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„The Problematic of Implementing a Social Mixing Policy
in the Process of an Urban Restructuring in a
Marginalized Urban Neighbourhood and its Impact on
Urban Governance - A Case Study of the Creative
Destruction of La Duchère“

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Vienna, 12.04.2018

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Index of abbreviations

ANRU: Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine

CDV: Contrat de Ville

CIV: Comité Interministériel des Villes

CNDSQ: Commission Nationale du Développement Social des Quartiers

DIV: Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville

DSQ: Développement Social des Quartiers

FSU: Fédération Syndicale Unitaire

FAS: Fonds d'Action Sociale pour les travailleurs musulmans d'Algérie en métropole et pour leur famille

FLN: Front de Libération Nationale

FN: Front National

FMA: Français Musulmans originaires d'Algérie

GPV: Grand Projet de la Ville

GTI: Groupe de Travail Inter-quartier

HLM: Habitation à Loyer Modéré

LOF: Loi d'Orientation Foncière

LOV-Law: Loi d'Orientation pour la Ville

NPRU: Nouveau Programme de Renouvellement Urbain (former ANRU)

OPAC: Office Public d'Aménagement et de Construction

PLH: Plan Local de l'habitat

PLU: Plan Local d'Urbanisme

QP: Quartier Prioritaire

SERL: Société d'Équipement du Rhône et de Lyon

SRU- Law: Loi relative à la Solidarité et aux Renouvellements Urbains

ZAC: Zone d'Aménagement Concerté

ZFU: Zone Franche Urbaine

ZUP: Zone à Urbaniser en Priorité

ZUS: Zone Urbaine Sensible

Introduction

Is violence coming back into the intimate social relations where “civilisation” had long been maintained as a modern society’s organizing principle? Is the ongoing dis-embedding of social relations within globalized neoliberalism producing “hyper-ghettos” for a penalized “underclass”?

These were the first questions I had in mind after an admittedly short but intensive reading of Zygmunt Bauman’s thought on “liquid modernity” (Bauman 1996, Bauman 2000, Bauman 2001b) and a re-establishing intimate form of violence at the heart of post-modern social formation. It is here that a long journey started; a journey that became my subject of research. It led me to search for answers, not through philosophical deliberation, but rather through the empirical domain of that social world of which Bauman’s theory is inspired. As I am not educated as an economist, historian, human geographer or sociologist, it was clear that for me this question had to be confronted in line with my training: In an ethnographic way. Hence, I was to work with the real people, within their real places and in their time.

Starting from a theoretical investigation into liquid modernity my fieldwork was carried out as an Extended Case Method (ECM) as developed by Michael Burawoy (Burawoy et al. 1991; Burawoy 2009; 1998) . The ECM is about theory testing and theory reconstructing by using ethnography as a method. According to the ECM, every empirical case functions as an abnormal case that shall help to refine and empirically enrich the initial theory. In the ECM, the general is extracted from the unique whereas the unique is granted its own relevance in terms of contingent local processes. The casing was done -in accordance with the ECM- by what, in my view, is the key hypothesis of a liquid modernity: Ongoing marketization and acceleration based on new technologies lead to insecure forms of social existence. They reshape social relations based on “solid” institutional structuring like nationality and class, reorienting individual life to be more mobile, consumerist, episodic. The individual behaves as an autonomist and self-reflexive agent towards the socially produced problems that he/she confronts. This accelerated condition of social insecurities articulates in new “liquid” social formations with strong tendencies towards polarisation and othering.

My research was carried out using techniques appropriate to ethnography that uses participant observation as its primary method. The fieldwork, understood as a “rolling revisit” (Burawoy 2003) was carried out from May 2015 until the mid-summer and was followed by another set

of revisits from April until May 2016. Expert- and narrative-interviews were carried out over that time.

Placed on Lyons 3rd and long forgotten hill, la Duchère is located in the 9th *arrondissement* and could be described as an eruptive quartier that was constructed quickly and haphazardly between 1956 and 1977. Result of an urbanist experiment of the 50's „an administrative ordering of nature and society... “(Scott 1998: 88) high modernism seems an appropriate term for this aspiration. It was executed on the bases of the Charter of Athens (CIAM) or what has merged into the *Zeitgeist*; the greatest part derived from the visions of two *lyonnais* urbanists F.R. Cottin and G. Grimal.

The topographical gesture of the terrain was underlined by two parallel walls of apartments, 100's, most of them (80%) social housing, that marked the west end of Lyon populated by 20.000 in 1968. In the middle of the horizontal lines, a monumental skyscraper containing 26 floors of private property was set up next to an American styled shopping mall both marking the centre of the overall project. The socio-economic constitution – most of all working class (Halitim 1995) – diversified with the arrivals of the repatriated North Africans in 1962 into a complex ethnicity as the anti-colonial struggle in Algeria and North Africa in general led to waves of migration into France and into la Duchère. After the “glorious age” (*Les Trente Glorieuses*) followed a continuous pauperization; from the mid 1970's onwards a general “profitability crises” (Clévenot et al. 2010) emerged in France. This is what -in the tradition of Gramsci, can be called an “organic crises” (Simon 1991: 42) of capitalism that led to a loss of hegemony, social conflicts between classes and to the moving out of wealthier parts of the population from the *banlieue* with high quantities of social housing (see Hargreaves, 2007 [1995]). By the late 1970s, this process created volatile conditions that alerted fractions within the state apparatus. Lyon's *banlieues* became especially well known in the summer of 1981 when urban uprising led to the institutionalization of the *banlieue* problem (Fourcaut 1999). From that time onwards, the people living in the *banlieues*, that were opened towards an immigrant working class by the mid 1970's, became what Zygmunt Bauman called the “ethnique strangers” (Bauman 2001a: 103) . This is the outcome of a continual ascription that mutually produce ‘ethnization’ of identity and communal closure (see Hargreaves, 1996: 212; Lapeyronnie, 2005). This henceforth marks the beginning of the great advancements of the extreme right Front National that galvanizes an ethnic-nationalist discourse against a visibilized Muslim minority and helps to shift the whole political agenda away from the political economy of capitalism towards immigration, “ghettos” and “ethnic-communitarianism”.

By 1986, under pressure from local associations, the city Lyon had classified the quartier of La Duchère as a *géographie prioritaire de la politique de la ville*. (Rojon, 2014: 27) . A continuous process of national and local political investigations and different revitalization strategies led to a massive demolition-reconstruction as part of a social diversification approach in the early 2000's. Decades later, the state has been trying to reduce *banlieue* related conflicts. This marks a radical change in the urbanist vision that is continuously realized under several banners: *démolition-reconstruction*, *développement durable* and most importantly -at least for my research- *mixité sociale*, was taken place by the early 2000 within the “sensible urban areas” (*zones urbaines sensibles*) delineated under the first Chirac years. La Duchère is classified as such a *zone* and is affected by that (almost) tabula-rasa-approach that came with the Borloo-law in 2003. Along the project, La Duchère become part of Lyons defined ‘dangerous urban areas’ that officially rank as *Zone Sécurité Prioritaire* (ZSP). The neighbourhood of La Duchère might not be considered the “worst” by measure of sensationalized violent crime, but it is a lighthouse project and manifestations of French urban policy.

Officially the new town-planning utopia is a space organized by the principle of mixing: tenure mix, social mix, functional mix; an urban neighbourhood as a statistical average of a set of statistically relevant categories. This urban policy and the state interventionism that followed was characterized as the return of the republic (Kirsbaum 2015). But by the developed regionalized urban governance models on the ground this return leads to a complex interlacing of community redevelopment schemes and anti-multiculturalist state policy that produce a corporatist local democracy/participation model. In this contingent constellation, civil society becomes directly involved with urban policy-making and thus, urban politics. The project of urban renewal is the bases for this institutional reordering that took another leap by the Lamy-law of 2014. I had to reintroduce Gramsci’s concept of civil society, hegemony or hegemonic project to access an arena of struggle and understand transformations and innovation in urban governance taking place in the name of *mixité sociale*.

I started with Bauman’s (Bauman: 2000) liquid modernity and confronted it. After the explorative phase of my research was over, I found that Bauman’s theory lacks an understanding of how liquid modernity is stabilized and how collective forms of agency can build up and interact with each other without falling for an overly voluntarist-instrumentalist or structural-functionalist point of view. Bauman (2001) in accordance with Loic Wacquant assumes that disciplinary power lives on what he calls the hyper ghetto of the new urban poor, but I found that *mixité sociale* is exactly the opposite: It is a regime of disorganizing and

scattering out the dangerous classes by -at the same time- reorganizing by a selective participation scheme, the urban institutional set up on the local level.

To my understanding social crises are tackled by socio-spatial deconstruction and hegemony - by means of a local democracy that operates within urban governance. A theory of “Liquid modernity” must include an explanation of how society can be maintained while it is constantly deconstructed by marketization, and how liquidizing modernity produces its own solids.

1. Methodology, methods and theoretical point of departure

1.1 Theoretical point of departure

Bauman is said to be a key thinker within sociology and above all within the modernity and postmodernity debate but also regarding identity, consumerism or community (see Smith, 1999; Blackshaw: 2005, Jacobson et al 2008). From the mid 1990's onwards he became widely debated with a row of publication centring on his way of writing and elaborating on sociological theory (Jacobson, 2008 :1). Influenced by Antonio Gramsci, Albert Camus, Claude Lévi Strauss, Cornelius Castoriadis, Emanuel Levinas, Georg Simmel several authors of the Frankfurt School, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Michel Foucault, Richard Sennett and Sigmund Freud he wrote a considerable amount of books throughout and after his academic career (see Bauman, 2008: 233; Smith, 1999: 27, 29; Beilharz, 2007:109). Over the years, Marxism took a back seat, on the contrary to the works of Michel Foucault or Emanuel Levinas and Richard Sennett.¹ Most importantly his life experience is to be seen as the main source of his intellectual farsightedness as a communist, antifascist soldier, Jew, refugee, Marxist dissident.

From the enormous amount of literature of and about Bauman I focused on the beginning of a “new” period in his writing called “post-postmodernity work” (Tester 2004: 159). Subsequently I chose three books: “Life in Fragments” (1996), “Liquid Modernity” (2000) and “Community” (2001).

My reading of Bauman's post-postmodernity work takes three critical concepts as a point of departure: “life-politics”, “liquid modernity” and “ambivalence”.

Ambiguity is developed throughout his academic work and was my entry point into Bauman's oeuvre. For me, his concept of ambivalence stands in continuity with a critique of modern rationality such as positivism and universalism (see Smith 1999: 31).

Ambivalence stands for the creature of modernity as an irresistible tension that must be resolved in an enterprise of ordering to achieve regularity (Smiths 1999 :44). This ordering can even

¹ His Marxist interest was the early Marx of alienation and class, not so much the later political economist.

appear as being beyond moral judgement or pure of human intuition. Bauman (1996) calls this separation from morality “adiaphorization”.²

Ambivalence demands for an answer and it is an intense space of cultural activity. Culture in his sense is structuration not by the signs “nor language, but repertoire rules.” (Beilharz 2007: 121) . It is the “praxis” of reducing the possible choices and combination of the achieved repertoire of tools and language to such a degree that regularity and thus structure as “structuring” comes into existence.

Beilharz (ibid) illustrates this in how Bauman elaborates on the ambivalent in persona, the stranger. The reaction to the strange or stranger is – Bauman is borrowing from Lévi-Strauss, either a mode of assimilation and normalization or concentration and expulsion (Beilharz 2007: 119). These two modes are named “...the anthropogenic and the anthropoemic approaches.” (Mansson, 2008: 165)

The human subject that Bauman designs searches for orientation and must make decisions that involve morals - respectively questions about good and bad. Bauman’s subject is marked by an inner tension, that is oscillating between two desires: security and freedom. For him the existentialist demands of the self-orientating subject that acts within the regularities that are defined by the dominant culture are keys to an understanding of the ongoing transformations within modernity; this is the perspective of life-politics, a concept that he (2000) developed on the bases of Anthony Giddens (1991: 215). In his work he speaks from the position of the excluded and subjected.

One of the key issues that effects current life-politics is how work, as a creational activity with and for other human beings is organized: “the dimension of work, that it is possible for the exercise of a sociological imagination to show how the meta-level processes of globalisation link directly to personal troubles.” (Tester, 2004 :172). Also, globalization - according to Burawoy’s (2015: 16) reading of liquid modernity, leads to a removal of power from the sphere of national politics only to crystalize in the decision-making power of transnational capital, with the potential of destroying the conditions for democracy and thus control over social existence. Robert Campain (2008: 202) points to the same issue “The conflicts of solid modernity have,

² Adiaphorization is not only necessarily part of the modern national state. It was the state that could make the best use of it by multiplying its function as an ordering principle based on rationality that administers a national population. It is linked more generally to ways in which a distancing in responsibility of social action, a dissolution between the actual act and the effect, is occurring. The way bureaucracies are organized into a set of sub-processes that in fact generate final outcomes by syntheses without anyone developing feelings of authorship.

... gradually been dissolved through deregulation, flexibility of the workforce and unbridling of financial markets; or to use Richard Sennett's understanding of power techniques as incorporating 'speed, escape, passivity', leading to disengagement". Subjects that cannot mobilize themselves and cannot hold up to this "power techniques" will end up in spaces of exclusions like the "hyper-ghetto" and the "liquid community" (Bauman 2001). Zygmunt Bauman (1996, 2000, 2001) develops a new theory of community within postmodernity where he further elaborates on Michel Maffesoli (1996) neo-tribal theory. He sees three social processes that are leading individualization, the anomic consumer mass and the peg communities (Bauman, 2001). For Bauman (2000,2001) the sphere of circulation of commodities and people becomes central to the constitution of identities within liquid modernity. "Variegated neoliberalization" (Brenner et al, 2010) builds up enormous differences in life-chances against a disempowered population living outside or in precarity to the ongoing valorisation of (economic) value. These population are building contrasts: whereas the mobile disengage with locality and can follow the flows of capital and can involve themselves in consuming masses and develop consumer-based lifestyles the immobile or sedentary are bounded to locality and hindered; they become the new strangers (see Bauman 2001). In this atomized existence, insecurity is augmented which leads into demands for safeties that do not so much related to concepts of entitlements and equality but identity and belonging.

This "postulated" communities are not Ferdinand Tönnies (1887) traditional "Gemeinschaft" as they emerge as the defensive social-space against induced feelings of uncertainty but their social ties, caused by accelerated marketization and dis-empowered politics, remain instable and network like. Thus, the subject's search for stability and empowerment does not take place anymore within the capitalist labour relations; that is now the rain of global competition but also self-orientation towards community forms are not always a free choice.

"People are assigned to an 'ethnic minority' without being asked for their consent. They may be glad of the assignment, or grow to enjoy it ... The point is, though, that whether this does or does not happen has no tangible influence on the fact of enclosure, which is administered by the 'powerful collectivities' in charge, and perpetuated by the circumstance of their administration." (Bauman, 2001 :89f)

All this makes Bauman (2000) assume that within liquid modernity ambivalence might be less of an issue (he refers to the mainstreaming of multiculturalism) compared to solid modernity but this comes under the condition of a state that has gone "post-national" that has de-sovereignized; state and nation are divorced.

“...the nation, which used to offer the substitute for the absent community at the era of Gesellschaft, now drifts back to the left-behind Gemeinschaft in search of a pattern to emulate and to model itself after... institutional scaffolding capable of holding the nation together is thinkable increasingly as a do-it-yourself job.” (Bauman, 2000: 185)

The assumption of in Gramscian sense post hegemonic age where the government operates either extremely coercive and penalizes the subaltern (i.e. the “hypergetto”) or laissez faire belongs to one of Bauman’s known anomalies.³ This anomaly further consists of the negation the possibilities of new solidifications within liquidizing conditions and the tendency to neglect emancipative collective agency, within a liquid modernity (Blackshaw, 2008 :128f).

1.2 The Extended Case Method of Michael Burawoy

“At the heart of ethnography is the body of the ethnographer – a thinking, feeling, sensuous person constantly collecting ‘data’ from around them.” (Riain 2009: 292)

Paul Lichterman (2002) summarizes Michael Burawoy’s Extended Case Method (ECM) approach as “seeing structure happen”. Burawoy calls to “extract the general from the unique” (Burawoy 2009: 20) to enrich a theoretical paradigm over time by the means of empirical research and concrete cases. To legitimize Extended Case Method, Burawoy (1998) developed a metatheoretical “Überbau”, a distinct mode of science based on the situatedness of the participant observer he calls “reflexive science” to complementize positive science.

The overall architecture that defines ECM can be framed in four separate extensions within an ethnographic research program (Burawoy 2009: 21). It starts with a theory; this could be any theory but in order to end with theory as I would delineate from Burawoy’s pretensions of social science ought to be a macro-theory. Theory extends to the field in which social situations are encountered that can be interlinked and extended into “process” from where a distinct extension to macro-forces is to be attained. Finally, the initial theory is to be reconstructed through the anomalous case by extending to theoretical auxiliary explanations within the chosen research paradigm. (Burawoy 1991: 281, see Lichterman 2002: 123, Wadham and Warren 2014: 9)

³ I use Walter Adamson’s (1980:170f) synthetic reading of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony: “...it means the consensual basis of an existing political system within civil society. Here it is understood in contrast to the concept of ‘domination’: the state’s monopoly on the means of violence and its consequent role as the final arbiter of all disputes... In its second sense, hegemony is a common intellectual and moral awareness, a common culture.”

The Extended Case Method of Michael Burawoy has its roots within the history of socio-cultural anthropology or more precisely in a variant of British social-anthropology called “Manchester School” that got interested in interlinked conflictual events and social history; respectively how colonialism effected local rituals like marriage in todays Zambia (see Tavory and Timmermans 2009: 246). ” ... the whole Manchester School can be defined within a “processual paradigm” in anthropology. ⁴

The most visible “trace” that links Burawoy to his ancestors is the naming itself: “ Extended Case Method”, a name that goes back to the founder of the Manchester department Max Gluckman (1911-1975) (Burawoy 1998: 5, Glaeser 2008 : 65). Nevertheless, Michael Burawoy’s relation to the original ECM might be best understood within what he calls a “reconstruction”. As this methodology is widely unpractised and sometimes unknown to the practitioners of social and cultural anthropology I will explicate it by looking at its origins and functioning. From the perspective of an empirical social science it seems evident to me that methodology and method has a key importance in the process of research.

1.2.1 Burawoy’s Extended Case Method: From Rhodesia to England to the U.S.

Michael Burawoy was trained in a strand of British social-anthropology that reaches back to the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in what was then Norther Rhodesia (todays Zambia). This institute, was the headquarter of several influential social-anthropologists like Victor Turner, Clyde Mitchel, Max Gluckman, Elizabeth Colson, and was exported to England where a new department of social anthropology, led by Gluckman since 1949, was established in Manchester (Barth 2005: 32f). The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute became its base of research. For the founding figures, like Clyde Mitchel and Victor Turner, most of whom came out of a legal context, personhood, conflict, process, and deviation was not something exceptional to the structural norm but expression of a dialectical relation between agency and structure (see Evens 2008: 50). The focus thus moved from the macro to the micro, to the actors within the

⁴ The role of conflict and the procedural understanding of social anthropology was partly possible because of the collapse of the British Empire and the loosening of restrains that it used to pose on anthropological research (Wadham and Warren, 2014 :6f).

constraints of structure (Rössler 2008). This “school” also developed an emphasis on analysing networks (see Barth, 2005 :38).

Max Gluckman is the social anthropologist who is said to have originated the “Extended Case Method” (Evens and Handelman 2005: 1). By the urge of Clyde Mitchel, he (1958 [1940]) formulized it in his “Analyses of a Social Situation in modern Zululand”. Gluckman studied within the tradition of the department the effects of industrialization and migration between villages and urban areas. Gluckman turns towards social processes, events and the role of actors and turns against using situations as “apt illustrations” to concretize established normative theory (Hillermann 2017: 80). “Instead of collecting data from informants about what “natives” “ought to do,” they began to fill their diaries with accounts of what ‘natives’ actually were doing, with accounts of real events, struggles, and dramas that took place over space and time.” (Burawoy 1998: 5). The abnormal became the interesting and revealing and the field of research, contrary to the enclosed field of Malinowski, opened (see Burawoy, 2009 :4).

The Manchester department formed between a decolonizing southern part of Africa, the socio-political change in the Copperbelt and the -in today’s terms- rather rigid structural-functionalism emphasised by Radcliffe-Brown’s take on Durkheim. In fact, the Manchester School might be one of the first “post-structuralisms” (see Evens and Handelman, 2006 :3).

After Burawoy graduated in Mathematics (BA) at the Cambridge University, he switched over to social Anthropology. By moving to Zambia in 1968, the person to support his research ambitions became Van Velsen (1921- 1990). Van Velsen was a lawyer and social-anthropologist and became very important for the anthropological formation of Michael Burawoy (2009: 2f).

Van Velsen was also part of what formalized during the 1960’s into the “Manchester School” and the first Professor of Sociology in the new university of Zambia. He (1979: 148) elaborated “... a method that aims at analysing the interrelations of structural (‘universal’) regularities, on the one hand, and the actual (‘unique’) behaviour of individuals, on the other.”. Van Velsen (1979) develops a branch within the extended case analyses he calls “situational analyses” and was arguing that the object of the analysis is not in fact ‘culture’ or ‘society’ of which the events studied might be considered as samples but rather social processes which may be abstracted from the course of events analysed.

Coming from Zambia University to Chicago, Burawoy became involved with a complex critique of the post second World War sociology that developed in the US. Overall the latter

shifted towards survey method and Middle Range theory, the ethnographic traditions declined. In Chicago, this was most evident. Qualitative research design conflated the macro into the micro, adopted rational choice theory, network-theory and research fields were still “imprisoned” into superficial units (Burawoy 2009: 4f) . Grounded theory evolved in a balancing act between the upcoming quantification- and scientism the late 1960’s as a strong ethnographic tradition but assumed historic universal categories were attainable when inductively studying social interactions (ibid).

In this context the role of events or “situations” for case study could be clarified. The Manchester school rethinking of the relation structure had to agency and its mediation is something that is likewise puzzling Burawoy (2013), and throughout his writing it seems that he increasingly complexified this relation (Riain 2009: 298).

This rethink allowed to differentiate ECM from another form of case study that he encountered in Chicago and that became popular within the discipline: the “interpretive case method” (ICM) that he (1991: 277f) explicates in referring to Clifford Geertz’s Balinese Cockfight. In this approach casing, it is the search for a context where the condensed symbolic enactment of macro structures is alive and expressed as a ritualised form (Burawoy 1991: 6, 278). ECM in short is not Clifford Geertz’s (2005: 84) “paradigmatic human events”, that is “drawing on almost every level of Balinese experience ... builds a symbolic structure in which ... the reality of their inner affiliation can be intelligibly felt.” Another well-known casing close to the ICM approach is -according to Burawoy- the bridge opening of Zululand by Max Gluckman (1958). In both examples Burawoy shows how the context and the local history vanishes and condenses into a general principle, the Extended Case Method instead tries to detect how the extra local plays into the diverging local context thus leaving the local social world open to difference.

Besides these critiques of current ethnography, Michael Burawoy (1998:13f) took up an idea that he has developed within his confrontation with postmodern turn: reflexivity.

Within the wider discipline of Anthropology, the explicit push towards an openly practiced reflexivity came in the late 1970s but more accentuated in the 1980s when Foucault’s “archaeology” and “genealogy” and Bourdieu’s “praxeology” became widely known, Clifford and Marcus published “Writing Culture”, etc.. Reflexivity coincided with the wider postmodern turn in anthropology; reflexivity thus came by abolishing grand theory. Now, it “was not the culture itself that needed explaining so much as the anthropologist’s explanation of that culture.” (Erickson and Murphy 2008: 126). The shift towards “cultural relativism” (Brereton 2011) carried upon the idea of developing theory out of the micro-context by not burden

research with the heavy loads of meta-theory, informants became partners and research was becoming more particularistic (Puddephatt et al 2009: 6). Cultures were granted “ontological” status and not just epistemological distinctiveness (Graeber 2015). Having fulfilled an important critique about the historical role of anthropology in constructing the other and as a helpful science in colonialism, the studies themselves often could not hold on to that expectation. Ethnographic-styled research was heavily constrained to common-sense knowledge, it could not extend out to other investigation and theory was evolving in a highly opaque way (Puddephatt; et al 2009: 12).

Burawoy’s reflexivity takes up this paradigm shift in order to reengage with empiricist versions of participant observation in order to defend ethnography on the bases of its strengths: engagement with the people and contexts one is studying. Overall, he has two leitmotifs. The first: He contemplates on the ontological implication of the positioned practices of a participant observer. Two dimensions became relevant, the immanent hermeneutical impetus that aims at deeper understanding and the scientific that wants to explain from the outside. The participant is the former position and the observer the latter but both come together within the ethnographer (Burawoy et al. 1991: 3).

The second Leitmotif is the relation of the researcher to his or her theory. Theory, as Burawoy makes clear with Michael Polanyi (1962), is not something distant, something that is taken up or put aside like a pair of socks.⁵ Theory as within the strong version of ECM, the one that he himself applies, is related to a life-concern, a deep commitment to a theoretical paradigm and an internal dialog enriched by life-experience.⁶ Theory is granted its own powers, it is not just another narrative, it is related to a historical process between science and the world and the researchers biography.

The ECM takes advantage of what are distortions for the positive research design: “contexts effects” like: interview effects, respondent effects, field effects and situation effects. By taking them as inevitable responses to the rather intervening researcher and as revealing intersubjective

⁵ Michael Polanyi (1962) assumes that an objectivity that sees the researcher as separated from his object -as conceptualized by the scientific mainstream, is illusory even for the natural science. Polanyi (1962: preface) recognizes in theory a personal dimension; theory has to be en-acted by a person’s commitment “a personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding.” Theory-enactment does not assume “that the world has no intrinsic structure, and that it can therefore be described in all possible ways ...” (Groff 2004: 2) as within constructivism it rather is a key to reality that is its *raison d’être*. Michael Polanyi (2009: 21) speaks about tacit knowing and the moment of experiencing a problem that uncovers a void.

⁶ Burawoy et al (1991). proposes two alternative strategies of ECM one that starts from the commitment to a field and reaches back on existing theory and one that starts from a theory, that is known by its core and by its anomalies.

situations. “The premise that distinguishes positive from reflexive science is that there is an ‘external’ world that can be construed as separate from and incommensurable with those who study it.” (Burawoy 1998: 10) . A reflexive model of science is drawn from the idea of engagement with the world through the means of scientific inquiry based on three dialogues: between the theory and the field, between the field to its extra local conditions that co-constitute it and thirdly a dialog where theory creatively re-engages with itself (Burawoy 2009: xv)

1.2.2 From reflexive science to practicing the Extended Case Method

Burawoy (1991, 1998) developed the ECM so it can, as reflexive ethnography, engage with the macro dimensions of social structures but contrary to the classical Manchester school he approaches them with the help of an established theory that is used for casing and that shall be tested and reconstructed through the anomaly of the empirical case. For the ECM participant observation is the primary method for the identification of anomalies between the theory and what it should explain on the “ground” (see Wadham 2014: 09). In fact, one of the key criteria’s is that the chosen case must be immediately meaningful and that it constitutes an “anomaly” to the theory one has chosen to work in (Ridder, 2016:150).

Within Burawoy’s ECM theory could thus be called the main pillar as the construction of the case and the guidance through the field of research is done in a constant dialog with it (Burawoy 1998: 5). “... theory ... turns the site into a case that gives meaning to the site beyond its own particularity.” (Burawoy 2009: 17) Theory or “analytical theory” -as he (2009: xiii) prefers, also distinguishes between external forces and processes that are to be settled within the concerned lifeworlds: “...theory is necessary not just to grasp the forces operative beyond the site; it is also necessary to conceptualize the very distinction between internal and external, local and extra-local.” (Burawoy 2003: 653).⁷ Thus, ECM is very much obliged to take the context seriously and cannot de-contextualize it like in survey method also it cannot conflate the micro in the macro like in the ICM (Burawoy 1998: 30).

⁷ Analytical theory is distinguished from folk theory, that is a theory that involves practical or tacit knowledge but also a theory that is developed within the lifeworlds and therefor a theory that is in unease with analytical proposition that are reaching beyond (Burawoy 2009: xiii). Analytical theory cannot unfold by our bare participation and interaction with the actors within field work, a key distinguishing feature ECM holds against Grounded Theory that because of its focus on narration is blind for those things that are left unspoken or unseen (Tavor; Timmermans 2009: 257f).

The first step of practicing ECM as the method to the model of reflexive science involves predicting the necessary conditions for a (theoretical) mechanism; to assume it is actualizing, that it can be detected and framed within an ethnographic encounter. The first step (or dialogical relation) thus makes theory virtually confronted with its corresponding reality or as Burawoy calls it: “Extending the observer to the participant” (Burawoy 1998: 16).

The second step of ECM concerns the way time and space extensions are preceded. This does assume that engagement of the researcher is perturbing the social field that he/she has encountered. Initial expectation is to be disappointed and new hypothesis about the “why” must be set up along -consciously or not- further experimenting within the field. The point however is to excess social situations, these are the intersections, this is where the macro is in the micro through structuring it by the means of power which is to be reproduced within those situations. If a social situation is reappearing and thus maintained we can speak of it as process, which allows agents to make use of as they offer cultural “schemas” and institutionally guaranteed resources.

The third step is the extending process to force not to reify what cannot be explained by the local context. “This is the principle of structuration -locating social processes at the site of research in a relation of mutual determination with an external field of social forces.” (Burawoy 1998: 20). It’s here that the big question appears: Is this a systematic process, a process that does reproduce itself, or not? This question must be answered within the chosen theoretical tradition.

Finally, the fourth undertaking concerns the extension of Theory. In every step, theory was involved: when delimiting a field into a case, when our “false” expectations and irritations were trying to get back in sink, when we were understanding the resources involved in a social situation and lastly, when we explained what could not be explained by the local context. The context of theory was always in irritation but at this point the initial theory must be reconstructed or otherwise it would be a degenerated research program and not worth the effort thus refuted. (Burawoy 1998: 9) . “When our expectations are violated-when we discover what we didn’t ‘anticipate – we then turn to existing bodies of academic theory that might cast light on our anomaly.” (Burawoy et al. 1991: .

The context understood as “abnormalities” is to enrich and increase the empirical range of the initial theory through incorporating auxiliary theorie(s) by a process described as a “dialog”. Whenever a theory is reconstructed, the auxiliaries which are holding the case must be

differentiated from what comes about by contextual contingencies that coproduce the object of research.

So, ECM as developed by Burawoy (1989 :229) offers a way for “...the development of scientific understanding [that] comes through commitment to a research program and engagement with the world one is studying.” as he says himself.

In every of those four extensions relations of power play a crucial role, it is not external to the researcher. Burawoy names four corresponding ways of how power is becoming part of the research, these four modes are the dangers and traps of practicing ethnography legitimated by a “reflexive science” (Burawoy 1998) model and thus dialog and intersubjectivity.⁸ Domination, silencing, objectivation, normalization are to be reduced as much as possible.

1.2.3 Methods applied: practicing ethnography

My field work in La Duchère was carried out as a “rolling revisit” (Burawoy, 2003: 668) between May to August 2015 and was followed by a one-month revisit from the mid-April till mid-May of 2016. Overall it was built on participant observation within a “reflexive science” (Burawoy 1998, 2003) approach. First, participant observation is the most basic qualitative method of ethnography “in which the researcher observes and to some degree participates in the action being studied, as the action is happening.” (Lichterman 2002: 120). Participant observation within the practice of the ECM applies differently as it is “theory-driven participant observation” (Lichterman 2002). This mode of participant observation is distinguished from an inductive “field-driven participant observation”.⁹ If the participant observation is the method that takes place within the space and time of the informants, the interview is the opposite, namely the study of others in “the interviewee’s space and time.” (Burawoy 1998: 25). This does suggest that an interview is difficult to apply within the model of reflexive science and the ECM when it is not -as Burawoy (1998: 27) suggests- applying a “clinical method” which means an interview that is oriented towards a psychoanalytical style of interrogation. But as almost no ethnographer is a trained psycho-analyst this seems fairly difficult.

⁸ Different to formal objectivity of positive science, “embedded objectivity” is judged differently. The criteria is the product in relation to the desirable outcome: a enriched theory, that is a theory that could adopt and hold to an abnormal case. “Embedded” points to the way research is performed namely as “communicative action”. (Burawoy 1998:28)

⁹ The inductive approach in Cultural and Social Anthropology to generate theory, is either ethnomethodology or grounded theory “both develop micro sociology” (Burawoy 1991: 6).

Here I would propose a middle ground, a method of interviewing that I applied during my research that is somewhere in-between, it is called “ero-episches Gespräch” which translates into ero-epic conversation. This mode of interviewing was defined by the Roland Girtler (1980, 2001), a microlevel orientated sociologist that works in the tradition of the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz (1899 -1959) and Max Weber (1964 -1920). It could be described as an informal, ethnographic, and conversational interview style.¹⁰ The narration is balanced in terms of the conversational possibilities to inter-act; both share an active role and take part. The original questions asked should stem from the situation itself and refer to the past and the everyday life of the interlocutor (ibid: 149-151).

“...das durch kluges Erzählen und Fragen bestimmte Gespräch, welches gerade für einen Feldforscher, wie ich ihn verstehe, ungemein wichtig ist, als ‘ero-episches Gespräch‘ bezeichnen. ... ein solches ,ero-episches Gespräch beginnt ... mit einer Erzählung des Forschers über seine Arbeitsweise und seine Interessen, wobei er darauf achtet, daß in demjenigen, von dem er etwas wissen will, Interessen geweckt werden und dieser schließlich selbst zu erzählen beginnt.“ (Girtler 2001: 150ff).

During participant observation several situations allowed for a form of interviewing as “ero-epic conversations” (Girtler 2001). I used it as a way to lay open what I was doing in La Duchère and what my interest was, after that the initial narration was oriented towards what I was interested in: the Algerian war, the history of the local soccer club or the situation in the old apartments.¹¹

Nevertheless, eight complementary interviews (narrative and expert-interviews) were conducted and necessary caused by a tight research budget and difficulties of access to the field. But -as I will argue- the field itself did also already have its own professional participant “experts” or “intellectuals” (Gramsci) that I wanted to engage with in what was a convenient way for both parties. It was clear for me that if one wants to speak to persons that are presenting themselves in their official roles or hold public responsibilities that informal interviewing might not be the only possible choice.

10 Ero-epic conversation might be seen as a version of “informal interviewing” as laid out by Schensul et al (2013 :103-107)..The “ethnographic Interview” as defined by Spradley (1979) might also be another example that -in my view- is quite similar to Girtler’s ero-epic conversation: “It is best to think of ethnographic interviews as a series of friendly conversations into which the researcher slowly introduces new elements to assist informants to respond as informants ... three most important ethnographic elements are its explicit purpose, ethnographic explanations, and ethnographic questions.” (Spradley 1979: 58)

¹¹ As cultural associations based on ethnicity were not allowed in France often soccer clubs took over such a function. However this ban was lifted in the first Mitterrand term in the early 1980’s.

I used two distinguishable kinds of interview techniques, the expert- and the narrative interview. The narrative interview was designed as a means to investigate biographies of persons. The stimulus of the interviewer is as less as possible, the interviewee's narration is initiated through an open question. The question should be not overburden but also not too specified and might best relate to important biographical feature like a rupture or an important event. (Flick 2011: 228f) The language used must be one that is compatible with the lifeworld of the informant (Froschauer and Lueger 2003: 69) .

For example, I asked a new middle-class inhabitant in la Duchère how it happened that she came to decide to go and live in La Duchère.

If the opening-question works, the interviewed person structures his/her narration into several stages and has to make decision, while the role of the interviewer is to stimulate but not interfere this narration. When analysing the interview an analytical distinction is to be made between the narrated and the experienced (Rosenthal and Rosenthal 2003: 405). Narrative interviews are highly effective when exploring a research subject, because the interviewees give the content and structure of whatever is explicated. This also has a reflexive and ethical dimension as due we neither can assume that we are the only ones that consciously reflect on social phenomena nor that everybody reflects the same way as we do.

The narrative interview has several weaknesses. It can take very long thus the transcription process could take up to 16 hours. By a long narration, the interview can loosen its character as the interviewed person might demand for a conversational mode. For the researcher, not so interesting subjects could be dominant or deliberately chosen to cover other issues (see Rosenthal, 2003: 465). Caused by self-protection, the follow up questioning could be quite unsuccessful.

The expert interview -in my understanding, can be the most efficient way in dealing with particular people that one meets in the field that have the function to be intellectuals. These “experts” that accounted for this type of status were positioned in crystallization points which allowed them to have a kind of practical knowledge within the urban governance structure of the GPV (see Bogner and Menz 2005: 7) . I took up the expert-interview technique as elaborated by Michael Meuser and Ulrike Nagel (2005). This variant of an expert interview functions with an “open interview guideline” to get access to “corporate knowledge” but also “contextual knowledge”. The latter was more important to me as it is about the structural involvements of the person, the institutional processes, where his or her role could be clarified.

For example, I carried out two extended expert interviews with the project-manager of La Duchère's urban regeneration program. In this interview, the researcher is concerned with a specific problem that also concerns the interviewee by an engagement that he or she has with it (Meuser and Nagel 2005: 72f) . So "Anyone can be an expert informant, but there cannot be too many. It is important that these people can and will find the time to sit with the researchers during multiple visits so that various points of interpretation can be cleared up." (Olsen 2012: 213).

During my field work I used photo-documentation to help my memory and to analyse some scenes that happened in the streets or within the semi-private spaces of La Duchère. I adopted some of W.B Hunt's (2010) general orientations for a documentary approach. "Some" because I did not share his applied anthropology concerns. In general, I held on to "A straight, simple, realistic technique uncluttered with visual aesthetics and avoidance of manipulation" and the "The finding of significance in the commonplace and ordinary, implying a valid representation of conditions;" (Hunt 2010: 70).

Having laid out all my ethnographic techniques that I applied during my field work a final word has to be said about the results that all of them bring about: fieldnotes and conceptualization. Field notes are when experience is translated though the potential bias and "power effects" (Burawoy 1998) into an observation close form of documentation that should be readable for another interested researcher. It is from fieldnotes that we eventually perform our dialog and draw new hypotheses (see Schensul, 2013: 109).

"Every entry into the field is followed not just by writing about what happened but also by an analysis in which questions are posed, hypotheses are formulated and theory is elaborated- all to be checked out in successive visits. ... field notes are a continuous dialogue between observation and theory." (Burawoy, 2003: 668)

In fact, the writing of field notes and their conceptualization is what I would consider a major challenge for a ECM. Unfortunately, Michael Burawoy (1998: 27) does not talk about it beside of contrasting his Method to the theoretical coding approach of GT.¹²

Coding could as well be called conceptualising field notes in relation to the abnormality and initial theory (see Lichterman, 2002 :130). Thus, theoretical categories must be re-established within the case, the realist moment or the inductive moment follows along this procedure as a void between the data (field notes) and the theoretical expectations based on the initial theory. This is the abnormal moment and the return to or the dialog with existing theory within the

¹² An online published participant observation.

research program; a complex dialog is evolving. “Research and writing become opportunities to connect what is said and unsaid, weaving together the stories of different actors and forging links between different kinds of knowledge.” (Wadham, 2014 :17)

2. La Duchère, contextualizing the place of research

“...money creates an enormous capacity to concentrate social power in space, for unlike other use values it can be accumulated at a particular place without restraint. And these immense concentrations of social power can be put to work to realized massive but localized transformations of nature the construction of built environments, and the like.”

David Harvey (1985 : 12)

In this section, I want to line out how the built environment of the plateau la Duchère is falling into three episodes. Subsequently a historical demographic description by consulting the statistical data of INSEE the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies will follow. As the overall focus is on the emergence of social mixing policies in France and how this affected la Duchère, the development from the mid 1980's onwards is granted greater attention.

La Duchère in its current administrative borders originated in the post Second World War urbanization pattern based on an area related urban policy (*Zone à urbaniser en priorité*) in the beginning of the 5th republic in France. This state driven urbanization led to the construction of the *Grands ensembles*, characterized by their peripheral location, their high-rise tower block architecture, and their open spaces. For the *Grand ensemble* of La Duchère the decision was taken in 1958 by the governing mayor Louis Pradel. Situated on a plateau north of Lyon in the direction of Paris before the highway “*de soleil*” was built and thus not entirely unproblematic to reach, expansion in comparable dimension to what later became La Duchère was first proceeded in the east (Vaulx-en-Velin) and south-east (Bron, Vénissieux, Minguette) of Lyon (Halitim 1996) .

The implication of building La Duchère is way more complex than the decision of a historical figure like Pradel; France was hit by a housing crisis that accelerated further after the Second World War. The priorities set in the early indicative planning (*planification*) under president de Gaulle concerned the industrial development while internal-migrations towards this industrial sight further augmented the housing problem (Blanc 2004). Whereas Pradel's precursor was doubtful, the independent centre-right affiliate was a mayor that had a great passion for an urbanism à l'américaine and la Duchère was not his only big-scale-project in Lyon.



Picture: GPV- La Duchère

A surface of about 120 hectares was carved out and flanked by two surrounding communes (Ecully, Champagne-au-Mont-d'or) but unlike many other French *banlieues* la Duchère became inserted into the 9th district of Lyon. It was due to the creation of La Duchère that in 1964 Vaise, the 9th district, had to be re-drawn as the municipality of Champagne-au-Mont-d'or had to hand over a good part of what became La Duchère.

La Duchère was not a place outside of social-history. The first traces of human settlements can be found in the Epipaleolithic (Bertrand, 1998). Due to its topographic situation at the marge of a plateau with a steep slope that leads into the river Saône, it became a strategic point to oversee movements of people and goods. This manifested itself over the centuries by two historical buildings a castle built in the 14th century and a military fort completed in the mid of the 19th century. In 1813 La Duchère briefly became an important spot in the Austrian military campaign against the Napoleonic Army (online source: www.archives-lyon.fr).

The villagers or the travellers coming from the north on their way down to Vaise would never have a reason to set a foot on the plateau of La Duchère, only a few worker-families had a kitchen garden next to the fort (Schwartz 2003: 27). The castle was demolished against the will of the executing urbanists François-Régis Cottin (1920-2013) and Franck Grimal (1912-2003), both coming from Lyon. The terrain of construction was a composite of agricultural land with

a few country houses of industrialists.¹³ This topographical quality was reaffirmed and even underlined with a green ribbon, a kind of boundary that marks the begin of the periphery.

Vaise further industrialised until the Second World War as it provided a river-harbour and the railway station. The shuttling in workers increased with the industrial capacities to about 70% of the workforce, which became a political issue (Schwartz 2003: 33). France's biggest synthetic textile producer "Rhodiacéta", founded in the early 1920's employed about 7500 workers in its original plant in the basin of Vaise and attracted many more enterprises and workers upcoming housing projects in the 50's were proceeded in a liberalist manner (see Halitim, 1996 :16).¹⁴ With the national housing offensive, the desolated terrain of La Duchère above was bought by SERL, a publicly-owned enterprise for the post 2nd World War development in the Lyon Region that emanated from the state-investment bank *Caisse des Dépôts et Consignation*. After control over the real estate was established, SERL began to allocate the building lots to social housing agencies (mostly OPAC and SACVL) on the bases of the urbanist plan and in accordance with the municipality (online source: serl.fr).

All of this can be framed within the government initiative from 1953 onwards and the decree that announced the *Zones à urbaniser en priorité* (ZUP) on the 31th December 1958 (online source: francearchives.fr).

La Duchère now is taking shape as the only ZUP of Lyon in a vast and fast enterprise that will take about five years before it becomes an autonomous but internally differentiated town of its own, counting about 20.000 inhabitants in the late 1960's (Halitim 1995: 64).

A Colossal project, a composite of four sub-neighbourhoods: Le Plateau, Château, Balmont, Sauvegarde that transcended the logic of the *Grands Ensembles* of the late 50's by not just being a place to sleep for the workers but a town that was built on the lifestyle and the new possibilities imaginable within the *Trente Glorieuses*. Other than earliest version examples *Grands ensembles* usually are not planned monofunctional as dormitory towns (see Fourcaut, 1999). A new way of building *Grands Ensembles* in France started from the 1960's onwards, emphasizing commercial supplies, social and cultural facilities and thus it cannot be said to be a singular event limited to La Duchère (Dufaux et al 2003). The urbanist principles distinguish

¹³ In my first personal tour through the project, the guide pointed out that the main direction of the wind that did not carry the contaminated air of the industries below like in Vaise towards La Duchère and that is why it was a good soil to build private recreational facilities for the bourgeoisie that could escape the unhealthy living conditions of the city Lyon.

¹⁴ It is this company that got famous in 1967 by a the first big strike action since 1936 that was documented in 1967 by Chris Marker and broadcasted in Mars 1968 before the student-workers revolt in Mai.

La Duchère from “new towns” built in the UK (Pelletier 2007: 68). The modernist vision behind La Duchère and the *Grand ensemble* in general included an almost utopic way of life which was stated against the traditional inner-city district. The leading urbanist of La Duchère : “A cette époque-là, on pensait donner une certaine forme à la vie avec l’architecture ... Mais on ne peut pas dire que c’est le plan qui fait la population. » (Cottin quoted in Schwartz, 2003: 37f)

What La Duchère became was the pragmatism stemming from the urgency of housing crises that aligned with the “Fordism” (see Gramsci quoted in Hoare, 2014 [1971] 279-287) and the dissemination of its production methods as much as its accompanied culture best represented in the auto-mobilized nuclear family. Its urban form lines up with a modernist utopic idea that flourished since the Charter of Athens. The ideas of the “ville nouvelle” were subsumed under the label of “modern humanism”, a new mode of urbanisation within an expanding and inclusive capitalism (see Dufaux, 2003: 11f).¹⁵

What sets La Duchère apart from other *Grands Ensembles* that were built before is its level of public equipment’s like movie theatres, schools, child-care, various kinds of sport facilities, and the overall commercial supplies. A shopping mall, before it became popular phenomena at the outskirts of cities, was built at the centre and the streets were named avenues with numbers like in US-American cities. The sub-neighbourhoods were, according to the leading urbanist Cottin a result of the circumstances of the terrain and the way the overall project was preceded, namely in units of project. This combination bears the idea of this particular mass-profile that he planned without having too much limitations (Schwartz 2003: 38). Even though heavily state-subsidized, the state did only intervene in the beginning to build a school of higher education within La Duchère. Sauvegarde was built by the city of Lyon and entirely dedicated to social housing, Balmont had a comparable high amount of private property tenure and the others were quite average in the sense of the overall project. Halitim (1995 :70) described an internal migration process towards the central area of La Duchère. The overall urbanist vision was to reintegrate all neighbourhoods by giving more importance in terms of public facilities to the centrality, the Plateau sub-neighbourhood. Nevertheless, each neighbourhood was designed with their own kind of village-life too. This meant that they were structured around their own public facilities, consisting of a church, municipality, shops but comparably less equipped than the *plateau* that should even radiate beyond the *ville nouvelle* (Schwartz 2003: 34). Behind every sub-neighbourhood, stood different kinds of developers but mostly social-housing

¹⁵ Inclusive stands for a capitalism that is absorbing a grate need of parts of population but with no restrains concerning the education levels.

agencies that were having distinct social-profiles and different ways of financing too. Overall 4029 flats out of 5432 built were dedicated to social housing, the three biggest operators where the OPAC du Rhône (public/county), SACVL (City of Lyon) and OPC HLM municipal (Halitim 1996: 64).

The local historian Anni Schwartz (2003) emphasized, that a *mixité sociale* existed in La Duchère long before it became national urban policy. The original undertaking envisioned a disciplined society oriented towards modernization that believed in overcome the class-antagonism by enabling – in terms of consumption patterns, upwards mobility or middle class “self-individuation” (Bauman, 2001:109) during the booming 1950-1970’s.

In the local collective memoring of the elder inhabitants of La Duchère I encountered this notion of *mixité sociale* as something that is coming back, a lost quality of community life that from the point of social historical research often is mythological or nostalgic (see Epstein, 2013: 103).



Picture: GPV- La Duchère

The idea that the exodus of the middle class is causal for the eclipse of La Duchère is widely shared and narrated also in guided tours organized by the local project-mission. However their wishful bringing back came with a price. This brings me to the next episode of how the built environment of La Duchère has changed over time.

The *Grand projet de la ville* (GPV) operationalised as a *Zone d'aménagement concerté* (ZAC), that took shape in the early 2000's within a *Contrat de ville*, that is an inter-communal partnership within the guidelines of the state massively changed the built environment of La Duchère. The slogan now became: “ en finir avec les grands ensembles” (Kirszbaum 2012: 217). This approach is formalized in Lyon between 1997-1998 under the banner of *mixité sociale* and the voluntarism to improve the “living condition” within a new urban form (Polga 2004: 23).¹⁶

In the concrete case of La Duchère the impetus was placed on the *désenclavement* (the opening up, my translation), that means the overcoming of the planned autonomy of the *cité*. One of the leading urbanists of the GPV La Duchère Alain Marguerit (online source: atelier-marguerit.com) writes:”Un des objectifs du projet est de valoriser cette position en renforçant les relations existantes entre ville périphérique et ville-centre par l’intermédiaire de la Duchère.” The arrangement of the buildings themselves might be associated with the neo-traditionalist current that breaks by principles with the modernist urban form (see Parker, 2004 :66).

In order to get developers of “national importance” on board they were “seduced” by a certain tolerance for concessions regarding their needs. According to the report of the project Consultants ACT (2009: 10) the financial power of the developers was important because they could shoulder a degree of risk that smaller developers could have possibly brought to fall.

The plateau, is the main area of intervention, it will gradually transform into a checkboard building pattern, a form of development that is more pleasing to private investors. In fact, the built environment is designed as a safer, cleaner, and ecologically friendly space. A social mix is realized by the means of emphasising the diversification of tenure and the strengthening of private initiatives through the overall reduction of social housing but not the total number of apartment units.

Social housing is reduced from about 80% to 55% (Rojon 2014: 29). “One of the key policy interventions was the demolition of several very long, 15-storey blocks of flats located at the centre of the neighbourhood. This was accompanied by the construction of private housing complexes and retail premises.” (Lelévier 2013: 411). A parc (parc du Vallon), today barley

¹⁶ Demolitions of single housing-blocks already took place earlier but here we see the first manifestations of a new urbanism.

used by residents, completes the new real estate development to the east and helps to underline the leisure and environmental qualities of the new La Duchère (see Rojon, 2014 :39).¹⁷

The first apartment-block that has been torn down during the creation of the GPV was the *barre 200* bynamed “barre Chicago”, this was a local political decision and had less to do with the original *contrat de ville* signed with the state (Quercy and Crepey 2003: 7).

The new centre named after Abbé Pierre expresses that urbanist reinterpreted the concept of centrality, it is the crossing point of the two main axes of circulation that connects the surroundings with La Duchère and the centre of civic life - the counter-point to the fragmented square-settlements. Also, the city of Lyon builds an indoor athletics-arena that is part of the projects overall orientation to attract other parts of Lyons populations and to transmit a different image of the neighbourhood.

This new centrality in the reconstructed *Grands Ensembles* is generally applied in French urban restructuring and in Lyon also visible in the GPV Vaulx-en-Velin (Chaline 2014:81). An open space (*désenclavement*) - like in today’s La Duchère - that holds on to a centre but one that is within a wider circulation of people and goods is not outside from considerations of policing too, as Garnier (2003: 7f) has indicated.

However, this mode is recalibrating and centralising the urban margins a general polycentric development of French cities is hardly definable in such terms as “european-style Edge Cities” because it is not driven by a dominant capital fraction (see Bontje, 2005). Also -as I will show later- a reduction to a global urbanisation pattern of a “3rd wave gentrification” (Smith, 2002) kind tends to be misleading (at least in the French context) as the project of La Duchère rather is a state intervention enterprise operating as part of a wider “hegemonic project” (Jessop, 1990 :208) that is manifested beyond Lyon’s “creative strategy” (Peck 2010) in all of Frances “sensible” or “priority” areas.¹⁸

In order to see the complexity involved within the urban reconstruction of La Duchère, I will present the different funds often associated with national laws and French urban policy in general. The money-capital involved is granted by “l’État, l’Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine (ANRU), l’Agence Nationale pour la Cohésion Sociale et l’Égalité des Chances (l’Acsé), la Région Rhône-Alpes, le Département du Rhône, la Ville de Lyon, les 4

¹⁷ The *parc du Vallon* also functions as a water drainage.

¹⁸ I am not saying that 3rd wave gentrification is somehow unimportant, only that is not the only causal mechanism to the overall urban restructuring. Indeed, I think gentrification has a potential to become more dominant in La Duchère if it’s not counteracted.

bailleurs sociaux du territoire, l'Europe et leurs partenaires.” (online source, gpvlyonduchere.org). The official project website states that out of 750 million Euros one third directly implies private investors thus most of it is public spending (online source: www.gpvlyonduchere.org). To account for 3rd wave gentrification international flows of capital are a key factor; which in this case is not wrong but also not obvious (see Smith, 2002).

Part of what shapes the project is the interference of private investors and the housing societies, either direct within urban governance structure or, on the national level, by being part of a law advisory boards. The latter is especially true for the social housing agencies that are part of the national urban policy making process.


I will now describe the demographic development of La Duchère through the abstract lens of statistical categories, averages and amounts assuming them to say something about the development of the neighbourhood La Duchère over the years in regard to the pauperisation, the exodus of the middle class and the role of immigration.

2.1 The demographic development of La Duchère


“Si les dimensions économiques sont à l'évidence essentielles et se mesurent dans les statistiques du chômage ou du niveau de vie, elles ne suffisent pas à rendre compte de l'ampleur d'un phénomène dans lequel les questions 'culturelles', 'ethniques' ou 'raciales' sont centrales. “

(Lapeyronnie, 2005: 209f)

Population wise Lyon is a growing city. The “urban renaissance” like in many other European cities has basically started from the early 1990's onwards (see Smith, 2002: 438).



The overall population of the 9th district Vaise has also been massively declining. We can see this in the figure below that shows that this trend is far from being reversed.



La Duchère's population greatly declined since the heydays in the 1970's from about a third of the total population of Vaise (20.000) in 1975 to about 14000 by 1990 (Halitim 1996:64).

La Duchère has been very connected to the industrial basin of Vaise and partially to the city centre of Lyon. With the industrial restructuring and stagflation, the industrial geography changed in a way that it did hinder the access to wage labour for the local inhabitants as it increased the commuting time. Today, the latest official data published, that also express the effects of the first project stage in La Duchère, shows the following quantitative characteristics.

Unit	Share of single parent families	Share of foreigners	Share of family with more than 4 children	Share of households that moved within the last 5 years	Share of young adults (15-25) without educational achievement	Share of recipient whom income is constituted of more than 50% of social welfare	Share of allotees guaranteed minimum income (RSA)	Number of registered job seekers (1st trimester 2016)
	Insee IRIS RP2012	Insee IRIS RP2012	Insee IRIS RP2012	Insee RP2012	Insee IRIS RP2012	CAF 31/12/2014	CAF 31/12/2014	Pôle emploi 2016
La Duchère	27%	19%	8%	33%	45%	36%	28%	1041
Métropole de Lyon	16%	9%	3%	41%	25%	22%	17%	122 250

(Data source : l'Agence d'urbanisme de l'aire métropolitaine lyonnaise 2016)

The average revenues of the households declined from 1978 to 1984 compared to the national median and the new inhabitants who took over abandoned social housing were even more fragile in terms of their purchasing power (Halitim 1996: 67). The unemployment rate increased to about 14% of the working population. The evaluation within the framework of the *contrat de ville*, a governance composite consisting of a vast range of “partners” like the state, regional actors, the city of Lyon, the municipality of the 9th district and housing operators speaks of an increasing pauperisation and the will of about 40% to leave La Duchère in 2000. Unemployment of the active population (15-64 years) before the GPV was by about 21,5% and has augmented to around 23% in 2010 (Lelévier 2013:411). That is more as double as much as the Lyon average of 11% (RP Insee 2010). Youth unemployment in 2010 was at 18,5 % compared to 7% in Lyons average. Also, the youth educational acquisition of the National diploma in La Duchère is almost two and a half times lower as in the Lyon average (Insee Rp 2010).

One must bear in mind that the project is not developed evenly throughout the sub-neighbourhoods of La Duchère - which has the effect of a tendential worsening of the socio-economic situation for those sub-neighbourhoods where the urban restructuring has not yet started. Sauvegarde for example became one of the poorest neighbourhoods of Lyon. 37,1 % of the inhabitants of Sauvegarde need social welfare benefits, compared to 30 % in overall La Duchère and 18 % in Lyon (CAF 2012).

A problem of the pauperisation, beside of the educational “deficits”, is the effect of a capitalism that has changed a lot since the area of “Fordist-Keynesian order” (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 360). Lyon became “entrepreneurial” and even regionalised into growth coalitions with Grenoble, holding a blue colour majority during the 1960’s -1980’s.

Now, only 6,5 % of the unemployed are searching for jobs, most of them lost their jobs because of limited contracts, in the traditional industrial branches. Most of them (25,8%) search in personal assistance and in the construction sector (13,9%), commerce, sale, and storage (12,5%) and transport and logistics (11,4%).

While the early La Duchère was a neighbourhood of young adults, the la Duchère of the 1980’s was increasingly aging. From 2% in the 1980’s the elder parts of the population went up to 31% of the total (Schwartz 2003: 197): a trend that was turned around to reach its original proportion in the current situation. It was the liberalisation laws in the late 1960’s and especially by 1977 that enabled many more people to access private homeownership, which also means that a good proportion who stayed in the neighbourhood could not leave because of their financial situation

(Schwartz 2003, Halitim 1996). A survey done in 2000 by APERTISE - thus before the project, concluded that 41% of the interviewed inhabitants of La Duchère would like to leave, 25% were preparing to leave. This situation did not change entirely with the urban restructuring in the main parts of La Duchère. The problems were accentuated as the population of Chateau and Sauvegarde felt not to be taken seriously in their needs and felt excluded. In Chateau, the population numbers are continuously declining even after all the years the new La Duchère is evolving, but this seems to be an inherent part of the projects principles that lead to uneven development within the priority areas of French urban policy (see Epstein, 2013: 204).

Whereas the overall population was declining La Duchère was a new home for many migrants coming from outside of Europe but in fact La Duchère ever was -leaving aside architectural concerns- more than anything else marked by internal and external migration.

People I met came from working class distinct districts of Lyon like Vaise and Croix-Rousse, Spain, West Africa, Turkey, and above all the maghrib region. The French government, for reasons I will discuss later, does not allow statistics based on collectives like religious collectives-or ethnic categories. Still, birth locations are known to them. Between 1975 and 1990 La Duchère became a home for migrants who were not born in France and without national-citizenship (Halitim 1995: 64f) . In 2011, 10214 people were officially living in La Duchère; 2929 were not born in France, 1889 did not have French nationality (Insee RP 2006, 2011). The biggest event in the history of immigration for La Duchère and one of the most significant for France was due to the on-going decolonization especially in Algeria.

“In 1962, over 750,000 French settlers crossed the Mediterranean. By December 1963, 913,100 repatriate entries from Algeria were recorded at the ports, among which counted 100,000 French Jews.” (Choi 2016: 57). Algerian workers were in France way before the national liberation in the interwar period by what was called a “rotation system” thus most of them returned, but some would also stay (Hargreaves 2007 [1995]: 23). At the time when La Duchère was constructed the first massive wave of “repatriates” landed in France. The mayor Louis Pradel (1906-1976), that himself held his military service in Oran (Algeria) assigned a third of the social housing apartments to the arriving population. Accident or not, according to Anni Schwartz (2003: 111f) a lot of repatriated that came to live in La Duchère were from the Oran region. Lyon also was in a city partnership with Oran since the

early 50's. A war monument from Oran was shipped to La Duchère in 1968 and is located since then in the sub-neighbourhood of Balmont where the first *pieds-noirs* were accommodated.¹⁹

Oran monument of war

Picture: Richard Pfeifer



During my fieldwork, Algeria was present very often, I could hear people talking about it regularly, young, and old. Once, I even sat at the table with the son of Algerian immigrants with a whole bibliography about the Algerian War in mind, next to him a “harki” that moved to La Duchère because of on-going discrimination against him and a former French soldier who fought during the Algeria War. This was one of the strongest moments during my stay in La Duchère.

¹⁹ “Pied-noir” is the designation for Algerians that have French metropolitan roots but were born in Algeria. “Harki” is prejudice for a native Algerian that is said to have collaborated with the French colonial authorities in Algeria.

2.2. The manifestations of the *politique de la ville* in La Duchère over the years

“Elle habite quelque part
Dans une banlieue rouge
Mais elle vit nulle part
Y'a jamais rien qui bouge
Pour elle la banlieue c'est toujours la zone
Même si au fond d'ses yeux y'a un peu d'sable jaune”

(Renaud - Banlieue Rouge)

In the following sub-chapters, I will first present the most important development and national laws that are concerned with what by the early 1990's became the main urban policy paradigm in France, *mixité sociale*. The overview will help to see *mixité sociale* within three distinguishable periods which underline its status as a contradictory common ground of politics that is nevertheless shared by both political spectrums (right and left) and thus makes it the “ideological terrain of struggle” (Hall 1996: 42f) or what Gramsci (2014: 331) defined as “common sense” that by precondition also relates to empirical sciences through the means of politics. Gramsci's (2014) theory about a non-deterministic but “organic” relation between the economic and superstructure will open a perspective on the case of La Duchère that sets it in relation to the political and juridical superstructure and the actual territorialisation of French social policies in the urban realm. As I have lined out in the sub-chapter before, by the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's, the situation in urban neighbourhoods with significant amount of social housing, near former industrial areas was worsening. This coincided with the end of the Fordist mode of accumulation and especially when Keynesian regulation of the social relations of capital was under decisive attack. The organic crises of capitalism had its severe impact on La Duchère which leads me to explicate the relations of urban policy and politics to participation models and top-down empowerment.

I will introduce *mixité sociale* within the domain of urban governance, as it turned inwards towards the civil society in order to re-establish the republican cultural hegemony most notably by opening channels towards the spatially immobile immigrant underclass population that is confronted with advanced forms of economic precarity with increased commuting distances, intersecting forms of social exclusion (stigmatisation by residential place, racialization) and unresolved sentiments of insecurity (vandalism, drug-economy). These channels are pushed

forward on the one hand by mobilizing the middle classes assuming them to be the transmitter of truly incorporated virtues of civic life and on the other hand by urban governance through which “empowerment” is organized.

The emerging vacancy in the Grands ensembles came with the 1970’s and was in part due to a neoliberal policy shift in social housing. It was tackled by giving a home to immigrant workers and their family as from the mid 1970’s integration politics was established (Weil 1994: 720). The state-supported flight of the middle classes by 1977 intensified the already difficult situation in the Grand Ensemble that by that time already suffered of chronicle underinvestment (Fée 2007: 105). This was known to the state authorities through the HVS (*Habitat et Vie Sociale*), a reformist institutionalised mechanism that actively engaged in problems that concerned the *Grands ensembles*. HVS started from the early 1970’s onwards but really was pushed forward by 1977 when it was already working in many *Grands ensembles* that issued sever problems. It shared key features of later approaches like: participation of local actors, experimental interventionism, a global approach hence social and urbanist, pushed towards a collaboration between ministries of the state apparatuses etc.. This could not hinder the overall worsening of the social and physical conditions within many *Grands ensembles*.

In the beginning of the 1980’s French urban policy emerges out of a complex historical conjuncture: the economic stagflation, the riots in the *banlieues* of Lyon, decentralisation of the state and the euphoria of a left at greatest strength since the popular front of the 1930’s forming a government under the socialist president Mitterrand, that in its beginning declared to defy the capitalist mode of production.²⁰

The first urban uprising with significant magnitude and media coverage broke out in the eastern suburbs of Lyon in the “hot summer” of 1981 like in the neighbourhood of Les Minguettes in Venissieux and then 10 years later with about the same amplitude in Vaux-en-Velin (see Lapeyronnie, 2006; Dikec, 2016 : 104).²¹ “The fact that most of these incidents took place in the working class *banlieues* in the east Lyon region—the so-called ‘3Vs’: Vénissieux, Villeurbanne, and Vaulx-en-Velin—is significant. The negative effects of economic

²⁰ At the begin of Mitterrand, the left-wing political executive was trying to abolish capitalism in France, a project given up about two years later.

²¹ There were many more uprisings and incidents that would have to be listed here. The two named have traceable impacts into the realm of politics and urban policy (see Dikec 2007, 2016; Lapeyronnie, 2005). It was mentioned by Dikec (2016: 111) that the huge uprisings of 2005 followed a different geographical pattern and did not immediately sprang over to Lyon’s or Marseille’ supports.

restructuring were severely felt in the working class *banlieues* of the east Lyon region.” (Dikec 2016: 104)

Usually the unrests followed a similar pattern often starting with the injuring or killing of immigrant working class youths by the police, by chasing them because of being suspected for property delicts or/and “joy rides” (*rodéo urbain*) or looting of cars. The victims usually are young men with immigration background. The most extreme case that took place in La Duchère was an execution of a 24-years-old local social housing resident with a pump gun inside the police station in Vaise in 1997, then unrest followed (20.12.1997, Liberation).

Especially the eastern suburbs of Lyon can be seen as the historical state-of-emergency for a *politique de la ville* in France throughout the 1980’s and early 1990’s and consequently the starting point for a paradigm shift within social policy making. This shift means a moving away from issues of redistribution of wealth and socio-economic justice to a problematization about specific urban spaces or *Quartiers sensibles* and assumptions about the quality of social structures, which then is formulated into issues about social mixing. (Tissot, 2007:19). This shift coincided by the 1990’s with the return of republicanism in the political discourse of the left where it replaced a meta narrative of social justice and inequality (see Dikec, 2007 :30).

It is here that the contours of urban policy formed around the problematic of exclusion and social cohesion with a local state that starts to see itself as animator of contractual relations between various actors. He finds his new role in engaging in “meta-governance” (Whitehead 2003) to cope with horizontal and self-organized forms of power and secure its hierarchical influence over them. The problem of sovereignty does not dissolve into webs of regional governance: Urban policy in France is marked by a profound republican voluntarism that is articulated from the truism of the unitary nation (Jazouli; Rey 2015: 192).²² Socio-spatial disintegration within the polity is either conceptualized as a lack of *égalité* and *solidarité* or separatism. French urban policy (*politique de la ville*) increasingly develops into establishing the conditions for republican-consent on the bases of a socio-spatial paradigm to guarantee what more commonly is spoken about as integration and social cohesion (Belmessous 2014; Dikec 2007; Hargreaves 2007, Kirzbaum 2014, 2015; Parlomares 2008).

It is important to remember that before urban policy was institutionalized by 1982 Mitterrand was pushing towards decentralizing the state (Fourcaut 1999: 116). Political powers were

²² A crucial argument for the lasting importance of sovereignty within governmentality studies see Stenson (1998) and for a more general critique McKee (2009).

redistributed towards the lower territorial entities such as the region, and the department, the municipality. The “local state” (Epstein 2013a) represented by the prefecture was weakened and regional governments established a degree of autonomy and were granted their own budget (see Hall, 2002: 692). This was a major blow against the French central planning paternalism (*dirigisme*). The local and regional entities started to take initiatives and became public actors especially within urban affairs (Epstein, 2013 a).

“La principale originalité de la politique de la ville réside en ceci qu’elle inaugure un processus dialectique entre le ‘local’ et le ‘territoire’ ... un rapport contractuel entre le centre (L’État) et la périphérie (les collectivités territoriales, les acteurs territoriaux, les habitants). » (Estèbe 2001: 26).

Urban policy was becoming a “territorial governance” (Epstein, 2013: 278) between the local/regional and the central forces of the political society.

The new local/territorial “dialectic” (Estèbe 2001) upheaves new political agents: this time it is the mayors, the social housing associations and the sub prefects that are mutually engaging in tackling the urban crises. The regional authorities take initiative and became the innovative forces within the realm of urban policy making. A national commission for the development of the neighbourhoods (CNDSQ) is set up and headed by the mayor of Grenoble, reports are conducted and presented. On the national level, we see the installation of an inter-ministerial committee (CIV) in 1984 with a big fund called FSU (David 2001: 18). This is the time of experimentation within the nominated and co-conducted local interventions areas (DSQ) that will be the bases for general proposition pronounced in the reports (Epstein, 2013 :39f). La Duchère becomes such a priority neighbourhood (DSQ) “only” by 1986. This was a process of several years prolonged by the political countermoves of the municipality against the will of local association (Schwartz 2003, Rojon 2014).

By the mid 1980’s social housing operators, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, engaged in the “diversification of the social composition” within the *Grands ensembles* (Deschamps 2001: 82) so social mixing as an institutionalized praxis of ordering was carried first within the social housing agencies, institutions like the SLPM (*Services de Liaison et de Promotion des Migrants*) that had entanglements with the former colonial administration of the Muslim population in Algeria and the prefecture (Belmessous, 2014; Sala Pala 2008). It stands in a historical continuation of demands for “brassage” (mix) and the “seuil de tolerance” (level of acceptance, my translation), social equilibrium, applied to immigrant workers hostels starting from the Algerian independence war and distribution of immigrant workers within social

housing by the mid 1970's. Demands for social mixing were then formulated and directed towards the municipalities and towards the national policy makers (Jazouli and Rey 2015) .

The social housing operators increasingly saw themselves as urbanist operators (Deschamps 2001; Jazouli 2015). The scientific and political debate that was discussing the problematic of social mix, by whatever assumption (immigration, concentration of poverty, spatial distance, lack of intercommunal solidarity, post-Fordism etc..) followed later.

In short, social housing operators started to develop tactics for the attribution of residents often by applying ethnicized, culturalist ideas of how to handle the intersection of a spreading poverty, “delinquency” and a post-immigration population that is replacing the middle class (Sala Pala 2008, Belmessous 2014).

Towards the end of the 1980's, the state is on its way back for two main reasons: the drifting apart of the communes and the search for a means to tackle the further deepening of urban problems effectively and more coherently (see Dikec, 2007; Hall, 2002). The *politique de la ville* then is established within the 10th national plan and defines “the level of intervention (quartier, commune, agglomeration) and the course of action (economic, social, cultural, education, sports, leisure).” (David 2001: 19) . The term “Ville” (city) also stands for a shift from the neighbourhood level of the DSQ to the city, it is the begin of the city contracts (*contrat de ville*, CDV from now on). By the 11th national plan 1994-1998 (see Kirszbaum, 2015 :24),²³ more than 200 CDV's - most of them intercommunal, have been initiated. And with normalisation, the term *mixité sociale* becomes omnipresent (Sala Pala 2008) .

2.3 Zoning

The French zoning mechanisms are an institutionalized practice that goes through various governments and presidencies, it can be understood as a mode of territorialisation and scaling of French urban and social policy. Zones, in the urban policy context, exist since the housing problems after the Second World War, like the *zone à urbaniser en priorité* (ZUP). La Duchère itself is a multiple complex of zones as visible in the figure below.

The zoning approach was according to the *banlieue* historian Annie Fourcaut (1999: 115), an approach “borrowed” from the urban area projects of the Chicago School. Before the first zones

²³ This contract model also made a career in the management of area regeneration England.

came about the *Politique de la ville* (French urban policy) was dealing with DSQ (*Développement social des quartiers*), which is better understood as neighbourhood areas that by the help of the government started to engage in urban renovation activities of a more open experimental kind. Often zoning went along the national plans within the French *dirigisme* that gave the financial means for interventions.


By the mid 1990's the *Pacte de reliance pour la ville* of the conservative government of Alain Juppé (that strongly pushed for a top down zoning approach within urban policy) and 546 neighbourhoods are delimited into *zones urbaines sensibles* (ZUS), *Zones de redynamisation urbaine* (ZRU) and *Zones franches urbaines* (ZFU). The Pasqua law initiated these zoning mechanisms most importantly the ZUS (*Zones urbaines sensibles*) which gives the bases for areas of intervention and was complemented by tax reduction zones for businesses like the ZFU (*Zone franches urbaine*). An initiative that was followed by the ZRU (*zones de redynamisation urbaine*). The ZFU and ZRU relate to the ZUS which is by itself hierarchically below and within the CDV. The focus in the mid 1990's thus shifted towards economic development policy through tax concessions and top down ways of determining intervention areas by using demographic assertion of distinct socio-spatial qualities. The ZUS came with a demand for empirical investigation, "taking into account the number of inhabitants of the area, the unemployment rates, the proportion of young people under 25 years old, the proportion of school drop-outs, and the fiscal potential of the relevant commune." (Dikec, 2007 :100).

By the end of the 1990's over 1000 priority neighbourhoods are known to the state (Chaline 2014: 25). The ZUS are areas delimited by a set of categories (unemployment, school-dropouts, income, etc.) and built from statistical data (Stouten and Rosenboom 2013) . A "zone" like the *Zone urbaine sensible* can also be understood against the supposedly operating "colour blindness" (Kirzsbaum, 2014: 2) of the republican state as it enables public authorities and politics to engage with minorities without using any categories of ethnicity, class, religion, banned by the French's republican tradition (Hargreaves 2007 [1995]: 194). ZUS can very well be understood as responding to the concentration of relatively poor migrants in urban areas near the former industrialised periphery of big French cities like Paris, Lyon and Marseille with high densities of social housing (see Hargreaves, 2007 [1995]: 63). In fact, the connection between zoning and discrimination was drawn by the Sueur report in 1997, which initiated a change in urban policy that was enabled by the newly formed socialist government of Jospin (see Dikec 2007: 104).

In general, the zone in the French context signifies or carries with it an older meaning that reflects a space at the urban margins of Paris outside of the taxation border. A space that is best understood within the externalization of contradictions deriving from capitalist urbanization, and the conflict between labour and capital. The *banlieue* also became home, by bureaucratic attribution, of an immigrant working class often derived from de-colonized French colonies and it can operate as an “ethnic boundary” in the sense of Frederik Barth (1969) its utilisation produces distinction of social status. This ethnicization by “zoning” does also work with Bauman’s (2001) notion of how minorities are constructed within relations of power and their capacities to ascribe and inscribe ethnic categories (see ch 1.1).

Even though not officially communicated as a zone the *Quartier prioritaire* (QP) of the Lamy law (2013) are the successor of the ZUS. The zoning, officially abandoned with the law just became a more coherent procedure that was given another name: *Quartier prioritaire* (QP). This was also due to the power of the mayors that feared a loss of funding (see Epstein 2015). The average income in comparison to a unit of reference built the unique criteria for defining a targeted area.

Figure: Système d'information géographique de la politique de la ville explanation :



red: Zone urbaine sensible (ended with the *Loi Lamy* in 2014)

magenta: Zone franche urbaine (ZFU)²⁴

blue: Quartier Prioritaire as defined by the Lamy-law.

violet hatching: Tax reduction area for becoming home owners, 300m around the QP limits.

White: NPNRU, in Lyon related to older GPV's, same surface as QP therefore not visible. It is the continuation of the ANRU program within the new legal context.

It is one out of five special policing areas in Lyon called *Zone de sécurité prioritaire*. Missing in the description above is a zone that is less associated with discrimination and the

²⁴ Like the ZUS, introduced within the first Chirac government, tax free zones (ZFU) after the British model and a general zoning approach with different classes or gravity of problems are initiated.

rolling out of urban policy, a technical zoning mechanism called *Zone d'aménagement concerté* (ZAC).

La Duchère had to be framed within a national real estate law of the late 1960's (LOF) that provides the operational rules of action for the ZAC and the control over the soil of the neighbourhood. The ZAC of La Duchère serves the purpose of being able to define the maximum price of 2600€ average per apartment m². This price is 1000€ less than in the agglomeration and shall attract young active middle classes from outside but also “help” local dwellers to become home owners and a bit more than 10% of the new built housing was bought by the inhabitants. Here it could be argued that a “Third-Wave-Gentrification” as defined by Lees et al (2008: 175-181) is on the move as the state and the commune are removing the barriers for real estate capital and reducing the risks for a market based development that otherwise could not take place within the neighbourhood. The majority publicly owned developer SERL facilitates this “wave” of gentrification with the help of national funds and exploits what Neil Smith (1982 :151) calls a process of “uneven development”.

2.4 Overlooking the normalization of *mixité sociale* within the French urban policy -

In 1990 the *Loi Besson* assures housing as a right but keeps the attributive mechanism and thus the access to social housing within the operations of the particular social housing agency, even though a national regulatory does exist the important “social equilibrium” is defined by the former ones (Sala Pala 2008, Bacqué and Fol 2008).The *départements* were beholden to contribute financially and it prohibited the use of the pre-emptive right against social housing projects in communes where social housing accounted for less than 20% of housing (Article 14).” (Dikec 2007:76) .

The LOV-law (*Loi d'orientation pour la ville*) that came together with the ministry of urban affairs in 1990/91 mediatized as the “anti-ghetto” law declared the “right to the city” and established a distributing mechanism for social housing estates over the territory to strengthen “social cohesion” and to work against segregation and the distance between the *Grands ensembles* and the city centres. This law and the setting up of a ministry of urban affairs a few month before, can be directly related to the uprisings in December 1990 in Vaulx-en-Velin suburb of Lyon (Hargreaves 2007 [1995]: 198f). Using a juridical tool of 1983, the *Plan local de l'habitat* (PLH), housing types associated with types of population shall be distributed on an

intercommunal scope. Residential mix was thus seen as the pre-condition for a better social cohesion. The communes within an agglomeration of more than 200 000 inhabitants had to provide for 20% of social housing. If they would ignore this demand they must -till today, pay a fine (Bacqué, 2008; Deschamps, 2001; Dikec 2007). This calculated ignoring within municipalities that don't want to supply for social housing remains a heated issue within local and regional French politics (Kirszbaum, 2013 :180; Jazouli, 2015 :191).

When it comes to the local urbanisation plan (*Plan local de l'habitat* - PLH) of the *communauté urbaine* Lyon many municipalities stick to it but some don't and prefer to pay the penalty for not sufficiently providing social housing within the areas where the law LOV (later SRU) is effective (Polga, 2004 :24).

Lyon's first PLH has been created in 1995 by the urban community of Lyon that itself was founded in 1969. It is responsible for a coherent housing development of the municipalities that together constitute it. The PLH is part of the CDV and in accordance with the overall urban development plan (*Plan local d'urbanisme* - PLU). Part of CDV is an evaluation institution cofounded between the *communauté urbaine* de Lyon and the state in 1996: the *observation partenarial de la cohésion social et territoriale*. The latter is surveying the efforts and results of the overall urbanist enterprise of Lyon.

To sum up, the CDV stands for the reengagement of the state and for the ending of bottom up contractualism between municipalities, it was integrated into the 11th national plan (1994-1998) and important laws that both build a selective mechanism within the locally contracting political subdivisions and works within the voluntarist framework of territorial governance. The CDV also brings a coherent evaluation where the level of analyses switches from smaller units like the neighbourhood to the city-agglomeration. Finally, it is the new laws and zoning practices aim to implement housing-type diversification at a city wide level (see Hall; Hickman 2002: 692). Zoning mechanism are debated as opposed to a politics of *droit commun* (general law, my translation) that would apply without the need for specification. Gradually, "zones" became part of what is debated as a "positive discrimination" as means to favour territorial "equality" through favouring the priority neighbourhoods. Zoning of this kind is more a thing of the conservative parties (Kirszbaum 2015: 23). As a reaction to zoning neighbouring suburbs, mostly consisting of single family units, started to explicitly define themselves as "peri-urban" not to evoke any negative imagery (Lambert 2015).

By the end of the 1990's the begin of a general housing crisis was hindering the process of redistribution of types-of population so the anti-exclusion law (*Loi d'orientation relative à la lutte contre les exclusions*) was put in place to reduce vacancy in communes by taxing it, the

gained tax money was than funding socio-cultural activities within the priority neighbourhoods with the aim to balance out inequalities.

Having already expanded the budgetary means, by 1999, the state was granting an additional budget for extreme cases where the existing means were deemed inappropriate this is called the *Grand projet de ville* (GPV) which replaced the GPU and came when the second generation of CDV was adopted in the late 1990's. Here the demolition reconstruction approach increasingly was pushed to the front. Initiated by the main decisional body of the *politique de la ville*, the CIV most of the DSQ's were transposed to the GPV (Epstein, 2013 :115).

The idea of social mixing is heavily present within the GPV that came with the centre-right government under Lionel Jospin (1997-2002). The GPV for the first time pushes towards a sociological constructivism that works through urban planning and by giving criteria for the residential buildings quantities of social housing within the overall project. On the level of the "project" the GPV started to create a tension between the "old" local inhabitants and the aspired middle classes that now are in the forefront of urban development. In Lyon the case of the GPV La Duchère and Vaulx-en-Velin expresses this middle-class orientation of the urbanistic project by moving the new city centre away from the social housing estates.

La Duchère was a former DSQ where the GPV mechanism has been applied in 2001 (Schwartz 2003: 209). A public information web-site (www.vie-publique.fr) defines the GPV as „... un projet global. Si des opérations lourdes de requalification urbaine restent au cœur du projet, le GPV se donne aussi comme ambition d'améliorer les conditions de vie des habitants, de transformer l'image du quartier et la perception qu'on peut en avoir et de redonner une valeur économique à ces territoires. »

As always, the concrete case of town planning is more complex. As already lined out above, La Duchère has been a GPV since 2003. This allowed the project to take off in its holistic conception thus to improve the living conditions for residents on a general level and the possibility of demolishing buildings. The initial project thus is framed within a "territorial governance" and not a "governing from distance" (Epstein 2013). La Duchère was part of general strategy with several GPVs conducted at that time and GPV also stands for a particular way of funding and operating the project.²⁵ Not to forget the PLH signed between the *Communauté urbaine de Lyon* that gave the bases for an operationalization of *mixité sociale* as

something that concerns every commune and determines an operation that aims at the distribution of urban poor between the communes. Nevertheless, the GPV La Duchère also states that all residents have to be able to stay within the commune of Lyon²⁶ and if they wish to stay in La Duchère they shall be guaranteed residency in La Duchère after the reconstruction. Christine Lelevier (2013) found in her study about social mixing, that included the case of La Duchère, that the residential choice of staying or leaving is often not taken by the agency of the concerned person but rather by the housing options that can accommodate the needs for cheap living space. Also, households with many children don't have much of choice as similar apartments usually are in proximity to the area of intervention.

Alike the LOV law initiated in 1991, the SRU law (*Loi de Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain* - SRU) of 2000 pushed in the same direction, by insisting on a form of urbanization that would equally tackle the challenge of socio-spatial segregation. It had a fine of approximately 150 € per missing social housing unity for those communes with more than 3500 inhabitants that did not follow the law (Dikec 2007:112). The SRU law takes control over the way the communes zone their soil by insisting on providing for a concept of retail, housing, and public transport otherwise the preconditions for a CDV are not met which means the big rise in the urban reconstruction budget is not available for the municipality (see David, 2001 :21).

The SRU was extremely contested by the parties and mayors of the right political spectrum (Bacqué and Fol 2008:) “ At the end of 2005 ... among 735 communes concerned by the SRU, only half of them satisfied their three-yearly requirements. Among the other half, 200 of them were so behind the required amount that their fines would be augmented.” (Dikec 2007:113). The SRU law “rationalizes an accumulated body of planning legislation and clarifies the roles of the state and local authorities in the contract process. It is widely regarded as representing a partial re-centralization of power.” (Hall and Hickman 2002: 695). The SRU law comes at a time when inter-communal cooperation is simplified (Chevènement law). The scope of how to tackle urban segregation expanded towards the whole agglomeration (Hulst and Monfort 2007, Dikec 2007). The SRU does so by assigning financial opportunities to those communes that organized within the new territorial entities and thus were also institutionally restructuring their own competences (ibid). The *Communauté urbaine de Lyon* for example consisted of 59 communes of the agglomeration that share the following competences: Economic, “social and cultural development planning; Spatial planning; Social balance in housing within the community, Town policy, Management of services of collective interest (water, cemeteries,

²⁶ With the 8th district as the only exception.

emergency services) Protection and use of the environment.” (ibid).²⁷ With the SRU law, the ZAC also became part of an intercommunal based urbanism (PLU) that has to be put in accordance with the national urbanist doctrine (*Code de l’urbanisme*). The SRU-law also changed the zoning mechanism for large scale urbanist intervention mechanism called *Zone d’aménagement concerté* (ZAC) that from then on also targeted the lack of *mixité sociale* not as a delimited “sensible” area (*zone*) but within the agglomeration by enforcing a de-segregation within the whole intercommunal urban planning (PLH) – in the case of La Duchère that is created upon such a ZAC the *Communauté urbaine de Lyon*.

Finally, with the *Loi Borloo* in 2003 this trend of recentralizing power is confirmed. “The Borloo law was conceived along three main lines that reflected the three priorities identified above: physical renovation, economic development and institutional restructuring.” (Dikec 2007:121). It is here that we can see a new dialectic between the local level of territorial governance and the central state which has significantly changed. It stands for a radicalization of the GPV approach by working within the geography of the ZUS that is not constructed within local partnership models but by the means of statistical data. The urban priority area called urban sensible zone (ZUS) builds the geography and the precondition for having access to public investment within the Borloo law and its national urban renovation program (PNRU); it becomes the only way for municipalities to get public funding for urban renovation within the ZUS (Epstein 2013: 165).²⁸

Subsequently this legal initiative was a definite shift away from the original decentralization of urban policy towards a “governing from distance.” (Epstein 2013: 303-332). The core idea of the Borloo law is a *mixité sociale* that operates on the level of a spatial redistribution of the poor population, this of course is not new. The Borloo-law initiates an area of demolition and reconstruction based on the assumption that neighbourhood effects and that other means cannot overcome the negative visible/symbolic representations of the selected areas. It is thus heavily oriented towards the built environment and quotas of social housing. The resolution to explode or tire down 200.000 social housing apartment units as a prelude between 2004-2008 was an endeavour that shall not only be continued but boosted within the following period.

Whereas the GPV was essentially intercommunal supported by the CDV and the creation of intercommunal territorial cooperation that was then integrated into the funding for national planning, the new program of urban renovation (PNRU) starts to push forward the communes

²⁷ In 2014 the *Communauté urbaine de Lyon* became the *Métropole de Lyon*.

²⁸ I will discuss the zoning approach at the end of this subchapter.

themselves and especially their mayors by introducing a new funding mechanism coupled to the co-established national financial agency for urban renovation (ANRU). Access is allowed by a mode of competition between projects where the horizontal governance structure of various interlinked “partners” is competing against other funding aspirants of other communes with a ZUS (Epstein, 2013).

ANRU, the National Agency for Urban Renewal is initiated as the way to finance and conduct what the *loi Borloo* is aiming at: to finish with the *banlieue* problem by finishing with the *Grands ensembles* thus the urban form itself. “45 milliards d’euros d’investissement pour modifier, dans un même mouvement, la morphologie urbaine, la structure de la propriété foncière et la répartition spatiale des groupes sociaux.” (Epstein, 2013 :19). The aim however is not to reduce social housing or minder its role on the city level, just to use it as a technology to arrange the poor population within the targeted territory (see Lelévier, 2013 :411). It must be added that the communes of the wealthy would nevertheless pay their fines to not have any immigrant urban poor population. This was acknowledged as something positive by Sarkozy in 2005 (see Dikec 2007: 113).

The ANRU budget was about 45 billion Euros, the long-demanded “Marshall Plan” thus has emerged (Houard, 2012 :211). The riots of 2005 only confirmed against critiques that this specific type of urbanism got to be abandoned, there was no way back. The main “partners” that forge into the ANRU by means of their already existing involvement in urban politics but particularly their financial powers are the state, the state-owned bank *Caisse de dépôts*, the social housing “movement” and the 1% tax on capital profit.²⁹ An important mission, the *délégation interministérielle à la ville* (DIV) that elaborated the contents for the CIV, thus is part of the institutional body of national urban politics and within the tradition of “people” and “place” understanding, recommended for innovations and guided the GPV’s was almost dismantled by the Borloo law (see Donzelot, 2006; see Jazouli, 2015 : 139f).

To summarize the changes that came with the Borloo law one must point to the main means of intervention that is the place, the built environment of the neighbourhood. The PNRU set itself as a goal to work on the “place” and not on the “people” side of urban restructuring. “...urban renewal in France results from a new political doctrine emphasizing spatial means of action, with social mix as its primary objective.” (Gilbert 2009: 646). So, the social mix now is a mix through the exterior by the means of a re-configured urban built environment; the comparably

²⁹ 1 % tax is targeting the profits of singular capitals, installed in the 50’s it helps to build housing for workers.

low ground rents and the magnitude of the urban reconstruction enterprise shall attract the middle classes from outside mainly through a reduction of social housing and by a significant increase of often subsidized home-ownership and investment friendly smaller sized apartments. A community regeneration approach is not at the heart of the intervention. The “people” side of the undertaking has even been institutionally separated which also is new to French urban policy (Rojon 2014) .

Within the conditions of financial crises and budgetary restraints, the ANRU program could not go on as before. Even though the ANRU program has been extended and also been given a new denomination: NPRU (*Nouveau programme de renouvellement urbain*) 10 years after the Borloo law banalized the massive destruction of what remained of the *Grands ensembles*, the Lamy law brought back means of action applied before, most notably the re-inclusion of the “people” side in on-going and future urban reconstruction.

The Lamy law was influenced by a key scholar in urban sociology in France, Marie-Hélène Bacqué and Mohamed Mehmache, an activist and community organizer that took initiatives after the urban uprising of 2005 that spread from his neighbourhood Clichy-sous-Bois to all over France. The Mehmache-Bacqué report ordered by the Minister Delegate for Urban Affairs Francois Lamy influenced the law by emphasizing “empowerment” (*pouvoir d’agir*) of the local citizens, associations and their role within the territorialisation and co-development within urban politics.

The main objectives of the Lamy-law are the following: Local democracy and empowerment (*pouvoir d’agir*), contractualization within bigger urban entities (*co-construction*) the end of zoning and a unique criterion (*critère unique*) for areas of intervention. The law brings with it a simplification of the operationalization of *mixité sociale* within French urban policy, it now builds the distribution of poverty in a given territory.

2.5 Participation and French urban policy

It is in the Sueur report (1998, ch.5) that is one of the key government reports of French urban policy where the question of participation was seriously taken up and described as something that was an inherent part of the French urban policy making from its very beginning. It did also state though that it never was clarified, defined or advanced to address the fundamental questions about urban restructuring.

The participation of the inhabitants became a part of the GPV with the *Conseil des quartier*, a top down initiated body for local participation that came in 2002 with the Vaillant law, one of the laws that followed the Sueur report. But other than in the report suggested, the *Conseil des quartier* stays a very limited approach, an intermediary structure in bigger French cities or an annex to the municipal government that is concerned with urban policy. Everyone can take part in it, but it has no decisional powers and works as a consultancy carried out by local inhabitants for the municipal government. It can make proposition to the district governments within the realm of urban policy and has a wide range of participants including a person from the district government and has control over an assigned budget. It must be noted that at the time the *Conseil de quartier* was normalized discourses about security and republican unity dominated the public sphere between the Jospin cohabitation till the election of Nicolas Sarkozy. A few months after the September 11 attacks a range of policing entitlements that can be associated at least with the discourse of the *banlieue* (staircase dealing, unlawful use of new technologies, drug trade) but also goes against counter cultures like the techno scene where deployed (see Dikec 2007: 118). This means that participation did not hold any prominent role within the published opinion and public debate. The *Conseil de quartier* is criticized for rather being a means for legitimation of the municipal governments urbanist endeavours than a form of participation of inhabitants.

In the case of La Duchère the level of participative planning must be regarded critical. It is not the case that on the overall scale of the project was co-designed by inhabitants, rather inhabitants were granted access and control over possible usage of certain areas within the project. They were and are involved but within placemaking procedures, the overall urbanist conception stays untouched.

In my view the lack of substantive participation within the urban planning also comes from outsourcing the general owner builder (*maîtrise d'ouvrage*) tasks from the municipality. They were transferred from the public authorities to a by majority publicly owned building society (SERL), very much like in the first days of La Duchère in the 1950's. SERL then invited the leading planning urbanists and other consultants who "... définit les prescriptions urbaines architecturales, paysagères et environnementales en amont des consultations et concours ; elle accompagne également les projets publics et privés tout au long de leur mise en œuvre." SERL however was not obliged, beside of diagnostical social research to deal with the needs of the inhabitants, this is also due to the fact that the local inhabitants weren't the most important recipients of the urban restructuring operation.

As laid out in the chapter before the GPV La Duchère used a zoning approach called ZAC to get control over the soil and the overall price development. The last letter in ZAC stands for *concerté*, it defines the participative or rather communicative character of the overall operation which thus is mandatory for any ZAC and ideally making the needs of the residents a part of it. If public planning authorities fall short in doing so the legal status of the project could even be withdrawn.

It is true that a considerable effort is made to communicate the project of La Duchère and to take part and co-initiated cultural activities. In the case of La Duchère we have public information and participation throughout the project: Initiatives like assemblages, a magazine, a website, several working-groups within the overall mission of the project, a constant exposition of the project, a general assembly in 2004 (gpvlyonduchere: online source; Anru, 2004). One of that issue called “La Duchère pari tenu” (2014: 8) declared that “Les habitants sont en effet associés à la gouvernance du projet.”.

By the begin of the GPV, local residents demands for further information about the project were strikingly present and were driven by strong feelings of insecurity about their residential status (Bousquet, 2011). This collective energy was used to promote participation and another comity that is directly linked to the GPV was set up in 2005. It has the role of defining the agenda of the four annual public meetings that are taking place within its institutional frame. There are several constantly operating “ateliers” workgroups around specified issues concerning the urban reconstruction. It was by the initiative of the civil society that “forums” as informative events about the project were carried out (ibid).

If one is looking on the overall impact this is correct that urban governance has expanded towards the local inhabitants and associations, but this should not be confused with the real effects this mode of participation had. Then, what are the results and the limitations of this inclusive governance one might ask?

Results that are frequently named in various issues of the official project magazine are the following: The facilities of the *Parc de Vallon* like a playground, a statue, the permanent exposition of the project, the renaming of the streets, the quality of the new central square Abbé Pierre, a community location for celebrations. There are many more less obvious renovations and remodelling's that are not named at this place but overall the local participation is about place making and not about the general lines of the project.

The limit of participation or “local democracy” is best illustrated by the case of a demolition of a social housing apartment bloc that did fulfil various criteria of the GPV like the wanted *mixité sociale* and just had been renovated. The inhabitants started to resist, and the collective of vigilant residents called GTI, together with a local association of renters that fought against the demolition, organized actions against its demolition. “Le GTI lutte par exemple pendant près de deux ans avec des locataires contre la démolition d'un immeuble qui respecte les quotas de mixité sociale mais que l'aménageur a décidé de démolir pour créer un axe de communication reliant directement la ville de Lyon à l'auto-route.” (Overney 2011: 5). This struggle of the local inhabitants, did not change the project as it touched dimensions within that obviously were not debatable, probably because they would have changed key urbanist ideas.

The last participatory achievement for a better participation in French urban policy making are the *conseil citoyen* that came with the Lamy laws insistence on empowerment. In La Duchère the council is set up within the mission of the GPV that coordinates the project but in general they ought to be in every QP in France. Unlike the other participative bodies (such as the *conseil de quartier*) the Lamy-law regulates the way it should operate. This precondition concerns the mandates that consist of corporate agents and local inhabitants, both can hold a maximum of 50%. The council is acknowledged as an official partner by the prefect (*département*) within the urban contracting. The contracting thus stands for an agglomeration approach and for a politics that does not just positively discriminate a delimited zone. The councils help to evaluate and hold a locally negotiated degree of co-conductance of what became part of the agenda. Every QP shall have one installed within the existing participative structure and everyone shall be represented by at least two agents, one from each college, in the contracting process.

As lined out before, participation bodies were established in La Duchère right at the beginning of the GPV in 2002, this went along with the ZAC procedure and the demands of the ANRU. The citizen-council (*conseil citoyen*) was officially founded in December 2016. Its formation took place in the second part of my fieldwork where I could see very well how it was operating within the GPV-mission and the already existing participative structure. To fetch a head to the next chapter, it was clear that a few months before its inauguration, what should become the *conseil citoyen* did not represent the population of La Duchère. At that time, during the *ateliers* within the GPV, it was above all a platform for those already active for a long period of time.

As pointed out by Donzelot et al (2006) participants start within a highly symbolic arena of “partnership” and never reach a sufficient moment of power as understood in the sense of Hannah Arendt’s “power to” that is understood as an emergent quality of social relations (see

Bernstein, 2011: 6).³⁰ “... à ceci que nous cherchons dans la participation beaucoup plus une légitimation de la décision qu’une mobilisation pour l’action.” (Donzelot and Epstein 2006: 34)

The mobilisation of local inhabitants stays in the realm of “développer des projets mobilisant les ressources endogènes du quartier en appui sur les ressources de l’environnement institutionnel.” (Kirszbaum 2015: 36). This space obviously is not a space where conflicts can be carried out but one of partnership or cooperation. Epstein (2015) analyses this democratisation as resulting from the crises of democratic representation as such and understands it as a form of corporatist social regulation. With Bob Jessops (2008: ch4) reading of Gramsci, one could see that whenever the state tries to absorb and blur the civil society with the political society the modalities of state power are changing. In the current situation though, the territorialisation of urban policy in France that came with the decentralization laws of the early 1980’s still functions by the will of the municipalities and inter-communal entities like Grand Lyon i.e. the mayors (Epstein 2015: 215). According to Epstein (ibid) it is doubtful if the new *conseil de citoyens* (citizen-council, my translation), now installed within the new zoning initiative *quartier prioritaire* (QP) and promoted as the new democratic tool within urban politics, change that position of the powerful mayors.³¹

Nevertheless, urban governance and participation entered into the policy paradigm of *mixité sociale*.

³⁰ This stands opposed to a Weberian power, that is a demanding “pouvoir” or a repressive “Macht”.

³¹ It is important to indicate at this place that the mayor of a French city can hold a row of other official functions. Taking the example of Gérard Collomb that was in 2014 the mayor of Lyon, the president of Grand Lyon and Senator of the republic.

3 *Mixité sociale* - Relevant theories, key authors

“...the common policy thrust toward neighbourhood social mixing must be seen as based more on faith than fact.” (Galster, 2007 :18)

“...hopes that the mixing of classes will iron out these inequalities. The intent is noble, but the means are inappropriate.” (Gans, 1961 :182)

The application of social mixing strategies in urban restructuring and housing policies is not a genuine French phenomenon or only applied in the French context, it occurs most notably within liberal democracies that have functioning welfare programs (see Bridge et al, 2012: 2). The initial deliberation about social mixing in the discipline of sociology and urban planning appeared in the 1960's within a historical climate marked by modernist authoritarian urban planning, the north American ghetto, and the civil rights movement (Bacqué and Fol, 2005; Gans, 1961; Jacobs, 1961).

Current debates about social mixing is not settled upon some new understanding of how social and cultural diversity and homogeneity affects the social fabric. Social mixing usually transports two assumptions: the positive effects of middle class people in the neighbourhood as role models and an increased sense of community and social cohesion (Arthurson, 2002, 2012).

The supposed result of social mixing is assumed to be a prosperous “liveable” city (Uitermark 2007; Gent 2013). Diversity is often embedded within a more general social imaginary of liveability or “creative strategy” about cultural and industrial competitive qualities of a city (see Epstein 2013; Peck 2010; Smith 2002; Uitermark et al 2007).³²

From the point of social science this assumption is usually highly contested. “it can be concluded that policies prompting desegregation and social mix rarely meet policy expectations. First, residential mixing cannot be assumed to enhance community cohesion or people's social capital (Nast and Blokland, 2013). On the contrary, urban renewal policies have been found to disrupt communities. Displaced households experience difficulties in establishing

³² The term “liveable” is defined with Uitermark et al (2007: 125) as a “‘balanced’ neighbourhood with a low level of crime and a sizeable share of middle class households.”. It is a concept in line with a post-industrial and knowledge based urban economy as laid out by Richard Florida (Lees et al 2008).

new social ties.” (Bolt et al, 2010 :132). Also, social mixing produces “othering” as “Social mix policies ... socially construct the middle class or middle-income groups as a natural category in contrast to a demonised working class or low-income groups (and this is done spatially).” (Lees, 2008 : 2463)

It is commonly indicated that the social mixing policy that brings in middle class pioneers, should be understood as a form of gentrification (Lees et al 2008: 122). To be more precise, this middle -class oriented urban restructuring is often referred to as state-led gentrification or “3rd wave gentrification” where the local government acts as a facilitator and guarantee for transnational real estate capital to enter the neighbourhood (Lees et al 2008 Gent, 2013; Smith, 2002; Uitermark et al 2007). Seen in this perspective the “3rd wave” is a form of continuation of a now generalized and global gentrification that operates within neoliberal urbanism. As regular gentrification, it valorises capital by grounding transnational capital flows within the wider urban scale by exploiting uneven development in the real estate development within a process that is bully backed by the initiatives of public authorities (Gent 2013; Smith 2002; Lees et al, 2008, Uitermark 2007). It is an on-going debate in the literature about social mixing if within the European context urban restructuring that is advanced in its name can *per se* be conceptualized as gentrification because of the often-lacking displacement criteria and the neglected role of the welfare state (Gent, 2013 :5, Uitermark 2007).

In my understanding of the French case a gentrification approach tends to obscure an important side of *mixité sociale* in the sense that it tends to not grant sufficient autonomy to the “coercive”, “governmental”, “hegemonic” etc.. strategies employed by the French national state. *Mixité sociale* as much as it involves real estate capital flows, is also crafting substantive unity between civil and political society by the means of urban restructuring and urban governance in disadvantaged urban areas (see Uitermark et al 2007).

I will argue that *mixité sociale* is a means that in a second move connects national objectives of social cohesion to urban governance. *Mixité sociale* thus has an important but less visible dimension of advancing an integrative and integrating structure to strengthen the cultural hegemony on the bases of French republicanism in poor former working-class neighbourhoods characterized by weak cultural and social resources with high amounts of welfare recipients and a precarious employment pattern. The urban restructuring double function is strengthening hegemony through re-unifying the population as individual citizens around concrete interventions into the urban environment, education through cultural events and by the means of leadership exercised through a participatory urban governance structure.

In the French case state-led intervention in the name of *mixité sociale* usually happened in the pauperized edges of mayor cities even though comparably weak forms of interventions are also pursued in the richer suburbs (*banlieues*). I see the emergence of the policy of *mixité sociale* and the institutionalization of French urban policy internally related with those new geographies of social relegation but even more to urban uprisings that inflicted a territorial destabilization and political urgency from the 1980's onwards. The immense uprising of 2005 covering 85% (about 300) of the communes that signed demolition of social housing, intervened within a period of a new schema of urban intervention emphasizing the need for another built urban environment because of assumed neighbourhood effects of the existing structure. This included the emphasis on private homeownership, and a “defendable” space. This paradigm shift came with a *mixité sociale* that was pursued as a sociological constructivism or designing.

The overcoming of the *banlieue*-problem coincided with the overcoming of its urban form which was mediated by the demolition of its visual representations: multiple storey tower blocks.³³

From the official side, *mixité sociale* stays undefined and thus can be considered as a policy paradigm “... within which conflicts over competing interests and demands can be negotiated without threatening the overall project.” (Jessop 1990: 210) of engendering hegemony in these areas of intervention.

3.1 The history of social housing in France and its relation to the working classes

*“Social housing was never intended for the homeless and the very poor, but
for the low-paid and stable workers required by local industries and, also,
for some ‘deserving’ poor.”
(Blanc, 2004: 285)*

In the need of another form of worker-housing by the end of the 19th century, one that did not carry on the assumptions about being responsible for “massification” and socialist intrusion through dangerous communications inside the worker barracks. Interestingly, the widely favoured segregated family houses like in the classical *cit  ouvri re* in Mulhouse (France) were

³³ The *Grand ensemble* does not mean tower blocks but a specific urban form that was inspired by the Charter of Athens and reality often built in urgency and poor qualities. However, it is the urban form that is targeted and not the physicality of the built urban environment.

deemed out-dated and unpractical. It was within this climate that some new liberal ideas could take shape. Most notably a highly influential philanthropist and politician - off a big textile enterprise - named Jules Siegfried (1837-1922) born in Mulhouse took initiative after having explored the regulation potential of social housing within class struggle started to advance his agenda during the 1889 exposition in Paris. This was not by a philosophical investigation but by his own experiences and experimentation within the family enterprise. Worker-family-housing, built as multi residence building, was understood by J. Siegfried as the social technology towards a socially fairer capitalism. The state should not have the initiative, only enabling the endeavours, by cutting taxes, helping with mortgages and then helping to establish building-societies. The Siegfried-law was successfully initiated in 1894. Already a few years later (1900), state intervention was accepted as a necessity (Rabinow 1989: 180ff). In hindsight, the Siegfried law was in essence tackling question around the recent problematization of a social mixing too, as the collective housing type for the working class was stated against a dispersed arrangement of social housing (Bacqué 2008: 117).

Cité ouvrière in Mulhouse (France)

Picture: Wikipedia, creative commons



The French situation was marked by problems resulting from capitalist urbanization bringing the effects of bad housing and living condition in the industrialising cities. Nevertheless, the harsh political debate did continue to follow the lines drawn by liberalist impetus thus the emphasis was laid on the efficiency of the market, not to conjure up the interventionist state to create facts (Lefebvre et al, 1991). In the imaginary of France as the counterweight to Britain's *laissez faire* liberalism, one might wonder if this is true. Indeed, France central governments only had a strong interventionist attitude in the pre-revolutionary area and then again after the second World War (Chang 2007: 32f) . So, the first hesitant steps taken by state intervention were not continuous and just after the Second World War the development of the *faubourgs*

(shantytowns) just wildly expanded. The slum-ring “la zone” in the former fortification around Paris was starting to be dismantled in the interwar period of the 1930’s with a quarter being given to the liberal predecessor (HBM) of the post-World War 2 social housing agencies (HLM). Traces of “la zone” remained visible till the construction of the ring-highway in the early 1970’s (Cohen, 1991).³⁴

The “slum clearance policies and urban renewal programmes did not produce many dwellings. They aggravated inner-city housing shortages, compelling former inhabitants to move out.” (Blanc and Bertrand 1996: 125). This was due to the way those clearances were operated “Slum clearance ... was selective. It occurred first in ‘strategic’ areas in the inner-city and not necessarily in the worst places, such as the *bidonvilles* in the periphery. ... The paradoxical result of these slum clearance policies, and urban renewal programmes was to worsen inner-city housing shortages, as they did not produce much affordable housing.” (Blanc, 2004 :287) Inner-city urban renewal was usually met with resistance by a legitimate fear of getting kicked out of the neighbourhood - which often was the case. In Paris the *rénovation urbaine*

“... en tant qu'ensemble d'initiatives publiques, à son point de départ en 1957-58, est étroitement liée au IVe Plan et suit les lignes indiquées par le Schéma Directeur de Paris. Ce n'est en effet qu'après le démarrage d'une politique de construction de grands ensembles, à partir de 1955, qu'il est devenu envisageable de transférer des populations vers la banlieue sans provoquer des résistances trop fortes.” (Nanterre, 1970 : 491).

Around the same time as the Parisian urban renewal the housing situation came to a climax during the cold winter of 1953. It was only by 1953, pressured from several directions from the civil society that the state started to really take social housing into its own responsibility (Madoré 2013: 95). It might be added that the struggle for housing was above all a popular initiative from the side of a well-known French priest, resistance fighter and politician named Abbé Pierre’s. Its mediatised outrage and civil engagement with the question of bad housing condition after the war was crucial for establishing a social housing policy in France. It arguably took the devastations of the war and the emergence of Keynesianism and its mixing with Gaullism’s *dirigisme* to really tackle the housing question for the working class (ibid: pos. 1914). In 1953 the French state’s planning commissariat really took initiative by implementing social housing in the second *planification*; a few years later housing increasingly became affected by a functionalist urbanism in the tradition of the Charter of Athens. The construction of modern and independent estates often was advanced on the outskirts of big cities. Soil that

³⁴ When driving along the highway today one can easily spot new shanty towns styled barracks at its lateral limitations.

belonged to the state or offered cheap land became a priority geography defined as *Zone à urbaniser en priorité* (Estèbe, 2001, Epstein 2013). The enormous efforts taken for the production of social housing lasted for over 20 years (Bouculat 2014).

It must be indicated that the housing question was not solved for immigrants who did often built up the new estates; to be more precise, it was not solved for those immigrants that were not seen as being repatriated. This “other” part of the population was handled as a temporary workforce for whom the welfare system was limited. It took another twenty years until the miserable living conditions had been overcome.

By the mid 1970’s the state began to really invest in family housing for incoming families or family reunions of immigrant workers and they were increasingly integrated into the established and still expanding HLM- social housing structure. With the immigration stop in 1974 a policy change towards immigrants was declared. The immigrant workers were starting to get more visible in the *Grands ensembles* which according to Belmessous (2014: 3) was starting to change social housing policies. These changes are revealing regarding the issue of social mixing and institutionalized othering.

One turning point of this Keynesian *aide à la pierre* (bricks and mortar) policy ended by the 1977 reform that continuously shifted the gravity point towards a rather neo-liberal personal housing benefit approach (*aides à la personne*) to the advantage of small nuclear families, with a strong emphasize on home ownership (Blanc and Bertrand 1996: 129). Another push towards a more neoliberal approach within social housing came within the decentralization laws in the beginning 1980’s, (Blanc, 2004: 284). “In relation to housing, the State’s role changed from that of a ‘provider’ to that of an ‘enabler’ facilitating private initiatives in the housing field.” (ibid).

It is a consequent shift towards private property regimes but without really diminishing the welfare budget for social housing (Xavier, 2008: online). The conservative government with the liberalist Albin Chalandon as housing minister came to power in the elections that followed the left-wing May 1968 movement. Chalandon was a spearhead against collective housing estates and pushed towards nuclear family housing units. In his legacy falls the mass produced single family house pejoratively called “chalandonnette”.

Following the gradual abandoning of the *Grands ensembles* throughout the 1970s that was further sharpened by the 1977s initiatives of the Barre government that in my reading is one of the first neoliberal reforms in France (see (Blanc, 2004). The deregulation of finance and labour

does not set off before the mid 1980's (Sicsic et al, 1996; Amable et al, 2012: 129f). Raymond Barre and president Giscard d'Estaing both opted for a new housing policy that would concentrate on the financially weak strata only and that did emphasize private initiative especially towards the middle class (Harloe, 1995: 336,450). Housing as such would then be organized through the market (ibid: 449) and social housing as a general form of social wealth was falling off governmental consideration. The model of Barre included a regulation for landlords that applied for government subsidies when renovating their assets, but this was more followed by the social housing agencies than by the private landlords.

Barre himself was a moderate conservative and like Chalandon hostile of Gaullist state intervention, he started his turn in 1974 as finance minister. Around the same time, Hargreaves (2007 [1995: 63]) also notes signs of a "white flight", a concept he takes from Battergay (1992) to apply it in the French context. This concept underlines the impact of majority group sentiments against visible minorities whose influx they fear. The majority population then consequently make use of the purchasing power to move into "whiter" suburbs. When looking at the social housing policies throughout the 1970's, this "white flight" was state subsidized and mixes with the emerging middle classes desired social distinction or "politics of elective belonging" (Savage, 2010) against the immobile popular class. A mechanism that was studied in the *Grands ensembles* by the late 1960's (Chamboredon, 1970).³⁵

As shown in the beginning of this chapter, republicanism as a cultural system had a socio-cultural interaction that occurred in colonialism. During the Algerian decolonization an internal conflict inside the Algerian liberation movement and an external between the colonial power and those movement was raging in Algeria as within France itself. Algerians of non-European or Jewish origins thus Algerians of Muslim faith could travel freely by 1947 and there was a continuous labour migration setting in that was managed within the tradition of colonial institutions connected to the prefecture of the department that was dedicated to the *affaires musulmanes* (Belmessous 2014: . In France these Algerians were classified as "Français musulmans originaires d'Algérie ('FMA') (Belmessous 2015: 83). Here, the first reflexions over a possible "brassage" mixing was taking place in a reflection that concerned the accommodation for immigrant workers and the threats of the Algerian liberation movement within France (ibid: 86f). The *bidonvilles* should be emptied through a system of worker-hostels installed by the local state.

³⁵ The social mechanism of distinction has been examined by Pierre Bourdieu. He published in 1979 a famous research called "La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement".

Migration was stopped in 1974 when the economy was slowing down (Weil 1994) . At the same time the “repatriates” and the Algerian allies of the French regime fled to metropolitan France for their personal safety. In this historical socio-political climate, the idea of a deconcentrated immigrant population that should be spatially distributed evenly across the territory was connected to a housing initiative that should end the miserable conditions of immigrant workers. Thoughts about spatial redistribution included to expel immigrant-labour from France. When the governments under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing were trying to convince those, declared to nomadic labour migrants to leave France by the second half of the 1970’s a mass deportation was planned in parallel. In the campaign of Giscard against Mitterrand in 1981 this move against Muslim labour migrants was even more offensive when he announced that he would expel 100.000’s non-EC labour migrants (Hargreaves 1996: . As Mitterrand was elected 1981, this measure could not have been enforced and a flirt with a light version of multiculturalism occur under banner of “right to be different” (le droit à la différence). (see Hargreaves, 2007 [1995] : 182)

But before any law, it was the social housing operators that started to install within the tradition of “brassage” an attribution mechanism by which a socio-spatial distribution within the realm of social housing began. Here a bureaucratic process emerged where every client is attributed a set of categories that are either ethnical (!) or socio-economical.

“Cette représentation selon laquelle les territoires ne peuvent pas ‘tolérer’ plus d’une certaine proportion de certains groupes aux caractéristiques ‘spécifiques’, qui a émergé dans les années 1950-1960 face à la gestion du relogement des ‘immigrés’ des bidonvilles est toujours fortement mobilisée par les acteurs HLM locaux. » (Sala Pala 2008: By the very late 1980’s any attempt to guaranty right for association based on cultural criteria that were non-European and especially Islamic was abounded between the Iranian Revolution and a highly mediatised scarf-scandal (see Kirszbaum, 2015; Hargreaves [1995] 2007). After that the three first *mixité sociale* laws followed.

The genealogy of *mixité sociale* can thus be understood as a counter-move to the prospects of an upcoming multiculturalism that was branded within the republicanism as a communitarian threat thus *mixité sociale* is an urban policy principle within the context of national cohesion. It holds assumptions about the concentration of immigrants that build communitarian retreats that must be dissolved through spatial distribution by using socio-economic and camouflaged ethnic categories. At the same time, when social scientist demand for ethnic categories (in the

national statistics) in order to monitor processes of exclusion, they are rejected (see Damon, 2012; Epstein 2015).

Mixité sociale is instead proposed as a solution based on the absence of a middle class. This measure is framed within the republican idea of *égalité* and *solidarité*.

3.2 The immigrant working class and its relation to social housing in France

France always had a significant attraction and a significant will to attract an immigrant workforce, it even often thought of its weakness and failures in terms of a lack of immigrants (see Weil, 1994 :720). After World War II, most of the immigrants would come from the Iberian Peninsula or from Italy.

Bad-housing condition of the immigrant population was the rule not the exception and only rose to wider attention by 1968. So that by the late 60's the *bidonvilles* and private substandard inner-city housing were inhabited by migrants, which was due to a liberalist attitude towards their needs for affordable housing.

Most of the worker-immigrants that had come with family members lived in *bidonvilles*, shantytowns that made an estimated housing for 75.000-200.000 at that time. In the mid-1960's about 80% of the *bidonvilles* inhabitants had immigration background, most of them came from Algeria. A minority was accommodated in specially built and separated hostels and others in run down inner-city districts until they got pushed out by a first wave of gentrification in the mid 1970's around the same time when the last *bidonvilles* got demolished (Hargreaves 2007 [1995]: 63).

From 1968 onwards, inner-city neighbourhoods and the *bidonvilles* were increasingly dissolved. (see Weil, 1994: 720)

In Lyon, the influx of immigrants from Algeria and the Maghreb region was regulated with the creation of the *Services des affaires musulmanes* in 1958 within the prefecture and in coordination with the overall policing of possible affiliates of the Algerian independence Movement (Ebane 2012 ; Belmessous 2014). « La période de la guerre d'Algérie a ainsi laissé des traces dans les politiques de logement. » (Ebane, 2012 : online). This point will be revisited as the origins of the debate about “communitarianism” that until today can be traced back to the late 1950's.

The French government did set up a system for social benefits for Algerian workers (FAS) from the same fund and with the *décret du 4 août 1956* a building society called Sonacotra was established. Sonacotra the *Société nationale de construction pour les travailleurs algériens* started to build worker hostels to get control over the sprawling *bidonvilles* that were increasingly feared for being the metropolitan base for the FLN (Du 2008) .

Lyon had with 26 000 (of over a million) a significant population of the so called “repatriated” that immigrated towards France, in fact comparable to many other cities not so distant from the Mediterranean coast.³⁶ The *harkis*, native Algerians that fought on the side of France together with their family affiliates left for France and are estimated in numbers of about 100 000 but were not included in the official statistics because of inconsistencies in the data.

The issue of social housing for immigrants became a serious matter again in 1974 after the immigration stop for non-EC nationals (Hargreaves, 1996: 212). At this time immigrant workers from the Maghreb did not dare to visit their families as they feared that they would be refused to re-enter French territory. They often brought their family into France but needed to prove proper housing and work. At the time many applied for social housing, and the social housing societies were pleased about it as vacancy was increasing budget due to high numbers of more affluent dwellers moving out of the *Grands ensembles* inflicting financial stress for the agencies. (Blanc, 2004 :289f)

Within a few years the welfare state catches up with the needs of immigrant workers and starts allocating often abandoned social housing on the urban outskirts to the immigrant-workers (Hargreaves 2007 [1995], Weil 1994: ; Belmessous, 2014). This amelioration of the housing conditions for non-EC immigrant workers often coming from the Maghreb-region and the overall treatment of the immigrant labour force- especially of Algerian origin, also came from official outside pressure and must be seen within the Franco-Algerian foreign-relation. When the tide turned economically against Algeria by the later 1970’s, Giscard renegotiated the original Evian contract that led to decolonization. Better living conditions for labour migrants had a price: ...“Algeria was obliged to relax controls over several frozen financial accounts and capital assets that had been withheld from the Europeans after their flight from Algeria. Boumédiène released the money to France.” (Choi 2016: 110).

³⁶ The authorities tried to control the spatial distribution of the immigrants from Algeria but did not achieve the wanted results. (Choi, 2016)

It is important to stress that not every immigrant is treated equally. There is a colonial tradition targeting Muslim population that has not entirely been resolved during history even though the involved institutions significantly changed after the Algerian decolonization (Belmessous, 2014 :2; Ewane 2012: online).

The last traces were dissolved when after the 2005 riots; the *Fonds d'Action sociale pour les travailleurs musulmans d'Algérie en métropole et pour leur famille* (FAS) was incorporated into the *Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances* which became the social arm within urban restructuring operation. What happened in the worker's accommodation in terms of political engagement and militancy during the time of the Algerian independence war remained a reference in the functioning of social housing institutions (Sala Pala 2008)). Cultural difference, that was associated with visible minority groups became a stigma that was further inherited into the next Generation (Laforcade 2006)).

3.3 *Mixité sociale*, the republican antidote against the communitarian ghetto

“Faire des quartiers comme les autres » par la mixité sociale veut dire en l'occurrence rapprocher ces quartiers d'une norme sociologique, celle de quartiers où les minorités ne devraient jamais être majoritaires.”

(Kirszbaum, 2014: 7)

The following chapter will deal with social mixing from a genuinely French perspective to see its relatedness to immigration, integration and French republicanism.

Behind the policy of *mixité sociale* stands the causally hypotheses that connects high densities of socio-economic homogeneity within spatial proximity, operationalized as concentrations of urban poor with the effects of social exclusion that are then augmenting the potential for territorial disintegration of nationhood. As a policy it might be best understood as a sociological constructionism, operationalized on behalf of statistical assumption of a general average of the national population that -by the mixing- will be approximated to mitigate the negative societal effect especially when it comes to integration of immigrants (see Kirszbaum 2015: 30). “Social mix is an ‘Apollonian utopia’. It presumes society is made of ‘average’, anonymous and exchangeable individuals. They can be displaced into a space, which is also ‘average’ and without qualities, for implementing a harmonious balance.” (Blanc 2010: 269). Even though Blanc (ibid) is right in the sense of seeing it like the state, the vagueness, and the policy

paradigm character of *mixité sociale* also allows it to work as an institutionalized form of ethnization concerning the problem of advanced urban segregation in France.

"(...) l'ethnisation des problèmes urbains constitue une des caractéristiques communes au discours des "quartiers". Or elle a des effets très réels dans la mesure où, d'une part elle présente les populations immigrées comme des menaces (et non comme des victimes de problèmes spécifiques), entretenant ainsi le racisme et où d'autre part, cette grille d'analyse évacue d'autres phénomènes comme les logiques socio-économiques." (Tissot, 2007 :39).

Mixité sociale as a policy was leading to significant area-based intervention that escaped an understanding of how socio-economic mechanisms (marketization) in the fields of education, work and housing were structuring mechanism in the lives of the concerned inhabitants. Instead the neighbourhood or the urban form itself became either reified within “neighbourhood effects” or conceived as retreats of choice from the republican society (see Estèbe 2015).

In France, the *banlieue* is the historical place where the discourse about immigration in its current understanding is formulated. In France after the colonial period, that ended under De Gaulle, “national identity was no longer faced with a ‘native problem’, but with an ‘immigrant problem’ of which the changing cityscape replaced the overseas territories as evidence of the danger.” (Laforcade 2006: 227) . A shifting imaginary from the image of the dangerous popular class member towards the danger of immigration is noticeable from the 1980’s onwards. From that date, the signification of the *banlieue* changes, especially after the riots in the Lyonese suburbs in 1981 (Heargraves 2007; Dikec 2016). This is further enhanced with the zoning approach of the central government. The *zone* is a territorialisation of urban policy that simultaneously signifies the homologous meanings as to *banlieue*, *cité* and the often used adjunct “... *des quartier*” that are all negatively connoted and connected with ethnic-communitarianism and ghettoization. The political and mediatic discourse about the *banlieue* shifted from the late 1970’s onwards from class to immigration and Islam. By the 1980’s, the representation of the *banlieue* became symbolically charged with immigration and the practice of Islam (Kepel 2012: 12). Also, around that time, a new political force is established on the extreme right-party spectrum speaking to the electorate from an aggressive ethnic-nationalist perspective. After a short uplift until 1983, class-based politics was in retreat the strong communist party collapsing.

The first sign of this changing dynamic from workers or “units of production” to the legal status “immigrant” surely happened from the late 1970’s onwards (Belmessous, 2014; Choi 2016; Dikec 2007; Hargreaves, 1996). Also, a discourse about “urban violence” of young, male, often

second-generation immigrants evolved within the urban uprising from the 1980's onwards (see Ratouis, 2005). It is in this context that the extreme right-wing party Le Front National (FN) expanded its electorate beyond its initial power base.

Nevertheless, the immigration debate dates many years back and increasingly became associated to populations with maghribi backgrounds (Laforcade 2006) . The crisis of the *banlieue* often is co-understood as the crisis of the republican integration model (Jennings 2000; Hargreaves 2007). The media analysis of Julian Damon (2012) shows the importance of three buzz-words within the context of French urban policy in French press-journalism, “ghetto”, “mixité sociale”, plan “Marshall”, whereupon the notion of “ghetto” and from the late 1990's onwards “mixité sociale” is used more frequently.

According to Damon (ibid) the general pattern correlates with the urban uprising and its mediatization. Widely used in the realms of politics and the media the *Loi d'orientation pour la ville* was mediatized as the “anti-ghetto law” in the early 1990's.³⁷ According to Belmessous (2014 :4f) all the laws concerned with social mix like the Besson-law, LOV and SRU are debated in parliament as “anti-ghetto” and aim for de-concentration of immigrant population.

French urban policy, formulated within the first years of Mitterrand, gave an urgent answer to the urban crises associated to *Grands ensembles* that were breaking away into segregated areas of relegation and were known but not officially spoken about. This segregation is especially related to the distance of the “popular-” to the middle classes that were leaving or “fleeing” the *Grands ensembles* towards the peri-urban (see Stouten, 2013 :105). The urban form of the *Grands ensembles* itself became the main target for the cohesive intervention mainly organized through the authority of the central government. This intervention into the built urban environment targeted the social modes of structuration of social housing residents by redistributing the concerned population first within the commune and *à la longue* within the whole city-area of urban contract (*contrat de ville*). This dispersal-strategy is built under the banner of *mixité sociale*. *Mixité sociale* as the *leitmotiv* or main policy paradigm under which the political society of the republican left and right coercively dis-organization a sufficient part of the immigrant working class that stranded in the social housing estates outside French metropolises. In the crisis of Fordist accumulation by the mid to late 1970's neoliberal housing policies and the stagflation entangled them- often former blue colour workers for the nearby industries, with the social-housing operators whose estates mostly were concentrating in the

³⁷ Politicians frequently travelled to the *banlieues* to reaffirm their ambitions and republican values particularly if they aimed for future presidency.

banlieues. With the pauperisation came a lack of income for the social housing agencies which was followed by chronicle disinvestment for the apartment blocks.

Mixité sociale always carries an unacknowledged ethnic side that is more visible in its associate: the *seuil de tolérance* or *rééquilibrage* (Belmessous, 2014; Kiszbaum 2014; Sala Pala 2008). Urban policy became entwined with the discourse of integration and was called upon to circumvent the north American ghetto. Ghetto and communitarian identities, and an associated drug economy became the main target of the media and national urban politics.

F. Lamy's discourse about the popular neighbourhoods at the *Assemblée Nationale* enounces the key ingredients that summarize the "banlieue" and his ambitions. "‘ghettos’ qui génèrent ‘des problèmes dangereux pour la cohésion nationale, trafics de stupéfiants et économies souterraines, replis communautaristes, extrémismes religieux’ Des ghettos qu’il faudrait ‘casser’ en repensant ‘la mixité sociale à l’aune des politiques de peuplement’ »³⁸. (Kirszbaum 2015:)

"Ghetto" in the arena of social science remains a highly controversial and even widely refused concept in France. Those thematising the concept of ghetto widely acknowledge that within the French/European context several key elements are missing as the deliberately chosen *laissez faire*, the size and ethnic homogeneity Wacquant (1999: 131). By quantities, the biggest *banlieues* in France make at maximum about 30.000 inhabitants that is 10% of South Side Chicago. So the emergence of "a complex division of labor, which in the past enabled some of these districts to function almost as closed micro-societies ..." (Hargreaves 2007 [1995]: 67) is not assumable and did not happen. When it comes to ethnicity it becomes clear that people within a social housing neighbourhood have various socio-cultural backgrounds and are far from homogenous. It is also not the case that the *banlieues* are not home to French citizens of European ancestry, especially a high number of aged residents (Kriszbaum 2014). Also, I would suggest, that the institutional logic of the operators already exercises a policy of "mixing" since the 1980's, which rather increases the ethnic complexities.

Nevertheless, there are factors that also account for a ghetto, like exclusion from symbolic and material resources, family histories that root in French colonialism, racism, a feeling of structural relegation and the encounter of a militarised police seemingly acting in impunity (see Lapeyronnie and Courtois, 2008, Lapeyronnie 2005).

³⁸ Lamy also denounces the communes that counter act the national solidarity by not allowing the *mixité sociale*. He understands the concentration of ethnic minorities as an error that occurred within national politics.

Still, a ghetto in the north-American sense would fit better for the *bidonvilles* (shantytowns, my translation) of the 1950's and 60's than the concentrated social housing areas or *Grands ensembles* (see Hargreaves, 2007 [1995]: 63).

In my analyses, this missing ingredient of a homogenous ethnic group is within the political discourse sufficiently substituted by what is absent in the U.S debate namely community or “communitarianism”. It is assumed that ethnic-community is a socio-political space that hinders or makes impossible a social integration within the republican model.

The local state official for preventive politics Jean-Philippe Riou (quoted in Schwartz, 2003 :199) about the dangers of cultural development in La Duchère:

“ On se trouve dans le cas d'une multiculture, avec plusieurs logiques qui s'entrecroisent, s'affrontent ou se tolèrent, parfois s'aiment, se détestent... En fait, le danger à la Duchère, c'est moins la paupérisation économique que culturelle. ... Le communautarisme n'est pas un passage obligé. Nous sommes certes guettés par ce risque-là, mais jusqu'alors ce modèle d'intégration anglais ne correspond pas au nôtre. »

‘Communitarianism’ (*communautarisme*) is basically used to refer to ‘ethnic’ communities, formation of which is seen as a threat to the cultural and political integrity of the republic. “... Ghettos are the spatially reified forms of this ‘ethnic’ nightmare haunting the republic.” (Dikec 2007: 11) Also, anti-communitarian discourse serves to orient French policy making away from anglo-saxon multiculturalism.

Historically, this “nightmare” of the republic can at least be traced back the last century and especially the time of the decolonization of Algeria and the political organizing and confrontations with Algerians living within metropolitan France. The refusal and the negative connotation, rather different to the US or British context, can also be seen to the republican discomfort with religious communities and the long fought for one of its main pillars: the *laïcité*. Another republican discomfort becomes visible in the official denial of any collective categories; whenever they are invoked they become interpreted as forms of separatism. But republicanism as a political will organized within the political and civil society does not just translate into the population that is a wide range of socio-cultural entities by itself.

On a more local level and within the realm of territorial governance, hence within urban governance where power is strategically orchestrated rather than commanded, cultural associations obviously do become partners (see Davies, 2014 :3218).

“In the context of urban policy, public authorities are mandated to deal with legally constituted ‘associations’ that represent groups of citizens.” (Hall and Hickman 2002: . This reorientation

has resulted from the inauguration of a “dialectics” (Estèbe 2001) of “locality” and “territoriality” within the implementation of urban policies and de and partial re-centralization of the state since the 1980’s. If wished, this problem can be understood within the Gramscian notion of the “integral state” that emphasises the cohesive and consensual processes and their constant reconfiguration in space-time or the daily struggle for building hegemony. Every urban project in “priority neighbourhoods” (*quartiers prioritaires*) is than a hegemonic project aiming for unifying and regulating key societal forces (see Davies, 2014: 3218ff). The local acceptance of cultural association within urban governance then does not contradict the cohesive means of urban-reconstruction put to action on a territorial scale. To keep up with the republican understanding of integration through unifying culture practice, a form of solidarity (positive discrimination) is exercised to gain social cohesion. By the late 1990’s a mechanism that really tackle, “ghettoization” and “ethnic-communitarianism” transformed itself into a transitionary “war of movement” (Gramsci) of various urban project-utopia that were further advanced in the early 2000’s and till this day.

In the arena of French republicanism and its cultural hegemony that was strongly build on Keynesian indicative planning the emergent social forms like communitarian or neo-tribal modes of social structuration can be understood in what Bauman (2000) understands within capitalist globalisation as emergent social forms of a liquidising. But these forms become process of communitarian anti-integration from the side of the republican national state that only knows the individual citizen. In fact, the national state as an expression *par excellence* of the political order protects the individual from the community.” (Maffesoli 1996: 64) . Seen from the path dependent instutional culture of French republicanism community becomes « du ‘ communautarisme ‘ et de la ‘ ghettoization ‘ des menaces mortelles pour le « vivre ensemble » républicain. » (Kirszbaum 2015: 29)

Excuse : republicanism

“ Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute sa puissance sous la suprême direction de la volonté générale ; et nous recevons en corps chaque membre comme partie indivisible du tout. ”

(Rousseau, 1964:161)

French republicanism “is rooted in the inheritance of the French Revolution and one where the claims of popular democracy and sovereignty are wedded to demand for greater social justice. ... a tradition that stresses the virtues of civil equality.” (Jennings 2000: 577) The political philosophy of French republicanism tends to see itself as the expression of humanist universalism, the latter only being contingently and not essentially related to France (Dument 1994).

Its basic regulative idea is a formal egalitarian universalism which allows for all particularities to be absorbed by assimilation of the individual citizens into the political sphere of nationhood.

“La France est ‘une République indivisible’ (article 1er de la Constitution de 1958). Ne reconnaissant que la communauté des citoyens, la République se refuse, en effet, à considérer les personnes selon leur appartenance.” (Métropole de Lyon Direction de la prospective et du dialogue public 2017: 22)

Other categories that would grant socio-cultural collectives or “race” influence within the nation are refused as they assume enduring difference (Hargreaves 2007 [1995]:9) . In the French public debate the community is a risk, something that is traditional and holds back integration, consequently it is often equalized with ethnic communitarianism (Bacqué and Éric 2016: .

Multiculturalism that would accept communitarian principles cannot be framed within the social contract (*Contrat social*), the republic only knows citizens and their representatives (Hargreaves, 2007 [1995]: 199; (Dikec, 2007: 4).

When it comes to the issue of social cohesion, social integration is framed within the individual citizen and social power based on other forms of subjectivity must be dissolved. « Au nom de la cohésion social cette perspective de dispersion s'aligne sur la conception française de l'intégration (l'individu plutôt que le groupe et la communauté). » (Deschamps 2001: 82)

Conceptualization about the virtues of the French citizen can be traced back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *contrat social* where a political revolution that shall lead into the bourgeois society is realized by subjecting the citizen under the normative forms that constitute the possibility of existence of the *bourgeoise* society. Karl Marx (MEW 1: 370) detects this in Rousseau’s idea of the political revolution.

“Celui qui ose entreprendre d'instituer un peuple doit se sentir en état de changer pour ainsi dire la nature humaine, de transformer chaque individu, qui par lui-même est un tout parfait et solitaire, en partie d'un plus grand tout dont cet individu reçoive en quelque sorte sa vie et son

être, de substituer une existence partielle morale à l'existence physique et indépendante. Il faut qu'il ôte à l'homme ses forces propres pour lui en donner qui lui soient étrangères et dont il ne puisse faire usage sans le secours d'autrui.” (*Contrat Social*, livre II, Londres 1782, p. 67. quoted to MEW 1: 370)

So, citizenship becomes a constant practice a “daily plebiscite” as Jennings (2000: 577) put it through which the citizen is established through the nationhood. This leaves little space for other cultural associations that demands for recognition and rights.³⁹ “France has built up a significant and well-established policy frame of assimilation. This centres on the ideas of individual formal legal and political equality in addition to the separation of church and state (laïcité) as the sole legitimate guarantors of social integration and equality” (Wihtol de Wenden 2004; Hargreaves 2007; quoted to Dowing, 2015: 2).

This national citizenship often has been opposed to ethnic citizenship, that is citizenship based on kinship or lineage; French *ius soli* stands against the German *ius sanguine* (Soysal 2001: 65).⁴⁰ It is very interesting to debate the effects of supranational institution that -for example promote regionalisation such as the Council of Europe (Recommendation 384, 2016) and recently was criticizing France for redesigning its regional territories (*regions*) in a top down manner. Soysal (2001) or Dowing (2015) interestingly pointed those processes but it would lead me too far from the issue of republicanism’s relation to cultural associations and French urban policy.⁴¹

³⁹ Even one of the essential passions of political action, the strike, is framed as an individual and not collective right.

⁴⁰ In the history of ideas though, *ius soli* was not established from the begin of the French revolution but from the mid-19th century onwards, at the beginning French nationalism even evoked strong notions of kinship (Laforcade 2006)

⁴¹ Bob Jessop (1997) gives a different explanation for tendential regionalisation and points to the importance of the strategic accumulation of capital and how entrepreneurial city-regions and their institutions operate within this.

4. Empirical part

“Much time is spent hanging around cafes drinking tea.”

(Rabinow 1977: 42)

My ethnographic fieldwork, understood as a “rolling revisit” (Burawoy 2003) was carried out from Mai 2015 until the mid-summer and was followed by another set of revisits from April until Mai 2016. Eight interviews (expert- and narrative) were carried out over that period to complement participant observation supported by photo-documentation and ero-epic conversations.

The following part of my work will intensely focus on the empirical material that I gathered during my revisits. These revisits are organized around the last demolition of an originally 500m long social housing complex. The sources of the empirical data is mainly my own fieldwork; sometimes where I found it necessary, it also includes the project related publications (primary sources) that were used to inform citizens and professional partners about the project of La Duchère. Usually these primary sources are textualized outputs of the urban governance structure of La Duchère that can transgress my own fieldwork-time. All these documents are quoted as “primary documents” (P x) that will be listed in the appendix of this work. This is necessary because all my empirical data is organized in the qualitative data analyses software atlas.ti; so all my conceptualizations are easy traceable and transparent.

Other than grounded theory my codes were built or/and inspired from the conceptual frame of Zygmund Bauman’s “liquid modernity” and were “refined” around the known “anomaly” of that theory (see Blackshaw, 2008 :128f). This known anomaly I call by having Margaret Archer (1995) in mind, the need for a minimal morphostasis within morphogenetic social processes. The fact that even though post Fordist social formation within a supply side oriented globalized capitalism, its high potential for mobility and consumer based identities and the weakening decision powers on and over the nation state level, it does not explain away the necessary cultural glue or minimal equilibria, that every existing bourgeois society is obliged to produce whatever the overall strategic setting of capital accumulation i.e. for Lyon the “creative strategy” (Peck 2010). La Duchère and French urban policy makes this evident, as I will show in this chapter, in how urban governance is increasingly involved within the civil society hence transcends the neoliberal partnership model. The civil society “comprises all the ‘so called

private' organisations such as churches, trade unions, political parties and cultural associations which are distinct from the process of production and from the public apparatuses of the state.” (Simon, 1991 :79). Public private partnership is constructed on the assumption that market players and proxies must be integrated within the public authority to develop an efficient and successful urban reconstruction enterprise. Recent advances in urban governance are now, so my argument, the main prospects of deepening social mixing or the making of minimal solidifications. This is done by advancing a republican cultural hegemony through a top down empowerment structure called *Conseil citoyen*. Unfortunately, this council was such a recent development within French urban policy, in La Duchère as in France, that I could only study the time till its official establishment.

As showed in the chapter before, in the French context, *mixité sociale* first appears around intersecting issues of social-exclusion, that from a critical-analytical point of view - is a consequence of the neo-liberal social housing policies as pursued after 1968 and especially since late 1970's Barre government that intervened within the climate of an organic crisis of the fordist-keynesian order. Bauman's (2000) assumptions of liquid modernity was the theoretical starting point of my case study (see ch.1) but it also helped me to conceptualize the republican paranoia about the return of the ethico-religious subject that is best represented by the localized Muslim communities.

As laid out in part two of my work, this paranoia of the ethnic-community historically comes with the quarrelling related to France's Mediterranean colonial past. These unsolved conflicts could reappear during the economic crisis and change the representation of the non-European immigrant population (especially from the Maghreb region) by ascribing ethnic or religious identities.

Since the recent terrorist attacks this paranoia about the ethico-religious subject comes with a growing fear of a endogenous jihadist political movement that historically first appeared in the mid 1990's and which is carried on by little numbers of mostly sons of Maghrebi immigrants the “little brothers” (*petits frères*) that grew up and lived in the banlieues and often made money as petty criminals (theft, drug dealing) that -if caught, radicalized in the French prisons (see Hargreaves, 2007 [1995] :110f). Relatively small by numbers but very dangerous as their logic of operation that first was affected by a militarized Algerian jihadist strand (*Front islamiste du salut*) now is functions within the polycentric and transnational Islamic State movement. The secret service estimates the overall jihadist movement or those close to it to involve about 11 700 adherents in France (online source: lemonde.fr).

The jihadist movement is not the driving force of the urban uprisings, the political rap music nor the protest of young 2nd generation immigrants that started in 1980's and which was heavily influenced by a popular-republican and/or left-wing political culture. This struggle held a progressive role but broke during the 1990's (see Beaud and Masclet 2006). The next generation of Banlieue youth is not so much interested in revolting for a societal change or changes in the institutional culture of the state but wants to declare and manifest feelings of injustice and rage, which can be understood as articulations of a post-colonial identity formation (Lapeyronnie, 2005).

Other than within a Grounded Theory approach I did not search for a regulative idea or a universalistic concept of -in this case- *mixité sociale* but a historic-political process that I understood as a post-neoliberal strategy, or at least a “flanking mechanisms” (Peck) that drives towards a stabilization of intense urban marginality and its political implications in terms of cohesive interventions and institutional reconstruction within those “priority neighbourhoods” (quartiers prioritaires).

After my first fieldwork period I was progressively working with a reading of Gramsci's concept of hegemony and civil society and the role of intellectuals that is more sensitive towards the overall issue of the wider political economy. This was necessary as for Bauman's is speaking from a too constricted perspective where “the prospects of individualized actors being 're-embedded' in the republican body of citizenship are dim.” (Bauman 2000: 37) . In my view it is not important for the theory of liquid modernity to make the subaltern's successful integration its essential part but to include a strategic mechanism that Bauman did -in my view, underestimate. Therefor I take up the relational perspective that looks on how the institutional ensemble called the state is crafting sufficient unity by engaging in emergent social relations that are not genuinely supportive to it: A perspective that looks at the re-embedding strategies that aim at achieving social cohesion whether through rearranging the urban poor in space or through “passive revolution” (top down empowerment) as pursued in the antrophagic republican tradition that stands opposed to the antropemic annihilation or deportation of the cultural other.

4.1 Mixité sociale as an exogeneous process

Mixité sociale as an exogenous coercive intervention based on a socio-spatial constructivism - the levelling out of a poor population within a diversified urban environment, is the most visible

intervention into the urban spaces of advanced urban marginality at the “margins of the state” (Das et al, 2004). By the way that social housing is organized in France this poor population coincides with a concentration of visible minorities in the suburbs of Lyon. The origins of social mixing in France can be traced back to the Algerian independence war that shifted colonial institutional practices (differentiations of population types) under the authority of the local state (*préfecture*) into the post-colonial France, from which it then started to normalise during the second half of the 1980’s within the social housing agencies distribution and acceptance policies (see chapter 2). Both of these currents build the foundation for a *mixité sociale* on a city-wide level in the 1990’s and since early 2000 with the new *Contrat de ville*, the *loi Chevènement* and the GPV the agglomeration. This generalized process does hold for the concrete case of La Duchère too. With this more recent development came the initiatives that tackle the built urban form, that emphasized the necessity for moving the middle classes in and to disperse the social housing including its residents often of non-European origin within the whole agglomeration.

In La Duchère the wanted proportion of the overall amount of social housing originally was a reduction from over 80 to 60% and finally will be -according to the project manager B. Couturier about 54%.

"1711 logements sociaux sont démolis et 1775 logements diversifiés sont reconstruits à La Duchère sur la durée totale du projet, afin de ramener la part de logement social à 54 % à l'échelle du quartier." (P73). The relocation operation of the inhabitants of La Duchère was carried out in a collaborative manner that included all relevant social housing agencies most notably OPAC, SACVL, Grand Lyon Habitat.

These numbers, as he pointed out in the second of two expert interviews, were wanted by the city government. Apparently, a reduction to 60% is not based on any empirically guided social science but on a best practice principle. Paris Bernhard (P 72) one of the two leading urbanists of La Duchère underlines that it is the duty of the politicians to define the ratio. The reduction of social housing also stands for a will to install regimes that emphasize private property, which is assumed to have benefits for the overall neighbourhood as it valorises an ascending social mobility and re-establishes the real estate market with a new clientele, which ideally belongs to a middle class with which also comes purchasing power that helps to diversify the shopping surfaces.

Gérard Collomb the mayor of the 9th arrondissement of Lyon (the municipality that La Duchère belongs to) became mayor of the city and metropolitan region of Lyon at the time when the reconstruction was pushed to the front in the municipal election campaign. When debating La

Duchère and “urban renewal” in general (*renouvellement urbain*) Collomb stated that the demolition of the *Grand ensemble* La Duchère is a legit intervention against emerging ghettos. « C’est une politique fondamentale si l’on ne veut pas de ghettos dans l’agglomération » (Colomb 2001 quoted in Graven, 2006: 326). Collomb that was one of the first to join the “movement” of president Emmanuel Macron became the minister of interior of the French republic in 2017. The evaluation of the project includes the effective attraction of middle class households that can “mix” the rebuilt neighbourhood. For the ancient mayor of the 9th, demand from real estate capital and demand from their clients is what really matters in terms of evaluation of urban reconstruction under the banner of *mixité sociale* (Graven, 2006 :347). As outlined by Jamie Peck (2010: 219) in his reflections on the creative city strategy of Richard Florida, real estate markets become the real metrics of evaluation within neoliberal urbanization.

The whole project of La Duchère was an initiative that according to B. Couturier (P2) did not involve national laws and/or intervention but came from the electorate and a partnership of municipalities that formed the territorial collective of Grand Lyon. The national ANRU programme was validating the project ex post and did approve it because of its main orientations towards destruction-reconstruction and social mixing. The effects of ANRU are nevertheless of great importance as the project would not have taken off on that scale and speed. B. Couturier (P2), critical of such a reading, nevertheless emphasizes the role of a “partner” that came with the ANRU approval.

“Alors il y a UN PARTENAIRE qui est essentiel dans l’Agence de la Rénovation urbaine, qui est l’action logements donc c’est c’est les collecteurs d’impôts/ du versement contribution/financement du logement par les sociétés enfin les entreprises -qui aujourd’hui enfin demain vont financer 93% des programmes de renouvellement urbain. ». This « partenaire » is l’Association Foncière Logement (AFL), a public investment fund and ANRU partner that is financed on the bases of a 1% tax on capital revenues. It invests in real estate projects (rented apartments) that fit into the profile of private sector employees but also drives the privatization or -in the language of the project, “diversification” of the built housing space after La Duchère was given approval by ANRU (Graven et al. 2006: 335).

This view about the importance of the AFL was also confirmed by the project manager B. Couturier in my Expert interview. Like everywhere else ANRU de-localizes the project over time as it not only concentrates the states investment programmes urban renovation and community regeneration but also demands for a distinct overall urbanism (ibid, Epstein 2013). In an ad hoc interview with H. Julien-Laferrrière the mayor of the 9th arrondissement, he

answers the question about the role of ANRU for La Duchère by spreading his arms into the various directions of the new central square Abbé Pierre by saying, “all of this is ANRU”. Here it might be important to refer to Epstein’s (2013) research on the programme that emphasized that ANRU structurally pushes the position of the mayors as it enables them to show “their” merits to the electorate but also links them with the national urban policy makers. In my view the ANRU programme became more important in the second and especially now with the third tranche and less important in the project planning phase. This is basically in accordance with B. Couturier (P2).

The whole reconstruction of La Duchère on the macro scale is based on socio-economic categories and a new urbanism of small residential blocks that opens the space in the direction of a metropolitan Lyon thus values closeness to the centre and openness towards the peri-urban communes of the regional authority. Most evident; it tries to be attractive to middle classes, while at the same time organizes the spatial redistribution or dispersal of the potentially problematic groups that -as I was told in an informal talk, has low income or is unemployed, households with more children than average, single-parent families etc...⁴² The whole urban environment is re-designed in its urban form to be inclusive and attractive towards the first group while the second group shall not be expelled but must consciously decide if they want to stay in the neighbourhood or close by, which about 50% did.

Emphasising on the middle class, it certainly does not exclude the existing middle class of the neighbourhood of La Duchère. They too were invited to become home owners in the newly built urban environment. About 15% of the new built apartments were purchased by this group in the first phase of the project, most of them were first time buyers (P78: 15f). Those who did purchase and are moving in from outside are according to B. Couturier (P71:3), in referencing a study done by Christine Lelévier (2013), coming from the lower strata of the middle classes. “À La Duchère à Lyon, ces nouveaux arrivants se définissent comme appartenant à une ‘petite classe moyenne’, ni pauvres, ni riches, et pas ‘bobos’. La moitié d’entre eux est d’origine étrangère, principalement issue du Maghreb, mais aussi d’Asie, ou d’Afrique subsaharienne.”. In this interview in a Grand Lyon publication that shall enhance public dialog, he stresses the similarities of the new inhabitants that often share a non-European ancestry, sometimes grew up in social housing, working class families with two salaries. The evaluation of the project

⁴² This information was attained after a call of a social housing agency that engaged “street level bureaucrats”, which is defined with Limpsky (1980) as “Public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work.” In this case it was the *médiation sociale* of La Duchère.

from the side of the GPV thus includes the effective attraction of middle class households that can “mix” the rebuilt neighbourhood.

As outlined by Jamie Peck (2010: 219) in his reflections on the creative city strategy of Richard Florida, real estate markets become the real metrics of evaluation. For the ancient mayor of the 9th arrondissement and later mayor of Lyon, senator and now interior minister of France, demand from real estate capital and demand from their clients is what really matters in urban reconstruction under the banner of *mixité sociale*.

His discourse obviously defends on the ground of demographic data against critiques of La Duchère being a huge gentrification. This is a discourse that haunts the leading urbanists and the electorate.

It is most important to mention that this coercive strategy of moving social housing residents out of La Duchère did not or was at least -in the official statements- avoided as much as possible by granting the concerned residents a right to stay and in my view this was because they were to a certain extent quite aware of the dynamics of gentrification or at least about the critics and the potential for civil resistance. The leading urbanist Paris-Bernhard (P72) also emphasizes the role of the demolition and how older building should be valued if possible, for not giving the impression of just gentrifying the neighbourhood and even proposes an anti-speculation politics for those areas.

“...il faut créer les conditions spatiales et éventuellement déconstruire pour reconstruire, sans exclure la possibilité de réutiliser des bâtiments existants. Ce dernier point est délicat, car on peut donner l’impression que l’on déplace des ménages défavorisés pour y réinstaller des ménages plus aisés.”

Another argument that is stated against gentrification critics is that the moving out of a part of the social housing operation is also part of the French urban policy, most notably since the SRU-law (Loi relative à la solidarité et au renouvellement urbain, see chapter 2) which gives political pressure and initiative to build social housing in those areas/communes that have low quantities and who often want to stay like that (P70). This would also be my emphasis, *mixité sociale* is a political mechanism that is internally related to a wider economic strategy that also involves gentrification but is structurally bounded to welfare institutions and a wider discursive field that engages regional and national politics. Its state of emergency is the dealing with social unrests within the declining Fordist accumulation strategy most notably the loss of blue-collar labour starting from the early 1980’s, fostered by the neoliberal housing reform in the late 1970’s (see chapter 2) that also was supportive to an already ongoing “white flight” of the

financially capable white middle class. This was also described by the annalist of La Duchère Anni Schwartz (2003).

Nevertheless, and even though the official discussion does emphasize that every inhabitant of la Duchère had a right to stay in La Duchère or at least in the 9th arrondissement, La Duchère could be analysed -by the danger of economic reduction- as a 3rd wave gentrification, but the phenomenon is -in my view- more complex and I did turn away from such a view.⁴³ The empirical data of Christine Lelévier (2013) shows that La Duchère function as a kind of fall-back position for the lower segment of the middle classes given the effects of unregulated inner-city real estate markets and inner-city gentrification and -at least in theory, *mixité sociale* tries to cope with this housing crises too. According to Bruno Couturier in the early 2000's the metropolitan area of Lyon was confronted with 42 000 persons demanding for housing, this is about 8% of the total population of the city of Lyon (see figure below) and in this housing crises La Duchère started to manifest within this back to the city movement (chapter 2.1).

Currently, the population of the 9th arrondissement that La Duchère is part of was at a historical base (see figure below) by the massive loss of industrial labour from the late 70's onwards and parallel the moving-out of an ascending middle class (see Lambert, 2015).

The economic dimension of the project of la Duchère is of great importance to the overall success of the project. First and before the GPV la Duchère had started it was introduced as a tax reduced area (ZRU) for enterprises that was reinforced in 2015 when it became a ZFU (online source: gpvlyonduchere.org).

The conditions for a policy of *mixité sociale* is internally related within the arena of the political economy where the real estate market must be re-established through state and an inter-communal "partnership" that involves other private developers often equipped with public subsidies through tax reductions, but also social housing societies. This is typical for any gentrification too, but middle class development within the paradigm of *mixité sociale* ought to perform another thing; the middle class, that by definition is adapted to the imperatives of the local labour market is a guarantee for the overall success of the economic integration of the newly built neighbourhood. Thus, seen from a wider perspective exogenous *mixité sociale* comes with a wider entanglement in the field of political economy. Middle class people qualified for the service industries are -à la longue, for sure a factor of la Duchère. The project has been embedded quite from the start in the regional strategies to attract and ground service based capital flows and especially in the Saone valley that is part of the Vaise-district that has

⁴³ For a good overlook about the gentrification literature see Lees et al (2008).

lost all the classic industries especially textile, transport and domestic appliances (Halitim 1995: 67).

The reconstruction of La Duchère became involved in such a strategy that above all comprises the local service sector that by the early 1990's weight out blue-collar labour (ibid) and is best represented by the *pôle numérique*: a digital technology hub now dominant in Vaise. La Duchère, as a tax reduced enterprise-zone, is also working on such a programme that is called Greenopolis. The office buildings being the fastest growing sector in the 9th district already make 2/2 of the total enterprise-surface (P79: 7). This is also mirrored in the project of la Duchère that consists of two such building blocks "îlots".

The reason the commune of Lyon made La Duchère a ZAC (see chapter 2.2) was not only for managing and deciding about the whole reconstruction process but to exploit the effects of a "rent gap" (Smith 1987) , by bringing down square meter prices of the property and subsequently the rent. This was partly financed under the national ANRU program.

Bernard Paris, one of the two main urban-planners of La Duchère writes in his reflection paper: "Il faut qu'il y ait un marché et les conditions du marché, c'est-à-dire des acquéreurs en capacité d'acheter et qui souhaitent s'installer dans le quartier.". He (P72 :46) then goes on by accounting for distinct factors that must be fulfilled in order to accomplish what I call *mixité sociale* as an exogenous process : « l'environnement social, sécuritaire, scolaire, commercial, environnemental, doit être stimulant, ou en tout cas acceptable pour les acquéreurs potentiels. » In short, the whole built environment must be created after the lifestyle and consumption patterns of the middle class.

Bruno Couturier in a more balanced manner names the importance of infrastructure like public transport and the highway, diversified commercial facilities, shops that are attractive to middle classes and to the economically weaker households. Also, La Duchère, that already has a smaller clinic on its administrative margin in the north-west, is now further equipped with a medical centre right at the centre. The department of Rhône's administrative office was moved to La Duchère. Another public infrastructure is the new athletic hall that stands almost at the centre of the neighbourhood next to the old sport-stadium.

These are public infrastructures that shall illuminate beyond La Duchère and are used by the inhabitants of Lyon and the neighbouring communes as well and are in the case of La Duchère built within the new centrality and thus at distance to the old social housing estates. The creative city strategy is also a way to overwrite the stigma that weighs on La Duchère that shall help

against the “discrimination by the address”, that is encountered by workers from La Duchère that apply for jobs in the local labour market.

Thus *mixité sociale* in La Duchère is entangled with a wider urbanist endeavour that I consider with Peck (2010) as a creative city strategy. “Lyon spends around 20% of its annual budget on cultural output and institutions in one form or another, a significant allocation of municipal resources...” (Dowing 2015: 13). Part of this is the idea that public institutions shall oblige other external populations to do their artistic work in La Duchère, art production itself becomes an asset for promoting the neighbourhood through cultural events but also to help in community redevelopment by involving local dwellers in the making of those cultural events. This strategy to attract other populations further includes the construction of facilities that are based on different kinds of events but most notably -in the case of La Duchère- sportive facilities.


According to the urbanist Alain Marguerite the new urban environment of La Duchère also was designed to increase the circulation of people and "open up" (*désenclavement*) a space that is considered as a symbolic and physical barrier, the main ones being the tower-bloc architecture that “enclose” the neighbourhood: the object of demolition. One of this social housing estates in La Duchère was the so called "barre des milles" (the block of the thousands): three 15 storeys high social housing blocks that together made 500m in length at the west side of the plateau. Often, beside of them being a barrier, the weak qualities of the building and their non-existing patrimonial or symbolic value are evoked in the argumentation for their destruction. This is of course true, as those building were constructed as cheap and fast as possible within the political climate of a lasting housing crisis after the second world war and Algerian immigration during the decolonization process.

The new built arrangements consist of housing blocks that combine types of propriety, rent and social housing, which are read from a sociological perspective as degrees of exclusion. Beside of subsidized home ownership, subsidized private rent, there is the regular private rent market and social housing. As underlined before, it is important to keep in mind that even the lower middle-class families that have moved to La Duchère were spoken of as economically fragile and because of the high ground rents excluded from the cities centre, which -assuming the neoliberal politics hold- is also verifiable.

In La Duchère these new built *ensembles* share a common semi-public space. The types of access to housing are almost nowhere combined within one building itself. It seems that social housing agencies don't want to get entangled with private developers.

On the left the modernist conceptualization of an open public space with added secured entrances compared to the semi-public “residentialized” space below.

Pictures: Richard Pfeifer



A private developer (P70) : "Les bailleurs sociaux préfèrent être « chez eux » et nous, « chez nous ». Les bailleurs sociaux apprécient rarement de se retrouver engagés dans des copropriétés. Il est plus simple, en termes de gestion, que les allées soient séparées. Les espaces extérieurs par contre peuvent plus facilement être communs."

When asked, the representative of an influential local association called GTI spoke dismissive towards such a mixt arrangement that is combining various types of access to housing. Her

main argument was that it would make much more difficult the collective struggle against some unacceptable conditions. The tenant types imply that they face different kinds of authorities when confronted with a problem. It was said that the social housing tenants must deal with their agency whereas the property owners hold -if unified- much more power and can engage directly with local political authorities.

In the history of La Duchère there is a very elucidating example about the structural effects of tenants housing status. The housing block called *Les Érables*, now celebrated as an architectural patrimony of Lyon, was after a partial privatization a mixed block with one part of tenants and one part of private owners. During the decline of La Duchère, the budget for the tenants was cut back by their common apartment owner called AOTEP and so were the services that concern the building's maintenance. When youth gangs started to vandalize and appropriate common spaces of the building or the parking area in front of it and squatted those areas, security measures (digi-codes) were installed but did not help to improve the situation. The tenants could not act and felt infantilized and descending in their social status while the property owners did take action till at one point they installed a wall in between in order to be separated from the tenants. This was experienced as a stigmatization and the wall was named after the Berlin wall. (Overney 2011: 8)

This traumatic experience might also be part of the history of the housing-block collective as one engaged person at that time became the responsible for those issues in the social centre, a job that is -as said before- partly payed by the municipality.

During my observations I didn't see this semi-public space that shall function as a space of encounter and meeting to have any real use value for the inhabitants of the residential blocks. Rubbish bins were always empty, sometimes children would play in this space. The blocks are secured so nobody that doesn't have the digi-code or the magnetic card can access them, there are physical barriers and no places that give the sensation of intimacy, quite on the contrary. Some teenagers use hidden stairways, cellars, and garages of the new build blocks as meeting points. The semi-public spaces can be best read in the tradition of crime prevention through architectural design, or what is called *résidentialisation* in the French literature.



Pictures: Richard Pfeifer

Adolescents re-appropriate intimate places within in the newly built part of La Duchère.

On the other side it was argued by a participant of the meetings of a participatory structure within the governance structure of the GPV La Duchère, that this separateness by housing types would hinder a true *mixité* as the former communitarian ties, that means the old inhabitants with Maghrebin ancestry, could prolong in the new blocks. A similar statement was made in an eropic interview with an older male of French ancestry that was working in the security business in Paris and now lives in a truly mixed apartment block which he was happy about. Some tenants that I conceived of being “frontier pioneers” thus demand for more *mixité* especially when it comes to what appears as ethnic or religious based communities. This in fact I heard from new inhabitants of la Duchère but also within the working groups about the future of la Duchère. A former representative of a syndicate of property owners that is also engaged in the local urban participation explained me that to many of the old inhabitants were allowed to stay in the neighbourhood and that their ties could henceforth be re-established, which she found problematic (P4). The issues of relocation, that was not radical enough was often part of these discourses about communitarianism within exogenous social mixing. Basically, some argued that the mode of distribution should not separate people by their status but should provoke them to break with old habits and enhance their geographical mobility. Here another facet that is quite important shows up in La Duchère: these groups appear to be represented by Muslims mostly form the Maghreb region that have lived in La Duchère for long.

On the other hand, the social centre that is the umbrella for many associations drove in the exact other direction as the last relocation of the *barre 230* happened. They effectively managed to move many of their original neighbours into the same new-built social housing structure. Also,

projects were granted to a group of artists called *Le Fanal*, that try to reconnect the neighbours of the social housing complexes that now lost sight of each other.

In an interview with the *médiation sociale*, they were highly critical of what for them was a rupture between the philosophy of *mixité sociale* and the new urban form that is expressing the principles of mixing or "diversity". For the "street level bureaucrats" (Limpsky 1980) it seems obvious that arranging different kinds of categories does not necessary change the social relation and -as it seems- rather prolongs difference than transcends it (P6). This understanding is also stressed by the project management of the GPV La Duchère; a *mixité sociale* based on multiplication of functions and tenant types is insufficient for the assumed benefits of middle class oriented urban restructuring. Those benefits can be subsumed as coming from a re-generated community.

4.2 Mixité sociale as endogenous dwelling

During my first ethnographic rapprochements I voluntarily kept myself at distance to the various local associations as I -quite naïvely, wanted to meet the "normal" inhabitants of La Duchère first. I began with exploring La Duchère by walking around and by drawing my walks into google earth. If I wasn't walking I was sitting on the terrace of the *brasserie* Rosa Parks at the new central square Abbé Pierre. This place fascinated me and I started to compare it with the Place Compass-Raison on the side of "old" La Duchère that is located just a bus stop before. The square Abbé Pierre stands as the manifested will of making a neighbourhood based on the idea of mixing as outlined before: mixing the tenures, mixing the functions, mixing the different socio-economic strata and the household (family) sizes all of which can be subsumed under an urban environment that is attractive for the middle class which becomes the nexus of the reconstruction. I conceptualized this process as exogeneous *mixité sociale*. Place Abbé Pierre which became the new centrality of La Duchère came into existence by the demolition of a tower block called *barre 260*. This was preceded by a significant civil resistance organized by neighbours of the housing estate but it was cut short by technocratic planning authority and local politics, showing at the same time and from the very beginning the limits of local participation (Graven et al. 2006: 337).



Picutre: Richard Pfeifer

Place Abbé Pierre (left) and Place Compass-Raison (right)



4.2.1 Resistance against urban restructuring: The barre 260

The demolition of the *barre 260* is a collective trauma for local associations and organizers that almost routinely popped up when I was speaking to people from the local civil society about their engagement in relation to the project. The *barre 260* was a renovated housing block that, according to every informant that I talked to about this issue, corresponded to the idea or what sedimented into the common sense of *mixité sociale*. Why was it demolished then one might ask? The answer from the side of the planning executives is quite simple, it stood where the future centrality of La Duchère, the place Abbé Pierre, was planned to be thus it stood in the way. Ironically or not, this is the place where civic life today usually is organized by local officials. It was demolished against the greatest local resistance the project has seen since its beginning. It led to the creation of the first collectives that gathered around the problematic of urban reconstruction and the discontent that it still brings along. Collectives of this kind are not new in La Duchère and existed before the demolition-reconstruction approach had begun in the early 2000's. The social problems that arose out of the 1980's were institutionalized by what began as a community of interest and further institutionalized into a collective of vigilant inhabitants that exchanged themselves within their neighbourhoods and pressured the local political society to take action. This collective is called the *Groupe de Travail Inter-quartiers*.

In the case of the *barre 260* collective it was mostly the residents themselves with the help of the GTI and the social centre of La Duchère that together were innovating from the found conditions a form of political organization. According to reflections of Anne Bousquet, the leading figure of the GTI at that time, the mobilization of the local inhabitants was not strong

enough because they could not sufficiently reach out and involve the wider neighbourhood. It must be noted that the local inhabitants were all but well informed from the side of the project management and the electorate, people were mostly anxious about what this all meant for their lives and if they too had to move. These were the main issues during the public hearings (*concertations*) in La Duchère. These public meetings where compulsory applications demanded by the legal foundations of the project (ZAC). In these public hearings the main topics were relocation and people were animated to participate in place making projects. It was the GTI itself that organized information campaign about the reconstruction of La Duchère as the project management could not sufficiently reach out to the local residents.

This conflict with the collective of the *barre 260* had a big impact on how the urban community of Grand Lyon would engage in future relocation operation - it led to the *Charte de Relogement* which determines how such an operation must respond to the needs of the relocated (P 76). This Charta was then implemented for the whole territorial authority.

However, the GTI is not uncontested: in an interview I held with the *médiation sociale* it was described as lacking *mixité sociale* because of the dominant age group and their lack of representativeness regarding existing ethnicity in La Duchère. This is a good example of how the discourse of *mixité sociale* can be appropriated not only against the ascribed communitarian “old inhabitants” of La Duchère but also to contest legitimacy of a more autonomous political group within the civil society. For all the meetings (*concertations*) in May 2016 that I took part in, the problematic of age and ethnicity was evident and thus not only within the meeting of the GTI. In my late 20’s I was always the youngest participant while the dominant generation was way above 40. In an informal talk with a GPV project responsible complains about the lack of the groups representation or the questionable legitimacy of the group initiatives were stated. In my interview with Anne Bousquet she was indirectly replying to that critique when she was saying that the GTI was now clearly lacking newcomers, a new generation that would start to take over.

This learning effect of the organizers and participants against the demolition of the *barre 260* taught the local associations what participation in the project meant. It made clear that the general lines of the project were out of democratic debate and handed over to experts (urbanists, project managers) that were covered by the local electorate and the urban governance structure in the GPV.

It has been noted by Graven et al (2006: 344) that demolitions as such are used as a political statement that is carried across the public using the media coverage that such an event naturally brings about. Graven et al (ibid) write about the demolitions in La Duchère :

« La démolition d'un immeuble n'est pas un acte technique neutre. En effet, l'un des techniciens de l'entreprise de démolition Arnaud, qui est intervenue pour la barre 260, estimait que le grignotage est 3 fois moins cher que le foudroyage. Le choix de la méthode de démolition malgré l'argument du prix est donc toujours porteur d'un certain message de la part de ceux qui la décident. »



Picture: Richard Pfeifer

The *barre 260* was not dynamited like the *barre 230* that was at the centre of how I organized my first fieldwork period and that is shown in the image above; It was torn down bit by bit. The *barre 260* was not the first demolition. In the very beginning of the project it was the *barre 200* that was cut by half for political reasons as it symbolized “des maux de la Duchère” (Graven et al. 2006: 236). The institution that organized the relocation of half of the inhabitants of the *barre 200* came to the same conclusion when reporting about the operation (P77: 154). The *barre 200*, was called “barre Chicago” and was the home of a young male with parents that immigrated from the Maghreb region, that was executed by a police officer in the commissariat in Vaise in 1997.

The struggles that emerged around the first demolitions and most notably the *barre 260* had an impact on the urban governance structure in the sense that it let them invent a participatory element as Bruno Couturier (P76) pointed out in a defensive statement against the GTI. “Quatre fois par an, nous avons des échanges sur la concertation que nous proposons d’engager dans l’année en cours ou à venir, et où les représentants de la société civile organisée font remonter les inquiétudes et les interrogations.”

4.2.2 Communities of interest: residents-collectives

Looking back in time, the collective that formed in the *barre 260* was the first of the so called *collectifs locataires* that today are becoming an important element in how to deal with problems in social housing complexes. In a publicly funded publication called *Millenaire3* Catherine Foret (2014) discussed conflicts around social housing by the example of the *collectif de la barre 230* in La Duchère. Here citizen protest and organizing is positively understood as a mean for institutional innovation in the social housing agencies that brings efficiency and more democratic tenant and problem-oriented approach.

“Comme d’une manière plus générale dans toute organisation, la situation de crise que représente le conflit pousse à l’innovation. ... Un bon exemple de ce genre d’effets est donné par le responsable de l’OPAC du Rhône déjà cité, qui explique comment, après que la Ville de Lyon eût donné des moyens au centre social de La Duchère pour ‘ accompagner le collectif ‘ de la barre 230 et ‘ l’aider à grandir ‘, son institution a mis en place des rencontres régulières avec ce groupe” (P74)

Organized social housing tenants now are supported by the commune of the 9th arrondissement of Lyon that grant a small budget to the social centre of la Duchère to support residents in the formation and in the communication with the social housing agencies or the municipality.

These tenant collectives can come into existence because of problems with the building, feelings of unsafety, or because they are continuations from the time of demolition of their housing-block that could maintain as in the case of the *barre 230* collective. The latter organized and lived in the *barre 230*, that is the last block that was exploded in the project of La Duchère so far.

When I accompanied the formation of such a group the common issues concerned deficiencies in the construction but they were equally occupied with security and ethical issues that concerned disrespectful neighbours and the appropriation of common space by the youth. The problems of the tenants with the housing structure and consequently operator constitutes an internal relatedness between the residents or a "common interests" against an externality. Such a common object could also be related to unwanted effects of the new housing situation like the ironic increasing of living costs for those who become the inhabitants of ecologically advanced apartments that for many created financial pressures on the household budgets. Overall the participation in the setting up of the collective organized in the building block called Nelson Mandela was very weak even though they were effectively supported by the social centre of La Duchère that also supported them to build up pressure on the social housing agency. In the debates itself the representative of the housing agency was -as he put it, content about the formation of this group. During their first meeting it was very clear in the behaviour and by the decisional power in the negotiations that the collective was in a less powerful position. The response to the question of the collective regarding the central heating system was not operated in a way that it keeps the residents warm, or that this is good for the environment and that people must learn to consume less energy. When they asked for a little money to have a party with all the neighbours to help the collective in their internal communication, he respectfully insisted that other problems had to be solved first. Nevertheless, he convincingly agreed on the existence of the group and even underlined that his housing agency was positively involved with such collectives.

This structural effect that came with the relation tenants held to their social housing agency stays in the experience of dis-empowered often atomized ways of taking action, the same mechanism that produces feelings of uncertainty and dependency on the will of an impersonal power of bureaucracies that are in this case the project managers and the social housing agencies.

It is from this relation that "communities of interest" (Blackshaw 2010: 159) that could be understood -as Blackshaw (ibid) points out, as a first temporary revolt against the atomistic consciousness produced by bureaucracies; being a concrete person that is dealt with as an abstract number equal to all other numbers. This is a form of power inherent to modern

bureaucracies that Bauman conceptualized as "adiaphorization".⁴⁴ Nevertheless when this diremption is transcended, a new subjectivity evolves by a "community of interest". Here it is apparent that being an owner, or a social housing tenant has clear effects on organizing towards a collective agency. The tenants of the social housing complexes -other than the private homeowners, are not obliged to organize themselves in syndicates. Tenants cannot overcome their form of access to the tenure which means that social housing tenants are politically speaking in a different and structurally weaker position than the property holders as their taking of action consequently involves personal relation to local political forces. In an interview with a former representative of a private owner-syndicate, a different issue turned up. In her experience there are also problems arising from property owners that give their apartment for rent and only think of maximizing their profits. As she pointed out, this behaviour hinders a syndicate to be more active in the house and led her to give up and turn towards the participatory structures in the GPV.

4.2.3 The social space of *mixité sociale*: a contact zone?

When analysing my data I was looking out for ways of how *mixité sociale* could enter the practical consciousness of the participants of the everyday life in La Duchère.

Drawing on a Gramscian understanding of the role of the intellectual's efforts to translate the hegemonic philosophy to the subaltern help me to understand how experiencing troubling conditions creates a need and thus a door of entrance for conceptualization that add meaning to these irritating everyday experiences. "For while Gramsci certainly meant to include the scholar, the writer, and other men of letters, he was referring generally to anyone whose social function is to serve as a transmitter of ideas within civil society and between government and civil society." (Adamson, 1980 :143).

Intellectuals were operationalized as people that either were professionally involved in the urban reconstruction, or organized members of the local civil society that to a minimal degree endorsed the reconstruction of La Duchère's and publicly spoke out their thoughts about it. I gained knowledge from them mostly by the means of interviewing but also through primary sources. Every institutional background of intellectual activity invoked a different space where *mixité sociale* (in the endogenous sense) would have to take place which implied how it could be operationalized in the local context.

⁴⁴ This alienation is seemingly referring to the classical diremption of the bourgeois subject; Marx's notion of the abstract free and equal *citoyen* against the concrete existence within modern capitalist societies that he developed early in his Parisian time.

Here the *médiation sociale* is elucidating as they translated *mixité sociale* within categories of the immediate proximity or the living next to each other. They emphasised the ethics of being a good neighbour ("voisinage") or working towards a better living-together ("un mieux vivre ensemble") as a stirrup for the demands of their contractor (the municipality of Lyon) to locally implement the policy of *mixité sociale*.

"Alors "mixité sociale" c'est un terme... / On est médiateur, c'est une association qui est portée par la ville de Lyon, qui est portée par des politiques, donc bien évidemment c'est un terme que nous aussi on emploie au quotidien. ... et travailler la mixité dans des endroits où les gens ont des problèmes d'insécurité, un sentiment d'abandon ... Ils n'ont pas envie de ça. Ils s'en foutent."

The social space of *mixité sociale* for the technicians-intellectuals are either on the macro levels of metropolitan Lyon or in the situational encounters they planned for the inhabitants. When confronting technicians with the problems of social mixing they concluded that at least "they" meaning different categories like the middle class and the "old inhabitants" must encounter each other in their everyday life's. The semi-public and public spaces of La Duchère are then the spaces of social mixing that bring along a notion of the universal citizen that is co-established in a public encounter between people that are assumed to hold a respectful relation of mutual indifference in spatial proximity.

This space of *mixité sociale* is characterized by a situationism, that I conceptualized with Mary Louise-Pratt (1991) as "contact zone" even though her concept comes from literary studies I found it quite accurate because it shows how diversified social spaces are potentially collapsing boundaries but stay nevertheless inscribed with power relations. The contact zone in reality is a space of pseudo-egalitarian encounter that allows for a degree of uncontrolled mutual cultural appropriation thus is a space that enables for "transculturation". Transculturation for Pratt (1991 :36) is a phenomenon of the contact zone that she defines as a potential to selectively invent from forms and contents of -in here initial examples a dominant culture, that positively re-defines the internal relations of the subaltern group and the relation to the dominant group.

Contact zones because they remain instable and precarious by lacking the power of unification can -in my reading, easily flip into their opposite form: cohesive social control.

In my reading of "contact zones" they remain an intensely experienced precarious social space that is not only based on well intentioned "communities" as "shared understandings, knowledges, claims on the world" (Pratt, 1991 :40) but into the tendential re-inscription of socio-cultural hierarchies and thus the dissolvment of what Bauman would call ambivalence.

Pratt assumes this when saying that it is from the side of the community's appreciation of the contact zone that it can be re-established (ibid).

The contact zone is effective in disorganizing communitarian structures to then reintroduce the community of citizens that in the case of La Duchère is effectively grounded in and transmitted by the middle class.

This everyday life encounters in the semi-public and public contact zones are a personal experience that acknowledge a living together by ritualized gesturers. The whole *mixité sociale* that is inscribed by exogenous technocratic mechanism is designed to guarantee proximity and minimal forms of mutual acknowledgement.

But if these contact zones planned by the technical-intellectuals of the project do effectively guarantee mixing from below is highly doubtful. One reason is a mechanism described in Bauman's heuristic idealtyp-polarities of vagabonds and tourists. The property holders or middle class members, might want to live in La Duchère because of the built environment and facilities that they can appropriate within their everyday life's but they do have other life orientation and basically are way more mobile than the economically weaker parts of the neighbourhood. The *médiation sociale* and the GPV assume -by their experience- that for them La Duchère offers investment or at least gives the chance to achieve property-owner status which is homologous to "social ascendancy" but the socially relevant activities might very well be outside of La Duchère. Living together in La Duchère with one of Bauman's middle class "tourist" gave me a small glimpse in how spatial proximity itself even between relatively equal neighbours is hardly more than a friendly "hello how are you". According to the project manager Couturier B., the new inhabitant's lifestyles does not give much opportunities to make them part of local community action. Their activities, besides of those with very young children are more centred on the outside of the neighbourhood.

"Parce que la mixité ne se décrète pas, il convient de favoriser la mise en œuvre d'actions qui facilitent les relations entre les gens à l'échelle du quartier, ou au moins du sous-quartier. Il est indispensable de donner aux gens des occasions de « faire ensemble », de « faire communauté » autour d'intérêts communs largement partagés." (P71)

Another social space of *mixité sociale* that is described by the involved actors as a contact zone that advances endogenous *mixité sociale* are the cultural events that take place in La Duchère. Those events shall help to at least temporarily bring the people of La Duchère together.

Mixité sociale here is perceived to break down every day socio-cultural interaction that built upon (un-republican) values such as ethnicity, origin, and religion. Cultural difference is highly appreciated when covered by a formal cultural association and within ritualized cultural events that in principle are designed to become a contact zone. Those groups that are ascribed ethnic-communitarian features are -in my experience, constructed by their not taking part in the associational life and/or are identified as those that do not take part in cultural/artistic events and which do not help to create those events and “projects”. Thus, that do not take self-initiative and help to creatively innovate within the urban reconstruction endeavour by bringing in their culture as assets.

Lyon that signed the “Charter of Cultural Cooperation” does hard in dealing with minorities in general and according to Downing (2015: 13) it is the institutional culture and not the budgetary restraints that constrains the recognition of cultural association based on ethnicity or religion. This is not so much the case in La Duchère where a good and a problematic cultural difference -as stated above- seemingly exists. The “good” is the difference that takes part in the overall creative strategy, that helps to produce positive representations of La Duchère with all the wanted effects on social cohesion, the real estate market, and the grounding of enterprise. The bad side is the difference that is resisting the hegemony built by the institutions of the civil and political society. The contact zone as a temporarily instable social situation, an exception that gives the possibilities of breaking down boundaries and offers resources to reinvent social relation that otherwise would build on hierarchy, has to play out within a republican hegemony that rather uses contact zones as a technology to expand its influence.

So the emphasis on community development through contact zones is two sided because as laid out before becoming a community member comes with the price of taking part in the local civil society and taking part in the creative strategy endeavours that shall promote La Duchère as part of a “liveable” city, to borrow a term from Richard Florida (2005) and finally to ally against the delinquents, old inhabitants, and the supposed ethnic-communitarian groups.

In my experience the tenant’s collectives can hardly be understood as contact zones when they are established as a relation of individuals that form into a community of interests that does not built on group homogeneity or on “seeking security in a common identity rather than in an agreement on shared interests” (Bauman, 2000 :106). Bauman (ibid) thought turned out to be

crucial as what is often discussed within collectives or participatory structures were the persons that appeared as the unwanted strangers, persons that transmitted feelings of insecurity like a neighbour that behaved differently or a group of adolescents or the “old inhabitants” that did not participate in local democracy and kept to their own ties. The question then was not so much where they were but what they were in relation to the group.

The most effective group for establishing a group identity are the “delinquents” that squat and appropriate the halls and staircases and against whom fences and a complex security architecture is built. Those groups are also associated by the officials with the local drug trade. The delinquents produce their own inclusive spaces: one of them is on the western side of the place Abbé Pierre just next to a tobacconist. While the local political society perceives them as gangsters the *médiation sociale* told me that most of them are the kids of the so called old inhabitants” -like the tobacconist himself- that now just meet there to chat.

In my experience this is a highly intense place and much more complicated. In an ero-epic interview with one of the shop owners I encountered, defensive issues towards Salafism were set in relation to institutionalized forms of anti-muslim racism in France but also in relation to another shop owner that was indirectly accused of being a supporter of the Muslim brotherhood. I am not saying that the tobacconist is a Salafist, but that Salafism seemed to have sedimented into a philosophy that is used to make sense of sentiments of exclusion and cultural domination. This interview took place after France suffered from severe terrorist attacks and in a harsh public climate and shall only (!) illustrate why I think the tobacco place is intense. Nevertheless, a militant Salafism is present in La Duchère as death threats against the local Imam were announced by such a group that is not necessarily a group of La Duchère (online source: rue89lyon.fr). Salafism is not something ascribed to the “delinquents”, who are seen as rebellious, provocateurs, the lower end of hashish dealers, adolescent dropouts close to petty crime.

Alike Mary Louise Pratt (1991) the schools are understood as one of the main hegemonic zones for elaborating unity under the guidance of what for Gramsci would be lower strata of traditional intellectuals; the teachers in the classroom. Educating the young and adolescent and guaranteeing the mix of different social groups in the class, like in the traditional village, is a major issue of endogenous *mixité sociale*. But here one must be particularly careful because as pointed out in an interview with a higher education teacher in La Duchère, educational

institutions do effectively separate social classes in La Duchère. This is an issue that is separately debated in the citizen council within the GPV's participatory structure.

4.3 Urban governance and *mixité sociale*

The whole project of *mixité sociale* is dealing with the effects of the decline of the Fordist-Keynesian order and the restructuring of capital on the basis of revolutionized productive forces.

I argued that *mixité sociale* has seen two successive phases in La Duchère which with the institutionalization of participation in urban governance -the *conseil citoyen*, is extractible to all the priority neighbourhoods in France where such a mechanism is operating.

Whereas the exogenous mixing concerns the whole reorganization of the urban space by constructing a new social composition of the inhabitants through tenant types and a middle-class environment emphasizing private property, legibility and social spaces of public encounter between what officially are different kinds of socio-economic groups, endogenous dwelling is about the strategic integration of agents of the civil society into the urban governance structure by which republican hegemony and thus social cohesion is established.

I understand this with Gramsci as a “passive revolution” (Hoare and Smith, 2014 [1971]: 106) that creates the condition for republican by selectively including collective and individual agents of the civil society. The population concerned must share the values and objectives and ways of imagination but also concessions must be made. (see Sum and Jessop 2013 :204). Bauman's insights about the liquid modernity offers an understanding of how neoliberal capitalism structurally enhances insecurities and by doing so promotes formation of communities based on loyalty and a common enemy than on a nonexclusive community of interest.

The endogenous dwelling is an institutional crafting strategy that demands for and not only makes use of initiatives from the neighbourhood's social capital. Urban governance is restructured around evolving bottom up self-organization, that I understood as communities of interest. The importance of institutions as settings that support social mixing was recently investigated by Julia Nast et al (2013). They proposed that institutions might be highly effective in these regards. The tendencies of the communities of interests towards reaffirmation of a

shared identity against what appears ambivalent and dangerous is the entrance door for the discourse or the philosophy of *mixité sociale* under the banner of republicanism. The other of *mixité* is the ethico-religious subject or “old inhabitants” that appear as communitarian and thus counter-hegemonic.

Republicanism also builds the normative bases for the diverse encounters within the public “contact zones” in which transculturation, the appropriation and reinvention of republicanism ought to take place between the middle class, that in the case of La Duchère are not only of French ancestry, and the “old inhabitants” or non-European inhabitants of La Duchère. Even though transculturation is a potentially open process, not every interpretation of republican values will have equal chance to access political power in participatory policy making. In fact those (middle class, academic, European, parent or grandparent generation) who already worked for the overall success of the project, often within cultural associations or more political groups like the GTI, seemed highly over-represented in the begin of the *conseil citoyen* in La Duchère. It seems highly unlikely to me that these zones become spaces of empowerment for the marginalized part of the local population. A polarization seems more tangible.

5. Conclusion

My extended case study sets off from Zygmunt Bauman (2000) theory of a liquid modernity. A core idea of this concept is the relation between processes of modernization to its “solids”, i.e., the enduring institutional structure of society that is maintained through agentic human praxis and might be best exemplified by the modern national state.

The ambivalent or cultural other, personified as the ethnicized or racialized “stranger” and the “flawed consumer” are subjectivities that refer to marginal positions within the liquidising modern social relations: The losers of a capitalism in accelerated globalization.

Bauman (2000), in reaching back on Lévi-Strauss, proposes two socio-spatial concepts that he understands as paradigmatic modes of ordering the cultural other: “anthropoemic” or “anthropophagic” mode of ordering. *Mixité sociale*, so I claim, denominates an anthropophagic way of socio-spatial ordering of the cultural other that followed the anthropoemic episode the French State engaged with since the heydays of the Algerian war and that were leading to important social policy changes: a halt to immigration in 1974 and a shift in social-housing policy that encouraged self-organized forms of segregation (“white flight”) from the aftermath of 1968 onwards until the Barre government in 1977, peaking at the 1981’s presidential campaign when Mitterrand’s adversary Giscard d’Estaing claimed to deport 100.000’s of immigrant workers in a historical turning point that also ushered the rise of the extreme right party Front National.

Just around the time immigrant workers found a home at the heart of the French welfare state, capital was globally restructuring to the disadvantage of the arriving and now sedentary population. The recently built suburbs, a modernist utopia and spearhead of the municipal socialism of the *Parti communiste français*, were immediately pauperized and became places of relegation and stigmatisation. By the anthropoemic way social housing was established in France, working class immigrants became residents of these outskirt neighbourhoods, were they increasingly got embedded in discourses about Muslim immigrants and the duties of integration. On the other side, the lower strata of the middle class continuously moved into the peri-urban space. Suffering from the same macro-economic restructuring they entrenched themselves often in proximity to the *Grands ensembles*.

Mixité sociale as an urban policy paradigm historically emerged from a series of urban uprisings in the early 1980’s that led to the construction of a targeted space for French urban policy not

based on a critic of the political economy, but rather on socio-spatial and racialized categories. These ethnicized categories evoke an othering discourse of “ghetto” and lost territorial sovereignty and spoke of voluntary retreats into ethnic-communitarianism. From the ideology of French republicanism, social forms (cultural associations) based on ethnic or religious identities are negotiated as forms of separatism or as counter-hegemonic thus undermining the formation of a collective will (*volonté générale*).

After failing to introduce state-socialism in the early 1980s the central government drew back from managing the social crises by introducing a gradual decentralization of the state, while also accepting regional particularities. The results: enhanced competition that led to partnership models formulated urban contracts on the bottom to (unsuccessfully) reduce inter-communal inequities. It was by the late 1990s that urban policy positively redefined the role of the national state with a series of laws concerning French urbanism and its relation to social mixing (the “anti-Ghetto” laws), economic development through free-tax zones and workfare (Wacquant 2010: 44). But the role of the state apparatus remained distant in its functioning as an enabler, and exercises control over municipal policies by regulating their access to public funding.

Bauman (2000) speaks of difficulties of social regulation within liquid modernity but does not elaborate on the question of modes of sovereignty and how the national state could craft unification and appropriate these emerging forms or micro-structuration that Bauman describes as “life-politics ... the immediate spheres of being in the world” (Tester, 2004 :162). This is where his theory must be refined by auxiliary means. To that end, I borrowed a neo-Gramscian perspective on urban governance, top-down empowerment and governing from distance. The national state can be understood, since the age of mass politics, as the integral state that crafts unity between two main fields of political power, that of the political and civil-society. Other than Bauman assumes, the national state has not dissolved but found flexible modes of solidification that are evident in the way it is intervening into the urban social crises in the banlieue.

The social conditions of uncertainty are enhanced by marketization but also by the effects social mixing has on that part of the population that is “mixed”. It enhances polarization by its strong middle-class orientation, emphasis on private property and ethnicized zoning strategies and thus introduces mechanisms that are disorganizing solidarity (see Wilson 1996: 200ff). The planned contact zones within the urban form itself tend to counteract their intentions and rather confirm difference in proximity. But uncertainty does also open possibilities for institutional restructuring and innovation on behalf of which temporal solids in a liquidizing modernity are

built. This is exercised by offering participation and access to urban governance which appear as means to exercise control over one's individual and collective lives. It is yet to be proven how inclusive these structures will be given the structural advantage of the already well organized and better equipped middle class.

This permanent “passive revolution” by a top down participative mechanism within urban governance aims to involve and integrate local agents and can institutionally adapt to liquid social formations (cultural associations, community forms). This is the second move of *mixité sociale* that I call “endogenous dwelling”. Here *mixité sociale* is not a sociological constructivism but has turned inward. It is when urban governance institutionalizes itself via top down empowerment as in the case of the *conseil citoyen*.

Further research around the question of how social mixing is now carried out in the sphere of urban governance and by the use of citizen participation would be -in my view- of great interest for a critical social science.

Abstract

My work traces the urban policy of social mixing to the case of La Duchère (Lyon, France). I will present a distinct methodological approach called “Extended Case Method” (Burawoy 1998) that I used for my case study about how *mixité sociale* was established and changing after the demolition-reconstruction in La Duchère was partly completed. Representativeness of the case is addressed from the perspective of a theory-guided ethnography. I will work out how social mixing in La Duchère led, after the urban form was demolished and reconstructed to changes in the urban governance structure by being selectively inclusive towards collective agents in the civil society. Finally, Bauman’s (2000) theory of liquid modernity shall be refined by introducing the necessity of minimal solidifications that work through the field of urban governance by using conflict and existential uncertainty that are often related to social mixing as a political resource for crafting social cohesion.

Abstract in Deutsch

Die vorliegende Fallstudie befasst sich mit der Städtepolitik der sozialen Mischung (*mixité sociale*) anhand eines Vorzeigeprojekts in La Duchère (Lyon, Frankreich). Die soziale Mischung ist eines der wesentlichen Stadtentwicklungsparadigmen zur Bewältigung der sozialen Krise in den französischen Vorstädten. Die Feldforschung beginnt nach der weitreichenden Sprengung und Rekonstruktion der gebauten städtischen Umwelt von La Duchère. Die Repräsentativität des gewählten Falles legitimiert sich innerhalb einer theoriegeleiteten teilnehmenden Beobachtung, im Rahmen einer „Extended Case Method“ (Burawoy 1998). Ich werde zeigen, dass nach dem spektakulären Wiederaufbau, sich eine weitere Facette der Politik der sozialen Mischung zeigt; die selektive Einbeziehung der Zivilgesellschaft in das Stadtmanagement. Den theoretischen Rahmen der Arbeit bildet Baumans (2000) Theorie einer verflüssigten Moderne. Diese Theorie wird im Rahmen meiner Arbeit „rekonstruiert“ indem gezeigt wird, wie verschärfte soziale Unsicherheiten und Konflikte, als Ausgangspunkt flexibler städtischer Institutionalisierungsprozesse, staatliche Festigkeit und sozialen Zusammenhalt ausbilden können.

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P 4	TranskriptBaghdadi
P 5	EntretienMediationSociale_2016Mai
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P 7	TranskriptBruno-Courturier_Entretiens1
P 8	CouturierB_Entretien1
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P 12	Fieldnotes-23_04_2016
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P 66	Fieldnotes-30_05_2016
P 68	Transkript_DiscussionEnGroupe
P 69	DiscussionEnGroupe -30_05_2016
P 70	Bonnet, Jean-Xavier 2012. Interview de Jean-Xavier Bonnet. <i>In</i> : Panassier, C. (ed.). Grand Lyon communauté urbaine.
P 71	Couturier, Bruno 2012. Interview de Bruno Couturier. <i>In</i> : PANASSIER, C. (ed.). Grand Lyon communauté urbaine: Grand Lyon communauté urbaine.
P 72	Paris, Bernard 2015. Rénovation urbaine dans le Nord Témoignage d'un architecte-conseil de l'État. 3.12.2015 ed. préfet du nord: SIG/DILA.
P 73	Maison Duchère (2014) : 2003-2014 : Bilan de 12 années de relogements dans le cadre du Projet Lyon La Duchère

