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Introduction

The early 1990s remain remembered in history for bitter inter-ethnic wars between states of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its annihilation. Many stressed that it was the most horrific genocide since Second World War. After years of mass executions and massacres whose perpetrators were different ethnic groups on the territory of former Yugoslavia, newly created states were left with weak economies and even weaker national identities. They had the same language, no country flags, no national anthems and the borders were still pretty much blurred which resulted in disputes that are still present.

Volcic (2008) states that these new nation-states had to involve in a specific type of a nationidentity production since few of the republics had the historical experience of being an independent nation-state. Also, all of the countries aimed to rebrand the war image in order to attract foreign investors and tourists. As Kaneva (2012) argues, in order to do that, countries had to implement 'Nation Branding' techniques to articulate a new image for external consumption and, at the same time, to revive national pride at home.

Place branding of former Yugoslav countries has been widely studied by many scholars. They intensively analyzed and described how all of the countries are depicting their untouched nature, cultural heritage, food and folklore in order to show another side of Balkan history.

However, the political dimension of nation branding among former countries has somehow been neglected, even though analyzing political framing should have equal priority since all of the countries have used intense propaganda campaigns in the past. Additionally, few scholars point out that public diplomacy is 'the branding technique of politicians' which adds upon the claim that public diplomacy and its' framing techniques became a vital factor of nation branding.

(Lewis, as cited in Szondi, 2008).

Therefore, this research aims to analyze how all of the former countries (including partly recognized Kosovo) implement nation branding techniques in public diplomacy. In other words, how diplomatic institutions are trying to brand their nations and sell their newly-created reputation to the rest of the world. It is essential to examine the governmental use of nation branding communication strategies, especially in the post-communist and post-war countries because of its tendency to turn into, how some scholars name it, “a tool for soft nationalism”. (Jodran, 2013) Thus, former Yugoslav countries may serve as a good example of nation branding strategies which are used on a diplomatic level.

Conflicts in Yugoslavia and present relationship between former countries In order to explain how nation branding of former Yugoslav countries is expected to be implemented in public diplomacy communication strategies, it is inevitable to give a brief overview of the historical background and explain relationships between former Yugoslav countries.

Hoare (2007) explains that history of conflicts dates back to when Nazi Germany conquered Yugoslavia in 1941 and established the ‘Independent State of Croatia’ (NDH). The military of the fascist NDH consisted of two forces, the regular army and Ustasha. Their primary task was internal repression. Approximately 300,000 Serbs were murdered in the genocide as well as at least 30,000 Jews and a similar number of Roma. Torture, brutality, and inhumanity of the genocide (victims were killed with ‘hammers, picks, rifle butts, and knives; they had their ears, noses, sexual organs, and fingers cut off, their eyes gouged out, their hair, beards and eyebrows ripped out and stuffed in their mouths) and the multitudes of victims, is documented in detail. The concentration camp ‘Jasenovac’ in Croatia is still one of the major key points of the present dispute between Serbia and Croatia. It is often referred to Croatian officials and civilians as

Ustashes when a dispute with Serbia arises. Nevertheless, Croats are often accused of not paying respect to Serbian victims who lost their lives in this genocide.

During the break-up of former Yugoslavia, Serbia was involved in four wars. After a short conflict in Slovenia in 1991, it was during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia from 1991/1992 to 1995, as well as in Serbia's then province of Kosovo in 1998/1999, that mass war crime was committed. (As cited in Golcevski, N., von Engelhardt, J., & Boomgaarden, H. G., 2013) In both Serbia and Croatia nationalistic politicians and civilians are still involved in controversy regarding: 1) 'Vukovar massacre', where approximately 300 Croats were murdered by Yugoslav Army whose majority were Serbs, and also 2) 'Operation Storm' which was counterattack from Croatian army where more than a thousand ethnic Serbs were killed and around 200 000 ethnic Serbs had to depart from the country. In Croatia the day of Operation Storm is being celebrated and in Croatian media it is often referred to it as "peace-bringing" operation, which causes intense disputes between countries.

As Golcevski et al. (2013) stressed it is not questionable whether persecution on an ethnic and/or religious basis, illegal detention, forced 'disappearances', torture, rape, murder and other crimes against humanity were committed by all sides involved in the conflicts, and that many of these atrocities, including "Srebrenica" genocide in whose victims were more than 8000 Bosniaks, were committed by Serbian forces. In response, as early as 1993, the United Nations Security Council founded the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

With each trial that takes place in ICTY the disputes between former war countries start to arise. By this time the court has mostly sentenced Serbian war criminals while not many war leaders from Croatia and Bosnia were prosecuted. Arguably, this is one of the reasons which triggers disputes between former countries. Hence, despite the fact that countries are diplomatically accentuating that the reconciliation officially happened, it is expected that war crimes from the

past will guide their present relationships and that when a conflict occurs attitudes toward significant others which date back to 1990s will come to the surface.

Not long after former states gained autonomy and sovereignty as independent, it was required that all of them create systems which would be established on democratic principles. Therefore, in the following years all of the countries involved in democracy building and implemented nation branding strategies in different sectors with an aim to represent themselves as democratic societies. Also, since ICTY took over jurisdiction for war crimes which occurred in former Yugoslavia, all states involved in war crimes were obliged to surrender individuals responsible for crimes against humanity and genocide initiators. As previously mentioned, the war crimes dispute is still present between countries and emerges in media of conflicted countries with each trial for war crimes perpetrators.

Hence, Bjelakovic (2002) argues that the priorities of core Yugoslav successor states' governments (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) are dealing with complex and difficult economic and social realities where also the issue of war crimes comes to the fore as a paradox: this issue is politically more divisive than any economic or social policy dilemma. The consequence is that imperatives of stability within each of these countries precede interest in reconciliation, at the same time when the imperative of institution-building precedes the interest in the rule of law. As he further stresses this is perhaps why on these issues of economic and social nature, such as the freedom of movement and return of property, the governments and societies of the core Yugoslav successor states have achieved domestic consensus. Consequently, as examined discourse indicates visible differences in these societies do exist only on the issue of war crimes.

Furthermore, as Sancin (2010) argued, certain conflicts regarding territory sovereignty remained unsolved until today and these are the main reason for recent disagreements between former

Yugoslav countries. A decade of negotiations to resolve the territorial dispute between Slovenia and Croatia led to drafting in 2001 of the 'Treaty between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia on the Common State Border', which is also known as 'the Drnovsek-Racan agreement'. This agreement was however only initiated. While Slovenia was willing to sign it, Croatia refused to do so and years of further negotiations and third-party assistance were necessary before a new treaty, the 'Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia', or so-called 'Pahor-Kosor agreement', could be concluded with the aim to finally resolve this long-standing dispute.

Another, perhaps more intense negotiation is led for Serbia's southern autonomous province Kosovo, where Kosovo Albanians self-proclaimed independence of the territory in 2008 and whose legality Serbia refused. However, some of the countries supported the autonomy of the country, which still has only a partial-recognition.

Scholars point out that the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo is not nearly leading to solving of the crucial issues. Guzina (2014) argues that at the moment there are incompatible goals and interests which allow progress in the high-level dialogues. On the Serbian side, the government can portray the decentralized power-sharing in the north as a way to maintain ties with the Kosovar Serb population, thus arguing that Serbia has not "given up" on them. At the same time, the agreement leaves the issue of recognition unsettled in the short term.

Similarly, Graan (2013) explains how Macedonia experienced an armed conflict in 2001, during which ethnic Albanian insurgents and the ethnic Macedonian-dominated state security forces clashed. He argues that during the conflict main question was whether Macedonia could house a multiethnic state project. Fortunately, the conflict did not escalate and a peace treaty was reached that strengthened Macedonia's power-sharing structures. As he further argues, political

competition remains over how to square ethnic Macedonian dominance in the country with ethnic Albanian claims to inclusion and distinction. (Graan,2013)

Thus, it is expected that public diplomacy communication of all of the countries will emphasize the progress made in reconciliation and cooperation of countries as well as good neighborly relations. On the other hand, due to tragic common history, with not completely solved crimes of enormous proportions, we also expect to find negative attitudes towards former rival countries and signs of victimization when it comes to ongoing issues.

Building National Identity

National identity is a complex phenomenon but most of the definitions can be summed up to what scholars define as human population sharing a historical territory and culture, myths of origin, common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members of the collectivity. (Smith, 1992) However, some authors stress that the concept of identity loses all analytical power when it is used to explain the political and military conflicts in former Yugoslavia. (Wodak et al, 1999) What is emphasized in the literature by many scholars is that identity politics is always and necessarily used to create a difference. (Smith, 1992) This further implies that in order to create their unique identities, countries have to emphasize what makes them different from others. After the turbulent collapse of Yugoslavia and a countless number of massacres and war crimes that affected each of former ethnic countries, all of them, including Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia, sought to create a distinguished national identity and rebrand the 'war country' image. One would ask how people of the same origin and history can create distinguished national identities, cultures or even languages? As already mentioned, scholars stress that nations cannot be built regardless of their neighbors or opponents.

One of those scholars is Triandafyllidou (1998) who argues that the identity of a nation is defined or re-defined through the influence of 'significant others', which means other nations or ethnic groups which are perceived to threaten the nation, its distinctiveness, authenticity and/or independence. She conducted a case-study focusing on Greece and Macedonia and their conflicted identities. In this study, she proves that the existence of "significant others" influences the nation in defining and redefining of national identity.

This can be applied to former Yugoslav countries which are trying to emphasize qualities of their countries that their "significant others" lack. Former Yugoslav states have attempted to position themselves on the global map while seeking to create a distinctive 'brand' national identity.

"Former Yugoslavia on the World Wide Web" draws upon a textual analysis of official governmental websites during 2005 and 2006 and explores how these former Yugoslav states use the Internet to create and represent self-images for the world as well as how they frame their nations as a brand that they promote and sell to foreign investors and tourists. The websites yielded two characteristics that are present online when it comes to former Yugoslav states. First, the construction of a national imaginary after the violent collapse of Yugoslavia and second, the characteristics and extent to which the Internet helps to frame national identity. (Volcic, 2008)

This leads us to the concept of "Nation Branding" which is most often used to distinguish and promote different national identities and values.

Nation Branding

Fan (2009) states that the relationship between national identity, nation branding, and a nation's image can be summarized as:

National identity → Nation branding → Nation's image.

He distinguishes national identity which he sees as "a sense of belonging" or a set of characteristics of a nation that its people perceive to be central, distinctive, and enduring in a nation when past, present, and future is taken into account, from nation branding which he describes as altering the image that outside people hold about the nation. Nation branding, in essence, is seen to align the nation's image to the reality. He finds it to be imperative for those countries that have undertaken dramatic changes in their political, economic and social systems, as the external images are almost always lag behind the reality. (Fan, 2009)

In 'Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice', the author Dinnie (2008) describes nation-brand as the "unique, multi-dimensional blend of elements that provide the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences". He investigated the relevance of nation branding in terms of what value a nation-brand strategy can deliver to a country, as well as tracing the evolution of nation branding and outlining the prominence, which it has achieved in recent years. As an example he takes the country case insight which illustrates how South Africa has set about developing its nation-brand through the activities of the International Marketing Council of South Africa, whose strategic objective is to establish a compelling brand image for the country and to position it favorably in order to attract trade, tourism and investment. (Dinnie, 2008)

Thus, all of the former states have employed branding campaigns, mostly with a focus on place branding, in order to enhance tourism and make foreigners familiar with beauties of nature and culture these countries have to offer rather than war images. Nevertheless, Volcic (2008) states that all of the former Yugoslav states have ambitious plans to enhance their global recognition and attract foreign tourists. 'Catchy slogans such as Serbia's The Guardians of Time; Macedonia's Come to Macedonia and Your Heart Will Remain Here; Slovenia's On the Sunny

Side of the Alps; 8 Croatia's the Mediterranean as it Once Was; Montenegro's The Pearl of the Mediterranean; or Bosnia's Old Europe are commonly used.'

Nation Branding in Post-Communist countries

The vast majority of studies have analyzed how post-communist and post-war countries are implementing nation branding strategies and how they are rebranding the image of war and terror in that area. Many types of research stress that nation branding in post-communist countries tends to turn into nationalism. This claim was one of the main points in 'Nation Branding: A tool for Nationalism?' where the author Jodran (2013) tries to answer what images of the nation do branders seek to promote, who is this image for and whether nation branding is a more palatable version of nationalism. He focuses especially on the case of Estonia, which was the first Former Soviet Republic to launch a nation branding project and, even more controversially, it was managed by a British-based company, Interbrand.

Estonia serves as an example where the line between nation branding and nationalism is very much blurred. The development of Brand Estonia propagated that Estonia is a European or Nordic country and was an attempt of some nationalist politicians of the time to make a distance from the Soviet Union. The elite-level interviews conducted with politicians highlighted the importance of nation building as well as image building of Estonia as a non-communist country. As Jordan states this suggests that in this case nation branding was a tool for soft nationalism. This is mostly due to the fact that governments hire private firms to develop and propagate their national brand. (Jordan, 2013)

In "Branding Post-Communist Nations" Kaneva (2012) describes how nation branding is implemented in the post-communist environment and how national identities are recreated after communism and established in newborn countries. She considers that the "transition" of post-

communist countries from state command economies to free-market ones, and from authoritarian one-party systems to liberal democracies are responsible for the set of challenges that can lead nation branding to intertwine nationalism with globalization.

The reasoning behind rising concerns on nation branding of former communist countries such as those emerged after the collapse of Yugoslavia happened, is as Rupnik (1996) explains, due to the well-known characteristic of post-communist countries where nationalism in the region tends to "reawaken". He points to three primary causes for the return of nationalism to post-communist Europe and those are the end of the Cold War and the transformation of the international system; the ideological vacuum after communism; the economy, caught between globalism and the decomposition of systems.

In addition, Melissa Aronczyk (2008) claims that nation branding is an updated form of nationalism, thus considering that nation branding extends the nationalistic discourse where the nation-state is considered to be a necessary frame of identity, allegiance, and affiliation. In the case of post-communist former Yugoslav countries, it can be said that they are still in seeking of their national identities and it is not sure whether their nation branding can turn into a "tool for nationalism". (Jordan, 2013)

However, the literature suggests in which purposes former Yugoslav countries are implementing nation branding. Some examples are given by Hall (2002) who claims that Croatia and Slovenia tried to distance themselves from any connection with the Balkans. Slovenia is aiming to reinforce the image of Western/civilized Europe by emphasizing the Central European character, Habsburg heritage, Alpine associations and contiguity with Austria and Italy- "disengagement from any 'Balkan' connotations. Similarly, in the case of Croatia that was Austro-Hungarian and thus Roman Catholic as well, the most vital part of distinguishing itself from its war opponent

and neighbor Serbia, was establishing nation branding campaign which would differentiate the country from its neighbors and emphasize advantages through the country's major tourism attributes. (Hall, 2002)

On the other hand, he also explains that while some countries use heritage as a tool of modernization and reconstruction others see it as a tool for reinforcing an exclusive national or ethnic identity. As such case, Serbia has employed heritage as a tool for nation-building in their promotional campaign 'Serbia: Landscape painted from the heart'. What Hall notices is that the images of the "landscape" showed only Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries, while erasing images of minority Muslim and Catholic groups that represented one-third of the total population at the time. (Hall, 2002)

There are other cases that caught the attention of scholars as well. For example, Volcic and Andrejevic (2011) take a former Yugoslav state, Slovenia, which because of its position as relatively new ("start-up") European nation, and in part because of its attempt to develop local economy and gain entry to the European Union, embarked on some kind of publicly financed branding campaign. They claim in "Nation Branding in the Era of Commercial Nationalism" that Slovenes continue to be obsessed with their nation image even after 18 years of independence. The survey conducted in 2006 showed that Slovenes are concerned for Slovenia being confused with Slovakia by other European countries. Therefore, the main goal of Slovenia was to become more recognizable in the West which resulted in a state-sponsored nation branding campaign with a slogan in English "I feel *Slovenia*" (with an emphasized "love" in the name). They claim that nation branding is not post-political due to the fact that nationalism is used to sell a range of cultural products and build brand loyalty. In other words, nation branding often reflects politics in sales and marketing promotions. "In the example of Slovenia, nation branding represented a shift from official, state propaganda to reliance on a commercial campaign (and the private-

public partnership that develops it) for building a sense of national identity both at home and abroad. As the private sector embraces the commercial power of nationalism to address anxieties over the fate of the nation in an era of globalization, the state embraces some of the strategies of marketers.” (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011)

Slovenia is not the only among former Yugoslav states that launched an aggressive tourist campaign. Similarly, Montenegro proclaims itself to be ‘the pearl of the Mediterranean, unique in many ways – ‘There is nowhere else that you can find, in such a small place, so much natural wealth, beauty, mild beaches, clear lakes, fast rivers, and gorgeous mountains – except in Montenegro.’ (Volcic, 2008). Croatian tourism also focuses on the ‘freshness’ of Croatia – of its sea, people, food, cuisine, and culture – ‘Croatia is indeed unique, not only for its crystal clear, clean blue sea but also for a thousand years of different cultures.’ (Volcic, 2008) Similarly, Macedonian government officials have contracted advertising and marketing firms to promote Macedonia abroad. Targeted to select audiences in Europe and the North America, government-sponsored campaigns such as “Invest in Macedonia” and “Macedonia Timeless” celebrated Macedonia as a land of business opportunity and tourist delight through advertisements in the likes of the Wall Street Journal and Financial Times, and on CNN International. (Graan, 2013)

While place branding studies focus on promoting specific economic interests (export, tourism or inward investment), nation branding is concerned with a country's whole image on the international stage covering political, economic and cultural dimensions (as cited in Fan, 2010). Recently, scholars started to discuss whether public diplomacy is one of the branches of nation branding. However, there is a lack of research on this topic, especially regarding case studies, where this research aims to contribute to the literature and fill in the existing gap.

Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy

Rather than branding a country as a touristic attraction, scholars suggest that nation branding is often used in the field of politics and diplomacy.

Nation branding campaigns are enlisted by the state to address a whole range of issues related to public diplomacy and economic development. (Volcic&Andrejevic, 2011)

As Kaneva (2011) sees it, in the past decade the term nation branding has gained popularity in business, policy and intellectual circles. Under the pressures of globalization, numerous countries have invested in branding efforts in the hopes of producing images that point to a future of new possibilities. Also, Fan (2005) implies that the origin of nation branding can be traced to four different sources. Those are country of origin, place or destination branding, national identity and more recently, public diplomacy.

Nevertheless, Szondi (2008) defines public diplomacy as government communication aimed at foreign audiences to achieve changes in the 'hearts or minds' of the people. Public diplomacy, however, can also refer to the domestic public in two ways: either as the domestic input from citizens for foreign policy formulation (engaging approach), or explaining foreign policy goals and diplomacy to the domestic public (explaining approach). Furthermore, he indicates that there are 5 different views identified as far as the relationship between nation branding and public diplomacy is concerned. According to the first one, these concepts are unrelated and do not share any common grounds. In other views, however, these concepts are related and it is possible to identify different degrees of integration between public diplomacy and nation branding. In the final version, the concepts are exactly the same, public diplomacy and nation branding are synonyms for the same concept. (Szondi, 2008) The possible relationships are visualized in Figure 1.

Even though some authors see terminology of 'Nation Branding' and 'Public Diplomacy' to be distinct, nation branding can be used as a tool of public diplomacy. Nation branding uses the tools of branding to alter or change the behavior, attitudes, identity or image of a nation in a positive way. Similarly, nation branding occurs when a government or a private company uses its power to persuade whoever has the ability to change a nation's image. Therefore, we can say that nation branding and public diplomacy are not so distinct after all. The author dismisses the popular idea that nation branding is a process to brand a nation, arguing that nations or their governments cannot be branded per se; however, governments and other public institutions can use the techniques of branding. (as cited in Szondi, 2008)

Also, Szondi (2008) argues that government's role in communicating with foreign publics is crucial as foreign policy priorities can change with the change of government and public diplomacy can easily boil down to promoting a government (and its foreign policy) abroad rather than promoting the country and its interests.

Golan (2013) identifies three layers of public diplomacy:

1. the short-to medium-termed mediated public diplomacy
2. the medium-to long-termed nation branding and country reputation,
3. and the long-termed relational public diplomacy that is based on soft power programs

(see Figure 2).

While each element of integrated public diplomacy differs on the basis of its stakeholder engagement goals, it is only through the integration of all three that governments are likely to produce positive long-term engagement outcomes. The second layer of his division is specifically out of interest for this research. This theory above all proves that nation branding is, in fact, part of public diplomacy. (Golan, 2013)

The embrace of nation branding treats issues of international relations and public diplomacy as amenable to strategies for brand management. As van Ham puts, “Creating a brand is not only economically desirable, it has considerable political and strategic implications”. When politicians refer to “branding” the United States for Middle Eastern audiences, for example, they are not as concerned with direct forms of consumption (such as encouraging tourism) as with positive public relations. (As cited in Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011)

Nation branding consultants mobilize the mystical marketing notion that a brand identity might be separable from actual “product” attributes—that, in other words, successful marketing spin might eclipse the effects of past policies. The language of nation branding translates non-economic or only indirectly economic goals into the logic of the marketplace; diplomacy is seen to be reliant on an appropriate marketing strategy (rather than as an adjustment of the “product” itself). The result is a blurred distinction between political public relations and commercial brand management. (As cited in Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011)

Framing in Public Diplomacy

Framing theory has been widely studied in communication research because of the influence it has on its auditorium. One of the most appreciated framing theory researchers, Entman (1993) emphasized that framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. As he explains, frames then define problems determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes-identify the forces creating the problem; make moral

judgments-evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies-offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects. (Entman, 1993)

Chong & Druckman (2007) further argue that “framing effects” occur when (often small) changes in the presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion. Moreover, Sheafers & Gabay (2009) perceive agenda and frame building as strategic actions by national actors who try to promote their own agenda and frames in order to influence the international policy to their advantage raise two main issues. First, the success of one actor in promoting its agenda and framing in foreign media is a function of the cultural and political congruency between itself and the targeted country. Second, the competition over the media involves not only a contest between two national rivals but is a much more diverse environment than perceived in previous studies, in which local governments and the media as independent actors play an important role. Nevertheless, the findings show a strong correlation between the agendas of a country's government and its media.

Thus, we can argue that framing intentionally manipulates true facts and when used as a tool of diplomatic corps, media framing can have ominous consequences. Eventually, through traditional media or public diplomacy and their channels of communication, the perception of public opinion will be influenced.

Victimization of a Nation in post-conflict Yugoslavia

As scholars suggest victimization through media can have drastically negative outcomes, which has happened many times in recent history.

For example, Hadzic (2004) argues that in former Yugoslavia a process of self-victimization of ethnicity or nation through gendered nationalist-racist stories of rape, was creating a pre-war discourse apt to mobilize the population which has drastically stimulated the formation of ethnic

conflicts and substantially contributed to various extremely violent “solutions”. These processes culminated in a real rivalry between different ethnic groups over who is going to acquire the status of a victim and who will prevail as a greater victim.

He also states that this strategy was not an invention of the late 20th century Europe. Already in Nazi-socialist Germany in the 1930s, Hitler’s approach to “German suffering” after the Great War was a crucial feature in forming a collective German victim identity. Victims’ discourses and images were/are also central to preoccupations with national identity in Poland, Russia, Romania and elsewhere. He also considers that these processes and discourses were later transferred and translated into postwar societies and that they exist even today and maintain old sentiments, myths and fantasies within the newly founded political bodies. They remain a mobilizing source for ethnic and racist forces in some segments of civil society. (Hadzic, 2004) Similarly, Nikolic-Ristanovic (2003) stresses that in all wars in the former Yugoslavia, the victimization was widespread, and as such, it referred to the majority of the population, regardless of ethnical affiliation. Also, the victimization was brutal, with serious and long-term consequences, and multiple. In other words, the majority of the population experienced several forms of the victimization.

Obradovic (2016) describes, that the narrative around Kosovo has established a Serbian ‘essence’ emphasizing the co-existence of victimhood and resilience. The ‘heroic martyrdom’ mentality rooted in the charter grounds most of the politician speeches analyzed, becomes an essential point of collective continuity, which constrains the rhetoric strategies available to political speakers. This discourse, in turn, is not limited to the persuasive language of politicians but is visible in broader context. Consequently, it is expected that because of the long history of victimization in war, public diplomacy will use the same strategies when it comes to reporting on recent conflicts.

Research Questions and Hypothesis

Even though vast of literature suggests that nations are using place branding techniques in order to attract foreign investors and tourists or simply to create a self-image for the rest of the world, a few scholars emphasized that public diplomacy is the field where nation branding can be implemented in different purposes. Thus, in the case of former Yugoslav countries it is necessary to analyze public diplomacy communication strategies and question how nation branding is used not just as a remedy for distorted image of a country as a touristic destination, but rather as a tool used in political purposes. Therefore, the main question this research aims to answer is:

RQ – How are countries and their “significant others” represented in public diplomacy as a part of their nation branding?

The first hypothesis can be derived from key diplomatic aims and nation branding strategies of governmental institutions. As discussed in the literature, nation branding is used in public diplomacy with an aim to create a positive image of the country and enhance public relations with other countries. Thus, the hypothesis bellow was formulated:

H1 – When reporting on cooperation between countries, the country will present itself as a peace-maker, promoting the strengthening of regional cooperation and friendly neighborly relations.

Further two hypotheses are connected to conflicts which still appear between former Yugoslav countries. Based on their political history there is an assumption on how these conflicts will be framed and how the countries will portray themselves and their significant others. Firstly, since

post-war countries are obliged to rebuild democracy and obey international laws and agreements with countries they waged war with, most likely when a conflict occurs countries will refer to how their significant others are failing to obey these laws and agreements, Secondly, since victimization was present throughout the history of Yugoslav conflicts it is expected to find similar patterns in framing of diplomatic press releases.

H2 – When reporting on a conflict between countries, the “significant other” will be referred to as violating laws, democracy, agreements, security or sovereignty of the country and destabilizing regional cooperation and good neighborly relations.

H3 – When reporting on a conflict between countries, the country will position itself as a victim of “significant other” and their injustice.

Methodology

The hypotheses were tested using Quantitative Content Analysis. In order to understand how “significant others” are present in public diplomacy branding strategies, a sample of press releases and statements published in 2018 on websites of Ministries of Foreign Affairs of all former Yugoslav countries were analyzed. This applies for websites of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia as well as partly-recognized Kosovo. Thus, out of 336 analyzed units, 45 were taken from Serbian MFA website, 61 from Croatian, 33 from Montenegrin, 37 from Macedonian, 47 from Bosnian, 41 from Slovenian and 73 from Kosovar online platform. The criterion for statements (press releases) to be chosen was based on whether the statement deals with the country whose website is being analyzed and its significant other. Press releases which were based on cooperation or conflicts with countries other than former Yugoslav countries were not taken into consideration. The collected sample was further

coded by two coders, both political science and journalism graduates. Previous to analysis, the coder was briefed and provided with a Codebook. The pre-test, consisting of 10 press releases from 2017, was conducted in order to improve Codebook questions and so that the better understanding and reliability are achieved.

Intercoder Reliability

In order to test whether the consensus is achieved between coders Krippendorff's alpha (α) was used as most applicable for content analysis and in order to question is how much the resulting data can be trusted. Krippendorff's alpha (α) is a reliability coefficient developed to measure the agreement among observers or coders, drawing distinctions among typically unstructured phenomena and assigning computable values to them. (Krippendorff, 1993)

The reasoning behind choosing Krippendorff's alpha is that it satisfies all of the disadvantages present in other types of reliability measurements. Furthermore, it can be applicable for nominal data and it defines the two reliability scale points as 1.000 for perfect reliability and 0.000 for the absence of reliability. Unfortunately, Krippendorff's alpha cannot be calculated by popular statistical packages used in the social sciences. As described, the remedy to this situation is a macro written for SPSS and SAS that computes Krippendorff's alpha. (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007) Using SPSS macro (KALPHA) Krippendorff's alpha was calculated.

The Codebook consists of three concepts which are used to develop questions that would test the hypotheses. Bellow written concepts were used to test the hypotheses:

Rebranding the Nation – Peace Building. The first concept of the analysis consisted of 8 questions which were testing whether the statement describes or mentions peace building terms

such as solving issues efficiently (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .887$), progress in cooperation of countries (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .981$), good bilateral cooperation (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .997$), good neighborly relations (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .972$), good economic cooperation (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .921$), satisfaction of the country with politics of significant other (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .901$), support for political decisions such as joining EU or NATO (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .748$), promoting peacebuilding and democracy (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .862$) etc. Most importantly, these questions were referred to the key question which was: Does the unit of analysis deal with cooperation of countries? However, questions referred to conflicts were also taken into consideration, but expectedly weren't related to articles where it was reported on cooperation.

Framing the Enemy. The second concept was testing how the country reported on significant other in a conflict. The emphasis was put on whether the country condemned the act (Krippendorff's $\alpha = 1$), accused significant other of provocation (Krippendorff's $\alpha = 1$) and violation of laws, sovereignty and security (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .978$), as well as if significant other was accused of destabilizing regional cooperation and neighborly relations (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .987$). Also, it was beneficial to analyze whether the country took certain sanctions against their significant other (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .950$).

Victimization. Due to the tendency of post-conflict societies to remain committed to victimization of an entity or a nation, the third concept was developed. The questions were referred to reporting on conflicts and tested how the country presented itself in these disputes. Some of the questions, used tested whether it was mentioned or described that the country suffered due to the injustice of significant other (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .997$), or whether the country emphasized that it was a victim in a conflict (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .987$). Furthermore, it was analyzed whether countries are comparing present conflicts to war crimes from the past where their country and people suffered because of significant other (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .968$) or if they

call on NATO, EU members and other peace-building international institutions to condemn the act (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .979$).

The analyzed units were paragraphs of press releases/statements. However, in order to correctly code the units, the entire press release was taken into consideration. This means, if the key word was not mentioned in the paragraph but was mentioned elsewhere in the text, the paragraph was coded based on the entire article. The inter-coder reliability for the bellow mentioned key variables was significant.

“Does the Unit of Analysis deal with cooperation of countries” (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .985$) was important to analyze in order to learn about branding strategies of governmental level websites and also to question which sentences will be used when talking about cooperation. Furthermore, additional insights could be acknowledged regarding current relationships between former Yugoslav countries. Thus, it was noticed that most countries framed their relationship with significant other as cooperation, in order to brand themselves as democratic countries eager to enhance cooperation and relationships with other countries. However, countries which still have major disputes regarding sovereignty, borders, war crimes from past etc. avoided reporting on their significant others regarding cooperation. Certainly, this was because of the fact that the level of cooperation between these countries is at low level. Also, it was crucial to test this variable in a relation to next set of variables:

Progress in cooperation of countries (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .981$) was one of the most repetitive terms when the article dealt with cooperation with significant other. Not surprisingly, since most of the countries must keep up with international agreements which require former Yugoslav countries to intensify dialogues and come to solutions in overcoming disputes. Similarly, good neighborly relations of countries (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .972$) were also used as a representation of country's aim to rebrand its' war picture and create a new picture of stable relations in Balkans.

In addition, promoting peace building and democracy (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .862$) was one of the key variables which aimed to test how countries are branding themselves with regard to violent past. Since all of the countries were more or less affected with wars and violence, the main emphasis was put on building peace and democracy as the main value of the country. Nevertheless, this research aimed to analyze whether conflicts between officials or civilians or/and issues regarding borders, arbitration, sovereignty, war crimes or other acts (Krippendorff's $\alpha = 1$) still occur between countries and how these are framed in context of accusation of significant other and victimization of the country. As it will be presented in results, accusing significant other for destabilizing regional cooperation and neighborly relations (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .987$) appeared in very high percentage. This is mostly due to the fact that general public is familiar with unstable situation in the region. Thus, the countries are trying to frame conflicts in their advantage. One of the ways how they do it is with accusing significant other of violating laws/democracy/agreements/security/sovereignty (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .978$). As mentioned, countries are obliged to obey international agreements and laws in order to avoid potential repeating of past. It was also of great value to test whether the country positions itself or its people as victims (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .987$) because victimization has a long history in Balkans and it is likely that it is still used to manipulate the picture general public has about enemies and victims in this region. Therefore, it was often referred that the significant other or its people were unjust towards the country or its people (Krippendorff's $\alpha = .994$)

Results

Out of the sample which consisted of 336 units of analysis, 203 were dealing with cooperation between countries whereas 133 were referred to present conflicts between former Yugoslav

countries. The analysis yielded a high number of cooperation units between former Yugoslav states, especially Bosnia and Slovenia, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 26.417, p < .000$, Serbia and Bosnia, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 35.801, p < .000$ and Serbia and Montenegro, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 19.684, p < .000$. However, certain relations such as the relations of Serbia and Croatia, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 13.335, p < .000$, Serbia and Kosovo $X^2(1, N = 336) = 94.521, p < .000$ Croatia and Slovenia $X^2(1, N = 336) = .906, p < .000$ and Bosnia and Kosovo $X^2(1, N = 336) = .255, p < .000$ showed significantly relevant number of conflict units. The most contrasting relations are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Crosstabulation of Cooperation and Conflicts within Former Yugoslav countries

	Bosnia and Slovenia	Serbia and Bosnia	Serbia and MNE	Serbia Croatia	Serbia Kosovo	Croatia and Slovenia	Bosnia and Kosovo
Cooperation	36	47	40	23	20	19	20
Conflict	0	0	0	36	74	17	12

Bellow presented results are sorted by analysis of frames which test proposed hypotheses:

Frame: Rebranding the nation and peace-building

H1 – When the article deals with cooperation between countries, the country will present itself as a peace-maker, promoting the strengthening of regional cooperation and friendly neighborly relations.

Table 2

Crosstabulation of Cooperation Units with Peace Building Frame

	Progress	Good neighbor	Good economy	Good bilateral	Peace building	Solving issues	Satisfaction
Cooperation	94.1	93.1	98.5	95.4	97.5	59.6	77.8
Conflict	3.0	0.0	2.9	1.7	3.0	0.7	0

Note: Cell entries are percentages of Peace Building Frame within Cooperation Units

The Crosstabulation analysis (Table 2) was conducted to test the frame “Rebranding the Nation - Peace Building” which was used to test Hypothesis 1. From the results we can see that in 94.1% of cases there was a “Progress in cooperation of countries” mentioned when the unit of analysis dealt with cooperation between countries, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 270.096, p < .000$.

Furthermore, when the unit of analysis dealt with cooperation between countries in 93.1% cases “Good neighborly relations” were mentioned or described, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 278.481, p < .000$.

The same applies for good bilateral relations, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 213.514, p < .000$, and good economic cooperation, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 269.195, p < .000$. Also, the units of analysis were “Promoting peace building and democracy” in 97.5% of cases when they dealt with cooperation between countries, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 115.714, p < .000$. Nevertheless, 59.6% of time in cooperation units it was emphasized that the issues are being solved efficiently, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 96.516, p < .000$, and that the country is satisfied with the politics of significant others, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 165.511, p < .000$.

The presented key variables correlated with high percentage which means that when unit of analysis was coded as cooperation between countries the other key variables were also coded, thus the first hypothesis was confirmed.

Frame: The Enemy

H2 – When reporting on a conflict between countries, the “significant other” will be referred to as violating laws, democracy, agreements, security or sovereignty of the country and destabilizing regional cooperation and good neighborly relations.

Table 3

Crosstabulation of Conflict Units with The Enemy Frame

	Condemning	Provocation	Violation	Destabilization	Sanctions
Cooperation	0	0	0	0	0
Conflict	100	91.8	96.3	93.3	37.3

– Note: Cell entries are percentages of The Enemy Frame within Conflict Units

Out of the sample of 336 units of analysis, 134 referred to conflicts. Thus, the second frame “Framing the Enemy” was prone to be measured. (Table 3)

When the unit of analysis reported on a present conflict between officials or civilians or/and issues regarding borders, arbitration, sovereignty, war crimes or other acts, the country would condemn the act of significant other in 100% of cases, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 300.100, p < .000$. Also,

significant other would be accused of provocation 91.8% of time, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 278.481$, $p<.000$, and of destabilizing regional cooperation and neighborly relations, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 300.064$, $p<.000$, in 93.3% of time. The same applies for “Accusing significant other of violating laws/democracy/agreements/security/sovereignty” which appeared in 96.3% of the cases when the article reported on conflicts, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 315.650$, $p<.000$. However, only 37,3% of time the country would undertake certain actions against significant other, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 22.987$, $p<.000$.

Frame: The Victim

H3 – When reporting on a conflict between countries, the country will position itself as a victim of “significant other” and its’ injustice.

Table 4

Crosstabulation of Conflict Units with The Victim Frame

	Victims	Injustice	Suffering	War crimes	EU/NATO to condemn
Cooperation	0	0	0	2.7	0
Conflict	90.3	94.8	81.2	50.4	61.2

Note: Cell entries are percentages of The Victim Frame within Conflict Units

When referring to conflicts another frame was analyzed to test the third hypothesis and that is

“Victimization” (Table 4). In units of analysis which were coded as conflicts between officials or civilians or/and issues regarding borders, arbitration, sovereignty, war crimes or other acts, the country positioned its people as victims 90.3% of the time, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 285.058^a$, $p < .000$.

Consequently, significant other or its’ people were presented as “unjust towards the country or its’ people” in 94.8% of cases when the unit of analysis was coded as a conflict, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 307.782^a$, $p < .000$. Also, in 81.2% of cases the country would emphasize that it is suffering due to acts of significant other, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 269.421$, $p < .000$. In 50.4% of time the war crimes from past, in which the country and its people suffered, were mentioned or compared to the present conflict, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 74.291$, $p < .000$. Hence, in 61.2% of cases the country would call EU or NATO members, as well as other peace-making institutions to condemn the act of significant other, $X^2(1, N = 336) = 192.946$, $p < .000$.

Finally, since the units of analysis which were coded as conflicts framed country and its’ people as victims and accused significant other of being unjust towards the country and its people, hypothesis three was confirmed.

Discussion

The analysis showed that even though there was a vast number of cooperation articles, almost half of the analysis units dealt with conflicts between countries. More precisely, 134 units were based on conflicts, which is far more than expected. Consequently, we can conclude that even though the countries are trying to create a new image and forget the past, the issues are still flaming between former Yugoslav countries. Most of those disputes were referred to officials and their acts regarding them overtaking arbitration in justice or provoking with statements regarding wars from the past etc.

Hence, this research yielded that, for example, Serbia and Croatia still have a long way in dealing with the past since the conflict articles outnumbered the cooperation articles. Not just that the conflict articles were present, but they also showed presence of mentioning war crimes from the past while comparing them to present conflicts, which further indicates that the countries are implementing nation branding through public diplomacy in such way that the country is branded as a victim of significant other.

Similarly, the ongoing dispute for Kosovo independence between Serbia and Albanian government in Kosovo determined the messages sent through communication channels of public diplomacy, and that is that the dialogue is not close to being peacefully closed. Rather, the record number of conflict articles with negative framing of significant other found between Serbia and Kosovo illustrates that both Serbia and Albanian government seek support from western countries through victimization branding. In addition, most of Kosovo articles dealing with significant others were pointed at Serbia. Thus, it is evident that the strategy of nation branding is implemented so that the contrast from Serbia is made.

Also, as earlier mentioned certain conflicts regarding territory sovereignty between Slovenia and Croatia remained unsolved until today. (Sancin, 2010) In fact, a vast number of conflict articles between countries was dealing with jeopardization of territory sovereignty. As an example, Slovenian decision to fine Croatian fisherman for fishing at the disputed sea boarder resulted in many negatively framed press releases where Slovenia was accused of disobeying the law etc. On the other hand, a significant number of cooperation statements between Serbia and Montenegro which split in 2006 shows that the disputes such as recent separation of language and establishment of Montenegrin as an official language are overcome. Thus, both countries emphasized their democratic ways of solving issues with significant others. Similarly, Serbia and Bosnia yielded mainly positive attitudes and eagerness to rebrand the war image which could be

concluded from their highlighting of good neighborly relations. Also, it was emphasized by both countries that it is taken good care of significant others' society in the country. The reasoning behind could be the fact that wide part of Bosnian territory still belongs to Serbian political entity, Serb Republic, and that a high number of Serbian population still lives in Bosnia. Thus, we can argue that both countries implemented nation branding as a tool to emphasize overcoming of war issues and democratic principles in dealing with the past.

Arguably, based on the results we can conclude that nation branding is present in all of the analyzed countries and their public diplomacy. Firstly, the countries were rebranding their image by emphasizing that their mutual cooperation and relationships are at high level and that issues from the past are being solved efficiently. The nation branding is implemented in almost same patterns in all of the analyzed countries and this can be concluded from how the same phrases were used in all of the cooperation articles. Some of the phrases used were good bilateral relations between countries, good neighborly relations, supporting political decisions of significant other such as joining NATO or European Union etc. As previously discussed, postcommunist countries are implementing nation branding in order to distance their countries from the old economic and political systems which existed before the transition. (Dinnie, 2008)

In the case of former Yugoslav republics, what countries are trying to point out is that the autocratic leadership and war era are over and that the progress in reconciliation and democracy has been made. Therefore, it is not surprising that significant number of articles accentuated that there was a progress in economical and bilateral cooperation, as well as that the relationship of former rivals is friendly at the time and continuously on a way of progress. Also, since public diplomacy as government communication, and its' nation branding campaigns, are mostly aimed at foreign audiences to achieve changes in the 'hearts or minds' of the people (Szondi, 2008), we can also come to conclusion that countries are in this way communicating to the foreign

community, all in order to evoke positive feelings about the country and its' political acts. In this way they are not just rebranding country's image to attract foreign investors and tourists, but also to induce good public relations with their significant others or other foreign countries. In order to do that, we can see that in most of the news on cooperation of countries, the countries are trying to build good diplomatic relations by supporting significant others' political decisions such as EU or NATO membership, condemning the acts of significant others' enemies or supporting independence of the country for example, which was often the case in some of the pro-European countries which support Kosovo's independence.

As some authors suggested, after the conflict has ended, the media can play a very important positive role by providing support for processes of peace building and reconciliation (Bratic, 2008) Thus, even Serbia and Bosnia which waged wars of terrific proportions in past, reported that the war past is long behind the two countries and that their neighborly relationship and economical cooperation nowadays are more than excellent. As mentioned, both emphasized that it is out of great importance for everyone to solve issues of Serbian and Bosnian minorities in these countries. Knowing the situation in Bosnia whose large part still belongs to autonomous entity, Serb Republic, this message was certainly used not just for building a positive picture for the foreign audiences but also for enhancing public relations. Similarly, as Volcic & Andrejevic (2011) gave example, when politicians refer to "branding" the United States for Middle Eastern audiences, they are not as concerned with direct forms of consumption (such as encouraging tourism) as with positive public relations.

Nevertheless, since the core Yugoslav successor states have achieved domestic consensus on freedom of movement and return of property, it is believed that visible differences in these societies do exist only on the issue of war crimes. (Bjelakovic, 2002) Thus, the countries which weren't involved in bigger conflicts with one another in the past, also weren't involved in

disputes in the analyzed sample. Their relationship was mostly framed as friendly and on a way of enhanced cooperation. Consequently, for those countries which do have a history of wars and conflicts in the past, in most cases, this was not applied. The exception is Serbo-Bosnian relationship for previously stated reasons.

Due to unsolved war crimes and manipulations with numbers of victims or denials of war crimes, the hostile attitudes are easily evoked when minor conflicts between officials or civilians occur. Moreover, from what will further be discussed, it can be emphasized that conflicts which have roots in the tragic past are still present and that real attitudes and relationships are more then hostile. However, this can be argued only in cases when certain conflicts occur and this is due to, what we believe, news framing which is implemented with an aim to hide the fact that there is still intolerance between former Yugoslav countries. As mentioned before, frame building is a strategic action by national actors who try to promote their own agenda and frames in order to influence the international policy to their advantage (Sheafers, 2009). In this case, the framing is used to spin the opinion of international public about current situation in the Balkans and to bring sympathies to some countries while their significant others would be presented as enemies. In addition, when a conflict occurs, countries are implementing the form of nation branding which is used in building of national identities. As we already know from the literature, the identity of a nation is defined or re-defined through the influence of 'significant others', which means other nations or ethnic groups which are perceived to threaten the nation (Triandafyllidou,1998). This was certainly visible in most cases of conflict-driven public diplomacy nation branding strategies. One of those is Croatia's creation of national identity by distancing itself from Serbia, whilst framing Serbia in all minor conflicts as undemocratic and violating laws, agreements, security or sovereignty. Also, in most of the news it was referred to Serbia as destabilizing regional cooperation and neighborly relations. This can be due to the fact that Serbia and Croatia

have a long history of wars between each other and terrific crimes which were executed from both sides. Thus, the war crimes from past were often addressed and connected to the nowadays' conflicts between countries. Vice-versa, Serbia also framed present conflicts as the fault of Croatia and its' long history of jeopardizing country's security and sovereignty. Similarly, even more intense case of nation building, while distancing from significant others, is Kosovo whose politics of nation branding was completely directed to Serbia. It seems that Albanian institutions in Kosovo are trying to build its' separate identity as a victim of Serbia's oppression. This is derived from the analysis which yielded that most of the news dealing with significant others were in fact referred to Serbia. The framing was rather sensationalist with constant accusations of provocation and violation of security and sovereignty. Another frame which was analyzed is victimization when reporting on conflicts between countries. As many scholars claim, victimization in former Yugoslavia was widespread and referred to the majority of the population, regardless of ethnical affiliation. Also, the victimization was brutal, with serious and long-term consequences. (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2003) Those consequences were visible throughout the analysis. For example, there was a very high correlation of reporting on conflicts and positioning themselves as victims and at the same time claiming that significant other or its people were unjust towards the country or its people. Victimization is still present between former countries and this research contributes to discussion on present situation among former Yugoslav countries. Also, war victimization was often used in a sense that countries were reminding and giving historical background where the country suffered a lot of victims, while reporting on present conflicts that were not related to the war past. One of those examples is when Croatia banned Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs from entering the state because of statements he previously made about Croatia, while comparing him to Milosevic and his autocratic regime due to which Croatian people suffered tragic consequences.

Certain limitations have to be taken into consideration regarding this specific study. Firstly, the communication channels of public diplomacy have strict rules when reporting on other countries. Thus, in countries which waged no wars and have a long history of democracy, it would be difficult to analyze conflicts. Most likely, only statements on cooperation could be found. This means that the present study cannot be applied for those countries which did not have major disputes in past or present.

Additionally, since the channels of public diplomacy are used as an official communication strategy of the country and a tool of nation branding, negativity in reporting is most likely to be avoided. Thus, even for conflicted countries, if replicating the study researchers may struggle to reveal existing attitudes and relationships and notice used framing.

The advice for future studies is to apply the same type of analysis for media outlets. The media, and especially sensationalist press, can yield even stronger attitudes because it is easier to notice the type of framing which is used. The speeches of politicians could also be analyzed since they are creating the image of the country and use the media as a tool for branding the country to the foreign audience. Also, since the gap is present in the literature regarding whether and how nation branding is used in public diplomacy, it would be beneficial to analyze the field in order to have more profound results. For example, case studies of nation branding in public diplomacy would certainly add upon minor number of authors who claim that nation branding is a tool of public diplomacy. Especially, analyzing post-war and post-communist countries which tend to use more intense nation branding would be necessary in order to claim how nation branding can also have negative implementation.

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Appendices

Figure 1. 5 views on the relationship between Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy





Figure 2. Integrated Model of Public Diplomacy



Screen 1 of 4

1. ADMINISTRATIVE INFO		
Name of the Coder		
Number of the Article		
Headline of the Article		
MFA of which country		
Date of publication		
Article URL		
Paragraph number		
Copy the unit		

2. UNIT CHARACTERISTICS		
2.1. FRAME : <i>Rebranding the Nation – Peace Building</i>		
Does the Press Release deal with cooperation of countries	YES	NO
Note whether the unit mentions or describes any of the following:	YES	NO
Solving issues efficiently	1	0
Progress in cooperation of countries	1	0
Good bilateral relations of countries	1	0
Good neighborly relations of countries	1	0
Good economical cooperation of countries	1	0
Satisfaction of the country with politics of significant other	1	0

Screen 3 of 4

Macedonia and Kosovo	1	0
Slovenia and Kosovo	1	0
	YES	NO
Generally, the cooperation of these countries is positive		

2.2. FRAME: <i>The Enemy</i>		
Does the press release deal with conflicts or issues of countries	YES	NO
The conflict/issue is related to:	YES	NO
Boards	1	0
Arbitration in justice	1	0
Sovereignty	1	0
Officials and their acts	1	0
Civilians and their acts	1	0
War crimes from past	1	0
The actor is:	YES	NO

Screen 2 of 4

The country supports its' significant other political decisions (EU/NATO membership, independence etc.)	1	0
Promoting peace building and democracy	1	0
The article mentions the cooperation between:	YES	NO
Serbia and Bosnia	1	0
Serbia and Croatia	1	0
Serbia and Montenegro	1	0
Serbia and Slovenia	1	0
Serbia and Macedonia	1	0
Serbia and Kosovo	1	0
Croatia and Bosnia	1	0
Croatia and Montenegro	1	0
Croatia and Slovenia	1	0
Croatia and Macedonia	1	0
Croatia and Kosovo	1	0
Montenegro and Bosnia	1	0
Montenegro and Slovenia	1	0
Montenegro and Macedonia	1	0
Montenegro and Kosovo	1	0
Bosnia and Slovenia	1	0
Bosnia and Macedonia	1	0
Bosnia and Kosovo	1	0
Macedonia and Slovenia	1	0

Screen 4 of 4

Condemning the act of significant other or expressing concerns	1	0
Accusing significant other of provocation	1	0
Accusing significant other of violating laws/democracy/agreements/security/sovereignty	1	0
Accusing significant other for destabilizing regional cooperation and neighborly relations	1	0
Undertaking certain sanctions and actions toward the significant other	1	0
2.3. FRAME: <i>The Victim</i>		
	YES	NO
When referring to the conflict does the country position itself as a victim	1	0
Does the Press Release state that the significant other was in any sense unjust towards the country	1	0
Does the Press Release suggest that the country is in any way suffering because of acts of significant other	1	0
Does the Press Release mention war crimes from the past in which the country and its' people suffered due to acts of significant other	1	0
Does the Press Release call EU and NATO members or any other peace-making institutions to condemn the act of significant other	1	0

Abstract

Two decades after tremendous wars, the newly created countries of former Yugoslavia are still in search of their separate national identities. Hence, the countries have to distinguish themselves from each other which can be a demanding job concerning that they share the same language and origins. Therefore, all of the countries involved in nation branding campaigns, not just in order to emphasize differences and attract foreign investors and tourists but also to enhance their public relations and evoke positive attitudes about their country's politics, which would ideally lead to rebranding the war image these countries have in the world. Thus, this research aimed to analyze how nation branding strategies are implemented in public relations of government level websites and whether countries are using different frames when reporting about their significant others. There is a visible trend of rebranding countries image to a more democratic and neighborlyfriendly, however the findings yielded that former Yugoslav countries still have unsolved issues from the past which are framed on the basis of 'them-enemies' and 'us-victims'. Consequently, the nation branding is being implemented as a tool for manipulating the perception of politics in the Balkans.

Keywords: National identity, Nation branding, Public diplomacy, Former Yugoslav countries, framing, post-war conflicts

Abstrakt

Zwei Jahrzehnte nach gewaltigen Kriegen sind die neu geschaffenen Länder des ehemaligen Jugoslawien immer noch auf der Suche nach ihrer eigenen nationalen Identität. Daher müssen sich die Länder voneinander unterscheiden, was eine anspruchsvolle Aufgabe sein kann, da sie die gleiche Sprache und Herkunft haben. Deswegen haben diese Länder mit starken nationalen Branding-Kampagnen begonnen, nicht nur, um Unterschiede zu betonen und ausländische Investoren und Touristen anzuziehen, sondern auch, um ihre Öffentlichkeitsarbeit zu verbessern und positive Einstellungen in der Politik ihres Landes hervorzurufen, die im Idealfall zu einer Änderung des Kriegsbildes führen würden, das diese Länder in der Welt haben. In dieser Studie sollte untersucht werden, wie nationale Branding-Strategien in der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit von Websites auf Regierungsebene implementiert werden, und ob Länder unterschiedliche Rahmen verwenden, wenn sie über ihre wichtigen anderen Personen berichten. Es ist ein deutlicher Trend erkennbar, das Image der Länder zu einem demokratischeren und nachbarschaftlicheren Land umzubenennen. Die Ergebnisse haben jedoch ergeben, dass die ehemaligen jugoslawischen Länder immer noch ungelöste Probleme aus der Vergangenheit haben, die auf der Grundlage von "ihnen-Feinden" und "uns-Opfern" festgelegt werden. Daher wird das Nation Branding als Instrument zur Manipulation der politischen Wahrnehmung auf dem Balkan eingesetzt.

Schlüsselwörter: Nationale Identität, Nation Branding, Öffentliche Diplomatie, Ehemalige jugoslawische Länder, Framing, Nachkriegskonflikte