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### List of Abbreviations

COE – Council of Europe

Daesh – (from Ar. “Daulat al-islāmīya fī l- ‘Irāq wa-š-Šām”) Islamic State (of Iraq and Syria)

ECA – European Court of Auditors

ECHR – European Convention of Human Rights

EU – European Union

ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

LGBTQ+ – Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual / Transgender, Queer / Questioning and other sexualities and genders

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OUN – Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

RQ – Research question

SQ – Sub-question

UN – United Nations

UPA – Ukrainian Insurgent Army

USA – United States of America

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWI – First World War (World War One)

WWII – Second World War (World War Two)

## Abstract (Deutsch)

Propaganda ist ein kraftvolles Instrument des Informationskrieges. Die Hassrede ist ein junges, aber gefährliches Phänomen der Kommunikation, das starke Ähnlichkeiten mit militaristischer Propaganda zeigt. Könnten diese zwei Phänomene miteinander verbunden sein? Diese Studie verfolgt das Ziel, eine Antwort auf diese Frage mit Rückblick auf den laufenden Konflikt zwischen Russland und Ukraine zu finden. Zwei verschiedene Ansätze zu Propaganda, nämlich von Harold Lasswell und von Noam Chomsky, wurden miteinander und mit dem Konzept der Hassrede verglichen. Das wurde mithilfe von kritischer Diskursanalyse und Inhaltsanalyse der konfliktbezogenen russischen und ukrainischen Mediatexte gemacht. Diese Studie strebt auch danach, den existierenden Forschungsstand zu ukrainischen Medien in der Zeit des Konfliktes mit Russland zu erweitern.

**Schlüsselwörter:** *Propaganda, Propagandamodelle, Klassische Propagandatheorie, Hegemonisches Propagandamodell, Harold Lasswell, Noam Chomsky, Hassrede, Informationskrieg, Russland, Ukraine, Russisch-Ukrainischer Konflikt, Krim, Donbas, Inhaltsanalyse, Kritische Diskursanalyse, CDA.*

## Abstract (English)

Propaganda is a powerful tool of information warfare. Hate speech is a young, but dangerous phenomenon in communication that shows strong similarities with military propaganda. Can these two phenomena be related to each other? This study aims to find an answer to this question against the backdrop of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Two different approaches to propaganda – by Harold Lasswell and Noam Chomsky – were compared to each other and to the hate speech concept. This was done through critical discourse analysis and content analysis of conflict-related Russian and Ukrainian media texts. This study also aspires to extend the existing research on Ukrainian media content during its conflict with Russia.

**Keywords:** *Propaganda, Propaganda models, Classic propaganda theory, Hegemonic propaganda model, Harold Lasswell, Noam Chomsky, Hate speech, Information war, Russia, Ukraine, Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Crimea, Donbas, Content analysis, Critical discourse analysis, CDA.*

## Hate Speech and Propaganda in Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

**§1. Introduction**

Technological innovations, globalization, accessibility and transparency of information are without doubt exerting a massive impact on human life. These factors transform the way countries and other actors of international relations conduct warfare as well. Since the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, traditional armed conflicts are being complemented with by information war. Information war, perceived as a fourth generation of warfare (*Jones et al., 2002*), can be defined as “information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary” (*Joyner & Lotrionte, 2001: 826–827*). Some scholars and analysts even believe that in future, traditional wars will be completely transformed into information wars, with conflicts relocating from the traditional battlefields into the sphere of communication, taking a symbolical form. It is a powerful weapon that applies pressure upon the enemy, misleading and morally suppressing him (*Jonsson & Seely, 2015*).

One of the most recent and illustrative examples of the synthesis of traditional and information war is the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that started in the late 2013. The relations between these two Post-Soviet republics have always been far from perfect (*Arbatova & Dynkin, 2016; Jonsson & Seely, 2015*): both within the Soviet Union and especially after its collapse. However, soon after November 23<sup>rd</sup> 2013 when the revolution in Ukraine called “Euromaidan” (named after the central square of Kyiv where it began) broke out, their relations have entered the stage of an armed confrontation. However, even before the military confrontation broke out, the two sides started an information war against each other (*Bērziņš, 2014; Darczewska, 2014a; Darczewska, 2014b; Jonsson & Seely, 2015*).

Since and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, many scholars have conducted research on the information war accompanying the armed conflict. Most previous studies focus on the Russian side of the story, namely, on Russian communication campaigns against Ukraine. These campaigns are characterized by militarism and disinformation (*Furgacz, 2016*), falsification of history (*Liñán, 2010*), use of derogatory racist terms concerning Ukrainian people even in the state-run media channels (*Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014*). Their effect on ordinary people has been proved not only by American scholars (*Gerber & Zavisca, 2016*), but by a Russian state-run statistical bureau as well (*Volkov & Goncharov, 2014*).

These attributes are strikingly similar to those of propaganda: an integral part and tool of information war (*Xie & Boyd-Barrett, 2015: 67*). It is an old phenomenon which originated in the late Middle Ages within the discourse of the Catholic Church (*Bussemer, 2008*). However, by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, propaganda has left the religious context, transforming into a tool of warfare during WWI. The main aim of propaganda is to influence and ultimately shape the public opinion in a way that is preferable to the communicator, even this might involve twisting of facts, militarization, use of derogatory language in reference to opponents, and other typical traits of propaganda.

The use of derogatory language in reference to opponents is a key attribute of another negative phenomenon of communication: hate speech. This phenomenon has emerged from one of the core democratic values, the freedom of expression; however it is a serious threat to this very value. A message is regarded as hate speech if it inflicts moral suffering or results in physical harm towards a certain sociodemographical group or its individual members. Rwandan genocide of 1994 is the most illustrative example

of racist hate speech exploited as a tool of warfare. The similarity of attributes as well as the fact that these two phenomena can be tools of info war, have led to a speculation that they might be related to each other.

This similarity between Russian communication campaigns and propaganda has been noticed by scholars and journalists. As a result, they are analyzing the Russian communication towards and about Ukraine as propaganda. The phrase “Russian propaganda” can be even regarded as a kind of a set phrase. Furthermore, the fact that propaganda was actively exploited by the KGB, contributes to the consolidation of these associations (*Darczewska, 2014a: 7*). As a result, a perception of Russia as an aggressor has been established among Western academics and journalists. Ukraine is perceived as a victim of this aggression that only engages in self-protection. Thus, any Ukrainian media campaigns involving Russia are viewed as justified.

Nevertheless, a rise of Ukrainian nationalism as a result of Crimea annexation and the ongoing conflict in the east of its territory (*Gerber & Zavisca, 2016: 83*) makes it difficult to treat Ukraine barely as an innocent victim of its neighbor’s aggression. Despite the recognized progress in terms of media freedoms (*Freedom House, 2017; Pörzgen, 2016*), Ukraine is also taking active part in this “war of narratives and interpretations” (*Darczewska, 2014b: 9*), and its media rhetoric towards Russia is often far from neutral and unbiased (*Kuznetsova, 2016*). Fact manipulation is not uncommon in Ukraine, especially in the pre-election periods, including the “...manipulation by the owners of commercial channels who use media to achieve their [personal] goals” (*Kozyryatska, 2016: 3*) and paid media content, also known as “jeansa” (*Pörzgen, 2016*). After 2014, biased presentation of the EU and Russia in the Ukrainian media is noticeable: whereas the EU is idealized, Russia is presented with noticeable hostility

(*Shinkaruk, 2017: 106–107*). Moreover, subjectivity is evident in Ukrainian academic research of the conflict with Russia. The majority of Ukrainian scholars (i.e., *Demyanchuk, 2015; Holovka & Tokarsky, 2016; Lernatovych, 2013; Vasylyk & Polyanska, 2017*) is rather straightforward and directly accuses Russia of aggressive propaganda and biased presentation of information. They claim that “Russia is an aggressor that only understands the language of force” (*Demyanchuk, 2015: 85*), describe Russian media as a weapon of info war and claim that Russian journalists “follow the words of Goebbels” (*Holovka and Tokarsky, 2016: 310*). Another alarming discovery is the presence of racist slurs, mostly (yet not exclusively) against ethnic Russians in the Ukrainian media (*Popova & Solodun, 2016*). This is a trend that started before the armed conflict with Russia, as proved by the analysis of xenophobia in Ukrainian media (*Kuznetsova, 2012*).

Despite this numerous evidence, the subject of Russian and Ukrainian propaganda (especially regarding the latter) is still under research in the academia. Due to the fact that this is a new and still developing case, there is a wide number of competing evidence. The Ukrainian scholars themselves (i.e., *Demyanchuk, 2015; Holovka & Tokarsky, 2016; Kozyryatska, 2016*), as well as some Western researchers (i.e., *Darczewska, 2014a & 2014b; Furgacz, 2016; Gerber & Zavisca, 2016; Snyder, 2014*), adhere to the viewpoint that Ukraine is not practicing propaganda against Russia or anyone else. On the contrary, Russian media, public figures and scholars speak of “russophobic hate speech” in the Ukrainian media, and of hostile, even fascist, propaganda (i.e., *Glazyev, 2017; Kislitsyn & Petrova, 2017; Skorkin, 2014*). This research gap, i.e. this competing evidence, provides a topic for closer inquiry and investigation.

This study is pursuing the two main aims. First of all, its goal is to investigate and discover the relation between propaganda and hate speech as tools of information war. Secondly, this work aims to clarify the competing evidence regarding Ukrainian communication in terms of its conflict with Russia and find out whether it would be legitimate to speak of “Ukrainian propaganda” and “russophobic hate speech”. This will be achieved through the critical analysis of the two countries’ media discourse regarding their conflict with each other. The results of the critical discourse analysis will be complemented by the content analysis of typical Russian and Ukrainian media texts that were published from the annexation of Crimea (mid-March 2014) until the end of 2017. Apart from that, policy analysis was conducted to obtain an insight into the phenomenon of hate speech.

The following chapter of this paper contains the review of the existing literature on propaganda, hate speech, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the two countries’ communication campaigns against each other; it also introduces the research questions and hypotheses. The following chapter describes the implemented research methods and the analyzed media content. Chapter 4 contains the analyses themselves, whose results are discussed in Chapter 5. The one but last chapter describes limitations of the study and suggests topics and implications for future research that could be done on the matter.

## §2. Literature Review

This chapter is dedicated to the overview of the existing research that has been done on topics of information war, propaganda, hate speech, and Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Despite numerous studies in these fields, the academia lacks studies conducted on the connection between all of these phenomena.

### §2.1. Information War

Since the late 1980s, the world has witnessed a change in the international relations paradigm. The end of Cold War and collapse of the bipolar world order have marked an era of greater cooperation between the actors, which also required more information exchange and transparency. On the other hand, globalization and its manifestations, including the IT boom and severe market competition, and an increased vulnerability of national sovereignty have catalyzed the development of information war, sometimes also called “info war” or “IW”.

Some analysts (for example, *Molander et al., 1996*) limit this phenomenon only to its cyberspace aspect, or the so-called “hacker warfare” which means malware attacks on the enemy’s computer system. However, this study agrees with the other ‘wing’ of analysts and academia (represented by i.e. *Libicki, 1995, Jones et al., 2002, Jones & Kovacich, 2016; Szafranski, 1997* and *Tumber & Webster, 2006*) which adheres to the viewpoint that information war is a multifaceted phenomenon, with cyber war only being one of them. Secondly, as Libicki (1995) argues, information war never exists alone: it always coexists with any kind of confrontation in the material world.

In his work, Szafranski (1997) underlines numerous times that the decision to start information war comes exclusively from the leadership: be it political

establishment of a country or a commercial organization's top management. Speaking about information war as a tool of political confrontation, the scholars underline that it is not solely a tool of war in undemocratic regimes. Western democracies actively engage in information warfare with their external opponents as well. Despite being rather emotional at times, the book by Nancy Snow (2003) is an illustrative example of this, describing USA's communication campaigns against Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

In this regard, Tumber & Webster (2006) give the key role in information war to the media. The analysts argue that the media are the key mediators of information warfare to the audience. Therefore, in order to achieve strategic information war aims, it is crucial for the attacker to be perceived favorably by the leading media, i.e. to obtain and secure a positive image in their eyes. In democratic regimes of the Internet age, it is a difficult task.

Like any other types of warfare, the main aim of information war is to defeat and subjugate the enemy (*Szafranski, 1997*). However, its main advantage in contrast to the traditional war is, first of all, its ability to defeat and subjugate the enemy without physically destroying them or their infrastructure; secondly, its speed and reach. An information war attack may occur in a matter of seconds from any corner of the globe (*Jones & Kovacich, 2016*).

Usually, information attacks are aimed against external enemies. However, they can be used against internal opponents as well. The areas of information war are very broad and various. So, the "internal enemy" does not only mean political opposition to the ruling regime, but also an organization's market competitors (*Jones et al., 2002*). In this case, one can speak about "economic information warfare", as defined by Libicki (1995), who distinguishes between totally seven types of information warfare. This

work, however, does not focus on the economic aspect of Russian-Ukrainian confrontation. Speaking in Libicki's terms, the information war between Russia and Ukraine is similar to the type that he describes as *psychological warfare*: "the use of information against the human mind" (Libicki, 1995: 35). In this type of information war, the attacker manipulates the opponents' beliefs, fears and discourse and twists the facts, thus morally suppress the enemy in order to ultimately gain moral victory over it. This strategy is described as a tool of information war in general by Jones & Kovacich (2016). However, the main weapon of information war is not the information *per se*, but the communication and its elements: words, audio and visual elements (Szafranski, 1997).

As a type of warfare that employs communication as its main weapon, information warfare has got many tools. Xie and Boyd-Barrett (2015) mention one of them: propaganda. This reference is crucial, as modern academia and journalism frequently speak about "Russian propaganda" in terms of this country's modern conflict with Ukraine. For this reason, the phenomenon of propaganda will be given extra attention in this paper and examined in details in the following subchapter.

## **§2.2. Propaganda and Its Two Models**

As it was mentioned above, one of the main tools of information war is propaganda. It is a special type of communication whose main aim is to promote certain ideas for a lasting period of time, often by embellishing these ideas and slandering the opposite opinions. Although it is often associated with hateful communication campaigns of dictatorships such as Nazi Germany, propaganda may not exclusively have a destructive nature. Academia distinguishes three large types of propaganda,

labeling them with colors: white, gray and black (*Becker, 1949*). This classification is based on the source of information. ‘*White*’ propaganda is distinguished by transparency of the source and clearly announced aims. Therefore it is sometimes identified with PR, advertising and promotion campaigns (i.e., propaganda of healthy lifestyle) (*Bussemer, 2008: 32*). ‘*Grey*’ propaganda provides sources of information as well, however, these sources are unreliable and therefore, its trustworthiness is doubtful (*Guth, 2009: 3*). The last type is ‘*black*’ propaganda, where the messages lack any references and sources of information and may be completely deceitful. For this reason, it is often used by undemocratic regimes to discredit its political opponents, and the lack of alternative opinions in such regimes leaves the opponents little chance of gaining support and fighting back (*Jowett & O’Donnell, 2014: 23–24*).

This paper will deal with the ‘gray’ and ‘black’ forms of propaganda, sometimes united by the term “concealed propaganda” referring to the concealing of information sources (*Guth, 2009: 2*). Snow’s definition of propaganda matches the characteristics of its ‘black’ and ‘gray’ manifestations and explains what they do: “Propaganda injects false or misleading information into the media in order to influence the behavior of populations here and abroad”. (*Snow, 2003: 37*) Now and further on in the text ‘grey’ and ‘black’ i.e. ‘concealed’ propaganda will be analyzed and referred to as ‘propaganda’ only for the cause of text simplicity.

Propaganda has been a subject of interest and research for numerous scholars from various fields, from history and political science to law, psychology and communication science. It is a multidisciplinary term with a centuries-long history. It traces its origins back to the late Medieval times, and was mostly associated with religion before World War I, when it was used by conflicting nations to discredit the

enemy and set their peoples and armies against them. However, propaganda reached its peak within the totalitarian regimes, especially in the Third Reich and the USSR (*Bussemer, 2008: 27; Dupré, 2013: 137–138*). The former's propaganda machinery was by far more massive and aggressive than that of many other countries, later becoming the most prominent example of propaganda and thus the subject of numerous studies of the phenomenon (*Bussemer, 2008: 13*). Propaganda became so strongly associated with totalitarian and authoritarian regimes that even today it is seldom perceived outside them. Apart from undemocratic regimes, propaganda is often mentioned in reference to the communication of terrorist organizations with the rest of the world, i.e. Daesh or Boko Haram (*Wyszomierski, 2015*).

During different periods of modern history, there have been different approaches to defining propaganda. There is an explanation for this uncertainty. As mentioned above, WWI was a forceful 'trigger' for the development of modern non-religious propaganda. The political regime of a country and its condition after WWI determined the way propaganda developed within it. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century Western democracies propaganda was a neutral-to-positive phenomenon, an integral part of a democratic society and an essential tool for managing the country and its economy (*Bernays, 1928*). This paper however does not aim to go deep into the history of the phenomenon, but rather to stick to its most modern form.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, numerous propaganda theories were proposed, among them – the *Theory of Political Propaganda*, also called the *Classical Propaganda Theory* by Harold Lasswell. Lasswell's theory is worth mentioning as one of the first attempts to give a systematic approach to political propaganda. It was developed in the first half of

the 20<sup>th</sup> century as a reaction to WWI and WWII, but this theory enjoys great popularity today as well.

The scholar defines propaganda as “management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols” (*Lasswell, 1927: 627*) and underlines that collective attitudes cannot be observed apart from individual attitudes. He also notes that collective attitudes are prone to change, which may, for instance, occur in case when the propagated messages are proven false, i.e. if the leader cannot meet the people’s expectations. In other words, any ideology fails if the reality proves it false (*Patrick & Thrall, 2007: 101–102*). Speaking of military propaganda, the scholar sees its aim in “mobilization of opinions” (*Lasswell, 1938: 14*). This means that propaganda is not only a powerful demoralizing weapon against the enemy. Most important is the “inner” propaganda that demonizes the enemy in the eyes of the country’s own army and civil population. Moreover, propaganda also helps to maintain the public morale during times of war accompanied with hunger, losses and need for extreme economy and to keep people’s belief in the war as a necessary measure. In other words, to quote Taylor (1997), the “sanitized version of war via the media helps to sustain public support for it” (*p. 104*). However, Lasswell (1938) underlines that in times of peace propaganda is the prerogative of undemocratic societies (*p. 16*).

Another important peculiarity of this theory is that it gives great importance to public opinion and its ability to indeed influence the course of propaganda. “The bedrock beliefs of the masses are [...] important [...] because propaganda must align with common beliefs for it to be effective” (*Patrick & Thrall, 2007: p. 103*); thus making propaganda extremely adaptable to social changes and public demands. “Social structures” or societal basic values – income, safety, respect and power – are believed to

influence the content of propaganda (*Smith, Lasswell, & Casey, 1946*). Namely, even in military propaganda of undemocratic regimes the leader has to deal with criticism from his opponents and therefore may be forced to change his rhetoric when the situation requires it. In this regard, Lasswell argues, propagandists have to be familiar with psychology of the masses before they start communicating.

In contrast, there is the *Hegemonic Propaganda Model* by Herman and Chomsky (1986). The authors have been criticized by many scholars as “apologists of totalitarian regimes” and “controversial figures” (*Mullen, 2009: 19*). Although this model was developed in the USA during the Reagan era and thus mainly focuses on the American society of that time, its authors believe that nowadays globalization has made their propaganda model applicable in other corners of the world, including the Post-Soviet countries. (*Ibid., 18*). This theory implies that in a country where power and wealth are concentrated in the hands of a relatively small ruling elite, media channels are also under its control. Media serve as a mediator of messages between the government and the masses, and the news are being selected based on the “important domestic power interests” (*Herman & Chomsky, 1986: p. 35*). In this way, the government is able to spread favorable propaganda and control the public discourse; this being especially true in turbulent times of war and other political crises. According to Chomsky (1997), the main mechanism of such propaganda includes diverting public attention away from real societal problems and keeping the populace interested in other, less meaningful topics instead. This is achieved by the five methods that the author highlights through the analysis of media communication in the USA during the Vietnam and Gulf wars. These methods were largely supported by numerous other scholars (*Baran & Davis, 2011; Bussemer, 2008; Ellul, 1973; Jowett & O'Donnell, 2015;*

*Hanisch-Wolfram, 2014; Kohl, 2011*). According to Chomsky, the methods of propaganda are:

1. Incitement of fear among the population,
2. Excessive militarization,
3. Falsification of history in order to make it favorable and fit the ultimate goal of propaganda,
4. ‘Demonization’ of enemies, concentration on their faults and evil deeds, whereas the “self” is portrayed as righteous and fighting for a noble cause, and
5. Selective presentation of facts: disinformation, over-simplification of events and messages, one-sided (read: favorable) presentation of events, ripping words out of context etc.

This model is a development of the 1971 hegemonic theory of the Italian Marxist Gramsci. He stated that the ruling elites in capitalist states are suppressing the working class by manipulated symbolic communication through mass media (as quoted in *Patrick & Thrall, 2007: 97*). This theory also posits the leader’s total control of the public opinion and state’s policy and even his ability to impose attitudes unfavorable to the populace, making it believe and support them.

### **§2.3. Hate Speech**

The review of literature on information war and propaganda has demonstrated that these two phenomena among others involve the employment of hateful, discriminatory rhetoric in reference to the communicator’s opponents. These characteristics resemble another term and phenomenon that is analyzed in this paper: hate speech, also known as “harmful speech” or “speech of harm” (*Leets, 2002*);

“dangerous speech”, “fear speech” and “inflammatory speech” (*Gagliardone, Gal, Alves, & Martinez, 2015: 12; Banesh, 2012*). The term was introduced in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and has since then been a subject of research and study by scholars from various disciplines – and also a subject of interest for human rights activists and governmental officials.

Numerous studies have been carried out on hate speech. The deep harm it causes both to individuals and social groups all over the globe has been proven by numerous scholars (*Delgado, 1982; Gelbert & McNamara, 2016; Matsuda, 1989; Sellars, 2016* etc.) and can be thus considered an axiom. Measuring hate speech, as well as defining messages as such is difficult due to extremely personal interpretations of what hateful content is. Regulating hate speech is also a difficult task, as it develops a clash between freedom of expression and protection of human dignity. Thus, one of these two foundation stones of democracy has to be ‘sacrificed’ for the sake of the other to some extent (*Gagliardone et al., 2015: 11*). However, if not battled, hate speech can have devastating consequences: both in short and long term. It results not only in real violence against target groups, up to massive physical exterminations (i.e. genocides of Jews by Nazis, of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda etc.). It also changes the people’s mindset in a way that the target groups are perceived as indeed deserving to be hated, discriminated and even physically destroyed (*Benesch, 2014; Leets, 2002: 345*).

The scholars have discovered that the most common victim groups of hate speech are ethnic, religious groups and women. Less common but not neglectable victims include various social and economic groups, for example, the LGBTQ+ people. The hate speech definition proposed by Burnap and Williams (2014) that focuses on the first target group, namely: “*written expressions of hateful and antagonistic sentiment*

*towards a particular race, ethnicity and religion*” (p. 2) is yet only partially true because it focuses merely on the written form of hate speech, neglecting its other manifestations, and also neglects other possible victim groups. For example, one of the most atrocious direct results of hate speech is the 1994 Rwandan genocide. There and then, the main channels through which hateful messages against the Tutsi people were distributed were in fact radio and television, not the print media (Benesch, 2012). However, regarding distribution channels, this definition is truthful, as hate speech – although it is often the opposite, especially in undemocratic regimes – is not broadcasted through media only.

Therefore, this study supports the definition of hate speech, suggested by Gagliardone and his colleagues (2015): “*Expressions that advocate incitement to harm (particularly, discrimination, hostility or violence) based upon the target’s being identified with a certain social or demographic group*” (p. 10). Similar definitions were proposed by other scholars (Benesch, 2012 & 2014; Gelber & McNamara, 2016; Leets, 2002; Ross et al., 2017; Sellars, 2016).

## **§2.4. Relation between Hate Speech and Propaganda**

Direct comparisons of hate speech and propaganda are vague and de-facto missing in relevant research studies. Yet the elements of propaganda mentioned earlier in this paper can be traced in numerous studies carried out on hate speech, and vice versa. For example, both propaganda and hate speech deal with a certain target, or victim group, which is subject to aggression, verbal attacks, hatred and discrimination. To express these, derogatory and even dehumanizing language can be used to refer to the victim groups (Benesch, 2012; Benesch, 2014). Furthermore, case studies of

Yugoslav war and Rwanda genocide prove that systematical incitement of fear towards a target group by political elites can provoke physical violence against the target group (*Benesch, 2014; Simmons & Mueller, 2001: 188, 191*). Violence is an inevitable result of racist hate speech and racist propaganda as well, as studies of the American society have shown (*Delgado, 1982; Matsuda, 1989*). However, it is not clear whether this is also true for modern Russia and Ukraine. Twisting and denial of history – one of the main methods of military propaganda – is a fertile ground for the development of hate speech. Herewith the victim group is often being accused of deceptive propaganda and twisting of history in its favor. In certain cases denial of history can even become a part of some states' ideology (*Fraser, 2009; Davidovitch & Dana, 2017*). Selective and biased presentations of facts, very common for military hegemonic propaganda, have also been noticed within pre-election media campaigns in the Democratic Republic of Congo (*Vollhardt, Coutin, Staub, Weiss, & Deflander, 2007*).

## **§2.5. Research Questions**

The analysis of literature demonstrates the significant role that is attached to media propaganda in science and society. Especially in authoritarian, i.e. so-called “hybrid regimes” that balance between democracy and authoritarianism (*Shulman, 2015*), like Russia and Ukraine both are. Here propaganda serves as a powerful tool of shaping the public opinion and swaying it into the current that is favorable for the ruling elites. In times of war, propaganda – be it offensive or defensive – becomes a dangerous weapon in the rear aimed to create a “demonic image” of the enemy and breed hatred among the local population towards it. As studies show, it is done with astonishing speed and efficiency, and can have long-lasting effect.

Hate speech is a relatively new phenomenon in communication, however history has proved how devastating its effect can be if distributed through mass media channels and not fought against. Despite numerous legal international regulations, hate speech is unfortunately still present in media. It is obvious that hate speech, like propaganda, is a serious threat to such essential human rights as freedom of information and right to human dignity. Through this, they are a serious threat to democracy itself.

Furthermore, as literature review has demonstrated, propaganda (as described by both Lasswell and Chomsky) and hate speech seem to have many common characteristics in their content, method and aims. These similarities bring up the assumption that these two phenomena might be related to each other and that they may in some way complement one another, especially in periods of instability: for example, during deep social and economic crises and war.

The modern Russian-Ukrainian conflict presents an outstanding example. First of all, it is the most recent case still unfolding in front of our eyes. Although a large number of studies have already been written on this topic, they mainly touch upon the Russian propaganda, namely, its background and content. The studies dedicated to the Ukrainian side of the story are, on the one hand, written in the Ukrainian language and are thus unavailable for the international academia. On the other hand, they either discuss internal political situation in Ukraine only, or their comparison to Russian media propaganda is defensive and lacking objection to some extent. Therefore, a need of an objective comparative analysis of Ukrainian media content available for English-speaking scholars persists. Furthermore, both sides in the conflict accuse each other of aggressive military propaganda, especially concerning Ukraine. This research gap requires more profound inquiry and clarification.

Based on the above-mentioned, the aim of this paper is to find an answer to the following research question:

*RQ<sub>1</sub>: In which way are propaganda and hate speech related to each other in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine?*

More specifically, this paper will examine the relation of propaganda and hate speech between the two propaganda theories i.e. models described by Chomsky and Lasswell. Therefore, the following sub-question is also to be answered:

*SQ<sub>1</sub>: What role, if any, does hate speech play in the two propaganda models by Lasswell and Chomsky, looking at the case study of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine?*

As discussed, Russian communication campaigns are regarded as propaganda both within the academic community and in media. They have been researched more thoroughly than the Ukrainian communication campaigns against Russia. Therefore, the further interest of this work is connected with Ukraine's side of the story. Turning back to what was said about the lack of previous studies addressing Ukrainian involvement in the info war with Russia, the second sub-question is introduced:

*SQ<sub>2</sub>: Is Ukraine practicing russophobic hate speech in media within its conflict with Russia?*

## **§2.6. Hypotheses**

The discoveries of the existing studies, especially the works of Lasswell and Chomsky, allow making certain forecasts on the possible outcomes of this study. Based on the literature review, three hypotheses have been derived.

First of all, both propaganda models see demonization of the enemy as an essential part of propaganda mechanisms. This can be achieved among others by use of derogatory terms and dehumanization of the enemy, which is also a feature of hate speech. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is introduced, stating that:

*H1. Hate speech is a tool of propaganda within both propaganda models.*

Secondly, speaking of propaganda theories (or models) separately and relying on what was said before about them, this paper proposes the following relationship each of them has with hate speech. Chomsky's model appears to be more closely related to propaganda of undemocratic regimes which are more likely to practice hostile and aggressive media attacks on their enemies. In this regard, Hypothesis 2 is proposed.

*H2. Hegemonic propaganda model by Chomsky employs more hate speech than Lasswell's classic propaganda theory.*

Regarding the sides of the conflict and their participation in the info war, Hypothesis 3 is proposed. With reference to what is already known about Ukrainian media, xenophobic rhetoric might well be present there, however not as prominent as in texts by their Russian counterparts.

*H3. The amount of russophobic hate speech in Ukrainian media texts is smaller than ukrainophobic hate speech in Russian media texts.*

### **§3. Methodology**

In order to find answers to the research questions and test the hypotheses, this paper adopts a qualitative method of research, namely a mixture of *content analysis* and *discourse analysis*. This chapter explains what kind of methods they are and takes the first steps to their implementation in the first subchapter “Preparation Steps”. For example, the to-be-analyzed material, i.e. Russian and Ukrainian media texts, are introduced and their selection criteria are explained; as well as the coding units. Moreover, an analysis of policies and legal documents has been conducted at this stage in order to get a better insight into the phenomenon of hate speech and its legal regulation: both internationally and in the two countries of interest.

An extremely important prerequisite for a successful analysis of media text is the knowledge of the to-be-analyzed situation’s context. This is especially important in analysis of such complex and multidisciplinary phenomena as Russian-Ukrainian relations. For this reason, an overview of Russian-Ukrainian relations after the collapse of the USSR has been introduced at this stage as a first part of the methodology.

#### **§3.1. Preparation Steps**

##### ***§3.1.1. Content Selection***

The amount of news pieces published in both countries about each other from the Euromaidan (November 23<sup>rd</sup> 2017) till December 31<sup>st</sup> 2017 is astonishing. According to the Google News tool, around 10.925.500 Ukraine-relevant news pieces were published in Russia in the given time period. This number was composed out of the following news pieces published in the above-mentioned period of time: ~6.850.000 news pieces with the tag “Ukraine”; ~1.490.000 news pieces tagged “Ukrainian crisis”;

~1.100.000 news pieces tagged “Crimea”; ~529.000 news pieces tagged “Donbas”; ~436.000 news pieces tagged “DPR” and ~272.000 tagged “LPR”; and ~248.500 news pieces tagged “Integration of Crimea [into Russia]”. The Ukrainian media published around 6.855.500 news pieces about Russia in the above-mentioned time-period. This number was composed out of the following quantities of news pieces per tag: ~2.005.000 tagged “Crimea”; ~1.503.000 tagged “Russia”; ~1.264.300 tagged “Donbas”; ~738.000 with the tag “Donetsk province” and ~579,100 “Luhansk province”; ~656.600 pieces tagged “Russian aggression”; and ~109.500 tagged “Crimea annexation”. This massive amount of information needed to be narrowed down in order to conduct a research.

First of all, the amount of texts to be analyzed was limited to ten typical pieces from both countries of interest were selected. Half of them were Ukrainian, the other half was Russian. The texts selected from both countries needed to touch upon Russian-Ukrainian relations after the annexation of Crimea from the geopolitical perspective, and not simply retell an event. Therefore, news reports shorter than 100 words were not taken into consideration

The Crimean crisis of March 2014 is a unique case in contemporary history. For the first time since WWII, a part of territory of a sovereign European country was annexed by another state. The Crimean case also triggered other separatist and independence movements across Europe (i.e., Scotland, Catalonia). The annexation of Crimea was the starting point of Russian-Ukrainian conflict. For this reason, the texts that were published after the annexation were selected as a part of the conflict discourse.

A typical trait of both countries’ media field is that the texts are published in the respective national languages of the both countries: Russian and Ukrainian. However,

an important remark needs to be made at this moment. The distinctive feature of Ukrainian media is their bilingualism: a vast number of Ukrainian media channels are broadcasting in Russian language as well. (*Pörzgen, 2016*) Also, a large number of Ukrainians consumes Russian media channels. However, recent studies show that their number has significantly dropped since the conflict with Russia had started (*Internews, 2016*). Regarding this fact, Russian media channels were excluded from the pool in the Ukrainian set of texts.

The other main text selection criterion was the popularity of their sources: in other words, their wide reach. Only large nationwide media channels were selected based on the statistic data for Russia and Ukraine. For the sake of objectivity, data of several statistic sources were compared to each other. Based upon that, those channels that were among top 5 in all ranking lists were selected. Another crucial factor for selection was the texts' online availability in written form. This criterion was necessary in order to be able to retrieve the full text after a long period of time.

The last important factor was the texts' *political orientation*. The channels supporting their own country were used for both Russia and Ukraine. In case of Ukraine, though, it would be not completely correct to say "pro-government media". For example, an author may not support president Poroshenko and his government, but still feel hostility towards Russia and write about it in a respective way. Moreover, there is another important nuance: in Ukrainian provinces inhabited predominantly by ethnic Russians (southeastern Ukraine), media support of Russia and pro-Russian Donbas rebels is noticeable. It would not be a mistake to state that media from this part of Ukraine replicate opinions expressed in the Russian media to a certain extent, and are thus highly unlikely to contain russophobic hate speech. Therefore, pro-Russian media

channels from Ukraine were not taken into consideration. For the same reason and because of their small reach, oppositional and government-critical media channels are also not regarded in the Russian set of texts.

To sum up the above-mentioned, the top five Russian media channels that fulfill the selection criteria are (in alphabetical order) (*Brand Analytics, 2017; Rambler, 2017*):

1. “Komsomolskaya Pravda” (<http://www.kp.ru>),
2. “Lenta.ru” (<https://lenta.ru>),
3. “Moskovskiy Komsomolets” (<http://www.mk.ru>),
4. “RIA Novosti” (<http://www.ria.ru>), and
5. “Vesti.ru” (<https://www.vesti.ru/>).

In Ukraine, ranked top 5 news media channels that fulfill the selection criteria are (in alphabetical order) (*Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2014; De Jong et al., 2015; Internews, 2016*):

1. “5 Kanal” (<https://www.5.ua/>),
2. “Hromadske Telebachennya” (<https://hromadske.ua/>),
3. “Kanal 24” (<https://24tv.ua>),
4. “1+1 / TSN” (<https://tsn.ua>), and
5. “Ukrayinska Pravda” (<http://www.pravda.com.ua>).

The texts were selected in a way that there is one text addressing each topic that is prominent in the Russian and Ukrainian media discourse regarding the other country. The channel distribution of topics was done randomly. Texts were selected from the ten listed media channels’ websites. Notably, there was no repetition of the text authors in either country’s set of texts. The originals of all texts as well as their translations into English made by this study’s author can be found in Appendix A of this paper.

Table 1.

*Distribution of Article's Topics and Their Original Media Channels*

| Topic                                  | Title of publication translated into English, media channel of origin                                           |                                                                                                                       |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                        | Russian Set                                                                                                     | Ukrainian Set                                                                                                         |
| Crimea                                 | "Crimea After Two Years",<br><i>Komsomolskaya Pravda</i>                                                        | "Russian Racism in Crimea",<br><i>Kanal 24</i>                                                                        |
| Other country's inner policy           | "Path to Bright Past",<br><i>Lenta.ru</i>                                                                       | "Putin's Greatest Fear Came True",<br><i>Ukrayinska Pravda</i>                                                        |
| Other country's foreign policy         | "Bandera Will Not Help Ukraine: Nezalezhnaya Fell Out with All Its Neighbors",<br><i>Moskovskiy Komsomolets</i> | "Kremlin's 'Trojan horse': Social Media Admitted They Were Used to Manipulate USA",<br><i>Hromadske Telebachennya</i> |
| Donbas                                 | "In Ukraine, Freedom of Speech Was Definitely Abolished and Nazism Fortified",<br><i>RIA Novosti</i>            | "Set a Fire Trap: A Story of Hero of Ukraine Who Laid Mines under Enemy's Infantry Combat Vehicle",<br><i>5 Kanal</i> |
| Other country's government / president | "Poroshenko Giggles and Turns Ukrainians Into EU Slaves",<br><i>Vesti.ru</i>                                    | "Words about Crimea, Thoughts about Empire",<br><i>1+1 / TSN</i>                                                      |

**§3.1.2. Hate Speech Policy Analysis**

In democratic countries, the legal system clearly defines what a violation of human dignity that requires legal punishment is. This makes a timely legal reaction to hate speech possible (Ross *et al.*, 2017).

The need of legal reaction to hate speech has emerged as a reaction of the international community to the WWII and the atrocities of the Nazi regime. (Kübler, 1998: 336) On the global level, it the UN *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, particularly its Article 4 implies obligation to declare any forms of incitement of racial hatred and superiority, as well as any incitement of such (including racist propaganda) a criminal offense (ICERD, Art. 4). Another significant UN document, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)*, defines freedom of expression as an essential human right. It also encourages prohibition of any forms of military propaganda, as well as racial and

religious discrimination (*ICCPR, Art. 19–20*). On the European level, there are recommendations issued by *the Council of Europe* in 1997. The latest hate speech-related COE Recommendation No. 1805 (2007) addresses blasphemous hate speech only and is thus not relevant to this study. As both Russia and Ukraine are COE members, the two 1997 COE recommendations are applicable to both of them.

The first one, *Recommendation № R 97 (20)*, deserves special attention. First of all, it gives its own definition of hate speech as “all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance” and stresses the great danger of hate speech when disseminated through media channels. In this regard, the Recommendation points out the special legal responsibility of national media channels alongside with the media authors who broadcast content that can be interpreted as hate speech. However, broadcasting topics related to hatred and intolerance is restricted and regulated by *Article 10: “Freedom of Expression” of the ECHR*, and, according to it, may be limited only by certain cases outlined (“in the interests of national security, territorial integrity [...], for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals [and] reputation”) (*ECHR, Art. 10*). Concerning the role of mass media in hate speech dissemination, *Recommendation № R 97 (21)* stresses the importance of fostering principles of tolerance and multiculturalism within national media houses and among media workers, and implementing these principles into codes of conduct. It also encourages objective, non-biased and respectful depiction of other cultural communities in the media (*p. 110*).

On the local level of both countries of interest, hate speech is also legally regulated: both by laws and journalistic codes of conduct, although not directly named

“hate speech” (*Arapova & Kuzevanova, 2011; Jackson, 2016*). In Russia, the most noteworthy documents are the country’s Constitution and the Federal Law “On the Mass Media”. Article 29 of the *Russian Constitution* does not only guarantee freedom of information and expression, but also forbids any forms of social, racial, religious or linguistic discrimination, as well as its propaganda (*St. 29 Konstitutsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii*). The Federal Law “On Mass Media”, Article 4, forbids exploitation of mass media as a means of disseminating materials that “promote terrorism [...], [contain] other extremist materials, [...] pornography, cult of violence and cruelty, and [...] obscenities” (*St. 4, Zakon RF “O Sredstvakh Massovoy Informatsii”*). Article 51 forbids journalists to broadcast discrediting information based on the person’s “gender, age, race or ethnicity, language, [...] religion, profession, place of residence or employment, as well as their political preferences”. (*St. 51, Zakon RF “O Sredstvakh Massovoy Informatsii”*).

In Ukraine, relevant legal documents are the also country’s Constitution, the law “On Protection of Public Moral” and “Code of Ethics of the Ukrainian Journalist”. The *Ukrainian Constitution*, unlike the Russian one, does not directly prohibit dissemination of hate speech, but it guarantees equal rights regardless of gender, race, religion and social status (*St. 24*) and prohibits establishing political parties whose programs contain violent propaganda, “incitement of inter-ethnic, racial, or religious enmity, and the encroachment on human rights and freedoms and the health of the population” (*St. 37, Konstitutsiya Ukrayiny*). The law “On Protection of Public Moral” prohibits production and distribution of information that contains “propaganda of war, ethnical and religious hatred [...] fascism and neo-fascism [...] bigotry, blasphemy [...] ignorance” and discrimination based on age, physical or mental disability (*St. 2, Zakon Ukrayiny vid*

20.11.2004 № 1296-15). Article 15 of the “*Code of Ethics of the Ukrainian Journalist*” proclaims that no-one shall be discriminated based on their gender, language, race, religion, social status or political views, as well as physical illness or disability (*St. 15, Kodeks Etyky Ukrayins'koho Zhurnalista*).

### §3.1.3. *Characteristics Charts*

In order to test Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 based on the selected media texts, a basis of characteristics needed to be created, according to which propaganda models and hate speech could be compared to each other. To do this, the following typical characteristics of hate speech based on its legal definitions and attributes were outlined. Also peculiarities of this particular study were taken into consideration while formulating the criteria. For example, gender intolerance, a prominent aspect of modern hate speech, is irrelevant for this study, because this paper focuses on hatred of two nations towards each other; therefore, it was not included in the list of attributes. Finally, a detailed and accurate characteristic of hate speech in comparison with neutral speech outlined by Johanna Vollhardt and her colleagues was used as a reference (*Vollhardt et al., 2007: 30*). Each attribute is coded as “*HS<sub>n</sub>*”, namely:

Table 2.

#### *Characteristics of Hate Speech*

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*HS<sub>1</sub>*: Written or oral expression;

*HS<sub>2</sub>*: Addresses a certain social group and / or its individual members;

*HS<sub>3</sub>*: Contains expressions of hostility towards this social group and / or its members;

*HS<sub>4</sub>*: Accusations addressed to this social group and / or its members;

*HS<sub>5</sub>*: Dehumanizing, derogatory language, slurs in reference to this social group and / or its members (aggressive nationalism);

*HS<sub>6</sub>*: One-sided, biased presentation of facts;

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*HS*<sub>7</sub>: Simple language;

*HS*<sub>8</sub>: Charged with negative emotions (such as sadness, hatred, fear).

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The similar charts were created for each propaganda model based on their typical characteristics, outlined in the previous chapter and coded “*CPT<sub>n</sub>*” and “*HPM<sub>n</sub>*”, respectively. The Common Propaganda Attributes coded as “*CPA<sub>n</sub>*” will be reviewed both separately and as parts of both models.

Table 3.

*Characteristics Charts for Propaganda*

| <u>Classic Propaganda Theory</u><br>(Lasswell)                             | <u>Hegemonic Propaganda Model</u><br>(Chomsky)                             |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>CPT</i> <sub>1</sub> : Manipulation of significant symbols              | <i>HPM</i> <sub>1</sub> : Total governmental control;                      |
| <i>CPT</i> <sub>2</sub> : Mobilization of public opinion;                  | <i>HPM</i> <sub>2</sub> : Media channels controlled by ruling elites;      |
| <i>CPT</i> <sub>3</sub> : Demoralization of enemy;                         | <i>HPM</i> <sub>3</sub> : Distracting public attention from real problems; |
| <i>CPT</i> <sub>4</sub> : Adaptation of rhetoric to public opinion swings. | <i>HPM</i> <sub>4</sub> : Incitement of fear.                              |
| <u>Common Propaganda Attributes (both models)</u>                          |                                                                            |
| <i>CPA</i> <sub>1</sub> : Militarization;                                  |                                                                            |
| <i>CPA</i> <sub>2</sub> : Falsification of history;                        |                                                                            |
| <i>CPA</i> <sub>3</sub> : Demonization of enemies;                         |                                                                            |
| <i>CPA</i> <sub>4</sub> : Selective presentation of facts.                 |                                                                            |

As the charts demonstrate, the Classic Propaganda Theory focuses mostly on the recipients and senders of the message. In contrast, the Hegemonic Propaganda Model and common attributes bring the message’s content into focus. Therefore, the role of hate speech in each propaganda model will be evaluated based on the matches between the following characteristics pairs (*see next page*):

|                                    |                                    |                                    |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| HS <sub>2</sub> – CPT <sub>1</sub> | HS <sub>6</sub> – HPM <sub>1</sub> | HS <sub>3</sub> – CPA <sub>1</sub> |
| HS <sub>7</sub> – CPT <sub>2</sub> | HS <sub>6</sub> – HPM <sub>2</sub> | HS <sub>6</sub> – CPA <sub>2</sub> |
| HS <sub>2</sub> – CPT <sub>3</sub> | HS <sub>6</sub> – HPM <sub>3</sub> | HS <sub>5</sub> – CPA <sub>3</sub> |
| HS <sub>4</sub> – CPT <sub>4</sub> | HS <sub>8</sub> – HPM <sub>4</sub> | HS <sub>6</sub> – CPA <sub>4</sub> |

### §3.2. Directed Content Analysis

One of the key scholars of content analysis, Klaus Krippendorff, defines it as a “research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use.” (*Krippendorff, 2004: 18*) Under ‘texts’ the scholar understands not only written and printed words, but also visual and electronic material. This is an old method used by numerous scholars to analyze texts – regardless of their form and source, and is still growing and developing.

This method goes from a viewpoint that a text *per se* has no meaning or aim. What matters are the concepts that authors and readers put into it, as well as the social, economic, ideological etc. background. These factors need to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, the fact of crucial importance for this study is that content analysis was implemented to analyze military propaganda, especially WWII propaganda.

There are different approaches to content analysis. Choosing among them highly depends on the goals and research questions the scholar sets. In their study, Hsieh and Shannon (2005) give detailed descriptions of three types of content analysis. One of them is the so-called “*directed content analysis*”, or “*deductive content analysis*” (*Elo & Kyngäs, 2008: 109*), or “*structuring content analysis*” (*Mayring, 1991: 213*). The goal of this approach is to test or extend relevant previous studies or existing theories that “direct” the new research, its research questions and hypotheses. For instance, the main

phenomena described in earlier studies determine the future coding categories of s new study. The scholar may also have to introduce new coding subcategories that represent the subtypes of the initial phenomenon, thus extending the initial theory.

The main difficulty of this approach is that an excessively strong orientation on the “directing” theory may cause the scholar to ignore some important details which can lead to inaccurate results of the new study (*Hsieh & Shannon, 2005: 1281–1283*).

Furthermore, the risk of one-sided text interpretation persists, which emerges when the scholar starts to analyze the matter subjectively, based on their own experience and attitude – especially when dealing with sensitive matters (*Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Kohl, 2011; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005; Granenheimer & Lundman, 2003*). These risks bring up the concepts of credibility and trustworthiness, crucial for any type of qualitative content analysis. While credibility means the correspondence of data and its analysis to the initial goal of the study, transferability questions whether research outcomes can be applied to other circumstances and focus groups (*Graneheim & Lundman, 2003: 109–110*). It is crucial to adhere to these principles in order to conduct a reliable worthwhile study. The author of this study seeks to hold on to these principles as well and be maximally objective, despite certain personal attitudes on the case and general condemnation of any forms of propaganda and hate speech.

The main stages of the directing i.e. deductive or structuring content analysis are the following (*Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Geller, Kaplan, & Lasswell, 1942; Graneheim & Lundman, 2003; Krippendorff, 2004; Mayring, 1991*).

1. Preparation stage:

- a. Selection of analysis units, and
- b. Understanding the context and the background.

## 2. Organizing stage:

- a. Development of the analysis matrices (based on the theory),
- b. Selection of data:
  - i. Grouping of data by content,
  - ii. Categorization and sub-categorization of data, and
  - iii. Abstraction (i.e. giving names to categories and sub-categories),
- c. Category-based data coding,
- d. Testing of hypotheses, and
- e. Checks, revisions, eventual re-testing.

## 3. Final stage:

- a. Preparing and reporting the study results.

### ***§3.2.1. Analysis Units***

The first step in the organizing stage of content analysis is the collection and definition of unit symbols (*Geller, Kaplan, & Lasswell, 1942*). This study uses syntactical and categorical approaches (*Krippendorff, 2004: 104–106*) to definition of the analysis units: namely, relevant words and their variations: (metaphoric) synonyms, related terms from the relevant theory, etc.

For the Russian set of texts, the codes used by Holovka and Tokarsky (2016) are used as a fundament for the coding units, as they were used to conduct content analysis of two Russian newspapers in period from 2014 till 2015. These were enriched and adjusted based on the texts selected for this analysis. For the Ukrainian set of texts, a new set of codes was developed. Thus, the following sampling and coding units were outlined (*see Table 4*). The full list of coding units can be found in Appendix B.

Table 4  
*Sampling and Coding Units*

| <u>Russian Set</u>                                        |                                                                      | <u>Ukrainian Set</u>                                                      |                                                                              |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <u>Sampling Unit</u>                                      | <u>Coding Unit</u>                                                   | <u>Sampling Unit</u>                                                      | <u>Coding Unit</u>                                                           |
| Ukraine's territory and regions                           | 1. Crimea<br>2. Donbas<br>3. Rest of Ukraine                         | Russia and its "allies"                                                   | 1. Russia<br>2. Crimea after annexation, DPR and LPR                         |
| Ukraine's population                                      |                                                                      | Russian and pro-Russian population                                        | 1. Russian "agents"<br>2. Crimean post-annexation authorities, Donbas rebels |
| Ukraine's ruling elites                                   | 1. Politicians<br>2. Regime & ideology                               | Russian politicians                                                       | 1. Putin and his team<br>2. Historic personalities                           |
| Ukraine's policy                                          | 1. Inner policy<br>2. Foreign policy and foreign partners of Ukraine | Russia's foreign policy                                                   | 1. Involvement in Crimea and Donbas<br>2. Involvement into USA elections     |
| Social and political process in Ukraine                   | Euromaidan                                                           | Russian internal policy                                                   | 1. Political regime<br>2. Everyday life                                      |
| Russia and Russians in contrast to Ukraine and Ukrainians |                                                                      | Ukraine and Ukrainians in contrast to Russia, Russians and "pro-Russians" |                                                                              |

### §3.3. Critical Discourse Analysis

It is important to mention the difference between approaches of the two sides on the nature of the conflict. Ukraine adheres to the viewpoint that both the Crimean crisis and the violence in Donbas were provoked and supported by Russia. Ukraine thus refers to these areas as "occupied territories". In contrast, Russia insists that Crimea's integration into Russia was a result of a democratic referendum which reflects the civic stance of the majority of Crimean population. Concerning the Donbas war, Moscow refers to it as a civil war in Ukraine between the pro-Russian "*opolchentsy*" ("rebels") of Donbas and Kyivan regime. This collision of interpretations complicates the negotiation process and eventual conflict resolution. What are the reason and the origin of this difference in approaches to the same situation and the same personalities?

Russian-Ukrainian relations have always been extremely complex (for details, see next subchapter). They have been shaped by most diverse events, phenomena and personalities, and other factors. These and other aspects of the problem prove its complexity. For this reason it would be a mistake to rely on the analysis of the media texts' content alone (*Fairclough, 2012*).

The words do not only exist per se, outside the environment and the context in which they are said or written. It is thus important to be aware of the discourse of each media text that is analyzed. Under "discourse", the scholars understand the interpretation of the environment which shapes not only the language, but also people's identities and world perception in a particular society (*Brown & Yule, 1983; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 2010*). Van Dijk (1998) refers to discourse as a "spoken or a written verbal product" (p. 194) of language, of the act of communication between at least two parties: the writer i.e. speaker and the reader i.e. listener, such as understanding of a discourse is mostly subjective, depending on the individual understanding of the context and mental model for the discussed matter (*Ibid.; McGregor, 2003*).

Discourse in its turn is shaped by *ideologies*: sets of beliefs and perceptions that are considered an axiom by their adherents. Discourse plays an important role in the dissemination of an ideology. Based on certain linguistic tools, as well as some non-verbal components (the speaker's intonation, mimics, gestures etc.) one can recognize the ideology hiding behind the discourse (*Van Dijk, 2006*).

Academia identifies two basic types of discourse analysis: descriptive and critical. Descriptive discourse analysis aims to look deeper into linguistic patterns of the text for the sake of better understanding of the language and its functions. In other

words, this approach deals more with the semiotic aspect of the texts analyzed.

However it is yet different from the pure linguistic approach and analysis which focuses solely on grammatical structures of the text (*Van Dijk, 1991: 46*).

This paper however applies the second approach, the *critical discourse analysis*, or shortly CDA. It requires unraveling the ideology and problems it deals with, making sense of social phenomena that shape the discourse unique to the particular society, and finding out the relations between power and discourse are the aims of critical discourse analysis. To a certain extent, critical discourse analysts even offer their own solution to the negotiated problem (*Gee, 2004: 9; McGregor, 2003; Van Dijk, 1993: 252*).

According to the above mentioned, critical discourse analysis is not subjective (*Kohl, 2011; McGregor, 2003*), as it is based on the researcher's individual understanding of the discourse. Therefore a certain threat of biasing the research always persists, especially in matters involving two conflicting sides. For this reason, some scholars might argue that this method is far from scientific (*Gee, 2004: 9*). Despite this opinion, critical discourse analysis is an established method of propaganda and hate speech analysis. For example, the CDA has discovered that it was not only ideology, but also numerous social and economic factors that have influenced the judophobic propaganda of Nazi Germany (*Kohl, 2011*). This is also true for the critical discourse analysis of hate speech: historical and cultural clashes were found to be the trigger for a massive hate speech media campaign which resulted in Rwandan genocide (*Benesch, 2012; Benesch, 2014*). Taking into account the geopolitical i.e. ideological nature of the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict, discourse analysis seems applicable to this case.

Against this background, the answer to the question asked at the beginning of this subchapter is clear. The difference in how Russia and Ukraine refer to the same

events, phenomena and personalities in their media reflects the difference within the discourses of the two countries. Under “discourses”, the dominant media discourses in each of the two countries are understood. Any communication science scholar needs to be aware of this discourse clash while analyzing Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

There are numerous approaches i.e. schools of critical discourse analysis. They vary depending on the author, the country of origin and other factors. The CDA in this study was conducted against the backdrop of approaches of *Norman Fairclough* and *Teun Adrianus Van Dijk*. These two scholars’ methods were chosen, as they are the core figures and first developers of this analysis method. Numerous scholars from various disciplines all over the globe rely on their studies to conduct their own research. Thus the methods and approaches described by Fairclough and Van Dijk can be regarded as trustworthy.

The four stages of critical discourse analysis according to Norman Fairclough (*Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 60; Fairclough, 2001, p. 125; Fairclough, 2009*) are:

1. *Identification of a social problem in the text.* At first, a major social problem is identified, and then – its narrow, i.e. more specific manifestation.
2. *Identification of obstacles to tackling of this problem.* In other words, the researcher determines semiotic and social factors that do not allow the problem to be solved. At this stage, the analyses themselves are conducted. More specifically, Chouliaraki and Fairclough talk about three main analyses on this stage (*Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 61–63*):
  - a. *Conjuncture analysis:* i.e., analysis of a large-scale problem that the discourse is located in;

- b. *Practice analysis*: it's sense is in identification of connections between the discourse and other factors (social relations, material practice, mental factors) of a particular social practice;
  - c. *Semiotic discourse analysis*: the analysis of the text itself and its linguistic patterns that incorporate the power relations and ideology hiding behind it.
- Among others, the researcher needs to pay attention to the following discourse structures of a written text outlined by Van Dijk (1995):
- Syntax (word order, sentence complexity);
  - Lexicon (“terrorists” vs. “freedom fighters”; euphemisms etc.);
  - Local semantics (victim blaming, disclaimers);
  - Topicalization (avoiding negative topics for the “Us”-group);
  - Schematic structures (intentional downgrading of important topics);
  - Rhetoric (metaphors, dehumanization, rhymes etc.).
3. *Identification of connection between the problem and the existing social order*. Is the problem an integral part of it? Is it a product an existing ideology? These questions need to be answered at this stage.
  4. *Identification of possible solutions to the problem and obstacles*. This solution has to be based on the gap between semiotic and social obstacles identified on Stage 2.
  5. *Critical reflection on the analysis*. Realistic reflection on the conducted analysis, description of limitations.

### **§3.4. Understanding Context: Roots of Russian-Ukrainian Conflict**

The roots of modern hostility between Russia and Ukraine lie deep in the history of the two countries and their bilateral relations.

Over the centuries of coexistence and common history, a great similarity between Ukrainians and ethnic Russians has developed. The two nations share not only physical similarities, but also common religious, cultural, linguistic and psychological elements. There is a large number of “russified” Ukrainians in Russia, and of “ukrainized” Russians in Ukraine who have perfectly fit in within the other country’s society (*Lieven, 1999*). This unique similarity was exploited by nationalists on both sides. Whereas for Ukrainian nationalists it is a hurdle for acquiring new supporters among ordinary people, for Russian imperialists it is an excuse for claims that Ukrainians are in fact Russians and therefore their country’s territory also belongs to Russia (*Ibid., p. 2*).

In the times of the Russian Empire, Ukrainian independence was suppressed by the central government, and the population was intensively “russified”. In this regard, Lieven (1999) aptly compares Russian-Ukrainian relations of that time with those of England and Ireland, respectively (*Ibid., p. 25*). However, Moscow practiced the same policy of ‘russification’ towards all other ethnic minorities of the Empire.

In contrast, the Soviets were by far more tolerant towards Ukrainian national identity, especially in the 1920s and in years before WWII, with the exception of *Holodomor*, the famine of 1932-1933 which Ukraine is officially perceives as an act of genocide against Ukrainian people (*Zakon Ukrayiny vid 28.11.2006 № 376-V*). However, it is by the end of the Soviet era that the basis of the modern conflict between the two nations has formed. The government of the Soviet Ukraine sought for more independence within the Union and more equality with the central power in Moscow. This resulted in the rise of Ukrainian nationalism in the late 1980s, with 90% of Ukrainians voting for Ukraine’s independence from the USSR at the referendum in

1991. The independent Ukraine, especially under president Leonid Kuchma (1994 – 2005), pursued a policy of “ukrainization” (i.e. active promotion and granting a privileged status to Ukrainian language, traditions and culture over those of the ethnic minorities).

In the 1990s, Russia was also undergoing a similar process as well. After the USSR and socialism had collapsed, Russia was in search of a new state ideology that could unite the large country and its various peoples and keep them together (*Liñán, 2010*). In the mid-to-late 1990s, an attempt was made to adapt to European, i.e., Western, set of values. However, this time of Russian history was marked with severe social, economic hardships, devastating wars in Chechnya and deep identity crisis for many Russians. As the USSR collapsed, the economically weak Russia as its successor state de-facto lost the status of a second global superpower (*Taylor, 1997: 56*): this was an extreme humiliation for many Russians (*Shevtsova, 2015*). Therefore, a large number of Russians perceives the “wild 90s” as an era of unrest and chaos for which the weak pro-Western government alone is to blame (*Furgacz, 2016; Liñán, 2010*). All these factors were quite easily exploited by the conservative powers under Putin who declared the conceptions of a “multipolar world”, “Eurasianism”, and most importantly the so-called “*derzhávnost*”: “belief in the primacy and greatness of the Russian state” (*Merry, 2016: 23*) This concept is briefly yet accurately expressed by Kubanev and Nabilkina (2015): “The leading role in European-Asian Union belongs to Russia.” (p. 330). Indeed, as the most economically stable of all Post-Soviet republics (except the three Baltic republics) and the only one among them that plays the greatest international role, Russia is truly the dominant power of the Post-Soviet region. It is able to control the elites and economies of the other eleven states, supporting them economically in

exchange for absolute loyalty on the international level – or, at least, neutrality (*Bērziņš, 2014*). Therefore, Ukraine's striving for more independence and closeness to the West caused immediate reaction in Russia.

The majority of scholars agree on the following main reasons for Russia's actions against Ukraine: the country's ambitions to once again dominate the post-Soviet region (*Darczewska, 2014a; Darczewska, 2014b; Götz, 2015; Götz, 2016a; Marten, 2015*); Kremlin's striving to distract Russian society from the country's real internal problems, especially after the 2011-2012 protests (*Liñán, 2010*); and, as a result, the need to raise Putin's plummeted voting numbers. The second approach is dominant among Russian scholars, although it also has supporters abroad (i.e., *Boyd-Barrett, 2017; Glazyev, 2015; Kubanev & Nabilkina, 2015; Tsygankov, 2015*). In contrast, a wide number of Western scholars and analysts (*Bērziņš, 2014; Darczewska, 2014a & 2014b; De Jong et al., 2015; Furgacz, 2016; Gerber & Zavisca, 2016; Götz 2015; Jonsson & Seely, 2015; Liñán, 2010; Sakwa, 2014; Snyder, 2014*) are adherents of the former approach, often in connection with the third.

Merry (2016), however, also sees the Ukrainian crisis as a result of a clash on a much larger, symbolic scale, coming from the sphere of geopolitics. She speaks of a clash between the Russian "Great Power approach" (striving for supremacy in the region), and the European "shared sovereignty approach" (pp. 22 – 23). This stance in a slightly different interpretation is shared by Putin's two main geopolitical advisors, Igor Panarin and Alexandr Dugin. Their geopolitical models both postulate that the "continental Eurasian civilization" (read: Russia) is in eternal struggle with the hostile "oceanic Euro-Atlantic civilization" (read: USA and NATO) that constantly tries to destroy Russia. According to them, the "Arab Spring", the "color revolutions", the

2011-2012 anti-government protests in Russia etc. are all American attempts to shatter Russian dominance in its “sphere of interest”, the Post-Soviet region (*Cordesman, 2014*). The USA (and the EU as their “puppet”) are directly accused of meddling into Russia’s “sphere of interest” and of their “aggression and hostility” towards it throughout the history (note this quote: “During all times Europe, beginning from the crusaders, brought only death and destruction to Russia” (*Kubanev & Nabilkina, 2015, 332*). For detailed descriptions of main viewpoints of Dugin’s and Panarin’s geopolitical schools, see *Darczewska, 2014a*.

Thus, the current conflict can be regarded a result of Russia’s major discontent with the pro-Western political course that Ukraine has started to pursue after the Euromaidan (for an overview of what happened and how protests in Kyiv escalated into the Donbas war, see *Merry, 2016: 26–27*, and *Trenin, 2014a: 4–6*). Aggressive reaction on pro-Western social movement in the post-Soviet republics is not unique for Russia. For example, the 1992 Transnistria war in Moldova war and the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, both of which too resulted in occupation of parts of the other country’s territory by pro-Russian militants.

However, the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict is unique. Its geographical closeness to the heart of the EU, omnipresence of the Internet and social networks, as well as the informational freedom of the digital era have given the modern Russian-Ukrainian conflict unprecedented international attention, like no other post-Soviet armed conflict before. With USA and EU supporting Ukraine by all means, this war has evolved into more than just a local conflict. According to some analysts, it has marked the beginning of a second Cold War (*Charap & Shapiro, 2015; Kalb, 2015; Kroenig, 2015; Levgold, 2014*). It would not be an exaggeration to say that Russian-Ukrainian

conflict is an important milestone in the modern international relations, if not the turning point.

The *status quo* in the international relations is such that it imposes limitations on the info war between the two states. So, Russia's important international status (the country being a nuclear power and member of the UN Safety council) does not allow it to practice ukrainophobic hate speech on the "Rwandan level"; at least, not through the traditional media channels. This is also relevant for Ukraine. Although it does not have the same international weight and influence as Russia, its pro-Western political ambitions determine its behavior. The conflict with Russia and the general international perception of Ukraine as the victim of aggression also attracts attention of the international community. Thus Ukraine too cannot openly practice "direct" hate speech against Russia in its dominant traditional media channels.

To sum up, this research employs a mixed qualitative method of research. The two main methods are critical discourse analysis, whereas the latter 'supports' the former one. Policy analysis conducted at the very beginning of this chapter helped to gain more insight into the legal aspect of hate speech and its status – especially in Russia and Ukraine. The international and national legal regulation of hate speech, as well as the two countries' current international status, do not allow them to engage in more blatant hate speech as some extreme undemocratic regimes have done.

The following chapter makes up the largest part of the paper, because it contains the CDA and content analysis of the ten selected texts and their discourse.

#### **§4. Analysis**

This is the largest chapter of the research, dedicated to the analyses itself. In order to avoid any possible conflict of interest, the text sets were analyzed in the alphabetic order. Thus, the Russian set of texts was analyzed first, followed by the Ukrainian one. The texts themselves were analyzed in the same order as their topics were listed in Table 1 (namely, Crimea – Other country's inner policy – Other country's foreign policy – Donbas – Other country's government / president).

Notably, the texts were analyzed in their original languages. However, for the convenience of non-Russian- and non-Ukrainian-speaking scholars, all texts excerpts quoted in this and following chapters are quoted in English; these quotes are taken from the author-made translations of the texts into English. Full texts in both original languages, links to the texts online, and the author-made translations of all texts into English can be found in Appendix A of this paper.

##### **§4.1. Critical Discourse Analysis**

In order to understand the content of the texts, an insight into their discourse is crucial. For this reason, discourse analysis was conducted first.

The previous subchapter aimed to examine the general context of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict. However, the particular context of each text – both Russian and Ukrainian – needs to be examined additionally, as an essential part of critical discourse analysis. Depending on the particular text, some stages of analysis were united with each other in the same paragraph, which was indicated in the subheading of the analysis stage. CDA Stage 5: “Critical reflection on the analysis” will be presented in Chapter 6 of this paper, “Implications and Suggestions for Future Research”.

It should be mentioned first that all ten texts are a part of the major problem: “Russian-Ukrainian conflict” and its general, broad discourse. Each text, however, addresses different aspects of this problem, even if two of them deal with one event in the conflict (like Crimea annexation, for example).

#### **§4.1.1. Russian Texts**

##### ***Text 1: “Crimea after two years”***

##### ***The media channel***

This text was published on the website of the daily Russian newspaper “*Komsomolskaya Pravda*”, which was founded in 1925. During Soviet time, it was the nation-wide print organ of Komsomol, the youth wing of the Soviet Communist Party. As such, it published articles about popular science, travelling, and literature. Famous Soviet writers and poets like Vladimir Mayakovski and Arkady Gaidar published their works in “*Komsomolskaya Pravda*”. (*Encyclopaedia Britannica online, 2017*).

“*Komsomolskaya Pravda*” survived the collapse of the USSR and continued to work under the same name as a private-owned news medium. It is published both in Russia and abroad (in Ukraine as well). It is one of the most popular news media in Russia, and de-facto the only truly nationwide Russian newspaper. (*RIA Novosti, 2010*)

It’s chief editor and owner since 1992 is Vladimir Sungorkin, member of several Russian governmental structures’ public councils. Sungorkin is known for close relations with the ruling elite and with President Vladimir Putin in particular. In 2014, Putin rewarded him the Order IV class “For Merit to the Fatherland” for his newspaper’s “professional and objective” coverage of Crimean crisis (*BBC Russia, 2014*). In the first quarter of 2018, Sungorkin was an election agent of Putin.

“Komsomolskaya Pravda” is criticized for its excessive sensationalistic and tabloid language and frequent publication of fake news. Another object of criticism towards the medium is its one-sided, pro-government stance. (*Venediktov et al., 2009*)

Thus it becomes clear that “Komsomolskaya Pravda” publishes those texts which are in conformity with the official Russian stance, vindicate Russia and present it and its actions in positive light only. In this regard, it would not be a mistake or exaggeration to say that the opinions expressed by the authors of “Komsomolskaya Pravda” are de-facto the opinions of Kremlin. The authors express opinions that Moscow’s officials cannot due to various reasons.

#### *The author*

The text’s author is *Israel Shamir*, also known under alias “Robert David”, who calls himself “Russian-Israeli journalist”. He is Russian author, translator and journalist of Jewish descent baptized into Orthodox Christianity.

Shamir is notorious for his judophobic views and controversial statements about the state of Israel. He refers to Jews as “Christ-killers”, “parasites” and “virus form of a human being” (as quoted by *Ibish & Abunimah, 2001*). Shamir is a Holocaust denier, adherer of Jewish world domination theory and supporter of Palestine (*Ibid.*). In one of his essays, Shamir states that in 1991, out of their hatred towards Russia, the Soviet-Russian Jews “supported pro-Western coup of President Yeltsin” in order to collapse the Soviet Union (*Shamir, 2002*). He is also a friend and supporter of the former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: another known Holocaust denier who frequently called to destruction of Israel while in office.

Shamir is a controversial figure, both in Russia and internationally. His true identity is questionable, and he was accused of falsification of biography. In the lead of

the analyzed text, Shamir is referred to as “our columnist”. As of April 2018, he still publishes in “Komsomolskaya Pravda”, although, remarkably, his page on the newspaper’s website lacks any biography. (*Komsomolskaya Pravda, n.d.*) As discussed before, “Komsomolskaya Pravda” publishes articles that reflect the government’s stance. The fact that Shamir’s text has made it to the audience proves that he is a supporter of Putin and his political course. For this reason, Sungorkin has turned a blind eye on Shamir’s judophobia. This raises a question of ethical and moral conscience of Sungorkin, his editorial team and the newspaper itself.

#### *Problem and obstacles definition*

The text was published on March 26<sup>th</sup> 2016, two years and one week after Crimea was integrated into Russia. The text addresses the state of events in Crimea at that moment, more precisely – the current life of Crimean pro-Russian politicians who played an active role in the annexation of the peninsula. It also reflects on the annexation itself: namely, what was and what should have been done.

As already mentioned, this text’s discourse is part of the major problem of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, whose triggering point was the annexation of Crimea. In the Crimean case, there is a communication problem described in detail in Ambrosio’s (2016) study. He discovers that through clever communication campaigns, Russia strived to create a visibility of juridical legitimacy of Crimea’s “*vossoedinenie*” (“*reunion*”) with Russia. A clever manipulation of internationally established legal norms and practices (including the principle of self-determination of peoples) should have made the capture of Crimea legally valid in the eyes of the international community. Merkel (2014) claims that the Crimean case was not an “annexation” (which he defines as a forceful capture of foreign territory: like the capture of Kuwait

by Iraq in 1991), but a secession. This does not eliminate its legal dubiousity, though. Lack of transparency, threats of violence and numerous human right violations before and during the Crimean “referendums”, Merkel stresses, have made the entire situation legally invalid.

Even before Crimea became part of Russia, the USA imposed first sanctions against “persons involved in Crimean events” (*Exec. Ord. No. 13662*). The UN resolution 68/262 “Territorial integrity of Ukraine” adopted by all democratic states of the world criticizes the Crimean referendums as illegitimate (*General Assembly Resolution 68/262*). It is notable that neither of these documents directly mentions Russia’s responsibility for intervention. However, the constant neutral-to-approving reactions of Russian authorities on the Crimean events and their dubious claims (reprinted among others in the very “Komsomolskaya Pravda”: *Novikova, 2014*) only aggravated the situation not in Kremlin’s favor. In this regard, one of the elements of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that this text largely deals with is the *vindication of Russia’s actions regarding Crimea*.

In this text, Russia also attempts to vindicate itself before the Crimeans. By integrating Crimea into its territory Russia has bound itself to certain responsibilities towards it. Many Crimeans were inspired by Kremlin’s promises of a safe better life. However, the immediate harsh international reaction and Russia’s official denial-of-involvement stance have made the full realization of these promises impossible. Once again it should be underlined that Russia’s important international status and role within the international community make it barely possible for it to launch a full-scale military campaign i.e. an open war with Ukraine. Although Russia by far exceeds Ukraine by military power even under international sanctions, an open war would trigger an

immediate reaction from Ukraine's economically strong foreign partners. It is obvious that both Europe and Russia do not need a full-scale war.

*Semiotic analysis*

First of all, the text is written in a *simple, colloquial language*. The sentences are relatively short, abundant with idioms, allusions, metaphors and slang. There are no complicated professional terms, which make the text easy to read. It is much simpler in comparison to other texts and essays by this author. On the one hand, this is done because "Komsomolskaya Pravda" is a mass newspaper: its texts must be understandable for ordinary people without profound professional knowledge. On the other hand, the rhetoric used by Putin himself in speeches, press conferences etc. is notably very colloquial and idiomatic as well. Considering the author's and the newspaper's backgrounds, the second phenomenon is an influential factor as well.

Topically, the text can be divided in a following way:

1. *Introduction*: paragraph 1;
2. *Vindication*: paragraphs 2 – 7 and 13;
3. *Fate of pro-Russian Crimean activists*: paragraph 8 – 12; and
4. *Conclusion*: paragraph 14.

Notably, seven out of fourteen paragraphs are dedicated to the vindication of Russia's actions towards Crimea. However, even in other parts, vindication elements are clearly noticeable, and the semantic discourse elements clearly demonstrate it. And through vindication peculiarities and language patterns, one can spot the power relations and the ideology hiding behind the text.

The introductory paragraph resembles a novel. The author begins by describing Crimean nature and weather at the moment of his visit: "*It is chilly in Crimea; a cold*

*wind is blowing from the sea, snow lies on the mountains. But, as a solace, almond, apple, peach trees are blooming*". This is an artistic device called "psychological parallelism": the description of nature is used as a metaphor of social and political situation. The epithets of coldness ("cold", "chilly", "snow") are used to reflect the difficult economic, social and political situation in Crimea. However, it is spring i.e. hope of slow, but certain recovery ("*as a solace*", "*trees are blooming*") after a period of turmoil ("*pink and white clouds of flowers decorate the stiff slopes*") persists. Even people's activities – "*spas and hotels are undergoing ... renovation*" – contribute to this. The people that Shamir describes are also *allegories* of new hope after turmoil ("*young tourists ... and joyful couples*") and certain upcoming stability ("*ordinary corpulent holiday-makers*"). It is a reminder of Russia's hard experience with the 1990ies turmoil and long-awaited stability associated with Putin. In this regard, Moscow (i.e. Russia) is mentioned in context of stability: "*flights to and from Moscow are full, flights prices are quite sparing ... like under Leonid Ilyich [Brezhnev]*". Historical reference to Brezhnev is not mentioned by chance: his 18-year long rule is known as "Stagnation Period", characterized with economic stability. Here, the vindication is not so visible, although this *linguistic opposition* of Crimea and Moscow contributes to it.

Most notable are the vindication paragraphs where the author makes use of all ideology-identifying discourse structures enlisted by Van Dijk. The part begins with the statement "*Crimea returned to Russia*". This verb underlines the official Kremlin ideology line: the "reunion with Russia" was solely the free will of the Crimeans; and Crimea was unjustly taken away from Russia (by Khrushchev in 1954). This is followed by downgrading rhetoric about Ukraine and its new government: "*they* [Crimeans] *visit*

*Ukraine and know that there too the life has become far more difficult*”, “*Ukraine ... is no more*”.

An important and relevant remark about the untranslatable linguistic phenomenon of the Russian language needs to be made here. Namely, there are two options to say “in Ukraine” in Russian: *na Ukraine* and *v Ukraine*. In terms of geography, the preposition *na* is used with islands (i.e., in Sicily: *na Sitsilii*) and single-island states (i.e. in Madagascar: *na Madagaskare*). In contrast, the preposition *v* is used with all other countries (i.e., in Austria: *v Avstrii*). *Na Ukraine* is an exception and a set linguistic tradition of the Russian language. In Ukraine itself, however, this variant is considered discriminatory, as it resembles the phrase *na okraine* (“on the outskirts”), referring to the times when Ukraine was a province of the Russian Empire (*Graudina, Itskovich, & Katlinskaya, 2004: 69*). The variant *v Ukraine* is used instead, for it serves as a linguistic verification of Ukraine’s independence and is used by speakers and authors in and outside Ukraine who respect this. Pro-Kremlin speakers and authors are fully aware of this, and thus use the combination *na Ukraine* for derision.

Derision and downgrading of Ukrainian independence is the same reason why they use the Ukrainian word *nezalezhna* (“independent”), Russified into *nezalezhnaya*, to refer to Ukraine after Euromaidan. For them, Ukraine has never been and will never be independent: from its subordination to Russia it has allegedly converted into subordination to the Western democracies. It is and an example of *semantic deprivation* serving ideological purposes. Memorably, the imperialistic ideology treats Ukraine as Russia’s province, and the interaction with it in equal terms as impossible: hence the word’s ironic shading and its respective use. Shamir obviously does not treat Ukraine as

a sovereign country either, because he so freely and openly uses phrases such as “*take the whole Ukraine*” more than once.

Derision, derogation of and hatred towards Ukraine can be observed through the entire text, even though there is only one blatant offense: referring to the new Ukrainian government as “*junta*”. When talking about Ukraine, the author inflames fear and hatred by using metaphors related to suffering, death and destruction: “*Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics are... tormented by battles... Russia saved them from demise*”. Another phrase, “*Krym ushol by pod Kiev*” (literally: “Crimea would have gone under Kyiv”), makes no sense to a non-Russian speaker, because, apparently, Crimea as a Ukrainian province has been “under Kyiv” anyway. However, the phrase “*ushol by pod Kiev*” is in fact an allusion to a slang idiom *uyti pod zemlyu* (“to go under the soil”), which means “to die”.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the text are worth special attention. They contain vindication of Russia’s actions, thoughts on what could have been done, and make-believe criticism of Russia and Putin himself. The epithet “make-believe” is used, because in a pro-government Russian newspaper, no real criticism is possible.

Topicalization and “victim-blaming” is an important tool of Shamir’s vindication. Notably, he puts the responsibility for capture of Crimea on anyone but Kremlin, read, Putin. On the one hand, “*the Kyivan coup of 2014*” is the main reason that “*forced Russia to make a painful decision on Crimea*”. On the other hand, “*Crimeans... even before... felt a greater intimacy towards Russia*”, which, according to Shamir, left Russia no choice: “*Everyone who judges Putin’s decision on Crimea need to accept its inevitability. Less could not have been done.*” Through this regretful rhetoric, Shamir de-facto begs the reader to forgive Putin the intervention, turning him

into a heroic savior of people who were begging him for help. Paradoxically, in the very next sentence Shamir says: “*Russia remains faithful to the principles of non-intervention, and chose to intervene into the Ukrainian affairs as little as possible.*”

Furthermore, Shamir turns to *projection*, accusing “Them” for what “We” have done. He blames the ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych (“...*president Yanukovych... was afraid to fight*”), “*governors appointed by Yanukovych*” and “*powerful enemies [that] stand against*” Russia. The only quasi-direct accusation (“*Moscow lacked confidence and determination*”) is put into mouths of the “*immigrants*” from Crimea to whom Shamir has allegedly spoken. Donbas war is also mentioned, but not in a supportive tone either. The author refers it as “*Russian Spring*”: an obvious allusion of the Arab Spring. Memorably, Kremlin and its geopolitical scholars see the Arab Spring as NATO’s plot to shatter Russia’s authority in the Middle East by toppling pro-Russian leaders of the region. This allusion reflects the unwillingness of Kremlin to be associated with the “*friendly Novorossiya*”.

In this regard, it becomes clear that the allegeable criticism of Kremlin in the paragraphs addressing two pro-Russian activists in Crimea is questionable. The first activist “*wears a t-shirt with Putin’s portrait*” and does not blame the Russian leader anything. Instead, the blame is transferred onto Russian TV channels that are “*no longer interested in him*”, the marionette-oppositional Communist Party of Russia who refused to take him as an MP, and Facebook – for deleting his profile. The second “*hero of the Russian Spring*” has problems because of the conflict with a governor and “*clerks who served under Ukrainian rule*”, but never because of Kremlin or Putin.

The conclusion paragraph is about Kyiv’s decision to cut off electricity and water supplies to the occupied Crimea. It contains only three sentences, yet it is

extremely interesting for the unraveling of ideology. First of all, it again underlines the derision towards Ukraine, describing the official decisions as an act of hysteria (“*cannot get over it*”, “[punitive measures] *were unleashed*”). Secondly, it demonstrates the lack of responsibility of Russian authorities towards Crimea as the new province (why does Kremlin expect the illegitimate “Kyivan junta” to supply “our Crimea” with electricity and water?) Finally, little respect is shown to Crimea itself, i.e. its ability to self-determination: note the subtitle to conclusion paragraph (“*If the referendum were held again, the whole Crimea would stand in line to Russia again*”).

*Possible solutions to the problem and obstacles*

Vindication of its actions in Crimea is a crucial problem for Russian ruling elite and can thus be considered an organic part of the discourse. After the attempt to capture the entire Ukraine had failed, Kremlin was left with severe economic sanctions, accusations of international law violations, conflict with Ukraine, and a rather weak Crimea to take care of. In this situation, Moscow needs the self-vindicating discourse – for both domestic and foreign audience. Kremlin’s strategy of denial might seem senseless with so much counter-proof, however the acceptance of its involvement into Ukrainian affairs could provoke an even harsher international reaction – up to excluding Russia from the UN Security council (such suggestions have already been announced). Self-vindication, however vague it may seem at times, yet manages to persuade some international actors and the large part of Russia’s own population (see research by *Gerber & Zavisca, 2016*). However, it is questionable how long will this strategy be able to endure. It now depends not only on Moscow, but also on Donbas rebels and their further actions (do they feel betrayed by Kremlin’s denial of involvement?), and on the international community (further sanctions?).

Numerous suggestions have been made on how to solve the Crimean problem. This paper adheres to the viewpoint that the first step to its solution is of communicational nature, namely: to change Russia's public discourse from self-vindication to admitting all committed violations. This needs to be done openly and directly, and not by giving hints and letting the listeners and readers guess. The second step is to conduct another Crimean referendum on its self-determination: whether to stay in Russia, return to Ukraine, or become an independent state. However this referendum needs to be democratic, completely transparent and open, with as much foreign observers present as possible. Depending on how the Crimeans vote, further steps need to be taken in accordance with their decision, without violations and violence. This will lead to gradual restoration of Russia's international reputation and trustworthiness, as well as to the withdrawal of international sanctions.

***Text 2: "Path to Bright Past"***

*The media channel*

The text "Path to Bright Past" was published on "Lenta.ru", a popular Russian online periodical. For many years, it has been and still is one of the most quoted Russian online news portals (*Etlings et al, 2010: 29 – 30*). It was founded in 1999 after the financial crisis with the aim to create the first online newspaper in Russian language. It had many categories, but it gained and kept its popularity among readers mainly because of its short and accurate news digests (*Kolpakov, 2015*). In March 2014, however, more than the half of "Lenta.ru" journalists and editors (including the chief editor) were ousted or left the channel on their own. This happened as a result of an interview with Andriy Tarasenko, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian ultra-right party

“Right Sector” (*Ekho Moskvy*, 2014). Critics believe it was done out of ideological reasons, and as a part of a massive media channels reorganization campaign which aims to suppress government criticism in the Russian media (*Vedomosti*, 2014). The current editor-in-chief of “Lenta.ru” is the 24-year old Vladimir Todorov, a former news reporter, HSE University graduate and researcher of darknet. Little is known about him. He was hired by “Lenta.ru” owner in order to make the channel “more provocative, ironical and hype” and “attract young audience”. (*Peopletalk*, 2017)

Modern “Lenta.ru” with a new editorial board is criticized by readers for its irresponsible attitude to the news content, relying on TV content and that “now, the only KPI of Lenta’s editors is [internet] traffic”. (*Sinodov*, 2017)

*The author*

Author of the text is *Gevorg Mirzayan*. He is a political scientist from Tashkent currently living and working in Moscow. The focus of Mirzayan’s studies is laid on the USA. He used to work in the Institute of USA and Canada of Russian Academy of Sciences. Mirzayan is the author of numerous media articles and a frequent guest in Russian political talk shows on various topics. He signs his articles as “Lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences of the Financial University under the President of the Russian Federation”. Apart from “Lenta.ru”, Mirzayan also writes articles for the Russian weekly business periodical “Expert” (*Natsoix.ru*, 2017).

A brief overview of Mirzayan’s column on “Expert” website demonstrates that he is a rigorous supporter of Putin and Trump, an adherer of anti-Western and ukrainophobic views. Notable are his militaristic, emotionally laden quotations: “[Putin] Took Sevastopol, took Aleppo, [but he] decided not to take Vienna” (*Mirzayan*, 2017a), “Ukraine emerged in ultra-right radicalism” (*Mirzayan*, 2016d), “revolutionary

maidanian propaganda” (*Mirzayan, 2016b*), “Rabid dog with brains” (*Mirzayan, 2016c*) in reference to the USA State Secretary of Defense James Mattis, etc. Although he is native Armenian, Mirzayan expressed insulting derogatory comments about Armenians as well: “[they are] so lame that they are ready to lick up anyone who says well about [them]” (*Mirzayan, 2017b*).

Mirzayan is not objective in his analyses. For him, only Russia is right in international affairs, and only Putin is wise, smart and tactical enough to carry out clever policies and fool everyone. All other countries are either Russia’s enemies, allies or ‘sycophants’ who have harmed Russia before, but have realized their ‘mistake’ and now try to make amends for it (for example, Turkey: see *Mirzayan, 2016a*).

#### *Problem and obstacles identification*

The text was published on April 18<sup>th</sup> 2014, nine days after the adoption of the so-called four decommunization laws by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The aim of these laws is to legally eliminate traces of Soviet legacy in Ukraine, perceived as occupational government. The laws prescribe the ban on communist symbolism and change of municipality names that contain communist elements or names of communist leaders. The laws also implied a ban of Ukrainian Communist party.

Decommunization in Ukraine has started since the late 1990ies. However it received a real boost after the Euromaidan on the wave of the rise of Ukrainian nationalism, when the country allegedly gained its “second”, symbolic independence – this time, from Russia through the liquidation of a pro-Russian regime (*Viatrovykh, 2015*). The Ukrainian government views these laws as a “restoration of historic justice” (*Parubiy, 2015*) and a means to counter “Russian propaganda” and threats of “Russian dictatorship” (*Viatrovykh, 2015*). However, the law set received much criticism: not

only from Russian officials who describe it as “anti-Russian and anti-Ukrainian” (as quoted by *Tumanova, 2015*), but also from the international community who viewed the laws as a threat to freedom of expression and imposing of censorship (*Amnesty International, 2015; OSCE, 2015*).

On the one hand, the aim of decommunization laws is understandable. Ukraine wants to become a democratic European country. From this point of view its authoritarian Soviet past marked by Russian dominance is viewed as a dark page of its history. As Russia is the legal successor state of the USSR, and Russian officials proudly underline this legacy, Ukraine puts an equality sign between the USSR and modern Russia. Crimea annexation and Donbas war have triggered a new, more decisive wave of decommunization in Ukraine. Routing out the ideology of the “aggressor” and “oppressor” aims to distance Ukraine from him, even if this would require sacrificing a part of Ukraine’s own history.

On the other hand, three quarters of a century under communist ideology have shaped more than one generation of Ukrainians. Russian influence is still very strong. As a result of “russification” by Soviet authorities, almost all Ukrainians are now bilingual, and a large number of Ukrainians who were born and raised in the USSR do not even speak Ukrainian language. Too little time has passed to fully reshape these people’s mindsets. For example, people of Germany needed more than 20 years to admit and accept their country’s responsibility for WWII and Nazi crimes against humanity. This is an extremely difficult and sensitive problem of all European Post-Soviet countries and of Ukraine in particular: *making a balance between its authoritarian history shared with an “aggressor” and its desirable future as an independent European democracy*. How to make a “painless” transition to democracy,

how to make peace with the Soviet past and leave it behind? Ukraine needs to find correct answers to these questions.

The obstacles to solving this problem are numerous. The first group of obstacles is of internal nature, for instance, the previously discussed historical and human factors. Centuries of common history have formed ethnical, cultural, religious and linguistic similarities between Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Moreover, many Ukrainians have friends and relatives living in Russia and vice versa. The psychological factor originates from this: Soviet-raised Ukrainians associate the USSR with time of their youth when they had state-guaranteed employment and living space, free healthcare etc. These people perceive the USSR with nostalgia rather than threat. Another set of obstacles is international. There is a seemingly paradoxical international reaction: the democratic West, a part of which Ukraine strives to become, criticizes Ukrainian decommunization as an attack on freedom of speech. Most important, though, is Russian influence through armed violence in Donbas on the one hand, and information and psychological pressure (i.e. propaganda) on the other hand.

#### *Semiotic analysis*

The analyzed text can be regarded a means of information pressure on Ukraine, namely an attempt to make it feel ashamed of its “destructive” nationalistic policy, and ultimately force Ukraine to give up its pro-EU policy and return into Russia’s “sphere of influence”. The lead to the text reveals not only this aim, but also the imperialistic ideology it promotes: “*Denial of the Soviet era questions the annexation of West-Ukrainian provinces*”.

This text’s rhetoric and general atmosphere it creates is more aggressive than those of “Crimea after Two Years”. Mirzayan is more straightforward in his criticism

and less subtle than Shamir. His text is rather poor on metaphors, allusions and allegories. However, the language is more complicated, it contains less jargon and colloquialisms, and is very close to the journalistic style. The author's (regardless of his political attitudes and views) academic background influences this. It also influences his clever choice of discourse structures. Although this text is formally addressing the Ukrainian decommunization laws, the semiotic analysis shows that its main aim in fact is to downgrade Ukraine and its government.

A notable ideology-revealing discourse structure in this text is *pragmatics* as named by Van Dijk (1995: 30). Although it is more noticeable in oral discourse, it can yet be applied to this particular text as well. The main message of all Mirzayan's texts and speeches is the following power relation: supremacy of Russia is axiomatic, not only in the post-Soviet space, but in the whole world. "Path to Bright Past" is no exception. Namely, throughout the text, Mirzayan stresses the inferiority of Ukraine to Russia by describing Ukrainian ruling elite as stupid, incompetent, corrupt, and aggressive. This attitude ultimately gives him a self-proclaimed, but unfounded right to give instructions to Ukraine on how to organize its domestic policy ("*In Ukrainian status-quo, an optimal variant would be...*").

Syntactic features such as *word order* reflect this power relation in the ethnic discourse too. When the author lists the ethnicities living in Ukraine ("*Russians, Ukrainians, Jews and other ethnicities...*"), he names Ukrainians after Russians. The first notable *disclaimer* ("*Actually, nobody argues that Ukraine... needs a new state ideology... However...*") again deprives Ukrainians of the right to determine their country's future themselves.

With the second disclaimer (“*Of course, in Kyiv they say that no-one will go too far, but in reality...*”), Mirzayan attacks Ukrainian ruling elites, describing them as deceitful, turning them into unreliable, illegitimate negotiation partners. It is notable that Putin himself referred to Euromaidan as an “anti-constitutional coup d’état”, and the post-Euromaidan government as “illegitimate” (*Prezident Rossii, 2014*). It might make no sense that Russia feels hostility towards the Ukrainian cabinet and president Poroshenko after recognizing them as legitimate. The reason is simple: despite the recognition, the new government of Ukraine still needs to be presented to domestic public as illegitimate, so that the Russians do not try to repeat Euromaidan. Therefore, pro-government Russian media keep presenting the Ukrainian government as illegitimate. For instance, Mirzayan uses very specific *lexicon* to refer to the Ukrainian government: “*Kyivan regime*”, “*coupists*”, “*would-be patriots etc.*”, who bring only “*corruption and inefficiency of state governance*”. In this regard, very notable is the following *rhetoric*: “*Ukrainian government ... (whose interests do not fit the country’s interests)*”. The straightforwardness of this claim leaves the reader with little doubt that it indeed is so, and contributes to the image of Ukrainian government’s illegitimacy.

Memorably, Russian geopolitics views all revolutions of the late 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century (including the Euromaidan) as a plot of the NATO, especially the USA, to destroy Russia’s international weight. Therefore, it is no surprise that, according to Mirzayan, the West has “bought” the new Ukrainian government and constantly instructs it how to act in the international arena. This rhetoric both downgrades Ukrainian elites as incompetent, and cultivates the growing anti-Americanism among Russians. (“*External friends of the Kyivan regime whose opinion... is of paramount importance for the internal policy of Ukraine*”; “*United States are interested in*

*strengthening Ukrainian... governance... in order to turn the country into a solid anti-Russian sanitary barrier*”). Although this is yet another method of downgrading Ukraine, it deserves extra attention as it involves international actors.

The main body of imperialistic ideology is hidden in the *rhetoric* of the text. Not only hyperboles, rhetoric questions and over- and understatements, but also falsification of facts is used. This is especially noticeable in the description of the third “decommunization law” of Ukraine. Mirzayan writes: “*The third law aims to eradicate... the victory over fascism*”. In the law’s introduction, both Germany’s Nazi regime and USSR’s communist regime are proclaimed equally responsible for WWII (*Zakon Ukrayiny vid 09.04.2015 № 315-VIII*). Any attempts to “*forbid May 9th*” [Russian Victory Day. – author’s note] and “*non-personified symbols of the Victory – for example, the ribbon of St. George*” that Mirzayan writes about are not mentioned in the law. In contrast, the law bans flags and anthems of socialist states, images of red star, hammer and sickle, and portraits of Lenin and Stalin (*Zakon Ukrayiny vid 09.04.2015 № 317-VIII*). This falsification is made in order to contribute to the image of Ukraine as an ultra-right russophobic dictatorship in the mainstream Russian media.

Another notable type of rhetoric that Van Dijk and Fairclough have not mentioned in their works is the *adoption of the enemy’s rhetoric* – notably enough, in inverted commas; for example the phrase “*Russian aggression*” and derogatory terms for Russians used by far-right Ukrainians (“*Moskals*” and “*Colorado beetle*”). This tactic aims to incite hatred among readers towards the “enemy” and at the same time distance themselves from it, by locking words in inverted commas.

Although *allusions* are rare in this text, there is one that deserves special attention. Notably, Mirzayan equalizes various regions of Ukraine to political powers

that are seated or dominant in them. First of all, there is “Kyiv” (read, “hostile ultra-right anti-Russian regime”), which is in conflict with the pro-Russian fighters from the so-called DPR and LPR, which author sees as fully legitimate independent states (namely, he writes: “...*integration of DPR and LPR into Ukraine*”). Finally, there are the “*west-Ukrainian provinces*” “*that were seized from Poland in 1939*”, read, illegitimately annexed by Ukraine (actually, by the very USSR that Mirzayan so rigorously vindicates). This attitude to West Ukraine is twofold. On the one hand, it supports the claim that adherents of ukrainophobic imperialistic ideology raise: Ukraine is a “fake state” composed of other countries’ stolen territories (for this point of view, see *Nikolaides, 2016*). On the other hand, as Russia has no historic right to claim west-Ukrainian provinces, these ambitions are *projected* onto Poland, from which these “*were seized*” (“*in a suitable moment the Poles can remind of this*”).

#### *Possible solutions to the problem and obstacles*

In the current context, the problem of Ukrainian self-identification is still part of the social order. The country has already made a number of steps towards its solution. It must be made clear that only Ukrainians themselves have the legitimate right to determine their country’s internal affairs and state ideology. This being said, if this declared ideology is European-style democracy (which is the fact), Ukraine needs to be well aware of its key principles and adhere to them. In a European democracy, banning is regarded as an act of censorship unless righteously and reasonably justified.

This is a purely ideological problem, because it revolves around the clash of a (post-)socialistic and Western mentality and their respective ideologies within one state. Although this clash is painful and has erupted into violence, it should be underlined that it has been necessary for the future of Ukraine. Since the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine

has de-facto been in an ideological limbo. On the one hand, it was striving for more symbolic independence from Russia and the Soviet past associated with it. On the other hand, it could not have given up this vast legacy at once, due to numerous internal and international factors.

At the cusp of 2013 and 2014, Ukraine has ‘broken the ice’ and clearly identified its development priorities. However it started implementing these priorities with harsh Soviet-style method of arrests and bans. This might be understandable in the context of the complex situation in the country’s eastern provinces, but does not fit into the declared European democracy principles. It would be thus reasonable for Ukraine to seek assistance and advice from the international democratic community: in forms of expert discussions, conferences and consultations. And the international community, especially the EU, should fully accept Ukraine’s strivings and help it in the most tolerable way possible, thereby not violating its independence.

***Text 3: “Bandera Will Not Help Ukraine: Nezalezhnaya Fell Out with All Its Neighbors”***

*Media channel*

The text addressing Ukrainian foreign policy was published in the newspaper “*Moskovskiy Komsomolets*”, often abbreviated as “MK”. Founded in 1919, this is one of the oldest Russian daily newspapers. It changed name three times and did not publish from 1931 until 1945. “Moskovskiy Komsomolets” has a circulation from 700,000 to 930,000 copies depending on the day of publication. (RIA “O’Key”, 2016) It is published not only in Russia, but also in several Asian, European and American

countries. “MK” covers a broad range of topics: from daily news to entertainment material (*RIA Novosti, 2009*).

The editor-and-chief and the only owner of “MK” since 1983 is *Pavel Gusev*. In Soviet times, he was one of the leading personalities of the Komsomol. For nine months in 1992, he has been the Minister of Information and director of the Department of Information and Propaganda in the City of Moscow government. In 1999, Gusev and his newspaper were carrying out a harsh criticism campaign against Putin. However, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Gusev turned away from criticizing president of Russia into supporting him (*Shenderovich, 2010*). In 2006, Putin appointed him the President of the Communication Commission of the Russian Federation Public Chamber. Gusev has also received a number of orders and awards from the Russian president, as well as several prestigious social positions. In the 2012 presidential elections of Russia, Gusev was among Putin’s election agent (*Lenta.ru, n.d.*). In 2016, Ukrainian president Poroshenko included Gusev into the sanctions list against Russian media channel owners. In response, Gusev compared Ukraine to “regimes which existed in Spain in the 1930ies, Portugal and Germany” (*Moskovskiy Komsomlets, 2016*).

#### *The author*

*Vadim Samodurov* is the author of the third text in the Russian set. He is a journalist, PR expert, co-founder of the analytical and consulting and lobbying agency “Agency of Strategic Communications”. Apart from “MK”, he worked in other Russian periodicals: “Novaya Gazeta”, “Itogi” and “Ogonyok”.

Samodurov lives in Serbia and has a dual citizenship of Russia and Serbia. During 2012 Serbian presidential elections, he was an election agent of elections winner Tomislav Nikolić. Thus, in order to understand Samodurov’s political stance, it is

enough to examine the figure of Nikolić. In the 1990ies, he was the vice-president of the ultra-right Russophilic *Serbian Radical Party* founded by the war criminal Vojislav Šešelj. Despite his recently proclaimed pro-EU attitude, Nikolić still supports Šešelj's ideas of Greater Serbia and Serbs' supremacy in the Balkans, denies Srebrenica and Vukovar massacres as acts of genocide. He frequently makes controversial statements of racist and misogynic character.

*Problem and obstacles identification*

The text was published on November 19<sup>th</sup> 2017 in the light of a diplomatic scandal between Ukraine and Serbia. Namely, in his interview to the Serbian news agency BIRN (*Zivanovic, 2017*), the ambassador of Ukraine to Serbia Aleksandrovykh criticized the Serbian government for doing nothing to prevent its citizens fighting on pro-Russian insurgents' side in Donbas war. He also underlined that Russia repeatedly uses militant and paramilitary Serbian groups to destabilize situation in the Western Balkans and Europe. This interview sparked an outrage in the Serbian public sphere. Ambassadors of both countries were recalled to consultations, and Aleksandrovykh was accused of anti-Serbian and Russophobic views. A massive hate speech campaign was launched against the Ukrainian ambassador. Serbian comments in social media called Aleksandrovykh "*a diplomatic provocateur*", "*enemy of Russians and Serbs*" who is "*showing off*" because he is "*backed by the USA*" who are "*abusing their country*" (Tanjug, 2017b). They also demanded to "*keep him in Kyiv as long as possible... for the sake of [Serbians'] mental health*". (Tanjug, 2017a; Telegraf, 2017)

The issue of Russian involvement in the eternal "powder keg of Europe" – the Balkans, deserves special attention as well and is relevant for this text's analysis. In recent years an increasing presence and growing influence of Russia in this region

which is traditionally viewed as one of Russia's key regions of interest in Europe, is noticeable. Russia seeks to fulfill its strategic aims in the region, and is doing it mainly through Serbia as its major partner. Russia manipulates a number of factors in order to accomplish these goals. Namely: traditionally friendly relations with Serbia, the ideas of cultural and religious closeness of the two peoples, as well as Serbia's major discontent with its ongoing deep social, economic and political crisis, the difficult process and criteria of acquiring EU membership (which include negotiations about Kosovo), and nursed anger with the USA and NATO for "humiliating" Serbia by Belgrade bombings. Serbia in its turn perceives Russia in terms of a cultivated historic myth: as its "elder brother" and friend who never betrayed it in times of historical turmoil. For this reason, Russian media campaigns against the West and Ukraine are always finding a fruitful ground and support in Serbia: not only among pro-Russian politicians, but among ordinary people as well.

Russian-Ukrainian conflict is seldom a topic of Serbian media discourse. When it happens, in most cases Serbian media simply reprint and translate the information from the Russian mainstream media channels. In this way, although Serbia and Ukraine never were in conflict with each other, a negative image of Ukraine among Serbians is fostered. Against this backdrop, Samodurov's text was published.

Besides the incident with Aleksandrovykh's interview, the analyzed text addresses Ukraine's relations with five other European countries – Hungary, Romania, Poland, Belarus and Moldova – through the prism of recent incidents and tension points between them and Ukraine. There are important similarities between these seemingly different states. Namely, all five countries are post-socialist states with developing economies. The first three (Hungary, Romania and Poland) are all former Warsaw Pact

members and current EU members. In all of them the level of democracy has been dropping at an alarming rate recently, as their conservative and EU-critical governments impose rather disputable measures and controversial legal restrictions. The last two (Belarus and Moldova) are former USSR republics. Belarus is a closed-off country under an autocratic regime and the member of a vague confederation with Russia, its long-term close ally. Moldova is like Ukraine struggling for cultural and economic independence and has been facing the problem of pro-Russian separatist movement in its east since as early as 1990.

Both globally and within Europe, none of these six countries plays a key role in the international relations. Within the EU, these three populist governments are sometimes even called “Europe’s troublemakers”, because experts fear that their focus on their own “national interest” against the common EU well-being could threaten the core European principles of cooperation, secularity and diversity (*Balfour et al., 2016; Gressel, 2017*). It is notable that Balfour et al. set the close relations of these countries with Russia as one of the main criteria that “directly affect the well-being of EU countries and their citizens”. (*Balfour et al., 2016: 17*) This also explains why Samodurov chose exactly Russia’s partners and “Europe’s troublemakers” to present Ukrainian relations with entire Europe as failed. This approach, however, does not illustrate the real situation, nor depicts the whole state of relations between Ukraine and Europe, i.e., EU, if the author wanted to stress it, for none of the EU key actors were mentioned in his text. Namely, if Samodurov wanted to present the analysis of the deterioration of European-Ukrainian relations, he should have mentioned the condition of relations between Ukraine and such major and influential European actors as UK, Germany, France, etc.

Nevertheless, the problem addressed in this text, namely – *the role of Ukrainian nationalism in the country's foreign relations* – is extremely important and needs to be elaborated upon. Experts claim that, amid its conflict with Russia, Ukraine sought inspiration for the fight for independence in its history. It was found, among others, in Stepan Bandera: the 1940- and 1950-ies leader of the radical nationalist Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its paramilitary branch, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Most notably, Bandera himself is responsible for the ideological inspiration of the Volynhia massacre of Polish civilians during WWII (*Woidelko, 2017*). Although Bandera does not enjoy wide national support in the post-Euromaidan Ukraine (apart from far-right radicals), the government still cautiously exploits his figure. So, one of the “decommunization laws” included OUN and UPA into the list of “Fighters for Ukrainian independence” and granted their members’ families special privileges and honors (*Zakon Ukrayiny vid 09.04.2015 № 314-VIII*). Such noticeable rise of Bandera’s popularity has raised international concerns. Especially in Poland, where a conservative nationalistic government came to power in 2015, and where Bandera is perceived as a second Hitler (*Bateson, 2017*). This has strained Polish-Ukrainian relations, which is especially problematic for Ukraine, because Poland was a key advocate for Ukrainian interests in the EU (*Iwaniuk, 2017*).

This text is the first one in the Russian set that justly touches upon the real problem of post-Euromaidan Ukraine. In this regard, Samodurov’s criticism of Ukrainian government for its exploitation of WWII nationalistic war criminals is reasonable. Nevertheless, Samodurov aims not to speak for victims of radical Ukrainian nationalism, but, like in previous text – to deride and downgrade Ukraine. The language

he uses, and the fact that Russian-Polish relations have always been far from friendly, demonstrates the ideological background and the true aim of this text.

*Semiotic analysis*

The *language style* of this text is a mixture of journalistic style and colloquial language. Such simplified language is used for the sake of readers, i.e. making the text understandable for the wide masses. The language use contributes greatly to the spreading of imperialistic ideology hidden behind the text.

*Syntactic elements* of the text reveal the imperialistic ideology behind it. For instance, the original title's first half, where the common structure of the Russian declarative clause "subject – predicate – object" ("Бандера не поможет Украине") is altered into "subject – object – predicate" ("Бандера Украине не поможет"). Although the word order in Russian language is free, the author's choice of this variant is symbolic: placing "Bandera" and "Ukraine" first, he underlines their tight connection.

Similar to this is the "framing" schematic structure in the text. Namely, two expert opinions on Ukrainian foreign policy that are located at the very end of the text are announced in the text's lead, thus creating a "frame" for the rest of the text. This emphasizing of a subordinate topic is often used in ideologically laden texts. Attracting readers' attention to expert opinions in the lead vindicates all criticism as something approved by political experts, hence truthful and legitimate. However, these expert opinions are definitely not the main reason why this text was created: otherwise, more attention would have been given to them, or it would have been an expert interview.

Lexical tools serve the ideological means as well. Notably, the author unites all six states that have arguments with Ukraine as "*Western neighbors*", although among them, only Poland mostly fits this description. Hungary, Romania and Serbia are not

“West”: neither geographically (in relation to Ukraine), nor culturally; not to mention Belarus and Moldova. By using this simplified unification, the author creates an illusion that the whole democratic world is having problems with Ukraine, ultimately to discredit its government as hostile, aggressive, and, again – illegitimate. Expressions referring to the government’s actions (i.e., “*games*”, “*home entertainment*”, and “*rudeness*”) only contribute to the enforced image of incompetency and aggressiveness.

In contrast, Ukraine’s “opponents” are presented in a positive way, even Poland, which is Russia’s historic “enemy”. The author mentions neither the conflicts that Hungary and Poland have with the EU, nor their governments’ reputations as conservative populists who threaten EU’s unity and stability. Samodurov praises the Serbian ruling elite’s decisive reaction on ambassador Aleksandrovykh’s criticism, but does not mention its key role in ethnic cleansings of Bosnians and Croats during Yugoslav wars. This topicalization serves the same purpose: to discredit Ukraine, even if its opponents themselves have the same problems as those Ukraine is accused of. This is by far not “victim blaming”, but definitely “finger-pointing” at Ukraine, as if it alone were responsible, i.e., for the tensions in its bilateral relations with Poland. Examples of Ukraine-Polish relations’ objective analyses can be found in texts by Bateson (2017), Iwaniuk (2017) and Woidelko (2017), where both countries’ responsibility is equally analyzed.

The main ideology-revealing discourse structure of this text, however, is *rhetoric*. The imperialistic ideology and downgrading of Ukraine is expressed, for instance, by the frequent use of the already discussed word *nezalezhnaya* instead of “Ukraine”; the reference to Ukraine as a “*land of the victorious dignity*” in the text is of the same background and serves the same cause. Another ironic word transformation

example is the author's neologism "*maidanniy*", which can be loosely translated as "Maidanian".

*Possible solutions to the problem and obstacles*

Like any other nationalism, Ukrainian nationalism can be both constructive and destructive, but the separation line between them is very thin. In revolutions and freedom fighting, its strong motivating and unifying force has made it a powerful propaganda tool, especially when fortified by memories of relevant historic events. But when nationalism becomes radical, it can cause tremendous harm: especially to ethnic minorities, however, to the "carrier" nation as well (for more information on constructive and destructive nationalism see *Davidov, 2011*).

The main mistake of the post-socialist nations (including Russia and Ukraine) is an excessively strong focus on their history and religion as sources of inspiration for building a new future. This work's author is strongly convinced that the past needs to be remembered and learned from, but it must under no circumstances dictate the future, for this results only in regression and isolation. Only orientation to the future and progress can guarantee a place in the modern society. Here, nationalism needs to be kept on the "safe" level so that motivates people to develop their country without any negative effects. For example, in the USA or Singapore, nationalism brought no harm to the state. Instead, it contributed to the acceleration of the country's progress.

***Text 4: “In Ukraine, Freedom of Speech Was Definitely Abolished and Nazism Fortified”***

*Media channel*

The fourth text from the Russian set addressing the Donbas war against the backdrop of another problem was published in “*RIA Novosti*”, or simply “*RIA*”: the leading Russian online news agency. It was registered in April 2014 after the merge of the old national news agency “*RIA Novosti*” and radio channel “*Voice of Russia*” to create the information agency “*Rossiia Segodnya*” (not to be confused with the international TV network “*RT*”). This merge was initiated by Putin himself as a measure to enhance the work of state-run media channels (*Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 9 dekabrya 2013 g. N894*). Now, “*RIA Novosti*” is a part of the “*Rossiia Segodnya*” media group. (*RIA Novosti, n.d.*)

As a news agency, “*RIA Novosti*” is famous for their short informative news pieces that brought the channel its popularity. Many other media channels – both Russian and international – reprint or quote the information published in “*RIA*”. The channel publishes news on politics, economy, sport, science, cultural life in Russia and abroad. There is also a special section of the website called “*Opinions*” that contains longer analytical texts on various topics. The analyzed text was found in this section.

Head of “*Rossiia Segodnya*” is *Dmitry Kiselyov*: a Russian journalist, television presenter, also deputy director of the “*All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company*” (“*VGTRK*”) (see details on pp. 82 – 83). His most famous TV program is “*Vesti Nedeli*” on the state channel “*Rossiia-1*” since 2012.

Often called “the chief state propagandist of the Kremlin” or “the Kremlin's propaganda outlet” (*Bovt, 2013*), *Kiselyov* is a highly controversial figure, famous for

his homophobic (i.e., *Psychannel*, 2014), xenophobic, anti-American (i.e., the notorious show *Vesti nedeli*, 2016, when he spoke about “turning the USA into radioactive dust”), anti-Ukrainian (i.e., *Vesti Nedeli*, 2015), anti-opposition (*Azar*, 2013) and pro-Putin regime stances. The journalist is often criticized for his aggressive propaganda, for inciting hatred and fear, manipulating and distorting the facts, providing false data, offensive comments about Russian and foreign public figures and politicians. After the Crimean crisis Kiselyov was listed among Russian political and public figures subject to visa and financial restrictions in the European Union; he was also included into the similar sanction lists of Ukraine, Canada, Switzerland and Moldova.

Kiselyov has been awarded a number of state medals, including Order of Friendship, Order “For Merit to the Fatherland” IV class (for the labor achievements, significant contribution to the social and economic development of the Russian Federation, achievements in the humanitarian sphere, strengthening of the rule of law, protection of the rights and interests of citizens, long-term dedicated work) and Russian Orthodox Church Order of Sergiy Radonezhskiy.

#### *The author*

*Zakhar Vinogradov*, this text’s author, is the Russian political journalist. He was born in 1958 in Odessa, but in his youth he moved to the Soviet Russia. From 2006 until 2011, he was head of “RIA Novosti” headquarters in Kyiv, and works in Moscow office of “RIA” since 2011 (*Zakhar Vinogradov*, n.d.). Vinogradov’s texts in “RIA Novosti” are all dedicated to criticism of the post-Euromaidan Ukraine, however in his criticism he uses provocative tabloid-style headings (i.e., “How Poroshenko’s Government Fights Ukrainian History”: *Vinogradov*, 2017), dehumanizing metaphors (i.e., “...Ukrainian elite turns into wicked spiders”: *Vinogradov*, 2015b) and rude collocations (i.e.,

“...Ukraine turned into an authoritarian nationalistic state, and its people are an object of experiments” (*Vinogradov, 2015a*).

Three months after the analyzed text was published, the Security Service of Ukraine forbade Vinogradov to enter the country for five years for his “especially dangerous activities... that contradict the safety of Ukraine” (*Ukrinform, 2017*).

#### *Problem and obstacles identification*

Notably, Vinogradov is not the first Russian journalist expelled from Ukraine. Numerous other Russian journalists faced the same measures for “violating [Ukraine’s] national interests” and “disgracing Ukraine” in their media coverage, as well as for “fake news stories of anti-Ukrainian nature” (*112.ua, 2017*). These measures have faced criticism from the international community criticism as unnecessary, excessive and threatening transparency and media freedom (*OSCE, 2017; Simon, 2017*).

The problem this text addresses is *the balance between freedom of expression and national safety in Ukraine*. These two sides of the problem are in fact also the obstacles to each other being fully realized. Limiting critical journalists in their work is indeed a serious threat to the freedom of press – one of the key freedoms in any democratic regime. On the other hand, these measures can be explained as Ukraine’s methods of countering Russian “attacks” in the information war they are engaged in, for there are no set methods of dealing with info war attacks.

#### *Semiotic analysis*

This text, like the previous one, also addresses an important and topical problem of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the author’s profile and background, the language he uses and the general way he exerts his criticism are far from objective analysis. Instead, they

reveal the ideology and the true aims of the author and his text, namely, to deride, downgrade Ukraine and incite hatred towards it among his readers.

These aims are achieved by the use of discourse structures already mentioned in the previous analyses, e.g., colloquialisms (“*Ukrainian media ... finish chewing on the blasts by Vinnytsia*”), strong, straightforward claims and accusations (“*Poroshenko’s regime... is definitely turning into a Nazi regime*”), use of “enemy rhetoric” in inverted commas (“*And the LPR is an “enemy” organization*”), pseudo-rhetoric questions (“*So what is happening in Ukraine?*”), and repetitions (“*And the same judge... will judge him. And it will happen in the same court hall. And it seems that...*”).

Another notable moment is the constant reference to fascism i.e. Nazism, comparison and identification of Ukrainian regime with it. Altogether, the word “Nazi” and its derivatives appear five times in the text. The choice of this ideology is not coincidental. It is not only connected with noticeable growth of nationalism in Ukraine and heroization of Stepan Bandera. The USSR, whose successor modern Russia is, suffered the greatest casualties in WWII, amounting to 20 – 26 million people, which is nearly 14% of the Soviets’ pre-war population. Among those 20-26 million, around 66% were Russians (*Filimoshin, 1999: 98-99*). Therefore, for ordinary Russians, Nazism and WWII are a painful topic, and, without exaggeration, a personal trauma. Exploiting the Russians’ national trigger of Nazism is a common tool of Russian propaganda that was already used before the conflict with Ukraine: i.e., against Georgia (*Lenta.ru, 2008*), Latvia (*Grigoryev, 2012*), even Mongolia (*Aslamova, 2013*). This historic-ideological reference enhances the new Ukrainian government’s illegitimacy and fosters the hatred of Russian readers towards it.

*Possible solutions to the problem and obstacles*

Can keeping “the enemy’s information soldiers” away from one’s own territory indeed be one of the methods to answer to info war attacks? This study’s author is convinced that in the age of Internet, where any information can be found online, this measure will hardly bring any desired effect. Information wars are taking place in the immaterial world of communication, symbols and their interpretations. Therefore, the author believes that info war attacks need to be countered in the same immaterial way too. Bans and deportations rarely do any good, unless all other measures have been exhausted. And in this case, the very Internet can be the most effective tool of protection i.e. counter-attacks. On the particular example: if “Russian propaganda” is a matter of national security, the Ukrainian government might consider launching a state-run website that debunks “fake news” and offensive comments about Ukraine in a most transparent way, with decent proofs. Such website already exists: it is a non-for-profit academic initiative *StopFake.org*. A similar project run on the government level would not only be more efficient in problem solving, but also underline Ukraine’s commitment to principles of democracy and freedom.

***Text 5: “Poroshenko Giggles and Turns Ukrainians into EU Slaves”****Media channel and the author*

“*Vesti.ru*” is one of the largest Russian news web portals. It was founded in 1999 by a famous Russian political scientist Gleb Pavlovski. Until 2002, it was a part of a wider project that embraced three information web portals: “Gazeta.ru”, “Lenta.ru” and “Vesti.ru”, with the first two focusing on providing only news while “Vesti.ru” specialized on publishing analytical articles. The first chief editor of “Vesti.ru” was

Anton Nosik, a Russian-Israeli journalist, a public figure and a popular blogger. He was replaced by Lev Bruni in 2000, when the complete editorial board was replaced. In 2002 the information agency with all three web portals was sold to the “All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company” (“VGTRK”), the largest state-owned media conglomerate in Russia which incorporates the majority of Russian information agencies, information companies, TV and radio channels. After joining the “VGTRK”, “Vesti.ru” once again changed the complete editorial board, and the agency became practically the web-site of the popular television news program “Vesti”. Few years later “Vesti.ru” became the official internet portal of the TV channel “Vesti” (renamed into “Rossiya-24” in 2010) and the radio “Vesti FM”.

The chief editor of “Rossiya-24” is *Evgeniy Bekasov*. Former chief producer of the TV channel “Stolitsa”, a member of the editorial board of the TV channel “Euronews”, a member of the Public Council under the Ministry of Energy, a member of the Public Council under Main Directorate for the City of Moscow of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*RIA Novosti*, 2012). In 2014 he was included into the sanction lists of Ukraine.

The author of the text is the director of “VGTRK” *Dmitry Kiselyov* (for information about him, see *pp.* 78–79).

Being a part of the federal state information television channel “Rossiya-24”, “Vesti.ru” is criticized by most experts for being a political project aimed at exerting an impact on public opinion. It is linked with several scandals related with broadcasting the fake news, biased data (see *Shepelin*, 2014) and judophobia (*REK-TV*, 2014). In 2014 “Rossiya-24” was banned in Ukraine (*Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrayiny №549/2015*).

*Problem and obstacles identification*

The text was published 10 days after the European Commission adopted visa liberalization for Ukrainian citizens. It entered into force on June 11<sup>th</sup> 2017 (*Makarenko & Gavrilko-Alekseev, 2017*). This news was celebrated in Ukraine as an important step to the country's future EU integration, although it also raised concerns that the number of illegal Ukrainian migrant workers in the EU might rise. These concerns were not ungrounded: before the visa liberalization, over one million Ukrainians worked in EU countries, the majority of which was there illegally. This is especially problematic for the development of Ukraine (*Wolanskyj, 2006*). Apart from addressing this concern, the text's author also expresses the viewpoint that the visa liberalization was the only achievement towards EU integration of the post-Euromaidan Ukraine. This he does by frequent references to Ukrainian government officials and president (his surname appears eight times in the text, including the title). Thus, this text is dedicated to both achievements and failures of Ukraine after the Maidan and to the deterioration of the Ukrainian government, of president Poroshenko in particular.

In this regard, the problem addressed in this text is the *problem of governance effectiveness in Ukraine* after the Euromaidan, as well as the effectiveness of the steps the government takes towards the country's EU integration. It is a vast, multidisciplinary problem that involves thorough research and monitoring, i.e. by the international community. Of course, the effective governance is a complex issue that requires effective work of numerous parties beyond political elites (*Stoker, 1998*). However, in a post-socialist developing democracy with a weak civil society such as Ukraine, the government's role is crucial.

Among the *obstacles* to a transparent, progressive, EU-oriented governments are not only foreign political problems such as conflict in Donbas and info war with Russia. The unwillingness of Ukrainian officials to cooperate can be the first serious obstacle. It is remarkable that after gaining power, numerous post-Soviet liberal and progressive politicians gradually lose government accountability and turn to corruption and repressive measures against their critics. Banning of Russian media channels and deportation of journalists are a signs that this might happen to the Ukrainian government too, under cover of “protection of national interests” and patriotism.

#### *Semiotic analysis*

The tone of this text is relatively calm, in comparison to the majority of other Kiselyov’s media appearances. Nevertheless, this text is also purely ideological, and, like the four previous texts, serves the purpose of derision and deterioration of Ukraine, i.e., Ukrainian government. The discourse structures reveal these aims.

Firstly, it is worth mentioning that the accent on laughter, i.e. that president Poroshenko “giggles behind the backs of the Euro-clerks” (who are in fact president of the European Parliament and Maltese Minister of Interior) during the official signing of visa liberalization papers. In total, the words ‘giggle’, ‘laugh’ and their derivatives appear eight times in the text: as much as Poroshenko’s name. This accent serves ideological aim to represent Poroshenko not only as stupid (the reader gets an impression that he laughed all the ceremony long), but ultimately also as a cruel dictator (note this sentence: “*The visa-free regime that made Poroshenko giggle so frantically turns his citizens into slaves for the European Union*”). In reality, as the official video recording (*European Parliament, 2017*) shows, Poroshenko laughed shortly and only twice: when EP president Antonio Tajani made a joke (*at 00:54*) and after his own

remark “Yes, we did it!” when the papers were signed (*at 01:03*). Notably, in both cases all the other politicians in shot laughed as well. Moreover, although Poroshenko frequently smiles in the video, he still does it less often than the EU officials. Thus, not only is Kiselyov’s accent on Poroshenko’s laughter ideological, but also twisted to serve ideological aims.

Another example of twisting the facts is the reference to the 2016 report of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on Ukraine. Kiselyov writes: “*According to the results of the year 2016, the European Court of Auditors named Ukraine the most corrupt state in Europe*”. The “results of the year 2016” is in fact the ECA special report on results of EU’s assistance to Ukraine (both financial and consultative) between 2007 and 2015. (*European Court of Auditors, 2016b*) The report underlines that although Ukraine has made progress in fighting corruption (especially after the Euromaidan), the levels of corruption and shade economy in Ukraine remain very high and hamper important reforms (*p. 31*). No word in the report addresses the level of corruption in Ukraine in statistical comparison to other European countries. Yet the press release to the special report contained the following sentence (underlining by the author) “*Despite reform efforts, Ukraine is still perceived as the most corrupt country in Europe*” (*European Court of Auditors, 2016a: 2*) that was reprinted by the Ukrainian news agency 112.ua as the “proof” that Ukraine was recognized as most corrupt European country (*112.ua, 2016*). There, it was probably found by Kiselyov and reused in his text. Although Ukraine indeed had the highest level of corruption in Europe in 2016 according to Transparency International (2017), the ECA special report does not declare that.

Another rhetorical motif is *generalization* (“*Everyone takes [bribes]: attorneys and judges, Ministry of Emergency situations clerks, border guards and army people*”; “[Euromaidan] *brought only suffering*”). By generalization and exaggeration, the text also creates an impression that all Ukrainians will rush into the EU as illegal workers.

Other lexical and rhetorical structures that were discovered in previous texts are present here too, such as historic allusions (reference to the Arab spring), epithets of suffering, degradation and death when referring to life in Ukraine (“*plunging into chaos*”, “*theft, degradation of state and society, collapse of industry and people’s impoverishment*”, “*lies, powerlessness and fear in modern Ukraine*” etc.) and downgrading epithets and metaphors when referring to Ukrainians (“*pathetic Ukrainians*”, “*slaves for the European Union*”, “*pariahs*”, etc.)

Topicalization is very vivid in this text and serves important internal-political ideological aims. Namely, a large part of the text is dedicated to description and harsh criticism of the wealth of Ukrainian politicians (including Yatsenyuk, Avakov and Poroshenko). These people indeed possess great wealth, and the alarming problem of oligarchs in the Ukrainian government was noted, among others, in the above-mentioned ECA report. The analyst must yet remember that this text is aimed at internal Russian audience. Numerous international reports prove that the problem of corruption in private and state sectors of Russia is as acute as in Ukraine, and even more acute in some parameters (Buckley, 2018; Hope, 2017; Transparency International, 2018). Russia is ranked 131 out of 180 by Transparency International (2017) by level of corruption, whereas the median household income in Russia is almost half of USA’s average (OECD Better Life Index, n.d.). Although this text is not about Russia, it contributes to the shifting of public attention away from the country’s own governance

problems to the neighboring state. In contrast to Ukraine presented as a collapsing country with unintelligent, greedy nationalist dictators in power, Russia in its brief references acts on the one hand as a safe haven for illegal workers from Ukraine, and on the other hand as generous and merciful for not expelling these people back.

Summing up, although it addresses a real acute problem of Ukrainian governance, this text is in fact another media tool of spreading the imperialistic ideology. It aims, on the one hand, to degrade Ukraine, its people and politicians; on the other hand, although subtly, it also polishes the image of “Self” in comparison to “Them”. Using acute problems of Ukraine as ideology-covering tool is also a way to vindicate the info war and armed conflict against it in the eyes of own population.

*Possible solutions to the problem and obstacles*

The problem of ineffective governance of Ukraine is an acute problem, and the progress is slow and hindered by the Ukrainian authorities’ intransparent way of policy-making and reluctance to engage in effective fight against corruption.

The role of communication in the combatting of these obstacles is crucial. Namely, the development and promotion of free and objective analytical journalism that would focus on Ukrainian governance problems is a first step towards the recognition and ultimate overcoming of this problem. Issue of frequent transparent and truthful statistic reports on Ukrainian economy and workforce market would make accusations of deceitfulness from the side of mainstream Russian media groundless. After a new transparent and honest discourse of the problem has been established, the further tangible steps on fighting corruption and improving Ukrainian governance can be taken.

#### §4.1.2. Ukrainian Texts

The selected Ukrainian texts, like the Russian ones, are a part of the large discourse on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that embraces both armed and information warfare. Each of them, however, is dedicated to various aspects and manifestations of this problem, sometimes in interconnection with one another.

Another peculiarity of the selected Ukrainian texts is that two of them were published in Russian language. On the one hand, the main reason for this is the previously mentioned phenomenon of bilingualism among the vast majority of Ukrainians. The other possible reason is that both Ukrainian texts in Russian language to greater or lesser extent refer to Crimea, where the majority of the population is Russian-speaking. One of these texts will be analyzed first.

##### ***Text 1: “Russian Racism in Crimea”***

###### *Media channel*

News channel “Kanal 24” is the second-largest Ukrainian TV channel by audience reach (*Dankova, 2014*). It was founded in 2006 under the Lviv-based media conglomerate “TRK Lux”, whose owner is Kateryna Kit-Sadova, wife of the mayor of Lviv. The general director of “TRK Lux” and of “Kanal 24” is the co-founder and co-owner of the conglomerate: businessman and politician Roman Andreyko (*Telekanal Novyn 24, n.d.*). Apart from “Kanal 24” the conglomerate also includes several Lviv-based radio stations and online news channels, as well as an advertising agency.

“Kanal 24” presents itself as a source of objective and non-biased news. It offers political, economic and cultural news of Ukraine (separately for Kyiv and twelve other large cities) and abroad (*Ibid.*). Its other sections include Blogs, Interviews,

Videos, Analytical articles etc. The channel also has 31 special programs, among them two are dedicated to Russia (“Vesti Kremlya” (News of Kremlin) and “Vesti Kremlya – History”) and one to Crimea (“Krym. Realii”). Notable is another special program “Dictators”, which contains biographical videos of historical and modern authoritarian and totalitarian leaders, among them are Putin, Erdoğan, Aliyev, and even Merkel.

In June 2017, “Kanal 24” suffered from a massive hacker attack by cyber-viruses “Petya” and “NotPetya” that also affected a number of Ukrainian media channels, ministries, banks, metro networks and airports. After the investigation, the Ukrainian State Security blamed Russia’s intelligence service for the attack (as quoted by *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, 2017).

#### *The author*

The text’s author is *Maxim Osadchuk*, native Crimean author and blogger. Apart from “Kanal 24”, he also writes and speaks for other Ukrainian media, such as TSN, Obozrevartel, Hromadske Radio etc. Before Euromaidan, he was also a lecturer at Tavrida University.

Osadchuk is a well-known personality in Ukraine. Since 2013, he is an activist of the local Crimean Euromaidan and fighter in the voluntary battalion “Aidar”. Although this battalion is composed mostly of nationalistic fighters, Osadchuk claims that he adheres to leftist views and treats Euromaidan as a “progressive bourgeois-democratic revolution”. He justifies war in eastern Ukraine as a “protection of Ukraine against foreign aggression” (*informator TV*, 2014). As of October 2017, Osadchuk is also a member of the nationalistic and anti-imperialistic organization “Autonomous Resistance” inspired by Stepan Bandera’s OUN. In October 2017, Osadchuk and

several other members of “Autonomous Resistance” were taken into custody by the State Security of Ukraine over “collaborationism” with Russia (*Kovalenko, 2017*).

Osadchuk’s views on Russia and president Putin are rather harsh. He labels Russia as an “aggressor” and “the last empire” and hopes that Putin’s regime will fall soon as a result of a “Russian Euromaidan” (*informator TV, 2014*).

Osadchuk proclaims himself a leftist, and at the same time he is or was a member of openly nationalistic, even far-right, organizations. Moreover, during his interview with *informator TV*, he is holding a chopped head of Lenin’s monument. Left-wing nationalism is not uncommon in the Post-Soviet countries; however, one of its main principles is the condemnation of ethnic supremacy: a pillar of right-wing nationalism. This study’s author is convinced that if he were indeed a leftist, first of all, Osadchuk would not have joined any right-wing organization: first of all, because other members would hardly accept him as he openly condemns one of their ideology’s core ideas. Secondly, he would hardly have showed Lenin’s head as a “trophy”. If he did it out of condemnation of the USSR, it is even more confusing for a leftist to do. Also confusing are his discriminatory comments about Russia. This study’s author is thus convinced that Osadchuk is indeed a nationalist, who is presenting himself as leftist for some reason; probably because the majority of public has negative associations with right-wing nationalism.

#### *Problem and obstacles identification*

Crimea has always been an ethnically diverse peninsula. For a long time, the absolute majority of the peninsula’s population was composed of the Muslim Crimean Tatars. Crimean Tatars are the ethnicity of horsemen and warriors emerged in the 13<sup>th</sup> century as a “mixture” of the Turkic Kipchak tribe and Mongol conquerors (*Williams,*

2016). When the Russian empress Catherine the Great conquered Crimea in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, many Tatars fled into their former metropole, the Ottoman Empire. The remaining Tatars faced displacement into mountainous regions of Crimea and intense “russification”. During WWII, Crimean Tatars were proclaimed “enemies of the homeland” for alleged collaboration with the Nazis. Hundreds of Crimean Tatar men were executed, and up to 200,000 women, children and seniors faced massive deportation to Uzbekistan in 1944 (*Williams, 2002: 334*). It is only after Stalin’s death, and especially during Perestroika that the Tatars were able to return to Crimea. However, ever since then, they have been struggling for independence and recognition in the now predominantly Russian-inhabited Crimea.

Many Crimean Tatars supported the Euromaidan and protested against the annexation of Crimea by Russia, claiming that the peninsula belongs to Ukraine. At first, the Russian government gave promises to solve the Tatars’ problems and grant them more independence. However, instead, Tatars faced prosecution and discrimination. Already in 2014, many Crimean Tatar media channels were closed or banned; two political Crimean Tatar leaders were banned from entering the peninsula and faced legal prosecution by the Russian government (*Kujawa & Morkva, 2015*). Ultimately, in 2016 Milli Mejlis, the representative organ of Crimean Tatars, was legally banned as an “extremist organization” (*Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, 2018: point 58*) “whose entire ideology revolves around fighting against Russia” (as quoted by *Reshetilova, 2016*). The international community condemns these actions and calls upon Russia to stop them. EU High Representative Mogherini (*Council of the EU, 2018*), 25 states of the Americas and Europe (*Mulrean, 2014*)

including Ukraine (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2016*), and the UN Human Rights High Commissioner (*OHCHR, 2016*) are among them.

Therefore, this text addresses the problem of *ethnic discrimination of Crimean Tatars by Russian authorities*: both historically and after the annexation. As Crimean Tatars have supported the Euromaidan and protested the annexation, Kremlin needed to suppress their political influence and partially achieved that by the Soviet method of bans and arrests. Furthermore, Crimean Tatars have always had strong connections with Turkey, whose government still supports them (*Bildircin, 2017*). The main obstacle to the solution of this problem is the information vacuum in the Russian media and public discourse about the Crimean Tatars and the problems they face.

The author analyzes this problem against the backdrop of his claim that Russia is “one of the most racist societies in Eurasia”. This is a straightforward and strong accusation. However, it is similar to Kiselyov accusing Ukrainian officials of corruption in the fifth Russian text, but vice versa: here, a Ukrainian nationalist accuses Russian authorities of racism.

Both internally and externally, Ukraine is commonly treated as a victim of Russian aggression. Technically speaking, this is a righteous claim. However, nurturing this victimizing discourse and the respective image of Ukraine does more harm than good. According to Holstein and Miller (1990), a victim is someone “*harmed by forces beyond his or her control, simultaneously establishing the “fact” of injury and locating responsibility for the damage outside the “victim”*” (p. 106). Most threatening for Ukraine is the last element and its development: namely, shifting the responsibility not only for direct damage, but for any other current troubles on the “aggressor”. By doing this, the “victim” frees itself of its own responsibility for failures in matters that can by

no means be dependent on the “aggressor”. This attitude will be further named “*victim ideology*” by analogy of the phenomenon analyzed by Berbrier (2000) in his analysis of self-victimizing discourse of white supremacists in the USA. This ideology will be searched in the Ukrainian texts.

### *Semiotic analysis*

The victim ideology does not only free the (self-proclaimed) victim from responsibility. The established victim-role also allows them to accuse the “aggressor” of anything without strong condemnation. Exactly this happens in this text, whose main idea is expressed in the first sentence of the fourth paragraph already quoted before: “*Modern Russia remains one of the most racist societies in Eurasia*”. The author brings up strong claims and arguments in favor of this idea and puts them into various contexts. Hereby, the victim role is transferred from Ukraine and Ukrainians to Crimea and Crimean Tatars. Ukraine, in contrast, is depicted briefly and as a supporter and savior of the victim-Crimea (“*And one of the main tasks of the pro-Ukrainian human rights advocates and journalists is to...*”).

*Historical context* plays a key role in this text’s victimizing discourse. The frequent historical references aim to unify the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and modern Russia into one single image of a racist aggressive empire. So, when Osadchuk refers to Russia and its historic forms, he often uses ironical metaphors, often with historical background: “*imperial state*”, “*unbreakable Union*”, “*Great Rus*”; all of which are meant to underline Russia’s imperial, colonialist nature. Memorably, Osadchuk believes that Ukraine’s conflict with Russia is similar to a colonial war for liberty.

Falsification of historic facts is common in ideologically-laden texts, and this text is not an exception. For instance, Osadchuk writes: "*Titular nation ... has the privileged position, and it was always so, during the entire history of Russia*". This claim presents an exaggeration of truth. Russians are indeed an ethnic majority, but it does not mean that ethnic minorities are and were completely deprived of privileges. An example is the ruling political elite. In modern Russia, head of Chechnya, close friend and vigorous supporter of Putin Ramzan Kadyrov is ethnic Chechen, mayor of Moscow Sergei Sobyanin is ethnic Komi, minister of defense Sergei Shoigu is half-Tuvan, etc. Out of six Soviet General Secretaries (heads of state), only two (Brezhnev and Gorbachev) were ethnic Russians (Andropov's true ethnicity is debatable). Russian Empress Catherine the Great who first "colonized" Crimea was ethnic German; her successors up to Nicholas II were not purely ethnic Russians either. Obviously, this exaggeration serves ideological purpose to support the claim that Russia is a racist society from the top government to the ordinary people.

In this text, the armed conflict is transferred into the *legal context*. Author opposes the Russian law: the "paradoxical" repression instrument of Russian ruling elites ("*jaws of the occupational justice*") and the "fair" Ukrainian ("*pro-Ukrainian human rights advocates and journalists*") and international law, that will ultimately end the "racist empire's" life ("*...future international tribunal dedicated to Russia's crimes against humanity*"). In contrast to the Russian texts where the authors accused only the post-Euromaidan Ukrainian government as illegitimate, Osadchuk's rhetoric depicts Russia's mere existence throughout its history as illegitimate. In this regard, he exceeds the already high grade of radicalism of the Russian texts.

All democratic societies of the world condemn racism. If racism originates from the ruling elites, this regime automatically becomes illegitimate in the eyes of the international community. Thus, Osadchuk's accusations of "institutional racism" appear in the text's title and in every paragraph and add to the illegitimate image of Russia. He goes so far to state that racism is a "*centuries-old tradition*" of Russia.

Finally, there is the modern context in which author "proves" that modern Russia adheres to the "tradition" of racism in Crimea. Here, the author adopts the enemy's rhetoric and uses the first-person perspective when retelling the self-vindication of "an important Crimean clerk": "*And all in all, we have representatives of indigenous people as MPs*". This method creates an impression of genuineness of the narrative. The following story about the incident on the late Crimean Tatar activist Vejje Kashka's funeral marginalizes this narrative and its speaker. It also marginalizes the person involved in the incident, former advisor to Putin's representative in Crimea Eskender Belyalov, who is referred to as *one of these "representatives"* (he was forced to leave the funeral because other invitees shouted at him "Traitor!" for his cooperation with Russian authorities after Crimea annexation (*Gordon, 2017*)). Thus, not only Russia and its authorities are subject to harsh criticism, but also their supporters among the Crimean Tatars.

#### *Possible solutions to the problem and obstacles*

The problem of Crimean Tatars' discrimination obviously persists and is part of the actual social paradigm. The obstacle that was named before has got a solution from the sphere of communication. An access of objective and transparent journalism to Crimea and the Tatars would make all cases of ethnic discrimination against the Tatars immediately become public, attracting greater attention of the international community.

However, it is also important for Russian authorities to start communicating with the Tatars on equal, and not only declare that, and respect the Tatar's needs and identity.

***Text 2: "Putin's Greatest Fear Comes True"***

*Media channel*

The text addressing Russian internal policy was published in the online newspaper "Ukrayinska Pravda". In 1999, three Ukrainian journalists – Georgiy Gongadze, Olena Prytula and Serhiy Sholokh after their visit to Washington D.C., where they spoke about the problems and pressure that Ukrainian journalists face. They founded "Ukrayinska Pravda" the year after as a medium where they could publish their investigations of corruption in the Ukrainian ruling elite. In the same year, Gongadze was kidnapped and murdered. The perpetrators are still unknown, although there is indirect evidence that he was killed on order of then-president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma.

Olena Prytula, who has previously worked for Reuters, Interfax, became the editor-in-chief and she remains in this office today (*Diuk & McFaul, 2004*). She was the wife of her newspaper's journalist Pavlo Sheremet who was killed in a car blast in 2016.

Since its establishment, "Ukrayinska Pravda" was a medium of the opposition and an important source of unbiased information during the 2004 Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. Among its journalists are the Euromaidan initiators Serhiy Leschenko and Mustafa Nayem (*Nayem, 2014*). In 2015, the forum of "Ukrayinska Pravda" was blocked in Russia because a note to Russian tourists which reads that Crimea is an occupied territory was discussed there (*Ukrayinska Pravda, 2015*).

*The author*

The author of this text is *Oleh Petrovets*: politician, lawyer and civic activist. He began his active civic and political career after the Euromaidan. In 2014, he founded an anti-corruption civic organization (*Deputaty Kyivrady, n.d.*). Since 2014, Petrovets holds the office of MP of the Government of the city of Kyiv. He is also a founder of two local civic organizations providing the legal support of citizens and enhancing the effectiveness of the local governance (*Biohrafiya Oleha Petrovtsya, n.d.*). In 2016, he has joined the Anti-corruption counsel of the head of the Government of the city of Kyiv (*Deputaty Kyivrady, n.d.*). In “Ukrayinska Pravda”, Petrovets publishes analytical texts on legal issues, but he has also authored texts on political topics, mostly focusing on Russia and Russian-Ukrainian relations. Notably, all his texts are in Ukrainian language (*Ukrayinska Pravda, n.d.*).

*Problem and obstacles identification*

Against the backdrop of the March 2017 anti-corruption protests in Moscow, this text addresses the entire row of problems of the modern Russia. All of them can be united as *problems and future of democracy and civil society in Russia*. Petrovets also addresses the *problem of the future of Putin’s regime*. Notably, by referring to the Russian authorities’ violation of freedom guarantees prescribed in the Constitution, he ultimately comes to a conclusion that Putin’s regime is illegitimate. Namely, out of fear of losing his power, Putin sees any form of civic activity as a threat to his power and takes ultimate measures against it. Therefore, free and democratic Russia cannot be built unless his regime is overthrown. The author has no doubt that this will eventually happen, the question he leaves open is when.

Thus, according to Petrovets, the *obstacles* to solving these problems are Putin's regime itself and its total control of Russian public life, which is exerted through violence. Therefore, Petrovets claims, the only way to solve the problem past the obstacle i.e. to change the status-quo is the revolutionary one.

This being said, the victim ideology is not so vivid in this text. Here, it is not Ukraine, but the Russian opposition that is victimized, as it is opposing Kremlin's politics, i.a. its Ukrainian direction. In this regard, the Russian opposition is viewed as Ukraine's "ally" and thus gains the author's sympathy. However, this text is not as much about victimization and sympathy towards the oppressed "ally", as it is about condemnation of the "aggressor" regime, hopes and anticipation of its violent end.

Nevertheless, placing the role of victims onto the ally-group under the control of "Them" is also an ideologically laden: it is freeing the "Us" group of the responsibility for such gruesome forecasts. If said in the first-person perspective: "we hope for this not for ourselves, but for the sake of our oppressed allies".

#### *Semiotic analysis*

The language style of this text is journalistic, devoid of emotions and colloquialisms. The "dry" language means that the rhetoric is not the main ideology-bearing discourse structure. But the other discourse structures reveal it.

For instance, the author uses the so-called "frame" *schematic structure* of the text. Namely, the very anticipation of a revolution that would topple Putin, described as his "greatest fear", is placed into the title and the text's very end. This structure emphasizes this anticipation, turning it into the main topic of the text.

Another important ideology-revealing discourse structure that is used at the very beginning is contraposition of the "aggressor" to "Self". The author quotes chapters of

three Western democracies' and Ukraine's constitutions on freedom of peaceful unarmed assembly. After that, he writes in a separate paragraph: "*Even the Constitution of Russia, however strange it may seem, also protects (at least, as declared in Article 31...)*". This contraposition both discredits "Them" (Russia) as a "fake" democracy and de-facto dictatorship, and glorifies "Us" (Ukraine) as a part of the democratic West. The last sentence only proves this: "...*Russians still have a chance to become a democratic part of the civilized world*". On the other hand, the follow-up sentence ("*But even the right of Russians to peaceful assembly declared in the Constitution did not prevent the... authorities from denying the... protests*") acts as a safeguard against possible accusations of russophobia: it says, "We are not against Russia, but against its authorities". With or without this 'self-vindication', Petrovets, like Osadchuk, insists on the illegitimate character of the Russian ruling elite.

The sentence structures, choice of words and word order, putting some words into inverted commas add to derision irony towards the 'arbitrary' Russian legislature, ultimately portraying it as a tool of political repression.

Although rhetoric is not so "emotional" as in the previous text and may for this reason seem not ideologically-laden, it yet is. The choice of lexis regarding Russia and Putin's policy ("*obscenely sacralized [regime]*", "*Putin regime*", "*Putin's propaganda*", "*constant Russian oppression*") shape the image of Russia as a totalitarian dictatorship with the Leader's cult, who only understands the language of force ("*fear of political and even physical violence*", numerous reference to arrests, detentions, money fines, "*harsh*" and "*rigorous*" reactions of police security forces).

Last but not least, the author uses rather strong claims that are yet not fully developed in the text; in other words, understatement. For instance, he writes "*another*

*world condemnation of the Putin regime*” in the introduction. Yet the text does not contain a single reference to international reaction to the Russian protests. In the end, he writes about the experts’ evaluation of protests in Russia and then quotes these summarized opinions yet without mentioning a single expert name. This tactic creates strong support for the author’s claims, but without proof, these words are ‘an empty talk’.

*Possible solutions to the problem and obstacles*

The problem of Russian democracy is an important part of the discourse of the conflict, although regarding the regime itself as an obstacle to its solution is rather radical and thus questionable. Even if Putin were toppled as a result of the “Russian Euromaidan”, examples of other countries show how long it takes for the country to recover after a revolution and how risky this path for democracy is. To quote the Russian classic author Bulgakov in his novel “Heart of the dog”, “disruption is in the head”. Therefore, a peaceful and more efficient way of fostering democracy in Russia is perceived to be the path of constant communication and education of the people on democracy, their rights and freedoms. This could ultimately lead to a peaceful growth of democracy and respect for human rights in Russia.

***Text 3: “Kremlin’s “Trojan horse”: Social Media Admitted They Were Used to Manipulate USA”***

*Media channel*

*“Hromadske Telebachennya”* (Ukrainian for “Civic Television”) is a Ukrainian Internet broadcasting channel with a formal status of a NGO. It was founded in 2013 by a group of journalists, rather prominent public figures in the Ukrainian media field most

of whom have the reputation of independent and trustworthy journalists. “Hromadske” positions itself as an independent media, focused on broadcasting the unbiased news without censorship restrictions imposed by the government (*Suspilne Movlennya*, 2013).

“Hromadske” has several sources of funding, including both private contributions (i.e., of the “Hromadske” founders), and public contributions from Ukrainian governmental institutions. A considerable amount of funding is accounted for grants and financial support from various international sources, such as governments and embassies of foreign states (including the Embassy of the USA, the Embassy of the Kingdom of The Netherlands, the Government of Canada, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, etc.), international organizations and foundations (such as George Soros International Renaissance Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Fritt Ord Foundation, etc.) (*Hromadske*, 2017)]

“Hromadske” is occasionally subject to criticism mostly for the violation of journalistic ethics which implies unbiased attitude towards certain public personalities or information, one-sided reporting of events (*Unian*, 2016). The internet channel has also been involved into the scandal with financial malversations by the founder of the internet channel Roman Skripin (*Zakusylo*, 2017).

#### *The authors*

*Natalya Humenyuk* is a Ukrainian journalist and TV presenter. Since 2002 she has been working as the international affairs columnist for a number of Ukrainian media and information agencies, including “Novy Kanal” and “5 Kanal”. Humenyuk has also been working as a free-lance correspondent for several Ukrainian (such as “Ukrainskaya Pravda”, “Ukrainskaya Nedelya”, “Esquire Ukraina” etc.) and international media (“The Guardian”, “The Independent”, “M6”, etc.) (*Ostapa*, 2016). She was among the

initiators and establishers of “Hromadske TV” Internet broadcasting channel. In 2015 Natalya Humenyuk was elected the President of the Program Board of “Hromadske” and has been holding the office since then (*Hromadske, n.d.*).

The co-author of the text is *Ostap Yarysh*, a Ukrainian freelance journalist and reporter. His articles are published in a number of Ukrainian online media and media websites. There is very few information about Yarysh or his professional biography, no official biography or any interview with the journalist is available in the open access in the Internet in Ukrainian or Russian language.

#### *Problem and obstacles identification*

This text addresses the problem of *Russia’s hacking interference into 2016 USA elections*, which in its turn is strongly connected to the problem of international cyber-security. Furthermore, the authors underline the direct role of global social networks Google, Facebook and Twitter in this problem, as well as their enormous responsibility that they have betrayed.

In other words, according to the text’s authors, the carelessness and the lack of responsibility demonstrated by Google, Facebook and Twitter have become the main obstacles to the solution of this problem. Here, the “victim vs. aggressor” ideology is traceable, but this time not with the usual “actors”. Memorably, the USA is supporting Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. The text is built in a way that, by making Russian hacking interference possible, the social networks appear as collaborators of the “aggressor”. The title itself proves this.

In this regard, the “victim” and “aggressor” roles are partially projected upon the respective “allies” of the two parties within the American society. This being said, the authors clearly distinguish between conventionally named “Ukraine’s friends” and

“Russia’s collaborators”. The first category includes the “victims” (ordinary American citizens fooled by “enemy’s” “manipulations”) and their “saviors” (US Senate intelligence committee who questioned the representatives of Google, Facebook and Twitter). The second group contains the three social networks and president Trump, clearly portrayed as “Russia’s man”. Nevertheless, Russia remains the main “aggressor” who exploits its “allies”, and Ukraine is still the main “victim”, although it is not so obviously depicted. The semantic analysis will illustrate these ideas in more details.

### *Semiotic analysis*

This text’s language style is journalistic, almost completely deprived of emotional radical expressions typical for Russian texts. However, the ideology relation scheme described above is no less visible because of it.

The most vivid ideology revealing discourse structures of this text are *lexical structures and the rhetoric*. By using special ideologically laden terms (like the word “manipulation” and its derivatives that appear ten times in the text, including the title) and metaphors (“*Trojan Horse*”), the authors create an image of a criminal, calculative, deceitful “aggressor” who exploits its foolish “allies” (“[they] *became instruments in the manipulators’ hands*”), who vainly vindicate themselves before the justice (“*The leaders of [Twitter] even promised to rehabilitate themselves... [But] Senators remained unsatisfied*”). Moreover, none of the companies’ representatives is called by their names. In contrast, all quoted members of the Senate who questioned them are named. This method also contributes to the deterioration of the “collaborators” and promotion of the “allies”. At the same time, quotation of Head of the Investigative Commission where he refers to Russia as a “*foreign enemy state*” puts the ideologically favorable thought of the “Us”-group into the mouth of a person who is more likely to be

“Their” ally (his Republican party membership is explicit). This tactic both distances the “Us” from accusations of radicalism and aims to demonstrate “Them” that they were abandoned by their allies. It also gives “Us” a hope for the near victory over the “aggressor”.

However, the main ideology-revealing discourse structure of this text is *topicalization*, as it is present on various directions. First of all, the authors do not mention that the Republican Senators and the predominantly Republican US Congress enjoy little support and sympathies among ordinary Americans. The reason is obvious: these people and institutions support “Us”, so their mistakes and negative image is irrelevant.

Secondly, in the one but last paragraph, Ukraine is suddenly mentioned in the first sentence for no obvious reason (*“the word ‘Ukraine’ was never pronounced [during the hearings]”*). Notably, this appears under the subheading “Why is it important”. For ideology, this reference is crucial as it points out who the real victim of the “aggressor” is, at the same time reproaching the “allies” for little attention before and encouraging them to help: *“...using social networks for political manipulations was raised to such a high level for the first time. ...Cyber-security problems [...] can be solved not only in individual countries, but also on a global level”*.

#### *Possible solutions to the problem and obstacles*

The problem of cyber-security and the growing responsibility of social networks is indeed an important issue, not only for the case of Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but for the entire world as well. Notably, the problems and obstacles somehow provide the solution to themselves, as the Internet age and digitalization leave little room for intransparency and information concealment. This is ultimately leading to the legal

measures, such as the EU-wide development of data protection policy. With cyber-war being a key branch of information warfare, these measures only contribute to global safety and better protection against attacks.

***Text 4: “Set a Fire Trap: A Story of Hero of Ukraine Who Laid Mines under Enemy’s Infantry Combat Vehicle”***

*Media channel*

“5 Kanal” (5<sup>th</sup> Channel) is a TV news channel founded in 2003. It was the first Ukrainian TV channel which provided daily news. “5 Kanal” has always been an oppositional TV channel. During the 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine it was the main media channel of the opposition, publishing daily broadcasts of protests in Kyiv and other cities of Ukraine, as well as criticism of Yanukovich. (*5 Kanal, n.d.*; *Honcharenko & Nemyrovskiy, 2014*). According to the report by Ukrainian media watchdog “Telekritika” (NB: published before the Euromaidan!), “5 Kanal” is one of the two media channels in Ukraine which present reliable unbiased facts (*Onyshkiv, 2010*). During the Euromaidan, “5 Kanal” supported the protests.

The founder and owner of “5 Kanal” is the incumbent president of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko. Notably, before becoming president, Poroshenko owned a number of other media channels; however, all of them were sold apart from “5 Kanal”. Poroshenko himself explains this that he kept the ownership of the channel because of its key role during the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. “5 Kanal” is unavailable in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (*Honcharenko & Nemyrovskiy, 2014*).

Although it enjoys a reputation of reliable news channel, “5 Kanal” still faces criticism for selective presentation of information, especially in news about Poroshenko.

So, during the presidential elections, “5 Kanal” broadcasted Poroshenko’s campaign thrice as much as of his main competitor Yuliia Tymoshenko (*Berdynskykh, 2017; Honcharenko & Nemyrovskiy, 2014*).

#### *The authors*

*Viktoriia Kovalyova* and *Petro Kovalyov* are the authors of this text. Very little information is available about them online. They are both reporters of “5 Kanal”, and they specialize in coverage of Donbas war. They finished their studies in Luhansk and live there. Viktoriia is a supporter of the center-right “Fatherland” party and of several civic and non-profit Luhansk-based organizations aimed at the ‘Ukrainization’ of Donbas (*Viktoriia Kovalyova, n.d.; Petr Kovalyov, n.d.*).

#### *Problem and obstacles identification*

The text revolves around a young Ukrainian battalion chief whose soldiers blew up the infantry combat vehicle of Donbas rebels with mines. For this operation the chief received a two high Ukrainian awards, including the Order of the Hero of Ukraine.

The beginning of war in Donbas was an unexpected and hard blow for Ukraine weakened by political turmoil which followed the Euromaidan. Morally, militarily and economically, the land was unprepared for the armed conflict. Ukraine needed not only material resources to engage in warfare, but also moral support from the citizens. This could only be done by presenting the Donbas war as a war for (symbolic) independence and freedom. One of the old media technologies that helped achieve this is the glorification of the army and military soldiers. This text is an example of this method’s implementation.

In this regard, an acute problem of *society’s militarization and justification of war* is raised. This is a multifaceted problem, and the media have been playing a key

role throughout its existence: they were involved in the emergence of this problem, and they sustain it by supporting the militarization.

The victim ideology also needs militarization for two reasons: on the one hand, during the war, it gives people hope and motivation by portraying the “Us”-group as capable of fighting “Them”. On the other hand, self-victimizing ideology can make use of the consequences of militarization after the conflict has ended, especially if the war has been lost. In this case, militarization leads to revanchist sentiments with further demonization of “Them”, sustaining the conflict in the non-material dimension of symbols and mindsets, and creating a threat of a new armed conflict. Therefore, the victim ideology itself is one of the main *obstacles* to solution of this problem, as well as the support it receives through the media.

#### *Semiotic analysis*

This text is written in Ukrainian language, thus it is targeted on Ukrainian readers. The language of the texts resembles a novel. It is generally easy to read, as it lacks complex sentences and long passages. However, there are a lot of military terms, such as names of military units and army machinery that ordinary readers may not be familiar with. However, the numerously mentioned rank of the protagonist (i.e., *commander, chief, major, officer*) is rather simple and known to wide public without military expertise. This might have been done to enhance the protagonist’s experience and professionalism, but at the same time without paying attention to details.

Generally, the narrative referring to the protagonist is only positive and praiseful, even in the words of other people about him. He is shown to the reader as patriotic, fearless, inventive and committed professional, but at the same time he is a modest (“*When asked about his rewards, Tkachuk just jokes. He prefers to talk about*

*others*”) and sentimental person (“*He hurts for people who were forced to leave their homes because of warfare*”). Even the fact that he lost several soldiers is transformed into valour (“*For almost three months’ the Major’s squadron lost only two brothers in arms*”). And so are the other Ukrainian fighters (referred to as the protagonist’s “*brothers in arms*”) and volunteers “*who were risking their lives*”. When describing their actions, the authors use euphemisms (for example, “[crew of the rebels’ tank was] *liquidated*” instead of “killed”).

The description of the pro-Russian rebels makes the clear contrast to that of the Ukrainian soldiers. Various rhetorical means are used to downgrade them and provoke the readers’ aversion towards them. From the very title, they are referred to as “enemy” and other terms with negative connotations (“*militants*”, “*terrorists*”); dysphemism are used to describe them (“*loss of [...] living force*”). The Donetsk and Luhansk provinces that the rebels control (“*the East*”, “*occupied territories*”) are here the victim-group that needs to be set free.

Notably, Russia or its ruling elites are not mentioned. In the Ukrainian political and media discourse, however, the Donbas rebels are viewed as Russian mercenaries; therefore, by downgrading them, they downgrade Russia as well. Even if not viewed so, the fact that Russia frequently speaks, to say the least, in defense of the pro-Russian insurgents in Ukraine, contributes to this claim and opinion. Therefore, by calling them “terrorists”, the authors send the respective message to Russia as well.

#### *Possible solutions to the problem and obstacles*

This text’s discourse is in direct connection with the problem of the deliberate militarization of the Ukrainian society and is an illustrative example of how militarization is achieved through media content. Without reshaping the discourse into

less emotional and more objective, militarization and war glorification will continue to prosper, and it may have devastating effects on the post-war development of the Ukrainian society. This would once again require more transparency and objectivity of the media, more media attention to the groups of people who call for peace and not the escalation of war.

***Text 5: “Words about Crimea, Thoughts about Empire”***

*Media channel and the author*

TV channel “1+1” is a national Ukrainian TV channel and one of the largest privately owned TV channels in the country. It was founded in 1995 and became an independent broadcaster in 2005 when the American media corporation “Central European Media Enterprises” (CEM) bought out 30% of “1+1 media” stocks. In 2009 CEM sold the media holding to the Ukrainian magnate *Ihor Kolomoyski*, who currently owns 100% of the company’s shares. Being a politically engaged public figure, Kolomoyski is famous for his active advocacy of the resistance to the Russian aggression against Ukraine (*Dossier EDINIST, n.d.*). “1+1” is one of the most popular TV channels in Ukraine. According to 2017 data, it had highest ratings amongst all key types off target audience (with covering 11.6% of audience aged between 18 and 54 and about 11% of wider audience as well). (*1+1, 2017*)

“TSN” is a daily news program broadcasted on the “1+1” channel It was first broadcasted in 1997. “TSN” is the most popular news program in Ukraine, according to the audience preferences statistics. Over the past few years it held a stable leading place among Ukrainian news programs, reaching in different years the rating from 7.3% to 31,5% (*Telekritika, 2012*).

“TSN” has been often criticized for providing unconfirmed or even false information, and information from unreliable sources, as well as for misrepresentation of facts (*Shariy, 2014*). Moreover, “TSN” as well as “1+1” TV channel have been subject to journalists’ criticism for practicing censorship, i.a. banning the coverage of certain events and advocating a defined stance on certain topics (*Mirer, 2010*).

The text author’s name is *Mykola Kolomoiets*. Information about him in the open sources is very scarce. Except for several articles published by the author, only information available is that Kolomoiets is a legal consultant and a correspondent for “TSN” that writes articles on Russian-Ukrainian relations.

#### *Problem and obstacles identification*

This text addresses four aspects of the so-called “Crimean speech” of Russian president Putin that he delivered before the parliament of Russia two days after the Crimean referendum and two days before Crimea was officially integrated into Russia. At the same time the author also touches upon the legal aspects of the Crimea annexation, Ukraine’s (re)action on Crimean crisis, ethnic policy of Russia, and the moral aspect of Crimean events. The author seems confused by Russia’s actions that purportedly violate the international legal norms and basics of human morality. Based on the Crimean and Donbas precedent, the author finishes the text with an evident fear for the future, vaguely referring to a possible nuclear war.

The author’s confusion is explainable. Memorably, the current Russian state ideology is Eurasianism, “*derzhavnost*”, the so-called “special path” (“*osobiyy put*”) of development. This ideology is based on geopolitical dogmas that confirm the country’s desired image of a superpower. Geopolitics plays a crucial role in Russia’s high-level decision-making. However, the geopolitics-based governance gets into discordance with

the established international norms of law, foreign relations, diplomacy etc. that declare and demand equality and equal responsibility. Speaking metaphorically, Russia and the West hold a dialogue on the same matter, but in different languages. Therefore, the main problem discussed in this text is the problem of *Russia's geopolitics-based interpretation of legitimacy and responsibility*.

This “language barrier” is perhaps the main reason of why the Ukrainian crisis is still far from solution. A constructive dialogue cannot take place if the negotiation partners are not treating each other as an equal. Therefore it might be regarded as the key *obstacle* to the mentioned problem's solution.

#### *Semiotic analysis*

The language of this text is Russian, which makes it understandable for Russian and the vast majority of Ukrainian readers. It is written from the first-person perspective, which, on the one hand, gives the reader an impression of direct involvement into the text. On the other hand, the author automatically distances himself from possible accusations of insults (he writes, “*this is my opinion about him [Putin], not an attempt to besmirch or dignify him*”).

In the first two paragraphs, Kolomojets makes this opinion explicitly clear. This opinion fits into the Ukrainian self-victimizing ideology that, as analyses of previous texts have shown, also includes feelings of deep anger and detestation towards the “aggressor”. Here, the “aggressor” image is projected upon Russian president Putin.

The author's enmity towards Putin is explicit and is repeated manifold: Putin is not simply an enemy, but a “cunning”, “mean, deceitful enemy”, aggressive (i.e., see comparison of Putin's diplomacy to street bully fighting), a racist, even a dangerous mentally incompetent person “*who has an access to the nuclear launch suitcase*”. The

introductory quote by Hemingway (*"Fascism is a lie told by bullies"*) is also symbolic in the context of this text, for it de-facto means attacking Russia with its own communication weapon: accusation of fascism.

The author's references to himself are noteworthy. On the one hand, they are a contrast to the description and references to Putin: he is respective (*"I was taught to respect the enemy"*), competent (*"As a lawyer I am obliged to justify my claim"*), responsible (*"my memory is not as selective as [Putin's]"*). On the other hand, the author frequently uses the *reverse psychology rhetoric*. To underline his contrast to Putin, and Kolomojets enhances his capability of self-criticism repeatedly makes peculiar excuses and self-deteriorating comments regarding him and Ukraine (*"it is my stance [...] of a savage with a degree"*; *"violating the laws and codes, our soldiers did not fight back"*) for something that no-one would normally be accused of. Thus, in Kolomojets' text, for its honesty and "lack of cruelty", Ukraine becomes the "mean" aggressor's victim.

Reverse psychology rhetoric also appears, for example, in this passage: *"there is nothing awful [...] that the Russian Federation violated the UN Chart [...] and another couple of documents [that are] completely useless"*. This tactic is similar to what was labeled as "adopting the enemy's rhetoric" in previous texts' analyses and it pursues the same goals: besmirching, illegitimizing the "enemy". In this passage's case, Kolomojets ostensibly reconstructs the "enemy's" way of thinking, thus completing its negative and illegitimate image. The established norms of international law and common morality imply the exact opposite of what the passage describes; thus, it is meant to provoke contempt and enmity towards the "enemy".

*Possible solutions to the problem and obstacles*

As discussed before, imperialistic ideology and geopolitics play a crucial role in Russian governance. Therefore, the identified problem is persistent in the *status quo*.

Speaking about the obstacle, historical practice shows that the ideology of equality and cooperation is more effective and viable than the superpower ideology. Therefore, the author of this study is convinced that, in order to solve both the Ukrainian crisis and its own problems (i.e. international sanctions), Russia should give up its current discourse and adopt the ideology of equality and cooperation instead. Not only the international community, but also Russians themselves would benefit from this approach.

**§4.3. Content Analysis**

Bearing in mind the results and findings of the critical discourse analysis, the content analysis of the ten texts was conducted. It needs to be stressed that the coding and the analysis was carried out by the author of the study alone. Therefore, the results of the content analysis are to a certain extent limited by the author's understanding, interpretations and perceptions of the texts. Although the author sought to adhere to the principles of credibility and trustworthiness during the analysis, and a voluntary reviewer has done an objectivity test after the analysis, a certain amount of bias and subjectivity may still remain.

The stages of content analysis were outlined in §3.2. "Directed Content Analysis". Out of the three stages, Stage 1 was completed in previous chapters, as well as the half of Stage 2. This subchapter is dedicated to Stage 2d: Testing of hypotheses.

During the reading of the texts, a wide set of ideologically-laden terms was found and noted. These words, expressions and their derivatives were split into five sampling units and eleven coding units' groups, whereas two sampling units are coding units at the same time. The belonging of a text to a certain model of propaganda, as well as the presence of hate speech was determined by the presence or absence of these sampling and coding units within it, checked by the characteristics charts (see *Tables 2 and 3*). If at least 50% of the listed attributes were identified within a text, this text was classified as a tool of a propaganda model which has more matches. The same principle was applied to hate speech identification.

The analysis was conducted manually, via highlighting the sampling and coding units and their derivatives on the printed version of the texts in original language. Then, these units were compared to the attributes of both propaganda models and hate speech, namely if among these discovered units were those that fitted the attributes of propaganda models and hate speech.

Notably, the metaphors, allusions and other "indirect" propaganda rhetoric that were discovered and described during the CDA were not highlighted i.e. taken into consideration during content analysis.

#### ***§4.3.1. Russian Texts' Content Analysis***

In Russian texts, the main direction of hate speech is anti-Ukrainian, and to a lesser extent anti-Western. However, this study does not focus on anti-Western rhetoric of Russian media; therefore, it was studied only in reference to Ukraine. Table 5 shows what exactly in the Russian was regarded as hate speech.

Table 5.

*Interpretation of Hate Speech in Russian Texts*

| <u>№</u> | <u>Hate speech attribute</u>                                                                              | <u>Definition</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | <u>Examples</u>                                                                                                                                                               |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1        | Written or oral expression ( <i>HS<sub>1</sub></i> )                                                      | The message was mediated in written or spoken form.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | ( <i>All texts</i> )                                                                                                                                                          |
| 2        | Addresses a certain social group and / or its individual members ( <i>HS<sub>2</sub></i> )                | The expression addresses:<br>1) Ukrainians, which include: citizens of Ukraine, Ukrainians as an ethnicity, famous Ukrainian historic and now-living personalities (including politicians); Ukraine as a political actor and its geographic territory with exclusion of Crimea, DPR and LPR, i.e. Donetsk and Luhansk provinces.<br>2) Persons and / or organizations that support Ukraine and / or oppose Donbas insurgents and Crimea annexation.<br>3) Western democracies, particularly: EU and USA, and its politicians in their relation to Ukraine. | Poroshenko; Bandera; Western funders; Friends of Ukraine; Feast on Ukraine; etc.                                                                                              |
| 3        | Contains expressions of hostility towards the social group and / or its members ( <i>HS<sub>3</sub></i> ) | Strong unfriendliness towards Ukrainians; harsh, emotional, sometimes ungrounded criticism and disapproval of their actions; delegitimization of Ukrainian government.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Coupists; Antiputinism; Illegal overthrow of the government; Forgive Ukraine its rudeness; etc.                                                                               |
| 4        | Accusations addressed to this social group and / or its members ( <i>HS<sub>4</sub></i> )                 | Concentration on Ukraine's mistakes and diminishing / neglecting of its positive achievements. Also includes falsification of facts (via generalization, hyperbole, evasions, etc.) that support the negative image of Ukraine and / or Ukrainians.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | Complete disregard of the [ <i>minorities</i> ] rights; Mass plundering of resources; [ <i>Poroshenko</i> ] increases his capital [ <i>on the</i> ] permanent civil war; etc. |

|   |                                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                             |
|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 5 | Dehumanizing, derogatory language, slurs in reference to this social group and / or its members (aggressive nationalism) ( <i>HS<sub>5</sub></i> ) | References to Ukraine and / or Ukrainians with downgrading, derisive terms or epithets. Aggressive Russian nationalism. Some of these terms <i>per se</i> are not negative, but in the context, they receive a besmirching tone.           | Anti-Russian “sanitary barrier”; Nezalezhnaya; Pariahs; Slaves for the European Union; Pathetic Ukrainians; Junta; Nazi regime; etc.        |
| 6 | One-sided, biased presentation of facts ( <i>HS<sub>6</sub></i> )                                                                                  | Referring to or presenting only one opinion or several similar opinions: the ones that contribute to the negative image of Ukraine and / or Ukrainians. The alternative or opposite opinion(s) are either absent, or twisted and rejected. | Ban May 9 <sup>th</sup> ; Rewrite the history; [ <i>Poroshenko</i> ’s] Last stronghold in the country [ <i>radical nationalists</i> ]; etc. |
| 7 | Simple language ( <i>HS<sub>7</sub></i> )                                                                                                          | The sentences are short and the text is very easy to read. Frequent use of colloquialisms. Absence of complicated or disciplinary (i.e., military) terms.                                                                                  | [ <i>Media</i> ] Chew on [ <i>the news</i> ]; Go too far; Cannot get over it; Siphon off the budget; Witch hunt; etc.                       |
| 8 | Charged with negative emotions (such as sadness, hatred, fear) ( <i>HS<sub>8</sub></i> )                                                           | The message contains reference to a perceived threat to Russia coming from Ukraine, or simulated empathy towards Ukraine and / or Ukrainians, or hostility towards them. Can have a demoralizing effect.                                   | Lawlessness; Collapse; Degradation; Indebted [ <i>Ukraine</i> ]; Fear; Hate campaign; Chaos; People’s impoverishment; etc.                  |

Like hate speech, the propaganda is regarded in its anti-Ukrainian manifestation in Russian texts. Table 6 shows the interpretation of what exactly in the Russian texts fell under the term of “propaganda”.

Table 6.

*Interpretation of Propaganda in Russian Texts*

| <u>№</u>                             | <u>Propaganda attribute</u>                                    | <u>Definition</u>                                                                                                                                                  | <u>Examples</u>                                                                             |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Classic propaganda theory (Lasswell) |                                                                |                                                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                             |
| 1                                    | Manipulation of significant symbols ( <i>CPT<sub>1</sub></i> ) | Exploitation of symbolic images significant to the majority of Russians for ideological purposes in a way that Ukraine is presented as the one who “defiles” them. | Ban May 9 <sup>th</sup> ; Uniting [ <i>symbol</i> ]; Nazism; Nazi regime; Coup d’état; etc. |

|                                      |                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                                                                                                     |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2                                    | Mobilization of public opinion (CPT <sub>2</sub> )                  | Contains a call to action, encouraging Russians to respond to Ukraine's actions.                                                                                                                                                        | Take the whole Ukraine; Repeat the Crimean result; Russian initiative; Annexation of West-Ukrainian provinces; etc. |
| 3                                    | Demoralization of enemy (CPT <sub>3</sub> )                         | By underlining Russia's power and / or concentrating on Ukraine's problems and mistakes, the message aims to discourage Ukrainians and ultimately shatter their ability to fight back in the armed conflict.                            | Life has become far more difficult; Chaos; Crisis; Inefficiency of state governance; Economy implodes; etc.         |
| 4                                    | Adaptation of rhetoric to public opinion swings (CPT <sub>4</sub> ) | (Hypothetical) Negative rhetoric (Not discovered) towards Ukraine and Ukrainians becomes less harsh after a numbers of Russians large and thus influential enough begins to advocate for an improvement of Russian-Ukrainian relations. |                                                                                                                     |
| Hegemonic propaganda model (Chomsky) |                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                                                                                                                     |
| 1                                    | Total governmental control (HPM <sub>1</sub> )                      | The ruling elite controls all spheres of Russia's public life, thus opinion of ordinary people (especially if in discordance with the official rhetoric) has no impact on public life.                                                  | (Based on the discoveries of CDA)                                                                                   |
| 2                                    | Media channels controlled by ruling elites (HPM <sub>2</sub> )      | A consequence of Attribute 1. The media channel of text's origin is in direct or indirect control by Russian ruling elites, thus it publishes only information favorable to them.                                                       | (Based on the discoveries of CDA)                                                                                   |
| 3                                    | Distracting public attention from real problems (HPM <sub>3</sub> ) | The problem addressed in the text is irrelevant to the Russian society and thus has no tangible significance.                                                                                                                           | (Based on the discoveries of CDA)                                                                                   |
| 4                                    | Incitement of fear (HPM <sub>4</sub> )                              | By painting a grim picture of Ukrainian reality, the text stirs fear among Russians of a similar scenario in Russia.                                                                                                                    | Crisis; Degradation; Radicals; Nazism; Radical nationalism; etc.                                                    |

| Common propaganda attributes (both models)    |                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 Militarization ( $CPA_1$ )                  | Strong accent and praising of the Russian army and military officials (in contrast to those of Ukraine).                                                                                  | Take Crimea; Take the whole Ukraine; etc.                                                                                                                                             |
| 2 Falsification of history ( $CPA_2$ )        | Historical events are deliberately twisted (via generalization, hyperbole, evasions, etc) in a way that they support the negative image of Ukraine and / or the positive image of Russia. | Cutting off from the history; Rewriting of Ukrainian history; Seized from Poland; etc.                                                                                                |
| 3 Demonization of enemies ( $CPA_3$ )         | Excessive besmirching of Ukraine and Ukrainians, sometimes with use of derogatory and dehumanizing terms.                                                                                 | Glorification of Nazi criminals; Nazi regime; Junta; etc.                                                                                                                             |
| 4 Selective presentation of facts ( $CPA_4$ ) | Facts that may damage Russia's positive image are not mentioned, as well as positive facts about Ukraine.                                                                                 | Delegitimization of the Soviet era; Complete disregard of the [ <i>minorities</i> ] rights; Abolished freedom of speech; Russia saved them [ <i>DPR &amp; LPR</i> ] from demise; etc. |

The words and coding units count discovered the following statistics (NB: the numbers are based on the original version of the texts written in Russian language):

Table 7.

*Number of Ideologically Laden Expressions Per Each Russian Text*

| <u>№ Short text name</u> | <u>Total № of sampling and coding units</u> | <u>№ of words (w / title and lead) (%)</u> | <u>№ of ideologically laden expressions</u> |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| 1 Crimea...              | 73                                          | 1.043 (100%)                               | 174 (~17%)                                  |
| 2 Path to...             | 83                                          | 1.751 (100%)                               | 176 (~10%)                                  |
| 3 Bandera...             | 43                                          | 737 (100%)                                 | 83 (~11%)                                   |
| 4 In Ukraine...          | 43                                          | 763 (100%)                                 | 72 (~9%)                                    |
| 5 Poroshenko...          | 66                                          | 917 (100%)                                 | 96 (~10%)                                   |
| <b>MEDIAN</b>            | <b>~62</b>                                  | <b>~1.042</b>                              | <b>~120 (~12%)</b>                          |

Based on data from the Tables 5 and 6, the five Russian texts fulfill the interpretations of both propaganda models and hate speech in the way presented in Table 8. The attributes that were found within a text were marked with the tick sign. The unfulfilled attributes' cells were left blank.

Table 8.  
*Propaganda and Hate Speech in Each Russian Text*

| Attribute               | Text 1       | Text 2      | Text 3      | Text 4      | Text 5      |
|-------------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| HS <sub>1</sub>         | ✓            | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |
| HS <sub>2</sub>         |              | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |
| HS <sub>3</sub>         | ✓            | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |
| HS <sub>4</sub>         | ✓            | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |
| HS <sub>5</sub>         | ✓            |             |             |             | ✓           |
| HS <sub>6</sub>         | ✓            | ✓           |             | ✓           | ✓           |
| HS <sub>7</sub>         | ✓            |             | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |
| HS <sub>8</sub>         | ✓            | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |
| <b>TOTAL</b>            | <b>7/8</b>   | <b>6/8</b>  | <b>6/8</b>  | <b>7/8</b>  | <b>8/8</b>  |
| CPT <sub>1</sub>        | ✓            | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |
| CPT <sub>2</sub>        | ✓            | ✓           | ✓           |             |             |
| CPT <sub>3</sub>        | ✓            |             | ✓           |             | ✓           |
| CPT <sub>4</sub>        |              |             |             |             |             |
| <b>SUB-TOTAL</b>        | <b>3/4</b>   | <b>2/4</b>  | <b>3/4</b>  | <b>1/4</b>  | <b>2/4</b>  |
| HPM <sub>1</sub>        | ✓            | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |
| HPM <sub>2</sub>        | ✓            | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |
| HPM <sub>3</sub>        | ✓            |             |             |             | ✓           |
| HPM <sub>4</sub>        | ✓            |             |             |             | ✓           |
| <b>SUB-TOTAL</b>        | <b>4/4</b>   | <b>2/4</b>  | <b>2/4</b>  | <b>2/4</b>  | <b>4/4</b>  |
| CPA <sub>1</sub>        | ✓            |             |             |             | ✓           |
| CPA <sub>2</sub>        |              | ✓           |             |             |             |
| CPA <sub>3</sub>        | ✓            | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |
| CPA <sub>4</sub>        | ✓            | ✓           |             | ✓           | ✓           |
| <b>SUB-TOTAL</b>        | <b>3/4</b>   | <b>3/4</b>  | <b>1/4</b>  | <b>2/4</b>  | <b>3/4</b>  |
| <b>TOTAL PROPAGANDA</b> | <b>10/12</b> | <b>7/12</b> | <b>6/12</b> | <b>5/12</b> | <b>9/12</b> |

Thus, the attribute pair matching for the five Russian texts is the following.

Table 9.  
*Attribute Pair Matching: Russian Texts*

| Attributes pair                    | Text 1 | Text 2 | Text 3 | Text 4 | Text 5 |
|------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| HS <sub>2</sub> – CPT <sub>1</sub> |        | ✓      | ✓      | ✓      | ✓      |
| HS <sub>7</sub> – CPT <sub>2</sub> | ✓      |        | ✓      |        |        |
| HS <sub>2</sub> – CPT <sub>3</sub> |        |        | ✓      |        | ✓      |
| HS <sub>4</sub> – CPT <sub>4</sub> |        |        |        |        |        |
| HS <sub>6</sub> – HPM <sub>1</sub> | ✓      | ✓      |        | ✓      | ✓      |

|                                    |             |             |             |             |             |
|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| HS <sub>6</sub> – HPM <sub>2</sub> | ✓           | ✓           |             | ✓           | ✓           |
| HS <sub>6</sub> – HPM <sub>3</sub> | ✓           |             |             |             | ✓           |
| HS <sub>8</sub> – HPM <sub>4</sub> | ✓           |             |             |             | ✓           |
| HS <sub>3</sub> – CPA <sub>1</sub> | ✓           |             |             |             | ✓           |
| HS <sub>6</sub> – CPA <sub>2</sub> |             | ✓           |             |             |             |
| HS <sub>5</sub> – CPA <sub>3</sub> | ✓           |             |             |             | ✓           |
| HS <sub>6</sub> – CPA <sub>4</sub> | ✓           | ✓           |             | ✓           | ✓           |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                       | <b>8/12</b> | <b>5/12</b> | <b>3/12</b> | <b>4/12</b> | <b>9/12</b> |
| <b>TOTAL CPT</b>                   | <b>4/8</b>  | <b>3/8</b>  | <b>3/8</b>  | <b>1/8</b>  | <b>4/8</b>  |
| <b>TOTAL HPM</b>                   | <b>7/8</b>  | <b>4/8</b>  | <b>0/8</b>  | <b>2/8</b>  | <b>7/8</b>  |

#### §4.3.2. Ukrainian Texts' Content Analysis

The same aspects were analyzed in the Ukrainian text, yet from the Ukrainian perspective and with the use of Ukrainian coding units.

In the five Ukrainian texts, the direction of hate speech and propaganda is *anti-Russian* and, to a lesser extent, also against Russia's "allies", like pro-Russian rebels of Donbas and to an even lesser extent – Donald Trump in the USA. Even so, the rhetoric against them is analyzed in the context of their interaction with Russia. Memorably, the Donbas rebels are viewed as Russian mercenaries and are not regarded as Ukrainians.

Table 10 illustrates the interpretation of hate speech in the Ukrainian texts.

Table 10.

*Interpretation of Hate Speech in Ukrainian Texts*

| <u>№</u> | <u>Attribute</u>                                                                    | <u>Definition</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | <u>Examples</u>                                                                                  |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1        | Written or oral expression (HS <sub>1</sub> )                                       | The message was mediated in written or spoken form.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | (All texts)                                                                                      |
| 2        | Addresses a certain social group and / or its individual members (HS <sub>2</sub> ) | The message addresses:<br>1) Russians as an ethnicity, as citizens of Russia, Russian historic and living personalities (including politicians); pro-Russian rebels in Donbas; Russia and its predecessor states as a political actor including the DPR and LPR i.e. Donetsk and Luhansk provinces under rebels' control;<br>2) Persons and / or organizations | Aggressor; Enemy state;<br>Occupied territories;<br>Terrorists; Putin; Stalin / Jugashvili; etc. |

|   |                                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | that support Russia, Crimea annexation and Donbas insurgents.                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 3 | Contains expressions of hostility towards the social group and / or its members ( <i>HS<sub>3</sub></i> )                                          | Strong unfriendliness towards Russians; harsh, emotional, sometimes ungrounded criticism and disapproval of their actions; delegitimization of Russia and its predecessor states as such.                                                                                           |
| 4 | Accusations addressed to this social group and / or its members ( <i>HS<sub>4</sub></i> )                                                          | Street bully; Misuse; Violate the UN chart; Violate territorial integrity; Provocation; etc.                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 4 | Accusations addressed to this social group and / or its members ( <i>HS<sub>4</sub></i> )                                                          | Concentration on the negative aspects of Russia's influence on Ukraine and diminishing / neglecting of its positive achievements. Also includes falsification of facts (via generalization, hyperbole, evasions, etc.) that support the negative image of Russia and / or Russians. |
| 5 | Dehumanizing, derogatory language, slurs in reference to this social group and / or its members (aggressive nationalism) ( <i>HS<sub>5</sub></i> ) | Racist society; Savage; Mean / cunning enemy; Terrorists; etc.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 5 | Dehumanizing, derogatory language, slurs in reference to this social group and / or its members (aggressive nationalism) ( <i>HS<sub>5</sub></i> ) | References to Russia and / or Russians with downgrading, derisive terms or epithets. Aggressive Ukrainian nationalism. Some of these terms <i>per se</i> are not negative, but in the context, they receive a besmirching tone.                                                     |
| 6 | One-sided, biased presentation of facts ( <i>HS<sub>6</sub></i> )                                                                                  | Dominance of Russian people; Deliberately tears; Persistently dissolves; etc.                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 6 | One-sided, biased presentation of facts ( <i>HS<sub>6</sub></i> )                                                                                  | Referring to or presenting only one opinion or several similar opinions: the ones that contribute to the negative image of Russia and / or Russians. The alternative or opposite opinions are either absent, or twisted and rejected.                                               |
| 7 | Simple language ( <i>HS<sub>7</sub></i> )                                                                                                          | Does not give a damn; Squeezing out the local element; etc.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 7 | Simple language ( <i>HS<sub>7</sub></i> )                                                                                                          | The sentences are short and the text is very easy to read. Frequent use of colloquialisms. Absence of complicated or disciplinary (i.e., military) terms.                                                                                                                           |
| 8 | Charged with negative emotions (such as sadness,                                                                                                   | Crimes against humanity; Suppress the dissatisfied; Fear of violence; etc.                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 8 | Charged with negative emotions (such as sadness,                                                                                                   | The message contains reference to a threat to Ukraine coming from Russia, simulated empathy                                                                                                                                                                                         |

hatred, fear) ( $HS_8$ ) towards Russians, or hostility towards them. Can have a demoralizing effect.

Table 11 demonstrates what in Ukrainian texts was treated as propaganda:

Table 11.

*Interpretation of Propaganda in Ukrainian Texts*

| <u>№</u>                             | <u>Propaganda attribute</u>                                 | <u>Definition</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                | <u>Examples</u>                                                            |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Classic propaganda theory (Lasswell) |                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                            |
| 1                                    | Manipulation of significant symbols ( $CPT_1$ )             | Exploitation of symbolic images significant to the majority of Ukrainians for ideological purposes in a way that Russia is presented as the one who “defiles” them.                                                              | Imperialistic policy; Manipulations; Violate territorial integrity; etc.   |
| 2                                    | Mobilization of public opinion ( $CPT_2$ )                  | Contains a call to action, encouraging Ukrainians to respond to Russia’s actions.                                                                                                                                                | International tribunal dedicated to Russia’s crimes against humanity; etc. |
| 3                                    | Demoralization of enemy ( $CPT_3$ )                         | By underlining Ukrainians inner strength and justice and / or concentrating on Russia’s problems and mistakes, the message aims to inflict shame on Russians and ultimately encourage them to stop “aggression” against Ukraine. | Bravery; Hero; Legend; Absence of cruelty; Adequate man; etc.              |
| 4                                    | Adaptation of rhetoric to public opinion swings ( $CPT_4$ ) | ( <i>Hypothetical</i> ) Negative rhetoric towards Russia and Russians becomes less harsh after a numbers of Ukrainians large and thus influential enough begins to advocate an improvement of Russian-Ukrainian relations.       | ( <i>Not discovered</i> )                                                  |
| Hegemonic propaganda model (Chomsky) |                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                            |
| 1                                    | Total governmental control ( $HPM_5$ )                      | The ruling elite controls all spheres of Ukraine’s public life, thus opinion of ordinary people (especially if in contrary to the official rhetoric) has no impact on public life.                                               | ( <i>Based on the discoveries of CDA</i> )                                 |

|                                 |                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                        |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2                               | Media channels controlled by ruling elites (HPM <sub>6</sub> )      | A consequence of Attribute 1. The media channel of text's origin is in direct or indirect control by Ukrainian ruling elites, thus it publishes only information favorable to them.        | (Based on the discoveries of CDA)                                                      |
| 3                               | Distracting public attention from real problems (HPM <sub>7</sub> ) | The problem addressed in the text is irrelevant to the Ukrainian society and thus has no tangible significance.                                                                            | (Based on the discoveries of CDA)                                                      |
| 4                               | Incitement of fear (HPM <sub>8</sub> )                              | By painting a grim picture of Russian reality, the text stirs fear among Ukrainians of the situation in Ukraine which could have occurred if there were no Euromaidan.                     | Bans; Detaining; Corruption; Institutional racism; Suppression; Repressive norms; etc. |
| Common attributes (both models) |                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                        |
| 1                               | Militarization (CPA <sub>1</sub> )                                  | Strong accent and praising of the Ukrainian soldiers and volunteers, their professionalism and moral qualities (in contrast to those of Russia).                                           | Bravery; Hero; Absence of cruelty; Adequate man; etc.                                  |
| 2                               | Falsification of history (CPA <sub>2</sub> )                        | Historical events are deliberately twisted (via generalization, hyperbole, evasions, etc.) in a way that they support the negative image of Russia and / or the positive image of Ukraine. | Dominance of Russian people; Destruction; etc.                                         |
| 3                               | Demonization of enemies (CPA <sub>3</sub> )                         | Excessive besmirching of Russia and Russians, sometimes with use of derogatory and dehumanizing terms.                                                                                     | Racist society; Legal nihilism; Enemy; Savage; etc.                                    |
| 4                               | Selective presentation of facts (CPA <sub>4</sub> )                 | Facts that may damage Ukraine's positive reputation are not mentioned, as well as positive facts about Russia.                                                                             | Dominance of Russian people; Forcefully taking away; etc.                              |

The result of the coding unit and word count in the Ukrainian texts can be found in Table 12 (*see next page*). The word numbers are valid the original texts, i.e. in Ukrainian or Russian language.

Table 12.

*Number of Ideologically Laden Expressions per Each Ukrainian Text*

| <u>N</u>      | <u>Short text name</u>      | <u>Total № of sampling<br/>and coding units</u> | <u>№ of words (w /<br/>title and lead) (%)</u> | <u>№ of<br/>ideologically<br/>laden words (%)</u> |
|---------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| 1             | Russian racism...           | 33                                              | 545 (100%)                                     | 54 (~10%)                                         |
| 2             | Putin's greatest<br>fear... | 51                                              | 864 (100%)                                     | 67 (~8%)                                          |
| 3             | "Kremlin's Trojan<br>horse" | 62                                              | 1.078 (100%)                                   | 84 (~8%)                                          |
| 4             | Set a fire trap...          | 43                                              | 634 (100%)                                     | 61 (~10%)                                         |
| 5             | Words about<br>Crimea...    | 77                                              | 1.124 (100%)                                   | 122 (~11%)                                        |
| <b>MEDIAN</b> |                             | <b>~53</b>                                      | <b>849 (100%)</b>                              | <b>~78 (~9%)</b>                                  |

The mapping of hate speech and propaganda in the Ukrainian media texts is

presented in Table 13.

Table 13.

*Propaganda and Hate Speech in Each Ukrainian Text*

| <u>Attribute</u>            | <u>Text 1</u> | <u>Text 2</u> | <u>Text 3</u> | <u>Text 4</u> | <u>Text 5</u> |
|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| HS <sub>1</sub>             | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             |
| HS <sub>2</sub>             | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             |               | ✓             |
| HS <sub>3</sub>             | ✓             |               | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             |
| HS <sub>4</sub>             | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             |               | ✓             |
| HS <sub>5</sub>             | ✓             |               |               | ✓             | ✓             |
| HS <sub>6</sub>             | ✓             |               |               | ✓             | ✓             |
| HS <sub>7</sub>             |               |               |               | ✓             | ✓             |
| HS <sub>8</sub>             | ✓             |               |               |               | ✓             |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                | <b>7/8</b>    | <b>3/8</b>    | <b>3/8</b>    | <b>5/8</b>    | <b>8/8</b>    |
| CPT <sub>1</sub>            | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             |
| CPT <sub>2</sub>            | ✓             | ✓             |               | ✓             |               |
| CPT <sub>3</sub>            |               |               |               | ✓             | ✓             |
| CPT <sub>4</sub>            |               |               |               |               |               |
| <b>SUB-TOTAL</b>            | <b>2/4</b>    | <b>2/4</b>    | <b>1/4</b>    | <b>3/4</b>    | <b>2/4</b>    |
| HPM <sub>1</sub>            |               |               |               |               |               |
| HPM <sub>2</sub>            | ✓             |               |               | ✓             |               |
| HPM <sub>3</sub>            | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             |               | ✓             |
| HPM <sub>4</sub>            |               |               | ✓             |               | ✓             |
| <b>SUB-TOTAL</b>            | <b>2/4</b>    | <b>1/4</b>    | <b>2/4</b>    | <b>1/4</b>    | <b>2/4</b>    |
| CPA <sub>1</sub>            |               |               |               | ✓             |               |
| CPA <sub>2</sub>            | ✓             |               |               |               |               |
| CPA <sub>3</sub>            | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             | ✓             |
| CPA <sub>4</sub>            | ✓             | ✓             |               | ✓             | ✓             |
| <b>SUB-TOTAL</b>            | <b>3/4</b>    | <b>2/4</b>    | <b>1/4</b>    | <b>3/4</b>    | <b>2/4</b>    |
| <b>TOTAL<br/>PROPAGANDA</b> | <b>7/12</b>   | <b>7/12</b>   | <b>4/12</b>   | <b>7/12</b>   | <b>6/12</b>   |

Finally, the attributes pair matching in the Ukrainian texts has the following results:

Table 14.

*Attribute Pair Matching: Ukrainian Texts*

| Attributes pair                    | Text 1      | Text 2      | Text 3      | Text 4      | Text 5      |
|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| HS <sub>2</sub> – CPT <sub>1</sub> | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |             | ✓           |
| HS <sub>7</sub> – CPT <sub>2</sub> |             |             |             | ✓           |             |
| HS <sub>2</sub> – CPT <sub>3</sub> |             |             |             |             | ✓           |
| HS <sub>4</sub> – CPT <sub>4</sub> |             |             |             |             |             |
| HS <sub>6</sub> – HPM <sub>1</sub> |             |             |             |             |             |
| HS <sub>6</sub> – HPM <sub>2</sub> | ✓           |             |             | ✓           |             |
| HS <sub>6</sub> – HPM <sub>3</sub> | ✓           |             |             |             | ✓           |
| HS <sub>8</sub> – HPM <sub>4</sub> |             |             |             |             | ✓           |
| HS <sub>3</sub> – CPA <sub>1</sub> |             |             |             | ✓           |             |
| HS <sub>6</sub> – CPA <sub>2</sub> | ✓           |             |             |             |             |
| HS <sub>5</sub> – CPA <sub>3</sub> | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |
| HS <sub>6</sub> – CPA <sub>4</sub> | ✓           |             |             | ✓           | ✓           |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                       | <b>6/12</b> | <b>2/12</b> | <b>2/12</b> | <b>5/12</b> | <b>6/12</b> |
| <b>TOTAL CPT</b>                   | <b>4/8</b>  | <b>2/8</b>  | <b>2/8</b>  | <b>4/8</b>  | <b>4/8</b>  |
| <b>TOTAL HPM</b>                   | <b>5/8</b>  | <b>1/8</b>  | <b>1/8</b>  | <b>4/8</b>  | <b>4/8</b>  |

To sum up the analysis chapter, this mixed-method approach has revealed some remarkable trends within the media discourse of Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, the CDA has once again proved to be the suitable method of the wide-spectrum analysis of media propaganda. Furthermore, the main ideologies of the two countries that are shaping their media discourse were identified and revealed. The answers to the research questions can be given and the hypotheses can be tested based on the analysis results. The detailed findings and hypotheses testing are given in the following chapter.

## §5. Findings

This chapter is dedicated to the reflection of the analysis findings and the testing of hypotheses based on them. Firstly, the findings will be presented separately for the Russian and Ukrainian texts analyses. After that, based on this information, the answers to the research questions will be given, and the hypotheses – supported, partially supported or declined.

The analyses of the Russian texts have revealed several important trends. First and foremost, due to historic reasons, the geopolitical schools of Panarin and Dugin have a major influence on Russian governance and public life. Being based on the imperialistic ideology, they give the country's ruling elite the *carte blanche* to a rather aggressive reaction on the events in Ukraine and an interpretation of international law that seems dubious to the Western democracies.

Secondly, all of the five major media channels from which the texts were taken are under the direct or indirect control of the country's political elite. This allows them to control the media field and agenda of the country, i.e. to channel the public opinion in the desired way. Knowing this, it would be appropriate to state that in the Russian media people de-facto reproduce the opinion of Kremlin itself. This is especially important in terms of the conflict with Ukraine. Although all Russian texts demonstrate the trend to “demonize” Ukraine, especially the Ukrainian authorities, the dominant rhetoric of the Russian media regarding Ukraine is not aggressive and dehumanizing, but rather derisive, ironic and sarcastic. Even those Russian texts which discussed real acute problems of the Ukrainian society contain this tone and are far from being an objective analysis. Four out of five Russian texts present only one (type of) opinion.

This type of rhetoric mitigates the hostility of the message and makes the text less “propaganda-like”, with explicit ideologically laden rhetoric making out the median of only 12% of the total number of words. However, taking into consideration all factors and discourse structures, it matched around **60%** of all propaganda criteria. If split by the two models of propaganda, the median value of match for Russian texts with the *Classical Propaganda Theory* is ca. **59%** (57,5% match including common criteria and 60% without them). For the *Hegemonic Propaganda Model*, the number makes up **67,5%** (70% with and 65% without common attributes). At the same time, the rhetoric of Russian texts coincides with exactly **85%** of the hate speech attributes. However, concerning propaganda attributes pairs matched within the Russian texts, **37,5%** of pairs matched for the Classic Propaganda Theory, and **50%** matched for the Hegemonic Propaganda Model.

At the same time, Ukrainian media channels enjoy by far greater freedom from political elites’ influence than Russian ones, with only two channels out of five controlled by acting politicians. This being said, though, all of them lack criticism of the ruling elites and the country’s overall political course, taking a self-defensive and self-vindictory stance. Ukrainian texts demonstrate a contrast to the Russian ones with stronger abhorrence towards and blaming of the “aggressor”, whereas derisive tone is also present, but to a lesser extent. The main ideological background of Ukrainian texts is the so-called “victim ideology” which is manifested in the self-victimization of Ukraine, excessive blaming of (“finger-pointing” at) Russia and vindication of its own rather aggressive and hostile opinions. Among them are such extremes as depriving Russia and its predecessor states of legitimacy to exist (in contrast to Russian rhetoric

that delegitimizes only the post-Euromaidan government of Ukraine). As a result, the five Ukrainian texts' rhetoric corresponds with **65%** of hate speech attributes.

Speaking of *propaganda*, despite being more evident than in Russian texts, the ideologically laden words and expressions make up the median of only ca. 9% of all words in the texts matched the propaganda attributes by **51,4%**. The rhetoric of Ukrainian texts matched attributes of *Classic Propaganda Theory* by the median of ca. **51%** (by 52,5% with common attributes and by 50% without them). It matched the *Hegemonic Propaganda Model* attributes by the median of **~41%** (by 47,5% with common attributes and by 35% without them). However, only **33,4%** of the Classic Propaganda Theory attributes and **~31%** of the Hegemonic Propaganda Model (i.e., less than 50%) matched with hate speech attributes in the Ukrainian texts.

Therefore, judging by these data, **Hypothesis 1** ("*Hate speech is a tool of propaganda within both propaganda models*") **is rejected**, for it appears to be a tool of only one propaganda model, the Hegemonic. **Hypothesis 2** ("*Hegemonic propaganda model by Chomsky employs more hate speech than Lasswell's classic propaganda theory*") **is partially supported**, or, more precisely, supported for the Russian case, but rejected for the Ukrainian case. Both countries appear not to employ much blatant hate speech in their propaganda. Instead, they rely on other lexical tools of propaganda. This can be explained by the geopolitical context that both countries are a part of. Both of them are an integral part of political processes in the European continent and globally (especially Russia), which does not allow the regimes of both states to develop into blatantly authoritarian regimes able to deploy a full-scale propaganda machinery, as it is a case of some undemocratic regimes of Asia and Africa.

**The answer to the SQ<sub>2</sub> “Is Ukraine practicing russophobic hate speech in media within its conflict with Russia?” is positive.** And with Ukrainian 65% match to hate speech compared to the Russian 85%, **Hypothesis 3** (“*The amount of russophobic hate speech in Ukrainian media texts is lower than ukrainophobic hate speech in Russian media texts*”) **is supported.**

Apart from hypotheses-relevant discoveries, the study has also found out a notable peculiarity. Namely, the Russian texts seem to fit more into the Hegemonic Propaganda Model, whereas the Ukrainian texts’ rhetoric rather coincides with the principles of the Classic Propaganda Theory. A proposed explanation for this is the difference in ideological backgrounds of the two countries. Each ideology shapes the discourse and the aims of propaganda rhetoric. For Ukrainians, the main direction of the rhetoric is defensive, and for Russians – offensive. This could have also caused the different proportions in matching hate speech and propaganda within them.

Summing up, the analysis of the Russian and Ukrainian media text has given a rather surprising answer to the research question concerning the role of hate speech in the propaganda models. Although it is prominent, in the texts, it is not directly tied to propaganda, or, more precisely, it is not implemented as a full-scale tool of information war, as it was the case, for example, during the Rwandan genocide. Furthermore, it has been found that both countries’ media discourses are highly influenced and shaped by the dominant ideologies in Russia and Ukraine. These do not only shape the media agenda, but the very policy of the countries: both on the international level and towards each other. Although this study is broad and multidisciplinary, it still leaves a number of research gaps and limitations, which will be examined more thoroughly in the following chapter.

## **§6. Implications and Suggestions for Future Research**

This chapter is dedicated to the reflection of the study. More precisely, it gives an overview of the possible research gaps for future generations of scholars that this study has left or brought up. Moreover, this chapter contains the description of this study's limitations that could influence the results of the analyses in this or that way.

This is a pioneering study of connections between propaganda and hate speech in a modern armed conflict. First of all, this research is a valuable multidisciplinary reference for further studies of modern Russian-Ukrainian relations in terms of their conflict. This conflict has become global and influences not only the two participants, but the global international scene. Moreover, as the conflict is still unfolding and ever new manifestations of it keep appearing, this study can be an informative basis for future analysis of them. Nevertheless, this study leaves several "blank spots" which can give inspiration to further analyses.

One of such gaps is the Ukrainian media and their content. Until this study, they have been on the outskirts of international academic research. However, after the Euromaidan and Ukraine's declaration of the pro-European path of development, its media policy and media field needs further research – especially on the part of the international academia. Further objective analysis and expert recommendations will help shape and develop Ukrainian media channels in a way that they genuinely become part of the European i.e. Western media system.

Although this study is wide and covers a wide range of phenomena and material, it is not without certain limitations. They are connected with the study's topic and methods. First of all, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is a complex and delicate topic which embraces such questions as trust between nations, principles of legitimacy,

problems of state security etc. This conflict has had a global impact on international relations, and it is thus rather difficult to preserve neutrality towards this matter.

Secondly, both methods of this study impose the limitations of the researcher's personal attitudes, knowledge, understanding and interpretations. The author tried to adhere to the principles of objectivity, remain as neutral as possible in judgments and analyses, and not to involve personal opinion on the matter in any way. Nevertheless, the personal factor cannot be fully excluded.

Moreover, this study selected media channels based on their popularity and audience reach. Therefore, the relation between propaganda and hate speech in other media channels remains unknown. Particularly notable and worth further research would be the investigation of propaganda and hate speech relation in social media where content control is not so strict. Furthermore, other communication channels and their exploitation for propaganda tools remain open to studies.

Information warfare is a newly emerged and rapidly unfolding dangerous phenomenon that threatens the whole world and the very basics and principles of democracy. There are still no internationally unified ways to counter it without infringing freedom of expression and information. Further research could investigate other local manifestations of info war, its impact on democracy from different perspectives: political, legal, communicational, etc. When applied to some other two conflicting countries of the world, this study could shed light on the media propaganda in them, as well as the role of hate speech in it.

Thus, this study leaves a wide range of various phenomena and theory variations that are yet to be analyzed and touched upon. Future generation of scholars that chose to dedicate their research to the phenomena of hate speech and propaganda, to this study's

methodology, or to any aspect of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict will be able apply findings of this study as a useful and informative reference in their own papers.

Furthermore, they will be able to mind this study's limitations and thus avoid or minimize them in their own works, thus enriching the existing academic research on any matter touched within this paper.

## **§7. Conclusion**

The modern digital era when information has become transparent and easily accessible from all over the globe keeps changing all spheres of human life. One such sphere that is undergoing major changes is the sphere of conflicts and war. More and more armed conflicts are being largely supplemented by information war which unfolds in the sphere of communication and symbols. Its advantage in contrast to the traditional war is, first of all, its speed and efficiency. Secondly, info war is able to cause extensive damage without physically killing the enemy and destroying his infrastructure. By manipulating and exploiting the opponent's beliefs, fears and discourse, the information warfare is able to secure a victory over him with long-term effects. The main weapon of information war is communication and its phenomena.

It is no wonder that a wide number of political regimes has understood the destructive force of communication and has begun to exploit it and its phenomena as a tool of warfare. For instance, conflicting countries have been using the phenomenon of propaganda since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century: not only to demoralize the enemy and distort the public discourse in their own favor, but also to keep their own populations battle-ready and to persuade them to willingly die "for a cause". Historically, propaganda has been associated with undemocratic countries whose power structures allow total control of the information agenda by the ruling elites. Today, propaganda is still practiced by such regimes, although due to numerous reasons (among them: globalization and the need to cooperate with other actors on the international arena) its rhetoric appears as toned-down in comparison to, for example, judophobic propaganda of Nazi Germany.

Until now, two large approaches to propaganda have been described: the Classic Propaganda Theory by Lasswell and the Hegemonic Propaganda Model by Chomsky.

The major difference between them is the evaluation of the role of ideology within propaganda. While Lasswell leaves a lot of room to the public opinion and its ability to influence the rhetoric of propaganda, Chomsky claims that the public opinion has little to no impact on the rhetoric of propaganda, because the government control is too strong. Despite the different approaches to ideology, these two models agree on several aspects of propaganda. These common traits include excessive militarization, one-sided presentation of current and historic events and extreme besmirching of the opponents, portraying them as evil and dangerous. The last attribute is often manifested in the use of pejoratives, slurs and derogatory terms in descriptions of opponents.

This very attribute is also the main attribute of another communication phenomenon: hate speech. Like propaganda, it can have a devastating effect in real life and inflict physical harm. As historical examples demonstrate, it can even lead to armed conflicts and acts of violence, and can thus be used as a weapon of information war. Hate speech is a modern phenomenon; however, its attributes and historic cases of its implementation have brought forth an assumption that it might be used as a tool of propaganda as well.

The contemporary Russian-Ukrainian conflict presents a remarkable example of a conflict where armed and information warfare are combined and complement each other. The two states actively engage in information war against each other, justifying their own actions and accusing the other side of aggressive racist hate speech and propaganda. Due to this fact, historic reasons and peculiarities of the two countries and their bilateral relations, an assumption had been made that, if hate speech and propaganda are related to each other in any way, the example of Russian-Ukrainian conflict would demonstrate it.

In order to examine this problem, a mixed qualitative method was implemented. Among the employed methods are: critical discourse analysis (CDA), content analysis, and policy analysis. These methods were chosen because of the complexity and multifaceted nature of the analyzed problem and phenomenon. The main method of this study is CDA, and the other methods are employed as supporting methods.

This study has revealed several noteworthy phenomena and trends. First of all, both Russian and Ukrainian media texts addressing their neighbor are largely ideologically laden. Although the ideologies behind Russian and Ukrainian texts are different, the main common aim they follow is, on the one hand, to vindicate the own country and its role in the conflict, and, on the other hand, to besmirch the other country, its ruling elite, population, supporters and foreign allies, way of life etc. Even when the media authors analyze actual problems of the neighboring country, their tone is still ideologically laden and far from objective. As propaganda is largely built on ideology according to both models, it can be stated that when it comes to analytical overview of Russian-Ukrainian bilateral relations since 2013, both countries' mainstream media largely publish propaganda material.

The second noteworthy discovery is the definition of types of propaganda that the two countries engage in. It appears that Russian media texts' rhetoric largely coincides with attributes of the Hegemonic Propaganda Model; the Ukrainian ones' – with those of the Classic Propaganda Theory, respectively. This distribution is presumptively based on the key ideologies of the two states discourse that influence the propaganda rhetorics as well.

Furthermore, both Russian and Ukrainian mainstream media texts can be characterized by the presence of a large amount of hate speech published in their media

contents. In both cases the main direction of hate speech is nationalistic: anti-Russian for the Ukrainian texts and anti-Ukrainian for the Russian texts. At the same time, the study had demonstrated that a typical Ukrainian media text contain less russophobic hate speech in contrast to the amount of ukrainophobic hate speech in Russian texts.

It has also been found that a typical Russian mainstream media text employs hate speech as a tool of propaganda to a certain extent, whereas a typical Ukrainian mainstream media text does not. However, the general trend for the both states is the majority of texts avoid the use of dehumanizing rhetoric in reference to the “enemy”, in contrast to the historical examples of violent hate speech (i.e., in Rwanda). The main tool of propaganda in both cases is rather emotionally laden derisive rhetoric towards the other country rather than blatant hate speech.

However, an alarming trend is that none of the ten analyzed texts contained even an indication of a change towards less hostility between the two states and restoration of normal relations between them. This indicates that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is still far from its resolution.

This research has also made some developments of the existing theoretical background. First of all, it has proven that propaganda and hate speech are both tools of information war. Secondly, it can be said with certainty that hate speech is an instrument of the Hegemonic Propaganda Model. The same cannot be said about Classic Propaganda Theory, though, as this theory is more applicable to the defensive information war. Further research of the Russian-Ukrainian information war or the application of this study to other international examples could test these claims and expand the existing research. The more attention and academic scrutiny information war and its instruments receive the more controllable and less devastating it will get. Finally,

this study has broadened the Critical Discourse Analysis theoretical background by the discovery of a new discourse structure which was not mentioned by previous scholars. This structure has been called “adoption of the enemy’s rhetoric”. It was employed by both Russian and Ukrainian texts’ authors. Based on this structure, the analyst can not only identify the text’s ideology, but also get an insight into how the communicator aims to present the “enemy’s” way of thinking.

All these findings present an important development in the research of the information war, its theories, tools and manifestations. They will be a useful background study not only for scholars of various disciplines, but also for political analysts, media workers and political advisors, thus contributing to a development of a safer democratic society.

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## **Appendix A**

### **Media Texts Sets**

#### **Preface to Media Text Sets**

This appendix contains the two sets of media articles that were analyzed in this paper. The two sets of media articles are presented in this appendix in alphabetic order. Thus, the Russian set is presented first, followed by the Ukrainian one. This order is valid in English, Russian and Ukrainian languages.

These sets contain the original texts of media articles in Russian or Ukrainian language, followed by the translation of the texts into English. The translations were done by this study's author. Articles in this appendix are arranged in the order they were analyzed.

In the English translation of the 5<sup>th</sup> Ukrainian text, the quotations from Constitutions of different states were taken from their original text (in case of USA Constitution) or from official English translations of these.

The appendix contains only textual elements of the media articles. Any audio, visual and audio-visual materials supporting the articles were neither analyzed nor included in this appendix.

Each media article is preceded by the name of its publishing media channel spelled in English, the web-link to the original publication on the channel's website, the date of publication, and the name of the publication's author(s) spelled in English, and in original spelling put in round brackets.

The original bold and italic formatting of the media texts after the article's title and the title's translation was preserved in this appendix, both in original texts and in English translations.

Important notes by this study's author are italicized and given in the English translations of the texts in square brackets. Their aim is to clarify certain terms, puns or metaphors in the texts that may not be clear to a non-Russian or non-Ukrainian scholar i.e. reader.

## **Media texts: Russian Set**

### **1. Komsomolskaya Pravda**

Link: <https://www.kp.ru/daily/26507/3376520/>

Date of Publication: March 23<sup>rd</sup> 2016

Author: Israel Shamir (Израэль Шамир)

#### **Original Text:**

#### ***Крым – Два Года Спустя***

*Наш колумнист - о нынешнем положении героев «русской весны»*

В Крыму прохладно, дует холодный ветер с моря, в горах лежит снег. Но в утешение – сейчас цветет миндаль, яблони, персик, и белые и розовые облака цветов украшают крутые склоны. Трава только начинает пробиваться, а море все еще ледяное. Рестораны в большинстве своем закрыты, санатории и отели проходят предсезонную уборку и ремонт. Но рейсы в Москву и из Москвы полны, цены на авиабилеты вполне щадящие и терпимые, сравнимые с поездкой на такси в аэропорт – как при Леониде Ильиче. Сейчас в Крым летят молодые туристы в тяжелых походных ботинках с палатками, веселые парочки, для обычного полнотелого курортника еще рановато.

Вот уже два года, как полуостров вернулся в состав России, и по этому случаю прошли праздники и парады, несколько омрачаемые перебоями с энергией. А как сами жители Крыма? Они не сожалеют, что оставили Украину и

присоединились к России. Во-первых, потому, что к России они чувствовали и раньше большую близость. А во-вторых, потому что той Украины, в которой они жили и которую они помнят, уже нет, и они это знают.

Некоторые – возможно, многие – с грустью вспоминают о жизни до воссоединения. Цены были куда ниже, продукты доступнее, жизнь проще и дешевле, говорят они. Тогда мы всё могли себе позволить, сейчас – уже нет. Но они бывают и на Украине, и знают, что и там жизнь стала гораздо трудней. Киевский переворот 2014 года еще долго будет кошмаром висеть над нашими странами. Это февральский путч вынудил Россию принять болезненное решение по Крыму.

Если бы Россия не взяла Крым, в севастопольскую бухту вошли бы американские авианосцы. На этом можно было бы поставить крест на черноморском военно-морском флоте. Ему пришлось бы частично уйти в маленький и непригодный порт Новороссийска, а основной массе – "эмигрировать" на Тихий океан. Напрасны оказались бы старания Петра, Екатерины, Ушакова, Нахимова, матроса Кошки и прочих матросов, офицеров и адмиралов. Россия осталась бы без военно-морского щита на своем юге. Все, осуждающие решение Путина по Крыму, должны понять его неизбежность. Меньше сделать было нельзя. Возможно, следовало бы взять больше, но Россия, верная принципам невмешательства, предпочла как можно меньше вмешиваться в украинские дела.

К сожалению, два года назад жители русскоязычных областей Украины – а их восемь, от Одессы до Харькова – приняли политическую риторику федеральных телеканалов за призыв к действиям. Так поднялась Русская Весна.

После ее поражения множество про-русских политиков, журналистов, бизнесменов бежали – кто в Ростов, кто в Москву, а многие – в Крым. Остались измученные боями Донецкая и Луганская народные республики, отказавшиеся примириться с хунтой. Россия спасла их от гибели, но не дерзнула присоединить, – а они надеялись на повторение крымского результата.

Для эмигрантов Крым – предмет горькой зависти. Так старшие сестры смотрят на самую юную и красивую, вышедшую замуж, и оставившую их куковать в девках. Для них решение взять Крым – только Крым – было трагедией. Если взять всю Украину было трудно без активной поддержки президента Януковича, а тот побоялся бороться, – то хотя бы восемь русскоязычных областей Могли бы стать дружественной Новороссией, – говорят эмигранты, и тогда Крым стал бы локомотивом, тянущим все вагоны. Возможность отделиться всей Новороссии оставалась до мая 2014 года, до признания Россией президента Порошенко. Не хватало только убежденности и решимости в Москве.

Мне рассказали украинские эмигранты, что в окружении российского президента было мало сторонников Новороссии. Если бы не настойчивое требование армии и флота, то и Крым ушел бы под Киев. Кремлевские эксперты убеждали президента, что народ на Украине не поддержит русскую инициативу. Они не верили, что можно провести референдум, и поэтому президент Путин просил руководство мятежных республик отложить референдум. (Как мы знаем, он все же был проведен с блеском.) И назначенные Януковичем губернаторы были готовы стать на сторону России. Но Россия все колебалась, и принимала только вынужденные решения.

Я встретил в Крыму Олега Царева, высокого, статного и харизматического молодого (сорока с лишним лет от роду) лидера. Бывший зампред украинского парламента, замглавы фракции правящей партии регионов – самый крупный политик Украины, открыто ставший на сторону России; multimиллионер, пожертвовавший почти всем своим немалым состоянием во имя Новороссии; во время киевского майдана он был одним из немногих, смело выступавших за союз с Россией.

Он носит зеленую майку с портретом Путина и девизом «Самый вежливый президент». Впрочем, ему так ни разу не довелось встретиться с русским президентом. «Свита не допускает?» – спрашиваю я его. Он старается отвечать дипломатично, чтобы никого не обидеть. «Я в изгнании, но, слава Богу, не на Колыме, а в Крыму. Путин не встречается – и не встречался ни с одним из украинских политиков.»

Да, конечно, он в Крыму, владелец небольшого санатория, в прошлом – усадьбы княгини Барятинской, а не в тюрьме в Киеве. Но ему нелегко – после четырех каденций в Раде, после высоких постов (последний – председатель парламента Новороссии) он напрочь выведен из политической жизни. Федеральные каналы перестали им интересоваться. КПРФ вроде позвала в депутаты, но потом передумала. Фейсбук удалил его страницу с тремястами тысячами подписчиков, без права обжалования.

Он собирался идти на президентские выборы на Украине в мае 2014 года, но его отговорили – мол, не следует придавать легитимности этим выборам. Он снял свою кандидатуру, на выборах победил Порошенко, которого признала Россия, а Царев остался на бобах. Жаль, что этот замечательный отважный

человек с его удивительным, достойным восхищения прошлым вынужден заниматься койко-местами.

В сложном положении находится и Чалый, еще одно блестящее имя Русской Весны. Он конфликтует с губернатором Меняйло. Действительно, за два российских года я не увидел улучшений в Балаклаве, самом красивом и необычном районе-пригороде Севастополя. Обшарпанные дома, заколоченный кинотеатр, самострой-киоски мешают разглядеть эту жемчужину Южного Крыма. Да и в других районах не видно улучшений. Жители говорят, что на местах осталось большинство чиновников, служивших во время украинского правления, и они, как и прежде, норовят распилить бюджет, а не улучшить очень потрепанную инфраструктуру дивного полуострова.

Мы можем понять трудные решения, которые иногда вынуждено принимать российское руководство. Россия не всё может, ей противостоят могущественные враги. Но больше доверия к людям, настоящим живым активным людям, героям русской весны в Украине только упрочило бы российскую власть. И Крым, где у Москвы все еще высокий кредит доверия, мог бы стать площадкой для нового союза народа и власти.

### **МЕЖДУ ТЕМ**

**Если заново провести референдум, весь Крым опять встанет в очередь в Россию**

Несмотря на решение крымчан больше никогда не возвращаться на Украину, независимая никак не может с этим смириться. В ход пошли и перекрытие дорог, и энергоблокада... И нам очень уж захотелось посмотреть, как

живет семья человека, под чьим руководством и были взорваны линии электропередач, ведущие из Украины в Крым.

**Translation into English:**

***Crimea after Two Years***

*Our columnist [writes] about the current condition of the heroes of the “Russian Spring”*

It is chilly in Crimea; a cold wind is blowing from the sea, snow lies on the mountains. But as a solace, almond, apple, peach trees are blooming, white and pink clouds of flowers decorate the stiff slopes. Grass only begins to sprout and the sea is still chilly. Most restaurants are closed; spas and hotels are undergoing a pre-season cleaning and renovation. But the flights to and from Moscow are full, flights prices are quite sparing and enduring in comparison to prices of taxis to the airport – like under Leonid Ilyich [*Brezhnev*]. Now young tourists with hard ammunition boots on and tents, and joyful couples are flying to Crimea; it is still early for an ordinary corpulent holiday-makers.

It has been two years since Crimea returned to Russia, and on this occasion there are festivals and parades, somewhat darkened by blackouts. How about Crimeans themselves? They do not regret leaving Ukraine and rejoining Russia. First of all, because even before they felt a greater intimacy towards Russia. And secondly because the Ukraine they lived in and remember is no more, and they know it.

Some – maybe, the majority – remember their life before the reunion [*of Crimea with Russia*] with sadness. The prices were much lower, the grocery more available, the life was simpler and cheaper, they say. Then we could allow ourselves everything, not

anymore. But they visit Ukraine and know that there too the life has become far more difficult. The Kyivan coup of 2014 will haunt our countries for a long time to come. This February coup forced Russia to make a painful decision on Crimea.

Had Russia not taken Crimea, American aircraft carriers would have entered the port of Sevastopol [*Crimean capital city*]. That would put an end to the [*Russian*] Black Sea Navy. Part of it would have been forced to relocate into the small and unadjusted port of Novorossiysk, and the rest would have to “immigrate” to the Pacific Ocean. All labors of Peter [*the Great*], Catherine [*the Great*], Ushakov, Nakhimov, sailor Koshka and other sailors, officers and admirals would have been in vain. Russia would have been left without a naval shield on its south. Everyone who judges Putin’s decision on Crimea needs to accept its inevitability. Less could not have been done. Maybe more should have been taken, but Russia remains faithful to the principles of non-intervention, chose to intervene as little as possible into the Ukrainian affairs.

Unfortunately, two years ago inhabitants of the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine – there are eight of them, from Odessa to Kharkiv – accepted the political rhetoric of the federal TV channels calling to action. So the Russian Spring was raised. After its failure many pro-Russian politicians, journalists, businesspeople fled – some to Rostov, some to Moscow, and many – to Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics are left, tormented by battles, refusing to bear with the junta. Russia saved them from demise, but did not dare to integrate them, – and they hoped to repeat the Crimean result.

For the emigrants Crimea is an object of bitter envy. It is the way elder sisters look at the youngest and the prettiest one who got married and left them old maids. If we take the whole Ukraine, it was hard without president Yanukovich’s [*former*

*president of Ukraine, ousted as a result of Euromaidan*] active support, but he was afraid to fight, – at least eight Russian-speaking regions could have become a friendly Novorossiia, – emigrants say, and then Crimea could have become a locomotive pulling all wagons. The possibility of all Novorossiia separating [*from Ukraine*] remained until May 2014, before Russia recognized president Poroshenko. Moscow lacked confidence and determination.

Ukrainian emigrants told me that there were few supporters of Novorossiia in Russian president's team. Without insistent demands of the army and navy Crimea would have gone under Kyiv. Kremlin experts kept persuading the president that Ukrainians would not support the Russian initiative. They did not believe that a referendum could be held, therefore president Putin asked the leaders of rebellious republics to postpone the referendum (As we know, it was still brilliantly held). And governors appointed by Yanukovych were ready to stand with Russia. But Russia kept doubting and made only constrained decisions.

I met Oleg Tsaryov in Crimea, a lofty and charismatic young (in his early forties) leader. Former deputy head of the Ukrainian parliament, deputy head of the ruling Party of regions [*Yanukovych's party*] – the greatest politician of Ukraine who stood with Russia; a multimillionaire who spent almost all his riches in the name of Novorossiia. During the Kyivan Maidan he was one of the few who boldly advocated for union with Russia.

He wears a t-shirt with Putin's portrait and slogan "The most polite president". However, he has never had a chance to meet the Russian president. "Did [*Putin's*] escort not let you?" – I ask him. He tries to reply diplomatically in order not to hurt anyone. "I am in exile, but, thank God, not on the Kolyma [*river in the Russian far*

*north. Near its shores numerous Soviet Gulag labor camps were situated*], but in Crimea. Putin does not meet – and never met anyone of Ukrainian politicians”.

Yes, of course, he is in Crimea, the owner of a small spa, formerly the manor of duchess Baryatinska; and not in prison in Kyiv. But he is having a tough time – after four cadences in the [*Verkhovna*] Rada [*Ukrainian parliament*], after high positions (the last one – chairman of the Novorossiia parliament) he is completely thrown out of the political life. [*Russian*] Federal channels are no longer interested in him. KPRF [*Russian Communist party*] ostensibly invited him as MP, but then changed its mind. Facebook deleted his profile with three hundred followers without the right of appeal.

He planned to run for presidential elections in Ukraine in May 2014, but was persuaded from it – like, do not legitimize these elections. He withdrew his candidacy, Poroshenko won the elections and was recognized by Russia, and Tsarev was left high and dry. Such a pity that this amazing and daring man with his unique admirable past needs to work with hotel rooms.

Chaliy, another brilliant name of the “Russian Spring” is also going through a tough time. He is in conflict with governor Menyaylo. Indeed, for two Russian years I have not seen improvements in Balaklava, the most beautiful and unusual suburb region of Sevastopol. Shabby houses, nailed-up cinema, unauthorized kiosks prevent from seeing this pearl of South Crimea. And there are no improvements in other regions either. Locals say that the majority of clerks who served under Ukrainian rule are still in local governance. As usual, they strive to siphon off the budget and not to improve the extremely dilapidated infrastructure of the marvelous peninsula.

We can understand the hard decisions that Russian government needs to take sometimes. Russia cannot do everything, powerful enemies stand against it. But more

trust towards the people, real living and active people, heroes of the Russian Spring in Ukraine would only strengthen the Russian government. And Crimea, where Moscow still enjoys a high credit of trust could become a ground for a new union of people and government.

### **MEANWHILE**

**If the referendum were held again, the whole Crimea would stand in line to Russia again**

Despite the Crimeans' decision never to return to Ukraine, the "Nezalezhnaya" just cannot get over it. Blocking of roads and blackouts were unleashed... We would really like to see the life of the family of the clerk who ordered to blow up the power lines from Ukraine to Crimea.

### **2. Lenta.ru**

Link: <https://lenta.ru/articles/2015/04/18/backtothefuture/>

Date of Publication: April 18<sup>th</sup> 2015

Author: Gevorg Mirzoyan (Геворг Мирзоян)

#### **Original Text:**

#### ***Путь к Светлому Прошлому***

*Отрицание советского периода ставит под вопрос присоединение западноукраинских областей*

Украина продолжает все глубже и глубже погружаться в полномасштабный кризис. Ее кредитный рейтинг на преддефолтном уровне, экономика продолжает схлопываться, правящую коалицию сотрясают интриги и скандалы. Люди из Блока Петра Порошенко активно копают под Яценюка,

премьерский «Народный фронт» в лице депутата Антона Геращенко называет Юлию Тимошенко и Олега Ляшко агентами ФСБ, сама Юлия Владимировна присоединяется к травле Яценюка. На фоне этого слишком много знающие бывшие соратники Януковича отстреливаются или совершают загадочные самоубийства, а минские соглашения находятся на грани срыва. Однако у киевских властей есть более важные задачи: они принимают серию законов по глобальному переписыванию украинской истории XX века. «Лента.ру» разбиралась, к чему это может привести.

### **Четыре реформы**

Придя к власти на Майдане, путчисты обещали населению не только светлое европейское будущее, но и не менее светлое украинское прошлое. В частности, реабилитацию «героев борьбы за независимость Украины», а также отказ от влияния России и всего «москальского» на украинское государство. Однако после того, как первый шаг на этом направлении (начало процедуры отмены статуса русского языка) привел к потере значительной территории Донбасса, официальный Киев отказался действовать в лоб и попытался подойти к пересмотру истории через Компартию Украины, которую отождествил с советским наследием. Сам процесс запрета КПУ и коммунистической идеологии начался в июле 2014 года и завершился 9 апреля 2015 года — принятием в режиме ошпаренного ежика (по сокращенной процедуре и без всякого обсуждения) так называемого «пакета по декоммунизации», состоящего из четырех законов. И касался он не только коммунизма, но и коммунистического прошлого Украины.

Так, первый из этих законов предполагал рассекречивание советских архивов и создание специальной базы данных, куда содержимое архивов будет выложено для всех желающих с ним ознакомиться. По замыслу авторов закона, эти архивы должны продемонстрировать всю преступность коммунистического режима, существовавшего на территории нынешней Украины, — а значит, архивы будут должным образом отфильтрованы. Из них, скорее всего, удалят документы, компрометирующие нынешних руководителей страны, которые в годы славной комсомольской юности сотрудничали с КГБ. Ну или не удалят, — все в итоге зависит от устремлений тех, кому поручат разбирать документы.

Второй закон признавал всех украинских террористов и партизан XX века борцами за независимость Украины. Их награды приравниваются к государственным, ветераны этих группировок получают государственные льготы. А чтобы историки не пытались начать дискуссию о методах их работы (например, о Волынской резне, где ради «независимости Украины» нынешние герои вырезали несколько десятков тысяч местных поляков), закон вводит уголовную ответственность за публичное отрицание заслуг ОУН-УПА и других подобных организаций, а также самой трактовки тех событий как борьбы Украины за независимость.

Третий закон направлен на ликвидацию одного из самых сильных объединяющих символов советской эпохи — победы над фашизмом, которая, как известно, была «одна на всех». По мнению авторов закона, Украина не находилась в стане победителей, поскольку была оккупирована Советским Союзом. Именно поэтому в документе прописана замена термина «Великая Отечественная война» на «Мировая война», введено 8 мая как День памяти и

примирения. Авторы закона не рискнули запрещать 9 мая, но отменили «неперсонифицированные символы» Победы — например, георгиевскую ленточку (которая уже дискредитирована отождествлением ее с «российской агрессией» и «колорадами»).

Наконец, четвертый закон приравнял коммунизм к нацизму (две принципиально разные идеологии — коммунизм не предполагает ни расовой ненависти, ни расовой исключительности, ни физического уничтожения всех «иных» по биологическому признаку), запретил публичное использование всех коммунистических символов на Украине и обязал власти переименовать все города, населенные пункты, улицы и площади, имеющие советскую топонимику. «Символы, включая пятиконечную звезду, а также серп и молот исчезнут с улиц украинских городов. Это равносильно свастике. Символика тех, кто мучил Украину, больше не будет использоваться, а нарушители будут привлекаться к ответственности», — заявил председатель Блока Петра Порошенко Юрий Луценко. Ответственность за такие нарушения — до пяти лет тюрьмы.

### **Эта история не нужна**

Сами украинские власти считают масштабное переписывание истории своего рода обнулением негатива, после которого страна может двигаться в прекрасное далеко, которое украинцам обещают уже больше года. «Пока мы не освободимся от этого коммунистического груза в худших его проявлениях, он будет тянуть Украину в прошлое, тормозить развитие и закрывать дорогу в будущее», — говорит нардеп от Блока Петра Порошенко Мария Матиос. Ряд политологов соглашаются с этой точкой зрения. «Психологически украинцы давно готовы распрощаться с тоталитарным, посттоталитарным, советским и

постсоветским прошлым. Люди очень устали от безысходности или же временности существования, на что нас и обрекает такое состояние промежуточности, — говорит украинский политолог Вадим Карасев. — Из СССР как бы вышли, когда он распался, однако он остался не как административная или геополитическая структура, а как некая среда, в которой мы были вынуждены проживать, проматывая при этом собственное позитивное наследие и откладывая на потом европейское будущее. По этой причине декоммунизация является давно назревшим шагом. Он должен привести государство к существованию в совершенно новых символических координатах».

Никто, в общем-то, и не спорит, что Украине как новому государству, существующему всего лишь два с лишним десятка лет, нужна новая государственная идеология, а также набор мифов — идей и ценностей, которые самоидентифицируют и сплачивают создаваемую украинскую нацию, отделяют ее от «чужих». Однако в украинских реалиях оптимальным вариантом стало бы строительство мультиэтничного украинского общества, создание или же акцентирование наднациональной идеи, объединяющей живущих на территории государства русских, украинцев, евреев и другие народности. Однако этот вариант был расценен как слишком сложный. Он требует не только тщательной и осторожной работы, но и привлекательных объединительных идей.

«Евроинтеграция» и «антипутинизм» оказались, по всей видимости, неэффективными, а иные варианты власти предложить попросту не могут. Отчасти потому, что страна в кризисе, отчасти из-за того, что все идеи, так или иначе связывающие украинцев с российским наследием, кажутся Киеву политически некорректными.

Именно поэтому власти выбрали иной вариант — создание моноэтничного, моноязыкового и унитарного государства, легитимность которого будет основываться на тотальном отрицании советского прошлого Украины, а также и всего позитивного, что дала стране Россия. Однако проблема Киева в том, что этот подход хотя теоретически и имеет перспективы, но на практике, в украинских реалиях, несет новому государству ряд угроз.

### **Разрушать не надоело?**

Прежде всего, он не способствует достижению цели — созданию стабильного и эффективного государства. Для этого режиму Петра Порошенко необходимы достаточные силовые инструменты для наказания несогласных, с высоким уровнем легитимности и идеологически привлекательные, которые нивелировали бы культурное влияние восточного соседа. Ничего этого у Киева сейчас нет, поэтому законы эти лишь вносят дополнительный раскол в украинское общество.

Так, далеко не все украинцы согласны с отсечением от истории страны целых пластов населения. «Исходя из логики авторов последних украинских новаций, навешанных во многом внешними консультантами, не ясно, чем на деле занимались многие поколения украинцев, строившие современное государство, но не сидевшие при этом в схронах бандеровцев и не участвовавшие в националистическом диссидентском движении», — говорится в заявлении российского МИД. Особенно сильно непонимание на подконтрольной Киеву части юго-востока, где местные провластные активисты не стали дожидаться подписания закона президентом и уже начали разрушение памятников советской эпохи. «В нынешних условиях массовых протестов ждать вряд ли стоит, но

раздражение киевской властью усилилось еще больше. Более того, многие умеренные сторонники проведения АТО на Донбассе и в целом того курса, которым идет Украина, тоже не одобряют такого рода решения. Ведь сложно не заметить, что, например, памятники разрушаются просто варварски, с вопиющим нарушением закона. И даже те люди, которые спокойно восприняли бы цивилизованный демонтаж, отрицательно относятся к действиям радикалов. Кроме того, все больше и больше украинцев задаются вопросом, когда же «патриоты» будут не только разрушать, но и что-то, наконец, создадут», — говорит директор Восточноукраинского центра стратегических инициатив Роман Травин. Про Донбасс и говорить нечего, — пакет по декоммунизации еще больше усложнил и без того непростой процесс интеграции ДНР и ЛНР с Украиной.

Кроме того, закон может дестабилизировать ситуацию и в центральных регионах Украины — в частности, дать новый толчок охоте на ведьм и «мусорным люстрациям», поскольку обеспечивает крайне широкую трактовку понятия правонарушений. Фактически, согласно закону, посадки и штрафы возможны даже за чтение советской литературы, а также за хранение старой советской банкноты. В Киеве, конечно, утверждают, что никто перегибать палку не будет, однако в реальности закон можно использовать для сведения политических счетов. Тем самым у власти снова отнимут монополию на насилие, а идея верховенства закона и социальная стабильность будут подорваны.

Наконец, большие споры и дискуссии в обществе вызовет процесс переименования улиц и населенных пунктов, которое, согласно закону, должны провести за полгода. Мало того, что население недовольно стоимостью процесса (по некоторым оценкам, только комплексное переименование населенных

пунктов обойдется влезшей в долги и сокращающей бюджетные расходы Украине почти в 300 миллионов долларов), так еще и возникнет серьезный вопрос, на что менять. Например, город Днепропетровск (вторая часть названия дана в честь коммуниста Петровского) до 1926 года назывался Екатеринославом — в честь Екатерины II. Вряд ли нынешние власти согласятся возвращать такое название. Как тогда называть? Коломойск? Если да, то как к этому отнесутся украинские националисты? Другой пример — Кировоград, который до 1934 года назывался Елизаветградом, то есть снова в честь императрицы. Российской.

### **Польша подождет**

Конечно, теоретически такие разговоры хоть и несут угрозу государству, но при этом выгодны самим украинским властям (чьи интересы с государственными не совпадают). Уж лучше пусть люди ломают копья вокруг «Коломойска», чем задают неудобные вопросы о коррупции и неэффективности государственного управления. Однако проблема в том, что закон о декоммунизации может повлечь за собой недовольство внешних друзей киевского режима, чье мнение (как показала, например, история с тем же Коломойским) имеет определяющее значение для внутриукраинской политики.

Ни для кого не секрет, что Игоря Коломойского осаждали во многом по решению Вашингтона. Соединенные Штаты заинтересованы в укреплении властной вертикали на Украине. По полуофициальным данным — для того, чтобы предотвратить массовые расхищения средств, выделяемых Украине западными фондами, по неофициальной — для того, чтобы превратить страну в надежный антироссийский «санитарный барьер», который разделял бы Россию и ЕС как в географическом, так и в политическом смысле. В этом плане дерусификация

Украины соответствует интересам Вашингтона, однако им не соответствуют методы, избранные Киевом для реализации процесса. Американцы опасаются обострения внутреннего конфликта на Украине, которым может воспользоваться Владимир Путин (отчасти поэтому они и не дают «добро» на активизацию борьбы между Яценюком и Порошенко), поэтому хотели бы, чтобы дерусификация проходила медленно, через постепенное отождествление символов советской эпохи (вплоть до русского языка) с российской агрессией, через топорное, но эффективное обрабатывание украинского населения через СМИ. А не через перманентную гражданскую войну, которую может вызвать ускоренная декоммунизация.

Кроме того, отрицание советского наследия дает некоторым украинским друзьям основания для того, чтобы в будущем поживиться за счет Украины. Так, многих возмутила пассивная реакция Польши на закон, героизирующий организаторов Волынской резни, — польский министр иностранных дел Гжегож Схетына заявил, он не является проблемой для Варшавы. «Во главу угла встает вопрос политической целесообразности. Поляки сами выбирают, какие трагедии выносить на подмостки аудитории, — поясняет «Ленте.ру» полонист Дмитрий Офицеров-Бельский. — Сейчас для Польши вопрос построения партнерских отношений с новыми украинскими властями является приоритетом. И если напоминание о болезненных вопросах общей истории может этому помешать, то громких заявлений ждать не стоит». Однако поляки держат в уме другой аспект закона: делегитимация советского периода ставит под вопрос и законность присоединения к Украине западноукраинских областей (отторгнутых у Польши в 1939 году). И в нужный момент поляки этот счет могут предъявить.

**Translation into English:*****Path to Bright Past***

*Denial of the Soviet era questions the annexation of West-Ukrainian provinces*

Ukraine continues to plunge deeper and deeper into a full-scale crisis. Its financial ranking is on a pre-market crash level, the economy continues to implode, the ruling coalition is shaken by intrigues and scandals. People from Petro Poroshenko's block actively dig under Yatsenyuk [*Ukrainian prime minister in the transition period*], prime minister's "Narodny Front" via MP Anton Geraschenko calls Yulia Tymoshenko and Oleh Lyashko FBI agents, and Yulia Vladimirovna herself joins the hate campaign against Yatsenyuk. Against this background the former people of Yanukovych fire back or commit mysterious suicides, and Minsk negotiations are on the brink of hindering. However, Kyivan government has more important tasks: they pass a series of laws on global rewriting of Ukrainian history of the 20th century. "Lenta.ru" investigated what this can lead to.

**Four reforms**

After coming to power on Maidan, the coupists have promised the populace not only a bright European future, but also a not less brighter Ukrainian past. Among others, the rehabilitation of "the heroes who fought for Ukraine's independence" and the rejection of Russia's influence and everything "Moskal" [*derogatory term for a Russian used mostly by Ukrainians and Poles*] in the Ukrainian state. However the first step in this direction (annulation of the status of the Russian language) has led to a loss of a significant part of Donbas' territory; official Kyiv refused to act straightforward and tried to rewrite the history via the Ukrainian Communist Party which is associated with the Soviet legacy. The process of forbidding the UCP and the communist ideology

commenced in July 2014 and ended on April 9th 2015 by passing the so-called “de-communization packet” consisting of four laws, in a form of a “bald hedgehog” (shortened procedure without any discussion). It concerned not only communism, but Ukrainian communist past as well.

So, the first of these laws foresees the disclosure of Soviet archives and creation of a special database where the archives’ contents will be placed for everyone who wants to get familiar with them. As envisioned by the law’s authors, these archives should demonstrate the utter criminality of the communist regime that existed on modern Ukraine’s territory – it means that the archives need to be duly filtrated. Most likely the documents that unmask the country’s current leaders who have cooperated with the KGB in the years of their Komsomol [*Soviet Communist Youth Union*] youth will be removed. Or [*they will*] not [*be removed*], – it eventually depends on the strivings of those who will be authorized to sort the documents.

The second law recognized all Ukrainian terrorists and partisans of the 20th century as fighters for Ukraine’s independence. Their awards are made equivalent to national awards; veterans of these alignments will receive national benefits. And to prevent historians from discussing their working methods (for example the “Volhynian slaughter”, when in the name of “Ukraine’s independence” the now-proclaimed heroes massacred tens of thousands of local Poles), the law foresees criminal offense for public denial of the merits of organizations such as OUN and UPA, and of the mere interpretation of those events as Ukraine’s fight for independence.

The third law aims to eradicate one of the strongest uniting symbols of the Soviet era – the victory over fascism which, of course, was “one for all”. In the law’s authors’ opinions, Ukraine was not among the victors, because it was occupied by the

Soviet Union. For this reason the law foresees the substitution of the term “Great Patriotic war” [*the term used in Russia and most Post-Soviet countries to describe the war between Soviet Union and Nazi Germany from 1941 until 1945*] with “World war”, and May 8th is introduced as the Day of remembrance and reconciliation. The authors did not risk to forbid May 9th [*in Russia and most Post-Soviet countries, May 9th, “the Victory Day”, is when the victory over Nazi Germany is celebrated*]; however, they forbade the “non-personified symbols” of the Victory – for example, the ribbon of St. George [*black and orange ribbon, an important military and patriotic, pro-governmental symbol in Russia*] (which is already discredited through its identification with “Russian aggression” and “Colorados”) [*derogatory term for a Russian: connected with the St. George ribbon that is striped, as a Colorado beetle*].

Finally, the fourth law made communism equivalent to Nazism (two groundly different ideologies – communism does foresees neither racial hatred, nor racial superiority, nor physical extermination of all “others” in a biological sense), forbade the public use of all communist symbols in Ukraine and obliged the government to rename all cities, settlements, streets and squares with Soviet toponymy. “Symbols, including the five-winged star, as well as hammer and sickle, will disappear from the streets of the Ukrainian cities. It is equal to a swastika. The symbols of those who tortured Ukraine will be no longer used, and the violators will be prosecuted”, - said the president of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, Yuriy Lutsenko. Amenability for such violations is up to five years in prison.

### **This history is not needed**

Ukrainian government itself sees the massive rewriting of their kin as a nulling of negativity, after which the country would be able to move forward into the beautiful

far that is being promised to the Ukrainians for over a year. “Until we get rid of this communist burden in its worst manifestations, it will be pulling Ukraine back into the past, braking the development and closing the way into the future”, - says Maria Matios, MP of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. Some political scientists support this point of view. “Psychologically, Ukrainians are long ready to say goodbye to the totalitarian, post-totalitarian, Soviet and post-Soviet past. People are very tired of hopelessness and impermanence of existence – that is what this intermediate condition foredooms us to, - says Ukrainian political scientist Vadim Karasev. – [*We*] left the USSR as if when it collapsed, but it remained; not as an administrative or geopolitical structure but as some kind of environment that we were forced to live in, blowing off our own positive legacy and postponing the European future. That is why the de-communization is a long overdue step. It has to bring the country to an existence in a brand new set of symbols”.

Actually, nobody argues that Ukraine as a new state which exists for only two decades needs a new state ideology and a set of myths – ideas and values which serve as a self-identifying and uniting element for an emerging Ukrainian nation, that divide it from the “others”. However, in Ukrainian status-quo, an optimal variant would be a creation of a multiethnic Ukrainian society, creation or underlining of a supranational idea which would unite Russians, Ukrainians, Jews and other ethnicities living on the country’s territory. However this variant was cast out as too complicated. It demands not only a thorough and careful work, but also attractive uniting ideas. “European integration” and “anti-Putinism” obviously turned out to be ineffective, and the government cannot offer new variants. Partly because the country is in crisis, partly because all the ideas that bind Ukrainians with Russian legacy in this or another way seem politically incorrect to Kyiv.

This is why the government chose another option – creation of a monoethnic, monolingistic and unitary state whose legitimacy will build upon a total denial of Ukraine's Soviet past and all the positive [*things*] that Russia gave to the country. However Kyiv's problem is that although this approach is promising in theory, it brings the new state a row of threats in practice, in Ukrainian reality.

**Are you not tired of destruction?**

First of all, it does not contribute to the accomplishment of the aim – the creation of a stable and effective state. For this, Petro Poroshenko's regime needs a sufficient amount of highly legitimate and ideologically attractive force instruments for punishment of the dissenters which would minimize the eastern neighbor's influence. Now, Kyiv has nothing of that; that is why these laws bring extra polarization into the Ukrainian society.

So, not all Ukrainians agree with cutting off entire blocks of population from the country's history. "According to the logic of the authors of the most recent Ukrainian innovations, by far inspired by foreign consultants, it is not clear what were indeed many generations of Ukrainians doing, who were building a modern state but did not sit in the Banderovites' hideouts and did not take part in the nationalistic dissident movement", - so the announcement of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs. Especially unclear it is to the part of the southeast [*of Ukraine*] controlled by Kyiv where the local pro-government activists could not wait for the president to sign the law and already started to destroy the Soviet-era monuments. "The annoyance with Kyivan government has become even stronger, although in current circumstances we should not expect mass protests. Moreover, many moderate supporters of political subdivision in Donbas and of the general course that Ukraine is following also do not support such

decisions. It is hard not to understand that, for example, the monuments are destroyed in a barbaric way, with flagrant breach of law. Even those people who would have accepted a civilized demolition view the radicals' actions negatively. Apart from that, more and more Ukrainians ask themselves when will the would-be patriots finally start creating something, not only destroying", - says director of the East Ukraine Center for strategic initiatives Roman Travin. There is nothing to say about Donbas – the decommunization pack has made the uneasy process of integration of DPR and LPR into Ukraine even more complicated.

Moreover, the law can destabilize the situation in central provinces of Ukraine too – more precisely, to give a new start to the witch hunt and “trash lustrations” [*purge of Ukrainian government from Yanukovych's people and high Soviet communist party members; nicknamed “trash” because several ousted politicians were later beaten up and thrown into trash containers by radical activists*], as it understands a very broad interpretation of law violations. De-facto, according to the law, imprisonment and fines are possible even for reading Soviet literature and for storage of old Soviet banknotes. Of course, in Kyiv they say that no-one will go too far, but in reality the law can be used for settling political scores. Thus the government will be deprived of monopoly on violence, and the idea of the primacy of law and social stability will be shaken.

Finally, the renaming of streets and settlements that the law prescribes to be carried out in half a year will cause large arguments and discussions. Not only is the population displeased with the cost of the process (according to some evaluations, the complex renaming of settlements alone will cost the indebted Ukraine that slashes its budget expenditures nearly 300 million dollars), but also a serious question arises, as what to rename. For example, the city Dnipropetrovsk (the second part of the name

comes from the communist Petrovsky) bore the name Ekaterinoslav – after Ekaterina II – until 1926. Hardly will the new government agree on restoring this name. How to name it then? Kolomoysk [*after Ihor Kolomoyski, the former Governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast*]? If yes, how are Ukrainian nationalists going to treat that? Another example is Kirovograd, which was called Elizavetgrad before 1934, i.e. again after an empress. The Russian one.

### **Poland can wait**

Of course, theoretically, although these talks do not threaten the country, they are profitable for Ukrainian government itself (whose interests do not fit the country's interests). Let people better shake spears over "Kolomoysk" than ask unsuitable questions about corruption and inefficiency of state governance. However the problem is that the de-communization law can lead to discontent of external friends of the Kyivan regime whose opinion (as the story with Kolomoyski, for instance, has shown) is of paramount importance for the internal policy of Ukraine.

It is not a secret that Ihor Kolomoyski was besieged mostly because of Washington's decision. United States are interested in strengthening Ukrainian top-down governance. Officially – in order to prevent mass plundering of resources given to Ukraine by western funds, unofficially – in order to turn the country into a solid anti-Russian "sanitary barrier" that would divide Russia and the EU both geographically and politically. In these terms, de-Russification of Ukraine fits Washington's interests; however the methods Kyiv has chosen to realize it do not fit them. Americans are afraid of escalation of Ukrainian inner conflict that Vladimir Putin could make use of (partly because of this they give a "green light" to the escalation of conflict between Yatsenyuk and Poroshenko), that is why they would not like the de-Russification to go slow,

through gradual identification of Soviet era symbols (up to the Russian language) with Russian aggression, through an uncouth but efficient brainwashing of Ukrainian populace through mass media. Not through permanent civil war that can be caused by accelerated de-communization.

Apart from that, the denial of Soviet legacy gives some friends of Ukraine grounds to feast on Ukraine in future. So, many were outraged by a rather passive reaction of Poland on the law that praises the organizers of Volhynian slaughter, - Polish minister of foreign affairs Grzegorz Schetyna stated that it is not a problem for Warsaw. "The question of political practicability is a top priority. Poles will choose themselves what tragedy will be scaffolded by the public, - explains Dmitry Ofitserov-Belsky, an expert in Polish studies, to "Lenta.ru". – Now for Poland the building of partner relations with new Ukrainian government is a priority. And if reminding of painful moments of common history can hinder it, one should not expect bombshells". However, Poles keep another aspect of the law in mind: delegitimization of the Soviet era puts into question the accession of west-ukrainian provinces to Ukraine (that were seized from Poland in 1939). And in a suitable moment the Poles can remind of this.

### **3. Moskovskiy Komsomolets**

Link: <http://www.mk.ru/politics/2017/11/09/bandera-ukraine-ne-pomozhet-nezalezhnaya-razrugalas-so-vsemi-sosedyami.html>

Date of Publication: November 9<sup>th</sup> 2017

Author: Vadim Samodurov (Вадим Самодуров)

**Original Text:**

***Бандера Украине Не Поможет: Незалежная Разругалась со Всеми  
Соседями***

*Эксперты рассказали, почему Порошенко изолирует свою страну*

Украина вместо заявленной евроинтеграции все больше противопоставляет себя западным соседям. Сербия срочно отозвала своего посла в независимой Раде Булатовича для консультаций. Причиной стал дипломатический скандал, разразившийся между Белградом и Киевом. Таким образом, Сербия стала четвертой страной, у которой в последние недели резко испортились отношения с Украиной, примкнув в этом противостоянии к Венгрии, Польше и Румынии.

Майданный украинский лозунг «Вся Европа с нами» незаметно трансформировался в тезис «Пол-Европы против нас». Что стало закономерным следствием ориентации украинской политической элиты на радикальный национализм. В Европе наконец-то разглядели, что игры с возвеличиванием нацистских преступников времен Второй мировой — не просто «домашнее развлечение», но несут угрозу всем западным ценностям. Так же, как и полное игнорирование прав национальных меньшинств в стране «победившего достоинства». Венгрия и Румыния, чьи диаспоры в независимой вкуче с русскоязычным населением Украины попали под удар нового закона об образовании, запрещающем обучение на родном языке, устали уговаривать Киев смягчить свою позицию. И перешли к жестким ответным мерам. Вице-премьер Украины по вопросам европейской и евроатлантической интеграции Иванна Климпуш-Цинцадзе пожаловалась, что в Будапеште всячески блокируют дальнейшее развитие «запланированных вещей между Украиной и НАТО»,

используя для этого действие в Альянсе принципа консенсуса. Кроме того, Венгрия намерена блокировать и сближение Украины с Евросоюзом.

До недавнего времени у незалежной был свой «адвокат» в ЕС — Польша. Но с начала ноября отношения с этой страной резко обострились. После того, как главе МИД Польши Витольду Вашиковскому во Львове сообщили, что его страна так же, как и Россия, является оккупантом, политик вернулся в Варшаву на «взводе». Он заявил, что Польша слишком много прощала Украине, но «мы пришли к выводу, что нас используют». В связи с чем в Польше пригрозили создать «черный список» украинских политиков с «антипольскими взглядами». Первым таким «черносписочником» стал никто иной, как глава Украинского института национальной памяти Владимир Вятрович, который обзывал Польшу нехорошими словами за то, что она отказывается впускать в страну сторонников СС «Галичина». Напомним, бойцы именно этой дивизии устроили в годы ВОВ резню польского населения Волыни. По этому поводу высказался уже и президент Польши Анджей Дуда, который обратился к Петру Порошенко с призывом отстранить от должности людей, «которые откровенно провозглашают националистические и антипольские взгляды». Ситуация накалилась настолько, что Порошенко инициировал проведение чрезвычайного заседания Консультационного Комитета президентов Украины и Польши...

И на этом фоне теперь возникла Сербия, которая тоже оказалась не готова прощать Украине хамства. Дело в том, что посол Украины в этой стране Александр Александрович дал интервью информационному portalу BIRN, в котором сообщил, что Россия использует Сербию для уничтожения Европы. . В сербском МИД напомнили, что «Сербия всегда поддерживала территориальную

целостность Украины. В то же время украинские наемники участвовали в преступлениях, совершенных хорватскими силами против сербского народа в Хорватии». Сербские радикалы уже призвали выслать из страны разговорчивого украинского посла...

А если вспомнить еще и недавние разногласия Украины с Белоруссией и Молдавией, то получается, что независимая своими руками создала вокруг себя «недружественный пояс». Зачем ей это надо и готовы ли украинские политики хоть к каким-то компромиссам, «МК» рассказали эксперты:

**Кирилл МОЛЧАНОВ, замдиректора украинского Института анализа и менеджмента политики:**

Ситуация для Порошенко сложная: с одной стороны он понимает, что заигрывание с националистами приведет к тому, что он подорвет взаимоотношения со странами Восточной Европы, а с другой не может отказаться от уступок им в вопросах образования, исторической памяти и так далее. В противном случае ультраправые воспримут решение президента как предательство национальных интересов, и он лишится своей последней опоры в стране. В связи с этим Порошенко вынужден идти по пути вялой текущей изоляции страны в военном, финансовом, дипломатическом и других аспектах. Всем этим он жертвует ради того, чтобы в 2019 году попытаться вновь стать президентом и получить большинство в Верховной раде.

**Андрей БУЗАРОВ, член Общественного совета при МИД Украины:**

- Для части гражданского общества Украины вопрос героизации Бандеры является принципиальным моментом. В этом же ключе они рассматривают взаимоотношения республики с соседями. Если президент Петр Порошенко

откажется разделять их взгляды на украинизацию школ, героизацию ОУН-УПА (запрещенная в России организация) и так далее, он растеряет весь свой электорат. При этом та часть украинского общества, которая считает бандеровцев преступниками сегодня слишком разобщена. Опора на них ничего не даст правящей элите. Вместе с тем едва ли проводимая украинскими властями политика в обозримой перспективе повлияет на европейские устремления Киева. Евросоюз не монолитен в своем отношении к истории. Например, Италии, Франции и Германии нет никакого дела до того, кто такой Бандера. Да, отношения Украины, например, с Польшей могут продолжить ухудшаться, но на взаимодействии с Евросоюзом в целом это никак не скажется.

#### **Translation into English:**

#### ***Bandera Will Not Help Ukraine: Nezalezhnaya Fell Out with All Its Neighbors***

*Experts said why Poroshenko isolates his country*

Instead of proclaimed European integration Ukraine opposes itself to its western neighbors more and more. Serbia urgently called off its ambassador in nezalezhnaya Rade Bulatović for consultations. The reason was a diplomatic scandal that broke out between Belgrade and Kyiv. Thus Serbia became the fourth country with which Ukraine has drastically spoilt its relations, accompanying Hungary, Poland and Romania in this resistance.

‘Maidanian’ Ukrainian slogan “All Europe is with us” discreetly transformed into the claim “Half of Europe is against us”. This was a natural consequence of the orientation of Ukrainian elite towards radical nationalism. Europeans have finally

understood that [*Ukrainian*] games with glorification of Nazi criminals of World War II are not just a “domestic entertainment”, but a threat for all Western values. As well as complete disregard of the ethnical minorities’ rights in the land of “the victorious dignity”. Hungary and Romania whose diasporas and Russophone population in the nezalezhnaya fell under the new law on education forbidding education on [*their*] native language got tired of persuading Kyiv to soften its position. So they turned to a harder reply. Vice-Prime-Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze complained that Budapest keeps blocking the further development of “planned things between Ukraine and NATO” by using the consensus principle of the Alliance. Apart from that Hungary is determined to block the alignment of Ukraine with the European Union.

Until recently, nezalezhnaya had its “advocate” in the EU – Poland. But since the beginning of November the relations with this country have rapidly grown worse. After Polish foreign affairs minister Witold Waszczykowski learned in Lviv that his country, like Russia, is an occupant, he returned to Warsaw steamed up. He stated that Poland has been forgiving Ukraine too much, but “we came to a conclusion that we are being exploited”. In light of this Poland threatened with a creation of a “black list” of Ukrainian politicians with “anti-Polish views”. The first “blacklisted” became none other than head of Ukrainian institute of national remembrance Vladimir Vyatrovych who called Poland nasty names because it refused to let supporters of SS “Galicia” [*Nazi German military division formed of ethnic Ukrainians*] into the country.

Reminder: during WWII the fighters of this division committed a massacre of Poles in Volhynia. Polish president Andrzej Duda already reacted to this and addressed Petro Poroshenko with an appeal to dismiss people who “openly proclaim nationalistic and

anti-Polish ideas”. The situation heated up to the extent that Poroshenko initiated the organization of an emergency meeting of the Consultive Committee of Presidents of Ukraine and Poland...

Against this background now Serbia has appeared, also unready to forgive Ukraine its rudeness. The matter is that Ukrainian ambassador in this country Alexander Alexandrovych gave an interview to the information portal BIRN where he stated that Russia exploits Serbia to destroy Europe... Serbian foreign affairs ministry reminded that “Serbia always supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine. At the same time Ukrainian contractors took part in crimes of Croatian forces against Serbs in Croatia”. Serbian radicals have already called to banishing the talkative Ukrainian ambassador from the country...

And if we remember Ukraine’s recent disputes with Belarus and Moldavia, it happens that nezalezhnaya has created an “unfriendly circle” around itself by its own hands. Experts told “MK” why it needs this and whether Ukrainian politicians are ready for at least some compromise.

**Kirill MOLCHANOV, deputy director of Ukrainian Institute of analysis and management of politics:**

It is a complicated situation for Poroshenko: on the one hand, he understands that flirtation with nationalists can lead to a loss of relations with Eastern Europe; on the other hand he cannot renounce concessions to them in terms of education, historical memory et cetera. Otherwise the far-right will see the president’s decision as a betrayal of national interests and he will lose his last stronghold in the country. In this regard, Poroshenko is forced to follow the path of a low-level isolation of the country in

military, financial, diplomatic and other aspects. He sacrifices all this in order to become a president again in 2019 and acquire the majority in the Verkhovna Rada.

**Andrei BUZAROV, member of the Public Council of the Ukrainian**

**Ministry of foreign affairs:**

- For a part of Ukrainian civil society, the heroisation of Bandera is a principal issue. They view relations of the republic with neighbors against this background. If President Petro Poroshenko refuses to share their views on ukrainization of schools, heroisation of OUN-UPA (organizations forbidden in Russia) and so on, he will lose all his voters. Herewith, the part of Ukrainian society that regards Banderovites as criminals is too divided nowadays. Relying on them will give nothing to the ruling elite. Moreover the policy of Ukrainian government will hardly influence Kyiv's European strivings. European Union is not monolithic in its views on history. For example, Italy, France and Germany do not care about who Bandera is. Yes, Ukraine's relations with, say, Poland, may continue to get worse, but it will not affect its general relations with the European Union.

#### **4. RIA Novosti**

Link: <https://ria.ru/analytics/20170929/1505881674.html?inj=1>

Date of Publication: September 29<sup>th</sup> 2017

Author: Zakhar Vinogradov (Захар Виноградов)

**Original Text:**

*На Украине Окончательно Отменили Свободу Слова и Укрепились в*

*Нацизме*

*Захар Виноградов, обозреватель РИА Новости*

Украинские СМИ дружно дожевывают взрывы под Винницей, где сначала вроде бы поймали "диверсантов" (само собой разумеется, российских), а потом решили, что никаких диверсантов не было и что во всем виноват начальник Генштаба Виктор Муженко.

Нет, речь не о том, что в расследовании по взрывам на оружейном складе восторжествовала правда. Просто одна украинская политическая группировка решила подставить под удар другую. Ту самую, в которой у Муженко заметная роль.

Поэтому на Украине решили, что взрывы произошли не в результате диверсии, а вследствие халатности, допущенной генштабистом. И его теперь хотят уволить.

Потом диверсантов снова "поймали". Пока о них на Украине ничего не пишут. Но вряд ли их отпустили. Возможно, продержат на всякий случай в камере до тех пор, пока ситуация окончательно устаканится. А то, если генерал Муженко оправдается, может, опять придется в диверсантов играть...

Еще одна тема, которую бурно обсуждают украинские СМИ, — языковая. Украинские коллеги встали на защиту закона об образовании, который возмутил европейскую общественность запретом на преподавание в школах на языках национальных меньшинств.

Новый закон вызвал негодование в ряде европейских столиц — прежде всего Бухаресте и Будапеште.

И вот украинские коллеги разобрались. Нет, написали они, никакого нацизма нет и в помине. Оказывается, в примечаниях к закону (видимо, появившихся после протестов руководителей Венгрии и Румынии) специально

таким мелким шрифтом указано, что преподавание будет разрешено не только на украинском, но и на двух европейских (на выбор) языках — английском, например, и румынском.

Таким образом, утверждают на полном серьезе некоторые украинские журналисты, никакого нацизма в законе об образовании нет: 150 тысяч венгров и 180 тысяч румын теперь могут спать спокойно, потому что в отношении румын и венгров нацизма и дискриминации на почве национальных языков на Украине не будет.

Что касается восьми миллионов 330 тысяч русских, то о них на родине Гоголя и Шевченко никто не вспомнил.

Как, впрочем, не заметили в большинстве своем мои коллеги и другой сюжет. В Житомире был объявлен приговор в отношении двух украинских журналистов — Дмитрия Васильца и Евгения Тимонина, которые были осуждены по статье "За содействие терроризму" на девять лет тюрьмы каждый.

Фабула дела следующая. Василец и Тимонин, будучи гражданами Украины, помогали продвигать в интернете YouTube-канал проекта "Новороссия ТВ". Сам канал принадлежит кому-то в ЛНР. А ЛНР — "вражеская" для украинской власти организация.

Еще раз: Василец и Тимонин получили по девять лет тюрьмы за продвижение в Сети YouTube-канала "Новороссия ТВ". Это теперь называется на Украине "содействием сепаратизму и терроризму".

В качестве главных доказательств вины журналистов были использованы материалы пресловутого сайта "Миротворец", который курирует народный депутат Украины и советник министра МВД Антон Геращенко.

Характерная деталь: приговор в зале Житомирского суда обоим журналистам судья выносил в отсутствие обвиняемых. Васильца охрана скрутила и вынесла из зала заседаний, поскольку он выразил во время объявления приговора свое несогласие с ним. Тимонин в знак протеста вышел из зала сам.

Как считает весьма авторитетный и известный на Украине юрист Андрей Портнов (вынужден был эмигрировать за границу), "реально они осуждены за высказывания в адрес участников Майдана, чем, как указано в обвинительном акте, "унизили национальную честь и достоинство украинского народа".

Политическая подоплека этого дела ясна: показать всем на Украине, что любое сотрудничество, даже чисто техническое, с ДНР и ЛНР является преступлением, которое влечет наказание — подобное тому, которое присуждают за изнасилования и пытки.

И это не фигура речи. Бойцы добровольческого батальона "Торнадо", которые были осуждены за изнасилования, пытки и угрозы убийством мирных граждан в зоне так называемой "антитеррористической операции", получили примерно такие же, как Василец и Тимонин, сроки — от восьми до 10 лет тюрьмы.

Теперь о ближайшем будущем. В настоящее время в Житомирском суде находится другой подозреваемый в сепаратизме журналист — Василий Муравицкий, которого обвиняют в сотрудничестве с российскими СМИ и за это держат в СИЗО. Его тоже готовят к судебной расправе.

И судить его будет тот же судья, что вынес приговор Васильцу и Тимонину. И в том же зале это будет происходить. И, похоже, многие наши украинские коллеги постараются этого суда так же не заметить.

Вскоре, 5 октября, начнется процесс над другим нашим украинским коллегой — главным редактором сайта "Страна.UA" Игорем Гужвой, против которого сейчас возбуждено то ли четыре, то ли пять уголовных дел. И причина та же — критика существующего режима.

Так что же происходит на Украине?

Однозначно, режим Порошенко под прикрытием и с позволения западных спонсоров, прежде всего США, превращается в нацистский, с активными репрессиями в адрес своих политических оппонентов, в первую очередь журналистов. В этом смысле свобода слова на Украине, по всей видимости, окончательно умерла.

Но это не победа власти над свободой слова, потому что это понятие абстрактное. Это победа над журналистами. Хотя, пока не над всеми.

Потому что пока еще на Украине посадили не всех критиков режима.

Но тенденция — налицо.

#### **Translation into English:**

*In Ukraine, Freedom of Speech Was Definitely Abolished and Nazism*

*Fortified*

*Zakhar Vinogradov, RIA Novosti correspondent*

Ukrainian media unitedly finish chewing on the blasts by Vinnytsia, where allegedly at first the (of course, Russian) “diversionists” were caught, but then it was agreed that there were no diversionists and that it is all fault of Viktor Muzhenko, Chief of Defense.

No, the point is not that the truth has triumphed in the investigation of blasts at the weapons depot. Simply one Ukrainian political group decided to put the other one under fire. The one where Muzhenko is an important figure.

That is why in Ukraine they decided that the blasts happened not as a result of a diversion, but of carelessness of the Defense person. And now they want to fire him.

Then the diversionists were “caught” again. There are no reports about them in Ukraine yet. But they have hardly been released. Perhaps they will be under arrest just in case until the situation calms down for good. Because if general Muzhenko gets justified, they will probably have to play diversionists again...

One more topic that is actively discussed in Ukrainian media is the linguistic one. [My] Ukrainian colleagues rallied to defense of the education law that outraged the European society with an abolishment of school education in languages of ethnic minorities.

The new law caused outrage in several European capitals – first of all in Bucharest and Budapest.

And now [my] Ukrainian colleagues have sorted things out. No, they wrote, there is no trace of Nazism here. Turns out, an appendix to the law (that probably appeared after protests of Hungarian and Romanian leaders) points out in small letters that education not only in Ukrainian, but in two European languages, for example, in English and Romanian, is also allowed.

Therefore, as some Ukrainian journalists say in dead earnest, there is absolutely no Nazism in the education law: 150 thousand Hungarians and 180 thousand Romanians can now sleep peacefully because there will be no Nazism and discrimination on linguistic grounds against them in Ukraine.

Regarding eight million 330 thousand Russians, no-one remembered them in the native land of [*Nikolai*] Gogol and [*Taras*] Shevchenko.

By the way, most of my colleagues did not notice another topic as well. In Zhytomyr, a sentence was passed to two Ukrainian journalists – Dmitry Vasilets and Evgeny Timonin, both convicted under the article “For assisting terrorism” to nine years in prison each.

The background is such. Vasilets and Timonin as Ukrainian journalists helped to promote the YouTube channel of the project “Novorossiia TV”. The channel itself belongs to someone in the LPR. And the LPR is an “enemy” organization to the Ukrainian government.

Once again: Vasilets and Timonin got nine years each for promotion of a YouTube channel of “Novorossiia TV”. This is called “assistance of separatism and terrorism” in Ukraine now.

As main proofs of the journalists’ fault materials from the notorious website “Mirovtorets” supervised by Anton Geraschenko, Ukrainian MP and Minister of interior’s advisor, were used.

Remarkable detail: the sentence to both journalists in the Zhytomyr court was passed *absente reo*. Vasilets was rounded up and carried out of the session hall because during the pronouncement of sentence he was expressing his disagreement with it. Timonin exited the hall by himself as a sign of protest.

As a rather competent and prominent Ukrainian lawyer Andrey Portnov (was forced to leave Ukraine) means, “in fact they were convicted for their statements about the Maidan participants. In this way, as it is written in the crime bill, they have “humiliated the national honor and dignity of the Ukrainian people”.

The political background of this case is clear: to show everyone in Ukraine that any cooperation, even the technical one, of DPR and LPR is a crime that carries punishment – similar to the one given for rape or torture.

And it is not a metaphor. Fighters of the volunteer battalion “Tornado” who were convicted for rape, torture and threats to kill civilians in the so-called “anti-terrorist operation zone”, received the same sentences as Vasilets and Timonin – from eight to 10 years in prison.

And now about the nearest future. Currently there is another journalist accused of separatism in Zhytomyr court – Vasily Muravitsky, who is also accused of cooperation with the Russian media, and is therefore on pretrial custody. He is also being prepared for the legal reprisal.

And the same judge who passed the sentence to Vasilets and Timonin will judge him. And it will happen in the same court hall. And it seems that our Ukrainian colleagues will try to ignore this case too.

Soon, on October 5th the trial of another Ukrainian colleague of ours, chief editor of the website “Strana.UA” Ihor Guzhva, against whom either four or five criminal charges are brought. The reason is the same – criticism of the current regime.

So what is happening in Ukraine?

Poroshenko’s regime is, under cover and with blessing of western funders, particularly the USA, definitely turning into a Nazi regime with active repressions against its political opponents, primarily journalists. In this regard, the freedom of speech has obviously forever died in Ukraine.

But it is not a victory of government over freedom of speech, because this is an abstract term. This is a victory over journalists. However, not over all of them.

Because not all critics of Ukrainian regime are jailed yet.

But the trend is obvious.

### 5. Vesti.ru

Link: <https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2890298>

Date of Publication: May 21st 2017

Author: Dmitry Kiselyov (Дмитрий Киселёв)

#### Original Text:

#### *Порошенко, Хихикая, Превращает Украинцев в Рабов ЕС*

Евросоюз поставил последние бюрократические подписи, разрешающие туристические поездки гражданами Украины без оформления виз. Порошенко при этом счастливо хихикал. Ранее он называл безвизовый туризм в ЕС "национальной идеей" украинцев. Теперь он заявил, что с Россией оформлен "окончательный развод".

Новый режим пересечения границы вступит в силу в ночь на 11 июня. Туристы из Украины при этом не получают право на работу или учёбу в ЕС, а время пребывания там ограничено — 90 дней в течение полугода. Как раз достаточно для нелегального сбора клубники на польских плантациях.

Ну, что ж, визы сегодня — действительно архаика. Но украинский безвиз — единственное, чего добился Киев после госпереворота, совершённого националистами в феврале 2014-го. Другие "достижения" — лишь отрицательные. И если посмотреть на цену этого безвиза, то будет не до хихиканья. Можно просто ужаснуться.

Госпереворот вырос из "Евромайдана" и совершался под лозунгами борьбы с коррупцией. Мол, Янукович — страшный коррупционер, мол, ему нужна система коррупции, и поэтому-то он не хочет в Европу.

Лозунг борьбы с коррупцией, надо сказать, всегда и везде универсально популярен. Те, кто его выдвигают, как правило, рассчитывают сами прийти к власти, и не демократическим путём, а в результате уличных волнений и незаконного свержения власти. Так было в Северной Африке в ходе "арабской весны", так было и на Украине.

Сработало. Но когда борцы с коррупцией побеждали, то страна погружалась в хаос, а коррупция расцветала, как никогда. Украина — типичный пример. Так, если при Януковиче откаты были 25%, то сейчас с Порошенко откаты при получении госконтрактов достигают аж 50%, а иногда и 75%. По итогам 2016 года Счетная палата Евросоюза признала Украину самой коррумпированной страной Европы. Взятки там — в порядке вещей. Берут все: прокуроры и судьи, чиновники службы МЧС, пограничники и военные. А по Верховной Раде в кабинеты разносят баулы с чёрным налом. Рейдерские захваты, вооружённые и по мошенническим схемам, — норма жизни. Грязные деньги делают на всём.

Пример — украинский конкурс "Евровидения" этого года, который готовили и проводили в хаосе и неразберихе. Европейский перформанс стоил украинской казне 30 миллионов евро, в то время как куда лучшие музыкальные шоу "Евровидения" — например, в Швеции или Эстонии — ранее обходились втрое дешевле. И это при том, что уровень цен там куда выше, чем в Незалежной. Угадайте, куда ушла разница — те самые 75%?

После госпереворота под лозунгами борьбы с коррупцией Украина стала чемпионом мира по скорости распространения воровства, деградации государства и общества, развалу промышленности и обнищанию народа. За три года рост коммунальных платежей увеличился более чем в десять раз. Если в конце 2013-го они составляли на круг 175 гривен с человека, то к концу 2016-го — уже 1978 гривен, то есть под две тысячи.

Зато революционеры, поднятые во власть пеной госпереворота, быстро обогатились. Все помнят, как Арсений Яценюк, ещё находившийся в кресле премьера, не постеснялся шумно отпраздновать "свой первый миллиард".

Дальше — больше. Вынужденно опубликованные декларации министров и депутатов потрясли не только нищий народ Украины, но и все континенты от Европы до Америки. У очень многих — огромные суммы наличности дома, роскошная недвижимость, включая даже храмы, элитные автомобили, коллекции уникальных предметов искусства, дорогих часов, вин, оружия и антиквариата. Описывая всё это, недавние революционеры-антикоррупционеры теряют не только стыд и меру, но даже и чувство юмора.

Так, министр внутренних дел Аваков, судя по его же декларации, — счастливый обладатель коллекции картин и 8 тысяч книг, датированных с XVIII века, монет — с XV века, коллекции винных этикеток, четырёх шуб, собрания оружия и брендовых сумок. Но это все — мелочи по сравнению с множеством рэкетирских долей в украинских компаниях, платящих Министру внутренних дел дань. Ещё у Авакова есть фирма в Италии и две на Кипре.

Офшорный олигарх-президент Порошенко круче всех. Продолжая увеличивать своё состояние, он недоплачивает Украине налоги и богатеет на

гражданской войне. Так что когда Порошенко хихикает за спинами еврочиновников, то можно понять, почему. Хотя смешно бывает и другим тоже.

Например, недавно завод Порошенко "Лениньска кузня" чудесным образом выиграл тендер на ремонт дизеля на флагманском корабле Военно-морских сил Украины, фрегате "Гетьман Сагайдачный". А недавно стало известно, что сразу после ремонта двигатель в море сломался. Теперь уже хохочет народ.

Хотя, если всерьёз, то не смешно. Ведь так называемый антикоррупционный госпереворот принёс сплошные страдания. И никакой туристический безвиз их не компенсирует. Мало того что страна развалилась — Крым ушёл безвозвратно, похоже, и Донбасс — тоже, суммарно это 8,5 миллиона человек — так и на оставшейся территории смертность радикально превышает рождаемость, а массовая эмиграция — легальная и нет — лишь усугубляет демографическую проблему. Да вон у нас в России сколько этих вызывающих жалость украинцев?! Мы же видим их все.

По официальным данным МИД Украины, в России постоянно пребывают 4 миллиона их граждан. Примерно столько же "заробитчан" с Украины и на Западе. Безвиз, заставивший Порошенко столь сильно хихикать, превращает его граждан в рабов для Евросоюза. Ведь они там — изгои безо всяких социальных гарантий, без легальных контрактов и даже без легального жилья. Унизительно и жалко.

При этом экспорт из самой Украины в 2016 году оказался втрое ниже, чем в 2012-м. В этом году в стране продолжали останавливаться крупнейшие производства, и, можно сказать, процесс деиндустриализации успешно завершается. Если же прикинуть потери Украины после госпереворота в целом, то

экс-премьер Николай Азаров оценивает ущерб в 143 миллиарда долларов. Это на порядки больше, чем все кредиты, полученные от МВФ, которые ещё придётся с процентами отдавать.

Но какими деньгами измерить человеческое горе: 10 тысяч погибших в гражданской войне и десятки тысяч раненых, навсегда морально травмированных детей, не доживших век стариков, бросивших свои разрушенные дома жителей? Как и чем всё это измерить?! Чем измерить уровень вранья, бесправия и страха в сегодняшней Украине? А уровень безумия Порошенко, который своей подписью блокирует в стране самую популярную поисковую систему – "Яндекс" — самые популярные социальные сети — "ВКонтакте" и "Одноклассники" — и ещё сотни информационных ресурсов и компьютерных программ?

#### **Translation into English:**

##### ***Poroshenko Giggles and Turns Ukrainians into EU Slaves***

The European Union set the last bureaucratic signatures that allow Ukrainians to travel [*to the EU*] as tourists without visas. Poroshenko happily giggled at that moment. Before he referred to the visa-free tourism with the EU as a “national idea” of Ukrainians. Now he stated that a “definitive divorce” with Russia is completed.

The new border crossing regime will enter into force on the night of June 12<sup>th</sup>. Ukrainian tourists however do not get the right to work or study in the EU, and the residence time is limited to 90 days in six months. It is enough for illegal harvesting of strawberry on Polish plantations.

Well, the visas are indeed an archaism nowadays. But the Ukrainian visa-free travel is the only thing that Kyiv achieved since the nationalist coup in February 2014.

All the other “achievements” are negative. And if one looks at the price of this visa-free regime, there is nothing to giggle about. One will be just terrified.

The coup grew out of “Euromaidan” and was unfolded under slogans of fighting corruption. Like, Yanukovych is a horrible kleptocrat; like, he needs a system of corruption: that is why he does not want [*to go*] into Europe.

Notably, the fighting-corruption slogan is always and anywhere universally popular. Those who advance it usually count on coming to power themselves – and not democratically, but as a result of street protests and illegal overthrow of the government. It was in Northern Africa during the “Arab spring”, it was so in Ukraine too.

It worked. But when the corruption fighters were winning, the country was plunging into chaos and corruption was blossoming like never before. Ukraine is a typical example. So, if under Yanukovych the kickbacks were 25%, now with Poroshenko kickbacks received state contracts and reach up to 50% or even 75%. According to the results of the year 2016, the European Court of Auditors named Ukraine the most corrupt state in Europe. The bribes are normal there. Everyone takes them: attorneys and judges, Ministry of Emergency situations clerks, border guards and army people. And in Verkhovna Rada suitcases with black cash are carried cabinet by cabinet. Illegal takeovers, both armed and fraudulent, - are a norm of life. Dirty money is made on everything.

An example – the Ukrainian “Eurovision” contest of this year which was prepared in chaos and mess. The European performance act cost Ukrainian budget 30 million euros, when much better “Eurovision” music shows – for example, in Sweden

or Estonia – cost a third of this price. Whereas the prices are much higher there than in “nezalezhnaya”. Guess where did the difference go – those 75%?

After the coup under slogans of fighting corruption Ukraine turned into a world champion in the spreading of theft, degradation of state and society, collapse of industry and people’s impoverishment. For three years the utility bills have risen more than ten times. In late 2013 they made up 175 hryvni per person, by the end of 2016 it is already 1978 hryvni, i.e. almost two thousand.

But the revolutionists risen to power by the foam of the coup quickly became rich. Everyone remembers how Arseny Yatsenyuk, still as Prime Minister did not feel ashamed to clamorously celebrate “his first billion”.

From bad to worse. Constrainedly published declarations of ministers and MPs did not only shock the poverty-struck people of Ukraine, but entire continents from Europe to America. Many of them possess enormous sums of cash at homes, luxury real estate including even temples, elite cars, collections of unique pieces of art, expensive watches, wines, weapons and antiquities. By describing all this the former revolutionaries do not only lose shame and moderation, but even the sense of humor.

So, Minister of Interior Avakov, according to his own declaration, is a proud owner of the collection of paintings and 8 thousand books dated by XVIII century, XV century coins, wine labels, four fur coats, a collection of weapons and labelled bags. But this is all nothing in comparison to numerous racketeer shares in Ukrainian companies that pay the Minister of Interior a tribute. Also Avakov has one company in Italy and two in Cyprus.

The off-shore oligarch president Poroshenko is the coolest of all. By continuing to increase his capital, he underpays Ukraine and grows rich on civil war. So when

Poroshenko giggles behind the backs of the euro-clerks, it is understandable why. However others may feel funny too.

For example, recently Poroshenko's factory "Leninska kuznya" magically won the contract to repair the engine on the Ukrainian Navy flagship, frigate "Hetman Sahaydachniy". And recently it became known that after the renovation the engine broke in the sea. Now the people are laughing.

But, speaking seriously, it is not funny. Because the so-called anti-corruption coup brought only suffering. And no visa-free tourist regime will ever compensate them. Not only did the country break up – Crimea is gone forever, Donbas too, altogether it is 8,5 million people – but mortality by far exceeds natality in the remaining territory, and mass emigration – both legal and not – only makes the demographic problem worse. Just look how many of those pathetic Ukrainians do we have here in Russia?! We see them, after all.

According to the official data of Ukrainian Foreign ministry, there are 4 million of their citizens indwelling in Russia. Nearly the same number of Ukrainian "zarobitchany" [*Ukrainian immigrant workers. The term is literally translated as "those who are earning" from Ukrainian*] is in the West. The visa-free regime that made Poroshenko giggle so frantically turns his citizens into slaves for the European Union. Because they are pariahs there, without any social guarantees, legal contracts and even without legal accommodation. Humiliating and pathetic.

That said, the 2016 export volumes from Ukraine were third the volume of 2012 export. This year large companies continued to stay in the country and we can say that the deindustrialization process is successfully ending. If we estimate the general losses of Ukraine after the coup, the former prime minister [*of Ukraine*] Mykola Azarov

estimates the losses as 143 billion dollars. It is much higher than all IMF credits that [Ukraine] will have to pay off with interest.

But what money can measure human suffering: 10 thousand killed in the civil war and tens of thousands of wounded, forever morally traumatized children, elderly who have not lived through their old age, civilians who had to leave their destroyed homes? How to measure all this?! How to measure the level of lies, lawlessness and fear in modern Ukraine? And the level of Poroshenko's madness, who with his signature blocks the most popular search engine in the country – "Yandex" – and the most popular social networks – "VKontakte" and "Odnoklassniki" – and many hundreds of information resources and computer software?

**Media Texts: Ukrainian Set****1. Kanal 24**

Link: [https://24tv.ua/rossiyskiy\\_rasizm\\_v\\_kryimu\\_n896744](https://24tv.ua/rossiyskiy_rasizm_v_kryimu_n896744)

Date: December 7th 2017

Author: Maxim Osadchuk (Максим Осадчук)

**Original Text:*****Российский Расизм в Крыму***

Исторически российское государство строилось на известном парадоксе. С одной стороны, Закон здесь всемогущ, ведь именно на него опираются Вертикаль, Преемственность, Скрепки и другие милые русскому уху понятия. С другой, репрессивные нормы и правила в России всегда использовали инструментально – когда надо было прижать недовольных.

Хотя при буквальном толковании Закона виноватыми могли оказаться полстраны.

Всего этого никак не может понять, например, бедолага Олег Зубков – он уже третий год пытается спасти свои предприятия от челюстей оккупационной юстиции. Но ему, как этническому русскому и горячему стороннику аннексии, не так трудно, как многим другим.

Нынешняя Россия остается одним из наиболее расистских обществ в Евразии. Это хорошо видно не только на улицах Москвы, где трудовая сегрегация имеет ярко выраженный этнический характер, но и в отношениях между столицей и регионами, в том числе национальными республиками.

Экономическое перераспределение в пользу Белокаменной и крайний политический централизм, сложившиеся в результате процесса, который

Александр Эткинд назвал "внутренней колонизацией", соседствуют с традиционной для имперских государств этнической иерархией. Титульная нация, разумеется, занимает привилегированное положение, и так было на протяжении всей истории России.

Надо отдать должное: наиболее последовательно с устоявшимся порядком вещей в сфере межэтнических отношений пытались бороться большевики с их концептом "советского человека", но и они уже при Сталине смирились с тем, что "Союз нерушимый" сплотила все-таки "Великая Русь".

Знаменитые банкетные речи Иосифа Виссарионовича прямо декларировали восстановление вековых традиций: грузин Джугашвили во главе советского государства признавал доминирование русского народа и его культуры.

Возвращаясь к захваченному полуострову, полезно будет вспомнить, что вовсе не Сталин первым начал проводить давление на крымских татар по этническому признаку.

Уже в конце XVIII века, после стартовой аннексии Крыма Российской Империей, численность автохтонного населения стала стремительно сокращаться. В государстве Екатерины Второй не было места для уже тогда нелояльных к центральной властям крымляк.

Через столетие политика выдавливания местного элемента вкупе с интенсивной российской колонизацией дала свои плоды: крымские татары составляли меньше половины от общего населения региона, тогда как в 1784-м они были здесь основным этносом (80% от общей массы). Советские комиссары, как и в большинстве других случаев, не придумали ничего нового. Они лишь с

характерной индустриальной напористостью довели тенденцию до логического завершения – депортации крымскотатарского народа 18 мая 1944 года.

Если сегодня вы попытаетесь публично спросить какого-нибудь видного крымского чиновника, почему против крымских татар заведено так много уголовных и административных дел, почему каждую неделю проходят обыски и задержания, он обязательно скажет вам, что ни малейшего этнического подтекста тут нет, а силовики проводят свои мероприятия исключительно для того, чтобы обеспечить соблюдение закона, перед которым "все равны". А если татар "берут" чаще, ну так что же: значит, нарушают они больше! Да и вообще, у нас представители коренного народа и в правительстве есть, и в администрациях на местах.

Одного такого "представителя" в минувшую пятницу со скандалом прогнали с похорон легенды крымскотатарского национального движения Веджие Кашка. 83-летняя активистка, которая сражалась за права своего народа с начала 1950-х, погибла во время очередной "спецоперации" ФСБ: не выдержало сердце.

Крымские татары прекрасно понимают, что остались лицом к лицу с могущественным врагом, который за последние двести лет несколько раз пытался свести их как народ в могилу. И одна из основных задач проукраинских правозащитников и журналистов – убедить мировое сообщество в том, что политические репрессии на оккупированных территориях проходят в первую очередь по этническому принципу.

А значит, институциональный расизм станет еще одним пунктом обвинений на будущем международном трибунале, посвященном преступлениям России против человечества.

**Translation into English:**

***Russian Racism in Crimea***

Historically, the Russian state was being built upon a well-known paradox. On the one hand, the Law is omnipotent here, because it is upon it that Vertical [*of power*], Inheritance, [*spiritual*] Bonds and other words so pleasant for the Russian ear rest. From the other [*side*], repressive norms and rules were used in Russia instrumentally – when the dissatisfied needed to be suppressed.

However, if the Law is interpreted literally, half of the country could become guilty.

These all are the things that for example the poor Oleg Zubkov [*Russian-Ukrainian businessman, director of two small zoos in Yalta, Crimea*] cannot understand. For the third year he is trying to save his companies from the jaws of the occupational justice. But as an ethnic Russian and zealous supporter of the annexation does not doing as hard as many others.

Modern Russia remains one of the most racist societies in Europe. This is clearly noticeable not only on streets of Moscow where the labor segregation is obviously ethnical, but also regarding the relations between the capital city and the regions, including national republics.

Economic redistribution in favor of the White-Stoned [*Metaphoric definition of Moscow with reference to its historic white Kremlin walls*] and extreme political

centralism developed as a result of what Alexander Etkind [*Russian psychologist and culturologist*] has called “internal colonization” coexists with ethnical hierarchy, traditional for empires. Titular nation of course has the privileged position, and it was always so, during the entire history of Russia.

With due respect: it was the Bolsheviks who were fighting the status quo most consistently with their concept of “the Soviet man”. But under Stalin they too reconciled with the idea that the “unbreakable Union” [*line taken from the Soviet national anthem*] was still pulled together by the “Great Rus”. [*ancient name of the territory where ethnic Russians originally lived; now sometimes used to refer to modern Russia as a great powerful state*]

Famous banquet speeches of Joseph Vissarionovich [*Stalin*] directly declared the reestablishment of centuries-old traditions. Jugashvili [*Stalin’s real surname*], the ethnic Georgian, on head of Soviet state, recognized the dominance of Russian nation and its culture.

Coming back to the captured peninsula, it would be useful to remember that it was not Stalin who first started to oppress the Crimean Tatars based on their ethnicity.

Already in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, after the initial annexation of Crimea by the Russian Empire, the number of the indigenous population of Crimea began to decrease rapidly. In the state of Catherine II [*empress of Russia from 1762 till 1796*] there was no place for the Krymmlar [*Crimean Tatars’ endonym*] who were already unloyal to the central power.

After a century, the politics of squeezing out the local population combined with the intensive Russian colonization yielded their fruit: Crimean Tatars made up less than half of the general population of the region, whereas in 1784 they were the dominant

ethnic group here (80% of the entire population). Soviet commissars, like in many other cases, did not come up with anything new. They just brought the trend to a logical end with typical industrialist aggressiveness – the deportation of Crimean Tatar nation on May 18<sup>th</sup> 1944.

If you try to publically ask an important Crimean clerk why are there so many legal and administrative cases filed against Crimean Tatars, why are there searches and arrests every week, he will most likely answer that there is not a slightest ethnic implication. The security officials are just conducting their operations exclusively in order to assure the observation of a law, before each “everyone is equal”. And if they “catch” Tatars more frequently, well: it means they break the law more [*than others*]! And all in all we have representatives of indigenous people as MPs, and in local administrations too.

One of these “representatives” was kicked out from the funeral of Vejje Kashka, the legend of Crimean Tatar national movement, with a scandal. The 83 year old activist who was fighting for the rights of her people since the 1950ies, died during another special operation of FSB [*Russian intelligence service*]: her heart failed her.

Crimean Tatars clearly understand that they are left face to face with a powerful enemy who has repeatedly tried to drive them into the grave as a nation for the last two hundred years. And one of the main tasks of the pro-Ukrainian human rights advocates and journalists is to convince the international community that the political repressions on the occupied territories occur primarily on ethnic principles.

It means that the institutional racism will become another charge on the future international tribunal dedicated to Russia’s crimes against humanity.

## 2. Ukrayinska Pravda

Link: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2017/03/29/7139629/>

Date of Publication: March 29<sup>th</sup> 2017

Author: Oleh Petrovets (Олег Петровець)

### Original Text:

#### *Найбільший Страх Путіна Стає Реальністю*

*Безперечно, найбільш обговорюваний світовою спільнотою політичний скандал відбувся на цьому тижні у Росії – державі, у якій діючий політичний режим та його керманичів прийнято або до непристойності сакралізувати, або ж, якщо і протестувати, то хіба що внутрішньо, через небезпідставний страх політичної і навіть фізичної розправи.*

*Тим не менше, найбільший кошмар Путіна потроху стає реальністю. Масові акції протестів проти корупції у владі прокотилися по всій Росії.*

*Безпідставні заборони проводити акції, понад 1000 затриманих, жорсткий поліцейський та політичний інструментарій у відповідь на спробу громадян мирно виразити свою позицію, черговий світовий осуд путінського режиму...*

Право людей на вільне вираження своєї позиції уже давно визнане одним із найбільших надбань та цінностей демократії. Воно закріплене сьогодні в конституціях держав усього цивілізованого світу.

Так, у поправці I до Конституції США 1787 року вказано, що "конгрес не повинен приймати законів, які б обмежували право народу мирно збиратися ..."

Подібні положення зафіксовані також у Конституції Італійської Республіки 1947 року, де зазначено, що "громадяни мають право збиратися мирно і без зброї". У

статті 8 Основного Закону ФРН 1949 року також зафіксовано, що "усі німці мають право збиратися мирно і без зброї".

Закріплене право на мирні збори і в Основному законі України – у статті 39 встановлюється право громадян України збиратися мирно, без зброї, і проводити збори, мітинги, походи і демонстрації, про проведення яких завчасно сповіщаються органи виконавчої влади чи органи місцевого самоврядування.

*"Обмеження щодо реалізації цього права може встановлюватися судом відповідно до закону і лише в інтересах національної безпеки та громадського порядку – з метою запобігання заворушенням чи злочинам, для охорони здоров'я населення або захисту прав і свобод інших людей", – говорить Конституція.*

І навіть Конституція Росії, як не дивно, також захищає (принаймні так задекларовано 31-ю статтею) права росіян на мирні зібрання.

Але навіть закріплення права росіян на мирні збори у Конституції не завадило більшості представників місцевої влади не дати дозволу на проведення акцій протесту проти корупції, які, не зважаючи на заборони, проходили 26 березня. Як відомо, організатори просили дозволу провести акції в 100 російських містах.

Масові акції протесту, організовані опозиціонером Навальним, супроводжувалися жорстким протистоянням з боку силовиків і закінчилися затриманням активістів по всій Росії. За інформацією ЗМІ, тільки у Москві було затримано близько 1000 осіб. Відносно більшості із них будуть складені адміністративні протоколи за статтею 20.2 КоАП РФ (Порушення встановленого порядку організації або проведення зборів, мітингу, демонстрації, ходи або

пікетування). Санкції по цій статті передбачають чималий грошовий штраф – близько 20 тисяч рублів.

Стосовно самих організаторів реакція Кремля була ще жорсткішою. На Олексія Навального, затриманого в Москві, склали адміністративний арешт до суду і врешті арештували на 15 діб з накладенням штрафу, в офісі очолюваного ним "Фонду боротьби з корупцією" пройшли обшуки із вилученням техніки, а самих співробітників затримано.

Показово, що причини обшуків і затримань працівників антикорупційної організації обґрунтовуються звинуваченнями в "неузгодженій" інтернет-трансляції масових акцій проти корупції та підозрами в екстремізмі.

Який екстремізм вгледіла російська влада у мітингах проти корупції – питання риторичне.

Втім, дивуватися такому після подій у Москві від 12 вересня минулого року не приходиться. Нагадаємо, тоді Тверський суд Москви оштрафував на 250 тисяч рублів одного з активістів, затриманих біля Держдуми за "гучне читання **31 статті Конституції РФ**".

За словами адвоката активіста, його затримали під час заходу, на якому учасники порядку не порушували. Гасел не скандували, плакатів не тримали, просто читали Конституцію, а точніше – ту саму 31 статтю, яка гарантує росіянам право проводити мирні акції.

Показово і те, що попри широкий резонанс як серед світової спільноти, так і представників іноземних ЗМІ, російські медіа "чомусь" тему антикорупційних протестів, в цілому, обійшли – мабуть, оцінили як не надто важливу.

Чи не єдиним коментарем офіційного Кремля щодо полії 26 березня став коментар прес-секретаря Володимира Путіна Дмитра Пєскова, який заявив: *"У Кремлі поважають громадянську позицію людей і право росіян висловлювати громадянську позицію, коли це відбувається в узгодженому з владою форматі"*.

Загалом, протести в Росії оцінюються експертами дуже по різному.

Основні меседжі зводяться до наступного:

– події 26 березня неначе "розбудили" приспаних путінською пропагандою росіян. За антикорупційними лозунгами насправді неспіливі через постійні утиски росіяни, ховають обурення сьогодишнім політичним режимом. І це стане хорошим початком його кінця;

– основною причиною опозиційної активності росіян є санкційний режим, що суттєво погіршив економічне становище не тільки самої Росії, але і її громадян;

– несподівані протести дуже налякали Кремль, який всі сили кинув на їх придушення;

– Кремль знав про заплановані мітинги і був готовий блискавично відреагувати. В даному контексті вбивство в Києві екс-депутата Держдуми Воронєнкова могло бути з боку російської влади реакцією на випередження, адже покійний багато знав про корупційні схеми у російському політикумі;

– акції протесту в Росії були організовані самим Кремлем з метою протестувати опозиційні настрої напередодні чергових виборів.

100% відкидати будь-яку з вищезазначених версій, звичайно ж, не можна, адже про "витончені" політичні маневри Кремля ходить не одна легенда. Такі вже правила гри під назвою "велика політика".

Проте, як би там не було, навіть підтвердження версії стосовно тестування російського суспільства на "опозиційність" – це чіткий сигнал для ідентифікації основного страху Путіна – бути скинутим з владного трону власним же народом.

На даному етапі говорити про готовність російського суспільства до реалізації такого сценарію, звичайно ж, занадто рано. Проте сам факт, що до протестних акцій масово приєднувалася молодь, мітингарів підтримували у соціальних мережах і так далі, говорить про те, що опозиційні настрої в Росії живі.

А це означає, що шанс бути демократичною частиною цивілізованого світу у росіян усе-таки є.

#### **Translation into English:**

##### ***Putin's Greatest Fear Comes True***

*Without doubt, the most discussed political scandal of the international community occurred this week in Russia – the country whose current political regime and its leaders are either obscenely sacralized, or, if criticized, only internally because of the fear of political and even physical violence.*

*Nevertheless, Putin's greatest dread is slowly coming true. Mass protests against corruption and government swept across all Russia.*

*Unjustified prohibition of protest actions [Russian government imposed a ban on protest actions that were not previously coordinated with police], more than 1,000 people detained, rigorous police and political reaction to an attempt of citizens to peacefully express their position, another world condemnation of the Putin regime...*

The right on free expression has since long time been recognized as one of the greatest achievements and values of democracy. It has been enshrined in constitutions of all civilized world countries.

For example, in the First Amendment to the 1787 United States Constitution it is stated that “Congress shall make no law <...> prohibiting the <...> right of the people peaceably to assemble...” Similar statutes have also been enshrined in the constitution of the Italian Republic of 1947, where it is stated that “citizens have the right to assemble peaceably and unarmed”. Article 8 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany also states that “all Germans shall have the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed”.

The right to peaceful assembly is enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine – the Article 39 prescribes the right of Ukrainian citizens to assemble peacefully, unarmed, and to hold meetings, rallies, processions and demonstrations, upon notifying in advance the bodies of executive power or bodies of local self-government.

*“Restrictions on the exercise of this right may be established by a court in accordance with the law and only in the interests of national security and public order, with the purpose of preventing disturbances or crimes, protecting the health of the population, or protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons,”* – the Constitution states.

Even the Constitution of Russia, however strange it may seem, also protects (at least, as declared in Article 31) the Russians’ rights to peaceful assembly.

But even the right of Russians to peaceful assembly declared in the Constitution did not prevent the majority of local authorities from denying the permission to hold protests against corruption, which, despite the prohibition, took place on March 26<sup>th</sup>. As

it is known, the organizers requested a permission to hold promotions in 100 cities of Russia.

Mass protests organized by the opposition leader Navalny, were accompanied by violent confrontations with the security forces and ended with the detention of activists throughout Russia. According to media, almost 1,000 people were arrested in Moscow alone. For most of them, administrative protocols will be drawn up under Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation (“Violation of the established order of organization or holding meetings, rallies, demonstrations, processions or picketing”). The penalty prescribed by this article is a significant monetary fine – about 20 thousand rubles.

Regarding the organizers themselves, the Kremlin's reaction was even harder. Against Alexei Navalny who was detained in Moscow, an administrative case was filed, and he was eventually arrested for 15 days and received a fine. The office of his "Anti-Corruption Foundation" was searched, all technical equipment was confiscated, and the employees – detained.

It is notable that the reasons for searches and detainments of the employees of the anti-corruption organization are grounded in allegations of "inconsistent" internet broadcasting of mass actions against corruption and suspicions of extremism.

What extremism did the Russian government see in anti-corruption rallies is a rhetoric question.

However, this is not surprising after what happened in Moscow on September 12<sup>th</sup> last year. On that day the Tver Court of Moscow fined one of the activists detained near the State Duma building 250 thousand rubles for "loudly reading **Article 31 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.**"

According to the activist's lawyer, he was detained during the event, whose participants did not violate the order. They did not chant slogans, they did not hold posters; they were just reading the Constitution, namely, the very Article 31 that guarantees the Russians the right to peaceful assembly.

Notable is also the fact that despite the general resonance among both the international community and foreign media, the Russian media generally "somehow" avoided the topic of anti-corruption protests – perhaps they were regarded as not very important.

Virtually the only comment of the official Kremlin was the comment of the spokesman of Vladimir Putin Dmitry Peskov on March 26<sup>th</sup>, who stated: *“The Kremlin respects the civil stance of the people and the right of Russians to express their civic stance, **if this is done in a format coordinated with the authorities**”*.

Generally, the experts evaluate the protests in Russia very differently. The main opinions are as follows:

- The events of March 26<sup>th</sup> seemed to have “awakened” the Russians lulled by Putin’s propaganda. The anti-corruption slogans are in fact timid because of constant Russian oppression, hiding the indignation of today's political regime. And this will be a good start to its end;
- The main reason of Russians’ opposition activity are the sanctions that have strongly worsened the economic condition not only of Russia itself, but of its citizens too;
- The Kremlin was very frightened by unexpected protests and threw all its forces at their suppression;

- Kremlin knew about the planned rallies and was ready to react at once. In this context, the murder of the former State Duma member [*Denis* Voronenkov [*who fled to Kyiv in 2016 and became a harsh critic of Putin's regime until his death, which is believed to be a contract murder*]] in Kyiv could be a proactive response of the Russian government, because the deceased knew a lot about corruption schemes among Russian political elites;
- Protest actions in Russia were organized by Kremlin itself with the aim to test the oppositional sentiments before the general [*i.e., presidential*] elections [*in Russia, held in March 2018*].

It is impossible to reject any of the versions listed above completely, because there is not a single legend about the "sophisticated" political maneuvers of the Kremlin. These are the rules of the game called “big politics”.

But, whatever the case, even the confirmation of the version that the Russian society was being tested on “opposition sentiments” is a clear identification of Putin's main fear – to be thrown off his throne by his own people.

Of course, at this stage, talking about the readiness of Russian society to implement such a scenario is too early. However, the very fact that young people were massively involved in protest actions, that the protesters were supported in social networks etc., shows that the opposition sentiment in Russia is alive.

And this means that the Russians still have a chance to become a democratic part of the civilized world.

### 3. Hromadske

Link: <https://hromadske.ua/posts/rosiya-cherez-socmerezhi-manipulyue-amerikancyami>

November 2nd 2017

Authors: Ostap Yarysh (Остап Яриш) & Nataliia Humenyuk (Наталія Гуменюк)

#### Original Text:

#### *«Троянський Кінь» Кремля: Соцмережі Визнали, Що Їх Використали Для Маніпуляцій у США*

Google, Facebook і Twitter визнали, що стали інструментом для маніпуляцій Росії. Керівники останнього навіть пообіцяли реабілітуватися, віддавши зароблені на російських кампаніях гроші на просування демократії. У кожній з компаній пообіцяли або зробити рекламу прозорішою, або ретельніше працювати над безпекою.

Кореспондентка Громадського побувала на слуханнях комітету з розвідки американського сенату щодо ролі соціальних мереж у втручанні Росії у вибори 2016 року. Зокрема РФ використала для розпалювання ворожнечі в американському суспільстві онлайн-платформи, створені американськими компаніями. Сенатори залишилися незадоволеними і вважають, що технологічні гіганти не приділяють достатньо уваги тому, щоб убезпечити користувачів від маніпуляцій.

#### **Звинувачення та цифри**

Тисячі ботів, замовна реклама в інтернеті, “фейкові” спільноти в соціальних мережах — усі ці інструменти використовувалися Кремлем для розпалювання ворожнечі в американському суспільстві та просуванні на пост

президента Дональда Трампа. У цьому впевнені розслідувачі з американського сенату.

«Мета була дуже простою: забезпечити появу так званих «новин» у новинних стрічках якомога більшої кількості податливих американців. І таємне й тонке підштовхування в тому напрямку, якого прагне Кремль», — пояснив сенатор-демократ Марк Варнер.

Голова слідчої комісії, республіканець Річард Берр додав:

«Це не стосується перегляду результатів виборів 2016 року. Не йдеться про те, хто виграв, а хто програв. Це напряму стосується національної безпеки, корпоративної відповідальності. Це навмисне маніпулювання американцями, яке здійснювали агенти ворожої іноземної держави. Я скажу це знову: агенти ворожої іноземної держави вторглися в Сполучені Штати, провели інформаційну операцію, щоб розділити наше суспільство. Ще більше обурює, що для цього використали наші власні соціальні платформи».

Простіше кажучи, Facebook, Twitter і Google мали свідчити перед сенатом, адже їхні платформи стали інструментами в руках маніпуляторів. Сервіси могли допомогти Росії вплинути на суспільну думку перед виборами президента.

Компаніям закидають недостатню прозорість і пасивну позицію у вирішенні цих питань. Мовляв, вони реагували лише на окремі скарги, проте не досліджували проблеми самостійно й навіть не перевіряли замовника та валюту, в якій здійснювалась оплата політичної реклами (деякі замовлення оплачували російськими рублями). Іншими словами, інформаційні гіганти легковажно поставилися до втручання Росії й не приділили цьому належну увагу.

Сенатори зауважили, що на схожі маніпуляції Росія витратила 300 тисяч доларів. Оплата проводилася, зокрема, й через канали Russia Today і Sputnik. (Для порівняння, за словами юристів Facebook, обоє кандидатів у президенти США — Клінтон і Трамп — витратили на просування в соцмережах 81 мільйон доларів).

Як приклад навели 43 години відео на 18 YouTube-каналах, понад 700 “фейкових” Instagram-аккаунтів, 450 “фейкових” сторінок у Facebook, які керувалися з однієї російської компанії, а також понад 2700 ботів у Twitter.

Хоча цифри відносно невеликі, охоплення таких повідомлень за даними сенату — 40% населення США. Однак “охоплення” — наразі досить загальний термін, який не може вказати на прямий вплив соцмереж на зміну політичних поглядів.

На свій захист представник Twitter навів дані, згідно з якими 36 746 пов’язаних з Росією ботів, які публікували контент про вибори в США, складали 0,012% існуючих на той час облікових записів. Натомість, за словами senatorів, у матеріалах іншого незалежного дослідження йдеться, що 15% усіх аккаунтів у Twitter — боти. Тобто це значить, що майже 50 мільйонами «мертвих душ» хтось керує для просування інформації.

### **Відповіді та вирішення**

Під час слухання представникам Facebook, Twitter і Google ставили доволі жорсткі питання.

«Раніше ви зазначили, що мета вашої компанії — це об’єднувати людей, — заявив голова комісії Річард Берр у зверненні до віце-президента Facebook. — У цьому випадку людей дійсно об’єднали — щоб сформувати штучний конфлікт. І Facebook допоміг цій зустрічі відбутися. Я б сказав, що Facebook свою місію

провалив. Буду відвертим: ви маєте краще працювати над захистом американського народу й усіх своїх користувачів, щоб уберегти їх від подібних маніпуляцій».

Керівники глобальних світових компаній намагались уникати прямих відповідей. Та всі троє визнали, що сервіси дійсно використали для маніпуляцій, і що цьому не надали достатньо уваги.

«Це болить нам як компанії, і це болить мені особисто — бачити, як нашою платформою таким чином зловживали. Сильна сторона нашої країни — те, що люди можуть відкрито казати про те, що їх бентежить. Той факт, що іноземні агенти змогли використати нашу платформу і цю відкритість, став для нас дуже болісним уроком, який ми засвоїмо, щоб рухатися вперед», — відповів віце-президента Facebook.

Представники компаній запевнили, що набагато ретельніше стежитимуть за використанням сервісів, а також зроблять їх прозорішими — насамперед це стосується реклами. Крім цього, Twitter пообіцяв, що віддасть гроші, зароблені на російських кампаніях, на дослідження просування демократії. Facebook удвічі збільшить кількість працівників, що відповідають за безпеку — з 10 до 20 тисяч. Google уже працює над механізмами, які дозволять усім користувачам бачити, хто є замовником реклами. Усе це — на додачу до інших заходів, які компанії вже застосовують.

### **Методи російських маніпуляцій**

Російські компанії використовували алгоритми соціальних платформ, зокрема, таргетінг (вузьке визначення цільової групи), яким досі відома була виборча кампанія Барака Обами у 2012-му. Росія намагалась охопити

найрізноманітнішу і якомога конкретнішу аудиторію — від неонацистів та антиісламістів до ревних християн і членів ЛГБТ. Водночас повідомлення не завжди стосувалися прямої агітації за Трампа. Найчастіше вони мали на меті посіяти ворожнечу й підвищити градус радикальності в суспільстві. New York Times опублікував приклади такої реклами.

Для цього в соціальних мережах спеціально створювали та рекламували сторінки. Деякі з них на перший погляд навіть просували ідеї противників Трампа та електорату з іншого табору. Наприклад, підтримку мігрантів чи боротьбу за права афроамериканців. Проте тут важливі дві деталі. По-перше, це робилося під досить провокаційними гаслами, щоб зачепити противників. По-друге, у таких випадках обов'язково рекламувалася «опозиційна» сторінка, яка закликала до спротиву.

Під час слухань сенатори згадали про випадок у Х'юстоні. 21 травня 2016 року там відбулися два мітинги: захисників ісламу та антиісламістів. В одному місці та в той самий час. Обидві події були організовані та прорекламовані на Facebook, ворогуючі спільноти — націоналістична й мусульманська — активно закликали людей до захисту своїх прав та протистояння. Люди дійсно вийшли на вулиці, й сутичкам між ними завадило лише вчасне втручання поліції.

Проте серед людей, які прийшли на мітинги, не було жодного активного агітатора Facebook-спільнот. Пізніше слідство знайшло причину: усі вони насправді були фейковими сторінками тролів, які модерувалися із Санкт-Петербурга. Це означає, що користувач з Росії може легко створити й розрекламувати подію в Штатах, яка призведе до реального протистояння людей на вулиці. Сенат з'ясував, що це коштувало Росії 200 доларів.

**Чому це важливо**

Журналістка Громадського Наталія Гуменюк відвідала слухання і зауважила, що слово «Україна» жодного разу не пролунало. Утім, політики наголошували, що зловживання відкритістю соцмереж стосується не лише США, а й інших країн. Зокрема, згадали про можливий вплив на конфлікт у Каталонії, проте представники жодної з компаній не відповіли на це через відсутність даних.

Питання використання соцмереж для політичних маніпуляцій уперше підняли на такий високий рівень. Це викрило багато проблем в кібербезпеці, але разом показало, що їх можливо вирішувати не лише в окремих країнах, а й на глобальному рівні.

**Translation into English:**

***Kremlin's "Trojan Horse": Social Media Admitted They Were Used to Manipulate USA***

Google, Facebook and Twitter admitted that they have become a tool for Russia's manipulations. The leaders of the latter even promised to rehabilitate themselves by giving money they earned for Russian campaigns for the promotion of democracy. Each of the companies promised to either make advertising more transparent, or to work more thoroughly on security.

Reporter of Hromadske attended the hearings of the US Senate intelligence committee about the role of social networks in Russia's interference into 2016 [USA] elections. Namely, Russia used online platforms created by American companies to incite hatred in the American society. Senators remained unsatisfied and believe that

technological giants do not pay enough attention to keep their clients safe from manipulations.

### **Accusations and numbers**

Thousands of bots, paid online advertising, “fake” groups in social media – all these instruments were used by Kremlin to incite hostility in American society and promote Donald Trump to presidency. Investigators from the American senate are sure about this.

“The aim was simple: to ensure the emergence of so-called “news” in the news feeds of as many yielding Americans as possible. And to secretly and subtly steer them in the direction that Kremlin aspires”, - Democratic senator Mark Warner explains.

Head of the Investigative Commission, the Republican Richard Burr added:

“This does not apply to the vote counting. It is not about who won and who lost. This is directly connected to the national security, corporate responsibility. This is an intentional manipulation of Americans conducted by agents of a foreign enemy state. I will say this again: agents of a foreign enemy state invaded the United States and conducted an information operation in order to divide our society. Even more outrageous is the fact that they used our own social platforms for this”.

Simply said, Facebook, Twitter and Google had to testify before the Senate; after all, their platforms became instruments in the manipulators’ hands. Services could help Russia influence the public opinion before presidential elections. They say they had reacted only to some complaints, however, had not investigated the problems independently and had not even checked the customer and the currency in which the payment of political advertising was carried out (some orders had been paid in Russian

rubles). In other words, information giants treated the Russian interference carelessly and did not pay due attention to it.

Senators noticed that Russia spent 300 thousand dollars on these manipulations. Payment was carried out particularly by Russia Today and Sputnik (For comparison: according to Facebook's lawyers both American presidential candidates – Clinton and Trump – spent 81 million dollars on their social media promotions).

As an example, 43 hours of videos on 18 YouTube channels, around 700 “fake” Instagram accounts, 450 “fake” Facebook profiles which were operated by a single Russian company, as well as around 2700 bots on Twitter.

Although the numbers are relatively small, the coverage of these posts is 40% of USA population, according to the Senate's report. However, “coverage” is a rather general term that cannot indicate a direct impact of social networks on the change of political views.

In his protection the representative of Twitter brought in data, according to which 36 746 bots connected to Russia that published US elections-related content, made up 0.012% of accounts existing at that time. On contrary, according to Senators, the materials of an independent investigation show that 15% of all Twitter accounts are bots. Thus, it means that somebody manages nearly 50 million “dead souls” [*an allusion to Nikolai Gogol's novel of the same name*] in order to promote information.

### **Answers and solutions**

During the hearings, representatives of Facebook, Twitter and Google were asked rather tough questions.

“Before you used to say that the aim of your company is to unite people, - said Head of the Commission Richard Burr in appeal to Facebook's vice president. – In this

action people were indeed united: in order to form an artificial conflict. And Facebook helped this meeting happen. I would say that Facebook failed its mission. I will be frank: you need to work better on protection of the American people and all of your users in order to keep them safe from such manipulations”.

Leaders of global international companies tried to avoid direct answers. However all three confessed that [*their*] services were indeed used for manipulations and that they did not pay due attention to it.

“It hurts us as a company, and it hurts me especially – to state that our platform was misused in such way. The strength of our country is that people may openly express what confuses them. The fact that foreign agents could use our platform and its openness became a painful lesson for us that we will learn in order to move forward”, - vice president of Facebook replied.

The companies’ representatives admitted that much more closely monitor the use of services, as well as make them more transparent - first of all it concerns advertising. Moreover, Twitter announced it will give off money earned on Russian campaigns for the promotion of democracy. Facebook doubled the number of employees responsible for security: from 10 to 20 thousands. All this come in addition to other measures that companies already conduct.

### **Methods of Russian manipulations**

Russian companies used the algorithms of social platforms, first of all – targeting (narrow definitions of target groups), for which Barack Obama’s 2012 election campaign is still known. Russia planned to reach the most diverse and most concrete audience – from neo-Nazis and islamophobes to zealous Christians and LGBT people. At the same time, the messages did not always contain direct agitation for Trump. Most

often their aim was to spread hatred and raise the level of radicalism in the society. New York Times published examples of such advertisement.

For this, special pages were created and advertised in social networks. On the first sight, some of them promoted ideas of Trump's opponents and their electorate. For example, support of migrants and fighting for African Americans' rights. However, two details are important here. First of all, this was done under very provocative slogans in order to attract the opponents' attention. Secondly, in such cases, an "opposition" page, which called for resistance, was necessarily advertised.

During the hearings Senators remembered about the Houston attack. On May 21st 2016 two demonstrations have taken place there: one of the Islam supporters, the other – of islamophobes. At one place at one time. Both events were organized and advertised on Facebook, rival societies – nationalistic and Muslim – actively encouraged people to defend their rights and confront the other side. People really went to protest, and only the timely interference of the police prevented the clashes between them.

However, among people who came to protests there was not a single active agitator from the Facebook communities. Later the investigation found out the reason: all of them were actually fake troll pages that were moderated from St. Petersburg. This means that a user from Russia can easily create and advertise an event in the States that could lead to a real confrontation of people on the streets. The Senate found out that it cost Russia 200 dollars.

### **Why is it important**

Hromadske's journalist Nataliia Humenyuk attended the hearings and noticed that the word "Ukraine" was never pronounced. However, politicians have pointed out

that the misuse of social networks' openness concerns not only the USA, but other countries too. Particularly, the possible impact on the Catalanian conflict was mentioned, but none of the companies' representatives replied to this because of the lack of evidence.

The question of using social networks for political manipulations was raised to such a high level for the first time. This has exposed a lot of cyber-security problems, but at the same time it showed that they can be solved not only in individual countries, but also on a global level.

#### **4. 5 Kanal**

Link: <https://www.5.ua/suspilstvo/oblashtuvav-vohnevu-pastku-istoriia-pro-heroia-ukrainy-shcho-pidtyahuvav-miny-pid-vorozhyi-bmp-145246.html>

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#### **Original Text:**

***"Облаштував Вогневу Пастку": Історія Про Героя України, що  
Підтягував Міни під Ворожий БМП***

*Історія про подвиг Героя України Андрія Ткачука – у серії спецпроекту "5 каналу" "Справжні Герої"*

Колишній ротний одного з батальйонів 25-ї бригади Андрій Ткачук три роки тому обладнав блокпост між Слов'янськом та Краматорськом зручним лише для цивільного транспорту. Ворог понад місяць не здогадувався, які сюрпризи

чекають у разі спроби прориву там технікою. Перша ж обернулася втратою п'яти одиниць техніки та понад двох десятків живої сили.

"Адекватна людина, якій усі вірять. Він знає свою справу, пунктуальний. Він начальник штабу. Справжній начальник штабу!" – каже військовий 25-ї повітряно-десантної бригади ЗСУ.

Так про Андрія Ткачука говорять його підлеглі. Майорові, Герою України та начальнику штабу батальйону лише 30 років. Він постійно змінює позивні і через те, що перебуває на передовій, не може знайти часу для спілкування з журналістами.

"Я військова людина, яка просто намагається виконати свою роботу. Є слюсар, який певну роботу виконує; є токар, який певну роботу виконує; є купа професій. Я – військовий!" – каже Андрій Ткачук.

Нині його підрозділ тримає оборону Зайцевого на Донеччині, звідки до ворожих позицій подекуди менше ніж 200 метрів. На схід Андрій Ткачук поїхав у квітні 2014 року, а на початку травня тоді ще командир роти почав війну з ворогом на околицях Слов'янська.

5-й блокпост з'явився на шляху між Слов'янськом і Краматорськом у ніч проти 2 травня 2014 року. Тоді вже обидва міста були окуповані бойовиками. Задача Ткачука була заблокувати транспортний зв'язок між ними.

Терористам було видно лише невеличкий блокпост на трасі. Через нього понад місяць проїжджали сотні цивільних машин. У деяких з них були й ворожі розвідники. Однак, ніхто не помітив, що насправді рота Ткачука з відрізка дороги у понад 2 кілометри зробила справжню вогневу пастку.

"Це усе було закручено так, аби у будь-якому випадку, навіть якщо вони не хотіли туди їхати, то потрапляли у цю пастку вогневу", – пояснює Андрій.

На початку липня терористи здійснили спробу прориву з боку Слов'янська. Два танки, три БМП та одна БМД з бойовиками одразу потрапили у вогневу пастку Ткачука. Під час бою вся ворожа техніка була знищена. Сам офіцер отримав контузію, але відмовився від евакуації та продовжив керувати підлеглими.

"Було два танки Т-64. Одного було знищено, один перед цим під час контакту просто випав. Якщо виїжджати зі Слов'янська – у районі ринку – він потрапив у кювет. Екіпаж було ліквідовано, а танк цілий лишився, його потім забрали. Інший танк було знищено. Було знищено два БМП-2, які намагалися прорватися і вони були знищені підривами на мінних шлагбаумах і вогнем з гранатометів", – згадує військовий.

Волонтер Юрій Федорченко каже: "Я взагалі не розумію, як це можна було зробити. У них було два окопи. Міни через усю дорогу на мотузочці. Одна людина сидить по той бік дороги, інша – по цей. І вони ці міни підтягували під танк. Тобто, коли БМП йшла, вони під неї підтягували міни. Сиділи буквально поряд з нею".

Краматорські волонтери, які від початку війни, ризикуючи життям, допомагали 25-й бригаді, нині відновлюють картину подвигу роти Ткачука. Вони показують лісосмугу, в якій близько сотні бійців кілька місяців залишалися непоміченими.

За майже три місяці боїв на 5-му блокпості рота майора втратила лише двох бойових побратимів. За ці бої у липні 2014 року Андрій Ткачук отримав

Орден Богдана Хмельницького. А далі було визволення Дзержинська і Лисичанська. Потім – Дебальцеве, Шахтарськ, Вуглегірськ, Ждановка, Комунар.

За свою мужність 14 жовтня 2016 року, у День захисника України, офіцер отримав орден "Золота зірка" Героя України. Також отримав звання "Народний герой". На запитання про свої нагороди Ткачук лише віджартовується. Воліє говорити про інших.

"За що я завжди хвилювався – це за людей, які у мене були. А за себе? Коли починаєш більше думати за людей, за задачу, то себе відсуваєш трохи подалі і навіть особливо не замислюєшся", – каже Герой України Андрій Ткачук.

Йому болить за людей, які змушені були покинути свої рідні домівки через бойові дії. Каже, що головне – звільнити окуповані території від терористів і дати людям повернутися додому.

#### **Translation into English:**

#### ***“Set a Fire Trap”: A Story of Hero of Ukraine Who Laid Mines under Enemy’s Infantry Combat Vehicle***

*Story about the heroic deed of the Hero of Ukraine Andriy Tkachuk – in the special project “True Heroes” on “5 Channel”*

Three years ago, the former commander of one of the battalions of the 25th brigade Andriy Tkachuk equipped the checkpoint between Slovyansk and Kramatorsk for civilian transport only. For more than a month the enemies could not guess what surprise awaits them if they attempt to cross it with their machines there. The first [attempt] ended in the loss of five units of technology and two dozens of living force.

“An adequate man, whom everyone believes. He knows his job, he’s punctual. He is the chief of staff. The real chief of staff!” – says a soldier of the Ukrainian army 25th airborne squadron.

That is what Andriy Tkachuk’s subordinates say of him. The major, the Hero of Ukraine and chief of battalion’s staff is only 30 years old. He constantly changes his call signs, and because he is on the front line, he cannot find time to talk to journalists.

“I am an army man; I am just trying to do my job. There is a locksmith who does some job, a turner who does some job; there are plenty of professions. I am a soldier!” – Andriy Tkachuk says.

Currently his unit is defending Zaytsevo in Donbas, from where the enemy positions are less than 200 meters away. Andriy Tkachuk came to East [*of Ukraine*] in April 2014, and in early May the battalion commander began to fight with the enemy on the outskirts of Slovyansk.

The 5th checkpoint stood on the way between Slovyansk and Kramatorsk on the night of May 2nd 2014. Then all surrounding places were occupied by the militants. Tkachuk’s task was to block the transport communication between them.

The terrorists could only see a small checkpoint on the road. For more than a month, hundreds of civilian cars were passing through it. In some of them were the enemy’s scouts. However none of them noticed that in reality Tkachuk’s squadron made a real fire trap in 2 kilometers long section of the road.

“It was all planned so that in any case, even if they would not want to go there, they would fall into this fire trap anyway”, - Andriy explains.

In early July the terrorists made an attempt to break through the side of Slovyansk. Two tanks, two ICVs [*infantry combat vehicles*] and one AAV [*airborne*

*assault vehicle*] with militants inside fell into Tkachuk's fire trap. During the battle, all enemy machinery was destroyed. The officer himself got wounded, but refused to evacuate and continued to command his subordinates.

"There were two T-64 tanks. One was destroyed; the other just fell down before it. When you leave Slovyansk – in the area of the market – it fell into a ditch. The crew was liquidated, and the tank was undamaged, so it was taken later. The second tank was destroyed. Two infantry combat vehicles BMP-2 that wanted to break through were destroyed, they were destroyed by blowing up on mine chains and by fire from grenade launchers", - the soldier recalls.

Volunteer Yuri Fedorchenko says: "I truly do not understand how they managed to do it. They had two trenches. Mines [*were hanging*] across the entire road from the rope. One man sits on that side of the road, the other one – here. And they pulled these mines under the tank. Namely, when the ICV came, they pulled a mine under it. [*They were*] sitting literally by its side."

Volunteers from Kramatorsk, who were risking their lives to help the 25th brigade, now restore the heroic deed of Tkachuk's squadron. They show the wood line in which almost a hundred fighters remained unnoticed for several months.

For almost three months' fight the Major's squadron lost only two brothers in arms on the 5th checkpoint. For that battle in May 2014 Andriy Tkachuk was rewarded the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky [*Ukrainian high military award*]. After that, Dzerzhinsk and Lysychansk were liberated. Then – Debaltseve, Shakhtarsk, Vuhlehirsk, Zhdanovka, Komunar.

For his bravery on October 14th 2016 on the Ukrainian Independence day, the officer was rewarded the Order "Golden star" of the Hero of Ukraine. Also he received

the title of “National Hero”. When asked about his rewards, Tkachuk just jokes. He prefers to talk about others.

“What I always boasted about are the people I had. And about me? When you start thinking more about the people, about the task, you push yourself aside a bit and do not think much [*about yourself*]”, - the Hero of Ukraine Andriy Tkachuk says.

He hurts for people who were forced to leave their homes because of warfare. He says that the main thing is to set the occupied territories free from terrorists and give people the chance to return home.

## 5. TSN.UA

Link: [https://ru.tsn.ua/blogi/themes/law/slova-o-kryme-mysli-ob-imperii-355673.html?\\_ga=2.195565999.2074636803.1517410839-1432926172.1517410839](https://ru.tsn.ua/blogi/themes/law/slova-o-kryme-mysli-ob-imperii-355673.html?_ga=2.195565999.2074636803.1517410839-1432926172.1517410839)

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Author: Mykola Kolomojets (Микола Коломоець)

### Original Text:

#### *Слова о Крыме, Мысли об Империи*

*В речи Путина много лжи и моментов, которые могли бы вызвать смех, если бы их не произносили уста человека, имеющего доступ к "красной кнопке ядерного чемоданчика".*

*Фашизм есть ложь, изрекаемая бандитами.*

*"Писатель и война", Э. Хемингуэй, 1937 г.*

Меня учили уважать врага, основывая это уважение на простом постулате: "Чем сильнее враг, тем больше должно быть к нему уважение, ведь чем сильнее враг, тем слаще победа над ним, и тем более сильным он сделает тебя".

Жаль, что никто не учил меня правильному отношению к подлому врагу. Владимир Путин, безусловно, сильный и хитрый, но еще и подлый, лживый враг — это мое о нем мнение, а не попытка его очернить или облагородить.

В отношении двух первых качеств я был уверен давно, но в его подлости я убедился накануне, услышав его обращение. В его речи много лжи и моментов, которые могли бы вызвать смех, если бы их не произносили уста человека, держащего свою руку на "красной кнопке ядерного чемоданчика".

Как юрист, я обязан обосновать свое утверждение. Поэтому прошу обратить внимание всего на несколько высказываний президента РФ, чтобы убедиться, что я не вырвал их из контекста и не изменил их значения.

### **Об этносах, России и Крыме**

Владимир Путин, очевидно, не считает этносами множество коренных народов РФ, которые сейчас считаются исчезнувшими или исчезающими.

Большинство россиян даже не знают о существовании таких этносов, как манси, ульчи, тофалары, долганы. Эти народы издавна проживали на территории, ныне называемой Российской Федерацией, а сейчас представителей этих этносов осталось от нескольких сотен до нескольких тысяч. А некоторых пару десятков или вовсе пару человек.

Да, благодаря анекдотам россияне слышали о чукчах, но вряд ли многие знают о том, что по официальным данным их осталось всего около 1000 человек.

Это печальный результат того, что Россия насильственно отбирает их детей для учебы в закрытых интернатах. Возвращаясь домой, они не умеют охотиться, ловить рыбу, укрываться от снежных бурь, ориентироваться в снежных пустынях. Не умеют всего того, чему сотнями лет учились их предки и

передавали из поколения в поколение. В то же время они не имеют возможности жить в других условиях.

Россия умышленно разрывает связь поколений, создавая условия для вымирания этих народов - уничтожая их образ жизни, историю, культуру, их языки. Десятки этносов Россия целенаправленно растворила и уничтожила - и продолжает это делать.

### **"Карательные операции"**

Дальше вождь российского народа В.Путин начал нести еще более "развесистую клюкву", перейдя к более насущным проблемам.

Крымчане узнавали о репрессиях и карательных операциях исключительно из уст того же человека, который на днях пообещал превратить США в радиоактивный пепел. Крымчане ходили на работу, отправляли своих русскоязычных детей в школы, гуляли в парках и нигде не видели бандеровцев, но, включив российские телеканалы, тут же начинали их бояться со страшной силой.

Никто в Украине не собирался причинять какой-либо вред людям, живущим в Крыму, какой бы национальности они не были. Майдан боролся с властью, с ее коррупцией и неэффективностью, как подтвердил сам В.Путин, а не со своим же народом.

Майдан боролся за то, чтобы в Украине исполнялись законы, чтобы каждый мог получить равные права на участие в управлении государством, чтобы власть дала возможность регионам развиваться в соответствии с их требованиями и особенностями. Что из этого могло напугать Крым? Думаю, что это могло

напугать только Путина, которому не нужны такие же майданы на его предприятии под названием Российская Федерация.

### **Правовой нигилизм по-путински**

Эти вещи не так интересны, как попытки В.Путина обосновать то, что его захватническая политика в отношении Украины является "белой и пушистой" с правовой точки зрения.

Сначала он поблагодарил мировую общественность, что она вспомнила о международном праве, после чего выдал следующее:

В.Путин считает, что нормы международного права действительно предоставляют России право принимать решения, предполагающие нарушение территориальной неприкосновенности суверенного государства.

Парламент Российской Федерации, ссылаясь на весьма размытые нормы в законодательном поле Российской Федерации, принял решение о вооруженной агрессии против соседнего суверенного государства. Мы не берем даже во внимание, что они это сделали под предлогом защиты россиян и русскоязычных от опасности, существующей только в воспаленном воображении Д.Киселева.

Действительно, нет ничего страшного в том, что Российская Федерация нарушила Устав ООН, Декларацию о принципах международного права, касающихся дружественных отношений и сотрудничества между государствами в соответствии с уставом ООН и еще пару-тройку совершенно бессмысленных для агрессора, владеющего ядерным оружием, документов.

Что с того, что Россия взяла на себя обязательства воздерживаться от угрозы силой или ее применения против территориальной целостности или политической независимости любого государства?

Кому не нравится, что России плевать на эти бумажки, пускай еще раз послушает Д.Киселева о "ядерном пепле" - это не такое уж и забытое старое, представляющее из себя один из примеров новой ядерной дипломатии. Очень подлого инструмента отстаивания своих интересов на международной арене, когда на любой аргумент можно отвечать демонстрацией готовности стереть человеческую цивилизацию с лица земли.

Так может рассуждать гопник, рассказывая, что наказал лоха, гуляющего по парку вечером, и что не нарушил никаких законов. А просто научил этого самого лоха и других лохов жизни, и кому не нравится, тот может легко получить в ухо для закрепления урока.

### **Об интервенции**

Самой подлой частью речи, лично для меня, является вот эта:

Я припоминаю, память у меня не столь избирательна, как у Владимира Владимировича, что дает мне возможность помнить то, что В.Путин припомнить не может. Но не об этом речь.

Зачем опять проводить аналогии с Гитлером? Как не прискорбно признавать, но этот аргумент мы сами дали Путину в руки. Наше законодательство, наши уставы обязывают Вооруженные силы Украины открывать огонь по врагу, открывать огонь по лицам, которые пытаются захватить территории воинских частей, причинить вред жизни и здоровью военнотружущих и материальным ценностям, находящимся под их охраной.

За все время кризиса в Крыму ни один солдат украинской армии не оказал вооруженного сопротивления. Нарушая законы и уставы, наши военные не

оказали сопротивления вооруженным людям, захватывающим воинские части, органы власти и самоуправления.

Такое поведение наших войск дает Путину возможность делать вид, что в Крыму не было никакой агрессии, никакого захвата и интервенции. Подлость этой позиции в том, что фактически Путин осуждает за отсутствие кровожадности тех, кто не согласен с захватом Крыма. Осуждает их за то, что не было "одного единственного выстрела" и не было человеческих жертв (до вчерашнего дня).

По его мнению, отсутствие должной кровожадности у украинцев дает ему право говорить об отсутствии агрессии с его стороны на полуострове Крым.

Да, я согласен с тем, что как только начались захваты зданий, угрозы оружием, захваты воинских частей, мы должны были незамедлительно и жестко на них реагировать, как того требует Закон, но это моя позиция — позиция дикаря с высшим образованием, готового и сейчас разрешать конфликты силой или угрозой такой силы.

Мне очень неприятно видеть такого точно дикаря с высшим образованием во главе соседнего государства. Который искренне сожалеет о распаде СССР и его заедает то, что часть земель, которые он считает, как и Крым, исконно русскими, сейчас составляют Юго-Восток Украины. Тем более, что количество оружия, которым В.Путин может ударить по Украине, превращает нас в одну большую болевую точку, на которую давят его амбиции и сожаления.

#### **Translation into English:**

##### ***Words about Crimea, Thoughts about Empire***

*Putin's speech contained a lot of lies and moments that could have provoked laughter, had they not been pronounced by a person who has an access to the nuclear launch suitcase.*

*Fascism is a lie told by bullies.*

***E. Hemingway, 1937***

I was taught to respect the enemy, basing this respect on a simple statement: “The stronger the enemy is, the greater you have to respect him, because the stronger the enemy is, the sweeter is the victory over him and the stronger he makes you”.

It is a pity that no-one taught me how to treat a mean enemy properly. Vladimir Putin is without doubt strong and cunning, but he is also mean, deceitful enemy – this is my opinion about him, not an attempt to besmirch or dignify him.

I was absolutely sure about two first qualities since long ago, but I got convinced in his cunning only yesterday, after listening to his speech. His speech contained a lot of lies and moments that could have provoked laughter, had they not been pronounced by a person who has an access to the nuclear launch suitcase.

As a lawyer I am obliged to justify my claim. Hence I ask to pay attention first of all to several things the Russian President said in order to understand that I neither ripped them out of the context nor altered their meanings.

#### **About ethnicities, Russia and Crimea**

Obviously, Vladimir Putin does not treat numerous indigenous peoples of Russia who are now regarded as disappeared or threatened, as ethnicities.

The majority of Russians do not even know about the existence of such ethnicities as Mansis, Ulchis, Tofalars and Dolgans. All these peoples have since long time lived on the territory now called „The Russian Federation“. And now there are only some hundreds to some thousands of these ethnicities left. And from some [*of these ethnic groups*] there are only a few people left.

Yes, Russians heard about Chukchis from anecdotes [*indigenous people inhabiting the shores of the Bering Strait, portrayed as silly in Russian anecdotes*], but hardly anyone knows that according to official data there are only 1000 people left of them.

This is a sad result of Russia forcefully taking away their children to learn in closed boarding schools. When they come back home, they cannot hunt, catch fish, hide from blizzards, orient themselves in snow deserts. They cannot do all the things that their ancestors have been learning and passing from generation to generation for hundreds of years. At the same time they have no opportunity to live in other conditions.

Russia deliberately tears the connections of generations, creating conditions for these peoples to die out – by destroying their way of life, history, culture and languages. Russia persistently dissolved and destroyed dozens of ethnicities – and it continues to do so.

#### **„Punitive expeditions“**

Furthermore the leader of the Russian nation V. Putin passed on to more acute problems and talked even denser rubbish.

Crimeans found out about repressions and punitive expeditions exclusively from the very same person who promised to turn the USA into radioactive dust just a couple of days ago. Crimeans went to work, sent their Russian-speaking children to schools, walked in parks and saw Banderovites nowhere. But as soon as they turned on the Russian TV channels, they panically started to fear them.

No-one in Ukraine ever wanted to do any harm to people living in Crimea, whatever their ethnicity is. Maidan fought against the government, its corruption and inefficiency, like Putin himself confirmed, and not with its own people.

Maidan struggled for Ukraine to abide by the laws, for everyone to be equal in state management, for the government to allow regions to develop according to their demands and peculiarities. What from all this could scare Crimea? I think this could scare only Putin who did not need the same maidans in his enterprise called Russian Federation.

### **Legal nihilism a-la Putin**

These things are not as interesting as V. Putin's attempts to explain that his invasive politics towards Ukraine is „white and fuzzy” from the legal point of view.

First of all he thanked the international community that it remembered about the international law, and then he said the following:

V. Putin thinks that the norms of international law indeed give Russia the right to make decisions that presuppose the violation of territorial integrity of a sovereign state.

Relying on rather blurry norms within the Russian Federation's laws, the Parliament of the Russian Federation made a decision about the armed aggression against the neighboring sovereign state. We do not even take into account that they did it on the ground of protecting Russians and Russian speakers from danger that exists only in D. Kiselyov's debris imagination.

Indeed: there is nothing awful in the fact that the Russian Federation violated the UN Charter, the Declaration on Principles of International Law which encompasses friendly relations and cooperation between states according to the UN Charter, and

another couple of documents, completely useless to an aggressor in possession of nuclear weapons.

Russia has bound itself to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of any state. What of it?

Whoever does not like that Russia does not give a damn about these papers should once again listen to D. Kiselyov [*talking*] about radioactive dust [*after Crimea annexation, Kiselyov stated that Russia is the only country able to turn the USA into radioactive dust*]. This is not the much forgotten old, and it is an example of new nuclear diplomacy. A very mean instrument of advocating for one's interests on the international stage, when readiness to wipe off the human race the off the Earth's face can be the answer to any argument.

A street bully that "punishes" a jerk who walks in a park at evening can argue like this. That he has not violated any laws: he just taught this jerk and all other jerks a lesson. Whoever does not like it can easily get punched in the face for the means of solidifying the lesson.

### **About interventions**

For my part, the meanest part of the speech was exactly this one.

I remember, my memory is not so selective as Vladimir Vladimirovich's; and it gives me a chance to remember the things that V.V. Putin cannot. But this is not what I am talking about.

Why bring up analogies with Hitler again? Sad as it may be, but we gave Putin this argument ourselves. Our laws, our codes oblige the Armed forces of Ukraine to fire on enemy, to fire on people who try to occupy the territory of military bases, who try to harm the life and health of the soldiers and the material values they guard.

For the entire time of Crimean crisis no soldier of the Ukrainian army ever fought back militarily. Violating the laws and codes, our soldiers did not fight back to the armed people who were capturing military bases and government agencies.

This behavior of our army allows Putin to pretend there was no aggression on Crimea, no capture or intervention. The meanness of this standpoint is that Putin de-facto criticizes those who oppose the annexation of Crimea for their lack of cruelty. He criticizes them that “there was not a single shot” and no casualties (until yesterday).

He believes that the insufficient cruelty of Ukrainians gives him the right to speak about the absence of aggression from their side on the Crimean peninsula.

Yes I agree that as soon as the buildings and military bases were captured, as soon as it was threatened with weapons, we should have reacted immediately and harshly in accordance with the Law, but it is my stance – the stance of a savage with a degree who is still ready to solve the conflicts with force or with threat of such force.

It is extremely unpleasant for me to see the same savage with a degree as head of the neighboring state. Who sincerely regrets the breakup of USSR, who is tormented because some lands that, as he believes, like Crimea, are originally Russian, are now part of Southeast Ukraine. Especially because the amount of weaponry that V.Putin can strike Ukraine with turns us into one large pain point that is pressed by his ambitions and regrets.

## Appendix B

### Sampling and Coding Units

#### Sampling and Coding Units: Russian Texts

| <u>Sampling units</u>           | <u>Coding Units</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Ukraine's territory and regions | <u>Crimea</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Близость к России (Intimacy towards Russia)</li> <li>▪ Вернуться в состав России (Return to Russia)</li> <li>▪ Взять Крым (Take Crimea)</li> <li>▪ Воссоединение (Reunion)</li> <li>▪ Встанет в очередь в Россию (Stand in line to Russia)</li> <li>▪ Дивный полуостров (Marvelous peninsula)</li> <li>▪ Крым ушёл (Crimea is gone)</li> <li>▪ Крым ушел бы под Киев (Crimea would have gone under Kyiv)</li> <li>▪ Не возвращаться на Украину (Never to return to Ukraine)</li> <li>▪ Оставить Украину (Leave Ukraine)</li> <li>▪ Предмет зависти (Object of envy)</li> <li>▪ Присоединиться к России (Rejoin Russia)</li> <li>▪ Референдум (Referendum)</li> <li>▪ Решение по Крыму (Decision on Crimea)</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|                                 | <u>Donbas</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Восемь русскоязычных областей (Eight Russian-speaking regions)</li> <li>▪ ДНР (DPR) / Донецкая Народная Республика (Donetsk People's Republic)</li> <li>▪ Взять всю Украину (Take the whole Ukraine)</li> <li>▪ Гражданская война (Civil war)</li> <li>▪ Дружественная Новороссия (Friendly Novorossiya)</li> <li>▪ Измученные боями (Tormented by battles)</li> <li>▪ Интеграция с Украиной (Integration into Ukraine)</li> <li>▪ ЛНР (LPR) / Луганская Народная Республика (Luhansk People's Republic)</li> <li>▪ Мятежные республики (Rebellious republics)</li> <li>▪ Отделиться всей Новороссией (All Novorossiya separating)</li> <li>▪ Повторение крымского результата (Repeat the Crimean result)</li> <li>▪ Присоединение Западноукраинских областей (Annexation of West-Ukrainian provinces)</li> <li>▪ Русская Весна (Russian spring)</li> <li>▪ Русская инициатива (Russian initiative)</li> </ul> |

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Rest of Ukraine

- Антироссийский «санитарный барьер» (Anti-Russian “sanitary barrier”)
- Незалежная (Nezalezhnaya)
- Новое государство (New state)
- Родина Гоголя и Шевченко (Native land of Gogol and Shevchenko)
- Страна «победившего достоинства» (Land of “the victorious dignity”)
- Украинское государство (Ukrainian state)

Ukraine’s population

- Бандеровцы (Banderovites)
- Вызывающие жалость украинцы (Pathetic Ukrainians)
- Жалко (Pathetic)
- Заробитчане (Zarobyтчane)
- Изгои (Pariahs)
- Местные провластные активисты (Local pro-government activists)
- Нищий народ (Poverty-struck people)
- Рабы (для Евросоюза) (Slaves (for the European Union))
- «Патриоты» (“Patriots”)
- Радикалы (Radicals)
- Украинский коллега (Ukrainian colleague)
- Создаваемая нация (Emerging nation)
- Украинские наемники (Ukrainian contractors)
- Украинские террористы (Ukrainian terrorists)
- Унизительно (Humiliating)

Ukraine’s ruling  
elites

Politicians

- Бандера [Степан] (Bandera [Stepan])
  - Баулы с чёрным налом (Suitcases with black cash)
  - Безумие (Madness)
  - Богатеет (Increases [his] capital)
  - Борцы с коррупцией (Corruption fighters)
  - Коррупционеры (Kleptocrats)
  - Националисты (Nationalists)
  - Не постеснялся (Did not feel ashamed to)
  - Обогатились (Became rich)
  - Олигарх-президент (Oligarch president)
  - Офшорный президент (Offshore president)
  - Платить дань (Pay tribute)
  - Политическая группировка (Political group)
  - Последняя опора в стране (Last stronghold in the country)
  - Поставить под удар (Put under fire)
  - Путчисты (Coupists)
  - Растеряет весь электорат (Lose all voters)
  - Революционеры (Revolutionists)
  - Террористы (Terrorists)
-

- Теряют стыд и меру (Lose shame and moderation)
- «Черносписочник» (“Blacklisted [person]”)

Regime and ideology

- Антипутинизм (Anti-Putinism)
- Евроинтеграция (European integration)
- Киевские власти (Kyivan government)
- Киевский режим (Kyivan regime)
- Майданный (Maidanian)
- Набор мифов (Set of myths)
- Наказание несогласных (Punishment of the dissenters)
- Нацизм (Nazism)
- Нацистский режим (Nazi regime)
- Неэффективность государственного управления (Inefficiency of state governance)
- Официальный Киев (Official Kyiv)
- Радикальный национализм (Radical nationalism)
- Режим Порошенко (Poroshenko’s regime)
- Силловые инструменты (Force instruments)
- Украинское правление (Ukrainian rule)
- Хунта (Junta)

Inner policy

Ukraine’s policy

- Бесправие (Lawlessness)
- В ход пошли (Were unleashed)
- Взятки (Bribes)
- Влезшая в долги (Indebted)
- Возвеличивание нацистских преступников (Glorification of Nazi criminals)
- Воровство (Theft)
- Вранье (Lies)
- Деграция (Degradation)
- Делегитимация советского периода (Delegitimization of the Soviet era)
- Дерусификация (De-Russification)
- Дестабилизировать ситуацию (Destabilize the situation)
- Дискриминации (Discrimination)
- Дружно дожёвывают (Unitedly finish chewing on)
- Жизнь стала труднее (Life has become far more difficult)
- Заигрывание с националистами (Flirtation with nationalists)
- Закон о декоммунизации (Decommunization law)
- Запрет (Ban)
- Запретить 9 мая (Forbid May 9<sup>th</sup>)
- Игнорирование прав (Complete disregard of the rights)
- [Играть в] Диверсантов ([Play] diversionists)

- 
- Интриги (Intrigues)
  - Копать под (Dig under)
  - Кризис (Crisis)
  - Массовые расхищения средств (Mass plundering of resources)
  - Монополия на насилие (Monopoly on violence)
  - Нести угрозу государству (Bring the state threats)
  - Никак не может смириться (Just cannot get over it)
  - Обнищание (People's impoverishment)
  - Обострение конфликта (Escalation of conflict)
  - Отказ от влияния России (Rejection of Russia's influence)
  - Откаты (Kickbacks)
  - Отменили свободу слова (Abolished freedom of speech)
  - Отрицание (Denial)
  - Отсечение от истории (Cutting off from the history)
  - Охота на ведьм (Witch hunt)
  - Перегибать палку (Go too far)
  - Переписывание истории (Rewriting of Ukrainian history)
  - Пересмотр истории (Rewrite the history)
  - [Перманентная] Гражданская война ([Permanent] Civil war)
  - Подорвать (Shake)
  - Потеря территории (Loss of territory)
  - Пресловутый сайт (Notorious website)
  - Развал (Collapse)
  - Раздражение киевской властью (Annoyance with Kyivan government)
  - Раскол (Polarization)
  - Распилить бюджет (Siphon off the budget)
  - Рекет (Racketeering)
  - Репрессии (Repressions)
  - Сведения политических счетов (Settling political scores)
  - Светлое украинское прошлое (Bright Ukrainian past)
  - Свобода слова умерла (Freedom of speech has died)
  - Скандалы (Scandals)
  - Скрутить (Round up)
  - Страдания (Suffering)
  - Страх (Fear)
  - Судебная расправа (Legal reprisal)
  - Травля (Hate campaign)
  - Украины нет (Ukraine is no more)
  - Хаос (Chaos)
  - Экономика схлопывается (Economy implodes)
  - Это теперь называется (This is called [...] now)

Foreign policy & foreign partners of Ukraine

- Антипольские взгляды (Anti-Polish ideas)
- Безвиз (Visa-free travel)
- Безвизовый режим (Visa-free travel)
- Бюрократические подписи (Bureaucratic signatures)
- Внешние друзья киевского режима (External friends of the Kyivan regime)
- Внешние консультанты (Foreign consultants)
- Вяло текущей изоляции страны (Low-level isolation of the country)
- Дипломатический скандал (Diplomatic scandal)
- Европейские устремления Киева (Kyiv's European strivings)
- Западные спонсоры (Western funders)
- Изолировать страну (Isolate [his] country)
- Испортились отношения (Spoilt the relations)
- Могущественные враги (Powerful enemies)
- «Недружественный пояс» ("Unfriendly circle")
- Нелегальный сбор клубники (Illegal harvesting of strawberry)
- Обзывал Польшу нехорошими словами (Called Poland nasty names)
- Обнуление негатива (Nulling of negativity)
- Обработка украинского населения (Brainwashing of Ukrainian populace)
- Отторгнутые у Польши (Seized from Poland)
- Подорвет взаимоотношения (Loss of relations)
- Поживиться за счет Украины (Feast on Ukraine)
- Прекрасное далеко (The beautiful far)
- Противопоставляет себя западным соседям (Opposes itself to its western neighbors)
- Противостояние (Resistance)
- Прощать Украине хамства (Forgive Ukraine its rudeness)
- Разговорчивый посол (Talkative ambassador)
- Резко обострились отношения (Drastically spoilt its relations)
- Светлое европейское будущее (Bright European future)
- Ситуация накалилась (The situation heated up)
- Слишком много прощала (Has been forgiving too much)
- Украинские друзья (Friends of Ukraine)

Social & political  
processes in  
Ukraine

Euromaidan

- Госпереворот (Coup d'etat)
- Киевский майдан (Kyivan Maidan)
- Киевский переворот (Kyivan coup)

- Незаконное свержение власти (Illegal overthrow of the government)
- Нелегитимные выборы (Illegitimate elections)
- Февральский путч (February coup)

Russia & Russians vs. Ukraine & Ukrainians

- Блестящее имя (Brilliant name)
  - Болезненное решение по Крыму (Painful decision on Crimea)
  - Верная принципам невмешательства (Faithful to the principles of non-intervention)
  - В изгнании (In exile)
  - Влияние восточного соседа (Eastern neighbor's influence)
  - Вмешиваться в украинские дела (Intervene into Ukrainian affairs)
  - Вынудить Россию (Force Russia)
  - Вынужденное решение (Constrained decisions)
  - Герой (Hero)
  - Достойный восхищения (Admirable)
  - Замечательный (Amazing)
  - Критика режима (Criticism of the [Ukrainian] regime)
  - Меньше сделать было нельзя (Less could not have been done)
  - Объединяющий (Uniting)
  - Отважный (Daring)
  - Подозреваемый в сепаратизме (Accused of separatism)
  - Позитивное, что дала Россия (Positive [things] that Russia gave)
  - Про-русские [политики] (Pro-Russian [politicians])
  - Россия спасла их от гибели (Russia saved them from demise)
  - Российское наследие (Russian legacy)
  - Следовало взять больше (More should have been taken)
  - Сотрудничество с Россией / российскими СМИ / ЛНР (Cooperation with Russia / the Russian media / LPR)
  - Союз с Россией (Union with Russia)
  - Статный (Lofty)
  - Стать на сторону России (Stand with Russia)
  - Трудное решение (Hard decision)
  - Харизматичный лидер (Charismatic leader)
  - Эмигранты (Emigrants)
-

## Sampling and Coding Units: Ukrainian Texts

| <u>Sampling units</u>              | <u>Coding units</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Russia and its "allies"            | <u>Russia:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Агрессор (Aggressor)</li> <li>▪ Враг / Ворог (Enemy)</li> <li>▪ Имперское государство (Imperial state)</li> <li>▪ Предприятие (Enterprise)</li> </ul> <u>Crimea after annexation, DNR and LPR</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Захваченный полуостров (Captured peninsula)</li> <li>▪ Оккупационный (Occupational)</li> <li>▪ Окуповані території (Occupied territories)</li> <li>▪ Схід (East)</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Russian and pro-Russian population | <u>Russian "agents"</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Агенти ворожої іноземної держави (Agents of a foreign enemy state)</li> <li>▪ Боти (Bots)</li> <li>▪ Іноземні агенти (Foreign agents)</li> <li>▪ Маніпулятори (Manipulators)</li> </ul> <u>Crimean authorities, Donbas rebels</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Бойовики (Militants)</li> <li>▪ Вооруженные люди (Armed people)</li> <li>▪ Ворог (Enemy)</li> <li>▪ Ворожі розвідники (Enemy's scouts)</li> <li>▪ Жива сила (Living force)</li> <li>▪ Ліквідовано (Liquidated)</li> <li>▪ Спецоперація (Special operation)</li> <li>▪ Терористи (Terrorists)</li> <li>▪ Угрозы (Threats)</li> <li>▪ Челюсти оккупационной юстиции (Jaws of occupational justice)</li> </ul> |
| Russian politicians                | <u>Putin and his team</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Амбиции (Ambitions)</li> <li>▪ Владний трон (Throne)</li> <li>▪ Вождь российского народа (Leader of the Russian nation)</li> <li>▪ Воспалённое воображение (Debris imagination)</li> <li>▪ Вызывать смех (Provoke laughter)</li> <li>▪ Враг (Enemy)</li> <li>▪ Гопник (Street bully)</li> <li>▪ Дикарь (Savage)</li> <li>▪ Лживый (Deceitful)</li> <li>▪ Ложь (Lies)</li> <li>▪ Нести "развесистую клюкву" (Talk utter rubbish)</li> <li>▪ Подлый (Mean)</li> <li>▪ Радиоактивный пепел (Radioactive dust)</li> <li>▪ Російськи політикум (Russian political elites)</li> <li>▪ Силовики (Security forces)</li> </ul>                                                                |

Russia's foreign  
policy

- Хитрый (Cunning)
- Historic personalities
- Джугашвили / Сталин Иосиф Виссарионович (Jugashvili / Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich)
- Екатерина Вторая (Catherine II)
- Советские комиссары (Soviet commissars)
- Involvement into Crimea and Donbas
- Аннексия (Annexation)
- Бойові дії (Warfare)
- Вбивство (Murder)
- Війна (War)
- Вооруженная агрессия (Armed aggression)
- Выдавливание местного элемента (Squeezing out the local population)
- Давление [на крымских татар] (Oppress [the Crimean Tatars])
- Депортации (Deportation)
- Захватническая политика (Imperialistic policy)
- Интервенция (Intervention)
- Карательные операции (Punitive expeditions)
- Колонизация (Colonization)
- «Красная кнопка ядерного чемоданчика» (“Nuclear launch suitcase”)
- Нарушение территориальной неприкосновенности (Violate territorial integrity)
- Новая ядерная дипломатия (New nuclear diplomacy)
- Нарушить Устав ООН (Violate the UN chart)
- Плевать (Does not give a damn)
- Преступления против человечества (Crimes against humanity)
- Репрессии (Repressions)
- Стереть с лица земли (Wipe off the Earth's face)
- Угроза (Threat)
- Ударить по Украине (Strike Ukraine)
- Involvement into USA elections
- Агітація (Agitation)
- Вплив (Impact)
- Вплинути на суспільну думку (Influence the public opinion)
- Вторглися (Invaded)
- Втручання (Interference)
- Зловживання (Misuse)
- Зміна політичних поглядів (Change of political views)
- Інструмент (Tool)
- Інформаційна операція (Information operation)
- Кампанія (Campaign)
- Конфлікт (Conflict)
- Маніпулювання американцями (Manipulate the

Americans)

- Маніпуляцій (Manipulations)
- «Мертви душі» (“Dead souls”)
- Підвищити градус радикальності (Raise the level of radicalism)
- Підштовхування (Steering [*of public opinion*])
- Провокація (Provocation)
- Просування на пост президента Дональда Трампа (Promote Donald Trump to presidency)
- Реклама (Advertising)
- Розпалювання ворожнечі (Incite hatred / hostility)
- Сіяти ворожнечу (Spread hatred)
- «Трояньський кінь» (“Trojan horse”)
- Фейкови (Fake)

Russia’s inner policy

Political regime

- Екстремізм (Extremism)
- Імперія (Empire)
- Індустріальна напористість (Industrialist aggressiveness)
- Інституціональний расизм (Institutional racism)
- Корупційні схеми (Corruption schemes)
- Правовий нігілізм (Legal nihilism)
- Політичні маневри Кремля (Political maneuvers of the Kremlin)
- Путінська пропаганда (Putin’s propaganda)
- Путінського режиму (Putin’s regime)
- Размытые нормы [*в законодательстве*] (Blurry norms [*within laws*])
- Расистских обществ (Racist society)
- Репрессивные нормы (Repressive norms)
- Сакралізувати (Sacralized)
- Уничтожение (Destruction)

Everyday life / Inner policy

- Акції протестів (Protest actions)
- Доминирование русского народа (Dominance of Russian people)
- Екстремізм (Extremism)
- Жорсткий поліцейський та політичний інструментарій (Rigorous police and political reaction)
- Заборони (Bans)
- Затримання (Detaining)
- Корупція (Corruption)
- Кошмар (Dread)
- Мітинги (Protests)
- Насильственно отбирает (Forcefully taking away)
- Не считает этносами (Does not treat as ethnicities)
- Обшуки (Searches)
- Придушення протестів (Suppression of the protests)
- Прижать недовольных (Suppress the dissatisfied)

- Сакралізувати
- Санкції (Sanctions)
- Скандал (Scandal)
- Создавая условия для вымирания [для народов]  
(Creating conditions [for ethnicities] to die out)
- Страх розправи (Fear of violence)
- Умышленно разрывает (Deliberately tears)
- Целенаправленно растворила (Persistently dissolved)
- Штраф ([Monetary] Fine)

Ukraine and Ukrainians vs. Russia, Russians and “pro-Russians”

- Адекватна людина (Adequate man)
  - Активистка (Activist)
  - Бійці (Soldiers)
  - Бойови побратими (Brothers in arms)
  - Болевая точка (Pain point)
  - Виконати свою роботу (Do [his] job)
  - Військова людина / Військовий (Army man / Soldier)
  - Візволення (Liberation)
  - Вогнева пастка (Fire trap)
  - Вооруженное сопротивление (Fight back militarily)
  - Герой [України] (Hero [of Ukraine])
  - Задача (Task)
  - Легенда (Legend)
  - Мужність (Bravery)
  - Независимая (Independent)
  - Отсутствие кровожадности (Absence of cruelty)
  - Подвиг (Heroic deed)
  - Ризикуючи життям (Risking [their] lives)
  - Сражалась за права своего народа (Fighting for the rights of her people)
  - Суверенная (Sovereign)
  - Цивілізований світ (Civilized world)
-