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“We should learn languages because language is the only thing worth knowing even poorly.”

(Kató Lomb)

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PART I: Theoretical Considerations

1. Introduction

*Words strain
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still.*

(T.S. Eliot 1948: 12)

Throughout their lives, any human being will be confronted with precisely what T.S. Eliot describes in “Burnt Norton”: the complicated nature of word meanings. Specifically, anyone studying foreign languages will realize sooner or later how many new possibilities speaking these languages offers, and how they differ from and resemble their own, native language. For the speaker unskilled it can be difficult to comprehend words of a new system, while upon becoming increasingly more adept, one may learn to appreciate the alternative ways of communicating a new language introduces. One may even come to the realization that certain words in another language do express meanings for which no equivalent exists in one’s native language, that translations are often inaccurate, or that there are meanings which are similar, but not exactly alike.

These observations, and particularly the three issues just enumerated, constitute the incentive for this thesis. It is concerned with the phenomenon underlying the realizations puzzling to the language learner, namely categorization, a fundamental principle of human cognition and a crucial necessity for our existence. It helps organize perception, allows for orientation, and facilitates acting in complex environments. Also, it explains the problems language learners face: categorization can – and does – differ across languages. Within the scope of research on the interrelation between cognition, language, and culture, substantial attention has been devoted not only to linguistic categorization, but also to related issues, such as the debate on (un)translatability and, consequently, linguistic relativity. The questions as to how far the linguistic categories we become acquainted with exert influence on our perception, whether and in how far they differ cross-linguistically, and, as a consequence, whether they have equivalents in other languages are therefore of utmost relevance.

In an attempt to answer these questions, this thesis examines how English and German native speakers linguistically categorize anger-like emotions in their respective first languages, and in a further step how non-native speakers of English, more specifically, students of English as a

foreign language, do so in the foreign language. Moreover, it investigates the role the language students' proficiency levels and their native language plays in foreign language categorization. Finally, it aims at eliciting speaker intuitions regarding the question of translatability, and briefly addresses whether the awareness of semantic non-equivalence between certain concepts may motivate code-switching.

To do so, this thesis is divided into two parts. Part I constitutes a theoretical framework, critically discussing numerous approaches and theories related to linguistic categorization, cross-linguistic variability in categorization, and emotion. Chapter 2 explains the workings of (linguistic) categorization, addresses the nature of word meaning, and describes the system within which linguistic categories are embedded. Chapter 3 focusses on cross-linguistically differing categories: it exemplifies the issue and investigates whether categorization differences impact thought, by briefly discussing the theory of linguistic relativity. Furthermore, it addresses the problem of translatability and compares how native and foreign language categorization differ. Chapter 4 looks at the realm of emotion, both from a general and a linguistic perspective. It outlines peculiarities regarding this field of study, explains how emotional experience can be accessed, and, finally, studies emotion with regards to cross-linguistic differences.

Based on these theoretical considerations, an empirical study was devised and conducted. It consists of two interrelated parts and is presented and analyzed in Part II of this work. Chapter 5 describes the motivations underlying the present research in more detail, introduces the study, and explains how it was operationalized. Chapter 6 answers the question as to how native speakers of German and English categorize anger terms and tests whether it is possible to determine subtle semantic differences between closely related and semantically similar emotion concepts. Chapter 7 is concerned with the question as to how students of English as a foreign language linguistically categorize anger terms in English, and presents the results obtained in the main part of the study. The discussion in chapter 8 interprets the findings, points out limitations, and gives recommendations for further research. Chapter 9, lastly, restates the main insights gained in and conclusions drawn from this research.

2. Finding logic amidst chaos: (linguistic) categorization, concepts, categories

As human beings, in our day-to-day life we are permanently confronted with a myriad of impressions. A student writing a Diploma thesis, for instance, is surrounded by numerous different things: a laptop, pens, books, notes, etc. Not only does one see, but also hear different things, like traffic noises, typing on a keyboard, students skimming through books, or even smell different things, such as the dusty odor of old bookcases. These observations may seem trivial to the reader, a superfluous description of what is obvious to everyone: human beings are able to recognize what their surroundings consist of and can, consequently, name them. In fact, however, the ability to recognize, describe, and distinguish entities from one another is in itself an immense achievement. Without our brains working tirelessly to comprehend what our senses absorb every minute, we would wake up, open our eyes, and be infinitely overwhelmed by what we see and perceive. Without language to think and speak about our impressions of the world, we would be left alone with our experiences and lack a means for communication. Our surroundings would seem chaotic, overwhelming, oppressing. So, seeing it this way, it is quite the achievement that human beings can operate freely and function perfectly in a world which is so full of different entities, smells, noises, etc. The question, then, is: what is it that governs our perception?

2.1. Defining basic terminology

Without the ability to categorize, we would not function at all, either in the physical world or in our social and intellectual lives. An understanding of how we categorize is central to any understanding of how we think and how we function, and therefore central to an understanding of what makes us human (Lakoff 1987: 6).

George Lakoff, in his 1987 publication *Women, fire and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind* provides an explanation for the first question. Alongside other scholars in the fields of linguistics and psychology, he describes the phenomenon which is assumed to be one of humankind's most fundamental cognitive accomplishments and most elementary way of discrimination: categorization (cf. Croft & Cruse 2004: 74; Krumov & Larsen 2013: 167; Taylor 2003: 2; Kay 2004: 60; Labov 1973 [2004]: 68; Lakoff 1987: 5). Krumov and Larsen (2013: 167) consider categorization to be "universal", an activity undertaken in any culture in the world, Kay (2004: 60) claims that it is an ability that human beings are born with, and Taylor (2003: xi) emphasizes that not only humans, but any living being is capable of categorization.

The importance of this phenomenon stems from the fact that categorization comprises the ability to perceive, recognize and assort individually different situations, experiences or entities as examples or instances of one type: a category (cf. Croft & Cruse 2004: 74; Taylor 2003: xiff.;

Smith & Medin 1981: 1; Kay 2004: 60; Radden & Dirven 2007: 3). According to Radden and Dirven (2007: 1), categories are essential components of human thinking and linguistic expression, to which Lakoff (1987: 9) adds that “[w]e have categories for everything we can think about”. Precisely what, then, are categories? Radden and Dirven (2007: 1ff.) point out that “[c]ategories are conceptual units”: they conceptualize groups of entities, situations or experiences which are alike in certain respects. Their formation depends on the community using them: things without relevance or significance to a community are not categorized (ibid.; for an example, see section 4.3.3.1). In accordance with the view of categories as conceptual units, Plag et al. (2009: 149) and Croft and Cruse (2004: 74) consider categories to be abstract products of cognition; they argue that a category should be referred to either as a concept or “a **conceptual category**” [original emphasis]. What, then, is a concept?

Croft and Cruse (2004: 7) explain that a concept is a “unit of meaning”. These units of meaning are made describable by assigning linguistic symbols to them: concepts are labelled with words (ibid.). Aitchison (1994: 41) specifies that concepts constitute a link between words and entities in the world; it is not clear, however, how exactly this takes place. What is known, by contrast, is that concepts are organized according to a certain internal mental structure (Croft & Cruse 2004: 7). This idea dates back to Ferdinand de Saussure, who considered “[l]anguage [...] a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others” (1916 [2011]: 114). In this view, when concepts are seen as relating to other concepts within a larger system, word meanings are suitable for comparison and contrast (cf. Saussure 1916 [2011]: 115; Croft & Cruse 2004: 7). The approach concerned with the analysis of such word relations is called structural semantics (Croft & Cruse 2004: 7).¹

Concepts, however, are not merely organized by means of the relations between them, but also by ties established through experience: when thinking or speaking about a concept, frequently other concepts belonging to the initial one are evoked: the concept LAPTOP, for instance, may evoke related concepts like TYPING, INTERNET, STUDYING, SURFING, etc. (Croft & Cruse 2004: 7). Croft and Cruse (2004: 7f.) name this phenomenon association “in experience”; it has been studied extensively by Fillmore (1982 [2006]: 373, in Croft & Cruse 2004: 8) in what came to be known as “the model of **frame semantics**” [original emphasis]. In the simplest sense, it purports that when a person speaks, their utterances construe a “frame” which enables their conversational partner to understand what is being said; frames hence facilitate communication

¹ For further reference, see Croft and Cruse (2004: 7).

(Croft & Cruse 2004: 8).² Concepts, thus, connect language and reality, and are our minds' "tools" (Croft & Cruse 2004: 74) to structure the environment we live in. The principal function of concepts becomes clear: they "give our world stability" (Smith & Medin 1981: 1). Through language, we acquire access to the abstract ideas formed in our minds and can communicate what we experience in the world.

Building on these ideas, one can now explain what a linguistic category is: a conceptual unit encoded in language for culturally and individually meaningful categories (Radden & Dirven 2007: 1). Taylor (2003: xii) skillfully encapsulates this description by saying that linguistic categorization is "the process by which people, in using language, are categorizing their experience of the world". Radden and Dirven (2007: 4) claim that linguistic categorization is the formulation of one's thoughts in language: only the use of "linguistic signs" makes a conceptual category describable. Their observations resemble Croft and Cruse's (2004: 74) findings about conceptual categories, and it becomes obvious that conceptual and linguistic categories are related to each other, although the exact relation, and the degree of correspondence, is not always clear.

Let us briefly examine two popular examples explaining the phenomenon, mentioned by both Taylor (2003: xii) and Croft and Cruse (2004: 74): the process of understanding and employing linguistic signs to refer to a Border Collie, a Great Dane or a Golden Retriever as the same kind of animal, namely a dog, or to say that crimson, ruby, or scarlet are shades of red, is referred to as (linguistic) categorization. In Taylor's (2003: xi) view, categorization and denomination frequently occur simultaneously: a word's meaning also serves as the name of a conceptual category. Having knowledge of a word and its meaning allows us to understand what instances can or cannot be referred to by that name: we are able to differentiate it from other linguistic categories (Taylor 2003: xif.). Taylor (2003: xii) thus argues that "the study of lexical semantics is the study of categorization" [original emphasis].³

² According to Fillmore (1982 [2006]: 373), a frame is a conceptual system: understanding one concept requires an understanding of the structure at large in which it is embedded. As soon as a concept is used in a conversation, all concepts belonging to the same conceptual system are also evoked (ibid.).

³ Linguistic categorization can also be understood differently: we not only categorize our surroundings, but also "language itself" (Taylor 2003: xii). In fact, our ability to use language to communicate is crucially dependent on the categorization of "language events", i.e. the classification of a variety of distinct sounds as kinds of one phoneme, or of different words as kinds of a lexical category, like ADJECTIVE or ADVERB (ibid.). For further elaborations on this understanding of linguistic categorization, see Taylor (2003: 200-259), Croft and Cruse (2004: 74), or Smith and Medin (1981: 1).

2.2. The importance of (linguistic) categorization and its functions

After having described what (linguistic) categorization is, it is imperative to explain the reasons for which it has developed and to analyze some of its functions. Taylor (2003: xi) claims that the simplest function of categorization is survival: without the ability to categorize, living beings would be unable to recognize what is safe to eat and what not, what is dangerous and what not, nor their conspecifics (which would complicate reproduction severely). Also, he speaks of the uniqueness of situations and entities: whatever we perceive in the world is singular, non-replicable (2003: xi). For that reason, it is crucial to have the ability “to group different entities together as instances of the same kind” (ibid.), or better said, “to see sameness in diversity” (Taylor 2003: xiv). Without this ability, we would be forced to consider and memorize any individual difference we encounter and be overwhelmed and severely impeded in our functioning (cf. Taylor 2003: xiv; Smith & Medin 1981: 1). Taylor (ibid.), Krumov and Larsen (2013: 167) and Radden and Dirven (2007: 3) emphasize that categorization is a means of simplifying and structuring our complex surroundings: it helps us process the manifold impressions we are constantly confronted with and linguistic categories enable us to speak about what we perceive. This suggests that categorization is an integral part of perception (Taylor 2003: xi). Kay (2004: 60) notes that “[d]eep within all of us lurks the urge to classify and categorize”, it is characteristic of all cultures in the world (Krumov & Larsen 2013: 167). Humankind is a species of “categorizing creatures par excellence”: as agents operating in socially and physically demanding settings, categorization is a crucial and indispensable tool providing orientation in the chaotic outside world (Taylor 2003: xi). For the most part, human beings categorize without being consciously aware of it; it occurs automatically (Lakoff 1987: 6). The process of categorization becomes only tangible when problems arise (ibid.): not knowing what something is or, better said, the inability to categorize, results in discomfort (Taylor 2003: xi).

Croft and Cruse (2004: 74) ascribe four specific functions to conceptual categories, two of which will be briefly addressed here.⁴ The first function is termed learning and resembles Taylor’s (2003: xi) argument concerning the non-replicable nature of entities and situations. Croft and Cruse (2004: 74) claim that the inability to replicate past experiences and moments forces us to learn from them. Without conceptual categorization, similar experiences would have to be re-learned with every encounter: relating present to former experiences would be impossible (ibid.).

⁴ The two functions which are disregarded here were either insufficiently described or not entirely relevant for this thesis. For further reference, see Croft and Cruse (2004: 74).

Most importantly, however, Croft and Cruse argue that categorization serves economical purposes (2004: 74). Through categorization, one can retrieve information about an entity not solely on basis of one source, but by examining the relations the individual entity has to larger groups (ibid.). Experiences with individuals have the potential for generalization: parallels to previous experiences with other category members may be discovered (ibid.). This also works the other way around: entities can be identified as category members only by knowing a few criteria qualifying it as such (ibid.). Notably, the verification of category membership comes with more information than only what something is (ibid.). The automaticity of this cognitive process is quite impressive; Taylor (2003: xi) elucidates: apart from the category, also other information about the entity (function, purpose, etc.) is activated. Smith and Medin (1981: 1) specify that after having classified an object as belonging to a category “on the basis of its perceptible attributes,” it is possible to “infer some of its nonperceptible attributes”. They exemplify this idea by saying that after having classified something as an apple based on what is visible (round, red or green), one also knows that it is edible, how it tastes, that it has seeds in it, etc., even though this is not immediately obvious.⁵ Categorization, therefore, economizes the effort needed to determine category membership and to gain further knowledge about concepts through exploiting the network of category relations (cf. also section 2.4.1).

Radden and Dirven (2007: 4) also recognize the importance of category relationships and seem to build on Saussure’s ideas (see section 2.1) when stating that “[t]he special meaning of a linguistic category is defined relative to its neighbouring categories and the system at large, and the introduction of new categories affects other categories”. This means that linguistic categories are organized in a larger system and must be seen in relation to each other to make sense. Section 2.4 examines and explains the internal structure of category systems and the organization of related categories within them.

2.3. Fuzzy boundaries or fixed meanings? A discussion

So far, the discussion of categorization has presented itself as relatively unproblematic, as a way of structuring our perception and a means of mentally “tidying up” the mess we are confronted with in the outside world. What has also been mentioned, however, is that the inability to categorize may foster discomfort in us as “categorizing creatures” (Taylor 2003: xi). It is unsurprising that we may quite frequently stumble upon unclear categories or fail to find a category at all, considering that we perceive far more than what is denoted by words (Radden & Dirven 2007: 5).

⁵ It seems as though frames were evoked: see Fillmore (1982 [2006]: 373ff.).

Radden and Dirven (2007: 5) argue that in fact, “only [...] a very small fraction of our conceptual distinctions” are laid down in language. Also, one and the same linguistic category may frequently designate a variety of concepts, which means that expression through language is inevitably “vague or, to use the technical term, ‘fuzzy’” in nature (ibid.). Along these lines, Croft and Cruse (2004: 75) observe that while former and, to a certain extent, present research on conceptual categories has been more focused on the perspective that categories represent “fixed cognitive entities with stable associations with linguistic expressions”, more recent research in the realms of psychology and linguistics opts for the view that categorization is dynamic: the creation and use of concepts occurs simultaneously. The fixed-meaning versus fuzzy boundaries discussion has received wide attention among linguists (cf. Aitchison 1994; Taylor 2003; Lakoff 1987, and many more). As this thesis is concerned with lexical categories, a brief illustration of the debate on the nature of lexical meanings is vital to the research question formulated in section 5.1.

2.3.1. The classical view: meanings are fixed

Firstly, it will be necessary to elucidate a rather outdated view on categorization, namely the so-called classical view. According to Taylor (2003: 20), the theory is referred to as classical because on the one hand, it originates in “Greek antiquity”, and on the other hand, because it has had a long tradition and prominent status in psychological, philosophical, and linguistic study, particularly in the 1900s. Lakoff (1987: 6) observes that even though the classical theory enjoys considerable prominence, it must be noted that it is not based on solid empiricism. More precisely, he argues that instead of being debated, the view developed based on what he terms “a priori speculation” (ibid.). For a considerable amount of time it was not considered to be a theoretical concept, but rather “an unquestionable, definitional truth” (ibid.). Despite the wide prevalence and high standing of the classical view, the fact that it is based on speculation rather than empirical study indicates that it must become subject to questioning. But what position does it ultimately portray?

Essentially, the classical view purports the idea that word meaning is fixed and stable (Aitchison 1994: 39). An unavoidable starting point for the discussion of this idea is the Aristotelian distinction between the “essential meaning” of things and “accidental facts” (Aitchison 1994: 44). When transferred to linguistic utterances, this means that words consist of two kinds of meanings: the essential meaning defines a word’s “essence”, making it “what it is”, and then there exist “[a]ccidents”, “incidental properties” irrelevant for the identification of a thing (Taylor 2003: 20), which however provide “additional, non-essential information” (Aitchison 1994:

44).⁶ In principle, this suggests that words have a certain unaltered core meaning and are ascribed a variety of attributes additionally describing its meaning.

According to Lakoff (1987: 6), in these early (Aristotelian) times of the classical view, Aristotle's conception of the process of categorization – the essence-vs-accidents distinction – became an accepted view in academia. A category was imagined as an “abstract container”: certain fixed characteristics constituted prerequisites for category membership; if an entity did not fulfil these prerequisites, it was not considered a member of the category (ibid.). Aitchison (1994: 43) refers to Fillmore (1975) when naming this approach the “‘checklist’ theory”. It states that speakers of a language internalize certain “‘criterial attributes’” which allow them to identify whether an entity is a category member or not (ibid.). The name checklist stems from the fact that the processing of these “essential characteristics” resembles mentally checking off items off a list (ibid.). If an entity does not possess the characteristics necessary for category membership, they cannot be checked off the mental list of attributes, meaning that the entity does not qualify as and is not labeled an instance of the category (ibid.). In this view, as Taylor (2003: 21) puts it, category features are not only “binary” but also, do “[c]ategories have clear boundaries”.

Whilst I have suggested that the classical approach is by no means unproblematic, it accords with what Rosch (1978 [2004]: 92) refers to as one of the underlying principles of categorization, namely that by means of minimal cognitive effort, sufficient and maximally useful information should be acquired. Taylor (2003: 35) agrees with this view, and further argues that since the ideas of the classical theory are deeply entrenched in occidental thinking, simply abandoning them is difficult. Moreover, he believes that categories analyzed and used in accordance with the classical view allow us to see what we intuitively perceive as essential to them (ibid.). Aitchison (1994: 43) also notes that the approach, on first sight, seems tempting to human beings: we are accustomed to dictionary entries which are – though not explicitly – also based on lists of attributes.⁷ Taking this into account, the classical theory and its stable categories initially may seem plausible: words have clear meanings and we can easily identify them. Under closer scrutiny, however, it becomes obvious that the approach poses a variety of problematic issues.

It has been argued that a classical category is defined by certain distinctive, binary features with clear boundaries, and that entities need to exhibit said features to become members of said

⁶ Aitchison (1944: 44) proposes that these distinct kinds of meanings are stored apart: the essential meaning is stored in a “linguistic dictionary”, the accidental facts “in an encyclopedia of general knowledge”.

⁷ They are, however, not always entirely comprehensive, as the comparison and analysis of dictionary entries and native speaker intuitions in sections 6.2 and 6.3 demonstrate.

category. How, one might ask, is it possible to know which features constitute a category? Both Taylor (2003: 35) and Aitchison (1994: 43ff.) address this problem. Though Aitchison (1994: 44) admits that it is “enticing” to believe that essential and non-essential meaning can be easily identified and organized separately, she asserts that this approach is only very rarely applicable.⁸ Taylor (2003: 35) argues that knowing which properties pertain to a category is a problem of “epistemological” nature and adds to the discussion that it is difficult to acquire knowledge about further properties of a category in this rigid view. Let us reconsider the example of the apple given in the previous section: on the checklist approach, it would be necessary to verify whether it is edible and to check what it tastes like before being able to establish that the entity in question is indeed an apple. If this were the case, we could not learn from former experience with categorization anymore, and categorization would cease to be a matter of “[c]ognitive economy” (Rosch 1978 [2004]: 92). It follows, therefore, that the classical view is hardly informative (Taylor 2003: 36). Neutralizing these assumptions, Taylor argues that often category definition may be undertaken by experts (cf. Aitchison 1994: 45), allowing access to further knowledge about a category member, and that features may correlate with each other, so certain specifically salient features provide cues which facilitate categorization (Taylor 2003: 36f.).⁹

Still, there remain two problematic issues. One of them is a conceptual problem: categories are made up of categories, and all of them must be defined in terms of their features, which results in an “infinite regress” (Taylor 2003: 37f.). Another one is concerned with the fact that only very few lexical items have the potential to become “classical items” (Taylor 2003: 38); usually, these are words which have been defined by official instances and are used for official purposes: they decide on the features constituting the category and determine clear, unalterable category boundaries (cf. Taylor 2003: 38f.; Aitchison 1994: 43).

2.3.2. Fuzzy boundaries: meanings are loose

More often than not, word meanings are not entirely clear, unchangeable, and separate from each other. Therefore, after having outlined the classical view to categorization, it is necessary to consider contrasting views.

One alternative approach is offered by Langacker (1987: 369), who argues that instead of taking category membership as “a predictable, all-or-nothing affair”, it should be seen as dynamic: it “is commonly a matter of degree, resistant to strict delimitation, and subject to the vicissitudes

⁸ This exact phenomenon is addressed in section 6.4 of the empirical part of this thesis.

⁹ Such salient features exhibit “a high cue validity” regarding a certain category, meaning that one attribute alone may reliably indicate category membership: if something has feathers, it is very likely that one identifies the thing as a bird and concludes that it has “other bird-like properties”, i.e. claws or a beak (Taylor 2003: 36). The co-occurrence of such features is expected, because they are “typically correlated” (Taylor 2003: 37).

of linguistic convention” (Langacker 1987: 369f.). Taylor (2003: xi) similarly argues for a more flexible view: categorization allows for the incorporation of new experiences into one’s prevailing system, category formation is creative, and invention of new ones is not only possible, but sometimes even necessary. Langacker (1987: 369) and Taylor (2003: xi) thus agree that categories are coined by dynamic processes: they evolve and expand, in that they are open to integration of new experiences and change during language use. William Labov, a pioneer in favor of a shift in attention from the classical to an alternative approach towards categorization, quite early on considered words to be “slippery costumers” (1973 [2004]: 67). By that, he means that words meanings evade clear, undefeatable definitions, for they have an inclination for semantic shifts (ibid.). Aitchison (1994: 46) argues that those who support views different from the classical one base their belief in the fluidity of meanings on two grounds: “the ‘fuzzy edge phenomenon’ and the ‘family resemblance syndrome’”.

What at present is referred to as the fuzzy edge phenomenon has become known after Labov conducted experiments proving that it is extremely difficult to precisely determine the end of one word and the beginning of another (Aitchison 1994: 46). Word boundaries are thus blurry rather than clear-cut. In Labov’s experiments, students were shown diverse types of containers, such as bowls, cups, and vases, and asked to categorize and denominate them separately (ibid.). The results of his study demonstrated that this categorization task was not entirely unproblematic and straightforward, as it should have been according to the rules postulated by the classical view (ibid.). While it appeared to be equally clear to the participants that certain instances qualified clearly as cups, bowls, or vases respectively and could therefore be categorized as such entities, substantial difficulties evolved in relation to in-between elements, like for instance a bowl with a handle: decision making was impeded, and the choice of label differed from participant to participant (ibid.). What is interesting about these findings is the inconsistency in the individual participants’ answers (Aitchison 1994: 47). Depending on certain contextual cues, like container contents, the entities were considered more cup- or more bowl-like respectively (ibid.). This provides more evidence for the assumption that meanings are subject to change and withstand unambiguous specification. As has already been mentioned, Radden and Dirven (2007: 5) describe this notion of vagueness in that they argue that the same word may denominate various concepts; in Labov’s experiment, this means that the label *cup* must not unequivocally apply to the concept CUP alone, but depending on context and differing features, the word’s meaning may mutate. The fuzzy edge phenomenon will become particularly relevant in the empirical part of this thesis (see chapter 6).

Further evidence supporting the fuzzy boundary approach is a phenomenon referred to as the family resemblance syndrome (Aitchison 1994: 47). Family resemblances were first studied by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953 [2004]: 41), who introduces and coins this way of describing word relations by the analysis of games: he considers a wide range of different games a family, because even though games lack a common distinguishing characteristic tying them together, they can be grouped on basis of resemblances; they are, somehow, related to one another (Aitchison 1994: 49). Wittgenstein argues that the game family should be considered “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail” (Wittgenstein 1953 [2004]: 41). The family resemblance syndrome developed out of Wittgenstein’s comparison of games to members of families (hence the name): a mother and her daughter may have a similar hair color but be of distinct heights, or a cousin may be as choleric as his uncle but apart from that have nothing in common with him; still, all of them are related to one another and form a family (ibid.). This process of identifying similarities can be applied to other words which do not share a single equal attribute but demonstrate overlap in semantic values (ibid.). Such words, therefore, would defy the checklist viewpoint, as it would be virtually impossible to define a word like game in terms of “necessary conditions” (Aitchison 1994: 45).

Together with the two counterarguments described in section 2.3.1 (the difficulty of defining “a hard core of meaning” and the issue of deciding what qualifies as essential meaning and what as additional (Aitchison 1994: 48f.)), the fuzzy boundary phenomenon and the family resemblance syndrome form the four “insuperable obstacles to the fixed meaning viewpoint” (Aitchison 1994: 49). From this, it can be concluded that instead of having at their disposal fixed meanings with hard boundaries, it is likely that our minds are filled with fuzzy meanings (ibid.), in agreement with Aitchison’s assumption that “[w]ord meanings cannot be pinned down, as if they were dead insects. Instead, they flutter around elusively like live butterflies” (1994: 39f.). The question that remains to be answered, then, is how this “hazy mush of meanings” is organized in our minds (Aitchison 1994: 49).

2.4. Being orderly: Internal structure and organization of category systems

Categories, apart from having the function to structure the outside world, have intrinsic structure. The way in which internal category structure is organized is most usefully explained on a visual level: Figure 1 demonstrates that it is possible to make a distinction between vertical and horizontal dimensions of category systems. (Rosch 1978 [2004]: 93; Taylor 2003: 48).




Figure 1: The two axes of categorization (cf. Taylor 2003: 48)

Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 60) argue that we as speakers can choose “categories on different levels of generality”. This has also been observed by Taylor (2003: 48f.): with reference to Figure 1, he illustrates how diversely one thing may be classified; a KITCHEN CHAIR, for instance, can be referred to as a *kitchen chair*, a *chair*, a *piece of furniture*, and an *artefact* alike: all labels are acceptable. The link between these categories is of hierarchical nature: they are organized in what Rosch (1978 [2004]: 93) names “taxonomies”, systems structuring categories based on “class inclusion”. When “inclusiveness” is the determining force (ibid.), categorization occurs on the – as Taylor (2003: 49) names it – “vertical axis”. An inclusive category thus allows for a wide range of entities to become members and is according to Rosch (1978 [2004]: 93) more abstract than less inclusive ones. Compare, for instance, the categories ARTEFACT and CHAIR: In the ARTEFACT category, membership is very diverse (it comprises all instances of ARTEFACT, like TOOL, FURNITURE, DENTIST’S CHAIR), while the CHAIR-category consists of fewer, more specific items (mainly “individual instances”, i.e. specific types of chairs, which have much in common) (Taylor 2003: 49). Referring back to Figure 1, it becomes apparent that categories are also organized horizontally, where they are subdivided within one level of categorization (Taylor 2003: 49; Rosch 1978 [2004] 93). A dining-room chair, a kitchen chair and a dentist’s chair operate on the same level, and – in principle – exemplify the superordinate category CHAIR (Taylor 2003: 49). The horizontal level is therefore the level of “segmentation” (Rosch 1978 [2004] 93).

The proposition that category structure follows a hierarchical order (cf. Taylor 2003; Rosch 1978 [2004]; Ungerer & Schmid 1996; Radden & Dirven 2007; Croft & Cruse 2004) presents two aspects which deserve of close attention: the special position of the basic level of

categorization on the vertical axis and the effect of prototypes in categorization on the horizontal axis (Rosch 1978 [2004]: 93; Taylor 2003: 49).

2.4.1. Basic level categories

First, we need to address the question as to why the basic level of categorization has a special standing within the hierarchy of categories. As has been proven, it is possible to categorize at different degrees of generality. Croft and Cruse (2004: 82) argue that categories with a higher degree of specificity are “nested within more inclusive ones”, and that one can distinguish three levels of specificity. The level usually receiving most attention is the basic level (Rosch et al. 1976, in Croft & Cruse 2004: 82; Taylor 2003: 50); the other two levels are called superordinate and subordinate level (Croft & Cruse 2004: 82).

Taylor (2003: 50) argues that the basic level is “cognitively and linguistically more salient than the others”, because it is generally used for conceptualization and labelling of entities. It is the level which allows human beings the mental formation of a “clear visual image” (Croft & Cruse 2004: 83): a superordinate category, like FURNITURE, does not evoke clear images (it comprises too many different instances), whereas a basic-level category, like CHAIR, does (cf. Croft & Cruse 2004: 83; Taylor 2003: 50; Radden & Dirven 2007: 9). Similarly, if one is asked to identify a certain entity, the respondent is likely to use the basic level term rather than a sub- or superordinate category term (Taylor 2003: 50f.). An explanation for this might be that terms on the basic level are neutral, and frequently considered “the ‘real’ name of the referent” (Croft & Cruse 2004: 83). Also, they are very common and thus frequently used, short in length, monomorphemic, and acquired early (cf. Taylor 2003: 51; Croft & Cruse 2004: 83; Radden & Dirven 2007: 9). The question, now, is where the special status of this level descends from.

Rosch (1978 [2004]: 93) argues that levels of categorization differ in terms of their usefulness, the basic level being the most useful one. The usefulness of a category is determined by two factors (Rosch 1978 [2004]: 92): (a) “[c]ognitive economy” and (b) “[p]erceived world structure”. So, if a speaker uses a category which is (a) highly informative while simultaneously not requiring immense cognitive effort, and which (b) follows the structure the perceived outside world predetermines (i.e. certain attributes may “co-occur” to form a category, see section 2.3.1), it should, according to Taylor’s (2003) and Rosch’s (1978 [2004]) understanding, usually be a basic level one. Such categories ideally display a maximum number of shared attributes with in-group members and a minimum number of shared attributes with non-members (cf. Rosch 1975, in Taylor 2003: 52). Taylor (2003: 53) concludes that basic level categories should be “maximally distinct, and hence maximally informative” or to put it in Rosch’s words (1978 [2004]: 94), they should “best mirror the correlational structure of the environment”.

Super- and subordinate categories are much more prone to problems. For superordinate categories, it is extremely complicated to find distinguishing attributes which are characteristic of all category members in equal measure (rather, I would argue, they are linked by means of family resemblance); subordinate categories, in turn, are characterized by coinciding meanings: category members possess a multitude of similar attributes and therefore lack level-internal distinctiveness (cf. Rosch 1978 [2004]: 94; Taylor 2003: 52). Taylor (2003: 53) observes, however, that within levels of categories, the attributes shared by category members differ: there appear to be certain members which play a more vital role than others. The centrality of certain category members will now be the concern.

2.4.2. Prototypes

As has been pointed out, on the horizontal axis, categories are segmented (Rosch 1978 [2004]: 93). They appear on one level and function as examples of a higher-order category (Taylor 2003: 49). On the same level, however, not all elements are considered as adhering equally well to the category requirements (Croft & Cruse 2004: 77). In fact, on the basic level, there are certain elements which do so more successfully than others; linguistic categories cluster around what linguists and researchers in other fields alike call prototypes (most notably, Rosch 1987 [2004]; cf. also Croft & Cruse 2004; Taylor 2003; Aitchison 1994, etc.). Several authors (Croft & Cruse 2004: 77; Aitchison 1994: 51; Radden & Dirven 2007: 7) have noted that speakers of a language intuitively consider certain category members to be particularly salient; therefore, they begin to compare their perceptions to said “prototype”, which functions as a point of reference when they are unsure as to how they should categorize an ambiguous entity (Aitchison 1994: 51; Taylor 2003: 45). They do so because a prototype possesses “the attributes most representative of items inside and least representative of items outside the category” (Rosch 1978 [2004]: 93). Generally, numerous scholars agree that a category member is considered a prototype when it (a) is felt to be the best representation of a category, (b) has the most central position within the category, and (c) is unmistakably recognizable as belonging to the category (Croft & Cruse 2004: 77; Aitchison 1994: 51; Rosch 1978 [2004]: 98; Taylor 2003: 45).¹⁰

In contrast to the classical approach to categorization, which is very strict as regards category membership, the prototype theory allows for much more flexibility: categorization is no longer a matter of exclusiveness, requiring a fixed set of features for entities to become members; rather, it enables membership for a wide range of entities and activities (Taylor 2003: 58; Rosch 1978 [2004]: 93; Aitchison 1994: 55). Provided that the entity to be categorized is “a reasonable

¹⁰ Moreover, it has been observed that prototypical instances may be determined by cultural factors, so the inter-cultural understanding of certain prototypes may differ (Taylor 2003: 45).

match” to the prototype, it can be considered a category member (Aitchison 1994: 52). This clarifies why it is possible to categorize almost any kind of entity, also ones which deviate from the norm, ones which are not entirely clear, and previously unknown ones (Aitchison 1994: 55; Taylor 2003: 58).

The first coherent theory on prototypes was presented by Eleanor Rosch and was based on empirical data obtained through a series of experiments conducted in 1975. Rosch interrogated university students of psychology: they were presented with a list containing category names and their supposed members and asked to provide a rating (Rosch 1975: 198). The students had to decide whether the category members constituted good or bad representations of their understanding of the category, assigning numbers to each item using “a 7-point scale” (ibid.). Assigning a low rating to an item meant it was a good fit, a high one that it was not (ibid.). Croft and Cruse (2004: 77) argue that the experiments aimed at determining what they name “[g]raded centrality” or “**Goodness-Of-Exemplar**” [original emphasis]. The results of Rosch’s studies revealed that the students had relatively uniform opinions on the matter: they considered similar instances as the best fit for the category (Rosch 1975: 198; Aitchison 1994: 53). Also, the respondents complied with the task requirements, which indicated that it was a reasonable interrogation: it confirmed the intuition that there are indeed examples of a category which are more representative than others (Rosch 1975: 198; Taylor 2003: 47). This finding is another counterargument refuting the classical theory, according to which membership is not graded (Taylor 2003: 47).

Where prototypes come from, then, is also an interesting question. Taylor (2003: 55f.) argues that the prototype theory has “psychological reality”, but it is unclear according to what qualifications a category member becomes prototypical. Taylor (2003: 55ff.) elicits several possible origins of prototype development¹¹ but settles on the assumption that a prototype is inherently “functional” because it excels in the fulfilment of two factors: it is the category member most widely sharing features with in-category members and the one sharing as few features as possible with non-members (Taylor 2003: 57).

2.5. Concluding remarks

The present chapter constitutes a summary of the basic principles underlying this thesis at an abstract, general level. It describes categories, concepts, and their relationship, outlines what (linguistic) categorization is, names its functions and emphasizes the value of conceptualization and categorization for humankind. Moreover, it discusses the nature of meaning in general:

¹¹ For further reference, see Taylor (2003: 56ff.).

categories frequently overlap, and their boundaries are flexible rather than plainly discernible. Finally, it elucidates that category systems are structured internally, within hierarchical structures, so-called taxonomies. It emphasizes the relevance of the basic level of categorization; terms within this level are most readily used to communicate. Within the basic level, categories are structured around prototypical members, i.e. excellent representatives of the category. So far, categorization has been treated as a phenomenon of human communication and language in general; therefore, the following chapter will take a different approach.

3. Mismatching meanings: a scrutiny of cross-linguistically differing categories

In this chapter, we will turn towards a particularly interesting aspect of this thesis. As the previous chapter did consider examples in English only, it gives no account of the peculiarities which arise when linguistic categories are compared across languages. While a cross-linguistic comparison of categories does complicate the matter even further, it also has the potential to reveal immensely valuable insights into cognition and language in general. Therefore, the following chapter will be concerned with the ways in which categorization differs cross-linguistically, the ties between thinking and linguistic expression, and the question of translatability. In order to do so, it is necessary to briefly discuss what the basis for the development of categories is, as there is no unanimity as to the question of whether categories exist language-independently or whether they are linguistically determined. The first part of this chapter will therefore be concerned with category origins.

3.1. Uncovering category origins: Reality as-a-continuum vs. natural categories

Taylor (2003: xiif.) argues that there exist three well-known approaches with the potential to explain where categories descend from: nominalism, realism, and an alternative orientation, conceptualism.

Nominalism, a relatively radical position, advocates the view that it is linguistic convention which governs category formation: the category name given to a group of entities is the only commonality tying its members together (Taylor 2003: xiii). Their shared denomination is used “simply because that is the linguistic convention” (ibid.). Realism, as the name suggests, is concerned with reality rather than language and vindicates the point of view that categories pre-exist human categorization; they are properties in the world which are language- and user-independent (ibid.). Linguistic formulations to describe such properties are of secondary importance. As a third option, Taylor suggests conceptualism, the understanding that categorization is enabled through the knowledge of mentally mediated concepts and their respective meanings (ibid., see section 2.1).

Taylor (2003: xiii) mentions that conceptualism may exhibit both nominalist and realist traits, and opts for an in-between position: he argues that while our conceptualization of reality may be a mirror image of conventionalized language, developing through observations of how words designating concepts are usually employed, it is equally likely that linguistic categories may be generated differently: they may reflect “actually existing discontinuities in the world, [...] the manner in which human beings interact, in a given culture, with the world, and [...] general cognitive processes of concept formation”, hence they are not crafted arbitrarily. Taylor

explains that the conflicting relationship between these opposing orientations of conceptualism, “convention and motivation”, supports the assumption that cross-linguistically, categories lack “one-to-one correspondence with the categories of another language” (ibid.). Although, he argues, categorization does differ cross-linguistically and exhibits quite some diversity in its encoding, its diverse nature is limited to some extent (ibid.).

In accordance with the approaches presented above, it is crucial to point out another aspect of the discussion, namely whether reality is a continuum or has natural boundaries. The most prominent scholar in this debate, Benjamin Lee Whorf (1940a [2012]: 272), likens our reality to “a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions” which acquires order and logic only when we use our minds and our linguistic knowledge to make sense of it.¹² According to his view, our surroundings are partitioned in compliance with what our native languages predetermine (ibid.). Taylor (2003: 2) elucidates this claim, explaining that this means that categorization depends on how people have learnt to subdivide reality; therefore, he considers “it [...] ultimately a matter of convention”. In consonance with Whorf, Edmund Leach (1964: 34, in Taylor 2003: 2f.) compares language to a “discriminating grid” we become accustomed to utilizing over time and which is predisposed by our linguistic environment: he argues that language enables us to cope with the continuity of our environments through classifying such elements as separate which initially are perceived as continuous. In this view, objective categories are non-existent; rather, linguistic categories determine our perception (Taylor 2003: 2f.).

To a certain extent, this view is attractive. An eighteen-month old baby may be observed during an attempt to make sense of the world: in picture books, it easily labels cars as *car*; simultaneously, however, it overgeneralizes and uses the label *car* also for a toy duck with wheels, recognizing only parts of the whole entity. When pointed out by adults, the baby corrects itself, labelling the duck as *duck*: its perception seems to be “re-directed” by language, the baby is taught how to “correctly” label units of reality. Danziger (2005: 64) agrees with the views here presented, arguing that through categorization, the continuity of our world of phenomena becomes segmented artificially. Interestingly, she further comments that through subdividing reality into these essentially haphazard categories, we as users may become so accustomed to them that they “take on a conceptual life of their own” and are powerful enough to lead us to believe that our surroundings inherently are “objectively discontinuous” (ibid.).

¹² This idea goes back to Saussure (1916 [2011]: 112), who argues that “[w]ithout language, thought is a vague, uncharted nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language”. Language, in his view, constitutes a segmentation of “the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas [...] and the equally vague plane of sounds” (ibid.).

In contrast to the belief that reality is essentially continuous without separations, therefore, much attention has also been devoted to the intuitive conception that there is in fact some sort of objectivity to the world around us and that some parts of it are indeed undeniably separable from others, irrespective of language (Taylor 2003: 3; Danziger 2005: 64). Language, in this view, is a means of naming “preexisting and natural units of reality” which is reminiscent of the above explained notion of realism (Danziger 2005: 64; Taylor 2003: xiii). According to Danziger (2005: 65), cognitive linguists have rigorously criticized this perception, as the views purported by this position are in line with the classical view discussed in section 2.3.1. Danziger (ibid.) names classical categorization “the ‘all-or-nothing’ type” and the denial of a continuous reality “the ‘discontinuity illusion’”. Despite this criticism, Taylor (2003: 3) maintains that not everything we categorize can be considered “learnt cultural artefacts” and points out that we do very well encounter separate units in everyday life which have the potential to constitute categories. This observation does seem plausible, as human beings can distinguish between, for instance, animate and inanimate objects already at a very young age, without having thoroughly learnt a language which could guide their perception. To illustrate this, let us reconsider the example of the eighteen-month old: it can distinguish unequivocally between real dogs and cuddly toys, and one can witness that it reacts much more expressively to a real cat than to a cat in a picture book. Taylor confirms these observations, arguing that language acquisition research has proven young children’s ability to distinguish animate and inanimate entities from one another very clearly (2003: 3).

3.2. Language-specific category differences: some examples

While the argument that “linguistic categories exist independently of the situation of their users – including the particular language learned” (cf. Chomsky 1975, in Danziger 2005: 65) does persist, some authors maintain that meanings are “highly culture-dependent” (Wierzbicka 1992: 21) and that the linguistic encoding of categories differs from culture to culture (Radden & Dirven 2007: 5). Particularly when reality is assumed to be a continuum, the classifications of reality we engage with are most comprehensibly understood as a matter of cultural and linguistic influence.

With reference to this issue, the realm most thoroughly investigated is color, and, according to Taylor (2003: 5), a discussion of this field is an indispensable component of any linguistic work, which is why this topic needs to be discussed in some detail. “[T]he reality-as-a-continuum hypothesis” applies here (Taylor 2003: 3). Taylor refers to Brown and Lenneberg (1954, in Taylor 2003: 3) when he explains that human beings have the capacity to perceive and discern an immense range of distinct colors. What is surprising is the fact that colors are sequenced in

continuity, meaning they gradually merge from one color to another without natural points of subdivision; still, human beings can detect and speak about specific, isolated colors (Taylor 2003: 3). Taylor deduces, thus, that color categories exist because they have been learnt and created through language (ibid.). In addition to this, there is empirical evidence confirming linguistic differences in color categorization: The number of utilized color terms varies from language to language, just like the spectrum of colors designated by linguistic labels does (ibid.). He exemplifies this by referring to Lyons (1968: 56f., in Taylor 2003: 3), who found that speakers of Russian lack an umbrella term for the color blue, but distinguish between lighter and darker shades of blue, consider them as separate and thus encode this linguistically (ibid.). Similarly, there is no direct French translation of the word *brown*; instead of using one term which comprises the color, speakers of French distinguish more finely-grained between brown colors and use several terms to do so (ibid.). This non-correspondence also holds for entire color term clusters (Taylor 2003: 4). What must be noted here is that how and where color is partitioned linguistically into categories is a matter of arbitrariness (Taylor 2003: 5). Taylor even considers the realm of color “an ideal hunting ground for anyone wishing to argue the arbitrariness of linguistic categories” in general (ibid.). Arbitrariness will be commented on in more detail in section 3.4; at present, however, the focus lies on other continuums (ibid.).¹³

Radden and Dirven (2007: 5) demonstrate how categorizations diverge cross-linguistically by examining weather conditions. Just as the color spectrum, weather does not have clear-cut “edges” which allow for an unequivocal, objective classification of different weather phenomena (ibid.). When considering air humidity, for instance, Radden and Dirven (ibid.) argue that “there is an undifferentiated gradual transition from dense fog caused by evaporation to dry haze”. While everyone perceives this continuum and its distinct stages similarly, the linguistic devices used to communicate about them are not only limited, but also vary from language to language (ibid.). Also, the points at which the continuum is segmented differ (ibid.). This is illustrated in Table 1: while German speakers distinguish between two categories of air humidity, *Nebel* and *Dunst*, English and Dutch speakers have three categories at their disposal: *fog*, *mist*, *haze* and *mist*, *nevel*, *waas* respectively (ibid.). In addition, Dutch *mist* turns in to *nevel* more promptly than English *fog* into *mist*, but also Dutch *nevel* becomes *waas* later than English *mist* becomes *haze* (ibid.).

¹³ For instance, Taylor (2003: 5) also considers “length, height, temperature, speed” as continuous phenomena, and, most interestingly for the purpose of this thesis, “even emotions like love, hatred, anger” (see chapter 4).

Table 1: Culture-specific lexical categorizations (cf. Radden & Dirven 2007:5)

weather continuum			
English culture	<i>fog</i>	<i>mist</i>	<i>haze</i>
Dutch culture	<i>mist</i>	<i>nevel</i>	<i>waas</i>
German culture	<i>Nebel</i>		<i>Dunst</i>

In the case of weather conditions, it is plausible to believe that categorization differences such as the ones just presented are simply a result of “the prevailing climatic conditions” which in turn acquire meaningfulness in the respective cultures (Radden & Dirven 2007: 6). Regardless of the source causing differences in categorization, however, German, Dutch, and English speakers must allocate what they perceive to the lexical categories their native languages equip them with, and, thus, are influenced by language in its function as a “conceptual grid” (ibid.).¹⁴

In one respect, the linguistic categorization of air humidity differs from that of color: in contrast to the color continuum, the air humidity continuum could – in some way – be considered as having a “physical basis for [...] demarcation” (Taylor 2007: 3) rather than being entirely arbitrary, in the sense that those stages occurring most commonly in the geographical region a speaker community is located in are more prominent than others, hence worthy of linguistic categorization.¹⁵ Apart from that, however, the linguistic categorization of air humidity is essentially also arbitrary: there is nothing within neither the color, nor the weather continuum that would justify why one should use one or another term to refer to certain points on the continuum (cf. section 3.4). Speakers of German, though their language offers only a twofold linguistic division, are equally capable as speakers of Dutch or English of perceiving three stages of air humidity. Owing to the conventions of their linguistic environment, however, German speakers are inclined to use the categories which in their language have been deemed most relevant (see section 2.1). It is plausible that this – at least to some extent – influences how one’s surroundings are perceived, i.e. guides how one conceives of reality. This however, will be discussed in more detail in the upcoming sections.

An essential remark in this discussion is Radden and Dirven’s (2007: 6) comment that instead of classifying “objective reality”, categorizations of groups of speakers are usually grounded on what they experience and on how they conceive their surroundings, i.e. whatever is more frequent or usual becomes the norm. In principle, this means that individuals always relate what they perceive to themselves and their role in the environment (ibid.). As has been pointed out

¹⁴ This concurs with Leach’s (1964: 34, in Taylor 2003: 2f.) observations on language as a “discriminating grid” (see section 3.1).

¹⁵ The same does not apply to color: it is unlikely that the way colors are encoded, say, in German, stems from the frequency of occurrence in the cultural community.

in the previous pages, Taylor (2003: 3) presents a similar claim, which is based on Whorf's and Leach's research, arguing that it is our native language which biases our view of reality rather than objective, pre-existing categories (see section 3.1). He emphasizes that in this view, categorization is undoubtedly language-specific, and that, therefore, language-specific categorizations of reality have – irrespective of the language used – equal value (Taylor 2003: 3). Radden and Dirven (2007: 5), finally, point out that this peculiarity of linguistic categorization is frequently noted by language learners: studying foreign languages comes with the revelation that foreign and native linguistic categories only appear to comprise the same meanings, when really such meanings frequently differ.

This is a crucial point, and the basic assumption underlying this thesis: when learning foreign languages, speakers become aware of and are sometimes surprised by certain discrepancies between their first and the foreign language. Speakers of various languages can confirm this: upon learning a foreign language, it is very difficult to find words which adequately represent the ideas one could easily name in the first language. After having acquired a high proficiency level, sometimes the reverse is true: one is familiar with the system of the target language, realizes that the words within that system differ from the native system in their semantic content, and as a result it becomes inherently difficult to translate the word back into the first language. The translation of a word frequently does not seem to match the source word. The dissatisfaction of not being able to precisely translate may be grounded on what Taylor (2003: xiii) observes: “categories encoded in one language do not always stand in a one-to-one correspondence with the categories of another language”.

From this, the question emerges whether some concepts, thus, are inherently untranslatable. Before answering this question, however, it will be necessary to briefly address a related issue; one that has also been raised in this section and which is essential to a discussion of translation difficulties: linguistic relativity, or the question as to how language and thought interlace.

3.3. Language, thought, reality: examining linguistic relativity

The issue that has been touched upon in the previous section, namely the intuition that cross-linguistic disparities are somewhat puzzling to the foreign language learner, is also mentioned by Everett (2013: 3).

He elaborates on the difficulty of thought transfer between languages, alongside with the revelation that such transfer is frequently unsatisfying, because inaccurate (Everett 2013: 3). Being “‘lost in translation’”, he argues, is hence not a phrase too far-fetched, for it seems to be grounded on fundamental challenges emerging from the multifarious ways in which thought

can be expressed cross-linguistically (ibid.). Everett exemplifies that, for instance, jokes are virtually impossible to translate, because “the foundational concepts of a humorous interaction cannot be accurately captured in a target language”, at least in most cases: circumscribing what is funny about an utterance is detrimental to its initial intention, i.e. the joke, when explained, “ceases to be funny” (ibid.). The essence of a joke, namely the cue which makes us laugh, seems to be untranslatable, for the words in one language would have to be explained “in terms of a set of others” (ibid.; cf. section 3.4). The problem at stake here is that the translation of the original words lacks “a number of relevant connotations associated with the phrase”, which are sometimes inherent to the culture, or even to the grammar of the source language (ibid.). The question then, is whether one can think a joke – or any utterance, for that matter – in a different language at all (Everett 2013: 4).

Everett (2013: 4) argues that obstacles encountered during translational processes “reflect systematic differences in the way certain semantic domains are encoded in different languages”. Such differences may involve mismatches between semantic categories of different languages, meaning that languages vary in the number of words they have for the same category (ibid.).¹⁶ He reasons that intuitively, besides demonstrating semantic non-uniformity across languages, this may also be an indication of “very different associated patterns of thought” (ibid.); more specifically, these intuitions raise the possibility that differences in the lexica of languages “reflect and reinforce differences in the way speakers conceptualize [...] entities, even in nonlinguistic contexts” (Everett 2013: 7).

The challenges related to meaning transfer between languages hence complies with “the notion of linguistic relativity” (Everett 2013: 8), which essentially portrays the view that “thought patterns or cognition do vary in accordance with people’s languages” (Everett 2013: 1). More simply put, it is “the idea that culture, *through* language, affects the way we think, especially perhaps our classification of the experienced world” [original emphasis] (Gumperz & Levinson 1996a: 1). Lucy (1997: 294) further observes that any type of linguistic relativity involves a conjunction of “three key elements linked in two relations”: language, thought, and reality. According to him, “[l]anguage embodies *an interpretation* of reality and language can *influence* thought about that reality” [original emphasis] (ibid.). Thought patterns influenced by language may involve, amongst others “immediate perception and attention, [...] personal and socio-cultural systems of classification, inference, [...] memory, or aesthetic judgement and creativity”. Judging from the extensive literature available on linguistic relativity, there is reason to

¹⁶ See, for instance, previous chapter, the example on different words for air humidity in three languages. Further examples will be discussed in section 4.3.3.2.

believe that opinions on the matter are not uniform. Everett (2013: 1) even claims that they differ widely, especially when arrived at on basis of intuitive perceptions about the issue.¹⁷

A crucial remark in any discussion about linguistic relativity is that even though translational challenges foster the idea that “there are obstacles to thinking the same exact thoughts while utilizing different languages”, this should not be seen as proof or even clear support for the assumption “that different languages affect how their speakers think in general terms” (Everett 2013: 8). While there does seem to be a relation between these claims, it should be noted that it is not causal, i.e. translational difficulties (alongside with intuitive assumptions on the issue) are not necessarily indexes for differences in thought across languages (ibid.). Lucy (1997: 294) points out that in the 20th century, empirical research on the issue was scarce, if not absent, to which Everett (2013: 1) adds that only the data available in the 21st century was of sufficient quality to be worthy of effective inclusion in the discourse. Lucy (1997: 294) further claims that the lack of empirical research calls for suspicion, as well as considers this a crucial peculiarity characterizing the research on linguistic relativity. Before examining how this problem may be overcome, however, it is vital to briefly discuss the principles underlying the theory as well as its historical development.

3.3.1. Historical development and underlying principles

Determining with certainty when the question whether thought is affected by the language one speaks first emerges is seemingly impossible. Research concerned with finding an answer to it has an equally long history and is characterized by controversy (Everett 2013: 1).¹⁸

In the 19th century, for instance, a now famously known misconception regarding the relationship between language and thought emerged, namely the idea that language and thought are inextricable (Everett 2013: 9). Amongst others, Humboldt purported the view that thought is molded by language, hence concluding that “[t]hought and language are [...] one and inseparable from each other” (1836 [1988]: 54, in Everett 2013: 9). According to this idea, i.e. when language is treated as identical to thought, it is undeniable that language must strongly affect other areas of cognition, and, consequently, that one’s first language determines – and limits – one’s cognitive processes, i.e. thinking (Everett 2013: 9). This position, termed “linguistic determinism”, is the most extreme form of linguistic relativity (Everett 2013: 9; Lucy 1997: 295; cf. Gumperz & Levinson 1996b: 21ff.). It must be decidedly rejected, however, for it would imply that language limits cannot be crossed, and a look beyond one’s native language (perhaps

¹⁷ cf. my observations on foreign language learners in section 3.2, or Everett’s own ideas (2013: 4ff.).

¹⁸ It must be noted here that the following presents a very abridged version of the history of linguistic relativity, only aspects relevant for this thesis will be explained. For more extensive outlines of the roots of the theory, see for instance Everett (2013: 9ff.), Lucy (1997: 293) or Gumperz and Levinson (1996a: 2ff.).

by learning other languages) would be impossible (cf. Wittgenstein 1922, proposition 5.6, in Everett 2013: 9). If this were true, the underlying assumptions and the purpose of this thesis would be missed entirely. Also, it would imply that without language, no thinking can occur, which is an idea clearly to be discarded, considering that cognitive processes are proven to be present in animals as well as in children prior to language acquisition (Everett 2013: 9).¹⁹ In addition, Humboldt considered languages with “inflectional morphologies” as superior, for he associated this with “the cultural or mental advancement of a people” (Everett 2013: 12; Lucy 1997: 294). This claim has been heavily criticized by many, most notably by Franz Boas,²⁰ and consequently by Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, for it suggested that because of their language, some cultures were mentally and culturally more advanced than others, ignoring the complexity of structural systems used by, for instance, indigenous peoples (ibid.).

The early 1900s were formative years for the theory of linguistic relativity (Lucy 1997: 293): Whorf, inspired by and building on the work of his mentor Sapir,²¹ was the first scholar to sketch “a coherent treatise on the effects of linguistic differences on thought” (Everett 2013: 10). Therefore, though the linguistic relativity hypothesis is heavily tinted by findings traceable to numerous other researchers (Everett 2013: 10f.), Whorf could be – tentatively – considered the “founding father” of the linguistic relativity hypothesis. This explains why it is often also called “‘Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’” or even “‘Whorf hypothesis’” (Everett 2013: 10). The following oft-cited paragraph encapsulates Whorf’s (1940b [2012]: 282f.) definition of the principle:

From this fact proceeds what I have called the ‘linguistic relativity principle,’ which means, in informal terms, that users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world.

Everett (2013: 14) claims that Whorf’s ideas have at times been confused with the restricted notion of linguistic determinism and suggests that it is necessary to read his work in context, rather than in isolation. The general idea, he argues, is that the language differences fostering variation “in nonlinguistic cognition [...] are not necessarily impossible to overcome” (ibid.). This crucial point will be briefly commented on in sections 3.5 and 3.6.

¹⁹ See also Vygotsky (1987: 210); he considers the relationship between language and thought “not a prerequisite for, but rather a product of, the historical development of human consciousness”.

²⁰ “the founder of American anthropology”, see Everett (2013: 11).

²¹ For an elaboration on Sapir’s ideas, see Everett (2013: 11ff).

While the assumption that thought and language are identical may be dismissed, it is equally doubtful to claim that “that language and thought are completely dissociable” (Everett 2013: 9; cf. Vygotsky 1987: 211). If this were the case, my research, and research on linguistic relativity in general would be pointless, as it hinges upon precisely the idea that there is indeed a meaningful interrelation between the two. The interrelation between thought and speech, however, is complex: “Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into existence through them” (Vygotsky 1987: 218). Everett (2013: 30) specifies that “some thought”, rather than the entirety of it, emerges from language. “Words [...] are not simply mapped on to antecedent concepts” but rather, he claims, “they are tools”, facilitating and assisting us in “thinking about concepts” (ibid.).²² Consider, for instance, science (the field of linguistics, to be precise): Everett maintains that there is a correlation between “[t]he expansion of scientific knowledge” and “lexical expansion” (ibid.). Becoming acquainted with, say, the compound noun *linguistic relativity* can help a novel researcher in the field “think [...] in new ways”, i.e. widen their perception through a combination of concepts (ibid.). As Everett adequately puts it, “we could not think in all the ways we do without language” (ibid.).

After having examined the groundwork relating to linguistic relativity, let us now turn to some popular points of criticism and the contemporary understanding of the theory.

3.3.2. Criticism, state of the art, and methodological concerns

While Whorf’s perspective enjoyed wide popularity and had deep impact on subsequent work on the issue (Everett 2013: 12), it must be stressed that present research on linguistic relativity exhibits substantial discrepancies when compared to former approaches (Everett 2013: 18f.).

The contemporary tendency to deviate from Whorf’s ideas is most likely a result of the methodological shortcomings his work displays (Everett 2013: 19ff.). Consider, for instance, that much of Whorf’s work is famously associated with his comparison of words for snow in Eskimo and English (Everett 2013: 15). On basis of linguistic evidence alone, Whorf “makes claims about Eskimo nonlinguistic cognition”, i.e. he argues that speakers of Eskimo, because they segment the semantic field of snow in a more differentiated way than English speakers do, perceive snow differently: they have “greater perceptual refinement” (Everett 2013: 15f.). As Whorf does not provide evidence “beyond the linguistic data”, his claims remain unproven; they are “patently circular” (Everett 2013: 23). Moreover, anecdotal data of the type Whorf provides is insufficient to demonstrate effects of language on nonlinguistic cognition, because (a) it is subject to “confirmation bias”, for it is not collected in a systematic, objective way and

²² This observation, together with the observation made in section 2.1 (concepts as tools) indicate that aspects of cognition and language are in interaction.

is possibly only selected because it lends support to one's assumptions on the topic (deliberately or coincidentally) (Everett 2013: 23f.) and (b) it stems – sometimes – from exaggerated accounts of cross-linguistic differences, which was also the case in Whorf's Eskimo example, and results in data distortion (Everett 2013: 25).

Taking these points of criticism into account, it is important to point out that current ideas on the subject do not operate in a Whorfian vein (Everett 2013: 29). Contemporary research, according to Everett, interprets linguistic relativity as the idea that “crosslinguistic differences have *any* demonstrable effects on nonlinguistic cognition” [original emphasis] (cf. Lucy 1997: 295, in Everett 2013: 22). Formulations of the theory are subject to change, varying in conformity with developing research and new insights into “the strength and pervasiveness, or lack thereof, of relativistic effects” (Everett 2013: 22). Everett (2013: 64) also argues that it is essential to conduct not only “detailed linguistic fieldwork”, but also to employ “experimental tools” to investigate instances of linguistic relativity. It may precisely be this dichotomy between linguistic and experimental methods which hindered the emergence of quality empirical evidence in previous centuries: linguists are acquainted with language description methods, psychologists with experiments inquiring the mechanisms of human cognition, but neither linguists nor psychologists are proficient in the use of methods descending from and employed in the respective other field of study (Everett 2013: 64f.). Method sharing is only now becoming popular, allowing for “cross-disciplinary interaction” and “serious inquiries into linguistic relativity” (Everett 2013: 65).

How, then, are these methods synthesized to attain evidence for relativistic effects? Everett (2013: 65) explains that first, linguistic fieldwork to discover explicit cross-linguistic disparities should be undertaken. The next step is usually to hypothesize which effects on nonlinguistic cognition could emerge from the evidence (Everett 2013: 66). A nonlinguistic experimental task is then administered to the sample representing the linguistic communities under investigation, to confirm or refute the hypotheses; such tasks could be – amongst others – “reaction-time tasks” or “tests of recall” (ibid.). Finally, statistical analysis of the quantified results must be conducted: if the difference between the results of the populations in question exhibits statistical significance, it is possible to deduce “that the previously established linguistic disparity may in fact influence nonlinguistic cognition” (ibid.). Still, further research may be necessary to corroborate the evidence (ibid.). It is upon the researcher to validate their own claims after having thoroughly scrutinized other explanations for the correlation between linguistic

differences and differences in thought (ibid.):²³ “confounding issues [...] must be addressed” (Everett 2013: 70).

Though it would be interesting to scrutinize the evidence confirming relativistic effects, this extends the scope of this thesis: the reader is referred to Everett (2013: 72-265), who presents numerous studies on the subject. It is important to note, however, that cross-linguistic differences between languages should not automatically be considered as causally related to differences in thought; other sources may also have influence on how people of different linguistic communities think (Everett 2013: 8). The role of empirical evidence is hence crucial to any inquiry into the field of linguistic relativity. Despite all this, we will now return to the issue which inspired this section, namely the difficulty of thought transfer across languages, and the question whether there are thoughts – or concepts – which are untranslatable.

3.4. Are certain concepts inherently untranslatable?

Both Robert L. Politzer (1956) and Artemij Keidan (2015) make some interesting points regarding the question of translatability. In their discussion, both authors refer to Ferdinand de Saussure and his understanding of the arbitrary nature of linguistic signs (Politzer 1956: 319; Keidan 2015: 636).

In the field of linguistics, it is widely accepted that “[t]he bond between the signifier and the signified [of a linguistic sign] is arbitrary” (Saussure 1916 [2011]: 67); concepts or things do not contain any inherent ties which determine their names (Saussure 1916 [2011]: 67; Politzer 1956: 319).²⁴ Saussure argues that the fact that across languages the same signifieds (concepts) are assigned differing signifiers (sound-images) is proof of this arbitrariness (1916 [2011]: 68; cf. Keidan 2015: 636). According to Keidan (2015: 636), it is the reason why “[l]anguages sound different”. In addition to this, he argues that words across languages do not only differ in terms of phonology, “but they also [...] mean different things” (ibid.). More precisely, he speaks of “meaning boundaries” (ibid.), which is in line with Radden and Dirven’s exemplification of how variedly speakers of different languages divide the weather continuum (see section 3.2): Keidan (2015: 636) observes “that different languages can have unpredictably different and cross-linguistically mismatching lexical meanings”. He concludes that this is due to “their semantic and structural anisomorphism”, meaning that the semantic content of a word changes its shape in accordance with the language spoken (ibid.). Therefore, he argues, translation is so

²³ See Everett (2013: 25): it might, for instance, be the case that “the linguistic and cognitive data are consistent because of a more general cultural factor”.

²⁴ The terms “*signified*” and “*signifier*” [both original emphasis] are the Saussurian notions for “concept” and “sound-image” (see Saussure 1916 [2011]: 66f.).

challenging: it is not “a simple permutation of signifiers between signs with the same signified”; rather, he argues, “the ‘same signified’” is non-existent, which is why “finding in the target language a word that exactly matches the meaning of a given word in the source language is quite unlikely in practice” (ibid.). In line with this argument, Politzer (1956: 319) even goes as far as saying that it is not only highly unrealistic to assume, but also “from the theoretical point of view impossible [...] that two signs of different linguistic systems should ever have the same Value”. Said “Value” is what emerges when considering the linguistic sign as part of a larger system and is only preserved when viewed within that system (ibid.; see section 2.1). He also observes that even though two cross-linguistically differing signs can never be identical, “they can be put to the same specific uses” (ibid.). Moreover, he argues that while certain expressions may potentially signify similar things cross-linguistically, they differ on the associative and imaginative level (Politzer 1956: 320).

Undoubtedly, successful communication between speakers of different languages is possible, and understanding translated versions of films or books poses no problems to us. What is problematic, though, is that many translators have difficulty “conveying in their target language each and every meaning inherent to their source text” (Keidan 2015: 635).²⁵ Politzer (1956: 319) agrees, mentioning that it is extremely challenging to completely translate a source text: “an intranslatable [sic] residue” always remains, irrespective of the quality of the translation. Rather than aiming at hyper-precision, translation is about “achieving a satisfying degree of translational equivalence”: it is mostly a matter of approximation (Keidan 2015: 635). Keidan claims that translating successfully is, to a great extent, dependent on a “key element” which he considers “the equivalence of what is *unsaid*” [original emphasis] (ibid.). The accurate transfer of the literal wording of a source text is thus no longer the only requirement for a translation to be deemed successful; rather, it is just as (if not more) important that other aspects of the message are also conveyed accurately (ibid.). The *unsaid*, according to Keidan, is “every non-trivial component of a message besides those that are stated by its literal wording”,²⁶ whereas “*what is said*” [original emphasis] is argued to be merely “the content preserved throughout the process of translation” (though he admits this definition may be too narrow) (ibid.). In relation to this, I would argue that it is possible that *the unsaid* may concur precisely with what Politzer names the “intranslatable [sic] residue” (1956: 319), so, if done poorly, parts of *the unsaid* disappear during the process of translation. Instead of rigidly insisting on verbatim translations,

²⁵ This difficulty has been present “[f]or millennia” among “believers of various faiths”: translating scriptures is extremely time-consuming, difficult, and rarely loss-less (Everett 2013: 7).

²⁶ Such components could be the humorous content of a joke, or connotations evoked by a word or phrase (cf. Everett 2013: 3).

it seems more reasonable to focus on *the unsaid* and translate in a way that the meaningfulness of a text is preserved (Keidan 2015: 635f.).

Having established that certain bits of information go missing when translation takes place because meanings are never completely alike, the focus now lies on these subtle meaning differences complicating translation. Politzer (1956: 321) mentions that frequently difficulties when translating emerge out of miniscule, barely palpable and culturally determined disparities. According to him, it is the speakers' familiarity with the target culture which determines whether such subtleties are recognized or not (ibid.). Translational limitations, therefore, "underline the intimate and inevitable tie between culture and language study" (ibid.). Culture study is as important for students of a new language as language study itself, since without proper cultural knowledge, they disregard the surrounding environment language is embedded in (ibid.). In this way, language learning eventually becomes manipulation: it is a mere medium to administer "symbols without meanings" and, as a result, language learners frequently misarrange meanings (ibid.). This way of using the foreign language as a tool, perhaps at times still alien to the user unfamiliar with the culture, can be observed specifically when examining the writing of basic to intermediate level students. Such students – it could be assumed – appear to still think and categorize according to their native language: unknown foreign words are simply substituted with a translation fit for their purposes. In the way non-native speakers use them, these words can be likened to empty shells: they serve merely as a means of bypassing difficulties in communication, and their full meaning is not yet grasped entirely. Frequently, what are assumed to be equivalents are incorrect or do not match the context. This concurs with Politzer's observations about assigning "wrong meanings" (1956: 321). He goes on to say that linguistic study is essential to cultural study, because when words are difficult or impossible to translate, they are cues to "important cultural differences" (ibid.). In general, Politzer considers "the study of culture [...] an integral and necessary part of the study of language" (ibid.).

Finally, he concludes that it is important particularly in the realm of pedagogy to raise awareness about the potential of foreign language learning to provide learners with novel truths and to disclose "a completely new way of looking at already familiar facts" (Politzer 1956: 322). If a learner of a foreign language understands this and abandons the idea that using a new language is simply another, unproblematic way of communicating already known contents through applying "a new set of symbols" to them, learning foreign languages acquires utmost importance (ibid.). The last section of this chapter will be concerned with precisely this aspect.

3.5. Native language influence and categorization in the foreign language

With reference to the cross-linguistic differences in the categorization of, for instance, color, Deutscher (2014: 170) emphasizes the “Macht der Gewohnheit [power of habits]”. He argues that the language we grow up with and the speaking habits we become accustomed to over time are immensely powerful (ibid.). As we use, hear, and practice our native language innumerable times, we internalize it in speaking habits which guide and influence us automatically (Deutscher 2014: 170f.).

Our native language, for we are in contact with it as soon as we are born, plays a special role in coining our perception of naturalness, makes us susceptible to specific aspects of our perception and experience and affects our associative linkages (Deutscher 2014: 171). Littlemore (2009: 14) mentions similar cognitive processes which are influenced by our native languages. With regards to categorization, she maintains that frequently one considers those categories as most logical and plausible which one has acquired first, when in reality – as I have established above – they are characterized by arbitrariness and subjectivity (Littlemore 2009: 27). While our native language – because we are born with it, and because we are constantly exposed to it – may have special standing, it does not constitute “ein Gefängnis [a prison]” (Deutscher 2014: 170) to our perception: as has been similarly mentioned in section 3.3.1 above, it is unreasonable to believe that “speakers are incapable of loosing [sic] the linguistic handcuffs placed upon them during infancy” (Everett 2013: 14). Rather than forcing us “to *think about* phenomena in a certain way” [original emphasis], the language we speak leads us “to focus on, and *present* information in certain ways” [original emphasis] (Littlemore 2009: 14).

Learning further languages, thus, entails grasping that categorization differs cross-linguistically, comprehending the mechanisms of the new, foreign system of categorization and contrasting it with the native system (ibid.). Also, the confrontation with a foreign categorization system makes it imperative for a language learner to rethink and eventually modify their native ways of categorizing (Littlemore 2009: 27f.). Initially, it may be difficult to become attuned to new forms of categorizing: Deutscher (2014: 170) likens the acquisition of our native speaking habits to car driving, which is highly complex when one is still unskilled, but becomes unproblematic and unconscious at last. The training we undergo when learning our native language begins when we are born, and the unconsciousness and automaticity of it are therefore not to be underestimated (Deutscher 2014: 170f.). Foreign language learning, naturally, is given less attention, and is thus more easily prone to difficulties.

3.6. Concluding remarks

As has become clear in this chapter, while our native language habits may determine what we perceive as most natural, they do not in themselves constitute a barrier to understanding ideas which are not encoded linguistically in our own language (cf. Deutscher 2014: 170; Wierzbicka 1992: 123; Keidan 2015: 637). For instance, speakers of languages which lack a differentiation between two color terms can still see both colors regardless (Deutscher 2014: 170). Likewise, speakers can “discern between past, present and future” even though their native language is devoid of the category TENSE entirely (Keidan 2015: 637). The same is true of the above-mentioned cross-linguistically differing segmentations of the weather continuum: everyone can see and perceive all states, they are simply categorized differently in different languages. Through observation and learning, categories of other languages may be recognized and eventually comprehended. If this were not the case, this paper would be redundant, as it argues for a certain flexibility regarding the influence of language on thought: it presumes that human beings are not enslaved to the constraints of their native languages (which undoubtedly do exert some influence upon them, as empirical evidence demonstrates), but that learning new languages may allow them to extend their perception of the world.

After having scrutinized the way in which categories come about, cross-linguistic categorization differences, the relationship between language and thought, the problematic issue of category translatability, and the special role of a speaker’s first language with regards to categorization in the foreign language, in the following chapter, we will examine how these approaches and theories apply to a specific domain: emotion.

4. Emotion, language, and categorization

The domain of emotion is interesting in equal measures with regards to linguistic categorization, translatability, and cross-linguistic study. The present chapter provides insights into the realm of emotion in general, explains the relationship between emotion and language, and examines how emotions can be categorized linguistically. Most importantly, however, this chapter aims at emphasizing the cross-linguistic variability emotion conceptualization exhibits. To begin with, it is crucial to define what emotion is, and to outline several issues related to this field of study.

4.1. What is emotion? An attempt at definition

Defining emotion is, in principle, as complicated as defining meanings. Both emotions and meanings are not concrete, visible objects: they “cannot be pinned down”, as Aitchison (1994: 39) puts it; rather, both emotion and meanings are abstract, impalpable phenomena of human experience. What makes the realm of emotions particularly difficult to pin down is that emotional experiences are not entirely under our control: we cannot consciously decide to feel in one way or another, or to have a particular emotion in a particular situation. One thing that can be stated as a fact, however, is that everyone has emotions.

Athanasiadou and Tabakowska (1998: xi) assert that “[e]motions are a crucial element of human existence”. To this, Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988 [1999]: 3) add that “[e]motion is one of the most central and pervasive aspects of human experience”: like categorization, emotion is thus something fundamental to human beings, something they engage with daily. Solomon (1995: 257) even maintains that “[e]motions [...] are at the very heart of that [our] experience” and claims that they “are culturally taught, cognitively framed, but implemented by the individual” (1995: 276). In our lives, we constantly experience things that evoke emotional reactions within us; we feel that some of them are stronger, some less intense. What these different emotional responses do, however, seem to have in common is that they come and go; as the word already suggests, emotions are in motion: they are not permanent conditions which are easily detected, labelled, and explained. Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 2) confirm this intuition and claim that “[e]motions are among the least tangible aspects of human experience, yet they exert powerful influences upon our thoughts and actions, and even upon our physical appearance and physiological processes occurring within our bodies”. This has also been observed by Athanasiadou and Tabakowska (1998: xi), who similarly argue that emotions are experienced both physically and psychologically. Solomon (1995: 257) adds that emotions are “determining our focus, influencing our interests, defining the dimensions of our world”. Though

abstract and difficult to study, emotions are thus of crucial importance to human life and experience.

A further complication in the definition of emotion is that “an emotional feeling is [...] internal to the experience of the person who has it” (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 2), or as Solomon (1995: 276) puts it, “implemented by the individual”. This fact constitutes an obstacle to a direct access and observation of the essence of emotion; as such, we cannot simply assume that a particular emotional experience should ever be the same or even similar for two people “in the same or some other situation” (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 2). Solomon (1995: 255) agrees that emotions are characterized by subjectivity, they develop mentally. He also mentions that one merely has direct access to one’s own emotions, the emotions other persons experience can never be directly monitored (Solomon 1995: 256). But despite having access to our own emotions, it sometimes even proves difficult for oneself to identify what exactly it is that one feels.²⁷ Solomon (ibid.) concludes that “this inaccessibility of others’ emotions, contrasted with the immediate accessibility we have to our own, presents something of a philosophical puzzle”.

In addition to the essentially individual and abstract character of emotion and the impossibility to gain unmediated insight into the inner workings of others, it is crucial to also mention the role context and situation plays in this discussion. According to Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 2), one and the same context has the potential to provoke manifold distinct emotional reactions among different individuals. Let us examine a situation in which this holds true. Imagine three people scheduling a meeting at a specific time, to which one person arrives ten minutes too late. While person A sympathizes with the latecomer, person B gets extremely irritated by this behavior. In the exact same event thus, one individual experiences anger-like feelings, while the other one is bothered only peripherally and is essentially indifferent towards the issue. In addition to this, people react differently even regardless of what “social or cultural expectation” prescribes (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 2). So, in the situation described, Western cultural norms would, in principle, expect all three individuals to be punctual, and to consider this behavior laudable and worth striving for. Still, person A and person B react differently, which may be a result of their individual attitudes towards the proposed situation: A usually also tends to be late for appointments, and B is generally always on time. Their reaction, therefore, is essentially individual, rather than adhering to cultural norms.²⁸

²⁷ It seems plausible to assume, then, that through assigning linguistic labels to emotional experiences, this impalpable phenomenon may acquire form. This, however, will be the concern of the next section.

²⁸ Also, it may be determined by the relationships between A, B, and the latecomer.

What must further be noted is that generally, people are not always consistent in their own emotional responses either (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 2): while person A may be tolerant of the latecomer's unpunctuality on one day, they may react impatiently or even angrily on another day, for reasons undefined. It can be concluded that emotional reactions differ from person to person, according to context, and even person-internally, and that, therefore, they "cannot be defined purely in terms of situation, context, or eliciting conditions" (cf. Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 2).

4.2. Understanding and accessing emotional experiences

Though it is impossible to gain immediate access to the emotions of others (Solomon 1995: 256), we do have two means of interpreting their emotional responses. Human beings have the capacity "not only [...] to *feel* emotions but also to *express* emotions, and to *speak* of emotions" [original emphasis] (Athanasiadou & Tabakowska 1998: xi). Knowledge about emotions can only be attained by examining the latter two externalizations. Therefore, as Solomon suggests, the first way emotions may be interpreted is through attentive observation of the non-linguistic emotional reactions of those around us (Solomon 1995: 256).

4.2.1. Observing paralinguistic features

Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 2) elucidate in a similar way that enhanced understanding and access to emotions is enabled through "[e]xamining the outward manifestations of facial expression and measurable physiological responses". The problem here is the variability in the "observable displays of emotion", which is determined by a range of factors (ibid.). As has been elucidated in section 4.1, this means that the same emotion may manifest itself differently in various situations (ibid.): a grieving person, for instance, can display their sadness silently in some context, they may even appear indifferent to an observer; in a different context, however, the same person may cry, moan, and visibly express their distress. Here, again, socially and culturally determined rules of conduct may indeed influence the emotional behavior of people, in that they contain the manifestation of their emotions to avoid conflict or embarrassment (ibid.). As a matter of fact, it is frequently the case that such contained emotional experiences are noticed only after their occurrence, once they are put into words (ibid.).

Fussell (2002: 2), in a similar vein, addresses "nonverbal and paralinguistic mechanisms to express emotion," such as "facial expressions, gestures, posture, tone of voice, and the like". Although she ascribes a certain importance to them, she argues that "paralinguistic and nonverbal channels [...] are insufficient for expressing the full range of human emotional experiences for several reasons" (ibid.). She argues, for example, that non-linguistic emotional responses allow us to draw conclusions about the "general class of emotions a person is feeling"; it is

impossible, however, to acquire any deeper knowledge necessary to understand the situation (ibid.). The tears of a crying person, for instance, may be an indicator for the person's sadness, but what we do not know are the "cognitions that go along with the sadness [...] or the circumstances that lead up to feeling sad": the precise nature of the emotion remains unclear (ibid.). Considering this, the crying person's tears may just as well be tears of joy, they may cry out of exhaustion, or perhaps even for no definite reason at all (again, see section 4.1). Without language, the conditions driving our emotional behavior and the scope of the emotion itself remain undetected, shapeless and blurry. This can be illustrated by the baby example provided in section 3.1: in the pre-linguistic stage, babies indicate their needs through crying, and as they are not yet capable of verbalizing their inner states it is unclear whether crying is an expression of emotion or simply a demand to have their needs met. An adult person, for instance, can express their reasons for crying verbally, which constitutes an invaluable advantage for us, as it facilitates communication substantially. Considering all this, it is therefore of vital importance to now scrutinize the relationship between emotion and language.

4.2.2. Interpreting verbalizations of emotional experience

Generally, it is assumed that the most reliable and accurate tool to confirm that the emotion observed in another person is indeed the emotion experienced is, thus, communicating it using language (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 3). Only once the person feeling an emotion describes or specifically denotes the experience, observers attain knowledge about its content (ibid.). An emotion like anger is thus identified with relative certainty not until the person feeling it confirms that it is *anger* (ibid.). In the previous sections, it has been argued repeatedly that the impalpable nature of emotions may pose substantial difficulty to human beings when they are not consciously aware of what they are experiencing at a moment: it is frequently necessary to concretize internal states through verbalization to comprehend which emotion a situation evoked.

Linguistics has not always played the prominent role in emotion research that it does today (cf. Foolen 1997: 15f.): Athanasiadou and Tabakowska (1998: xi) mention that traditionally, the realm of emotion and feelings was considered from a philosophical and psychological perspective, in which "the physiological sphere of bodily symptoms" (in short, non-verbal manifestations) was considered the main outlet for emotional expression (see section 4.2.1). This view, formerly popular among philosophers and psychologists, contrasts sharply with Wierzbicka and Harkin's (2001: 3) reasoning presented above, since it postulates the belief "that any attempt at expressing one's emotions by means of words must be futile by definition, as an attempt to 'express what cannot be expressed.'" (Athanasiadou & Tabakowska 1998: xi). Still, the realm

of emotions has been the focus of much linguistic study and of cross-linguistic study in particular. Also, since the scope of this thesis is “words, categories and concepts for emotions, rather than emotions themselves”, as Russell (1991: 427) appropriately puts it, emotion will be examined from a linguistic point of view.

Fussell (2002: 1), in the introduction to her work *The verbal communication of emotions: Interdisciplinary perspectives* is certainly correct when stating that

[t]he interpersonal communication of emotional states is fundamental to both everyday and clinical interaction. One’s own and others’ affective experiences are frequent topics of everyday conversations, and how well these emotions are expressed and understood is important to interpersonal relationships and individual well-being.

This means that the expression of emotional experiences through language claims a significant share of the conversations human beings engage in. On a daily basis, we experience things which provoke emotional reactions within us – be it joy about the beautiful weather, anxiety about a deadline, or annoyance about a delayed tram – we do not simply feel these emotions, we almost always appreciate the ability to speak about these feelings with friends or family.

Fussell (2002: 2) observes that “verbal descriptions of emotional states can provide quite precise information about the specific form of an emotion”. Apart from this, the use of language enables the connection of one’s individual emotional experiences to other, already experienced emotional responses or even to the experiences of other people (ibid.). This supports the view that linguistic study does indeed play a crucial role in the research on emotion, as non-verbal cues to emotional states are not telling in situations when “people are communicating about emotions and feelings they are not personally experiencing at the time of the conversation” (ibid.). The communicational benefit of non-verbal cues is poor in comparison to that of language, as they usually transmit “signs rather than intentional signals of emotional state” (ibid.).

Besides enabling us to establish links between present and past emotions as well as to the emotional experiences of others, verbal emotion expression serves two other functions. Firstly, linguistic signs operate as “labels or definitions” for particular emotional experiences (Athanasidou & Tabakowska 1998: xi; cf. Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 3). Secondly, they fulfil descriptive purposes, as they specify “symptoms of people’s behavioural reactions, as well as the actual nature of the experience itself” (Athanasidou & Tabakowska 1998: xi). Specifications and definitions may, on the one hand, be necessary because different individuals externalize emotions in distinct ways: language helps explaining and connecting these different externalizations. On the other hand, as has already been mentioned, it is difficult to understand the nature

of emotion itself without the verbalization of such a fleeting experience. Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 3) sustain this view in that they argue that by means of language, we can consider similar or equivalent externalizations of emotion as examples of the same overall emotions: we categorize them.²⁹ In its categorizing function, language makes it possible to develop “a conceptual connection between two disparate emotion experiences, by giving them the same label” (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 3). Important to note, however, is the fact that these labels may differ depending on the language chosen (ibid.). Before elaborating on emotion categorization and its relation to cross-linguistic study, however, we will examine the views of another author with regards to functions of emotion words.

According to Kövecses (2000: 2), “emotion-related vocabulary” can generally either serve the expression or the description of emotions. “[E]xpressive [...] emotion words”, for instance, are words such as “*wow!* when enthusiastic or impressed, *yuk!* when disgusted, and many more” [original emphasis] (ibid.). It seems that such expressive emotion words are intuitive, immediate responses to a situation and the promptest externalization of emotional experiences. Kövecses (2000: 2) also elaborates on “descriptive emotion words (or terms or expressions)”, words that “describe the emotions they signify or that ‘they are about.’”. Amongst them are adjectives and nouns “like *anger* and *angry*, *joy* and *happy*, *sadness* and *depressed*” [original emphasis] (ibid.). This appears to concur with both functions Athanasiadou and Tabakowska (1998: xi) mention (see section 4.2). Lastly, Kövecses (2000: 2) claims that at times, the expressive and descriptive functions of emotion language coincide, i.e. in utterances like “*I love you!*” [original emphasis], which both specifies that a person feels affection towards another person and simultaneously constitutes an immediate emotional reaction. Kövecses (ibid.), besides from emotion word functions, mentions that emotion-related vocabulary is organized in a certain way. Therefore, the concern of the next section will be the categorization and organization of emotion words, both language-internally and cross-linguistically.

4.3. Emotion and categorization: (cross-)linguistically examined

According to Taylor (2003: 5), although the domain of emotions could be likened to “a smooth continuum” within which perception permits us to distinguish manifold states, linguistically speaking, its segmentation is relatively crude. Kövecses (2000: 2) provides evidence against the latter claim (one which has similarly been urged by numerous other researchers in the field) and argues that emotion language comprises much more categories than previously assumed. He emphasizes that the argument that the language of emotion comprises merely a limited

²⁹ This concurs with Taylor’s (2003: xi) definition of linguistic categorization, see section 2.2.

number of words is minimalistic: according to him, emotion words “such as *anger*, *fear*, *love*, *joy*” [original emphasis], are only part of the immense inventory of emotion language (ibid.). As has been mentioned, he also considers expressive emotion words as belonging to it (ibid.). With regards to categorization, however, his focus lies on descriptive emotion words.

4.3.1. Categorizing emotions: internal structure

Kövecses (2000: 3) argues that descriptive emotion terms, like other linguistic categories, exhibit internal structure. More precisely, emotion words can be organized into taxonomies, as illustrated in Figure 2 below. In this taxonomy, words which are perceived by speakers as “more basic than others”, such as “English *anger*, *sadness*, *fear*, *joy*, and *love*” [original emphasis] operate on the basic level, while the most inclusive category, *emotion*, operates on the superordinate level and comprises these basic-level emotions (ibid.). The subordinate level, then, includes more specific emotion words, such as “*annoyance*, *wrath*, *rage*, and *indignation*” [original emphasis], which are, in principle, variations of the basic-level category *anger* (ibid.). Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 5) complement this idea, explaining that subordinate-level emotion terms may be perceived as more differentiated than basic-level terms or as variations of them: *rage* could be considered an intense type of *anger*, while *annoyance* is a weaker version of it. Such words are often explained “in terms of ones that appear to be simpler” (ibid.).

superordinate level	<i>emotion</i>
basic level	<i>anger</i>
subordinate level	<i>annoyance</i>

Figure 2: Levels of emotion terms in a vertical hierarchy (cf. Kövecses 2000: 3)

In addition to this, Kövecses (2000: 3) also points out prototypicality: when examining basic-level emotion categories, some members appear to be better representatives of the superordinate category, i.e. “a particular emotion category can be judged to be more ‘prototypical’ [...] of emotion than another at the same horizontal level”. He maintains that the emotion categories *anger*, *fear*, or *sadness* are usually judged as more prototypical than *hope* or *pride*, which appear to be peripheral category members (Kövecses 2000: 3f.). This is illustrated in Figure 3; prototypical category members are emphasized in bold.




Figure 3: Prototypical vs. nonprototypical emotion terms on the horizontal level of conceptual organization (cf. Kövecses 2000: 4)

Kövecses' (2000: 3f.) discussion of basicness gives rise to the question whether the – for him – prototypical emotions enumerated here have a particularly prominent standing also in languages other than English, i.e. whether there exist universally shared prototypical emotions. Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 5) similarly point out that simply because in English an emotion word like *anger* may have special standing, it is questionable “whether ‘anger’ really is a basic human experience”.

4.3.2. Emotions: universal or culture-specific? A discussion

According to Everett (2013: 253), “[s]ome cross-cultural research suggests that human emotions, or at least some human emotions, are universal”. This issue has been investigated quite thoroughly and discussed at length by numerous researchers in cross-linguistic study (Ekman 1992, Solomon 1995, Kövecses 2000, Wierzbicka 1992, Athanasiadou & Tabakowska 1998, Everett 2013, etc.). This section will present an abridged overview of the research conducted, as the focus of this thesis lies on cross-linguistic differences, rather than similarities between emotion categories.

Still, as studies conducted by – amongst others – Paul Ekman (1992, in Everett 2013: 253) show, it is possible to recognize certain commonalities in non-linguistic emotional expression (i.e. countenance) which enable the identification and proclamation of a set of supposedly “shared human emotions: anger, fear, happiness, surprise, sadness, and disgust”.³⁰ Though the idea that certain universal emotions exist was popular for a while, it has also been heavily criticized (ibid.). Wierzbicka (1992: 119), for instance, calls the existence of “universal human emotions” into question:

[H]ow is it that these emotions are all so neatly identified by means of English words? For example, Polish does not have a word corresponding exactly to the English word *disgust*. What if the psychologists working on the ‘fundamental human emotions’ happened to be native speakers of Polish rather than English? Would it still have occurred to them to include ‘disgust’ on their list? An Australian Aboriginal language, Gidjingali, does not lexically distinguish ‘fear’ from ‘shame’, subsuming feelings kindred to those identified by the English words *fear* and *shame* under one lexical item (Hiatt [1978]:185). If the researchers happened to be native

³⁰ This list, however, varies; it is sometimes more, sometimes less extensive.

speakers of Gidjingali rather than English, would it still have occurred to them to claim that fear and shame are both fundamental human emotions, discrete and clearly separated from each other? [original emphasis]

As this passage demonstrates, Wierzbicka (ibid.) suggests that “English terms of emotion constitute a folk taxonomy, not an objective, culture-free analytical framework”; the same, then, applies to the word *emotion* itself, which according to Russell (1991: 426) may be tied to culture. Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 4) term this a “prevailing ‘Western’ [view] of emotion” which should be contested if one is “interested in the emotions of all people, not just those who speak English” (Russell 1991: 428).

Generally, thus, it is imperative to criticize “the kind of ethnocentric view that assumes that an English word such as *anger* [...] denotes the same experience or concept as its supposed equivalents in other languages or other cultural contexts” [original emphasis] (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 5).³¹ A further obstacle in this discussion is that it can hardly be assumed that all the individuals belonging to a cultural group understand a certain emotion word in the exact same way (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 5). Considering this cross-linguistic, cross-cultural and even individual variability in the perception of emotion terminology, it is thus unsurprising that it is difficult to examine emotion lexica from an entirely objective perspective. Wierzbicka (1992: 25) confirms this intuition and claims that

[i]t is impossible for a human being to study anything—be it cultures, language, animals, or stones—from a totally extra-cultural point of view. As scholars, we remain within a certain culture, and we are inevitably guided by certain principles and certain ideals which we know are not necessarily shared by the entire human race.

An attempt towards resolving this problem is, still, to abandon the assumption that the English terminology for emotions is “neutral, self-explanatory, [...] culture-independent” and applicable to “human emotional experience in all cultures” (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 8), and instead adopt another perspective towards this issue. In lieu of insisting on the identification of universals in emotions and emotion language, a more fruitful approach would be to describe and comprehend emotion words of different languages employing language which – in contrast to the “complex (decomposable) and culture-specific” nature of emotion terms – is “simple (non-decomposable) and universal” (ibid.). Wierzbicka (1992: 20) names this type of language “a natural semantic metalanguage” (NSM) which enables cross-linguistic comparison of emotion words.³² According to Goddard (2002: 23), NSM is constituted by words referred to as

³¹ This argument resembles Keidan’s (2015: 636) elaborations on the lack of “the ‘same signified’” in translation, see section 3.4.

³² For further reference on NSM, see Wierzbicka (1992: 6ff.).

“semantic primes” i.e. lexical items which exist in all languages, such as “a separate word, an affix, or a fixed phrase”. This would comprise “meanings like *think, know, want, or feel*; or [...] meanings like *people, good, bad, do, and happen*” [original emphasis] (Goddard 2002: 23f.). Crucial to point out is that even though all languages have expressions for these meanings, it is not agreed upon how speakers of different languages understand and interpret words such as, for instance, *good* or *bad* (Goddard 2002: 24). Goddard (ibid.) suggests that approximately 65 semantic primes exist, and Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 9) claim that they “constitute the bedrock of intercultural understanding”.

In virtue of evidence acquired from a variety of cross-linguistic word comparisons conducted using NSM, Wierzbicka (1992: 20) concludes “that not everything that can be said in one language can be said (without additions and subtractions) in another”. Though she is convinced that through careful and accurate arrangements of lexical universals it is possible to explain language-specific words of one language to speakers of another language in a comprehensible way, the use of “a standardised and non-idiomatic *metalanguage*” [original emphasis] to translate culture-specific contents into a new language results in a loss of the character of the “natural language in all its richness and idiosyncrasy” (Wierzbicka 1992: 20f.). To apply the terminology introduced in section 3.4, using a metalanguage to translate and compare meanings of emotion words results merely in a transfer of “*what is said*” [original emphasis]; and a loss of “*what is unsaid*” [original emphasis] (Keidan 2015: 635): there does remain an “intranslatable [sic] residue” (Politzer 1956: 319). Wierzbicka (1992: 21) claims that this incongruity is what “defines the limits of precise translatability”. In what follows, therefore, the cross-linguistic variability in emotion terminology will be examined.

4.3.3. A cross-linguistic scrutiny of emotion concepts

Generally, there does exist agreement that cross-linguistically and cross-culturally, the meanings encoded and conceptualized through emotion words and categories do both differ and exhibit similarities to varying extents (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 5; Kövecses 2000: 139; Russell 1991: 426). Still, much evidence points to substantial cross-linguistic variation in the linguistic categorization of emotional states (Russell 1991: 426). Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 1) sustain this view, arguing that linguistic research on emotions acquires even more meaningfulness when it is acknowledged that groups of speakers of different languages and cultures vary in their encoding of emotions: they observe that certain cultural and linguistic groups linguistically encode “emotional states for which other groups don’t even have names”. Also, they maintain that describing and scrutinizing cross-linguistically differing emotion experiences

constitute an aid in the comprehension of “emotions in cultural context” (ibid). The nature of cross-linguistic differences will be briefly elucidated now.

Russell (1991: 426ff.) claims that languages differ from one another in terms of how they categorize emotions, and, consequently, “in the number of words they provide to categorize emotions”. Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 3) point out that when describing one emotion, speakers of different languages use different words to do so, i.e. “[t]he same label [...] may not apply across languages”. To support these claims, it is useful to examine some examples.

4.3.3.1. Language-specific emotion categories without translational equivalents

Some cross-linguistic disparities in emotion categorization are easily identifiable. This is the case when an emotion category simply lacks a translational equivalent entirely. Russell (1991: 426), for instance, recounts an anecdote, claiming that the Arab language is devoid of the label *frustration*, an emotion which in English is linguistically encoded. Similarly, he observes that a word corresponding to German *Schadenfreude* is non-existent in English (ibid.). Russell thus theorizes “that different languages recognize different emotions. They carve up the domain of emotion differently” (ibid.). Wierzbicka (1992: 123) similarly mentions this difference in categorization of emotion: she takes an emotion word of Polish as an example, arguing that *tęsknić* is an emotion encoded linguistically in Polish, but not in English. Though both speakers of English and Polish can experience the emotion and may have conceptually categorized it, in only one culture it was categorized linguistically (ibid.). Russell (1991: 434) extends this argument, alleging that while an emotion (say, *tęsknić*) in one language may not exist as a monolexemic equivalent in another language, there are still alternative ways to encode the emotion, i.e. it “may be expressed in a phrase, or metaphorically, or even nonverbally”. Still, Wierzbicka’s (1992: 124) example illustrates that the emotion lexicon of a language appears to develop according to what speakers of a certain language consider “particularly salient” emotions, worthy of linguistic processing (cf. section 2.1). She makes an interesting observation regarding such sets of emotion words, arguing that “these language-specific sets overlap and, presumably, the closer two cultures are, the greater the overlap between their respective sets of emotion words” (ibid.). This will be examined in the next section and is relevant for the empirical study in Part II.

4.3.3.2. Semantic nuances: overlaps, non-equivalence and meaning mismatches

Some cross-linguistic differences among emotion categories are more difficult to detect. Usually, when comparing words disposing of alleged translational equivalents, subtle semantic mismatches emerge, which only become apparent after close examination. To exemplify this, Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 3) compare dictionary entries of the English noun *anger* and

the French noun *colère*. Though overlapping in some respects, the meanings of these two supposedly equivalent words are not completely alike, as “they cannot correctly be substituted for each other in every situation” (ibid.). In addition, a translation of *angry* at times yields *furieux* as a result, “which therefore, in turn, cannot be regarded as an exact equivalent of *furious*” [original emphasis] (cf. Wierzbicka 1988, in Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 3). The word *angry* is an interesting object of investigation: Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 5) point out that it also lacks a monolexemic equivalent in the Australian language Yankunytjatjara; instead, *angry* is denoted by three Yankunytjatjara words, which all differ slightly from the source word and whose employment is strongly dependent on context (cf. Goddard 1991, 1998 in Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 5). The difference between these three Yankunytjatjara words and the English word *angry* is aspectual, they are more closely associated with feelings such as “active hostility, [...] grievance, and [...] resentfulness” (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 5f.).

A similar case is presented by Everett (2013: 253), who takes the emotion love as an example. He argues that while in English, the emotion love is labeled by one single word, *love*, in ancient Greek, a fourfold distinction was made between “*agápe*, *éros*, *philia*, and *storge*” [original emphasis] (2013: 253f.). He describes the nuances between the four words in Ancient Greek and the stark contrast to the English equivalent as follows:

These terms helped to differentiate feelings of deep forms of attraction and affection (*agápe*) from more passionate, sensual longing (*éros*), or from affectionate friendship-type feelings (*philia*), or from the emotion felt towards children and kin (*storge*). In the light of such lexical refinement, the word for love in English seems a pretty blunt instrument. I can, after all, say that I love my child or that I love burritos [original emphasis] (Everett 2013: 254).

The Ancient Greeks’ differentiations between words for love seem to be grounded on specific aspects distinguishing each term and resemble the differentiations between words for anger in Yankunytjatjara. The simplicity of the English word *love* becomes apparent also when comparing it to the word *Liebe* ‘love’ in the German language. German speakers usually make a more rigid distinction between romantic love and love for a friend than English speakers would. Presumably, therefore, German speakers are less likely to say *Ich liebe dich* ‘I love you’ to a person short of a family member or a significant other than are English speakers (American English speakers, more precisely), who, from experience, are more readily willing to use the word *love* also to describe their feelings for a friend. A German speaker, for instance, would rather use the word *mögen* ‘like’ as in *Ich mag dich* ‘I like you’ to show affection towards a friend. This is, admittedly, highly speculative, as the preferences to use one word or another (*love* or *like*, *lieben* or *mögen*) obviously also differ from person to person and according to context, but it could be

conjectured that these observations may also stem from culturally determined attitudes connected to emotions.

From this evidence, therefore, it seems natural to assume that the above presented cross-linguistic differences relate to culture. Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 3f.) point out that “differences in usage of emotion words are connected in some way with cultural attitudes and cultural identity” and explain that untranslatable, language-specific words are crucial items enabling the comprehension of “cultural patterns and motivations”. They also mention that language-specific words have a particular “‘feel’” to them, which stems from the expressive reactions of speakers of different languages “when they feel these emotions” (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 3). Similarly, Russell (1991: 427) states that the assumption that “emotion words vary with culture” entails a variation in the speakers’ encoding, response, and memorization of emotion, too. Essentially, thus, he argues that this perspective constitutes “a version of linguistic relativity”, but advises to treat this view with caution, for as has been stated in section 3.3.2, research on the issue is characterized by an insufficient empirical underpinning (ibid.). Further along in his article, Russell (1991: 428) then claims “that what varies with culture are events that surround the emotion”, namely “the frequency of, the causes of, the expression of, the importance of, attitudes towards, beliefs about, and the regulation of emotion”.

Similar observations are made by Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 7). While they concede that the subtle semantic differences between a source word like *angry* and its quasi-equivalents in other languages upon first consideration seem as if they were negligible, they eventually emphasize that “socially accepted ways of thinking about the kinds of events that provoke [anger-like feelings] and the kinds of behaviour that result from these feelings are integral parts of the emotion itself” (ibid.). This reflects the understanding “of what constitutes an emotion” agreed upon by “several different lines of recent research in the cognitive sciences” and supports the assumption that subtle discrepancies between semantically related words are indeed meaningful. Substantial evidence from an extensive list of researchers³³ provides reason to believe that the inclusion of “both situational or social and cognitive elements in addition to the obvious affective elements” is imperative for emotion description (Wierzbicka & Harkins 2001: 7f.). Taking these arguments into account, it proves useful to examine a specific set of emotion terms which have semantically similar translational equivalents and scrutinize them with regards to the subtleties which distinguish them from one another. For these purposes, it is not entirely useful to use NSM to avoid ethnocentric distortions of the analysis, as native speaker intuitions,

³³ For further reference, see Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 7f.).

attitudes and contextual cues will be of crucial importance for the empirical study of emotion terms.

4.4. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, it has been elucidated what emotions are, how they can be interpreted, how they relate to language and categorization, and an attempt has been made to determine what is universal and culture-specific in emotion. Examples pointing to non-negligible cross-linguistic diversity in emotion categorization have been provided, and words encoded in one language without translational equivalents in other languages have been examined; however, for the purposes of this thesis, the focus lies on words which do have equivalents in the broadest sense, but which differ semantically, albeit in very miniscule ways. Precisely those semantic differences among closely related languages are of interest for the study conducted in Part II of this thesis, as they are presumed to be products of cultural practice. The role of these differences will be scrutinized in the following chapters.

PART II: Empirical Study

5. Framework

Besides exploring the workings of cross-linguistic emotion categorization in general, it is also the aim of this thesis to gain new insights into this area of linguistic study. As has been outlined in the introduction, therefore, the second and main part of the present paper consists of an empirical study. Primarily, it examines how German and English native speakers linguistically categorize five semantically similar and overlapping anger-like emotion words in their respective languages. Secondly, and more specifically, it aims at finding out how German native speakers of English as a foreign language (EFL) at university level linguistically categorize selected anger terms in English and investigates the role of proficiency as well as the influence of their native language in this process. Lastly, it studies semantic (non-)equivalence between anger terms in English and German and constitutes an attempt at verifying whether the use of English categories in German results from the speakers' awareness of language-specific categorization differences.

The study at hand is inspired by a phenomenon observed frequently among students of foreign languages, and among students of EFL at the Department for English and American Studies at the University of Vienna in particular. Listening to students of EFL, one gets the impression that with increasing proficiency in English, conversations between peers frequently contain English words, resulting in utterances such as the following:

- Ich bin heute so *happy*!
- Wenn ich daran denke, werde ich *anxious*.
- Das ist einfach ein *struggle*...
- Sowas macht mich echt *angry*.
- Ich war ein bisschen *upset* deswegen.

Apart from giving the impression that Viennese students of English and American Studies live in a constant state of stress-induced dissatisfaction, these sentences also raise the question as to why learners of EFL seem to feel the need to use English emotion categories in their native language, when they would have an entire system of German ones at their disposal.

The habit of switching between two linguistic systems is referred to as code-switching,³⁴ a phenomenon of language contact, and one of the central concerns of research on bilingualism (cf. Heller 1988: 1, Trousdale 2010: 97; Milroy & Muysken 1995: 7, Auer & Eastman 2010:

³⁴ The following paragraph presents only a brief discussion of the issue. For further reference, see Gumperz (1982), Heller (1988), Milroy and Muysken (1995), Auer and Eastman (2010), and Trousdale (2010).

84). Interestingly, even speakers “with very little bilingual ability” can code-switch (Auer & Eastman 2010: 87). In the broadest sense, code-switching is referred to as “the use of more than one language in the course of a single communicative episode” (Heller 1988: 1; cf. Milroy & Muysken 1995: 7ff.; Gumperz 1982: 59ff.), Gumperz (1982: 59) names this “[c]onversational code switching”. Trousdale (2010: 97) specifies that code-switching occurs usually when conversational partners “have a similar linguistic repertoire”; Milroy and Muysken (1995: 7) claim that code-switching can take many forms. It can, for instance, not only occur within a conversation, but also within one sentence, such as in the examples given above (Gumperz 1982: 60). Speakers code-switch for manifold reasons (Milroy & Muysken 1995: 7). Auer and Eastman (2010: 90) list several of them: “[c]ode-switching can index social class consciousness, political-ideological or ethnic affiliations and preferences, and so on”. In the proposed context, it is plausible to believe that speakers switch codes to “signal affiliation with a bilingual group” (which can occur even at low proficiency levels), or to “mimic or imitate other speakers”, using words assumed to be typical of another language (Auer & Eastman 2010: 87).³⁵ All of this may be indebted to the prestigious status of English as a world language.

As plausible as these reasons are, the question remains whether code-switching may also occur because of what has been extensively demonstrated in Part I of this thesis: words can never be translated with complete accuracy (see section 3.4), which is often caused by differences in the linguistic categorization of concepts across languages (see section 3.2 and 4.3.3). Thus, when German native speakers code-switch to English while speaking German, this may be due to either their awareness of the non-existence of a corresponding concept in German, or because they consider the differences in the semantic content of the assumed English equivalent significant enough to borrow the word. It may be assumed, therefore, that advanced EFL students have recognized differences and begun to actively use and incorporate a new categorization system in their speech. It is likely that regular, long-term exposure may be responsible for their having “mastered” the English system and driven them to use it across the confinements of their own language.³⁶ EFL students at the beginning of their studies, still less intensely exposed to the English language, may not yet be aware of cross-linguistic differences and are thus also not yet proficient enough to categorize as accurately and successfully as more advanced students. Therefore, they may refer more readily to their native language when speaking English, trying to translate their thoughts into the new language, i.e. transferring the categories of their native

³⁵ For further reference on these two issues, Auer and Eastman (2010 87) advise to refer to Kelly-Holmes (2005), Auer (2006), and Quist and Jørgensen (2007).

³⁶ This intuition coincides with Politzer’s (1956: 321) argument that familiarity with a culture determines ability to recognize subtle semantic differences between languages, see section 3.4

system to the new system. The longer learners are actively and regularly exposed to the English language, the more proficient they become and, thus, it could be hypothesized that at some point a shift in thinking occurs, resulting in not a complete abandonment of the native categorization system, but at least an increased awareness of linguistic differences, and hence a more active engagement with the system of the new language.

The domain of emotion is a valuable field to test, as people speak and think about their emotions frequently (see section 4.2.2); it is therefore likely that speakers are familiar with English emotion categories and that they are relevant to them. For reasons of space, and because emotions in themselves are extremely abstract and difficult to grasp phenomena, the word set chosen is confined to anger-like emotions, to which researchers have already devoted considerable attention. In addition to the findings of this study, input from previous studies will thus positively add to the discussion below. Substantial research has been conducted in the realm of emotion and categorization, comparing emotion concepts in various languages; to the best of my knowledge, however, none have employed the specific approach used in this study, which surveys how non-native speakers linguistically categorize anger-like emotions in English. Therefore, this research may add new insights into the study of emotion categorization.

5.1. Research questions and hypotheses³⁷

This study aims at testing whether the intuitions and observations outlined above do indeed have truth value. For this purpose, four research questions (RQ) and several hypotheses (H) have been defined. Research question 1 is what guides the entire study and will be answered progressively in sections 6.2 to 6.4 and reads as follows:

RQ1: How do native speakers of German and native speakers of English define anger-like feelings in their respective native languages?

A pre-study was conducted to answer this question, allowing for a deduction of ten emotion categories which were subjected to testing in sections I and II of the main study. The second and third major research questions guiding this research will be answered in chapter 8, through a discussion of the results presented in sections 7.2 and 7.3.

RQ2: Does proficiency level have an influence on how accurately Austrian university students of EFL categorize anger terms in English?

RQ3: In how far are Austrian university students of EFL influenced by their native (German) categorization system when categorizing anger terms in English and does this change with increasing proficiency in the English language?

³⁷ The terminology related to study design employed in the upcoming sections follows Dörnyei (2007), Wagner (2015), Schilling (2013), and Durand and Chantler (2014).

As has been described in the previous section, it is likely that the ability to categorize in the foreign language improves with increasing proficiency level, resulting in a high command of the English categorization system and less interference from the native language. Hence, the following hypotheses will be tested:

H₂: The proficiency level of Austrian university students of EFL has an influence on how accurately they categorize anger terms in English.

H_{2a}: Austrian EFL students at a high proficiency level tend to categorize English anger terms correctly.

H_{2b}: Austrian EFL students at an intermediate proficiency level tend to categorize English anger terms incorrectly.

H₃: With increasing proficiency in English, Austrian university students of EFL gradually cease to transfer categorization habits from their native language to the foreign language and begin categorizing anger terms according to the English categorization system.

H_{3a}: The influence of the German categorization system is lower in Austrian EFL students at high proficiency levels.

H_{3b}: The influence of the German categorization system is higher in Austrian EFL students at intermediate proficiency levels.

Finally, a fourth research question has been formulated. It surveys speaker intuitions regarding the translation of categories and the use of untranslated English categories in German. The results for this question were obtained in sections III and IV of the main study; it will also be answered in chapter 8 of this thesis by means of an analysis of the results presented in sections 7.4 and 7.5. The final question reads as follows:

RQ₄: Do Austrian university students of EFL incorporate English categories into their speech and if so, why?

5.2. Setting and participants

As has been implied, the study at hand consists of two successive, interrelated parts (termed pre-study and main study) and was conducted with three groups of subjects between April 17th, 2018 and May 16th, 2018.

The pre-study consisted of a task which was developed to design the categories surveyed in the main study. It was completed by the first two groups of subjects, control groups A and B; the former consisted of 20 native speakers of German, the latter of 30 native speakers of English. The sample was retained via a mixture of convenience sampling and snowball sampling (cf. Dörnyei 2007: 98). That is, the sample of German native speakers was personally selected and provided with the task, while the sample of English native speakers was obtained by emailing

the task to selected English native speakers from the United States of America, who agreed to further distribute the task to other native speakers (also via email).

The main study, a questionnaire, was conducted online at the University of Vienna, specifically at the Department for English and American Studies. Hence, the population of the study consisted of students of EFL at the Vienna Department for English and American Studies with German as their first language (L1). The sample comprised 25 EFL students with German as their L1, 13 of which were in their first year of studying English (level B2+), and 12 of which were in their final year (level C1+/C2) (this will be further specified in chapter 7.1). The sample was thus retained via a mix of convenience sampling (Dörnyei 2007: 98) and stratified random sampling (Wagner 2015: 85).³⁸

5.3. Data collection instruments

In this section, the two data collection instruments used will be briefly explained. As indicated in the previous section, the pre-study was a means to devise the main study. This will now be elucidated.

5.3.1. Definition task

The task conducted with control groups A and B is aimed at answering RQ₁ and examines how native speakers define ten selected anger terms. To collect this kind of data, each participant was asked to answer seven questions about one emotion concept.³⁹ In a further step, the responses gathered were compared with dictionary definitions of the ten emotion words under examination. This comprehensive approach to studying word meanings eventually allowed for the deduction of ten emotion categories (see sections 6.2 and 6.3). The purpose of this task was to identify the most prototypical, as well as culture-specific meaning components of the categories. Also, both overlapping and cross-linguistically differing meaning components of German and English emotion categories, assumedly equivalent, became apparent.

5.3.2. Questionnaire

The questionnaire conducted with the actual sample is aimed at answering RQ₂ to RQ₄ and is concerned with how the ability to accurately categorize anger terms in the foreign language may be dependent on a student's proficiency level. Also, it constitutes an attempt at ascertaining the extent to which a student's L1 influences categorization in English. It further aims at demonstrating that anger terms in different languages, though similar, may exhibit semantic non-

³⁸ For more information on sampling procedures, see Dörnyei (2007: 97ff.) and Wagner (2015: 85f.).

³⁹ For samples of both the German and the English versions of the task, see Appendix.

equivalence. Lastly, it surveys the likeliness of German speaking EFL students to use English anger categories in their native language and inquires why this is or is not done.

The data was collected online, and the test consists of four main sections. Section I aims at establishing how accurately the respondents categorize. They are provided with either two or three selected English anger terms and must select one out of four definitions for each term, only one of which precisely describes the word given. The definitions either define English or related German categories. Section II examines how the respondents categorize in context. They are provided with sentences containing a blanked out English anger word and must select one out of five anger term, only one of which correctly completes the sentence. In section III, respondents are asked to translate. They are provided with five English anger terms and must indicate which of the five German anger terms given constitutes the best translation. Finally, section IV surveys the respondents' intuitions. They are asked to rate how likely they are to use each of five anger terms – untranslated – when speaking German and indicate why. They are given various options to choose from; also, there is an option for a short individual answer.

Two versions of the questionnaire have been devised and administered to half of the sample each.⁴⁰ In section I of questionnaire A, the words *angry*, *upset*, and *outraged* are tested, in section II, *furious* and *annoyed*. The reverse is true for questionnaire B, in section I of which the words *furious* and *annoyed* are tested; section II tests *angry*, *upset*, and *outraged*. Section III and IV are the same for all respondents.

⁴⁰ For samples of both Tests A and B, see Appendix.

6. Data analysis and results of the pre-study

The present chapter presents and summarizes the data obtained in the pre-study. In sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.5 and sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.5, the categories tested in the main study will be defined.

6.1. A note on definitions, or: determining emotion categories – an impossibility?

To test how German native speaking EFL learners at various levels of proficiency categorize English emotion concepts, it is, naturally, not only vital to decide on a specific semantic field, but more importantly, to define those categories which will be subjected to testing. This section thus constitutes an attempt at reproducing how anger-like feelings are categorized in both English and German. The words under scrutiny are, grammatically speaking, adjectives, and are all semantically similar, with merely subtle differences in meaning. The German words chosen are the ones which are assumed to be most closely matching the English words, translation-wise.

Judging from the discussions in sections 2.3 and 4.1, it can be noted that determining emotion categories is a daunting task. An effort to do so is not only complicated by the fuzzy nature of word meanings and the impossibility to clearly delineate word boundaries in general, but also by the phenomenon under investigation itself, as emotions are such individual and fleeting experiences that retaining and accurately recording them poses difficulties to even the most skillful researcher.

At this point, it is therefore of crucial importance to remark that the categories which have been defined and tested for the purpose of this study do not aim at representing universally valid, unquestionably true and unalterable categories; rather, they are – in principle – artificially constructed categories synthesizing official definitions of the terms with definitions provided by native speakers. For this reason, the categories presented below may be heavily tinted by subjective experiences and ideas and are, thus, subject to bias of both regional and individual nature. Rather than striving to “capture” the essence of anger-like emotions (hence rejecting the classical view to categorization, see section 2.3.1), the below discussion represents an attempt at recognizing a general trend in the way native speakers categorize them and aligning these perceptions to official definitions. This is in line not only with the discussion of the volatility of meanings and emotions in Part I, but is also empirically meaningful within the scope of the small-scale study conducted in Part II of this thesis.

6.2. Defining anger-like emotions in German

The subsequent sections present a summary and comparison of the results of the pre-study and the official dictionary definitions of the five German anger terms *wütend*, *zornig*, *verärgert*,

aufgebracht, and *empört*.⁴¹ At the end of each section, a category will be composed on the basis of both the official definitions and the definitions obtained from the native speakers.

6.2.1. *wütend*

A comparison of the dictionary definitions for the adjective *wütend* (approx. ‘angry’) and the corresponding noun *Wut* (approx. ‘anger’) yielded the following results. In *Duden*, *DWDS*, and *Deutsches Wörterbuch* alike, *wütend* is defined as being *voller Wut* ‘full of anger/rage’ (*Duden*, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*: s.v. *wütend*) or *von Wut erfüllt* ‘filled with anger/rage’ (*DWDS*: s.v. *wütend*).⁴² Also, being *wütend* involves a sensation of *Erregung* (approx. ‘excitation’, ‘arousal’) (*Duden*, *DWDS*, *Das treffende Wort*: s.v. *wütend*; *DWB*: s.v. *Wut*) and a lack of self-control (*Duden*: s.v. *Wut*; *DWB*: s.v. *Wut*; *Das treffende Wort*: s.v. *wütend*). Another aspect worthy of mention is that *Wut* seems to be externalized frequently through shouting or facial expressions (*Duden*, *DWDS*: s.v. *wütend*). Interestingly, all dictionaries define *wütend* in terms of the word *zornig* (approx. ‘furious’), which shows that the two words are closely related; also, this may be an indication that their semantic content overlaps. In general, however, it can be deduced that the dictionary definition of *wütend* reads as follows:

Ein intensives, heftiges Gefühl der Wut, gekennzeichnet durch eine die Person beherrschende, nicht mehr oder nur schwer kontrollierbare Erregung, welches sich nicht nur seelisch-emotional, sondern auch durch körperlich-expressive Äußerungen bemerkbar macht (Miene, lautes Sprechen oder Schreien) [approx. An intense, severe feeling of anger, characterized by a barely or not at all controllable arousal capturing the person entirely, which is not only perceived internally but also expressed physically (facial expression, loud speaking or shouting)].

The survey of German native speakers yielded remarkably similar results. Though several respondents commented that they found the task a challenging one, it appears that overall, there seems to be uniform agreement as to what feeling *wütend* involves. Most respondents claim that the emotion is very intense, unpleasant, and frequently sought to be avoided (*Schwäche* ‘weakness’; *unnötiges Gefühl* ‘unnecessary emotion’; *versuche [...] mich abzulenken* ‘I try to distract myself’; *Gefühl unterdrücken bzw. in mich hineinfressen* (approx. ‘suppressing the emotion or bottling it up’)); however, it is agreed that it is difficult to control *Wut*, which may result in or is associated with some sort of emotional outburst (*Kontrolle verlieren* ‘losing control’; *Bombe platzt* ‘a bomb explodes’; *Zerstörung* ‘destruction’; *aufgeladen* ‘charged/loaded’; *Ich werde zum Rüpel* (approx. ‘I become a bully’); *ausfallend* (approx. ‘verbally abusive’)). In

⁴¹ The following dictionaries were used: *Duden – Deutsches Universalwörterbuch* (*Duden*), *Digitales Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache* (*DWDS*), *Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm* (*DWB*), *Das treffende Wort: Wörterbuch sinnverwandter Ausdrücke* (*Das treffende Wort*), and *Deutsches Wörterbuch: mit einem „Lexikon der deutschen Sprachlehre“* (*Deutsches Wörterbuch*).

⁴² Note, here, the translation of *Wut* as *anger*: this will be briefly commented on in section 6.4.

accordance with what has been stated in the literature review (see section 4.1), the way in which the emotion is manifested differs from person to person; most respondents state, however, that shouting or loud speaking is the most probable externalization of feeling *wütend* (*möchte schreien* ‘I want to shout’; *Stimme wird schärfer* (approx. ‘biting tone’); *Ich werde laut* (approx. ‘I raise my voice’, ‘I speak loudly’)). Also, being *wütend* is accompanied by bodily heat, tension, and is associated with aggression. The most common trigger for *Wut* is dissatisfaction with the (unfair) behavior of other people – including the self – or situations of stress and dispute (*Dämlichkeit anderer Menschen* ‘stupidity of other people’; *überlege [...] wer an meiner Wut Schuld sein könnte* (approx. ‘I wonder who could be responsible for my anger’); *[m]eist mit Personen verknüpft* ‘usually related to people’; *Differenzen mit Mitmenschen* (approx. ‘differences of opinion with other people’)).

The sum of these definitions allows for a relatively comprehensive description of the category *wütend*, which is tested in the second part of the study and reads as follows:

(1) Category 1: *wütend*

An intense emotional state of dissatisfaction and aggressiveness, characterized by a barely or not at all controllable arousal capturing the person entirely, triggered by either the unfair or unjustified behavior of others or by situations of stress and dispute, usually manifested through a) physically experienced heat and tension, b) irrational and inconsiderate behavior and/or c) loud speaking or shouting.

6.2.2. *zornig*

The definitions of *zornig* (approx. ‘furious’, ‘angry’) and *Zorn* (approx. ‘rage’) were of particular interest, because as has been observed above, *zornig* is frequently used synonymously for *wütend*, or to describe *wütend*, and vice versa. This is also noted in the article “Why Germans don’t feel anger” by Uwe Durst (2001: 127), who argues that in many contexts, either term may be used, i.e. *wütend* and *zornig* are often used interchangeably.

Similarly to *wütend*, *zornig* is also commonly defined in terms of the corresponding noun *Zorn*, whereby the most frequent definitions of *zornig* are *voller Zorn*, *voll Zorn* (approx. ‘full of rage’), or *zustand des zornes* (sic; approx. ‘state of rage’) (*Duden, DWDS, DWB, Deutsches Wörterbuch*: s.v. *zornig*). *Zorn* is further commonly defined as intense *Unwille* or *Unlust* (approx. ‘displeasure’; ‘reluctance’) (*Duden, DWDS, DWB, Das treffende Wort, Deutsches Wörterbuch*: s.v. *Zorn*), which in principle involves feeling strong opposition towards someone or something. Both *zornig* and *Zorn* are also often defined in terms of *Ärger* (approx. ‘anger’, ‘annoyance’) (*Duden, DWDS, Deutsches Wörterbuch*: s.v. *zornig, Zorn*). What is worth noting is that these feelings of *Ärger* and *Unwille* are described as *heftig* (approx. ‘fierce’, ‘intense’) and *aufwallend* (approx. ‘boiling’, ‘surging up’) or *erregt* (approx. ‘aroused’) (*Duden, DWDS,*

DWB, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*: s.v. *zornig*, *Zorn*). A possible explanation is that *Zorn* is an emotion which is *vorübergehend* (approx. ‘passing’, ‘temporary’) (DWB: s.v. *zornig*) and thus both develops and vanishes quickly: *zorn ist die rasch und plötzlich entstehende leidenschaft* (sic; approx. ‘rage is a passion developing rapidly and suddenly’) (DWB: s.v. *Zorn*). Also, it is usually directed towards the trigger of the feeling.

A definition of *zornig*, deduced from all dictionary definitions examined, would therefore read as follows:

Ein heftiges, leidenschaftliches, animalistisches Gefühl des Unwillens, gekennzeichnet durch Kurzlebigkeit und rasches Aufkommen, welches oft ausgelöst wird, wenn man etwas als Unrecht empfindet oder sich ungerecht behandelt fühlt, und welches sich unwillkürlich äußert (Sprache, Mimik, Gestik) [approx. An intense, passionate, animalistic emotion of displeasure, which is short-lived and emerges rapidly, triggered frequently when something is perceived as wrong or when one feels treated unfairly, and which manifests itself instinctively/involuntarily (language, facial expression, gestures)].

Again, it is surprising how much the native speaker definitions resemble the official ones. What is particularly interesting is that although all respondents use the word *wütend* or *Wut* to describe *zornig*, it is still noticeable that the concepts differ from one another. While *wütend* is associated with the urge to suppress the emotion, respondents report that feeling *zornig* often involves a loss of control, hasty, thoughtless acts, and an intense desire to react to the source of *Zorn* through destroying or fighting it (*negative Empfindungen [...], die man sehr schwer unterdrücken kann* ‘negative sensations which are very difficult to suppress’; *Kontrollverlust* ‘loss of control’; *emotionale Kurzschlusshandlungen* (approx. ‘sudden irrational acts of emotional nature’); *denke [...] daran, meinen ‘Gegner’ [...] ‘fertigzumachen’* (approx. ‘I think of ‘destroying’ my ‘enemy’’); *[h]abe Lust etwas kaputt zu machen* (approx. ‘I feel like breaking something’); *Zorn [...] loswerden* (approx. ‘getting rid of the rage’); *Quelle des Zorns [...] beseitigen* ‘disposing of the source of rage’; *hektisch* ‘hectic’). Also, it is noted twice that *Zorn* is short-lived rather than long-lasting, and that it is an emotion that overcomes the experiencer (*eher kurz auftretender Gefühlszustand* (approx. ‘rather short-lived emotional state’); *sthenischer Affekt [der] mit kurzer Erregung verbunden [ist] und kein langanhaltender Gemütszustand* (approx. ‘powerful emotional reaction which entails short arousal and is not long-lasting’)). Interestingly, sadness, disappointment, and powerlessness are mentioned most frequently as sources or triggers of *Zorn* (*Verrat, Betrug, Lügen* ‘betrayal, fraud, lies’; *[m]an wird durch eine Person verletzt, beleidigt oder enttäuscht* (approx. ‘one is hurt, insulted, or disappointed by a person’); *Trauer, Verletzung, Enttäuschung* (approx. ‘sadness, being hurt, disappointment’)). Moreover, a person who is *zornig* is, according to the native speakers, visibly aggressive.

Finally, it is possible to compose a refined, synthesized definition of the category *zornig*, which reads as follows:

(2) Category 2: *zornig*

A passionate, short-lived and rapidly emerging emotional state of displeasure, characterized by a simultaneous sensation of powerlessness and rage which evokes the urge to actively destroy, fight, or dispose of the feeling, triggered by specific actions or situations perceived as disappointing, unalterable and unfair, usually manifested instinctively and visibly in language, distorted facial expressions and gestures indicating “readiness” to fight.

6.2.3. *verärgert*

The third anger term, *verärgert* (approx. ‘upset’, ‘angry’, ‘annoyed’, ‘cross’), presents a special case. Firstly, it is extremely difficult to find a satisfactory translation; Durst (2001: 124), for instance, argues that *Ärger*, the corresponding noun to *verärgert*, is “polysemous between *Ärger*₁ = ‘anger’, ‘annoyance’, and *Ärger*₂ = ‘trouble’” [original emphasis]. Secondly, none of the dictionaries under examination contain any entries for *verärgert*. Hence, to define the word, a comparison of the words *ärgerlich* (approx. ‘angry’, ‘annoyed’), *Ärger* (approx. ‘anger’), and *verärgern* (approx. ‘to annoy’) is undertaken.

The word most commonly used to describe *Ärger* is *Verdruss* (approx. ‘annoyance’, ‘vexation’) or *Verdrossenheit* (approx. ‘sullenness’) (*Duden, DWDS, DWB, Deutsches Wörterbuch: s.v. Ärger*). *Verdruss* is a word rarely used in everyday German for it is a formal, antiquated way to say that something is annoying or bothersome. Additionally, to be *verdrossen* means to be *lustlos* (approx. ‘listless’) and *missmutig* (approx. ‘sullen, morose’) (*Duden: s.v. verdrossen*). This is what best describes *Ärger*, to be *ärgerlich*, or *verärgert*: it is a feeling which is *unangenehm* and *unerfreulich* (approx. ‘unpleasant’) (*Duden, DWDS: s.v. ärgerlich*), the person feeling it is *unwillig* ‘reluctant’ and *unzufrieden* ‘dissatisfied’ (*Duden: s.v. ärgerlich; Das treffende Wort: s.v. verärgert → erbittert*) and the *Ärger* may be triggered by an *Unannehmlichkeit* (approx. ‘inconvenience’) (*DWDS: s.v. Ärger*) because something is *nicht zu ändern* (approx. ‘unalterable’) (*Duden: s.v. Ärger*). *Verärgern* then could be described as *jmdn. ärgerlich machen, in schlechte, gereizte Stimmung versetzen* (approx. ‘to make someone annoyed, to put someone in a bad, irritated mood’) (*DWDS: s.v. verärgern*), *in Zorn versetzen* (approx. ‘to make someone angry’) (*Deutsches Wörterbuch: s.v. ärgern*) or *schlechter machen* (approx. ‘to make worse’) (*DWB: s.v. verärgern*). Essentially, being *verärgert* thus seems to involve feeling slight anger (*Deutsches Wörterbuch: s.v. Ärger*), accompanied by moodiness and annoyance. The dictionary definition for *verärgert* deduced from all words examined thus reads as follows:

Gefühl der Unzufriedenheit und Verstimtheit, charakterisiert durch Unwillen, Misshmut und Gereiztheit, ausgelöst durch unangenehme Erfahrungen und Erlebnisse, welche sich nicht mehr ändern lassen [approx. A feeling of dissatisfaction and moodiness, characterized by unwillingness, moroseness (grumpiness) and irritability, triggered by unpleasant experiences which cannot be changed].

Though in dictionaries, the adjective *ärgerlich* was more frequently listed than *verärgert*, the respondents were quite decided in their definition of the term. They also listed moroseness, becoming moody and being troubled through unpleasant situations and experiences as defining characteristics of *verärgert* (*Eine Situation, eine bestimmte Handlung einer Person oder mein eigenes Verhalten verstimmen mich* (approx. ‘a situation, a specific thing a person has done, or my own behavior annoy me’); *aus der Ruhe gebracht* (approx. ‘disconcerted’, ‘flustered’); *unangenehm* ‘unpleasant’). The most frequent reasons for becoming *verärgert* appear to be unforeseeable, unexpected situations, unfulfilled expectations (by others and by oneself), and the ignorance of others (*wenn ein erwartetes Ereignis nicht eintritt bzw. wenn etwas passiert, das zu meinen Erwartungen völlig im Gegensatz steht* (approx. ‘when something I expected to happen does not happen, or when something happens which is completely contrary to my expectations’); *wenn mich jemand verletzt oder beleidigt* ‘when somebody hurts or insults me’; *[u]nvorhersehbare Ereignisse, Unzuverlässigkeit, Ignoranz, Egoismus, Unzulänglichkeit (meinerseits)* (approx. ‘unpredictable situations, unreliability, ignorance, egoism, deficiency on my part’); *Ich bin verärgert, weil du mir nicht zugehört hast* (approx. ‘I am annoyed/angry because you didn’t listen to me’); *nicht [...] berücksichtigt [werden]* (approx. ‘not being taken into account’)). Most respondents also comment that when they are *verärgert*, they feel an urge to change the situation, even though they are aware that what triggered the feeling is, essentially, unalterable. Therefore, the most common way to approach the problem is to either avoid the situation or to think and reflect about it rather than making irrational decisions (*ich muss mich zusammennehmen* (approx. ‘I have to compose myself’); *abwenden* (approx. ‘to turn away’); *Ich übe [...], solche Situationen gelassener zu sehen* (approx. ‘I am trying to see such situation more calmly’); *Ich ziehe mich zurück, meide die Situation* (approx. ‘I seclude myself, avoid the situation’); *Ich warte darauf, bis sich die Situation auflöst oder versuche aktiv selbst den Ärger aus der Welt zu schaffen* (approx. ‘I wait until the situation resolves itself or actively try to get rid of the problem’); *setze mich mit den Umständen auseinander und reflektiere Situationen* (approx. ‘I try to deal with the circumstances and reflect situations’); *versuche den Auslöser auszublenden* (approx. ‘I try to ignore the trigger’); *rationalisieren* ‘to rationalize’).⁴³

⁴³ Durst (2001: 130) argues that feeling *verärgert* may even be “generated [...] by a thought”. Hence, it is possible for it to “be changed or abandoned via another thought”.

From these observations, it is finally possible to deduce a category for *verärgert*, which reads as follows:

(3) Category 3: *verärgert*

An unpleasant emotional state of dissatisfaction, characterized by moodiness, triggered by unchangeable experiences (i.e. the ignorance and unreliability of others, unfulfilled expectations or unforeseen developments), which is generally sought to be abandoned by a) avoiding the situation or b) by active engagement with the problem (through a conversation or rational consideration).

6.2.4. *aufgebracht*

The adjective *aufgebracht* (approx. ‘upset’, ‘furious’) is comparable to the adjective *verärgert*. When examining the entries for *aufgebracht*, in all dictionaries one is forwarded to the verb *aufbringen* (approx. ‘to infuriate’), because there is no entry for *aufgebracht* alone. *Aufbringen*, in all dictionaries under scrutiny alike, is defined as either *in Wut bringen* (approx. ‘to incense’) (Duden, DWDS: s.v. *aufbringen*), or *erzürnen* ‘to enrage’ (Duden, DWB, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*: s.v. *aufbringen*). It appears that *aufgebracht* is a feeling characterized by an upwards movement, a pre-stage for another emotion. Another definition for *aufbringen* contains the words *aufreizen* (approx. ‘to tease/aggravate sb.’) (Duden, DWDS: s.v. *aufbringen*) and *aufregen* (approx. ‘to upset’) (DWB: s.v. *aufbringen*), as well as *erregen* (approx. ‘to excite/arouse’) (*Deutsches Wörterbuch*: s.v. *aufbringen*). From this, it can be deduced that a dictionary definition of *aufgebracht* should read as follows:

Gefühl der inneren Erregung, gekennzeichnet durch Aufregung, wütende Unzufriedenheit, und Gereiztheit [approx. A feeling of inner arousal, characterized by agitation, angry dissatisfaction and irritation].

The native speakers’ understanding of the term adds some interesting characteristics to this relatively broad definition. They specify that *aufgebracht* is a feeling of inner turmoil and nervousness, it appears to be a simultaneous feeling of anger and excitement (in a negative sense) (*aufgeregt* (approx. ‘excited’, nervous’); [*w*]ütend, *erregt im negativen Sinn* (approx. ‘angry’, ‘negatively excited/aroused’); *Eine Mischung zwischen aufgeregt, nervös und sauer/erzürnt* (approx. ‘a mixture between excited, nervous, and annoyed/enraged’); [*i*]nnere Unruhe (approx. ‘inner turmoil’); *Nervosität* ‘nervousness’). It is also reported that being *aufgebracht* frequently results in thoughtless, hectic and expressive behavior because one’s emotions are in charge (*übersprudelnde Emotionen* (approx. ‘brimming over with emotion’); *unüberlegtes Handeln* (approx. ‘rash actions’); *nicht im Gleichgewicht mit sich selber* (approx. ‘feeling unbalanced’); *aktiv* ‘active’; [*h*]ektisch ‘hectic’; *verärgert sich artikulierend* (approx. ‘articulating angrily’); *mit den Händen herumfuchtelnd* (approx. ‘fidgeting with one’s hands’)). This is frequently accompanied by physical discomfort: sweaty palms, increased pulse rate, heat. Most

respondents agree that feeling *aufgebracht* may result from misunderstandings, injustice, insinuations, or unexpected situations.

Synthesizing both the dictionary definitions and the definitions provided by the native speakers, it can be deduced that the category for *aufgebracht* should read as follows:

(4) Category 4: *aufgebracht*

An emotional state of negatively charged agitation, characterized by dissatisfaction, nervousness and inner restlessness, triggered by injustice, insinuations, misunderstandings or unexpected incidents, usually manifested through hectic gesturing or speaking, accompanied sometimes by increased pulse rate and sweaty palms.

6.2.5. *empört*

The last German anger term under scrutiny is *empört* (approx. ‘indignant’), which is, ironically, frequently defined as *aufgebracht* (Duden, DWB: s.v. *empört*; *Das treffende Wort*: s.v. *empört* → *entrüstet*). Also, the verb *empören* (approx. ‘to incense’), the noun *Empörung* (approx. ‘outrage’, ‘indignation’), and the adjective *empört*, are often equated with *entrüsten* (approx. ‘to outrage’) and *entrüstet* (approx. ‘indignant, enraged’) (Duden, DWDS, DWB, *Das treffende Wort*, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*: s.v. *Empörung*, *empören*, *empört*). Generally, feeling *empört* is a reaction to something which is *empörend*, meaning *unerhört*, *skandalös* (approx. ‘outrageous’, ‘scandalous’) or *schändlich*, *abscheulich* (approx. ‘infamous’, ‘abominable’), i.e. *Verstöße gegen moralische Konventionen* (approx. ‘violations of moral conventions’) (Duden: s.v. *Empörung*, *empörend*). *Empören* also means *in aufruhr bringen* (sic; approx. ‘to throw sb. into turmoil’) (DWB: s.v. *empören*), which indicates that *empört* is indeed somewhat similar to *aufgebracht*, in that it is characterized by a sensation of increasing restlessness. From this, the following dictionary definition of *empört* can be deduced:

Gefühl der Entrüstung, charakterisiert durch negative Erregung und Aufregung über etwas das als unerhört, skandalös, oder unmoralisch empfunden wird, verbunden mit dem Bedürfnis, sich dagegen zu widersetzen oder aufzulehnen [approx. A feeling of indignation, characterized by negative excitation and agitation about something which is perceived as unbelievable, scandalous, or immoral, accompanied by the desire to defy the trigger or to revolt against it].

To this definition, the native speakers add some interesting aspects. They consider it as a quite intense feeling of negatively surprised disbelief (*Bestürzung* (approx. ‘dismay’); *kurz aus der Fassung (über die Realität der Situation nicht ganz sicher)* (approx. ‘to be briefly disconcerted (unsure about the reality of the situation)’); [*s*] *chockiert*, *aufreibend*, *außer sich sein*, [...] *fasungslos*, *entsetzt* (approx. ‘shocked, grueling, to be distraught over sth., stunned, appalled’); *moderat wütend* ‘moderately angry’; *sprachlos* ‘speechless’). When questioned about their associations with the word *empört*, most respondents agree that it has to do with suppression,

injustice, and the violation of norm or morale, both privately and publicly (*Verletzung der Norm/ der Moral/ des guten Benehmens* (approx. ‘infringing the norm/morale/good manners’); *Ungereimtheiten, Meinungsverschiedenheiten, Unterdrückung* (approx. ‘inconsistencies, differences in opinion, suppression’); *Politik, Ungerechtigkeit* ‘politics, injustice’; *politische Entscheidungen, soziale Ungerechtigkeiten, Unverschämtheiten, Frechheiten, Gewalt* (approx. ‘political decisions, social injustice, impertinences, insolence, violence’)). The respondents describe their reaction as relatively calm: the situation perceived as *empörend* is usually criticized or discussed in private, sometimes also openly (*Ich beschwere mich, kritisiere die Situation [...], diskutiere, stelle in Frage* ‘I complain, criticize the situation, discuss, call into question’; *schnippisch, aufbrausend* (approx. ‘snippy, cocky, quick-tempered’); *[m]aßregeln, Fehlverhalten aufzeigen, mit anderen Menschen lästern* (approx. ‘disciplining, pointing out misconduct, gossiping with other people’)). Generally, the respondents seem to think rationally and remain relatively reserved (*Körpersprache eher verschlossen, Situation zuerst beobachten, dann ggf. handeln* (approx. ‘body language rather reserved, observing the situation, then, possibly, taking action’); *zurückziehen* (approx. ‘to seclude oneself’)).

From these definitions, the last German category, *empört*, can finally be deduced:

(5) Category 5: *empört*

An emotional state of disbelief, dismay, and consternation, characterized by shock and agitation, triggered by actions, statements or situations perceived as inappropriate, scandalous, unjust, and morally reprehensible, usually manifested in physically visible reservedness and rational, sometimes open criticism of the problem causing the feeling.

6.3. Defining anger-like emotions in English

In this section, five anger-like English emotion terms will be defined: *angry*, *furious*, *annoyed*, *upset*, and *outraged*.⁴⁴ The approach employed is the same as in the previous section: from the synthesis of both dictionary definitions as well as data gathered from native speakers, five emotion categories will be determined.

6.3.1. *angry*

The adjective *angry* and its corresponding noun *anger* are most frequently described as being *annoyed* or feeling *annoyance* (OED, MacMillan, COBUILD, LDCE, MW, Pons: s.v. *anger*, *angry*). In addition, definitions of *angry* and *anger* involve words like *hostility* (OED: s.v. *angry*, *anger*), *animosity* (COBUILD: s.v. *angry*) and *antagonism* (MW: s.v. *anger*) indicating

⁴⁴ The following dictionaries were used: *Oxford English dictionary* (OED), *MacMillan dictionary* (MacMillan), *Collins dictionary* (COBUILD), *Longman dictionary of Contemporary English* (LDCE), *Merriam-Webster* (MW), *PONS Cambridge Dictionary of American English* (Pons).

that the experiencer is feeling some sort of opposition towards the trigger of the anger.⁴⁵ Also, feeling angry involves a sense of *dislike* (COBUILD: s.v. *angry*) and *displeasure* (COBUILD, MW: s.v. *anger*), and is, according to the MacMillan dictionary (s.v. *angry*), *used about people's behaviour*.⁴⁶ Frequently, the feeling is evoked when situations are perceived as *unfair* (MacMillan, COBUILD, LDCE, Pons: s.v. *anger, angry*), *wrong*, and *bad*. As a result of feeling angry one usually has the desire for some kind of active response, like shouting at or hurting the person responsible for the anger (MacMillan, LDCE, MW: s.v. *anger, angry*). From these definition, the following general definition of *angry* can be deduced:

Feeling or showing a very strong, unpleasant emotion, characterized by hostility, which is usually caused by the (bad, unfair, inconsiderate) behavior of a person or results from a situation perceived as unfair, incorrect, or hurtful, and which evokes the urge to react to the cause by hurting the other or shouting.

The English native speakers, just like the German ones, frequently use other anger terms to describe *angry*. Amongst them are *fury, annoyed, enraged, upset, cross, mad*, etc. Frequently, being angry is – similarly as in the dictionaries – associated with hostility and negativity (*connotes hostile actions; Hostile. Violent. Hateful.; I find anger tends to bias focus on negativity. Intentions are assumed to be malevolent. Actions have ulterior motives.*) and may result from displeasure or disappointment with other people's behavior, ranging from smaller inconveniences to deliberate, more serious wrongdoings (*criticism, disappointment, betrayal; Something careless or unnecessary might cause me a flash of anger; people who walk slowly in front of me, or people who don't show much respect; Disrespectful actions*). It is important to note here that it seems that respondents perceive anger to be gradable (*Moderate displeasure; Anger has gradations. Someone could be angry enough to kill, or simply upset with themselves [sic]; [try] not [to] let the anger turn into fury*), and that the intensity depends on what causes the anger. All respondents report that feeling angry is accompanied by an increase in temperature and heart rate, and that one's behavior is more *eccentric* i.e. louder or more aggressive, depending on context and audience.

Taking all definitions into account, it could be deduced that the category for *angry* is defined as follows:

(6) Category 6: *angry*

A strong, unpleasant emotional state, characterized by hostility, impatience, and negativity, triggered by the disrespectful or inconsiderate behavior of other people or inconvenient, unnecessary, or hurtful situations, usually manifested in the urge

⁴⁵ This resembles the definition of *zornig*, see section 6.2.2.

⁴⁶ This, in turn, resembles the definition of *wütend*, see section 6.2.1.

to react to the cause through loud, aggressive behavior and accompanied by physical heat and increased heart rate.

6.3.2. *furious*

When examining the word *furious*, the first thing that becomes obvious is that it appears to be a stronger version of *angry*. Its meaning roughly resembles the meaning of *zornig*, although *zornig* is sometimes also translated as *wrathful* or *angry*, so the translations are somewhat ambiguous. In all dictionaries, *furious* is most frequently described as *extremely angry* or *very angry* (OED, MacMillan, COBUILD, LDCE, MW, Pons: s.v. *furious*) and associated with *violence* (all dictionaries except for LDCE: s.v. *furious*). Hence, in contrast to *angry*, *wütend*, and *zornig*, the word *furious* is rarely defined in terms of its corresponding noun, *fury* (merely in COBUILD: s.v. *furious*). Rather, it is often described as being a powerful, energetic, goading feeling (all dictionaries: s.v. *furious*): *furious* seems to be a more intense version of *angry*. From these definitions, it can be deduced that a dictionary definition of *furious* should read as follows:

Feeling or showing a very intense, extreme emotion, characterized by a sense of violence and an inner drive, which seems to be somewhat impulsive, wild, and unrestrained.

As for all words under examination, the native speaker definitions for *furious* exhibit a great degree of congruence with the official definitions. All respondents agree that feeling furious exceeds feeling angry, in that the former is perceived as much more intense and less controlled than the latter (*Intense anger; beyond angry; Blinding and uncontrollable anger*). Also, it seems to be an emotion which occupies and captures the experiencer entirely, leaving them unable to focus on anything else; one is governed by it and it is compared to an outburst or to natural disasters (*Furious is when anger exceeds logic, and you're under more emotional control [rather than rational control]; extreme emotion; Apoplectic outburst, bursting with rage; scorching hot, [...] tsunami; Steaming anger; livid; irate; Pure hatred toward whatever got me to that point; peak state where I am incapable of thinking about other things. [...] [V]ery intense focus on either the subject matter that made me infuriated, or a complete overwhelming of all other senses and emotion with only the anger remaining*).

As feeling furious seems to involve a loss of control, many respondents also report that their reactions become somewhat violent, aggressive and lack consideration of others and their feelings (*Physical, or verbal abuse; irrational and strictly reacting, no more thoughts; I don't care about how anybody feels or what people think of me; a need to physically vent extra energy; I [...] yell; [I behave] [i]rrationally; [I react] [p]ossibly with negative and hurtful physical and verbal actions; [I behave] [s]ometimes destructive of property; in need of an outlet for extra*

energy). A noteworthy contribution by the native speakers is that the majority claims that the emotion is triggered rarely, and if so only by situations considered as extremely negative and disrespectful, like injustice, getting attacked both psychologically and physically (*on very rare occasions if I get attacked...like overhearing people talk rumours about me or my family; Getting hit in the face really hard*), as well as betrayal (*lies; Betrayal; Being cheated on*). Overall, for it is such an intense emotion, feeling furious appears to be temporary (*I don't think anyone can be furious for very long – the intensity could not be sustained – it would fade to 'anger' or 'disappointment'*).

From the sum of definitions examined above, it appears that the category *furious* should read as follows:

(7) Category 7: *furious*

An extremely intense, blinding, and overpowering emotional state, characterized by hatred and violence, triggered by disrespectful and unjust actions like betrayal, lies or physical and psychological assaults, usually manifested in intense physical heat and impulsive, unrestrained, potentially violent or destructive behavior and complete disregard for one's surroundings.

6.3.3. *annoyed*

In the case of the adjective *annoyed*, one can – as for *furious* – observe that it seems to be a kind of anger, albeit in this case at the other end of the scale of intensity. In all but one dictionary, *annoyed* is defined as *slightly angry* or *fairly angry* (*OED, MacMillan, COBUILD, LDCE, Pons*: s.v. *annoyed*), i.e. feeling annoyed seems to be a less intense type of anger. To this, most dictionaries add a component of *irritation* or *impatience* (*OED, MacMillan, COBUILD, LDCE*: s.v. *annoyed*). A dictionary definition of *annoyed* would, therefore, be quite straightforward:

Feeling or showing an emotion which is essentially a mitigated version of angry, characterized by irritation or impatience about something; slightly angry.

The native speaker intuitions for this word are particularly interesting. All respondents concur when arguing that feeling annoyed is unpleasant; one feels uncomfortable or frustrated, as feeling annoyed involves being irritated, bothered, or teased by something or someone (*Feeling irritated; Redundant, vexed, not likeable; to be bothered, uncomfortable; Slight displeasure towards someone or something; nagged, not left alone, bothered*). While only two respondents use the words *anger* and *angrily* to describe feelings of annoyance, overall, the responses indicate that all respondents behave and think somewhat angrily when annoyed (cf. section 6.3.1), in that they swear or behave rudely, must make an effort to restrain themselves, and feel physically tense (*[I think,] Are you fucking serious?; I think, 'Take a deep breath and relax'; my shoulders feel tense, my teeth clench; I behave very impatiently and rude*). The main difference

to feeling angry, however, is that the element of hostility is not explicitly mentioned. While an annoyed person – just as an angry one – might have the urge to react to the cause of the feeling, the way in which this happens is usually more controlled than when resulting from anger. Respondents comment that when annoyed, they are ruder and more impatient than usual (*[I behave] [s]hort tempered, bitchy, impatient, frustrated; complaining and self-pity; I behave very impatiently and rude towards the person annoying me*); also, they think about how they want the feeling, as well as the cause of it, to go away and are thus relatively quiet (*I think that it would be nice if I could change these circumstances/change people; I think about the fact that I [...] want that feeling to go away; I think the thing, or person annoying me needs to go away; stop the behavior, or activity annoying me; I [...] remove myself from the situation; [I think of] [h]ow to make whatever it is stop; Lethargic, limp; disengaged; Calm and quiet*). Finally, it is frequently mentioned that the feeling is easily noticeable through a person's body language, visibly indicating annoyance, i.e. through rolling one's eyes (*My eyes get wide/I roll them; Eye rolling, sighing; eye roll, arms fold; I frown and if it is an annoying sound, I cringe or my ears twitch*). Triggers for this behavior are usually minor: inconvenient or unexpected situations or circumstances as well as behaviors, things or utterances that are considered redundant and irritating (*when I am trying to do something and somebody interferes; getting a bad grade on an assignment; the sound of a mosquito buzzing in my ear; When someone says something unnecessary or rude; When someone is talking too much nonsense. When somebody keeps joking but they're not funny; People keep talking to [sic] much or doing something that is excessive and not needed; people who act like they know it all*).

A summary of all definitions of *annoyed* would result in the following category:

(8) Category 8: *annoyed*

An unpleasant emotional state of frustration, characterized by irritation and discomfort, triggered a) by inconvenient or unexpected situations or circumstances, or b) by things or utterances considered unnecessary and bothersome, usually manifested in impatient, mildly rude behavior, and body language indicative of the feeling.

6.3.4. *upset*

The word *upset* was chosen because it is somewhat similar to and one of the translations of both *aufgebracht* (in the sense of being agitated) and *verärgert* (in the sense of being in a bad, anger-like mood). Under closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the meaning of *upset* does not only differ substantially from *verärgert* and *aufgebracht*, but also from the other English and German anger terms. In contrast to them, *upset* seems to be a peripheral member of the anger category, in that it is primarily described in terms of sadness or worry, and only secondarily connected to feelings of anger, i.e. *unhappy, disappointed, or worried* (OED: s.v. *upset*),

very *sad*, *worried*, or *angry* (MacMillan: s.v. *upset*). Similar definitions can be found in *COBUILD*, *MW* and *Pons*. Generally, *upset* seems to signify being in emotional distress (*COBUILD*, *MW*: s.v. *upset*), and – if one assumes that emotion is a continuum – the word *upset* appears to be located somewhere in its middle, between the terms *anger* and *sadness*. A comprehensive dictionary definition of the term *upset* should read as follows:

Feeling or showing a somewhat frustrating emotion of distress, characterized by worry, sadness, and disappointment or sometimes anger, triggered by unpleasant or disappointing experiences.

The native speakers' definitions concur relatively well with the official definitions, although the respondents seem to more distinctly categorize *upset* as belonging to the basic-level category *sadness*. Most respondents associate feeling *upset* with feeling *sad*, crying, worrying, experiencing disappointment (by oneself or others), or disappointing someone else (*A negative emotion felt when one is let down by something; distressed, worried, and unhappy; associated with disappointing your parents, then further with letting someone or yourself down; sad, crying; agitated, red or white-faced; I do not feel like eating or doing anything fun*). Often, being *upset* appears to involve rumination over the trigger, resulting in an aggravation of the feeling or even self-doubt (*[W]hy did this happen? [H]ow can I get rid of this feeling?; I re-think the situation [...]. I think of OTHER sad things and then feel overwhelmingly sad; I think of self-sabotaging thoughts, that people think badly of me and my ideas, or that things aren't 'perfect' and therefore not worth focusing on*) and quiet, pensive behavior, as well as the desire to be alone (*sad, crying, frustrated, let down; Sad, lull, introverted; irritable, quiet, and annoyed; I shut down and do not want to talk to other people, like to lay alone and listen to sad music, let out the tears*). One person indicates that they would behave more actively, visibly distressed, and hasty, depending on where they are and who they are surrounded with (*Some people would be very expressive, while others would become introverted – this can be different, depending on the environment (i.e. [a]t work in a professional role vs. at home) and who is around them (strangers vs. close family and friends); Distressed, hard-to-understand, fast [...], garbled speech, pacing, racing thoughts*). These responses are consistent with the observation that the experience and externalization of emotion varies person-internally, with context and with environment (see section 4.1). Generally, feeling *upset* seems to be somewhat private; an emotion which is only reluctantly shown. It could be assumed that this stems from the fact that feeling *upset* appears to be closely related to feeling *sad* or *vulnerable*, which is – speaking from experience – something many people are uncomfortable to concede.

Finally, it is possible to deduce the following category for *upset*:

(9) Category 9: *upset*

A negative, somewhat frustrating emotion of distress, characterized by worry, sadness, or nervous tension, triggered when a) one experiences disappointing, unexpected, or burdening situations, or b) disappoints someone else or oneself, usually manifested in quiet, introvert, and pensive behavior.

6.3.5. *outraged*

The last emotion term examined, *outraged*, seems to be the strongest realization of anger-like emotions. To a certain extent, it resembles German *empört* and does seem to be related to English *furious*; still, in some semantic components, *outraged* does differ slightly from both *empört* and *furious*.

Except for *COBUILD*, none of the dictionaries used have entries for *outraged*, so the examples used were all obtained from the entries for the corresponding noun *outrage* (a person who is outraged is someone feeling outrage). Most dictionaries describe outrage as an extreme emotion, usually as an in-between sentiment of anger and shock, some also mention *indignation* (*OED*, *MacMillan*, *COBUILD*, *LDCE*, *MW*, *Pons*: s.v. *outrage*). Upon closer scrutiny, it becomes clear that an act referred to as an outrage is *an act of violence or brutality which violates accepted standards of behavior or taste* (*MW*: s.v. *outrage*), i.e. *a gross violation of decency, morality, honour, etc* (*COBUILD*: s.v. *outrage*). According to the *Merriam Webster* (s.v. *outrage*), *outrage* is legally defined as *the tort of intentionally inflicting emotional distress*; also, outrage can stem from *grave offense* (*ibid.*). Based on these descriptions, a dictionary definition of *outraged* should read as follows:

Feeling or showing an extremely strong emotion of shock, anger, and indignation which is usually caused by an act perceived as violating, offending, and endangering agreed upon standards of human coexistence (morality, decency, dignity) through, for instance, acts of violence and cruelty or offensive, intentionally hurtful, and vicious behavior.

The analysis of the native speakers' definitions revealed that almost all respondents describe *outraged* as a type of anger, graded in terms of intensity (*Feeling insulted to the point of losing one's temper; the state of extreme anger; anger that is almost uncontrollable; highest intensity AND energy level of negative feelings*). The element of shock indicated in the dictionaries is mentioned by only one respondent (*shocked, disbelief, upset*). Feeling outraged is considered as extremely intense, sometimes even more intense than feeling furious (*losing one's temper with possible physical violence or screaming out in defiance; even more than '[f]urious'; passed the 'boiling point'; there is no control left*). Similar as for *furious*, outraged behavior is described as uncontrolled, thoughtless, and irrational (*losing one's temper; 'snapping'. Pressure becomes unbearable and there is no control left; Pure reactions, ZERO rational thoughts*;

black out; Not much thoughts involved. Consequences are no longer considered.; no control over your thoughts or actions).

A meaning component not included in the definition of *furios* is a sense of being beside oneself when outraged; various respondents comment that they associate feeling outraged with being *mad*, or with behaving *completely out of character*, they describe that their *emotional intelligence shuts down* and that they must tell themselves to *[s]tay calm* in order not to *get too crazy*. Also, the triggers to feeling outraged differ from the ones that trigger feeling furious. Although it is possible to be outraged about everyday occurrences (*domestic turmoil; disrespect or maltreatment to oneself or [one's] loved ones; continually being angered by the same thing; when students refuse to listen and are disrespectful; Previously angering behaviors to the highest degree that I expected to end*), usually, one is outraged about injustice, disrespect, or maltreatment, particularly when committed by larger organizations or institutions, i.e. higher instances against which it is difficult to revolt against as an individual alone, like a government, religion, corporations, etc. (*invaded or insulted or treated without justice; wronged; [It may be triggered by] the way one is treated by government policies and their employees and other organizations such as health care, employers, religion, or suppliers of products or services; Witnessing injustices that violate the strongest of moral standards; Shocking events with very impactful and emotional results; injustices and hypocrisies committed by large organizations like governments, corporations and most organized religions*). Two respondents even give specific examples for such outrageous actions, one involving weapon supply, the other gun laws (*I have always felt outraged by the US Government's involvement in wars overseas killing or supplying the weapons to kill other human beings in various parts of the world I have nothing against; After witnessing another mass shooting, citizens of the town were outraged by the relaxed gun laws*).

One respondent provided an interesting comment: they argue that *[o]utrage is like a fire inside which helps ignite defense mechanisms* and that it is an aspiration *to maintain one's personal freedom, identity and choices of the way of life they choose*. Hence, it is unsurprising that also other respondents say that feeling outraged comes with a desire for revenge or retribution. Lastly, with regards to behavior, responses vary: some people seem to only feel outrage and do not show it (*Melancholy, distant; I am calm on the outside but internally I am irate*), while others are actively and visibly distressed. From these numerous descriptions, the category for *outraged* should thus read as follows:

Category 10: *outraged*

An extreme, barely containable emotional state of shock and indignation, characterized by a sense of being ‘beside oneself’, triggered by disrespectful, unjust, or abusive actions – frequently on the part of official institutions – which violate the morality, decency and dignity of other people (i.e. the government allowing violence), manifested in a desire to seek revenge and the need to defend oneself against, destroy or reject the source of the feeling

6.4. Concluding remarks

In the previous sections, an attempt has been made to identify the meaning of ten anger terms in English and German by comparing and merging dictionary entries in 11 dictionaries with the collective understanding of 50 native speaking respondents. To conclude this chapter, some observations worthy of special mention will be summarized.

Perhaps most surprising is the fact that although some of the selected anger terms are – at first sight – very much alike, native speakers do intuitively perceive the subtle differences in meanings which distinguish the words from one another. When defining the words, many were described using other anger terms, indicating that the respondents do notice a resemblance between the concepts; when considering reactions or triggers, however, the semantic differences did become clear. Although the anecdotes, sentences, and associated ideas reported were individually different, it was possible to recognize general trends. Hence, while it may be difficult for native speakers to actively and precisely state what the difference between, for instance, *wütend* and *zornig* is, their intuitions associated with the words reveal that they unconsciously do make semantic distinctions, enabling a deduction of different categories.

Another aspect worthy of mention is that it is striking how difficult a clear categorization of emotions is, confirming precisely what has been outlined in the theoretical part of this paper: the meanings of the anger terms under investigation are not only visibly dynamic (stemming from individual understandings of and experiences with the words), but also somewhat slippery, to put it in Labov’s words (see section 2.3.2). When confronted with the task to define emotion concepts, numerous respondents reported that it was difficult and somewhat annoying for them to not be able to clearly and irrevocably state what, for instance, *wütend* means. This confirms Taylor’s (2003: xi) observation that we are essentially “categorizing creatures” and that the inability to categorize unproblematically makes us uncomfortable, and Lakoff’s (1987: 6) claim that we only become consciously aware of categorization when it causes difficulty (see section 2.2). Still, it is remarkable that even though emotions are inherently individual, difficult to grasp experiences, the respondents seemed to associate similar things with each of the words under scrutiny. While the externalization of emotions tends to vary substantially according to person,

context, and surroundings, there seems to be general consent as to which categories comprise which main meaning components.

Finally, the translational non-equivalence of the selected terms deserves of special mention. When considering the categories established for the German and English terms respectively, it appears that cross-linguistically, the conceptualization of anger-like feelings does seem to be somewhat similar. It is tempting to believe, then, that translation is unproblematic. In reality, however, this is rarely the case. Let us consider words such as *upset* and *aufgebracht*, for instance. Translations for *upset* range from *aufgebracht* to *bestürzt* (approx. ‘shocked’, ‘bewildered’) to *verärgert* to *traurig* ‘sad’, while translations for *aufgebracht* range from *upset* to *furious* to *incensed* to *angry*.⁴⁷ It is therefore not only unlikely that *upset* and *aufgebracht* should be exact equivalents, but also that they should have an exact equivalent in the respective other language at all. This is plausible when considering both the fact that the translations for the words differ substantially according to search direction, as well as the fact that under close examination, clear differences in their semantic content can be discerned. The same is true for *verärgert*, which is in equal measures translatable as *upset*, *angry*, and *annoyed*; none of the translations, however, precisely capture what the category *verärgert* means. When examining the translations for *annoyed*, entries reach from *verärgert* to *gereizt*, while intuitively, it seems likely that most German native speakers would translate *annoyed* as *genervt*. Even for words which appear to have a simpler, less language-specific semantic structure, translations are ambiguous. Basic-level terms like *angry*, for instance, can be translated as *wütend*, *zornig*, or *verärgert*; it is unclear which one most closely matches the meaning of *angry*. As Durst (2001: 116) mentions, “*anger/angry* seems to cover a wider range of use than each of the German words in question” [original emphasis], which can be confirmed considering particularly the native speaker responses (i.e. anger can be provoked when someone walks slowly, see section 6.3.1). Also, meaning elements of both *zornig* and *wütend* overlap with elements belonging to the category *angry*, making it difficult to clearly argue which translation is more accurate. These observations are in line with what Wierzbicka and Harkins (2001: 3) observe when comparing the word *angry* in English and *colère*, the French “equivalent” (see section 4.3.3.2). Section III of the main study is aimed at elucidating further whether and if so, how non-native speakers perceive such translational obstacles (see section 7.4).

In conclusion, it seems that English anger terms seem to be very clearly graded in terms of intensity, *angry* being the most basic term. The scale reaches from *outraged* and *furious* as the

⁴⁷ All translations used in this paragraph were obtained using the online dictionary *dict.cc*.

most intense terms, to *annoyed* which is less strong, and eventually to *upset*, which seems to be a marginal example of the overall anger-category. For German terms, it is more difficult to see an internal structure; *wütend* and *zornig* could potentially both be considered basic-level terms. *Empört*, *aufgebracht*, and *verärgert* do not really appear to be as clearly graded as the English words; rather, they seem to be less intense kinds of *Wut* and *Zorn*. Also, many of the more complex terms are defined in terms of basic-level terms, which concurs with what has been theorized in part I of this thesis (cf. section 4.3.1).

7. Data analysis and results of the main study

In the present chapter, the data obtained in the main study will be presented and summarized. Section 7.1 provides background information on the sample, sections 7.2 to 7.5 constitute a summary of the findings. The questionnaire was piloted with four respondents who were included in the sample.

7.1. Demographical information

As has been explained in section 5.2, the sample surveyed comprises 25 respondents. In the following, the sample will briefly be described in some more detail.

7.1.1. Age & Gender

This section describes both age and gender distribution of the sample. Figure 4 illustrates the age distribution.




Figure 4: Age distribution of the sample

The age of the sample under examination ranged from 18 to 28 years. The largest part of respondents, approximately 46%, were between the age of 22 and 25. About 21% of the respondents were 26 years old or older. Approximately 33% of all respondents were 21 years old or younger. Notably, first-year students made up the entirety of this group. Of those who were between the ages of 22 and 25, only about 17% of the respondents were first-year students, and 29% were final-year students. The majority of final-year students made up the 21% of respondents who indicated that they were older than 26 years old; only 4% of the first-year students

were older than 27 years. 80% of the respondents stated that they were female, 20% that they were male.

7.1.2. Nationality & native language

The only requirements to participate in the study were (a) being an EFL student at the University of Vienna and (b) having German as one's native language; therefore, the entirety of the sample consists of Austrians with German as their native language. Only two respondents stated that they have more than one native language, namely English and Italian.⁴⁸

7.1.3. Proficiency level

To determine the proficiency level of the respondents as effectively as possible, the respondents were asked to indicate the number of semesters studied at the Vienna Department for English and American Studies, the number of years for which they had been learning English, as well as whether they had lived in an English-speaking country or not.

As has been mentioned in section 5.2, the respondents for the study were obtained via stratified random sampling. Via this method, it was possible to obtain an almost even number of students for two groups: one group consisted of 13 students who had been studying English for two semesters or less (first-year students), the other of 12 students who had been studying English for nine or more semesters (final-year students).⁴⁹ The group of first-year students hence amounts to 52% of the sample, the group of final-year students to 48%.

The curriculum of the Vienna Department for English and American studies states that ideally, upon finishing their studies, students of English and American studies should have reached a C1 or C2 proficiency level (according to the levels defined in the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR)) (Universität Wien 2016: 2). At the beginning of their studies, before being able to participate in classes on language competence, students must have a B2+ proficiency level (also according to the CEFR), certified by passing the Vienna English Language Test (VELT) (Universität Wien 2016: 5). It is, therefore, assumed that the group of first-year students exhibits an estimated official proficiency level of B2, while the group of final-year students exhibits an estimated official proficiency level of C1+ or C2.

⁴⁸ The person with English as their second native language is known to have grown up in Austria, however.

⁴⁹ The responses varied from 9 to 14 semesters, to be precise.

Figure 5 illustrates the responses to the question as to how many years the students had been learning English.




Figure 5: I have been learning English for ____ years

In general, the respondents' answers could be divided into three groups: they had been learning English either between 9 to 12 years, between 13 to 16 years, or for more than 17 years. In total, the majority of respondents (64%) stated that they had been learning English for more than 13 years: 36% indicated numbers between 13 and 16, 28% numbers at or over 17. 36% of the respondents stated that they had been learning English for 9 to 12 years; the entirety of this group consists of first-year students, none of the final-year students gave responses of the kind. Of the 36% of respondents who indicated that they had been learning English for 13 to 16 years were more final-year students than first-year students (24% and 12% respectively), which was also true for the 28% of respondents who indicated that they had been learning English for more than 17 years: 24% of the respondents in this group were final-year students, and only 4% were first-year students.

Figure 6 shows the sample's responses to the question whether they had or had not lived in an English-speaking country before.




Figure 6: I have lived in an English-speaking country

The majority of the sample, 72%, indicated that they had not lived in an English-speaking country before, only 28% of the sample stated that they had done so. Of those who selected “Yes” as an answer were more final-year students (20%) than first-year students (8%). Among the 72% of respondents who indicated they had not lived in an English-speaking country before were more first-year students (44%) than final-year students (28%).

From this – as expected – it is possible to argue that the group of first-year students has been less intensely exposed to the English language than the final-year students: not only have they been learning – and studying – English for less time than the final-year students, but also did most of them not learn and study English in an English-speaking country. The greater exposure to the English language in terms of language learning both within and outside of English-speaking countries, in addition to the fact that this group is older than the other one, makes it (though only tentatively, of course) possible to consider the group of final-year students as better acquainted with and hence more proficient in English than the group of first-year students.

7.2. Results of section I

In the following, the results of section I will be presented. The question format was single choice; the respondents had to choose the best definition out of four for a given English anger

term. The response options for all five items comprised two definitions of English anger terms, and two definitions of German anger terms; only one definition adequately described the word in question. Two versions of the test were administered to half of the sample each. The respondents in Test A were given items 1, 2, and 3; 6 of the respondents were first-year students, the other 6 were final-year students. The respondents in Test B were given items 4 and 5; 7 of the respondents were first-year students, and 6 were final-year students.

Table 2 illustrates the responses obtained for item 1 of section I (Test A).⁵⁰

Table 2: Item 1, section I

1) The word <i>angry</i> is most adequately described as...	First-year students	Final-year students	Total (100%)
Definition <i>outraged</i>	0%	0%	0%
Definition <i>wütend</i>	25%	17%	42%
Definition <i>angry</i>	17%	25%	42%
Definition <i>verärgert</i>	8%	8%	16%

In total, the sample selected the definitions for German *wütend* and English *angry* in equal measures (42% each) as the best description of English *angry*. 16% of the sample considered the definition of German *verärgert* as the best answer. Of the 42% of respondents who selected the correct definition for English *angry*, 25% were final-year students, while only 17% were in their first year of studies. Among the 42% of respondents who chose German *wütend* as the best answer option were more first-year students (25%) than final-year students (17%). Half of the respondents who chose the definition for German *verärgert* were first-year students, the other half final-year students (8% each). None of the respondents chose the definition for German *outraged*.

The responses for item 2 of section I (Test A) are illustrated in Table 3.⁵¹

Table 3: Item 2, section I

2) The word <i>upset</i> is most adequately described as...	First-year students	Final-year students	Total (100%)
Definition <i>upset</i>	33%	8%	42%
Definition <i>annoyed</i>	17%	0%	17%
Definition <i>zornig</i>	0%	8%	8%
Definition <i>aufgebracht</i>	0%	33%	33%

⁵⁰ For reasons of transparency and better readability, the category definitions are here substituted by the terms they describe; the response option in bold is the correct response. The complete questionnaire, as it was administered to the sample, can be found in the Appendix. Also, note that the word “correct” here only indicates that this is the definition which – according to dictionary and native speaker definitions – best describes the word; it does not prescribe how the word must be defined.

⁵¹ Note, here, that the percentages in the first two columns are rounded: hence the incongruity of numbers. This also applies to most of the tables below.

In total, 42% of the sample selected the correct definition for English *upset*. 33% of the sample considered the definition for German *aufgebracht* as the best answer option, 17% selected German *annoyed*, and 8% German *zornig*. Interestingly, among the 42% of respondents who chose the correct definition were more first-year students (33%) than final-year students (8%). The bigger proportion of final-year students, instead, seemed to consider the definition of German *aufgebracht* as best describing English *upset* (33%), which none of the first-year student selected as the best answer. Also, none of the first-year students chose the definition of German *zornig*, while 8% of the final-year students did. 17% of the first-year students chose the definition for English *annoyed* instead, which none of the final-year students did.

Table 4 outlines the responses to item 3 of section I (Test A).

Table 4: Item 3, section I

3) The word <i>outraged</i> is most adequately described as ...	First-year students	Final-year students	Total (100%)
Definition <i>furious</i>	25%	33%	58%
Definition <i>empört</i>	8%	8%	17%
Definition <i>outraged</i>	17%	8%	25%
Definition <i>verärgert</i>	0%	0%	0%

Remarkably, the majority of the sample (58%) considered the definition for English *furious* as most adequately describing English *outraged*. Only 25% of the sample chose the correct definition, and 17% chose the definition for German *empört*. Interestingly, again, of the 25% of respondents who selected the correct definition for English *outraged* were more first-year than final-year students: 17% of the first-year students selected the correct option, while only 8% of the final-year students did. The final-year students, instead, made up the bigger part of respondents who selected the definition for *furious*, namely 33%; 25% of the first-year students chose this option. Both groups in equal measures (8%) selected German *empört*, while none of the respondents chose German *verärgert*.

In Table 5, the results for item 4 of section I are outlined.⁵²

Table 5: Item 4, section I

1) The word <i>furious</i> is most adequately described as ...	First-year students	Final-year students	Total (100%)
Definition <i>aufgebracht</i>	8%	15%	23%
Definition <i>furious</i>	8%	23%	31%
Definition <i>upset</i>	0%	8%	8%
Definition <i>zornig</i>	38%	0%	38%

⁵² Here numbered as 1, as it was done in Test B.

In total, only 31% of the sample chose the correct definition for English *furious*. Instead, 38% of the sample considered German *zornig* as the best definition, and another 23% German *aufgebracht*. The smallest part of the sample (8%) selected English *upset*. Of the 31% of respondents who chose the correct definition, most respondents were final-year students (23%), only 8% of the first-year students chose the correct option. The entirety of the 38% of respondents who selected German *zornig* as the best definition consisted of first-year students. Among the 23% of respondents who selected German *aufgebracht* were more final- (15%) than first-year students (8%). The 8% of respondents who selected English *upset* as the best definition were all final-year students.

Finally, Table 6 illustrates the results for item 5 of section I.⁵³

Table 6: Item 5, section I

2) The word <i>annoyed</i> is most adequately described as ...	First-year students	Final-year students	Total (100%)
Definition <i>annoyed</i>	31%	46%	77%
Definition <i>empört</i>	0%	0%	0%
Definition <i>angry</i>	23%	0%	23%
Definition <i>wütend</i>	0%	0%	0%

In this item, the majority of the sample, 77%, agreed on the correct definition for English *annoyed*. Only 23% of the respondents selected the definition for English *angry*. Of those who selected the correct response, 46% were final-year students, and 31% were first-year students. The 23% of the sample who selected English *angry* were all first-year students. Both the definitions for German *empört* and German *wütend* were not selected by any respondents.

7.3. Results of section II

In this section the results of section II (5 items) will be presented. Again, the question format was single choice; this time, however, the respondents were provided with an English sentence in which the anger term was blanked out.⁵⁴ Five English anger terms were given as response options; the respondents had to select the option which was correct in the given context. This time, the respondents in Test A were given items 1 and 2; the respondents in Test B were given items 3, 4, and 5.

⁵³ Here numbered as 2, as it was done in Test B.

⁵⁴ All sentences were retrieved from the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) (Davies 2008).

Table 7 illustrates the responses to item 1 in section II.⁵⁵

Table 7: Item I, section II

4) “Certainly this must be about my tardies, I thought as I walked to the principal's office, they do merit my being called to the principal's office. I remember a patch of the floor was sticky, and I was _____ because I had just gotten new shoes and I didn't want to mess them up” (COCA).	First-year students	Final-year students	Total (100%)
<i>angry</i>	0%	0%	0%
<i>upset</i>	8%	0%	8%
<i>outraged</i>	0%	0%	0%
<i>furious</i>	0%	0%	0%
<i>annoyed</i>	42%	50%	92%

In total, 92% of the sample selected the correct word, *annoyed*, for the sentence in question. Only 8% of the sample considered the word *upset* as the best answer. Of those respondents who selected the correct answer, 50% were final-year students, 42% were first-year students. The 8% of the sample who chose the term *upset* as the best answer consisted only of first-year students. None of the other answers were selected.

In Table 8, the responses to item 2 of section II are presented.⁵⁶

Table 8: Item 2, section II

5) “‘I'm glad they finally tied the knot. I was a little worried because... well, you know.’ Abigail nodded. Joanna and Andrew were supposed to marry last October, shortly after she'd returned from Middlefield, but her sister had called off the wedding at the last minute. At the time Abigail had been _____. How could Joanna throw away the love of a good man who wanted to marry her?’” (COCA)	First-year students	Final-year students	Total (100%)
<i>angry</i>	8%	0%	8%
<i>upset</i>	8%	17%	25%
<i>outraged</i>	17%	8%	25%
<i>furious</i>	8%	25%	34%
<i>annoyed</i>	8%	0%	8%

For this item, in total, 34% of the sample selected the correct answer, *furious*. In equal measures, the sample considered the words *upset* and *outraged* as the best fit for the sentence in question (25% each). The same applied for the words *angry* and *annoyed*, which were selected by 8% of the sample each. Of the 34% of respondents who chose the correct answer, the majority (25%) were final-year students, only 8% of the first-year students selected the correct response. Of the 25% of respondents who selected the term *outraged*, the bigger proportion were first-year

⁵⁵ Here numbered as 4, as it was done in Test A.

⁵⁶ Here numbered as 5, as it was done in Test A.

students (17%); only 8% of the final-year students selected this option. The reverse was true for the term *upset*: of the 25% of respondents who selected this term, 17% were final-year students, and 8% first-year students. All responses obtained for the words *angry* and *annoyed* were given by first-year students.

In Table 9, we can see the results for item 3 of section II (Test B).

Table 9: Item 3, section II

3) “Her parents had read a magazine article about renovating Colonial trade houses and had snapped up this building, and now they were constantly yelling at Patricia not to run indoors or scratch any of the perfect oak furnishings, until their foreheads showed veins. Patricia's parents were the sort of people who could be in a good mood and _____ at almost the same time” (COCA).	First-year students	Final-year students	Total (100%)
<i>angry</i>	8%	15%	23%
<i>upset</i>	23%	0%	23%
<i>outraged</i>	8%	8%	16%
<i>furious</i>	15%	15%	30%
<i>annoyed</i>	0%	8%	8%

In total, the largest part of the sample (30%) selected the word *furious* as the best answer for the sentence in question, only 23% of the sample selected the correct option, *angry*. Another 23% of the total sample selected the term *upset* as the best answer. 16% of the sample considered the term *outraged* as the best option, 8% chose the word *annoyed*. Among the 23% of respondents who selected the correct answer option were more final-year students (15%) than first-year students (8%). The part of the sample which chose the word *furious* as the best answer consists of first- and final-year students in equal measures (15% each); this is also the case for the part of the sample which selected the term *outraged* as the best option (8% each). The entirety of the 8% of respondents who selected the term *annoyed* consists of final-year students, and all respondents who chose *upset* were first-year students (23%).

Table 10 illustrates the responses given for item 4 of section II (Test B).

Table 10: Item 4, section II

4) “‘So, your cousin hasn’t been attentive to your demands as the mother of the child.’ ‘No. She’s been defiant and unpredictable, going on errands she doesn’t care to explain and snapping at me when I ask where she’s been.’ ‘It sounds like she has some reason to be _____,’ I said. ‘Of course she does, and I’d like to give her space to deal with her... grief, if that’s the right word for it.’” (COCA)	First-year students	Final-year students	Total (100%)
<i>angry</i>	15%	0%	15%
<i>upset</i>	31%	38%	69%
<i>outraged</i>	0%	0%	0%
<i>furious</i>	0%	0%	0%
<i>annoyed</i>	8%	8%	16%

Overall, 69% of the sample selected the correct option for the sentence in question, *upset*. 16% of the sample chose the word *annoyed*; another 15% of the sample selected the term *angry*. Of the 69% of respondents who selected the correct option, 38% were final-year students, 31% were first-year students. The 8% of the sample who selected the term *angry* consisted of first-year students only. Half of the first-year and half of the final-year students (8% each) constitute the 16% of the sample who chose the word *annoyed* as the best answer option. Neither the term *outraged* nor the term *furious* were chosen by any respondents.

Finally, in Table 11, the results for item 5 of section II (Test B) are outlined.

Table 11: Item 5, section II

5) “‘I kept calling back, but Louis kept hanging up on me. Then he stopped answering the phone at all. I went over there to see my son, to talk to Louis... and he wouldn’t let me in. He kept calling me a stupid bitch, a cheap tramp, a gold-digging slut. He spit at me. ‘What?’ Camille was _____” (COCA).	First-year students	Final-year students	Total (100%)
<i>angry</i>	8%	0%	8%
<i>upset</i>	0%	0%	0%
<i>outraged</i>	31%	15%	46%
<i>furious</i>	15%	31%	46%
<i>annoyed</i>	0%	0%	0%

Of the total sample, 46% of the respondents selected the correct answer option, *outraged*, for the sentence in question. Another 46%, however, selected the term *furious* as the best fit, and 8% of the sample considered the word *angry* as most appropriate. Notably, of the 46% of respondents who selected the correct response, 31% were first-year students; only 15% of the final-year students selected this option. On the contrary, of the 46% of respondents who chose the word *furious* as the best option, the bigger part were respondents of the final-year group

(31%), while only 15% of the first-year students selected this word. The 8% of respondents who decided on the term *angry* as the best answer were all first-year students. The respondents selected neither the term *annoyed* nor the term *upset*.

7.4. Results of section III

In the present section, the results obtained in section III of the questionnaire will be illustrated and explained. This section was the same for the respondents in both tests; the sample thus comprises 25 respondents, 13 of which were first-year students (52% of the sample), and 12 of which were final-year students (48% of the sample). The item format is single choice, though – strictly speaking – there is no correct answer. The respondents had to indicate which German word they considered the translational equivalent for a given English anger term. In total, five items were tested, with five response options each. The aim of this section was to recognize a tendency in how German speakers translate English anger terms and find out which items could be considered problematic in terms of correspondence.

Figure 7 below illustrates the responses given for item 1 in section III, *angry*.




Figure 7: Item 1, section III

In total, 48% of the sample agreed that *angry* best translates as *wütend*. 28% of the sample chose *verärgert*, while 24% chose *zornig* as the best translation for *angry*. None of the respondents selected *aufgebracht* or *empört*. Among the 48% of respondents who selected *wütend* as the best translation were more first- than final-year students (28% and 20% respectively).

Verärgert, the response option with the second highest percentage (28%) was also selected by more first- than final-year students (20% and 8% respectively). *Zornig*, by contrast, selected by 24% of the respondents, consisted mostly of respondents in the group of final-year students (20%); only a small percentage of the respondents in the group of first-year students selected this option (4%). Comparing the group of first-year students and the group of final-year students, it can be said that while the responses of the first-year students indicate that they consider *wütend* and *verärgert* as the best translation for *angry*, the responses of the group of final-year students indicate that they perceive *angry* as translating equally well as *wütend* and *zornig*. Overall, however, *wütend* could be considered as the best translation for *angry*.

In Figure 8, the responses for the second item in section III, *furious*, are outlined.




Figure 8: Item 2, section III

The total sample, as this figure illustrates, translated *furious* most frequently as *zornig* (52%). *Wütend* was the word with the second highest percentage; it was chosen by 32% of all respondents. Only 12% of the sample selected *aufgebracht*, and 4% chose *empört*. None of the respondents selected *verärgert*. Of the 52% of respondents who considered *zornig* as the best translation for *furious*, 28% were first-, 24% final-year students. Of the 32% of respondents who indicated that *furious* best translates as *wütend*, a higher percentage were final-year students (20%); only 12% of the first-year students selected this response. More first-year students (8%) than final-year students (4%) translated *furious* as *aufgebracht*; 4% of the first-year students chose *empört*,

which was selected by none of the final-year students. In comparison, the responses imply that the first-year students more distinctly translate *furious* as *zornig*, while the final-year students seem to be undecided between *zornig* and *wütend*. Two other answer options, *aufgebracht* and *empört*, were selected by a small part of the respondents only, most of which were first-year students.

Figure 9 illustrates the responses for item 3 in section III, *outraged*.




Figure 9: Item 3, section III

In total, 64% of the sample chose *empört* as the best translation for *outraged*. A smaller percentage of respondents selected the term *wütend* (16%), *zornig* and *aufgebracht* were chosen by 8% of the sample respectively, and 4% of the respondents selected *verärgert*. Among the 64% of respondents who selected *empört* were 36% of the final-year students and 28% of the first-year students. *Wütend* was the word with the second highest percentage; most of the respondents who chose this word were first-year students (12%), only 4% of the final-year students considered this the best translation for *outraged*. The 8% of respondents who selected *aufgebracht* as the best translation were final-year students. All responses for *zornig* and *verärgert* were given by first-year students (8% and 4% respectively). Comparing these results, it can be deduced that generally, both groups of respondents agree that *outraged* best translates as *empört*. Most of the respondents who decided on other translations were first-year students

(24% in total), only 12% of the group of final-year students selected other translations than *empört*.

In Figure 10, we can see the responses for item 4 in section III, *upset*.




Figure 10: Item 4, section III

Most respondents (84%) selected *aufgebracht* as the best translation for *upset*. 12% of the sample selected *verärgert*, and only 4% *zornig*; none of the other responses were chosen. Among the 84% of respondents who selected *aufgebracht* as the best translation were more first- (48%) than final-year students (36%). Of the 12% of the respondents who chose *verärgert* as the best translation were more final- than first-year students (8% and 4% respectively). 4% of the final-year students considered *zornig* to be the best translation for *upset*. Overall, a comparison of the responses shows that both groups of respondents mainly agree that *upset* best translates as *aufgebracht*. Surprisingly, 12% of the respondents in the group of final-year students selected other responses, while only 4% of the first-year students did so.

Finally, in Figure 11 the responses for item 5 in section III, *annoyed*, are illustrated.




Figure 11: Item 5, section III

The responses for this item also show a clear tendency. 76% of the total sample selected *verärgert* as the best translation for *annoyed*. 12% of the sample chose *empört* as the best translation, 8% *aufgebracht*, and 4% *zornig*. The 76% of respondents who selected *verärgert* consist of approximately half of the first- (36%) and half of the final-year students (40%). The 12% of the sample who selected *empört* as the best translation for *annoyed* were all first-year students. Of the 8% of respondents who selected *aufgebracht*, half were first- and half were final-year students (4% each). *Zornig* was chosen by only 4% of the respondents, which were all final-year students. In comparison, it is possible to recognize a general trend in both groups to translate *annoyed* as *verärgert*. 16% of the first-year students chose different translations, while only 8% of the final-year students did so.

7.5. Results of section IV

Finally, in this section, the results of section IV of the questionnaire will be presented. This section was also the same for the respondents in both tests. First, the sample was asked to rate the five English anger terms under examination according to how likely they are to use the words – untranslated – in their native language on a Likert scale.⁵⁷ Then, they were asked to

⁵⁷ See, for instance, Schilling (2013: 105).

explain why they would or would not do so; the question format was multiple-choice, they had to select at least one answer option or choose “Other” and specify.

Figure 12 below illustrates the ratings given by the overall sample.⁵⁸




Figure 12: Item 1, section IV

In total, the sample was somewhat undecided when rating the word *angry*. 48% of all respondents indicated that they were likely (32%) or very likely (16%) to use this word untranslated in their native language, and 40% stated they were either unlikely (28%) or very unlikely (12%) to do so. 12% of the sample selected “not sure”. The ratings for the word *furious* exhibit a clearer tendency. 60% of all respondents stated they were either unlikely (36%) or very unlikely (24%) to use English *furious* in German. 28% of the sample indicated that they were either likely (20%) or very likely (8%) to do so. For this word, also, 12% of the respondents were unsure. *Annoyed* is the word which most respondents would use untranslated in German. Overall, 72% of the respondents stated they were likely (40%) or very likely (32%) to do so, and only 24% claimed they were unlikely to do so. Merely 4% of the respondents stated they were unsure. The responses for *upset* resemble the ones for *furious*. About half of the respondents (52%) stated they were rather unlikely to use this word in German; 36% selected “unlikely” and 16% “very unlikely”. 36% of the sample said they would use *upset*, 24% of which selected

⁵⁸ For this section, only the results of the overall sample were calculated; a comparison of the first-year group and the final-year group was not undertaken, as the focus of the two items in this section concerned the intuitions of total sample regarding this issue.

“likely” and 12% “very likely”. Finally, *outraged* was the word which most respondents (68%) deemed as most unlikely to be used in German. Of these 68%, 20% of the respondents stated they were unlikely, and a total of 48% stated they were very unlikely to do so. Merely 8% of the sample responded they were likely to use this word, and 24% stated they were unsure.

The results of the final item of the questionnaire are outlined in Figure 13.




Figure 13: Item 2, section IV

Figure 13 shows clearer tendencies: the answer option which was most frequently selected was “it better expresses what I want to say” (18 times, which amounts to 72%). The responses “I find it difficult to come up with a satisfying translation” and “it comes natural to me” were selected equally often (10 times each, which amounts to 40% each). The same is true for “it sounds better” and “I cannot think of a German word” (6 times each, which amounts to 24% each). Finally, the option “Other” was selected twice (8%). The respondents specified as follows: one of them wrote “I can usually express my emotions best in German” and the other one “[I] don’t really use these words in [German]”.

8. Discussion

The last chapter of this thesis discusses the results obtained in the main study. It comments on and interprets the responses given for each section of the questionnaire (in the order in which they were presented in the previous chapter) and illustrates in how far the findings are in line with the theoretical considerations presented in the first part of this thesis. In addition, this chapter constitutes an attempt at answering the research questions formulated in section 5.1.

To recapitulate, it was hypothesized that proficiency level influences how accurately German native speaking EFL students categorize anger terms in English (implying that students with a high proficiency level categorize more accurately than students with an intermediate proficiency level), and that an elevated proficiency level in English leads to a heightened sensibility for the new categorization system, meaning that speakers categorize more readily according to the new system, instead of recurring to the habits of their native language (implying that highly proficient students are less influenced by their native language when categorizing than students at intermediate proficiency levels). Also, translational equivalence between English and German anger terms and speaker intuitions regarding the use of English categories in German were surveyed in the scope of the study; these will be also be the concern of this chapter. Lastly, this section will briefly address the question whether EFL students use English categories in German and give an account of their reasons to do so. A conclusion will be drawn based on the discussion and interpretation of the results in the following sections, and it will be examined whether the hypotheses have been corroborated or not.

8.1. Interpretation of the results of section I

Section I of the questionnaire aimed at finding out whether final-year EFL students categorize anger terms more accurately in English than first-year EFL students and whether the responses of the first-year students exhibit a tendency to choose German category descriptions instead of English ones.

Generally, it can be observed that the results in this section are ambiguous. In terms of accuracy of categorization, it appears that only item 5, the word *annoyed*, was categorized correctly by a clear majority (77%) of the respondents. For all other items, the responses indicate that the respondents perceive a different definition as better, or two definitions (one of them correct) were selected by more or less equal numbers of respondents. When examining the responses in terms of the respondents' proficiency level, it becomes clear that in two cases (item 2, *upset* and item 3, *outraged*), more respondents in the group of first-year students selected the correct English category for the words under examination, while in three cases (item 1, *angry*, item 4,

furious, and item 5, *annoyed*) more respondents in the group of final-year students did so. Overall, it was not the case that first-year students selected German definitions more frequently than final-year students, as respondents in both groups did so in more or less equal measures. Let us now consider the responses given for the individual items in more detail.

The responses given for item 1, the word *angry*, indicate that the sample was undecided between two definitions: the ones for *wütend* and *angry*. Overall, *angry* was more often correctly defined by final-year students. A relatively high number of respondents in this group, however, also selected the definition for *wütend*. More first-year students defined *angry* in terms of the German definition for *wütend*, but a considerable number likewise selected the correct definition. These findings indicate that *angry* and *wütend* seem to be very similar in their semantic content. Still, more final-year students than first-year students seem to have recognized and correctly selected the response option which describes *angry* in all its nuances and subtleties. It could be theorized, therefore, that while both groups identify the semantic content of the definitions for *wütend* and *angry* as similar, the group which is assumed to be more proficient more readily categorizes accurately in English. The same was true for item 4, the word *furious*, which was decidedly more often correctly defined by final-year students than by first-year students. The first-year students most frequently defined *furious* in terms of the definition of German *zornig* (approximately 40%). Item 5, the word *annoyed*, was categorized correctly by all final-year students, and while also a considerable number of first-year students did so, they chose the definition for *angry* relatively frequently, too. For items 1, 4, and 5, therefore, it could be said that hypothesis 2a, stating that more proficient speakers categorize more accurately in the foreign language, holds, and so does hypothesis 3a, for more first-year students than final-year students selected German category definitions in these items.

Considering the responses given for item 2, the word *upset*, and item 3, the word *outraged*, however, the evidence points to a different conclusion. The responses given for item 2, *upset*, are particularly surprising. Although the term was correctly defined by the majority, under closer examination it becomes clear that the bigger part of respondents who had selected this answer option were first-year students. It is remarkable that for this item, the first-year students selected only English definitions (*upset* at 33% and *annoyed* at 17%); the final-year students, by contrast, selected the definition for German *aufgebracht* most often (33%). The correct option and German *zornig* were selected in equal numbers, 8% each, by the final-year students. The responses for item 3, *outraged*, are similarly puzzling. For this item, also, the bigger part of respondents who categorized correctly were first-year students (17%), while a smaller proportion of the final-year students (8%) did so. Most respondents, however, chose another

definition for *outraged*, namely *furious*: the bigger proportion of the 58% of the sample who selected this response option consists of final-year students (33%). A small percentage of both first- and final-year students selected *empört*. Since the first-year students not only categorized more accurately, but also selected fewer German category definitions than the final-year students in these items, for items 2 and 3 both hypothesis 2 and 3 do not seem to hold.

In contrary to what was expected, it can therefore neither be distinctly stated that first-year students more often prefer German categories over English ones than final-year students, nor that final-year students generally categorize more accurately than less proficient ones. It seems that all but one word (*annoyed*) seem to be somewhat difficult to categorize for the entirety of the sample; some definitions for German anger terms were considered as the best description for the words in question by large parts of the sample, some definitions of related English terms were deemed the better choice by others. What can be stated, however, is that most of the categories under examination were not easily distinguishable as having one definition only: it seems that the definition for *angry* resembles the one for German *wütend*, the definition for *upset* resembles the one for German *aufgebracht*, the one for *outraged* seems to be similar to the one for *furious*, and the one for *furious* also resembles the one for German *zornig*. This implies not only that different speakers have different ideas about these anger terms, but also that determining categories is not always unproblematic, for it is difficult to pinpoint distinguishing meaning components. Also, the semantic content of both the English and the German concepts seems to overlap substantially.

8.2. Interpretation of the results of section II

Section II of the questionnaire inquired how accurately EFL students categorize in context, and, again, whether the presumably highly proficient final-year students did so more successfully than the intermediately proficient first-year students.

The results for the items in this section yielded clearer results than the ones in the first section of the questionnaire. In context, three out of five items were categorized correctly. For item 1, the sentence containing the word *annoyed*, item 2, the sentence containing the word *furious*, and item 4, the sentence containing the word *upset*, all respondents relatively unambiguously selected the – in these contexts – correct responses. Among those who selected the correct responses for these items were generally more final-year students than first-year students. The only one of these three items which could be considered somewhat problematic was item 2 (eliciting the word *furious*), since around half of the total sample also selected the terms *upset* and *outraged* at 25% each, instead of the correct response. Under closer examination, it could

admittedly be said that both these terms would potentially also be an acceptable fit for the sentence in question, although *upset* would be the more likely candidate (cf. sentence in question, section 7.3 and the definitions for *upset* and *outraged* in sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5 respectively). *Upset* was also the option more frequently chosen by final-year students.

Items 3, the sentence containing the word *angry*, and 5, the sentence containing the word *outraged*, were more problematic. While in item 3 more final- than first-year students selected the correct response, overall, both groups of respondents in equal measures selected the word *furious* as the best fit for the sentence in question. Interestingly, of the respondents in the group of first-year students, most selected the term *upset*, which in this context would not make sense (see definition, section 6.3.4). Most of the respondents in the group of final-year students selected either *angry* or *furious*, which are semantically somewhat similar, but differ substantially in intensity and duration. In the sentence in question, *being in a good mood* is compared with the emotion word, in the sense that one can feel good and bad simultaneously over a stretch of time. In this context, *angry* is therefore clearly the best choice; *furious*, by contrast, for it is a short-lived and extremely powerful emotion, would constitute an unlikely fit (cf. sentence in question, section 7.3, and the definition for *furious* and *angry*, sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.1 respectively). Finally, for item 5, the sentence containing the word *outraged*, two responses were selected by 46% of the respondents each, namely the words *furious* and *outraged*. As in item 3 in section I of the questionnaire (see section 7.2), surprisingly, more final-year students than first-year students chose *furious* instead of *outraged*; more first-year students made up the 46% of the sample who selected the correct response option in this context. Disregarding the proficiency level of the respondents here, this demonstrates that *outraged* and *furious* are terms which EFL students perceive as quasi-synonyms. Notably, however, after closer examination it could be argued that in the sentence in question, *furious* might be a more likely fit for the sentence, for the category definition contains an element which would justify the choice of this word: it is an emotion which may be “triggered by [...] physical [...] assaults” (see section 6.3.2); this would clearly be the case in the sentence in question (“He spit at me.” (COCA), see section 7.3). If *furious* were considered the best answer, both first- and final-year students would have categorized accurately, though the larger part of “correct” responses would amount to the final-year students.

In this section, the responses could be tentatively assumed to be confirming both hypotheses subsumed to hypothesis 2. Examining the responses given by both groups, it appears that the group which is assumed to be more proficient selects the correct responses in most items, and even if they select other responses, the words chosen would semantically constitute an adequate

fit in most cases. This was not the case for some of the words the group of first-year students selected, as their responses imply indecisiveness (see item 2, section 7.3: 17% of the first-year students selected *outraged*, and 8% each all other four response options) as well as limited command of the categories given (see item 3, section 7.3: 23% of the first-year students selected *upset*, which does not make sense in this context). Although nothing can be said about a direct influence of the German categorization system, it seems that, in this section, the more proficient group of EFL students more accurately categorized according to the English system than the less proficient group of students.

8.3. Interpretation of the results of section III

Section III of the questionnaire constituted an attempt at ascertaining whether the English anger terms under examination were considered by the respondents as having clear translational equivalents in German, or whether the responses point towards translational non-equivalence. The assumption underlying this section is that the more acquainted EFL students become with the categories in the foreign language, the more likely they are to realize that translation is frequently difficult or even impossible. Also, it could be assumed that EFL students at lower proficiency levels are not yet aware of the subtle meaning differences between semantically similar English and German categories and are therefore more likely to disregard such nuances and to be more straightforward when translating.

For each of the five items examined in section III of the questionnaire, one German term was clearly favored and selected most frequently as the best translation by the overall sample. Items 3 (*outraged*), 4 (*upset*), and 5 (*annoyed*) could be considered as least problematic: the responses given by the overall sample clearly indicate that the words in question should be translated as *empört* (64%), *aufgebracht* (84%), and *verärgert* (76%). If other translations were chosen, this was generally done on part of the first-year students, while the final-year students seemed to be relatively decided on one translation (except for the term *upset*, maybe, see section 7.4). Items 1, *angry*, and 2, *furious*, constitute more ambiguous examples. While for both items about half of all respondents (48% and 52% respectively) showed a distinct preference for one translation over the others (*wütend* for *angry*, and *zornig* for *furious*), the other half of the sample selected other responses, too. For item 1, *angry*, the final-year students selected *wütend* and *zornig* equally often as the best translation; the first-year students most frequently selected *wütend*, followed by *verärgert*. Besides *wütend*, the sample therefore considered *zornig* or *verärgert* as other appropriate translations for *angry*. A similar tendency to select other translations can also be observed in item 2, *furious*, which was most frequently translated as *zornig*, but also quite often as *wütend*. Again, almost even numbers of final-year students selected both these terms,

while the first-year students – although they also chose *wütend* quite often – more distinctly decided on the term *zornig*.

These results are an indication that *angry* and *furious* do not have exact semantic equivalents in German, but that a precise translation should comprise meaning elements of both *wütend* and *zornig*. The relatively balanced selection of both the terms *wütend* and *zornig* on part of the final-year students as translations for *angry* and *furious* allow for the assumption that this group of respondents has recognized that there is no adequate equivalent for either term. It could thus – though only tentatively – be deduced that the more proficient group of speakers knows that in these cases, direct, unproblematic, and straightforward translation is impossible. First-year students, by contrast, at least for the term *furious*, more clearly decided on *zornig* as the most adequate translation. Considering item 1, *angry*, however, which according to the first-year students besides *wütend* translates best as *verärgert*, it could be said that first-year students also have recognized that *angry* is a somewhat problematic item, translation-wise. Generally, it can be argued that a precise translation of the term *angry* seems to be extremely difficult: these observations are in line with Durst's claim (2001: 116) that *angry* is a broad term, more comprehensive than several related German anger terms (see section 6.4).

In conclusion, it appears that the term decidedly most difficult to translate for both groups was *angry*, followed by *furious*. The terms *outraged*, *upset*, and *annoyed* seem to possess certain distinctive features which could be more easily identified and translated in comparison to rather generic emotion terms such as *angry* or *furious* – at least when provided with answer options to choose from. It is probable that if the students would have been asked to provide their own translations of the terms in question, more variation, and hence more problems with direct translations would have surfaced. This, however, could be the concern of further research.

8.4. Interpretation of the results of section IV

Section IV, finally, surveyed the students' likeliness to use the English anger terms under examination untranslated in German, and elicited reasons for the use of English categories – or, essentially, reasons for code-switching. The assumption behind this task is that the semantic content of certain English emotion categories differs from that of German ones, and it is assumed that if they are used in German, one of the reasons to do so is the awareness about such meaning differences.

The word which was favored by most students was *annoyed*. Only approximately a quarter of all respondents stated they were unlikely to use this word in German. Of all words, *annoyed* was the only one for which most respondents distinctly indicated they were either likely or very

likely to use it in German (72%), for all other words, the results imply either indecisiveness or unlikeliness. The word *angry*, for instance, was rated as unlikely to be used by approximately 40% of the sample, while 48% stated they were likely or very likely to use this word in German. The three remaining words, *furious*, *upset*, and *outraged*, seem to be less likely candidates for code-switching: for all these words, over 50% or more of the sample stated that they were unlikely or very unlikely to use them in German, *outraged* being the unlikeliest one.

As concerns the reasons to use English words in German, the response option most frequently selected was “it better expresses what I want to say” at 72%. This would imply that EFL students do indeed perceive a semantic difference between English and German (anger) words and therefore code-switch for reasons of semantic non-equivalence. Two other reasons were selected at relatively high frequency, namely “I find it difficult to come up with a satisfying translation” and “it comes natural to me”. This could be considered as affirming the intuition that certain concepts cannot be directly translated, and that EFL students are aware of that fact (this is in line with the elaborations in section 3.4). The argument that an English term comes natural to a non-native speaker may be the result of intense immersion in the English language, or generally, the ubiquity of the English language at present times. Finally, fewer parts of the sample selected the responses “it sounds better” and “I cannot think of a German word”. When the option “Other” was selected, respondents stated that German is their preferred language for emotion expression, or that they considered the particular words given in this study as unlikely candidates for code-switching.

From these responses, it could be deduced that code-switching – at least for this sample – is not so much a matter of prestige, but indeed of an awareness of semantic nuances, as expected. A problem with this task, however, is that the response options given, in combination with the title and topic of the questionnaire, may be prone to bias – on part of the researcher, as well as on part of the respondents. The response options provided may be the result of my own biased intuitions regarding the issue, and the respondents may have selected precisely the ones which fit best within the scope of this questionnaire. To clearly determine whether code-switching is a matter of awareness of semantic differences, this task would have to be revised: potentially, conducting qualitative interviews would be a more fruitful approach to further inquire into this issue.

9. Conclusion

Finally, it is time to provide some concluding remarks on the study as a whole. An effort will be made to answer the research questions, comment on the hypotheses, and discuss main tendencies and insights gained in this thesis.

The first research question was concerned with how native speakers of both English and German linguistically categorize anger terms in their respective native languages and was addressed in detail in chapter 6, through an examination of two groups of native speakers' understanding of ten anger terms and a subsequent formulation of ten categories. The responses provided by control groups A and B indicate that even though the ten terms under examination are semantically similar and their meanings may at times overlap substantially, each of them is characterized by certain distinctive meaning elements, as subtle as they may be, enabling us to differentiate the terms from one another. Notably, however, these differences were not easily distinguishable: the individual respondents had substantial difficulties to precisely state what certain words meant, how they should be defined, and to realize how they were different from other, similar terms. Only by comparing and examining the collective of responses of numerous different speakers, it was possible to "extract" distinctive meaning elements. The results of the pre-study hence clearly corroborate the view that words are "slippery" (Labov 1973 [2004]: 67), categories are dynamic (cf. Langacker 1987: 369; Taylor 2003: xi), as well as that meaning boundaries are fuzzy (cf., for instance, Aitchison 1994: 46f.). Also, they allow for a rejection of the classical theory, because it has become clear that the linguistic categorization of anger terms is not simple and straightforward, a matter of checking off items of a list; rather, it seems to differ depending on who categorizes the terms, resulting in an individual, subjective understanding of the terms which varies according to context, surroundings, and participants (confer sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2).

Let us now examine research question 2, which was concerned with the influence of linguistic proficiency on the accuracy of categorization in the foreign language. When comparing the results of sections I and II of the study in terms of proficiency level only, it becomes clear that in seven out of ten cases, the respondents in the group of final-year students made up the bigger part of respondents who selected the correct category (even when another term was favored by the entire sample). In this respect, despite the fact that there was some inconsistency in responses, hypothesis 2 can be – tentatively – confirmed, as the responses imply that proficiency level does indeed influence how EFL students categorize anger terms in English, and that highly proficient EFL students do so more accurately than less proficient ones.

However, when the responses are examined in terms of accuracy only, disregarding the sample's proficiency level, the results provide reason to believe that categorizing English anger terms seemed to be a challenging task for the entire sample, not only for the less proficient group of students. In both sections I and II of the questionnaire, the sample categorized accurately (according to the English system) in only about half of the cases, mostly when the words occurred in context. In the other half of the cases, the "correct" English category was either chosen alongside another category, or a different category was preferred altogether. These findings indicate that categorization is not only blurry and ambiguous within one language, but also, if not more so, cross-linguistically. The ambiguity of word meanings in general, combined with the individual nature of emotional experience itself must have been what made it substantially difficult for all students to "correctly" categorize in English. The hypotheses accompanying research question 2, though they could be tentatively confirmed, should be subject to questioning: the accuracy of responses may not only be a matter of proficiency level, but also of other factors, such as individual preference, guessing, or lack of concentration, because the definitions were very long and similar to one another. It should, therefore, be concluded that proficiency level is not the only factor determining accurate foreign language categorization.

Research question 3 was concerned with the influence of the German categorization system on anger term categorization in English; it was hypothesized that the German system exerts a higher influence on EFL students at intermediate proficiency levels than on those with a high proficiency level. An attempt to test this was made in section I of the main study, in which the sample was asked to categorize English anger terms, but the answer options for this task did not only consist of English, but also of German category definitions: the selection of German category definitions should reveal an unconscious influence of their native language. Here, it can be argued that a substantial part of all respondents, regardless of proficiency level, selected German categories, and that, therefore, the hypotheses accompanying research question 3 must be refuted. It is, generally, very difficult both to describe what role the native system plays here, and to determine how and to what extents it affects nonlinguistic cognition. Further, experimental research complementing my study would be necessary to gain more detailed insight into this matter, for the present study is an entirely linguistic one – this could, following Everett's (2013: 23) reasoning, be considered a pitfall of studies concerned with linguistic relativity, for it is circular, and cannot reveal information about nonlinguistic cognition (see section 3.3.2). What could probably be assumed, however, is that the frequent selection of German categories may be due to the linguistic habits the speakers have come accustomed to over time, and that the German system is indeed very present in their minds: the German definitions were familiar

to the respondents and were therefore more frequently considered to be correct (cf. Deutscher 2014: 170; section 3.5). In addition, some of the English and German categories are almost identical in their semantic content, and it seemed to be decidedly difficult to keep the German and the English categories apart. This constitutes another argument in favor of the fuzzy nature of meanings.

Another objective of this thesis was to examine the semantic correspondence of translations across languages. Section III of the main study was aimed at examining this issue and observed how EFL students translated English anger terms and whether the results would constitute an indication for non-equivalence or translational difficulties. Generally, it could be observed that except for two items, *angry* and *furious*, translation appeared to be rather unproblematic. As has already been pointed out in section 8.3, however, it is likely that translational non-equivalence could have been better, or at least more exhaustively tested if the sample would have been asked to provide open answers instead of having them choose from pre-defined responses. It is possible that open answers would have yielded more – and different – terms than the ones that were defined in the present study, and that this would have exhibited extensive variety in translation. Such a task should, therefore, be improved to reveal useful results in further studies. Returning to the responses given in the present study, it can be said, however, that translations should be considered as approximate equivalents (cf. Keidan 2015: 635), rather than as reflecting the semantic content of a source term with complete accuracy (see section 3.4). An aspect worthy of mention here is that the final-year students seemed to be more aware of this fact, especially when considering their translations of *angry* and *furious*: the more proficient part of the sample exhibited substantial uncertainty as to what was the best translation, which could be an indication that they do not presume a one-to-one correspondence for these terms.

Lastly, it remains to answer research question 4, which inquired whether EFL students do incorporate English categories into their speech and if they do so, why. The results given imply that of the terms given, only one term, *annoyed*, is likely to be used in German. The ratings of the other terms imply that the respondents are rather unlikely to use them in their speech. It appears that anger terms do not seem to be suitable candidates for code-switching matters, and that the respondents are more likely to code-switch with terms belonging to other semantic fields. Remarkably, however, the second question in section IV revealed that if EFL students do use English categories in their speech, it is because they perceive a semantic difference, i.e. because they feel that the term better expresses what they want to say. The other frequently chosen answer options confirmed some of the intuitions which inspired this thesis, namely that it is sometimes difficult to find an accurate translation for certain terms as well as that one can

become so accustomed to speaking English that the use of English terms in German is considered as natural. It is here, of course, important to re-emphasize that the response options given may have induced the desired outcome, and that the results may therefore be biased to a certain extent. Revising this task for more accuracy, and with more focus on the reasons for code-switching should be the concern of further research.

In conclusion, it can be said that the present study yielded several interesting insights into the study of cross-linguistic categorization of emotion. It was possible to confirm that while anger terms in both English and German are very similar, they can be differentiated clearly from one another. Consciously recognizing these differences, however, seems to be more of a problem. Although small numbers of highly proficient EFL students were able to correctly categorize in English, overall it became clear that emotion categorization is complex for EFL students at both high and intermediate levels of proficiency. It seemed to be particularly difficult to categorize in isolation; in context, categorization was easier, especially for the final-year students. A possible explanation for the difficulties that arose might be that the category definitions provided were constructed artificially and may not have reflected the individual opinions about the terms of all respondents (this is in line with the observations made in section 4.1, stating that emotional experience is inherently internal and different for each and everyone (cf. Solomon 1995: 257)). It is hence crucial to remark that it is uncertain whether the definitions used for this study are an accurate depiction of the categories under examination, and whether they are applicable in larger scale studies. In order to more closely examine the role proficiency level plays in categorizing emotions, further studies would be necessary, perhaps by comparing groups of EFL speakers at substantially more differentiated levels of proficiency (i.e. A2+ and C2 levels).

Also, the present study provided some insights into the influence of the sample's native language: it appears that when German category definitions were given in a task, all EFL students could be observed to resort to these categories, which may stem from the fact that it is the language the sample was most intensely exposed to. Experimental studies would be necessary to determine whether differences in the categorization of emotions across languages affects nonlinguistic cognition, with particular focus on the sample in question. Regarding the issue of translation, it can be argued that this study needs further improvement, but it can be stated that certain items are more difficult to translate than others, i.e. terms in which many meaning elements of two terms overlap.

Finally, it could be demonstrated that one of the many reasons for code-switching may be the speakers' awareness of semantic differences between the words in the source language and the

target language. More detailed investigation into this subject would be a valuable complement to this study. Most of what has been examined in the scope of the present study was in line with the theoretical considerations presented in the first part of this thesis. To be conducted with larger samples and to adequately represent the population of this study, it should, however, be subjected to substantial revision to yield generalizable results.

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Appendix

English Abstract

This thesis has two purposes: it investigates how English and German native speakers linguistically categorize semantically similar anger terms and it examines how students of English as a foreign language (EFL) with German as their native language do so in English. The major objective of main part of the study is to determine whether proficiency level influences the accuracy of foreign language categorization, as well as whether the influence of the speakers' native language decreases with increasing proficiency level. Data for this research were obtained in two steps: two control groups consisting of 20 German and 30 English native speakers participated in a pre-study, and a group of 25 Viennese EFL students at varying proficiency levels in the main study, a questionnaire. The pre-study revealed that while the anger terms under scrutiny are characterized by substantial semantic overlap, they possess several distinctive features which distinguish them from one another. By comparing dictionary definitions with the sample's definitions, ten emotion categories could be deduced, which were tested in the main study. The results revealed that highly proficient EFL students generally categorize more accurately in the foreign language than intermediately proficient ones; overall, however, explicit emotion categorization appeared to be challenging for the entire sample. Also, participants at either proficiency level seemed to be inclined to categorize according to the German system. These data support the view that linguistic categorization in general, and emotion categorization in particular, is characterized by ambiguity, fuzzy boundaries, semantic overlap, and inter- and cross-linguistic variation. Translation, hence, is rarely lossless. Also, this research allows for the assumption that a person's native language exerts influence on foreign language categorization, regardless of proficiency level.

Keywords: *linguistic categorization; fuzzy boundaries; cross-linguistic differences; semantic overlap; untranslatability; emotion; linguistic relativity; foreign language learning.*

German Abstract

Die vorliegende Arbeit hat zwei Ziele: einerseits wird untersucht, wie Sprecher mit deutscher und Sprecher mit englischer Muttersprache bedeutungsähnliche Wutbegriffe linguistisch kategorisieren; andererseits wird erforscht, wie Englisch-Studenten mit deutscher Muttersprache ebendiese Begriffe in der Fremdsprache kategorisieren. Der Hauptteil der Studie zielt darauf ab, herauszufinden, ob die Sprachkompetenz der Befragten die Richtigkeit der fremdsprachlichen Kategorisierung beeinflusst, und zu untersuchen ob der Einfluss der Muttersprache der Sprecher mit steigendem Sprachlevel sinkt. Das Datenmaterial für diese Studie wurde in zwei Schritten gesammelt: zwei Kontrollgruppen von 20 Sprechern mit deutscher, und 30 Sprechern mit englischer Muttersprache nahmen in der Vorstudie teil und eine Gruppe von 25 Wiener Englisch-Studenten unterschiedlicher Sprachlevels an der Hauptstudie - einem Fragebogen. Die Vorstudie zeigte, dass die untersuchten Wutbegriffe sich zwar semantisch überschneiden, aber gewisse Merkmale aufweisen, anhand derer man die Begriffe voneinander unterscheiden kann. Durch einen Vergleich von Wörterbuchdefinitionen und den Definitionen der Befragten konnten 10 Gefühlskategorien abgeleitet werden, welche in der Hauptstudie getestet wurden. Die Ergebnisse ergaben, dass Englisch-Studenten mit einem hohen Level an Sprachkompetenz in der Fremdsprache generell richtiger kategorisieren als solche mit einem mittleren Level; allgemein war die explizite Gefühlskategorisierung jedoch für die gesamte Stichprobe schwierig. Zudem waren alle Teilnehmer gleichermaßen dazu geneigt, nach dem deutschen System zu kategorisieren. Diese Daten stützen die These, dass linguistische Kategorisierung im Allgemeinen, sowie Gefühlskategorisierung im Speziellen, von Mehrdeutigkeit, unscharfen Übergängen, semantischen Überschneidungen und innersprachlicher, sowie sprachenübergreifender Variation gekennzeichnet ist. Übersetzungen sind daher selten verlustlos. Zudem lassen die Ergebnisse vermuten, dass linguistische Kategorisierung in der Fremdsprache – ungeachtet von der Sprachkompetenz – von der Muttersprache beeinflusst wird.

Pre-study, German version

Liebe_r Teilnehmer_in,

Vielen Dank für Ihre Bereitschaft, bei der Entwicklung meiner empirischen Studie mitzuhelfen, welche ich im Rahmen meiner **Diplomarbeit** über die **Unterschiede in der linguistischen Kategorisierung Wut-ähnlicher Gefühle in Englisch und Deutsch** durchführen werde.

Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten, Ihre persönlichen Intuitionen sind gefragt. Hiermit garantiere ich Ihnen Vertraulichkeit und Anonymität; Ihre Antworten werden ausschließlich für die Erstellung des Fragebogens für meine Studie verwendet.

Im Folgenden **beantworten Sie bitte sieben Fragen über den gegebenen Gefühlsbegriff**. Sie können **stichwortartig** antworten; vollständige Sätze sind nicht zwingend notwendig.

1. Bitte versuchen Sie, die Bedeutung des Wortes *aufgebracht* zu beschreiben.
2. Bitte notieren Sie Ihre intuitiven Assoziationen mit dem Wort *aufgebracht*.
3. Was denken Sie, wenn Sie sich *aufgebracht* fühlen?
4. Welche körperlichen „Symptome“ empfinden Sie, wenn Sie sich *aufgebracht* fühlen?
5. Wie verhalten Sie sich, wenn Sie sich *aufgebracht* fühlen?
6. Was könnten Auslöser für dieses Gefühl sein?
7. Bitte formulieren Sie einen Satz, welcher das Wort *aufgebracht* beinhaltet.

Liebe_r Teilnehmer_in,

Vielen Dank für Ihre Bereitschaft, bei der Entwicklung meiner empirischen Studie mitzuhelfen, welche ich im Rahmen meiner **Diplomarbeit** über die **Unterschiede in der linguistischen Kategorisierung Wut-ähnlicher Gefühle in Englisch und Deutsch** durchführen werde.

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Im Folgenden **beantworten Sie bitte sieben Fragen über den gegebenen Gefühlsbegriff**. Sie können **stichwortartig** antworten; vollständige Sätze sind nicht zwingend notwendig.

1. Bitte versuchen Sie, die Bedeutung des Wortes *empört* zu beschreiben.
2. Bitte notieren Sie Ihre intuitiven Assoziationen mit dem Wort *empört*.
3. Was denken Sie, wenn Sie sich *empört* fühlen?
4. Welche körperlichen „Symptome“ empfinden Sie, wenn Sie sich *empört* fühlen?
5. Wie verhalten Sie sich, wenn Sie sich *empört* fühlen?
6. Was könnten Auslöser für dieses Gefühl sein?
7. Bitte formulieren Sie einen Satz, welcher das Wort *empört* beinhaltet.

Liebe_r Teilnehmer_in,

Vielen Dank für Ihre Bereitschaft, bei der Entwicklung meiner empirischen Studie mitzuhelfen, welche ich im Rahmen meiner **Diplomarbeit** über die **Unterschiede in der linguistischen Kategorisierung Wut-ähnlicher Gefühle in Englisch und Deutsch** durchführen werde.

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Im Folgenden **beantworten Sie bitte sieben Fragen über den gegebenen Gefühlsbegriff**. Sie können **stichwortartig** antworten; vollständige Sätze sind nicht zwingend notwendig.

1. Bitte versuchen Sie, die Bedeutung des Wortes *verärgert* zu beschreiben.
2. Bitte notieren Sie Ihre intuitiven Assoziationen mit dem Wort *verärgert*.
3. Was denken Sie, wenn Sie sich verärgert fühlen?
4. Welche körperlichen „Symptome“ empfinden Sie, wenn Sie sich verärgert fühlen?
5. Wie verhalten Sie sich, wenn Sie sich verärgert fühlen?
6. Was könnten Auslöser für dieses Gefühl sein?
7. Bitte formulieren Sie einen Satz, welcher das Wort *verärgert* beinhaltet.

Liebe_r Teilnehmer_in,

Vielen Dank für Ihre Bereitschaft, bei der Entwicklung meiner empirischen Studie mitzuhelfen, welche ich im Rahmen meiner **Diplomarbeit** über die **Unterschiede in der linguistischen Kategorisierung Wut-ähnlicher Gefühle in Englisch und Deutsch** durchführen werde.

Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten, Ihre persönlichen Intuitionen sind gefragt. Hiermit garantiere ich Ihnen Vertraulichkeit und Anonymität; Ihre Antworten werden ausschließlich für die Erstellung des Fragebogens für meine Studie verwendet.

Im Folgenden **beantworten Sie bitte sieben Fragen über den gegebenen Gefühlsbegriff**. Sie können **stichwortartig** antworten; vollständige Sätze sind nicht zwingend notwendig.

1. Bitte versuchen Sie, die Bedeutung des Wortes *wütend* zu beschreiben.
2. Bitte notieren Sie Ihre intuitiven Assoziationen mit dem Wort *wütend*.
3. Was denken Sie, wenn Sie sich wütend fühlen?
4. Welche körperlichen „Symptome“ empfinden Sie, wenn Sie sich wütend fühlen?
5. Wie verhalten Sie sich, wenn Sie sich wütend fühlen?
6. Was könnten Auslöser für dieses Gefühl sein?
7. Bitte formulieren Sie einen Satz, welcher das Wort *wütend* beinhaltet.

Liebe_r Teilnehmer_in,

Vielen Dank für Ihre Bereitschaft, bei der Entwicklung meiner empirischen Studie mitzuhelfen, welche ich im Rahmen meiner **Diplomarbeit** über die **Unterschiede in der linguistischen Kategorisierung Wut-ähnlicher Gefühle in Englisch und Deutsch** durchführen werde.

Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten, Ihre persönlichen Intuitionen sind gefragt. Hiermit garantiere ich Ihnen Vertraulichkeit und Anonymität; Ihre Antworten werden ausschließlich für die Erstellung des Fragebogens für meine Studie verwendet.

Im Folgenden **beantworten Sie bitte sieben Fragen über den gegebenen Gefühlsbegriff**. Sie können **stichwortartig** antworten; vollständige Sätze sind nicht zwingend notwendig.

1. Bitte versuchen Sie, die Bedeutung des Wortes *zornig* zu beschreiben.
2. Bitte notieren Sie Ihre intuitiven Assoziationen mit dem Wort *zornig*.
3. Was denken Sie, wenn Sie sich *zornig* fühlen?
4. Welche körperlichen „Symptome“ empfinden Sie, wenn Sie sich *zornig* fühlen?
5. Wie verhalten Sie sich, wenn Sie sich *zornig* fühlen?
6. Was könnten Auslöser für dieses Gefühl sein?
7. Bitte formulieren Sie einen Satz, welcher das Wort *zornig* beinhaltet.

Pre-study, English version

Dear participant,

Thank you for your willingness to help developing the empirical study I will be conducting for my **Diploma Thesis** about the **variation in (cross-)linguistic categorization of anger-like emotions in English and German**.

There are no right or wrong answers, your personal intuitions are of interest. I hereby ensure confidentiality and anonymity; your responses will be used for the sole purpose of designing a questionnaire for my study.

In the following, you will be asked to **answer seven questions about the emotion term given**. You may respond in **note form**; full sentences are not necessary.

1. Please try to describe the meaning of the word *angry*.
2. Please write down your intuitive associations with the word *angry*.
3. What do you think when you feel angry?
4. What bodily “symptoms” do you experience when you feel angry?
5. How do you behave when you feel angry?
6. What may trigger this feeling in you?
7. Please formulate a sentence containing the word *angry*.

Dear participant,

Thank you for your willingness to help developing the empirical study I will be conducting for my **Diploma Thesis** about the **variation in (cross-)linguistic categorization of anger-like emotions in English and German**.

There are no right or wrong answers, your personal intuitions are of interest. I hereby ensure confidentiality and anonymity; your responses will be used for the sole purpose of designing a questionnaire for my study.

In the following, you will be asked to **answer seven questions about the emotion term given**. You may respond in **note form**; full sentences are not necessary.

1. Please try to describe the meaning of the word *annoyed*.
2. Please write down your intuitive associations with the word *annoyed*.
3. What do you think when you feel annoyed?
4. What bodily “symptoms” do you experience when you feel annoyed?
5. How do you behave when you feel annoyed?
6. What may trigger this feeling in you?
7. Please formulate a sentence containing the word *annoyed*.

Dear participant,

Thank you for your willingness to help developing the empirical study I will be conducting for my **Diploma Thesis** about the **variation in (cross-)linguistic categorization of anger-like emotions in English and German**.

There are no right or wrong answers, your personal intuitions are of interest. I hereby ensure confidentiality and anonymity; your responses will be used for the sole purpose of designing a questionnaire for my study.

In the following, you will be asked to **answer seven questions about the emotion term given**. You may respond in **note form**; full sentences are not necessary.

1. Please try to describe the meaning of the word *furious*.
2. Please write down your intuitive associations with the word *furious*.
3. What do you think when you feel furious?
4. What bodily “symptoms” do you experience when you feel furious?
5. How do you behave when you feel furious?
6. What may trigger this feeling in you?
7. Please formulate a sentence containing the word *furious*.

Dear participant,

Thank you for your willingness to help developing the empirical study I will be conducting for my **Diploma Thesis** about the **variation in (cross-)linguistic categorization of anger-like emotions in English and German**.

There are no right or wrong answers, your personal intuitions are of interest. I hereby ensure confidentiality and anonymity; your responses will be used for the sole purpose of designing a questionnaire for my study.

In the following, you will be asked to **answer seven questions about the emotion term given**. You may respond in **note form**; full sentences are not necessary.

1. Please try to describe the meaning of the word *outraged*.
2. Please write down your intuitive associations with the word *outraged*.
3. What do you think when you feel outraged?
4. What bodily “symptoms” do you experience when you feel outraged?
5. How do you behave when you feel outraged?
6. What may trigger this feeling in you?
7. Please formulate a sentence containing the word *outraged*.

Dear participant,

Thank you for your willingness to help developing the empirical study I will be conducting for my **Diploma Thesis** about the **variation in (cross-)linguistic categorization of anger-like emotions in English and German**.

There are no right or wrong answers, your personal intuitions are of interest. I hereby ensure confidentiality and anonymity; your responses will be used for the sole purpose of designing a questionnaire for my study.

In the following, you will be asked to **answer seven questions about the emotion term given**. You may respond in **note form**; full sentences are not necessary.

1. Please try to describe the meaning of the word *upset*.
2. Please write down your intuitive associations with the word *upset*.
3. What do you think when you feel upset?
4. What bodily “symptoms” do you experience when you feel upset?
5. How do you behave when you feel upset?
6. What may trigger this feeling in you?
7. Please formulate a sentence containing the word *upset*.

Empirical study: Linguistic categorization of anger-like emotions among Austrian students of EFL (TEST A)

Dear student,

My name is Sofia Grabner and I am studying English and Spanish at the University of Vienna. Thank you for agreeing to fill out this questionnaire, which I have developed as part of my Diploma Thesis. Its purpose is to examine how German native speakers studying English as a foreign language linguistically categorize anger-like emotions in English at differing proficiency levels.

You will have to complete four different tasks; instructions will be indicated at the beginning of each section. Please note that there are no right or wrong answers, so I encourage you to refrain from using dictionaries and to respond honestly and to the best of your knowledge.

The time frame to complete this questionnaire is approximately 15 minutes. All responses will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous and will only be used for this research.

*Required

Section I: Categorizing English emotion concepts

In this section, you will be asked to provide your understanding of three English emotion categories by choosing from pre-designed definitions describing the words. Please read each definition carefully and decide which one most adequately describes the emotion word given.

1) The word "angry" is most adequately described as... *
Mark only one oval.

- An extreme, barely containable emotional state of shock and indignation, characterized by a sense of being ‘beside oneself’, triggered by disrespectful, unjust, or abusive actions – frequently on the part of official institutions – which violate the morality, decency and dignity of other people; usually manifested in a desire to seek revenge and the need to defend oneself against, destroy or reject the source of the feeling.
- An intense emotional state of dissatisfaction and aggressiveness, characterized by a barely or not at all controllable arousal capturing the person entirely, triggered by either the unfair or unjustified behavior of others or by situations of stress and dispute; usually manifested through a) physically experienced heat and tension, b) irrational and inconsiderate behavior and/or c) loud speaking or shouting.
- A strong, unpleasant emotional state, characterized by hostility, impatience, and negativity, triggered by the disrespectful or inconsiderate behavior of other people or inconvenient, unnecessary, or hurtful situations; usually manifested in the urge to react to the cause through loud, aggressive behavior and accompanied by physical heat and increased heart rate.
- An unpleasant emotional state of dissatisfaction, characterized by moodiness, triggered by unchangeable experiences (i.e. the ignorance and unreliability of others, unfulfilled expectations or unforeseen developments), which generally can be alleviated by a) avoiding the situation or b) by active engagement with the problem (through a conversation or rational consideration).

2) The word "upset" is most adequately described as... *

Mark only one oval.

- A negative, somewhat frustrating emotion of distress, characterized by worry, sadness, or nervous tension, triggered when a) one experiences disappointing, unexpected, or burdening situations, or b) one disappoints someone else or oneself; usually manifested in quiet, introvert, and pensive behavior.
- An unpleasant emotional state of frustration, characterized by irritation and discomfort, triggered a) by inconvenient or unexpected situations or circumstances, or b) by things or utterances considered unnecessary and bothersome; usually manifested in impatient, mildly rude behavior, and body language indicative of the feeling.
- A passionate, short-lived and rapidly emerging emotional state of displeasure, characterized by a simultaneous sensation of powerlessness and rage which evokes the urge to actively destroy, fight, or dispose of the feeling, triggered by specific actions or situations perceived as disappointing, unalterable and unfair; usually manifested instinctively and visibly in language, distorted facial expressions and gestures indicating "readiness" to fight.
- An emotional state of negatively charged agitation, characterized by dissatisfaction, nervousness and inner restlessness, triggered by injustice, insinuations, misunderstandings or unexpected incidents; usually manifested through hectic gesturing or speaking, sometimes accompanied by increased pulse rate and sweaty palms.

3) The word "outraged" is most adequately described as ... *

Mark only one oval.

- An extremely intense, blinding, and overpowering emotional state, characterized by hatred and violence, triggered by disrespectful and unjust actions like betrayal, lies or physical and psychological assaults; usually manifested in intense physical heat and impulsive, unrestrained, potentially violent or destructive behavior and complete disregard for one's surroundings.
- An emotional state of disbelief, dismay, and consternation, characterized by shock and agitation, triggered by actions, statements or situations perceived as inappropriate, scandalous, unjust, and morally reprehensible; usually manifested in physically visible reservedness and rational, sometimes open criticism of the problem causing the feeling.
- An extreme, barely containable emotional state of shock and indignation, characterized by a sense of being 'beside oneself', triggered by disrespectful, unjust, or abusive actions – frequently on the part of official institutions – which violate the morality, decency and dignity of other people; usually manifested in a desire to seek revenge and the need to defend oneself against, destroy or reject the source of the feeling.
- An unpleasant emotional state of dissatisfaction, characterized by moodiness, triggered by unchangeable experiences (i.e. the ignorance and unreliability of others, unfulfilled expectations or unforeseen developments), which generally can be alleviated by a) avoiding the situation or b) by active engagement with the problem (through a conversation or rational consideration).

Section II: Categorization in context

In this section, you will be asked to supply the emotion category which you consider most appropriate in the context provided. Please read each paragraph carefully and choose the word which best completes the sentence.

4) Certainly this must be about my tardies, I thought as I walked to the principal's office, they do merit my being called to the principal's office. I remember a patch of the floor was sticky, and I was _____ because I had just gotten new shoes and I didn't want to mess them up. *

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ angry
- ☐ upset
- ☐ outraged
- ☐ furious
- ☐ annoyed

5) "I'm glad they finally tied the knot. I was a little worried because... well, you know." Abigail nodded. Joanna and Andrew were supposed to marry last October, shortly after she'd returned from Middlefield, but her sister had called off the wedding at the last minute. At the time Abigail had been _____. How could Joanna throw away the love of a good man who wanted to marry her? *

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ angry
- ☐ annoyed
- ☐ furious
- ☐ outraged
- ☐ upset

Section III: Category translation

In this section, you will be asked to choose the - in your opinion - best translation for five English emotion concepts.

The word "angry" best translates as... *

Tick all that apply.

- ☐ zornig
- ☐ verärgert
- ☐ aufgebracht
- ☐ empört
- ☐ wütend

The word "furious" best translates as... *

Tick all that apply.

- ☐ verärgert
- ☐ empört
- ☐ wütend
- ☐ zornig
- ☐ aufgebracht

The word "outraged" best translates as... *

Tick all that apply.

- ☐ aufgebracht
- ☐ zornig
- ☐ empört
- ☐ wütend
- ☐ verärgert

The word "upset" best translates as... *

Tick all that apply.

- ☐ aufgebracht
- ☐ zornig
- ☐ wütend
- ☐ empört
- ☐ verärgert

The word "annoyed" best translates as... *

Tick all that apply.

- ☐ wütend
- ☐ zornig
- ☐ aufgebracht
- ☐ verärgert
- ☐ empört

Section IV: Category rating and intuitions

In this last section, you will be asked to rate how likely you are to use English categories in your daily life and give reasons why.

Please rate the following items according to your likeliness of using this word – untranslated – in German. *

Mark only one oval per row.

	very unlikely	unlikely	not sure	likely	very likely
angry	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
furious	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
annoyed	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
upset	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
outraged	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If I use an English word (untranslated) in German, it is because... *

Please choose at least one possibility or select "Other" and specify.

Tick all that apply.

- ☐ it sounds better
- ☐ it better expresses what I want to say
- ☐ I find it difficult to come up with a satisfying translation
- ☐ it comes natural to me
- ☐ I cannot think of a German word
- ☐ Other:

Section V: Demographical information

You have now reached the end of this questionnaire. Below, please provide some information about yourself.

Age

Gender

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Female
- ☐ Male
- ☐ Prefer not to say
- ☐ Other:

Nationality

Native language(s)

Learning English since _____ years

Number of semesters studied at the Department for English and American Studies

I have lived in an English-speaking country

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Contact information

Please do not hesitate to contact me in case you have any question about this research. If you are interested in the outcomes of this study, please call or send an e-mail, and I will gladly send you the findings once I have completed my Thesis. Thank you again for your time and participation!

Empirical study: Linguistic categorization of anger-like emotions among Austrian students of EFL (TEST B)

Dear student,

My name is Sofia Grabner and I am studying English and Spanish at the University of Vienna. Thank you for agreeing to fill out this questionnaire, which I have developed as part of my Diploma Thesis. Its purpose is to examine how German native speakers studying English as a foreign language linguistically categorize anger-like emotions in English at differing proficiency levels.

You will have to complete four different tasks; instructions will be indicated at the beginning of each section. Please note that there are no right or wrong answers, so I encourage you to refrain from using dictionaries and to respond honestly and to the best of your knowledge.

The time frame to complete this questionnaire is approximately 15 minutes. All responses will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous and will only be used for this research.

*Required

Section I: Categorizing English emotion concepts

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1) The word "furious" is most adequately described as ... *

Mark only one oval.

- An emotional state of negatively charged agitation, characterized by dissatisfaction, nervousness and inner restlessness, triggered by injustice, insinuations, misunderstandings or unexpected incidents; usually manifested through hectic gesturing or speaking, sometimes accompanied by increased pulse rate and sweaty palms.
- An extremely intense, blinding, and overpowering emotional state, characterized by hatred and violence, triggered by disrespectful and unjust actions like betrayal, lies or physical and psychological assaults; usually manifested in intense physical heat and impulsive, unrestrained, potentially violent or destructive behavior and complete disregard for one's surroundings.
- A negative, somewhat frustrating emotion of distress, characterized by worry, sadness, or nervous tension, triggered when a) one experiences disappointing, unexpected, or burdening situations, or b) one disappoints someone else or oneself; usually manifested in quiet, introvert, and pensive behavior.
- A passionate, short-lived and rapidly emerging emotional state of displeasure, characterized by a simultaneous sensation of powerlessness and rage which evokes the urge to actively destroy, fight, or dispose of the feeling, triggered by specific actions or situations perceived as disappointing, unalterable and unfair; usually manifested instinctively and visibly in language, distorted facial expressions and gestures indicating "readiness" to fight.

2) The word "annoyed" is most adequately described as ... *

Mark only one oval.

- An unpleasant emotional state of frustration, characterized by irritation and discomfort, triggered a) by inconvenient or unexpected situations or circumstances, or b) by things or utterances considered unnecessary and bothersome; usually manifested in impatient, mildly rude behavior, and body language indicative of the feeling.
- An emotional state of disbelief, dismay, and consternation, characterized by shock and agitation, triggered by actions, statements or situations perceived as inappropriate, scandalous, unjust, and morally reprehensible; usually manifested in physically visible reservedness and rational, sometimes open criticism of the problem causing the feeling.
- A strong, unpleasant emotional state, characterized by hostility, impatience, and negativity, triggered by the disrespectful or inconsiderate behavior of other people or inconvenient, unnecessary, or hurtful situations; usually manifested in the urge to react to the cause through loud, aggressive behavior and accompanied by physical heat and increased heart rate.
- An intense emotional state of dissatisfaction and aggressiveness, characterized by a barely or not at all controllable arousal capturing the person entirely, triggered by either the unfair or unjustified behavior of others or by situations of stress and dispute; usually manifested through a) physically experienced heat and tension, b) irrational and inconsiderate behavior and/or c) loud speaking or shouting.

Section II: Categorization in context

In this section, you will be asked to supply the emotion category which you consider most appropriate in the context provided. Please read each paragraph carefully and choose the word which best completes the sentence.

Her parents had read a magazine article about renovating Colonial trade houses and had snapped up this building, and now they were constantly yelling at Patricia not to run indoors or scratch any of the perfect oak furnishings, until their foreheads showed veins. Patricia's parents were the sort of people who could be in a good mood and _____ at almost the same time.*

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ angry
- ☐ upset
- ☐ outraged
- ☐ furious
- ☐ annoyed

4) “So, your cousin hasn't been attentive to your demands as the mother of the child.” “No. She's been defiant and unpredictable, going on errands she doesn't care to explain and snapping at me when I ask where she's been.” “It sounds like she has some reason to be _____,” I said. “Of course she does, and I'd like to give her space to deal with her... grief, if that's the right word for it.” *

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ angry
- ☐ annoyed
- ☐ furious
- ☐ outraged
- ☐ upset

5) “I kept calling back, but Louis kept hanging up on me. Then he stopped answering the phone at all. I went over there to see my son, to talk to Louis... and he wouldn't let me in. He kept calling me a stupid bitch, a cheap tramp, a gold-digging slut. He spit at me.” “What?” Camille was _____. *

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ furious
- ☐ upset
- ☐ annoyed
- ☐ angry
- ☐ outraged

Section III: Category translation

In this section, you will be asked to choose the - in your opinion - best translation for five English emotion concepts.

The word "angry" best translates as... *

Tick all that apply.

- ☐ zornig
- ☐ verärgert
- ☐ aufgebracht
- ☐ empört
- ☐ wütend

The word "furious" best translates as... *

Tick all that apply.

- ☐ verärgert
- ☐ empört
- ☐ wütend
- ☐ zornig
- ☐ aufgebracht

The word "outraged" best translates as... *

Tick all that apply.

- ☐ aufgebracht
- ☐ zornig
- ☐ empört
- ☐ wütend
- ☐ verärgert

The word "upset" best translates as... *

Tick all that apply.

- ☐ aufgebracht
- ☐ zornig
- ☐ wütend
- ☐ empört
- ☐ verärgert

The word "annoyed" best translates as... *

Tick all that apply.

- ☐ wütend
- ☐ zornig
- ☐ aufgebracht
- ☐ verärgert
- ☐ empört

Section IV: Category rating and intuitions

In this last section, you will be asked to rate how likely you are to use English categories in your daily life and give reasons why.

Please rate the following items according to your likeliness of using this word – untranslated – in German. *

Mark only one oval per row.

	very unlikely	unlikely	not sure	likely	very likely
angry	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
furious	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
annoyed	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
upset	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
outraged	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If I use an English word (untranslated) in German, it is because... *

Please choose at least one possibility or select "Other" and specify.

Tick all that apply.

- ☐ it sounds better
- ☐ it better expresses what I want to say
- ☐ I find it difficult to come up with a satisfying translation
- ☐ it comes natural to me
- ☐ I cannot think of a German word
- ☐ Other:

Section V: Demographical information

You have now reached the end of this questionnaire. Below, please provide some information about yourself.

Age

Gender

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Female
- ☐ Male
- ☐ Prefer not to say
- ☐ Other:

Nationality

Native language(s)

Learning English since _____ years

Number of semesters studied at the Department for English and American Studies

I have lived in an English-speaking country

Mark only one oval.

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Contact information

Please do not hesitate to contact me in case you have any question about this research. If you are interested in the outcomes of this study, please call or send an e-mail, and I will gladly send you the findings once I have completed my Thesis. Thank you again for your time and participation!