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Abstract

The Gezi Park incidents against the demolition of the park are still significant as being one of the unprecedented collective, civil society actions in the Turkish history. The environmental awareness motivation at the beginning of the protests turned into an anti-government stance during the course of the events and as a result of the strategies pursued by the involved actors. The thesis aims to conduct the case study to explore the consequences of the protests on the political power of the government and the impacts of the incidents on the Turkish population. The thesis investigates the thirty days of the protests through employing three different theoretical approaches, which illustrate the changing dynamics of the events. The first ten days, the second ten days and the third ten days of the protests are visualized with various power concepts of Foucault, Arendt and Weber. The election results, in the aftermath of the protests until present, construe the continuous influence of the ruling party on the population, which is epitomized by Gramsci's concept of hegemony. The thesis argues that although the Gezi Park was a unique posture against the increasing realm of political power of the AKP government, the incidents strengthened the ruling party.

Key words: Foucault, Arendt, Weber, Gramsci, political power, hegemony, Taksim Gezi Park, incidents, protests, Turkey.

Abstrakt

Die Gezi-Park-Ereignisse gegen den Abriss des Parks sind immer noch wichtig als eine des beispiellosen kollektiven zivilgesellschaftlichen Handelns in der türkischen Geschichte. Die Motivation des Umweltbewusstseins zu Beginn der Proteste änderte sich zu einer regierungsfeindlichen Haltung im Laufe der Ereignisse und als Folge der Strategien der beteiligten Akteure. Die Masterarbeit zielt darauf ab, eine Fallstudie durchzuführen, um die Konsequenzen der Proteste auf der politischen Macht der Regierung und die Auswirkungen der Ereignisse auf die türkische Bevölkerung zu erforschen. Die Masterarbeit untersucht die dreißig Tage der Proteste anhand dreier verschiedener theoretischer Ansätze, die die sich verändernde Dynamik der Ereignisse veranschaulichen. Die ersten zehn Tage, die zweiten zehn Tage und die dritten zehn Tage der Proteste werden mit dem Unterschiedlichen Machtkonzepte von Foucault, Arendt und Weber visualisiert. Die Wahlergebnisse, nach den Protesten bis heute, zeigen den fortwährenden Einfluss der Regierungspartei auf die Bevölkerung, der durch Gramscis Hegemonie-Konzept verkörpert wird. Darüber hinaus diskutiert die Masterarbeit, dass, obwohl der Gezi-Park eine einzigartige Protesthaltung gegen den wachsenden Einfluss der politischen Macht der AKP-Regierung war, eben diese Ereignisse der Regierungspartei stärkten.

Schlüsselwörter: Foucault, Arendt, Weber, Gramsci, Politische Macht, Hegemonie, Taksim Gezi-Park, Ereignisse, Proteste, Türkei.

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List of Abbreviations

AA	Anadolu Agency
AKM	Atatürk Cultural Center (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi)
AKP	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi)
CHP	Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
CNN	Cable News Network
DISK	Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
EU	The European Union
HDP	Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi)
ITUC	Confederation of International Unions
KESK	Confederation of Public Workers' Unions
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Organization
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PM	Prime Minister
RTUK	Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu)
SDP	Socialist Democracy Party (Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi)
SODAP	Socialist Solidarity Platform
TBB	Turkish Bars Association Istanbul
TBMM	Grand National Assembly of Turkey (parliament)
TGS	Journalists Union of Turkey
TMMOB	Chamber of Architects and Engineers
TTB	Turkish Medical Association
UN	The United Nations
USA	The United States of America
WHO	World Health Organization
YSK	Supreme Electoral Council

1. Introduction

1.1. State of the Art

The authenticity of the Gezi Park protests shines in the recent history. The spirit, enthusiasm and political humor of the protesters, more significantly their peaceful resistance against the demolition of the Gezi Park, at the heart of Istanbul would always be recalled as one of the most determined collective social actions, experienced in Turkey. It started as a small scale protest by about 50 environmentalists in order to criticize the project of converting the park into a shopping mall. On the first days, the sit-in of the protesters was disrupted by severe police interventions, which spontaneously mobilized people for solidarity against the unjust treatment towards the peaceful environmentalists. Hence, the main motivation of protecting the trees turned into a protest against excessive police force. As the intervention of the security forces was a command of the ruling, the quality of the protest altered from a green event into an anti-government stance. Thereafter, the opposing citizens started to criticize the overwhelming policies of the government, such as increasing restrictions on freedom of speech and freedom of press, on basic human rights and government's authoritarian manner. In a country, of which population has been apolitical and immune to the multivariate policies of different governments, the anti-government posture of the resistance was unprecedented. Disregarding the aftermath, Occupy Gezi Park resistance was an unexpected challenge to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) ruling and its increasing realm of political power. Nevertheless, the continuous interventions and uncompromising rhetoric of the authorities, as part of the strategies of the government, dominated the ongoing and attained to break the determined resistance. Despite the continual protests on the streets, the power of the group, gained through their collective action started to descend after the evacuation of the park. As inversely correlated the power of governance was kept monopolized. In Weberian sense, the state had the right to use legitimate force to disperse an unauthorized resistance through the means of the state. As being elected by the majority, the voters legitimized the practices of the government. The support of the AKP-voters was evident in the results of the elections that took place after the Gezi Park resistance. As a matter of fact, the politics in Turkey is shaped at the ballot. The collective action of millions could not translate its perspective into votes, thus PM Erdoğan was elected as President, the AKP ruling regained parliamentary majority and increased their political power.

The thesis aims to discuss how the protests of opposing people affect the political power of the government in six chapters. Following the introduction, the second chapter provides selection of the controversial implementations before Gezi Park protests. In the pre-Gezi Park atmosphere, local protests were observable such as the assemblies against the demolishing of the AKM building, Emek Theater and against the pedestrianization project of Taksim square as well as against the restrictions of rights and freedoms. These undesired regulations, which had created small scale tensions, could be perceived as concrete grounds leading to the Gezi Park resistance. The third chapter explains how the protests began and specifies statistical data on the profiles of the participants on the first days of the resistance. The survey results are relevant to comprehend the concerns and demands of the protesters as well as the reasons that made separate and peaceful individuals join the nation-wide resistance.

The fourth chapter aims to examine the thirty days of the resistance in three parts; first ten days, second ten days and third ten days. This categorization is needed for three reasons; firstly, although the starting goals of the protest remained the same, the protest changed its character as a result of specific occasions; this change should be explained separately. Secondly, the power in the hands of the protesters increased, kept intact and decreased during the course of the events in thirty days. The third reason is the attempt to explore the protests with three different theoretical approaches, which expedite to comprehend the changing characteristics of the resistance. In this regard, the discourse of Foucault on *governmentality* and *power* match with the first ten days; Arendt's relationship between *power* and *violence* construes the occurrences in the second ten days; and the conceptualizations of Weber on *power*, *pure types of domination* and the *legitimate use of force* perfectly decode the third ten days of the resistance.

During the resistance, the government certainly pointed at the ballot box as the only mechanism to change the ruling. Therefore, the fifth chapter provides statistical data on the presidential, parliamentary elections and referendum that took place after the Gezi Park resistance until present. As mentioned, the electorate plays an important role in shaping the politics. The election results are significant for a second reason, while these lead to the overall argument that the dominant ideology in the population is able to convert its perspective into votes. This ideology is shaped by the governmental authorities and conveyed to the public through their rhetoric. The more influence the ruling has on the

population, the more support the presented ideology gets. As a result, the multitude of people pursuing the same ideology increases and the ideology of the ruling becomes hegemonic in the society. This assertion leads to the *hegemony* of Gramsci, through which the main argument of thesis is discussed. Finally, the arguments are concluded and hypotheses are tested in the sixth chapter.

1.2. Research Question and Hypotheses

The thesis aims to discuss the research question: “How do the anti-government protests affect the political power of the Turkish government?” and test the following hypotheses:

1. If opposing views form collective action, the power of the government will be decreased.
2. If the government weakens the opposition, it will consolidate its political power.
3. If the leader of the ruling party is influential, the dominant ideology in the population will gain more support.

The protests, which started as a criticism against an undesired mall project turned into criticisms against the ruling, and its restrictive policies. The protesters achieved to form a collective action during the resistance and gained power with the mobilization of more people. Nevertheless, the government attained to break the determined manner of the protests and consolidated its political power. Therefore, the thesis aims to refute the first hypothesis.

After the evacuation of the park, the protests continued on the streets along a descend and the support in the collective action declined in time. As the protests were supported by the opposing citizens, the government achieved to weaken the opposition, after suppressing the protests. The opposition was unable to translate the collective power of resistance into votes; hence the ruling party formed the parliament alone as a result of the elections in the aftermath of Occupy Gezi Park. According to this fact, the second hypothesis is to be proven.

Thereafter the question of how the ruling party wins the elections despite the presence of the people, who determinedly resisted against the ruling, raises in minds. A possible answer could be: the leader of the ruling party is influential and able to make masses follow him, no matter how determined the resistance was. This influence can be seen as reflections of his ideas in the population. Citizens, who pursue the same ideology, empower him and his party as evident in every election and referendum. Therefore, the overall hypothesis: if the leader

of the ruling party is influential, the dominant ideology in the population will gain more support, is to be justified.

Accordingly, the research question “How do the anti-government protests affect the political power of the Turkish government?” could shortly be answered as follows: the anti-government protests consolidated the political power of the government. Despite the opposition of masses, the support for the AKP government and its leader Erdoğan and their continuous influence on the population guaranteed their presence in the ruling. The major impact of the protests on the opposing population is the idea that holding a similar protest in the future to criticize the policies of the government would not bring any outcomes. The findings of the thesis could propose a general statement that despite small scale assemblies, the opposing citizens of the Turkish population are muted by the political power of government and discouraged to hold such protests; additionally, they are convinced that the only way to change the government is the elections.

1.3. Methodology

The thesis is designed by case study method aiming at explaining the phenomena, and proving or nullifying the hypotheses through comprehensive qualitative analysis of the case. Quantitative method is also employed to provide statistical data on the participants of the protests as well as on the results of the elections, took place in the post-Gezi period. Theoretical explanatory parts contain reviewing of books, journals and articles. It aims to integrate the selected theories into the case study in order to comprehend the changing temperament of the case. The theoretical framework guides the research and organizes the relationship between phenomena. The selected theories also lead the way to draw an accurate conclusion. Additionally, deductive reasoning expedites to interpret the data on statements, protests, strategies of the actors and dialogue between actors.

The qualitative analysis of the case aims to be descriptive, indicative and explicitly interpretative from direct quotations, which are selected in accordance with the research questions and hypotheses. Analysis of the occurrences is possible through providing information on all actors that are involved in the process as well as providing multidimensional data, such as statements and strategies of governmental authorities and prominent figures; motivation, strategies, reaction and announcements of protesters and their leading organization; detailed media coverage on the course of the events. Final

selection of the media coverage and direct quotations aim to provide multiple perspectives of all actors. With these data, the thesis aims to analyze the cause and effect relationship and consequences of the incidents.

It must be noted that the election results in the aftermath of the protests are included to provide the electorate decision, which did not change the ruling party since Gezi Park. Other significant political occurrences -such as the coup attempt in July 2016, or the current rule by state of emergency (which also did not change the ruling party) - were not included in the argument, as these could be the subjects of different researches. In addition, the thesis aims to avoid any bias and prejudgment, considering the ethnic, cultural, social, religious, political and ideological differences of the protesters and of the governmental officials. Worth mentioning is that the interpretative parts are aimed to be reasonable, commonsensical, impartial, and objective; furthermore, presumptuous and subjective judgment are avoided.

2. Prior to Gezi

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was by then the Prime Minister and current President of Turkey has been holding the parliamentary majority since 2002. The ruling of the AKP has changed many things in Turkey both positive and negative. During AKP's and Erdoğan's governance, there have been many changes in political, economic, social and cultural fields as well as plenty controversial policies, implementations and law amendments. These have triggered criticisms and reaction by some segments of the population. Despite many critiques, the political power of the government had not been questioned collectively and most of the opposing people were respecting the positions of the governors and position of Erdoğan as PM. This respect started to fade away in the pre-Gezi climate because of his parental speeches for the last few years and run out of stream during the Gezi Park protests. Although this decline could be observed among opposing people in personal criticism, this could never mobilize people holding same views. The break, though, was observed from the beginning of the Gezi Park protests; those who had been against one or numerous policies and implementations of the ruling could come together for the first time, putting aside their differences and meeting in common. Hence the violence was the last drop in a full glass that made the water flow and the opposing people started to question the increasing political power of the government, collectively. Unification in common idea, which was being against the disproportionate use of violence, made people go out and join protests or bang pots and pans at their homes as a way of protest.

Before exploring the Gezi Park protests, it is useful to have a look at the context of the pre-Gezi Park period as the context is important to understand the reasoning of the people, who joined actively or supported the protests. The following selected cases took place before Gezi Park protests will try to find answers to the question: What were the policies and implementations, testing the patience of people in near history and slowly led to Gezi Park resistance?

2.1. Restrictions and Bans

2.1.1. Canceling of National Celebrations

Every country has special national rituals that people would like to perform every year at

national occasions. These days are cultural routines that the belongings of the nation would like to see taking place. One cannot image that Austria's National Day celebrated annually on 26 October at Heldenplatz is being canceled unless there is a significant reason to do so. Turkey celebrates the Republic Day, marking the declaration of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923, with annual marches across Turkey. Likewise, other national days like 23 April National Sovereignty and Children's Day, 19 May Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Day, 30 August Victory Day are celebrated with the attendance of the President, Prime Minister and other ministers.

In his column, journalist Yılmaz Özdil underlines that the President (by then Abdullah Gül) and Prime Minister (then Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) were not attending these celebrations with various excuses like "being ill" or "visiting a country." (Hürriyet, 29.10.2013)

In 2012, the planned 29-October Republic Day march was canceled by the governor of Ankara because of the possibility of "provocation by radical groups." (Milliyet, 28.10.2012) Despite the ban, people including old, young, children and the Republican People's Party (CHP) Leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu wanted to continue the traditional celebrations and marched from the TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey, parliament) to Anıtkabir (mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk). The police interventions with tear gas and water cannon could not stop the Republic March. Despite the tensions, the march of ten thousands of people continued until Anıtkabir. (NTV, 29.10.2012)

Upon the intervention, CHP Leader Kılıçdaroğlu said: "For the first time in history, despite the bans and hindrances, the 29 October [Republic Day] is celebrated by the public. All institutions of the government tried to block the march, but ten thousands of people came with Turkish flags." (TRT, 29.10.2012)

It was further reported that people from other cities wanted to join the march and were coming to Ankara by buses. The buses were stopped by the police at the entrance of Ankara and 110 buses (each bus has approximately 45-seat capacity) were not allowed to enter in the city. (Hürriyet, 29.10.2012)

This case was selected to mark that the march was held, despite the cancellation and police interventions. Several other examples in line with this can be provided while the national celebrations were being restricted, were not held or were not attended by the President and Prime Minister and the population could not raise a collective voice asking the reasons.

2.1.2. Removal of T.C.

In early 2013, the T.C. acronym, representing the Turkish Republic, is started to be deleted from the logos of state-run banks, hospitals and of the Ministry of Health. The state-owned T.C. Ziraat Bank changed its name to Ziraat Bank and removed the T.C. in its name. Following this, the Ministry of Health and some hospitals removed the T.C., which caused discussions in the country. People, who are against these changes, started to use T.C. acronym in their names in social media accounts as a way of protest. According to a 9 April 2013 report of daily *Milliyet*, there were, by then, 32 million Facebook users in Turkey and 9 million Facebook users added T.C. in front of their names. (Milliyet, 09.04.2013)

It is reasonable for the private owners to name their companies as they wish, however it was an extraordinary implementation for a ministry and a state-run bank to change their names. This triggered reaction of the opposing people but could not form a collective action further than changing names on their social media accounts.

2.1.3. Banning Curettage, Caesarean Birth, Number of Children

In a 2012 speech, Prime Minister Erdoğan said that “abortion [curettage] is murder,” and following his speech other ministers also spoke against abortion. A draft law was planned to ban the legal abortion, which did not put on force upon the reaction and protests by feminists and other activists and the law was amended to limit abortion, only. Nevertheless, a *Milliyet* report underlined that even though the law did not ban abortion, the hospitals apply an invisible ban. According to the law, women have the right to end pregnancy until the tenth week and without the permission of their husbands. However, the report carried its research at state-run hospitals in various cities that the hospitals do not allow women to end pregnancy without the permission of their husbands; even unmarried women are asked permission by the father of the child. The research included important hospitals like Ankara Atatürk State Hospital and Istanbul Haseki Education and Research Hospital, both said that the “application was removed as abortion was banned.” (Milliyet, 19.02.2014; Guardian, 01.02.2013)

If the hospitals are not informed on a legalized ban, it might be the rhetoric of the prime minister and ministers and their manner posing as if the law was passed, made the hospitals obey a non-existing law. This application of hospitals may force women to illegal ways of

abortion that threatens the lives of ladies.

A law banning caesarean birth was passed the parliament in 2012. The *Hürriyet* report said the law passed and banned caesarean birth unless a medical necessity exists. The report cited Recep Akdağ, by then the Health Minister, speaking to the CNN Türk news channel saying: “The caesarean birth is not possible; it can be done if there is a medical need,” and added: “We count ‘fear of giving birth’ as a medical necessity.” Akdağ also underlined that the aim of the law is to decrease the number of caesarean and encourage normal birth. (Hürriyet, 04.07.2013)

In December 2014, at a marriage ceremony Erdoğan said that the nation needs “more young population” to be “powerful” and added: “We need young and dynamic population, in order to make our nation powerful. It is important for economic power and also morally. For years, they did betray the country with birth control and they led to our extinction!” (Hürriyet, 22.12.2014)

At different occasions, Erdoğan underlined the need for at least three children in a family. In 2009, Erdoğan said: “There must be at least three children in every family. Be sure! The more our population increased, the more powerful we will be.” (NTV, 10.10.2009) He then repeated his demand in 2014; daily *Vatan* cited him saying: “In every marriage ceremony that I attend, I say, at least three children, but no one come closer to this.” (Vatan, 30.11.2014) He criticized families that did not follow his advice.

In 2014, daily *Cumhuriyet* said that previous statements of Erdoğan on banning abortion, caesarean birth and on the number of children of families were “discussed a lot.” It carried the video of a new suggestion by Erdoğan, addressing the young ladies: “Do not be so selective about marriage, decide instantly and get married.” (Cumhuriyet, 18.07.2014)

The statesmen are expected to have many other primary occupations rather than being engaged with the private issues of the families. How to give birth, the number of children and when to get married are the issues that must be decided by the couples and especially by women and rest in their free will. The rhetoric of the prime minister and his intervention in the private lives of the families and especially of women had been debated intensively and read as an attempt to restrict liberties. Hearing and following the rhetoric of the authorities, ordinary people can get encouraged and start to act in a same manner, which could complicate daily life of individuals.

2.1.4. Lady Wearing Short

Another incident showed that the power of the government is applied by people, who approve the policies of the government. These policies and rhetoric of the authorities encourage some people to put power on ‘others.’ In August 2011, in Istanbul; in a public bus, a young girl, who was playing volleyball professionally, got in the public transportation with her sport short after training, and she was verbally attacked and punched on face by a man, who said that her short was too short and “against morality.” (Radikal, 09.08.2011)

Conservativeness of neither people nor government would be included in this argument but this example can be explained through the norms and taboos that some people have in minds. Even though they had had such stereotypes, it was not appropriate to voice it in public in the past. After people acquired a kind of authority from the rhetoric of the government, they were encouraged to voice their thoughts in an inappropriate manner and even to attack ‘others’ physically. As in this case, classifying people according to their outfit and voicing that it is “not morally appropriate” to wear a short short in public is a right, which was given to those people by the government through the imperative rhetoric of the statesmen intervening private lives of people. So does the ordinary officials; they feel being empowered by the government to act in a similar manner.

2.1.5. Morality Announcement

On 23 May 2013, just a few days before the Gezi Park protests, people of capital Ankara started to hear announcements in a metro station saying that people should “act within the frames of moral rules” in the public. The announcement was reportedly addressed to the youth “acting inappropriate” among the public. (Hürriyet, 23.05.2013) This warning against the embracing or kissing of young couples, triggered reaction of people as it was not the duty of the officials to intervene in the lives of people and furthermore the function of the security cameras was questioned. People of Ankara organized a prompt “kissing demonstration” via Facebook and held on 25 May 2013 at that metro station in order to protest the officials and the “morality announcements.”(Hürriyet, 25.05.2013) The security officials and cameras in metro stations must monitor any actions against order or threats against peace. This case demonstrates the misuse of duties even by the officials at metro stations.

2.1.6. Ban on Selling Alcohol

The selling of alcohol in shops between 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. was banned with a law, which was passed the parliament on 24 May 2013, a few days before the protests started, and approved by the President Abdullah Gül on 10 June, on one of the intensive days of the resistance. The law put into effect on 10 September 2013. (Radikal, 24.05.2013; Milliyet 10.06.2013; CNN Türk, 10.09.2013)

This law was one of the controversial implementations of the government just before the Gezi Park protests and was interpreted as limiting the rights and civil liberties of a particular segment of people, in other words, targeting at the secular population.

One month before the protests, on 27 April 2013, Erdoğan delivered a speech at the symposium of the Global Alcohol Policies and underlined that “Ayran,” yogurt drink, is the “national drink” of Turks. (Hürriyet, 27.04.2013)

His speech caused humorous discussions before and during the protests as the national drink of Turks is considered to be “Rakı,” otherwise known as Lion’s Milk, which is an alcoholic drink. Moreover, his description was read as a deliberate target to change the cultural knowledge of the nation through this new information; furthermore, new cultural perception might aim at getting approval of the conservative segment of the population. This attempt to change the cultural knowledge might be perceived as an attempt to form a new cultural hegemony in the society. The citizens, who agree with the mentality of the government, would approve the changes and follow the new values, which could become the dominant culture and replace the real culture of that society. Another way to carry out such a cultural alteration could be the demolition of historical and cultural buildings and locations.

2.1.7. Demolition of Emek Movie Theater

Historic Emek Movie Theater, which was the oldest cinema, located in Beyoğlu, Istanbul was demolished on 21 May 2013, despite all rejections and protests. It had been closed since 26 October 2009 as part of the supposed restoration project; however it became a part of a shopping mall project and the complete demolition process took place from March 2013 to 21 May 2013. (Hürriyet, 22 May 2013)

This was a current incident took place just before Gezi Protests and public was against this demolition as well. Project of another shopping mall to replace the Gezi Park, in a quite close neighborhood was one of the strongest arguments of the protesters, who were against demolition of both the Emek Theater and Gezi Park.

2.2. Four Projects for Taksim Square

“Whatever you say, the Military Barracks and a shopping mall will be built in Taksim, moreover the Atatürk Cultural Center will be demolished; in addition a mosque will be constructed.” Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 10)

The four different projects for Taksim Square were strongly criticized by many non-governmental organizations, civil society associations, chambers as well as academicians and citizens. The critiques stated that the project is not a pedestrianization project rather “disidentification of the square.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 14) Some associations added that the project is not appropriate to the modern arrangements in squares and transportation projects. Other negative perspectives underlined that people would face difficulties in walking and entering the square because of the traffic tunnels. First and foremost, the overall project was criticized as it included demolition of the Gezi Park, which is the last green space in the district.

Kongar (in Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013) lists four projects that were planned for the Taksim Square. First, the pedestrianization of the square, which was a project, approved by the municipality, that aimed to move the traffic underground and open the square to the walkers, i.e. to the public. It was seriously rejected by some groups but did not cause disturbance in the society. (p. 14)

Second controversial project was the restoration or demolition of the Atatürk Cultural Center (AKM), which includes theater hall, opera house and concert hall. Kongar underlines that “it is known” that Erdoğan was “in favor of demolishing” the building, but as the building is accepted as historical monument, it was suggested to preserve the original in the restoration process. (p. 14) The AKM was closed on 31 May 2008. (BBC Turkish, 27.03.2015)

The project and AKM’s being closed to the audience have been triggered reaction of the public. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 14) Very recently, on 6 November 2017, President

Erdoğan announced that the AKM would be demolished and be constructed anew as an opera house; to be completed and opened in the first quarter of 2019. The name would remain the same as new Atatürk Cultural Center. (Hürriyet, 06.11.2017)

Third project was demolishing the Gezi Park and constructing the historic Taksim Military Barracks, from Ottoman Empire era which was demolished in 1940. The Taksim Military Barracks was to include a shopping mall and residence as announced by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The project was designed by the municipality in 2011, but rejected by the Preservation Council of Istanbul with the reasoning that “Taksim Gezi Park is a place that should be preserved for the urban memory.” After the rejection the project was brought to Higher Preservation Council in Ankara and got approval. Against the approval, the case was brought to the Administrative Court that decided the stay of executing the project a few days after the “Taksim Gezi Park Resistance” started. Kongar (2013) adds that the future of the project is unknown. (p. 14)

Even though the PM Erdoğan had stated that there would be a shopping mall in the new Taksim Military Barracks, it was announced, right after the escalation of the Gezi Park protests that the project had not included a shopping mall. (p. 15)

According to Öztürk (2014) the reconstruction of the barracks project, including the shopping mall and residence was “one of the typical assaults of the AKP government to turn the entire country into a great building site in line with its neoliberal urban policies.” (p. 112)

Fourth project was a mosque to be built in the square; however, later, the PM Erdoğan announced that the location of the project was changed. Kongar (2013) adds that there was no concrete information on the future of this project. (p. 15)

2.3. Media Censorship

One of the features of democracies is the freedom of the press; a free media, providing right and just information to the citizens through unbiased media channels. During the 15 years of ruling of the AKP, the media channels, one by one changed their ways of reporting from an objective manner to a biased way or at least preventing the reports that would not be welcomed by the government, in other words, self-censorship. The best example for this auto-control mechanism took place during the Gezi protests; the most important national

news channels aired an animal documentary and a cooking program during the most intense days of the Gezi Protests.

The news channels, newspapers and especially the mainstream media are expected to report what is happening in the real world objectively and impartially, in order to provide the true information to the public on what is going on in political, economic, social and even in cultural lives. Even though the Gezi Park protests affected all these components of life, the media did not think it was worth to report and kept its mute mood.

Why did the media disregard the protests, can be explained with two reasons; first, the media channels do not want to go against the government for their present as well as future interests; they want to continue their businesses and they have observed that the media channels opposing the government suffered in many ways, mainly financially. Secondly, the biased media channels do not want to disobey the government because of the sanctions. The state agency named Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK), which monitors radios and televisions, sanctions them if their broadcasts are inappropriate. The channel gets high amount of financial penalties if the RTUK finds out that the posture of the channel is oppositional.

Worth mentioning how Foucault explains the difference between force and power. He says that power is not similar to force; for example, if a person is beaten by another one, this action does not include power but force, only. However, when the beater threatens the beaten for not telling it to anybody, then the beater applies power on the beaten. The freedom of the beaten is limited and “subjected to power” under this circumstance. (Foucault, Kritzman, ed., 1988, pp. 83-4) As Foucault stresses, the power of the governments can be exercised by other institutions. Therefore, RTUK becomes one of the institutions through which the power is applied on the media.

This is how most of the radios and televisions are made mute; either you publish what is happening objectively, like a media channel should do, and pay the large amount of fines or you obey the invisible rules and play three monkeys. These censorship was proved during the protests; while CNN International were airing live from Istanbul with at least three correspondents, a Turkish news channel was airing a penguin documentary, which made penguin one of the symbols of the protests, another channel was airing cooking program.

It is impossible to omit the existence of the social media channels in today's world. Perhaps, in a country over 80 million population, it would not have been possible to mobilize millions in every city across Turkey without Twitter and Facebook, especially in the absence of the mainstream media. These social media channels replaced the mainstream media and enabled people to learn about the incidents in seconds, to communicate during the protests and especially Twitter interlinked the protesters.

However, the speedy flow of information through the social media did not last so long because the internet connection of the smartphones was blocked to hinder people from sharing locations of where the protests were taking place, of where the water cannons were, of where the police were using pepper spray and of which places were secure for taking shelter for the treatment of wounds. Against this blockage, people living or working in neighboring districts of Taksim shared the passwords of wireless networks to maintain the communication flow.

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The context of the pre-Gezi Park atmosphere sheds light on the reasoning of the people, for whom it was a necessity to hold the protests. Before moving on the analysis of the Occupy Gezi resistance, it is important to provide information on the profiles of the protesters and on the questions, such as, how did the protests get started; what was the main motivation of a small protest and how did it turn into a nation-wide resistance.

3. Beginning of Protests and Participant Profiles

3.1. How Did Protests Start?

“Resistance is not a rare attribute of certain heroic subjects but an essential fact to everyone’s everyday struggles with power.” (Nealon, 2008, p. 111)

The Gezi Park protests, started on 27 May 2013, led by about 50 environmentalists against replacing Istanbul Taksim Gezi Park with a shopping mall having the same architecture with historic Taksim Topçu Military Barracks (which was demolished in 1940), turned into riots after the unarmed group’s sit-in, camping peacefully, reading books, playing guitar in the park, was attacked by the police with tear gas and their camping tents were burned down in the early morning. The subjects of the protests broadened into wider anti-government demonstrations and also spread to other cities in Turkey and protested by the Turkish people living in Europe and around the world.

The peaceful demonstrators were there for the sake of “twelve trees,” as the Prime Minister Erdoğan referred to (Bianet, 02.06.2013); Gezi Park is the only green place in the center of Istanbul, which enables the 15-million inhabitants to breath. Started with a couple of trees but protests then turned into having an anti-government stance and attended by those who were against one or more than one policies of the government; first of all because of government’s becoming authoritarian. The reasons included increasing restrictions on freedom of speech and freedom of press, restrictions on basic human rights and government’s invasion on secularism as observable in the cases in the previous chapter.

Author Emre Kongar (in Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013) answers the question of how a “small” environmentalist and green event turned into a nation-wide resistance. It was the “merciless and violent intervention” and “usage of pepper spray by the police, even the very first day of the sit-in,” which mobilized the people against police violence and this changed the “quality of the movement” from a simple protest into a nation-wide resistance. (p. 17)

The protests did not, in fact, have an anti-government motive in the very beginning; rather it was against the disproportionate police violence on unarmed civilians. The police violence was a reflection of long-standing authoritarian policies of the government, which had been testing the patience of people for the last few years before the protests and overstepped the limits after the police violence on the first days of the protests. Kongar (2013) underlines

that before Gezi Park protests “no social or political assembly had been included this amount of youth, this amount of women, this amount of families” and no assembly had been “such non-institutionalized, non-leadership and most importantly this much peaceful but this much resistant.” (p. 59)

The intervention of the police that morning on about 50 environmentalists, who did not have a leader, did not have other roots than the roots of the trees in Gezi Park and did not have a *power* behind them, was protested by millions of people, who are of every segment of society, of different beliefs, ideologies and cultures; wealthy-homeless, artists-workers, white collars-blue collars, professors-students, young-old-children, all came together for the first time against the brutal violence of police and for gaining their civil liberties back. Later the protests were attended by other groups, who wanted to voice their demands together with the protesters such as the labor unions. In the meantime, followers of competitor soccer teams, followers of different political parties and members of different associations, which can rarely come together, walked hand in hand, against the interventions.

For the last few years before the protests, the community was tried to be divided and classified under different attributions or nationalities through politics. When asked, middle-age people explain that they had never known the faith of their neighbor; such as people holding Alevi faith, or the origins like being Armenian or Kurdish. It was not a polite behavior to ask the origin or belief of people. They were living in the same building, in the same district, greeting each other regardless of their origins or faith. However, the political rhetoric and changes in the last years, made people question these differences and take a stand against the ‘other.’ This classification, imposed by the politics on people’s minds, were broken by the Gezi Park protests and more specifically the severe force on unarmed people led the creation of a unified and a colorful chain, without any division.

The use of force by the police, which spontaneously unified people, is commanded by the Prime Minister Erdoğan himself, citing his own words during a rally addressing to the AKP supporters on 24 June 2013: “They were still all there. The limits of tolerance have been exceeded. I told my Minister of the Interior: within 24 hours, you will clean up the Atatürk Cultural Center. You will clean up the statue. After that, you will clean up Gezi Park. They ask: who gave the order to the police [for using force]? I did. I did. Yes. Were we supposed to sit and watch the forces of occupation? Were we supposed to wait until the whole world would join in and celebrate?” (Amnesty International, Gezi Report, 2013, p. 9)

The reason why a small environmental protest turned into a nation-wide anti-government resistance can be inferred from the fact that the severe police interventions were command of the Prime Minister and therefore the government. Plain logic of all participants or supporters of the protests can conclude a simple conditional statement: 'I am against police force, if police intervention was a command of the government; I think the government should resign.' Even though the people, who pursued this kind of logical consequence, could not achieve the resignation of the government, the starting aim of the protests - stopping the demolition of the Gezi Park- was achieved. Disregarding the political aftermath of the protests, the Gezi Park protests can be marked as one of the most important collective actions in the Turkish history. Before going into the details of the protests and resistance, the profiles of the participants, especially at the beginning of the protests should be analyzed with the help of the surveys.

3.2. Who Were There?

One of the main contradicting arguments during the protests was the question of who the protesters were, in other words, who was 'behind' the protests, ordering or directing the behaviors of the protesters? As it was claimed, was there a 'foreign power' or 'interest rate lobbies' behind the scenes? It was clearly found out by various surveys that the protesters on the first days of the protests were *simple citizens* whose basic rights and freedoms were restricted by politics. Kongar (in Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013) provides the results of two surveys: first was held on internet between 3-4 June 2013, between the second and third interventions of the police; it was online for 20 hours, only and answered by some 3 thousand people. (p. 31) The second survey was held between 6-7 June and 4,411 active participants of the protests were asked in person by KONDA Research and Consultancy. (KONDA Gezi Report, 2014) Metropoll survey and report of Ombudsman will also be included in order to find answers of other significant questions.

Online Survey

According to the first survey held on internet between 3-4 June 2013:

- 39.6 percent of the people supported the protests are between 19-25 years old; 24 percent are between 26-30 years old;
- 75.8 percent joined the protests through going out the streets; 53.7 percent have not

attended any protests before;

- 70 percent did not feel themselves close to any party;
- 81.2 percent of the protesters described themselves as “liberal”;
- 64.5 percent said: “I am secular.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 31)

The data tells that the large majority of the protesters were young people, who could be marked among the generation Y, of which characteristics are known as being good at technology and communication and holding mainly liberal views. It can be inferred from the data that these young protesters were liberal, secular and non-partisan and they were active participants of the protests; more than 50 percent participated in a protest for the first time. What was their main motivation to attend the protests for the first time in their lives?

The results of the online survey also adduced the reasons why people attended the protests:

- 92.4 percent totally agreed that the authoritarian attitude of the Prime Minister made people attend;
- 91.3 percent totally agreed that the disproportional force of the police made people attend;
- 91.1 percent totally agreed that the violation of democratic rights made people attend;
- 84.2 percent totally agreed that the silence of media made people attend;
- 56.2 percent totally agreed that cutting of the trees made people attend;
- 96.7 percent of survey participants supported the idea that the “police violence should stop.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 32)

It is clear that the vast majority of the people joined in order to protest the authoritarian manner of the Prime Minister, the severe police interventions and the violation of democratic rights as well as to demand ending the police violence. It is worth mentioning that the overwhelming majority was protesting the mute mood of the media and small majority was against cutting of the trees. It is understood by these answers of the survey, held on 3-4 June that the nature of the protests was changed from an environmental protest to an anti-government stance, by the end of the first week of the protests.

Therefore, the first survey on internet puts forward that the young generation using internet supported the protests; they were modern and non-partisan. They also thought that the authoritarian attitude of the Prime Minister and excessive police force motivated people to attend the protests.

KONDA Survey

The second survey was held by KONDA Research and Consultancy between 6-7 June and 4,411 active participants of the protests were asked in person. The results were published in the KONDA Gezi Report (2014) as follows:

- Age average was 28. (p.7)
- 55.6 percent attended any other protests, marches, sit-ins before Gezi Park;
- 44.4 percent attended a protest for the first time. (p.15)
- 93.6 percent of the participants described themselves as “simple citizens who do not represent a group.” (p.14)
- 78.9 percent said they are not a member of a political party, formation or association, foundation and platform. (p.14)

The survey added that the “organization members do not form the majority in the park.” (p.17)

Like the first one, this survey also proves that the protesters in the park were young people with an average of 28 years. It further finds out that the vast majority of the protesters was simple citizens and did not have an interest to represent any group, ideology or party. Likewise, the large majority said they were non-partisan and they were not affiliated to any association, foundation or any platform. Therefore, the majority of the participants in the first ten days of the protests were not members of any organization.

KONDA also asked “When they decided to come?” to learn the incident that made people join the protests:

- 49.1 percent came, when they saw the violence of the police;
- 19 percent, when the trees were pulled out;
- 14.2 percent, when they heard the statements of Prime Minister Erdoğan;
- 10.2 percent, when they heard the Taksim project;
- 4.3 percent, when they saw the atmosphere at Taksim;
- 3.2 percent decided to come with other reasons. (p.18)

According to these answers, it is obvious that almost half of the attendees were actually against the “violence of the police” in the foreground.

The frequency of the protesters was another question: “How frequent the protesters came to the park?”

- 35.6 percent comes every day;
- 31 percent has been coming since the first day, that trees started to be pulled out;
- 20.3 percent came one or two times;
- 13 percent came for the first time. (p.16)

If the ones that came every day and that had been coming from the beginning are summed up, it is obvious that more than 66 percent of the protesters joined the protests regularly. Therefore, a large majority of the participants were resistant protesters, who did not leave the park alone during the first ten days of the protests.

Other important questions raised by the survey were: “Why they are at the park” and “what they demand?”

- 34.1 percent is there for freedoms;
- 18.4 percent against violation of rights and for demanding of rights;
- 9.7 percent against dictatorship and pressure;
- 9.5 percent for demanding government to resign;
- 8 percent for democracy and peace;
- 6.2 percent against the police violence;
- 6.1 percent for support and solidarity;
- 4.6 percent against cutting off the trees and building the Military Barracks;
- 3.2 percent for revolution and against the system;
- 2.5 percent for making their voice heard. (p. 19)

These results put forward that a multitude of people attended the protests for their freedoms and rights as well as for democracy and peace. Almost ten percent of the protesters wanted the government to resign and almost ten percent was against dictatorship and pressure. These percentages make it clear that the real demand of the protesters was not actually the resignation of the government rather preserving freedoms and rights were in the foreground. This was proved by another question of the survey which asks people whether or not their rights were violated:

- 61.9 percent said they think that they are part of the groups whose human rights are violated;

- 24.6 percent said their rights are sometimes violated;
- 13.5 percent said their rights are not violated.

KONDA concludes the results of this question with the following outcome: “Therefore, 9 of every 10 people at the park think that they faced human rights violations.” (p.16)

It is inferred that the large majority thought their rights are violated; when the people who said their rights are “sometimes violated” are inserted, it is found out that an overwhelming majority thought their rights are violated. This result was also deduced by the survey that 9 out of 10 people think that they experience human rights violations.

One of the most significant question was how the attendees in Gezi Park and how other people (across Turkey) learned about the protests, especially in the absence of the mainstream media.

- 69 percent of the people in Gezi Park learned about the protests via social media;
- 15.4 percent from a friend or relative;
- 8 percent from internet news portals;
- 7 percent from television channels.

Whereas, 71.3 percent of the people in Turkey learned about the protests from television;

- 15.9 percent via social media;
- 6.4 percent from internet news portals;
- 5.3 percent from a friend or relative;
- 1.2 percent said they have not heard of the protests. (p.23)

Large majority of the active participants of the protests at the Gezi Park learned about the protests via social media. As mentioned in the previous questions of the survey, the majority of the participants were young people with an average of 28 years, who use communication tools on internet, like the social media, very well. This advantage enabled them to learn about the protests very speedily and further they benefited from the social media for finding escape routes during the interventions of the police. Looking at the answers of other survey participants at any other location in Turkey, it is clear that the majority of the citizens learned about the protests via television, although it was a fact that the mainstream media channels were not reporting the protests until the fifteenth day. The incident on the fifteenth day that made the mainstream media audible again will be analyzed in the second ten days of the resistance.

Since an environmental protest changed its character into having a political content, and since the “simple citizen” protesters were politicized -whether consciously or not-, the political preferences of the protesters were of interest. The KONDA survey participants were asked about the political parties that they had voted for in the last elections in 2011.

- 41 percent of the participants voted for the CHP;
- 17 percent was not full age [18] to vote in 2011;
- 13 percent did not vote;
- 10 percent voted for independent candidates;
- 7 percent voted empty;
- 5 percent voted for BDP or independent,
- 2 percent for MHP;
- 2 percent voted for AKP. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 33)

It can be claimed that the multitude of protesters was voters of the CHP in the past according to the survey; however, with this information, it is not possible to claim that the protests were organized and directed by the CHP. Recalling one of the previous questions of the survey, which finds out that the protesters were non-partisan and did not belong to any political party, association and organization; being voters of a party do not make them active members of that party and do not make the party organizer of the protests.

In this respect, another significant question of the survey was the “current” [June 2013] political preferences of the protesters; they were asked: “If an election to be held today, which party would you vote for?”

- 31 percent would vote for CHP;
- 29 percent is indecisive;
- 18 percent would not vote;
- 12 percent would vote for other parties;
- 8 percent for BDP;
- 2 percent for MHP;
- 0.3 percent would vote for AKP. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 34)

It can be inferred that the percentage of past CHP voters was decreased from 41 to 31 in this time frame from 2011 to 2013 or as a result of the protests. 13 percent, who did not vote in 2011 elections, increased to 18 percent, if an election to be held in June 2013. Moreover, the

protests caused largest parties the CHP and AKP to lose their voters; CHP declined ten percent and AKP decreased from 2 percent to 0.3 percent. According to the survey, the number of the indecisive people is quite high with 29 percent; it can be defended that they either refrained from expressing their political opinion publicly or they have lost enthusiasm for politics -at least for voting- despite the fact that the protests politicized people because of the changing characteristics of the protest from an environmental awareness protest to an anti-government stance.

Before providing the last survey, one of the significant outcomes of the KONDA (2014) report must be added. It puts forward that the public thought the protests were escalated and the direction of the incidents changed “after the police violence.” 54 percent of the public thought that the Gezi incidents were “games played against Turkey” and protesters were “provoked by these games,” as it was hinted at by the PM. On the contrary, “two of every five people” thought that the protesters demanded their “rights and freedoms democratically.” According to the half of the population, the “incidents grew because of the excessive police force and of the discourse of Erdoğan.” In contrast, the “voters of the AKP,” who reportedly are “more religious, more conservative and less educated,” did not attach much consideration on these two reasons that expanded the protests. (KONDA, Gezi Report, 2014, p. 20)

Metropoll Survey

Metropoll survey was held between 3-12 June 2013; the questions were answered by 2,818 people. (p. 82) (Der Spiegel, Ausgabe 26/24.06.2013, pp. 78-93)

- According to the results, 46 percent of the survey participants thought that the protests were “not justifiable”; 62 percent thought that the “media does not reflect the occurrences correctly” (p.83) and 52 percent thought that the “Gezi Park protests will have effects on the upcoming election” (p.84)

- It was asked whether the media in Turkey was free or not: 41 percent replied “yes”; 53 percent replied “no” and 6 percent said “no reply/no idea” (p.85)

- The survey asked whether the government intervened in the private lives of people: 54 percent replied “yes”; 40 percent replied “no” and 6 percent refrained from answering (p.84)

- Metropoll asked: “Do you have anxiety for publicly expressing your political position?” 47 percent replied “yes”; 50 percent replied “no” and 3 percent refrained from answering. (p.85)

- Metropoll asked: “Do you think that the government increasingly becoming repressive and authoritarian?” 50 percent of the participants replied “yes”; 36 percent replied “no” and 14 percent said “no reply/no idea.” (Der Spiegel, Ausgabe 26/24.06.2013, p.84)

As it was found out by the survey, 47 percent of the participants had been hesitating to voice their political position publicly; 54 percent thought the government intervened in their private lives and life styles and 50 percent thought that the government was becoming “repressive and authoritarian.” It can be inferred from these answers that individuals were feeling restrictions in their lives as a result of the policies of the government and joined the protests to express their reaction.

To conclude the statistical survey data, it must be added that according to the Metropoll survey, 23.3 percent of the survey participants preferred the construction of the mall instead of the park, whereas 62.9 percent demanded the Gezi Park to be preserved as a “green area.” (Metropoll Survey, 03-12.06.2013)

Ombudsman Report

One of the controversies was the question whether or not the protesters included the members of the illegal or terrorist organizations. The PM Erdoğan repeated at several occasions that the protests were attended and provoked by these organizations. In this regard, the report of the Ombudsman is worth mentioning. In the report, the profiles of the protesters were detected as follows:

1. Communities composed of separate individuals who would like to express their reaction through peaceful means;
2. Terror organizations, illegal organizations that provoked the above mentioned peaceful vast populace and made this populace wholly illegal;
3. Legal organizations in opposition to the political power;
4. Some non-governmental organizations;
5. Those gathered with the motive of sincere thoughts and curiosity.

(Ombudsman Report, 2013, p. 116)

The report clearly puts forward that the protesters were motivated by sincere thoughts and aimed to express their reaction peacefully. It was underlined, however, the existence of the illegal organizations among the peaceful, separate individuals made the peaceful populace “wholly illegal.” It can be claimed that the protests of communities of separate and peaceful individuals were exploited by the participation of members of illegal organizations. Nevertheless, this fact should not be adequate to tar everyone with the same brush.

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Now that the starting aims and the protester profiles are clear, the protests can be explored in detail. In the light of the above mentioned statistical data, the Occupy Gezi Resistance will be analyzed in three parts, with reference to three theoretical approaches, which are appropriate for the changing characteristics of the protests.

4. Thirty Days of Resistance

In the previous chapters, the beginning of the protests, the aims that the protesters would like to accomplish and the profiles of the participants were examined. Different theoretical frameworks are needed for the detailed analysis of the protests according to the changing dynamics of the course of the events. In this sense, the discourse of Foucault such as on *governmentality* and *power*; Arendt's relationship between *power* and *violence*; and the conceptualizations of Weber such as on *power*, *pure types of domination* and the *legitimate use of force* would be explored and integrated in the thirty days of the resistance. Foucauldian concepts match with the first ten days; Arendt's "On Violence" construes the occurrences in the second ten days and terminologies of Weber perfectly define the third ten days of the resistance.

4.1. Foucault and First Ten Days of Resistance

4.1.1. Foucauldian Governmentality

Government is a rational activity to regulate the actions of the population with using knowledge and techniques. "Conduct" can be understood as leading, directing and guiding and also involves how it should be done. Conduct includes our actions and all behaviors. "Conduct of oneself," or self-regulation would bring an ethical or moral side. It would not be wrong to claim that (individual) self-regulation might also include feelings; therefore, might be subjective. In addition, it might be copies of the ways of role models such as influential leaders that shape our ways of self-regulation willingly or unconsciously. "Codes of conduct" refers to people, who are responsible for the regulation of others, for example teachers; they can control the behaviors of students "rationally and deliberately." However, like the conduct of the teacher, human conduct is also guided by the codes of government; governors assume that human conduct can be "regulated, controlled and shaped." (Dean, 1999, pp. 17-19) This would mean that governors attempt to shape human conduct rationally and intentionally. Furthermore, people can get affected by the governors irrationally just because of their need to belong to a group, i.e. to an ideology. Government of population includes shaping human conduct rationally. Rational here means bringing "any form of rationality to the calculation about how to govern." In other words, dealing with how things are or should be with any form of thinking, making calculations, "being

consistent” and in a “systematic way” can be called rationality. Foucault underlines that there are different ways of thinking rationally and called these as “multiplicity of rationalities.” (Dean, 1999, pp. 17-19) Government as “conduct of conduct” can be defined as “cases in which governor and governed are two aspects of the one actor.” (p.19) Government involves how we govern ourselves as well as from governors’ aspect how we govern states and populations. In conduct of conduct, government shapes activities in other words freedom of people. Supposed by the government, those who are governed/ citizens as actors, can think or act freely. In this type of government those, who are governed involve the capacity of thinking and acting, which according to the government means “freedom of the governed.” (p. 24) This capacity of thinking while we are governing ourselves or when governors rule the citizens can be explained as *governmentality*. Foucault’s study of *governmentality* can be explained as “critique of political reason.” (p. 59) Governmentality, therefore, deals with “how we think about governing with the different rationalities or mentalities of government.” (p. 24) Worth repeating that the rationality here means the reasoning, thinking and rationalities of human beings, which come from knowledge and experiences of that person. And mentality here refers that “thinking is a collective activity, relatively bounded unity” (pp. 24-25) and it is not a representation of individual mind but “bodies of knowledge, belief and opinion.” (Dean, 1999, p. 24) Therefore, it can be claimed that the people, who approve and follow the ideas of a leader, get affected by him/her and starts to think with the same mentality. Thus the same governmentality is shared by not only the governors but also the citizens, who cheer for the policies of that governor. It is questionable though, if the citizens are rationally approving the policies or convinced by the governor on the truth of his/her governmentality, while their conducts have already been shaped by the influence of that governor “rationally and deliberately.”

According to Mitchell Dean (1999), mentalities can also include elements that are not rational, but are “imaginary and mythology” especially in times of crises and attacks or warfare in order “to define enemy.” (p. 25) For instance, a country that had experienced many coups can estimate the possibility of a similar attack at present. This expectation might result in defining a non-existing enemy irrationally or drawing the conclusion of a coup attempt from a simple, low oppositional voice.

In addition, governmentality analyzes the problem and solution of governance; it analyzes historically how problems occur and how they are governed, with different “technologies of

governance.” (Nadesan, 2008, p. 6) Foucault underlines that techniques of governing are very important. How to govern, knowing those who would be governed, using some special techniques to govern, conduct of the governed and defining identities for the governed can be called as an art; “art of government.” (Dean, 1999, p. 28) Analytics of government involves organized practices, which enable to govern others or ourselves and which involves production of knowledge, truth and calculative rationality and is called “regimes of practices” or “regimes of government.” (Dean, 1999, p. 28)

Dean adds that according to Foucault, governmentality, in relation between government and thought, has another meaning, which is “the emergence of a new form of thinking about and exercising power in certain societies.” The power meant is related to economy and population. With the emergence of political economy and population as an “object,” this “modern” governmentality is seen in particular regimes of government, such as in liberal democracies. (Dean, 1999, p. 28) Nadesan (2008) says that three arts of government in state, market and population of Western societies can be named as “laissez-faire or classical liberalism, welfare liberalism and neo-liberalism.” (p. 6) Foucauldian governmentality proposes relationship of government with other forms of power, such as sovereignty and discipline, which are strategies of power.

“Disciplinary power” is the commanding and regulation of people in the territory of the state, as Dean points out. (1999, p. 29) According to Foucault there are three forms of power; “power triangle” that consists of “sovereignty, discipline and governmental management, which has population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism.” (p. 30) Not necessarily for the sovereign power but for disciplinary power, it can be added that the belongings of the states, living in another country also face this kind of power. Even if they acquired the citizenship of that country, they, who feel belonging to that nation of origin, might be under the influence of this kind of disciplinary power rationally or irrationally. The governors can be observed commanding all people of that nation living across the world and people living in another country can be observed as obeying this disciplinary power willingly. “Although discipline is exercised on the bodies of individuals, the individual simply serves as a way of ‘dividing up the multiplicity’ upon which the discipline is exercised to accomplish an end or objective.” (Nadesan, 2008, p. 8)

Foucault focuses on the disciplinary power in prisons, mental hospitals or in armies; however, the same disciplinary power can be exercised in all spheres, including the public

sphere, as the case study will epitomize. It can be called as an open-air disciplining space targeted at the whole country and at all disciplined, in other words all citizens in order to achieve particular aims. People governed by the ideologies of governors that they oppose, might feel this disciplinary power as pressure. Whereas people, who approve the policies and implementations of the governors, might think that the power of the governor is a facility for the country and consolidates the power of the nation in the international arena.

Foucault adds that a new art of government is emerged and now “the problem of sovereignty is more acute than ever” and “discipline was never more important or valued than when the attempt was made to manage the population.” (Dean, 1999, p. 30)

According to Nadesan (2008), Foucault stresses that discipline, sovereignty and government “should be understood as eventually constituting a triangle of interconnected systems of government, or governmentality, aiming at security by targeting the population” (p. 7) “Over time, sovereign power increasingly became subject to juridical concerns pertaining to the rationalization and administration of law and was exercised through the juridical and executive arms of the state through the mechanisms of laws, constitutions, and legislative bodies.” (Nadesan, 2008, pp. 7-8) The juridical and all public or private institutions, which should be independent, just and equal, can become bodies that apply sovereign power of the state on the population. Therefore, as Dean (1999) says: “Sovereignty becomes democratized and linked to the juridical and political rights of the citizen.” (p. 203) “Sovereign power” is applied via juridical and executive bodies of the state and includes constitutions, laws and parliaments and is an applied authority on the citizens within the territory of the state. (Dean, 1999, p. 29)

Recalling the separation of powers, which distributes the power among executive, legislature and judiciary bodies of government; in some cases these sovereign powers of different bodies of government might be controlled by the governor invisibly or visibly. Such cases might result from the power of the governor or lead to authoritarianism.

Another point Foucault puts forward is the apparatuses of security, which includes “use of standing armies, police force, diplomatic corps, intelligence services and spies” and all practices and bodies of the state that ensure the continuity of economic and social system, healthcare, welfare and education systems for its people. (Dean, 1999, p. 29) However, it can be claimed that the apparatuses of security of a state might pose too much power over the citizens through the application of the sovereign and disciplinary powers.

4.1.2. Foucauldian Power

[...] power was exerted by state apparatus or, in any case, by a public institution such as the police.” M. Foucault (Foucault, Rabinow, Rose, eds. 1994, p. 133)

As Kelly (2009) underlines, in early works of Foucault “reconceptualization” of power is being observed, but after 1971, he starts really to deal with the “theory of power.” (p. 33) Subtexts of perhaps every article or book of Foucault has a kind of link to power; it would be correct to claim that almost every subtext of each Foucauldian concept is questioning the power and its effects on people. Therefore, it is preferable to quote primary sources, while listing relevant parts on power. For this reason, Foucault’s 1978 interview *On Power* with Pierre Boncenne regarding the “nature of power and who exercises it, how it happens and produces a body of knowledge” is quite appropriate. (Foucault, Kritzman, ed., 1988, p. 96) According to Foucault, ‘what is power and how is it exercised’ are questions at the center of everything and these should be resolved in the meantime. In 1960s, power was what prohibits, what prevents people from doing something but Foucault saw that “power was something much more complex”; “power must be repressive, since power is bad, it can only be negative” (Foucault, Kritzman, ed., 1988, p. 102)

In the interview, Foucault’s words were quoted from his earlier interview with Gilles Deleuze in 1972, in which Foucault says: “It is the great unknown at present who exercise power? And where does he exercise it? Nowadays we know more or less who exploits, where the profit goes, into whose hands it goes and where it is reinvested. But power... we know very well that it is not those who govern, who hold power. But the notion of ‘ruling class’ is neither very clear nor very highly developed.” (Foucault, Kritzman, ed., 1988, pp. 102-3)

Regarding the power of governments, he asked some questions like “Who makes decisions for me? Who is preventing me from doing this and telling me to do that? Who is programming my movements and activities?” And continued:

“I don’t believe that this question of ‘who exercises power’ can be resolved unless that other question ‘how does it happen’ is resolved at the same time. We know perfectly well that even if we reach the point of designating exactly all those decision makers we will still not really know why and how the decision was made, how it came to be accepted by everyone and how it hurts a particular category of person.”

“There is power everywhere and power is the problem that has to be resolved.” [...]

“We cannot study power without strategies of power. Strategies/ networks/ mechanisms/ all those techniques by which a decision is accepted and by which that decision could not but be taken in the way it was.” [...]

“[...] from eighteenth century onwards, there has been a specific reflection on the way in which these procedures for training and exercising power over individuals could be extended, generalized and improved, i.e. I constantly show the economic or political origin of these methods but while refraining from seeing power everywhere I also think there is a specificity in these new techniques of training I believed that the methods used right down to the way of conditioning individuals’ behavior have a logic obey, a type of rationality and are all based on one another to form a sort of specific stratum.” (Foucault, Kritzman, ed., 1988, pp. 103-105)

Barrett (1991) says that “how” is a very important question for “Foucault’s concept of power.” For Foucault other questions can be answered “when the question *how does it happen* is resolved.” Foucault’s questioning ‘how’ does not aim to disregard what, who and why of power, rather “it simply allows a critical investigation of the thematics of power. The object of analysis changes from power as an absolute, or in itself, to power in terms of *power relations*.” (p. 136)

According to Nealon (2008), Foucauldian power means there is “no place outside the power” and there is no liberation or “absolute freedom” from power because it is not something “held” but something “practiced”; “power is not imposed from ‘above’ a system or socius, but consists of a series of relations within such a system or socius.” Foucauldian power “produces desires, formations, objects of knowledge and discourses, rather than primarily repressing, controlling, or canalizing the powers already held preexisting subjects, knowledge, or formations.” (Nealon 2008, pp. 24-25) It can be read that the owners of the - political- power in Foucauldian sense is powerful to the extent that they could form knowledge, and practices and influence people in accordance with their discourses.

Foucault says that from sixteenth century onwards, there has been “a new form of political power,” which is the “state.” He underlines: “...the state is envisioned as a kind of political power that ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the totality or, I should say, of a class or a group among the citizens.” He adds: “But I’d like to underline the fact that state’s power (and that’s one of the reasons for its strength) is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power.” (Foucault, Rabinow, Rose, eds., 1994, p. 131) It can be inferred that the power of the state is not used for the best of all individuals rather for the interests of

the class behind or in cooperation with the state. Therefore, the power relations between the power imposers -actors- result in a *power over* the community. This overwhelming power over the individuals is exercised by the state through its institutions and its cooperators with the possibility of being overused or misused.

In 1971, Foucault and Noam Chomsky he had a debate, which later became popular and reprinted. It was aired on television in Netherlands. During the debate, Foucault defended that the “level of power” cannot be explained through looking at the state or the class behind the state (Kelly, 2009, p. 32). Citing some parts of Foucault’s words:

“One of the most urgent tasks, before everything else is that we are used to consider, at least in our European society that power is in the hands of the government and is exerted by some particular institutions such as local governments, the police, the army. These institutions transmit orders, apply them and punish people, who do not obey. But, I think that the political power is also exerted by a few other institutions, which seem to have nothing in common with the political power, which seem to be independent but which actually are not. We all know that university and the whole educational system that is supposed to distribute knowledge we know that the educational system maintains the power in the hands of a certain class and exclude the other social class from this power... Psychiatry is also a way to implement a political power to a particular social group. Justice also. It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the workings of institutions that appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize and attack them in such a manner that political violence has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them. If we want right away to define the profile and the formula of our future society without criticizing all the forms of political power that are exerted in our society there is a risk that they reconstitute themselves even through such an apparently noble form as anarchist-unionism.” (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OY93gHVynaY>; from 34:27 to 37:45 minute, 05.01.2015)

He defends the idea that power is in the hands of the government and applied through its institutions such as security forces, and judicial bodies as well as the institutions, which are known as independent like universities. In addition, power is kept by certain classes that ‘exclude’ social classes from this power. He also stresses that this power, which is exerted through various institutions, might be abused. He underlines that the task of the society is to question, “criticize” and even to “attack” the institutions that exercise, overuse and misuse

their power. It can be claimed that in some of the cases, the materialization of power by institutions is a command of the political authorities or the government. The fact must also be added that individuals also exercise power on ‘other’ people, who look different; who hold different beliefs, pursue different ideologies, or life styles. People get this power from the government; if the government carries out policies that are approved by those people and if the government is posing the same manners, people assume that they are empowered by the governors to behave in the same way. This supposed empowerment of people give them the courage to exercise visible (verbal or physical attacks) or invisible (staring at, psychologically) power on ‘others,’ who have an oppositional stance or merely look ‘different’ and who are able to criticize the undesired implementations of the government through different means.

4.1.3. Foucauldian Resistance

In Foucault’s works where there is power there is resistance as well (Nealon, 2008, p. 108) because power produces resistance. Foucault does not discuss the question of resistance very often but second literature talks about the resistance that is caused by power and underlines that resistance is there in Foucault’s works, can even be called as Foucauldian resistance. (Nealon, 2008, pp. 95, 97) In the meantime, it is a fact that Foucault is critical about pretty much everything and advises people to be able to criticize the power; it can be inferred that being critical and not accepting the perpetual truth in the community is also a kind of resistance. Nealon says that resistance, trying to “eradicate power altogether,” is not primary function against power, otherwise, resistance is the attempt of “tackle” power before it produces other different effects. (Nealon 2008, pp. 24-25)

According to Foucault “it is the axiom that force or power produces truth and truth can serve the ends of domination just as surely as produces resistance.” (Nealon, 2008, p. 95) However, it is difficult for people to stand against power, wealth and truth in an effective and productive way; “critique will have to work toward redeploying those very sources of power, truth and/or wealth.” Foucault says that people have to produce the truth in the same way that they have to produce wealth and they also have to produce the truth in order to be able to produce wealth. This is power’s “productivity.” (Nealon, 2008, p. 95)

Nealon (2008) underlines that critique might become resistance and critique becomes a matter of attempting to “extend, broaden, saturate” effects within a given field while trying

to “constrict limit or downplay other effects.” Critique is within “affirmative negotiation of a field, intense play of forces that one might begin to locate Foucauldian resistance.” (p. 95) Nealon analyzes that the critical way of the late Foucauldian work on subjectivity is related to the questions of resistance, power and the body. “Foucault abandoned his genealogical work on power, to preempt the possibility of resistance,” Nealon states and adds: “Foucault’s entire corpus has been read as enabling or enacting resistance.” (p. 96) Therefore, it might be claimed that Foucauldian terms, practices, thoughts or concepts and his critical, theoretical approaches are for achieving resistance against power. It would eventually be achieved, if those who face the increasing power can start questioning and criticizing it. Practice might include various “forms of resistance against different forms of power.” (Foucault, Rabinow, Rose, eds., 1994, p. 128) Resistance can clearly explain the power relations; understand their aims, strategies, positions and ways of application. Elderly people would possibly say to young generations that they understand the youth as they had been at that age but the youth, to understand the middle-aged people, must come to that age. Similarly, in order to understand the value of happiness, one must feel the sorrow. Likewise Foucault says: “...in order to understand what power relations are about, perhaps we should investigate the forms of resistance and attempts made to dissociate these relations.” (Foucault, Rabinow, Rose, eds., 1994, p. 129)

The forms of power “make individuals subjects”; according to Foucault, there are two meanings of subject: “subject to someone else by control and dependence and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to.” (Foucault, Rabinow, Rose, eds., 1994, p. 130)

He stresses that struggles against power is possible; these struggle might include criticisms through protests and resistance against forms of power. As Foucault says: “Just as there have been forms of resistance to power as the exercise of political sovereignty, and just as there have been other, equally intentional forms of resistance or refusal that were directed at power in the form of economic exploitation, have there not been forms of resistance to power as conducting?” (Foucault, Senellart, Ewald, Fontana, eds., 1977-78, p. 259)

During the 15 years of ruling of the AKP, the people have been *subjugated* to the power of the governance as a result of many undesired implementations in their daily life. The disapproved policies of the government disturbed the segments that did not give consent to

these practices. Since there was no other option to be heard by the political power-holders, individuals felt the necessity to voice their criticisms through peaceful protests and resistance against the forms of power. Despite the fact that the course of the events adjusted to the changing characteristics of the protests, the primary intention remained the same: the protection of one of the last green public spheres in the metropolis Istanbul.

4.1.4. First Ten Days of Resistance

The Taksim Solidarity Platform (or Taksim Solidarity Constituents, which consists of 128 chambers, associations, unions and some political parties [Taksimdayanisma.org/bilesenler] and was established to be the voice of the public and had been actively involved in the pedestrianization process of the Taksim Square), and small number of activists aimed to protect the trees and the Gezi Park from being demolished. Despite the involvement of the platform, the activists at the beginning were manageable amount of people, who stand against an undesired project to be executed at the Gezi Park. In the light of the surveys, it is appropriate to say that the only reason of the escalation and mobilization of millions was the strategy in managing a small environmentalist protest; the usage of pepper spray. Imagining if the activists or their leaders were called for a meeting by the local governors to discuss the situation or at least to hear their demands, possibly the case would have been closed before nobody heard of it. However, extreme usage of pepper sprays on the first days and unjust treatment of the protesters, synchronously motivated thousands and later millions of people to go out the streets for an unprecedented resistance across Turkey. As Foucault says the overwhelming *power over* the citizens exercised through the institutions of the state at the public sphere, made people question, criticize and protest this power.

In the light of Foucault's concepts, the course of the events in the first ten days will be analyzed under three subtitles; Protests, Strategies and Dialogue. This separation ensures a detailed examination of the protests; an analysis of the strategies of the actors involved in the process and a search of dialogue attempts by actors.

Protests

On 27 May 2013, at 10 p.m., the engineering vehicles demolished some walls of the Gezi Park and pulled out five trees. In that night, the Taksim Solidarity and activist youth started to gather around the park and the day and night guarding shifts started. The protesters were

holding peaceful sit-in in order to hinder any further damage to the Gezi Park. Despite their peaceful sit-in, the first pepper spray intervention of the police took place at 1 p.m. on 28 May. The police targeted at an unarmed lady, and used pepper spray directly to her face. The lady named Ceyda Süngür, an academician, known as “Women in Red,” as she wore a red dress, became the symbol of the Gezi Park resistance and made the protests heard by everyone with the help of the speedy communication through the social media.

After the group was dispersed by pepper spray, the workers continued to demolish the park, which was stopped by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) parliament member Sirri Süreyya Önder, who stood in front of the machines -using his right of parliamentary immunity. The workers could not continue, stopped the machines and leaved the park because of Önder’s attitude, which was supported by the youth. The activists planted the trees that had been pulled out and continued sit-in. On 29 May, the activists started to pitch tents and to live in the park for guarding. (Kongar, Küçükaya, 2013, p. 99, 100)

While the tents were being set up at the park, the first statement of the Prime Minister Erdoğan regarding Gezi Park was heard. He criticized the protests speaking at the opening ceremony of the third Bosphorus Bridge -which also caused an environmental massacre, cutting of almost one million trees for the project. (Türkiye, 06.03.2013) For the construction of the third Bosphorus Bridge and the third airport in Istanbul, almost three millions of trees were cut. (Sözcü, 12.03.2015)

Some parts of his statement at the opening ceremony were ironic. Despite the fact that millions of trees were cut, he said: “This and that is happening in the Gezi Park; they will go and protest there and so on. Whatever you do; we took the decision, and will apply the decision [demolish the Gezi Park].” He continued: “We planted 2.5 billion trees across Turkey; these are done by this government; we are environmentalists.” (Kongar, Küçükaya, 2013, p. 101)

Having planted billions of trees across Turkey was not a justification of cutting the trees at the center of a metropolitan where grown trees and parks were needed. So thought the group at the park and released a prompt press statement in reply to Erdoğan’s speech. The group underlined that the park was tried to be taken from the public and to “be erased from the memories of the public” in order to build a residence and shopping mall with the “command of Erdoğan.” Late in the evening, the opposition party CHP Leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and CHP committee visited the park and supported the activists. Kılıçdaroğlu said: “The Gezi

Park should not be demolished; a shopping mall should not be built. It should be open to public. Person who turns the park into a shopping mall betrays Istanbul. I promise that a MP of CHP will support the protests every day.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 101) The promise of a parliament member everyday was to ensure personnel having the right of parliamentary immunity, to stop any damage to the park by the workers or engineering vehicles that were commanded to demolish the Gezi Park.

The first protests, the statements of leaders of the ruling and opposition parties and reply of the protesters as well as the first use of pepper spray, unintentionally creating the symbol of ‘woman in red’ carried the issue on the first place of interest of the youth. The social media, especially *Twitter* became an important tool of sharing information that enabled a very speedy flow of information and through Twitter young people started to come to the park in support of the activists’ sit-in in the night of 29 May. The generation Y, who sit on the computer and use virtual tools to criticize or protest anything on the social media, only, (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 37) started to be active on the streets as a result of the use of pepper spray.

In that night and on 30 May, the general frames of the issue and the existence of an active protest at Gezi Park was known especially by the youth, who uses social media as a source of information; they were interested in the ongoing and started to follow up the events curiously. The “twilight intervention” in the early morning at 5 a.m., on 30 May is identified with the “police force” and the “disproportional violence” and it also made the Gezi Park protests heard by millions. Police used pepper spray to deport the activists from the park and the officials of the municipality burned down the tents. This intervention caused the uprising of people, who learned the incidents through the social media but had not yet joined the protests. After emptying the park, the machines started to work again; for the second time Sirri Süreyya Önder stood in front of the bulldozers and stopped the works. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 102)

After the uncompromising statement of Erdoğan saying: “Whatever you do, we have decided,” and the strong police intervention, people started to come to Taksim in order to defend the park and the rights of the activists, who were trying to rescue the park. The newcomers, including academicians, artists and politicians joined the protesters because of the brutal intervention of the police. It is a question mark to add: if the police had not intervened severely, would these people join? Probably, most of them would not join, as the

whole Gezi Park protests and resistance across Turkey were against the use of disproportional force by the police. As found out by the surveys, mentioned in the previous chapter, the new participants of the protests, who were not members of the Taksim Solidarity Platform, were motivated to join, after seeing the disproportional police intervention.

In the evening of 30 May, thousands gather at Taksim, actress Sebnem Sönmez read press statement on behalf of the Taksim Solidarity Platform. The statement underlined: “Democracy has been planted in the park, since Monday [27 May 2013]. We have jumped over the wall of fear; our struggle here is not only for Taksim, but also for all living spaces.” Thousands of people shouted that “this is just a beginning; struggle will continue.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 103) It was started as a struggle to protect a park, which is one of the last green places in Istanbul, but it turned into a struggle for freedom of expression and therefore, for democracy that mobilized millions of people in the following days.

The 31st of May was a very long day, as if there were more than 24 hours. The second “twilight raid” was held by the police at around 5 o’clock in the morning. Water cannons targeted at people and tens of gas bombs were thrown. CHP MP Ilhan Cihaner said that the government “laid a trap to its own citizens” and woke people up with tear gasses without any warning. He added: “This is not an intervention; this is an attack.” He also underlined that they will not let the park turn into a shopping mall. Seeing the intervention, thousands of people swarmed in Taksim, while police continued the intervention with gas bombs, which also affected the tourists, children and elderly people who were just passing by the square. Despite the gas bombs, people did not leave the square; some affected people took shelter in hotels and metro stations, but police threw gasses also in these places. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 103-4) Once again, it was the severe police intervention that mobilized people.

How ironic it was, on the other hand, the Prime Minister Erdoğan was at an award ceremony in a nearby hall and World Health Organization (WHO) General Director Margaret Chan was presenting him a certificate for making “indoor spaces 100 percent smoke free”; marking the success of the smoking ban in the restaurants or indoor places. While the public was under the smoke of gas bombs, Erdoğan was presented with the “WHO Director-General’s World No Tobacco Day special recognition certificate.” (WHO,

03.06.2013). At the conference, Erdoğan talked about the implementations for tobacco control, new punishments for those who do not apply the regulations and answered the criticisms against the alcohol regulations (ban on selling alcohol in shops between 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.).

Clouds of gas bomb smoke were over the neighborhood of Taksim square during the day. In addition to the tear gas and water cannons, plastic bullets were used; hundreds of people hospitalized, including parliament members and journalists. It was observed that the police threw the capsules of pepper gasses “directly targeting at the heads of the people.” Across Turkey, Gezi Park got support via the information flow through Twitter and Facebook with #resistgezipark hashtag that mobilized ten thousands of people in cities like Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Bodrum, Eskişehir, Izmir, Izmit, Mersin, Tunceli, Zonguldak. Thousands marched with the slogan -which later became the motto of the resistance- “Everywhere is Taksim, Everywhere is Resistance,” and invited the government for resignation. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 104)

The protests started to change the character from being an environmental awareness protest to having an anti-government stance on the fifth day. However, what made people get mobilized was actually neither defending the Gezi Park and the trees in the park, which was the starting aim of a small resistance, nor the anti-government stance. What made people get mobilized across Turkey and Turkish people living around the world was defending the rights of affected people, who were unjustly faced the brutal police interventions. As found out by the mentioned surveys, the police force and use of power were the reasons of people’s mobilization. It was then became the protest of defending all rights that have been started to be restricted one by one.

The Topçu Military Barracks was not only a project of rebuilding an historical Ottoman architecture but also an economic project to include shopping mall; however, the police violence affected the economic interests sought by the project. Owners of famous labels announced that they will not open a shop in a shopping mall that would be built after destroying Gezi Park. One of the businessmen said: “I will not open a shop in a place where blood was shed.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 105)

As mentioned in the second part, the Taksim Topçu Military Barracks project was designed

by the municipality in 2011, but rejected by the Preservation Council of Istanbul with the reasoning that “Taksim Gezi Park is a place that should be preserved for the urban memory.” (Kongar, 2013, p. 14) After the rejection the project was brought to Higher Preservation Council in Ankara and got approval. Against the approval, the case was brought to the Administrative Court that decided the stay of executing the project. Therefore, on 31 May, the jurisdiction stopped the Military Barracks project; upon the decision of the jurisdiction, CHP Leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu urged Erdoğan to draw the police back saying: “According to the decision of the jurisdiction, draw back the police from Gezi space. Do not make the public and police come face to face. The public defends Istanbul on their own [will]. From now on, the responsible of every incident is the Prime Minister [Erdoğan]” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 105)

MHP Leader Devlet Bahçeli also said the police force was extreme and added: “No one should blame the police, police carried out the command.” He questioned why the court did not decide to stop the project and waited for 15 months to announce this decision, he added: “If it was decided from the beginning, Turkey would have not been in such a disorder.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 111)

According to the decision of the court, the project could not be executed. If the decision of the court to be taken into account by the government, there was no need to use police force to disperse the protests because there was no reason to protest anymore. In his previous statement, Erdoğan said “Whatever you do; we took the decision, and will apply the decision,” however, that was before the court’s decision to stop the execution. The attempts to disperse the protesters through police violence could pursue two *governmentalities*; first the court decision would not be taken into consideration and the project would be executed and thus the protests would continue and police should stop the protests. The second reasoning could be the possibility that the protesters should be stopped by the government and their collective *bodies of knowledge* should understand that possible future protests regarding any controversial policies would not bring any positive outcomes to the protesters. In both assumptions, the head of the government would become the executive body and neither legislation and judiciary nor any social collective action can change the results.

Likewise, the question of the MHP leader was thought provoking, why did the court take the decision after the protests started. Normal judicial procedures are quite slow in Turkey

because of large number of lawsuits. Nevertheless, it is not wrong to assume that the case of such a project, approved by the prime minister and having economic interests should have been one of the priorities of the courts. It can be inferred that the court would most probably approve the execution of the project under normal circumstances; however, disapproved as a result of the protests in order to stop the escalation.

The protests and the police interventions continued; the police force triggered mobilization of more people for peaceful assemblies in solidarity with the affected activists. As the tension between the actors increased and the issue spread world-wide, international criticisms started to be received. According to the 31-May report of *The Guardian*, the US state department released a statement supporting peaceful demonstrations saying: “We certainly support universally peaceful protests, as we would in this case.” It added that the European Parliament members in Brussels “called on the EU to act” and the Amnesty International “condemned the ‘use of excessive force’ by police.” (The Guardian, 01.06.2013)

While the criticisms received from the international community and the world media channels were reporting the Gezi Park protests as breaking news, the Turkish mainstream media channels were airing animal documentary or cooking program, which triggered reaction of people on social media. The first media channels to get information and communicate were Twitter and Facebook. Journalist Aykut Küçükkaya (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013) criticized the Turkish media channels’ ignorance with saying: “Turkish TVs play three monkeys!” (p. 106) CNN Türk news channel’s airing documentary on penguins made penguins symbol of Gezi Park protests and a gleam of political humor. In addition, the disregarding manner of the media was protested during the resistance. Protesters wrote “For Sale Media from Owner!”; “First Hand Media, Great Deal!” slogans on the live airing vehicles of TV channels at Taksim square. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 110)

Ignorance of Turkish media redirected people either to Twitter and Facebook or to international news agencies that were airing from the heart of the protests. Associated Press and Reuters underlined that the “Islamic rooted” government of Erdoğan was getting “more authoritarian” and “not compromising,” which caused the reaction of public and the “Gezi

Park protests turned into an anti-AKP action.” In addition, CNN said the protests started against the Taksim project but turned into protests “against the policies of the government.” It added that the protesters get organized via Facebook and Twitter. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 106-7)

The alteration of the character of protests from an environmental nature to an anti-government stance was started to be observed on 31 May. In the night of 31 May-1 June, police continued using thousands of pepper gasses, water cannons, which did not achieve to disperse people. Some groups who tried to reach Taksim Square were blocked by the police; some groups used fireworks and sound bombs and some other groups started to build barricades by using garbage containers. Other protesters gathered in Cihangir, in Beyoğlu district of Istanbul shouted “Government, Resign” slogans. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 107) During that night the green protest changed its character to an anti-government stance with the protesters calling for the government’s resignation.

Recalling Foucault’s theory on *power*, which underlines the fact that the power of the government is being exercised by the institutions like the security forces, the protesters started to question the power of the government that use extreme force on its own citizens. Above all, the peaceful assemblies is a right that could be used for expressing oneself, an opinion or for criticizing an overwhelming decision that would affect the lives of the citizens. The rational choices of the protesters told them to come to the areas of protests to question and criticize the mentalities behind the use of excessive force and thus the government. Since the government commanded the security forces to disperse the protesters, the environmental awareness of the protesters was politicized and the nature of the protests was altered towards the demands of democracy and freedom as well as resignation of the government.

Individuals, who did not go out the streets, joined the protests with banging pans and plots from their windows, which is a way of protest in Turkey. In the early morning on 1 June, people gathered in the Anatolian side of Istanbul; some of them took their pans and plots with and walked to the European side over the Bosphorus Bridge. The group reached to Beşiktaş district at 7 o’clock and there they met the water cannons and gas bombs of the police. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 108) Hundred thousands, including young, old, women, and children gathered at Taksim in the afternoon and shouted their demands of

“democracy and freedom” and criticized the “bans and violations of human rights.” During the protests, people started to get arrested because of their peaceful and unarmed way of protest. Another symbol of the Gezi Park protests was the “Woman in Black,” an Australian lady named Kate Mullen stood before the pressurized water coming from a water cannon and opened her arms; she became the second symbol of the resistance after “Woman in Red.” (p. 108)

In the night of 1-2 June, thousands of people held sit-in at Gezi Park. Some groups held protest marches in various districts and criticized the excessive police force. Many citizens banged pans and pots at their homes. In the afternoon on 2 June, people started to gather at the Taksim Square again and called the government to resign. On behalf of the Taksim Solidarity, DISK Secretary General Arzu Cerkezoglu delivered a speech underlining that the Gezi Park Resistance is for “freedom and democracy” and added that the park was “protected by the public.” (Kongar, Küçükaya, 2013, p. 114)

The long day of 3 June could not come to an end; the clashes in Ankara intensified. It was reported that the police threw gas bombs and used their batons even against three protesters. After brutal intervention, some 700 people were arrested in Ankara. In the meantime, police officers in Ankara were observed covering their officer numbers written on the helmets. A CHP parliament member asked: “Are they closing their officer numbers, as they know, what they do is crime?” (Kongar, Küçükaya, 2013, p. 122) The number of the officers written on their helmets is for identification and the reason why they closed their numbers was thought provoking. It can be inferred that the officers were aware that their interventions were overwhelming and they did not want to be identified. Another attitude of the police attracted attention in Ankara, police shouted announcements: “Everything is for you” before their intervention with pressurized water and gas bombs. For the first time, the resisters in Ankara set their tents up at the Kuğulu Park, despite continuous severe interventions. (Kongar, Küçükaya, 2013, p. 131)

The continuous protests and police force were economically disadvantageous. Fitch Ratings, which had rated Turkey as “investable” after 18 years, urged Erdoğan to listen to the demands of the masses. Upon the statement, the stock market declined. (Kongar, Küçükaya, 2013, p. 121) The protests also affected tourism; the tourists, who booked

hotels in Istanbul, especially in the district near Taksim, canceled their reservations. In the following days, many countries warned their citizens not to go on vacation to Turkey. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 128, 153)

At the Taksim Square, tear gas attacks continued, and people going to the work, children going to the school were affected on 4 June; nevertheless, the Gezi Park was like a festival area. In park, a medical care point, a food service point, and a library were established. In the Gezi Park market, all goods were not for sale rather for free. In addition to the tents, people brought their blankets and started to live commune life in the park on the seventh day of the protests. After the breakfast from free market, they picked up the rubbish and put them in garbage bags. A group did morning yoga; an activist read book in a hammock; the book he read was worth mentioning: “Public Goods, Private Goods” by Raymond Geuss. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 124-5)

Strategies

Voicing disagreements and different thoughts through peaceful assemblies is one of the indispensable features of democracies. Such assemblies should be tolerated unless these seek to destroy order and peace. It is clear that governments and even local governors follow a strategy to deal with such protests that could occur in every society. In this regard, President Abdullah Gül released his first written statement on the protests; he urged for “more common sense” to ease Taksim Gezi Park protests and underlined the importance of listening to the worries and “different perspectives with common sense in a democratic society in order not to abuse protests.” He added: “The biggest responsibility that falls on us about the ongoing events in Taksim Square, which have reached a point that makes us all worried is to have more maturity so that these events cool down.” (AA, 02.06.2013)

After the invitation of Gül for proportional interventions, the police started to step back. PM Erdoğan also accepted that “there was something wrong” in the extreme use of tear gas. In the meantime, he brought a new dimension to the ongoing process with a new strategy, Erdoğan described the resistance as “ideological” and accused CHP Leader Kılıçdaroğlu of cooperating with “illegal organizations” that joined the protests and accused media of provoking the incidents. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 109) He meant that the protesters were members of illegal organizations that aimed at imposing their ideologies through the

resistance. This description of Erdoğan was the beginning of a new strategy to handle the protests and the same strategy was pursued by other authorities.

Likewise, governor of Istanbul Hüseyin Avni Mutlu said in a press conference: “The struggle of groups that want to exploit the love of trees, continue. We know these groups and their targets. I know that the aim of these groups is not love of nature and trees.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 105)

Erdoğan and Mutlu voiced the existence of other groups in the protests for the first time, naming them “illegal.” According to the previously mentioned surveys, held on 3-4 and on 6-7 June, 79 percent of the survey participants, who attended the protests, said they “are not member of an association, a party or club.” The vast majority, 93.6 percent of the participants described themselves as “simple citizens” who “do not represent a group.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 32) If the survey results are accepted as correct, the number of members of “illegal groups” among the protesters should be very low until 7 June, the last day of the survey. The members of other groups started to join the demonstrations with the flags of their unions, associations, clubs or parties. These may hold the ideology of their belonging groups; however, these groups did not start and not lead the protests.

As mentioned in the *governmentality* section, governors assume that human conduct can be “regulated, controlled and shaped.” The governments attempt to shape human conduct rationally; in other words, the aim of the governors could be drawing a definition of the Gezi Park protests in the perception of the population. Due to that, people get affected by the governors rationally or irrationally as being under the influence of them. It can be claimed that the people, who approve and follow the ideas of Prime Minister Erdoğan, would agree with him and pursue the same mentality that the Gezi Park protests consist of illegal groups that were harming the peaceful coexistence of the population. The rationality behind pointing at these groups might also be the aim to discredit the Gezi Park protesters through showing them in cooperation with illegal groups and to decrease the support in the protests.

As found out by the surveys, the 91.3 percent of the participants totally agreed that the disproportional force of the police made people attend the protests; therefore, the mobilization of people aimed standing against the increasing police force rather than supporting or representing a group. The motivation of the new attendees was being in solidarity with the environmental protesters against the unjust treatment of extreme pepper

spray and pressurized water.

Further in his speech Prime Minister Erdoğan added that the opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu is “responsible of anything wrong could happen.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 109) He also drew the conclusion that Kılıçdaroğlu was leading the protests and gathering new protesters. He said: “Such meetings that you [Kılıçdaroğlu] hold with such extreme groups do not bring anything. If the issue is holding demonstration and social movement, where he [Kılıçdaroğlu] gathers ten thousand, as my party [AKP], I would gather one million people. We do not have any problem like that but do not carry the issue at that point” (Sabah, 01.06.2013)

The manner of this statement was like challenging the opposition as if the ruling and opposition leaders are in a race of holding demonstrations and the one, who gathers more people, would be the winner of the challenge. After the allegation of Erdoğan, Kılıçdaroğlu demanded resignation underlining: “One resigns in democracies.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 109) The calls for resignation was heard at the Taksim square as well. The police leaved the park to the public after five days of protests; people met at the square and shouted “Government Resign” slogans.

The strategy of the government to name the protesters as illegal groups resulted in unification of more people of different segments of the population. This unification can be a strategy used by the protesters instinctively. The supporters of rival soccer teams were hand in hand at the square that could rarely happen. This was not the only example of the mixture of people having different concerns; Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian people, atheists, Muslims, Alevis, doctors, artists, lawyers, journalists, teachers, students, engineers, workers, unemployed, young, old and children; all people gathered at the same square for celebration with traditional dances. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 109-10) One did not question, who the person next to him/her was, of which origin he/she was or whether he/she was a member of an “illegal” association or any political party. The one and only starting aim of the protests was still alive; that was not letting the demolition of Gezi Park. However, the attempts to attach other characters to the protesters continued with the statement of Mehmet Ali Şahin, by then the deputy president of AKP. Şahin said that the protesters were trying to prepare the ground of a coup and added: “Their aim is to prepare ground for coup d’état; ‘how can we cause chaos’ this is the aim. They do not have hope for coming to the power [ruling] with any other way. The aim is not 13 trees there.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p.

110)

As found out by the survey on 3-4 June, more than 50 percent of the protesters attended a protest for the first time in their lives and these were alleged with the aim of overthrowing the government. According to the report of the BBC Turkish, the majority of the protesters were people protesting anything for the first time and the majority was young people. The report quoted a 25-year old young woman saying that she had not heard of any slogans before but she had been shouting slogans “since last night.” According to the report, people living around the world supported the Gezi Park resistance through holding protest marches in their countries, such as at Hyde Park and Trafalgar Square in London; in Amsterdam and Hague, Netherlands; in Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne, Australia; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Vienna, Austria; Boston, USA; Barcelona, Spain and in Shanghai, China. (BBC Turkish, 02.06.2013)

Henceforth, Prime Minister Erdoğan addressed to the protesters with different attributions, most probably as part of his strategy to handle or to escalate the protests. Erdoğan named the protesters as “a few *chapulcu* [looter, marauder]” saying: “We do not let a few *chapulcu* to come to that square and provoke our public.” Erdoğan continued that not only Gezi Park, but also the “AKM will be demolished as well,” in order to build an opera house and a mosque. Most of the protesters were also against the demolishing of the Atatürk Art and Culture Center (AKM) building as discussed in the second chapter. He added: “I would get the allowance of this neither from the CHP leader nor from a few *chapulcu*. Those, who voted us, gave us the allowance of this.” (Hürriyet, 02.06.2013; Bianet, 02.06.2013)

Kongar and Küçükkaya (2013) say that Erdoğan’s attribution of “*chapulcu*” resembles the *sans-culottes* of the French Revolution; the lower classes that rebelled against the regime. (p. 39)

Upon his declaration that the AKM building will be destroyed, a huge placard was hung from the roof of the AKM building that read: “Do Not Surrender.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 115) PM Erdoğan hinted at the plurality of his voters, who empowered him to the decision-making, and meant that the opposition could not alter the decision. Worth repeating that the execution of the Topçu Military Barrack project was stopped by the Administrative Court and the demolition of the AKM was not allowed as it is an historical monument, it could only be restored.

Immediately after his statement, the new symbol of the protests was born as well as the new strategy of the protesters: satire. Previously, the penguins -an allusion to the biased manner of the media that aired penguin documentary instead of the protests- were a source of satire. From now on, the word “chapulcu” -coined from Erdoğan’s use of the term- became the most popular word and source of political humor of the resistance. This new symbol was used as another peaceful way of protest. People changed their Twitter and Facebook profiles and added “chapulcu” in front of their names, which was a method to show support in the protests. Çapulcu as written in Turkish; “chapulcu” anglicized version; verbified as “chapulling”; “chappuler” to address person, who makes “chapulling” and additionally in the hybrid word form “çapuling”; all have been used in the meaning of fighting for [y]our rights. Disregarding the real meaning of the word, the protesters have been proud of being a chapulcu. Chapul TV was established and many people applied the patent institute for the branding of Çapulcu (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 135) Moreover, slogans and songs included the word, such as “Every day, I am chapulling,” which was used by the protesters in order to poke fun at the situation and was an example of the great sense of humor. Bogazici Jazz Choir made musical arrangement to an old well-known Turkish song having allusions to Gezi Park. The choir sang the song in the evening of 6 June at the park and was applauded a lot. The “capulcu songs” by the choir and by various artists became hit songs in the upcoming days of the protests. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 135) One slogan, read on a placard is worth mentioning: “The only thing they do not know how to cope with is non-violent actions and humor.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 52)

The next day, Chapulcu started to be the official slogan of the resistance; people chanted “Chapulcus are here, where is Tayyip [Erdoğan]”; “No stones, no batons, aim is freedom”; “We are soldiers of Atatürk” and “Jump, jump, who does not jump is Tayyip” slogan made hundreds of people jump at the square. They also sang “Ciao Bella,” Turkish Youth March and Turkish National Anthem. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 118-9)

American linguist and political philosopher Noam Chomsky condemned the “brutal police crackdown” saying that it recalled “the most shameful moments of Turkish history.” He showed his support for the Gezi Park protest by a video message with a banner read “I am also a ‘çapulcu’ in solidarity.” (Hürriyet Daily News, 01.06.2013)

While the #chapulcu hashtag was increasingly in use on the social media, Erdoğan

continued with new clarifications; he described Twitter as “menace [or pest]” saying: “The best examples of lies can be found there; for me, social media is the worst menace to society” and called everyone, who drinks alcohol as being “alcoholic.” (Milliyet, 02.06.2013; Milliyet, 02.06.2013)

CHP Leader delivered another speech urging Erdoğan to apologize from the public and added: “If the Gezi Park protests are being held in every city and if it became at international level, this is the result of the pressure of the AKP government.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 115)

Non-violent strategies of ten thousands from every segment of society continued to question the political power of the government across Turkey and all the different protesters gathered proudly under the attribution of being *chapulcu*. The statement of the Education Minister Nabi Avcı was appropriate for this unification: “We have achieved the thing that the opposition has been trying to do but could not achieve for years; we unified different groups, fractions and people of different parts of the society that cannot be imaged coming together under normal conditions.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 116)

As one of the arguments mentioned, the Gezi Park Resistance unified the public that do not come together “under normal conditions” and that has been tried to get separated from one another through polarization. In addition, after the 1980 coup in Turkey, especially the generation Y was raised apolitical. Until Gezi, no one could imagine the youth on the streets protesting anything; anything political, especially the generation Y, consisting of youth sitting on computer. However, the extreme police interventions and uncompromising attitude of officials politicized generations that had had nothing to do with politics before. Despite the fact that this unification of different segments of the population faded away after the Gezi Park protests and disregarding the aftermath, the Gezi Park protests would be recalled as one of the most significant social collective actions in Turkish history because of the unification of different segments.

While the protests in Istanbul continued intensively, according to Küçükkaya (2013) the most severe intervention happened at Kızılay square, in Ankara from the beginning of the protests. The police achieved to disperse the square with tear gas and water cannons; the protesters escaped to side streets; police threw gas bombs to the small streets as well.

In Antalya, three young protesters were beaten by 17 police officers that incident was recorded by the security cameras in the garage. Nevertheless, none of the incidents were reported by the Turkish mainstream media channels. The biased media was an advantage for the government that did not want the demands of the protesters to be known by the general public, who uses the mainstream media as a source of information. In Istanbul, 752 artists condemned the “censored attitude of the mainstream media against the Gezi Park resistance” with a press statement that read in front of the AKM building. They criticized the “biased manner” of the TV channels and newspapers that do not carry any information on Gezi Park and that “disregard the principles of providing objective news.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 117)

The heavy interventions of the police and use of disproportionate power left heavy wounded people and deaths. The first death was a 19-year old worker, member of the Socialist Solidarity Platform (SODAP) in Istanbul and another 19-year old university student was heavily beaten and hospitalized in Eskişehir. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 116) The Interior Affairs Minister Muammer Güler announced a five-day report; according to the numbers “1,730 people got arrested in 235 protests in 67 different cities.” He underlined that most of the arrested people were released after being questioned and their identity information were taken. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 115)

As a reply to the continuous protests, PM Erdoğan determined a new strategy and delivered a speech reminding the upcoming presidency elections. According to him, the votes would be the best respond to the protests: “My nation will give the required answers at the ballot box.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 119) The *governmentality* of political participation was interpreted as voting in the elections only, which would be discussed in the next sections, with the inspiration of Weber. It is worth mentioning though, in advanced democracies, there are many ways of political participation. President Gül corrected this wrong impression, stated that democracy “does not mean elections only” and added: “If there are different views, situations, rejections, it is natural to voice them with various ways. Peaceful demonstrations are one of these ways. In this regard, I see the improvements in the last few days within this frame. I should openly say that the messages [of the protesters], sent with good intentions, were received.” (Hürriyet, 03.06.2013)

While the President was using a strategy to calm down the situation with his statement that

the “message, sent with good intentions, were received,” Erdoğan, in reply to Gül, repeated his thought that the will of public is determined by the elections.

During his speech, he delivered another controversial and polarizing statement saying: “At least 50 percent of this country is kept at their homes by our force; we are telling them ‘be patient, do not get provoked by these games.’” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 120)

He referred to his supporters as the 50 percent of the population and the subtext of his speech was read as the 50 percent wants to go out the streets and clash with the Gezi Park protesters but forced to stay at home by the AKP. It was further read that this statement provoked the public even more and caused escalation. His statement was another challenge to the opposing people and aimed to bring the protesters into line. Another message might be coded in his speech for addressing his young followers, as if they would like to intimidate the protesters -as it would be observed in the upcoming days- but advised to stay at home.

First reaction to Erdoğan’s statement was released by Oktay Vural, MHP deputy president, who underlined that the statement is provoking the public. Vural asked: “Do you want people to kill each other?” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 120) It can be inferred from this statement that if the AKP youth went out the streets in order to intimidate the Gezi Park protesters, there would most probably be clashes between two groups and these clashes might result in deaths.

On the same day, President Gül received the CHP Leader Kılıçdaroğlu for a meeting; during the meeting Kılıçdaroğlu said that polarizing statements of Erdoğan and continuation of tear gas attacks cause escalation of the protests. He highlighted that the protesters were not mobilized by a party or an organizations rather it was a “public movement.” He invited the president to intervene and use his constitutional rights, which could be used in such social incidents. He referred to the right of holding a council of ministers’ meeting. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 121) Except moderate and smooth statements, president did not use his constitutional rights.

A method of support to the protests was observed from the world-wide prominent hacker group “Anonymous” that released a video, warning the Turkish government. They said they are watching that protesters were being beaten, facing violence, affected by pressurized

water, gas bombs and “still resisting against a government, which is behaving like dictator.” They warned that the websites and communication means of the Turkish government would face cyber-attacks by world-wide members. It added: “You hindered people from getting information against you, through censoring the social media and mainstream media. Now, Anonymous will close you down. Your own public will overthrow you. Think for yourself. Question authority.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 122-3) The hindrance mentioned in the statement referred not only to the mainstream and social media but also to the blocked internet connection. The protesters could not connect to internet via their smartphones as the connection was blocked; against this blockade, people in the neighborhood shared wireless connection passwords to help protesters to continue communication in order to learn where the unrest was, where the police were throwing gas bombs, from which direction the police came, at which location someone wounded was waiting for help or to learn the nearest place to take shelter for the treatment of wounds.

Considering that, another strategy of the government was the detainment of voluntary doctors and medical students, who were willingly helping the wounded people. Turkish Doctors’ Union announced that doctors and medical students were arrested and added: “This scandal cannot even happen in a war.” The statement added that 2,500 people were wounded during the clashes in Ankara and Istanbul. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 123)

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As a positive strategy pursued by the protesters, the social media played a significant role in the mobilization of people; the curious youth got organized on Twitter and Facebook and joined the protests. In addition to mobilization of people, the social media was used as a tool to express opinion, to call for support and solidarity as well as to announce the locations of the protests. Social media was disadvantageous for the government and security forces because it was a free movement area for the youth. The words that they cannot voice out loud can easily be written in virtual life. People shared their perspectives pro or against the ongoing process; those who were openly supporting the Gezi Park resistance on their accounts faced trouble, even if they did not actively join the protests. Maybe the concerns of the youth had been anything but political before Gezi Park, henceforth; the contents of tweets were politicized so did the youth themselves. It is possible that it caused self-censorship after the arrests, though. Even if it had advantages as a free expression tool,

social media had disadvantages for the protesters. Despite being “menace [pest]” as described by the prime minister, the government utilized Twitter for getting information on the protesters, who called others for action or for support and who provoked the situation via their tweets. One of the advantages of Twitter for the security forces was the identification of those people. For example, in Izmir; police raid in the houses of 34 young people, who called support for Gezi resistance on their Twitter accounts, and arrested them for the reason that they “encouraged public for crime”; 33 of them were released in the next days. Few days later, on 8 June, five people were arrested in Adana on the same ground “provocation on social media” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 129, 135, 141)

The last words of 22-year old Abdullah Cömert, posted on his social media account, was worth mentioning while during the interventions in Hatay, Cömert died of brain haemorrhage; his last post was: “I am at squares for revolution, will die if needed.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 124) His death caused more anger and escalation of the protests.

Dialogue

During the first ten days, almost no efforts were made to establish dialogue with the protesters. After the death of Abdullah Cömert on 4 June, the officials smoothed their statements and accepted that the extreme violence was a wrong way to deal with the demonstrations. While the prime minister was on visit in Africa, his deputy Bülent Arınç met President Gül and spoke afterwards. Arınç accepted that the use of excessive force made the protests escalate and he apologized from the first activists saying: “In that first incident, the extreme violence against those, who were motivated by environmental awareness, was wrong. I apologize from them.” (Hürriyet, 04.06.2013)

Acknowledgment of the excessive police force, being aware of the fact that disproportional interventions caused escalation and apologizing from the environmentalists can be named as a positive step towards dialogue.

President Gül was also aware that the concerns of the protesters were important and evaluated the protests as follows:

“Why do you think these were happened? There is a government ruling Turkey for the last 10 years. Opposing people can have summation and sensitivity. There might be people who do not approve the applications. These can be environmental issues, or the thought might be ‘some things are happening in Istanbul, why people were not asked

[about their ideas]?’ Politics in Turkey can be offending from time to time; there might be people offended. I see all of these. These are all the issues [happening] in developed countries. The Occupy Wall Street continued for months in America; the university campuses were occupied. The things happening in Turkey resemble those in Western countries not in the Middle East.” (Milliyet, 04.06.2013)

From the speech of President Gül, it can be inferred that empathy with the opposing views and considering their sensitivity important were the main messages of the protests, sent to the governors. This message also included the demand of taking part in the decision making process regarding a significant change in the region that people live in; therefore, the demand was democracy. This could not be disregarded in today’s world. Moreover, this is how the Western advanced democracies implement such fundamental changes in cosmopolitan cities; through holding referendum or plebiscite. It was known by the youth and it was impossible to expect the Western-oriented liberal youth to adopt such changes without questioning its legitimacy. Thus the President’s approach in the issue aiming at interpreting the concerns of the youth could only be role model for the politicians.

A similar approach on the issue was observed from the opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu who underlined that the youth demands democracy: “All of the young people demand freedom and democracy. There were people from every party, every faith, and every identity. This picture must be read very carefully by politicians and lessons should be taken. They are new generation, they are our children and we have to understand our children. Our duty is to draw lessons from this picture. We should form the politics that would answer their expectations.” He stated that democracy does not mean suppressing the opposing perspectives rather respecting them and added: “It [democracy] does not mean suppressing different thoughts; it is preparing area for freely expressing these thoughts. If you see democracy as an element of oppression, you cannot end the protests.” He repeated once again that the protests were not organized by CHP: “Some say ‘CHP gathered the protesters in Taksim square.’ No! We did not.” (Cumhuriyet, 04.06.2013)

One of the first things in the ‘to do’ list in order to ease the protests should have been establishing dialogue between the parties. The protesters had concerns to voice and they had no other opportunity to voice their demands than holding protests. The authorities could have established dialogue with the protesters on the first days if they had wanted to end the protests. However, Deputy Prime Minister Arınç met the Taksim Solidarity representatives

on the tenth day of the protests in Ankara. Arınç suggested holding a referendum to take the decision regarding the Gezi Park and Topçu Military Barracks project. The platform members replied: “Scientific reality cannot be changed through referendum.” After the meeting, the Taksim Solidarity voiced their seven demands to end the resistance as follows: “Gezi Park should stay as a park; cancellation of the Military Barracks project should be announced; cancellation of the demolition of the AKM should be announced; the responsible authorities should be dismissed from their duties; using gas bomb should be banned; detained citizens should be released immediately and no investigations regarding them should continue and the obstructions before the freedom of expression should be removed.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 130)

The statement of Taksim Solidarity also underlined: “Unfortunately, the government is continuing its policies of violence, repression and censorship in the face of the people presenting their demands for human rights in a peaceful and democratic way. We want it known that we are diligently working towards a climate in our society, where not a single person is physically hurt, where democratic demands can be expressed without tension.” (Amnesty International, Gezi Report, p. 5)

The platform requested ending the policies of violence, repression and censorship and clearly announced the demands of democracy, human rights and freedom of expression.

Other needs like tolerance, respect and dialogue were highlighted by one of the most important names of Turkish literature; Yaşar Kemal wrote an article, urging for democracy, published by *La Repubblica*. Kemal underlined the need for tolerance and respect and called the government to listen to the protesters. (Edebiyat Haber, 05.06.2013)

Other prominent authors could not help but wrote articles on Gezi Protests. Orhan Pamuk, recipient of the 2006 Nobel Prize in Literature, wrote an article that was published by dailies like *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* and *The Guardian*. Pamuk described the attitude of the government as “increasingly oppressive and authoritarian.” He added that “seeing people, who do not give up on their right to hold political protests at Taksim, gives trust and hope for future.” (Edebiyat Haber, 05.06.2013)

World-wide famous Brazilian novelist Paulo Coelho tweeted in support of Gezi saying: “Shame on us: the pepper spray in Turkey is made in Brazil.” He attached a photograph of the pepper spray capsule on which ‘made in Brazil’ is written under Brazilian flag. (Edebiyat Haber, 05.06.2013)

At the commemoration concert of poet and novelist Nazım Hikmet, world-wide famous pianist and composer Fazıl Say -who has three compositions named Gezi Park 1, 2, 3- thanked the protesters and described the Gezi Park resistance as “enlightenment.” He said that alone individuals became a whole and united; “we have to endure this oppression and cruelty.” At the end of the concert, he banged a pan in support of the Gezi Park; the audience accompanied him with the slogan: “Everywhere is Taksim, Everywhere is Resistance.” (Izlesene, 06.06.2013)

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Summary of ten days was worrisome: two people died; ten people lost their eyes, because of being hit by gas capsules; 4,177 people were injured, 43 of them seriously wounded and two people lay at hospital in life-threatening situation because of head trauma. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 131) Despite the pathetic situation, people continued their determined and peaceful resistance in the following days in order to voice their expectations and concerns.

4.2. Arendt and Second Ten Days of Resistance

The second ten days of the protests would be explored with reference Hannah Arendt's essay "On Violence." These days were like a tug-of-war; two sides pull against each other at opposite ends of a rope. The attempt to suppress the protests through intensifying the violence, and aiming at the consolidation of power mobilized more people for solidarity against the increasing violence. Even though the rope was pulled by the ruling party and the institutions of the government, more people at the opposite site of the rope gathered to pull faster as long as they can hold on. This power struggle can be explained with the approach of Arendt on the relationship of violence and power.

4.2.1. Arendt

"Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together." H. Arendt (Arendt, 1970, p. 239)

Hannah Arendt in her essay *On Violence* underlines that being a republic "where the rule of law, resting on the power of the people would put an end to the rule of man over man" and rule of law is a willing obedience of citizens to the legal rules that they "had given consent." The citizens give power to the institutions of the state with their "support" to laws. She stresses that in representative governments, the "people are supposed to rule those who govern them. All political institutions are manifestations and materialization of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them." (Arendt, 1970, p. 238) The power of the governments and its institutions is, therefore, generated by the people and they can continue to hold this power, as long as the people continue to empower them. She adds: "When we say of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name." (p. 239) Turkey as a parliamentary representative democratic republic is being ruled by the AKP since 2002. By then the Prime Minister and current President Erdoğan has been 'in power' and holding an ascending power as winner of three parliamentary elections -until Gezi Park resistance- and a presidency election with the majority of the votes. The thin line between power and violence in the art of the government was overstepped during the Gezi Park protests.

Arendt's relationship between power and violence, which are "opposite" (p. 243) to each

other, could be integrated into the protests. Until last days of the 30 days of protests, each attempt to increase the political power through using police force resulted in mobilization of more people against the power. According to Bernstein (2011), “Arendt rejects the idea of political power as power of one individual or group over another.” (p. 9) It was also clear that she disagreed with “Max Weber’s definition of the state as ‘rule of men over men based on the means of legitimate, that is allegedly legitimate violence.’ ” (Arendt, 1970, p. 236) Bernstein adds that if the definition of power was “the rule of an individual, group, or state over others”; if we think power means power over, “it makes perfect sense to claim that the ultimate kind of power is violence.” (p. 6) The attempt of power over the Gezi Park protesters through intensifying the violence and aiming at the reinforcement of political power, unintentionally, gave birth to the power of more people, who mobilized for solidarity against the increasing violence.

Bernstein (2011) adds that “Politics involves acting together; it is based upon human plurality and citizens encountering each other as political equals. In the public space created by acting together, citizens debate and deliberate with each other; they seek to persuade each other about how to conduct their public affairs. Persuasion involves debate among political equals, where citizens mutually seek to clarify, test, and purify their opinions.” (p. 9) The Gezi Park protesters were political equals, who were in interaction in a public sphere for preserving their rights and freedoms. Bernstein says: “Liberty is a necessary condition for public freedom, but not a sufficient condition. Public freedom is a positive political achievement that arises when individuals act together and treat each other as political equals.” (p. 9) It is a fact that the protesters were of different origins and different segments of the population however they were equal at the areas of protest for their common interests. This collective action granted them an elusive power. As Arendt (1970) underlines: “Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together.” (p. 239) Özbek (2013) also cites Arendt saying that attempts to consolidate the political power through violence actually decrease the power of the governors and “increase the political power of people” (p. 27) if those can achieve to act together without any discrimination. Likewise, Bernstein (2011) underlines that power and violence are “antithetical” and “where power reigns there is persuasion, not violence. And when violence reigns, it destroys power.” (p. 6) In the case, the political power of people, acting together, was born at Gezi Park, among “equal and different” people, who have been

“making politics at the public sphere.” (Özbank, 2013, p. 22)

Public sphere is misapprehended by the majority of the Turkish population. Özbank (2013) explains the definition of public sphere according to Arendt as follows: “Public sphere is not the place that is under the control of the state”; it is the place, where the “equal and different people, sharing the common life, can make politics freely; people’s being able to experience political freedom, political participation, political solidarity, political discussion, political competition, political disagreement, and political reconciliation.” (p. 23) He continues that public sphere means being “open to public”; and this place can be qualified as public “as long as the people can make politics and to the extent that they can make politics.” (p. 23) In this regard, the Taksim Square and Gezi Park should belong to the public and making politics in that sphere, or voicing opinions pro or against any project that would destroy the public sphere should be natural. If the public is unable to express themselves in that sphere, it could no more be named as public sphere. As Özbank stresses, however, most of the Turkish people perceive making politics as voting in the elections, only, in order to determine the statesmen. (p. 22) If this approach had been correct, the attitude of the PM Erdoğan would have had a point, as the AKP had won the majority of the votes in the last elections. From that perspective, the ‘legitimate political power of the AKP was attacked by a few chapulcus and this had no legitimacy’ would have been a reasonable judgment; but democracy should mean more than that. Democracies promote voicing of demands or criticisms of minorities, or even a small group through freedom of expression and peaceful assemblies.

Interpreting from the fact that the protesters were questioned at the police station with the allegation to overthrow the government, PM Erdoğan thought his political power would be in danger, if he let the protests continue; so he increased the police force to stop them. As Bernstein (2011) underlines “when there is a loss of power, there is an enormous temptation to resort to violence” (p. 11) however “violence is anti-political” and “political violence” is “self-contradictory.” (p. 10) As mentioned, the political power cannot survive in the existence of violence; when one exists, the other cannot. According to Arendt, violence can destroy the power and it is “impossible for violence to produce power.” (Özbank, 2013, p. 22) She stresses that attempting to reinforce the power through increasing violence would destroy political power. Moreover, in Gezi Park case, increasing the police force caused mobilization of more attendees against the violence. Özbank (2013) adds that according to

Arendt, the political violence, through the means and opportunities of the modern state can bring victory to those who use it; however, the victory, which is gained through violence, would cause losing of political power. (p. 27) Despite the fact that the government used all the facilities of the modern state and tried new strategies to suppress the protests, the protesters showed a determined manner and achieved to continue the resistance during the second ten days.

4.2.2. Second Ten Days

In the light of Arendt's *On Violence*, the most important occurrences of the second ten days of the resistance will be explored under three subtitles: Protests, Strategies and Dialogue. This classification provides a detailed examination of the protests; an analysis of the strategies of the actors involved in the process and the dialogue attempts by actors. The second ten days of the protests is beneficial to test the hypothesis: If opposing views form collective action, the power of the government will be decreased.

Protests

In general, the acute demands of freedom and democracy continued to be the main concerns of the resistance. In particular, people of different occupations voiced other demands like justice, freedom of the press and respecting syndicate rights through their peaceful demonstrations.

Lawyers in Ankara reacted against the police violence in front of the Ankara Courthouse. Lawyers wrote "We Want Justice" on the floor, with the gas bomb capsules, that had been used for the last ten days. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 132) In the following days, on 11 June, lawyers protested the police violence at Çağlayan courthouse; when they tried to read the communique, the police intervened "illegally and forcibly" and detained 49 lawyers, who then released in the evening. The next day, lawyers in many cities protested the disproportionate use of force and detainment of 49 lawyers; they said: "If lawyers shut up, public shuts up." (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 152, 156)

This is also true for journalists; if the media shuts up, public shuts up. It was known that the media has become biased gradually as a result of the restrictive policies of the government; not only censorship because of the sanctions but also self-censorship in order not to suffer

from the sanctions affected the way the media reported. The principle of objectiveness - ought to be a sine qua non condition- faded away, which was proven during the protests. Two important news channels aired an animal documentary and a cooking program during the most intense days of the Gezi Protests.

Biased manner of the media was one of the most important criticisms in pre-Gezi Park period, during the resistance and in the aftermath. Journalists Union of Turkey (TGS) organized a march on 6 June in support of the resistance and the TGS Istanbul Chairman Gokhan Durmus hoped that the resistance, which was expanded with the demand of “freedom” would free the media. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 132) Since the beginning of the resistance, three TV channels, one radio channel started broadcasting and 1 newspaper started to be published at Gezi Park. (p. 148) In addition to these local media sources and international channels, Halk TV and Ulusal TV were the channels covering the protests. In the following days, Ulusal TV and Halk TV were fined by RTUK on the ground that they “provoke public for violence” but in fact it was because of their unbiased coverage of the protests. Upon the penalties of RTUK, Turkish hacker group Redhack hacked the website of RTUK as the “media channels reporting the truth” were fined. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 154; Bianet, 24.07.2013)

The biased manner of the mainstream media was known internationally, CNN International correspondent reporting from Istanbul said that “many Turkish people watch us as they do not trust their own media.” (p. 154) Violent interventions in the following days were also reported by foreign media channels; many perceived Erdoğan’s attitude as “divisive and close to negotiation.” (p. 153)

Striking of workers and taking part in the protests can be listed among the peaceful strategies of the resistance; previously on 5 June, thousands of labors, who are namely members of DISK, KESK, TMMOB and TTB struck and marched to Taksim from two different ways. They met the Gezi Park resisters at Taksim Square, invited the government to resign and sent the message of a possible strike saying: “Apologize. Either you stop violence, or the labor will stop production.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 129)

European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), representing 85 trade unions in 36 European countries, released a communique in support of the Gezi Park protests. It underlined that the disproportionate force of police and oppression reminded the May Day protests. “ETUC

supports people struggling for social democracy, respecting syndicate rights and against the expanding authoritarianism in Turkey,” it said and invited the Turkish government to respect basic international rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 134)

On 7 June, social media continued to be the first address to mobilize support; #OccupyGezi hashtag called people to support the protests around the world. The announcement, which spread in short time said: “We invite you this weekend [8-9 June] to be in solidarity with #OccupyGezi and with the protest waves across Turkey and to go out the squares in order to protect your public sphere.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 139-140)

Resistance continued in Ankara, at Kuğulu Park. The police warned the activists to remove their tents, otherwise intervention would take place. The activists leaved the park but in the evening, thousands of people with their spouses and children met a Kuğulu park, where the atmosphere was like a “festival.” People marched chanting slogans, urging Erdoğan for resignation and greeted Gezi Park with “Everywhere is Taksim, Everywhere is Resistance” slogans. (p. 140) Küçükkaya (2013) underlined that during the day, freedom, equality and peace demands were voiced at the park and the resistance ‘spirit’ was kept alive with songs. (p. 137)

On 8 June, the “commune” life continued; the number of the activists in the Gezi Park increased and the park turned into a camping area with many tents. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 141) The Taksim Solidarity Platform repeated their demands and added: “We are here until the demands are met.” (pp. 144-7) Upon the call for support via #OccupyGezi hashtag on social media, and the announcement of the platform continuing the resistance, the fans of three biggest soccer teams gathered at Taksim square. Some carried firebrands on the roof of the AKM building. From the beginning of the protests, this was the largest march held in Taksim by hundreds of thousands. (p. 144)

The protests continued all day on the thirteenth day, mainly in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir; in Izmir, followers of teams together with people marched with firebrands, applause and slogans. In the meantime, people in Ankara started marching from Kuğulu Park to Kizilay square; police intervened with water cannons and tear gasses. (p. 143)

The protests took place not only in Turkey but also around the world; a group of supporters

protested in front of the White House in Washington D.C.; “ten thousand” people protested in Berlin; following day on 9 June protests took place at Trafalgar Square in London; some 600 people protested in Vienna; and in Zurich and Geneva. The resistance continued on 10 June; people set up tents at Kuğulu Park in Ankara and more than 200 students pitched tents at Espark in Eskişehir. In the evening, people of Ankara marched with their pans and plots and invited the government to resign. (pp. 143, 147, 149, 150)

While the protests continued to get international support, it was found out from the camera records that Ethem Sarisülük, who was heavily wounded during the protests in Kizilay square, Ankara, was shot at the head with a real bullet fired by a police. On 13 June, his parents presented official complaint against “misuse of authority” regarding the suspect police officer. Sarisülük died on 14 June and tomography proved that the material in his brain was a real bullet. On 24 June, the police officer Ahmet Sahbaz, who shot Sarisülük, was released on the ground that it was a “self-defense”; however his trial continued (pp. 149, 159, 161, 163, 186)

June 11 was an important day to mark, a crucial point in the course of the events; in the early morning Istanbul Mayor Hüseyin Avni Mutlu sent a tweet: “We think that we need to end these scenes; that is why, we will be working from 8 a.m. onwards.” Many police officers started to come to Taksim Square at 6 a.m. and announced that they will not intervene; the aim was to do arrangements on the statute at Taksim and in the AKM building. The police dropped off all different flags hung on the statute and on the AKM building. (p. 151) Despite the announcement, the intervention continued all day. However, this intervention was different from the previous ones; journalist Küçükkaya (2013) underlines that it was read as if a “theater staged” by the police. At the square, a group of “supposedly” protesters and police clashed; after 15 days of resistance, for the first time, this group threw Molotov cocktails to the police. A small group escaped to Tarlabaşı and Siraselviler direction, there they attacked the police with Molotov cocktails again and lighted fireworks. It was observed that these attackers had flags of the Socialist Democracy Party (SDP) and had bulging in their waists like a gun or a walkie-talkie. This observation caused suspicion that these could not be the real protesters. Mayor Mutlu announced that the person, who threw Molotov cocktail, was a member of the SDP; SDP denied the

allegation and criticized that the party was tried to be shown as provocateur. Another thought provoking point was the media; all channels of the mainstream Turkish media, which had not been reporting or airing the protests for the last 15 days were “airing this clash live.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 151) The fact that the mainstream media had been mute since the beginning of the protests and observed airing these clashes live consolidated the interpretation that these were fake protesters clashing with the police. It was further read that the aim of this broadcast was to show the Gezi Park protesters as criminals, who did not hesitate to clash with the police and to throw burning materials to the police.

As a reply to this provocation, the Taksim Solidarity read a statement underlining that they were not leaving the park “until concrete steps are taken.” It criticized the government and PM Erdoğan, who would hold a meeting with an unknown group: “The reason of meeting that group is to disregard our legal and democratic demands. The interlocutor is clear: it is Taksim Solidarity.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 151)

After the interventions, groups held sit-in in front of the water cannons around AKM building, right across in the Taksim Square and people formed a human chain hand-in-hand. After the police leaved the square, the groups wanted to hang their flags on the statute; however police intervened again with tear gasses and water cannons and removed the flags on the statute. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 152)

In the evening on 11 June, after work, people started to gather at Taksim Square; hundreds of people affected by the water cannons; even a disabled person on wheel chair attacked by pressurized water and thousands of police threw pepper gas. Later in the evening, the electricity tripped off and many gas bombs were thrown. Some protesters threw Molotov cocktails, stones and fireworks to the police. Police entered in the Gezi Park but as a result of the determined resistance, police had to leave the park. CHP parliament members came in the park for support. Despite the announcement of the mayor that no gas bomb would be used, continuously gas bombs were thrown by the police that caused anger. (p. 152)

After all night long clashes, 12 June started quiet at Gezi Park. Police hung a huge Turkish flag and a huge Atatürk poster from the roof of the AKM building; some protesters applauded the police. Around Taksim and Gezi Park was quiet but the whole country was quite active; in districts of Istanbul and across Turkey, people marched to protest yesterday’s

and last night's interventions. The tents at Kuğulu Park, Ankara were pulled out. Police used pepper spray and pressurized water to hinder the marches. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 154)

After Erdoğan's speech urging the parents to take their children from the park, mothers came to Gezi Park on 13 June and formed a human chain hand in hand for supporting their children. Mothers continued joining the protests in the following day and affected by the interventions at the Taksim Square (pp. 159, 162-3) The protest marches continued; the marches were held for Ali Ismail Korkmaz, who was wounded in Eskişehir and was still in intensive station. (pp. 159-160) Turkish Doctors' Union announced that some 15 thousand people were wounded in 20 days. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 170)

Strategies

One of the most effective strategies of the resistance that won recognition of the participants was the public forums. With reference to the approach of Foucault, stressing the possibility to question and criticize the overwhelming attitudes of the governors over governed - population-, these public forums can be named as one of the most peaceful strategies of the protesters. Individuals might be questioning and criticizing the government in their private lives and private spheres, however forums enabled the individuals to express themselves in community and criticize the policies of the government in a public sphere. Each participant of the forums was free to take the floor and say their opinion. The 6 June meeting at Taksim turned into a "public rostrum" in other words a forum, during which everyone who wanted, got the chance to speak and was heard by the participants. These forums brought a new dimension, namely participatory democracy; people from different segments of life voiced their demands and opinions in various fields, such as politics, education and animal rights. One of the expectations was worth mentioning: pulling down the party flags at the Gezi Park. The demand to cut down the party or association flags should have been fulfilled in order to prove that the Gezi Park protests were above the parties, associations and organizations. It could have been evidence that different participants of various groups were there for the Gezi Park but not for representing their affiliations or ideologies. Not giving up the pure aim of protecting the park from being demolished could have been proven with the removal of different flags and getting unified under the umbrella of the trees of Gezi Park.

During the forum, a speaker apologized from the participants as she/he voted for the AKP in the past saying: “I am here as a person from the other 50 percent, I apologize from all of you. I invite all my friends here.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 132)

Arendt underlines the importance of councils for the freedom of the public. Bernstein (2011) says that these councils can be “neighborhood councils, councils of writer and artists, students and youth councils.” (p. 28) The forums of the Gezi Park resemble the councils that were named by Arendt. Bernstein (2011) cites Arendt saying that “under modern conditions, ‘the councils are the only democratic alternative to the party system.’ The rise of the councils ‘was the clear sign of a true upsurge of democracy against dictatorship, of freedom against tyranny.’ ” (p. 29)

In the following days, Taksim Solidarity started to organize these forums at different locations, mainly in parks, in Istanbul and provided an elusive opportunity to everyone, who wanted to express their opinions in community but could not find a sphere of expression or/and had been hesitating to speak openly in a public sphere. As provided earlier, the results of the Metropoll survey put forward that the 47 percent of the inquired individuals hesitated to voice their political opinions publicly.

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As part of the strategies of the government, the intransigent rhetoric of the officials continued during the second ten days of the resistance. The aim to degrade the protests was obvious in one of the most speculative speeches of the PM; he claimed that the protesters drank alcohol in the mosque. Previously, on 3 June, people who were affected by tear gas and/or wounded took shelter in the Valide Sultan Mosque in Dolmabahçe. The voluntary doctors also entered in the mosque to provide medical support. The police threw gas bomb even in the courtyard of the mosque. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 118) The protesters and the religious official of the mosque denied the allegation of consumption of alcohol at the mosque. Even though it was disclaimed several times, in a 9-June speech, Erdoğan repeated that the protesters, who took shelter in the mosque, entered in “with beer bottles and with their shoes.” (Under normal circumstances, it is inappropriate to enter the mosque with shoes.) The muezzin of the mosque Fuat Yildirim denied the claims saying: “No one drank alcohol here. If the protesters saw anyone drinking, they themselves would expel him out.”

The PM further claimed that the protesters attacked young ladies, who wear headscarves; this assertion was also denied. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 145-6) Upon the allegation, investigation carried out to find whether anyone drank alcohol at the mosque or not. The security cameras were investigated and muezzin Fuat Yildirim questioned for three hours. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 149) Yildirim, who had publicly said that nobody drank alcohol at the mosque, was appointed to a village, because of telling what had happened objectively. (Hürriyet, 21.09.2013)

Different attributions to the resisters continued with new narration of the officials; Egemen Bağış, minister for the EU Negotiations said that they had identified “11 terrorist groups,” encouraging the public to attend the protests. (p. 133) Previously, Istanbul mayor had defined the groups as “marginal”; the statement of Bağış underlined the existence of “terrorist groups” among the protesters; PM Erdoğan mentioned “illegal” and “terrorist groups” as well as “foreign manipulation,” all of which carried the protests to an unprecedented resistance across Turkey. Erdoğan repeated that he did not give up on the plans for Taksim and stated: “Members of terrorist group that attacked the USA embassy [1 February 2013, a suicide bomber attacked the US embassy in Ankara, a security guard died, three people wounded] are within this issue. I acquit citizens having environmental awareness. I did say you insistently; I said ‘extreme ends’ even terrorist groups are among these.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 133-4; Bianet, 06.06.2013)

After these ascriptions of Erdoğan and Bağış, ten thousands of people started protest marches in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and in other cities. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 136) Erdoğan extended his identifications on his return in Turkey after midnight and delivered a speech on the top of the AKP election campaign bus. He described the protesters as “vandals”; in reply, his supporters listening to him around the bus shouted: “Let us go and grind Taksim!” (Bianet, 07.06.2013; Özbek, 2013, p. 39) The PM did not answer this slogan. In his speech, he hinted at the demands of the Taksim Solidarity Platform as being “undemocratic” and added: “We could die for democratic demands.” The next day, exactly the same sentence was the headline of six different dailies and sub-headline of one daily thus the same sentence was on the cover page of seven mainstream presses. According to Küçükkaya (in Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013) this was read as “concurrence rather than coincidence.” (p. 137) It also showed the continuous biased manner of the media and a

vivid example of the censorship towards the perspectives of Gezi Park protesters. The advantage of the media has been serving well for the government to inform the general population, who could not access to the social media and had no other source of information than the mainstream media to learn the points of view and reasons of the resistance. Therefore, through the media, the prime minister's rhetoric towards the protesters had a negative effect on people's perception of the course of the events.

In addition, his speech and the reply of his followers caused further disorder. Previously, he had said referring to his followers that the 50 percent of the population was "kept at home by force." During this speech, the young followers asked permission to "go and grind Taksim!" in order to intimidate the Gezi Park protesters. This request was not answered by Erdoğan, however it can be inferred that the statements of the PM were pursued by his followers and were provocative not only for resisters but also for his own followers. His shrill rhetoric deepened the already existing cliff between different segments in the population. This polarization was observed on 8 June, two thousand protesters in Adana were attacked by a group of young people with stones and batons. The attackers shouted: "We are soldiers of Prime Minister Tayyip" while they were attacking the protesters (p. 143)

CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu criticized the attitude of Erdoğan and invited Erdoğan not to obstinate with the public saying: "In democracies to obstinate with public is not possible. If a ruling starts being obstinate with public, the problem of legitimacy comes on the agenda." (NTV, 07.06.2013)

The speech of the opposition party leader was cautionary. According to him, the inaccurate statements of the PM could cause a legitimacy problem in the governance. The intensification of the police force could cause losing of legitimacy. This reminds the approach of Arendt in which she openly underlines that power needs legitimacy and adds: "Power springs up whenever people get together and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than from any action that then may follow. Legitimacy, when challenged, bases itself on an appeal to the past, while justification relates to an end that lies in the future. Violence can be justifiable, but it never will be legitimate. Its justification loses its plausibility the farther its intended end recedes into the future. No one questions the use of violence in self-defense, because the danger is not only clear but

also present, and the end justifying the means is immediate.” (Arendt, 1970, p. 241)

Bernstein (2011) stresses that “Power, as we have indicated, is not to be understood in a vertical hierarchical manner, where it is taken to mean control or domination over another individual or group. Power is a horizontal concept: it springs up and grows when individuals act together, seek to persuade each other, and treat each other as political equals.” (p.10)

Özbank (2013) says that the “different and equal” protesters and their “Gezi spirit” was a political power like the one, described by Arendt, and was legitimate. As she says violence can be justified but cannot be legitimized. The more the “illegitimate” police violence increased the more legitimacy the protesters gained with the support of more participants. (p. 27) Özbank underlines that PM Erdoğan perceived the real political power -born at a public sphere- as violence and believed that some internal or external powers, which “want to defeat him,” must be behind this violence. (p. 38) That is why, he replied it with violence (p. 35) and toughened his speeches and manner that became “authoritarian and rough” (p. 36) If the first days of the protest were a local environmental protest, misinterpretation of this protest caused expansion of both the issues -in question of protests- and of the number of attendees, who either share the same view with protesters or merely against an unfair situation. As a result, apolitical young people, whose best political action is to vote in four years, politicized and became people making politics on the streets for the first time in their lives. As Foucault would most probably say, more supporters jumped on the stage -streets- to criticize the power in the hands of an institution of the government, i.e. security forces.

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The AKP government came up with a new strategy to test the water and to justify the violence. AKP announced demonstrations, like election campaigns, for the “50 percent that kept home by force” as it was previously said by the prime minister. These “Respect to National Will” meetings were planned to take place on 15 June in Sincan, Ankara and on 16 June in Kazlıçeşme, Istanbul. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 142) It can be inferred that on the one hand, the young members of the AKP were watching the Gezi Park protests and would like to hold similar events and on the other hand, they want to intimidate the activists. Therefore, these meetings would be an opportunity for the AKP youth to let off their steam and a proof showing the attendance of masses to the AKP events. As mentioned

in the previous part, during the first ten days, PM Erdoğan had challenged the opposition party leader Kılıçdaroğlu saying: “If the issue is holding demonstration and social movement, where he [Kılıçdaroğlu] gathers ten thousand, as my party [AKP], I would gather one million people.” The meetings of the AKP would be evidence for the political power of the government as well as for the power of the “national will” [referring to being elected by the majority, therefore by *national will*].

In the meantime, the Prime Minister pursued the strategy of finding a leading organization or an affiliation that direct the actions of the protesters, despite the fact that protesters were simple citizens having no roots. On 9 June, Erdoğan named the possible power behind the protests as “interest rate lobbies.” He added new depictions and called the protesters as anarchists and terrorists saying: “Are we going to leave the squares to anarchists and terrorists? Why are they struggling?” He further claimed that “interest rate lobbies” were leading the protests and added: “Those who try to crash the stock market without hesitation; Tayyip Erdoğan does not have money in the stock market, if it declines, you will crash.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 145)

He hinted at the economic outcomes that could be acquired through such uprisings. He referred to the aim of declining the stock market, and increasing the interest rates. Any further economic knowledge is redundant as it is well known that if the interest rates are high, it would have negative effects on the economy. If the organization that hid behind the Gezi Park protests aimed to increase the interest rates, such disorders would possibly induce the desired increase. He mentioned that the resistance was a game of the interest rate lobbies seeking economic gains and political outcomes through declining the Turkish stock market because these are disturbed by the increasing economic and political power of Turkey, according to the prime minister.

Özbank (2013) answers the question whether or not there were “inside or outside points,” interest rate lobbies, or foreign countries that “are disturbed by the power of Turkey” and that were trying to weaken the power with these protests. He says, “there was no political organization, no inside or outside points, no interest lobbies behind, or under the Gezi Park protests.” He states that the “political parties took part in the protests, but they did neither start nor led the protests.” He also adds that “it was possible that some interest seekers were

following up the events for possible political and economic benefits and interests,” however they were not behind or under the protest rather they were “inside” i.e. among the protests. That means, those did not mobilize millions of people; “those came after millions of people.” Various organizations or interest seekers that were among the protesters did not make the masses follow them; “this time people led the way and organizations followed millions of people.” (Özbank, 2013, pp. 30-1)

In the following days, the same strategy tried to convince the population that a power must be behind the protesters or a group is leading the resistance. However, according to Özbank (2013), there were no interest seekers behind the Gezi Park incidents; “the political power, born at Gezi, was not violence under the name of political power; it was a real political power based on the togetherness of the voluntary people having reason and conscience.” (p.54) Worth repeating the citation from *On Violence*: “Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together.” (p. 239)

With this togetherness, protests gain more support and solidarity during the second ten days of the resistance and as a result of this support, the leaders of the protests -with the consent of people through the forums- decided not to end the protests. The power derived from the collective action of the protesters in the park and the overwhelming police violence decreased the power of the government. Recalling Arendt that “it is not correct to think of the opposite of violence as nonviolence” because according to her “power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance.” (Arendt, 1970, p. 242) Nevertheless, the government increased the violence through its institutions to get back its power. For this aim, the government tried new strategies like making the public believe that the Gezi Park protests were a game of “foreign manipulation” or of “interest rate lobbies” and there were “illegal” and “terrorist” groups among the protesters. Until then, none of the television channels were reporting on the protests but with this new strategy, all mainstream media started broadcasting. The aim was to convince the public on the terrorists among environmental protesters. This strategy was a breakpoint and an evidence that the government was about to lose political power on the 15th day of the protests.

The strategy was the clash of a group of provocateurs or fake protesters with the police on

11 June, as mentioned in “Protests” part. This group struck back the police intervention with Molotov cocktails. This was a first after fifteen days of peaceful protests and read as a game that tried to show the Gezi Park protesters as criminals because as mentioned the mainstream media was the only source of information for the majority of the population and this clash was aired by these channels. The public watching the protesters throwing burning material at the police convinced that the Gezi Park protesters must be members of terrorist organizations. This strategy justified the police interventions and discredited the Gezi Park resistance; thus the PM was using the police force in all conscience.

After this clash, the severe interventions continued all day. Erdoğan thanked all police officers for their work and replied the criticisms of being brutal with saying: “Erdoğan would not change.” Even some MPs of AKP started to criticize Erdoğan for being too strict. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 153) Erdoğan requested the protesters to end their resistance and further addressed to them saying that “Otherwise, I have to speak the language that you understand” and added: “Because there is an end to the patience.” (Hürriyet, 11.06.2013)

CHP Leader Kılıçdaroğlu replied Erdoğan’s statement asking: “What does it mean ‘speaking the language that we understand’? Would you beat us; would you kill us? Democracy describes the regime, in which one can kill whoever he likes as dicta and the head of that regime is named dictator.” Likewise, MHP Leader Bahçeli described Erdoğan as a “savage provocateur” and added: “We do not let you grind the Turkish youth down.” BDP Co-President Demirtaş also criticized: “Ruling of the country by 2-3 capulcu [looter -- allusion to Erdoğan’s calling the protesters 2-3 capulcu] is more democratic than being ruled by one capulcu.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 153)

Upon clashes and severe interventions, the Prime Minister toughened his tone. It is possible that he implied that he had been tolerating the protests but “there is an end to patience” and he had been approaching the incidents with appropriate rhetoric but if needed, he could speak a language that the protesters would understand. One of the possible messages encoded in the “language that you understand” could be intensifying police interventions, increasing detainment and violence. Other hidden meanings might have been read instead of this pure-minded interpretation and those meanings could add fuel to the fire.

He pointed at the “end of the patience” with another statement saying: “I instructed the interior affairs ministry; this will end in 24 hours.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 155)

In addition, Istanbul Mayor Mutlu and chief of police visited the police officers, waiting in

front of the AKM building; after his visit Mutlu said: “The youth in the Gezi Park are in a very risky area. It is important for our children [at Gezi] to go back home.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 154) Mutlu underlined that the Gezi Park was a risky area and the PM said that the protesters would come to an end in 24 hours. These statements gave the impression that new interventions would take place.

One of the inconceivable strategies that the authorities practiced was observed on the nineteenth day on 14 June. Director of Istanbul Police Fatih Sariyildiz compared the police struggle during the Gezi Park protests with Battle of Çanakkale (Gallipoli) saying: “You [police] are writing a second epic after the Çanakkale victory.” Upon the debates, the police department verified that such a message was sent to the police officers “aiming to increase motivation.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 162)

This controversial statement triggered reaction among the protesters because the comparison of a war with a resistance was incomprehensible. The victory of Battle of Çanakkale was the most crucial war that initiated the Turkish War of Independence and was a gleam of hope for the declaration of the Republic of Turkey. The message encoded in the sentence “second epic after the Çanakkale victory” might be the notion that the Gezi Park resisters were enemies and the police should defeat these enemies with more motivation. It must be questioned whether this message increased the motivation or gave the impression that the country was in a warfare.

Dialogue

The Council of Ministers held meeting, headed by Prime Minister Erdoğan; following the meeting, his deputy Arınç announced that Erdoğan would meet a group on 12 June. It was read as a possibility of dialogue with the Taksim Solidarity Platform; however, the platform underlined that they were not informed about the meeting and were curious about the group to meet Erdoğan and stated that those “are not related to the Taksim Solidarity.” The platform urged government to be “serious” as the interlocutor of any meeting must be the representatives of the platform. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 148)

The first scarce effort of establishing dialogue was observed on the seventeenth day, Erdoğan met with a committee including famous artists, academicians, students, architectures and social media experts who took part in the protests. However it was

criticized that a meeting should have been held with the representatives of the Taksim Solidarity. After the five-hour meeting of Erdoğan and committee members, Deputy Prime Minister Çelik informed that a referendum could be held to take the decision on Gezi Park and urged protesters to empty the park immediately.

Spokesperson of the committee delivered a short speech underlining that they were not spokesperson of anyone and added that possibility of referendum was not asked to them during the meeting. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 155)

Furthermore Erdoğan said: “We have heard about such attempts against Turkey, against the government three months in advance; it [Gezi Park protests] was not a surprise.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 155) He referred to secret information on the possibility of overthrowing the government through such uprisings and meant that the real aim of the Gezi Park resistance was a coup. This possibility answers why the protesters, who were arrested in Ankara, were questioned by the Coping with Terrorism unit of the police with the suspicion of planning a coup d’etat. The arrested people were asked whether or not they “have joined the protests in order to overthrow the government and to disgrace the government in the international arena”; suspects were also asked information about “who commanded” them to join the protests and “who have organized” the protests. (Bianet, 06.06.2013)

On the following day, Erdoğan delivered a speech on his meeting with the committee that he called “sincere and honest” protesters. He said to the group that they had to distance themselves from the “illegal groups” in the park. The committee told that they had “no relationship with illegal groups” but Erdoğan replied: “Whatever you say, you are at the same scene [of crime] with them. That is why, you cannot criticize my police.” Further in his speech, he said that the “Gezi Park is a mess, smells like urine.” (Hürriyet, a-14.06.2013) The next day, the youth at Gezi Park replied Erdoğan saying: “Gezi Park smells relish of freedom, solidarity and struggle.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 161)

PM Erdoğan defended that the use of pepper spray is a legal right and referenced the EU and the USA saying “all advanced democracies” use pepper spray. He repeated his demand from sincere and honest environmentalists to leave the park and let the security forces clean the park from the “extreme terror organizations” and then give the park to the owners, who

are the “people of Istanbul.” He warned all the protesters for the “last time” that it was the “end of patience” and urged the parents of the activists to take their children from the park; “otherwise, we will not wait any longer,” he stated. He added that during the meeting he suggested the possibility of plebiscite regarding the future of the park. (Hürriyet, a-14.06.2013) Nevertheless, as said by the committee, the possibility of a referendum or a plebiscite was not discussed in the meeting.

Opposition party CHP Leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu underlined that the Gezi Park is “freedom park” of the world and neither plebiscite or referendum nor judiciary decision could destroy the park. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 162-3) In addition, Kılıçdaroğlu urged Erdoğan to stop the “ruling understanding” that brought police and public face to face and invited President Gül to hold a Leaders’ Summit. His demand was rejected by Gül on the ground that gathering the leaders do not contribute in finding a solution and underlined that the “first intervention of the police on the first day was wrong.” Kılıçdaroğlu replied Gül and accused him of acting together with Erdoğan and added: “We did what we are responsible of, the things that could happen from now on is under the responsibility of the government.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 156)

President Gül acknowledged the wrongness of the first intervention and the opposition leader reminded the responsibility of the government. Upon these, the next day, another scarce effort for dialogue was observed in the evening of 13 June. The Prime Ministry said that Erdoğan would meet a committee from the Taksim Solidarity Platform as well as representatives of artists and intelligent, at 11 p.m. This meeting was organized to tell the representatives in person that there were terror organizations among the protesters and to urge them for ending the protests. In the meantime, Istanbul Mayor Mutlu posted a tweet and invited youth to a cafe in the midnight. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 158-9) Late in the eighteenth day, the expectation of holding meetings with the representatives of the protesters was fulfilled. PM Erdoğan was to meet the committee from the platform and Mayor Mutlu to meet the youth in person. After the 4-hour meeting of Erdoğan and the committee, AKP spokesman Hüseyin Çelik delivered a speech promising that nothing would be done to the park until the end of the legal process. He added that after the process regardless of the court decision, the public would be asked about their opinion through

holding plebiscite or referendum. He said the ideas of the people of Istanbul were “very important.” He underlined that Gezi Park would not be demolished before holding referendum and urged people to leave the park and sleep at their homes in order to end this tension. Çelik continued: “[Turkey] is a democratic country. The government tolerated a lot and continues to tolerate. I do not think that the government would let the Gezi Park be occupied for so long.” (Hürriyet, b-14.06.2013)

The representatives of the platform said that during the meeting, they voiced their “evaluation and suggestion of solutions.” The PM said the disproportionate use of force would be investigated and the decision of the public regarding the park would be respected. (Hürriyet, b-14.06.2013) Chamber of Architects Chairman Eyüp Muhcu from the platform underlined that the meeting was held in a “nervous atmosphere”; he said that the PM Erdoğan interrupted the speeches of the representatives or did not let them speak at all. Muhcu underlined that the decision would be taken with the activist youth and inclusionary forums would be held to get the opinions of participants; seven forums at seven different locations in Gezi Park would be held to decide on the next steps. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 161) On behalf of the artists, actor Halit Ergenç evaluated the meeting:

“As artists, we have voiced our experiences, explained how we read this process, expressed our worries and voiced our expectations. Prime Minister listened to us carefully. He repeated that he is respectful to the legal process and underlined that they will obey the decision of the court. He added that those in the park should go back to their homes and sleep comfortably. We have also voiced our worries about the violence scenes and of course, they have voiced their issues. They wanted us to send them the camera records regarding violent incidents and assured that they would investigate [the police officers who misused their authorities].” (Hürriyet, b-14.06.2013)

Istanbul Mayor Mutlu had invited youth to a cafe via Twitter; before the meeting he hoped that this chat would be a message to the youth at Gezi Park and added: “What we expect, what are we doing and what are the things that they [protesters] want to do, would be evaluated with all dimensions.” He met a group of 150 young people and chatted until the early morning. During the five-hour meeting, some young participants criticized Mutlu. Reportedly, the expression of a lady applauded by the participants at the cafe: “There is one issue that we should thank you and the AKP government. Thanks to you, we have seen that

we can accomplish our personal revolutions. You, now, know that we would gather there even for a little thing.” (Bianet, 14.06.2013)

PM Erdoğan, once again, repeated the existence of the illegal organizations among the sincere activists and he extended his claim that the protests were manipulated from abroad. He claimed that an “open-air theater” had been played in Gezi Park saying: “The front and back of the curtains are different; youth before the curtains is sincere but there are illegal organizations in the back. The button was pushed from outside.” He accepted that the concerns of the sincere activists were understood saying: “The message was received; the evaluation was made. There is judiciary decision and we will follow up the process.” Erdoğan suggested again that the sincere environmentalists should stop living in the park and go to their homes and added: “If any illegal organizations continue to stay at the park, we will see them [after the activists left].” (NTV, 14.06.2013)

PM’s underlining that the message of the sincere environmentalists was received and Gül’s acknowledgment that the “first intervention was wrong” prompted to think the following logical consequence; if the first intervention, which was the major reason that mobilized people, was wrong, why did other interventions take place and mobilize more people? Why did the government let more people to get mobilized and let expansion of the incidents? Why would a government risk its political power and let the anti-government protesters get powerful through uniting for their common goal? The government could have ended the protests on the first days, when they identified the presence of terrorist or illegal organizations among the protesters. Was that a strategy to consolidate the power of the government in the perception of the Turkish population?

If the course of the events and the governmentality of the government is taken into consideration, some possible answers would be: firstly, if the protests were attended by illegal groups, protests were an opportunity to identify them, so did the government; secondly, it was an opportunity to show the whole population that any foreign powers or illegal organizations tried to overthrow the government -which was not allowed; and thirdly, it was an opportunity to prove that the government and the PM used the right strategies to handle the incidents within the frames of democracy. All of these, as part of the strategy of the ruling, increased the creditability and political power of the government.

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The second ten days of the protests nullified the hypothesis: If opposing views form collective action, the power of the government will be decreased. Despite the collective action of the opposing people, the government attained to handle the protests. The strategy to justify the use of excessive police force and legitimization of violence with the mentality that illegal groups tried to overthrow the legitimate government won recognition among the AKP supporters; however did not achieve to end the resistance yet, as it would be construed in the next part with reference to the concepts Max Weber.

4.3. Weber and Third Ten Days of Resistance

In this last part of the protests, the park was emptied by the police, by force. This was commanded by the prime minister. Although the protests continued on the streets, the government handled the resistance with the legitimate means of the state. From this point on, the course of the events will demonstrate that the power of the protesters, gained through their collective action was loosen. As being inversely correlated, the power of the government was consolidated. One of the strategies of the government, as discussed, leaned on the idea that there were illegal groups behind the sincere protesters. This idea got acceptance among the voters of the AKP and increased the creditability of the government, especially after the park was emptied out. According to PM Erdoğan, his voters were the 50 percent of the population and the will of the 50 percent brought him to his position and continue to empower him. He decided to hold meetings -like election campaigns- for this 50 percent. The “Respect to National Will” rallies were attended by the AKP followers, who represent the “national will,” and through these meetings; the power of the government was reinforced. Accordingly, this part will back up the hypothesis: if the government weakens the opposition, it will consolidate its political power.

For the last part of the protests, some conceptualizations of Weber should be explained, such as power, pure types of domination and the right to use *legitimate physical force* by the state. It is legitimate to use police force to end the unauthorized protests; therefore, people can criticize the elected governments as long as the governance lets them do so. From the perspective of the government and its followers using force was legitimate, however from the perspective of the protesters, this power was coercive.

4.3.1. Weber

“I wish to state for our consideration merely the purely conceptual fact that the modern state is an institutional association of rule, which within a given territory has succeeded in gaining a monopoly of legitimate physical force as a means of ruling, and to this end has united material resources in the hands of its leaders, after expropriating all the autonomous estate functionaries who previously controlled them in their own name.” M. Weber (Weber, Dreijmais, 2008, pp. 160-1)

Numerous translations and different interpretations of Weber's *Macht* are present in the literature. According to the translation of Bendix (1960), Weber's power is "the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behavior of other persons." (p. 290) Bendix omits a few significant details, though. Weber defines power as follows: "*Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht.*" (Weber, 1922, p. 50) In the light of the original definition, Dennis Wrong translates Weber's power more comprehensibly, as: "The probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will, despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this possibility rests." (Wallimann, Tatsis, Zito, 1977, p. 231)

Bendix (1960) emphasizes that "For Weber 'domination' [*Herrschaft*] was identical with the 'authoritarian power of command.'" Bendix translates Weber's definition of *Herrschaft* as follows: "The manifested will (*command*) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more others (*the ruled*) and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake." (p. 291) It can be paraphrased that the command of the ruler(s) influences the conduct of the ruled(s), who are evidently guided by, and who accept and obey the command of the ruler. Furthermore, the mutual relationship between the ruler(s) and ruled is a hierarchical relationship, in which the ruler(s) expect their command to be obeyed and the ruled have preconceived opinion that "the rulers and their commands constitute a legitimate order of authority." (p. 292)

The ruler can be interpreted as the position of the leader of the ruling party and/or the head of the state and/or head of the government. In *Politics as Vocation*, Weber underlines that the state has the right to use the coercive power in all legitimacy within the borders of the country. He explains it as follows:

"Of course, force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state -nobody says that- but force is a means specific to the state. Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one. [...] Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory. Note that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence." (Weber, Gerth, Wright

Mills, eds., 1946, p. 3-4)

Weber, then, points at three *rein* [pure] types of “legitimations of domination,” which are ‘traditional,’ ‘charismatic,’ and ‘legal’ domination [authority/leadership]. For him the traditional domination is “the authority of the ‘eternal yesterday,’ i.e. of the mores sanctified through the unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform. This is ‘traditional’ domination exercised by the patriarch and the patrimonial prince of yore.” (Weber, Gerth, Wright Mills, eds., 1946, p. 4) The traditional domination legacies of a country can have reflections on the present politics and these may echo even in the modern liberal states.

He defines the charismatic domination as follows: “There is the authority of the extraordinary and personal *gift of grace* (charisma), the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership.” According to Weber, this ‘charismatic’ domination can be exercised by the “political party leader” in modern states (Weber, Gerth, Wright Mills, eds., 1946, p. 4)

The charismatic domination of Weber points at a leader having “extraordinary quality,” which gives him/her “a unique, magical power.” (Bendix, 1960, p. 299) This includes an ability to influence the population and to make masses follow him willingly. He adds that the legitimate power of the charismatic domination or the charismatic leader of the ruling party should be recognized; he should be obeyed by his/her staff, by the administration and executive body in addition to the obedience of the population. Weber adds: “The powerholder must be able to count on the obedience of the staff members, officials, or whoever else they may be.” (Weber, Gerth, Wright Mills, eds., 1946, p. 5-6)

Weber clarifies the last pure type of domination saying: “Finally, there is rule by virtue of ‘legality,’ by virtue of the belief in the validity of a legal statute and the validity of ‘competence’ that is based on rationally created rules. This means an attitude of obedience in the fulfillment of statutory duties: the kind of rule exercised by the modern “servant of the state” and all those bearers of power, who resemble him in this regard.” (Weber, Dreijmaier, 2008, p. 157)

Regarding the legal domination, Turner (1996) says that “Weber wants to connect this type of authority with the rise of formal legalism and with the modern bureaucratic state.” (p. 357) Weber attaches significance to bureaucracy as it is one of the features of the modern state, saying: “The bureaucratic state order is especially important; in its most rational

development, it is precisely characteristic of the modern state.” (Weber, Gerth, Wright Mills, eds., 1946, p. 7) Turner underlines that “the legitimacy of the state rests on the belief that its legal domination is constituted by correct procedures.” (p. 357) Therefore, the legal domination derives its legitimacy from rules and legal procedures, which are believed to be correct. The ruled are expected to obey the laws that are enacted for their benefits. The components of the state are also shaped by rational legal procedures; the obligations of the legislation, execution and jurisdiction bodies as well as the missions of the head of the states and governments are assigned by the laws and the constitution. The elected statesmen and governments are expected to comply with these regulations and not to overextend their missions.

According to Weber, the most stable of these three types is the “legal-rational authority” (Turner, 1996, p. 358) because “Weber treats modern society as a rationally organized, bureaucratic and stable order of hierarchical relations.” (p. 360) Bendix (1960) underlines that for Weber, the legal and traditional domination are “permanent structures that provide for the everyday needs of the community” (p. 299) whereas the charismatic leadership “is the product of crisis and enthusiasm.” (p. 301) However Weber adds that these ‘pure’ types is “rarely found in reality” rather their “highly complex variants, transitions, and combinations” can exist. (Weber, Gerth, Wright Mills, eds., 1946, p. 5) To Bendix, “Weber’s three concepts of domination refer to archetypes of human experience. All of us have felt or witnessed the pervasive influence of an overpowering personality (charisma) or of a commanding father (tradition), and examples of such influences can be found in all historical situations.” (Bendix, 1960, p. 389)

It would have been ideal, if one of the ‘pure’ types of domination could be found; however as Weber says, it happens rarely in reality and the three types of domination could only be found in variations and combinations. It can be claimed that the current ruling understanding of the Turkish government includes the composition of these three authorities, classified by Weber. Especially, in the recent years, with the expansion of the authorities of the executive, the mixture of three types of domination in Weberian sense is observable. In terms of the charismatic authority, by then the PM and current President of Turkey, Erdoğan is assumed to fulfill the characteristics of such an authority, particularly by his followers; he is influential; he is believed to have God-given qualities and is followed by his voters without questioning, as evident in the election results. Regarding the traditional

authority, the President's discourse sounds like a parental interference because of his imperative statements. This paternalistic attitude is highly acceptable in a society in which the advices or commands of father, elder brother or any person hierarchically in an upper and respected position are followed. As having bureaucratic state order, the Republic of Turkey can be classified as legal-rational authority, yet the legality of some practices performed by various governments is questionable. In general, omitting its pure types, the "authority" is one of the main features of the Turkish community; people are "depended on" and are "in need of an authority." The community tends to "be unable to move without a leader because of their dependence on the authority." (Gökçe, 2004, p. 305) In the light of this sociological fact, the continuous belief in the president, by his voters, is justifiable, especially in the absence of a powerful opposition.

As Bendix (1960) raises, the condition for the presence of the authority is the belief: "For example, charismatic authority depends upon a belief in the sanctity or exemplary character of an individual person, but this person loses his authority if those subject to it stop believing in his extraordinary powers. Charismatic authority exists only as long as it 'proves' itself, and such 'proof' is either believed by the followers or rejected." (p. 418) He adds that any forms of domination (charismatic, traditional, legal-rational) can continue to exist as long as the belief in their legitimacy persists. (p. 431) Therefore, the head of the state and/or the government continues to hold his/its power, as long as the followers believe in the legitimate authority of the ruling. During the last ten days of the resistance, the authority achieved to empty the park from the protesters. Although the protests continued on streets along a descent, the government managed to control the occurrences through new strategies, which proved the continual belief in the governance. This fact confirmed that the support in the legitimate authority of the government and President Erdoğan persists in the population.

4.3.2. Third Ten Days of Resistance

In the light of the Weberian theoretical framework, the last part of the resistance will be elaborated in two parts: Protests and Strategies. The Dialogue subtitle, which was present in previous parts, could not be included as any attempt of dialogue between the actors was not observable.

Protests

The Taksim Solidarity Platform held a 9-hour meeting and other forums; as a result with the consent of the forum participants, decided for re-resistance in other words decided to continue the resistance, until their democratic demands are met. Kuğulu (Park) Initiative in Ankara announced supporting the decision of Taksim. The decision was also supported by the public with applause and slogans. In addition, Kılıçdaroğlu said that the decision would be respected, as it ought to be so in democracies. On the other hand, President Gül posted a tweet on his twitter account urging: “Everyone should go to their homes.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 164)

PM Erdoğan held the first of “Respect to National Will” meetings in Ankara that was attended by the AKP supporters and held in an election campaign atmosphere. It, however, aimed to gather people, who are against the Gezi Park protests. In the meeting, Erdoğan reminded that the second meeting would be held in Istanbul on 16 June and added: “We have meeting tomorrow. Either the protesters empty Taksim Square or our security forces know how to empty them out.” (Radikal, 15.06.2013)

The speech of Egemen Bağış, Minister for the EU Negotiations also gave the impression that the intervention would take place: “I am specifically calling on all our citizens, who have been giving support to these protests. They should return to their homes. Unfortunately, at this stage, the state will have to consider every individual there [Taksim] as members of terrorist organizations.” (Amnesty International, Gezi Report, p. 15)

AKP Deputy President Hüseyin Çelik underlined that it is the end of patience and state should perform, what it ought to do for the whole population. He said: “The government must maintain security of its public.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 166)

As reply to Erdoğan’s message, Taksim Solidarity repeated that they would continue the resistance. However, in the evening of 15 June, police started warning announcements to make people leave the park and at around 9 p.m., two hours after PM Erdoğan said that the ‘security forces would empty the park,’ the police officers entered in the park by force. Police used hundreds of pepper spray capsules, gas bombs, batons, plastic bullets and pressurized water targeting at unarmed civilians who were sitting in the park with their children. Police did not distinguish old people or children and emptied the park in 35 minutes with intensive intervention. Police also threw gas bombs and pressurized water in

Divan Hotel, where the wounded protesters took shelter in order to get treatment by voluntary doctors. After people were taken out the park, construction vehicles entered and demolished the tents, placards and stands and all the belongings of the protesters were put in garbage conveyors. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 165-6)

CHP Leader Kılıçdaroğlu criticized the intervention saying that it “is a crime against humanity and neither public and humanity nor history will forgive it.” (p. 166)

The brutal intervention and disproportionate use of force made people go out the streets once again for criticizing the power of the government. Thousands of people in Istanbul and Ankara protested the excessive force and riot police on the streets. Istanbul Body of Lawyers announced that thousands of lawyers would become voluntary lawyers of the arrested people. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 166)

The excessive intervention of the police continued all night long; despite gas bombs and pressured water, a group of people walked the Bosphorus Bridge from Anatolian to European side at 3 a.m. During the night, more than 300 wounded people hospitalized to state hospitals; numerous people were treated at infirmaries, close to protest areas, by voluntary doctors. However, voluntary doctors and nurses were arrested as well. (p. 167)

In the meantime, it was reported by the Amnesty International (2013) that the pressurized water included chemicals that caused an “immediate burning sensation” and reddening of the skin when it hit the people. (p. 19)

Berkin Elvan, a 14-year old boy, who went out to buy bread in Istanbul, was hit by a gas bomb capsule and hospitalized because of cerebral hemorrhage. In Ankara, Dilan Dursun was also hit by a gas bomb capsule and was treated in intensive care station. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 167)

Once again, the brutal interventions, use of extreme force and violence made people mobilize in support of the affected people across Turkey. Despite continuous interventions, thousands of people went out in all districts of Istanbul and tried to go to Taksim and thousands in many other cities gathered at squares in solidarity with the protesters. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 167) Another night was passed on the streets in Istanbul and in Ankara; the conflicts in Ankara continued until 4 a.m.

After Erdoğan said: “I gave the directions; Gezi Park was cleaned up,” the polarization of

the public increased; a group of 20-25 people, shouting “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan” slogan, attacked the CHP Istanbul building; they broke the door but they could not enter in and escaped when the CHP members came. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 168-9)

After emptying the park and Taksim square, the police started to guard the park and to control identity cards of people around the square. On 17 June, Labor Unions went on a one-day strike across Turkey; ten thousands of workers marched in Ankara and Izmir, and two different groups of workers in Istanbul marched to Taksim but they were stopped by the barricades of the police. (p. 170) In the following days, government started investigation for public officials, who joined the strike in order to support Gezi resistance. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 176)

The brutal police intervention was replied with peaceful strategies once again and the intelligence level of the protesters reached to the peak with the action of the artist Erdem Gündüz, known as “Standing Man.” He started the “quiet protest” method by just standing at Taksim square and looking at the Turkish flags and Atatürk poster hung in front of the AKM building. Standing Man started his standing protest at 6 p.m. on 17 June and completed at 2 a.m. The eight-hour standing was spread through social media and supported across Turkey by standing, only. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 172)

The peaceful as well as democratic way the protesters reply the violence of police was surprising. Kongar (in Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013) said that the resistance continued “not only peacefully but also in the line of democracy and human rights.” (p. 60) However, many people, who joined the standing man protest, were detained because of “resisting against police” without violence and without any movement. The passive resistance of standing man spread around the world via social media; activists stood in front of the Statue of Liberty as well as in many European countries, in Mexico and India. Standing man Erdem Gündüz said that he stood in order to “voice his pain” without saying a single word. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 172) Despite the fact that some standing men were detained, Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç said he liked the type of the protest but suggested shortening the action from eight hours to eight minutes; he said: “This is not a violent protest; a pleasant protest type. We will not condemn such an action.” (Aksam, 19.06.2013)

The intervention in Ankara continued until 4 a.m.; activists, who were sleeping at Kuğulu Park, were taken out and park was emptied. Police raid in some 130 addresses in Istanbul and Ankara and arrested 64 people in Istanbul and 26 in Ankara. Police also raid in Espark in Eskişehir, took the activists out, destroyed 350 tents and arrested 13 people.

In the evening, standing man protest started again; hundreds of people stood at Taksim square, looked at either AKM building or Republic Statue at the square and some read books while standing. In addition, Taksim Solidarity started forums of “Gezi Assemblies” that would be held every evening at other parks -as people were not allowed to enter in the Gezi Park- in order to discuss how a desired future should be. (Kongar, Küçükaya, 2013, pp. 172-174) While the forums continued, the Gezi Park Forum at Sarıyer Yeniköy Park was attacked by people having knives and choppers; many people were beaten and one person was hospitalized. (Kongar, Küçükaya, 2013, pp. 178-9)

Standing Man action was followed by leaving shoe action on 19 June; in this action people brought a few pairs of shoe and left them in the Taksim Square. The shoes symbolized the people, who died during the protests, and their joining in the Standing Men action.

Standing man versus standing man was also observed; eight people holding opposing views wore t-shirts read “standing man versus standing man” and stood faced to the standing men in the square. The eight counter standing men could stand for 45 minutes only and then left the square. During the standing man protests, some 30 people were detained just because they stood. Another action was held by a woman, who undressed herself and stood with her bikini at the Taksim square. Her way of protest was supported by some protesters, whereas some people reacted. (Kongar, Küçükaya, 2013, pp. 175, 177, 178)

Confederation of International Unions (ITUC) called on holding global demonstrations on 21-22 June in order to support Gezi resistance and to draw attention to the violation of freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly in Turkey. (Kongar, Küçükaya, 2013, p. 176)

Police held another twilight raid on 20 June; this time in Izmir. The protesters, who set up tents at Gündoğdu square, were emptied out the park with the water cannons and tens of protesters were arrested. It is said that the arrested protesters were forced to watch the “Respect to National Will” meeting of Erdoğan in Kazlıçeşme. CHP politician Sezgin

Tanrikulu described this method as the modern version of 12 September 1980 coup d'état detainment in which the arrested people had forced to learn the Turkish national anthem. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 177) In addition, 26 people, who were detained in Ankara, were investigated at the Coping with Terrorism Unit of Ankara Police. The questions asked to people under arrest included: "Which organization commanded you to occupy the prime ministry, the TBMM and ministry buildings?"; "What was your aim in going to the residence of the prime minister?"; "Did you get a command to overthrow the government and to put the government on the spot in the international platform through attending the protests?" (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 177)

Previously, it was reported that the students, who were under house arrest in Ankara, were threatened by the police in order not to attend any protests again. The police said that the students would be judged with terror crimes and "it will not be good for them to join protests again." (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 163)

DISK, KESK, Turkish Bars Association (TBB) Istanbul, Doctors' Chamber Istanbul, Forensic Specialists' Association, Chamber of Architects and Engineers (TMMOB), Turkish Doctors' Chamber and Taksim Solidarity established a legal watch group against the intervention in Gezi Park. The group announced that they would apply to the UN Committee Against Torture because of the intervention in the park. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 178-9)

The standing men action continued in Ankara; two people stood in front of the Güven Park monument and tens of people supported them. 20 women hung Turkish flag and Atatürk poster on a tree at Gedavat Park in Konya, held standing action and read books. Some of them tied their mouth with a black fabric band to represent the violation of freedom of expression and some closed one of their eyes with bandages to represent the people, who lost their eyes during the protests. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 180-1)

Taksim Solidarity announced that they would not give up on their demands and gains, and invited people to Taksim with gillyflowers on 22 June at 7 p.m. After the invitation, ten thousands of people marched to Taksim square to commemorate those who died during the protests. People placed the gillyflowers and held one minute respect standing. The names of

the deceased people were read and the crowd replied “here!” All roads leading to Taksim was blocked with barricades by the police and at 8:30 p.m. the intervention of the police started. Ten thousands of people were tried to be dispersed with gas bombs and water cannons and the operations continued even in the small streets in the neighborhood. Istanbul Governor Hüseyin Avni Mutlu said that the event was not placing gillyflowers only, and claimed that “it destroyed the public order and the car traffic was affected that was the reason of the intervention.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 183)

The strong intervention on people, who were commemorating the deceased ones in Istanbul, was protested across Turkey. People, who did not approve the severe intervention of police, protested in many cities; police intervened in Ankara and Izmir. The people were dispersed from the Taksim Square in the night but the conflicts continued all night long. While the operation continued, the Taksim Solidarity announced that they did not get a reply from the government to their demands; “moreover those who voice the demands are attacked and arrested. We will continue to shout our demands, despite all these pressures.” During the night of 22-23 June, at least 20 people wounded and 30 people were arrested in Istanbul. On 23 June, ten thousands protested in Kadıköy, Anatolian side of Istanbul. The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Organization (LGBT) and ten thousands of people also marched in Taksim. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 182-3; Everywheretaksim.net, 30.06.2013)

“Thinking Men” action was another method of non-violent protests; in Mersin, some people held the thinking men action around a pool, they put their hands under their chin and posed thinking for three hours (reference to ‘The Thinker’ sculpture of Auguste Rodin). The protesters said they invited everyone for thinking: “We invite them to think; the police, throwing gas bomb on public; attorney, arresting innocent people; prime minister, governing the country bad and business owners, who continue to air advertisement on the AKP-biased media channels.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 185)

“Falling Men” action or known as flash mob was held at Taksim square on 25 June, symbolizing the shooting and falling of Ethem Sarisülük. It aimed to protest the release of the police officer, who shot Sarisülük. Thousands of people joined the falling men action and lay on the floor for five minutes. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 189)

The criticisms of the international community were received from the beginning of the protests. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of the NATO, of which Turkey is a member, said: “We do not participate to the domestic policies of Turkey. We assume all alliance members of NATO would act according to basic democratic principles and would allow peaceful protests and freedom of political views’ expression.” (AA, 24.06.2013)

Obama, by then the President of the USA and PM Erdoğan talked on the phone, for about an hour. According to the announcement of the White House, two leaders underlined the “importance of non-violence, freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and importance of a free media.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 186)

Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjorn Jacgland met Prime Minister Erdoğan, Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu; during the meeting, they watched a video in which the violent actions of the protesters were shown. Jacgland said: “Others may show me a video on the extreme force of the police and use of pepper spray. As a matter of fact, the unacceptable amount of use of pepper spray was seen in this video. I am not a judge. What important is, police should act according to the European Court of Human Rights.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 188)

The ambassadors of the EU member countries expressed their worry on disrespecting freedom of press and on the attitude of the police against peaceful protesters. (Bianet, 24.07.2013)

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Interior Affairs reported that 2.5 million people actively attended the protests in 79 cities (of 81 cities), 4,900 people arrested since 31 May. (Amnesty International, Gezi Report, 2013, p. 56) Moreover, 4 thousand protesters and 600 police officers wounded; 58 public buildings, 14 political-party buildings, 68 police enforcement cameras, 337 shops, 90 public buses, 214 private cars, 240 police cars and 45 ambulances were damaged. In addition, 28 journalists were wounded, 22 were beaten and 18 journalists were arrested. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 183, 186)

Strategies

The authorities determined a new strategy to end the ongoing resistance especially after the

park was emptied out by the security forces. This strategy had direct effects on the health of the protesters. It was observed that the pressurized water shot from the water cannons included chemicals that cause skin irritation. The Amnesty International Report (2013) underlined that the people “hit by pressurized water suffered an immediate burning sensation that was accompanied by reddening of the skin that lasted for hours after the event.” (p.19)

Istanbul Doctors’ Chamber Secretary General Ali Cerkezoglu explained that the pressurized water used by the water cannons included chemicals that harm skins of people and cause severe reaction. He advised people to take their clothes out when they hit by the water. He added that this dose was used for the first time since the beginning of the incidents; “the previous chemicals in the water did not cause such a reaction, we do not know what that is; we are worried and upset.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 167-8)

Ironically, Istanbul Mayor Mutlu denied that the water included chemical but added that it “contained medication, only.” (Amnesty, Gezi Report, p.19) Moreover, the Interior Affairs Minister Idris Naim Şahin said, what the water contained, was “natural.” (p. 73) However, in the photographs reported by some news agencies, police was seen pouring OC (Oleum Capsicum, also known as pepper spray) from 10 liter barrel into the water cannon. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 168) A few days later, the Chemical Engineers’ Chamber announced that the gasses poured in water cannon were identified as “chemical weapons” according to Chemical Weapons Convention and should definitely not be used. (pp. 172-3)

Kongar (in Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013) provides information on the gasses that were used during the protests. There were two versions observed being used; OC and CS (2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile, also known as tear gas). These names were written on the capsules. The OC and CS can be used in spray form for close intervention, and in gas form to be fired from a distance, which also causes smoke. While the OC causes irritation in the eyes, tears, pain as well as temporary blindness, the CS, in addition to these, causes burning and irritation of the nose, mouth, throat and difficulty in breathing as well as irritation on the skin when it is used in the water. The unusual usage of these was experienced by the protesters. The officials poured the CS in the water of the cannons, which caused an extreme irritation on the skins of the people, who were hit by this water. According to Kongar, even doctors were bewildered by this incredible reaction caused by this chemical. (pp. 72-4) This strategy to disperse the masses seriously threatened the health of the

participants; whereas in Weberian sense it can be considered as monopolization of the *legitimate use of physical force* by the state.

The prime minister continued to draw the attention to the existence of terrorists among the protesters during the “Respect to National Will” meeting in Kazlıçeşme, Istanbul. The followers of the AKP, who attended the meeting, were spoiled with great convenience. They were taken to the meeting location in Kazlıçeşme free of charge by the hired public transportation buses and ferryboats. (Hürriyet, 19.06.2013) Whereas, it was known that the public transportation going to Taksim was either closed or not working properly in order to hinder people from joining the protests from the beginning of the resistance.

During his statements at the meeting, the PM described the protests as “violent action” and said these as minorities aimed at getting the majority; aimed to “dominate the nation.” He underlined that the state knew the “interest rate lobbies” hiding behind the Gezi Park in order to reach their “dirty” aims. He added: “We will not let those who are seeking another way [to come to the ruling] than the ballot box. We will never give opportunity to the robbers of national will. We will not let the gangs, terror and illegal organizations to destroy the serenity of the nation through vandalism and indecency.” (AKP, 16.06.2013)

Previously, Egemen Bağış, by then the minister for the EU negotiations had agreed with the prime minister that the problems should be solved in the elections saying: “There are elections in nine months; we will listen to the voice of the voters. If people think that this government should go, they should deal with this problem at the ballot box.” (Kongar, Küçükaya, 2013, p. 133) From the beginning of the protests, at several occasions, the prime minister and other ministers pointed at the elections saying that the “national will” was determined at the ballot box and the government was elected through legitimate elections. Recalling Weber saying that the state has the monopoly to exercise power and legitimate force. Erdoğan renounced the valid demands of the Gezi Park supporters and repeated once again that the legitimate way to criticize the policies of the government is the elections; if the opposing people want to change the governors it can be done through elections. He named the protesters as minorities that could not come to the ruling through legitimate ways and hinted at the attempt to seize political power through creating the uprising. According to Özbek (2013), the political reason of Erdoğan “seems to be stuck” within Weber’s frames, like “many other politician of the modern era”; “his political reason

was telling that he is the one acting in the democratic legitimacy and protesters were acting against.” He stresses that in this understanding of democracy, “the only measurement is the ballot box.” Özbek said that Erdoğan agreed that there was a “disruption in democracy” but for him this was not because of his “authoritarian attitudes.” He adds that “according to Erdoğan, the democratically elected prime minister is tried to be overthrown by non-democratic ways of some economic and political interest seekers.” (pp. 51-52) From his perspective, “Erdoğan had the misapprehension of thinking that democracy is holding elections on regular basis” in order to determine the rulers and of thinking that “political legitimacy is winning the popularity race” in the elections in every four years. Özbek adds that Erdoğan thought that “he has the democratic legitimacy” to decide on the Military Barracks project, as he was “elected by the votes of more than the half of the voters in Turkey.” (pp. 53-54)

PM Erdoğan also pursued a Weberian point of view regarding the methods that a state can use to disperse such uprisings. According to this, it was legitimate to use police force to end the unauthorized protests and people could criticize or protest the elected governments as long as the state lets them do so. Erdoğan’s words at his rally was an evidence of this approach: “I gave the directions; Gezi Park was cleaned up” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 168-9) Özbek (2013) explains the relationship of being powerful and using legitimate force in Weberian sense as follows: “One is powerful to the extent that he is capable of forcing others to act according to his will; the most effective and irresistible means used for this aim is violence or threat of violence; the state has the monopoly of using legal violence in modern societies.” (p. 17) As mentioned, it took only 35 minutes for the police to empty people from the Gezi Park; this fact and the above citation of PM Erdoğan raise the following question: why did the government or the prime minister wait for twenty days to clean up the park from the protesters or from illegal organizations if it could have been done in 35 minutes?

PM proved that the country is governed through the means of democracy and the state tolerated even unauthorized protests, resistance and occupation for twenty days; however, the limits of toleration were exceeded and therefore, the police emptied the park through intervention, which is a legitimate right of the state, in Weberian sense. Furthermore, the reason of waiting twenty days to end the resistance might be showing the existence of the “illegal groups” that aimed at overthrowing the legitimate government, empowered by the

majority. The government tolerated the protests of illegal groups, even if it knew the real goal that hid behind the environmental awareness of the “sincere” activists. This method of handling the protests reinforced the political power of the government in the perception of the population, through which the state gained more support.

Even though the park was cleaned up and the police started to block the entrance to the park, the protests continued on the streets, so did the police interventions. The overbearing manner of the PM continued to be observed until the protests ended completely. After the severe interventions of the police while emptying the park, the European Parliament (EP), once again, reacted against the disproportionate use of police force. Erdoğan replied the reaction of the EP saying: “I do not recognize such an EU parliament.” In addition, Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjorn Jagland urged Turkey to obey the article 52 of the European Convention on Human Rights regarding the freedom of peaceful assembly and the article on the disproportionate use of force. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 170-71)

On the contrary to the manner of Erdoğan, President Gül repeated with a negotiating manner that the protests reached the aim and the government and received the messages. He warned that if the protest continued, it would “lose its legitimacy.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 170-71)

The rightful demands of the protesters, the multitude of the attendees and the peaceful strategies of the resistance consolidated the legitimacy of the protests. It can be inferred that Gül acknowledged the legitimacy of the protesters until this stage and warned that from now on, it would lose legitimacy. Even though the protests continued, the protesters started to lose the power that they gained through their collective actions and their unification, especially after the park was emptied, despite their determined resistance. On the contrary to the acknowledgment of the President, PM Erdoğan continued with similar epithets while addressing to the protesters; he defined the activists as “betrayers inside, cooperators outside” Turkey and implied that the protests were manipulated by foreign actors. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 173) In the following days, another attribution to the protesters was described by Erdoğan during his meeting in Erzurum; he called the protesters as “sub-suppliers of enemies of Turkey” and invited them to stop being sub-suppliers. (p. 184)

Previous announcement of Erdoğan underlining that the police would be strengthened “in every way” and the “power of the police” would be increased (p. 173) triggered reaction. In

reply to the demand of Erdoğan to increase the power of the police, Kılıçdaroğlu cited phrase of Sheikh Edebali (influential Sufi Sheikh, helped developing state affairs in Ottoman Empire): “Let man flourish for the state to be flourished.” He added: “You are prime minister, you should make effort to enable people live; is it possible to strengthen the power [of the police] for the death of citizens?” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, p. 173)

MHP Leader Devlet Bahçeli also replied his demand and compared Erdoğan’s attitude with regimes of Saddam Hussein, Kaddafi and Bashar al-Assad saying that attacking innocent citizens and blaming them as being members of terrorist organizations was a copy of these regimes. (p. 174)

PM Erdoğan continued to praise the performance of the police at the graduation ceremony of the Police Academy. The Prime Minister said that the police “passed a democracy exam” and added that the police officers were acted “heroic” against the attitudes that could not be tolerated if those were happened in another country. He referenced the police of England, France and Germany that use pepper gas and pressurized water, which is a “natural right” of the police against such protests. (Bianet, 24.06.2013) His speech once again evidenced a Weberian approach of legitimate use of force by the state. As mentioned earlier, the “natural right” of the police caused the escalation of the protests from the beginning of the incidents. The extreme use of pepper spray on peaceful citizens was the first reason that mobilized people against this attitude. Another reason of mobilization on the first days was the burning of tents at the Gezi Park. On 20 June, Istanbul Büyükşehir Mayor Kadir Topbaş announced that four municipal officers, who burned the tents of the protesters at Gezi Park on the first days, were dismissed from their duties and contracts of three subcontractor officers were terminated. He provided reasons why the park was closed to both the protesters and to the public, Topbaş said that the works at Gezi Park continued with thousand personnel and added that 129 big trees would be planted. He further claimed that from now on the public would be asked “even when the place of a bus stop is to be changed.” (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 178-9)

Dialogue

As mentioned in the beginning of this part, the Dialogue subtitle, which was present in previous parts, could not be included as any attempt of dialogue between the actors was not observable. Nevertheless, it is worth raising an example of a dialogue that was established

with the public 90 years before the Gezi Park protests. In the year 1923, on 2 February, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk met the public in Izmir and at the beginning of the six hours and forty-five minutes meeting with the public; he said that the reason of holding the meeting was direct and in person conversations “fraternally” and “publicly.” He added: “I wish to hear your expression. Now, your answerer is neither the chairman of the TBMM [parliament], nor commander in chief. Solely, parliament member Mustafa Kemal. Your fellow citizen, Mustafa Kemal, who likes you. I am giving the word to you. I request you sincerely; ask what you want and what you want to learn from me with a great courage and freedom. I would do my best to try to satisfy you.” (Başbuğ, 2012, p. 315)

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Turkish Medical Association statistics showed that 8,038 people sustained injuries in 13 cities since the beginning. (Amnesty, Gezi Report, p. 57) Human Rights Association announced that 11 people lost their eyes, 100 people had head trauma and 150 thousand tear gas capsules were thrown at the protesters. It was reported that 294 children were arrested from 28 May to 25 June. On the 30th day of the protests, thousands of people were still at the Taksim Square. (Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013, pp. 188-9) The protests continued along a descent until 20 August 2013 (Amnesty, Gezi Report, pp. 57, 58) so did the excessive interventions. Although the 30 days of the resistance was aimed to be explored, the protests continued until the first week of September, 2013, according to the report of the security forces. The report stated that in total 5,532 protests were held in 80 cities (out of 81, except Bayburt) during 112 days; these protests were attended by almost 3 million 600 thousand people; 5,513 people were taken under arrest as part of the investigations, 189 of them were imprisoned; 4,329 people and 697 police officers were wounded. (Milliyet, 24.11.2013) Nine young people, namely Berkin Elvan (15), Ali Ismail Korkmaz (19), Ethem Sarisülük (26), Abdullah Cömert (22), Mehmet Ayvalıtaş (20), Ahmet Atakan (22), Medeni Yildirim (18), Hasan Ferit Gedik (21) and Commissar Mustafa Sari (27) died during the Gezi Park protests. (Cumhuriyet, 11.03.2014)

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At the end of the resistance, the government achieved to disperse the protesters and demanded the population to tell what they think about the governance at the ballot. For

some people, the only political duty of citizens is to vote in the elections. In the aftermath of the protests several elections were held and resulted in favor of PM Erdoğan and the AKP, as it will be discussed in the next chapter. These results would be evidences that the anti-government protests actually strengthened the government, hence the government attained to weaken the opposition and to consolidate its political power. The more influence a government or the leader of the ruling has, the more political power it/he has over the population. Judging from the results of the elections, PM Erdoğan and the AKP increased their influence on people and therefore consolidated their political powers. Their influence on people, verified by the elections, will be explored further in the next chapter with reference to the *hegemony* of Gramsci.

5. Post-Gezi Park Elections and Hegemonic Domination

It has been discussed that the protests, started as criticism against the policies of the government, turned into a Turkey-wide anti-government resistance. The protesters gained political power through their collective activity; nevertheless, this power started to decline with the new strategies of the government to end the protests. It was explored that the protesters aimed to realize their democratic demands, whereas the government clearly pointed at the ballot box as the only mechanism to change the ruling. With the institutions of the government, the resistance was achieved to be handled by the end of the 20th day and completely ended within months; with this the opposing views in the population became aware of the fact that they would not be able to accomplish their aims through resistance. The supporters of the government believed in the rhetoric of the President Erdoğan and the AKP officials and continued their support in the legitimacy of the ruling. They agreed with the government that some foreign powers tried to overthrow the elected and legitimate government through resistance. Although there were illegal organizations among the protesters, alleging all opposing people as members of terror groups was not reasonable for commonsense. However the supporters of the government believed in this strategy and increased their support in the government. In this regard, the question from where this power of the government comes could be answered simply as from the support -consent- of people that was proven by the elections, which resulted in favor of the AKP in the aftermath of the Gezi Park resistance.

In this sense, as discussed the Weberian approach of ruling was applicable, which says that it is legitimate to use force to end any unauthorized protests with the means of the state. Therefore, even a Turkey-wide resistance attended by masses could not achieve to question the legitimacy of the policies, implemented by the government. As it was the concluding argument of the previous chapter, the more influence a government or the leader of the ruling has, the more political power it/he has over the population. In this chapter, this argument would be proven with the results of the elections took place after the Gezi Park resistance. Further in the chapter, the influence of the ruling on the population will be epitomized with reference to the ideological *hegemony* of Gramsci. This last chapter aims to test the hypothesis: If the leader of the ruling party is influential, the dominant ideology in the population will gain more support.

5.1. Post-Gezi Park Elections

“...Such a government is the people’s government based upon national sovereignty; it is a Republic.” Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (2010, Nutuk, p. 299)

As discussed earlier, one of the most important measurements of politics in Turkey is the ballot. During the Occupy Gezi Resistance, the PM Erdoğan and other ministers repeated several times that the next elections would be deterministic for demonstrating the *national will* of the population. They underlined that if the majority of the population demands the resignation of the government, it can be possible through elections, only; the electorate decision would empower the government and legitimize the policies of the government. In this regard, the parliamentary, presidential elections and referendum results, took place after the Gezi Park resistance, will be evidence for two reasons. First, proving the argument that the elections shape the politics in Turkey, and secondly proving that the more influence a political party or the leader of the ruling party has on population, the more political power it/he would have through the support of the population, verified by the elections.

Turkey is a secular parliamentary representative democratic republic. The most important founding principle is: “Sovereignty belongs to the Nation without any reservation or condition.” (TBMM, Duties and Powers) The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (parliament), is the unicameral legislature, and “composed of five hundred and fifty (550) deputies directly elected from 81 provinces and 85 electoral districts in total.” (TBMM, Duties and Powers) The parliamentary elections are held every four years with the “system of proportional representation” and with the ten percent threshold. Individual candidates may run as independents. (TBMM, Parliamentary Elections, <https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/>) One party has to win more than 276 seats to “form a government alone.” (BBC, 02.11.2015)

12 June 2011 General Election

The last election took place before the Gezi Park protests should be included in order to provide a background on the past political behavior of the electorate. The parliamentary general election took place on 12 June 2011 resulted in favor of the AKP with the following percentages and the seats:

AKP: 49.83 percent; 327 seats;

CHP: 25.98 percent; 135 seats;

MHP: 13.01 percent; 53 seats;

Independents: 35 seats. (YSK, www.ysk.gov.tr, 2011a; 2011b)

As a result of winning almost 50 percent of the votes and the parliamentary majority, the AKP formed the government alone, with 327 parliament members and empowered by the population for a four-year term.

10 August 2014 Presidential Election

The president is elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term. The election of the president by popular vote -rather than being elected by the parliament- was approved in a Constitutional Referendum, which had taken place on 21 October 2007, by the “Yes” votes of the 68.95 percent of the electorate. (YSK, www.ysk.gov.tr, 2007)

The first election after the Gezi Park resistance was the presidential election that took place on 10 August 2014. As the Prime Minister Erdoğan hinted at during the protests, the *national will* of the population was determined by the election of the twelfth President of Turkey. As a result of the election that had a 74.13 percent turnout, the candidates took the following votes and percentages:

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (AKP): 21,000,143 votes; 51.79 percent;

Selahattin Demirtaş (HDP): 3,958,048 votes; 9.76 percent;

Ekmeleddin Mehmet Ihsanoğlu (joint candidate of the CHP and MHP): 15,587,720 votes; 38.44 percent. (YSK, www.ysk.gov.tr, 2014)

The leader of the AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan became the first directly elected President of Turkey to carry out the duty until the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, scheduled on 24 June 2018, which is a year and a half earlier than planned. (Hürriyet, 18.04.2018)

7 June 2015 General Election

The first general election that took place after the Gezi Park resistance was the 7 June 2015 parliamentary election. The results were declared as follows:

AKP: 40.87 percent; 258 seats;

CHP: 24.95 percent; 132 seats;

MHP: 16.29 percent; 80 seats;

HDP: 13.12 percent; 80 seats. (YSK, www.ysk.gov.tr, 07.06.2015a; 07.06.2015b)

The votes of the AKP decreased almost 9 percent comparing to 2011. The election produced a hung parliament; the AKP could not win the parliamentary majority to form the government alone and the negotiations failed to form a coalition. The parliament was dissolved and a new election was scheduled to take place on 1 November 2015. (IHA, 01.11.2015)

1 November 2015 General Election

After the hung parliament, the snap election took place on 1 November 2015 and the result was declared as follows:

AKP: 49.50 percent; 317 seats;

CHP: 25.32 percent; 134 seats;

MHP: 11.90 percent; 40 seats;

HDP: 10.76 percent; 59 seats;

Turnout: 85.23 percent. (YSK, www.ysk.gov.tr, 01.11.2015a; 01.11.2015b)

The AKP regained the parliamentary majority and formed the government alone, with 317 parliament members and was empowered by the population for a four-year term.

16 April 2017 Constitutional Referendum

The constitutional referendum took place on 16 April 2017, in order to approve 18 amendments to the constitution. One of the most controversial one among the proposed changes was the removal of the position of the prime minister and expansion of the roles of the president as head of the state as well as head of the government, i.e. executive presidency model. In the new system, which would take effect after the next parliamentary and presidential elections that are recently announced to be held together, on 24 June 2018 (Hürriyet, 18.04.2018), the “president will be able to appoint senior judges, declare a state of emergency, dissolve parliament and in some cases issue new laws by decree.”

The controversies continued after the referendum as the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK) declared with a “last-minute” decision that it would “accept ballots that had not been officially stamped unless they could be proven to be fraudulent.” (The Telegraph, 16.04.2017)

As a rule, the unstamped ballots are invalid; the ballots must be stamped before the voters

stamp their choice on it. The last-minute decision of the board to accept unstamped ballots triggered reaction and shaded suspicion on the close outcome of the referendum.

According to the official result declared by the YSK:

“Yes” won 25,157,463 votes; 51.41 percent;

“No” won 23,779,141 votes; 48.59 percent;

Turnout was 85.43 percent. (YSK, www.ysk.gov.tr, 2017)

The daily *Telegraph* said that the “opponents have warned the new system will send Turkey lurching towards dictatorship as it would concentrate unchecked power in the hands of Mr. Erdoğan.” (The Telegraph, 16.04.2017)

The narrow result of the referendum was challenged by the CHP, main opposition, upon the allegations of vote fraud. On 4 July 2017, leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu said that the CHP would apply to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) regarding the decision of the board. He underlined that “the referendum has become illegitimate due to the decision by the Supreme Election Board [YSK], which largely lost its legitimacy.” The ruling party AKP Spokesman Mahir Ünal underlined that the board’s decision was “final and clear” and he alleged the opposition for attempting to create a “legitimacy crisis.” (Hürriyet Daily News, 04.07.2017)

President Erdoğan also underlined that the decision of the YSK was “final” and could not be challenged by any other institution. He said that the issue “is neither within the authority of the Turkish Constitutional Court nor within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)” and added: “This issue is over.” (RT, 20.04.2017)

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Further details on the elections and referendum are redundant, as the outcomes in percentages serve to prove the argument. Moreover, as declared, the results are “final” and the issue “is over.” Despite the fact that the largest three cities of Turkey, namely Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir voted for “No” in the referendum, and despite the suspicions, the narrow victory of the “Yes” demonstrates the continuous support of the population. In Weberian vocabulary, the charismatic authority of the President Erdoğan proves that those subjected to his authority continue to believe in his ruling. More importantly, winning the elections is the consequence of his massive influence on the population and of the created *hegemony*.

5.2. Hegemonic Domination

Marxism could have been the theoretical approach of this chapter and overall the Gezi Park case, while the construction of a shopping mall serves the interests of the capitalist ideologies and so-called *bourgeoisie*. However, it should be more. In addition to the economic benefits of the project, the mall, having the architectural design of an Ottoman military barracks, planned to replace the Gezi Park, is a project having an ideological background. It is a strategy to rebuild an Ottoman architecture aiming to steal the “hearts and minds” of the followers of the ruling party and of the conservative perspective that support the ruling government. People, who are proud of the Ottoman Era, are captured by the government with the signal of rebuilding an Ottoman architecture. In the meantime, it aims to alter the cultural knowledge of the population. In this regard, the Gramscian approach is more applicable to prove that if the leader of the ruling party is influential, the ideological hegemony will gain more support in the population.

Although there are economic grounds that could be justified with the case study, it is crucial to build the argument upon ideological background. That is why; Gramscian perspective is preferred instead of the Marxist approach to ideology. While, regarding the theory of ideology, Gramsci “is the strongest candidate for having developed the ‘positive’ alternative approach in Marxism” (Barrett, 1991, p. 31) rather than “critical” approach to ideology. (p. 52) Because “Gramsci has shown us how capitalism is not just a system of production, but a whole form of social life.” (p. 56) As being differed from the Marxist approach of ideology, Gramsci presented the concept of “hegemony.” Barrett (1991) stresses that “classically Gramscian idea” defines ideology as a “terrain of struggle” (p. 53) and says: “Thus in order to see how Gramsci’s treatment of ideology meshes in with the tradition, we have to take it in conjunction with its companion term – hegemony.” (p. 54)

According to Fontana (1993), in “his formulation of the concept of hegemony,” Gramsci uses the “educator and educated” relationship that was used by Marx. (p. 105) Nevertheless, Ludwig (2009, in McNally, Schwarzmantel, eds.) underlines that Gramsci goes beyond Marx and “connects this theorem with the question of the specific role of the state.” (p. 98) The relationship of governor and governed is similar to the relationship of teacher and student. Fontana (1993) cites Gramsci saying: “the relation between teacher and student... (an) active relation of reciprocal interaction, (so that) every teacher is a student and every

student a teacher.” (p. 106) The governors should learn their target group so that they know how to get the approval -consent- of the population. In this sense, Gramsci asks, cited by Ludwig (2009, in McNally, Schwarzmantel, eds.): “how (...) educative pressure [will] be applied to single individuals so as to obtain their consent and their collaboration; turning necessity and coercion into ‘freedom.’” (p. 98) One of the central questions to be asked is how the governed do not detect while the new moral, cultural, or political knowledge is inflicted by the hegemon can be answered as “consent” instead of coercion. For Gramsci “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily an educational relationship.” (Fontana, 1993, p. 107) Likewise, the relationship between the governor and governed is an educational and a “hegemonic one.” Fontana adds: “It is hegemonic because it represents the diffusion of a conception of the world that posits a particular form of interaction between rulers and ruled, culture and politics.” (p. 110) So not only the rulers and ruled but also culture and politics have an interactive hegemonic relationship; politics affects culture and vice-versa.

According to McNally (2009, in McNally, Schwarzmantel, eds.), there might be different interpretations of the Gramscian hegemony and puts forward four different definitions that could be found in the *Prison Notebooks* of Gramsci. One of these definitions strengthens the argument: “...hegemony is frequently interpreted in a narrower sense and identified *solely* with the struggle for ideological ascendancy in civil society as Gramsci distinguishes between two major superstructural ‘levels’ ... ‘civil society,’ which corresponds to the function of ‘hegemony’ ... and that of ‘political society,’ which corresponds to the ‘direct domination’ or command exercised through the State and ‘juridical government.’ ” (p. 188) These Gramscian concepts should be handled in order to comprehend the theory of hegemony.

Buttigieg (in Francese, ed. 2009) underlines that Gramsci uses the term “state” to mean “government.” (p. 26) He adds that according to Gramsci, “state does not mean only the apparatus of government but also the ‘private’ apparatus of hegemony or civil society.” (p. 26) For Gramsci, state is the summation of the political and civil societies: “State= political society+civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion.” (Ludwig, 2009, in McNally, Schwarzmantel, eds., p. 95)

It could be inferred that the Gramscian hegemony is not limited to politics only because “Gramsci conceptualizes hegemony as political, cultural and social authority.” (Barrett, 1991, p. 56) In this regard, the political authority can also pose as cultural and social authority in the concept of hegemony and therefore both political and civil societies would be affected by this hegemony. Concerning this, it is crucial to ask how this hegemony gets support in the community. A straightforward answer would say that it could be possible through the willing approval of the population, i.e. consent of the governed. However recalling the approach of Foucault in which the rulers are rationally “regulating, controlling and shaping” the human conduct through their discourse; in other words, ruled are externally controlled with or without their conscience as they suppose they agree with the rulers as a result of their self-knowledge. Likewise, in Weberian sense, ‘domination’ [*Herrschaft*] of the ruler(s) and/or command of the ruler(s) influences the conduct of the ruled. Ruler(s) evidently expect their command to be obeyed and the ruled have preconceived opinion that “the rulers and their commands are the legitimate authority that should be obeyed.” (Bendix, 1960, p. 292)

Similarly, in Gramscian vocabulary, the hegemonic authority in civil and political societies aims at getting the consent of the ruled and this consent of the human conduct has already been rationally organized by the ideological hegemony in these spheres. These are constructed as part of the “project of the ruling bloc,” as Barrett (1991) stresses:

“The concept of hegemony is the organizing focus of Gramsci’s thought on politics and ideology and his distinctive usage has rendered it the hallmark of the Gramscian approach in general. Hegemony is best understood as ‘the organization of consent’ -the processes through which subordinated forms of consciousness are constructed without recourse to violence or coercion. The ruling bloc, according to Gramsci, operates not only in the political sphere but throughout the whole of society. Gramsci emphasized the ‘lower’ -less systematic- levels of consciousness and apprehension of the world, and in particular he was interested in the ways in which ‘popular’ knowledge and culture developed in such a way as to secure the participation of the masses in the project of the ruling bloc.” (p. 54)

It is clear that to Gramsci the “ruling bloc” is pursuing a project to influence the masses according to the interests and ideologies of the ruling. A project can be defined as a planned, organized, calculated, investigated, as well as systematically, and strategically pursued aim to accomplish. Therefore, this project should be shaped in accordance with the population of target. This would mean that a project of influencing the masses would include the

ideology of the ruling bloc, which would aim to impose this ideology on the targeted population as if it is the consent of the population. To begin with this project, the ruling must gain the trust of the population through its practices and rhetoric that would be appreciated by the targeted group. After winning their support -consent- the rhetoric may alter according to the interests and ideology of the ruling. The population, because of their faith in the ruling, would conceive of this new ideology and interests as the best interests for the whole. As Holub (1992) says: "What Gramsci proposes is rationally planned political and cultural intervention, rationally planned in the interest of the best possible results." (p. 105) This intervention with the consent of the ruled could be possible through the popular knowledge and culture, according to Gramsci.

Holub underlines that "cultural hegemony labors to maintain an order of privilege of which marginally or the 'other,' most often considered inferior from the point of view of hegemony, is both condition and effect." (p. 78) Therefore, since two or more cultures cannot be hegemonic concurrently, the hegemon presents its culture, or cultural preferences, shaped by his/their ideology, as superior, what it ought to be and aims to disseminate it. As the hegemon can be interpreted as a role model, whose words are followed and whose proposals get acknowledgment, the followers among the ruled accept it as shown by the hegemon and cheer for this cultural identity as it serves their perspectives, or merely because they believe everything the entrusted hegemon says is the perpetual truth. For instance, a cultural alteration serving for the conservative population may easily be accepted by the followers of the conservative government. As a result of this acceptance, the new cultural knowledge becomes dominant in the population. As discussed earlier, the new cultural knowledge regarding the national drink of the Turkish society would be a case in point. Although the alcoholic drink 'Rakı' is considered as the national drink by the whole Turkish population and also accepted as such by the conservative segments, presentation of Ayran as national drink of Turkey by the President Erdoğan got a speedy acceptance among the conservative people, envisaged as truth and acknowledged by the supporters of the ruling party. Many other examples in line with this can be provided. Such cultural interventions could not have been possible, if these were imposed by a person who has no influence on the population. Those, who approves and acknowledges the new culture, would transmit it to next generations and in time, this new cultural knowledge would become known as the pure culture of the society. As Fontana (1993) says: "A social group

or class can be said to assume a hegemonic role to the extent that it articulates and proliferates throughout society cultural and ideological belief systems whose teachings are accepted as universally valid by the general population.” (p. 140) Fortuna adds: “The social group or class that is capable of forming its own particular knowledge and value systems, and of transforming them into general and universally applicable conceptions of the world, is the group that exercises intellectual and moral leadership [hegemony].” (p. 140) Therefore, hegemony, as defined by Gramsci, means “intellectual and moral leadership (direzione) whose principal constituting elements are consent and persuasion.” (Fontana, 1993, p. 140)

In a similar way, Michael Barnett (2001, in Baylis, Smith eds.) quotes Weber saying: “We are cultural beings with the capacity and the will to take deliberate attitude toward the world and to lend it *significance*.” Barnett adds that actors give meaning to their activities through the “society or culture” not by their personal beliefs. He adds that these meanings “are fixed through politics” and fixed meanings “have consequences for the ability to determine the fates of people suggests an alternative way of thinking about power.” (p. 260) In this sense, meaning of Ayran in the community as *national drink* was fixed by the politics, not by the personal knowledge of the individuals. This construction could not have been possible if the ruling had no power and influence on the population.

The aim of the “ruling bloc” is to be influential not only in politics but also culturally and socially throughout the society with intellectual and moral leadership. The more influence it has, the more powerful it would be; this influence would elicit more support for the ruling party and for the works proposed by the government. This support on the ruling is validated by the elections that replenish the approval in every four years. The willing support of the population enables ruling with consent, without coercion; therefore power without force. As long as the ruling keeps the majority of the population in its hands -ratified by the elections- it could be in power in the long run and can implement its interests not only in political but also in economic, social and cultural fields of life. This power in the overall system of a country comes from the consent of the majority that upholds the elected government. It also produces an endless legitimacy to every action of the government or/and the leader of the ruling party; consequently the actions of the ruling do not require coercive means to influence the masses, which is the central question of Gramsci.

Barrett (1991) cites Stuart Hall et al. who underline that the main question of Gramsci is

“how can the state rule without coercion?” (pp. 54-55) They underline that Gramsci attracts attention to “non-coercive aspects of class rule” and this was because of the interest of Gramsci in the “relationship between the state and ‘civil society.’” (p. 55) Gramsci’s “interest in the relation between the state and civil society leads directly to his work on what has been called the socially ‘cementing’ functions of ideology and the ways in which consent is secured at a non-violent level.” (pp. 55-56)

Regarding the relationship between the state and civil society in the Turkish community, Dikici-Bilgin (2009, in McNally, Schwarzmantel, eds.) says that “the AKP also presents itself as the representative of the Turkish civil society.” According to the author, the civil society is a “sphere for hegemony,” in Gramscian sense and the civil society has influences in politics. (p. 117) In addition, she stresses why the AKP had dealt with the minority rights as part of its policies and questions whether the aim was the “reconciliation” or was it a “strategy to become hegemonic and win the consent of the minorities in the Gramscian sense.” (p. 116) Rather than putting pressure -through coercive means- on the minorities, posing consideration on the minority rights in rhetoric -not necessarily in practice- might be sufficient to get the consent of this segment.

Concerning the importance of being influential in civil and political societies through non-coercive means, Gramsci proposes two concepts of the struggle of gaining the hegemony in the society. Barrett (1991) argues these Gramscian concepts: “ ‘war of position’ is the battle for winning the political hegemony, the securing of consent, the struggle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people and not merely their transitory obedience or electoral support. ‘War of manoeuvre,’ by contrast, comes at a later stage: it is the seizing of state power, but (in direct opposition to the Leninist tradition of political thought) cannot take place except in a situation where hegemony has already been secured.” (p. 55)

‘War of position’ and ‘war of manoeuvre’ are occurrences following each other, in other words first the ‘war of position’ should be guaranteed by the rulers and when it is achieved, the government can seize power at the stage of ‘war of manoeuvre.’ The ruling of the AKP and President Erdoğan have succeeded the ‘war of position’; it won the political as well as the civil hegemony, it secured the consent of the supporting people and gained the ‘hearts and minds’ of its followers. This followed with the ‘war of manoeuvre’ i.e. seizing of state power with the consent of the ruled.

In this sense, the Gezi Park resistance can be comprehended as a protest against the project of the 'ruling bloc' and the 'war of manoeuvre' of the AKP; accordingly against the seizing of power, which was overwhelming for that particular ruled, who did not give consent to the rulers. This war of manoeuvre was becoming a *power over* the ruled, and was changing its character from hegemony to domination. In contrast, for Gramsci, hegemony is the modern form of power but this power differs from domination. (Ludwig, 2009, in McNally, Schwarzmantel, eds., p. 95) As Fontana (1993) says: "Diametrically opposed to rule through intellectual and moral leadership [hegemony] is rule through *dominio* (pure domination or coercion)." (p. 141)

During the Gezi Park resistance, the power of the government turned into domination through its institutions such as the security forces and sought to continue to seize state power through coercion. Holub (1992) says: "In his attempt to understand the mechanisms that lead either to the loss of or the maintenance of state power, Gramsci interrogates the ways in which the predominant class in power operates. What he finds is that the powers of the state, or rather the powers of the predominant class operating a specific state, extend far beyond the proper realm of the state with its major institutions: the army, police and law." (p. 103) As it is clearly stated, in times of the loss of state power, the state, as the predominant power extends its authority and refers to its institutions, like the police, in order to reinforce its power. This reminds the approach of Arendt, who underlines that applying force to regain power, would decrease the political power of the ruling. However, in the presence of the hegemony, this attempt gets a 'spontaneous' consent by the supporters. As Holub (1992) underlines: "Most accounts appear to regard hegemony as predominant power that manages to assure 'spontaneous' consent to its dominant operations precisely because domination consists not only of institutions, traditions, coerced ideas, beliefs, and ideologies, but also practices that involve the most minute operations and expectations of everyday life." (pp. 103-4)

In this regard, the ideological strategy of the government to convince the population that the Gezi Park protesters were members of illegal organizations and/or the resistance was manipulated by foreign countries -which, as claimed, tried to stop the ascending power of Turkey through this uprising- prompted a 'spontaneous' consent by the half of the population -according to the estimation of the PM-. Likewise, the "Respect to National Will" rallies, held by the PM during the most intense days of the Gezi Park protests, can be

read as an ideological practice, in addition to being a strategy to turn the protests in his favor. Holding such meetings was a strategy to show the continuous consent of the population, which proceeds to legitimate the operations of the AKP government and to pursue the same ideology. Moreover, addressing the population from the podium can be regarded as a direct communication with the targeted group, although its primary aim might be sending messages and showing off the multitude of followers. The people can be flattered with the gathering of the PM, who attaches attention to the public and addresses them in person. The messages in the speeches of the PM can be comprehended by his followers as ‘we think so’ and therefore, his ideologies can become the ideology of that group, or of masses. This can be detected as an evidence of exercising constant control over the population and as influencing the public opinion through rhetorical strategy. In this sense, every honorific attribution of the PM towards the Gezi Park protesters (such as *chapulcus*, marginal, vandals, illegals) can be perceived as part of his strategy of establishing the ideological hegemony through degrading those, who do not uphold his position. As Gramsci says: “To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity, which is ‘psychological’; they ‘organize’ human masses, they form the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.” (Gramsci, Forgacs, ed., 2000, p. 199) Therefore, the hegemon aims to organize and persuade the human masses according to their ideological preferences and to be acknowledged by the general population as if that particular ideology is common for the whole. While, the aim of the hegemon is “not only to create a particular way of life and a particular conception of the world, but also to translate the interests and values of a specific social group into general, ‘common’ values and interests.” (Fontana, 1993, pp. 140-1) Hegemon aims at getting the consent of the majority because their acknowledgment of the hegemony would have reflections on their attitudes, who would pose as if their ideological point of view is the mainstream ideology in the population and is also the one, pursued by the hegemon. However, as discussed, the ideological hegemony has already been set up by the hegemon deliberately for being influential.

There are many means that the rulers can derive benefit from while establishing the hegemony. According to Gramsci, the press is “one of the most dynamic parts of the ideological structure.” (Holub, 1992, p. 104) As discussed in the previous chapters, the biased manner of the mainstream media was proven several times during the Gezi Park

protests. Recalling one of these as a case in point: in a speech, the prime minister said “we could die for democratic demands,” which was published as the headline of six different dailies and sub-headline of one daily as if it was a concurrence. The government first created the ground to keep the media mute, and then used it in its favor, as means to transmit the ideological preference, which persuaded the public opinion that the demands of the protesters were undemocratic and furthermore they were members of illegal organizations. In this regard, the role of the media cannot be underestimated while it sped up the acknowledgment of the ideology of the hegemon.

Regarding other influential tools of the “ideological structure,” Holub (1992) adds: “Everything which influences or is able to influence public opinion, directly or indirectly, belongs to it: libraries, schools, associations, clubs, even architecture, and the layout and names of the streets.” (p. 104) In this regard, while creating an ideological hegemony, architecture could also be used as means to accomplish the aim. In addition to being a strategy to alter the cultural knowledge of the population, the construction of the Ottoman Military Barracks at Taksim square is part of the aim to create ideological hegemony. As Kongar (in Kongar, Küçükkaya, 2013) says: “Political power that has ideological claims, wants to attribute their claims to the history through building their own monuments at the squares of Istanbul.” (p. 13) It can be claimed that the Gezi Park resistance, in general, was against these changes in the cultural knowledge and against the creation of ideological hegemony. The resistance was also a criticism against the silence of the overall population - while these changes were inflicted and hegemony was created- because sometimes silence can imply consent, despite the presence of people, who do not approve but could not find a sphere to express their opinion collectively. Disregarding the aftermath, the “Gezi spirit” (Özbank, 2013, p. 27) would be recalled as one of the most significant social collective actions in the history of Turkey. After all, the facts of the suppression of the evolved resistance and the election results prove the persisting ideological hegemony of the AKP ruling.

To sum up the theory and its relevance for the case study, it is clear that the Gramscian hegemony is an influential authority in political and cultural spheres, and a legitimate way of governance through the consent of the population or other interest groups including the civil society with commonsensical norms and ideas. As discussed, Gramsci treats hegemony as a positive concept and differentiates hegemony from domination on the ground that

hegemony is kept through consent; whereas domination through coercion. However, as Lears (1985) says: "...we need first to recognize that the concept of hegemony has little meaning unless paired with the notion of domination." (p. 568)

In the case of the Gezi Park protests, as explored, both hegemony and domination are observable concurrently. Hegemony as perceived by the supporters of the ruling can be positive and can be defined as consent of people; whereas domination over the opposing people can be coercive. It can be claimed that the coercion is hid behind the mask of the consent and there exists an acute possibility of showing its face, when the hegemony is in danger. Therefore, the domination could be interpreted as the subsidiary part of the hegemony, which could be called as hegemonic domination; that was experienced during the Gezi Park protests. In reference to President Erdoğan's attribution to "fifty percent" as followers of the AKP, the hegemony of half of the population dominates over the other half; for the whole population, this can only be named as hegemonic domination.

6. Conclusion

The Occupy Gezi Park resistance remains significant as being the first mass collective social action, challenging the political power of the AKP government by the population that has been disturbed by restricting policies of the ruling. After Gezi Park, very important political occurrences were witnessed and challenged the government in the recent history - such as the coup attempt in July 2016. However, these are not included in this study, as these should be researched separately. The thesis aimed to conduct the case study of Gezi Park resistance to explore the consequences of the anti-government protests on the political power of the government and aimed to discuss the research question: “How do the anti-government protests affect the political power of the Turkish government?” To accomplish this aim, the thesis started with explaining the pre-Gezi Park atmosphere, during which small scale assemblies against controversial policies of the government were observable. It followed with providing data on the beginning of the protests and statistical data on the protesters as well as on the motivation of the mass mobilization. The thirty days of the protests were divided into three main parts, in accordance with the changing dynamic of the incidents.

The thesis employed different theoretical frameworks in order to analyze the thirty days of the protests in detail and to demonstrate the changing temperament of the case. In this regard, the discourse of Foucault on *governmentality* and *power* expedites to comprehend the occurrences in the first ten days. The protests enabled people to question and criticize the overwhelming *power over* the citizens, exercised through the institutions of the state. The environmental awareness motivation of the protests turned into an anti-government stance as a result of the extreme usage of pepper spray and unjust treatment towards the peaceful protesters. The disproportionate police force motivated and mobilized masses for an unprecedented resistance across Turkey that challenged the political power of the AKP government. The democratic and peaceful strategies of the protesters -such as park forums, political humor and intelligent actions like Standing Man- won recognition of the segments that have been critical towards the ruling. These strategies encouraged people, sharing the same perspectives, to join the resistance and protesters gained power through their collective action at the public sphere. At this stage, Arendt’s relationship between *power* and *violence* contributed in the discussion. With Arendt’s *On Violence*, the thesis tried to prove that the attempt to suppress the protests through intensifying violence, would mobilize more

people for solidarity and this unification would decrease the power of the government over the citizens. Nevertheless, despite the collective action of the opposing people, the strategies of the government attained to control the protests. This fact refuted the first hypothesis: “If opposing views form collective action, the power of the government will be decreased.” On the contrary, the government weakened the opposition and achieved to break the determined manner of the protesters after the evacuation of the park. The strategies of the government - such as the excessive police force, biased media and the rhetoric to discredit the protests- achieved to weaken the protesters and additionally, to strengthen the AKP followers’ belief in the ruling. The supporters of the ruling were convinced that the government was exercising the right policies through the means of the state. In Weberian sense, the state has the right to use *legitimate physical force* in order to end an unauthorized protest. From the perspective of the government and its followers, using force was legitimate; however, from the perspective of the protesters, this power was coercive. In addition, according to the *power* definition of Weber, one is powerful to the extent that he is able to force others to act according to his will, despite resistance. This produces evidence that the government and leader of the ruling party were powerful; despite resistance, they were able to make people follow their ideologies, presented by the rhetoric of the president. In this regard, the strategy to degrade the protesters -such as illegal groups tried to overthrow the legitimate government or interest rate lobbies sought economic outcomes- won recognition among the AKP supporters. In Weberian vocabulary, the authority of President Erdoğan and the government prove legitimacy as long as those subjected to their authority continue to believe in them. The “Respect to National Will” rallies of Erdoğan and the elections in the aftermath construed the continual belief in the government and hence the AKP maintained its political power. This argument helped to prove the second hypothesis: “If the government weakens the opposition, it will consolidate its political power.” It can be claimed that the protesters -and people holding opposing views in the community- received a message at the end of the resistance: “any collective, motivated and highly mobilized protest/resistance in the future would not bring any outcomes.” Disregarding the individual criticisms and small scale assemblies, a determined opposing resistance -like the Gezi Park- has not been observable in the aftermath, in spite of the fact that several controversial policies disturbing the opposing citizens were implemented -such as cutting millions of trees for the constructions of the Bosphorus Bridge and of the new airport in Istanbul. The

negative experiences of the anti-government protests discouraged the Turkish population to hold such protests. The AKP government's response to the Gezi Park exemplifies their manner and possible strategies in handling an anti-government protest, if any similar protests ever happen in the future. The citizens, opposing the AKP ruling, could not translate their aim into votes, yet, and they were convinced that the ruling party could be changed through elections, only.

During and after the resistance, the governmental authorities repeated at several occasions that the population should tell what they think about the governance at the ballot. It means that the legitimate way to criticize the government is the elections; decision of the electorate empowers the government and legitimizes the policies of the government. In the aftermath of Gezi Park, several elections took place and resulted in favor of the AKP and its leader Erdoğan. Even the 7 June 2015 election -first general election after the Gezi Park- could not change the government; although, the AKP could not win the parliamentary majority and could not form a coalition, it regained the parliamentary majority in the snap election and formed the government alone, in November 2015. These results verified that the anti-government protests actually improved the political power of the ruling, hence the government attained to weaken the opposition. The more influence a government or the leader of the ruling has, the more political power it/he has over the population. Judging from the results of the elections, President Erdoğan and the AKP consolidated their political powers, reassured and restored trust in the governance as well as increased their influence on people. In this regard, the power of the government comes from the consent of the people that was proven by the elections. One can argue that the AKP government and President Erdoğan use coercive measures and intimidation to govern and they are able to maintain political power only under the state of emergency -which was declared after the coup attempt in July 2016 and still remains in effect. Even though this argument could be justified by a different research; currently, it does not change the fact that the AKP continues ruling and neither the opposition nor people are able to question. When questioned, the government evidences the last election and the *national will* that empowered them with 49.5 percent of votes and additionally, points at the upcoming elections as the only way to change the ruling.

The electoral support of the population was a result of the acknowledgment of the presented ideology of the AKP. The massive influence of the ruling on the population is epitomized

with reference to the *hegemony* of Gramsci in order to prove the last hypotheses: “If the leader of the ruling party is influential, the dominant ideology in the population will gain more support.” In Gramscian vocabulary, the hegemonic authority in the society aims to get the consent of the ruled, however, this consent of the human being has already been rationally constructed by the ruling. The ruling does not require coercion as the citizens decide to adopt the dominant ideology through the influence of the hegemon. This could not have been possible, if the leader of the ruling had no influence on people. Moreover, the sociological fact explains the continual support in the government; Turkish community needs a leader to follow and an ideology to pursue. This fact was well utilized by the AKP ruling. In addition, President Erdoğan achieves to keep the dominant ideology alive through his campaigns and his rhetoric, i.e., well-chosen, conscious, deliberate wording. The population that believes in his rhetoric continues to empower his ruling; the absence of a powerful opposition leader plays into the hands of the AKP. As evident in the election results, followers of the dominant ideology continued to empower the ruling party.

The shopping mall project could get the acceptance of the followers of the government through having an ideological background. The Ottoman Military Barracks was architecturally serving to accomplish this aim, just as Gramsci says; architecture may serve as means to create the hegemony -the name of the third Bosphorus Bridge construes a second example out of plenty. The public was convinced that, what would be built up was the barracks in the foreground instead of the mall, seeking economic outcomes. In addition, the reconstruction of the barracks at the heart of Istanbul would have been attributed to the AKP ruling and remained in the history as a symbol of its ideology. The followers of the AKP governance perceived it, as it was presented by the hegemony; they thought that the Gezi Park protests were actually against the barracks. On the contrary, the protests were against the construction of a mall, regardless of its architectural design, and against the demolition of one of the last green public spheres in the neighborhood. The main concern was the unnecessary of another mall, whereas the created perception among the followers of the ruling was, as if the protests were opposing to the barracks. This perception was attained through the dominant ideology in the community, which had been shaped by the government and adopted by the public; hence resulted in more support in the hegemony. During the Gezi Park resistance both hegemony and domination are concurrently observable. People, who are penetrated by the hegemon, perceive a positive hegemony,

whereas some segments of the population, which do not give consent to the practices of the hegemon, feel intimidation and discern it as domination. For the whole population, this could be named as hegemonic domination.

Since Gezi Park resistance, many other political occurrences have been experienced in Turkey and resulted in favor the AKP government, until now. Although the Gezi Park resistance was a tremendous unified posture against the increasing realm of political power, it not only strengthened the AKP government but also increased support for the ideological hegemony, which would presumably continue to produce the amount of consent required to the practices of the ruling, until the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections -to be held on 24 June 2018. President Erdoğan announced that the snap elections are to be held a year and a half earlier than planned; it can be read as he is starting to loose political power. It can be claimed that firstly, he wants to regain his descending power, through being reelected as president, and secondly, he, immediately, wants to use the rights that are granted by the presidential system, which was accepted by the controversial referendum, in 2017, and to take effect after the elections. Another possibility might be that he wants the elections to be held within the powers, granted by the state of emergency, which has been prolonged for the seventh time. With the current state of emergency, the AKP government and President Erdoğan enjoy hegemony and pose, as if they have overcome the political challenges, started with the Gezi Park protests. However, it would be witnessed in the near future, whether the reflections of these challenges and upcoming elections would decrease the political power of their ruling.

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