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1. Introduction

In the beginning of 2018 I met a journalist from THOMSON REUTERS in Lisbon. Portugal belongs together with Greece and Ireland to the countries that suffered the most from the international financial crisis unfolding after the year of 2008. REUTERS has a team in Lisbon which covers mainly economic issues and is one of the main press agencies to the Portuguese Press. We talked about the European Crisis, which ten years later seemed to be nearly a thing of the past. I asked about its reasons, its measures and about the political and social consequences from his point of view. The journalist told me a story which I have read before: the austerity measures that were imposed by the ESFS, European Commission and the IMF in exchange for loans[1] to Portugal were too hard and too deep, nevertheless they were necessary. The introduction of austerity seemed *common-sense* to him. According to him the success of the left-wing government that came into power in 2015 was based mainly on those measures of austerity. Their intelligent softening of the measures just reinforced its potential. It still seems to be a compelling story: the hardship of austerity is the only way towards reasonable economic behavior. The journalist turned to me and said again: "*This is common sense*." The main question is: *Where does this story comes from*?

In the introduction of his book Language and Power, Norman Fairclough depicts a similar story from Britain for the year of 2010. He writes about the conservative government, which at that time introduced austerity in the means of mainly cutting public spending as a response to the crisis. He quotes how they attributed their measures, for instance: "*as a basis for building upon the 'ruins of an economy built on debt' […] 'a new and balanced economy. […] This strategy is 'tough' […] but 'fair', that we are all in this together and that everyone will be asked to contribute, but the richest more than the poorest*." (Fairclough, 2015, p. 3) Fairclough contrasts the statements with research by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, that shows that poorer groups of society would be hit hardest by the cuts in public spending. He concludes: "*We might put the point more strongly: this government serves the interest of the rich (including the bankers) by dumping the costs of a recession caused by the rich onto the poor, while allowing the rich to get richer. This is not an extreme or marginal view, it can be found for example in the opinion columns of the Financial Times over the past few years, not occasionally, but regularly*." (Fairclough, 2015, p. 4) The main question becomes wider: *Where does this story comes from and how does it dominate the discussion even though it is questioned sometimes?*

[1] European Financial Stability Facility

The first minister of finance of Greece after the January 2015 election, which had been won by the opposition party Syriza, wrote a book about his negotiations in the months after, about his view on the European Crisis in Greece and about austerity. It is Yanis Varoufakis, who wrote:

> "*By early 2010, some five years before I took office, the Greek state was bankrupt. A few months later the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the Greek government organized the world´s greatest bankruptcy cover-up. How do you cover up a bankruptcy? By throwing good money after bad. […] the European Union and the IMF extended to the broke Greek government around €110 billion, the largest loan in history. Simultaneously a group of enforcers known as the troika*[2] *[…] was dispatched to Athens to impose measures guaranteed to reduce Greece´s national income and place most of the burden of the debt upon the weakest Greeks. […] Forcing new loans upon the bankrupt on condition that they shrink their income is nothing short of cruel and unusual punishment. Greece was never bailed out […], the EU and IMF effectively condemned Greece to a modern version of the Dickensian debtor´s prison and threw away the key.*" (Varoufakis, 2017, p. 19)

With his view Varoufakis does not only question where the dominant story comes from and how it dominates the discussion, but he questions that it makes sense at all. Alternative stories exist, and this thesis wants to shed light on what stories are there, where do they come from (who spreads them), and how do they compete in the public arenas?

To begin the exploration of these questions it is important to start with the crisis itself. What does it mean? The word derives from Greek and originally described a turning point or a moment of decision. It implies that in challenging a crisis, there is the chance to change the situation. From a point of view of communication science, a crisis is a non-intentional, negative and problematic situation that threatens in its worst consequence the existence of individuals, organizations or even bigger groups. (Bentele, et al., 2005, p. 591) In their development crises are similar to each other. A cause leads to the crisis, which becomes receiver of media and public attention when it builds up, to only drop after its peak and become normalized. It is then at this point that an analysis and evaluation can be made. (Bentele, et al., 2005, p. 591)

[2] "- so called because they represent three institutions: the European Commission (EC), […] the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)" (Varoufakis, 2017, p. 19)

What has been the situation in the European Union since the year of 2009? What happens has been labelled as “financial crisis” or “economic crisis”. What does this mean? Is it possible to still call this a crisis? What has been done to challenge this crisis? Who were the actors and how did they make up their decisions? How did the media set their attention to these events? What does this mean for decision-making processes?

> *“Our European Union began life under the presumption that to achieve political and social union we must first bind together our economic interests; that economics would lead the way to a united European polity. It was a good idea except that, as the years and the decades went by, a problem emerged: our collective understanding of ‘economics’ became increasingly crude. We slipped into a simplistic mindset according to which the sphere of the economy began decoupling, separating itself from that of politics, of philosophy, of culture. As it did so, the economic sphere acquired massive discursive and social power for itself, thus causing democracy, politics and culture to fade out, to become shadows of their former selves.”* (Varoufakis, 2014, p. Preface to the German edition)

The crisis that has been unfolding in Europe since 2009 is a complex issue with social, cultural, economic, and political perspectives. First this thesis will use the term “European Crisis” (see chapter 1.2) because narrowing a complex and multi-dimensional problem through usage of the terms “financial” or “economic” does not help to find adequate interdependencies between the elements and structures in this crisis. It is no less than a “European Crisis”. The question that this thesis asks is which perspectives have been taken to approach the problem of the crisis. What has been identified as the cause for the problems? What has been done to address the problems? Who made the decisions? An important resource and actor in this field are the mass media, for they enable communication in society, but also trigger the processes of information and uncertainty that requires administrations, elites and the public to rely again on the information of the mass media. (Luhmann, 1995, p. 149) This means that this thesis heads for an analysis of media coverage, and thus by analyzing the case of the Greek election of 2015, which is dominated by the issue of the European Crisis. The Greek election was a turning point in the history of the European Crisis, because it challenged the dominating story of austerity through the rise of the opposition party Syriza. Syriza understood itself as being mainly anti-austerity and spear-headed together with Podemos in Spain a new and opposing wave of social and anti-austerity parties and movements. (della Porta, et al., 2017, p. 220) Syriza won the election of January 2015 and had the chance to introduce alternative stories

to the public arena in Greece and in the whole of Europe, as their success and compete for power was covered by all main media outlets.

The aim of this thesis is not only to work out theoretical and empirical findings for media coverage in the European Crisis. Finding structures and perspectives leads to the question for alternatives. Alternative perspectives, opinions, coverage and decisions that yet have not been taken into account enough. There is more than one perspective on what happens in the European Crisis. If this thesis can show, that specific perspectives dominate the interpretation of the European Crisis, then it is up to further thinking how and what can be changed to approach the crisis in an appropriate holistic way. Especially European issues require a holistic approach. And especially the people of Europe demand alternative approaches, as they suffer from political decisions and economic decline. Europe is a continent, whose history dates back more than thousands of years and where people have been in constant exchange and interdependency since. Analysis without a perspective on the intertwined history, culture and values will lead to insufficient results and a mechanistic understanding of a problem which goes beyond its mere economic outcome. The European Union itself had been established in its beginning as an economic association, but its main purpose was peace.

1.1 The meaning of the European Crisis – Economic and political implications in the Euro Area

The Project of European Integration through political and economic cooperation and the foundation of a supranational Union, which today is the European Union, does not have a precedent in history. Having been started under the impression of two world wars, which devastated Europe in the 20th century, European integration has been a success and has provided at least to its member states peace and prosperity. However, with the global financial crisis of 2009 this success came to an abrupt halt. Many members of the European Union suffered from severe economic fallbacks and millions of people lost their work and money in the crisis. The construction of the common currency bound their members in a specific way, so that single countries could not deal with their economic problems alone anymore and needed the solidarity of their partners in the Euro-Area and the European Union. The most affected countries are Greece, Portugal and Ireland. (Hallerberg, 2011, p. 128)

Integration in the European Union (EU) reached a new level with establishing the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and its common currency EURO in 1999. From the beginning hopes and fears have been attached to this highly emotional project, not all member-states of the EU participated in. (Hodson, 2011, p. 1) Although the EURO was a success in the first ten years of existence and absorbed some of the shocks of the global financial crisis of 2009 from its member-states, with the years of 2010 until today the Euro Area has experienced an economic downfall with deep economic and political implications. (Hallerberg, 2011, p. 128) This development has its roots in the global financial crisis of 2009 and would be seen as its extension. (European Commission, 2009, p. 10) Being seen as an extension of the financial crisis into a sovereign-debt-crisis, it is primarily measured with economic figures as debt levels, changes of GDP, unemployment rates, etc. So are identified the actors as being those which are capable to deal with financial, macroeconomic and structural policies to address causes and effects of the crisis; especially governments of nation-states, the ECB, the IMF and the European Union Commission, who all became creditors of the founded financial aid programs. (European Commission, 2009, p. 3) Scholars have to ask beyond this economic perspective for cultural, sociological and political conditions and impacts. Though the economic fundament of a society creates underlying structures, a crisis of these structures has to be seen with diverse patterns of thinking and perception to acknowledge occupations for solving it through holistic approaches. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 183) This crisis affects societies as a whole and the interdependencies of its elements are crucial for an understanding of its dynamics and development.

Going back to ask for the elements and interdependencies in the EMU, it becomes clear, that policy-making in monetary matters differs a lot from other matters in the EU. While the European Parliament and the Council have little influence, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been established as a powerful actor. Beyond that there is no unified representation of the euro area. Decision-making in the EMU happens in a decentralized approach (in contrast to the Community method in the EU). (Hodson, 2011, pp. 3-5) These developments in the EMU and the fact that a higher degree of public integration, which is seen by policy-makers as crucial to deal with the crisis and is achieved by agreements on policy goals, can just be made by the elected heads of national governments have led to a situation in which nation-states regained a very powerful role in the crisis. (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2011, p. 9) This happens in contrast to the limitations that the single currency imposes on national Governments of crisis-stricken countries to react on a macro-economic level, because they have no influence on their own currency. (Boeri & Jimeno, 2016, p. 32) By this the single currency and the structures of policy-making in the Euro Area reinforce powerful members of the Euro-Area as even more powerful in dealing with the crisis on a European level.

When nation-states belong to the most powerful actors in this crisis, the conditions of decision-making have to be examined in this context. Paul Krugman[3] put these conditions into a polemic anecdote: "*When I was young and naïve, I believed that important people took positions based on careful consideration of the options. Now I know better. Much of what Serious People believe rests on prejudices, not analysis. And these prejudices are subject to fads and fashions"* (Krugman, 2010)

Policy-makers and the media are two main actors in this situation. News media give a picture of what happens, who is involved, what has to be done and what has been done with which outcome. They inform the public and policy-makers, while policy-makers try to influence the media on the other side due to their reliance on the public opinion. (Entman, 2004, p. 18) An important aspect about the role of the media regarding an impartial and factual approach to European Union matters has been the liberalization of the media and the influence of private corporations. They "*undermined the efforts for peer understanding among member states as well as top down initiatives to make the polity easier to navigate informationally."* (Lodge & Sarikakis, 2013, p. 49) For a further examination of the impacts of austerity on the Greek media landscape see chapter 1.1.4.

1.1.1 Economic key figures

The crisis began in the aftermath of the *global financial crisis* in the year of 2010, when Greece lost its ability to refinance its debts at the free markets. It had to agree with the European Commission, ECB and the IMF over financial loans in May of 2010, which included reforms of the political and economic system of the debtor country demanded by the creditors. Soon the crisis reached Ireland and Portugal, which made similar agreements with the so-called *Troika* (European Commission-ECB-IMF) and got credits through financial aid programs; Ireland in November of 2010 and Portugal in May of 2011. The programs were institutionalized in the network of EMU actors through the introduction of the EFSF, a funding for rescue. To gain access to the financial loans Greece, Ireland and Portugal had to impose strict austerity measures under supervision of the Troika, which had the economic effects of deepening recessions in the affected countries. Market speculation reached new heights in the end of 2011 when Italy and Spain had to pay high interest rates for their bonds. (Armingeon & Baccaro, 2011, p. 32)

[3] * 1953, Professor of Economics and International Affairs, Nobel Prize winner of 2008 and influential economist, columnist for *The New York Times*

In the following table the key figures for GDP growth are depicted for the Euro Area and selected member states. It is obvious that Greece suffered a deep and long-lasting decline that was reinforced by austerity measures. (Boeri & Jimeno, 2016, p. 42)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
European Union - 28 countries	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Euro area (19 countries)	108	108	108	107	107	107	106
Germany	117	120	123	124	124	126	124
Ireland	129	130	130	131	132	136	178
Greece	94	85	75	72	72	71	69
Spain	100	96	92	91	89	90	91
France	108	108	108	107	108	107	106
Italy	106	104	104	101	98	96	95
Austria	127	126	128	132	131	130	129
Portugal	82	82	77	75	76	77	77
United Kingdom	108	108	106	108	108	109	109

Figure 1: GDP per capita in PPS (Index EU28 = 100) (Eurostat, 2019)

1.1.2 Effects of the crisis on youth unemployment

One of the main effects of the European Crisis has been the cross-national divergence of unemployment rates. The driver for this divergence is youth unemployment. Especially in the southern European country's youth unemployment reaches more than 40% in 2014.[4] (Boeri & Jimeno, 2016, p. 32) At the same time the share of young people of the total population declines. (Hernanz & Jimeno, 2017, p. 8) These developments make a large portion of those young people feeling excluded from participation in society, be it economically, politically and socially. (European Commission, 2016, p. 3) The main responses to this crisis are introduced on a national level by the member states. In this context it has to be taken into consideration that with declining shares and less representation the young do not belong to a powerful group, but to one of the weakest groups that especially needs protection from a European Union which stated in 2016 the following: "*Tackling the situation of young people on the labour market is also a question of social fairness and, ultimately, of the credibility of Europe's social and economic model*." (European Commission, 2016, p. 3)

[4] This figure compares the employed and unemployed in the labour force, still there are more people that have not registered for employment and are economically inactive, out of the labour force. For the age group 15-24 in the EU-28 this number reaches more than 33 Million, compared to a labour force of 24 Million (Eurostat, 2019)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Germany	11	10	9	8	8	8	7
Ireland	25	28	30	31	27	23	20
Greece	26	33	45	55	58	52	50
Spain	38	42	46	53	56	53	48
France	24	23	23	24	25	24	25
Italy	25	28	29	35	40	43	40
Austria	11	10	9	9	10	10	11
Portugal	25	28	30	38	38	35	32
United Kingdom	19	20	21	21	21	17	15

Figure 2: Youth unemployment rate (15-24 years old) - % of active population in the same age (Eurostat, 2019)

1.1.3 The Development in Greece

To get a realistic summary of the EU-IMF-ECB measures on Greece, a 2013 Evaluation of the Brussels Think-tank Bruegel, which lead directly into a committee study of the European Parliament, expresses clearly the outcome: "*the programs have so far been […] unsuccessful in Greece, which is on a totally different trajectory to the other two countries [Ireland and Portugal]. In Greece, early assumptions by the Troika about the ability of the economy to adjust and of the Greek political-administrative system to implement program measures proved unrealistic. The subsequent European debate on Greek exit from the euro area further hindered progress in Greece*." (Pisani-Ferry, et al., 2013, p. 9) This conclusion shows not only the ineffectiveness of the economic program and austerity imposed on Greece, it also leads to the question, why the program continued and has not been changed substantially. Memorandums of Understanding focused on fiscal austerity, welfare cuts and wage reduction. These cuts, mainly cutting unemployment and health benefits, reducing minimum wage and increasing retirement age, had been imposed without taking into account that they have opposing effects in relation to unemployment, GDP and debt sustainability. The results of the program have proved to be devastating for citizens, especially by harming less protected groups. (Boeri & Jimeno, 2016, p. 42) Young people faced increased levels of unemployment. The youth unemployment rose from 26% in 2009 to 52% in 2014, as it can be seen in fig. 2.

High levels of unemployment, low levels of income, high levels of emigration, caused by cuts into social and health budgets as demanded by international creditors characterize the economic and social situation in the countries that fell under the guidance of ECB-IMF-European Commission. This social and economic crisis, which had its worst consequences in Greece, sets the stage for the election of 2015, which will be analyzed by this work.

Even in 2018 analyses concluded the same for the developments in Greece. An in depth-analysis requested by the European Parliament concluded in 2018: "*Greece's unemployment rate still remains the highest within the EU and continues to affect mainly women and young people*". (Angerer, et al., 2018, p. 4) The main aim for all measures and projections under the perspective of a sovereign debt crisis, as the crisis was labelled for Greece, has been to reach sustainable debt levels for Greece. It still is considered unsustainable. (Angerer, et al., 2018, p. 2)

1.1.4 The Greek media under austerity

The media system in Greece, being grouped together with similar systems in France, Italy, Spain and Portugal by Hallin and Mancini in 2004 as the 'Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model', is characterized by a stronger influence of the state, higher degrees of clientelism, commentary-oriented journalism and deregulation. Privatization has been loosening the bonds between the media and the state. (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 282) Newspaper readership in Greece is one of the lowest in the world, Television and social media have a more important influence. (Lekakis, 2017, p. 30) The media in Greece suffered already before the crisis from oversupply and inefficient organizations, the concentration of ownership was and is still high in Greece. The European Crisis deeply affected the Greek media landscape and put enormous pressure on this already fragile and dependent system. Daily circulation of newspapers had fallen from 400,000 copies in 2005 to 216,000 copies in 2011. (Iosifidis & Boucas, 2015, p. 5) Consequences have been lower wages and higher degrees of unemployment for journalists, and the closure of several outlets after the years of 2010. During 2013 the only public broadcaster ERT and its subsequent television, radio and online channels had been closed due to budget cuts, which had devastating impacts on the media landscape, where domination of private channels increased evermore[5]. (Iosifidis & Boucas, 2015) In this abnormal situation of shrinking audience and funding, surviving became extremely difficult for media outlets. Dependencies between private money, political interests and the media have been reinforced in an atmosphere of fear. Yanis Varoufakis painted an apocalyptic picture of the media dependencies in the Crisis after 2010:

> "T*he bankers now took over the funding of the media […], they kept the media alive by paying them ludicrous sums to advertise their services and more importantly granted them large extend-and-pretend loans […] The triangle of sin was complete: the insolvent media were kept in a zombified condition by zombie banks, which were*

[5] 2015 the new elected Syriza government reopened the ERT public broadcasting

maintained in their undead condition by a bankrupt government, itself preserved in a condition of permanent bankruptcy by the EU and the IMF bailout loans. Is it any wonder that the Bailoutistan media extolled the benefits of the bailout and portrayed its bankers as victims of an unreliable state, while demonizing anyone who dared reveal what was really going on?" (Varoufakis, 2017, p. 55)

Recent research supports this picture, the expression: 'The triangle of sin' is based on the triangle of power (diaploki – deep intertwinement of interests) that served the power of economic actors, including banks, political actors and the media. The banks influence grew throughout the European Crisis. "*Banks invest huge sums in advertising through the press, television, and radio, while the banking system is intertwined with political interests, particularly under the conditions of the "Memorandum" imposed on Greece by the Troika*" (Iosifidis & Boucas, 2015, p. 14) Studies could show the reproduction of dominant discourses in mainstream Greek media, favoring austerity towards other measures and understating the effects on weaker groups of society, e.g. youth unemployment and poorer groups of society. (Lekakis, 2017, p. 30) Mylonas showed in 2014 that Ekathimerini columnists supported in their editorials neo-liberal framing of the Crisis in Greece and focused on symptoms rather than addressing a systemic character of the crisis. Opposition to the austerity measures was seen as a problem. (Mylonas, 2014, p. 371)

1.1.5 Syriza and the Greek political landscape before the 2015 election

Syriza is one of the main actors in the election of January 2015 and its origins and influence on the political landscape of Greece should be explained in this paragraph. The party evolved as a coalition and unitary party for many leftwing movements and parties since its foundation 2004. It incorporates communist traditions, extra-parliamentarian left groups and anti-globalization movements., as well as social-democratic traditions. (Milios, 2016, p. 12) The name means "*coalition of the radical left*". Until 2012, Syriza had a share of around 4% in national elections, while it rose 27% in the 2012 parliamentary election. At the same time the established social democratic party PASOK, who formed a coalition with the conservative Nea Demokratia (ND) fell from 44,9% in 2009 to 13,8% in 2012 and 4,6% in 2015. In January 2015 Syriza won with 36% formed the government together with the right-wing and anti-Euro party ANEL. Syriza positioned itself as anti-establishment and anti-austerity. Its success is strongly connected to the rise of the crisis and Syriza promised to end austerity in Greece. (Milios, 2016, p. 13) Its leader is Alexis Tsipras. His opponent was Antonis Samaras, leading the government and the ruling ND until the 2015 election.

1.2 Research questions for the theoretical approach

Functions of the mass media in a democracy are to inform and orientate the public regarding issues with possible impacts on society. This orientation works through the offer of impartial views, the ideal of a journalist as an objective observer, who is able to explain causes and effects of specific issues. The impossibility of objectivity has been discussed in the field of communication science. It has many roots, be it the conditions of language, the news values which enhance some news to be more newsworthy than others, the psychological aspects of information processing, be it organizational demands, and the aspects of decoding and encoding of messages. The relations between journalists and elites are additionally weakening the achievement of impartial supply of information, because these relations are often cooperative in reality. The expense and effects of this cooperation is the crucial question for scholars, who take the political, media-orientated perspective on society. Especially in foreign affairs the media play a strong role in orientating society and have to be under scientific observation to shed light on the system of elites, governing and non-governing, the media, and the public and their approach to information and decision-making in foreign affairs. (Entman, 2004, p. 2) With regard to these relations, the following chapters try to find theoretical approaches to answer the following research question:

> **What view on the issue of the Greek elections and the European Crisis have been depicted in the European Media coverage?**

To be able to examine this in an empiric study the theoretic outline has to answer the following question:

> **What are the structures and processes of news coverage that are relevant for the European Crisis and the Greek elections in European media?**

1.2.1 Normative approach

Concerning the importance of political issues for societies and individuals, a study about structures, conditions and processes of the media has to go beyond mere description. It has to analyze these conditions and the relations of the involved actors to be able to criticize existing models and develop new aspects or approaches. If the media´s ideal of providing independent and objective information to orientate the public suffers from the given structural restraints, it is needed to find out, which

adjustments are possible to enable the system to fulfill its task better than before. The issue of the Crisis of the European Union affects millions of individuals and its remedies are the outcome of the interplay between different elites, the media, and the public. This importance forces this work to include a normative aim, which asks for the conditions of information, orientation and decision-making and for the developments of balanced approaches to the roles and behavior of the involved actors. Normative and empirical research should complement each other. (Entman, 2004, p. 17)

To be able to criticize existing approaches it is needed to look at, how the ideal model imagines the interplay and conditions of political affairs in society. Independency is one aspect of this ideal model. Therefore the relations between the actors have to be reflected and depicted. Under which conditions can the media provide information which balances asymmetries in the interplay between elites and the public, with the media as the mediator and orientating actor? How much and what kind of information is needed? The structural constraints of the news itself have to be taken into account. This means a reflection of style, the usage of language and pictures, furthermore a reflection about information processing and the interplay of information in the media. Another aspect is the motivation and interests of the actors. This leads to a reflection about elites and the public. What do they want to achieve and to which extent they exert influence on the conditions of information?

2. Theoretic approach

2.1 Common sense in Critical Discourse Analysis

In an attempt towards a holistic approach that examines the relations between elites, media, and the public in different European countries it is crucial to ask for the 'common sense', as demanded in the introduction, which lays the pattern in which relations develop and behavior is grounded. This "*common sense in the service of power*" (Fairclough, 2015, p. 107) in discourses and paradigms sets up the framework for the interdependent relations between elites, media and the public.

Fairclough and his Critical Discourse Analysis investigate the interpretation of texts, e.g. articles in the mass media. According to him, they have to be coherent in two ways: inherently in the text itself and outwardly drawing *"upon those background 'assumptions and expectations'"*. (Fairclough, 2015, p. 102) The recipient has to bring these assumptions into an interpretation and make sense of the text. "*Persuasive discourse and propaganda do this all the time, often in quite obvious ways, for instance, when a journalist begins an article with The Soviet threat to western Europe . . ., she presupposes there is a Soviet threat.*" (Fairclough, 2015, p. 106)[6] Ideology and common sense are strongly connected.[7] Ideology in regard to power relations leads to an understanding of "*common sense in the service of sustaining unequal relations of power*" (Fairclough, 2015, p. 107), though it does so in varying degrees. Besides the power relations, common sense also reinforces cohesion inside social groups. (Fairclough, 2015, p. 107)

The problematic dimension of common sense and relations of power is when it hides those relations and deviates from questioning them, when it shrinks wider problems into individual questions or problems of a specific group. In the case of this thesis a wider problem seems to be shrunk to the problem of a specific country rather than acknowledging a problem that affects all citizens of the European Union. Fairclough states and hints already to categories of following approaches "*that there are social causes, and social remedies, for social problems*" (Fairclough, 2015, p. 108), which challenges the common sense of technical remedies imposed by dominant and powerful groups, as the austerity and neo-liberal measures by the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF in various countries throughout the European Crisis.

[6] Fairclough also states that "Fortunately, readers do not always accept being placed where writers place them!" (Fairclough, 2015, p. 106)

[7] Fairclough relies here on Antonio Gramsci who saw ideology as 'implicit philosophy', as common sense taken for granted for social practice (Fairclough, 2015, p. 107)

An important condition of common sense to be effective is its invisibility. If individuals or groups have experienced negative consequences of a common-sense worldview, they question the ideology behind and common sense as serving power relations becomes visible. This is the reason, that ideologies cannot be brought up "*as explicit elements of the text, but as the background assumptions, which on the one hand lead the text producer to 'textualize' the world in a particular way, and on the other hand lead the interpreter to interpret the text in a particular way*". (Fairclough, 2015, p. 108) The greater one ideology is shared in a society, the greater its effects are. If there are contesting ideologies, which are spread through text production, e.g. in the mass media, they have the capacity to question common sense and its underlying ideology. These contesting ideologies need the support of groups in society, which use their power to spread their ideas and ideologies. This happens mostly through the mass media. (Fairclough, 2015, p. 110) It is still a question of power, that should lead the examination of this thesis.

Fairclough distinguishes between ideology and discourse, which can be flexible towards ideology. "*Discourse is language viewed in a certain way, as a part of the social process (part of social life) which is related to other parts.*" (Fairclough, 2015, p. 7) Discourses contest for dominance to reinforce "*certain ideological assumptions as commonsensical*". (Fairclough, 2015, p. 112) In the political arena, which will be the issue of this thesis, parties and their respective discourses, or in other words their language imposed by writing and talking about problems, remedies and consequences, fight for general acceptance, a naturalization of discourses. Discourses can be dominant or opposing[8] a dominant view. Dominant discourses "*will come to be seen as natural and legitimate, because it is simply the way of conducting oneself.*" (Fairclough, 2015, p. 113) This leads to their respective ideology becoming common sense. The term of naturalization means that the discourse is perceived as a general discourse in society and by that as neutral, rather than serving the interests of the group or actors supporting and spreading this discourse by their power and through the mass media. (Fairclough, 2015, p. 113)

The following chapters will lay the framework to apply this first concept of power interests, common sense and discourse in media coverage to media specific models and theories. Appropriate theories leading to empirical categories will be discussed and applied. The next chapter will turn towards the conditions of the European Crisis and their implications for media coverage.

[8] Fairclough speaks about 'anti-language'. (Fairclough, 2015, p. 112) 'Anti-' will be an important characterization of the opposing party Syriza in the Greek elections

2.2 Paradigms of foreign affairs

The European Crisis is a foreign affairs issue, as mostly governments of the member states of the Eurogroup have dealt with developments. (Pisani-Ferry, et al., 2013, p. 21) The mass media of specific countries focus on the area of their own language. Still the often bespoken "European public" is doubted to exist and elites address a national public and a national agenda through national media, although a "*synchronization of national debates*" can be seen (Kleinen-von Königslow, 2011, p. 72). The economic developments affected the countries in different ways and thus resulted in different relevance of the crisis for the citizens. Citizens of different nationality experienced the crisis in different ways and the European Crisis was an unobtrusive issue, that means not amenable to direct experience. (McCombs, et al., 1991, p. 5) "*Political discourse in the media reflects and strengthens this in many member states, making the creation of a European public sphere more fraught and infinitely less relevant to citizens not already engaged in political discussions either at home or with 'foreigners'*". (Lodge, 2013, p. 292) This all leads to the fact, that the European Crisis is seen as a foreign affairs issue from a political and media perspective.

The definition for an underlying pattern can be borrowed from Kuhn´s definition of scientific paradigms, regarding relations between actors for foreign affairs: "*a dominant paradigm or meta-schema that organized 'normal' elite thinking, media coverage, and public response to foreign and defense policy*." (Entman, 2004, p. 3) These paradigms are not factual, but interpretations of problems, their causes and remedies of developments and events, thus they can change and even vanish over time. The last dominant pattern in western politics of foreign affairs was the Cold-War paradigm. A perceived communist aggression was the problem, ideology and dictatorship were the cause for this and the remedy was a lasting fight against these aggressions in all fields of politics. Especially in the United States of America this paradigm lead to an idealization of the own country as the 'leader of the free world' and dominated perspectives on foreign affairs. It made it easier to impose government actions, which lead to wars and spent big parts of the national budget for military investments, because the Cold-War paradigm united the society towards the conflict. Arguably a change started with the disaster of the Vietnam War, where the media began to reflect the War against communist aggression in a different way and questions arose about necessity, justness and about the paradigm itself. The Cold-War paradigm ended with the breakdown of the USSR and transition of communist into capitalistic countries. (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p. 149)

The next paradigm that dominated the perspective on foreign affairs in the United States of America was the "war on terrorism". It was established after the shock of the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on the 9th of September 2001 and lead to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Although helpful for the government of George W. Bush for the war on Afghanistan, it already showed its limits regarding the Iraq war, when media questioned the remedies of the government and the aftermath of the war. It had been long periods of expensive occupation in which many American soldiers lost their lives. (Entman, 2004, p. 95) The election of Barack Obama, whose campaign was focused on the issue of "change" ended this declining paradigm. With the deep economic consequences of the year of 2009 and the possible independence of energy supplies from the Arabic nations through new ways of gas supply from own soil, a new paradigm could turn away from big military interventions and lead to another approach in policies of the United States of America.

These paradigms of foreign affairs are not conferrable to the European situation in every aspect. Still they give hints on the developments, as Europe shares the western perspective on the world with the United States of America and as Europe had been the main battlefield of the Cold War. The resulting division in Western and Eastern Europe influenced the perspective on the world and its own future. Beyond the Cold-War the experience of two world wars on own ground and the constant aggressions in European regions and between European nations for hundreds of years lead to the establishment of a supra-national union with the aim of peace and prosperity, "*to construct an international society based on cooperation between peoples and between states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, security and the strengthening of international organizations*". (Lodge, 2013, p. 271) This Union evolved out of the economic European Coal and Steel Community from 1951 and resulted in the political and economic European Union with 27 member-states in 2013, 15 of them sharing a common currency. The expansion from 5 to 27 member-states tells its own story of success, which many of the European nations wanted to be part of. This process towards a deeper economic and political integration had been the dominant paradigm of Europe until the beginning of the 21st century. It could be called "peace and prosperity" paradigm or schema. More importantly there was the need for the integration of Western Germany[9] to guarantee stability and economic development as the basis for cooperation. (Lodge, 2013, p. 267) The remedies were a deeper economic and political integration and cooperation on an institutional level. The moral evaluation lead also to the will to guarantee equality in a structure, where powerful entities as the large nations of e.g. Germany, France, Italy meet less powerful entities as the nations of The Netherlands, Luxemburg, Belgium, and others. The idea was that they should negotiate their future in a balanced and democratic way. The European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Court of

[9] The *Deutsche Frage* (question for Germany) was the problem of German unification but beyond has been a fundamental issue for developments in Europe. (Lodge, 2013)

Justice are the main institutional achievements of this process. "*The underlying discourses and practices of institutionalism rely on the democratic ideals, norms, behaviours, laws and procedures that require citizen engagement to sustain them and which derive from a rights based approach to citizenship.*" (Lodge, 2013, p. 289) Although several nation-states experienced difficult economic hardships while being inside the European Union, the reasons for these hardships had been identified in national conditions, as it was the case for the economic downturn of Germany because of the costs of unification in 1990. The European Union in general was perceived as an economic success and membership was often seen equal to a more prosperous future. At the same time the European cooperation made it possible that no war occurred between its members since its establishment, a situation which had not occurred in Europe for centuries before. The paradigm of "peace and prosperity"[10] told the legend of an everlasting peaceful and economic successful Union in which nation-states would decide equally about their future. This paradigm seems to have failed in the developments after the worldwide economic crisis of 2009. Economic success and harmony between the European nations eroded and new paradigms appeared.

The decline of paradigms affects the balance between its actors and their probability of acting. According to Entman, who examined foreign policy and framing, four hypotheses can be stated about the occurrence of a shift of paradigms, when novel matters fail to fit a dominant paradigm, as it is the case in the European Crisis:

> 1. The media gain more power and can actively challenge the administration
> 2. The administration faces a double-bind by the media, which is driven by journalistic motivations: a simultaneous demand for leadership, but complaints as soon as policies turn costly
> 3. To explain more complex foreign issues the media turns towards the use of visual information, as graphs, tables, pictures, etc.
> 4. There are hints that conservative governments are more successful in managing the media and news coverage than progressive governments. Their core ideology legitimizes more disciplined control and exerts stronger control, which may be one reason for their success. (Entman, 2004, p. 96)

[10] Although this paradigm of "peace and prosperity" was not convincing all to join. Norway, Switzerland and Iceland have rejected membership as they do not share this vision inside the EU. The UK has been enjoying a special relation to the EU, leading to the most recent developments of a Brexit, which could be interpreted as a result of new paradigms

In the case that a dominant paradigm declines, habitual associations and the identification of problems become more difficult. Considering foreign affairs and problems a quagmire schema can fill the gap, which is left by the declining paradigm. This quagmire schema highlights costs and risks and nurtures isolationist perspectives. (Entman, 2004, p. 97)

The quagmire schema is directly related with the journalistic double-bind on governments. This double-bind means that the media demands immediate and consequent responses but criticize the action when they happen. This critical approach results from the fact that the losses accompanying such actions and measures are not accepted by the media and other elites, they want actions with "*instant evidence of success – and clear indications that no quagmire loomed*." (Entman, 2004, p. 100) To the public the costs and risks are highlighted, and it seems that a majority opposes the taken measures, although this does not have to be true. To not accept and explain inevitable costs in dealing with foreign affairs can lead to isolationist thinking. In addition, it has to be considered that the costs become even more important, if potential benefits seem low. This could be important for an examination of the European Crisis in which some countries have been deeply affected, while others have not been affected in a negative way.[11]

Being ambivalent, inconsistent and without orientation seems in times of declining paradigms a characterization of journalists as well as the ordinary citizen. Their focus on quick, but cost-free solutions and their emphasis of risks can be explained by the production conditions of news. Pressure from sales and advertising implies a tendency towards simplification and dramatization. In contrast to the political elite they also do not face electoral restraints. This enables the media to have the paradoxical behavior of demanding action and at the same time complaining about the consequences of these actions. (Entman, 2004, p. 103)

This tendency towards simplification and dramatization leads way to usage of emotive rhetorical style and visuals. Despite the confusion about the complex issue, coverage can become aggressive. (Entman, 2004, p. 103) Considering actors, the decline of a dominant paradigm also gives space to a certain kind of simplification, which is the introduction of villains. These villains can be demonized and pose a direct threat to the own country. For political benefit "*statesmanship is less important than constructing villains and turning up the rhetorical heat on enemy states*". (Entman, 2004, p. 99) This is also true for the media and other elites who try to make up their own new interpretations and

[11] For example Germany had a rose of the gross domestic product of XX from 2010 to 2013, while Portugal suffered from a loss of XX in the same period.

try to impose them on the public.[12] Dramas and conflicts are good stories that the media can tell and that it needs, but at the same time they cannot "*acknowledge intractable contradiction without blaming political authority*."[13] (Entman, 2004, p. 104)

The fourth hypothesis states that different ideologies of political parties can influence the ability of media management. This hypothesis bases mainly on research from the United States of America, but can be applied to the German situation, as the structures of progressive and conservative parties differ from each other. Conservative parties as the CDU are more unified and open to disciplined leadership. Progressive parties (especially the big opposition party SPD) struggle with the incorporation of different ideological core values (social vs. fiscal stability) and tend more to discuss their agenda in public than the conservative parties, by that they appear to the outside weaker, because they do not seem to agree quickly on important questions. The understanding of leadership turns more towards an open process of compromises and consensual decision-making. If the process is more closed, the messages to the media can be more consistent and by that more powerful. Here lies the advantage of conservative media management. (Entman, 2004, p. 105)

In summary the media gained strength with the decline of bigger social paradigms that offered easily adaptable interpretations of what happened in the world. Especially in foreign news the media play a big role, because direct experience is not often possible for the average citizen. Still the decline of paradigms and the rising of complex problems in an interdependent world leaves the media as confused as the average citizen. Despite the big influence, the media alone cannot determine public opinion or make politics by themselves. (Entman, 2004, p. 120) The next chapters will examine the relations between elites, media, and the public and the conditions under which they influence each other in following their aims. To which extent are media able to fulfill their role of orientating the public, what is the motivation and power of elites and what active role the public has in this game? These questions lead us to the following chapters.

2.2.1 Critical Evaluation of contemporary standard theories in the field of communication

With the advent of digital and social media it must be questioned if there still exists a coherent public sphere on which legacy media have an authoritative influence. This is the underlying assumption of

[12] In the "European Union crisis" this role of the villain could be the chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel, but it has to be discussed in later chapters.

[13] From a philosophical perspective the difference between ethics of responsibility and ethics of conviction comes into play, when violating a principle happens by following this principle – these paradoxes are hardly to solve. An example is the violation of human rights by starting a war with the aim of securing people.

traditional media theories, also the ones that are discussed in the following chapters. Recent research found a fragmentation of media usage and media content. (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018, p. 245) This explains recent developments that have not been predicted by the media and traditional media theories, as the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and the "Brexit" in 2017. Alternative media, especially on the political spectrum of right-wing ideologies, algorithms and computational logics in distributing frames, and the general decline of traditional and quality media have led to a new era of political communication in which a new complexity and abundance of communication question core concepts of communication science, such as framing, agenda-setting and media-effects. (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018, p. 247) These changing empirical conditions can be faced with a critical assessment of traditional theories, more comparative studies, and a different approach to empirical methods through big-data and network analysis. (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018, p. 250) This thesis aims at fulfilling the demand of comparative studies but in the theoretical and methodical approach it will use traditional approaches, which are discussed in the following chapters. This is due to the highly complex issue of the European Crisis and the Greek elections itself, which is also seen as an issue of foreign policy. Few information is available firsthand for the public which relies mainly on the coverage and explanations of the traditional media, where traditional theoretical approaches are still valid.

2.3. The Cascade Model of spreading activation

2.3.1 Description and definition of the cascade model

The media function mainly as the mediator between the elites and the public and they deliver the perceived reality of the actors in society. Their influence increases when declining paradigms lead to a more powerful role of the media. This influence relies on the ability "*to frame the news in ways that favor one side over the other*." (Entman, 2004, p. 5) The model that examines the interdependencies of elites, the media and the public and the role of news coverage in this triangle is the cascade model of activation.

The cascade model depicts the relations between actors important for issues of foreign affairs as a hierarchical structure. These actors are the government, which is on the top of the hierarchy, with other elites, the media, and the public following. Ideas spread in this hierarchy between the actors, with the government being the most influential. On each level happens a spreading of network activation. This means that stimuli activate thoughts and feelings, and this leads to conversation and

the spreading of ideas between the actors top-down or bottom-up in the hierarchy. Although the top of the hierarchy being the administration and elites enjoy the most probability of their interpretations and ideas becoming part of the circulation, the public itself can also spread ideas, but to a less powerful degree. Journalists listen carefully to the thoughts and opinions spread, they test their network sources for the consistency of opinions. It is important for them to ask for the agreement over the discussed topics and for the aspects that are highlighted or are not highlighted in the discussions. This does not just happen between the media level and other levels of the cascade model, but also between news organizations as they always follow and judge their competition.[14] If the discussion is far from agreement on an issue, agreement in the public opinion is less likely. On the other hand, a one-sided discussion is likely to lead to a consistent public opinion which cannot be changed easily. (Entman, 2004, p. 9)

Ideas occur inside the levels, between a network of individuals or groups and organizations with the intention to influence and spread between the levels of the cascade model. Inside of groups there is a tendency to match priorities between the members. Need for orientation[15] and social affiliations influence the personal agenda of relevant issues. (McCombs, 2004, p. 142) The public is essentially accessible through the media. This media level consists of a "*network of […] reporters, columnists, producers, editors, and publishers who work for the important national media*." (Entman, 2004, p. 11) Their contacts with the elites are the main transmission point for the spreading of ideas, whereby it cannot be said if elites exert influence on media or vice versa.[16] Organizational norms and operating procedures affect news coverage further. The elite newspapers and TV-channels are the most important to examine as they influence other media outlets. Especially in foreign issues a broad agreement can be assumed for the national media, it can be seen under this circumstance as a "*more or less homogenous entity*". (Entman, 2004, p. 11)

Especially interesting in analyzing framing and news salience of foreign and domestic political issues in the context of the European Crisis is the application of attribution theory to actors in the coverage. Research has shown that the attribution error happens in framing and that actors of administration level tend to blame problems rather to particular groups than to structural factors. (Snow, et al., 2007, p. 408)

[14] This leads to the model of intermedia agenda setting, which will be discussed in chapter XX on page XX
[15] On the concept of need for orientation see chapter XX
[16] This question asks for the strength of personal contacts, do upper-tier journalists and top editors merely reflect or do they influence elites? The general influence in the cascade model of news coverage on elites will be discussed in chapter XX

Another important factor are cognitive conditions of the ideas that spread in the cascade model. Cognitive limitations narrow understanding and competence, but people are not conscious about these limitations and about their personal motivations in approaching news coverage and interpretations. "*The implication of these cognitive limitations is that what passes between levels of the cascade is not comprehensive understanding, but highlights packaged into selective framed communications.*" (Entman, 2004, p. 12)

To summarize the cascade model, it shows first the hierarchical order between the actors of the system that produces news. Second it helps to explain whether dissent on the elite level occurs or not, because it highlights the relations between the actors in spreading ideas and the fight for imposing interpretations of events. Third it allows with the help of framing to distinguish the aspects of messages which earn acceptance or lead to dissent and by that examines the effects of news coverage on policy-making. To understand this activation and spread in the cascade model it is important to look on the impacts on communication between the actors in the cascade model. After that the concept of framing will be explained as the main concept of this thesis and as the condition of messages being frames moving in the cascade.

2.3.2 Influencing factors on activation in the cascade model

The important question regarding the cascade model is: how activation spreads inside and between the levels. There are four important variables influencing activation and the spread of ideas and interpretations: motivation, cultural congruence, power, and strategy. While motivation and cultural congruence are "pulling" mental associations, power and strategy are pushing factors, which are exerted by actors outside to impose their frames. (Entman, 2004, p. 13) In the following paragraphs motivations and cultural congruence will be explained. Power and strategy of the actors depend on the situation.

Motivations

Motivation is an aspect of the individual and can be diverse. The individual seeks to minimize cognitive costs. That is the reason for messages in the cascade model being framed, which means they select and highlight certain aspects of an event and offer interpretations, this is a simplification of the message and reduces cognitive costs. Another motivation for the individual is to avoid emotional dissonance. The individual monitors its surroundings for threats against its core values and

reacts to them. Another important aspect is the demand to participate in public life and to maintain personal contacts. Therefor the individual needs to know about issues of the public and these issues offer at the same time the possibility to share thinking and experiences in personal relations. News coverage provides follow-up communication. The importance of news coverage for career interests is a motivation followed mostly by journalists and members of the elite. (Entman, 2004, p. 13)

These motivations build up a barrier with a high threshold that news stories have to pass to reach the individual. To be able to do this, they have to "*represent a truly significant threat to values or must generate so much news of such high magnitude and resonance that a distracted public actually notices*."[17] (Entman, 2004, p. 13) If the administration on top of the cascade seeks to implement its own ideas and interpretation of events, it has to adapt its information to the conditions of media production and to individual motivation.

Cultural Congruence

Cultural congruence is crucial to the success of a news frame to move through the cascade and convince the actors on different levels about its ideas and interpretation of an event or issue. "*The most inherently powerful frames are those fully congruent with schemas habitually used by most members of society*." (Entman, 2004, p. 14) The more a frame is aligned to dominating culture, the easier it is to implement. If the issue is ambiguous, imposing a frame relies more on the factors of motivation, power, and strategy. An incongruent framing would lead to a blockade in audiences´ response, because the issue and its interpretation become too complex or the audience tries to avoid dissonance. Unfamiliarity and a low relevance are other factors.[18] The frame would be blocked from spreading by turning towards schemas that are more acceptable or simply ignoring the framing. It is not possible to distinguish issues exactly into being culturally congruent, ambiguous, and incongruent, but they move on a continuum between these three marks. The tipping point at which the audience reacts with non-acceptance is between ambiguous and culturally incongruent. (Entman, 2004, p. 15)

[17] For a more detailed examination of magnitude and resonance see chapter 2.3.2

[18] One extreme example of an incongruent interpretation is to imagine the Al-Qaida interpretation of 9/11 spreading as a frame in news stories in the United States of America. This could lead for the majority of Americans to a rejection of this frame. (Entman, 2004, p. 15)

2.3.3 Conclusion of influencing factors for the cascade model

Considering the variables of motivation and cultural congruence it can be concluded that a premise for the success of a frame is its fitting to habitual schemas, which means that it should be understood in little time, it should be relevant and immediately available to memory and schemas. The more schemas are repeated, the more available they are. (Entman, 2004, p. 15) Paradigms can be interpreted as "*networks of habitual schemas that promote the application of analogies from previous major stories to new developments*." (Entman, 2004, p. 24) If framing happens aligned to this paradigm, it enjoys a great possibility of spreading through the cascade. An example of the activation of schemas is the case of terrorism. It triggers a familiar set of prototypical events, e.g. a bombing, which immediately is connected to specific actors, e.g. islamist forces. They lead to available remedies, e.g. military actions. Different actors in the cascade can activate similar schemas, provoking the "*use of certain resonant words and images in constructing the news.*" (Entman, 2004, p. 24) Connections are even possible to further events in the collective memory, such as traumatic experiences, e.g. when 9/11 is compared to the attack on Pearl Harbor in World War II. The European Crisis or aspects of it have been compared often to the world economic crisis of 1928 and the following years and to the crisis of hyperinflation in Germany in 1924. (Cukierman, 2017, p. 109)

It is important to highlight that in the cascade model the media have an independent stand to other actors. They have their own motivations in depicting issues and they enjoy higher influence since greater paradigms decline and issues become more complex and ambiguous. (Entman, 2004, p. 56)

2.3.4 The hierarchy flow

The flow of interpretation and ideas spreading through the cascade model is predominantly top-down, but influence can run in both directions. The important aspect for influence going bottom-up is opinion polling, which give elites an idea about public sentiment. If the results show accordance of the public with the administration, pressure is heightened on political elites to support the administration´s line. Elites are a crucial joint in the spreading of ideas; they can impede or spur spreading by supporting or ignoring critical news coverage. It is impossible for them to work alone through all available data about public opinion, so polls themselves become object of interpretations and discussion. These interpretations and discussions are transported and delivered by the media and may spread, depending on motivation, power, and strategy. The media offer an interpretation of the poll data, while also offering, albeit the challenges of representation regarding news coverage, a depiction of the general public mood: "*representation has been at best a haphazard thing, with the*

media playing a central but problematic […] role in transmitting interpretations of public sentiments on foreign policy up to officials." (Entman, 2004, p. 21)

A consequence of the hierarchic model is the effect of self-reinforcement for the more powerful actors. The hierarchy is a hierarchy of power and the more powerful an actor is in the cascade, the more attention it gets through unequal treatment. This is the reason and the effect of the media reporting especially on talks, plans, and measures of the powerful. "*The unintended consequence is that the administration´s opponents obtain secondary treatment even when what they say is substantively important*." (Entman, 2004, p. 88) Critics often receive a lower prominence and their ideas are inhibited from spreading.[19]

2.3.5 Hypotheses from the cascade model

Out of the theoretical insight into the cascade model the following hypotheses about the interplay between the actors can be deducted.

1. Control over framing is highest for the administration when dealing with culturally congruent or incongruent issues. In these cases, elites outside the administration tend to remain silent and the interpretations and ideas can flow directly to and through the media.
2. If the issue is ambiguous the media have professional motivations to support oppositional interpretations of foreign policy. Even when elites do not stand against the administration, the media themselves offer a high amount of oppositional views.
3. The motivation of elites is strongly connected to their own political success. This makes them follow indicators of public opinion and reinforces the tendency to remain silent, if the administration seems to be successful with its policies. If the issue is ambiguous the elites have a decisive role in strengthening oppositional interpretations and ideas and lead them through the cascade.
4. Under specific circumstances oppositional elites and the media can block the administration´s framing, their interpretation and ideas, from spreading. The media gained more power in this process with the decline of dominant paradigms of society. For the elites indicators of public opinion become more important in guiding their responses to administration´s policies. (Entman, 2004)

[19] Studies showed that members of the public remember name of opponents significantly worse than names from administration officials (comp. Delli, Carpini and Keeter 1996)

2.4. Framing

A standard definition of framing, deriving from review and synthesis of research literature would be: "*selecting and highlighting some facets of events and issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution*." (Entman, 2004, p. 5)
Framing is an action that is executed by individuals, groups or organizations. As in standard communication models there are communicators and receivers of communication; they act under the circumstances of the hierarchy of the cascade network. Media are a key player of this model. Communication is intentional and follows specific aims and motivations. The whole process is embedded in cultural values. As different groups try to win the contest for the dominating frame and by that impose their own ideas and interpretations to society, frames are always in a competition to each other. The cascade model showed that groups on top of the cascade are more powerful in this frame contest. Scholarly questions have to ask for the process of selecting and highlighting, for the connections among different aspects of frames and the promoted solution or evaluation and their success. How does framing work and how can the media influence a balanced and fair distribution of power in the cascade and in the framing contest? (Touri, 2008, p. 172)

There is a conceptual openness towards framing, which is an advantage for a prolific research but a disadvantage to bring together findings and conclusions from these studies in a coherent way. (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p. 141) This thesis focuses on the work of Entman, because he aligns framing with the cascade model and brings up questions for an examination of news coverage in foreign affairs. That is exactly the aim of this thesis. McCombs is important by offering an insight on the effects of framing.

2.4.1 Classes: Procedural and substantive framing

Iyengar distinguished first between two classes of framing, which differ in function and focus: thematic and episodic frames. Thematic frames focus on a topic which is embedded into a political, historical, or social context. They search to answer the questions for underlying causes of a development or of an event. In contrast episodic frames focus on the coverage of processes, circumstances and problem definitions. (Iyengar, 1991, p. 14)

Entman further examined this approach and elaborated a difference between substantive frames and procedural frames, which function in regard to thematic and episodic frames. Substantive frames functions are:

- Defining effects or conditions as problematic
- Identifying causes
- Conveying a moral judgment
- Endorsing remedies or improvements

Substantive frames have to perform at least two of these functions, though problem definition and remedy have the biggest potential to support or oppose public policy. (Entman, 2004, pp. 5, 6)

Procedural frames are not meant to engage the public. They focus on evaluation of actors´ legitimacy. They do that by examining technique, success, and representativeness and occur in the media mostly as horserace-framing, when they compare actors´ success in regard to a specific result or situation.[20]

Substantive framing offers interpretations of problems, their causes and remedies. This does not mean that procedural framing is less important or less worth. Its focus is narrower, but by examining leadership and techniques, e.g. violation of international law, censorship, it influences substantive framing and the interpretation of political situations. (Entman, 2004, p. 54) It can enable a deeper discourse and empower a more informed opposition. At the same time procedural framing diminishes the ability to connect with other discourses and to see the bigger picture. To empower less powerful groups in the hierarchy of the cascade a wider approach of criticism is needed, and this is the reason why the following analysis will focus on substantive framing. (Entman, 2004, p. 84)

2.4.2 How framing works: conditions and requirements of framing

Winning the frame contest means to activate similar thoughts and feelings throughout the cascade model. These similar thoughts promote similar interpretations of problem definition, causes, judgment and remedies. "*News Stories become a platform for framing contests, where political actors compete by sponsoring their preferred meanings*." (Touri, 2008, p. 172) The spread of ideas

[20] A question for further research in the Greek election could be the importance of appearance of the new Greek government of Syriza officials after the elections of January of 2015 in news coverage and procedural framing

through framing can be supported or impeded by structural or psychological conditions. Further frames have inherent conditions, which can reinforce them or diminish their power. This chapter will shed light to structural, psychological and inherent conditions and requirements. The main influences are cultural congruence for structural conditions, motivations for psychological factors, and resonance and magnitude for inherent requirements. The goal of this chapter is to find out how framing is influenced in its spread through the cascade, and what characterizes successful framing.

> "*The words and images that make up the frame can be distinguished from the rest of the news by their capacity to stimulate support or opposition to the sides in a political conflict. […] Those frames that employ more culturally resonant terms have greatest potential for influence. They use words and images highly salient in the culture, which is to say noticeable, understandable, memorable, and emotionally charged*." (Entman, 2004, p. 6)

Cultural resonance and magnitude are crucial for the ability of frames to travel through the cascade. More of them enable the likeliness of frames´ being spread throughout different groups in the cascade. There are three principal contrasts that influence the reception of framing: empathy, categorizing, and generalizing. Empathy enables the audience to view the situation from the vantage point of those who are directly experience it. Categorizing connect interpretations to similar schemas. This can lead to immediate evaluation as it is the case in e.g. terrorism. Words and images create empathy and opportunities to categorize. Generalizing happens when larger categories are bound with specific situations, actors or behavior. An event can easily be connected to groups or nations. This approach comes near to stereotype research. (Entman, 2004, p. 36)

Magnitude is a dominant factor for framing and a condition for salience of frames. The administration has an advantage in regard to magnitude, as the media focus normally on governments´ actions.[21] "*Presidents who create action, almost any kind of action, can draw journalists´ attention away from mere ideas*." (Entman, 2004, p. 85)

As words and images are used to make up these principal contrasts, comparative analysis of news is needed to examine what establishes the difference in similar events. Some examples of how news can be depicted in different ways are the choice of pictures accompanying the text, different

[21] Studies have shown, that in regard to favor pronouncements of the administration there is no difference between elite newspapers and network media. Editorials are more balanced, though their influence is questionable in a mixed-message newspaper. The cascade model correctly predicts the independence of editorial staffers as they are less dependent from elites. (Entman, 2004, p. 87)

emphasis on physical facts, and judgmental (humanizing or neutral) terms. Reasons for the usage of these words and images are inherent in texts and the production of news and news values. Ethnocentrism also plays an influential role in depicting foreign affairs. (Entman, 2004, p. 38)

For categorizing the use of adverbs and adjectives are important. They are able to charge a depiction emotionally. In addition, labels can be used to give an emotional and categorizing view of an event. The words crime, kill, murder have a different impact on interpretations than the labels mistake, accident, blunder. Still both can be used to depict the same or similar events. (Entman, 2004, p. 40)

In contrast to categorizing, generalizations attribute behavior, acts or characterizations from individuals to groups, organizations or countries as a whole. Single acts are thus embedded in a larger context of group behavior, whether it be foreigners as a minority, the government as a ruling group or members of another country, symbolizing this country as a whole. This framing asks for the moral interpretation of responsibility. Is the single individual or a specific group responsible for an event, or is the society as a whole, the mentality of nations, the ideology to be blamed. This question implies also the question if an event can happen again, and what behavior can be expected for the future. Generalizations can be done by explicit judgments in the texts. (Entman, 2004, p. 41)

2.4.3 Counterframing

Besides the function of framing in defining problems, identifying causes, endorsing remedies, and conveying moral judgments, framing places a focus on different objects. These objects can be issues, events, and or political actors. News stories normally describe more than one object. The following table offers an analytical grid for finding these functions and their relations to objects.

	Focus of Frame		
Function of frame	Issues	Events	Political Actors (Individual, Groups, Nations)
Defining problematic effects/conditions			
Identifying cause/agent			
Endorsing remedy			
Conveying moral judgement			

Figure 3: Dimensions of focus and functions of frames

The categories are not mutually exclusive, but one frame can be the specification of the function of another frame. The grid is not just filled through evaluation of the media; moreover, individual

interpretations of events rely on interpersonal communication, personal assumptions, experience and tacit understanding. (Entman, 2004, p. 24)

Counterframing describes the ability of the public to develop an interpretation of events that opposes the administration´s frame. Frames from the top of the cascade are potentially more powerful in spreading and becoming dominant. Counterframing relies more on the full coverage that fills every cell of the grid in focus and objects of framing, may it be initiated by elites, the media or parts of the public. Voids and gaps in the presentation of alternative information can lead to the fact that "*the average citizen may have great difficulty developing a more independent interpretation and evaluation*." (Entman, 2004, p. 23) Successful counterframing is based on the full depiction of the frame in the media, of its repetition and magnitude and how it fits into the cultural circumstances. In the end the force and strategy of specific groups can push its salience. (Entman, 2004, p. 31) Elites are especially important groups for counterframes. Through their public dissent with the administration they offer sources to quote for the media. The audience needs to connect the opposition with mental associations that an alternative reading stimulates. A strategy to push counterframing for journalists is the usage of vivid images. They can enhance the salience of their interpretation through empathetic images to establish an emotional connection. (Entman, 2004, p. 55)

2.4.4 Frame contest in foreign policy

Different groups in the cascade try to impose their interpretation and their point of view on events on the public. "*The central goal […] is simply to generate support or opposition to a political actor or policy.*" In this regard winning the frame contest means "*winning acceptance of their problem definition, cause, remedy, and moral assessment.*" (Entman, 2004, p. 47) The audience develops then matching schemas.

Three aggregate states mark the state of framing on a continuous line: frame dominance, frame contestation and frame parity. In the state of frame dominance alternative readings and interpretations are difficult to impossible to achieve for the majority of the public. They have no chance to spread through the cascade. Frame parity on the other side is the ideal of the free press: the media established a complete counterframe with problem definition, causes, remedies and moral judgment. This counterframe achieves as much resonance and magnitude as the competing framing allowing citizens to develop their own opinion through a balanced view on events and weighing arguments. Frame parity is exceptional while frame dominance happens more often,

especially in foreign issues. Frame contestation is the state somewhere between dominance and parity. (Entman, 2004, p. 48)

Frame dominance

A dominant frame is powerful as it leads to reactions in the cascade that reinforce it. Out of the motivations of elites and journalists dominant framing establishes congruent understandings between politically significant majorities. The public´s role is passive and one of legitimation of the political measures that derive from the congruent understanding and common point of view. As the media focus on the actions and measures of the government, the underlying problem definition is not object of discussion. This makes it difficult for alternative reading and interpretations to gain spreading through the cascade. Opposing framing is largely procedural and criticizes, if so, the proposed measures and the strategy in execution. Dominant frames happen particularly in the field of foreign issues, as these issues are normally rich in complexity and low in first-hand information for the public. The members of the public do not hold expertise in foreign issues, without sufficient counterframes that make alternative information and readings available, they hardly have a chance to develop an independent interpretation. (Entman, 2004, p. 49)

Frame contestation

Ambiguous matters allow more influence of elites and the media. Although the administration can spread their interpretation of one or more functions of framing, elites and media can still challenge the interpretation of other functions, or even impose their own.[22] (Entman, 2004, p. 50) The important aspects supporting frame parity are the factor of time, which elites and journalists have to investigate, the factor of a high degree of elite conflict, and a divided public. (Entman, 2004, p. 77) To achieve relevant results in analysis of news, a broad quantitative and qualitative approach is needed. In a situation in which the sheer amount of critical texts seems to lead to a heavily challenged administration´s frame and the possibility of a strong counterframe, a less prominent display could diminish the power of counterframing. If criticism is procedural rather than substantive it again diminishes the possibilities of challenging the administration´s framing.[23] Discussing a limited choice

[22] Different to the indexing model, where dissent in the parliament is a crucial point for the ability to challenge the administration´s interpretation and frame, Entman does not attribute a special role for the parliament. It does not need to be in discussion or opposition to the government,

[23] This happened e.g. in the time before the Iraq War in 2003. While the American press discussed just the choice of remedies (war vs. sanctions), the European media discourse was broader and included cooperation and the doubt over the need for war. (Entman, 2004, p. 78) The case of the Iraq War proved to be one example for a dominant administration´s framing, despite an ambiguous issue and despite elites´ and medias´ dissent. It

of the function of remedies in the media is "*gauging likelihoods*", which "*reinforces the governments place at the top of the cascade*." (Entman, 2004, p. 78) A careful examination and analysis in a broad approach is needed to be able to see behind the pure quantitative amounts of news, which can be misinterpreted in regard to results in the frame contest.

2.4.5 Power and strategy

Power and strategy are external "*forces that may push the activation of a particular set of mental connections"*.[24] (Entman, 2004, p. 90) Power is a force of the top of the cascade, the top administration officials can exert it depending on their perceived popularity and effectiveness. The power of non-administrational elites is based mostly in their networks with journalists and the need of journalists to cover elites as well. With this access to news organizations elites can push alternative information to establish a counterframe.

Journalists have power, which is based on their watchdog-function of society. They are able to "*ask questions and decide precisely which words and images to assemble and transmit*." (Entman, 2004, p. 91)

Strategy is the "*deliberate, planned activation of mental associations*". (Entman, 2004, p. 91). It is exerted through word choice, information distribution and timing. This information strategy is per se a domain of the administration, to a lesser extent of elites. Assumptions about political advantages, benefits and risks in domestic or foreign issues form the origin for strategic evaluations and actions. If the information strategy of the administration fails, opposing elites and the media can easily fill the gap and create a powerful opposing counterframe that spreads through the cascade. There is some strategy behind journalist´s behavior and thus framing as well, but it is more on stories that could enhance their careers and less related to power over the outcome of these stories. The case is different with editorialists and pundits, as they follow strategic aims, but their role in framing is less important. The Public has no possibility of strategy in the cascade model. They use strategy just within interpersonal networks. (Entman, 2004, p. 92)

The media turns towards the powerful. Higher power to shape newsworthy actions and outcomes leads to more attention, while lower power leads to less coverage. This attention is not based on the

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was ´dominant due to the prominent display of supportive assertions and administration´s officials, due to the higher magnitude, due to criticism, which was mainly procedural, and due to the strategy and power of the administration. (Entman, 2004, p. 90)

[24] Motivations are the internal forces (Entman, 2004, p. 90)

actual newsworthiness. The media rely on official sources and they need to cultivate these sources over time. Agenda-setting studies have found, that issues need weeks of persistent media coverage to reach salience in public opinion. (McCombs, et al., 1991, p. 99) Together with commercial needs, these limitations and motivations of the media can impede the success of counterframes. (Entman, 2004, p. 92)

2.5 Agenda-Setting

The fundamental claim of agenda-setting theory is that prominence of an issue on the side of news coverage leads to prominence in the audiences´ heads. Framing and agenda-setting do not just share the same object of research, but also theoretical insights, which are compatible to each other. A broad approach to the interdependence of actors in the cascade network needs the model and findings of agenda-setting research.[25] It depicts the influence of news coverage on the thinking, opinions and behavior of the audience. (McCombs, 2004, p. 86) Agenda-setting as a theory exists since the 1970s in communication science and it is therefore a well-researched and fully developed concept, that sheds light on the processes that framing and the cascade network rely on. Agenda-setting explains how and to which extent news change society. (McCombs, et al., 1991, p. 96)

Recent criticism of the agenda-setting perspective on framing has claimed on one side that agenda-setting is merely focusing on media effects rather than on external influence on journalistic content, be it by elites, advocates and social movements. "*Journalists frame issues, but their interpretations are shaped, in part, by discourses external to news organizations*" (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 219) Especially the understanding of framing as attribute agenda-setting is seen in this context as an unnecessary narrowing of a richer discourse. (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 219) With the cascade model of activation, the hierarchies of communication in framing and agenda-setting have been worked out theoretically and it enables categories for the empirical analysis. Allowing the examination of external influences, the agenda-setting perspective provides enriching insights for the purpose of this research. Though the cascade model is limited to administration, elites, media and people and marginalized groups or social movements are not properly included, for this research the

[25] Other neighboring concepts are status conferral, stereotyping, image building, gatekeeping and the spiral of silence. (McCombs, 2004, p. 86)

oppositional approach to framing is expected to be exerted by Syriza, which belongs to elites and has in the Greek election a powerful position to influence or even set frames and the media agenda.

In the advent of developments in digital media and its role in the breakdown of coherent media-audience spheres, recent criticism of agenda-setting voices doubts about the limitations and suitability of this theory. Now there are multiple arenas in which multiple agendas follow non-authoritative paths. Criticism demands a re-conceptualization of agenda-setting to incorporate dynamic issue developments in digital media. (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018, p. 249) To examine this has to be the task of future research. For this thesis, which focuses on an issue of foreign policy, on a crisis and an election issue, agenda-setting and framing are appropriate in their traditional form. In these cases, administrations and elites still have an authority on information that follows the cascade model. (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018, p. 249)

The following chapter highlights the aspects and models of agenda-setting theory, which are most important for framing.

2.5.1 Attribute Agenda-Setting

Agenda-Setting explains the transfer of salience between the media and the public. In a basic model this is the salience of mere objects of news coverage. In a second step agenda-setting theory turns towards the salience of attributes of objects. This is called Attribute Agenda-Setting and it forms the junction between framing and agenda-setting. (McCombs, 2004, p. 69)

The transmission of attribute salience is independent from transmission of object salience, e.g. the name of an actor is known, but not his character. Attribute agenda-setting asks for the salience of certain aspects, characterizations, attributes of actors, issues, etc. An attribute is "*a generic term encompassing the entire range of properties and traits that characterize an object*." (McCombs, 2004, p. 70)[26] The learning effect merges the media agenda about attributes and the public agenda over time.[27] This effect is mainly based on exposure to news coverage, so the more exposure happens, the more attributes are internalized. The time-span of attribute agenda-setting is within weeks. (McCombs, 2004, p. 73)

[26] Some examples of attributes that have been found in studies about the attributes of election candidates: competency, compassion, political belief, further isseu positions, political ideology, formal qualifications, biographical data, personality, perceived qualification, integrity, etc. (McCombs, 2004, p. 73)

[27] Studies with cross-lagged correlations and experimental settings showed that the direction of influence goes clearly from the media to the public. (McCombs, 2004, p. 73)

"*Voters do learn from the media*." (McCombs, 2004, p. 75) It could be shown that critical coverage lead even for affective readers to more critical reflections about own assumptions and preferred candidates, while opposition to the own point of view was seen more positive. The fundamental condition for these effects is a free press. If the media are seen as not independent and government controlled, the agenda-setting effects do not happen significantly. The question is to which extent the influence on the media is understood by the public (questions of ownership and media networks).

Other influences on the acquisition of the media´s attribute agenda are the need for orientation and the dimensions of social salience, personal salience and emotional arousal. Social salience depends on the relevance for society or bigger groups that the individual belongs to, while personal salience asks if the issue matters to oneself. The emotional dimension is triggered by how interesting or exciting aspects of an issue are. (McCombs, 2004, p. 83)

2.5.2 Attribute agenda-setting and framing

> "*News coverage and people´s ideas about a complex issue such as the economy can involve many different aspects or attributes. One set of attributes associated with the recurring general topic of the economy consists of the specific problems of the moment, their perceived causes and the proposed solutions to these problems. Another, more narrow, set of attributes consists of the pro and cons arguments for the proposed solutions to economic problems*." (McCombs, 2004, p. 79)

Framing and the wider set of attributes in agenda-setting are very near to each other, attribute agenda-setting of complex issues offers an insight about the functions of framing with defining problematic situations, causes and remedies. In contrast the narrow set of attributes equals procedural framing. Agenda-setting shows that that the correlation between media and public agenda is higher for the wider set of attributes than for the narrow set of attributes, though still significant. (McCombs, 2004, p. 80) This reinforces the assumption of framing, that substantive framing is more important, especially for critical ideas, than procedural criticism as it happens still in the boundaries of a wider set of attributes.

From the perspective of agenda-setting theory frames are central organizing ideas for content, which highlight and prepare interpretations of issues. Selection and emphasis happen particularly with attributes of an object. "*A frame is an attribute of the object because it describes the object*." (McCombs, 2004, p. 88) This description happens in different forms of complexity, while the age or birthplace belong to simpler attributes of socio-economic data, political tendencies or perspectives are complex attributes. Seen from the perspective of agenda-setting, framing relates to the bigger and more complex attributions, which can incorporate lower level attributes. Framing selects, bundles and highlights these lower level attributes to organizing principles, that offer the audience an understanding of the situation, its causes, actors, and promotes remedies. They are dominant perspectives and central themes having the power to "*structure thought, to shape how we think about political issues, political candidates or other objects in the news*." (McCombs, 2004, p. 89)
Agenda-setting studies showed that correlations for all attributes exist between the agenda of the media and the agenda of the public. These correlations are higher the more dominant and the less categories exist inside the frame. (McCombs, 2004, p. 91)

2.5.3 Compelling arguments

Some attributes are perceived as more important than others. Agenda-setting research calls them compelling arguments. Their specific character makes them influence the salience of their objects. They reach this by connecting attribute salience in the media coverage with object salience in the public´s perception. The impact of a particular attribute of objects affects their salience as a whole. This field widens the explanations of agenda-setting effects, as they are mostly explained through magnitude. At the same time compelling arguments are a prolific perspective on effects of framing in the cascade model. One example for compelling arguments is the threat of crime. Numbers of crimes can drop in reality, but if news coverage highlights attributes, which psychologically threaten the audience, it will lead to a higher availability and salience of the issue among the public. (McCombs, 2004, p. 95)

Different groups among the public perceive compelling arguments in a different way. Agenda-setting research could show that specific environmental issues with regard to industrial production had different effects on working class and middle-class members. While the argument was compelling for one group, it had no significant effects on the other group. "*The news media are the public´s major*

source of information about public affairs, but the public is not an automaton passively waiting to be programmed by the media." (McCombs, 2004, p. 96)[28]

2.6 Priming

While framing is a process of highlighting and selecting aspects in texts (or images), schemas happen on a psychological level. "*Framing works to shape and alter audience members' interpretations and preferences through priming*." (Entman, 2007, p. 164) They are "*neighboring clusters in memory*". (Entman, 2004, p. 7) This activation of neighboring interpretations, available schemas, is near to the process of spreading activation in the cascade, it actually explains the process on a personal level. The cascade model is based on these psychological and personal processes. Early stimuli are more important, because activation spreads from a first idea and it can guide further interpretation of events. (Entman, 2004, p. 7)

An approach to explain the joint between framing and psychological processes is priming. It means "*activating an association between an item highlighted in the framed text and audience´s thinking about a related concept*." This is the reason that the same issue in the same audience can be interpreted differently, when the texts accentuate different contexts. Depending on what is highlighted in the news, audience´s responses are shaped differently, as their mental connections activate different schemas according to the context. Priming can influence evaluations of issues or persons. (Lenz, 2009, p. 821)

Priming is based psychologically on selective attention. Instead of complex weighing and due to limited capacity "*people use simple rules of thumb and intuitive shortcuts*." (McCombs, 2004, p. 122) These rules and shortcuts are founded on what schemata and connections are available. By that they rely on information and the agenda of the media. The salience of specific issues primes the public in their judgment of an overall performance of political candidates or parties. If environmental issues are more available in their salience, the judgment of parties will favor those having this issue on their agenda as well. Attribute salience leads to attribute priming and influences opinions. (McCombs, 2004, pp. 122, 123)

[28] The implications for a normative perspective on journalism change through these findings of framing and agenda-setting research. Patterns of emphasis, tone and style and their consequences of attribute agendas become central issues rather than accurate and balanced content. (McCombs, 2004, p. 96)

Although successfully implemented through several studies, some studies doubt the influence of priming and the causality of priming and media effects. The actual discourse seems to tend to distinguish between priming effects of so-called valence issues (economy) or "easy issues" as strong attitudes that a person had already developed in her or his life, may these be related with stereotyping, religion, etc. With these issues priming seems to have an effect. But other effects seem to relate more to learning. "*Campaigns and the media may lack the power to decide elections through agenda setting, voters' decision making may not be subject to manipulation (at least not through priming)*" (Lenz, 2009, p. 835) Information on issues and learning of these information and changing or adopting positions could have a more substantial effect on opinions and behavior. This means, that in at least some issues there are hints that the opposite of what agenda-setting and priming teaches, is true. This could have a significant influence on election behavior. (Lenz, 2009, p. 835) As these studies have not reached yet an appropriate level this thesis follows the traditional agenda-setting and framing approach, it also focuses in its empirical research more on the depictions in the media than on media effects.

2.7 Framing, Agenda-setting, Priming and their influence on opinions

Beyond salience, Framing and its related concepts influence thinking and opinions about issues, actors and measures. "*That is, frames introduce or raise the salience or apparent importance of certain ideas, activating schemas that encourage target audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular way*." (Entman, 2007, p. 164) There are supporting factors, for which a direct relation to opinion directions could be shown in several studies. Exposure is one of the more important variables. For a high exposure to media the salience of objects and attributes of the news media merges with the salience of objects and attributes of the audience. Low or moderate exposure does not have the same effect. (McCombs, 2004, p. 125)

Tone is another variable, as it is able to transport positive, negative or neutral mentions of attributes. Studies showed that attributes in the media correlate with attributes in the public with a time lag up to half a year. (McCombs, 2004, p. 127)

Economic issues are sensitive towards public sentiment. The audience of the news makes up the domestic market and thus information about economic data, outlooks and prediction can influence economic behavior. Media coverage influences the perception about the state of economy. The

reliance on domestic markets and the affection of the public can turn into self-fulfilling prophecies, when the public as consumers adjust their behavior to perceived economic outlooks. Agenda-setting effects have been found in studies of the New York Times headlines in the 1980s and their correlation with national indicators. News coverage encourages or discourages consumers. (McCombs, 2004, p. 128) In perspective to the euro-area crisis it has to be asked if the depiction of complex and interdependent causes, actors, remedies and their possible consequences was possible in a sufficient way. The public remains on the orientation through media to decide for their own and society´s future. This future is based on decisions and behavior of the public and thus gives influence of the media a higher importance in the process of forming the public opinion.

Salience is the basis for public opinion. Salience influences strength and direction of opinions about issues and actors. Influencing variables on this salience-opinion chain are socio-demographic factors as well as personal salience. The outcome is behavior. Several studies have shown direct effects of news coverage on behavior. This was the case for ticket sales of airflights in times of reported crashes and deaths. Another example is the correlation between applications for a specific university in the United States and coverage about crimes and violence. The number of applications dropped after reports. (McCombs, 2004, pp. 129, f)

Political partisanship and salience of specific issues, for which a party has a perceived expertise, correlate with each other. "*Beyond influencing the salience of issues on the public agenda, the media´s agenda can at times also advantage a particular political party because of issue ownership, the perception among voters that one political party is more capable than another of handling certain issues*." (McCombs, 2004, p. 130) This aspect is important for the change of the political landscape through the euro area crisis, as voters turned towards parties with a perceived expertise on economic issues.

To fully understand the implications of framing, agenda-setting and priming it is needed to integrate their insights systematically. The aim is to establish a holistic research approach for a theory grounded analysis and to set up dimensions and processes for analysis. "*Content analysis should be informed by explicit theory linking patterns of framing in the media text to predictable priming and agenda-setting effects on audiences*." (Entman, 2007, p. 163)

In a general summary of agenda-setting effects, it has been proven, that they influence need for orientation, perceived personal relevance and adequacy of own knowledge about an issue in all

cultural surroundings. Salience has a direct effect on attention, interest, reflection and discussion. To influence these processes is the aim of advertisement, PR and all its subdivision as corporate reputation management, etc. Salience of attribution is related to opinion formation and change. "*Beyond attitudes and opinions, the pictures of reality created by the mass media have implications for personal behaviors, ranging from college applications to voting on election day*." (McCombs, 2004, p. 133)

2.7.1 Reasons for effects on opinions

Individual reasons

The mass media are a primary source of information. The audience turns towards them for orientation, especially if there is no other bond in regard to the issue. Effects of mass communication and in this case framing and agenda-setting rely on psychological processes[29]. The need for orientation differs between individuals, some seek for simple information and some seek for understanding the background and interpretation of the issue in a bigger picture. Need for orientation is based on dimensions of relevance and uncertainty. Relevance is the "*initial defining condition*" (McCombs, 2004, p. 54) and it correlates personal relevance strongly with the need for orientation. The higher the personal relevance is the stronger is motivation for the individual to search for orientation. If personal relevance exists, the second dimension is uncertainty which again correlates strongly with the need for orientation. If an individual is certain about an issue, it does not search actively for more orientation, while uncertainty forces the search for orientation. Media use for an individual that is certain functions as a form of monitoring, in that case the need for orientation is moderate. If relevance is low, need for orientation is low as well. Complexity and the importance of possible consequences of relevant issues and situations reinforce the need for orientation. It is then the highest.[30] Consequences and implications are of particular importance, because threats to society and social consequences influence the need for orientation directly. (McCombs, 2004, p. 55)

[29] The foundation for these psychological approaches was made by Edward Tolman and his concept of cognitive mapping. In an unknown situation the individual tends to form maps about the external environment. (McCombs, 2004, p. 54)

[30] Need for orientation explains issues, which get a high coverage in the media, but do not have agenda-setting effects on the public. This happens sometimes with scandals, like the lewinsky-clinton-case. (McCombs, 2004, p. 57)

The need for orientation does not trigger necessarily information seeking through media, "*citizens are not defenseless, even in the face of continuous massive media barrages about a topic*." (McCombs, 2004, p. 59) Interpersonal communication and personal experience are further sources of information and accompany the process. Especially in specific economic issues personal experience is dominant for the interpretation. These issues are mainly unemployment and inflation and they are experienced by the public in their daily life. Trade and budget deficits on the other side are out of the reach of personal experience. For their understanding and interpretation, the public needs further information. The same happens for foreign issues, which are hardly to experience by the individual. Obtrusiveness is the dimension to distinguish both issues. Obtrusive issues are inside our personal experience, while unobtrusive issues are outside this sphere[31]. (McCombs, 2004, p. 60) The media agenda permeates more into the public agenda, if the issue is unobtrusive, the correlation is significantly higher. (McCombs, et al., 1991, p. 5)

The conclusion for media effects is that a higher need for orientation leads to higher adoption of the media agenda.[32] (McCombs, 2004, p. 57) In regard to the European crisis the theory of agenda-setting predicts that the overall need for orientation is high among the European public. There are three main reasons for it: 1. Personal relevance is high due to the implications for the economy and society, 2. Uncertainty is high because of the complexity of the issue and 3. The issue of the European crisis is about relatively unknown aspects of society and the actors of it, members of national governments and European institutions are unknown as well. Framing and agenda-setting become an important factor for scholars then in the European crisis, when elites turn towards the public and the public turns towards the media. National governments negotiated intergovernmental agreements, which shape the process of overcoming the crisis and these governments, particularly the German government monitored the public for the chances in national and regional elections. The media play a decisive role in the crisis.

Societal Reasons

Salience is bound to time and capacity. For this reason, there is a limit to the number of issues salient in the media´s and public´s agenda. It was possible to research the threshold for public issues and

[31] The difference between obtrusive and unobtrusive issues is not leading to a dichotomy, but rather to a continuum, in which issues tend towards one or the other side. Obtrusiveness depends also on personal experience in a way, that in a strong economy unemployment may not be obtrusive, in other economies it is so.

[32] Need for orientation is in regard to education an intervening variable. Education increases the need for orientation and thus turning towards media for information

conclude that it is 10% to be of significant importance for the public. The maximum amount of issues can thus not exceed many more than ten. The issues are competing with each other over salience; one can just gain salience with another issue losing it.[33] Time and capacity in the media´s space and individual understanding set this limit, which has not changed since the beginning of research about it in the 1950s. It is a stable threshold that has not changed with higher education or even the rise of online media. The internet could not change that, because "*public´s attention span and available time impose severe constraints.*" (McCombs, 2004, p. 38) Education and the internet have not changed the amount of issues, but the variety of issues and the ability to connect to issues, which are normally beyond the personal sphere. Growing diversity is possible due to the higher frequency of issues in the public attention. While minor issues receive today faster the threshold of 10%, the dominating issues, like politics, governance and relevant economic issues, have the same average duration as 50 years before. (McCombs, 2004, p. 40)

For the variable of education, it was possible to find out that higher education influences the strength of correlation between personal and media agenda in a positive way. Education reinforces higher attention and broader capacity for issues, a loss in confidence towards media could not be proved in research. In the big picture education is a minor influence; it is responsible for a difference up to 2% in agenda-setting effects on different groups. (McCombs, 2004, p. 41)

The timeframe for agenda-setting effects is about four to six weeks, until issues and attributes permeate from the media to the public agenda. Studies showed that the first two months establish correlations up to 80%, while after the effects lose quickly their strength. The first month is the most important time-span for effects of media coverage. "*The agenda-setting effects […] are shaped to a considerable degree by characteristics of the media´s messages and to a far lesser degree by the characteristics of the recipients of those messages.*" (McCombs, 2004, p. 51) The time-span of effects can be shorter or longer, especially in internet groups of highly interested people, effects happen faster, sometimes within a week.

[33] One example is the issue of government spending, which gains normally attention on the cost of the issues of inflation and unemployment, and vice versa. (McCombs, 2004, p. 42)

2.8 Framing and agenda-setting in the cascade of activation and for the function of the media

> *"It is the agenda of attributes that define an issue and in some instances tilt public opinion towards a particular or preferred solution. […] Setting the agenda of attributes for an issue is the epitome of political power. Controlling the perspective of the political debate on any issue is the ultimate influence on public opinion."* (McCombs, 2004, p. 82) *The cascade model showed the hierarchy in the flow of frames through society. The government and top elites enjoy more power to control the perspective and impose their framing. "Perceptions of policy 'success' often do not rest on objectively measurable conditions, but rather must rely on selective interpretations and evaluations – on framing."* (Entman, 2004, p. 69)

A function of media in society should be "*encouragement of knowledgeable citizen involvement*" (Entman, 2004, p. 93) and activation of "*independent public thinking*." (Entman, 2007, p. 93) The cascade of activation shows the structural failure of the media in the cascade to empower democratic debate. The opposition does not have an equal voice and attention lies on the more powerful and the actors, to predict future events rather than reflect stakes and substantive options in the discourse. [34] Encouraged journalists can experience frustration and express cynicism in these structures, but the public has even less access to information and without cognitive closure it experiences helplessness. Contrary to structural inequalities the public itself "*seeks to avoid dissonance by refusing to confront the implications of journalists´ criticism*." (Entman, 2007, p. 71) As long as policies seem successful the public does not care about reflection of it. Judging relies on success. This further limits the media´s power to activate opposition. (Entman, 2004, p. 71)

2.8.1 Representation of the public in the cascade in issues of foreign policy

Although elites and the administration enjoy the power to activate framing top-down, the cascade model allows a bottom-up approach as well. Officials and elites calculate the political costs and benefits of decisions by assessing public opinion. The influence that the public exerts on groups higher in the cascade hierarchy is difficult to measure. The power of the public is rarely direct and independent. The cascade of frames shows that public opinion is founded itself in framing. The depiction of public opinion through polls and through a general picture of public sentiments happens

[34] There is a difference between editorials and news coverage, as editorials are more polemic and more reflective. There are differences between media outlets as well. This confuses the audience.

in the news either, so again it is selected and highlighted information, which elites rely on. Framing influences both, policymakers and the public. Thus, elites have to influence frames which influence them. (Entman, 2007, p. 123) For the issue of foreign affairs, it is important that framing exerts even more influence on individual and public opinion, as just few have direct access to information, while the majority relies completely on media coverage for information about the issue. Framing does not lead to identical responses. Different interpretations spread through the public, depending on which problem definition, cause and remedy for an issue are accepted by the individuals.

In the cascade model, the direction of flow of frames can be down or up the hierarchy. Frames work in the same way, though the public does not have the same possibilities in strategy and power to influence policymaking. The public does not have a single voice to express and to impose its intention. Framing happens in the media, which present selected and highlighted information and thus communicates a specific interpretation.[35] Issues of foreign affairs are traditionally elite driven, and they also need public approval. Elites do not always have good and exhausting access to survey data and a deep scientific explanation of those results, therefore misconceptions of public opinion are common. Public opinion as depicted in the media becomes an object of political intentional and strategic communication between different groups in the cascade. The success in imposing framing and policies relies in major parts on, that the public shares the definition of problem, cause and remedies and supports the policies. As elites need the approval of the public, administration framing aims not just on the public, it also aims through public support on elites themselves. (Entman, 2004, p. 123 ff.)

There are different dimensions, which can be highlighted in framing of public opinion. The depiction of public opinion is about the dimensions of polling, perceived majorities, anticipated majorities and priorities. Polling as aggregate surveys is one of the main dimensions. The results are strongly influenced by the available concepts and knowledge of the people about the issue, but also about the emotions and general mood.[36] This set up, in which polling happens, is provided mostly by media coverage. The other influence happens by the pollster themselves. They have influence through methods, wording and conclusion about the results, in which they and the publishing media put

[35] The parliament and important elite groups outside the administration function as indicators of public opinion, still the media are seen as the important resource about public sentiment

[36] Polls often show confusing results, which make it hard for democratic institutions to respond in an appropriate way. E.g. the public votes in polls for higher fiscal discipline, but also for higher spending in defense. This is one reason, that for elites anticipated and perceived majorities play a more influential role in decision-making. (Entman, 2004, p. 130)

single results in a wider context. Perceived majorities are the majorities, which the administration, elites and the media think exist in favor of specific framing. They do not necessarily need to be real majorities and perceived majorities can be disapproved by polling. "*Elites develop their perception of majority views less from surveys than from the dominant frames of the issue and events in the news, which are assumed to move public opinion in certain directions."* (Entman, 2004, p. 127) Anticipated majorities are predicted majorities, which the administration and elites take into account in their assessment of policies and strategic intentional communication. They are strongly influenced by this anticipation of future consequences. The last dimension is priorities and it goes hand in hand with findings of agenda-setting research. Priorities are the first function of agenda-setting and they are influenced through news media. This is important for actors in the cascade, because to reduce a policy to low or high priority can be as important as generating actual approval or disapproval. (Entman, 2004, pp. 126, 127, 128)

The relationships between elites, media and public opinion are extremely complex and interdependent. To get an insight into the flows of ideas and opinions, it is helpful to turn towards models of representation, using covariance relationships, and to blend them into the cascade model with the media as an intervening variable. The outcome would be as proposed by Entman:

> *"Elites policy activity, the political balance, and elites strategic communication especially in the media influence the administration´s interpretations about elites and public sentiment, which lead to policy decisions, their effects and external conditions. News media frame these decisions which in turn shape the public opinion, which elites interpret based in measure on news frames, to which they respond with further policies and which influences the political balance through voting behavior, still influenced by framing and internal associations."* (Entman, 2004, p. 145)

3. Problem definition and research questions

The leading question for this thesis has been about the perspectives that were taken to approach the problem of the crisis. Who tells which narrative through the media to the people? This leads to the following research question as discussed in chapter 1.3.

What view on the issue of the Greek elections and the European Crisis have been depicted in the European Media coverage?

Out of the theoretical discourse in the previous chapters the following sub questions are deducted. Framing according to Entman leads to the questions for frames and the focus and functions of frames.

Which frames are used in different media outlets?

What is the problem definition in the frames?

What is the proposed response?

What consequences are discussed?

Discourse analysis and the cascade model of activation questions the actors and their influence on news coverage.

Who are actors in the decision-making process?

What levels of actors are quoted and act in the coverage according to the cascade model of spreading activation?

Framing and attribute Agenda Setting ask for the attribution of specific actors, or entities.

How are these actors attributed?

These sub questions lead to the development of criteria and categories for the empirical analysis of the news coverage. The next chapter will work out this empirical framework and the chapter after will discuss the specific news coverage that this empirical framework has to analyze to arrive to appropriate results for answering the research question of this thesis.

4. Methodology

As already discussed in the theoretical framework, framing analysis is viable to approach the issue of the European Crisis through examining the news coverage. This analysis happens as a Content Analysis, which is one of the most important research methods of communication science. While it was known before, Berelson introduced it in 1952 as a standard scientific method in his book "Content Analysis in Communication Research". Schulz characterizes content analysis as a standardized method for the analysis of messages in the process of communication. (Schulz, 2004, p. 42) Content analyzes is appropriate to research media coverage, its criteria and categories will be developed from the research questions and hypotheses. The analysis can focus on syntactic and semantic elements. (Bonfadelli, 2002, p. 89) Quantitative and qualitative categories can be examined together.

4.1 Criteria and Categories

The criteria and categories derive from the theoretical outline of the works of mainly Entman and McCombs. Their main understandings focus on the problem definition, the proposed responses, the consequences, on the actors and the attribution of those actors. This thesis will use a frame matrix being based on these focuses that had been developed by Katharine Sarikakis[37] [38] at the University of Vienna in 2012. This thesis stands in line with her works and the works of her team and her students about framing of the European Crisis in news coverage. The frame matrix sets up three frames, an economic frame, a political frame and a moral frame. These frames have each subsequent three levels of analysis and three dimensions. The levels of analysis consider the actors, which can be individuals, specific countries or organizations, or they can be codified on a supranational level of the European Union and its institutions. The dimensions can be a problem definition, proposed treatments or responses, or discussed consequences. This leads to a set of 27 categories that can be represented in a three-dimensional matrix (see fig. 1).

[37] Sarikakis, Katharine (2012): Communication Science Research Seminar (FOSE) 2012W. 220064: European Integration, Financial Crisis and the Media. University of Vienna: Department of Communication.
[38] Sarikakis, Katharine (2013): Communication Science Research Seminar (FOSE) 2013S. 220048: European Integration, Financial Crisis and the Media. University of Vienna: Department of Communication.

Dimension / Level of Analysis	Problem What is the problem? (10)	Treatment/Response What are the proposed and viable responses? (20)	Consequences What kind of consequences are discussed? (30)
Individuals, people/citizens (100)	- Are financial gains or losses of individuals presented as the central problem? (111) - Is the political behaviour of representatives/citizens presented as the central problem? (112) - Is the moral behaviour of individuals (citizens, politicians) presented as the central problem? (113)	- Are citizens required/asked to change their economic behaviour? (121) - Are citizens required to change their political behaviour / adopt a specific political attitude? (122) - Are citizens required to change their moral behaviour? (123)	- Are future economic consequences for citizens presented? (131) - Are future political consequences for citizens presented? (132) - Is there a moral lesson for citizens presented? (133)
Specific country/countries/nations (200)	- Are financial gains or losses of one or more specific countries presented as the central problem? (211) - Is the political behaviour/measures of national government(s) / parties / banks / institutions presented as the central problem? (212) - Is the moral behaviour of national government(s) / parties or cultural values and ways of life presented as the central problem? (213)	- Are countries/national governments required/asked to change their economic policy as means of solving the crisis? (221) - Are countries/national governments required/asked to change their political system/administrative system/political processes? (222) - Does the text suggest a fault in the moral standards or ways of life of a specific country/countries? (223)	- Are consequences for the national economy of specific countries presented? (231) - Are consequences for the national political system of specific countries presented? (232) - Is there a moral lesson for a specific country suggested/ presented? (233)
EU / Europe / Eurozone (300)	- Is the economic system/ situation of the EU / Eurozone presented as the central problem? (311) - Are political decisions of EU institutions / EU actors presented as the central problem? (312) - Is the moral behaviour of European actors / institutions presented as the central problem? (313)	- Is a change of the economic policy at EU level presented as a viable treatment/response? (321) - Are political decisions taken at EU level presented as a viable treatment/response? (322) - Does the treatment lie in (a change of) the dominant moral norms of EU actors / institutions? (323)	- Are consequences for the economy of the whole EU presented? (331) - Are political consequences for EU institutions / for EU-treaties presented? (332) - Is there a moral lesson for Europe / EU presented? (333)

Frames: Economic (1), Political (2), Moral (3).

In addition to these 27 categories the criteria of the actors will be examined more deeply to get an understanding of the narrative and answer the research question about the actors and how they are attributed. These categories will ask for specific countries or group of countries, as Greece, Germany, central Countries, peripheric countries, specific institutions or groups of institutions, as the IMF, ECB, and European Commission or the Euro-Area as a whole and banks of the Euro Area. Furthermore, specific people or organization and countries are singled out, which play a decisive role in the decision-making process, as Alexis Tsipras, Angela Merkel, Mario Draghi, the ECB, the Greek Administration, etc. In accordance with the agenda setting model of attribute agenda setting and framing it will be examined who is named and how they are attributed. Following the cascade model of spreading activation, it has to be examined who appears and is quoted in the coverage. To find a narrative it is also interesting to ask who of these actors is depicted as acting, and who is depicted as reacting or being the object of acts. These categories can be integrated into four research units: 1. Actors, 2. Attribution of specific Actors, 3. Quotes of Actors, 4. Actors as subjects and objects in the narrative.

4.2 Scope of research

Scope of research defines the news coverage in terms of time, in which the coverage depicts the Greek elections and or the European crisis, and of media outlets which should be examined. The aim of this thesis is to include a wide range of countries and actors with their perspectives on the crisis. At the same time this thesis stands in line with the works of Katharine Sarikakis, her team, and her students at the University in Vienna and thus has specific newspapers pre-selected to enable comparability of different events in the European Crisis. This selection of newspapers includes The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian from Great Britain, Die Welt and Süddeutsche Zeitung from Germany and Ekathimerini from Greece. (Kritsch, 2014, p. 50) In addition, this thesis will examine one national Spanish newspaper of daily coverage, El País. El País is the most circulated newspaper in Spain and has a center-left political orientation. (Canel, 2013, p. 137) Spain has been since the beginning of the European Crisis in a similar economic situation. Its GDP plummeted; unemployment rose, and the country received financial loans from the EU-ECB-IMF.[39] As in Greece the beginning of the European Crisis was marked with manifestations against austerity policies. In contrast to these similarities the geopolitical situation and the historic circumstances differ from Greece´s.

This scope provides an insight into the range of narratives and actors in the European crisis and allows the finding of the underlying fundaments, commonalities and distinctions between the different European nation states. It can be said, that the most circulated newspapers in each country are part of this analysis, with the following political views: center right – Die Welt, The Daily Telegraph, Ekathimerini; center-left – The Guardian, Süddeutsche Zeitung, El País. (Kritsch, 2014, p. 50)

4.2.1 Time frame for analysis and type of articles

The time of coverage has been set by the political circumstances of the election of Greece in 2015. On the 9th December of 2014 the then Prime Minister of Greece Antonis Samaras announced early presidential elections. From the first moment it was clear that a failure to elect a president would lead to snap parliamentary elections in January, which happened. The time frame of the coverage reaches from the 9th of December 2014 until the 25th January of 2015, the day in which the parliamentary elections had been decided. This makes up 7 weeks of research.

[39] See chapter 1.1.1. and 1.1.2

The first quantitative figure is the number of articles and their frequency throughout the timespan until the election took place in January 25th of 2015. It is obvious, that the coverage concentrates on the week right before the election. Coverage about the bond-buying program by the ECB (Public Sector Purchase Program) and the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting happen to reach its peak in week seven of the timespan of the analysis. If they mention the crisis, they are part of this study.



Figure 4: articles in the examined coverage per week

In regard to the length of the articles a division between the coverage of Ekathimerini and the other newspapers is helpful, because Ekathimerini features mostly short articles with less than 300 words (266). Coverage of the other newspapers is found mainly in articles with a length between 600 and 1000 words (162) and between 300 and 600 words (146). Just 19 articles have more than 1.500 words. The long articles were mainly human Interest or editorial articles, while news articles dominate the coverage. Editorials make up about 20% of the coverage, human interest stories just 3% in total. Economic news with 36% and political news with 39% make up the majority of coverage, with political that can be subdivided into domestic political news, foreign political news and mixed coverage, in which foreign and domestic politics are discussed at the same time[40].

[40] These News are called „News_politics_mixed“ in the categories and happen when e.g. the consequences of the Greek election are discussed for domestic politics or the national economy, or when developments in Europe and other countries are discussed for Greek politics from the vantage point of Ekathimerini



Figure 5: Types of articles in examined news coverage

What is to notice is the high number of financial articles, descripting immediate activities and reactions of stock markets and investor relations. Predominantly quoted in this context are financial analysts of banks, insurance companies or other investor related organizations. That is why it is important ask how biased these articles are, as they serve the interests of a particularly small group. This point of view can be seen as narrowing an economic and political crisis with social implications to a question of financial evaluations following neo-liberal perspectives and a neo-liberal turn in approaching social developments. (Tracy, 2012, p. 515)

4.3 Research process

After finding the theoretic framework that provides a sufficient base for empiric investigation into answering the research questions, and after defining the methodological approach and the scope of research it is important to examine the research process per se. This happens to strengthen validity of the study and to follow the line of works made by Katharine Sarikakis, her research team and her students, to enable comparability of the results. The following paragraphs will explore how the empiric research takes place.

The process of collecting articles happened after the end of the Greek Election on 25th of January of 2015. The articles were collected through the database LexisNexis. The software for adjusting and coding the articles has been Atlas.ti. The keywords were drawn upon the issue of the election and from the experience with collecting articles made by Kritsch for her thesis at the University of Vienna and consist of the following (Kritsch, 2014, p. 53):

Crisis, Greece or *Europe or Syriza or Election*

The articles from LexisNexis for these keywords in the time-frame from the 9th of December 2014 until the 25th of January of 2015 deal to a varying degree with the issue of the Greek Elections. As previously pointed out, two issues mainly interfere with the Greek Elections: the decision for a bond-buying program by the ECB (Public Sector Purchase Program) in January and the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting from the 21st to the 24th January of 2015. Articles that mainly discuss the conditions or outcomes of these two issues in regard to the European Crisis were considered as well.

In the process of coding articles, statements were the main unit for coding. A statement can reach from one sentence to several paragraphs or a whole article. These semantic units were then coded into the categories as set by the frame matrix. Attributions reached from single words to sentences.[41]

[41] See codebook in the appendix for further explanation

5. Findings

This chapter will discuss findings of the empirical analysis. The design of the research leads to outputs in the form of quantitative and qualitative findings. The quantitative findings measure the number of different units in the categories and different calculations to find underlying dependencies. The qualitative research of this study focuses on the interpretation of parts of articles and single arguments, as well as on attribution in the press. The following chapter shows the findings from framing examination and the space that different actors were given in coverage. After that the attribution will be examined through word counts and the analysis of single statement. Both will be brought together to answer the research question in chapter 6: "Discussion of the findings".

5.1 Findings from framing and actors

Measuring frames reveals a clear domination of political frame. Fig. 6 shows, that within a reach from 18,69% (Die Welt) to 28,84% (Süddeutsche Zeitung) frames define a problem of political behavior of national parties or institutions, which is frame 212. This finding is not surprising given that coverage of elections focuses on the process of the election itself, the performance of single candidates and parties. The following frame problematizes political behavior of individuals or representatives (112). The crisis in the Greek election is seen mainly as a national issue, with a possible response lying in the national systems and processes and with mainly national consequences. Fig. 7 shows the percentages of frame topics, dimensions and levels. The European level ranges from 17% (Süddeutsche Zeitung) to 43% (Daily Telegraph), but these amounts result also from the interference of the bond buying program of the ECB in January. To sum it up, the coverage sees the Greek election and its interdependence with the European Crisis as a national issue. The solution of the crisis is mainly in the hands of Euro Area nations. As it will be shown later, the second most named country in the frames of problem definition and response is Germany. The most named persons as actors are Alexis Tsipras, the then leader of the opposition party and possible new Prime Minister of Greece, Antonis Samaras, former Greek Prime Minister, and Angela Merkel, the chancellor of Germany. This shows that the European Crisis is seen mainly as an issue that national behavior and actors deal with. The only dominant European Institution is the ECB, acting as the central bank and a member of the so-called "Troika".



Figure 6:Frames found in examined news coverage

Breaking down the frames into their respective topics, levels and dimensions of analysis, fig. 7 is formed.

	Daily Telegraph	Welt	Süddeutsche Zeitung	Guardian	El Pais	Ekathimerini
individual	10%	13%	28%	24%	18%	21%
national	47%	55%	55%	48%	48%	59%
european	43%	32%	17%	27%	34%	20%
economic	58%	33%	17%	30%	23%	31%
political	37%	57%	73%	65%	72%	63%
moral	5%	10%	11%	5%	4%	6%
problem	48%	49%	68%	60%	68%	70%
response	23%	32%	15%	23%	27%	14%
consequence	29%	19%	17%	18%	5%	16%

Figure 7: frame topics, dimensions and levels

As already pointed out in chapter 4.2.1 economic news with a coverage of stock markets reactions and financial actors´ behavior makes up about a third in coverage. Quotations in these articles are mainly from financial analysts, who serve the specific interest of investors. Tracy (2012) has shown, that already in the beginning of the Greek debt crisis in 2010 these specific perspectives influenced coverage and framing: "*The contagion premise was largely fueled through reliance on explanations of financial industry representatives and economists*" (Tracy, 2012, p. 521) The role of banks as a cause for the crisis had been undermined by news coverage, though they played an active role in causing the financial crisis. Through the framing of financial experts the role of banks and markets was turned from a cause to a negatively group of victims, that had to react to losses: "*In a peculiar turn the contagion frame also presents speculators as victims rather than culprits or accessories of market tumults*" (Tracy, 2012, p. 522) This is still valid in the coverage of 2014/2015 where banks and financial actors do not play a role for a cause, but play a role in explaining the causes, remedies, and consequences of the developments and thus frame them.



Figure 8: Actors found in examined news coverage

The Cascade model is underlined by the measures of quotation and actors. Nearly all relevant quotations are made by administration and elites, as shown in fig. 9 (the percentages do not add up, given that indirect quotes had been counted as well). The same happens with the actors, who consist mostly of administration and elites. (fig. 8) Furthermore, the influence of elites is higher in the coverage of the Greek election, as representatives of Syriza and Tsipras himself are considered as elites before the election.



Figure 9: Direct quotes found in examined news coverage

5.2 Attribution findings

5.2.1 General findings

Attribution of actors and specific groups or nations had been coded in the analysis. The units with the most attributions are “Greece”, “Germany”, “Syriza”, “Tsipras”, and “old Administration Greece”. In the following paragraphs a comparison between national coverage will be examined through quantitative wordcount in the coded attributions and a heuristic approach to selected statements. The quantitative wordcount will be shown through selected word clouds to enhance understandability. [42]

Examining the attribution of Greece in the UK coverage, the most frequent words associated to Greece are crisis, debt, euro, eurozone and austerity (Fig. 10). German and Spanish coverage are similar, with the German coverage stressing additionally unemployment and democracy, and the Spanish coverage stressing suffering (sufrido), the political nature (politica), the Troika and drama. In relation to the found frames, these depictions focus on symptomatic and political framing.

[42] The wordlists of the quantitative wordcount can be found in the appendix.

Figure 10: Word cloud attribution of Greece in UK coverage

The word cloud of the Greek coverage about Greece shows that this political nature of the attribution of Greece and its developments are the leading attribution (Fig. 11). It is followed by the attribution of uncertainty, economic, recession and unemployment. These are clearly stressing the negative impact of the crisis and depicting Greece as a country in distress. At the same time, although less often, the word count also shows positive depictions, such as recovery, progress, growth and return.

Figure 11: Word cloud attribution of Greece in Greek coverage

Germany in general is depicted as a strong and resilient force in the coverage, as can be seen in fig. 12. The dominant words in the British coverage are euro and eurozone, export, Greece, resistance, austerity and economic. In addition, the adjectives powerful, fierce, biggest and rigour paint a picture of a force protecting the status quo.

Figure 12: Word cloud attribution of Germany in UK coverage

5.2.2 The attribution of Greece in Greek editorial articles

An analysis of single statements shows the context of the different depictions of Greece in the Greek coverage. While the negative depictions implying uncertainty, unemployment and recession prevail in the general coverage (see 5.2.1), the normative statements in the editorials do speak about positive developments with the aim of convincing the audience that the conservative government lead Greece on a successful path towards growth and recovery.

> *"The local economy was beginning to show encouraging signs, while financial forecasts had been pointing to 2015 as being a year of considerable recovery. At the same time, serious investors had either already made investments in Greece or were expected to sign new deals. The signs coming from the tourism industry were also exceptionally encouraging. All of the above, and especially the prospect of economic recovery, now appears to be in real danger."* (Ekathimerini, 12/12/2014)

On the other hand, the political process of the election and their predicted outcome with a victory of Syriza are depicted as a danger to recent economic success.

> *"Many people who love and care about Greece are clearly concerned: "What exactly are you doing? Things had calmed down, you were on the way up again, and here you are playing your old-style political games again." This is exactly what happened."* (Papachelas, 12/17/2014)

> *"Just as the economy started to show signs of recovery, it looks like we are heading to elections and a long period of uncertainty, all over the election of a President with a mostly cosmetic role. Public debate has been hijacked by mindless populism and dirty politiking. Reforms are on the back burner again. The coalition has basically stopped making any real progress, as the leftist opposition indulges in chest-thumping and sterile rejectionism."* (Ekathimerini, 12/21/2014)

These statements increase with the election approaching. The readers and potential voters are addressed directly and are called to follow "common sense". Chapter 2.1 showed that common sense seeks to reinforce certain ideological assumptions. It works best when the ideology and the interests of those in power is kept hidden and the audience is given clues and hints, from which they have to interpret, what common sense means.

> *"Inevitably, voters who […] are aware of the risks facing the country are key to the next election. They too find little comfort, but they nevertheless acknowledge that the economy had finally posted some growth, that Greece had started to attract some foreign investment, and that 2015 could have been a relatively good year. Now the economic achievements have been put into doubt and the specter of a Greek euro exit has returned. These people realize that big mistakes were made, particularly after May. […] But they deem that this is not a good time for experimenting and putting too many captains at the helm of the ship without a map and compass. They would prefer a vote of hope and enthusiasm. But they are bound to back the pro-European parties out of fear and self-preservation. They know that we cannot afford to take risks when there is no money and when some of our European peers wouldn't have any qualms about leaving us behind."* (Papachelas, 12/31/2014)

> *"Let's go back to where the country stood prior to December's presidential election. Greece was in growth mode in the last quarter of 2014 and all predictions were pointing to a 3 percent growth rate for 2015. New entrepreneurship was also making timid steps and there was a small drop in unemployment. More importantly, many Greek and international investors were already positioning themselves in the local market or preparing major deals. A success story? No, and we never claimed this to be the case. But we did have the requirements to do better. As a foreign friend put it, "Your economy would have done better in spite of your politicians."* (Papachelas, 1/24/2015)

Fig. 13 shows the main attributions of the conservative government and its leader Samaras in comparison to depictions of Syriza and Tsipras in all Greek coverage of Ekathimerini. The main program of Syriza appears in its dominant descriptions: a leftist party that opposes austerity and the measures accompanying the bailout. Debt and its handling define Syriza. Syriza stands also in the dominant attribution of the conservative government, a result from the fact that their campaign was focused against Syriza. The word "failed" is another dominant attribution, though a closer examination shows that it is mainly used in the context of the failure to elect a president in December 2014.

Figure 13: Word cloud attribution of Syriza/Tsipras (left) in comparison to attribution of the old administration (right) in Greek coverage

Focusing again on the editorial coverage and its attribution of Greece the statements show that Ekathimerini depicts a polarized country and calls for unity and understanding. This is a call for common sense in a conservative discourse that serves the then ruling party ND, as the following quotes show.

"The country needs to reach a rudimentary level of national understanding and unity in order to overcome its problems and move on." (Ekathimerini, 1/8/2015)

"[…] voters need a sense of hope and optimism, as opposed to just fear." (Ekathimerini, 1/9/2015)

"We have entered a new phase, one that requires mutual understanding and cooperation. […] people would prefer to see more cooperation and mutually accepted solutions." (Ekathimerini, 1/15/2015)

"Polarization has prevented a serious discussion from being carried out on the main challenges the next government faces" (Konstandaras, 1/22/2015)

"Sangfroid and common sense must emerge as the absolute winners of this particular battle." (Ekathimerini, 12/16/2014)

5.2.3 The attribution of Greece in British and German coverage

In contrast to the perspective of the Greek coverage, The Guardian sees the polarization not between national parties and groups, but rather between two different ideas of handling the crisis in Europe, as the following quote indicates.

"The crisis and its aftermath have exposed the limitations of what is supposed to be an independent central bank. The delays, the horse-trading and the limitations of the ECB plan show how deeply politicized it has become. The ECB president is holding the ring between two rival camps: the inflation hawks of northern Europe led by Germany and the French-led group calling for more monetary activism" (Elliott, 1/22/2015)

This quagmire schema implicates that decision-making and policy-making inside the Euro Group has been poised, that institutions as the ECB do not act according to their non-political foundation; that Germany has a big influence, but that it is not legitimate for one member-state to set up the decisions for the whole group. The Guardian implicate causes, remedies and future consequences of the European Crisis. It goes beyond symptomatic framing and tries to grasp a bigger picture.

"The political forces set in motion by austerity policies designed to cope with the still unresolved economic crisis are coming to the fore everywhere, undermining

established parties, changing the way countries are governed, and reshaping popular attitudes." (Guardian, 12/29/2014)

Austerity is condemned, because of its devastating effects on society. The problem is diagnosed on a European level, depicting the power relations in the Eurozone favoring the powerful member states, while Greece suffers from this structure of the Eurozone and the obvious lack of solidarity. The administration in Germany is described as one of the main responsible actors.

"For their part, Germany and others should be able to see that Greece, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 170%, remains miles away from debt sustainability" (Pratley, 1/5/2015)

"Greece and some other Mediterranean economies are facing poverty not seen in half a century. A return to normal growth means they must declare themselves bankrupt, restructure past debts, leave the eurozone and devalue. Don't bury money in their banks. Bury it in their wallet. The eurozone may still look great from the top of a Swiss mountain; it looks terrible from the foot of the Acropolis." (Jenkins, 1/22/2015)

The Guardian criticizes the Greek elites as responsible for "*Corruption and cronyism*" (Margaronis, 1/23/2015), but the dominant discourse is one of a needed European solution, proposing solidarity to end austerity. Syriza is seen as a possible game-changer.

"All politics is local, but solidarity has no borders. In the tough negotiations ahead, Greece will need the support of its neighbours, politicians and citizens as it pushes for debt relief, an end to austerity and a different future for Europe." (Margaronis, 1/23/2015)

The Daily Telegraph follows this lead and diagnoses the problem on a European level. Already in figure 4 it could be shown, that The Daily Telegraph has the most frames (43%) of all newspapers focusing on a European level. The following quotes are taken from normative units, mostly found in editorials which have an attribution of Greece in them. The first quote is outstanding in regard that it questions the assumption of common sense in media coverage.

"In these circumstances, it is hard to disagree with Syriza's leader, Alexis Tsipras, when he says: "We must end austerity so as not to let fear kill democracy." I was

> *amused to read a learned, anxious article in the Financial Times this week, which speculated about whether Mr Tsipras will ultimately let "reason or unreason" prevail. The author did not say which is which, as if FT readers all knew. But where is the "reason" in the centrist, moderate Greek parties which, for several years, have conspired with the Troika to impoverish their country?"* (Moore, 1/24/2015)

The Daily Telegraph defines in these quotes the European Union and its currency system, as well as a financially strong and rigorous Germany as the problem, which lead to unbearable consequences for weaker members of the Eurogroup, in this case mainly Greece. One remedy is to leave the Eurozone.

> *"Greece has, almost literally, nothing, because it has little policy freedom, a currency whose value it cannot affect and a deflation that makes its debt-to-GDP ratio arithmetically unbearable. It is being told what to do by exterior powers whose first interest is not the welfare of Greece, but that of the system they have invented to run more than half the Continent."* (Moore, 1/24/2015)

> *"The bottom line is that Greece, and a number of other eurozone nations, urgently need to leave the euro"* (Warner, 12/17/2014)

The introduction of a failed system as common sense can be interpreted as laying the ground for a discourse of Brexit, which followed a little bit than one year later.

> *"Like a bad penny, Greece keeps coming back to remind us of the folly of Europe's grand experiment in monetary union and the havoc it has created for a once thriving continent."* (Warner, 12/30/2014)

Analysis of the same normative units, which have an attribution of Greece in them, in the German center-right newspaper Die Welt, mostly in editorials, shows a completely different approach that blames mainly Greece as the problem. The proposed remedy is the same, but while The Daily Telegraph demands to leave a problematic Eurozone, Die Welt demands the problematic Greece to leave a functioning Eurozone. In the following quote a common sense in the neo-liberal discourse is stated – that not the financial system, but rather social welfare is the reason for the European Crisis:

> *„Längst hat sich gezeigt, dass nicht die Weltfinanzkrise nach dem Zusammenbruch der US-Investmentbank Lehman Brothers Europas Schuldenmisere ausgelöst hat. Vielmehr sind die Ursachen der europäischen Misere größtenteils hausgemacht. Mangelnde Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und überbordende Sozialsysteme haben zuerst Griechenland und später auch Italien und Frankreich in arge Haushaltsnöte gebracht. […] Dass etliche Schuldensünder bis heute zu wenig Reformeifer an den Tag legen, ist unbestreitbar."* (Siems, 1/22/2015)

The proposed remedy is the introduction of 'reforms', which are not explicated, but can be understood in the neo-liberal context as measures of austerity. The following quotes depict Greece as the problem of the European Crisis. The articles use specific words that evoke strong comparisons in the readers head, such as "Schuldensünder" (sinners of debt) and "Rettungseuropäer" (rescue Europeans), to attribute clear moral implications to specific nations in the European Union.

> "*Immer wieder ist es Griechenland, das die Euro-Zone aufs Spiel setzt.*" (Ettel & Zschäpitz, 12/11/2014)

> *„Mit Blick auf Griechenland müssen die Rettungseuropäer sich jetzt entscheiden: Entweder sie halten das Land trotz Reformmüdigkeit, Tricks bei der Haushaltsplanung und politischer Krise mit weiteren Milliardenkrediten und einem erneuten Schuldenschnitt weiter künstlich über Wasser, oder sie ziehen die Notbremse. Griechenland sollte aus dem Euro austreten"* (Schiltz, 12/11/2014)

An examination of the same attribution units in Süddeutsche Zeitung supports chapter 2.2 and its implication, that the European Crisis for the media and the audiences is a matter of foreign affairs and that the media arenas are national arenas. The discourses are national and news outlets of the same political vantage point have national discourses. Being center-left, Süddeutsche Zeitung is more diversified in the discourses it gives space to, and it is less harsh in the wording than Die Welt. The dominating discourse is still an approach to the European Crisis as a problem on a national level. Süddeutsche Zeitung hereby does not generalize as Die Welt, but sets the Greek elites as central to the problem definition and attributes them as mainly 'corrupt' as the following three quotes show:

> *„Die Schuld an der fehlenden Zukunftsperspektive und der Reformschwäche liegt einzig und allein bei der politischen Elite des Landes."* (Fratzscher, 12/30/2014)

> *„Doch gelang es den etablierten politischen Kräften in Griechenland auch unter Aufsicht der Troika nicht, die großen Probleme etwa der Korruption, des Oligarchentums oder der Steuerhinterziehung wirksam zu bekämpfen.“* (Peter & Giegold, 1/25/2015)

> *„Eine korrupte Wirtschafts- und Politikelite hat Griechenland zusammen mit reichen Oligarchen über 40 Jahre in den Ruin gewirtschaftet.“* (Gammelin, 1/26/2015)

While The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph see remedies on a European level or even in leaving the Eurozone, Süddeutsche Zeitung defines Greece as responsible for introducing appropriate remedies, as does Die Welt. The Troika and the loans are seen mainly as help, as the following quote shows:

> *„Die Euro-Gemeinschaft ist nicht mehr erpressbar und kann auf Einhaltung des Rettungsvertrages bestehen, der da heißt: Kredite und Bürgschaften gegen Strukturreformen. Griechenland hat, was die Bedingung seiner Verschuldung angeht, massiv profitiert von der Rettungspolitik. Umgekehrt hat Athen nicht wie versprochen geliefert. Der Sparkurs trifft die Bevölkerung bitterhart, die politische Klasse aber macht in vielerlei Hinsicht weiter wie bisher, Initiativen etwa gegen Steuerbetrug wurden abgebrochen*“ (Beise, 1/4/2015)

As in Die Welt, the wording in Süddeutsche evoke strong pictures, as the word “Rettungspolitik” (rescue policy). On the other hand, Süddeutsche allows more discourses and the following quote declares “Hilfsgelder” (rescue money) a fake:

> *“Die angeblichen Hilfsgelder haben nicht Griechenland gerettet, sondern die Gläubiger Griechenlands und die korrupte griechische Oberschicht. Die Troika stützt sich in Griechenland auf die politischen Kräfte, die ein System von Vetternwirtschaft und Korruption zugunsten der Besitzenden geschaffen haben.“* (Bock, 1/22/15)

The austerity measures of the EC, ECB and IMF is repeatedly questioned. In one article, Süddeutsche Zeitung uses the term of “Zinsknechtschaft” which corresponds with the prospect of a *debtor´s prison* that Yanis Varoufakis feared in his analyses (see chapter 1).

> *"Ohne gemeinsames Handeln würde das Land in eine Zinsknechtschaft kommen, aus der es sich unmöglich alleine befreien kann."* (Peter & Giegold, 1/25/2015)

Süddeutsche Zeitung allows to question the legitimacy of austerity, which has not been the object of democratic processes. It concludes with sympathy towards Syriza, which is seen as a chance to overcome the problem of 'corrupt' elites. Still for Süddeutsche Zeitung the problem definition and consequences are localized mainly on a national level and the newspaper demands political national reforms in Greece as the main remedy.

> *"Es hatte eine demokratisch gewählte Regierung, aber das Sagen hatten die von den internationalen Kreditgebern geschickten Banker und Bürokraten, die Troika. Über fünf Jahre haben die Bürger diese Fremdbestimmung hingenommen. […] Die griechischen Bürger haben damit eine ohnehin paradoxe Situation beendet. Denn im Befund sind sich die Hauptstädte der Euro-Länder grundsätzlich einig: Eine korrupte Wirtschafts- und Politikelite hat Griechenland zusammen mit reichen Oligarchen über 40 Jahre in den Ruin gewirtschaftet. […] Wer es ernst meint damit, den Willen des Volkes zu akzeptieren, der muss dem Linksbündnis in Griechenland eine faire Chance geben."* (Gammelin, 1/26/2015)

6. Discussion of the findings

The findings of the quantitative and qualitative analysis give answers to the research questions, that lead the empirical work.

Which frames are used in different media outlets? The frames are dominantly about the political behavior of actors on a national and individual level. The Greek election is an event on a national level, but the main topic of this election was the response to the ongoing deep financial and societal crisis in Greece, which is the result of European politics by imposing austerity measures. In 2015 the European Crisis was still severely affecting Greece and other southern Europe countries, as the tables for youth unemployment rates and GDP in chapter 1.1.1 and 1.1.3 show. The debt was still unsustainable in Greece. These facts and the probable failure of the program in Greece could have led to a discussion of the program and wider discussion about austerity, the responsibility of the European Union and the discussion of alternative approaches. Frames could have been more on a European level with a discussion of remedies and consequences. There are differences comparing the newspaper outlets regarding nationality and political view. The center-right newspapers Die Welt and The Daily Telegraph give more space to a perspective on a European level (32% Die Welt; The Daily Telegraph 43%) They also have a more economic approach (33% Die Welt; The Daily Telegraph 58%) and discuss less a problem definition than remedies and consequences than other newspapers. The center-left newspapers (including El País) clearly focus on the political problem definition. Bringing these results together with the qualitative statement analysis a national “agenda” appears, that clearly influences the center-right newspapers. Ekathimerini is giving an advice to its Greek readers to support the Greek administration and not to vote for Syriza. The Daily Telegraph blames austerity in the Euro Zone and the construction of the single currency for the problems of Greece and supports an exit of Greece out of the Eurozone, hinting towards a possible Brexit, which happened one year later. Future research should analyze the influence of policy making in the European Crisis for the Brexit vote of 2016. The German newspaper Die Welt blames Greece and supports the continuation of austerity in the Eurozone. The normative statements of Süddeutsche Zeitung and Guardian do share this national agenda, though they are more diversified and less clear in their statements. The Guardian is in comparison to Süddeutsche Zeitung more critical of European policy making, while Süddeutsche Zeitung is more critical of Greek elites. This outcome of the normative statements makes up just 20% (normative vs. descriptive statements) of the coverage and gives just an insight into the proposed remedies of the newspapers. In regard to concepts of frame and

discourse contestation discussed in chapter 2 and chapter 2.4.3 the newspapers do not allow a fully developed counterframe and thus do not question appropriately the dominant discourse or framing.

Who are actors in the decision-making process? What levels of actors are quoted and act in the coverage according to the cascade model of spreading activation?

The actors being subject of the stories in the coverage are mainly representatives of the administrations. Direct quotations are dominantly by elites, to a lesser extent to administration representatives. In these elite quotations are included analysts and financial experts, who support the dominant and established discourses and framing. These findings affirm the spreading model of activation. Even though the results of the 2015 election in Greece were an unprecedented change in the political behavior of the Greek people, who elected Syriza as the strongest party to renegotiate the terms and conditions of the austerity measures; this powerful acting has not been depicted in the coverage. Further research could examine the framing in alternative outlets to analyze their approach towards depicting actors.

How are these actors attributed?

Greece and Germany, Syriza and the former government are the objects that this examination analyzed their attribution. They are the poles, symbolizing the different response to the ongoing financial and social crisis on different levels. Germany and the former government of Greece stand for the status quo, one of their dominant attribution is the oppositional force - Greece for Germany, and Syriza for the former government. This supports the assumptions of Fairclough for opposing discourses - Greece and Syriza could be seen as challenging the dominant discourse, as opposing forces. While Greece is in the coverage heavily connected with crisis and negative depictions of a country in distress, Syriza is attributed as the party against austerity, that seeks to renegotiate the conditions of debt. A closer examination of the Greek coverage reveals a clear tendency to recommend not voting for Syriza in the name of a ‘common sense’. A comparison of the German and English newspapers reveals then a tendency to follow mostly national discourses and interpretations, as already depicted in the discussion of framing findings before.

7. Conclusion

The question of this thesis is about the dominant storytelling in the media and its origins. In the introduction the idea of a *common-sense solution* to the European Crisis appeared. A solution, that reinforces administration interpretations and measures. A solution, that strengthens the status quo. The research in social and communication sciences points to the fact that news coverage heavily relies on administration and elites framing of events and developments. The results of the empiric examination show clearly that an appropriate discussion of remedies and solutions to the European Crisis do not happen in the venue of the traditional quality media and it does not matter, from which country they are, nor to which political spectrum they belong. Besides the hints of contestation in normative statements, discussed in the chapter before, the quality media in Europe focus on the discussion of problem definition, mainly on a political level of nation states. The Greek election of 2015 are not depicted as a chance to change the course of crisis management, to question the still underlying causes of the crisis and promote or discuss remedies. They are depicted as an, maybe understandable, but unnecessary prolongation of the crisis. Concluding from this can only mean that the remedy and solution was already there and has been discussed enough – it is the memorandum of Greece and the Troika and its accompanying austerity measures.

In line with other studies[43] the crisis can be localized in the framing of newspaper coverage: It is located in Greece and even in Greece it can be localized in the framing of Ekathimerini: namely in the behaviour of Syriza and its challenge of austerity and the continuation of neo-liberal policy-making. This simplification of a crisis, this shrinking of responsibilities and exclusion of alternative and contesting discourses and framing services the established power relations as shown in chapter 2 and discourse analysis. This outcome of framing and discourses fits to the findings of the European Crisis in chapter 1.1.2: the costs of the European Crisis have been turned to be paid by the weakest Member States and in these Member States by the weakest groups – the young and poor.

It could be shown, that the actors in coverage are mainly elites and administrations on national and European level, the powerful actors communicating established discourses and frames. Syriza has been quoted, but they have not managed to introduce a new discourse about remedies and causal interpretations. Rather their behavior is analyzed in a typical mode of election coverage - non-substantial framing. The austerity program of the memorandum between the so-called Troika and

[43] Compare: United in diversity' in the wake of the European financial crisis? – European identity in print media's framing of the crisis" (Kritsch, 2014, p. 78)

Greece has dealt in 2015 for four years with, what was interpreted in their understanding as a "sovereign-debt crisis". Even after the continuation of the program and until today the Greek debt is seen by the IMF and the European Commission as unsustainable. (Angerer, et al., 2018, p. 2) The program has had ostensibly the main target of eliminating debt – it obviously failed. To speak of common-sense in a continuation of the underlying strategies and ideologies must seem to many in the audience that are affected by austerity as "fake news".

This failure of the traditional media to inform and orientate the audience appropriately by offering a diversity of discourses, questioning or reflecting power relations and the medias´ own limitations, and empowering those who do not have a voice; this failure is dangerous for democracy. Not only because it oppresses less powerful groups in society. (McCombs, et al., 1991, p. 103) Oppressed groups discover the construction of discourses and their ideology, because they are negatively affected by them. (Fairclough, 2015, p. 108) The dangerous aspect of this misrepresentation and frames or discourses serving the powerful in the mass media and the political system, in which audiences can cannot recognize themselves and participate anymore, is that it makes them turn towards alternative media outlets. The 2015 Greek election happened in the middle of a deep crisis for journalism, in terms of credibility and economic survival. The fragmentation of the media (see chapter 2.1.1) can be seen in this sense not just as technical development of new online arenas but rather as failure to represent citizens. When they turn towards other means of explanation and orientation or distance themselves from democratic participation, the outcome can be unpredictable and dangerous for societal integration and democratic understanding, as it happened with the vote for the Brexit in the UK and the election of Donald Trump in the USA in 2016. Future research must examine the conditions and demands for quality media to fulfill their traditional role of orientation and explanation in a contemporary, fragmented world with ever more complicated and interdependent issues, by depicting the societal discourses in a holistic and integrating way.

It can be done differently. Referring again to Fairclough in chapter 2: "*there are social causes, and social remedies, for social problems*." (Fairclough, 2015, p. 108) Solving the European Crisis could have been discussed as an act of a social and first European approach, protecting the weaker Member States and in the Member States the weakest groups of society. It could have been discussed as a question of identity, solidarity, "*social fairness and, ultimately, of the credibility of Europe's social and economic model*." (European Commission, 2016, p. 3) A question of being good neighbors to each other: *πῆμα κακὸς γείτων, ὅσσον τ' ἀγαθὸς μέγ' ὄνειαρ.*

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Appendix

9. Codebook

The codebook follows the conception of Werner Früh and consists of the following parts: formal identification figures for units of analysis, general coding advice, categories, definition of categories. (Früh, 2015, p. 166) The codebook is being used in a content analysis of the media coverage in European newspapers of the Greek election in January of 2015.

9.1 Formal figures for units of analysis

The content analysis examines the following newspapers: The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt, El País, Ekathimerini. The time frame of the coverage goes from the 9th of December 2014 until the 25th January of 2015, the day in which the parliamentary elections took place. The formal figures of the articles will be coded with following codes.

#Headline1	code the whole main headline
#Headline2	code the secondary headline, if there is one
#Length_up_300_words	length of the article with headlines, use atlas.ti wordcrunch or word-count in MS-Word
#Length_up_600_words	
#Length_up_1000_words	
#Length_up_1500_words	
#Length_up_2000_words	
#Length_up_2000_words_and_more	
#Press_DEU	code the name of the newspaper with country of origin
#Press_GR	
#Press_UK	
#Press_ESP	
#Time	code date and time of the article
#Title_Ekathimerini	code name of the newspaper
#Title_Guardian	
#Title_Sueddeutsche	
#Title_Telegraph	
#Title_Welt	
#Title_El_Pais	
#Type_Editorial	code type of article: editorial, human-interest story, interview, economic news, political news about domestic issues, political news about foreign issues, political news about foreign and domestic issues related to each other
#Type_HumanInterest	
#Type_Interview	
#Type_News_Economic	
#Type_News_politics_domestic	
#Type_News_politics_foreign	
#Type_News_politics_mix	

9.2 General coding advice

Statements are the main unit of coding articles, as one article can describe one or more problems and propose one or more responses or depict different consequences. Statements which are irrelevant to the Greek elections or the European Crisis must not be assigned to a code. A statement can be a sentence, one or more paragraphs or even a whole article, mostly if it is short and less than 300 words. A statement is characterized by a unique meaning. (Früh, 2015, p. 169) One statement can be just coded with one frame, but within this frame can occur further attributions, quotes and actors. Before coding the whole article has to be read once, to grasp an understanding of the context.

9.3 Categories and explanation

The statements are coded according to the frame matrix from chapter 4.1. It was developed by Katharine Sarikakis at the University in Vienna in 2012 and consists of 27 categories that examine: 1. The level of analysis (individual, national, European), 2. Dimension of framing (problem definition, proposed remedies, consequences), 3. Framing (economic, political, moral). The following detailed explanation and the detailed matrix have to be used for coding.

a. Economic frame

A dominant narrative/story line in the article/statement that involves one or more of the following:

- financial gains and losses of states, companies or individuals
  e.g. debt, government bonds, balance of payment problems, inflation, shortage of money, trust in banks, lack of credits for the industry, (the inevitable mechanisms of) the financial system
- economic reasons for/consequences of unemployment
- the state and competitively of the (Greek, French, Italian) industry, economic outlook/economic growth
- technical problems, reasons and consequences of measures taken by national central banks and the ECB
- economic risks induced by the (Greek) dept crisis for any country of the Eurozone; consequences of a break-up of the Euro zone etc.

b. Political frame

A narrative about 'Who gets what and how from government?' (Lasswell) or, in other words, politics is about collectively binding decisions on the allocation of goods and values (Easton)

A dominant narrative/story line in the article/statement that involves one or more of the following:

- bargaining/power struggle among political actors at the national level or the EU-level. Political actors can be either individuals or collective actors, such as party leaders, chancellors, prime ministers, ministers, heads of states, governments, parliaments (e.g. "the German Bundestag" as a collective actor), parties, the president of the EU council, the European Commission, commissioners, trade unions, the Central Bank, "the French opposition", "the German Liberals", "Hollande", Tsipras, Merkel, Cameron, Obama, the chairman of the Euro Group, news media ("Bild" as a political actor), etc.

Bargaining means negotiations among political actors over resources, norms and values. It involves bargaining/negotiating power and strategies and potential or actual outcomes of the bargaining. Bargaining can take place between governments (e.g. between Merkel and Samaras), within countries, in the EU council, between "donor countries" like France and Germany, between parties within and across borders etc.

- political behaviour of individuals, e.g. political protest (including its political reasons and objectives, reactions from those addressed (e.g. the government); forms of political participation; electoral behaviour of citizens (reports on voting intentions)
- political behaviour of governments, e.g. (reasons for) the adoption of certain positions, policy measures, decisions, alliances etc. Particularly relevant is their behaviour at the EU-level and inside EU institutions.
- discussion of political ideology or political projects like different/differing approaches to EU integration or economic or social policy that are not purely economic accounts.

As far as economic outcomes can be changed or depend on political decisions (e.g. does X get a loan from the IMF and under what conditions?) they fall in the political domain.
In case of unclear cases one could ask, if the majority changes - does the economic outcome then change as well? Then, it would probably be a political issue rather than a purely economic one.

c. Moral frame

Descriptively, "morality" refers to personal, religious or cultural values, codes of conduct or social norms. It does not connote objective claims of right or wrong, but only refers to what is considered to be right or wrong. e.g. if the news/text insist(s) on the (in)correctness of a certain pattern under any circumstance.

Dimensions / Level of Analysis	Problem What is the problem? (10)	Treatment/Response What are the proposed and viable responses? (20)	Consequences What kind of consequences are discussed? (30)
Individuals, people/citizens (100)	- Are financial gains or losses of individuals presented as the central problem? (111) - Is the political behaviour of representatives/citizens presented as the central problem? (112) - Is the moral behaviour of individuals (citizens, politicians) presented as the central problem? (113)	- Are citizens required/asked to change their economic behaviour? (121) - Are citizens required to change their political behaviour / adopt a specific political attitude? (122) - Are citizens required to change their moral behaviour? (123)	- Are future economic consequences for citizens presented? (131) - Are future political consequences for citizens presented? (132) - Is there a moral lesson for citizens presented? (133)
Specific country/countries/nations (200)	- Are financial gains or losses of one or more specific countries presented as the central problem? (211) - Is the political behaviour/measures of national government(s) / parties / banks / institutions presented as the central problem? (212) - Is the moral behaviour of national government(s) / parties or cultural values and ways of life presented as the central problem? (213)	- Are countries/national governments required/asked to change their economic policy as means of solving the crisis? (221) - Are countries/national governments required/asked to change their political system/administrative system/political processes? (222) - Does the text suggest a fault in the moral standards or ways of life of a specific country/countries? (223)	- Are consequences for the national economy of specific countries presented? (231) - Are consequences for the national political system of specific countries presented? (232) - Is there a moral lesson for a specific country suggested/ presented? (233)
EU / Europe / Eurozone (300)	- Is the economic system/ situation of the EU / Eurozone presented as the central problem? (311) - Are political decisions of EU institutions / EU actors presented as the central problem? (312) - Is the moral behaviour of European actors / institutions presented as the central problem? (313)	- Is a change of the economic policy at EU level presented as a viable treatment/response? (321) - Are political decisions taken at EU level presented as a viable treatment/response? (322) - Does the treatment lie in (a change of) the dominant moral norms of EU actors / institutions? (323)	- Are consequences for the economy of the whole EU presented? (331) - Are political consequences for EU institutions / for EU-treaties presented? (332) - Is there a moral lesson for Europe / EU presented? (333)

Frames: Economic (1), Political (2), Moral (3)

e. Out of the frame matrix and the 27 categories the following 27 codes in Atlas.ti will be used for examination:

111_LEV_ind_DIM_prob_FRA_eco, 112_LEV_ind_DIM_prob_FRA_pol, 113_LEV_ind_DIM_prob_FRA_mor,
121_LEV_ind_DIM_resp_FRA_eco, 122_LEV_ind_DIM_resp_FRA_pol, 123_LEV_ind_DIM_resp_FRA_mor,
131_LEV_ind_DIM_cons_FRA_eco, 132_LEV_ind_DIM_cons_FRA_pol, 133_LEV_ind_DIM_cons_FRA_mor,
211_LEV_nat_DIM_prob_FRA_eco, 212_LEV_nat_DIM_prob_FRA_pol, 213_LEV_nat_DIM_prob_FRA_mor,
221_LEV_nat_DIM_resp_FRA_eco, 222_LEV_nat_DIM_resp_FRA_pol, 223_LEV_nat_DIM_resp_FRA_mor,
231_LEV_nat_DIM_cons_FRA_eco, 232_LEV_nat_DIM_cons_FRA_pol, 233_LEV_nat_DIM_cons_FRA_mor,
311_LEV_eur_DIM_prob_FRA_eco, 312_LEV_eur_DIM_prob_FRA_pol, 313_LEV_eur_DIM_prob_FRA_mor,
321_LEV_eur_DIM_resp_FRA_eco, 322_LEV_eur_DIM_resp_FRA_pol, 323_LEV_eur_DIM_resp_FRA_mor,
331_LEV_eur_DIM_cons_FRA_eco, 332_LEV_eur_DIM_cons_FRA_pol, 333_LEV_eur_DIM_cons_FRA_mor,

9.3.1 Categories and explanation for actors, quotes and attribution

Actors are separated according to the cascade model of activation into: administration, elites, media, people. Administration can be ministers or other members of government, but also the heads of the so-called Troika are coded in this thesis as administration, as they exert executive power in imposing the measures of the MoU (Memorandum of Understanding). Members of parliament (if not ministers or belonging directly to the government, e.g. secretaries of state or spokespeople of government) are coded as elites, as well as other party members, financial analysts and advisors, heads of corporations, judges, mayors, influential people on a national level, etc. Media are media outlets and journalists or spokespeople working for the media. People are individuals or groups of people that do not exert a wider influence.

These actors can be subjects or objects of a story in a newspaper article. This codebook assumes that there is one main story/narrative in an article, therefor just assigns one coding of subject and one coding of object to the actors. The dominant acting person or group is the subject of the story, the object is the target of behavior. One example is the prime minister speaking to a general audience in an election campaign, this would be the administration as subject, and people as object. If Tsipras speaks in the parliament, both subject und object belong to the actors of elites. Following codes are used in Atlas.Ti:

NAR_ACTORS_SUB_Adm	**Administration is subject**
NAR_ACTORS_SUB_Elit	**Elites are subject**
NAR_ACTORS_SUB_Med	**Media are subject**
NAR_ACTORS_SUB_Peop	**People are subject**
NAR_ACTORS_OBJ_Adm	**Administration is object**
NAR_ACTORS_OBJ_Elit	**Elites are object**
NAR_ACTORS_OBJ_Med	**Media are object**
NAR_ACTORS_OBJ_Peop	**People are object**

Quotes are coded analogue to the level of actors. Quotes are coded not in single sentences, but in statements of unique meaning. The following codes are used in Atlas.ti:

NAR_QUOT_DIR_Adm	**Quotes of administration representatives**
NAR_QUOT_DIR_Elit	**Quotes of elites**
NAR_QUOT_DIR_Med	**Quotes of media**
NAR_QUOT_DIR_Peop	**Quotes of people**
NAR_QUOT_INDIR_Adm	**Indirect quotation of administration representatives**
NAR_QUOT_INDIR_Elit	**Indirect quotation of elites**
NAR_QUOT_INDIR_Med	**Indirect quotation of media**
NAR_QUOT_INDIR_Peop	**Indirect quotation of people**

Attribution can be adjectives or wider descriptions of an actor or of the actors´ behavior. Examples are: 41-year old Tsipras; Mario Draghi, who is committed to do everything to hold the Eurozone together; the rigorous German administration. For attribution coding the actors are named explicitly and also according to the cascade model of activation. The following codes are used in Atlas.ti:

NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_CENTRALC_ADMIN	**administrations of central countries (Germany is separate, but France, BeNeLux, Austria)**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_CENTRALC_ELITES	**elites of central countries**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_CENTRALC_MEDIA	**media of central countries**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_CENTRALC_PEOPLE	**people of central countries**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_DIJSSELBLOEM	**Jeroen Dijsselbloem, head of the Eurogroup**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_EUROGROUP	**the Eurogroup**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_EUROGROUP_BANKS	**Banks of the Eurozone**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GERMANY	**Germany, if not specified more**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GERMANY_ADMINISTRATION	**German administration**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GERMANY_ELITES	**German elites**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GERMANY_MEDIA	**German media**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GERMANY_MERKEL	**Angela Merkel, chancellor of Germany**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GERMANY_PEOPLE	**German people**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GERMANY_SCHÄUBLE	**Wolfgang Schäuble, Finance Minister**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GREECE	**Greece, if not specified more**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GREECE_ADMIN(OLD)	**Antonis Samaras and the Greek administration**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GREECE_ADMIN(SYRIZA)	**Syriza**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GREECE_ELITES	**Greek elites**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GREECE_PEOPLE	**Greek people**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GREECE_TSIPRAS	**Alexis Tsipras, head of Syriza**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_GREECE_VAROUFAKIS	**Yanis Varoufakis**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_MARKETS	**markets in general (analysts, stock markets)**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_PERIPHERY_ADMIN	**administrations of 'peripheric' countries (Greece is separate, but Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain)**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_PERIPHERY_ELITES	**elites of 'peripheric' countries**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_PERIPHERY_MEDIA	**media of 'peripheric' countries**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_PERIPHERY_PEOPLE	**people of 'peripheric' countries**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_TROIKA	**the so-called Troika in general**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_TROIKA_COMMISSION	**European Commission and Juncker**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_TROIKA_ECB	**European Central Bank**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_TROIKA_ECB_DRAGHI	**Mario Draghi, head of the ECB**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_TROIKA_IMF	**International Monetary Fund**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_USA_ADMIN	**Administration of the USA**
NAR_ATTRIBUTE_ACTORS_USA_ELITES	**Elites of the USA**

The last coding in the process of analyzing an article is to distinguish between descriptive and normative statements. Every coded frame has to be coded being dominantly normative or descriptive. Descriptive in this sense means a pure description of a situation or process, e.g. the behavior of the parties in the Greek election. Normative implies that something has been done or has to be changed, that includes the proposal of remedies or actions. This also includes judging statements that propose indirectly a remedy or an action to be done. An example of a descriptive frame is “The Greek parliament elects tomorrow a new head of state.” An example of a normative statement would be: “The Greek parliament has to elect tomorrow a new head of state, the programs agreed with the creditors have to continue and the political insecurity has to be stopped immediately for the sake of our economy.” The codes in Atlas.Ti are:

NAR_TYPE_DESCRIPT	**Descriptive frame**
NAR_TYPE_NORMAT	**Normative frame**

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11. Word count tables for word clouds

Tables show first 45 words in attributions

Syriza/Tsipras in UK press		Government/Samaras in UK press		Germany in UK press		Syriza/Tsipras in GR press		Government/Samaras in GR press	
Word	**Count**	**Word**	**Count**	**Word**	**Count**	**Word**	**Count**	**Word**	**Count**
syriza	64	greek	7	eurozone	7	austerity	58	syriza	15
austerity	38	prime	7	euro	6	party	56	failed	12
left	37	greece	6	berlin	4	leftist	48	coalition	7
party	37	minister	6	export	4	anti	46	country	7
tsipras	37	coalition	4	greece	4	debt	38	budget	6
anti	29	athens	3	austerity	3	bailout	36	conservative	6
radical	28	conservative	3	bund	3	opposition	27	cuts	6
alexis	20	country	3	country	3	tsipras	25	government	6
leader	15	gamble	3	economic	3	will	24	greece's	6
euro	13	government	3	economy	3	euro	23	new	6
leftists	13	party	3	inflation	3	lead	23	voters	6
debt	12	alliance	2	made	3	wants	23	accused	5
greece's	11	brought	2	resistanc	3	european	18	democracy	5
syriza's	10	budget	2	banks	2	radical	17	exit	5
leftist	9	centre	2	big	2	renegotiate	17	greece	5
bailout	8	corruption	2	biggest	2	alexis	16	greek	5
greek	8	credited	2	budget	2	leader	16	made	5
mr	8	cronyism	2	cost	2	polls	16	political	5
opposition	8	cuts	2	eu	2	creditors	15	tax	5
wing	8	decision	2	europe's	2	greece	15	tsipras	5
eu	7	economic	2	european	2	greek	15	alexis	4
tsipras's	7	embattled	2	eurozone	2	international	15	antonis	4
will	7	eurozone	2	fierce	2	government	13	austerity	4
back	6	foreign	2	germans	2	win	13	can	4
country's	6	fragile	2	germany'	2	greece's	12	european	4
far	6	greece's	2	governme	2	left	12	gamble	4
hard	6	leader	2	italy	2	political	12	last	4
polls	6	led	2	largely	2	called	11	minister	4
power	6	old	2	largest	2	leading	11	office	4
wants	6	policies	2	makes	2	program	11	prime	4
alliance	5	power	2	markets	2	reforms	11	progress	4
also	5	premier	2	powerful	2	country's	10	reforms	4
leftwing	5	presidential	2	rest	2	new	10	also	3
main	5	private	2	rigour	2	opinion	10	back	3
marxists	5	public	2	scheme	2	pledged	10	campaign	3
movement	5	recovery	2	surplus	2	economic	9	creditors	3
coalition	4	reforms	2	thing	2	election	9	economic	3
communists	4	right	2	towards	2	measures	9	enough	3
europe	4	school	2	year	2	writedown	9	expected	3
government	4	sector	2	yields	2	abandon	8	fight	3
greece	4	since	2			also	8	gambit	3
greens	4	spending	2			budget	8	get	3
help	4	syriza	2			end	8	led	3
membership	4	vote	2			eurozone	8	merkel	3
new	4	whose	2			greece's	8	nd	3
						zone	5		

Greece in GR press		Germany + Admin in GR press		Greece in ESP press		Syriza/Tsipras in GER press		Greece in GER press	
Word	**Count**	**Word**	**Count**	**Word**	**Count**	**Word**	**Count**	**Word**	**Count**
political	35	economy	7	crisis	11	linken	18	prozent	13
greece	34	berlin	4	más	11	linksbündnis	18	land	11
uncertainty	21	biggest	4	europa	6	linke	15	etwa	5
country	19	currency	4	griego	6	partei	14	eu	5
economic	18	debt	4	económica	5	chef	10	griechische	5
recession	17	easing	4	política	5	linkspartei	10	hat	5
year	16	euro	4	griega	4	radikalen	10	politische	5
six	14	france	4	país	4	jährige	9	schulden	5
economy	13	greece	4	amenaza	3	griechischen	8	seit	5
greek	13	european	3	atenas	3	oppositionspartei	8	um	5
unemployment	13	interest	3	años	3	bündnis	7	arbeitslosigkeit	4
growth	12	open	3	aún	3	eu	7	demokratie	4
crisis	10	quantitative	3	drama	3	schuldenschnitt	6	griechischen	4
debt	10	single	3	se	3	verspricht	6	hoch	4
euro	9	austerity	2	sido	3	will	6	krise	4
percent	9	calculated	2	son	3	internationalen	5	reformen	4
recovery	9	concern	2	sufrido	3	radikal	5	athen	3
turmoil	9	concerns	2	troika	3	deutschland	4	euro	3
austerity	8	discussing	2	ue	3	griechen	4	griechen	3
budget	7	eurozone	2	atornillar	2	hat	4	hochverschuldeten	3
progress	7	fiscal	2	aunque	2	jährigen	4	iwf	3
rate	7	general	2	borde	2	linksbündnisses	4	lage	3
country's	6	government	2	bruselas	2	linksradikalen	4	mehr	3
indebted	6	greece's	2	comicios	2	radikale	4	noch	3
will	6	greek	2	deuda	2	radikaler	4	ohne	3
years	6	low	2	devastación	2	star	4	staates	3
area	5	members	2	difíciles	2	versprechen	4	staatspleite	3
election	5	officials	2	elecciones	2	wollen	4	unsichere	3
emerged	5	partners	2	ese	2	aufstieg	3	alles	2
europe's	5	program	2	euro	2	deren	3	andere	2
quarter	5	region's	2	europea	2	diese	3	athens	2
state	5	relief	2	financiera	2	euro	3	damit	2
surplus	5	risk	2	financieramente	2	europäischen	3	europa	2
bond	4	taking	2	griegos	2	freundlich	3	europäische	2
currency	4	voiced	2	han	2	gegen	3	fast	2
cuts	4	want	2	inestabilidad	2	große	3	ganz	2
deep	4	will	2	inicio	2	großen	3	gegen	2
encouraging	4			lustro	2	größte	3	geschichte	2
greece's	4			mayor	2	hemdkragen	3	gesenkt	2
lack	4			nuevo	2	hoffnung	3	gespalten	2
markets	4			panorama	2	ihm	3	gestiegen	2
new	4			peor	2	jahren	3	geworden	2
one	4			político	2	jugendlich	3	griechenlands	2
output	4			resultado	2	lächeln	3	großen	2
period	4			riesgo	2	linker	3	gut	2
polarization	4			sistema	2	linksradikale	3	haben	2
shrunk	4			social	2	lockern	3	immensen	2

Abstract English

The European Crisis following the global financial crisis of 2008 had devastating effects on Member States of the Euro Area. Several Member States had to accept loans from European funding or from other Member states. Condition for these loans were strict budget control and the introduction of austerity and deep budget cuts in social spending as a remedy to the Crisis. Greece is one of these states and suffered as a result of the austerity program from unprecedented GDP decline and abnormal high levels of unemployment. In 2015, after 5 years of austerity measures, an election happened, where a left-wing party promised to challenge the discourse of austerity and social cuts. This study examines the European news coverage of quality newspapers in Germany, Great Britain, Greece and Spain in a period of nearly two months before the election. Through discourse and framing analysis, the study shows that news coverage happens mostly as a depiction of political problem definition on a national level. Qualitative statement analysis hints to national agendas of newspapers, where a Brexit is anticipated in parts of the English coverage. The actors in coverage are mostly administration representatives and elites. Overall, news coverage supports established and dominant discourses and the framing of administrations, and thus the continuation of austerity. The European Crisis is simplified as being the problem of one or few member states that fail to react in the right way to the Crisis. Contests of frames and discourses do not happen appropriately in newspaper coverage and parts of society, like young people, are excluded from representation. The newspapers fail to orientate and inform people appropriately and this could explain in parts the ongoing crisis of journalism.

Abstract German

Die Europäische Krise, welche auf die Globale Finanzkrise von 2008 folgte, hatte weitreichende Auswirkungen auf Mitgliedsstaaten der Eurozone. Einige Mitgliedsstaaten mussten Kredite von anderen Mitgliedsstaaten oder von Europäischen Fonds annehmen. Auflagen dieser Kredite war eine Sparpolitik (Austerity), die strikte Budgetkontrolle und tiefe Einschnitte in Sozialsystem vorsah. Griechenland ist das am stärksten betroffene Land und litt nach den Sparprogrammen ab 2010 unter einer außergewöhnlichen Wirtschaftsrezession, bzw. Depression mit tiefgreifenden Folgen für Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 2015, nach fünf Jahren Sparpolitik, kam es zu einer Wahl, bei der zum ersten Mal eine neue linksgerichtete Partei die Sparpolitik beenden und einen neuen sozialen Diskurs einführen wollte. Diese Studie untersucht die Pressedarstellungen dieser Wahl in Deutschland, England, Griechenland und Spanien in dem Zeitraum von 2 Monaten vor der Wahl. Die Anwendung von Diskurs- und Framing-Analyse auf die Berichterstattung zeigt, dass die Presse die Wahl und die Europäische Krise hauptsächlich als politisches Problem auf nationaler Ebene in Griechenland darstellt. In einer qualitativen Analyse von Statements in der Berichterstattung deutet sich an, dass es eine nationale Agenda gibt, der die Zeitungen folgen und die in der konservativen britischen Presse den Brexit als nationale Lösung der Europäischen Krise vorweg nimmt. Die Akteure in der Berichterstattung sind hauptsächlich Repräsentanten nationaler Regierungen und Eliten. Die Berichterstattung stützt den hegemonialen und dominanten Diskurs und das Framing von Regierungen und Eliten, und damit auch die Sparprogramme als Lösung der Krise. Die Europäische Krise wird vereinfacht als Problem einzelner Mitgliedsstaaten dargestellt, die falsch auf die Krise reagierten. Die hegemonialen Frames und Diskurse werden nicht ausreichend diskutiert und in Frage gestellt, damit werden Teile der Gesellschaft, speziell junge Menschen werden nicht genügend repräsentiert. Die Presse verwirkt damit ihren Anspruch auf Orientierung und Information, womit ein Teil der aktuellen Krise des Journalismus erklärt werden könnte.