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Introduction

Populism is on the rise – all over the world. Front National in France, One Nation in Australia, Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain and Donald Trump in the USA are the most prominent examples for populist movements or movers (Frölich-Steffen & Rensmann, 2005). However, populism is not a new phenomenon in political science. Researchers have studied populism around the globe, throughout the centuries and a variety of definitions has been put forward to understand it in its entirety. In the last decade, Cas Mudde's (2004) minimal definition of populism as an ideology was often the basis of theoretical and empirical analyses. Like many definitions in political science, there are contestants. Paris Aslanidis (2015) uncovered conceptual, methodological and measurement challenges when defining populism as an ideology. Previously, parties were either defined as populist or not, but recent studies show the usefulness of thinking populism not as black and white, but as having grey areas. It has been shown that even populist parties vary in the use of populist statements in their communication (Rooduijn, de Lange & van der Brug 2014) and that a binary approach to populism is not sufficient to grasp the full complexity of the subject. Taking this into account, this master thesis will be based on Moffitt and Tormey's (2014) definition. The authors define populism as a political style that allows the differentiation between populist behavior and the opposite, technocratic behavior. Whether an actor is populist or technocratic or where on the scale she/he can be located, depends on the features of the style. Populists appeal to 'the people', show bad manners and use crisis to garner support, whereas technocrats appeal to expertise, show good manners and put emphasis on stability and progress (Moffitt, 2016: 46). Populism as a political style acknowledges the possibility that it is a more fluid concept than an ideology, "the degree of populism that a given political actor employs may vary across contexts and over time" (Gidron & Bonikowski 2013: 9).

The focus of this thesis is on political parties and their use of the political style in different communication channels. The research questions that guide this master thesis are "*How do political parties use elements of populist and technocratic styles? Which elements do parties use in different communication channels? Which elements are used by different parties?*" The differences between mainstream and non-mainstream parties in their use of populist and technocratic statements across channels will be studied based on the Austrian case. The thesis finds that there actually are differences between communication channels. It seems that the degree of inwardness/outwardness and formality of a channel affects the degrees of populism

and technocracy. TV debates are the most balanced channel whereas party congress speeches have a clear surplus of populist statements. As expected, variation between the parties is found. The major government party Social Democrats (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs - SPÖ*) shows the highest degree of technocratic (i.e. non-populist) behavior in all communication channels, followed by the slightly more populist parties the Greens (*Die Grünen*) and the People's Party (*Österreichische Volkspartei - ÖVP*), while the Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs - FPÖ*) shows the highest degree of populist behavior.

The following reviews the literature on populism, summarizing the contributions made by political scientists in recent years. In section 3, the theoretical background is presented from which the hypotheses are derived. The political style and its characteristics as well as theoretical considerations of different channels of party communication and how they are used by mainstream and non-mainstream parties will be introduced. Populism is not “intrinsically linked to the radical right” (Zaslove, 2008: 320). “Mut zum progressiven Populismus” (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2016), the courage to pursue a progressive populism, was a demand of the former federal party manager of the Austrian Green party, Stefan Wallner, in an interview with the German Greens in 2016. This quote by a representative of a green party shows that populism is not only a strategy used by radical right parties. In contrast to an ideology, defining populism as a political style allows to identify populist and technocratic elements in party communication across the party spectrum. This approach understands populism and technocracy as communication tools or techniques parties can use in order to mobilize voters, something they choose to do. To “*do populism*” (Moffitt, 2016: 32, emphasis in original) can then be used in the competition for the public attention, which is a “limited commodity” in our information society (Plasser & Ulram, 2004a: 37). Political parties have to communicate on different channels to get the sought attention. In the hypotheses, on the one hand, a connection is assumed between a party's political style and the communication channel that is used, and on the other hand, the position of the party in the party system, mainstream or non-mainstream, is expected to have an influence on the political style it makes use of.

The fourth section describes the case, data, method and analysis that are used to test the hypotheses. The party communication in different channels in the run-up to the Austrian national elections of 2013 is the empirical basis for a qualitative content analysis. The legislative period from 2008 to 2013 changed the Austrian party system substantively. The well-established parties had to cope with the diminishing of one right-wing party and the rise of two new parties. One of these established parties is the FPÖ, which is usually classified as a

populist party. The definitions of populism and technocracy as communication styles allow a more fine-grained analysis (Moffitt, 2016; Bossetta, 2016). One cannot only determine if parties are populist or not but also which elements of populism and technocracy they use in their communication. The communication channels analyzed are TV debates between parties' top candidates, press releases, parliamentary debates and party congress speeches of the SPÖ, FPÖ, ÖVP and the Greens. Including different channels allows a more in-depth analysis of the parties in the political field. Which parties rely on technocracy and which one on populism? Which features of populism and technocracy do they use in which channel? Following the result section is the concluding section with a critical evaluation of the findings, linking them back to the existing literature and theories.

1 Approaches to populism: from populism as ideology to populism as style

From agrarian populism in Russia over left-wing populism in Latin America to new forms of right-wing populism nowadays in Europe and North America, populism has shown many faces over the last decades. Many scholars tried to meet the challenge to describe populism with various definitions. Some lay emphasis on organizational aspects (Taggart, 2004) and others on the strategies behind populism (Weyland, 2001). The theoretical basis of this thesis' empirical analysis is the political style (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Moffitt 2016) to answer the research questions *“How do political parties use elements of populist and technocratic styles? Which elements do parties use in different communication channels? Which elements are used by different parties?”* To better understand where populism as a political style originated from, the relevance of populism for democracy and a short introduction in the concept formation on populism, with emphasize on gradual populism, follows.

1.1 Populism and democracy

Populism has interested political scientist for a very long time due to the fact that democracy and populism are “intimately interlinked” (Mény and Surel, 2002: 16). Populists consider themselves true democrats and their success must be considered by scholars in the analysis of democratic systems (Canovan, 1999: 2). Populism can be perceived as both a chance and a threat for democracy. De Raadt, Hollander and Krouwel (2004: 3) think of populism as ideology and dub it “the nemesis of representative democracy”. Mair sees a rift between the popular and the constitutional pillars of democracy – “the two pillars on which the legitimacy and effectiveness of democratic regimes rest” (Mair, 2002: 81). Whereas the popular democracy would entail “government *by* the people” (Ibid., emphasis in original), the constitutional democracy refers to “government *for* the people” (Ibid., emphasis in original). An ideal democracy would balance these evenly. A rift comes into existence because political parties – the adhesive holding them together – are becoming less important (Mair, 2002). Like democracy, populism has two pillars or senses. Populism can manifest as protest, in the form of anti-party notions for example. The other sense is populism as a process or linkage, that can be called populist democracy which is also a “partyless [popular] democracy” (Mair 2002: 89). In this

populist democracy, the electorate is encouraged to become more indifferent towards party politics and depoliticization spreads.

One can identify three perspectives in the literature, first, the relationship between populism and democracy per se, second, the effects populism has on democracy and third, the causes of populism. The first is addressed by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013a) in their volume studying the relationship between populism and democracy and whether populism is a threat or a corrective to (liberal) democracy. They find that populism is positively related to democracy since populists support the sovereign. And even though some populists adopt anti-establishment attitudes, they compete in elections and have delegates representing them in legislative assemblies, which indicates that the relationship to representative democracy is not a negative one per se. As far as the effects of populism on democracy are concerned, populism can have either positive or negative effects. The rejection of checks and balances or the authoritarian streak that can lead to the suppression of minorities are usually considered negative effects. The moral impetus of populists also makes compromises less likely, leading to a new cleavage of populists against non-populists (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013a: 21). But populism is also a potential corrective. Positive effects include the demand for direct democracy and marginalized groups can find representation, new topics can turn up on the political agendas, accountability might increase and some conflict may revitalize the system (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013b; similar Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014). The third perspective, causes of populism, is discussed by Mair (2011). He finds part of the reason for the rise of populism lies within the actions of mainstream parties. They first and foremost govern and neglect their representative role in the process of governing. The representative function is left to other players, such as niche parties that rarely get the chance to prove their rhetoric in office. The governing parties do not have the time to mobilize the voters which leads to a growing tension between the government and the electorate. There seems to be a “growing divide in European party systems between parties which claim to represent, but don’t deliver, and those which deliver, but are no longer seen to represent” (Mair, 2011: 14).

1.2 Binary approaches to populism

To explain and understand the phenomenon of populism, researchers have put forward different theories and concepts. In this section of the thesis, definitions will be introduced that influence the political style. One approach is populism as a *political strategy* that goes back to

Weyland (2001). The author defines populism in his studies of Latin American populism as such. He rejects the notion of populism as a political style as being too broad and not delimited enough. Political actors can choose to implement a populist style only, for example, in times of elections. Populism as a political strategy prevents this by focusing on “the methods and instruments of winning and exercising power” (Weyland, 2001: 12). Every actor could use this so-called power capability but only those who base their rule on it, can be called populist. An occasional use of it cannot be counted as populist in this definition. In Weyland’s definition, populism needs an individual leader that relies on the unorganized mass as his power capability. If the populist is threatened or a crisis arises, then the base is activated. The leader contacts his followers mostly direct and not via an elaborate organizational machinery. To prevent the mass from deserting its leader when his or her promises are not fulfilled, the leaders establish an intense connection using their charisma. With growing success, the leader needs to rely on another strategy with a more formal organization (Weyland, 2001: 12). As Moffitt and Tormey (2014) point out, Weyland (2001) ignores the references to the people – an element that is important in most other definitions.

Laclau (2007) considers *populism as a logic*. According to this approach, populism is a political logic applied by different and heterogeneous movements to gain influence. Politics are in Laclau’s sense the “anatomy of the social world” (2007:154) and the political constitutes ever new frontiers that lead to social change. These frontiers define identities in the sense that the construction of the people also constructs a frontier in “the space of representation” (Laclau, 2007: 153). Every struggle in this social world is political and “[t]here is no political intervention which is not populist to some extent” (Laclau 2007: 154). It remains unclear how this should then be applied to empirics because everything political could be populist too, to a varying degree.

Following the Essex School and Laclau (2007), Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014) define *populism as a discourse*. This perspective shares similarities with populism as a thin-centered ideology. Townshend (2003) characterizes discourses as a way to dissociate oneself from others by which the discourses get established through hegemony. In the democratic political arena, there is a constant struggle for hegemonisation and political actors want the power to talk on behalf of the people. A discourse can be classified as populist if the focus is on ‘the people’ or on other “nodal points” (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014: 123), like class or nation, imagining the people as separate from an aloof and ignorant establishment. Using this definition allows researchers to develop typologies of populist phenomena. Critiques argue

that this approach neglects “‘stylistic’ elements beyond what is recorded on the page” (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014: 385). They criticize that populism cannot be defined without the inclusion of elements that go beyond mere words.

The most prominent approach to populism is the definition as an ideology. In his text ‘The populist Zeitgeist’ Mudde (2004: 543, emphasis in original) defines populism as “*an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people*”.

The author argues that there is a populist zeitgeist since populism has become a mainstream phenomenon in Western politics. His minimal definition was used by many researchers. Some included all components of the minimal definition in their analyses, other operated with a “thin” version. Populism as a thin-centered ideology has ‘the people’ as a core and can be attached to other ideologies. Jagers and Walgrave (2007: 322) combine this thin center with anti-establishment feelings and exclusion habits and refer to that as the thick concept of populism. Critics say that populism as an ideology is not delimited enough and could be applied to too many political actors. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013: 499) do not share this concern since they do find clear delimitations of populism to other concepts, for example, elitism and pluralism. Another concept that can clearly be delimited from populism is clientelism. Clientelism ensures parties support in exchange for benefits for their voters. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013: 500) label this behavior not an ideology but a strategy to gain and hold political power.

But populism as an ideology has serious conceptual and methodological shortcomings. Aslanidis (2015) criticizes that populism as an ideology lacks coherence, since it is ‘empty-hearted’ or ‘chameleonic’ (Taggart, 2000). Aslanidis (2015) forms his criticism along three dimensions: conceptual, methodological and measurement challenges. Conceptually, Aslanidis (2015) thinks of the definitions of thin-centered ideologies as slippery. Ideologies are said to have a rich core. Liberalism, for example, has “liberty at its core; human rights, democracy and equality adjacent to the core; and nationalism on the periphery” (Aslanidis, 2015: 3). Thin ideologies on the other hand do not fulfill the checklist of a full ideology and there is no coherent list of attributes a thin ideology needs to have. Aslanidis (2015) concludes that many political notions could be a thin-centered ideology and even the populist core features like people-centrism and anti-elitism themselves could be thin ideologies. The methodological shortcomings concern the fact that Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) use elitism

and pluralism as opposites for populism. Since antithetical concepts should be of the same rank in the conceptual hierarchy, elitism and pluralism would also have to be thin-centered ideologies, but Aslanidis (2015: 4) rejects this idea. A better explanation is Pappas (2013) conception of populism as a democratic illiberalism which compares two same equally ranked ideologies: democratic liberalism and populism (as democratic illiberalism). Another point of criticism is that the classification of parties in either populist or not populist cannot hold but that populism is graded (Rooduijn, de Lange and van der Brug, 2014). Aslanidis (2015: 5—6) states that ideologies are binary, either you are Marxist or you are not, you cannot reject the core of an ideology without rejecting it as a whole. But if one rejects the notion of populism as a binary concept one has to think further, which leads to the debate about gradual approaches to populism.

1.3 Gradual approaches to populism

As Aslanidis (2015) points out, the debate over binary versus graded political concepts is an old one. Populism as an ideology may produce subtypes like Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) propose: neoliberal populism, national populism and so on. Another example of subtypes can be found in the analysis conducted by Jagers and Walgrave (2007).

The authors analyzed broadcasts of Belgian parties from 1999 to 2001. In their analysis, populism is seen as a political communication style but it is also based on the minimal definition of populism as an ideology. Their theoretical ideas consist of a core and a shell. The core is made up by the reference to the people and in the shell surrounding this core one can find anti-establishment sentiments and exclusion of groups of people (known from the thick definition of populism as an ideology) (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007: 324). The three components (reference to the people, anti-establishment, exclusion) are then put in a multidimensional model that leads to a typology of populism. The vertical position of actors is determined by their anti-establishment expressions, the horizontal dimension by their stance concerning the exclusion of specific groups. The resulting four categories of populism are “empty populism”, “excluding populism”, “anti-elitist populism” and “complete populism” (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007: 335). In their analysis, the authors find only one case for the “complete” populism. Only Vlaams Blok used all elements (reference to the people, anti-establishments and exclusive elements), and there is a large distance to the other parties. All other parties can be classified in the category “empty populism”; they may have referred to the people but did not use many

anti-establishment or exclusive elements in their communication. Some parties touch the fringes of other categories. The socialist SP.A is close to the “excluding” category (that means they use more exclusive elements than the other parties in the “empty” category). The Flemish nationalist party VU-ID is adjacent to the “anti-elitist” category, that means that they use slightly more anti-establishment elements than the others (see Jagers & Walgrave, 2007: 333).

Subtypes are one way to deal with the binary implications of populism as an ideology, to escape the black and white thinking. Another is grading of populism – the benefits were shown in recent studies. Rooduijn, de Lange and van der Brug (2014) analyze the contagiousness of populism from non-mainstream populist parties to mainstream parties, to find out if mainstream parties adopt populist strategies over time if there is a populist contender. They compare French, German, Italian, Dutch and British parties and measure the share of populist elements in parties’ election manifestos over the course of 20 years. A paragraph in a manifesto was coded as populist if they include both people-centrism (refer to people) and anti-elitism (criticize elites). Since mainstream parties were the primary focus and the populist parties the reference category, the other parties were identified as non-populist non-mainstream parties¹. The results indicate that the mainstream parties in the UK use more populist elements than the mainstream parties in other countries, most likely because of the structure of the political competition there. The terminology ‘us’ (the opposition) versus ‘them’ (the government) is maybe not a populist critique of the establishment but the form of competition in the British two-party system. Overall, the authors conclude that mainstream parties’ manifestos are least populist compared to populist parties and non-populist non-mainstream parties (Rooduijn, de Lange and van der Brug, 2014: 568—569). Interestingly, they neither detect differences between non-populist non-mainstream parties and populist parties, nor a contagion of populism to mainstream parties. The share of populist elements in the mainstream parties’ manifestos is constantly below one per cent. Besides that, the authors find that even populist parties vary in their use of populist elements (Rooduijn, de Lange and van der Brug, 2014: 571).

Another gradual definition is populism as a political style. This definition has been mentioned by scholars over the course of 20 years. The first attempts to define populism as a communication style were made by Knight (1998) and Canovan (1999). Weyland (2001: 12) describes

¹ If at least two researchers identified a party as populist then Rooduijn, Lange and van der Brug (2014) also labeled them as such. Examples of the 11 populist parties that were included in the analysis are, among others, the Front National, Die Linke and Forza Italia. Based on the Comparative Manifesto Project the other parties were then labeled as mainstream vs. non-mainstream parties. Giving an own example: in Austria, the ÖVP and SPÖ would be mainstream parties, the BZÖ, FPÖ and Team Stronach populist parties and the Greens and the NEOS non-mainstream non-populist parties.

these early stages of populism as a style as “a broad not clearly delimited concept. [...] Defining populism as a political style therefore casts too wide a net and hinders the clear delimitation of cases”. Knight (1998: 225), however, states that “‘populism’, as a concept, is useful inasmuch as it helps us order, compare, and understand the vast complexity of history. Its justification is therefore instrumental [...]; it possesses no inherent and enduring essence” and concludes that populism should be defined as a political style. The ability to mobilize voters is essential in Knight’s definition, which is achieved by a reference to ‘the people’, the bond between a leader and the people and an element of crisis. The author himself observes that ‘crisis’ is a vague term and can be used to describe political or economic crises but sometimes not a crisis causes populism but populism causes “crisis” (Knight, 1998: 227). Canovan (1999:4) bases her theoretical considerations on the fact that populism cannot be an ideology because “in another context the anti-elitist mobilization [...] may be reacting to a different ideological environment”. In her definition, populism is a “tabloid style”, characterized by “simplicity and directness” (Canovan, 1999: 4) when addressing the ordinary people. The simplicity in language is accompanied by a simplicity of solutions and a high degree of emotionality of populist parties and leaders. The populist style is also included in the theoretical section of Jagers and Walgrave (2007) but ultimately, they use the ideological approach in their analysis.

These attempts to define and operationalize populism as a political style were undertheorized. Most recently, the theory of populism as a political style was further developed by Moffitt and Tormey (2014) and Moffitt (2016) who differentiate the populist political style from the technocratic political style. The two poles differentiate in how they reach out to ‘the people’, the manner in which they conduct themselves or communicate with ‘the people’ and how they communicate their stories. Populism as a political style makes it not only possible to determine if an actor is populist but whether the actor is clearly the opposite – technocratic. Thinking of populism as a political style allows a more differentiated analysis of the subject of how the different parties use populism and technocracy in their communication channels.

Whereas populism as a political strategy focuses on ‘the people’ as power capabilities that empower a charismatic leader (Weyland, 2001), populism as a discourse defines it as a struggle for power through hegemony (Stavrakakis & Katambekis, 2014). Laclau (2007) goes even further and sees populism as a logic that is an integral part of social changes. Mudde’s (2004) approach of populism as an ideology emphasizes the sovereignty of ‘the people’ and their

stance opposing the elite. It allows to operationalize populism to collect data about parties and actors. Nevertheless, the section above has shown that this definition has serious shortcomings (Aslanidis 2015). The political style (Moffitt & Tormey 2014) represents a gradual approach to populism that differentiates between populism and technocracy. The following section explains the theory behind populism and technocracy as a style in more detail and allows to derive hypotheses that will guide the analysis.

2 Theoretical background and hypotheses

In the following section, populism as a political style will be introduced. This definition was put forward by Moffitt and Tormey (2014) and Moffitt (2016). Populism is “*a political style that features an appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’, ‘bad manners’ and the performance of crisis, breakdown or threat*” (Moffitt, 2016: 45, emphasis in original). Technocracy on the other hand features an appeal to expertise, ‘good manners’ and the performance of stability (Moffitt 2016). The political style discriminates between populist and technocratic forms of communication. Parties, as mentioned in the section above, vary in the extent of populism, when speaking to journalists, their opponents or their constituents. In the second part of this section the guiding hypotheses are outlined. Both, the different communication channels parties have at hand and differences between party types are considered.

2.1 The political style: populism and technocracy

Moffitt and Tormey (2014) and Moffitt (2016) define populism as a political style and clarify its specifications as an autonomous definition from populism as an ideology. Populism is not solely something rhetorical but also something aesthetic. Moffitt (2016) attributes written and spoken language in the rhetorical category, whereas self-presentation and ‘staging’ are part of the aesthetic category. These two categories are part of the political style but there is also a performative element inherent to the definition of populism as a political style. Performance for an audience is part of “how politics operates in the contemporary world” (Moffitt 2016: 38). Political performances are constructed – “decisions are made about how to present oneself politically” (Moffitt, 2016: 38) to become visible to the ‘people’. Ideas for this approach were also mentioned in political sociology. Jansen (2011) writes about “populist mobilization” rather than “populism”. Instead of implying that different ideologies, regimes and movements have the same essence, he considers populism a political mobilization practice. It is “a political *means* that can be undertaken by challengers and incumbents of various stripes in pursuit of a wide range of social, political, and economic agendas. This implies that populism should no longer be understood as a movement or regime type, but rather as a flexible way of animating political support” (Jansen, 2011: 77). In this sense, populism is something that actors can use to differentiate themselves and make themselves visible in an environment that is “intensely mediatised and ‘stylised’” (Moffitt, 2016: 39).

The key features of populism as a political style were discerned on an inductive basis. In his analysis, Moffitt (2016: 41—43) includes 28 leaders previous studies had classified as either left-wing or right-wing populists. Thus, he was able to derive and isolate common features of contemporary forms of populism. The political style not only defines populism but it also allows to distinguish between a populist and a technocratic style which are then the opposite poles on a common scale.

The idea of technocracy was already put forward by others, e.g. Laclau (2007) or Leonard (2011). The latter describes the relationship between the technocratic and populist style as diametrically opposed:

“Technocracy and populism are mirror images: one is managerial, the other charismatic; one seeks incremental change, the other is attracted by grandiose rhetoric; one is about problem solving, the other about the politics of identity.” Leonard (2011: 3)

Leonard (2011) contrasts populism and technocracy when talking about the problems of European integration. The European Union (EU) may have been pushed by charismatic politicians but the day-to-day business is bureaucratic and pragmatic. “But, as the EU matured as a political project, its very success as a bureaucratic phenomenon fuelled a populist backlash at a national level” (Leonard, 2011: 2), although it could also be the other way around when there is a populist government and a technocratic backlash follows. A growing divide between technocrats and populists is not limited to the EU. Bossetta (2016) builds on Moffitt’s work and studies the influence a populist candidate has on his opponent and to what degree the latter adapts to the populist tone. As mentioned above, the populist style is characterised by an appeal to ‘the people’, criticizing the elite, using ‘bad manners’ and mediating the social by evoking crisis. Technocracy on the other hand appeals to expertise and knowledge, ‘good manners’ and conjures stability or the progress to stability (Moffitt, 2016; Bossetta, 2016). For technocrats, propriety in manners, language and presentation is at the forefront. Their performances are characterized by “emotional neutrality and ‘rationality’” (Moffitt, 2016: 46). ‘The people’ are not as important as the expertise and knowledge.

Differentiating between populist and technocratic elements in parties’ communication enhances the understanding of how and when parties use the two styles. Sometimes the term populism is attributed to an actor or a party hastily. Mainstream parties, for example, could use the populist style in specific communication channels or on specific occasions, but for a binary approach, this would not be as relevant and they would be labelled non-populist (Moffitt 2016). The scale from populist to technocratic allows for a more differentiated insight.

Some features of the populist and technocratic characteristics can be found in table 1 and a detailed overview follows in the next sections.

Table 1: The populist and technocratic political styles – their characteristics and features

	Populist	Technocratic
Appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘expertise’	appeal to ‘the people’ vs. ‘the elite’, trust the ‘common sense’	appeal to expertise and specialist training
Mannerism	‘bad manners’ (language, self-presentation, pathos)	‘good manners’ (‘proper’ behaviour, dry language, ‘official’ self-presentation, logos, ethos)
Mediation of the social	crisis, breakdown, threat	stability and progress
	emotional, passionate performances	neutral emotions, ‘rationality’

Adapted from Bossetta, 2016; Moffitt, 2016: 46—47

2.1.1 Appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘expertise’

The Latin term *populus* translates to people and it is the appeal to them which is the most commonly accepted feature of populism. Populism refers to ‘the people’ as the true sovereigns of a state. But the political style denotes more than just the reference to ‘the people’. Moffitt and Tormey (2014) include performative elements in their definition of the political style and postulate that politicians not only perform for an audience. They address ‘the people’ and as a consequence they bring the ‘people’ into existence. According to the authors, performance is needed in politics. Including the performative in the theory helps to identify “how certain tropes, themes and ways of acting within politics can become mainstays of our political ‘common sense’, and how others fail to gain a foothold” (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014: 389). For the right-wing populists one such theme that resonates very well is immigration (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Switching the theme too often, or a performance that can be easily identified as superimposed, could prove treacherous (e.g. the top candidate of the ÖVP in Austria in 2013, Michael Spindelegger, appeared uber-coached and lost credibility, see Bonavida, 2013). The reference to ‘the people’ is linked to the critique of the elite. In contrast to the ideological approach, populists do not need to see the elite or the establishment as corrupt – they just need to communicate that they are different from them. By using slang or differentiating themselves in other ways from ‘the establishment’, populists put themselves closer to ‘the people’

and the ‘common sense’. Rejection of experts and ‘the system’ puts populists on the side of ‘the people’ who are ‘being betrayed’ (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014: 392). At other times populists target others like immigrants and link them to elites. Moffitt (2016: 43) gives the example of ‘liberal elites’ who allow immigration and thereby threaten ‘the people’. ‘The people’ and the critique of the elite are not as important for technocrats. They appeal to “expertise and specialist training” (Moffitt, 2016: 46).

2.1.2 Mannerism

When populists appeal to ‘the people’ and technocrats to expertise, they do so in specific ways. As has been mentioned above, Canovan (1999: 5—6) ascribes a so-called “tabloid style” to populism which is characterised by a “simple, direct language” and “propos[ing] solutions that are also simple and direct”. Ostiguy (2009) provides a similar characterisation introducing a new political dimension – “high” and “low” in politics. Since Moffitt (2016) picks up some of his ideas from Ostiguy (2009), a very short overview will be given of Ostiguy’s ideas on the high and low in politics. Like the well-established left and right scheme, high and low politics make up a political dimension, axis and scale. The political dimensions, high and low, are defined by two components, the political cultural and the social-cultural. The social-cultural component refers to an actor’s behaviour in public, politicians on the high could be seen as stiff but could also be described as well-behaved. Politicians on the low can act more freely and have less inhibitions, but what is “culturally *popular*” (Ostiguy, 2009: 11, emphasis in original) depends on the culture of a society. The political-cultural component reflects the leadership of a polity, whereas on the high it is very impersonal, on the low it is more personal. Populism is low, whereas the opposite, anti-populism, is high (Ostiguy, 2009).

Table 2: Ostiguy's high-low dimension of politics

	Political-cultural	Social-cultural
High	Institutionally mediated	Well-behaved
	Impersonal authority	Stiff/rigid
	Proceduralism	Polished
	Legalistic	Learned
Low	Personal authority	Coarse/slang language
	Strong (male) leader	Uninhibited
	Closer to 'the people'	Culturally <i>popular</i>

Adapted from Ostiguy, 2009: 8; Moffitt, 2016: 59

Populist leaders often portray themselves as 'outsiders', whether they really are 'outsiders' or not is beside the point. The leader of the Austrian Freedom Party Heinz-Christian Strache, for example, has been in politics since the 1990s and his party often leads the polls. But still he talks about being powerless in face of the FP's suppression by the public broadcasting company ORF, a company that, in his opinion, propagandizes for the Green and Social Democratic Party (Kleine Zeitung, 2016). The FPÖ thereby appeals to 'the people', signalling that it is oppressed by the elite, appealing to emotions. Moffitt (2016) adapts parts of Ostiguy's high-low scale and transfers some of the elements to his 'good' vs. 'bad manners' categories. Populists use 'bad manners' to distance themselves from 'politics as usual'. 'Bad manners' refer to a rejection of "'appropriate' modes of acting in the political realm" (Moffitt, 2016: 44) and depend on the culture-specific context, one example is the use of slang words or other inappropriate/unusual behaviour that ensures media coverage. Another way of making both the populist and the technocratic political style measurable is relying on rhetoric appeals (see Bossetta, 2016; Reisigl, 2008: 97). For the populist political style, the relevant appeals are *pathos* and *denigration*. *Pathos* appeals to the audience's emotions and sentiments. *Denigration* describes the use of direct or indirect slander against other actors. Whereas the technocratic *ethos* establishes credibility for the actor who uses it, *denigration* causes exactly the opposite – it seeks to undermine the legitimacy of the opponent by attacking him or her.

Populist incorrectness is the antipode to technocratic language and behaviour. Technocrats can be found on Ostiguy's high side and are expected to show 'good manners'. Professional and politically correct behaviour, as well as being polished and composed, make up their atti-

tude (Moffitt, 2016: 61). Furthermore, Bossetta (2016) notes that the technocratic style has, in addition to the scientific language, a focus on the rhetoric appeals *logos* and *ethos*. *Logos* stands for a rationality in an actor's argumentation that is grounded on facts and examples and *ethos* refers to the fact that these actors then make themselves credible by referring to their own expertise and previous experiences. The populist and technocratic appeals can be combined for better effect and, depending on the type of speech, one or the other will prevail.

2.1.3 Mediation of the social

The third and last characteristic of the political style is the mediation of the social. It helps to understand the way actors 'tell their story' to their audience, how they mediate the social reality to 'the people'. The technocratic narrative in this category is stability. Actors stress the stability of the general situation, or the progress that is made towards stability, in a positive way. Whereas the technocratic political style places emphasis on stability, populism is linked to crisis. Taggart (2000: 1) states that "populism draws great support at times of crisis". Moffitt (2016: 45) goes further and sees populism not simply as a beneficiary of crisis, but also as a catalyst for crisis "through dramatization and performance". The populist performance of crisis runs through six steps (Moffitt, 2016: 121). At first, the actors need to identify a failure (but crisis and failure are not one and the same, a failure need not lead to a crisis). In the next step, urgency is added to the mix and the crisis is embedded in a wider framework to add more drama. Then the linkage to 'the people' follows and the blame is put on 'those responsible'. The media is the means to transport the populist performance which offers simple solutions and the leadership is presented as being able to execute this solution. Crises can lead to a divide between the representatives and the represented and can be related to a variety of themes (immigration, economy, change). To perform a crisis leads to distrust towards the representatives under critique and due to the simulated urgency, it also leads to "short-term and swift action" in favour of the populist performers. (Moffitt, 2016: 45).

2.2 Differences in the political style across communication channels

The political world is ever changing and political actors have to adapt to keep up with new challenges. As mentioned above, they can use the political styles to mobilize voters, to gain

electoral support (Moffitt, 2016: 77) and media coverage. The following section introduces the first set of hypotheses to understand how political parties use the political style in different communication channels.

Political parties are an important part of democratic systems, in Austria their role is enshrined in the constitution. Their existence is an important part of the democratic order and they are part of the political decision-making (Müller, 2006). Political parties seek office in elections and need to communicate with the electorate. Depending on the party type (see Krouwel, 2006, for an overview), parties have changed the means and strategies to get in touch with the electorate over time. An illustrating example for political challenges is Austria. After World War II, the country was divided into political camps, dominated by the Social Democrats and the Christian Democratic People's party. The Social Democratic and the Christian-Democratic party organizations split the voters and structured nearly the entire life of their party members. Both camps had (and partially still have) youth organizations, labour unions, newspapers, insurance and banking companies, ambulance services, as well as motorist, sports and retirement clubs. Parties also had vast resources which allowed them to supply their members with jobs and housing. In the 1980s, party loyalties started to decline. Up until today, the number of loyal party voters is declining and the votes of people with no party affiliations are contested in every election (see Plasser and Ulram, 2004b: 383, for a summary of party loyalties in Austria from 1969 to 2004). If parties have less members whom they reach via party newspapers or at party rallies, then they must find new ways to get their message to the people and the importance of new communication channels increases.

In times of elections, the candidates get in touch with the electorate personally, e.g. when they tour the country to visit companies or festivities. In the Austrian electoral system, parliamentary representation depends on two thresholds for political parties. Either “winning one seat in one of the forty-three regional electoral districts or winning 4 per cent of the valid votes nationwide” (Müller, 2005: 405). In 2013 a ‘democracy package’ was passed by the Austrian parliament to, as it was said, strengthen democracy, including a widening of the previously existing preference vote system and a reform of the postal vote system. The postal vote was reinforced to fight low turnout rates but it was, and still is, a very controversial topic and heavily influenced the Austrian presidential election of 2016. In 2013, the preference vote system was implemented on the national level for the first time (in addition to the preference vote system on the regional and Land levels that already existed). If a person was able to receive a preferential vote to the extent of 7 per cent of all the party votes, she or he was pro-

moted on the national party list. For the regional and Land levels, the thresholds were lowered to strengthen personality elections (Aichholzer et al., 2014). Dolezal, Haselmayer and Jenny (2014a) find that 2,2 per cent of all the candidates (87 persons) made use of personalized campaigns, four persons thereof were the top candidates of SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ and Team Strolach. In modern campaigns, political parties often place their top candidates in the foreground, if there is “popular personnel” (Dolezal et al., 2014b: 68) available. These candidates are then promoted across all communication channels.

The media plays an important role by picking up parties’ press releases and ads, by writing articles, by conducting and broadcasting interviews, reports and debates on TV and radio etc. The most recent development is the use of online campaigning tools such as social media and websites. All these different media need to be considered to carry out a successful election campaign. Plasser and Ulram (2004b: 398—401) compare the trends of campaigning in (industrial) democracies and the predominating formats in the premodern, modern and postmodern area of campaigning. The authors see commercials and debates on TV as big trends on the macro level of the modern area, whereas microtargeting of voters will be very important in the postmodern area. The premodern area was more focused on content for internal uses whereas the modern and postmodern area have to produce for an external audience (see also Norris et al., 1999).

“[P]arties need to communicate via both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ channels at the same time [...]” (Elmelund-Præstekær, 2011: 39). An internal channel is directed towards the partisans whereas the external channels are directed towards swing-voters. Elmelund-Præstekær (2011) discusses the role of the media and that parties have to formulate certain content, like press releases, in a way the media will pick them up and report them. The author concludes that party agendas vary across communication channels, but similar results could be expected from the analysis of the political style. Parties must anticipate the different audience and their varying expectations whom they reach when using various communication channels. This puts parties in an awkward position: On the one hand, parties should have a consistent campaign and stay “on message” (Plasser, 2012; Norris et al., 1999) but on the other hand they also need enough flexibility to meet the technical demands of the channel in use and react to strategic moves and attacks from their competitors. Political actors could therefore vary the amount of populist and technocratic elements in their communication, depending on the communication channel and the connected audience. Previous studies on populism, defining it as an ideology, concentrate on one or two channels to determine whether or not a party is


populist (Cranmer, 2011; De Raadt, Hollanders & Krouwel, 2004; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Rooduijn, de Lange & van der Brug, 2014). However, more variation may be found when including more channels in the analysis that reach a broader and more diverse audience. Two hypotheses will be formulated to test how the political style varies across communication channels.

Pauwels (2011) points out that “populist parties tend to have different faces depending on the audience they address”. Mudde (2000) therefore includes party papers in his analysis and states:

“It seems plausible that this literature will hide ‘the true nature of the party’ to a far lesser extent than externally directed literature since it is aimed at a different group of recipients, i.e. the party members (the internal arena), as against the whole electorate (the external arena [...]).” (Mudde 2000: 21)

Internal media would be e.g. party newspapers and speeches at party congresses, external media are party manifestos, ads, press releases, and many more. Pauwels (2011) measures populism in both internal and external media, comparing Belgian parties’ manifestos and membership magazines, finding that the magazines are overall more populist than the manifestos. A possible explanation of his results could be that “party members often have more extreme views compared to the electorate” (Pauwels, 2011: 110). He concludes “that the strategy to analyze both internal and external oriented party literature is of added value” (Ibid.). Following that rationale, the first hypothesis will test whether the populist political style outweighs the technocratic style in internal channels.


Figure 1: The range of external and internal communication channels



H1a: In internal channels, actors use more populist elements than in external channels.

There could also be a range of formality attached to the different channels. If one thinks of formality in the sense of how many restrictions there are on actors, then the least formal are also the internal channels. Party congresses for example allow actors to speak their mind more freely whereas in TV debates there are restricting entities in the form of an interview partner and a moderator who most likely will set the discussion issues. The political actors are dependent on others to communicate their messages and have to moderate themselves to gain attention and coverage. The same is true for parliamentary debates, where the presidents of the *Nationalrat* monitor the language and the duration of the speech. Connecting that to the political style, the less formal channels are also expected to be more populist, whereas the more formal channels will show a more ‘well mannered’ behavior and tone. Press releases are a more differentiated case, due to their written form and their content. On the one hand, press releases are used to distribute messages on the most important policies of a party’s campaign, long planned events etc. but they can do much more. Like Tresch et al (2014: 3) point out, they can “also be used to take up new issues and pressing demands in response to changes in public opinion, unfavorable media coverage, or the electoral strategies of other parties”. For the political style, this leads to the conclusion that channels that “allow for short-term tactical adjustments during the campaign” (Tresch et al., 2014: 1) may use both populist and technocratic elements in a more balanced way.

Figure 2: The range of formal and informal communication channels



H1b: The more formal the channel is, the more technocratic the actors using them behave.

2.3 Differences in the political style across parties

Besides different channels of party communication, different types of parties should also explain some variance. Populism is very often associated with right-wing or radical right parties. Western European research focuses primarily on right-wing populism. In other contexts, mainstream parties and left-wing parties can also use populism. Another influential factor could be the status of a party (government vs. opposition). The next set of hypotheses is formulated to test which parties use which elements of political style.

Political parties participate in elections to get appointed to office, as part of the parliament or part of government. Keman (2006: 160, emphasis in original) identifies political parties as the “core *actors* within systems of representative democracy”. In elections, voters delegate their power to parties, thereby legitimizing parties’ positions in parliament and government. As Ignazi (1992: 4) describes it, the decline in turnout rates and party memberships could lead to “a higher electoral volatility, the rise of new parties and the decline of parties as such”. The author speaks of an “‘unexpected’ rise of the new right-wing parties” (Ignazi, 1992: 3) that he traces back to a radicalization in mass beliefs and neglect by conservative parties to adopt to the electorate’s new needs. Populist radical right parties have an ideological core consisting of a “combination of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism” (Mudde, 2010: 1173; original from Mudde 2007). Nativism is based on the idea of a homogeneous nation state, a state that is inhabited by its native people and not threatened by another group. Authoritarianism relies on the need to obey authority to uphold a specific type of society (Mudde, 2010). But populism is not only a phenomenon restricted to the radical right. Left-wing populism is mostly analyzed in the Latin American context (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013). Latin America is also the starting point for March (2007) who seeks to find out more about the evolving phenomenon ‘left populism’. Relying on Mudde’s definition of populism as an ideology, the author presents the differences and similarities between right and left populism in detail. They may share organizational features, but left populists emphasize egalitarianism, economic inequality and anti-capitalism (March 2007: 66). The rise of populism in Latin America was facilitated by the fact that charismatic leaders acted more flexible and had only loose organizational ties, while party politics structure the political competition in Europe (March, 2007: 70). Populist leaders often came into power following a legitimacy crisis. But even when populists are in power, they rely on criticizing the elite concerning the economy, sometimes justifiably so, sometimes to justify their own lack of success (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013: 12).

One study that focuses on both left- and right-wing populism is the analysis of political parties in Austria by Winder (2012). The author analyses Austrian party communication of governing parties (the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the People's Party (ÖVP)), as well as opposition parties (the Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Greens and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)). He uses a multidimensional model of populism that centers around inclusion and exclusion. With this model, the author wants to find out which parties use inclusive or exclusive communication strategies. The author finds no significant differences in the use of inclusive elements but his analysis uncovers interesting results for the use of the exclusive dimension. The Greens had the most references in the first exclusive level 'elite-/outside-/fringe groups references'. 47,1 per cent of the Green's (46,1 of the FPÖ's) press releases defined elite-, outside- or fringe groups as a homogeneous group and spoke to them as such. The Greens primarily targeted economic and political elites (like big international businesses, oil companies), whereas the FPÖ primarily addressed outside- and fringe groups (like foreigners, criminals) (Winder, 2012: 242). The other two levels of Winder's exclusive category were whether parties portrayed the groups of the first level as being different from the rest of the population and if the parties repelled these groups. On both these levels, the FPÖ or the BZÖ were either in first or second place, followed by the Greens. Plotting both the inclusive and the exclusive dimensions together, one can see that the FPÖ and the BZÖ are the most populist, but that all parties use populist elements in their communications (Winder, 2012: 245). Some of these findings correspond well with the political style. The left-wing Green opposition party emphasizes anti-elitism, criticizing economic and political elites. In the political style, anti-elitism is a feature of the appeal to 'the people', which is a characteristic of the populist style. Winder's (2012) findings for the right-wing opposition parties correspond to Moffitt's (2016) populist political style characteristic 'bad manners', politically incorrect targeting of minority groups and slandering them. Winder's (2012) findings concerning mainstream parties are less expressive. The author traces this back to the fact that the governing mainstream parties are themselves part of the elite and it would be hardly credible if they were to attack the elites.

Another example of the comparison between mainstream non-populist and non-mainstream populist parties was provided under section 1.3 of this thesis. Rooduijn, de Lange and van der Brug (2014) analyze the contagiousness of populism from populist parties to mainstream parties. Their analysis is one of the first to compare five countries (France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom) over time. The authors want to understand if mainstream parties adopt populist strategies over time and conclude that mainstream parties' mani-

festos are less populist than those of populist parties but also less populist than those of non-populist non-mainstream parties (Rooduijn, de Lange & van der Brug, 2014: 568—569). The contagiousness of right-wing populism and the adoption by mainstream parties has been the center of other studies as well. Recent studies found that mainstream parties (on the left and the right of the political spectrum, although to different extents) are affected by populist agenda-setting, meaning they shift their policy positions under the electoral pressure of populist parties (Bale, 2010; Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 2016; van Spanje, 2010). But mainstream parties in government are less affected than opposition parties (van Spanje, 2010) and there are not necessarily long-term effects (Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 2016).

Mainstream parties are less populist but considering Winder's (2012) findings, it is to be expected that they are also on the technocratic side of the political style. Mainstream parties are often also the “‘governing’ parties” (Katz & Mair, 2009: 757) and get more and more intertwined with the state, leading to a prioritization of their institutional role and they are “likely to be drawing further away from society” (Katz & Mair, 2009: 756). Moffitt and Tormey (2014: 393) see the regular politics in Western democracies as “marked by an absence of outward performative style, and instead favour[ing] the coldness of ‘office politics’ and the technocratic style”. The emphasis is on ‘good manners’ and mildness in all matters. Considering the above-mentioned findings and connecting them to the political style, this leads us to the next set of hypotheses. It seems that mainstream parties may use populist elements from time to time but altogether, they make less use of anti-system rhetoric and emphasize their knowledge and achievements as well as the stability that they add to the political system. This means that they are overall more technocratic than populist. In contrast, non-mainstream parties rely on anti-elitism and ‘bad manners’ when communicating with ‘the people’, leading to the expectation that their style is overall more populist than technocratic.

H2a: Mainstream parties are expected to emphasize the technocratic political style.

H2b: Non-mainstream parties are expected to emphasize the populist political style.

To answer the research questions, this thesis contrasts the populist and technocratic political style. Populists appeal to peoples’ emotions and attack elites and their opponents while using the narrative ‘crisis’. Technocracy features a political style that appeals to expertise, ‘good manners’ and the performance of stability. Technocrats use facts, personal experience and expert knowledge, while emphasizing stability to gain support. The first set of hypotheses

builds on the fact that both internal and informal but also external and formal communication channels need to be considered when talking about the populist and technocratic political style. The second set of hypotheses is about the different parties, mainstream and non-mainstream, and their use of the political style. The following section of this thesis is about the case, the data, the method and the analysis that will be used to test the hypotheses formulated above.

3 Data and Method

The hypotheses outlined in the previous section will be tested by studying four different communication channels used by political parties in Austria. Previous studies clearly considered the FPÖ as populist but the more systematic definition of populism as style allows a more in-depth analysis. In addition to the distinction between populist and non-populist parties, considering populism a style makes it possible to distinguish grades of populism and technocracy (also in different communication channels). This thesis takes the party communication of the Social Democrats (SPÖ), the Freedom Party (FPÖ), the People's Party (ÖVP) and the Greens (*Die Grünen*) into account. Namely press releases, parliamentary debates, party congress speeches and debates between the parties' top candidates on public television are analyzed. The hypotheses will be tested using a qualitative content analysis.

Austria has a long-standing tradition of right-wing populism. Thanks to the FPÖ, Austrian mainstream parties have been facing a populist competitor since the 1980s and they were not always able to overcome the populist temptation. The 2008 national election was called because the minister of transport at the time, Werner Faymann, sent a letter to the editor of the tabloid *Kronen Zeitung*, announcing a SPÖ policy shift concerning EU issues, demanding compulsory referenda on substantial treaty reforms (Aichholzer et al., 2014: 9). Another example is the explicit call for left-wing populism by the former Green party manager, Stefan Wallner (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2016). Therefore, the analysis of Austria might be fruitful for a better understanding of the nature of populism.

3.1 Case selection

Moffitt (2016: 53—54) points out that the basis of the analysis of the political style depends on the region that is the focus of the study. There are populist leaders that cannot be analyzed as stemming from one particular party because Latin Americans like Hugo Chávez or Australian populist Pauline Hanson are not always attached to one specific party but go through different parties and organizations to reach their goals. In Western Europe, the circumstances are different – populist parties are more stable and lasting entities that are useful bases for an analysis. Austria has been included in many studies on populism before – both in single-case studies (inter alia Pelinka, 2002; Luther, 2007; Plasser, 2012; Schmuck et al., 2017) and com-

parative research (inter alia Helms, 1997; Heinisch, 2003; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Akkerman, 2012) but not based on the political style comparing four party communication channels.

Like many other countries, Austria struggles with decreasing turnout rates at elections and the national elections on 29 September 2013 saw a record low turnout of 74,9 per cent (Dolezal & Zeglovits, 2014). In addition to low turnout rates, two new parties emerged: the liberal party NEOS, and the populist business-firm party, Team Stronach. The right-wing party Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) was threatened in its parliamentary existence due to the loss of their charismatic leader and former FPÖ leader Jörg Haider who died in 2008. All these changes hit the Austrian party system and affected the established parties. Furthermore, the continuation of the government between the two mainstream parties SPÖ and ÖVP was not a given (Aichholzer & Willmann, 2014). The populist right-wing FPÖ was affected by the establishment of the Team Stronach (Aichholzer et al., 2014: 23), whereas the left-wing Greens were predicted to reach their best national result. They achieved their best result, nevertheless, their electoral gains stayed below the predictions of the polls. The constellation of the party system with two mainstream parties and at least one left- and one right-wing party makes Austria a perfect case. The national election of 2013 is the case studied in this thesis. Austria has been studied before but the election year 2013 brought many changes: new parties emerged, threatening the established parties, and institutional changes, like the widening of the preference vote system, requiring the parties' attention. This could also have led to a different approach to populism and technocracy across the party spectrum.

In addition, Austria has a special way of conducting pre-election debates on TV. All top candidates of the parties² face each other. That makes it possible to not only analyze one debate between the top candidates of the biggest parties competing for the chancellery but to study debates between top candidates of all parties. Furthermore, press releases, parliamentary debates and party congress speeches of the SPÖ, FPÖ, ÖVP and the Greens are included in the analysis³. Lengauer, Plasser and Seeber (2012: 63) make use of AUTNES data (Kritzing et al. 2014) to find out, on what channels Austrian voters used to inform themselves about politics (multiple answers were possible): 86,5 per cent answered TV-News, 71,9 per cent press and 16,5 per cent opted for the TV debates. Since the press releases are received by the press and parliamentary debates are often part of the TV-News, the sample could have included more channels (like ads) but will make a first overview possible.

² Actually, only those leaders of parties currently in parliament are invited to the TV debates.

³ Other channels like social media or party websites were not included since the role of these media was neglectable in Austria in 2013 (Dolezal, Eberl, Jacobi & Zeglovits 2014b: 72—73).

3.2 Data collection

The empirical analysis includes TV debates, press releases, parliamentary debates and party congress speeches of the SPÖ, the ÖVP, the FPÖ and the Greens. When possible, the period under review covered the last two weeks before the national election. These two weeks are often considered as the most critical phase right before heading to the polls. Detailed information about the different communication channels, their relevance and how to access them, can be found in the following sections. An overview of the analyzed texts is in the appendix.

3.2.1 Pre-election debates

The Austrian television landscape was, for a long time, dominated by the public Austrian broadcasting corporation (ORF), private broadcasting stations emerged late but they also conduct pre-election debates. The TV debates of the ORF will be included in the sample since the ORF has a much broader audience and reaches far more people than the private stations (Arbeitsgemeinschaft TELETEST, 2016). The first TV debate which aired on Austrian television was in 1970 between the Christian Democratic People's Party chancellor Josef Klaus and the Social Democratic candidate Bruno Kreisky. Since then, the number of debates has varied depending on the number of parliamentary parties. This led to the highest number of debates to date, as the Team Stronach achieved parliamentary representation before the election, allowing its participation in the debates (Dolezal et al., 2014b). Fourteen one-on-one debates and an additional final debate of all opposition top candidates were broadcasted via ORF to an interested public audience. Since the debates were aired over the course of four weeks (two debates per evening, twice a week), the period under review starts with the very first debate between Heinz-Christian Strache and Eva Glawischnig on 29 August 2013 and ends with the second last debate between Werner Faymann and Michael Spindelegger on 24 September 2013. The transcripts of the pre-election debates were made available by the Austrian Press Agency's OnlineManager Library tool and could be used more or less directly (i.e. without further editing exercises necessary) for the analysis.

3.2.2 Press releases

Press releases are short texts (a few paragraphs in length) produced by politicians, electoral candidates, parliamentary party groups or party organizations and addressed to the Austrian Press Agency. The target audiences are media outlets and journalists. Press releases are considered to be official and authentic texts which are then distributed by the Austrian Press Agency through its original text service (short: APA-OTS), which is available online (<http://www.ots.at/>) and can be browsed by a search mask. Some of the texts are very well crafted and elaborated, others are not. Press releases are not only a PR-tool but are used by journalists to craft news items. Kaid (1976) finds that the US American candidate for Congress Kenneth V. Buzbee was very successful in finding media coverage for his press releases. Out of 26 press releases by the candidate, newspapers produced up to 50 stories. 30 of these 50 stories were actually duplicates, mostly unedited, but sometimes cutting the final paragraph. This shows to what extent press releases influenced the media and still do (Rußmann, 2012). The press releases can be about dates and events which are interesting for the press or can focus on (current) issues. In times of elections, the candidates and parties rely heavily on these texts. In the 2013 campaign the Austrian parties released 1.922 press releases (Kleinen-von Königslöw et al., 2014: 43). It can be assumed that the press releases represent the official parties and their positions⁴ even though the press releases sometimes come from other senders, like the parliamentary fraction or individual candidates. As Kleinen-von Königslöw et al. (2014: 42) point out, press releases are meant to stir the media coverage into a direction that is desirable for the party. This could include pushing certain issues or defending oneself against other parties. Press releases are important for parties because they have influence on the media coverage. The media pick up a lot of information from press releases, about the structures, strategies and issues parties utilize, not only, but especially, in times of elections. In addition, the parties influence the media's issue agendas to a certain degree and thereby also shape the public opinion (Rußmann, 2012: 142).

The press releases were downloaded with the software R⁵. The observation period lasts for two weeks and starts on Sunday, 15 September, and ends on election day, 29 September 2013. In a first step, all the press releases (n=2.982) from that period were downloaded, including all press releases released by the party headquarters. Due to research economic reasons, the anal-

⁴ Always the most federal sender available was chosen, more details can be found in the appendix.

⁵ The R packages that were used: Rcurl, rvest, stringr, tm, XML, car.

ysis of the press releases was then limited to a random selection of 50 texts per party, or in case of the Greens all 19 press releases that were released. Ultimately, 169 press releases were analyzed.

3.2.3 Parliamentary debates

Parliamentary debates are used by the government and the opposition to communicate with their electorate. Parliamentary debates could reach citizens directly, were they to watch them via television or online streaming, but most people will be reached indirectly by the parliamentary sessions in the press or in newcasts. The maximum length of a speech is 20 minutes per speaker. Often voluntary time limits are set by the parliamentary party groups⁶. In addition, the total amount of speaking time is limited for each party group separately – according to the seat share of the group⁷. For urgent inquiries, whoever handed in the inquiry has 20 minutes to speak, all other speakers have ten minutes and each party group has a total of 25 minutes⁸. In the last two weeks before the election, the parliament was in session three times, on 17, 18 and 25 September. To make the text comparable, the first speaker of each party of an urgent inquiry were chosen for the analysis. Since there was no urgent inquiry in the session on the 18th of September, this results in a total of eight speeches. The stenographic protocols of the parliamentary debates can be accessed and downloaded via the parliamentary homepage.

3.2.4 Party congress speeches

Party congress speeches are meant to appeal to the partisans and the interested public. This thesis analyzes the first ten minutes of each party leaders' speech. The period under review differs from that of the other channels, since the party congresses are not always held in temporal proximity to the national elections. The party congress of the ÖVP was in 2011, two years prior to the election, and Michael Spindelegger was just announced leader of the ÖVP. The Greens held their party congress in 2012 and set the candidates and their positions on the party list for the national election in 2013. It was the first time for Eva Glawischnig to be

⁶ <https://www.parlament.gv.at/PERK/GL/ALLG/R.shtml>

⁷ <https://www.parlament.gv.at/PERK/GL/ALLG/B.shtml#Blockredezeit>

⁸ https://www.parlament.gv.at/PERK/RGES/GOGNR/gog13_P89-97.shtml#P93

nominated to head the list. The FPÖ congress was after the national election in September, but since Heinz-Christian Strache demanded new elections, the speech was interpreted as a sign of postmodern communication– constant campaigning – and still included in the analysis. Unfortunately, there was no video of the SPÖ congress available and a speech of then leader Werner Faymann could not be analyzed.

The videos of the party congress speeches were not available online any more, but access was given thanks to the “Party congress in Austria”-project (Matthias Kaltenegger and Prof. Wolfgang Müller) that stored available videos. Since the speeches varied in length⁹, the first ten minutes were chosen to compare similar textual segments. Following introductory remarks, the speakers then changed to more substantial topics, making these ten minutes rhetorically interesting to study. While transcribing, a limitation of using the stenographic protocols and already existing transcripts became apparent. Slang is part of the ‘bad manners’ category. Due to the correction of the transcripts and protocols to standard German, it can only be included to a certain extent. Eva Glawischnig’s party congress speech for example has a lot of regional colouring, she alternated between standard German and Carinthian, but only real slang words were included in the analysis.

3.3 Analysis and operationalization

The text bases are analyzed using qualitative text analysis. The coding was conducted following the categories depicted in table 3. The three characteristics of the political style (appeals, mannerism, mediation of the social) and its features were coded as they appeared in the text, sometimes there was just one word (e.g. slang) or a set of words, sentences or sets of sentences. In addition, more than one characteristic can be coded in the same paragraph or sentence (e.g. slang and political incorrectness) and one characteristic can be coded more than once per paragraph or sentence. The codes were then added to allow for a first overview of the use of populist and technocratic elements in political parties’ communication. The results can be found in tables 4 to 8. The pre-election debates were coded as paragraphs that were written in the transcripts. One paragraph could contain one word, one sentence, or a set of sentences. Of the press releases, the first paragraph that often contains a condensed summary of the press

⁹ The whole speeches had durations of: Glawischnig - 29:56 minutes, Strache - 42:31 minutes and Spindelegger - 56: 38 minutes.

release was coded, the rest of the text was not included (sometimes the press releases were just one paragraph long, others were much longer). The parliamentary debates were coded in paragraphs. The party congress speeches were coded sentence by sentence.

Table 3: Guidelines of the qualitative content analysis

Characteristics	Features		
Appeals	appeal to ‘the people’		populist
	anti-elitism		populist
	appeal to expertise		technocratic
Mannerism	bad manners	pathos	populist
		slang	
		slander	
		political incorrectness	
	good manners	logos	technocratic
		ethos	
		political correctness	
Mediation of the social	crisis		populist
	stability		technocratic

Sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.3 elaborate how the characteristics are detected in the text bases. Appeals to ‘the people’ versus ‘expertise’ are noted when certain keywords, institutions or groups of people were mentioned. ‘Bad manners’ are coded when attacks or political incorrect behavior occurred, whereas facts and references to own expertise signify ‘good manners’. The mediation of the social was coded when actors appealed to crisis or to expertise. Examples from the analyzed texts will conclude each subsection.

3.3.1 Appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘expertise’

Whereas populists rely on the *appeal to ‘the people’* and *anti-elitism*, technocrats rely on the *appeal to expertise/knowledge*. The populist characteristic appeal to ‘the people’ can be detected by noting keywords like Jagers and Walgrave (2007) use: ‘(the) people’, ‘(the) public’,

‘(the) citizen(s)’, ‘(the) voter(s)’, ‘(the) taxpayer(s)’, ‘(the) resident(s)’, ‘(the) consumer(s)’, ‘(the) population’ and many more. Anti-elitism can be directed at political elites but also at the media or individuals. This could also include an actor portraying his or her opponent as being part of the elite, to make himself appear closer to ‘the people’. The technocratic appeal to expertise/knowledge means that actors rely on the expertise or knowledge of other elite members or experts. An example for the appeal to expertise is Heinz-Christian Strache: “Since the introduction of the Euro, many economists, the members of the Freedom Party too – we even had a Schilling-referendum – warned about the undesirable developments that we could face”¹⁰. An example of reference to ‘the people’ would be this SPÖ statement: “Everyone who wants social solidarity, who wants the best future for the youth and well-deserved prosperity for older people, can only vote SPÖ”¹¹. And another example of a statement in press releases by the ÖVP in the anti-elite category: “No to the Faymann-Hollande-path with new debts, new taxes and forced policies for families”¹².

3.3.2 Mannerism

‘*Bad manners*’ are part of the populist style and encompass appeals to the audience’s emotions and sentiments. This includes the use of colloquial language and sometimes even made-up words are used. In addition, it can include swearing, taunting and over-the-top claims. Because populists are the voice of ‘the people’ (Moffitt, 2016: 63) and represent “common sense” - they express what everyone thinks and rally against minority groups. Other examples from Moffit (2016: 61) are attacks towards minority groups to provoke reactions. The populist style seeks to undermine legitimacy by attacking everything about the opponent. In contrast to technocrats, populists use anecdotes instead of hard facts to prove the point (Moffitt, 2016: 44). An example for ‘bad manners’ would be Michael Spindelegger in his party congress

¹⁰ „Wir erleben seit Einführung des Euro, dass viele Ökonomen, auch wir Freiheitlichen im übrigen, davor gewarnt haben, auch ein Schilling-Volksbegehren gehabt haben und darauf hingewiesen haben, welche Fehlentwicklungen auf uns zu kommen können.“

¹¹ „Wer den sozialen Zusammenhalt, wer die beste Zukunft für die Jugend und für die älteren Menschen den wohlverdienten Wohlstand will, der kann nur die SPÖ wählen.“

¹² „Nein zu einem Faymann-Hollande-Irrweg mit neuen Schulden, neuen Steuern und Zwangspolitik für Familien“

speech, talking full of pathos: “The people will feel again, that we fight for them, because one cannot allow that the middle class is the nation’s cash cow.”¹³

‘*Good manners*’ are part of the technocratic style and stand for a rationality in an actor’s argumentation that is grounded on facts and examples. These actors then make themselves credible by referring to their own expertise and previous experiences. In addition, they emphasize political correctness by playing the game correctly. An example for a ‘*good manners*’ statement is Heinz-Christian Strache saying: “Education is the best prevention of poverty”¹⁴.

3.3.3 Mediation of the social

This is about the ‘story’ an actor tells, the narrative that guides the content. Whereas populists mediate *crisis*, technocrats mediate *stability* by portraying the situation as stable or on the way, certainly with a positive progression. One example of the Greens in the category stability is the following statement: “...where the Greens are part of the government, the party funding was reduced, namely in Upper Austria and Vienna...”¹⁵. And Werner Faymann’s statement in the category crisis: “... and Mr. Strache wants to leave the Eurozone! And I want to tell the Austrians, that he would lead Austria into poverty!”¹⁶

¹³ „Das werden die Menschen auch wieder spüren, dass wir uns für sie einsetzen, denn man darf nicht zulassen, dass der Mittelstand die Melkkuh der Nation ist.“

¹⁴ „Bildung ist die beste Form gegen Armutsbekämpfung.“

¹⁵ „...wo die Grünen auch in der Regierung sind, die Parteienförderung auch reduziert worden ist, nämlich in Oberösterreich und in Wien...“

¹⁶ „...und der Herr Strache will austreten aus der Eurozone! Und ich will den Österreichern sagen, dass er damit Österreich in die Armut führen würde!“

4 Results

In this section, the hypotheses presented under 3.2 and 3.3. are tested and the results of the qualitative content analysis are discussed in order to answer “*how political parties use elements of populist and technocratic styles, which elements parties use in different communication channels and which elements are used by different parties*”. Table 4 to table 8 depict which style, populist or technocratic, are dominant per characteristic. If for example Faymann appealed more often to ‘the people’ than to expertise in the TV Debates, an X would be found in the row labelled ‘people’ and the columns labelled ‘TV debates’. This allows for a quick survey of a channel’s or an actor’s position. If all marks are made in the populist rows, one can see that the channel or the actor is populist and not technocratic. The results that will be presented here are meant to be a first overview to uncover tendencies of political style in Austrian political parties’ communication and a basis for further analyses.

4.1 Differences across channels

When comparing communication channels cautiously, including all four parties, it is clear to see that there are differences in the use of technocratic and populist styles. The channel that included the most text, the TV debates, were also the most balanced of the four. In the category people vs. expertise there were more populist references to ‘the people’ than to expertise, which is true for all the four channels. But in the other two categories, mannerism and mediation of the social, the TV debates show a clear surplus of technocratic elements. As can be seen in table 4, both the ‘good manners’ and the emphasis on stability are used more than their populist counterparts. The other more formal channel are the parliamentary speeches, that show a populist surplus. The same is true for the party congress speeches. One limitation of the analysis was the absence of a recording of a SPÖ party congress speech. The remaining three parties have more populist statements than technocratic ones. The press releases were not as easy to rank but the qualitative text analysis leads to the same conclusion as that of the party congress speeches and the parliamentary speeches: there are more populist elements in the press releases, than technocratic ones. Hypothesis H1b must be rejected, one cannot say that the more formal the channel is, the more technocratic the actors behave.

Table 4: Comparing the dominant (populist or technocratic) features across communication channels

	press releases	party congress speech*	parliamentary speeches	TV debates
Appeals to				
the people	X	X	X	X
expertise				
Mannerism				
bad manners	X	X	X	
good manners				X
Mediation of the social				
crisis				
stability	X	X	X	X

* Not available for the SPÖ

In both the press releases and the parliamentary debates there are more populist elements in both ‘the people’ vs. expertise and in the mannerism categories, both appeal to ‘the people’ and ‘bad manners’ are used more often than appeals to expertise and ‘good manners’. As in the other two channels, the emphasis on stability seems to be used more often than the intonation of crisis. It needs to be stressed that the sample of press releases of the Greens is smaller than that of the other parties and could influence the above-mentioned findings. The case is very different for the party congress speeches. They seem to be the most populist channel, whether that is due to the lack of an SPÖ speech, or the length of the sample, cannot be answered. H1a can thus be confirmed: the internal channel that was part of the analysis was also the one with the most populist statements. A more detailed breakdown of these findings for the individual parties can be found in the next section of this chapter, addressing the differences in the use of populist and technocratic styles across parties.

4.2 Differences across parties

4.2.1 The mainstream parties in-depth

‘Governing parties’ (Katz and Mair, 2009) in Austria are mainly the ÖVP and the SPÖ. At any time since the establishment of the Second Republic in 1945, at least one of these parties made up (part of) the government. There were times when the parties were able to govern without the support of the other, or with the help of the FPÖ. Following the hypotheses formulated under 2.3, it was tested which political style mainstream parties emphasize more in their communication.

SPÖ – Social Democratic Party

In 2013, the incumbent chancellor Werner Faymann was also the top candidate for the SPÖ. Faymann clearly stated that he wanted to continue his work as leader of the government. Thus, many would not expect a government party and their top candidate to use populist elements in their communication due to their office. The overall picture that can be drawn from the analysis is that the SPÖ and its top candidate indeed use populist elements in their communication but the technocratic statements prevail, table 5 shows that the dominant style in the SPÖ’s communication is technocracy. Examples will illustrate how the SPÖ uses the populist and technocratic styles.

Table 5: Comparing the SPÖ's dominant (populist or technocratic) features across communication channels

	press releases	party congress speech*	parliamentary speeches (Cap)	TV debates: Faymann against		
				Glawischnig	Strache	Spindelegger
Appeals to						
the people	even		X	X	X	X
expertise	even					
Mannersism						
bad manners	X		X			
good manners				X	X	X
Mediation of the social						
crisis						
stability	X		X	X	X	X

* Not available

The first characteristics that will be described in detail are appeals, the populist appeals to *'the people'* and against the elite and the technocratic appeal to *expertise*. The elite is not criticized that often, when they are, both the ÖVP and the FPÖ are mentioned, in addition, critique against the ÖBB, the ORF, banks, financial markets and millionaires, and references to David Cameron can be counted in this category. Whereas there is some critique against economic elites, there are far more appeals to the people in almost all texts. Adding all the mentioned appeals to *'the people'*, the Social Democratic actors use the reference to *'the people'* ((*die Menschen, die Leute*)) the most, followed by *'employees'* and *'workers'* ((*die Arbeitnehmer(innen), (die) Arbeiter*)). *'The Austrians'* ((*die Österreicher(innen)*)) is mentioned as often as *'senior citizens'* and *'pensioners'* ((*die SeniorInnen, (die) PensionistInnen*)). *'Young people'* and specific groups of working people as well as *'the population'* (*die Bevölkerung*) is also mentioned often. The *appeal to expertise*, the technocratic opposite to the appeal to *'the people'*, was most often coded in the TV debates. With the appeal to expertise, Faymann points to juridical entities like the audit court and state prosecutors, the OECD and the European Union with its key players (Catherine Ashton, Angela Merkel, Wolfgang Schäuble). But Faymann also points out the work of his cabinet members. The populist statements outweigh the technocratic ones.

For the second characteristics – manners – technocracy is predominant in the TV debates whereas populism is predominant in the press releases and parliamentary debates. In the press releases, the *'bad manners'* category is mainly used to attack the coalition partner ÖVP and

its top candidate Michael Spindelegger, sometimes reminding the recipients of the failure of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition that forced the SPÖ into opposition in 2000. There are also some messages full of pathos directed at the voters concerning Werner Faymann's 'vision' for Austria and his 'desire to lead the country'. In the parliamentary debates, the critique of the coalition partner and the ÖVP/FPÖ is also prevalent. The FPÖ is criticized because of its proposal for a direct-democratic system similar to that in Switzerland (with the suggestion to the FPÖ of 'buying a Swiss chocolate, sitting down and reconsidering everything they proposed'). The TV debates are less populist, Werner Faymann discusses some heated topics with all his opponents: social equality and distribution of wealth, Europe and being part of the European Union. Faymann criticizes his vice-chancellor Spindelegger for his stance on the economy and his way of working and Strache for his radical right sympathy, and the agitation from the FPÖ that is 'repetitive' and 'not based on facts'. Another observation is Faymann warning the Austrians about the threat of a potential ÖVP-FPÖ coalition often. In the TV debates, Faymann relies more heavily on the '*good manners*' feature than the SPÖ. That the TV debates have more 'good mannered' statements than 'bad mannered' ones could be owed to the fact that this channel allows for extensive statements on various topics. Both the press releases and the parliamentary debates show a surplus of attacks in contrast to fact-based statements. Statements in the '*good manners*' category, that are mentioned in all the channels, are about the good governmental work that Faymann did as chancellor, among other things: fighting the financial crisis and the prosperity of the Austrian business location due to Faymann's politics¹⁷. Other topics that are mentioned often are a tax reform that will bring financial relief to 'the people', pleas for better childcare and education, social issues like pension stability and affordable living for young people. In the debate against Glawischnig, Faymann lays emphasis on their good working relationship and future possibilities to work together, whereas against Strache, Faymann states that agitation and extremism make a future coalition impossible.

The last stylistic characteristics concern the mediation of the social. The technocratic feature *stability* is very interesting because it is dominant across all communication channels. Faymann and the SPÖ emphasize it to remind recipients of previous successes. In the TV debates, Faymann underlines his achievements for the country and its people in the five years he was head of government and thereby recommends himself for another period in office, discouraging the Austrians from 'experimental votes' (like for the new party Team Stronach). Another

¹⁷ „Da muss man ja einmal einen wichtigen Satz auch sagen. Wenn es den Leuten gut geht, geht es auch der Wirtschaft gut.“ (Werner Faymann debating Michael Spindelegger)

concern of the party and its leader is the needed stability that goes hand in hand with a membership in the European Union. The Social Democratic actors hardly ever put the emphasis on the populist element *crisis*. What can be noted, however, is the fact that it is most often used by Werner Faymann in the debate against Heinz-Christian Strache where Faymann pleads for remaining in the Eurozone. In the debate against Eva Glawischnig, the ongoing problems originating from the financial crisis, such as unemployment, are mentioned. In the parliamentary debates, there is talk about the bank scandal surrounding the Hypo-Alpe-Adria.

ÖVP – People's Party

Going into the election of 2013, the ÖVP was junior partner in the government and their top candidate was then vice-chancellor Michael Spindelegger. Similar to his opponent for the chancellery, Werner Faymann, Spindelegger's TV debates are more balanced than the party communication in press releases and parliamentary speeches. As depicted in table 6, the most populist TV debate is the one against Werner Faymann (this is true vice versa for Faymann). Like the SPÖ, the ÖVP's press releases and parliamentary debates use 'bad mannered' statements more than 'good mannered' ones. Since there were no records for the SPÖ's party congress, Spindelegger's speech is the first one to be analyzed and it shows a surplus of populist statements. The overall picture of the ÖVP and Michael Spindelegger suggest that there is a surplus of populism in the appeals categories and manners, but a clear surplus of technocratic statements in the mediation of the social (the populist 'crisis' is hardly ever used). The TV debates are more balanced across all categories but the other channels are dominated by the populist characteristics.

Table 6: Comparing the ÖVP's dominant (populist or technocratic) features across communication channels

	press releases	party congress speech	parliamentary speeches (Kopf)	TV debates: Spindelegger against		
				Glawischnig	Strache	Faymann
Appeals to						
the people	X	X	X	X	X	X
expertise						
Mannerism						
bad manners	X	X	X			X
good manners				X	X	
Mediation of the social						
crisis		Not mentioned				
stability	X	Not mentioned	X	X	X	X

In the appeals category, the ÖVP emphasizes different *appeals to 'the people'* than the SPÖ. The top mentioned group is the same, 'the people' ((*die*) *Menschen*; *Leute* is only mentioned once). References to 'families' ((*die*) *Familien*, (*die*) *Eltern*) and to 'young people' are second ((*die*) *Kinder*, (*die*) *Jungen*). Followed by appeals to 'the Austrians' ((*die*) *Österreicher(innen)*), 'citizens' ((*die*) *BürgerInnen*) and 'employees' ((*die*) *Arbenehmer(innen)*, never workers). Interestingly, 'farmers' ((*die*) (*Bio*)*Bauern*) are mentioned often, as well as 'taxpayers' ((*die*) *Steuerzahler*). *Anti-elitism* is hardly present in the TV debates, but a lot in the press releases. Faymann gets criticized for following a 'Faymann-Holland-path' of 'debts, taxes and forced policies for families'. The SPÖ is under critique for the experiments of the SPÖ-The Greens coalition in Vienna as well as the financial scandal 'Causa Mayr' in Linz, and patronage. Like Werner Faymann, Michael Spindelegger and the ÖVP emphasize judicial *expertise* in the technocratic category (judges, state prosecutors). Other statements are about the EU and its key players, going so far as speaking of the 'Spindelegger-Merkel-course' for Europe. The social partners and their expertise are also mentioned more than once.

In the category '*bad manners*', there are some topics that are picked up in all the channels. Michael Spindelegger (in the TV debates and the party congress speech) and his party (in the press releases) and the ÖVP's leader of the parliamentary group, Karlheinz Kopf (parliamentary speeches), plead against a continuation of Faymann as head of the government and for Spindelegger as chancellor. In the press releases, the topics range from less bureaucracy to

fighting crime and being strong in the face of the European Union. There are a lot of attacks against the SPÖ, the party is pictured as ‘being without courage’, ‘without content’, ‘taking from the employees’, ‘attacking the families’, ‘having failed in their endeavors’ and ‘without decency’, among others (*mutlos, Werner-mutlos-Faymann, inhaltsleer, aussackln, Anschlag auf die Familien, gescheitert, andstandslos*). A similar tone can be found in Kopf’s parliamentary debates, it seems that in both speeches primarily the party that requested the urgent inquiry gets attacked: the FPÖ not as heavily as the Greens who, according to Kopf, ‘patronize’, ‘moralize’ and ‘lie’ (*Bevormunden, Moralisieren, Herr Pilz mit Halbwahrheiten*). The party congress speech is characterized by Spindelegger’s use of very short sentences in these first 10 minutes, where he appeals to the middle class and relies on the ÖVP narrative: achievement (*Leistung*). He wants to establish the ÖVP as the ‘pacemaker’ in Austria and he rounds everything off with anecdotes of his wife and sons. These anecdotes can also be found in the debate against Eva Glawischnig, where he talks about the daily routine of his son instead of describing his vision for an educational reform. Another anecdote can be found when the topics are family and equality, Spindelegger is ‘the master of the refrigerator’ (*“Herr des Kühlschranks”*). Attacking the Greens makes up the most part of the ‘bad manners’: criticizing their behavior in committees of inquiry, against their patronizing (‘to forbid Austrians their roast pork (*Schweinsbraten*)’ is not the way to gain votes) or regulating farmers. Telling the people ‘to buy organic-meat or no meat at all is degrading’ (*herabwürdigend*), and the Greens’ style in campaign posters is also criticized (the Greens used photos of sheep and the word sheepish (*belämmert*) on their posters, a fact that some of the opponents used against them). Spindelegger’s TV debate against Strache was dominated by the former’s stance against agitation and the uncertainties that Strache creates in the population, Spindelegger emphasizes that ‘not everything foreign is bad’ and ‘integration through achievements is welcomed’. In the debate against Werner Faymann a lot of attacks take place. Some based on topics like taxes (Faymann wants new ones and ‘too many’), making promises the SPÖ’s top candidate cannot keep, confusing the public with his election promises (*Wahlzuckerl*). Other attacks by Spindelegger against Faymann are more abstract: Faymann is ‘without ideas and only brings up old ideas’ (*Mottenkiste*). Furthermore, Faymann is not ‘close to the companies’ like Spindelegger. Throughout the entire debate, Spindelegger tries to differentiate himself from Faymann by saying things like ‘this is where we differ’ (*“das ist aber ein großer Unterschied zwischen uns”*), sometimes sounding like a child talking to its father (‘You don’t get to tell me what to say’ - *“Das wirst mir Du jetzt nicht vorschreiben, was ich sage.”*). In addition, he advocates for himself as chancellor by telling Faymann ‘you have to leave’

(“...*Bundeskanzleramt, dort gehörst du einmal weg*”). In contrast, most of the facts and *good manners* are found in the TV debate against Heinz-Christian Strache, where Spindelegger has a clear surplus of rational statements added to the emphasis on stability. Overall, the ÖVP, Karlheinz Kopf and Michael Spindelegger place emphasis on the good governmental work of the previous legislative period but they also praise the time when the chancellor came from the ÖVP. They do not exclude anyone from a future coalition with the ÖVP although a positive attitude towards the EU and the Euro should be a given. Some other topics in the ‘*good manners*’ category are support for farmers, not giving empty promises but ‘acting on them’, politics for families and good education as well as for ‘achievement’ and against tax reforms.

Another similarity with the other party in government, the SPÖ, is a dominant technocratic mediation of the social. The populist element *crisis* is almost never used, when it is used the party attacks various Social Democrats to create a negative atmosphere against them. The technocratic style feature *stability*, emphasizes various topics, ranging from the prevention of new taxes, for stable pensions, a strong Austria in the global economy, finding its way out of the financial crisis, praise for the asylum system, and the leadership in climate technologies as well as the European Union and the stable Euro. Spindelegger highlights the good leadership in the ÖVP since he became party leader, the good governmental work, specifically outcomes like benefits for farmers and measures against unemployment. The party and the top candidate look forward to a ‘stable future’ that will be even better with the ÖVP and Spindelegger leading the country.

The findings indicate that the two mainstream parties follow a slightly different course concerning populism and technocracy. Hypothesis *H2a* cannot be affirmed: both mainstream parties clearly emphasize the technocratic element ‘stability’, but there are inter-party differences for other characteristics. Overall, the SPÖ and its leader Werner Faymann, are clearly emphasizing technocracy in their statements whereas the ÖVP and its leader Michael Spindelegger have an overall tendency towards populist statements. The TV debate Faymann vs. Spindelegger was more populist than the two party candidate’s debates against other top candidates. Hypothesis 2a must thus be rejected too because the mainstream parties do not emphasize the technocratic style in their communication channels evenly, the ÖVP uses more populist statements than technocratic ones.

4.2.2 The non-mainstream parties in comparison

FPÖ – Freedom Party

The FPÖ is the biggest opposition party in Austria and has been junior partner for the SPÖ and the ÖVP before. The top candidate of 2013, Heinz-Christian Strache, has lead the party since 2005, currently making him the longest-serving chairman. Unsurprisingly, the FPÖ has much more populist statements than technocratic ones across all channels. The most balanced case between, for example, ‘good’ and ‘bad manners’ is the debate against Eva Glawischnig. An interesting finding can be seen in table 7, Strache emphasizes stability more than crisis in his party congress speech, a more detailed summary follows below.

Table 7: Comparing the FPÖ’s dominant (populist or technocratic) features across communication channels

	press releases	party congress speech	parliamentary speeches (Kickl/Strache)	TV debates: Strache against		
				Glawischnig	Faymann	Spindelegger
Appeals to						
the people	X	X	X	X	X	X
expertise						
Mannerism						
bad manners	X	X	X	X	X	X
good man- ners						
Mediation of the social						
crisis	X		X	X	X	X
stability		X				

The FPÖ uses the most varied *appeals to ‘the people’* of all the parties in the analysis. While the SPÖ appeals to the most clearly delimited group, the FPÖ appeals to the most differentiated group. But like it was the case with the other parties, the top mentioned group are ‘the people’ ((*die*) *Menschen*; (*die*) *Leute*), second place are ‘Austrians’ ((*die*) *Österreicher(innen)*), followed by ‘employees’, ‘workers’ and ‘servants’ ((*die*) *Arbeitnehmer(innen)*, (*die*) *Arbeiter*, (*die*) *Bediensteten*) sharing the third place with ‘the population’ ((*die*) *Bevölkerung*). Whereas the ÖVP never appeals to women directly, both the SPÖ and the FPÖ do so, the FPÖ nearly

as often as appealing to ‘senior citizens’ and ‘pensioners’ ((*die*) *SeniorInnen*, (*die*) *PensionistInnen*) as well as to ‘voters’ ((*die*) *WählerInnen*). The category *anti-elite* is used to measure critique against elitist actors or institutions. The FPÖ criticizes the EU (its climate and energy policies, as well as its’ power seizing’), the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition (e.g. for not participating in the last TV debate with the opposition, as being part of the Madoff-scandal, and they are accused of being ‘puppets of banks and the EU’). Criticism is also directed against interest groups (Radlobby Österreich), banks in general and the national bank specifically, the ORF (‘distorts’ Strache’s words, works for the SPÖ and the Greens) and the press (Standard, Presse), the city of Vienna (red Viennese bigwigs - “*roten Wiener Bonzentum*”, corrupt, patronage, part of the Madoff-scandal), the Social Democratic youth as well as entrepreneur and political opponent Frank Stronach. In addition, Strache attacks the interviewer, Ingrid Thurnher, in the TV debates more than once, even calling her ‘low’ (*schäbig*) and accusing her of ‘distorting his words’ and ‘preferring the other speakers’ by giving them more speaking time (which the ORF prevented by tracking the speaking time for all to see). The populist appeals are diverse, the technocratic counterpart, the *appeal to expertise* is also used, but to a much lesser degree. Most of the appeals to experts can be found in the press releases and in the parliamentary speeches, directed at juridical entities (both regional and national courts, state prosecutors), economists (concerning the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Euro), journalists (international and national) and animal rights activists (who made incriminating photos of ÖVP parliamentarians’ farms), and the European Union (concerning help for asylum seekers as soon as they reach the EU’s external border).

In the category ‘*bad manners*’, some topics are repeated across the channels: the European Union is criticized, sometimes the ESM, other times the Euro, or a threat to neutrality and sovereignty¹⁸. Other topics are related to immigration: speaking against mass immigration, the misuse of asylum (concerning crimes committed by foreigners, like selling drugs, or ‘radical Islam’) and the misuse of naturalization. Often Strache and the FPÖ portray themselves as the target of ‘dirty campaigning’, like the Social Democratic youth who wants to discredit the FPÖ by telling ‘Nazi horror stories’. The FPÖ has more ‘patriotism’ (“*Inländerfreundlichkeit*”) but the other parties interpret that as ‘hatred of foreigners’. Another target is the ORF, who has ‘the order to snub the FPÖ’ and is ‘morally questionable’. In Strache’s statements in the TV debates, some have the lowest tone of all that were analysed were found. In the TV debate with Eva Glawischnig, Strache not only calls Glawischnig ‘sheepish’ (“*belämmert*”),

¹⁸ „Und viele Menschen haben da nicht nur Ängste, sondern die spüren auch bei sich persönlich ein Unbehagen, ja?“ (in the debate against Faymann)

but asks her whether ‘she is envious or (sexually) frustrated’¹⁹ because she mentioned that his bare upper body can be seen in one of the FPÖ’s campaign materials. In the debate against Werner Faymann, Strache tells his opponent that ‘his program, like his voice, is hollow and shallow’²⁰, additionally Faymann is told that he is ‘too hectic’ and ‘should calm down’, that he ‘failed and is ridiculous’, ‘under self-hypnosis’, that he is a ‘puppet of companies and banks’, that ‘the economy is well – despite Faymann’ and also telling Faymann: ‘Pride comes before a fall’, followed by ‘I think you have already fallen’. About Spindelegger, Strache says that he ‘toadies to the EU’²¹, is a ‘Duracell-bunny’, and that he is ‘not only a stopgap’, directly translated to German that would be “*Notlösung*”, emergency solution, adding ‘more emergency than solution’²². In the parliamentary debates Faymann is called a ‘coward’, renamed to ‘Werner Coward-man’ (“*Feigmann*”) who ‘breaks all his promise’s, ‘produces bluff packages’ (“*Mogelpackungen*”) and ‘misappropriates money’. Peter Pilz is said to be ‘blind on the left eye’ not seeing the ‘moral rottenness of Social Democracy’. A similar tone can be found in the party congress speech: both SPÖ and ÖVP were losers of the election and ‘chained themselves together again, still stupidly excluding the FPÖ’²³. Both Faymann and Spindelegger are said to be ‘without courage and lying’ (about the budget problems that are addressed in the TV debates), Strache demands new elections (not even three months after the election) because the FPÖ ‘would win new elections’. They won votes in the election despite ‘artificial new competitors’ that were there to paralyze the FPÖ. The technocratic ‘good manners’ are outweighed by the populist statements, more fact-based is the debate between Strache and Glawischnig. There are some topics that the FPÖ and Heinz-Christian Strache like to emphasize in all channels, like that they are for a minimum pension for Austrians, for fighting poverty with education, against corruption (especially in the SPÖ-The Greens dominated Vienna) and for reliefs for employees and workers. Strache says he is ‘pro-European but against a centralist construct’ and certainly against the currency Euro. In the TV debates, Strache pleads for a better conversation culture and complains often about the bad style the others have.

Whereas the governmental parties showed a clear tendency to emphasize stability over the populist crisis, the FPÖ does the reverse. The narrative *crisis* can be found in all channels and

¹⁹ „Sind Sie neidig oder frustriert, Frau Glawischnig?“

²⁰ „Also Ihre Stimme ist teilweise so hohl und so seicht, wie das Programm, das Sie vertreten“

²¹ „Nein. Ich sehe nur, dass man unter dem Teppich nach Brüssel hineinkriecht und letztlich das, was dort vorgegeben wird als EU-Sektierer automatisch übernimmt zum Nachteil der eigenen Bevölkerung“

²² „...sind ja auch Sie, sowie Josef Pröll, eine Notlösung. Mehr Not als Lösung wahrscheinlich...“

²³ „...setzt seine dummliche Ausgrenzung fort...“

ranges over different topics, e.g. the Greens are ‘destroying the economy’ and creating a ‘subvention disaster’ in the Austrian capital Vienna. But the main story is the government and its failure concerning budgets, scandals, asylum seekers and asylum misuse, the ESM, an unemployment high and workers from Eastern Europe – everything was ‘stirred in a negative direction by Faymann and Spindelegger’²⁴. *Stability* as one of the technocratic characteristics is almost never used in any channel, with the exception of Strache’s party congress speech. In this speech, Strache highlights his own accomplishments since becoming leader of the FPÖ. Gaining women as voters is presented as a big progress as well as the continuity and dependability that the FPÖ represents since Strache has become its leader.

The Greens

As has been mentioned above, the opposition party the Greens had a good standing in the polls in 2013. It was the first election with Eva Glawischnig as party leader and she was the only female top candidate of all parties in the race. The political style used by the party and Eva Glawischnig was overall more populist than technocratic, but more balanced than the ÖVP and the FPÖ. As can be seen in table 8, The Greens conjure crisis more often than stability, they appeal more often to ‘the people’ than to expertise, but the ‘good manners’ statements are used more frequently than ‘bad mannered’ ones. The only time when there is a surplus of ‘bad manners’ is the party congress speech of Eva Glawischnig.

²⁴ „Ein Faymann und ein Spindelegger haben unser Land in allen Bereichen, in negative Richtungen geführt“.

Table 8: Comparing the Greens' dominant (populist or technocratic) features across communication channels

	press releases	party congress speech	parliamentary speeches (Musiol/Kogler)	TV debates: Glawischnig against		
				Spindelegger	Strache	Faymann
Appeals to						
the people	X	X	X	X	X	X
expertise						
Mannerism						
bad manners	even	X				
good manners	even		X	X	X	X
Mediation of the social						
crisis	X	Not mentioned	X	Not mentioned		X
stability		Not mentioned		Not mentioned	X	

All appeals to 'the people' combined show that the most frequently used appeals are to 'the people' ((*die*) *Menschen*; (*die*) *Leute*), to 'young people' and 'kids' ((*die*) *Kinder*; (*die*) *Jugendlichen*; *die jungen Leute*) and to 'families' and 'parents' ((*die*) *Eltern*, (*moderne*) *Familien*). In the populist category *anti-elitism*, the Greens criticize the SPÖ-ÖVP government (their inactivity in the education policy, their inability to close the pay-gap between men and women, their 'success' in being 'world champion in corruption'). The Greens criticize the tone that the governing parties use, that they 'do not keep their promises' and when Spindelegger calls Faymann a 'chancellor of lies' ("*Lügenkanzler*") that is 'unacceptable' for coalition partners. The ÖVP is criticized specifically concerning the 'bribe carousel' ("*Schmiergeldkarussell*") that includes banks and gaming corporations and the network operator Telekom. Banks are a big part of the anti-elitist statements concerning corruption and bribery. Furthermore, all the other parties are criticized due to their violations of the new law on political parties, matching the Greens's 2013 slogan about 'clean politics' ("*Saubere Politik*"). The technocratic *appeal to expertise* is hardly ever used by Eva Glawischnig and the Greens. In the party congress speech, there are a lot of 'experts' against corruption mentioned, Ute Bock, a supporter of people who had to flee their country, Heini Staudinger, an entrepreneur and activist, Global 2000, an environmentalist group, as well as party internal 'revealers' ("*Aufdecker*") like Gabi Moser and Peter Pilz. In other cases, Glawischnig refers to the juris-

diction (state prosecutors, court of auditors), economists, the EU and one of its key players, Angela Merkel.

Many statements in the ‘*bad manners*’ category are directed towards the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition. Topics are the termination of committees of inquiry and the coalition’s political ‘trench-warfare’. Another ‘shady’ (“*anzupfig*”) topic that is discussed in the parliamentary debates is the ‘buying of laws’ by the Telekom and the ÖVP. The Greens say that ‘bribery and fictitious invoices’ should lead to resignations in the ÖVP. The press releases contain elements of pathos, an emotional ad, ‘Clean environment. Clean politics’ to ‘break the red-black majority’ is featured as well as the ‘democracy refusal’ (“*Demokratieverweigerung*”) by Faymann and Spindelegger. The party congress speech is also full of pathos: Glawischnig tells her ‘friends’ to stay morally strong, to ‘fight for the Austrians’ and against bailing out the banks (“*Bankenrettung*”) and speaks a lot about incorruptibility (giving both internal and external examples). There are anecdotes about Glawischnig’s children in the mix and attacks against former ÖVP-FPÖ coalitions both on the regional (Carinthia) and national level, against the Eurofighter bribery, and against ex-FPÖ politicians due to their convictions. The TV debate with the most attacks is the one against Strache, ranging from topics like the Hypo scandal to the FPÖ’s time in government. Glawischnig criticizes a brochure for political education with 15 photos of Strache in it and accuses him that the Carinthian subparty FPK took money from the Telekom. Strache has a problem with the truth – ‘the worst enemy are not the Greens but the truth’. There are other pathos-elements in that debate: Glawischnig is fighting for the environment: ‘being in the black with green ideas’. It is ‘the Greens’ role in the world to help not only Austrians but all the people’. The debate with Faymann on the other hand focuses on committees of inquiry in that category. Glawischnig demands changes after the government’s ‘destruction of money’, her goal is a ‘transparent state’ (“*gläserner Staat*”). The SPÖ is said to be ‘just about slogans but never action’, ‘doing ÖVP politics’. Against Spindelegger, Glawischnig focuses on anti-corruption and social justice, the ÖVP stance on anti-corruption laws is ‘careless and extremely irresponsible’, repeating the accusation of ‘buying of laws’, and emphasizing that the banks committee of inquiry could have ‘prevented damage’. According to Glawischnig, committees of inquiry help against corruption that consumes the future – it is not ‘pleasure and fun’ (“*Lust und Gaudi*”) to inquire. The category ‘*good manners*’ is used across all channels to emphasize the campaign motto ‘Clean Environment, clean politics’ and the right for parliamentary minorities to establish a committee of inquiry is prominent everywhere. More democracy and less corruption as well as less illegal party financing are topics, others are education reforms, coalitions in the regional parliaments with Green participation

and advocating for a positive style in politics. All the channels have more ‘*good manners*’ than ‘*bad manners*’, except the party congress speech, which has slightly more populist statements.

As previously mentioned, the populist category *crisis* is used when talking about the failures of the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition, like its termination of the banks committee of inquiry that resulted in ‘the mother of all billion major losses’ (“*Mutter aller Milliardengrößschäden*”) or ‘the biggest financial gap in the history of the Second Republic’ (“*...das größte Finanzloch in der Zweiten Republik*”) and the overall budget situation. In addition, the way the coalition functions is criticized, the Greens plead against their ‘dispute and standstill’-politics. The technocratic emphasis on *stability* is almost never used. In the rare cases that it is used, Eva Glawischnig emphasizes the good work of the Greens who are part of a regional government not only in Upper Austria and Vienna.

Summarizing the findings of the analysis concerning the non-mainstream parties, both parties have a surplus of populist statements in their communication. Hypothesis H2b can be confirmed, the FPÖ emphasizes populist elements in all categories across all channels. The Green party and its leader Eva Glawischnig are more populist than technocratic but to a lesser degree than the FPÖ. As can be seen in table 8, the Greens use more populist elements in their communication than technocratic ones. In comparison with the ÖVP, which emphasizes stability, the Greens mediate crisis, but they have more ‘good mannered’ statements than the ÖVP.

4.2.3 Comparing the mainstream and non-mainstream parties

In this section the results of the analysis are summarized. The first set of hypotheses tested for differences in the use of technocratic and populist elements across communication channels. The first hypothesis (H1a) presumed that internal communication channels are more populist than external channels, which was true for all party congress speeches analyzed. The second hypothesis (H1b) was about the formality of the channels. The more formal channels were not more technocratic than the informal one and the hypothesis therefore must be rejected. The more in depth analysis of the differences across parties yielded interesting findings. The third hypothesis (H2a) tested for the political style of mainstream parties and found that there are inter-party differences, leading to the rejection of the hypothesis. Whereas the Social Demo-

cratic SPÖ was overall more technocratic than populist, the People's Party ÖVP had more populist statements than technocratic ones. However, there were similarities like the emphasis on stability in the category *mediation of the social*. The non-mainstream parties were the focus of the fourth and last hypothesis (H2b). The hypothesis was confirmed since both parties, the FPÖ and the Greens, were predominantly populist, but the Greens were, similar to the ÖVP, much closer to the technocratic pole than the FPÖ.

5 Conclusio

This thesis wanted to answer “*how political parties use elements of populist and technocratic styles, which elements the parties use in different communication channels and which elements are used by different parties*”. Considering the critique voiced by some researchers (e.g. Aslanidis, 2015), the theoretical basis of this thesis was not populism as an ideology, but a gradual approach to populism. Rooduijn, de Lange and van der Brug (2014) found that populists vary in the use of populist elements in party manifestos. The qualitative text analysis in this thesis shows, that it also fruitful to look at more than one communication channel. The populist FPÖ has a surprisingly high number of technocratic statements in Heinz-Christian Strache’s party congress speech. All parties that were analyzed, use populist elements in their party communication but they all use technocratic elements too, reinforcing the use of a graded populism theory and the more differentiating approach of the political style. Following Moffitt and Tormey (2014) and (2016), the political style ranges from populism to technocracy. The trends that were uncovered in this thesis both confirm and reject previous findings. The political parties tone the populism up or down, depending on the formality or informality and the inwardness or outwardness of the channel they are using. According to Mudde (2000: 21) parties may show their “true nature” in internally directed media. This thesis found that internal communication channels (the empirical part of this thesis included party congress speeches held by the leaders of the ÖVP, FPÖ and the Greens) are more populist than external channels. The formality of the communication channels did not affect the political style in the way that was expected. More formality in a channel does not lead to more technocracy. In the TV debates, populist and technocratic elements were more evenly distributed, but not in the other formal channel, the parliamentary debates, which was more populist than technocratic. The findings on the individual party level are both expected and unexpected. The results for the FPÖ are as expected, their results are overall the most populist and never do their technocratic statements outweigh the populist ones. The Greens are more populist than technocratic, even though they are closer to the technocratic SPÖ than to the populist FPÖ. This is in accordance with Winder’s (2012) findings, who finds that the non-mainstream parties use more populist statements than the mainstream parties. The mainstream parties’ communication analyzed in the empirical part of this thesis shows more differentiated results than expected, the mainstream left party, the SPÖ, is technocratic, whereas the mainstream right party, the ÖVP, is in comparison more populist. The latter relies more on ‘bad manners’ than on ‘good man-

ners' whereas the opposite is true for the SPÖ. Both parties do emphasize the appeal to 'the people' (populist characteristic) and the mediation of stability (technocratic).

One limitation of the conducted analysis is that the texts vary significantly in length. Therefore, it is not possible to compare the different channels directly with each other. The party congress speeches were held during a period ranging from 2011 (two years prior to the election) to 2013 (after the election). The different length of the text bases on the one hand and the absence of other texts (SPÖ: Werner Faymann's party congress speech) make more meaningful statements impossible. The analysis did however reveal some interesting facts and gave a first overview of the tendencies of the political style in Austrian political parties' communication and could function as the basis of further analyses. These could also elaborate the technocratic political style further, as the concept is still theoretically underdeveloped.

The qualitative, more in-depth approach applied in this thesis, could be extended with the use of an automated, quantitative content analysis. One example for a quantitative analysis of the political style was conducted by Bossetta (2016) who used R packages (that are only available in English at the moment and cannot be used for texts written in other languages). This way, a much bigger sample of texts could be included in the analysis. Interesting facts that could then be considered would be changes in the use of technocracy and populism over time. What are the differences between election times and non-election times and does that influence the use of populist and technocratic elements in different party channels? The party congress speeches were either well before the election or after the election and showed a surplus of populist statements, maybe due to the directness to 'the people'. Another factor that might influence the political style is the status of a party, government vs. opposition, and how this changes the use of populism and technocracy. A comparative approach including more than one country would be interesting that includes a left-populist party. Or an analysis that includes other or more channels, like social media, that are even more directly targeted at 'the people'.

Further analyses of the Austrian case could also be of interest. The results of the analysis show that Heinz-Christian Strache is least populist in the TV debate against Eva Glawischnig and that raises some questions. Is it because she is a woman, or because she is the leader of an opposition party? The next election in Austria will be held in the autumn of 2017 and the only political actor that is still party leader, and was part of the analysis in this thesis, is Heinz-Christian Strache. Werner Faymann was replaced by the charismatic Christian Kern, Michael Spindelegger was replaced by Reinhold Mitterlehner who himself was replaced by the young ÖVP 'star' Sebastian Kurz (as Spindelegger said in his party congress speech: "It is truly not

easy to be party leader of the ÖVP”), and the Green candidate Eva Glawischnig stepped down and was replaced by a dual leadership. The three charismatic men Kern-Kurz-Strache and other changes in the party system will make the election campaign of 2017 even more interesting to study under stylistic aspects.

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7 Appendix

7.1 Supplementary Material

Table 9: Overview of the text bases

Format	Sprecher/Aussender	Zeitraum
Austrian broadcasting corporation “Konfrontationen Wahl 13“	Heinz-Christian Strache – Eva Glawischnig	29.08.2013, 20.15
	Werner Faymann – Eva Glawischnig	09.09.2013, 20.15
	Michael Spindelegger – Heinz-Christian Strache	09.09.2013, 21.05
	Michael Spindelegger – Eva Glawischnig	17.09.2013, 20:15
	Werner Faymann – Heinz-Christian Strache	17.09.2013, 21:05
	Werner Faymann - Michael Spindelegger	24.09.2013, 20:15
Press releases APA OTS*	SPÖ press service ÖVP federal party management FPÖ Freedom party parliamentary group Die Grünen	15.09 - 29.09.2013
Parliamentary debates	Josef Cap	217 th session of the <i>Nationalrat</i> , 17.09.2013
	Karlheinz Kopf	
	Herbert Kickl	
	Daniela Musiol	219 th session of the <i>Nationalrat</i> , 25.09.2013
	Josef Cap	
	Karlheinz Kopf	
Party congress speeches	Heinz-Christian Strache	
	Werner Kogler	
	Michael Spindelegger	13.05.2011
	Heinz-Christian Strache	07.12.2013
	Eva Glawischnig	01.12.2012

*the most federal sender was chosen

7.2 Abstracts

English abstract

This thesis examines the use of populism and technocracy in political parties' communication channels. It considers populism and technocracy as political styles actors can use to mobilize their supporters. Populism is defined by the appeal to the people, the use of bad manners and the mediation of crisis, whereas technocrats appeal to expertise, use good manners and mediate stability. The communication of Austrian mainstream and non-mainstream parties in advance of the Austrian national elections 2013 is analyzed, formal and informal as well as internal and external channels (namely TV debates, press releases, parliamentary debates and party congress speeches) were included. The qualitative text analysis shows that all parties use both populist and technocratic elements, to a varying degree, across all communication channels.

German Abstract

Die Verwendung von Populismus und Technokratie in Kommunikationskanälen politischer Parteien werden in dieser Masterarbeit untersucht. Populismus und Technokratie sind politische Stile, die AkteurInnen anwenden können um ihre BefürworterInnen zu mobilisieren. Populismus zeichnet sich durch den Appell an die Menschen, schlechtes Benehmen und die Vermittlung von Krise aus. Technokraten appellieren an Expertise, zeigen gutes Benehmen und vermitteln Stabilität. Die Kommunikation von österreichischen Parteien vor der Nationalratswahl 2013 wird analysiert, formelle und informelle sowie interne und externe Kommunikationskanäle (TV Debatten, Presseaussendungen, Parlamentsdebatten und Parteitagsreden) wurden einbezogen. Die qualitative Inhaltsanalyse zeigt, dass alle Parteien über alle Kommunikationskanäle hinweg in unterschiedlichem Maße populistische und technokratische Elemente anwenden.