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URBAN REGENERATION AND CONFLICT



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I. Introduction

1.1. Problem setting

Urban planning is inherently ideological. The planning practices are result of number of choices on how to define the space and how to organize life spatially (Gunder, 2010). Therefore, urban planning belongs to the realm of politics and is embedded in a system of power and domination. However, the recent trends in urban governance tend to evacuate the properly political from the urban life. In the context of implementation of consensual neoliberal practices, the city governance is increasingly becoming the matter of depoliticized technocratic decisions (Swyngedouw, 2007). In such a context, citizens' protest against planning choices could be considered as a key element to regaining meaning of political in the urban planning (Gualini, 2015).

This thesis addresses the issue of conflicts in urban development in the contradictory context of two post-socialist cities - Moscow and Budapest. After the collapse of the Eastern Block and Soviet Union, both cities became a part of the late capitalist reality. Nowadays their urban space are arenas where "second generation" of neoliberal post-socialist change is happening (Büdenbender and Zupan, 2016; Golubchikov, and Mahrova, 2012; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015); where the states express their new ideologies (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; Büdenbender and Zupan, 2016); and where the emerging grassroots social movements try to overcome social mistrust and allergy to collective action and to elaborate new collective identities (Jacobsson, 2015; Clement, 2014a). Particularly, I will pay attention to the grassroots social movements challenging urban regeneration programs.

Urban regeneration is a global phenomenon. In different places and at different scales urban actors apply variety of strategies to provide urban renewal of public spaces, housing, business and cultural districts and so forth. These strategies are based on different narratives – from culture-led or market-led regeneration of European cities (Colomb, 2011; Swyngedouw et al. 2002) to self-made improvements of slums in Latin America (McGuirk, 2015); from top-down state-led renovations of public spaces in Istanbul (Batuman, 2015) to participative planning in Catalonia (Pares et al. 2014). The renovation strategies and narratives are highly depended on the local factors but also are influenced by the global forces. Moreover, local urban actors use urban regeneration to pursue their political and economic goals.

On the one hand, the neoliberal city is described as a city, which address "*all its energies to achieving economic success in competition with other cities*" (Leitner et al. 2007:4).

Urban regeneration is becoming a strategic instrument, which is used by urban actors to promote a city in the context of global “*completive urbanism*” (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Public spaces could be the target of investments and at the same time a tool to attract investments and people. In order to make it function this way, city administration has to make the urban economy conducive for investment (Büdenbender and Zupan, 2016). Therefore, the renewal of public space not only makes the place globally “attractive” (for investments and certain groups of people and activities) but also shifts the city model to more market-orientated.

On the other hand, although the urban politics is increasingly driven by collaborative networked models of governance (Peters and Pierre, 2012) it still depends on the use of state power (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). On top of in, in some cases the urban regeneration is used by local political regimes to represent their ideological orientation and consolidate their power (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015). Therefore, local political regimes both could provide an institutional framework for neoliberal urban politics (Harvey, 2007) and pursue their own political interests through the urban regeneration of public space.

Besides their global, economic and political functions, the public spaces accommodate the everyday life events of the citizens. If urban regeneration is provided in the sake of global competitiveness or in interests of local elites it could contradict local usage of the space and violate interests of some of local users. If such contradiction emerges, urban renewal becomes a potential accelerator of conflicts and protests.

In the context of deliberative democracy these conflicts are supposed to be solved through the proper negotiation strategies supported by the institute of experts (Gualini, 2015). One of the tools which supposed to turn the conflicts in urban development to the positive force is collaborative planning. The idea of collaborative planning is based on the associative understanding of urban politics where citizens are considered as active agents and conflicts are resolved through consensus-oriented deliberative process. The conflicts therefore, are considered as originated within the complex urban life. In this case, the role of planning is to “*provide the theoretical and analytical framework necessary for the proper development of collaborative practices*” (Gualini, 2015, p.48).

Another approach assumes antagonistic character of urban dynamics. Critical urban geographers argue that spatial and social dynamics in the city depends on the economic-political interests and power relations (Harvey, 2009; Brenner et al. 2009). In such a perspective, collaborative planning is considered as embedded in existing structures of power and domination (Gualini, 2015; Purcell, 2009; Marcuse, 2012). Therefore, it is used

as a tool to resolve the conflicts inside the existing system of domination in the interests of elites. The authors, mentioned above, argue for rethinking the role of planning and conflict and suggest to analyze planning as an *“act of politicization of the contradictions of capitalist restructuring in order to challenge the discursive and institutional terrains of urban politics”* (Gualini, 2015). From this perspective, conflict possesses antagonistic nature and could not be resolved without changing urban and territorial dynamics at the local and global level. The antagonistic nature of the conflict brings us back to the issue of “political” in urban planning. As Dikeç put it: *“Space becomes political when it becomes an integral element of the interruption of the ‘natural’ order of domination through the constitution of place of encounter by those who have no part in that order”* (Dikeç, 2005, p. 172)

Consequently, I consider conflicts in urban development as a way to look at the political dimension of urban planning. Since urban development reflects political and economic order, the conflicts in urban development signals the contradictions and tensions of this order. I assume that the conflictual space could become an arena for discussion of the existing order and the space for encounter for those who outside this order.

1.2. Aims and objectives

I would like to look at the issue of conflicts caused by urban regeneration of public spaces in post-socialist context. After the collapse of Soviet Union and fall of the Iron Curtain former socialist cities faced two challenges: how to become complete and how to create new identity in place of the lost one. In last three decades public spaces become arenas for both: there are the spaces where “attractiveness” is displayed and where new identities are manifested. City centers of Moscow and Budapest are heavily reconstructed and public spaces are becoming more commercialized (Golubchikov and Mahrova, 2012; Akçalı and Korkut, 2015). This process is often challenged by grassroots social movements, which usually remain at the local level. Speaking about grassroots social movements I mean *“organized collective action, which is reflecting to the issues rooted in everyday life, is lasting for some time and engaging “ordinary” people without activist’s experience”* (Clément, 2014a:11). Such movements are the main object of my research. I would like to look how regeneration of public spaces is becoming the accelerator of the conflicts, how these conflicts are developing and to which extent emerged movements could be considered as political.

In this research, I will compare six recent conflicts in Moscow and Budapest in order to:

- a) Compare different approaches to justification of urban regeneration of public space;

- b) Understand how and why conflicts are emerging and what makes movements arise in different contexts.
- c) Evaluate the political dimension of the conflicts.

1.3. Research questions

Following the described social processes and research objectives I formulate next research questions:

- a) How urban regeneration processes are justified in post-socialist context?
- b) What does make conflict emerge and in which forms it is expressed? In which conditions urban movements arise and how do they define themselves?
- c) If and why the renovating spaces are becoming arenas for discussion the neoliberal-capitalist model?**

The last question is considered as the main one.


1.4. Research design

The research will be structured as qualitative comparative analysis of six case studies – three in Moscow and three in Budapest.

Moscow and Budapest have been chosen as examples of two post-socialist cities with distinctive experience under socialism and during the post-socialist transition. Soviet Union was purer example of socialism than Hungary, which was one of the most capitalistic countries in Eastern Block. The transition in Hungary started earlier and went much smoother than in Russia (Pickvance, 2001). The communist past is considered completely negative in Hungary (Chelcea and Drute, 2016) and communist regime is deemed as a criminal. In Russia the relation to the past could range from the hatred to proud and nostalgia. After the collapse of Soviet Union Moscow has lost many of its political and economic functions while Budapest got bigger role than it had before.

One of the intentions of this research was to examine how different experiences under socialism and during post-socialist transition influenced urban governance in Moscow and Budapest today, almost thirty years after the collapse of Soviet Union. Both cities accepted neoliberal capitalism as the only one possible way of development. However, we can say that, rather than just adopt western forms of neoliberal governmentality both cities elaborated their own. Although this topic needs a separate research, we could assume that 'hybrid forms of governmentality', which could be found today in Moscow and Budapest have a lot in common. I will elaborate this topic in the part "Empirical framework".

Figure 1. Research design



II. Theoretical and empirical framework

The theoretical framework for my research is based on two blocks of theories.

The first one is related to the issue of conflict in urban planning and, specifically, in urban regeneration. The concept of post-political city (Swyngedouw, 2007; Macleod, 2011; Dikeç, 2005) is central for this part. In the second part, I tried to find out what are the theories about “post-socialism”, which main questions are relevant now for post-socialist studies and what is specific about post-socialist cities.

2.1. Post-political city

In this part I will refer to Swyngedouw and Dikeç to set the connections between space and politics.

2.1.1. Police and politics

In the first place, it is important to narrow down the term of “politics”. Further, I will use this notion as it was defined by Rancière. “*Politics* – Rancière writes – *is not the exercise of power*” (Rancière, 2001, p. 1). As Dikeç (2003) rephrase it, politics arise when the police order is disrupted and when this disruption is guided by the principle of quality. Police here refers to “*an established social order of governance with everyone in their ‘proper’ place in the seemingly natural order of things*” (Dikeç, 2003, p.174). For Rancière police is the

organization of power, the whole system of governance. It includes distribution of roles and places, institutional settings and procedures, which are used by actors to reach a consensus. Discussing Rancière's definition of police Dikeç argues that the essential element of police is plurality of activities. Any police order is contested, full of tensions and never completed. The politics, on the other hand, is a form of action which not only ruptures the "normal" distribution of the positions between whoever in power but questions the "natural order" itself (Rancière, 2001). The essence of police is to define the whole system and to find proper place for each part of the system (Dikeç, 2003). *"The essence of politics is manifestation of dissensus"* (Rancière, 2001, p. 9). Politics therefore is opposite to police.

2.1.2. City governance and politics

As "the police" refers to the order of governance, the city governance could be considered in these terms. According to Peters and Pierre (2012) *"urban governance is about the formulation and pursuit of collective goals at the local level of the political system"* (p. 2). The question arises what are these collective goals and how they are formulated.

Number of authors argue that the global forces caused a significant shift in the local institutional dynamics of European cities in last decades. Global reorganization of production and demand, increasing mobility of capital, migration, growing transnational networking of companies and individuals brought new challenges to the cities (Swyngedouw and Baeten, 2001). To meet these challenges the governance of the cities has been redefined. The new urban agenda reflects the inter-urban competition and shift from the redistribution and regulatory policy toward *"the promotion of economic growth and competitiveness, entrepreneurial growth, and creativity"* (Swyngedouw, 2007:4). On the one hand, the urban governance became more networked, horizontal and consensus-based (Swyngedouw, 2007); on the other hand, the role of government in urban governance has changed (Peters and Pierre, 2012). This institutional restructuring is embedded in a neoliberal ideological polity. That means that all actors involved in the urban governance process are supposed to share the same vision about the aims and future of the city development. Although there is a big variety of the governance styles across different cities, the urban regeneration is increasingly becoming framed *"in a common and consensual language of competitive creativity, flexibility, efficiency, state entrepreneurship, strategic partnerships, and collaborative advantage"* (Swyngedouw, 2007:4). Swyngedouw criticizes this institutional shift to the policy of consensus that puts all debates

inside existing political and ideological system and marginalize disagreement emerged outside of the consensus.

“Governance-beyond-the-State systems are presumably horizontal, networked, and based on interactive relations between independent and interdependent actors who share a consensual view of objectives and problems and a high degree of trust, despite internal conflict and oppositional agendas, within selectively inclusive participatory institutional or organizational associations.... This urban police order vitally revolves around a consensual arrangement in which all those that are named and counted can take part, can participate.” (Swyngedouw, 2007:7)

So that, Swyngedouw argues that politics in contemporary city was reduced to the technocratic management where collective goals are shaped by the neoliberal logic of urban development. Swyngedouw states that this shift announces “new forms of autocratic governmentality”. His argument is that the conflict is a constitutive element of democracy and that the politic appears when the police order is disrupted. Therefore, *“democracy always works against the pacification of social disruption, against the management of consensus and ‘stability” (p.21)* that means that consensual urban policy is deeply undemocratic. Following Rancière, he sees the essence of politics as the manifestation of dissent. So that, space becomes political when it is a part of interruption of the ‘natural’ order, when it *“creates a place of encounter by whose who have no part in this order”* (Dikec, 2003:172).

2.1.3. Post-political city: planning and conflict

Enrico Gualini, in the introduction to a book “Planning and conflict” focuses on the participatory strategies in different democratic contexts and pay attention to the role of conflict and disagreement in each strategy.

First, he explain what is the collaborative policies and criticizes them arguing that they are embedded in the existing system of domination. Collaborative planning is based on the relational understanding of urban space (Healey, 2003). In that sense, collaborative planning provides conceptual and institutional framework for resolving complex multi-actors planning scenarios. Collaborative planning assumes citizens’ participation as a necessary element of planning process. Arnstein (1969) defines participation as *“the*

redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic process, to be deliberately included in the future” (p. 216).

According to the Gualini (2015), nowadays collaborative planning becomes an integral part of undemocratic post-political urban reality Swyngedouw writes about. He assumes contention and conflict as the key element for understanding meanings of ‘political’ in the city.

Gualini refers to Mouffe and Rancière in order to make the difference between “politics”, “political” and “police”. “Politics” “refers to the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions that seeks to establish a certain order and to organize human coexistence in conditions which are always potentially conflicting” while “political” is “the dimension of antagonism that is ever present and never fully suppressed in the sphere of social relations”(Mouffe, 2013).

All the authors mentioned above share the understanding of the political as something rooted in difference and conflict. They call for (re)politicization of urban policy and urban planning as well as planning theory debates. This (re)politicization could happen through the questioning of the post-political conditions and hegemonic neoliberal order. Practically, it could be questioned in many ways. For example, through application of “radical democratization experiments” inside “in-between spaces” where mainstream policy did not come yet (Swyngedouw, 2007) or in the form of protest against market-led urban renewal policy. In the second case, the protest could be considered as a “real” democratic force only if it challenges whole existing system of power relation and priorities but not when group of people is defending their interests inside the system. Following this logic, participation also could be a re-politicizing force but only if it meets certain criteria. Kębłowski and Van Criekingen (2014) suggests that participatory practices could be instrument of challenging existing configuration of power if it is 1) redistributive (transferring power towards city-dwellers and created not for them but with and by them); 2) have a political character (opposite to de-politicized consensual technologies).

2.2. Post-socialism

There is a huge amount of literature of post-socialism. In my overview I will start with general questions and finally come to the specifics of social movements in post-socialist cities. The main questions of my overview of the literature about the post-socialism are 1) how post-socialism could be conceptualized; 2) what are specific characteristics of post-

socialist cities; 3) what is specific about grassroots movements in post-socialist cities and how to study them.

2.2.1. Concept of post-socialism

According to Tuvikene (2016), post-socialism could be perceived 1) as a container; 2) as a condition and 3) as a de-territorialized concept.

The spatio-temporal perception is the most common way to understand post-socialism. Here the post-socialism is considered as something, which comes after the socialist city and usually refers to the cities located in the region of Central and Eastern Europe and cities of former Soviet Union. Only in some cases other cities such as Chinese and Vietnamese cities are also considered (Tuvikene, 2016). The spatial understanding of post-socialist is a part of the division of the world into “*self-closed geographical containers of social, economic, political and cultural relations*” (Brenner, 2004, p. 29).

The perception of post-socialism as a condition is related to a transition as an essential element of post-socialism. As Keresztély and Scott (2012) write: “*Post-socialism can be understood as a socio-political context of transformation in which new rules and identities form under circumstances of uncertainty and enormous fiscal restraints*” (p.1112). In that sense, the post-socialist is a temporary existing phenomenon. Following that logic, post-socialism is a time of changes (Sýkora, 2009) including the democratization, increasing socio-spatial differentiation and shift from state-led to market-led urban planning. Tuvikene (2016) argues that this vision of post-socialism could be about “catching up” with the Western world where the goal is to achieve “proper” western democracy and capitalism. This view has been criticized by number of scholars for its simplification and lack of critical perspective (Tuvikene, 2016).

The post-socialist as a condition approach refers to the city as a hybridity of past and present. Such interpretation related to the main discourses of comparative urbanism that states the interconnectedness of space. Cities therefore are part of the process of globalization and are constituted by flows of capitals, people and ideas (Tuvikene, 2016). In this sense the post-socialism could be understood as a case of globalization (Keresztély and Scott, 2012). According to Martinez (2014) the difference between Western and Eastern European countries is about different patterns of negotiating modernity and ways of applying a transition ideology. As he says: “*To a certain extent, we all are post-socialist yet with different ‘normalities*” (Martinez, 2014, p. 175). Martinez understands a post-socialism as a perennial state of transition, endless attempt to achieve ‘normality’ rather

than a conscious way from socialism to capitalism. He suggests the concept of “bardak mentality” where transition is a state of mind (Russian word “bardak” means multi-dimensional chaos). The concept is applied to a situation when the system is always in the process of renovation but change is never completed that impedes the possibility to imagine alternative (first the ‘transition’ should be done and ‘normality’ achieved).

Finally, the third perception of post-socialism is elaborated by Tuvikene (2016). He explains the shortcomings of the container and condition approaches (logic of the division of the world into regional containers, hierarchical ordering of cities into modernizing/developing, eurocentrism and so forth) and suggests to address each city on its own terms. Cities therefore should be seen as ordinary, *“distinctive, diverse and contested, while existing within the world of diverse interactions and flows of different people, ideas and material”* (p. 9). According to this logic, post-socialism does not apply to a whole city or society but is related to specific aspects of social and urban life. Tuvikene suggests two ways to discuss post-socialism as a de-territorialized concept: as *“a continuity of governmental technologies and spaces”* and as *“anti-continuity that in a desire to be different is implicated through inscription of the past acting as a ‘constitutive outside’”* (p. 10). Continuity is related to material environment, social practices, governing technologies and sentiments inherited of the socialist past and changed. While these aspects could be considered as post-socialist, generally a city remains ordinary. Anti-continuity refers to the practices consciously antagonistic to socialism such as market-led logic of urban planning (Tuvikene, 2016) or individualistic and anti-leftist frames of new social movements (Jacobsson, 2015).

In my analysis I will use the later concept of post-socialism. Basing on the previous empirical studies (Jacobsson, 2015; Keresztély and Scott, 2012; Büdenbender and Zupan, 2016; Golubchikov and Makhrova, 2012; 2014 and others) I consider urban development and social movements in Moscow and Budapest as having post-socialist features both in terms of ‘continuity’ and ‘anti-continuity’.

2.2.2. Socialist and post-socialist city

As it was mentioned above, the term “post-socialist city” usually refers to the cities of CEE and former Soviet Union (FSU). The term is based on the assumption that there was a “socialist city” which after the collapse of Soviet Union became a part of the process of transformation towards market-based democratic societies (Stanilov, 2007).

So, to start with, what was a “socialist city”? Lefebvre (1974) argues that any socio-economic order produces space of its own. “Socialist city” therefore is supposed to be a product of socialist order. According to neo-Marxists approach, the socialist city was defined by its mode of production that was different from that of capitalist city and hence determined essentially different social and spatial structures. The neo-Weberian approach focused on the variety of the systems of social organization, for example dominant type of integrative mechanisms (market vs state).

On the one hand, if we compare “socialist cities” of CEE and FSU with a “capitalist city” of Western Europe of the same time, a number of distinctions could be found. Being unique products of different versions of “really existing socialism”, socialist cities still share some common characteristics. They were not market-driven and the means of production were in hand of a government (Fierl and Marcuse, 2012). All the land was owned and maintained by state while the logic of urban development was based on the top-down distribution (Golubchikov and Mahrova, 2014). The spatial organization was supposed to promote collectivists sentiments (Smith, 1996). It resulted in some physical characteristics common for socialist cities of CEE comparing with the non-socialist cities of Western Europe – emergency of big ceremonial public spaces in the city center, smaller spatial segregation, greater scarcity in mass-housing estates, fewer signs of urban marginality (Hirt, 2017), less broad suburbanization and “microraiions” (or districts) as a basing building block of a city (Smith, 1996).

On the other hand, looking from another perspective, the socialist cities of CEE and FSU are not fundamentally different from those of advanced capitalist world, especially Western Europe. As Smith (1996) states they share many historical and physical legacy. *“Both socialism and capitalist cities are industrialized and standardized in terms of land uses and architectural styles in the twentieth century and especially in the decades after World War II, much more so than their nineteenth-century predecessors”* (Hirt, 2017, p. 3). Both types of cities are the subjects of the same forces of modern society (Smith, 1996). Finally, as Fierl and Marcuse (2012) conclude, neither capitalist nor socialist cities were cities for people. Although the socialist cities were not led by market-driven logic, the decision-making was monopolized by a government. While the capitalist cities are ‘cities for profit’ the socialist cities of Soviet Union and Eastern Block could be called ‘cities for power’ (Fierl & Marcuse, 2012).

So that, we can say that ‘socialist city’, just as other cities, is ordinary at some aspects and specific in others.

The transition to “post-socialist city” could be described as economic and political restructuring towards market-based democratic society in the context of a struggle among new political groups. The cities, which used to be part of ‘building socialism’ experiment, turned to be a platform of another grandiose project involved the construction of capitalist society (Stanilov, 2007). “Democratic capitalism” was declared as henceforth the only ruling ideology (Golubchikov, 2014; Petrovic, 2005). According to Stanilov (2007) urban development during the transition period was heavily impacted by policy decisions adopted on the different levels of urban governments. Rather than being a result of “wild” market forces, the massive redistribution of assets (land, industry, services) was defined by specific policies. As Stanilov writes: *“The subsequent appropriation of urban space has been controlled and directed by the rules established and enforced through the various levels of public administration”* (p.348).

The transition from ‘socialist’ to ‘capitalist’ cities took different amount of time and went in various ways depending of the context. In the contrast to the expectations of adepts of “catching up” theory, the transition was happening in a logic of its own and was shaped by controversial interests of variety of economic and political actors (Keresztély, 2012). Generally, it resulted in shift to neoliberal ideology, institutional and political restructuring and hybrid spatialities which emerged from the mutual embeddedness of neoliberalism and socialist legacies (Golubchikov, 2014).

2.2.3. Grassroots and post-socialism

Socialist cities did not have the experience of mass protest movements of 1960-s. Instead, both in socialist Hungary and Russia state encouraged public involvement in official mass organizations while organized opposition was repressed. However, dissident activities were tolerated to the various extends. In both countries small localized protest groups existed from 1970-s. In Hungary from 1980-s some of this groups had clear anti-regime agenda. In both cases protest collective action grown before change of regime although in USSR that action was more localized (Pickvance, 2001).

In last three decades grassroots activism in the region has grown significantly. This brings us to the questions a) in which theoretical framework these movements should be studied and b) to which extent they are path-dependent.

a) Approaches to the development of civil society in Eastern Europe

According to Torsello (2012), there are two conflicting approaches to the development of civil society in Eastern Europe. The first one is based on the M. Howard's book "The weakness of civil society in post-communist Europe" published in 2003. The main assumption is that civil society in the region is generally weak. Howard uses two analytical approaches to study civil society in post-socialist context. First, he analyses it in the broad comparative framework included 'old democracies', post-authoritarian and post-socialist countries. Second, he brings 'legacies' approach in order to find what is new and what is different in post-socialist experience. Finally, he argues that the differences between civil society in post-communist countries are "in degree" and not "in kind". According to Howard, citizens in post-communist countries share high degree of mistrust to voluntary organizations because of their experience under communism. They are disappointed in the political and economic situation in their countries and rely more on the personal networks and friendship.

The second approach is critical to Howard's arguments and is presented by number of authors (Badescu et al, 2004; Jacobsson, 2015; Anhaier et al., 2000). They all are critical about the comparison of "western" and "post-socialist" civil societies although use different arguments. Jacobsson (2015) argues that appearance of "weak society thesis" is closely related to the fact that scholars on civil society and social movements in Central and Eastern Europe tend to focus on the NGO-type organizations, which has been supported and funded from abroad. At the same time, she claims that there is another type of activism in the region, which got less attention from the scholars. *"In contrast to the 'NGO-ised' civil society, developed during the first decades of political and economic transformation and supported by Western Europe and US, this activism is domestically funded and grassroots-driven. It has developed in response to local problems and needs, while often being inspired ideationally by urban movements across the world"* (Jacobsson, 2015, p. 3). Anhaier (2000) makes similar remarks about the civil society organizations in the former Eastern Germany sector. He divides them into two types: organizations, developed as a consequence of large institutional transfer from Western Germany organizations and smaller civil groups *"rooted in the local area and mainly operated in the areas which were restricted or prohibited in GDR - political organizations, recreational centers and environmental groups"* (Torsello, 2012, p. 184).

Finally, Torsello (2012) makes the point about complexity of dealing comprehensively with the problem and suggests that comparison between the countries of the region and

with Western European countries could be better done through comparison civil societies in operation. Jacobsson (2015) assumes that studies of “rich variety of forms of urban protest” could help to test and challenge some of established knowledge about post-socialist civil society including views of the weak civil society in the region.

b) Path-dependency of grassroots social movements in post-socialist countries

As it was mentioned above, during the communist times collective action existed only in the form of institutionalized official mass organizations. That resulted in strong anti-collectivist tendencies after 1989 (Clément, 2014a; Jacobsson 2015). Jacobsson (2015) extends it to the argument that if most of the countries of the region represent the radical version of neoliberalism, this is not despite but because of post-socialist legacies. She refers to Hirt (2012) to argue that the neoliberal individualist subjectivity goes very well with socialist atomization of society. This atomization is one of the challenges for a new urban activism in the region. For example, many neighbourhood activists' groups in Moscow emerged in 2012-2013 were based on a strong idea about activist's personal independency and individual responsibility. At the same time, they did not manage to create supporting practices inside the groups and many activists eventually were disappointed. By the winter of 2013 new local movements came to crisis and broader urban movements has not emerged (Erpyleva, 2014).

The second important characteristic of grassroots movements in the region is their anti-political and pacifist approaches (Jacobsson, 2015). After short explosion of the interest to the politics in early 1990-s, the attention to the political parties and movements decreased. According to Cesar (2013a), for post-socialist citizen freedom meant freedom from politics. Among activists, “non-political” frame came from the understanding of ‘political’ as something corrupt and repressive (Jacobsson, 2015).

Third, the most notable development of Eastern European civil society in last 15 years is the resurgence of low-key grassroots activism. In the contrast to ‘imported’ from the West NGO-ised civil society, such an activism is deeply rooted in everyday life (Clément, 2014a), domestically funded (Jacobsson, 2015), based on “many events, no organizations and few participants” (Cesar, 2013b: 143), often combined radical and collaborative practices, different forms of contestation, and encouraged unexpected alliances among heterogeneous collectives (Jacobsson, 2015). Here the local urban space provides an arena for ordinary people to overpass social mistrust and make a step into activism and for localized initiatives – to enhance “generality, solidarity and scale” (Jacobsson, 2015).

To summarize, the main inherited features of grassroots activism in the region are: the strong anti-collectivist tendencies as well as strong anti-communist frames; 'apolitical' sentiments among people and particularly among activists; localized and domestic character of many movements. Coming back to Tuvikene's concept of post-socialism, the two former features could be considered as 'anti-continuity' elements while the later one related to the 'continuity'. However, recent researches show the significant growth (Clément, 2014a; Jacobsson, 2015; Císař, 2016) and institutionalization of the movements in the region. There are more participatory forms of local government, collaboration and deliberative structures within society and more structured collaboration between civil society and public authorities (Jacobsson, 2015).

2.3. Post-socialism and post-political condition – main questions for the research

There are two main questions coming from the theoretical part.

The first question is if and how the theory of post-political condition could be used to study governance models in post-socialist cities and more specifically, role of urban movements in urban governance. I will start to answer this question in the part "Empirical framework", which is based on the previous studies, and will try to support the arguments by analysis of my own empirical results.

The second question is how post-socialist legacy influences grassroots social movements in Moscow and Budapest. I intend to find out if and how they try to overcome social mistrust and atomization and how activists of the movements negotiate their apolitical sentiments.

2.4. Empirical framework

2.4.1. Urban governance

According to Peters and Pierre (2011), the key function of urban governance is "*the formulation and pursuit of collective goals at the local level of political system*" (p. 9). They describe three main constraints which define the capacity of urban governance: 1) economic constraints (business role in the city development and structure of taxes and service fees), 2) institutional constraints (level of city's autonomy) and 3) political constraints (place of local governments in national or transnational political system). I will use them to analyze the system of local governance in Russia and in Moscow.

As transformative capacities of the cities are not given but constrained, the gap between city's challenges and capabilities could force city governments to seek for a social partnership and apply the strategy of mobilizing private resourceful actors towards collective objectives. Because of that during last years, the border between private and public actors is becoming increasingly unclear (Peters and Pierre, 2011).

Accordingly, the key conceptual question about urban governance is the role of urban government in the governance process. The involvement of many non-elected actors also brings questions about accountability and democratic control.

2.4.2. Empirical framework: Budapest

a) Economic and institutional changes in Hungary after 1989

During the transition period, Hungary had some economic advantages in comparison to other post-socialist countries. Within the Hungarian communist system ("Goulash Communism") the first reforms towards market economy began already in the 1960s (Dovenyi and Kovacs, 2006). According to Pickvance (2001), because of that the post-socialist transition in Hungary went much smoother than in Russia. First, the more stable institutional framework and experience of private enterprise made Hungarian economy attractive for investments. Between 1989 and 1995 it received 1113\$ per capita while in Russia it was 21\$ per capita. Second, although both countries went through inflation and rise of unemployment, in Hungary inflation has never exceeded 35% while in Russia the rate of inflation was over 2000% in 1992 (Pickvance, 2001).

According to Akçalı and Korkut (2015), the systemic change in Hungary in 1990s consisted of two elements: 'utopian monetarism' and 'mythical nationalism'. The former related to the idea of 'self-regulating market' and political liberalism while the later referred to the attempt to promote *"the early 19th century conservative-gentry paradigm of 'pure nationhood' as an ultimate value and elevate it to the level of a secular state religion"* (Böröcz, 1991: 112).

The key elements of economic restructuring were privatization of large state companies, reduction of industry and massive growth of the service sector. According to Kulscar (2005), since the regime change in Hungary came from above, the role of civil society and intelligentsia was minor. Many of former elites kept their positions and top-down autocratic decision-making structures remained as well (Keresztély, 2012). The members of former elite successfully transformed their economic power, used the opportunities of privatization to buy former state property and obtained access to a capital. At the same time economic

restructuring in Hungary was dominated by transnational corporations more than in other countries of the region (Kulcsar, 2005).

The economic restructuring was going in parallel with institutional change. On the one hand, urban policy was increasingly influenced by EU regulations. On the other hand, considerable economic and political authority was transferred to local governments and private sector (Keresztély, 2012). After the introduction of municipal self-governance, the 23 city-districts, constituting Budapest, gained wide administrative authority and political autonomy. So that, the urban policy process became more fragmented while increasingly influenced by EU regulations and funds. Later the capital city was provided with planning authority although the districts still have lawful means to block its implementations (Dovenyi and Kovacs, 2006). However, many communities are relatively poor and local governments still depend on central transfers (Kulcsar, 2005; Tosics, 2006). So that, decentralization was limited (Tosics, 2006) and, as Kulcsar argues, although the role of the state has changed, the competition among local governments for redistributive resources has remained. It influences the dynamics of local governance. On the one hand, local politicians aim to establish good connections with the prevailing government; on the other hand, the national government fill the local positions with 'parachutists' who possess significant influence in local affairs (Kulcsar, 2005). Finally, despite of decentralization of power, the role of civil society in decision-making has remained minor and the major decisions are made without serious public participation. Although number of the civil society organizations emerged in 1990-s and 2000-s, their capacities are still limited (Keresztély, 2012).

b) The 1990-s and the 2000-s in Budapest – 'urban rehabilitation' projects and 'growth machine'.

Budapest is one of the most extensively restructured of all post-socialist cities (Petrovic, 2005). Since 1990-s it went through significant urban transformation while the wave of foreign investments intensified the city's function as the main "gateway" for modernization in Hungary (Dovenyi and Kovacs, 2006). Between 1999 and 2003, 33,2 billion Euros of Foreign Direct Investments came to Hungary with more than half invested in Budapest (Tosics, 2006). In the first years after recession the growth agenda was popular and there was strong desire for *"almost any type of development especially in a visible physical form"* (Kulcsar, 2005: 556). Kulcsar argues that the post-socialist context provided good opportunities for development of 'growth coalitions'. He concludes that Hungarian growth machine shown to be even more successful than the one described by Molotch because

of solidified local elites (came from socialist time), absence of anti-growth movements, speculative urban development and very favorable conditions for investors. Kulcsar writes: *“Local elites accumulated wealth, white people were given a fancy landscape and the feeling of development”* (p.559) while the development usually did not include any improvement of social, cultural or health services.

The urban growth in Budapest was going in two directions – 1) suburbanization on the metropolitan area and 2) gentrification in the inner city (Keresztély, 2012). Gentrification was a result of a spontaneous movement of young people towards city center and a consequence of renewal projects and later ‘urban rehabilitation’ projects (Keresztély, 2012). The population of the inner city was gradually changing while the massive displacements occurred mainly in the officially designed areas of urban regeneration (Kovacs, 2012). Commercial development in that period mainly related to the office boom (when all empty plots in the city center were filled with office and bank buildings), “ground floor capitalism” (rapid establishment of shops) and erection of large shopping malls, including brownfield development (Tosics, 2006).

Finally, the dominance of the market in urban development and the lack of proper mechanisms to protect the public led to intensification of social and spatial inequalities in Budapest. The city faced such social problems as *“social exclusion, negative demographic trends and deteriorating health situation”* (Tosics, 2006:141).

c) Budapest since 2010 - “city of order and hope”

In 2010 the mayor of Budapest István Tarlós declared that *“Budapest needs spirit change, order and hope”*. According to him, *“the majority of city dwellers are yearning for security, accountability and order. Under the liberal authority disorder has become the norm; the fundamental aim is that Budapest becomes a livable European major city and the capital of national unity and competitiveness”* (quoted in Akçalı and Korkut, 2015:84). Akçalı and Korkut (2015) argue that following urban transformation was paralleled by the emergency of neo-authoritarian political system that limited role of the judiciary, cut the freedom of media and institutionalized majoritarian democracy. The process was legitimized through the notion of traditional family values, religion and patriotism. It resulted in the emergency of hybrid system neither fully neoliberal nor welfare oriented. It is ultra-neoliberal in some aspects (such as tax and social policy) while remains paternalistic in others (for example energy or water charges). This example illustrates Tuvikene’s vision of post-socialism as de-territorialized concept. Central distribution of electricity and water

inherited from socialist times, could be considered as 'continuous' factor while taxes and social policy were changed to opposite in order to fit into new capitalist paradigm.

The new political ideology was supported by urban policy. The streets and squares were massively renamed and the key public spaces such as Kossuth Square went through the radical transformation. According to Akçalı and Korkut (2015), after 2010 (when Fidesz came to power) Budapest became a platform for the reflection of the 'glorious past' and consolidation of power of new regime. This trend did not contradict neoliberal character of urban development. Instead, as Muller (2011) shown, *"nationalism and neoliberalism should not be considered as conflicting ideologies but can enter into a productive association"* (p.493).

d) Conclusion

From the economic perspective the first phase of urban development of Budapest in the post-socialist period was characterized by market-led logic, boom of foreign investments and emergency of local 'growth coalitions' formed mainly by the previous economic elites. After the short 'vacuum period' (Tosics, 2006) the new legal regulations and urban policies were elaborated. However, for some time the urban governance remained fragmented. As Petrovic (2005) wrote: *"Urban governance in post-socialist cities is more reactive to the interest of capital investments as well as tolerant of illegal practices than it is strategically proactive, which leads to organic rather than comprehensive entrepreneurial city development"* (p.9). The transfer of authority to the local governments intensified the fragmentation. At the same time, the local governments remained politically dependent on the center because of their financial inability.

The second period is characterized by the consolidation of power, centralization of the governance and more strategic approach to urban development. Since 2010, Hungarian politics took authoritarian turn associated with Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz. Neoliberalism was increasingly shaped in nationalistic terms and the urban transformation became a tool of political representation and propaganda (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015). Therefore, the Hungarian version of "actually existing neoliberalism" (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) was successfully combined with the authoritarian political attitude. Emerged form of urban governance implicated active role of private actors while did not leave any space for public participation except formal.

Growing social inequality together with contradictory political agenda expressed in new monuments and renovation programs turned Budapest into arena of *"ideological battles"*

between secularism and religious conservatism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism, and welfare and neoliberal politics in highly polarized Hungarian society” (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015:76).

2.4.3. Empirical framework: Moscow

a) Local regimes in Russia in the 1990-s and 2000-s

V. Gelman and S. Ryzhenkov (2011) define ‘local regime’ as *“a complex of political institutions, actors, and the resources and strategies available to them, which determine the conduct of local politics, local policy and local governance”* (p.449).

They argue that the collapse of Soviet Union, breakdown of centralized communist rule and application of market reforms caused decentralization and democratization at the local level. The new local regimes were emerging in the context of deep economic crisis, so that their main goal was the maintenance of the status quo based on redistributive social policies. In most cases, resources were centrally distributed that meant that these new regimes were heavily dependent upon transfers from the higher levels of authority. The main processes, in which key local actors were involved during the transition time, were “the privatization of gains” and “the socialization of losses”. In the 1990-s the local regimes in the majority of Russian cities showed the predominance of local-based distribution coalitions which involved dependent social groups, businesses closely linked to local authorities and criminal “violent entrepreneurs”.

In 2000-s the dynamics of local regimes changed significantly. It had to do first with enormous economic growth in Russia and, second, with the large-scale recentralization of the government and the rise of authoritarian tendencies. That led to a shift from decentralized to a centralized party-based model of urban governance.

In the large Russian cities economic renaissance led to the emergency of ‘growth coalitions’ based on booming construction and real estate. As a result, the value of land has risen and the influence of local and nation-wide business actors in local governance grown significantly. However, the actors involved in and practices developed by changing local regimes were highly dependent on the institutional and political changes of 2000-s. The changes were shaped by the process of re-establishing of a hierarchical model of regional and urban governance (“vertical power”). This process resulted in de-facto prohibition of open political competition among local elites, integration of the majority of key actors into the “party of power” “United Russia” and continuous decay of local

autonomy as well as shrinking space for public participation (Gelman and Ryzhenkov, 2011).

Although “vertical power” is operated through the hierarchical party-based model of governance with the system of formal and informal incentives and punishments, it is far from an army-like chain of command. Gelman and Ryzhenkov (2011) argue that the “vertical power” did not only serve as a tool used by the center to maintain loyalty and governability at the local level but was turned into a dual system of local governance serving the interests of both local actors and the center. The center demanded from the local regimes following: 1) the maintenance of mass patronage which required the use of business resources; 2) the production of electoral results acceptable for Kremlin and prevention of mass protest activism. If local actors were able to do so, it resulted in stability and legitimacy for both the local and the national regime. In that case the center was tolerant to the local elites perusing private interests and to the methods which they use for it (Gelman and Ryzhenkov, 2011).

b) Two models of Moscow urban governance: from growth machine to post-political city

Moscow recovered from the economic crisis of the 1990-s much faster than other Russian cities due to its exceptional role in Russia’s political economy. Its urban development in the post-Soviet period has been going on under the rule of two mayors – first Yury Luzhkov from 1992 to 2010 and Sergey Sobyenin from 2010 onwards.

In 1991 Gavriil Popov was elected Mayor of Moscow in the first direct elections. However, he was unsuccessful in solving the city's transitional crisis and resigned in June 1992. Yury Luzhkov was appointed by president Boris Yeltsin after Popov. He was more popular than his predecessor and was elected three times – in 1996, 1999 and 2003 – each time with high share of votes (70-87%). In 2004 president Vladimir Putin abolished popular elections of the heads of the regions including the Moscow mayor. In 2007 Yury Luzhkov was assigned mayor of Moscow and later resigned in 2010.

According to Büdenbender and Zupan (2016) Luzhkov’s period of Moscow development was shaped by the real estate boom, strategy of promotion of Moscow as a new global city and paternalistic and authoritarian relationship between Luzhkov’s administration and Moscow citizens. The business actors existed under major condition of participation in the city social policy. Luzhkov’s period could be considered as the time of

the emerging “growth coalition” (Macleod, 2011) including real estate companies closely related to the city administration.

In the late 2000-s multiscale processes such as global financial crisis, the rise of local protest movement and intensified tension between Moscow and federal elites launched essential changes in urban governance model. New mayor Sergey Sobyenin was appointed in 2010 and then elected in the direct elections in 2013 (after direct elections of the heads of the regions were partly recalled by the president Dmitry Medvedev). New city administration announced new urban strategy of turning Moscow into “the city comfortable for life”. The new model of urban development included broadly advertised upgrading of public spaces, reorganization of spatial boundaries and hierarchies and creation of the illusion of democratic and transparent governance (Büdenbender and Zupan, 2016). This second period shows clear features of the appearance of “the post-political city” (Swyngedouw, 2011).

e) Conclusion

Luzhkov's model of urban governance was a good example of the ‘local regime’ (Gelman and Ryzhenkov, 2011) in Russia in the 2000-s. Institutionally it was embedded into ‘power vertical’. The main function of the Mayor of Moscow was described as that of an “experienced manager” and his political role was 1) not to participate in federal politics; 2) provide ‘right’ results in the federal elections in Moscow. Economically the model was based on the real estate development and enormous urban growth. The resources of private actors were mobilized for social needs. Although it gave business actors political and economic power, they still were restricted by political and institutional limitations of the “power vertical”.

Sobyenin's model of urban governance continues to be part of the political and institutional framework of the ‘vertical power’. However, it shows a significant shift in urban development to the concept of ‘city, comfortable for life’ and policy oriented to middle class. One of the most significant changes is appearance of ‘citizens’ and ‘civil society’ as part of official discourses. City administration aims to appropriate critical practices and creates the semblance of transparent and democratic governance (Büdenbender and Zupan, 2016). Swyngedouw describes it as a part of “post-political condition” and criticizes its undemocratic nature. However, in the case of Moscow, such developments probably could be considered rather as positive. For example, Ekaterina Shulman (2015) states that in such political regimes as Russian, appearance of democratic institutions, even fake, opens

more possibilities than complete absence of them. Following this logic, returning of the mayor's elections and emergence of platforms for participation, even memetic, could create new opportunities for civil society and local grassroots movements, at least, at the beginning.

2.4.4. Moscow and Budapest – empirical framework

I chose Moscow and Budapest for the case studies as two distinctive examples of post-socialist cities. Their socialist and early post-socialist experiences were very different. As it was mentioned above, Soviet Union was much purer example of socialism than Hungary. Moreover, Hungary was the most capitalist country among the countries of Eastern Block (Pickvance, 2001). The transition in Hungary went much smoother. Its economy recovered very fast due to early start of market reforms and massive foreign investments. Pickvance (2001) argues that even in 1995 Hungary was more democratic and free country than Russia.

However, finally both countries seem to arrive to more or less similar destination. Both of them faced the authoritarian turn in politics. Both capitals became the cities, where, on the one hand, the neoliberal urban policies are realized, on the other hand, the new conservative political agendas are manifested. In both cases the top-down transition left no space for public participation; however, the social movements are growing and there were several waves of broad political mobilization both in Moscow and Budapest. At the same time “citizens’ participation” and “livable city” (“or “the city comfortable for life”) are rather part of the official discourse than real policy.

Mix of neoliberalism with authoritarian attitude resulted in hybrid form of governmentality. This form on the one hand, share some of the features of the governance-beyond-the state in its western version such as 1) significant role of private actors and private money in urban politics, 2) unclear border between public and private, 3) multiactor approach, based on the neoliberal consensus and 4) depoliticization of urban governance. On the other hand, it possesses some specific features such as 1) integration of the main actors into party of power (Fidezs in Budapest or United Russia in Moscow); 2) centralized decision-making (especially in Moscow) which eventually limits the opportunities of private actors; 3) ideological character of urban development; 4) very limited and mainly formal public participation; and in the case of Moscow – 5) embeddedness of all levels of local governance into “power vertical”.

III. Methodology

3.1. Selection of the case studies

Basing on the insights from theoretical and empirical overview, I decided to choose six low-key activists groups challenging renovation of public space in Budapest and Moscow.

The quick research on the conflicts in urban planning has already shown significant difference between the cities. While there were more than fifty conflicts going on in Moscow in 2016 (see Annex 6.6, figure 16), in Budapest I hardly found three. First, it could be due to my better knowledge about Moscow and language limitations. Probably there are some small conflicts in Budapest, which I did not find. Second, Moscow is six times bigger than Budapest. Nevertheless, the difference is still obvious. When I asked activists in Moscow about the conflicts in the city, they easily listed tens of them and gave contacts of the activists from other groups. The activists of all three groups protesting against renovation projects in Budapest mentioned only each other and couple of previous small conflicts mainly against cutting the trees. In both cities the activists of the movements know and support each other. Even if there are some conflicts in Budapest, which I did not find, they should be very localized and separated from the rest of the activism in the city. Therefore, I had a wide choice of the cases in Moscow and did not have any choice in Budapest.

The logic of the selection of Moscow cases is justified by the objectives of research. The main criteria of selection were: 1) the movement is grassroots; 2) the conflict is recent but is going on for at least one year; 3) activists protest against the project with public functions (for example, not private housing). At the same time, I aimed to select diverse movements so each case would be outstanding in some sense. The result of selection are shown in the table.

Table 1. Selection of case studies

Name of the movement	Project	When did the conflict start	Spatial dimension of the conflict	Specifics
Ligetvédők, Budapest	Museum quarter and renovation of the City Park	Since March 2016	Camps in the park	Large-scale movement
FÁK a Rómain, Budapest	Embankment for flood protection and renovation of the recreation zone at the coast of Danube	Since 2015	Events on the coast, rallies	No camp or physic presence on the site

Eleven Emlékmű, Budapest	Memorial dedicated to the victims of the German invasion	Since 2014	Alternative monument Physical presence Discussions near the memorial	Ideological character of the project Protest against the memorial, not against the renovation project
Torfyanka, Moscow	Church and orthodox center	Since 2015	Camp Physical presence	Ideological character of the project Two movements – one is against the church, another is for the church
Dryzhba, Moscow	Stadium	Since 2015	Camp	Strong identity of the place
Mitino, Moscow	Shopping mall	Since 2013	Freemarket	The initiative group was formed by former activist of the movement “For fair elections”

3.2. Methods

I used for research primary and secondary qualitative data. Primary data was collected through the interviews, unformal talks, analysis of published interviews and the content produced by the activists in offline and online in media and social media (see Annex 6.1 and 6.2). Secondary literature was used to set the problem and develop theoretical and empirical framework for the analysis.

The fieldwork involved three interviews in Moscow in January of 2017 and six in Budapest in April and June of 2017 (see Annex 6.4 and 6.5 for list of interview and questions). Since Moscow is my home city, I was involved in some activists groups there and know the context better, I tried to pay more attention to Budapest.

The activists for interview were chosen according to the following criteria: being in the movement from the beginning to the end, active participation, being involved in decision-making and organizational activities. In Moscow, I did one interview with activists from each group (two of them with one activist and one with two). In Budapest structure of the groups is more complicated so I had to do three interview with activists of Ligetvédők movement, two interview with the activists of Living Memorial and one interview with three members of FÁK a Rómain group. In Budapest, because of internal conflicts, there are many small subgroups inside the movements. For interviews I tried to approach activists from different subgroups in order to get more diverse picture.

IV. Empirical analysis

4.1. Sources and limitations

The empirical analysis is based on

- nine interviews with the activists in Moscow and Budapest made in February, April and June of 2017

Table 2. Interviews

	Budapest				Moscow		
(BL1)	Ligetvédők	Gregory G Ras Komáromy Gergő,	28.03.17	(MD)	Park "Druzhba" "Defense of Levoberezhny"	Mikhail Barbotkin	24.01. 2017
(BL2)	Ligetvédők	Olga Dmitrievna	01.04.17	(MM)	Park "Mitino"	Natalya Smirnova and Nina Reshetilova	25.01. 2017
(BL3)	Ligetvédők	Talk in one of the camps, 3-4 people	07.06.17	(MT)	Park "Torfyanka"	Vika Mironova	29.01. 2017
(BR)	FÁK a Rómain	FÁK a Rómain Activists – 3 people	1.04.17				
(BEE1)	Eleven Emlékmű	Maja Ceszárszkaja	06.06.17				
(BEE2)	Eleven Emlékmű	Sebő Gábor	08.06.17				

- printed interviews with the activists,
- articles about the movements in online-media,
- movements' websites and groups in social networks Facebook and VK
- activists' discussions on online-platforms

Limitations:


1. Unequal knowledge about Moscow and Budapest. Since Moscow is my home city, I am more familiar with context and was involved in some of the movements there. I tried to pay more attention to Budapest in order to equalize my knowledge about the cases. I spent more time in Budapest during my fieldwork, trying not only to collect the data about three case study movements but also to find out what is going on there nowadays in terms of urban regeneration, social movements and political activism. Also I did more interviews in Budapest.

2. Differences in communication in Moscow and Budapest. I speak Russian and do not speak Hungarian. So that, all Moscow activists were talking to me at their mother tongue while half of the activists in Budapest had to speak in English. Two interviews in Budapest also were taken in Russian. In Moscow I could come to meetings and talk to everybody while in Budapest it was not possible.
3. Different attitudes by the activists. In Budapest the activists talked about politics in general much more than in Moscow. One of the reasons could be their intention to explain to me (foreigner) situation in the country. In Moscow the activists supposed that I am familiar with social and political context. They talked about politics only in relation to their protests or in form of interpretation.
4. All the studied movements were in different phases of conflict. In some cases conflict was over, sometimes - going on already for two years, sometimes – just started. On the one hand, it is clear that there are some common patterns in development of these kind of movements. On the other hand, they are shown to be highly flexible and dependent on context.

Since most of the case movements have very flexible structure and membership, they are changing very fast depending on the situation, joining people, emerging connections with other movements. Moreover, it is difficult to say when the conflict is over. Some of the conflicts have been going on already for 3-4 years and are still far from resolving. In that sense, it is clear that it is better to study such movements in operation and conclusion could be done only about specific stage of the conflict.

5. Heterogeneous character of the movements. Since all six movements have very flexible structure and membership and unite people with very different attitudes and opinions, all generalizations about the motivations, political views and general attitudes are approximate. It is possible to formulate a main collective goal and an elaborated attitude regarding particular questions but it could never means that all the participants share it. When I write “the activists” I mean activists who shared their opinion during the interviews, discussions or in social networks.

Figure 2. Location of Moscow and Budapest case study movements.



Location of all Moscow movements are located in the north of the city is coincidence although there are a little bit more conflicts in the north then in the south. However, their location in the city periphery reflects the pattern of planning conflicts in whole city. The open-source map of most of urban planning conflicts which were ongoing in Moscow in November of 2016 could be found in Annex 6.6. Figure 16.

4.2. MOSCOW – cases profiles

4.2.1. Introduction – bottom-up and top-down political mobilization in Moscow in the 2010th

Before starting to describe and analyze particular cases, it makes sense to mention two multiscalar events which clearly had strong influence on the social and political activism in Moscow in the describing period (2013-2017).

First, the rise of the movement “For the fair elections” in Russia in 2011-2013 resulted in the politicization of society from below and emergency of the new network of the activists all around Moscow (Clément, 2014a). Second, the Ukrainian revolution and Russian

annexation of Crimea launched the top-down process of the political mobilization organized through the pro-governmental media. This campaign also was staked against Russian protest movement considered as treacherous and dangerous for the country. Therefore, the local movements described below, emerged just few years after the wave of anti-governmental uprising and were developing in the period on powerful propagandistic campaign in the media.

The movement “For the fair elections” (FFE) is often described as the first broad bottom-up mobilization with political mottos since early 1990-s. It emerged from within the society, which came through the wave of politicization and then rejected “politics” in 1980-1990-s. Carine Clément (2014b) argues that, although the FFE movement was based on the mottos of democracy and fought against corruption, it still bore inherited refuse of “political”. That made the movement internally tension and incoherent. Clément refers to Turchin (1968) and Havel (1978) to explain the roots of the anti-politics ideology of FFE. Both of them insisted that, since Marxism-Leninism preached the maximum politicization of any aspect of public life, society needed depoliticization of all the main aspects of the life. According to Havel, in the conditions of manipulative post-totalitarian regime any free action or free word, any attempt to live honestly was becoming the treat for regime therefore could be counted as political action. As Clément concludes, it turned out to the paradox: in highly politicized society to be apolitical meant to act politically. However, after the collapse of the communist regime the idea of refusing the power and ideology of apolitics turned into the values of political apathy and blocked the development of democracy. In this context, the FFE movement on the one hand overcame the apathy and intolerance to a collective action; on the other hand, it reproduced the logic of 1970-s and stayed incapable to elaborate collective political subjectivity (Clément, 2014b). The movement had many consequences – on the one side, emergency of the activists’ initiative groups in Moscow neighbourhoods and rise of new political and civil initiatives; on the other side, target repressions against the leaders and activists of the movement and passage of the set of anti-civil society laws.

Ukrainian crisis is the second event important for understanding political context in Moscow in 2013-2017. During the winter of 2013-2014, main topic discussed in Russian media both official and independent was Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine. This movement was triggered by government’s decision to suspend the signing of association agreement with EU. The movement resulted in the change of regime and political instability in Ukraine. The Ukrainian territory of Crimea was annexed by Russia in March of 2014; in

May the military conflict on the East of Ukraine started. All these events were broadly covered by Russian media and attracted broad interest of Russian citizens. The time of political indifference was over and the top-down political mobilization started (Prostakov, 2014). The Ukrainian revolution, annexation of Crimea and the military conflict in the East of the country became tools of Russian propaganda. The events in Ukraine and their interpretation in Russian official media were used to sustain current political regime, to boost president Putin's ratings and to blame any emerging protest movements in their connections with "Ukrainian fascists" or intention "to do like in Ukraine".

Authors of the collective research "Politics of apolitical: civil social movements in Russia in 2011-2013" describe the political process in Russia as sequences of transitions between "politicized" and "depoliticized" periods (Semenov, 2015). Following this logic, the recent wave of bottom-up movement FFE and top-down political mobilization in the relation to Ukrainian crisis signals the end of post-socialist period of political indifference in Russia.

Consequently, the initiative groups and local movements, described below, were emerging and developing on the one hand, just after the big wave of bottom-up anti-regime mobilization and followed reaction, on the other hand, in the conditions of the top-down political mobilization and anti-Ukrainian and anti-opposition media campaign. Some of these new movements partly inherited internal contradictions of the movement "For fair elections"; all of them had to deal with conflictual atmosphere and the division of society related to the Ukrainian crisis.

The detailed overview of all six conflicts could be found in the annex. Here I give the short description of each movement and present preliminary thoughts regarding to the main research question "If and why the conflictual space becomes the platform for discussion of existing political or economic order?"

4.2.2. Mitino. Initiative group "Save the park Mitino"

Table 3. Mitino case profile

When	April 2013 – April 2014
Project	Sport center and shopping mall
Customer	NGO "International Academy of Tretyak"; later – private company "Sport city"
Money	Private

Land	Park in the Mitino district (population around 188 thousands), belongs to the city. Construction site used to be a part of protected natural area and protected archeological area; after series of legal manipulation was excluded from both protected areas that made the construction possible (MM 2017).
Public participation	Public hearings regarding the exclusion of the plot from the natural area
Emergency of the movement	Group of former activists of the FFE movement wanted “to do something useful” in their neighbourhood (MM 2017)
Participants and supporters	Former activists of the FFE and locals joined later. Political parties: Communist party and Yabloko (call themselves ‘united democrats’) (MM 2017)
Anti-project arguments	Against illegal construction; against construction in the park; against construction in the archeological area; against development which would attract new people to the park (MM 2017)
Pro-project side	Private company “Sport-city”
Communication between the sides	Mainly through legal courts
Methods of struggle	Unsuccessful attempt to organize referendum; legal courts; complains to the authorities; rallies and street actions; signatures against construction; Freemarket and other events in the park
Organizational structure	One core group (10-20 people) – coordinators responsible for different activities; around 50 activists and around 2000 supporters
Ideology	Although the core group kept anti-government sentiments they considered their protest as “apolitical”; the activists tried to avoid the conflicts and did not discuss politics inside the movement
Internal conflict	The internal conflict was launched by two events: 1) Ukrainian crisis and annexation of Crimea; 2) Criminal case against the group. The conflictual division reflected the division of society in the spring of 2014: “patriots” vs “traitors”. The conflict went through aggressive phase, when both sides engaged militarized groups of activists (Cossacks and nationalists) to make pressure on each other, and led to a total collapse of the movement.

Figure 3. Freemarket in Mitino park



The project of the shopping mall in Mitino park is an example of highly speculative market-led urban development and nontransparent decision-making. The plot of the land in the park was transferred through the NGO into the land for the commercial development (MM 2017).

The movement against the project, on the other hand, is an example of the local initiative emerged in 2013 in the wake of FFE movement and inherited some of its feature such as apolitical frames, intention to avoid the conflicts and idea ‘all together against common problem’(Clément, 2013). The main visible result of the protest activity is the Freemarket in the park, which has been happening each month already for three years. According to the activists of Mitino movement at the beginning, the Freemarket used to be a platform to discuss the project of the shopping mall and other problems of Mitino district; it attracted people from different movements and inhabitants of the district (MM 2017). The format of Freemarket shown proofed to be very successful and sustainable for attracting new people and creating safe ground for “ordinary people” to do the first steps into activism. It has been happening each Sunday already for three years and new people regularly join the event

(Freemarket.moscow, 2017; MM 2017). Moreover, non-commercial and informal character of the event shows that the activists of “Save the park” group understood a need to make something pronouncedly alternative to the profit-led logic of the new development in the park.

The Freemarket had big potential to become an arena for political discussions and place where new political objectivities could be developed. However, eventually it turned into the charity and ecological project without any political or even civil component (MM 2017). Probably the reason is the inability and unwillingness of the activists to lead the political discussion, refuse to define themselves politically or ideologically and their will to avoid the conflicts.

Non-discussed political contradictions inside the group came out with the first real challenge – criminal case against the group. Strong propaganda and hysterical atmosphere, created by official media in 2014 in relation to Ukrainian crisis and annexation of Crimea provided poor environment for the discussion and inspired conflicts. The conflict itself and division to the “patriots” and the “traitors” inside the group was not result of the activists’ process of self-definition but came from the outside in 2014. It did not help the subgroups to define themselves politically but forced them to accept political objectivity constrained by official propaganda.

Although the initiative group failed, the whole process of resistance created new layer of the civil activism in the district. The criminal case against the initiative group triggered collapse of the group and scared activists and supporters. Nevertheless, since no real repressions happened and the case was not developed, they lay back and returned to their activities (MM 2017). Furthermore, some of the activists who were involved in the initiative group or joined later for the Freemarket are going to the polls in the municipal elections in the autumn of 2017 (municipal councils in Moscow possess almost no political or economic power. The only one political role of municipal deputies is related to the procedure of nomination of candidates on a mayor elections (which is coming in 2018). Moreover, this is the only authority, which, on the one hand, is elected, on the other hand is considered as truly connected to citizens). However, there is a treat that non-solved contradictions which led to collapse of the group will be transferred to the new level of their activities.

4.2.3. Torfyanka; Movement “For the park Torfyanka”

Torfyanka movement emerged as a protest against the erection of the Orthodox church in park Torfyanka. The movement attracted a lot of media attention in the summer of 2015

because of violent opposition between the movements for and against the church. Finally the Russian Orthodox church was given another plot for the construction.

Table 4. Torfyanka case profile

When	July 2015 – present time
Project	Orthodox church as a part of the program “200 churches in Moscow” (see Annex 6.6. Figure 17)
Customer	Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)
Money	Private (http://www.rbc.ru/investigation/society/25/05/2015/555dbc3f9a794754d9f7b674)
Land	Park Torfyanka in Losinoostrovsky district (population is around 82 thousands people); land belongs to the city. Construction plot used to be a part of protected natural area, later was excluded from the area of the park that made construction possible.
Public participation	Public hearings, round tables and alternative poll on the online participation platform “Active citizen”. As a result of the later, the ROC was provided with alternative plot for the church.
Emergency of the movement	The first activists started legal struggle in summer 2013 (Dudkina, 2015) The movement emerged spontaneously when the building works started (MT 2017).
Participants and supporters	Locals; supporters - Communist party, Yabloko, various left movements (MT 2017)
Anti-project arguments	Against construction in the green zone; against illegal construction; against undemocratic decision-making (MT 2017; Dudkina, 2015; Blog “Ioda”, 2015)
Pro-project side	ROC officials; local “orthodox activists” and the activists of the far-right orthodox movement “Sorok Sorokov”(MSS)
Communication between sides	1) physically in the park: both pro- and anti- church activists kept day and night alert at the beginning and attended events of each other. Anti-church activists tried to physically block delivery of construction supplies while the pro-church supporters tried to physically remove anti-church activists from the way of building machinery. Sometimes opposition took even more violent forms, for example when MSS activists attacked the camp of anti-church activists 2) through complains, legal opposition in courts and petitions 3) through media: campaign against the movement (MT 2017)
Methods of the struggle	Camp; after the camp was destroyed - physical presence in a car; courts and complains; rallies and street actions (MT 2017)

Organizational structure	One core group (10-20 people) – coordinators responsible for different activities; 100-200 activists; around 4000 supporters (MT 2017;)
Ideology	Apolitical; later – anti-ROC (MT 2017)
Internal conflict	No conflicts. <i>“There were some political disagreements but they always were comparatively minor. Anyway, all the discussions, including political, came to conclusion that the patriarch is to be blamed in everything. There is a figure which is unbearable for everybody”</i> (MT 2017)
Role of the state	1. provided the land for ROC 2. organized public participation 3. organized repressions against the activists – arrests during the protests and the criminal case against the group

Figure 4. Pro- and anti-church activists near construction site in Torfyanka park



Figure 5. Anti-church rally in Torfyanka. On the signs: "Protect Torfyanka together", "Resign prefecture", "Moscow government has to answer for reallotment of land in Moscow", "We need park"



Figure 6. Pro-church rally in Torfyanka. On signs: "The church to be", "We are for the church"



For many months park became the platform for discussions between all the participants of the conflict. The criminal case did not split the group but united (MT 2017). The main topic discussed in Torfyanka were issues related to the Russian Orthodox Church and the patriarch Kirill. The activists discussed politics as well, but tried to avoid conflicts and considered political discussions as something minor. At the same time, some of pro-government media presented the movement as negatively political (related to the parties, aimed to organize “Maidan like in Ukraine” and so forth) (Shubin, 2015; Egorcev, 2015; Malosolov, 2015). On the one hand, as the activists had to answer, it forced them to reflect their political position, particularly in relation to political parties and Ukrainian crisis. On the other hand, since the media presented “political” as something negative, the activists normally answered that they are “outside of politics”(MT 2017)

The activists were united not only by their intention to save the park but also by their common deep dissatisfaction with behavior of the officials, representatives of ROC and activists of MSS. These anti-ROH sentiments were elaborated by the activists in the process of confrontation (MT 2017). On the one hand, these sentiments gave them some ideological identity that helped them to keep unity through all the internal disagreements and external pressure. On the other hand, focus of the ROC channeled activists' dissatisfaction and did not allow to generalize it. Political generalizations sounded quite primitive while discussions about Russian Orthodox Church, Orthodoxy and religion issues were pretty detailed and deep. At the same time, opinions about the ROH were more or less solid while political views were very different.

The political discussion in Torfyanka was shaped by pro-governmental media and their agenda. In 2015 “politics” for many activists was strongly connected with the Ukrainian question (MT 2017; <http://echo.msk.ru/blog/yopolisnews/1582712-echo/?=top>). On the one hand, conflictual atmosphere created by media around Ukrainian issue forced the activists to avoid what they considered as political discussions. On the other hand, it inspired them attempt to present their protest as a social and civil. As a result, political identity of the group was based on their opposition to the Russian Orthodox Church and idea of citizens struggling for their common land against bureaucracy and undemocratic decision-making (MT 2017).

4.2.4. Druzhba (“Oborona Levoberezhnogo” – “Defense of Levoberezhny”)

The movement emerged in 2015 and protested against the construction of football field in park Druzhba. The plot for the construction was actively used by the locals before and they were outraged that the decision was made without them. The conflict went through violent phase when the activists tried to stop building machinery and fought against the private guards securing the construction site. Till the winter 2016 the activists lost the fight in the courts and got tired of the physical confrontation. At the moment of interview (February 2017) the construction was almost completed.

Table 5. Druzhba case profile

When	June 2015 – present time
Project	Football field as a part of program “Eleven football fields”
Customer	Construction department of Moscow
Money	Public (https://stroimsk.ru/articles/v-moskve-postroyat-10-futbolnyh-polei-s-podogrevom)
Land	Located in the park “Druzhba” and belongs to the city
Public participation	Round tables (MD 2017)
Emergency of the movement	First activists started negotiations with the authorities in July 2015. The movements emerged spontaneously after the building works started in August (MD 2017)
Participants	Locals; former activists of the movement FFE and other previous political initiatives; Communist Party and Yabloko (MD 2017)
Anti-project arguments	1) Against appropriation of common land for private use (did not believe that the field will be accessible for everybody) 2) against undemocratic decision-making (MD 2017)
Pro-project side	public company “Luzhniki” (presented on the field by Cossacks organization KOBR; local authorities (MD 2017)
Communication between the sides	1) legal courts and complains 2) violent opposition between activists and private security guards
Methods of the struggle	Camp (first on the construction site, then near by), physical presence; events in the park; rallies; legal courts and complains; petition (MD 2017)

Organizational structure	One core group (around 10 people) – coordinators responsible for different activities. Around 50 activists. Around 1000 supporters (MD 2017)
Ideology	Apolitical; part of the core group was anti-governmental (MD 2017)
Internal conflict	Political conflict related to the issue of collaboration with United Russia. Some of the activists considered such collaboration as acceptable while others protested against any communication with the party of power (MD 2017). The conflict happened when the movement already was not activists and did not have big influence on it.
Role of the state	- Provided the plot to “Luzhniki” company - Funded the project - Organized public participation

Figure 7. Activists are trying to occupy the construction site in Druzhba park



Figure 8. Activists in front of the construction site in Druzhba park after police removed their camp



One of the main sentiments shared by all the activists in park Druzhba was issue of the appropriation of common land for private use. Accessibility of the future football field was the main topic of discussion between the activists and the customer of the project. Political views also shown to be important, although, according to the activists, they did not discuss politics until the internal conflict (MD 2017).

One of the things prevented development of the discussion was rash of events. Confrontation with KOBR took violent forms from the very beginning and some of the activists described conflictual space more in terms of battlefield than like platform for a dialog (MD 2017). The core group thinned of fast, already six month after there were quite few people participating in the struggle. Since the struggle was basically failed, there was no inspiration for new people to join.

However, the core group continued to work on other issues in the district. They kept strong anti-government sentiments which on the one hand, could prevent engagement of new people, on the other hand, probably inspired them go to municipal elections of 2017 (Defense of Levoberezhny, n.d.).

4.3. BUDAPEST – cases profiles

4.3.1. Budapest: introduction

The interviews shown that there are two events particularly important for the development of the local grassroots movements in Budapest in the describing period of 2015-2017. The first one is the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015 and civil movement emerged in Budapest in response to that. The experience of participation in this movement shown to be very inspiring and empowering for the activists (BL1 2017; BEE1 2017). The second one is the authoritarian turn in Hungarian politics started in 2010 (Bozoki, 2012). Many activists were particularly dissatisfied with Viktor Orban's corrupt and undemocratic government (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BL3 2017; BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017) while others questioned the whole idea of representative democracy (BL1; BEE1).

So that, the three movements described and analyzed below emerged just after the big wave of civil activism in the summer of 2015 and were developing in the conditions of shrinking democracy and rise of authoritarian tendencies.

4.3.2. Ligetvédők – “Park defenders”

Ligetvédők (“Park defenders”) is the city-scale movement protesting against the renovation of Városliget (City park). The movement is very diverse and includes people with different social background and various political views. The activists claimed that 80% of Budapest citizens are against the renovation project (BL1 2017; BL2 2017) The conflict attracted a lot of media attention in the spring of 2016 because of violent confrontation between activists, police and private security services. At the moment of interviews (April-June 2017) the construction company was preparing the site for the building works and there were at least three protest camps in the park.

Table 6. Ligetvédők case profile

When	March 2016 – present time
Project	Museum quarter “Liget Budapest”– several museums + renewal of leisure and sport infrastructure in the park (Spike, 2016a; Liget Budapest project, 2017)
Customer	Hungarian government (Hopkins, 2016)
Money	Public +EU (BL 2017)
Land	14 th district of Budapest, rented to private company City Park Property Development Company (CPPDC)

Public participation	Round tables (BL2 2017)
Emergency of the movement	First Facebook group month before construction works started; the protest in the park emerged spontaneously when trees started to be cut (BL2 2017)
Participants and supporters	Locals; NGO "Natura"; citizens of Budapest (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BL3 2017)
Anti-project arguments	Against cutting trees; against building up in the park; against commercialization and touristification of the park; against undemocratic decision-making; environmental issues; don't believe that the project will be realized properly ("everybody is a dilatant"(BL2 2017)) (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BL3 2017)
Pro-project side	The national government
Communication between the sides	Forums at the beginning; pro- and against-movement campaign in media; physical confrontation between the activists, police and private security services
Methods of the struggle	Petition; occupation of the buildings, which had to be demolished; camps (at least 3 in summer 2017); rallies; legal struggle (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BL3 2017)
Organizational structure	Three core groups – 1)"educated middle class group"; 2)"asocial radical group";3) NGO "Natura" with conflictual relationship. The activists from different groups collaborate with each other but the groups as a whole act separately. Also there are many activists who do not relate themselves to particular core group and NGOs helping the movement (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BL3 2017).
Ideology	Different core groups possess different ideologies. 1)"educated middle class group" pretends to stay apolitical; part of the group insists to focus on the park issue while another part suggests to look at the commercial construction in the park and undemocratic decision-making as part of more broad political issue; 2)"asocial radical group" is openly anti-governmental; 3)NGO "Natura" stays apolitical and focus on environmental issues. All the groups share

	anti-party sentiments so no political parties are allowed to join the movement(BL1 2017; BL2 2017)
Internal conflict	First, there was a social conflict between “more educated” people and people with lower social status. Group of “educated activists” insisted that image of the movement is very important for successful struggle. They argued that participation of homeless, drunk and all kinds of declassified people in the protest brings discredits on the movement. So that, the camps were separated. The second conflict was about either the movement should focus on the single issue of the park or consider more general anti-government agenda. It divided the group again (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BL3 2017)
Role of the state	Initiated and partly funded the project; provided land; provided special law for the project; organized pro-project campaign in media; opened criminal case against the activists (BL2 2017)

Figure 9. Activists are trying to get into construction site in Varosliget. Summer of 2016



Figure 10. Camp “Near Yurt”, summer of 2017



Figure 11. Camp “Near yellow building”, Summer of 2017



The camps, meetings and all the real and virtual spaces around the conflictual renovation program became a true platform for discussion. Main topics of this discussion were clearly related to the issues of neoliberal city. Firstly, the activists and the media discussed the problem of privatization and commercialization of public space and creation of new identities, which are serving the idea of city attractiveness (BL1 2017; BL2 2017). This topic included 1) the problem of the corruption and incompetence of the government (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BL3 2017) 2) commercial logic of the city development (BL1 2017; BL2 2017). Secondly, they discussed the issue of decision-making and went political here (BL1 2017; BL2 2017). Although the activists had different opinions, some of them clearly understood a need to challenge whole political-economic system in order to solve the problem. They saw the Ligetvédők movement as one of starting platforms for this challenging (BL1 2017).

There were hot discussions and conflicts around organizational structure and strategies of the movement (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BL3 2017). Again, some of the activists confirmed that the movement should be organized by alternative way (comparing with parties or NGOs) and should try to avoid institutionalization to stay grassroots movement and not to become an organization (BL2 2017).

The conflicts inside the movement on the one hand, split the movement but on the other hand, raised many questions and helped the activists to formulate their positions. The movement did not collapse because of the conflicts and splits but became consciously diverse and fragmented. The groups inside the movement developed diverse and complicated relationships based on what they had in common and what separated them.

Splits and conflicts did not follow official “traitors vs patriots” dividing line. It was more about personal issues, social disagreement, strategy of the protest and ways of organization (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BL3 2017).

4.3.2. FÁK a Rómain

FÁK a Rómain is a movement emerged in Budapest in 2013. It has been protesting against the construction of the dam in the Danube coast. The project is in the process of elaboration now and the construction works has not started yet. There is almost no information in English about this movement. All the information below is from my interview with three representatives of the movement, from the movement’s website and one publication in media.

Table 7. FÁK a Rómain case profile

When the protest started	2013-present time
Project	The mobile dam is to be built along the coast. It consists of two steel walls; each wall is supposed to be 4 meters high. The road between the walls is planned for the bicycles and technical transportation. The project has a status of “high priority governmental project” that makes all the legal procedures (participation, coordination, finalization and approval) easier and faster for the customer and construction company (BR 2017).
Customer	The 3rd district
Money	Public + EU (BR 2017)
Land	There is a natural waterfront along Danube called Romai part. This is a recreational area with a beach, bars and cafes. The area is flooded every 5-10 years so that traditionally only boat houses and summer houses are located there. Military services and locals build the temporary dam to protect the area every flooding period. Land belongs to the 3rd district of Budapest (BR 2017).
Public participation	Public hearings (BR 2017)
Emergency of the movement	The first group on Facebook was created by NGO “City and water”. The same NGO organize demonstrations on the coast
Participants	Activists of NGO “City and water”; locals; citizens of Budapest; experts – engineers, architects and urban planners; Greenpeace (BR 2017)
Anti-project arguments	1)Environmental issues – the activists insisted that the dumb would destroy the natural coast; 2)Against speculative urban development – the activists suspect that the authorities decided to build the dam because they target to develop housing projects in the recreation area. They suspect the former mayor of the district in informal agreements with investment companies and insists that the dam is to be built in the sake of this new development and not for local people (BR 2017).

Pro-project side	City administration; district administration; people who invested in the area
Communication between the sides	1) through complains and letters to the authorities; 2) on radio or in studio with pro-dam NGO organized by people who invested in the area (BR 2017)
Methods of the struggle	Rallies and demonstrations; events on the coast; petition; complains and letters to different levels of authorities; alternative technical expertise and an alternative project (BR 2017).
Organizational structure	Several core groups (around 20 people all together) with collaborative relationship (BR 2017).
Ideology	<i>"try to stay as far from politics as possible"</i> (BR 2017); do not collaborate with political parties but appreciate efforts of local politicians to organize a referendum on the issue of the dam project
Internal conflict	No internal conflicts
Role of the state	Initiated and partly funded the project; provided the land and legal regulations; organized public participation (BR 2017)

Figure 12. Rally against the dam project on Roman coast



The FÁK a Rómain movement is still developing mainly on virtual space. Although the activists often meet and sometimes organize events on the Roman coast, the main struggle is happening on paper. There is still no physical space of the protest. Therefore, the activists mainly focus on the technical and legal sides of the struggle. Conflictual project of the dam and the protest movement against it has not encouraged appearance of platform for struggle and discussion. However, through the communication with the other protest movements in Budapest and participation in common events the FÁK a Rómain movement is becoming the part of more broad protest movement in Budapest.

4.3.4. Eleven Emlékmű

Eleven Emlékmű (Living memorial) emerged as a protest against the erection of the memorial for the victims of German invasion in 1944. It started with the occupation of the construction site, then the activists created the alternative memorial. *“Somebody unvented the name – “Living memorial”. The memorial, which can do a runner. They would demount it – we would assemble it again”* (BEE1 2017). The Living Memorial created from the personal things related to the Jewish Holocaust in Hungary, which people brought from the home. The central element of the memorial is two white chairs faced to each other. The main idea of the Living memorial and the movement emerging around it was the need for the discussion (BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017). They have been organizing the discussions about actual social and political issues already for three years.

Table 8. Eleven Emlékmű case profile

When the protest started	Spring 2014-present time
Project	A memorial to the “victims of the 19 March 1944 German invasion of Hungary” was supposed to be built by 19 March 2014 – the anniversary of the day of German invasion when, according to the new constitution of 2010 Hungary lost its sovereignty.
Customer	Hungarian government
Money	Public
Land	5 th district
Public participation	No participation

Emergency of the movement	Spontaneously
Participants	Citizens of Budapest, mainly well-educated middle class; also many elderly people; supporters - Association of Hungarian Jewish Organizations (Mazsihisz)
Anti-project arguments	Against falsification of the history (BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017; Zöldi, 2014)
Pro-project side	Hungarian government
Communication between sides	No direct communication (BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017)
Methods of the struggle	Occupation of the building site at the beginning; petition; physical presence near the building site; alternative "Living memorial"; rallies and demonstrations; lectures near the monument three times a week; moderated discussions near the monument twice a week (BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017)
Organizational structure	Two core groups – "Living memorial" and "Stage of freedom". The former arranges open moderated discussions, the later organized rallies and demonstrations and then started to do lectures and other events (BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017)
Ideology	Anti-governmental (BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017)
Internal conflict	The split happened because of a political disagreement among the activists. They discussed if the movement should communicate with the far right-wing Hungarian party Jobbik and its members. Core of the "Stage of freedom" group did not accept any communication with any far-right activists while core of "Living memorial" agreed to hold a dialog with the people but not with the party. The split made the division between two groups more clear. Before the conflict, many activists and supporters did not even know that there are two different groups inside the movement (BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017).
Role of the state	National government assigned and funded the memorial. The 5 th district assemblymen approved decision to erect the monument (Nagy, 2014).

Figure 13. "Living memorial" in front of the construction site of the memorial "For the victims of the 19 March 1944 German invasion of Hungary".



Figure 14. Preparations for the discussion in Liberty square



Figure 15. Two memorials in Liberty square. The angel in the memorial “For the victims...” symbolizes Hungary and eagle images Germany. Two chairs in the “Living memorial” mean call for discussion.



The current Hungarian government aims to sustain its power and legitimacy through political mobilization of loyal population against all kinds of “enemies” – communists, immigrants, Soros, “civil society” or “traitors” (BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017). All the activists I talked to told about this total division of the society and lack of understanding between the sides. Even if this separation is not so total in reality, it is clearly dominating in the activists’ minds.

In that sense, call for the public dialog and truly open discussion is a political protest against the status quo. The activists of the Living memorial/Stage of freedom consciously separated themselves from the current government and official politics and tried to make a platform where people could talk to each other about everything. They created the new discourse of

4.4. Moscow and Budapest cases: comparison

In this part I will compare the six case studies in Moscow and Budapest.

4.4.1. The projects

Table 9. Qualitative comparison of the projects

	Project	Scale of the project	Land ownership	Money for funding the project
Mitino, Moscow	Shopping mall	District	City of Moscow	Private
Torfyanka, Moscow	Church	Part of city-scale program	City of Moscow	Private
Druzhba, Moscow	Stadium	Part of city-scale program	City of Moscow	Public
Ligetvédők, Budapest	Museum quarter	National	14 th district of Budapest	Public + EU
Eleven Emlékmű Budapest	The memorial "For the victims of German occupation"	National	5 th district of Budapest	Public
FAK a Rómain, Budapest	The dam	City	3rd district of Budapest	Public + EU

First, it makes sense to look more precisely at the character of six projects which forced the conflicts.

In all six cases the projects were developed on public land. Although land in all Budapest cases belongs to districts, whole control over particular project plots was in the hands of the national state or the city. The role of the national government and city and district administrations in the projects was 1) to provide the companies with the land; 2) to guarantee the loyal planning regulations and legal justification for the development; 2) to fund the projects (for the museum quarter and the dumb the funding included also EU money). The role of the district administrations was to approve the decisions made on the higher level of authority and to organize public participation (BL1 2017; BR 2017; Nagy, 2014). In the Moscow cases development plans also came from above. Since the cession

of the land demanded the public hearings the district administrations were supposed to organize them. The role of the city authorities was 1) to provide the land and favorable urban planning and building regulations for the private actors; 2) in the case of the stadium to fund the project.

Justification of the projects

In both cities main tool of citizen's participation was public hearings and round tables. However, because of the poor informing, citizens in Moscow usually did not participate. Moreover, the local administrations consciously avoided informing the citizens about public hearings and instead invited to participate loyal public servants, who a voted for whatever were asked (MM 2017; MT 2017). In two cases, the results of public hearings became the object of the legal argument as the locals complained that they were not informed about the public hearings and did not have a chance to participate (MT 2017; MM 2017). In Budapest the citizens participated in public hearings or discussion forums but it did not have any impact on projects (BL2 2017; BR 2017).

Direct participation of city officials in the conflicts in both cities was lowest notch. When conflicts went too violent (like in Torfyanka and Druzhba cases) administrations of the districts organized round tables where all the sides of the conflicts discussed the problem (MD 2017). However, only in the case of Torfyanka there was real intention to resolve the conflict and the discussions led to compromise (MT 2017).

Consequently, we can say that participation in all Moscow and Budapest cases was very limited. The formal participation tools such as public hearings were used to legalize the project. Only in one case, the participation tools helped to make some changes.

All the projects in both cities (except the memorial "For the victims of German invasion") were justified through the simple explanation that they are good for everyone (Russian News, 2015; Liget Budapest project, 2017; BL2 2017; BR 2017). It was told that the project will occupy only small part of the park (Mitino and Torfyanka); will improve abandoned and degraded space (Mitino, Druzhba, Ligetvédők, FAK a Rómain); will be used by all the citizens (Mitino, Druzhba, Torfaynka, Ligetvédők, FAK a Rómain). In some cases the justification included an attack against the protest movements. In pro-project publications they were blamed in realizing somebody's political interest (Mitino, Druzhba, Torfyanka, Ligetvédők); in realizing somebody's commercial interest (Druzhba); in being just gathering of anti-social low class elements (Torfyanka, Druzhba, Ligetvédők); in the will to "destroy

Russia” and “do like in Ukraine”(Torfyanka); in being the gathering of homeless or drug addicts (Ligetvédők, Druzhba, Ligetvédők).

One of the key questions, especially in Moscow, was the issue of legitimacy of the projects. Three Moscow projects, described above, were all located in the parks. In Mitino and Torfyanka the land for the projects has been officially removed from the parks territories few years before the building works (MM 2017; MT 2017). In the case of park Druzhba, the project was developing officially in the park. In all three cases, the activists challenged the legitimacy of the developments in the courts. In Budapest two of the projects (museum quarter in Városliget and the dam on Roman coast) were developing under special legislation as national government’s projects (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BR 2017).

Therefore, in both cities the developments were either legal or legalized through the row of legislative and/or manipulative actions that made the developments formally or seemingly legal. Since the issue of legality of the project is not the target of this paper, for us it is only important from the point of the activist’s attitude to the legal side of the conflict. In Budapest only in one case (Ligetvédők) the activists considered the project as illegal and in one (FAK a Rómain) as speculative. In Moscow all the projects were considered by the activists as illegal and speculative.

Four projects (Museum quarter and the dumb in Budapest, shopping mall and the football field in Moscow) were presented as the public projects which would improve the local’s quality of life.

4.4.2. Movements

Table 10. Qualitative comparison of the movements

	Moscow			Budapest		
	“Save the park Mitino”	“For the park Torfyanka”	“Defense of Levoberezhny”	Ligetvédők	FÁK a Rómain	Eleven Emlékmű
Emergency of the movement	Former activists of the movement “For the fair elections”	Spontaneously	Spontaneously	Spontaneously	NGO “City and water”	Spontaneously
Participants and supporters	-Locals -Political parties	-Locals -Political parties	-Locals -Political parties	-Locals -Budapest citizens	-NGO “City and water” -Locals	- Budapest citizens

		-Left political movement			-Citizens of Budapest	
Why disagree with the project	- against commercialization and densification of the park	-against use of the public land for private needs - against offensive behavior of ROH officials and activists	-against use of the public land for private needs -against undemocratic decision-making	- against commercialization and touristification of the park -against undemocratic decision-making - against violence of the police - against illiberal turn in Hungary	- environmental worries -speculations with the land	-falsification of the history
The goals	- to participate in the life of the neighbourhood - cancel the project	- cancel the project	- cancel the project	- cancel the project	- cancel the project - build the dumb in another place	To remove the monument
Changes of the goals	Make an organization which would represent citizen's interest		Make an organization which would represent citizen's interest	-people's democracy		Public dialog
The main method	Court Freemarket	camp	camp court	camps	legal struggle	physical presence
The organizational structure	-One core group -coordinators	-One core group - Coordinators	-One core group - Coordinators	Min four core groups	Min three core groups	Two core groups
Relation to political parties	Neutral (except	Neutral	Neutral (except	Negative	Neutral	Negative

	United Russia)		United Russia)			
The internal conflicts	yes	no	yes	yes	no	Yes
Repressions	yes	yes	no	yes	no	no
Intention to institutionalize	yes	no	no	no	no	yes
Ideology	apolitical	anti-ROH	apolitical	complicated	apolitical	anti-governmental

a) Emergency of the movements

As it was expected, most of the movements are grassroots local-based movements emerged spontaneously as a reaction to the renovation projects. The movements were less spontaneous in two cases – “Save the park Mitino” in Moscow and “FÁK a Rómain” in Budapest. In these cases they actually were not the movements but initiative groups, organizing all the events and big groups of supporters who occasionally come to participate but are not involved in the strategy planning and decision-making and organization process (MM 2017). The reason probably was that in both cases there was no real building works on the site. So that, the initiative groups were formed not by outraged locals but by activists and organizations. I will call these two movements “paper-based” since their main tool of resistance was juridical struggle.

In four other cases (“For the park Torfyanka” and “Defense of Levoberezhny” in Moscow and Ligetvédők and Eleven Emlékmű in Budapest) the movements were growing spontaneously from the below. All of them involved both experienced activists and people without activist experience. I will call these four movements “camp-based” since they were formed around protest camps near construction sites.

b) The goals and disagreements

In all the cases, except Eleven Emlékmű, the main intention was to protect the green area from the construction. Moreover, in these five cases the locals demanded to include them in the decision-making process. The idea that the public space belongs to the people and people have to decide what to do there was common for five mentioned movements. The activists of all five movements related this idea to the statements that the public space should be accessible for all people, be non-commercial and keep its identity. In four cases (Mitino and Druzhba in Moscow and FÁK a Rómain and Ligetvédők in Budapest) the

activists' motivations were clearly anti-neoliberal. On the one hand, they protested against commercialization (Mitino, Druzhba, Ligetvédők), land speculation (Mitino, Ligetvédők, FÁK a Rómain), touristification (Ligetvédők) and use of the public land in private interests (Mitino, Druzhba, Ligetvédők, FÁK a Rómain, Torfyanka). On the other hand, they aimed to protect the local identity of the place (Ligetvédők, Mitino, Druzhba, FÁK a Rómain) and protested against the creation of new one (Ligetvédők).

In all the cases the main goal was to stop a construction and to cancel a project. In four cases (two in Budapest and two in Moscow) the goals were up scaled. The new up scaled goals were formulated either by the movements as a whole or by certain activists or by the groups of activists inside the movement. However, in all the cases (except Mitino) the new goals and attitudes could be considered as a collective product of a movement because they were elaborated in the process of common struggle, internal conflicts and divisions.

Movements in Budapest developed their goals towards the issues of civil peace, people's democracy, alternative political and economic approaches. For example, Eleven Emlékmű movement eventually focused on the inspiration of the public dialog. They believed that falsification of the history and political manipulations are possible because of the absence of the dialog and poor communication between people (BEE1 2017). The state fills this vacuum with propaganda and force an agenda. This attitude was developed collectively by the movement as a whole and creation of the environment for the public dialog became a new goal of the movement.

Ligetvédők was the most diverse among all described movements. For Ligetvédők as a whole the protection of the park continued to be the main goal but the activists and the groups of activists inside the movement gradually developed new goals. Different activists of Ligetvédők movement saw the protest as a part of global movement for people's democracy and against capitalism, part of national movement against authoritarian rule of Victor Orban's government, part of world or national environmental movements (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BL3 2017).

Movements in Moscow developed their goals towards the issues of citizen's representation and local governance. "Save the park Mitino" group had the aim to participate in the life of the district from the beginning (MM 2017). The protest against the construction of the shopping mall in the park helped the activists to start their activities, to find each other and unite. In the process of the protest they created the "public organization "Our Mitino" which supposed to deal not only with the project of shopping mall but with various issues related to district life. The creation of the group "Our Mitino" could be

interpreted as intention to make kind of neighbourhood association which would represent interests of the citizens. The same intention emerged from the “Oborona Levoberezhnogo” (Druzhba) movement. Activists of Torfyanka in the spring of 2017 started to publish district newspaper “Dear Losinka” about the district life and problems. Neighbourhood associations are totally absent in Moscow and the activists of all described Moscow movements at some point felt the need to create a platform for all the citizens of their districts. We can say that all three Moscow movements are on the way to a creation of such a platforms. Moreover, tens of similar initiative groups and movements in Moscow are trying nowadays to unite their efforts and create one broad movement against the current politics of urban development and against Moscow administration.

c) Methods

In four camp-based movements the main tool of the protest was physical presence. The camps emerged in the first days of the protests and became the main platform for communication for many months. In Budapest the camp in Ligetvédők and the physical presence in Eleven Emlékmű were really continues – more than a year in the first case and more than three years in the second. In Moscow the camps in Torfyanka and Druzhba parks existed less than half of year. However, in Torfyanka the activists have been physically presented in the park for more than 1,5 year. This difference in the duration of the camps’ life probably could be related to the level of non-state violence against the activists. In both cities police removed the camps several times but in Moscow the camps were also attracted by private security services or “patriotic” militarized activists (MT 2017; MD 2017; BL1 2017). When the number of activists in the camps decreased, they decided that it was dangerous to keep the camp (MD 2017).

The legal struggle such as courts, petitions, complains and letters to authorities was used by all the movements. However, there is the difference in the character of usage by the movements in Moscow and Budapest. For three Moscow movements the legal struggle was part of movements’ self-justification. The activist used the illegal status (for short periods courts banned the building works in all Moscow cases) of construction to explain why they have a right to protest against it (MM 2017; MT 2017; MD 2017). For the movements in Budapest the legal struggle was merely one of the tools to make pressure on the construction companies or public authorities (BL1 2017; BR 2017). Unlike Moscow activists, the activists in Budapest never mentioned illegality of the construction as a reason to protest. It probably has something to do with first, the character of urban development

(openly illegal in some of the Moscow cases (MM 2017; MT 2017) and hiddenly speculative in some of the Budapest cases (BL1 2017; BR 2017)) and second, with the activists' understanding of their rights in the city. For Moscow activists their right to protest was a civil right embedded into Russian legal system. As far as building works were officially illegal by court decision, they considered their protest as legal. For the activists in Budapest the right to protest was a political right and part of democratic political system. Even if the construction was officially legal, they still esteemed their right to protest because, as they stated, they did not respect the laws adopted by Hungarian government to legalize the projects (BL1 2017; BL2 2017).

d) The organizational structure

All the movements were organized around the core groups, which included 10-20 activists. There is clear difference in terms of the core groups structure between the movements in Moscow and Budapest.

All the Budapest movements included several core groups each while all the Moscow movement had only one. In the case of Budapest several core groups existed in the movements from the beginning but in some cases the division was intensified by the conflicts. In FÁK a Rómain there were no conflicts and the division was only functional (BR 2017). In Eleven Emlékmű there was functional division which became political after the conflict (BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017). In Ligetvédők there were organizational divisions but after number of conflicts the division became social and political (BL2 2017). In all Budapest cases different core groups more or less successfully collaborated (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017) although in Ligetvédők the relationships among core groups were both collaborative and conflictual (BL1 2017; BL2 2017).

All the Moscow movements tried to keep one core group in each movement. They attempted to build a consensus regarding common issues inside the group and tried to avoid raising the questions, which could split them (MM 2017; MT 2017; MD 2017). Such a questions were considered as unrelated to movement's goals. In such a manner Torfyanka movement stayed solid, Druzhba movement went through the conflict and did not manage to resolve it and Mitino movement collapsed because of the conflict. There was clear inability of the activists of Mitino and Druzhba movements to deal with openly different opinions and conflicts inside the core groups. Different opinions were considered as 'normal' while they did not become the topic of discussion. Conflicts were considered as destructive process which could destroy the group (MM 2017; MT 2017; MD 2017)..

Finally, in two Budapest movements (Ligetvédők and Eleven Emlékmű) the conflicts helped the activists to elaborate their positions and create political subjectivity. In two Moscow movements (Mitino and Druzhba) the conflicts forced the splits but were not developed and did not have any positive results.

The activists of all six movements understood and appreciated their specifics and their power as the grassroots movements. However, they had different opinions about institutionalization. Some of them (Mitino, Druzhba, part of Eleven Emlékmű and part of Ligetvédők) aimed to institutionalized to become a formal actor in urban politics or in to better organize the movement and to fight more efficiently. All of them avoided the appearance of official leadership but some of them employed certain organizational methods such as closed meetings of core groups (BEE1 2017; MM 2017), division of labor (BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017; MM 2017; MT 2017), making the rules and so forth. In Eleven Emlékmű and Ligetvédők movements, the issue of institutionalization was discussed among the activists. Some of them did not support the formalization tendencies and insisted that movements have to be organized alternatively to current political and economic system (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BEEE1 2017). In Moscow movements this question had rather practical meaning. The activists tried to balance between formal and informal attitudes. For example, in Mitino they did not register a NGO in order to avoid the personal responsibility and pressure on the official leaders. At the same time, they had organizational charter and followed all the rules (MM 2017).

Consequently, most of the movements gradually institutionalized. However, only Mitino movement expressed clear will to become a formal organization. In all other cases, it was happening occasionally. First, as the activist were becoming more familiar to each other and spent more time together, they formed the shared rules, regulations and even kind of membership. Second, some of them understood the formalization as a way to organize their struggle more efficiently. At the same time thee of camp-based movements (Torfyanka, Druzhba, Ligetvédők) still kept their grassroots spontaneous character. Three other movements became kind of small unformal organizations.

e) Attitude to political parties

One of the sharpest topic debated among the activists in all six movements was the collaboration with the political parties.

In Budapest the discussion was inspired by the activists themselves. All three Budapest movements consciously rejected any collaboration with any political parties (BL1 2017; BL2 2017; BL3 2017; BR 2017; BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017). Eleven Emlékmű movement developed the discussion to the question if they could “talk to [far-right Hungarian party] Jobbick as a party and with the Jobbick members as people” (BEE1 2017). Although the open public dialog was the main idea and one of the main aims of the movement, they eventually rejected communication not only with the party but also with its members.

In Moscow all three movements collaborated with the political parties except party of power United Russian (UR) (MM 2017; MT 2017; MD 2017). The official media and the opponents of the movements tried to present this collaboration as a proof of political interest of the movements. The activists had to assure that they are “outside of politics” but continued to collaborate with parties. There could be two reasons why Moscow activists generally tolerated collaboration with political parties and why they did the exception for “United Russia”. First, the activists in Moscow have shown very practical approach to the problem solving. Until political parties can suggest them any real help, they would accept it. This attitude is rooted in the Moscow movements’ assurance that first they have to follow the main aim – stop the construction. At the same time and also because of practical reasons they tried to stay apolitical. It led to the second reason - the understanding of “political” among the activists. In Russia to become political means to start criticize Putin. Because of that, collaboration with parties was not considered by activists as something political. They did not believe that parties had any political power and relayed on them rather in bureaucratic and practical issues. The only one exception was made for the party of power “United Russia” which was associated with Putin’s regime. Collaboration with United Russia was considered as a political step and activists tried to avoid it. However, it was not total taboo.

Consequently, in both cities all movements (except Eleven Emlékmű and part of Ligetvédők) claimed their apolitical nature. Their attitude to collaboration with political parties was related to the treatment of the “politics” and understanding of “political” among the activists. In Budapest all political parties were considered by the activists as a part of current political system. The activists did not want to come in touch with that system and for this reason rejected communication with the parties. In Moscow the activists understood “political” as something related to Putin, UR and Ukrainian crisis. All political parties except UR they considered rather as a part of bureaucratic than political system.

Table 11. Qualitative comparison of the movements - results

The characteristic	Variations		Which movements
Emergency of the movement	Spontaneous		Torfyanka, Druzhba, Ligetvédők, Eleven Emlékmű
	Less spontaneous		Mitino, FAK a Rómain
The disagreement	1.Anti-neoliberal	Against commercialization	Mitino, Druzhba, Ligetvédők
		Against land speculations	Mitino, Ligetvédők, FAK a Rómain
		Against touristification	Ligetvédők
		Against use of the public land in private interests	Mitino, Druzhba, Torfyanka, Ligetvédők, FAK a Rómain
	2.Protect the local identity		Mitino, Druzhba, Ligetvédők
	3. Against state identity-building		Eleven Emlékmű
	4.For democracy: People should decide what to do with public land		All, except Eleven Emlékmű
	4.Against state and non-state violence		Torfyanka, Ligetvédők
Initial goal	Stop the construction and cancel the project		All
	To participate in the life of the district		Mitino
New goals	Towards the issues of citizen's representation and local self-governance		Moscow movements
	Towards the issues of civil peace, people's democracy alternative political and economic approaches		Budapest movements except FAK a Rómain
	Did not develop new goals		FAK a Rómain
The methods	Camp/physical presence	Long-term	Ligetvédők, Eleven Emlékmű, Torfyanka, Mitino
		Short-term	Druzhba

	Legal struggle	As a tool	All
		As justification of the protest	Moscow movements
The structure	One core group		Moscow movements
	Several core groups		Budapest movements
The attitude to the political parties	Negative		Budapest movements
	Neutral		Moscow movements (but with exception to the party "United Russia"
The ideology	Apolitical		All except Eleven Emlékmű
	Anti - ROH		Torfyanka
	Openly against the government		Eleven Emlékmű, part of Druzhba, part of Ligetvédők

It is clear from the comparison above that some of the features are distinctive for the movements in both cities while others are specific only for the movements in Moscow or Budapest. The differences are related to the elaborated goals of the movements or groups of activists inside the movements, their organizational structure and their attitude to the political parties. The convergences are related to how the movements emerged, why they were disagree with the project, what was their initial goal and which methods they used to achieve it. Some of the convergences, such as grassroots character of the movements and their initial goals were expected since they coincide with the parameters, which I used to choose case studies.

The three described Moscow movements tend to keep one main core group as a main organizational resource, broadly collaborate with political parties except United Russia and develop their goals towards issues of the representation of the citizen's interests and democratic local self-governance. The three described Budapest movements tend to have several collaborating (and sometimes conflicting) core groups, avoid communication with political parties and develop their goals towards issues of people's democracy and public dialog.

The results of this analysis of course do not allow to make any generalizations about civil and political activism in Moscow and Budapest. The other way around, the political, economic and social context of Moscow and Budapest should be used to analyze the differences between particular Moscow and Budapest movements. Doing following

analysis, I will try to find out which features of Moscow and Budapest movements are related to the local contexts and which just concurred occasionally.

4.5. Discussion of the findings

4.5.1. Discussion of the findings: the conflicts

What makes conflict emerge and in which forms they are expressed?

Reasons

Conflicts in both cities emerged because of more or less similar reasons - undemocratic nature of decision-making and market-oriented or ideological character of the projects.

On the one hand, the hybrid forms of governmentality in Moscow and Budapest, described above, resulted in lack of participatory practices and nontransparent and undemocratic decision-making. It puts citizens on position where they possess very few real tools of influence. In all six cases activists found information about the projects before building works started, but there still was no way to make changes. As we can see, in all the cases public hearings did not suppose any citizens' engagement and were used only as a tool to legalize the construction. In Budapest some of the projects were legalized through special legislation and justified through the forums and round tables. In Moscow round tables were happening later in order to resolve conflicts which already started. In both cases participation was rather a tool of manipulation than an instrument to "transfer power to citizens" (Arnstain, 1969). Moreover, state and private actors seem to have no idea that citizens could possess any opinion. The activists in both cities told that customers of projects and construction companies "did not expect any resistance and were surprised" to see people blocking the way of building machinery (MT 2017; BL1 2017; BL2 2017).

All projects, except Liget Budapest, were poorly organized in terms of communication. Although in all six cases the state or city authorities were involved in the decision-making, the activists never had a chance to discuss project directly with the state or city officials. All the round tables with the representatives of the construction companies were organized in order to assure locals to accept a project, not to discuss it. In all the cases the activists complained that it was difficult to find proper information about the projects. Consequently, in most of the cases after the building works started, the physical resistance became the main tool of the opposition.

On the other hand, market-led logic of urban development, speculative and sometimes illegal nature of the projects outraged locals who felt that their interests were violated by

such development. Even in the case of Torfyanka the activists considered the church as a kind of private space and protested against capture of public space for a private use. In the case of Eleven Emlékmű speculative approach to historical memory was one of the reasons for the protest. Although the customer of the project (Hungarian government) did not have there any commercial interests, their will to use common memory to achieve private political goals could be considered as an act of political privatization. This case is an example of how the state use public space and public memory to build new identity and how this top-down identity building is becoming accelerator of conflict. We can say that in all six cases the activists attempted to protect what they considered as a common against the usage of it in one's particular interests.

So that, two main reasons of the emergency of the conflicts were 1) undemocratic decision making and 2) market-led logic and/or speculative nature of urban development.

Camps

The protests were expressed mainly in the street action – rallies, demonstrations and finally, camps near construction sides.

Because of low trust to politicians, officials and representatives of the construction companies the activists preferred to keep day and night alert near construction sites. In some cases these camps turned to be the platforms where the activists met and elaborated new ideas, goals and attitudes. The physical dimension of the conflicts provided bases for the protest. As one of the activists said: *“we have to do the same about our education and medicine system, but here it is easier because we have a physical space of protest”* (BL1 2017). At the same time only in two cases the platforms survived after the acute stage of the conflict. Eleven Emlékmű movement kept their position near the memorial “For the victims of German occupation” and turned it into open platform for a dialog and discussion. Mitino movement kept Freemarket as a platform for local's communication and non-profit exchange. Although the Freemarket does not possess any political meaning nowadays it has a potential to turn into proper political platform in certain circumstances. In all other case, the results of the conflict are related more to the activist's experiences, emerged networks and elaborated collective goals and interests.

4.5.2. Discussion of findings: the movements

In which conditions urban movements arise? How do they define themselves and how do they question the renovation process?

Conditions: post-socialist, capitalist and semi-authoritarian

Moscow and Budapest are both post-socialist cities. Both of them are the capitals of the countries, which are on the one hand, follow capitalist model of economic development, on the other hand, tend to be semi-authoritarian at some aspects of political development. Both cities became arenas where new post-socialist identities are being built, the power of political elites is consolidated and capitalist economic model is realized.

According to Emel Akçalı and Umut Korkut (2015), Budapest is used by semi-authoritarian Hungarian government to express its ideological orientation. Enjoying mobility of capital, foreign investments and EU funding they adopt urban transformation as a technique for consolidating neo-authoritarianism. The authors suggests that it signals “*new form of hybrid governmentality that combines neoliberalism with illiberal logics*” (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015, p. 76).

We could say that it partly just for Moscow as well. While current Moscow urban development is defined by some of the authors as neoliberal (Büdenbender and Zupan, 2016; Kalaykin et al, 2015; Golubchikov, 2006), some of the aspects point out its ideological character. According to Büdenbender and Zupan (2016) the reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour by first Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov in 1990-s established the key principles that would define Moscow’s urban development in the following years. It symbolized Russian post-socialist renaissance, set orthodoxy, autocracy and national identity as inspirational topics for new Russian architecture and “*set the standards for the way business was to be conducted in Moscow, with private companies donating most of the \$700 million heavy project*” (Büdenbender and Zupan, 2016). Later projects – Peter the Great huge monument (1997), number of the monuments of the pre-revolution statesman erected in different years, reconstruction of soviet memorial complex “The park of the victory” on the Poklonnay Gora, enormous statue of Saint Vladimir (the ruler who christianized Russia in 10th century)(2016) and, finally the program “200 churches in Moscow” started in 2011 show that Moscow urban space is used as arena for post-socialist identity building. However, as Büdenbender and Zupan (2016) argues, the new Sobyenin’s model of urban development is supposed to be seemingly transparent and democratic. It is opposed to Luzhkov’s authoritarian rule. So that, Moscow urban transformation should on the one hand, serve to transmit the official conservative ideology,

on the other hand, to be an example of democratic and participative urban development. This contradiction is more visible in the city center and got birth to a term “hipsters Stalinism”. Büdenbender and Zupan (2016) believes that the whole model therefore is inherently tension laden and has to be changed soon.

Consequently, there are some differences in how the urban transformation is going and how the socialist past is being negotiated in urban space in Budapest and Moscow. Urban transformation in Budapest tends to response revanchist sentiments of Hungarian government, their will to reflect “glorious past” (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015). In their attempt to base new Hungarian identity on the great events of the Hungarian past, they reject to consider time of German occupation and time under communist regime as a part of Hungarian history. As one of the activist defined it: *“Between 1944 and 1990 - when we were not we”* (BEE1 2017). Such approach demands not only demolition of certain monuments and renaming streets and squares but also the recreation of the public spaces according to the new ideology. In Moscow, on the other hand, the socialist period is an integral part of the past and urban environment. While the new-built Russian identity is supposed to be based on the religion, conservative values and nationalism, it glorifies also some events of Soviet past. So that, the ideology in Moscow is mainly expressed through the monuments, the renaming of the streets, new erection and restoration of the churches and reconstruction of the key ideological locations (such as the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, Poklonnyy Gora, Soviet Exhibition of Economic Achievements). It resulted in illogical mix of contradictory values.

In both cities there were waves of civil and political activism in last years. In Budapest these events had direct relation to some of the movements – activists of Ligetvédők and Eleven Emlékmű remembered their volunteering during the summer of 2015 as inspiring, awaking and empowering time. In Moscow the protest movement “For fair elections” of 2011-2012 resulted in the appearance of the networks of the activists all around the city. On the one hand, the experience of collaboration and solidarity forced them to seek for participation in the local politics. Some of these activists became part of core groups of the case study movements. On the other hand, authorities’ reaction and repressions against the participants of the FFE movement made the activists fearful.

In both cities the activists of the case study movements faced pressure from the authorities. In both cases such pressure looked more like an act of intimidation than real repressions. In Moscow in the cases of Torfyanka and Mitino the pressure shown to be effective in neutralizing certain activists. However, the flexible structure of the movements

and the weak character of the repressions encourage the development of the movements in general despite all the pressure. Moreover, in both cities the level of citizens' tolerance to the state and non-state violence shown to be very low. Any physical (such as beating by police or security guards) or psychological (such as arrests, police searches and questionings) pressure caused broad media attention and public support to the activists. In case of Moscow physical violence from the police, security services and the movement "Sorok Sorokov" inspired the activists to formulate their position regarding the non-violent resistance, radical or not radical methods.

Post-political condition

Post-political condition refers to the technocratic urban governance based on the neoliberal consensus. It implicates the widening of the sphere of governing and shrinking the sphere of political. As a result, the new, depoliticized city is emerging (Swyngedouw, 2007). As it was mentioned above, both Moscow and Budapest are arenas where the political power is consolidated and new ideologies and identities are manifested in the context of highly divided societies. The question arises if these cities could be considered as depoliticized.

Both Hungarian and Russian political projects tend to be semi-authoritarian and based on strong nationalist and conservative values (Akçalı and Korkut, 2015; Muller, 2011). In both capitals the neoliberal principles of urban development are successfully embedded into nationalist and illiberal political frameworks. As Muller (2011) shows, the nationalism can be easily reframed in entrepreneurial terms. However, illiberal logic of development and will to use urban transformation as a tool to express ideological orientation and to consolidate neo-authoritarianism does not allow city authorities to drive transparent and at least seemingly democratic policy. On my opinion, post-political condition in Budapest and especially in Moscow, could be found rather at the layer of discourses, strategies and 'pilot projects' than at the level of broad practices. Swyngedouw argues that in post-political city the disagreement is possible only inside consensus while true disagreement is evacuated. We could say that it is partly just for Moscow and Budapest although even participation inside consensus is very limited. The participation is organized by the way that citizens are supposed just to accept a solution. It creates potential for protest. Moscow administration clearly is making attempts to capture decency and disagreements but their institutional capacities are limited. So that, the theory of post-political condition is so far almost useless when it comes to analysis of grassroots movements in Moscow and Budapest.

Why do the movements arise?

Despite all the contradictions of urban and political development mentioned above, contextual and structural conditions in Moscow are not very favorable for the social mobilization. The citizens are disappointed in politics; the protest activism is marginalized (Clement, 2014a); the state is considered by citizens as repressive and corrupted (Jackobsson, 2015). The urban governance is vertically organized which means nontransparent decision-making, absence of the independent local governments (Gelman, 2011) and lack of non-commercial organizations. So what helps the movements to overcome the unfavorable conditions?

I believe there are several reasons why the grassroots movements not only arise but also grow, generalize and upscale their goals and demands, extend their connections and create city-scale solidarity networks. First, all the analyzed conflicts were enrooted in the everyday life and related to the local issues. That provided clear motivation and justification for the participation for the citizens and helped them to make a first step into activism. Second, all the conflicts were place-related. The protest movements had a physical platform (especially in the cases of Torfyanka and Druzhba) and these platforms existed for a long period of time. So that, the new public space emerged and became the space for civil engagement and discussion. The experience of common struggle, solidarity and real public life turned out to be truly empowering. Third, the formation of the leaders or “coordinators” played important role in the rise of the movements. These people became the core groups of the movements, kind of movements’ framework. They were instrumental in the elaboration of common goals and strategies and in establishing connections with other movements and initiatives.

The activism in Budapest has a little longer history than in Moscow. There were several waves of the mass protests during 2000-s. However, at some aspects the conditions are similar to Moscow – people are disappointed in politics and share low social trust (Jackobsson, 2015; BL 2017; BL2 2017). All three Budapest movements are also enrooted in everyday life. Even in case of Eleven Emlékmű the activists described the memorial as related to their family history therefore offensive for them. Budapest activists easier than Moscow’s made a step towards political protest. Moreover, the experience of civil solidarity during the refugee crisis of 2015 shown to be very empowering for them.

Finally, we can say that several aspects were important for the emergency of the movements: 1) regular character of the problem, rootedness in everyday life; 2) place-

related character of the conflict, emergency of the physical platform for communication; 3) personal role of leaders, coordinators, experienced activists and in two Budapest and one Moscow case – 4) previous experience of collective action.

How do the movements define themselves

Most of the activists characterized their movements as grassroots, spontaneously emerged, apolitical or anti-political, representing the interest of the citizens, and supported by many people.

All the activists insisted that their movements are grassroots and spontaneously emerged. Moreover, for most of them, it was important to underline that the movement is organized horizontally and the decisions are made collectively. They considered their bottom-up democratic character as a way to justify themselves and to underline their difference from the bureaucratic city administrations and profiteering developers. The activists of Ligetvédők movement declared that they have a right to protest because they represent the public interests of the citizens while the construction company represent the private interests of the political elites and developers (BL2 2017). The activists in both cities shared the anti-neoliberal stance although they did not formulate it that way. Moreover, in the conditions of the political division, dictated from above, these anti-neoliberal sentiments become the main uniting element. They insisted that the movements were socially diverse so that they struggle for the interests of the broad population. The only one exception was Eleven Emlékmű, which had openly political character, homogeneous social composition and ideological disagreements with current political system. Here it makes sense to compare Torfyanka movement in Moscow with Eleven Emlékmű in Budapest. Although in both cases the movements protested against ideologically tinged projects, they defined themselves differently. If Eleven Emlékmű was openly anti-governmental from the beginning, Torfyanka movement started with the regular sentiments about “protecting our land” and “we are not against the church but against the church in the park” (MT 2017). The analysis of activists discussions in social network Vkontakte and their statements in the media show that the anti-ROH sentiments were elaborated during the protest and therefore, could be considered not as the motivation but as result of mobilization.

Most of the activists declared the non-political character of the movements although they implicated different meanings of political. For the activists in Budapest “politics” meant everything related to the current political system – all political parties, representative democracy, Victor Orban and so forth. In that sense to be non-political meant to have

nothing in common with this system. Part of the activists insisted that even organizational structure should be alternative to the traditional structure of public organizations. At the same time, part of Ligetvédők movement and whole Eleven Emlékmű movement actively participated in anti-government events. For the activists in Moscow the meaning of “political” was related to president Putin personally and Russian policy in Ukraine. Most of political parties or the representatives of the city administration were considered as unrelated to “politics”. Practically it resulted in the different attitudes to the collaboration with political parties in Moscow and Budapest. At the same time, in most of the cases in both cities the activist did not make any attempts to re-appropriate “politics” but just tried to separate themselves from everything considered as “political”.

The main identities, elaborated by the movements during the protests both in Moscow and Budapest were “Moscow/Budapest citizens”, “ordinary people”, “the locals”, “not indifferent citizens” and “civil society”. This identity was related to their common rights and interests in the city – the right to use the public spaces, the right to enjoy green zones and the right to decide how the city should be developed. In Moscow the activists’ relationship with public authorities continued to be both conflictual and collaborative at the same time while the relationship with private actors (ROH, “Sport-city”, “Luzhniki”) got highly conflictual. After number of unsuccessful attempts to win assistance from the authorities, the activists of all the groups came to conclusion that they have to fight for their interests independently. They considered solidarity, collective action and transparency as their main tools. In Budapest, only FAK a Rómain movement tried to collaborate with public authorities and private actors. Two other movements were alien to both.

Consequently, the activists defined their movements as grassroots local-based “apolitical” movements representing the interests of the citizens. All the movements except Eleven Emlékmű tried to separate themselves from whom they considered as political actors and to contradistinguish themselves to the economic actors. Eleven Emlékmű movement had openly anti-governmental attitude and had nothing to do with economic actors.

4.5.3. Discussion of findings: conflictual spaces as arenas for discussion

If and why those renovating spaces are becoming arenas for discussion the neoliberal-capitalist model?

In both cities the conflicting spaces became the platform for discussion. However, the activists in Moscow and Budapest discussed different things and so far came to different conclusions.

In Moscow the protest sites were becoming arenas where current urban policy was discussed. First, the activists focused on how local governance is operated. Through communication with local authorities, they came to understanding that local government bodies 1) do not have any political or administrative power and completely depend on decisions of the city hall; 2) have main actors integrated in the party of power “United Russia”; 3) represent interests of political and economic elites. So that, the discussions about particular project very fast turned to the discussion about the policy of Moscow city hall and personally Moscow mayor Sergey Sobyanin. In such a way, the activists found out how “the power vertical” (Gelman and Ryzhenkov, 2011) works in the scale of the city. Second, in the process of communication with the authorities and private actors the activists realized that there is no space for their voice in the system of decision-making. At the beginning some of the activists relied on public authorities who supposed to help them in their struggle against private actors. However, eventually they concluded that whole institutional framework is organized in order to serve interests of elites. On the one hand, because of that activists complained that they are alone and nobody helps them. If support practices inside a movement were not strong enough, activists got disappointed and demotivated (like in the case of Mitino movement). On the other hand, it forced them to perceive themselves as an unadmitted actor in urban politics and realize that they have to struggle for their interests by themselves. If a movement was able to work up proper solidarity practices, the alien environment did not destroy a movement but accelerated elaboration of common identity and common goals (like in Torfyanka movement).

The main conclusion of the discussions inside the movements in Moscow could be interpreted as following. First, the activists insisted that current Moscow urban policy is profit-led and is conducted in interests of private actors. Even in case of Torfyanka movement, the economic interests of the ROC were one of the main topic of discussion. Second, they argued that citizens’ interests are violated and the city hall is not interested in the citizen’s opinion. Their demands could be generalized as: 1) urban development in the interests of citizens and 2) citizen’s participation in the decision-making. Both demands could be counted as political because they question the natural order of urban development and decision-making system in Moscow. The camps and protest sites in the parks become, therefore, political spaces, which provided a platform for “*encounter by those who have no*

part in that order” (Dikeç, 2005, p. 172). The occupation of the space and twenty-four-hour presence could be defined as a political act although the activists did not put it that way. Through these platforms ordinary people became activists and started to participate in collective action which already meant to go against the dominant socio-cultural norms in contemporary Russian society (Clément, 2014a).

Consequently, we could say that two conflicts provided a platform where “ordinary people” overcame their mistrust to an activism and collective action, united and elaborated collective goals and collective identities. The two bottom up groups which emerged spontaneously as a reaction to the construction project (Torfyanka and Druzhba) shown to be more successful in social mobilization and in upscaling of their demands. Mitino group, which emerged as top-down transfer of the practices from the national political movement to the local activism shown to be less sustainable. This conclusion supports the assumption made by authors of “Politic of apolitical” book that truly grassroots movements rooted in everyday life have more chances to survive and develop in current conditions (Clément, 2014a). Moreover, Torfyanka movement shown to be the most sustainable and successful among three Moscow movements probably because it had some kind of uniting ideology.

In Budapest it makes sense to separate two camp-based movements (Ligetvedok and Eleven Emlékmű) and one paper-based (FAK a Rómain). The former became platforms of very active citizen’s engagement and heated disputes. Number of internal conflicts, splits and divisions show political character of these movements. In the case of Ligetvédők, the main uniting demand was anti-neoliberal – against commercialization and touristification of the public space and the attempt to protect the local identity. Since the project was pushed by the national government, the activists related the economic interests of private actors to the political and economic goals of national elite. They understood the neoliberalism in Hungary as embedded into local political system. In all three cases the activists found that although the projects were developed on the districts’ land, the districts’ authorities does not possess any power to influence on it. So that, the activists in Budapest opposed themselves both to the state and private actors.

In both cities the activists protested against the private-oriented urban development and demanded for the citizens the main role in decision-making. Both in Moscow and Budapest they considered the local authorities as helpless and addressed their demands to the higher level of authorities. However, there are some differences between Moscow and Budapest activists’ discussions. While all the discussions in Moscow were kept around the

city's urban policy and city authorities and private actors, the discussions in camp-based Budapest movements was going around the national authorities and national policies. The main anti-hero in Moscow was Moscow mayor Sergey Sobyenin (although in Torfyanka patriarch Kirill occupied this role); the main anti-hero in Budapest was Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Moscow activists discussed their urban issues as unrelated to federal politics. Budapest activists considered urban politics as a part of national politics. It could be because of different scale and character of contesting projects. Two camp-based Budapest movements protested against the central-located city-scale projects while all the Moscow movement protested against the local developments on the outskirts. The city centers play for the political representation much more important role than outskirts. Although the erection of 200 churches in Moscow is for sure political and ideological project, the building of one church in particular neighbourhood at the outskirts looked for the activists like just unwanted development.

Finally, we can say that all contesting spaces except Eleven Emlékmű became the arenas for discussion the neoliberal-capitalist model of urban development. In the cases of camp-based movements this discussion could be considered as political because it included the interruption of the "natural" model of urban development. In some of Budapest cases the activists related current capitalist order to the current political system and saw them as integral parts of one system. In all Moscow cases the activist discussed only the city economic model and the local system of decision-making. So that, in two Budapest cases the discussion sometimes included the issues of representative democracy and capitalist model as a whole while in the case of Moscow it was more about local governance and Moscow urban development. In both cities most sustainable movements appeared as a response to ideological development (Torfyanka in Moscow and Eleven Emlékmű in Budapest). It seems that ideological character of the projects gave the activists strong uniting argument. However, while in Budapest it resulted in appearance of clearly political movement, in Moscow Torfyanka movement stayed apolitical.

V. Conclusion

First, as it discussed in the theoretical part, the usage of the theory of governance-beyond-the-state and theory of post-political city shown to be pretty limited for analysis of the cities in post-socialist context, especially when it comes to social movements. On the one hand, post-socialist cities borrowed some western governance practices and developed governance systems based on neoliberal consensus. On the other hand,

instead of merely adopting governance models transferred from the west after 1989, both cities elaborated their own forms of 'hybrid governance', which mix neoliberal governmentality with paternalistic government and neo-authoritarian political rule. First, the role of private actors in these "hybrid" forms of governmentality is quite important but pretty much defined and limited by the state. Second, the civil society does not possess any real tools of participation in urban governance. Public participation and citizens engagement in Moscow and Budapest are rather part of official discourse and political advertising than an instrument of urban policy. Third, although city administrations are supposed to possess depoliticized management functions, they continue to be part of semi-authoritarian political systems. Both mayors of Moscow and Budapest are members of party of power (Fidesz in Hungary and United Russia in Russia); moreover, in both cities national governments use urban transformation to sustain their power and to build post-socialist identities. At the same time, the city authorities in Moscow and Budapest are forced to compete with other cities for investments and professional. So that, they try to create the images of the European cities "comfortable for life" and repeat mantras about "public participation" and "citizens opinion". Both models of "hybrid governance" are therefore full of contradictions and tensions and provoke conflicts.

While the governance systems in Moscow and Budapest do not suppose citizen's participation, there is evident demand for democratic urban governance from below. Because of the absence of participatory tools, this demand sometimes is expressed in the form of physical resistance such as occupations, camps and blockages organized by 'ordinary' people. It creates the platforms for citizen's engagement and participation. However, there is clear problems with negotiation and discussions among the activists, especially in Moscow. I assume it as a post-socialist feature related to the fact that socialist society was deeply consensual. As one elderly women explained why it is so hard for her to deal with people with different political views: "We are Soviet people, for us ideological purity of a person is essential". As the movements tried to stay solid, they attempted to avoid conflicts and refused political discussions. This attitude limited the possibilities of Moscow movements. Despite their common anti-neoliberal arguments, they stayed incapable to elaborate collective political objectivity. The movements in Budapest were more successful in it; different groups with different objectivities emerged as a result of discussions, conflicts and splits.

I assume that in next years the internal tensions of Moscow and Budapest governance models and the contradictions between urban policies and citizen's requests will result in

growing dissatisfaction and increasing number of conflicts. However, so far grassroots responses are different. In Budapest activists increasingly looking for alternatives both for socialism and capitalism, dictatorship and representative democracy and demand political changes. In Moscow activists believe that proper democratic institutions like fair elections, working courts and participatory practices can solve their problems, so they call for institutional change.

VI. Annex

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6.2. Online sources: pages of the movements in social media and their websites

Mitino

- <https://www.facebook.com/igspasempark/>
- <http://spasem-park.livejournal.com/>
- <https://vk.com/club53730129>
- <https://mitino.ru/forum/17319/2013-04-24/dejstviya-initsiativnoj-gruppyi-spasem-park-den-za-dnem>
- <http://freemarket.moscow/>

Torfyanka

- <https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BA%D0%B5%D0%A2%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%84%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%B0>

Anti-church movement

- <https://vk.com/park.torf2016>
- <https://vk.com/park.torf>
- <https://www.facebook.com/groups/torfynka/?fref=ts>
- <https://www.facebook.com/groups/OboronaLevobereg/?fref=ts>

Pro-church movement

- <https://vk.com/club96623694>
- https://vk.com/za_park_s_hramom

Druzhba

- <https://vk.com/oboronalevobeg>
- <https://www.facebook.com/groups/OboronaLevobereg/>
- <https://twitter.com/oboronlevobereg>
- <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCXDfJhGtzIDPmOBTHaNWEag>

Ligetvédők

- <https://www.facebook.com/groups/545113162358363/?fref=ts>
- <https://www.facebook.com/groups/1768375410063915/?fref=ts>
- <https://www.facebook.com/groups/ligetvedok.tarsalgo/?fref=ts>
- https://www.facebook.com/ligetvedok/?hc_ref=ARSjMhJnE6QLXUav3dmwsvSDV7AQhgAYoKr7y8n5i3X7fQkAI5AMwbOnVyG_zE38C-Q&fref=gs&hc_location=group
- <http://ligetvedok.hu/>
- <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCBo8NY5wNaEbCFkgeTTJoxQ>

FAK a Rómain

- <http://fakaromain.hu/>
- <http://valyo.hu/portfolio-item/fak-a-romain/>
- <https://www.facebook.com/themostbeautifultrees/>
- <http://themostbeautifultrees.simplesite.com/429693539>
- <https://www.facebook.com/FakARomain/?fref=nf>

- Eleven Emlékmű

<https://www.facebook.com/ElevenEmlekmu/?fref=ts>
<https://www.facebook.com/Szabads%C3%A1gsz%C3%ADnpad-848336808511082/?fref=ts>
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCzgMp_tLseICOPsLobFWI7w

Last access of all sources: 27 August 2017.

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6.4. List of interviews

Mitino

- (MM) Natalya Smirnova and Nina Reshetilova (activist, middle-age woman living in Mitino district) – 25.01.2017

Torfyanka

- (MT) Vika Mironova (activist, young women living in Losinoostrovsky district) - 29.01.2017

Druzhba

- (MD) Mikhail Barbotkin (activist, young men living in Losinoostrovsky district) – 24.01.2017

Ligetvédők

- (BL1) Gregory G Ras Komáromy Gergő (Young male activists) - 28.03.17
- (BL2) Olga Dmitrievna (activist, middle age local women) - 01.04.2017
- (BL3) Activists in the camp “Near yellow building” - 07.06.2017

FÁK a Rómain

- (BR) Three activists (One young women, one middle-age women, one middle-age man, all are the locals living in 3th district of Budapest) – 01.04.2017

Eleven Emlékmű

- (BEE1) Maja Ceszárszkaja (activist, middle-age women, living in Budapest) – 06.08.2017
- (BEE2) Sebő Gábor (activist, middle-age men, living in Budapest) - 06.08.2017

All interviewed by Liubov Krutenko

6.5. Interview questions

All the interviews except the interview with FAK a Rómain activists, went in the form of free conversation. Following main research question and two sub questions, I was mainly interested in following: 1) How did activists communicate with public authorities and construction company? How did later explained the activists the purposes of a project? 2) Why activists were against the project? How did they try to challenge it? 3) How did activists communicate among themselves? Were there any conflicts? Were there any political discussions and what they consider as “political discussion”.

Some of the activists had in mind the structure they would like to follow while telling the story. So I used questions below more as a checklist to make sure that the activists told me about all aspects I am interested in.

1) The project

- What is a project?
- Who is a customer?
- Whose is a land?
- Where money come from?
- Why did they told the project is needed?
- How did you get to know about the project? Did you have any disagreements? Where did you address them? Did you get any responses?

2) Movement

- Why you were against the project?
- What were your goals? Have the goals changed?
- Who participated in the protest at the beginning and then? Did you knew each other before (maybe previous conflicts)?
- How the movement was organized?


- How did you attract new people?
- Who and how was making decisions?
- Any ideology? Political discussions?
- Did you try to establish connections with:
 - the same groups in the same city?
 - the same groups in others cities in the same country?
 - with the same groups worldwide?
- What was your relationship with the authorities (in municipal, city, federal level)?

3) Conflict

- When did the conflict start? How?
- Who did participate in the conflict?
 What is the role of state/local authorities?
 Did local council/city council/state parliament deputies participated and in which side?
 - NGO?
 - Political groups and parties?
 - Activists of the same urban movements from other neighbourhoods?
 - Security agencies: police, private security organizations, Special Police Force, Centre for Combating Extremism, public prosecution office (were there any criminal cases)+«informers»
- How did you protest?
- Were there any attempts to avoid the conflict?
- How did you try to resolve the conflict?
 Was there “the third side” trying to solve the problem?


6.6. Additional figures and illustrations

Figure 16. Map of ongoing urban planning conflicts in Moscow for 16.06.2017



This map is open source map created by activists in Moscow. Therefore, it could not cover some of the conflicts.

Figure 17. Map of churches, which were built and are planned to be built as part of program “200 churches” in Moscow.



Since all Moscow residential districts were built in Soviet and post-Soviet time, there is absence of religious architecture everywhere except city center. The program “200 churches” started in 2010 aiming to provide “churches in walking distance” in all residential districts in Moscow. Therefore, churches are considered as an infrastructure object. The program is funded by business and ROC (Reiter, 2015). According to official website of the program at time of summer of 2017 34 churches have been completed and 42 were under construction.

Figure 18. Architecture style of churches of program “200-churches”
(Source: <http://moscowwalks.ru/2012/03/21/200-modulnyh-hramov/>)



Architectural style of all new churches refers to traditional style of Russian churches of XII-XIX centuries.

6.7. MOSCOW – cases profiles

6.7.1. Initiative group “Save the park Mitino”

The initiative group “Save the park Mitino” emerged in 2013 and struggled against the construction of the shopping mall in the landscape park Mitino. The park is located in the outskirts of Moscow in the district Mitino with the population around 188000 people. The description of the movement is based on the

The project

The story of the legal transformations of the disputable plot of land is long and non-transparent. Since legal details are not the target of this paper, I will only shortly describe what was happening with the plot before 2013.

The plot is located in the Landscape Park Mitino and initially belonged to the city of Moscow. The whole park including this plot used to be protected natural area and protected archeological zone. In 2000 the plot has been given for free for 45 years to the NGO “International Academy of Tretyak” in order to build there hockey academy for the School of Olympic Reserve. According to Russian law, it is allowed to build sport and recreation objects in the green areas. In 2012 the plot was excluded from the protected territory of the park by Moscow authorities. After that, the NGO “International Academy of Tretyak” rented the land out to the private company “Sport-city”. The function of the future building has been changed; large commercial area was added and the sport area was shrank which was legal because the plot was not the part of the park anymore. The sport center turned into the shopping mall.

At that moment, the conflict started. The group of activists successfully challenged the construction company in the courts. In 2013 the company lost in the court the Development Plan for the land, one of the main documents, and had to stop preparations for the building works. At the end of 2016 the company got the plan back but construction works didn't start till nowadays.

The emergency of the movement, participants and motivations

The initiative group “Save the park Mitino” appeared at the end of 2012 when some local activists got to know about planning construction from the online newspaper. At the same time, the fence around the plot was erected so it became visible that something is going on in the park. First activists, who paid attention to the projects, came from the movement “For fair elections” and observers community. They already knew each other and had strong will to “participate in the life of the neighbourhood” (Mitino, 2017). According to Zhelninna (2014) this kind of new activists groups started to emerge in Moscow on a

wavelength of the movement “For fair elections” in the spring of 2012. There were networks of observers who worked together on the polling stations in their neighborhoods in the federal elections in 2011-2012 and participated in demonstrations with “abstract” political demands on winter 2011-2012. Inspired by the feeling of action and solidarity, they decided to start to work with the “real” local issues. Among other things, they decided to protest against the construction in the park.

Zhelinnina (2014) points that these “new” groups of activists did not come to the vacuum – there were “old” groups of the activists emerged before 2011 and enrooted in the local life. In Mitino such “old” activists also existed. However, according to the “new activists”, they were disappointed because of the previous failures and did not want to join the new struggle (MM, 2017).

The first activists of “Save the park” group used their contacts in observers community to involve people into the protest activities against the shopping mall project in the park. They also distributed information in the social media and the leaflets in the park, started to do neighbourhood newspaper and went around apartments to inform people about the situation, collected signatures and contacts of supporters. Gradually people without any activist experience started to join the initiative group. Unlike the founders of the group, these people were motivated by the simple disagreement with the idea of shopping mall in the park.

Eventually, the group was consisted mainly of two types of people – former FFE activists inspired by the experience of collective action and wanted to do something “real” in their own district and local citizens without activist experience outraged by the idea to build shopping mall in the park (MM, 2017).

Methods

All the methods applied by the group were pronouncedly legal. The activists defined their right to protest in the relation to the legal status of the construction site. At the beginning the activists tried to organize a referendum but failed at the very first step – although they collected enough signatures, the local municipal council did not allow them to hold the referendum. Then they were combining street activities such as rallies, protest bike rides and pickets with the legal struggle in the court. They addressed tons of complains to the different levels of authorities, collected signatures to the president, tried to reach Vladislav Tretyak, the deputy of the parliament whose NGO rented the land to OOO “Sport-city”. At the same time, the activist officially declared that they do not communicate with

“Sport-city” itself because they are totally against any commercial buildings in the park and there is nothing to discuss (Mitino, 2017).

Gradually the activists of the initiative group got interested in other issues in the district and started to struggle against many things. *“More activist joined, more problems we got informed about. The whole neighbourhood is full of illegal construction sites, and the grass is cut wrongly and there are reagents and the dangerous waste is stored in the forest and so on”* (Mitino, 2017). Therefore, the same activists formed the organization “Our Mitino” which was supposed to deal not only with the construction in the park but also with all spectrum of the district’s problems.

At the autumn of 2013 they started to organize the Freemarket in the park in order to have the physical platform for communication. This format shown to be very sustainable and even after the group split and collapsed, the Freemarket continued to work and works until today.

The organizational structure and the conflict

The initiative group did not grow up organically from the conflict. It was formed by the activists of the movement ‘For fair elections’ consciously seeking for participation in the district life. Although eventually new people joined the movement, it partly inherited the internal contradictions of the movement ‘For fair elections’.

The first inherited feature was the activists’ intention to unite with any civil and political forces under the motto of “doing positive practices” (Erpileva and Kylaev, 2014). The main idea of the movement “For fair elections” was “all together against the government”(..) and the group “Save the park” applied the same strategy “All together against the shopping mall”. In the different periods Communist Party, party Yabloko (call themselves “united democrats”) and activists of the nationalist movement were involved in the struggle and actively helped the initiative group. All political groups except the party of power United Russia were welcome (MM 2017)

The second inherited feature of former FFE activist was conscious attempt to avoid political conflicts (Erpileva and Kylaev, 2014). The activists inside the initiative group did not try to build common political or ideological subjectivity. Supporters and other locals blamed the activists of the initiative group that they are “liberals” and “opposition” from the very beginning but the activists tried to argue that they are “outside the politics” (фопым митино). At the same time, they felt the need of institutionalization and wanted to mark themselves as a formal actor in urban politics. They told: *“The idea emerged to become an official organization, to register us. Is not it the time to become an official force, to be*

counted?” (MM, 2017). The initiative group focused either on legislative and institutional struggle than on the political contestation. Carine Clément defines this as a movement towards civil activism away from political.

These contradictions eventually resulted in the internal conflict, which led to the total collapse of the group. The conflict was triggered by the criminal case opened against the group. It was intensified by political disagreement appeared because of the Ukrainian crisis and annexation of Crimea. At the beginning of 2014 it became very clear that the activists in the initiative group have completely opposite opinions. The FFE activists were in the strong opposition to the Russian policy in Ukraine while some of the new activists appeared to support it. The conflict was initiated by the latter because the former still followed the idea “All together against the construction” and the strategy of avoiding conflicts inherited from the movement “For fair elections”. *“We would keep silence and continue to collaborate on the neutral topic of the park protection, which is generally outside of politics”* – they told (MM 2017). There were no political discussions before the conflict probably because the FFE activists consciously avoided it and the joined new activists were not interested in the politics up to a certain time. The revolution in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea accelerated a broad patriotic campaign in all official media aimed for the political mobilization of the population loyal to Putin’s regime. So that, the activists of “Save the park” group divided into two parties defined in the official propaganda as “patriots” and “traitors”. At the same time, the criminal case against the initiative group was opened. The “patriots” group blamed the “traitors” in it and insisted that the repression started because of the “traitors” political opposition activities (MM 2017).

In few weeks, the conflict developed to a very aggressive phase. Opinions’ conflict and criminal case together made the atmosphere inside the group unbearable. People, who successfully worked together for many months, became enemies. In April 2014, year after the emergency of the group, the activists officially declared the closure of both “Save the park” and “Our Mitino” initiatives. They spend summer in the conflict about who should keep the Freemarket where both sides engaged militarized groups of activists (Cossacks and nationalists) to make pressure on each other. Eventually leaders of “patriots” group tried to do political carrier and leaders of “traitors group” continued to work on the district’s issues but almost without support.

6.7.2. “For the park Torfyanka”

The movement emerged in 2014 and protest against the construction of the church in the park Torfyanka. the park is located on the outskirts of Moscow in the district Losinoostrovsky. The population of the district is around 82000 people. The specifics of this conflict is that there is the opposite movement for the construction of the church. Because of the violent opposition between the movements the conflict was very well covered both in official and oppositional media.

The project

The project was to build in the park Torfyanka an orthodox church as a part of the program “200 churches” in Moscow. The land is the property of Moscow city and the plot used to be the part of the protected natural area of the park. In 2012 the plot was removed from the park territory, that made legally possible to build it up. Then the plot was given to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) for free use. The building works started in the summer of 2015 but were physically stopped by the locals protesting against the church in the park.

In the autumn of 2015, after violent confrontation between the supporters and the opponents of the church, Moscow authorities provided an alternative plot outside the park. However, until the summer of 2017 the plot in the park was still in the free use of the ROC, was fenced and the church supports hold church services there each Sunday.

The emergency of the movement, participants and motivations

According to Snob magazine (<https://snob.ru/selected/entry/94393>), locals got to know about the plan to build the church in the park in 2013 and tried to challenge it through the court.

In the summer 2015 the construction works started. The appearance of the fence around the plot and arrival of the building machinery launched the protests. *“It all was very spontaneous and nobody believed that it could ran over time. People were coming and discussing that, well, if there is probability that they want to take our land, lets put some tents here and keep eyes on them for sometime”*(MT 2017).

At the beginning, the locals were outraged by the idea to build up the green area in the park (MT 2017, Dudkina, 2015) and by the fact that the decision has been done without them. But very soon they faced the activists of the movement “Sorok Sorokov”(MSS). This is militarized patriotic orthodox organization fighting on the side of the ROC in this kind of conflicts. *“Important role [in mobilization] played the presence of the activists of the MSS. They did the Nazi salute, came with swastikas, told us that Moscow is for Moscovites, something about other nationalities, beat people... I think it was one of the key moments why people took the situation so seriously. We all have good vaccination against*

Nazism”(MT 2017). Finally, the aggressive and offensive behavior of the ROC officials in the relation to anti-church activists forced the sentiments against Russian Orthodox Church in general and patriarch Kirill individually. *“They called us bandits, neopagans, cult followers. It is offensive, I’m an orthodox myself. There was a moment (after half of year) when people started to remove the crosses, saying: that’s all, I’m an atheist now”* (MT 2017). Now the policies of the Russian Orthodox Church is one of the most discussable topic among the activists of the movement.

The movement “For the park Torfyanka!” against the construction of the church was spontaneously formed by the residents of surrounding district. However, political parties and movements also participated from the very beginning. As activist explained: *“Because we all are very indifferent politically, we had no preferences; the main thing was the park. There was no political wars about the parties”* (MT 2017). Communist party, Yabloko, various left political movements participated in the protest and even the party flags in the camp were allowed. The anti-church activists considered parties and politicians as supporters but not as the part of the movement (*“they helped us very well, but they have their own policy. So we can’t demand anything from them and can’t say that [the result] is their achievement”* (MT 2017).

The conflict and communication between the sides

The communication between the opponents of the church on the one side and church’s supporters, public and ROC authorities on the other was happening in the three layers – 1)physically in the park; 2)through the complains, legal opposition in the courts, petitions and documents and 3)in the media.

Both the supporters and the opponents of the church were presented in the park all the time. Anti-church activists tried to physically block the delivery of the construction supplies while the pro-church supporters tried to physically remove anti-church activists from the way of the building machinery. Sometimes the opposition took even more violent forms, for example when MSS activists attacked the camp of anti-church activists. Both groups attended each others events and conducted hot discussions about the park, church and religion. Presented in the park ROC officials tried to avoid the contact with the anti-church activists.

The activists of “For the park!” tried to contact “everybody” who could help them to cancel the project. They wrote to the president, to local authorities, to the patriarch and to the local ROC authorities. Despite of the ignorance from the ROC authorities and offensive public announces made by the patriarch (Konstantinov, 2016, His holiness Patriarch Kirill: we

must not pander to people who hate Holly Cross, 2016), the activist continued to send them collective and individual complains until the moment of the interview (February 2017). At the same time they tried to challenge the construction in the courts and sent tons of complains to the public authorities. The public authorities answered to the complains but preferred not to be involved in the conflict. Police demolished the camp few times and arrested activists but the main physical confrontation was between the anti-church activists and MSS. When at the beginning of the autumn of 2015 the confrontation became critical, the city authorities organized the poll in the online participatory platform “Active citizen”. They suggested three alternative plots for the church outside the park. The plot, which got more votes, was given to the ROC.

At the autumn of 2016 a criminal case was opened. Indefinite range of persons was blamed in the violations of the believers feelings. Special police force went to the apartments of the activists of “For the park Torfyanka” movement early at the morning and made a searches there. The activists and some of members of their families were brought to the investigation committee for the questionings. The whole operation looked very scaring because the police came at 6 am, break opened the doors, was in the masks, armed and behaved aggressively; the activists and some of their relatives went through hours-long searches and questionings. (Zotova, 2016). However, until the current moment (summer of 2017) it did not have for the activists any real consequences.

The opinion of the ROH authorities was mainly presented through the official announces and pro-church publications in the media. Since the conflict in the Torfyanka park was happening in the time of the Ukrainian crisis, any protest was immediately associated by the official propaganda with the Ukrainian revolution. There was a big campaign in the pro-government and religious media against the opponents of the church. The camp in the park Torfyanka was called “anti-church Maidan” (Shubin, 2015; Egorcev, 2015) and the protesters were blamed in using technologies of color revolution (Malosolov, 2015). At the same time, activists of “For the park Torfyanka!” movement used social media to share their protest against the construction and ROH behavior and to blame the activists of MSS and other “orthodox activists” in violence. In the Wikipedia page called “Confrontation in the park Torfyanka” an active edit war has been going since the summer of 2015.

Methods

During the summer of 2015 the main method of the protest against the construction was physical presence. The anti-church activists kept the camp and hold twenty-four-hour alert near the construction site. When the camp was removed by police they moved to the

minibus and continue to be on duty till the moment of interview (February of 2017). At the same time, they unsuccessfully tried to challenge the construction in the court.

The organizational structure, views, ideologies

The group was managed through the network of coordinators responsible for different activities. They communicated with the supporters through the phone, messengers and social media. The decisions were done through discussions in the open meetings in the park. The organizational structure shown to be flexible. When the coordinators were not able to actively participate in the protests, other activists took their responsibilities. As one of the activists told: *"Everybody thought that there were coordinators responsible for different activities. And the main coordinators were shut down [by criminal case]. And we thought that we are decapitated. But no, we are not, it is appeared that people are interchangeable"*(MT 2017). The activists were clearly inspired by the unity and solidarity shown by people around. Many of them didn't expect it and told that *"It is something and not common for our society"*, *"Here is some communist moment in our group, everybody know each other, substitute for one another"* (MT 2017).

The activists spent lot of time together and discussed many issues but the politics was a minor topic. The most discussable issues were related to the Russian Orthodox Church, religion, behavior of the movement "Sorok Sorokov" and "orthodox activists". As Vika Mironova told: *"There were some political disagreements but they always were comparatively minor. Anyway all the discussions, including political, come to the conclusion that the patriarch blame in everything. There is a figure which is unbearable for everybody"*. In the group of the movement in social network "Vkontakte" there is special place to discuss whatever activists want. There are very few political discussions and most of them are about Europe and US. It is clear from these discussions that 1) the activists had very different opinion about Russian political regime and foreign policy; 2) the political discussions were followed the topics promoted by pro-governmental media. On the other side, the topic named "religious dimension" is the most popular among all the discussions.

Some people said to journalist: *"Don't bring politics here. There already was one who compared us with Ukrainian fascists. Normal people would not protest because of politics and would not go against their state. We are here only because of the park"*. Other said: *"There are Ukrainians who aim to build the church here. I love our government. I always knew that Crimea is ours. But there is revolution coming... and it will start from our park because kids have a right to be healthy and have enough oxygen"*. (Blog "Ioda", 2015)

Despite of very different political opinions the activists successfully avoided internal conflicts. *“There were many situations when the opinions were completely opposite but we always managed to find a compromise. Our people are very open and kind. This is very diverse collective here, nothing unite us but “please, leave the park”* (MT, 2017). Official page of the group in Vkontakte declares the same: *“We are against the building in the park but not against the religion. The only one thing which unite us is our park”* (For Torfyanka park (За парк торфянка), n.d.)

6.7.3. Druzhba (“Oborona Levoberezhnogo” – “Defence of Levoberezhny”)

The project

The plot of the land is located in the middle of the Park Druzhba and is belonged to the city of Moscow. There used to be a big glade with grass used by locals to play sports, make picnics and organize events. In 2005 it was decided to build there a heated football field for the sport school as a part of Moscow city invest program “Eleven football fields”(Novosty Rissii (Russian news), 2015). The customer of the field was a public company “Luzhniki”. At the moment of interview (February 2017) more them half of the project was realized.

The emergency of the movement, participants and motivations

The facebook group “Defense of Levoberezhny” emerged in July 2015 when the locals got to know that there are two objects to be build in the park – the football field and the circus. The circus project was later cancelled; the locals reached the agreement with the officials of “Lyzhniki” company that building works will not start until the agreement between locals and company will be reached. However, in the middle of August the building works started. The activists called the supporters through the Facebook and Vkontakte groups to come and block the building machinery. They occupied the construction site, set the camp and started twenty-four-hour alert.

People were outraged by the appropriation of the common space by some company. The glade meant a lot for many of them. They did not believe that the future football field will be accessible for everybody and were dissatisfied that decision about so important place has been done without them. Moreover, locals insisted that if it is possible to build something in the glade, then the whole park could be easily built up. In addition, as one of the activist told: *“One of the aspects that made us angry is that there are five abandoned football fields in 15-minute walk radius. Actually it was senseless claiming of the plot, senseless white washing”*(MD 2017).

The group included locals without any activist experience but also people with such experience, for example former activists of the movement “For fair elections” or people who participated in a mayor campaign of opposition politician Alexey Navalny.

Conflict, communication and methods

During the first months, the opposition on the field was quite violent. The private security organization KOBR safeguarded the construction site. Activists tried to block building machinery and it led to the fights with KOBR. Gradually the people who participated in the fights were becoming more and more radical. *“My position is that call to the police [to stop the construction activities] does not help. Indeed, after we call, they come and arrest us. So we have to fight KOBR the same way they do – beat them”* – told one of the activists.

The activists also tried to challenge construction in the court, collected signatures and sent complains to all kinds of authorities. There were certain violations of the law by the construction company and it gave the activists moral right to block the construction works. The activists’ strategy related to the legal status of the construction – if the construction was legal, activists were less radical and when the court enacted to stop the construction works, they went back to blockage.

The camp was demolished by police few times but activists set it again. It became the place where activists spend time together and organized different events. At the same time, one of them told that *“camp became kind of closed community, it was difficult for new people to join”* (MD, 2017). Activists in the camp either were suspicious or blamed newcomer that he/she didn’t joined earlier. In November of 2015 they decided to take the camp away. One of the explanations is *“When the KOBR came and remained on the construction site I understood that this neighboring will be dangerous. Really dangerous. Because, unfortunately, the majority of the activists were women. And even if there are 1-2-3 man in the camp, they can do nothing if KOBR attacks. It happened in many camps like ours around Moscow.”* (MD, 2017). The activists moved to the car and continued their twenty-four-hour alert. In December they decided that it does not make any sense and stopped the duty.

Finally, when the construction company won the courts and got all the necessary documents the building works continued almost without resistance.

The organizational structure, views, ideologies

The group was organized through the network of coordinators responsible for different activities. The communication inside the group was done through the social media and messengers.

The group was united by their protest against the construction of the football field in the park. One of the activist told that they avoided to discuss politics in the camp: *“Political discussions, it was closed question. It was conscious decision. All the attempts to argue whose is Crimea and things like that were cut out. We could talk about social politics but avoided to touch the topic of the foreign policy. I knew, for example, who has the same position as me so we could talk a little bit somewhere aside. But there was no common discussions”* (MD, 2017). At the same time the activists were quite tolerant to the participation of political parties in the protest. People from Communist party were part of the core group and activists of Yabloko and Parnas supported the protest.

The activists understood that the whole issue has political dimension because decision making is done by the political elites. Part of them made a conclusion that the activists have to collaborate with the authorities. *“It was very hot topic, especially after the confrontation with KOBR when we understood that we are nobody for the political elite. People lost their trust to the authorities. Many people realized that only with political will it is possible to stop the construction. And political will belongs to the party of power. One guy, Stalinist, he supported me very much in this question. He said: well, what can we do, there is no way to solve the problem another way”*(MD, 2017). Another part of the activists had completely opposite opinion. *“It was their fundamental point – no connections with them [party of power]. “This is party of power, they are to blame in what is happening here, how can we do something together”* (MD, 2017). The official page of the movement declares that *“In the conditions, when the power in Moscow and Russia is captured by the crooks and thieves, we hold the fort of Levoberezhny district against the occupants of Uprava, Prefecture and Moscow city hall. This group is open and transparent; there is democracy and this is the place for discussion (except United Russia)”* (Defense of Levoberezhny (Оборона Левобережного), n.d.). It is not clear if this position is inherited from the motto of the movement “For fair elections” but the similarity is obvious.

6.8. BUDAPEST – cases profiles

6.8.1. Ligetvédők

The project

In October of 2015 the Hungarian government approved the master plan for the renovation of the Városliget or the City park in Budapest. Before the land belonged to the 14th district has been conveyed to the city of Budapest. Later the land of park was rented to the private City Park Property Development Company (CPPDC) created specifically for

this project (BL2, 2017). The park is located in the city center and the residents claim that this is the biggest and the oldest public park in the city. (Hopkins, 2016). According to the plan, the sport and leisure infrastructure in the park has to be renewed. Moreover, several new museum building (4 (Spike, 2016a) or 2 (Liget Budapest project, 2017) according to different sources) are to be built in the park. The project was initiated by the national government and is strongly associated to them in media and among the citizens and the activists' protesting against the project (Spike, 2016a; Hopkins, 2016; BL1 2017; BL2 2017).

There were several forums where the citizens could discuss the project but, according to the activists, it was not possible to question the project itself. *"We could discuss everything but not the idea to build museums there. It was decided already. And what, to discuss where to place the running tracks or which color the benches should be? It didn't make any sense"* (BL2, 2017)

The preparations for the construction started on 17th of March of 2016 and triggered the movement against the renovation project. Under the pressure of the movement and media, the building works slowed down and some changes were done in the project. The strategy of the representation of the renovation program also was changed. At the beginning the focus was on the museums. After the protests the construction company declared that the main aim is to renew the park and make it more comfortable for the citizens.

At the moment of interviews (April-June of 2017) the construction company was preparing the construction site; the protest movement was in action and presented in the park.

The emergency of the movement

The Ligetvédők or Park Defenders movement emerged in the spring of 2016, when the real works on the site have started. Previously some activists before participated in the forums with the construction company, collected the signature under the petition against the renovation project and sent complains to the authorities. Then one of them created the "radical group" (BL2, 2017) in Facebook. *"And he wrote that all the steps are done, peaceful demonstrations and petitions didn't work so he is making the team to physically protect the trees if something starts. And I was very happy that eventually something real started"* (BL2, 2017). A month after the workers of the City Park Property Development Company started to cut the trees in the park in order to prepare the construction site. The group of 15-20 activists arrived to stop them and set up the camp to protest the project

(Hopkins, 2016). They occupied the buildings which, according to the renovation project, had to be demolished. This camp existed until the middle summer when police removed it from the construction site. Then the activists set up three other camps near different construction sites around the park. All the camps still existed at the moment of interviews, 16 months after the start of the protest.

Motivations

The activists of Ligetvédők are motivated to participate in the movement by a broad range of things from global issues to the local problems. First, somebody sees this protest as a part of a global movement for people's democracy. In that sense, the protest in the park is considered as a way of citizen's empowerment, symbolic struggle that could show people their power (BL1, 2017). Second, the important common motivation is the disagreement with the undemocratic decision-making ("Stop all this because it's people's property. People have to decide what to do there") (BL1, 2017). Third, the private use of the public land and the potential commercialization and gentrification of the park worried people (BL1, BL2, Kerzhelyi, 2016). Fourthly, people are concerned about environmental issues – decrease of the green area, cutting of the trees and related problems like the air pollution. They wanted to save the park as a green area and did not want to have facilities that would attract there too many people. In the fifth place, one of the very discussable topics is the historical importance of the place and the need to save it as it is. Sixthly, activists protest against the enormous scale of the project, suspect the construction company and officials related to the project in corruption and do not believe that the quality of the final works will be gratifying. As one of the activists stated: *"The biggest problem is that everybody is dilatant. It is clear that even if they start to build here it will be very bad because half of money would be stolen and eventually there will be no money for good realization. Even if it was very good project, anyway it would be necessary to protest because what is built in Hungary nowadays is a shit"* (BL2, 2017). Finally, many people joined the movement after riot clashes with police in the summer of 2015. It attracted a lot of media attention and protesters got a lot of interest and support. *"For us it is something unusual. All the newspaper, all the media started to write about us"* (BL1, 2017). *"Most of these people who came to support us in the summer, came against the aggressive behavior of the government, against the violence"* (BL2, 2017).

So that, the activists of the movement are motivated by different things. However, we can say that they mainly address the issues related to the neoliberal trends in urban development – commercialization and touristification of the park, shrinking green area,

creation of the new attractiveness (modern “museum quarter”) at the place of the old identity (“first public park in Europe”), privatization of public space and role of money and private businesses in decision-making.

Participants and supporters

In both interviews I took as well as in many published interviews the activists insisted that the movement is very diverse in terms of participants. Many of them considered it as “a beautiful thing” (BL1, 2017) and strong side of the movement. There is a big group of the residents who live around and but also people from all over Budapest and even from the surrounding towns. The activists of the other movements also come to support and to share experience. Experts, such as architects and landscape architects, urban planners and engineers are also part of the movement.

Activists told that “many NGO” support them (BL1 2017; BL2 2017). No parties were allowed to join the movement but the politicians joined as regular participants.

Although one of the activist complained that there is almost no independent media in Hungary (BL1 2017), it seems that the Ligetvédők protests was covered by media very well, especially in the period of the violent opposition (BL1 2017; BL2 2017). According to Ipsas, public research institution, 75% of Budapest population were against the erection of new buildings in the park (Hopkins, 2016)

The organizational structure, ideology, internal conflicts

The heterogeneous social composition of the movement inspired many conflicts (BL2, 2017). At the moment of the interviews there were three different protest camps in the park. Since the beginning, there were several conflicts divided the movement into several groups. First, there was a social conflict between “more educated” people and people with lower social status. Group of the “educated activists” insisted that the image of the movement is very important for successful struggle. They argued that participation of the homeless, drunkers and all kinds of declassified people in the protest brings discredits on the movement. So that, the camps were separated. The second conflict was about either the movement should focus on the single issue of the park or consider more general anti-government agenda. It divided the group again (BL2, 2017).

Finally, the Ligetvédők movement has split into several groups fighting the same problem and collaborating mainly in the situations of physical opposition with police or private security company. One group is radical in action, have clear leadership, collaborate with many other movements around Budapest and has broad anti-government agenda. But *“they are so declassified that there are no politicians among them”* (BL2, 2017). Around

20 people form the camp and around 50 people actively support them. The second group is well-educated middle class people, trying to stay apolitical, have horizontal structure and create good image of the Ligetvédők movement. There are around 10 people in the camp and around 50 people who support them. The third camp is organized by ecological organization "Nature" which claim to "protect the nature in all Hungary" (BL2, 2017). Many Ligetvédők activists collaborate with all or some of the groups at the same time and do not define themselves as a part of one of the camps. These activists also form the groups and eventually the whole movement is becoming a complicated network of the activists, groups and camps with conflictual and consensual relationships among them.

According to the activist Gregory Ras (BL1 2017) all the conflicts inside the movement were rather minor and related to the personal issues, ambitions and views. He compared them with the strong political division happening in Hungary in general and concluded that there is not this kind of the division among the activists of Ligetvédők. He told: *"The real conflict is like "we refuse to look at each other as even the members of the same community". [Like in Hungary where] the ones who are against the government think that ones who are support the government are complete idiots. On the other hand, supporters of the government think that we are not even Hungarians, like we are traitor of the country. We don't share anything anymore"*. The conflicts inside the Ligetvédők movement are different, he said. The activists in the park are *"still kind of the same group, so it is not conflict between pro-government or anti-government"*. Olga has different opinion: *"the "educated" group pretend that they are the only one real Park protectors and the others are anarchists, homeless, who are not counted. They even don't talk about them as about people, call them "orks"*". It is clear that more interviews are needed to understand the structure of the movement and the whole spectrum of relationship inside it.

What is clearly unite all the activists in the park, is their disagreement with the renovation project and intention to protect the park as a green area and free and unregulated public space. Since the movement is so diverse and fragmented it is clear that there is no common ideology or identity. Moreover, ideologies and identities are becoming the object of conflicts. However almost all the groups inside the movement did not allowed the parties to join them.

The conflict and communication between the sides

The communication between the government and the construction company on the one side and the Ligetvédők movement on the other side happens now in two dimensions.

First, there is physical confrontation in the park and second, there is opposition in the media.

There were some discussions and round tables about the renovation program at the beginning. But, as it was mentioned above, according to the activists it was possible to discuss only the details and not the project itself. Then the activists did not try to contact the construction company. *"We all are more or less agree on that. What can talk with them about? This company is created specially to build these museums. It is not possible to make an agreement with them not to build the museums"*(BL2 2017).

The active stage of the conflict started after the construction company begin cutting the trees to prepare the site for the building works. The main tool of the protest was a physical presence and resistance. The activists chained themselves to the trees and blocked the building machinery. That forced the clashes with the private security company defended the construction site and with police. Police also arrested the activists and the courts charged them but eventually they win back by court action. The criminal case was opened but was not continued until the moment of interviews. As it was mentioned above, the police's and private guards' violence attracted a lot of attention and support to the Ligetvédők movement.

None of the activists I talked with either other activists in the printed interview told that they protest because the construction is illegal. But they used the law and all kinds of regulations as a tool of the protest. At the beginning they collected signatures and sent complains but then decided that this is *"the closed chapter"*(BL2, 2017). They forced the construction company to follow all kinds of small rules and regulations. *"We use the law against them, that's civilian resistance. Best form of civilian resistance is to be very lawful, like over legal"*- Gregory said (BL1).

The media attention and publications in social media are the main tools for the activists to attract attention and justify the protest. At the same time, the construction company and city administration also use media to advertise the project. They present it as a great improvement of the park for everybody and present protesters as anti-social elements. *"Of course they write that we are drugg-edicted hippies... At their eyes we are communists, traitors (international meaning Jewish, of course but they cannot say it now), they say it like "internationally founded by America.. " (BL1 2017).*

Generally the protest strategy is on the one hand, radical, on the other hand, peaceful. The activists do not avoid confrontation with police and private security organization but try to resist peacefully. Their hold conflictual position in the relation to the development

program and demand the full reversal of the project. They did not reach agreement among themselves on if they should focus on the park or come up with more broad political agenda. So different groups inside the movement followed different strategies. The anti-Ligetvédők campaign in media influenced the internal relationship. Since the media presented the protesters as “declassified elements” homeless, hippies, drunkards and so forth, part of the activists tried to separate themselves from the real “declassified elements” participated in the movement.

6.8.2. FÁK a Rómain

The project

The project side is located along the Danube river in the south of Budapest. This natural waterfront is called Roman coast (Római part) and historically it was a flooded area. The military services and the locals build every flood the temporary dumb to protect the area. The Roman coast is a recreation area with a beach, cafes and bars along it. Since there are few places with natural beaches and greenery along the Danube in Budapest, it became very popular. Mainly boat houses and summer houses located there. Now it is recreational area and it is allowed to build there only recreational buildings.

In 2007 the administration of the district announced the idea to build the dumb along the beach in order to protect the area from the floods. In 2008 the city administration supported the idea and the project was scaled up to the city level. It was argued that the floods are happening more and more often (approximately each 5 years) and the dumb is needed. In 2013 the first plan for the project appeared and was announced in the media. Since the initial plan had some technical mistakes, the new plan was presented in 2016. At the moment of the interview the project was in the process of elaboration.

The mobile dam is to be built along the coast. It consists of two steel walls; each wall is supposed to be 4 meters high. The road between the walls is planned for the bicycles and technical transportation.

The project has a status of “high priority governmental project” that makes all the legal procedures (participation, coordination, finalization and approval) easier and faster for the customer and construction company.

The emergency of the movement

The first protest group in Facebook called “FÁK a Rómain” was created in 2013 after the presentation of the first project. The group was founded by the members of the NGO “City and river”. They organized the first demonstration on the coast. In 2016 with the new

plan the protest group activated again. More people joined, they started to organize demonstrations and events on the coast, collect signatures and send complains to the authorities.

The participants and supporters

The core of the protest movement is people from the NGO “City and water” and the residents of the district. Many experts such as engineers, architects and urban planners support the movement and help with technical expertise. Since the Roman coast is a popular recreation area, there are supporters from all over Budapest. The activists collected 11 thousand signatures under the petition against the project. The group in Facebook has around 20 thousands followers.

The motivations

There are two kinds of motivations shared by the activists. Firstly, they worry about environmental issues and insists that the dumb will destroy the natural coast. The project demands to cut the trees on the both sides ten meters apart of the dumb. The creation of the four-meters-high steel wall along the coast will need some changes in landscaping and could let to the urbanization of the natural area. Secondly, they suspect the district and the city administration on the land speculations. The activists argue that the authorities decided to build the dumb because they target to develop housing projects in the recreation area. They suspect the former mayor of the district in unformal agreements with investment companies and insists that the dumb is to be built in the sake of this new development and not for people. *The proposed dam would only serve to protect a very thin band of largely illegally built structures between Római-part and Királyok útja, something critics have said gives undue privilege to wealthy speculators and investors with interests in the area. According to demonstrators, a more effective dam could be built along the Nánási út/Királyok útja line, further inland from the shore, and save the cultural and natural features of Római-part* (Spike, 2016b). So that, the activists protested against urbanization of the natural area and against nontransparent and speculative market-led urban development. They also claim that the project is non-professional and has many technical mistakes.

The organizational structure, ideology, internal conflicts

There are several groups of activists working closely together. The groups are organized around different methods and different kinds of people. For example, one group unites the families with kids and organize events on the coast. Another group collects signatures and works with the documents; the third group is organized around the NGO “City and water”.

The representatives of the groups meet every week – all together there around 20 activists in the meetings.

The activists *“try to stay as far from politics as possible”*. However, they mentioned that other people consider them anti-governmental because *“in Hungary if you are opposite something, you are automatically related to anti-governmental party. Even if we stay apolitical everyone will stay that we are part of opposition”* (BR 2017). One of the activists assumed that 90% of the movement activists are really against the government but they do not rise this topic among them. *“If we have a meeting, this meeting is about our issues, not very general”* – he told.

They do not collaborate with the political parties but appreciate the efforts of the local politicians to organize a referendum on the issue of the dumb project. In addition, there are some NGO helping the movement such as Greenpeace or “City and water”.

The conflict, methods and communication between the sides

The communication between the sides of the conflict is happening mainly in the legal field. The activists send complains and letters to the authorities and collecting signatures against the project. They also did alternative technical expertise and designed an alternative project. The official media and the authorities are trying to avoid the communication with the movement. The activist told that they communicate mainly with the pro-dumb NGO organized by people who invested in the area. *“Sometimes we have a chance to discuss on radio or studio. They are very aggressive and quite primitive. It’s not easy to fight with them because they are very emotional not rational”*- they said (BR 2017).

6.8.3. Eleven Emlékmű

The memorial “To the victims of the 19 March 1944 German invasion of Hungary”

In 2010 the new-elected Hungarian government carried the new Hungarian constitution. According to it, Hungary lost its sovereignty in 1994 after German invasion, continued to be occupied by Soviet Union after 1945 and got its sovereignty back after free, multi-party elections in 1990.

At the end of 2013 Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjen, acting on behalf of the Hungarian government, assigned a memorial to the “victims of the 19 March 1944 German invasion of Hungary”. The monument was supposed to cost HUF 220 million (USD 1 million) and to be completed and erected in Budapest’s Freedom square by 19

March 2014 – the anniversary of the day of German invasion when, according to the new constitution Hungary lost its sovereignty.

The land is belonged to the 5th district of Budapest. In the city council held on 22 of January, the 5th district assemblymen approved the decision to erect the monument (Nagy, 2014).

Because of the protests from the public the erection of the monument was postponed. It started the next day after the national elections. Despite the protests, the monument was completed in the summer of 2014.

The emergency of the movement against the monument

The public got to know about the decision to build the monument when it was published together with the other bills and decisions of the government at the end of 2013 (BEE1 2017). It immediately attracted attention of the media, public organizations and citizens of Budapest.

Association of Hungarian Jewish Organizations (Mazsihisz) criticized the memorial's statement that only Germany's invasion of Hungary was responsible for Hungarian Jews Holocaust. They insisted to pay more attention to the events led to Holocaust in Hungary such as the 1920 Numerous Clauses laws (Europe's first anti-Jewish laws). They required that any Holocaust memorials recognize the responsibility of the Hungarian government in pre-Holocaust anti-Jewish events.

The controversial nature of the future monument evoked discontent among Hungarian and foreign politicians, organizations and citizens. The first public statements, petitions and demonstrations against the monument started already in January of 2014 (BEE1 2017; Nagy, 2014).

When the building works in Budapest's Freedom square began, people started to come there to protest. During the first three weeks they tried to dissemble the fence around the construction site aiming to occupy it. Then the new stronger fence was erected and the activists continued to protest nearby.

At some point they decided to build another monument in the opposite of the original one (BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017). They called it "living memorial" to counterpoise it to the "dead" official one (Zöldi, 2014). *"Somebody unvented the name – "Living memorial". The memorial, which can do a runner. They would demount it – we would assemble it again"* (BEE1 2017)). The Living Memorial created from the personal things related to the Jewish Holocaust in Hungary, which people brought from the home. The central element of the memorial is two white chairs faced to each other. The main idea of the Living

memorial and the movement emerging around it was the need for the discussion (BEE1 2017; BEE2 2017).

The activists started to organize two kinds of events in the Freedom Square. Firstly, there were traditional rallies and demonstrations against the erection of official memorial. Secondly, the open moderated discussions began. “It was one of the main topic – people were just talking what really was happening. What was happening with my grandmother, how she met my grandfather... there were people who are 90 and older than 90). We were talking about all the pain points of the country and of the city” (BEE1 2017). Gradually rallies turned into lectures and the discussions became more organized. Both types of events are still happening several times each week.

Participants and supporters

According to one of the activists, the core of the movement are people with cultural and intellectual background such as university professors, teachers, theater people and so forth (BEE1 2017). Another activist described the participants as *“people who connected to the tragedy of 1944 and also all honest people”* (BEE2 2017). All the activists mentioned that there are many elderly people attending lectures and discussions organizing by the activists. As Maya explained it: *“... it's just super-interesting for them or there is just no other place they can go and here is so decent community”*.

According to the conducted interviews, published interviews and my observations, the movement and especially the core group is belonged to the well-educated middle-class intellectuals.

The motivations

The main feeling shared by many participants of the movement was their protest against falsification of the history. For some of them, whose relatives were repressed in 1920-1940-s, it was a personal matter. Others were outraged by the simple fact of open lying and adulteration of the facts. The activists also stated that the memorial to the “victims of German invasion of Hungary” is a part of political manipulation aimed to avoid the responsibility of Hungarian government (Maya, 2017; Gabor, 2017). Some of the activists clearly related the erection of the memorial to the whole home policy of the national government: *“their tendency to start everything from the blank page enrages me personally”* (BEE1 2017)

“It was just an elementary indignation. But how long could you keep on it?” –the activist told – *“We wanted the discussion. It's possible to do such a monuments here, because everyone lies to everyone, everyone is against everyone. Lets talk about our*

common past and how the things are going now. It'd not true that people are so antagonistic to each other that they even can't to talk. Lets try, that's was the idea"(BEE2 2017).

The organizational structure, internal conflicts and ideology

Nowadays the movement consists of the two core groups and around 100-200 activists all-together.

The core groups emerged during the first weeks of the protest in Freedom square. The first one included the people who organized rallies and demonstrations and then started to do lectures and other events under the name "Scene of freedom". The second group arranged open moderated discussions and called themselves "Living memorial". At the begging the groups were mixed, different activists participated in different activities and the difference among the groups was only in methods (BEE2 2017).

The split happened because of the political disagreement among the activists. They discussed if the movement should communicate with the far right-wing Hungarian party Jobbick and its members. It happened that the core of "Scene of freedom" group does not accept any communication with any far-right people while the core of "Living memorial" agree to hold a dialog with the people but not with the party. The split made the border between two groups more clear. Before the conflict, many activists and supporters did not even know that there are two different groups inside the movement (BEE1 2017). During the conflict, the activists of the core groups formulated their positions and united according to them. Although the conflict partly ruined the personal relationships inside the movement, the activists of different core groups manage to establish collaborative relationship.

The second important process happened inside the movement in the three years between 2013 and 2017 is the institutionalization. On the one hand, the disagreement about Jobbick made Living Memorial's discussions less open and not for everybody. On the other hand, the core group started to discuss organizational issues separately in the closed chats in social networks and in closed meeting. Some of the activists were disappointed. The activist told: *"I wanted us to be something opposite to the authorities even in terms of structure. But then it became a routine. And we found that we can't talk about everything"* (BEE1 2017)..

The subjects of the discussions also have been changing during the time. At the beginning, the topics were related to the issues of historical remembrance and social responsibility. Then more and more questions were raised (The Living Memorial and the

Szabadsag square resistance, n.d.). At the beginning people talked about more general subjects (“a world order” Maya told) but then moved to the “more real things” (BEE2 2017)

The whole movement is clearly political, both in terms of the content and organization. In lectures, discussions and in private conversations the activist do not avoid any topics. Instead, they try to discuss the most painful and contradictory issues. They focus a lot on the issues of democracy and dictatorship, truth and lay, social and political responsibility, personal responsibility. They did not allowed politicians to join them and eventually did not allowed even the members of Jobbick to participate in open discussions.

Since the movement was political from the beginning, the activists shared the main political and ideological attitudes. *We are considered as a left-wing – Maya told – but things which unite us are obvious. We are the allies; all the divergences are in details* (BEE2 2017).