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“The Impact of the War on Terror on the Securitization of the Uyghur Minority Question in the People's Republic of China and the Moro Minority Question in the Republic of the Philippines”

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I. Abbreviations

General

9/11	–	Attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center
WoT	–	War on Terror

China

CCP	–	Chinese Communist Party
ETIM	–	East Turkestan Islamic Movement
ETIP	–	East Turkestan Islamic Party
PLA	–	People's Liberation Army
PRC	–	People's Republic of China
RWG	–	Report on the Work of the Government
XUAR	–	Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

Philippines

ASG	–	Abu Sayyaf Group
AFP	–	Armed Forces of the Philippines
ARMM	–	Autonomous Region Muslim Mindanao
CAFGU	–	Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
CVO	–	Civilian Volunteer Organisations
MILF	–	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	–	Moro National Liberation Front
PNP	–	Philippine National Police
SONA	–	State of the Nation Address

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Figure 1: Non-Politicization, Politicization and Securitization as a diagram

1 Introduction

1.1 Foreword

The sociologist Max Weber defined our modern definition of a state as the only human *Gemeinschaft* (Community) that can legitimately claim a monopoly on the use of physical force within its spatial dimensions.¹ A challenge to this monopoly was the only way that the security of a state and thus the security of its people could be compromised – either through an external invasion or an internal uprising. During the Cold War, the ability of the United States to maintain this monopoly was only threatened by the Soviet Union and vice versa – a bi-polar struggle within a traditional security dilemma. Through numerous proxy wars, the two superpowers and their allies provided emerging ethno-national and religious groups with military, financial and logistical support in order to fight a common enemy.^{2,3} At the time, the ideology that eventually developed in Afghanistan was not considered an existential threat that could spill-over territorial borders and target the values associated with statehood: territorial integrity, national independence and domestic political order.⁴

Today many countries present terrorism as a significant security threat. The terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda gained unparalleled international notoriety and even though the territorial integrity and national independence of the US were not compromised during the coordinated attacks on September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center (9/11), the deaths of 2,996 individuals marked a turning point in our social construction of terrorism and Islam. It also demonstrated the significant damage that non-traditional security threats could impose. In response to the devastating attacks, President Bush launched the global War on Terror (WoT). Terrorists were no longer regarded as a symptom of underlying causes, nor were they viewed as criminals that could be dealt with by normal political or law enforcement procedures. Instead, terrorists were seen as enemy combatants and the war analogy warranted hard-line, military and extraordinary measures to engage suspected terrorists successfully.

¹ Max Weber; cited in Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters, “Politics as Vacation,” in Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters eds. *Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 133.

² Brenda Lutz and James Lutz, “Terrorism,” in Allen Collins eds. *Contemporary Security Studies* (4th Ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 312.

³ Washingtonsblog, “CIA Helped to Train and Support Bin Laden, Ramzi Yousef and Other Top Islamic Terrorists Who Bombed The World Trade Center,” *Washington Post*, March 1, 2014. Date Accessed: 01.04.17. Site: <http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/03/blowback.html>

⁴ Kanti Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” (Occasional Paper #19, *Kroc Institute*, August 2000), p. 3. Date Accessed: 27.03.2017. Site: http://www.conflictresolution.org/bin/Kanti_Bajpai-Human_Security_Concept_and_Measurement.pdf

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon but rather a technique that has been used by various groups around the world. However, according to Farish Noor, “the discourse on the War on Terror framed the conflict... [between] the two dyadic categories of Islam and the West... [which] made it impossible for ordinary Muslims to stand outside the economy of differentiation and difference and to claim a sense of Muslim identity that was not somehow or another drawn into this dialectical conflict.”⁵ For example, it is not surprising that Louis Cainkar found that “shortly after the attacks of 9/11, public opinion polls showed widespread support for the special treatment of Arabs in America.”⁶ Today, Islam is still strongly associated with international terrorism, even though the vast majority of Muslims and Islamic scholars reject the notion that Islam permits terrorist acts.⁷ The indiscriminate use of violence and the theatrical nature of terrorism further eased the securitization of Muslim minority groups and justified the infringement of human rights in order to provide security.⁸ However, the securitization and marginalisation of ethno-national identities can complicate the relationship between the periphery and the core. In such circumstances, minorities may adhere to a shared ethnicity in order to reduce uncertainty at times of heightened insecurity: “Ethnicity did not provide the values that people sought through secession, but it did influence what strategies they thought would best give them what they valued.”⁹ Although unity would benefit all, a collective action problem arises whereby the periphery “fear[s] that the union government would one day use its power to a given republic’s detriment rather than to its benefit.”¹⁰ Once separatism or independence is considered beneficial to members of the periphery, the core government can either choose to negotiate new power-sharing dynamics in exchange for a cessation of hostilities, construct policies and institutional structures in order to foster better relations or to securitize ethno-nationalist claims in order to legitimize extraordinary measures and implement a hard security campaigns.¹¹

⁵ Farish A. Noor, “From Empire to the War on Terror: The 1915 Indian Sepoy Mutiny in Singapore as a case study of the impact of profiling of religious and ethnic minorities,” (Working Paper No. 206, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, July 30, 2010), p. 6. Date Accessed: 01.04.17. Site: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/119771/WP206.pdf>

⁶ Louis Cainkar, “The Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Arab and Muslim Community in the United States,” in John Tirman eds. *The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration After 9/11* (New York: The New Press, 2004), p. 225.

⁷ Charles Kurzman, “Islamic Statements Against Terrorism,” (Collection of quotes, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, March 2012). Date Accessed: 01.04.17. <http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic-statements-against-terrorism/>

⁸ Elena Pokalova, “Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33 (2010), p. 433. Date Accessed 24.03.17. DOI: 10.1080/10576101003691564.

⁹ Henry E. Hale, *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World* (Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics, 2008), p. 6.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Elena Pokalova, “Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33 (2010), p. 430-432. Date Accessed 24.03.17. DOI: 10.1080/10576101003691564.

1.2 Research Objective

The research objective of this thesis is to assess the impact of the events of 9/11 and the WoT on the securitization of the Uyghur minority question in the People's Republic of China and the Moro minority question in the Republic of the Philippines.

A suitable proposal for a definition of a 'national minority' was presented at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1993, where the term was defined as a group of people who:

“(a) reside on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof; (b) maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with the state; (c) display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics; (d) are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of that state or of a region of that state; (e) are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion or their language.”¹²

The term 'minority question' in this thesis is understood as issues that relate to the national minority as outlined above. As such, the minority question in China and the Philippines refers to the endeavour of national citizens to maintain their societal identity, which “is often tied to control over those institutions responsible for cultural reproduction, and/or territory.”¹³ Issues regarding a country's minority question are often closely related to territorial integrity and the relationship between the core and the periphery. If the core feels that the national sovereignty or territorial integrity is threatened, then it may frame minority aspirations within a security context.

Early evidence suggested that China and the Philippines are suitable case studies as China has employed a military strategy against Uyghur separatist groups and has curbed cultural and religious freedoms in order to promote state security, while the PhD thesis of Gene Segarra Navera argued that in the Philippines, President Joseph Estrada and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo have both linked independence movements in the South with criminality and terrorism.¹⁴ The attacks of 9/11 made it easier to frame actions committed by mainly Muslim ethno-nationalist groups, as a fight against international 'Islamic terrorism' rather

¹² Cf. Article 1 of the Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1201; cited by Steven Wheatley, *Democracy, Minorities and International Law* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 48.

¹³ Paul Roe, *Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma* (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 72.

¹⁴ Gene Segarra Navera, “Metaphorizing The Philippine Presidency: Schemas of Presidential Leadership in The Post-Marcos State of The Nation Addresses (1987-2009),” (PhD Dissertation, National University of Singapore, 2012), p. 385. Date Accessed: 31.03.18. Site: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48651402.pdf>

than mere secessionism or separatism.^{15,16} As the WoT has been linked to the ‘Islamic terrorism’, two Muslim minority groups were chosen within two countries in order to highlight the impact that the WoT had on framing a Muslim minority question. In order to understand the protracted nature of the conflict between the Uyghur and Moro minorities with their respective governments, the next two sub-chapter will present a short timeline of their relations.

1.2.1 Uyghurs in the People’s Republic of China

From all the ethnic groups living in China, the Han Chinese make up the vast majority with 92 per cent of 1.4 billion people. The remaining 114 million people, or eight per cent of the population, are part of the 56 ethnic minorities and are mainly concentrated along China’s border regions but are also spread throughout the Middle Kingdom.¹⁷ Chinese and Uyghur scholars have taken up different sides in discussing the national identity of Uyghurs. In *Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land* (2010), Gardner Bovingdon compares various nationalist claims made by Han and Uyghur historians, and notes that while Uyghur nationalists generally aim to strengthen the collective identity, by putting forward the notion that Uyghurs appeared around 6,000 years ago, Chinese nationalists have made the opposite argument, rejecting almost any history of collective Uyghur identity.¹⁸ For example, Chinese historian Liu Zhixiao, has argued that Uyghurs never ceased to be part of the ‘great family of *minzu* (minorities)’.¹⁹ However, Uyghurs originated from the Mongolian core lands as ‘Turko-Mongolian steppe nomads’, and were part of the Türk Khaghanate, until 744, when along with other dissident tribes, the Uyghurs overthrew the ruling house and established their own Khaghanate, which extended into the Northwest.²⁰ Today, the Uyghur Muslim minority is primarily located in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the northwest of the country. Modern Uyghur is written in Arabic script, located within the ‘Ural-Altaic language family’ and possessing strong similarities to Uzbek languages, thus differing greatly

¹⁵ Elena Pokalova, “Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33 (2010), p. 429. Date Accessed 24.03.17. DOI: 10.1080/10576101003691564.

¹⁶ Steven Hawkes, “How has Russia framed the conflict in Chechnya as part of the ‘War on Terror’?” *E-International Relations Students*, July 30, 2011. Date Accessed: 06.04.18. Site: <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/30/how-has-russia-framed-the-conflict-in-chechnya-as-part-of-the-‘war-on-terror’/>

¹⁷ James Leibold, *Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable?* (eBook: East West Center, 2013), p. 2. Date Accessed: 05.04.17. Site: <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/ps068.pdf>

¹⁸ Gardner Bovingdon, *Uyghurs: Strangers in their own Land* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 27.

¹⁹ Zhixiao Liu, *维吾尔族历史上编 [Uyghur History Series]* (Beijing: Minzu chu ban she, 1985); cited in Gardner Bovingdon, *Uyghurs: Strangers in their own Land* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 28.

²⁰ James Millward and Peter Perdue, “Political and Cultural History of the Xinjiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Frederick Starr eds. *Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland* (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 40.

from Chinese *Hanyu*, which is written in traditional and simplified Chinese characters and spoken by the Han majority.²¹ The term Uyghur was lost for large periods of time until it was rediscovered more recently. Some scholars have argued that the term was re-adopted by Uyghurs following a Soviet conference in Tashkent in 1921, a plan orchestrated by Soviet officials to stave off any pan-Turkic uprising,²² while others have claimed that the term had returned in the late 19th century.²³ While it is clear that the ‘Uyghur’ identity was readily accepted by Xinjiang’s Turkic populace, “it is likely that the Chinese nationalists and Soviets both realized that such an identity had so many cracks and fissures that the newly self-defined Uyghurs would be easy to control.”²⁴ Uyghur identity thus developed as a form of opposition towards both Soviet and Chinese influences as well as self-determination. The independence movements that formed the independent East Turkestan Republic in 1933 in Kashgar and then again in 1944 in Ili, further strengthened Uyghur consciousness.²⁵ However, soon after the Soviet Union and the Nationalist Government of China arranged the ‘Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance’ in 1945, the new Uyghur republic was pressured into entering a ceasefire with the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek.²⁶ When his forces were defeated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, it was the latter who signed the ceasefire and thus incorporating Xinjiang into the PRC.

Many Uyghurs are very proud of their cultures long history. Although the majority of Uyghurs are Turkic Muslims, Nick Holdstock writes in his 2015 book *China’s Forgotten People* (2015) that “for some Uyghurs the notion of being ‘Muslim’ is more a cultural marker than a description of faith. This is not to downplay the importance of Islam to many Uyghurs’ sense of identity but just to acknowledge the diverse ways in which this is expressed.”²⁷ There is also no unified position regarding the Uyghurs relationship with Beijing. While there are some Uyghurs who seek independence, there are also does who prefer greater autonomy

²¹ Dolkun Kamberi, *Uyghurs and Uyghur Identity* (Washington D.C.: Radio Free Asia, 2015), p. 7.

²² Dru Gladney, “The Ethnogenesis of the Uighur,” *Central Asian Survey* 9 (No. 1, 1990); cited in Gardner Bovingdon, *Uyghurs: Strangers in their own Land* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 28.

²³ Tursun Nābijan, “The Formation of Modern Uyghur Historiography and Competing Perspectives Toward Uyghur History,” *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 6 (No. 3, 2008), pp. 87-100; cited in Gardner Bovingdon, *Uyghurs: Strangers in their own Land* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 28.

²⁴ Justin Rudelson and William Jankowiak, “Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identities in Flux,” in Frederick Starr eds. *Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland* (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 302.

²⁵ Michael Clarke, “China’s War on Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism,” (Regional Outlook Paper No. 11, *Griffith Asia Institute*, 2007), p. 5. Date Accessed: 22.03.17. Site: https://www.griffith.edu.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0005/18239/regional-outlook-volume-11.pdf

²⁶ James Millward, *Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment*, *Policy Studies* 6 (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), p. 5.

²⁷ Nick Holdstock, *China’s Forgotten People: Xinjiang, Terror and the Chinese State* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2015), p. 11-12.

and cultural freedoms and others who prefer integrating into the Chinese nation-state.²⁸ From the 1950s onwards, Beijing started a policy of resettling Han Chinese to Xinjiang, which, according to Rémi Castets, was a tactical choice in order to improve the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) control over the region.²⁹ In his research, Bovingdon noted that the 1944 population of Xinjiang had numbered less than four million, of which Han had only constituted just over 200,000, but following:

“several decades of ... state-directed immigration beginning in 1950 ... the Han population [increased] to nearly five million by 1975. From the mid-1980s on, state policies to lure more immigrants brought that figure to roughly 8.2 million in 2007. Thus while Uyghurs are still officially the most numerous non-Han group in Xinjiang, they now constitute only a plurality.”³⁰

However, Uyghurs retained much of their distinct religion, language, identity and cultural background. Scholars have argued that due to these differences, Beijing adopted policies of Sinification or nation-building policies in Xinjiang, preferring a homogenous and monolingual society.³¹ Yet policies that restricted religious and cultural activities of Uyghurs have also raised simmering tensions. In the 1980s, unorganized protests against environmental degradation, nuclear testing, Han resettlement and discrimination, culminated in the violent 1989 Urumqi protest.³² Following the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent WoT, Beijing began increasingly attributing violent incidents to ‘Islamic’ terrorist organisations such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) with its alleged links to Al-Qaeda, of which eight attacks were confirmed and recorded in the Global Terrorism Database (with a further two attacks suspected).³³ The Chinese government began various Strike Hard campaigns and broad security sweeps in order to crackdown on separatism, but according to Terry Narramore, the authorities exaggerated the security threats in the post-9/11 context to legitimize counterinsurgency methods.³⁴ The US Department of State has stated that due to the tight control of information, it was “difficult to determine whether particular raids,

²⁸ Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China,” (Overview, *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*, January 2008). Date Accessed: 11.04.17. Site: <http://apcss.org/college/publications/uyghur-muslim-ethnic-separatism-in-xinjiang-china/>

²⁹ Rémi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows,” *China Perspectives* 49 (October, 2003), p. 2. Date Accessed: 05.10.16. Site: <https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/pdf/648>

³⁰ Gardner Bovingdon, *Uyghurs: Strangers in their own Land* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 11-12.

³¹ Arienne M. Dwyer, *The Xinjiang Conflict* (Washington: East-West Center, 2005), p. 2.

³² Rongxing Guo, *China's Spatial (Dis)integration* (Waltham: Elsevier, 2015), p. 10.

³³ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Database Advanced Search: Perpetrators – ETIM; All Terrorism Criteria must be met; Ambiguous cases included; Unsuccessful attack included; *Global Terrorism Database* (2017). Date Accessed: 12.12.17. Site: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>

³⁴ Terry Narramore, “State violence and China’s unfinished national unification: conflict with minorities,” in Matt Killingsworth, Matthew Sussex and Jan Pakulski eds. *Violence and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), p. 69.

detentions, arrests, or judicial punishments targeted individuals who were seeking political goals, voicing local grievances, or orchestrating criminal or terrorist acts.”³⁵ After analysing several incidents, Guo Rongxing, came to the conclusion that most clashes by ethnic Uyghurs were either accidental or preventable,³⁶ while human rights groups have argued that most were isolated incidents carried out by young and demoralized people using knives or makeshift explosives.³⁷

1.2.2 Moros in the Republic of the Philippines

The Philippines is a vast archipelago with thousands of islands inhabited by various ethno-linguistic groups. Information on the various groups is limit, but according to a Working Paper at the United Nations University, which explored horizontal and vertical inequalities among Filipino ethnic groups, there are around 182 ethno-linguistic groups in the country, of which 110 are considered to be ‘indigenous’.³⁸ The Philippines are divided into three major island clusters. The main islands are called Luzon, which is located in the north, Visayas, which is located in the centre and Mindanao, which is located in the South. Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago and the Western island strip of Palawan have large Muslim Moro populations. According to data collected during the official 2010 Census on Population and Housing, by far the largest religious affiliation in the Philippines consists of Roman Catholics, which make up 74.2 million people of a total population of 92 million (around 80.6 per cent), while Islam is the second largest religious group with a total population of 5.1 million people (around 5.6 per cent).³⁹ Islam arrived in the Philippines in the 14th century, and according to an article posted on the official website of the Philippine National Commission for Culture and the Arts by Hannibal Bara, Islam may have “charted the entire destiny of the Philippine nationhood,”⁴⁰ if Western colonialism hadn’t influenced Filipino history. When the Spanish arrived at the Philippines, Islam was the dominant religion in the Sulu Archipelago and in Mindanao. The Spanish referred to the followers of Islam as Moros,

³⁵ Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2014,” (Report, U.S. Department of State, June 2015), p. 58. Date Accessed: 01.04.17. Site: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf>

³⁶ Rongxing Guo, *China’s Spatial (Dis)integration* (Waltham: Elsevier, 2015), p. 61-62.

³⁷ Jamil Anderlini and Christian Shepherd, “China rebukes west for terror ‘double standards’,” *Financial Times*, November 17, 2015. Date Accessed: 31.03.17. Site: <https://www.ft.com/content/8a5463e4-8d14-11e5-a549-b89a1dfede9b>

³⁸ Celia M. Reyes, Christian D. Mina, and Ronina D. Asis, “Inequality of opportunities among ethnic groups in the Philippines,” (Working Paper No. 154, *World Institute for Development Economics*, July 2017), p. 5. Date Accessed: 22.11.17. Site: <https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Publications/Working-paper/PDF/wp2017-154.pdf>

³⁹ Philippine Statistics Authority, *2015 Philippine Statistical Yearbook* (Quezon City: Philippine Statistics Authority, 2015), p. 1-30. Date Accessed: 22.11.17. Site: <https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/2015%20PSY%20PDF.pdf>

⁴⁰ Hannibal Bara, “The History of the Muslim in the Philippines,” *Philippine National Commission for Culture and the Arts*, April 30, 2015. Date Accessed: 13.11.17. Site: <http://ncca.gov.ph/subcommissions/subcommission-on-cultural-communities-and-traditional-arts-secta/central-cultural-communities/the-history-of-the-muslim-in-the-philippines/>

which is a term derived from the word ‘Moors’ and was applied by Europeans to describe North African Muslims and Berbers as well as occasionally to denote ‘any Muslim in general’.⁴¹ Although the term Moros was used by the Spaniards in a derogatory way, the term became self-applied by the communities of Mindanao and Sulu, referring to themselves as *Bangsamoro* or Moro nation in the Dansalan Declaration of 1935.⁴² While the northern regions of Luzon and Visayas were defeated by the Spanish, the Moros resisted the advance of colonialism until 1848, when the Spanish were able to establish a few outposts in the south through the use of modern gunboats.⁴³

After the Spanish were defeated in the Spanish-American War in 1898, the US took official control of autonomous Muslim territories, which after centuries of opposition to the Spanish north, differed culturally and politically from the rest of the Philippines. US policies towards Muslim territories were greatly influenced by the Philippine Revolution that began in 1896, which fought against Spanish rule. After the Spanish were defeated by US forces and signed the Treaty of Paris, Emilio Aguinaldo became President of the First Philippine Republic in January 1899 and objected to its terms, in particular, US control of Philippines.⁴⁴ This led to the Philippine-American war, which began a few weeks later and would last until 1902. During this war, the US made concession to Muslim leaders by guaranteeing autonomy and independence with regard to religious and juridical affairs, as “American policy-makers thought it best to neutralize the Moro threat,”⁴⁵ in order to wage war against the north, while establishing military control in Mindanao and Sulu and ensuring that Moro forces would not interfere. However, Jeffrey Milligan goes on to explain that:

“By the end of direct American rule in 1935, all the regions of what had been the relatively independent territories of the Moros had been thoroughly penetrated by American colonial power. ... Muslim Filipinos, however, did not enter the new state as equals but as socioeconomic subordinates in an ostensibly democratic political system that in fact masked a long tradition of semifeudal elite–masses relations.”⁴⁶

⁴¹ Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Moor,” *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (n/d). Date Accessed: 13.11.17. Site: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Moor-people>

⁴² Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Revisiting the Bangsamoro Struggle: Contested Identities and Elusive Peace,” *Asian Security* 3 (No. 2, 2007), p. 149. Date Accessed: 22.11.17. DOI: 10.1080/14799850701351425.

⁴³ Michael C. Hawkins, *Making Moros: Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the Philippines’ Muslim South* (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2012), p. 15.

⁴⁴ Ooi Keat Gin, “Introduction,” in Ooi Keat Gin eds. *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopaedia from Angkor Wat to East Timor* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004). p. 33.

⁴⁵ Michael C. Hawkins, *Making Moros: Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the Philippines’ Muslim South* (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2012), p. 9.

⁴⁶ Jeffrey A. Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy: Schooling and Ethno-Religious Conflict in the Southern Philippine* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 83.

America thus reinterpreted relations between the north and the south as a ‘pedagogical problem’, the solution of which would be the concealed intent to change the cultural and religious identity of Moros.⁴⁷ As such, military repression against Moros was justified as punishment for ‘unruly’ behaviour, while Christian Filipinos were tasked with civilizing Muslim Mindanao.

Following colonization and marginalization by both the Spanish and the United States, Muslim Moros in the south established a separate geographical identity from the Christian north. When the Philippines was to be finally granted independence in 1946, many Muslims wanted Mindanao and Sulu to remain under the control of the United States rather than under a Filipino government located in northern Manila.⁴⁸ The new Philippine government encouraged resettlement projects after the Second World War, which caused many Muslims to lose their land to Catholic settlers leading to several clashes, while Muslims were also banned from teaching their languages and selectively excluded from many political positions.⁴⁹ As a result, Thayil George wrote that “Muslims in Mindanao were a devitalized people, their economic conditions stagnant, their social conditions in jeopardy, their laws and customs in danger of disintegrating.”⁵⁰ Against this setting, the secessionist Mindanao Independence Movement was created in 1968 and was a key factor in the establishment of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1971, which was formed by Nur Misuari to fight for an independent Moro nation. The sectarian violence occurred in the context of a separatist insurgency, but following the announcement of the WoT, the US dramatically increased funding for the Philippine government to launch counter-terrorism operations, which “led to tremendous repression, including large numbers of extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture and cruel treatment.”⁵¹ Over many years, the MNLF has splintered into various groups, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Peace negotiations and arrangements between the government and the MILF have often been interrupted by hard security campaigns, breaches of trust between the parties involved and escalating tensions.

⁴⁷ Jeffrey A. Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy: Schooling and Ethno-Religious Conflict in the Southern Philippine* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 82.

⁴⁸ R. A. Cumming, “Historical Injustice and Human Insecurity: Conflict and Peacekeeping in Muslim Mindanao,” in P. J. Carnegie et al. eds. *Human Insecurities in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Springer, 2016) p. 125.

⁴⁹ *Minority Rights Group*, “Philippines – Muslims,” (n/d). Date Accessed: 01.04.17. Site: <http://minorityrights.org/minorities/muslims-3/>

⁵⁰ Thayil J. S. George, *Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 120.

⁵¹ Marjorie Cohn, “Forgotten ‘War on Terror’ in the Philippines,” *Covert Geopolitics*, July 25, 2015. Date Accessed: 01.04.17. Site: <https://geopolitics.co/2015/07/25/forgotten-war-on-terror-in-the-philippines/>

1.3 Relevance

Based on the case studies, there is reason to believe that the WoT justified extraordinary measures, which targeted individuals as security risks due to their ethno-national or religious affiliation. According to Martha Crenshaw, the “concern that the ‘terrorism’ label will be used to vilify opponents, legitimise repression, and fuel conflict has resurfaced.”⁵² Treating ethno-nationalist groups as security threats reinforces a divisive definition of security that may reduce civil and political rights and justify extraordinary security measures. Very importantly, this does not excuse the behaviour of those that engage in violent conduct but allows us to form policies that are more likely to prevent terrorism and violent separatism and instead encourage the use of legitimate political processes to voice real or perceived grievances. Of course, this may not always be in the interest of those in power, however, compromising the ability of collectivities to preserve that which constitutes their common identity, culture, tradition and religion, can propagate a continued cycle of violence. In such instances, shared ethnicity may become an uncertainty-reduction device, further dividing societies.⁵³ Within a securitised environment, governments may aim to de-politicize or manage certain issues in order to provide the minority population with some degree of certainty, while the majority can rest assured that the insecurity ‘caused’ by the minority group is being addressed. While de-politicizing practices may achieve some form of normalization, the language of security still prevails, which can harm positive identity formation amongst minority groups and ease the way for re-securitization processes.⁵⁴

The study aims to provide some insight into the social and discursive construction of Muslim minority questions as an existential threat to a referent object, i.e., an object that is presented as being existentially threatened. By analysing the discourse of security actors, before and after the WoT, this thesis hopes to shed some light on how certain issues can be discursively framed and used to justify regimes of truth. Framing can oversimplify solutions for ‘objective’ security issues, when in fact such realities are ‘intersubjective and socially constructed’.⁵⁵ This phenomenon combines questions of societal identity with questions of

⁵² Martha Crenshaw, “The Name Game,” *Foreign Policy*, October 22, 2009. Date Accessed: 20.06.17. Site: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/22/the-name-game/>

⁵³ Henry E. Hale, *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World* (Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics, 2008), p. 6.

⁵⁴ Bezen Balamir Coskun, “Regionalism and Securitization: The Case of the Middle East,” in Cilja Harders and Matteo Legrenzi eds. *Beyond Regionalism?: Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East* (New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 101,

⁵⁵ Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 31.

security, which can trigger a societal security dilemma because the reproduction of society is perceived to be existentially threatened. During a time where “ethno-cultural conflicts have become the most common source of political violence in the world,”⁵⁶ a better understanding of the impact of 9/11 on majority-minority relations is important to improve the rule of law.

The following chapter will present a short literature review, to present some of the relevant findings regarding the WoT as a discursive organizing principle and as a tool for framing ethno-nationalist groups as a security threat, with a particular focus on China and the Philippines.

1.4 Literature Review

1.4.1 Framing and the War on Terror

Following the attacks of 9/11, President George W. Bush announced the global WoT, which produced numerous reactions from the media, international organizations, countries and scholars. Political scientists, in particular, focused on the impact that the WoT had on various international norms. In 2006, Barry Buzan – a central figure within the Copenhagen School – claimed that the WoT’s significance is as “political framing that might justify and legitimize US primacy, leadership and unilateralism.”⁵⁷ However, the ramifications of the WoT go beyond US policies as alliances have been re-forged and international norms reinterpreted. Shortly after the announcement of the WoT, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization contributed to WoT’s legitimization by invoking ‘Article 5’ for the first time – the principle of collective defence whereby “an attack against one is considered an attack against all.”⁵⁸ This provided countries with an effective narrative that they could use to persuade national and international audiences of the dangers that they face.

According to Elena Pokalova, 9/11 and the WoT “presented governments with the opportunity to portray their internal contestations as part of the global struggle against the international threat of terrorism.”⁵⁹ Pokalova found in her analysis of Kurdish and Chechen

⁵⁶ Will Kymlicka, *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 1.

⁵⁷ Barry Buzan, “Will the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” *International Affairs* **82** (No. 6, 2006), p. 1102. Date Accessed: 29.05.17. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00590.x

⁵⁸ Ibid. 1103.

⁵⁹ Elena Pokalova, “Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* **33** (2010), p. 429. Date Accessed 24.03.17. DOI: 10.1080/10576101003691564.

conflicts that by framing separatism as terrorism, states found it easier to legitimize the use of hard security measures.⁶⁰ Nozima Kamalovam came to a similar conclusion, namely that authoritarian governments used the WoT against political opponents and separatists to justify extraordinary measures.⁶¹ Such governments would usually have been confronted by an outspoken international community, which would appeal for a peaceful conflict resolution during ethno-national conflicts. However, when the label ‘terrorist’ was included, the international community did not elicit a similar response. Indeed Stephen D. Reese concluded that the WoT had the “ability to organize ... a large swath of political action... [which] may not lie in sheer emphasis.”⁶² It became a ‘Macro-Framework’ where even basic assumptions would go unquestioned. Author Adam Hodges goes further and describes the WoT as being a type of discursive formation that sustains a regime of truth.⁶³ As such, the WoT became a powerfully discursive organizing principle, which supported measures that could somehow be attributed to the fight against terrorism,⁶⁴ in particular, in framing separatist movements as purely terrorist organisations.⁶⁵

The discursive power of the WoT has even redressed developmental priorities. According to Richard Jackson, the context of the WoT “has largely diverted international attention and resources from poverty eradication, democracy promotion, and peace-building activities,”⁶⁶ which could have otherwise reduced societal and political insecurities. A paper by Jocelyne Cesari and an article by Mikkel Rytter and Marianne Holm Pedersen, found that the WoT also damaged relations between Muslim minorities and majority populations: Cesari found that the WoT resulted in Muslims facing considerable restrictions in European public

⁶⁰ Ibid. 442.

⁶¹ Nozima Kamalova, “The War On Terror and its Implications for Human Rights in Uzbekistan,” (Occasional Paper #296, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2007), p. 1. Date Accessed: 02.04.17. Site: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/OP296_war_on_terror_uzbekistan_kamalova_2007.pdf

⁶² Stephen S. D. Reese, “The Framing Project: A Bridging Model for Media Research Revisited,” *Journal of Communication* **57** (No. 1, 2007), p. 153. Date Accessed: 16.12.17. Site: <https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/teaching/articles/J-Communication-2007-9.pdf>

⁶³ Adam Hodges, *The ‘War on Terror’ Narrative: Discourse and Intertextuality in the Construction and Contestation of Socio-political Reality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 5.

⁶⁴ Stephen D. Reese and Seth C. Lewis, “Framing the War on Terror: The internalization of policy in the US press,” *Journalism* **10** (No. 6, 2009), p. 777. Date Accessed: 16.12.17. DOI: 10.1177/1464884909344480

⁶⁵ Elena Pokalova, “Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* **33** (2010), p. 432. Date Accessed 24.03.17. DOI: 10.1080/10576101003691564.

⁶⁶ Richard Jackson, “Regime Security,” in Allen Collins eds. *Contemporary Security Studies* (4th Ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 212.

spaces,⁶⁷ and Rytter and Pedersen found that in Denmark, the discourse resulted in a ‘decade of suspicion’ and damaged relations with the Muslim minority.⁶⁸

In its essence, the literature confirms that the WoT has allowed states to “prioritize regime security over state building... [receiving] vital international support for their efforts,”⁶⁹ and allowed countries to gain a freer hand in dealing with ethno-national and religious separatist movements,⁷⁰ which otherwise would have faced greater national or international scrutiny.

1.4.2 Framing Muslim Minorities in East and Southeast Asia

Scholars have found that states who have been confronted with violent separatist groups have applied different approaches. Senia Febrica argues that Indonesia demonstrates a special case, as pressure and financial ‘aid’ from the US enlisted its cooperation on tackling terrorist activities, but Jakarta was careful not to link the terrorist threat with the Islamic faith as not to alienate the public of which the vast majority are Muslim.⁷¹ By contrast, Febrica remarks that Singapore did not face similar constraints. As a result, Singapore argued that ‘Islamic terrorism’ represented an existential threat for the social, political and economic realm, even though no terrorist attack materialized within the city-state.⁷²

In China, Kılıç Buğra Kanat found that the framing of Uyghurs justified violent repression and persecution in the name of the War on Terror and only further alienated Uyghurs from the Chinese state.⁷³ Patrik Kristof Meyer’s analysis found that the Chinese government framed Muslim practices as security threats in order to pressure Uyghurs to accept Sinification and Han-supremacy,⁷⁴ while Michael Clarke’s *China’s War on Terror in Xinjiang* (2007) found that since 1990, a causal link between a lack in human security (in

⁶⁷ Jocelyne Cesari, “Mosque Conflicts in European Cities: Introduction,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* **31** (No. 6, 2005), p. 1015. Date Accessed: 15.06.17. DOI: 10.1080/13691830500282626.

⁶⁸ Mikkel Rytter and Marianne Holm Pedersen, “A decade of suspicion: Islam and Muslims in Denmark after 9/11,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* **37** (No. 13, 2014), p. 2303. Date Accessed: 15.06.17. DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2013.821148.

⁶⁹ Richard Jackson, “Regime Security,” in Allen Collins eds. *Contemporary Security Studies* (4th Ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 212.

⁷⁰ Elena Pokalova, “Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* **33** (2010), p. 429. Date Accessed 24.03.17. DOI: 10.1080/10576101003691564.

⁷¹ Senia Febrica, “Securitizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Accounting for the Varying Responses of Singapore and Indonesia,” *Asian Survey* **50** (No. 3, 2010), p. 573, 590. Date Accessed: 03.04.17. DOI: 10.1525/AS.2010.50.3.569.

⁷² Ibid, p. 590.

⁷³ Kılıç B. Kanat, “The Securitization of the Uyghur Question and Its Challenges,” *Insight Turkey* **18** (No. 1, 2016), p. 196. Date Accessed: 03.04.17. Site: <http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/kanat-18-1-web.pdf>

⁷⁴ Patrik Meyer, “Governing Muslim Minorities as Security Threats: The Case of the Uyghurs and the Concept of a New Chinese Nation,” (PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, June 2012), p. 2. Date Accessed: 03.04.17. Site: https://www.academia.edu/24003946/PhD_Thesis_Governing_Muslim_Minorities_as_Security_Threats_The_Case_of_the_Uyghurs_and_the_Concept_of_a_New_Chinese_Nation

particular in the realm of political and civil rights) and terrorism was the key determinant for the violence that erupted in the region, increasing tensions between the Han population and Uyghurs.⁷⁵ Terry Narramore also came to the conclusion that the Chinese state's "decision to securitise [i.e., frame] separatism as an international threat,"⁷⁶ contributed to the escalation of violence. In order to reduce tensions in Xinjiang, Beijing attempted to increase the region's economic development, but such initiatives may have been attempts to de-politicize the issue. Hanna Michelle Tarbert came to such a conclusion in her thesis on *Self Determination in the People's Republic of China*, namely that Chinese Communist Party leaders (following Deng Xiaoping) pursued economic development in combination with political repression.⁷⁷ Tina Sundree Lauge Gill also found that the official discourse of the Western Development Plan had been directed towards the non-traditional security agenda, but that the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the WoT, caused the traditional (military) security agenda (and its measures) to expand.⁷⁸ As such China needed to frame the Uyghur minority question as part of the global WoT. Indeed, Arienne Dwyer even argues that the US was purposefully misled by the Chinese media into believing that Uyghur nationalism was related to terrorism,⁷⁹ while Michael Clarke has argued that China has been very successful in framing Uyghurs ever since the first official reference to Uyghur terrorism.⁸⁰

With regards to the Philippines, John Harber explained that the origins of the conflict could be traced back to the politicization of Moro identity, which occurred during the Spanish and American colonial periods, as well as by the government of the Philippines.⁸¹ Amador Peleo found that separatist violence in the Philippines was able to grow because of an unwillingness

⁷⁵ Michael Clarke, "China's War on Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism," (Regional Outlook Paper No. 11, *Griffith Asia Institute*, 2007), p. 2. Date Accessed: 22.03.17. Site: https://www.griffith.edu.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0005/18239/regional-outlook-volume-11.pdf

⁷⁶ Terry Narramore, "State violence and China's unfinished national unification: conflict with minorities," in Matt Killingsworth, Matthew Sussex and Jan Pakulski eds. *Violence and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), p. 63.

⁷⁷ Hanna Michelle Tarbert, "Self-Determination in the People's Republic of China: Elite Responses, 1949-2012," (Master Thesis, Wright State University, July 2015), p. 111, 134. Date Accessed: 03.04.17. Site: https://etd.ohiolink.edu/etd.send_file?accession=wright1439813669&disposition=inline

⁷⁸ Tina Sundree Lauge Gill, "China & Xinjiang: The Western Development Plan, China's Security Agenda, & Consequences for the Uighurs," (PhD, Roskilde University, December 2012), p. 77. Date Accessed: 17.09.16. Site: <http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/9278>

⁷⁹ Arienne M. Dwyer, *The Xinjiang Conflict* (Washington: East-West Center, 2005), p. x.

⁸⁰ Michael Clarke, "China, Xinjiang and the Internationalisation of the Uyghur Issue," *Peace, Security & Global Change* 22 (No. 2, June 2010), p. 225-226. Date Accessed: 17.04.18. Site: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14781151003770846>

⁸¹ John Harber, "Conflict and Compromise in the Southern Philippines: The Case of Moro Identity," (PhD, California Naval Postgraduate School, June 1998), p. v. Date Accessed: 28.09.16. Site: <http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/8141/conflictcompromi00harb.pdf?sequence=1>

to resolve differences locally as well as a trans-nationalization of the conflict.⁸² In this sense, the trans-national nature of the WoT made it increasingly complicated to address the issue in the normal political sphere.⁸³ Paz Verdades M. Santos also believes that the WoT has had a direct negative impact on peace negotiations as well as the armed conflict, injecting ‘new fuel’ and military support into the Philippines internal conflicts after the events of 9/11 – focussing on the Communist Party of the Philippines’ armed wing, the New People’s Army, as well as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and its link to international terrorism.⁸⁴ In her PhD thesis, Gene Segarra Navera demonstrated via a critical discourse analysis of the State of the Nation addresses that President Estrada favoured a macho-like, militarist solution to the Moro rebellion in Mindanao, while the Arroyo administration was interested in showing its commitment to the US-led WoT.⁸⁵ Both favoured policies that reacted to the existing conflict, rather than addressing the underlying root problems.

The vast amount of literature demonstrates that there have been varying degrees to which 9/11 and the WoT have influenced the framing of Muslim minorities. Many governments had equated ethno-nationalism and separatism with an existential international terrorist threat, even when this was not the case. Legitimization or military support from important actors from the international community has also been sought-after in order to pursue extraordinary measures. However, most cases in the literature review have studied the framing of one minority group as a security threat to one country. The impact of a dependent variable – such as the events of 9/11 and the WoT – on the framing processes of different Muslim minorities in two different countries has remained unexplored. Furthermore, the literature does not always demonstrate the impact that the WoT had on the referent object, the existential threat and the extraordinary measures that are utilized by security actors. Therefore this thesis will compare the impact of the WoT on two separate conflicts in order to add to the existing research and to demonstrate the impact of the WoT as a facilitating condition within the framing of ethno-national minority groups.

⁸² Amador Peleo, “Living with a Culture of Conflict: Insurgency and the Philippines,” *Political Perspectives* 1 (No. 1, 2007), p. 1. Date Accessed: 03.04.17. Site: <http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/CIP-2007-01-04.pdf>

⁸³ Ibid, p. 10.

⁸⁴ Paz Verdades Santos, “The Communist Front: Protracted People’s War and Counter-insurgency in the Philippines (Overview),” in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 52-53.

⁸⁵ Gene Segarra Navera, “Metaphorizing The Philippine Presidency: Schemas of Presidential Leadership in The Post-Marcos State of The Nation Addresses (1987-2009),” (PhD Dissertation, National University of Singapore, 2012), p. 16-17. Date Accessed: 31.03.18. Site: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48651402.pdf>

1.5 Thesis Outline

The thesis has the following structure: Chapter 2 will present the theoretical framework. In order to answer the research question, the thesis benefits from building on the disciplines and theories of constructivism, security studies, securitization theory, ethnic identity, conflict, separatism and terrorism. These are then summarized into one theoretical framework. Chapter 3 will explain the case selection, the data selection process and introduce sociological discourse analysis as the main methodology. The securitization, i.e., the framing, of the Uyghur and Moro minority question by Chinese premiers and Filipino presidents, will be presented in Chapter 4. This part of the thesis is split into the pre- and post-9/11 period in order to highlight the impact of the WoT on the security actors references to the referent object, the existential threat and the extraordinary measures, in relation to the minority question. Finally, Chapter 5 will present the conclusions of this thesis.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Constructivism

The theoretical foundation of this thesis rests on various schools of thought in order to create a complete framework. However, most of the thought process is located within a constructivist approach towards security studies, which in turn is based on the notion that the structure of the international system and the concept of security are both socially constructed.⁸⁶ The view that security problems eventually boil down to social phenomena differs drastically from many of the mainstream international relations theories.

International relations includes a wide range of theoretical approaches, such as realism, institutionalism, liberalism, constructivism, the English School, the Copenhagen School and critical approaches, which have either evolved from within the discipline or have been altered from other disciplines that deal with the human condition.⁸⁷ Constructivism has firmly established itself in the spectrum of international relations theories. With the end of the Cold War, realism and liberalism were at odds to explain the sudden transformation that was reshaping the international system. This is because the orthodox theories were unable to account for structural changes that did not include material factors. This made it possible for constructivism to gain ground, as constructivists used a society/individual-centred approach that included important factors such as norms, culture and identity, i.e.: non-material factors, whereby, according to Peter Katzenstein, norms are shared expectations about the appropriate behaviour of actors within a given identity (thus affecting the behaviour and the identity of actors), culture is a system of norms and values that define multiple actors within a system and their relation to another and identity is an image of self in relation to others, as well as an image of a group identity, such as nationhood, as opposed to others.⁸⁸ These assumptions lie at the heart of constructivism, which Anne-Marie Slaughter refers to, not as a theory, but as an ontology: “A set of assumptions about the world and human motivation and agency.”⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Ronnie Lipschutz, “On Security,” in Ronnie Lipschutz eds. *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 10.

⁸⁷ Annie-Marie Slaughter, “International Relations, Principal Theories,” in Rudiger Wolfrum eds. *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law* [Vol. 6] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), par. 1. Date Accessed 28.03.17. Site: https://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf

⁸⁸ Peter Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspective on National Security,” in Peter Katzenstein eds. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 5-7.

⁸⁹ Annie-Marie Slaughter, “International Relations, Principal Theories,” in Rudiger Wolfrum eds. *Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law* [Vol. 6] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), par. 19. Date Accessed 28.03.17. Site: https://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf

As constructivism developed as a theory and became more complex, various schools of thought emerged that proposed different approaches towards ontology and epistemology. If ontology deals with the nature of being, our existence and our transformations, then epistemology deals with the theory of knowledge and relates to theories of learning, asking itself what claims can be made about our nature of being and how we behave.⁹⁰ Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba authored the *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (1994), a standard in its field, in which they discussed constructivism's ontology and epistemology. They determined that constructivism is based on a relativist (depending on our culture, history and society) ontology and a subjectivist (knowledge can only be internally constructed) epistemology.⁹¹ Balzacq goes a step further in defining constructivism's ontology as being 'pluralist-idealist', as its approaches incorporate either 'materialism or idealism' and combines this with either 'monism, dualism, or pluralism'. Shifting away from the postmodernist ontological-epistemological debate within constructivism, two major forms of modernist analytical propositions have emerged.

Alexander Wendt, one of the fathers of constructivism, famously claimed that "anarchy is what states make of it."⁹² There is no authority above state-actors, hence an anarchical system, but this does not necessitate country-by-country competition or a self-help system. It is our understanding of anarchy and society that defines 'what we make of it'. Wendt's approach to constructivism has been labelled 'systemic', as his focus on the relations of states within the international system, attempts to view the system as a whole. He also partly accepts the notion that the international structure is defined by an ordering principle, as proposed by neorealists (or structural realists). However, rather than just focusing on the distribution of material factors (and power), Wendt also claims that the social relationships matter. Social identity is rooted in the actors understanding of self and the corporate identity that is given to the Westphalian understanding of statehood. Wendt argues that while material resources undoubtedly exist, they only arouse a response, though structures that are immersed in social interactions, social identities and common knowledge.⁹³ For example, Sweden has a different opinion on US missiles stationed in Poland than Russia does. Even though the

⁹⁰ Thierry Balzacq, "Constructivism and Securitization Studies," in Victor Mauer and Myriam D. Cavelty eds. *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 58.

⁹¹ Egon Guba and Yvonne Lincoln, "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research," in Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln eds. *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), p. 110-111.

⁹² Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," *International Organization* 46 (No. 2, 1992), p. 391. Date Accessed: 28.03.17. DOI: [10.1017/S0020818300027764](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764)

⁹³ Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20 (No. 1, 1995), p. 73. Date Accessed 28.03.17. Site: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539217>

material reality doesn't change, the response is undoubtedly different. This is based on the assumption that "states will act differently to friends and enemies, based on their threat perceptions."⁹⁴ Wendt's systemic focus explains interactions between states, but cannot explain non-systemic domestic identity formation.⁹⁵

While systemic constructivism allows us to study the international system as a whole, 'Holistic' constructivism, "is more concrete and historical, consciously shunning systemic theorizing [and instead] ... focus[es] on how domestic and international social phenomena interact to determine the rules that structure international orders."⁹⁶ The holistic approach to constructivism has been forwarded, amongst others, by Katzenstein. He took Japan's transition from militaristic to pacifist nation as an example, to demonstrate that domestic norms and identity can greatly impact questions of national security.⁹⁷ His norm-based approach, which focused on pacifism as a transformative idea, was better able to explain why Japan decided to reverse decades of military policy in order to accommodate US demands. Friedrich Kratochwil and Rey Koslowski, renowned scholars of international relations, also placed a greater emphasis on rules and norms, which they claimed must be the basis of all analysis.⁹⁸ In their article *Understanding Change* (1994), they argue that beliefs and identities influence the practices of domestic actors (individuals/groups) and domestic actors influence the practices of international actors (states) and thus influence the international system: "Fundamental change of the international system occurs when actors, through their practices, change the rules and norms constitutive of international interaction."⁹⁹ This explains why narratives and framing practices can be so effective on a national and on an international level. This process is not a one-way street, as "structures do not exist independently of the knowledgeable practices of social agents,"¹⁰⁰ the same way that actors do not exist

⁹⁴ Janani Krishnaswamy, "How Does Terrorism Lend Itself to Constructivist Understanding?" *E-International Relations Students*, September 18, 2012. Date Accessed 12.11.16. Site: <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/18/how-does-terrorism-lend-itself-to-constructivist-understanding/>

⁹⁵ Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* [6th Ed.] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 220.

⁹⁶ Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism," *European Journal of International Relations* 4 (No. 3, 1998), p. 269. Date Accessed: 28.03.17. DOI:10.1177/1354066198004003001

⁹⁷ Masaru Kohno, "Review: Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 30 (No. 2, 1997), p. 403. Date Accessed: 20.06.17. DOI: 10.1017/S0008423900015821

⁹⁸ Rey Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics," *International Organization* 48 (No. 2, 1994), p. 226. Date Accessed 28.03.17. Site: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2706931.pdf>

⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 216.

¹⁰⁰ Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism," *European Journal of International Relations* 4 (No. 3, 1998), p. 266-267. Date Accessed: 28.03.17. DOI:10.1177/1354066198004003001

independently from the existing structures. This is the crux of all constructivist thinking, which outlines the “mutual constitution of structure and agents”.¹⁰¹

The constructivist emphasis on ideas, norms, beliefs and identities as part of an interpretive methodology, highlights “a deeply inductive research strategy that targets the reconstruction of state/agent identity, with the methods encompassing a variety of discourse-theoretic techniques.”¹⁰² Identities and norms are continuously changing and as a result, security also does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, security threats are the result of constant, socially constructed changes, providing a far deeper understanding of security processes than orthodox international relations theories. A constructivist view of security, therefore, allows the security analyst to investigate socially constructed notions of security.

2.2 Non-Traditional Security

As the Cold War reached its end, security studies underwent another massive social transformation. Prior to this transformation, traditional security was solely based on a realist construct and competition between nation-states, whereby the security of citizens was automatically guaranteed if the security of the state was maintained. However, globalization and the spread of technological advancements in the field of industry, communications, travel and weaponry, meant that actors and threats were no longer restricted to statehood.¹⁰³ In the 21st century, certain non-state actors such as separatist and terrorist groups were viewed as existential security threats. This became particularly evident following the attacks of 9/11, which made non-traditional security threats more visible to the general public. Threats posed by cybersecurity, transnational criminal organizations, financial interdependence, environmental degradation, health epidemics and international terrorism required a different assessment than traditional security threats.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Ian Hurd, “Constructivism,” in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal eds. *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 303-304.

¹⁰² Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Social Constructivism in Global and European Politics: A Review Essay,” *Review of International Studies* 30 (No. 2, 2004), p. 231. Date Accessed: 27.03.16 DOI: 10.1017/S0260210504006023

¹⁰³ Hans Günter Brauch and Úrsula Oswald Spring, “Introduction: Coping with Global Environmental Change in the Anthropocene,” in Hans Günter Brauch et al. eds. *Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security: Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks* [Vol. 5.] (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2011), p. 31.

¹⁰⁴ Niklas Swanström, “The Narcotics Trade: A Threat to Security? National and Transnational Implications,” *Global Crime* 8 (No. 1, 2007), p. 5. Date Accessed: 02.06.17. DOI: 10.1080/17440570601121829

Innovative approaches and cooperation are necessary to deal with the transnational nature of some of these security challenges. The Asia-wide outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome virus in 2003, which originated in southern China but resulted in the deaths of 774 people in 37 countries, provides a case and point.¹⁰⁵ Caballero-Anthony has defined non-traditional security threats as “challenges to the survival and well-being of people and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources ... these dangers are often transnational in scope, [and] transmitted rapidly due to globalisation and technological advances.”¹⁰⁶ While the range of non-traditional security threats is quite diverse, they share some common features. These are:

1. Non-military: They do not include issues that belong in the field of traditional security.
2. Transnational: Non-traditional security threats do not adhere to traditional state boundaries and need to be managed by regional or multilateral cooperation.
3. Not state-centric: They can affect both state and non-state actors.
4. Rapid: They can arise suddenly and reach a large area over a short period of time.¹⁰⁷

Criticism has been tabled against the term non-traditional security, as it may be used to ‘camouflage’ national and policy-related issues with simplified solutions that do not address the root of the problem.¹⁰⁸ As such any issue can be labelled a security issue if doing so is thought to be beneficial to the security actor. Furthermore, even if security threats are identified as non-traditional, states may still choose to combat these via traditional security responses. Regardless of its shortcomings, non-traditional security threats have taken the limelight away from the military-dominant understanding of security and focus on issues that more directly impact the well-being of individuals and collectives, whose protection requires different approaches as those suggested by traditional security theorists. Securitization theory, as envisioned by the Copenhagen School, is well suited to address non-traditional

¹⁰⁵ Eli Avraham and Eran Ketter, *Tourism Marketing for Developing Countries: Battling Stereotypes and Crises in Asia, Africa and the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), p. 141.

¹⁰⁶ Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security and Multilateralism in Asia: reshaping the contours of regional security architecture?” (Policy Analysis Brief, *The Stanley Foundation*, June 2007), p. 1. Date Accessed: 29.03.17. Site: <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/pab07mely.pdf>

¹⁰⁷ Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security Challenges, Regional Governance, and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC),” (Policy Series Working Paper No. 7, *Asia Security Initiative*, September 2010), p. 1. Date Accessed: 23.02.17. Site:

http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/nts/resources/research_papers/MacArthur_working_paper_Mely_Caballero-Anthony.pdf

¹⁰⁸ Yongjin Zhang, “Understanding Chinese views of the emerging global order,” in Gungwu Wang and Yongnian Zheng eds. *China and the New International Order* (eBook: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007), p. 157.

security threats, since it analyses the social construction of ideational existential threats. This will be examined in the following chapter.

2.3 Securitization Theory

The Copenhagen School provided a significant contribution to constructivism with the introduction of ‘securitization’ as an analytical tool to investigate traditional as well as non-traditional security issues, developed in numerous writings and expanded upon in the book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998) by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. Securitization describes a process where security actors within a society, frame an issue as an existential threat for a referent object through the use of speech acts (securitizing move), which if accepted by a relevant audience, allows the security actor to legitimize the use of extraordinary measures in order to counter the perceived threat.¹⁰⁹

Within the theory, a security actor is a person with sufficient ‘social capital’ (i.e., level of authority), in order to create ‘truths’ regarding threats. Usually, this is a head of government, who is in control of the state apparatus. Existential threats do not necessarily have to represent a ‘real’ existential threat, but rather need to be presented in combination with a sense of urgency.¹¹⁰ Presenting an issue as an existential threat is referred to as a security move, which occurs when discourse “takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object.”¹¹¹ The referent object is whatever needs to be protected. Traditionally, the referent object has been the state territorial integrity and national independence. While the referent object can include any concept that can be socially constructed, therefore also including aspects of societal identity, Buzan found that the size or scale of the referent object is an important factor in determining whether it is successful in gaining the support of the audience.¹¹² Success is found when “limited collectivities ... engage in self-reinforcing rivalries with other limited collectivities, and such interaction strengthens their ‘we’ feeling.”¹¹³ If the unit is too big, it may not elicit the same emotional response. If the unit is too small, it will fail to legitimize extraordinary measures. In order for there to be a successful speech act, the agent, has to fulfil two facilitating conditions:

¹⁰⁹ Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 26.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 24.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p. 25.

¹¹² Ibid, p. 36.

¹¹³ Ibid, p. 36-37.

1. Internal conditions: The security actor's ability to use the 'grammar of security' (following existing procedures) in the 'particular dialects' of the security sectors (such as utilizing identity politics in the societal sector) to establish an existential threat justification and to provide a solution.
2. External conditions: This refers to the 'social capital of the enunciator' (the security actor must have a level of authority) – and the nature of the threat (how likely is it that an issue is regarded as threatening by the population).¹¹⁴

The context of the speech act is relevant as it plays an important role in facilitating or containing a successful securitization. As a result, a significant event such as 9/11 can, therefore, have a considerable impact on securitization processes. However, if the securitizing actor fails to convince a specific audience, the Copenhagen School believes that the securitization effort will have failed. The relevant audience can include public opinion, military officers, or the general public, but can also include international audiences such as allies or the international community. For example, the US War in Iraq may have succeeded in securitizing Saddam Hussein's regime to the US Congress. However, it arguably failed to convince other audiences, such as the UN Security Council.¹¹⁵ Therefore, by studying security discourse, one can determine "what referent objects are appealed to and... [which outcomes] hold security legitimacy so an appeal to their necessary survival is able to mobilize support."¹¹⁶ Following a successful securitization, issues are no longer discussed in the public sphere but are moved beyond the 'established rules of the game' – Securitization is thus an extreme form of politicization located on a spectrum ranging from:

1. Non-politicized issues, which are not part of the public debate and the state does not address them.
2. Politicized issues, which are discussed as public policy and therefore require government policies and resources.
3. Securitized issues, which are presented as an existential threat to a referent object and requiring functional actions beyond normal political procedure, such as emergency measures.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p. 32-33.

¹¹⁵ Ralf Emmers, "Securitization," in Allen Collins eds. *Contemporary Security Studies* [4th Ed.] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 179.

¹¹⁶ Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 39.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p. 23-24.

The shifting of a concern from a non-politicized state to a securitized state is also demonstrated in Figure 1. in the subchapter on De-securitization and De-politicization. Issues that have been securitized successfully receive disproportionate attention and resources, while issues that are not treated with the same urgency may receive less.

This chapter has outlined the Copenhagen School's model for securitization analysis, but its founders also stressed the dangers of securitization. Wæver is also highly critical of securitizing issues, as "security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics."¹¹⁸ Regimes can abuse such practices and greatly influence the role of the military in civilian affairs. Ralf Emmers remarks that in the "the growing articulation of issues as threats in a post-9-11 context, an act of securitization can lead to the further legitimization of the armed forces in politics as well as to the curbing of civil liberties in the name of security."¹¹⁹ Wæver would prefer such issues to be de-securitized and moved to the public sphere of the political system, which is based on rules and regulations.

2.3.1 De-Securitization and De-politicization

Constructivism and the Copenhagen School emphasize that security issues are not constant but subject to continuous change. Indeed, Paul Roe argues that as long as an issue can be securitized and moved out of the public sphere and into the realm of security conceptualizations, then it is also possible for security actors to de-securitize issues and return them back to normal politics.¹²⁰ However, achieving de-securitization is extremely difficult. Roe describes how securitized issues can either be managed or transformed, whereby management does not represent de-securitization (as issues are not returned to normal politics) but rather a type of 'de-politicized' security (away from the extreme politicization of securitization) where discourse, prejudice and norms relating to security remain present.¹²¹ Management may thus only offer some degree of uncertainty-reduction for the audience. Transformation, on the other hand, challenges the basic premise that securitized an issue in the first place. This also has an ethical component according to Jef Huysmans:

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p. 29

¹¹⁹ Ralf Emmers, "Securitization," in Allen Collins eds. *Contemporary Security Studies* [4th Ed.] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 173.

¹²⁰ Paul Roe, "Securitization of Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization," *Security Dialogue* 35 (No. 3, 2004), p. 282. Date Accessed: 28.03.17. DOI: 10.1177/0967010604047527

¹²¹ Ibid, p. 285.

“De-securitization unmakes politics which identify the community on the basis of the expectations of hostility. Instead of simply removing policy questions from the security sector and plugging them into another sector, de-securitising turns into a political strategy which challenges the fundamentals of the political realist constitution of the political community.”¹²²

Thus the goal of de-securitization lies in “shifting ... an issue from something that is ‘security’ to something – and borrowing from Wæver once more – that is ‘asecurity’,”¹²³ in other words, neither representing a security situation, which is a threat situation but with the means to address it, nor an insecurity situation, which is a threat situation but without sufficient means to address it.¹²⁴

Non-Politicization, Politicization and Securitization




Figure 1: Non-Politicization, Politicization and Securitization as a diagram¹²⁵

¹²² Jef Huysmans, “The question of the limit: Desecuritisation and the aesthetics of horror in political realism,” *Journal of International Studies* 27 (No. 3, 1998), p. 576. Date Accessed: 28.03.17 DOI: 10.1177/03058298980270031301: 569–589.

¹²³ Paul Roe, “Securitization of Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization,” *Security Dialogue* 35 (No. 3, 2004), p. 285. Date Accessed: 28.03.17. DOI: 10.1177/0967010604047527

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ This diagram does not imply that issues in the private sphere are not political, an argument that has been successfully made by feminist scholars. Issues in the private sphere in this sense are ‘politicized’, if addressed in public debate.

Lene Hansen delves more deeply into this subject, including the four outcomes of de-securitization,¹²⁶ but analysing de-securitization is not the purpose of this thesis. Instead, it is important to acknowledge the possibility of de-securitization (transformation) as well as the management tools of ‘normalization’ and ‘de-politicization’ that are utilized by security actors to mitigate existing security dilemmas, but not with the goal to transcend them. Instead, some of the consequences of the security dilemma are addressed, but the structural causes remain. For Roe, security actors manage security in order to achieve a situation where:

“the minority can feel secure when certain provisions/legislations/mechanisms are put in place that will guarantee its existence (in identity terms), while similarly the majority can also feel secure in the knowledge that the minority will thus work (politically, economically and also societally) within the existing framework of the state.”¹²⁷

The danger here lies with recurring conflicts and governments abusing civil liberties. Only de-securitization can return issues into the realm of public debate. After having expanded on the central tenants of securitization theory, the next subchapter will introduce criticisms of securitization theory and revisions that will apply to the theoretical framework of this thesis.

2.3.2 Transformation of Securitization Theory

As part of the ‘second generation’ of the securitization scholarship, Thierry Balzacq improved upon many of the systematic assumptions of the Copenhagen School’s Securitization Theory, by offering two corrections in order to examine securitization processes in ‘real situations’: “(i) that an effective securitization is audience-centered; (ii) that securitization is context-dependent,”¹²⁸ The first suggestion concerns itself with the importance of the audience and the inherent ‘power struggle’ whereby the securitizing actor requires the support of the audience in order to continue their course of action. Buzan himself asserted that the acceptance of the audience is crucial for a successful securitization:

“A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a *securitizing move*, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts this as such... If no signs of such acceptance exist we can talk only of a securitizing move, not of an object actually being securitized.”¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Lene Hansen, “Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it,” *Review of International Studies* 38 (2012), p. 525. Date Accessed: 28.03.17. DOI: 10.1017/S0260210511000581

¹²⁷ Paul Roe, “Securitization of Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization,” *Security Dialogue* 35 (No. 3, 2004), p. 293. Date Accessed: 28.03.17. DOI: 10.1177/0967010604047527

¹²⁸ Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (No. 2, 2005), p.171. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. DOI: 10.1177/1354066105052960

¹²⁹ Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 25

If an audience does not accept the securitization of an issue, then it results in a failed securitization attempt. Balzacq noted that it was important for security actors to convince ‘as broad an audience as possible’ both in terms of a formal context as well as moral support.¹³⁰ The formal context in this regard refers to political institutions, while the moral support refers to the public. Thus failure to convince a wider audience or even an international audience can affect the success of the securitizing act.

Even though it is given such importance within the Copenhagen School, the tools to assess whether the audience has accepted securitization have been the focus of much criticism. The acquiescence of the audience is always assumed unless provided with evidence to the contrary. According to Rita Floyd, “if securitization operated like an illocution, then the distinction, much emphasized by the Copenhagen School, between a ‘securitizing move’ and a complete ‘securitization’ would be redundant as the saying itself (the securitizing move) would be the complete securitization.”¹³¹ Balzacq also criticized Wæver’s view of security as an illocutionary speech act as it “becomes effective *ex opere operato*.”¹³² The emphasis placed on the acceptance of the audience thus becomes negated, even though “successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act.”¹³³ The impact of the audience is also located at the end of the securitization process, thus dismissing any effect the audience may have on the securitizing actor, prior to the securitizing move.¹³⁴ However, the audience, their perceptions of threat and external developments are integral parts of the contextual factors, as securitizing agents do not engage in existential threat justifications within a vacuum. Security actors securitize certain threats because of the external conditions that they occur in.

This also touches on Balzacq’s second improvement, namely that securitization is context-dependent and is a strategic practice. The facilitating conditions of securitization theory remain outside of the theoretical framework and Balzacq urges the security analyst to incorporate “the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that

¹³⁰ Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (No. 2, 2005), p.185. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. DOI: 10.1177/1354066105052960

¹³¹ Rita Floyd, *Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 52.

¹³² Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (No. 2, 2005), p.176. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. DOI: 10.1177/1354066105052960

¹³³ Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 31

¹³⁴ Philippe Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement & Order* (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 41.

both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.”¹³⁵ Furthermore, Balzacq continues to explain that “far from being a departure from constructivist approaches to security, external developments are central to it. [...] to move an audience’s attention toward an event or a development construed as dangerous, the words of the securitizing actor need to resonate with the context within which his/her actions are collocated.”¹³⁶ Analysing the securitization of terrorism and separatism in a pre-9/11 and post-9/11 context can go a long way in explaining the strategic practices of security actors. Philippe Bourbeau makes a similar argument, namely that “securitizing moves both percolate from the environment in which they are made and are constrained by the same environment. As such, agents’ securitizing moves have to be analysed within the context in which they are made.”¹³⁷ This harks back to the point made by holistic constructivism: That agency and structure are mutually constituted.

2.4 Identity

As discussed previously, non-traditional security is based on the concept of norms, ideas and identity. This is because for constructivists “identities and norms influence how security interests are defined.”¹³⁸ Individuals form their identities based on their ethnicity, as well as their culture, religion, language, regional belonging, and customs.¹³⁹ Similarly, Wæver explained that “society is about identity, about the self-conception of communities and individuals identifying themselves as members of a community,”¹⁴⁰ whereby identity is defined as “what enables the word *we* to be used.”¹⁴¹ As such, ethnicity is a very powerful identity marker, as it often dictates how we are perceived and what status we receive. According to David Bromell in 2008, there were over 600 language groups and over 5,000 ethnic groups living in 192 independent states.¹⁴² Within a multi-ethnic world, ethnic identity is a dynamic social phenomenon, which is strongly affected by developmental and contextual

¹³⁵ Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (No. 2, 2005), p.172. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. DOI: 10.1177/1354066105052960

¹³⁶ Ibid, p.181-182.

¹³⁷ Philippe Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order* (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 44.

¹³⁸ Nilüfer Karacasulu and Elif Uzgören, “Explaining Social Constructivist Contributions to Security Studies,” *Perceptions* (Summer-Autumn, 2007), p. 37. Date Accessed: 20.06.17. Site: <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/KaracasuluUzgoren.pdf>

¹³⁹ Pierre Nikolov and Daniel Semcesen, “Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict,” (Essay, Lund University, 2008), p. 9. Date Accessed: 18.06.17. Site: <https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=1320021&fileId=1320022>

¹⁴⁰ Ole Wæver, “Societal Security: The Concept,” in Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Pierre Lemaitre eds. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda* (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 24.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p. 17.

¹⁴² David Bromell, *Ethnicity, Identity and Public Policy: Critical Perspectives on Multiculturalism* (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 2008), p. 7.

factors,¹⁴³ but also able to influence intergroup and majority-minority relations. A study by Maria Jamias, Renato Pablo and Donald Taylor, which was designed to analyse the self-perception of Filipino children, indicated that children ages six, eight, and ten years old were not only aware of their ethnicity, but also “identified more often with their regional group (Tagalog) than with the national group (Filipino).”¹⁴⁴ This finding is important because it exemplifies the natural progression of identity formation, especially in minority groups. This progression was mapped by Jean Phinney, who claimed that the ethnic progression of minorities groups changed from those “who had not explored their ethnicity (diffusion foreclosure); ... [those] involved in exploration (moratorium); and [those] ... committed to ethnic identity (ethnic identity achieved).”¹⁴⁵ Ethnic and societal groups are differentiated by various parameters, such as their relative power, size, status and prestige. Those born into groups that are at a relative and collective disadvantage to other groups may become involved in “constructive actions aimed at affirming the value and legitimacy of their group... or to feeling of insecurity, confusion, or resentment over treatment of their group.”¹⁴⁶ In cases where positive affirmation of the group is not possible, there is a threat to the reproduction of identity. According to Catarina Kinnvall:

“The destabilizing effects of globalization obviously predate 9/11, but we will find it difficult to understand this event and others like it unless we grasp the structural conditions of insecurity related to globalization. As individuals feel vulnerable and experience existential anxiety, it is not uncommon for them to wish to reaffirm a threatened self-identity. Any collective identity that can provide such security is a potential pole of attraction.”¹⁴⁷

When questions of identity are mixed with questions of security, this can trigger a security dilemma between opposing groups, or a ‘societal security dilemma’. Wæver defined societal security as concerning “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.”¹⁴⁸ As such, states can

¹⁴³ Jean S. Phinney et al., “Ethnic Identity, Immigration, and Well-Being: An Interactional Perspective,” *Journal of Social Issues* **57** (No. 3, 2001), p. 496. Date Accessed: 23.05.17. DOI:10.1111/0022-4537.00225

¹⁴⁴ Maria Jamia, Renato Pablo and Donald Taylor, “Ethnic Awareness in Filipino Children,” *Journal of Social Psychology* **83** (No. 2, 1971), p. 164. Date Accessed: 22.05.17. DOI: 10.1080/00224545.1971.9922457

¹⁴⁵ Jean S. Phinney, “Stages of Ethnic Identity Development in Minority Group Adolescents,” *Journal of Early Adolescence* **9** (No. 1-2, 1989), p. 34. Date Accessed: 15.06.17. DOI: 10.1177/0272431689091004

¹⁴⁶ Jean S. Phinney et al., “Ethnic Identity, Immigration, and Well-Being: An Interactional Perspective,” *Journal of Social Issues* **57** (No. 3, 2001), p. 34. Date Accessed: 18.06.17. DOI: 10.1111/0022-4537.00225

¹⁴⁷ Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security,” *Political Psychology* **25** (No. 5, 2004), p. 742. Date Accessed: 15.06.17. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00396.x

¹⁴⁸ Ole Wæver, “Societal Security: The Concept,” in Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Pierre Lemaitre eds. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda* (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 23.

also perceive threats to their societal identity. Buzan and Wæver named three issues that can be identified as a threat to any society or to the societal identity of a state. These include:

1. Migration: Where societal identity is threatened or diluted by a large number of people from another society.
2. Horizontal Competition: Where population remains unchanged but bordering societal groups fear that the societal identity of the 'other' may impact their societal identity.
3. Vertical Competition: Vertical competition is especially pertinent to separatist conflicts, where determined identities are either widened or made more narrow due to secessionist intentions.¹⁴⁹

Wæver bases his definitions of society and identity on Anthony Giddens view that "societies operat[e] as units in an international system."¹⁵⁰ In this sense, societies constitute identities and behave similar to states and can be analysed in a similar way. The societal security dilemma improves our understanding of conflicts that do not occur between states, but those that occur within them.

2.4.1 Ethno-National Conflicts

According to Donald Horowitz, "the state system that first grew out of European feudalism and now, in the post-colonial period, covers virtually the entire earth,"¹⁵¹ has shaped the framework in which modern ethno-national conflicts occur. Research in this area has been greatly influenced by Horowitz's *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (2002), which established his overarching theory of ethno-national conflict by covering a range of topics, from ethnic affiliations and ethnic conflict to ethnic politics and conflict reduction strategies. Horowitz argues that in Africa and Asia, ethnic identity hold greater sway than national identity (whereas "the moving forces of European history can be described broadly in terms of religion, nationalism, and class"¹⁵²). Being in control of the organs of a state is a highly coveted position, especially when it may determine the inclusion and exclusion of groups

¹⁴⁹ Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 121.

¹⁵⁰ Anthony Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence. Vol. II of Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), p. 163; cited in Ole Wæver, "Societal Security: The Concept," in Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Pierre Lemaitre eds. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda* (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 19.

¹⁵¹ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* [2nd Ed.] (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), p. 5.

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 6, 20.

within the decision-making process. Ethno-nationalist conflict may differ from case to case, but the fact that it occurs all over the world makes it ripe for comparison.

In *Asia: The Changing World* (2007), The Bertelsmann Stiftung identified the growing occurrence of ethno-national conflicts between state and non-state actors in Asia as ‘identity conflicts’ and divided them into five categories:

1. Conflicts of state consolidation.
2. Conflicts relating to control and power among political elites.
3. Anti-regime conflicts.
4. Separatist conflicts driven by ethnic groups located on the periphery of the state.
5. Inter-communal conflicts.¹⁵³

The categories 1. and 4. are particularly relevant to the research question because they explain conflicts between different societal identities and are subject to understand the securitization of ethno-national minorities, such as the Uyghur and the Moro minority. However, before delving deeper into the various types of ethno-national conflict, it is important to acknowledge that ethnicity is not an agent of conflict. Even though there are various issues over which minority and majority groups can challenge each other, which Will Kymlicka lists as “language rights, federalism and regional autonomy, political representation, religious freedom, education curriculum, land claims, immigration and naturalization policy, even national symbols,”¹⁵⁴ most struggles between ethnicities take place within the legitimate political process and do not appear on our radar. As such, violent ethnic conflicts are ultimately rare compared to the plethora of ethnicities that exist within the world today.

2.4.2 Conflicts of State Consolidation (State Building)

In *Asia: The Changing World*, China’s ‘low-level conflict’ with Uyghur’s in Xinjiang as well as the early stages of the Philippines’ conflict with Moros in Mindanao, are identified as

¹⁵³ Aurel Croissant, “Inner-Asian Fragilities,” in Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung eds. *Asia: Changing the World* (Hamburg: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), p. 66-69.

¹⁵⁴ Will Kymlicka, *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 1.

conflicts of state consolidation.¹⁵⁵ Both countries have utilized state-led nation-building policies (assimilation, accommodation, and exclusion) in order to strengthen their power in minority regions. In *The Politics of Nation-Building* (2012), Harris Mylonas shows that such nation-building policies often result in conflict and points to the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran, the situation of Kashmir, Tibetans and Uyghurs in China and various African states to illustrate his point.¹⁵⁶ This can be explained as follows: As former colonies began unifying their countries, often divided along colonial lines, minorities viewed unification as a ‘societal threat’. Not without reason, as governments have often tried to assert their dominance in minority areas through policies that promote economic modernization (which often degrade the environment), encourage migration and extract resources, often protracting the unequal distribution of resources between majority and minority groups. However, as precolonial boundaries and power structures returned, ethnic minority groups reorganized in order to protect themselves from excessive state coercion.¹⁵⁷ While ethno-national minorities viewed consolidation policies as a societal threat, state security actors viewed minority aspirations for increased autonomy or independence as a political threat to “achieving control over economic resources or the acquisition or retention of political power.”¹⁵⁸ As grievances grew, conflicts of state consolidation often transformed into separatist conflicts.

2.4.3 Separatist Conflicts

Separatist conflicts between ethno-national groups are also often associated with vertical conflicts between a central government and a peripheral minority.¹⁵⁹ Government repression towards such groups can be explained by the high stakes involved as challenges to the legitimacy and authority of the nation-state are seen as encouraging fragmentation, which would make the nation-state vulnerable on the international stage. During separatist disputes with Aceh province in Indonesia, President Megawati Sukarnoputri commented that “no country in the world ... would tolerate disintegration.”¹⁶⁰ Damien Kingsbury and Costas Laotides characterized separatist conflicts as exhibiting extreme violence, whereby any

¹⁵⁵ Aurel Croissant, “Inner-Asian Fragilities,” in Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung eds. *Asia: Changing the World* (Hamburg: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), p. 67.

¹⁵⁶ Harris Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation-Building* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 9-10.

¹⁵⁷ Richard Jackson, “Regime Security,” in Allen Collins eds. *Contemporary Security Studies* [4th Ed.] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 204.

¹⁵⁸ Aurel Croissant, “Inner-Asian Fragilities,” in Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung eds. *Asia: Changing the World* (Hamburg: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), p. 68.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Megawati Sukarnoputri; cited in Barbara Walter, *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts are so Violent* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 163.

settlement “comes at a high human, economic and political price, especially in cases where the logic of denial prevails by prioritizing military options.”¹⁶¹ Kingsbury and Laotides further explain that this “modern sense of sovereignty and indivisibility of states evolved historically in Europe... through a gradual transformation of the notion of political community and its relations to territory.”¹⁶² Should governments be unable to find a solution to a separatist movement, other ethnicities or minorities may also raise similar concerns. As a result, there is a reluctance to openly discuss such issues. This view is also supported by important findings by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, which established that there is a “weak performance of political institutions in transforming countries when it comes to political and social integration and the limited ability or willingness on the part of political leaders to build social consensus and to de-escalate social conflicts.”¹⁶³

However, this reluctance for negotiations and arrangements is unreasonable, as the empirical findings of Ted Gurr suggest that seven out of eleven instances, where some regional autonomy was granted, resulted in a de-escalation of violence and did not develop into separatist struggles (and two of the four failures were the result of incomppliance by the government).¹⁶⁴ This indicates that autonomy arrangements mitigate some of the effects of majority rule in ethnically or religiously diverse societies and therefore do not necessitate further secessionist demands. Similarly, evidence from the conservative RAND Corporation indicates that negotiated settlements are the most effective tactic in stopping terrorist campaigns.¹⁶⁵ This also questions the efficacy of securitization processes, when negotiations may ultimately raise the safety for all rather than enforcing a divisive understanding of security. However despite this evidence, separatist struggles tend to end without a peaceful agreement: Barbara Walter’s research demonstrates that self-determination disputes have the highest likelihood of erupting into war and are the most difficult to achieve settlement, even

¹⁶¹ Damien Kingsbury and Costas Laotides, “Introduction,” in Kingsbury and Laotides eds. *Territorial Separatism in Global Politics: Causes, Outcomes and Resolution* (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 4.

¹⁶² Ibid, p. 2.

¹⁶³ Aurel Croissant, “Inner-Asian Fragilities,” in Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung eds. *Asia: Changing the World* (Hamburg: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), p. 71.

¹⁶⁴ Ted Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 300-305.

¹⁶⁵ Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida,” (Monograph Series, *Rand Corporation*, 2008), p. 42. Date Accessed: 02.06.2017. Site: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf

though the human and economic cost is high, as the average independence war between 1940 and 1992 lasted eight years.¹⁶⁶

Difficulties in resolving separatist conflicts can also be explained due to the transnational character of many such conflicts, removing the boundaries of the state and further requiring non-traditional solutions. The heavy degree of foreign involvement and the transnationalization of these conflicts combined with the spread of religious fundamentalism, makes it more difficult to de-securitize such issues and address them in the public sphere. Indeed, if there is a reluctance on both sides to resolve their differences, then transnational support may be used by insurgent groups to increase local pressure.¹⁶⁷ However, transnational ties can also be used as a ‘cognitive threat amplifier’ to heighten the level of fear and to legitimate tougher repression,¹⁶⁸ as is suspected to be the case regarding the global WoT.

2.5 Terrorism

2.5.1 The Relationship between Terrorism and Separatism

Finally, the last chapter of the theoretical framework focuses on the social construction of terrorism and its relationship with separatist conflicts. It has previously been argued that the context of the speech act is relevant in analysing securitization processes. The events of 9/11 and the WoT have functioned as significant facilitating conditions in the securitization of the Uyghur and Moro minority question, especially, since both ethno-national minorities are predominantly Muslim and some individuals of these minority groups have engaged in separatist or violent terrorist activities. However, terrorism does not adhere to a fixed definition, but instead has been used as a tactic of war since thousands of years, by “zealots in Judea in the first and second centuries CE, the Assassins in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Sons of Liberty in colonial America, and Fascists and Nazis after World War I,”¹⁶⁹ as well as many more.

¹⁶⁶ Barbara Walter, *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts are so Violent* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 3-4.

¹⁶⁷ Amador Peleo, “Living with a Culture of Conflict: Insurgency and the Philippines,” *Political Perspectives* 1 (No. 1, 2007), p. 1. Date Accessed: 03.04.17. Site: <http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/CIP-2007-01-04.pdf>

¹⁶⁸ Johan Erikson and Mark Rhinhard, “The Internal-External Security Nexus: Notes on an Emerging Research Agenda,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 44 (No. 3, 2009), p. 253. Date Accessed: 02.01.18. DOI: 10.1177/0010836709106215. pp243-267.

¹⁶⁹ Brenda Lutz and James Lutz, “Terrorism,” in Allen Collins eds. *Contemporary Security Studies* [4th Ed.] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 312.

After the Second World War, terrorism became used more frequently in conflicts relating to independence or self-determination movements: “By the 1950s and early 1960s, guerrilla groups in places as diverse as Northern Ireland, Algeria and Kenya (among other places), employed terrorism in an effort to overthrow colonial powers, leading many people to associate terrorism with revolutionary movements to end colonialism.”¹⁷⁰ In fact, many self-determination, separatist and ethno-nationalist movements commonly adopted terrorism as a tactic of war to achieve independence. An increasing prevalence of intrastate wars has witnessed non-state actors “who use terrorist attacks or specific activities aimed at the civilian population.”¹⁷¹ Separatist conflicts are naturally asymmetrical, pitting smaller against larger groups. As such conflicts become more protracted and violent, incidents of terrorism can become more frequent. The tactics of terrorists, such as “bombings, kidnappings, assaults including assassinations, and takeovers of buildings, planes, or ships, invariably with hostages,”¹⁷² can cause a significant amount of damage, without expending large numbers of personnel or material costs.

However, as explained by Fernando Reinares, “there is no direct causal nor unavoidable connection between separatist nationalism as expression of political discontent, socio-economic grievances or identity claims and terrorist violence.”¹⁷³ There is plenty of evidence of separatist causes that utilized terrorist tactics, but also plenty of evidence of separatist causes that ended in peaceful liberation movements, “as exemplified by the secessions of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, of Hungary from Austria in 1867, and of Norway from Sweden in 1905... as a result of legal processes. In these cases, the leadership of the predecessor state accepts the inevitability of secession, and negotiations follow.”¹⁷⁴ Thus, it is the variation in the government response to separatist demands that have the greatest impact on the chain of events. Should the fear of redistributing power or allowing secession occur to be too great, then the “state would have certain incentives to misrepresent the nature of the conflict it is facing in order to resist accommodations of ethno-nationalist grievances.”¹⁷⁵ By

¹⁷⁰ Carolyn Gallaher, “Terrorism,” in Carolyn Gallaher et al. eds. *Key Concepts in Political Geography* (London: SAGE Publications, 2009), p. 248

¹⁷¹ Aurel Croissant, “Inner-Asian Fragilities,” in Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung eds. *Asia: Changing the World* (Hamburg: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), p. 69.

¹⁷² Brenda Lutz and James Lutz, “Terrorism,” in Allen Collins eds. *Contemporary Security Studies* [4th Ed.] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 314.

¹⁷³ Fernando Reinares, “Nationalism Separatism and Terrorism in Comparative Perspective,” in Tore Bjorgo eds. *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myth Realities and the Way Forward* (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 119.

¹⁷⁴ Elena Pokalova, “Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* **33** (2010), p. 430-431. Date Accessed 24.03.17. DOI: 10.1080/10576101003691564.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p. 431-432.

framing or securitizing a conflict as being part of a global terrorist agenda, a state is able to justify hard security measures, which would otherwise be illegitimate against secessionist claims.¹⁷⁶ Especially in the context of post-9/11, fear of terrorism resonates more strongly in the public's perception, functioning as a facilitating condition and allowing identity markers, which are related to a minority question seeking greater independence, to be more easily be securitized. As such, the urgency associated with terrorism means that governments do not have to explain their procedures under the same level of scrutiny. In summary, separatism does not in itself provide the conditions for terrorism. Instead, internal constraints and repressive behaviour towards ethno-national and religious minorities may provide such groups with the perceived legitimacy to use terrorist tactics.¹⁷⁷

2.5.2 Analysing Terrorism

From a theoretical perspective, Brenda Lutz and Peter Lutz have suggested that Peter Sederberg's three categories of terrorism have been the most useful in analysing terrorism:

“The *first* perspective is to think of terrorism in the context of an enemy to be defeated in war. The war analogy presumes that the use of military methods can be successful and that it is possible to achieve victory. A *second* perspective for dealing with terrorists is to rely on normal police techniques... The *third* perspective is to consider terrorism as a disease, emphasizing both symptoms and underlying causes. It assumes that there is a need for long-term strategies that address the basic causes, even if there can be successes along the way in treating symptoms. The three perspectives, although not mutually exclusive, represent dominant ways in which terrorism is viewed.”¹⁷⁸

These perspectives, represent the most common way in which terrorism is perceived and thus what strategies are adopted to deal with terrorism. Following the events of 9/11, the war analogy, i.e., the first perspective became the most dominant. The reason why so many countries have worked willingly within this framework is that framing ethno-national aspirations for increased autonomy or independence as part of the WoT has been very successful.¹⁷⁹ According to Junaid Rana, the language of the WoT in particular “demonizes Muslims and has created an industry of policing and militarism,”¹⁸⁰ which threatens societal identities of large groups of people and marginalizes them from society. Michael Clarke lists

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 433.

¹⁷⁷ Rhonda Callaway and Julie Harrelson-Stephens, “Toward a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant of Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* **29** (2006), p. 698. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. DOI: 10.1080/10576100600701974

¹⁷⁸ Brenda Lutz and James Lutz, “Terrorism,” in Allen Collins eds. *Contemporary Security Studies* [4th Ed.] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 312-313.

¹⁷⁹ Elena Pokalova, “Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* **33** (2010), p. 429. Date Accessed 24.03.17. DOI: 10.1080/10576101003691564.

¹⁸⁰ Junaid Rana, “Policing Kashmiri Brooklyn,” in Sylvester A. Johnson and Steven Weitzman eds. *The FBI and Religion* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), p. 257.

further state actions, such as “restrictions of language or dress, and control or closure of places of education and worship, to the deportation or killing of members of the community,”¹⁸¹ which further undermine the positive association of minority identities. In a 9/11-context, governments have also framed separatist or ethno-national conflicts as part of the international terrorist agenda and have directed this towards an American target audience, eliciting either support or acquiescence.¹⁸² Today, the war analogy is the most common method with which security actors engage terrorism as it legitimizes the possibility for utilising hard security measures.

The second perspective, normal policing strategies, assumes that terrorism, like crime, is part of human society and can be policed. This strategy can make “use of informers and the infiltration of agents into potentially dangerous groups (like the Ku Klux Klan in the United States in the 1960s).”¹⁸³ The second perspective applies, where a state believes that its security is not so seriously compromised that it must resort to a military response. Instead the response occurs within the law and within normal political procedures.

Finally, the third perspective believes that terrorism needs to be addressed via long-term strategies that improve the underlying symptoms. One can compare the third perspective to modern strategies for combating drug abuse. Instead of declaring a war on drug users (through the lens of the first perspective), which causes a significant number of victims as evident by President Rodrigo Duterte’s drug policy in the Philippines; or incarcerating drug abusers after they are caught taking drugs (through the lens of the second perspective), which puts vulnerable individuals into prison and among criminals where their well-being is undoubtedly going to deteriorate; modern strategies include providing drug abusers with safe spaces to take drugs, and provide emotional and psychological support to improve their lives so that they can eventually refrain from taking drugs. Addressing the underlying causes requires short- and long-term peace-building efforts that address the “economic, social, political, cultural, and ecological spheres through participatory and consultative

¹⁸¹ Michael Clarke, “China’s War on Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism,” (Regional Outlook Paper No. 11, *Griffith Asia Institute*, 2007), p 3-4. Date Accessed: 22.03.17. Site: https://www.griffith.edu.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0005/18239/regional-outlook-volume-11.pdf

¹⁸² Elena Pokalova, “Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* **33** (2010), p. 438-439. Date Accessed 24.03.17. DOI: 10.1080/10576101003691564.

¹⁸³ Brenda Lutz and James Lutz, “Terrorism,” in Allen Collins eds. *Contemporary Security Studies* [4th Ed.] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 313.

mechanisms.”¹⁸⁴ Non-governmental organisations and international institutions can also mediate the challenges to human security and “help cope with the scourge of [Non-traditional security] ... challenges.”¹⁸⁵

Security is about survival: “If a state loses its sovereignty it will not survive as a state, while if a society loses its identity it will not survive as a society.”¹⁸⁶ On the topic of societal survival, Buzan enquires: “What happens when societies cannot look to the state for protection?”¹⁸⁷ If a union is unable to guarantee the security of its minorities, or if the ‘management’ or de-politicization of security issues does not address the underlying concerns, then collectivities will attempt to change the system or provide their own security. This correlates to Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens findings that “terrorism is intrinsically linked to threats to human security... [and] accordingly, in the war on terrorism any idea of security can only be realized if human security is explicitly included.”¹⁸⁸ The Global Terrorism Index 2016 also came to the conclusion that for non-OECD countries, terrorist activity by various groups is strongly related to ongoing conflicts, where religious persecution, state terror, low respect for human rights and group grievances have a high correlation.¹⁸⁹ While violence and incidents of terrorism are never justified, hard security measures can be seen as a failure of a government to engage with some of the real or perceived grievances of ethno-national or religious minorities in the normal political sphere.

¹⁸⁴ Soliman M. Santos Jr., “War and Peace on the Moro Front: Three Standard Bearers, Three Forms of Struggle, Three Tracks (Overview),” in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 69-70.

¹⁸⁵ Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security Challenges, Regional Governance, and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC),” (Policy Series Working Paper No. 7, *Asia Security Initiative*, September 2010), p. 4. Date Accessed: 23.02.17. Site:

http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/nts/resources/research_papers/MacArthur_working_paper_Mely_Caballero-Anthony.pdf

¹⁸⁶ Michael Clarke, “China’s War on Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism,” (Regional Outlook Paper No. 11, *Griffith Asia Institute*, 2007), p 3. Date Accessed: 22.03.17. Site:

https://www.griffith.edu.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0005/18239/regional-outlook-volume-11.pdf

¹⁸⁷ Barry Buzan, “Societal Security, State Security, and Internationalisation,” in Buzan et al. eds. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda* (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 56-57.

¹⁸⁸ Rhonda Callaway and Julie Harrelson-Stephens, “Toward a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant of Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29 (2006), p. 680. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. DOI: 10.1080/10576100600701974

¹⁸⁹ *Institute for Economics and Peace*, “Global Terrorism Index 2016: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism,” (n/d), p. 70-71. Date Accessed 08.02.17 Site: <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf>

3 Methodology

3.1 Overview

This part of the thesis discusses the choice of the case studies, the data selection process and the methodology that will be applied to the case studies. The first part of this chapter will discuss the reason for choosing the cases of Uyghurs in China and the Moros in the Philippines. The second part will discuss the data selection process and will explain the selection of security actor, since the purpose of analysing securitization is to identify: “who is securitizing (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions.”¹⁹⁰ The third part will discuss the chosen method, the discourse analysis, which is recommended by the Copenhagen School.

3.2 Case Selection

China provides a suitable case study as it has employed a military strategy against separatist groups and has curbed cultural and religious freedoms in order to promote state security. The WoT provided a suitable opportunity. According to Michael Clarke, the events of 9/11 “prompted Beijing to immediately appropriate the lexicon of the ‘war on terror’ to label Uyghur opposition as ‘religious extremism’ linked to the malign influence of regional and transnational jihadist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, in order to generate diplomatic capital for the ongoing repression of Uyghur autonomist aspirations.”¹⁹¹

After deciding to analyse the securitization of the Uyghur minority question, a Muslim minority in China, it was significant to compare their securitization in the pre- and post-9/11 period with another Muslim minority in Southeast Asia. The case of the Moros is chosen as a comparison, due to a case study by Gene Navera, which argues that President Joseph Estrada and President Gloria Macaraeg-Arroyo have linked independence movements in the South with criminality and terrorism to legitimate the use of extraordinary measures.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 32

¹⁹¹ Michael Clarke, “China’s Counter-Terrorism Law and the Uyghurs,” *The Cipher Brief*, September 29, 2016. Date Accessed: 04.01.18. Site: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/chinas-counter-terrorism-law-and-the-uyghurs

¹⁹² Gene Segarra Navera, “Metaphorizing The Philippine Presidency: Schemas of Presidential Leadership in The Post-Marcos State of The Nation Addresses (1987-2009),” (PhD Dissertation, National University of Singapore, 2012), p. 385. Date Accessed: 31.03.18. Site: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48651402.pdf>

3.3 Data Selection

In the scope of this research, the securitizing actors are Chinese premiers and Filipino presidents, since they provide authoritative annual speeches on the state of their nation. The Philippines is a democratic republican state where the President is elected for a six-year term by popular vote and receives executive powers. The Filipino presidents are well suited for a securitization analysis of presidential speech acts, due to their yearly constitutionally mandated State of the Nation Address (SONA) to Congress. According to Gene Navera, the SONA “contains the president’s assessment of the national situation, the government’s performance during the previous year, and ... recommendations for the succeeding year.”¹⁹³ Speech acts by Chinese presidents are not readily accessible nor are they consistent in their periodic delivery or their thematic outline. However, the Chinese premier is the theoretical head of government and the leader of the State Council, which is the executive organ of the National People’s Congress (NPC). The Chinese premier presents an annual Report on the Work of the Government (RWG) to the NPC, which provides authoritative information on a government’s defence and security policies as well as insight into real or perceived threats. According to Han Ze, the RWG’s “offers a rare opportunity for observers to tabulate and evaluate the major areas of work China is prioritizing.”¹⁹⁴ A sociological discourse analysis of the Chinese premiers and the Filipino presidents will thus represent the government’s position on security issues and detect securitization. The ‘social capital’ of the Chinese premier and the Filipino president comes from the formal position of power that both positions have in the national security structure.

This thesis will conduct a discourse analysis of 20 yearly state of the nation addresses from 1997 to 2006. The time frame was chosen in order to analyse the discourse in ten speeches (five by a Chinese premier and five by a Filipino president) before and after the announcement of the WoT. An issue to be addressed is the subjectivity of security actors, who will view terrorist or separatist groups as greater or lesser security threats. However, this thesis argues that security actors in China generally follow the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) policies and are required to toe the line so to speak. All party members are expected to adhere to the four principles, which are laid out in the constituting of the CCP: “to keep to the

¹⁹³ Ibid, p. 6.

¹⁹⁴ Han Ze, “China’s 2017 Work Report: Changes on Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Global Order,” *The Diplomat*, March 7, 2017. Date Accessed: 16.01.18. Site: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/chinas-2017-work-report-changes-on-hong-kong-taiwan-and-the-global-order/>

socialist road and to uphold the people's democratic dictatorship, leadership by the Communist Party of China, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”¹⁹⁵ The same case cannot be made for the Philippines, which is a multi-party state and whose government has changed frequently. However, there is a certain continuation of policy and of government. While different security actors have had different styles and approaches, President Fidel V. Ramos’ vice-president was Joseph Estrada. When Estrada became president, Gloria Macaraeg-Arroyo was vice-president, until she herself assumed the office in 2000, when Estrada was removed from office. In the post-9/11 period of analysis, Arroyo was the only president under investigation.

The data set for this thesis will, therefore, include Filipino SONA’s and Chinese RWG’s from March 1997 to July 2006, following the Premiers Li Peng (1987-1998), Zhu Rongji (1998-2003) and Wen Jiabao (2003-2013) in China as well as the Presidents Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), Joseph Estrada (1998-2001) and Gloria Macaraeg-Arroyo (2001-2010) in the Philippines. RWGs that were not available in English were translated from Chinese, while passages in Filipino, within the mainly English SONAs, have also been translated.

3.4 Sociological Discourse Analysis

This thesis will utilize a discourse analysis, as recommended by the Copenhagen School: “How should we study our cases? The obvious method is discourse analysis, since we are interested in when and how something is established by whom as a security threat.”¹⁹⁶ Discourse analysis is complementary to securitization theory because it essentially scrutinizes the ‘everyday discourse critique’ of the state in relation to “struggles against domination on the basis of class, gender, race, and so forth.”¹⁹⁷ It is also complimentary to holistic constructivism as agency and structure are mutually constituted:

“Discourse is shaped by the world, and discourse shapes the world. Discourse is shaped by language, and discourse shapes language. Discourse is shaped by participants, and discourse

¹⁹⁵ *Chinese Communist Party*, “Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” (Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party Of China, November 14, 2002). Date Accessed: 17.04.18. Site: <https://fas.org/irp/world/china/docs/const.html>

¹⁹⁶ Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 176.

¹⁹⁷ Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” in Teun A. van Dijk eds. *Discourse as Social Interaction* [Vol. 2] (London: Sage Publications, 1997), p. 281.

shapes participants. ... Discourse is shaped by purpose, and discourse shapes possible purposes.”¹⁹⁸

However, discourse analysis does not represent one method but is an umbrella term used for a wide variety of methodologies. Social discourse analysis is particularly useful as it offers a wide array of flexibility in terms of qualitative analysis and can be used to explain the *raison d'être* of the securitizing move. Therefore this thesis will apply a sociological discourse analysis.

According to Jorge Ruiz Ruiz, a sociological discourse analysis requires three stages: A textual analysis, which aims to determine the discourses ‘composition and structure’, usually through a content analysis, which breaks down the discourse in order to code relevant fragments; a contextual analysis, which details the circumstances in which the discourse is produced; and a sociological analysis, which places the discourse as a social product by connecting it to the social space in which it has emerged.¹⁹⁹ A speech act may imply that only a textual analysis should be used to investigate securitisation. However, according to Maria Julia Trombetta, there are “limits of a formalistic and de-contextualized approach to securitization.”²⁰⁰ Therefore a sociological discourse analysis is used, which initially takes advantage of textual and contextual analysis, but also goes further by allowing for an interpretive explanation of what the discourse implies. This is especially useful for explaining majority-minority relations, which need to be placed within their social and historical context, in order to convey the underlying motives behind a security actor’s discourse when addressing issues such as a country’s ethno-national minority question. Furthermore, the three dimensions included within a sociological discourse analysis are particularly useful for analysing speeches of those in powerful institutional positions, as the contextual analysis can help understand the circumstances in which the narrative is constructed, while the sociological analysis can explain the ideology behind it.²⁰¹ As a result, this study identifies categories and themes within the data corps, which directly or indirectly refer to the ethno-

¹⁹⁸ Christopher Eisenhart and Barbara Johnstone, “Discourse Analysis and Rhetorical Studies,” in Barbara Johnstone and Christopher Eisenhart eds. *Rhetoric in Detail: Discourse Analyses of Rhetorical Talk and Text* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2008), p. 11.

¹⁹⁹ Jorge Ruiz Ruiz, “Sociological Discourse Analysis: Methods and Logic,” *Forum Qualitative Social Research* 10 (No. 2, Art. 26, 2009), p. 4-15. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/download/1298/2883>

²⁰⁰ Maria Julia Trombetta, “Rethinking the securitization of the environment: Old Beliefs, New Insights,” in Thierry Balzacq eds. *Understanding Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (eBook: Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2010), p. 135.

²⁰¹ Jorge Ruiz Ruiz, “Sociological Discourse Analysis: Methods and Logic,” *Forum Qualitative Social Research* 10 (No. 2, Art. 26, 2009), p. 4-15. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/download/1298/2883>

national minority or the societal identity of the state, as well as references to overall majority-minority relations. These will be discussed in the analysis.

4 Analysis

4.1 Overview

Within the data corps – the state of the union addresses in China and the Philippines – this thesis identified the following categories:

Referent Object	State / National Security
	Social Stability
	Economy
	Sovereignty / Territorial Integrity
	Democracy / Constitution
	People
Existential Threat	Crime
	Separatism
	Terrorism
	Poverty
	Religion
Extraordinary Measures	Hard Security Measures
	Extra-Judicial Killings

This is an overview of all the categories used in the pre- and post-9/11 era. Not every referent object, existential threat or extraordinary measure is addressed or identified by each security actor in China and the Philippines for both periods of analysis. In order to make the results more comparable, the analysis for China and then the Philippines will be divided into discourse before the events of 9/11 and discourse after the events of 9/11. The relevant categories within the data set will be outlined at the start of each subchapter. The referent object, the existential threat justification, and the extraordinary measures will be analysed with regard to their socio-historic developments. The relevant findings of the analysis will then be summarized in the conclusion.

4.2 Pre-9/11: Li Peng from 1997-1998 and Zhu Rongji from 1999-2001

4.2.1 Pre-9/11: Referent Object

Within the discourse, Chinese Premier Li Peng and Premier Zhu Rongji identified several referent objects, which according to them, were existentially threatened. The referent objects were State / National Security, Social Stability and the Economy.

4.2.1.1 State / National Security

The pre-9/11 understanding of the referent object State / National Security, as understood by the Premiers Li Peng and Zhu Rongji, is based on the idea of a multinational state. The concept is communicated as the collaboration of “the people of all nationalities in our country, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China.”²⁰² A reason why Beijing has been able to communicate itself as a multinational state, has been because, according to the 1982 census, Han Chinese made up 93.4 per cent of the total population, while the remaining 6.6 per cent of the population, were part of the 56 ethnic minorities that were mainly concentrated along China’s border regions.²⁰³ As a result, Beijing was able to control the state apparatus, while claiming to represent all nationalities equally. However, in the 1990 census, ethnic minorities made up a greater share of the entire population, namely 8 per cent, which may not be a massive increase, but combined with “the booming market economy and unfolding political decentralization,”²⁰⁴ meant that ethnic minorities started demanding greater political participation.

Student protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989 for increased economic freedom and democratization coincided with Uyghur students demands for political reforms.²⁰⁵ The failure to resolve the events of Tiananmen peacefully dashed Uyghur hopes for greater autonomy. Although a multinational state was communicated by Chinese security actors, Uyghurs seeking greater autonomy realised that those wishing for greater political participation, like the students at Tiananmen, would only be met with force. Not soon afterwards, the Baren riot

²⁰² Rongji Zhu, “1998 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201129.htm

²⁰³ Dongyan Blachord and Yu Chao, “Mission Impossible? Can China Survive as a Multinational State?” (Paper submitted for the Hawaii International Conference on Social Sciences, June 12-15, 2003), p. 4-5. Date Accessed: 22.04.18. Site: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228732165_Mission_Impossible_Can_China_Survive_as_a_Multinational_State

²⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 5.

²⁰⁵ Roy Anthony Torgers, “Xinjiang in the Aftermath of Tiananmen,” *International Journal of China Studies* 5 (No. 2, 2014), p. 421. Date Accessed: 21.04.18. Site: https://umexpert.um.edu.my/file/publication/00001630_112439.pdf

occurred in April 1990, which resulted in an armed confrontation when the East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP) led over 200 men to protest against alleged forced abortions and Han migration to Xinjiang.²⁰⁶ Party officials became increasingly anxious about Uyghur independence movements following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.²⁰⁷ The CCP leadership did not want to risk University campuses in Xinjiang becoming hotspots for Uyghur nationalism and protests against the government,²⁰⁸ which might threaten their control of the state apparatus and are thus signalled as a threat to the referent object State / National Security. The use of force to counter this threat was emphasized by Li Peng's RWG in 1997, when he said that China "[will] prevent and combat all kinds of sabotage activities that endanger national security,"²⁰⁹ and was also emphasized by Zhu Rongji's RWG in 2000, where he said that China must "take strong measures against acts of sabotage perpetrated by hostile forces and elements inside and outside China."²¹⁰ Further links between the referent object and the Chinese military were also found in the RWGs. For example, in appeals to modernize the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Zhu Rongji claimed that "in order to defend the national security, [China] must modernize and strengthen [its] national defense."²¹¹ Similarly, China's security apparatus was praised in defending the referent object: "The Chinese People's Liberation Army, the Armed Police Force and police officers have made new contributions in defending the motherland, safeguarding national security."²¹²

4.2.1.2 Social Stability

The other referent object, Social Stability, has been commonly described by some CCP officials as a "society without disputes or incidents, and [CCP officials] have therefore endeavored to prevent the people from speaking about their needs and interests."²¹³ This shows that the referent object Social Stability, similar to the referent object State / National Security, is defined by a homogeneity, which according to Li Peng, is necessary in order to

²⁰⁶ Rongxing Guo, *China's Spatial (Dis)integration* (Waltham: Elsevier, 2015), p. 44.

²⁰⁷ Kılıç B. Kanat, "The Securitization of the Uyghur Question and Its Challenges," *Insight Turkey* 18 (No. 1, 2016), p. 193. Date Accessed: 03.04.17. Site: <http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/kanat-18-1-web.pdf>

²⁰⁸ Rémi Castets, "The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows," *China Perspectives* 49 (October, 2003), p.7, 9. Date Accessed: 05.10.16. Site: <https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/pdf/648>

²⁰⁹ Peng Li, "1997 年国务院政府工作报告," *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201124.htm

²¹⁰ Rongji Zhu, "Report on the Work of the Government (2000)," *China Government Network*, July 22, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/22/content_16669.htm

²¹¹ Rongji Zhu, "1999 年国务院政府工作报告," *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201143.htm

²¹² Peng Li, "1997 年国务院政府工作报告," *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201124.htm

²¹³ Tsinghua University Report; cited in *China Daily*, "What is social stability?" April 22, 2010. Date Accessed: 18.03.18. Site: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-04/22/content_9760079.htm

achieve the “building of a socialist spiritual civilization.”²¹⁴ The term ‘socialist spiritual civilization’ was first introduced by the CCP in the early 1980s and provided a counternarrative to the disillusionment with the CCP and interest amongst its citizens in foreign government models. While Mao Zedong’s initial rise to leadership had been shaped by his ability to acquire tremendous repute in defeating the enemies of the CCP and legitimizing the political system of the CCP,²¹⁵ his death in 1976 forced the CCP to find a new justification, without wanting to abolish the basic principles, upon which the party had relied on.²¹⁶ The party continued to articulate a narrative within a Sinification of Marxism but was forced to introduce new key terms, such as ‘socialist spiritual civilization’. Deng Xiaoping describes the term as follows:

“the socialist China we are building should have a high level of material civilization as well as a high level of spiritual civilization. When I speak of a high level of spiritual civilization, I refer not only to education, science and culture (which are of course indispensable) but also to communist thinking, ideals, beliefs, morality and discipline, as well as a revolutionary principles, comradely relations among people, and so on.”²¹⁷

The aim of building a ‘socialist spiritual civilization’ was also aimed to “improve all ethnic peoples’ socialist consciousness and scientific cultural level,”²¹⁸ according to the Act of Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities (which came into effect in 1984). This implies that the government was seeking to impose their narrative of a societal identity, on the societal identities of its national minorities by claiming to promote a socialist civilization. This is described by Stevan Harrell as the CCP’s ‘civilizing project’, presenting Han society as superior to minority societies.²¹⁹ According to Nick Holdstock, it isn’t that the CCP is hostile towards Uyghur culture, but that Uyghur culture needs to be part of Chinese identity as a whole.²²⁰ Even though the CCP has adopted various approaches towards its ethnic minorities over the past decades, with varying degrees of repression, the goal of an efficient and homogenous modernization has not changed. Following the religious and cultural repression

²¹⁴ Peng Li, “1997 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18.

Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201124.htm

²¹⁵ Kenneth Lieberthal, “The Organization of Political Power and its Consequences: The View from the Inside,” in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard eds. *Critical Readings on the Chinese Communist Party* [4 Vol.] (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2016), p. 203.

²¹⁶ Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, “In Search of a Master Narrative for 20th-Century Chinese History*,” in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard eds. *Critical Readings on the Chinese Communist Party* [4 Vol.] (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2016), p. 148.

²¹⁷ Deng Xiaoping, (1984); cited in X. L. Ding, *The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977-1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 124.

²¹⁸ Act of regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities, (1983), Art. 6; cited in Zhiyong Zhu, *State Schooling and Ethnic Identity: The Politics of Tibetan Neidi Secondary School in China* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 52.

²¹⁹ Stevan Harrell, “Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them,” in Stevan Harrell eds. *Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), p. 3-6.

²²⁰ Nick Holdstock, *China’s Forgotten People: Xinjiang, Terror and the Chinese State* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2015), p. 58.

of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the liberalization of the 1980s, brought about a revival of Islamic culture and practices as mosques were rebuilt and Koranic schools reopened.²²¹ Expression of Uyghur culture was viewed as a threat to the narrative of building a ‘socialist spiritual civilization’. It, therefore, became a priority for the Chinese state to ensure national unity among its ethnicities: “[We must] unswervingly safeguard the unification of the motherland and national unity, and firmly oppose all statements and actions that divide the motherland and undermine the unity of the nation.”²²² National unity, a synonym for social stability, was also considered to be important in order to develop the national economy. This was emphasized by Zhao Ziyang, the former general secretary of the CCP, Deng Xiaoping believed that in order “to develop the economy, social stability must be guaranteed; otherwise, nothing will take place, to guarantee stability, political centralization must be there, and the leadership of the party must be strengthened.”²²³

According to the RWG’s, social stability and public order could be guaranteed through hard security campaigns. According to Li Peng, “the ‘strike hard’ fight has promoted the improvement of public order,”²²⁴ and according to Zhu Rongji in 2000, the hard security campaign was a “wide-reaching and powerful drive..., bringing about improvement in all facets of public security and increasing social stability.”²²⁵ Zhu Rongji also references, that “safeguarding social stability and state security is a fundamental prerequisite for promoting reform,”²²⁶ meaning that only if social stability is guaranteed, is it possible to push through national reforms. Even in the pre-9/11 period, Chinese premiers intertwined social stability with ethnicity and religion. Similar to the term ‘socialist spiritual civilization’, Zhu Rongji emphasised that there needed to be “socialist relations [with] ... all ethnic groups”²²⁷ and while the official government policy guaranteed freedom of religious belief, he stressed that these beliefs should be “correctly enforced... and vigorous efforts should be made to guide the various religions in adapting to socialist society.”²²⁸ This can be understood as Han

²²¹ Rémi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows,” *China Perspectives* 49 (October, 2003), p. 6. Date Accessed: 05.10.16. Site: <https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/pdf/648>

²²² Peng Li, “1997 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201124.htm

²²³ Ziyang Zhou, cited in Yongnian Zheng, “From Individual to Organisation,” in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard eds. *Critical Readings on the Chinese Communist Party* [4 Vol.] (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2016), p. 195.

²²⁴ Peng Li, “1997 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201124.htm

²²⁵ Rongji Zhu, “Report on the Work of the Government (2000),” *China Government Network*, July 22, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/22/content_16669.htm

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

cultural superiority. According to Zhu Zhiyong, “culture was commonly considered as a direct reflection of the mode of production,”²²⁹ which implied that Han Chinese were also economically superior to its ethnic minorities. This is also communicated within the Zhu Rongji’s RWG in 2001 when he claims that “central and western regions must seize opportunities and quicken the pace of reform and opening up. They should rely on their own hard work to develop themselves.”²³⁰ The statement insinuated that Uyghurs are ‘lazy’ and unwilling to work hard, propagating a stereotype of Uyghurs being an economically ‘backward’ minority.

4.2.1.3 Economy

The health of the Economy is the third referent object mentioned in the pre-9/11 RWG’s and includes references to poverty, inequality, unemployment and economic development. The unequal economic development along ethnic lines was an aspect referenced within the RWG’s. Zhu Rongji’s claimed in 2001 that “China must continue to increase poverty alleviation efforts and focus on poverty alleviation work in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities in the central and western regions... and poverty-stricken areas.”²³¹ Indeed, according to Cindy Fan and Mingjie Sun, “heightened concerns over social and political instability as a result of economic polarization have propelled the Chinese government to implement and endorse programs that aim at alleviating inequality.”²³² However, while the economic well-being of Uyghurs was placed as being important, Uyghurs were often excluded from the economic benefits of large-scale programs in the region. This is best explained according to two examples.

The first example regards infrastructure projects in Xinjiang. These were referenced in the RWG’s by Li Peng, who claimed that “key construction was further strengthened and infrastructure projects in the central and western regions accelerated.”²³³ While infrastructure projects sound positive for a region struggling with to catch up with China’s east coast, they

²²⁹ Zhiyong Zhu, *State Schooling and Ethnic Identity: The Politics of Tibetan Neidi Secondary School in China* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 52.

²³⁰ Rongji Zhu, “Report on the Work of the Government (2000),” *China Government Network*, July 22, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/22/content_16669.htm

²³¹ Rongji Zhu, “2001 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201157.htm

²³² C. Cindy Fan and Mingjie Sun, “Regional Inequality in China, 1978-2006,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 49 (No. 1, 2008), p. 1. Date Accessed: 08.03.18. DOI: 10.2747/1539-7216.49.1.1

²³³ Peng Li, “1997 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201124.htm

were not targeted at the needs of Uyghurs, but in fact, benefited export-oriented enterprises. In 1996, 84 per cent of Xinjiang's enterprises were state-owned and Han dominated.²³⁴ Another issue with Xinjiang's infrastructure projects was its financing. According to Nicolas Becquelin, the Chinese government had announced tax-sharing arrangements in June 1992, which in theory would have allowed ethnic minority areas to retain 80 per cent of their local taxes but because the government also recentralized fiscal powers, the local budget expenditures were steered towards expensive infrastructure projects.²³⁵ While Han Chinese benefited from the export-oriented infrastructure projects, they also indebted Xinjiang's government, making it increasingly dependent on Beijing.²³⁶

The second example is the Western Development Program in 2000, which aimed to improve the economic situation in western China but failed to target Uyghur citizens.²³⁷ Within the RWG's there is an indirect reference to this 'large-scale development strategy', which according to Zhu Rongji is a strategy: "to speed up development of the central and western regions of the country is a major policy decision made by the CPC [Communist Party of China] Central Committee for the new century in accordance with Deng Xiaoping's strategy for China's modernization drive, which encompasses the development of both the border areas and the interior."²³⁸ While such poverty alleviation programs have impacted Growth per Capita GDP, with Xinjiang being placed 12th highest of all China's provinces in 2000, Rémi Castets found that cities with higher Han populations had far higher GDP per Capita than cities with higher Uyghur populations, according to data taken from the 2002 China Statistical Yearbook and the 2002 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook.²³⁹ However, Zhu Rongji emphasised that the Western Development Plan "is crucial to [China's] efforts to ... strengthen national unity, safeguard social stability and consolidate border defense,"²⁴⁰ amongst other benefits.

²³⁴ Nicolas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the nineties," *China Journal* (No. 44, 2000), p. 72. Date Accessed: 15.03.18. DOI: 10.2307/2667477

²³⁵ Ibid, p. 71-72.

²³⁶ Ibid, p. 72.

²³⁷ C. Cindy Fan and Mingjie Sun, "Regional Inequality in China, 1978-2006," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* **49** (No. 1, 2008), p. 1. Date Accessed: 08.03.18. DOI: 10.2747/1539-7216.49.1.1

²³⁸ Rongji Zhu, "Report on the Work of the Government (2000)," *China Government Network*, July 22, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/22/content_16669.htm

²³⁹ 2002 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook and 2002 China Statistical Yearbook; cited in Rémi Castets, "The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows," *China Perspectives* **49** (October, 2003), p. 8. Date Accessed: 05.10.16. Site: <https://journals.openedition.org/chin perspectives/pdf/648>

²⁴⁰ Peng Li, "1997 年国务院政府工作报告," *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201124.htm

The referent object the Economy is often used as a litmus test for the overall stability of the country. This is exemplified by Li Peng, who in his 1997 RWG, claims that “help to low-income urban residents is an important responsibility of the government and is necessary for maintaining social stability.”²⁴¹ Furthermore, he also stated that solving the “employment problem is an important way to improve people's lives and maintain social stability.”²⁴² This connection with the other referent objects State / National Security, Social Stability and Economy is better understood in combination with the CCP’s legitimacy to govern China, since they all serve the same purpose – they are all important for the CCP’s survival. This is echoed by Verna Yu, who said that as “long as the government can accomplish goals such as economic growth, social stability, or national strength, it will retain its legitimacy.”²⁴³

4.2.2 Pre-9/11: Existential Threat

While the Chinese Premiers Li Peng and Zhu Rongji addressed issues that were related to the Uyghur minority question within the RWG’s, Uyghurs were never mentioned specifically and were not directly politicised. Instead, references were made in connection to the ‘Western region’ or to ethnic groups in general. The toponym ‘Western region’, however, is already laden with stereotypes. According to Arienne Dwyer, the term is “imbued with the ancient Han view of China’s territories and the modern Chinese development of its backward border regions.”²⁴⁴ Other references to the Uyghur minority question are made through describing existential threats in the RWG’s such as Crime, Separatism and Hostile Forces, Terrorism and Religion. While the Uyghur minority question is not explicitly mentioned as part of the existential threats, members of the Uyghur minority have been the targeted through extraordinary measures. The threats, which justified the extraordinary measures, will be presented below.

4.2.2.1 Crime

Crimes that can be associated with the Uyghur minority question but haven’t been directly linked in RWG’s include illegal publications and serious crimes. The latter includes crimes that seriously harm the social or public order and include crimes such as “robbery, rape,

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Verna Yu, “Communist Party powered by history? Why China's one-party rule is facing a legitimacy crisis,” *South China Morning Post*, October 10, 2015. Date Accessed: 18.03.18. Site: <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1865965/legitimacy-crisis-facing-chinas-communist-party>

²⁴⁴ Arienne M. Dwyer, *The Xinjiang Conflict* (Washington: East-West Center, 2005), p. 51.

homicide, assault, bombing, kidnapping, arson, crimes committed by crime syndicates and other organized criminal groups, drug manufacturing and trafficking, and ... other offences that pose a serious threat to public security.”²⁴⁵

‘Illegal publications’ have often been targeted by authorities in Xinjiang. While such content is not described in detail, the *Human Rights Watch* has claimed these include religious materials, such as scripture, as well as books or documents used for peaceful opposition. For example in March 1998, the government cracked down on ‘illegal publications’, including religious books, because they “distort the Party’s nationalities policy and undermine national unity.”²⁴⁶ Ever since official border crossings between Xinjiang and the Central Asian Republics increased, more publications such as the Koran and sermons, have been brought into Xinjiang.²⁴⁷ These ‘illegal publications’ represent a counternarrative to the societal identity that the Chinese government has propagated through terms such as building a ‘socialist spiritual civilization’. Therefore Li Peng called for a “‘fight against illegal publications’ so as to promote the healthy development of cultural undertakings.”²⁴⁸ Publications that are seen as contrary to Beijing’s unification policies, which intend to build national unity, are marked as illegal and are criminalized. As a result, many forms of Uyghur religious and cultural expressions are framed as illegal.

Xinjiang has been a region where poverty and unemployment have led to an increase in crime, drug addiction and prostitution. According to *Amnesty International*, the reason for the rise in crime is because Uyghurs “have become impoverished due to new policies, the multiplication of taxes, and corrupt or discriminatory practices... [where] Uighur farmers have had to sell their land and joined the ranks of the unemployed and vagrants.”²⁴⁹ It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that between 1997 and 1999, Uyghurs accounted for 3-4 per cent of all state executions, even though the Uyghur minority only made up 1 per cent of the

²⁴⁵ Susan Trevaskes, *Policing Serious Crime in China: From ‘strike Hard’ to ‘kill Fewer’* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 3.

²⁴⁶ *Human Rights Watch*, “Xinjiang, China’s Restive Northwest,” (Report, October 31, 2000). Date Accessed: 23.04.18. Site: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/10/31/xinjiang-chinas-restive-northwest>

²⁴⁷ Michael Dillon, “Ethnic, Religious and Political Conflict on China’s Northwestern Borders: The Background to the Violence in Xinjiang,” (IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Spring 1997), p. 84. Date Accessed: 24.03.18. Site: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.503.2817&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

²⁴⁸ Peng Li, “1997 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201124.htm

²⁴⁹ *Amnesty International*, “People’s Republic of China Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,” (Report, April 21, 1999), p. 9. Date Accessed: 23.04.18. Site: <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/144000/asa170181999en.pdf>

population.²⁵⁰ Li Peng described the “the current law and order situation is still not optimistic. We must continue to take effective measures to focus on cracking down the crimes of violent crimes, drug-related crimes, criminal gangs with gang war crimes and evil and rogue forces.”²⁵¹ Another reason how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) links serious crimes with Uyghur minority question prior to the events of 9/11, is by claiming that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) receives funds through “drug trafficking, arms smuggling, kidnapping, blackmailing, robbery, and other organized crimes.”²⁵² In particular drug trafficking, which has led to drug use, has been on the rise in Xinjiang since 1995 and has demonstrated a public safety issue for authorities. According to an article in *The Central Asia-Caucasus*, “by the end of 2001, there were 6,029 officially reported cases [in Xinjiang] of HIV/AIDS, or 22% of the national total.”²⁵³ As a result, Zhu Rongji has promised a “crack down on violent crimes against public security, the mafia-related crimes, drug-related crimes.”²⁵⁴

4.2.2.2 Separatism

Even though the CCP has claimed to be a multinational state, it issued the Anti Rightist Policy in 1967, which was opposed to localized nationalism among its ethnic minorities, thus restricting cultural and religious expressions.²⁵⁵ However, at the same time, such nationalism was not yet perceived as a threat. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Uyghur separatist organizations formed within the borders of the new Central Asian republics, that the CCP articulated separatist organizations as a national security threat. According to Chinese authorities, ‘ethnic separatism’ is a substantial threat, because it “is a

²⁵⁰ Marika Vicziany, “State responses to Islamic terrorism in western China and their impact on South Asia,” *Contemporary South Asia* 12 (No. 2, 2003), p. 246. Date Accessed: 28.03.18. DOI: 10.1080/095849302000147690.

²⁵¹ Peng Li, “1997 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201124.htm

²⁵² People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Public Security; cited in J. Todd Reed and Diana Raschke, *The ETIM: China’s Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat* (Oxford: Praeger, 2010), p. 72.

²⁵³ Eric D. Hagt, “HIV, STI’s and Drugs in Xinjiang and Central Asia,” *The Central Asia-Caucasus*, February 11, 2004. Date Accessed: 23.04.18. Site: <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/8749-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2004-2-11-art-8749.html>

²⁵⁴ Rongji Zhu, “1999 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201143.htm

²⁵⁵ Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China,” (Overview, *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*, January 2008). Date Accessed: 11.04.17. Site: <http://apcss.org/college/publications/uyghur-muslim-ethnic-separatism-in-xinjiang-china/>

reactionary political stand, a reactionary social trend of thinking, and an actual reactionary behaviour aimed at creating ethnic separation and undermining the motherland's unity.”²⁵⁶

In 1996 the ‘three evils’, “national separatism... illegal religious activity... [and] international counterrevolutionary forces,”²⁵⁷ were defined in the CCP Central Committee’s Document No.7. Organizations in the Central Asian republics have been on the CCP’s radar ever since the first meeting of the Uyghurstan Azatliq Tashkilati (UAT) in 1992 when around 700 people gathered in Almaty and decided that promoting Uyghur independence would be its top priority.²⁵⁸ The CCP was worried that the disintegration of the Soviet Union would allow extremism to spread into Xinjiang. However, in the First Congress of the UAT, it stated that it would use only non-violent methods to achieve an independent Uyghurstan.²⁵⁹ Another organization located within the Central Asian republics, the Inter-Republican Organization of Uyghurs (IROU), declared Uyghur ‘cultural-enlightening work’ among its priorities and distanced itself from political struggles for independence.²⁶⁰ Regardless of these statements, the CCP did not distinguish between violent and non-violent organizations that promoted Uyghur culture or independence. Therefore the term Separatism was not given according to the methods that these groups choose, but according to the Chinese government’s perception of those groups, which made it possible for the Chinese government to frame any cultural or religious expression as acts of separatism. Within the pre-9/11 RWG’s, separatism per se was only mentioned once in connection to the Uyghur minority question. In 2001, Zhu Rongji claimed that “ethnic separatist activities”²⁶¹ represented a threat to China’s public and national security. There were indeed other references towards separatism in the pre-9/11 RWG’s, but these referred to Taiwan, whose independence from mainland China was seen as a historical injustice and has been blamed of ‘foreign hostile forces’.

²⁵⁶ *Xinjiang Ribao*, “Commentary on Ethnic Separatism, Religious Activities”; cited in Abanti Bhattachary, “Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism,” *Strategic Analysis* 27 (No. 3, 2003), p. 373. Date Accessed: 23.04.18. Site: https://idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_abhattacharya_0903.pdf

²⁵⁷ James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 342.

²⁵⁸ Ablet Kamalov, “Uyghurs in the Central Asian Republics,” in Colin Mackerras and Michael Clarke eds. *China, Xinjiang and Central Asia: History, Transition and Crossborder Interaction into the 21st Century* (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 127.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p. 127-128.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 127.

²⁶¹ Rongji Zhu, “2001 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201157.htm

Organizations that are seeking greater autonomy or independence are often described as having been manipulated by ‘hostile forces’. While these forces aren’t specified in the RWG’s as relating specifically to separatism, China has made accusations that “western hostile forces have stepped up infiltration, separation and subversive activities in Xinjiang,”²⁶² which implies that aspirations for separatism within the PRC were in fact orchestrated by the West. A similar strategy was pursued in Tibet, where it was argued that due to the region being a ‘weak link’, hostile foreign forces were able to manipulate it.²⁶³ Internal unrest is often described as being coordinated by obscure forces, removing any blame and casting foreign interests as contrary to national unity. Zhu Rongji made reference to these forces in 1999, when he said that China had “to strictly prevent sabotage and combat domestic and foreign hostile forces,”²⁶⁴ and again in 2001 when he claimed there was a threat from “domestic and foreign hostile forces opposing our socialist government.”²⁶⁵

4.2.2.3 Terrorism

Terrorism in Xinjiang has existed as a violent strategy for a long time and has been used by various political organizations, including some Uyghurs groups, as a form of opposition towards Soviet and Chinese influences. Uyghurs separatism has a long history as independence movements formed the independent East Turkestan Republic in 1933 in Kashgar and then again in 1944 in Ili.²⁶⁶ The first Uyghur separatist group was allegedly formed after the CCP’s successful unification of China in 1949, calling themselves the Eastern Turkistan People’s Party (ETPP).²⁶⁷ The Soviet Union initially supported the group logistically, through KGB agents located in Kazakhstan, however, according to Rémi Castets at the Université Bordeaux-Montaigne:

“The Soviet Union lost its appeal among anti-colonialist Muslims to the benefit of revolutionary Islam, and as the revival of Islamism was gathering pace in Xinjiang, the Islamic Pan-Turkic trend centred on the south of Xinjiang was given renewed vigour by new

²⁶² Abanti Bhattachary, “Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism,” *Strategic Analysis* 27 (No. 3, 2003), p. 373. Date Accessed: 23.04.18. Site: https://idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_abhattacharya_0903.pdf

²⁶³ Tashi Rabgey and Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, *Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects* (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), p. 29.

²⁶⁴ Rongji Zhu, “1999 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201143.htm

²⁶⁵ Rongji Zhu, “2001 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201157.htm

²⁶⁶ Michael Clarke, “China’s War on Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism,” (Regional Outlook Paper No. 11, *Griffith Asia Institute*, 2007), p 5. Date Accessed: 22.03.17. Site: https://www.griffith.edu.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0005/18239/regional-outlook-volume-11.pdf

²⁶⁷ Rémi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows,” *China Perspectives* 49 (October, 2003), p. 7. Date Accessed: 05.10.16. Site: <https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/pdf/648>

young leaders. It was re-organised around the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP) (Sharki Turkistan Islam Partisi). This Pan-Turkic nationalist movement also aimed at renewing Islam among the Uyghurs and developed from networks of mosques in southern Xinjiang during the 1980s.”²⁶⁸

In the time period from the establishment of the PRC in 1949, until Soviet Union forces retreated from Afghanistan in 1989, Uyghur separatist movements rarely committed violent political acts.²⁶⁹ The domestic pressure experienced by separatist groups following the events of Tiananmen in 1989 and the transnational developments of extremist organizations in neighbouring countries, culminated in the rise of the ETIM. A Backgrounder from the *Council on Foreign Relations* describes ETIM as an ‘umbrella organisation’ for many smaller terrorist groups, which aimed to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state in Xinjiang.²⁷⁰ However, according to Todd Reed and Diana Raschke all these smaller groups were in face one and the same: “The terms ‘East Turkistan Islamic Movement’ (ETIM), ‘Islamic Movement of East Turkistan,’ ‘East Turkistan Islamic Party’ (ETIP), ‘Islamic Party of East Turkistan,’ ‘Turkistan Islamic Party’ (TIP), and ‘Islamic Party of Turkistan’ (IPT) all refer to the same group once led by Hasan Mahsum.”²⁷¹

Regardless of the uncertainty surrounding these terrorist organizations, their presence was clearly regarded as a threat to China’s national security. As a result, it began training its forces in anti-terrorist operations, such as “the special 100-day crackdown from January to March 1999, the ‘General Campaign against Terrorism’ from April to June 1999, the new campaign ‘Strike hard’ from April 2001 onwards.”²⁷² However, these ‘East Turkestan’ groups also assembled a transnational network between extremist organizations within the wider region.²⁷³ As a result, China sought international support through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which aimed to tackle the ‘three evils’ – terrorism, separatism and

²⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 8.

²⁶⁹ Pan Guang, “East Turkestan Terrorism and the Terrorist Arc: China’s Post-9/11 Anti-Terror Strategy,” *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 4 (No. 2, 2006), p. 20 Date Accessed: 23.04.18. Site: http://archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/East_Turkestan_Terrorism_and_the_Terrorist-2.pdf

²⁷⁰ Beina Xu, Holly Fletcher, and Jayshree Bajoria, “The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),” (Backgrounder, *Council on Foreign Relations*, September 4, 2014). Date Accessed: 10.12.17. Site: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim>

²⁷¹ J. Todd Reed and Diana Raschke, *The ETIM: China’s Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat* (Oxford: Praeger, 2010), p. 4.

²⁷² Rémi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows,” *China Perspectives* 49 (October, 2003), p. 10. Date Accessed: 05.10.16. Site: <https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/pdf/648>

²⁷³ Pan Guang, “East Turkestan Terrorism and the Terrorist Arc: China’s Post-9/11 Anti-Terror Strategy,” *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 4 (No. 2, 2006), p. 20 Date Accessed: 23.04.18. Site: http://archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/East_Turkestan_Terrorism_and_the_Terrorist-2.pdf

extremism. The term ‘counterrevolutionary forces’ mentioned in the CCP Central Committee’s Document No.7. was replaced by the term ‘terrorism’ in the ‘Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism’, which was accepted by SCO-members in Shanghai on the 15th of June, 2001.²⁷⁴ Within the data set, there is no direct reference to any Uyghur separatist group, even though contextual references exist. This suggests that there is an interest by the security actors, not to overly politicize this conflict. However, in March 2001, Zhu Rongji did state that China should “crack down on ethnic separatist activities, religious extremist forces, violent and terrorist activities, cults, and the use of religion to engage in illegal activities.”²⁷⁵ This was the only time before the attacks of 9/11, where terrorism was mentioned within an RWGs.

4.2.2.4 Religion

Finally, the CCP has also identified religion as a threat. Since the beginning of the PRC, China has had a precarious relationship with religion. During the cultural revolution, the PRC attempted to prosecute religious expression and proceeded to destroy religious structures. However, the CCP realised under Deng Xiaoping that their efforts to halt religion had been for nought. As a result, the CCP started to manage religions in accordance with a ‘socialist spiritual civilization’. According to André Laliberté, the CCP issued Document 19 in 1982, in which “the CCP recognized that religion would remain influential in Chinese society for ‘a long time’, and therefore the mission of the CCP would be to ensure compatibility between socialism and religion.”²⁷⁶ Yet even then, many qualified Uyghurs had troubles getting government jobs, which were instead predominantly given to Han Chinese.²⁷⁷ Regulations such as that a party member is required to be atheist made it difficult to include Muslim Uyghurs in political decision-making processes. According to Patrik Meyer, this regulation is not compulsory in most Chinese provinces, however, in Xinjiang, “the Party requirement to be an atheist is strictly enforced and Muslim CPC [Communist Party of China] members are

²⁷⁴ Jing-Dong Yuan, “China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),” *Journal of Contemporary China* **19** (No. 67, 2010), p. 855. Date Accessed: 08.05.18. DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2010.508587

²⁷⁵ Rongji Zhu, “2001 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201157.htm

²⁷⁶ André Laliberté, “Religion and the State in China: The Limits of Institutionalization,” *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* **40** (No. 2, 2011), p. 5. Date Accessed: 23.04.18. Site: <https://d-nb.info/1024415481/34>

²⁷⁷ Rémi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows,” *China Perspectives* **49** (October, 2003), p. 5. Date Accessed: 05.10.16. Site: <https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/pdf/648>

prohibited from encouraging any religious practice, and must promote materialism and atheism instead.”²⁷⁸

Furthermore, religion has long been an important marker of identity for the Uyghur minority, making it difficult to square with the CCP’s vision of a ‘socialist spiritual civilization’. Indeed, Deng Xiaoping himself claimed in 1996 that “religion is a very serious issue, because it affects the whole country’s social stability and unity, challenges the construction of the desired socialist material and spiritual civilization, and also is part of the struggle between peaceful evolution and anti-peaceful evolution.”²⁷⁹ Islam, as the fastest growing religion in China, combined with a large minority group such as the Uyghur ethnic minority, poses a particular threat to national identity.²⁸⁰ While Li Peng references that the “the equal rights of ethnic minorities and the autonomy of ethnic autonomous areas are guaranteed,”²⁸¹ he also stresses that “the normal religious activities,”²⁸² should be promoted. Zhu Rongji also emphasized that “vigorous efforts should be made to guide the various religions in adapting to socialist society.”²⁸³ Finally, Li Peng concluded in 2001 that “religious extremist forces... and the use of religion to engage in illegal activities,”²⁸⁴ pose a great threat for the CCP’s ‘socialist spiritual civilization’.

4.2.3 Pre-9/11: Extraordinary Measures

Extraordinary measures are measures taken by security actors, which either contravene the national or international law or are unproportioned in their response. The reason behind extraordinary measures is to address an existential threat to a referent object. In the case of China and the Uyghur minority question, this threat has been very broadly defined. Rather than providing an individual answer towards legal protests, aspirations for greater political and religious rights, separatist organizations as well as terrorist organizations, the CCP

²⁷⁸ Patrik Meyer, “Governing Muslim Minorities as Security Threats: The Case of the Uyghurs and the Concept of a New Chinese Nation,” (PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, June 2012), p. 79-80. Date Accessed: 03.04.17. Site: https://www.academia.edu/24003946/PhD_Thesis_Governing_Muslim_Minorities_as_Security_Threats_The_Case_of_the_Uyghurs_and_the_Concept_of_a_New_Chinese_Nation

²⁷⁹ Jiang Zemin; cited by Patrik Meyer, “China’s De-Extremization Of Uyghurs In Xinjiang,” (Policy Paper, *New America*, June 2016), p. 8. Date Accessed: 22.03.18. Site: <https://na-production.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Meyer-Uyghurs.pdf>

²⁸⁰ André Laliberté, “Religion and the State in China: The Limits of Institutionalization,” *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 40 (No. 2, 2011), p. 11. Date Accessed: 23.04.18. Site: <https://d-nb.info/1024415481/34>

²⁸¹ Rongji Zhu, “1998 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201129.htm

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Rongji Zhu, “Report on the Work of the Government (2000),” *China Government Network*, July 22, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/22/content_16669.htm

²⁸⁴ Rongji Zhu, “2001 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201157.htm

decided to target all of these threats to the CCP's legitimacy through coordinated Strike Hard campaigns.

Up until the end of the time period being analysed in this thesis, there have been three nationwide Strike Hard campaigns (as well as several hundred campaigns taking place at a regional level), with the first being "carried out from 1983 and 1986, the second in 1996, and the third from 2001 to 2003."²⁸⁵ The official mission statement of the first Strike Hard campaign in 1983 was to target criminals "severely, heavily and with no delay."²⁸⁶ This is corroborated by Siyi Ni, Chen Wu and Min Zhang, who claimed that:

"during the first national 'Strike Hard' campaign in 1983 more than 1.6 million criminal cases were handled ... [b]ut rapid police interrogations and hasty judgments by the court were also blamed for widespread torture and unjust punishments for innocent parties. Many others were given penalties harsher than they deserved in accordance with the law."²⁸⁷

Strike Hard campaigns were officially intended to be able to respond to serious crime, while the 'comprehensive management of social order' labelled China's normal approach towards crime. This distinction in the two public security approaches was also made by Li Peng in 1998, when he claimed that "[China] must adhere to the 'comprehensive management of social order' and thoroughly carry out the 'strike hard' campaign and to prevent and combat criminal activities."²⁸⁸ According to Susan Trevaskes:

"crime prevention practices that operate within a system called 'comprehensive management of public order' are the state's key stated approach to the control of minor crime. By contrast, the management of serious crime has tended to favour an 'attack' or 'strike' approach. The 'attack' is exemplified by the Strike Hard policy of 'severely and swiftly punishing in accordance with the law'."²⁸⁹

This 'attack' approach was specifically emphasized in the second Strike Hard campaign in April 1996, which was started shortly after a CCP meeting on 'maintaining stability in Xinjiang' and was said to target threats associated with the 'three evils' – including terrorism,

²⁸⁵ Susan Trevaskes, *Policing Serious Crime in China: From 'strike Hard' to 'kill Fewer'* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 2.

²⁸⁶ Siyi Ni, Chen Wu and Min Zhang, "China rejects 'strike hard' anti-crime policy for more balanced approach," *Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China*, March 11, 2007. Date Accessed: 09.03.18. Site: <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztlh/sessions/lanmua/200703/20070304457471.html>

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Rongji Zhu, "1998 年国务院政府工作报告," *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201129.htm

²⁸⁹ Susan Trevaskes, *Policing Serious Crime in China: From 'strike Hard' to 'kill Fewer'* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 4-5.

separatism and fundamentalism.²⁹⁰ Xinjiang's Party Secretary Wang Lequan, explained the targets of the Strike Hard campaign that were identified at the meeting:

“The [14 to 15 April] meeting has identified the key points for crackdown for the current ‘strike hard’ and rectification struggle. First, they are organized crimes conducted by people led by key elements of national ‘splittism’, elements who have committed violent crimes and terrorist acts, and elements of extremist religious forces; crimes committed by gangs that have connections with the underworld, and crimes committed by highway bandits and tyrants, rogues and evil forces. Second, they are serious and violent crimes such as explosions, murder, robbery, inflicting serious harm on others and kidnapping. Third, they are repeated crimes that seriously influence the sense of security among people, such as theft and robbery.”²⁹¹

According to Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “the initiation of a ‘strike hard’ campaign against crime throughout China in 1996 ... made Uyghurs and separatists in Xinjiang a key target.”²⁹² It was thus a Chinese government response to demonstrations in various cities throughout Xinjiang in the mid-1990s, which were seen as a threat to social stability. However, rather than repressing demonstrations, the hard security campaigns further stoked resentment and ultimately played an important role in the Ghulja ‘incident’ in January 1997.

According to James Millward, “starkly different accounts of this event emanate from official Chinese sources on the one hand, and foreign press, rights organisations and Uyghur groups on the other.”²⁹³ The CCP portrayed the Ghulja incident as “Islamic terrorism carried out by various East Turkestan movements.”²⁹⁴ Gardner Bovingdon also noted that Chinese sources claimed that Pâyzulla, the leader of ETIP, “had begun infiltrating Ghulja in early 1996, planning for the demonstration in January 1997.”²⁹⁵ However, according to Guo Rongxing, following the news that the state had executed 30 Uyghur activists, hundreds of demonstrators took to the streets between the 3rd and 5th of February 1997 to protest against Beijing’s oppressive measures.²⁹⁶ According to Ka Po Ng, the crowd swelled to over 600 and lead to rioting and violence, leading to 16 deaths and 144 wounded, while ‘foreign

²⁹⁰ Rémi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows,” *China Perspectives* 49 (October, 2003), p. 10. Date Accessed: 05.10.16. Site: <https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/pdf/648>

²⁹¹ Lequan Wang, cited in Susan Trevaskes, *Policing Serious Crime in China: From ‘strike Hard’ to ‘kill Fewer’* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 86.

²⁹² Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China,” (Overview, *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*, January 2008). Date Accessed: 11.04.17. Site: <http://apcss.org/college/publications/uyghur-muslim-ethnic-separatism-in-xinjiang-china/>

²⁹³ James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 331.

²⁹⁴ Terry Narramore, “State Violence and China’s unfinished national unification,” in Matt Killingsworth, Matthew Sussex and Jan Pakulski eds. *Violence and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), p. 75.

²⁹⁵ Gardner Bovingdon, *Uyghurs: Strangers in their own Land* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 126.

²⁹⁶ Rongxing Guo, *China’s Spatial (Dis)integration* (Waltham: Elsevier, 2015), p. 45.

dispatches' claimed that in the aftermath almost 100 Uyghurs were executed as separatists.²⁹⁷ Michael Dillon quotes eyewitness testimony, who claimed that the final death toll reached 400 people, while many hundreds were injured in the clashes with China's security organs.²⁹⁸ Guo Rongxing quotes 'dissident sources', which claimed "as many as 1,600 people were arrested on charges of intending to split the motherland, conducting criminal activity, fundamentalist religious activity, and counterrevolutionary activities,"²⁹⁹ in the ensuing crackdown. Later that year, an Islamic/social organization (Māšrāp) in Ghulja, which had become influential in tackling drug abuse and alcoholism through youth football leagues, was labelled an illegal separatist gathering and was forced to disband, while football courts were used for tank exercises and protests against the decision were violently put to rest.³⁰⁰ Those that engaged in Uyghur cultural activities or remained critical of China's handling of the situation were quickly framed as separatists or sympathizers. Once such grievances were made public, the "Chinese government ... suppresses public protests and dissent through use of internal security forces, legal and extralegal measures, and censorship."³⁰¹ Li Yanjie labelled the extraordinary measures of the Strike Hard campaign as "policy prior to the law."³⁰²

The Strike Hard campaigns represented broad security sweeps that aimed to tackle a variety of threats towards the CCP's legitimacy. Susan Trevaskes claimed that "Xinjiang authorities merged the national Strike Hard target (gangs and syndicates) with their own local targets – the three evil forces."³⁰³ Nicholas Bequelin also claims that regular Strike Hard campaigns in Xinjiang took place for over a decade, aiming to "shorten judicial proceedings. The threshold for arrests and convictions is lowered and the number of cases where people are sentenced

²⁹⁷ Ka Po Ng, "Chronology of 1997," in Joseph Y. S. Cheng eds. *China Review 1998* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1998), p. xxi.

²⁹⁸ Michael Dillon, *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Far Northwest* (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 94.

²⁹⁹ Rongxing Guo, *China's Spatial (Dis)integration* (Waltham: Elsevier, 2015), p. 45.

³⁰⁰ Eric T Schluessel, "Islam in Xinjiang: an ancient rival for a young China," *The Guardian*, July 15, 2009. Date Accessed: 22.03.18. Site: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/14/ughur-china-islam>

³⁰¹ *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, "2014 Report to Congress," (Report, November 2014), p. 348.

Date Accessed: 18.03.18. Site: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%202%3B%20Section%203%20China's%20Domestic%20Stability.pdf

³⁰² Yanjie Li, "The aftermath of the Milk Scandal of 2008: The Challenges of Chinese Systemic Governance and Food Safety Regulation," (PhD Thesis, University of Warwick, 2015), p. 88-89. Date Accessed: 09.03.18. Site: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/98045/1/WRAP_Theses_Li_2015.pdf

³⁰³ Susan Trevaskes, *Policing Serious Crime in China: From 'strike Hard' to 'kill Fewer'* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 86.

collectively generally goes up.”³⁰⁴ However, rather than repressing religious or cultural expressions, such hard security measures only fanned conflicts. Terry Narramore also claims that Strike Hard campaigns only appeared to “exacerbate tensions and provoke further protest ... [as they were] often combined with broad security sweeps to warn against separatist activity or detain people for questioning.”³⁰⁵ Arianne Dwyer even suggested that ‘militant Islam’ would have been unlikely to spread to Xinjiang if the government hadn’t restricted cultural and religious freedoms: “Most Uyghurs espouse a tempered, syncretic Sufism. While virtually all Uyghurs identify themselves as Muslims, what being Muslim entails varies considerably depending on locale and education. Islam appears to permeate most aspects of daily life in rural areas, while many urban Uyghurs only abstain from pork and observe a few major holidays.”³⁰⁶

A reason behind the harsher methods may have been the urgency that transnational ‘East Turkestan’ network within the Central Asian republics could support Uyghur groups aspiring for an independent state in Xinjiang. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the CCP was quick to formalise friendly relations with the new republics,³⁰⁷ offering favourable settlements in ongoing territorial disputes as well as the promise of beneficial economic deals.³⁰⁸ Xinjiang caused a conundrum for policymakers as the need to open up the borders and increase economic cooperation was contrasted with the desire to isolate Uyghurs from potentially radical foreign influences.³⁰⁹ However, between 1996 and 2000, China managed to improve its bilateral relationships with the Central Asian Republics, removing the threat posed by Uyghur advocacy groups in these countries (where Uyghurs numbered around a quarter of a million),³¹⁰ as well as isolating Uyghurs by playing a leading role in the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which specifically aimed to

³⁰⁴ Nicholas Bequelin; cited in Tania Branigan, “China launches ‘strike hard’ crackdown in Xinjiang,” *The Guardian*, November 3, 2009. Date Accessed: 09.03.18. Site: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/03/china-strike-hard-crackdown-xinjiang>

³⁰⁵ Terry Narramore, “State violence and China’s unfinished national unification: conflict with minorities,” in Matt Killingsworth, Matthew Sussex and Jan Pakulski eds. *Violence and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), p. 75.

³⁰⁶ Arianne M. Dwyer, *The Xinjiang Conflict* (Washington: East-West Center, 2005), p. 3.

³⁰⁷ Michael Dillon, “Ethnic, Religious and Political Conflict on China’s Northwestern Borders: The Background to the Violence in Xinjiang,” (IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Spring 1997), p. 84. Date Accessed: 24.03.18. Site: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.503.2817&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

³⁰⁸ Patrik Meyer, “Governing Muslim Minorities as Security Threats: The Case of the Uyghurs and the Concept of a New Chinese Nation,” (PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, June 2012), p. 64. Date Accessed: 03.04.17. Site: https://www.academia.edu/24003946/PhD_Thesis_Governing_Muslim_Minorities_as_Security_Threats_The_Case_of_the_Uyghurs_and_the_Concept_of_a_New_Chinese_Nation

³⁰⁹ Rémi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows,” *China Perspectives* 49 (October, 2003), p. 3. Date Accessed: 05.10.16. Site: <https://journals.openedition.org/chin perspectives/pdf/648>

³¹⁰ Michael Clarke, “China and the Uyghurs: The ‘Palestinization’ of Xinjiang?” *Middle East Policy Council* 22 (No. 3, 2015), p. 136. Date Accessed: 29.03.18. Site: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mepo.12148>

tackle the ‘three evils’ – terrorism, separatism and extremism. The creation of the organization was announced at the Shanghai Convention in June 2001, during which Kadyrbek Sarbaev, the former foreign minister of Kyrgyzstan, said: “The fight against the ‘East Turkestan’ forces has been the top priority of the SCO since it was established, and we are confident that we will emerge the winner.”³¹¹

Strike Hard campaigns in the RWG’s were not justified in the speeches but rather were praised for their effectiveness at targeting existential threats. For example, in relation to the second Strike Hard campaign, Li Peng said in 1997 that “the massive ‘strike hard’ fight launched in the past year has yielded good results,”³¹² as it had “contributed to the improvement of the public security situation.”³¹³ Therefore he appealed to his audience that China “must continue to take effective measures to focus on cracking down on violent crimes, drug-related crimes, criminal gangs with engaged gang wars and evil and rogue forces, raise the detection ability of major cases and deepen the ‘strike hard’ campaign in a sustained and lasting manner.”³¹⁴ There was also a continuation of supporting the Strike Hard policies, as Zhu Rongji claimed in his 1999 RWG that China must “continue to carry out the ‘strike hard’ campaign to crack down on violent crimes against public security, the mafia crime, drug-related crimes, as well as theft, robbery, trafficking in women and children and other criminal activities to further improve the social security situation.”³¹⁵

4.3 Post-9/11: Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao from 2002 to 2006

4.3.1 Post-9/11: Referent Object

While the post-9/11 era resulted in new alliances being forged in the international arena, the referent objects State / National Security and Social / Stability remained largely unchanged, since they remained key objectives for the Chinese Premiers Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao. However, the referent object, the Economy changed to focus more exclusively on economic inequality among Uyghurs and its relation to overall social stability. Therefore these referent

³¹¹ Kadyrbek Sarbaev; cited in *Human Rights in China*, “Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: The Impact of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” (White Paper, March 2011), p. 64. Date Accessed: 23.08.18. Site:

<https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/Reports/SCO/2011-HRIC-SCO-Whitepaper.pdf>

³¹² Peng Li, “1997 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18.

Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201124.htm

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Rongji Zhu, “1999 年国务院政府工作报告,” *China Government Network*, February 16, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18.

Site: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_201143.htm

objects have become intertwined in the post-9/11 era. Furthermore, a new referent object Sovereignty / Territorial Integrity, which in the pre-9/11 era had only been used in connection to the Taiwan-issue, was also referred to in the post-9/11 era with regards to the Uyghur minority question.

4.3.1.1 Economy / Social Stability

The Economy became further intertwined with the referent object Social Stability in the post-9/11 era. According to Wen Jiabao, it was important “to concentrate on resolving prominent conflicts in economic and social development and acute problems concerning the vital interests of the people and properly balancing reform, development and stability.”³¹⁶ Within the RWG’s, there was a greater emphasis that the income inequality, a facet of the Uyghur minority question, was one of “a few factors threatening social stability,”³¹⁷ which in turn could threaten China’s economic output. Therefore, social and economic development plans were indirectly referenced towards the Uyghur minority and towards the region of Xinjiang, by stating that such plans should ‘in earnest’ reach “old revolutionary base areas, ethnic minority areas, border areas, and poverty-stricken areas.”³¹⁸ According to Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, economic incentives “are the most often used tool in the central government’s policies towards Xinjiang and the Uyghurs, especially the Western Development policies.”³¹⁹ The idea behind this is that if economic inequality in Xinjiang is reduced, then Uyghurs will no longer have aspirations for increased autonomy or independence and thus will not negatively affect the economy. However, according to Michael Dillon, “Uyghurs and other non-Han people in Xinjiang claim with some justification that they are excluded from new developments and see new employment opportunities going to Han Chinese.”³²⁰

This sentiment is shared by Mathew Moneyhon, who claims that the infrastructure projects included within the Western Development Plan, seem to be geared towards promoting Han re-settlement to Xinjiang and easing the extraction of resources, both of which are contrary to many of the grievances that Uyghur minorities have expressed about current majority-

³¹⁶ Jiabao Wen, “Report on the Work of the Government (2004),” *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18349.htm

³¹⁷ Jiabao Wen, “Report on the Work of the Government (2005),” *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18351.htm

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, *Ruling, Resources and Religion in China: Managing the Multiethnic State in the 21st Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 100.

³²⁰ Michael Dillon, *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Far Northwest* (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 158.

minority relations.³²¹ Zhu Rongji even refers to the importance of extracting resources for the rest of the country, by stating that “[China needs] to concentrate on key projects, including ... projects to divert gas and electricity from the western to the eastern regions.”³²² While economic development plans have been suggested as efforts to “support and assist the ethnic minority regions [and] to speed up their development,”³²³ the development plans seem to be increasing Beijing’s strategic hold over Xinjiang.

This may be because Xinjiang also functions as an important crossroads, as it borders Mongolia to the East, India to the South, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to the West and Kazakhstan and Russia to the North. As such it serves as an important economic and transportation hub between China and Central Asia for China’s vital export industries. As a consequence, if economic inequality between Han and Uyghurs leads to political instability in the region, then this could trouble China’s plans for a growing Western-oriented export industry and thus severely damage China’s economic capabilities. However, rather than truly focusing on improving Han-Uyghur inequality, China has referenced Xinjiang’s large infrastructure projects as a method to increase economic development in the region, even though, such industries are commonly state owned. Furthermore, Davis claims that Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao were “acutely aware of the challenges and the dangers that lesser development in the western regions like Xinjiang means ... for political stability, the possible enticement of religious extremism, and the calls for ethnic separatism.”³²⁴ It is therefore unsurprising that according to Moneyhon, “every new project takes more Han Chinese to Xinjiang, and according to many estimates, 250,000 Han move to Xinjiang each year.”³²⁵ While securing the region may be Beijing’s true intention, Wen Jiabao continued to emphasize in his 2006 RWG that China “will give more aid to ethnic groups with small populations and continue working to vitalize border areas and enrich the people living there.”³²⁶

³²¹ Mathew Moneyhon, “Controlling Xinjiang,” *Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal* 3 (No. 1, 2002), p. 148. Date Accessed: 12.04.17. Site: http://blog.hawaii.edu/aplpj/files/2011/11/APLPJ_03.1_moneyhon.pdf

³²² Rongji Zhu, “Report on the Work of the Government (2002),” *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18337.htm

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, *Ruling, Resources and Religion in China: Managing the Multiethnic State in the 21st Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 100.

³²⁵ Mathew Moneyhon, “Controlling Xinjiang,” *Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal* 3 (No. 1, 2002), p. 148. Date Accessed: 12.04.17. Site: http://blog.hawaii.edu/aplpj/files/2011/11/APLPJ_03.1_moneyhon.pdf

³²⁶ Jiabao Wen, “Report on the Work of the Government (2006),” *China Government Network*, March 14, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2006-03/14/content_227248.htm

4.3.1.2 Sovereignty / Territorial Integrity

While the referent object Sovereignty / Territorial Integrity was mentioned in the pre-9/11 RWG's it was only mentioned with regards to Taiwan. However, in the post-9/11 era, Sovereignty / Territorial Integrity was also tied to the referent object State / National Security, and the fight against international terrorism. The extension of terrorism with the global WoT encouraged an approach whereby the US, the world's most powerful state, in cooperation with its allies, vowed to fight against transnational terrorist organizations led by Al-Qaeda.³²⁷ China perhaps feared that the regional network of Uyghur terrorist groups such as ETIM as well as the transnational threat that terrorism posed, could be misused in order to interfere with China's national policies. Shortly after the announcement of the WoT, the US and its allies had invaded Afghanistan under the pretext of fighting international terrorism. The invasion of Afghanistan, a neighbour of China, signalled to Beijing that the sovereignty of a nation-state could be infringed upon in the fight against terrorism. As a result, Zhu Rongji made sure to emphasize that China rejected any interference, as it has safeguarded "[China's] state sovereignty, territorial integrity and national dignity, defeated the outside forces' attempts to interfere in ... [China's] internal affairs,"³²⁸ especially because China has reiterated that they remain opposed to all forms of hegemonism (hegemon also often used as a euphemism for the US).³²⁹ However, Rongji also emphasized China's commitment to fighting terrorism, by stating that "China has joined the international community in condemning and fighting terrorism and is playing a constructive role in the international counter-terrorism struggle."³³⁰

4.3.2 Post-9/11: Existential Threat

One major development from the pre-9/11 to the post-9/11 RWGs has been that various threats associated with the Uyghur minority question, such as crime, religion, separatism and hostile forces, as well as terrorism, have been merged into one existential threat in order to provide one 'solution' to protect the referent objects. Prior to the events of 9/11, Uyghurs have received various labels from Beijing, and "were described by the state as feudal elements and as ethnic nationalists in the 1950s and 1960s, as counter-revolutionaries in the

³²⁷ Amitav Acharya, "State Sovereignty After 9/11: Disorganised Hypocrisy," *Political Studies* 55 (2007), p. 274-275. Date Accessed: 24.04.18. Site: [www.amitavacharya.com/sites/default/files/State Sovereignty After 9 11.pdf](http://www.amitavacharya.com/sites/default/files/State%20Sovereignty%20After%209%2011.pdf)

³²⁸ Rongji Zhu, "Report on the Work of the Government (2003)," *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18346.htm

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Rongji Zhu, "Report on the Work of the Government (2002)," *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18337.htm

1970s and 1980s, as separatists in the 1990s, and now, since 2001, as terrorists,”³³¹ in order to justify hard security measures. However, after 9/11 it became easier to merge separatism as well as religious and cultural expressions as terrorism because governments could frame “internal contestations as part of the global struggle against the international threat of terrorism.”³³²

While ‘terrorist activities’ are only mentioned once in the pre-9/11 RWGs, there are numerous references to terrorism in the post-9/11 RWGs. The first mention of terrorism in Zhu Rongji’s 2002 RWG, immediately connects the term with the ‘three evils’: “We must ... firmly crack down on criminal activities perpetrated by forces of terrorism, religious extremism and ethnic separatism.”³³³ Indeed, terrorism is usually mentioned in combination with separatism and religious extremism in the post-9/11 era as Beijing does not want to present these threats separately. However, while Beijing remained staunchly opposed to any interference from foreign agents in their domestic fight against terrorism, with Wen Jiabao reiterating that China “will oppose hegemonism, power politics, and terrorism in all its manifestations,”³³⁴ China was also prepared to utilize the global WoT’s rhetoric to gain international legitimacy for their fight against Uyghur separatism. In October 2001, Sun Yuxi, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, expressed the notion that “efforts to fight against East Turkestan terrorist forces should become a part of the international efforts and should also win support and understanding,”³³⁵ from the international community. Urgency was communicated by Wen Jiabao, when he claimed that “international terrorist activity is rampant,”³³⁶ while asserting that China was “playing a constructive role in the international counter-terrorism struggle.”³³⁷ It suggests that Beijing used the WoT in presenting the Uyghur minority question as an existential security threat with connections to the international war against terrorism. A positive response to George W. Bush’s appeal, “either

³³¹ *Human Rights Watch*, “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,” (Report, April 11, 2005). Date Accessed: 24.04.18. Site: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/04/11/devastating-blows/religious-repression-ughurs-xinjiang>

³³² Elena Pokalova, “Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33 (2010), p. 429. Date Accessed 24.03.17. DOI: 10.1080/10576101003691564.

³³³ Rongji Zhu, “Report on the Work of the Government (2002),” *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18337.htm

³³⁴ Jiabao Wen, “Report on the Work of the Government (2004),” *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18349.htm

³³⁵ Sun Yuxi; cited in *Human Rights Watch*, “China: Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang,” (Backgrounder, October 2001). Date Accessed: 26.04.18. Site: <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/china-bck1017.htm>

³³⁶ Jiabao Wen, “Report on the Work of the Government (2004),” *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18349.htm

³³⁷ Rongji Zhu, “Report on the Work of the Government (2002),” *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18337.htm

you are with us or with the terrorists,”³³⁸ also had little drawbacks as linking Uyghurs with international terrorism legitimized extraordinary measures to an international audience. According to Arienne Dwyer, ever since the events of 9/11, the “skillful Chinese government media rhetoric has drawn these countries—especially the United States—unwittingly into China’s domestic minority-nationalism issues.”³³⁹ Even the term ‘Eastern Turkestan’, which was originally used by the Uyghur diaspora wishing to achieve greater autonomy, was successfully reframed and brought into association with terrorism and separatism.³⁴⁰ Sympathy for the plight of the Uyghurs dwindled fast amongst the international community in the post-9/11 years, although human rights organization and Uyghur communities abroad remained critical.³⁴¹ All that Chinese security actors had to do in order to convince the international community, was to accuse Uyghur groups of having “links with the Taliban in Afghanistan, ... [and that they] were supported from abroad by radical Islamist organizations.”³⁴² However, according to *Human Rights Watch*, there were several reasons that these allegations seem to be incorrect:

1. Xinjiang’s Afghan border, known as the Wakhan corridor, was controlled by the Northern Alliance, who was fighting the Taliban leaving little room for the establishment of a cross-border network;
2. Uyghurs had closer ties to ethnic Uzbeks rather than to the Pashtuns-dominated Taliban;
3. Islamabad had frequently repatriated Uyghurs, closed Uyghur establishments and refrained from enlisting Uyghurs in their proxy wars in order not to upset the important Sino-Pakistani relationship;
4. Finally, interviews with captured Uyghurs who had joined the Taliban demonstrated that they affiliated with Taliban for individual reasons rather than out of a coordinated effort.³⁴³

³³⁸ You Ji, “China’s Post 9/11 Terrorism Strategy,” *China Brief* 4 (No. 8, 2004). Date Accessed: 28.04.18. Site:

<https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-post-911-terrorism-strategy/>

³³⁹ Arienne M. Dwyer, *The Xinjiang Conflict* (Washington: East-West Center, 2005), p. x.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 52.

³⁴¹ Patrik Meyer, “Governing Muslim Minorities as Security Threats: The Case of the Uyghurs and the Concept of a New Chinese Nation”, (PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, June 2012), p. 59. Date Accessed: 03.04.17. Site: https://www.academia.edu/24003946/PhD_Thesis_Governing_Muslim_Minorities_as_Security_Threats_The_Case_of_the_Uyghurs_and_the_Concept_of_a_New_Chinese_Nation

³⁴² Sun Yuxi; cited in *Human Rights Watch*, “China: Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang,” (Backgrounder, October 2001). Date Accessed: 26.04.18. Site: <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/china-bck1017.htm>

³⁴³ *Human Rights Watch*, “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,” (Report, April 11, 2005). Date Accessed: 24.04.18. Site: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/04/11/devastating-blows/religious-repression-uighurs-xinjiang>

Regardless of the unlikelihood that Uyghur separatists had joined a sophisticated network of ‘Islamic terrorists’, ETIM was classified as an international terrorist organization by Washington and the United Nations in 2002,³⁴⁴ indicating a successful securitization of the issue to audiences abroad, even though, some scholars openly doubt the very existence of ETIM as an operational unit able to severely threaten the People’s Republic.³⁴⁵ Michael Clarke summarized his view on ETIM as follows: “It’s not that China shouldn’t be concerned [about ETIM’s ties to Pakistan and central Asian countries], but the core issue is that the linkages have been exaggerated by the Chinese government.”³⁴⁶

After 9/11, China continued to provide unsubstantiated claims of “infiltration, subversion and sabotage by hostile forces at home and abroad.”³⁴⁷ This might seem to be paradoxical as on the one hand, Beijing wanted to participate with the international community in fighting terrorism, but on the other hand, was suspicious of foreign forces, such as the West, of influencing domestic separatist aspirations. Being able to accuse ‘the West’ or foreign countries of terrorism shows that China’s definition of terrorism is very fluid and can apply it to any opponent. Indeed, the organization *Human Rights in China* criticized Beijing’s broad definition to terrorism, which was based heavily on ideology, without “incorporating the internationally-accepted components of terrorism relating to intention, purpose, and offensive act.”³⁴⁸ Marika Vicziany also claimed that the vague definition of terrorism was used by China to suppress its Uyghur population.³⁴⁹

4.3.3 Post-9/11: Extraordinary Measures

In the post-9/11 era, China continued its Strike Hard campaigns, which included the continued two-year campaign that had started in April 2001; the 2002 ‘High Pressure Strike Hard’ campaign; the 2003 launch of ‘100 Days Strike Hard’; and the 2004 ‘High Pressure

³⁴⁴ Hanna Michelle Tarbert, “Self-Determination in the People’s Republic of China: Elite Responses, 1949-2012,” (Master Thesis, Wright State University, 2015), p. 121.

³⁴⁵ Hannah Beech, “The Men and Women Who Fight China’s Shadowy ‘Anti-Terrorist’ War,” *Time Magazine*, November 23, 2015. Date Accessed: 10.12.17. Site: www.time.com/4124001/china-xinjiang-uyghur-terrorism-police/

³⁴⁶ Michael Clarke; cited in *BBC*, “Q&A: East Turkestan Islamic Movement,” (November 1, 2013). Date Accessed: 12.12.17. Site: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24757974>

³⁴⁷ Rongji Zhu, “Report on the Work of the Government (2003),” *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18346.htm

³⁴⁸ *Human Rights in China*, “Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: The Impact of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” (White Paper, March 2011), p. ii. Date Accessed: 23.08.18. Site: <https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/Reports/SCO/2011-HRIC-SCO-Whitepaper.pdf>

³⁴⁹ Marika Vicziany, “State responses to Islamic terrorism in western China and their impact on South Asia,” *Contemporary South Asia* 12 (No. 2, 2003), p. 246. Date Accessed: 28.03.18. DOI: 10.1080/095849302000147690.

Strike Hard' campaign, which targeted the 'three evils' and was extended indefinitely.³⁵⁰ In describing China's security threats in his 2004 RWG, Wen Jiabao claimed that "local conflicts continue, international terrorist activity is rampant, the North-South gap is widening, and traditional and non-traditional security issues are intertwined."³⁵¹ It seems to suggest that traditional and non-traditional issues can be approached with a singular solution. While traditional issues require hard security measures, non-traditional security issues do not. However, China has approached separatism and terrorism, which are non-traditional security issues, purely through a military approach. Thus this statement seems to justify hard security measures for non-traditional issues. As a result, hard security campaigns were seen as the only viable solution in addressing the Uyghur minority question on a national level. This was exemplified by Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan, in January 2003, when he said that "Xinjiang will always keep up the intensity of its crackdown on ethnic separatist forces and deal them devastating blows without showing any mercy."³⁵² It also stresses the importance of the SCO, which is concerned with security issues that are transnational and are not defined by national boundaries.³⁵³

As was the case in pre-9/11 Strike Hard campaigns, mass arrests, trials and quotas were common in the post-9/11 Strike Hard campaigns, while according to a 2003 article posted on the website of the Supreme People's Court, judges "whose political ideas are not strong, who waver at the critical moment, and who do not want to shoulder leading responsibilities [in the fight against separatism],"³⁵⁴ would be targeted for investigation. Such an approach ensured that judges would rather be viewed as taking a hard line against those accused of separatism, rather than seeming to be weak and thus calling into question their political allegiance. As such, these Judges had a direct professional interest in prosecuting as many 'separatists' as possible. This practice continued into 2004 and in September of that year, *Unrepresented Nations and People Organization* quoted Wang Lequan who said that in the previous eight months, Xinjiang had handed out 50 death sentences and had cracked down on 22 separatist

³⁵⁰ *Human Rights Watch*, "Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang," *HRIC Special Report 17* (No. 2, 2005), p. 67. Date Accessed: 28.04.18. Site: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/china0405.pdf>

³⁵¹ Jiabao Wen, "Report on the Work of the Government (2004)," *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18349.htm

³⁵² *Human Rights Watch*, "Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang," *HRIC Special Report 17* (No. 2, 2005), p. 3. Date Accessed: 28.04.18. Site: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/china0405.pdf>

³⁵³ Steven Aris, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 'Tackling the Three Evils'. A Regional Response to Non-Traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 61 (No. 3, 2009), p. 465. Date Accessed: 08.05.18. Site: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27752254>

³⁵⁴ Chinacourt.org; cited in *Human Rights Watch*, "Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang," *HRIC Special Report 17* (No. 2, 2005), p. 67-68. Date Accessed: 28.04.18. Site: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/china0405.pdf>

groups.³⁵⁵ As the repressive climate in Xinjiang intensified, it became increasingly difficult for international observers to obtain information on the security situation in Xinjiang. According to a report by *Human Rights Watch*:

“Information on the extent of the post-September 11 anti-crime campaigns has been severely curtailed, but local accounts tell of an even more tense and repressive climate. As the Chinese government embarked on an effort to convince international observers of the legitimacy of its crackdown on Xinjiang’s Uighurs, local media apparently stopped carrying periodic reports on the results of these campaigns, which often had featured information such as numbers of people arrested and convicted, names of such individuals, and details of their sentences.”³⁵⁶

Strike Hard campaigns were already praised for their successes in 2002, when Zhu Rongji claimed that “the ‘strike hard’ campaign and the comprehensive management of social security have achieved initial successes, eradicating a group of crime syndicates, criminal gangs and punishing a group of serious criminal elements,”³⁵⁷ while he also emphasized that the Strike Hard campaign had “brought about marked progress in social security,”³⁵⁸ thus protecting the referent object. One year later, Zhu Rongji continues to praise Strike Hard campaigns and even emphasizes in his RWG their importance for safeguarding the “2008 Olympic Games in Beijing as well as the 2010 World Exposition in Shanghai”. Furthermore, in his 2006 RWG, he claims that the preparations for the Beijing Olympic Games should “spare no effort in maintaining social stability,”³⁵⁹ since expressions of Uyghur ethno-nationalism or even violent attacks would cause embarrassment for China, by placing the international spotlight on Beijing’s handling of its Uyghur minority question. One way that domestic security would be guaranteed in the run-up to the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing was through anti-terrorist units of the PLA, who would specialise in counter-terrorism measures.³⁶⁰ Wen Jiabao perhaps hinted at such during his 2006 RWG: “We will improve the early warning system for disturbances to social stability and the emergency response mechanism.”³⁶¹ Indeed, following the attacks of 9/11, Strike Hard campaigns were increasingly placed in connection with crime prevention: “Under the principle of combining

³⁵⁵ *Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization*, “East Turkestan: China convicts 50 to Death in ‘terror crackdown’,” September 14, 2004. Date Accessed: 27.04.18. Site: <http://unpo.org/article/1186>

³⁵⁶ *Human Rights Watch*, “Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,” *HRIC Special Report 17* (No. 2, 2005), p. 68-69. Date Accessed: 28.04.18. Site: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/china0405.pdf>

³⁵⁷ Rongji Zhu, “Report on the Work of the Government (2002),” *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18337.htm

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁹ Rongji Zhu, “Report on the Work of the Government (2003),” *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18346.htm

³⁶⁰ Arabinda Acharya, Rohan Gunaratna, and Wang Pengxin, *Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 144.

³⁶¹ Jiabao Wen, “Report on the Work of the Government (2006),” *China Government Network*, March 14, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2006-03/14/content_227248.htm

action with prevention while putting prevention first, we must implement measures for the all-round improvement of social order, and we must actively establish a prevention and control system for public security.”³⁶² The PLA became actively involved in deterring Xinjiang separatism and terrorism through its increased military presence thus contributing towards a ‘prevention and control system’. According to Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya and Wang Pengxin, “after the September 2001 incidents and the subsequent U.S. rout of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, China moved an estimated 100,000 soldiers into Xinjiang, concentrating them on the border regions.”³⁶³ Following the events of 9/11, combined with the military presence, China’s security apparatus in Xinjiang increased its surveillance of ethnic Uyghurs.³⁶⁴ This is also corroborated by *Human rights in China*, which claimed that “ongoing anti-terrorist campaigns seek to maintain a high-pitched mood of paranoia and justify generalized police surveillance, particularly in the Kashgar area, where ethnic Uyghurs make up over 90 percent of the population.”³⁶⁵ Plain-clothed police would also investigate ‘suspicious behaviour’ and sources claim to have been held for hour-long interrogations.³⁶⁶

³⁶² Rongji Zhu, “Report on the Work of the Government (2002),” *China Government Network*, July 29, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-07/29/content_18337.htm

³⁶³ Arabinda Acharya, Rohan Gunaratna, and Wang Pengxin, *Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 144.

³⁶⁴ Matthew D. Matsaganis, Vikki S. Katz and Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, *Understanding Ethnic Media: Producers, Consumers, and Societies* (London: Sage Publications, 2011), p. 219.

³⁶⁵ D. T. [pseudonym], “Uyghur Culture Faced with Endless Campaigns,” *China Rights Forum* (No. 4. 2007), p. 103. Date Accessed: 27.04.18. Site: https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/CRF.4.2007/CRF-2007-4_Uyghur.pdf

³⁶⁶ D. T. [pseudonym], “Uyghur Culture Faced with Endless Campaigns,” *China Rights Forum* (No. 4. 2007), p. 103. Date Accessed: 27.04.18. Site: https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/CRF.4.2007/CRF-2007-4_Uyghur.pdf

4.4 Pre-9/11: Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada and Gloria Arroyo from 1997 to 2001

4.4.1 Pre-9/11: Referent Object

Unlike the Chinese state of the union addresses, individual differences between Philippine security actors are greater. However, some referent objects were still identified throughout various Filipino presidencies in the pre-9/11 era. These include Democracy / Constitution, People and Sovereignty / Territorial Integrity .

4.4.1.1 Democracy / Constitution

The first referent object is Democracy / Constitution. While democracies are usually understood as a system of government, which is controlled by the majority of its members, democracy as a referent object in the Philippines is usually a term associated with peace, stability and freedom. In January 1986, the Philippines became the first country in the region to overthrow a dictatorship, when the first people power revolution removed Ferdinand Marcos from power through a constitutional right, i.e.: protests and marches. The referent object Democracy / Constitution, therefore, refers to individual freedoms and stable development but also made the Philippines ‘special’ in Southeast Asia. Within his last SONA in 1996, Fidel Ramos indeed described democracy as an important prerequisite for stable economic development. As such it had to be protected: “We cannot allow our democracy to wither – because Philippine democracy is our unique comparative advantage in the new global order.”³⁶⁷ According to Soliman Santos, Ramos believed since the beginning of his tenure that peace was a precondition to economic development and was necessary for the Philippines to gain the status of a newly industrialized country.³⁶⁸ Ramos presents democracy as something organic that needs to be nurtured, but more importantly, its significance was framed within an international free market. Ramos focussed on finding a “competitive niche”³⁶⁹ within “this ‘survival-of-the-fittest’ socioeconomic order.”³⁷⁰ However, separatists

³⁶⁷ Fidel V. Ramos, “Fidel V. Ramos, Sixth State of the Nation Address, July 28, 1997,” *Official Gazette*, July 28, 1997. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1997/07/28/fidel-v-ramos-sixth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-28-1997/>

³⁶⁸ Soliman M. Santos Jr., “War and Peace on the Moro Front: Three Standard Bearers, Three Forms of Struggle, Three Tracks (Overview),” in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 69

³⁶⁹ Fidel V. Ramos, “Fidel V. Ramos, Sixth State of the Nation Address, July 28, 1997,” *Official Gazette*, July 28, 1997. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1997/07/28/fidel-v-ramos-sixth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-28-1997/>

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

and rebels were seen as an obstruction to democracy and the Philippine's development goals. Ramos, therefore, sought to end open conflicts and granted the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) administrative rights over the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Ramos believed allowing those outside the political process to enter into democratic procedures, would strengthen the Philippines' democracy and constitution. Ramos suggested that:

“[The Philippines] must encourage the radical Left as well as the conservative Right to take a healthy role in electoral politics as former military rebels and Muslim separatists have already done. And we must strengthen the institutions of direct democracy installed in the 1987 Constitution because accountability is the very essence of representative government... [and] every successful election helps to consolidate democracy in our country.”³⁷¹

Joseph Estrada's SONA's also mentioned the reference object Democracy / Constitution, but unlike Ramos, who believed that increasing participation of the MNLF would strengthen democracy, Estrada planned to reaffirm his “unwavering commitment to democracy,”³⁷² by making sure that “no insurgency of any color has the legal, political, or moral right to try to bring ... [democracy] down.”³⁷³ Estrada, who had previously been Ramos' vice president, presented democracy as an entitlement or a constitutional privilege that could only be wielded by rightful citizens and not separatists. Estrada had received considerable support from the poor, using the slogan ‘Erap para sa mahirap’ (Erap for the poor), and his tough rhetoric “reaffirmed Estrada's image as the quintessential Filipino Macho – strong, audacious, uncompromising, and a hero ready to rescue persons or institutions in distress.”³⁷⁴ After launching repeated attacks on the press and those who opposed him in 1999, he tried to reassure many within his country that he would not take actions that would result in democratic freedoms being curtailed, but only managed to use divisive language, saying that “those who fear the loss of freedom do not share my faith in the strength of our Constitution.”³⁷⁵ Estrada began his July 2000 SONA by repeating his oath “to preserve and

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Second State of the Nation Address, July 26, 1999,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 1999. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1999/07/26/joseph-ejercito-estrada-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-1999/>

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Gene Segarra Navera, “Metaphorizing The Philippine Presidency: Schemas of Presidential Leadership in The Post-Marcos State of The Nation Addresses (1987-2009),” (PhD Dissertation, National University of Singapore, 2012), p. 268. Date Accessed: 31.03.18. Site: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48651402.pdf>

³⁷⁵ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Second State of the Nation Address, July 26, 1999,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 1999. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1999/07/26/joseph-ejercito-estrada-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-1999/>

defend the Constitution. It was my solemn duty under that Constitution to repel the armed rebellion.”³⁷⁶

Gloria Arroyo, who was vice-president during the Estrada administration as well as Secretary of Social Welfare and Development, came to power after Estrada was ousted from office following four days of political protest from the 17th to the 20th of January, 2001, known as the second people power revolution. Arroyo had distanced herself from the Estrada administration in October 2000 by resigning from the cabinet due to corruption allegations levelled against Estrada. Arroyo ascended to the presidency after the Supreme Court declared the office to be vacant and initially faced strong opposition and questions of legitimacy due to the manner in which she gained the office.³⁷⁷ She delivered her first SONA in July 2001 and called to “set aside bickering and politicking”³⁷⁸ and referred to the uniqueness of the Philippine democracy. She referenced the people power revolution of 1986, during which she said “Filipinos peacefully reclaimed their civil liberties ... [and] under the leadership of Corazon Aquino, ...reaffirmed [their] commitment to freedom and democracy.”³⁷⁹ Arroyo didn’t really use Democracy / Constitution as a referent object, which was existentially threatened. Instead, she invited everyone who wished to participate in democracy to do so: “We will continue to talk with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the National Democratic Front as long as all sides maintain good faith.”³⁸⁰

4.4.1.2 People

Another referent object that was referred to by Filipino presidents was the People. A term that was influenced by the events of the 1986 revolution, which disposed of President Marcos, and was even named the people power revolution. As a result, power in the Filipino political system is strongly associated with being deferred from the people. Estrada often referenced this power, claiming that “our people overwhelmingly support our constitutional system and our functioning democracy ... This government was elected by the people. It

³⁷⁶ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

³⁷⁷ Frank Cibulka, “The Philippines: In the eye of the Political Storm,” in Daljit Singh and Lorraine Carlos Salazar eds. *Southeast Asian Affairs 2007* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), p. 259.

³⁷⁸ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, First State of the Nation Address, July 23, 2001,” *Official Gazette*, July 23, 2001. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2001/07/23/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-first-state-of-the-nation-address-july-23-2001/>

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

enjoys their support. Your rebellion does not.”³⁸¹ The referent object People does not refer to all the people of the Philippines, but only those that accept the system of government. Rebels were faulted for the “potential implications of the Mindanao conflict on the economy ... [and] the depreciation of the peso,”³⁸² and were framed as an “obstacle to the war against poverty, and the development of all the people.”³⁸³ Estrada thus framed the conflict as a war against the people: “I hope you stop - for the sake of the people, especially the poor, who will suffer the most from continued hostilities.”³⁸⁴ While Estrada places himself as the leader and protector of the people, “I implore the rebels who are left behind. We are not fighting ... Erap is always with you in caring for the masses,”³⁸⁵ he depicts the MILF as imposing itself on an “unwilling people... [taking advantage] of the 1997 ceasefire to commit at least 227 violations.”³⁸⁶ This reference conceptualizes that the MILF is taking advantage of the peace process and is deceiving the people to position themselves as *de facto* leaders in the Mindanao region. However, this does not represent an existential threat to the People of the Philippines, but rather a threat to the professional capacity of the President of the Philippines. Estrada’s successor, Arroyo, doesn’t articulate the MILF as competition to her presidency. However, she still emphasizes that the security organs stand ready to protect the people. In her first SONA, Arroyo highlights that even though she is engaged in the peace process, “the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] stands ready to protect our people at a moment’s notice.”³⁸⁷

³⁸¹ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Second State of the Nation Address, July 26, 1999,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 1999. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1999/07/26/joseph-ejercito-estrada-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-1999/>

³⁸² Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

³⁸³ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Second State of the Nation Address, July 26, 1999,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 1999. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1999/07/26/joseph-ejercito-estrada-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-1999/>

³⁸⁴ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

³⁸⁵ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Second State of the Nation Address, July 26, 1999,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 1999. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1999/07/26/joseph-ejercito-estrada-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-1999/>

³⁸⁶ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

³⁸⁷ (Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, First State of the Nation Address, July 23, 2001,” *Official Gazette*, July 23, 2001. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2001/07/23/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-first-state-of-the-nation-address-july-23-2001/>

4.4.1.3 Sovereignty / Territorial Integrity

The final referent object that was presented in the SONA's was Sovereignty / Territorial Integrity . Sovereignty is placed as an important virtue in the Filipino discourse, as the country was colonized from the arrival of the Spanish in the 16th century until it was granted independence in 1946. When talking to the 'rebels', Estrada made it clear that his administration was "not elected to compromise the sovereignty of this Republic, not in substance, not in symbol, never ever."³⁸⁸ Estrada goes on to argue that due to his successful election, he "could not just stand by while the rebels ate up more and more of the country's territory they were not elected to govern... It was my solemn duty ... to defend the sovereignty and integrity of this republic."³⁸⁹ The metaphor presented in the previous quote is organic, as are the rebels, which are eating away at the Philippine's sovereignty. Arroyo and Estrada both directly warned the MILF and other rebel groups, with Arroyo stating that they "must not compromise constitutionality, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity,"³⁹⁰ while Estrada insisted:

"We do not ask that you respect and recognize the sovereignty of the republic. We demand that you do. May I give the MILF some unsolicited advice. Secession in the Philippines is an impossible dream. There simply is no space in our geography, in our demographics, and in all our national mentality for forcibly carving another state out of the present Philippine territory."³⁹¹

Here the concept of changing the republic's sovereignty or its territory is akin to 'carving', a term used to describe the cutting of cooked meat into slices, repeating the living organic metaphor used earlier. However, Estrada emphasized that while the referent object was threatened, it would not suffer such a fate, due to the success of the Philippines' security organs. According to Estrada, the "[Armed Forces of the Philippines]' outstanding performance in Mindanao further highlighted their importance in preserving the territorial integrity of the republic from external and internal threats."³⁹² The same praise was given to

³⁸⁸ Joseph Estrada, "Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Second State of the Nation Address, July 26, 1999," *Official Gazette*, July 26, 1999. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1999/07/26/joseph-ejercito-estrada-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-1999/>

³⁸⁹ Joseph Estrada, "Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000," *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

³⁹⁰ Gloria Arroyo, "Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, First State of the Nation Address, July 23, 2001," *Official Gazette*, July 23, 2001. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2001/07/23/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-first-state-of-the-nation-address-july-23-2001/>

³⁹¹ Joseph Estrada, "Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000," *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

³⁹² Ibid.

Filipino soldiers, “who valiantly and bravely fought the rebels in defense of the sovereignty, integrity, and honor of the Republic of the Philippines.”³⁹³

4.4.2 Pre-9/11: Existential Threat

The first SONA analysed within this thesis is Ramos’ 1996 SONA, which did not frame threats in relation to the Moro minority question. This could be because of a report by the National Unification Commission in 1993, which had launched a national consultation process amongst civil society organisations, the military, rebel groups, public officials and other organizations. In terms of securitization theory, this report can be understood as a de-securitization process, whereby issues are taken out of a security context and addressed in the public sphere. The report was novel in the sense that it identified the root causes of the armed conflicts in the Philippines, including: “(1) poverty and economic inequity, (2) poor governance, (3) acts of injustice or abuse, (4) structural inequity in ... [the Filipino] political system, and (5) exploitation and marginalization of the indigenous cultural communities.”³⁹⁴ The report was institutionalized through Executive Order No. 125, wherein Ramos outlined the principles of a community-based peace process, which aimed to create an equitable and pluralistic society,³⁹⁵ and according to Miriam Coronel Ferrer the report “legitimized and validated the long-existing demands of social movements and progressive sections of civil society.”³⁹⁶ Ramos stressed the importance of incorporating peace initiatives to help along the integration process, referencing the ARMM and its cooperation with “the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development ... helping build political consensus, coordinating development projects, and aiding in law enforcement.”³⁹⁷ As a result, for Ramos, the main threat to the Philippines came not from its internal conflicts, but from foreign threats, such as China’s actions in the South China Sea. However, such threats are not linked to the Moro minority question. In the succeeding administrations, during Estrada’s tenure and Arroyo’s first year in office, both presidencies focused more on the Philippines’

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ National Unification Commission, *National Unification Commission Report to President Fidel V. Ramos on the Pursuit of a Comprehensive Peace Process* (Quezon City: National Unification Commission, 1993), p. 27.

³⁹⁵ Fidel V. Ramos, “Executive Order No. 125: Defining the Approach and Administrative Structure for Government’s Comprehensive Peace Efforts,” *Official Gazette*, September 15, 1993. Date Accessed: 05.04.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1993/09/15/executive-order-no-125-s-1993/>

³⁹⁶ Miriam Coronel Ferrer, “National Consultation and the ‘Six Paths to Peace’,” *Accord* (No. 13, 2002), p. 84. Date Accessed: 05.04.18. Site: http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2013_17Philippines%20National%20Unification%20Commission_2002_ENG_0.pdf

³⁹⁷ Fidel V. Ramos, “Fidel V. Ramos, Sixth State of the Nation Address, July 28, 1997,” *Official Gazette*, July 28, 1997. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1997/07/28/fidel-v-ramos-sixth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-28-1997/>

internal conflicts within their SONAs. The pre-9/11 existential threats included the categories Separatism, Terrorism, Crime and Poverty.

4.4.2.1 Separatism

The pre-9/11 SONA's identified two specific separatist organizations that have been referenced as existential threats to the Philippines and have been put in connection with the Moro minority question. One of these, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), was only mentioned in connection with the peace process that was ongoing. A combination of colonial injustices, land displacement, internal migration and inequalities, had culminated into rising grievances among the Moro population and led to the formation of the MNLF in 1972 by Nur Misuari.³⁹⁸ However, tensions within the MNLF had caused it to fractionalize and the Islamic-fundamentalist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formed in 1981 under Salamat Hashim, an Islamic teacher who initially sought a separate Moro state under Islamic law. This was an important split because it marked a change in consciousness from separatism to religious fundamentalism. Unlike the MNLF, the MILF's focus on religion changed the nature of the separatist struggle and it continued along a path of militancy. In January 1986, the People Power Revolution removed the Marcos dictatorship from power, delighting both Hashim and Misuari, who agreed to reconcile their differences and enter joint negotiations with President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), which culminated in the establishment of the ARMM.³⁹⁹ However, in September 1986 President Aquino visited Misauri, while refusing to negotiate specifics of the ARMM with the MILF, frustrating Hashim who launched an offensive in early 1987.⁴⁰⁰ The ARMM was inaugurated in 1990, but at this point, Misuari and Hashim objected to the area of control as well as the accompanying plebiscite.⁴⁰¹ Ramos re-entered talks with the MNLF and the MILF, and in 1996 it was possible to reach a peace settlement that granted the MNLF administrative rights over the ARMM. The MNLF also became involved in a formal alliance with Ramos' ruling party Lakas. Misauri was even able to run for regional governor of the ARMM. As such the MNLF was not articulated as an existential threat in Ramos' 1997 SONA. In 2000, his successor Estrada referenced the MNLF as part of his "four-point strategy in approaching the

³⁹⁸ Lisa Huang, Victor Musembi and Ljiljana Petronic, "The State-Moro Conflict in the Philippines," (Carleton University, June 2012), p. 7. Date Accessed 12.12.17. Site: <https://carleton.ca/cifp/wp-content/uploads/1392-1.pdf>

³⁹⁹ Paul A. Rodell, "Separatist Insurgency in the Southern Philippines," in Andrew T. H. Tan eds. *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007), p. 231.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ Paul A. Rodell, "Separatist Insurgency in the Southern Philippines," in Andrew T. H. Tan eds. *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007), p. 231.

Mindanao question,”⁴⁰² which included “the implementation of the peace agreement between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF] – because that is our commitment to our countrymen and to the international community.”⁴⁰³ However, although Estrada and Arroyo did not articulate the MNLF as a threat, they did not support or cooperate with MNLF leaders who ran for regional government positions. As a result, the MNLF’s “authority remained limited and it never received sufficient resources to fulfil its mission... [and] while some former rebels were incorporated into the country’s military... many were not, which led disgruntled MNLF rebels to join the ranks of the MILF.”⁴⁰⁴

The severity of the conflict and the nature of MILF’s existential threat justification changed after Estrada called for ‘all-out war’ against the MILF in early 2000. This resulted in institutional peace-building measures to be traded for hard security measures. According to Gene Navera, it was around this time that Estrada “conceptualized war as a necessary instrument to ensure peace, thereby warranting the determined use of military action when dealing with the problem of insurgency in the countryside and Moro secessionism in Southern Philippines.”⁴⁰⁵ The response to Estrada’s ‘all-out war’ against the MILF was a “surge in hostilities in Lanao del Norte [in March 2000],”⁴⁰⁶ as Hashim responded in kind, by calling out for a *jihad* against the government.⁴⁰⁷ Estrada referenced the MILF as being untrustworthy and eager to “force their separatist aims on ... unwilling people.”⁴⁰⁸ According to Estrada, they tried to “amputate southern parts of the country away from the organic whole,”⁴⁰⁹ and wish to “carve out [lands] to convert into [an independent Muslim state]”. While displaying the threat as urgent, Estrada also presents reasoning with the separatist group as futile. Indeed, Estrada explains how the MILF was able to expand their territorial

⁴⁰² Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ Paul A. Rodell, “Separatist Insurgency in the Southern Philippines,” in Andrew T. H. Tan eds. *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007), p. 231-232.

⁴⁰⁵ Gene Segarra Navera, “Metaphorizing The Philippine Presidency: Schemas of Presidential Leadership in The Post-Marcos State of The Nation Addresses (1987-2009),” (PhD Dissertation, National University of Singapore, 2012), p. 232. Date Accessed: 31.03.18. Site: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48651402.pdf>

⁴⁰⁶ Diana Rodriguez, “Appendix: A Very Long Engagement: A Chronology of Four Decades of the Communist and Moro Insurgencies in the Philippines,” in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 437.

⁴⁰⁷ Soliman M. Santos Jr. and Octavio A. Dinampo, “Abu Sayyaf Reloaded: Rebels, Agents, Bandits, Terrorists (Case Study),” in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 120.

⁴⁰⁸ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

control under the previous administrations as Ramos had “refused to fight, pretending that it was not happening,”⁴¹⁰ and being “either naive enough to tolerate them or too timid to stop them.”⁴¹¹ He further claimed that the MILF used the peace talks during the “1997 ceasefire to commit at least 227 violations.”⁴¹² Estrada makes it clear that the existential threat posed by the MILF can only be countered through hard security measures. He himself refers to the MILF as ‘traitors’ to the Philippines who “owed their allegiance elsewhere,”⁴¹³ and who are a “threat to the republic.”⁴¹⁴ According to Navera, Estrada portrayed the MILF in a way, which made “pursuing negotiations with them ... impossible and unnecessary,”⁴¹⁵ further justifying the implementation of hard security measures.

However, at the same time as Estrada displayed hardball tactics by suggesting that “an armed rebellion demanded an armed response,”⁴¹⁶ he still presented himself as willing to make a peace deal, by stating that he would like to “invite the MILF into a brotherly embrace of peace,”⁴¹⁷ and that he wishes to “continue seeking peace talks with the MILF within the framework of the Constitution – because a peace agreed upon in good faith is preferable to a peace enforced by force of arms.”⁴¹⁸ This strengthens the image that in actuality Estrada would want nothing else but to have a peace agreement with the MILF but that his hand was forced into taking up arms against them. This frame is strengthened when Estrada demonstrates the futility of the MILF’s separatist aims and appears to offer the MILF ‘unsolicited advice’ saying that: “Secession in the Philippines is an impossible dream.”⁴¹⁹ According to Navera, Estrada’s statements “deemphasized the ‘historical and systemic marginalization of the Moros’ in Southern Philippines... and how the previous governments including post-Marcos administrations had themselves been complicit in the marginalization

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Gene Segarra Navera, “Metaphorizing The Philippine Presidency: Schemas of Presidential Leadership in The Post-Marcos State of The Nation Addresses (1987-2009),” (PhD Dissertation, National University of Singapore, 2012), p. 259. Date Accessed: 31.03.18. Site: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48651402.pdf>

⁴¹⁶ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

of the Moros in the countryside through state policies and programs that tend to under-privilege Muslim communities.”⁴²⁰

4.4.2.2 Terrorism

Another existential threat to the Philippines was identified as terrorism. In the 1990s, an even more radical and violent extremist group had emerged. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), created by young radicalized Tausug, “had close ties to the network of Al-Qaeda and stress[ed] the notion of a jihad against Christians rather than mere Bangsamoro [Moro nation] separatism,”⁴²¹ which it had waged since 1991. According to the Global Terrorism Database, there have been 375 successful attacks that were either suspected or confirmed to have been carried out by ASG, spanning a timeline from 1994 to 2016.⁴²² The threat posed by this terrorist group is severe and a major difference between the MILF and the ASG is their distinction of the ‘enemy’. According to Julkipli Wadi, the ASG’s enemies “were not only Philippine soldiers; they included non-combatants, Christians, and Muslims who did not agree with their version of political-struggle-cum-war.”⁴²³ As a result, the ASG often targeted Christians and thus aggravated sectarian violence.

In the pre-9/11 SONA’s, the ASG is only mentioned twice by name, once by Estrada and once by Arroyo. In his 2000 SONA, Estrada claims that “on the matter of the Abu Sayyaf... contrary to rebel propaganda, our fight is not against Muslims at all. They are all our brothers. Our fight is against rebels and other outlaws, regardless of their religion.”⁴²⁴ In doing so, Estrada does differentiate between the Moro minority question and the terrorist group ASG. However, regarding how the government should approach the threat, Estrada embraces the perspective that the war analogy can be applied to terrorists, which assumes “that the use of military methods can be successful and that it is possible to achieve

⁴²⁰ Gene Segarra Navera, “Metaphorizing The Philippine Presidency: Schemas of Presidential Leadership in The Post-Marcos State of The Nation Addresses (1987-2009),” (PhD Dissertation, National University of Singapore, 2012), p. 257. Date Accessed: 31.03.18. Site: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48651402.pdf>

⁴²¹ Kathrin Ruprecht, “Separatist Conflicts in the ASEAN Region: Comparing Southern Thailand and Mindanao,” *ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies* 7 (No. 1, 2014), p. 26. Date Accessed: 12.12.17. Site: <https://aseas.univie.ac.at/index.php/aseas/article/download/200/92>

⁴²² National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Database Advanced Search: Perpetrators – ASG; Incidents between – 1990-2016; All Terrorism Criteria must be met; Ambiguous cases included; Unsuccessful Attack excluded; *Global Terrorism Database* (2017). Date Accessed: 12.12.17. Site: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>

⁴²³ Julkipli Wadi, “They’ve Come This Far,” *News Break Archives*, January 1, 2003. Date Accessed: 05.04.18. Site: <http://archives.newsbreak-knowledge.ph/2003/01/01/they’ve-come-this-far/>

⁴²⁴ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

victory.”⁴²⁵ Estrada even provides the following quote in his 1998 SONA to further justify hard security measures: “In crime, our answer is punishment. In the rebellion, our response is negotiation. To the emerging ones, the only desire to achieve social change, we are willing to negotiate. But with terrorists, we have no time.”⁴²⁶ In his 2000 SONA, Estrada goes on to say that the threat posed by the ASG has the potential to grow and that the “abstention from military action would have meant political abdication.”⁴²⁷ Arroyo meanwhile described the terrorist group as “a treacherous and elusive enemy in Basilan.”⁴²⁸ To meet the threat posed by the ASG, Arroyo claimed to “have earmarked additional funding in several billions of pesos for the AFP modernization program... [and that] the leadership of the Abu Sayyaf has started to fall. The crackdown has neutralized 130 of them. Many of them have come down from their mountains because they have been abandoned by their leaders.”⁴²⁹ Arroyo also emphasises the importance of hard security measures, which according to her have been successful.

4.4.2.3 Crime

A report by the *World Bank* claims that the overall human and social cost of the conflict in Mindanao from the 1970s until 2004, had resulted in: Over 100,000 deaths, more than two million displaced persons, the creation of ‘Muslim ghettos’ with high unemployment, an increase in poverty to 71.3 per cent in 2000, a deteriorating security situation within conflict areas and the emergence of narcotics trafficking and drug abuse, a new problem that had not existed in Mindanao before the conflict started.⁴³⁰ The Moro minority question has easily been equated to the rise in criminality in Mindanao. During Estrada’s term, there were two perceptions within the administration regarding separatist groups in Mindanao – one viewed

⁴²⁵ Brenda Lutz and James Lutz, “Terrorism,” in Allen Collins eds. *Contemporary Security Studies* [4th Ed.] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 312-313.

⁴²⁶ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, First State of the Nation Address, July 27, 1998,” *Official Gazette*, July 27, 1998. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1998/07/27/joseph-ejercito-estrada-first-state-of-the-nation-address-july-27-1998/>

⁴²⁷ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

⁴²⁸ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, First State of the Nation Address, July 23, 2001,” *Official Gazette*, July 23, 2001. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2001/07/23/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-first-state-of-the-nation-address-july-23-2001/>

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Salvatore Schiavo-Campo and Mary Judd, “The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend,” (Social Development Papers No. 24, *The World Bank*, February 2005), p. 5-6. Date Accessed: 03.05.18. Site: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-1111996036679/20482477/WP24_Web.pdf

‘Islamic’ separatists as a political group and the other viewed them as criminals.⁴³¹ However, the two terms were often intertwined: “A rebellion should not be treated lightly. It should be crushed so do not challenge us! The same applies to crime and its perpetrators. A crime is not something to be treated nicely. It is crushed.”⁴³² Crime is also brought into connection with terrorism and Estrada also stresses that the MILF “must drop all [their]... criminal activities because terrorism, bombings, and violence have no place in a civilized society. Criminals have no place in a negotiating table.”⁴³³ Arroyo had made similar remarks in her 2001 SONA when she claimed that criminality has “terrorized the common folk,”⁴³⁴ even asking “Congress to enact a law reducing the amount of drugs in a suspect’s possession for him to be charged with drug trafficking.”⁴³⁵ As such, the solution to the existential threat Crime is similar to that proposed against separatism and terrorism. In connection with ending drug trafficking, Arroyo claimed that she had “earmarked additional funding in several billions of pesos for the AFP modernization program.”⁴³⁶

4.4.2.4 Poverty

In the pre-9/11 era, poverty is also an issue identified as an existential threat and associated with the Mindanao region and the Moro minority question. While poverty does not specifically address the Moro minority question, decades of violence and conflict have had a considerable social, economic and human cost on the islands of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, even though these regions are rich in resources. It is estimated that almost 59 per cent of the country’s fish supplies comes from the surrounding waters, while also containing vast mineral deposits.⁴³⁷ However, According to Timothy Williams, the conflict had left “over 120,000 people dead by 1996 and three ‘all-out-wars’... [and] up to 140

⁴³¹ Denise Youngblood-Coleman, “2018 Country Review: Philippines,” *Country Watch* (n/d), p. 13-14. Date Accessed: 03.05.18. Site: <http://www.countrywatch.com/Content/pdfs/reviews/B3ZQ9893.01c.pdf>

⁴³² Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Second State of the Nation Address, July 26, 1999,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 1999. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1999/07/26/joseph-ejercito-estrada-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-1999/>

⁴³³ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

⁴³⁴ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, First State of the Nation Address, July 23, 2001,” *Official Gazette*, July 23, 2001. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2001/07/23/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-first-state-of-the-nation-address-july-23-2001/>

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ Cristina J. Montiel, Rudy B. Rodil, and Judith M. de Guzman, “The Moro Struggle and the Challenge to Peace - building in Mindanao, Southern Philippines,” in Dan Landis and Rosita D. Albert eds. *Handbook of Ethnic Conflict: International Perspectives* (Boston: Springer, 2012), p. 73.

million EUR spent yearly by the state.”⁴³⁸ The Philippine Human Development Report 2005 estimated that the conflicts in Mindanao have had an annual economic cost between five and ten billion Philippine Pesos from 1975 to 2002 (between 156.7 to 313.4 million EUR according to the 2000 exchange rate), while also uprooting entire societies, with “anywhere from one-fifth to one-third of major Muslim tribes... [living] outside their ancestral homelands.”⁴³⁹ For the year 2000, the *Asian Development Bank* found that the ARMM had the highest poverty incidence in the whole country, reaching 60 per cent,⁴⁴⁰ while also concluding that “much of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago reel under the weight of poverty and underdevelopment,”⁴⁴¹ with many Muslim provinces being the poorest in the country. From the pre-9/11 security actors, Estrada, in particular, broached the issue of poverty as “an intolerable social shame ... [which] defines and drives the substance, the content, and the heart and soul of ... [the Estrada’s administration’s] entire strategy of government.”⁴⁴²

According to Estrada, “the war on poverty is not just a policy but a passion.”⁴⁴³ In his specification of his ‘war on poverty’, Estrada lists several aspects including developing the economy, focussing on the rural areas, accelerating land distribution processes, restructuring health programs, education spending, housing for the poor, improvement of women welfare, moderation of population growth, improvement of financial markets and the improvement of the competitiveness of Filipino businesses. Estrada also mentions Moro separatist groups as being “another obstacle to the war against poverty, and the development of all the people,”⁴⁴⁴ as well as having a direct negative impact “on the economy ... [contributing] to the depreciation of the peso.”⁴⁴⁵ According to Estrada, his “initiatives to bring about stability in Mindanao are directly related to poverty elimination... [Estrada] will build up Mindanao as

⁴³⁸ Timothy Williams, “The MoA-AD Debacle,” *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 29 (No. 1, 2010), p. 122. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/212/212>

⁴³⁹ *United Nations Development Programme*, “Philippine Human Development Report 2005,” (Report, Human Development Network, 2005), p. viii. Date Accessed: 01.12.17. Site: www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/philippines_2005_en.pdf

⁴⁴⁰ Asian Development Bank, *Poverty in the Philippines: Causes, Constraints, and Opportunities* (Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank, 2009), p.15. Date Accessed: 06.05.18. Site: <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27529/poverty-philippines-causes-constraints-opportunities.pdf>

⁴⁴¹ Rommel A. Curaming, “Historical Injustice and Human Insecurity: Conflict and Peacekeeping in Muslim Mindanao,” in P. J. Carnegie et al. eds. *Human Insecurities in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Springer, 2016), p. 122.

⁴⁴² Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Second State of the Nation Address, July 26, 1999,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 1999. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1999/07/26/joseph-ejercito-estrada-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-1999/>

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

the country's food basket. But we can only succeed if an environment of political tranquillity is established there.”⁴⁴⁶ In order for Estrada to ‘build up Mindanao as the country's food basket’, security has to be assured. According to Estrada, “to assure internal and external security, and to preserve the environment of stability the country needs to prosper, we will pursue the 15-year modernization program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”⁴⁴⁷ Estrada also claims that in order to support the development of the Mindanao region, Congress needs to sign the “ARMM Organic Act and the bill granting special powers to enable the fast-track of development of Mindanao.”⁴⁴⁸ However, this is a point of contention with the MNLF, as the current ARMM law stipulated that strategic minerals in the region are not under government control, while the new bill provides a split down the middle for the government and the MNLF.⁴⁴⁹ According to an article by the *Institute for Autonomy and Governance*, Attorney Parcasio claimed that the bill was also passed when ‘nobody was looking’, due to Estrada's current impeachment proceedings.⁴⁵⁰ While Arroyo didn't emphasize a ‘war on poverty’ as Estrada had done during his presidency, she too emphasized that her government would bring “war against poverty to rural Mindanao, especially the areas most affected by the past conflicts,”⁴⁵¹ thus continuing the war metaphor.

4.4.3 Pre-9/11: Extraordinary Measures

Numerous military deployments to counter existential threats associated with the Moro minority question have been primarily deployed in Sulu and Mindanao, but have also affected nearly the whole of the Philippines. According to the Philippine Human Development Report 2005, “91 percent of all provinces were affected by ideology-based

⁴⁴⁶ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Second State of the Nation Address, July 26, 1999,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 1999. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1999/07/26/joseph-ejercito-estrada-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-1999/>

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁸ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

⁴⁴⁹ Miriam Coronel Ferrer, “Framework for Autonomy in Southeast Asia's Plural Societies,” (Working Paper No. 13, *Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies*, May 2001), p. 15. Date Accessed: 10.05.18. Site: <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP13.pdf>

⁴⁵⁰ Atty. Parcasio; cited in *Institute for Autonomy and Governance*, “Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Policy Report – Opt In and Opt Out: History, Context and Issues on Territory,” December 14, 2015. Date Accessed: 10.05.18. Site: www.iag.org.ph/index.php/blog/1274-muslim-mindanao-autonomy-policy-report-opt-in-and-opt-out-history-context-and-issues-on-territory

⁴⁵¹ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, First State of the Nation Address, July 23, 2001,” *Official Gazette*, July 23, 2001. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2001/07/23/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-first-state-of-the-nation-address-july-23-2001/>

armed conflicts during the 18-year period from 1986-2004.”⁴⁵² In the run-up to the hard security campaigns, cease-fire agreements between the MILF and the government had broken down intermittently and had hampered peace talks. Amid increased clashes in 1999, the Philippines government led a “periodic aerial bombardment of villages suspected of harbouring members of armed opposition groups [which] led to mass displacements of civilians, especially in Mindanao.”⁴⁵³ However, in March 2000, after rebels took over Kauswagan taking hundreds of people hostage, Estrada decided to launch an ‘all-out war’ against the MILF. Hard security campaigns in Mindanao have led to numerous human rights abuses and mass displacement. In the pre-9/11 period, there were two hard security campaigns, Oplan Makabayan in 1998 and Oplan Balangai in 2000, which featured “heavy troop deployments and ... intensive and relentless military operations in priority areas the AFP considered as strongholds of the NPA, MILF, and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).”⁴⁵⁴ The escalation of the conflict resulted in over 400,000 civilians being displaced and over 300 civilians killed, “amid reports of indiscriminate bombings and human rights violations by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).”⁴⁵⁵

Estrada justified these military operations within his 2000 SONA, where he claimed that retaking “territories was not just a symbolic victory but a substantive one... [The Philippines] upheld the constitutional principle that the Philippines is one state, one republic, with one government, one military answerable to one civilian commander in chief, under one constitution and one flag, in one undivided territory.”⁴⁵⁶ Estrada also makes numerous references to war within his SONA’s including the root causes of the conflict:

“We cannot talk about secession. But we can talk about a new beginning for Mindanao. In fact, if you are bold enough for it, we can talk about a different war, a bigger war that needs to be fought. I do not mean the guerrilla warfare that you appear to have shifted to. I hope

⁴⁵² *United Nations Development Programme*, “Philippine Human Development Report 2005,” (Report, Human Development Network, 2005), p. viii. Date Accessed: 01.12.17. Site: www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/philippines_2005_en.pdf

⁴⁵³ *Amnesty International*, “Amnesty International Report 2000 – Philippines,” (Report, June 1, 2000). Date Accessed: 15.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa0f6c.html>

⁴⁵⁴ *Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace*, (2006), p. 6; cited in Gene Segarra Navera, “Metaphorizing The Philippine Presidency: Schemas of Presidential Leadership in The Post-Marcos State of The Nation Addresses (1987-2009),” (PhD Dissertation, National University of Singapore, 2012), p. 234. Date Accessed: 31.03.18. Site: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48651402.pdf>

⁴⁵⁵ *Amnesty International*, “Amnesty International Report 2001 – Philippines,” (Report, June 1, 2001). Date Accessed: 15.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b1de37f8.html>

⁴⁵⁶ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Third State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2000,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2000. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2000/07/24/joseph-ejercito-estrada-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2000/>

you stop – for the sake of the people’s especially the poor, who will suffer the most from continued hostilities.”⁴⁵⁷

Even though he opens up the possibility of ‘opening up a new beginning’, he continues with offering war as the alternative, while applying a negative intonation to the solution that the ‘other’ proposes, i.e., guerrilla warfare. He also places himself as the protector of the people. For Estrada, the ‘rebellion’ is only to be solved through the military action: “Fighting the rebellion is one thing. It takes the military to do it.”⁴⁵⁸

This situation was made worse by numerous human rights abuses by Philippines security forces. Although the Amnesty International Report reported that in 1998 the abuses and extrajudicial executions continued to decline,⁴⁵⁹ in 1999 “incidents of alleged extrajudicial executions by police of suspected criminals were reported in Manila, Davao and other provincial towns.”⁴⁶⁰ In 2000, as Oplan Balangai was underway, members of the AFP were accused of beating, electrocuting, suffocating and sexually abusing alleged members of the New People’s Army, Muslim separatist groups and criminals, including children, in order to coerce confessions.⁴⁶¹ In 2001, 28 Muslim Moros in southern Mindanao, suspected of sympathizing with the ASG, were arrested, incarcerated and allegedly tortured by the AFP on charges of kidnapping – 14 were released by court order in October 2004, but no charges were filed against members of the AFP.⁴⁶² However, in June 2000, “10 members of a police unit who shot dead two Muslim men in Manila during an arrest operation against suspected MILF sympathizers,”⁴⁶³ were indeed presented with murder charges.

While the military has faced considerable criticism of human rights abuses, the Philippine National Police (PNP) and auxiliary forces have also been accused of numerous violations and have been subject to much debate in the Philippines. The mandate of the PNP was expanded in the Republic Act 8551, which ordered the PNP to assist the AFP in counter-insurgency operations in the form of information gathering as well as combat operations, if

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ *Amnesty International*, “Amnesty International Report 1999 – Philippines,” (Report, January 1, 1999). Date Accessed: 15.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa0a14.html>

⁴⁶⁰ *Amnesty International*, “Amnesty International Report 2000 – Philippines,” (Report, June 1, 2000). Date Accessed: 15.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa0f6c.html>

⁴⁶¹ *Amnesty International*, “Amnesty International Report 2001 – Philippines,” (Report, June 1, 2001). Date Accessed: 15.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b1de37f8.html>

⁴⁶² *Amnesty International*, “Amnesty International Report 2004 – Philippines,” (Report, May 26, 2004). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/40b5a1fef.html>

⁴⁶³ *Amnesty International*, “Amnesty International Report 2001 – Philippines,” (Report, June 1, 2001). Date Accessed: 15.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b1de37f8.html>

deemed necessary by the President.⁴⁶⁴ The auxiliary units can be split into two groups: Those under the supervision of the state's security organs and those employed by powerful clans and families. Decades of insurgencies and high crime rates have caused many powerful families to invest into their own private armies. The Philippines' Commission on Elections has identified 154 groups in 2000, despite being outlawed in the 1987 Constitution and being used by politicians, such as the Ampatuans, for their own private gains.⁴⁶⁵ Many of these private armies were also created in order to fight against the MNLF and then the MILF and have since joined under an umbrella organisation labelled the Military Christian Unified Command.⁴⁶⁶

Over a million civilians were also recruited in the AFP and the PNP as part of the auxiliary forces, such as the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU), under the administration of the AFP, and the Civilian Volunteer Organisations (CVO), under the administration of the PNP, ostensibly to mitigate the unstable security situation.⁴⁶⁷ However, according to a 2000 report by the Philippine Commission on Human Rights, "853 cases consisting of murder, execution, torture, disappearance, illegal arrest, and detention were filed with the Commission against 1,070 CAFGU member[s]."⁴⁶⁸ Such abuses of power, as well as the general climate of being able to act with impunity, has been particularly problematic for minority groups. Indeed, the National Unification Commission Report to President Fidel Ramos in 1993, claimed that one of the root causes of Philippine's internal conflicts was a result of "injustice, abuse of those in authority and power, violations of human rights; and inequality, corruption and delays in the administration of justice."⁴⁶⁹ Auxiliary units under the state's security organs, as well as those held by private families have been deployed against the MILF or against villages who were thought to be sympathetic to the MILF. According to Herman Joseph Kraft:

⁴⁶⁴ Republic of the Philippines, "For The Reform and Reorganization Of The Philippine National Police And For Other Purposes," (Tenth Congress, Republic Act No. 8551, February 25, 1998). Date Accessed: 09.12.17. Site: http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1998/ra_8551_1998.html

⁴⁶⁵ Herman Joseph S. Kraft, "The Foibles of an Armed Citizenry: Armed Auxiliaries of the State and Private Armed Groups in the Philippines (Overview)," in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 198.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 199.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 185-186.

⁴⁶⁸ *Commission on Human Rights*, "On the Revival of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs)," (March 2, 2001); cited in *Australian Government: Refugee Review Tribunal*, "Country Advice Philippines," (Country Advice Philippines, September 29, 2011), p. 3. Date Accessed: 09.12.17. Site: https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1352217196_phl39183.pdf

⁴⁶⁹ *United Nations Development Programme*, "Philippine Human Development Report 2005," (Report, Human Development Network, 2005), p. 83. Date Accessed: 09.12.17. Site: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/philippines_2005_en.pdf

“The rival Ampatuan and Candao families are at the heart of ongoing violence in the ARMM and have frequently involved the MILF, the military, and, by association, the CVOs in their conflict. CVOs in Maguindanao province armed by the PNP and the AFP are said to have participated in attacks against villages sympathetic to the MILF.”⁴⁷⁰

However, in light of this ongoing problem, no effective action was taken by pre-9/11 security actors to tackle these abuses of power. Instead, in his first SONA in 1998, Estrada expressed the desire to “devolve greater administrative control over the Philippine National Police to the local government units... The police force is hardly far from the temptation to abuse. But I am not doubtful that law enforcement officials have always done their duty no matter how difficult they are.”⁴⁷¹ While the number of active CAFGUs remained fairly stable in the pre-9/11 period, following Estrada’s call for an ‘all-out war’, the number increased from 32,748 to 41,979 in 2001.⁴⁷²

⁴⁷⁰ Herman Joseph S. Kraft, “The Foibles of an Armed Citizenry: Armed Auxiliaries of the State and Private Armed Groups in the Philippines (Overview),” in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 197.

⁴⁷¹ Joseph Estrada, “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, First State of the Nation Address, July 27, 1998,” *Official Gazette*, July 27, 1998. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1998/07/27/joseph-ejercito-estrada-first-state-of-the-nation-address-july-27-1998/>

⁴⁷² Herman Joseph S. Kraft, “The Foibles of an Armed Citizenry: Armed Auxiliaries of the State and Private Armed Groups in the Philippines (Overview),” in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 192.

4.5 Post-9/11: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from 2002 to 2006

4.5.1 Post-9/11: Referent Object

In the post-9/11 era, the referent objects included Democracy / Constitution and People. While these referent objects had already been established in the pre-9/11 era, a feature of the post-9/11 era was that the referent object needed more protection than before.

4.5.1.1 Democracy / Constitution

In the post-9/11 era, direct references to the constitution were not made in relation to the Moro minority question. However, democracy was. Reform was argued to be needed in order to protect the Philippines' democracy, which was presented as an object that can be taken advantage of. Arroyo warns her audience that existential threats can result "in the destruction of our democratic institutions."⁴⁷³ As a result, she encouraged Congress to sign "with a great sense of urgency, a new bill that will strengthen our legal armory in this war: the Anti-Terrorism Bill... [which can] plug the loopholes by which crimes spread and democracy is undermined."⁴⁷⁴ Thus Arroyo argues that she must be given increased power to protect the Philippines and its democratic rights and liberties: "In the area of national security, I urge the swift passage of an anti-terrorism law that will protect rather than subvert, enhance rather than weaken, the rights and liberties that terrorism precisely threatens with extinction."⁴⁷⁵ On the other hand, democracy is also presented as being able to utilize 'self-defence' as Arroyo warns criminals that they will "feel the full brunt of the arsenal of democracy."⁴⁷⁶ This establishes that Arroyo still frames democracy as a referent object, but also uses it to justify that its 'arsenal' and its 'armory' can be used in order to fight in 'self-defence'. Arroyo made sure to emphasize the prolonged and entrenched need to fight for democracy's virtues as "four generations of fighting Filipinos have ceaselessly struggled against totalitarians and

⁴⁷³ Gloria Arroyo, "Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Third State of the Nation Address, July 28, 2003," *Official Gazette*, July 28, 2003. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2003/07/28/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-28-2003/>

⁴⁷⁴ Gloria Arroyo, "Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Second State of the Nation Address, July 22, 2002," *Official Gazette*, July 22, 2002. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2002/07/22/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-22-2002/>

⁴⁷⁵ Gloria Arroyo, "Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Fifth State of the Nation Address, July 25, 2005," *Official Gazette*, July 25, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2005/07/25/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-fifth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-25-2005/>

⁴⁷⁶ Gloria Arroyo, "Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Second State of the Nation Address, July 22, 2002," *Official Gazette*, July 22, 2002. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2002/07/22/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-22-2002/>

terrorists for our freedom, for the freedom of our people and the people of the world.”⁴⁷⁷ While the democracy remains a referent object after the events of 9/11, its uniqueness is not exclusively stressed as was done in the pre-9/11 era, but instead, emphasis is placed on the greater urgency needed to defend it.

4.5.1.2 People

Unlike pre-9/11, Arroyo’s post-9/11 SONAs made more people-centred references, a similar approach chosen by her predecessor Estrada. Arroyo, for example, claims that “the power of the people is the heart of democracy.”⁴⁷⁸ This shift is emphasised in her 2004 SONA where she states: “I promise a new direction: people first. The people are our biggest resources.”⁴⁷⁹ However, similar to the referent object ‘constitution / democracy’, Arroyo still appeals to Congress that her powers need to be strengthened, in this case, to protect the Filipino people: “I also ask the Congress to pass the Anti-Terrorism Law, and include here the imposition of heavy penalties for negligence in dealing with suspected terrorists. Along with terrorism and the drug problem, the people are concerned with their personal safety.”⁴⁸⁰ There is another instance, where she requests a better ‘structure of government’ so that she can enhance the people’s ‘freedom’: “Once we have proved to our people that we have done what we can within the present structure of government, we can move on to changing the system to one that enhances our freedom and flexibility to do more.”⁴⁸¹ Arroyo even goes so far as to declare herself the “protector of my people,”⁴⁸² as she is “taking a direct hand... [because] at stake in this war is the very life of society, the very possibility of basic rights and liberties, which have been under attack for too long.”⁴⁸³ She also claimed that her policies had shown that “government does care even for a single Filipino life... especially the weakest among

⁴⁷⁷ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Fourth State of the Nation Address, July 26, 2004,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 2004. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2004/07/26/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-fourth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-2004/>

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Third State of the Nation Address, July 28, 2003,” *Official Gazette*, July 28, 2003. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2003/07/28/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-28-2003/>

⁴⁸¹ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Fourth State of the Nation Address, July 26, 2004,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 2004. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2004/07/26/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-fourth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-2004/>

⁴⁸² Ibid.

⁴⁸³ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Second State of the Nation Address, July 22, 2002,” *Official Gazette*, July 22, 2002. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2002/07/22/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-22-2002/>

us.”⁴⁸⁴ This portrayal of the referent object and herself as the protectorate is very similar to her predecessor Estrada, who frequently appealed to the masses for support. However, when Estrada and Arroyo referred to the people, they did so referencing the majority and not the whole republic. According to Arroyo, a feature of a ‘strong republic’ includes standing up “for the interests of the people rather than of a powerful minority.”⁴⁸⁵ In the post-9/11 era, the referent objects are not only portrayed as reference objects but also as a self-defence justification. Democracy is needed to protect democracy and people are needed to defend the people. Thus, Arroyo argues that it requires ‘men and women in uniform’ who are “at the forefront of our Republic's efforts to fight terror and enforce peace.”⁴⁸⁶

4.5.2 Post-9/11: Existential Threat

Shortly after Arroyo’s succession to the Presidency in the pre-9/11 era, Arroyo sent emissaries to negotiate with the MILF in a counter policy strategy labelled ‘all-out peace’ – a stark contrast to Estrada’s ‘all-out war’ offensive in 2000.⁴⁸⁷ However, after the events of 9/11, Arroyo became one of the first leaders to support George W. Bush’s WoT and shifted her approach towards “war against ‘local terrorists’ that included Muslim armed groups.”⁴⁸⁸ As a result, the existential threat categories Separatism and Terrorism are intertwined in the post-9/11 era.

4.5.2.1 Separatism and Terrorism

Conflating separatism and terrorism is one of the most important developments in the post-9/11 era. Arroyo seems to imply that past and current insurgencies could be interpreted as terrorism, since “four generations of fighting Filipinos have ceaselessly struggled against totalitarians and terrorists for our freedom.”⁴⁸⁹ Within the post-9/11 SONAs, separatists are

⁴⁸⁴ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Fourth State of the Nation Address, July 26, 2004,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 2004. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2004/07/26/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-fourth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-2004/>

⁴⁸⁵ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Second State of the Nation Address, July 22, 2002,” *Official Gazette*, July 22, 2002. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2002/07/22/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-22-2002/>

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁷ Sylvia Concepción et al., “Breaking the links between economics and conflict in Mindanao,” (Discussion Paper, *International Alert*, Manila, 2003), p. 14. Date Accessed: 05.05.18. Site: www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/econ_conflict_mindanao.pdf

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁹ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Fourth State of the Nation Address, July 26, 2004,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 2004. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2004/07/26/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-fourth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-2004/>

also referred to as “rebel terrorists,”⁴⁹⁰ while the term ‘terrorism’ is loosely placed on the Philippine’s insurgencies, including the fight against the the Communist Party of the Philippines’ military wing: “We have been fighting the longest-running communist insurgency in history. We have been coming to grips with fundamentalist terrorism long before 9/11.”⁴⁹¹

The first step in framing internal conflicts as part of the WoT happened shortly after the events of 9/11 when in October 2001, Arroyo signed Memorandum Order No. 37, which was titled: Providing for the Fourteen Pillars of Policy and Action of the Government Against Terrorism. The 14-Pillars emphasize the importance of waging a ‘war against terrorism’ and utilizing hard security measures in order to be successful,⁴⁹² while the root problems of the Philippines internal conflicts, identified by the National Unification Commission, remained largely unaddressed. Soliman Santos Jr. claims that following Memorandum Order No. 37, there was a ‘slowdown’ in the peace process between the MILF and Arroyo’s government as its importance was deemphasised.⁴⁹³ This is exemplified by the decision of the Arroyo government to suspend peace talks with the MILF, following intelligence reports that the MILF was sheltering criminals and members of Jemaah Islamiyah within in its ranks following the Davao bombings in March and April 2003.⁴⁹⁴ Jeemah Islamiyah is a transnational terrorist organisation with links to Al-Qaeda, with units in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore.⁴⁹⁵ The MILF denied these links, but as a result of these allegations, the ongoing peace process with the MILF-leadership was significantly delayed, even though the MILF was interested in negotiations, well aware that it would not be able to

⁴⁹⁰ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Sixth State of the Nation Address, July 24, 2006,” *Official Gazette*, July 24, 2006. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2006/07/24/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-sixth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-24-2006/>

⁴⁹¹ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Fourth State of the Nation Address, July 26, 2004,” *Official Gazette*, July 26, 2004. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2004/07/26/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-fourth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-26-2004/>

⁴⁹² Gloria Arroyo, “Memorandum Order No. 37: Providing for the Fourteen Pillars Of Policy and Action of the Government Against Terrorism,” (Office of the President of the Philippines, Manila, 2001). Date Accessed: 05.04.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2001/10/12/memorandum-order-no-37-s-2001/>

⁴⁹³ Soliman M. Santos, Jr., “Terrorism and Philippine Armed Groups: Networks, Lists, and the Peace Process (Overview),” in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 103.

⁴⁹⁴ Sylvia Concepción et al., “Breaking the links between economics and conflict in Mindanao,” *International Alert* (‘Waging Peace’ Conference, Manila, 2003), p. 15. Date Accessed: 05.05.18. Site: www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/econ_conflict_mindanao.pdf

⁴⁹⁵ *Council on Foreign Relations*, “Jemaah Islamiyah (a.k.a. Jemaah Islamiyah),” (Backgrounder, June 19, 2009). Date Accessed: 10.05.18. Site: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/jemaah-islamiyah-aka-jemaah-islamiyah>

defeat the AFP militarily.⁴⁹⁶ This policy change did not seem to be proportionate to the importance of signing a peace agreement with the MILF, especially since the MILF had distanced itself from the ASG and Al-Qaeda following the events of 9/11.⁴⁹⁷ According to Maria Ressa, who had interviewed Arroyo multiple times, the president had also denied that any links existed, yet following her claim that she would not run for office in 2004, Arroyo claimed that the Philippines had to approach the MILF both politically and militarily, while not wanting to provide details on the intelligence reports.⁴⁹⁸ Following intense fighting, the MILF declared a 20-day ceasefire on the 25th of May, which was extended until June,⁴⁹⁹ at which point MILF-leader Salamat Hashim officially renounced terrorism and terrorist links, stating that:

“[t]here can be no more strong ground for the MILF to condemn terrorism than that it is anathema to the teachings of Islam. To stress seriously this point, I hereby reiterate our condemnation and abhorrence of terroristic tendencies in order to eschew the reverse side of the language of endemic state violence. Consequently, we reject and deny any link with terrorist organizations or activities in this part of the Asian region, particularly in South Philippines, and elsewhere in the world.”⁵⁰⁰

A few days before Arroyo’s 2003 SONA on the 23rd of July, the MILF agreed to a cessation of hostilities with the government, which Arroyo also referred to when she addressed Congress: “Next week, peace talks between the government and the MILF will begin to reach a final peace deal. We will avail of the good offices of Malaysia in the search of a political solution to the conflict with the MILF, while looking to the help of the United States in the rehabilitation of conflict areas and the eradication of the roots of war.”⁵⁰¹

With the MILF and the government discussing peace agreements, the fight against the terrorist group ASG became increasingly important to Arroyo’s administration to continue the narrative of the WoT: “As Commander in Chief, I am taking a direct hand in the war

⁴⁹⁶ Soliman M. Santos Jr., “War and Peace on the Moro Front: Three Standard Bearers, Three Forms of Struggle, Three Tracks (Overview),” in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 77.

⁴⁹⁷ Kathrin Ruprecht, “Separatist Conflicts in the ASEAN Region: Comparing Southern Thailand and Mindanao,” *ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies* 7 (No. 1, 2014), p. 25-26. Date Accessed: 12.12.17. Site: <https://aseas.univie.ac.at/index.php/aseas/article/download/200/92>

⁴⁹⁸ Maria Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia* (New York: Free Press, 2003), p. 15-16.

⁴⁹⁹ Lei Chavez, “Timeline: GRP-MILF peace process,” *ABS-CBN News*, August 15, 2015. Date Accessed: 05.05.18. Site: <http://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/08/15/08/timeline-grp-milf-peace-process>

⁵⁰⁰ Salamat Hashim; cited in Soliman M. Santos Jr., “War and Peace on the Moro Front: Three Standard Bearers, Three Forms of Struggle, Three Tracks (Overview),” in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 77.

⁵⁰¹ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Third State of the Nation Address, July 28, 2003,” *Official Gazette*, July 28, 2003. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2003/07/28/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-28-2003/>

against the enemies of the Republic. This was how I did it with the Abu Sayyaf.”⁵⁰² The links between ASG and Al-Qaeda presented itself as an opportunity for the Philippine and US governments to cooperate, as Arroyo was one of the first heads of state to join George W. Bush’ international WoT. In the 2002 SONA, Arroyo stated that “as a result of our decisive action after September 11, the Philippines is now a recognized player in world affairs.”⁵⁰³ Indeed, Bush had labelled the Philippines as the ‘second front’ in the WoT, with the ASG and Jemayah Islamiya being targeted for their links to Al-Qaeda.⁵⁰⁴ According to Diane Mauzy and Brian Job, increased US-cooperation with Southeast Asian partners comes after a period of “exhibiting varying degrees of benign neglect.”⁵⁰⁵ Following the events of 9/11, the US and the Philippines strengthened their military partnership by holding joint exercises near the bases of the ASG. According to Nathan Quimpo, the US were “providing substantial training, intelligence and logistic support ... [and] in 2002, US soldiers helped stamp out the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan island, where it was mainly based, but many of its leaders managed to escape to nearby islands, including Mindanao.”⁵⁰⁶ In 2004, ASG performed its most notorious attack, bombing a ferry that had left Manila Bay and killing 116 people.⁵⁰⁷ While the ASG and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (a splinter group from MILF) did indeed have links to international terrorist organizations (even pledging their allegiance to ISIS in a *Youtube* video in 2014),⁵⁰⁸ these networks are believed to have been pragmatic rather than ideological decisions and have not manifested themselves as substantial to the home-grown separatist cause.⁵⁰⁹ According to a report by the Moro-Christian Peoples Alliance, the ASG was nothing more than “a bandit group that thrives on kidnap-for-ransom activities.”⁵¹⁰ However, in her 2005 SONA, Arroyo stated the successes of her hard security

⁵⁰² Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Second State of the Nation Address, July 22, 2002,” *Official Gazette*, July 22, 2002. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2002/07/22/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-22-2002/>

⁵⁰³ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁴ John Gersham, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 2002. Date Accessed: 14.04.18. Site: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2002-07-01/southeast-asia-second-front>

⁵⁰⁵ Diane K. Mauzy and Brian L. Job, “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia,” *Asian Survey* 47 (No. 4, 2007), p. 622. Date Accessed: 20.06.17. Site: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2007.47.4.622>

⁵⁰⁶ Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “The US and the Southern Philippines’ Quagmire,” (Working Paper No. 144, *Asia Research Centre*, Murdoch University, July 2007), p. 1. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <https://www.murdoch.edu.au/Research-capabilities/Asia-Research-Centre/document/working-papers/wp144.pdf>

⁵⁰⁷ BBC, “Philippines unrest: Who are the Abu Sayyaf Group?” June 14, 2016. Date Accessed: 13.12.2017. Site: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36138554>

⁵⁰⁸ Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Impact of the Islamic State in Asia,” (Policy Report, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, February 2015), p. 12. Date Accessed: 27.03.2017. Site: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PR150211_The_Impact_of_the_Islamic_State_in_Asia.pdf

⁵⁰⁹ Soliman M. Santos, Jr., “Terrorism and Philippine Armed Groups: Networks, Lists, and the Peace Process (Overview),” in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 92-97.

⁵¹⁰ *Moro-Christian Peoples Alliance*, “The Human Rights Situation Of The Moro People In The Philippines,” (Report submission to the OHCHR, 13th Session of the UPR Working Group, 2012), p. 2. Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site:

campaigns, saying that the Philippines’ “victories in the war on terror have been acknowledged by no less than President Bush before the U.S. National Defense University. The Jemaah Islamiya and the Abu Sayyaf can only pick up the pieces of its broken backbone in Mindanao.”⁵¹¹

4.5.2.2 Poverty

With regards to poverty, the war analogy was continued in the post-9/11 era. Arroyo demanded that a war was fought against several ‘existential threats’: “We are at war. War against terrorism. War against corruption. War against poverty. War on drugs. War against destabilization.”⁵¹² Poverty is not as strongly associated as an existential threat in the post-9/11 era. However it is placed in direct connection with the WoT. In her first SONA following the events of 9/11, Arroyo claimed that she “was the first head of government to emphasize the interconnection between the war against terrorism and the war against poverty.”⁵¹³ Indeed, Arroyo claims that the need to defeat terrorism is related to the Philippines “viable proposition in the world economy,”⁵¹⁴ which is necessary if the Philippines is “to win the most fundamental war, the war against poverty.”⁵¹⁵ Following this logic, winning the war on poverty can only be achieved by winning the WoT. Arroyo emphasises this position, by claiming that the increased international standing that the Philippines has received due to the WoT, also has “increased international visibility and will continue generating capital inflows for the Philippines.”⁵¹⁶

4.5.2.3 Criminality

Arroyo’s references to the threat posed by drugs and criminality soared in her post-9/11 SONAs. This may be partly motivated because the ASG received a cut by protecting regional ‘trafficking syndicates’, while Philippine authorities have also claimed that ‘extensive links’

http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session13/PH/MCPA_UPR_PHL_S13_TheMoroChristianPeoplesAlliance_E.pdf

⁵¹¹ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Fifth State of the Nation Address, July 25, 2005,” *Official Gazette*, July 25, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2005/07/25/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-fifth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-25-2005/>

⁵¹² Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Third State of the Nation Address, July 28, 2003,” *Official Gazette*, July 28, 2003. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2003/07/28/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-28-2003/>

⁵¹³ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Second State of the Nation Address, July 22, 2002,” *Official Gazette*, July 22, 2002. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2002/07/22/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-22-2002/>

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid.

existed between drug traffickers and members of MILF.⁵¹⁷ Arroyo has on multiple occasions drawn connections between terrorism and criminality, by referencing them together: “Criminal gangs and home-grown terrorists have exploited the poisoned political atmosphere to spread poisons of their own,”⁵¹⁸ while Arroyo herself has been “determined to build a strong republic by breaking the back of terrorism and criminality.”⁵¹⁹ She has also often promoted similar treatment regarding the problem of terrorism and the problem of criminality, by saying that she is “taking a direct hand in the war against the enemies of the Republic. This was how I did it with the Abu Sayyaf, leading to the death of Abu Sabaya. This is how I will do it with the criminal gangs,”⁵²⁰ and by saying that “criminal syndicates will be treated as what they are – as direct threats to national security.”⁵²¹ On many occasions Arroyo has raised the threat level of the ‘drug menace’ to that of national security, saying that she is:

“I am instructing the Armed Forces of the Philippines to field military resources for intelligence and to field soldiers in drug raids in support of civilian law enforcement. Drug lords will be treated as enemies of the State! In this war with the drug trade there will be no compromise and no quarter, not for fear or favor. Indeed, we are at war: at war with the terrorists, at war with the kidnappers, at war with the drug lords-and we are determined to win decisive victories on all fronts.”⁵²²

In the post-9/11 era, Arroyo has contributed to the framing of rebellion and criminality with terrorism. This is also echoed by Gene Navera, who also claims that “the conflation of these terms was strategic in that it allowed the government to target rebels in the same way that criminals were treated in the Philippine domestic war on terrorism.”⁵²³

4.5.3 Post-9/11: Extraordinary Measures

Following the attacks of 9/11, the concept of being at war was pushed from all angles: “We are at war. War against terrorism. War against corruption. War against poverty. War on drugs. War against destabilization. In our collective struggle and cooperation, we will prevail

⁵¹⁷ Aurel Croissant and Daniel Barlow, “Terrorist Financing and Government Responses in Southeast Asia,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas eds. *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 209.

⁵¹⁸ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Second State of the Nation Address, July 22, 2002,” *Official Gazette*, July 22, 2002. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2002/07/22/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-22-2002/>

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ Gene Segarra Navera, “Metaphorizing The Philippine Presidency: Schemas of Presidential Leadership in The Post-Marcos State of The Nation Addresses (1987-2009),” (PhD Dissertation, National University of Singapore, 2012), p. 371. Date Accessed: 31.03.18. Site: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48651402.pdf>

and win.”⁵²⁴ Post-9/11 extraordinary measures included hard security campaigns and extra-judicial killings by the PNP and auxiliary forces.

While hard security measures had already been justified in the pre-9/11 era, Arroyo reminded the Filipino people in the post-9/11 era that these hard choices had been necessary, saying that “many of the right decisions are tough decisions.”⁵²⁵ Arroyo also highlighted the importance and the success of the military in “breaking the back of terrorism and criminality.”⁵²⁶ After sealing an initial peace agreement with the MILF, Arroyo claimed: “We achieved all of these backed by the valor, professionalism, and restraint of our soldiers and police. I salute our men and women in uniform, at the forefront of our Republic’s efforts to fight terror and enforce peace.”⁵²⁷ As a result of this success by the military, Arroyo appealed to Congress that more resources should be made available to the Philippines security organs: “Congress will also note a reallocation of resources in this year’s budget to enhance the Republic’s crime-fighting capabilities.”⁵²⁸ Arroyo also argued ‘with a great sense of urgency’ that Congress should pass the anti-terrorism bill, as “this bill will plug the loopholes by which crimes spread and democracy is undermined.”⁵²⁹ Arroyo pushed for this legislation, as she argued that it would “enhance rather than weaken, the rights and liberties that terrorism precisely threatens with extinction.”⁵³⁰ This bill was eventually passed in 2007 as the Human Security Act and contained many similarities to the US Patriots Act in terms of being able to detain suspects without warrants and without charges. The Human Security Act severely curtailed civil liberties and was justified as terrorism “creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace.”⁵³¹ According to Gene Navera, the increased spending on the military and the anti-terrorism bill, in the context of the global

⁵²⁴ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Third State of the Nation Address, July 28, 2003,” *Official Gazette*, July 28, 2003. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2003/07/28/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-28-2003/>

⁵²⁵ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Second State of the Nation Address, July 22, 2002,” *Official Gazette*, July 22, 2002. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2002/07/22/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-22-2002/>

⁵²⁶ Ibid.

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

⁵³⁰ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Fifth State of the Nation Address, July 25, 2005,” *Official Gazette*, July 25, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2005/07/25/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-fifth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-25-2005/>

⁵³¹ Human Security Act 2007 [also known as Republic Act No. 9372]; cited in Chester Cabalza, “Marawi Siege: Testing the Philippines’ Anti-Terror Law,” *The Diplomat*, June 2, 2017. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/marawi-siege-testing-the-philippines-anti-terror-law/>

WoT, “serve as proof or evidence that discourses circulated and perpetrated by those in positions of power have impact on our socio-economic reality.”⁵³²

The effect of the WoT discourse greatly hampered the peace process with the MILF, as a military solution was favoured by the government after the bombings in Davao City (March and April 2003). Once the attack was attributed to Jemaah Islamiyah operatives, with alleged connections to the MILF, Arroyo declared a ‘state of lawlessness’ and pledged to introduce further counter-terrorism measures in order to win the WoT through hard security campaigns,⁵³³ even though the MILF leadership continued to deny their involvement with the Davao bombings or their links to a regional terrorist network.⁵³⁴ According to Santos, regardless of whether such a link existed between the MILF and Jemaah Islamiyah, “the logic of the war on terror is to downgrade peace negotiations with the group in favour of military offensives or ‘all-out war’.”⁵³⁵ However, a military solution was presented as viable and resulted in “mass displacement of civilians and increased tension related to alleged Islamist ‘terrorist’ bombings.”⁵³⁶ According to a report prepared by the Moro-Christian People’s Alliance for the office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights:

“Hapless Moro civilians continue to bear the brunt of government’s ‘War on Terror’. State security forces conduct random warrantless arrests, not sparing even minors. In some cases the victims were set free after a few days in detention, in most, they were charged with fabricated criminal cases. In most, if not all cases, the victims are subjected to torture. At present [2017] there are more than 400 Moro political detainees in the Special Intensive Care Area 1 and 2 in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, Metro Manila. More than 100 of them were arrested 15 years ago, victims of the State of Lawlessness under the past Arroyo regime who continue to languish in jail on charges of which they are innocent.”⁵³⁷

This view is also shared by the Amnesty International Report 2004, which claimed that “Arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial executions and ‘disappearances’ were reported in the context of operations against suspected Islamist ‘terrorists’, Muslim separatists and

⁵³² Gene Segarra Navera, “Metaphorizing The Philippine Presidency: Schemas of Presidential Leadership in The Post-Marcos State of The Nation Addresses (1987-2009),” (PhD Dissertation, National University of Singapore, 2012), p. 299. Date Accessed: 31.03.18. Site: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48651402.pdf>

⁵³³ Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2004 – Philippines,” (Report, May 26, 2004). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/40b5a1fef.html>

⁵³⁴ Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2005 – Philippines,” (Report, May 25, 2005). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/429b27f22.html>

⁵³⁵ Soliman M. Santos, Jr., “Terrorism and Philippine Armed Groups: Networks, Lists, and the Peace Process (Overview),” in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 104.

⁵³⁶ Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2004 – Philippines,” (Report, May 26, 2004). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/40b5a1fef.html>

⁵³⁷ Moro-Christian Peoples Alliance, “The State of Moro Human Rights under the GPH-MILF Peace Agreement,” (Report submission to the OHCHR, 27th session of the UPR Working Group, 2017), p. 6. Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/philippines/session_27_-_may_2017/js16_upr27_phl_e_main.pdf

communist insurgents.”⁵³⁸ The situation improved slightly in early 2005, as despite intermittent clashes, “the ceasefire agreement between the government and the Muslim secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), monitored by military observers from Malaysia and Brunei, was maintained in Mindanao,”⁵³⁹ while reports of “arbitrary arrests, unlawful killings, torture and ‘disappearances’ [continued] ... in the context of military counter-insurgency operations.”⁵⁴⁰ While the ceasefire agreement between the government and the MILF was upheld, the unlawful killings and the climate of impunity that existed had led to a deep distrust in law officials.⁵⁴¹

Hard security measures against the ASG, were also referenced as part of the global WoT. In 2002, a six-month military exercise had begun in Mindanao, which included around 650 US soldiers with the intent to train the AFP in counter-terrorism strategies and hostage rescue operations against the ASG.⁵⁴² At the time, the move was “heralded as the opening of a second front in Washington’s war on terrorism.”⁵⁴³ Indeed, Arroyo specifically referenced the cooperation with the US as addressing the conflicts root problems: “[the Philippines are] looking to the help of the United States in the rehabilitation of conflict areas and the eradication of the roots of war.”⁵⁴⁴ However, the resulting clashes led to numerous human rights violations and killings on both sides of the conflict.⁵⁴⁵ The successful securitization of domestic terrorism to an international audience, in particular, the US government, further resulted in a five-year ‘Mutual Logistics Support Agreement’, which was signed in November 2002, and stipulated that the Philippines should become a ‘supply-point’ for US operations.⁵⁴⁶ Even though Arroyo had already claimed in 2002 that she had “led [Filipino]

⁵³⁸ Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2004 – Philippines,” (Report, May 26, 2004). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/40b5a1fef.html>

⁵³⁹ Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2006 – Philippines,” (Report, May 23, 2006). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/447ff7b42f.html>

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁴¹ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2007: Events of 2006* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007), p. 314-315. Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/447ff7b42f.html>

⁵⁴² Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2003 – Philippines,” (Report, May 28, 2003). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3edb47ddc.html>

⁵⁴³ John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 2002. Date Accessed: 14.04.18. Site: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2002-07-01/southeast-asia-second-front>

⁵⁴⁴ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Third State of the Nation Address, July 28, 2003,” *Official Gazette*, July 28, 2003. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2003/07/28/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-third-state-of-the-nation-address-july-28-2003/>

⁵⁴⁵ Amnesty International, “Amnesty International Report 2003 – Philippines,” (Report, May 28, 2003). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3edb47ddc.html>

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

soldiers in defeating the Abu Sayyaf,”⁵⁴⁷ she continued to highlight hard security measures as effective in defeating the ASG: “[The Philippines’] victories in the war on terror have been acknowledged by no less than President Bush before the U.S. National Defense University. The Jemaah Islamiya and the Abu Sayyaf can only pick up the pieces of its broken backbone in Mindanao.”⁵⁴⁸ However, following her 2005 SONA, the intensification of the conflict in late 2005, further displaced over 25,000 civilians.⁵⁴⁹ In the final year of the analysis, President Arroyo declared a week-long state of emergency in February 2006 after a failed coup by members of the military and her cabinet in June 2006. Arroyo declared an ‘all-out war’ against the communist New People’s Army, which led to soldiers, journalists, politicians and leftist activists being detained and arrested,⁵⁵⁰ while extrajudicial killings surged in the aftermath.⁵⁵¹ According to an article by John Hall, “an estimated 800 political opponents, human rights campaigners and members of groups and churches critical of [Arroyo’s] government have been assassinated... In fact, legitimate opponents or her government are just as likely to be targeted as Muslim terrorists and Communist rebels.”⁵⁵²

According to a Report on Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines from 2001 to 2010, 57 per cent of the 837 suspects in extrajudicial killings have not been identified, while those belonging to the AFP reached 19 per cent, those part of the PNP reached 9 per cent and the CAFGU reached 1 per cent.⁵⁵³ The intensity of the hard security campaign against separatist and terrorist groups in Mindanao combined with the numerous human rights abuses by the AFP, meant that the PNP and auxiliary forces also experienced a climate of impunity. Even though institutional safeguards existed in the Philippines, members of the PNP who arrested individuals without warrants rarely faced any repercussion by the state’s legal system.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁴⁷ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Second State of the Nation Address, July 22, 2002,” *Official Gazette*, July 22, 2002. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2002/07/22/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-22-2002/>

⁵⁴⁸ Gloria Arroyo, “Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Fifth State of the Nation Address, July 25, 2005,” *Official Gazette*, July 25, 2005. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2005/07/25/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-fifth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-25-2005/>

⁵⁴⁹ *Amnesty International*, “Amnesty International Report 2006 – Philippines,” (Report, May 23, 2006). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/447ff7b42f.html>

⁵⁵⁰ Nadine Ragonjan, Bryony Lau and Patthiya Tongfueng, “Philippines,” in John Rieger eds. *The State of Conflict and Violence in Asia* (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2017), p. 145. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/The_State_of_Conflict_and_Violence_in_Asia-12.29.17.pdf

⁵⁵¹ *Human Rights Watch*, “Philippines: Clinton Should Press Arroyo on Killings,” November 9, 2009. Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/11/09/philippines-clinton-should-press-arroyo-killings>

⁵⁵² John Hall, “Manila’s dirty war,” *International Herald Tribune*, December 18, 2007. Date Accessed: 15.04.18. Site: <https://www.laborrights.org/in-the-news/manilas-dirty-war>

⁵⁵³ Al A. Parreño, *Report on the Extrajudicial Killings 2001-2010* (Makati City: Supreme Court of the Philippine, 2011), p. 9. Date Accessed: 09.12.17. Site: <https://www.asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ReportonPhilippineEJK20012010.pdf>

⁵⁵⁴ *Amnesty International*, “Amnesty International Report 2003 – Philippines,” (Report, May 28, 2003). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3eddb47ddc.html>

Indeed the lack of lawyers and doctors meant that ill-treatment by the PNP became the norm.⁵⁵⁵ According to the Human Rights Committee's report on the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a culture of impunity developed in the Philippines as human right violations were not investigated.⁵⁵⁶ Furthermore, Amnesty International Report 2005 stated that "high crime rates and a lack of confidence in criminal justice institutions meant there was little public opposition to killings of suspected criminals by PNP officers or by 'vigilantes', some allegedly linked to local officials and the PNP."⁵⁵⁷ Arroyo referenced this by claiming that she has "told the PNP that they must start with the cleansing of their own ranks."⁵⁵⁸ However, this was not followed by any policy changes. As the conflict intensified, auxiliary forces linked to the security organs, such as the CAFGU and the CVO, were also deployed. Also private armies committed human rights abuses, as the Ampatuan family, with their 300 strong force, was accused in 2006 of displacing over 4,500 families in MILF-controlled areas in an effort to acquire more land.⁵⁵⁹

Widespread allegations of extrajudicial killings also became a sticking point for the Philippines' main ally, the US government. As a result, in 2006 the US even "expressed concern over the spate of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines."⁵⁶⁰ Reynato Puno, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, blamed the killings on the 'mindless' international WoT, which had compromised human rights through 'legal short cuts'.⁵⁶¹ His criticism highlights the impact that the WoT had as a facilitating condition. However, the WoT also requires willing security actors. Indeed, the Arroyo administration even sought to prevent the release of the Report by the Melo Commission, which was set up to investigate extrajudicial killings. Following public pressure, the report was released in February 2007 and placed part of the blame on President Arroyo. According to the Report, solutions "must

⁵⁵⁵ Amnesty International, "Amnesty International Report 2004 – Philippines," (Report, May 26, 2004). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/40b5a1fef.html>

⁵⁵⁶ Human Rights Committee; cited in Amnesty International, "Amnesty International Report 2004 – Philippines," (Report, May 26, 2004). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/40b5a1fef.html>

⁵⁵⁷ Amnesty International, "Amnesty International Report 2005 – Philippines," (Report, May 25, 2005). Date Accessed: 08.04.18. Site: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/429b27f22.html>

⁵⁵⁸ Gloria Arroyo, "Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Second State of the Nation Address, July 22, 2002," *Official Gazette*, July 22, 2002. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2002/07/22/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-second-state-of-the-nation-address-july-22-2002/>

⁵⁵⁹ Herman Joseph S. Kraft, "The Foibles of an Armed Citizenry: Armed Auxiliaries of the State and Private Armed Groups in the Philippines (Overview)," in Diana Rodriguez eds. *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 197.

⁵⁶⁰ Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, "The US and the Southern Philippines' Quagmire," (Working Paper No. 144, *Asia Research Centre*, Murdoch University, July 2007), p. 13. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: https://www.murdoch.edu.au/Research-capabilities/Asia-Research-Centre/_document/working-papers/wp144.pdf

⁵⁶¹ Reynato S. Puno; cited in Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, "The US and the Southern Philippines' Quagmire," (Working Paper No. 144, *Asia Research Centre*, Murdoch University, July 2007), p. 13. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. Site: https://www.murdoch.edu.au/Research-capabilities/Asia-Research-Centre/_document/working-papers/wp144.pdf

start with the President who must pursue the prevention and prosecution of extrajudicial killings with urgency and fervor.”⁵⁶² This sentiment is echoed by Gene Navera, who argued that conflating rebellion and criminality with terrorism created an environment, “which could have possibly accounted for the rise in the cases of political executions during Arroyo’s presidency.”⁵⁶³

⁵⁶² Melo Commission Report; cited in *Davao Today*, “Melo Commission Report: Recommendations,” February 23, 2007. Date Accessed: 05.05.18. Site: www.davaotoday.com/main/human-rights/melo-commission-report-recommendations/

⁵⁶³ Gene Segarra Navera, “Metaphorizing The Philippine Presidency: Schemas of Presidential Leadership in The Post-Marcos State of The Nation Addresses (1987-2009),” (PhD Dissertation, National University of Singapore, 2012), p. 371. Date Accessed: 31.03.18. Site: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48651402.pdf>

5 Conclusion

5.1 Overview

The research objective of this thesis was to assess the impact of the events of 9/11 and the War on Terror on the securitization of the Uyghur minority question in the People's Republic of China and the Moro minority question in the Republic of the Philippines. The analysis was divided into the period before and after the events of 9/11, in order to examine relevant changes in the way that security actors identified and described the nature of their referent objects, the existential threats and how they justified extraordinary measures. Securitization theory is well suited to address non-traditional security threats since it analyses the social construction of real or perceived existential threats. As such, threats are socially constructed, as they do not exist independently from the discourse – instead, the speech act is the central form by which certain issues can be constructed as existential threats. A sociological discourse analysis of 20 speeches from 1997 to 2006, by the Chinese premiers and the Filipino presidents, represented the government's position on security issues and detected securitization moves. The discourse analysis was also able to highlight how security actors, in a post-9/11 era, were able to frame ideologies and identities. The importance of facilitating conditions, such as the War on Terror and the theatrical nature of terrorism, have greatly impacted the context in which security actors speak security, making audiences far more amenable to securitization moves. The main conclusions of the analysis will first be presented for China and then for the Philippines.

5.2 Conclusions for the People's Republic of China

5.2.1 Referent Object

In the pre-9-/11 era, the referent objects that were identified in the RWG's, National / State security, Social Stability and the health of the Economy, were all heavily intertwined with the CCP's legitimacy to govern. Without being able to claim legitimacy through periodic elections, the CCP is perhaps more pressed than other countries to justify its legitimacy, especially, since the main tool used to mitigate open criticism is through repression. Threats to the referent object were not merely threats to China's national security *per se*, but to the CCP's entire political legitimacy. Threats to the Economy, including economic inequality between Han and Uyghurs in the region of Xinjiang, could spill over to other regions and was

seen as a direct threat to the social stability of the country. Therefore the CCP's vigorous promotion of a homogenous society seems to envision a society that doesn't publicly question the CCP's authority or its legitimacy. Chinese premiers also intertwined social stability with ethnicity and religion, emphasising the need for 'socialist relations' between China's nationalities and correctly enforcing religions so that they are compatible with a 'socialist society'. The narrative of a 'socialist spiritual civilization' was used to provide the CCP with an additional moral justification, while providing a counter-narrative to other identities.

Following the events of 9/11, the CCP more closely associated economic inequality with social stability. The CCP promoted the Western Development Program in a way that would suggest that it would be able to address the income disparities between Han and Uyghurs. A considerable emphasis, in particular, was placed on infrastructure development programs, which were meant to re-energize the Western areas. However, many of the benefits that this entailed were not directed at Uyghurs but at Han and state-owned enterprises. Indeed, the Western Development Plan seems to have increased its political control over Xinjiang rather than reduce Han-Uyghur income inequality. There was also a shift from referring to China's many nationalities to referring to China's ethnicities. This is thought to weaken the frame that China's ethno-national minorities constitute a nationality *per se* and is in line with the modern understanding of the nation-state. Indeed, China also began referencing the referent object Sovereignty / Territorial Integrity in connection with the Uyghur minority, which had previously only been mentioned in connection with Taiwan. As the WoT had also brought about several invasions by the US military in order to tackle terrorist threats abroad, China seemed keen to emphasise that it was perfectly capable of protecting its state sovereignty and territorial integrity, while also stating its commitment to participating in the international WoT.

5.2.2 Existential Threat

In the pre-9/11 period, the Uyghur minority question was connected with several existential threats in the RWG's, such as Crime, Religion, Separatism and Terrorism. Serious crime was usually described as being perpetrated by violent criminal syndicates. Religion was described as something that had to be controlled or adapted to a 'socialist society'. Growing voices for greater autonomy were seen as a particular threat to China's social stability and national security. Such threats were also often accused of being influenced from abroad, such as from

Central Asian republics or from ‘the West’. Finally, the term terrorist was only used once in the pre-9/11 period.

In the post-9/11 period, terrorists or terrorism was referenced 11 times. However, one particular interesting impact of the WoT was that the existential threats referenced in the pre-9/11 era were commonly mixed and merged into one. After 9/11 it became easier for the CCP to merge religion, crime, separatism and terrorism, as being part of the global WoT. This coincided with CCP efforts to have East Turkestan forces included in the WoT and securitizing the group internationally. The vague definition of terrorism also allowed China to more assertively pursue what it considered to be dangerous forms of religious or cultural expressions, without having to endure international criticism.

5.2.3 Extraordinary Measures

The pre-9/11 extraordinary measures favoured an attack style approach and were defined as strategies that targeted heavy crime without the administrative burdens that usual check and balances entail. Such campaigns were usually marketed as targeting violent crimes and criminal syndicates, but authorities in Xinjiang also used such framing to target forms of religious and cultural expression. The Strike Hard campaigns were also directed at threats towards the legitimacy of the CCP. Indeed, the CCP was worried that independence movements in the region could threaten social stability, by providing a counter-narrative to CCP’s ‘socialist spiritual civilization’. As a result, China also played a leading role in the establishment of the SCO, which curbed Uyghur nationalist groups within its territories, even when these groups focused on cultural exchange.

Following the events of 9/11, the CCP took the opportunity to further justify its extraordinary measures as part of the global WoT. This strategy proved to be highly successful. While the West had often criticized China’s human rights record, especially following the aftermath of Tiananmen, the discourse on the WoT provided the CCP with the necessary tools to frame Uyghur ethno-nationalism as a terrorist threat. Even the term Eastern Turkestan, which was originally used by the Uyghur diaspora wishing to achieve greater autonomy, was successfully reframed and brought into association with terrorism and separatism. As a result, sympathy against Uyghur repression, which had been strong for Tibetan independence, wavered among the international community in the post-9/11 years. The WoT has intensified

security campaigns have only further exacerbated the situation and alienated Uyghurs in China.

5.3 Conclusions for the Republic of the Philippines

5.3.1 Referent Object

In the pre-9/11 era, the referent objects included democracy and constitution, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the people. In the Filipino discourse, the referent object democracy was referenced as a unique competitive niche in southeast Asia and had to be defended at all cost. Freedom and the virtues associated with democracy are given great importance in the Philippines as it is strongly associated with the pride with regards to toppling the Ramos dictatorship. Estrada made particularly strong references to safeguarding the Philippines territorial integrity, which he compared to something living. Estrada also made numerous references to the people, presenting himself as their protector.

In the post-9/11 era, Arroyo was the only security actor and only identified two reference objects: Democracy / Constitution and People. Greater urgency was communicated with regards to the referent objects and was often tied to legislative issues in relation to terrorism and the WoT, which Arroyo wanted Congress to support. Democracy was continued to be referenced as something special that needed to be protected, but it also provided the justification for its own 'self-defence'. The same was the case for the referent object people. While Arroyo herself had made few references to the people in her pre-9/11 SONA, she frequently did so in the post-9/11 era, also bringing the term in connection with other referent objects, claiming that this is the wish of the people. However, Arroyo distinguished the people, as being the majority of the Philippines and not the minority.

5.3.2 Existential Threat

The existential threats identified in the pre-9/11 era include poverty, separatism, terrorism and crime. Ramos did not frame the Moro minority question as an existential threat in the pre-9/11 era. However, Estrada called for a war on poverty, for an 'all-out war' against the MILF with whom he claimed that negotiations would be futile, a war against terrorism and that criminals 'terrorized' the Filipino population. Estrada placed poverty very high on his agenda, referring to it as something against which a war needed to be fought. In doing so, Estrada suggested that hard security tactics had to be taken. In fighting poverty, Estrada

highlighted the obstacle that the MILF represented in developing Mindanao, rather than addressing the historical injustices that Moros had experienced. Estrada also referred to his predecessor's tactics as being too soft and portrayed the existential threat posed by separatism in a way that negotiations were unnecessary and that only an armed response would be able to protect the referent object. The ASG was only mentioned twice in the pre-9/11 SONAs and were addressed as legitimate military targets by both Estrada and Arroyo. The latter also 'earmarked' funding for the AFP to target criminals.

In the post-9/11 era, Arroyo became one of the first leaders to support George W. Bush's WoT and placed greater emphasis on the threat posed by local conflicts and groups. As a result, similar to China, the Filipino existential threat categories Separatism and Terrorism were intertwined. The WoT meant that security actors categorized terrorists exclusively as enemy combatants that needed to be killed in order to solve the problem. In the post-9/11 era, Arroyo focused on the effectiveness of the Filipino military in fighting and defeating terrorism, arguing that resources allocated towards the military should be increased and that Congress should pass anti-terrorism legislation. The focus on a military solution and the narrative framing of the WoT meant that allegations that the MILF was sheltering members of Jemaah Islamiyah caused Arroyo to neglect the importance of the peace process with the MILF in favour of hard security measures. Furthermore, the fight against the ASG and links to Al-Qaeda were often displayed as part of the WoT and were presented as providing the Philippines with a place in the international spotlight. The fact that before the events of 9/11 military cooperation with the US had been rare, suggests that presenting internal conflicts as existential threats also benefitted the Philippines' military reputation and international role.

5.3.3 Extraordinary Measures

In the pre-9/11 era, Estrada decided to launch an 'all-out war' against the MILF after rebels took over Kauswagan taking hundreds of people hostage. Hard security campaigns in Mindanao have led to numerous human rights abuses and mass displacement, with the AFP being accused of arresting and torturing Moros that were suspected of sympathizing with the ASG.

In the post-9/11 era, the WoT had massively influenced the perspective of the Philippines existential threats, thus affecting its policy approaches. Under Arroyo, human rights

violations have increased severely, as the intensification of many hard security measures led to mass displacement and deaths. The impact of the WoT on the peace process was to delay its resolution, despite decades of armed conflict, which have had a massive socio-economic impact on Mindanao. It also seemed to justify human rights abuses by security organs, which were often directed against the Moro minority. The fact that Arroyo did not effectively address extrajudicial executions and abuses meant that they would continue unchecked. The WoT provided justification as it was important to be 'hard' on terrorism, even though the very definition of terrorism was vague and did not distinguish between a non-terrorist separatist and a terrorist. The tough stance and the conflation of separatism and terrorism meant that hard security measures frequently abused human rights and targeted those that were critical of the administration.

5.4 Final Remarks

As a contextual factor, the War on Terror has had a substantial impact on the securitization processes, as in order for security actors to construe an issue as dangerous, it has to be placed within a relevant context. The global agenda of the Bush administration framed those that used acts of political violence as enemy combatants with a war analogy that warranted hard-line, military and extraordinary measures to engage suspected terrorists successfully. This meant that institution and capacity building measures received less importance. Not only in the US, but also in other parts of the world, since the discourse of the War on Terror, was used by other states in order to pursue military responses to internal conflicts more freely. However, in order for a securitizing move to have a perlocutionary effect, the security actor still has to speak to the audience's experience,⁵⁶⁴ and in both China and the Philippines, security actors referenced existential threats associated with the minority question, to establish a threat justification to a referent object. The fact that Uyghur and Moro minorities also shared a common ethnicity, nationality and religion, made it easier for issues to be securitized, evoking a stronger 'us' versus 'them' response. Generally speaking, in the post-9/11 era, referent objects required more urgency to be protected, while existential threats were conflated with each other in order to propose one solution – existential measures. In both cases, the impact of the War on Terror resulted in an intensification of hard security measures as the conflation of terrorism with various other existential threats, meant that

⁵⁶⁴ Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (No. 2, 2005), p.184. Date Accessed: 12.05.18. DOI: 10.1177/1354066105052960

extraordinary measures could be framed as part of the global War on Terror, without having to fear the same level of international criticism for repressing ethno-national minorities. As had been done in the past. However, treating minorities as security threats and curbing their rights for cultural and religious expression has only helped to marginalize and radicalize individuals further. When individuals do act violently, this serves as further justification for the securitizing actor's policies even though they may be contributing to the violence in the first place.

As a result, minorities who have been stigmatized and discriminated against for many decades, often receive fewer possibilities for social development. The Uyghur and Moro minority question has also been securitized to increase the control over peripheral regions. Especially in China, economic development plans have been promoted as improving the livelihood of those living in Western regions. However, rather than truly addressing the existing inequality between the majority and the minority population, such plans have largely benefitted the Han-dominated export industry. Furthermore, with every development project, more Han have been re-settled to the Western region, improving Beijing's strategic hold over an important crossroad. While the existing minority grievance of economic inequality seems to be addressed by Chinese leaders, the solutions proposed do not seem to be the most effective. Similarly in the Philippines, the connection between terrorism and economic development is made repeatedly by President Arroyo. However, for all the connection that is made between the two, there is a lack of effective solutions offered to address decades of marginalization.

Redistributing power relations is largely desired by many members of the ethno-national minorities, yet in the post-9/11 era, the discursive portrayal of minorities as security issues has also made it hard to address these issues in the normal political arena. Indeed, security actors often have to use language that suggests that they take 'tough decisions', which ironically would be considered more popular when addressing a 'threat'. While power-sharing arrangements have been attempted in the Philippines, the plethora of strategies – moving frequently between peace negotiations and 'all-out' war – means that there has been an incredible lack of trust between all parties involved. China, on the other hand, may be very wary of opening up Pandora's box. The events of Tiananmen have made true political reform a significant risk to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, Chinese security actors may believe that hard security measures are useful in discouraging separatism

or terrorism. However, it seems that such efforts have a contrary result, as they only serve to further ostracise various communities and escalate conflicts. J. Ann Tickner, therefore argues that it requires a re-visioning of security: “Working towards the elimination of both physical and structural violence... [which] requires dismantling hierarchical boundaries between women and men, rich and poor, and insiders and outsiders which have contributed to an exclusionary divisive definition of security.”⁵⁶⁵ Approaching minority questions outside the realm of security, will go a long way to satisfy our need for a positive identity,⁵⁶⁶ while also providing security that does not pick-and-choose.

There were also some differences between China and the Philippines. China’s RWGs were less politicised as the Philippines’ SONAs, while the latter used metaphors and even jokes in order to come across as more popular to a national audience. The ‘East Turkestan’ groups such as ETIM and ETIP, and even a direct reference to the Uyghur ethnic minority was missing from the RWGs, even though, East Turkestan groups were much politicised elsewhere – perhaps targeting an international audience. Another reason may have been that addressing a problem with an ethno-national minority to a national audience, would have required the security actor to acknowledge that there are Chinese citizens that do not want to be part of China. Instead, terms such as ‘counterrevolutionary forces’, ‘splittists’, and terrorists were used by Chinese security actors to present these groups as separate entities from the People’s Republic. Filipino security actors, on the other hand, used much colourful language as establishing a connection with the audience was far more important. Some of the rhetoric, especially that used by Estrada, seemed to use populist tactics in order to gain support from the audience. Due to the system of government, security actors in the Philippines relied far more on their populace for political survival. The second people power revolution is testimony to this claim. Another difference is how the Filipino presidents and the Chinese premiers treated religion. The events of 9/11 and the narrative spread by Al-Qaeda greatly influenced the social construction of terrorism and Islam, whereby the Islamic religion has been strongly associated with global terrorism. It was thus assumed that the Islamic religion might also be treated as an existential threat. However, even though Muslims are specifically addressed as a group within the SONAs, such references are amicable and refer to the group as ‘Muslim brothers’. While discrimination seems to have been committed

⁵⁶⁵ J. Ann Tickner, “Re-visioning Security,” in Ken Booth eds. *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: MPG Books Group, 1994), p. 194.

⁵⁶⁶ J. Ann Tickner, “Re-visioning Security,” in Ken Booth eds. *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: MPG Books Group, 1994), p. 189.

by Filipino security organs, Islamic religion is not presented as an existential threat. In China, the RWGs only reference Islam once and that is to acknowledge the friendly relations that China has forged with Islamic countries. However, religions in general are highlighted as an element that needs to be controlled. Religions need to be ‘guided’ toward a socialist society and religion was presented as something that could be misused to do something illegal. However, while the RWGs did not articulate Muslims or Islam as a threat, the Chinese media has done so repeatedly. Whenever there is a violent attack, with a connection to Uyghurs or to Xinjiang, the Chinese media commonly refers to Uyghurs as Muslim Uyghurs, while Xinjiang is referenced as a Muslim region. Even in the Western media, Uyghurs are most commonly referenced in connection with ‘Islamic’ terrorism.⁵⁶⁷

While the findings may provide some greater insight into the impact of the War on Terror on two different countries, one has to be wary not to make generalizations. As has been hinted, there are vast structural differences between China and the Philippines, which impact their need to justify policy measures. Furthermore, the influence of functioning actors, such as the media, non-governmental organisations and academia can influence the securitization of ethno-national minorities. For example, how the media discusses issues can greatly shape an audiences ‘experiences’ and thus make minority issues more or less susceptible to securitizing moves. The analytical capabilities of securitization theory offer a substantive toolset, but the original theory is unclear on how to measure the actual acceptance of a security threat by an audience. Such an understanding would make any analysis of securitization processes more rounded and informative. This issue becomes even more convoluted when the ‘audience’ is not able to express their opinions freely, due to fear of repression. That journalists are often specifically targeted in the Philippines, exemplifies the dangers that free expression of opinions may bring. The Maguindanao massacre on the 23 November 2009, when a convoy of 58 people, among them many journalists, were kidnapped and killed by auxiliary forces of the Ampatuan family, remains the deadliest event for journalists in recorded history. Undemocratic countries, such as China, where the media has strong ties to the government, also make it difficult for its citizens to freely express criticism towards its president. The level to which Chinese citizens can express their dissatisfaction with officials (for example through microblogging sites such as Weibo or by using similar sounding Chinese characters to refer to something that has been censored) is also hard to

⁵⁶⁷ Arienne M. Dwyer, *The Xinjiang Conflict* (Washington: East-West Center, 2005), p. 55.

ascertain. Especially, since public protests and dissent are treated as threats to the legitimacy of the CCP. It should also be noted that as the CCP's legitimacy for governing is based on its ability to provide stability and economic development, this means that issues such as corruption can easily sway public opinion, but ethnic minority policies, which affect fewer people, do not have a similar impact. Therefore the impact of media on the acceptance of the audience would be relevant for further investigations. Another interesting aspect that warrants further investigation, is the degree to which existential threats are communicated not towards national audiences, but towards international audiences. There were several instances within the analysis, where the securitization of an ethno-national minority was directed at international actors, such as the US.

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7 Appendix

7.1 English Abstract

The coordinated attacks on September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the deaths of 2,996 individuals marked a turning point in our social construction of terrorism. In response to the devastating attacks, President Bush launched the global War on Terror. Terrorists were no longer regarded as a symptom of underlying causes, nor were they viewed as criminals that could be dealt with by normal political or law enforcement procedures. Instead, terrorists all over the world were seen as enemy combatants and the war analogy, not only in the US, warranted hard-line, military and extraordinary measures to engage suspected terrorists successfully. This thesis set out to assess the impact of the events of 9/11 and the War on Terror as a discursive organizing principle in framing ethno-national minority questions as existential threats. The Uyghur minority question in the People's Republic of China and the Moro minority question in the Republic of the Philippines were chosen as case studies to assess the impact of the War on Terror on securitization processes. Securitization theory is well suited to analyse non-traditional security threats as well as the construction of security threats, since it can be used to scrutinize discourse made between those in a position of power and those that are not. A sociological discourse analysis of 20 yearly state of the nation addresses from 1997 to 2006, by Chinese premiers and Filipino presidents, represented the government's framing of security issues. The results of the analysis has shown that the War on Terror has had an impact on the discursive presentation of referent objects and existential threats, as well as justifying extraordinary measures. In the post-9/11 era, referent objects required more urgency to be protected, while existential threats were conflated with each other in order to make it easier to legitimize extraordinary measures.

Key Words: The War on Terror, 9/11, Securitization, Framing, the Copenhagen School, Constructivism, Identity, Islam, Muslim Minorities, Ethno-national Conflicts, Separatism, Terrorism, Non-Traditional Security, Extraordinary Measures, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines.

7.2 German Abstract

Die Anschläge vom 11. September 2001 auf das World Trade Center und der Tod von 2.996 Personen stellt einen Wendepunkt in unserer sozialen Konstruktion des Terrorismus dar. Als Reaktion auf die verheerenden Anschläge startete Präsident Bush den globalen Krieg gegen den Terror. Terroristen wurden nicht mehr als ein Symptom von beispielsweise sozialer Marginalisierung gesehen oder als Kriminelle betrachtet, denen mit politischen Maßnahmen oder mittels Strafverfolgung begegnet werden kann, stattdessen wurden sie mit feindlichen Soldaten gleichgesetzt. Die Analogie des Krieges garantierte, nicht nur in den USA, harte, militärische und außerordentliche Maßnahmen, um mutmaßliche Terroristen weltweit erfolgreich zu bekämpfen. Diese Masterarbeit hatte zum Ziel, die Auswirkungen der Ereignisse von 9/11 und des Krieges gegen den Terror als diskursives Organisationsprinzip zu untersuchen, welches ethnonationale Minderheitenfragen als existenzielle Bedrohungen betrachtet. Die Uigurische-Minderheitenfrage in der Volksrepublik China und die Moro-Minderheitenfrage in der Republik der Philippinen wurden als Fallstudien ausgewählt. Die Theorie der securitization (Versicherheitlichung) ist gut geeignet, um nicht-traditionelle Sicherheitsbedrohungen, sowie die Konstruktion von Sicherheitsbedrohungen, zu analysieren, da sie dazu verwendet werden kann, den Diskurs zwischen Machthabern und ihrem Pendant zu hinterfragen. Eine soziologische Diskursanalyse von 20 jährlichen Staatenansprachen von chinesischen Premierministern und philippinischen Präsidenten, welche zwischen 1997 und 2006 gehalten wurden, repräsentierten die Narrative der Regierungen bezüglich sicherheitspolitischen Fragestellungen. Die Ergebnisse der Analyse haben gezeigt, dass der Krieg gegen den Terror sich auf die diskursive Darstellung von Referenzobjekten und existenziellen Bedrohungen ausgewirkt und außergewöhnliche Maßnahmen gerechtfertigt hat. In der Ära nach 9/11 wurde die Bedrohung für Referenzobjekte mit einer erhöhten Dringlichkeit kommuniziert, während existenzielle Bedrohungen semantisch miteinander verknüpft wurden, um die Legitimation außergewöhnlicher Maßnahmen zu erleichtern.

Schlüsselwörter: Der Krieg gegen den Terror, 9/11, Securitization, Versicherheitlichung, diskursive Narrativen, die Kopenhagener Schule, Konstruktivismus, Identität, Islam, Muslime Minderheiten, ethnonationale Konflikte, Separatismus, Terrorismus, nicht-traditionelle Sicherheitsbedrohungen, außergewöhnliche Maßnahmen, Volksrepublik China, Republik der Philippinen.