at the end of 2002 as well as the Medzamor nuclear plant in early 2003” as a form of \$32 million debt payment.

⁴¹² “In 2006, Armenia was demanded either pay \$110 for 1000 m³ of gas instead of the former \$54, or transfer a 45 % stake **in the Iran–Armenia gas pipeline under construction** to Russia and hand over the fifth power unit of the Razdanskaia thermoelectric power station and the republic’s gas transportation system as a payment for cheap gas supply until 2009.” (Suny, 2010: 16; McGinnity, 2010: 16). Gazprom increased its 45% stake to 58% ensuring Russian control over the new pipeline. (Forsyth, 2013: 779). Gazprom has an 85 percent share in ArmRosGazprom (Kiss, 2014: 17).

⁴¹³ The major sales are: Mars electronic and robotics plant in Yerevan, the largest cement factory in the Caucasus, the sale of the fifth and final power bloc of the Hrazdon power plant, which was the only bloc that Russia did not receive after the 2003 Equity-for-Debt deal, controlling the ownership of 92 percent of ArmRosGaz (McGinnity, 2010:17). For a comprehensive study of the Russian economic penetration, refer to Kelkitli, 2008.

⁴¹⁴ Major investments are mentioned in the followings: the acquisition of Armentel, Armenia's national telecom company, Armsberbank's, Armavia airlines (Armenian Airline Company), Armenian Railways. (Web-6).

The capital transferred by Armenians⁴¹⁵ in Russia also constitutes a vital source for the Armenian economy (Interview-VII; 2). The existence of a visa-free regime (not stay longer than 90 days within any 180-day period) between the two states facilitate the trade and cultural cooperation (Minassian, 2008: 10).

6.1.1.4. *Cultural alignment*

The deep affection of Armenian people towards Russia is a peculiar situation. According to the results of a survey, 90 percent of the 2000 participants call Russia as a friendly nation (Mirzoyan, 2010: 51). Historical, religious, and economic factors affect the positive development of the cultural links between the two countries. There are many organizations established to create a Russia-friendly environment in Armenia such as “the *Armenian-Russian Union*,” “*Russian-Armenian support center for strategic and public initiatives*,” Armenian branch of “*Union of Russian Armenians*,” and “*Regional public movement in support of the development of Russian-Armenian relations*.” Similarly, many Russian TV channels and Russian supported websites, as well as papers, operate in Armenia to propagate Russian interests through strengthening cultural affection (Web-7; Doc-34, 2014: 7).⁴¹⁶

Russia also aims to strengthen the cultural links through education. Russia provides educational materials in the Russian language to the schools based on the agreement on cooperation in public education.⁴¹⁷ In this regard, the newly established Russian-Armenian Slavonic University is an important initiative to keep flourishing the Russian cultural dominance.⁴¹⁸ The extensive use of Russian language facilitates the cultural penetration of Russia. According to the survey results of the CRRC, 80 percentages of Armenians speak the Russian language in 2012.

The figure of the Armenian exchange students is also a clear indicator of the cultural link between two states. According to the Report of UNESCO in 2009, the majority of the Armenian exchange students visit Russian universities: Russian Fed. (2174), U.S.A. (436), Germany (321), France (282), Greece (175) (Doc-24, 2009:143).

⁴¹⁵ There are about 2 million Armenians living in Russia that is the second largest Armenian diaspora in the world (Web-5).

⁴¹⁶ “Rossotrudnichestvo” (Russian partnership) organization under Russia’s MFA, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Public Diplomacy Fund after Gorchakov, and “Russian world” Foundation are the most active organizations to boost up Russian culture and language in Armenia (Web-19).

⁴¹⁷ There are around 115 schools in Armenia, which teach in the Russian language (Web-16).

⁴¹⁸ Presently, there are about 3500 students, who study in the Russian-Armenian Slavonic University and in the branches of seven Russian higher educational institutions (Web-19).

6.1.2. USA

6.1.2.1. Security alignment

The security relations between Armenia and the USA were arranged within the framework of NATO. Armenia became a participant of the NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) in 1994. After that, Armenia agreed with NATO on the Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) for military and civil-military reforms in 2004 (Nichol, 2013: 49, 50). As a sign of her willingness for cooperation, Armenia sent a contingent of 34 soldiers to Kosovo under the Greek command (Minassian, 2008: 12). Moreover, Armenia participated in the U.S.-led operations with the symbolic troop contributions. In 2005, Armenia deployed platoon-coy level units in Iraq and continued to serve in KFOR. In 2010, she contributed to ISAF in Afghanistan with about 130 troops (Nichol, 2013: 6; Mirzoyan, 2010: 160; Priego, 2008: 55).

Table 19 US Aid to Armenia, Source: Doc-12, 2014: 1

BY ACCOUNT	FY2013 ACTUAL	FY2014 ESTIMATE	FY2015 REQUEST
TOTAL (in thousand \$)	37,129	27,564	25,740
Economic Support Fund	27,026	20,700	20,700
Foreign Military Financing	2,564	2,700	1,700
Global Health Programs - USAID	2,386	0	0
International Military Education and Training	680	600	600
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	3,009	2,824	1,700
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs	1,464	740	1,040

In 2004, both sides sought to find ways to enhance their security relations. In this regard, they conducted several meetings to plan joint military exercises between two nations (Ilan, 2005: 62). Under the framework of military cooperation, over 100 Armenian officers were trained in the USA in the last four years (Doc-27, 2013: 16).

The USA supported Armenia financially and provided \$223 million between the years 1992 and 2010 (Nichol, 2013: 44) to deepen the military cooperation. In the period of 2013-2015, Armenia received \$8.8 million in total under the programs of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) (table 19).

Presently, the level of the military cooperation is low. Consequently, there is no U.S. military presence in Armenia, and the U.S. did not sell military equipment to Armenia.

6.1.2.2. *Diplomatic alignment*

The diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on January 7th, 1992.⁴¹⁹ After that, both nations signed 17 bilateral agreements on different subjects to enhance the cooperation (Doc-17, 2015:4).

Armenia has a strong and efficient diaspora in the USA. The estimation of the figures of Armenians living in the USA varies approx. between 3.5 million and 6 million (Anderson, 2000: 34). The diaspora is represented by two organizations: Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) and the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA).

The most remarkable success of the diaspora was the provision of the U.S. aid to Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh as well as the legislation of Section 907, which bans the U.S. foreign aid and military hardware transfer to Azerbaijan despite the aggression initiated by Armenians (Moniquet, & Racimora, 2013: 22). The other important achievement of the diaspora was the removal of Armenia from the country list, which is supposed to be the potential supporter of terrorism (Zarifian, 2014: 510).

Furthermore, the diaspora also achieved some success in blocking arms sales to Turkey, despite the strategic relations between the U.S. and Turkey. Diaspora exerted heavy pressure on the U.S. Congress and gained serious support. Accordingly, 46 states out of 50 of the United States adopted parliamentary resolutions that recognize “genocide,” even the federal state did not recognize it yet.⁴²⁰

The USA supported the democratic and economic reforms in Armenia by funding them. In this context, Armenia became a member of the Millennium Challenge Corporation led by the State Department (Minassian, 2008: 12).⁴²¹ U.S. strives to promote better governance and democracy in the country; however, she did not hesitate to criticize Armenia for her violation of human rights and the manipulation of the elections and suspended aid programs.⁴²²

⁴¹⁹ Allegedly, the second biggest U.S. embassy in the world is the Yerevan embassy in term of the terrestrial size (Mirzoyan, 2010: 159).

⁴²⁰ <http://asbarez.com/163544/texas-becomes-46th-u-s-state-to-recognize-armenian-genocide/>, 14.08.2017.

⁴²¹ In 2006, Armenia signed an agreement with the Millenium Challenge Corporation and received \$235.65 million (Doc-17, 2015:5).

⁴²² After the disputed Presidential Election in 2008, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) decided in May 2009 to freeze a 67-million-dollar project due to the abuses during the election (Moniquet, & Racimora, 2013: 23, 24).

The U.S. took a neutral posture during the negotiation process for the conflict over the Nagorno Karabakh, but the political stance of the U.S. co-chairpersons in Minsk Group was criticized in some cases by Armenia.

The voting coincidence percentages of Armenia with U.S. in General Assembly are 39,7%, 41,7%, and 35,3% in 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively, which indicate to a low-level consensus on the world matter (Doc-18, 19, 20).

The diaspora channeled a significant amount of U.S. aid to Armenia through the Freedom Support Act legislated in 1992. Because of the continuous aid programs, Armenia received about 2 billion (table 20) funding between 1992 and 2010 that made Armenia the second largest per capita recipient of the U.S. assistance in the world (Forsyth, 2013: 779; Zarifian, 2014: 510; Gevorgyan, 2011:3).

(millions of dollars)			
South Caucasus Country	FY1992-FY2010 Budgeted Aid ^a	FY2011 Actual ^b	FY2012 Estimate ^b
Armenia	1,951.83	44.42	44.25
Azerbaijan	975.75	26.4	20.87

Table 20 U.S. Foreign Assistance to the S. Caucasus States between 1992 and 2012, Source: Nichol, 2013: 56

Interestingly, the Self Proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic also receives a substantial amount of aid from the USA (Zarifian, 2014: 510).⁴²³ This unusual situation also indicates the power of the Armenian Diaspora in manipulating U.S. foreign policy.

Armenian presidents conducted seven official visits to the U.S., in exchange, none of the U.S. presidents visited Armenia in the period of 1992-2014. The highest level and important visits were the visits of the secretary of state in 2010 and 2012 (Doc-17, 2015:1).

6.1.2.3. Economic alignment

Even though U.S. investors show little interest in the region due to the instability, the U.S. and Armenia signed many agreements on trade and investment between the two countries, such as Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) and a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). The present economic and trade relations between two states are regulated by the US-Armenia Task Force (USATF), which convenes once a year. The U.S. government included Armenia under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program that provides duty-free export privileges to the local and the U.S. investors (Web, 27).

⁴²³ “Budgeted aid has amounted to about \$41 million from FY1998 through FY2012” (Nichol, 2013: 42; Interview-I; 1).

Presently, more than 70 U.S. enterprises operate in Armenia including major American firms such as Coca-Cola, Microsoft, IBM or Dell (Moniquet, & Racimora, 2013: 21). They invested in the sectors such as energy, information technology, hotels, carpet and furniture production, construction, jewelry and textile production, and mining.

Armenia has not imposed visa requirements for the U.S. citizens since 2017, in return, U.S. government facilitated stricter visa procedures for Armenian nationals.

6.1.2.4. Cultural alignment

Comparing the cultural relations with Russia, the present cultural ties with the USA can be regarded as moderate. The main factor regulating the cultural relations is the Armenian Diaspora in the USA. The American TV programs and movies exert a certain influence on the Armenians; however, they are not widespread in the country.

According to the latest data, 304 Armenians study in the U.S. (Web-12).

6.1.3. EU

6.1.3.1. Security alignment

Except for the framework of NATO, the EU does not have a significant military cooperation with Armenia. Some European states signed some special military cooperation agreements with Armenia. In this regard, UK MoD trained Armenian officer cadets, and members of the armed forces participated in various training courses such as English language training. Similarly, German and French MoDs cooperate with Armenia in the fields of military education, military health, and peacekeeping activities.

6.1.3.2. Diplomatic alignment

The relations between the EU and Armenia have been developing since 1996. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (from now on PCA) constitutes the basis of the relations. Thereafter, the intensified relations culminated with the agreement on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (hereinafter DCFTA) on 25 July 2013.⁴²⁴

The Armenian decision to join the Russian-led Customs Union prevented the adoption of the Association Agreement with the EU during the Vilnius Summit in November 2013 (Doc-1, 2014:

⁴²⁴ “The free trade agreement was expected to bring Armenia’s laws and regulations into harmony with EU standards, greatly enhance Armenia’s exports to the EU, and boost Western investment in Armenia.” (Nichol, 2013: 17).

5).⁴²⁵ Presently, both sides maintain their relations under the framework of PCA entered into force in 1999.

The other decisive documents between both parties are the followings: European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) signed in 2004 and 2009 respectively (Freire, & Simão, 2013: 175). Under the framework of these documents, EU adopted Country Strategy Paper (hereinafter CSP) and the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (hereinafter ENPI) which maintains financial aspects to realize CSP (Doc-1, 2014: 9). EU deployed a delegation to Yerevan since 2004 (Irrera, 2008: 195).

Although Armenia did not sign the Association Agreement with the EU, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA) in 2013, EU strives to cooperate with Armenia in particular areas. As a result, the EU negotiates with Armenia to draft a new comprehensive agreement since the end of 2015, which will replace the current EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation agreement (Doc-9, 2015: 1).

France represents EU in the Minsk Group; thus, EU participates indirectly in the negotiation process. Armenia is also a member of the European Council

Armenia was supposed to receive financial aid from the EU under the framework of the National Indicative Program (hereinafter NIP) and ENPI in the period of 2007-2013 amounting to 285.1 million euros. She will receive additional 140-170 million euros in grants for the period 2014-2017 (Doc-9, 2015: 2, 3; Doc-1, 2014: 9; Mayer, 2014: 1694, 1695).

6.1.3.3. Economic alignment

The EU is the major trade partner of Armenia and comprises the 26.6 % of the Armenian overall trade volume (Doc-2, 2015: 8) which is regulated through PCA. At 2014, EU's import reached to \$275 million, whereas her export amounted to \$714 with an annual average growth rate 1.4 and 6.4 respectively in the period of 2010-2014 (Doc-2, 2015: 2). The EU maintains her position as being Armenia's biggest export and import partner with respective 39.4 % and 26.5 % share in total Armenian exports and imports (Web-1,). The table 21 below shows the trade turnover between the EU and Armenia since 2004:

⁴²⁵ On September 3, 2013, Armenia's President Serzh Sargsyan announced that Armenia would join in the Customs Union instead of signing an Association Agreement with the European Union.

Period	Imports			Exports			Balance	Total trade
	Value Mio €	% Growth*	% Extra-EU	Value Mio €	% Growth*	% Extra-EU	Value Mio €	Value Mio €
2004	247		0.0	338		0.0	91	586
2005	514	107.7	0.0	420	24.2	0.0	-94	934
2006	339	-34.0	0.0	478	13.8	0.0	139	818
2007	355	4.5	0.0	605	26.5	0.0	250	960
2008	318	-10.3	0.0	670	10.7	0.1	351	988
2009	161	-49.4	0.0	535	-20.1	0.0	374	696
2010	260	61.4	0.0	556	4.0	0.0	297	816
2011	322	23.9	0.0	645	15.8	0.0	322	967
2012	275	-14.5	0.0	683	5.9	0.0	407	958
2013	261	-5.2	0.0	717	5.0	0.0	456	978
2014	275	5.2	0.0	714	-0.4	0.0	439	988

% Growth: relative variation between current and previous period

% Extra-EU: imports/exports as % of all EU partners i.e. excluding trade between EU Member States

Table 21 EU Trade Flows and Balance, Source: Doc-2, 2015: 3

EU's direct investment in Armenia reached to 0,4 billion euro in 2015. French investors invested in telecommunications sectors, while UK, Germany and Swiss investment went to the mining industry (Doc-40).

The Mobility Partnership with Armenia signed in 2011 allowed the provision of the EU-Armenia Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements which were entered into force in 2014. This agreement improved the mobility of Armenians between EU and Armenia (Doc-9, 2015: 2). In this context, EU Citizens can enter Armenia and stay visa-free for up to 90 days.

6.1.3.4. Cultural alignment

Armenia participated in many cultural programs of the EU, including Culture 2000 and 2007-2013 as well as in the TEMPUS and ERASMUS MUNDUS programs with the involvement of 22 Armenian universities and 31 other organizations (Doc-8, 2014: 8).⁴²⁶ In the period of 2004-2014, approx. 800 students and staff of the Armenian universities participated in Erasmus Mundus projects and Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree Programs. Furthermore, 1443 young Armenians and youth organizations participated in the Erasmus+ mobility projects (Web-28).

On the country level, France has a strong cultural link with Armenia, particularly, in education. In this regard, over 900 students per year visit the French University in Armenia (Doc-8, 2014: 8).

⁴²⁶ "In 2014 Armenia participated in the Tempus programme with 29 projects to modernise higher education mainly through university cooperation projects. 246 students and staff were selected in 2014 for mobility within partnerships supported by Erasmus Mundus." (Doc-9, 2015: 3).

6.1.4. Turkey

6.1.4.1. Security alignment

Turkey does not have security relations with Armenia except the cooperation under the framework of NATO PfP activities.

6.1.4.2. Diplomatic alignment

Turkey recognized Armenia officially on December 24, 1991.⁴²⁷ Turkey was among the first nations, which established diplomatic relations with Armenia. Turkey and Armenia started to negotiate the establishment of the diplomatic relations in August 1992.⁴²⁸ Both sides agreed on many issues except for the recognition of the existing borders demarcated by the Kars treaty signed in 1921.⁴²⁹

Despite this problem, the negotiations went well until the occupation of Kelbajar by the Armenian troops in April 1993. Turkey withdrew from the negotiations and stopped the transit shipment of wheat to Armenia (Libaridian, 2004: 269). Thereafter, Turkey interrelated the establishment of the relations with the withdrawal of the occupation forces from the Azeri territories and, accordingly, closed her border to Armenia. The occupation of the Azeri territories, non-recognition of the existing border, and strong anti-Turkish sentiment in Armenia, as well as Armenian pursuit of the recognition of the “genocide” by Turkey, prevented the establishment of the cordial relations between two countries (Gabrielian & Nedolian, 1997: 100). Moreover, the NK conflict caused to the suspension of the diplomatic relations.

To foster the regional cooperation and stability, Turkey invited Armenia to join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) (Valigholizadeh& Zaki& Barani, 2013:199) and Armenia became a member of that organization. BSEC is the only organization where both states cooperated except for UN and OSCE.

In 2008, both sides initiated a process to normalize the relations.⁴³⁰ After the hard work of the sub-committees,⁴³¹ foreign ministers of Turkey and Armenia signed “a five-point agreement”

⁴²⁷ “The Turkish government, in April 1991 sent its ambassador in Moscow to Yerevan for talks aimed at boosting bilateral ties and showed its inclination to establish friendly relations with the newly Armenian government.” (Valigholizadeh& Zaki& Barani, 2013:198).

⁴²⁸ During that time “Local officials on two sides of the border, mainly Gyumri and Kars, established contact and visited each other.” (Libaridian, 2004: 273).

⁴²⁹ After the declaration of independence, Armenian parliament proclaimed that Armenia no longer recognized the existing borders between two states (Goldenberg, 1994: 53)

⁴³⁰ As a part of this effort, Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited Armenia on September 6, 2008, which was the first high- level visit.

⁴³¹ The following organizations were established to study the problematic issues: Vienna Turkish-Armenian Historians Platform (VAT), Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC),

under the mediation of Switzerland in October 2009 (Valigholizadeh& Zaki& Barani, 2013:199).⁴³² However, both sides did not ratify the protocols in their parliaments due to internal concerns, and the process has been stalled until today.

Due to the non-existence of the diplomatic relations, both sides did not sign any significant agreement. After many years, two high-level visits took place in 2008 conducted by both presidents as well as by foreign ministers (Doc-15, 2015:1).

6.1.4.3. Economic alignment

In the period of 1991-1993, both sides strived to establish economic relations through the formation of the Turkish-Armenian Business Council. However, the deterioration of the political relations spoiled the newly flourishing economic relations. Presently, there are not any official economic platforms, where both states cooperate.

Although the Turkish-Armenian border is closed, Turkey ranks as the fourth biggest trade partner of Armenia in term of import. It amounts to \$231 million in 2014, and this amount makes 5.3 % of the overall Armenian imports (Doc-2, 2016: 8).⁴³³ Armenia imports Turkish goods through Iran and Georgia. In this context, the suitcase trade constitutes a significant part of the trade volume.

In the period of 1992-1993, Turkey allowed Armenian Airlines to flight twice in a week to Istanbul (Libaridian, 2004: 273). However, Turkey canceled the authorization of those flights and closed her airspace to Armenia from in 1994 until 1995 (Valigholizadeh& Zaki& Barani, 2013:199). Presently, several Turkish (Atlas jet and Bora jet) and Armenian carriers operate between two states. Both sides impose visa requirements for the travelers.

6.1.4.4. Cultural alignment

The two nations share many common customs because of the co-existence for more than one thousand years. The existence of these similarities offers the potential to construct new cultural ties. Remarkably, the Turkish TV serials have a considerable number of Armenian audience in Armenia due to these cultural similarities. However, the present political crisis impedes any development in this field.

Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC), and various secret official meetings in Vienna (Görgülü, 2008: 141).

⁴³² These issues are the followings: a. the normalization of relations, b. re-opening of borders, c. recognition of the Kars treaty by Armenia, d. the joint study of the alleged 1915 genocide.

⁴³³ According to the Turkish side, “the current situation is neither an embargo nor a blockade.” (Görgülü, 2008: 131).

Presently, it is estimated that 50000-140000 native Armenians live in Turkey and most of them live in Istanbul (Web-29). The patriarch in Istanbul represents the Turkish Armenians. Due to the secular constitution of Turkey, which prohibits strictly religious and ethnic discrimination, they are treated relatively well by the state and the Turkish community (Libaridian, 2004: 32). The Armenian community enjoys their rights to conduct their religious and cultural activities.⁴³⁴

The Turkish-Armenian Workshop⁴³⁵ and the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) established in 2000 and 2001 respectively, aimed to study the means of reconciliation in line with the mutual interests (Libaridian, 2004: 277, 278) by focusing on the cultural resemblances. There are other independent activities of civil society to abolish mental borders between the two nations and to boost amity instead of enmity (Mc Ginnity, 2010:41). To show her gesture of goodwill, Turkey started to repair and renovate the old Armenian churches and cultural buildings in Turkey (Mc Ginnity, 2010:41).⁴³⁶

6.1.5. Iran

6.1.5.1. *Security alignment*

There are not active military relations between two states. As explained in the previous chapters, the securitization process of both nations is activated by a common perception of threat that brings them closer. These perceptions emerge from the fear of Turkish domination of the region and territorial disintegration of Iran and Armenia. The mutual interests of both sides entail balancing Turkey (Valigholizadeh& Zaki& Barani, 2013:203). In this regard, both sides together with Greece signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1997 encompassing military cooperation as well. This agreement was considered as the sign of the formation of the counter-axis against Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Mirzoyan, 2010: 123). In 2002, both sides agreed on a military cooperation accord, which delineated the exchange of personnel and logistic supplies (Mirzoyan, 2010: 127).

After the visit of the Iranian Defense Minister in 2007, both sides demonstrated their willingness to extend their military cooperation even in the area of developing some joint military projects (Koolae & Hafezian, 2010: 396).

⁴³⁴ The current Armenian press in Turkey: Jamanak, Nor Marmara, Agos, Surp Pirgiç, and Jibit.

⁴³⁵ "Aims at establishing an intellectual and scholarly framework within which the Genocide can be looked at as a historical phenomenon and dealt with as objectively as possible. The Workshop was led by Professor Ronald Suny." (Libaridian, 2004: 278).

⁴³⁶ "Akdamar Church in Van was inaugurated as historical and artistic museum in the presence of Gagik Gorgian, Armenia's Deputy Minister of Culture." (Valigholizadeh& Zaki& Barani, 2013:199).

Concerning the active military support, there were claims that Iran overlooked the illegal weapons transfer to Armenia during the Nagorno Karabakh War (Gresh, 2006: 5). Besides, it was alleged that Iran supported and trained the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which conducted terrorist attacks to the Turkish targets and constituted the core element of the Armenian resistance in Karabakh (Gresh, 2006: 5).

6.1.5.2. Diplomatic alignment

Iran officially recognized Armenia on December 25, 1991, and both states established diplomatic relations on February 9, 1992.

As a result of the anti-Iran policies of Elchibey, Iran sought to enhance her relations with Armenia, and both sides signed the Treaty of Friendship and Economic Cooperation in 1992 (Gresh, 2006: 5). This treaty marked the beginning of the growing relations, which were never disrupted by unpleasant developments in the future years.⁴³⁷ The core of the relations rests on the trade, economic development and political cooperation (Houman, 2012: 390).

Both sides conducted more than 50 mutual visits (at the level of heads of states and governments, as well as ministers of foreign affairs) that reaffirm the importance of the friendships between two countries (Zarifian, 2008:131).⁴³⁸ During the Khatami's visit to Armenia in 2004, both states signed the Treaty of Bilateral Relations that contributed to the further improvement of the relations.⁴³⁹ Two states signed 63 agreements on various areas of cooperation between 1992 and 2012 (Doc-14, 2012: 3).

6.1.5.3. Economic alignment

After the cease-fire between the Azerbaijan and Armenia, the economic relations developed noticeably. Both sides strived to improve the infrastructure, which is necessary to facilitate the trade between two countries, and they interconnected their electrical grid as well as considered the construction of a gas pipeline in 1995 (Masih & Krikorian, 1999: 118; Mirzoyan, 2010: 119; Libaridian, 2004: 243).

The establishment of the Iran-Armenia Joint Economic Commission fostered the economic dynamism. Both countries signed many agreements on the cooperation in the fields of trade,

⁴³⁷ "Even an incident as serious as the accidental shooting down of an Iranian military plane by the Armenian forces of Karabakh in 1994 did not derail the two states burgeoning friendship." (Zarifian, 2008:131).

⁴³⁸ Both states conducted 11 mutual visits at presidential level and numerous high level visits in the period of 1992-2012 (Doc-14, 2012:1).

⁴³⁹ The Iranian president Khatami visited also the Memorial of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 during his visit to Armenia in 2004 (Zarifian, 2008:131).

customs, as well as energy and transportation.⁴⁴⁰ According to some observers, their economic cooperation demonstrated a clear sign of their alignment.⁴⁴¹

The gas pipeline, which was constructed between Tabriz in Iran and Sardarian in Armenia, was officially inaugurated in 2007 by the presidents of both nations.⁴⁴² Both sides signed an agreement for the gas supply, which would be valid for 20 years. According to the agreement, Armenia supplies electricity to the Northern Iran in exchange for the natural gas.⁴⁴³ The gas supply of Iran diminished the Armenian energy dependency on Russia to a certain extent (McGinnity, 2010:16).

Both states continue to improve their economic relations by signing of several memorandums of understanding concerning various joint economic projects such as the construction of a hydropower station on the Araxes River, a new trans-border power line and building of a 470-kilometer railway line⁴⁴⁴ (Moniquet, & Racimora, 2013: 7, 8).

Armenia violates the UN sanctions imposed on Iran due to the intense economic relations. Particularly, there are claims that Iran uses Armenian Banks and financial institutions to circumvent sanctions (Doc-41, 2012:14).

Iran has invested in Armenian businesses for years, and the direct investment amounted to \$110 million, according to official data (Web-3). Iranian entrepreneurs possess many joint companies in Armenia. These companies operate in the fields of energy, transportation, construction, and communications (Koolae & Hafezian, 2010: 397). The number of these companies is estimated around 3000 (Web-3).

Armenian trade relations with Iran develop steadily. The trade turnover, which was \$92.5 million in 2003 (Zarifian, 2008:133), reached the amount of \$291 million that makes Iran the fifth largest trade partner of Armenia in 2014 and 70% of which was the Iranian export to

⁴⁴⁰ The most important agreements are: "the Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (1995); the Trade Agreement (1995); the Agreement on Trade-economic Cooperation (1995, signed by Turkmenistan as well); the Air Transport Agreement (2001); Agreement of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Tourism (2001); the Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Proper Application of Customs Law and for the Prevention Investigation and Combating of Customs (2003)." (Zarifian, 2008:132).

⁴⁴¹ Journalist Emil Danielyan depicted their economic relations so that "*Iran and Armenia see closer economic cooperation as the best way to cement their unofficial alliance.*" (cited in Zarifian, 2008:132).

⁴⁴² "According to their most recent agreement, Iran will transfer 3 million cubic meters of natural gas to Armenia each day, for a total of 1.1 billion cubic meters per year." (Houman, 2012: 392).

⁴⁴³ "For each cubic meter of the Iranian gas, Armenia is to deliver to Iran 3 kWh of energy." (Zarifian, 2008:134).

⁴⁴⁴ The cost is estimated \$3.2 billion and it will run between the Black Sea ports of Armenia's northern neighbor, Georgia and Iranian Gulf (Web-3, Web-4).

Armenia (Web-3). With the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), both sides aim to reach the level of \$1 billion in 2019 (Moniquet, & Racimora, 2013: 9, 12).

There are regular flights between two countries and free visa regime since 2016 to facilitate economic and trade relations.

6.1.5.4. Cultural alignment

It is estimated that 100000 or 150000 Armenians live in Iran. The growing economic and intellectual relations between two countries led to the increase of the Iranian population in Armenia. The peoples in both countries serve to the embellishment of the cultural relations.

There are more than 200 churches across Iran under the Armenian Apostolic Church. Iranian Armenians have right to establish their football, basketball and swimming teams, which are immune to the Islamic laws. Additionally, Iranian Armenians issue a daily and weekly newspaper called “Alik” and “Arax” respectively (Moniquet, & Racimora, 2013: 5-7).

The long shared history created a certain kind of cultural affinity that facilitates the improvement of the relations.⁴⁴⁵ Politicians and elites supported the further development of the cultural ties and took initiatives such as proclaiming Isfahan and Yerevan as sister cities in 1997 (Koolaei & Hafezian, 2010: 397).

Armenia’s Center for Iranian Studies was opened in Yerevan and Isfahan in 1997 to promote cultural relations. Furthermore, both states accepted the mutual recognition of their academic degrees and agreed on the cultural and artistic collaboration in 2002 (Koolaei & Hafezian, 2010: 397).

As a part of cultural affinity, both states signed an agreement to open the public TV offices in Yerevan and Tehran (Zarifian, 2008:136). Furthermore, in 2005, Iran renovated two Armenian churches in Armenia by spending \$50 million.

6.2. Azerbaijan

6.2.1. Russia

6.2.1.1. Security alignment

Although Azerbaijan preferred to remain outside of the Russian sphere of influence, the pragmatic policies of Putin and Aliyev reduced the tension between the two states. As a result,

⁴⁴⁵ “Informally, Iranian intellectual circles as well the upper echelons of the Iranian regime have favored Armenia in part because of cultural commonality, the ‘Aryan’ element.” (Mirzoyan, 2010: 114).

after the meeting between the two presidents in 2002, Russia announced that for the first time, military cooperation would be established between Azerbaijan and Russia.

Azerbaijan refused the presence of the Russian troops on her soils after the dissolution of Soviets. The exception was the Gabala radar site in her northern region. The military cooperation encompasses the leasing of the Gabala Radar Station for ten years with a Russian contingent up to 1500, the arms transfer to Azerbaijan and providing military education for at least 100 Azeri officers as well as modernization of the Azerbaijani defense forces and industries. Azerbaijan relinquished the leasing agreement in 2012; there remains no Russian military presence in Azerbaijan.⁴⁴⁶

According to the SIPRI report, 85% of Azerbaijan's arms imports came from Russia (Web-9) which were supported by the statements of some high-level officials that Russia delivered military hardware worth more than \$4 billion (Nichol, 2013: 11) under the military-technical cooperation.

6.2.1.2. Diplomatic alignment

Both states established diplomatic relations on April 4, 1992. Due to the high tension, it took several years to improve relations. During the Aliyev-Putin summit, both sides signed nine agreements on cooperation in various areas such as administration, communication, and a contract on economic cooperation until 2010 (Strakes, 2013: 52).

After 2008, the relations of both nations have been improved gradually and culminated with the visit of President Putin in 2013. During this visit, Putin called Azerbaijan as the “strategic partner” of Russia (Nichol, 2013: 11). In this regard, both sides signed 166 agreements as of the year 2013, according to the official sources (Doc-4, 2013: 6). The presidents of both parties conducted 36 mutual visits between 2001 and 2012 and minister presidents conducted four visits in the same period (Doc-4, 2013: 1).

6.2.1.3. Economic alignment

Russia and Azerbaijan signed the Long-Term Economic Cooperation Agreement in 2002. The cooperation in the energy sector is at the core of the economic relations.

Russia is a shareholder (Lukoil 10 percent) of the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) and she secured her stake in the development of the vast Shah Deniz 2 field by exploiting the

⁴⁴⁶ “Azerbaijan purportedly demanded a lease increase from the present \$7 million per year to \$300 million”, which was refused by Russia (Nichol, 2013: 11; Herszenhorn, 2012).

deterioration of the Turkish and Azerbaijanian relations due to the reconciliation process between Armenia and Turkey (Saivetz, 2012: 407).

More than 600 Russian enterprises are operating in Azerbaijan, and the amount of their total investment is estimated over \$ 3 billion (Nichol, 2013: 11, Web-30).

It is estimated that more than one million Azerbaijanian immigrants live in Russia.

Russia is the third largest trade partner of Azerbaijan with a turnover of \$1.426 billion that consists of 6.3% of the total trade of Azerbaijan in 2014. Azerbaijan imports goods amounted to \$959 million from Russia (14.3% of total import), whereas her exports to Russia amounted to \$467 million (2.9% of total export).

Russian citizens can visit Azerbaijan without a visa for up to 90 days, and Russia allows visa-free entry for Azeris valid for a stay no longer than 90 days.

6.2.1.4. Cultural alignment

Traditionally, both societies have close cultural relations. Even after 25 years of independence, many Azeris still prefer to speak and write in the Russian language. Due to the cultural affinity, Azerbaijan proclaimed 2006 "The Year of Russia in Azerbaijan" (Minassian, 2008: 15).

Russia is the second important destination for the Azeri students (Doc-24, 2009:143). Azerbaijan allowed the broadcasting of the Russian channels only through paid packages offered by cable TV operators. Despite this restriction, 43 Russian TV channels broadcast through the Azerspace-1 satellite (Doc-31, 2015: 26).

6.2.2. USA

6.2.2.1. Security alignment

The U.S. and Azerbaijanian military cooperation had been developed on the ground of NATO's Partnership for Peace Program from 1994 to 2001. "The global war on terror" increased U.S. interest in the region that led the USA to improve her military relations with Azerbaijan. The U.S.' interests constituted an opportunity for Azerbaijan to ally with a global power in the region.⁴⁴⁷ Consequently, in 2001, the USA and Azerbaijan signed their first security agreement on military cooperation regarding some specific military issues.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁷ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited the region twice in a twelve-month period in 2003-2004.

⁴⁴⁸ These areas were: "technical assistance in air traffic control and safety, military and peace-keeping training, enhanced naval border security, and the upgrade and modernization of military airports." (Giragosian, 2004: 57).

Furthermore, the U.S. started to issue a one-year waiver of section 907 every year in acknowledgment of Azerbaijan's support for the anti-terrorist coalition in 2002.

The U.S.'s technical assistance aims to improve Azerbaijanian Armed Forces' capacity for interoperability, peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and coastal/maritime security (Doc-33, 2011:1). The U.S. supported Azerbaijan to improve her naval capabilities in the Caspian Sea (Nichol, 2013: 44) and showed her willingness to establish anti-missile radar sites in Azerbaijan.⁴⁴⁹

Except for some logistic units operating under the "NATO's Northern Distribution Network" that supports the U.S. operations in Afghanistan, there is no significant U.S. military presence in Azerbaijan.⁴⁵⁰ Occasionally some U.S. troops visit Azerbaijan to conduct joint military exercises in the Caspian Sea as a part of the program that aims to enhance the Azerbaijanian maritime capabilities (Ilan, 2005: 62).⁴⁵¹

Azerbaijan played a key role in the logistic support of the coalition operation in Afghanistan by providing air bases in 2001. Thereafter, Azerbaijan deployed troops in Afghanistan under the command of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in late 2002, which lasted until the end of the NATO-led operation in 2014. Presently, she supports the follow-on mission by contributing to the training of the Afghan security forces.

Later, Azerbaijan was among the first countries, which openly vowed support to the USA in the Operation Iraqi Freedom and provided logistic support as well as deployed troops under the U.S. command.⁴⁵²

The U.S. encouraged the Azerbaijan to become a NATO member. In this context, in 2004-2005, Azerbaijan participated in the NATO's Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) to implement the military and civil-military reforms, which were the major step on the road to a full membership (Nichol, 2013: 49, 50). In this context, Azerbaijan developed intense relations with NATO. She took part in the NATO-led operation in Kosovo (KFOR) from 1999 to 2008,

⁴⁴⁹ In 2005 the U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Rino Harnish announced U.S.' *"plans to construct two radar systems in Azerbaijan: one in the southeast of the country, on the Iranian border near Astara city, the other in the northeast, near the Russian border on the Caucasus Mountains near Khyzy."* (Baban and Shiriyev, 2010).

⁴⁵⁰ *"Azerbaijan has been providing a secure route for 40% of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) multi-modal transit to and from Afghanistan."* (Doc-36, Chiragov & Karimov, 2015: 97).

⁴⁵¹ The U.S. Air Force demanded to establish an airbase on the Apsheron peninsula (Cornell, 2005: 114).

⁴⁵² In 2003, Azerbaijan deployed 150 troops in Iraq and removed in 2008 (Nichol, 2013: 5).

declared units available for PfP activities. Furthermore, she is an active partner in the

BY ACCOUNT	FY 2013 ACTUAL	FY 2014 ESTIMATE	FY 2015 REQUEST
TOTAL (in thousand \$)	16,206	14,281	13,435
Economic Support Fund	11,029	9,000	9,600
Foreign Military Financing	2,564	2,700	1,700
International Military Education and Training	576	600	600
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	1,262	1,226	800
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs	775	755	735

Table 22 US Aid to Azerbaijan, Source: Doc-13, 2014:1

Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T).

In the period of 2013-2015, Azerbaijan received \$8.8 million in total under the programs of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) (Table 22).

6.2.2.2. Diplomatic alignment

Azerbaijan and the U.S. established the diplomatic relations at the beginning of 1992. Thereafter, the relations progressed slowly contrary to the expectations emancipating from the geopolitical thoughts. Despite called by some high-level U.S. officials as an “important partner,” the USA did not hesitate to criticize Azerbaijan for the human rights abuses and political oppression in the country (Nichol, 2013: 4). As a part of low-level diplomatic relations, Azerbaijan and the USA signed 76 agreements on various issues as of 2014, (Doc-6, 2015: 3).

Azeri presidents conducted 13 official visits to the USA, and none of U.S. president visited Azerbaijan between the periods of 1994 and 2012. The highest-level U.S. visit to Baku was the visit of vice president Cheney in 2008 (Doc-6, 2015: 1).

Azerbaijan and the U.S. cooperate in a number of the same international organizations, such as the UN, OSCE, IMF, and NATO. However, their relations are not healthy due to some controversial issues. For example, the U.S. refrained from condemning “*Armenian aggression*” directly in the U.N., because of the Armenian Diaspora’s influence, (Leeuw, 2000: 175). Moreover, Azerbaijan believes that the U.S. follows a pro-Armenian policy in the Minsk Group. However, in the recent years, U.S. slightly changed her policy and supported Azerbaijan’s temporary membership to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) in 2011 (Nichol, 2013: 3).

Azerbaijan received about one billion foreign assistance from the U.S. between 1992 and 2012 as depicted in table 23

**Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to the South Caucasus States,
FY1992 to FY2012**
(millions of dollars)

South Caucasus Country	FY1992-FY2010 Budgeted Aid ^a	FY2011 Actual ^b	FY2012 Estimate ^b
Armenia	1,951.83	44.42	44.25
Azerbaijan	975.75	26.4	20.87

Table 23 U.S. Foreign Assistance to the S.Caucasus States between 1992 and 2012, Source: Nichol, 2013: 56

6.2.2.3. Economic alignment

The U.S. oil companies showed enormous interest in the Azerbaijan's energy sector. The oil and gas reserves of Azerbaijan do not amount to a significant percentage of the world export. However, they play an important role in the energy security of the Europa.⁴⁵³ Consequently, the economic relations were developed on the ground of the energy sector.

In this regard, Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) entered into force in 2001. The U.S.-Azerbaijan Economic Partnership Commission Dialogue established in 2007, which was ineffective until 2012 (Strakes, 2013: 54; Nichol, 2013: 3). Both states did not sign any treaty on taxation and a free-trade agreement. The trade turnover between two states, which was \$296 million in 2006, rose to \$1185 million in 2015.

Through the realization of the aforementioned "Contract of the Century," Baku opened its energy resources to a Western consortium with heavy involvement from four U.S. energy companies: Amoco (17.01 percent), Unocal (9.52 percent), Pennzoil (9.82 percent) and McDermott International (2.45 percent). Over 90 US energy-related companies currently have an office in Baku and a total U.S. investment for Azerbaijan amount to \$10 billion, while the investments of Azerbaijan in U.S. are about \$3 billion (Web-31, Web-32).

The U.S. imposes visa requirements for Azeris while U.S. citizens can obtain a 30-day visa on arrival.

6.2.2.4. Cultural alignment

There is no significant level of cultural cooperation. The most important relationship is the exchange students. In this regard, the number of students from Azerbaijan in the U.S. was 408 in 2015 (Web-12).

⁴⁵³ "The U.S. Energy Department reports estimates of 7 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, and 35 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves in Azerbaijan. In addition, gas was discovered in 2011 at the Umid and Apsheron offshore fields, estimated at 15 trillion cubic feet of proven reserves." (Nichol, 2013: 53).

6.2.3. EU

6.2.3.1. *Security alignment*

EU military cooperation with Azerbaijan is also limited to the activities conducted under the framework of NATO. Due to the UN sanction on weapon sales, EU states do not transfer any military hardware to Azerbaijan.⁴⁵⁴

6.2.3.2. *Diplomatic alignment*

Since 1999, EU has regulated and progress her relations with Azerbaijan under the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Thereafter, the relations were developed systematically under various plans and programs.⁴⁵⁵ The EU and Azerbaijan have been negotiating an Association Agreement since 2010, which does not include DCFTA since she did not fulfill the basic requirements (Mayer, 2014: 1697).

EU follows a balanced policy against Azerbaijan and some EU members directly criticize internal policies of Azerbaijan, particularly, under the context of the OSCE. France, although being a member of the Minsk Group, takes a pro-Armenian stance on many occasions due to the Armenian Diaspora's pressure on the politicians.

EU exercises an aid policy to support reforms in the fields of human rights, media freedom and free and fair elections as well as justice, regional and rural development. These aids are regulated through the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI).⁴⁵⁶

6.2.3.3. *Economic alignment*

Energy sector constitutes the core of the economic relations. Azerbaijan participates in the EU regional energy program called as "INOGATE" (Doc-10, 2014:2). In this context, the Southern Gas Corridor project was launched which will supply 10 billion cubic meters per year of Azerbaijani gas to Europe starting in 2020 (Doc-7, 2015:12).

The EU is the major trade partner of Azerbaijan and comprises of the 47.3 % of the Azerbaijanian overall trade volume, which is regulated through PCA (Doc-3, 2015: 8). In 2014,

⁴⁵⁴ An arms embargo bans the export of arms and related material imposed by either the UN, the EU, or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Arms and related material covers: a. military ammunition, b. weapons, c. goods.

⁴⁵⁵ Adoption of the EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan in 2006, participation of Azerbaijan to the Eastern Partnership in 2009, and authorization of an additional Protocol to the PCA in 2014.

⁴⁵⁶ The EU is the largest foreign donor in Azerbaijan by funding 60 projects. In this context, EU allocated a total of up to €77-94 million for Azerbaijan in the years 2014-2017 (Doc-10, 2014:2).

EU's import reached to \$13207 million, whereas her export amounted to \$3482 with an annual average growth rate 7.1 and 10.3 respectively in the period of 2010-2014 (Doc-3, 2015: 2). The EU maintains her position as being Azerbaijan's largest export and import partner with respective 48.3 % and 27.7 % share in total Azerbaijanian exports and imports (Web-2). The table 24 below shows the trade turnover between the EU and Azerbaijan since 2004.

The EU-Azerbaijan readmission and visa facilitation agreements entered into force in 2014. Since 2017, Azerbaijan has introduced electronic visas for EU citizens that facilitated the visa requirements and procedures for a single-entry visit up to 30 days (Doc-7, 2015: 11).

Period	Imports			Exports			Balance	Total trade
	Value Mio €	% Growth*	% Extra-EU	Value Mio €	% Growth*	% Extra-EU	Value Mio €	Value Mio €
2004	1,292		0.1	1,246		0.1	-46	2,538
2005	2,508	94.1	0.2	1,496	20.0	0.1	-1,012	4,003
2006	5,448	117.3	0.4	1,955	30.8	0.2	-3,493	7,404
2007	7,355	35.0	0.5	1,589	-18.7	0.1	-5,765	8,944
2008	10,663	45.0	0.7	2,061	29.7	0.2	-8,602	12,724
2009	7,546	-29.2	0.6	1,602	-22.3	0.1	-5,943	9,148
2010	10,045	33.1	0.7	2,348	46.6	0.2	-7,697	12,394
2011	15,462	53.9	0.9	2,883	22.8	0.2	-12,579	18,344
2012	14,287	-7.6	0.8	2,994	3.9	0.2	-11,293	17,282
2013	14,370	0.6	0.9	3,729	24.5	0.2	-10,641	18,099
2014	13,207	-8.1	0.8	3,482	-6.6	0.2	-9,725	16,689

% Growth: relative variation between current and previous period

% Extra-EU: imports/exports as % of all EU partners i.e. excluding trade between EU Member States

Table 24 EU Trade Flows and Balance, Source: Doc-3, 2015: 3

6.2.3.4. Cultural alignment

The cultural activities are developing under the Culture program of the Eastern Partnership Program. The EU seeks to enhance the cultural links and contribute to the social development through the EU sponsored various cultural programs. In this context, the EU has hosted the European Film Festivals in Baku since 2010 and organizing Euro Villages that exhibits EU projects in Azerbaijan and introduces the culture of EU countries (Doc-29, 2014: 17, 19). Also, many Azeri students benefit from the EU exchange programs.

6.2.4. Turkey

6.2.4.1. Security alignment

The first military contact between Azerbaijan and Turkey was established in 1992 through the agreement on military education (Walker, 2000: 172). After that, some Azeri military personnel was educated in military schools and training centers (Öztarsu, 2011: 2).

In 2000, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed several protocols concerning military cooperation, including military mapping, technical assistance, and industrial cooperation. In the period between 2004 and 2006, both sides further advanced their military cooperation through

various agreements and protocols (Öztarsu, 2011: 3, 4). In this regard, a platoon-sized Azerbaijanian unit served in Kosovo under the Turkish command to improve the interoperability of the Azerbaijanian Forces.

In 2010, both states signed the “Agreement on strategic cooperation and mutual assistance between Azerbaijan and Turkey” for ten years. The agreement encompasses mutual assistance in the case of a third-party attack, cooperation for the elimination of the internal and external threats to the national security, collaboration on the military production, conduct of joint military exercises, and instruction of army specialists (Nichol, 2013: 15).

Presently, there are not any Turkish combat units deployed in Azerbaijan except for some military specialist and advisors. Nevertheless, both military conduct various joint exercises to improve interoperability and mutual understanding.

Turkey is one the most important military hardware supplier of Azerbaijan. However, because of the international arms transfer restrictions, Turkey provides only nationally licensed defense products to Azerbaijan. The Turkish defense firms such as ROKESTAN, ASELSAN and MKEK concluded several protocols and contracts with the Ministry of Defense Industry of Azerbaijan to product jointly optical equipment, armor, munitions, reactive rockets, infantry weapons and long-range missiles (Strakes, 2013: 53).

6.2.4.2. Diplomatic alignment

Turkey recognized the independence of Azerbaijan in 1991 and both states established diplomatic relations on 14th of January 1992. Turkey and Azerbaijan gradually developed their relations, and Turkey constituted a model for the newly independent state as well as she assisted Azerbaijan in the forming of the Azerbaijanian diplomatic corps.

Turkey and Azerbaijan have intense diplomatic relations. The diplomatic relations culminated through the foundation of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in 2010. In this context, both states signed more than 190 bilateral documents (Doc-3, 2014) and since 2008, 13 visits at the presidential level, ten visits at the head of the government level and numerous visits at ministerial level have been conducted.

Both states are co-member in many international organizations. Turkey sponsored the membership of Azerbaijanian to other international organizations such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. Both states are a member of the Turkic Council and related bodies such as the International Organization of Turkic Culture and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Turkic Speaking Countries (TURKPA) that established to increase the cooperation among the Turkic states.

Turkey allocated a significant amount of economic and developmental aid to Azerbaijan through TIKa (Turkish Economic Development Agency).⁴⁵⁷ The aim of these funds was to foster the development in the areas of industrial, infrastructural development, health, and education as well as support the academic and business relations (Doc-25, 2014:3).

6.2.4.3. *Economic alignment*

Besides the politic relations, economic relations play a significant role in the cooperation of both states. In this regard, Turkey and Azerbaijan regulate their economic ties through several agreements and mechanisms. Both states signed several agreements and established a Joint Economic Commission in 1997 to supervise bilateral economic issues.⁴⁵⁸ The economic relations progressed gradually, and both sides signed an economic partnership program and action plan in 2007 that covers various fields such as trade, free economic zones, banking, and transportation. The establishment of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in 2010 further fostered the economic relations by the elimination of some technical hitches. Turkey supported the modernization of Azerbaijan's economy and infrastructure by the allocation of the Eximbank's investment credit (Kardaş and Macit, 2015: 27, 29).

The energy projects stay at the core of the economic relations. Turkey and Azerbaijan initiated three strategic projects: Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, South Caucasus (Baku–Erzurum) gas Pipeline (SCP) and Trans Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP). The first two projects were implemented and are now operational. The last project is now under construction and aims to transport gas from Shah Deniz-2 to Europe via Turkey between 2017 and 2042 (Saivetz, 2012: 407; Doc-25, 2014:4).⁴⁵⁹

Turkey emerges as the largest foreign investor in Azerbaijan with a total stock of capital exceeding more than \$10 billion in 2012. Turkey's national Oil and Natural Gas Company (TPAO) covers half of the Turkish capital flow to Azerbaijan.⁴⁶⁰ Except for the energy sector,

⁴⁵⁷ Azerbaijan received 54.8% of Turkish direct investments (\$449 million) in 2013 and \$28.6 and \$37 million development aid in 2013 and 2014 respectively. (Web-33).

⁴⁵⁸ The Commercial and Economic Relations Agreement signed in 1992, which was followed by an agreement on the prevention of double taxation in 1994, and by an agreement on investments in 1995 (Kardaş and Macit, 2015: 26).

⁴⁵⁹ "Shah Deniz Stage Two, also known as the Shah Deniz full field development (FFD), is one of the world's biggest gas projects and will increase the gas production capacity of the Shah Deniz field by an additional 16 billion cubic meters per annum (bcma) and condensate capacity by a further 120,000 barrels a day...Gas to Turkey will be transported via the Trans Anatolian pipeline from SCP, which will stretch approximately 1,900km from the SCP and connect with the Trans Adriatic pipeline (TAP)." (www.bp.com).

⁴⁶⁰ TPAO has bought out French energy giant Total's stake in the Shah Deniz field that increased the stake of TPAO to 19% in the Shah Deniz field and made Turkey Azerbaijan's primary energy partner (Web-13).

more than 1700 Turkish companies operate in Azerbaijan that invested in food, textiles, and consumer goods sectors. The Turkish construction companies implemented many projects valued \$8 billion between 2003 and 2012 (Kardaş and Macit, 2015: 40-42).

On the other hand, around 1300 Azeri companies operate in Turkey, and their investments amount to \$1.3 billion in 2011. The State Oil and Gas Company of Azerbaijan, SOCAR ranks as the largest Azeri company invested in Turkey with an investment volume of \$7 billion. SOCAR bought Turkish Petroleum, and Chemical Company called as PETKIM, and it also plans to invest \$4.8 billion in TANAP (Kardaş and Macit, 2015: 41, 42; Doc-23, 2013: 60). It is estimated that SOCAR`s investments will reach to \$21 billion by 2023 (Doc-25, 2014:4).

The trade volume between two nations upsurges due to the intense economic cooperation. The trade volume rose from \$326 million in 2000 to \$3.3 billion in 2013. However, Azerbaijan is not among the important trade partner of Turkey since she ranks as a 15th partner with a volume of \$1.5 billion, which makes about 0.44% of Turkey`s total turnover in 2015. Nevertheless, Turkey ranks as the second largest country of Azerbaijan in term of import that makes 13% of the total imports of Azerbaijan in 2015.

Presently, the citizens of both nations are exempted from visa requirement for their visits less than 30 days. Since 1992, Turkish Airlines have conducted its direct flights to Baku and, today, several carriers conduct daily flights between two countries.

6.2.4.4. Cultural alignment

After the regaining her sovereignty, Turkey sought to strengthen the existing cultural links through broadcasting Turkish serials, distributing literature and newspapers as well as through implementing the student exchange programs.

According to the Caucasus Barometer 2009 survey results, 82% of Azerbaijanians approve friendship with Turks (Web-20). Such high-level ethnic affinity enables the enhancement of cultural relations. Thus, Turkey sought to foster the existing cultural links through conducting a series of summits on the improvement of the cultural relations.⁴⁶¹ In this regard, Turkey feverishly supported the adoption of the Latinized Azeri alphabet in 1993 (Swietochowski, 1995: 214). It is noticeable that Azerbaijan and Turkey support mutually in the elimination of the Eurovision Song Contest due to the ethnic affinity (Blangiardo & Baio, 2014: 2321).

⁴⁶¹ "On March 21, 1993, Turkey sponsored the First Congress of Turkic Peoples, in which delegations from Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and the Turkic-speaking republics of Russia participated." (Aktürk, 2006: 341).

As of 2009, 3050 Turkish students prefer to study in Azerbaijan, which constitutes the third wanted destination for the Turkish students (Doc-24, 2009:143). In return, 3233 Azerbaijani students preferred to study in Turkey and the total number of the Azeri students in Turkey reached 12.504 in 2015 students that made Turkey the top destination for education (Web-34).

Starting from 1992, Turkish TV channels broadcast in Azerbaijan and have a significant influence on Azerbaijanians (Goldenberg, 1994: 49, 50). Although Azerbaijan restricted the air broadcasting of foreign TV channels since 2015, she allowed Turkish (TRT1) channels to broadcast openly and free of charge (Doc-31, 2015: 26).

6.2.5. Iran

6.2.5.1. *Security alignment*

Azerbaijan and Iran have limited military cooperation. In this regard, both states have signed a non-aggression pact in May 2005 (Zarifian, 2009: 393). Accordingly, there is not any military presence of both states in the territory of the other.

6.2.5.2. *Diplomatic alignment*

Iran recognized the independence of Azerbaijan Republic in 1991. The diplomatic relations between two countries were established in 1992. The diplomatic relations are strained due to the problems mentioned in the previous sections. In the recent years, both states accused of each other of harboring the enemies of the other.⁴⁶²

As of 2014, 103 documents were signed between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Doc-5, 2014; 6).

Both sides conducted 17 mutual visits at the presidential level, two visits at the level of minister presidents and numerous other high-level visits in the period of 1994 and 2014 (Doc-5, 2014; 1).

Even though both states are co-member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Non-Aligned Movement, and Economic Cooperation Organization, they do not support each other politically in the international arena. On the contrary, Azerbaijan has pledged to support international sanctions against Iran (Nichol, 2013: 16).

⁴⁶² The claim on the use of Azerbaijan's territory to attack Iran, the sensitive military cooperation of Azerbaijan with Israel, and sponsorship of the religious radicals in Baku by Iran are some of the problematic issues (Koolae & Hafezian, 2010: 398, 399).

6.2.5.3. *Economic alignment*

The economic relations are limited to the sector of energy, customs, commerce, communications, transportation, and construction.⁴⁶³ Initially, both states intended to cooperate in the Shah Deniz Consortium in 1996, however, due to the US pressure, Iran was excluded from the project (Koolaei & Hafezian, 2010: 398; Gresh, 2006: 6). Presently, Azerbaijan exports 10 billion cubic feet per year of Azeri natural gas to Iran based on the agreement signed in 2011 (Houman, 2012: 388).

Due to the strained political relations, investors on both sides hesitate to invest in the other country. Thus, the mutual investment level is low. Similarly, during the first years of the independence, Iran was one of the most important trade partners of Azerbaijan.⁴⁶⁴ However, Iran lost her status in the recent years. As of 2015, the total trade turnover between the two countries reached \$123 million. Presently, the citizens of both nations are exempted from visa requirement for their visits less than 15 days.

6.2.5.4. *Cultural alignment*

Azerbaijan has the second largest Shi'a population in the world, after Iran. Both countries have many cultural commonalities (Doc-42). In 1996, a Faculty of Persian Literature was inaugurated in the Khajeh Nasireddin Tousi University in Baku and the Baku University. Several Azeri students were sent to Iran as a part of an exchange program in 1996 (Shaffer, 2002: 164).

Presently, both states regulate the cultural relations under the scope of the cultural agreement, which provisions are holding cultural weeks, cultural exchanges, including books and films, Persian language classes and the exchange of professors and students (Koolaei & Hafezian, 2010: 403). Accordingly, in 2010, Azerbaijan Cultural week held in Iran and 2011, Iranian Cultural days held in Azerbaijan (Doc-5, 2014; 5).

⁴⁶³ Iran provides electricity to the Azerbaijan via the Astara border since 2006 and both states connected electricity grid as well as signed several customs treaties (Koolaei & Hafezian, 2010: 402).

⁴⁶⁴ Iran was covering 36% of the Azerbaijan's exports in 1996 (Koolaei & Hafezian, 2010: 402, 403).

6.3. Chapter Conclusion

6.3.1. General

Table 25 The Analysis of Trade Turnover and the Ratio between Armenia and Azerbaijan

	The Change of the Trade Turnover (2006-2015)		Share Ratio 2006	Share Ratio 2015
	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Ar/Az	Ar/Az
RU	292%	122%	0,27	0,66
EU	114%	481%	0,45	0,11
US	89%	409%	0,43	0,09
IR	194%	32%	0,37	2,24
TU	146%	191%	0,12	0,09

Table 26 below summarizes the trade among the actors between 2006 and 2015. Based on that, table 25 shows the

change of trade turnover and the ratio during the same period. For instance, the Russia's trade share was 27% of the Armenia's total trade turnover in 2006, which rose to 66% in 2015 (the first line). It implies the followings concerning the effect of the security cooperation on the economic relations:

Azerbaijan is the most important economic partner in the region. The intra-regional actors have improved their trade relations with Azerbaijan since 2006, except Iran (see share ratios). The EU is the largest trade partner of both nations. The EU and the U.S. have much deeper economic relations with Azerbaijan than that with Armenia, even though they have limited security cooperation. The economic relations of Russia and Iran with Armenia reflect a strong correlation with their security cooperation.

Trade Partner	2006				2007				2008				2009				2010			
	Am		Az		Am		Az		Am		Az		Am		Az		Am		Az	
	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.
RU	116	300	344	1182	199	482	527	1004	214	835	583	1350	107	788	745	1071	159	828	774	1145
EU	339	478	618	1199	355	605	1393	1317	318	670	1686	1515	161	535	817	1270	260	556	1453	1343
US	46	80	92	198	33	110	228	269	42	151	6000	266	77	77	1747	264	75	113	1628	206
IR	29	113	296	86	37	141	435	105	25	201	356	97	14	134	90	79	40	218	125	118
TU	0,231	94	388	385	0,790	130	1056	625	0,363	267	626	807	0,887	178	108	906	0,064	211	171	771
Trade Partner	2011				2012				2013				2014				2015			
	Am		Az		Am		Az		Am		Az		Am		Az		Am		Az	
	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.
RU	221	886	1187	1641	278	1052	1000	1378	332	1104	1079	1514	305	1069	640	1314	225	991	417	1438
EU	322	645	1360	2483	275	683	2575	2055	261	717	2295	1852	274	713	2064	2486	305	629	6085	2653
US	92	94	1805	630	88	64	1601	716	101	91	990	379	96	60	746	563	62	50	338	847
IR	94	217	145	160	94	219	87	176	86	187	73	209	84	206	39	147	78	198	33	90
TU	0,327	240	456	1302	0,207	213	600	1520	0,373	210	526	1481	0,159	231	502	1287	1,394	136	304	1171

Table 26 Trade Turnover, Source: UN COMTRADE statistics / Eurostat Comext - Statistical regime 4/ <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance>

O: observer	COE of Council Europe	BSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation	CIS	CSTO	EEU Eurasian Economic Union	NATO PfP	OSCE	IMF	WTA	GUAM	OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation	Turkic Council	ECO Economic Cooperation Org..
Armenia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
Azerbaijan	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
Russia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	0	-	-
Turkey	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
Iran	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+
EU	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
USA	0	0	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	-

Table 27 Co-Memberships in IO's

Table 27 depicts the co-membership of the relevant actors in IOs. The analysis of that table provides some evidence on the drivers of cooperation. The co-memberships in CSTO, EEU, GUAM reflects mainly security concerns while co-memberships in OIC, Turkic Council, and ECO rests on the ideational links.

The table 28 below sums the analysis made in this chapter. It aims to show the scope and strength of the present relations in line with the indicators used in the analysis. Based on the study in the preceding sections, I envisaged three cooperation conditions for each indicator such as full, limited and none. Then, I assigned different points to each condition to define the strength of the relations quantitatively. The table serves us to understand whether the cooperation in the four sectors has the quality of the alignment.

Sector	Indicators	Armenia					Azerbaijan				
		RU	US	EU	TU	IR	RU	US	EU	TU	IR
Security alignment	Military Agreements	+	-	-	-	X	X	X	-	+	-
	Military Presence	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-
	Hardware Transfer	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-
	Active engagement in War efforts	+	X	-	-	X	-	X	-	X	-
Diplomatic alignment	Membership and Cooperation in non-Military Treaties	+	X	X	-	X	X	-	X	+	-
	Political Support	+	+	X	-	X	-	-	X	+	-
	Cooperation in multilateral organizations	+	+	+	X	-	-	X	+	+	-
	Foreign Aid	+	+	+	-	X	-	X	X	+	-
Economic alignment	Economic Relationships	+	-	+	-	+	X	+	+	+	X
	Penetration in the Domestic Economy	+	-	-	-	X	-	-	X	+	-
	Trade Relations	+	-	+	-	X	X	-	+	+	X
	Visas Regimes	+	-	-	-	X	X	-	-	+	X
Cultural alignment	Joint cultural events	+	-	+	-	X	X	-	-	+	X
	Exchange of students	+	X	X	-	X	+	X	X	+	X
	Religious relations	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	X
	Media presence	+	-	-	X	X	+	-	-	+	-
+: Full cooperation (2 points) X: Limited cooperation (1 points) - : None cooperation (0 points)		15+	3+	5+	-	1+	3+	1+	3+	14+	-
Strength of Alignment		31	9	13	2	13	13	7	11	30	6


Table 28 Analysis of the Relations based on Indicators

The results in Table 28 confirm the alignment pattern depicted in figure 15. Considering the results, we can say that there is a strong CI between Russia and Armenia, as well as between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The EU and U.S. tend to cooperate with Armenia more than Azerbaijan, as does Iran. Because the existing corporate identity link facilitates the

cooperation of the EU and the USA with Armenia. The lack of ideational link with Azerbaijan leads to the cooperation only in the diplomatic and economic sectors. Iran has intense diplomatic and economic relation with Armenia, while she has only cultural ties with Azerbaijan due to the attributed different role identities (friend and rival). Azerbaijan's cooperation is more intense with Russia than that with the U.S. and EU since she has a weak type identity link with Russia (see figure 14).

The analysis above offers strong empirical evidence for the validity of the proposition on alignment types depicted in chapter V (figure 16). Namely, it proves the existence and role of ideational and material links. Considering the findings of the chapter IV and V, we can define the present alignment patterns and their dynamics as depicted in Figure 17.

Figure 17 The Patterns of the Regional Alignment



In this context, we can only consider the following cooperation as alignment: Russia-Armenia and Turkey-Azerbaijan, since both material and ideational factors cultivated strong collective identities. The other cooperation models can be regarded as alliances that do not rest on a true alignment. Therefore, these

alliances are regarded as relatively weak and temporary arrangements, which are subject to change over the time and depending on the material conditions.

The analysis in this chapter proves that true alignment occurs only at the intersection, where strong ideational and strong material links joint (figure 16, upper right cell), while conditional alliance formations emerge at the intersection, where strong ideational and weak material links joint (upper left cell). The other forms of cooperation are not considered as alignment due to the weak collective identity (lower right and left cells). Rather, we understand that various types of alliance formations that do not rest on true alignment.

In the next sections, I will briefly assess the alignment patterns of Azerbaijan and Armenia with other actors to indicate the essence of dyads' cooperation, after a brief analysis of each country's behaviors.

6.3.2. Azerbaijan

In the recent years, Azerbaijan followed a more independent and prudent foreign policy than she did in the first years of the Azeri state. Economic prosperity and the improvement of the state apparatus reinforced the self-confidence; accordingly, she enjoyed exerting a more pragmatic foreign policy. An interview partner explained this issue as in the followings: *“I will say that in a very generic form that Azerbaijan is progressing strongly and in many aspects a very good and solid self-sustainable basis. And has a good understanding of its own need and its own way of thinking which does not include running for EU or NATO cover”* (Interview-VI; 3).

Parties	Total number of bilateral instruments	% of “low-level politics” agreements	% of “high-level politics” agreements
RF	151	84.6	15.4
Turkey	145	71.8	28.2
Iran	100	81.5	18.5
USA	52	82	18
EU	19	21	79

Table 29 Major Diplomatic Interactions of Azerbaijan 1991-2011, Source: Strakes, 2013: 51

A sign of this policy, Azeri policymakers, seek multiple options instead of formal bilateral alliances. The table 29 above indicates the multi-vectoral approach of Azerbaijan explicitly. Among the regional countries, Turkey appears as the major partner of Azerbaijan by cooperating through multiple security and military aid agreements, as well as energy transit arrangements. Although Azerbaijan conducted the most intensive diplomacy with Russia, diplomatic activities occur at the low political level due to the lack of ideational link with Russia and dissatisfaction with her policy in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Azerbaijan also conducts diplomacy with Iran at a certain threshold through the means of low-level politics, since they attribute the “rival” role identity to each other. The number of the respective instruments also indicates the low-level engagement of the U.S. in the region. However, Azerbaijan signed high-level political agreements with the EU because of the moderate material link rests on the cooperation in the energy sector.

Azerbaijan and Russia

The examination of the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan demonstrates that they do not represent any alignment quality. The present intensive relations rest on the material factors rather than ideational factors. Since both nations have conflicting components in their corporate identities, they cultivate fears fueling the threat perception. According to the Azeri

perception pattern, Russia is the biggest threat to the independence of Azerbaijan considering her past lessons and material capacity. The present-day support of Russia to Armenia reinforces the Azerbaijanian collective fear orientation upon Russia. On the contrary, Russia fears from the expansion of the Turkic influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, which forms a risk to the Slavic and Christian identity of Russia.

Accordingly, Azerbaijan seeks to balance Russia through gaining western support by offering her vast energy resources, while Russia tries to put Azerbaijan in her orbit. In this regard, Azerbaijan regards the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union as the tools of the Russian Imperialism and, therefore, she refrains from becoming a member of these organizations. In contrast, Azerbaijan supports the new establishments, such as GUAM, to curtail Russian influence. Against this policy of Azerbaijan, Russia strives for the preservation of the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and manipulates the ethnic separatism among the Karabakh Armenians, Talysh, Avars, and Lezgins against Azerbaijan.

If one is not aware of the historical and social context of the region, he can propose realist explanations for the political struggles between two states that focus solely on the material factors. However, the analysis of the social context enables us to realize the true motives of the present alliance behavior, which are the material interests driven by the ideational factors (subjective security interests). In this regard, the lack of an ideational link and the existing of the weak material link prevent the formation of a collective identity that leads Azerbaijan to balance Russia. Both actors may form only Ad-Hoc alliances under particular conditions.

Azerbaijan and EU

The EU considers the following aspects as vital issues in the cooperation: ensuring political stability, economic benefits, and energy supplement. Despite these material interests, EU restrains itself from engagement with Russia in the region. She avoids using of hard power since coercion is not a part of the present European corporate identity, which internalized Lockean culture to 3rd degree in the last 60 years.

However, the EU policy developed under the Lockean and partly Kantian cultures does not operate effectively in the region, where 1st degree internalized Lockean and temporarily Hobbesian cultures prevail. Therefore, Azerbaijan does not consider EU as a reliable partner to protect her independence against Russia.

Azerbaijan believes that the EU follows standard procedures, which are not corresponding with the cultural realities of the region and peculiarities of each actor. Therefore, Azerbaijan experiences many political problems with the EU concerning the issues such good governance and human right abuses. The EU puts over-emphasize on them without taking the special

context of that society and regional culture.⁴⁶⁵ This policy distances two actors, and we can say that an invisible, but sensible unkindness prevails the present relations.

Azerbaijan also disappointed with the support of the EU regarding her territorial integrity and with the EU's low-level effort to realize huge energy projects. According to the elites of Azerbaijan, EU exercises a double standard and selective policy in dealing with the regional problems such as seen in the Crimea crisis. Considering Azerbaijan's lessons derived from the bitter experience of Georgia and the dilemma of Armenia, she prefers to follow a more independent foreign policy with less reliance on the western support.

The EU's corporate and type identities are distinct from those of Azerbaijan that prevent the establishment of an ideational link with Azerbaijan. Accordingly, EU exercises less cooperative policies towards Azerbaijan. In the lack of ideational link, a moderate material link became the main driver of the cooperation. The relation between the EU and Azerbaijan fits the form of collaboration depicted in the lower right cell in figure 16. Therefore, considering the weak collective identity, we cannot call the present cooperation as alignment or alliance.

Azerbaijan and USA

The examination of the U.S. and Azerbaijan relations suggest a phenomenon, according to the predictions of the alliance literature. From the point of the realist view, Azerbaijan and the U.S. share many common material interests that will serve to curb the Russian and Iranian influence in the region. The vast energy resources, geostrategic location, and her western orientation make Azerbaijan a significant regional partner for U.S. On the other hand, U.S. economic and military power, as well as its traditional competition with Russia, makes the U.S. an indispensable partner for Azerbaijan.

However, the course of the relations generated an anomaly contrary to the expectations mentioned above. In this context, contrary to the arguments of Brzezinski (1997), the U.S. showed little enthusiasm to enhance the relations except for providing some temporal foreign aid and security assistance to Azerbaijan after 9/11. The U.S. avoided of forging any military cooperation that would obligate the U.S. to intervene even under the pretext of peacekeeping (Interview-IV; 15). The U.S. reluctance to support Azerbaijan in the NK Conflict initiated concerns and caused disappointment in Azerbaijan, which forced to the foreign policy changes. Consequently, Azerbaijan started to form a more balanced and independent foreign policy.

⁴⁶⁵ "And we are focusing sometimes we are focusing too much on the human right situation." (Interview-IV; 18).

The analysis of this anomaly suggests once again that non-existence of an ideational link diminish the prospect of the forming a genuine and vigorous collective identity formation and, thus, the occurrence of the alignment. Indeed, the non-existence of collective identity also hinders the alliance formation and paves the way to Ad-Hoc arrangements. Furthermore, the propaganda of the strong Armenian Diaspora (interest group) affected the beliefs of the U.S. policymakers and created negative perception pattern that drove them to make irrational decisions (misperception). The ideational link (Christian solidarity) with Armenia prevents the U.S. politicians to exercise pro-Azerbaijan policies that might best serve to the U.S.' subjective security interests concerning the region.

Azerbaijan and Turkey

The relations between two nations portray an example of the alignment based on both ideational and material factors. Turkey and Azerbaijan consider themselves as "*a nation, two states.*" This belief forms the core of the relations and defines the common interests.

Turkey's unconditional support to Azerbaijan in the NK Conflict sometimes harms the material interests of Turkey. Her support increases the Armenian dependency on Russia and fosters the penetration of Russia into the region. However, the collective identity undermines the Turkey's material interests and leads Turkey to exercise policies against her subjective security interests. For example, Turkey ceased the reconciliation process with Armenia in 2009 due to harsh criticism of Azerbaijan.

The contemporary relations between two states cannot be linked to the mutual dependence in the energy sector. We shall consider the intensive relations in this sector and other sectors as a natural outcome of the present alignment.

Similarly, balancing Russia and Iran by forming an alliance with Turkey seems to be the major motive of Azerbaijan according to the realist premises. However, the study revealed that shared "Turkic" identity is the major driver of the relations. Therefore, Turkey's commitment to defend Azerbaijan, which has been stipulated in the 2010 agreement on the Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance (Strakes, 2013: 52, 53), can be explained only with the idealist assumptions. Otherwise, Turkey would not bind herself to encounter with a Great Power like Russia to protect a small state.

The Turkish and Azeri relation is an outstanding example of the alliance formation, which rests on a true alignment nurtured by a strong collective identity. In this type of alliance formation, the emerging problems cannot poison the well-founded relations, and the cooperation is immune to the adverse effect of the systemic changes.

Azerbaijan and Iran

Initially, the energy competition and Azerbaijan's orientation towards the West seem to be the real causes of the present problems between two states. However, a comprehensive analysis reveals that the core factor regulating the relations is the Iranian fear of the increasing influence of the Turkic identity in the region. This fear, as explained earlier, is so strong that leads Iran to securitize it by forming subjective security interests and forces her to cooperate with a Christian neighbor, Armenia.

Even though their corporate identities share some commonalities such as common literature and religious sect, the fear-driven subjective security interests suppress the weak ideational link. Furthermore, the successful policy of Turkey led to transcend ethnic component over the religious component of the Azeri corporate identity that undermined the Iranian influence on the Azerbaijanian corporate identity.

Since two states have a weak ideational link and no material link, they cannot form a collective identity. The lack of collective identity prevents alignment and alliance formation naturally. In contrast, their mutual fears lead them to balance each other. In this regard, both actors may form Ad-Hoc alliances under only particular circumstances.

6.3.3. Armenia

The present situation of Armenia in the international system is referred to as "bandwagoning" according to the Kenneth Waltz's Neorealist theory (Gresh, 2006: 10). However, Armenia's bandwagoning with Russia rests on the formed collective identity, rather than on the fear of Russian aggression as argued in that theory. In this context, Armenia and Russia formed a strong collective identity resting on both ideational and material factors.

The EU and U.S. have weak ideational links with Armenia due to some similar components of the corporate identities. Thus, they considered Armenia as a friend (weak) and formed a weak collective identity. However, the EU and U.S. exercised controversial policies towards Armenia due to the inconsistency between ideational and material interests.⁴⁶⁶ The ideational link, even it is weak, explains why the EU is less critical for Armenia and why U.S. allocates immense financial aid to Armenia, despite she firmly aligned with Russia.

⁴⁶⁶ For example, USA and EU neglected Armenian violation of the western sanctions against Iran and continued to provide financial aid to Armenia in spite of her pro-Russian stance and even she supported Russia during the Crimean annexation. Because of her exceptional position, Armenia was entitled by Huntington (1996: 281) as "*the Israel of the Caucasus*."

Without an identity change, Armenia will continue to consider Turkey and Azerbaijan as “enemy.” The role identity change depends on the alteration of corporate identities under the positive change of the regional culture. However, the level of the present interactions and their scope are too low and narrow that cannot upsurge the degree of the internalization of the Lockean culture.

Armenia and Russia

As studied in the earlier sections, Armenia is highly dependent on Russia in term of security, economy, and energy. Nevertheless, the examination of the relations explicitly reveals that they revolve around the security concerns rather than the economic concerns, which were socially constructed.

For Russia, Armenia serves as an outpost in the region. Her military bases in Armenia allow Russia to exert pressure on Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (German, 2012: 1660). Thus, the Russia’s military presence in the region empowers the Russian sphere of influence, while it curtails Turkish influence. Therefore, Russia endeavors to keep Armenia on her side.

In this context, Russia forced Armenia to abandon the EU Association Agreement by threat. The existence of the pro-Russian elites in Yerevan, the prolonged conflict with Azerbaijan, and historical hatred towards the Turks/Azeris generated ideal conditions for Russia to keep Armenia on her side.

For Armenia, who obsessed with the Pan-Turkish threat, Russia constitutes a protective shield against the imagined Turkish aggression. Turkey’s absolute support to Azerbaijan serves to empower the political position of the pro-Russian elites, who foster historical fears and threat perception. Consequently, the Armenian society constructed an imagined threat with the help of the past lessons and traumas. Therefore, the present-day alignment dynamic of Armenia rests on the socially constructed threats rather than an immediate Turkish threat as advertised by some Armenian elites. These elites sought to cultivate the religious linkage with Russia to assure the Russian protection.

The strong ideational and material links enabled the formation of a strong collective identity and naturally resulted in the alignment of both states. Both societies consider each other as “ally” or “friend.” Armenia’s alliance formation with Russia also represents a clear-cut example of the alliances based on alignment. In this regard, Armenia joined in the various alliance institutions such as CSTO, Customs Union, and the Eurasian Union. The present alliance formation of two states explicitly hints at balancing the threats sensed from the Turkish and Azeri alignment.

Armenia and EU

Armenia regards the relations with the EU as a part of her multi-vectoral foreign policy. These relations intensify in the field of trade, democratization, and good governance. EU constitutes the major trade partner of Armenia, second largest investor and financial aid provider. Despite this reality, Armenia had chosen to join the Russian-led Customs Union instead of signing the EU Association Agreement in 2013.

The Lockean culture (1st degree internalized) prevails in the South Caucasus, but sometimes it experiences regression to the temporary Hobbesian conditions. The non-cooperative security paradigm of the region prioritizes the security concerns rather than the economic concerns. In this regard, security-centric and threat-driven decision-making unit of Armenia cannot generate rational behavior. The choice of Armenia explicitly demonstrates the validity of this argument, since she preferred security (against an imagined threat) to the concrete economic and political benefits that might help to improve democracy, to ensure economic stability and to offer assets for good governance.⁴⁶⁷ EU's immense economic and political power would also guarantee indirectly Armenian security in the long-term, as it provided a protective shield for the Baltic states against Russia.

As mentioned before, some similarities of the corporate identity with the EU enable the establishment of a moderate ideational link between two actors. However, they do not have a significant material link. Under these conditions, both states consider each other as a friend (role identity) and may form a moderate collective identity (figure 17) that does not lead to alignment and alliance formation.

Armenia and USA

Although Armenia has little to offer U.S. to secure U.S. material interests in the region, the U.S. provided immense political and financial support to Armenia when compared with that to Azerbaijan. She became the largest donor of Armenia; even she has little prospect of cooperation with Armenia.

The main force driving U.S. to aid Armenia is the Armenian Diaspora. The Diaspora owns certain level of financial power and has strong relations with U.S. policymakers. Therefore, they can influence them in the foreign policy-making on the South Caucasus. As in the case of the Freedom Support Act (Section 907), sometimes U.S. politicians might decide contrary to

⁴⁶⁷ "While it might have been possible for Armenia to bear the economic losses caused by aborting the AA/DCFTA with the EU, Yerevan could not risk the loss of security by rejecting their strategic partner Russia, which is their security guarantor." (Doc-36, Paul: 80).

the material interests of the country. How can Armenian Diaspora easily affect the decisions of the U.S. policymakers that are contradicting U.S. interests? We can explain this anomaly through the role of beliefs (worldview) and perceptions of the decision makers. The narratives on the so-called “genocide” also affected the belief system of the politicians, who are prone to internalize such stories due to the cultural similarity and religious solidarity with Armenia. Accordingly, they developed a negative perception pattern. This situation demonstrates once again the role of the ideational factors in the making of the foreign policy.

Like the EU, U.S. also aims to pull Armenia to the western camp by employing soft power. However, in this part of the world, due to the culture, states need concrete security assurance rather than assistance on secondary issues like democratization and good governance. Therefore, the regional culture constrains the further development of the relations. Consequently, Armenia prefers to collaborate with Russia, which offers tangible security assurance.

The similar components of their corporate identities create a moderate ideational link that enables the attribution of the moderate “friend” identities to each other. Thus, both actors formed a moderate collective identity that offers little prospect for alignment and alliance formation.

Armenia and Turkey

Both states almost have no relations except some indirect trade (through third countries) relations. This situation reflects the mutual threat perception, which nourished by traumas, hatred, and fears.

The bitter experiences created a negative perception pattern that amplifies threat perception with the help of the prevailing “self-help” security paradigm in the region. The non-existence of ideational and material links leads to consider the other as a strong “enemy” and prevent the construction of a collective identity in any form. Accordingly, Armenia, who’s material capacity is not able to cope with the Turkey’s material capacity, seeks an ally to balance the sensed threat from Turkey.

Armenia and Iran

The relations of both actors also constitute a peculiar example, considering the purpose of this study. It is expected that both countries should have complicated relations due to the radical religious, corporate identity of Iran (Houman, 2012: 390). However, the outcome contradicts this expectation, since both countries have strong diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations. At first sight, the advocates of the realist theories would explain this fact through the Waltzian-

balancing concept. However, a deep analysis conducted in the earlier sections discloses the role of the ideational factors shaped by the past lessons, fears, and hatreds in the conduct of the foreign policy.

Both states perceive a similar threat from Turkey and Azerbaijan. The fear from the possible Turkish dominance of the region leads actors to cooperate for the curbing of the Turkish influence. This sense of threat embedded into their culture and became a part of their corporate identity. Furthermore, the autocratic state system of both actors generates similar type identities. Consequently, both actors had a weak ideational and material links based on the weak corporate and moderate type identity and attributed moderate “friend” role identities to each other that led to the formation of a moderate collective identity (figure 17). In this context, the collective identity resulted in the formation of the present alliance without resting on alignment.

6.3.4. Implications

The variables of BoT Theory rest on the following threat formula: perceived intentions + capacity (aggregate power + offensive capabilities + geographic proximity). However, Walt did not explain how the intent is constructed. To fill this gap in his theory, I proposed the following formula of intent in chapter V with the help of inferences derived from the case study.

Intent f (x) = Corporate identity + Subjective security needs + **Perception pattern** + Role identity + Regional and Systemic setting.

I also underlined the decisive role of perception pattern in the construction of intent by defining it with the following formulation:

Perception Pattern f (x) = Past lessons + Domestic dynamics + Type identity

It has been already explained in chapter V the construction of the threat perception by the actors according to the premises of the BoT and its relationship with identities. The findings of this chapter on the alignment pattern confirm the arguments chapter V. In this context, the tables 30 and 31 have been prepared to sum up all the relevant dynamics of alignment and the alliance formation as well as the components of the intent derived from the formulas above (except Subjective security needs). The tables also present an analytical framework for the analysis of the dynamics of the alignment and threat construction. The blue color indicates the components of intent while the brown color represents the components of perception pattern. In this context, the following inferences can be drawn from the analysis of table 30 on Azerbaijan:

- A true alignment requires strong ideational and material links. A true alignment nullifies threat perception (Turkey).

- A positive perception pattern enables the formation of Ad-Hoc collective identity and temporary Ad-Hoc alliances; even though the actors do not have any identity links (EU and U.S.).

Table 30 The Dynamics of Threat Perception and Alignment of Azerbaijan

		Ar	Tur	Ir	Ru	EU	USA
Identity Link		CI: - TI: -	CI:Strong TI:Strong	CI:Weak TI:-	CI:- TI:Weak	CI:- TI: -	CI:- TI: -
Role Identity		E:Strong	F:Strong	R: Strong	R: Moderate	F: Weak	F: Weak
Alignment/ Alliance Dynamic		ID : - M : -	ID : Strong M : Strong	ID : - M : -	ID : - M : + Ad-Hoc	ID : - M : + Ad-Hoc	ID : - M : + Ad-Hoc
Collective Identity		-	Strong	Ad-Hoc	Ad-Hoc	Ad-Hoc	Ad-Hoc
Alignment		-	+	-	-	-	-
Alliance Formation		-	+/Formal	Ad-Hoc	Ad-Hoc	Ad-Hoc	Ad-Hoc
Perception Pattern	Past Lesson s	Fear : ++ Enmity: ++ Hatred: ++	Fear : - Enmity: - Hatred: -	Fear : + Enmity: + Hatred: -	Fear : + Enmity: + Hatred: -	Fear : - Enmity: - Hatred: -	Fear : - Enmity: - Hatred: -
	Domestic Dynamics	Nationalism : Primordial/ Weak chauvinist/ Symbolic Ethnic coherence : Fragile Interest groups : Leader centric/ Oil companies State apparatus : Moderate/Corrupt Political leadership : Authoritarian Political orientation : Turkey/ Balanced/ Ideological heterogeneity Religion/ affiliation : Weak Public discourses : Anti-Armenia					
	Type Identity	Secular, Not free Democracy, Dominant Military, Leader centric					
Aggregate power		L	H	H	H	H	H
Offensive capability		M	M	M	H	H	M
Geographic proximity		H	M	H	H	L	M
RSP		Hobbesian	Lockean 3 rd Degree	Lockean 1 st Degree	Lockean 1 st Degree	Lockean 2 nd Degree	Lockean 2 nd Degree
SSP		Lockean 2 nd Degree					
Offensive Intention		H	N	L	M	N	N
Threat perception		H	N	L	M	N	N
Political Outcome		Revision	Integration	Balance	Balance	Orientation	Orientation
CI: Corporate Identity TI: Type Identity E: Enemy R: Rival F: Friend ID: Ideational M: Material N: None L: Low M: Moderate H: High RSP: Regional Security Paradigm SSP: Systemic Security Paradigm							

- Negative perception pattern increases the perception of offensive intention, even though the actors have type identity links (Russia).

- In contrast, positive perception pattern diminishes the threat perception of high aggregate power and offensive capability, even though the actors do not have identity links (EU and U.S.).
- The regional security paradigm affects the operation of the perception patterns. The lower degree of cultural internalization means the formation of aggressive intention at a higher level (Armenia and Iran).
- Political behavior depends on the strength of collective identity and threat perception. The non-existence of identity links and existence of negative perception pattern initiate high-level threat perception that drives to the generation of the revisionist policies (against Armenia), while strong identity links and existence of positive perception pattern reduce the threat perception that drives to integration (Turkey) and orientation (EU and U.S.).

The table 31 below also analyzes the alignment and threat perception of Armenia with the same logic. The inferences are similar to those derived from table 30. In addition to them, we can infer the followings from the analysis of table 31 on Armenia:

- Past lessons are the most decisive factor in the construction of the perception pattern, therefore in the formation of offensive intention (Turkey and Azerbaijan).
- Identity is the major driver of the alignment (with Russia), not the threat perception (from Turkey and Azerbaijan), but the threat perception is the strongest driver of the alliance formation (with Iran).
- Power imbalance becomes a factor of threat estimation and leads to balancing, if there exists negative perception pattern (Turkey), in contrast, the existence of the positive perception patterns excludes material imbalances from threat estimation (Iran).
- Domestic dynamics and type identity play a significant role in the interpretation of the past lessons in the transformation of them into actual policy (Russia).
- The ideological views of the ruling elites play a less significant role in the alignment; however, their ideas are very effective in the formation of role identity and alliance formation as well as in the arrangements of Ad-Hoc relations, since they shape short and mid-term foreign policy behaviors.
- Similar domestic setting and type identity increase the likelihood of alliance formation (Russia and Iran).
- Ideology becomes an important aspect in alliance formation if states share a positive perception pattern.
- System and regional culture affect the type of alliance formation as well as its parameters.

		Az	Tur	Ir	Ru	EU	USA
Identity Link		CI: - TI: -	CI: - TI: -	CI:Weak TI:Moderate	CI:Strong TI:Strong	CI:Moderate TI: -	CI: Moderate TI: -
Role Identity		E:Strong	E:Strong	F: Moderate	F: Strong	F: Moderate	F: Moderate
Alignment/ Alliance Dynamic		ID : - M : -	ID : - M : -	ID : Weak - M : Weak	ID :Strong M :Strong	ID :Moderate M : -	ID : Moderate M : -
Collective Identity		-	-	Weak	Strong	Moderate	Moderate
Alignment		-	-	-	+	-	-
Alliance Formation		-	-	+/- Informal	+/-Formal	-	-
Perception Pattern	Past Lessons	Fear : + Enmity: + Hatred: +	Fear : + Enmity: + Hatred: +	Fear : - Enmity: - Hatred: -	Fear : - Enmity: - Hatred: -	Fear : - Enmity: - Hatred: -	Fear : - Enmity: - Hatred: -
	Domestic Dynamics	Nationalism : Primordial/Strong chauvinist/ Symbolic Ethnic coherence : Firm Interest groups : Karabakh clan/ Pro-Russian politicians / Diaspora State apparatus : Moderate/Corrupt Political leadership : Repressive Political orientation : Russia/ Complementary/ Ideological heterogeneity Religion/ affiliation : Strong/ Russia Public discourses : Anti-Turkish					
	Type Identity	Partly free Democracy, Supremacy of the Nagorno-Karabakh clan, Influence of Diaspora and religion, Military intervention in the domestic politics, Past-oriented political leadership					
Aggregate power		M	H	H	H	H	H
Offensive capability		M	M	M	H	M	H
Geographic proximity		H	H	H	M	M	L
RSP		Hobbesian	Lockean 1 st Degree	Lockean 2 nd Degree	Lockean 3 rd Degree	Lockean 2 nd Degree	Lockean 2 nd Degree
SSP		Lockean 2 nd Degree					
Offensive Intention		H	H	N	N	N	N
Threat perception		H	H	N	N	N	N
Political Outcome		Balance	Balance	Cooperation	Alignment	-	-
CI: Corporate Identity TI: Type Identity E: Enemy R: Rival F: Friend ID: Ideational M: Material N: None L: Low M: Moderate H: High RSP: Regional Security Paradigm SSP: Systemic Security Paradigm							

Table 31 The Dynamics of Threat Perception and Alignment of Armenia

- Geographic proximity exerts little effect on alignment; however, it becomes a factor in alliance formation if only there exists a negative perception pattern.
- As Walt (1987:41-44) claimed, foreign aid and penetration play a negligible role in alliance formation (EU-Armenia, U. S. -Armenia).

- Armenian alliance formation with Russia considered as Bandwagoning, however, it does not rest on the motive of vulnerability or fear from aggression as argued by Walt (1987:173). In fact, it is an alignment constructed on ideational and material links.

To conclude:

As Weaver (2011:10) contends, the South Caucasus is an example of a “*mini security complex*.” This study showed that balancing behaviors are at work in this complex. The regional actors strive to aggregate their powers against a sensed threat as expressed in Walt’s theory⁴⁶⁸ by gaining the support of the intra-regional actors. In this context, GUAM is an outstanding example of the balancing behavior at the regional level with the intrusion of the system level dynamics. Regional members of GUAM aspire to balance Russia with the indirect support of Turkey and non-regional actors such as the U.S. and EU. Therefore, the analysis confirmed the proposition that a better explanation of alignment and alliance formation needs analysis conducted at two levels: system and regional levels (Hansen, 2000: 95).

The analysis in this chapter also confirmed Walt’s proposition on the role of threat perception in alliance formation. However, this analysis offers some insights to fill the gap in BoT Theory that does not explain where the threat comes. As explained in the tables 30, 31, the threat is a construction, and its generation is more linked to the ideational factors rather than the material factors. In this regard, the similar perception patterns and subjective security interests led to the construction of the compatible threat perceptions (increasing Turkish influence and the western penetration into the region) by Armenia, Iran, and Russia. The common threat forged common security interest, which aims to curtail Turkish and western influences. It paved the way for the formation of an informal alliance of these states called as “*great axis*.”

On the other hand, Turkey, the U.S., and Azerbaijan sense similar threat that is the retake of the region by Russia due to their negative perception pattern on Russia, Iran, and Armenia. Consequently, these actors together with Georgia sought to form a “*horizontal or Atlantis axis*” against the axis of Russia, Armenia, and Iran (Zarifian, 2008:138; Mirzoyan, 2010: 122; Cornell, 2001: 398).

We learned that the traumatic past lessons, conflicting identities, and non-cooperative regional security paradigm generate negative perception patterns and depending on the identity links, actors construct threat at various levels. Accordingly, politicians tend to articulate subjective security interests usually by using the materialist pretext to disguise the underlying ideational

⁴⁶⁸ According to Priego (2008: 57), Georgia has adopted a balancing strategy, whereas Armenia and Azerbaijan have chosen different sorts of bandwagoning behaviors.

interests since they must behave diplomatically. Remarkably, this political tactic leads IR scholars to make wrong assumptions about the true motives of the alliance behaviors. Accordingly, the ill-advised realist and neo-realist scholars, who have limited knowledge of the social context, fail to see the essence of the problem and the true dynamics of the alliance behaviors. For example, most of the realist scholars will tend to assess the Russian military bases in Armenia as a vehicle of systemic balancing strategy against the West. However, a scholar acknowledging historical and social context would explain it through the long-lasting rivalry between Russia and Turkey based on the ideational factors.

As we explained in the earlier sections, different degree internalized sorts of the Hobbesian and Lockean cultures prevail the South Caucasus. Thus, the mutual mistrusts, egocentricity, and self-action constitute the core of the social conduct in the region. Consequently, societies prioritize reprisal, inexorable enmity, lasting hatred, and repressive policies instead of social welfare, collective action, democracy, and human rights. Also, this kind of culture hampers every effort to form various collective identities. This logic paved the way for the external intervention and manipulation of the inter-regional problems.

Chapter VII: Conclusions and main findings

Based on the central research question, the objective of this dissertation was to study the alignment motives of the states through refining of the Walt's Balance of Threat Theory (BoT). I employed the premises of the Wendtian constructivism. As a secondary tool, I used the security concept of Buzan and Waever to conduct a regional security analysis and also benefited from the propositions of Reiter on the past lessons to analyze the effect of the formative events in the two periods.

The weakness of BoT lies in its inability to explain the construction of the intent and threat. To overcome this shortcoming, in the first step, I studied the factors, which might be effective in the process, with the help of the approaches mentioned above to gain insights. Then, I conducted a comparative case study under the theoretical frame given in chapter IV to derive empirical data and infer some implications. Furthermore, I examined the validity of the inferences by studying the present security constellation of the actors (chapter V) and contemporary alignment behaviors (chapter VI).

I presented the empirical findings at the end of each chapter, i.e., III, IV, V, and VI. Therefore, this last section will synthesize these findings in response to the central research question. An accurate analysis needs a comprehensive conduct by considering all factors relevant to the subject of the study.

In this context, we should realize that the present structure (system or culture) differs from the time when the core premises of realist alliance theories were developed. Because the norm of sovereignty became an organizing principle of IR, the military power is still significant, but it lost its predominant role in IR, the deep internalization of the Lockean culture paved the way to the emergence of local security communities. Accordingly, the major theories fail to explain the effect of the contemporary radical changes on the alliance formation. In this regard, the Balance of Threat Theory, the most promising theory, also fails to capture the essence of the alliance formation and alignment, since it ignores the ideational elements, even though it deals with the cognitive issues such as intent.

Framing the change in IR and the flaws of the present theories drove the study to employ a holistic approach that aims to combine material and ideational factors. The case study revealed that the past interactions, culture, actor's identities, domestic settings, decision-making units, cooperation and security paradigms play the major role in the formation of our perception patterns and the estimation of others' intent.

Finally, I strived to develop an analytical framework that combines material and ideational factors to conduct a comprehensive examination. I will explain these main findings in detail in the next paragraphs:

7.1. The System is under the Effect of the Constant Change

The international system is evolving steadily as most of the scholars agree (e.g., Schroeder, 1994; Wendt, 1992, 1999). The transformation rests on various dynamics such as the downsized number of states and increased human population.⁴⁶⁹ Tang (2010: 37, 38) studies the decrease of the states' death in five major phases as depicted in table 33: 1450-1648, 1648-1815, 1815-1919, 1919-45, and 1945-95.

Period	1450–1648	1648–1815	1815–1919	1919–45	1945–95
Number of states at the beginning of each period	~581	~260	~63	30	25
Number of states at the end of each period	~260	~63	30	25	35
Years of the period	199	168	105	27	51
Number of states eliminated in the period	~321	~197	33	5	4 ^a
Rate of state death (states eliminated per century)	~161	~117	~31	~19	ND
Average time (years) needed to eliminate a state	~0.62	~0.85	~3.18	5.4	ND

^aThese state deaths have actually led to an increase in the number of states in the system. As such, it is not really meaningful to calculate rate of state death for this period.

Table 32 Pattern of state deaths in post-Roman Empire Europe, 1450-1995 AD, Source: Tang, 2010, 38

The table explicitly shows that the option of conquest is no longer on the agenda of the powerful states because of their negative experiences with it. Ensuring security through defensive strategies became prevalent through positive learning among states.

Stephen Pinker (2011) provides convincing data that societies changed their policies from the reliance on violence to the reliance on compromise.⁴⁷⁰ The findings of the Human Security Project (Doc-38, 2013) support Pinker and confirm the decline of the international wars. Furthermore, Global Peace Index Report (Doc-37, 2016: 33-35) also proves the fact that the

⁴⁶⁹ Tang (2010: 36) informs us that there were 600000 independent political entities in 1000 BC, today, that number decreased to about 200.

⁴⁷⁰ Pinker (2011) writes that 15% ancient people met with a violent death; it was 2% in the 16th century and the percentage of the world's population died in battle decreased to around 0.7%.

conflict between states (external conflict) shifted to the conflict within states (internal conflict) and territory changes through conquest declined radically as depicted in the figures 18, 19, and 20 respectively.

These data offer strong evidence for the proposition that *“the world has become more peaceful and also that direct conflicts between nations are becoming much rarer”* (Doc-37, Global




Figure 18 The number of the Countries in an internal or external Conflict, 1500-2000

Peace Index Report, 2016: 33-35). The emergence of the international and non-governmental organizations also contributed to the change of the logic of the

international system that ensured the implementation of the sovereignty norm.




Figure 19 Conflicts by Type




Figure 20 Territorial Changes by Type

(Source: Doc-37, Global Peace Index Report, 2016: 33, 34, 35)

In this context, the negative and positive learning of states from the past lessons served in the construction of two institutions: sovereignty and less assertive nationalism (Tang, 2010: 42).

Based on my following central research question, the objective of this dissertation was to study the alignment motives of the states through refining of the Walt's Balance of Threat Theory (BoT). I employed the premises of the Wendtian constructivism. As a secondary tool, I used

the security concept of Buzan and Waever to conduct a regional security analysis and also benefited from the propositions of Reiter on the past lessons to analyze the effect of the formative events in the two periods.

The weakness of BoT lies in its inability to explain the construction of the intent and threat. To overcome this shortcoming, in the first step, I studied the factors, which might be effective in the process, with the help of the approaches mentioned above to gain insights. Then, I conducted a comparative case study under the theoretical frame given in chapter IV to derive empirical data and infer some implications. Furthermore, I examined the validity of the inferences by studying the present security constellation of the actors (chapter V) and contemporary alignment behaviors (chapter VI).

I presented the empirical findings at the end of each chapter, i.e., III, IV, V, and VI. Therefore, this last section will synthesize these findings in response to the central research question. An accurate analysis needs a comprehensive conduct by considering all factors relevant to the subject of the study.

In this context, we should realize that the present structure (system or culture) differs from the time when the basic premises of realist alliance theories were developed. Because the norm of sovereignty became an organizing principle of IR, the military power is still important, but it lost its predominant role in IR, the deep internalization of the Lockean culture paved the way to the emergence of local security communities. Accordingly, the major theories fail to explain the effect of the contemporary radical changes on the alliance formation. In this regard, the Balance of Threat Theory, the most promising theory, also fails to capture the essence of the alliance formation and alignment, since it ignores the ideational elements, even though it deals with the cognitive issues such as intent.

Framing the change in IR and the flaws of the present theories drove the study to employ a holistic approach that aims to combine material and ideational factors. The case study revealed that the past interactions, culture, actor's identities, domestic settings, decision-making units, cooperation and security paradigms play the major role in the formation of our perception patterns and the estimation of others' intent.

Finally, I strived to develop an analytical framework that combines material and ideational factors to conduct a comprehensive examination. I will explain these main findings in detail in the next paragraphs:

7.1.1. Sovereignty

The state is the central element of the international politics since it has been recognized as the supreme power within a defined juridical border (Barkin & Cronin, 1994: 111). Thus, the legislation of that power called as sovereignty, which is the core subject of all political theories. The existence of states in an anarchic system became the subject of the realist theories through the formulations such as the balance of power concept. In this context, the variation of the sovereignty concept throughout in the last two hundred years explicitly indicates that the theory of international politics can only explain a part of the reality based on the valid concepts at that time. The sovereignty concept is “*neither fixed nor constant*, ” and it changes “*the environment in which states relate to each other*” or changed by the development of the system (Barkin & Cronin, 1994: 128). It is a continuous mutual construction process, in which it constructs the behaviors of states and states’ behaviors re-construct it. Table 34 below depicts the historical progress of the concept. We see that formative events change the structure of the international system/culture, valid norms, and paradigms. Accordingly, the meaning of the sovereignty alters over the time, and we can expect that it might also affect the alignment logic to a certain extent.

In this context, the longstanding of the Westphalian system implies that most of the states have internalized the Lockean culture deeply (Wendt, 199: 287). It means that the Lockean culture exerted some constructive effects on the corporate and type identities of the states, which are the member of the Westphalian system (Wendt, 199: 292).⁴⁷¹ Thus, we can expect that identity changes will lead to the alteration of alignment logic. Similarly, with the emergence of the unipolarity and security communities, the balance of power logic became more irrelevant and ad-hoc coalitions transcended over the classical methods of the formation of the alliance. Taking into account the change of sovereignty norm, actors’ identities, and system structure, we should refine the present theories.

⁴⁷¹ “It is no longer necessary for a state to be Christian or monarchical; now it is being a ‘nation’ state, having the institutions of a modern state, refraining from genocide, and, increasingly, being a ‘capitalist’ and ‘democratic’ state. In all these respects being part of Westphalian culture is not just a matter of a state’s physical individuality, but of conforming the internal structure of this individuality to external norms about its proper form.” (Wendt, 1999: 293).

Formative Events	International System/Culture	Norms and Security Paradigms	Cooperation Paradigms	Implications
30 Years War and the Westphalian agreement	Multipolarity. Transformation of the Hobbesian culture into the Lockean culture.	Mutual recognition of sovereignty	The old Continental system of principalities and dynasties. The defensive balance of power.	Equal rights before the international law. The decline in the death rate of states. Inter-state war became limited. Territorial boundaries became important.
The French revolution, The Napoleonic Wars	Multipolarity, Temporary regressions to a Hobbesian condition.	War of all Against all Self-help Zero-sum	Endemic and unlimited warfare Offensive balance of power.	Return to the norm of conquest. Elimination of unfit actors. Constitutive wars.
The Treaty of Vienna (1815)	Multipolarity. Return to the Lockean culture.	State over the nation, Self-restraint sovereignty	The Holy Alliance. Conservatism and repression. The defensive balance of power.	Low death rate over time. Balancing is not essential for survival.
World War I and post- WWI	Multipolarity. Temporary regressions to a Hobbesian condition. Wilson principals, League of Nations. Return to the Lockean culture.	Self-help Self-determination. Nation-state.	Elimination of the balance of power, and autocratic governments. The emergence of idealism. The defensive balance of power.	The increase in the number of states and disintegration of traditional empires. The rise of the value of international equity and justice.
World War II and post- WWII	Multipolarity, Bipolarity, Temporary regressions to a Hobbesian condition, UN Charter Return to the Lockean culture.	Collective action. Non-interference. Self-determination became illegitimate.	Collective Security, Deterrence, Defensive balance of power, Pluralistic security communities	Nuclear weapons. Decolonization. Winning coalition against secession. The commitment of ethnic genocide.
The end of the Cold War	Unipolarity. The transformation from the Lockean culture into Kantian culture (in progress).	Rule of mutual aid. Restricted sovereignty.	Pluralistic security communities.	Ethnic nationalism. Non-governmental organizations. Globalization. Promotion of the western political ideals.
9/11 and the war on terror	Unipolarity. Interruption of the Kantian transformation. The rise of nationalism.	Preemptive strike. Violation of Sovereignty. Intervention (R2P).	Collective action through Ad-hoc coalitions. Axis of evil.	Fundamentalism. Use of terrorism, WMD, and ethnic cleansing, migration, Human rights abuses. The proxy/asymmetric wars.

Table 33 The Historical Progress of the Sovereignty and the Change of the Structure, Norms, and Paradigms.

7.1.2. The Changing Meaning of Military Power

The realist tenets rest on military power. Like sovereignty, the status of the military power changed dramatically that affected the pattern of alliance formation. Over the past several decades, the military capacity and methods of warfare changed due to the military-technical revolution (MTR). The changes in the following issues produced “a *dramatic improvement in military effectiveness*” (Krepinevich, 2002:3):

- Technological Change,
- Military Systems Evolution,
- Operational Innovation,
- Organizational Adaptation.

The bulk of the alliance theories deduced their insights concerning military capacity from the empirical studies of the 30 years Wars, Napoleonic Wars, Imperial Wars between 1850 and 1914, WWI, and WWII. These wars were marked by entrenchments and field fortifications as well as by use of machine guns, airplanes, submarines, the dreadnought, and tanks in the “blitzkrieg.”

Nevertheless, the nature of warfare had changed dramatically after the invention of the nuclear weapons and military applications of electronics. This shift in the military technology enabled the instant and total destruction of the state capacity, thus made the additional aggregation of power meaningless, since both Blocs already reached the threshold of “*assured mutual destruction*.” In this context, both Blocs agreed to restrict their military capacity by signing successive treaties (The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks-SALT-I and II). Furthermore, the signatures of the enclosed documents are other milestones to reduce military capabilities and to ensure its control; Helsinki Final Act, the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Open Skies.

First time in the history, rival states envisioned to diminish their destructive military capacity instead of arms racing and to create confidence by ensuring transparency in arms control. This fact points out a radical shift in the power-centric mentality and sense of threat.

The overwhelming military capacity of same states also made the use of time and geography meaningless. The extra long-range fire systems, controlling air and space, integration of information systems to enablers (weapons and troops), strategic power transition, and application of Unconventional Warfare (electronic warfare, special operations) enable the states to conduct deep-strike operations without considering spatial limitations. It means that these powers became less dependent on the other powers than they were previously. Therefore,

powerful states are less prone to form an alliance with other small powers and prefer to establish ad-hoc coalitions for particular purposes.

In the face of the MTR, traditional alliance logic offering aid after the onset of hostilities became obsolete because of “*the sheer speed and destructiveness of modern warfare*” (Schmidt, 2014: 824). In this context, powerful states need allies only to deploy their expeditionary forces and ensure prompt logistic support for them instead of the Cold War logic seeking to build garrisons in allied states.

The emergence of the peacekeeping missions also reflects the changing meaning of the military capacity. These operations served to the enhancement of the military cooperation, interoperability and confidence building. Thus, they played a significant role in the threat reduction emancipating from military power around the globe.

Although Wendt (1999: 282) contends that “*relative military power is still important*,” the “Declinist” literature implies that war and military force are no longer a decisive determinant in IR, since, as Buzan (2015: 136) also pointed out, “*war is not a constant feature of anarchic international systems but a negotiated practice within international societies that varies markedly over time*.” Therefore, we cannot insist on working with the realist premises that championing military capacity and, in our examination of alignment behaviors, we need to bear in mind the changing meaning of the war.

7.1.3. Emergence of Security Communities

The bitter experiences of the two world wars served to the gradual change of norms and paradigms in IR. The reconciliation of the historical animosities in Europa and the foundation of EU introduced the concept of a (pluralistic) security community as a new paradigm in IR theory. A security community consists of the states, which aims to realize an efficient and progressive “*peaceful change*” through “*formal*” or “*informal institutions*” in the long term (Deutsch, 1954: 33).

Since the end of the Cold War, the concept transcended in IR by new formulations of the goals of the old security and economic formations such as NATO, ASEAN, and the OSCE as “*building a security community*.”

Realist and Neoliberalist scholars accept the concept of the security community. Realist explanation of nuclear deterrence (Jervis, 2002) and the regulatory concept of security dilemma through IOs in Neoliberalism (Keohane, 1989; Keohane and Nye, 1977) rest on the kind of security communities.

Constructivist scholars (Adler and Barnett, 1998b; Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1999) focus on the role of norms and identities in progress towards the formation of the security communities. They believe that peaceful change needs the transformation of identity and the establishment of the shared norms.

The end of the Cold War and the successive globalization process created many shared norms that served to the formation of similar type identities (formation of liberal democratic states and the emergence of democratic zones), which facilitated cooperation and diminished the number of the war-prone states.

As depicted by Wendt (1999: 285, 293,294), Lockean culture undermines the role of balancing, since it awards states the survival guarantee by recognition of their sovereignty. The transformation into a Kantian culture creates a firm “*group consciousness, in turn, creates a rudimentary capacity for other-help*” and their collective identities and shared norms diminish the need for an organized alliance formation. Friendship brings more than forming an alliance, which is “*a temporary, mutually expedient arrangement within rivalry to revert a condition*” (Wendt, 1999: 299). Alliances are formed to cooperate against the common threat. However, this “*collaboration is self-interested and will end when the common threat is gone.*” In a security community, collective action is “*neither threat- nor time-specific,*” the states act for the sake of group solidarity (Wendt, 1999: 300, 301).

Wendt (1999: 285, 298) contends that the present settings of the international system are an advanced form of Lockean systems, in which balancing is not essential for survival due to the recognition of sovereignty. He adds that the example of German and France friendship have diminished the threat of revisionism.⁴⁷²

Today, balancing is not an automatic action; states have different policy options to exercise against a rising power, such as appeasement, hiding, buck-passing, free riding, and neutrality. Moreover, economic interdependence, the spread of the nuclear weapons and the mentality of the present modern civilization rule out the war as an option (Wendt, 1999: 303).

Furthermore, in a security community, the meaning of the military power is different from the meaning in a system where rivalry prevails.⁴⁷³ Rival states are more prone to securitize the

⁴⁷² Wendt (1999:300) argues that “*in a pluralistic security community war is no longer considered a legitimate way of settling disputes.*”

⁴⁷³ “*France has reacted very differently to the unification of Germany in the 1990s than it did to the same process in the 1860s. Western Europe of the 1990s, as a democratic security community of sovereign states, reacts to relative capabilities changes among them in very different ways than it has in the past.*” (Johnston, 1996: 263).

military power than the friend states. In the disputes among friend states, other elements of national power are in the foreground rather than the military power. The members of the community share the belief that the military power of the other members will not be used against themselves and it will be deployed only for collective action (Wendt, 1999: 300, 301). The emergence of security communities and the construction of collective action beliefs are expected to affect the alignment behaviors radically, thus; we cannot continue to consider the old approaches as fully valid and generalizable.

7.1.4. The Flaws of the Theories

The literature advanced in the last 20-25 years focuses on both material and ideational factors related to the alignment behavior. In this period, most scholars strived to develop new concepts to explain the other aspects of the alliance formation and alignment. However, they failed to investigate the underlying structures comprehensively. The scholars studied the visible part of “iceberg,” most of them, however, ignored to inquire into the submerged part of the “iceberg” since the theoretical foundation was not enough to cope with such complexity. Moreover, they interpreted the outcomes using the logic of the dominating system in the era of study. This preoccupation prevented most scholars from grasping the essence of the studied phenomenon.

Based on the examination of the alliance theories in the chapters II and III, we can infer the followings about the realist theories:

- Anarchy has no pre-determined content (Wendt, 1992: 391-425; Checkel, 1998: 324-48; Wendt, 1999: 246-312; Adler, 2002: 95-118; Guzzini, 2005),
- Power alone does not determine action (Herrmann& Fischerkeller, 1995: 418) and anarchy is not the fundamental aspect of analyzing interstate relations,
- There are other level dimensions to focus on except for system level,
- The international politics is not united and stable. It changes over time and space. It is complicated and consisting of “*vast array of different domains.*” A full and coherent explanation of international politics is not possible (Hopf, 1998: 199, 200),
- Materialist assumptions reached their limits, and they started to use ideas to define the intersected areas (Rathbun, 2008:300). The mutual influences of the material and the ideational worlds should be explained by employing new analytical tools (Herman, 1996: 276, 278),
- Materialist assumptions tend to explain the past, and they offer limited insights to predict future,

- Some realist approaches contradict each other's proposition such as offensive realism and defensive realism.

This study also derived the following issues, which have to be considered in the development of a comprehensive theory:

- The past interactions generate lessons, myths, narratives that constitute domestic culture and perception pattern for each relevant actor,
- The culture, the distribution of knowledge and beliefs affect the design and exercise of the foreign policy (Legro, & Moravcsik, 1999: 39),
- States are not unitary actors. Each state apparatus generates different outcomes,
- The domestic political analysis offers insights for the regional and system level analysis (Rathbun, 2008:317),
- The personality, beliefs, and worldviews (mental, social, and political inclinations) of decision makers are crucial (Herrmann & Fischerkeller, 1995: 422, 427; Ringmar, 1996:39).
- To overcome the simplistic realist assumptions in IR, we should also consider the cognitive aspects and psychological factors (Rosati, 2000:74; Goldgeier, 1997: 165).
- The type and strength of the identity and material links determine the role identities that plays predominant role in the construction of CI,
- The kind of the CI determines the kind of the perception pattern and the extent of the alignment or alliance formation,
- The kind of the perception pattern generates the intention; a negative perception pattern get to construct aggressive intention despite the presence of the ideational link,
- The regional and systemic culture regulates the alignment behaviors by prevalent security and cooperation paradigms.

In this context, this study showed that the traditional alliance theories based on the realist thinking offer insufficient explanations for the origins, formation, and persistence of alliances. Identifying the weakness of these alignment theories leads us to advance and refine them with the help of the constructivist approaches.

7.2. A Right, but weak Attempt: Balance of Threat Theory (BoT)

The balance of Threat Theory differs from the rest of the realist approaches since it goes beyond the boundaries of realism and embodies a constructivist stimulus (Rathbun, 2008: 300). Katzenstein points out the major shift in BoT as follows: "*Walt's threat theory is... A substantial departure from [neorealism]. ... His emphasis on threat perception moves away*

from the systemic level and shift analysis from material capabilities to ideational factors” (Katzenstein, 1996: 27).

Walt argued, that threat is a function of the aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and perceived intentions of the adversary. In this context, BoT Theory offers more insights to understand the origins, the formation, and the persistence of alliances, since its analytical framework consists of the ideational variable “*aggressive intention*.” Adding this variable into the analysis shows that the distribution of capabilities alone is not enough to identify a state as a threat.

As Reiter (1996: 204) argued, BoT Theory shows “*a poor match with reality*.” In this regard, the thorough analysis of BoT Theory reveals that its assumptions, which were derived from the examination of the Arab politics (Arabism and its ideology), rest on the ideational forces rather than materialist forces (Barnett, 1996: 403). Although it makes references to identity, the theory suggests the distribution of threat as the major causal factor in the alliance formation. Accordingly, Walt does not need to offer any insights to understand the role of identity and the construction of intent, (Rathbun, 2008: 315; Goldbeater, 1997: 141). This negligence is problematic.

In this regard, as Barnett (1996: 403-406) rightly argued that “*the concept of intent is left underspecified and undertheorized*,” thus, BoT Theory needs to be revised through the integration of the ideational factors. Hopf (1998: 186) articulates that BoT is prone to be transformed into a constructivist alternative by adding “*constructivist account of identity*” and explaining threat perception. Therefore, if we can advance and refine this theory with the help of constructivist assumptions, we would better explain the complex issues and grasp the essence of the alignment behavior. This aspiration requires the employment of a holistic approach.

7.3. Need to Holistic Approach

The examination of the origin of the power politics (geopolitical, realist and neorealist approaches) explicitly showed the influences of the time on the developments of the alliance theories. The theoretical foundation of these theories reflects the influences of the formative events and the experiences of their founder. Thus, the successive theories have been developed and evolved in line with the formative events and changing paradigms.⁴⁷⁴ In this context, the progress of

⁴⁷⁴ “*They were seared by those experiences and derived from them the fundamental lessons that became the hallmark of a power politics image of the world. Their worlds were realpolitik worlds and*

the alliance theories follows a course ranging from the Westphalian era to the time of the security communities. Being aware of this fact implies that the existing theories do not portray the entire picture of the reality, but, they portray only a small piece of it.

After the end of the Cold War, the bipolar international system turned into unipolar one. Moreover, the globalization changed the political traditions and social behaviors, since its logic created multi-dimensional and reciprocal long-term interests. The international system became more complex and complicated. We experience the alignment of the states in some fields simultaneously, while the same states even confront in the other fields. Therefore, today's alliances got distinctive character than that of the earlier alliances. We experience diverse types of alliance formation and strategies, such as "*regional treaty agreements-RTA*," "*coalitions of the willing*," "*security communities*," and "*strategic partnerships*" that they do not represent the traditional military alliance logic. The new alliance formations are more flexible and multipurpose operating in various fields (Wilkins, 2012: 54, 75). This transformation obliges us to reconsider the fundamental assumptions in the alliance literature and focus on the ideational factors⁴⁷⁵ that became more determinant than the material factors (Dinerstein, 1965: 593).

According to Koslowski & Kratochwil (1994, 217), the neorealist theory did not predict the system level change (the disintegration of the Soviet bloc) that happened without system-wide war contrary to the dictated theoretical propositions of the neorealist theory.⁴⁷⁶ Besides, they could not explain the drivers of these changes; their premises are incapable of dealing with the complexity in IR. In this context, as Paul (2004: 2) underlined, many scholars started to think that BoP Theory has become irrelevant after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Balkans.

Moreover, the traditional concept of security departures from a military-centric logic into a more ideational logic (Williams & Neumann, 2000:370). In this regard, Buzan and Wæver are among the most influential scholars who developed a new security conception. They (2003: 464-66) broaden the security conception by adding newly securitized issues such as globalization, global warming, environmental problems, transnational organized crime, and international

the lessons they derived from their experiences captured a historical reality, but not all history, not all worlds." (Vasquez, 1987: 372).

⁴⁷⁵ "..... a world in which the weak are protected by the restraint of the strong, not a survival of the fittest. If states think that others recognize their sovereignty, however, then survival is not at stake if their relative power falls, and the pressure to maximize power is much less." (Wendt, 1999:284).

⁴⁷⁶ "Waltzian argument rests on some peculiar assumptions about bipolarity...Bipolarity means that the two great powers in the system have to cope primarily with each other." (Kappen, 1996: 360).

terrorism. They (2003:467) argue that “*non-territorial security problems are of increasing importance.*” ⁴⁷⁷

Gärtner (2001: 53) also points out the changing nature of security. According to him, the present-day threats have non-military aspects, and he counts the followings as the nonmilitary threats: economic threats, ethnic hostility, insecure borders, organized crime, corruption, Information warfare and proliferation of military equipment. Gärtner (2001: 75) argues that alliances are transforming in the face of the changing world.

The unipolarity and complexity of the system, the changing logic of the alliance formation, the newly emerging security approaches and the weakness of the grand theories to deal with new challenges get the present-day scholars to experience difficulties.⁴⁷⁸ They could not explain the transformation of the security paradigm from the balance of power logic to the logic of the security community through the premises of the grand theories. Consequently, grand theories turned into the vague theories in the wake of the new theoretical problems (Jepperson, & Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996: 77).

The paradigm shift brought the long-ignored issues such as culture, identity, and nationalism on the agenda (Jager, 2007: V). Hence, the politics of ethnicity, language, and religion started to play a dominant role in the shaping of the international politics (Harknett and Vandenberg, 1997:122). In this regard, Barnett (1991: 370) argues that state-society relations will be a central aspect in the explanations of the alliance behavior and, therefore, further research should focus on this aspect. On that point, constructivist theories offered different views on the interpretation of the anomalies in IR. They suggest that material and ideational structures equally make up the identities and interests. In this regard, the table 35 compares the major components of neorealism and constructivism and clarifies the distinctions.

Furthermore, constructivist theories define the causality by applying a different conceptualization of the world, which serves to the development of the alternative explanations for the world politics. Therefore, as Chidley (2014:10) contends “*this allows for a vision beyond the securitization of International politics.*”

⁴⁷⁷ The other important contribution of Buzan and Wæver is their argument that security concerns “*shift away from global-level toward regional and local level*” (Buzan & Wæver & de Wilde; 1998: 61).

⁴⁷⁸ The classical alliance understanding, which is based on fixed, multilateral, and highly institutionalized structures, became irrelevant.

	Identity and interest	Sovereignty	Anarchy	Structures	Actors' behaviour
Constructivism	Intersubjectively constituted	Social identity	Historically contingent feature of international politics (Institution)	Intersubjective and material (sociological structuralism)	Cognitively driven
Neorealism	Constituted by the system	Intrinsic feature of state agency	Inherent feature of international politics (Essential)	Mainly material (micro-economic structuralism)	Conditioned by the system

Table 34 The Comparison of Neorealism and Constructivism, source: Balzacq, 2002:493

How can we find a midway between these two approaches that will enable us to combine both material and ideational explanations? As Waeber (1998: 102) rightly argues, there is a link between systemic changes and historical developments. To identify this link, we need to develop “a nesting approach to integrating material, institutional, and cultural factors,” since anarchical systems are formed jointly by these three factors (Snyder, 2002:36, 37).⁴⁷⁹ The constructivist epistemology allows considering the material factors. Therefore, the midway shall be constructed on the ground of constructivism for practical reasons.

Despite the extensive research on alignment, there are still gaps in the comprehensive comprehension of it. The literature survey showed that the realist alliance theories couldn't offer a general explanation for the alignment behavior of states. Thus, the shortages in the constructivist explanation of the alliance formation dictate us to develop innovative approaches. If we can develop a holistic theory of alignment, then we would explain the anomalies. The famous contention of Wendt “*anarchy is what states make of it*” can be converted and rephrased as follows; “*alliance and alignment are what states make of it.*” We can argue so since this study accumulated many empirical pieces of evidence from the case studies, which disclosed the significant role of the ideational factors in the formation of alliances. The analytical tools of constructivism showed that interests are the expression of the identity through material needs. Moreover, we learned the role of the past interactions in the creation of culture and belief system. We also know that the mechanism of “othering” and decision making are managed by beliefs and culture of the society. Therefore, we can claim that alignment and alliance formation is mostly a social construction.

⁴⁷⁹ “who seek to transform the culture of contemporary anarchy need to work within an existing material and institutional setting that may enable, derail, or pervert efforts to promote change.” (Snyder, 2002:40).

7.4. Theoretical and Empirical Implications “A Synthetic View”

Very few studies have attempted to explore the relationship between alignment and identity in a systematic fashion. This study revealed once again the primary role of identity-based variables in the international system and alignment (Haas, 2014: 750). I do not exclude the effect of the material forces, on the contrary, I argue that the ideational forces run the material forces; they interact together and construct each other in an eternal process.⁴⁸⁰ This argument implies a paradigm shift from a material conception to an ideational conception of the political behaviors.

The realist and neoliberalist theories do not envisage the natural tendency for evolution. They define the structure solid and immune to the other effects. Moreover, they endeavor to conceptualize entire international politics through a material prism without considering other forces. However, as Tang (2010: 45) points out, the international system is constantly transforming due to the changes in the material and societal domains. Thus, each era (such as pre-Great Power, Great Power, post-WWII and post-Cold War eras) generated its own grand theory (such as classical realism, liberalism, neorealism, and constructivism) to reflect and to explain the nature of the system at that time. For example, offensive realism is the best theory to explain the pre-Great Power era, whereas defensive realism can best explain the post-Cold War era. This situation is evidence of the everlasting paradigm shift in the system.

The long-lasting positive and negative learning from the past lessons and constructive interactions altered the nature of the system (anarchy/culture) and perception patterns of the units progressively. This transformation creates new paradigms, which affect the logic of the security analysis. Therefore, one should study and explain the past foreign policy behaviors with the prevalent theory of that time rather than explaining it with a theory from another era, since scholars could not develop a comprehensive theory yet.

To overcome this shortcoming, as mentioned in the earlier chapters, we shall combine the material and ideational elements to create a more promising theorization. The international system and its elements such as anarchy, polarity, and enmity/amity patterns are so complex and intertwined that must be examined comprehensively rather than unconnectedly (Snyder, 2002:9). As Snyder (2002:34) writes, “*no single part of a system suffices to define the system and its behavior.*” In this context, the behaviors of the states, as called Jervis, are under the

⁴⁸⁰ “*The social evolution paradigm gives material forces the ontological priority over ideational forces,*” however, “*it does not imply that ideational forces have played a less significant role than material forces in the whole human history.*” (Tang, 2010: 34).

“*system effects*,” which is a function of the combined effects of ideas, values, norms, and culture as well as the material and institutional elements. Thus, focusing solely on the material factors masks the underlying roots of the threat perception (Snyder, 2002:21).

The biggest problem of IR theories is that scholars developed them under the scope of “*uni-causal paradigm*.” As Legro and Moravcsik (1999: 50) propose, scholars shall replace the existing mono-causality with “*multicausality*.” This attempt will facilitate the preparation of the necessary ground for the theoretical development. The reality should be somewhere between realism and idealism (Legro, & Moravcsik, 1999: 54).

In this regard, constructivist accounts of conflict fill a significant gap in many rationalists and quantitative studies by revealing ideational variables that lead to the construction of war and political violence; such variables are rarely included in the rationalist studies. Constructivist literature defines an international system and its study as follows (Monteleone & Rossi, 2008: 59):

- The social meaning and shared social understandings, which emerged from the interaction among states, construct the actors, structures, and the process of IR.
- The actors, structures, and the process of IR are subject to change.
- The knowledge of the actors, structures, and process of IR is not objective rather it is subjective.
- Mapping social world needs interpretive rather than quantitative methodologies, which are excluded from the positivistic analyses.
- The constructivist study seeks to identify the contextual understanding of the interactions rather than an explanation or prediction of them (*it focuses on “how” question*).

Constructivist approaches to security can be applied to the study of the interplay between the material and the ideational factors as well as to the examination of the process, in which agent and structure mutually construct each other. As Peter Katzenstein argues in *Culture of National Security*, a state's history, culture, and identity determine his definition of security, which will be reflected in conceptions of security and policies. Constructivist approaches consider security as malleable, which is constantly reconstituted through the changing interests and identities of actors, contrary to the fixed definitions of security in the realist approaches (Mirzoyan, 2010: 8).

The present progress of the IR studies brought us to the verge of a radical change that will enable us to integrate materialist and ideational perspectives. In doing so, we will be able to

generate theories that can define much of the reality. This aspiration forces us to develop a new hypothesis that can be a crucial step to understand the essence of alignment.

However, without solving the problem of “*uni-causality*,” it would be nonsense to offer a comprehensive social theory of alignment behavior in world politics. Nevertheless, in the recent years, neorealist and neoliberalist theories tend to focus on perceptual and ideational variables. Constructivist theories showed the key role of identities and embedded culture. Today, we are experiencing the rise of the dominance of ideas and norms, although power still matters a great deal. This situation leads us to consider both material and societal factors for the sake of “*multi-causality*.” To do this, we need an analytical framework that can integrate two distinct epistemologies. This framework should include the conduct of three-level analyses at the unit, regional, and structural levels to develop generalizable deductive models.⁴⁸¹ These models might fill the explanatory gap of the grand realist theories of IR. (Goldgeier, 1997).

In this regard, the comparative case study of the alignment behaviors of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the two periods (1878-1915, and 1988-1994) proved that the external alignments of two nations couldn't be explained exclusively by the distribution of power, external threats, and interests. Detailed analysis of the alliance behaviors of Armenia and Azerbaijan revealed some underlying aspects of reality that turned out to be of great significance. These aspects consist of the societal factors such as culture (past lessons, enmity, narratives, myths, and symbols), identity, beliefs and psychological issues that coordinate their values, expectations, and behaviors. Moreover, the study highlighted the interplay among identity, intent, threat perception, and alignment. In sum, the case study showed evidently the need for a multi-causal approach that will combine the material and ideational factors in a single framework. In the next paragraphs, I will try to outline the basic components of that framework.

7.4.1. Societal Dimension of the Alliance Formation

The major predicament of the rationalist and realist approaches is that they put their focus on the behaviors and they ignore the origin and essence of them. Thus, they misjudge the drivers of the cooperation. However, constructivism refers to the social and ideational dimensions, which were made up of norms, values, and culture (Rathbun, 2008: 300). It offers “*an alternative world order and the rules constituting this order to emerge*” (Chidley, 2014:12). Constructivists express identity as the main determinant of the cooperation. Wendt (1999:353) argues that “*homogeneity or a likeness*,” namely, similar corporate and type identities foster

⁴⁸¹ The works of Kaufmann (2001) and Reiter (1996) offer valuable analysis to capture the role of cognitive factors in decision-making process.

the cooperation. Haas (2014: 718) also underlines the role of the corporate and type identities as the key factors in the formation of collective identity at the international level. On the contrary, heterogeneity impedes cooperation and triggers the dynamics of conflict.

Realists highlight the role of interdependence in the building of cooperation. However, Wendt (1999:348, 349) argues that interdependence not necessarily leads to cooperation and to the formation of collective identity since states worry about the fear of exploitation emancipating from interdependence. However, reduction of the differences leads to the diminution of fears of exploitation and the formation of a collective identity (1999, Wendt: 354). Furthermore, the commonalities or the “*subjective awareness of being in the same boat*” serve to the setting up of consensus and they reduce the probability of conflict (Wendt, 1999:355, 357). The sense of common fate is the far more powerful driver than interdependence in the formation of the collective identity.

We cannot neglect the social nature of the IR. The ideas manage and control the operation of IR; thus, IR is a social construction and an arena where various identities interact. The interaction produces anarchy or culture in term of constructivism. In this regard, anarchy is a sack, which takes the shape of the object inside. The distributed knowledge, prevailed beliefs and thoughts shape the setup, content, and operation of the anarchy.

Ideas pose new possibilities to explain structural changes (Wendt, 1999: 20). In this context, the end of the Cold War in 1989 and bipolarity in 1991 were not the outcome of the changes in the material polarity; on the contrary, they were the outcome of a perceptual change. Therefore, perception or misperception is a decisive factor that leads either to cooperation or conflict (Stein, 1990: 55). The past lessons, norms, values, and beliefs, shape our perception patterns. Thus, despite the existing of similar information, two states might act differently, when they have a problematic past and do not share same norms, values and beliefs (Rathbun, 2008: 316). Our perception of other’s identities determines the extent and magnitude of the relations. Thus, shared identities become the principal basis of the cooperation (Huntington, 1993: 7).

The other important aspect of the cooperation is the repeated interactions. If the states interplay for a long time because of the similar interests, they construct a kind of the collective identity. Thus, the more states interact, habitually, the more they are prone to cooperate (Wendt, 1999:351).

Hopmann (Interview-III, 2) rightly underlines, “*ideas, shared values and shared cultural heritage*” play a decisive role in the alliance formation. Thus, we can expect that similar

identities, common fate (interests) and long-lasting interaction based on the positive experiences might lead to the formation of collective identity and, thus, alignment.

This study showed that identity, culture (namely the social context of a society or the domain of ideas: anarchy) and past interactions are the major issues to focus on when one strives to understand the essence of alignment. Barnett (1996) points out that alliance formation is the result of the calculation that consists of two phases: in the first phase, actors identify the threats, and in the second phase, they make decisions on whether to ally and with which states. In the same manner, I will first explain the components of intent formation and then other aspects that are relevant to the alignment decision. In the end, I aspire to outline a concept that can be used as a tool to analyze the alignment behavior.

7.4.2. Assessment of the Intentions and the Social Construction of Threat

As explained in the earlier chapters and sections, none of the alliance theories offer enough insights or conceptions to explain the construction and perception of intent. The estimation and perception of other's intentions are a cognitive process and has strong relations with the embedded culture (memories, beliefs, myths, mental representation, analogies), past interactions and identity.

Based on the results of chapter V, we proposed the followings formula of threat that is compatible with the variables of BoT Theory: **Threat f (x) = Intent + Capacity**.

The investigation of the intent in this study brought us to recognize the significant role of the corporate and role identities, subjective security needs, perception pattern, and regional/systemic setting. Therefore, we can formulate intent as follows:

Intent f (x) = Corporate identity + Subjective security needs + Perception pattern + Role identity + Regional and Systemic setting.

A state with its base identity (corporate identity) knows itself and others through interactions, accordingly generated some interests (subjective security needs) to protect its identity from others' attacks as well as it developed various standards (perception pattern) applicable to the relations with other identities. This explanation above reflects the basic logic of the intent formation. In the next section, I aspire to explain the components of the intent formation briefly. However, before moving on to the next section, I would like to discuss the role of intent in the emergence of security dilemma and in the construction of securitization. In broad terms, security dilemma is the fear or concern about actor's own security. Different scholars refer to various descriptions and aspects of it as follows:

Herz (1951: 157) claims “*uncertainty and anxiety as to his neighbors’ intentions*” as the source of the security dilemma. This assumption considers the states as they are operating in a vacuum, in which they did not interact with others in the past, and they did not form collective memory, culture, beliefs, and identities. However, we know that each state has “personality” and carries many attributed labels in the system as well as its interaction last for a long time. Therefore, we cannot argue that there exists “*a pure uncertainty*,” since each state has some knowledge of the others.

Jervis (1976) defines the security dilemma as follows: “*The heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state’s security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imaged hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations.*” According to Jervis (1976, 62), the source of the security dilemma is the anarchical structure of international politics. This presumption is simplistic and ignores the role of identity, national culture, and past lessons. States do not behave mechanically. They accumulated knowledge about other actors through their past interactions. They formed various identities and attributed many labels for others as well as created a perception pattern for each actor. Finally, it emerged a culture consisting of many codes of conduct, behavioral norms, and operational logic. Therefore, an increase in one state’s security does not always make other states less secure, since it depends on many other factors such as identity, perception patterns, and security paradigm.

Tang (2009:595) proposed the following issues as the major aspects of the security dilemma.⁴⁸²

- *The ultimate source of the security dilemma is the anarchic nature of international politics.*
- *Under anarchy, states cannot be certain about each other’s present and future intentions.*
- *Because of the uncertainty about each other’s intentions and fear, states resort to the accumulation of power.*
- *The dynamics of the security dilemma are self-reinforcing and often lead to unintended spirals.*
- *The severity of the security dilemma can be regulated by both material factors and psychological factors.*⁴⁸³

⁴⁸² Waltz considers the Cold War as a security dilemma between two great powers, “*a conception easily compatible with most cognitive perspectives of ‘fearful warriors’ locked in a spiral conflict.*” (Cited in Herrmann& Fischerkeller, 1995: 424).

⁴⁸³ Crawford (2000: 133) points out that the antagonist perception patterns drive to security dilemma.

We can draw three essential issues as the motives of the security dilemma: anarchy, negative intentions, and power accumulation. As explained in this study, the security dilemma rests not only on the change in the material factors but also on the change in the ideational sources. For example; the U.S.'s actual military capacity outweighs the EU's military capabilities. Despite the huge discrepancy, a security dilemma does not arise, and the EU does not strive to balance U.S. through formation alliance with Russia or other regional states because the EU has developed a positive perception pattern for the U.S. with respect to the positive past lessons. The EU shares similar corporate and type identities with the U.S. that formed a friend "role" identity, later, turned into a "collective" identity. The existence of the collective identity prevents the rise of the security dilemma.⁴⁸⁴

Securitization is a further step of the security dilemma. When an actor caught in a security dilemma, it detects and frames threat. In the securitization process; however, the actor takes extraordinary measures and adopt emergency action. It can be formulated as follows:

Securitization: **security dilemma + action.**

In this regard, I would like to define the security dilemma as the activation of the negative perception patterns, when contradicting identities and subjective security interests confront under the non-cooperative security paradigm. In the same manner, securitization means acting through various power accumulation strategies such as internal balancing (building up one's own power), external balancing (with or against), and bandwagoning against the constructed threat. Namely, we can conclude that the alliance formation is the most important outcome of the securitization process.

7.4.3. The Identity

Identity is the chief factor in the formation and preservation of a relationship since it "*makes a thing what it is*" and tells who is a friend, rival or enemy as well as it "*generates motivational and behavioral dispositions*" (Wendt, 1999: 223).

As Social Identity Theory predicts, a group inherently favors for itself and treats other negatively. The self-esteem of a group makes the group believe in her exclusiveness. This belief generates out-group stereotypes that foster negative perception pattern (Snyder, 2002:19). The more a group collects positive information on another group through interactions and share same beliefs, the more they will be prone to cooperate.

⁴⁸⁴ Kappen (1996: 367) underlines, "*the collective identity of actors in democratic systems defines both the 'in-group' of friends and the 'outgroup' of potential foes.*"

The features of the corporate identity play a special role in sensing of threat.⁴⁸⁵ The group distinguishes its friend and enemy through the “*prescribed norms of appropriate behavior*” that defined by group identity (Kappen, 1996: 367). Therefore, the perceived threat from the international power structure only becomes relevant or real, if there is a constructed norm and beliefs defining it. In this context, identity and structure (internal and external) mutually shape and constructs each other (Wendt, 1999: 224).

Also, Barnett (1996: 408) points out that there is a direct relation between identity and threat construction. A shared identity constructs norm (like organizational rules) that teach the group members how they must treat each other and regulate their relations. This means as Wendt (1992: 398) asserts, identities “*predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will be a revisionist or status quo powers, and so on.*” Therefore, a shared identity reduces the threat perception, since actors define the threats equivalently. Moreover, shared identity facilitates cooperation and leads to form a positive perception pattern that diminishes misperceptions by increasing the level of knowledge about the other.

Identities (collective state identities and personal identity) array hierarchical order that is determined by the degree of commitment and by the level of the threat (Wendt, 1999: 230, 231). People are prone to sacrifice their identities for the sake of the threatened collective identities. Cultures play a key role in the promotion of that kind of sacrifices as it is seen in the Armenian culture (remember fedayee fighters). This fact points out once again the supremacy of the ideational factors over the material factors.

Identity also defines the range, scope, and degree of the interests. They are the wills of the actors, and they stem from the components of the identities, while the motivational force of identities stems from interests. As identities, interests are also malleable and subject to change depending on the culture and systemic conditions. Sometimes, actors assume temporarily different type and role identities due to the systemic conditions. However, this behavior also rests originally on deeper identities (Wendt, 1999: 231). Basically, there are two types of needs such as identity needs and material needs (Wendt, 1999: 130). In this regard, each state has an objective (national interest) and subjective interests (materialized national interest in respect to the type, role, and collective identities as well as to the prevailing security paradigm). The basic objective interests of a state are the followings: “*physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem*” (Wendt, 1999: 197). A state might

⁴⁸⁵ “*The United States, for example, is more likely to resist threats to its identity as ‘leader of anticommunist crusades’ than to its identity as ‘promoter of human rights.’*” (Wendt, 1992: 411).

generate many subjective security interests from these objective interests depending on its identities and security paradigm.

Shared components of the corporate, type and role identities form an ideational link that constructs collective identity. Barnett (1996: 410, 413, 427) depicts the role of a common identity in the alignment as in the followings: a. it makes the actors more attractive for each other, b. an identity privileged the other similar identity in the choice of partner and formation of an alliance, c. it generates similar threat definition, d. it determines the scope of cooperation.

A shared identity also reduces the costs of interaction due to the similar procedures and practices in the decision-making process (Barnett, 1996: 407). Consequently, the actors with shared identity consider the interests of the other as own interests and, thus, they are more prone to ally (instinctively) even though there does not exist an immediate threat (Wendt, 1999: 229).

On that point, we know that ideological similarities function such as shared identity. Often, states with similar regime types (type identity) incline to set up ideological solidarity. Walt (1997: 168) underlines the role of “*ideological solidarity*” to show the importance of political similarities in the cooperation against common threats and the preservation of alliances. What Walt tries to imply is the role and importance of the corporate and type identities as the stimulus of the alignment. We know that the ideological solidarity emerges among states, which have similar corporate (for example, Arabic) and type (for example autocratic) identities.

The formation of a shared identity needs “*cultural, political, social, and ideological homogeneity*” (Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 51). Therefore, we can easily predict the emergence of an alignment, where “*cultural affinity, ethnic, racial, and religious similarity*” exists (Kupchan, 2010: 65). Therefore, as emphasized by Wendt, culture does a similar task as anarchy does and shapes the beliefs, interests, and behaviors of actors.

In this context, the study of Armenian and Azeri relations offered enough empirical evidence that the alignment and alliance formation is better connected conceptually to identity than to anarchy and material factors. The examination and explanation of alignment behavior necessitate the analysis of identity and its variation as independent variables. In this regard, scholars shall analyze and depict the **identity layout** among states as explained in chapter V (see figure 13). The future development of alignment theories should treat identity as a major independent variable to have better explanatory power and validity. However, this proposition is not an iron law, and it does not mean that identical identities will always align and cooperate. There are other factors and conditional issues to consider.

7.4.4. Past Interactions and Derived Lessons

Scholars should understand the social context to conduct a healthy analysis. In this regard, the academics shall examine the formative events that made a profound impact on the studied societies. In the examination process, one should infer some insights regarding their effects on the formation of identity, fear, hatred, and enmity to figure out the type of the perception patterns.

Furthermore, we should note that national character, the public discourses, analogies, master narratives, myth-symbol-complexes, the effect of religion, the role of other powers, and politicization of the past are the other decisive factors to be examined.

7.4.5. Focus on the Unit and Domestic Level (*Corporate and Type Identities*)

The systemic theories ignore the unit-level analysis, even though they deal with states. Therefore, the unit level deserves more attention to examine the corporate and type identities. Accordingly, in the recent years, the domestic dynamics became the significant subject of many studies (Regime survival-Omni-balancing: David, 1991; Domestic Stability-Balancing Multifaceted Threats: Barnett and Levy, 1991).

The state is an organization of many institutions established by the people to rule over a defined or “sovereign” territory and responsible for ensuring the security, political, economic and social welfare of the people. An analysis of the domestic setting necessities focusing on identity types, national culture, decision-making unit, regime, ideological position, and domestic institutions.

The study in the earlier chapters showed that the corporate identity, national culture, and character shape the type and role identities of states. They also determine the type of the decision-making unit (unitary, cartelized, and democratic) and the function of state apparatus. On the other hand, the regime and the ideological position of the ruling elites also affect the type and role identities of a state. In this regard, I will explain the role of the national culture and decision-making unit in detail below.

7.4.5.1. *Nationality, National Character, and Culture*

Nationality means belonging to a distinct group, while the national character is the perceived image of a nationality by other nations.⁴⁸⁶ It serves to the mobilization of the nations (Snyder,

⁴⁸⁶ Morgenthau and Thompson (1985: 151) depict the national character of some nations as follows: “*The ‘elementary force and persistence’ of the Russians, the individual initiative and inventiveness of*

2002:24) through the formation of a collective identity among the group members. Similarly, we can consider national character as the representational style of a nationality (corporate identity). It is a peculiarity differentiating a group from other groups (Snyder, 2002:27; Johnston, 1996: 226). In brief, while nationality is self-perception of a group about who it is, national character is the perception of this nationality by others.

The subjective meaning of the state A will differ from the objective meaning of it.⁴⁸⁷ The other states will have different ideas on the state A since state A has different corporate and type identities and formed many role identities in IR during its past interactions. The others will attribute many labels (roles) to the state A and regulate their relations in line with these labels. Nevertheless, these labels are not rigid and subject to change based on the new interactions and cultural changes.

Basically, there are two types of cultures: in-group and out-group cultures. While in-group culture is a product of the inter-group actions, the out-group culture is a product of the intra-groups actions. Both types affect and construct the beliefs, interests, and behaviors of the groups through interactions. These Interactions generate cultural forms such as symbols, myths, analogies, metaphors, and idioms that manifest norms, rules, axioms, and preferences. In-group or out-group members learn and internalize these cultural forms and behave consistently.⁴⁸⁸

The in-group culture shapes the nationality, and the group transfers it from generation to generation through socialization. On the other hand, the out-group (external) culture (called anarchy by realists) defines the extent of the national character. For example, a state can perceive itself the defender of human rights. However, this state might be perceived by others as provoker due to its intervention in others' internal affairs. The past interactions of this state or the experiences of others with this state are the central issues in attributing of the roles. These roles affect the formation of security interests and perception patterns as well as the meaning of the material capacity.

the Americans, the undogmatic common sense of the British, the discipline and thoroughness of the Germans are some of the qualities."

⁴⁸⁷ Each object has at least two meanings for everyone: objective and subjective meanings. For instance, a dog is an animal for everyone (objective meaning), but the term "dog" produces also different meanings (subjective) for individuals such as ferocious, dirty, dangerous, etc., in respect to his/her subjective experiences and embedded social context.

⁴⁸⁸ "If groups are susceptible to myths because they lead to a more positive social identity, then leaders need to work less hard in order to galvanize their publics against other groups. We need, however, to learn more about the role of proximity, likeness, history, and material factors in shaping this process." (Goldgeier, 1997: 161)

The nationality is a key factor in the formulation of the subjective security interests, while national character outlines the ways of the fulfillment of these interests through the use of the national material capacity (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985: 151). On this point, we should note that the similar material capacity might generate different outcomes depending on the national character and domestic settings. Therefore, the actual material capacity cannot have absolute strength since it varies with respect to the national characters of the confronting actors.

According to Rathbun (2008:303), what neoclassical realists call as nationalism is, in reality, no more than the collective identity of society. He argues that “*the existence of nationalism is evidence that the world is socially constructed.*” I agree with his proposition and add that nationality, and national character is symbolic-cognitive representations and might alter over time depending on the extent, magnitude, and change in the internal and external cultures. Therefore, threat perception and alignment behavior are directly connected with nationality (identity) and national character (image).

7.4.5.2. *The Role of the Decision-Making Unit*

We know that many factors affect the state behaviors (Stein, 1990: 53). One of the most crucial effectors is the decision-making unit. The realist theories mostly neglect the role of the decision-making unit, which is still a “*black box*” in alliance literature (Rosati, 2000:48), since they failed to explain the unit level outcomes, and they seldom preferred to examine the function of the decision-making unit (Herrmann& Fischerkeller, 1995: 417).

We can consider a decision-making unit as the engine of a state’s foreign policy⁴⁸⁹ and cannot ignore the role of the policymakers and the state apparatus in IR. The political history shows us that some politicians make a profound impact on the destiny of their states such as the Bismarck’s influence on Germany. In this context, the composition of the state apparatus, type of the interest groups, the discourse of threat construction and the worldview of the ruling elites play a primary role in the formation of state type identity.

Ideas, norms, and culture (internal and external) mitigate or amplify the impact of the systemic changes in the decision-making processes (Johnston, 1996: 265). The cultural setting surrounding the polity makes elites to believe in the socially constructed reality, which often differs from the objective reality, thus these states often do not exercise consistent foreign

⁴⁸⁹ According to Morgenthau and Thompson (1985: 159), “*diplomacy is the brains of national power.*”

policies. That explains the reasons for the foreign policy fluctuations of the states after the change of the ruling elites.

Decision maker's perception of the problem plays a vital role in the formation of the political behavior.⁴⁹⁰ ⁴⁹¹ Their worldview and processing of the available information are the major factors in interpreting the political behaviors of other states. The ideological belief system of the ruling elites leads to the different threat perceptions (Rathbun, 2008:318).⁴⁹² The magnitude of the threat perception is strongly related to the ideological differences between the leaders (Haas, 2014: 717).

We cannot assume decision makers as rational actors in a classical sense. They are a human being and behave per their personal interests and emotions. The cognitive constraints, use of faulty analogies, and psychological distortions trigger misperceptions that lead to false decisions and the security dilemma. Moreover, power struggles and constellations, as well as individual interests of the decision makers, affect directly the domestic stability, which makes up the basement of a cohesive exercise of the foreign policy and attributed role identity to the state by others.⁴⁹³

This study, like other studies, also provided empirical evidence for the determinant role of the decision makers and state apparatus in shaping the foreign policy behavior based on their individual experiences, lessons learned and interests to remain in power. Therefore, for the investigation of intent, threat perception, and alignment, scholars shall analyze the speech acts of the decision-makers to capture the true motives of their decisions.

7.4.6. Subjective Security Interests

For the identification of subjective security interests, one should examine self-esteem of the state society, domestic culture (components of the corporate identity, belief system, norms, values, ethnic composition, religion and sects), nationalism (myth-symbol complexes, master narratives, self-esteem interests), domestic institutions (the components of the type identity, lobbies) and decision-making unit (type of decision unit, most referred analogies, schemata).

⁴⁹⁰ In this context, the Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and the Attribution Theory (Heider, 1958; Mercer, 2005) offer valuable hypotheses for the source of threat perception

⁴⁹¹ The literature on cognitive processes (such as analogies, schemes, and motivated biases) offers theoretical insights for the analysis at unit level.

⁴⁹² Haas (2014: 716) contends that *"leaders possessing similar identities tend to have low threat and cooperative relations; decision makers dedicated to divergent identities have the reverse."*

⁴⁹³ *"foreign policy roles are entirely a function of policy-makers' beliefs and domestic politics."* (Wendt, 1999: 227).

The self-esteem needs (as explained in the Social Identity theory of Mercer) of society are the real driver of its material needs (physical security needs explained by Campbell). The self-esteem need can also be regarded as the fueling motives of the nationalism, which are used by elites to mobilize their groups. They function such as a vehicle of internal power aggregation. Thus, scholars should define subjective security interests through analyzing the self-esteem needs, culture, and domestic setting, since they are of paramount of importance in the examination of the intent.

7.4.7. Perception Patterns

In the chapter IV and V, we explained the formation of the perception patterns, which is an outcome of the interplay among culture, identities, and past lessons generated by interactions. It has two forms: negative and positive.

If there exists, the negative perception pattern initiates the sense that the other has aggressive intention. It means that an existing material capacity will be seen as threatening when a negative perception pattern operates. On the contrary, the positive perception pattern mitigates the sense of threat arising from an offensive capacity.

Based on the beliefs (emancipating from the embedded culture), interactions and identities, each culture generates various “*patterns of perception*” at the unit, regional and system levels. The operation of these patterns leads to the different foreign policy behaviors (Rosati, 2000:72). To assess other’s intent and to understand the construction of the perception patterns, we shall examine culture, past interactions, and identities.

In this context, we know that the internal and external cultures are the major factors in the formation of the belief system, which function like “*a prism through which society members view their world and relate to it*” (Bar-Tal, 2001: 606). The worldviews and principled beliefs are an integral part of identity. The worldviews such as religion and nationalism evoke deep in-group loyalties and out-group discriminations. The worldviews and principled beliefs are utmost resistant to the effects of the environmental changes. Their resistance and fixation result in the biased selection and interpretation of information. Therefore, the interplay of the world views and principled beliefs is also important for the type of the perception patterns, which consist of numerous schemas and analogies that process the incoming information

negatively or positively.⁴⁹⁴ In this regard, the perception is a set of many integrated schemas and analogies, which is used for the interpretation of the others' behaviors.

The constitutive effects of culture on identities and interests determine the generation and reproduction of enemy identities over the time (Wendt, 1999: 274).⁴⁹⁵ Armenian and Azeri in-group cultures and their corporate identities produce steadily enemy role identities because of the regional culture formed on enmity pattern. The "self-help" and "zero-sum" logic of the regional culture produce continuously "*discourse of danger*" that activates the negative perception patterns and fosters the threat perception.

The perception patterns operated by psychological dynamics function as a chief factor to determine the art of the confrontation.⁴⁹⁶ Even similar identities might construct negative perception patterns if they share a negative past. Thus, we should also focus on the psychological factors at the unit level since they might help us to understand the construction of the perception patterns at the unit level. In this context, the case study proved the significant role of the perception patterns in the analysis of threat perception.

As a key component of intent formation, the identification of perception pattern requires the investigation of the following issues depicted in the formula below:

Perception Pattern f (x) = Past lessons + Domestic dynamics + Type identity

7.4.8. Role Identities

A role means an attribution of other units to another unit that coordinates its position in the structure. A state can accept the attributed role or refuse it. However, the other states will treat the unit in line with the attributed role, no matter it accepts. For example, a unit can be labeled an autocratic state by other members of the regional or system level structures. No matter, he refuses this label, the other members will treat so as if it is an autocratic state. Sometimes, a unit will accept the attributed role, if this label incorporates into its corporate and self-attended

⁴⁹⁴ Rosati (2000:71) points out that the cultural differences create various beliefs, which constitute the basis of the misperceptions and predispositions.

⁴⁹⁵ Wendt (1999: 275) suggests three reasons of enemy construction in the Hobbesian culture: a. domestic interest groups such as lobbies for arms race (remember Karabakh clan), b. "discourse of danger" formed by elites for "in-group solidarity" (remember pan-Turkish threat), c. projective identification (remember genocidal identity of Armenia).

⁴⁹⁶ Goldgeier (1997: 156) points out the empirically proven fact that "*culturally and physically similar groups could generate hostility and aggression toward one another due to competition for scarce resources.*"

type identities.⁴⁹⁷ For example, the entitlement of the U.S. as the protector of the global system will be only operational, if it fits the U.S.' corporate and type identities. Thus, understanding the roles (self-attended or attributed) and their strength will facilitate the recognition of the casual and constructive links leading to threat perception and alliance formation. In this context, scholars shall disclose the role identity links existing among actors for better assessment of the intent (for example, see figure 14 in chapter V).

7.4.9. The Analysis of the Regional and System Level-The role of Security Paradigm

Collective knowledge structures consist of unit and process (Wendt, 1999: 164). The structural and regional level analysis needs to investigate some relevant variables (norms, values) concerning the systemic and regional cultures and the degree of internalization as well as the past and present interactions.

The interplay of the region and system level cultural context generate different norms and values. The culture and identity mutually exert causal and constitutive effects on each other. If regional and system-level cultures share similar norms and values, then the macro system operates more stable and is more prone to develop a collective identity. In contrast, conflicting norms and values generate conditions for violence and confrontation, since these discrepancies hinder the formation of the collective identity and "*poses different truth conditions about the states' intentionality*" (Wendt, 1999: 176).

Each system, region, and unit generate various security paradigms depending on the prevailing culture and past lessons. It is a logic and actors regulate their behaviors in respect to this logic. The security paradigm plays a vital role in the formulation of the subjective security interests and to reverse existing perception patterns; it can mitigate or amplify their effects as well. Therefore, it is a significant factor in the analysis.

The state apparatus processes the inputs (other's political behaviors) through analogical reasoning and checking the correspondence with its identity while it considers the prevailing security paradigm. However, the outcome (reaction) might present temporal and spatial differences. For example, a negative perception pattern will lead to the sense of aggressive intention, only when a "self-help" or "competing-non-cooperative" security paradigm prevails in the region or system. Otherwise, "cooperative" security paradigm will mitigate the effect of the negative perception pattern. In this regard, states assess others intent as "*a powerful,*

⁴⁹⁷ "...Role-identities are subjective self-understandings; roles are the objective, collectively constituted positions that give meaning to those understandings. The former come and go as individuals take on or discard beliefs; the latter persist as long as someone fills them." (Wendt, 1999: 258).

aggressive, threatening” by considering the security paradigm besides the past interactions, derived lessons, attributed role identities, and the actual behavior.^{498 499}

In this context, as part of the analysis conducted in the system and regional level, we should identify the status of the collective identities and alignment pattern (as seen in figure 15 in chapter V) to assess more accurately actors’ intention.

7.4.10. The Internalization Degree

The internalization degree of the culture by units depends on the unit’s own in-group culture, identity and past interactions. Its compliance with the regional or systemic culture rests on the various motives such as force, interests (price), and self-driven. Therefore, even in a small region, each actor will interpret the prevailing culture differently based on its degree of internalization. We should take into consideration that the internalization degree and the logic of the culture can vary across a domain and show local differences. Thus, scholars should conduct a separate analysis for each of structure of cooperation. Understanding of the degree of internalization is of paramount importance to assess the effect of perception pattern and security paradigm in the explanation of the alignment behavior.

7.4.11. The Relative Power

As for material forces, Waltz suggests focusing on the distribution of capabilities and Walt also follows Waltz’s logic when he explains the origin of the threat construction. Most scholars consider the followings as the indicators of the capacity to distinguish actors’ power:

National Capacity: GDP, Population, Economic Relationships, Trade Relations.

Military Capacity: Size, Strength, Military readiness, Power projection, Military Hardware Procurement, Military Presence, Active engagements (exercises, operations)

However, power is not related only to these material factors. It is a simplistic approach, which aims to make power measurable. Power has other dimensions, which we cannot measure.⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁸ U.S. perceived potential Soviet ability to destabilize Western Europe as a threat when Soviet exerted an offensive policy (*offensive intention-the third of Walt's indicators*) in Eastern Europe (Kappen, 1996: 361).

⁴⁹⁹ Moreover, the existences of opposite type identities (Ideological differences, none-compatible regime type) and nearby geographical locations contribute to the upsurge of threat perception by amplifying the fear of regime collapse and invasion (Kappen, 1996: 360; Haas, 2014: 722, 723).

⁵⁰⁰ “*Dimensions of Power: scope* (Scope refers to the aspect of B's behavior affected by A), *domain* (refers to the number of other actors subject to its influence), *weight* (*ceteris paribus*-refers to the probability that B's behavior is or could be affected by A (Dahl, 1957; Deutsch, [1968]1988; Kaplan, 1950).), *costs, means* (of exercising influence, Symbolic means, Economic means, Military means, Diplomatic means) Discourses, propaganda, framing, and narratives could also be considered symbolic means of influence.” (Baldwin, 2013).

The following definition of Max Weber (1947: 152) points out the cognitive dimension of power: “*the probability that one actor within a social relationship will in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.*” (cited in Baldwin, 2013: 278). When considered the cognitive dimension of power, it does not make sense to rank states by adding up their material capabilities or sources of power. It is a fact that the objective capabilities might generate different effects/outcomes depending on who owns it and who is affected by them.

Each political actor has different national character, domestic setting, and decision makers. Therefore, each interplay between actors will generate different outcomes (Baldwin, 2013: 279, 281). This fact leads us to think that aggregation of power through alliances is a complex matter, contrary to the general understanding, which considers power aggregation simply as the linear addition of power.

Dahl (1991: 35) considers “*friendship, social standing values, attitudes, expectations, decision-making rules, structures*” as the elements of political power resources (cited in Baldwin, 2013: 286). Baldwin (2013: 288) contends that we shall consider power as the dependent variable and focus on its other dimensions. Thus, we should examine the effect of the power in a relational manner that combines material and ideational elements as a generator of power. The culture, corporate and type identities exert certain influences on the dimensions of the power. The “*brute material forces*” gain their meaning through ideas, culture, and national character.

Material capacity (the distribution of power) has always been a significant element of the strategic calculation; however, the intention (distribution of knowledge) gives the meaning to this calculation through various concepts concerning self and other. Therefore, an analysis of power without considering the embedded societal context and identities of the actors will lead us to make wrong assumptions. Wendt (1992: 397) gives the following examples concerning the assessment of the material capacity: “*U.S. military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba, despite their similar “structural” positions, just as British missiles have a different significance for the United States than do Soviet missiles.*” This phenomenon can be explained only with the term of power relativity and operation of perception patterns. In the case of Cuba and Soviets, a negative perception pattern prevails in the U.S. policy circles, while a positive perception pattern operates in the case of Canada and Britain.

The examples above explicitly reveal the crucial role of the ideational factors that give meaning to the actual material capacity.

7.5. Implications

7.5.1. Alignment or Alliance

Before proceeding, I would like to distinguish the meaning of alignment and alliance. Even in this study, the readers can think that both terms were used interchangeably. However, the confusion rests on the fact that the term “alignment” has two meanings:⁵⁰¹ a. adjustment to a line,⁵⁰² b. cooperation.⁵⁰³ Therefore, when we use the term “alignment,” we usually mean orientation, which is the first phase of alliance formation. However, the true mean of alignment in IR is deep, strong and long-lasting cooperation. Thus, readers shall be aware of two different meanings during the reading of this study to avoid of any misperception.

Alignment is a fundamental behavior, which’s formation and de-formation need a lengthy process. It must not always have an institutionalized form such as alliances. Moreover, alignment is a deep structure, non-visible and non-measurable. On the other hand, alliances are formed formally or informally as a vehicle of power aggregation to overcome or deter threats. Sometimes, alliances can be a natural outcome and an institutionalized form of alignment, which lies in the background. The alignment of two different actors needs strong similarities of the corporate and the type identities. However, in alliance formation similarities are not a pre-condition.

The decline in quality of the relations in an alliance is less likely and will be temporary, yet though the relations have been worsened, the actors will sense a little threat from each other. However, the deterioration of the relations in an alliance is an expected situation. Thus, sides always keep their eyes on each other due to the low-level mutual trust and they cannot construct a robust and genuine collective identity.

If actors collaborate for the realization of the material and short-term interests and they do not have, or they have a weak ideational link, they cannot form a strong collective identity. In most cases, an alliance for-profit or deterrence might emerge. Although they formed an alliance, the actors will continue to fear from each other’s destructive capacities, since they do not have a strong collective identity and in-group sense.

⁵⁰¹ <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/alignment> and <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/englisch/alignment>

⁵⁰² an arrangement in which two or more things are positioned in a straight line or parallel to each other.

⁵⁰³ an agreement between a group of countries, political parties, or people who want to work together because of shared interests or aims.

Usually, alliances are sensitive to the temporary or permanent changes in the system, while alignments are less sensitive. The figure 22 below illustrates the change of the alliance behavior over the time following the alteration of relative security and the norm of sovereignty in the system.

The strongest cooperation will arise when an existing alignment generates an alliance such as emerging in the case of Russia and Armenia. In this situation, the level of the security commitment and cohesion of the alliance will be extra-high. In this context, table 35 was prepared to discern the differences between two forms of cooperation.

Factor	Alignment	Alliance
Role Identity	Friend-Ally	Rival-Friend
Collective Identity	High sense of in-group identity	Low sense of in-group identity
Internalization Degree	High/embedded	Low and depends on type of alliance
Fear / Trust	None-low / high	Moderate-high/ none-low
Purpose/Motive	Sense of unity to protect commonalities even without exposing threat	Protection or realization of interests and assurance of security
Formation	Informal	Formal
Operation	All Sectors (Military, societal, economic)	Military sector (Aggregation of power, increasing security, deterrence)
Cooperation	Inherent-less Institutionalized	Institutionalized
Commitment	High	Low
Duration/Cohesion	Long-lasting/extra firm	Temporary-short or mid-term/weak

Table 35 The Differences between Alignment and Alliance

7.5.2. Alignment Mechanism

Alignment is a deep structure, and its formation requires strong ideational and material links. If two actors have common corporate and type identities, their objective and subjective interests as well as their threat perception will be highly similar. The more two actors share commonalities, the more they will generate similar subjective security interests and positive perception patterns. The shared interests, existing mutual trust and positive past lessons will facilitate the attribution of the “friend” role identity to each other. A long-lasting mutual friend role will automatically lead to the construction of a collective identity, even though regional and systemic security paradigm is not a cooperative one (as the German-Austria collective identity formed under the Hobbesian culture before the WWII). The existence of a strong collective identity will lead inherently to the formation of an alignment. When two actors collaborate as a friend

for a long duration, this will create a true “in-group sense,”⁵⁰⁴ and each actor will endeavor for the welfare of both sides without having a fear of being exploited or attacked. Furthermore, the existence of the durable material links will also reinforce the formation and the stability of the alignment.

Sometimes, alignment of two actors can generate formal or non-formal alliance formations due to the changes in the systemic conditions. However, alignment of two actors generates generally balancing behavior against a common threat. The other types of the alliance strategies rarely emerge due to the explained logic of alignment above.

7.5.3. Mechanism of Alliance Formation

Alliance formation is a reaction against the possible or immediate threat. If there is not an already existing alignment between two actors, they will employ an alliance strategy, according to mechanism depicted in figure 21 below.

In this context, actors’ behaviors are the function of a process, which is run by the state-society complex and regional/systemic structures. Corporate identity together with the domestic culture and dynamics define the objective security interests. The interplay of the state-society complex and regional/structures generate the type and role identities of the actors. The type and role identities transform the objective security interests into the subjective security interests. At this point, regional and systemic cultures involve in the analysis, which are the chief factors in the interpretation of others’ behaviors and available capabilities. They and their product **security paradigm** also affect the shaping of actor’s perception patterns. In this regard, actor A will assess Actor B’s intent based on his/her identities, subjective security interests, and perception patterns.

The entertainment of the emerging “intent” with the existing capabilities generates a belief called “threat.” As seen in figure 21, an actor will assess an offensive capacity as “high threat,” if the actor developed a negative perception pattern due to his/her past interactions and prevailing non-cooperative security paradigm (see red arrow). On the contrary, the actor will see another actor non-threatening, if he developed a positive perception pattern (due to his/her past interactions and prevailing cooperative security paradigm) and the other actor possesses defensive capacity (see green arrow).

⁵⁰⁴ “the longer a practice has been in existence the deeper it will be embedded in the individual and collective consciousness.” (Wendt, 1999: 311).




Figure 21 Construction of Intent and Balancing Strategies

Eventually, an actor will decide various alliance strategies based on the sensed threat level and the regional/systemic culture. For example, a high-level threat will drive to balancing or bandwagoning under the Hobbesian culture, while it drives to soft balancing under the Kantian or Lockean cultures (3rd degree internalized), where “collective security paradigm” prevails. Contrary to Reiter’s proposition (1994: 515), this study shows that neutrality has relation with the level of external threat. The past lessons are only a part of the analysis. Reiter ignores the other variables of the analysis such as the internal and external cultures, perception pattern, prevailing security paradigm and material capabilities. Accordingly, neutrality does not seem a right strategy based on the past lessons, when an actor perceives a high threat.

In this context, the figure 21 underlines the significant role of the past interactions embedded cultures (systemic, regional, domestic) and existing material capacity in the formation of the intent and threat perception. This model offers an alternative explanation of the securitization process and shows the complexity of the alliance behaviors. Also, it indicates that the alliance formation is a product of the multi-causality and both ideational and material factors affect alliance formation, sustainment, and dissolution. Therefore, one cannot explain alliance strategies only by focusing on certain aspects. If we follow such a confined strategy for the study, the explanatory power of our approach will be less, and our concept will be only valid and generalizable as long as similar temporal and spatial conditions are in effect.

7.5.4. An Analysis Framework

Based on the modeled explanation in figure 21, I suggest the following hybrid analysis framework to study alignment and alliance strategies. This framework integrates material and ideational factors by focusing on the following independent variables: a. subjective security interests, b. perception patterns, c. material capacity. To analyze these variables, one should examine the other underlying factors depicted in table 36.

Subjective Security Interests	Perception Patterns	Material Capacity
Domestic Culture Components of the corporate identity, belief system, norms, values, ethnicity, religion, and sects	Past interactions Formative events, traumas, memories, emotions, collective fear orientation, hatred, enmity, stereotypes	Relational power Scope, domain, weight, costs, means, past employment
Nationalism Myth-Symbol Complex, master narratives, nationality, national character, self-esteem (objective) interests	Regional Culture Ideational and material links, security paradigm, norms, internalization degree, attributed and accepted role identities, trust	Power constellation Power centers, interest groups
Domestic institutions Type identity, lobbies, dominant discourses, regime stability	Systemic Culture Ideational and material links, security paradigm, internalization degree, attributed and accepted role identities, trust	Geography Proximity, location, physical features
Decision-Making Unit Type of decision unit, (unitary, cartelized, and democratic), used analogies, schemata	Securitization process Referent objects, Securitizing actors, Functional actors	Penetration Engagement of intra-regional actors, security, economic, diplomatic and trade relations

Table 36 The Hybrid Analytical Framework

I derived these factors from the existing literature, which I outlined at the beginning of this study. The three variables together with the sub-variables make up an analysis framework for the analysis of the existing dyadic cooperation. It can be used as a guide to determine the character, scope and strength of the cooperation in a spectrum ranging from alignment to the various variants/strategies of alliance formation. This framework seems to be complex as the IR. However, its operationalization is not difficult as it appears. We applied some part of this framework to analyze the alliance and alignment behavior of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the tables 30 and 31 (chapter VI).

This framework combines all relevant factors, which is effectual in the formation and sustainment of cooperation, in a single structure. It is applicable to the studies of alignment and alliance formation behaviors. Its focus on underlying factors might enable scholars to overcome the general shortcomings of the present theories, which focus on the certain aspects or strategies of alliance formation and ignore alignment behavior. This approach aims primarily to disclose the essence of the alignment.

7.5.5. Closing Remarks

Today, the discussion on alliances revolves around certain issues. The realist scholars studied power, threat, system structure, interests, and domestic stability as the motives of alliance formation as well the ways of alliance formation under different conditions. They put their focus on alliances rather than on alignment. This situation is a natural outcome since the realist theories deal with the visible and measurable structures and processes in IR. However, this study showed that all these discussions are futile if academics do not try to capture the essence of alignment. **On this point, I would like to draw some general conclusions:**

- The figure 22 below illustrates that the structure and its elements (unit, culture, relations) are constantly changing. The progressing internalization of the sovereignty norm by the system units led to the increase in relative security and, thus, to the decline of alliance formation. It is remarkable that the scholars tried to explain the certain aspects in line with the contemporaneous alliance logic of their epoch. They usually studied past formative events to infer insights. However, they failed to see the constant change of the system/culture and its constructive effects on the system elements as well as the **multi-causality** behind the events. Despite these failures, they claimed generalization and validity. In this regard, a systemic theory development should be aware of the constant change and multi-causality. Thus, this study showed that a holistic strategy could meet the dynamism of the IR.




Figure 22 The Correlation among Sovereignty, Security and Alliance Formation

- A societal approach to international politics adopts the idea that the elements of the system are malleable and subject to change across time and space. The continuous interactions in the system alter the corporate and type identities that construct new subjective security interests, perception patterns, and security paradigm, thus, affects the alignment behaviors. This mentality allows us to conduct a **dynamic analysis**, which is not possible with the existing system theories.

-To balance against the most powerful state in the system is a false and not a universally valid proposition since alliance behavior has a multi-casual character.⁵⁰⁵ Numerous factors, whether material or ideational affect the actions of the actors, thus, even though power or threat are main factors they are not the only factors of the alliance formation. Accordingly, the move to the states towards a more Kantian culture **diminished the balancing motives** and altered balancing behaviors as seen in the U.S. case.

-This study proved once again that BoT and its other supplements explain only some parts of the reality. A better explanation is only possible when academics consider **sociological** and **psychological** factors. The sociological approaches will tell us the sources of beliefs, ideas, and identities as well as their roles in figuring out how states pursue their interests in international politics while psychological approaches will disclose the formation of the threat perception through focusing on intergroup and intragroup dynamics that shape identities.

-Ideational and material links, as well as emerging collective identity (CI), determine the type of the inter-state cooperation, contrary to the arguments that power and threat determine the type of the cooperation. The spectrum of the inter-state cooperation can be defined from the strongest form to the weakest form as follows: a. integration (pluralistic security community), b. alignment, c. employment of various alliance strategies (see figure 16 and table 38), d. orientation.

- In this context, I propose the term of “orientation” and “integration” to add to the portfolio of alliance literature. Orientation is a pre-stage of alliance formation. At this stage, the actor shows its willingness to involve in a deep cooperation with other actors. For example, Azerbaijan does not have any alliance relationship with the U.S. and EU. However, she expressed her desire to increase the quality of the existing relationships and endeavored to comply with their policies as possible as she can. This behavior of Azerbaijan can be called as “orientation.” On the other hand, the term of “integration” indicates an intensive cooperation resting on a strong CI. Integration is the further step of alignment and might emerge under the

⁵⁰⁵ See Levy &Thompson (2005)

3rd degree internalized Lockean and Kantian cultures. As seen in the case of the EU, a deeply internalized collective action paradigm characterizes integration.

- Contrary to the arguments of scholars, the motives of a cooperation depend on the strength of the formed CI rather than on other aspects such as interests, domestic stability, and external threat. We can argue that the stronger the CI is, the stronger form of cooperation emerges and lasts longer. Most of the alliances do not rest on a strong collective identity, and they are formed there, where the weak ideational and material links intersect, while alignment and integration emerge when the strongest ideational and material links concurrently exist (see figure 16). Most of the alliances have two basic motives: ensuring protection and profit. However, aligned and integrated states focus less on security and look for mutual benefits.

Political Outcome	Strong CI	Moderate CI	Weak CI	Ad-Hoc CI
Integration	+	-	-	-
Alignment	+	-	-	-
Bandwagoning for Protection	-	+	+	+
Balancing against	+	+	+	+
Buck-passing	+	+	-	-
Chain-ganging	-	+	+	-
Hedging	-	-	+	+
Tethering	-	-	+	+
Bandwagoning for Profit (wolves, jackals, piling on)	-	-	+	+

Table 37 The Relationship between Collective Identity and Alliance Strategies

- As depicted in table 37 above, the exercise of the various alliance strategies depends on the strength of the CI. In this regard:

- the actors formed a moderate CI cooperate to balance a strong predator state,
- a weak state may bandwagon with a powerful state, with which it formed a moderate CI, to be safe from its aggression,
- state A may avoid of balancing State B through buck-passing due to formed moderate CI,
- state A may cooperate with the offensive state B through chain-ganging to get more advantage.

However, if actors formed a weak or Ad-Hoc CI, they can also exercise the other less cohesive and committed as well as short-term strategies with respect to the prevailing security paradigm and perception pattern:

- State A seeks to cooperate with a powerful state by making only minor commitments at low-level threats “hedging,”

b. State A cooperates with a rival state to prevent its cooperation and to forge alliances with others against itself “tethering,”

c. State A bandwagons with a victorious state to share the spoils “piling on.”

- The power, cohesion, and sustainability of a formal cooperation also depend on the strength of the formed CI. It can be argued that the stronger CI be, the more cohesive is the alliance institution. The actors organize under different institutions to exert alliance strategies mentioned above. The alliance institutions can be ranked from the most cohesive to the less cohesive as follows: a. pacts (defense, Neutrality, Aggression), b. entente, c. coalition, d. strategic partnership (see figure 16).

-As some other studies suggested, this study proved that small and great powers have different cooperation dynamics.

-In sum, I suggest the collective identity as the major driver of the alignment and the exercise of the various alliance strategies. The past interactions and lessons constitute the source of the culture, identity formation, subjective security interests and perception patterns. The mechanism of alignment is complex that rests on the interplay of these factors with the regional and systemic cultures. A strong CI based on both ideational and material identity links is prone to generate an alignment. Otherwise, moderate and less stronger CIs tend to generate other alliance strategies depending on the formed intent and material capacity.

The study of alliances and alignment is a challenging task. Dingman (1979: 245) points out this challenge as follows:

“The Question of How to Study Alliances does not lend itself to an easy answer. Although I have spent some years in doing so, I cannot provide a checklist of what one should do in analyzing either alliance in general or a particular alliance.”

Taking into consideration his statement, this study aimed to explain the alignment and alliance behavior more systemically by focusing on the underlying factors rather than putting emphasis on other aspects as did the majority of other academics. I tried to show that we cannot understand the genuine and underlying mechanism by developing theories explaining the various aspects of the behavior. I argue that only a holistic and multi-causal approach might offer us more insights in our endeavor to discover the reality. As a result, as demonstrated in the chapters IV, V, and VI, this approach offered more insights to explain the anomalies explained in chapter III.

Throughout the study, I strived to explain the research question and other sub-questions. Under this aspiration, this study contributed to other studies in the alliance literature by:

a. developing a threat estimation model and explaining the formation of perception patterns (chapter IV), b. showing the role of identities in the alignment and framing a concept on identity links (chapter V), c. explaining alignment dynamics (chapter VI), d. distinguishing alignment from the alliance, e. offering “integration” and “orientation” as new terms for the alliance terminology, f. framing the alignment and alliance formation mechanisms, g. suggesting a holistic analytical framework that combines ideational and material factors.

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Interviews

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Interview-I	High-Level Armenian Diplomat	30.10.2013	Vienna
Interview-II	High-Level Azeri Diplomat	20.03.2014	Vienna
Interview-III	Prof.Dr. P. Terrence Hopmann	18.03.2014	Vienna
Interview-IV	High-Level OSCE Official	12.06.2014	Baku
Interview-V	High-Level OSCE Official	01.11.2013	Vienna
Interview-VI	High-Level Russian Diplomat	17.06.2014	Vienna
Interview-VII	High-Level Turkish Diplomat	02.06.2014	Vienna
Interview-VIII	An Azeri Deputy	13.06.2014	Baku
Interview-IX	Dr. Ferhad Mammedov (Director of Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan-SAM)	12.06.2014	Baku
Interview-X	An official from MFA Azerbaijan	13.06.2014	Baku

Abbreviations

AAA	Armenian Assembly of America
ACP	Armenian Communist Party
ADL	Armenian Democratic Liberal Organization
ANCA	Armenian National Committee of America
ANM	Armenian National Movement
APF	Azerbaijan Popular Front
ARF	Armenian Revolutionary Federation
ARP	Armenian Revolutionary Party
APNM	Armenian Pan-National Movement
AzCP	Azerbaijan Communist Party
BoP	Balance of Power Theory
BoT	Balance of Threat Theory
BSCO	Black Sea Cooperation Organization
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIS	Commonwealth of Independence States
CORF	Collective Operational Reaction Forces of CSTO
CRRC	The Caucasus Research Resource Centers
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CST	Collective Security Treaty
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements
DPs	Displaced persons
EACU	Eurasian Customs Union
EaP	Eastern Partnership
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization

ENI	European Neighborhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
EurAsEC	Euro-Asian Economic Community
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova
INOGATE	Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to EU
MTR	Military-Technical Revolution
NIP	National Indicative Program
NSS	National Security Strategy
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
OMON	Azerbaijani Interior Ministry Forces
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PKK	Kurdish Workers Party
SCP	South Caucasus Pipeline
SCT	Self-Categorization Theory
SIT	Social Identity Theory
TIKA	Turkish Economic Development Agency
TRACECA	Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia
TSS	Traditional Security Studies
TURKPA	Parliamentary Assembly of the Turkic Speaking Countries

Annex B

Alliance Studies and Theories

Period	Theory/ Concept/ Study/	Explanatory Variables	Definition	Aspects of Cooperation			Hypothesis/ Arguments	Level of Analysis	Empirical Basis	Importance/ Contribution
				commitment	engagement	character				
C O L D W A R	Liska 1962		Wide	not defined	Formal	Security	Weaker states align themselves with core powers for the sake of protecting themselves from a potential adversary, achieving status, and stability.	Unit	Realism/ Bipolarity	The first major study in alliance literature.
	Morgenthau 1967	Distribution of capabilities	Narrow	not defined	Formal	Security	States seeking to improve their own power standing on the world arena could resort to three options : a build-up of armaments, adding their influence to that of other states, or preventing the adversary from obtaining the power of other states.	System	Realism/ Multipolarity	Shaping realist thinking in the field of alliance theory.
	Rothstein 1968	Small power's behavior	Wide	not defined	Formal	Security	Small Powers are something more than or different from Great Powers.	Unit	Realism/ Multipolarity	The role and importance of small nations

Alliance Studies and Theories

Period	Theory/ Concept/ Study/	Explanatory Variables	Definition	Aspects of Cooperation			Hypothesis/ Arguments	Level of Analysis	Empirical Basis	Importance/ Contribution
				commitment	engagement	character				
C O L D W A R	Holsti, Hopmann, Sullivan 1973, 1985	ideology, political stability, geographical dispersion, size, goals, and international conflict	Wide	not defined	Formal	Security	They test various propositions emerged in alliance literature.	System/ Unit	Realism/ Balance of power, loose bipolar and tight bipolar.	
	Waltz 1979	Distribution of power	Wide	not defined	not defined	Military/ Security	<i>States balance the strongest power</i> Balancing (power) Bandwagoning (power)	System	Structural Realism/ Bipolarity	Vast impact on the development of other theories
	Walt 1987 Balance of Threat	Distribution of threat	Wide	changeable	Formal/ informal	Military/ Security	States balance the threat Balancing (threat) Bandwagoning (threat)	System	Structural Realism/ Bipolarity	Threat: Aggregate power, Geographical proximity, Offensive capabilities and Perceived intentions.

Succeeding Theories of Balance of Power Concept

Period	Theory/ Concept/ Study/	Explanatory Variables	Definition	Aspects of Cooperation			Hypothesis/ Arguments	Level of Analysis	Empirical Basis	Importance/ Contribution
				commitment	engagement	character				
P O S T C O L D W A R	Offensive realism' (Mearsheimer 2001)	External variables/ behavior and outcome	Narrow	not defined	Formal (defense pacts)	Military	Direct power optimizing to increase their own position or indirect power optimizing to keep others down	System	Structural Realism/ unbalanced multipolarity	A theoretical rationale for revisionist state behavior
	Balance of interests and underbalancing (Schweller 1998, 2006)	Domestic variables / the behavior of states	Wide	not defined	Formal and informal (Aggression and defense pacts)	Military and non-military	Interest of states and the trade off between internal and external stability determine alignment	System and Unit	Neoclassical realism/ unipolarity	Strategies : ✓ underbalancing ✓ nonbalancing, ✓ appropriate balancing ✓ overbalancing. Domestic factors to alliance theory
	Alliance security dilemma (Snyder 1997)	External variables/ Alliances as the independent variable	Narrow	not defined	Formal (defense pacts)	Military	Formation phase is mainly determined by the structural variable and management phase is mainly determined by the multipolar alliance security dilemma	System	Structural Realism/ Multipolarity and bipolarity	Elaboration of intra-alliance cooperation/ alliance security dilemma

Succeeding Theories of Balance of Power Concept

Period	Theory/ Concept/ Study/	Explanatory Variables	Definition	Aspects of Cooperation			Hypothesis/ Arguments	Level of Analysis	Empirical Basis	Importance/ Contribution
				commitment	engagement	character				
P O S T C O L D W A R	Trade-off model & game theory (Morrow 1991; Smith 1996)	Internal and cognitive factors	Narrow	entente, non-aggression and aggression pacts	Formal	Military	Alliances increase the probability of third-party intervention in wars alliances are the means to change status quo	Unit	Structural Realism/ Unipolarity	Division between small and major states / asymmetrical and symmetrical alliances
	Model of unipolarity (Hansen 2000)	External factors Structural changes	Wide	not defined	Formal	Military economic political	Under unipolarity, states follow a strategy of free riding	System	Structural Realism/ Unipolarity	Adds the layer of unipolarity to the analysis frame of neorealist theory
	Soft balancing (Paul et. al. 2004, Pape 2005)	External factors	Wide		Formal or Informal	not defined	hard balancing can be both to risky and costly, and therefore not a rational strategy to follow	System	Structural Realism/ Unipolarity	Four indicators on measuring soft balancing
	Constellation theory (Mouritzen & Wivel 2005)	Internal factors: geopolitics locational or spatial attributes	Wide	not defined	Formal	not defined	Foreign policy can be explained as a result of their present and past locations/ States will most often balance locally	Unit	Structural Realism/ Unipolarity	✓ non-pole powers ✓ power balancing at system and threat balancing at regional level ✓ reformulation of polarity

Succeeding Theories of Balance of Threat Theory

Period	Theory/ Concept/ Study/	Explanatory Variables	Definition	Aspects of Cooperation			Hypothesis/ Arguments	Level of Analysis	Empirical Basis	Importance/ Contribution
				commitment	engagement	character				
P O S T C O L D W A R	Curvilinear threat relation (Weitsman 2004)	External and perceptual threats	Wide	defense pacts, aggression pacts, entente and non-aggression pacts	Formal or Informal	Military	Different levels of threat promote different alliance behavior and that there is a link between why states enter into the alliance and the cohesion	System	Structural Realism/ Multipolarity	Four potential state strategies: hedge, tether, balance and bandwagon distinguishing between wartime alliances and peacetime alliances
	Omnibalancing (Larson 1991; David 1991; Harknett & Van Den Berg 1997; Miller & Toritsyn 2005)	Internal threats	Wide	not defined	not defined	Security	The most powerful determinant of alignment is the rational calculation of leaders. Alignment is driven by a reaction to the most pressing threat—external, internal, or interrelated	Unit/ National leaders	Structural Realism/ Bipolarity	The interaction between the distribution of systemic and domestic threats cognitive condition of fear focus on third world states
	National economy and domestic stability (Levy & Barnett 1991)	Domestic political economical factors	Wide	not defined	Formal or Informal	Security	Domestic factors can lead to alliance formation. The resources is the determinant for the selection of ally.	Unit	Structural Realism combined with liberalism, and constructivism/ Unipolarity	National structures (interplay among economical, political and external security threats)

Other Approaches

Period	Theory/ Concept/ Study/	Explanatory Variables	Definition	Aspects of Cooperation			Hypothesis/ Arguments	Level of Analysis	Empirical Basis	Importance/ Contribution
				commitment	engagement	character				
	Clash of Civilizations (Huntington 1996)	Culture, Religion	not defined	not defined	not defined	not defined	The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.	Unit	Realism combined with cultural aspect/ Multipolarity	The role of identity and cultural division in the emergence of conflicts and alliance formations.
	Learning theory (Reiter 1994, 1996, 1998)	Experiences from formative events in the past/ Beliefs about alliance	Narrow	not defined	Formal	Military	Systemic wars are formative events that determine minor powers' beliefs concerning whether neutrality or alliance with great powers is preferable.	Unit/ National leaders	Enlightened Realism	Individual experiences are powerful determinant of alliance choice/ States behave differently than others under the same circumstances.
	Perceptions and foreign earning (Jervis 1976; Levy 1994)	Past experiences, perceptions and beliefs	not defined	not defined	not defined	not defined	State behavior can be explained through examination of the perceptions and calculations of the top decision-makers. Individuals learn from experience, and their inferences from experience influence their behavior.	Unit/ National leaders	Social Psychology	The role of beliefs and perceptions in IR

Abstract

A comprehensive literature survey showed that the present research on alliances is not able to explain **the essence of alliance formation and alignment**. Because the mainstream of these research fails to consider the role of ideational factors due to their realist ontology.

In this context, the Balance of Power and Balance of Threat Theories and their numerous variants emerge as the major approaches. However, Walt (1987)'s neorealist theory **Balance of Threat (BoT)** is regarded as the most accepted approach in the literature. It offers rich analytical tools to understand and explain the motives of the alliance formation based on four variables: *aggregate power*, *proximity*, *offensive capability*, and *offensive intentions*. The last variable requires an ideational interpretation that makes BoT Theory promising one to advance it on the ideational ground.

Accordingly, the analysis of the intentions was made by using constructivist tools since they offer more insights to explain the construction of the social issues such as past interactions, identities, perceptions, unit-regional-system level cultures, interests, and material factors. Furthermore, the analysis of the past lessons has been conducted with the help of the Learning Theory (Reiter, 1996).

In this context, a case study focusing two historical periods has been designed to understand the effect of narratives, myths, analogies, fear, enmity/amity, hatred, and roles in the construction of identities, perceptions, and subjective security interests.

The study showed the presence of a causal and constructive link among identity, threat perception, and alignment. The investigation proved that the traumatic past lessons, conflicting identities, and non-cooperative regional security paradigm generate negative perception patterns, which constitute the primary source of the security dilemma. The proposed Threat Estimation Model indicates that the negative perception patterns and offensive capability generally lead to high-level threat estimation. Additionally, the empirical findings demonstrated that identity, which is the referent object of the societal securitization, gives the meaning to material needs and ignites the securitization processes in the other sectors.

The study examined security dynamics at three levels: domestic, intra-regional and external to figure out the alignment dynamics by defining identity layout, role structures, and prevailing security paradigm in the region.

Accordingly, the study demonstrated that an alignment could emerge on the ideational and material links or both. The study found that there are four types of cooperation in respect to the strength of the Collective Identity (CI).

The study identified the CI as the major driver of the alignment and the central motive behind the different alliance strategies. Based on the strength of the CI, two different mechanisms might operate. A strong CI based on both ideational and material identity links is prone to activate an alignment mechanism. Otherwise, the moderate and less strong CIs tend to operate alliance formation mechanism that generates various alliance strategies such as balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging. Therefore, scholars shall be aware of the difference between the alignment and alliance formation.

Considering the empirical findings, the study outlines an analytical framework that can be used as a guide to determine the characteristic, scope and strength of the cooperation in a spectrum ranging from alignment to the various variants/strategies of alliance formation. It combines all relevant factors, which is effectual in the formation and sustainment of a cooperation, in a single structure.

A societal approach to international politics adopts the idea that the elements of the system are malleable and subject to change across time and space. The continuous interactions in the system alter the corporate and type identities that construct new subjective security interests, perception patterns, and security paradigm, thus, affect the alignment behaviors. This mentality allows us to conduct a dynamic analysis based on the multi-causality. Based on this approach, this study contributed to other studies in the alliance literature by:

a. developing a threat estimation model and explaining the formation of perception patterns (chapter IV), b. showing the role of identities in the alignment and framing a concept on identity links (chapter V), c. explaining alignment dynamics (chapter VI), d. distinguishing alignment from the alliance, e. offering “integration” and “orientation” as new terms for the alliance terminology, f. framing the alignment and alliance formation mechanisms, g. suggesting a holistic analytical framework that combines ideational and material factors.

Abstrakt

Eine umfassende Literaturerhebung ergab, dass die vorliegende Allianzforschung nicht in der Lage ist, indem das Wesen der Allianzbildung und -ausrichtung zu erklären. Weil der Mainstream dieser Forschung die Rolle der ideellen Faktoren aufgrund ihrer realistischen Ontologie nicht berücksichtigt.

In diesem Zusammenhang entstehen die Balance of Power und Balance of Threat Theories und ihre zahlreichen Varianten als die großen Ansätze. Walt (1987) 's neorealistische Theorie Balance of Threat (BoT) gilt jedoch als der am meisten akzeptierte Ansatz in der Literatur. Es bietet reiche analytische Werkzeuge, um die Motive der Allianzbildung auf der Grundlage von vier Variablen zu verstehen und zu erklären: Aggregat Macht, Nähe, Offensive Fähigkeit und Offensive Intentionen. Die letzte Variable erfordert eine ideologische Interpretation, welche macht die BoT-Theorie entwicklungsfähig.

Dementsprechend wurde die Analyse der Intentionen unter Verwendung von konstruktivistischer Ansätze gemacht, da sie mehr Einblicke bieten, um den Aufbau der sozialen Themen wie vergangene Interaktionen, Identitäten, Wahrnehmungen, Einheit-regionale Systemniveau-Kulturen, Interessen und materielle Faktoren zu erklären. Darüber hinaus wurde die Analyse der historischen Erfahrungen mit Hilfe der Lerntheorie (Reiter, 1996) durchgeführt.

In diesem Zusammenhang wurde eine Fallstudie mit zwei historischen Perioden entworfen, um die Wirkung von Erzählungen, Mythen, Analogien, Angst, Feindschaft / Freundschaft, Hass und Rollen in der Konstruktion von Identitäten, Wahrnehmungen und subjektiven Sicherheitsinteressen zu verstehen.

Die Studie zeigte das Vorhandensein einer kausalen und konstruktiven Verbindung zwischen Identität, Bedrohungswahrnehmung und Allianzbildung. Die Untersuchung ergab, dass die traumatischen historischen Erfahrungen, die widersprüchlichen Identitäten und das nicht kooperative regionale Sicherheitsparadigma erzeugen negative Wahrnehmungsmuster, die begründet die primäre Quelle des Sicherheitsdilemma. Das vorgeschlagene Bedrohungsschätzungsmodell zeigt an, dass die negativen Wahrnehmungsmuster und die Offensivfähigkeit zu einer hochgradigen Bedrohungsschätzung führen. Darüber hinaus zeigten die empirischen Befunde, dass Identität, die das Referenzobjekt der gesellschaftlichen Verbriefung ist, den materiellen Bedürfnissen den Sinn gibt und die Verbriefungsprozesse in den anderen Sektoren auslöst.

Die Studie untersuchte die Sicherheitsdynamiken auf drei Ebenen: inländisch, intra-regional und extern, um die Allianzbildungsdynamik herauszufinden, indem sie Identitätslayout, Rollenstrukturen und vorherrschendes Sicherheitsparadigma in der Region definiert.

Dementsprechend zeigte die Studie, dass eine Allianzbildung auf den ideellen und materiellen Verbindungen oder auf beiden entstehen könnte. Die Studie ergab, dass es vier Arten von Zusammenarbeit in Bezug auf die Stärke der Kollektiven Identität (KI) auftreten.

Die Studie identifizierte den KI als Haupttreiber der Ausrichtung, Allianzbildung und das zentrale Motiv hinter den verschiedenen Allianzstrategien. Basierend auf der Stärke des KI können zwei verschiedene Mechanismen funktionieren. Ein starker KI, der gleichzeitig auf idealen und materiellen Identitätsverbindungen basiert, aktiviert einen Ausrichtungsmechanismus. Ansonsten, die moderaten und weniger starken KI aktiviert einen Allianz-Formationsmechanismus, der generiert verschiedene Allianz-Strategien wie Balanzierung, Bandwagoning und Hedging. Deshalb müssen sich die Akademischen über den Unterschied zwischen der Ausrichtung und der Allianzbildung informieren.

In Anbetracht der empirischen Befunde, die Studie skizziert einen analytischen Rahmen, der als Leitfaden für die Bestimmung der Charakteristik, des Umfangs und der Stärke der Zusammenarbeit, welche schwankt in einem Spektrum von der Ausrichtung bis die Übung von verschiedenen Varianten/Strategien der Allianzbildung, verwendet werden kann. Es verbindet alle relevanten Faktoren, die in der Bildung und der Aufrechterhaltung der Zusammenarbeit wirksam sind, in einer einzigen Struktur.

Ein gesellschaftlicher Ansatz für die internationale Politik nimmt die Vorstellung an, dass die Elemente des Systems verformbar sind und sich über Zeit und Raum verändern können. Die kontinuierlichen Interaktionen im System verändern die Gesellschaft - und Typidentitäten, die konstruieren neue subjektive Sicherheitsinteressen, Wahrnehmungsmuster und Sicherheitsparadigmen und somit beeinflussen das Ausrichtungsverhalten. Diese Mentalität ermöglicht es uns, eine dynamische Analyse auf der Grundlage der Mehrfachkausalität durchzuführen. Basierend auf diesem Ansatz, diese Studie hat zu anderen Studien in der Allianz-Literatur beigetragen durch:

- a. Entwicklung eines Bedrohungsschätzungsmodells und Erläuterung der Bildung von Wahrnehmungsmustern (Kapitel IV),
- b. Darstellung die Rolle der Identitäten in der Ausrichtung und Gestaltung eines Konzepts auf Identitätslinks (Kapitel V),
- c. Erläuterung der Ausrichtungsdynamik (Kapitel VI),
- d. Unterscheidung die Ausrichtung von der Allianzbildung,
- e. Anführung "Integration" und "Orientierung" als neue Begriffe für die Allianz Terminologie, f.

Framing der Ausrichtungs- und Allianzbildungsmechanismen, g. Entwurf einen ganzheitlichen analytischen Rahmen, der vereint ideologische und materielle Faktoren.

Curriculum Vitae

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