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Security Theaters in Istanbul and Brussels

The Spectacle of Government Ideology

Master Thesis by Damon Major

Security Theaters in Istanbul and Brussels

The Spectacle of Government Ideology

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Figure 1: Military vehicle outside of Brussels Central Train Station

The word theater is very well chosen, it really is that way.
It is the theater ...

All the measures and the impressive number of policemen and soldiers on the streets do not hinder the possibilities of terrorist attacks. This theater reflected their inability to act on the real social causes, at the origin of these attacks. What's more, their speeches clinging and racist practices and police violence, favored people, the end of the selections that serve organizations such as Deash. (Magali)

Abstract

Looking at Istanbul and Brussels as case studies, this paper explains how the policing of the city became a theater, perpetrated by these two governments. In situations where governments feel threatened, the use of security to restore a sense of normality is a commonly used tactic. But underlying the use of police is a systematic presentation of ideology, one which functions to manipulate perceptions while reinforcing state control. Using an expanded version of Bruce Schneier's term Security Theater, both a discourse oriented analysis and an observational analysis located similarities in how security in Brussels and Istanbul following moments of realized risk encompassed militarized aspects in their core and adhered to higher ideological concepts such as religion, democracy, and freedom to unite people in moments of fear. These similarities, built off of creating a security system that people respond to for quelling fears relating to traumatic events, are countered by other, more discrete means of control. The results demonstrated that although there were general similarities, the two case studies had distinct differences, with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan using policing as a means of control of the population, and Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel using the theater to return to a sense of normality with less repression. Because of this dissimilarity, the distinction of Stabilizing Militarized Security Theater and Repressive Militarized Security Theater.

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1 Introduction

When a dramatic, frightening, and unforeseen event occurs in a city, the reaction by the state can be to step forward, to portray that the situation is safe, and that life can begin to return to normal. One method to display security and normalize the situation may be the use of a greater security presence (Schneier, 2003). But what does the increased security presence in the urban environment mean? Are they placed in the city to ensure that another traumatic event doesn't occur, or are they serving more concealed purposes? In the case of both Istanbul and Brussels, the cities have been shaken by pronounced events where the government felt threatened. Terrorist attacks, protests, and a coup in these cities have redefined how security is enacted (Simpson, et.al., 2017) and (Estrada and Koutronas. 2016). Security is stated as measures which will thwart future attacks (Schneier, 2003). But, these measures created under the guise of security are supplemented by other measures, used to redefine control of the city, and support the goals of the ruling parties (Boin, et. al., 2009) and (Graham, 2010). These measures are what the author calls Security Theater (1), ones that manipulate perceptions to make citizens believe that security has been restored, while projecting ideology and power outwards towards its citizens.

1 Security Theater: The systematic use of security tactics that are intended to manipulate perceptions, deliver messages, or repress, all while doing little or nothing to improve security.

1.1 Concept of Security Theater

Bruce Schneier coined the term Security Theater as a means express what he saw as the growing discrepancy between the needs of security and the practices that were being enacted by governments in response. In his analysis, psychology is the root of the equation, and Security Theater bridges the gap between what people are afraid of and the government's responsibility of preventing risks. Governments assume the role of both decreasing the perception of risk, as well as the reality of its existence. Security Theater has found a home analyzing airports and air travel. In Schneier's original explanation it is the epitome of a space where the systems of security do not completely align with the realities of security (Stewart, Mueller, 2011), (Sanquist, et. al. 2008), and (Schneier, 2003). The simple event of a terror attack does not necessarily presuppose a future attack, but in the moment following an attack there is increased security to help alleviate fear. In the aftermath of a terror attack in 1972 where hijackers threatened to fly a plane into a nuclear power center, the government first placed armed guards in the boarding areas, and in the aftermath of 9/11, National Guard soldiers were placed at the checkpoints. Schneier argues that in both situations, the security measures are not responsible for alleviating further attacks, as armed guards in the boarding areas does little to stop an attack, but the sole presence allows for travelers to feel safer, and thus the economic conditions to return to a state where commerce can continue (Schneier, 2003). Thus, Security Theater is defined by Schneier as

“Security measures that make people feel more secure without doing anything to actually improve their security” (Schneier, 2008).

Although the structure of Schneier's definition is useful, it fails to realize the full scope of theater. Primarily, Schneier's use of the term, and the analysis that comes after, is largely anecdotal, with little methodology behind it (Schneier, 2003) and (Schneier, 2008), or as a catchy term used non-centrally (Stewart and Mueller, 2011) and (Pütz, 2012), with some exceptions (Amoore and Hall, 2011). Secondly, the analysis draws on how a theater is solely the misunderstood response and perception by citizens' feelings of insecurity, when

theater is more than that. Schneier attempts to note ineptitudes of security practice, and the cost/benefit analysis that produces them, but struggles to grasp the structural aspects of power dynamics (Schneier, 2003) and (Schneier, 2008). These power dynamics are messages sent out by the government, towards a variety of sources, media, residents, and international observers, who are receptive of different messages. The security becomes a performance, one where ideology and goals are put on display. Because of this additional component, the concept of Security Theater must be translated into a definition that allows for greater understanding of how security is manipulated to reinforce other intentions. To do this, the following definition is proposed:

The systematic use of security tactics that are intended to manipulate perceptions, deliver messages, or repress, all while doing little or nothing to improve security.
(author's definition)

A distinction must be made that a Security Theater is invoked in two separated spheres. First, there is the visible; police, police stations, military, or security cameras. Through the visible representation of the security apparatus, perceptions are changed, (Foucault, 1975), (Schneier, 2003), and (Althusser, 2006). But, there is also the means in which the danger or security is portrayed to the population, the frame which risk is presented. (Tankard, 2001) and (Boin et.al. 2009). One example is when a government declares martial law, an action that limits the freedom of individuals while imposing a sense of urgency amongst the population (Agamben, 2005). Martial law is a grand display, one which is widely repeated, but it is accompanied by much more subtle means of theater such as processes of otherizing (2) (Butler, 2006). How the danger is reported to the population thus has an influence on how the risk is received (Graham, et.al., 2004) and (Boin et.al. 2009). Because of this distinction, the Security Theater can be further divided into the **Physical Security Theater**, regarding the presence of police, military, and other infrastructural elements in the city, and a **Discursive**

² Otherize: To make a person or group of people seem different, or to consider them to be different (Cambridge Dictionary, 2017)

Security Theater, regarding how danger is personified in linguistic and other non-visible forms.

1.2 Typology of Security Theater

Security operates on a spectrum where each security measure is affecting the reality of security and the perception of security (Schneier, 2003). Likewise, the increased perception of security can also be viewed as a legitimate promotion of security (Moore and Trojanowicz, 1988), and more security does not necessarily make people feel safer, in fact it can do the opposite (Hinkle and Weisburd, 2008). In the end, a Security Theater is a neutral concept. Just as it can represent a legitimate form of security with the intentions to decrease risk (Schneier, 2008), it can equally be a tool to further a political agenda (Althusser, 2006).

Some types of Security Theater are related to exceptional circumstances, as will be discussed in this paper, but others are related to the mundane and everyday life. To express this, a brief typology was developed that explores the possibilities of some types of Security Theater. This does not aim to be exclusive, and other Security Theaters can be theorized and created. There are three main points of reference.

The first is a negative Security Theater that emphasizes the safety of a space by the lack of security. Negative Security Theater can be best identified on a state-wide level, by countries that have disbanded their military. Using a discourse that they are pursuing a program of peace, the disbanding can still be a theater, as the role of military transfers into the policing sector. An example of this is Costa Rica, where the de-militarization of the country has been a source of national identity, with ex-President and advocate of de-militarization Oscar Arias stating how the re-administered funds from military can improve the well-being of the entire country (Buscone, 2017). Although stated as a demilitarization program, the

continuation of internal threats has encouraged the country to adapt paramilitarization of the police force (Brysk, 2005).

The second is a petty crime theater. In this environment, a focus is placed on the perception that petty crime is being controlled, and with this, greater security is formed. These ideas are found in Hot Spot Policing, where police focus their attention on spaces which are deemed problematic, and the Broken Window Theory, where order is attempted to be maintained through the perception of a clean neighborhood. The Broken Window Theory invokes policing practices that are far from solely symbolic including incarcerating low-level criminals and security concentration in certain zones, but also includes symbolic aspects, such as fixing broken windows, taking abandoned cars off the streets, and removing graffiti. With these symbolic actions, it encourages the idea that an environment is safe, and through this process, both fear of crime and crime itself decrease (Ratcliff, 2004) and (Wilson and Kelling, 1982).

The final example of Security Theater is the most dramatic, the Militarized Security Theater. Governments attempt to influence the population towards a preconceived equilibrium by operating from the concept that large visible symbols can project either a sense of security and/or control (Giroux, 2004) and (Graham, 2010). From this point, two subgroups can be created. The Stabilizing Theater is focused outwards, from the government to the population, manipulating risk that the population is perceiving. It focuses on national unity, and while an ideology that cannot be completely inclusive, it aims to unite the population (Boin, et.al., 2009) (and (Schneier, 2003). The Repressive Theater is focused inwards, addressing the risk of the government or party. It utilizes the theater to reassert dominance over its own population, and uses authority as a main tool of compliance (Althusser, 2006), (Foucault, 1975), and (Boin, et.al., 2009).

Security Theater Typology: Author's Typology

1: Negative Security Theater	A Security Theater where the absence of police and other forms of security help to reinforce the idea that an area is secure.
2: Petty Crime Theater	A Security Theater that focuses on demonstrating constant vigilance against petty crime through widespread visible actions.
3: Militarized Security Theater	A Security Theater focused on demonstrating stability or authority using visible and intimidating security forces.
3A: Militarized Stabilizing Theater	A Militarized Theater that focuses on stabilizing fears and reputation.
3B: Militarized Repressive Theater	A Militarized Theater that attempts to restrict voices of dissent and centralize power.

Table 1: Security Theater Typology (Author's Typology)

1.3 Problem Statement

In the aftermath of realized risk in Brussels and Istanbul, policing became increasingly militarized and present within the urban environment. The locations selected for policing were not evenly dispersed, with specific locations receiving large numbers of police, military, and militarized vehicles. In these moments, both governments (3) created a Security Theater which utilized the fractured status-quo through different means to further their agendas (Renard, 2016) and (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016).

3: Government will often be spoken in an abstract manner as to how it can pursue political goals. When in the abstract form, it can refer to the entirety of government, a portion of government, a political party, or a portion of a political party.

1.4 Research Question

Using Brussels and Istanbul in the aftermath of realised risk, how do governments use Security Theater to manifest ideology in the physical sphere through the security apparatus, and then focus this ideology using discourse? Understood through the two processes of manifesting and focusing ideology, what are the intentions?

1.5 Hypothesis

This paper sets out to prove that in the aftermath of the realized risk, both governments pursued a Security Theater which directly placed ideology in the physical sphere through militarized personnel. The head of state discourse for Turkey attempted to clearly delineate an enemy to repress, while the Belgian Head of State refrained from delineating the enemy. The Turkish government pursued a form of Security Theater which used authoritarian tactics to control the population and increase their political capital (4) and authority. The Belgian government utilized tactics that attempted to demonstrate that they were in control of the situation and ensure that the population was feeling secure to return to a new status-quo.

1.6 Framework of Analysis

So far, the concept of a Militarized Security Theater has been broken down in two ways.

1. The means of the Security Theater:

4 Political Capital “political power enjoyed by politicians, a power that is derived from the trust (expressed in a form of credit) that a group of followers places in them. Then, it follows that whenever this trust increases or decreases, the political capital of a politician changes accordingly” (Schugurnesky, 2000).

- a. The physical reality of the security system, which is enacted through visible security measures, such as the police, the military, the weapons, and changes to the built environment.
- b. The Discursive Security Theater, which is the language and discourse that is used by elites (5) to frame how the risk is received by the population.

and

2. The intention of the Security Theater:

- c. The Militarized Stabilizing Theater, which is focused outwards to stabilize fears.
- d. The Militarized Repressive Theater, which focuses inwards to assert control, reduce risk to the government, and centralize power.

The methods use the two **means** of Security Theater (physical and discursive) to dissect the **intentions** of the security theater (stabilizing and repressive). To do this, five sections are formed. 1st is the literature review (Chapter 3), which provides a wider conceptual understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of Security Theater, as well as how Security Theater can be incorporated into militarized policing trends. This section concludes with a conceptualization of how the metaphor of a theater can be placed in the city, and how ideology can be viewed as a theatrical performance. 2nd is a contextualization of Brussels and Istanbul (Chapter 4). Once again focusing on secondary source academic articles, the ideology of state and of political parties is developed. This ideological assessment is limited, focusing on governing structures, especially levels of authoritarianism for Turkey and the process of Europeanization for Brussels. From here, the analysis is how these ideological features are represented in the Security Theater. The 3rd section begins through an observational analysis of the

5 Throughout this paper, elites refer to individuals who have the ability to influence society through their discourse, focusing on, but not solely, political actors and members of the media.

two cities, focusing on visible representations of security (Chapter 6). These visual representations are understood through the space's symbolic value, either as the main point of congregation and contestation, or their function as unique economic spaces in the city. Through this section, it first delineates if a security theater is formed, and from there utilizes theories by Schneier (Schneier, 2003) and Althusser (Althusser, 2006) to draw connections between government ideology and the security apparatus which arises. 4th, a discourse oriented analysis (Chapter 7) views public communication from the head of state in the moments following realized risk. Building off a Call to Arms framework developed by Graham, it uses concepts of overlexicalization and bifurcation as identifiers of alienation and repression (Graham, et.al., 2004). The final section (Chapter 8), the Weaponization of Risk concludes by demonstrating the increasingly repressive apparatuses that both countries enacted through the legal system and interactions between individuals and security. The totality of this aims to first note that a Security Theater has been formed in both contexts, but more importantly to delineate that the realized risk was weaponized in different manners and the security practices had different intentions.

Introduction

Introducing the
Concept of
Security Theater

Problem Statement
Problem Question
Hypothesis

Framework

Moments of
Realized Risk

Literature Review

Risk
Heuristics

Weaponizing
Risk

Spectacle
of Security

The Urban
Theater Metaphor

Contextualizing the Case Studies

Political Ideology

Security Apparatus

RESEARCH QUESTION

Using Brussels and Istanbul in the aftermath of realised risk, how do governments use Security Theater to manifest ideology in the physical sphere through the security apparatus, and then focus this ideology using discourse? Understood through the two processes of manifesting and focusing ideology, what are the intentions?

Observational Analysis

Q1 Is a Security Theater formed?

Q2 Through Bruce Schneiers conceptualization of Security Theater and Louis Althusser's Theory of ideology, how can Security Theater represent stabilizing the economic environment and manifesting government ideology?

Discourse Oriented Analysis

Q3 Does discourse from the symbolic Head of State serve to oppress, alienate, or call violence upon an Otherized population?

Weaponizing Risk

Q4 How does the implementation of the Security Theater reflect the legal framework and the relationship between security and the population?

Conclusion

1.7 Selecting the Case Studies

Case studies were selected based on cities in which there was a moment of realized risk. Being present during the Gezi Park Protests and the Coup d'état in Istanbul, as well as in Brussels during the Bataclan Terror Attack and the aftermath of the Zaventem Attack allowed for an analysis of the environment both before and after the attacks. Other case study options such as New York City after 9/11 or Paris after the Bataclan Attack were considered, but the observational analysis would have been severely limited due to place of residence. Brussels and Istanbul allow for a successful study of a Security Theater, as both security apparatuses were dramatically changed following realized risk enacted (Simpson, et.al., 2017) and (Estrada and Koutronas. 2016), and the differing cultures, political parties, and government types allowed for an analysis of how security is utilized in different manners by different governments. The cases studies are limited temporally, initiating at the moment of realized risk, and continuing to the present.

1.7.1 Realized Risk in Brussels

The initiation of a Security Theater was due to the initial event in Paris, when on November 13, 2015, a series of coordinated attacks occurred. Beginning at 21:20 three suicide bombers attacked the Stade de France during a football match. This coincided with mass shootings on the streets at cafes and restaurants. The attacks culminated in Bataclan Theater where hostages were taken during an Eagles of Death Metal concert. The attack resulted in the deaths of 130 individuals, plus the attackers. After the attacks, it became known that the terrorists originated from Brussels in a neighborhood that garnered an increasingly problematic reputation, Molenbeek. This lead to a 6-day lockdown of the city, in which the perpetrators were searched for and eventually located, all while much of Brussel's economic functions halted. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by ISIS (Bigo et. al., 2015).

This attack was followed by one in Brussels at the Zaventum Airport on March 22, 2016. Three coordinated suicide attacks, two in Zaventum airport, and

one in the Maalbeek Metro Station killed 35 people. They occurred a mere four days after police raids were conducted that resulted in the capture of Salah Abdeslam, the perpetrator of the Paris attacks, the attack reinforced reinforcing a sense of insecurity in the city. The attack, claimed by ISIS (Rokach and Patel, 2017) reinforced a sense of insecurity in the city. In the backdrop of these terrorist attacks is a fragmented political system (Section 4.1.2), in which two political parties exert influence on the Security Theater, the Mouvement Réformateur (RM) (6), primarily on the Discursive Security Theater, and the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) (7) on the Physical Security Theater.

1.7.2 Realized Risk in Istanbul

Unlike Brussels where there were two terrorist attacks, both perpetrated by similar motivations, the events in Istanbul are more complex. The events are from separate actors, and through separate tactics, each necessitating a separate response. The events can be separated into three temporal time frames. Each of the three eras build upon each other, as none of the threats to government power have deteriorated completely, although some governmental risks have been lessened over time. In the backdrop of the Realized Risk in Istanbul is the increasingly authoritarian government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (8), and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This authoritarianism is further discussed in section (Section 4.1.1.3).

The first era, the Gezi Park Protests and Post-Gezi Park environment. The Gezi Park Protests began on May 28th, 2013 over the proposed demolition of Gezi Park in favor of an Ottoman style military barracks. Unconfirmed estimates of the protest state that approximately 3.5 million of the 80 million Turkish residents

6: A Center Right party representing the French speaking population. For analysis see section 4.1.2.5

7: A Flemish Nationalist party representing the Flemish speaking population. For analysis see section 4.1.2.3

8: The AKP is a right party in Turkey, which currently holds a majority in the parliament and the Presidency. It is led by President Erdoğan, and can be identified as a Right Islamic government, which utilizes levels of authoritarianism For analysis see section 4.1.1.2

took part, the largest number centering in the most populous city of Istanbul. This era represents a time when Erdoğan's rule was under pressure by his own citizens. Security measures were addressing this very direct threat to him, directly targeting the Gezi Park protestors and attempting to reassert control over key public spaces in the city (Gül, et. al., 2014).

The second era follows a series of terrorist attacks. Unlike the attacks in Brussels in which ISIS claimed responsibility, Turkey is faced with multiple interconnected conflicts ranging from the conflict in bordering Syria, which has led to greater ISIS and other Islamic terror threats, along with internal conflicts with both the Kurdish population and the secular Kemalist (9) organizations. This time frame will be discussed the least in the Turkish context because following the series of terrorist attacks in 2016 (Table 3), I returned to Istanbul on July 15th, the same day as the Coup d'état, limiting the ability to research the effects of the terrorism without intervening factors. And, the Coup and Gezi Park Protests have been utilized by the government to further the AKP ideology in a congruent manner for authoritarianism (Gül, et. al., 2014), (Esen and Gumuscu, 2017), and (Turam, 2017). It is this that will be analyzed.

9: Kemalism: An ideology which was initiated by Ataturk. It represents republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and revolution (Zürcher, 2004, pg. 181)

Date	Location	Casualties	Affiliation
06/01/2015	Sultanahmet Bombing	1 dead 1 injured	Islamic
23/12/2015	Sabia Gokcen Bombing	1 dead 1 injured	Kurdish
17/01/2016	HDP Headquarter Attack	0	Unidentified
19/03/2016	Istiklal Bombing	4 dead 26 injured	Islamic
07/06/2016	Vezneciler Bombing	12 dead 51 injured	Kurdish
06/10/2016	Yenibosna Bombing	10 injured	Kurdish
01/12/2016	Sultanahmet Bombing	13 dead 14 injured	Islamic
10/12/2016	Vodafone Arena and Macka Park Bombing	48 dead 166 injured	Kurdish
01/01/2017	Reina Nightclub Attack	39 killed 70 injured	Islamic

Table 3: Terror attacks in Istanbul

The third era is defined by the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15th, 2016 where military personnel attempted to remove President Tayyip Erdoğan from power while he was on holiday in Marmaris. Invoking memories of past coups, the reaction in Istanbul was divisive with many residents supporting Erdoğan, others supporting the military, and others refusing to support any of the sides. In the end, Erdoğan returned to Istanbul under questionable circumstances and could rally support of large segments of the population (Esen and Gumuscu,

2017). Calling residents to the street with the help of the mosques and religious organizations, the military uprising was brought to a halt and a purge of large swaths of society began. To solidify control over sectors of the government, police, military, universities, and other sectors, over 100,000 citizens lost their jobs (Milan, 2016), (Esen and Gumuscu, 2017), and (Fisk, 2016)

2 Definitions

Before entering the literature review, there are three concepts which supplement Security Theater.

2.1 Risk

Risk: “A state where there is the possibility of exposure to harm”

Modified from (Mythen and Walklate, 2005)

Uncertainty remains the key aspect of risk. The risk itself exists in the present, but is always referring to a future action. This future action is one which is inherently uncertain, both in the probability in which it occurs, and in the damage that could occur. In this sense, risk is always on a spectrum, one which is impossible to judge because of its futurity, but the use of past trends and current knowledge can create risk assessment calculations providing hypothesizes for how risks should be controlled (Mythen and Walklate, 2005). An example is provided below, as demonstrated by table 4 and 5.

		Consequence			
		Catastrophic	Very Serious	Serious	Not Serious
Likelihood	Certain A	1A	2A	3A	4A
	Higly Probable	1B	2B	3B	4B
	Probable	1C	2C	3C	4C
	Improbable	1D	2D	3D	4D

Table 4: Consequence and Likelihood of Risk (Little, 2004, pg. 55)

Risk Level	Action Indicated
1A, 1B,1C, 2A, 2B, 3A	There are unacceptable risks. Action must be taken to eliminate or reduce them.
1D, 2C, 2D, 3B, 3C	These may be unacceptable risks. These risks may be acceptable as part of a comprehensive risk management strategy.
3D, 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D	These risks are usually acceptable as part of a comprehensive risk management strategy.

Table 5: Action Required for Risk Level (Little, 2004, pg. 55)

2.2 Realized Risk

Realized Risk: “A moment or period of time where a portion or all of the dangers of a risk occur” (author’s definition)

In the context of this paper, security systems, systems which address the perception (10) and reality (statistical probabilities) of security (11), are often enacted in the moment when risk has been realized. It is in this state, where the

10: Perception of Security: The amount of risk that an individual or entity feels. Author’s definition
 11: Reality of Security: The amount of risk that is exerted on an individual or entity. Author’s definition

fear of the hypothetical becomes manifested in action, and most importantly, there is both a threat to the government's stability, and an opportunity to shore up support and to advance a political agenda. Realization of risk does not necessarily realize the entirety of a risk, as it is often only a certain aspect, yet the realization of risk provides a more solid justification and produced political capital (12) that can be used in the pursuit of ulterior motives (Boin, et.al., 2009) and (Ulmer et.al., 2013). The realized risk of one group does not necessarily correlate to realized risk of another, and in the case of social movements and regime stability, they may be in direct opposition of each other.

2.3 Security

Security is the set of strategies, put in place, to prevent adverse consequences. (modified Schneier, 2003, pg 12)

When reduced to its naked roots, security is not concerned with perceptions or emotions. Security can be seen as a mathematic process, using historical events, risk calculations, and countermeasures to predict the likelihood of certain future events (Schneier, 2003). For example, one study showed the use of a burglar alarm reduces the chance of a burglary by 11.9% (Hakim et. al., 2001). Replicated up towards a citywide scale, security measures taken by an urban government aimed to reduce the likely hood of risk, but understanding the security measure's effects on crime are not clear. There are difficulties in precisely calculating decreases in any single variables effect on crime due to numerous interconnected variables. Fluctuating societal/economic conditions may have decreased crime (better economic conditions), crime may be reported less often, police may accomplish other meaningful tasks, or the police may have successfully reduced crime (Weisburd and Eck, 2004), (Schneier, 2008), (Marvell and Moody, 1996), and (Chiras and Dominic, 2004).

12 Political Capital: The sum of combining other types of capital for purposive political action or the return of an investment of political capital which is returned into the system of production (reinvestment) (Casey, 2008).

3

Literature Review

This paper aims to demonstrate first that a Militarized Security Theater is enacted in both case studies, and second, once enacted the governmental intentions behind them. But, before reaching this point, the foundation will establish, through a four-part process, where security can be seen as a representation of ideology. First, utilizing the concepts that Schneier developed in his analysis, the process of misunderstanding risk is identified. This section is admittedly brief, as it is central in Schneier's work (Schneier, 2003) and (Schneier, 2008), and the aim is to extrapolate from it rather than rehash it. Second, the means used to distribute information influences the misconceptions, and the process of distributing information is one which can be utilized by the government for political gain. Utilizing a moment of exception, following realized risk, the government has increased opportunity to pursue their goals (Boin et.al., 2009), (Schumpeter, 1954) and (Frank and Rooij, 2015). Third, the practice of security is undergoing changes in which it is increasingly militarized. The militarization process is one in which the perception of the military, the equipment, and weapons have a direct influence on society's perception of fear (Graham, 2010), (Kraska, 2007), and (Foucault, 1975). Finally, the city represents a stage for a theatrical performance to take place within (Mumford, 1937) and (Sassen, 2001). Demonstrating a series of different ways for theater to be enacted, the Security Theater becomes an ideological performance, where the government manifests its ideology in the physical sphere as described in Althusser's concepts of ideology (Althusser, 2006). The locations governments choose to secure, and the methods which it does represent where it wishes to draw attention, and in which manner.

3.1 Misidentifying Risk

3.1.1 Risk Heuristics

Bruce Schneier's original analysis of Security Theater is based on the process judging the perception of risk as opposed to actual risk, the foundation of which was demonstrated through studies in risk heuristics, led by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. These studies began to find the cause of why humanity is so inept at understanding and reacting to the danger that surrounds it. This ineptitude is revealed through a series of studies regarding personal safety and choices individuals make. Originally developed in the framework of gambling, they looked at choices in gambling patterns and why these choices were made irrationally (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). This study was later expanded to consider how these heuristics relate to security. The key research object became technological advancements, which individuals were increasingly afraid of, highlighted in the 1980's by nuclear energy. These technologies posed what Slovic deemed Catastrophic Risks (Slovic, 2000). The researchers came to a series of conclusions. Fear is a result of a series of emotional and rational shortcuts. It is derived from a series of places, through the culture that surrounds humanity, the fears that individuals are fed, and through these understandings (Schneier, 2008) and (Slovic, 2000). The understandings that surface may seem rational to the individuals, but they have dramatic implications in which risks governments protect against, and how the individual reacts to risk. In Beyond Fear, Schneier lists a set of examples.

1. People exaggerate spectacular but rare risks and downplay common risks.
2. People have trouble estimating risks for anything not exactly like their normal situation.
3. Personified risks are perceived to be greater than anonymous risks.
4. People underestimate risks they willingly take and overestimate risks in situations they can't control.

5. Last, people overestimate risks that are being talked about and remain an object of public scrutiny.

(Schneier, 2003: pg. 26)

Resulting from these misunderstandings of risk have, on one hand, created an environment where the population has demanded that responses are substantive enough to quell their fears, while simultaneously providing the opportunity for people in power to manipulate these perceptions for future gain (Sunstein and Zeckhauser, 2011).

3.1.2 The Risk Society

As Security Theater attempts to understand the effect of fear on an individual, Risk Society addresses what occurs when the societal entity experiences greater risks. The very basis of risk and threat can be seen along a progressively extending timeline of human progression. Risk Society is heavily intertwined with how risk is perceived by those it affects, with attempts to bridge risks with the rapidly increasing scientific technologies. Developed as a concept in the early 1990's by Ulrich Beck, he posits that:

"Being at risk is the way of being and ruling in the world of modernity; being at global risk is the human condition at the beginning of the twenty-first century."

(Beck, 2006, pg 330).

It is his argument that modern society is increasingly involved in a never-ending process of controlling the risks that it itself created, each a savior for their predecessor. Yet in their present state, these security measures are perceived as latent risks, more dangerous than their technologically inferior predecessors. Large interconnected systems, such as electrical grids, sewage systems, air travel, or the mail system, become intertwined in everyday life, allowing for deviant modifications to have wide ranging impacts. Likewise, the technological advancements improve the destruction of a hypothetical attack, with airplanes used as missiles, chemical

weapons, or automatic guns increasing the latent risk (Beck, 2002) and (Beck, 2012).

Risk evolves, making it both uncalculatable and non-compensable. It becomes catastrophic, with irreparable damage to the nation state and the world. Risk has managed to situate itself in two extremes, never actually present, a state where it is latent and waiting to happen, while simultaneously poised and ready to inflict irreparable damage, an ominous disaster (Mythen, 2016). In the Hobbesian sense, the government is responsible for maintaining security, but against unknown possibilities, it is impossible to accurately calculate the damages that risk could hypothetically create. This invokes strong reactions (Mythen and Walklate, 2005) and (Beck, 2012). As risk is incalculable, then creating security processes against it is a risky endeavor. One security failure opens the door for large political, social, and economic losses. Using political capital as a weight of measure, a politician or political party must engage in a balancing act. If a catastrophe occurs, more political capital is lost if the security measures appeared inadequate and the converse is also true where abnormally high expenditures lose political capital when no risks become reality. If there is no risk, why pay for the security? To combat hypothetical risk, governments engage in a practice of hedging their bets, implementing security measures, ones which can be observed by the population and the government can maintain that they were “doing their best” (Beck, 2012), (Spence, 2005) and (Beck, 2006).

3.2 Weaponizing risk

3.2.1 Bounded Rationality

So far, risk has been shown to be something which both individuals and society misinterpret, but this process of misinterpretation is not solely derived from risk heuristics, but elite’s use of media and other channels of communication to augment or manipulate information. This process called framing is

The selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters.

(Gitlin, 1980, p. 6)

Bounded rationality combines the ability to frame events in a certain manner, to weaponize the risk heuristics into a tool for political gain. It is viewed as a constraint of rational thought, a theory where an individual can make perfect decisions, using tools such as cost benefit analysis and game theory (13) to maximize happiness or other emotions. But, a pure rationality exists within a bubble where all the variables are known, and the decision maker has the time and capability to achieve the right decision. This is a dramatic assumption. (Schumpeter, 1954) and (Arthur, 1994). Bounded rationality places individuals in a situation where they are following the practices of rational thought, but are continuously forced to make sacrifices in terms of limited information, limited mental capabilities, and limited time. The human brain is simply not capable of understanding all the intricacies of a situation, garnering all the necessary information, and finally making the decision (Druckman, 2001).

The effect of this is that when bounded rationality enters the political sphere, it creates an eerily similar correlation to propaganda. The information/propaganda which is provided does not provide for standard game theory calculations to be made. Instead, it is information which is meant to serve certain purposes. When placed within a rational framework, one must first be aware of the “game”. This concept of a “game being played” is related to how politics and media discourse are a separate sphere with their own intentions and ambitions. Within the political sphere, politicians are battling for political capital, and information is weaponized to gain it. When information is returned to the individual, that person must spend time and energy (restraints of bounded rationality) to understand the elite’s ambition and remove their bias. Taking this logic one step farther, the information that is provided to the person must then be acknowledged by them as the totality of information. If significant pieces of

13: Game theory is the formal study of decision-making where several players must make choices that potentially affect the interests of the other players (Turocy and Stengel, 2001 pg. 4).

information are simply misrepresented or ignored, then once again an accurate judgement is impossible. Finally, these processes of distorting the receiver's perception is furthered by accurate knowledge by the perpetrators of propaganda with the knowledge of risk heuristics. By utilizing tactics to misrepresent, elites frame and posit the information in a way that pinpoints inaccuracies in judgement and inner fears to further their gains (Herman and Chomsky, 2010) and (Frank and Rooij, 2015).

3.2.2 Using Exemptions for Exceptions

The moment for utilizing framing and risk heuristic is not always equal, and at a moment with exemptions, opportunity arises to exploit a new status quo (Ulmer et. al., 2013). Exemptions to the norm allow the opportunity for boundaries to be pushed, and a framework to be created which justifies greater security and minimizes personal freedoms. These events can be both planned, exemplified during the Olympics, the World Cup, and other mega events, or unplanned exceptions, such as terror attacks, protests, or natural disasters. Both forms of exemptions provide the opportunity for vast restructuring, of the built environment, of the legal system, and other political ambitions (Klauser, 2013) and (Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010).

In the moments of exception, spectacle becomes a key aspect. Mega events, spectacles in themselves, require spectacle in their security, incorporating the security apparatus in the bidding process, and key factor in the selection of this which city hosts the event. The exception becomes a testing grounds for numerous new technologies, and a moment to introduce new security practices, ones which are widely advertised and produced. They are initially advertised as short-term fixes, but are often incorporated in the long-term infrastructure of the environment. As the media reproduces images of security, the image of the city changes, as police or military become are sometimes engrained in the urban environment, (Samatas, 2007), and (Graham, 2012).

The unplanned exception offers a unique mode of opportunity, as the realized risk encourages concrete structural changes to government, the legal framework, and justification aggression. As described by Boin, crisis exploitation is utilized in different manners, and with different and unpredictable results. The crisis itself becomes a political weapon, opening the door for questions about the status quo, and utilizing media to intensify the focus on critical issues. Boin utilizes two variables, the political stance and the policy stance to determine the intentions for how the crisis will be framed. In Table 6, he provides a framework. With relevance to this paper, his definitions of Crisis as a threat and an opportunity for elites to manipulate perception are provided (Boin et.al. 2009).




Table 6: Crisis as framing contests

Type-2. Crisis as threat frame

Deeming the events to be a critical threat to the collective good embodied in the status quo before these events came to light, and thus a predisposition to defend the

agents (incumbent office-holders) and tools (existing policies and organizational practices) of that status quo against criticism.

(Boin, et. al., 2009 pg 84)

Type-3. Crisis as opportunity frame:

Deeming the events to be a critical opportunity to expose deficiencies in the status quo ex ante, and hence a predisposition to pinpoint blameworthy behavior by status quo agents and dysfunctional policies and organizations in in order to mobilize support for their removal or substantive alteration.

(Boin, et. al., 2009 pg 84)

The frame of how the government speaks represents intentions. There is no obligation for the government to use the realized risk to perpetrate further policy programs, but it does provide the opportunity for it to happen. Utilizing the crisis as an opportunity requires blame to be focused on an outside group of people, one that can be targeted and used as a point to initiate policy against. (Graham et.al., 2004) and (Boin, et.al., 2009). For example, in the aftermath of 9/11, the often-repeated phrase “You are either with us or with the terrorists” posits a difficult dichotomy to break, making it strenuous to oppose both. With the delineation, anyone who does not support war, a central feature of the “us”, is thus framed as a terrorist (Butler, 2006).

In the aftermath of realized risk, there are changes to what the government can do, both from what their supporters will back, and with expanded lawmaking power. In circumstances where the government can rally support behind themselves, the event serves as a conductor of producing political capital. But, an equally possible failed response can result in its loss. Identified within the context of a single US presidency, George H.W. Bush received popular support boost following 9/11, and support evaporated following Hurricane Katrina. The result of the outcome is dramatic. Utilizing 9/11 and a bump in support from 51-86 %, Bush could enter two wars, create new agencies to defend against future threats, and ultimately create a legacy for better or worse. In the aftermath of Katrina, Bush engaged in a public discourse circuit solely to regain his previous political capital and salvage his reputation and dropped in support from 45% to 40%. He was

widely blamed for the failures of Katrina by the Democratic Opposition (65.5%), and was unable to utilize the disaster in the same success as 9/11 to further his agenda (Gallup, 2017), (Malhotra and Kuo, 2008), and (Benoit and Henson, 2009). While the support boost is beneficial, the aim is ultimately to transform it into concrete means of executing ideology (Boin, et. al. 2009) and (Olson, 2000).

If the government successfully navigates the public discourse, they are granted exceptional powers. Predetermined martial law, which is part of many constitutions, provide emergency powers to combat a threat. Built on the duality of exception vs. norm, a State of Emergency offers aid against a temporary threat, but modern threats remain ill-defined in both time and space, creating an environment where threats are never able to be completely repressed. As the threat perpetuates, without a clear elimination of threat, the state of exception has clear temporal delineations (FereJohn and Pasquino, 2004). The state of exception **shouldn't** be indefinite and omnipotent, (although it can be utilized as such), and so, it has a creeping influence into the legal framework. Highlighted by the US War on Terror (Boin, et. al. 2009), which incorporated the exception into a permanent state of war, there can be more subtle changes in the frameworks of countries such as Belgium (André, et. al., 2017) Canada (Panitch, 2002), and Egypt (Abouelhossein, 2015). In each of these circumstances, the exception provided a direct change on the permanent rights that individuals in the country had (Agamben, 2005) and (Neocleus, 2006).

3.3 Police Militarization

9/11 is a day when risk heuristics came to the forefront. The dramatic risk, from a foreign threat, which was repeated for months on end entered the television set of every home, and the radio of every car. On this day, the totality of potential dangers for terrorism was manifested in the deaths of almost 3,000 individuals and a re-conceptualized fear of terror, the Other, and the catastrophic event created an environment where both the needs and potentials of security were morphed and amplified. While dramatic, the event did not create a completely new

framework, but rather proliferated a trend in which police have been militarized, initiated in the aftermath of the Cold War and during the War on Drugs (Hill and Berger, 2009). What has occurred following 9/11 has been defined in a series of ways, as homeland security policing (Oliver, 2006), militarized policing (Graham, 2011) and (Kraska, 2007), or pre-emptive policing (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009). Each of the three frameworks focuses on specific aspects of wider policing trends, which coincide with the centralization of policing power, the use of technological equipment, and the duality visible means of control (military and militarized police) and its counterpart, invisible control (information gathering, CCTV, and drone systems).

This paper explores how policing changes induce concepts of spectacle and theatricality. To do this, it pinpoints the visible aspects of militarization, as described by Stephan Graham and power dynamics of policing, through Foucault.

3.3.1 Militarized Security

Before entering the discussion of the separation or interconnectedness between military and police, militarization must be defined. Militarization can be viewed on two scales. The first as a societal reorganization towards a military focus, and the second as a process of reorganizing a specific apparatus in a manner which further resembles the military. The societal reorganization involves shifting discourses that encourage the use of force on a national and international scale, and the shift of resources towards military goals (Lutz, 2002). This broader understanding of militarism is not as crucial in this paper's analysis, as it would require a separate set of tools, including foreign policy analysis, a comprehensive discourse analysis, and budgetary spending. Instead, the unit of analysis is connected to the police and security forces, which can be understood through a more focused concept of militarization. As writes Kraska,

Militarism, in its most basic sense, is an ideology focused on the best means to solve problems. It is a set of beliefs, values, and assumptions that stress the use of force and threat of violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems. It

emphasizes the exercise of military power, hardware, organization, operations, and technology as its primary problem-solving tools. Militarization is the implementation of the ideology, militarism. It is the process of arming, organizing, planning, training for, threatening, and sometimes implementing violent conflict (Kraska, pg 3, 2007).

Militarization in this paper concentrates on the use of militarized equipment by the police, the activation of the military, and the intentions of why this process is made visible. It follows a specific stream of research, focused on Western countries, and centered in the USA (Hill and Berger, 2009), (Lutz, 2002), and to a lesser extent the UK (Coaffee, 2004) and (Graham, 2012). From here, it has been extrapolated onto a European and global scale (Lutterbeck, 2004) and (Graham, 2003).

Extrapolation into the global occurs through two modes, either exogenous or endogenous, both posited by the effects of globalization on the understanding of risks. The exogenous process explains how globalization works as an overbearing force that exhibits a transformational role on the state, redefining threats as clandestine transnational actors (international drug trafficking, terrorism, or human trafficking) that force states to redefine their defensive structures from international warfare to international crime-fare. The endogenous structure focuses on globalization again, but instead highlighting how capital has become unmanageable. Capital and the political are thus detached. As the wellbeing and rights of the populace can no longer be guaranteed within the social contract, a socially constructed fear must be created, and then addressed to placate the population. These Clandestine Transnational Actors are amplified as threats, and the security measures are thus created to fulfill the state's end of the societal contract (McCulloch, 2007) and (Hill and Berger, 2009). As globalization continues to introduce new threats, all while limiting the nation states capability to deal with them, an environment for militarized security can be seen developing on an international level, but with differing degrees and ambitions. These militarized security apparatuses develop in both the grand displays of visibility and as invisible mechanisms of control. (Graham, 2012). Using the effects of observing and being

observed as key aspects of manipulating perception of security and power, the gaze can be a key instrument for the continuation and escalation of ideologies and a reinforcing hand for control over the city (Foucault, 1975).

3.3.1.1 Spectacle of Security: The Police

In the modern democratic state, there has historically been a clear distinction between the military and police. Throughout the Cold War Era, the police were responsible for everyday domestic matters, while the military is responsible for foreign affairs and exceptional events in the domestic sphere. As the globally defined enemy became less clear, there was a mixing of roles for both the police and military within the local context (Lutterbeck, 2004). This blurring has occurred through three separate factors, the rise of paramilitary organizations in domestic affairs, the rearmament of police in a militarized fashion, and the boomerang effect from international conflicts, especially Israel.

Paramilitary organizations such as SWAT in the United States and Gendarmeries in Europe have specific features, a dual-association with the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior, a more hierarchical structure than civilian policing, heavier weaponized equipment, and sometimes a role in national defense in moments of war. With a non-distinct duty, these organizations have undergone a proliferation, operating in response to transnational clandestine organizations, which have been grouped as homeland security risks, and defined as the new enemy in the post-Cold War Era (Lutterbeck, 2004) and (Balko, 2006).

Paramilitary organizations are not the only means of blurring the army and police. Centered in the US, where the interconnected nature of police and military equipment has proliferated at an alarming rate, equipment and function of police increasingly resembles that of the military. A changing legal framework encourages surplus military equipment to be purchased by local governments and allows for police units to buy military equipment at reduced costs and with expanded budgets. Changes to the legal framework, initiated during the War on Drugs, such as the amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act, opened the door for

the police to adapt more militarized equipment (Hill and Beger, 2009) and (Kraska, 2007). These weapon transfers culminate in the relationship between Warfront and Homefront becoming blurred, as the military weapons being used in foreign affairs are relocated to the Homefront.

This home-front war-front paradox is exacerbated through Stephan Graham's adaptation of Foucault's boomerang effect. The boomerang effect allows for weapons, ideas, and means of control to be exhibited in colonial lands, before they were returned to their home countries. Israel has become a place of exceptional police securities, utilizing a series of measures which exist within a state of both perpetual war and perpetual peace (Zureik et.al., 2010). These technologies assimilate to the control aspect of the police state, and in due time, transition back to the Homeland. A series of technologies and tactics, ranging from CCTV, biometric identification, drones and the tracking of personnel vehicles are examples of such technologies. It is only in spaces of insecurity where the justification for the technologies is viewed as legitimate, before they become partially normalized, and suspicion for their use has waned (Graham, 2010).

3.3.2 Foucauldian Sense of Security

Foucault's work provides a basis for understanding how state, police, and surveillance institutions affect the very basis of the human body. The ever-present security systems create interconnected webs of oppression, ones which are impossible to break free from, and subtly yet continuously mutate personal choice and actions. Foucault's book Discipline and Punish procures a genealogical timeline where state tools for disciplining society are analyzed and then extrapolated as to how this translates into control. There are two conceptual ideas which can be drawn from Foucault that remain particularly relevant, spectacle and observation. For Foucault, the spectacle of security involves the process of making security a spectacle to the observer, and conversely observation which makes the subject visible to state apparatuses. Although he sees both spectacle and observation as key tools of control, modern society has reduced its reliance on spectacle,

especially the visibility of punishment, fueled by enlightenment thought, creating a penal system which is deemed as more “humane”. Yet, when the tools of spectacle and observation are used together, the result for Foucault is one of oppression and domination (Foucault, 1975).

To Foucault, the primary function of spectacle is to demonstrate the primacy of political power by those who have legitimacy. Condemned individuals are placed in a situation where the punishment is an observation, where they themselves are a spectacle and a process of codifying law in a direct manner to the population.

Set up scaffolds, stakes, drag out the guilty man to the public squares, summon the people with great cries; you will then hear them applaud the proclamation of your judgements, as the proclamation of peace and liberty; you will see them run to these terrible spectacles as to the triumph of the laws. Public punishment is the ceremony of immediate recoding. The law is re-formed: it takes up its place on the side of the crime that violated it. The criminal, on the other hand, is detached from society, he leaves it.

(Foucault, 1975 pg. 110)

The spectacle of punishment is a direct display of what happens when the rules of society are broken. Participatory aspects of observing the spectacle connects individuals to the law and equally distances the criminal from the society they reside within. Yet, this very visual understanding of punishment does not exist anymore. Instead, there is a more continuous presence of surveillance, one in which police, military, and security are present and visible in life, noting the same codification of power, both assuring individuals that the state is responsible for their security, while also being continuously aware that their body can be surveilled. This constant state of surveillance is crucial, as Foucault continues by stating

We are neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since we are part of its mechanism. The importance, in historical mythology, of the Napoleonic character probably derives from the fact that it is at the point of junction of the monarchical, ritual exercise of sovereignty and the hierarchical, permanent exercise of indefinite

discipline. He is the individual who looms over everything with a single gaze which no detail, however minute, can escape:
(Foucault, 1975, pg. 217)

Panopticon represents the utopic or dystopic view of surveillance based upon an unequal gaze. Envisioned in a prison, the panopticon operates as a tool whereby the totality can be surveilled by a select few who are incapable of being seen. By being invisible to the observed, the observed are never sure if they are being observed or not, creating an environment where the observation is not necessary for “corrected behavior”.

“All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible”
(Foucault, 1975, pg. 200)

The panopticon, or the idealized surveillance society operates as a theatrical performance, but as a theater in which the objects are reversed. As the city is displayed as a theater for ideological and political demonstration, the individuals become enclosed within their own individual theaters. Their everyday action becomes observed, analyzed, and inescapable, hostages within a personal stage. Extrapolated upwards, the panopticon creates a structuralist view where power is possessed and then consolidated in the hands of those with power. Using built environment, technological superiority, and tools garnered from legitimacy of violence and oppression the state can re-envision a society whose roots are based on discipline.

3.3.3 Power of the Uniform

Foucault’s research into surveillance and the militarization of security are interrelated. Foucault’s work underlines the importance of the power that is articulated in the process of observation (spectacle), and the converse change in

behavior that is associated with the observation. This causes a change in behavior associated with the observation; and militarized security incorporates the use of visible signifiers that denote that the government is aware of potential risk and thus takes steps to eliminate the risk (Foucault, 1975). The question arises how does the presence and the appearance of the police affect the perception of those who encounter them?

There became an acute interest in how police signifiers (uniforms, weapons, and tactics) influenced their perception during the era of community policing, centered in American cities, and proliferating during the late 80's and continuing in part to the current day. It encouraged stronger relationships between police and citizenry, as well as increasing visible police presence. Using proactive problem-solving methods, a more decentralized structure, and opting for greater input from citizens, policing attempted to break down the borders that separated police into a structure outside of the community (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990) and (Cordner, 2014). Historically, police uniforms were surplus military uniforms, allowing for a systematic recycling of materials following moments of warfare. This process changed in the post-WWII period where Victor Cizankas and others championed the use of professional attire, most notably a blazer. In studies that he produced following the change, he cited positive improvements in community relations and decline in violence. (Tenzel and Cizankas, 1973). Although blazers and other professional attire remains common in the current epoch of policing, urban security is equally defined by the militarized uniforms and equipment that police officers are increasingly receiving (Graham, 2010).

As police receive more militarized equipment, and the military enters the urban, the question is evoked, how does this affect the perception? Studies have been conducted demonstrating how the mind reacts to seeing weapons, showing that the immediate reaction to weapons produces a similar reaction as other fear inducing stimuli, including spiders and snakes. The use of symbols which are inherently fearful to individuals reinforces a symbolic difference in the function of policing and their relationship to the community (Fox, et al, 2009). Breaking from

the core of Community Policing, which advocates for relations which are based from cooperation, and visible approachable police. Not fear and alienation. Militarized uniforms construct a unique identification, one where security is placed in an authoritative position, with black, camouflage, and weapons distancing them from the public, placing them on a pedestal of inaccessibility and the distributor of violence (Vrij, 1997) and (Paul and Birzer 2004). The transition of the uniform and function of police in the urban environment culminates in how police perception relates to security and insecurity.

This fear and insecurity must be placed in specific context. On the level of the state, each state has differing levels of trust for the institution (Kääriäinen, 2007). This can be reflected on a local level, where police in an affluent suburb represent a different function than in the inner city. A specific context needs to be determined to understand how the population is perceiving the increased security, as the effects of more visible and aggressive security has differing impacts depending on the needs and history of the residents. (Cooper, et.al., 2004) and (Jiao, 2001).

3.3.3.1 Typography of Police

As police have divergent identifiers, a framework of police can be created, with approachable, professional, and militarized attire, utilizing the different perceptions of uniforms to further conceptualize their functions. Approachable police are represented by a distinct colored uniform, reflective material and general casual attire and actions. Professional officers wear attire associated with the workplace, such as slacks, blazers and button-up shirts. Militarized officer, either directly employed by the military, or solely resembling them, wear combat fatigues, military grade weapons, or other means of suppression (Table 7).

Likewise, the use of vehicles in the two case studies can be analyzed through a similar framework of civilian compatible vehicles that have corresponding vehicles bought and driven by civilians, and militarized vehicles, with no comparable model. This approach of separation based on vehicle perception

does not relate directly to militarization as a tactic, because vehicles such as busses in Istanbul have been used to pursue military tactics, most notably mass detentions, while not breaking the urban context in the same manner as the more noticeably militarized TOMA vehicles (Table 8).



Location	Approachable	Proffesional	Militarized
Istanbul			
Brussels			

Table 7: Typology of personel

Location	Civilian compatible	Militarized
Istanbul		
Brussels		

Table 8: Typology of vehicles

3.3.4 Urbanity as a Threat

The presence of militarized police in both Brussels and Istanbul is not an anomaly, as both security measures and risk are not evenly distributed. They have become centered within the urban environment, which has become seen as **the** point of contestation. The urban environment firstly encompasses a stronger interconnection of people, technologies and infrastructure, which allows for the risk to be escalated to larger amounts of people and allow for the possibility of cascading failures. The congestion at certain areas, such as stadiums, shopping malls, or transportation hubs provide the opportunity for risks to affect larger groups of people, and the interconnected systems that serve millions of people, such as water, sewage, and power infrastructure represents. Urbanity provides a point of proximity, where maximum damage can be produced from any terrorist activity (Graham, 2011) and (Coaffee et.al., 2008)

Asymmetric warfare has found its home in the city (Graham, 2009). Utilizing anonymity that the city provides and the ability to disrupt the power dynamics that are provided by technological advancements, the urban environments provides significant benefits to those who lack traditional power. Urban actors are often operating within their own territory, allowing them greater

mobility in terms of evasion and knowledge into strategic vulnerabilities. Although formed on the back of terrorism and warfare, the urbanity operating as a leveling agent can be expanded to most urban conflict including social movements. Likewise, their familiarity with residents allows for a base of support to be formed, and places to seek shelter amongst residents whom they trust (Graham, 2009) and (Sassen, 2010). Finally, there is a difficulty in terms of separating actor from the environment surrounding it. Proximity towards other individuals in a dense space is the primary factor, as an “enemy” is both difficult to identify and easy to lose track of within densely populated spaces. Likewise, proximity to symbolic places both increases the potency of a visible movement, and can provide a shield from too dramatic of actions (Rubinstein and Roznai, 2011) and (Goulding, 2000).

Discursive campaigns, originating within media and the political sphere attempt to paint the city as something dangerous. Originally defined as a place of security, separated from places of chaos, the city was a walled and defensible oasis (Bishop and Clancy, 2004). Now, cities are referred to as locations of war, enticing fear amongst the population as well as justifying increased policing within the areas. Declarations of intranational and international wars have been declared on the urban, the war on drugs, the war on crime, and now the war on terror, each inducing different methods of control into the urban environment (Swanstrom, 2002). Urban planning policies during the Cold War aimed to depopulate cities due to threat of a nuclear attack on an urbanity (Dudley, 2001). The political motivation to demonize the city develops out of the urban rural divide. The rural heartland invokes levels of pure and holy national identity, while being largely responsible for the policing of its largest fear, the urbanity (Graham, 2010).

Given that Western militaries deploy from overwhelmingly exurban and rural bases, the widespread discourse that cities must be 'targeted' and 'pacified' through military power - whose exurban and rural heartland is the normalized space of 'authentic' nationalism.

(Graham, 2010, pg 62)

The representation of the urban as a place in need of pacification is only one way that the city can be represented. Given the complex and

interconnected nature of existence in an urbanity, it has been theorized in many ways, a select few which will be built on now.

3.4 The Urban Theater Metaphor

So far, the literature review has focused on two larger themes, the process of militarization that the police force and urbanity has undergone, and how threats are perceived by the population and utilized by the government. The final step of the literature review aims to look at theater as a concept, to understand what a theater is, how the city functions as a theater, and finally how ideology is manifested in the urban environment.

When the city is viewed through the lens of a metaphor, it is then necessary to understand what a theater is. Paul Woodruff provides a definition which attempts to branch into a sociological understanding by saying:

“the art by which human beings make human action worth watching, in a measured time and space”

(Woodruff, 2010, pg. 18).

Theater thus becomes the art of making something important. Value is attached to it and society is made to understand that it is **worth** watching. This distinction becomes encompassing, and Woodruff cites the numerous daily actions, inherent in living that denote a theatrical aspect. Events that bring people together such as weddings, sporting events, and funerals are each composed of a theatrical element. Society attaches a value to them which makes them valuable to attend, and they are framed in a specific way. There is a frame of reference, a noted time and place, one which people adhere to and create a structure for observation. Within this structure, there is the audience and performers, each accepting their role to differing degrees. (Ezrahi, 1995) and (Woodruff, 2010). Thus, when the city becomes the stage, the question becomes what is the city deeming “worth watching” and how does the government use this ability to control urban space to produce a specific frame?

3.4.1 The City as a Theater

Within urbanity, the theater metaphor diverges in two directions as authors focus on what the city should ideally be, and what it has become. The first incorporates theater as the physical theater, a place for people to express themselves (Mumford, 1937) and (Benjamin, 1999). A second vantage is that the city is producing a stage for itself. As capital flows into the city, the city itself becomes a commodity, one which is built and marketed as an attraction (Sassen, 2001) and (Fainstein, 2007).

Lewis Mumford has provided a basis for the conception of a city in which the theater is the stage for individual and group expression. Born in New York City and writing at an age of modernist planning, he spoke out as to how the city was a group of collective actions and experience. The design of the city, in and of itself, must facilitate the process of creating social interactions, and becomes the stage in which they are demonstrated. To him, everything else, the politics, the architecture, and the city planning, all must take a back seat to encourage a pleasant and engaging environment for those living within or experiencing the city.

“The city in its complete sense, then, is a geographic plexus, an economic organization, an institutional process, a theater of social action, and an aesthetic symbol of collective unity. The city fosters art and is art; the city creates the theater and is the theater. It is in the city, the city as theater, that man’s more purposive activities are focused, and work out, through conflicting and cooperating personalities, events, groups, into more significant culminations”.

(Mumford, 1937)

Theatrical elements of the city are developed in the series of interactions that people have, as good urban planning involves the participation of the residents in the urban design. The process of creating buildings, parks, and other places of engagement come together in the form of cooperation, confrontation, and in conclusion the stage for society to exist upon. In the concluded environment, urbanity intensifies and focuses interactions, bringing the proximity between individuals to the forefront. Cities should engage the individual,

with arts, culture, and education to provide the lighting and staging for the individual and collective to shine.

Mumford takes the collective understanding of a theatrical performance in the city, while Walter Benjamin takes a more individual route. Using flaneur as a concept, the slow observer and wanderer, the process of walking, enjoying, viewing and experiencing the city is to many, a performance, and a resistance against modernist planning (Makeham, 2005) and (Benjamin, 1999).

To the flaneur, his city is-even if, like Baudelaire, he happened to be born there-no longer native ground. It represents for him a theatrical display, an arena (Benjamin, 1999, pg. 347).

The routes taken, the styles encompassed, and implication that it has on the built environment encompasses a personal stage to denote what life is within the urbanity. Every individual who takes residence within the urbanity can be both visible and invisible, to make a display or be the observer. Throughout every city, a series of theatrical performances occur in the everyday. The man playing a guitar on the street or a troupe of dancers in the city center perform for the passersby, with only the pavement as the stage and the backdrop of the city as the set (Benjamin, 1999).

Rather than as Mumford or Benjamin, who argue that the city is a stage for social expression, a Post-Marxist lens of theater is one where the ideology of capitalism, in its form of uninhibited consumption, is put on display. Understanding the city as a spectacle for itself coincides with the trend of neoliberalism, especially on the urban level. From Guy Debord's perspective, explained in *La Société du Spectacle*, spectacle becomes an integral part of everyday life, and is manifested within the city.

"The spectacle cannot be understood either as a deliberate distortion of the visual world or as a product of the technology of the mass dissemination of images. It is far better viewed as a *weltanschauung* that has been actualized, translated into the material realm a world view transformed into an objective force."

(Debord, 1995: Thesis 5)

Spectacle is not something solely observed by those choosing to witness it. It is all around us, in the built environment and everywhere in life. First, the city itself becomes the focus of commercialization, with billboards appearing in the city centers and pieces of the city renamed along the lines of consumer goods. Secondly, the city becomes host to the ideology which it represents. San Francisco and Silicon Valley; the tech industry, Brussels; Europeanization, New York City; high finance. There is more to each of these cities, but they remain in competition with each other, vying for resources, and branding themselves in the process. The city comes to stand for specific things, a basis of what it represents and what how it reflects upon an individual to live there. Authors such as Richard Florida cite that the representation of the city, one that can be upgraded to attract middle and upper-class talent, is something that cities should and are actively in pursuit. Large scale projects such as mega-events, architectural spectacles, and marketing programs are designed to improve the place attractiveness (Florida, 2014), (Brenner, 1998), and (Lindell, 2013).

This sense of place attractiveness scales the necessity of a theater from the local level to the international level. Seen as a location of residents not only for those who currently live within, but also as a hypothetical home for attractive investors, taxpayers, and consumers, the city readjusts its identity and priorities to fit with new flows of capital. The unit of analysis for the combined de and re territorializing of space has often been the multinational institutions, which can situate its headquarters and offices in strategic cities based on their specific needs. As these multinational corporations have tended to conglomerate in a series of central cities, often distanced from their direct hinterland, place has adapted a new form of meaning. Resulting from the centralization of industries in particular locations, cities have strived to reach the status of “global city”, a city in which their agglomeration of talent and place attractiveness makes it a site where capital flows are directed towards. (Sassen, 2001) and (Brenner, 1998). Sassen reiterates that while each city is in competition, it is not direct, as each builds off comparative advantages to find niches in the global system. In the case of Brussels and Istanbul, each have pursued a policy of niche dominance, not in the financial sector as Sassen

originally highlighted, but in an N-GO and Supranational governance global city in Brussels (De Groof, 2009) and (Corjin, 2013) and a cultural and touristic global city in Istanbul (Gezici and Kerimoglu, 2010) and (Aksoy, 2012). Global city is not solely the status that a city reaches, but a central concept of urban planning. Developmental projects focus on creating a sense “place” for these global economies to reside in, and capital flows have been re-directed towards particular industries by the governments in order to maximize future rents.

3.4.1.1 Brussels as a Supranational Organization Global City

Brussels is the capital of Belgium and the informal capital of the European Union. Central to this paper is the location of many European non-Governmental organization, European Union bureaucratic structures, and multinational company headquarters, Brussels has enticed to reside with the European Quarter. Beginning in 1954, the government began adapting policies to attract European Institutions hoping that the temporary residence would become permanent (Hein, 2004). This hypothesis has been realized, and what has developed out of it is a lengthy and expensive urban development project. Incorporating European institutions in Brussels entailed the creation of a new district, one with the spatial potential to hold the office space required for the expanding European Union. Within the quarter, 3.4 million sq. meters of office space has been realized as well as numerous landmark projects such as the Berlaymont building 65,000 m², the European Parliament 300,000 m², and the Council of Ministers building 200,000 m². (Baeten, 2001) and (Vandermotten, 2013), Resulting from the creation of this quarter, has been a restructuring of the local economy. The process of introducing the multinational international nature has been a driving force of the economy providing 13-14 % of the GDP either directly or indirectly (Vandermotten et al., 2007). It also provides approximately 40,000 jobs high status international jobs (Van Crielingen, 2009). The culmination of this global city project can be seen in table 9, where Brussels is a global city for political importance, the sole exception to the Paris London dominated framework.

Europe	Headquarters of Main Firms	Global Economic Importance	Advanced Service Firms	Research and Development	Human Capital, Information Exchange, Cultural Experience, Fashion	Political Importance
Global Cities	Paris	London	London	Paris	London	Brussels
	London	Paris	Paris		Paris	Paris
						London

Brussels is categorized as a “Major City” in all other categories

Table 9: Global City rankings
(Vandermotten, 2013)

3.4.1.2 Istanbul as a Touristic and Cultural Global City

As the primate city of Turkey, it holds many of the symbolic, economic, and governmental functions although it is not the official capital. Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, it has been the capital of 3 empires, Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman Empire. Central to this paper is its creation as a historical cultural center, and has attempted to utilize the increased touristic potentials of a “cultural global city” to reap the economic benefits. Fueled by its selection as the Capital of Europe in 2000, in a project where of the 228 million-euro costs, the Turkish government contributed 99 percent, Turkey has initiated a program to develop the infrastructure necessary to compete as a global touristic hub (Rampton, et.al., 2010). The construction of new museums, hosting of festivals, and an expanded service industry provide the environment for international consumerism (Gezici and Kerimoglu. 2010) and (Alvarez and Yarcen, 2010), while the expansion of Turkish Airlines and the airport provide the means to access it. Turkish Airlines, a company that the government holds a 49 percent share, with the rest fragmented in the Turkish Stock Market has been utilized by the Turkish government as a means of soft power, integrating routes to ex-Ottoman territories, creating routes to the largest number of countries out of any airline, and advertising it prestigious awards (Selçuk, 2013). Accompanying the rise of Turkish Airlines, a new airport is

under construction that will host a capacity of 15 million people, the largest in the world (Reid, 2015) Until recent political upheavals, the project has been a success, launching Istanbul to the 3rd most visited city in Europe, and 5th in the world. The increase has been dramatic (Table 10)

Overnight international Visitors	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	7.51	8.82	9.87	11.27	12.56	11.95

Table 10: Overnight International Visitors to Turkey (Hendrick-Wong, and Choong, 2015, pg. 8) and ((Hendrick-Wong, and Choong, 2016 pg. 6)

3.4.2 Althusser's Theater of Ideology

If the theater is constructed as the refocusing of attention, then who is refocusing this attention and for what means? To answer this, the paper shifts to theories of theater developed by Louise Althusser, who positions ideology as physically manifested within the city. He sees ideology as a theater, believing that within the theater, politicians represent the face, the symbol which can be associated with the ideology (Althusser, 2006). This face is responsible for providing recognizable attributes, ones that can be easily understood by the masses. For situations which are masked in uncertainty, a leader's response which appears forceful and secure, aids in the process of restoring order, regardless of if there is tangible effect in the uncertainty. In this strictly realist viewpoint of realist, the truth and actions are less important, with the persona and behavior taking the forefront (Machiavelli, trans. 2008) and (Althusser, 2006)

Underlying this face, is the apparatus that is transforming the *idea* of ideology into the *reality* of ideology. Rather than perceiving ideology as a belief stored within language, it is present in the physical sphere. Ideology places individuals as a subject, the point of reception. Derived from a Marxist lens, Althusser is focused on the reproduction of capital; and in the case of ideology, the system of reproducing the superstructure of capital reproduction. This superstructure is transmitted through two modes of transmission, the Ideological

State Apparatuses (independent actors such as churches, medias, or educational institutions) which utilize ideology as the primary mode of reproduction, and Repressive State Apparatuses (such as armed forces and police) which utilize repression as the primary force of compliance. He is clear that the distinction is blurred, as both Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses utilize both tools (Althusser, 2006).

Reverberating back to Marx and Hegel, the state takes on a machine-like presence- not as Hegel would like to claim, as a concoction of cogs and wheels- but rather that ideology is made present by the physical environment that it creates and representations that it places into everyday life (Statkiewicz, 1998) and (Montag, 2015). This ideology has no outside, no place to be separated from. Through this engulfing state, every individual becomes a subject. Althusser specifically uses police in his analogy, stating that whenever a police officer shouts “hey you”, the individual responds, turns, and becomes a subject to ideological reception. The ideology takes the place of the stage. It is elevated, displayed through a series of “theatrical machines” creating the metaphorical lighting and sound system which induces an ideology that becomes intertwined with spectacle. As Woodruff claims that theater is the act of making things **worth watching**, Althusser sees the spectacle of these apparatuses as identifiers of the ideology, the act of making ideology visible and projectable to the population. As the ideology is projected, it is separated. The stage of performers is disconnected from the observers, as the audience cannot produce the police, the church, or the public-school system for ideology to be represented within (Bargu, 2012) and (Althusser, 2006). It is through this lens, that ideology is manifested in public space that the analysis will be grounded.

3.5 Placing the Literature Review into the Realized Risk of the Case Studies

Throughout the literature review, realized risk has been a central theme. It's ability to activate risk heuristics that society is susceptible to, as well as the opportunity to gain political for radical transformations provides a moment of exception for radical changes in the urban environment. Backdropping these events is a global paradigm in security, where militarized options have become the norm, and in Istanbul and Brussels, both cities adapted militarized tactics to respond to the realized risk. In the moment of realized risk, the stage of the city of the city transforms into one of crisis. The global city environment which both cities have pursued is threatened, and thus the capital flows which the city is reliant on are. In Althusser's analogy, it is in this moment that the theater's actors enter the environment as the police and/or military step out onto the stage, and the discourse of the Prime Minister operates as the face, a narrator enunciating how the population should respond. These basic principles will be demonstrated as analogous in Istanbul and Brussels, but there are distinctions between the two environments which denote how the security practices diverge from each other, and how they are received by those experiencing them.

4

Contextualizing the Case studies

Between Brussels and Istanbul, there are distinctions between the two environments that frame how the Security Theater is enacted and what the intentions are. First, political ideologies of the two contexts must be developed. The focus of the ideology section is to demonstrate that the Turkish and Belgian governments have separate governing structures, which provide different **means** of reaching their ideal ideological state. Second, the basic structure of the security apparatus is developed, as it enables and limits the ability for the government to project the ideology.

4.1 Ideology

As the focus of this paper is to place ideology in the manifested sphere, it is important to provide contexts to each party ideology. Ideology has numerous ways of being defined and understood. It can be placed in the superstructure as Marx does (Williams, 1973), as the physical manifestation of beliefs in the environment through Althusser (Althusser, 2006), or as a set of glasses that one puts on to see the world for Zizek (Zizek, 2000). The true allusiveness of the concept is apparent as this paper will focus not only on Althusser's understanding of ideology in the manifested form, but will attempt to place a second, and more encompassing form of ideology within Althusser's model, which places it in the public sphere. To do this, a definition of ideology is used which states that ideology is not solely a state to be reached, but the means of reaching it

"A set of ideas by which men posit, explain, and justify ends and means of organized social action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot, or rebuild a given order" (Seliger, 1976, pg. 14)

The government structure that each city operates under provides tools for how their ideological focus can be projected. Opportunities and constraints to what the response can be to realized risk. A central theme is that an authoritarian regime has greater leeway with repression, (Heydemann and Leenders, 2011) while in democratic regimes, direct violence is restricted (Davenport, 2004). The governments of the respective countries are both analyzed, Turkey as Competitive Authoritarianism (14) and Brussels as a democracy which has accepted and is thus limited by constraints of Europeanisation (15). The aim is to realize how the two government structures are manifested through the security apparatus and discourse.

4.1.1 Turkey and The Political System

The political structure is one of a quasi-authoritarian-democracy, with government structures centralized and power structures residing in the hands of a select few individuals, namely Erdoğan. The centralized power structures have also disenfranchised minority groups, both within Istanbul and throughout the rest of Turkey, namely the Kurdish population (Gunes, 2013). The country has a secular constitution which was initiated by the non-democratically elected Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and maintained through the threat and realization of Coup d'états (1960, 1971, 1997, and 2016) (Zürcher, 2004) and (Pope and Pope, 2000). The rise of the AKP has represented the first moment when an Islamic government has been able withstand pressure from the army to assert a non-Secular and Islamic platform.

14: Competitive Authoritarianism: Civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely used as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair. (Levitsky and Way, 2010)

15: Europeanization: The process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree the EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making (Ladrech, 1994, pg. 69)

Now, the AKP controls the President, a majority in Parliament, metropolitan municipalities, district municipalities, and provincial councilors (AkParti, 2017). There is little effective opposition to the party (Esen and Sebnem 2016).

4.1.1.1 Turkish Democracy Rankings

	Democracy Rankings		
Source	<i>The Economist Intelligence Unit</i>	Freedom House	Center for Systemic Peace
Country Rank	97 th	108 th	-2 (-10 to 10 scale)
Government Description	Hybrid Regime	Partly Free Country	Closed Anocracy

Table 11: Turkish Democracy Rankings

Turkey has undergone a steady decline in democratic rankings, especially since the Gezi Park Protests and the aftermath of the Coup d'état. It is now positioned in the lower tier of a competitive authoritarian frame (EIU, 2016) (Freedom House, 2017) and (Center for Systemic Peace, 2016).

4.1.1.2 AKP

The AKP ideology is muddled with different features. 1st, the analysis of the political party differs from the ideology which the party claims to represent. As taken from the AKP Political Vision document, the AKP is a democratically oriented conservative party with Islamic tendencies, and acceptance of a human orientated form of capitalism (AKP, 2012). The contextual understanding of the AKP ideology represents a very different face as will be demonstrated. 2nd, the ideology of the AKP has undergone temporal shifts, originating as pro-European and more democratic, and evolving towards a more self-reliant structure (Anderson, 2009).

4.1.1.3 Competitive Authoritarianism

Competitive Authoritarianism is first reliant upon a democratic electoral process. In the case of Turkey, it is clear that Turkey holds elections, and that these elections do hold validity (Esen and Gumusu, 2017) and (Göl, 2017). But, while the AKP uses the ballot box to stay in power, the authoritarian nature of the government is well documented, both in the actions of the state in response to dissent, centralization of media and other key resources, repression of other political parties, and the fulfilled desire to create a more centralized constitution through referendum (Özbudun, 2014), (Turam, 2017), and (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016). The response against protests highlighted this authoritarianism and has been cited as a turning point in the AKP ideology, furthering and normalizing repression (Kuymulu, 2013).

In the moment when Erdogan's rule was under threat through the Gezi Park protest, Erdogan reverted to intense forms of repression. Over the course of the protests, 150,000 tear gas canisters, 4,000 tons of water from water cannons, and rubber bullets were used as means to suppress the protests (Gürcan and Peker 2014). Over the course of the protests, 8000 civilians were injured, 59 seriously, and five lost their lives (PHR, 2013). The use of violence was perpetrated as a process of maintaining power, and the right to peacefully assemble was categorically denied (Figure 2) (Amnesty International, 2016).

The authoritarian structure is internalized within the party. Turkish political structures are historically authoritarian (Musil, 2011), but there are differences in models of authoritarianism, with the AKP functioning in a hegemonic structure. This centralization structure focuses on using monetary, political, and social benefits as rewards for cooperation. The result of this centralization process is the accumulation of power in a hierarchical manner, where those with the tools to produce the necessary benefits consolidating it, with Erdogan at the top of the chain (Ayan, 2010). Erdogan's reign has resulted in a "cult of personality", one where his presence is central to the party's electoral viability (Lancaster, 2014)




Figure 2: Security Practice for Gezi-Park Eviction
(Simpson, et.al., 2017)

The authoritarian nature enters the economic sphere, as the AKP centralizes and controls powerful institutions and produces a clientelist economy. Clientelism is not a unique ideology to the AKP, as it has been perpetuated by other parties throughout Turkish history (Gunes-Ayata, 1994). Clientelism functions both on the allocation of provision of wide ranging benefits to low level contributors and voters, as well as the centralization of businesses and positions of the elites in privileged positions. Wide ranging low-level contributions can be demonstrated by Turkey's Mass Housing Administration (TOKI) which overwhelmingly produced housing in AKP voting strongholds (Marschall et.al. 2015). The centralization of business can be demonstrated through the media whereby the second largest media company p, Sabah-ATV, was sold to AKP supportive Çalık Holding. Berat Albayrak. Erdogan's Son in Law was named the company's CEO. Another secularist media organization Doğan Media, receive a \$2.5 billion tax fine, and was forced to sell the newspaper branch Milliyet to another conglomerate with ties to the AKP. Other media groups engage in economic projects that receive government contracts, such as İhlas Holding, which operates Türkiye, İhlas News Agency, and TGRT TV, which received a contract to develop Gaziosmanpasa district for \$1.86 billion (Corke et.al, 2014).

Finally, political parties have faced an uphill battle to attain office, as the AKP has taken advantage of their political dominance to further their power. The attained media dominance is crucial for this process. During June of the 2015 election TRT, a media company closely associated with the AKP ran 46 percent of its total airtime in favor of the AKP, not including time reserved for Erdogan. It likewise ran 91% of their advertisements for the AKP, and refused to run advertisements for the rival CHP. Out of all media stations, only on CNN TURK ran more advertisements for the opposition, and in the aftermath, the AKP harassed their newspaper, and arrested a lead journalist Ahmet Hakan (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016). Likewise, the AKP has been accused of utilizing and overspending state funds for campaigning, especially discretionary funds, which are outside of bureaucratic control, (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016).

Concluding, the realized goal of the authoritarian nature has led to the AKP enjoying an ideological hegemony over the whole political scene that none of the (other Turkish political parties) had ever possessed (Anderson 2009: 447)

4.1.2 Belgium and the Political System:

The Belgian government was a unitary structure from its founding in 1830 until 1970, but a series of changes created because of linguistic tensions and the rise of the Flemish economy lead to the federalization of the state, and the creation of three regions, Flanders, Walloon, and Brussels Capital. Belgian elections entail two regional elections, one in Flanders and one in Wallonia, which are then combined to create the national election results. Each party can only receive votes from its region, except for the bi-lingual region of Brussels (Sinardet, 2008) and (Witte et.al., 2009). Resulting from this is an electoral system which remains fragmented, with four parties forming the current coalition and 12 parties attaining seats in the parliament. The four parties which formed the coalition are highlighted by the N-VA (New Flemish Alliance), who controls the security apparatus and the MR (Reformist Movement) who controls the Prime Minister. In the 2014 elections, the N-VA received a plurality of votes, with slightly over 20 percent and the MR coming in 5th with just under 10 percent. During the resulting negotiations for forming a coalition, the N-VA was unable to form a government. Following this failure, the MR could form a government, and thus attain the seat off Prime Minister, through Charles Michel (André and Depauw. 2014). As the Prime Minister, Charles Michel is thus responsible for being in many ways the voice of the nation, while only having received votes from the French speaking community (Deutsche, 2010) and (Belgium, 2010).

Within the Belgian system, the federalist structure makes it difficult for any party to exert excessive influence, requiring cooperation amongst different parties. Due to the highly federalized structure, it is common to require four parties to form a government, a key factor in the governmental crisis of 2010 (Deschouwer,

2012). When Parties exhibit undemocratic principles, they are pushed out of politics through cordon sanitaire, the tactic of not cooperating with the party for agreements or engaging in coalitions. This process is utilized against the Vlaams Belang, for their conviction of breaking laws against racism (Witte, et.al., 2009).

4.1.2.1 Belgian Democratic Rankings

	Democracy Rankings		
Source	<i>The Economist Intelligence Unit</i>	Freedom House	Center for Systemic Peace
Country Rank	35 th	15 th	8 (-10 to 10 scale)
Government Description	Flawed Democracy	Free Country	Democratic Country

Table 12: Belgian Democracy Rankings (EIU, 2016), (Freedom House, 2017), and (Center for Systemic Peace, 2016)

4.1.2.2 Europeanization

In this paper, the concept of Europeanization focuses on the coalescence of party ideology in line with European values (Kenneth and Soetendorp, 2014) and (Risse, et. al., 2001). As a founding member of the European union, Belgium has a long history of integrating policies into the national context, and the adaptation of Brussels as the capital of Europe has furthered integration. The European project has not garnered central importance in politics, not because of a lack of drive, but rather the unspoken acceptance (Kenneth and Soetendorp, 2014). European initiatives rarely enter long debates, and the true debate about leaving the European Union have never been brought near to a referendum. Belgium has continuously held a support for the EU above the European average (Kelbel and Camille, 2014). The fragmented nature of the political sphere has encouraged a process of consensus building for the integration and support of the European project (Kenneth and Soetendorp, 2014). Fringe parties, such as Vlaams Belang have opposed the European Union and their

initiatives, but never with possibility of blocking legislation, nor pushing the topic for fear of public backlash (Moufahim and Humphreys, 2015). The analyzed parties, the N-VA and MR have both publicly stated and voted for European Initiatives, and in party discourse and platform, the N-VA has referenced the European Union the most often of all Belgian parties (Dardanelli, 2012).

The culmination of this connectivity with Europeanness creates a political frame, which is codified in European norms (Manners, 2002). These norms establish a framework of behavior, one that connects upwards towards the European Union, but equally downwards towards constituents. Upon abiding by European norms, legitimacy is garnered, and can be transferred into political capital (Laffan, 2001). Brussels does not claim to act upon all the principles of Europeanness, but it has a greater connection to them than other places, and its continued desire to repurpose itself as the capital of Europe creates a frame in which it must act (De Groof, 2009) and (Corjin, 2013). A brief excerpt from the European Union constitution is used to describe this Europeanness

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”

(European Union, 2004: Treaty 1-2).

Two concepts will be utilized, 1st is non-discrimination which is utilized within a field of discursivity, where mainstream political parties can maneuver within, but entail risks when breaking out (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). 2nd is freedom, which entails the freedom to express oneself in public. This is codified in the EU charter of Fundamental Rights (16).

16 “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”

4.1.2.3 N-VA

The N-VA is self-identified as a “modern, forward-looking and democratic form of Flemish nationalism,” with a stress that it is not Anti-Islam, having a focus on integration and not assimilation policy. Economically, it cites itself as a proponent of a free-market economy, but not a neo-liberal economy (N-VA. 2017)” The N-VA has successfully navigated the populist right, adhering to fears in its rural, Flemish, and large upper middle-class electorate, while avoiding alienation of being deemed Far Right and being politically alienated such as Vlaams Belang (Beyens et.al., 2015). The party is separatist, and has been criticized for racist statements against immigration and handling the security apparatus (Jones, 2016).

4.1.2.4 Authoritarianism

The N-VA, does attain some tendencies of a more authoritarian structure. Its identity is largely based off the success of Bart De Wever, a politician who rose to prominence in the 1970's. A talented speaker and negotiator, he has dominated the rise and public persona of the fledgling party that received 3 percent of the vote in 2003, to getting a plurality by 2010. (Polling, 2012) and (Rochtus, 2012). In a case study in Belgium, voting parties in the 2014 elections were analyzed, utilizing seven populist parties from both Left and Right. The preference for voting for N-VA was placed 2nd in both Justice and Criminality, and immigration. Likewise, the voters' attitudes were studied, and N-VA voters ranked second in authoritarianism and tolerance for repression, once again behind the VB (Swyndegou, et. al., 2015) and (Van Haute, 2016). This comparative statement does not assert that the N-VA have an authoritarian ideology, rather they are more authoritarian than the Belgian norm.

4.1.2.5 Reformist Movement

The Reformist Movement self identifies as a Center Right party, based in the French portion of the country. Its stated ideology and analyzed ideology do

not differ (Egner, 2015), as scholars have placed them as either a liberal (Hay and Mennon, 2007) or conservative-liberal (17) party (Colomer, 2008) and (Slomp, 2011), its policies can be placed in this wider frame.

Situated within a Belgian context, the liberal ideology relates to a strong welfare state, democratic values, and inclusion within the European Union. Based in Wallonia, the French portion of Belgium, and linking the industrial past, the French speaking portion of the country has a greater tolerance for immigration (Billiet, 2006) (Fiore, 2016). Rather than the N-VA and AKP, which have relevant features for authoritarian tendencies or unique ambitions, the MR largely supports the continuation of the status quo, with a pro-business mentality (Slomp, 2011), and (RM, 2015).

4.2 Security Structures

4.2.1 Turkey

After the coup, soldiers and the army became the enemy. So, the police are the loyal dog (to Erdoğan), and the army are the bandits, those who rebelled.
(Demir, 2017) (18)

The security system in Turkey is fragmented by a historic divide between the police and the military. The military has operated in a space outside of the government control, as an institution which is staunchly secular, and attempting to retain the legacy of the founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, either through its status as a trusted state actor, or through its power to initiate a coup. Since the inception of the AKP government, the military has both been at risk of power reduction while trying to reduce the power of the AKP, coming to a climax during Ergenekon, a military operation that attempted to destabilize the

17: Liberalism: “individual freedom is the core element in society: As freedom from pressing bonds of authority and from total responsibility for subordinates with Conservative liberals defending state abstinence (Modified Slomp, 2011 pg. 107)

18: Demir is an LGBT activist and a participant in the Gezi Park movement.

government and initiate a coup (Gürsoy, 2012) and (Kandil, 2016). While there are still discussions as to the legitimacy of the validity of the attempt (Arango, 2014), the influence of the Gulen movement (19), and the validity of the AKP's prosecution, the result was that the military was restrained, with key officials removed from power, initiators of the previous and Ergenekon plot imprisoned, and a loss of trust within the population (Table 13 and 14) and (Kandil, 2016). The final curtailment was changing the role of the military from protecting the constitution to protecting against foreign threats, eliminating the justification for further coup attempts (Güler and Bölücek, 2016).

Year	Trust in Turkish Military		
	Tend to Trust	Tend Not to Trust	Don't Know
2004	89%	10%	1%
2005	88%	9%	3%
2006	86%	12%	2%
2007	84%	16%	2%
2009	77%	20%	3%
2010	70%	27%	3%

Table 13: Trust in Turkish Military 2004 -2010 (Gursoy, 2012, pg 11)

19 The Gulen Movement is a transnational organization which is led by Fethullah Gülen, a Islamic preacher currently living in the US. Advocating for what he describes as a modern version of Islam through the creation of schools and democratic principles, it remains controversial. Originally an ally of Erdoğan and the AKP, the Gulenists have been accused of operating as a deep state agent, perpetrator of the Coup D'etat, and are such villainized in Turkey. This paper does not take a stance on their belief system, solely observing them as an entity that opposes Erdoğan (Hendrick, 2013).

Trust in Turkish Military and Presidency

Year	Military	Presidency
2012	56.3%	53.7%
2013	51.7%	40.7%
2014	57.7%	40.5%
2015	62.4%	46.9%
2016	47.4%	49.4%

Table 14: Trust in Turkish Military and Presidency 2012-2016 (Kadir Has Üniversitesi, 2016)

While the military has been the stalwart of secularism, the police has transformed into a tool of control for the AKP government. Beginning following the Gezi Park Protests, a conflict emerged amongst the police system, with the Gulen movement and the AKP vying for control of the religious right in the country. This led to AKP initiating purges of the police, just as they did for the military to remove officers and staff who were suspected of being Gulenists or other opposition members (Kandil, 2016) and (Özbudun, 2014). Recruitment for the police is tied to ideology, where, especially in the Cevik Kuvvet, or the Rapid Intervention Force, members are recruited from rural areas, (82 %), are children of blue collar workers (80 %), and with at least one year of unemployment following high school (69 %), key demographics for Erdoğan. They are brought into the city to deal with riot control, most notably protests, reverberating Graham's concept of the rural policing of urbanity (Uysal, 2010). As the police remains firmly in control of the AKP, through a centralized hierarchy, the perception of the police is dramatically affected by political orientation in key indicators such as trust, cooperation, and obedience. This strong correlation demonstrates the stark partisan divide as to the interrelation between government ideology and the police apparatus (Table 15 and 16) (Kırmızıdağ, 2015).




Table 15: Effectiveness Dimensions by Political Identity




Table 16: Trust, obedience and cooperation by political identity (Kırmızıda, 2015, pg. 82 and 94)

4.2.2 Belgium

Although the Belgian ruling coalition is led by the RM, the security positions are secured by the N-VA. The Minister of the Interior is Jan Jambon, responsible for police, the Secretary of State for Asylum, Migration and Administrative Simplification is Theo Franken, and the Minister of Defense is Steven Vandeput, responsible for the military. The police and military are separate entities, with different interactive capabilities with the population and organizing structures. While separate, there is coordination amongst them and no clear ideological rift. While the N-VA's control of the Secretary of the Interior means

that at the national level, policing is completed under their guidance, the policing is further decentralized into National and Municipal Forces. In the case of Brussels, there are 6 zones, each organized with their own intentions and policies (Brussels Police) and (Devroe and Ponsaers, 2013). Amongst the zones, cooperation is common, and necessary, but there is not a synchrony of ideology based on the organization (Elhus, 2016).

5 Methodology

There are two methods chosen, an Observational Analysis and a Discourse Oriented Analysis. These methods use the two **means** of Security Theater (physical and discursive) to dissect the **intentions** of the security theater (stabilizing and repressive).

5.1 Observational Analysis Methodology

First, the physical representation of the theater must be analyzed by looking at how the landscape of the cities transformed. To accomplish this, an observational process occurred over four years (Appendix 1). In the moments following realized risk, changes to the environment were noted through visual indicators of security. Visibility of security was demonstrated as a governmental tool for manipulation in multiple ways.

1st, through the lens of Schneier, who proposes that visible security measures are utilized by governments as tools to demonstrate that stability is returned to the environment.

2nd, through the lens of Foucault, who believes that the security represents an apparatus that gazes on the individual and thus influences their action.

3rd, through the lens of Althusser, who sees the visible representation of security in the physical sphere is the manifestation of ideology.

Indicators for Militarized Security Theater: Author's Typography	
Presence of Security Personnel	Large concentration of police with continuous presence. Static or mobile in strategic locations.
Strategically Placed Visible Vehicles	Large concentration of visible vehicles. Preference for militarized vehicles. Static in strategic locations. Static in symbolic locations.
Use of Militarized Weapons and Uniform Changes	Clear use of militarized weapons. Use of militarized uniforms.
Activation of Military	High levels of military activation. Interconnected nature of policing and military.

Table 17: Indicators for Militarized Security Theater (Author's Typography)

5.1.1 1st Intention of Observational Analysis

Each case study is observed and then analyzed in two parts. In the Observational Analysis: Description, the intention is to present that a Militarized Security Theater is created through the fulfillment of the four indicators for Militarized Security Theater. This is completed through numerous visits to each of the cities and documenting the security practices. Throughout the process, an observational diary was kept, which documented the number, armament, and location of security personnel within the built environment. To validate the results, photography was used as a means of solidifying the research. In each of the selected locations, photographs are presented to provide a visual representation of the security apparatus that exists, and to provide context to each of the unique urban environments (Basil, 2011).

5.1.2 Incorporating Symbolism

Although the observational analysis could be expanded to many locations in the city, the police, military, and vehicles were not equally dispersed. The observation led to the conclusion that the location was intertwined with governmental priorities, and one of the central themes which the analysis delves into is symbolism. Each of the selected sites entails its status as a symbol,

“a building, a statue, a coin, etc. that communicates something intangible an idea, a value, a feeling”

(Monnet, 2011, pg 1)

The places in which security apparatuses centered their control, each hold value, either for the government, the residents, or higher points of ideology. Symbolism holds two separate forms, one where the utilization of space provides the meaning, and the second when the production of the space provides the meaning. Using an example from New York City, Zucotti Park claimed its importance as a space selected for resistance by the Occupy Wall Street Movement (Hammond, 2013), while the Twin Towers held a specific importance due to its construction, designed in a manner symbolic of the values of Free Trade and Capitalism (Bin Laden, 2004) and (Geisler, 2005). The symbolism of space is a method of communication, allowing people with power to produce messages, the immaterial knowledge that is placed in material to be seen and understood (Monnet, 2011).

5.1.3 Selecting Case Studies Through Symbolism

Four localities were selected, two in Brussels and two in Istanbul. Localities were selected 1st, as the location where there was the greatest security presence, and 2nd, with semi-congruent modes of symbolism within the city. The first pair of spaces represent central urban policy intentions for the respective governments, utilizing the concept of “Global City” as a policy planning tool that creates a unique and irreplaceable urban economic structures and governmental priorities. In the case of Istanbul, Sultan Ahmet Square is a central point of

tourism, while for Belgium, the European Quarter is the central point of the Supranational governmental structures and NGO headquarters (Göktürk et.al., 2010) and (Vandermotten, 2013). The second pair of spaces, Taksim Square and Bourse are central places, both of which are pedestrianized and function as points of congregation for tourists and residents alike. Symbolically, they were the point where social movements enunciated themselves within the city, both aligned with and in opposition to the governments (Milošević, 2017) and (Sadri, 2017).

5.1.4 2nd Intention of Observational Analysis

A second section: Placing Ideology, utilizes hypotheses of Bruce Schneier and Louis Althusser to understand **why** the security apparatus exists the way that it does. Utilizing the separation created through symbolism (Monnet, 2001), the niche Global City environments of Sultan Ahmet Square and the European Quarter are first located as ideological points of focus. The decision to protect these economic imperatives is an ideological decision of how the economy should be prioritized. From here, the hypothesis of Schneier is utilized, viewing visible physical security to stabilize the environment (Schneier, 2003). As argued in the literature review, within risk society and the exogenous extrapolation of militarized security, the state is unable to realistically defend the population. It's responsibility thus transforms to show that **something is being done to provide security** (Hill and Berger, 2009) and (Beck, 2012).

For the central spaces of Bourse and Taksim, which are symbolic for social movements that can threaten the government, it focuses more intently on Althusser's hypothesis that security is a representation of ideology, drawing upon the identification of the Turkish regime as "Competitive Authoritarian", and Belgium as a "European Democracy" with limitations that Belgium has imposed upon itself and accepted (Laffan, 2001) and (Althusser, 2006). What Foucault sees in the development of Enlightenment thought, Christian Davenport sees as democratization, but both see the reduction of visible security measures and the replacement with measures that tame (Davenport, 2004) and (Foucault, 1975). The

analysis does not aim to discover the taming features, but notes the restrictions posed by democratic principles within Brussels, and the active use of repression by the Turkish government. This second frame of analysis, utilizing Althusser begins the delineation between Stabilizing and Repressive Security Theater.

5.2 Discourse Oriented Analysis Methodology

The second portion of this research analysis is the discourse, which further separates the ideologies of Istanbul and Brussels in terms of how the Security Theater was presented as an instrument of the elite to manipulate behavior. As Althusser argues, ideology is portrayed in the physical, but discourse produced by the government is the face which is recognizable and understood. Ideology is directed outwards to be consumed and then acted upon (Althusser, 2006). The discourse is analyzed through a process of Uniting versus Othering. Teun Van Dijk discusses how ideology is bounded by those who are included within it and excluded from those outside of it. Regardless of how inclusive ideology claims to be, there are always limits to its inclusiveness (Van Dijk, 2006). The limits of inclusion and exclusion, as well as the veracity of this distinction will be analyzed through a Call to Arms Analysis.

The Call to Arms framework provides the bedrock of analysis for how this separation occurs. Characterized through a historic perspective, it functions by analyzing four speeches used before declaration of war: Pope Urban II before the 1st Crusade, Queen Elizabeth before the Anglo-Spanish War, Adolf Hitler prior to the German annexation of Austria, and George Bush, before the War on Terror. A series of similar themes were noted throughout the speeches.

1. An appeal to a legitimate power source that is external to the orator, and which is presented as inherently good;
2. The construction of a thoroughly evil Other
3. Construction of a united front with legitimization from an external power source

- a. Legitimizing use of force for the unified group.

(Graham, et. al. 2004: pg199)

To Graham, these characteristics serve as a rallying cry, a legitimization for the use of force, and a process of deligitimizing the opposition. As the Call to Arms's analysis anticipates the creation of war, the framework used in the context of this research has clear distinctions, where no war is declared. Primarily, the act of going to war is based on the premise that individuals must risk their lives, something which is not necessarily a requirement for a response to realized risk. Likewise, Graham focused on a public speech as the sole form of communication. The specific use of speech rather than other forms of discourse in Graham's analysis highlights the function of a speech in creating energy for the legitimization of the united front and the possibilities of Otherization (Graham, et. al., 2004).

The method of analysis focuses on three concepts, bifurcation, overlexicalization, and field of discursivity. Bifurcation operates as the process of dividing into two sections. In the case of the Call to Arms it is the United Front and Evil Other. 2nd is overlexicalization, which is the process of utilizing over the top, antagonistic lexicons to describe the opposition (Brinton and Traugott, 2005). These first two tools are used as means of alienation and oppression. By segmenting society into two groups, and then using demonizing vocabulary, an authoritarian trend can be noted. 3rd, is a neutral term, the field of discursivity (20), which is the process of using discourse to define the rules of articulation. It functions by creating a center, the nodal point of communication and a bubble that surrounds it. Discourse within this bubble aims to become dominant, and discourse outside is intended to be ostracized (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001).

A benefit to utilizing the Call to Arms Framework is that there is a large body of literature conceptualizing the same theme (Fairclough, 2006), (Van Dijk,

20: Field of Discursivity: Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre. We will call the privileged discursive points of this partial fixation, nodal points. (Lacan has insisted on these partial fixations through his concept of points de capiton, that is, of privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain.

2005) and (Graham, et.al, 2004). For a brief overview, three War Speeches selected for review, each of them use the process of bifurcation, uniting of the “good” or legitimate force, and the alienation of an Other. Each of the three analysis has separate themes, with Graham arguing that the Call to Arms Speech is a historical norm, Fairclough discussing how Blair’s War Speeches created a new international relations hegemonic discourse, and Van Dijk centered on a more nuanced approach to a single speech, covering a syntax analysis of the speech. There are also differences based on environment, as television reproduction, the setting, and audience each create the need to change tone to adapt to how information would be received. Speaking to an elated crowd requires the use of different syntax than speaking to parliament before a vote. The choice to use Graham’s work is that he provided the most succinct framework to replicate his study (Fairclough, 2006), (Van Dijk, 2005) and (Graham, et.al, 2004).

5.2.1 Intention of Discourse Oriented Analysis

With structural differences in the use of the Call to Arms Framework, the intention is to understand how the government portrays risk and security, and the government’s goals of how it desires the population respond to the risk? The circumstance of this research finds that it is not necessarily achieved with a Call to Arms using concrete arms. Instead, the call to arms creates an oppressive environment for individuals, one in which they are unable to voice their opinions or live their personal ideology (Butler, 2006). The alienation of the Other creates a frame where the government is provided greater leverage to pursue their ambitions (Boin, et. al., 2009). Thus, if the framework is fulfilled, it lends credence to the creation of a Militarized Repressive Security Theater. If the Call to Arms Analysis is not fulfilled, then the aims can be viewed in a separate light, and lends credence to the creation of a Militarized Stabilizing Security Theater.

5.2.2 Selecting Case Studies for Discourse Oriented Analysis

There are first, two relevant events for both of the cities. For Istanbul, there was the Gezi Park Protest and the Coup D'etat, and one case study is selected for each. For Brussels, there was the Zaventem Airport Attack and Bataclan Attack. In this situation, only the Zaventem Airport Attack is used, as in the case of Bataclan, the non-domestic nature makes it more likely to include international solidarity.

There are numerous opportunities to compare discourse, with multiple modes of communication being used. As used in The Call to Arms Framework, a source of public discourse was desired. In the case of Istanbul, a speech was offered in the moment when Erdoğan first returned to Istanbul to confront the Gezi Park Protests (Erdoğan, 2013). This speech, utilized in the moment when the protests were ongoing, and urban unrest was high, represents the closest comparison to the public discourses used in Graham's framework. During the Coup D'etat, Erdoğan spoke through facetime, in a more limited context (Erdoğan, 2016b). In the case of Brussels, the public discourse in the aftermath of both the Zaventem Terror Attacks (Michel, 2016) and the Bataclan Terror Attacks (Michel, 2015) were a press conference, with the Zaventem Press Conference being selected due to its national context.

Second, a standardized mode of communication was desired, as the rally that Erdoğan held differed from the press conference held by Michel. There were two options, a press release from the government website or a social media account. The latter method was selected due to both Head of States heavily using Twitter in the aftermath, and second is that the Twitter account is a real time provider of information. As the speech for the Gezi Park Protests had already been utilized, the Coup D'etat tweets were selected (Erdoğan, 2016). Once again for Brussels, the Zaventem attacks were utilized (Michel, 2016). In both of the environments, there is a temporal frame, as in the following three days there was a flurry of tweets, and then a lull in the communication. It is the flurry of tweets timeframe that is analyzed.

5.3 Genres of Political Discourse

For every piece of discourse, there is a frame, one that is socially constructed, that influences what can be said and how that message is interpreted. This frame is called a genre. Different characteristics of discourse can be into separate genres, which allows for these intentions of the discourse to be categorized and understood. Just as the speaker changes their discourse, the audience adapts the messages to their interpretation of the genre. (Cap and Okulska, 2013), (Van Dijk, 1997), and (Fairclough, 2005). In the case of this paper, genres will be used to address the format of communication, three modes are used, a press conference (Brussels), a Speech (Istanbul), and Twitter accounts (Istanbul and Brussels). As separate from Graham's Call to Arms Framework, a brief description of Press Conferences and Social Media are provided.

5.3.1 Press Conferences

Press releases represent discourse which are formalized in their presentation. They operate as an opportunity to present information to journalists who can reuse it for articles, as well as to broadcast on both television, radio, or the internet to provide direct information to the general population (Jacobs, 2011). Rather than in interviews where there is the clear opportunity for a person other than the subject to influence the frame, press conferences do not have to answer questions, and in recent history there has been a diminished number of questions, and questions on foreign policy are structured as less aggressive by the journalists, allowing the orator greater control over the frame of reference (Clayman, et.al. 2007).

5.3.2 Social Media

Social media is built on the wide distribution of small "knowledge chunks" divulged to the population, ones which are easily consumed (Yates and Paquette, 2011). Social Media response can be seen through two lenses. The 1st is as

a unique opportunity for political elites and the public to directly interact with each other. 2nd is with wide numbers of users, the medium is unique in its ability to rapidly and efficiently contact the population. Five examples of political uses include

1. Providing links to information sources for other Twitter users
2. Informing about the representative's ongoing activities
3. Expressing views on topical issues
4. Introducing non-political (private) content
5. Participating in online discussions with other parliament representatives.

(Sæbø, 2011, pg 1)

This daily contact is supplemented in the event of an emergency, where social media is increasingly used by government officials to provide information, and likewise has an increased use by the population as a up to date news source. (Kavanaugh et al, 2011) and (Lindsay, 2011). In the situation of crisis management, it can both serve as a passive information provider, or as an emergency management tool (Latonero and Shklovski, 2011). The dual function then differs by the intention of the government, as they can either attempt to engage the population (management tool), by reporting services that are needed, or solely attempt to inform (information provider).

5.4 Limitations

The chosen methodology for this paper holds what the author sees as two missing pieces. 1st, due to the constraints in length, a complete discourse analysis was omitted, either political or media based. The process of framing a threat and security system is not completed solely through the first moments of discourse following an event. It is done through a lengthy process, through different actors, and with different intentions. 2nd, although multiple attempts were made to interact with police and military in both contexts, it was met with silence,

presumably due to the sensitive nature and language barriers. The decision as to exactly why certain policing policies were adapted was not able to be ascertained. This was supplemented with eight interviews (appendix 5-12) with professionals, activists, and academics who could partially answer this question through their perspective, but direct interactions with individuals in charge of decision making would have been ideal.

6


Observational Analysis

Key Question:

- 1 Is a Security Theater Formed?
 - 2 Through Bruce Schneiers conceptualization of Security Theater and Louis Althusser's Theory of ideology, how can Security Theater represent stabilizing the economic environment and manifesting government ideology?
-

6.1 Istanbul

The Istanbul observation begins in June 2013 following the Gezi park Protests, and experiences a second moment of attention following the Coup D'état July 15, 2016. The difference in security threats and political opportunities creates a distinction between the security tactics during these two eras in the symbolic space of Taksim Square.



Map 1: Istanbul

500m 



Map 2: Taksim Square

200m 

Locations of Permanent Security

- 1 Ataturk Cultural Center
- 2 Location for TOMA militarized vehicle
- 3 Staging location
- 4 Greek Embassy
- 5 Galatasaray



Map 3: Sultan Ahmet Square & Bazaars

200m 

- 1 Sultan Ahmet Square
- 2 Grand Bazaar
- 3 Spice Bazaar

The maps only represent the location of security that is discussed in the paper.

6.1.1 The Urban Center: Taksim Square

Observational Analysis: Taksim Square

Security Practice	Observation dates: Gezi Park (July 2013): One-year anniversary of Gezi Park (July 2014): Coup d'état (July 2016): One-year anniversary of Coup d'état (July 2017)
Presence of Security Personnel	Largest concentration of police with continuous presence. Most often static in strategic locations
Strategically Placed Vehicles	Central location with large numbers present constantly. Preference for militarized vehicles in static visible locations. Civilian compatible vehicles moving throughout district.
Use of Militarized Weapons and Uniform Changes	Clear use of militarized weapons Militarized black uniforms with riot control equipment. Militarized camouflage with rifles. Police with approachable and professional uniforms in shopping district.
Activation of Military	None

Table 18: Observational Analysis: Taksim Square

6.1.1.1 Function and Symbolism of the Space

Gezi Park and the connecting Istiklal Street is a multifunctional space. It is a central point for the tourism industry with hotels, for local entertainment, as a point of engagement for activism, and as a point of urban development for the AKP (Sadri, 2017) and (Örs, 2014). The AKP's redevelopment proposal of Gezi Park focused on a Neo-Ottoman shopping mall, privatizing space, decreasing alcohol consumption, and destroying the Ataturk Cultural Center and the modernist architecture of the republic, in an attempt to redefine the symbolism (Burcu, 2017) and (Gürcan and Peker, 2015).

The construction of Taksim Square is based on the creation of the Turkish Republic, and the secular principles that the founding as associated with. The monument of the Republic is the central point, and the Ataturk Cultural

Center is bordering the square, each denoting Kemalist principles which are at odds with AKP ideology (Örs, 2014). Central to this historic symbolism, and this paper, is Taksim Square's historical value as a space which activists have utilized to bring people together, and directly threaten government legitimacy. This strength is a derivative of the historic importance of the square, highlighted with the 1977 May Day Protest in which 34 individuals were killed, and since been furthered by the Gezi Park Protests existence in the square (Gül, et.al, 2014).

6.1.1.2 Security Description Post-Gezi Park:

The basic control of Taksim Square includes the distinct and visible use of security officers. Continuously throughout the day and night, there are vehicles parked along the Western portion of the square. In the Southern corner of the Western border, the TOMA Water Canon, the preferred method of crowd control, is typically present, but not permanently (Figure 3). Heading North, there is a permanent installation of police cars with police officers mingling amongst the vehicles. Behind this Western Wall is a street which is further filled with police and continues to a depository of police vehicles in a large lot that previously functioned as bus storage. In the center of the square is a continuous flow of police officers, mingling amongst the users of the space. In the entirety of the square, police are wearing black and stationary officers are often in the presence of riot equipment such as shields. The Eastern portion of the square is defined by the Ataturk Cultural Center, a building with walls preventing visibility into the yard. Police armed with machine guns or pistols tend to be present in the front, and the police have taken an active presence inside of the walls. Istiklal St, the main shopping street, is dotted with permanent encampments of militarized vehicles, notably at the Greek Embassy and Galatasary University (Figure 4). Mobile civilian compatible vehicles move along the street, and static vehicles are located on side streets.

6.1.1.3 Security Description Post Coup

In the aftermath of the coup, the permanent row of civilian compatible vehicles in the Western side of the square were removed, although they are often parked there on a temporary basis. More civilian compatible vehicles can be seen on Istiklal Street. One militarized vehicle continues to be permanently present.

6.1.1.4 Althusser's Manifested Ideology in the Post Gezi-Park Environment

Throughout the Gezi Park protests and in the moments following their conclusion, the police were very visible in their protection of the square. To many citizens of the city, the police's presence was a direct shield against them accessing it.

“During Gezi Park, maybe not the State, but Erdoğan's Government tried to show people that all the public are under control and their power, so we don't have the rights to participate in those public spaces ... The government tried to show it by using the police forces. Not even just the police forces, but the supporters of Erdoğan's forces ... They don't want to see other ideologies.”

(Yavuz, 2016) (21)

The selection of this space as the point in the city where the strongest theater is held is not random, and builds upon governmental fears that the square can be retaken and used as a symbol for resistance. On days of celebration for Leftist groups in the city, May Day, the anniversary of the Gezi Park Protests, or the LGBT March, the space is cordoned off, and made inaccessible. During these moments, where the government is directly threatened by social unrest, the tactics of control become increasingly militarized. (Demir, 2017), (Al Jazeera, 2017), and (Hürriyet Daily News, 2016).

21: Yavuz is a professor of urban studies at Bilgi University focusing on the use of public space.



top Figure 3: Toma water cannons at western portion of Taksim Square: Photo 2013

down Figure 4: Militarized vehicle on Istiklal Street: Photo 2017



They employed more people to become police officers, especially in the opposition protest, for example the pride marches, they keep getting worse and worse. I remember in 2012, the police were just around waiting. If we kept the pride march too long, they would warn us and we would go away. In the last 3 years, they attacked people. They attacked people. They gassed people. They took one of my friends into custody and forced him to listen to the Quran, just because he was a gay activist ...

The amount of policemen deployed for a single pride march, so many heavily armed policeman, as if a lesbian is going to attack them with an RPG, but then a fucking bomb goes off in the middle of Istanbul. Where are they?

(Demir, 2017)

As demonstrated by the Pride March and Gezi Park, the intention of the movement and the threat to the government is of prime concern. In the moments following the Coup d'état, security was enunciated in a very different manner.

6.1.1.5 Althusser's Manifested Ideology in the Post-Coup Environment

When the threat is not there, and the opportunity exists for the perpetuation of state ideology, the space becomes truly public again. In the aftermath of the Coup, and on the one-year anniversary, there was a brief reprieve from the repression of space. Public transportation was free for this period, ensuring that as many people as possible could enter Taksim. In the aftermath of the coup, poignant flags were hung from the Ataturk Cultural Center, denouncing Gülen (Figure 5). Likewise, on the one-year anniversary, a large festivity was produced, and the entire city was invited into the square (NY Post, 2017). Police with approachable uniforms mingled amongst the celebrators, a stark contrast to the riot police who greet protesters from the Left (Figure 6 and 7).

The symbolism of the space was not only important for the people of Gezi Park, those which Erdoğan wished to remove from the space, but served equally as a point of theater for the AKP and its supporters (Ors, 2014). Building from the garnered emancipation from the election of the AKP, the religious right in Istanbul was eager and capable of make themselves visible within Taksim Square. A new mode of demonstration has developed, one which is constructed by the AKP as

a celebration of unity, yet refuses admission for the Kurdish Party (Turam, 2017). The square serves as the point for enunciation for the entirety of the city, but the access to enunciate is now restricted and threatened by police force. Acceptable ideologies are given the ability to articulate themselves, while those which are in opposition to the government are met with outright force as well as a modern representation of Foucault's Panopticon, where anyone who enters the space is fully aware of the surveillance that surrounds them.



Figure 5: Banner against Gülen hanging from Ataturk Cultural Center

"We are going to hang you and your dogs in your own design with the permission of Allah. We will wave the soul of democracy to the earth"



top Figure 6: Celebration of the one year anniversary of the coup

down Figure 7: Police preparing before a left protest



6.1.2 The Ottoman Heritage: Sultan Ahmet Square and the Grand Bazaar

Note: No analysis was taken of Sultan Ahmet Square and the Spice Bazaar following Gezi Park as the protests occurred before initiating this thesis.

Observational Analysis: Sultan Ahmet Square and the Grand Bazaar

Security Practice	Observation dates: Coup d'état (July 2016): One-year anniversary of Coup d'état (July 2017)
Presence of Security Personnel	High concentration of police centralized around tourist sites. Police aided by private security contractors in certain localities.
Strategically Placed Vehicles	Visible police cars. Single militarized vehicle.
Use of Militarized Weapons and Uniform Changes	Use of Militarized uniforms by militarized vehicle. Approachable uniforms used in touristic space.
Activation of Military	None

Table 19: Observational Analysis: Sultan Ahmet Square and Grand Bazaar

6.1.2.1 Function and Symbolism of the Space

Sultan Ahmet is a district in the South-Western portion of Istanbul. Bordering the Bosphorus, it houses many of the touristic attractions in the city including the Grand Bazaar, the Hagia Sophia, Sultan Ahmet Mosque, and Topkapi Palace. Bordering Sultan Ahmet Mosque and the Hagia Sophia is a large stone square. During the day, this square is continuously utilized by pedestrians and vendors. It is in this space that a terrorist attack occurred on January 12, 2016 (BBC, 2016). Because of this terrorist attack as well as the touristic importance of the space, security is particularly important here. The Grand Bazaar and Spice Bazaar are enclosed historical retail spaces near Sultan Ahmet square. The space is symbolic through its utilization of the government as one of the main touristic goals and as a grand relic of the Ottoman past.

“If there are two icons that symbolize the city (Istanbul), they are the Blue Mosque (Sultan Ahmet Mosque), named for its 20,000 richly hued Iznik tiles hand crafted by the empire’s best artisans, and the awe-inspiring Hagia Sophia, Justinian’s palatial ode to the Almighty.”

(Turkish Culture and Tourism Office, 2017)

6.1.2.2 Security Description

The method of security in Sultan Ahmet Square varies dramatically from that in Taksim. In this space, there is a continuous flow of mobile police officers walking, usually without vehicles, as opposed to the highly militarized control of Taksim. Within the square, there are a variety of police, some wearing militarized equipment, but most wearing approachable uniforms. They are moving about the square, talking and interacting with people. Police cars could be seen in a stationary role, as well as mobile around the square. A distinction is that on the one-year anniversary of the coup and the aftermath, one militarized vehicle can be seen parked between the Sultan Ahmet Tram Station and the square. This was not present in the direct aftermath of the coup.

A second location in the district is the Grand Bazaar. Located Northwest of Sultan Ahmet Square, it is a large enclosed labyrinth of shops, selling a variety of goods. Once again, a central point for the influx of tourists, it represents a location which the government took specific interest in securing. As an enclosed space with a limited number of entrances, two security guards were posted at each entrance, each in a red vest, responsible for checking bags upon entry. Inside the space there was an unnoticeable amount of security. Like in Sultan Ahmet Square, a militarized vehicle could be noted on the anniversary of the coup attempt, and not in the direct aftermath of the coup.

6.1.2.3 Schneier’s Security Theater in the Post-Coup Environment

In the above analyzed space, the buildings are a symbol themselves, a representation of Turkish history, both political and apolitical. Relating to the Neo-Ottoman nature of the AKP, and the use of religion as a uniting factor, the

neighborhood holds many of the symbolic pieces of the Ottoman past is of high importance. Likewise, new trends of Islamic Tourism have provided added value to symbols of Islamic heritage (Al-Hamarneh and Steiner, 2004) and (Duman, 2012).

Tourism remains a key aspect of the Turkish industry, but the effect of terrorism, the coup, and general instability has caused a significant drop. In the direct aftermath of the coup in July, the number of tourists dropped by more than one third (Hayden, 2017) (See Appendix 2). The desire to return to a stable economic situation requires that individuals in the main tourist attractions feel a sense of stability. Bruce Schneier built his principles from the idea that individuals are afraid of the wrong things, things that are spectacular and foreign, but in reality, create very low risk. The process of being a tourist in a foreign country with a history of terror attacks checks many of these boxes (Schneier, 2003). In order to counter this, tendencies of community policing can be activated. Rather than utilizing the militarized environment, police can engage the individuals with approachable uniforms that do not separate them from the population (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990) and (Cordner, 2014). This sense of creating stability involves a dramatically different representation of policing than can be seen in Taksim Square. There is the exception of the single militarized vehicle at each of the touristic locations, but this can correlate to the overall militarized environment of Istanbul.

top Figure 8: Approachable police officers in Sultan Ahmet Square

down Figure 9: Militarized vehicle by Sultanahmet Square






top Figure 10: Approachable police officers outside of Grand Bazaar

down Figure 11: Militarized vehicle outside of Grand Bazaar



6.2 Brussels

The Brussels observation analysis begins with the Bataclan attack November 13, 2015 and has a second moment of focus on the Zaventem Airport attack March 22, 2016. These two can be seen as a continuity, as security measures initiated following Bataclan were amplified after Zaventem, rather radically changed.



Map 4: Brussels


500m 



- 1 Parlementarium
- 2 Berlaymont

Map 5: European Quarter

200m 



- 1 Bourse Square
- 2 De Brouckere

Map 6: Bourse

200m 

The maps only represent the location of security that is discussed in the paper.

6.2.1 The Urban Center: Bourse

Observational Analysis: Bourse	
Security Practice	Observation dates: Bataclan Attack (Nov. 13, 2015- Jan. 30, 2016), Zaventem Attack (April 6 – 10, 2016 and Dec. 8 – 11, 2016), and Stabilizing Environment (July 20 – 27, 2017)
Presence of Security Personnel	Large and visible policing force. Static around vehicles as well as mobile patrolling streets.
Strategically Placed Vehicles	In direct aftermath of attacks, strategic vehicles place in strategic and visible space. In stabilized environment, militarized vehicles placed on main street away from most symbolic place (Bourse memorial)
Use of Militarized Weapons and Uniform Changes	Combination of militarized uniforms and reflective colored uniforms Militarized weapons and no weapons
Activation of Military	Activated

Table 20: Observational Analysis: Bourse

6.2.1.1 Function and Symbolism of the Space

Boulevard Ansplach is a road running in a Southwest Northeast orientation in the core of Brussels. It connects the central areas of Bourse and Brouckere which operate as a shopping center, a point of congregation, a central point for tourism, to the main train station Gare du Midi in the South. Focusing on symbolism, the central point for Brussels is Bourse, a point where protests have historically occurred, as well as the vigils for the terrorist attack. These vigils were self-organized and not perpetrated by the government, as candles, photographs, and chalk graffiti were left to remember the events and the victims. Similar to Taksim Square, Bouse is also a central point of tourism, with main attractions. As a place of local congregation, it has undergone a pedestrianization project, which has encouraged its position as a key component of the Brussels city center (Torfs, 2015).

6.2.1.2 Security Description

In this space, similar to the symbolic space of Istanbul, there is the highest density of policing. Militarized vehicles have a presence in two locations. The first is directly outside of Bourse (Figure 12), occupying space in the large plaza, and second is outside the station for Brouckere along the road (Figure 13). Furthermore, for extended periods of time, security checks were initiated at a number of entrances for the metro, while a number more were completely closed (FlandersNews, 2016). The street itself was patrolled by a combination of police and military, working either in pairs or small groups, either separated or in collaboration. Although continuously present, their uniform and attributes are consistently changing. During festive events, such as the Christmas Market, police don vibrant neon orange suits to ensure they are easily visible and approachable, but in the direct aftermath of attacks as well as in their normal patrols they were in combat attire or their standard uniforms.

6.2.1.3 Image Re-stabilization in the Post-Terror Environment

For clarity, the description is after the Bataclan attack, because the response was more dramatic than after Zaventum.

In the immediate aftermath of the Bataclan attack, the city of Brussels felt need to reassert control over the city. The city shut down the metro, ordered residents off the streets, and sent the military and police into the streets. This event, publicly denounced by the mayor of Brussels represents the disconnect between the national and local government in security policy, as well as the intentions. (Matharu, 2015). The situation which followed was dramatic and a show of force.



top Figure 12: Military vehicle in front of Bourse

down Figure 13: Military vehicles located by construction site at Brouckere

Let's be clear, I think all of the security measures which have been taken, like police in the streets, are only only only to give the signal that we are doing something, and we are there for you. It is not at all, at all, at all logic, or even effective. There is no effect. I don't think this helps at all. It is very symbolic.

(Enhuis, 2016) (22)

There is necessity of making people feel that there is something being done. For example, there is a big presence of police in front of Bourse, you can just walk there with a bag and explode it, so its not necessarily effective. But it is effective in the terms of making people feel safer. That is what we all the Security Theater. It is more to work on the fear of violence than on effectiveness

(Note: It is this interview that lead to the Security Theater concept).

(Melgaco, 2016) (23)

The show of force was produced for the local and international community. The government spoke to the local community but also directed correspondence to the international community, highlighted by the #Call Brussels tourism campaign. A series of telephones were placed around Brussels, where foreigners could call Belgians, and in a two-minute YouTube video, Belgians are able to respond in a positive manner to how they saw the city after the attacks. The introduction explains exactly this intention

As Brussels was linked to terror plots, the International media portrayed the city as a warzone. We wanted to change that perception with an honest answer.

(Call Brussels, 2016)

As the city progressed in re-stabilizing its image, the intimidating military vehicles moved near Brouckere, an area where construction is occurring, and at the moment not a place of leisure. The military and police foot presence remains intense around Bourse.

22 Els Enhuis is a professor of criminology at Vrije Universiteit Brussel. She focuses on the relationships between social groups and police and the social construction of security.

23 Lucas Melgaço is a professor of criminology at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. He focuses on the policing of public spaces and urban conflict.

6.2.1.4 Althusser's Manifested Ideology in the Post-Terror Environment

Similar to how Gezi Park is defined by citizen access to space, the same can be done for Bourse. As the symbolic space of resistance, cooperation, and mourning within the city, Bourse became a vocal point in the expression of security. And, just as Istanbul, the access to space was either restricted or granted based on the moment and intention. In the aftermath of Bataclan, when the environment was tense, social activism clashed with the ideology and intentions of the government. Contention arose as protests were initiated by the Right agitating for tighter border controls and the Left for a more inclusive society. Arrests were made, and the police intervened harshly. The stated reason for the banning of protests and arrests were due to intensified security concerns and overworked police (Stanglin, 2016) and (Dearden, 2016). While a restriction of speech, it was temporal, and the crackdown on social unrest has waned, and the space is once again free to use. Space was claimed multiple time, and although it did result in violence at times (RT, 2016), it was never categorically denied (Stupp, 2017).

The confrontations between Left and Right represented a contested moment, but an inclusive memorial arose directly following the Zaventem attack. A ceremonial was held on the steps of Bourse, as flowers were laid, and messages written to express condolences to those who have lost their lives. As this occurred, the policing of the area changed (Siddique and Khomami, 2016). Rather than reinforcing a sense of control in this space, the police were relocated farther down the street. While not initiated by the government, nor interfered with, the memorial aligned with the intentions of the government, and posed no threat to their power or ideological frame.

In the case of Brussels, the ability to restrict has a limited scope, as citizens are able to redress the government. Likewise, Europeanized governments, and in this case Brussels, are bounded by the requirement that individuals can express themselves freely, and through this and the process of redress, prolonged visible repression is met with high risks through the democratic process (Davenport,

2007) and (Poe, 2004). The theatrical performances of security demonstrate that **something** is being done, while continuing to grant most individuals their rights.

6.2.2 The European Ideals: European Quartier

Observational Analysis: European Quartier

Security Practice	Observation dates: Bataclan Attack (Nov. 13, 2015- Jan. 30, 2016), Zaventem Attack (April 6 – 10, 2016 and Dec. 8 – 11, 2016), and Stabilizing Environment (July 20 – 27, 2017)
Presence of Security Personnel	Public police and military at entrance to European Institutions.
Strategically Placed Vehicles	Vehicles placed at entrances of European institutions. Militarized Vehicles.
Use of Militarized Weapons and Uniform Changes	Militarized uniforms. Militarized weapons. No or few professional or approachable police
Activation of Military	Highly activated.

Table 21: Observational Analysis: European Quartier

6.2.2.1 Function and Symbolism of the Space

The economic space in Brussels creates its own ideology. Pan-Europeanism is not a derivative of Brussels, something that needed Brussels existence to form, but rather Brussels has successfully situated itself as the “Capital of Europe.” Hosting many of the international institutions for the European Union, Brussels is responsible for ensuring the safety, as well as the perception of safety for the buildings and the workers, which are important factors in the Brussels economy, and ones which significant investment has gone into its realization (Romanczyk, 2012) and (McNamara 2015).

6.2.2.2 Security Description

The European Quartier is located just outside the Ring Road in the Eastern part of the city. Within this area is a key piece of the Brussels economy, a congregation of multinational institutions and corporations. Distinct from the historic architecture of the city center, it is dominated by concrete and glass buildings with a European and International nature such as the Parliamentarium and Le Berlaymont. Accompanying these buildings is a series of modern plazas, which operate as large entranceways towards these institutional buildings which are removed from the road. It is in this space that most of the security takes place. The entrances of the buildings are securitized themselves, utilizing large bars, concrete barriers, and different elevations to eliminate the opportunity for street threats to damage the building (Coaffee and Wood, 2006) (Figure 14). Guarding the entrance of the buildings, are large militarized vehicles and military personnel. Unlike the area surrounding Bourse mobile foot police officers are not present (Figure 15).

6.2.2.3 Schneier's Security Theater in the Post Terror Environment

Sassen speaks clearly about how cities compete for status as a global city, vying for the lucrative and transnational high service sector. In Sassen's analysis of Brussels, he shifts this service sector towards transnational governance and the non-profit sector, which Brussels has successfully centered within itself (Sassen, 2008). Continued acceptance of the institutions in Brussels status is not set in stone, as the European Union is a polycentric organization, and instability in Brussels threatens to relocate not the entirety of these organizations away, but pieces of them. As Brussels has large sunk investment into production of office space in the European Quartier, and a large portion of their economic production comes from these institutions, it represents an economic imperative for the city that the institutions stay (Baeten, 2003).



top Figure 14: Example of constructed defenses of the European Parliament

down Figure 15: Military vehicle in plaza outside of Berlaymont



Security also protects those within the building, a specific class of individuals, ones who are expatriate and middle to high income (Figure 22). Along with the economic imperatives, the military, controlled by the N-VA, a political party, which has demonstrated high levels of support for the European Institutions, has made it a high priority that these spaces are secured (Dardanelli, 2012). Their choice to control these spaces is linked with the ideological choice to view these locations as important over others.




Table 22: Median Income by District in Brussels

For the enemy, this symbolism is derived from the symbolism of the buildings themselves. Just as the buildings represent the possibilities of a European Identity and economic progress for the N-VA and MR, they represent something alternative for those trying to destroy them (Cannière et.al., 2013). An attack on these buildings, the institutions, and those who work there can be viewed as an attack on the system itself. The attacks on 9/11 were an attack on American capitalistic and militaristic expansionism (Bin Laden, 2004). An attack in the European Quartier holds a specific nuance, one where the European Values that are implicitly held within the building are similarly under attack (Hein, 2004). This defense for a symbol is represented in the form of security, which is not concerned

about the individuals on the street, rather protection of space (Parfomak, 2004), protecting infrastructure and thus ideology.

6.3 Observational Analysis Conclusion

The observations of the cities provide evidence for the fact that a Security Theater was present in both Istanbul and Brussels. Once the moment of realized risk occurred, there was a distinct change in the presence of police in both cities, and military in Brussels. The spatial analysis shows that security is in symbolic locations, not dispersed evenly throughout the city, and all in localities that provide strategic benefits for political parties and the system. Visibility was a key component, where all case studies used militarized vehicles and militarized equipment. Key differences arise as the security in Istanbul became coercive, pressuring those who desired access to the space, and attempting to ensure that only the AKP ideology had access to the symbolic space of Taksim Square, while in Brussels the Security Theater had less intention to deny people access to space (except in the very short term for protests). In Istanbul, policies paint a poignant picture that space is not something that is allowed for everyone, and thus, the system of Security Theater that Istanbul initiated can begin to be viewed as one that is repressive. In the case of Sultan Ahmet Square and the European Quarter, security is an ideological choice of space, ensuring that specific industries are deemed safe.

7

Discourse Oriented Analysis

Key Question 3 Does discourse from the symbolic Head of State serve to oppress alienate and call violence upon an Otherized population?

7.1 Brussels

For Brussels, the discourse will focus solely on the attacks that occurred at Zaventem airport. As the other attack in Bataclan occurred in France, and thus involved a certain level of solidarity with outside countries. The Zaventem attack provides a clearer example of what levels of international cooperation are truly desired, and how the Other is framed when the realized risk occurs against Belgians.

7.1.1 Twitter account of Prime Minister Charles Michel

Prime Minister Charles Michel began using Twitter directly following the attack, originally to provide news to the nation, but quickly transitioned towards producing an ideological defense. The twitter timeline includes only March 21st – 24th, 2016 the day of the attack and the following three days.

(Michel, 2016)

Discourse Oriented Analysis: Twitter Account of Charles Michel

Indicator	Discourse Example
An appeal to a legitimate power source that is external to the orator, and which is presented as inherently good	"We will defend and protect our freedoms . We are faced with a cowardly enemy. But we are determined and United." (March 22: 11:42)
Construction of a united front with legitimization from an external power source	"We will defend and protect our freedoms. We are faced with a cowardly enemy. But we are determined and United ." (March 22: 11:42) "Meeting this afternoon with Prime Minister @manuelvalls. The destiny of Europe is peace and security" (March 21: 6:21)
The construction of a thoroughly evil Other	"We will defend and protect our freedoms. We are faced with a cowardly enemy . But we are determined and United." (March 22: 11:42)
Legitimizing use of force for the unified group	Absent

Table 23: Discourse Oriented Analysis: Twitter Account of Charles Michel

The use of ideology in the tweets was one that was refrained but clear. This can be seen by the fact that one tweet and sentence was able to accurately fulfill three of the requirements of the Call to Arm framework. A wider and grander ideology that is built upon a multitude of ideas, is condensed into 19 words, clearly delineating why Belgium has legitimacy, a derogatory scope of who the enemy is, the cowardly enemy, and words of encouragement for future actions.

"We will defend and protect our freedoms. We are faced with a cowardly enemy. But we are determined and united."
(March 22: 11:42)

Starting with a higher ideology that the united nation is based upon, Michel calls to the forefront the freedoms that Belgium has, a reference not only to the democratic institution of the country, but also a statement regarding the importance of Western and European thought, in which freedom is a central concept (Kymlicka and Opalski, 2002). The concept of Democracy is incorporated later, as further justification for the resilient nature of Belgium, and a further uniting factor.

"Our country is in shock. But we are also strong and confident.

This is a democracy that no one gets broken.”

(March 24: 7:57)

Rhetorical tools such as democracy and freedom are posited as defenses against future attacks. It is the strength of these ideals which are best able to prevent future attacks, and provide resilience once occurred (Kurrild-Klitgaard, et.al., 2006). Throughout the Tweets, Michel never articulates who exactly the threat is, even though ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack on the same day. This can be understood through what Chantal Laclau and Ernesto Mouffe call the field of discursivity. The field of discursivity is a constructed boundary as to what is deemed acceptable to be said, which is connected to the framework of European ideals encompassing a field of morality (Laffan, 2001). The delineation of a common enemy in the genre of public discourse threatens the alienate an Other, in this case the Muslim community of Brussels. By creating a center of discourse, which is isolated from alienation, Michel shifts acceptable discourse towards a more inclusive terminology (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). While the enemy is never clearly defined, the use of discourse reverberates historical trends. Just as Graham argued that Call to Arms Speeches have a similar history, a boundary is placed around what it entails to be a “good nation”: freedom and democracy. The same justifications were used following 9/11, and the 2004 terror attacks in Madrid, further centralizing democracy as one of the key legitimizing features in the Call to Arms Framework (Kurrild-Klitgaard et.al., 2006) and (Van Dijk, 2006).

7.1.2 Press Conference of Prime Minister Charles Michel Following Zaventem Attack:

Charles Michel gave a press conference on March 22nd, the same day as the attack at Zaventem Airport.

(Michel, 2016)

Discourse Oriented Analysis: Press Conference of Charles Michel

Indicator	Discourse Example
An appeal to a legitimate power source that is external to the orator, and which is presented as inherently good;	Absent
Construction of a united front with legitimization from an external power source	There is something I'd like to bring to everyone's attention; in this time of tragedy, in this dark time for our country, more than ever, I want to commend everyone for their calmness, but also for their show of solidarity. We are confronted with an ordeal, a difficult ordeal, and facing this ordeal, we are united, we are stand in solidarity, we stand together. (United without external legitimization)
The construction of a thoroughly evil Other	Ladies and gentlemen, it is as we had feared, our country and fellow citizens have been hit by blind, violent, and cowardly attacks (Other is not defined)
Legitimizing use of force for the unified group	OCAM has adjusted their threat assessment to bring it up to level 4 , as a result, a series of additional security measures are currently being taken; military reinforcements are being deployed, borders are being secured, and specific measures for the restriction of public transport are being implemented.

Table 24: Discourse Oriented Analysis: Press Conference of Charles Michel
(Transcript of the Press Conference Provided by Safaa Charafi and Muhib Nabulsi)

As the first moment of public speech, the press conference held by Michel was the first piece of discourse which was largely absent of ideology. Situated as the first moment of public speech, the setting and content chosen by Michel is controlled, formal, and providing practical information. The keywords that have justified the creation of a united front are largely absent, although it does utilize inclusive terminology for delineating commonality. Democracy, freedom, and other signifiers used in Michel's twitter account are replaced with solely unity and solidarity.

Michel advocates for the systematic implementation of violence, one that is coded through Belgian law and the actions that are taken on the back of the state. By changing the threat assessment level to 4, this decision comes with direct implication on what the government is allowed and even required to do. With the increased security, the security apparatus is mobilized on its own, as numerous

actions become mandatory, the increased border security, increased security at certain locations (Brussels as a whole in this situation), and public transport restrictions (Royal Decree Executing the Law, 2006). Further systematic increase in policing continued through the legal framework, including a law that dramatically changed the ability to search, arrest, and prosecute individuals. This legal justification of violence is not through violence in the streets, but through surveillance, expanded power, and incarceration (Agamben, 2005). Monopoly of violence is directly taken into the hands of the government, and through a legal justification, it is justified in its introduction (Davenport, 2007) The elevated threat levels have a symbolic impact on the population, which sees the constant level of **instability** as the threat system stabilizes at three which denotes “serious, possible and likely” (Massumi, 2005).

7.2 Istanbul

The analysis for Istanbul consists of the Gezi Park speech that Erdogan gave upon returning to Istanbul June 6th, 2013, slightly over one week after the protests began, and his Twitter account between July 15th and July 18th, 2013, in the immediate aftermath of the Coup d'état.

7.2.1 Post Gezi Park Rally of Prime Minister Erdoğan

Attended by a large group of people, and facilitated by extended transport hours to the airport, it provided the opportunity for Erdoğan to address the population. This selection of style differs from Brussels which held a press conference. The rally had an energized population, and an environment where energy could be used for public confrontation of the defined enemy.

(Erdoğan, 2013)

Discourse Oriented Analysis: Gezi park Speech Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Indicator	Discourse Example
An appeal to a legitimate power source that is external to the orator, and which is presented as inherently good;	“Dear brothers, as we respect the democracy, the elections and the national will , we ask for respect towards us. As we started on this path, we said one thing: The goal is advanced democracy and we will achieve it. Brothers, the nation gives the responsibility. And it can only be the nation who can take it back.” I salute my grandmothers, my sisters, who are kneeling on their seccade (prayer mat) right now mumbling their prayers.
Construction of a united front with legitimization from an external power source	“Brothers, some people say that the Prime Minister is the prime minister of the 50 percent only. How can that be true? We always said until today that we were the servant of 76 million. ”
The construction of a thoroughly evil Other	“These actions which have lost their status of democratic protest and turned into vandalism and total lawlessness must stop immediately. Our citizens who acted with sincere intentions who later became the tools of terrorist organizations should see the real game and must refrain from this lawlessness. My innocent citizens should separate themselves from this dirty game, from this social engineering, from these lawless protests against democracy... We will see every other way, as 76 million together, lawless and illegitimate, and stand against them. ”
Legitimizing use of force for the unified group	“The police are on duty to protect our lives, our safety. At times, he stands against the terrorists, at times, he stands against the anarchists, at times, he stands against the vandalism. Of course, this will not be in the best interests of some. And what do they say? Pull the police back! What now? This is not some random place, this country is the Turkish republic.

Table 25: Discourse Oriented Analysis: Gezi park Speech Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Before initiating an analysis of the content of Erdoğan’s speech, it is first necessary to address that the method Erdoğan chose to speak is one which encourages action. His choice of setting and environment is one in which he can individuals engage in the political sphere, to activate them into public space, and use them as a tool to further his agenda. This backdrop to a Call to Arms framework represents the Call in a powerful sense, demanding the first step of activation as people choose to leave their homes and enter the urbanity in order to hear his speech.

In regard to the fulfilment of the Call to Arms framework, Erdoğan uses dual concepts in order to justify legitimacy, democracy and Islam. These concepts, which are not inherently connected or disconnected, but ones in which Erdoğan has tried

to develop as a backbone of support within his regime. The concept of advanced democracy is one which Erdoğan uses as well. By advocating for these democratic principles, while simultaneously engaging in the repression of the opposition, it highlights the power of democracy as a unifying principle. While this “commitment” to democracy can be uniting, the use of Islam as a unifying feature is one which is inherently alienating. It is selected in a context where Erdoğan knows the sharp divides, that the people joining the protests are largely supporters of the CHP, a political party which is staunchly Kemalist and Secularist. The intention of democratic principles, to provide a voice to everyone, is not followed in his own speech which is targeted at his own base (Table 26).




Table 26: Opinion on the attitude of the Prime Minister by demographic clusters




Table 27: Opinion on the Gezi Park Protest by Political Preference

Just as Erdoğan justifies his support through his perception of a noble Islamic and democratic government, he selects terms which aim to delegitimize and paint the opposition as a dishonorable enemy. Protests in themselves question the state, and Gezi Park was attempting to build what protestors felt was a better society, but Erdoğan's terms fail to address the optimistic and productive aspects of the opposition. Overlexicalization is used by Erdoğan, as he positions the opposition as terrorists, lawless, and vandals signifies them as threats to state control, but also threats in which there are no redeeming factors. They are signifiers where repression is expected and justified against.

Yes, he's targeting certain groups, in every speech, calling people names, terrorist, enemies of the state, wanting to kill me, my family, wanting to kill this and that. Sometimes he even said I am the state. Either people are believing in that, or they feel the need to be in line with the government. It's a complex situation. But, they do things in line with his speech. They target people, discrimination is on the rise, every single speech of his, based on my political beliefs is a hate crime.

(Burak, 2017)

As the discourse moves away from Erdoğan, and enters other channels, especially those which the AKP controls, the repetition of these signifiers threatened the legitimacy of the protests. The police response to Gezi Park, one which is advocated for in the Erdoğan's speech, is one which was brutal in its implementation. This is demonstrated in the Table 27, denoting the political affiliation of those who see the protesters as foreign agents. The process of denouncing the protests as foreign has a clear tendency to be believed by Erdoğan's supporters (AKP) than by those most likely to attend (CHP)

7.2.2 Post-Coup Tweets of Erdoğan Following Coup Attempt

(Erdoğan, 2016)

The twitter response that Erdoğan posited was compiled in a flurry, 20 tweets over three days, (July 15-18) focusing on directives for the population, ideological statements, and once again the process of vilification. Specific attention

is paid to the clear delineation of an enemy, as well as the incitement of the general population to act. In the event of the Coup, Erdoğan's rhetoric was contained to instances where he was removed from the public, excluding the opportunity where he could give a speech like his arrival to the Istanbul airport following Gezi Park, but he would host a nationwide celebration on August 7th during the Democracy and Martyrs' Rally (Arango, 2016), and another on the anniversary of the failed attempt (Kingsley, 2017).

Discourse Oriented Analysis: Coup Tweets of Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Indicator	Discourse Example
An appeal to a legitimate power source that is external to the orator, and which is presented as inherently good;	"Turkey's democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed, so that there is no other alternative than a system." (July 18: 4:46)
Construction of a united front with legitimization from an external power source	"Military-looking posture across the country of terrorists and the future of our nation has written an epic of heroism. " (July 18: 4:49)
The construction of a thoroughly evil Other	"After that, what do you know about your organization ... Fethullahist Terror, nor any other terrorist organization will not show the slightest compassion for their supporters." (July 18: 4:45)
Legitimizing use of force for the unified group	"The emergence of the attempted coup d , état and my call to the squares, streets, the gratitude to each and every one of my countrymen." (July 18: 4:35) After that, what do you know about your organization ... Fethullahist Terror, nor any other terrorist organization will not show the slightest compassion for their supporters (July 18: 4:45)

Table 28: Discourse Oriented Analysis: Coup Tweets of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

The Call to Arms framework is in this case matched coherently with the twitter account. The twitter starts with justification using the use of "democracy, freedoms, and rule of law" as the basis for legitimacy. Based in a historical context where Turkish Coups have represented both eras of instability as well as repression, it is only Erdoğan's Turkish state which is able to thwart the repression that a new military regime would incur (Satana, 2008). Then follows a very clearly delineated Other. In this situation Erdoğan is able to speak of the Fethullah Gülen movement, a transnational Islamic movement, which has had an increasingly contentious

relationship with the AKP (Taş. 2017) This ability to clearly define Gülen as the Other not only creates an easily detectable villain, but has also enables repression by Erdoğan to continue into the post-coup period (Gumuscu, 2016).

The most important distinction to make in regard to the twitter discourse following the coup is the active desire for Erdoğan to encourage the reclamation of space. Erdoğan directly calls residents to the streets to counter the military claim on the state. In a situation in which 265 people were killed, the desire for people to reenter the streets is something which is based on government preservation rather than the safety of individuals (Worley and Cockburn 2016). This enticement into the street is one which is interconnected with violence. During the moments of the coup, violence was occurring, and the contestation of space aggravated this further. This action ignores the risk of the individuals, but focuses on maintaining Erdoğan's stay in power. This is the only example of a Call to Arms analysis in the context that it directly asked for the population to enter into a warzone.

7.3 Discourse Conclusion

Discourse between Istanbul and Brussels encompasses the differences in national policy and desires of the national governments. In both situations, the use of ideology justified future action. In one sense, the ideologies called upon similar aspects such as democracy, liberty, and unity, but in conclusion, the Call to Arms Analysis drew out key differences. The authoritarian model of Turkish politics encouraged a more divisive unity, calling upon Islam, a feature which has been a key point of contestation since the founding of the republic. With a divisive unity created, there were also key differences in terms of how the enemy was framed. Reverting to Boin and Graham's framework, the denotation of an evil enemy is a step in the exploitation of the crisis, or the call to arms respectively. Brussels failed to delineate an easily recognizable enemy. Although derogatory signifiers were used, Islam was never mentioned, instead left to the imagination. This connects the European frame of morality to the field of discursivity. Speaking

outside the bounds of acceptable discourse poses a threat to the Michel's political capital if he is deemed racist. It also aims to center future discourse by other parties around his chosen point.

On the other side, Erdoğan was very clear about delineating an enemy. It used foreign powers, and the Gülen movement as the culprits and ones which violence could be justified against. Similarly, it advocated for the activation of the citizenry as a tool to confront the forces, one which when completed aided in ending the coup, but it also risked the security of anybody in the streets. In total, Erdoğan's speeches filled the Call to Arms framework in a more comprehensive manner. Underlining the effect that Erdoğan's speeches were provocative in nature, and attempted to justify further response to and by the population. In the case of Brussels, a further analysis of the N-VA discourse would prove fruitful, as statements by politicians such as Jan Jambon have advocated for "cleaning Molenbeek", but this remains outside of the methodological framework (Cerulus, 2015).

8

Weaponizing the Risk

Key Question 4 How does the implementation of the Security Theater reflect the legal framework and the relationship between security and the population?

The final aspect of comparing the Security Theater, is analyzing the effect that the security system has on individuals. In both of the discourse situations, there is a legitimization of the unified group, and the creation of an Other, although it is done with different levels of clarity and intensity. Although outside the frame of theater, and placed into the lives of individuals, the systematic repression of the Other must be stated. This repression is one which provides the final context for the intentions.

8.1 Turkey

In Turkey, there has been a continuous state of repression for individuals speaking out against the government, but it has escalated through the legal framework in the aftermath of the coup. Since this coup, a state of emergency has been present. This state of emergency allows for Erdoğan and his ministers to rule through decree, issuing orders which bypass the parliament, and review by the court system (Constitution of the Turkish Republic article 119). By operating through a system with further centralized power, Erdoğan has garnered the opportunity to issue repression for who both stood up against the regime, but also those who solely appeared to have done so has been met with a harsh response. A

series of purges were completed that removed over 100,000 individuals from their jobs, ranging from teacher, to military, to government officials, or any other occupation that the AKP viewed as threatening (Arango, et. al., 2016)

Accompanying the massive purge is a systematic repression of individuals within the penal system. The process of detaining individuals has been facilitated with the passage of decree 668, which allows individuals to be detained without charges for 30 days and decree 667, which limits the ability for suspects to access their lawyers, often for days at a time upon arrival, and have their access restricted during the following time (Emergency Decree Laws of July- September 667-674, 2016). Likewise, there have been accounts of torture in the prisons and the end of the prison monitoring commission, which removes the ability for observers to access the system and both oversee and document the accounts. (Human Rights Watch, 2016) The state of both ensuring that individuals are punished in the day to day life for their disapproval of the government through the purge, and through the penal system is further enabled through the solidification of power which has occurred through a national referendum on the political structure.

Finally, the turmoil and fear provided political capital for the AKP that was used to pass the long-awaited referendum to the constitution, increasing the power of Erdoğan, and transitioning his rule from Prime Minister into President. This centralization of power has been one of his key political ambitions, and one in which he risked much of his political capital in a narrow vote. Through this political capital, he increases the ability for his say to dictate rule of law within the country (Quamar, 2017).

8.2 Belgium

Focusing on the capabilities to surveille, pursue, and detain individuals, especially regarding terrorism, which holds a distinct connection to People of Color, especially those within the Muslim community. Following the attack at Bataclan, 18 anti-terror measures were passed November 19th, 2015 which increased

national spending by 400 million Euros for policing and security services, 72-hour administrative detention without charge, and the allowance of 24-hour searches to individual's homes (Belgium, 2015). A key difference in the legal framework is that although the opportunity for some of the same contested practices to be implemented in Belgium as in Turkey, they are used more sparingly and with more judicial oversight. Even with the harsh prison conditions, one can be ensured that rights to a lawyer, even in the situation where they are charged under the new legislation, and property damage following raids is returned, although it is claimed to be less than necessary (Human Rights Watch, 2016) and (Amnesty International, 2016). On top of this, the Plan Canal incorporates a new policing design which will send 1000 new police officers into Molenbeek. The plan cites the need to action against violence and extremism, but underlying issues of Brussels, which leave it as a deeply divided city are perpetuating (Pirsoul, 2016).

The transformation of the legal framework is supplemented by policing practices in Brussels which have been under increasing scrutiny for racist practices. A series of high profile cases of discrimination and racist policing tactics have been noted by Human Rights organizations. The proliferation of events such as these have raised concern, and have led to deteriorating race relations, especially amongst the Moroccan Community. Human Rights Watch conducted interviews with individuals with negative experiences with police.

The only way for a Muslim or Arab youth to protect himself from the police, said "Samir," 19, was to "stay out of their way." (24)

and

I was handcuffed, I was blindfolded... They put me against a wall and I received several blows from different policemen...

When I see a patrol of police, I immediately think it's for me. And what also bothers me, it's that once they know someone was not involved [in a crime], they throw you out like you are a sponge, without even an apology, like you are nothing, like you are

24 Samir is a resident of Molenbeek

less than nothing. These days it is not easy to be Arab, Muslim and living in Molenbeek (25)
(Human Rights Watch, 2016)

Increasing policing violence profiling as well as police presence in neighborhoods of minority populations have furthered the calls for police reform, but a key distinction remains that no connection has been made by the author that 1st, that government has used security as a means of attacking political adversaries, and 2nd, that although there have been systematic changes to the legal system and breaches of the legal system, that the breaches have come with the explicit permission of the government (Human Rights Watch, 2016) and (Amnesty International, 2016).

8.3 Comparison

The comparison between the presentation of ideology in the manifested realm between Belgium and Turkey is one which incorporates a similar trajectory of stronger governmental power in detaining and prosecuting individuals who are suspected of acts against the state. This similar trajectory encompasses severely different levels of intensity in their implementation, with Turkey using this increased power to initiate a restructuring of the society, promoting supportive party members throughout the ranks of national positions, while forcefully repressing those who do not toe the party line (Turam, 2017). In Belgium, the research was unable to draw a conclusion that the state is actively engaging in a disciplining program aimed at attaining more power. An exception to this conclusion could be the use of security as a measure to attain political power through elections, but methods would need to analyze wider political discourse and the upcoming 2019 Belgian election. These differing intensities, while important to note, are amplifications of the same root, a root which remains repressive at its core.

25 Omar was a resident who was suspected of being a terrorist in Spring of 2016. He was granted a lawyer upon his request, but believed that he was working with the police.

9 Conclusion

Utilizing the original Bruce Schneier framework, the simple conclusion that can be drawn that in both situations the governments utilized visible security systems to denote a “safe environment”. The use of grand spectacles of policing, as well as discourse revolving around the resilience and future security of the city are clearly demonstrated. Commonalities can be created in the partial fulfillment of the Call to Arms analysis in both situations. In the aftermath of attack, both governments utilized external legitimization to create a united front, and to validate the stability of the government. But, the intentions for the two case studies demonstrate different intentions in the subliminal message that should be received. In the case of Istanbul, the process of delineating spaces which only specific groups can access, as well as the directly noting the Other creates an environment where the process of speaking out is difficult to do. Erdoğan used a strong villainization process, a strategy for him to maintain and develop power. In the situation of Brussels, there was a similar, but not identical process of utilizing symbolic security systems to manipulate perceptions, but the accompanying discourse was not as alienating, and the methods of policing, while alienating and discriminatory, do not reach comparable levels to the mass firings and blatant deprivation of rights for those awaiting trials in Istanbul. This distinction follows the author’s original framework with a Repressive Militarized Security Theater, where the intention is to use security to repress certain segments of society, or Stabilizing Militarized Security Theater, where the intention is focused on attempting to revert to a state of normality and provide a feeling of safety for residents (regardless of the state of security). The most important thing to draw from the concept once again

reverberates to the connection of theater and city. In a combination of Althusser, Woodruff, and Mumford, the city provides the stage for a multitude of theatrical performances to take place, ones that exist within the narrowest alleyways or in the largest squares, but in this situation where risk becomes actualized, the stage is dominated by a state which has a monopoly on providing security and defines the parameters of what should be watched, and the manner in which it should be viewed.

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Appendix

9.1 Research Timeline

City	Event	Date	Purpose of Research
Istanbul	Gezi Park Protests	May 28, 2013	Gezi Park Protests began.
Istanbul	Living in Istanbul	May 28 - June 30, 2013	Research initiated following the Gezi Park Protests.
Istanbul	Research Trip	July 1 - July 30 2014	Organized research structure for militarization of public space during Sociology Course.
Brussels	Bataclan Attack	Nov. 13, 2015	Bataclan Terrorist Attack occurred.
Brussels	Living in Brussels	Nov. 13, 2015- Jan. 30, 2016	Witnessed the direct aftermath of Bataclan attack and developed framework to compare Istanbul and Brussels.
Brussels	Zaventem Attack	March 22, 2016	Zaventem Terrorist Attack occurred.
Brussels	Research Trips	April 6 - 10, 2016 and Dec. 8 - 11, 2016	Interviews and returning to see the effects of the Zaventem Airport terror attacks.
Istanbul	Turkish Coup d'état	July 15, 2016	Turkish Coup D'état occurred.
Istanbul	Research Trip	July 15 - 22, 2016	Interviews and returning to see effects of terror attacks in Istanbul. July 15 th coup shifted focus towards understanding

			effects of coup.
Istanbul	Research Trip	July 13 – 20, 2017	Interviews and analyze the 1-year anniversary of the Turkish Coup D'état.
Brussels	Research Trip	July 20 – 27, 2017	Interviews and analyze a more stabilized environment, over 1 year following the last Brussels attack.

9.2 Overnight Tourists per Month

Months	People per Year			Rate of Change (%)	
	2011	2012	2013	2012/2011	2013/2012
January	975 723	981 611	1 104 754	0.60	12.54
February	1 079 505	997 571	1 268 440	-7.59	27.15
March	1 617 782	1 460 563	1 841 154	-9.72	26.06
April	2 290 722	2 168 715	2 451 031	-5.33	13.02
May	3 283 125	3 232 926	3 810 236	-1.53	17.86
June	3 780 637	3 882 592	4 073 906	2.70	4.93
July	4 597 475	4 571 389	4 593 511	-0.57	0.48
August	4 076 783	4 470 202	4 945 999	9.65	10.64
September	3 923 546	3 991 415	4 266 133	1.73	6.88
October	3 039 754	3 050 981	3 402 460	0.37	11.52
November	1 596 295	1 631 647	1 709 479	2.21	4.77
December	1 194 729	1 343 220	1 442 995	12.43	7.43

(Minister of Culture and Tourism, Turkey, 2016)

Months	People per Year (millions)			Rate of Change (%)	
	2014	2015	2016	2014/2015	2015/2016
January	1.15	1.25	1.17	9.08	-6.44
February	1.35	1.38	1.24	2.3	-10.32
March	1.85	1.86	1.67	2.37	-12.84
April	2.65	2.44	1.86	-8.10	-28.07
May	3.90	3.80	2.45	-2.46	-34.67
June	4.34	4.12	2.44	-4.89	-40.86
July	5.21	5.48	3.46	5.1	-36.72
August	5.28	5.13	3.18	-2.88	-37.84
September	4.35	4.25	2.85	-2.31	-32.84
October	3.40	3.31	2.45	-4.02	-25.79
November	1.73	1.72	1.35	-0.53	-21.35
December	1.58	1.46	1.32	-7.29	-11.10

(Minister of Culture and Tourism, Turkey, 2016)

9.3 Charles Michel Press Conference

9.3.1 French – English Translation

Ladies and gentlemen, it is as we had feared, our country and fellow citizens have been hit by blind, violent, and cowardly attacks, and of course, our initial thoughts are with the victims, their families, and those among us who are awaiting news from loved ones. Two attacks occurred this morning, one at Zaventem (airport), the other at Maelbeek metro station, and at this very moment, the crisis centre, together with our security forces are trying to stabilise the situation by insuring the security of other sites for which there are still concerns. The most urgent issue for us, needless to say, is the treatment of victims, being able to evacuate the victims of these attacks to the different hospitals, we know that in any case there are a number of casualties, a number of people injured, some seriously. OCAM has adjusted their threat assessment to bring it up to level 4, as a result, a series of additional security measures are currently being taken; military reinforcements are being deployed, borders are being secured, and specific measures for the restriction of public transport are being implemented. There is something I'd like to bring to everyone's attention; in this time of tragedy, in this dark time for our country, more than ever, I want to commend everyone for their calmness, but also for their show of solidarity. We are confronted with an ordeal, a difficult ordeal, and facing this ordeal, we are united, we are stand in solidarity, we stand together. We will continue to follow the situation minute by minute, with the different security services, with the different emergency services. I would like to thank the emergency services and security services for the work being carried out as we speak. Let me say, again, just how determined we are to face up to, and try to manage and pursue this situation in the most appropriate manner.

Flemish 2:51 – 4 :34

At a later time, we will be able to fill in the details with the information received on behalf of the government or crisis centre. In the mean time, an emergency number has been established to provide some answers for those

concerned for their loved ones, it's 1771. I want to clarify that in the current situation, the evacuation of the victims is ongoing, and it is difficult at this moment to provide accurate answers to some questions. We first need to be in a position, with the hospitals and emergency services, to be able to accurately assess the situation in terms of the identities of those concerned, this also applies to people not of Belgian nationality, for whom the embassies will liaise with the department of foreign affairs in order to provide answers. That's all I have to announce at this point. I hand over now to the federal prosecutor, needless to say, this situation requires immediate judicial action.

Thank you Prime Minister. Yes, ladies and gentlemen, this morning in Zaventem, two explosions took place in the departure hall, one of which was probably carried out by a suicide bomber, and a short time after, half an hour after, there was an explosion at Maelbeek. It took some time to secure the area because there was still baggage circulating, and we had to be sure that there were no more explosives, or dangerous objects in the any of the baggage, and so, for the moment it's too early to give an accurate number of victims, and (stutters), as the Prime minister said, the priority is to treat to the wounded, some of whom are seriously wounded. An examining magistrate has been appointed for the incident at Zaventem in an attempt to make every effort at finding the perpetrators, and to see if there are others still at large. The federal police of Brussels, Zaventem and Asse have been put in charge of the investigation, and at this time, they are looking over the camera footage. I don't know any other details concerning the investigation, you should know that different civil protection measures have been put in place, and that the different services are functioning together impeccably at this time, and that we are making every effort to try to return things to normal and move forward.

Flemish 7:27 - 8:38

[Question from journalist: Do you think that these attacks are linked to the arrest of... (inaudible)]

No, we don't have any information of that kind at this moment, at this time our priority is to try to organise support for the victims, to evacuate the injured to various hospitals, and guarantee the security of a number of sites.

9.3.2 French Transcription

Mesdames et Messieurs, ce que redoutions s'est réalisé : notre pays et nos concitoyens ont été frappés par des attentats, aveugles, violents et lâches, et bien sûr nos toutes premières pensées sont pour les victimes, pour leur famille, et peut-être celles et ceux parmi nos concitoyens qui sont dans l'attente de nouvelles de leurs proches. Deux attentats se sont produits ce matin, l'un à Zaventem, l'autre à la station de métro Maelbeek, et en ce moment même, au départ du centre de crise, avec nos forces de sécurité, nous tentons de stabiliser la situation en assurant la sécurité sur d'autres sites pour lesquels des préoccupations existent encore. La première urgence pour nous est, évidemment, le traitement des victimes : pouvoir évacuer les personnes victimes de ces attentats vers les différents hôpitaux, et nous savons qu'il y a, en toute hypothèse, de nombreux morts, de nombreuses personnes blessées, parfois gravement. L'OCAM a adapté son évaluation de la menace pour l'amener au niveau 4, en conséquence de quoi, une série de mesures de sécurité additionnelles sont en ce moment prises, des renforts militaires sont déployés, des renforcements des contrôles aux frontières sont décidés, et des mesures particulières de restriction pour les transports en commun sont également mises en œuvre en ce moment. Je voudrais vous indiquer que dans ce moment de tragédie, dans ce moment noir pour notre pays, plus que jamais je veux appeler chacun à faire preuve de calme mais aussi de solidarité. Nous sommes confrontés à une épreuve, à une épreuve difficile et nous devons faire face à cette épreuve en étant unis, en étant solidaires, en étant rassemblés. Nous allons continuer à suivre la situation minute par minute, avec les différents services de sécurité, avec les différents services de secours. Je veux d'ores et déjà remercier les services de secours et de sécurité pour le travail qui est réalisé en ce moment même. Je vais vous dire, encore une fois, à quel

point nous sommes totalement déterminés à faire face et à tenter de gérer cette situation, et de poursuivre cette situation de la manière la plus adéquate possible.

Flemish 2:51 – 4 :34

Nous aurons probablement l'occasion, plus tard, de compléter un certain nombre d'informations que ce soit au départ du gouvernement, ou au départ du centre de crise. Un numéro d'urgence a également été mis en place pour permettre d'apporter des réponses aux personnes qui sont sans nouvelles de leurs proches pour le moment : c'est le 1771. Je veux préciser que nous sommes en situation, pour l'instant, où les évacuations de victimes étant en cours, il est difficile en ce moment même d'apporter des réponses précises aux questions qui sont posées puisque l'on doit d'abord être en mesure, au départ des hôpitaux et des centres de secours, d'évaluer quelle est la situation précise en terme d'identité des personnes concernées. Cela vaut aussi pour des personnes qui ne sont pas de nationalité belge et pour lesquelles les ambassades se mettent en contact avec le Département des affaires étrangères qui organise les réponses, que l'on pourra progressivement apporter dans ce cadre-là également. Voici les quelques éléments que je voulais vous indiquer. Je donne maintenant la parole au procureur fédéral puisque cette situation entraîne bien étendu l'ouverture immédiate de procédures judiciaires. Monsieur le procureur fédéral.

Je remercie Monsieur le Premier Ministre. Donc, oui, Mesdames et Messieurs (...), ce matin à Zaventem, ont eu lieu deux explosions dans le hall des départs de Zaventem, l'une étant probablement provoquée par un kamikaze, et un petit peu après, une demi-heure après, une explosion à Maelbeek. Il a fallu un petit peu de temps pour sécuriser le lieu parce que pas mal de bagages trainaient à gauche, à droite et il fallait être sûr qu'il n'y avait pas de nouvelles bombes, d'objets dangereux dans les bagages et donc pour le moment il est trop tôt pour donner un nombre précis de victimes, et (...) comme l'a dit Monsieur le Premier Ministre, la priorité a effectivement été donnée au traitement des blessés dont certains sont gravement blessés. Un juge d'instruction a été saisi, pour les faits à Zaventem et pour effectuer de rapides devoirs afin de mettre tout en œuvre pour essayer, déjà,

de retracer les auteurs éventuels, et de voir s'il n'y a pas encore d'autres auteurs en fuite. La police fédérale, de Bruxelles, de Zaventem et de Asse, a été chargée de l'enquête et travaille, et regarde aussi toutes les images de caméras pour le moment. Je ne sais pas donner plus de détails sur l'enquête, vous devez savoir que, directement, les différents PC opérationnels ont été mis en place, et que les différentes disciplines fonctionnent parfaitement ensemble pour le moment et qu'on met tout en œuvre pour essayer de normaliser la situation et d'avancer.

Flemish 7:27 - 8:38

[Question : Est-ce que vous pensez que ces attentats sont liés à l'arrestation de...]

Non, nous n'avons pas d'information à cet égard à ce moment-ci, et au moment où l'on se parle, nous travaillons par priorité pour essayer d'organiser le soutien aux victimes, d'évacuer les blessés vers les différents hôpitaux, et nous travaillons aussi pour tenter de garantir la sécurité sur un certain nombre de sites.

9.4 Rough outline of Gezi Park Speech

Translation of key passages and contextual notes were done by Ayse Demir

-Stand up straight, that this nation is with you ...

Dear brother and sisters ...

Dear people of Istanbul

My very valuable to all my friends ... My Citizens who watch us on the TV. Longing to greet all of you heartily.

-Stand up straight, this nation is with you ... I'm thankful to you for giving us this unwavering commitment at this hour (2:20 night), at this great night of Istanbul!

This night not just for you, I greet my brothers and sisters who lives in every village and every city in the Republic of Turkey, -What allah.bismillah.allah Akbar ...

I greet my mothers, my grandmothers, my sisters who knelt for prayer in the presence of God now. I greet all my farmer, the peasant, all workers, all working their brothers who are additive to sweat their bread. I greet my young brothers and sisters who is big and dignified as Turkey, I currently greet from Istanbul to Istanbul's brother Sarajevo, Baku, Beirut, Cairo ... Skopje, Baghdad, Damascus, Gaza, Ramallah, and Mecca and Medina! Of course, to greet you again and again Istanbul, within each district, every street and in every neighborhood heartily.

Istanbul people is here Where are the marauders? I've brought to you greetings from distant lands. I've brought the greetings of my brothers and sisters in Morocco. I've brought the greetings of my brothers and sisters in Algeria. I've brought the greetings of my brothers and sisters in Tunisia.

Dear sister and brothers, I hope God makes it permanently brotherhood. I hope God makes it permanently unity and solidarity ... I hope God makes it permanently fondness. Manager brothers and sisters out there (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco) ... They've always said: All will be passed on these ... Because ... " We believe you, " they said.

Dear sister and brothers ... -let's speak to speak, in your list of marauders. Dear sister and brothers, Dean Dolphins (Poet) says: " I did not come for fighter ... My duty is for the love of a friend's home is the hearts I've come to build hearts. " Yes .. We had no time destroying side of hearts, We were always at the side of making nice hearts. But we stood upright, we did not become Up Right!

Stand up straight, this nation is with you ... We have nothing to do with a fighter. We have nothing to do with the conflict. We have nothing to do with vandalism, lay waste, dilapidate. Sisters and Brothers, Dear sister and brothers ...

-Cyrillic hands reaching out to the police. We know to build. We came to this building days with more and more with the growing Turkey. Now underline! .. We came here despite 'lobby interests.' ' This interest lobby, thinks now would use threat by entering the stock market speculations. They have to know that very well! ... We will not let them, to eat this nation's brow!

-Stand up straight, this nation is with you ... Says that if a general manager of bank; he is with people who vandalism organizes so ...

They will find us, in the face. They will find us! ... We came to this days by the growing economy of Turkey When we come across they said: 'your times we were five times richer'. Those who began to deal here with us these days. We came to this days by elevating our people. The world is talking about Turkey and Turkish people anymore. In such a period ... where's works from this?

Dear sister and brothers, I came to this days with patience, with the saying: 'Patient Reaches person to the victory.' Anyone must know that. We have built on the fraternity Turkey. We came to this growing days with our brotherhood.

We did not distinguish any one member of 76 million. Dear sister and brothers, dear sister and brothers. Some says: 'The prime minister's PMI become 50 per cent. Let alone your hands and your tongue! We are up to this date, we're told that we were servant of 76 million

We took service from the east to the west of Turkey without distinguishing We took to serve the cities that are not served until this time. Who would believe that, the airport will be done in Hakkari? Who would believe that the airport will be done in Izmir? Who would believe that the airport will be done in Sirnak? We came, there were 26 airports 10.5 years ago, and now it s 50 airports in Turkey ... But who planted across not for us, " no service in this country. ' They do all this, " SERVICES, WHO does this. "

AK Party Goverment does does. ak Party! Than, they said we have to do what we could not success in the ballot box. Dear sister and brothers, By our belief that no one in this country's, ethnic origin, denomination, did not experience discrimination life style. Because we take of care, not 50 million, not 50%. We are servants of 76 million people of Turkey! We are Turkey together! We are united! We are together! We are brothers and sisters!

Our understanding is that: WA read events, we make analyzes than we take steps.

The success of the AK Party government is never tension, conflict or polarization.

But they have to know this very well. We are Asim Generation (The generation of the Turkish struggle which we described by Wayne Akif (Poet Nationality). Generation by Asim may not like someone's. What says Mehmet Akif (The author of the national anthem) ...

I can not acclaim the cruelty, I can never love the cruel! I can not swear at pastor for the pleasure of coming! If someone swears my ancestors, I will even choke! But if I can not choke, at least I will send away! If I am compliant who said

that I am a docile sheep. It may be cute, but my neck does not submit. If I see a bleeding wound I suffered great hardship To stop it, I'll be whipped, I'll be kicked.

I can not say, "Never mind, forget it," I'll mind I'll crush, I'll be crushed, I'll hold the justice and raise it up. Did I do what I love oppressed enemy of cruel Dear sister and brothers, how we are respectful to democracy, pollen and national will ... We want everyone and everyone has to be respectful to us. We are told one thing while the road: The destination is, advanced democracy, 'we said.

Dear sister and brothers, Nation that gave entrusted to us. And ONLY THE NATION takes it back. No one outside the nation can not extend the hand to this nation's national will. No one cant touch to this nation's national will custody outside the polls. Years.10,5 was 10.5 years, we saw that holy deposit. We will keep to protect our nation's national will.

I think there Is a problem over there. Let's open the way to security! Let's get out our brother from there. We wont let no one but no one! To lawlessness, to make vandalism, burning cities and public goods. Now, which made for protests not amount to even 15 3 Losses left behind the Gezi Park. Two young people and one or police officer was killed. I'm telling something from here. How much the death of these young people is important, the important police officer's death at least that much. Who's this police? What's the duty they do? They protect our lives security. The place turns or police against terrorists, the place turns against anarchism, the place turns against vandalism! Some does not like that. What they say: Move police back. The What the? ... This country is not a place that everyone behave as their enjoyment. This country is Turkish Republic! It is their duty police made SUCCESFULLY who burns against public Institutions, public vehicles, cars and Citizens humans who attack it. Sometimes, they may have used excessive force.

Me and my Deputy Prime Minister told that we gave the instruction for Them. Minister of the Interior is on the issue. No one has no right to attack us, the cause of this. Dear sister and brothers, The unborn baby of our police officer, was orphaned at her mother's womb. Most of police, Citizens about our 1000 he has

been injured. Most of Polices ...Cities plundered, looted shops area, artisans were damaged. They went wild enough to burn the Turkish flag! Some people who has Turkish flag on their hands without shame, without getting bored, they've become a toy. ~Let us to smash the Taksim ... They killed one child or who continue to survive by picking up the paper fibers on streets.

My brothers and sisters; Within saying I am a journalist, artist, politician ... With a highly irresponsible man ... They made the worst of hatred, discrimination, lawlessness, and provocations. These actions which must end immediately become making lawlessness, vandalism. Our friendly people who Become toys terrorist groups they should stay away from this unlawfulness. Citizens should leave my innocent from which to protest against unlawfulness and democracy. Do whatever we will do in a democracy, whatever we do, we will do in justice. In all other ways, we're together 76 million illegitimate, WA to stand up in front of 76 million all together. Dear sister and brothers, During the 10 days you were with common sense and sobriety Now we break up homes. We will not compromise from common sense and sobriety. You don't have pots and pans in your hands, right? That's very important, this is very important. You will not be a youth who walk around pots and pans are at their hands. This youth will walk with their computers! As big Turkey and Turkey's Youth ... We will work hard to keep Turkey to grow more. My younger brothers, you are a hope for oppressed people ...

You are a good youth in The Middle East, the Balkans, Africa. You will think big. You can take big steps. You will run for big goals. You will not come into play, and you will not be deceived, do not deceive you! ~What allah.bismillah.allah Akbar ... Young brothers, I thank all of you. The person of you, I embrace all of youth of Turkey. I greet my sisters and brothers in Anatolia, Thrace in heartily. Dear people of Istanbul, be sure that: No one, can not make any power to stop Turkey's rise, other than God! I pay tribute to martyrs mercy and our two young police officer people. I will share my sadness with their families. Don't forget! ... "Begin to rejoice your heads high, Rejoice even we die or we back to home. Do not think that this wheel will bump Future is of course it is! ... Day was born and

steeped beyond repute days are ours! I hope God help us. I hope we have Open ROSA and good luck. I commend all of you to God. -That's Turkey leader's lover! - That's our nation's servant! -That's the star of democracy! -That's leader who s Turkey Lover! -W Recep Tayyip Erdogan proud of you! -Turkey is proud of you! ... Recep Tayyip Erdogan of us-you are everything! You are democracy! You are freedom! You are brotherhood! You are peace! You are Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan! ...

9.5 Interview 1: Luisa Garcia December 10, 2016

Luisa Garcia is an employee in the Schumann district at one of the European Institutions. Questions were asked about her experiences relating to the changing security in the district

So I started working at Schumann 2 years ago more or less. When I started working there wasn't anything. No security at all. And I feel a huge difference. Not necessarily after the Brussels attacks, but what happened in Paris actually. The change sort of started, and the change is basically in the military. Before we had our security in our building. But the security as you might know is not armed.

It was private security?

Yes, but they don't have weapons. And then after Paris, the military came, so in front of all big buildings, all institutions, around Schumann, the commission, the parliament, some action service, some embassies, some critical embassies, for example the Norwegian embassy, you have military in front of them. It is mostly two guys, patrolling there together. Apart from that, I wouldn't say something has changed necessarily. But this feeling is already strong enough I think. You know in the sense, there was no military and now they are sort of everywhere, and after Brussels it was reinforced.

Was it only in this district you noticed the change?

I am almost never in the center, so I can't really say about the center. In Flagey, I almost never see the military. If there is a market on Sunday there is sometimes, but apart from that never. Other neighborhoods like San Gilles, in general not really. It's mostly the EU institutions that are now protected. Which is also a bit weird, but I guess they just decided that those would be potential aims.

So there is usually two military on the outside, and the private security checkpoint on the inside?

Yes

How has the process of checking when you enter the building changed?

They check the bags when people enter, but it has gotten stricter. Me they know, so they wouldn't really check my bag, and also I have a badge. But, controls for people that they don't know, that don't have a badge, those have become stricter.

Were you working on the days when the attacks happened? Can you explain what happened?

In Paris, I am working in the area of media, so if you can imagine it was quite a hectic day for me. But Paris was still rather away, but when the Brussels lockdown happened, we were allowed to work from home which I think a huge difference when they just said to stay at home. Your feeling of freedom is very much decreased.

Was there anything particular that happened during the times that it happened?

When Brussels happened, I was at home, and I was at home and going to the office and I was right at Maelbeek. So I also saw those people running out, one guy who was really bloody, and then I went to work and many of my colleagues hadn't arrived to work, so they were told to stay at home, and I had to stay in the building. I couldn't leave the building.

Were you aware of what happened when you saw it?

Yeah, I got a message on my phone.

So then a lot of people on the streets said another attack happened at Schumann. I cycled from Maelbeek to Schumann and then I left my bike there, and then someone said an attack happened at Schumann, and I completely lost it, where should I go.

I went inside the commission. Of course, the security worked very well that day. They checked me even though they would never check me because of my badge. They still checked my bag and it was very well done I thought. And then it was just

a security measure, but they said that they would advise people not to leave the building. So we stayed in the building until 3 more or less, until we were allowed to go home. I mean we could leave earlier, but it was just advised not to.

I am also wondering for how long they plan to leave the military patrols there. I mean I hope at some point it is no longer necessary, but I think it will be permanent.

I think the feeling of security has changed in the sense. For example, you leave the house and never see the military before. For me that was something from Honduras. That was one of the thoughts I had in my mind when I saw the military for the first time. In Honduras you would have military everywhere, but here is a safe place, we grew up in. But now, it is just in our minds that it will happen again. Is it really preventing terrorists from doing something? The military in the city. I don't think so. What are they going to do?

If there is a guy with a bomb, you don't necessarily see it. You cannot check every person that passes by, the luggage or the bag, so it is going to happen anyway. If someone is going into a building to shoot people, they can just shoot the two military guys. So I don't necessarily think that it would prevent a terrorist from doing anything. They just want to show presence and that they are protecting the civilians. I am more scared of the military in the city than anything else

Who do you think the police is coming out to protect?

I think the general public. I don't think there is a difference necessarily. I don't think it's about protecting. What is the other choice, not doing anything? Of course they can't do that, so the easiest solution is to put two military guys in front of a building, but that's not effective. I think.

Now they are discussing whether Europe should become second Israel. Please no, this would be horrible. It's also about general mistrust in everyone. You can also die from a car accident, its much more probable than dying from a terrorist attack. I don't think that it should be protection, but also an exchange of information. That

should be better organized. Those aspects should be improved. But putting cameras everywhere in the street, I'm not sure about that.

9.6 Interview 2: Els Enhus April 8 2016

Els Enhus is a professor of criminology at Vrije Universiteit Brussel. She focuses on the relationships between social groups and police and the social construction of security.

Are there any statistics released about more police coming out?

It has to do with the Belgian police system, which is complicated. So for Brussels, it is segmented into zones, where each operate their own system. So you have these zones, a local police as they call it.

The basics of police works. Every basic of police work has to be done by them. Everything that involves order maintenance, crime which you can locate within the borders of the zone, for example a very well known example is you murder your wife, and what is well known is that 60 percent of murders are done between relatives, people who know each other. It doesn't involve going over the borders. They have to be involved in basic policework. Whenever they are not able to do that, because of a special circumstance, a big football game, and you have to do a big maintenance, then you get support of the other zones, not necessarily from Brussels, but they can be from all over the country, but they tend to be from close by. The Federal police, which is the same system, have a reserve, have also been put into this space. It's not that big, its 600 people. You have a crisis situation, so then the reserves get put in. This is the basic police working. Then you have the people doing the specialized forces. Anything specialized is from the federal government. But you can have all kind of support, services with dogs, with helicopters, which are all different services. They are federal police. So it is very difficult to say how many people have been here

Is it precedent for police and military to work together?

No, they have completely different tasks. It's not allowed for military to intervene in anything. To stop you and ask you for your identity card. Impossible. There always has to be a policeman with them, because they are the only ones able to do that. They are only observing, and in a crisis they can search.

So what is their function?

There is none, in my opinion there is none. Its truly a management of our government. It's very symbolic. Its saying, we are doing something, but they are not allowed to do anything. I don't know if you've seen them.

There is always a policeman next to them, because they aren't allowed to do anything.

20 years ago we had a huge debate on military and police working together. And it was the first time they did. It was the attacks of the left wing movement we have had CCC. There have never been a clue of what happened. It was a terrorist attack, it has never been resolved what happened. At that time, the empowerments lead to huge debates. With very reluctantly, they said ok, very temporary. So I was very surprised that they took now the decision. Oh who put some military people in the streets, because there is a whole history with huge debates on not doing this. So it's very special.

Do you think it will continue to stay this way?

I think what they will do is not have them in the daily life on the ground anymore. They will take them away. It gives lots of feelings of insecurities. We know from police studies that having police in the streets, and you can speculate the same for military, it can cause on the one hand the idea of safety for some people, and for others it is a huge source of unsafety. So it has been very recent research on that. It depends a lot on which neighborhoods they are present. Some neighborhoods are very reluctant to see police in the street. It depends on how they feel they have been treated by the government as a whole. You see where the social housing project with big buildings, and they had an experiment where they put more police, and the people felt very threatened that they were there. Because they felt it was another way to control us. The government of Birmingham is leaving us, and the only thing they can do is put more control. There was a reaction the same way to putting cameras there, which they also did.

Has there been anything in particular about how the troops have been deployed

They are deployed in the public spaces, and in transport. That's where they have put their focus.

What do you think about the closing about the trains, metros and lines being cut?

Very difficult. I don't know what I would do if I was in charge. I really wouldn't, I don't know. Trains and metros, I think is a very vulnerable space. Trains not as much, metros more because they are underground and very difficult to escape.

Let's be clear, I think all of the security measures which have been taken, like police in the streets, are only only only to give the signal that we are doing something, and we are there for you. It is not at all, at all, at all logic, or even effective. There is no effect. I don't think this helps at all. It is very symbolic. We did research with mayors of communes. And they really recognized it. We often have to do this stuff where we really know it doesn't make any sense, but we do it because its very symbolic. And we calm down people.

Who is the symbolism for?

Their power. The police is the arm of the government. It's saying we are there present. Our arms are stretched out. Maybe you don't see us but no we are doing it. Because they are the arms of the government. Let me take care of you.

One things I was noticing was these concentrated pockets. Is the demonstration of power for the international, national, or local community?

It is for everyone. The whole country in fact. There are some difficulties. When we have this long level of 4, the second attacks in Paris, in November, we have alarm phase 4. It was horrible. It was even worse than now, and we have even had an attack. And it shows the effectiveness or efficiency is not played in this game.

It's safe to be here or it's not safe to be here.

To me no, I'm quite sure if you really think this over in a rational way, we never do, it's a very emotional thing. What have we done with the police, its counterproductive even. They put people in the spaces where you quite surely won't

have any attack. It's not very logic that immediately after one attack you have a second attack. It's not so logic he begins to do something, or it has been planned in this sort of frequencies. So they are doing lots of things which are very illogic and counterproductive, and against one another. It's chaos. It's scary. Also because you have all these players, the 19 mayors of Brussels who can take some kind of decisions on maintenance. There are conflicts with the mayors of Brussels and the national politics.

What are the conflicts?

One of the reasons is the first lockdown, the national government did this lockdown, and Mayor was actually against it, because it was a disaster. There was news on the economic effects on these effects. It's immense. It's a drop of 25 percent of economical activities for the hotels. They are very much suffering. All kind of smaller shops and things. The effects are huge. It is being fed as a city problem, they attack cities, they don't attack some kind of rural spaces, which for terrorists is very symbolic. It is the heart. They talk on the news that economically is not just for the city, but also for the country. There is very little very steep dropdown on people coming into the country, not just the city. Which means the cities are much more important than you think, in the whole system.

How can you explain the police response to social movements?

They supported the actions, especially the mourning of people in public spaces. All of the government. It was quite clear what was happening. They made clear that you can respond to these attacks in a few ways, or you are mourning, or you seek to be together, or you are very angry at the people doing this. The extreme right reaction, you can't pinpoint it on a party or direction. But I think you have two main reactions. Coming together and saying we don't want this. The other one is being very very angry and show it and then do some demonstrations, which are not forbidden. In the newspapers, they said it was extreme right, I'm not sure. They are the people who say loudly they don't want these Islam people and want to chase

them away. There was a big clash, between police and people who wanted to demonstrate. I didn't follow it so much though.

The mayor was very angry about the reaction of the police.

Is there a precedent for blocking protests?

These protests they will block them. Before the attacks not. You had this thing also in Germany, a movement against Islamic people, and they tried to do it in Belgium in Antwerp I think There was a contra movement who would also be there. and they were restricted. In Brussels there are like 4 protest movements every day, in general. It is very rare that these are blocked.

Has there been a reaction by civilian populations towards the police or military?

In this moment, people are reacting on the macro level, happy that they are there. They are not really confronted in the daily level with them. It's not about daily conflict. I'm quite sure, I'm absolutely convinced that those guys, who are practicing Islam, and are identifiable are getting much more conflict with police because they are really focusing on them. They are really not kind to them. Not at all. They don't do the basics, They don't treat people as human, because the whole climate of terrorism. For a minority in Belgium, it will be a very bad moment for them. We've already seen this, certainly those that are Moroccan, where they don't treat them as they should as if they are normal people. I'm quite sure that these groups will be... the way police is acting will be a process of radicalization. I said this on a conference on European Cities, there were police in the room. They were very angry at me saying we hear this all the time. Because of profiling, the way they are profiling, and focusing. I don't think its about the macro level where they are visible, but on the micro level where they will have a bigger impact.

9.7 Interview 3: Lucas Melgaco April 7, 2016

Lucas Melgaço is a professor of criminology at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. He focuses on the policing of public spaces and urban conflict.

One thing we are talking about is Security Theater, there is a response from police, from Law enforcement in general, police and army, a massive presence, and also private security, for example I went to the supermarket 2 days after the attack and there were private security guards at the entrance and they were asking you to open your bag, and I went there yesterday and there were no security guards there. And the risk is the same. There is necessity of making people feel that there is something being done, but it is not necessarily being effective. That's the thing with the entrances of the metro. There is some checks, but not in a station which is far away from the center of Brussels. You can make an attack a bit more difficult, but you can still enter with a bomb in another station and put it in Schumann. For example, there is a big presence of police in front of Bourse, you can just walk there with a bag and explode it, so its not necessarily effective. But it is effective in the terms of making people feel safer. That is what we all the security theater behind it. It is more to work on the fear of violence than on effectiveness. That's one thing that caught my attention. The other thing I found impressive is the reaction of left and right wing of social movements.

1 week after the attack there was a march against fear. And that was canceled, and from a geographical point of view it is interesting to think why it was canceled by the government, by the commune of Brussels. They said it was because of the security issues, but there will be another one which they approved on April 17/18th. What changed from that day, it's just the proximity to the attacks itself. I don't see why its safer. So they prohibited some left wing groups from protesting, and then you have this group of more than 200 neo-Nazis and they were escorted by the police. The police didn't stop them. You could clearly see it was a Nazi group. The police was like should I stop them here, but they are not doing anything illegal yet. They allowed them to get to the center La Bourse, which is a symbolic space in Brussels, and there, there was immediately a confrontation. And the police acted. I

was there, and the police was pretty fast. In less than 2 hours, they managed to expel the Nazis from the center. 1 week after that, there was a protest from a left wing group. The Human Rights League in Brussels was arrested immediately there. He was there with his children, and he was spotted and the police know that he is a leader of the social movement, and he was arrested. And this created a rift between the social movements and the police, because the claim is that the police were very lenient towards the Nazi groups and strict towards the left-wing groups, one week after. The guy was not doing anything very violent, when you compare it to the Nazis, who were doing the racist things, which is illegal. On the other hand, the other guy was not doing anything illegal. The assembly was illegal because there was a clear order that no protest was allowed there. Then there is the question, what is a protest, if he's there by himself, can he still be considered a protest.

The law is very unclear here, and there is a huge room for discussion. The police has a lot of choices there, allowing that, waiting for something to happen, or acting immediately when they see someone gathering. What happens in the first place they were lenient, and the second time they were very strict. And there was no issue between the mayor of Brussels who went publicly to say he disagreed with how the police worked.

Was this an isolated incident of a protest being blocked?

That's a good thing to study, what kind of protest is blocked. If you want to protest in theory, you always have to go to the commune for permission. The neutral zone has a lot to do with tourism. You don't want people to protest next to the tourists.

What is the justification for arrest?

Because the protest was not allowed, and you are breaking the law in this sense. It is very subtle. The law is not very clear, and the police have a lot of discretion. My hypothesis is that it depends a lot on what kind of political orientation you have, and how problematic it's going to be. But it's the same with Right Wing

demonstrations. There are many things were they ask for authorization, but they are not allowed to.

Also during the day, the move a lot, especially in the center. You can see them there more often. They are not always in the same spot.

Schumann changes a lot between day and night and then weekends You don't see many army actors happening because they leave the place. They were there already before the attacks. The army entered after the Charlie Hedbo attack.

Have they stayed there since?

There is a lot of discussion of is it too expensive, but after the attacks in Bataclan, there is no discussion. There is a sort of consensus that they have to stay. They think the fear is that between Charlie Hedbo and Bataclan, why do we have to have them there? It's very expensive and not necessarily effective against terrorists. Or its difficult to say.

The police do not have the same divisions as the commune. They are bigger of the communes. The most important is the one of Brussels and Ixelles.

Is there a lot of cooperation between the districts?

Yes, you have to normally especially during protests you go to the boundaries of the communes, and you need this agreement between Communes. The police they work in different scales so they work in different communes that they are in charge of. The main conflict that you will see is in terms of Molenbeek. Here you have a different police unity. In fact, its bordering the center. In fact, when you have protests that start in the center that move to Molenbeek, you have a very dynamic environment. Once you pass this canal, you change the responsibility.

Is there a difference in policing between Molenbeek and policing, especially in the post attack environment?

The things that I've seen is that the general idea is that police in Molenbeek is more racist. They are clearly targeting and flagging the Muslim community. That is the

impression. That is the general feeling. Being a young Muslim Arab in Molenbeek is not a very easy task.

Can you relate CCTV into the attacks?

The police requested from individuals and shop owners, everyone in Brussels to give their images to the police. It doesn't matter who is in it. It is just from the 15th of March to 15th of April. Every image that you have send it to the police, including CCTV. That means they were working not only with CCTV run by municipality and police, but also individuals. They managed to create a video of the whole trajectory of the suspects after the attacks. This is incredible from the geographic point of view, your action space leaves traces that comes back to you. It's not necessarily a big brother thing, because its not one entity. It's very scattered, theoretically we call it an assemblage. Different individuals but once you put it together, you can trace back these movements. As a deterrence tool CCTV is almost useless, especially for terrorists. A guy who explodes himself doesn't care if he is being recorded. Now, instead of installing more cameras, there is a switch to installing better cameras, ones with facial recognition as well.

How does this relate to migration and the concept of Other?

It's leading towards a crisis in the situation of migration and a lot of prejudice against Muslims. And this comes together in coincidence in a moment when there is this border control and a wave of migration towards Europe. But, it's interesting to see most of the terrorists were born in Belgium. So if you cross the border now, it's going to make absolutely no difference in new trends of radicalization. Maybe one thing to take a look at is that most of them stay in Syria, in one of these countries. And if you control that, it can be effective somehow. But closing the borders to new refugees, are using the attacks to make another political issue. This is a discussion that is going on a lot.

How are the tactics that the police are using, are they targeting specific demographics?

I'm very curious as to how the intelligence service is working? We don't know who are they targeting, how are they doing that. We can assume they are very active on Facebook and twitter to see some profiles that can invite some radicalization. There are a lot of raids going on, and we don't know the criteria to invade a house. But they are finding things by doing that. I don't know the answer, but 200 houses, I saw a number, and it was a lot of houses. I don't know the criteria. Most of the activities are being done in Molenbeek Schaerbeek. Neighborhoods that are known for having a presence of Muslims. I'm pretty convinced that being a Muslim now is one criteria to invade your house and check for things. I don't have the data for this to prove my point, but its probably something. Also not only in relation. If you are young, and if you are men. I am guessing these things, this profile.

9.8 Interview 4: Derin Yavuz July 19, 2016

Derin is a professor of Urban Studies at Bilgi University,

If we are talking about 3 different cases, then it will be almost totally different, because during Gezi, it was totally different system, rules by the state. After Gezi, it was something else, especially during the elections, and the Taksim site bomb. And now, it is totally something else. Even we don't know, with the coup.

About Gezi, I will start with Gezi. During Gezi Park, maybe not the State, but Erdoğan's Government tried to show people that all the public are under control and their power, so we don't have the rights to demonstrate or participate in those public spaces ... The government tried to show it by using the police forces. Not even just the police forces, but the supporters of Erdoğan's forces. They tried to stop all the people from leaving their ... They don't want to see other ideologies. They don't want to live with other people in this space, who are not like them, who are not Islamic.

How did he use supporters to do this?

Maybe you have already watched or followed the news, they used knives, baseball bats. They just threatened people. I was living in Tophane, one of the main places of violence against the protesters. I heard many times that people were beaten by Tophane people. Tophane is one of the main supporters of Erdogan. If police couldn't stop the protestors. When the police used water cannons or tear gas on people, and the people got away, they stopped by Tophane people, so instead of police, the people were beaten by these people. I guess nobody was killed, but people were taken to the hospital because they were hurt so badly. So they were also saying the same thing, why are you here, why do you disturb us. You are terrorist, you are anarchist. They were totally against all of the people in the streets.

Did the function of the police switch after this moment?

For a kind of people it didn't. For Taksim, Gezi, they were already gathering all together, doing foundations, civil society, and they were already fighting in different

categories, so they were always faced with the police violence and the police were always violent. With Gezi Park, we just saw that they were more brutal when its more crowded, when they are more afraid, when they get more permission from the government, but it was almost the same in every 1st of May or in December 6 months before Gezi Park, there was a huge protest again, just next to the Gezi. It was against the whole Taksim project, and there was also a huge police attack during this time. Since it wasn't so crowded, it didn't get so messy, and the police didn't get permission from the government. So they didn't show all their performance, but it was always so violent and already doing the same thing against the leftist or non Islamic groups.

Was the military called upon during the Gezi park Protests?

We just heard some of the vehicles, the huge ones, larger than water cannons, and they can use guns from them. The main weapons of the military. It was told that two of the cars were taken from the military campus. They were just waiting though, they didn't attack us, but they were with the force, waiting.

Is there a warning system used in Turkey to identify threats?

We know that we had many times alarm system, but they never used the alarm. I'm not sure. We know the idea, for daily life, but I don't know if we have it or not.

In regards to the terror attack, how did the function of police or military change between Gezi Park and the terror attacks?

I'm trying to organize, because it was three years, and I am trying to remember step by step, but we had so many political actions during these years, that I have to categorize. Let's start with police. After bombings, people started to lose all their trust in police, because most of the kills were done by police, and the people, public maybe not Erdogan supporters, but the other half of the country knew that police aware of the bombs. For example, 1 year ago today 20th of July it was the Suruc bombing. Many people passed away. It was the first time we had such things. So, it was a huge shock. We all know, even the main stream media told that police had documents that there was going to be a suicide bombing in Soruc. Police were

aware of this, so police instead of controlling the area, they just preferred to stay away from this gathering area, so there was nobody killed from the police department. So other people losing their belief in the security that the police protect us, that they are the right institution to protect us has gotten lost for many people. But for the other half of the country, I guess they started to believe in the police department more than the military, because Erdogan made the police department a kind of army for himself. Erdogan supporters were always against the army. So after Gezi, they make a kind of new army for Erdogan supporters.

Do you see these bombings used by the government for other means?

First of all, it has already started, in the previous day of the elections 7th of June, the first bombing was in the head of the HDP office. They were just saying the HDP was bombing themselves to get more votes, but Erdogan knows that it was from ISIS or it was from Erdogan so they know that they already get more and more Erdogan supporters from those things. So then it became more like Soruc or Ankara, the peace meeting. So the bombings are used to get more support from others, not maybe others. They are already half of the country, but they make themselves more and more powerful I guess. Half of the country is not aware of it. Just October 1, 100 people were killed by suicide bombing, Erdogan supporters said that they were already communists, socialists, leftist people, so it is good, they were killed. So it was useful for them. This was the peace meeting bombing, the Ankara train station. All the leftist parties were there were asking peace and demonstrating for peace and complaining about suicide bombings, so then there were two bombs at the same time. The other half of the country was even happy. And Erdogan started to use all the bombings, especially when the bombs are not from ISIS, but from PKK, they get really crazy when it became against Mosques, or some kind of religious people, he said that they are trying to kill all the Muslims in the country. So they are using all kind of bombings for their interests.

So do you see the group of the Other changing?

Unfortunately not, in Suroc or Ankara, the cases I have seen from the videos, the police attacked after the bombing, attacked the people. Most of the people were lost because they need an urgent treatment, but most of the people couldn't get them because there was teargas, there was water cannons. Just after 2nd bombing, they were still target of the police, that group of people, they were aware of it, so I think it didn't change unfortunately. As a citizen you expect that if there is a bomb or attack, from anywhere, the police should protect you as a citizen, but after attacks in that cases, police still attack the groups. You are a part of a leftist group, it doesn't matter which one you are. I think it became more and more strict. It became more true.

How has coverage of the attacks been portrayed by the media? Has it been in favor of Erdogan and is there a dialogue that he supported?

The media just belongs to Erdogan now. It wasn't so different than Gezi. There was a bomb, but before it was announced that it was ISIS or something else, they just started to talk about how it was from PKK. They tried to show that it was something else. For the security of the state, there was a gag order. Even if they wanted to show something, they couldn't show anything or broadcast anything. After any kind of bombing, if it is not abroad, if it is in Turkey, it's always banned in 15 or 30 minutes. Nobody shows anything that is real. Nobody could give any information about the bombings because they are not allowed.

Does the media just ignore it completely??

Almost, or they show the area from very distant cameras. They show that there was a bombing but nobody knows what's happening, we know that there are some dead people, but we don't know their names, we don't know anything, because we don't know and we can't talk about it. If 100 people are killed in a country, they should announce it for days without a break, but they were really trying to show everything was normal or just a few people were killed by a Syrian Killer. They were just trying to make a real censor. Today is also the anniversary of the coup, and 5 days ago was the coup, so it is getting more and more hard to talk about it. It's emotional, on a

personal level. I'm not talking about being afraid, but how hard it is to talk about 100 of dead people, which I know most of them, or which I am a part of them, so it's hard to find the right words or the political terms or be politically correct.

So the last part is about the coup of a couple days ago, what are your impressions?

What we see, what half of the country, the people like me like you, who are aware of what is going on in that country in the streets, and what is the police of Erdogan, we all know that it was an attempt, but the government were made aware of it. They had interests if they

9.9 Interview 5 Alexander Van Rompuy, July 10, 2017

Van Rompuy is a PHD student studying political culture at VUB.

What do you see as the ideology of the Belgian State?

Decentralist in the sense we don't like strong men in government. The great statements on the federal level are those who are able to find compromise, not those who are bullies and pushing forward their agency. If you can say something, that there is a tendency in federal Belgium, that is moderation compromise, trying to find middle ground. We are quite conservative, change goes very slowly. It is a matter of institutions, and a matter of attitude. If you compare it to Holland, they have a much more experimental attitude. We are more for incremental change. Smaller adjustments to the system.

What do you see as the ideology of the Reformist Movement Party?

As a person of Brussels, what I hear about MR is mostly what I hear in Flemish media. Their agenda is the classical liberal agenda, which is not extremely liberal. I don't see them as hardliners, more in the center. Less expenses, less taxes, a bit smaller government

How have the policing practices changed following the Bataclan attack or the Zaventem attack, and how have they represented any of the aforementioned ideologies?

Well I think then, it got very present. I talked about the lockdown, which I thought was over the top and detrimental to the image of Brussels, not the Spirit of Brussels. Then you had the thing with the cats on twitter. People always find a way to express their sense of humor. But I really felt that these were decisions taken by non-Brussels people. We are going to make a point, we will do it in Brussels. The policing itself, obviously the presence of army was very strong. I know many people who were very disturbed by that. Personally not so much. Also, in other countries, like Madrid and Barcelona after the attacks there, and in other places other

countries are more militarized. I'm not impressed by people with the guns, it's their job. I do understand that it will have some effect on potential attacks, but it doesn't really do anything, it doesn't prevent anything. It's like a very superficial way of dealing with things. You cannot see this out of context. Suddenly we have all these army guys in Brussels. You have someone like Jan Jambon, he says things like we are going to clean up the Molenbeek area, so if you use that kind of discourse, you are filling Brussels with army guys, you are militarizing it a little, and then at the same time you say we are going to clean up Molenbeek, just a few years after you killed so many social and cultural projects in the same area. It's a counterproductive and not human centered method of building community. It's very superficial, very simplistic approach. For a big deal, it had to do with looking strong. Of course, they had to make a point to citizens, to the world, we will protect you. 2016 showed it doesn't work like that. 2017 we also had an attack. And then you have people from the N-VA saying thank you for the military guys, we do need them. No, you didn't prevent it; you shot the guy dead who failed to kill himself while harming himself.

Any difference after Zaventem?

It's very difficult to say factual things about how many military. It is really dependent on where you are, week to week. I can imagine it was much more afterwards.

Are there particular spaces which are controlled, and why do you think they are controlled?

What I notice is big fluctuations. Some days I notice that I'm bumping into a lot of security guys in the metro, and others I would bump into none. I used to live by Simonis, and some days there were just two guys, and then suddenly there were 20 people there. I just thought maybe it's just the tactics, you shift a little bit to be unpredictable. Maybe they had a tip or some kind of information. When you do the metros, it does make you feel a bit insecure, there are a lot of them today. There are nothing happening today, no international conference, no football match.

In any do you see the policing as reflecting on ideology?

I see it mostly reflecting on N-VA. For me it is very compatible with the Jan Jambon discourse. I don't see it compatible with how I see Michel as a person. Maybe its also because I dislike the N-VA, but many of the NV-A are very central to how we deal with it. It's a certain discourse about how other communities, that bothers me.

Do you see it reflecting in capitalistic ideology?

No, it's more this the tradition hardline approach, tough response, rather have tough responses than the soft approach.

If the policing patterns have changed, have they made you feel as though your person or belief system is under threat?

No I don't think so. Definitely not my person, I don't like it per say, but I am not easily intimidated. They are just doing their job. I am feeling this more in other countries. I'm not so worried about that. My belief system, just come on guys, this is not the right approach. Focus on soft power, focus on smart intelligence.

What do you think the intentions of Charles Michel's discourse has been in the moments following the Bataclan attack or Zaventem attack? Has it been used to incite violence?

Not particularly. I did see his talks, his press conferences. No I don't remember. There was something. But it was not in a negative way. If I remember correctly, he said some really strong words. We are going to find them. It's just the thing you need to say. I was kind of appreciative of his tone. I remember that he was better than Holland. Holland went all the way. Michel is a bit more sensible a bit smarter, a bit more experienced, a bit more cool. If I remember correctly. I don't remember exactly why, but how Michel presented himself, I felt that he was in control, and impressed.

Are there themes (key words, phrases, concepts) that Michel uses to unite supporters and to delegitimize the opposition?

No, I don't think so. I don't remember, but I cannot remember him being divisive. This is one of the things he was good at was not being divisive.

Has Michel's discourse made you feel as though your person or belief system is under threat?

No

And for the N-VA?

In the aftermath, in all the tweets and the comments and Jan Jambon. It was so stupid. This insistence on how important it is to have the military on the streets. We have to keep on doing this for our security. If you just use common sense, this is not the way to prevent an attack. Maybe you will be very fast in killing the guy afterwards.

Has the discourse been used to incite violence

No, neither policies. That is not the Belgian way. To make room for more right-wing agenda yes, but not violence.

How can you relate the concept of security theater relate to the situation in Brussels?

(The systematic use of security tactics that are intended to manipulate perceptions, deliver messages, or repress, all while doing little or nothing to improve security)

Personal definition

Well to manipulate perceptions and deliver messages definitely. Manipulate perceptions, I think the message was a lot to the Belgian population, to the world and Europe, we are in control, we are not a failed state. So you have to see it in this context. We are still the center of Europe, we are not a hell hole as Trump would say. That's just my idea. I don't think the actual idea is to create a feeling of fear. I don't think that is the agenda.

Do you think it was the opposite?

In a way yes. In certain moments, its not normality, it was about giving a sense of we are protecting you, which is not normal. I think they did want to send a message to the Belgian population, that we are taking care of things. This is what they said, these guys are here to protect you.

Repress. I don't feel repressed by it. Of course there have been ethnic profiling, the Moroccan community. There have been some episodes. Did you hear about this big clash in Place de Commune. So there was this period when at a certain moment you had this extreme right party that had a meeting in Molenbeek. I don't know exactly what happened, but a few weeks later, there was this big group of Molenbeek young guys, and they got together and I was sitting at Walvis, and suddenly there was this big military force, the water cannons, people on horses. Maybe 60 or 80 police on foot in battle dress. And there was a big confrontation on the bridge. And I never understood what happened. Was it extremists that kind of fired up these young guys. I remember just standing there and this whole thing happened, and some of the young guys were arrested and taken down. And it was a very threatening situation. One of the possibilities, whether it was extreme elements that fired up these guys, the fact that they could fire them up meant there was some backlash. Personally, I don't experience any impression, but if you ask in Molenbeek, they would have a very different perspective.

Little or nothing?

Nothing I wouldn't say. I wouldn't say trying to do little, but I would say that it does little. More important not being willing to stop it. For me at least, I don't have the feeling that it helps one bit. I don't feel safer, I don't feel threatened, but I certainly don't feel safer. The theater aspect is probably relevant. It is a manifestation of the state, especially certain approaches. I would connect it more to N-VA than MR. But who is in charge, I think it's Jan Jambon using the military.

The thing is also, that nobody in Flanders can vote for Michel. It's tricky to say that he is the speaker of the state. He doesn't really need to care about Flemish voters. Because of this weird structure in the voting system. N-VA is only caring about the Flemish voters. And we don't vote N-VA in Brussels. I'm sure he sees himself as the prime minister of all of the country. But in terms of accountability, he is only responsible to the French people and N-VA for the Flemish.

Organ that decides the security level. They would say we need to go from 3-4. But it's a political decision to drop it back. Politics are involved in that. Most importantly, OCAT is a neutral state agency, that gives information, and we advise you. But what the actual policy is, to respond, to security threat, that is a political decision. They are not the experts of OCAT who say you should do this... this. This is how they can create a theater, without being an expert. I do have vague recollections that politicians were more forward going than OCAT would say, than was necessary. It's all in the papers, it's all there. I think it has to do more with N-VA.

9.10 Interview 6: Magali July 11, 2017

Magali is an employee at an anti-racist organization in Belgium

What do you think about the ideology of the Belgian State?

The ideology of the Belgian state is a capitalist, liberal ideology. With the current government we are in a hard right that advocates restricting public spending and competitiveness.

What do you think about the Reformist Movement Party

The MR is a right-wing liberal party that defends the interests of business and the market. Supporting ultra-secure measures to strengthen the police and the military.

What do you think of the New Flemish Alliance?

The current government is composed of a majority of Flemish parties. It is a hard right coalition that is moving ahead with an agenda of austerity measures (attacks on public spending, social security, wages), ultra-safe and racist measures (a law to withdraw nationality from bi Or the recent law to deport persons of foreign nationality if they are suspected of being a danger to public security). It is endowed with an increasingly authoritarian and fascinating character.

How did the policing practices change after the Bataclan attack or the Zaventem attack, and how did they get any of the aforementioned ideologies?

Face control and police violence was already a reality in Brussels. Mainly in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods. But since the attacks, violent acts and abusive practices have intensified and are the subject of almost complete impunity. Numerous testimonies echo physical verbal violence, home ransacking during unannounced excavations without valid justifications, deprivation of liberty and isolation of people who have nothing to reproach themselves with. Often suspected for the mere fact of being Muslim and living in Molenebeek. See the HWW report on this subject: <https://www.hrw.org/en/report/2016/11/03/sources-dinquietude/the-residents-anti->

It is clear that these abuses were encouraged by the measures decided by the government. Like the canal plan (which increased the number of policemen in the poorest communes of the capital) and the legitimization of exceptional practices in the context of the "fight against terrorism" What time without a warrant or maintain it prolonged in solitary confinement.

Are there particulars which are controlled, and why are they controlled?

Yes, the most popular neighborhoods with a majority of immigrants.

If the policing tactics have changed, how have the relationship between people of color and police been affected?

They are more controlled and more often stopped. And as already said, they suffer more abuse and police violence.

Do you think that the attacks were used by political entities to create or reinforce the concept of an Other?

Yes, certainly. In the speech of the politicians it was clear that we had been attacked by others. These other being the fundamentalist Muslims. This has largely contributed to fuel the Muslim amalgam = terrorists and thus, reinforced racism and xenophobia.

A definition of othering to help: By "othering", we mean any action by which an individual or group becomes mentally classified in somebody's mind as "not one of us"

If the policing patterns have changed, have they made you feel like your belief system is under threat?

Yes, I think that many measures taken in the fight against terrorism are dangerous for everyone. Many of them are contrary to respect for fundamental rights: mass surveillance, monitoring and recording of the population, exceptional measures (excluding traditional justice) in case of suspicion of belonging or linking to terrorist organizations. These dangerous measures could, in the future, easily turn against those who oppose the government. The notion of terrorism is extremely

vague. Who tells me that tomorrow it will not be enough to organize actions or to hold a speech that opposes the government to be suspected of terrorist?

What do you think the intentions of Charles-Michel's speech were in the moments following the attack on Bataclan or the attack on Zaventem? Was it used to incite violence?

I think that at that time Charles Michel and his government were in danger. Social protest was in full swing. This event and the one that followed a few months later in Brussels, allowed them to divert attention from antisocial policies that are busy carrying on wielding a foreign scarecrow. It is also possible to redefine its image by putting in place a whole bunch of security measures designed to protect us, thus becoming the "protector of the people".

Are there any themes (key words, phrases, concepts) that Michel uses to unite partisans and to delegitimize the opposition?

The feeling of fear and panic was such that everyone (or almost) was paralyzed. There was, as it were, no dispute or it was inaudible. The key words for the government will have been "security" and "fight against terrorism".

Behind these words, they have passed an impressive number of laws, endangering the freedoms of all.

Did Michel's speech make you feel that your person or your belief system is under threat?

Not his speech as such but the measures that were put in place behind this yes speech. For the reasons already explained above.

Was the speech of the N-VA or Jan Jambon different from that of Michel?

Their speech is not fundamentally different. They are part of the same government and have common policies. That being said, the NVA has a clearly racist and xenophobic discourse. For Charles Michel it is subtler less obvious.

How can you relate the concept of security theater to the situation in Brussels?

The word theater is very well chosen, it really is that way. It is the theater ... All the measures and the impressive number of policemen and soldiers on the streets do not hinder the possibilities of terrorist attacks. This theater reflected their inability to act on the real social causes, at the origin of these attacks. What's more, their speeches clinging and racist practices and police violence, favored people, the end of the selections that serve organizations such as Deash.

9.11 Interview 7: Ezgi Deniz, July 9, 2017

Ezgi is an employee at NATO working with security measures. She is from Turkey and living in Brussels for 10 years.

Is about ideology. So what do you see as the ideology of the Belgium State and the ideology of Turkish State in general? How policing ends up as the physical manifestation of ideology. So in turkey and Belgium...So that the policing comes from what the ideology is.

What I think about Turkey... If you were going to ask me about thoughts what happens after attacks would happen, I tell you what would happen and how I could see it.

Yes

I mean the control in Belgium is more likeit has been not done by not by the police but the army itself. I guess also see a lot of army people standing on the subways and many places like institutions like in front of the Bourse. I think it is scarier if you're asking my personal opinion.

In Brussels?

In Brussels. And I guess in Turkey it is more of a police state if it's true. But its more ... you don't really feel secure in Turkey and the proportions are not good enough, I think.

So, in Turkey you see it kind of as more as a necessary with the police? Like you said, it's not so scary in Istanbul?

Not scary in Istanbul. I mean, as a person you can be scared but there are not many polices or you cannot see a lot of people from the army so there is no real control in Turkey. That's what I think. Here (in Brussels) I see it more controlled.

Okay.

I guess it's more like controlling. More controlling. Here in Belgium. Not in Turkey

Do you see any particular spaces in Turkey that are controlled?

Not really. No. That's my perception. That's how I see it. Because we had last year we had, what, ten attacks or more. I don't see it really as controlled.

Back to Ideology because it is important. Taking security out, taking policing out, what do you think the Belgium state stands for? What do you see the Turkish state stands for? What do you think the ideology of the state is? Like, for me, the US is a capitalistic state, it's imperialistic it's...

About Belgium, if you're asking, it's more capitalistic and socialism together. But it's going more towards capitalism right now. People are losing their social security rights. And if you are asking about Turkey, I mean, it's not capitalism either is it?

What about things like multiculturalism, authoritarianism?

Turkey itself is a very multicultural state but I don't believe that people in general in the state as well is ready to be a multicultural state. Here, I see exactly the same actually. There are a lot of foreigners here as well. I mean Brussels is an exception. But when you go to other places like Antwerp and other places like that, I cannot say that it is a multicultural place either. So. People are not really open to that. That is the thing.

And do you think the state in either of the places is more accepting of it or in both it is

When it comes to the state, well, When I am getting the work permits for example for foreigners, even for Americans, the procedures are very extreme, I must say, here even in Belgium. So even though they know they are working for an international organization there is a long procedure. But the thing is, I heard from some Romanian people in Turkey that they were having also some difficulties obtaining their work permits, and finding jobs and stuff like this. So I guess it is pretty similar. There is a lot of paperwork as well involved in it. But I guess it is really similar in that but the social life, is of course obviously better here (In Belgium).

After the attacks at Bataclan originally and Zaventem how did you see the policing practices in the city change?

I mean, the thing is that there was less control. I live here from 2004 so I mean that's why I say this. But it's quite scary actually to see people with the guns and stuff like this. Yeah. There is more police, more army, more than policemen I believe. It was a quiet city but it is not anymore.

And do you see specific areas which are controlled more than others?

Yes. The international institutions like I said, like the U, NATO and other places. And

And why do you think this is controlled more?

I guess, I mean, those are the decision-making organizations so I guess it's somehow important. And there's government involved so like, you know, when you have government institutions, they are controlled more as well. So yep.

Through these practices, through these extra "policing," do you ever feel threatened yourself or with your police system?

No! Not at all! Not at all! But I feel. I'll just say, I guess it's my emotions maybe more talking, but I don't feel secure anymore here (Brussels) either. I mean, nothing was really involved which was hurting me, or, you know, like. But once when I was in Zaventem and I was trying to make a Selfie which was really funny and the police asked me why I was taking pictures. I never had this before. It's like... It's an interesting thing because, you know, normally they shouldn't be asking that. You know. It's just a stupid Selfie. I wasn't really trying to.... But when you do regular stuff. That's what I mean, normal daily life things, they do ask now. They do ask.

But is it more the situation, of the kind insecurity of the situation that was making you afraid, or was it the police that were making you afraid? Was it the situation or was it the police?

It's not the police itself. But I mean, it's not, for me it's not good to see the people with the guns and everything. It's just like, I don't like that.

So it's more the weapons that they have.

Yeah. Weapons. Yeah. Yeah.

And then for Istanbul, it's the same question. So after ... Did you see policing practices change after Gezi Park?

During the Gezi Park it has changed I do believe. Not after that. But during that situation, yes the police attitude totally changed. After Gezi Park it has actually changed. Yeah. It has changed I believe. I think as a childhood the police was something to secure people but I think it's more like not (laughing) securing people anymore. I think that's what is hurting.

And did you notice any changes after, well you went back so often, but after the bombings or after the coup?

No not really. Not really. Because you know I often travel from Ankara from that train station and ah. Yeah. There are, you know, scanners and some sort of private company which is trying to secure, trying to look at you, like look at your luggage and stuff. But not like here. Like here if you go to train station you again see the people with the guns and everything else but you cannot really see the police or anyone with security. Not a big change I must say.

In Istanbul or Turkey, has the policing changes made your person or belief system feel under threat?

No. Oh. Maybe. Maybe once. Yeah. In Ankara. That happened in Ankara actually. Yeah. I was driving from one place to another and they stopped me. They asked for my Turkish ID. And which I gave to them. But it was a very weird feeling I must tell you because I was in the middle of a police group and they just stopped me and I gave them everything, and um, they must check you. Whatever. It takes a little bit of time. Ten, fifteen minutes, maybe more. I was actually getting quite nervous because there was another bus coming up with, you know, full of police, because

most probably changing the shift. They were switching, or I don't know. Actually, that time I didn't feel secure at all, because, you know, I thought you know, you are open to any target at that time. That was a case, but otherwise, not really.

Did the police make you feel any safer or did they make you feel neutral?

I didn't feel any safer, no. I felt trapped. Actually not secure at all.

Do the police make you feel safer, or is it just completely neutral. In Brussels and Istanbul?

No I don't feel safe at all.

And the use of the big weapons in Istanbul or Ankara? Is it the same as you feel in Brussels where it makes you a bit paranoid.

It's not really making me paranoid. It is making me feel (sigh) not comfortable actually. No. it's not the same feeling. No not at all.

What is the difference?

For instance, like, in Turkey, I really don't believe the police can help people. After there is an attack or there is something, I don't believe the police can really react to it. Here I feel more controlled and it's like more like show off. Maybe that's how it is. But not in Turkey.

So there is two things that I used. I used the policing patterns and then I used the discourse of the President and Prime Minister So I am going to ask you if you followed the discourse...

So no I didn't.

So you didn't hear anything that happened after the terrorist attacks?

No. No I didn't, because each time if the attacks happened here, I was in Turkey. And if the attacks happened actually in Turkey, I was here. So I didn't follow up. No. It was really, really funny.

Okay. Then this doesn't work.

So the last piece that I have is this definition of Security Theater which I use. The systematic use of security tactics which are intended to manipulate perceptions, deliver messages and oppress, while doing little or nothing to improve security. Do you see this in either of the two situations?

Both situations. There is no security improvement I don't think, neither in Turkey or here (Brussels). Not at all. Just like I said, the show off is bigger here. That you feel uncomfortable though with that. But I am not so sure they are really taking the right security steps.

Why do you think they are raising these security things if, in your perception, they're not so affective?

It's just more, as I said, I mean ah. It's more like show off really. It's exactly the word. They put more control but I'm not so sure that they're really effective. Yeah. But in Turkey they don't put the people with the guns. You don't see those people but it's also not secured. If you understand what I am saying. I mean. Okay. Once it happens it always happening. And why it's happens again. Do you understand that if your security is improving than I believe you have to have an idea of what is going on.

And then the last question would be then for you the purpose is just to make a show?

Yes that's what I think. That's what I think.

And is there an intention as to why this show is made?

Ahhh. Well I guess that somehow the government is trying to say, you know, okay, We are trying to put some security measures, like, you know, we have more people trying to protect and stuff. But I guess it's more show?. I am not sure both governments are taking the right steps for the intelligence agencies. I mean, just putting up the people on the streets with the guns, you know. It's not going to (unintelligible)

9.12 Interview 8: Ayse Demir, July 18, 2017

Demir is an LGBT activist and a participant in the Gezi Park movement.

What do you see as the ideology of the Turkish State?

In the beginning, it was secular state, but it has nationalistic tendencies. It was modernistic and believed in the idea of progress towards western standards, towards literacy and science, but I don't think it was ever implemented correctly. So, I will talk about the current state of affairs. Unfortunately, ideology of the Turkish state is the ideology of the ruling government. So currently the state is more about trying to establish itself as a powerful actor in the world politics, but failing to do so due to many mistakes, making allies unhappy through antagonist comments. So currently, I think the ideology is about control, a return to roots of the Ottoman times, a sense of nostalgia for something that's past, 300 years ago. The current government is framing itself as a successor of the Ottoman times. Currently, we are not moving forward, but in terms of ideology we are trying to go back to the late 19th century. More authoritarian, more controlling. I don't want to make this distinction, but an appeal to a larger majority of people not in the urban, not in the production of culture or information, but in the rural areas. It's more about religion and appealing to people's need to feel to belong to a powerful country, a powerful ruler, who speaks up to other world leaders. No more of the ideas of progress of Western values, but creating our own values, but they are borrowed from other Middle Eastern Countries, or Ottoman times.

What do you see as the ideology of the Ruling AKP?

How have the policing practices changed following Gezi Park, and how have they represented AKP ideology?

Well control and repression is what is going on. After people were clashing with the police, there was a distinction between the people versus the police. The police were mostly called Erdogan's dogs, and stuff like this. Police have become in the eyes of the people, and of the protestors, either those who are trying to fight against western spies, and against those who are threatening Turkish economic stability. Or

the mercenaries who are doing anything to get the pay check. This didn't change, it kept increasing. Every day you see more and more police. They employed more people to become police officers, especially in the opposition protest, for example the pride marches, they keep getting worse and worse. I remember in 2012, they were just around there waiting. If we kept the pride march too long, they would warn us and we would go away. In the last 3 years, they attacked people. They attacked people, they gassed people. They took one of my friends into custody and forced him to listen to the Quran, just because he was a gay activist.

The Terrorist attacks?

After the terrorist attacks, some days you see Istiklal Street closed from top down, and sometimes they claim there are rumours of a terror attack. They put barricades in the beginning of the street, the end, and the middle. After the terrorist attacks this happened. There are so many questions about the terrorist attacks. I find it highly unlikely that the Turkish police and intelligence didn't have intel about everything that happened. Even I don't understand that when the bomb exploded in Vodafone Arena, there was this rumour that the police were kept there long after the football match ended. Of course when the bomb exploded, a lot of police men were killed and became martyrs. I believe that the terrorist attacks are used to create new Martyrs and new Heroes. The police doesn't actually interfere with the terrorist threats, but more with the opposition.

The Coup?

After the coup, soldiers and the army became the enemy. So, the police is the loyal dog, and the army are the bandits, those who rebelled. So, I think the status of the policemen increased by the fact that the army is less trusted.

Are there particular spaces which are controlled, and why do you think they are controlled?

The specific places that are controlled are the places where people make demonstrations. There are many spots in Istanbul, in Kadikoy, or in Taksim or in front of Galatasary, there is a TOMA there is a water cannon that is forever and

always there. It is more about keeping those places in check so that people don't come to make demonstrations, even though there are scheduled demonstrations. In some places it is about not giving the opposition a physical space to make their voice heard.

If the policing patterns have changed, have they made you feel as though your person or your party's belief system is under threat?

Absolutely, I cannot even though it is my right by the constitution, I cannot join in a demonstration in the fear that I will be attacked, which they do. They attack you physically, they attack you verbally, this is what they do. Now that we are under martial law, custody times are longer and you don't get to see your lawyer, so as a person, I cannot defend what I believe in. I cannot participate in the political sphere as much as I would like, because of the fear of getting lost in custody, getting killed, or fall into the hands of the police. I feel personally threatened.

What do you think the intentions of Erdogan's discourse has been in the moments following the Gezi Park Protests? Has it been used to incite violence?

It was used to incite violence, because he was trying to make it clear that protestors are against the people themselves, the Turkish nation. The protestors versus the others, so that when people watched the news, and don't know anything about what's going on. When they listen to Erdogan, they would believe that the protestors were the evil. At the same time, he was saying that he was keeping the 50 percent hardly in their homes, meaning that if he was mobilizing his own supports, you would be beaten, because they were going to clash with the protestors. This is a direct way of inciting the violence. The discourse was about making evil of the protestors and trying to glorify the police.

The Terrorist Attacks?

After the Gezi Park Protests, he was scared, so he was always talking, always giving speeches, always trying to control the discourse. But for the terrorist attacks, what happened in Ankara, he didn't say anything, because those people were mostly HDP, in Soruc, people between 17 and 25 died, and this is a huge loss and he

didn't say shit because the people were socialists, outright leftists. He sometimes says weird things. After the bombing in Istiklal, which killed tourists, some were Israeli, I suspect he might have made racist comments about it. So no, it's not as important to him, no big deal. Also you remember before the Brussels Bombing, he was saying how these kinds of things can happen in the US or Europe too.

The Coup?

After the Coup, oh my God, it was the same thing as Gezi. Although it was a controlled coup in my opinion, he was trying to use it to create a lasting effect. He needed people to buy it, the Western Media, the global politicians. He had to use the us versus them, the traitors versus those loyal, all those polarizing discourse.

Are there themes (key words, phrases, concepts) that Erdogan uses to unite supporters and to delegitimize the opposition?

He uses my brothers, always the religion, but the way he constructs these identities is by negating the other. So, he doesn't use anything straight, but many comparisons. You have to hear what he says about him and his supporters when he is saying things about the Gulenists. For example, he mostly uses we are the friends of the Palestinians against the Israelis. We are with the people of Iraq and Afghanistan against the US. We are always with the Syrian immigrants because Europe didn't let them in. So it's always in negation to the other.

Has Erdogan's discourse made you feel as though your person or your party's belief system is under threat?

It does, the discourse only demonizes me, never includes me. I don't believe I am a part of this country anymore. I am in this small percentage of people who are actually suffering, who are afraid of what is going to happen to them in daily life. Imagine women, women get killed, not even every day, every three hours or so. You cannot go into the street wearing shorts because something will happen to you. You cannot be LGBT because they are going to kill you. You cannot say that you support the Kurdish people because they are going to say you are a terrorist, even though there is 100 years of oppression towards them. Everything I believe and that

I think of is against their discourse. It makes me think of moving someplace else, like most of my friends did.

How has discourse and policing reflected the ideology of the AKP?

It's direct causality. The discourse is about demonizing the other, keeping it under control, and glorifying your own people. People is doing exactly that. People are going to call you disgusting things when you are demonstrating. They are going to take you into custody and beat you up. It's a direct relationship.

How can you relate the concept of security theatre relate to the situation in Istanbul?

(The systematic use of security tactics that are intended to manipulate perceptions, deliver messages, or repress, all while doing little or nothing to improve security) Personal definition

This is exactly what is going on. The last part of the sentence, that's what I was trying to tell you about the terrorist attacks. The amount of policemen deployed for a single pride march, so many policeman heavily armed, as if a lesbian is going to attack them with an RPG, but then a fucking bomb goes off in the middle of Istanbul, where are they. Only in Vodafone situation they were there, and here it might be on purpose they are standing there. And if you take a closer look at the terrorist attacks, one of the guys, I don't remember which minister, he said we cannot catch a suicide bomber until he explodes himself. This logic what they are using, and how does that make you feel as a citizen. It makes you think how should I feel using the metro, maybe I should walk instead. Oh there is someone with a black backpack, maybe I should wait a bit longer. It's total paranoia. And manipulating perception, it doesn't work for some people. The opposition has their own media which is always repressed. There is a website, which every time the government closes it down, they buy a new domain. They are up to 40 or something. They are still trying to publish what is going on, even though the newspapers are attacked. They shut it down because it was spreading Kurdish propaganda, while they were talking about the mass murders and the policemen

dragging the people from the vehicles. They were taken into custody for 2 or 3 days, and we were so scared. We learned they were beaten up, and then at one point let go. Every morning I wake up and check my mail and social media, and I am afraid that one of us is dead. We as the people who are in the opposition, and I couldn't do shit about it. The way they are treating those people, they are trying to give the message I don't care if you die. If you starve yourself that's fine, just die. That's why so many people are saying to end the hunger strike because if you die, you are doing exactly what the government wants you to do.

It's a perfect concept.

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