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MASTER THESIS

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„Third State Influence on EU Foreign Policy: How Israel was able to influence EU Foreign policy through alliances with Eurosceptical Actors“

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Pledge of Honesty

On my honor as a student of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given, or received unauthorized assistance on it.

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Abstract

This Master thesis aims to illustrate that EU foreign policy can be influenced by third countries through alliances with Eurosceptical member states. EU foreign policy has in the past years been predominately considered to be an EU internal affair by academic research. EU centric approaches, based on realist, governance, or institutional assumptions have explained its formation either driven by member states or the EU's institutional structure. During the past years, the EU encountered difficulties finding consensus on particular foreign policy issues, especially the Middle East Conflict. This developments indicate that divergence in positions between member states have made it increasingly difficult for the EU to position itself on those issues. This papers aims to that not only divergence in positions are able to provide problems for EU foreign policy making, but also that third countries can capitalize on differences between EU member states as Euroscepticism, to yield themselves influence on EU foreign policy. This master thesis presents based on two cases that EU foreign policy can as well be influenced from the outside by third countries by forming alliances with Eurosceptic member states. The two cases illustrate an alliance Israel established with the states of the Visegrad Group, which are notorious for their Eurosceptical stances, and concerning the first case also Greece, which enabled it influence EU foreign policy formation. Both cases proof that outside interference with EU policy is possible and should receive adequate scholarly attention. The conclusion additionally indicates possible foreign policy areas, in which the EU likely will find it difficult to establish consensus in the future and therefore conduct a decisive foreign policy.

Abstrakt

Diese Master Thesis hat das Ziel zu zeigen, dass Drittstaaten durch Koalitionen mit euroskeptischen EU Mitgliedstaaten, Einfluss auf EU Außenpolitik nehmen können. Akademische Forschung bezüglich EU Außenpolitik hat sich soweit vornehmlich mit EU internen Erklärungen für die Entstehung von Außenpolitik befasst. In den letzten Jahren hatte die EU zunehmend Probleme Consensus zu speziellen Außenpolitischen Themen zu finden, besonders bezüglich des Konflikts im Nahen Osten. Dies impliziert das divergierende Meinung zu diesem zwischen EU Mitgliedstaaten vorherrschen und diese Schwierigkeiten bedingen. Diese Thesis will einen tangierenden Bereich beleuchten, nämlich dass Drittstaaten diese Divergenzen durch Allianzen mit euroskeptischen Mitgliedstaaten nutzen können um EU Außenpolitik beeinflussen zu können. An Hand von zwei Case Studies wird die Einflussnahme auf spezifische außenpolitische Aktionen gezeigt. Beide Case Studies zeigen, dass Israel in der Lage war durch eine Allianz mit den euroskeptischen Visegrad Staaten, und im Ersten Fall vor allem Griechenland, in der Lage, EU Außenpolitik zu beeinflussen. Dadurch wird deutlich, dass äußerer Einfluss auf EU Außenpolitik durchaus möglich ist und adäquate akademische Aufmerksamkeit genießen sollte. Zusätzlich wird in der Conclusio noch auf Themenbereich hingewiesen, in welchen die EU in Zukunft voraussichtlich Schwierigkeiten haben wird sich zu positionieren.

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1. Introduction

Measuring success of EU foreign policy is a difficult enterprise (Jørgensen, 2012), but it can be said that without doubt EU foreign policy has developed decisively since the first creation of the EPC. Foreign policies positions of the member states have converged towards a common EU positions concerning a wide range of issues, a process institutionalist scholars describe as Europeanization (Tonra, 2001). Especially, regarding the EU position towards a the Middle East Peace Process the positions, the member states have been able find a remarkable consensus, in comparison to the huge divergence of opinion that characterized their positions towards that issue in the beginning (Müller, 2012: 1)

Nevertheless, EU foreign policy formation has experienced serious issues finding consensus, in particular concerning Israel and the Middle Eastern Conflict during the past years. The EU's Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) has not been able to come pass a conclusions relating to the Middle East Peace Process since June, 2016. Furthermore, after more than a year of negotiations the EU and its member states can still not agree on holding the first EU-Israel Association Council meeting since 2012. Neither they are able to find consensus on setting partnership priorities following the 2015 review of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). (Lovatt, 2017)

The lack of ability to find consensus concerning the Middle East Peace Process, comes at the same time as positions between EU member states diverged decisively on the topic. The EU's position towards the Israeli-Arab Conflict defines itself to be a policy of *evenhandedness*, firmly based on respecting both Israeli and Palestinian Right to self-determination (Tocci, 2009: 388). Certain member states, particularly states belonging to the Eurosceptical Visegrad Group (V4), have increasingly started to challenge established EU positions towards the Middle East Peace Process and Israel (Dyduch, 2018:1). They do not necessarily share criticism of Israeli policies, which also materializes itself in acts taken by the V4's political establishment. In 2016 the Hungarian and Czech Parliaments rejected the labelling of settlements goods by the EU (Reuters, 2015). Also concerning the status of Jerusalem, members of the V4 have voiced different stances. The Czech Republic's whole leadership announced in 2018 that it endorsed a gradual location of its embassy to

Jerusalem, counter to the EU position on Jerusalem (Staff and AFP, 2018). In the wake of the meeting between the leaders of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic with Israel, the three states announced to open diplomatic offices in Jerusalem (Associated Press, 2019). This made them first EU member states to open diplomatic offices in Jerusalem. In the wake of this widening cleavage in preferences, it does not come as a surprise that the EU member states experienced difficulties in finding consensus regarding the Middle East Conflict. Recent research even expects it to become more difficult for the EU to find consensus on those issues in the future and sees the basis in an increasing ideological and economical rapprochement between Israel and the V4 (Dyduch, 2018).

Contemporary research by Sharon Pardo and Neve Gordon (2018) has even found that Israel used Greece's Euroscepticism in the beginning of 2016 to interfere in EU foreign policy and soften a conclusion it considered to counter its national interest. Conceptualization of EU foreign policy formation is mostly focusing on institutional mechanism as the decisive driver of EU foreign policy (Smith, 2004; de Flers and Müller, 2012). Foreign influence on EU foreign policy has drawn relatively limited resource. Therefore this master thesis embarks on the ambition quest to illustrate how third state influence can influence EU foreign policy making and even block its machinery. Therefore the Research Question is as follows:

Can EU foreign policy formation be influenced by third states through conducting an analysis with Eurosceptical member states?

The thesis explores the subject analyzing to separate illustrative case studies. Both studies portray incidents in which Israel has been able to influence EU foreign policy through alliances with Eurosceptic member states. As in both cases Israel's alliance with the V4 played an integral role, a sub aim of the paper is to display the alliance Israel has cultivated with V4 member states and their possible implication for the future. The paper is structured the following way. It starts with presenting conceptualizations of EU foreign policy formation, drawing on the latest academic research. Subsequently it presents two possible conceptualizations of third state influence on EU foreign policy; bilaterally through capitalizing on Eurosceptical notions of member states, and triangularly together with another third country. It then continues with a historical part laying out the development of

the EU foreign policy institutions since the foundation of the European Community (EC). Then it culminates with analysis of the two cases.

At this point it is necessary to clarify terminology used in this thesis. The acts in the names of state is synonymous with the acts of governments in this work, and does aim to indicate anything else.

2. Methodology:

In this relatively little researched topic, conducting a case study brings a double benefit. As a case study is not only an extensive study of one unit itself, but also serves as a study of the broader class of units (Gerring, 2004: 352), it is most appropriate method for tackling this subject. It would go beyond the scope of a master thesis to present in-depth case studies, therefore the thesis has to rely on exemplary (anecdotic) case-study drawing on secondary sources from literature and newspapers. The aim of a case study is to analyse a single unit in detail to generalize across a set of units As a case study relies on covariational evidence. it should not be understood as a way of analyzing a unit or aiming to illustrate causal relations, but to define cases. The single case, here relations between the V4 and Israel, must resemble a relatively bounded phenomenon. Its aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of phenomenon. (Gerring, 2004, 343)

3. Conceptualization of EU Foreign Policy

The formation of EU foreign policy has drawn a wide range of scholarly opinion. Explanations for EU foreign policy can be differentiated between EU centric approaches, who focus on the internal mechanisms and structures, and recent approaches who consider the influence of third states on EU foreign policy.

3.1. EU-Centric View of EU Foreign Policy

EU centric views of EU foreign policy model the formation through internal dynamics Researchers already heavily engaged with explaining the formation of EU foreign policy, producing a range of different theoretical approaches. The following part is conceptualizing member driven and institutionalist approaches, while lastly discussing a potential gap in research.

3.1.1. Member State Driven Conceptualization(s)

Many scholars argue that EU foreign policy is determined by the member states. While, realist scholar emphasize the role of the large member states; France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Hill, 2004; Gegout, 2002), scholars focusing on governance approaches consider small state to have a significant influence on EU foreign policy under the right conditions (Nasra, 2011; Jakobsen, 2009).

Member state driven explanation of EU foreign policy often rely on Realist assumptions and consider the large states to determine EU foreign policy (Gegout, 2002; Hill, 2004). The "big three", France, the United Kingdom, and Germany are seen as the driving force behind EU foreign policy, and since the Italian EU presidency of 2003, Italy is increasingly added to the group. They are considered a distinct leadership group, who not only consult among each other before decisions are due, but also drive initiatives themselves. Their success in pursuing their goals depends on the compatibility of their individual interests. Before council meetings, the so-called 'big-four' (Gegout, 2002; 331) meet for prior consultation and if their interests align, they agree on a position they will then pursue in the council meeting. As of their size, financial and military strength, they are able to dictate their policy in the respective meetings. The smaller states are forced to accept and adopt the `big-fours' policies. Under this approach the small states lack freedom of action concerning policies and are reduced to be takers of EU foreign policy.

In the past years, recent research sees a more influential role for the smaller states. Under specific circumstances small states can successfully pursue their foreign policy objectives through the EU (Nasra 2011; Jakobsen 2009; Bunse 2009; Kronsell 2002). Small state influence is mostly conceptualized through a governance framework (Nasra, 2011; Jakobsen, 2009). They do not only consider action by single governments, as individual state sovereignty is diluted by collective decision-making in the EU. EU foreign policy is envisaged as a policy systems in which multiple players are co-ordinating their respective activities. The setting of their activities is defined by a high degree of interdependence. In this framework materially powerful actors do not 'a priori' posses a superior position, but weaker actors can be positioned as good, or even better. The framework relies on three key assumptions:

"(1) the political processes of EU foreign policy are an essential explanatory factor for policy outcomes
(2) the day-to-day functioning of the processes differs analytically from history-making decisions; and
(3) the political processes vary across different policy areas. (Nasra, 2012: 165)"

Regarding the level of influence of small states, four elements that determine their influence: First, states that are eager to commit to EU policies are in an advanced position to define and execute policy. Second, actors are forming informal groups and networks to lead an issue in a given policy area. Third, actors who possess politically relevant resources, as special expertise and knowledge regarding a topic, are in a preferred situation concerning the respective subject. (Nasra, 2012: 167)

Jakobsen (2009) pins down small state influence to similar four central factors, which he defines as a minimum requirement for small states to have a decisive impact on EU foreign policy: "(1) they must be recognized as leaders in the issue area at hand; (2) they must back their initiatives with convincing arguments; (3) they must engage in honest broker coalition-building; (4) they must support implementation with personnel and treasure (Jakobsen, 2009: 86)."

3.1.2. Institutional Explanations

The underlying assumption for most institutional explanations of EU foreign policy is that the EU is a sui generis entity (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 35). In the framework of this entity, fixed national foreign policy positions on an expanding number of issues have not only ben pre-empted through institutional mechanisms, but the participants have been socialized into voicing a common European foreign policy on those issues (Smith, 2004: 99f.). The dense institutionalized social settings influence members to resort to shared, values, ideas and knowledge in their decision making process (Ibid, 99). Therefore, national policy positions are not formed in a social vacuum, but they are heavily influenced by regular institutionalized interactions with the other member states (Sandholtz, 1996). This leads to socialization of (EPC)/Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) professionals in the institutional setting, as well as to organizational changes in national foreign policy bureaucracies (Smith, 2004: 746). Socialization in this regard can be characterized as actors

adopting the communities' rules, norms, and policies, steering them towards pursuing common European goals (Quaglia, de Francesco, and Radaelli, 2008: 157 in de Flers and Müller, 2012: 24). On the other hands, this does not mean that actors completely let go their national preferences, but they may combine national preferences with the pursuit of a collective outcome (Adler-Nissen, 2009: 130f. in de Flers and Müller, 2012: 24). Through this mechanism member states started a gradual process to adopt EU foreign policy positions and preferences on the national level; so called top-down Europeanization of national policies (Major and Pomorska, 2005). This does tough not imply a general homogenization process across all member states, but the level of Europeanization differs from state to state (de Flers and Müller, 2012; 23).

3.1.3. Gap in Research

While the presented conceptualizations of European foreign policy are to a varying degree effective in explaining EU foreign policy resulting from inside the EU, they neglect external influence on EU foreign policy. In comparison, little research on the influence of external factors on European foreign policy has been published. Member state driven conceptualizations of EU foreign policy based on governance approaches even have to preclude external influence in their assumptions. Similarly institutionalist approaches, who also exclude outside influence. This does not mean that exterior effects on EU foreign policy have completely been ignored. Several scholars have dedicated attention to the issue. Approaches to the subject have focused on different aspects. 'Special relationships' between member states and third countries, in which their influence on EU foreign policy through the respective state, namely Israel and Germany, have been elaborated upon (Müller, 2012). Works in this regard, focused on the unique German history concerning Second World War and the crimes committed in the Shoah.

Based on this historic idiosyncrasy, German relations with Israel had naturally a special status. In 1952, the German state acknowledged the extension of its own moral debt from the Holocaust to the state of Israel, in the Luxembourg Restitution Agreement between the two states. While, establishing and maintaining good relations with Israel was on the hand seen as an instrument to regain international acceptance and regaining full sovereignty, there was always a strong moral component accompanying this process. The German political elite considers Israel's security and right to exist as an historic obligation for the

German state, and its special relationship with Israel therefore also comprises the core of its policy towards the Israeli-Arab Conflict. From the early 1970s on, Germany adopted a policy of so-called 'even-handedness' towards Israel relying on those pillars with a special emphasis on Israel's security. In international institutions, Germany regularly defended Israel's interest and generally refrained from openly criticizing Israel. Besides close political relations between the two states, a strong cultural bond developed between the two states and Germany and Israel are in close exchange of information and cooperation. Foreign policy issues of mutual interest, including EU issues, often draw consultation between Israel and Germany. Furthermore, annual government consultations take place since 2008. (Müller, 2012: 69ff.)

Special influence on EU foreign policy from the Israelis through Germany has therefore been acknowledged and discussed in the literature. Nevertheless, this influence is based on a unique relationship determined by historical circumstances, which hardly translate to other EU member states and third countries. The emerging cleavages inside the EU during the European sovereign debt crisis, particularly between Greece and Germany, have brought attention to external influence again. A recent and groundbreaking paper by Sharon Pardon and Neve Gordon (2018) examined the use of Euroscepticism as a foreign policy instrument. They assess that during the Euro Crisis, Israel was able to exploit differences between, in particular Greece and other EU members, to soften the language of Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) resolution that was supposed to reinforce "differentiation policy" regarding Israel's occupied territories. Two central elements are identified for enabling this act. The Eurosceptic attitude of Greece, as well as shared strategic interests. This framework is also used in this framework to explain external influence of Israel through the Visegrad Group.

Another current paper directing attention towards exterior influence on EU foreign policy was published by Johanna Dyduch (2018). She describes the increasingly close relationship between the V4 and Israel and finds that this could provide for significant issues for future policy decisions towards the Israel-Arab conflict, as opinions between the V4 and other EU member states significantly diverge on this topic.

While this literature sheds light on potential external influence on EU foreign policy, there is a lack of a general conceptualization of third state influence. This paper aims not at

providing a full-fledged framework, but aims to conceptualize different channels third states can use to influence EU foreign policy, based on the concrete case of Israel and its influence on EU foreign policy through the V4. This shall contribute to the development of literature examining the role of external influence on EU foreign policy, and explain why further research concerning exterior influence is needed.

3.2. Conceptualizing External Influence

External influence on EU foreign policy can come in different forms. Third states can try to engage in classical bilateral diplomacy, capitalizing on good relation with member states to influence foreign EU foreign policy. Secondly, a third state could try to influence EU foreign policy through using another third state and leverage their relations and potential influence on EU member states, to achieve their goal.

3.2.1. Influence on EU Foreign Policy Through Bilateral Diplomacy capitalizing on Euroscepticism of Member States

One way to conceptualize third parties influence on EU foreign policy, is through the use of Euroscepticism as an instrument to modify EU foreign policy. Under the right conditions, third countries can form alliances with Eurosceptic member states to pursue their own interest and influence in EU foreign policy. This is due to the idiosyncratic structure of the EU itself and its decision-making processes.), in which the ultimate authority to approve decisions is reserved for the member states, especially in the realm of foreign and security policy (Smith, 2004: 741). Even though the supranational EU institutions play a role in CFSP/CSDP, their influence has traditionally been marginalized in comparison with other fields (Ibid: 741). The intergovernmental structure of CFSP/CSDP decision making allows member states to block decision making. Even a single member state is enough to block decisions in CFSP/CSDP, as QM-voting only applies to a narrow number of subjects and has to be approved by the member states (as discussed in the part of the historical development of EU foreign policy). Nevertheless, this framework considers institutional explanations for EU foreign policy and assumes that despite the intergovernmental structure of decision making, member states are subjects to processes of Europeanization (as discussed in "Institutional Explanations for EU Foreign Policy: de flers and Müller, 2012 or Quaglia, de Francesco, and Radelli, 2008), resulting from institutional mechanisms that socialize the particpants into voicing a common European foreign policy (as in Smith, 2004 99f.).

Therefore member states are avers to block decisions, and even preference-outliers change their decisions in favor of the common one (Ibid, 97). This is due to the most important principle of EU foreign policy cooperation, which states that member states *must avoid taking fixed positions on important foreign policy questions without prior consultation with their partners* (Single European Act, 1973 in Smith, 2004: 101). Since member states are averse of blocking the EU foreign policy machinery, this also constitutes the biggest hurdle for third countries to influence EU foreign policy, which is found by Sharon Pardo (2018)'s interviews with Israeli top diplomats: 'the issue is not to find Eurosceptic MS (…). The challenge is to convince a Eurosceptic EU member to operate with the same passion of Greece and block the Union's voting machinery (Pardo, 2018: 9).'

Nevertheless, if a member state is willing to block decision making, one state is enough. If convincing a member state to block a decision is the biggest hurdle, on what basis is a state willing to form an alliance with a third country for that action. In this framework the basis of these alliances are conceptualized two-folded and draw on Pardo and Gordon's (2018) modelling about the use of Euroscepticism as a foreign policy tool. First, both parties hope to benefit from the alliance to further specific interests. Second, the alliance of the parties is based on ideological affinities of the two states, which stay in contrast to the EU's dominant norms. (Pardo and Gordon, 2018: 2)

In this regard, it is necessary to define what kind of actor the EU is, and what norms guide its policy decision making. Secondly, the term Euroscepticism and the resulting policy interests have to be defined. I assume that the EU is acting as a 'normative' power (Manners, 2002). Following institutionalist approaches, the EU constitutes a 'sui generis' actor in this framework (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 35), acting according to norms rather than balance-of-power politics (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007). The 'core' norms that constitute the EU's broad normative basis are five-folded: *peace, liberty, peace, democracy, rule of law,* and respect for *human rights* (Manners, 2002: 242). This norms essentially guide the EUs internal and foreign policies. The EU furthermore aims to promote its core values among its neighbors and trading partner, who are animated to adopt the EU's values (Whitman, 1998). During, the past years EU values have become internally contested through the emergence of Euroscepticism among EU member states. The term is understood to express doubt or disbelief in Europe and European integration in general (Hooghe and Marks, 2007:119f)."

Concerning Euroscepticism, scholars differentiate between “soft” and “hard” Euroscepticism. States, who embrace “hard” Euroscepticism principally reject the project of European integration in its current form, politically and economically, since it offends depply held values or is considered to be the manifestation of negative values (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004, 300 in Pardo and Gordon, 2018). Eurosceptic members are not a homogeneous group, they include both politically right- and left wing parties (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001: 6), opposing ‘Normative Europe’s core norms. Therefore, the attraction of the alliance lies in the states shared ideological affinities, specifically their Euroscepticism, while both parties expect to be able to advance specific national interests (Pardo and Gordon, 2018: 12). If the Euroscepticism of a member state is pronounced enough, it can be willing to overcome its aversion to block the EU’s decision making machinery.

3.2.2. Triangular Influence

Third countries can also pursue to influence EU foreign policy capitalizing on relations with another non-member state. To model this influence on EU foreign policy, the paper draws on the concept of triangular diplomacy. It takes elements from the original term and concept coined by Henry Kissinger, but also uses different elements from a more recent concept developed by Young and Birchfield (2018). While Kissinger described triangular diplomacy as using closer relations with one state to leverage them against a third (Young and Birchfield, 2018:8), the concept of Young and Birchfield defines it to be coordinated behavior by two states to change the particular behavior of another state (Ibid, 2018: 9). In this model, lets call it state A, aims to influence the behavior of the EU through using a member state, called state C. To advance the chances of convincing C, it capitalizes on the adoption of it’s foreign policy goal by State B. The adoption of the foreign policy objective by B yields influence on State C, for it’s relationship with State B. Therefore, as a pre-condition state B must be an economically and/or military powerful state, which makes it unattractive for state C to oppose its foreign policy, as it either could hurt relations between the government of B and C, or state C hopes for even improved relations with B. While state A intending to influence EU foreign policy, tries to gain state C’s support for that action, the fact that state B also pursues states As foreign policy, aids states A’s enterprise. In this point the conceptualization used here differs from Young and Birchfield, in which both actively states aim to modify the behavior of state C.

Two things have to be clarified now, first how and why does state B adopt the foreign policy goal of state A, and secondly on what basis is the is the influence of states A and B. Birchfield and Young (2018: 9f.) explain the cooperation of states A and B, which forms the so-called base of the triangle, through international cooperation. In the literature approximate to their approach, cooperation between states is conceptualized along the lines of realist assumptions of anarchy and attainment of common goals (Oye, 1985:1 in Young and Birchfield, 2018: 10). Literature helpful to explain this foreign policy cooperation between the states is partially set in the underdeveloped realm of 'strategic partnerships' which stipulates the idea that addressing common problems is assisted by having good relations with partner that can be strategically helpful in this regard (Carter, 2006 in Young and Birchfield, 2018: 9). Also helpful for explaining the gaining of popularity of foreign policy ideas, are the concepts of Public Diplomacy and Soft Power (Nye, 2008). Nevertheless, both approaches are not sufficient to explain the change of foreign policy in the analyzed case, but are helpful to comprehend the processes partially. For a fuller a explanation of this issue the scope of this master thesis would be overextended.

A distinction from Young and Birchfield's model is that the acting state does not try to influence behavior of another nation state, but the EU. In fact, the EU is structurally decisively different from 'normal' nation states and therefore also the way its foreign policy is fabricated deviates from the formation of foreign policy by nation states. Like in the conceptualization of direct bilateral influence on EU foreign policy, the EU is considered to be 'a sui generis' entity. As a consequence to its idiosyncratic structure and the different construction of foreign policy, its foreign policy can be influenced in other ways than a nation state in the framework of Birchfield and Young. As in how to influence EU foreign policy this framework draws on the conceptualization of influence through bilateral relations. As in the bilateral conceptualization of influencing EU foreign policy, the decision making structure of the EU can be used by member states to single handedly block EU foreign policy decision making. Therefore, the focus of A alter EU foreign policy behavior lies on specific member states, which are considered to be potential partners in this enterprise. As in the bilateral conceptualization, the basis of those alliance is two-folded. First, the participating parties hope to further specific interests and secondly shared ideological views running counter to the EU norms and have to overcome the hurdle for member states to

block the decision making process. So beside shared interests, the central mechanism for a state to cooperate with the third country, is again Euroscepticism. Also the indirect influence B exercises on C, is modeled along the same lines. State C hopes to further specific interests with following B's policy, as it hopes to further specific interests and secondly has shared ideological sentiments. Therefore A's approach to convince state C's to represent it's foreign policy gains in the EU, is aided by B adopting the same foreign policy goal.

4. Historical Development of EU Foreign Policy

(This Part 4 has been submitted as a seminar paper in Prof. Patrick Müllers (thesis advisor) Course 'EU Foreign Policy and Israeli Arab-Conflict' in spring 2019)

The underlying assumption for much of contemporary research of EU foreign policy is based on the assumption that the EU is a *sui generis* entity (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 35). Altogether, EU foreign policy formation has drawn an extensive amount of research exploring its different aspects. Researchers already heavily engaged with explaining the formation of EU foreign policy, producing a range of different theoretical approaches. While few scholars still explain the formation of EU foreign policy with realist theories where the big states are supposed to dominate (Hill, 2004; Gégout, 2002), many scholars emphasize the importance of the institutions for the making of EU foreign policy (Smith, 2015; Nasra, 2011; Tonra, 2003;). Identified as pivotal in this approaches is the socialization of European Political Cooperation (EPC)/Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) professionals in the institutional setting which led to a gradual process of Europeanization of national foreign policies (de Flers and Müller, 2012). Therefore, the development of the institutions through the reports and treaties providing the framework for the formation of EU foreign policy deserve close examination.

The report and treaties leading up to CFSP/CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy) demand a closer look regarding a second aspect of EU foreign policy that attracts scholarly interest. The characterization of EU foreign policy and its role in the international system. In categorizing it, scholars draw on a wide range of concepts to model the role the EU. Framing it a "superpower" (Galtung 1973), to "soft power" (Nye, 2004), or "normative power" (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007). A decisive role determining policies and therefore the character

of EU foreign policy, play the treaties, who set out the objectives for first the EPC and later CFSP. The objectives of EPC/CFSP developed gradually in the reports and treaties.

In helping to understand the character of EU foreign policy today, this part has the aim of providing a picture of the historical development of EU foreign policy institutions. Under this umbrella, the paper has the goal to display the gradual development of the EU institutions through the different reports and treaties, while particularly looking at the development of three aspects that can be considered essential in the making of EU foreign policy today and are central for contemporary theories. First, the internal institutional set up providing a framework for the processes producing foreign policies. More concretely, the modus operandi determined by first the structure (for example the irregular meetings of the early EPC) and secondly the development of norms and rules (as the *coutumier* or *receuil*). Second, the objectives of EU foreign policy as set out in treaties and reports. Thirdly, the de relationship between the institutions of the EC/EU and EPC/CFDP and the role they play in the making of EPC/CFDP foreign policy. Particularly, the expanding role of the European Commission, as the role of the European Parliament always was and still is very limited.

As the gradual steps were determined in reports and treaties, this section examines the changes the respective reports and treaties brought. While shortly covering pre-EPC attempts, as Charles de Gaulle's Fouchet Plans, the part continues to provide an overview of the creation and successive development of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) through examining the changes Luxembourg, Copenhagen, London Report, and Single European Act brought. After the linking of political and economic union, and the establishment of CFSP through the Treaty of Maastricht, this sections starts with analyzing the impact of the Maastricht Treaty, continuing to the Treaty of Nice, and ending the last significant changes the Lisbon Treaty brought. The necessity of this historical part lies in its inclusive presentation of institutional development of EPC/CFDP, while portraying the stepping stones in foreign policy integration. As the character of CFSP is the result of 50 years of foreign policy integration, and to grasp its functioning and structure providing the background for contemporary theories, it is necessary to understand the historical steps of integration.

4.1 Pre-EPC: The Origins of European Foreign Policy Coordination

The stipulating treaties of the European Community (EC) define the European integration process being limited to the spheres of economics and commercials. Nevertheless, there was from the beginning interest in foreign policy coordination between member states. The member states were divided though, how and in what framework foreign policy should be coordinated. Especially France objected to put foreign policy coordination under a supranational umbrella, favoring an intergovernmental forum. Two notable attempts to establish a framework for European foreign policy coordination precede the eventual establishment of European Political Cooperation in 1970 (Ifestos, 1987: 47).

The first attempt was the failed establishment of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954 at the very beginning of European Integration. The EDC was based on the Treaty of Paris, which the six members states signed in 1952. The Treaty of Paris would have stipulated an integrated European defense system, creating a supranational European military organization. Even though, all member states signed the treaty, the French Parliament eventually blocked the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. French objection had two main motives. First, France was still skeptical concerning German rearmament after World War II and its military contribution to the EDC. Second, France was highly averse of rendering national sovereignty in the areas of foreign policy and defense to a supranational organization. A pattern that will return. Through the years of European foreign policy integration France will repeatedly object to a supranational framework for foreign policy and defense coordination. France still firmly wanted to keep foreign policy in their own hands, fearing limitation for its own room to maneuver. The failed ratification of the Treaty of Paris led to the failure of the EDC, as an ambitious first approach towards a common European foreign and security approach under a supranational umbrella. (Pastor-Castro, 2006: 386ff).

A second approach towards coordinating foreign policy took place in the 60s and was initiated by France itself. It came in form of two proposals for an intergovernmental approach towards a political union. In contrast to the EDC before, the so-called Fouchet Plans lacked any supranational element, but aimed at an intergovernmental approach towards the coordination of foreign and defence policy. Importantly, the Fouchet Plans wanted to establish the political union not under the umbrella of EC, but as a parallel organization. Charles de Gaulle made first attempts in this direction already in 1959. They

came in the form of a suggestion by France and Italy, proposing that the foreign ministers of the six member states meet regularly to discuss political affairs. The meetings were supposed to take place separate from EC Council of Ministers' meetings. Reactions of the member states were mixed, with the Dutch voicing the most vocal opposition to de Gaulle's proposal. Also, the results of the proposal were not very significant. A mechanism for regular consultations among the foreign ministers was established, but it was vague what purpose and extent the cooperation should have. Eventually, after three meetings in 1960, the proposal effectively failed. This did not dissuade De Gaulle to abandon his vision of an intergovernmental European political union. Overall, his vision set out a united Europe, which would act on its own, stop to further integrate itself transatlantic with the Americans and oppose further supranational European integration. Fueled by the surprising announcement of the United Kingdom that they would seek accession to the EC, the French dashed forward with the first of their eventual two Fouchet Plans. In October 1961, to the surprise of the other member states, they presented a draft treaty calling for a political "Union of States". Especially, Belgium and the Netherlands were opposed to the Fouchet Plan, as they considered it being a threat to transatlantic relations, an attempt by France to claim continental European leadership, and an attempt to shape institutions before the Brits accession to European institutions. Belgian and Dutch opposition and insistence on combining the UKs accession talks to the EC with the discussion about the future of the political union slowed down de Gaulle's proposal. In January 1962, De Gaulle then issued a second proposal himself, which was an only slightly altered version. The small changes in the second Fouchet Plan were nevertheless considered to be provocative by the other member states, and even Fouchet himself spoke of his regret that the 2nd plan would be brought forward. The pressure of the other member states had led to the inclusion of references about the relation of the political union with NATO, which de Gaulle now had removed again. Belgian and Dutch opposition now only intensified, while also the Italians took an ambivalent position again. Encountering such an extent of opposition, the second Fouchet Plan failed and put an end to the second approach towards a European political Union. This time intergovernmental and separate from the EC. (Vanke, 2001 :97ff.)

4.2. EPC Part 1: Luxembourg Report and the Birth of EPC 1969 -1973

Even though, the EDC and the Fouchet Plans had failed, the thought of European coordination of foreign policy never had stopped to be appealing. Even though unsuccessful, a number of states initiated proposals for foreign policy coordination. Belgium, in 1964 with the Spaak Plan, and Germany and Italy separately later in 1964. Throughout the 60s individual proposals were presented. Still, in what framework foreign policy should be coordinated was unclear. France, in de Gaulle's tradition, preferred an intergovernmental approach outside of the EC framework, firmly opposing any framework that could limit their room of action concerning foreign policy. Finally, a breakthrough was achieved in October 1970, with the launch of the Luxembourg Report, which eventually led to the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). Presented by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EC countries and headed by Belgium Foreign Minister Viscount Etienne Davignon, the Luxembourg Report led to the beginning of European foreign policy coordination (Ifestos, 1987: 49).

Behind the eventual success of the Luxembourg Report stood a bigger bargain. France had blocked the UKs accession to the EC for many years. The Luxembourg Report became part of compromise regarding France's acceptance of British accession. For letting the UK join, two French demands were met. The formation of a forum for political cooperation along Gaullist lines in the form of the EPC and secondly the permanent funding of the Common Agricultural Policy. The failure of the EDC as to supranational and defence focused, and of the Fouchet Plans as too intergovernmental, led the EPC to be hybrid form of the two, leaning though decisively towards intergovernmentalism. It was set up outside the EC framework and the topics security and defence were omitted from the EPC. (Smith, 2004: 104).

The Luxembourg Report set out the following framework for foreign policy coordination. It defines two major objectives for foreign policy cooperation

"(a) to ensure greater understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics, by exchanging information and consulting regularly".

Secondly, it put an emphasize on coordinating action

"(b) To increase their solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, concentration of attitudes, and joint action when it appears feasible and desireable." (Luxembourg Report, 1970: 3)

Furthermore, the Luxembourg Report stipulated a multilayered framework for cooperation. The foreign ministers were supposed to meat at least one time, every six months. If the matter of discussion was considered too important, a meeting of the head of states could take place instead of the conferences. The role of chairing and organizing the meetings fell to the EC President in office. It also stipulated a second level of coordination with the establishment of a Political Committee (Ifestos, 1987: 49). Members of the Political Committee were the heads of the political departments of the respective foreign ministries, who met four times a year and were responsible for the agenda. The Political Committee is the guiding committee of the EPC and plays a similar role as the COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives) for the Council of Ministers (da Fonseca-Wollheim, 1981: 49). Furthermore, workings groups of experts were established, which got their directives from the Political Committee (Ifestos, 1987: 49). The working groups were separated into two different fields: regional and sectorial. A number of groups was committed to the regions: Africa, Asia, the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Latin America. While the sectorial groups engaged with the Helsinki Conference, the United Nation, etc. The only regions completely excluded were the North American continent and the countries of Western Europe, which were not part of the EC. No working group for transatlantic relations was established, neither for Western Europe that was part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (da Fonseca-Wollheim, 1981: 49).

The role of the EC institutions in the new framework was very limited. While the Commission would only be consulted when the activity of the EC was affected by the decisions of the foreign ministers, the role of the European Parliament was even more restricted. The European Parliaments only role in the system was that its Political Affairs Committee had bi-annual consultation meetings with the ministers. Neither the European Commission, and even less the European Parliament had any say in the EPCs actions. The only right the Commission had was to make its views know, when an issue effected the activities of the EC (Nuttall, 2013: 132). Otherwise, also the Commission was not allowed to observe the meetings The organizational structure was separated from the EC. The meetings between

the foreign ministers took place in the country, which held the rotating EC presidency (Ifestos, 1987: 49). One of the most striking characteristics of the early EPC was its lack of a judicial base and institutional structure. It was not based on a treaty and resembled rather a procedure than an institution (Ifestos, 1987: 49). It was a forum, which allowed the foreign minister to meet periodically and discuss discretely. The matters discussed were not limited, and the members were free to propose any political subject they wanted to discuss. Neither were they bound when it came to decision making. They were not bound to implement any policies discussed or complying if views diverged (Smith, 2004: 104).

The EPC policies were only directed towards non-member states. Inner European conflicts as the Norther Ireland conflict could not be discussed in the EPC. Also third-countries and whole areas were effectively out of the EPCs' realm. Everything related to Western Berlin is not to be discussed in the EPC, but only by Germany and the other three Western Powers: France, UK, and the United States. Furthermore were also the Magrhib and francophone Western and Central African states held out of EPCs discussions. Those were less formally excluded, but only appeared seldom on EPC agendas, likely due to French interests. (da Fonseca-Wollheim, 1981: 49).

In its first form, the EPC resembled an informal Gentlemen's club, were the foreign ministers could freely consult among themselves. The structure was intergovernmental with no supranational elements. The role of the EC institutions was very restricted, waging no effective influence regarding decision making, or even being informed about the issues discussed in the EPC after.

In this structure the EPC existed for three years until 1973. In those three years minor reforms to improve political cooperation took place. In the meeting of October 1972, the per-annum number of meetings of the foreign ministers was increased to four times. Nevertheless, the heads of state were positive about the development of foreign policy coordination, which also led to the next institutional step for the EPC.

4.3. EPC Part 2: Copenhagen Report 1973-1981

The Copenhagen Report of 1973 produced the next development for the EPC, even though it did not modify the principles the EPC was based on. A consequence of the Copenhagen Report was that the institutional structure of the EPC was strengthened (da Fonseca-Wollheim, 1981: 48).

The Copenhagen meeting can be seen as a reaffirmation of the Luxembourg Report. It resulted in codification of the practices and working habits that had developed through the previous three years. The amount of meetings of foreign ministers were doubled, to now take place four times a year. Similarly, the Political Committee now met at least once a month, or as often as necessary. What would proof important for the development of the EPC in the future was the establishment of the EPCs own mechanism of encrypted communication: the *COREU* (correspondance Europeène), as well as the creating the positions of correspondents. The correspondents were officials in the respective foreign ministries, who were solely responsible for working with the EPC. (Ifestos, 1987: 50)
The reforms of the EPC set out in the Copenhagen Report strengthened the structure of the EPC and formalized the procedures. Already, during the years before a "reflex" of coordination had began to develop. Before member states acted towards third-countries, they now often consulted the opinions of the others in the EPC. This had two effects. It not only altered the relations between the member states, creating a more cooperative and trustworthy environment, it also altered the relations between the member states and third-countries. The consulting process and "reflex" of coordination led to a more coherent foreign policy approach towards third-countries, also mentioned in the Copenhagen Report. (Ibid: 50).
The customs and rules which developed inside the working groups proofed to be successful. As cooperation increased, shared standards of behavior were established, which were accepted by the EPC participants. Already in 1977 steps inside the EPC were taken to codify them and assemble them in a collection. The rules were written down in the *coutumier* (customs) and defined the rules how coordination was to be conducted. Second collection was created, which included all EPC foreign policy declarations and other substantive policy texts in the *receuil* (collection). Both collections were transferred among the officials when the Presidency changed, which it did every six months. The rules themselves had a clear focus towards consensus building and problem solving. (Smith, 2004: 106f).

While inside the EPC coordination between the member states evolved, and customs supporting cooperation were codified, the relation of the EC to the EPC remained limited. The EPC was still a pure intergovernmental organization, even though the Copenhagen Report had recognized that the Commission should participate in discussions regarding the

economic aspects of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Also, did the Copenhagen Report stipulate the future role of the Council of Europe regarding the EPC (Nuttall, 2013: 132).

Since the Paris summit in 1974 the EPC and EC had a common roof under the European Council (da Fonseca-Wollheim, 1981: 48). This did not alter the relationship between the EC institutions, especially the Commission, and the EPC. The EPC still was a intergovernmental institution, with no supranational elements and therefore the Commissions role kept being limited until the London Report of 1981. During that time the Commission was only allowed to participate irregularly at meetings of the Political Committee, and only in certain working groups. In Meetings of the Correspondents, they were not allowed to participate at all. Generally, the Commission could participate in the United Nations Working Group, but it was never invited to take part in meetings of the Middle East Working Group. To Meetings of Mediterranean Working Group it was invited to irregularly. The participation of the Commission always depended on the good will of the participants of the other member states. Any member was always allowed to veto the Commissions participation, which especially France did from time to time. Also the Commissions access to COREU correspondence was restricted. It did receive the COREU correspondence among foreign ministers in the EPC, but this was only amounted to a small share of correspondence. The Commission could sent COREU, but only through the Belgian Foreign Ministry (Ibid: 134f). For the period between 1970 and 1981 the strict intergovernmental structure of the EPC prevailed. Coordination and Cooperation in the EPCs structures developed significantly, and the collections of *coutumier and receuil* can be seen as important steps; cultivating an orientation towards cooperation based on consensus building and problem solving. A significant converging process of positions of the member states, especially towards the Middle Easter Conflict, took place (da Fonseca-Wollheim, 1981: 57). The ECs role continued to be limited, with the EPC functioning outside EC structures, even though they were both put under the roof of the Council of Europe in 1974. This did not change the Commissions limited affiliation with the EPC.

4.4. EPC Part 3: London Report 1981 – 1987

The next step in the evolution of the EPC happened in 1981. Based on the Luxembourg and Copenhagen Reports, a third report about the character and future of the EPC was signed by

the member states: the London Report. In certain aspects the London Report was an acknowledgment of the practice of the EPC, which it made official. As a step forward it can be considered that the London Report for the first time covered aspects that had been left out of the previous reports. This included the institutional structure, crisis procedures, security, and the degree of political commitment by the member states. Cooperation was furthered. The report stipulated for example, that member states were now obliged to consult partners before adopting a final position and had to take into account the positions of their partner states (Ifestos, 1987: 54).
This formalized the consultation "reflex", further converging European foreign policy. Additionally, closer coordination was also intensified in the updated procedures of the EPC. The discussions about crisis management led to the ability of the Political Committee to call emergency meetings within forty-eight hours, a privilege that was also reserved for heads of mission in third-countries. Furthermore, the working groups were instructed to prepare themselves for the possibility of political crisis happening and prepare possible reactions. Regarding the realm of security the signatories agreed to continue the possibility to discuss the political aspects of security related issues. The structure of the ECP was further confirmed and enhanced. Until now the rotating Presidency was depended on its own staff. Now it became to be supported by a small team of officials. The team consisted of officials of the preceding and succeeding presidencies. The member states decided against a permanent secretary as the wanted to preserve the flexible character of the EPC (Ibid: 54).

The London Report included important changes for the association between the EPC and the Commission. The member states had decided not to link EPC and EC judicially, but they enhanced the association of the Commission and the EPC. In the report the members called for "Within the framework of the established procedure the ten attach importance of the Commission of the European Communities being fully associated with Political Cooperation on all levels. This enabled the Commission to attend all meetings of the EPC and significantly improved its level of integration in the EPC structures. The Commission could now attend Correspondence group meetings and the meetings of the Political Directos, it was omitted to attend before. It was now also integrated into the COREU network, even though they were doubts about the Commission's ability for discretion as it was infamous for its leaks (Nuttall, 2013: 134f).

After the London Report, the structure of the EPC was strengthened once more and the role of the Commission in the EPC enhanced. Especially, the formalization of consultation before deciding should be seen as a decisive step in institutionalizing norms that enhanced coordination and provide a basis for "Europeanization" of foreign policy. The full association of the Commission made furthermore clear that a closer cooperation and consistency between the EPC and the Commission was deemed to be necessary by the member states. The EPC now persists in this form until the implementation of the Single European Act in 1987.

4.5. EPC 4: The Single European Act 1987-1991

The Single European Act, which was signed by the Member States in 1986, and implemented in 1987, strengthened the role of the Commission in the EPC. Nevertheless, it still differentiates between the EPC and the Community as separate institutions (Ifestos, 1987: 56). Through the Single European Act, the split between the institutions was bridged to a certain degree as the Commission now assumed a connecting role between EC and EPC. This contributed to coordination and the Commissions expanding association signal that the member states identified the value of the Commissions role in the EPC (Nuttall, 2013: 137). The new relationship between the Commission and the EPC reserved a more influential role to the Commission than it had had before. Commission and EPC had now to be consistent in their foreign policies. Art. 30(5) of the Single European Act defines the new relationship

"the external politics of the European Community and the policies agreed in European Political Cooperation must be consistent. The Presidency and the Commission, each within its own sphere of competence, shall have special responsibilities for ensuring that such consistency is sought and maintained. (Single European Act, 1983:18)"

Now the Commission had a clearly defined role in the legal texts stipulating the EPC and actions between the EC and EPC demanded closer coordination. Still, the two institutions existed separately existed. The authority was not as clear as before since the more influential role of the Commission. The strictly intergovernmental structure had been loosened, even though only slightly, for the first time. The Commission could not speak for the EPC, a role still solely reserved for the rotating presidency. The power largely remained with the EPC as Article 30 of the Single European Act clearly states: the Commission is not

integrated as a co-decider, but “fully associated with the proceedings of Political Cooperation. (Ifestos, 1987: 57)”

A discussion, which lasted over a decade was finally settled in the Single European Act. Eventually, a permanent secretariat was established. The permanent secretariat was to be based in Brussels, but did not significantly enhance the role of the secretariat itself (Ibid, 1987: 58). In size the secretariat did not significantly increase. The rotating presidency had now a team of EPC officials working for them in the Brussels office, which assisted them in preparing and implementing EPC activities (Dehousse &Weiler, 1991: 10). In other areas the Single European Act did not substantially change the Status Quo. In the articles devoted to security, the Single European Act largely stuck to the previous line, only strengthening the member states ambition in Art. 30 (6) that “they are ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security (Single European Act, 1983:18 in Ifestos, 1987: 58).”

After the Single European Act, a split between the EPC and the Community institutions still existed. The enhanced role of the Commission helped to bridge the organizational cleavage. Nevertheless, the central character of the EPC, being an intergovernmental institution did not change. The power of decision making still lay with the member states themselves. The position of the Commission was only such improved that it was even closer associated now, and consistency in foreign policies demanded closer cooperation. In other areas, the Single European Act exerted little reformative power over the EPC. While, the secretariat was now based permanently in Brussels, this did not amount for a big change for the setup of the secretariat.

Nevertheless, over the decades the EPC had proven to be a success story. The institutional mechanisms established, led not only to the previously mentioned “Reflex of coordination”, but significantly improved overall foreign policy coordination between the member states. Numbers of sent COREU telexes illustrate this increase well. In the mid 70s, EU member state sent approximately 4400 COREU telexes per annum regarding sensitive foreign policy issues. Until the 90s this number skyrocketed with an average of 13.000 COREU telexes sent per annum per country (Smith, 2004: 107). This implies a significant increase in coordination between the member states, also visible in the number of EPC actions taken. Before the establishment of the EPC, only two multilateral foreign policy actions had been taken since

1957 (Treaty of Rome). The first decade of the EPC produced nearly 20 multilateral foreign policy actions, while in the second decade the number rose to 50 (Ibid: 110). During the 90s, and especially with the establishment of CFSP the number of collective foreign policy actions skyrocketed. This shows that already the measures of institutionalization of the EPC had significant influence on foreign policy coordination of the member states.

4.6. The CFSP: The Maastricht Treaty

In 1993, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty brought the end of European Political Cooperation (EPC) and replaced it with a new institution: Common Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP). The re-unification of Germany had provided the background to strike a new bargain for political cooperation between the member states (Smith, 2004: 107). Until now the EPC and the EC had been separate entities, even though they were already formally connected through the dual role of the Commission. The Maastricht treaty stipulated a merging of the political cooperation and EC under the name of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In spite of combining political cooperation and economic union, the CFSP kept its intergovernmental character. Providing a break-through in the institutional setup, the reforms of the Maastricht Treaty were less far reaching in the areas of objectives and procedures.

Despite the name Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the dual system of separate EC foreign policy and coordinated national foreign policies continued. In the field of objectives, the reforms of the Maastricht Treaty were modest. A stronger emphasis on democracy, rule of law, human and basic rights was articulated in the objectives. For the first time, the Maastricht Treaty also defined Security, including military dimension as a future competence of the CFSP. Emphasized was the processual character of a European defence policy, which can lead at the right time to common defence. (Regelsberger, 1992: 86f).
The second and most influential change stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty concern the institutional structure. Having existed as two separate institutions until now, EPC and the EC were now merged. The European Council was officially confirmed as the guiding authority for EC and the newly founded CFSP. This also resulted in the fusion of the meeting of foreign ministers and the Council of the European Union. Foreign ministers had already before served in their capacity for both institutions. The meetings of foreign ministers were now absorbed into Council Meetings. The unofficial Gymnich Meetings were not affected by the

reform. Regarding the internal CFSP structures the fusion trend did not continue, and the CFSP kept essentially the character of the EPC. The Political Committee kept to be in its position and was not replaced by or integrated into the COREPER. Competences in this regard are not clear as the COREPER is formally responsible for the preparations of Council meetings, and therefore occupies a formative capacity as well. The secretariat of the EPC was integrated into to the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (Ibid, 1992: 90f).

The third substantial change the Maastricht Treaty brought, was the introduction of Qualitative Majority Voting (QMV). The applicability and extent of QMV is very limited though. QMV is stipulated to take only place by internal CFSP procedural votes, and common actions. In the area of common actions QMV, is subject to further restrictions QMV. During every stage of the process for a common action, the council has to decide if the next step's decision is taken with QM (Ibid, 1992: 88).

The Commission's position in political cooperation was strengthened through the Treaty of Maastricht. On the one hand, the Commission had de facto competencies and rights put into law. For example the shared obligation with the European Council to guarantee coherence between EC and ECP/CFSP actions, as well as shared representation of the EPC/CFSP with the European Council. On the other hand, the Commission gained an initiative right in the CFSP, though together with the member states. The Commissions initiative right differs significantly from its initiative right in the EC institutions where it has the monopoly on initiatives. The European Parliament position, which only allowed for ex-post questioning, largely stayed the same through the Maastricht Treaty. The only gained competency for the EP was that the Commission was put under the obligation to report to the Parliament (Ibid 1992: 91).

Overall, the biggest reform of the Maastricht Treaty was that it eventually merged political cooperation with the European Community. Both was now under one common European roof. Nevertheless, despite the merger the member states were preserved the intergovernmental structure of the EPC/CFSP. The internal structure of EPC/CFSP underwent little changes. Even though QMV was introduced, the strong restrictions on its use, determine a continuation of unanimous decision making. The role of the Commission was

strengthened through the Maastricht Treaty, most importantly gaining the shared initiative right together with the member states, while the role of the European Parliament continues to be without direct influence on decision making.

4.7. The CFSP Part 2: The Nice Treaty

Before the Nice Treaty brought changes to the architecture of CFSP, the Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed in 1997, had already brought amendments. It established the role of the High Representative. The High Representative, who also occupies the function of Secretary General of the Council, was described as the new face of CFSP (Duke, 1999: 7). Nevertheless, his role is less clear and more ambiguous when looking at the competencies occupied by the Presidency of the European Council. The Amsterdam Treaty still stipulates the Presidency to be responsible in representing the Union in matters of CFSP, and responsible for the implementations and decisions taken under the CFSP (Ibid: 7). Therefore, the role of the High Representative is dependent on the Council in the extent of his actions, preserving the inherent intergovernmental structure of CFSP.

In 2001, the first reform for the CFSP came through the Treaty of Nice. The changes regarding structures, processes, and institutional setup of the CFSP itself were marginal, but the Nice Treaty included on significant innovation and addition to the CFSP. Making due on the trend of an enhanced emphasis on security and military issues in EPC/CFDP, which was already pronounced in the Maastricht Treaty, a new institution, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was embedded in the CFDP. While the institutional set up of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) had already started in 2000, it was only through the treaty of Nice that it was stipulated in an EU treaty (Regelsberger, 2001: 157).

Embedding the CSDP in the CFDP led to organizational adjustments inside CFDP. The Political Committee got the overlordship over the CSDP. To reflect this expansion in function, the Political Committee was renamed into Political and Security Committee (PSC). Furthermore, the Political and Security Committee was now given the authority in times of crisis, when approved by the European Council, which naturally persisted to be the guiding and highest authority of the CFDP. The development of CSDP infrastructure, which only started at the beginning of the 2000s, was put under the authority of the newly created European Union

Military Committee (EUMC). The EUMC reported directly to the High Representative of the CFDP (Ibid, 2001: 161f).
The Nice Treaty also led to a procedural reform regarding qualitative majority voting (QMV). Very narrow in its extent until now, the range for QMV was slightly widened. Article 24 EUV loosened unanimity on conclusion of international agreements, but only if the aspired international agreement is already based on an already decided common action or position. Secondly, the appointment of special representatives, the Secretary General and vice-Secretary General of the CSDP, was now to be decided by QMV as well. (Ibid, 2001: 158)

The Nice Treaty institutionalized the already in the Maastricht Treaty articulated objective of an increased common European military and security cooperation, separate from NATO. Set inside the CFSP, CSDP is governed by the same intergovernmental structure. The expansion of QMV was minor, while the most parts CFSP were left untouched by the Nice Treaty.

4.8. The CFSP, Part 3 Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty of 2007 introduced a range of reforms of the CFSP. The reform originated in the perception that the Nice Treaty had left the CFSP lacking efficiency in decision-taking and coherence in its external presentation (European Council, 2007b: 15 in Wessel & Bopp, 2008: 5). Therefore, the treaty of Lisbon stipulated two new central positions in the CFSP architecture: The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was created as the center piece of the CFSP architecture, together with new full-time presidency for the European Council (Wessel & Bopp, 2008: 19).

The office of the new High Representative combined three functions: two positions that had previously been separate under the Treaty of Nice: the post of the High Representative and of the Commissioner for external action. As a third function, the High Representative is chairing the Foreign Affairs Council (Wessel & Bopp, 2008: 19).
The High Representative is also representing the Union in front of international organizations, as long it's within the CFSP (Art. 27(2) TEU). He/she may represent the position of the EU in the UN-security council when a position has been defined by the Union regarding a topic in the agenda, but only when he/she is requested by the member states in the Security Council (Art.34(2) TEU) (Wessel & Bopp, 2008: 21).
In the framework of the CDSP the High Representative has the shared right of proposal

together with the member states (Art.42(4) (Ibid: 21). The role of the High Representative is located between the different institutions. The new High Representative is voted, as stipulated in Art.18 (1) TEU, by qualified majority in the European Council and has to be agreed upon with the President of Commission. She is also responsible to European Parliament, which has to consent the entire Commission where the High Representative is part of. Also, the President of the Commission can request the withdrawal of the High Representative. In the Commission the High Representative also occupies the role of a Vice-President (Wessels & Bopp, 2008:21).
A new body was created to support the work of the High Representative, the "European External Action Service" (EEAS). The EEAS "shall comprise of officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States" (Art. 27(3) TEU).

Since the Treaty of Lisbon the President of the European Council is not rotating anymore, but is occupied by a full time president for 2 ½ years, who can be reelected once. He is elected by qualified majority by the members of the European Council. A role for the Commission is not foreseen in the election process. Article 15 (6) of the TEU lays out the role of the permanent President.

The President of the European Council:

(a) shall chair it and drive forward its work

(b) shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council

(c) shall endeavor to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council;

(d) shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Council

Furthermore, "The President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (TEU, Art. 15(6)

This clearly stipulates the permanent presidency as the most important position in the CFSP architecture. As under the Nice Treaty before, the extent of the Highest Representatives competencies depends on the interpretation of the President of the Councils role. Additionally, the President of the Council can be regarded as the overall spokesperson for the external matters of the EU (Wessel & Bopp, 2008: 18), while the Highest Representative represents the EU in CFSP matter. This potential overlap in function, together with the ambiguousness of the relationship between Highest Representative, leaves open the two will fulfill their roles.

Overall, dominant role of the European Council was not weakened in the Treaty of Lisbon, but rather reinforced comparing to the previous Nice Treaty. The European Council shall "identify the Union's strategic interests, determine the objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including matters with defense implications." (Art. 26 TEU in Devuyst, 2012: 330) The role of the Council proofs to be similarly equivocal as before regarding its objectives.
Voting in the Council was minor altered as well. Voting with qualitative majority has been expanded through the Lisbon treaty and includes now a range of exceptions caught by Art.31(2) TEU. Unanimity in voting continues to be standard though, as the added exception do not significantly widen matters eligible for QMV. Also member states are still able to eventually block QMV, if the issue effects "vital and stated of national policy" (Art. 31(2) TEU). So, if states completely object a decision taken by QMV, they still have a mechanism to stop it.

The position of the European Parliament, as in the Reports and Treaties before, was not significantly altered. Its competencies were not substantially widened and the overall effects of the Lisbon Treaty for the EP continued to be marginal. The High Representative was made the new contact partner for the EP (a role previously filled by the Commission). Secondly, the number of the debates in the EP on CFSP and CSDP matter were doubled to twice a year, while also adding that the EP should be consulted regularly on aspects of the CFSP, and not only on particular issues (Wessels & Bopp, 2008:14).

Objectives and goals set out for CFSP in the Lisbon Treaty expanded the normative basis for the Union's external service. The Lisbon Treaty references in the preamble of the Treaty on

European Union the “cultural, religious, humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.” Based on this, the aim of not only CFSP, but also CSDP should be “reinforcing the European Identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and the world.” (Preamble Treaty of the European Union in Wessel & Bopp 7)

Furthermore, the general provisions on the Union’s external action stress:

“The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.” (Wessel & Bopp, 7)

Besides expanding the normative objectives, the emphasis on future common defence is further repeated and strengthened in the Lisbon Treaty. It stipulates in Article 42(2) TEU that “The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to common defence, when the European Council (…) so decides.” (Art. 42(2) TEU in Wessels & Bopp, 2008: 9)
The “Solidarity” clause emphasized the common defence character of the EU as well. Similar to Art. 5 NATO Treaty, the so called “Solidarity” clause stresses the obligation of the member states to “aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.” if a member states is the victim of armed aggression. (Art. 222 TFEU in Wessels & Bopp, 2008: 9)

Overall, the Lisbon Treaty brought changes in several aspects of the CFSP. Not only, are there now two central figures in the architecture of the CFSP, both of them function as spokesperson as well. Nevertheless, the overall position of the Council was even reinforced, and the intergovernal decision making structure, foremost relying on unanimity still persists. The Lisbon Treaty emphasizes common defence and security more than the previous treaty, but it still has not shown that serious European attempts to eventually built a common

defence will materialize. Additionally, the objectives set out further highlight the normative basis for EU foreign policy.

4.9. Lessons drawn from the Historical Development of EU Foreign Policy

The start of European foreign policy coordination was characterized by two failures. First, the European Defence Community (EDC), which found its end being rebutted in the French Parliament. Two major reasons stood behind France's aversion for the EDC. The first reason, doubts about re-arming Germany after World War II, vanished quickly with the integration of Germany into NATO, only one year later in 1955. The second reason, an animosity to limit national sovereignty concerning foreign policy, persists until this day. Not only in France, but many EU member states. The Fouchet Plans of the early 1960 are a counter reaction by France. A suggestion for a common European foreign policy, but strictly intergovernmental and with a more dominant position for the big states. This plans foundered under the resistance of the Netherlands and Belgium. Nevertheless, the intergovernmental basis of the Fouchet Plans stayed alive and formed the basis for the Luxembourg Report, which eventually was able to establish European Political Cooperation (EPC). The first step of European foreign policy integration. The subsequent reports reforming the EPC, the Copenhagen and London Report, followed the spirit of the Copenhagen Report keeping intergovernmentalism as the foundation of the EPC. Even when the EC, especially the Commission, became closer and closer associated, there was aversion by the member states to unite EC and EPC in one organization. Only through the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the now named Common Foreign and Defense Policy (CFSP) was merged with the European Union. Nevertheless, this change did not supra-nationalize the CFSP. The intergovernmental structure was kept intact, and even after the latest reforms through the Treaty of Lisbon, it stayed at the center of decision making. In comparison to the Treaty of Nice, the role of the European Council was even reaffirmed. The creation of CFSP and the establishment and reform of the High Representative gave more competencies to the EU as the played a more influential role in CFSP, but the core structure stayed intergovernmental. Scholars describe the result of this evolution as "rationalized intergovernmentalism" (Wessels, 2001: 204). A common foreign policy was undoubtedly a central pillar of European integration, but it was a pillar not evolving at the same pace as the EC institutions, and in comparison lacking supranational elements. The failure of the EDC was never overcome and

rationalized intergovernmentalism persists until today, neither allowing stipulating a truly intergovernmental system, nor a supranational. The persistence of the intergovernmental decision mechanisms, allow furthermore the influence of third countries on EU foreign policy if they are able to find a member state willing to assist them.

Even though, supranational decision structure were never adopted for EPC/CFSP, coordination and cooperation of national foreign policies in the EPC did. From the point, when the irregular meetings of the early EPC in its "gentlemen's club" form changed into a regular forum, a gradual process of ever increasing coordination started. Already in the 1970s, coordination between the member states had intensified to such a high level that the diplomats started to speak of the "reflex of coordination". Member states started to generally consult the others before they took decisions regarding positions. This later found its way into the treaties, demanding from the member states to coordinate before they decided on positions. Besides increased coordination, also heightened foreign policy cooperation took off. While the member states took only two notable multilateral foreign policy actions between 1957 and 1971, multilateral foreign policy actions expanded rapidly after the establishment of the EPC. Already the first decade of EPC saw a rise to 20 in the 70s, and to 50 during the 80s. In the 90s the number of multilateral foreign policy actions reached well over a 100. In this regard, the EPC was more successful than anticipated and led to a process of Europeanization of national foreign policies. A result so remarkable that scholarly interest still produces explanatory approaches. One central element making this possible was the development of consensus orientated norms and customs, regulating the process of position finding. This norms and customs were considered so important in the EPC that already in 1977 steps were taken to assemble them into a collection. Two different collections resulted of this process, the *coutumier* (customs) and *receuil* (collection). *Coutumier* and *receuil* were weighed to be so essential for the efficiency of the EPC that they were granted treaty status through the Single European Act in 1986. Regarding coordination and cooperation, the EPC turned out to be a great success. The ground stones for this success were lain early in the history of the EPC and its starting point can already considered to be establishment of regular meetings.

While coordination and cooperation increased between the member states, the member states started to set more and more ambitious objectives for the EPC and later CFSP. The

objectives set out in the Luxembourg Report defined “greater understanding” and “increased solidarity” between the member states in foreign policy as goals. The most recent reform, the Lisbon Treaty set out very ambitious goals towards the character of the exercised foreign policy. Based on the distinct history and identity of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty strong normative goals for the CFSP and therefore EU foreign policy. Among those objectives were to spread “democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law”. Over the decades of its existence, in a gradual process, European foreign policy coordination and cooperation developed an inherently normative character in the treaties.

5. Case Studies

In this part the thesis touches down on it's main aim to illustrate influence on EU foreign policy by third states using alliances with Eurosceptic member states. In the first case, Greece is the main protagonist in furthering Israel's interest influencing EU foreign policy. Nevertheless, the thesis lays an emphasis of the alliance between the V4 and Israel. This has two central reasons. First, the main aim of this thesis to emphasize the role of external influence on EU foreign policy, which is illustrated by Greece's acts. Additionally, even though Greece was the pivotal actor in softening the FAC's resolution, also the V4 played an important role in bolstering Greece's advances. Secondly, the sub aim of this thesis is to characterize the continuing alliance between Israel and the V4, which is not only shown in the second case, but also provides serious indications for future EU foreign policy formation.

5.1. Analysis: Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) Position on Differentiation Policy between Israel and the Occupied Territories, January 2016

The first case concerns the EUs 'differentiation policy' towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which the EU's Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) reinforced in January 2016 in its 'conclusion on the Middle East Peace Process' (MEPP). According to a paper by Sharon Pardo and Neve Gordon (2018), Israel was able to yield influence on the content the FAC's conclusion through coordinating with Greece (and then V4 and the Baltic States), changing it according to Israeli interest. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposes a clear distinction between Israel-proper and the occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank, and therefore the 'differentiation policy' of the EU, which recognizes products produced in Jewish settlements in the West Bank. As the FAC conclusion was supposed to reiterate a clear distinction between Israel and the occupied territories, it feared that the conclusion could bolster the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Campaign, widely known as BDS. Therefore Israeli government decided to try to influence the conclusion and decrease content it deemed critical. (Pardo and Gordon, 2018: 8)

The case study is now structured the following way, first the basis for the alliance between Israel and the V4 is discussed, focusing on the Eurosceptic sentiments that provide and ideological basis for an alliance between Israel and the V4. Secondly, the economic

foundation of their relationship is lain out. Thirdly, the influence taking of Israel in the FAC through Greece, the V4, and the Baltic states is shown.

5.1.1. Euroscepticism and Ideological Rapprochement

Euroscepticism and their character in the political systems of the Visegrad states has been broadly discussed in academic literature, already since their accession process to the EU (see Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001). Poland and Hungary are considered the 'hardest' Eurosceptic members of the European Union, challenging central EU norms as freedom of expression and rule of law regularly, which earned Poland an Art.7 procedure for breaching the EUs founding values (European Commission Press release, April 3, 2019), while the EU Parliament has voted for action against Hungary under Art.7 as well (EU Parliament Resolution of the 12 September 2018). In contrast to Greece's Euroscepticism, which was rooted in its particular economic situation and the resulting conflict with the EU and certain member states (Pardo and Gordon, 2018: 6), Euroscepticism in the Visegrad States already preceded their EU accession and has a long tradition (Taggart and Szcerbiak, 2001).As there is extensive literature on the character and basis of Eurscepticism in the Visegrad states (see Taggart and Szcerbiak, 2008 and 2013) the focus here lies on specific elements of their Euroscepticism, which characterize their alliance with the Israeli government.

Joana Dyduch (2018) examines the close relationship between the V4 and Israel and argues that it takes place "against the background of a discernible ideological rapprochement between these governments and Israeli leadership on issues of national security" (Dyduch, 2018: 2). She argues they have a shared understanding of the importance of the nation state, seeing them as entities which should not be taken for granted and require constant defense. This has lead the V4 governments to adopt a realist stance concerning international conflicts, which focuses on power relations, instead of norms and ideals. Israel shares this focus in conducting its foreign policy. Norms central to the EUs foreign policy, as liberalism, are rejected, deemed insufficient or even dangerous for the nation state. Public discourse on issues as migration and rule of law are discussed as security issues. This is also strongest commonality between the governments of Israel and V4 is based on common perception of migration being a potential threat to Europe, which is associated with terrorism. Terrorism is furthermore synonymously seen with Islamist extremism. (Dyduch, 2019:2f)

Viewing foreign policy in this framework and sharing views with the Netanayahu government has led the V4 to alter their positions towards the Middle East Conflict, diverging from EU positions. They advocate to re-define the priorities in EU-Israel relations away from the Israeli-Arab conflict, which is dominating the agenda between Israel and the EU. In the Joint Statement the V4 promote to further enhance relations, which is currently limited by the EUs position towards Israel:

"(…) they (the V4) underlined to promote an improved relationship between the State of Israel and the European Union and strong interest to convene the EU–Israel Association Council as soon as possible, which could lead to the setting of new partnership priorities (…). (Joint Statement, V4 – Israel Summit, 2017)"

Members of the V4, mainly the Czech Republic and Hungary, also disagree with specific EU policy points towards Israel, particularly the status of Jerusalem and the labelling of settlement goods. The EU considers the status to Jerusalem to be determined through negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, rejecting outside recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Besides, directly blocking a statement condemning the move of the U.S. embassy, which is the topic presented in the second case, Czech President Milos Zeman announced that he would seek for relocation of the Czech embassy to Jerusalem (Ahren, Times of Israel, April 2018). Later in the year, the whole Czech leadership, now including Prime Minister Babis, as well as the parliament speaker and the foreign and defense ministers, endorsed a gradual relocation of the embassy to Jerusalem (Staff and AFP, 2018). Furthermore, following Hungary as the first EU states to open a diplomatic office in Jerusalem, Slovakia and the Czech Republic also newly opened offices in Jerusalem (The Associated Press, 2019). Concerning, the declaration of settlement goods, the Czech and Hungarian parliaments rejected this in 2015, saying they would ignore EU legislation (Reuters, 2015).

5.1.2. Economy, Development, Technology & Energy

Israel and the V4s alliance is also based on shared interests in the field of economy, development and technology, which has also been expressed in a Joint Statement by the V4 and Israel, during a V4-Israel summit in 2017. For Israel and the V4, furthering economic cooperation is an attractive option as it promises economic gains for both parties. Israel has

a highly developed high-tech sector, from which's expertise the V4 states can benefit. The expect knowledge spillovers that are supposed to stimulate economic development in general, and technological development in particular. This desire materialized in a Memorandum of Understanding from June 18, 2018, which stipulated an exchange program that "will offer a short-term, intensive training program for the V4 countries' selected entrepreneurs to familiarize themselves with the best practices of the leading innovation ecosystem in Israel. (Memorandum of Understanding, V4 and Israel, 2018)" While the V4 can profit from Israel's know how, Israel can profit from the lower wage level in the V4 countries, as they provide a relatively cheap, but qualified labor force. Currently, the trade volume between the Israel and the V4 states is limited in comparison to Israel's overall trade with the EU. Although, during the past years the trade volume has been gradually growing. Leaders of the countries have regularly stressed their desire to increase and investment and trade volumes between the countries. (Dyduch, 2018: 4)

Another contributing factor to their alliance is the V4s interest in Israeli gas. This was also expressed in a joint statement resulting from the V4-Israel summit on July, 2017 defining increased energy cooperation between the states as a goal:

"(6) The V4 and the State of Israel recognized the usefulness of strengthening energy cooperation and agreed to consider opportunities to exchange views on the global and regional energy situation and energy policies, with a special focus on the opportunities offered by natural gas" (Join Statement, V4 – Israel Summit, 2017).

For the V4, seeking energy cooperation with Israel is the continuation of an nearly 30 year old goal. The V4 states inherited a strong dependence on Russian Gas from the Warsaw Pact Era (Marušiak, 2015: 31). A dependence they longed to decrease for a long time. Already, in the first Visegrád Declaration in 1991, the aspiration of the V4 to detach themselves from their Soviet/Warsaw Pact past, politically and socio-economically was made clear. As one of the central objectives of the formerly three Visegrád Group states (Czechoslovakia still existed) was to achieve "elimination of all existing social, economic and spiritual aspects of the totalitarian system. (Visegrad Declaration, 1991)" Israel therefore could help to ease the gas dependency of the V4 from Russian Gas. Pursuing this objective is especially important since the EU is divided on the issue of Russian gas dependency. States as Germany do not

consider energy dependence from Russia a major issue and further the volume of gas trade between the EU and Russia through the construction of the North Stream 2 pipeline, which started in 2018. First and foremost, Poland object the North Stream 2. In 2018, Polish President Andrzej Duda called "North Stream 2 a threat to Central and Eastern European Countries. (Deutsche Welle, 2018)"

5.1.3. The Act: FAC Conclusion's Wording is successfully influenced by Greece, V4 and Baltic Member States

In mid-December 2015, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs became aware of the fact that the FAC meeting conclusions in January 2016 were supposed to contain a clear distinction between Israel-proper and territories it occupies in the West Bank. The Israeli Foreign Ministry feared that this would legitimize a boycott of Israeli goods, produced in the occupied territories. Additionally, it expected the international Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement to gain strength by the conclusion. As this countered the interest of the Israeli government, they tried to influence the wording of the conclusion to weaken the distinction between Israel proper and the occupied territories. According, to interviews Pardo and Gordon (2018) conducted with Israeli and EU officials, as well as with former Israeli diplomats, Israel had organized workshops with Eurosceptic countries since the 2004 enlargement, on how the EU works and on how decisions within the EU apparatus can be blocked. Therefore the Israeli foreign ministry contacted EU member states, which it hoped would be willing to argue in Israel's favor in the FAC and exert pressure to change the wording. As stated by senior diplomats, Israel started contacting a group of EU member states it calls the 'Regional Group for Crisis Response', which contained of the V4, the Baltic member states, Germany, and the UK. Those states provided Israel with the exact wording of the conclusion's proposal. This reinforced the opposition of Israel's Foreign Ministry towards the wording and Israel approached Greece, which then showed willingness to lobby on Israel's behalf and request changes to the wording. The interviewed Diplomats stated that Greece's motivation was due to it's Euroscepticism, which had been steered up by the austerity policies the EU forced on Greece in the wake of it's financial crisis. Israeli diplomats further stated that the difficulty was not to find Eurosceptical member states, but finding state that was willing to completely block the EU's voting machinery. Greece was motivated reportedly more by its animosity against the EUs austerity programs and Germany, then by

its strategic partnership with Israel. In agreeing to help the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the Greek officials forwarded all five drafts, which were rotating in Brussel during the week, to the Israeli MFA in Jerusalem. In the Israeli MFA the officials introduced changes to the wording, who were then proposed by Greece. Through this acts Israel was already able to soften the language, but they were still not satisfied with the fifth draft, so Greece did not approve the fifth draft text and forced a sixth. Even though Greece was alone in its opposition on the fifth draft text on Friday January 15th, it had the backing of the V4 and the three Baltic member states. With their combined opposition to the formulation of the fifth draft, they were able to introduce changes Israel desired. Pardo quotes a senior Israeli official "We got the exact wording we wanted" (Pardo and Gordon, 2018: 12). Reportedly, the EU did not understand what had happened and had been hit unexpectedly by Israel's use of Eurosceptic member states to change the resolution. (Pardo and Gordon: 2018, 9ff9

5.2. Analysis: Blocking of EU Condemnation of US Embassy Move

The second case concerns the move of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. U.S. President Donald Trump had recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel December 6, 2017 and as a consequence the U.S. embassy would be relocated from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (President Trump, 2017). As President Trump's declaration stood in contrast to the EU position on the status of Jerusalem, the EU wanted to reiterate their position on the status of Jerusalem and issue a condemnation of President Trump's decision ahead of the opening of the embassy on May 14, 2018. When the issue was up for vote in the FAC, the move was blocked by Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Romania after successful diplomatic efforts by Israel and the United States, as Israeli media outlets (originally Channel 10, then most of Israeli media) reported on the same day (Ravid, 2019).

5.2.1 Background: Change of U.S. policy towards Jerusalem

While the status of Jerusalem was an internationally contested issue since the beginning of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinian, the U.S. had never until President Trump recognized Israel as the capital of Israel. Originally the U.S. position from 1947 towards 1967 was that Jerusalem should be a *corpus seperatum,* governed internationally. This changed in the wake of the 1967 War when President Johnson adopted a new policy of a unified Jerusalem, which future should by determined by the conflict parties, meaning that neither

side should unilaterally change Jerusalem's status or claim Jerusalem as its capital. (Neff, 1993: 20)

Another change took place under the Clinton Administration, which stated that the status of East and West Jerusalem should be determined by final status negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians (Khalidi, 2000: 82). Only under President Trump the U.S. defied international consensus, and recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital, declaring to move their embassy to Jerusalem (Feldman and Khalil, 2018: 1). With announcing the recognition and relocation (both terms will from now on be used synonymously) President Trump announced a policy change, which considered a long-term Israeli goal of recognizing Jerusalem as its capital (which is opposed by the international community). President Trump's move had several reasons, with the main one arguably being domestically motivated, courting his evangelical voting base as interviews with diplomats suggested (Landau in Haaretz, 2019). Underlying Trumps decision is a longstanding strategic partnership between Israel and U.S., as they share many strategic assessment in the Middle East. Generally, the overlap in strategic interests, as well as the financial and diplomatic support Israel receives from the U.S. reach such an extent that they are not solely explainable with shared strategic interest. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) further emphasize the influence of pro-Israeli lobby organizations in Washington and an American leadership, which lays a strong emphasis on military might in foreign policy. Nevertheless, the overlap of shared strategic interest is a central tie between the countries. Those factors combined provided the basis (though not limited to them) for President Trump's decision to give in to Israel's foreign policy goal of recognition of Jerusalem's status as Israel's capital and consecutively relocate the U.S. embassy.

5.2.3. Basis for U.S.-V4 relations: Ideological Rapprochement & Security:

The basis for the alliance between Israel and the V4 has been thoroughly explained in in the first study and is therefore not repeated anymore. The closeness between the V4 and the current U.S. administration is also based on shared ideological affinities. Trump has publicly stated his appreciation for Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban and his staunch stances on immigration and 'Christian' values. Trump shares the strong opposition against immigration with the V4 states. He welcomed Prime Minister Orban as the first U.S. President since 1998 and described it as 'a great honor' to host him. (Borger and Walker,

2019)

President Trump himself mad immigration a centerpiece of his campaign and started to adopt aggressive policies against immigration right after coming to office (Pierce and Selee, 2017). Additionally, President Trump also shares the Euroscepticism of the V4, voicing harsh criticism against EU trade policy and plans for an EU army, as well as heavily attacking EU member states on spending enough on NATO, putting U.S.-EU relations under scrutiny (Glaser, The New Yorker, 2017).

5.2.4. NATO and Security

An additional strongest connection between the U.S. and the V4 states is based on the NATO membership of the V4. The Visegrad Group members are all members of NATO, with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic having joined in 1999. Only Slovakia entered the alliance in 2002. All members stand in close alliance to the US and consider NATO and the US to be the essential for European security (Hendrickson, 2000: 28ff).

A special role regarding relations between the V4 and the US is occupied by Poland. Since the beginning of the 90s Poland has established themselves as one of the staunchest allies to the US in the region. Poland, since becoming independent, had a strong interest of becoming a NATO member as it considered NATO to be a security guarantor, against especially Russia. After NATO accession in 1999, As a result of Poland's broad military and diplomatic support for US military action, it is now seen by the US as even closer ally then France and Germany, who opposed the Iraq War of 2003. Poland additionally played an important role in NATOs policies towards Eastern Europe in general, and Russia in particular. Warsaw continuously supported the US driven missile defence program of NATO, of which Western European states and NATO members as Germany and France, were generally critical of. In 2001, Poland even offered territory and a financial contribution for the installation of missile defence on its territory. (Zaborowski & Longhurst, 2003: 1010ff)

Even though Poland does not play a role in this case, the strong alliance and divergence between its visions on security and EU's contain possible implications for the future of EU foreign policies discussed in the analysis.

5.2.5. The Act: Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania block EU declaration

As President Trump's decisions stood in contrast to international consensus, which is underlined by UN-Security Council Resolution 478 from 1980 and states that no diplomatic mission should be located in Jerusalem and since then no country had opened an embassy in Jerusalem (Landau, 2019). Therefore President Trump prompted wide spread criticism for his decision, including from EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Mogherini, Pope Francis, UN Secretary General Guterres, Leaders of the Arab world, China and Russia (BBC, 2017).

Before the opening ceremony of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem on May 14th, the EU was planning to issue a joint EU statement with all 28 members, reiterating the EUs position on the status of Jerusalem and criticizing the unilateral U.S. approach of recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital. According to interviews of European and Israeli Diplomats to Barak Ravid of Israel's Channel 13 news (and former diplomatic correspondent of Haaretz) the statement circulating was supposed to contain three points:

- "Jerusalem should be the capital of both states – Israel and the future state of Palestine.
- The final status of Jerusalem should be negotiated and only determined through negotiations between the parties.
- The member states of the EU will not follow the U.S. and will not move their embassies to Jerusalem."

The articulation of this three points would have stated a united front of the EU and it's member states against the U.S. relocation of the embassy and for the two-state solution. It directly criticized the U.S. unilateral decision as it as it proclaimed that the final status of Jerusalem can only be determined through negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis. Additionally, it would have announced that the EU member states will not relocate their embassies to Jerusalem and therefore deliberately not follow the U.S. example. Thirdly, it declared Jerusalem to be the capital of both states, Israel and the future state of Palestine, reiterating EU support for the two-state solution.

Israeli news station Channel 10 reported that as the statement was circulating in the capitals of the member states, Israel coordinated with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania to block it. When the subject was up for vote in the FAC on May 11, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania objected to the statement, and made it impossible to reach the necessary consensus. According, to interviews with Israeli and European officials the decision of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania happened in coordination with the Israeli government. The reasons for the individual states differed, though. A Senior European diplomat stated that the main motivation for the decisions of the Czech Republic and Romania lay in their Eurosceptic stance towards the status of Jerusalem. Both governments consider moving their embassy to Jerusalem as well, which in the Czech Republic's case was publicly announced by the whole leadership in August that year. Hungary's motivation was on the other driven by the condemnation of the U.S., which they didn't supported. According to European diplomat "The Hungarians didn't want to poke Trump in the eye and the Czechs and the Romanians are considering to move their embassies to Jerusalem against the EU position. This is the state of the EU these days"(Ravid, 2018). The statement indicates a divergence in positions leading it to be difficult to find consensus on certain issues. After European diplomats leaked the proceedings in the FAC, the Palestinian Authority (PA) released a statement heavily criticizing Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania act to block the condemnation (Fulbright, 2019).

Conclusion:

Several important conclusions can be drawn from these cases. The first and most important is that it clearly shows that EU foreign policy can be influenced by third states if the find a Eurosceptic member state willing to exert pressure to influence EU foreign policy formation. Therefore, third states can use Euroscepticism as a foreign policy instrument to affect EU foreign policy. Furthermore, the first case illustrates that EU foreign policy cannot only be influenced from the outside, but third countries are aware of this and make use of it. With Israel already conducting workshops with member states since 2004 on how to influence and block EU decision-making procedures, this clearly indicates that they were aware of this possibility for over a decade. On top of that, the Israeli MFA seems to have been able to assemble a group of member states, which are willing to share information with them and in seldom cases, interfere strongly in Israeli interest. This so-called "Regional Group for Crisis

Response" stipulates that Israel is actively looking out to protect its own national interests inside the EU's decision making processes. The EU on the hand seems not yet to be fully aware of the possibility of third state influence on its foreign policy decision-making processes, as interviews with diplomats indicated.

Also the second case illustrates interference by a third country on EU foreign policy on EU foreign policy, capitalizing on relations with Eurosceptic by EU member states. Israel was able to block an EU condemnation of a position it considered hurting its own national interests. The Czech Republic and Romania both shared Israel's view on the status of Jerusalem and therefore opposed the condemnation of the U.S.'s embassy relocation after coordinating with Israel. An action that would have been coherent with the norms and policies of the EU. In their coordination with Israel, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania neglected the most important principle of EU foreign policy coordination in taking a fixed position without consulting with the other member states. Instead the consulted with Israel and as a consequence blocked the machinery of EU foreign policy making an action by the EU itself impossible.

Secondly, the motives behind Hungary's action in the FAC indicate to be influenced by the fact that it was the U.S. act the EU position was supposed to condemn. Therefore, U.S. adoption of the Israeli foreign policy goal to achieve recognition for Jerusalem as its capital was aiding Israel's enterprise to block the EU condemnation of it. This is underlined by the statement of an EU diplomat. As in the first case, members of the V4 played an integral role in Israel's aim, show the mid-term alliance Israel has cultivated with the V4 to interfere in EU foreign policy. This makes it more likely that the EU will encounter difficulties to position itself towards the Israeli-Arab Conflict in future, since the divergences between the member states are becoming more pronounced. Especially regarding the status of Jerusalem or the designation of settlement goods, the EU is likely to encounter heavy opposition by members of the V4 in the FAC. Additionally, it is distinctly likely that the Israeli government will also in the future try to capitalize on those differences and has found fruitful allies in members of the V4. Therefore my thesis clearly shows that EU foreign policy can be influenced from the outside.

Additionally, the role the U.S. played also could lead to possible problems in other fields of EU foreign policy. Regarding for example the EU strategy towards Iran, which the U.S. and Israel oppose. There already signs that overlapping interest between Poland and the U.S. could in the future also create problems for the EU concerning this issue. Poland hosted the February 2019 Warsaw Conference or so-called US-led Middle Eastern conference in Warsaw, which was considered to be controversial by the major EU states as it served to propagate the U.S. strategy towards Iran. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom judged it as an attempt to form an Anti-Iran alliance in opposition to the European strategy, which is centered around the Iran Nuclear Deal. Therefore, they refrained from sending their top diplomats. UK Foreign Secretary Jeremy left the conference early, while Germany only sent its Junior Foreign Minister, and France relied on sending a civil servant. Furthermore, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini abstained as well. (The Guardian, 2019)

Poland not only hosted this from EU side controversially perceived conference, but also voiced stances contrasting the common EU position. Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz announced in a statement that while his country supported the EU's efforts to maintain the nuclear deal, the agreement "does not stop Iran from activities destabilizing the region" and he hoped the conference would bring closer the EU and U.S. positions (Reuters, 2019). Even though, Poland has not yet opposed EU strategy concerning Iran, it could start to actively oppose it, if relations between the EU and Poland worsen, or the U.S. increases its pressures on Poland based on defence cooperation. Therefore the subject of third state interference with EU foreign policy should not only receive more scholarly attention, but also the EU should try to find a strategy overcoming this issue.

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