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Zainichi communities in Japan”**

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List of abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank Institute
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CIP	Consumer Price Index
CMW	Committee on Migrant Workers
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EAP	East Asia and Pacific
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GC	Geneva Convention
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization of Migration
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
JGSS	Japanese General Social Surveys
JNTO	Japan National Tourism Organization
JSL	Japanese as a Second Language
KEI	Korea Economic Institute of America
KIEP	Korea Institute for International Economic Policy
LAZAK	Lawyers Association of <i>Zainichi</i> Koreans
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MEXT	Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
MHLW	Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
MIC	Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
MOFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of South Korea
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MPI	Migration Policy Institute
MRTC	Migration Research and Training Centre
NGO	non-governmental organization
NINJAL	National Institute for Japanese Language and Linguistics
NPO	non-profit organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OKF	Overseas Korean Foundation
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SMB	small- and medium-sized businesses
SMJ	Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan
TNSS	transnational social space
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USA	United States of America
USD	U.S. Dollar

1. Introduction

According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM) “we live in an era of unprecedented human mobility” (2015:17). Therefore, one of the worldwide most discussed topics in the last decades is the interminable flow of migrants heading to industrialized nations in Asia, Europe and the United States as well as connected aspects such as the implications of these migration movements for both the country of origin and the host-country and the concerns about future developments in this field. The recent discussions in European and American politics show that migration is not only one of the major relevant contemporary issues nations have to deal with, but also that it affects the economic, political, financial, social and cultural progress and development of countries all over the world at once.

However, geographical mobility as well as migratory movements in one form or another due to situations such as environmental changes, ecological conditions or social conflicts have distinguished human societies from the time of their establishment onwards. Since the beginning of the capitalist expansions of Europe, a distinction between forced and voluntary migration was made, which still plays into the decision making process of contemporary migration (Iosifides 2013:1). Although nowadays migrants generally choose to leave their home country, there still exist situations where they are forced to leave such as in the case of civil wars or political persecution. Nevertheless, in most cases migration involves a search for security and well-being or economic opportunities and benefits and thus reasons and driving aspects for the interminable flows of migrants vary considerably (Des 2011:259):

Driven by diverse forces – economic pressures and opportunities, climate change, war, conquest, and transformation of political regimes – human migration has been central to the circulation of knowledge and values, goods and labour. (Truong/Des 2011:3)

Therefore, the modernization process, economic development and political struggles not only increase the so-called physical migration, but also contribute to the transformation of the identities, values and social context of a migrant (Des 2011:260).

When referring to these international developments one important aspect is the cross-border relations of migrants, which not only connect them with their family and relatives at home, but also the two countries involved in the migration process (Faist et al. 2014:11). This master’s thesis attempts to investigate migration movements in East Asia¹, which are

¹ When it comes to the term ‘East Asia’ there exist various definitions. Each of these definitions is focusing on different aspects such as cultural, economical or geographical. In this thesis the term ‘East Asia’ refers to the definition provided by the United Nations (UN) of ‘Eastern Asia’, which includes the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Macao Special Administrative Region, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan, Mongolia and Republic of Korea (ROK) (UN 2014).

embedded into these international settings and explores not only the home- and host-land of the involved countries, but also the characteristics of the migrant communities itself, which had to adapt based on the developments of the field of migration studies. Throughout the last decades anthropologists such as Nina Glick Schiller and her colleagues have gradually noticed that “immigrants live their lives across borders and maintain their ties to home, even when their countries of origin and settlement are geographically distant” (1992:ix). Therefore, the traditional concepts of migration or (im)migrant with their emphasis on abandonment of the old life and the sense of being uprooted are no longer adequate since a new kind of migrating population is emerging, whose pattern of behavior, activities and everyday life includes values of different societies and cultures. Due to the fact that their lives cut across borders and therefore bring two different nations and societies together this phenomenon is described with the term ‘transnational’ and the theoretical basis is called ‘transnationalism’ (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:1).

The acceleration of globalization has not only formed unparalleled transnational movements, but also drastically altered the frameworks and mechanisms of the modern nation state. Consequently, the driving economic, political and sociological aspects behind these movements, the multi-layered identities of the involved actors and the trans-border actions expose the limitations of the traditional concepts of the state and the necessity to reconsider its construction as a fixed entity (Truong/Des 2011:3). A transnational perspective pays attention to these trans-border connections and also sees migration not as an irrevocable process or a one-way road, but as a flexible practice, where re- or onward-migration and continuous interaction across national-borders are a daily occurrence (Faist et al. 2014:11). As such, transnational migration differs considerably from prior migration flows. In addition, as the transnational experiences are progressively becoming a worldwide phenomenon, inhabitants of capital-dependent nations are forced to move to industrial centers in order to survive. In doing so they build nation overarching networks or social fields that are influenced by both the economic, cultural, social and political context of the country of origin and the new host-country of the migrants (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:ix-x).

In the last decades no other region went through such dynamically economic and social changes than Asia, including East Asia. These transformations became manifested in three different areas: First, the economic sector, where high growth rates can be seen not only in industrial production, but also in the food industry. The second area concerns the transport and communication systems, which were an important part of the development projects and are also beneficial when it comes to migratory movements. Finally, the demographic and

social areas are in constant transition and diverse projects promoted such as a higher education for the population. These changes took significant effect on scope, direction and composition of migration flows in Asia and are described as demographic transition as well as mobility revolution (Husa/Wolschlägl 1995:85-86). The American cultural geographer Wilbur Zelinsky made the case that due to this demographic transition and the continuing modernization new forms of migration would emerge and replace earlier forms. Already in 1971 he published an article, in which he anticipated the density of migration flows and the increase of urban movements within a country as well as circular or non-permanent migration (Zelinsky 1971:245-246). Due to international movements in Asia including their complexity and extent and their socio-economic and political impact were never as significant as in the present time, the last few decades are described as the era of migration. Since the 1980s migration movements in Asia changed continuously; one of the major aspects in connection with these movements is the increase of labor migration as well as transnational migration (Husa/Wolschlägl 1995:88-89).

In Asia there can be distinguished two different migration movements. On the one hand, the southwest region, including the major oil-exporting states, which are migrant destinations for South-Asian nations and on the other hand, the East-Asian region, where over 85 percent of the migrants originate from this region and migrate in order to pick up work in another country in East Asia (Chiavacci 2005:7). One of the main factors for the direction and scope of migration flows are the economic and demographic degree of development of each individual country. Therefore, it follows that the primary immigration nations are advanced industrial nations such as Japan, which are characterized by a demographic transition resulting in a fast aging population and the demand of labor force (Chiavacci 2005:7).

Migration movements are always embedded into the economic, political and socio-cultural context of the country of origin as well as the host-country and the relations and connections between these two countries. As a result, international relations play a major role, when it comes to analyzing migration flows. These connections between two or more countries increase exchange and economic cooperation or political relations in a region and are seen as a catalyst for migration flows (Chiavacci 2005:7). Transnational migration flows in the last decades resemble the importance of international relations in the globalized age. These days, migration is no longer seen as a one-way street and once migrants settle into their new home they maintain the relationships and associations to their country of origin and even establish new ties with communities connected to their former home. A transnational perspective considers these border-crossing and multilayered connections between individuals,

groups and organizations and their transnational engagement (Faist et al. 2014:17). These processes between two nations are often based on transnational-social networks, which lead to a rise in international migration flows and are an important element in Asia as well, when it comes to the exchange of labor, knowledge and values. These networks act as an intermediary between emigrants and their home countries and in addition, simplify the process of migration for individuals (Chiavacci 2005:8).

The topic of migration mainly has been subject to disciplinary inquiries and the existing body of studies has lacked a comprehensive perspective on Asia. As a result, this master's thesis attempts to investigate migration movements in East Asia and explores these transnational migration flows by means of a case study focusing on Japan as the host country and on Korea² as the country of origin of the migrants. Consequently, the object of this analysis is the Korean community, called *Zainichi* 在日³, in Japan. The decision to use two industrialized nations for this master's thesis is not only based on the historical bond and the maintained relations between these two countries, but also on the condition that for a long period of time *Zainichi* represented the largest migration community and to the present day are still among the three leading immigration groups to Japan. Furthermore, due to the fact that studies in the field of transnationalism commonly refer to a socio-economic elite, which is characterized by a certain social- and human capital in order to participate in the political, economical, cultural and social aspects of both their home and host country, migrants from industrialized countries may present an advantage when searching for these specific characteristics, since international migration or migration across borders entails considerable resources and most "migrants come neither from the poorest countries nor from the poorest social classes" (Castles et al. 2014:6).

Since the above described developments affect the whole migration process and connections or social networks are getting more and more important in this transnational world, the case study is based on the theory of transnationalism and the focus lies on transnational migration, transnational migrants and transnational social-spaces (TNSSs) respectively. In this sense, although *Zainichi* have been subject of studies focusing on various aspects such as their ethnic identity or their complicated relationship to their host-country due to incidents in the past, this master's thesis is attempting a different approach and applying a theory relatively new to the field of migration studies. Therefore the following research questions are kept in mind and will guide this thesis. The first question addresses the

² In the thesis at hand 'Korea' refers to South Korea, officially called the Republic of Korea (ROK).

³ This thesis uses the Hepburn system for the romanization of Japanese terms.

condition of migrant communities in general and of the *Zainichi* in specific. Its aim is to highlight the various aspects, which influence the situation of *Zainichi* in their host-land and in their former home-land. Therefore, the analysis of the home-land delivers significant background information and helps to build the basis of the analyzed migration flow, whereas the focus lies on the analysis of the key variables of the host-land. **Research Question I: “Which socio-economic, political and cultural aspects in the home-land Korea and in the host-land Japan influence the situation of *Zainichi* as transnational migrants?”** The second research question is going to analyze the migrant communities of *Zainichi* in Japan and significant aspects such as the demographic development of the migrant flows, their primary target destinations or the social position of *Zainichi* in the Japanese society are pointed out. Furthermore, the research question takes also the relations and connections of *Zainichi* to their home-land into account. **Research Question II: “What are the key aspects of the *Zainichi* communities in Japan and what characterizes their relations to Korea?”** The analysis is focusing on the time from 2005 onwards given that it has been forty years since the relations between Korea and Japan have been normalized and a treaty has been signed. However, due to the significance of past incidents for the contemporary *Zainichi* communities, the different generations of *Zainichi* will be taken into account as well. These data may be able to facilitate a comparison not only for the *Zainichi* communities as one entity, but also between the different generations of *Zainichi*. To address the two research questions, it is necessary to generate an adequate theoretical understanding and a suitable methodological knowledge.

Consequently, the thesis is organized into three parts: The first deals with the theory of transnationalism and describes not only the significant terms used in this thesis, but also introduces the key criteria, which will be applied during the analyzing process. These criteria consider the socio-economic and political aspects of the migrants’ home and host country as well as the existing transnational relations such as cooperation or networks and characteristics of the migrant community. The framework will be explained in detail after the following chapter on the state of the art. The second part of the paper first gives a short overview of the migration movements and developments in Japan to provide the reader with the basic context and afterwards examines the migrant flow from the home-land Korea to the host-land Japan as well as the Japanese-Korean relations according to the developed key criteria. Therefore, information dealing with the criteria will be consulted using statistical data from the government itself, such as the Country Migration Report of the IOM or the Statistics Bureau Japan, as well as secondary sources and other empirical data dealing with migration. Finally,

after having set the essentials of the analysis, the following chapter will assess the case study based on the research questions and the most significant findings will be summarized and discussed. A final overview will conclude this thesis.

2. State of the art

In the modern society migration is described as a global phenomenon constituting of an interdisciplinary field of study. The movement of people has taken place since the early years of settlement and therefore is a constantly changing area of research (Treibel 2003:13-14). Until the end of the 1970s the core of the carried out research was the reasons for the abandonment of their country of origin, the perception of the migrants' lives in their host country and the predicament of being caught between two societies or cultures (Watson 1977). However, since the beginning of the 1990s technological advances as well as political, economic and cultural dynamics steered the focus of the research in a different direction. This paradigm change in the field of research is known as 'transnational turning point' and addresses the shifting characteristics of contemporary migrant flows (Faist 2007).

As a result, in recent times a growing number of publications shed light on the transnational perspective in present-day migration flows, which no longer sees migrants as trapped between adjustment and nostalgia (Anwar 1979). Rather, it is emphasized that migrants live their lives more and more across borders and create networks through economic, political, cultural or social activities, which link not only migrants and family or relatives together, but also the country of origin and settlement (Rouse 1992, Basch et al. 1994). The controversial issue about definition and characterization of the term 'transnational' and the theory of 'transnationalism' have thus far primarily taken place within the setting of labour migration to the United States of America (USA), but have not yet been applied to the Asian region (Rouse 1991, Basch et al. 1994, Portes 1996, Goldring 1998, Guarnizo/Smith 1998, Smith 1998, Ong 1999).

The growth of a new perspective in the form of economic activity and means of existence on migration and the accompanying developments are all part of this so-called transnational turn and analyze the settling and involvement of migrant communities in their host-country (Glick Schiller et al. 1992, Castles/Miller 1993, Faist 2000a). In addition, there has been a growing recognition of the possibility to live a transnational life, to assume transnational identities and to become a transnational family (Vertovec 1999, Guarnizo et al. 2003). Furthermore, a continuing research field analyzes the connection between the

development of an advanced transportation system as well as enhanced communication technologies and the intensification of the transnational phenomenon (de Haas 2005, Zirh 2005, Faist 2014). Moreover, studies of transnational migration focused on the multiple and unequal forms of social status of migrants and pointed out that often money earned in the host country was transferred back home in the form of remittances in order to increase the social status of their family in the home country (Basch et al. 1995, Glick Schiller/Fouron 1999). In addition, studies highlighted that migrants occupy incongruent forms of social status based on their transnational identity in both their country of origin and their new country of settlement and as a result challenge the conventional notions and concepts of social structure in a society (Goldring 1998, Levitt 1998 and 2001a, Beck 2008).

Moving on to the body of literature in connection with migration flows from Korea to Japan it is visible that studies have taken place in different research fields. The main research area is concerned with the measurement of the immigration flow to Japan – not only the number of people migrating to Japan, but also the characteristics of foreign residents such as the nationality, age, gender as well as education and occupation of the immigrants (Statistics Bureau 2014, 2015 and 2017, Vogt 2008, Immigration Bureau of Japan 2016, JGSS 2016). In the last decades, the sociological literature regarding the public opinion towards immigration to Japan and migrants in the Japanese society grew parallel to the increasing number of foreigners coming into the country. Publications focus on various aspects such as education, employment status, domicile and the participation in the life of the society including community groups (Mazumi 2008 and 2015, Ōka 2008, Chiavacci 2014, Green/Kadoya 2015, Kage et al. 2016).

An intensively researched topic is the development of the relations between Korea and Japan, beginning with the expansion attempts of Japan in connection with the *Meiji Restoration* in 1868 and the events leading up to the annexation of Korea in 1910. Many researchers have broached the issue from various points of views like for example the transformations Korea experienced during the Japanese rule (Iyenaga 1912, Lone 1991, Sunoo 2006, Jeon 2011). One important topic is the steady flow of labor migrants moving from Korea to Japan in order to fill labor shortages. Research in this area also includes forced migration and the role of immigrants in the Japanese economy (Shipper 2002, Tamura 2003, Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006).

One significant research point presents the issue of ‘comfort women’, which not only led to numerous publications focusing on their fate, their suffering and their lives after the war ended, but also shaped the policy making and relations between the two countries since Japan

widely ignored the existence of these women up until the year 2015 (Soh 1996 and 2009, Yoshimi 2000, Tanaka 2009). Other studies are dealing with the minority groups in Japan, including immigrants from South America of Japanese descent known as *Nikkeijin*, who were invited by the government due to serious labor shortages in diverse sectors (Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006, MHLW 2009).

Zainichi, Korean immigrants, are counted among the groups of minorities in Japan and are by far the largest. Literature and research on the topic of ‘*zainichi*’ was published in various languages, however, the publications in Japanese are numerous. There exist a number of works that provide the reader with an overview of Korean migrant flows as well as the development of communities based on sociological and anthropological evaluations of contemporary *Zainichi* communities (Fukuoka 1993, Miyamoto 1993, Gen 2002). Moreover, many standard works contain field reports of Korean immigrants living in Japan gathered between 1960 and 2000 (Hicks 1997, Nakao 1997, Ryang 1997, Fukuoka 2000). Nevertheless, although there have been published studies on *Zainichi* in the last decade, those publications often resorted to records of past field research and therefore lack new data, which the current master’s thesis tries to overcome (Chapman 2008, Lie 2008). Whereas some scholars are dealing with the issues of identity and citizenship of Korean communities (Goldstein 1972, Daekyun 2001), others are analyzing the differences among Korean immigrants focusing on aspects such as class distinction, occupation or economic status (Kawashima 2009, Kim 2011). Among the research on *Zainichi* in Japan, discrimination is a frequently analyzed aspect including the discrimination in case of job-seeking or apartment-hunting, rights, marriage as well as status in the society. However, the analyses often focus on the fate of a single person rather than looking for a bigger picture as this master’s thesis is going to undertake (Fukuoka 2000, Chapman 2008, Lie 2008, Suzuki 2016).

Similar research approaches can be found when looking at studies conducted by Korean scholars on the issues of *Zainichi* and transmigration. For instance, field research often focuses on the fate of individuals or small groups and documents experiences of Korean migrants in Japan as well as their lives, social relationships and networks (Kim 2013). Popular research topics are the evolution of the Korean Diaspora to and from Japan (Oh 2012) as well as the problems *Zainichi* face within the Japanese society such as identity crisis, integration or the non linear development of policies concerning Korean transmigrants (Kim 2015, Kim 2016). Furthermore, the issue of remigration to the homeland, the political and economical significance of *Zainichi* in a more and more transnational age and the changing geopolitical

politics in addition to the significance of international relations are among the research areas (Cho 2011, Kim 2017a, Kim 2017b)⁴.

3. The theory of transnationalism

Before starting the examination of migrant flows between Korea and Japan, an analytical framework consisting of characteristics used in secondary literature that are necessary to define the process of transmigration was developed. Therefore, the development of the theory of transnationalism in the field of migration studies as basis of the framework as well as aspects, which are seen as responsible factors for the necessity to consider the development of a new concept in migration studies, are discussed. These aspects include the shifting migratory behavior, technological advances and the transformation of economic, political and social structures. Secondly, the chapter focuses on the definition and process of the concept of transmigration while at the same time takes the development of the theory into account. Lastly, the key characteristics for the later in the analysis used conceptualization are pointed out.

3.1. The necessity of a transnational perspective and methodology

The study of the movements of people between nations in the form of migration has concerned scholars for a long time, resulting in diverse research fields such as migration studies, international relations and global studies. For instance, some of the first theories developed in the field of migration studies in the late nineteenth century aimed to understand the process of migration as well as the motives and reasons behind the migration flows. The application of these theories differs with regard to their focus, their assumption and the analysis itself (Castels et al. 2014:26). The focus of the subsequent theories in the field of migration studies shifted towards the migrants themselves and first attempted to categorize them based on the reason for migration such as economical, forced or voluntary or as a refugee. However, the case studies soon revealed that in most cases the motives for migration are diverse and relate to more than one of aspects such as economic, political, cultural and social (Castels et al. 2014:26). In further consequence theories turned to a basic distinction and considered on the one hand the cause of migration processes and on the other hand the impacts for both the receiving and sending countries, societies and communities. Since these

⁴ Looking at the research listed in this chapter it may be concluded that a few authors distinguish between a North Korean and South Korean community when it comes to *Zainichi* in Japan (e.g. Kim 2017 or Ryang 1997 and 2000), but the majority of case studies does not treat Korean immigrants separately.

theories and the subsequent conceptual frameworks arose in the industrial-era and lasted for decades, they grew stagnant over time and the conditions of the late twentieth century called for new ideas, concepts, hypotheses and approaches (Massey et al. 1998:3). In recent years aspects related to migration movements have moved to the center of the research. Among these aspects are the process of decision making, the development of an identity, the socio-political mobilization, the role of social capital, the significance of social networks and, as this master's thesis is going to explore, the dynamics of TNSSs (Iosifides 2013:1).

Previous migration studies have produced a broad set of literature covering a wide range of issues and subjects using various methodologies. Due to this diversity the trans-border cooperation between researchers of different fields is required. The knowledge, perception and subject-specific background of the scholars have contributed to a comprehensive account on the topic of migration (Brettell/Hollifield 2008:3-4). Generally speaking, the methodology is discussed in connection with a discipline or an established field of research. In the case of this master's thesis the area of research are the socio-scientific migration studies, which in turn are influenced by sociology, geography, political science, international relations, economics, demographic studies and social anthropology. The following considerations contribute to a better understanding of the methodology used in this thesis. Therefore, a transnational perspective on migration and the implications go beyond the immigration countries and also includes the country of origin as well as connections and activities of people, groups and organizations, which are part of the in the introduction mentioned TNSS (Faist et al. 2014:153).

In many cases a scientific approach to migration includes inherent theories about the core values and especially the culture of the society involved in the migration process. The conceptualization of the connection between these aspects and the society including its members leads to a range of anthropological and sociological approaches. Furthermore, in order to understand the specificity of the in this thesis used transnational approach transnational migration studies will be contextualized within the broader field of migration studies. The assessment and explanation of different methodological aspects and frameworks for the study of transnational migration contribute to a better understanding in this field of research (Nieswand 2011:14).

There are three methodological challenges when it comes to migration studies in general and transnational migration studies in specific (Amelina et al. 2012:50-51). The first problem is known under the term 'methodological nationalism' and refers to migration researchers who see the state as the only relevant context for an empirical study on border-

crossing migration. Thus the state and the society are regarded as congruent and in territorial respect as identical (Martins 1974:289). The second obstacle to overcome is that nationality and ethnicity are often used without question and therefore become a dominant aspect to categorize migrants. This leads to the perception that migrants are foremost a member of an ethnic group and not an individual (Faist et al. 2014:154). The third aspect is directly related to the transnational approach and calls the position of the researcher in the TNSS and the eventually disequilibrium of the study into question, especially when scholars from both the home and host country are working together and have to interpret social-scientific concepts of two geographically distant areas (Faist et al. 2014:155).

To determine an analytical unit, the transnational approach suggests the state as one option, since both the access to the country itself and politics and cooperation with other states are controlled by this entity. However, the nation state is not able to influence every single aspect of a migrant's life such as the environment or associates. TNSS are part of the process of trans-nationalization and allow the researcher to analyze not only the social, political, economical and cultural environment, but also the position and connections among each other and in respect of their country of origin (Faist et al. 2014:12-13). Therefore, the concept of TNSS is seen in connection with this analytical unit and offers an alternative access point to analyze territorialized aspects as well as de-territorialized elements. Since these units rely on the research questions and different analytical levels such as households, networks, organizations and states are taken into account. From the point of a transnational perspective there is no preferential unit or preferential locality. As a result, the concept of TNSSs, which not only considers the secluded and therefore territorialized *space of places*, but also takes the de-territorialized *space of flows*⁵ into account, represents a suitable point of origin for the analyzes (Faist et al. 2014:158).

Although a transnational methodology addresses the above mentioned challenges, there exists no systematically designed framework to deal with an established research question. Furthermore, research on transnationalism, TNSS or transnational migrants does not necessarily have to be multi-local, but scholars may analyze important aspects through the conceptualization of these transnational social networks (Faist et al. 2014:162). Another crucial point is reflected in the tendency to homogenize (transnational) migrants. Any research of transnational migrants, spaces or activities has to incorporate not only the social,

⁵ For further information on the concepts of *space of places* and *space of flows* see Ruggie 1993 and Harvey 1990.

economic or political context of the migrants, but also differences within the migrant community such as gender, age or occupation (Al-Ali/Koser 2002:5).

3.2. The rise of a new concept

The theory of transnationalism and thus transmigration is an adaption of theories in the field of migration studies or Diaspora studies. The term 'Diaspora' already referred to the general concept of migration dealing with colonial population movements. For all intents and purposes the theory was rediscovered and tried to combine with the fast changing patterns of international immigration of the post-war era (Zirh 2005:2). Therefore, the concept of Diaspora as an analytical tool has become insufficient when it comes to understanding the newly rising phenomena in international migration processes in the globalized age (Zirh 2005:18). Factors such as the transformation of economic, social and political structures were taken into account as well as the concept of culture as an attempt to explain the formation of the migrants' multifaceted identity and to evaluate "the emergence of new forms of immigrant practices and types of immigrant communities" (Zirh 2005:23). The following considerations represent important factors for the rise of a new conceptualization in migration studies (Zirh 2005:8).

In general, the secondary literature distinguishes a tangible connection between the emergence of transnationalism and the increasing globalization. Therefore, the theory of transnationalism is considered "an emergent phenomenon associated with the accelerating globalization process in the past several decades" (Yang 2000:253), which deals with the increasing intermixture and hybridization of societies, when borders between nations become more and more blurred. The British sociologist Stuart Hall defines globalization as follows:

Globalization is the process by which the relatively separate areas of the globe come to intersect in a single imaginary 'space' [...] when sharp boundaries reinforced by space and distance are bridged by connections (travel, trade, conquest, colonization, markets, capital and the flows of labor, goods and profits) which gradually eroded the clear-cut distinction between 'inside' and 'outside'. (1995:190)

Consequently, this process of connecting different nations and societies within a single space is the first step towards a transnational perspective, where "transnational social spaces are becoming a mass phenomenon and are important outcomes and forms of what is frequently referred to as 'globalisation'" (Pries 2001:23). In other words, the emergence of the theory of transnationalism and the ongoing process of globalization are argued to be both encompassing and interdependent. The sociologist Ludger Pries even goes one step further and argues that

the concept is a “precondition for and, at the same time, sediment outcome of, the globalization process” (Pries 2001:5).

The continuing process of globalization is responsible for the transformation of certain aspects in our daily life. As a result, “in this era of heightened globalization, transnational lifestyle may become not the exception but the rule” (Levitt 2001a:4). Consequently, to get a better understanding of the context and development of the concept of transnationalism, four different aspects are analyzed. Whereas the first two characteristics can be seen as core elements, the following two aspects are considered as an important context to explain the rise of transnationalism (Zirh 2005:25).

3.2.1. Shifting migratory structures

Migration is commonly specified as “a redistribution of skills, experiences, and other ‘human capital’ across the planet” (Sowell 1996:38) resulting in an economic inequality between the country of origin and the host country (Scheffer 2003:27). Often migration flows are not only influenced by developments that are responsible for demographical, socio-political or economical transformations, but are also a reflection of these changes in economic systems around the globe (van Hear 1998:13). In this sense, the shifting of the structure of migration after the Second World War is seen as the origin of “the general characteristics of contemporary migratory patterns” (Zirh 2005:26).

After the Second World War, the existing political economy of the post-war capitalist system is described as a benefactor for the new and steady flow of migrants across different nations. These migration flows have occurred in two sequenced phases. The first phase is the period between 1945 and 1973, which is described as *Les Trente Glorieuses* (translated: ‘The Glorious Thirty’) and refers to “the golden age of migration” (Zirh 2005:27), when labour forces were able to easily move from one nation to another. These migrant laborers were recruited and incorporated into the economic system, offered a full-time employment position and were subjects of the social welfare state (Castles/Miller 1993:6). The assumption of all participants including the immigrants, governments of the home and host country as well as their societies was that the labor force would stay as long as they were needed and therefore migration would be temporary. As a result, one strategy among those recruited migrants was to save their income and bring it back home once they leave again (Zirh 2005:27). Their intent was to support their family and not only increase the living environment for their left behind children, but also afford a proper education for them (Foner 1997:358).

The Oil Crisis in 1973 marked the beginning of the second phase of migration flows. This Crisis caused a disruption of the global economy and until the 1990s also affected the migration flows and the situation in the country of origin and settlement (Castles/Miller 1993:65). Simultaneously, countries in Western Europe, which until the crisis hit were relying on migrant laborer, stopped their recruitment to focus on their own working population and get in front of the crisis. However, these measurements generated a form of “boomerang effect” (Zirh 2005:28) and since immigrants decided to stay in the country instead of returning home, the supposedly temporary lasting migration continued (Zirh 2005:27-28). In addition, due to the pursued policy the dimensions of migration increased further resulting for example in family unifications and marriages (Faist 2000a:5). These family unifications had great impact on the societies of host countries as women and children, who – in most cases – did not participate in the economic system, came into the nation. As a result, different religious and ethnic cultures surfaced in the societies and for the public benefit new social and cultural services as well as rights were demanded by the newly emerging migrant communities. Therefore, host nations were urged to enact laws concerning migrant communities, provide support and make investments such as schooling for immigrant’s children (Zirh 2005:28).

According to the sociologists Stephen Castles and Mark Miller the patterns of international migration after the Oil Crisis developed some distinctive characteristics. Not only has the process of migration been globalized and therefore affected more countries and people than ever, but the dimensions of migration increased as well. Furthermore, the participants of migration became more various as not only migrant labour seeking work came into a host-country, but refugees joined the migration flow as well since they were forced to leave their home countries behind due to various reasons such as civil wars, persecution and so on, which led to an increase in the diversity of educational and socio-economic backgrounds. As a result, the new wave of international migration has become “globalized”, “accelerated”, “differentiated” and “feminized” (Castles/Miller 1993:8).

These new characteristics have affected countries of origin, host-countries and migrant communities in equal shares resulting in changing demographics, economic transformations and shifting political and socio-cultural structures including the quest for identity. The changes first take place in the socio-cultural organization of the host-country, which receives and absorbs so-called ‘foreign’ cultural elements, and then move on to influence the sense of self of migrants living in these transforming host-societies. In this sense, the increasing scope and changing structures of international migration are in need of new concepts to describe the

perception of identity in a transnational space (Zirh 2005:30-31). According to the sociologist Kim Matthews “who we are and where we belong” has become one of the most important questions in contemporary migrant communities around the globe (Matthews 2002:68).

3.2.2. Technological progress

Throughout history technological progress has been an important factor for the acceleration of migrant flows around the world. By way of example, the invention of steamships in the nineteenth century led to a rapid increase in the number of migrants from Europe to the USA (Zirh 2005:35). At the end of 1979, an advanced technological development around the world was responsible for the growth of migration. Technological improvements influenced the daily routine of migrant communities and allowed them to maintain transnational relations and establish transnational connections (Guarnizo/Smith 1998:17). For instance, migrant communities frequently began using video-messages as a form of communication to contact their family and relatives in their country of origin. Through this means of communication information about daily live or news concerning members of the family were exchanged quickly and cost-efficiently (Foner 2001:363). In addition, with the beginning of the 1990s air travel became more and more popular and also affordable for migrants who settled near their country of origin due to the development of an overarching transportation system (Zirh 2005:36).

A more recent example for technological developments is the phenomenon of ‘cheap calls’ and therefore refers to the technological progress in the infrastructure of long-distance communication systems. In addition to the technological advances in this area, the reducing of expenses for global communication was also a crucial factor for the increase of international calls (Vertovec 2004:219-220). As long-distance international communication needs an adequate infrastructure, technological developments reached even the poorest areas of potential host-countries and affected the technological progress in the migrants’ country of origin. Another result is the reconfiguration of connections and the strengthening of social relations across national borders, which “serve as a kind of social glue, connecting small-scale social formations across the globe” (Vertovec 2004:220). The anthropologist Ted Lewellen highlights the new emerging form of life, which are based on these technological advances: “‘Lives are lived across borders’ with a high intensity of ongoing social and economic interactions made possible by cheap and rapid travel and by instantaneous communication” (Lewellen 2002:152).

These above described new advances in communication and transportation technologies are without difficulty accessible for both macro-actors such as governments and micro-actors like individual participants. However, “the internationalisation of mass media has provided ethnic groups with a new tool for socio-political mobilization and for cultural survival” (Stack 1981:21). For instance, in contrast to earlier movements of people migration flows in the twenty-first century rely heavily on social media and almost all participants are equipped with an internet-enabled mobile phone. Migrants use these mobile phones to exchange information, obtain the latest news, maintain social relationships or and above all stay in contact with family and friends left behind while at the same time share their personal experiences via social media (Pries 2016:51). In this time and age internet-enabled communication forms such as SMS, e-mail or social media and the necessary technical means are important features, which highlight the significance of transnational social networks and the dynamic of migration movements (Pries 2016:72-73). Migrants are able to use the efficient technologies to increase the flow of people and material as well as information and ideas and overcome the space between their country of origin and their new host country (Bryceson 2002:40).

Summing up, it was conducted that the rise of new advances in communication and transportation technologies is considered as “technical infrastructure of the transnationalism” (Zirh 2005:40) by means of which migrant communities are able to stay in contact and create a border-crossing network intensifying political, social and cultural exchange. This denotes that migrant communities “define themselves and articulate political indefinites and demands that are formed within a transnational and global, as opposed to simply a local and national, context” (Adamson 2002:157).

3.2.3. Reorganization of the international economic system

As described above, the technological progress fundamentally transformed the everyday life of migrant communities since the 1970s and border-crossing practices have become affordable, easier accessible and more efficient. At the same time, these technological advances affected the international economic system, which in turn played a prominent role in the internationalization of migrant communities worldwide. Since the members of these communities were participating in the economic system of their host-country, changes in the international economic system, and especially in the labour market, directly affected the socio-economic dynamics of migrants in their country of settlement (Zirh 2005:41).

The structural crisis in the 1970s triggered the adaption of the global economy. Therefore, the worldwide economic system entered a new development phase, which also

entailed the transformation of the structure of international migration. One of these changes regards to the ability to respond to critical situations such as labor shortages and was summarized under the term “flexibilisation” (Zirh 2005:42). Simultaneously with the beginning of a de-industrialization practice manufacturing bases and facilities were relocated from industrialized regions to still developing countries. As a result, owing to a lack of demand of manual workforce in the mining and manufacturing industries, the primary host-countries did not longer require to import a skilled workforce. In fact, the conventional lines between blue-collar workers and white-collar employees increasingly became blurred and with the emergence of the service sector new demands for specialized labor entered the market (Zirh 2005:41-42). Other terms and expressions used to describe the shifting structure of the economy were “de-industrialization”, “restructuring of capitalism” and “economic dislocation” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:33-34).

The transformation of the worldwide economic system was in more than one way responsible for the transnationalization of migrant communities. On the one hand, the restructuring process and capitalist expansion worldwide was part of international policies and was responsible for the destabilization of local markets. As a result of the integration of developing regions into the international economic and political system new migration waves such as rural depopulation and seasonal migration were triggered (Castles/Miller 1993:3). On the other hand, due to the new demands for the de-industrialized and re-structured labor market of developed nations, fundamental changes took place in the labour market structure (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:8-9). Whereas migrants in the 1970s got the opportunity for a promotion or the landing of a better job once new migrant workers entered the market (Faist 2000a:262), this mobility was interrupted through the process of de-industrialization and the stabilization of economies in the 1980s and employment opportunities for migrants decreased exponentially. Furthermore, since in this time period service-oriented job offers replaced industrial employment offers and migrant laborer were not equipped with the demanded skills, they were no longer welcome to the labor market (Jurgens 2001:105) and basically have “become economically useless for receiving economies” (Zirh 2005:43).

Nowadays, the world market is faced with economic, political and social transformations taking place on a daily basis, which shape the world of today. These transformations also affect the labor market and once a countries’ own need of labor is satisfied or the employment opportunities are inadequate people are searching for an employment offer outside of their home country. The number of migrants benefiting from a globalized economy is rising continuously and the call for flexible, mobile and qualified

specialists is further promoting migration flows towards industrialized countries in need of labor (Castles et. al 2014:6).

3.2.4. Transformation of international socio-political patterns

The last important aspect is the international socio-political structure, which underwent significant transformations over the last few decades. Changes of the socio-political dynamics of a country generate developments such as the redefinition of identity, the notion of citizenship or the restructuring of the role of the nation-state that are relevant to understand the transnationalization of migrant communities. As a result, the nation-state as a single unity and the belonging of a person in the form of identity or citizenship have become insufficient to fit into the description of the changing socio-political context and were called into question. The most important aspects are the emergence of transnational corporations and transnational entrepreneurs in the global economic market, which more and more gained economic power as well as the rise of transnational organizations that were able to influence the transnational networks and established rules in agreement with the transnational communities. Furthermore, the acceleration and differentiation of migration flows in the post-war period and a worldwide mobility on the basis of technological progress influenced the developments on equal terms (Castles 1996:187).

In the case of migration, on the one hand international migration flows and structures are influenced by changes in the socio-political dynamics of the host-country, and on the other hand, the changes in these dynamics affect the international migration flows. As already described above, due to increased migration flows the demographic structure of the society of countries of settlement has resulted in cultural and ethnic diversity. These different groups all call for different actions to be taken for example in the form of policies and consequently the political structures of the nations are changing as well. In other words, contemporary international labor migration was accompanied by discourses on migrants about integration or assimilation as well as transformations and shifts in the socio-politic structure of every host-country (Zirh 2005:46).

In general, until the 1950s assimilation was seen as leading concept in the political systems around the globe. During this time period, immigrants were expected to show a degree of assimilation capacity and integrate themselves into their new society. There were different stages of integration and it was concluded that the assimilation plan will outreach one generation (Lewellen 2002:150). In this sense, migrant communities were perceived as “a socially and culturally absorbable population” (Castles/Miller 1993:116) and the integration

into the society will be concluded with the participation in the labor market of the host country (Grostoguel/Cordero-Guzmán 1998:351). However, as transnational migration flows rose radically and as a result the 'foreign' population of host countries increased exponentially, the perspectives on assimilation were replaced with ideas of the school of cultural pluralism. From this new point of view, the disparity of migrants and their communities within their country of settlement are described in a positive manner as examples for hybridized forms of identity, which continue to be "recreated as a new form of identify that is not a simple repetition of what existed in their communities of origin" (Grostoguel/Cordero-Guzmán 1998:351).

However, although in most cases the growth of transnationalism and diversity is seen as a beneficial aspect in order to overcome differences, sometimes border-crossing migration flows are also seen in connection with arising conflicts as well as problems as a result of the living together of socially and culturally diverse communities (Castles et al. 2014:6). However, in the field of international migration most governments recognized migrants as permanent settler in their countries and therefore, "there has been a tendency to move from policies of individual assimilation to acceptance of some degree of long-term cultural difference" (Castles/Miller 1993:13). This change from a policy of assimilation to an acceptance of cultural diversity in the host-countries is one of the visible aspects of the transformation of the socio-political dynamics of a country of settlement. As a result of the new socio-political structure migrants were equipped with the means in form of rights to stay different and create their own living environments (Zirh 2005:48).

According to the sociologist Stephen Castles, from the point of view of the host countries, migration strategies were based on the perspective to "maximize the profitability" while at the same time "minimizing the social cost" of migrant workforce (Castles 2000:49). In this sense, the workforce migrants presented was very welcome for the host countries, "while their social needs and their potential impact on receiving societies was largely ignored" (Castles 2000:8). However, the migration flows, which started out as temporary phenomenon after 1945, have increased significantly over time and the migrants have become permanent residents in the form of migrant communities in their new countries of settlement, which makes the existence of social and political rights for migrants an essential part of the new socio-political order in a country (Castles 2000:49).

The social significance of cultural or ethnic diversity largely depends on the thoughts and predominant values of the society of the receiving country. Whereas some countries mostly have accepted a certain degree of cultural difference within their societies due to

permanent settlers, others have emphasized temporary labour recruitment and also have tried to prevent further immigration through difficulties when obtaining citizenship or the denial of family reunions. These are two opposite examples and within this frame exist various levels. However, studies have emphasized that permanent settlers are often divergent from the society in their new home country; they have different traditions, political affiliations and religious or cultural practices: “Culturally distinct settler groups often maintain their languages and some elements of their homeland cultures, at least for a few generations” (Castles et al. 2014:19) while at the same time explore and adopt elements of the receiving societies (Castles et al. 2014:18-19). Therefore, migrants are “able to move in and out of daily contexts where nationalities, languages, ethnicities, and classes coexist” (Slimbach 2005:211). In this sense, the concept of cultural diversity is seen as “the first rung in the socio-cultural ladder” or as “the next step” (Cuccioletta 2002:8) towards the development of the theory of transnationalism and the concept of living a life across borders (Cuccioletta 2002:8-9). Furthermore, the rise of such ‘transnational actors’ was a result of this new conceptualization. In this sense, the social anthropologist John Stack points out the aspect of the newly emerged concept of transnationalism:

The idea of transnationalism freed us from the dogmatic assertion that states are the exclusive actors in world politics. Moreover, the idea of transnational relations conveys a more holistic approach to evaluate contemporary international political and economic relations. (Stack 1981:3)

3.3. Living in a transnational world

The new approach focuses on migration within a globalizing economy and the questioning of the role of the nation-state in shaping activities and identities of migrants (Mazzucato 2010:207). Thus, the transnational approach is based on the observation that migrants not only cross borders to live and – in most cases – work in their new host country, but use border-crossing practices such as remittances or political involvement as strategies to provide financial aid for their families or improve their environment. Although this phenomenon is not a new one, migration and its accompanying developments have intensified over the last hundred years. Technological advances such as the internet offer a simple way to stay in touch with family members and economical and flexible transportation networks such as air travel are seen as favorable characteristics (Faist et al. 2014:18). In other words, although these technological advances may not have directly increased migration flows, “they have made it easier for migrants to foster close links with their societies of origin” (Castles et al. 2014:41), which increases the capability of migrants to take part in life at two distant places at

once. In this day and age migration occurs in a world that is compressed in time and space, which allows individuals to act as agents and engage in border-crossing projects (Harvey 1990:211).

A transnational perspective relating to migration studies distinguishes between three key concepts: transnationalization, transnational social spaces (TNSS) and transnationalism. As a matter of fact, these three concepts correlate with the three consecutive research generations in the field of transmigration: Whereas the term transnationalization matches the theories on transnational relations in the political science studies in the 1960s and 1970s, TNSS are social networks and were used by scholars in the fields of sociology and anthropology in the second half of the 1990s, and finally transnationalism, which is functioning as essential addition to the first two concepts (Faist et al. 2014:19-20). Thus, the concept of transnationalism used today in social science primarily emerged in the fields of international relations, economics and political science, where it “referred to official international bodies, non-governmental organizations, and multinational corporations” (Lewellen 2002:150). Pries points out that since the 1960s the concept has been in the field to comprehend “all types of interactions and institutions above nationally bounded phenomena and international relations” (2001:17). He focuses on the rise of so-called transnational actors, who are fundamental to the international system, and on TNSSs, which became a mass phenomenon and tightly intertwined to the globalizing process (Pries 2001:22-23).

In the field of migration studies the terminology ‘transnational’ was first used in the early 1990s and has its roots in the theory of transnationalism. Early on the German sociologist Thomas Faist for example used the word ‘trans-state’ to refer to the territorial aspect of migration movements and the term ‘trans-national’ to point out the connection between individuals⁶. Although only a few researchers dealt with this differentiation, it was an important step towards the development of the later established concept (Fox 2005:172). There exist a large number of different definitions when it comes to the terms ‘transnationalism’ or ‘transnational’, which demonstrates the diverse research approaches of each author. The anthropologists Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller and Cristina Szanton Blanc were among the first who worked with the theory of transnationalism and defined it as “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (1994:7)⁷. Other researches picked up this

⁶ For further information on the differences of the terms ‘trans-state’ and ‘trans-national’, see Faist 2000b.

⁷ For more information, please refer to their release *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered* published in 1992.

conception and pointed out the importance of people within those networks by focusing on numerous ties and interactions linking them and/or institutions across the borders of nation-states. These networks consisting of people are called transnational communities. According to the social anthropologist Steve Vertovec the concept of transnationalism generally relates to the various links and interactions connecting institutions and people across the borders of a state. Therefore, transnational communities are seen as one aspect of transnationalism (Vertovec 1999:447). The common ground of all these definitions is the existing ties between people living in different countries. When it comes to the conceptualization of transnationalism it is therefore necessary to analyze the existing network in form of transnational communities, villages or circuits (Mazzucato 2010:206-207).

In general, definitions of the term transnational focus on border-crossing exchanges, practices and relations and as a result transnational communities exceed the national space as the center of reference for activities and identities, which means that exchanges and interactions across borders are frequent actions. Transnational connections established by migrants can be related to the society and their culture through the exchange of music, art, cuisine or education. Furthermore, there may occur economic exchanges in the form of trade or investment or political exchanges, such as political activism both in the new host country and the country of origin (IOM 2010:3-4). This observation can also be found in other definitions: For example, according to the UNESCO, who says that “transnational communities are groups whose identity is not primarily based on attachment to a specific territory” (UNESCO 2017:#4). Furthermore, it was emphasized that members of a transnational community return occasionally to their state of origin, and invest part of their income in their place of birth or send remittances home in order to support their relatives. However, there is no strong desire to return for good, because transmigrants never actually leave their place of origin due to the preserved family and community ties (Bruneau 2010:43-44). These actions are described as transnational activities, which “take place on a recurrent basis across national borders and require a regular and significant commitment of time by participants” (Portes 1999:464). Another important notion when speaking of transmigration is the term ‘transmigrant’, which is used to identify people whose lives take place in transnational communities based on migration. According to the anthropologist Nina Glick Schiller these are people who are part of social, economic, familial, political and religious cross-national networks (1999:203).

3.3.1. Towards a transnational perspective

The anthropologist Delmos Jones describes his scientific view on the concept on transnationalism as follows: “Not so much something new but something that has increased in density and significance” (1992:218-219). He especially points out the early use of the term and concept of ‘transnational’. The Oxford Dictionary of English dates the emergence of the concept to the 1920s, when a science-based economic article used the expression ‘transnational economy’ to describe Europe’s development after the First World War. The next time the term surfaced was in the late 1960s in the field of international relations. Scholars used the phrase ‘transnational relations’ to illustrate the increasingly economical and political dependence of industrialized countries as well as border-crossing practices including powerful multi-national concerns, political associations or religious communities. However, the concept faded away with the appearance of the globalization discourse since the late 1970s (Faist et al. 2014:20).

The notion of transnationalization differs from the conception of internationalization; since the latter is only concerned with connections, events and activities including nation states and their players. Examples therefore are international rules and standards such as the Geneva Convention (GC) from 1949 and the subsequent treaties and protocols, which establish the principles for the humanitarian treatment in war and the protection of refugees (Faist et al. 2014:20-21). Furthermore, transnationalization also distinguishes from the concept of globalization. When speaking of ‘globalization’ the term is normally related to economic and financial trends, whereas the expression ‘transnationalism’ takes not only economic ties into account, but also political connections and social networks (Zirh 2005:24-25). However, in the early stages research on globalization takes a bird’s eye of view and is based on two assumptions: First, an intensification of global interdependence and networking (Giddens 1990:76-77) and second, the development of a single global system or a single “global state” (Albrow 1996:178). The first aspect overlaps with the field of study on transnationalization, which focuses on the intensity and scope of border-crossing transactions, whereas the second aspect is specifically related to globalization and the characteristics within the system of world-theories⁸ (Faist et al. 2014:21). According to the cultural anthropologist Hannerz Ulf the term ‘transnational’ as opposed to ‘global’ often is “a more adequate label for phenomena which can be quite variable in scale and distribution” (1996:6). In his opinion, the

⁸ These theories address how global structures, discourses and institutions affect and potentially change the national and local levels. One example is the world-systems approach developed by the sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, which emphasizes not a single nation state, but the world-system as the most important unit of analyses (Faist et al. 2014:21).

expressions ‘globalization’ and ‘global’ are often used too generally in the different fields of research, whereas the theory of transnationalism is not bound to a national framework and therefore able to include multi-directional flows of capital, culture or values of not only for example government-controlled organizations, but individually acting participants as well (Iwabuchi 2002:16-17).

As a result, a transnational view uses a different approach. Border-crossing activities and structures or a global citizenship are seen as the product of border-crossing practices (Faist et al. 2014:21-22). Therefore, the point of origin of a transnational approach is those processes, which shape trans-border activities and structures such as practices of migrants and their network in their home country. Border-crossing practices are influenced by existing norms, values and standards of a country and their society and are able to change, adapt or absorb and vice-versa are also capable of triggering change or transformation (Faist 2000a: 211). The focus on border-crossing practices of transnationalization allows the construction of a conceptual space, which depends on terms such as TNSS or transnationality. Thereby it is possible to take phenomena such as Diaspora, developmental aid, integration of migrants, social networks between migrants and/or organizations and border-crossing practices into account (Faist et al. 2014:22).

The already mentioned pioneers of the transnational approach in the field of migration studies – Nina Glick Schiller and her colleagues – argument that present-day migrants are fundamentally different than immigrants of the late nineteenth or early twentieth century since they used to cut all their cultural and social ties to the home country in order to live in the political and socio-cultural world of their new host country. In contrast, contemporary migrants, or transmigrants, establish a social structure including wide-ranging networks that connect home- and host-country (Faist et al. 2014:22). Instead of focusing the attention on transnational connections in the form of powerful players such as multi-national concerns as it was common in the field of international relations, the approach used by Glick Schiller and her colleagues point out the importance of activities performed by individuals. Whereas the first concept is known as ‘transnationalism from above’, the second model falls under the designation of ‘transnationalism from below’. The authors describe their approach in the following way:

Transnational political, economic, social, and cultural processes (1) extended beyond borders of a particular state but are shaped by the policies and institutional practices of a particular and limited set of states; and (2) include actors that are not states. (Glick Schiller/Fouron 1999:343-344)

Consequently, the first in these area active researchers declared that it was necessary to look beyond a nation state as primary unit of analysis since a closed system of operations within a state was problematic for the broader and nation-crossing actions of present day migrants. Furthermore, contemporary migration flows are able to develop momentum that keeps aloof from economical or political sources⁹. The same characteristics can be found in the development and reproduction of TNSS¹⁰ (Faist et al. 2014:23).

3.3.2. Transnationalism – a critical approach

Although the theory of transnationalism represents a suitable tool and framework for the developments in migration studies, there exist a number of weaknesses when it comes to this specific theory. The most intensively researched being the development of the theory over time and if it may be described as an entirely new approach. In the last decade researchers analyzed similarities and differences between transnationalization of migrants in the past and in the present and further explored the possibility that transnational migration is not a new phenomenon, but was already practiced over the course of time (Faist 2000a:211). According to the sociologist Nancy Foner transnational practices among migrants such as transnational households or cultural, economic and political ties to the country of origin were quite common in the past. In fact, her studies show that European immigrants in New York at the turn of the century could also be described with the term transnational. She stated that “transnationalism has been with us for a long time, and a comparison with the past allows us to assess just what is new about the patterns and processes involved in transnational ties today” (Foner 2001:52).

Foner and other scholars concluded that there are continuities between migrants from different eras and their economic, political and socio-cultural engagement in more than one country. Since the phenomenon has developed over time, examples demonstrate that in the past although migrants used transnational activities, “they lacked the elements of regularity, routine involvement, and critical mass characterizing contemporary examples of transnationalism” (Portes et al. 1999:225-226). Transnational behavior of migrants intensified over time and is the basis of their daily routine. One of the most important technological advances was the implementation of new and improved transport- and communication options such as ocean transport or telegraphy. The steady improvements were significant for the

⁹ For further information on the characteristics of present-day migration flows, please refer to the article “Theories of international migration” written by Massey et al. and published in 1993.

¹⁰ For a detailed description on the development and reproduction of TNSS, see Faist 2000b.

cutback of costs and the possibility of overcoming geographic distances in a short amount of time. This progress increased more and more over time (Faist 2000a:212).

The enhanced reachability between the country of origin and the host country enables more frequent and closer transnational connections such as budget-priced air travel to visit family and friends or to go to the polls. Furthermore, the new technologies facilitate communication and migrants no longer have to wait two or more weeks to get a letter back from their loved ones, but simply pick up their phone or use wireless communication (Levitt 2001a:23-24). Thus migrants are presented with an easy accessible possibility to be a part in their family's everyday life in the country of origin as well as share their own living environment with them. Indeed, technological advances simplify border-crossing practices for migrants and their environment; however, there still exist differences with regard to the regularity of travels or the intensity of transnational activities (Faist et al. 2014:58-59). According to the anthropologist and sociologist Peter Kivisto communication technologies are influenced by a social background and “[t]hus, it is important to explore not simply access to communication technologies, but also the ways different groups employ them” (Kivisto/Faist 2010:156). Furthermore, Faist argues that these advanced technologies set the course for the development of modern, transnational networks, but are not sufficient enough to be the only determining factor (Faist 2000a:212). Therefore, the developments can be seen as one variable, while the political, economical and cultural dynamics within the home and host countries are identifying aspects to analyze the scope and duration of transnational practices. The conditions, which are seen as characteristic for transnationalization, include amongst others an “economic globalization” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:8-9) as well as the changing state of systems in the receiving and the sending country such as policies or economic agreements to benefit labor migration (Faist 2000a:213-214).

Summing up, the historical review of migration practices shows that transnationalism is not presenting a new phenomenon. It was concluded that the so-called “transnational turn” (de Haas 2008:38) in the field of migration studies occurred due to an ongoing blurring of long established categories such as home, land of origin and host-land. In the context of continuing mobility of migrants the meaning of these terms became fluctuate and multilayered (Manzenreiter 2010:224-225). Therefore, new emerging political, economic and cultural dynamics allow a different, scientific perspective on migration flows and their accompanying aspects, which illustrates the increase of transnational practices and the necessity to use a transnational perspective for the analysis of contemporary migration flows and communities (Faist 2014:60):

If transnational life existed in the past but was not seen as such, then the transnational lens does new analytical work by providing a way of seeing what was there that could not be seen before because of a lack of lens to focus on it. (Smith 2003:725)

After thoroughly discussing the research on the relevance of the theory in the past and how it affected the development up until now, other weaknesses researchers have encountered while working with this theory are explored. Another point refers to the definition of the term transnationalism and in specific the term transnational migrant. According to Vertovec the concept has become over-used and is used to describe far too many aspects of the phenomena. For instance, the term transnational migrant is applied by various scholars reaching from all migrants, to every Diaspora, to a specific migrant community as well as to all tourists and travelers per se. Therefore, the term may become too encompassing and could lack in relevance. However, although researchers may see eye to eye when it comes to the exact definition of transnationalism, all agree that transnational actions and patterns are significant for the analysis and may take economic, political or socio-cultural forms (Vertovec 2010:576).

Another issue questions whether maintaining of transnational relations by migrants may or may not present an alternative to programmes incorporating immigrants, processes of migration or other social structures of migrants. As opposed to preceding theories in these areas of research such as assimilation, cultural pluralism or political inclusion of migrants, the theory of transnationalism has not yet been very well theorized. Further research in this area is necessary to develop a frame, which includes all significant aspects concerning transnational relations and connections. The last point presented in this thesis is related to the very first described in detail above. It concerns the process of transnationalism and its applicability to migration movements. While researchers agree that contemporary patterns are embedded in TNSs, further studies have to be conducted when it comes to intergenerational succession or the maintenance of transnational networks and connections. In other words, this issue questions whether the theory of transnationalism is exclusively applicable to the first generation of migrants or if the children born and raised in the countries of settlement as the second generation still maintain economic, political and socio-cultural connections to the country of origin of their parents or rather their own ethnic roots (Vertovec 2010:577).

As these few examples show additional empirical research concerning aspects of the theory of transnationalism as well as development of methodologies in the diverse fields focusing on economic, political and socio-cultural aspects is necessary to further promote this research area. Nevertheless, more and more scholars from diverse research fields are taking a

vast interest in the transnational characteristics of migration flows and using the theory of transnationalism as a useful analytical tool (Vertovec 2010:576).

3.4. Conceptualization of transnationalism

The concept of transnationalism tries to understand the contemporary migratory phenomena in relation with the changing global aspects. The new frame allows the study of transnational practices and relations of different migrant communities in specific and contemporary migratory patterns or phenomena in general (Zirh 2005:iv). Compared to the limited access to border-crossing activities granted to an explicit group or organization in the past, nowadays these practices have become a “mass phenomena” (Pries 2001:6) and are part of the daily routine of a migrant community, increasing in frequency, regularity and speed (Grostoguel/Cordero-Guzmán 1998:358). In this sense, the social space of present-day transnational practices of migrant communities may be defined as:

An emergent social field that is composed of a growing number of persons who live dual lives: speaking two languages, having homes in two countries, and making a living through continuous regular contact across national borders. (Portes et al. 1999:217)

This developing social field is responsible for the emergence of innovative categories of social activities, practices and experiences likewise, which reflect the changing global context (Basch et al. 1995:24). Contemporary migrant communities, for example, “forge social practice and ethnic identity that have a transnational character rather than becoming hyphenated” (Foner 1997:355). Therefore, the changing characteristics have become a reference point in terms of identity that mirrors the shifting aspects in the field of politics. For instance, contemporary political movements of migrants “are dually incorporated into both states and participate in the political events” of the country of origin as well as the country of settlement (Basch et al. 1995:281). Consequently, due to both the shifting economic, technological and socio-political context and the aspect of interconnectedness, present-day border-crossing practices of migrant communities are able to broaden their influence and make use of structures within the home- and host-land (Zirh 2005:66-67).

This circumstance of belonging to more than one country and therefore more than one society is one of the important characteristics of present-day migrants. Transmigrants actively engage in the social life of both societies:

Transmigrants differ from emigrants and immigrants, and from return-migrants, just because they move back and forth between different places and develop their social spaces of everyday life, their work trajectories and biographical projects in this new and emerging configuration of special practices, symbols and artifacts that spans different spaces. (Pries 2001:21)

Furthermore, “[t]ransmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations – familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span borders” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:26) while they are connected to not only one, but two or more societies to develop their own identity in this web of social networks. In this respect, since transmigrants can become active members of more than one society, a definite distinction between the home- and host-country is no longer possible, since borders become more and more blurred (Zirh 2005:73). In other words, this complex network develops a new type of various and fluid identities. As Glick Schiller and her colleagues argue:

People live in and create a new social and cultural space which calls for a new awareness of who they are, a new consciousness, and new identities. [...] It is important to recognize that transnational migrants exist, interact, are given and assert their identities, and seek or exercise legal and social rights within national structures that monopolize power and foster ideologies of identity. At the same time, it is clear that the identity, field of action, ideology, or even legal rights of citizenship of transnational migrants are not confined within the boundaries of any one single polity. (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:39-40)

Therefore, transmigrants generate a new form of community based on the emergence of complex and fluid identities, border-crossing practices and the development of innovative TNSSs (Zirh 2005:74). Transnational communities “spread across borders, have an enduring presence abroad, and take part in some kind of exchange between or among spatially separated component groups” (van Hear 1998:242). These exchanges include not only economic relations, but amongst other things information on immigration policies in host-lands or data on openings in the labour market become part of the transnational social network (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:111).

In this sense, the newly emerging social space is seen as the outcome of the shifting migratory patterns and the changes in the socio-political, technological and economical structures (Zirh 2005:77). Although there exists no coherently derived framework for transnationalism, the concept of TNSS offers a heuristic method or instrument, which allows researchers to analyze transnational practices of migrant communities as well as the situation in both the country of origin and the country of settlement (Faist et al. 2014:60).

3.4.1. Transnational Social Space (TNSS)

The newly emerging theory of transnationalism conceptualizes immigration “as a process of network ties, of relationship between group and social agents distributed across different places” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992:101) and therefore “immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders” (Basch et al. 1995:7). In the globalized

age this space consisting of social networks and influenced by various migratory practices is defined as Transnational Social Space. The metaphor of TNSS “helps to broaden the scope of migration studies to include the circulation of ideas, symbols, and material culture, not only movement of people” (Faist 2000a:13).

The term ‘social space’ essentially does not refer to a straightforward physical condition, but focuses on a social connotation, which exceeds the principle of territoriality. According to Faist, TNSS are defined as follows:

By transnational spaces we mean relatively stable, lasting and dense sets of ties reaching beyond and across the borders of sovereign states. Transnational Social Spaces consist of combinations of ties and their contents, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that can be found in at least two geographically and internationally distinct places. (Faist 2000a:197)

The key aspect of TNSS refers to border-crossing and long-term transactions, which are embedded in a dynamic social process and manifest in the emergence of social networks that are independent from geographical or political boundaries. In this sense, “these networks usually follow economic linkages, lines of capital that unite the group within an interweaving of trade, finance, and remittances” (Lewellen 2002:8). Most of these actions take place either in a familiar and individual environment or include functional organizations with a political, economical or socio-cultural background. In this sense, TNSS are able to reach beyond territorial sovereignty and to affect the volume and density of specific assets such as human capital or economic and social resources (Faist 2000a:190-191). Furthermore, TNSS inherently point out that migration and re-migration are not necessarily irreversible and final decisions, but the choice to live a transnational life may lead to an improvement of the environment and therefore become a strategy of survival (Faist et al. 2014:62).

TNSS were developed in two stages. In the first one, they are a byproduct of international migration and mostly are confined to the first generation of migrants. However, for a long time scientists were aware of the social nature of migration, which promoted a steady exchange between geographically distant communities and the persistent social ties to the home-country. In the second stage TNSS exceed the connections build by the first generation of migrants and develop an independent existence and dynamic (Faist et al. 2014:62).

Although the development of TNSS requires a certain stability and consistency, the processes within the social space are dynamic and not viewed as static notions (Faist 2000a:199-200). The boundaries of TNSS are constantly shifting, evolving and changing:

By transnational, we propose an optic or gaze that begins with a world without borders, empirically examines the boundaries and borders that emerge at particular historical moments, and explores their relationship to unbounded arenas and processes. (Khagram/Levitt 2008:5)

A dynamic point of view allows to compare the shifting boundaries to aspects such as global systems or the structures of nation-states as well as to analyze the development of new spaces or the amplification of existing aspects. Therefore, social mechanisms, which are responsible for the development and dissolution of these boundaries, play an important role (Faist et al. 2014:66). The basic element of these social mechanisms is transactions and social ties, which are based on lasting, stable and multi-local exchanges between two individuals and link spatially mobile persons with immobile persons. For instance, when migrants visit their families back home or talk to their business partners over the phone (Faist et al. 2014:61). In other words, migrant communities and the communities in their former homeland have united in “a single area of social action” (Foner 1997:355) and as a result build a bridge between two geographically distant nations. Furthermore, the frequent exchanges knit a web of social structures, which in turn has an effect on the participants in TNSSs and the transnational practices (Faist et al. 2014:24).

3.4.1.1. Transnational players

Contemporary migrant communities are seen as an actor in the new emerging social space and due to the increasingly globalized world are technologically better equipped and politically and socially more influential. However, individuals, groups, organizations and even states are able to participate in TNSSs and therefore, the extent of border-crossing practices varies. These transnational players do not necessarily have to stay in close contact and one-time meetings or encounters by chance are part of TNSSs as well (Faist et al. 2014:63). For instance, two until now unacquainted corporations are entering the market place to exchange goods, capital and services. In other words, a person does not have to migrate in order to be a transnational player, but has to establish contact or engage in border-crossing transactions in different contexts such as familial, socio-cultural, political or economical. In this sense, transnational ties indicate a degree of heterogeneity similar to age, gender or language within the field of transnational players, which can range from high to low. For example, migrants may send a different amount of remittances back home, or choose to send nothing at all, which points out that participants in TNSSs are not only categorized into transnational or non-transnational, but that transnationalism may occur in a different degree (Faist et al. 2014:26). Based on the frequency of such social ties and practices there exist three main types of

transnational players in TNSSs, which are shaped by distinct forms of social resources: reciprocity in transnational small groups, exchange in transnational circuits and solidarity in transnational communities (Faist et al. 2014:63).

In general, migrants from the first generation developed border-crossing practices in small groups rooted in kinship. These small groups see the sense of belonging or allegiance to their homeland as common characteristic and use their social ties based on the principle of reciprocity, where mutual giving and receiving are key aspects. An example for reciprocity is remittances migrants send their families at home with the aim to improve their environment and support their families (Faist et al. 2014:63-64). In a globalized world geographically divided families are not an exception, but the rule and the process of transnationalization gives rise to the emergence of an innovative form of familial bonds and new interpretation of the classic labour division in families. The concept of this type of family, where migrants and the left behind family members rearrange the familial tasks across the borders of a nation state, is described as transnational household (Levitt 2001a:75). Despite the geographical distance between members of a family, they are able to stay in close contact due to the “feeling of collective welfare and unity” (Bryceson 2002:3) and use the transnational social ties to empower the members of the transnational household. Another term used to describe the stable relations across borders is transnational family (Levitt 2001a:75).

On the other hand, transnational circuits refer to social ties between migrants and organizations, whose common goal is the exchange of resources such as information, goods or services. Transnational players may be connected with each other due to different reasons. For instance, there exist scientific networks, economic corporations or social establishments in the fields of human rights or environmental protection (Faist et al. 2014:24-25). However, the exchanges are always based on mutual obligations and expectations. For instance, Chinese trading networks are benefiting from the advantages of being part of a group or network of organizations (Zirh 2005:81).

Finally, transnational communities represent a highly formalized type of TNSS based on close social ties with frequent, stable and often symbolic exchanges. A high degree of familiarity, emotional investment, moral commitment and social cohesion are characteristics when it comes to transnational communities, which can manifest on different levels (Faist et al. 2014:65). In the globalized age geographical proximity is no longer required for the development of communities. Whereas a village community with their long-term solidarity is described as the simplest form of communities, border-crossing religious groups and churches such as Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam or Judaism are characterized as a more

complex type of community, which already existed long before the development of the modern states. In this sense, Diaspora, labour migration flows and long-distance trading corporations may also be considered as a transnational community¹¹ (Faist et al. 2014:25).

3.4.1.2. Transnational social practices

Stable and frequent social ties and practices are able to intensify and build the basis of TNSSs. For instance, migrants use transnational practices to communicate over geographical distant regions, travel back and forth between the home- and host-land or maintain social and financial contact. A transnational perspective addresses the notion that not only migrants are part of the TNSS, but immobile habitants of both the immigration country and the country of emigration are participants as well and use transnational practices. For instance, whereas migrants send remittances to support their families, they may receive e-mails from their children, get social calls or information about events back home. All those examples indicate that border-crossing practices are used to build a bridge between ‘here’ and ‘there’ and between different players (Faist et al. 2014:37). Therefore, transnational practices are not only related to migrants, but concern non-migrants as well:

Non-migrants who engage in core transnational practices are those whose social and economic lives depend upon and are shaped on a regular basis by resources, people, and ideas in the receiving country. (Levitt 2001b:199)

Thus “transnational flows are not limited to geographic mobility” (Guarnizo/Smith 1998:19) and as information and ideas flow not only between transnational communities, but also between home- and host-land non-migrants enter into the process of transnationalization. As a result, the transnational players in a TNSS are subdivided into “people at the core and at the periphery” (Zirh 2005:83). Migrants and non-migrants use transnational practices in diverse areas of their social life, which can be categorized accordingly (Faist et al. 2014:38).

Often the process of migration is not only based on an individual decision, but involves the whole family. Sending a family member abroad may constitute as an investment and survival strategy and as a result geographical separation frequently is “a rational family decision to preserve the family, a resourceful and resilient way of strengthening it: families split in order to be together translocally” (Chan 1997:195). In some cases, it takes years for the family to unite again and the separated families have to find ways to organize their lives across borders. As a result, transnationalism and transnational practices becomes part of the

¹¹ For further information on the connection between Diaspora and transnational communities, please refer to the book *Global Diasporas: An introduction* by Robin Cohen (1997).

daily life of family members (Faist et al. 2014:39). “‘Transnational families’ are defined here as families that live some or most of the time separated from each other, yet hold together [...]” (Bryceson 2002:3). To achieve the feeling of social cohesion these families use transnational practices to strengthen their connections are inevitable. However, changes and transformations either in the immediate core of the family or in the extended domestic circle due to the aspect of migration. “[T]he family undergoes changes because it must continue to meet the same set of needs within a dramatically changed context” (Landolt/Da 2005:627), which indicates that responsibilities and commitments are still in place even if the family is geographically separated (Faist et al. 2014:40).

In addition to familial transnational practices, researchers also differentiate between socio-cultural and economical practices. Socio-cultural transnational practices are characterized through a degree of institutionalization and the establishment of networks between communities across borders: “Sociocultural transnationalism refers to those transnational linkages that involve the recreation of a sense of community that encompasses migrants and people in the place of origin” (Itzigsohn/Saucedo 2002:777). Irrespective of the participation of either organization with stable structures or informal networks, socio-cultural practices expand the notion that financial remittances are the only key aspect when dealing with migrant communities. Instead, the new perspectives take societal and cultural practices into account as well and integrate these aspects in a transnational setting under a new term: “Social remittances are the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving-to sending-country communities” (Levitt 1998:926) and are transmitted when migrants get in touch with other players of TNSs (Faist et al. 2014:42-43). These social remittances are able to take the form of normative structures referring to the exchange of norms, values and thoughts, or to represent a system of practices based on norms. Furthermore, social-cultural practices are also associated with ideologies, social capital or political attitude towards subjects such as the system of democracy or basic human rights (Faist 2008:34).

Finally, the globalization of capital and labour creates opportunities for economic practices for migrants. Often migration flows itself are driven by economical considerations and as a result migrants search for a profitable employment beyond the borders of their home country. In addition, both migrants and non-migrants practice a variety of economical transnational practices ranging from small and informal exchanges such as financial remittances to broader and formalized activities like transnational entrepreneurship (Faist et al. 2014:45). Financial remittances are the lion’s share of economical practices, in which

migrants are directly involved. First and foremost, remittances are used to support spouses and children or relatives back home with living expenses. However, the money is also invested in the construction of houses, the acquisition of real estate or the appropriation of funds for community projects (Faist et al. 2014:46). Transnational entrepreneurs are described as owners of a company as well as self-employed persons, who travel abroad and use transnational practices to achieve sustained entrepreneurial success. This success relies on an extensive exchange of goods, capital, labour and services between two or more countries (Portes et al. 2002:284).

Summing up, different forms of transnational practices are used equally by migrants and non-migrants on a daily basis. However, the extent of the participation when it comes to transnational practices in the above described fields varies – as will be described in detail the following chapter:

Some individuals whose transnational practices involve many areas of social life engage in comprehensive transnational practices while others engage in transnational practices that are more selective in scope. (Levitt 2001b:198-199)

3.4.2. Operationalization of the concept

The emerging TNSSs are not described as homogenous space, but are a multi-local and multifaceted process that “affects power relations, cultural constructions, economic interactions, and, more generally, social organization at the level of the locality” (Guarnizo/Smith 1998:6). Therefore, one attempt to define a framework separates transnational practices of large scale political and economical organizations from individual migrants or migrant communities to explore the different aspects of interactions. This separation is based on the concept of “transnationalism from above” and “transnationalism from below” (Itzigsohn 2001:291). For instance, whereas activities of local communities “create and reproduce another kind of transnational migration social space [...] to sustain material and cultural resources in the face of the neoliberal storm” (Guarnizo/Smith 1998:7) is an example for transnationalism from below, practices of global organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which regulate the transnational flow of trade, capital, people and ideas, are classified as transnationalism from above (Zirh 2005:79-80).

In addition to this universal division, the extent, regularity and consistency of the involvement of migrants and non-migrants in transnational practices are categorized. Therefore, the concept of “narrow/broad” forms of transnational practices (Itzigsohn/Saucedo 2002:770) and the idea of “core/expanded transnationalism” (Levitt 2001b:198) were

developed. Whereas the terms “narrow” and “core transnationalism” refer to frequent and continuous participations of transnational players, the expressions “broad” and “expanded transnationalism” are used to describe intermittent and occasional engagement in this area (Faist et al. 2014:53). A similar point of view can be found in the concept of active and passive transnationalism, which deals with the influences and objectives on transnational practices. For instance, active transnationalism refers to institutions, which organize protests movements to initiate social or political transformation in their country of origin or reinterpret their cultural heritage based on their new experiences in the country of settlement. In contrast, passive transnationalism is used to describe practices such as financial remittances or annual visits, which have no long-term impact or are able to influence the socio-political situation in the home-land (Zirh 2005:80-81).

Since TNSSs are not an established research frame and have yet to be formalized, pioneers of the research on transnationalism suggest that TNSSs first have to be operationalized. In this sense, for a long period of time they used a dual scaling consisting of macro- and micro-level analysis referring to the home- and host-country of the migrants in order to subdivide the research field of TNSS. However, newly emerging approaches emphasize the necessity to overcome such generalization in the form of these controversial levels and propose to add a third level, called meso-level, to the research framework, which helps to understand the relations between the categories (Guarnizo/Smith 1998:25). As Thomas Faist recommends social networks and transnational communities as key elements of transnationalism from below should be factored in as an intermediate phenomenon, which builds a bridge between formalized opportunities and individual expectations and values. In other words, the meso-level is connecting the micro- with the macro-level and helps to complete the framework for TNSSs (Faist 2000a:31).

In this sense, the concept of TNSSs “has been celebrated for its conceptual functions as a new theoretical frame and analytical tool” (Zirh 2005:22), because the different levels are adequate enough to grasp the fluidity of the contemporary migratory phenomena. However, although the concept is taking the various levels into account, some issue based on the fluidity of transnational migration arrives. For instance, the belonging to more than one society causes not only a problem for the researchers, which are trying to analyze the position of migrants within a broader context, but also presents the migrants themselves with the question of their identity or affiliation. This development confronts researchers with a complex net of social relations and fluid and multiple identities of migrants as well as the role of the nation state and politically motivated advances (Zirh 2005:74-75). One of the first researchers to take on a

case study utilizing the three different levels of TNSSs are Glick-Schiller and her colleague Fouron, who examine the experiences of immigration of Haitian migrants in the United States as well as the transnational connections to their former home-land using the concept of TNSS (Glick Schiller/Fouron 1999).

In addition to the already mentioned three levels, another key element of the framework is actors and sites of TNSSs, which are divided based on their migratory experience. According to the American economist and social theorist Thomas Sowell the dynamics and characteristics of migrant communities are important elements and show differences “among the migrants themselves, in the circumstances from which they came and in the changing settings in which their lives evolve” (Sowell 1996:3). In this sense, characteristics of specific migratory experiences are based on the main aspects of sending-societies, transnational migrant communities and receiving-societies on equal terms and also help to understand contemporary transnational practices (Zirh 2005:86). For instance, to specify actors and sites of TNSS, the sociologist José Itzingsohn on the one hand focuses on the socio-political condition in the homeland such as the immigration process and to migration related institutions, which play an important role in shaping forms and types of transnational migration (Itzigsohn 1998:292). On the other hand, Castles concentrates on the host-land and points out that “the presence or absence of an established ethnic community to receive the migrants”, “state policies” and “the reaction to and perception of the immigrants by public opinion” (Castles 2000:357) are key elements to understanding the circumstances of being a migrant in host-lands (Zirh 2005:86-87). Furthermore, Faist emphasizes the importance of specific characteristics of migrant communities as well as socio-political structures and organizations within the home- and host-countries (Faist 2000a:192). In other words, “[t]ransnational actions are bounded to the transnational networks and the policies and practices of territorially-based sending and receiving local and national states and communities” (Guarnizo/Smith 1998:10).


Summing up, it can be said that a TNSS builds a reference frame for transnational migration. However, the consideration of different actors, levels and places is important when dealing with the home-land, transnational migrant communities and the host-land. In this master's thesis Japan is the country of settlement representing the macro-level and Korea as the country of origin constitutes the micro-level. Moreover, it is important to exploit the socio-economical and political condition of migrants before the migration process and the reason and motivation behind the emigration such as voluntarily or involuntarily and economic or political. In the case of Korean migrants, although former migration movements

have often been forced, especially during the annexation of Korea by Japan, contemporary migration movements are voluntary, which leads to the fact that this aspect will only be discussed briefly in the analyses. Furthermore, although there is also the possibility to examine the particular ways of migration, either as an asylum seeker or by contract, these factors are not relevant in the case of Korean migrants, since Korea is not among the present countries in need of asylum. However, the socio-political situation of Korea as the home-land offers valuable information. Moving on to the host-land, a significant aspect concerns the development of the Japanese-Korean relations, focusing on the main events and in particular recent incidents. Like in the case of the home-nation one of the key criteria involves the socio-political conditions of the host-land such as government policies, institutions and migration agreements as well as the immigration procedures, residence permits and integration policy. In addition, a meso-level focusing on migrant communities is added, which in the case of this thesis are the *Zainichi* in Japan. Significant factors in this unit such as the demographic constitution of the migrant flows, the social position of *Zainichi* in the Japanese society including their integration as well as, if applicable, any discriminatory actions against the migrants and the core destinations are pointed out (Zirh 2005:88-89). According to the German political scientist Kirsten Hoesch transnational exchanges and the diverse networks are empirically measurable. She suggests looking at economical relations such as financial remittances or company foundations specialized to fulfill the needs of the *Zainichi* community. Furthermore, Korean organizations and institutions, which explicitly focus on and promote relations and networks between actors in the two participating countries which are of financial, political or cultural matter, may also be an indicator to identify transnational exchange and diverse networks (Hoesch 2017:51-52).

All these indicators are taken into account and will be integrated into one of the levels of the framework as well as examined based on the availability of the data. Looking closer at the framework on the next page, the meso-level intertwines the micro- and macro-level with each other and in some cases, the criteria may overlap. For instance, since the migrant communities are part of societal structure of the host country, the analyses of these two aspects goes hand in hand. Furthermore, comparing the significance of the three levels, it can be concluded that the macro- and meso-level outweigh the micro-level. In other words, although Korea as the country of origin is able to deliver background information and consequently helps to build the fundament of the analyzed migration flow, the focus lies on the key variables of Japan as the host-country as well as the aspects of the *Zainichi* communities within the country respectively.

3.5. Framework based on the theory

The following illustration sums up the above described key aspects of the framework used in this thesis to analyze TNSS. Therefore, the macro-level analysis is focusing on Japan as the host-land, whereas the micro-level analysis is dealing with Korea as the home-land. In addition, *Zainichi* communities and networks in Japan consisting of Korean immigrants are analyzed on the meso-level.



Source: The illustration was developed by the author based on the secondary literature used in this chapter.

4. Migration in a transnational age in East Asia

After the development of criteria in the analytical framework, this part of the master's thesis analyzes migration flows from Korea to Japan after the turn of the millennium, especially focusing on the years from 2005 onwards given that it has been forty years since the relations between Korea and Japan have been normalized and a treaty has been signed. However, due to the significance of past incidents such as the Japanese-Korean relations or policies directly affecting the condition of contemporary *Zainichi* communities, based on the availability of the data the conditions of different generations of *Zainichi* will be taken into account as well. These findings may be able to facilitate a comparison with other migrant groups not only for the *Zainichi* communities as one entity, but also between the different generations of *Zainichi*. Therefore, the levels of the developed framework are analyzed according to the key criteria: starting with the micro-level analysis of the home-land Korea, moving on to the macro-level analysis of the host-land Japan and finally the meso-level analysis dealing with the *Zainichi* migrant communities and their relations to their home-land.

4.1. Micro-level analysis of the home-land: Korea

Korea has been a migration sending country until the early 1990s and, due to the long history of emigration, in general the Korean society still associates overseas migration simply with the term 'migration'. In fact, overseas migration has started from the late nineteenth century when a large number of people struggled with life in Korea by reason of the political and economic disorder as well as the loss of Korea's sovereignty. From 1910 onwards Japan became the number one target country and the migration flows from Korea to Japan increased drastically. However, with the acknowledgement of Korea's independence in 1945, although a great deal of Koreans returned from their host-countries, including Japan, to the peninsula, the outward trend still continued, but the target countries changed to Europe and the US in the 1960s and the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s. With the beginning of the 1990s, the situation in Korea changed due to the economic development and the diminishment of political concerns. As a result, whereas the number of Koreans migrating overseas is steadily declining, the number of foreigners immigrating into Korea is rapidly increasing. Since this point of time, although there exist large migrant communities outside of Korea, the nation has lost its classification as a sending nation (Shin et al. 2012:32-33).

4.1.1. Socio-economic and political conditions in Korea

4.1.1.1. Demographic and economic aspects

From 1980 to 2000 the Korean population increased quickly from over 37 to 47 million inhabitants. However, as any other industrialized nation, Korea also struggles with a low birthrate as well as the rapid ageing of its citizens. For more than a decade, the average population growth rate was less than 0.5 percent. It is expected that the population will start to decline by 2018. This demographic change brings forth a decrease of the young working population, while the number of people in retirement is increasing rapidly. The ageing population and large number of elderly people affect the social costs and the funding of public welfare such as health insurance or pensions of the country. In addition, the decrease of the young generation is expected to lead to a lack of labor in the future, to a reduction of tax revenues and to a declining domestic consumption. In other words, the basic demographic developments in Korea point out not only an increase of social benefits costs, but also a decline in labour productivity (Shin et al. 2012:8-9).

Looking at the cultural context of the country certain characteristics stand out including the nationality. Although Korea was frequently invaded by foreign nations, the last two being China and Japan, it is believed that since the founding of the first state on the Korean peninsula by *Dangun* 단군왕검, the common ancestor of Koreans, in 2333 b.c., the state has maintained a moderately homogeneous society. In fact, over 99 percent of the population is Korean and many foreigners from China and Mongolia have adopted surnames and became naturalized. However, due to an increased immigration flow Korea is now facing the development of a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society. This discourse on ethnic nationalism has been widely spread and was aspiring for different objectives such as to overcome Japanese colonialism, to deal with Western modernization processes or to reprocess the Korean War and the following division of the peninsula (Shin et al. 2012:21-22).

Considering the development of the key economic indicators of Korea, the following conclusions can be drawn: Since 2001 the Korean Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has nearly doubled and is showing a stable annual growth rate of about four percent. At the same time, the growth rate of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) per year amounts to about three percent, which is considered steady. Economists have concluded that the stable, continuous economic growth and consumer price rate, the industrial structure, the trade conditions as well as the labor market will be an increasingly attraction not only for Korean migrants to return to their country of origin, but also for foreigners looking for a job opportunity (Shin et al. 2012:11-

12). Data on the labor market from 2010 shows that over forty million Koreans are over fifteen years old and therefore able to participate at the labor market. However, among this population about sixty percent are considered working population and are economically active. Looking at the labor market participation based on gender it can be concluded that Korea has a male-centered economic structure, since about 73 percent of the working population are male. In 2010 the unemployment rate amounts to 3.7 percent and although it is constantly rising, it is still considered low. Nevertheless, if people on the search for jobs or those preparing for job interviews are included, the rate goes up to 5.9 percent and once the number of unemployed youths is included it reaches eight percent (Shin et al. 2012:12).

4.1.1.2. Policies and governmental actions dealing with outward migration

The year 1980 marks a turning point concerning the handling of the issue of outward migration in Korea. Due to the increasing international engagement of the Korean society and the subsequent influence, both socially and politically, the Korean government had to revise their position on emigration. As a result, in the following year the emigration overseas expansionary measures were put into effect. These measures consisted of a set of innovative government policies supervising the emigration process, while at the same time providing everybody who desires to migrate with the equal opportunity to follow through. Consequently, revisions were made concerning various aspects of the migration process, which include among others the simplification of the procedure as well as the application for the required documents, the abolishment of limitations on property, social status or income, more flexibility referring to the obligatory military service or the transformation of the system into a reporting one instead of a recruitment authorization program. Furthermore, as of April 1, 1984 the department of emigration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, took over the assignment of sending out emigrants from the former Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, since 1994 referred to as the Ministry of Health and Welfare (Shin et al. 2012:71).

Besides these measures, other policies and agreements of the government dealing with emigrants overseas including a number of established acts. These acts divide Korean overseas migrants into three groups based on the characteristic of migration: The first is ancestry migration, which is a migration flow rooted in relative relations, engagement or marriage. The second category is defined as the non-ancestry migration and takes the migration movements due to employment in a foreign company into account. Finally, local migration considers those migrants, whose primary intention was not overseas migration at the moment of their departure, however, who acquired long-term visa or permanent residency in a foreign country

such as Koreans in Japan. Furthermore, the acts also includes the general aspects of overseas migration, laws regarding the property of migrants as well as the registration and laws concerning the recruitment of overseas migrants by businesses and companies. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trades has to be notified in the case of the first two categories, ancestry and non-ancestry migration flows (Shin et al. 2012:80).

Another significant statute represents the Legislation on Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans, or short the Overseas Korean Act, deals with the Korean population residing in a foreign country overseas. The Act has been revised various times with the currently effective version established in 2011. Article 1 of this law states the purpose of not only providing the basic laws and regulations for overseas Koreans, but also includes details and the intent of the policy regarding the overseas Korean population. It aims to define the concept and legal status of the overseas citizens, to assure the return migration of these migrants and attempts to further outline the established policies. As a result, this legislation plays a significant role for overseas Koreans and builds the foundation of the policies and laws regulating outward and return migration flows. The Act defines the term ‘overseas Koreans’ and makes a distinction between overseas Korean nationals who have obtained a residence permit, Koreans who have acquire a foreign nationality and Koreans of the second generation whose parents have possessed the Korean nationality, but they themselves have appropriated a foreign nationality or citizenship. According to this legislation, the Korean government is duty bound to support these members of the population, once they are returning to their home country, and see to it, that they are treated fairly and be not discriminated. In the case of Koreans with a foreign nationality, the application for a visa is necessary, which allows them to reside in the country for up to three years and to hold down a job “to the extent that they don’t harm social order or economic stability” (Shin et al. 2012:81). In addition, these regulations ensure equal status and treatment of overseas Koreans and Korean nationals regarding foreign exchange, financial matters and real estate concerns as well as permit overseas Koreans to collect National Health Insurance benefits in case they stay more than ninety days in the country (Shin et al. 2012:80-81).

Apart from these established Acts and policies, after the Korea Immigration Service under the Ministry of Justice was established, the Korean government has been continually advancing collaboration and cooperation with partners overseas on the topic of migration policy (Shin et al. 2012:118). Although most of the agreements benefit immigrants to Korea, the signing of the Social Security Agreement also has an impact on overseas Koreans residing in foreign countries. In fact, the treaty helps to coordinate the social security systems of both

countries in order to advocate the involved parties. Consequently, the key intentions of a Social Security Agreement is equal treatment of the own citizens as well as foreign working population, the taking into account of the coverage periods, the exclusion of a dual coverage and the sending of overseas remittances of benefits. The equal treatment guarantees nationals of the collaborating countries that the same indicators are applied for the eligibility and imbursement of benefits. Whereas the aspect of taking into account the coverage periods permits a person to become entitled for benefits in case the applicant has worked in two countries such as in the case of permanent residents or long-term migrants, the exclusion of dual coverage prevents double payments to the social security systems of the country of origin as well as the host country by migrants working in a foreign country. Finally, the aspect of overseas remittances of benefits allows migrants to send benefits they receive abroad to their families or other beneficiaries in contracting countries without restrictions. In general, the law distinguishes ‘totalization-agreements’ from ‘contributions-only agreements’. While latter only ensures the exclusion of a dual coverage, the first takes all four described benefits into account. As of 2011, Korea has signed 26 Social Security Agreements; eighteen of which are totalization agreements with countries like Australia, Austria, Germany and the USA and the remaining eight represent contributions-only agreements. Japan has among other countries such as China, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, an agreement on a contributions-only basis (Shin et al. 2012:120-121).

4.1.2. Social aspects and motivation behind emigration

The beginnings of the Korean immigration to Japan have been related to the Japanese colonization at the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact, the Japanese colonial advances, including the following land reforms, which challenged the traditional settlement patterns of Koreans as well as pushed the rural population to move to find work, was considered one of the main reasons for Korean nationals to subsequently emigrate to Japan. To the most part Korean migrants were “the result of dire economic conditions in the Korean countryside [...] compelled to find work in Japan in order to live” (Kawashima 2009:94). Although the Korean immigration was limited in extent and just prior to the annexation of Korea the number of Koreans legally residing in Japan was about 790 of whom the majority was only temporary residents, the origins of the modern *Zainichi* communities in Japan can be found in this period (Rands 2011:106-107). However, until 1910 Korean immigrants were considered foreigners and only after the annexation they were regarded as Japanese nationals, which opened several paths for migrations flows. The majority of the Korean migrants were laborers seeking

employment opportunities in Japan (Rands 2011:124) In 1988, the Korean youth association *Zainichi Daikan Minkoku Seinenidan* 在日本大韓民國青年団 (translated: youth group of South Korean residents in Japan) published a report, which included the reason and motivation behind the emigration of the first wave of Korean immigrants to Japan. Based on the results nearly forty percent migrated for economic reasons, while about seventeen percent left Korea to follow their family or get married and 9.5 percent had academic motivation (Zainichi Daikan Minkoku Seinenkai 1988:29-30).

Although a large number of Koreans migrated to Japan and China, until the mid-1980s there was little to no contact not only between the South Korean government and migrant organizations, but also between migrants and their family or relatives, who remained behind. In addition, any movement between China and Korea was limited due to the Cold War period. Only in 1986 when a campaign was launched in order to search for separated families, Korean Chinese were among the first ethnic Korean immigrants with a foreign citizenship, who began to visit their country of origin. In a further step, the same immigrant group returned to Korea from 1992 onwards on a temporary visitor visa in order to fill the problematic labor shortages in certain industries arising by reason of a rapid economic growth and the following increase of the gross national income (GNI) level (Shin et al. 2012:50).

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) of Korea in 2005 about 6.6 million Koreans were residing abroad; the main target areas being North East Asia including China and Japan, and North America with the USA. In the following years, the number of overseas Koreans rose and remained at over seven million, except for the year 2009 which shows a slight decrease to 6.8 million Koreans. In 2015 the number amounted to nearly 7.2 million overseas residents, which equals almost ten percent of the total population of the Korean peninsula – population census of over fifty million South Koreans and over 25 million North Koreans (MOFAT 2016). Comparing this percentage with other emigration countries, although the emigration flow of Koreans is constantly decreasing since the turn of the millennium and especially after 2010, Korea still counts to the nations with a significant Diaspora due to the large migrant communities overseas (Shin et al. 2012:61). Of these migrants over sixty percent acquired the citizenship of their new host country, whereas the remaining migrants maintain their Korean nationality either as a permanent resident or with a temporary visa with the attempt to return to their country of origin in the foreseeable future (Shin et al. 2012:24). Looking at the ratio of emigrants versus returnees, the statistics indicate that since 1981 the annual number of permanent returnees compared to the total number of emigration applicants per year was always lower. However, 2008 is the first year, when the

net inflows of Korean return migrants, who renounce their migrant status and return home as transmigrants, exceeds the number of Korean emigrants by nearly 2,000. This trend continues the following years and in 2010, whereas the number of Koreans migrating to another country fell below the 1,000 mark to 889 emigrants for the first time, the amount of outflow continues to exceed 4,000 Koreans per year (Shin et al. 2012:61-62).

Looking closer at the areas with the highest immigration rate of Koreans, it is evident that due to the declaration and legislation of the “Emigration Act” passed in 1962, the primary target country until the end of the 1990s was the USA. Between 1999 and 2004 Canada received the highest numbers of Korean emigrants, however, eventually the USA once more took over the leading position, only to be exceeded by the Asian region a few years later (Shin et al. 2012:62-63). Nevertheless, as of the beginning of 2011, Asia is receiving the highest number of Korean emigrants with almost 56 percent, whereupon China is the primary target country in this region with about 37 percent of overseas Koreans, followed by Japan with nearly thirteen percent of Korean immigrants. As a result, together with the percentage of 23 of the USA, nearly eighty percent of the outward flow of Koreans is either residing in other East Asian countries, or in the US (Shin et al. 2012:63).

The motivation or purpose behind the emigration of Koreans is also taken into account. Whereas in the 1980s the vast majority of migrants emigrated based on the reason of family reunion and international marriages, the purpose of emigration has changed over time. Around the turn of the millennium the stated purpose for emigration shifted to work as main reason. Over 8,000 Koreans emigrated due to this motive followed by about 3,300 migrating to reunite with their families and about 2,400 to conduct business in the new host country. Since 2004 over 3,000 Koreans independently migrated to other countries in order to take up residency there. However, this number is rapidly declining. Whereas in 2005 about 2,800 Koreans moved due to family reunions and international marriages and circa 4,100 to work or conduct business, the numbers fell far below the 1,000 mark in the following years. In fact, only a little over 500 Koreans migrated for the former purposes and about 160 for the latter. On the other hand, the number of remigration or renouncement of emigration rose since the beginning of the 1980s constantly from about 1,200 and reached a peak with about 8,900 returnees in 1992. Since this year the figure is slightly declining and in 2006 there are more returnees than emigrants for the first time. For instance, in 2010 a total of 889 Koreans migrated to a new host country, whereas 4,611 Koreans returned to their country of origin (Shin et al. 2012:62).

Moving on to the social issues regarding the emigration, in the past, the main concern of the Korean society was the impact of the remittances send by Koreans overseas in order to support their left behind family. However, in the last decade, the focus shifted to other areas such as the protection and extension of political rights for overseas Koreans, the financial loss for Korea since overseas Koreans also spend the majority of their money overseas and the brain drain of post-graduate students. Especially the third aspect plays a significant role, since studies indicate that students with a doctor degree, and especially those with degrees in engineering or sciences, tend to stay in their host countries after graduation (Shin et al. 2012:65). Another aspect concerns the rising negative balance of investments in the educational field. Compared to the expenditure of foreign students on domestic education and training courses, Koreans spend much more abroad on education leading to a deficit. For instance, the official measures show that the imbalance more than doubled since 2000 and reached a record high of thirty percent in 2010 (Shin et al. 2012:67).

The last aspect concerning the political rights of overseas Koreans developed gradually and became one of the main social issues. Although the granting of political rights to Koreans living overseas has been discussed since 2005, the ‘Public Offices Election Law’ established in 2009 was the turning point. This law allowed political rights including the participation in the presidential election and other elections for representatives in congress for Koreans residing in a foreign country, as long as they maintained their nationality and have no resident registration in Korea. The year 2012 marked the first opportunity for overseas Koreans to make use of their rights and participate in the presidential elections¹². There are two controversial factors in connection with the granting of political rights. First, the additional costs for the administrative process of elections. Overseas Koreans do not only have to register as voters at least sixty days prior to the election, but often also drive to distant polling stations in order to give their vote. The second factor refers to the possibility of the pro-North Korean population to interfere with South Korean politics. For instance, a large number of these sympathizers residing in Japan is allowed to vote and therefore able to shape the outcome of the election (Shin et al. 2012:67-68).

Another important aspect is social issues caused by ethnic Korean immigrants staying in South Korea. Whereas in 2001 the total number of ethnic Koreans was about 127,000, this population increased significantly and reached about 267,000 in 2006. In 2010 the number reached a peak and increased to over 470,000, which amounts to about 38 percent of the total

¹² Based on statistics of the MOFA in South Korea, in 2012 a turnout of 71.2 (158,235) percent overseas absentees and overseas voters cast their votes, including 25,312 *Zainichi* in Japan (MOFA 2015:408-409).

foreign population. As of 2010, the majority of ethnic Koreans with about 87 percent hold a Chinese citizenship, followed by 7.5 percent with an American and two percent with a Canadian residency. Looking at the reasons for ethnic Koreans to return to their country of origin, in 2006 the majority of Korean re-migrants came back to visit family (41 percent), followed by work related motivation with 27 percent. However, since 2007 the purpose of remigration changed radically due to the introduction of the Visit and Employment Program and about 65 percent returned in order to work in Korea while only 3.3 percent considered coming back and visiting relatives (Shin et al. 2012:54-55). Another aspect is the possibility to work as low skilled labor force in certain industries such as agriculture or manufacturing. However, while low skilled ethnic Koreans are seen as part of the foreign temporary labor force, they are subject to special regulations and hold a privileged position over non-Korean immigrants (Shin et al. 2012:57)

4.2. Macro-level analysis of the host-land: Japan

Japan is not a typical migration receiving country compared to other nations such as the United States, since policies and immigration laws prevent mass immigration into the country. However, recent events like the global economic crisis in 2008 and the 2011 catastrophes have influenced the position of Japan towards immigration. Furthermore, Japan has one of the fastest ageing societies in the world. Together with a low birth rate, a long life expectancy, the baby-boom generation rapidly reaching retirement age and not enough young people to maintain the social welfare system, the government is facing a loss in tax revenue from a declining labor force and an overstrained health-care and pension system. As a result, although the overall public opinion towards immigration and immigrants remains negative, the government has to consider the option of more immigrants in order to keep the Japanese economic and social system afloat (Green 2017:#17-18). However, while migration movements to Japan have continuously increased since 1990, the government is still able to control the migration flows to a great extent. As a result, policies promote the immigration of so-called ‘desirable’ immigrants, which immediately are able to contribute to the Japanese economy (Green 2017:#24). Overall, the Japanese government is not drawing attention on the issue of immigration, since the numbers of immigrants are still very small and Japan is not considered as a primary target for migration (Green 2017:#1).

4.2.1. Relations between Korea and Japan

In 1868, after the opening of Japan a period of rapid innovation and transformation took place to ensure the emergence of Japan as a modernized nation and the maintenance of its autonomy, which is known as the Meiji Restoration (*Meiji ishin* 明治維新). In this course, due to the desire to gain a greater power status within the international system and to extend the borders of their nation state, following the example of European nations, Japan centered her attention on the Korean peninsula as a valuable target. The reasons for an annexation Korea were numerous including the insurance of Japan's national safety, the elimination of a future threat, the promotion of prosperity and welfare in Korea and the strengthening of both countries through amalgamation, which was rather uncomplicated on grounds of the prevailing similarity in culture and race (Iyenaga 1912:201).

Following the victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Japanese government formalized its power over Korea and formulated a treaty stating the annexation of the Korean Empire by the Japanese Empire and is known as the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1910¹³. With the signing of this treaty Korea became a colony of the Japanese empire and therefore subject to the political and legal regulations of the Japanese government (Lone 1991:161). Furthermore, Japanese values, culture, religion and lifestyle were introduced in order to assimilate the Korean people. Different areas of life were affected by this assimilation process including religious affiliation, educational system, national language and the initiative to use the Japanese pronunciation instead of the Korean one when referring to names (Sunoo 2006:249-250). All these efforts were made under the slogans “Naisen ittai” 内鮮一体 (translated: ‘Japan and Korea are one entity’) and “Naisen yūwa” 内鮮融和 (translated: ‘Harmony between Japan and Korea’) to achieve Japanese-Korean unity (Jeon 2011:46).

Concerning the field of migration, around 1920 Japan developed a plan to support unqualified labour, which led to a steady migration flow of Koreans fleeing from the difficult situation in their home nation to try their luck in Japan. During this time, these movements “were defined as internal rather than international migration” (Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006:#5). Primary target areas were Ōsaka and Kōbe, where they were working under extreme working conditions in the fields of mining and railway construction (Shipper 2002:54). Between 1910 and 1940 the number of Korean immigrants in Japan has risen from about 2,600 to over 1 million. Due to Japan's participation in the war and the constant efforts to expand their

¹³ Nowadays, this treaty is counted among the unequal treaties. Originally the term was used when speaking of treaties signed by China and Japan with Western powers in the nineteenth and twentieth century. However, it also applies to the mentioned treaty between Korea and Japan. For more information, please refer to Auslin 2004.

territory at the end of the 1930s resulting in the lack of labour and troops, a national mobilization act was enacted, which led to compulsory labour and as a result to forced migration to Japan from the colonized Asian nations including Korea. Until the end of the Second World War over 2.2 million Koreans were either voluntary or involuntary living and working in Japan (Tamura 2003:80-81).

Among those forced Korean immigrants were also women, who were brought to war zones and forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese army. These women were called “comfort women”, which is a euphemism for ‘prostitute’ and translated from the Japanese term *ianfu* 慰安婦. The exact number of comfort women is unknown, however, it was estimated that between 70,000 and more than 200,000 women and girls, the majority being Korean, were forced to work as prostitutes (Soh 1996:1227)¹⁴.

After the end of the Second World War most of the 2 million Koreans returned to their home country. This repatriation of about 1.1 to 1.4 million Koreans caused a significant downward movement concerning the Korean population in Japan. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the number of Korean immigrants remained constant at about 520,000, while facing the issue of legal status under the Alien Registration Law of 1952. This law stated that ethnic minorities are to be treated the same way as if they were foreigners, which led to occupational segregation (Tamura 2003:83). Furthermore, it also enabled the Japanese government to monitor and check up on foreigners including Koreans entering Japan and those already living in the country for several decades. Although the Immigration Control Law was based on the American model, the framework on which the policy for immigration in postwar Japan relied on did not encourage migrants to settle permanently in the country as well as to apply for naturalization. In fact, the status of foreign residents in Japan and their integration into the society were often not given (Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006:#10-11).

During the economic boom of Japan in the 1960s, the country faced once more labour shortages. However, this time the government decided not to rely on foreign workers, but to advance their technical development and increase the mechanization of industrial production, which influenced the immigration flow to Japan until the end of the 1970s. Nevertheless, Japans’ status as rising, global economy, the increase of the value of the yen, cumulative lack of labor as well as the emergence of transnational networks, which also included migrant brokers, led the way for a new migration movement. More and more foreign workers, the

¹⁴ The existence of “comfort women” was only publicly announced in the 1990s and since then the topic became object of research and a discourse was developed. For more detailed information see Soh 2009, Tanaka 2009 and Yoshimi 2000.

majority of them still being Korean, were entering the country. Gradually the immigrants were divided into two distinctive groups by researchers: immigrants, who entered the country before 1952 and have resided in Japan, including their descendants, were called ‘old comers’, whereas those who arrived since 1980 were referred to as ‘new-comers’ (Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006:#7-8).

The number of these new arrivals increased further with the transformation of the immigration policy, which included the adjudication of a series of social rights for foreigners in consequence of the efforts by Korean residents and the modification of legal basis after Japan’s ratification of the international human rights agreements in 1979 (Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006:#12-13). Furthermore, with the beginning of the 1980s public research institutes such as universities were permitted to hire foreigners as permanent staff and thus the immigration rate of Koreans slowly increased to 570,000 until 1986 (Tamura 2003:84).

The year 1989 presents a major turning point. Due to the increasing population movements across national borders and the growth of the figure of those overstaying their visa, the Japanese government reformed the Immigration Control Law. As a result, while employer sanctions discouraged ‘illegal’ employment and ‘unskilled’ foreign labor was no longer accepted, the visa categories were rearranged to facilitate the immigration of skilled, educated and professional labor. However, ‘unskilled’ labor movements were still possible. Either through a trainee system, which was officially launched in 1993 as the Technical Internship Program and conveyed labor to industries such as agriculture, construction or textile, or as part of the recruitment of *Nikkeijin* 日系人¹⁵, the descendants of Japanese emigrants, who were given residential status and the freedom of choice when it comes to employment after they entered the country (Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006:#14-15). This led to an increase of immigration from Japanese Brazilians. According to statistics of the Immigration Bureau the number of *Nikkeijin* tripled from about 56,000 in 1990 to over 188,000 in the year 2000. When looking at the number of foreigners by nationality in 2000, Koreans still composed the largest group with over 529,000, followed by Chinese and the ethnic group of Brazilians (Statistics Bureau 2014). Eventually, the implemented New Immigration Control Law was inviting not only people from Brazil, China or Korea, but from other nations as well to boost Japan’s development toward an internationalized nation (Tamura 2003:84). However, the annexation of Korea between 1910 and 1945, the recruitment of compulsory labour, forced

¹⁵ For further information on this ethnic community as well as measures taken by the Japanese government, please refer to MOFA 2000.

migration to Japan and the subject of “comfort women” affects the relations between Japan and Korea to this day.

4.2.2. Immigration and Korean-Japanese relations since the turn of the millennium

At the turn of the millennium Japan faced a number of demographic challenges including an aging society, declining birthrates and labor shortages as well as social problems concerning among others minority groups. In 2000 Japan’s population was 126.9 million, accounting for the ninth largest in the world and one of the four most-densely populated countries, due to the largely mountainous landscape with declining fertility and mortality rates. As a result, Japan’s population aged rapidly, which is shown on the basis of the proportion of the population age 65 and over. Whereas in 1950 the number accounted for five percent of the population, it rose to 15.7 percent in 1997 and amounted to over 21 percent in a little while after entering the new millennium (Karan 2005:164-165)¹⁶. Compared to the relative low fertility rate of 1.3 in 2000 Japan is one of the fastest ageing populations in the world. Therefore, the politics concerning immigration had to adapt to the constantly shifting demographics (Vogt 2008:1-2).

To the same conclusion came the United Nations in 2000 and published a report on the topic of replacement migration and whether it is a solution to the ageing and declining population. The UN conducted a case study focusing on various different nations, including Japan, struggling with a rapid ageing population and a declining birth-rate. This report defines replacement migration as “the international migration that a country would need to offset population decline and population ageing resulting from low fertility and mortality rates” and suggests an increase of migrant population to counteract these developments (UN 2000). After the turn of the millennium, the number of foreign residents in Japan rose steadily from about 1.6 million in 2001 to over 2 million in 2007. In 2008 it reached a peak with 2,144,682 foreign residents, which as measured by the total population of Japan is about 1.67 percent (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2015:22). However, compared to other OECD nations such as France (6.1 percent), Germany (8.2 percent) or the United States (7.1 percent) Japan’s overall percentage of foreign population is extremely low. Furthermore, from 2008 to 2013 the number remained around 1.6 percent (OECD 2016).

¹⁶ In general, the aging of a population is calculated on the basis of the population 65 or older and classified into three categories: In Japan, the term *kōreika shakai* 高齢化社会 (ageing society) was applied in the 1980s and 1990s, since between 7 and 14 percent of the population were over 65. Afterwards Japan entered the next stage, which is 14 to 21 percent of the society, and the term *kōrei shakai* 高齢社会 (aged society) was used. Since 2006 Japan has entered the last stage referred to as *chōkōrei shakai* 超高齢社会 (overaged society), which means that over 21 percent of the population are 65 years or older (Coulmas 2007:15).

At the end of 2014, the Population Census by the Statistics Bureau concluded the same share; however, this figure was composed of 1,763,422 mid to long-term residents and about 358,000 special permanent residents. The total number of residence increased roughly 2.7 percent compared to 2013. According to the statistics on the nationality of these residents over thirty percent (654,777) are from China, followed by Korea (23.6 percent, or 501,230) and the Philippines (10.3 percent, or 217,585). Looking at the changes in the number of these foreign residents by year it is evident that the number of Korean residents is continually decreasing since 2005 and dropped about 3.6 percent from 2013 to 2014. Although residents of Chinese origin also declined since 2011, the number increased from 2013 to 2014 by 5,699 residents (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2015:22-23). However, the numbers of foreign residents in Japan vary and in some cases decrease slightly. For instance, the decline in the number of *Zainichi* in Japan is influenced by two distinctive developments: On the one hand, the aging of immigrants of the first generation resulting in a relatively high death rate among this share of the population. On the other hand, the decline is affected by the naturalization of foremost young Koreans. In fact, every year over 10,000 *Zainichi* of the third and fourth generation acquire the Japanese citizenship and as a result from this point onward are registered as Japanese in public statistical data while at the same time continue to be part of the Korean communities (Vogt 2008:6). As for the third country, the number of residents from the Philippines is steadily increasing since 2005 and in 2012 exceeding the declining number of foreign residents from Brazil (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2015:23). This rapid decline of *Nikkeijin* since 2009 was the result of a decree issued by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in order to counterbalance the high unemployment rate in Japan. According to this enactment, the Japanese government is offering to pay 300,000 yen (about Euro 2,300, as of April 2009)¹⁷ for every unemployed worker of Japanese descent, who is currently in Japan on a privileged “long-term resident” visa, and 200,000 yen (about Euro 1,500) for each family member accompanying them back to their own ‘home country’. This repatriation bribe further includes the clause that they are not alleageable to return to Japan with this special work visa ever again (MHLW 2009).

Moving on to the progress of the relations between Korea and Japan it is evident that there have been some major developments. In 2002 the FIFA World Cup as the first World Cup held in Asia was hosted by South Korea and Japan. Originally both countries had individual bids; however, they agreed to collaborate and united their bids. Up until now this

¹⁷ The amount in Euro in this case and the following cases was calculated by the author based on the exchange rate of the corresponding month and year.

World Cup remains the only one hosted by two countries. Although, there were quite a view reservations concerning topics such as the cultural and language barriers, logistical problems of a co-hosting arrangement or the infrastructure, Japan and Korea had a common goal and worked together in order to fulfill the Asian dream of a perfect World Cup. For this purpose, both countries made co-operative efforts and organized various meetings, working visits and inspections as well as attended events in both Korea and Japan (FIFA 2003). This experience is described as follows:

It provoked the formation of a fragile alliance between the two East Asian states and their people whose relationship is still deeply tainted by memories of the Japanese annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1910 and the colonial oppression during parts of the first half of the twentieth century. (Manzenreiter/Horne 2002:3)

As a result, mutual exchanges and interests between Japan and Korea were following the joint hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, and various Japan-ROK summits were held, including the Japan-Korea Friendship Year 2005 to “commemorate the 40th anniversary of the normalization of relations between the two countries in order to further solidify mutual understanding” under the slogan “Together! Toward the future, into the world” (MOFA 2005:29). Furthermore, with the beginning of the new millennium, a phenomenon known under the term *Hanryū* 韓流 (translated: Korean wave) or Korea-Boom and referring to the increasing global popularity of South Korean culture, is spreading across Asia including Japan. As a result, Korean television dramas were broadcasted in Japan including the drama *Winter Sonata* in 2002, which is seen as the initial entrance of the Korean Wave in Japan followed by K-pop and other cultural goods (Chua/Iwabuchi 2008:4-5). As a result, the Japanese MOFA acknowledged that the Korean Wave in Japan has contributed not only to ongoing discussions, but also initiated joint cultural exchanges between the two nations as well as increased the number of people traveling between the countries to about four million. Furthermore, there was also active inter-governmental exchange, such as summit meetings between President Roh Moo Hyun and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō 小泉純一郎 on Jeju Island in 2004 (MOFA 2006:21).

The year 2015 marks the fiftieth anniversary since Japan and Korea signed the “Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea” and therefore celebrations were held in Tōkyō and Seoul attended by officials from both countries. The objective was to lead Japan and Korea in a new and prosperous future. For this purpose, the issue of the “comfort women” was addressed as well. Whereas, the Japanese Prime Minister, Abe Shinzō 安倍晋三, apologized in public to the comfort women for their physical and psychological suffering and

experiences, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Kishida Fumio 岸田文雄, assured that the government would provide one billion yen (about Euro 7.5 billion) in order to help with the care of the surviving comfort women. The South Korean president, Park Geun-hye, took these actions on the part of Japan as a sign of positive progression in Korean-Japanese relations. Furthermore, the agreement is seen as a worthy ending of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the normalization of the relations between the nations as well as the beginning of a new era (MOFA 2016:39).

4.2.3. Socio-political conditions for immigrants

As already mentioned above, Japan has one of the fastest ageing populations and therefore a continuously declining working-age population as well as total population. However, one objective of the country is a steady level of economic growth on an international stage and in order to achieve this goal structural reforms and innovations were kept in mind while implementing new immigration policies. Among those is the aim to become one of the safest countries in the world in anticipation of the Tokyo Olympic Games in 2020 where the number of foreign nationals visiting Japan is expected to pass the number of visitors until then by far. Therefore, the Immigration Bureau is providing measures to further ensure a smooth immigration procedure and safe conditions for foreign nationals in Japan. This includes the implementation of new immigration policies and laws as well as measures for the immigration procedure after landing and the legal status of visitors and residents (Immigration Bureau 2015:82).

4.2.3.1. Recent developments concerning immigration policies and laws

In 1992, the Basic Plan for Immigration Control was first formulated based on discussions with various experts on the topic of immigration, administration and policy making. Since then it was updated continuously and with 2015 the fifth edition became effective. In general, this plan aims to specify the guidelines concerning the management of entry of foreign nationals as well as to simplify the situation of foreign residence in Japan and all related matters. Moreover, the objective is also to present basic theories for immigration control administration measures at home and abroad in order to suggest proper responses. As a result, over the last decade a number of topics, like for example the demographic development of Japan, measures towards a tourism-oriented country or efforts concerning the acceptance of foreign residents not only into the society, but also as labor force, have influenced the immigration policy of Japan (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2015:78-79).

One of the most discussed and an important theme in Japanese policy making is the rapid ageing of the Japanese population and the continuous population decline since 2006. These circumstances have pointed out the importance of counterbalancing the consequences of labor shortages and fiscal burdens through migrant labor. Especially the business community is emphasizing the urgency of relaxing policies concerning human resources (Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006:#31). The Japanese government responded by promoting the acceptance of foreign nationals as human resources into the Japanese economy and society, who will contribute to economic growth. Therefore, landing permissions and status of residence are being revised to allow foreign nationals to work in technical and professional fields and foreign students, who graduated from a Japanese university or institute, are gradually integrated into the job market (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2015:83). As a third measure in this area, foreign nationals are recruited in fields of urgent need of human resources and serious labor shortages such as in the medical field or in nursing services. However, before foreign doctors and nurses are allowed to practice in Japan, they have to pass the national examination (Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006:#32).

Another issue is the rising crime rate and deterioration of public security as cause of concern among the public. The general perception is that immigrants and “particularly those with unauthorized or questionable status in the country” (Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006:#28) are contributing to these developments. The discourse shows that often migrants are perceived as potential threats, not only to the national security, but also to public safety. Furthermore, it is believed that through such actions foreigners disrupt the harmony and peace of the Japanese society, which are core values in the Japanese society (Vogt 2014:63-64). To address these questionable claims, the government has implemented a plan including measures such as a stricter control of the status of residency upon entry or the expansion of immigration control employees in 2003. Furthermore, in 2004 the government has amended the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in order to reduce the figure of unauthorized foreign residents (Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006:#29-30).

The third topic addresses the exploitation of specific visa categories not only by foreign nationals, but by Japanese companies as well, which in particular concerns the training system. Often, small- and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) use this visa category to hire unskilled – and therefore cheap – labor, working under harsh conditions and for extremely low earnings (Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006:#33-34). Originally the aim of the technical intern training system was to facilitate international contribution and transfer skills and know-how. However, the practical application often did not meet this objective and instead used it to exploit labour. In

response, the government established stricter review procedures for the trainee system such as monitoring the supervising organizations and initiated the application of labor laws for trainees (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2015:81). Furthermore, to protect technical trainees and give them the opportunity to report misconduct, supervising organizations were established, who deal with the human rights protection of interns and in case of a violation impose a sanction on the companies. In addition, the revisions to the technical intern program also included the possibility to extend the training period, the introduction of a fixed quota to accept the interns after their programs and in case of necessity the option of such a program was also given to different industries depending on their economic situation (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2015:84-85).

An aspect valued by the Immigration Control Act is the realization of a tourism-oriented country. Therefore, the government launched a campaign in 2004, targeting specifically Korean and Chinese visitors, which aimed to increase the number of international tourists visiting Japan to ten million by 2010. Furthermore, Japan has eased the tourist visa category for Korean citizens, visiting Japan in the course of a school excursion, which last less than thirty days. These resulted in an increase of nearly fifteen percent of Korean and Chinese tourists' visiting Japan in 2005 (Kashiwazaki/Akaha 2006:#38-40). With respect to the hosting of the Olympic Games in 2020 the Japanese government is working on measures to facilitate even smoother landing procedures and further increase the promotion as a tourism-oriented country. As a result, various measures are implemented in order to reduce the waiting time such as stand-by interpreters, assisting officers to ensure quick and smooth process at the examination booths (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2015:101-102).

4.2.3.2. Immigration procedures and legal status in Japan

The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) is the responsible governmental organization for immigration control services and consists of the Immigration Bureau, eight regional bureaus, seven district immigration offices as well as 61 branch offices and two immigration centers (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2016:#Organization/Structure). The already above mentioned Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, short Immigration Control Act, as well as additional laws and regulations like for example the residency management system are the basis of all the immigration procedures and processes (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2016:#Immigration Process).

According to the Immigration Control Act foreigners are required to have a valid passport, when they want to enter Japan, which will be subject to the examination of an

immigration inspector. Furthermore, before the status of residence and period of stay is authorized, foreign nationals have to fulfill the following conditions upon landing in Japan: Additional to the valid passport, foreign nationals also have to hold a valid visa, which was issued by a Japanese consular officer. This visa not only confirms that the passport held by the foreign national was obtained legally and by an authorized institution, but it also indicates that the “entry or stay in Japan is recommended as being appropriate in accordance with the conditions appearing on the visa” (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2016:#Entry Procedures). Upon arrival, foreign nationals have to fill out a form, stating the activities they will be engaging in while staying in Japan. These activities specified on the application do not only have to be true, but also have to fall under one of the status of residence. Furthermore, the in the application requested period of stay has to comply with the provisions of the MOJ and finally, none of the grounds for denial of landing should be applicable to the foreign national. After landing an immigration inspector will collect the filled out application and information on personal identification including fingerprints and, if the applicant is over sixteen, a photograph (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2016:#Entry Procedures).

The total number of visas issued at foreign diplomatic missions for the year 2009 was about 1.4 million, which represents a decrease of 7.5 percent from the last year due to the recession in 2008 and compared to other foreign currencies a strong Japanese yen, which affected the number of foreign visitors to Japan. The total number of visas issued for the year 2010 increased by about 35 percent, before decreasing 28 percent to about 1.4 million again in the year 2011. In 2013, although the total number of issued visas fell by about six percent, the number of foreign visitors increased and exceeded ten million for the first time due to the relaxation policy of the Japanese government and the extension of visa exemption for member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In 2015, the total number of visas issued abroad was about 4.7 million, which represents an increase of 66 percent from 2014 and is stated to be the largest number ever and marked a record high. According to the Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO) factors benefitting this development are among others the promotion of Japan as a tourism-oriented country by the Japanese government, the relaxation of visa requirements, the extension of the consumption tax exemption program and the weakening yen. Taking the nationality of the visa recipients into account, in 2009 23,525 visas were issued to Korean nationals. The following years this number continued to remain around 22,000 and therefore from 2009 until 2014 Korea is among the top ten countries including China, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia, which account for approximately ninety percent of the total number of visas issued every year by a diplomatic

mission of Japan abroad. However, in 2015 China, the Philippines and Indonesia were the top three recipients of Japanese visa and China alone accounted for around eighty percent of the total number of issued visas, whereas about 20,400 Koreans applied for a visa (MOFA 2017).

The status of residence is the legal categorization for all foreign nationals, who enter and stay in Japan. At the present time, there are about thirty different types, which are defined based on either the personal relationship or status on which the residence is authorized or the activities authorized to engage in and while a lot of statuses fall under the mid- to long-term residency, only a few are considered for short-term stays. The most common example for latter are the residence status of a “Temporary Visitor”, allowing sightseeing, recreation, visiting relatives or participating in a conference for the period of ninety days, thirty days or fifteen days (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2016:#List of statuses of residence). Korea is among the 67 national countries that according to the “Reciprocal Visa Exemption Arrangement” do not have to obtain a visa to enter Japan in case of short-term stay or rather for a period of ninety days or less if they only plan to engage in the above stated activities. Consequently, a “Temporary Visitor’s” visa is only for non-remunerative activities and can not be used for economic activity (MOFA 2017).

Other categories for activities requiring a visa are for example students/researchers, trainees/interns, skilled professionals/specialists, entertainers/artists or diplomats/officials. All those statuses of residence fall under a visa category permitting the stay from around 30 days to up to five years, depending on the engaged activities and therefore are considered mid- to long-term stays. Examples for the authorization of a mid- to long-term status of residence between six months and five years are based on the personal relationship such as spouses or children of Japanese nationals or spouses or children of those, who reside in Japan as “(Special) Permanent Residents”. Furthermore, there is a differentiation between the status of “Long Term Residents”, who are authorized to reside in Japan for a designated period of time by the MOJ in consideration of special circumstances including adopted children or Japanese descendents, and the status of “Permanent Residents”, who are permitted to stay for an unlimited period of time by the MOJ based on certain legal requirements such as the length of the stay in Japan or records of tax payments and steady employment (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2016:#List of statuses of residence).

The legal status of “Special Permanent Residents” – in Japanese *tokubetsu eijūsha* 特別永住者 – is particularly important for Korean citizens. The term is mainly used to describe residents of Japan, who are descendents of former Japanese colonies such as Korea and were

subjects of the Japanese empire. However, in 1952, when the Treaty of San Francisco was established, they lost this status. Although Korean residents in Japan, called *Zainichi* 在日¹⁸, were permitted to become Japanese citizens by means of naturalization, many hesitated due to widely spread anti-Korean prejudice. In 1965 the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea was signed establishing basic diplomatic relations between the two countries and at the same time granting these *Zainichi* the legal status of “Special Permanent Residents”. Since then, the Japanese government has taken actions to integrate *Zainichi* in the Japanese population. In the 1970s for example, the access to social security benefits was extended to Koreans, in 1982 Koreans and their descendants living in Japan since before the end of the Second World War were given permanent residence status and in 1993 the fingerprinting of Koreans and other permanent residents during the immigration procedure was abolished (Suzuki 2017:3-4). The number of foreign nationals living in Japan under this specific status of residence has constantly risen accounting to about 500,000 special residents in 2006, who were brought to Japan before and during the Second World War from colonies in Korea, Taiwan and China as well as their descendants (Brophy 2006:#2). According to public statistics on foreign residents in Japan, in 2014 there were 358,409 special permanent resident visa holders residing in Japan of which over 98 percent accounted for *Zainichi*. Therefore, an overwhelming majority of this special resident visa category is from Korean descendent (Statistics Bureau 2015). In addition, in 2015 over two million foreign residents were living in Japan of whom about thirty percent are holding a permanent resident status (Kodama 2015:1).

There are certain aspects when it comes to mid- to long-term stays in Japan, which are regulated by the residency management system. Examples are the Certificate of Eligibility, the Application for a Residence Card or the Special Permanent Resident Certificate. According to the Immigration Control Act a foreign national, who intends to enter Japan not as a “Temporary Visitor”, but under another status of residence, is examined by the MOJ in advance. If the applicant meets the criteria for the desired status of residence, a certificate stating the fulfilled requirements is issued. This document is known as certificate of eligibility. The objective of this confirmation is, on the one hand to simplify the immigration procedure for foreign nationals and allowing them to engage in the states’ activities, while on the other hand, to make the system and control of immigration more efficiently (Immigration Bureau of

¹⁸ Originally, the term ‘zainichi’ was used to refer to all foreign nationals residing in Japan. However, in this thesis it only refers to South Korean nationals living in Japan. For a detailed definition please refer to chapter 4.3.1. of this thesis.

Japan 2016:Entry Procedures). If a foreign national is permitted to stay for a mid- to longterm period in Japan due to reasons such as change of residence status, extension of period or a new landing permit, a residence card is issued. This card is like a certificate allowing the foreign national to reside in the country until a fixed expiration date. A residence card contains important personal information such as name, gender, birth date, nationality, address, status of residence, the period of stay as well as a if employment is permitted and a photograph of the face. The residence card holder is responsible to update the information stated on the card if necessary (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2016:Procedures concerning the residency management system). Finally, a special permanent residence card is a certificate, which proves the legal status of a special permanent resident. It contains personal information of the card holder such as name, gender, birth date, nationality, a photograph of the face, domicile as well as the expiration date (Immigration Bureau of Japan 2016:Procedures concerning the issuance of a special permanent resident certificate).

4.2.3.3. Public opinion on immigration

Due to various factors such as the growing economy, the lack of experience with large-scale immigration and the image of an exceedingly homogenous society, aspects influencing the public opinion towards immigration and foreign residents that are normally taken into account when analyzing the point of view of a nation towards the issue of migration, may not have the same impact within Japan. In fact, the public opinion may be influenced by other factors, takes different aspects into account and provides innovative perspectives on this topic (Green/Kadoya 2015:60-61).

As highlighted in the previous chapters, over the last decades Japan has witnessed a stable migration flow and therefore an increase of foreign residents. In the 1990s important revisions concerning the migration policy, which was dominated by a rather restrictive agenda since the postwar era, took place in order to overcome serious labour shortages (Mazumi 2015:18). Furthermore, immigration has been introduced as one effective way of ‘internationalization’ and outward orientation through a greater exposure to foreign nations (Green/Kadoya 2015:63-64). Although, the number of registered foreigners reached a historic high with more than 2.2 million in 2015, compared to the total Japanese population, this number remains small, the increase of migrants and foreign residents still symbolizes a significant social transformation of the contemporary Japanese society (Mazumi 2015:18).

Therefore, a new period has started and the image of Japan is changing due to the efforts of the society. For instance, already in 2006 the Ministry of Internal Affairs and

Communications (MIC) has implemented a plan on prefectural and national level to not only preserve Japanese cultural sites and traditions, but also to foster awareness for cultural traditions brought into the country by immigrants and facilitate communication especially between the young generations. However, the Japanese society is still rather opposed to the plan of a transformation of the Japanese culture into a multi- and transcultural society. In 2009, a study was conducted in Ōsaka and about half of the interviewed residents stated that they were not influenced by the foreign population or have changed their opinion about foreign residents, while only around 26 percent have the feeling that the Japanese society is getting more international and diverse (Ōka 2008:130).

In the last years, there has been a great deal of discussions like cabinet meetings in 2014 and 2015 about the expansion of the acceptance of foreign labour in certain industries such as the automobile industry or nursing service. These discussions especially take four aspects into account: foreign labour as human resource in the face of the rapidly ageing and declining Japanese population, interaction and contact with other cultures, the Japanese political ideology and the competition at the employment market. However, while “the Japanese government has been looking to slowly expand its foreign population, much of the country prefers no such increase” (Green/Kadoya 2015:64). The opinion and views among the Japanese citizens differ (Mazumi 2008:52-53).

The Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS), which accumulates political, economic and sociological information on Japanese residents in order to analyze the attitudes, opinions and behavior of the Japanese society, is a valuable resource to get an impression of the point of view on the foreign population in Japan. One of the questions in the questionnaire compiled by JGSS refers to the attitude towards the foreign population in Japan: “Are you for or against an increase in the number of foreigners in your community?”¹⁹. According to the analysis, in 2005 over sixty percent of interviewees were against an increase in the number of foreigners, whereas around thirty percent were positive about this statement. The figures of the following years indicate that the number of people accepting an increase of foreign population in Japan is slowly, but steadily, rising, exceeding forty percent for the first time in 2012, while the opposing party is equally slowly shrinking. In 2015, 43 percent of the interviewees looked upon this question favorably (JGSS Research Center 2016). However, compared to the opinion on immigration of other OECD countries “Japanese attitudes towards

¹⁹ The question in the codebooks of JGSS has the codification QFNRINCR and is as follows: “Anata ga seikatsu shiteiru chiiki ni gaikokujin ga fueru koto ni sansei desu ka, hantai desu ka” あなたが生活している地域に外国人が増えることに賛成ですか、反対ですか。

immigration do not deviate starkly from those of other industrialized countries” (Kage et al. 2016:1). In fact, the nations experience with migration is quite different than in the case of Europa or the USA and therefore Japan is “perhaps more favorably disposed to immigration than it is often given credit for” (Green/Kadoya 2015:66).

Looking closer at the aspects affecting the opinion towards foreign population and immigrants in Japan, it can be concluded that there exist different variables, such as domicile, education, ethnicity or contact, which play a major role for the formation of opinions. According to a socio-political study conducted by the Nagoya University it is evident that in Japan the opinion towards immigrants is not influenced by the place of residence and therefore rural citizens do not tend to be more ‘conservative’ towards foreigners than people living in urban areas (Green/Kadoya 2015:74). However, while Japanese nationals with no high school education tend to be opposed on the topic of immigration due to the potential competition with migrants concerning low-skilled occupations, citizens with a higher education tend to look favorably towards migrants and cultivate a higher tolerance towards different cultures, values and thoughts (Mazumi 2015:23).

Looking at the social affinity in regard to the nationality of the immigrants, whereas the interviewees tend to have a negative image of Brazilian or Chinese residents on a national level, they do not associate these feelings with Koreans. However, Hokkaidō is the only region that maintains a negative perception when it comes to Korean immigrants (Green/Kadoya 2015:76-77). A large number of foreign residents is more likely to increase negative feelings towards the immigrant population. Nevertheless, since Japan has quite a small foreign population compared to its total population, these “sentiments are most likely traced back to a fear of the unknown” (Green/Kadoya 2015:68). In addition, the negative attitude towards an increasing number of foreigners and in fact more immigration is based on the fear that this development will lead to a higher criminality rate as well as will challenge the social order and bring ethnic and social conflicts. As a result, the foreign population is described as an internal security threat and an increase of immigration will therefore undermine the public peace and social harmony. Whereas public safety is portrayed as a distinctive Japanese characteristic, crime is ascribed to foreign nations and foreign citizens. These discourse on immigrants as threat to national security or potential criminals is by far the most influential one when it comes to the influence of opinions towards immigration (Chiavacci 2014:130-131). The studies also show that living near an immigrant community or having contact with a foreign resident significantly influences the public opinion towards immigration in a positive way. This contact may reach from a superficial form such as

exchanging greetings with in the neighbourhood living foreigners to the point of close and long-term relationships such as classmates or work colleagues. Therefore, Japanese residents, who occasionally associate with foreign population, tend to favorably look upon immigrants and do not perceive them as a threat, whereas the anti-immigrant attitude in regions without the possibility of interactions follows a negative trend (Green/Kadoya 2015:68-69).

This process of reciprocal cultural exchange is not only tolerated by the society, but seen as an important development towards a broader tolerance of immigrants, promotes contact and relations with foreign residents that are reaching beyond a greeting or a salutation. Thereby, the relations may take the form of a friendship or kinship as well as to get involved in the same community group like a sports club, religious group or a voluntary work. All those activities promote a diverse society while at the same time lower the feeling of threat or fear of the steadily increasing foreign population (Ōka 2008:130-131). Participation in community life, norms, trust and tolerance are aspects connected to the integration of migrants into the society. The social affiliation is based on participation in the community on a daily basis, where people with a different lifestyle, identity, interests, political affiliation converge and get the opportunity to develop a better understanding of each other. These community groups, the growing networks as well as the interactions are described as social capital (Ōka 2008:132).

Other significant variables influencing the public opinion in Japan are the age and unemployment. Older citizens almost universally tend to have a negative perception of foreigners and take a less favorably position towards an increased immigration rate, which coincides with worldwide studies that older generations are generally more conservative and prefer a stricter immigration control. However, the variable of unemployment influences the opinion differently than in other countries. Unemployed Japanese do not view an increased immigration rate as negative due to their economic situation, but rather support immigration. Foreigners in Japan are not seen as potential competition in most sectors of the job market and therefore pose a minimal economic threat. Instead the potential economic gains and benefits are highlighted and possible contributions for the ageing population are pointed out (Green/Kadoya 2015:82-83). Although citizens “worry about fiscal burdens or lower wages economy-wide” (Kage et al. 2016:3), the main objections and negative feelings among this interview group are more likely to come from concerns about cultural differences. In some cases Japanese residents fear that immigrants and new residents are going to mess up valued traditional cultural beliefs and practices and therefore are undermining social aspects of the Japanese society (Kage et al. 2016:3).

The main reason for Japanese workers to not see immigrants as threat are the long-term labor contracts, which emerged following the economic boom after the Second World War. With these contracts Japanese companies are not only attracting and cultivating the best human resources, but also living up to their image as life-time employers. However, since Japans markets changed in the mid 1990s and became more fluid and competitive, only the core workers of a company still benefit from lifetime employment, whereas an increasing number of laborers have less job security and stability due to short-term or temporary contracts (Kage et al. 2016:6-7). As a result, experts on the topic argue that these fluid labour markets will affect the immigration policy as well as the attitudes towards foreign labour in the future. It is expected that corporate managers will rely more on immigrant labour and therefore be more favorable towards immigration due to the pressure to reduce fixed labour costs. In fact, a survey conducted by the MHLW in 2016 shows that a lack of human capital is witnessed across the entire economical sectors and foreign labour is expected to fill these labour shortages (Kage et al. 2016:7-8). A survey on the opinion of Japanese towards an increase of the number of foreign workers shows that 54 percent of the citizens is in favor of accepting more short-term foreign workers, which proves to be notably higher than the percentage of 43 in 2015 of the JGSS, which was asking about an increase of foreigners in the community and did not narrow down the category to ‘foreign workers’ (Kage et al. 2016:15).

The analysis of how the presence of migrant workers at worksites influences the option on immigration shows that the presence of foreign workers increases the positive attitude towards immigration through the facilitation of better understanding and greater acceptance of immigrants while simultaneously squashing rumors and stereotypes connected to foreigners. Due to their positive experiences at work these citizens are also more likely to agree with a further increase of foreigners in their local communities as well (Mazumi 2015:23). However, this positive effect considerably decreases when it comes to unskilled labour, since a large number of migrants is employed in this sector. Like in other host-nations, migrants tend to work in low-paid and low-skilled occupations, where they compete directly with local workers (Mazumi 2015:19). In other words, the degree of tolerance among white-collar workers is considerably higher than the tolerance of workers in blue-collar jobs, which often have the feeling that foreigners represent a potential threat (Ōka 2008:134).

4.2.3.4. Integration policies and associated actions

In Japan, for a long period of time the immigration policy the restrictions were often more valued than the integration of immigrants into the Japanese society. In fact, it is frequently said that there either exists no consistent policy for the integration of foreign residents on a national level or that a policy considering all stages of migration, from the entry to the point of naturalization, only emerged after the turn of the millennium. However, in the last decade integration became gradually an important aspect in Japan resulting in the emergence of the concept of ‘*tabunka kyosei*’ 多文化共生 (translated: multicultural coexistence). Although the term itself is widely spread among the Japanese society, the process of integration and the role each participant, such as the government, private organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and every individual, are interpreted differently. As a result, the integration of foreign residents is not a standardized process and, depending on the involved parties, focuses on different areas (Kobayashi 2014:15). For instance, a public survey conducted by the Cabinet Office in 2010 revealed that while 94 percent and 89 percent considered having Japanese language skills and understanding Japanese customs and values as very important, only 74 percent see technical knowledge and skills as a determining factor. Consequently, due to the diversity in understanding of the concept of ‘multicultural existence’, the involved parties on a national, regional and individual level deal with the issue of integration of foreigners into the Japanese society differently and facilitate support in their respective capacity (Kobayashi 2014:1).

4.2.3.4.1. Integration on different levels

Although the immigration policy was modified in 1990, these amendments did not include a social integration policy on a national level. As a result, local governments with large foreign populations were forced to deal with the socio-economic integration of migrants into their municipal communities and had to provide support in health care, education and social protection in general (Kitawaki 2008:23). The proactive governments, who are working on the development of integration policies, can be divided into two groups: On the one hand, communities with large foreign populations, who have already lived there for a long time and as a result are identified as old-comers. The main sphere of activities of these municipalities is the promotion of human rights of Korean residents as well as the equality within the Japanese society. On the other hand are communities hosting a large population of new-comers such as *Nikkeijin* or immigrants from other Asian countries. Those municipalities aim not only to

protect the human rights of foreigners, but also promote interaction with native communities as well as provide daily support for migrants (Yamawaki 2011:32).

As a result, those local communities have not only been ahead of the national government in regard of integration policies, but play an important role “in shaping and sharing the idea of multicultural coexistence” (Kobayashi 2014:16). For instance, in 2001 thirteen local governments took part in a conference held in Hamamatsu city, in the prefecture Shizuoka, discussing the concept of coexistence with immigrants on a local level, which resulted in a report known as the Hamamatsu declaration, which addresses the challenges faced by both immigrants and local authorities in various areas such as education for children, administrative procedures during immigration registration or for setting up residence as well as the social protection and subsequently proposes improvements for the national- and the prefectural-level to the concerning authorities and governments (Kobayashi 2014:16). In addition, the Hamamatsu declaration is a progressive step towards the recognition of foreign residents focusing on their participation in local communities and their socio-economic contributions. Moreover, with the proposed integration processes followed by these local governments, they position migrants within the community structure of municipalities, where they are able to influence the development of the communities, and grant them both responsibilities and rights. However, the proposition is limited to administrative functions only (Kitawaki 2008:20).

On a national level, the MIC is one of the major players, when it comes to defining the content of the integration policy. In 2005, MIC has established the Research Committee on the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence, which has published the Plan for Promoting Multicultural Coexistence (in Japanese: *tabunka kyōsei suishin puran jisshikeikaku* 多文化共生推進プラン実施計画) in 2006. This plan is regarded as the first comprehensive strategy for the integration of foreign residents into the Japanese society and also contains the first definition of the concept of “multicultural coexistence”:

A society, in which people of different nationalities and ethnicities live together as members of a local community, while at the same time acknowledging their cultural differences and making an effort to build relationships as equals. (translated by the author from: MIC 2006:1²⁰)

This definition implies that the relationships between Japanese and foreign residents have not been seen as equal up until the establishment of the plan (Kobayashi 2014:17). Consequently,

²⁰ The original Japanese version of the plan states the following: “国籍や民族などの異なる人々が，互いの文化的差異を認め合い，対等な関係を築こうとしながら，地域社会の構成員として共に生きていくこと” (MIC 2006:1)

due to the proposition to the state to treat foreigners as local residents instead of seeing them as workforce, short-term visitors or a threat to the social security, the report presents a big step forward towards the integration of foreign residents into the Japanese society. In addition, while previous policies concerning immigrants addressed the promotion of border-crossing cultural exchange based on interaction with foreign residents under the notion of temporary visitors and therefore preventing them to be seen as members of the Japanese community (Yamawaki 2011:26), MIC is circumnavigating the issue by promoting the importance of the concept of multicultural coexistence as well as the need for reciprocal understanding between Japanese and foreigners resulting in the implementation of integration policies and plans (Yamawaki 2011:33).

However, as already pointed out, on the basis of the comparatively limited authority of the MIC, the plan is only focusing on daily life situations, while leaving out other aspects of socio-economic integration. In order to realize the socio-economic equality of immigrants, it would be necessary to involve ministries with a greater authority regarding the social security system, the immigration legislation and the labour market. These ministries are the MHLW, the MOJ as well as the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) (Kitawaki 2008:17). Consequently, a total of ten ministries, including the mentioned ones, worked together on measures to establish foreigners as residents of the communities based on the acknowledgement that the state is accountable for the care of foreign residents and in the course has to provide them with a safe environment and has to treat them as equal members of the Japanese society. Among the key aspects of the plan are the integration of foreigners into developed local societies, the education of children with different cultural backgrounds, the improvement of employment opportunities as well as the promotion of social protection (Kobayashi 2014:18). Although, since 2006 there has taken place a institutional change from the notion of foreigners as temporary visitors towards residents of the Japanese society, a large part of the official documents still uses terms such as '*gaikokujin*' 外国人 (translated: foreigner) or '*gaikokujin rōdōsha*' 外国人労働者 (translated: foreign worker) or instead of the more neutral term '*imin*' 移民 (translated: immigrant) (Gottlieb 2012:23).

The majority of employment opportunities for foreigners are provided by private companies and as a result, the private sector has a leading role when it comes to the socio-economic integration of migrants as well as their families. This sector is not only the key in determining the economic success of immigrants, but also interacts with them on a daily basis

(Kobayashi 2014:19). The Japan Business Federation, in Japanese *Nippon Keidanren* 日本経団連, founded in 2002, is one of the most influential economic organizations in Japan. In 2009, *Keidanren* expressed a positive attitude towards the immigration and integration of highly skilled human resource, while showing understanding that low-skilled workers are feeling threatened by the increasing number of immigrants. Nevertheless, *Keidanren* is promoting the concept of multicultural coexistence and a controlled immigration not only in quantity, but also in quality. As a result, the organization is valuing the immigration of skilled labor, such as university students, trainees or other professionals, who have been part of the Japanese economic system, have gained valuable knowledge and are able to contribute to the economic performance of the country as competitive human resources (Keidanren 2009:8). However, the standpoint of the *Keidanren* manifests a strong tendency to only accept those foreigners, who can be integrated into the Japanese society by using their knowledge and skills at work. Furthermore, the capability to learn the Japanese language is also highly valued by the organization. Consequently, the acceptance is based on a profit nature and often, although the concept of multicultural existence is promoted by the government, the integration of migrants at the workplace is limited independent of their Japanese language skills (Kobayashi 2014:19-20).

Another major key player due to the missing integration policy on a national level are NGOs as well as NPOs (non-profit organizations). Since the increasing number of immigrants in the 1980s, NGOs have provided immigrants with Japanese language education, consultations and support in everyday matters. The modern NGOs are based on the Law to Promote Specified Non-profit Activities, short as NPO Act, passed in 1998, which fosters activism as well as volunteerism. In general, NGOs promote mutual exchange between foreigners and members of the Japanese society instead of one-sided assimilation and support the equality between Japanese and foreign residents based on mutual respect and acceptance of different cultural backgrounds, nationalities and languages (Kobayashi 2014:20-21). The NGO Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ), in Japanese *Ijūren* 移住連, not only advocates for equal rights for foreigners, but also points out the importance of a reciprocal integration process by stating that the Japanese society will learn from the diversity in cultural backgrounds or knowledge migrants are bringing with them and eventually the society will benefit from these experiences (SMJ 2009:9).

NGOs in Japan are divided based on their pursued activities and focus. For instance, on the one hand are NGOs providing assistance for communication through translation services

and Japanese language education or daily support concerning issues such as health care, housing or employment (Tamura 2011:159-160). Whereas on the other hand are NGOs promoting the improvement of the concept of multicultural coexistence and the systematization of the support for immigrants based on cooperation of various actors through dialogue with local communities as well as governments (Tamura 2011:162-163). Due to the importance of the Japanese language for life in the society, the activities counting as communication support were among the most significant ones. In 2003, over 1,500 organizations were pursuing this activity with more than 20,000 volunteers working as teachers and supporting migrants with the learning of the Japanese language. This numbers show that the acquisition of Japanese language skills is not only an important issue for migrants, but due to the lack of support by the government on a national level and the existing disparity between the government and the private sector, NGOs have to pitch in and support the foreign residents needs (Kobayashi 2014:21-22).

4.2.3.4.2. The acquisition of language skills

As the previous chapters have shown, not only sees the majority of the Japanese population the learning of the Japanese language as a significant aspect, but the language also facilitates the socio-economic integration of foreign residents into the Japanese society. In fact, Japan is a country, where the overwhelming majority of the population speaks a single language and in addition has limited knowledge of foreign languages (Kobayashi 2014:2). Although there is no paragraph in the constitution that states Japanese as the only official language in Japan, in reality Japanese is assumed to be the sole language of the state. In spite of the increasing number of foreign residents, the government officially only recognizes the Japanese language and often promotes the idea of one nation, inhabited by one ethnic community, speaking one language. As a result, the skill to be able to use the national language has great influence on the integration of foreign residents (Kobayashi 2014:23-24).

In some cases, immigrants who are able to speak, write and read Japanese are able to gain access to information easily, whereas those without the necessary knowledge may be unable to interact with the Japanese community (Kobayashi 2014:2). Therefore, this language deficiency limits the interactions of immigrants with the local society and may be hindering in terms of employment opportunities. According to a survey by the National Institute for Japanese Language and Linguistics (NINJAL), seventy percent of immigrants have the feeling to be disadvantaged because of their limited knowledge of Japanese. However, the motivation and need to obtain these language skills, especially to acquire more than the basic

everyday skills, is varying depending on factors such as age, profession or stage in the immigrant's life. In fact, surveys conducted by different local governments point out that in general the proficiency in practical communication is higher reaching over seventy percent in Yokohama, than the level of reading and writing constituting to about 62 and 53 percent (Kobayashi 2014:24)

As a matter of fact, the level of knowledge of the national language is apparently influencing the socio-economic situations of immigrants and either enhancing or restricting their accessibility to the job market and public services as well as their participation in local communities. NINJAL has conducted a survey factoring in over one hundred situations foreign residents may be confronted with while living in Japan based on the ability of the immigrant to deal with the situation, the frequency of the encounters and the desire of the concerned person to learn for future interactions. The survey emphasizes that foreign residents who are only able to read *Hiragana* 平仮名 or ひらがな and *Katakana* 片仮名 or カタカナ²¹, the two syllabaries used in Japan, are struggling not only with daily situations beginning with reading the newspaper or going shopping, but also in their professional life like for example with the job search or the approval of a contract. In addition the survey concluded that immigrants, who have reached a higher level of Japanese enabling them to read texts on familiar topics and additionally are able to read *kanji* 漢字 (translated: Chinese characters), have less trouble with arranging their live in Japan such as accommodations. Nevertheless, the results specify that foreign residents have a hard time managing complex administrative tasks such as applications for residence cards, pensions or social benefits at the appropriate authorities (NINJAL 2009:9). As a result, although foreign residents achieve a certain level of Japanese and are regarded as advanced, they may need support in case of complex administrative situations (Kobayashi 2014:26-27). Other surveys focus on the difficulties faced by private companies in terms of hiring and supervising foreign residents and concluded that over fifty percent of the companies with foreign employees have to deal with problems when it comes to communicating in the Japanese language. Furthermore, over seventy percent stated that all their demands are met by Japanese employees and they do not have to resort to foreign labor, which demonstrates the lack of enthusiasm of Japanese companies to hire foreign employees (Kobayashi 2014:28).

²¹ Whereas both represent phonetic lettering systems, the *Hiragana* syllabary is used for various grammatical inflections and Japanese language words in general, the *Katakana* syllabary is mainly used for the transcription of loan words from various languages.

Basically, there are two distinctive ways to meet the needed language support for foreign residents and promote their socio-economic integration into the Japanese society: First by providing Japanese language courses and second by allocating information in various languages. In fact, the acknowledgement that immigrants need to be provided with opportunities to gain Japanese proficiency in order to be able to lead an independent life within the Japanese society is increasing simultaneously with the promotion of the concept of multicultural existence. However, the language policies on a national level in Japan are only considering native Japanese such as returners from China in the 1980s, while ignoring the foreign residents whose mother tongue is not Japanese. These actions, or rather inactions, on the part of national authorities are especially difficult for newcomers in need of learning Japanese as their second language (Kobayashi 2014:29-30). The SMJ states that the existing government policies and practices in case of language education for immigrants is based on an perspective influenced by assimilation theories, which is not considering the cultural heritage or mother tongue of foreign nationals (SMJ 2009:16). In addition, SMJ describes these developments as selective immigration and criticizes that multicultural coexistence implies the living together with all culturally different foreign nationals and not the selecting of welcomed foreign residents based on their language skills while at the same time eliminating all other immigrants (SMJ 2009:20). *Keidanren* also emphasizes the importance of language education and urges the government to take over the costs of educating foreign residents. Their objective is the integration of these individuals into the Japanese society on a permanent basis through the improvement of their Japanese proficiency (Keidanren 2009:10).

However, studies indicate that instead of providing direct support in the form of language education for immigrants, the main field of responsibility of governments refers to the formulation of guidelines for language education for local institutions including the determination of course contents, assessment methods and effectiveness of the language courses. Nonetheless, these language courses are targeting only one part of the foreign population, while ignoring other immigrants such as trainees, healthcare workers or students in terms of language-support (Kobayashi 2014:32-33). Although the central government recognizes the need of immigrants for language support, there still has not been developed an overreaching institution or consistent policies. In 2013, 180 million yen (Euro 1.242.428) were allocated by the government for language education for foreign residents in Japan, whereupon the majority of the language courses were targeting *Nikkeijin* in order to speed up their integration into the Japanese society and advance their opportunities at the labor market. Support for foreigners besides *Nikkeijin* is depending on either voluntary organized language

courses by NGOs or the available budget and their distribution by local governments (Kobayashi 2014:33-34).

Although national governments are considered the primary source in terms of language planning, other actors influencing this process are local governments, NGOs or educational institutions. In fact, in Japan local governments and communities have played a central role in promoting language support and multilingualism (Gottlieb 2012:124-125). Some local governments took matters into their own hands in cases they were faced with a large number of foreign residents in their communities, and autonomously developed Japanese language courses and integration projects with local volunteers or other institutions. For instance, MIC concluded that in 2008 over 130 such projects were established. Nevertheless, the number of immigrants attending these language courses provided by local institutions is rather limited compared to the number of foreign residents actually living in the particular areas. For instance, from the over 35,700 foreign residents in the Shinjuku ward, Tōkyō, in 2010 only circa 700 immigrants, both children and adults, attended the provided Japanese language programs, which is less than two percent of the foreign population (Kobayashi 2014:37).

NGOs and volunteers organizing language courses have made a significant contribution to the fulfilling of the demands for Japanese language education by foreign residence. Since public schools and private language institutions are mainly targeting children, students, trainees and refugees, NGOs and volunteers focus on foreign-born adults and provide language education for them. In fact, nearly half of the participants in such courses are organized by volunteers outnumbering the percentage of school education accounting for 22. Furthermore, the number of teachers volunteering at language courses organized by NGOs compared to the number of part-time specialized teachers (28 percent) and full-time professional instructors (twelve percent) accounts for sixty percent of all teachers for Japanese as a Second Language (JSL) in Japan. In general, NGOs are heavily relying on volunteer teachers, since over ninety percent of their instructors are volunteers (Kobayashi 2014:40-41).

In most cases, the quality and objective of the language education organized by NGOs and volunteers differs fundamentally in terms of extent and scope, reaching from basic courses for beginners with the aim to promote cultural exchange as far as to advanced or intensive courses for intermediates, which are run by trained instructors (Tamura 2011:159). These local language courses not only helped to improve the language skills of foreign residents, but also facilitated the interaction into the society by offering a platform for foreigners to interact with the local community and providing them with necessary information (Kobayashi 2014:41-42).

However, NGOs are facing some challenges regarding the volunteers. Due to the lack of standardized rules, contents or teaching materials, immigrants are provided with unequal language education depending on the language school they visit or the instructor they get. Furthermore, due to the limited teaching experiences and training volunteer instructors have, they are often not equipped to deal with the growing participants with various cultural backgrounds, different ages and mother tongues as well as unequal levels of Japanese proficiency (Kobayashi 2014:42). For instance, the majority of teachers volunteering at NGOs are housewives in their 40s, 50s or 60s as well as retired male employees, who dedicate their free time to helping in the integration of foreign nationals into the Japanese society. Moreover, both those groups are relatively fluent in a foreign language, whereupon the majority speaks English. Since the instructors work on a volunteer basis, they are able to decide the class times, frequency of instructing, the levels and teaching material as well as their contribution to the planning of Japanese language courses in general (Tomiya 2010:35-36).

Another challenge represents the regional discrepancy in terms of accessibility of language courses for all foreign residents. Since the volunteers have no obligation to extend their offer of courses regardless of the increasing number of foreign residents, not all arriving foreigners may have access to Japanese education and in rural or remote areas there might not even be the opportunity to attend such a course despite the increasing demand (Kobayashi 2014:42). Furthermore, since the Japanese language courses organized by local governments or NGOs are not mandatory, immigrants may lose interest after they have obtained a level of Japanese, where they are able to manage daily situations. This results in a lack of commitment of foreign residents as well as in the dropping-out of education, especially if they were able to find a job position that does not require Japanese proficiency. Although these employment opportunities are often on a short term basis and highly unstable, foreign residents often lack awareness that a higher level of Japanese skills would benefit them in the long run and is the basis of a successful integration into the Japanese society (Tomiya 2010:38-39).

4.2.4. Economic relations between Japan and Korea

Due to an increasing worldwide tendency to create economic relations or agreements based on geographical distance, the cooperation of countries in East Asia is getting more and more important. Since both Japan and Korea are counted among the major players in the region, close economic relations are not only beneficial for the countries itself, but also for the economic position of the whole East Asian region (Moon/Kim 2006:19-20). The following two subchapters focus on the economic exchange between these two countries in terms of

trade, cooperations and economic agreements as well as on financial remittances send from the *Zainichi* communities in Japan back to Korea. As already described in the theoretical framework, these remittances are an integral part of TNSSs and give further detail on the *Zainichi* communities in Japan.

4.2.4.1. Economic exchange

The economic exchange between the two countries can be traced back for hundreds of years. However, the economic relations of the post-war era between Japan and Korea were resumed in 1965 as a result of the normalization of their diplomatic relations. Since Korea opposed to Japan at this time lacked in terms of economic development and its GDP was only one-tenth of the one in Japan, Korea was welcoming Japan's financial aid in the form of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as part of their compensation for the Japanese colonial rule. The from both sides signed Treaty on Basic Relations stated that the Japanese government would not only grant aid of USD 300 million²², but would also provide about USD 500 million in loans to the Korean government, which was largely used in the steel industry. As a result, the economic development of Korea, especially in the manufacturing sector, was based on Japan's ODA (Kim 2017a:24).

At the same time, the re-establishment of economic exchange between the two countries and the financial aid in the form of ODA also entailed a certain dependence of Korea on Japanese imports. Taking a closer look at the trade data of the countries, the extent of Korea's economic dependency on Japan can be observed. After the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965 Korea's total imports amounted to USD 450 million of which 35 percent (USD 166 million) came from Japan and fourty percent from the USA. On the other hand, whereas Japan retained 34 percent of the total trade value of Korea (USD 625 million), the USA received 39 percent. In the 1980s, although the United States represented the largest trading partner for Korea, Korea's trade pattern was distinguished by its dependency on Japan and as a result, Japan owned the highest share of total value of imports. For instance, although the ODA ended at the beginning of the 1990s, about thirty percent of the total number of imports still came from Japan. Following the development of this figure, it shows that in the 2000s the total number of Japanese imports decreased to twenty percent and by 2014 reached ten percent (Kim 2017a:24-25).

²² Since the exchange rates of USD in Euro are only available as of January 1999, the thesis uses the exchange rate as of January 2018 to give the reader an idea of the amount in USD converted in Euro for every case before 1999: 1 Dollar = 0.81 Euro.

In view of the fact that in 1966, the Korean enacted a law on foreign capital importation, in the following decade the USA and Japan competed for the biggest share of FDI to Korea. Eventually the Japanese FDI has risen dramatically. Whereas in 1984 the total share of the inward FDI amounted to about 56 percent, the following year recorded over 84 percent and the presence of Japanese companies in diverse branches of industry was considerably high (Kim 2017a:25). Japan further increased the share to USD 1.8 billion by 1999 (about Euro 1.78 billion) and the trend in the 2000s showed a constant growth. In fact, in 2012 Japan's FDI to Korea was recorded with USD 4.5 billion (about Euro 3.4 billion), which was nearly twice as much as the previous year. Furthermore, up until today leading Korean businesses in diverse areas such as electronics turn to Japan for knowledge on high-level technology or a business corporation. Therefore, Japanese FDI not only contributed to the economic growth of Korea, but promoted the level of dependency as well (Kim 2017a:26-27).

Consequently, since the treaty between Korea and Japan was signed, Korea was never able to achieve a trade surplus with Japan. In fact, in 1974 the number of Korea's trade deficit already surpassed USD one million and further increased to USD ten billion until 1994. Since 2004 the number of the trade deficit was documented between USD twenty billion to USD thirty billion (between Euro 14.7 and 22.1 billion) (Kim 2017a:25). To counteract this deficit the Korean government took different approaches. For instance, in 1978 the Import Diversification Program was introduced, which restricted imports of specific products in order to compensate in areas where Korea had the biggest deficits. Japanese products such as home video cameras, machine tools, color televisions or motor vehicles were affected (Mukoyama 2012:8). In 1986 the Korean government declared the '1st Five-Year Plan for Correction of Trade Imbalance with Japan' and it was concluded that the imbalance with Japan was based on the conditions in the manufacturing industry of the country including materials, machinery and components, which were not competitive enough. As a result, to deal with the trade imbalance between Japan and Korea, the plan promoted the localization of products as well as the increase of the number of exports. Therefore, in 1992 Korea stated the '2nd Five-Year Plan for Localization of Machinery, Materials, and Components', which used government funding and financial assistance to support Korean companies (Kim 2017a:25). Although in 1997 Korea was able to record a surplus of USD three billion in the sectors of materials and components and the number increased from USD 35 billion to USD 100 billion between the years of 2006 to 2014 (about Euro 26.5 billion to 82.7 billion), Korea was never able to achieve a trade surplus with Japan. In fact the trade imbalance with Japan is increasing rather than decreasing and in 2014 still amounted to over USD sixteen billion (Kim 2017a:25).

Although this trade imbalance was never the cause for a dispute between the two countries, it was seen as a hindrance to multilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and negotiations of FTAs between Japan and Korea as well as Korea's Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) dialogues. Although Japan and Korea went into bilateral FTA negotiations in 2003, the economic relations between these two countries have been significantly influenced by the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997. Furthermore, since the expansion of the Chinese economy at the turn of the millennium, the economic relations between Japan and Korea have taken on an interdependent structure in order to use the economic globalization. As described above, the decrease of Korea's dependency on Japan can be examined through the number of imports of intermediate goods. For instance, whereas in 1990 Korea exported around 21 percent of intermediate goods to Japan and only 2.5 percent to China, in 2014 these figures changed drastically and statistics show that only six percent were exported to Japan and over 36 percent to China. Therefore, Korea's largest share of export of intermediate goods moved from the Japanese to the Chinese market and the Korean dependency on Japan is decreasing in this area (Kim 2017a:26).

Another development of the interdependent structure between the two countries represent economic collaborations between Korean and Japanese businesses in third countries, which increasingly occurred since 2008, the year of the global financial crisis. However, already in 2003 the transformation from a unilateral dependency of Korea on Japan to an interdependent partnership occurred through the construction of an energy plant in Saudi Arabia. Since then there have been recorded more than fifty cases of collaboration in the fields of resource development and energy production. After international oil prices peaked in 2009, Japan and Korea used these developments as opportunity to further strengthen their cooperation and work together on projects in third countries on a more frequent basis. In fact, the Korean government has followed a plan to expand the cooperation with Japan into other sectors such as automobile production (Kim 2017a:28).

In recent years, the economic relations between Japan and Korea have been broadly discussed, since Korea and Japan are both using the context of economic globalization not only to work together, but also to challenge each other. For instance, Korean companies have increased their exports and production overseas in order to expand their business networks worldwide. One indicator for this export strategy represents the percentage of GDP. Since 2002 Korea's GDP has steadily risen and reached over 52 percent in 2010. Since the global expansion is vital for the Korean economy, the government has made efforts to expand their network and has taken up negotiations for further FTAs (Mukoyama 2012:3-4). In fact, in

2011 an FTA between Korea and the European Union has been taken into effect, which has urged the Japanese government to resume negotiations with Korea. As a result the 43rd Japan-Korea Business Conference of 2011 states that a closer economic relationship between the two countries could only benefits the East Asian region and is essential to the economic prosperity and stability not only for the region, but also for Japan and Korea (Mukoyama 2012:20-21)²³.

4.2.4.2. Financial remittances

When looking closer at the economic relations in connection with transnational migration, one major indicator is financial remittance flows. Remittances are defined as “the money and goods that are transmitted to households by migrant workers working outside of their origin countries” (Yoshino et al. 2017:2). Remittances as economic contribution of migrants are closely linked to migration flows itself and as a result are influenced by the number of migrants, the exchange rate or the economic environment of migrants (Carling 2008:595). Furthermore, the amount of remittances as well as the frequency of those payments depends on various factors including the motivation of the migrant or the economic ability based on the income and savings of the migrant. One of the most important factors is the family situation in both the country of origin and the country of settlement. For instance, a major motivational factor is kinship, since family or relatives are often the reason to take on employment abroad in the first place. When migrants leave parents, children or a spouse behind it is more likely that remittance payments will be made in order to support the loved ones (Carling 2008:589-590).

According to the World Bank, when comparing remittances to other resource flows it is shown that inflows associated with migration represent a consistent form of earnings, which not only are able to provide a single household help in times of need, but also contribute to the development of a country. In fact, remittance payments to developing countries amount to more than three times of ODA and even take on FDIs (World Bank 2016:17). Consequently remittances affect the life of millions of people in a country, since they use the received money to support themselves. In general, the additional income is promoting a higher level of consumption on a daily basis such as clothing, food or medicine in order to help people out of poverty (Barajas et al. 2009:3). As a result, remittances not only increase the personal income of the recipient, but also add to the output growth through spending. These consumptions are

²³ According to records of the MOFA, as of 2018 a FTA between Japan and Korea has not been signed.

described as investments in the local market and benefit the growth of the local economy (Ratha 2005:32). Furthermore, remittances have proven to be more stable than other financial flows, which are influenced by fluctuations. For instance, the number of remittance flows is continuously increasing. Whereas in 1990 the figure amounted to USD 29 billion, in 2015, fifteen years later, the same number was USD 441 billion (about Euro 406 billion), which is about fifteen times more (World Bank 2016:17).

Based on the definition promoted by the World Bank the total amount of remittances is the sum of personal remittances and social benefits. Subsequently, personal remittances can be divided into personal transfers, compensation of employees and capital transfer between households; however, data on the later characteristic is difficult to obtain, since countries usually do not report these transactions. Looking at the first two indicators, whereas compensation of employees refers to a set compensation of the work of an employee based on a contract of employment, personal transfers concern all transactions made by migrants either to the household of family members or other recipients in their country of origin. Although the definitions are clear, accurate data is difficult to obtain since not all countries report remittance flows or are able to account for remittances transferred through unofficial channels. In fact, in 2007 a working paper of the IMF came to the conclusion although there was an official flow of over USD 300 billion (about Euro 206 billion) remittances reported worldwide, “it is likely that billions more were transferred through unofficial [channels]” (Barajas et al. 2009:3). Therefore, informal remittance flows still present one of the major issues to address when tracking of remittance transactions between two countries and the collected data may be used as a preliminary figure rather than a comprehensive result (World Bank 2016:xvii-xviii)²⁴.

In the case of Korea, the World Bank recorded the first inward remittance flow in 1976, which amounted to USD 47 million. The figure increased significantly over the next years and reached over USD 2,000 million in 1987 while still growing year by year. In 1998 remittance inflows reached a first peak with USD 5,596 million followed by a second one in 2004 with USD 6,574 million (Euro 4,850 million). Since 2007 the figure of inward remittance flows has never fallen under the limit of USD 5,000 million and since 2011 it always amounted to over USD 6,000 million. In fact, in 2016 the total migrant remittance inflows of Korea were reported with USD 6,393 million (Euro 6,074 million) (World Bank 2017:#Annual Remittances Data Inflow). Looking at the ratio of personal transfers and flows

²⁴ The available data used in this thesis is retrieved from records of remittance flows of the World Bank.

falling under the definition of compensation of employees the data shows that personal transfers constitute the lion's share of inward remittance flows. For instance, in 2006 personal transfers account for about 86 percent and in 2009 for ninety percent of remittance flows. Although the number is slightly going down, in 2014 personal transfers are still represented with 88 percent whereas compensation of employees accounts only for twelf percent of the total inflows (World Bank 2016:158).

Looking at the bilateral remittance flows between Japan and Korea the following developments are reported: based on the findings of the World Bank in 2010 Korean households and individuals received USD 2,483 million (Euro 1,855 million) in remittances. This figure slightly increased to USD 3,137 million (Euro 2,376 million) by 2012. However, the following year the number of remittances from Japan to Korea was nearly cut in half to about USD 1,700 million (about Euro 1,236 million). Although since 2013 remittance flows stagnate around this figure and in 2016 were reported with USD 1,699 million (Euro 1,614 million), Japan is still the second largest remittance sending country after the USA and before China (World Bank 2017:#Bilateral Remittance Matrices).

4.3. Meso-level analysis: *Zainichi* communities in Japan

Although there are different migrant communities in Japan, including the *Zainichi* and *Nikkeijin*, the share of the foreign population is still small compared to other industrialized countries. In fact, according to the Statistics Bureau the proportion of the foreign population has increased from 0.7 percent in 1990 (about 900,000 foreigners including *Zainichi*) to 1.8 percent in 2016 (2.3 million) (Green 2017:#8). The *Zainichi* communities have long been the largest migrant communities in Japan and although their numbers are shrinking, they represent an important society within the Japanese population. Often they appear impossible to tell apart from Japanese nationals, since the speak Japanese, use Japanese names and have obtained a high degree of cultural literacy. However, despite the high degree of cultural and social assimilation, *Zainichi* are marginalized and treated like other foreign communities (Green 2017:#28). This is the result of a strict nationality law, since although the second, third and fourth generation of *Zainichi*, which represent over eighty percent of the communities, were born in Japan, but unless they get naturalized, they are legally considered foreigners. Consequently, Japan is “the only advanced nation with a fourth-generation immigrant problem derived from exclusivist policies“ (Lee 2012:1).

4.3.1. Definition and development of *Zainichi* communities in Japan

Since the beginning of the Meiji period used term ‘*zainichi*’ 在日 is a combination of the two Japanese words or rather the two syllables ‘*zai*’ 在 translated as ‘being present’ or ‘being located’ as well as the first syllable of the word ‘*nippon*’ 日本, which is used for Japan, and as a result refers to a foreign citizen staying and residing in Japan. Although the term was originally used to describe all foreign residents in Japan, Koreans represent the largest group of foreign population and the term is often connected to this specific group. Nevertheless, other accepted terms used to describe the Korean community in Japan are ‘*kankokujin zainichi*’ 韓国人在日 (translated: South Korean *Zainichi*) to specify immigrants from ROK, ‘*zainichi Korean*’ 在日コリアン (translated: Korean *Zainichi*) as a neutral term as well as ‘*kankokukei nihonjin*’ 韓国系日本人 (translated: Japanese with Korean descent) in order to emphasize the Korean ancestry, but also note the relation to the Japanese nation (Chapman 2008:4).

In the existing body of literature on the Korean community in Japan, the Korean migrants and the communities they belong to are often portrayed as a monolithic entity or a single group. However, as the analysis of the development of Korean communities has shown, the communities are heterogeneous, and unite migrants with different views, attitudes and demographic characteristics (Rands 2011:80). The development of these *Zainichi* communities started very early onwards, leading back to the Edo-period (1603–1868). Until the end of this era, Ōsaka had become a vital part of Japan. Not only was the city played the city a vital part in the national commercial, financial and transportation sector, but also had become the second largest city of the country. In addition, due to this newly established status Ōsaka attracted an increasing number of foreigners, mostly Korean migrants, who wanted to take advantage of the economic growth (Rands 2011:42-43). As a result, the city was called the “Manchester of the Orient” (Rands 2011:47) and became known as the largest industrialized metropolitan area in all of Asia. Compared to this development, Tōkyō and Kyōto took a different path, since those cities were mainly known for their culture, academic achievements and governmental structures (Rands 2011:47). Nevertheless, during the Edo-period Tōkyō has grown from a small village to the capital of a nation as well as one of the largest cities not only in Japan, but in the world. Due to these different developments, the Korean communities in these cities were also affected differently (Rands 2011:76).

In general, the majority of the Korean immigrants were originally from provinces in the South of the peninsula and initially they were miners, day laborers or students. Since coal

mining was especially dominant in Kyūshū, the island was the primary destination of miners. Due to the harsh working environment these communities had a high turnover rate as well as labour mobility important in cases of lack of labor in neighboring mines. In addition, the communities mostly consisted of males and were of rural origin. Apart from these mining communities, Koreans also formed communities on the main island of Japan, thereby the largest communities emerged in Ōsaka and in Tōkyō. Although these two industrial urban centers are only about 400 kilometers apart and shared quite a range of similarities, the existing communities developed independently (Rands 2011:xv-xvi).

The earliest recorded Korean community developed in Tōkyō and exhibited diverse characteristics. Consequently, these *Zainichi* were never able to merge into a single community but established different groups and communities, whereas the community in Ōsaka developed more unitary (Rands 2011:xvi). Looking closer at the composition of these migrant communities, it stands out that over seventy percent of the *Zainichi* community in Tōkyō were students, less than ten percent were laborers and only three percent were representatives of commerce, whereas in Ōsaka one fourth were involved in commerce, about seventy percent were laborer and only about four percent represented students (Rands 2011:131). As a result, while Tōkyō was experiencing Japan's largest *Zainichi* student population, who influenced the majority of Korean day laborers of the city, the gender ratio of Ōsaka was more balanced and *Zainichi* were often employed in factories based on long-term contracts (Rands 2011:xvi). In addition, between 1902 and 1919 nearly eighty percent of the labour force in the cotton spinning industries as well as over ninety percent of the silk reeling industry was female and therefore representing the most striking difference compared to the composition of communities in Tōkyō. Overall, in 1919 about fifteen percent of the total number of the *Zainichi* population was women employed in the textile industry (Rands 2011:141-142).

These tendencies continued on at the beginning of the 1920s until the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923. The natural catastrophe significantly influenced the migration movements from Korea to Japan and from this time onwards, Ōsaka became the primary destination for *Zainichi*, while Tōkyō remained dominated by students (Rands 2011:160). Between the earthquake and the beginning of the Second World War the number of Korean immigrants increased drastically due to labour mobilization from 80,415 in 1923 to 961,591 in 1939. The recorded *Zainichi* population in Ōsaka alone reached a peak of over 241,600 in 1938, when the recruitment was still under way and the greater part of immigrants had high hopes for their new lives in Japan. However, the living conditions and life in general were

hard, especially with the pending war (Rands 2011:162). The constantly rising number of Korean population influenced the opinion towards migration and the communities sensed the growing hostility and experienced more and more discrimination. In addition, the majority of the mobilized Korean population was sent to Hokkaidō and Kyūshū, where they were forced to work in coal mines. For instance, in 1939 almost eighty percent of the newcomers, which accounted for over 19,000 conscripts, were sent to those coal mines. However, since the working conditions were hard and Korean immigrants did not expect this type of work, many coal miners fled to urban areas. Their main destination was Tōkyō, due to the job opportunities in public, labor-intensive projects offered by powerful conglomerates (Rands 2011:194). Meanwhile, the Korean communities in Ōsaka reached over 412,700 in 1942 and became the largest *Zainichi* population outside of Seoul. However, due to foreseeable defeat of Japan in the war, more and more Koreans returned to their country of origin, since limited resources reduced the demand for labour force as well. In addition, when Japan's industrial areas were the target of bombings, many Korean newcomers abandoned their contracts and immediately returned to the peninsula. As a result, the Korean population in Ōsaka dropped to less than 180,000 by the end of the war (Rands 2011:199-200).

After the end of the Second World War, an official repatriation program was established, which was more than welcome among the Korean population. Thousands of *Zainichi* gathered at the southern ports of Japan in order to return to the Korean peninsula and by the end of 1945 over 1.3 million people had used the opportunity to return to their former homeland. Although repatriation from Japan to the Korean peninsula was voluntary, the general assumption was that the *Zainichi* population in Japan would use this opportunity to leave Japan behind. However, already at the beginning of 1946 some of the ships used for the repatriation program left their ports half empty. Around 650,000 *Zainichi* stayed behind in Japan, since most of them were long-term residents and came to Japan long before the war broke out. Therefore, these people chose to remain in Japan where they had built themselves a life instead of returning to their former homeland. The number of *Zainichi* taking up the opportunity to repatriate decreased further and further until the end of 1946, whereas the number of illegal re-migration from Korea to Japan increased quickly, since returnees were faced with a changed homeland not only due to the division of Korea in North- and South-Korea, but also in their social status and personal freedom (Kim 2017b:99). Meanwhile in post-war Japan emerged two different points of view based on the sense of belonging of each individual resulting in the establishment of two distinctive groups: known today as *Sōren* and

Midan, which are not only instrumental for the further development of *Zainichi* communities in Japan, but still have influence over the actions concerning *Zainichi* (Zilberberg 2012:30).

The “League of Koreans” was established in Tōkyō October of 1945 after Korean communists were freed from prisons in Japan (Ryang 1997:70). The fundamental values of this organization are based on nationalism as well as communism and express strong ties to the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) (*Nihon Kyōsan-tō*, 日本共産党) (Chapman 2008:28). Their objective was the returning to Korea and, as a result, the education of their children in the Korean language in order to prepare them (Ryang 1997:80). Since the majority of Koreans living in Japan identified with North-Korea rather than South-Korea, the organization experienced a lively influx of members. In addition, many of the members acquired the North-Korean citizenship once the DPRK was formally established, due to various reasons such as the better economic prospect (Chapman 2008:29-30). Eventually, in 1955 the organization developed into the today known association *Chōsen Sōren* 総連, or *Ch'ongryŏn* 총련 in Korean, taking over many members from the former organization as well as ideological concepts and objectives (Ryang 1997:83). In contrast to other organizations, sees *Chōsen Sōren* the life of their members in Japan as a temporary solution resulting in a defensive policy. As a result, they do not campaign for the right to vote or have protested against the finger printing of Koreans upon entry of the country (Ryang 1997:117). However, their agenda among other aspects does not approve of intermarriages between Japanese and Koreans (Ryang 1997:147) as well as the voluntary acquiring of the Japanese citizenship (Chapman 2008:54) and instead promotes Korean schools and the education in Korean values, traditions and the language instead (Ryang 1997:36).

Shortly after the “League of Korean” was established, the opposing party formed their own community group on their part and, as a result, the so-called *Mindan* were founded. Although this group also aims to return to a unified Korea and therefore expresses nationalist tendencies, the core principles value an anti-Marxist approach (Ryang 1997:83). In addition, today the group and their members identify more with the ROK instead of the communist North and they do not agree with the severe anti-Japanese attitude of the *Chōsen Sōren*. Their main concern is the peaceful and harmonious cohabitation of Japanese and *Zainichi* and they advocate equal rights for everyone living in Japan as well as disapprove of every kind of discrimination against *Zainichi* (Chapman 2008:27). After the division of Korea and the establishment of the ROK, the *Mindan* were responsible for the registration of *Zainichi* as citizens of the ROK, which was the basis for the issuing of a passport. And only with a valid

passport, *Zainichi* were allowed to travel abroad (Hicks 1997:37). While in the late 1970s, the *Mindan* advocated in the ‘rights and benefits’-movement in order to end the discriminating education of children in Japan’s schools as well as gain the right of social benefits and national accommodations for *Zainichi*. Their constant efforts partially met with success over the next decades (Lie 2008:111). For instance, as part of their campaign to abolish the fingerprinting of *Zainichi* upon entry of the country in the 1980s, the *Mindan* collected signatures and eventually, the law was revised in favor of the Korean communities (Lie 2008:109). Another aspect promoted by the *Mindan* is the right to vote for Koreans. Although *Zainichi* without the Japanese citizenship are still not allowed to vote when it comes to national matters, they were granted the right to vote on a local level by many different areas. However, the efforts of the *Mindan* do not only concern issues within Japan, but also the international level. One of the main objectives on this level is the mediation between the two countries in case of discriminating statements as well as the improvement of the Japanese-Korean relations (Hicks 1997:38).

4.3.2. Characteristics of *Zainichi* communities in Japan

As already mentioned above, *Zainichi* “are far from homogeneous group; they reflect diverse perspectives attachments and configurations of identity” (Kim 2017b:2). In fact, when looking at the different generations within the *Zainichi* communities – starting from the very first generation to the contemporary third or even fourth generation – diverse patterns and characteristics emerge (Kim 2017b:10).

The first generation of immigrants from Korea came to Japan in the belief that they would stay here temporary and therefore avoided any feelings of permanency or belonging. However, the longer they stayed the less practical it was for them to leave Japan and return to Korea, since their whole lives have become economically, socially and even linguistically rooted in Japan (Kim 2017b:10). The end of World War II and the Korean War (1950–1953) complicated the situation for *Zainichi* in Japan even more by the division in North and South, since they originally came from an undivided homeland and were literary caught between two countries. In fact, not only were the North and South part of the Korean peninsula taking an opposing stance against each other and their allies, but also their Diaspora communities were affected. In fact, South and North Korean institutions located in Japan were struggling for the allegiance of the *Zainichi* in Japan (Kim 2017b:45). These institutions promoted the two different ideologies as a result of the division of the Korean peninsula and competed to attract as many ethnic Koreans who remained in Japan as possible. Furthermore, throughout the Cold

War the institutions further promoted their own nations and discouraged their associates from obtaining the Japanese nationality (Kim 2017b:19).

In Japan, one of the primary defining characteristics of *Zainichi* is their divided homeland and not their ethnic identity. One of the frequently asked questions is whether members of the *Zainichi* communities in Japan offer their allegiance to South or North Korea, since South Korea represents an ally whereas North Korea is seen as a security threat for the whole Asian region. Although contemporary *Zainichi* communities consist of the third or fourth generation, they find it difficult to answer, since they all descended from the first generation of Korean migrants, which left Korea when it still was an undivided country. Nevertheless, “the original ‘Korea’ is no longer there” (Kim 2017b:11), the question of identity and affiliation remains. The division of the homeland is not only part of the identity of the first generation of *Zainichi*, but follows the future generations too (Kim 2017b:33).

However, rather than falling into a bipolar identity categorization of either being Korean or being Japanese and having to affiliate themselves with either South Korea or North Korea, contemporary generations of *Zainichi* search for a way to escape these categorizations (Kim 2017b:207-208). Rather than choosing between the former homeland of their ancestors and their current host country, they search for a way that entails living in Japan and having a Korean nationality, which increases the sense of belonging to Japan without compromising their sense of a Korean identity (Kim 2017b:10). Literature on Korean identity states that the division within the *Zainichi* communities and therefore the identity will only heal through the process of reconciliation, which not only includes the unification of South and North Korea, but reaches far beyond the bringing together of a divided country and includes the *Zainichi* communities in Japan as well (Kim 2017b:207-208).

The following subchapters focus on three key characteristics of *Zainichi* communities in Japan. The first aspect deals with the demographic constitution of the *Zainichi* communities. Thereby, not only the percentage allocation by gender of *Zainichi* communities will be analyzed, but also the proportion of population by age, which gives further insight into the share of people in education, the working population and the elderly population. Furthermore, the number of households consisting of either only *Zainichi* or *Zainichi* living with others will be examined as well. The second key criterion analyzes the destinations of *Zainichi* and the largest migrant communities in Japan in order to see whether the target destinations of migrants from the first generation coincide with the destinations of the following generations. At the same time, the change of the migrant communities at the various destinations will be under consideration. The last characteristic focuses on the socio-economic position of

Zainichi in the Japanese society and economic opportunities for *Zainichi* at the labor market, which gives further information on the employment status, the category of occupation and the share of employees in certain industries of *Zainichi* compared to the numbers of the Japanese population. The majority of the data used in the next three subchapters was taken from the population census of the years from 1940 to 2015 provided by the Statistics Bureau of Japan.

4.3.2.1. Demographic constitution of communities

The earliest records of *Zainichi* in Japan in the population census are in the year 1940, where Koreans are still listed as part of the colonial population of Japan next to categories such as ‘inlanders’, ‘overseas inlanders’ or ‘Formosan’ and are not categorized as foreigners. However, as of 1955 the population census differs based on the legal nationality and places *Zainichi* in the category of ‘aliens’ as members of the Korean community without giving further details on the connection to either South or North Korea. The term ‘alien population by nationality’ is used until the end of the 1980s. Since 1995 members of *Zainichi* communities as well as other immigrants are recorded as ‘foreigners by nationality’ in the population census.

As already described above, the number of *Zainichi* in Japan is influenced by various aspects such as geopolitical events or policies and laws enacted by the host country and as a result, the overall number of the population is changing constantly. In 1940, over 1.2 billion *Zainichi* were residing and working in Japan, since it was part of the Japanese colonial empire. However, this number decreased radically to about 540,000 in 1955, when nearly sixty percent of the *Zainichi* population repatriated to their former home-land and continued to decline to 520,465. After a decade of a small increase, this downward trend proceeded further falling below a population of 500,000 for the first time in 2005. In 2015, the overall population of *Zainichi* in Japan amounted to 376,954 people (Statistics Bureau 2014 and 2017). However, the population census is based on the nationality of the population at the time of the survey and does not take the number of naturalized *Zainichi* into account. Therefore, the overall number of *Zainichi* is not only influenced by a declining flow of migrants from Korea, but also by the naturalization of members of their communities, who may or may not affiliate themselves with them after their naturalization²⁵.

Looking at the total *Zainichi* population by proportion of age it can be concluded that the number of *Zainichi* and under the age of fifteen decreased constantly since 1965 when

²⁵ For further information on the issue of being *Zainichi* and living as a member of the *Zainichi* community in Japan, see Ryang/Lie (2009).

about 34 percent of the total population were reported in this category. By 2005 the proportion had fallen under ten percent and in 2015 it decreased to 5.8 percent. Meanwhile the proportion of the population aged 65 or older continuously increased from 2.5 percent in 1965 to 24.5 percent in 2015. This development coincides with the overall development of the Japanese population, which is ageing rapidly while at the same time experiencing a demographic decline. The majority of the *Zainichi* populations fall into the category of working population, which consists of all members between the age of fifteen and 64. From 1965 until 2000 the share of the *Zainichi* labor force population increased from 63.7 percent to 76.5 percent. However, since 2000 the number of *Zainichi* in this age category is steadily decreasing and in 2015 69.2 percent of the total *Zainichi* population was considered as working population. Looking closer at the shares of the labor force population the results show that whereas only 7.9 percent are under the age of 25, the population in their 40s account for 8.7 percent followed by the *Zainichi* aged sixty to 64 (Statistics Bureau 2014 and 2017).

The percentage allocation by gender of the *Zainichi* communities over the years shows a distinctive development. In 1940, of the total *Zainichi* population of 1,241,315 sixty percent were male, while forty percent were recorded as female. However, whereas the number of male decreased continuously over the next decades to 53.1 percent in 1965 and 51.2 percent in 1980, the number of female increased by the same share to 46.9 percent in 1965 and 48.8 percent in 1980. Fifteen years later, in 1995 the percentage allocation of male and female has changed places and the *Zainichi* communities show more female than male members. This downward trend of the share of male members of the *Zainichi* communities continued until 2010 and reached 44.8 percent, which amounts to 189,731 of the total population, while the upward trend of the share of females peaked at 55.2 percent. From 2010 to 2015 the development of the percentage allocation reversed once more, which led to an increase of 0.5 percent of the male share to 45.3 percent leaving the share of females at 54.7 percent. Looking closer at the proportion of population by age among the male and female members the following conclusions can be drawn. In 1965, the proportion of the population under fifteen of both the male and female members of the *Zainichi* society was over thirty percent, which is the result of the birth of the second generation of *Zainichi* after the Second World War ended. Comparing these results to the population census recording the population by age in 2015 it shows that the proportion of population under fifteen has decreased significantly to 6.6 percent of male and 5.2 percent of female members. What's more, the largest number based on the population by age among the *Zainichi* communities are men in their 40s and 60s as

well as women in their 50s and 60s, which coincides with the population of 1965 since the children have aged about fifty years and are falling more or less in these age structures (Statistics Bureau 2014 and 2017)²⁶.

The population census also takes into account the number of households in Japan with foreigners. In 1985, the Statistics Bureau recorded 146,173 households with nearly 488,000 *Zainichi* living in these households. The number of households increased and peaked in 1995 with 207,680 and 581,435 household members. However, since 1995 the number of households consisting of members of the *Zainichi* communities is gradually decreasing. For instance in 2005 the total number of private households of *Zainichi* was 195,109 of which 80.4 percent consisted only of *Zainichi*, while 24.4 percent were households with *Zainichi* and Japanese members. Furthermore, 56.6 percent of the total number of households were recorded to consist of a nuclear family, 13.4 percent were two person-households of a (married) couple and about 35 percent single households. These numbers declined only slightly over the next decade and in 2015 the total number of private households was about 183,780 with 78.9 percent of households with only *Zainichi* members and 21 percent consisting of Japanese and *Zainichi*. While the share of households with a nuclear family declined to 48.5 percent, the proportion of two-person households and single households increased to 13.9 percent and 44.6 percent (Statistics Bureau 2014 and 2017).

4.3.2.2. Destinations and largest migrant communities

The majority of the first Korean immigrants came from the southern provinces of the Korean peninsula and landed either at the ports of the nearest Japanese prefectures including Yamaguchi and Fukuoka or sailed directly from Busan, one of Korea's major ports, to Hondo. Over ninety percent of emigrants used these two routes. However, as more and more from farther up north in Korea migrated to Japan, their target destinations also moved in the direction of Ōsaka and eventually all the way to Tōkyō, as already described above. In 1910, the share of Fukuoka and Yamaguchi in the distribution of destinations of *Zainichi* was 15.2 and 7.3 percent, while those of Ōsaka and Tōkyō were correspondingly 9.4 and 15.8 percent. The share of *Zainichi* choosing Ōsaka as destination of residence increased to 22.5 percent in 1925, whereas Tōkyō and Fukuoka had a *Zainichi* population of about ten percent each. These numbers show that in the colonial period when deciding on the target destination in the case

²⁶ For a more detailed account on the data pulled from the population census, please refer to 'Appendix I.: Registered *Zainichi* in Japan by age groups and gender' on page 147 of the thesis at hand.

of *Zainichi* communities the attractive economic areas prevailed over geographical and socio-political aspects (Tamura 2003:81-82).

Comparing the results of the target destinations of the first waves of *Zainichi*, with resident areas of later arriving Korean immigrants, the following conclusion can be drawn. In the post-war era it was recorded that *Zainichi* had almost spread out over all 47 prefectures in Japan; only in Okinawa were no *Zainichi* reported in 1955. However, the communities in Yamaguchi, which is part of the Chūgoku region, and Fukuoka, located on Kyūshū, decreased slightly to 5 and 5.6 percent, while 8.4 percent were living in Tōkyō and around twenty percent in the prefecture Ōsaka. The largest *Zainichi* communities after Ōsaka are located in the prefectures Hyōgo with 8.9 percent, Kyōto with 6.9 percent and in Aichi including the population of about 15,000 *Zainichi* in the city of Nagoya with 6.6 percent. These results suggest that the target destinations of immigrants in 1955 were the Kansai region, where 41 percent of the total *Zainichi* population was located, and the Kantō region with 16.1 percent. However, the island Kyūshū was still a popular target with 10.6 percent of the total population, while Hokkaidō and Shikoku reported only 1.6 and 1.1 percent. Looking at the share of population based on an urban-rural contrast the records show that in 1955 76.3 percent of *Zainichi* were residing in metropolitan areas, while 23.7 percent took up residency in a rural area (Statistics Bureau 2014).

In 1980 the distribution of *Zainichi* population shifted to some extent and the percentage of *Zainichi* in urban areas increased significantly to 92.2 percent. However, the least favorite target destinations still represented Hokkaidō and Shikoku where the share of the population decreased even further to one and 0.6 percent as well as the Tōhoku area with 1.7 percent. The decline of the communities in Yamaguchi and Fukuoka continued on and from 1965 to 1980 the share of the total population in the Chūgoku region and on Shikoku nearly split in half to 6.9 and 5.5 percent, showing that the former target destinations had lost their attractiveness for ‘new-comers’, which preferred other areas of Japan. In fact, 52.6 and 19.9 percent of the total number of *Zainichi* took up residence in the Kansai and Kantō area. Both, the metropolitan areas of Ōsaka and Tōkyō experienced an increase in *Zainichi* population and in 1980 28.3 percent of the total population (about 158,000) and 10.4 percent (about 58,000) were living at this destinations. The largest *Zainichi* communities in 1980 besides the two already mentioned destinations still coincide with the ones in 1960 and are the communities in the Hyōgo and Kyōto prefecture, located in the Kansai area, with 10.9 and 7.5 percent of the total population as well as the Aichi prefecture in the Chūbu region with 8.7 percent. Together these communities account for a share of about 66 percent of the total

Zainichi population in Japan. Another four communities catch the eye; namely the ones in the prefectures Kanagawa and Fukuoka, which both have about 23,000 members, as well as the prefectures Hiroshima and Yamaguchi with about 14,000 and 13,000 *Zainichi* residing in these areas (Statistics Bureau 2014).

In 2005, the records of the population census of the Statistics Bureau show that the previous trend was interrupted. Whereas the Kantō area including the metropolitan area Tōkyō still experienced an increase and the share of the total *Zainichi* population was 25.4 percent for the whole region and 15.1 percent for Tōkyō, the Kansai area including the prefecture Ōsaka faced a sharp decline from 52.6 percent in 1980 to 39.1 percent in 2005 for the whole area and leaving Ōsaka with a population of 115,440 (24.4 percent). Despite the negative development of communities in the Kansai and Chūbu are, the three largest *Zainichi* communities following Tōkyō and Ōsaka, which hold a share of over sixty percent of the total *Zainichi* population, are still in the prefectures Hyōgo with a share of 10.2 percent, Aichi with 7.6 percent and Kyōto with 6.3 percent. However, whereas the communities in Hiroshima and Yamaguchi shrank to under the mark of 10,000, communities in the Kantō region benefitted of the new development and out of seven prefectures of the region, four including Tōkyō itself show large *Zainichi* communities. In detail, in the prefecture Kanagawa the *Zainichi* population is recorded with 26,806 and the number in the prefectures Saitama and Chiba increased from about 8,800 each in 1980 to about 14,500 and 13,800 in 2005. As for the regions with the smallest communities of *Zainichi*, they are still Tōhoku, Hokkaidō and Shikoku (Statistics Bureau 2014).

Since the population census of 1980 the percentage of *Zainichi* in urban areas increased further and reached 97.1 percent in 2015, while only 2.9 percent were living in rural areas. This development coincides with the rural depopulation Japan is experiencing over the last decades. In the case of *Zainichi* urban areas are significantly more attractive than rural areas, especially if members of the communities are looking for economic opportunities. Looking at the overall development of the *Zainichi* communities between 2005 and 2015, the following results catch one's eye. Although the share of the *Zainichi* population in Tōkyō is further increasing from 15.1 to 19.5 percent, the proportion of the overall Kantō area is slightly declining since 2010 and in 2015 was recorded with 24 percent. Comparing this trend to the development in the Kansai region it shows, that the gap between these two areas is closing further and further since the share of the Kansai region is still declining and in 2015 was 27 percent. Furthermore, the proportion of *Zainichi* population in Ōsaka shows the same development and in 2015 was listed with the same percentage as Tōkyō. This shows that

although for a long time Ōsaka has been the first choice for *Zainichi* when it comes to destinations, in 2015 the same share of the population chose Tōkyō as their target destination. Despite the negative trend of the Kansai region, the prefecture of Kyōto was able to record a slight improvement of their proportion from 5.9 percent in 2010 to 6.2 percent in 2015. Looking at the overall development of migrant communities the distribution did not change since 2005 and the prefectures Hyōgo with a share of 9.5 percent, Aichi with 7.8 percent and Kyōto with 6.2 percent still hold the largest *Zainichi* communities after Tōkyō and Ōsaka, while Tōhoku with 1.5 percent, Hokkaidō with a share of 1.1 percent and Shikoku with 0.5 percent bring up the rear with the smallest *Zainichi* communities. In general, the results of the population census show, that although the *Zainichi* population is scattered among all 47 prefectures of Japan, since the 1950s the Kansai region as well as the Kantō area represent the core destinations of *Zainichi*. Furthermore, if the development follows the trend of the last ten years, Tōkyō will replace Ōsaka as number one target for the *Zainichi* communities (Statistics Bureau 2014 and 2017)²⁷.

4.3.2.3. Socio-economic position and economic opportunities

The last here discussed key aspect when it comes to characteristics of *Zainichi* communities in Japan is the socio-economic position of *Zainichi* as well as economic opportunities. Although there still exists discrimination based on nationality, as will be discussed in one of the following chapters, when it comes to the labor market, *Zainichi* and other immigrant communities are structurally embedded in various areas and “have become indispensable to the functioning of important core sectors of the economy” (Liang 2016:7). According to Kobayashi, the economic success of *Zainichi* is based on two factors. At one hand, the first generation of *Zainichi* immigrated during the colonial period and has paved the way for the following generations. These generations grew up in Japan receiving the same education as Japanese children and tend to assimilate more with the Japanese society. At another hand, the majority of the first *Zainichi* possesses the status of Special Permanent Residence, which gives them freedom of choice in terms of occupation and their employment contracts are generally without a time limit. However, this socio-economic status was not a given for the first wave of Korean immigrants (Kobayashi 2014:46).

During the colonial period, the socio-economic status of *Zainichi* was very low. Not only did they live in poverty, but due to their lack of language skills and a shortage of other

²⁷ For a more detailed account on the data pulled from the population census, please refer to ‘Appendix II.: Registered *Zainichi* in Japan by regions and prefectures’ on page 148 of the thesis at hand.

skills it was nearly impossible for them to get attractive jobs on the labor market. *Zainichi* were usually employed as manual laborers on a limited basis such as day laborers and only a few were able to get permanent positions as factory workers (Kim 2011:236). Due to lack of education, language barriers and high discrimination, the majority of jobs available for *Zainichi* were so-called '3K'-jobs; meaning *kitanai* 汚い, *kiken* 危険, *kitsui* きつい, which translates as dirty, dangerous and demanding. *Zainichi* in Ōsaka often found employment in factories manufacturing rubber, glass or textiles as day laborer (Lee 2012:4). In fact, between 1925 and 1945 an average of 88 percent of the labor force population of *Zainichi* was employed as laborers, whereas an average of six percent and an average of two percent worked in commerce and in agriculture and fishery (Tamura 2003:80-81). What's more, *Zainichi* in Japan were paid about 75 percent of the wages of Japanese nationals and therefore the overall wages of *Zainichi* were much lower than those Japanese citizens. Nevertheless, the immigration rate of *Zainichi* increased steadily since although the socio-economic situation in Japan was difficult, it was still better than in Korea, where the average wages were half of comparable wages for workers in Japan (Kim 2011:236).

After the Second World War ended, the socio-economic situation of *Zainichi* in Japan was still difficult since employment opportunities were very rare and even in the Japanese population the unemployment rates were high. Due to feelings of hostility and the arising discrimination against *Zainichi*, it was nearly impossible for them to obtain a position at a Japanese company and *Zainichi* had to work as laborers again or stay unemployed. What's more, the repatriation of over 6.6 million demilitarized soldiers to Japan worsened the employment situation for *Zainichi* visibly. During the 1950s the socio-economic status of *Zainichi* remained unchanged; most of them lived in poverty, had no regular employment and had to take low-status positions such as day laborers, construction workers or scrap iron dealers in unattractive and marginal areas of the economy in order to make a living (Kim 2011:236-237). According to the Statistical Yearbook of Japan in 1952 only 0.55 percent of the total population of Japan and 0.69 percent of Japanese male were unemployed, whereas the unemployment rate of *Zainichi* was recorded with 7.8 percent of the total *Zainichi* population, which is fourteen times higher than the national rate, and with 12.4 percent for males of *Zainichi* communities, which is about eighteen times higher (Statistics Bureau 2014a). As a result, at the end of the 1950s, about seven times as many *Zainichi* as Japanese citizens received Livelihood Protection from the Japanese state, which amounted to 1.8 billion yen per year (Kim 2017b:106). Although about 55,000 *Zainichi* were listed as owners and managers of their own small businesses, their socio-economic status was not much better than

those of other *Zainichi*, since they were engaged in simple businesses. In other words, they did not need any special skills and often were dealing with scrap iron or junk as well as operating small restaurants or entertainment businesses such as Pachinko (Kim 2008:879). Less than thirty percent were employed in manufacturing industries and less than one percent of the total *Zainichi* population was able to obtain positions considered as middle class. As a result, in 1956 the per capita income of *Zainichi* was only about 39 percent of that of a Japanese national (Kim 2011:237).

With the beginning of the 1960s, the high growth of the Japanese economy generated a great demand for labor and provided members of the *Zainichi* communities with diverse economic opportunities (Kim 2008:880). Furthermore, the level of education of *Zainichi* advanced extensively, which together with the numerous job opportunities lead to an improvement of the socio-economic position of *Zainichi*. Starting with 1965, *Zainichi* were able to apply for attractive position in core sectors of the Japanese economy such as managers, officials and professional technical workers. For instance, whereas in 1959 the number of *Zainichi* employed in these areas was 2.6 percent, in 1974 it was recorded with 6.5 percent. What's more, while from 1964 onwards the figure of unskilled laborers decreased steadily, there was reported a continuous increase of the number of semi-skilled and skilled workers. Nevertheless, the discrimination against *Zainichi* in the labor market continued and legal barriers prevented *Zainichi* from applying for public institutions such as schools, hospitals and governments. Guidelines influenced by the nationality laws of Japan stated that civil servants had to possess the Japanese citizenship in order to fulfill their duties. However, because not every member of the *Zainichi* communities applied for naturalization and further, not every application was granted by the Japanese government, they were not eligible to apply for positions in the public sector. Furthermore, the number of *Zainichi* obtaining attractive and high-paying jobs in core sectors of the Japanese economy increased further during the 1970s and in 1974 about twenty percent of employed members of *Zainichi* communities obtained so-called 'white-collar' positions (Kim 2011:237-238).

The 1980s were a turning point for the Japanese economy and for employees of the *Zainichi* communities in Japan. Under the slogan of 'internationalization', Japan opened up its economy and society to an increasing number of foreign workers as well as students. For instance, in 1982 public research facilities including universities were permitted to fill open positions of their permanent staff with foreign employees (Tamura 2003:84).

From 1980 onwards the socio-economic position of *Zainichi* improved significantly based on some decisive aspects. First, the economic growth of the Japanese economy directly

affected the *Zainichi* communities. The expansion of the construction and service industries provided *Zainichi*, who were engaged in either one of these industries, with diverse business and job opportunities (Kim 2011:238). Many businessmen of Korean ethnicity used the construction boom throughout the bubble economy to their advantage and their businesses grew as well (Kim 2008:881-882). An example for the service industry is the *pachinko* industry, which represents the biggest ethnic industry of *Zainichi* in Japan. During the bubble economy this industry grew remarkably and in 1994 based on findings of the Administrative Management Bureau *Zainichi* were occupying between sixty and seventy percent of the market and the market size of the industry surpassed thirty trillion yen (about Euro 221 billion)²⁸ annually (Kim 2008:880). Second, in the 1980s and 1990s took place some legal and institutional reforms, which made it possible for *Zainichi* to apply for jobs in the public sectors. For instance, since the reforms they were not only able to work as instructors at public schools on a full-time basis, but also as professional nurses at public hospitals. Furthermore, in the 1990s public governments opened up technical, clerical and general civil service jobs for all foreign employees including *Zainichi* (Kim 2006: 66-67). In accordance with these developments, the New Immigration Control Law of 1990 was enacted to invite newcomers from countries such as Korea, China or Brazil in order to participate in the booming economy and take over jobs in the newly opened up public sectors as well as growing industry branches (Tamura 2003:84). Third, employment discrimination against *Zainichi* decreased considerably in the private sector, although the matter of ethnicity or nationality still lingered. However, conducted surveys suggest that since the 1980s companies which receive applications from *Zainichi* do not disregard them in the first place, because of nationality issues (Kim 2011:239). The last factor contributing to the improvement of the socio-economic position of *Zainichi* is the education level of the immigrant community, which improved significantly. A survey conducted in 1995 came to the conclusion that there is no statistically noteworthy disparity in years of education between *Zainichi* and Japanese nationals. In fact, both groups completed their education on the same level and produced about twelve years of education (Kim 2003:8-9).

According to the Statistics Bureau the better socio-economic position of *Zainichi* has an impact on the positions they obtained as well as on the occupational category. Between 1985 and 2005 the number of *Zainichi* working as professionals and technical workers increased continuously. Furthermore, the proportion of *Zainichi* working as managers and officials

²⁸ Since the exchange rates of Yen in Euro are only available as of January 1999, the thesis uses the exchange rate as of January 2018 to give the reader an idea of the amount in this particular case.

among the total working *Zainichi* population has become twice the comparable rate of the total population of Japan aged fifteen years and over. In 1985, 8.5 percent of the *Zainichi* working population, which amounts to 20,553 people, has been working as directors. At the same time, the number of directors of Japanese nationality was 4.8 percent of the entire population. A decade later the number of *Zainichi* reached a new high with 29,196 people or eleven percent of the *Zainichi* population, while only 5.9 percent of the entire population was reported to work in this occupational field. In the following decade the number decreased slightly and in 2005 24,224 *Zainichi* have been working as directors, which amounts to 10.9 percent of the total working population among *Zainichi*, whereas the percentage of the entire Japanese working population was recorded with 5.4 percent. The most popular industries when it comes to the employment status of director among *Zainichi* are service followed by construction, wholesale and retail trade as well as manufacturing (Statistics Bureau 2014). This high concentration of *Zainichi* working as directors reflects the decades before the bubble economy, when the discrimination against *Zainichi* in the labor market was still higher and the majority of *Zainichi* had to become self-employed in small businesses. With the growth of the Japanese economy they achieved economic success, and reached higher occupational status since they built their businesses up by themselves. During the bubble economy the step from self-employed to a manager or director often was the logical choice and therefore represents a pattern of the upward social mobility of members of the *Zainichi* community (Kim 2011:239).

However, although there has been a significant improvement of the socio-economic position of *Zainichi* in the Japanese society, some socio-economic inequalities between the Japanese population and the *Zainichi* communities still remain. First, despite the latest developments the share of professional and technical workers is still lower for *Zainichi* than for the Japanese population. In 2005 the percentage of *Zainichi* working as professional and technical workers was recorded with about ten, which was lower than the share of Japanese employees in the same field (fifteen percent). Although the number of professional and technical workers employed *Zainichi* increased slightly to thirteen percent over the next ten years, the number of Japanese nationals increased as well and reached seventeen percent. A similar development can be seen, when looking at employment status of *Zainichi*. Whereas the shares of white-collar positions of *Zainichi* in areas such as finance, insurance, real estate, medical sector or public sector increased only slightly from fourteen to nineteen percent from 2005 to 2015, the share of self-employed *Zainichi* is still rather high (although the number decreased from 52 percent in 2005 to 39 percent in 2015 (Statistics Bureau 2014 and 2017)).

A second factor for the still remaining socio-economic inequalities represents the overall employment situation of *Zainichi*, which compared to that of the Japanese population still seems to be less secure. In 2005, over 30,000 *Zainichi* were in an irregular employment relationship, which represents 21 percent of the total working *Zainichi* population, whereas only about fourteen percent of the entire Japanese working population was employed as irregular workers. Furthermore, while the number of irregular workers among Japanese nationals decreased significantly to eight percent in 2015, the number among the *Zainichi* communities increased radically to about 45 percent (Statistics Bureau 2014 and 2017). A third aspect of inequality represents the unemployment rate of *Zainichi* compared to Japanese nationals, which is significantly higher. In 2005, thirteen percent of the *Zainichi* working population was registered as unemployed, while only six percent of the Japanese working population was without employment. Looking closer at the unemployment rate among the *Zainichi* communities, it was recorded that the population aged twenty to 34 had the highest unemployment rates. Although the overall unemployment rate of *Zainichi* decreased to eight percent and the highest rates within the communities shifted towards the population aged fifty to 64, the rate was still double compared to the unemployment rate of the Japanese working population (Statistics Bureau 2014 and 2017). These results show, that although the overall socio-economic position of *Zainichi* in Japan in relation to the mainstream Japanese population has improved significantly over the last decade, there still exists a socio-economic gap or inequality between these two groups (Kim 2011:243). Furthermore, the development of the socio-economic position of *Zainichi* suggests that

[I]f there is no legal restrictions on occupational choice, foreign-born population can assimilate in the labor market through generations by means of human capital accumulation to a similar level of education attainment in the host country. (Kobayashi 2014:50)

4.3.3. Social status of *Zainichi*

The social status of immigrants, including the status of *Zainichi*, is closely linked to two political discourses in the Japanese society. The first one has its origins in the 1980s and argues that foreigners not only represent an internal security threat, but also increase the possibility of social and ethnic conflicts as well as destroy the existing social order of the Japanese society. Supporters of this discourse are against in increasing immigration rate, because they fear the social harmony and public peace in Japan will be undermined. In fact, although the empirical validity of their theory has a lot of shortcomings and they use a distortion of reality, the discourse has some powerful arguments, which appeal to the

Japanese society and have a strong impact on the opinion of Japanese towards immigrants. As a result, the social status of migrants is affected by political discourses and “the campaign against foreigners as potential criminals has been successful in terms of public perception” (Liang 2016:2).

The second dominant discourse emerged in the late 1990s and involves foreign workers and labor migration, which are described as an essential future workforce by its supporters. Due to the rapidly ageing and declining Japanese population, labor migration is seen as a key factor in order to secure Japan’s economic growth. Therefore, the discourse states that a proactive immigration policy and a broader opening of the labor market for immigrants are necessary measurements to maintain Japan’s economic strength and current lifestyle, since foreign workers will not only meet the workforce shortages, but also contribute to the funding of the social welfare system and restore the economy. However, with the granting of access to the labor market for immigrants, another issue emerged, which was the question of the integration of immigrants into the Japanese society. Until recently, the general assumption in the Japanese society was that those workers are only here temporary and therefore few efforts had been made to integrate them into the social structure or the Japanese community, as will be discussed further in a subchapter (Liang 2016:6).

Although *Zainichi* have been in Japan for a long period of time and are among the largest immigrant communities, they often face the same challenges as newly arriving migrants and their social status is changing based on public opinion or policies. After the Second World War ended in 1945, Japan had to proof itself in a significantly changing postwar world and measures toward the rebuilding of the nation were taken. Among those were also policies which directly influenced the social status of *Zainichi* in Japan (Kim 2017b:9). The *Zainichi*, who for the large part had immigrated from the southern provinces of Korea and remained in Japan after the war had ended, were defined as a special category, since they were neither seen as Japanese nor as foreigners and therefore they were treated as nationals of a third-country (Chung 2010:75). Despite the fact that the USA supported not only their former homeland, South Korea, but also their current hostland, Japan, the USA played a major role in defining the social status of Koreans in post-war Japan. Not only did the USA re-classify *Zainichi* and took away their categorization as ‘imperial subject’ which they obtained through the annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1910, but they also promoted the new special category of a third-country national (Watt 2009:93). Although Japan changed its course and stated that *Zainichi* would be regarded as Japanese nationals until the legitimate government of Korea would recognize their Korean nationality, *Zainichi* were de facto

considered stateless for over three years since the ROK and DPRK were not officially established until 1948 (Watt 2009:76). During the US occupation from 1945 to 1952 *Zainichi* were “perceived as a troublesome minority that might threaten the homogenization of the nation-building process” (Kim 2017b:5) and *Zainichi* were treated as foreigners in Japan. Furthermore, the Japanese government further impaired their social status within the Japanese society through various policies restricting social welfare or other rights (Kim 2017b:5-6).

In 1949 new developments came to light, which further affected the status of *Zainichi* in Japan and resulted in exclusionary policies toward *Zainichi*. It was noted that the in Japan remaining Koreans should be offered three different options: They could choose to repatriate, to acquire full Japanese citizenship or retain a permanent alien status. However, eventually neither Japan nor ROK intended to give the option of citizenship to the *Zainichi* communities and the measurements only further divided the communities itself (Kim 2017b:102-103). After the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, the Justice Ministry in Japan takes away the Japanese nationality from all *Zainichi* and although they are permitted to stay in Japan for the time being until their legal status is resolved, all *Zainichi* instantly become subject to the Alien Registration Law and Immigration Control Law of Japan, which does not help to improve their social status within the Japanese society (Kim 2017b:104). Although the Japanese public opinion was not in favor of the treaty when it came to pre-colonial Korean residents in Japan, major Japanese newspapers emphasized the potential future problems concerning minorities should permanent residential status be granted to *Zainichi*, which influenced the public opinion of the Japanese population. On the one hand, *Zainichi* were faced with an uncertain future and a mixed public opinion towards them in their host country, but on the other hand, the South Korean government did not welcome them as their own citizens either. In fact, South Korea disapproved of their incapability to speak fluently Korean and treated returnees as foreigners in their own country (Kim 2017b:125-126).

Through the normalization treaty between Japan and the ROK in 1965, the social status of *Zainichi* improved slightly. However, *Zainichi* only benefitted from this development if they applied for South Korean citizenship in Japan, which automatically granted permanent residence status in Japan to them. This status was not made available for *Zainichi* who were pro-North Korea and therefore did not apply for South Korean citizenship first (Ryang 1997:124). After the treaty between the countries was signed, Japanese foreign policies focused on the alliance with the USA and South Korea, which also included the *Zainichi* communities in Japan. However, the perception of the Japanese government and the Japanese population towards the *Zainichi* communities in Japan only turned from a single category of

an uncertainty and feeling of threat into two different categories based on a political agenda: either *Zainichi* would apply for South Korean citizenship and support South Korea, or they would not apply for South Korean citizenship and show their affiliation with North Korea (Kim 2017b:36-37). However, in 1982 the Japanese Ministry of Justice created a new category of permanent resident for non-South Korean nationals based on their official policy and in doing so recognizing the legitimacy of the division of the Korean peninsula. This new status was called Exceptional Permanent Residence and granted all pro-North *Zainichi* residencies in Japan, without requiring them to establish a South Korean nationality (Ryang 1997:5). It is not until the 1990s, when the threat of North Korea is more prominent than ever and the Japanese media reports on the negative socio-political situation in North Korea, that a rising number of *Zainichi*, who previously were affiliated to North Korea and did not acquire a South Korean nationality in the course of the normalization treaty in 1965, and their following generations now applied for South Korean citizenship. This showed that they were now more concerned about their lives in Japan than their former homeland and social movements emerged demanding voting rights and other social benefits for *Zainichi* communities (Kim 2017b:180). In 1999 South Korea took a step towards the improvement of the social status of *Zainichi* in Japan and passed the Overseas Korean Act. This Act created a new overseas visa category and tried to connect overseas Korean migrants with the South Korean population. Furthermore, eligible migrants were given access to property rights, pensions, health insurance as well as unlimited employment opportunities and economic activities (Park/Chang 2005:2-3).

4.3.3.1. Discrimination of *Zainichi* by the Japanese society

Discrimination or unequal treatment of people is based on predominant aspects such as gender, ethnicity, descent, religion, age and others, which do not conform to the moral concepts of a society and, as a result, reflect public opinion, prejudice or emotional state of citizens. Although nations formulate a principle of equality containing norms and regulations for equal treatment of every human being, there still exists unequal treatment in every society. According to the Equality Act 2010 formulated by the British government, *Zainichi* in Japan are affected by discrimination due to descent, national origin as well as ethnicity (UK Legislation 2010). In the same year, the Human Rights Council gave an account of the situation in Japan and stated that “racism and discrimination based on nationality are still common in Japan, including in the workplace, schools, housing, the justice system, and private establishments” (CMW 2011:10). Consequently, the Japanese government was called

upon to take counteractive measures and to comply with the internationally accepted standards of human rights (Kobayashi 2014:1).

Thereby, the discrimination concerns different areas of life such as job-search, apartment hunting, marriage, daily life situations as well as problems based on citizenship. Looking closer at these different areas, the analysis of *Zainichi* at the labour market concludes the following: The Japanese legislature grants naturalized *Zainichi* as well as those with Korean citizenship absolute right and access to the labor market. The only exemption is the government sector, which is reserved for Japanese employees (Lie 2008:37). As a result, *Zainichi* have access to both Korean and Japanese companies and are able to follow similar career paths as Japanese employees. Furthermore, the economic growth of Japan's economy after the Second World War benefitted *Zainichi* as well, and the percentage of Korean workers decreased from 21 in 1964 to seven in 1984 (Lie 2008:153), while their participation in white-collar jobs increased to forty percent until the year 1985 (Ryang 1997:126). Despite the seemingly good conditions at the Japanese labour market, according to their own statements many *Zainichi* have problems when it comes to job-hunting or working their way up due to discrimination. A survey in the year 1971 concluded that 42 percent of companies indicated that they generally would not hire *Zainichi* and 38 percent stated that the recruitment of Koreans is problematic. Often companies would specify in their job postings that they are not recruiting foreigners (Lie 2008:74). One of the reasons for this refusal of foreign employees was that the recruitment of foreigners would seriously affect the harmony of the working environment (Nakao 1997:59).

The most famous example for discrimination at the labour market is known as Hitachi case and occurred in the 1970s. The Korean graduate Pak Chŏng'sŏk applied for a job offering at one of the biggest Japanese companies using his Japanese name Arai Shōji. After being recruited, the company asked for his documents and as soon as they learnt that he was Korean, they withdrew acceptance based on the statement that Hitachi would not hire foreigners (Chapman 2008:33-34). Thereupon, Pak decided to take court action and sue Hitachi. He was supported by many different organizations, including the *Mindan*, as well as from Japanese activists (Chapman 2008:35). Nowadays this case is seen as pioneer work resulting in a change and improvement of the situation for *Zainichi* as employees (Shipper 2002:48). However, although job postings do no longer contain discriminating statements, the refusal and other discriminating measures are still in effect. For instance, often *Zainichi* applying for a job are told that the post has already been filled, or their participation in

promotion exams is denied on the basis of a lack of Japanese citizenship in order to hinder them climbing the career ladder (Chapman 2008:80).

The second are affected by discrimination is the hunting for an accommodation. Although there are no formal limitations concerning the settling of *Zainichi*, they experience difficulties in finding a home for themselves. For instance, until 1979 state-owned residences were not rented to Koreans, which considerably limited their search location wise (Nakao 1997:72-73). In addition, it was quite common among private landlords to refuse the tenancy to Koreans, which they stated on signs posted on their front door. These actions led to great discomfort among the *Zainichi* communities. Eventually, a number of complaints and protests led to the acceptance of Korean tenants for state-owned buildings with the beginning of 1979 (Hicks 1997:111-112). As in the case of job-hunting, a case was brought to court and afterwards the open discrimination of Koreans was less obvious than before. Although *Zainichi* got access to state-owned resident buildings, the private landlords were often still refusing to take *Zainichi* as tenants. As a result, Koreans used agencies as middle party to search for accommodations; however, as soon as the landlord gained knowledge of the identity of the potential lessee, the offers were withdrawn. Reasons for the refusal of Korean tenants are among others the alleged communication problems between Koreans and Japanese, which is nonexistent since nowadays many Koreans are the second or third generation and therefore their mother tongue is Japanese, and the exotic, tradition Korean cuisine (Hicks 1997:113).

Moving on to the everyday life of *Zainichi* in the Japanese society it can be concluded that although Koreans are not easy identifiable based on their looks, there are certain criteria such as the typical Korean clothing, the use of the Korean language in public as well as the Korean names, which allow the Japanese society to differentiate. Consequently, the recognizing may lead to discriminating actions against Koreans in shops, public departments, schools, public transportation or simply on the street. The postwar era was affected by a series of acts of violence mostly from university students affiliated with the *Uyoku* 右翼 (translated: right wing) against minorities with migration background such as the *Zainichi* (Ryang 1997:181). Discrimination also affected the names of Koreans. In some cases *Zainichi* took over Japanese names, using different pronunciations perceived unnatural by Japanese, which exposed them as Koreans. As a result, people were whispering behind their backs, or talking really slow in Japanese, since they assumed that their interlocutors were not equipped with the abilities to communicate fluently in Japanese (Hicks 1997:70-71).

In addition, in some cases discrimination and unequal treatment were part of the upbringing or educational background of Japanese children. For instance, parents forbid their children to spend time with school mates or neighbor kids of Korean origin (Hicks 1997:73). As a result, the school is another place, where Koreans may be confronted with discriminatory actions. Whereas after the end of the war most of the Korean children were sent to Korean schools – and in particular *Sōren* schools – as time was passing and a return to a reunited Korea was not possible in the foreseeable future, the number of students at Korean schools significantly decreased. According to an empirical study, in 1986 only one percent of *Zainichi* visited a South Korean school, thirteen percent a North Korean and over 85 percent a Japanese school. One of the reasons for parents to send their children to Japanese schools was the legislation effective until the middle of the 1990s, which prohibited graduates of Korean schools to move on to Japanese high schools (Nakao 1997:88). Consequently, the acquisition of Korean language skills decreased in significance, since *Zainichi* communities wanted to adapt to their new homes. According to a survey from the year 1980, only about thirty percent of *Zainichi* in Ōsaka thought that the learning of the Korean language was important (Lie 2008:77).

The discrimination also influenced the school life of Korean children. For instance, Korean parents were advised by Japanese schools to use Japanese names for their children in order to prevent them from being victims of bullying (in Japanese: *ijime* 虐め). Most of the parents took this advice and in the year 1979 85 percent of Korean students used Japanese names in school, which decreased to about 65 percent until the year 1989 due to an increasing acceptance of *Zainichi* in the society. However, Korean children were often bullied by their Japanese classmates as a result of their unusual sounding names or their origin (Fukuoka 2000:114). The frequent bullying also influenced the lives of Korean students outside of school. They had to live a double life and often refrained from inviting classmates home in order to protect their Korean identity and origin (Lie 2008:75). However, the name changes were also relevant later on, since being part of a group is still considered as important in Japan, the government prompted adults to change their names to Japanese ones as well. Most of the *Zainichi* complied with this request and therefore, in 1970 over 85 percent of Koreans were using a Japanese name with a trend pointing to a steady increase (Lie 2008:78). These name changes occur either by keeping the Korean name, but using the Japanese pronunciation or by choosing a completely new Japanese name. The first option has the disadvantage that although the pronunciation is Japanese, often the names sound strange and unnatural, which points to the Korean descent of the concerned person (Fukuoka 2000:8).

Searching for a marriage partner is one of the areas as well, where *Zainichi* are faced with refusal and discrimination. Koreans are faced with the decision to search for a Japanese partner or marry another *Zainichi*, and although the latter may sound easier, there exist difficulties as well. For instance, finding a Korean partner is not that easy based on demographic constitution, since compared to the Japanese population, the potential group is quite small. Furthermore, the *Zainichi* community itself is not homogeneous and their views differ for example in political attitude or the affiliation to a group, either *Sōren* or *Midan* (Hicks 1997:107-108). Factors attributed to the significant growth of intermarriages are, for example, the decrease of arranged marriages between Koreans (Lie 2008:88), changes concerning the regulations of naturalization of *Zainichi* in case of a Japanese spouse (Chapman 2008:71) or the revision of statute in the year 1985 whereupon in Japan born children are automatically granted the citizenship of their father (Lie 2008:144).

However, marriage between a Japanese and a Korean spouse is still not an easy process. On the one hand, while many Korean parents do not believe that a marriage with a Japanese citizen is going to work out for their child, Japanese parents are afraid that they will lose their face in society, lose their social status as well as have to deal with additional problems. Therefore, in some cases, the Korean spouse was not added to the *koseki* 戸籍 (translated: family register) in order to prevent those consequences (Hicks 1997:107-108). The discrimination continued even after marriage. For instance, in case the newlywed were searching for an accommodation, landlords often refused to rent to mixed couples and quite often they wanted to inspect the above mentioned family register to confirm the descent of the applicants (Hicks 1997:113).

Finally, Koreans also experience discrimination based on citizenship. The “Alien Registration Law” of 1952 stated that all *Zainichi* without the Japanese citizenship at that time were to be considered foreigners regardless how many years they already have resided in Japan. The later added status of a “Permanent Resident” permitted members of the Korean minority to stay in the country for an unspecified period of time and gradually citizens of Korean descent gained the right to social benefits (Ryang 1997:125). Although *Zainichi* are in possession of this visa and enjoy some kind of safety, they are treated as foreigners by the Japanese government as long as they have not assumed the Japanese citizenship. As a result, they are treated the same way as other foreigners, which are often viewed as a form of discrimination. For instance, foreigners, who stay in Japan for more than three months have to register at an immigration bureau in order to get a residence cards, which they have to take with them all the times and has to be renewed after a certain period of time (Hicks 1997:91-

92). This law represents for *Zainichi* of the second and third generation, which were born in Japan, a discriminatory action and gives them the feeling of being foreign or, in severe cases, not welcome in the country (Hicks 1997:94-95). Similar is the feeling concerning the law on the fingerprinting upon arrival in Japan, which was initiated in 1955. 25 years after the implementation of this system Korean organizations including *Sōren* und *Mindan* started a campaign and collected 1.8 million signatures consisting of ninety percent Japanese ones in order to protest against this law (Lie 2008:109). Eventually, although these protests led to the gradual abolishment of fingerprinting for *Zainichi* until 1991, this minority group is still required to have their alien registration card with them (Ryang 1997:125).

Until the end of the Second World War all *Zainichi* had the Japanese citizenship and therefore, were allowed to be politically active by going to polls or announce their candidacy for a political function. However, due to the change of residency after the war, all Koreans without a Japanese citizenship lost not only their right to run for office, but also the right to vote. The granting of the “Permanent Residence Status” did not change this circumstances and as a result, many *Zainichi* took this opportunity to get naturalized (Chapman 2008:75-76).

4.3.3.2. Integration and naturalization of *Zainichi*

Although Japan experienced an increase in immigration flows of labour migrants since the 1990s, there have been made very few efforts to integrate immigrants into the Japanese society. In fact, in Japan exists no systematic measures to integrate migrants, since the majority of the Japanese population assumes that migrants are temporary residents who in due course will leave Japan behind and return to their country of origin. Not only the population sees foreign workers in this light, but also the government treats migrants as temporary residents and shapes their policies accordingly. However, as first organization with ties to the government the *Nippon Keidanren* emphasized that highly skilled migrants should be provided with a settlement and therefore partly integrated into the Japanese society as potential permanent residents. Apart from the distinct lack of effort on the part of the Japanese government, but also because of the earlier mentioned political and public discourse about the international security threat foreigners represent to the Japanese society. As a result, Japanese are hesitant to integrate migrants as rightful members into their society (Liang 2016:3). In most cases, the integration of immigrants is seen as a no-win situation, since the Japanese society as the host society measures all immigrants including the *Zainichi* communities against their ability to speak the Japanese language and be able to interact based on Japanese cultural standards. However, even if immigrants embrace the language and culture of their

host country, they are neither accepted nor treated as equal members of the Japanese society (Liang 2016:6).

The *Zainichi* communities in Japan distinguish itself from Korean migrant groups in other countries, because “unlike ethnic Koreans in China and Russia as well as Korean Americans they represent the only Korean migrant group that has not been granted citizenship by its host state” (Kim 2017b:1). In fact, as opposed to *jus soli* states such as the United States or Australia, Japan is a *jus sanguinis* state, which means that instead of granting citizenship by place of birth, they emphasize the blood status (Lee 2012:7-8). Originally, most ancestors of the contemporary *Zainichi* communities came from the southern provinces of the Korean peninsula, which today are part of the ROK, and retained their Korean nationality. However, nowadays most of them speak Japanese and have embraced the cultural life in Japan. Often, ethnic Koreans use Japanese names, due to discrimination against them, as already discussed in the previous chapter. As a result, members of *Zainichi* communities in Japan have become vastly acculturated to the Japanese society and although contemporary *Zainichi* communities represent the fourth or even fifth generation of descendants, who were all born in Japan, they are still not fully integrated into the Japanese society. Furthermore, despite the fact that the naturalization rate has improved since the 1990s, there exist *Zainichi* who have no intention of returning to their country of origin, but still keep their Korean nationality (Kim 2017b:1-2).

As already mentioned above, political and public discourses have influenced the degree of integration of immigrants into the Japanese society. Since the end of the Second World War, “Japan’s policies towards foreign settlers have changed from exclusion to inclusion and back again, but institutional barriers still remain” (Kim 2017b:3). Furthermore, the degree of integration also varies within the *Zainichi* Diaspora, which implies some underlying political strategies of the Japanese government when it comes to the two factions within the *Zainichi* communities as well as to the divided Korean peninsula. For the Japanese government, the process of nation building is connected to the ideology of a homogenized society, which is threatened by the potential integration of immigrants such as the *Zainichi* and resulting in the social and political marginalization of migrant communities (Kim 2017b:3). However, after the end of the war neither the Japanese government nor the two *Zainichi* factions fought to change the rules for citizenship, although the long-term *Zainichi* had no intention to return to Korea in the long run. Although the Normalization Treaty of 1965 presented the *Zainichi* communities with three different options – to return to their country of origin, to remain in Japan and become Japanese citizens, or to remain in Japan as permanent foreign residents – the integration into the Japanese society did not improve, since in practice, the minister of

justice was responsible for the recognition of naturalization applications. The minister could withhold the citizenship if one of his official judged deemed the applicant as undesirable or inadequately Japanese. Applicants had to renounce their Korean roots, which until 1986 included the taking over of a Japanese name and intrusive checks into the family, friends, personal life and finances of each applicant during the naturalization process (Kim 2017b:135).

In 1979 and in 1981 the Japanese government ratified the International Bill on Human Rights and the UN Refugee Convention in answer to worldwide policies on human rights, which affected the integration of *Zainichi* in Japan as well. These ratifications not only compelled the Japanese government to present *Zainichi* with access to welfare benefits such as the national pension program, but also provide them with the opportunity to apply for the status of permanent resident. The intention of the government was that a policy of social integration combined with a more steady legal status would persuade members of the *Zainichi* community to choose naturalization and help them to better assimilate into the Japanese society. In fact, when the Japanese government transformed the strict naturalization policy into a more towards assimilation leaning policy, the cultural and socio-economic integration of *Zainichi* increased significantly. At the same time, due to labor shortages in Japan new Korean immigrants began to arrive, splitting the *Zainichi* communities into the ‘old-comers’ and the ‘new-comers’, since to the government and the Japanese population they appeared more foreign than the already in Japan remaining *Zainichi*. As a result, Japan’s population began to regard the *Zainichi* who already resided in Japan long-term to see as would-be Japanese nationals, whereas the ‘new-comers’ had a long way to go before they could be integrated into the Japanese society (Kim 2017b:155-156).

However, the Japanese government started to change assimilation policies and focused more on change rather than similarity to the Japanese ethnicity, which resulted in the amendment of the Nationality Act in 1985 which eliminated the obligation to adopt a Japanese name in the course of the naturalization process. As a result of these policies, in the 1980s the number of ethnically mixed Japanese nationals increased considerably and the rate of intermarriage between *Zainichi* and Japanese rose as well (Kim 2017b:156-157). International marriages between *Zainichi* and Japanese are one key element when it comes to the integration of *Zainichi* into the Japanese society. According to a survey conducted by the MGLW the number of marriages between Japanese and non-Japanese has been continuously increasing from 1985 until 2005. Whereas the percentage of marriages with either of husband and wife being non-Japanese was two in 1985, the figure peaked with six percent in 2005 and

has been decreasing to three percent by 2015. Looking closer at marriages between *Zainichi* and Japanese it was recorded that in 1985 half of the marriages with either of husband and wife being non-Japanese were actually of Korean ethnicity. However this number declined continuously to eighteen percent until 2015. In 1985 took place 6,147 marriages between *Zainichi* and Japanese, of which 3,622 the wife was of Korean ethnicity and 2,525 the husband. This number nearly doubled over the next five years and peaked with 11,661 marriages in 1990, of which nearly 9,000 wives were *Zainichi*, whereas the number of husbands nearly stayed the same. Over the subsequent fifteen years the number of marriages between Japanese and *Zainichi* stayed on average at about 8,080 marriages, which followed a steady decline. In 2015 took place 3,834 marriages, of which 2,268 wives and 1,566 husbands were of Korean origin (MHLW 2016).

The decrease of marriages between *Zainichi* and Japanese is directly linked to the increase of naturalizations of ethnic Koreans since once they get their positively marked application for naturalization they are recorded as Japanese in the statistical yearbooks and other statistics conducted by government institutions. According to the MOJ between 1952 and 1966 41,151 *Zainichi* successfully applied for naturalization, which amounts to 88 percent of the total number of naturalizations in this timeframe. In the year 1975 this figure surpassed the 6,000 mark for the first time and after a brief decline again in the years 1981 and 1982 with the numbers 6,829 and 6,521 naturalizations, which represents 77 percent of the total number of naturalizations. In the following decade the number of naturalizations of *Zainichi* was between 4,500 and 5,600 and in 1992 there were over 7,200 naturalizations for the first time. Although the share of the percentage of the total number of naturalizations was slightly decreasing over the following years to 73 percent in 1995, the number of naturalizations of *Zainichi* increased steadily until it reached 10,327. Until 2003 the number of *Zainichi*, who applied for naturalization was going back and forth between 9,188 and 10,295 until the figure peaked in 2003 and the following year. In those two years over 11,700 and 11,000 *Zainichi* applied for Japanese citizenship and reached a record high two years in a row, which represented 67 and 68 percent of the total number of naturalizations in those two years. Since 2004 the number of naturalizations is steadily declining, falling under the 8,000 mark in 2008, under the 7,000 in 2010 and under 6,000 in 2011. In 2015 and 2016 the figure of naturalizations of *Zainichi* were recorded with 5,247 and 5,434, which amounts to 55 and 57 percent of the total number of naturalizations and show a slight upward trend (MOJ 2017).

Although not all *Zainichi* took the opportunity to apply for naturalization and there are still a lot of Koreans living under the permanent resident or special permanent resident status

in Japan, the integration of *Zainichi* into the Japanese community is an ongoing process. In fact, the opinion on naturalization or integration into the Japanese society differs from generation to generation. Already in the 1980s members of the *Zainichi* communities stated that the Korean peninsula would rather be a place to visit than to re-migrate to, since they have built their lives for themselves and their children in Japan. Similar feelings have been shared in the same way by the following generations of *Zainichi*. Since *Zainichi* of the second, third or even fourth generations were all born in Japan and are to some extent integrated into the Japanese society, the birthplaces or hometowns of their ancestors have a different meaning to them (Kim 2017b:157-158).

4.3.4. Organizations and institutions benefitting *Zainichi*

Since the founding of the *Zainichi* communities in Japan, various organizations and institutions have been established, whose objective it is to support the *Zainichi* communities in Japan as well as promote exchange between the two countries including social and cultural remittances. As of the end of 2013, a total number of 118 Korean organizations were recorded in Japan (MOFAT 2015:410). This chapter discusses a few of the Korean institutions in Japan and in Korea, which are important for the *Zainichi* communities.

As already mentioned, two organizations have been established – the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan or *Chōsen Sōren*, which has close ties to DPRK and the pro South-Korean *Mindan* or the Korean Residents Union in Japan – in order to support the *Zainichi* communities in Japan based on the ideology of each organization. At the beginning, both of the political organizations in Japan were discouraging the *Zainichi* communities from assimilating into the Japanese society and specifically in getting naturalized in order to preserve the Korean nationality and cultural identity. However, the feeling of belonging and sentiments towards Korea as a home-land and Japan as a host-land began to shift with the second, third and fourth generations of *Zainichi*. Since repatriation to Korea was no longer a motive and the younger generations settled for accepting Japan as a new home and building a life here, the purpose of the political organizations began to transform as well and especially *Mindan* started to promote *Zainichi* as transnational citizens of Japan demanding the right of political participation on a regional level. In contrast, *Chōsen Sōren* is requesting the lawful integration of Korean ethnic schools into the Japanese education system in order to preserve the Korean language and culture among *Zainichi* communities (Lee 2012:6).

One of the most frequently used institutions among *Zainichi* is Korean schools. The majority of these schools were established by *Chōsen Sōren*. In fact, they built a nation-wide web of more than 150 Korean schools including not only middle and high schools, but also nursery and primary schools as well as a grade school. The primary mission of these Korean schools was to promote North Korea as the home-land of *Zainichi* and to teach students the ideology of their national leader (Ryang 2000:36). *Mindan* is also managing four Korean schools in Japan: the Keon Kook School and Keum Kang Institute in Ōsaka, the Korean School in Kyōto as well as the Korean School in Tōkyō. However, in contrast to the pro-North Korea affiliated schools, the majority of students in *Mindan* schools does not consist of children of *Zainichi*. For instance, the student body of the Korean School in Tōkyō consists mostly of children of businessmen and diplomats with South Korean nationality, who are temporarily staying in Japan. In 2002 the Japanese government issued an act, which gave full accreditation to *Mindan* schools giving them access to higher educational institutions of Japanese, whereas students of pro-North affiliated schools were discriminated and rejected by Japanese institutions (Kim 2017b:198).

As a counteractive measure, the majority of pro-North Korean schools had to implement parts of the Japanese curriculum since 2006, which was not very popular with all members of the political organization. In order to avoid this development, the Korea International School in Ibaraki, near Ōsaka, was established, where the preservation of Korean cultural and ethnic identity is still one of the primary objectives. However, the mission of the Korean International School differs significantly from other Korean International schools in the world and traditional Korean schools. The vision of the school is to erase the invisible boundaries rooted within the *Zainichi* communities in Japan by accepting not only *Zainichi* affiliating themselves with North Korea, but students with various nationalities including South Korean citizenship, *Zainichi* with dual citizenship and Japanese nationals. With this diverse student body, the school is showing the younger generations that the living environment of contemporary *Zainichi* communities is infused with a more globalized cultural perspective and the affiliation to a certain state or an ideology are no reason for exclusion. Furthermore, the Korean International School teaches the significance of East Asia from a historical, political and cultural standpoint, which exceeds the predominantly used North-South dichotomy. As a result, the definition and extent of home-land and host-land becomes more and more dynamic and complex. Nowadays, *Zainichi* are building a bridge connecting Japan to other regions in the world, especially since not only the *Zainichi* communities in Japan have become increasingly diverse, but Korean communities exist throughout the world. The

Korean International School highlights these transnational qualities of their communities and emphasizes that ethnic Korean identities have been replaced with transnational and transcultural characteristics (Lee 2012:10-11).

Besides the founding of the Korean schools in Japan *Chōsen Sōren* was also responsible for the establishment of credit unions and insurance companies, which was primarily used by the *Zainichi* communities for their daily life in Japan as well as sending remittances to Korea. Furthermore, *Chōsen Sōren* also organized sports teams and other event. The objective of the political organization is to strengthen the ties within the *Zainichi* communities and uphold North Korea as legitimate homeland for all *Zainichi* in Japan with the prospect of returning to an undivided Korea in the near future (Ryang 2000:36).

There are numerous other organizations founded over time by *Zainichi* in Japan to support their communities. One of these organizations is the Lawyers Association of *Zainichi* Koreans (LAZAK), which was established in 2001 by a *Zainichi* lawyer. The field of activity of the organization is diverse and includes the support of *Zainichi* in the process of naturalization or the discourse in favor of voting rights for *Zainichi* when it comes to Japanese national politics. Consequently, a number of voluntary *Zainichi* lawyers has drafted a bill for the voting right of foreign communities in Japan. In other words, the objectives of LAZAK are the realization of the ‘rule of law’ for *Zainichi*, the support of minorities in Japan in diverse legal matters, the opportunity for *Zainichi* lawyers in Japan to be part of a network as well as the promotion of solidarity to other Korean communities throughout the world (LAZAK 2018).

In the Korea are also organizations aiming to support the *Zainichi* communities abroad, such as the Overseas Korean Foundation (OKF). The OKF was established in 1991 with the purpose to expand the cultural and educational exchange and cultivate the national identity of overseas Koreans. Furthermore, it also promotes the exchange between the home-land of overseas Koreans and the host-lands. Moreover, the OKF organizes various events and programs, which invite overseas Koreans to participate such as the invitational scholarship programs for overseas Koreans. These scholarships provide talents among overseas Koreans with the opportunities to come to one of the educational institutes in Korea. The objective of the scholarships is the cultivation of global talents and the contribution to the social and national development not only in Korea as their country of origin, but also in their countries of residence. Apart from educational events, the OKF also organizes festivals such as Korean festivals featuring Korean artists as well as artists from Korean communities abroad to maintain the ties through cultural exchange and the World Korean Business Convention in

order to promote information exchange and networks of businesses of Korean communities abroad with the ones in Korea itself (OKF 2018).

4.4. Summary of the findings

This prior chapters analyzed migration flows from Korea to Japan on the basis of the developed framework and distinguished between the three levels used in TNSSs: the micro-level with Korea as the home-land, the macro-level with Japan as the host-land and the meso-level dealing with the *Zainichi* communities in Japan. This chapter summarizes and discusses the most important findings.

The micro-level analysis of Korea as home-land focused on the socio-economic and political conditions in Korea as well as the social aspects and motivation behind the emigration and consequently provided significant information building the foundation of the conducted case-study. The findings show that Korea has predominantly been a migration sending country until the early 1990s. Nonetheless, policies focusing on outward migration were not instituted until the 1980s. The establishment of the Overseas Migration Act was a turning point for Korean migrant communities, including the *Zainichi* communities in Japan, since the act not only provides basic laws and regulations for the communities, but also support for the members of the migrant communities overseas in case they decide to return home. Another policy influencing the condition of *Zainichi* communities was the signing of the Social Security Agreement, which helps to coordinate the social security systems of both the home- and host-land. *Zainichi* communities especially benefit from the agreement between Korea and Japan, since it allows them to send money they earned in Japan in form of remittances to their families and relatives in Korea without restrictions.

The findings of the social aspects and motivation behind the emigration illustrate that during the period of the colonization the majority of Korean emigrants searched for better economic opportunities and since Japan was recruiting labor force, it became the number one target destinations. Other reasons for Koreans to migrate to Japan during this period were marriage, family reunion or academic studies. The analyzes of the motivation or purpose behind the emigration of contemporary *Zainichi* communities since the 1980s shows that the reason for migration has not changed that much compared to the first waves of Korean migrants. In fact, in 2005 economic reasons as well as family reunions and marriages are still the primary objectives of Korean emigrants. Looking at the economic situation in relation to the motivation behind the emigration rates of Korea the following conclusions can be drawn. Although since 2001 the GDP and the CPI show an annual growth rate of about four and three

percent and economists attribute these growth rates with a stable economic development, the unemployment rate of the country is constantly rising. In 2010 the unemployment rate including the people on job-search, people in training and professional development and the number of unemployed youths, amounts to eight percent, which is considered relatively high. These economic developments could be seen as one reason, why Korean emigrants are searching for better economic opportunities outside of their country. Since 2011, Asia including Japan with thirteen percent has received the highest number of Korean emigrants and nearly sixty percent of the total Korean migrant communities are residing in other East Asian countries.

The last aspect of the micro-level analysis focused on the social issues in connection with migrant communities. One of the involved aspects is concerning the political rights of overseas Koreans, including the *Zainichi* communities in Japan. In 2009, when the Public Offices Election Law was established, *Zainichi* communities in Japan were allowed political rights including the participation in the presidential election as long as they maintained their Korean nationality. In 2012, *Zainichi* could use their entitlement to vote for the first time and participate in the presidential elections. Nevertheless, about 25,300 *Zainichi* made use of the new election law and participated in the elections, therefore utilizing the transnational networks in order to actively take part in the societal life of their former home-land.

The macro-level analysis of Japan as host-land focused on the relations between Korea and Japan, which significantly influenced the immigration flows to Japan. Furthermore, the analyzed key aspects dealt not only with the socio-political conditions for immigrants including immigration policies, procedures, the public opinion and integration policies, but also with the economic relations such as financial remittance flows between the two countries. In general, it can be concluded that Japan is not one of the typical migration receiving countries. In fact the overall share of foreign population is relatively small. However, due to the rapidly ageing society resulting in a lack of labor force and an overstrained pension and health-care system the Japanese government is considering to approach the issue of immigrants as part of their solution.

In order to analyze the contemporary *Zainichi* communities in Japan, an adequate understanding of the relations between the two countries was necessary. First, relations between Korea and Japan mostly consisted of economic exchange, until the expansion desires of the Japanese empire, which lead to the annexation of Korea. During the colonial period from 1910 to 1945, Japan recruited a large number of Korean nationals as laborers for industries such as mining or construction. In total 2.2 million Koreans were brought to Japan,

including Korean women, who were called ‘comfort women’ and forced to work as prostitutes. The living conditions in Japan were hard and after the Second World War ended nearly 1.4 million Koreans repatriated to their home country, while the remaining *Zainichi* in Japan (about 520,000) were facing the question of legal status under the Alien Registration Law 1952. Until the 1970s the number of *Zainichi* in Japan remained constant, while the beginning of the 1980s marked a turning point. Due to the economic growth of Japan, the increasing value of the yen and a labour shortage, new Korean migrant waves reached Japan. Among the *Zainichi* communities, the new arrivals since 1980 are referred to as ‘new-comers’, while the already in Japan staying *Zainichi* are called ‘old-comers’. In the 1990s the Japanese government reformed the Immigration Control Law, which led to a further increase of migration flows between Korea and Japan.

Since the turn of the millennium a frequently discussed issue in Japan is the rapidly ageing society and the possibility of replace migration. Looking closer at the relations between Japan and Korea it shows that the collaboration of both countries in the course of the FIFA World Cup led to closer diplomatic ties and more frequent exchange. In 2015, both countries celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the normalizations of relations, which is seen as the beginning of a new era for the relations. The Korean-Japanese relations have experienced a positive progression, due to an official apology to the ‘comfort women’ for their suffering on the side of the Japanese government during the festivities in 2015.

The analysis of the socio-political conditions for immigrants in Japan illustrates that recent developments concerning immigration policies and laws focus not only on simplifying the immigration procedures, but also on new legal categories, which allow immigrants the integration into the Japanese job market. The majority of the members of *Zainichi* communities has a special residency permit and, compared to other migrant communities, more legal benefits and further advantages such as social security benefits or the abolition of the fingerprinting system for *Zainichi* in 1993.

However, the discourse on immigrants in Japan shows that the public opinion towards migrants is characterized by a negative feeling and concerns among the Japanese society. Often migrants are seen as potential threats to the core values such as harmony and peace of the Japanese society and the Japanese population is still rather opposed to the plan of the government to transform the Japanese society into a transcultural one. On the other hand, when confronted with the nationality of immigrants the survey shows that the majority of the Japanese public has no particular negative image of *Zainichi*.

Moving on to the integration policies in Japan the results suggest that on a national level there exists no consistent policy for the integration of migrants into the Japanese society and the term integration is interpreted differently by all involved actors such as the government, NGOs or individuals. Local communities with a high number of foreign residents are often involved in shaping the integration of immigrants on a local level and for instance, promote the equality within the Japanese society and a multicultural coexistence in general as well as the rights of *Zainichi* in specific. As far as the socio-economic integration is concerned, the private sector plays an important role, since most of the employment opportunities arise from there. However, while the economic organization Japan Business Federation is promoting the concept of a multicultural workplace, the organization prefers to integrate highly skilled human resources. One of the key aspects when it comes to the integration into the Japanese society is an adequate degree of language skills. Since the only official language in Japan is Japanese, language deficiencies limit not only the interaction of immigrants with the local communities, but also their socio-economic opportunities.

The last analyzed aspect was the economic relations between Japan and Korea. Both countries are major economic players in the Asian region with a long history of economic exchange in the form of trade. With the normalization treaty of 1965, Japan also offered ODA and FDI as part of their compensation, which led to economic growth, but also dependency on Japan concerning imports. However, although Japan and Korea went into bilateral negotiations concerning a Free Trade Agreement in 2003, they have never entered into an agreement. Nevertheless, events such as the economic crisis have brought Korea and Japan closer together in terms of economic collaboration in fields such as energy production or resource development and opened the door for possible future negotiations.

One key element when it comes to the influence of economic exchange between two countries for migrant communities is financial remittances. Remittance flows are one major indicator in TNSSs and connect transnational migrants with their home-land. The amount and frequency of remittances depends on various factors such as the economic ability or the relation to the recipient of the payments. The affects of remittances in the home-land are significant and support not only the beneficiary, but also increase the consumption and contribute to the economic growth of the country. In 2012 the amount of remittances sent from Japan to Korea peaked with over USD 3,000 million, while the amount nearly cut in half in the year 2016.

The meso-level analysis of *Zainichi* communities in Japan as transnational players in TNSSs focused on the characteristics of the communities such as the demographic

constitution, the target destinations, the socio-economic position of *Zainichi* as well as the social status within the Japanese society and institutions supporting the communities. Contemporary *Zainichi* communities have their origin in migration flows to Japan as a result of the annexation of Korea in 1910. The majority of the immigrants at that time came from southern provinces in Korea and targeted areas in Kyūshū and around Ōsaka, which had a need for laborers. While in the western part of Japan, the *Zainichi* communities mostly consisted of workers, the majority of members of the communities in Tōkyō were students and academics. During the war, the Korean population in Japan increased rapidly due to labour mobilization, however, as soon as the war ended a great number repatriated and the communities shrank to about 650,000 *Zainichi*.

The analysis of the characteristics of *Zainichi* communities in Japan has concluded that the *Zainichi* communities are far from a homogeneous unity, but they are distinguished by different perspectives, patterns and feelings of identity. The first generation of *Zainichi* believed that they were only temporarily residing in Japan and would return to their homeland in due time. However, since the division of the Korean peninsula the majority of *Zainichi* had postponed their return indefinitely and their lives have become economically, socially and linguistically rooted in Japan. In fact, the third and fourth generations are highly assimilated, but not fully integrated into the Japanese society and often are marginalized. Furthermore, although the division of Korea has occurred some time ago, in Japan the issue of affiliation and eventually national identity is still one of the major defining characteristics of contemporary *Zainichi*.

The demographic constitution of *Zainichi* communities is one of the three key aspects when it comes to the characterization of *Zainichi*. The population census conducted by the Statistics Bureau of Japan shows that whereas in 1940 the Korean population in Japan was recorded as imperial subjects, in 1955 they were listed under the category of foreigners. The overall development of *Zainichi* communities in the last decade shows that the number is slightly, but steadily decreasing. In 2015, about 377,000 *Zainichi* were residing in Japan, which is a mere fraction of the number of over 1.2 billion in 1940. Looking at the results of the analysis of the total *Zainichi* population by share of age groups it can be summarized that the number of *Zainichi* under the age of fifteen decreased significantly from 34 percent in 1965 to 5.8 percent in 2015. Meanwhile the share of the population over the age of 65 increased from 2.5 percent in 1965 to 24.5 percent in 2015, which mirrors the rapid ageing of the Japanese population in the same time frame. The share of the working population (aged fifteen to 65) is steadily decreasing since the year 2000 and in 2015 amounted to about 69

percent. The results for the analysis of the percentage allocation by gender show that while in 1940 sixty percent of the *Zainichi* communities were male, until 2015 this share decreased to about 45 percent. Consequently, the number of female members has increased over time and in 2015 over half of the total *Zainichi* population is female.

The second key aspect has analyzed the destinations of *Zainichi* as well as the cities and regions where the largest communities are located. The majority of the first Korean immigrants landed in the prefectures Yamaguchi and Fukuoka and only over time the destinations moved further inland to Ōsaka and further east to Tōkyō. In the postwar era, *Zainichi* communities were spread over all of Japan, and in 1955 the most popular regions were Kansai (41 percent of the total *Zainichi* population), Kantō (sixteen percent) and Kyūshū (eleven percent), while the regions Hokkaidō (two percent) and Shikoku (one percent) were the least favorable destinations. The largest *Zainichi* communities were located in Ōsaka with about 110,000. Further data shows that popular destinations of the first two generations of *Zainichi*, lost their attractiveness for the following generations. However, the Kansai region in general and prefectures such as Ōsaka still represent the core destinations for newcomers. In 2015 while the share of the Kansai region was 27 percent and the trend shows a steady decrease, the percentage of the Kantō is continuously increasing to 24, with the metropolitan areas Ōsaka and Tōkyō sharing the same percentage of 19.5. In comparison, the areas with the smallest migrant communities are still the same as for the first generations of *Zainichi*. Moreover, in 2015 the percentage of *Zainichi* living in urban areas reached over 97 percent, which coincides with the rural depopulation happening in Japan.

The last of the three key aspects are the socio-economic position of *Zainichi* and their economic opportunities. During the colonial period and in the following decade, the socio-economic position was very low. Most *Zainichi* were either working as laborers or were unemployed. In the 1960s and 70s, the growth of the Japanese economy not only generated the demand for labor, but the education level of *Zainichi* advanced extensively and they were able to apply for attractive positions in core sectors of the Japanese economy. The 1980s were a turning point for the socio-economic position of *Zainichi*, who benefitted from the bubble economy and used the new economic opportunities. However, although there have been significant improvements since the 1990s of the socio-economic position of *Zainichi* in the Japanese society, some inequalities and discrimination towards *Zainichi* still remain.

The next part of the analysis followed up on the issue of social status and discrimination of *Zainichi* in Japan. Two political discourses in the Japanese society have influenced the social status in Japan. Whereas the first one of the 1980s portrays foreigners including

Zainichi as potential threat to the social structure of the Japanese society, the second one in the 1990s emphasizes the necessity of foreigners as future workforce. Despite the fact that a large number of *Zainichi* have been in Japan since the colonial period, they are still considered as foreigners and are marginalized. Over time, although the Japanese government enacted laws and policies benefitting the *Zainichi* communities, their social status within the Japanese society is still not equal to Japanese nationals. In fact, often *Zainichi* are discriminated based on their ethnicity in various areas such as the labor market, real estate or educational institutions. Consequently, *Zainichi* experienced discrimination when searching for a job, hunting for an accommodation and even while going to school. Since in Japan the citizenship is granted on the basis of blood and not on the basis of the place of birth, in Japan born *Zainichi* from the second, third and fourth generation are not considered Japanese nationals unless they go through the process of naturalization. In 2015 and 2016 over 5,200 and 5,400 *Zainichi* were naturalized and obtained the Japanese citizenship, whereas a large number of Koreans still lives under the (special) permanent resident status in Japan.

The last part of the analysis dealt with organizations and institutions benefitting the *Zainichi* communities in Japan. At the end of 2013 there were over 110 organizations listed, which are supporting the communities in various ways and in diverse areas such as in the political sphere. After the division of the Korean peninsula, two political organizations were established, which followed the two different ideologies of the two Koreas. These organizations are the pro-North affiliated *Chōsen Sōren* and the *Mindan*, which maintained ties to the ROK. While *Chōsen Sōren* promotes the reunification of Korea and discourages *Zainichi* to integrate into the Japanese society, *Mindan* is supporting *Zainichi* communities in Japan in various ways and emphasizes the importance of integration. *Chōsen Sōren* was also responsible for the establishment of a net of Korean schools in Japan with the primary objective to promote North-Korea as home-land of all *Zainichi*, while *Mindan* only founded four schools. Examples for other organizations benefitting the *Zainichi* communities in Japan are the Lawyers Association of *Zainichi* Koreans supporting the communities in legal matters or the Overseas Korean Foundation, which brings the communities and their home-land closer together through the expansion of the cultural and educational exchange between *Zainichi* living in Japan and the population in Korea.

5. Conclusion

The objective of the master's thesis at hand was to analyze migration flows between Korea and Japan on the basis of the theory of transnationalism. The theory of transnationalism in the field of migration studies is an innovative method and considers contemporary migratory patterns, but there exists no coherently derived framework. However, although researchers have elaborated three different levels and analyzed various key criteria of TNSSs, a case study in the extent of this thesis on transnational migration flows in East Asia in general and of *Zainichi* in Japan in specific has never been conducted before. As a result, this master's thesis attempted to close a gap in research and is not only contributing to the disciplines utilizing the concept of the transnational phenomena, but also to the better understanding of the living environment of contemporary *Zainichi* communities in Japan. The essential challenge was to build a framework, which not only takes into account the most important key aspects of the three different level of TNSSs (micro-, macro- and meso-level), but also 'measures' transnational relations and transnational networks used by *Zainichi*.

The thesis was guided by two research questions. The first research question focused on key aspects influencing the condition of *Zainichi* communities in their country of birth and in their new home-country. **Research Question I: "Which socio-economic, political and cultural aspects in the home-land Korea and in the host-land Japan influence the situation of *Zainichi* as transnational migrants?"**

The analysis of Korea as the home-land has concluded that the migrant flows of *Zainichi* were especially influenced by political and socio-economic aspects. During the time of the annexation of Korea as part of the Japanese empire Koreans were considered imperial subjects and migrant flows based on labor mobilization in Japan a frequent occurrence. After the Second World War ended and over 1.1 million Koreans returned to their home-land, Korea was confronted with a large number of returnees and had to act accordingly. However, only in the 1980s various laws and policies supporting the re-migration were enacted and the Korean government revised its position on the overseas Korean population. For instance, the Overseas Korean Act aims to ensure the equal status and treatment of all Koreans no matter their current residence or the Social Security Agreement does not only provide coverage for overseas Korean workers, but also makes it easier for overseas Koreans to send remittances to Korea. These political actions significantly influenced the condition of *Zainichi* in Japan and made life easier for future generations of the communities. Another political aspect influencing the situation of *Zainichi* is the North-South division of Korea, since the previous

generations left when Korea was still one nation and future generations, who were born in Japan after the division, are defined based on their political affiliation.

Looking at the socio-economic aspects on the micro-level influencing the situation of *Zainichi* the following conclusion can be drawn: The motivation of contemporary Koreans to migrate to Japan are very similar to the reason for the previous generations. For instance, the most important factors for the motivation behind the emigration of the first migrant waves to Japan were of economic opportunities, family reunifications or marriage. Those three reasons still influence the decision making process of contemporary migration flows to Japan, however, economic opportunities account for the vast majority, while family reunions and marriages follow in second place. In other words, although the political environment of migration changed significantly, the socio-economic environment has hardly changed and previous as well as future generations of *Zainichi* show similar patterns.

The analysis of Japan as the host-land has illustrated that *Zainichi* in Japan are equally influenced by political, economical, social and cultural aspects. The political and economic relations between the two countries had a great impact on the situation of *Zainichi*. For instance, the first waves of Korean immigrants were confronted with the legal status of imperial subjects and their socio-economic position in the Japanese society as labor force was very low, while the future generations in Japan faced the Alien Registration Law of 1952, which declared them foreigners and restricted their legal status and rights. However, due to an economic growth in Japan in the 1980s and the high demand for foreign labor as a result of a rapid ageing of the Japanese population since the 1990s, the Japanese government had to adapt their immigration laws and revise policies concerning migrant communities such as the *Zainichi*. For instance, in 1965 the new legal status of (special) permanent resident was granted to the majority of *Zainichi* living in Japan, in the 1970s the access to social security benefits was extended and in 1993 the fingerprinting of Koreans during the immigration procedure was abolished. In other words, over time the political environment for *Zainichi* improved and future generations were not confronted with the same aspects as the previous generations. The year 2015 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the normalization of the relations between Japan and Korea and is seen as the beginning of a new era, not only for the political relations between the two nations, but also for the *Zainichi* communities in Japan.

However, when taking into account the public opinion of the Japanese society on immigration as social and cultural aspects of the TNSS all generations face similar obstacles. The first generations were looked upon by Japanese nationals as temporary migrants, who would come to Japan for economic purposes and would return to their home-land after a

certain time. However, the North-South division of Korea complicated the situation for *Zainichi* and due to the uncertainty in their former home-land, they remained in Japan, where they were marginalized. Although, in the 1990s a higher immigration rate has been introduced as one part of the solution to maintain the Japanese health-care and pension system despite the rapidly ageing society, the majority of the public opinion towards an increase of the number of foreigners in their society is still rather negative. Even though the Japanese government promotes foreign labor force, integration efforts on the part of the government keep within limits and the majority of these efforts are voluntarily organized by local governments with a high number of foreign residents in their communities. Those measures include an offer of language courses, however, since the second, third and fourth generation of *Zainichi* was born and educated in Japan, they often speak the Japanese language better than the native language of their ancestors. As a result, the linguistic integration is not the primary objective for *Zainichi*, but the integration based on social status, which is limited due to their legal status as foreigners in Japan.

The most important economic aspects influencing *Zainichi* are the economic relations between Japan and Korea as well as financial remittances sent from *Zainichi* in Japan. These two factors form part of the nation-overreaching network of TNSs and show that *Zainichi* participate as transnational players. The economic relations between Korea and Japan were always characterized by trade and after the normalization treaty Japan provided financial aid in the form of FDI and ODA to Korea. In recent years, the two nations have taken on economic collaborations in the fields of resource development and energy production in order to grow their market shares and Japan enabled a larger number of Koreans to participate in technical trainee programs in diverse sectors of the economy. These measures give contemporary *Zainichi* communities more opportunities than the previous generations had. A closer look at the economic relations in connection with transnational migration shows that financial remittances are closely linked to the migration flows itself. The amount and frequency of these payments is linked to the economic situation of *Zainichi* as well as their motivation such as kinship. However, since the earliest available records of remittance flows between Japan and Korea are dated with 1976, data on previous generations of *Zainichi* could not be taken into account in this thesis. Nevertheless, the existing data shows that the amount of remittances increased significantly since the 1970s and since 2007 remains constantly at the same level. This may be an indicator for the improvement of the socio-economic position of *Zainichi* and the resulting higher income to be at the disposal of each individual. Therefore, *Zainichi* are able to support their families back home with a stable additional income.

Whereas the first research question focused on the micro- and macro-level of the TNSS, the second research question deals with *Zainichi* communities in Japan and their transnational networks, which form the meso-level of this thesis. **Research Question II: “What are the key aspects of the *Zainichi* communities in Japan and what characterizes their relations to Korea?”**

As already described above, *Zainichi* communities have their origins in the colonial period and have evolved, transformed and adjusted over time. Although the Korean community in Japan is often portrayed as a monolithic group, the analysis of the development of *Zainichi* in Japan has shown that the communities are heterogeneous and connect migrants with different views, demographic characteristics and transnational identities. One frequently discussed aspect when it comes to *Zainichi* communities in Japan as well as their relation to Korea is the identity. The first generation of immigrants believed that their stay would be temporarily and as a result they avoided any feelings of belonging or permanency. Instead they emphasized their Korean identity. However, the division of their former home-land altered their views of identity, since they had to affiliate themselves either with South Korea or with North Korea, while at the same time their lives became more and more rooted in Japan. The North-South division is not only part of the identity of the first generations, but follows the future generations as well. In Japan one of the primary defining characteristics of *Zainichi* is their affiliation and especially the identity of future generations, who were born in Japan and have no other direct connection to Korea than their ancestors, is often questioned. These generations search for a way to escape the bipolar identity categorizations and emphasize the fluidity and mobility of contemporary transnational communities.

The analysis of other characteristics of the relations of *Zainichi* to Korea has shown that Korean organizations and institutions in Japan as well as in Korea especially influence the relations and networks. Two of the most influential political organizations are the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan or *Chōsen Sōren*, which has close ties to DPRK and the pro South-Korean *Mindan* or the Korean Residents Union in Japan. Both organizations provide support for *Zainichi* communities in Japan, while at the same time connecting them to Korea through the promotion of the two different ideologies. At the beginning, both of the political organizations discouraged the first generations of *Zainichi* from assimilating into the Japanese society and from getting naturalized. However, since the feeling towards Korea as home-land shifted with the future generations of *Zainichi*, the purpose of the political organizations began to change as well and especially *Mindan* started to promote *Zainichi* as transnational citizens, who should share the same rights as Japanese nationals. On the other

hand, *Chōsen Sōren* built a network of Korean schools in order to teach future generations Korean history and cultural values. Over time members of *Zainichi* communities have founded various organizations and institutions with the purpose to support *Zainichi* in Japan in diverse areas such as legal matters as well as to give them the opportunity of networking with organizations in Korea such as the Overseas Korean Foundation.

This thesis has identified four other key aspects in connection with *Zainichi* communities in Japan. The first aspect deals with the demographic constitution of *Zainichi* communities, which gives not only further inside into the overall development of the communities, but also in the share by gender and by age groups. Whereas the first generations were recorded as Japanese nationals until the Alien Registration Law took effect in 1952, future generations were declared as alien population or foreigners. In general, *Zainichi* communities have been the largest migrant groups in Japan followed by Chinese and Japanese Brazilian for a long time, and although the number of *Zainichi* is slightly decreasing since 2005, they still represent one of the largest foreign populations in Japan. The analysis of the communities by age groups showed that while the first waves of immigrants had a relatively high concentration of younger population and only a small share of elderly, contemporary communities showed the opposite picture with a high number of elderly. The percentage allocation by gender illustrated the same opposite development: Whereas the first generations had more male members than female, contemporary communities show a higher share of female members.

The second key criterion analyzed the preferred destinations of *Zainichi* and the largest migrant communities in Japan. The findings showed that since the majority of the first generations of *Zainichi* was originally from the southern provinces in Korea they mainly used two routes to come to Japan and their targets were coastal cities as well as the prefecture Ōsaka. Future generations not only came from further north of the Korean peninsula, but also had other destinations in mind and eventually *Zainichi* communities settled in Tōkyō. The analysis of the destinations showed that the Kansai region was the number one destination for a large number of immigrants, however, the Kantō region has seen a steady increase of *Zainichi*. In other words, while the destinations of the first generations of *Zainichi* were influenced by economic opportunities, future generations progressively targeted metropolitan areas such as Tōkyō and Ōsaka.

The third aspect focused on the socio-economic position of *Zainichi* in the Japanese society and economic opportunities at the labor market. The analysis concluded that the socio-economic status of the first generations in the 1950s was very low, since feelings of prejudice

and resentment were widely spread in Japan. As a result, it was nearly impossible to get desirable positions in Japanese companies, *Zainichi* were working low paid jobs and unemployment rates among *Zainichi* were very high. Due to the high growth of the Japanese economy, *Zainichi* communities in the 1960s and 1970s were provided with new economic opportunities and with the 1980s their socio economic position had significantly improved. Moreover, they were able to get more desirable jobs and the number of *Zainichi* in white-collar jobs and managing positions increased steadily. However, although compared to previous generations contemporary *Zainichi* communities are confronted with significantly improved socio-economic conditions, there still remain socio-economic inequalities and the gap between *Zainichi* and the Japanese population is still perceptible.

The last key aspect when defining *Zainichi* communities in Japan is their social status within the Japanese society, which is influenced by political discourses. On the one hand, foreigners, including *Zainichi*, are perceived as internal security threat, who are disrupting the social harmony and public peace in Japan. On the other hand, as already described above, labor migration is seen as a key factor in order to secure Japan's economic growth and to counteract the rapidly ageing and declining Japanese population. Especially the first generation of *Zainichi* was faced with a general aversion on part of the Japanese society and although future generations find improved conditions, they are still confronted with discrimination by the Japanese society. This unequal treatment concerns various areas of their lives such as searching for a job, apartment hunting, finding a spouse, school life as well as problems based on citizenship. The analysis of discrimination has concluded that members of all generations of *Zainichi* in Japan have experienced discrimination in different situations and in different magnitude. In order to avoid such situations *Zainichi* often use Japanese names or use the process of naturalization in order to integrate themselves better into the Japanese society. However, despite a high number of naturalizations, contemporary communities like previous generations are still marginalized.

Summing up, it can be concluded that the conditions of *Zainichi* in Japan have significantly improved over time and although there exist similarities between previous generations and contemporary communities the constantly changing and evolving global environment will confront future generations with new challenges. Consequently, there are a few interesting aspects for future research projects. For instance, the characteristics of transnational networks and relations formed by *Zainichi* offer a broad research field, which can be explored further than in the scope of this thesis. In addition, field studies in Japan using qualitative interviews on the issue of being *Zainichi* in a transnational age and the

implications for the relationship to identity and Korea would certainly bring some new developments and views to light, while at the same time providing current data. However, further studies can also be undertaken on a more theoretical level focusing on the advancement of the key criteria of TNSSs in general and on the individual level in particular as well as of the identifying characteristics of transnational players.

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Appendix

Appendix I.: Registered *Zainichi* in Japan by age groups and gender

The following table shows the available data of the population census by age group and gender recorded by the Statistics Bureau of Japan. The upper table illustrates the development from 1940 to 1980 in fifteen year intervals, while the lower table focuses on the years from 2000 to 2015.

	1940	1955	1965	1980
総数 total	1,241,315	539,635	520,465	557,672
0 ~ 4 years old			54,775 10,5%	48,724 8,7%
5 ~ 9			55,460 10,7%	56,565 10,1%
10 ~ 14			66,055 12,7%	51,853 9,3%
0 ~ 14			176,290 33,9%	157,142 28,2%
15 ~ 19			66,385 12,8%	49,260 8,8%
20 ~ 24			49,045 9,4%	46,069 8,3%
25 ~ 29			40,365 7,8%	49,894 8,9%
30 ~ 34			31,725 6,1%	50,114 9,0%
35 ~ 39			29,935 5,8%	41,876 7,5%
40 ~ 44			34,320 6,6%	35,092 6,3%
45 ~ 49			27,170 5,2%	27,300 4,9%
50 ~ 54			23,570 4,5%	24,086 4,3%
55 ~ 59			17,745 3,4%	25,936 4,7%
60 ~ 64			11,100 2,1%	19,191 3,4%
15 ~ 64			331,360 63,7%	368,818 66,1%
65 ~ 69			7,170 1,4%	14,701 2,6%
70 ~ 74			3,225 0,6%	9,313 1,7%
75 ~ 79			1,690 0,3%	4,909 0,9%
80 ~ 84			730 0,1%	2,059 0,4%
85 歳以上 and over			730 0,1%	730 0,1%
65 歳以上 and over			12,815 2,5%	31,712 5,7%
男 male	744,296 60,0%	296,384 54,9%	276,160 53,1%	285,543 51,2%
女 female	497,019 40,0%	243,251 45,1%	244,305 46,9%	272,129 48,8%

	2000	2005	2010	2015
総数 total	529,408	472,711	423,273	376,954
0 ~ 4 years old	16,654 3,1%	11,431 2,4%	8,644 2,0%	6,148 1,6%
5 ~ 9	20,398 3,9%	14,864 3,1%	9,852 2,3%	7,250 1,9%
10 ~ 14	24,932 4,7%	17,946 3,8%	12,518 3,0%	8,503 2,3%
0 ~ 14	61,984 11,7%	44,241 9,4%	31,014 7,3%	21,901 5,8%
15 ~ 19	33,059 6,2%	22,368 4,7%	16,481 3,9%	12,019 3,2%
20 ~ 24	39,163 7,4%	31,866 6,7%	24,438 5,8%	17,712 4,7%
25 ~ 29	50,020 9,4%	35,618 7,5%	29,590 7,0%	19,776 5,2%
30 ~ 34	46,407 8,8%	41,643 8,8%	31,774 7,5%	25,422 6,7%
35 ~ 39	44,817 8,5%	39,876 8,4%	36,109 8,5%	27,878 7,4%
40 ~ 44	43,009 8,1%	39,274 8,3%	34,422 8,1%	32,644 8,7%
45 ~ 49	43,371 8,2%	38,316 8,1%	33,602 7,9%	31,397 8,3%
50 ~ 54	41,936 7,9%	38,581 8,2%	33,427 7,9%	31,315 8,3%
55 ~ 59	34,806 6,6%	37,629 8,0%	34,327 8,1%	30,754 8,2%
60 ~ 64	28,505 5,4%	31,510 6,7%	34,348 8,1%	31,847 8,4%
15 ~ 64	405,093 76,5%	356,681 75,5%	308,518 72,9%	260,764 69,2%
65 ~ 69	20,665 3,9%	25,533 5,4%	28,476 6,7%	30,727 8,2%
70 ~ 74	15,664 3,0%	17,632 3,7%	22,307 5,3%	24,669 6,5%
75 ~ 79	14,157 2,7%	12,555 2,7%	14,461 3,4%	17,857 4,7%
80 ~ 84	7,312 1,4%	9,800 2,1%	9,109 2,2%	10,463 2,8%
85 歳以上 and over	4,533 0,9%	6,269 1,3%	8,464 2,0%	8,550 2,3%
65 歳以上 and over	62,331 11,8%	71,789 15,2%	82,817 19,6%	92,266 24,5%
男 male	249,045 47,0%	215,598 45,6%	189,731 44,8%	170,859 45,3%
女 female	280,363 53,0%	257,113 54,4%	233,542 55,2%	206,095 54,7%

Source: The tables were developed by the author based on the data of the Statistics Bureau.

Appendix II.: Registered *Zainichi* in Japan by regions and prefectures

The following table shows the available data of the population census by regions and prefectures recorded by the Statistics Bureau of Japan. The table illustrates the development from 1955 to 2005 in an interval of 25 years and focuses on the years from 2005 to 2015.

		1955		1980		2005		2010		2015	
	gesamt	539.635		557.672		472.711		423.273		376.954	
	Stadt	411.531	76,3%							366.072	97,1%
	Land	128.104	23,7%							10.882	2,9%
01 北海道	Hokkaido	8.731	1,6%	5.422	1,0%	4.319	0,9%	3.980	0,9%	4.089	1,1%
02 青森県	Aomori-ken	3.309	0,6%	1.563	0,3%	950	0,2%	846	0,2%	685	0,2%
03 岩手県	Iwate-ken	2.687	0,5%	1.236	0,2%	976	0,2%	950	0,2%	787	0,2%
04 宮城県	Miyagi-ken	4.776	0,9%	3.102	0,6%	3.595	0,8%	3.585	0,8%	3.066	0,8%
05 秋田県	Akita-ken	1.873	0,3%	874	0,2%	633	0,1%	614	0,1%	471	0,1%
06 山形県	Yamagata-ken	1.119	0,2%	595	0,1%	1.907	0,4%	1.811	0,4%	1.491	0,4%
07 福島県	Fukushima-ken	3.916	0,7%	1.874	0,3%	1.769	0,4%	1.698	0,4%	1.417	0,4%
	Tohoku	17.680	3,3%	9.244	1,7%	9.830	1,8%	9.504	1,8%	7.917	1,5%
08 茨城県	Ibaraki-ken	4.921	0,9%	3.472	0,6%	4.773	1,0%	4.634	1,1%	3.897	1,0%
09 栃木県	Tochigi-ken	2.686	0,5%	1.968	0,4%	2.667	0,6%	2.447	0,6%	2.028	0,5%
10 群馬県	Gumma-ken	2.924	0,5%	2.493	0,4%	2.677	0,6%	2.562	0,6%	2.222	0,6%
11 埼玉県	Saitama-ken	4.245	0,8%	8.829	1,6%	14.538	3,1%	14.075	3,3%	13.016	3,5%
12 千葉県	Chiba-ken	7.755	1,4%	8.883	1,6%	13.847	2,9%	12.788	3,0%	12.158	3,2%
13 東京都	Tokyo-to	45.288	8,4%	58.031	10,4%	71.576	15,1%	77.223	18,2%	73.489	19,5%
14 神奈川県	Kanagawa-ken	19.326	3,6%	23.676	4,2%	26.806	5,7%	24.865	5,9%	22.767	6,0%
	Kanto	87.145	16,1%	107.352	19,9%	136.884	25,4%	138.594	25,7%	129.577	24,0%
15 新潟県	Niigata-ken	3.077	0,6%	2.340	0,4%	2.022	0,4%	1.900	0,4%	1.688	0,4%
16 富山県	Toyama-ken	2.497	0,5%	1.727	0,3%	1.174	0,2%	1.137	0,3%	871	0,2%
17 石川県	Ishikawa-ken	3.637	0,7%	2.795	0,5%	1.848	0,4%	1.677	0,4%	1.313	0,3%
18 福井県	Fukui-ken	6.106	1,1%	4.532	0,8%	3.109	0,7%	2.475	0,6%	2.049	0,5%
19 山梨県	Yamanashi-ken	2.885	0,5%	1.223	0,2%	2.174	0,5%	1.874	0,4%	1.516	0,4%
20 長野県	Nagano-ken	6.049	1,1%	4.109	0,7%	4.111	0,9%	3.839	0,9%	3.238	0,9%
21 岐阜県	Gifu-ken	10.120	1,9%	9.532	1,7%	5.261	1,1%	4.490	1,1%	3.799	1,0%
22 静岡県	Shizuoka-ken	6.764	1,3%	6.584	1,2%	5.505	1,2%	5.148	1,2%	4.525	1,2%
23 愛知県	Aichi-ken	35.367	6,6%	48.558	8,7%	35.746	7,6%	32.043	7,6%	29.266	7,8%
	Chubu	76.502	14,2%	81.400	15,1%	60.950	11,3%	54.583	10,1%	48.265	8,9%
24 三重県	Mie-ken	7.894	1,5%	7.374	1,3%	5.401	1,1%	4.731	1,1%	3.916	1,0%
25 滋賀県	Shiga-ken	7.675	1,4%	6.785	1,2%	5.478	1,2%	4.770	1,1%	3.874	1,0%
26 京都府	Kyoto-fu	37.073	6,9%	42.063	7,5%	29.593	6,3%	24.780	5,9%	23.318	6,2%
27 大阪府	Osaka-fu	110.185	20,4%	158.079	28,3%	115.440	24,4%	90.506	21,4%	73.353	19,5%
28 兵庫県	Hyogo-ken	47.801	8,9%	60.533	10,9%	48.231	10,2%	40.979	9,7%	35.990	9,5%
29 奈良県	Nara-ken	4.816	0,9%	5.028	0,9%	4.095	0,9%	3.606	0,9%	3.110	0,8%
30 和歌山県	Wakayama-ken	5.821	1,1%	3.895	0,7%	2.505	0,5%	2.102	0,5%	1.873	0,5%
	Kansai	221.265	41,0%	283.757	52,6%	210.743	39,1%	171.474	31,8%	145.434	27,0%
31 鳥取県	Tottori-ken	2.587	0,5%	1.483	0,3%	1.201	0,3%	1.003	0,2%	882	0,2%
32 島根県	Shimane-ken	5.837	1,1%	1.270	0,2%	849	0,2%	771	0,2%	681	0,2%
33 岡山県	Okayama-ken	12.275	2,3%	7.370	1,3%	5.809	1,2%	5.317	1,3%	4.512	1,2%
34 広島県	Hiroshima-ken	15.975	3,0%	13.729	2,5%	9.179	1,9%	8.019	1,9%	7.706	2,0%
35 山口県	Yamaguchi-ken	27.170	5,0%	13.143	2,4%	7.545	1,6%	6.406	1,5%	5.349	1,4%
	Chugoku	63.844	11,8%	36.995	6,9%	24.583	4,6%	21.516	4,0%	19.130	3,5%
36 徳島県	Tokushima-ken	575	0,1%	283	0,1%	341	0,1%	319	0,1%	285	0,1%
37 香川県	Kagawa-ken	1.152	0,2%	813	0,1%	872	0,2%	796	0,2%	694	0,2%
38 愛媛県	Ehime-ken	3.177	0,6%	1.635	0,3%	1.269	0,3%	1.161	0,3%	1.070	0,3%
39 高知県	Kochi-ken	1.102	0,2%	667	0,1%	605	0,1%	492	0,1%	430	0,1%
	Shikoku	6.006	1,1%	3.398	0,6%	3.087	0,6%	2.768	0,5%	2.479	0,5%
40 福岡県	Fukuoka-ken	30.310	5,6%	22.811	4,1%	16.126	3,4%	14.615	3,5%	13.841	3,7%
41 佐賀県	Saga-ken	3.239	0,6%	1.203	0,2%	781	0,2%	754	0,2%	612	0,2%
42 長崎県	Nagasaki-ken	9.881	1,8%	2.021	0,4%	1.079	0,2%	1.045	0,2%	1.016	0,3%
43 熊本県	Kumamoto-ken	4.108	0,8%	1.244	0,2%	861	0,2%	838	0,2%	761	0,2%
44 大分県	Oita-ken	7.309	1,4%	2.545	0,5%	2.078	0,4%	2.057	0,5%	1.663	0,4%
45 宮崎県	Miyazaki-ken	2.481	0,5%	702	0,1%	547	0,1%	516	0,1%	471	0,1%
46 鹿児島県	Kagoshima-ken	1.134	0,2%	325	0,1%	419	0,1%	475	0,1%	425	0,1%
47 沖縄県	Okinawa-ken		0,0%	173	0,0%	424	0,1%	554	0,1%	748	0,2%
	Kyushu u.										
	Okinawa	1.134	0,2%	498	0,1%	843	0,2%	1.029	0,2%	1.173	0,2%

Source: The table was developed by the author based on the data of the Statistics Bureau.

Abstract

We live in an era of exceptional human mobility, technological advancement and continuous transformation of economic, political and social structures. Based on these developments the theory of transnationalism emerged. The theory of transnationalism in the field of migration studies is an innovative method and considers contemporary migratory patterns. However, there exists no coherently derived framework. Consequently, this master's thesis first introduces the concept of transnational social spaces and identifies three different levels – the micro-level for the home-land of migrants, the macro-level for the host-land and the meso-level focusing on the migrant communities – before developing key criteria for each level in order to analyze the conditions of migrant communities as well as their transnational social practices. Therefore, the theory of transnationalism adapts to the conditions of contemporary migratory phenomena in a global setting.

On the basis of the developed framework, this master's thesis aims to analyze migration flows between Korea and Japan as well as characteristics of Korean migrant groups in Japan, called *Zainichi*, focusing on the time from 2005 onwards given that it has been forty years since the relations between Korea and Japan have been normalized and a treaty has been signed. The micro-level analysis of Korea focuses on the socio-economic and political conditions in Korea as well as the social aspects and motivation behind the emigration. The macro-level analysis of Japan studies migration flows to Japan, the socio-political conditions for immigrants as well as the economic relations between the two countries. Finally, the meso-level analysis of *Zainichi* communities in Japan as transnational players in the transnational social space deals among other things with the socio-economic position of *Zainichi* or institutions used by the communities.

The findings concluded that various political, economical, social and cultural aspects influence the condition of *Zainichi* as transnational migrants. Although, there exist similarities between previous generations and contemporary communities and the conditions of *Zainichi* in Japan have significantly improved over time, the constantly changing and evolving global environment will confront future generations with new challenges.

Zusammenfassung

Wir leben in einer Zeit geprägt von außerordentlicher menschlicher Mobilität, technologischem Fortschritt und dem kontinuierlichem Wandel wirtschaftlicher, politischer und sozialer Strukturen. Basierend auf diesen Entwicklungen entstand die Theorie des Transnationalismus. Die Theorie des Transnationalismus im Bereich der Migrationsforschung ist eine innovative Methode und berücksichtigt gegenwärtige Verhaltensmuster in der Migration, wobei es jedoch kein einheitliches Framework gibt. In der vorliegenden Masterarbeit wird daher zunächst das Konzept der transnationalen Räume vorgestellt und drei verschiedene Ebenen – die Mikro-Ebene für das Geburtsland der Migranten, die Makro-Ebene für das Gastland und die Meso-Ebene, welche sich auf Migrationsgemeinschaften konzentriert – identifiziert, bevor Schlüsselkriterien für jede dieser Ebenen entwickelt werden, um die Situation der Migrationsgemeinschaften sowie deren transnationale soziale Praktiken zu analysieren. Demzufolge passt sich diese Theorie den vorherrschenden Bedingungen des gegenwärtigen, globalen Migrationsphänomens an.

Diese Masterarbeit nützt das entwickelte Framework als Grundlage, um Migrationsströme zwischen Korea und Japan sowie die Charakteristika der koreanischen Bevölkerung in Japan, *Zainichi* genannt, zu analysieren, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf die Zeit ab 2005 gelegt wird, da vor vierzig Jahren die diplomatische Beziehung zwischen Korea und Japan wieder aufgenommen und ein Vertrag unterzeichnet wurde. Die Analyse von Korea auf der Mikro-Ebene konzentriert sich auf die sozio-ökonomischen und politischen Bedingungen sowie auf die sozialen Aspekte und die Motivation hinter der Auswanderung. Die Analyse von Japan auf der Makro-Ebene untersucht Migrationsströme nach Japan, die sozio-politischen Bedingungen für Einwanderer sowie die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen den beiden Ländern. Die Analyse der Meso-Ebene beschäftigt sich mit *Zainichi*-Gemeinschaften in Japan als transnationale Akteure und erforscht u.a. die sozio-ökonomische Position von *Zainichi* und Institutionen, welche von *Zainichi* genutzt werden.

Die Ergebnisse lassen zu dem Schluss kommen, dass verschiedene politische, wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Aspekte das Leben von *Zainichi* als transnationale Migranten beeinflussen. Obwohl sich die Bedingungen von *Zainichi* in Japan im Laufe der Zeit deutlich verbessert haben und durchaus Ähnlichkeiten zwischen früheren und gegenwärtigen Gemeinschaften bestehen, wird das sich ständig verändernde und sich entwickelnde globale Umfeld künftige Generationen von *Zainichi* vor neue Herausforderungen stellen.