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Precarious Privilege

An Ethnography of Early-Career Academics

in the Neoliberalised University

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1 Introduction

This thesis asks what it means to be an early-career academic – a category that I consider to range from PhD candidates to temporarily employed Postdocs (including assistant professors) – in today's university, i.e. how their work is shaped by the policy and institutional context in which it unfolds and how they experience these conditions. As they are the ones most affected by the consequences of recent neoliberal university reforms, both because of their liminal and vulnerable position as well as the simple fact that their work contracts do not predate these reforms, the tensions and challenges universities and those academics working in/for them face become particularly visible through their case.

The answers that I develop in this thesis are ambiguous. On the one hand, a PhD degree is one of the highest academic degrees universities – the institutional emblem of higher education and academic freedom – offer, reserved in most OECD member countries for approximately one percent of the population (OECD 2016: 41) and the entrance ticket for an academic career. As it is not only likely to entail symbolic but economic benefits as well (cf. ibid.: 149f., ESF 2015: 19–21, AbsolventInnen-Tracking der Universität Wien[1]), it understandably carries with it a nimbus of being an exclusive privilege – even more so if the PhD education entails full-time employment for three years and is received from "the best anthropology[2] department in Scandinavia and number two in Continental Europe"[3] based at the University of Copenhagen, that together with its counterpart at the University of Vienna constitutes the empirical basis of this thesis. Accordingly, PhD candidates at the Department of Anthropology in Copenhagen are regularly reminded of that privilege – as well as the responsibilities it entails. For instance, at a one-day introductory course for PhD candidates at the Faculty of Social Sciences they were told by a leading representative of the Graduate School that they should "be happy that you can spend most of your time doing research" as they would "not have this much freedom again when you get a research position" – just after they had been told that they were expected to teach, disseminate their research and establish networks (both within and beyond academia), participate in the working life of their department as well as collaborate across departments and even faculties, visit a foreign university and/or do fieldwork trips for two to twelve months – and, of course, finish on time. In line with this, they were reminded in their department that although they were privileged to have three years to focus on a topic, these three years would pass quickly – and they had better not exceed that time limit. Therefore, they should work off the 840 hours of work they owe the department (of which 420 hours are allocated for fieldwork) as soon as possible while doing the obligatory course work (totalling 30 ECTS points corresponding to six months of studies), conducting fieldwork (of a standard duration of eight to twelve months), be an active

[1] See <https://www.uniport.at/absolventInnentracking2011> (accessed 18 September 2017).
[2] When using the term "anthropology", I refer to the discipline of social (and cultural) anthropology.
[3] See <http://antropologi.ku.dk/ominstituttet/Nyheder/anthropology-in-copenhagen-ranked-16-in-the-world/> (accessed 18 September 2017).

part of the department by attending meetings, research seminars and researcher groups – and have some publications (at least in the pipeline) when they finish. Considering this, it is not surprising that a PhD candidate left the one-day introductory course mentioned above with the impression that "it was so absurd that at the introductory day they repeated so many times throughout that day: 'These are going to be the best three years of your life', while they were listing all this stuff that we had to do." Although her[4] colleagues at the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Vienna do not face the same pressure to finish on time, they are confronted with similar expectations to perform at a decidedly high level – while receiving less remuneration for their efforts. In fact, the pressures to live up to the high demands accompanying their (supposedly) privileged positions were experienced by some PhD candidates at both departments as so burdensome that they reported of having nightmares of being stoned to death at a department meeting for secretly considering quitting or of being unexpectedly called to defend their thesis, trying to run away but being dragged back by the department's staff again and again. In addition, these performance pressures are coupled with precarious working conditions (especially in Vienna) as well as insecure career prospects.

These factors constitute the other side of the privilege of being an early-career academic – and do not end once they finally manage to finish their PhD education. As a Postdoc in Vienna aptly summarised in an e-mail, addressing the difference between temporarily employed (early-career) academics and permanently employed professors:

> It is somewhat tragic: Either you are in a constant state of insecurity and overload but creative and free – or you are safe, still constantly overworked and you basically don't do research anymore. It's actually a non-choice situation.

Correspondingly, a Postdoc at the department in Copenhagen explained to me in an e-mail:

> Btw. I've been wanting to tell you… I think at the time when you interviewed me I was still a bit in the clouds about having acquired the job […] etc. These days the neoliberal pressure on jumping hoops to fit into this or that grant scheme or next job application is really depressing me – so much time necessarily wasted that could have been spent on useful research & writing instead. Plus this atmosphere of competition (even though none of us likes it, it is a structural reality), vulnerability to student evaluations (jeez, I need to send these things in for job applications while some student in a rage wrote I was "the worst lecturer ever" on it… just great :-([…] And then the surprise of meeting […] who introduces herself as having been hired "to bring the department closer to the business community" (!). But […] I have no idea how to organise against any of this – I don't even have the opportunity to socialise and talk about it (which I guess would need to be step one).

Along similar lines, one of her colleagues sent the following e-mail to the department's PhD candidates and Postdocs:

> My dear young friends,
> Two weeks ago, there were not so very many of you at the seminar and fewer yet at the post-seminar drinks. We were unmanned and lonely and sad. Several people said I should write to you all, once more, to stress how important it is for your development as anthropologists and for your careers that you attend these things. […]

[4] For reasons of anonymisation I only use the female form when referring to or quoting from the subjects of my research.

> Anyway, I was all set to write you just such an encouraging email, but then the rector announced a hiring-freeze, all the money from FKK is going to the Innovationsfondet where projects have to contribute to the Danish labour market, and on the way to work, I saw a small, dying bird.
> There is no hope for any of us. We will all end up doing soul-destroying robotic piece-work for consultancy companies (if we are lucky), we will not have time to see our children grow, and the planet will burn around us.
> There is no hope. You should come to the seminar and for a beer afterwards, because this might be the last chance you have in your entire life to do something that is both futile and interesting. The devotion to futile and interesting things is what makes us human.
> Revel in your humanity! Come for a beer!

Of course these are snap-shots that only point to a part of academic life. Not all aspects of academic work are depressing: there is joy alongside struggle, academics do have families (and manage to spend time with them) and there is much to be said for bringing the academic and the non-academic labour markets together. However, these statements are more than personal sensitivities. They are indicative of structural tensions that universities and with them the academic profession are subjected to in the form of an increasing number of (partly contradictory) demands and working conditions that are characterised by notions of academic freedom, a (traditionally) "greedy" work ethic, the intensifying imperatives of competition and productivity as well as progressive precarisation that draw early-career academics into committedly pursuing an academic career while simultaneously preventing them from making it a permanent occupation. As Barcan (2013) puts it:

> It is […] the case that the pleasures and privileges of academic life continue, even if they are rather more precarious than was once the case and are unevenly distributed across the academic workforce. But in recognizing this dynamism, we must take care not to downplay some of the very real structural and ideological changes of the last few decades, and the intimate experience of the people who have been at the forefront of those changes. (ibid.: 5)

In order to understand how this ambiguous situation fraught with conflicting conceptions and demands reflected in the quotes above (1) comes about and (2) unfolds in the working lives of early-career academics I venture far afield in an attempt to link the policy, institutional and individual levels of these dynamics. In other words, this thesis intends to be a critique of (the impact of) recent "neoliberal" university reforms that aims to "connect up the big picture of the last few decades with some of the lived experiences in a contemporary university" (Barcan 2013: 13) – without nostalgically defending the previous state of university governance and life. In order to be able to capture these transformations and deepen my description of them, I supplement my analysis with a historical as well as regional comparative perspective, comparing the working conditions of early-career anthropologists in Vienna and Copenhagen to those experienced by their predecessors (although concentrating on their present situation). Such an endeavour leaves one with the difficult choice of whether to focus on similarities or differences, as neoliberal university reforms appear to be surprisingly similar in their rhetoric, intentions and instruments across countries – whereas their implementation and consequences do not necessarily share that similarity (cf. Boyer 2010b: 74, DiGiacomo 2005: 63, Etzkowitz et al. 2000: 313, Greenwood 2007: 97, Scott 2010: 83, Shore and McLauchlan 2012b: 298, Rata 2010: 77). I pay

attention to both perspectives, focussing on similarities in the structural tensions, pressures and insecurities resulting from recent transformations that are clearly discernible at both universities while also pointing out variations in their local specificities.

To that end, this thesis is divided into two parts. Part one discusses neoliberal processes of the economisation of universities and academic work more generally on a macro-, meso- and micro-level, i.e. with regard to their political economy, their organisation/institutional forms and the subjectivities they produce. In need of designating the general thrust of these complex and profound transformations, I use the term "neoliberal" as an umbrella term for a variety of phenomena affecting the contemporary state of universities that have their economisation, both with regard to their missions (that are extended by the "third mission" of generating income and economic development) as well as to their organisational structures and culture (that are reshaped according to the image of corporations), in common. Chapter 2 gives an introduction to traditional features of university life and academic work predating the neoliberalised university, such as notions of academic freedom, the fact that academic exchange follows the logic of a gift economy (thereby binding the academic community together by mutual obligations) and a vocational work ethic involving working long hours (irrespective of payment) and neglecting other (social) obligations. Chapter 3 describes the broader societal context for the transformation of university life and academic work. While chapter 3.1 discusses analytical approaches to the neoliberalisation of societies (elaborating on approaches based on the work of Bourdieu and Foucault), chapter 3.2 addresses the post-Fordist reorganisation of work (drawing on the concept of a projective city, among other things) and chapter 3.3 the instrumentalisation of academic work for political and economic ends in the "knowledge economy" (resorting *inter alia* to the concepts of Mode 2 Science and the Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations). Chapter 4 analyses how these developments impact universities and those academics working in them, blurring the boundaries between traditional universities and enterprises. First, chapters 4.1 to 4.3 introduce three alternative narratives explaining the contemporary transformation of universities: their underfunded massification, their increasing differentiation and their internationalisation/globalisation. Chapter 4.4 shows how universities are increasingly expected to earn/compete for money and generate economic growth (referring to the concepts of academic capitalism and the third mission), thereby being subjected to a market logic. At the same time, managerial logics run increasingly rampant within them, causing the managerialisation/ industrialisation of academic work – as is explained in chapter 4.5 (by drawing on concepts like managerialism, New Public Management and audit cultures). Chapter 4.6 then outlines how these developments on the macro- and meso-level of university governance affect the subjectivities of academics, constituting them as continuously self-optimising, entrepreneurial, flexible and auditable selves. Finally, chapter 5 concludes the first part of this thesis by revealing how the contemporary university combines traditional notions and structures of academic work with new, neoliberal demands and instruments – leaving it a fragmented, schizophrenic entity.

Part two focuses on the tensions and conflicts created by the developments discussed in part one for individual (early-career) academics. Those who are looking for the ethnography prom-

ised in the title of this thesis will find it there. Chapter 6 gives an overview of my empirical material, explains how I generated and analysed it and elaborates on my positionality as a researcher who is part of his field, my strategy for anonymising my interlocutors as well as its consequences and how I approach the comparative aspects of my research. Chapter 70 introduces my field sites, the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Vienna and the Department of Anthropology at the University of Copenhagen, moving from the policy level through the departmental level to the level of the working conditions of individual early-career anthropologists, pointing out differences between those two sites as well as between the early-career anthropologists at those two sites. Subsequently, chapters 8 and 9 elaborate on two fundamental tensions that early-career anthropologists face: Chapter 8 discusses how the pursuit of an academic career – based on and legitimised by a (questionable) discourse of meritocracy – turns into an increasingly competitive endeavour that leads people to inflate academic achievements (thereby intensifying productivity pressures as well as insecure career perspectives) while they also depend on the good will of and collaboration with their colleagues who are simultaneously their (potential) evaluators and/or competitors. Chapter 9 then picks up the thesis' eponymous tension, arguing that being an early-career anthropologist in today's university is not as privileged a position as may be assumed, with expectations of a high work commitment and a high workload alongside comparatively little pay, highly uncertain career prospects (within as well as outside of academia) and pressures to be (repeatedly) international mobile – precarious insecurities, uncertainties and demands that are aggravated by the fact that early-career academics can structurally never know whether they are performing well enough for their efforts to one day pay off in the form of a permanent, (relatively) secure academic job. Therefore, chapter 10 concludes that the intensification of competition, performance and mobility pressures on the one hand and of career insecurities on the other hand creates an imperative of continuous self-optimisation while leaving early-career academics (economically and socially) vulnerable and at the mercy of an already greedy occupation, prone to being exploited by their superiors and themselves.

A final introductory remark appears to be in order. Some may (rightly) argue that one should be careful with denouncing the working conditions of (early-career) academics as precarious just because they have been flexibilised, particularly when considering precarious working conditions in other lines of work. However, firstly there are those – and their numbers are significant and growing – who struggle to earn their living with the pay they receive for their academic work – a pay that is without doubt very low considering their work efforts. Secondly,

> [t]o pre-empt the further criticism that it is in bad taste to complain about any type of academic labour when it remains so privileged compared to the precariousness, boredom or danger of so many workplaces, I can rejoin only by saying that this claim effectively condemns academics to silence about major changes to a fundamental social institution. To analyse lamentable change in one sector does not mean one cannot see injustices in another. (Barcan 2013: 71, cf. Gill 2010: 242)

Having said that, I begin my exploration of the conditions of academic work today by showing how the idea and organisation of the university have changed over the last three to four decades.

PART ONE: IVORY TOWERS
IN A NEOLIBERAL KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY

The first part of this thesis elaborates on neoliberal processes of transformations that universities (and those working in them) currently face, both on a macro- (regarding their political economy) and a meso-level (regarding their institutional form), thereby setting the scene for the discussion of individual experiences that the second part focuses on. Talking about the neoliberal transformation of academia is a complex endeavour for at least four reasons: (1) the related analytical conceptions also comprise of normative facets and are as ambiguous as they are contested[5]; (2) neoliberal rationalities may manifest themselves differently on the macro- and meso-level[6]; (3) there is no single process shaping contemporary university life, but rather an amalgam of interrelated developments[7]; (4) a description of a transformation requires referring to a pre-transformative state, with such an (at least implicitly historical) comparison running the risk of producing over-generalising ideal types[8]. Although I do acknowledge these problematics for an adequate theorisation, I am convinced of the importance of attempting one in order to designate a range of phenomena that are crucial to the contemporary transformation of academic work and organisations.

2 Prologue: Traditional Features of the Academic Profession

When analysing how the institutional conditions of the academic profession have changed, one question arises immediately: What serves as a backdrop for its "neoliberal" transformation? More specifically: What are the characteristics of the predecessor of the "neoliberal university"? After all, the history of universities spans nine centuries respectively about 550 to 650 years in the case of the universities that set the stage for the empirical story I will tell in the second part of this thesis – a period over which university life has taken different shapes. Barcan (2013: 13,

[5] For instance, Boyer (2010a) reminds us that perhaps "the worst injustice critical scholarship does to itself these days is to begin with categories like 'capitalism' and 'neoliberalism' which, however useful and necessary glosses they are for narrative purposes, are analytically dangerous in that they bestow an undeserved systematicity upon current trends and relations" (ibid.: 80).

[6] Adding notions like managerialism or audit societies/cultures to the analytical picture that stress illiberal rather than neoliberal elements. These theoretical conceptualisations do not stand clearly delimited from each other but rather address related phenomena from different angles.

[7] Ranging from massification over differentiation to internationalisation/globalisation and economisation/marketization (cf. Barcan 2013: 6)

[8] For example, Münch (2011: 32) admits that his analysis of academic capitalism might sometimes appear exaggerated – and I agree with him, particularly when he contrasts a modern academic field untainted by external influences and loyal to its own cause (as I will admittedly also do in the next chapter) with a postmodern academic field colonised and perverted by economic interests (cf. ibid.: 70f.).

cf. 72) for example identifies three historical formations of the university: a scholarly society, a bureaucracy and a corporation. Along similar lines, Scott and Harding (2007: 20) distinguish three forms of university governance: by state (the pre-Humboldtian university), familial (the Humboldtian university) and by a quasi-market (the modern centrally managed, corporate university). Readings (1996), on the other hand, proposes a historical sequence of three ideas that inform the role of the modern university: "the Kantian concept of reason, the Humboldtian idea of culture, and now the techno-bureaucratic notion of excellence" (ibid.: 14). In order to point out "neoliberal" elements of contemporary university governance and academic work, I outline (in an ideal-typical manner) some of its "traditional" features, i.e. working conditions that previous generations of academics (that serve as a point of reference for current early-career academics) encountered. It is important to note that these features are not "dead" artefacts of a time long past, i.e. their occurrence is not mutually exclusive with more contemporary, "neoliberal" aspects that the chapters 3 and 4 elaborates on. On the contrary, this thesis argues that it is their interweaving that defines the contemporary university.

2.1 Academic Freedom

The backdrop for the neoliberalisation of academia is the *autonomous academic field* characterised by an academic interest that is according to Bourdieu (1998b: 27) anti-economic, i.e. unlike conventional interests impartial and disinterested, and characterised by the search for truth, i.e. "objectified reality" (cf. ibid.: 31) as well as "values of disinterestedness, magnanimity and indifference to the sanctions and demands of practice" (Bourdieu 1988: 124). Thus, neither the stakes nor the objectives are the same in the academic and the economic field (Bourdieu 1998b: 47).[9] In fact, in the course of the industrial revolution professionals – with faculty being paramount professionals (Slaughter and Leslie 1997: 5) – had

> negotiated a tacit social contract with the community at large, in which they received monopolies of practice in return for disinterestedly serving the public good (Furner 1975; Bledstein 1976; Haskell 1977). The very concept of professional turned on the practitioner eschewing market rewards in return for a monopoly of practice. […] They did not seek to maximize profits; they claimed to put the interests of client and community first. (ibid.: 4)

Of course, academics do have interests: they want to be the best – but according to the logic of their field (Bourdieu 1998b: 30). The autonomous academic field can be defined by its pursuit of – if not *critical*, then at least – *theoretical* research (i.e. basic, pure, blue-skies, fundamental, generic, curiosity-based/-driven respectively disinterested research) which is defined by the aspect of *invention* rather than *instrumental* research (i.e. applied, application-oriented, problem-driven, strategic respectively commercial research) which is defined by the aspect of *innovation* (cf. Bourdieu 1998b: 47). This circumstance (or attitude) is well exemplified by Polanyi's (1962) comment that

[9] Accordingly, academic quality is not measured by profit. However, (Bourdieu 1998b: 30) acknowledges that the academic field is to a certain, fluctuating degree at the mercy of economic or political power – as we will see in chapters 3.3 and 4.

> [a]ny attempt at guiding scientific research towards a purpose other than its own is an attempt to deflect it from the advancement of science. […] You can kill or mutilate the advance of science, you cannot shape it: For it can advance only by essentially unpredictable steps, pursuing problems of its own, and the practical benefits of these advances will be incidental and hence doubly unpredictable. (ibid.: 62)

Although I refrain from discussing the difference of those two ideal types of research when it comes to practice, I am convinced that there is a fundamental difference between them that goes beyond rhetoric.[10] Traditional science is not about delivering simple and swift solutions to problems defined by others outside of the academic field, i.e. it is motivated by the pursuit of new questions rather than definite answers. In this respect, Weber (2008) is anxious to demarcate the academic endeavour of "science for science's sake" (ibid.: 34) from economic or political endeavours, emphasising that "the prophet and the demagogue have no place at the lectern in the lecture hall" (ibid.: 42) within which "no other virtue exists but plain intellectual integrity" (ibid.: 52).

Put simply: Academics are to pursue the truth (if not an ultimate one, then at least an intersubjective one) rather than power or profit. Hence, if science is a good at all, it is a public good oriented towards the common good (cf. Münch 2011: 349). Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) designate such a social environment/mode of university governance as a public good knowledge/learning regime.

> The public good knowledge regime was characterized by valuing knowledge as a public good to which the citizenry has claims. […] The public good knowledge/learning regime paid heed to academic freedom, which honored professors' right to follow research where it led and gave professors rights to dispose of discoveries as they saw fit (Merton 1942). The cornerstone of the public good knowledge regime was basic science that led to discovery of new knowledge within the academic disciplines, serendipitously leading to public benefits. (ibid.: 28)[11]

This observation corresponds with that of Ferlie et al. (2008) who claim that a first organising concept of higher education public policies "is strongly related to the Mertonian sociology of sciences which considers that the role of the state, if any, is to ensure the autonomy of higher

[10] Notwithstanding that their borders are (being) blurred in a twofold respect, as they cannot be clearly separated in academic practice and are also actively dismantled by ideological claims as shown in chapter 3.3. Even the OECD (2015b), a promotor of the knowledge economy, distinguishes between three forms of research, defining basic research as "experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundations of phenomena and observable facts, without any particular application or use in view" (ibid.: 45). In contrast, applied research is "original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge. It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific, practical aim or objective" (ibid.: 45). Finally, it uses a third category of research, that of experimental development meaning the "systematic work, drawing on knowledge gained from research and practical experience and producing additional knowledge, which is directed to producing new products or processes or to improving existing products or processes" (ibid.: 45).

[11] Later on in their book, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) elaborate on this traditional Mertonian notion of basic science: "Merton (1942) is generally regarded as offering an early and enduring formulation of scientific norms and values with his conception of science as open, communistic (later changed to communal), universal, disinterested, and characterized by a skeptical habit of mind. […] In the 1950s, and 1960s, Merton's values were compressed into 'basic' or 'fundamental' science, and the value of science was that it was 'value-free' or 'objective'." (ibid.: 76f.) Accordingly, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) point out that "Merton posited the normative structure of science in 1942 and strengthened the ideology of 'pure science.' His emphasis on universalism and scepticism was a response to a particular historical situation, the need to defend science from corruption by the Nazi doctrine of a racial basis for science and from Lysenko's attack on genetics in the Soviet Union" (ibid.: 116).

education (or science more precisely)" (ibid.: 327). Such an (idealised) account of "traditional science" resonates well with that of a "Mode 1 Science" which is characterised "by the hegemony of theoretical or, at any rate, experimental science; by an internally-driven taxonomy of disciplines; and by the autonomy of scientists and their host institutions, the universities" (Nowotny et al. 2003: 179). Hence, in Mode 1 Science

> knowledge production takes place within disciplinary boundaries; research results are communicated through institutional channels; universities are the dominant knowledge-producing institutions and research groups are relatively homogenous and institutionalized. 'Knowledge for knowledge's' sake is the dominant rationale, with less concern for the ultimate use to which science will be put or for producing socially acceptable results, and peer review is seen as the appropriate mode of quality control. (Perry and Harloe 2007: 33)

Furthermore, it corresponds with the model of a "Triple Helix II" developed by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) that consists of separate institutional spheres of the state, industry and academia "with strong borders dividing them and highly circumscribed relations among these spheres" (ibid.: 111).

The institutional counterpart of the autonomous academic field in times of social capitalism respectively a Fordist mode of production is the *scholarly-bureaucratic university* (cf. Barcan 2013) or the "traditional liberal/Humboldtian university" (Shore 2010: 28) characterised by its missions of "humanistic" education and "basic" research under the mantle of *academic freedom*. This is for instance signified by the words stemming from the Austrian constitution that greet visitors to the university building hosting the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology of the University of Vienna: "Science and its teaching are free (Art. 17 Staatsgrundgesetz 1867)" (my translation). In other words, the autonomy of academic knowledge is guaranteed by the autonomy of both universities and academics. Thus I argue that academics in the scholarly-bureaucratic university have been subject to relative little institutional control. Of course, "organisations set up relationships between people through the allocation and control of resources and rewards" (Durão and Seabra Lopes 2011: 370) and in order to be able to become an academic it is essential to become a member of a university first – but the distribution of resources and rewards was mostly carried out by non-anonymous peers (although often in a distinct hierarchical relationship).

Books have been filled discussing the notion of academic freedom, a notion that is "under constant pressure to redefine its nature, its scope, and its application" (Nelson 2010: 26). For the sake of this thesis, I will settle for noting that the concept can currently be considered to comprise three aspects: academic freedom, shared governance and tenure (ibid.: 31).[12]

> There are four important strands to academic freedom; the first is the freedom to research. This includes the right to choose the subject of study, the methodology and the ability to publish findings without interference. The second is the freedom to teach, which includes the right to determine the curriculum, the mode of teaching, means of assessment and who should be taught. The third and

[12] For an overview of the development of academic freedom see Karran (2009).

> fourth strands concern security of employment (known as academic tenure), and the right to participate in how universities are run (known as academic governance).[13]

In short, it grants academics freedom from administration and the right to self-govern their institutions, i.e. to shape and control their own work to a high degree while at the same time enjoying a high grade of financial security. With this in mind, it becomes apparent why academic freedom is under increasing threat by the managerialisation of the university (further discussed in chapter 4.5) as well as the precarisation of the academic profession that chapter 9 elaborates on. The ideal type of an academic in the scholarly-bureaucratic university is the (male) tenured professor.

> Universities have generally been granted a partial degree of autonomy from the state and society, leading to particular and distinctive forms of self-organization and self-governance. This is epitomized in the traditional image of the curiosity-driven scholar, determining his or her own research agendas, pursuing largely individualized interests, which may or may not meet those of wider society, and with far greater degrees of autonomy than most employees. (Perry and Harloe 2007: 31)

Apart from the aspect of scholarly freedom, this observation contains another feature of the organisation of academic work in the scholarly-bureaucratic university: it is pursued by the *individual* curiosity-driven scholar (situated in a patriarchal relationship with a very narrow number of assistants), not the principal investigator of a team (funded by an external entity) who is "subject to the requirement for constant, demonstrable, productivity" (Barcan 2013: 114).

A different temporality not only applies to the expected work output of academics, but to their careers as well. Bourdieu (1988: 152–156, cf. chapter 9) depicts how the scholarly-bureaucratic university offered early-career academics reasonable hope for a permanent and predictable career. In this regard, it is in line with Sennett's (2006) observation of the central role of organised time in social capitalist bureaucratic institutions.

> Time lay at the center of this military, social capitalism: long-term and incremental and above all predictable time. This bureaucratic imposition affected individuals as much as institutional regulations. Rationalized time enabled people to think about their lives as narratives – narratives not so much of what necessarily will happen as of how things should happen. It became possible, for instance, to define what the stages of a career ought to be like, to correlate long-term service in a firm to specific steps of increased wealth. […] In the flux of the real world, particularly in the flux of the business cycle, reality did not of course proceed according to plan, but now the idea of being able to plan defined the realm of individual agency and power. (ibid.: 23)

In fact, exactly those predictable career perspectives (cf. Bourdieu 1988: 153) are allowing for a "delayed gratification in the present for the sake of long-term goals" (Sennett 2006: 77) that legitimise the submissive waiting that Bourdieu puts at the heart of the process of becoming and being an academic.

> [T]he exercise of academic power presupposes […] the capacity to 'have pupils, to place them, to keep them in a relation of dependency' and thus to ensure the basis of a durable power, the fact of 'having well-placed pupils' (geographer, 1971), implies perhaps above all the art of manipulating other people's time, or, more precisely, their career rhythm, their curriculum vitae, to accelerate or defer achievements as different as success in competitive or other examinations, obtaining the doc-

[13] See <https://www.lincoln.ac.uk/home/research/researchshowcase/academicfreedom> (accessed 3 March 2016).

> torate, publishing articles or books, appointment to university posts, etc. And, as a corollary, this art […] is often exercised with the more or less conscious complicity of the postulant, thus maintained, sometimes to quite an advanced age, in the docile and submissive, even somewhat infantile, attitude which characterizes the good pupil of all eras – in Germany the thesis supervisor is called the *Doktorvater*, the 'doctor's father'. (Bourdieu 1988: 88)

This is a crucial point: academics and other employees accept dire working conditions today, because they envisage gratification tomorrow. In order for this to function, superiors as well as their employees have to remain in their positions respectively their work relationship in order for the former to be able to witness the performance of the latter and thus allowing for a career progression of the employee (at least if one assumes that career progression should be based on performance).[14] Furthermore, Sennett (2006) notes that social capitalist bureaucracies "promoted by merit – but also by seniority. The machinery aimed to include the masses, whether competent or not, so long as the masses put in their time and served the institution" (ibid.: 113). Yet it is important to keep in mind that the "traditional university" did not aim to include the masses, but was an elite institution defined by

> a certain kind of relation between teacher and student within a community of scholars [that] was designed to teach gentlemen how to live a certain way of life; it was not meant to train young persons for specific occupations. Indeed, it rather looked down on that. (Trow 2005: 9)

Once one had managed to enter this "gentlemen club", putting in one's time and serving the university was rewarded with academic employment following the Fordist arrangement of "normal employment" characterised by planning security, stable work relations and -places as well as a clear legal description (cf. Loacker 2010: 34) – except for the aspect of clearly defined working hours that is discussed in chapter 2.3.

2.2 A Gift Economy

Academic work is frequently characterised as a gift economy binding people into a community via the exchange of gifts (cf. Barcan 2013: 78f.). For instance, Strathern (2004) remarks that "[s]cientists have used the term 'gift exchange' for a prestige-reward system through which scientists both ensure the circulation of information, and gain recognition for doing so" (ibid.: 59). Accordingly, Kenway et al. (2004) note that "the openness, the obligation to repay, and the sociality of the gift economy […] have hitherto been ideal features of academic communities" (ibid.: 342) – communities in which performance is based on reciprocity rather than economic principles according to Münch (2011: 40–44).

> Academic practice is giving out of gratitude, affinity and obligation, a collective search for knowledge and production of a public good, a productive competition over quality and priority without winners or losers. (ibid. 47, my translation)

[14] "Delayed gratification makes possible self-discipline; you steel yourself to work, unhappily or not, because you are focused on that future reward. This highly personalized version of the prestige of work requires a certain kind of institution to be creditable; it has to be stable enough to deliver the future rewards, its managers have to remain in place as witnesses to your performance." (Sennett 2006: 77f.)

As Münch's depiction of academic communities may appear highly idealised, I would like to complement it by Bourdieu's (1988) more prosaic comment that only

> a set of monographs would enable us to capture the logic of the exchange which academics enter into for a thesis viva (the person who asks a colleague to participate in the viva of a thesis which he has supervised commits himself tacitly to offering the return service and therefore enters into a circuit of continuous exchanges), for elections (the person who speaks up in favour of a colleague's candidate earns with this colleague – and his candidate – credit he can make use of on the occasion of another election), for an editorial committee (where analogous mechanisms operate), for a selection committee, etc. It is doubtless because of this that the logic of the accumulation of power takes the form of a viciously circular mechanism of obligations which breed obligations, of a progressive accumulation of powers which attract solicitations that generate more power. (ibid.: 97)

Although both Münch's and Bourdieu's observations are, in my opinion, limited to an (ideal) traditional academic community whose members enjoy permanent academic positions that allow them to cover their living expenses (or at least realistic prospects of such a position), they make clear that many, and maybe the most important, academic exchanges are not mediated by money but based on reciprocity.[15]

A more structured account of the similarities between academic research and gift economies is given by Vermeir (2013): (1) Just as gifts academic knowledge needs to be in circulation to fulfil its function (ibid.: 2496). "The more knowledge circulates, the more value it accrues and the more knowledge it generates." (ibid.: 2497) (2) Like in a gift economy, a return gift in the form of recognition and esteem is expected for academic activities like publications, conference talks, peer review, editorial work or advisory functions that are usually not paid for (ibid.: 2496).

> The scientist is not alienated from the research product, as is the worker in the capitalist system. The scientist's name remains connected to her invention or discovery. Her research is a gift to society and people continue to honor her for this particular contribution. (ibid.: 2497)

(3) Finally, government funding also resembles a gift "so long as it comes as a general funding package, that is, so long as it does not rigidly determine the topic and course of research" (ibid.: 2497).

2.3 A Greedy Vocation

Being an academic is considered – despite carrying with it the status of a civil servant in the scholarly-bureaucratic university – to be a vocation rather than a regular job (cf. chapter 9.1). This well-known definition traces back to a speech given by Weber in 1917 in which he stated that

[15] A point that is also eloquently made by Thomas Hylland Eriksen, who continues to elaborate on how this gift economy is threatened by the audit university (cf. chapter 4.5.1): "All good parents try to teach their children that the important things in life are free. This is also how it ought to be in the academic world, but after fifteen years of mounting student numbers, activity planning, auditing, efficiency-enhancing measures and reforms [I'm referring to Norway, but the situation is comparable elsewhere], it no longer appears thus. Today, what matters is everything that can be counted and measured, and in the last instance, this means death for the free exchange of knowledge. […] Much of the disillusion and unhappiness in today's universities is caused by the fact that their academic employees are about to be deprived of the right to spend a fair proportion of their working hours doing free work for others." (See <http://hyllanderiksen.net/Gifteconomy.html>, accessed 7 March 2016)

> [o]nly through rigorous specialization can the scientific worker truly gain the feeling of satisfaction, for the first and perhaps the only time in his life, of being able to say: here I have achieved something that will last. Today, a really final and proficient achievement is always a specialist achievement. And anyone who does not have the ability to put on blinkers, as it were, and to enter into the idea that the destiny of his soul depends on his being right about this particular conjectural emendation at this point in this manuscript, should stay well away from science. […] Without this strange intoxication (which appears faintly ridiculous to outsiders), without this passion, […] one has *no* vocation for science and should do something different. (Weber 2008: 31)

Weber's definition appears to be by no means outdated in the contemporary university in which academics are still considered (and expected) to display the cardinal virtue of commitment (cf. Sennett 2006: 195), i.e. to be driven by intrinsic motivation (cf. Münch 2011: 103). Barcan (2013) for instance reminds us that

> [v]ocationalism remains particularly strong in the university context. This is unsurprising given the university's origins as a religious institution. Vocation implies the meaningfulness of work, a privileged collectivity with whom to share it, values and goals that transcend the everyday, a tolerance of impecuniosity, and the inseparability of work and life. (ibid.: 78)

In accordance with the last point, Felt and Stöckelová (2009) note that "what is specific about vocation […] is that it achieves the long hours discipline through merging work and the personal to some extent" (ibid.: 102, cf. Gill 2010: 240). This is an important point: pursuing a vocation is not just an individualised calling, but a social experience as well.[16] Accordingly, Vermeir (2013) remarks that the

> rich social texture, fortified by apprenticeship and exchanges of tacit knowledge necessary for technical knowledge transfer, is responsible for continuous internal evaluation and control, in informal (reputation) as well as formal ways (peer-review, hiring committees). As a result, the scholarly gift economy produces researchers that are strongly committed to the [Mertonian, author's note] values and norms of academic science. (ibid.: 2500)

Another characteristic of vocation is "workaholism, long hours and indifference to time" (Felt and Stöckelová 2009: 102) and "a willingness to sacrifice pay and personal time" (Barcan 2013: 129). Correspondingly, Beaufaÿs (2003) states that the academics of her study (biochemists and historians at German universities) assume that "one does not work for money, but rather one receives money in order to be able to work academically" (ibid.: 146, my translation). According to her observations, academics establish an "ethos of time" that demands of them to give their undivided attention to their work (ibid.: 165; cf. Weber 2008: 33). "In this regard, it is not crucial how many hours they eventually work during a week, but rather whether they are capable of convincingly sustaining the impression that academia is their most important purpose in life." (Beaufaÿs 2003: 243, my translation) Likewise, Felt and Stöckelová (2009) – drawing on results from their study of bio- and social scientists in Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Slovakia and the UK – remark that

> [e]xpressions such as: "research is not a nine-to-five-job", addressing the problematic non-commitment of certain colleagues or interspersing the conversation with mentioning long daily

[16] Felt and Stöckelová (2009) designate this social aspect of vocation as the "informal part of vocation" that "consists of social ties – among researchers but also between researchers and their institutions – of belonging or not to insiders' circles or personal apprenticeship" (ibid.: 101).

> working hours, no week-ends etc. capture the grand narrative of the vocational relationship needed to be a successful researcher. (ibid.: 102)[17]

Furthermore, there is an additional aspect of the vocational "nature" of academic work as indicated by Weber's emphasis on the importance of rigorous specialisation: It is a craftsmanship in Sennett's (2006) sense of "learning to do just one thing really well" (ibid.: 4) for its own sake (ibid.: 104, cf. Münch 2011: 103, 107).

> Getting something right, even though it may get you nothing, is the spirit of true craftsmanship. And only that kind of disinterested commitment – or so I believe – can lift people up emotionally; otherwise, they succumb in the struggle to survive. (Sennett 2006: 195f.)

Such a notion of academic work as a craftsmanship resonates with Weber's (2008) statement that "[n]othing has any value for anyone, as a human being, that he *cannot* do with *passion*" (ibid.: 31) as well as with Bourdieu's (1988) description of traditional professors as "small producers exploiting their own independent cultural capital, which tends to be seen as a divine gift" (ibid.: 125) and the apprenticeship model that underlines the education of PhD candidates (cf. Bourdieu 1988: 152–156) up to the present day.

In short, becoming and being an academic requires the visible display of devotion and/ through submission to one's work by/and making sacrifices, i.e. the surrender of personal needs for the needs of a highly specialised occupation (or an institution). Only thereby can academics hope to receive the appointment of a professorship and find their calling (cf. Bourdieu 1988: 96).[18] This circumstance places academics (serving a greedy vocation) in good company with eunuchs and royal mistresses (serving greedy sovereigns), domestic workers and house-wives (serving greedy families) as well as sectarians, Jesuits and Leninists (serving greedy collectives). All of these groups belong to what Coser (2015) terms "greedy institutions", i.e. organisations and groups that make total claims on their members, usurping their personality by demanding total commitment and loyalty (ibid.: 14).

Writing in a time when a Fordist regime of work was considered to be the norm, Coser sets greedy institutions up in opposition to regular working conditions as well as to Goffman's greedy institutions. He points out that in modern non-totalitarian societies the amount of time that an individual owns to her employer is normalised and legally codified so that she has time for family or other extra-professional activities (ibid.: 12) – albeit the fulfilment of a series of obligations my come at the cost of painful compromises (ibid.: 14). Greedy institutions however try to inhibit these diverse engagements with numerous role partners. Unlike Goffman's total institutions, they do not physically separate their members from the outside world in order to gain total control over them, but rather rely on voluntary compliance in order to elicit total commitment, i.e. they aspire to maximise the consent to their life style by appearing highly attractive to their disciples (ibid.: 15f.). However, they also exert pressure on their members in order to undermine attachment to other institutions or persons making demands that conflict with theirs (ibid.: 16).

[17] Lind (2013: 98f.) reports similar observations for the German university context.
[18] In German, the appointment to a professorship is in fact called *Berufung* ("calling").

This can be achieved by prohibiting (dyadic) sexual or familial relationships, demanding the submission to a doctrine of the in-group, removing the separation between the private and the public sphere (for example by removing the separation between workplace and residence) or socially uprooting their members (for instance through geographic mobility) (ibid.: 18–25).

I understand academic work to be inherently greedy due to its "boundless and potentially infinite" (Barcan 2013: 93) nature as "[e]very scientific 'fulfillment' means new 'questions,' and *is intended* to be surpassed and rendered obsolete" and thus "in reality, never comes to an end and never can" (Weber 2008: 34). In addition, Trow (2005) observes that (traditional) elite higher education "has placed students at odds with other kinds of obligations" such as work and family that "present conflicting commitments and obligations, and interfere with the socialization most effectively accomplished in near totally encompassing social institutions" (ibid.: 12f.). Granted, academics are neither formally required to live celibate nor to renounce having a family. Yet less than a third of the female academics in Austria are married and every second female academic relinquishes having children – despite eight out of ten childless female academics stating that they want to have children (Buber 2010: 21–26).[19] In that regard, I argue that "traditional" greedy aspects of academic work are complemented by new aspects such as increasing performance pressures (cf. chapter 8.3) or the increasing demand for (early-career) academics to be (internationally) mobile (cf. chapter 9.4).

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter outlines three structural features of traditional academic work in the context of the scholarly-bureaucratic university: being protected by academic freedom, embedded in a gift economy and guided by a vocational ethos. It shows how academic freedom – rooted in the idea of an autonomous (and in this sense anti-economic) academic field – grants academics the right to shape and control (i.e. to self-organise) their own work to a high degree while at the same time offering them (reasonable hope for) a predictable and permanent career that follows a logic of delayed gratification. Secondly, it points out that academic exchange in the scholarly-bureaucratic university is not mediated by money but rather based on reciprocity, thereby binding members of the academic community together by mutual obligations (according to the logics of a gift economy). Finally, it depicts the structurally boundless and vocational "nature" of academic work that requires high commitment and the concomitant submission of personal needs. This vocationalism does not only achieve a willingness to work long hours while sacrificing pay and personal time, but more generally establishes academic work as a "greedy" occupation relying both on voluntary compliance as well as on undermining attachment to other (social) obligations in order to elicit total commitment.

[19] Lind (2013: 101) arrives at a similar conclusion for Germany. This fact points to the gendered dimension of the "greediness" of the academic profession that may partly explain why only 22% of professors at Austrian universities are women (BMBF 2015: 28) and only 18% at Danish universities – despite women comprising 56 percent of the newly enrolled undergraduate students at Danish universities in 2014 and 49.8 percent of those starting a PhD in 2013 (UFM 2015: 4f.).

3 The Neoliberal Economisation of Society and Science

While chapter 4 focuses on the neoliberal economisation (of the politico-economy and institutional settings) of academic work, chapter 3 provides the broader societal context for this transformation. Firstly, it discusses analytical approaches towards the neoliberalisation of (primarily European and US) societies as the alteration of the relationship between states, societies and markets. It then turns its analytical gaze towards the post-Fordist reorganisation of work (which historically accompanies the ascendency of neoliberalism) that is both inspired by the organisation of academic work as well as transforming it. Finally, it shows how academic work (in the form of research and higher education) is increasingly instrumentalised in a "knowledge economy" for politico-economic ends.

3.1 The Neoliberal Transformation of Society

There is no single, comprehensive definition of neoliberalism, nor is there "some sort of Ur text against which the actual implementations of it can be measured and found wanting" (Goldstein 2012: 305). To start with, I would like to draw the reader's attention to three distinctions. (1) Whereas the term was initially used as a positive self-designation in the 1930s (Michalitsch 2006a: 49, Walpen 2004: 64), it is predominantly used by critics from the 1990s onwards (Wilke 2003: 13)[20] – just when it became a hegemonic discourse. (2) We can distinguish between a "roll-back" phase of neoliberalism in its early years, "which focused on reducing the role of the government in the management of the economy, deregulation, privatisation of state-owned assets and the active destruction of Keynesian social and welfarist institutions", and a subsequent "roll-out" phase that remodelled the public sector according to private-sector management principles (Shore 2010: 17, cf. Kalb 2012: 326).[21] (3) Mudge (2008: 704f.) distinguishes between three aspects of neoliberalism: an intellectual face (for example an emphasis on the market as the source of human freedoms), a bureaucratic face (liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, depoliticisation and monetarism) and a political face (i.e. certain notions about the state's responsibility and authority).

In general, neoliberalism is characterised by the neoclassic conviction that the market is superior to the state when it comes to coordination (Wilke 2003: 32) and resting on the assumption of an utility-maximising, rational-economic individual ("methodological individualism"), resulting

[20] Jessop (2013: 65) remarks that the term "neoliberalism" is more often used by outsiders and critics and serves "more as a socially constructed term of struggle (*Kampfbegriff*) that frames criticism and resistance than as a rigorously defined concept that can guide research in anthropology and other social sciences". Therefore an analysis of neoliberal phenomena requires a theorisation of the concept according to the specific research context.

[21] This "historical" distinction may (at least partly) explain "analytical" differences regarding the role of the state in neoliberalism, i.e. whether neoliberalism undermines the role of the state or rather transforms it. Yet there is also an "analytical" distinction I want to draw the reader's attention to: that between neoliberalism and capitalism. Whereas a common understanding appears to be equating both, regarding neoliberalism(s) as the contemporary form(s) of capitalism (after a "liberal" early version that was followed by a more government controlled, "social" version particularly after World War II), Kalb (2012) makes a distinction between those two concepts: "While neoliberalism, like law, is a formal framework of governance, capitalism is the wider relational field of forces that upholds, animates and rules it." (ibid.: 327)

in demands for more deregulation, privatisation and flexibilisation (ibid.: 185). Consequently, competition, individualised responsibility and the freedom to choose are fundaments of a neoliberal ideology (cf. Bröckling 2007: 106, Mudge 2008: 706, Wilke 2003: 20), leading Lorenz (2012: 601) to sum up the "neoliberal dream" in the formula: "free market = competition = best value for the money = optimum efficiency for individuals as both consumers and owners of private property." However, whereas a liberal notion of freedom implies both the freedom from the state (and aristocracy) as well as the freedom of self-determination, a neoliberal notion primarily emphasises the freedom of the market from the state and the freedom of choice (cf. Lemke et al. 2000: 14f.). Accordingly, Mirowski and Sent (2008) note that

> neoliberalism differs from its classical predecessor through its transcendence of the classical liberal tension between the self-interested agent and the state by reducing both state and market to the identical flat ontology of the neoclassical model of the economy. "Freedom" is thus conflated with entrepreneurial activity, and state functions are "rationalized" by reducing them to market relationships. (ibid.: 670)

Despite the state being subjected to the logic of the market it remains strongly directive, as Sennett (2006) reminds us – characterising a neoliberal regime as enabling "economic development friendly to globalization, flexibility, and meritocracy" (ibid.: 163).

> The center controls infusion of resources into devolved institutions and monitors performance. It does not lead, in the Weberian sense: power and authority instead divide. As in business, so in politics bureaucracies increasingly centralize power while refusing to take responsibility for their citizens. […] The new institutional order eschews responsibility, labeling its own indifference as freedom for individuals or groups on the periphery; the vice of the politics derived from the new capitalism is indifference. (ibid.: 163f.)

Thus, the freedom of the individual parallels the individualisation of the responsibility for the individual's social success and well-being.

> The "new man" takes pride in eschewing dependency, and reformers of the welfare state have taken that attitude as a model – everyone his or her own medical advisor and pension fund manager. Practically, as in private business, this cuts down on public responsibility. (ibid.: 101)

This is one aspect of the transformation of the Fordist welfare state[22] into the post-Fordist neoliberal competition state that mobilises labour power and knowledge (as cognitive capital) to guarantee global competitiveness (cf. Prausmüller et al. 2005: 55f.) – a transformation corresponding to that of social capitalism into flexible capitalism (cf. Sennett 2006). In that regard, the globalisation of capitalism opening up "new and highly exploitable working classes elsewhere exerting downward pressure worldwide through the hidden hand" (Kalb 2012: 327) plays a crucial role in the triumph of neoliberalism.[23] According to Slaughter and Rhoades (2004)

[22] Clarke and Newman (1997) define the "post-war welfare state" as "the compromise between capitalism (and the free market) and socialism (and public provision through the state) or the compromise between the principles of inequality (market-driven) and equality (state guaranteed citizenship)" (ibid.: 1).

[23] Bologna (2006) for example understands globalisation not as a cultural phenomenon, but as a "historically determined mode of production that is characterised by the creation of a labour market setting the parameters according to the respective lowest standards, both regarding manual labour as well as those activities that require a high level of professionalism or technical-academic knowledge" (ibid.: 96, my translation). However, while it "accelerated and generalised the polarisation, 'precarisation' and pauperisation of segments of western labour", it simultaneously

> [t]he neoliberal state focuses not on social welfare for the citizenry as a whole but on enabling individuals as economic actors. […] The neoliberal state has participated in creating global governing structures, especially those related to protection of trade and intellectual property. […] The neoliberal state has also promoted privatization, commercialization, deregulation, and reregulation. […] The neoliberal state has reinterpreted labor law to increase workplace flexibility in corporations and universities. […] The state itself has become a flexible employer, outsourcing, relying on temporary workers, and reducing health care benefits. (ibid.: 20–22)

Referring to the EU, Michalitsch (2006a: 53) views the European integration project as a neoliberal project of the reorganisation of the welfare state into the competition state. In this context, Schunter-Kleemann (2001) attests a transformation of EU social and employment policy – beginning in 1993 with the publication of the white paper "Growth, competitiveness and employment" (ibid.: 27) – from a welfare to a workfare policy that aims to generate national competitiveness on international markets through the deregulation of employment relationships as well as the support of wage differentiation and low wages.[24]

Apart from such general observations, trying to clearly define neoliberalism constitutes a futile effort as "the theory of neoliberalism, like its implementation, is heterogeneous and contradictory, as 'messy', one might say, as the actual expressions of it" (Goldstein 2012: 305, cf. Kleinman et al. 2013: 2399). We can identify different schools that developed differently over time in different countries (Walpen 2004: 63), thus constituting the "polymorphous and flexible nature of neoliberal models" (Hilgers 2013: 78). Accordingly, we find diverse and diverging approaches in the current anthropological debate on neoliberalism. For instance, Wacquant (2012: 68) considers the anthropology of neoliberalism "as *polarised* between a hegemonic economic conception anchored by (neoclassical and neo-Marxist) variants of *market rule*, on the one side, and an insurgent approach fuelled by loose derivations of the Foucauldian notion of *governmentality*, on the other".[25] After positioning these approaches as thesis and antithesis, he suggest a third approach based on Bourdieu's concept of the state as a contested bureaucratic field, arguing that neoliberalism exhibits a distinct and recognisable institutional core that

> consists of an *articulation of state, market, and citizenship* that harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the third. […] I diverge from market-centred conceptions of neoliberalism in that I prioritise (political) means over (economic) ends; but I part with the governmentality framework in that I prioritise state-crafting over technologies and non-state logics. (ibid.: 71)

Subsequently, he underpins this approach with three theses: Firstly, that "*[n]eoliberalism is not an economic but a political project*" which does not lead to a reduction of the state but its reconstruction according to the four institutional logics of (1) commodification "as the extension of market or market-like mechanisms", (2) disciplinary social policy, characterised by a "shift from protective welfare […] to corrective workfare", (3) expansive and pornographic penal

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"produced revenues that too were recycled into the western financial machine, mostly to finance sovereigns whose tax incomes had dwindled relative to expenditures" (Kalb 2012: 327).

[24] Fach (2000) classifies this shift as one from a "grammar of care" to a "grammar of harshness" (ibid.: 112, my translation), and Jessop – according to Clarke and Newman (1997) – as one from the old "Keynesian Welfare State" to a "Schumpeterian Workfare State" (ibid.: 22).

[25] I agree with Kalb's (2012: 324) and Jessop's (2013: 66f.) critique that Wacquant's depiction of (neo-)Marxist and (neo-)Foucauldian analyses is rather one-sided.

policy "aimed at curbing the disorders generated by diffusing social insecurity" and (4) the trope of individual responsibility "as motivating discourse and cultural glue that pastes these various components of state activity together" (ibid.: 71f.). Secondly, he claims that "*[n]eoliberalism entails a rightward tilting of the bureaucratic field*" (ibid.: 73). In that regard, he distinguishes between two internal battles that traverse the contemporary state:

> the vertical battle (between dominant and dominated) pits the 'high-state nobility' of policymakers smitten with neoliberal notions, who wish to foster marketization, and the 'low-state nobility' of executants who defend the protective missions of public bureaucracy; the horizontal battle (between the two species of capital, economic and cultural, vying for supremacy within) entangles the 'Right hand' of the state, the economic wing that purports to impose fiscal constraints and market discipline, and the 'Left hand' of the state, the social wing that protects and supports the categories shorn of economic and cultural capital. (ibid.: 73)

Correspondingly, neoliberalism is "the systematic tilting of state priorities and actions from the Left hand to the Right hand, that is, *from the protective (feminine and collectivizing) pole to the disciplinary (masculine and individualizing) pole of the bureaucratic field*" (ibid.: 73). In this context, his third thesis states that the "*growth and glorification of the penal wing of the state are an integral component of the neoliberal Leviathan*" (ibid.: 74).[26]

Hilgers (2013), on the other hand, distinguishes between *systemic* and *governmentality* approaches to neoliberalism and argues "that in order to more fully grasp the effects of neoliberalism, the debate must take into account culture, understood here as a symbolic system articulated through systems of dispositions" (ibid.: 76). Hence, he suggests to study the implementation of neoliberal policies by considering "the process of their production, the historicity of places and institutions where neoliberalism is deployed and the historicity of dispositions that embody it" by targeting "the triangle constituted by policies, institutions and dispositions" (ibid.: 78).

Jessop (2013) offers yet another interpretation of neoliberalism by distinguishing five main approaches: as an intellectual-professional project, as a political project, as a distinctive set of economic policies "intended to intensify competition and extend market forces", as "the form taken by a capitalist offensive against organised labour after the crisis of the post-war mode of growth" and as a specific epoch starting in the 1970s "characterised by the advance of globalisation based on free trade, transnational production, and the free movement of financial capital" (ibid.: 69f.). Subsequently, he suggest the following baseline definition: "neoliberalism is a political project that is justified on philosophical grounds and seeks to extend competitive market forces, consolidate a market-friendly constitution and promote individual freedom" (ibid.: 70).[27]

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[26] However, the penal system is only "one *brick in the building of the neoliberal Leviathan*" (Wacquant 2012: 75). Further supportive elements are "'urban polarisation', 'racialised poverty', 'dispossessed and dishonoured populations', 'de-industrialisation' ('postindustrial working class') and the declining legitimacy of state authorities" (Kalb 2012: 324).

[27] However, even such a minimum definition may be contested by Bockman's (2012) claim that "[n]eoliberalism is not so much the spread of markets, but rather accumulation by dispossession enabled by the world created through radical economic, political and cultural empowerment. […] These new opportunities for accumulation by dispossession became available as the result of radical, left-wing critiques of state-organised capitalism and of state-organised socialism from the 1960s" (ibid.: 314f.).

I could go on enumerating attempts to define neoliberalism, but I think I have made my point on how ambiguous neoliberalism is as a subject of analysis. So why invoke the concept at all? On the one hand, because it is a central concept used in the academic literature on the current transformation of universities. On the other hand, because it designates important phenomena regarding this transformation – phenomena that I attempt to identify in this chapter.

Neoliberal discourse offers an alternative conception of the relationship between the economy and society (that is instructing state policy) to the narrative of employers – be they capitalists, entrepreneurs or managers – exploiting their employees so they can maximise profit: namely of both groups being in the same boat sailing the rough sea of globalised economic competition. Drawing on this imagination, the first group (steering the boat) can announce that "we" (i.e. employees) have to produce more for the same or even lower wages (i.e. "increase efficiency") and reduce tax burdens on enterprises so that "we" (i.e. employers) can secure our prosperity. If "we" fall back in this global race, it is because employees did not try hard enough. Such an attitude is for example reflected in the President of the Austrian Economic Chambers' complaint that "we in Europe are replete, complacent, pessimistic, or we persuade ourselves that we are still well and don't have to worry"[28] at a press conference where he announced that Austrian companies have exported more than ever in the last year. Yet being replete and content with having achieved a new export record is no reason to celebrate. Instead, it is highly problematic as we "are competing for the best positions in these emerging countries". Apparently, top performance is just not good enough.

Of course, such a portrayal of the relationship between capitalist and societal interests overemphasises (class) conflicts – as much as the alternative version obscures them. However, we should keep in mind that while neoliberalism

> has advertised itself consistently as a middle-class making project and was supported naturally by parts of the aspiring middle classes, over time it tended to fail dramatically in that respect… The cause for that failure is straightforward: In the OECD, from the late 1970s onwards, almost all productivity increases were appropriated by the owners of capital, while labour income remained stagnant in relative terms (Harvey 2005; Reich 2010; McNally 2010). (Kalb 2012: 327)[29]

Slaughter and Leslie (1997) confirm such a diagnosis of the effects of neoliberalism, referring more specifically to the university system.

> Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United Sates promoted academic capitalism as a means of stimulating national economic growth – that is, productivity and GDP – and increasing high paying jobs. […] Business are making greater profits, but recovery is not generating high paying jobs (Rifkin 1995). (ibid.: 213)

Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) complement this observation with the statement that although

[28] "Wir sind satt und selbstzufrieden" by Judith Hecht, *Die Presse*, 23 February 2016, 13.

[29] Accordingly, Bologna (2006: 76f.) describes the progressive weakening of the Italian middle class – a phenomenon that can also be attested to Germany and the US with the median household income of the middle class decreasing in both countries since 2000 (see "Die Mittelschicht profitiert nicht vom Wachstum" by bin, *Die Presse*, 7 May 2016, 18).

> those who support patenting argue that it will contribute to economic growth beneficial to the citizenry as a whole […] the overall pattern of the new economy, at least as configured in the United States, has resulted in greater income and wealth stratification within and outside the academy than was the case under the public good knowledge regime. (ibid.: 331)

After having given an overview of current interpretations of neoliberalism, I now introduce two central theoretical approaches to the conceptualisation of neoliberalism.

3.1.1 A Bourdieuian Approach to Theorising Neoliberalism

Drawing on Bourdieu's field theory, we can understand neoliberalism as the economisation of the political field and subsequently other fields through the mechanism of intrusion, i.e. the subjugation (or colonisation) of all social thinking and action by the capitalist logic (cf. Volkmann and Schimank 2006: 222f., Mackert 2006: 202). This intrusion is made possible because each field of cultural production consists of two sub-fields: on its cultural pole the field of "pure" production whose actors orient themselves according to the field's nomos and strive after recognition within that field – for example by generating knowledge for knowledge's sake; and on its economic pole the field of "profane" production oriented towards commercial success whose actors cannot obtain recognition according to the rules of the autonomous subfield and thus need to apply their cultural competences in external markets – for example in applied research.[30] It is the aspiration of actors for "profane" recognition – for example in the form of a (high) salary – that constitutes the springboard for intrusion. In a second step, this dynamic of intrusion is reproduced in the institutions of cultural production by their competing for market shares (Volkmann and Schimank 2006: 232f.). In this context, Volkmann and Schimank (2006: 238) claim that as universities are increasingly exposed to market forces, the worries of an increasingly insecure professional future drives those in particular who are not entirely established in the autonomous academic sub-field and are thus not financially secured (such as early-career academics with temporary employment contracts) to orient their action towards a commercial logic. "Exactly because they want to remain in the sub-field of 'pure' academia or art, they have to develop an economic habitus beside their genuine academic or artistic habitus due to the privatisation of their fields of activity" (ibid.: 238, my translation).

Mackert (2006: 197) identifies two lines of argument in Bourdieu's analysis of neoliberalism[31]: On the one hand, neoliberalism as an all-pervasive ideology and on the other hand as the entire economisation of society with the concurrent withdrawal of the state from all area of society[32]. As Volkmann and Schimank (2006: 237) point out, this development required unemployment as a structural precondition that significantly contributed to its acceptance. In that regard, I wish to draw the reader's attention to the analytical difference between the impacts of

[30] Of course, it only makes sense to attribute particular products or production processes to one pole or the other, not actors themselves (cf. Volkmann and Schimank 2006: 233).
[31] Concerning Bourdieu's own work, it is important to notice that it became "much more politically engaged, shifting into a very different mode of writing, research and argumentation" (Kalb 2012: 325) in the early 1990s (when he started to write on neoliberalism).
[32] A notion that may have been comprehensible in regard to the early "roll-back" phase of neoliberalism, but that has certainly lost its persuasiveness after the "roll-out" phase of neoliberalism.

the economic field on other fields on the one hand and the legitimisation of this impact on the other hand. The latter can be addressed drawing on the work of Boltanski and Chiapello (2001, cf. chapter 3.2.2) as well as on Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power, i.e. the acceptance of certain ways of thinking as universal truths (Mackert 2006: 208). Academic discourses play a central role in this regard, legitimising political interests through economic theory – as for example neoclassic theory and the Chicago school did for Thatcherism or Reaganomics.[33] Eventually, Bourdieu's critique of neoliberalism advocates a return to the social democratic consensus of the 1970s (Volkmann and Schimank 2006: 239), defending the Fordist model of the state guaranteeing the reproduction interests of capital but at the same time ensuring welfare benefits for those whose existence is threatened in a capitalist system generating inequality (Mackert 2006: 205).

3.1.2 A Foucauldian Approach to Theorising Neoliberalism

Foucault's reflections on governmentality (and those drawing on them with regard to a neoliberal governmentality) constitute, in my opinion, a currently more appropriate model for analysing neoliberalism. Lemke et al. (2000: 19) note that most critical analyses of neoliberalism (at that time) share two basic approaches: to understand neoliberalism as manipulative, false knowledge and as the repression of public welfare represented by the state through the market – hence assuming a fundamental division between the state and the market. However, they argue that the economy is always political economy as there can be no market independent from the state. Instead of assuming a zero-sum game of more market equals less state, they suggest a modified topology of the social, consisting of a shift from formal to informal forms of governance, for example through a transfer of decision making from the nation state to the supranational level (ibid.: 25f.) – a view that corresponds to the "roll-out" phase of neoliberalism.[34] Accordingly, neoliberalism redefines the relationship between the state and the economy by establishing the market as the organising principle of the state and society rather than the state defining and monitoring the freedom of the market (ibid.: 15, cf. Michalitsch 2004: 162). This results in a reconfiguration in the relationship between the "public" and the "private" as a "privatisation" exhibiting three forms:

> First, there is privatisation as the direct sale of public assets to the private/commercial sector. […] The second form of 'privatisation' can be found in the processes of undermining the boundaries between public and private sectors by means of sponsored competition and restructuring. […] This second sense of privatisation involves a degree of *de-differentiation* – a reduction, though not necessarily removal, of some of the distinctions between the state and the market (or the public and private sectors) through the requirement that public organisations come to behave 'as if' they were commercial corporate entities. The third, and rather different, sense of privatisation is the shift of responsibilities from public to private understood as the familial domain (or the 'informal sector'). (Clarke and Newman 1997: 27f., cf. Michalitsch 2006b: 122–125)

[33] In that regard, Bourdieu (1998a: 168) notes that the economic orthodoxy is without doubt one of the most powerful societal discourses of the social world, mostly because the mathematical formalisation it resorts to make it appear as a neutral tool.

[34] Clarke and Newman (1997: 30) develop a very similar line of argument.

While the first form of privatisation is (still) rather marginal when it comes to Austrian and Danish universities, we will re-encounter the second form in chapter 4.5. The third form of privatisation brings us to the question of the production of subjectivity which takes centre stage in neoliberal politics (Michalitsch 2006a: 66, cf. Opitz 2004: 146). The concept of a neoliberal governmentality allows to analyse this mode of subjectification (i.e. the work of subjectification that is complemented by the subjectification of work, a concept that I elaborate on in chapter 3.2.1) as it "relies less on direct control through state apparatuses of the conventional kind and more on 'productive subjection' through new discourses and practices" (Clarke and Newman 1997: 30). The subject is the central figure of thought in Foucault's work. He challenges the conception of the subject dominant at the end of the 20th century by emphasising its dual nature: the autonomous subject is simultaneously an object of power that cannot be imagined beyond society (cf. Opitz 2004: 65). Thus, neoliberal governmentality connects coercion and freedom by teaching the individual to govern herself through technologies of the self, provided with an extensive vocabulary such as freedom, individual initiative and responsibility, participation, uncertainty or competitiveness (Demirović 2006: 109). Its central figure of subjectification is the entrepreneurial self discussed in chapter 4.6.

3.2 The Post-Fordist Transformation of Knowledge Work

While the term "neoliberalism" usually refers to the formal framework of governance in contemporary capitalism respectively its underlying rationality, "post-Fordism" – as well as the related concept of the "knowledge economy" discussed in chapter 3.3.1 – refers to its mode of production. However, both conceptions are not clearly delimitable from each other as the underlying rationalities they address coincide – exactly because they both aim at analysing contemporary capitalism.

Lorey and Neundlinger (2012: 10f.) identify six key features of a post-Fordist paradigm of work: (1) an increasing proportion of the service sector in economic production, (2) the shift from material to immaterial production in the value-added chain, (3) the creation of new identities and communities of consumption through new information and communication technologies, (4) the incorporation of linguistic, cultural and affective practices into work, (5) the project-based organisation of work and (6) the self-organising, entrepreneurial worker.[35] Although space prohibits me to address all features in detail, I wish to point out that the first two features resonate with the new status of academic knowledge further discussed in chapter 3.3.13.3, the fourth (and partly the sixth) features correspond with the traditional vocational notion of academic (or artistic) work – while that work has in turn been re-organised according to the last two features. In the following, I elaborate on those last three features.

[35] For an alternative definition of post-Fordism, emphasising the flexibilisation and disintegration of production, see Opitz (2004: 97f.); for an extensive discussion see Loacker (2010: 21–83) and Sutter (2012: 18–69).

3.2.1 The Subjectification of Work

Academic work can be considered as an initial, i.e. pre-Fordist form of the immaterial labour that has come to be characteristic of a post-Fordist regime of work. In that regard, the traditional notion of academic work as outlined in chapter 2.3 corresponds with one demand of the new, post-Fordist organisation of work, which is that workers invest not only their bodies and minds, but also their "souls" into their work.

> [T]he rise of sacrificial labour – or, to put it another way, the hijacking of vocationalism – means that academia has come to function less and less as the privileged exception to the alienated labour of mass capitalism than as the model for a new, postmodern, form of self-directed work, in which labour cannot so easily be separated from life. (Barcan 2013: 138)

This demand for vocationalism in (knowledge) work is frequently theorised as the "subjectification" or "de-limitation" of work, i.e. that the individual's whole personality is increasingly (expected to be) involved in a work process that does not adhere to regular office hours and spaces. Hence, just as neoliberalism blurs the borders between the public and the private, post-Fordism blurs those between (wage) work and leisure. Thus, academic work conspicuously corresponds with the "new self-employed work" – that in turn corresponds with the entrepreneurial self, discussed in chapter 4.6. Self-employed work is a type of employment that, ranging between the independent entrepreneur (not to be confused with the entrepreneurial self) and the gainfully employed person, has come to epitomise post-Fordist working conditions. Bologna (2006: 9–45) considers new self-employed work (in contrast to Fordist wage work) as characterised by (1) an interpenetration of the space of working and living, (2) a deregulation of working and leisure time that is accompanied by a calculation in services delivered rather than in time units, (3) a dependence on establishing and maintaining business relationships, (4) a transformation from the principle of a guarantee of subsistence to that of existential risk, (5) an intensification of self-exploitation, (6) a permanent dependence on market demands and (7) a lack of unionist organisation and historical instruments of labour conflict (such as strikes).[36] Moreover, he observes that one feature of the "new economy" is that "work absorbs all energies, emotional and intellectual resources and thus the entire life time, which is why it proves to be one of the most efficient systems of the disgorgement of surplus value that ever existed" (ibid.: 69, my translation). In other words, the display of passion for one's work is becoming increasingly compulsory. Such a "greedy" character of knowledge work is not surprising considering that it cannot be controlled in the same way as material labour but rather depends on the employee's self-organisation and motivation (Dörhöfer 2010: 109).

While the interpenetration of working and living spaces, the deregulation of working and leisure time and the absorption of the entire person by her work are inherent to the traditional vocational notion of academic work in the scholarly-bureaucratic university, another feature of post-Fordist work is increasingly imposed on academic work: a project-based organisation.

[36] Whereas I only list (them as) seven, Bologna altogether sets out ten theses for self-employed work.

3.2.2 The Projectification of Work

Although academics have been self-organising workers/employees in the scholarly-bureaucratic university, they have not been flexible, "self-employed" entrepreneurial workers. However, while work in the private sector is transformed according to notions inherent in academic (or artistic) work as capitalism advances into the – formerly considered as private – area of emotional life, academic work is simultaneously transformed by organisational forms deriving from the private sector. Those essentially comprise of the managerial transformation of the university's administration discussed in chapter 4.5 which is complemented by a transformation of the funding logic (and consequently the organisation) of academic work according to that of the project – a development prompting Brenneis (2004) to remark that "[b]efore one can, to use James Clifford and George Marcus's (1986) phrase, 'write culture', one must first write money" (ibid.: 582). In that regard, the number of the core academic staff at Austrian universities increased by 22.6% between 2005 and 2014 whereas that of project staff increased by 97.8% (Baierl 2016: 15).[37] In the case of the University of Vienna, the amount of external project funding increased by 65% to 77 MM EUR in the period from 2007 to 2013, whereas its basic funding from the government only increasing by 27% (University of Vienna 2015b: 20, 27).[38] This development is reflected in the university's staff structure, with 894 of the 3,332 full-time equivalents (FTE) (26.8%) classified as "academic and artistic staff" employed on external funding in 2015.[39] In comparison, external funding at the University of Copenhagen even grew by almost 108% from 1,045 MM DKK in 2007 to 2,171 MM DKK (ca. 291 MM EUR) in 2013 (University of Copenhagen 2015: 12), amounting to approximately 27% of its total revenues in 2014 (ibid.: 12, cf. 52). The ascent of a project logic is particularly evident in the education of early-career academics with the majority of funded PhD candidates being paid through (external) project funds in Vienna (cf. chapter 7.6) and Copenhagen (cf. chapter 7.6), transforming the doctoral education into a project with a definite temporal starting and ending point and a timetable that is assessed (semi-)annually.

Such a project-based organisation of work is a key feature of post-Fordism (Lorey and Neundlinger 2012: 11), supplying it with the self-organising, entrepreneurial workers it requires. Boltanski and Chiapello (2001) analyse this new (post-Fordist) "spirit of capitalism" that has come to be at the centre of a new order of justification of contemporary capitalism as a *projective city* (*cité par projets*) – that complements the six forms/economies of worth identified by Boltanski and Thévenot (2007). According to them, the projective city constitutes the third spirit

[37] In the same period, the number of external lecturers increased by 29.4% (Baierl 2016: 15) and that of students by 36.4% (see <http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bildung_und_kultur/formales_bildungswesen/universitaeten_studium/021631.html>, accessed 7 July 2017, the specification in % is according to my own calculation).

[38] The amount of external funding universities receive significantly differs. For instance, while in 2014 15.49% of the University of Vienna's income was generated through R&D projects, the University of Technology Vienna generated 24.57% of its income through R&D projects and the Mining University of Leoben even 36.62% (BMWFW 2015c: 89).

[39] See uni:data, table 5.1: <http://www.bmwfw.gv.at/unidata/auswertungen/iatb/2015/tab5.1> (accessed 23 May 2016).

of capitalism, i.e. its contemporary regime of justification. While the first spirit, prevailing at the end of the 19th century, corresponds to a capitalism with a familial dominant, the second spirit, prevailing from 1940 to 1970, concentrates on the large, integrated (i.e. Fordist) company. The emergence of the third and current spirit of capitalism coincides with that of post-Fordism in the 1970s and 1980s and is characterised by the "lean" company and a significant reserve of temporary workers (ibid.: 463f.).[40]

Defining capitalism as an amoral process of the unrestricted accumulation of capital which is characterised by profit mongering, wage labour and competition, Boltanski and Chiapello (2001: 462) argue that it needs to refer to other orders of value in order to legitimise itself (cf. Boltanski 2007) and mobilise a large number of people who possess little profit opportunities, but high commitment. It achieves this incorporation by appealing to the idea that work has a meaning that transcends that of profit. "We designate this idea – to use the term coined by Weber – as the spirit of capitalism" (Boltanski and Chiapello 2001: 462, my translation). According to Boltanski (2007), it is the ability to adept, for example by integrating the demands of the "artistic critique" for individual autonomy and freedom through a "culture of projects" that explains the survival of capitalism. Thereby, both the "social critique" of the movement of 1968 as well as its "artistic critique" were defused, the former through its deracination and the latter through its appropriation and integration (Boltanski and Chiapello 2001: 468–470), allowing to "once more incorporate the workers in the productive process and to reduce the costs of control by replacing it by processes of self-control and directly linking autonomy and a sense of responsibility to customer demands" (ibid.: 469, my translation).

The projective city rewards (and thereby aims at producing) risk-taking, active and flexible individuals (cf. chapter 4.6). Unlike the rigid organisation of bureaucracy in social capitalism or the company in Fordism, it is characterised by the key metaphor/logic of the network. Not attempting to establish networks and new contacts amounts to social death (Boltanski 2007). Although the existence of networks is not new, it took until the end of the 20th century for their creation to become an art (and "form of worth") in itself (Boltanski and Chiapello 2001: 467) as

> [w]hat matters is to develop activities – it is to be avoided at all costs to run out of projects and ideas, […] to not belong to any group brought together by the will "to do something". The project fits so well into the network world because it is a form of transition: it is through projects that one forges links and works on the expansion of the network. (Boltanski 2007, my translation, cf. Boltanski and Chiapello 2001: 466)

An alternative theoretical approach to the role of project-based work in contemporary capitalism is provided by Sennett (2006) who reveals how the ascent of neoliberalism was accompanied by the preference of flexibility over stability.

> Enormous pressure was put on companies to look beautiful in the eyes of the passing voyeur; institutional beauty consisted in demonstrating signs of internal change and flexibility, appearing to be

[40] Accordingly, Clarke and Newman (1997) identify "[f]inding ways of becoming 'lean and mean' [as] an organisational imperative of the new managerialism" (ibid.: 57) emerging in the late 1970s and 1980s. They add that although "[t]his business agenda was articulated in the name of the market, the customer, the nation and the spirit of enterprise […] its primary objective was to remove the shackles from the processes of capital accumulation" (ibid.: 58).

> a dynamic company, even if the once-stable company had worked perfectly well. […] [I]nstitutional solidity become an investment negative rather than a positive. Stability seemed a sign of weakness, suggesting to the market that the firm could not innovate or find new opportunities or otherwise manage change. (ibid.: 40f.)

In flexible organisations "in which the contents are constantly shifting" (ibid.: 126) and "[w]ork is not a possession, nor does it have a fixed content, but becomes instead a position in a constantly changing network" (ibid.: 140), project work becomes the preferred work mode. Consequently, the ideal worker of such an organisation is the team-minded, flexible project worker who is able to

> work well with others in short-lived teams, others you won't have the time to know well. Whenever the team dissolves and you enter a new group, the problem you have to solve is getting down to business as quickly as possible with these new teammates. "I can work with anyone" is the social formula for potential ability. It won't matter who the other person is; in fast-changing firms it can't matter. Your skill lies in cooperating, whatever the circumstances. (ibid.: 126)

Although Boltanski and Chiapello's as well as Sennett's analyses are based on the private sector, they have become equally relevant for the public sector in a world of work – and beyond that a society – in which "[l]ife appears as a series of projects" (Boltanski 2007, my translation), i.e. a world in which the project has become a basic element of contemporary governmentality in both respects of governing projects and governing by projects (Bröckling 2007: 252). In line with this diagnosis, academic work is also increasingly organised according to a project logic/form that traverses all categories of the academic staff (cf. Torka 2006: 68f.) and academic careers themselves turn into a project of assembling a "potpourri of outputs and career indicators" (Felt and Fochler 2010: 318, my translation).[41] The appeal of the submission of research to the logic of the project is apparent: Firstly, it reduces the risk of research funders and those administering those funds, be they funding agencies or university managers, by creating predictability regarding its outcomes and allowing to evaluate them. Thus, the logic of the project corresponds with that of the contract and of audit (further discussed in chapter 4.5) and facilitates an "increasing intervention by state and/or commercial business interests in the delineation of the strategic objectives of scholarly research" (Amit 2012: 290). Secondly, it presents itself when there is more than one researcher involved and thus coordination needs arise regarding time and content (Torka 2006: 71f.). Thirdly, it creates the flexible workforce post-Fordist organisations require. However, although the project logic offers itself from such a managerial perspective, it is important to notice that it does not correspond with the "nature" of academic (in the sense of basic) research.

In relation to the first point, one has to bear in mind that traditional academic research is open regarding its outcomes and boundless and potentially infinite in its "nature": if one already knew the outcome of a research process, one would not have to conduct it at all (cf. Torka 2006: 73). Likewise, once an author publishes a text, she would ideally already have written another one. This feature of academic research conflicts with a project logic. As a consequence, the project

[41] Stichweh (1999: 177f.) attributes this development to the increasing financial needs of research in the 20th century, i.e. to economic considerations.

form transforms the "nature" of research itself by assuming a specific research design that rather matches hypothesis testing than open-ended, explorative research (ibid.: 69), as well as applied research rather than basic research. "Scientific achievement in the sense of the generation of truthful statements is replaced by a concept of performance and success that aims at the fulfilment of the assignment stated in the application and the demonstration of output" (ibid.: 77, my translation). Thus, the projectification of research corresponds with the industrialisation and politicisation of research discussed in the next chapter, privileging application-oriented over basic research.

Regarding the second point, we have to be aware that academic work, particularly in the social sciences and humanities, is traditionally oriented towards the individual researcher – as are academic careers. For instance, a core method of social anthropology, ethnographic fieldwork, is characterised by the unity of the ethnographer as the person who records, interprets and writes up her own material (Agar 1996: 119, Okely 2012: 24). Likewise, the work of academics is assessed based on their individual achievements – although collaboration with successful (senior) academics certainly helps in acquiring these achievements. An increasing projectification of research may thus place these disciplines at a disadvantage and/or transform their logic of functioning along the lines of "laboratory disciplines".

Finally, concerning the third point, I want to point out that what constitutes a flexible workforce in the eyes of employers easily turns out to be a precariously employed workforce. As the projectification and time limitation of academic employment increasingly requires academics "to be ready to sacrifice everything that restricts availability" (Boltanski 2007, my translation), they have to relinquish income security and the opportunity to plan their careers as well as their (private) lives (cf. chapter 9).

3.3 The Instrumentalisation of Academic Work

Just as the organisation of academic work is changing, so are its purposes and relevance. At least in German, "academic knowledge" connotes impractical, abstract and theoretical knowledge in everyday language[42] – a connotation that appears increasingly anachronistic as (academic) knowledge has gained a new prominence in public discourse as a major politico-economic resource.

> Whereas the highest goal of the traditional academy was to create fundamental knowledge, what has been described as the 'scholarship of discovery', the new emphasis of the knowledge society is on useful knowledge or the 'scholarship of application'. (Kogan and Teichler 2007: 10)

> The long stretches of uninterrupted time characteristic of contemplative modes have been cut up into tiny pieces, subject to the requirement for constant, demonstrable, productivity. […] This new temporality is bound up in contemporary politicization of academic work: the call for relevance, social and economic utility and so on. The ideal of research as retirement from the world that characterized Newman's vision is being replaced by that of research as turning *towards* the world. (Barcan 2013: 114)

[42] According to Zgaga (2015: 21), this is also the case for Slovenian and most likely for English.

For instance, I daresay that few would currently object to the OECD's statement that

> [h]igher education is at the heart of the knowledge society – it contributes to the development of high-level skills, creates new knowledge, carries out research that underpins our understanding of the world we live in and beyond and [sic] spurs innovation.[43]

Even the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), Austria's main funding agency of (mostly university-based) basic research, declares in its mission statement that it "makes a significant contribution to cultural development, to the advancement of our knowledge-based society, and thus to the creation of value and wealth in Austria".[44] As does its Danish counterpart (although less prominently), the Danish Council for Independent Research (DFF), when it emphasises that it is "in dialogue with significant stakeholders with a view to ensuring that Danish research creates the best possible research results in benefit to the Danish society".[45]

Of course, the idea of science being useful is not new and relevance is "an old and frequent visitor to universities whose intensity increases and decreases at various points in time" (May 2007: 123). Accordingly, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) remind us that "solution of practical problems through scientific means has been an important factor in scientific development" (ibid.: 116) and Brennan (2007) that "the training of professionals – whether to run churches, empires or public services – has long been central to the concept of the university" (ibid.: 20). What is new however is that "it has become more necessary to 'talk' about relevance, to explicitly make the 'claim' for it and, to varying extents, to find evidence with which to provide some justification for the claim" (ibid.: 20) and that "it is the needs of the economy and industry – as interpreted by governments and international organisations – that are generally at the centre of pressure on universities to achieve greater and new forms of relevance" (ibid.: 21, cf. Enders 1999: 74, Ferlie et al. 2008: 326, Goddard et al. 2016a: 298, Kellermann 2009, Kleinman et al. 2013: 2388, Nedeva 2007: 86f.). In that regard, Readings (1996) points out that as the role of the nation state appears to decline in a globalised knowledge economy[46], so does the university's mission as custodian of national culture (in the US and the EU) – and consequently the role of the humanities.

> The current shift in the role of the University is, above all, determined by the decline of the national cultural mission that has up to now provided its *raison d'être*, and I will argue that the prospect of the European Union places the universities of Europe under a similar horizon […]. In short, the University is becoming a different kind of institution, one that is no longer linked to the destiny of the nation-state by virtue of its role as producer, protector, and inculcator of an idea of national culture. (ibid.: 3)

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[43] See <http://www.oecd.org/edu/skills-beyond-school/why-are-we-doing-this-work-now.htm> (accessed 20 November 2016).

[44] See <http://www.fwf.ac.at/en/about-the-fwf/corporate-policy/> (accessed 13 November 2016).

[45] See <http://ufm.dk/en/research-and-innovation/councils-and-commissions/the-danish-council-for-independent-research/the-council> (accessed 13 November 2016).

[46] Claiming that the role of the nation state decreases does not imply that it disappears; "it simply becomes more and more managerial, increasingly incapable of imposing its ideological will, which is to say, incapable of imposing its will as the political content of economic affairs" (Readings 1996: 47). Moreover, Clarke and Newman (1997) point out that "[w]hile there are clearly examples of tendencies which have shifted power to supra-national organisations and institutions and those which have embodied decentralisation producing a 'hollowing out' of the nation state, there are contradictory trends towards the greater centralisation of some forms of power" (ibid.: 23).

In the context of a "paradigmatic shift that favors applied and technical disciplines while disadvantaging 'the other', namely the humanities, social sciences, theology etc., but also those areas of natural science that concentrate on basic research" (Meister-Scheytt and Scott 2009: 65), "[p]rofessors of business or of engineering or of medicine would be unlikely to have much difficulty with pressures for relevance" whereas such pressures are mainly felt to be increasing "in the arts and social sciences, and some areas of the natural sciences" (Brennan 2007: 20). Even within such sub-fields of science, some disciplines are affected more than others. For example within the social sciences

> [e]conomics and business management control the field of social sciences through their dominant position in academic policy consulting and thereby shield the political practice from rivalling academic insights. Thus the economisation of academia turns into the self-affirmation of economics. (Münch 2011: 70, my translation)

These pressures for economic relevance are accompanied by an "increasingly hegemonic discourse based upon the natural sciences and economic instrumentalism for disciplines […] which do not and cannot convincingly embody those virtues" (Scott and Harding 2007: 16). Not only is university research increasingly constructed as mainly techno-scientific research (Kenway et al. 2004: 334); it is simultaneously increasingly organised – and measured (cf. Felt and Stöckelová 2009: 97f.) – according to a model that Brenneis (2004) terms the "biomedical model", i.e. biomedical work has come to assume a proxy role for science across the board regarding the "*institutional* dimensions of funding, research, publication, circulation, and application" (ibid.: 583).

In short: academic knowledge is increasingly expected to be useful – not in the sense that it elevates the person who acquires it to become a more (self-)responsible, enlightened citizen, but rather in solving political problems ("societal challenges") and generating economic growth. Hence, universities are increasingly confronted with missions other than their traditional ones of educating a social elite, reproducing academia and generating basic research.[47] These "third mission activities" (cf. chapter 4.4.2) are currently mostly identified as providing the knowledge economy with the labour force and (applicable) knowledge it requires. This chapter sets the context for this third, neoliberal mission by expanding the analytical notions of neoliberalism and post-Fordism discussed in the previous two chapters by notions that address more specifically the relationship between science, the state, the economy and society: the knowledge economy, Mode 2 and Triple Helix.

[47] Of course, not all universities are equally affected by pressures for relevance. As Brennan (2007) points out, "'relevance' is more generally required of the 'mass' elements of higher education than of the 'elite'. If higher education is to be made more widely available in society, its utilitarian credentials usually have to be stronger. Elite institutions are generally under less pressure to demonstrate immediate utility providing they can continue to make convincing claims for 'excellence'" (ibid.: 22). However, "for all types of institution, applied research and knowledge transfer are increasingly important sources of income generation" (ibid.: 23).

3.3.1 The Knowledge Economy

The knowledge economy – or the "'new', global knowledge or information society" as Slaughter and Rhoades (2004: 1) refer to it – constitutes a new framework for the production of academic knowledge that emphasises its economic applicability. The close interrelation of science and (capitalist) society is not a particularly new historical feature: already in the 1930s Zilsel (1985: 50–53) traced the emergence of "the spirit of science" back to the development of an early capitalist society, most notably its individualism and economic rationality. However, we witness a tremendous increase in the economic weight of the research-based industries in the middle of the 20th century (Stichweh 1999: 191), causing a blurring of the borders between research and industry. Slaughter and Leslie (1997) ascribe this development to the globalisation of the economic system.

> In the 1970s and 1980s markets became global, in considerable part because of increased economic competition from Pacific Rim countries. […] Multinational corporations in established industrialized countries responded to the loss of market share by investing in new technologies so they would remain competitive in global market. These corporations turned increasingly to research universities for science-based products and processes to market a global economy. (ibid.: 7)

Two decades later, Wright (2016) concludes that

> [o]ne of the major changes from the turn of the twenty-first century has been the projection of a future 'global knowledge economy' in which the role of the state is to maximize the country's competitiveness by optimizing the capacity of its institutional and human resources to generate 'knowledge' that can be turned into 'innovations' and spawn new knowledge industries. […] From the 1980s, governments expected universities to 'support' the economy, then to be 'drivers' of the knowledge economy, and finally to be key actors in that economy themselves. (ibid.: 62)

This development is accompanied by a continuous decline of state funding for research and development in relation to industry expenditures that pushes universities to look for other sources of funding – like these corporations turning to universities for their services. Furthermore, while funding in the contemporary university becomes scarce(r), it simultaneously becomes more strategic, i.e. oriented towards a purpose defined by those applying it rather than those applying for it. This circumstance is clearly illustrated by a steep increase in temporary, problem-driven project funding rather than permanent, basic funding of academic work that gives rise to a "utilitarian model of research" (Amit 2000: 222) and a knowledge-as-culture to knowledge-as-commodity transition[48] (Barcan 2013: 20). New demands for (economic) relevance are assembled in a politico-economic context in which "knowledge is a critical raw material to be mined and extracted from an unprotected site; patented, copyrighted, trademarked, or held as a trade secret; then sold in the marketplace for a profit" (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004: 4, cf. 17). Accordingly, "[w]ithin the knowledge based economy, the connection between the HEI subsystem and policy goals of economic growth become sharper" (Ferlie et al. 2008: 328). For

[48] For a discussion of the commodification of academic research see Vermeir (2013).

example, the OECD (1996: 23) – the initial promoter of an alleged knowledge-based economy[49] – claims that "[t]he science system, especially universities, is central to educating and training the research workforce for the knowledge-based economy". Likewise, the Austrian Ministry of Science, Research and Economy considers universities to be strategic key institutions in a knowledge society (BMWFW 2015b: 7) and science and research as "raw material of the future" that is essential to succeed in the international competition among business locations (BMWFW 2015a: 1, my translation). As does the Danish Government (2006), expecting Danish universities to "be comparable to global top performing universities" which means that their study programmes "should be of high quality and have a content that fulfils society's need for employees with a research-based education" and that they produce "top level research and be among the top performers at turning research results into new technologies, processes, goods and services" (ibid.: 22). Hence,

> [i]n the future, the basic funds of universities should be distributed according to quality. All university study programmes must meet international standards. Universities should have the capacity to swiftly develop new study programmes that meet the changing needs of the labour market and society. […] Universities should set objectives for utilising the results derived from research and also cooperate with the business community. The work on disseminating knowledge should have a bearing on how much funding each university is awarded. Researchers should also be able to obtain help in testing and documenting whether an invention has commercial potential. (ibid.: 22)

It is striking how swiftly quality in education and research is equalled with its economic applicability by the Danish government – although it is not surprising considering that universities become in a knowledge economy "what coal mines and steel mills were to the industrial economy" (Scott and Harding 2007: 3). As "information has become an increasingly important factor of production" (ibid.: 3) and the "potential of science to contribute to economic development has become a source of regional and international competition at the turn of the millennium" (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000: 117), "the university becomes a key element of the innovation system both as human capital provider and seed-bed of new firms" (Etzkowitz et al. 2000: 315, cf. Perry and Harloe 2007: 25).[50]

Thus, the knowledge economy – or an equally economi(sti)cally connoted knowledge society[51] – has become a term commonly used as a legitimation of contemporary science policy. For the purpose of this thesis, I will refrain from a detailed discussion of the concept of the knowledge economy. Instead, I leave it at Powell and Snellman's (2004: 201) observation that "key components of a knowledge economy include a greater reliance on intellectual capabilities than on physical inputs or natural resources" as well as a "focus on the production of novel ideas that subsequently lead to new or improved goods and services and organizational practices" (which matches the definition of innovation discussed in chapter 3.3.3.1) and settle for a discus-

[49] Alleged insofar because "[t]he 'knowledge economy' is in its essence a fantasy albeit a highly institutionalised and powerful one" as knowledge "is only imperfectly commodifiable, at best an 'as if' commodity always vulnerable to being undone by its own polysemic semiotic basis" (Boyer 2010a: 80).

[50] For an overview of recent government initiatives in Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and England to render universities more relevant for the economy and/or society see Goddard (2016).

[51] For a (brief) critical account of the knowledge society see for example Resch (2008).

sion of the new demands such a conception creates with regard to universities. For this purpose it is worth having a closer look at another supra-national institution (beside the OECD) that is "intruding into higher education by disseminating common legitimating policy discourses on higher education and research policies" (Magalhães et al. 2013: 109): the EU.[52]

> In recognition of the movement towards a knowledge society, the European Commission has set a number of initiatives in place to ensure that innovation, research, education and training are core to the EU's internal policies. (Perry and Harloe 2007: 29)

This resulted in the creation of the *European Higher Education Area (EHEA)* through the Bologna process as well as the *European Research Area (ERA)* as a result of the Lisbon agenda that gave a significant boost to the EU's educational activities in 2000 (cf. Magalhães et al. 2013: 97f., 106). The *Bologna process*[53] – a very much top-down driven political process with little, if any, input from the European academic community (Trow 2005: 49) that is at its root "a major policy driver promoting the interaction between education and innovation" (Magalhães and Veiga 2017: 4) – aims at contributing to Europe's global (economic) competitiveness by creating the structural prerequisites of a European education and science market (Prausmüller et al. 2005: 70) in order to "compete on a regional basis for international students with the other major markets in the US and Australia" (Wright and Rabo 2010: 4).[54]

> Officially, the Bologna Agreement aims to create a *common* European area *and* market of higher education with interchangeable degrees and degree programs, a system of transferable credit-units or comparable examinations. One should be aware of the fact that Bologna – like the EURO – is primarily a top-down political-bureaucratic project and not a set of spontaneous initiatives emanating from academia. (Nybom 2012: 176)

> The Bologna process emphasises the need for European universities to coordinate, standardise and quality-assure their activities, so as to make Europe a leading provider of higher education and 'the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world' (Bologna Process 2003: 2). (Wright and Ørberg 2008: 33)

Moreover, it seeks to increase employability (Höllinger 2004: 62) and "to reduce the prolonged periods of study (or at least formal enrollment) that students undergo in some countries before a degree is earned" (Trow 2005: 49), while simultaneously undermining (traditional understandings of) university autonomy (Wright and Ørberg 2008: 28–34).

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[52] I concentrate on OECD and particularly EU policies – for a detailed description of how the OECD substantially informed (Danish) university reform(s) see Wright and Ørberg (2011) – as they are more relevant for the so-called "developed" nations. However, "developing" nations are equally pushed to adapt to the demands of "the knowledge economy". For instance, the World Bank (2002: 21) argues that "[c]ontinuous, market-driven innovation is the key to competitiveness, and thus to economic growth, in the knowledge economy. This requires not only a strong science and technology base, but, just as importantly, the capacity to link fundamental and applied research; to convert the results of that research to new products, services, processes, or materials; and to bring these innovations quickly to market".

[53] The Bologna process was initiated by national governments, not the European Commission (Zgaga 2017: 5) – which was however since 2005 vested "as a voting member of the Bologna Follow-up Group (BFUG) contributing to the establishment of EHEA as a far-reaching objective of the EU" (Magalhães et al. 2013: 98) – and also involves non-EU countries. Furthermore, to address another common misconception, its Bachelor-Master-PhD study architecture is not modelled on the US but on the UK higher education system.

[54] For an overview of the development of the European Higher Education Area see Teichler (2005: 90f., 312).

Likewise, the *Lisbon agenda* – confirming "a neo-liberal understanding of higher education's contribution to the socio-economic well-being of the region" (Robertson 2009: 7, cf. Erkkilä and Piironen 2014: 180f.) – famously set out for the EU "to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" (European Parliament 2000). In that context, the ERA aims "to establish a border-free zone for research in which scientific resources will be better deployed to create more jobs and improve Europe's competitiveness" and to create "[m]ore abundant and more mobile human resources" (European Commission 2000). The *Europe 2020 strategy*, superseding the Lisbon agenda, continues to regard research and (higher) education in view of a primarily economic agenda, aiming to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive (economic) growth and assigning higher education institutions and research organisations a key role in that endeavour (European Commission 2014: 4).

> That is the purpose of Europe 2020. It's about more jobs and better lives. It shows how Europe has the capability to deliver smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, to find the path to create new jobs and to offer a sense of direction to our societies. (European Commission 2010: 2)

Of the five measurable targets the European Commission proposes for 2020, two are oriented towards "research and innovation" and "education" (European Commission 2010: 3). Both of these targets aim at generating "smart growth", i.e. "developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation" (ibid.: 5). This economic agenda constitutes the context for the European Commission's aim of investing 3% of the EU's GDP in research and development (R&D) as well as having at least 40% of the younger generation obtain a tertiary degree.

What is striking in this context is to what degree questions of economic, trade, labour market, research and educational policies have become entangled in the creation of the EHEA and ERA (cf. Prausmüller et al. 2005: 63)[55], turning higher education and research policy into an amalgam fraught with tensions (cf. chapter 5). For example, the European Commission (2010) notes that the targets of the Europe 2020 strategy

> are interrelated. For instance, better educational levels help employability and progress in increasing the employment rate helps to reduce poverty. A greater capacity for research and development as well as innovation across all sectors of the economy, combined with increased resource efficiency will improve competitiveness and foster job creation. […] Smart growth means strengthening knowledge and innovation as drivers of our future growth. This requires improving the quality of our education, strengthening our research performance, promoting innovation and knowledge transfer throughout the Union, making full use of information and communication technologies and ensuring that innovative ideas can be turned into new products and services that create growth, quality jobs and help address European and global societal challenges. But, to succeed, this must be combined with entrepreneurship, finance, and a focus on user needs and market opportunities. (ibid.: 11f.)

Another example of this new rationality is a statement by Robert-Jan Smits, EU Director-General for Research and Innovation that research and innovation will play a crucial role in the negotiations on the British EU withdrawal which "would have been different ten or twenty years

[55] And how little coherent pedagogical or intellectual basis these initiatives exhibit (cf. Trow 2005: 51f.).

ago. Nowadays it is clear to every country in the EU how important the topic is for the economic development of a business location"[56]. This statement does not only signify the "neoliberal" economisation of research and higher education in the EU, but may also explain why the EU as a primarily economic association has come to play such a prominent role in higher education policy despite the fact that it formally remains a national responsibility[57]. An even more vivid expression of a neoliberal rationality is for instance provided by a remark of João de Deus Pinheiro, a former member of the European Commission, in a debate at the European Parliament on 12 March 2008.

> As for the education/research/innovation triangle, the simplistic solution of indiscriminately injecting money into research must be avoided. Rather than scientific articles or fanciful ideas, we need better innovation, which is something quite different. Innovation requires a culture that values entrepreneurship and those individuals prepared to take risks, who are precisely the ones who know how to make money from knowledge and not the other way round, in other words, throwing money around indiscriminately to see if knowledge appears.
> As regards education, it is fundamental that we also create a culture of competitiveness and directed creativity. We should firmly reject the easy solutions that hinder the future success of both individuals and companies.
> As a result, Mr President, I welcome the Commission's proposals to encourage entrepreneurship, directed research, links between schools and business, creativity in the education system, demand and competitiveness. However, more than this, I would say that the drive for innovation and the Lisbon Strategy can be summed up in two words: what Europe, business and universities must do is create value.[58]

In this – I daresay dominant when it comes to European policy practice (cf. Kenway et al. 2004: 335)[59] – opinion the future success of individuals is equalled with that of companies, as is the mission of universities, and legitimate knowledge becomes knowledge that makes money. Erkkilä and Piironen (2014) summarise this development of European politics over the last two decades as the fact that higher education "is now seen as an organic part of regional and national growth and survival strategy" (ibid.: 181).

Consequently, EU research funding is mostly following policy prescriptions and is as such not geared towards basic research. For instance, in the current EU Framework Programme for Re-

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[56] '"Es gibt Unruhe in der europäischen Forschung"' by Peter Illetschko, *Der Standard*, 31 August 2016, 14, my translation.

[57] Conversely, it can be argued that EU higher education policy is bound to be economistic as the EU has only supporting competences regarding education and shared competences regarding research whereas its original and also currently exclusive competences are more of an economic "nature" (see <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:ai0020&from=DE>, accessed 28 July 2016).

[58] See <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20080312+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN> (accessed 19 April 2016).

[59] I am aware that neither the EU nor the European Commission is a unitary actor and that policy papers are results of a series of negotiations and compromises – of which I have little knowledge as my fieldwork did not include this level. My aim with this brief digression to the EU policy level is to outline currently dominant rationalities in EU research policies that resonate with national Austrian and Danish research policies. In that regard, it is remarkable how influential EU research and higher education policies are in view of how little funding the EU actually provides in these areas. For instance, the EU only contributes 1.89% to the funding of R&D in Austria (see <http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/energie_umwelt_innovation_mobilitaet/forschung_und_innovation/f_und_e_in_allen_volkswirtschaftlichen_sektoren/index.html>, table "Finanzierung der Ausgaben für F&E 2013 nach Durchführungssektoren und Finanzierungsbereichen", accessed 23 May 2016).

search and Innovation "Horizon 2020"[60] 17% of the budget are allotted to the European Research Council (ERC).[61] The ERC, the EU's major funding body for basic research, was only established in 2007 in the Seventh Framework Programme[62] – with rather modest average approval rates of 11.2% for Starting and Consolidator Grants and 13.3% for Advanced Grants[63]. Another 8% are dedicated to the Marie-Skłodowska-Curie Actions which are open to basic and application-oriented research as well as experimental development (and which also allow applicants to choose their research topics freely) – whereas the bulk of European research funding is intended for "industrial leadership" (22.1%) and "societal challenges" (38.5%) with clearly politically informed thematic specifications.[61] Moreover, Kerr and Lorenz-Meyer (2009) observe that the main focus of the European Commission's Framework Programmes "is upon the natural sciences, and excellence is strongly tied to economic benefit and applicability" (ibid.: 154). For instance, in the Work Programme 2014 only 6% of the total budget went to the social sciences and humanities (SSH) (European Commission 2016: 42).

Such an instrumental thrust, be it economistic ("competitiveness") or political ("societal challenges"), of EU research and higher education policies is not particularly astonishing – after all, considering its emergence as a European *Economic* Union and current neoliberal orientation, who would expect the EU to promote the pursuit of knowledge for knowledge's sake?[64] However, I find it rather alarming that universities (or rather academics) appear to be increasingly pushed (or lured) by insufficient national funding into applying for EU funding that is not initially intended for basic, academic research but for industrial, applied research (cf. MVTU 2009: 19, University of Vienna 2015b: 20)[65]. Thus, they have to make their work appear to conform to this economistic logic without much discussion of the "undesirable side effects" of such a practice.[66]

To underline that argument, let us take a look at national research funding. In Austria, the proportions of expenditures for basic research only amount to 0.44% of the GDP. While from 2002 to 2007 public expenditure on corporate research rose by 48% (to 598 MM EUR), the one for academic research only rose by 25% (to 1,446 MM EUR) (Austrian Federal Government 2011: 19). In that regard, it is important to keep in mind that although the state is essential for the

[60] Horizon 2020 is "the financial instrument implementing the Innovation Union, a Europe 2020 flagship initiative aimed at securing Europe's global competitiveness" (see <https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/what-horizon-2020>, accessed 27 November 2016) and the EU's main instrument for funding research in Europe from 2014 to 2020 – apart from the European Structural and Investment Funds which, however, follow a different allocation logic that is (even) less based solely on academic excellence.

[61] See <http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/pdf/press/fact_sheet_on_horizon2020_budget.pdf> (accessed 28 July 2016).

[62] According to Nybom (2012) this happened on the initiative of "academics of science and private research foundations but *not* the universities […] *nor* national or EU research administrators and responsible European politicians" (ibid.: 178).

[63] See <https://erc.europa.eu/projects-and-results/statistics> (accessed 28 July 2016).

[64] Alternatively, it can be argued that basic research plays if not a prominent then at least an increasingly important role in EU research funding with the creation of the ERC.

[65] For instance, the European University Association claims that "[d]ecreases in public funding at national level put high pressure on universities to look for other sources" with the Danish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Higher Education expecting their universities to secure 2.5% of the Horizon 2020 funds (EUA 2015: 6). It also points out that the success rates for universities appear to be decreasing from 20% in FP7 to 14% in Horizon 2020 (ibid.: 7).

[66] Furthermore, the EU Director-General for Research and Innovation observes in a newspaper interview that it is those countries that invest most into research that are also most successful in EU programmes[56].

funding of basic research[67], it is not the biggest funder of research. In Austria 6,028 MM EUR were spent by business enterprise (including foreign business enterprise) on research and development (R&D) in 2013, compared to 3,216 MM EUR spent by the government.[68] On the other hand, the government contributed ca. 1,599 MM EUR in the same year to the R&D expenditure of Austrian universities (amounting to ca. 89% of the total expenditure), opposed to only ca. 87 MM EUR spent by business enterprises (amounting to ca. 5% of the total expenditure) (BMWFW 2015c: 103). In Denmark, business enterprise spent 36,253 MM DKK (4,866 MM EUR) on R&D in 2013, while government spent 17,684 MM DKK (2,374 MM EUR) on it.[69]

Bearing this disproportion in public and private funding in mind – and still referring to the OECD data from before – it is not surprising that in 2013 1,806 MM EUR (19.2%) were spent in Austria on basic research, whereas 3,403 MM EUR (ca. 36.2%) were spent on applied research and 4,204 MM EUR (ca. 44.6 %) on experimental development[70] – with 1,785 MM EUR spent on research and development in higher education on the natural sciences and engineering, whereas only 543 MM EUR were spent on the social sciences and humanities (SSH).[71] By comparison, 10,479 MM DKK (ca. 1,407 MM EUR = 19%) were spent in 2013 in Denmark on basic research, 20,273 MM DKK (ca. 2,721 MM EUR = 36.9%) on applied research and 24,244 MM DKK (ca. 3,254 MM EUR = 44.1%) on experimental development – with 15,156 MM DKK (ca. 2,034 MM EUR) in higher education on the natural sciences and engineering and 4,190 MM DKK (ca. 562 MM EUR) on the social sciences and humanities. These numbers are clear indicators of which kind of knowledge counts in the knowledge economy.

Another indicator – painting a similar picture – is the external funding the state allocates for basic and applied research. In 2014, the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), the main institution for promoting basic research in Austria, provided 211 MM EUR in funds (corresponding to an average approval rate of 25.6%) – with 80.9% of the funds going to the natural sciences and engineering (including medicine) and 19.1% to the humanities and social sciences on average in

[67] Accordingly, Newfield (2008: 196) reminds us that innovative research is characterised by "market failure", i.e. not "research fails markets, but that markets fail research: market calculations cannot correctly estimate basic research's future value". This circumstance is also acknowledged by the OECD (1996): "[M]uch of science is considered a *'public good'*, a good in which all who wish can and should share if social welfare is to be maximised. The public-good character of science means that, like other public goods such as environmental quality, the private sector may underinvest in its creation since it is unable to appropriate and profit adequately from its production. The government therefore has a role in ensuring and subsidising the creation of science to improve social welfare, just as it does in regulating environmental protection." (ibid.: 21) However, it adds that "the extent to which scientific knowledge can be appropriated, directly or indirectly, makes it necessary to modify or reject the idea that science is a public good" (ibid.: 22).

[68] See <http://www.oecd.org/innovation/inno/researchanddevelopmentstatisticsrds.htm> (accessed 16 April 2016).

[69] For the decline in federal R&D expenditures in relation to industry expenditure in the US since the late 1960s see Mirowski and Sent (2008: 659).

[70] These numbers correspond with those provided by Statistics Austria (see <http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/energie_umwelt_innovation_mobilitaet/forschung_und_innovation/f_und_e_in_allen_volkswirtschaftlichen_sektoren/index.html>, table "Ausgaben für F&E 2013 nach Durchführungssektoren und Forschungsarten", accessed 23 May 2016).

[71] Accordingly, the Austrian Ministry of Science, Research and Economy states that almost a quarter of the public funding for R&D was spent on the SSH in 2011 and 26% of university employees were attributable to this area – and 60% of all university students and graduates (BMWFW 2015a: 41f.). While the ministry takes this as a proof of the importance of the SSH for the Austrian science system, it can be equally regarded as a proof of it being underfunded.

the years 2009 to 2013 (BMWFW and BMVIT 2015: 48, 51).[72] On the other hand, the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG), the national agency for promoting application-focused, business-relevant research and development in Austria, provided a total of 617 MM EUR in funds (ibid.: 52) – nearly three times as much as the FWF. The Danish counterpart to the FWF, the Danish Council for Independent Research (DFF), provided an overall annual research funding of 148 MM EUR in the years 2009 to 2013 (corresponding to an average approval rate of 13%) – with 75.7% of the funds going to the natural sciences and engineering (including medicine) and 24.3% to the humanities and social sciences (UFM 2014: 13, the specification in % is according to my own calculation). On the other hand, the Danish counterpart to the FFG, the Innovation Fund Denmark (established in 2014), provided 213 MM EUR in funds in 2014 (ibid.: 11). Even on the level of universities, the institutional pillars of basic research, application-oriented research is increasingly prominent. For instance, in 2013 Austrian universities spent 57.8% of their budget for R&D on basic research, 35.1% on applied research and 7.1% on experimental development[70] – with 34.9% being spent on applied research and 2.2% on experimental development in the SSH (BMWFW 2015c: 107).

What I attempt to convey with these numbers is that basic research, although (still) central to the work of academics employed at universities, is not necessarily central to research policies that are increasingly geared towards the exploitation of research results – a development that can be summed up as follows:

> "Policy *for* Science" or the Vannevar Bush formula that characterized the first three decades after the Second World War was in practice abandoned in many European countries for something that rightfully could be labelled "politicized science". This gradually led to a growing tendency in research funding to replace the traditional criterion of academic excellence by more nebulous criteria, sometimes labelled "strategic", sometime [sic] "social-economic relevance", sometimes "mode 2", sometimes "the production of socially robust knowledge." […] The ultimate result has been a system of research funding where government earmarking, pork-barrelling and the "strategic" allocation of resources have become the rule rather than the exception. (Nybom 2012: 177)

> Because government increasingly values only work deemed 'economically useful' or providing 'policy-based evidence' (sic, Boden and Epstein, 2006: 226), academics are driven from 'blue skies', theoretically driven enquiry, or that which challenges received wisdoms. (Boden and Epstein 2011: 489)

Also, the SSH are pressured into occupying a marginal position in comparison to research in the natural sciences and engineering and/or moving into more application-oriented fields. In the following two subchapters I elaborate on this development, both from a more theoretical perspective (chapter 3.3.2) as well as a more descriptive perspective (chapter 3.3.3).

[72] A year later, that funding declined to 205 MM EUR amounting to an approval rate of 21.4% – with an average annual increase of the application volume of 12.2% between 2000 and 2015 that was only accompanied by an average annual increase in funding of 5.2% (FWF 2016: 26–28).

3.3.2 The New Production of Academic Knowledge: Mode 2 Science and the Triple Helix

This section addresses two affirmative (and influential) academic models of contemporary academic knowledge production that theorise the altered relationship between science and society respectively between universities, the state and the economy outlined in the previous chapter: Mode 2 and Triple Helix.[73]

Mode 2 Science has five major characteristics (Nowotny et al. 2003: 186–188, cf. Perry and Harloe 2007: 33f.): (1) It is generated within a context of *application*. (2) It is trans-disciplinary, i.e. a range of theoretical perspectives and practical methodologies is mobilised *to solve problems*. (3) It displays a "much greater diversity of the sites at which knowledge is produced, and in the types of knowledge produced" (Nowotny et al. 2003: 187). (4) Mode 2 Knowledge is highly reflexive, i.e. it is produced in "an intense (and perhaps endless) 'conversation' between research actors and research subjects" with problem-solving environments influencing "topic-choice and research-design as well as end-uses" (ibid.: 187). (5) It is subjected to novel forms of quality control as "the research 'game' is being joined by more and more players" and "clear and unchallengeable criteria, by which to determine quality, may no longer be available" (ibid.: 187), thus laying the ground for the advent of an audit culture into science (a concept that is further explained in chapter 4.5.1). What is striking is the central role problem-solving takes in Mode 2, where knowledge

> is now regarded not as a public good, but rather as 'intellectual property', which is produced, accumulated, and traded like other goods and services in the Knowledge Society. In the process, a new language has been invented – a language of application, relevance, contextualization, reach-out, technology transfer, and knowledge management. (Nowotny et al. 2003: 185)

While challenging the differentiation of basic and applied research, Mode 2 is clearly oriented towards applied research. Accordingly, Nowotny (2006: 24) asserts a growing contextualisation and sociation of scientific knowledge – positive designations of what others term "colonisation" (of the academic field) and "intrusion" (of economistic logics) or "the corruption of academic knowledge for applicatory interests" (Münch 2011: 70) – implying that science can no longer be regarded as an autonomous domain anymore. Instead, society is now "talking back" to science (Nowotny 2006: 27), which in Nowotny's view does not undermine the quality of scientific knowledge, i.e. its objectivity, but rather improves it by rendering it more reliable, i.e. "societally robust" (ibid.: 28–33). Accordingly, the authority of science becomes increasingly bound to concrete practice rather than to claims of truth/objectivity (ibid.: 35).[74]

Although they do not explicitly theorise the (neo-)capitalist context of "the new production of knowledge", Nowotny et al. (2003: 181–184) describe three trends that form the context for the emergence of Mode 2: (1) An increasing desire to steer research priorities within the context of global economic competitiveness. (2) The commercialisation of research, i.e. the "attempt to

[73] For an alternative overview of those two conceptions see Mirowski and Sent (2008: 667–670).
[74] In this context, Strathern (2004: 81) – referring to Dan Sperber – points out that "socially robust knowledge is usually authoritarian – transgressive contributions to knowledge find themselves pitted *against* the socially acceptable".

align public policy with market priorities in research policy – creating, what are, in effect, public-private partnerships" (ibid.: 182). (3) An increased concern regarding the accountability of science, meaning that "growing emphasis [is] placed upon the management of research – and, in particular, upon efforts to evaluate its effectiveness and assess its quality" (ibid.: 184). None of these trends should appear unfamiliar to the reader by now – just as their argument that "the great sub-systems of modernity (State, Market, Culture – and Science), once clearly partitioned, were becoming increasingly transgressive" (ibid.: 190). Essentially, this account of "the new production of knowledge" otherwise operates under the term "knowledge society" (Weingart 1997: 23).

Nowotny (2006: 24–27) furthers yet another argument drawing on the erosion of the distinctiveness of the state, the market, culture and thus the autonomy of science: the shift to a Mode 2 Science takes place in the development of a Mode 2 Society which is characterised by an increasing complexity and uncertainty. Again, Nowotny (2006) promotes a positive view of this uncertainty as a crucial element of the mutual progress of both science and society.

> The modern enterprise of research has turned into a giant and unique innovation machine that simultaneously strengthens scientific creativity and selectively sifts out which ideas, newly discovered phenomena or new methods and technologies should be taken up and developed. (ibid.: 26)

In this regard, she notes that in a Mode 2 Society scientific knowledge is not only incomplete according to the traditional understanding of it being bound to be replaced by a more advanced knowledge (cf. Weber 2008: 34), but also in the sense that it is "exposed to stiff competition and is no longer only subject to the control of academic experts" (Nowotny 2006: 32, my translation).

Another academic concept developed in the mid-1990s also addresses opportunely the contemporary role of research and universities for those promoting the usefulness of science in a knowledge economy: that of the *Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations*. The Triple Helix thesis basically states that "the university can play an enhanced role in innovation in increasingly knowledge-based societies" (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000: 109). In accordance with Nowotny's et al. (2003) assertion of the growing importance of the context of application in Mode 2 Science, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) state that the "'endless frontier' of basic research funded as an end in itself, with only long-term practical results expected, is being replaced by an 'endless transition' model in which basic research is linked to utilization through a series of intermediate processes" (ibid.: 110).[75] Similar to Mode 2, in the (contemporary) Triple Helix III the institutional spheres of the state, industry and academia increasingly overlap, "with each taking the role of the other and with hybrid organizations emerging at the interfaces" (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000: 111, cf. Etzkowitz et al. 2000: 315).

Moreover, like Mode 2, the Triple Helix model privileges change over stability (as is usually the case with an entrepreneurial paradigm promoting innovation), as "the innovator(s) and the

[75] However, they point out that the "so-called Mode 2 is not new; it is the original format of science before its academic institutionalization in the 19th century" (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000: 116).

innovated system(s) are expected to be changed by the innovation" (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000: 114) and "innovation systems should be considered as the dynamics of *change* in systems of both production and distribution" (ibid.: 115).

Both Mode 2 Science and the Triple Helix display strong similarities with the idea of neoliberalism as a reconfiguration of the relationship between the state, the market and society, as "the blurring of distinctions between university and corporation, or 'public versus private' science, found in both mode 2 and 3H are derivative representations of the larger neoliberal agenda" (Mirowski and Sent 2008: 670f.). Moreover, both conceptions correspond with Sennett's (2006) "culture of the new capitalism" as well as Boltanski and Chiapello's (2001) "new spirit of capitalism" with their emphasis on uncertainty, flexibility and short-term problem solving and that of the managerialisation of universities which is undermining academic autonomy and installing new forms of legitimation (cf. chapter 4.5). However, they let these developments shine in a much more promising light. While they resort to an appealing (and compelling) rhetoric of "let us/we have to break down barriers in order to create something useful together", they obscure questions of what this new togetherness (for example in regard to power relations between different actors) or usefulness (for example who in fact benefits from this cooperation[76]) entails. Instead, these discourses tend to disregard the down sides of the transformations they describe as well as differing interests of academic, business and government actors such as the circumstance that

> [w]hile in firms problem-solving in a rapidly changing environment is the rule, and value is given to flexibility rather than specialisation, university research tends to be carried out in a controlled world where continuity and specialisation are important. Academic scholars are rewarded through publishing original ideas or novel findings, while industry has little or no interest in novel ideas related to basic research and often seeks to delay or prevent publication (Cooke, Boekholt and Tödtling 2000). (Fischer et al. 2001: 61)

I am not arguing that expectations of research to be innovative or education to prepare students for the labour market should be rejected by academics; nor do I doubt that universities are and should be as relevant for society as society is for them[77]. My concern has to do with two issues: (1) The increasing blurring of borders between basic and applied research and the concomitant extension of a science model that subordinates science to the needs of a neoliberalised state and the economy/industry. This new model of science is currently applied as a "one-size-fits-all model to the broader range of scientific and scholarly activity and to the determination of relative value" (Brenneis 2004: 583), thereby undermining the relevance and role of academic disciplines oriented towards basic research and a humanistic conception of higher education (as is particularly the case in the humanities and social sciences) while simultaneously transforming

[76] McGill Peterson (2015) argues that "[a]s we look to the future, we need to reckon with what 'useful' means in considering higher education's obligations to its students and society. If the core mission is to educate students well for a lifetime, its usefulness will include an intellect developed for a personally rewarding life, the wherewithal for informed citizenship, and the ability to move productively between multiple jobs and careers" (ibid.: 14).

[77] For instance, Marilyn Strathern (2004: 2), a critic of the concept of Mode 2 and grande dame of British anthropology, states that "one way in which the social sciences 'advance' is in response to current issues, especially when couched in terms of public concern".

them according to the image of disciplines oriented towards economic and/or political applicability.[78] (2) The consequences for those who operate Nowotny's "unique innovation machine" driven by uncertainty and competition.

While the second part of this thesis elaborates on the second matter, I want to conclude this chapter by reminding the reader that as contested as Mode 2 may be in academia (cf. Nowotny et al. 2003: 189f., Strathern 2000: 296f., Weingart 1997), it is incontestably influential in the science-political realm. After all, Nowotny was President of the European Research Council from 2010–2013[79] and the OECD (1996) already refers to it (briefly after its first publication) in its influential report on "the knowledge-based economy". This political compatibility is not particularly surprising, considering that the conception of a Mode 2 Science emphasises the applicability of research and claims to reduce the tensions between mass access to higher education and high-quality research as "new synergies [become] apparent between the democratization of higher education and the wider social distribution of knowledge production" (Nowotny et al. 2003: 188).[80] Although Nowotny et al. (2003) assert that "by questioning the linearity and predictability of the research process" they intend to call into question "definitions of applied as well as pure research" rather than to create "a new-fangled label for applied science or programmatic research" (ibid.: 190), their reflections – as those of Etzkowitz et al. (2000) – easily offer themselves to policymakers who look for the "useful" in research rather than the "impartial, disinterested academic interest" in their research policies. Their all in all rather positive assessment of the current developments of science (policy) is certainly more appealing to policymakers, lending itself easily for legitimizing their programme(s), than other, overtly critical and partly even hostile accounts presented in this chapter. Hence, whereas it remains questionable whether the description and simultaneous prescription of Mode 2 Science and a Triple Helix of university-industry-government relations in fact empowers "citizens" or creates superior academic knowledge (cf. Nowotny 2006: 41) and "creative tension" that productively reconciles the university's (seemingly) conflicting missions (Etzkowitz et al. 2000: 326), it is safe to say that it does strengthen the position of policymakers while weakening that of (non-economic) academic expertise.

[78] As Bloch (2015) states (addressing the relationship of anthropology and cognitive science): "The question then becomes whether there is a different role for anthropologists who ask fundamental questions about the nature of human society to that, for example, journalists who expose abuses or NGOs who try to alleviate situations of obvious injustice. My view is that there is room for both kinds of activities, and that the two kinds of activities *should be* separate and *should* keep their distance. […] [W]hen it comes to the job of the anthropologist, it is important to also step back and engage in a far more general understanding of the situation, that is, in terms of the general characteristics of human beings, of the interrelation of their minds, their history and their society." (ibid.: 223)

[79] She is for example also the only person aside from the minister who is allowed to raise her voice in the "action plan for a competitive research area" of the Austrian Ministry of Science, Research and Economy (BMWFW 2015a).

[80] Likewise, the Triple Helix model professes to explain "why the tensions [between the interests of the state, industry and academia, author's note] need not be resolved" (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000: 119) or why the (increasingly) diverse elements of the contemporary university (such as applied and basic or entrepreneurial and scholastic) exist "in a creative tension that periodically come into conflict" that is however typically resolved, reconciling "different end even seemingly opposed ideological elements" (Etzkowitz et al. 2000: 326).

3.3.3 The New Relevance of Academic Knowledge

The developments outlined in the previous chapter shift understandings of research and higher education from more theory-driven or "humanistic" towards more application-oriented conceptions. These "colonising" (or transformative) effects on the university's traditional missions are, in my opinion, most impressionably reflected in three terms: innovation, employability and interdisciplinarity.

3.3.3.1 The New Relevance of Research: Innovation

While chapter 3.2.2 shows how the rise of the project form/logic privileges notions of application-oriented research, this chapter elaborates on requirements regarding the content of research that drive the ascent of an instrumental understanding of research. In that regard, the "galloping corporatization of the university" caused (or at least accompanied) by the rise of the third mission signifies a "shift in the status of commercialization as a possible outcome to a key objective of academic research" (Amit 2000: 220) – a shift that was already analysed by Slaughter and Leslie (1997) in their study of academic capitalism as one "from basic or curiosity-driven research to targeted or commercial or strategic research" (ibid.: 14f.).

> [P]olicy makers at the level of the nation state, whether responding to pressures from the market, international capital mobility, or the business class, are concentrating state moneys on higher education units that aid in managing or enhancing innovation and thereby, competitiveness. (ibid.: 14).

This circumstance is for example expressed by an increasing connotation of the term "excellent", a notion that is commonly understood by academics – at least those I encountered in my fieldwork – in terms of a significant contribution to basic research – with "economically successful". Intriguing examples for this are that the Europe 2020 strategy expects member states to "reform national (and regional) R&D and innovation systems to foster excellence and smart specialisation, reinforce cooperation between universities, research and business" (European Commission 2010: 13)[81] or that the "Excellent Science" section of Horizon 2020 comprises, besides the European Research Council, the Future and Emerging Technologies initiative that aims at turning "Europe's excellent science base into a competitive advantage"[82]. Other examples for the decreasing significance of basic research – with strategic research simultaneously gaining ground – include governments and academics legitimising basic research through a potential prospective benefit or even profit[83] and the significant contraction of the period in

[81] Whereas the Smart Specialisation Strategies tied to the EU Structural Funds that steer the priorities of research institutions towards engagement with business appear to provide relatively little incentive for Austrian and Danish universities to follow their econom(ist)ic agenda, this may be different for countries like for example Greece or Bulgaria that receive much more money out of these funds (in comparison to public national funding for universities) (see <http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/factsheets/2016/>, accessed 31 July 2016).

[82] See <https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/future-and-emerging-technologies> (accessed 14 April 2016).

[83] "In its most common form, this acceptance [of a populist devaluation of the intellectual enterprise, author's note] manifests itself in somewhat apologetic efforts by scholars to justify basic research as *eventually* if not immediately leading to socially useful or commercially applicable products. So, the difference between basic and product-driven research of the kind increasingly promoted by […] governments and research councils becomes just a matter of timeline rather than of ontology." (Amit 2000: 222)

which scientific knowledge needs to prove its applicability[84]. This increasing emphasis on demonstrable short-term utility of academic research has profound effects as

> open-ended, exploratory research is curtailed by the emphasis on demonstrable return on investment and accountability metrics. This is especially true for qualitative methods. A tremendous amount of high-quality ethnographic research begins not with a roadmap to its conclusions but with a hunting licence for looking. One can find evidence for this curtailment of hunting licence epistemology in the requirements of funding agencies […]. While the road-map approach is likely to yield efficiency gains, one only needs to think about what passes as ethnography within marketing research to worry that removing too much uncertainty from the early stages of observational research often yields mind-numbing narrow and very often exploitative insights into the human condition. (Hoffman 2011b: 504)

The contraction of research time is accompanied by what we could call a "contractualisation" of research respectively an increase of an "often undeclared but de facto 'contract' research", i.e. "the increasing intervention by state and/or commercial business interests in the delineation of the strategic objectives of scholarly research" (Amit 2012: 290). As knowledge ceases to be primarily oriented towards finding the truth and turns into a marketable commodity (Bührmann 2010: 337) and "[g]iven the increased participation of academics in entrepreneurial activities and the failure to define this new role as deviant, it can be concluded that the capitalization of knowledge appears to be taking increasing precedence over disinterestedness as a norm of science" (Etzkowitz et al. 2000: 315).

> A culture combining competitivity and the requirement to address social and economic problems and to demonstrate impact (or benefit) has driven research into specific (generally applied) areas of enquiry, and encouraged national and international collaborations. The emphasis on application, interdisciplinarity and usefulness has promoted specific forms of research engagement. (Fanghanel 2012: 87)

The commercialisation of research is epitomised by one term: innovation.[85] The OECD and Eurostat (2005) define innovation as "the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or external relations" (ibid.: 46). This is a crucial point considering that innovation increasingly serves as a buzzword in research funding: we should not confuse innovation with invention. Innovation is not an academic category but an economic one as it does not mean original research but the *implementation* of research results creating "commercial and societal value"[86] (Danish Government 2012: 4). "Innovation differs from invention, new ideas or novelty, however, in that it leads to commercialisation." (Kenway et al. 2004: 331) Moreover, "the terminology and infrastructure of innovation has had a strong bias towards an assumption of a scientific or technological basis", thereby largely ignoring the –

[84] "The period of trust in the expected return of investment is becoming briefer. The freedom of research becomes narrower, the societal demands and control become more direct." (Weingart 1997: 23, my translation, cf. Brenneis 2012: 295f.)
[85] It was Schumpeter who first theorised innovation as a key factor of economic growth (Kenway et al. 2004: 331).
[86] For the alleged linkage between innovation and market competition see for example Madelin and Ringrose (2016: 94f.).

again instrumentalised, i.e. framed in respect of their contribution to the solution of "Grand Challenges" – role of the social sciences and humanities (European Commission 2011: VIII).

Thus, innovation – just like interdisciplinarity (cf. chapter 3.3.3.3) – can be regarded as a phenomenon of crisis-response that did not gain prominence in science policy in the last decade because it promised better (basic) research, but because as "many OECD countries have entered a period of slow growth, high unemployment, and low demand and high public deficits […] innovation is thus seen a key to re-start growth and investment" (OECD 2013: 13, cf. Austrian Federal Government 2011: 6, cf. Danish Government 2012: 3). In short: discourses of innovation do not acknowledge knowledge that cannot be commercialised. Instead, they regard research as a means to an economic end.[87]

However, although basic research is by definition not geared towards economic application, it is considered as "one of the major pillars of the innovation system" (Austrian Federal Government 2011: 18) – an innovation system that the President of the Austrian Economic Chambers invokes as Austria's (only) chance of succeeding in a global economic competition and expects to be generated by having technical universities cooperate closely with companies.[88] Yet not only governments and Presidents of Economic Chambers (or of universities of technology) emphasise the economic importance of the knowledge they generate. Also the University of Copenhagen (2015: 11) attests that "[t]he development of knowledge generated by basic research and the innovative potential of research are two sides of the same coin". More cautious in its wording, the University of Vienna (2015b: 6f.) commits itself to basic research (using the term "anwendungsoffen" that can be interpreted both as "free of specific applications" as well as "open to specific applications"), while adding that it should take a more active role in the innovation process and that there is no clear division between basic research and its utilisation.

As shown in chapter 3.3.1 regarding the extent of basic vs. application-oriented research funding, (economic) innovation increasingly trumps (academic) invention when it comes to remuneration – on the general level of R&D funding, but also in regard to research conducted at universities. A quick glance at the names of research ministries respectively national or European research policies suffices to discover the current prominence of innovation. For instance, research agendas in Austria are mainly located in the Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology as well as the Ministry of Science, Research and Economy, with the Austrian government

[87] A telling example in that regard is the explanation of Philipp Weckherlin, co-founder of the Swiss financial consultancy CE Asset Management that annually ranks the best 100 listed companies worldwide, for the relatively poor rating of European companies: they lack innovation. By this he does not mean that they lack excellent researchers, but that they hesitate to optimise the added value by outsourcing work to cheaper foreign countries. ("Was Europas Unternehmen fehlt" by Karl Gaulhofer, *Die Presse*, 19 May 2016, 16) Another example is the claim made by Ludovit Garzik, CEO of the Austrian Council for Research and Technology Development, that the innovation system in Salzburg (a region in Austria) is suffering because of the distinct cultural tradition in the region that encourages young people to orient their career paths towards culture and administration. Instead, PhD supervisors and rectors should promote entrepreneurship in their organisations. ("Zu viel Kultur kann die Innovation verhindern" by Veronika Schmidt, *Die Presse*, 31 October 2015, 35) In his account, innovation is the victim of culture rather than the other way around (as argued in this chapter). Either way, both accounts attest that the traditional "cultural" mission of universities appears to conflict with the new mission of creating profit rather than complementing each other.

[88] "Wir sind satt und selbstzufrieden" by Judith Hecht, *Die Presse*, 23 February 2016, 13.

being committed to becoming an innovation leader (Austrian Federal Government 2011: 2) and orienting research towards societal challenges (including the potentials of the humanities and social sciences), as well as strengthen the cooperation between the economy and academia (Austrian Federal Government 2013: 30). As for the EU policy context, a look at the Europe 2020 flagship initiative "Innovation Union" (one out of seven) and the sections of its financial instrument, the Horizon 2020 programme, equally warrants the discovery of innovation as a – if not *the* – buzzword of research policies and funding initiatives.[89] A telling example of the prevalence of the term is a guest commentary by the Rector of the University of Vienna in which he announces the establishment of "thematically innovative professorships" and finishes with emphasising the importance of sufficient university funding for Austria's ability to innovate.[90]

In this regard, I find a speech given by José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission at the time, on 9 December 2010 concerning the Marie Curie Actions research funding programme of the European Commission (now in the Horizon 2020 programme called Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions) most revealing. The Marie Curie Actions are not just any research fellowship programme but the EU's flagship programme for supporting the training and mobility of researchers – she who receives a Marie Curie Actions doctoral or postdoctoral fellowship finds herself in a privileged position (in the competition for an academic career) compared to most of her nationally (or non-) funded colleagues. In this context, Barroso shares his conviction that "excellence and collaboration in research and innovation, carried out by high quality researchers, can fuel Europe's climb back to growth"[91]. It is this narrative of (economic) growth that constitutes the common thread of Barroso's speech about the role of research in Europe. Granted, he states that "[t]his is not only about science and technology-based innovation but also about design and creativity and about social innovation"[91]. However, terms like humanist, cultural or critical remain absent in his speech on the role of research in Europe. Rather, European research policy is simultaneously economic policy insofar as it aims at

> removing bottlenecks to cooperation and cross-border mobility and between academia and industry, and improving access to finance for innovation, [so] we can free up Europe's creativity. This is how we ensure that innovative ideas do not remain stuck on the drawing-board, but are turned into products and services that create growth and jobs.[91]

All in all, Barroso uses the term "excellence" (or excellent) three times in his speech – always in combination with "innovation". On the other hand, he uses "innovation" (or innovative) 24 times in what equals three pages of written text. So far, so unambiguous. From such a point of view it is only logical to demand that "[b]usiness should be more involved in curricula development and doctoral training, so that skills better match their requirements, and so that, ultimately, we get more innovation out of our research"[91]. We need to remember that it is in this policy context that Barroso states that "the EU will need at least one million new research jobs"[91]. Thus, it is safe to

[89] My personal favourite is the renaming of the FP7 Marie Curie Action "Initial Training Networks" into "Innovative Training Networks" in Horizon 2020.
[90] "Mehr Geld für die Unis als ein erster wichtiger Schritt" by Heinz W. Engl, *Die Presse*, 30 June 2017, 27.
[91] See <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-745_en.htm> (accessed 22 March 2016).

assume that he did not have researchers in mind driven by the traditional academic ethos outlined in chapter 2 but rather "knowledge workers".

Hence, imagine my surprise when Barroso locates the spirit of the Marie Curie Actions of all things in Einstein's passionate curiosity. "My great pride today is that with Marie Curie Actions, we can give free rein to the curiosity and hunger for discovery of the whole scientific community."[91] How he arrives from the resolve of "transforming Europe into a highly competitive knowledge-based society" at Weber's "science as a vocation" is hard to grasp – at least for me. I am left to assume that the latter is supposed to serve as a vehicle for enforcing the former, i.e. that Barroso is employing a double shuffle strategy (cf. Wright and Ørberg 2011), as I doubt that Weber (2008) meant "fuelling economic growth" when he demanded of a researcher "to enter into the idea that the destiny of his soul depends on his being right about this particular conjectural emendation at this point in this manuscript" (ibid.: 31). In fact, when explaining to his audience what the value of science is, he comes up with a series of historical possibilities – from "the path to true being", "the path to true art", "the path to true nature", "the path to the true God", "the path to true happiness" to "presuppositionless science" (ibid.: 39f.) – but "the path to economic growth" is not among them. On the contrary, his "man of science" "maintains that he pursues science 'for its own sake' and not because it will make it possible for others to attain commercial or technical success, such as enabling them to feed, clothe, light, or govern themselves better" (ibid.: 34). It is hardly surprising that Weber did not use Barroso's rhetoric when elaborating on the value of research and education. What is surprising is that Barroso assigned a significantly differing and even contradictory purpose to research and education, while at the same time invoking Weber's notion of how to pursue that purpose. However, there is also another explanation for Barroso's equation of Weber's traditional researcher with his entrepreneurial researcher: that he in fact believes them not to be contradictory. This contradiction is (seemingly) resolved by drawing on a similarity between these two figures: the passionate pursuit of their work and "hunger for discovery" that gains them recognition. To consider the symbolic gratification of the first as the monetary remuneration of the latter takes only a small step in an economised world. Consequently, despite the academic and the entrepreneur appearing to be worlds apart in a Weberian view, they fuse into the entrepreneurial academic (cf. chapter 4.6), thereby seemingly resolving that contradiction.

3.3.3.2 The New Relevance of Education: Employability

There are (at least) two sides to the economisation of education. One is the generating of income for universities by providing educational services to students as their customers. As neither in Austria nor in Denmark universities may charge (high) tuition fees to EU students, this aspect plays a minor role. The other, which most of the authors quoted in this chapter refer to, is the alignment of university education according to its applicability in the non-academic labour market in line with "an overall imperative for a shift from providing social and cultural capital to professional elites to preparing the workers of the knowledge society by equipping them with fairly practical and technical skills and knowledge" (Nedeva 2007: 95). This conception – which

has become commonplace in Austria and even more so in Denmark – is epitomised by one term: employability.

We can regard employability as innovation's counterpart in education, with its antagonist being a "humanistic" or "liberal" conception of education that aims at creating responsible citizens as well as at fostering the autonomy and agency of its subjects (cf. Liessmann 2006: 148) – i.e. at providing character formation rather than job training[92]. Such a conception appears to have become rather anachronistic in a societal environment in which the university "no longer participates in the historical project for humanity that was the legacy of the Enlightenment: the historical project of culture" (Readings 1996: 5)[93] and education turns from a public good into an economised commodity geared towards the (self-)optimisation of "human capital", while visions of self-realisation and self-empowerment lose their significance (Bührmann 2010: 338, Faschingeder et al. 2005: 7, cf. Lorenz 2012: 621–625). Take for example Borrero's (1991) account of the university's educational function for the 2nd UNESCO/NGO Consultation on Higher Education Issues stating that

> the teaching and educational mission which the university proposes for itself as an institution for…
> …the integral education of the person…
> …must actively keep in mind the following considerations:
> That the teaching function or task is not limited to the everyday contribution of the scientific disciplines. […] That the cultural formation of the student is not satisfied with making him an informal beneficiary and admirer of cultural values, for he has to be a builder of personal, social and national culture. […] That the student's integral work preparation should not be reduced to the sole servile function of satisfying demands, complaints and gaps in work organization and distribution. […] They will be even more necessary, judicious and successful if they are not simply planned and cut down to fit the size of the job, dispensing with a person's spiritual, intellectual and moral aspects (ibid.: 13f.)

and contrast it with the conception of the university's educational mission that the OECD (1996) promotes five years later:

> In the knowledge-based economy, learning becomes extremely important in determining the fate of individuals, firms and national economies. Human capabilities for learning new skills and applying them are key to absorbing and using new technologies. Properly-trained researchers and technicians are essential for producing and applying both scientific and technological knowledge. (ibid.: 23)

> In the case of higher education, **university/industry collaborations** bring with them opportunities to increase the relevance of the university's educational mission and to stimulate new research directions. They provide a means both for the efficient transfer of economically useful knowledge and for advanced training in skills required by industry. (ibid.: 25)

Apparently, it is the latter, economistic and instrumental vision of higher education that we currently predominantly encounter in higher education policies. Not only has this third mission

[92] The German distinction between "Bildung" and "Ausbildung" may be more appropriate – or at least elegant.
[93] Consequently, Readings (1996) calls the contemporary university "posthistorical" "in order to insist upon the sense that the institution has outlived itself, is now a survivor of the era in which it defined itself in terms of the project of the historical development, affirmation, and inculcation of national culture" (ibid.: 6).

drastically undermined the university's cultural mission, but its social mission as well. In this context, Musselin (2015) points out that

> [r]ecently, the social contribution of higher education has been ignored or even distained by policymakers, the governments of developed countries, as they stressed the need for more knowledge and innovation in order to promote economic progress. Training more highly qualified workers, able to understand and produce knowledge, was presented as a challenge for countries involved in the global knowledge economy. What was learned at universities was considered to be less important than the job one could obtain at the end of their studies. (ibid.: 13)

This view is shared by a large number of scholars across Europe and beyond. For instance, Fanghanel (2012: 7) distinguishes two main "educational identities" and suggest "that the latter is a dominant model in higher education".

> [E]ducation perceived as an end in itself and education as a means to an end. In the first perspective, learning is valued for its own sake, as a goal in itself. It is a view of education based on Humboldt's sense of the unity of knowledge […]. In the second ideological perspective, education is perceived with reference to its economic value. A 'human capital' theory (Schultz, 1963; Becker, 1993) of education promotes a view of higher education as the lever of economic capacity, and/or as a point of entry into the labour market. (ibid.: 7)[94]

Accordingly, Shore (2010) notes that the massification of universities in combination with a steep decline in government funding per student marks "a wider paradigm shift from the idea of tertiary education as a 'public good' geared to producing an educated citizenry to a conception of higher education as an individual economic investment" (ibid.: 15). In this context, Barcan (2013) points out that the humanities "have lost their civic or national functions and are perceived as a marker of preferences, interests and priorities that are purely *individual* in nature" (ibid.: 23), while simultaneously "'personal benefit' has taken on an increasingly narrow tenor in much public and political discourse: as economic benefit to individuals" (ibid.: 61). Under the pressure to impart practical or marketable knowledge, studying increasingly turns into human resource development rather than personal development (Weiskopf 2005: 182).

Of course, demands for an orientation towards application in teaching (and research) are no evidence per se for a neoliberal logic at work, as they also correspond for example with students' critique of the early 1970s (Gingrich 2003: 74f.). However, there is a difference in who sets the objectives of this orientation and what these objectives are. If they are not set by students of the early 1970s but a neoliberal state of the early 2000s and if they are geared towards the job market (and maybe even the maximisation of income), putting employability rather than the transfer

[94] However, she adds that there are also other dimensions of higher education such as personal growth and social progress or education as a human right and consequently distinguishes between three forms of educational ideologies: First *production ideologies* "with a focus on the direct link between higher education and the world of work"; second *reproduction ideologies* "which convey conceptions of the virtue of education for its own sake […] and transmitting tenets of a discipline"; and third *transformation ideologies* "which emphasize education for social, personal, human or global transformation" (Fanghanel 2012: 7f.). While I am not sure whether I agree with her to subsume both notions of a "humanistic" or "liberal" approach as well as an "academic-vocational", discipline-oriented approach under the same category (with "reproductive" in my opinion rather referring to the latter), I do agree with her assessment that economistic rationales of higher education are rapidly gaining ground while more traditional rationales are on the retreat (at least in the policy discourse).

of academic knowledge or social participation/mobility on top of the agenda of universities (cf. Reinprecht 2005: 130f.), then I believe we may very well identify this development as neoliberal.

There is a certain irony in the fact that "higher" education appears to currently not have much of a higher meaning besides that of training people to become productive knowledge workers. However, the knowledge economy may not even need as many academically educated people as its proponents claim. Take for example Sennett's (2006) observation that

> [t]he skills economy still leaves behind the majority; more finely, the education system turns out large numbers of unemployable educated young people, at least unemployable in the domains for which they have trained. […] [T]he skills society may need only a relatively small number of the educated who possess talent; especially in the cutting-edge realms of high finance, advanced technology, and sophisticated services. The economic machine may be able to run profitably and efficiently by drawing on an ever-smaller elite. (ibid.: 86)

Accordingly, "the spectre of uselessness" may loom larger over academics – even those trying to purse a useful, applicable approach – than they think, driven forward by the global labour supply, automation (that subtracts labour not simply from mechanical tasks but in the human-service sector as well[95]) and the management of aging (that devalues both older employees as well as working experience) (Sennett 2006: 86–99). Seen from this angle, it is not astonishing that students, governments and occasionally academics (at least if they are pushed by university managers to do so) worry about employability. Besides, we should not forget that a "humanistic" or "liberal" concept of university education is rooted in the (historical) context of elitist universities, appearing to be a valid option only for those who can afford it. Accordingly, criticising the economisation of higher education runs the risk of being in turn criticised for being an elitist endeavour. However, we as a society should ask ourselves if we (want to) live in a society that cannot afford its universities to offer a "higher" education to more of its citizen and if universities, just after having opened their gates to a larger proportion of the population, should in fact abandon this mission. After all, Trow (2005), a proponent of realistic student fees (ibid.: 52) who expects private business and industry to increasingly pay for (higher) education (ibid.: 57), reminds us that

> [s]ome kinds of education, perhaps the most important kinds, involve the shaping of mind and character, not only the way we think but also the way we feel and see the world. That kind of education, we have learned, requires that people care about one another beyond their usefulness to one another as carriers and recipients of bodies of information and skill. (ibid.: 59)

Finally, we as representatives of disciplines farther removed from market potential have to ask ourselves if we want to and convincingly can define our work according to (traditionally) non-academic criteria.

[95] For instance, the World Economic Forum expects a net loss of 5 MM jobs (mostly for white-collar workers) due to digitalisation and automation until 2020 ("'Fünf Millionen Jobs gehen verloren'" by ju/red., *Die Presse*, 18 January 2016, 5).

3.3.3.3 *The Rise of Interdisciplinarity*

There is another buzzword accompanying the ascent of the third mission, concerning both research and higher education: interdisciplinarity.[96] Although interdisciplinarity "has been long with us" (Strathern 2004: 69), it is not so much the "epistemic push" for interdisciplinary research dating back at least to the 1920s than the push of "federal agencies and private foundations looking to invest in problem-driven research". In combination with universities chasing revenue and grant opportunities, this has established interdisciplinarity "as a totalising mode of academic being" (Strathern 2004: 69). Along a similar line of argument, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) point out that "[n]ewly created disciplines are often the basis for these heightened expectations [that science will increasingly contribute to economic growth, author's note]" and that those new disciplines have arisen "through syntheses of practical and theoretical interests" (ibid.: 117). From this point of view, interdisciplinarity does not simply move beyond disciplinary borders but also beyond an academic orientation (in the sense of theory-driven, basic research) towards an application orientation. Thus, interdisciplinarity constitutes a key conceptual vocabulary of academic capitalism (Hoffman 2011a: 457, cf. chapter 4.4.1) as well as a phenomenon of crisis-response, as "such situations are often identifiable by the *multi-* or *interdisciplinary* nature of the expertise they seem to summon" (Strathern 2004: 2). From this point of view, "social science moves into these new fields not so much as a result of internal policy making, that is, as an outcome of its own theory-driven questions, but rather as an outcome of its largely responsive mode" (ibid.: 4f.).[97]

While in Denmark the re-organisation of Aarhus University may be an extreme example in that regard, interdisciplinarity is also gaining ground at the University of Copenhagen with the university having created a "2016 Pool" consisting of 400 MM DKK (ca. 54 MM EUR for interdisciplinary research and 80 MM DKK (ca. 11 MM EUR for interdisciplinary educational initiatives for the period of 2013–2017 (University of Copenhagen 2015: 41) – money that lead to several PhD and Postdoc positions at the Department of Anthropology. Moreover, the department currently offers two interdisciplinary Master's degrees in "Global Development" (with the Department of Economics & the Faculty of Science) and in "Global Health" (with the Faculty of Health Sciences).[98] Besides, in the university's "2016 strategy", a professor of the Department of

[96] Like Strathern (2004: 70), I do not make an analytical distinction between multi-, inter- and transdisciplinarity but take them as "indigenous classifications". Yet I am aware that there is one, with multidisciplinarity referring to the alignment of skills from different disciplines, interdisciplinarity to a common framework shared across disciplines and transdisciplinarity crossing disciplinary boundaries even further beyond institutional boarders (reaching beyond academia in the sense of Mode 2 and the Triple Helix).

[97] However, Greenwood (2007) claims that "[n]owhere else in the university do we find such hermetic, discipline-dominated and self-regarding behaviour as in the conventional social sciences" (ibid.: 107) under which he subsumes the academic disciplines of economics, sociology, political science, psychology and anthropology. "[I]t is quite clear that the conventional social sciences are mainly cartel-like organizations that consume their own products and promote their own interests, usually in a language unintelligible even to a well-educated person. Mono-disciplinarity and highly territorial behaviour are hallmarks of these fields, except among the most prominent and respected practitioners like Anthony Giddens, James Scott, Pierre Bourdieu, Clifford Geertz, Amartya Sen, and Albert Hirschman." (ibid.: 108)

[98] Younger universities appear to be even more embracing the interdisciplinary paradigm. For example, students can enroll in "techno-anthropology" at the University of Aalborg (established in 1974) or "market anthropology" at the University of Southern Denmark (established in 1998).

Anthropology states that "[w]e have something to look forward to: A greater collaboration between the faculties and individual academic fields" (University of Copenhagen 2012: 35). Although I assume that such a cooperation was not previously prohibited, it is now clearly encouraged – not only by the university, but also by private foundations such as the Velux Foundations and the Carlsberg Foundation too (not to mention EU funding).

In comparison, interdisciplinarity appears to be less prominent at the University of Vienna[99] (yet), or at least at the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology – although topics that lend themselves for interdisciplinary approaches (such as climate change or urban anthropology – but not medical anthropology for instance) are gaining ground there as well. I assume this to be the case, because there is less (external) funding (from the university or private foundations) attracting anthropologists to pursue this orientation.

The appeal of interdisciplinarity (for policymakers and funding agencies) is that it promises to help solve complex problems – thus turning interdisciplinarity itself into "an index of accountability" (Strathern 2004: 79). Strathern (2004: 80) constructs the nexus of this argument as follows: Accountability as an index of society – interdisciplinarity as an index of accountability – problem-solving as an index of interdisciplinarity. Accordingly, Kerr and Lorenz-Meyer (2009: 154) identify accountability as one of the prominent logics that guide interdisciplinary practice – together with innovation and ontological change. Thus, just as is the case with international mobility (or risk-taking research), interdisciplinarity is equated with innovation and excellence – with the high quality it promotes (both in research and teaching) being oriented towards application.

There is yet another appeal of interdisciplinarity (rather for academics than policymakers), as its idea "is similar in tone and idealism to the classical liberal economics of free trade between sovereign trading partners", i.e. "the relationship involves the free exchange of goods or services between good-faith partners who stand to mutually benefit from each other's respective products or expertise" (Hoffman 2011a: 454). However, we should not forget that in practice interdisciplinarity "can involve hierarchies of knowledge, with one discipline in the service of another (for example studies of the social impact of science to improve its uptake)" (Kerr and Lorenz-Meyer 2009: 155).

3.4 Conclusion

Chapter 3 discusses three intertwined developments: the unleashing of the market, the delimitation, subjectification and flexibilisation of work and the instrumentalisation of research and higher education. The first transformation from the Fordist welfare state to the neoliberal competition state has been analysed in chapter 3.1 using the concept of neoliberalism that can be summarised in two words: competition and individualisation. Neoliberalism aims at extending a competitive model of the market into (originally) non-economic social arenas while promoting individual freedom, responsibility and merit by establishing the market as the universal model of

[99] In Austria, as in Denmark, younger universities display the impact of interdisciplinarity more strongly. For instance, the Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt (established in 1970) hosts the Faculty of Interdisciplinary Studies.

socialisation. Thus, according to the rationale of neoliberal governance "[t]o govern means to promote competition, to govern oneself means to promote one's own competitiveness" (Bröckling 2007: 107, my translation). Drawing on the work of Bourdieu, we can interpret neoliberalism as a dynamic of intrusion (based on symbolic power) of the market logic into all other fields of society. Alternatively, drawing on the work of Foucault, we can understand neoliberal governmentality as a change in public governance that expands the market as a regulating principle to all areas of social life, thereby promoting a mode of subjectification characterised by constant self-optimisation that aims at creating a competitive, entrepreneurial self. This development is exemplified by discourses about the creation of profit and/or economic growth through research or of employability through higher education, but also by the market-based alignment of institutional processes or the transfer of structures and control mechanisms from commercial into academic institutions in order to make these institutions "more efficient", i.e. to increase output and/or cut costs (as the next chapter shows).

Just as public governance has profoundly changed over the last three to four decades, so has the organisation of work. While the de-limitation and subjectification of work discussed in chapter 3.2 appear to transform "regular work" according to characteristics of academic work, the flexibilisation and projectification of academic work follows a new, post-Fordist logic of "regular work". In that regard, we can observe parallel processes of a "scientification of industrial work" as well as an "industrialisation of academic work". Drawing on the work of Boltanski and Chiapello (2001) and Sennett (2006), I have discussed a central feature of the second development as the projectification of academic work (particularly in research). With a (relative) reduction in basic public university funding as well as in permanent university positions, the project increasingly becomes the dominant form of academic research. Consequently, the active creation of networks becomes increasingly important for academic careers – networks that enable the participation in projects which in turn allow expanding these networks. While the demand for the involvement of the individual's whole personality in the work process resonates with the traditional vocational "nature" of academic work, the demand for flexibility – despite having a clear appeal for employees as it allows them to maximise the disgorgement of surplus value – conflicts both with the traditional "nature" of academic work as a craftsmanship pursued with relentless passion as well as of science as an explorative, boundless and highly specialised endeavour.

Chapter 3.3 takes up the topics of the previous two sub-chapters and relates them more specifically to the academic world by discussing the "academisation" or "scientification" of the economy and the concomitant economisation of science and higher education.[100] As the (national and supra-national) competition state (or union) struggles to increase its competitiveness (and that of its population), it increasingly links research and higher education policies to economic and labour market policies – thereby shifting understandings of research and higher education to-

[100] The same applies to the politicisation of science that occurs simultaneously with the scientification of politics – most notably in policy areas requiring particular legitimisation like environmental, health, energy and technology policy – with both processes being mediated by the mediasation of their relationship, i.e. their increased publicity (Weingart 1997: 18f.).

wards more application-oriented conceptions. In that regard, European research funding is paradigmatic for the contemporary understanding of science, with much funding being available for application-oriented research (keyword "impact"), relatively little funding for outstanding basic research (keyword "excellence") – and hardly anything left in between (i.e. the research that is provided by the majority of university-based academics). In such a (European) policy context, "universities' competitiveness is linked to national and regional competitiveness believed to foster economic goals such as growth, employment and welfare" (Erkkilä and Piironen 2014: 178), with (policy) paradigms such as the knowledge economy, Mode 2 Society or the Triple Helix seeking to bring different actors from government, industry, "society" and academia together in order to boost innovation (i.e. economic growth). However, whereas society (or at least politics) increasingly "talks back" to science, it appears that many scientists do not (yet) talk back to policymakers – and are not encouraged to do so.[101] If we as academics do not (more) actively discuss – among ourselves, as well as with policymakers – about what kind of relevance is expected from our work (and what kind is silenced) and act accordingly, in agreement between academics and their superiors (be they rectors, head of departments, project leaders or supervisors), others will continue to set the agenda (as increasingly fewer of us enjoy the "privilege" of academic freedom).[102] Then, we (particularly academics working on temporary contracts) do not only risk losing our jobs as their relevance may turn out to be short-lived in the eyes of those who finance them; we (as an academic community and society in general) also risk "surrendering too much scholarly ground, such as the liberal humanist idea of knowledge for knowledge's sake or the scientific valuation of curiosity-led research, in favour of brute utilitarianism" (Barcan 2013: 137).

4 The Neoliberal Economisation of Universities

The neoliberal economisation of universities resonates with the more general trend of the economisation of all areas of society analysed in chapter 3.1, the concomitant transformation of the organisation of work described in chapter 3.2 as well as with the new status of academic knowledge in the knowledge economy discussed in chapter 3.3. Shore (2010) summarises its effects as (1) the increased government intervention in and control over university research, "leaving little room for funding basic research", and (2) the commercialisation of academia (ibid.: 22).

> Universities are just one site among many where we can observe the effects of neoliberalism and the rise of 'New Public Management'. What we have witnessed here is the transformation of the traditional liberal and Enlightenment idea of the university as a place of higher learning into the

[101] One example of an academic sharply criticising the application orientation of university-based research at a public event is a speech given by Gottfried Schatz at the opening ceremony of the 650th anniversary of University of Vienna (see <https://medienportal.univie.ac.at/videos/650-jahr-jubilaeum/detailansicht/artikel/eroeffnungsfestakt-der-festvortrag-von-gottfried-schatz/>, accessed 23 July 2016).

[102] Along a similar line of reasoning, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) invoke the academic community "to debate the question of where to draw the line between public, non-profit, and for-profit activities, as well as who should draw the line" (ibid.: 331).

> modern idea of the university as corporate enterprise whose primary concern is with market share, servicing the needs of commerce, maximizing economic return and investment, and gaining competitive advantage in the 'Global Knowledge Economy'. Several factors are driving this process: the cost-cutting fiscal regime of 'economic rationalism' in which government funding for universities has been steadily eroded; the move from 'elite' to 'mass' university education, which has brought many more students with no comparable increase in permanent staff numbers; and the trend towards universities increasingly operating like private businesses, accompanied by the emergence of higher education as a significant export industry (New Zealand Government, 2001). Audits, performance indicators, competitive benchmarking exercises, league tables, management by targets, and punitive research assessment exercises and periodic teaching quality reviews are the technologies that have been used to spread new public management methods into the governance of universities – and all at a time when overall government funding for universities and per student has declined. (Shore 2008: 282)[103]

Despite the fact that neoliberalism is heterogeneous and contradictory both in theory and practice (Shore and Davidson 2014: 13, cf. chapter 3.1), we can detect a number of characteristics that the neoliberalised (or neoliberalising) university displays across the globe:

> 1. The ontological shift of higher education from being conceived of as a 'public good' to a private investment in one's own individual career. […] 2. Public disinvestment in higher education and a corresponding shift by universities towards the pursuit of new income streams […]. 3. A preference (mainly on the part of governments and university managers) for more applied, problem-oriented and interdisciplinary 'Mode 2' knowledge over 'basic knowledge' […]. 4. [T]he further colonisation of the university by regimes of New Public Management (NPM) derived from the corporate sector. 5. A shift towards more hierarchical forms of leadership […] accompanied by a reduction of academic involvement in university governance […]. 6. The creation of new hierarchies both between and within universities […]. 7. [T]he casualization of academic labour. (Shore and Davidson 2014: 13f.)[104]

Whereas this comprehensive definition of contemporary university transformation encompasses both the alignment of its primary concern as well as that of its organisation along those of corporate enterprise, this thesis distinguishes between the analytical notion of the entrepreneurial and the managerial university (as well as related concepts, which are altogether multi-layered and not clearly defined, just as the phenomenon they try to capture). While chapter 4.4 draws on the first set of concepts to analyse the political economy of the university, i.e. the transformation of its mission(s) along the lines of (market-driven) commercialisation, chapter 4.5 addresses changes at the organisational level of the university, i.e. the transformation of its organisational culture according to managerial logics.[105] Finally, Shore and Davidson's seventh point (on the

[103] Along similar lines of thought, Perry and Harloe (2007) list ten challenges that are currently placed on universities: "the adoption of quasi-market systems and processes; a shift from a public service to a performance- and audit-based ethos; the commercialization of activities in teaching and research; responding to the needs of government, industry and 'customers'; linking research to demands for societal and economic relevance; pressures on traditional methods of management and governance; revised systems of remuneration and reward linked to revisions in evaluations of worth and status; individualization and the undermining of the culture of collegiality; new sites of knowledge production (e.g. corporate and e-learning universities); contestability of knowledge claims and delegitimation of the university." For a similar characterisation of the entrepreneurial university see Kenway et al. (2004: 336).
[104] Lorenz (2012) adds to this list the "continuous worsening of the faculty/student ratio", the dissociation of teaching and research as well as the increase in tuition fees while the duration of studies is being reduced (ibid.: 605f.).
[105] Such a distinction resonates with that made by Vermeir (2013: 2487f.) between the commodification of academic research as the transformation of academic knowledge into a commodity on the one hand and the reorganisation of

casualisation of academic labour) is discussed in detail in chapter 9. However, first I want to draw the reader's attention to three alternative narratives explaining the contemporary transformation of universities.

4.1 Prologue I: The Underfunded Massification of the Higher Education System

While the focus of this work is on ideological and institutional transformations of university governance theorised as neoliberal respectively managerial, these transformations are not clearly delimitable – neither chronologically nor substantially – from another development: namely of the drastic expansion of higher education (and research) over the last 50 years that "placed intolerable burdens on national and state budgets that were also having to cope with growing demands from other public agencies, such as social welfare, preschool education and child care, primary and secondary school systems, housing, transportation, and defense" (Trow 2005: 39f.). Thus, the neoliberalisation and managerialisation of the university – although clearly related to that of the state – can also be related to its massification (both in regard to the number of students it admits as well as to the services it delivers). Put simply, while some argue that universities (as providers of higher education and research) become commercialised because governments and societies become neoliberalised (i.e. based on an economistic rationality), others argue that they have to become commercialised because of their growth in size and cost.

> As institutions become larger and their functions more varied during the transition phase to mass higher education, their administrative staff becomes larger, there is now more commonly a top leadership of men who were formerly academics but who now are clearly full-time university administrators. […] The rationalization of university administration – based on the systematic collection and analysis of quantitative data on the costs of discrete activities, and on measures of the "outputs" or "benefits" of these activities – is a response to the growth in the size and cost of higher education, and growing demands for public accountability regarding its "efficiency." (Trow 2005: 28f.)[106]

Trow (2005) distinguishes three conceptions of higher education: elite (0–15% enrolment of the relevant age groups), mass (16–50 %) and universal (over 50%) higher education and attests "a very rapid expansion of the system of higher education beginning in the 1960s and developing very rapidly though unevenly in the 70s and 80s" (ibid.: 2). While after World War II, about 4–5% of the relevant age groups were enrolled in institutions of higher education, that number had reached 10–20% 25 years later and was up to around 30% in most European countries by 2000.

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research institutes like private companies on the other hand. However, I acknowledge that such an analytical distinction (i.e. the relation between neoliberalism and managerialism) is contestable as we cannot clearly demarcate the university's missions from its organisational forms. For instance, Hilgers (2013) assigns the features that I attribute to the "managerial university" to "neoliberal institutions", and Clark (2004) characterises the "entrepreneurial university" by features that I would rather attribute to the "managerial university". Another example is Münch's (2011) understanding of the entrepreneurial university as an academic institution that is released into autonomy.

[106] However, Trow (2005) also notes that "[t]here is a certain danger in the argument that the development of these managerial techniques, as also of the increasing centralization of control, are 'inevitable', given the growth in the size and cost of higher education" (ibid.: 29).

Accordingly, Scott and Harding (2007) observe that, although varying significantly across OECD countries, there has been a general tendency in the last 30–40 years "for the proportion of national populations that are degree-educated to rise" (ibid.: 9). As a result

> universities no longer only cater for the small percentage of the future workforce that is expected to take up leadership positions [including becoming university based academics, author's note], but also provide skills and advanced learning capacity to a much larger group that, in many cases, represents the majority of new entrants to, and aspirational movers within, the labour market. (Scott and Harding 2007: 9)

Let us take a closer look at the growth of university attendance in Austria after World War II – a revealing case insofar as its governments have practised a non-restrictive access to universities over the last decades. Statistics Austria shows a growth in student numbers at public Austrian universities from 19,124 in 1955 to 53,152 in 1970, 115,616 in 1980, 193,479 in 1990 and 227,948 in 2000. This increase was interrupted by a decline to 182,805 in 2001, followed again by an increase to 203,453 in 2005 to finally 277,508 in 2014 – an almost 15-fold increase in 60 years.[107] I could not find the corresponding numbers for Denmark up until 2005, but Statistics Denmark shows a similar growth from 116,724 students in 2005 to 165,480 in 2014.[108] Besides, the EUA (2015) attests Danish universities to "face a particular situation with an overall increase in the enrolled Full Time Equivalents in the 8 research universities of about 45% between 2008/2009 and 2014/2015 (figures based on completed exams)" (ibid.: 17).

Concerning the more specific context of the case studies of this thesis, we witness a considerable increase of students in social anthropology at the University of Vienna from 100 in 1970 to 965 in 1980, 1,901 in 1990 and 2,253 in 2000 (Német 2003: 205), reaching 2,808 in 2010[109] (excluding PhD candidates) and finally 2,347 in 2015[110] (a decline that can be explained by the expiry of the "Diplomstudium" in 2012 due to the introduction of the Bologna degree structure), amounting to a 24-fold increase in 45 years[111] – whereas the department's (quasi) permanent academic staff stagnated at approximately ten heads from the 1990s until late 2010. Unfortunately, I have no comparable numbers for the development of students in social anthropology at the University of Copenhagen. In 2015, the department educated 603 students as well as 212 Master students enrolled in two interdisciplinary two MSc programmes.[112]

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[107] See <http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bildung_und_kultur/formales_bildungswesen/universitaeten_studium/021631.html> (accessed 13 April 2016).

[108] See <http://www.statbank.dk/10335> (accessed 13 April 2016).

[109] See <http://slw.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/s_studienservice/Dokumente/Statistiken/studstat_72_2010W.pdf> (accessed 21 August 2017).

[110] See <http://slw.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/s_studienservice/Dokumente/Statistiken/studstat_72_2015W.pdf> (accessed 21 August 2017).

[111] Of course, these numbers are not entirely comparable, as the "Diplomstudium" was only introduced in 1982 – before the first degree obtainable in social anthropology was a doctorate – and the Bachelor's and Master's degree only in 2007. Moreover, of the 2,400 students enrolled in social anthropology in the winter term 2015, only 52 finished their studies – a fact that can be explained by the "open university access" described above.

[112] In 2015, 109 students were enrolled in the MSc programme in Global Development and 103 students in the MSc programme in Global Health, degrees that are offered by the department in cooperation with other departments of the University of Copenhagen (see <http://us.ku.dk/studiestatistik/studiestatistikker/bestand/KU_BESTAND_2015.pdf>, accessed 25 August 2017). However, we have to bear in mind that unlike in Austria, the university rigorously regulates its intake of students and encourages – or rather forces – them to be full-time students (cf. chapter 7.2).

This growth in higher education institution attendance brought democratic and egalitarian concerns for equality of opportunity to the centre of higher education agendas – creating a tension between the increasingly meritocratic organisation of universities on the one hand and increasingly strong egalitarian values of (European) societies on the other hand (Trow 2005: 5) as well as between a commitment to high standards and to an egalitarian spirit (ibid.: 42). Furthermore, it placed increased burdens on state budgets. While one solution for this was the creation of cheaper alternatives to elite universities (Trow 2005: 45), another one was "a reduction in per capita support for higher education institutions of all kinds by central governments"[113] (ibid.: 45, cf. Nowotny et al. 2003: 182, Scott and Harding 2007: 10) – institutions that in Europe almost entirely depend on public funding (cf. Trow 2005: 42)[114]. In that context, Nybom (2012) remarks that the systematic under-funding and political marginalisation of non-reformed European universities from the 1970s onwards led to the cancellation of a "200-year-old contract between the state and the university system, symbolized by the founding of the Berlin University in 1810 where the state accepted the role of 'guardian-angel' and 'lender of last resort'" (ibid.: 166f.). This development continues in the early 2000s, with the OECD (2015a) reporting that

> [b]etween 2000 and 2012, the average share of public funding for tertiary institutions decreased from 68.8% in 2000, to 64.9% in 2005 and decreased slightly again to 64.5% in 2012 (on average across the 20 OECD countries for which trend data are available for all years). (ibid.: 239)

In Austria, public expenditure for universities increased by 6.9% from 2010–2013 – whereas the GDP increased by 9.8% and the federal expenditure by 12.3% in the same period (BMWFW 2014: 52). Although the Austrian government increased the public funding of its universities by 16.5% between 2008 and 2015, the number of students grew by 24% in the same period (EUA 2016: 17).[115] What is more, the European University Association observes that Austria together with the Netherlands are the only two exceptions of 23 higher education systems "where student numbers are growing faster than staff, which puts some pressure on these systems" (EUA 2016: 15). It paints a similar picture for Denmark where university funding

> was growing at a pace similar to its Scandinavian neighbours from 2008 to 2015 (+21.15%). Together with Sweden, Denmark is the only country that has increased its share of public funding to higher education institutions beyond 1% of GDP. However, the student body expanded by more than 45% in line with the state priority of increasing higher education attainment. (ibid.: 17)

Therefore, the European University Association attests both Austria and Denmark to be "growing systems under pressure" (ibid.: 4). This explains why whereas some perceive an increase in nominal public funding of universities, others perceive a decrease in per capita funding by governments. Thus, the "success" of higher education has simultaneously amounted to its

[113] Accordingly, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) note for the US that from the 1970s onwards "[t]he flow of public money to higher education was receding, in part because of increasing claims on government funds" (ibid.: 7).
[114] For instance, in Austria 95.3% of the funding of tertiary education is public (OECD 2015a: 248) – with around 80% of the University of Vienna's total revenue coming from the federal government (University of Vienna 2015b: 26). Unfortunately, the OECD (2015a) does not give the numbers for Denmark, but if they are somehow comparable to Sweden or Finland, public funding of tertiary education should be close to 100%.
[115] For a more detailed description of the decrease in public funding for Austrian universities since 1970 see Pechar (2007: 34f.) who also points to the particularly poor teacher-student ratio in the humanities and social sciences (ibid.: 39).

"decline" (in regard to funding), confronting the academic field with its dependence on the political and/or economic field. This brings me to an important distinction between the massification of higher education from the 1960s onwards compared to that from the 1990s onwards. Pechar (2007: 48) points out that although the expansion of the Austrian higher education in the 1970s was already founded in beliefs that the economy would require more academics in the future, it was continued by a social democratic government – driven by a discourse of the "social opening" of universities for "educationally deprived classes" (ibid.: 49) – despite arising doubts that the government would lose control over the expansion.[116] Such a social welfare rationale has – just like the Fordist welfare state in general – increasingly been undermined since the 1990s by the economistic imperative of creating the knowledge and labour force required to prevail in a globalised knowledge economy (cf. Goddard et al. 2016a: 304).[117] Put simply, universities are no longer primarily expected to educate an increasing number of citizens but an increasing number of knowledge workers. This is the policy background for the Danish government's decision in 2006 to double the number of PhD scholarships and industrial PhDs, promptly adding that "[t]he increase should occur especially within the fields of natural science, engineering science, ICT and health science" (Danish Government 2006: 23). Three years later, the Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation reports that

> the total number of new PhD students in 2007 was about 1,800 and was 2,423 in 2009, a significant increase compared to 2005 (1,352). Funding of PhD fellowships remains vitally important. Several academics noted that funding has led to greater growth in "wet" fields than in "dry" fields[118]. The Government's announced goal of doubling the number of PhD fellowships by 2010 seems to be much needed, and may not be enough.[119] (MVTU 2009: 55)

Thus, the neoliberal knowledge economy project has colonised and transformed the massification of higher education initiated by the Fordist welfare state. In that regard, the narrative of the university's massification does not contradict that of its neoliberalisation but rather complements it, as illustrated by a quote of Nybom (2012):

> Due to its steadily rising costs and size, **and** its growing social and economic relevance, higher education no longer was perceived as primarily a national cultural investment but rather regarded as an integrated part of the ordinary education system where manpower planning and not academic excellence became the highest priority in higher education policy and planning. (ibid.: 173, my emphasis)

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[116] Accordingly, Gornitzka and Maassen (2000) point out that the Austrian university reform cycle of the 1970s, despite aiming at opening up higher education to society, "didn't imply that higher education should also become more oriented towards the national economic needs" (ibid.: 273).

[117] Accordingly, Lorenz (2012) notes that from the 1980s onwards "the social relevance of the universities demanded by critical students was turned on its head to become economic relevance to business and industry in the knowledge society" (ibid.: 600).

[118] "Wet" fields are natural, technical and health sciences, whereas "dry" fields are humanities and social sciences.

[119] On the other hand, the European Science Foundation notes that "[b]etween 1998 and 2006, the number of PhDs awarded in the OECD countries increased by some 40% prompting discussion of PhD bubbles, diminution in quality and concerns that an expensively educated group would not find suitable careers and displace others in posts that traditionally did not require a PhD" (ESF 2015: 29).

4.2 Prologue II: The Differentiation of Higher Education and Research Institutions

The massification of higher education was paralleled by the diversification and stratification of higher education institutions. Thus, when we talk about the transformation of higher education institutions (respectively the experience of studying/working in them) over the last decades we have to remember that we are likely to compare entirely different entities. *The* university does not exist anymore. When using that term, I refer to the comprehensive university that constitutes the empirical basis of this thesis, bearing in mind that it has come to be only one type of higher education institutions among many.

As students and studies[120] (as well as staff) have diversified, so have higher education institutions[121] – both *horizontally* with the growth of new types of higher education institutions (e.g. polytechnics/universities of applied sciences/university colleges[122]) as well as institutional profiles on the one hand and *vertically* with an increase in the competition between universities in an internationalised higher education system on the other hand. In regard to the former, it is important to note that these new kinds of higher education institutions are not the only new competitors that universities face, but also new institutions of research. As universities have become just one of an increasing number of institutions producing and disseminating (increasingly application-oriented scientific) knowledge, they have not necessarily remained the dominant institutions in this regard (cf. OECD 1996: 22). Thus, it would be a fallacy to assume that the expansion of the university equals an increase of its authority. Rather, higher education institutions

> face a decline of status on the way toward the knowledge society, not only as a consequence of their shrinking share in the overall knowledge production and dissemination, but also because trust declines that academics and higher education institutions themselves assess the results of research, teaching, and learning properly. (Teichler 2015: 19, cf. Enders 1999: 73, 75f.)[123]

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[120] Both regarding their content (for example with the emergence of interdisciplinary degree programmes) as well as the degrees they award (for example with the introduction of first "Diplom" or "Candidate" degrees and later on Bachelor's, Master's and PhD degrees).

[121] "Over time, as the number of institutions grew during the transition to a mass system, they became more diverse" – with the high and common standards the European systems claimed and tried to sustain breaking down (Trow 2005: 21).

[122] For example, the Austrian higher education system was relatively homogenous up to the 1990s, in general consisting of equivalent public universities. "Fachhochschulen" were established in Austria only in 1994 and "Pädagogischen Hochschulen" in 2007. (In Denmark, "Professionshøjskoler" were only established in 2008). The position of the thirteen private universities (see <http://wissenschaft.bmwfw.gv.at/bmwfw/studium/studieren-in-oesterreich/unis-privatunis-fhs-uebersicht/>, accessed 16 October 2017) – that are interestingly often funded by regional public authorities – in the Austrian higher education systems is (yet) marginal. In 2016, the Austrian Ministry of Science, Research and Economy initiated the project "Zukunft Hochschule" in order to promote the differentiation of the Austrian higher education system (see <http://wissenschaft.bmwfw.gv.at/bmwfw/wissenschaft-hochschulen/zukunft-hochschule/>, accessed 16 October 2017).

[123] Accordingly, the OECD (1996) notes that "the traditional base of the science system, research institutions and universities, cannot be assumed to dominate the production of scientific knowledge", with industry carrying out "about 67 per cent of total research" (ibid.: 22). This points to a problem the (entrepreneurial) university faces in attracting (industrial) funding and generating profit: Although universities are considered by policymakers as central in educating knowledge workers for the knowledge economy, their research may not be assessed as equally im-

> [T]he major bulk of research takes place within industry (often called 'research and development') or in research institutes outside higher education – though to a varying degree by country. Only 'basic research' seems to be predominantly located within universities, but this privilege seems to be losing its momentum in recent decades with the increasing societal expectation for research to be visibly relevant, as often underscored in recent years with terms such as the 'knowledge society', the 'knowledge economy', 'targeted research' and 'mode 2 research'. (Teichler et al. 2013: 11)

This development has repercussions for the hierarchies of the academic field in general, as Bourdieu (1988) points out.

> In fact, the development of independent institutions of research has reinforced the action of new principles of division which affect every dimension of intellectual life. Unlike those differences which could be observed in an earlier phase in the most academic sector of the academic system, which were produced by the very functioning of the system and were indispensable to its functioning, that is to the reproduction of its hierarchies, the ever more marked differences which separate teachers and researchers, or the products of the old and new style of appointment, tend to substitute, at least in the long run, a plurality of worlds controlled by different laws for the unified world of differences produced by one dominant hierarchical principle. (ibid.: 125)

As this thesis does not concern itself with the comparison of different types of academic disciplines or higher education institutions (as I consider anthropological education and research to be still primarily located within universities) I will not further dwell on the diversification of higher education institutions. Instead, I will content myself with remarking that in this context of stratified academic institutions, "universities become diversified sites of knowledge production in which instrumental forms of knowledge production mix with the critical and reflexive forms" (May 2007: 125). In this regard, the divides have been deepened between disciplines and faculties that are better positioned to serve the third mission of economic growth and technical innovation (such as natural and hard sciences) and those furthest removed from direct market potential (such as the humanities and social sciences) (cf. Hoffman 2011a: 447, 449). Furthermore, not only have universities as institutions, but also academics as employees become increasingly divided. Finally, I wish to underline that while universities have to meet increasingly differing demands, they have to increasingly compete for funding with other institutions of higher education or research as well as with other universities, both domestically and abroad – a fact that brings us to the next chapter.

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portant – as much as university managers and academics may like this to be the case in order to be able to attract more funding. In other words: What the knowledge economy seeks may not be traditional academic knowledge after all. Moreover, the OECD (1996: 25) points out that "[a]s university/industry collaboration becomes the norm in many areas of basic research [because of governments increasingly earmarking funds for academic activities meriting economic relevance, author's note], the traditional contribution of academia to the production of scientific knowledge may weaken under the burden of increasing its economic relevance". Thus, although in the knowledge economy more application-oriented research institutions play an increasingly important role in the production of scientific knowledge, universities being compelled to do more application-oriented research is likely to reduce their (traditional) production of scientific knowledge by doing so.

4.3 Prologue III: The Global University

The notion of the global(ised) – or internationalised – university draws our attention to the fact that the globalisation of the economy from the 1970s onwards – as a feature of its "neoliberalisation" (cf. Jessop 2013: 70) and in addition to its "scientification" – did not just initiate the emergence of the knowledge economy but also heavily impacted on the governance of universities. The globalisation of universities includes multiple layers. Readings (1996) for example points out that the "process of economic globalization" turns the university into "a transnational bureaucratic corporation, either tied to transnational instances of government such as the European Union or functioning independently, by analogy with a transnational corporation" (ibid.: 3). Münch (2011: 15) on the other hand notes that as the dynamics of the knowledge economy cause a transnationalisation of the academic field, they strengthen the material and symbolic power of transnational actors like the European Commission, the actors of the Bologna process, the European Research Council or the OECD who in turn force universities to position themselves globally and to compete for the best positioning in an increasingly differentiated academic field (cf. Kosmützky and Nokkala 2014: 375). In this globalised "regime of competition of entrepreneurial universities", benchmarking through rankings, most notably the Shanghai Ranking as well as the Times Higher Education World University Ranking, has become a major governance tool for research and higher education (Münch 2011: 53f.).[124] For example, the University of Vienna – as an outcome of an international conference on the occasion of its 650th anniversary in March 2015 – states that

> [w]hat makes a university "global" is that
> - it strives at hiring the best researchers and academic teachers from a global market
> - it attracts talented students from all over the world, equipping them with the skills and analytical abilities to make a difference throughout global society
> - it enables its students, graduates and researchers to be competitive globally
> - it contributes to the global pool of human knowledge through its educational programmes and research activities, especially through the publications of its members
> - it fosters and is committed to the exchange of students and the dissemination of innovative new ideas, across both academic communities and national borders by establishing networks of global collaboration. (University of Vienna 2015a: 33)

The "global university" appears to do what the (massified) "national university" has done so far, yet taking the whole world as its frame of reference rather than the nation state. However, it does not relate to the whole world, but rather just to "the best researchers and academic teachers" and "talented students from all over the world" – which favours people coming from elite institutions (that, I assume, are note equally distributed around the world). From this perspective, the "global university" appears to be a counter draft to the "mass university". However, it simultaneously displays an entrepreneurial and regional facet, as it

> adds value to its region by

[124] Accordingly, Scott and Harding (2007) note that the notion of the "global university" has become established over the last 30 years, "for example through a variety of international ranking exercises based on comparable sets of performance metrics" (ibid.: 4).

- transferring the knowledge gained from globally competitive research to the region, thereby enhancing regional society, commerce, trade and industry and supporting innovation and entrepreneurship
- driving economic expansion in the region through the skills of its alumni and its on-going research activities, leading to new knowledge and innovations
- contributing to the region's "brain gain" and to its open social climate through its international exchange programmes and global staff recruitment policy
- feeding questions from the region into the global research discourse and sharing the knowledge acquired. (University of Vienna 2015a: 33f.)

This points to a dilemma of internationalisation strategies: While internationalisation appears to constitute an elitist endeavour aiming at "excellence", European universities are mostly dependent on state funding. Thus, rhetoric of internationalisation is combined with that of the university's utility for the local society, i.e. its regional relevance[125] – a gap that is not easily bridged, even rhetorically. Moreover, it is difficult to explain the precise relation between increasing internationalisation and the quality of research and teaching in a mass university. For instance, the University of Vienna (2015a) considers

> the long-term implementation of the internationalisation strategy to be an essential element in achieving the following goals:
> - Acquiring a position as one of the best research universities in Europe
> - Raising its international profile in research and education
> - Consolidating the international presence of its achievements in research and teaching. (ibid.: 6)

Basically, the University of Vienna's internationalisation strategy aims at internationalising the university in order to improve its reputation. So far, the reader is left to wonder whether internationalisation, not unlike audit (cf. chapter 4.5.1), turns out to be an end in itself. Yet she soon learns that "[i]nternationalisation in research is seen by the university as an instrument to increase the quality, competitiveness and visibility of the results", while "[i]nternationalisation in education guarantees the best quality in the classroom and widens the cultural and cognitive perspective of the students" (University of Vienna 2015a: 7f.). Accordingly, the University of Copenhagen (2012) claims that

> [i]nternational collaboration improves both research and education. It grants the University a better position in its efforts to secure national and international research funding and to recruit the best researchers and students. The world's leading universities recruit from and collaborate with the entire world. Therefore, it is imperative that we further enhance the University of Copenhagen's international platform in order to live up to our ambition of increasing our international position further. (ibid.: 25)

Although the reader is still left to wonder how exactly internationalisation comes to mean better quality of research and education, she notes its importance in securing national and international research funding, as in a globalised knowledge economy not only corporations compete for "market shares" but also universities.[126] However, the Universities of Vienna and Copenha-

[125] For example, the EU – arguably a strong promotor of the internationalisation of higher education and research – has produced a guide for "Connecting Universities to Regional Growth" (European Commission 2011).
[126] As there are no (high) student fees in Austria and Denmark (yet), attracting international students from the EU is not attractive in this regard for universities. However, as Danish universities can charge high fees from non-EU

gen are not the only ones avoiding the matter of how exactly internationalisation and quality correlate. Internationalisation strategies – either from the EU, national governments, funding agencies or universities (as far as the rhetoric is concerned, it does not appear to make a difference who formulates them) – tend to unquestioningly equate international mobility with innovation and/or excellence according to the principle "if students/academics are internationally mobile, their work is good" (or at least better than those who are not) – usually while emphasising strategic internationalisation as an essential prerequisite to succeed in the international competition for the "best brains" (see for example BMWFW 2015b: 26).

> These [EU, authors' note] policies constitute a deliberate effort to relocate togetherness to make science and scientists more productive. Researchers are expected to move through institutions, building their careers and transmitting the benefits of their experience to new groups or teams. The most successful researchers are assumed to be the most mobile, moving between post-doctoral positions in their early careers, to set up research groups of their own, in different institutions. This natural science model assumes that researchers are highly autonomous, and largely ignore what it takes to foster and maintain the everyday forms of working together. (Kerr and Lorenz-Meyer 2009: 145f.)

Individualised, disregarding their social and cultural context, academics become commodities or "useful parts" that can be moved around according to the needs of the labour market rather than their own (intellectual) needs. Accordingly, "academic mobility commonly goes from the periphery to the science centre where most marketable science is produced (and then marketed to peripheries)" (Kerr and Lorenz-Meyer 2009: 146). It is this feature of internationalisation, i.e. academic mobility that this thesis focuses on in chapter 9.4. The pattern of argument that underlies the discourse of internationalisation is a familiar one: competition for funding, visibility, "human resources" and consequently the notion of higher education and research as commodities and national assets – whereas issues of intellectual or intercultural learning remain relatively peripheral, similar to the discourses concerning interdisciplinarity. In this regard, the "global university" coincides with the "neoliberal university".

4.4 The Entrepreneurial University: a Macro Perspective

Generally, universities have been considered as public interest institutions (Barcan 2013: 55) that "have historically not been expected to earn money" (Greenwood 2007: 98). Hence, they were clearly distinguishable from private enterprises. While 25 years ago Borrero (1991) could thus state that "[t]he University is a non-profit enterprise with the goal of intellectual production; the enterprise looks for a profitable product" (ibid.: 25), Nybom (2012) has to already remind us 20 years later that "if there were some interconnections between innovation/business and the traditional European universities, it was perhaps primarily a negative one" (ibid.: 175). During that period, the positioning of universities has drastically changed (in pursuit of a "neoliberal vision") "from being places of critical inquiry and autonomous learning […] to a new vision of universities as transnational business corporations operating in a competitive 'global knowledge

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students, the Department of Anthropology in Copenhagen is thinking about attracting those students through new Master programmes.

economy'" (Shore 2010: 15). Thus, we can view the entrepreneurial university as the product of both the neoliberal agendas arising in the 1980s as well as the OECD agenda of creating employment and growth in a knowledge-based economy originating in the mid-1990s (Münch 2011: 14) – an agenda that was subsequently adopted on the European level with the proposal that "European universities have to become more like private enterprises operating in competitive environments" (MVTU 2009: 19). Scott (2010) summarises this development as follows:

> A relatively independent – institutionally 'pillarized' – and simple organization with a short list of tasks (teaching and research) and occasionally a good wine cellar was to be turned into a multitasking engine of economic growth within the 'knowledge economy': relevant, engaged, internationally competitive, excellent, entrepreneurial. (ibid.: 83)

Whereas Burton Clark (who coined the expression "entrepreneurial university"[127]) stresses features that I attribute to the "managerial university", such as a "state that inclines them to go on changing" (Clark 2004: 362), I primarily understand the entrepreneurial university as attempting to foster "innovators and entrepreneurs who will contribute more effectively to national wealth creation by being more attuned to economic imperatives, and more enterprising in their use of knowledge" (Shore and McLauchlan 2012a: 281), placing "greater emphasis on profits and managerial efficiency than knowledge advancement and learning" (Hoffman 2011a: 458, cf. Münch 2011: 75–77). However, Perry and Harloe (2007) remind us that, as is usually the case with abstract concepts, "interpretations of 'entrepreneurial' remain variable, ranging from a neoliberal market-driven conception of entrepreneurialism based on wealth creation and economic growth to a more socially responsive and stakeholder-based approach" – although they add that "[t]he former would seem to be ascendant" (ibid.: 33).

As already mentioned, the entrepreneurial university corresponds to the *corporate university*. Barcan (2013) observes similar transformations for the British and the Australian university sector as well as Greenwood (2007), Bousquet (2008) and Newfield (2008) in the context of the US university system, referring to them as the "corporate" or "commercialised" university that is characterised by marketisation respectively "the ways campuses actually relate to business and industry in quest of revenue enhancement and cost containment" (Bousquet 2008: 9).

> Universities, whether public or private, are now multimillion dollar organizations, providers of educational products to a global market of discriminating customers, who seek choice, value for money and quality product. (Barcan 2013: 76)

> Perhaps the central issue any analysis of this sort must deal with is the 'corporatization' of universities. Corporate management strategies in US universities and around the world increasingly treat universities as fee-for-service providers, students and research contractors as clients or customers, and faculty as wage labourers. (Greenwood 2007: 95f.)

However, the entrepreneurial university's aspiration for profit is not necessarily of its own making. Even proponents such as Etzkowitz et al. (2000) remind us that "we should not underestimate the significance of funding shortages pushing academia in this direction" (ibid.: 326); as

[127] Whereas the term "neoliberal university" has a mostly critical connotation, "entrepreneurial university" is also used by proponents of the transformation these terms refer to.

do critics such as Slaughter and Leslie (1997) whose "central thesis at the institutional level is that organizational relationships are determined or are affected importantly by the changing financial environment" (ibid.: 224); or Shore and McLauchlan (2012a) when they state that the

> trend towards academic entrepreneurialism has been driven largely by external circumstances, most notably by changes in the political economy of higher education and progressive state disinvestment in tertiary education as policy makers increasingly view university education as a personal, private investment rather than a public good. (ibid.: 267)[128]

This is not surprising, considering that the idea of an entrepreneurial university is highly problematic. For instance, Münch (2011) considers it to transform universities from patrons of research who "offer academics freedom and leave the gains in the form of reputation available at their disposal" into parasites of research who "enter into target agreements with academics […] and claim the use of gains (economic and symbolic capital) for the institution" (ibid.: 372, my translation). Bousquet (2008: 41–44, cf. Bousquet 2002: 96–99) emphasises equally negative implications regarding teaching which is subjected to a profit logic at the expense of a massively casualised instructional force, their families, students and eventually all academics working at universities (cf. chapter 9).

Nevertheless, the commercialisation of universities is not simply a matter of evil economistic forces colonising the selfless academic world. "Far from being victims of a project to bring about the neoliberal colonisation of universities, many parts of the academy appear to have eagerly embraced the logic of privatisation and the ethos of entrepreneurialism" (Shore and McLauchlan 2012a: 270). For instance, Kleinman et al. (2013) note that

> [i]n an era of otherwise decreasing government support for education, university administrators realized that portraying their institutions as engines of economic development could raise their institutional legitimacy in the eyes of both elected officials and voters. (ibid.: 2388)

Moreover, the interest in neoliberal "incentive schemes" is not limited to university administrators, as Amit (2012) observes:

> I suspect that we would not be hard pressed to find quite a few participants who could critically dissect the political rationale underpinning these schema [sic] without missing a beat in their enthusiastic competition for the rewards these can deliver. (ibid.: 293, cf. Kleinman et al. 2013: 2399)[129]

On top of that, Bousquet (2008) points out that

> *[l]ate capitalism doesn't just happen to the university; the university makes late capitalism happen.* […] The university has not only casualized its own labor force; it continuously operates as a kind of fusion reactor for casualization more generally, directly serving the casual economy by supply-

[128] Accordingly, Amit (2000) points out that "[i]f Canadian governments did not deliberately underfund the post-secondary sector in order to render university administrators and faculty members alike more receptive to commercialization, they have not been averse to capitalizing on the 'persuasive' effects of their cuts. So we appear to have here a quite cynical but apparently rather straightforward scenario of manipulation and compulsion in which one political hand reduces state support for more traditional forms of university activities while the other hand tantalizes with the new funding possibilities intended to remodel some fundamental elements of the academic mission" (ibid.: 220).

[129] Shore and Davidson (2014) distinguish between "conscious complicity", "unwitting complicity" and "coercive complicity" with the regime of what they term the "modern neoliberal university".

> ing it with flexible student labor (that is, by providing flex workers with the identity of 'student'), normalizing and generalizing the experience of casual work (ibid.: 44).[130]

However, we must not forget that as little as academics are solely victims of the commercialisation of universities, universities have not been entirely transformed into private enterprises. As Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) point out, despite (US) not-for-profit universities acting like private enterprises pursuing profit

> and adopting many practices found in the corporate sector, they are not becoming corporations. Colleges and universities very clearly do not want to lose state and federal subsidies, or, in the case of research universities, to pay taxes, to be held to corporate accounting standards, to be held accountable for risks they take with state and donor money, and to relinquish, if they are public, eleventh-amendment protection and be liable for mistakes and various forms of malpractice. However, colleges and universities are participating in redrawing the boundaries between public and private sector, and they favor boundaries that allow them to participate in a wide variety of market activities that enable them to generate external revenues. (ibid.: 26f.)

Thus, wanting "the best of both worlds – the protections and continued subsidies of the public sector, and the flexibility, opportunities, and potential revenue streams of the private sector" (ibid.: 330), universities are ideally positioned to maximise profit without being bound by the same regulations as private enterprises. This endeavour to maximise profit has also been theorised as academic capitalism.

4.4.1 Academic Capitalism

At this point, it is not surprising to hear that academic capitalism "is the zeitgeist of the contemporary research university" (Hoffman 2011a: 439). It is both the "neoliberalisation" as well as the "scientification" of the state/economy – with the concomitant politicisation/economisation of academic knowledge discussed in chapter 3.3 – that constitute the context for the emergence of what Slaughter and Leslie (1997) and Münch (2011) designate as "academic capitalism". In line with concepts such as the knowledge economy and the third mission or models such as Mode 2 Science and Triple Helix III

> the theory of academic capitalism sees groups of actors – faculty, students, administrators, and academic professionals – as using a variety of state resources to create new circuits of knowledge that link higher education institutions to the new economy. (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004: 1)

> The political economy of current university reforms is expressed by an increasing overlap between politics, the economy and academia and by a knowledge production that closely relates the search for truth to the consolidation of power and the maximisation of utility. (Münch 2011: 91, my translation)

Slaughter and Leslie (1997) define academic capitalism as "institutional and professorial market or marketlike efforts to secure external moneys" (ibid.: 8) respectively as "[a]ctivities undertaken with a view to capitalizing on university research or academic expertise through contracts or grants with business or with government agencies seeking solutions to specific

[130] Along a similar line of thinking, Schier and Dudek (2012) consider graduates of the humanities (in Germany) as the contemporary "reserve army of labour" that supplies the labour market with highly qualified yet cheap labour power.

public or commercial concerns" (ibid.: 217). Describing it as "an environment full of contradictions, in which faculty and professional staff expend their human capital stocks increasingly in competitive situations" (ibid.: 9), they argue that

> [a]s the industrial revolution at the end of the nineteenth century created the wealth that provided the base for postsecondary education and attendant professionalization, so the globalization of the political economy at the end of the twentieth century is destabilizing patterns of university professional work developed over the past hundred years. (Slaughter & Leslie 1997: 1, 208)

Although they focus their examination of academic capitalism on four English-speaking countries – Australia, Canada, the UK and the US – and on for-profit activities of (public) universities such as patenting and technology transfer, their reflections have become most relevant for the European university sector and those academic disciplines that are removed from research-related market relations. In that regard, Hoffman (2011a) characterises academic capitalism[131] as the expectation of "policymakers, entrepreneurs, corporate leaders, economists, as well as many academic leaders that universities should strive to contribute directly to regional and national economic growth" (ibid.: 442) and adds that

> [w]hether or not I directly engage in research capitalisation is important but a bit beside the point. Academic capitalism pervades the profession, and organisational scholars of all stripes need to get a better handle on this hidden dimension of a complex institution. (ibid.: 443)

Arguing that "universities are increasingly expecting faculty and students to become entangled in the complex uncertainties of academic capitalism, even when their research and training is far removed from market potential"[132] (ibid.: 457), he identifies four conceptual vocabularies that constitute these "hidden dimensions of academic capitalism": market-oriented entrepreneurialism, external consulting work, consumer-oriented research and interdisciplinarity.[133] Market-oriented entrepreneurialism is probably the least "hidden" conceptual vocabulary of academic capitalism when it comes to "terms, skills and assessment methods oriented to the marketing of university assets on a pecuniary market" (ibid.: 446). However, Hoffman (2011a) also includes "the crafting of marketing buzzwords and 'new' managerial practices for measuring performance" such as "'freedom' and 'transparency', or words that connote performance, like 'accountability' and 'excellence'" (ibid.: 447) in this category. Besides, he reminds us that academic capitalist activities do not have to be geared towards generating income on the market, but can also consist of generating income on the quasi-markets of external research funding.

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[131] Hoffman (2011a) prefers using the term "academic capitalism" to "entrepreneurial university", as he regards the term as "both more precise and more inclusive than entrepreneurialism" (ibid.: 440).

[132] Accordingly, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) note that "[m]arket and marketlike activities are no longer confined to the sciences and engineering" (ibid.: 6).

[133] Correspondingly, Vermeir (2013) argues that the commodification of science "does not just involve the influence of money on science" but is "a broader phenomenon, referring to processes that mold scientific practice according to free market ideology and that implement new managerial structures, aiming at increasing the standardization, control and efficiency of science" (ibid.: 2506). This is in line with Kleinman's et al. (2013) claim that the neoliberalisation of higher education goes beyond mere commercialisation and has in fact become an "omnibus solution waiting to be employed when any opportunity arises, helping to define the 'problems' of the university in the first place" (ibid.: 2398).

> The positioning of one's research strengths within a field of limited resources and uncertain information, whether to maximise faculty resources in the eyes of a Dean facing limited allocations or to best position one's lab for a large grant, may not be directly capitalistic but is occurring within a broader social structure of academic capitalism in which the units that can best generate university revenue from their knowledge win. (ibid.: 457)

Furthermore, he lists external consulting work, consumer-oriented research[134] and interdisciplinarity as key conceptual vocabularies of academic capitalism – activities that become particularly visible at the Department of Anthropology at the University of Copenhagen (cf. chapter 7.5).

Referring to the German university system, Münch (2011) understands academic capitalism as the proliferation of the competition mechanism in combination with the economistic (which he stresses over the political) applicability of research and education, both on a political as well as an institutional level. He ascribes this colonisation of academia by the economy to the global dispersion of the competition rhetoric due to the success of the neoliberal paradigm (Münch 2011: 64–66). Thus, neoliberalism is constitutive of his understanding of academic capitalism, as is his understanding of New Public Management as an essential feature of neoliberalism (ibid.: 13, 364, 379).

> Research and teaching at universities have gained principal strategic importance for politics in the global competition for shares of the knowledge production in the knowledge society. Its alignment according to global competition is the aim of the close cooperation of research, technology and economic policy. In the course of this we can witness the same patterns of reform worldwide. They follow the paradigm of neoliberalism. […] In this process priority is given to the transition from universities to strategically operating enterprises. This involves the replacement of academic quality assurance by managerial controlling. (ibid.: 11, my translation)

In the new, worldwide competition between universities the traditional competition between researchers for truth is replaced by that for visibility (ibid.: 379). In Münch's (2011: 87f.) opinion, this economisation of academia reaches its climax in the pursuit of patents that ultimately put the wellbeing of the entrepreneurial university before the wellbeing of the academic community. While "[a]cademia is steered by the economy in the direction of producing material profits that are discernible in the near term", "the knowledge revolution is significantly narrowed down. Academia may then still autonomously rule over the truth of statements, but not anymore about the question it asks" (ibid.: 378, my translation). Besides, the alignment of universities along expectations of short-term utility does not only decrease research's potential for innovation but also increases the disparity between universities regarding the availability of research funds. In that context, Münch (2011) notes that this competition for economic and symbolic capital is not a level playing field as it is only universities who already possess a critical mass of economic and symbolic capital that can hope to succeed in it (ibid.: 79). Consequently, wealthy universities manage to obtain monopoly profits by creating research cartels that exclude potential competitors from resources and important positions (ibid.: 374–376), thereby becoming even richer (cf.

[134] Understood as research based on the principle that "good science ought to produce results that are useful or 'friendly' to lay audiences, often including members of such audiences in the conceptualisation, design and execution of research projects" (Hoffman 2011a: 451).

Greenwood 2007: 96, Münch 2011: 80–83, 358, 366f., Newfield 2008: 271, Science Europe 2016: 82). Finally, academic capitalism threatens – just as the projectification of academic work discussed in chapter 3.2.2 – both "the autotelic quality of academic craftsmanship" (Hoffman 2011b: 504) and "a sense of commitment to student learning" as students enroll "in larger and more anonymous courses taught by fewer tenured faculty who face strong incentives to pull back from their dedication to student learning and mentoring" (ibid.: 505).

4.4.2 The Third Mission

The knowledge economy and its economistic interpretation of higher education and research constitute the context for the narrative of the university's third mission (already addressed in chapter 3.3.3 in the guise of the buzzwords "innovation", "employability" and "interdisciplinarity"). Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000: 110) note that the "increased salience of knowledge and research to economic development has opened up a third mission: the role of the university in economic development". This third mission that is "geared towards 'knowledge transfer', forging links with industry and commercialising university research and teaching" (Shore and McLauchlan 2012a: 267) "increasingly define[s] the mission of the university and what counts as valid knowledge" (Shore 2011: 497). Although there is no singular definition of what constitutes third mission activity, Shore and McLauchlan (2012a) note that it is

> generally taken to refer to the linking of research to commercial outcomes (i.e. spin out and 'spin-in' companies, entrepreneurial incubators, start-up businesses, commercial patenting and licensing, the marketisation of research innovations), and externally-referenced relationships. However, it also includes other activities aimed at strengthening academia-business ties such as consultancy and contract research, student projects in industry, capacity building and continuing professional education. (ibid.: 268)

This characterisation can be complemented with Nedeva's (2007) observation that although

> [t]he ways in which the 'third mission' is promoted vary substantially between countries […] the direction of the transformation in each case […] is very similar and its essence is expressed by the steering of the universities to contribute systematically towards achieving economic and social goals and objectives. (ibid.: 85)

Hence, the university's first mission of education and its second mission of research (cf. Hoffman 2011a: 440) do not suffice anymore to justify its existence, i.e. its public funding, in the contemporary, "neoliberalised" and "informationalised" economy/society.

> The classic legitimation for scientific research as a contribution to culture still holds and military and health objectives also remain a strong stimulus to research funding. Nevertheless, the future legitimation for scientific research, which will keep funding at a high level, is that it is increasingly the source of new lines of economic development. (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000: 117)

For example, the Austrian government advocates the need to strengthen research, technological development and innovation in order to "create high quality jobs, supporting long-term employment and the sustainable growth of the economy" (Austrian Federal Government 2011: 2) –

with university managers readily adopting this rhetoric (cf. University of Vienna 2015b: 5f., 10–12, 43). For instance, the University of Copenhagen (2012) states that

> [o]ur task is to find the right formula to match our high academic standards with society's needs. We must and will improve our position in the fierce international competition. Therefore, we have to ensure that through our involvement with the new knowledge economies we will become part of their growth and success, and make them part of ours. (ibid.: 10)

Yet there is another side to the "translational" third mission that is equally no new phenomenon to the university: its "civic" mission(s) of societal engagement, public outreach and social inclusion. In this regard, we may well distinguish between the university's missions of commercialisation (the "entrepreneurial university") and of community service (the "engaged university") – adding another pole to the potential tensions for universities and academics. For example, Larner (2012) reminds us that "novel forms of public engagement and social partnerships with civil society and public sector institutions are also now receiving significant government and institutional investment" (ibid.: 288), positioning "science dissemination, public engagement, cultural intermediation and social enterprise" (ibid.: 289) as issues of discussion regarding the university's purpose. In other words, higher education and research are not only expected to display economic but also social relevance[135] – a fact that Goddard and Vallance (2013) and Goddard et al. (2016b) address with the notion of the "civic university".

Even such a neoliberally inclined agent as the EU administration (cf. Kalb 2012: 318) does not only consider research and higher education to be servants of economic growth/competitiveness – although it does clearly prioritise this purpose (cf. Goddard et al. 2016a: 302) – but of society more generally. While it is not clear what society means in this context (cf. Greenwood 2007: 102), I would argue that at the level of US and EU policies (including Austrian and Danish science policies) the needs of society are currently strongly equated with the needs of the economy – in line with the slogan of the Austrian Economic Chambers "When the economy is doing well, we all do well" – giving clear preference to the economic rather than the social aspects of the third mission (cf. Goddard and Vallance 2013: 63f., Newfield 2008: 14, Perry and Harloe 2007: 33, Shore 2010: 18). To use the words of Shore and McLauchlan (2012a): "'[S]ociety' is usually conflated with business and commerce, these being the primary 'users' who populate government imaginaries of what constitutes society." (ibid.: 270) Accordingly, profit becomes the new "public good" (ibid.: 283).

> The potential of university research to be commercially exploited and to generate revenue is being positioned as of equal (if not greater) significance as the liberal notion of university knowledge as a shared social good. (ibid.: 284)

Although the multiplicity of the third mission may help to contest an economistic interpretation of it, it simultaneously reduces the leeway of academics to contest the idea of a third mission as such – which in turn complicates resolving the tensions universities and academics currently face.

[135] This development is for example expressed by the emergence of the term "social innovation" in addition to the already well-established buzzword of "innovation" (cf. chapter 3.3.3.1).

Finally, the third mission does not simply join the other two, but also diversifies and "colonises" them as it "affects the educational and research missions of all institutions of higher learning" (Etzkowitz et al. 2000: 315) – with the consequences already outlined in chapter 3.3.3. Accordingly, Hoffman (2011a) argues that "an increase in market-orientation has not displaced more traditional academic practices and values but has facilitated the development of new conceptual vocabularies that are subtly remaking academic practice and culture" (ibid.: 441). Even the OECD as a major promoter of the idea of the knowledge economy is aware that the third mission of the university does not simply complement its traditional missions of education ("knowledge transmission") and research ("knowledge production"), but rather creates tensions regarding the fulfilment of these missions.

> [T]he OECD science system is facing the challenge of reconciling its traditional functions of producing new knowledge through basic research and educating new generations of scientists and engineers with its newer role of collaborating with industry in the transfer of knowledge and technology. Research institutes and academia increasingly have industrial partners for financial as well as innovative purposes, but must combine this with their essential role in more generic research and education. (OECD 1996: 7)

While the OECD (1996) does not offer a solution for this fundamental tension, it does develop a linguistic strategy allowing it to utilise this tension for promoting its ideas. Wright and Ørberg (2011) term this strategy the OECD's "double shuffle".

> That is, the OECD always makes a double appeal: the lead discourse steps out into the direction of a marketised future, but it does not do so alone; keeping step there is always a simultaneous appeal to 'academic tradition' to try and appease those worried by the reforms and carry them along. (Wright and Rabo 2010: 8f.)

In this way the subordinate (traditional) discourse is modified, shuffling along an ever-more radical version of the dominant (neoliberal) discourse, but always looking more traditional than its lead partner (cf. Wright and Ørberg 2011).

4.5 The Managerial University: a Meso Perspective

So far, I have explained how (academic) knowledge has become a central "raw material" of the knowledge economy, resulting in the emergence of academic capitalism. While the former amounts to a scientification of industry, it simultaneously causes (in the form of the latter) an industrialisation of science – regarding its purpose, but also its organisation; i.e. academic capitalism does not just undermine traditional notions of academic work, but its organisation as well.

> As centers and universities increase participation in the market, the contract between faculty and society, an implicit contract that grants faculty and universities a measure of autonomy in return for disinterested knowledge that serves the public welfare, may be undermined. To some degree, academic capitalism undermines the raison d'être for special treatment for universities and faculty, increasing the likelihood that universities will be treated more like all other organizations and professionals more like all other intellectual workers. (Slaughter and Leslie 1997: 222)

In that regard, Liessmann (2006: 39) argues that the knowledge society does not supersede industrial society; instead knowledge is increasingly industrialised. "[I]t is not the blue-collar worker who becomes knowledgeable, but rather the knowledgeable one who becomes a blue-collar worker" (ibid.: 43, my translation) – and who needs to be managed accordingly. Likewise, Musselin (2007) recognises features of an industrialisation of academic activities "if one defines it as the passage from craft production of ad-hoc products to the production of mass products through organised production processes through three mechanisms: specialisation of tasks, rationalisation and normalisation" (ibid.: 182, cf. Musselin 2013: 1167).[136] Thus, "the discrepancies between a wage-earner in a firm and a faculty member have decreased on the average (more for contingent staff than for the traditional tenured positions)" (Musselin 2007: 183). This observation is shared by Hyatt (2004) who remarks that

> [j]ust as the traditional structure of shop floor life is becoming increasingly extinct in the landscapes of the post-industrial West, those of us employed in what were once regarded as more privileged spaces are now being subjected to forms of management and surveillance that seem derived from the old Fordist world of production (ibid.: 25).

From this, we can conclude that as universities are increasingly expected to function according to economistic logics, they are simultaneously expected to be administrated – or rather managed – like private companies.[137] Thus, their managerialisation can be considered as the expression of a neoliberal governmentality at the institutional level (corresponding to the "roll-out" phase of neoliberalism), both in the sense that it shapes the structures of universities (cf. Shore

[136] Correspondingly, Bourdieu (1988) notes that "the wage earners of research […] can no longer surround themselves with the charismatic aura which attaches to the traditional writer or professor, small producers exploiting their own independent cultural capital, which tends to be seen as a divine gift. This is all the more the case since the products of the new research work often bear the mark of the conditions in which they were accomplished: these 'reports' and 'accounts', often drafted in haste to meet a deadline, according to the standardized norms of mass production, and, because of the need to justify the funds spent, bound to sacrifice all to a display of the amount of work accomplished – with interminable methodological notes, voluminous appendices, etc. – rather than to an interpretation or a systematization of the results, are just as different from a book or a scientific article as are the most traditional doctoral theses, which are also marked by the social need to have their labour displayed and appreciated, even if they cannot always clearly show what its results are" (ibid.: 125). However, there is a certain irony in the fact that Bourdieu's (1988) book itself comprises interminable methodological notes as well as voluminous appendices amounting to roughly a sixth of the book and presenting an enormous amount of data that is not easily comprehensible (cf. Fisher 1990).

[137] However, it is not clear what kind of private enterprise should in fact serve as an example. For instance, Clarke and Newman (1997) point out that "[b]y the time the state sector had discovered 'corporate management' as an approach to coordinating large scale organisational forms in the early 1970s, the avant-garde of business management was already looking to new ways of organising enterprise" (ibid.: 12). Accordingly, Greenwood (2007) remarks that the centralisation of university governance "appears to be increasing, precisely when many private sector corporations are pushing decision-making and economic responsibility as far down toward the site of production as they can. In this regard, the corporate model of universities is much more like mid-twentieth-century US manufacturing corporations than twenty-first-century global, multi-sited corporations" (ibid.: 101). Besides, while this thesis argues that the state pressures universities into becoming more like enterprises (respectively servants of the economy/industry), it appears that entrepreneurs and industrialists simultaneously feel abandoned by the state. In other words: While I (and other scholars) argue that the university is in ruins, others argue that the industry is in ruins. For example, the CEO of the Austrian Miba concern complains in a newspaper interview about the dwindling status of entrepreneurship in the Austrian government and population ("Keiner fragt, wer die Arbeitsplätze schafft" by Gerhard Hofer, *Die Presse*, 26 April 2016, 16.). Likewise, a former German minister of economic affairs worries in a newspaper interview that the German government currently acts against the interests of industry ("Wir haben keine Vorstellung mehr von Industrie" by Gerhard Hofer, *Die Presse*, 1 May 2016, 18f.).

2008) as well as that "[i]t is in the exercise of management that neoliberal structures take hold" (Rata 2010: 78).[138]

Universities are by no means the only public institutions affected by this development[139] that Clarke and Newman (1997) have characterised as an universalist (cf. ibid.: 66) ideology (that is applicable to all organisations) relying on "the introduction of quasi markets, a greater emphasis on decentralisation, a constant emphasis on the need to improve quality, and insistence on greater attention being given to meeting the wishes of the individual service user" (ibid.: 20f.). Aiming at the intensification of labour (ibid.: 75), managerialism

> actively seeks 'responsibility' and seeks to further disperse it as a corporate and individual good. It promises 'transparency' within a complex field of decision-making. It is committed to the production of 'efficiency' in the pursuit of super-ordinate objectives. Managerialism represents the cement that can hold together this dispersed organisational form of the state and, in its customer orientation, claims to be able to represent and service an individuated public […]. Managerialism promises to provide the discipline necessary for efficient organisation, particularly in relation to welfare professionalism's claims to exercise discretionary judgment. (ibid.: 30)

The ideal-typical counterpart to managerialism is bureau-professionalism. Whereas bureau-professional regimes "stress accountability to politicians, and promise the best 'treatment' for those in need, legitimated by professional criteria of judgement" (thereby offering "the pursuit of the 'public good' based on the application of forms of expert power which are service specific") managerial regimes "stress accountability to users, and promise the best service to customers" as well as "the best use of public resources based on the deployment of calculative power" (ibid.: 66). Besides, Clarke and Newman (1997: 47, cf. Lorenz 2012: 616f.) highlight the *imperative of change* that accompanies and legitimates the managerial transformation of the state (cascading from global competition to corporate and individual success).

> The need to 'love change' and to 'thrive on chaos' has helped to constitute a tyranny of transformation which has served to legitimate the processes of state restructuring. It is through the power of these discourses of change, we argue, that the unthinkable became thinkable; the unspeakable became speakable; and things which at first appeared to be terrifying inversions of older certainties came to be a normal part of everyday practice. Management has not just been the means through which change is to be delivered: managerialism as a discourse has energised the very process of change. (Clarke and Newman 1997: 39)[140]

Such reflections do not only resonate with those of Boltanski and Chiapello (2001) and Sennett (2006) presented in chapter 3.2.2, but also with those of Hilgers (2013) on neoliberal institutions that are not simply organised as enterprises but are based on the assumption that institutions

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[138] Inversing that argument, Goddard et al. (2016a: 300) link the move to a more corporate and entrepreneurial model of the university (rather than a more civic model) to the growth of managerialism in higher education.

[139] Managerialism may have originated in private business, but its logics have expanded far beyond the economic field. As Shore (2008) puts it: "'Taylorist' techniques were designed to construct a mechanism for governing the conduct of industrial workers in order to improve efficiency and increase the capacity of management. But the managerial revolution it precipitated had implications that went way beyond factories as assembly lines." (ibid.: 279)

[140] In this context, Burtscher et al. (2005: 162f., cf. Burtscher et al. 2006: 252f.) draw on Albert Hirschman's notion of "fracasomania" (failure complex), i.e. the conviction that an existing system has failed to such an extent that it needs to be replaced entirely. Focused on the weaknesses of the old systems and blind to its strengths its worst practices are compared to the best aspects of its alternative. Analogously, Clarke & Newman (1997) speak of the "vilification of the old and the idealisation of the new" (ibid.: 65) as a means to justify a managerial regime.

and individuals are malleable at all times. Hence, "[t]he obligation to enact permanent reforms, continual improvement, refinement of targets is part of this perpetual movement of amelioration by reshaping institutions and souls" (ibid.: 81). However, although neoliberal institutions advocate a permanent state of reform driven by a rhetoric of continuous improvement/optimisation (according to the motto "if you stop getting better, you stop being good"), they require to present the fictional foundation of "the belief in the constant necessity of change, in the inflexible need of 'flexibility' and in the obligation of adaptability" as a natural truth (ibid.: 81). In order to do so, they mobilise macroeconomics and official statistics as political fictions that "produce the reality and are incorporated into procedures, techniques, strategies, representations and practices" – with management taking on a central role in the process (ibid.: 81).[141]

There is yet another feature that Clarke and Newman (1997) observe: the depoliticising tendencies inherent in managerialism.

> One strong thread in the restructuring of the state has been the attempt to depoliticise decision making by making it a matter of 'operational management'. (ibid.: 144)

> The problems which the managerial state is intended to resolve derive from contradictions and conflicts in the political, economic and social realms. But what we have seen is the managerialisation of these contradictions: they are redefined as 'problems to be managed'. Terms such as 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness', 'performance' and 'quality' depoliticise a series of social issues (whose efficiency? effectiveness for whom?) and thus displace real political choices into series of managerial imperatives. (ibid.: 159)

Defining managerialism as a broad ideological movement that regards management as "that generic activity, group, and institution that is necessarily, technically and socially, superior to any other conceivable form of social practice and organization such as craft, profession, or community […] irrespective of time, place, and value" (Deem et al. 2007: 6), Deem et al. (2007) differentiate between three, historically consecutive forms of managerialism (in the context of the UK): a "corporatist" form of managerialism, neoliberal managerialism and neo-technocratic managerialism.[142] While the latter revolves around new discourses of personalisation, customisation, localisation, co-production and empowerment (ibid.: 10), neoliberal managerialism asserts that it is only

> through the universal imposition of free market forces and private sector market discipline that the public sector would be placed in a position to break free from the power and control of professional 'producer/provider cartels' and sustain a dynamic of entrepreneurial-driven change and transformation. (ibid.: 9)

Neoliberal managerialism provides the "ideological underpinnings and strategic political rationale for NPM [New Public Management, author's note]" (ibid.: 9), the term that managerialist reforms of the public sector frequently operate under. A concept "with clear roots in neo-

[141] While we can consequently understand managerialism as creating a "tyranny of transformation", it can equally be regarded as a response to transformation processes, for example when Kogan and Teichler (2007) note that "a greater professionalization of higher education management is regarded as necessary to enable higher education to respond effectively to a rapidly changing external environment" (ibid.: 11).

[142] Alternatively, Ferlie et al. (2008) distinguish between a New Public Management, network governance and Neo-Weberian narrative of (ideal types of) public service reform.

liberalism" (Broucker et al. 2015: 5, cf. Lorenz 2012: 603), NPM is a narrative rather than a purely analytical framework as it mixes technical as well as political and normative elements (Ferlie et al. 2008: 334). Besides, it is an umbrella concept encompassing various new management styles (Broucker et al. 2015: 2f.) and comprises of "a set of instruments or tolls from which policy makers can pick and choose depending on the circumstances" (ibid.: 24). Emerging in the UK under the Thatcher governments of the 1980s, NPM relies on

> (1) markets (or quasi markets) rather than planning, (2) strong performance measurement, monitoring and management systems, with a growth of audit systems rather than tacit or self regulation and (3) empowered and entrepreneurial management rather than collegial public sector professionals and administrators. […] There is a concentration on goals of efficiency, value for money and performance rather than democracy or legitimacy. There is a suspicion of monopoly public sector producers (including public sector professionals) and a desire to shift power to consumers and managers and to increase the strength of hierarchy, either directly through line management or indirectly through strong contracts within a principal/agent framework. Here the centre sets the strategic framework and governance instruments (steering not rowing); and the periphery is given operational freedom to deliver but only within its strategic framework. (Ferlie et al. 2008: 335)[143]

NPM gave rise to the general belief that higher education institutions are organisations rather than "sui generis collegial structures, with the company as an ideal type leading the direction of governance reforms" (Broucker et al. 2015: 5, cf. Musselin 2013: 1167). Relying on concepts such as strategy formation, goal orientation, competition or market orientation, NPM employs instruments like controlling, cost and performance accounting, planning and control systems, global budgets, management by objectives and performance agreements (Biedermann and Strehl 2004: 223). However, despite its claim on increasing economy, efficiency and effectiveness,

> NPM and the promotion of a private sector management style has been driven less by a sober empirical evaluation of consequences and more by faith in the presumed benefits of abstract management (Bogdanor, 1994) and a universalistic approach to administrative design (Hood, 1991:9-10). (Power 1997: 92)[144]

One feature of neoliberal managerialism and NPM is that they promote "an instrumental/market rationality that 'gnaws away' at professional autonomy and control" (ibid.: 22) by institutionalising "distrust in the capacity of public service professionals to articulate and defend a robust conception of the 'public interest'" (ibid.: 24).[145] Instead, it advocates the firm belief that public institutions (such as hospitals, schools or universities) should not be administered by the professionals working in them (such as doctors, teachers or university lecturers) but by professional managers instead who should have the "'freedom to manage' as long as they meet contract commitments and performance targets" (Shore and Wright 2015: 25), thereby reducing the pow-

[143] For alternative characterisations of NPM see Broucker et al. (2015: 2f., 5f.), Pellert (1999: 226f.), Power (1997: 43).
[144] In that regard, Lorenz (2012) remarks that "[b]ecause there are no substantial aims at all behind NPM policy, each cut in spending is simply a springboard to the next. Efficient, therefore, is never efficient enough" (ibid.: 606) – which does not keep managers "from awarding themselves salaries at some presumed market rate" (ibid.: 614). He then argues that "there is no evidence at all that this shift [towards NPM, author's note] in any way represents an improvement, while there is clear evidence supporting the opposite view" (ibid.: 608).
[145] Of course, it remains questionable why, assuming that public service professionals selfishly pursue their own interests rather than those of their clients, this should be any different in the case of managers.

er of welfare state occupations "to decide what service to provide and how, on the basis of their professional training and judgement" (Wright and Rabo 2010: 8, cf. Lorenz 2012: 610).[146]

Thus, if the university is expected to function like a private enterprise, an organisational form that is equalled with efficiency, it requires (appointed rather than elected) university management to take over control of the university (Münch 2011: 71).[147] Such a displacement of decisive power and work autonomy from professionals to managers as well as from faculty to administrators is clearly visible in the internal governance of universities – as for example attested by Musselin's (2007) observation of the "increased possibility of intervention for university leaders on the allocation of work among academics, while these leaders are less and less expected to behave as *primus inter pares*, but to act as employers" (ibid.: 180).[148]

Another aspect of the managerialisation of university life is the fact that "in a couple of decades, administrative work has morphed from an occasional service component in a professorial life to a 'desirable career path' in its own right (Lazerson et al.)" (Bousquet 2008: 6). This observation corresponds with Barcan's (2013) that

> [t]he last few decades have undoubtedly seen such a quantitative rise of administrative tasks as to constitute a qualitative shift in academic work. This growth of the administrative function is multifaceted, involving: a growth in the sheer number of staff employed by universities to do administrative work; growth in the proportion of administrative staff relative to academic staff; a rise in the number, variety and intensity of administrative tasks; the devolution of many administrative tasks onto academics; an increase in the number of administrative staff who have a university degree; and the credentialing of higher level administrative staff (via MBAs, degrees in Human Resources etc.), resulting in the creation of a structured career path specifically in university administration and management. The growth of administrative work has been accompanied by its constitution, both formally and informally, as a form of expertise in and of itself. (ibid.: 75)

Moreover, informed by the rhetoric of change, "[t]he culture of university management has the power and, crucially, the intention to remake competing campus cultures in its own image" (Bousquet 2008: 11). Along a similar line of argument, Readings (1996) claims that "a general principle of administration replaces the dialectic of teaching and research, so that teaching and research, as aspects of professional life, are subsumed under administration" (ibid.: 125). These assessments correspond with that of Trow (2005) that in the course of the diminution of the monopolistic power of the "professorial oligarchy"[149], "the weakness of the academic community in the governance of institutions of mass higher education is filled less by students[150] or junior staff than by agencies of government" (ibid.: 31).

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[146] However, Musselin (2013) argues that the academic profession "has been reconfigured rather than cast aside" (ibid.: 1165) due to the increasing role of peer reviews in the allocation of resources (that is in turn caused by the increase in performance-based funding) which reinforces an academic elite.

[147] For an overview of managerial reforms in European higher education see Musselin (2013: 1166–1168).

[148] In that context, Boden and Epstein (2011) note that a "facilitator makes the exercise of agency possible, whereas an employer has the right to allocate and direct the use of resources, including people, in a capitalist sense. As a consequence of the marketization and commercialisation of universities and the concomitant introduction of management accounting regimes of control, the husbanding of resources – space, time, money, facilities and labour – has become a key aspect of management activity (Willmott, 1995)" (ibid.: 488).

[149] For an overview of the German/Austrian "Ordinarienuniversität" see Burtscher et al. (2006: 243f.).

[150] While student participation increased during periods of student activism (predominantly in the earlier phase of the massification of higher education), "the heavy focus of mass higher education […] on vocational training and

As managerialism replaces a hierarchical structure dominated by full professors with a no less hierarchical one dominated by university managers (particularly rectors and deans), a concomitant *centralisation of decision-making processes* within the university allows for an increased influence of governments and government agencies on the internal governance of "autonomous" universities by establishing a clear line of command via (contractual) performance and target agreements from ministries over rectorates to head of departments and finally academic employees. While this circumstance facilitates the profiling processes (i.e. the setting of priorities in research and teaching) that governments increasingly demand of universities assuming that strong institutional profiles and the creation of a "critical mass" are required for universities to be internationally visible as well as to fulfil their third mission(s) (cf. BMWFW 2015b: 8, 32), it restricts the freedom of individual academics to pursue their own research and teaching interests.[151]

In that regard, I want to point out the role of a central instrument of managerial university governance that mobilises both technologies of subjection as well as of subjectivity: the *use of contracts*. Following the logic of "management by objectives", universities negotiate performance/target agreements both externally with ministries as well as internally with their employees. This resonates well with contemporary (European) university governance as it supports the shift from input-based to output-based funding (cf. Magalhães et al. 2013: 105, 107f.), i.e. "from ex-ante control to ex-post evaluation" (Ferlie et al. 2008: 328). Thereby, the influence of the state is – despite it apparently having "withdrawn from directly interfering in university management"– in fact increased as it "maintains arms-length control over budgetary provision and through regulatory mechanisms of policy performance and quality assurance" (Shore 2010: 20, cf. Ferlie et al. 2008, Gornitzka and Maassen 2000).

> [T]he greater managerial autonomy given by the state is partly an illusion as, in fact, incentive-based instruments exercise a stronger control over behaviors, a rather classic effect of NPM, as they affect the relationship between principal and agents (Schubert, 2009). (Musselin 2013: 1168)

> Contract steering, argues the OECD, reduces public administration, whilst tightening the Ministers' control over service suppliers, making it easier to ensure that service suppliers carry out Ministers' political aims for the sector and respond quickly to any changes in political direction. Such reforms involve changing the status of service providers (including universities in many parts of Europe) so that they are no longer part of the state bureaucracy, but are turned into 'autonomous' agents, with whom the state can enter into contracts, and through which they are held 'accountable' for their performance. (Wright and Rabo 2010: 5, cf. Wright and Ørberg 2008: 39)

While the element of negotiation, which is inherent to contracts, constitutes a seemingly liberal form of governance, we have to keep in mind that it takes place in the illiberal context discussed above that is characterised by a hierarchical principal-agent/employer-employee relation-

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credentialing have muted the demands of activist students to be represented on the decision-making bodies. Students are commonly not enrolled in the same institution long enough to make their voices heard. The ones who do are likely to be deeply immersed in their research studies and dissertations" (Trow 2005: 31).

[151] However, beside the academic freedom of individual researchers being restricted by the increasing importance of thematically earmarked, application-oriented external funding, external funding simultaneously undermines the room for manoeuvre of university managers to set up their own strategic priorities.

ship (between the state and universities on the one hand as well as between university managers and their employees on the other hand).[152] Thus, whereas managerialism aims to open universities for external (quasi) market forces in a neoliberal fashion, it simultaneously constitutes an "illiberal" form of university governance (cf. Shore 2008) – a circumstance that Scott and Harding (2007) take into account by summarising the managerial university as "a mix of 'bossism' (the 'hierarchist way') and competition plus rivalry (the 'individualist way')" (ibid.: 18). Accordingly, we can observe greater deregulation on the macro-level with simultaneous more regulatory forces shaping the meso- and micro-levels of institutions (Felt 2009: 28) – leading Lorenz (2012) to the remark that "NPM boils down to the notions that market rhetoric is good, and central control is better"[153] (ibid.: 607). Whereas an increase in competition and deregulation resonates with a neoliberal governmentality (i.e. the demand for flexible, responsibilised/self-monitoring entrepreneurial citizens/employees), the simultaneous increase in authoritarian managerialism is rather characterised by "Fordist" technologies of subjection.

Despite the apparent successful implementation of managerial ideas across the globe, this new mode of university governance exhibits a range of critical features.[154]

> (a) they create new risks and inefficiencies; (b) because they are grounded in a general theory of organizations qua organizations, they tend to be insensitive to qualities that may be necessary for a specific type of organization to perform its particular functions; and (c) they are much less effective than their modernizing rhetoric asserts. (Scott and Harding 2007: 14)

Moreover, managerial logics conflict with traditional notions of academic work. For instance, Barcan (2013) notes that "[t]he administrator's work must be sufficient rather than sacrificial; dutiful rather than devoted; and effective rather than inspirational" (ibid.: 79).[155] Furthermore, Boden and Epstein (2011) argue that

> [a]s the provision of research resources slips gently from gift to (monetary) exchange economy, it fundamentally changes the nature of accountability. In the former, accountability relies on recipients' sense of moral obligation engendered by such gifts. In the latter, accountability is formal, contractual and underpinned by structural power. (ibid.: 481)

Thus, the rationale for the need of managers to govern expert institutions simultaneously contains its critique: they bring a different, conflicting logic to the institution (cf. Lorenz 2012:

[152] This circumstance is even more visible in another reason for the increasing contractualisation of academic work: the rise of external funding und consequently the project logic discussed in chapter 3.2.2 that – at least in the case of funding applications ("Antragsforschung") which are typical for basic research – grants academics the "freedom" to choose what they offer; albeit with the omnipresent risk of not gaining funding if they offer less than their numerous competitors.

[153] In fact, Lorenz (2012) argues that "NPM managerialism ironically shows extremely interesting similarities to the type of managerialism found in former Communist states" (ibid.: 600).

[154] Although academics widely agree that the managerialisation of the university is one of its currently most prominent features, I found surprisingly little agreement on the extent to how its effects have been studied. While Broucker et al. (2015) claim that "empirical evidence regarding the outcomes and effects of NPM are scarce" (ibid.: 3), Fanghanel (2012) remarks that the "impact of managerialism and performativity regimes on universities […] has been extensively examined in the literature" (ibid.: 88).

[155] In this context, Felt (2009b) remarks that "[w]hile the myth of science still puts vocation and vision at the core of research activity, research is increasingly equated with work needing entrepreneurial and management skills" (ibid.: 29).

611).[156] This circumstance also includes (increasingly short-term) employment relationships based on a contract logic that differ from the traditional (patriarchal) relationship between senior and early-career academics as described by Bourdieu (1988: 157).

Before elaborating in the ensuing two sub-chapters on the cultures of audit and flexibility that the introduction of neoliberal-managerial university reforms resulted in, I want to conclude this introductory section by pointing out that there were good reasons for transforming the way universities are governed. For instance, Scott and Harding (2007: 12f.) attest them to have been "unhappy places" engulfed in cultural conservatism and elitism, unwilling to respond to changes in their environment or to answer those whom they serve. Along these lines, Barcan (2013) argues that an account of these transformations does not need to lament them,

> [f]irst, because the good old days were good only for the happy few; second, because at least some of the changes to universities can be considered improvements; and third, because most of the changes that have occurred over the last few decades are irreversible. (ibid.: 13, cf. Slaughter and Rhoades 2004: 33)

Acknowledging the necessity of transformation does not, however, imply approving of the transformations that have been made. In that regard, I agree with Scott and Harding (2007) when they propose "to argue not against (the necessity of) management, but rather against managerial-*ism* in its gung-ho mode" (ibid.: 19).

4.5.1 The Audit University

If the managerial university is expected to function like a private enterprise, its administration requires the establishment of elaborate procedures for quality assurance (Münch 2011: 72f.) which in turn requires "a new social phenomenon, professionals devoted to quality control" (Strathern 2004: 10). As in this process the use of audit increasingly finds its way into the governance of universities, it shifts from "a method of financial verification and bookkeeping" to a "generalized model (and technology) of governance" (Shore 2008: 290) while becoming "both cause and effect of itself" (Shore and Wright 2015: 25). This development has been described (particularly in the anthropological literature) referring to the notion of *audit culture(s)*. Shore and Wright (2015) define audit culture as

> the process by which the principles and techniques of accountancy and financial management are applied to the governance of people and organisations – and, more importantly, the social and cultural consequences of that translation. (ibid.: 24)

The reasons for the emergence of the "audit university" are multiple and founded in the developments stated above. Strathern (2004) notes, "[p]artly because of the scale of public investment, science has come under particular scrutiny" (ibid.: 9). In that regard, Barcan (2013) observes that

> [t]he modernization of the university – its bureaucratization, the massive increase in state funding and control, and an ever-developing public discourse about the university's social mission – all en-

[156] For instance, Bourdieu (1998b: 36) complains that academic managers who control economic resources can exert tyrannical power in the sense of it not being based on the specific logic of the field.

> tailed a stronger emphasis on accountability to students and to society more broadly, and a new way of understanding it. (ibid.: 83)

Shore and Wright on the other hand view it as a result of the "economic imperatives of neoliberalism combined with the technologies of New Public Management" (Shore 2008: 278, cf. 287f.) that has proven "indispensable for new public management" (Shore and Wright 2015: 24), with Shore (2008) considering the increasing use of audits as being based on "growing concerns about 'quality assurance', 'operational risk', and the 'crisis of trust' that is said to afflict most professions today" (ibid.: 280). In addition, I argue that the logic of audit resonates with the project logic that is increasingly defining academic work.

Despite its close conjunction with neoliberalism, audit culture promotes an "illiberal" governance and authoritarian forms of control rather than self-governance (Shore 2008, Shore and Wright 2015: 25), turning administration from being the servant of professors into an operative control tool of the university management (Münch 2011: 73) while robbing academics "of their professional autonomy to determine their own behavioral norms" (Lorenz 2012: 618).

> Trust in professional self-regulation and the autonomy of the researcher, departments and universities is replaced by the suspicion of principals and their agents and by external control according to the principles of target agreements, total transparency and measurement of results through indicators. (Münch 2011: 96f., my translation)

It is important to note that audit is not simply a neutral tool but rather one that "actively transforms the environments into which it is introduced" and changes "the way people perceive themselves" (Shore 2008: 281, cf. Nowotny et al. 2003: 183). "[E]xternal audit structures always produce internal self-auditing processes, and thus enforce standards of 'good behaviour' in a bottom-up manner" (Felt 2009: 31) as audit does not only consist of technological or operational elements, but of programmatic or normative elements as well (Power 1997: 6). This circumstance makes audit an ambivalent concept – which is exactly why it could expand into new organisational contexts (ibid.: 6).

> The ambiguity of auditing is not a *methodological* problem but a *substantive* fact. […] [T]he limits of the term are not always clear. And the reason that they are not always clear is that the word is not used simply *descriptively* to refer to particular practices, but *normatively* in the context of demands and aspirations for accountability and control. […] The power of auditing is the vagueness of the idea. (ibid.: 6f.)

Accordingly, Strathern (2004) reminds us that "[a]ccountability is at once: (1) a moral stance towards the wider world (the 'context' now invited to speak back); and (2) a set of procedures for verification" (ibid.: 72); and Brenneis (2004) remarks that it is

> critical to note that, as is often the case with key terms, *accountability* is polysemic and has multiple histories. In this instance, it does not refer to moral responsibility or being "called to account" on ethical grounds. Accountability here derives from the language of management and conveys a complex sense of measurement, transparency, and evaluation. (ibid.: 585)

Audit culture shifts the locus of accountability from being responsible to academic peers and students to being responsible to society in general (Erkkilä and Piironen 2014: 186), while con-

flating "accountability" with "accountancy" so that "'being answerable to the public' is recast in terms of measures of productivity, 'economic efficiency' and delivering 'value for money' (VFM)" (Shore 2008: 281).[157] Accordingly, Brenneis (2012) argues that "[o]ne might well end up writing for measurement rather than for one's peers" (ibid.: 296). Strathern (2004) terms such a kind of accountability (in reference to the Mode 2 model) as "accountability-2", i.e. "the verification of institutional achievement [that] can only be demonstrated by specifying in advance what is going to be measured" (ibid.: 72f.). Moreover, it emphasises terms like "excellence", "quality" and "standards" whose "meaning is invariably vague" (ibid.: 289). It is precisely this emptiness that constitutes the applicability of these notions as technologies of control. Wright (2005) draws on Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney's concept of "misrecognition" to explain this phenomenon: Political actors make use of key words with a vast field of meaning and a positive connotation for the subjects of their policies – so-called "weasel words" (cf. Wright and Rabo 2010: 5) – to impose their differing (and even opposing) understanding of that key word onto the policy's subjects who can hardly oppose such familiar, attractive terms.[158] In that regard, Clarke and Newman (1997) notice that

> [t]here is a literal sense of loss of words. Terms which once appeared to belong to radical vocabularies and progressive ideologies have been re-articulated into competing ideologies. […] The colonisation of languages of opposition by the discourse of transformation creates an *apparent* unity of interests against the old ways. (ibid.: 52)

Lorenz (2012) criticises this "bullshit nature" of NPM discourse, i.e. that "it is Orwellian in nature because it redefines concepts such as quality, accountability, transparency, and professionalism and perverts them into their opposites" (ibid.: 625); "[t]hose who sell NPM bullshit neither observe the rules of science nor break them; the NPM bullshitter is simply playing a completely different game from that played by the faculty" (ibid.: 627). Take for example the dominance of the term "excellence" in the governance of the contemporary university. As it transforms into a "transnational bureaucratic corporation", the ideology of (national) culture as the basis of the university's legitimacy is replaced by the discourse of excellence which "functions to allow the University to understand itself solely in terms of the structure of corporate administration" (Readings 1996: 29). From this point of view, despite appearing to be a notion that is mobilised by academics in order to assess their work performance, "excellence" is a term originating in the managerial logic of administrators.

> Today, all departments of the University can be urged to strive for excellence, since the general applicability of the notion is in direct relation to its emptiness. Thus, for instance, the Office of Research and University Graduate Studies at Indiana University at Bloomington explains that in its Summer faculty Fellowship program "Excellence of the proposed scholarship is the major criterion employed in the evaluation procedure." This statement is, of course, entirely meaningless, yet the assumption is that the invocation of excellence overcomes the problem of the question of value

[157] Accordingly, Vermeir (2013) notes that "accountability towards society could be framed in terms of *Bildung*, civilization, and a generalized education of society, but instead, the new management ideology focuses almost exclusively on the measurable impact of technology transfer, spinoffs, and the economic benefits of scientific research" (ibid.: 2488f.).
[158] For an example regarding academic freedom see Wright (2016: 70f.).

> across disciplines, since excellence is the common denominator of good research in all fields. Even if this were so, it would mean that excellence could not be invoked as a "criterion", because excellence is not a fixed standard of judgment but a qualifier whose meaning is fixed in relation to something else. An excellent boat is not excellent by the same *criteria* as an excellent plane. So to say that excellence is a criterion is to say absolutely nothing other than that the committee will not reveal the criteria used to judge applications. (Readings 1996: 23f.)[159]

If audit culture draws its legitimacy from claiming to foster accountability, it is important to notice that it not only promotes an economistic understanding of accountability but also a hierarchical kind of accountability that only runs upwards (rather than downwards); i.e. staff is accountable to their superiors, who are in turn also (only) accountable to their superiors. Amit (2000) addresses this circumstance for US and Canadian academics by remarking on an "institutional emphasis on confidentiality and the hypocritical willingness of some administrators to duck their own obligations for accountability while seeking it of others" (ibid.: 230).[160] Thus, accountability is institutionalised in the audit university whereas responsibility is individualised – a feature of a neoliberal governmentality as shown in chapter 3.1.

Despite – or because of – its reliance on invariably vague notions, audit culture also relies on *governing by numbers*.

> 'Governing by numbers' – reducing complex processes to simple numerical indicators and rankings for purposes of management and control – has become a defining feature of our times. At the heart of this process is an increasing fetishisation of statistical measurement and competitive ranking as robust and reliable instruments for calculating (and enhancing) what are largely qualitative features such as 'excellence', 'quality', 'value' and 'effectiveness' (Porter 1996; Rose 1999). (Shore and Wright 2015: 22)

The logic of governing by numbers replaces professional judgement with measurable performance criteria (cf. Shore and Wright 2015: 26) that aim at "the production of pre-determined forms of output, and evaluation demands displays of form" (Strathern 2004: 76) – "even when applied to the most subjective or intersubjective of academic activities" (Barcan 2013: 95). Correspondingly, Brenneis (2012) observes a

> gradual replacement of such specialised expert judgement by forms of generalisable and assumedly transparent and translatable assessment. An example here is the stunning ascendancy of citation analysis and impact factors in many academic systems. One might well end up writing for measurement rather than for one's peers. (ibid.: 296)

As audit culture cannot measure "the real thing" (for instance quality) but only proxies, "many university auditing practices try to capture signs of productivity, like activity or busyness" (Barcan 2013: 94f.).

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[159] However, his point is not such much that "no one knows what excellence is" but rather that "everyone has his or her idea of what it is" and is therefore more interested in being left alone to be excellent rather than argue about differing definitions (Readings 1996: 32f.).

[160] I can easily imagine a similar hypocritical willingness to duck their own obligations from professors ruling the former "University of professorial oligarchy"[149]. Thus, I believe the matter of a unilateral accountability to be based on the heavily hierarchical distribution of power in the university rather than on the question which of the university's three estates (faculty, students and administrators) is in power.

> Bureaucracy, unable to police scholarly *content* directly, has to content itself with imposing and policing its own systemic *values* – productivity and efficiency – and attempting to capture scholarly value through a bureaucratic notion of 'quality'. (ibid.: 84)[161]

While constituting its appeal, the metrical nature of audit culture simultaneously constitutes one of its problematic features: "the assumption that writing four papers make [sic] you a better academic than writing two" (ibid.: 98). In that regard, Jiménez (2016) criticises (referring to Spain and Portugal) that

> [w]e are pushed to write as many articles as possible instead of a really good one resulting from years of focused work. […] Nowadays, there is not enough time to write, there is not enough time to read. Ironically, in order to get positive evaluation of research quality, we may risk the quality of our scientific work. (ibid.: 362)

Along a similar line of critique, Münch (2011: 110) points out that the new focus on the delivery according to indicators ignores those achievements that cannot be grasped by indicators, turns means into ends as "indicators are not used anymore to improve research and teaching as an end, but rather research and teaching are performed in a way so that indicators are met" (ibid. 102, my translation, cf. ibid.: 126), diminishes the potential for creativity and originality in research (ibid.: 114) and generally drains resources from research and teaching (ibid.: 72f., 366).

> Measure the quantity of research and you rapidly risk its quality, by encouraging the rapid publication of flimsy work. […] Audit culture promotes a certain instrumentality: don't do anything that isn't worth writing down and that won't get you or your department 'points'. So-called outreach or community engagement activities may be particularly at risk. […] If so, this would represent an ironic result of strategies designed to enhance academics social utility. (Barcan 2013: 96)

Beyond that, Shore and Wright (2015) remind us that

> transforming people into accountable, responsibilised individuals comes at a cost that is not simply financial: increasing bureaucratisation, occupational stress and burnout, employee disengagement and cynicism, gaming strategies, loss of trust and diminished professionalism are perhaps the most visible symptoms of the new ethics of accountability that audit is producing. (ibid.: 26)

However, its inherent abstract nature is (just as its ambiguity) not simply a weakness of an audit culture, but rather constitutes its appeal, as indicators "make remote surveillance possible and seem to allow outsiders access to the inner world of a country or an organisation" (ibid.: 23). Besides, numbers "gain quasi 'natural' authority without needing much legitimation" exactly because they "seem abstract and impersonal". "Numbers somehow hide the traces of human production, they convey the feeling of being an objective, value-free description of reality." (Felt 2009: 30) The use of indicators and statistics to govern populations is nothing new, as Foucault (2000) has shown for the development of statistics as the science of the state in the 17th century. What is new about audit culture is "the extent to which these calculative practices of measurement and ranking have become institutionalised, extended and above all, *financialised*" (Shore and Wright 2015: 24).

[161] This critique is in fact older than audit cultures are. Already in 1917 Weber (2008) pointed out that "scholarly quality is imponderable and, especially in the case of daring innovators, often (and perfectly naturally) a matter of controversy" (ibid.: 29f.).

Given its problematic features (cf. Scott and Harding 2007: 13–17), it is surprising that audit culture still appears to gain grounds in academia without much resistance as attested by Bousquet (2008: 13), Felt (2009: 27)[162] and Shore (2008: 291). Thus, the question that Amit (2000) raised nearly 20 years ago is still valid.

> It is not difficult to understand why these corporate executives and the neo-liberal government which commissioned their advice would be concerned to extend their managerial control over the kind of valuable, economically strategic information resources so much associated with universities. But why would academicians and universities buy this bluff? Why at a time when their investigative and pedagogical work appears more sought after than ever before would they be ceding any part of their capacity to define their own agendas for inquiry? (ibid.: 221f.)

A number of answers have been developed: (1) Audit culture is an illiberal technology of governance that serves "as a seemingly rational basis for punitive decision-making, whether by outsiders who want to claim that all academics are lazy, or by vice-chancellors who want to claim that certain staff 'aren't pulling their weight'" (Barcan 2013: 98).[163] Consequently, "structural or intellectual critique is frequently met by strategies that individualize and pathologize those who complain – in short, that cast them as people who are failing to cope" (ibid.: 8). This observation is complemented by Shore's (2008) that audit culture can only be contested at huge costs for individuals and institutions: "Indeed, the audit process has made it far too costly for individuals and institutions even to admit shortcomings or problems" (ibid.: 291, cf. Lorenz 2012: 625). (2) It resonates with academics because "the new regime of governmentality engendered by audit and new managerialism is designed to work on and through our capacities as moral agents and professionals" by claiming to promote "transparency", "quality" or "accountability" (Shore 2008: 291). In that context, Lorenz (2012) observes that "most professors, especially in the humanities, seem stuck in individualistic ideologies that suggest a direct meritocratic connection between quality and individual success in academia" (ibid.: 625). (3) It serves the interests of some academics who "clearly benefit from the new regimes of audit as they disrupt old hierarchies and provide new avenues for rapid promotion, at least for the more research-active or managerially-inclined staff" (Shore 2008: 291f., cf. Lorenz 2012: 626). (4) Barcan (2013) argues that the fantasies of control underlying audit culture help "to capture the uncertainty of the future and yoke it to the promise of productivity" – a promise that is "in fact antithetical to the ethos of open-ended, curiosity-driven investigation" – thereby functioning as "a ritual resolution of shared social anxieties" (ibid.: 101). (5) Gill (2010) points out that the lack of re-

[162] Felt (2009b) notes that "[i]t is astonishing to see to which degree auditing is embraced by research institutions […] without questioning the underlying assumption and without reflecting what it might produce beyond the intended effects" – adding that "[t]he development of an ever-growing number of indicators for the 'quality of research' or the creation of information systems and the accompanying belief that they 'represent' the work performed might be taken as the most visible outcomes of this paradigm" (ibid.: 31). What is equally astonishing (at least at first glance) is that Felt, after having been elected as Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences (University of Vienna), implemented a process termed "project quality assurance" in May 2015 that aims at developing new (and more) indicators for the measurement of the faculty's performance in research and teaching (for example coming up with third mission activities or a ranking of publications).

[163] Considering this valid critique of audit culture, the question still remains what to do with lazy academics or staff that isn't pulling their weight – although this question, in my view, only poses itself in the case of a small minority of academics and is thus of a more ideological nature.

sistance to the neoliberalisation of universities is not only a result of "divisive, individualising practices, of the silences around them" (that have already been mentioned) but also "of the fact […] that people are too exhausted to resist and furthermore do not know *what* to resist or *how* to do so" (ibid.: 241). To this I would add two more reasons: (6) Those in (the most) influential positions to oppose these changes may simply not feel the need to do so, as they may not feel particularly affected by them or even profit from them (as for instance described by Shore and Davidson 2014). After all, the long-serving academic staff in countries that introduced managerial reforms one or two decades ago is still enjoying a fence season, whereas it is only the next academic generation that will be fully affected by them (Münch 2011: 73). (7) One more reason is connected to the illiberal character of audit cultures: Academics are neither monks looking for nothing but God (respectively the truth) nor tenured civil servants (anymore) – they are (increasingly) employees. No matter how much dedication to their cause may be expected of them and in fact displayed by them, they are highly specialised employees who struggle for employment in a highly competitive and precarious environment (cf. chapters 8 and 9). Hence, they find themselves in positions that significantly hamper the political courage Amit (2000) calls for "to speak out if [sic] even if our colleagues remain fearful and silent, the courage to insist that the true measure of the intellectual project must be the curiosity of a critical and independent mind" (ibid.: 233). This argument may not be enough to convince project leaders or funding agencies to relinquish the specifications made by those who now pay the piper and call the tune.

4.5.2 The Flexible University

Finally, I would like to touch upon the reflections of an author who is rarely referred to in the discussions on the managerial/audit university although I consider them helpful when assuming that universities become reshaped in the image of the private enterprise (particularly as he extends his analysis to the reorganisation of bureaucracy itself): those of Richard Sennett (whom we already encountered in chapter 3.2.2) on the transformation of large companies into flexible organisations. According to Sennett (2006), these new institutions

> are neither smaller nor more democratic; centralized power has instead been reconfigured, power split off from authority. The institutions inspire only weak loyalty, they diminish participation and mediation of commands, they breed low levels of informal trust and high levels of anxiety about uselessness. A shortened framework of institutional time lies at the heart of this social degradation; the cutting edge has capitalized on superficial human relations. This same shortened time framework has disoriented individuals in efforts to plan their life course strategically and dimmed the disciplinary power of the old work ethic based on delayed gratification. (ibid.: 181)

Sennett (2006) argues that – just as pointed out for universities in the previous section – "in a flexible organization, power becomes concentrated at the center" (ibid.: 51). This hierarchisation is bolstered by new computerised surveillance that enables these institutions to engage in "panoptic surveillance" (ibid.: 51). Simultaneously, work groups are granted a certain amount of autonomy "[i]n order to deliver quick, flexible results" (ibid.: 52).

> Indeed, the firm will try to motivate autonomy through internal markets; the center sets the terms of competition between teams in writing a piece of computer code, raising money, or designing a product, then five or six teams compete against each other to do it. […] [I]n the new, flexible way of thinking, what matters is producing the best result as quickly as possible. That's a more modern measure of efficiency. This kind of internal competition leads to what the economist Robert Frank calls "winner-takes-all" rewards: the big prizes come only to the winning team, and there are few or no consolation prizes. (ibid.: 52)

Although in a different context, this winner-takes-all competition plays an increasingly influential role in contemporary academic work that is increasingly based on externally funded project work and the publication of peer-reviewed journal articles. Sennett (2006: 54) points out that this kind of competition in combination with the hierarchisation of the workplace generates an increasing material as well as social inequality.

> The center governs the periphery in a specific way. On the periphery people are on their own in the process of laboring, without much interaction up and down the chain of command […]. Those at the periphery are answerable to the center only for results. […] At the opposite extreme, in a bureaucratic pyramid, would stand the paternalistic employer. In terms of wealth and power, a paternalist like Henry Ford was indeed as unequal to workers on the assembly line as any modern global mogul. In sociological terms, however, he was closer to them, just as the general on the battlefield was connected to his troops. The sociological idea here is that inequality translates into distance; the greater the distance – the less a felt connection on both sides – the greater the social inequality between them. (ibid.: 55)

It is this social distance that divorces control from accountability. In the process, power may be concentrated at the top, but not authority (in the sense of legitimate power eliciting voluntary obedience) (ibid.: 58) – while "accountability" is conflated with "accountancy" and responsibility is individualised.

The structural changes characterising flexible organisations produce three social deficits: low institutional loyalty (which is most damaging to institutions in times of crisis and particularly exacerbates employees' stress of working long hours), diminishment of informal trust among workers (resulting in networks which easily tear apart) and weakening of institutional knowledge (as low-level functionaries who often possess the most institutional knowledge are replaced by computerised technology that applies rather than adapts rules) (ibid.: 63–72). Consequently, while commitment to one's work is demanded in neoliberal/post-Fordist capitalism, commitment to one's workplace crumbles away (ibid.: 196). Moreover, flexible organisations do not offer a good home to the attitude of craftsmanship characterising the academic profession (cf. chapter 2.3).

> The value placed on craftsmanship, doing something for its own sake, sits ever more uneasily in institutions where process and networking rule. Instead, the flexible organization puts a premium on portable human skills, on being able to work on several problems with a shifting cast of characters, cutting loose action from context. (ibid.: 141)

> The problem lies in the last part of our definition, doing something for its own sake. The more one understands how to do something well, the more one cares about it. Institutions based on short-term transactions and constantly shifting tasks, however, do not breed that depth. Indeed the organization can fear it; the management code word here is *ingrown*. Someone who digs deep into an activi-

> ty just to get it right can seem to others ingrown in the sense of fixated on that one thing – and obsession is indeed necessary for the craftsman. (ibid.: 105)

Nor do flexible organisations offer stable, predictable career perspectives (unlike the previous state of the university outlined in chapter 2.1). On the contrary, "insecurity is not just an unwanted consequence of upheavals in markets; rather, insecurity is programmed into the new institutional model. That is, insecurity does not happen *to* a new-style bureaucracy, it is made to happen" (ibid.: 187) – for example by having academics move from one temporary project employment to the next. Finally, there is another parallel between the two universities of my case studies and Sennett's flexible organisations: their size.[164] In that regard, Sennett (2006) ascertains that large companies do encourage a swift, superficial work mode, thereby causing frustration among both employees and clients.

> In principle, any well-run firm should want its employees to learn from their mistakes and admit a certain degree of trial-and-error learning. In practice, such big firms do not. The size of the firm indeed makes the greatest difference in this regard: in small service firms (under a hundred or so employees) care of customers is more directly connected to the firms' survival. But in the large medical insurance company superficiality proved functional; taking too much time to straighten things out earned no rewards. The result, within the firms I and my colleagues studied – perhaps invisible to a frustrated customer – was a fair number of employees who also feel frustrated. (ibid.: 128f.)[165]

Summarising, we can consider flexible organisations (and bureaucracies) to be characterised by centralised power in combination with panoptic surveillance, a winner-takes-all competition, insecure working conditions/prospects and an encouragement of a superficial work mode with a simultaneous disdain of craftsmanship – all aspects that conflict with traditional notions of academic work.

4.6 The Neoliberal Academic: a Micro Perspective

Before finishing my theoretical discussion of the (neoliberal) transformation of universities, I expand on its consequences for the subjectivities of academics. When universities are (at least partly) transformed according to neoliberal/managerial logics it follows that the academics working in them face pressures towards a neoliberalised subjectivity. In fact, Gill (2010) argues that

> academics are, in many ways, model neoliberal subjects, with their endless self-monitoring, flexibility, creativity and internalisation of new forms of auditing and calculating. Neoliberalism found fertile ground in academics whose predispositions to 'work hard' and 'do well' meshed perfectly with its demands for autonomous, self-motivating, responsibilised subjects. (ibid.: 241)

[164] The University of Vienna prides itself with being one of the largest employers in Vienna with 9,700 employees (see <http://diepresse.com/home/bildung/universitaet/4680009/Uni-Wien_Eine-Hochschule-praegt-die-Stadt?from=simarchiv>, accessed 27 March 2016). Of course, a parallel in size alone does not justify transferring Sennett's conclusions from private companies to public universities. However, the argument could be made that the massification of higher education has for example encouraged a swifter, more superficial work mode in higher education.

[165] This preference of superficial, i.e. quick and cheap work performance does not just pertain to large companies but to individual, "self-employed" workers as well, as Bologna (2006) points out: "Those who work cheaply are preferred to those with higher competences." (ibid.: 29, my translation)

Hilgers (2013), defining a neoliberal disposition as "an organising principle of the self, of the self's relation to the self, and of its relation to others, articulated towards the maximisation of the self in a world perceived in terms of competition" (ibid.: 83), remarks that

> [b]odies are the objects and targets of a power that disciplines them in order to maximise production. On the one hand, technologies of subjection aspire to regulate populations for optimal productivity; and on the other hand, agents subject themselves to and embody technologies of subjectivity that incline them to optimise their individual choices and to perceive the world through the principle of competition. (ibid.: 83)

Drawing on such a Foucauldian understanding, Bröckling (2007) develops the *entrepreneurial self* as the central figure of subjectification in neoliberalism.[166] While it derives its appeal from addressing "a collective desire for autonomy, personal fulfilment and non-alienated work" (ibid.: 58, my translation), its appeal to neoliberalised governments is obvious: entrepreneurs (have to) take the responsibility for their economic success into their own hands and create jobs – at least for themselves, for example in the case of (often involuntary) self-employed workers. Thereby, they help to displace the costs of the welfare state from the public to the private sector. Accordingly, Bröckling (2007) remarks:

> That everyone should become the entrepreneur of his/her own life was in the logics of Thatcherism and Reaganomics that put individual self-responsibility at the top of their political agenda, flanking the depletion of welfare-state social security systems with this postulate. (ibid.: 53, my translation)

As in a neoliberal governmentality the market mechanism is extended to all forms of social relations, including that of the individual to herself (ibid.: 76), entrepreneurship turns from a specific form of organisation into a general mode of activity (ibid.: 60). In this context, entrepreneurial behaviour (as a specific form of economic activity) is defined by four basic functions: the exploitation of opportunities for profit, the introduction of innovations, the acceptance of risks inherent to the economic process and the coordination of the production and marketing (ibid.: 110). Such a notion of entrepreneurship is clearly influenced by Schumpeter who linked the idea of entrepreneurship to that of innovation. He understood the entrepreneur as someone who implements an innovation, thereby instilling dynamism into the economy (Michalitsch 2006a: 77) – whereby innovation generates a process of "creative destruction" in which new products, processes and forms of organisation generate (temporary) monopoly positions and thus profits.[167] However, we should note that unlike his entrepreneur who is set apart from the capitalist (ibid.: 77), the entrepreneurial self bears the (existential) risks of her economic activities. Individualised, without a wealthy backer or prospects of high profits, she is increasingly likely to find herself as a (de facto) "new self-employed worker" on an increasingly harsh labour market, thus

[166] Already ten years earlier, Clarke and Newman (1997) argued that "[m]ost statements of (post-Foucauldian) discourse theory have treated discourses as producing subjection: the creation of new subjects who enact the discourse. In this case, we would be looking for the production of 'change agents' or 'enterprising selves' as the effect of the discourse" (ibid.: 54).

[167] Although Schumpeter developed his notion of entrepreneurship in the first half of the 20th century, its timeliness appears to be unabated. For example, the Austrian government considers "[t]he core of entrepreneurship [to be] the firm founders' endeavour to improve their financial position by constantly seeking out innovations" which in turn constitutes "the engine of economic growth and social transformation" (Austrian Federal Government 2011: 30).

rendering her vulnerable to precarious working/living conditions. In this respect, the entrepreneurial self in post-Fordist capitalism may not be too far apart from the proletarian who is compelled to sell her labour power in industrial capitalism.

Moreover, the mechanism of competition that guides the entrepreneurial self constitutes an imperative of continuous self-optimisation. "All entrepreneurial activities share a logic of delimitation and outdoing" (Bröckling 2007: 125f., my translation) as entrepreneurial success is always measured by surpassing others. Accordingly, personal growth and the accumulation of human (in the sense of economic) capital merge (ibid.: 73) – turning into a never-ending task. "Unlike the traditional subject of discipline that never stops starting, the entrepreneurial self never finishes with something" (ibid.: 71, my translation) – a fact that is intensified by the condition of permanent reform that characterises neoliberal institutions. As neoliberal selves have to welcome change and the possibilities for the "creative destruction" it offers, the entrepreneurial self is complemented by the *flexible self*.

> What kinds of 'subjectivity' or 'selves' are required for today's 'global knowledge economy' characterized by fast capitalism and flexible specialization? Emily Martin's (1997) research on management training and leadership in America's leading corporations suggests one possible answer: The 'flexible', active, 'self-managed' and 'self-disciplined' worker who lives in a state of constant reorganization and permanent insecurity is likely to be far more productive and cost-effective from a managerial perspective. […] But as Martin concluded, the ideal modern corporate manager actually displays many of the qualities associated with Attention Deficit Disorder ('ADD'): an exaggerated sense of urgency when engaged with a task; always changing; easily frustrated, bored by routines; risk-taking; strong sense of individualism – in a word, self-driven (or more accurately, 'results driven' and 'proactive'). (Shore 2008: 283)

In this context, Sennett's reflections on the subjectivities that flexible organisations create prove helpful. Sennett (2006) argues that only "a certain kind of human being can prosper in unstable, fragmentary social conditions" (ibid.: 3) – one that displays three features: (1) She has to be able to "manage short-term relationships, and oneself, while migrating from task to task, job to job, place to place" (ibid.: 4). (2) She has to constantly develop new work skills – a demand that "militates against the ideal of craftsmanship" (ibid.: 4). (3) She has to be ready to let go of past achievements and discount experiences, a trait of personality that "resembles more the consumer ever avid for new things, discarding old if perfectly serviceable goods" (ibid.: 5). However, Sennett (2006) reminds us that such a human being is – "to put a kindly face on the matter" – rather "unusual" (ibid.: 5).

> Most people are not like this; they need a sustaining life narrative, they take pride in being good at something specific, and they value the experiences they've lived through. The cultural ideal required in new institutions thus damages many of the people who inhabit them. (ibid.: 5)

Finally, the figure of the flexible project worker contrasts sharply with the ideal of academic work being a craftsmanship, as "getting deeply involved in any one problem would be dysfunctional, since projects end as abruptly as they begin" (ibid.: 126).

Sennett's reflections resonate with the notion of a projective city developed by Boltanski and Chiapello (2001, cf. chapter 3.2.2). In a projective city those individuals gain "greatness" who

accept responsibility and risk (cf. Loacker 2010: 77), are adaptive and flexible, active and autonomous and privilege change over stability (Boltanski and Chiapello 2001: 466).

> [O]ne has to be ready to sacrifice everything that restricts availability. One has to relinquish having a project that lasts for life (a vocation, a profession, a marriage) and stay mobile. One has to become a nomad. In order to comply with the demand for "lightness", one has to renounce all kind of stability, entrenchment or ties to people or things. (Boltanski 2007, my translation)

Likewise, Sennett (2006) notes that

> [c]ommitment entails closure, forgoing possibilities for the sake of concentrating on one thing. You might miss out. The emerging culture puts enormous pressure on individuals not to miss out. Instead of closure, the culture counsels surrender – cutting ties in order to be free, particularly the ties bred in time. (ibid.: 196)

In that regard, Shore and McLauchlan (2012a) – defining an entrepreneur as "an individual who undertakes industrial and commercial activities with a view to making a profit" and risking capital "in the hope of substantial financial gains" – remind us of another characteristic attributed to entrepreneurs: that they are usually framed as "particularly passionate and energetic" (ibid.: 272). This feature connects the traditional academic with the contemporary post-Fordist entrepreneurial worker, constituting the link that Barroso constructs in his speech that we have encountered in chapter 3.3.3.1 between the entrepreneurial behaviour he demands of scientists receiving EU funding and the academic ethos of "curiosity and hunger for discovery" that he invokes. This is just one example of how "Schumpeter's model of the entrepreneur has been creatively extended beyond the sphere of business into education and government" (Etzkowitz et al. 2000: 326). Despite Shore and McLauchlan's (2012a) remark that for some, "the phrase 'academic entrepreneur' is an oxymoron or contradiction in terms as academia, by definition, is supposed to be a space for reflection set apart from the pecuniary imperatives of the market" (ibid.: 271), we do increasingly find academic entrepreneurs in practice. Shore and McLauchlan (2012a) define *academic entrepreneurs* (respectively *entrepreneurial academics*) as

> individuals who had raised substantial sums of money through government grants or contract research, often forming relationships with business in order to secure such grants. […] In short, entrepreneurial academics are knowledge brokers and mediators with track records for income-generation; individuals who are able to successfully operate in the space between the academy and industry, able to leverage external funding for their research and to employ teams of researchers and support staff. (ibid.: 271f.)[168]

Although I agree with Shore and McLauchlan's definition, I would expand the category by academics that have to generate their own income, i.e. not only influential senior academics but also (early-career) academics struggling along from one temporary employment to the next that is acquired on the quasi-market of external funding.

[168] The entrepreneurial academic (guided by economic utility) is accompanied by the techno-scientist whose subjectivity "combines scientific rationality with an instrumental and opportunistic sensibility", setting out "to solve technological problems identified by industry" and in the process surrendering "any pretence to intellectual autonomy and any responsibility to undertake basic or curiosity-based research" (Kenway et al. 2004: 334).

Shore's (2010) "neoliberalised academic subjectivities" (ibid.: 26) are not just flexible and fragmented, but also performative and subjected to and thus shaped by an audit culture. Hence, the *auditable self* – i.e. "self-managing individuals who render themselves auditable" (Shore and Wright 2000: 57) – is another manifestation of the entrepreneurial self. In that regard, Weiskopf (2005) points out that academics

> [n]eed to calculate their "value" according to evaluation criteria respectively to increase the value on which their recognition depends. It is part of the "entrepreneurship" of the individual to regard their own work with regard to its direct utilisation and to produce output measurable in the short term. (ibid.: 180, my translation)

Further traits of neoliberalised academic subjectivities include that they regard themselves as managers of universities, reduce educational issues to financial issues, use the language and arguments of for-profit business as well as their instruments (such as evaluations, controlling, outsourcing and advertising) and evaluation criteria (Gubitzer 2005: 40f.).

A final comment seems to be in order: Although neoliberal discourses are currently hegemonic, they are controversial. The neoliberal domestication of the self is never total, as the "[c]ategories and the practices that they produce are entangled in the historicity of states, institutions, groups and societies, never perfectly conforming to the utopian model of the spontaneous market order" (Hilgers 2013: 83f.). Thus,

> neoliberal reforms also produce forms of resistance and dispositions that do not correspond to the neoliberal project, and that are therefore not exactly neoliberal dispositions but merely dispositions produced by neoliberalism. (Hilgers 2013: 84)

In this context, Clarke and Newman (1997) emphasise that "attempted 'subjections' are not always accomplished and that 'discursive strategies' do not always achieve their objectives" (ibid.: 31). Hence, they

> would want to make a distinction between being subjected *by* a discourse and being subjected *to* it. 'Subjected by' points to what might be called the ideal effects of discourses – the production of new subjects who identify with it and enact it in their practices. By contrast, 'subjected to' suggest the experience of being regulated by and disciplined through a discourse, without it engaging beliefs, enthusiasms or identification. Rather than enacting it from commitment, such subjects enact the discourse […] conditionally, because 'there is no alternative'. (ibid.: 54)[169]

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter shows how the neoliberal economisation of societies, the post-Fordist flexibilisation of work and the industrialisation of science discussed in the previous chapter affect both notions of universities' purpose(s) as well as their governance and organisation. As the boundaries both between public and private sectors as well as between academic and industrial work blur, so do those between universities and enterprises – both regarding their mission(s) and organisation.

[169] Consequently, Shore and Davidson (2014) point to the importance of "finding a language to oppose managerialism" in order to resist detrimental effects of the neoliberalisation of universities; an endeavour that, however, needs to be complemented by "finding a platform for mounting effective collective action to challenge the dividing practices that are integral to the operation of neoliberal governmentality" (ibid.: 24).

Thus, I consider the economised "neoliberal" university to be characterised by "market-oriented and managerial-based logics of practice" (Hoffman 2011a: 458). In that regard, I distinguish the notion of the "entrepreneurial university" from that of the "managerial university", with the former referring to the political economy of the university and the latter to its institutional dimensions.

I consider the entrepreneurial university to be characterised by its pursuit of a "third mission" according to the logics of "academic capitalism". Pushed by a reduction in per capita support by central governments, universities increasingly (have to) follow "a market rather than a social welfare [or a traditional academic, author's note] logic" (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004: 332); i.e. they are subjected to a neoliberal governmentality relying on competition fuelled by scarce resources. Just as neoliberalised states compete in a globalised knowledge economy for market shares, universities increasingly compete for both state funding (that is increasingly assigned according to competitive allocation procedures) and private funding, for reputation, visibility and for the "best" staff and students (or those who generate the most capital). In other words: they increasingly compete for economic, symbolic and "human" capital – resulting in an increased stratification of both higher education institutions and their academic staff. This development is by no means limited to academic disciplines with direct market potential. It also affects those disciplines that are traditionally removed from such economic potential (particularly the social sciences and even more so the humanities) by transforming their missions of teaching and research – for instance through the vocabularies of innovation, employability, interdisciplinarity, market-oriented entrepreneurialism, external consulting work and consumer-oriented research.

Equally, all academic disciplines are affected by the transformation of universities' internal governance structures. Driven forward by NPM logics and the imperative of change accompanying them (which keeps neoliberal institutions in a condition of permanent reform), universities are transformed into "autonomous" organisations based on the model of private companies – thereby increasingly organising academic work according to the logics of industrial work. Whereas appointed managers are given greater managerial autonomy, professional autonomy (i.e. the self-governance of academics in the form of the decision-making powers of elected collegial bodies) is restricted. Thus, while university governance is "decentralised" in the sense that decision-making is shifted from governments to university management, those decision-making processes are simultaneously centralised at the meso-level in a hierarchical manner in the hand of university management. Two mechanisms secure the control of governments over "autonomous" universities (i.e. allow them to govern them "at a distance") as well as of university managers over their employees: the increasing use of contracts according to a logic of "management by objectives" and the deployment of audit (primarily relying on governing by numbers) that increasingly creates an environment of panoptic surveillance. In this context, weasel words like "excellence", "quality", "transparency" and "accountability" are mobilised by politicians and university managers to establish a new, bureaucratised conception of the (e)valuation of academic work according to an industrial logic of "productivity" and "efficiency". All too often,

this rhetoric boils down to meaning doing more (academic work) with less (state funding).[170] To put it bluntly: While neoliberal (university) reforms are driven by demands for the enhancement of (institutional) productivity and efficiency in the name of competitiveness, they basically pursue the goal of implementing cost savings according to the logic "if you want something to function better, provide it with less resources" (or rather "provide it with less resources and hope that it will continue to function"). As it is individuals who have to increase the productivity of the institution in the end, imperatives of neoliberal reforms merge seamlessly with that of continuous personal self-optimisation. Consequently, as universities are encouraged to increasingly operate like corporate enterprise, academics are expected to become more attuned to economic imperatives. With the market mechanism (i.e. the principle of competition) extended to all forms of social relations including that of the individual to herself, academic subjectivities turn into entrepreneurial, flexible and auditable selves. Living in a state of constant reorganisation and permanent insecurity, they are supposed to continuously optimise their productivity by optimising themselves, i.e. to passionately (or desperately) invest all their intellectual and emotional resources into their work. In such an environment, academics have to be not just self-managing, but flexible as well in order to succeed: they have to privilege change over stability and relinquish strong attachments, be it to people, positions or places, thereby making themselves completely available to the requirements of their work.

However, we have to be aware of a few caveats when discussing the neoliberal economisation of the university. (1) The transformation of the university into a capitalist enterprise is not (merely) a recent phenomenon. Already a hundred years ago, Weber (2008: 27) attested an Americanisation[171] of German universities (transforming them into "state capitalist enterprises") that was at odds with traditional university life.

> The technical benefits are beyond doubt, as in all capitalist and bureaucratized organizations. But the "spirit" that prevails in them is different from the atmosphere that has historically prevailed at German universities. There is an extraordinarily wide gulf, externally and inwardly, between the boss of a large capitalist university enterprise like this and the familiar old-style professor. (ibid.: 28)

(2) The differentiation of higher education institutions has made it difficult to still talk about "the" university. The comprehensive university this thesis is referring to, combining higher education and research, has become just one of a growing number of institutions of higher education and research and may neither remain the most significant one in those two fields nor retain the recognisable form it kept over the last 800 years (cf. Trow 2005: 56). (3) Neoliberalism is only one narrative explaining the restructuring of higher education policies and institutions. Others

[170] Accordingly, Goddard (2016) states that "[i]n summary, in each country [Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, England, authors' note] universities are confronting a turbulent environment in terms of declining public resources, rising student demands and the expectation that they will do more for less, including serving the wider society" (ibid.: 111).

[171] 70 years later, Readings (1996) attests an "Americanization" of the global university system, albeit not in the sense of a simple expansion of US cultural hegemony but rather as a synonym for globalisation. "'Americanization' today names less a process of national imperialism than the generalized imposition of the rule of the cash-nexus in place of the notion of national identity as determinant of all aspects of investment in social life." (ibid.: 2f.)

include the increasing relevance of academic knowledge for the economy (captured by terms like "post-Fordism" and "knowledge economy") as well as the internationalisation and massification of higher education. As we cannot clearly analytically distinguish between these conceptions, we can discern "neoliberal" elements in these alternative narrations – for instance when arguing that universities have to become economised/managerialised because they are of increasing importance to the economy, they have to prevail in a fierce international competition or have drastically expanded. This observation brings us to the concluding chapter of the first part of this thesis.

5 The Schizophrenic University

Just as there is no single narrative that accounts for the contemporary transformation of universities and as the domestication of academic selves by a neoliberal discourse is never total, so the contemporary university is not merely "neoliberal". Instead, it simultaneously epitomises traditional notions of its (historical) missions as well as remnants of previous institutional forms. This brings me to my central argument: The contemporary university is – contrary to what its etymological origin suggests[172] – a fragmented figure, a "chimera" (Barcan 2013: 91) or "hydra" (Noort 2015: 11), both regarding its organisation and its mission(s). Hence, Shore (2010) refers to it as the *schizophrenic university* and Barcan (2013) as the *palimpsestic university*. On the one hand, its *organisation* can be described as oscillating between "the *collegium* (an ascription which often occluded the great power of the *ordinarius*) and the hierarchy/bureaucracy which constitute the *Janus* face of university organisation" (Kogan and Teichler 2007: 13). Barcan (2013) adds a third feature to the university's institutional ambivalence, emphasising that the university is

> at least three different kinds of beast [sic] simultaneously: a scholarly society, a bureaucracy and a corporation. These different institutional forms do not so much succeed each other as overly each other in a kind of palimpsest. Each paradigm brings with it a particular set of expectations, demands and regimes of academic practice. (ibid.: 13, cf. 72)

Along a similar (historical) line of argument Burtscher et al. (2006: 242, cf. Burtscher et al. 2005: 144) distinguish between three ideal typical models of the (Austrian) university system – the guild model, democratised self-administration and the service-oriented proxy market – and argue that

> [n]ot only do the structures of contemporary universities contain historical sediments, universities have also in the course of time acquired new functions without shedding older ones. These too are layered one upon the other (Burtscher et al. 2006: 245).

The contemporary university's *missions* are in no way less ambivalent. Not only is it expected to mediate between historical "liberal" conceptions (of a "Mode 1 Science") and contemporary

[172] Deriving from "from Medieval Latin *universitatem* (nominative *universitas*), 'the whole, aggregate,'" (see <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=university>, accessed 21 August 2016).

"neoliberal" conceptions (of a "Mode 2 Science"), but also between differing contemporary conceptions of its third mission. While third mission activities (apparently) strengthen "democratic" demands of academic work to be "relevant" for "society" (or rather the economy and governments) on the one hand, they simultaneously reinforce the competition between universities for symbolic and economic capital, thereby strengthening "elitist" demands for "academic excellence" on the other hand. Accordingly, Trow (2005) sees a differing set of agendas reflected in the differing forms of elite, mass and universal universities and states that "evidence suggests that each phase survives in some institutions and in parts of others" which causes "strains inherent in the continuing existence of forms of higher education based on fundamentally different principles and oriented to quite different kinds of functions" (ibid.: 36). Thus, the contemporary university is expected to be (1) an autonomous capitalist institution successfully competing in a global higher education marketplace while simultaneously boosting regional economies by providing them with applied research and employable graduates, (2) a caring institution of the welfare state empowering all of its citizens by providing them with mass education and responsible research and innovation and (3) an excellent academic institution delivering outstanding elite education and basic research. Other (respectively differently formulated) demands include (1) expectations that universities save public costs by becoming more efficient and acquiring private funding, while (2) offering attractive working conditions for their academic staff – at least for those deemed excellent, (3) (better) catering for more students, for example by improving the teacher-student ratio and increasing students' social and international mobility, and (4) improving their position in international university rankings.

Several scholars have commented on this contested state of the contemporary university that leads Readings (1996) to conclude that it is "no longer clear what the place of the University is within society" (ibid.: 2), Barcan (2013) that "universities themselves scarcely know what they are and whom they are to serve" (ibid.: 3) and Goddard (2016) that "[i]n very general terms, the question 'What are universities for?' remains very much open" (ibid.: 96).

For example, Shore (2010) points out that the third mission does not simply replace its other missions, but rather constitutes

> a new set of discourses […] that draws together different, often contradictory, agendas. This heralds not the death of the liberal idea of the university but a shift towards a new, multi-layered conception in which universities are expected to fulfil a plethora of different functions (ibid.: 15, cf. 19).

This multi-layered, hybrid conception of – increasingly contradictory – demands placed on universities[173] confronts a once "relatively […] simple organization with a short list of tasks

[173] For an alternative enumeration of tensions that universities are currently facing see Goddard (2016: 96, 103); for a discussion of differences in the "nature" of universities and business/industry see Brennan (2007: 25). A vivid illustration of how difficult it may be to reconcile such differing agendas can be gained by contrasting the university that the politician and engineering scientist João de Deus Pinheiro calls for, featuring "a culture that values entrepreneurship and those individuals prepared to take risks, who are precisely the ones who know how to make money from knowledge and not the other way round" as well as "a culture of competitiveness and directed creativity" (see <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20080312+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>, accessed 19 April 2016) with the one which the academic Judith Okely (2006) invokes of a

(teaching and research)" (Scott 2010: 83) with a series of dilemma, as universities are "subject both to the utilitarian demand that they be responsive to the market and to the conservative requirement that their scholarly values not be corrupted by that same market" (Barcan 2013: 90) and required to be "at once the custodians of tradition and the standard bearers of innovation; responsive to student demands yet mindful of standards" (ibid.: 196). Greenwood (2007) observes that

> [u]nlike private corporations, driven by market tests of profitability of particular goods and services, universities are composed of a mixed, confusing and even contradictory set of activities. They are expected to promote respect for the past, to pass on the values and understandings that make for good citizenship, to provide job training, to advance the frontiers of knowledge on all fronts and to serve the public. (ibid.: 98)

Accordingly, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) remark that "academic capitalism has not replaced the public good knowledge regime. The two coexist, intersect, and overlap" (ibid.: 29). Readings (1996) emphasises that "the debate on the University is made up of divergent and non-contemporaneous discourses, even if one discourse dominates over the others at certain moments" (ibid.: 14). Drawing on the case of Danish universities, Ørberg and Wright (2009) argue that "the university now has to perform its self to multiple contexts according to diverse criteria" (ibid.: 131) resulting in the creation of "organizational subjects who are fragmented selves, responsive to diverse demands and constantly recalibrated expectations" (ibid.: 133).[174]

Even affirmative analysts of the (civic or economic) agendas of universities attest them to face competing expectations, "for example, increasing participation in higher education from hitherto excluded groups; graduates ready to enter the labour market; excellent research judged on scientific grounds and contributing to regional job creation" (Goddard 2016: 95) as well as to be "an amalgam of teaching and research, applied and basic, entrepreneurial and scholastic interests" (Etzkowitz et al. 2000: 326) that shows "continuous tensions between mobilizing knowledge as a public good (and maintaining the incentives to do this), and controlling its value as a private good" (ibid.: 326). Already 20 years ago, the OECD (1996) observed that

> [i]n part because of its increased importance in the knowledge-based economy, the science system finds itself torn between more traditional areas of research and investigations that promise more immediate returns. […] The knowledge-based economy is raising the profile of the science system, but also leading to a more intense probing of its fundamental identity. (ibid.: 26)

Policymakers are also aware of this increasingly contested "nature" of universities. For example, the Austrian Minister of Science, Research and Economy at the time states that universities move between the conflicting priorities of "traditional humanistic demands" and being "innovation drivers of future developments" (Mitterlehner 2015: 47, my translation) and that their tasks

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university as a place for curiosity, discovery and imagining in intellectual quest rather than for rote learning and assembly line graduate production.

[174] Alternatively, mobilising the theoretical language provided by Boltanski and Thévenot (2007) and Boltanski and Chiapello (2001), it can be argued that academic work, once dominated by an inspired polity as well as an (increasing) industrial polity (in the scholarly-bureaucratic university) is currently additionally determined by a projective city as well as a market polity and that this increasing number of (conflicting) regimes of justification makes it increasingly difficult to establish a compromise.

have become more extensive, comprising among other things "character formation on an academic basis at the intersection of science and business" (ibid.: 47, my translation). In this regard, Shore (2010) identifies "no less than thirteen major 'priority targets' that [New Zealand, author's note] government now requires universities to meet" (ibid.: 18). By contrast, the eleven assignments the Austrian University Act of 2002[175] attributes to the universities respectively the eight aims of the Austrian government for its universities (BMWFW 2015b)[176] appear rather straightforward, as do the five purposes the Danish University Act of 2003[177] states – although both university acts stress the university's responsibility towards academic research and education, as well as towards economic growth and the development of society.

Just as the university's missions and institutional forms are increasingly fragmented, so is the composition of its academic staff. As higher education institutions in Europe began to differentiate according to types and profiles from the 1970s onwards, "the academic profession which hitherto had been extremely homogenous gradually split up into different levels and tasks" (Nybom 2012: 173), i.e. it "is fragmenting, with different parts proceeding on different paths and at different speeds" (Scott 2007: 210). Academic staff is increasingly differentiated regarding their pay, "different kinds of contracts (e.g. temporary and permanent […]), gender, ethnicity/'race', tensions between those who specialize in teaching, and those who focus mainly on research and a growing chasm between those who manage and those who are managed" (Deem et al. 2007: 85). In other words, it is differentiated according to (1) career trajectories, with junior academics conducting research "while the professors raise funds, develop contracts, write project proposals" and "are less and less in contact with concrete scientific work" (Musselin 2007: 178), (2) the contractual status of academics, with an "increasing part of contingent staff" allowing "for a specialised distribution of activities among them" (ibid.: 178) and (3) the status of academics, with more research intensive academics on the one hand on those more committed to teaching and administrative tasks on the other hand. In that regard, performance-based funding "increases the differentiation in the academic profession between, on the one hand, those who get funding or good reviews, or those who are participating in the peer-reviews (sometime the same as those funded), and, on the other hand, other faculty members" (Musselin 2013: 1171), thereby changing "the distribution of winners and losers […] as the gap between them has increased: the prestige, resources, and academic autonomy of the latter are significantly lower than before, while they are significantly higher for the former" (ibid.: 1172). Thus, not only the differences between groups of academics increase but also the ones within those groups. For instance, in Austria the constitution of professorships has become more flexible after the cessation of their status as civil servants: a professorship can be awarded permanently or temporarily, full-

[175] § 3, BGBl. I Nr. 120/2002

[176] Among them the strengthening of basic research as well as the quality of teaching, a better support of early-career researchers, an increase of knowledge dissemination (including the intensification of technology transfer and a sentiment of entrepreneurship), a sustainable boost in internationalisation and social inclusion, gender justice and diversity.

[177] See <http://ufm.dk/en/legislation/prevailing-laws-and-regulations/education/files/the-danish-university-act.pdf>, § 2 (accessed 22 August 2017).

or part-time, with differing duties regarding teaching and research and differing remuneration and resources (Österreichischer Wissenschaftsrat 2013: 36). In Denmark, internally funded academics have differing teaching loads depending on how much external funding they acquire. At the other end of the academic career ladder some PhD candidates are paid for doing academic work (to varying extents, depending on their funding source), whereas others even have to pay for it themselves (for instance for their fieldwork or conference participation). A particularly differentiated group in both countries are (external) lecturers who, working on contracts ranging from being paid by the hour to permanent ones, can have a (secure) job outside the university and feed their expertise deriving from it into their teaching (as initially intended) or they can be aspiring academics of all sorts of career levels, from graduate students to former professors, (desperately) trying to keep a foot in the university for a wage far below the poverty level. It appears that the less senior and more recently introduced academic positions are, the less secure and more differentiated they are. Thus, universities have turned from being ivory towers, if they ever were ivory towers, to being workplaces of "the real (capitalist) world" – a world characterised by diversity and inequality.

Whereas some argue that the conflicts ensuing from this new, schizophrenic state of universities result "in compromise and normative change in which different and even seemingly opposed ideological elements such as entrepreneurship and the extension of knowledge are reconciled" (Etzkowitz et al. 2000: 326), others share a more critical view that "[i]ncorporating the third mission into the core of the university as an institution is not about organic absorption of new functions […] but about a radical change of its existing functions" (Nedeva 2007: 96). This thesis is more in line with the second position, focusing on the consequences these conflicting demands and processes of differentiation create for early-career academics (in anthropology, but probably also others in the socials sciences and humanities and possibly also in more application-oriented disciplines). My argument is as follows: As these tensions culminate in the schizophrenic figure of the academic "scholar-bureaucrat-entrepreneur" (Barcan 2013: 91), (early-career) academics become increasingly vulnerable to (self-)exploitation. In that regard, the disruptive effects of this "paradigmatic dissonance" on academics' wellbeing go far beyond the circumstance that "[h]ard working is tiring, but a thwarted sense of purpose is demoralizing" (Barcan 2013: 129). As we often find in universities "an idealism whose tensions and contradictions are easily passed down to individual practitioners, as opposed to being matters of larger communities of debate and support" (May 2007: 129), "[p]ressure builds as the logics of the newer institutional forms […] extend their reach, while academics still struggle to meet the responsibilities of the first. The privileges or freedoms associated with each discourse seem less available to the worker situated uncomfortably within all three" (Barcan 2013: 87). It is the consequences of (some of) these tensions and contradictions for the work lives of early-career academics that the second part of this thesis focuses on.

PART TWO: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF EARLY-CAREER ANTHROPOLOGISTS AT THE UNIVERSITIES OF VIENNA AND COPENHAGEN

In the first part of this thesis I have shown how the contemporary university is in a permanent state of tension between traditional logics of academic work and neoliberal logics. As the academic field is increasingly traversed by these tensions, academics – once protected "from the harsh discipline of the market" (Slaughter and Leslie 1997: 4) – are increasingly becoming a flexible workforce hired on short-term contracts, fiercely competing for the next short-term contract (not to mention a permanent one) and subjected to increasingly illiberal forms of management – while simultaneously adhering to the traditional norms of academic work outlined in chapter 2. This development particularly affects – and therefore becomes visible through – the contested and conflicted figures of early-career academics. As Barcan (2013) puts it:

> In the past, students aiming to become an academic might have doubts about their own abilities, but they would have been unlikely to have doubts about whether the university itself was a viable institution, nor if the life they might find within it would be a sustainable one. […] Today, though, those who are actively trying to break into it know it to be riddled with contradictions – undeniably privileged, but fraught, fractured, and pressured. (ibid.: 3)

The second part of this thesis elaborates on the demands and working conditions early-career academics encounter in the contemporary university and how they experience some of the resulting tensions – particularly those of pursuing a privileged vocation *as well as* an increasingly precarised, "proletarianised" and managerialised occupation shaped by structural pressures to increasingly collaborate *as well as* compete with each other (and more senior colleagues). It does so by drawing on ethnographic fieldwork at two university departments of social anthropology – as described in the following chapter.

6 Methodology and Empirical Material

In order to account for what it means to be an early-career academic in the contemporary university, i.e. how the developments on a policy level as well as an institutional level (outlined in part one) impact the subjectivities of early-career academics and are experienced by them, I resort to ethnographic fieldwork at two departments of social anthropology: one based at the University of Vienna and one based at the University of Copenhagen. I understand the category of "early-career academic" to encompass PhD candidates and temporarily employed Postdocs (including assistant professors) who can be considered as "academics in training" respectively as "academics in waiting" (cf. Barcan 2013: 200f.). Of course, not all of them (or even only a few of them)

will manage to have a permanent academic career – or even aspire to have one. However, their education and work is (still) clearly oriented towards such a career. [178]

Ethnographic fieldwork is an interpretative (cf. Agar 1996: 113–124, Okely 2012: 10–15, Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 92–95), open-ended and opportunity driven (Okely 2012: 4, 21) approach combining the research tools of (participant) observing, conversing and the close reading of documentary sources[179] (Ybema et al. 2009: 6) while concerning itself with everyday practices (Marcus 1995: 98) and being characterised by the ethnographer's immersion in a particular field in the role of a student-child-apprentice for an extensive period of time (Agar 1996: 120, 242), traditionally a year (Okely 2012: 19), as well as the unity of the ethnographer as the person who records, interprets and writes up her own material (cf. Agar 1996: 119; Okely 2012: 24). More specifically, I draw on organisational ethnography (Ybema et al. 2009) and in the case of the department in Vienna even at-home ethnography (Alvesson 2009) – even though from a relatively marginal positioning as an employed PhD candidate.

> More than mere method or tool, organizational ethnography embodies a special kind of orientation to the organizational world and its exploration. [...] There is no programmed procedure or fixed set of rules for doing ethnography, nor are there ready-made answers or prescribed pathways for interpreting the vast amounts of data that one amasses, typically in the form of field notes. (Ybema et al. 2009: 15)

Whereas I can easily specify the duration of my fieldwork at the department in Copenhagen, encompassing two stays of altogether ten months lasting from 6 January until 31 July 2014 as well as from 1 April until 25 June 2015, my fieldwork at my "own" department in Vienna is more difficult to pin down. My first day of work within the scope of my PhD project was 2 April 2012 and my last day of employment 31 March 2016 – which would make for approximately three years of potential fieldwork (deducting the 10 months of fieldwork in Copenhagen and two months of conference attendances and holidays). However, on the one hand I already knew the department, both as a student (writing my diploma thesis on the department) and an "external" lecturer, whereas that period was on the other hand shortened by a six-month-stay at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna (from January until June 2013) and my being in the role of an "ordinary" PhD candidate who attends courses and writes up his dissertation (rather than a

[178] Two comments are in order regarding my classification of early-career academics: (1) I differ from the European Commission's (2005) definition of an "early-stage researcher" as someone "in the first four years (full-time equivalent) of their research activity, including the period of research training" (ibid.: 28) as – at least at my field sites – early-career academics tend to remain in subordinate "junior" positions far beyond that period. In fact, I would go so far as to say that in Austria academics tend to be considered as "early-career academics" until they have obtained their habilitation. (2) I am aware that "external" lecturers could also be included in that category as they are a means of keeping potential PhD candidates or Postdocs in search for funding temporarily afloat and affiliated with their department, and I do not mean to belittle their contribution in keeping universities running. However, they differ from PhD and Postdoc positions insofar as they are exclusively teaching positions that do not allow to build up the research and publication experience required for an academic career in the long run (whereas it is easier for PhD candidates and Postdocs to acquire some teaching experience, even if their contracts do not include teaching).

[179] In that respect, Kunda (2013) gives a pointed definition of ethnographic research as consisting "of four very basic activities, regardless of the fancy names attached to them by methodologists seeking legitimacy in various popular genres of academic rhetoric: observing people's activities, talking with people willing to answer questions about their life, collecting texts of various sorts produced, preserved, displayed and consumed by the people one is studying, and devising ways of keeping a comprehensive, detailed and reasonably legible record of all of this" (ibid.: 14).

fieldworker who purposefully immerses himself in the field). Moreover, I spent comparatively more time at the department in Copenhagen – not least because I felt more comfortable in my office there (that was both more spacious and quieter). Most of my interviews with staff from the department in Vienna were conducted during a 20-month-period between May 2012 and December 2013, with the bulk of my field notes spanning the same period – although they continue after my return from the fieldwork in Copenhagen.

Altogether, I conducted 65 semi-structured interviews with 39 persons in Vienna – ten PhD candidates (with and without academic funding), six Postdocs, two "external" lecturers[180], eleven senior academics, five university managers, two members of the administrative staff and three representatives of major funding agencies[181] – amounting to 97 hours and 59 minutes. In Copenhagen, I conducted 51 semi-structured interviews with 42 persons – 14 PhD candidates, seven Postdocs, two external lecturers, ten senior academics, five university managers, three members of the administrative staff and one representative of a major funding agency – to the extent of 70 hours and 22 minutes. These recorded interviews were complemented by numerous informal conversations that I captured in field notes. I made summaries of all interviews, transcribed 17 of them completely (mostly those with early-career anthropologists) and transcribed relevant passages of the remaining interviews – that I then coded together with my field notes using the software Atlas.ti. Altogether, this theses contains interview quotes of 38 persons (17 from my fieldwork in Vienna and 21 from my fieldwork in Copenhagen). Obviously, these interviews do not give the whole picture of how these people feel every day, and often they also turned into an opportunity for them to vent their frustration – particularly when conducted at eye level with fellow early-career anthropologists. However, their accounts are clearly more than personal sensitivities; they were confirmed by all of them months or even years later when asked for their approval to quote them[182] (see below) and are substantiated by my fieldwork.

Apart from having an office (shared with other PhD candidates) at both departments, I participated in their (more or less) everyday life at PhD courses and departmental seminars, presentations and defences of PhD projects, supervision meetings, performance reviews, staff meetings, informal meetings of early-career anthropologists as well as information events and discussions

[180] The designation of this category as "external" is problematic insofar as lecturers at the University of Vienna have (for the most part) a regular employment contract with the university; five of them even had a permanent contract. Furthermore, their representatives have been struggling for years in order for them to be acknowledged as an integral part of the university. Nevertheless, I choose to refer to them as "external" because the majority of them are only employed on short-term contracts that are re-negotiated every (second) year and because of their (mostly) marginal position – that is also reflected in the fact that they are not provided with an employee ID card as other academic staff – that one of them described as follows: "I do like the department and I [...] also like working here a lot. But I wouldn't consider myself as a part of this department – no. Maybe that has to do with these strange work contracts that we have. That's why I don't want to and cannot feel that I belong here. [...] I think that does something to you: It's better not to feel like you belong to the department anyway, because you always get the feeling that you're actually not a part of it." For a historical overview of the positioning of "external" lecturers in Austria see Nöbauer (2009: 56–67).

[181] This classification is not consistent as some of my interlocutors occupied more than one position, for instance PhD candidate and "external" lecturer or senior academic and university manager or member of evaluation committees for external funding. I decided their attribution to these categories based on the position I interviewed them on.

[182] Although a few mentioned that their words appear as rather harsh or unduly complaining from a distance, they confirmed that this was how they felt at that time.

(for instance regarding external funding or the working conditions of early-career academics). However, in comparison to interviews and informal conversations, participant observation figured less prominently – also because it was unlikely for me to run into most of my research subjects by just "hanging around". In that regard, Nader (2002) notes already nearly 50 years ago that "the anthropologist's image of himself is shattered […] if he cannot participant-observe" (ibid.: 306) – adding that as many of the world's most relevant problems may not be participant-observed in a community

> we might have to shuffle around the value placed on participant observation that leads us to forget that there are other methods […] more useful for some of the problems and situations we might like to investigate. (ibid.: 307)

With respect to organisational ethnography, van der Waal (2009) remarks that participant observation

> often means using fragmented bits of immersion wherever this seems viable, for instance, attending a meeting, having lunch with someone involved in the everyday running of an organization, and attending to small talk. (ibid.: 34)

In addition, I contextualise my empirical material with diverse documents such as policy papers, evaluations, research and publication strategies, ministerial and university rules, curricula and statistics. I also consulted these documents in preparation for my interviews, especially with university managers and representatives of funding agencies.

Due to the fact that I study my own academic community, i.e. my superiors, colleagues and friends, I was facing a number of analytical as well as ethical challenges: (1) Being personally involved in the community under study is intellectually challenging as "one may be less able to liberate oneself from some taken-for-granted ideas" (Alvesson 2009: 166) and "while what are seen as personal biases are sanctioned, proceeding from and reproducing socially shared biases may be applauded" (ibid.: 167).[183] I respond to this challenge by taking into account perspectives of a large variety of actors as well as by comparing my "own" university department with a "strange" one abroad. (2) Such personal involvement is politically and ethically complex, as "[o]ne may fear that those targeted for study might experience breaches of trust" (ibid.: 156). In that regard, Ybema et al. (2009) point out that in organisational ethnography, research participants are more likely to become readers of the monograph, resulting in the occurrence of "issues of informal privacy versus scientific norms for the public dissemination of findings" (ibid.: 5). However, in my opinion researchers in general face the ethical challenge to present different and conflicting perspectives in a respectful and fair manner to the best of their abilities – I am just more poignantly confronted with this responsibility. What is more, I find myself not only in the subordinate role of an early-career academic whose academic reputation and career is at stake (and who tries to learn about the rules of his field while trying to avoid to break them) but also in the dominant role of a researcher-author who can potentially damage the reputation and, in the

[183] However, creating distance towards one's own cultural inclinations is not necessarily more difficult than creating closeness to emic understandings of one's research field.

case of early-career anthropologists, even the career of his interlocutors – a matter that becomes even more sensitive considering that a main argument of this thesis is that early-career academics find themselves in a vulnerable position, depending on the good will and support of their peers and superiors. Therefore, I asked for the consent of my interlocutors to use the quotes that you find in this thesis (but not for their approval for most of the translations of the interviews conducted in German). When I was asked by them – usually with an ironic undercurrent that indicated despite its playful surface the trust issue lying beneath their question – whether I was doing fieldwork at the moment my typical answer would be: "I am not sure whether this will turn out to be relevant for my research, but if you ask me like that – yes, it is part of my fieldwork."

Moreover, I decided (and was asked by many of them) to anonymise their statements – a difficult task in such a small community where basically everyone knows everyone. In order to achieve this, I refer to my interlocutors only in the female form, refrain from ascribing statements to specific persons (and consequently to juxtapose statements of a specific person) and disguise their precise positions by subsuming internally as well as externally funded Postdocs (including assistant professors) under the category "Postdoc", persons in management position at the university, faculty and departmental level (ranging from Rectors to Heads of Department/Studies) under the category "university manager" and those in (predominantly) permanent, senior positions under the category "senior academic" (irrespective of them being associate professors, professors with special responsibilities, full professors or senior advisors respectively ao. Univ.-Prof., Univ.-Prof. or V.-Prof.). Such an anonymisation strategy entails paying an analytical price: (1) I could not discuss my material with my colleagues who were at the same time my research subjects whom I had assured of my confidentiality. (2) The persons behind the quotes remain vague, so I cannot draw conclusions from their biographies or show how they contradict themselves and have to construct my narrative around abstract topics rather than concrete characters. In other words: Although drawing on ethnographic fieldwork to create my empirical material, my style of writing is not particularly ethnographic. (3) Besides, I do not pay attention to the implication of gender in academic careers – an important issue that is addressed for instance by Beaufaÿs (2003) or Lund (2015). However, I decided to prioritise the protection of my interlocutors – even more so as I came to the conclusion that I can make my arguments despite this rigorous anonymisation.

Then there is the matter of translation: I conducted my fieldwork in Vienna mostly in German and my fieldwork in Copenhagen in English. Although I understand some Danish, I do not know it well enough to have a more complex conversation. However, this did not constitute an irresolvable problem as the lingua franca at the department in Copenhagen was English. All the translations of the German material (be it interviews, reports or newspaper articles) have been done by myself with the kind help of Katharina Hasewend, Bettina Dobnig and Katherine Younger; the few translations from Danish material have been done with the kind support of Maria Eitzinger.

This leaves me with the matter of my comparison. First of all, why did I choose the departments in Vienna and Copenhagen? My "own" department in Vienna seemed a good starting

point as I was already familiar with it which made the mapping of my field and the concretisation of the focus of my research easier and more time-saving (as it allowed me to follow my PhD courses and meet my teaching obligations as an "external" lecturer while doing fieldwork) – with my considering early-career anthropologists as a case to talk about the working conditions of (early-career) academics more generally. The reasons for choosing the department in Copenhagen were that (1) I was looking for an anthropology department situated within the European Union in order to be able to compare the impact of EU science policies; (2) the department in Copenhagen is located in a welfare state of a similar (small) size – also with respect to its higher education system[184] – that had implemented a very similar university reform around the same time as Austria; (3) like its counterpart, it is based at a large, traditional comprehensive university; (4) despite these similarities it showed analytically promising differences to the one in Vienna, for instance concerning the (rigorously regulated) admission of PhD students as well as the (higher) number of PhD and Postdoc positions and their conditions of training and work.

Secondly, how did I handle the comparison? Anthropological comparison "is a largely *dependent methodology* that fully recognizes and acknowledges the *priority of ethnographic fieldwork and other primary empirical procedures*" (Gingrich 2012: 214, cf. Gingrich 2015: 414). After a majority of anthropologists had become "quite wary of the many abuses and dead-end streets of comparison in the service of the many grand theories and universalist 'meta-narratives'" (Gingrich 2012: 212) during the final quarter of the 20th century, comparison currently gains renewed interest in anthropology – particularly because of transnational and globalising forces that lend much additional weight to comparison as a source of "anthropology as cultural critique" and "highlighting the wider relevance of particular ethnographies" (ibid.: 213, cf. Palmberger and Gingrich 2014: 98).[185] However, anthropological comparison has returned "in more modest and in more pluralist forms than ever before" (Gingrich 2015: 412). These pluralist forms comprise of (1) *binary comparison* that "relates phenomena in two different socio-cultural settings with each other", (2) *regional comparison* that compares "three or more cases from the same – smaller or larger – regional sphere", (3) *temporal comparison* that "relates examples from different instances along a time line with each other, while keeping the regional contexts fairly constant", (4) *distant comparison* (or "self-reflexive, controlled macro-comparison" that compares "three or more cases […] with each other across widely different spatial and/or temporal contexts" and (5) *fluid comparison* (or "shifting time-space comparison") that "follows the flows of a phenomenon through time and space" (ibid.: 412f., cf. Gingrich 2012: 219f., Palmberger and Gingrich 2014: 106). While qualitative approaches clearly dominate contemporary anthropological research projects, in (comparative) higher education studies – a field that I also situate my research in – we come upon "contrasting research approaches, like

[184] In 2013, 2,157 full professors were employed at Danish universities (UFM 2015: 9) as opposed to 2,356 full professors employed at Austrian universities (BMWFW 2014: 98).

[185] More generally, Bleiklie (2014: 382) presents three advantages of comparative research: (1) "the scientific argument that when one increases the number of units under study, the possibility of generalization increases", (2) that "knowing culturally, politically and institutionally diverse places often challenges one's national and local superstitions" and (3) that it "challenges our conceptual understanding of the topic under study".

searching for causal explanations by using clearly defined hypotheses […], or emphasizing cultural and historical specificities" (Kosmützky and Nokkala 2014: 369, cf. 376). In this context, Bleiklie (2014: 383–387) provides us with an alternative typology of comparative research: meaningful interpretation of single cases, juxtapositions, thematic comparisons, identifying causal regularities and grand theories.

In both academic disciplines, the academic literature on comparison appears to be neither short on significant but rather general statements, nor on advice regarding the design of a comparative research project. Yet concrete and rigorous instructions on how to perform a comparative analysis appear to be rare.[186] This is not surprising considering that it is a highly complex endeavour that is likely to be different from each single case. For instance, Gingrich (2015) notes that the "kinds of choices that come along with each of these five main versions [mentioned above, author's note] simultaneously depend on the guiding research question, as well as on the available empirical evidence and its interpretation" (ibid.: 413). Moreover, rather than assuming a comparable "essence" of all objects of comparison, "qualitative anthropological comparison in all its main versions strives to remain open about the outcome of the comparative endeavour", instead elaborating "*criteria of comparison* in close dialogue with the ethnographic record" (ibid.: 413) and aiming "to achieve abstraction by doing justice to the context in which the different cases are embedded" (Palmberger and Gingrich 2014: 95). Regarding more concrete guidance on how to perform a comparative analysis, Gingrich (2015) emphasises that "anthropological comparison is no self-serving endeavour". Therefore, identifying the purpose of comparison is crucial –

> whether it is inspired by outlining the wider relevance of the specificity of the main examples under discussion, whether cultural critique is the driving motive or grasping certain aspects of wider developments such as the results of transnational flows or the potentials in multiple modernity. (ibid.: 413, cf. Gingrich 2012: 217f.)

Besides, Palmberger and Gingrich (2014) point out that it is important in qualitative comparative research to identify key themes, concepts and categories as soon as possible and keep the number of comparative dimensions low "in view of ensuring that the amount of data remains manageable" (ibid.: 102).

As ethnography entails (1) a prolonged stay in the field and (2) the unity of the ethnographer as the person who records, interprets and writes up her own material, an "*a priori* sequence of combining ethnographic fieldwork with anthropological comparison" tends to "be time-consuming, or budget-intensive, or both" (Gingrich 2012: 215, cf. Palmberger and Gingrich 2014: 102). In the case of my research, which settled for the minimum of two cases, I did about three years of fieldwork altogether. Beside these practical constraints, performing a binary com-

[186] Nearly 30 years ago, Holy (1987) remarked that "the use of comparison in contemporary anthropology is more akin to the unselfconscious, commonsensical comparison of everyday judgement than to the formal, cross-cultural comparison of analytically defined variables. This being so, it also shares with everyday judgement its lack of rigour" (ibid.: 16). In addition, Kosmützky and Nokkala (2014) note that in contemporary higher education studies, "comparative research projects often fall flat on the actual comparison. Due to insufficient integrated research design, the main outcomes of large international projects tend to be anthologies that merely present 'country chapters' and leave the comparison to the reader" (ibid.: 376).

parison is an intricate endeavour in at least two regards: On the one hand, because an "uncritical usage of binary comparison sometimes merely serves to corroborate preconceived stereotypes about 'others' (or, for that matter, about 'us')" (Gingrich 2012: 212). On the other hand, because the analysis runs the risk of being mastered by the contrast, i.e. of differences being regarded as absolutes rather than being positioned on a broader (global) continuum.[187]

I (at least partly) managed the practical challenge of the increased time and financial effort such a comparative approach requires by applying for additional funding for my fieldwork abroad. However, the application processes in turn took several weeks of my research time and the acquired funding did not suffice to cover the costs of my stay. Regarding the analytical challenge, I decided to not focus my comparison on my two field sites but on general tensions that define the lives of early-career anthropologists there and draw on my rich material to illustrate how they unfold at those sites. My analysis takes my field sites as instances of "neoliberal" public policy reform that display both global as well as national characteristics, relating them to large-scale social phenomena while showing how a specific group that is substantially affected by them experiences these phenomena in two differing settings. While in the first part of this thesis the comparison of my field sites remains largely implicit, I juxtapose them in chapter 7 – although still describing them separately. However, my description is clearly informed by my knowledge of the respective other setting – as my fieldwork at the department in Copenhagen was already informed by my previous fieldwork at the department in Vienna that had already generated central themes for my analysis as well as semi-structured interview guides that I continued to use (as well as adapt). In a next step, I focus on similar tensions and demands that early-career anthropologists face at both departments – while at the same time pointing to differences in the manifestations of these tensions. My comparison allows me to explain and illustrate the functioning of these tensions by reading one case through the other, i.e. by describing and analysing how they play out in each case while drawing the reader's attention to similarities between them despite significant local/historical differences in the working conditions of early-career academics.

Concluding, I want to address one more challenge regarding the comparative analysis of my research: Beside the regional/cultural dimension, my comparison also entails a historical/generational dimension. After all, analysing life in "neoliberalised" universities implies a significant transformation in contrast to a pre-neoliberal era. I approach this challenge by (1) moving the discussion of how the current state of universities differs from a pre-neoliberal state to the first part of my thesis while (2) focusing my analysis of my empirical material on the contemporary working conditions and experiences of early-career anthropologists, only contrasting them with those of their predecessors where it helps to illustrate my argument.

[187] I thank Davydd Greenwood for pointing this challenge out to me during the UNIKE Summer School that took place at the University of Porto from 29 June to 3 July 2015.

7 The Institutional Contexts of Early-Career Anthropologists in Austria and Denmark

Asking what it means to be an early-career academic involves asking what the meaning of science is, as the conditions of academic work are contingent on the conceptions that underlie the knowledge that it produces. Is science an endeavour of formulating a research question to then boldly go on a journey to discover insights that no one has discovered before by putting on "blinkers, as it were, and to enter into the idea that the destiny of his soul depends on his being right about this particular conjectural emendation at this point in this manuscript" (Weber 2008: 31) or to "fuel Europe's climb back to growth"[91]? Is it an endeavour serving the individual academic, her employer, the academic community, the government, public welfare and/or private companies?[188] Just as there is no definite answer to these questions – with the "nature" and purpose of academic work being contested and uncertain – the roles of early-career academics are equally contested and uncertain, underlain by numerous and diverging interests beyond their own: Is the early phase of an academic career a mastership examination proving an individual's worthiness of joining the academic community, years of apprenticeship providing superiors (be they university managers or project leaders) with cheap labour power in order to maximise their own (symbolic and/or economic) profits or a matter of providing states and/or companies with the "human resources" they require to successfully compete in a knowledge economy? Is it a calling of "[g]etting something right, even though it may get you nothing" (Sennett 2006: 195) or a project with clear deliverables as well as a start and ending date? This chapter explores the conditions – from the policy level over the institutional level to the individual level – influencing how these questions may be answered in the contemporary, schizophrenic university – and accordingly what it means to be an early-career academic in it – on the empirical basis of early-career anthropologists situated at the University of Vienna and the University of Copenhagen. Of course, given the imperative of change inherent to managerial regimes it is not only possible but even likely that these conditions – particularly in Denmark – have changed since my fieldwork and that my account of some details is, despite my best efforts, not entirely up-to-date anymore. This should not, however, diminish the significance of the overall picture created by this chapter.

7.1 The Austrian Policy Context

Funding of higher education in Austria is, like in Denmark, for the most part public (OECD 2016: 201), partly because universities are not allowed to charge tuition fees (apart from a few exceptions in the amount of 363.36 EUR per semester respectively twice that amount in the case of non-EU citizens). Another characteristic of the Austrian higher education system is the rela-

[188] According to the OECD (2016), men attaining tertiary education had net financial returns of 266,200 USD in Austria and 146,100 USD in Denmark (ibid.: 149), whereas women had net financial returns of 146,500 USD in Austria and 74,300 USD in Denmark (ibid.: 150). On the other hand, men attaining tertiary education provided the state with net financial returns of 180,400 USD in Austria and 142,300 USD in Denmark (ibid.: 151), whereas women generated net financial returns of 91,700 USD in Austria and 25,600 USD in Denmark (ibid.: 152).

tively unrestricted access it (still) grants to universities based on the idea of a so-called "offener Hochschulzugang". This conception refers to the fact that in the 1970s the Austrian government refrained from introducing a numerus clausus (Pechar 2007: 78), meaning that up to the present day everyone who finishes twelve respectively 13 years of school education by acquiring a "Matura" is entitled to study whatever subject(s) she chooses.[189] Therefore, the number of students enrolled in a degree course does not necessarily reflect the number of students who actually sit in classrooms pursuing their studies or who will eventually complete them – and certainly not the number of full-time students. In 2015, students at public universities (except for universities of arts) spent 30.3 hours per week on their studies (Zaussinger et al. 2016: 121) while 62% of them were gainfully employed for 19 hours per week on average (ibid.: 166).

As a consequence, the Austrian government is relatively generous regarding the (temporal) progress of university students, counting them as "active" (i.e. allocating funding for their education) if they pass exams equalling at least 16 ECTS per year.[190] Aside from that, it does not expect its universities to quickly "produce" employable graduates like its Danish counterpart. Although the University Study Act of 1997 (UniStG 1997) introduced the obligation for curricula to include a qualification profile describing occupational fields for graduates – resulting in the creation of application-oriented modules in the social anthropology education (Seiser et al. 2003: 12–15) – departments do not have to fear adverse effects if their graduates do not manage to finish in the prescribed duration or subsequently find employment.[191] On the other hand, unlike the Danish government, it is not generous enough to cover the standard costs of each university student ("Studienplatzfinanzierug"). In fact, although continuously increasing its funding for universities over the last years, it has not provided them with sufficient funding to compensate for the growth in student numbers (EUA 2016: 17, cf. chapter 4.1). Accordingly, we witness a reduction of funding per student at the University of Vienna (2015b: 26) with the majority of the 8.11% increase in state basic funding ("Globalbudget") in the performance agreements 2016–18 going into salary adjustments, whereas an intended increase in "Laufbahnstellen"[192] was reduced and a programme for Postdoc positions ("Uni:Postdoc") cancelled (cf. ibid.: 48). Furthermore, in 2015 the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) was forced to reduce the 20% overheads that it had been paying universities since 2011 due to a lack of funding.[193] Asked in a newspaper interview whether he thinks that Austria would reach its aim of spending two percent of its GDP on higher

[189] However, in the last years the government has increasingly allowed universities to limit the number of students they accept in certain subjects such as architecture, communication or psychology – but also business, computer science or medicine and dentistry (cf. University of Vienna 2016b: 90f.).
[190] 60 ECTS per year constitute the designated achievement of a full-time student.
[191] This is not to say that universities do not try to increase their managerial control of students, for instance by tightening the conditions for course registrations.
[192] "Laufbahnstellen" are temporary assistant professorships that are converted into permanent associate professorships if a qualification agreement ("Qualifikationsvereinbarung") is fulfilled (cf. Dachverband der Universitäten 2016: 19–21, University of Vienna 2016b: 38). These positions are somewhat akin to tenure-track jobs in US academia. For an overview of the (theory of the) new career structure at Austrian universities see Kreckel (2013: 65f.) or Baierl (2016: 10–12).
[193] See <https://www.fwf.ac.at/de/news-presse/news/nachricht/nid/20150323-2113/> (accessed 20 August 2017). The overheads had been introduced in 2008 but were suspended a year later (see <http://sciencev2.orf.at/stories/1678148/index.html>, accessed 20 August 2017).

education, the former university officer of Vienna (and current President of Austria) replied in 2015: "Yes. But the government does not want to. I have lost my interest in the issue because nothing happens."[194] In general, the Austrian government has refrained from far-reaching interventions into its university system (one way or another) in the last decade with the latest dating back to the early 2000s – which however constituted a major turning point.

The Austrian university reform of 2002 is clearly modelled on the neoliberal and managerialist ideas discussed in chapter 4 (cf. Weiskopf 2005: 171) and closely resembles that of the Danish university reform of 2003. The architects of the Universities Act of 2002 (UG 2002) explicitly refer to New Public Management as the "desired governance model" (Schimank 2000: 110, my translation, cf. Biedermann and Strehl 2004: 223, Burtscher et al. 2005: 152, Ridder 2005: 107f., Sandner 2006: 283, Meister-Scheytt and Scott 2009: 52) that is meant to create competitive pressure and introduce a strong university management along with deregulation and a reduction in academic self-governance (i.e. a reduction of autonomy in a traditional academic sense) (Titscher et al. 2000: 700, cf. Schimank 2000: 97f., 107).[195] Schimank (2000) sums up this new governance model with the keywords "intensification of competition plus deregulation plus hierarchisation plus external control via global objectives" (ibid.: 116, my translation). As a consequence of the university act, universities turned from semi-autonomous organisational units of the state to "autonomous" public law legal entities that draw up three-year performance agreements with the ministry (cf. Biedermann and Strehl 2004: 236–238), represented by a strengthened rector who – having previously been elected "by faculty, non-academic staff and student representatives" is now "selected by the university council from a list (of three names) drawn up by the University Senate" – has become "for the first time a true CEO with extensive powers attached to his […] office and to the team of vice-rectors" (Burtscher et al. 2006: 247). Furthermore,

> [t]he organizational reforms are necessarily accompanied by legal changes in employment status. New faculty will not only no longer be tenured civil servants, or on tenure track as this is understood in the US, but will be in private employment, frequently on temporary contracts with lower levels of job protection. This again strengthens the hand of management *vis-à-vis* faculty. If the UOG 75 [the previous university act of 1975, author's note], with its emphasis on guaranteed rights of co-determination and on employment security, encouraged a horizontal polarization along curia lines, UG 2002 has created a new vertical polarization between management and staff. […] All this represents a paradigmatic shift away from a collegial conception of the inner life of the university – strong Senate/strong deans/weak rector – to a managerial conception: strong rector/weak Senate/weak deans (or heads of division). The rectors and his team now make the operative decisions – including those concerning the internal steering of the organization – with the competence of the Senate being largely reduced to curricular matters, and to reviewing and approving university statutes. In place of the steering of the university activities taking place via modes of bureaucratic reg-

[194] See <http://derstandard.at/2000025982453/Van-der-Bellen-Der-Bund-hat-bei-der-Unifinanzierung-versagt> (accessed 20 August 2017, my translation).

[195] As noted by Burtscher et al. (2006), there is yet an alternative, more cynical interpretation of the reform's aims: "In this interpretation the aims of changes in the nature of university governance are fourfold: (i) cutting costs; (ii) reducing the level of state responsibility for the universities; (iii) ushering in the death of one more guild; and (iv) forcing the universities to open to a set of selective (primarily local) economic and political interests able to access this 'common'." (ibid.: 254)

> ulation, (new public) management measures have been introduced in order to encourage an orientation towards outcomes and performance. Just as the university has to draw up performance agreements with the Ministry, the individual units within the university are to draw up similar contracts with the Rector (*Zielvereinbarungen*), creating a transparent chain of responsibilities. (ibid.: 248)

The intellectual capital report ("Wissensbilanz"), a compilation of quantitative indicators that are partly used in the performance agreements in order to steer universities, is another of these new management measures and exemplary for a logic of governing by numbers.

The thereby newly acquired autonomy of Austrian universities is threefold (cf. University of Vienna 2015b: 12f.): (1) *organisational autonomy* transforms them from subordinate agencies ("nachgeordnete Dienststellen") of the ministry into actors represented by rectors who are empowered to significantly shape universities' (now more hierarchical) internal structures that are now characterised by monocratic rather than democratic decision-making bodies (Österreichischer Wissenschaftsrat 2013: 17–22), enter into contracts as well as set objectives and meet them; (2) a limited *financial autonomy* allows them to use three-year global budgets more freely while at the same time diversifying their funding sources (for example increasingly complementing institutional block grants with public as well as private project- and contract-based external funding)[196]; (3) *personnel autonomy* allows them to employ as well as deploy a more flexible work force[197], allowing them to reduce costs and simultaneously increase their room for manoeuvre regarding the development of "their" universities' research profiles[198]. The resulting diversification of the academic staff is in fact intended as it is expected to result in more effective and efficient structures (Schimank 2000: 111).

However, universities' newly gained "autonomy" is highly limited as (1) it primarily concerns university managers who are now free to manage (according to the prerequisites of the state) but not to charge tuition fees or select and limit their student intake and (2) the ministry only shifts its steering function from input control (for instance the appointment of professorships) to output control (i.e. defining objectives and installing a management that is held accountable for reaching them). Hence, it is not to be confused with the autonomy or academic freedom of individual academics in the sense of

> the necessary safeguard for the discharge of the university's primary duty, which was to permit intellectual non-conformity as the means of advancing knowledge. The picture of academe as being organized through 'organised anarchy' or the 'garbage can model of management' was perhaps an exaggeration applicable to only few privileged institutions, but it was the role model affecting to different degrees academics working under predominantly collegial arrangements irrespective of the strength of other actors involved. (Kogan and Teichler 2007: 9)

In that context, Felt (2009b) notes that while

[196] Thereby equalling an increased "autonomy" of the state in the sense of a reduced responsibility for sufficiently funding the expansion of its universities.

[197] Hence equalling an increased "autonomy" of university managers in the sense of a reduced responsibility for their employees who are increasingly offered short-term contracts instead of life-long employment (cf. chapter 9.3).

[198] At the same time, the capacity of universities to function as independent, autonomous institutions is reduced by the shift from block grant to project-based, "competitive" funding that renders "the possibilities of long-range research planning at the university level […] more or less illusory" (Nybom 2012: 174).

> for a long time, autonomy has been understood as a value underpinning academic identity and a synonym for academic freedom, now a clear shift towards much more technical meanings can be observed. Today, autonomy is frequently conceptualised as a more operational tool necessary to run the university, granted formally by the state through clearly defined legal processes. […] Routine decisions are left to the universities and other academic institutions, while strategic choices often remain with bodies composed of actors from 'outside'. (ibid.: 28)

Erkkilä and Piironen (2014) argue that "institutional autonomy […] was conceptualised in economist and market-oriented terms at the expense of traditional attributes of university autonomy" (ibid.: 178) resulting in university autonomy to be "increasingly seen as the managerial property of the university leadership, and not as the property of the entire academic community" (ibid.: 8). Gornitzka and Maassen (2000) complement these observations saying that despite governments across and beyond Europe having granted universities increasing institutional autonomy, they have simultaneously strengthened their control of universities' activities by holding them accountable for how they spend their funding.

> Quasi-market mechanisms and university self-regulation are replacing more and more elements of the central steering role of the government. However, it doesn't mean that the state is gradually disappearing. […] Enlarging university and college autonomy is a policy issue in each country [Austria, England, Finland, Flanders, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal, author's note], and many autonomy increases can be observed. However, at the same time, the nature of the remaining and new regulations and instruments with respect to higher education seems to have become more control-oriented. It is as if the governments want to make sure that the universities and colleges use the larger autonomy in such a way that the outcomes the governments expect of enlarging the autonomy are indeed achieved. (Gornitzka and Maassen 2000: 284, cf. Broucker et al. 2015: 1, Erkkilä and Piironen 2014: 178f., 185, Goddard et al. 2016a: 299, Nybom 2012: 174)

Accordingly, Kogan and Teichler (2007) summarise the main changes in the academic profession as "a gradual loss of professional autonomy, a stronger pressure to take into account external societal expectations, a decline of possibility to shape their organisational environment […], and an increasing control of their performance" (ibid.: 13f.). Likewise, Trow (2005) considers "[t]he weakness of tenure or job security for the teaching staff of open access institutions" as "a reflection of the weakness of the autonomy of those institutions, which come increasingly to be seen as at the service of other institutions in the society" (ibid.: 26) – with Musselin (2013) adding that the decreasing possibility of academics to self-determine their agenda "primarily concerns the growing number of 'permanently temporary positions' (post-docs, adjuncts, etc.), which are most of the time specialized in specific tasks and have hierarchical relationships with permanent staff" (ibid.: 1167). What is more, Wright and Rabo (2010) remark that

> [i]n many places 'autonomy' increasingly means that staff see themselves as autonomous from each other. Each teacher or researcher is becoming a lone entrepreneur utilising the trademark of the university as a badge when applying for funds, bidding for contracts or attracting new students. (ibid.: 7)

We can observe similar developments in the Danish university system as is shown in the following chapter.

7.2 The Danish Policy Context

Higher education in Denmark is "free" insofar as Danish and EU citizens do not have to pay tuition fees. Instead, they are even entitled (under certain circumstances) to receive public support in the form of a State Educational Grant and Loan Scheme (Statens Uddannelsesstøtte) amounting to 6,015 DKK (ca. 809 EUR) per month in 2017[199]. Also, universities receive funding for every "active" student (i.e. essentially for passed exams) according to a so-called taximeter system (cf. MVTU 2009: 98–101) – although their overall public funding does not keep up with the growth in student numbers (cf. chapter 4.1). According to a university manager, the resulting growing costs of the university system meant that

> *the focus on universities has increased during the last couple of years, no doubt about that. And the micro-management of universities is much tougher now than it was a few years ago. The reason, I think, is that the government realises that education is expensive. [...] There is a stronger focus on university programmes, more focus on the economic structures, more focus on employability, more focus on value for money.*

A senior academic of the Department of Anthropology referred to this development as "governmentality on steroids", a statement that two of her colleagues – a senior academic and a Postdoc – elaborate on as follows:

> *20 years ago, we didn't operate in that economic terminology to the same extent as now. Now it's just seeping into everything we do. And somehow there is always this economic bottom line that we have to take into account. That was different 20 years ago. [...] The university was oriented towards generating knowledge, basically. And now it's much more as if – which also comes with the university reform, I guess – now it's an industry. It's an economic machine that has to run. And that's becoming the primary rationale somehow. And then in our day-to-day work we are trying [to act, author's note] as if this is not the case. And then we end up in a meeting where we are reminded that it is the case. It is a machine, a factory.*

> *The general evolution of the department is from one of complete informality ten years ago to complete, bat-shit crazy audit culture stuff. […] It's astonishing, the speed with which this kind of New Public Management paper-pushing stuff manages to infiltrate the system – as evidenced by the whole debate about the employment prospects of anthropologists.*

Therefore, it is not surprising that I encountered critiques of a managerialised university setting similar to those already discussed in chapter 4.5.1. For example, a senior academic complained that

> *[t]here is this publish or perish thing because the merit of academia has been quantified. Instead of producing knowledge, we now produce articles. Instead of producing people that are interested and enlightened, we now produce students that have an economic value. So the whole sort of economistic quantification of the university has completely fucked over the scientific knowledge production. [...] I mean, Jesus! We publish the same thing four times over. If you have an idea, you write two chapters, you write an article and then you write another article where you twist it a bit. I mean if you'd spend that much time just writing that one very good article – that would have been a production of knowledge that would have been lovely. You would have written an article that people would have liked, that would have had a merit on its own afterwards. But because you have to quantify it – and that's how you are measured – you write four sort of bad versions of a good*

[199] See <http://www.su.dk/english/grants-and-loans-amounts> (accessed 15 august 2017).

argument instead of writing one very good version of a good argument. And that goes all over neoliberalist academia. It's a nightmare. And you do the same with students. Instead of saying, "take your time and when you think 'now I have understood it', then let's have the conversation and we take it from there" we are saying, "you have to write this now, you have to do this now". So instead of sending out students that have had a sort of in-depth relationship with some sort of scientific process, some sort of thought production or creativity, we send out these people who know how to appropriate knowledge. But do they know how to generate it?

But let us start from – if not *the* at least *a* – beginning. The probably most significant intervention in that regard was the Danish University Act of 2003 which – just as its Austrian counterpart of 2002 – is deeply ingrained in the neoliberal and managerial logics discussed in chapter 4. Wright and Ørberg (2008) argue that it is based on the aims

> to secure a closer correlation between the goals of the politicians and the behaviour of the providers, and a faster response by service deliverers when politicians changed their policy aims. To achieve this responsiveness to political goals, a bureaucratic command system has been transformed into one made up of self-owning, self-managing and self-disciplined independent contractors which are steered through market competition, contractual sanctions and rewards, and output-based payment. This system is called decentralised, but is designed to be more responsive and accountable to the top. (ibid.: 39)

Under the influence of both the Danish industry and the OECD's guidance on New Public Management (Wright 2016: 66f.), the university act changed (1) the legal status of universities into "self-owning institutions", (2) their governance by installing new governing boards, (3) their management by introducing appointed instead of elected leaders and (4) the way the government steers them through contracts and output-based funding (Wright and Ørberg 2011: 269f.).

> Universities were given the new status of 'self-owning institutions'. No longer shielded by the ministry, universities were now a free agent open to demands from stakeholders including industry, public services, community groups and government itself to do research and teaching that would benefit their interests. […] The reforms also intended to turn the university into a trustworthy contractual partner by making it into a coherent organization surmounted by a rector empowered to act 'as' the university in interlocution with government and other stakeholders. The previous, elected university management was replaced by a governing board with a majority from outside the university and appointed leaders at every level – rector, dean, and department head. Chains of contracts between these tiers of leaders distributed the deliverables in the ministry contract throughout the university. Each appointee in the 'unified leadership' was accountable upwards and subject to a 'loyalty obligation', so that the rector had the powers to act strategically, concentrate resources on the needs of the economy, and respond to political priorities. The new leaders had 'freedom to manage' in any way that would meet statutory and contractual obligations, deliver targets and fulfill politicians' aims. […] Smaller universities and government research institutes were also merged with larger universities to make them more globally competitive. […] State funding was also increasingly determined by measuring universities against each other (Wright 2014a) and they were expected to see themselves as units in competition with each other in Denmark and globally vying for position on league tables. (Wright 2016: 67f., for more detailed accounts of the Danish university reform see MVTU 2009: 95–98, Ørberg and Wright 2009, Wright 2014, Wright and Boden 2011, Wright and Ørberg 2008)

Universities are to enter into three-year development contracts with the Ministry of Higher Education and Science, with their funding no longer aiming "to keep institutions running, but to achieve the delivery of desired outputs from the sector" (Wright and Ørberg 2008: 45). At the

same time, they are subjected to the same accrual accounting system as companies (ibid.: 48, cf. Ørberg and Wright 2009: 127).[200] The Danish university act stresses the university's responsibility to "collaborate with the external environment" and "promote growth, prosperity and the development of society"[201] even more explicitly than its Austrian counterpart – a requirement that the university managers of my field site appear to be well aware of and keen on fulfilling as indicated by the following statement:

> *Now we have also set up a requirement that part of the PhD programme is to be prepared to do some outreach activities. […] So we have strengthened the requirement of disseminating research information. […] [This] is part of the fundamental change that universities should not work in isolation but should be much more connected to society. This is because politicians and society today expect that the university contributes much more to the development of the welfare state and the growth of the economy. […] If you want to care of the employability of students you really have to be in much closer contact with the world outside the university. […] Much of the funding of research today – EU funding and the private research funding – is thematic funding. They don't just want to fund anthropological research. They want to fund specific themes related to some of the big challenges in the world. […] I think it's a double pressure: it's a pressure from outside, but I think that also many people inside the university can see that it's a good opportunity. Society also asks the university to contribute more to innovations – and that is really to bring research more towards practical use. There is pressure to train our students more in relation to innovation. […] The tradition of this faculty is very much of producing students who get a job in the public sector. But the public sector will not grow in Denmark compared to the private sector, and the private sector asks for different competencies than the public sector.*

Other examples include an e-mail from the newly appointed Associate Dean for Research and External Relations (nomen est omen) at the Faculty of Social Sciences sent in September 2014 introducing her to the academic staff in which she announced that

> I am to help build the best possible framework for research, research quality and internationalisation. One important aspect is to contribute to the strengthening of the external positioning of the Faculty of Social Sciences, and of relations to stake holders, including partners, persons with ties to the university, national or international foundations etc.
> Your ideas and interests are the foundation for achieving this. My job is to make the connection between your ideas and our external partners, so that they will get to know us even better. This can further strengthen the research, and allow us to build new exiting research environments partially based on external funding. It would be positive if the projects included several departments or faculties.

In the same year, the faculty decided to reappoint the Head of the Department of Anthropology for a new term of five years, announcing in a newsletter that not only did she show "a very clear cross-disciplinary focus", but would also "commit herself strongly to developing and communicating to the private sector that anthropologists have competences which enable them to make valuable contributions to private companies, and she will focus on graduates' employment options upon obtaining their degree". This announcement was complemented by that of the Dean that

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[200] It is thus not surprising that in a ranking of the protection of academic freedom in 23 European countries, Denmark came last but two (Karran 2007: 308).

[201] See <http://ufm.dk/en/legislation/prevailing-laws-and-regulations/education/files/the-danish-university-act.pdf>, § 2.3 (accessed 14 August 2017).

> [t]he Department of Anthropology faces new big challenges related to the Study Progress Reform, and the government's plan to re-dimension the study programme. The study programme will need to be organized to help ensure that students progress at the right pace throughout their studies. At the same time the study programme must aim at ensuring employment opportunities for graduates. More anthropologists need to find employment in the private sector, and the studies need to qualify them for that.

The Dean's statement refers to two major developments characterising the policy context at the time of my fieldwork: the study progress reform ("studiefremdriftsreformen") and the dimensioning plan ("dimensionering").[202] The former is explained by a university manager as follows:

> *The government has decided that students should pass their study programme much faster than they are accustomed to. This is called "fremdriftsreformen". The university will have a huge reduction in their funding for teaching if we do not continuously succeed over the next five years to reduce the study time of students. This is a specific problem for the University of Copenhagen because the average study time in Copenhagen is the longest study time in Denmark. It's not that big a problem at the Bachelor's level but it's a huge problem at the Master's level. Because many students here in Copenhagen have part-time jobs – partly because they want to earn some money but I think for most of them, it's more important that they want to have this job on their CV because it matters very much if you want to get a job afterwards. [...] The norm is that the Master's programme is a two-year programme but they take up to 3.5 years for that. Now we have been forced by the government to reduce the time – but the measures we can use are very unclear.*

The last sentence indicates that the government sets objectives while leaving it to the "autonomous" universities to figure out how to achieve them. Taking effect as of 1 September 2015, the study progress reform compels students to study full-time, i.e. to register for courses to the extent of 30 ECTS per semester. After a two-week registration period, they are not allowed to deregister from courses or replace them with other courses and are automatically registered for re-examination if they do not pass their exams. Students who do not register for 30 ECTS per semester are registered by the study administration for courses corresponding to the lacking ECTS credits. In order to help students fulfil these new criteria, the Department of Anthropology changed its Bachelor and Master curricula in 2015 (after the former had already been revised in 2005 and 2011 and the latter in 2008, 2012 and 2013). Moreover, in May 2015 the faculty sent a letter to a number of employers encouraging them to limit the number of weekly working hours for a student employee to between eight and twelve hours.

However, by severely restricting the working experience students can gather and by de facto excluding working students, the study progress reform ironically conflicts with the aim of another reform demanded by the government: the dimensioning plan. It represents the Danish gov-

[202] Both reforms are in line with the conclusion of the Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation that the "Danish education system is not geared towards a knowledge society" because "Danish students begin and complete their studies late (age wise), higher education programmes have a high drop out rate, and the number of graduates in natural and engineering sciences is too low" (MVTU 2009: 21f.). Furthermore, the study progress reform was already heralded by the government's "Strategy for Denmark in the Global Economy" (released in 2006) postulating that "universities should ensure that the education programmes are organised in such a way that the content can be completed and the objectives achieved within the prescribed period of time. Universities must be assessed based on how quickly young people complete their studies. The system of performance based financing is to be restructured in a way that encourages the universities to push students to finish their studies within the prescribed period of time" (Danish Government 2006: 17).

ernment's increased focus on the employability of its university graduates and its strategy to delegate the corresponding responsibility to universities. It is summed up by a university manager as follows:

> *A few years ago, the government cared about two things: that the universities increase the intake of students and that they reduce the drop-out rate. Now the intake has risen to the goal that was set: about 25% of the youth generation. Since we receive funding related to the number of students, the government has now realised that it becomes expensive for them if they increase the number. So the policy of the government has changed dramatically during the last year from looking at the numbers we are taking in to looking at the quality […] – and they see quality very closely related to people getting a job. […] For that reason there is now a discussion going on that the government would want to reduce the level of student intake into the humanities and social sciences.*

This description is complemented by the remark of a senior academic of the Department of Anthropology that

> *[e]mployability is really on the political agenda. […] I would say that in the 90s when I was studying my Master's that was our business. That was up to us. It was our responsibility to make ourselves employable – it wasn't the university's. The university would provide a quality, disciplinary-founded research-based [education, author's note]. […] But now the political system has decided that actually we are irresponsible if we produce unemployable [graduates, author's note].*

According to one of her colleagues, whereas the government's preceding logic was that the longer students stay at the university the better the unemployment rates, it now not only expects students to finish their studies quickly, but also to find employment immediately afterwards – and not just any employment but well paid employment in the private sector in order for its investment in their higher education paying off in the form of high taxes. In that regard, a presentation of a member of the Danish Productivity Commission – that had been tasked in 2013 to "analyse the Danish productivity trends and come up with specific recommendations that can enhance productivity in Denmark's private and public sector"[203] – given at the City Campus of the University of Copenhagen on 13 February 2014 is quite revealing.[204] The economist[205] complained that the lower the income of graduates of a specific academic discipline, the more students would choose that education and emphasised that with the public funding the higher education of students, they (i.e. the commission) would want them to find jobs in the private sector (rather than in the public sector as before) in order to pay taxes for that education. Therefore, the commission would recommend to take the needs of the labour market into account when calculating the intake of students by informing them about their income opportunities, creating economic incentives for them to choose certain studies and having students take out loans so they have to reflect on their prospective income – or reduce student numbers. These considerations are in line with that of another committee – also tasked in 2013 and with an economic bias in their composition – to advise the government on higher education: the Expert Committee on

[203] See <http://produktivitetskommissionen.dk/media/133600/Kommissoriet på engelsk.pdf> (accessed 14 August 2017).
[204] As the presentation was in Danish, I can only give a rough summary of its content.
[205] The Productivity Commission was clearly dominated by economists. When asked by a member of the Department of Anthropology whether its findings would be different if it would have included other disciplines, the representative replied that the government had wanted an economic study. Besides, they would have never been able to agree on a report otherwise.

Quality in Higher Education in Denmark. This committee suggested to regulate the admission of students according to parameters such as

- Historical unemployment rates and income
- Trends in relative unemployment rates
- Projections of graduate numbers on the basis of present-day trends in intakes
- Deliverance of graduates into both public- and private-sector jobs
- Substitutability in the labour market
- Assessment of specific parts of the labour market towards which specific groups of programmes aim

and demands that "it should be ensured that there is no inherent automatic in the funding system which encourages institutions to increase their student intake or establish new education programmes with no consideration for labour market and societal needs".[206]

The government subscribed to this economistic input-output perspective on higher education (that it had apparently commissioned) and decided to reduce the number of students at Danish universities depending on their unemployment rates. According to a newsletter of the University of Copenhagen from 25 September 2014, the Ministry of Higher Education and Science planned to reduce the number of students by nine percent by 2017, the equivalent of 2,391 students, in the following groups of Master's degrees: ethno/anthropology, aesthetic courses, media and communication, classic humanities, area studies and other humanities studies, foreign language, bio- and other natural science studies. This shows that (as already observed in chapter 3.3), not all academic disciplines are equally affected by such economistic measures. Correspondingly, less than two months before this announcement the Ministry of Higher Education and Science reported that in 2014 a record number of students had been accepted for higher education programmes aiming at the private sector.

> The increase in the number of students is in large part generated by programmes aimed at the private sector as, this year, the business academy programmes have admitted 10 percent more students than in 2013.
> - We need to educate our youth for a future with jobs and opportunities, and not unemployment. In the future, far more people with a higher education programme will find work in private sector companies, and many of the young people have selected their education programmes based on the job opportunities. And with the large intake into programmes aimed at jobs in the private sector, we are on the right course, says Minister for Higher Education and Science, Sofie Carsten Nielsen.[207]

What is more, even the same disciplines were not affected in the same way. In its New Year's greetings from 2014/15, the Deanery of the Faculty of Social Sciences criticised that

> [t]he dimensioning plan is mostly based on historic numbers for unemployment among recently graduated students, and this means that the student intake at our Department of Anthropology will be reduced, while the University of Southern Denmark and Aalborg University can continue to have a large intake of students for similar study programmes, simply because these study programmes are so new that no students have graduated yet. We have repeatedly emphasised this to the Ministry and the outside world.

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[206] See <http://ufm.dk/en/education-and-institutions/councils-and-commissions/the-expert-committee-on-quality-in-higher-education-in-denmark/new-ways-high-standards.pdf> (accessed 14 August 2017).
[207] See <http://ufm.dk/en/newsroom/press-releases/2014/record-numbers-accepted-for-higher-education-aimed-at-the-private-sector> (accessed 14 August 2017).

Although the Department of Anthropology took the heightened demands for making its graduates more employable seriously (cf. chapter 7.5), it was expected to reduce (together with the Ethnology programme located at another institute) its intake in the Master programme – a programme whose high academic quality was unquestioned – by 30%, thereby suffering the highest cutback possible. Despite the cuts being restricted to the Master programme, the department had to be careful regarding its intake of Bachelor students as well as they have the legal right to be admitted to the Master programme. Therefore, if too many would want to continue their studies, the department would run the risk of having to educate them without receiving funding for their education.

However, these cuts were neither limited to the department nor the only ones the Danish universities had to face in recent years. Although according to Wright (2016) the far-reaching reforms discussed in this chapter "were to restore politicians' trust in universities, so they could increase public funding for universities to play their role in driving Denmark's competitiveness in the knowledge economy" (ibid.: 68) and despite the Department of Anthropology's (and as I would assume universities' more generally) best efforts to not only increase the employability of its graduates but the "relevance" of its research as well (cf. chapter 7.5), a newly elected government announced in September 2015 to reduce funding for higher education by 3.3 billion DKK over the next four years – an additional two percent reduction on top of the annual two percent general cuts that the Ministry of Finance already took from the education sector. Moreover, it cut the budget of the Danish Council for Independent Research by 280 MM DKK, reducing it from 1,190.6 MM DKK in 2015 to 922.4 MM DKK in 2016 and 804.7 MM DKK in 2017 (DFF 2016: 5). This measure especially affected early-career academics as

> [t]he Council has not wished to implement its cuts indiscriminately across the entire range of financial instruments. In this way DFF is able to ensure that 10 out 100 researchers will still be awarded funding for their research in 2016. At the same time, the Council finds it regrettable that the withdrawal of individual postdoc grants and mobility grants for Spring 2016 will especially impact the younger researchers.[208]

Correspondingly, the European University Association notes that

> growth nearly flattened out in 2016 and the outlook is negative. The Danish Parliament approved cuts to research grants (primarily with regard to competitive funding offered by research councils and funding programmes) and the level of funding will fall from 1.09% to 1.01% of GDP in 2016. Similarly, cuts to funding for education will be about 2% per year from 2016 to 2019, totalling approximately 8%. (EUA 2016: 7, cf. ibid.: 8f.)

On a related note, a senior academic of the Department of Anthropology told me in an e-mail dating from December 2015 that

> [w]e have gotten to the point of having to tell jokes about it:
> One researcher to the other: "I do hope Santa Claus will bring me a research grant for next year!"
> Other researcher's reply: "Oh, no, don't tell me you still believe in research grants!?"

[208] See <http://ufm.dk/en/research-and-innovation/councils-and-commissions/independent-research-fund-Denmark/news/fewer-researchers-to-be-awarded-funding-danish-council-for-independent-research-withdraws-call-for-proposals> (accessed 15 August 2017).

The funding cuts not only decrease the opportunities of early-career academics to obtain external academic funding. In its annual report, the University of Copenhagen (2016) remarks that

> [i]n the first instance, costs were reduced by introducing a hiring freeze in the autumn of 2015, and this freeze is expected to continue into H1 2016. In addition, there will be a major staff cut (voluntary redundancy and dismissals). The bulk of savings will be in administration, then PhD programmes, and with research and education being adjusted least. (ibid.: 23f.)

The immediate hiring freeze was imposed by the Rector's office in October 2015, meaning that from 5 October 2015 onwards recruitment was basically at a standstill. Nonetheless, in February 2016 the university announced via its newsletter that it was to dismiss 500 employees.

> 255 voluntary redundancy agreements have been signed. 68 vacant positions have been shed and 61 have had their working hours reduced. That leaves more than 200 employees who will now be recommended for dismissal.

With one senior academic applying for voluntary redundancy, one member of the administrative staff retiring and two senior academics as well as one administrative staff member reducing their working hours, the Department of Anthropology did not have to dismiss any staff. However, it appears that the cuts intensified the economisation of the University of Copenhagen with university managers trying even harder to fulfil the government's demands of producing employable graduates and relevant research. At least the Faculty of Social Sciences announced in October 2015 that "we are going to intensify our endeavours to increase income. We are currently strengthening our initiatives to boost income in the form of reduced drop-out rates, increased study-completion speed as well as increased external grants". With external grants for basic research being cut back, it appears reasonable to assume that this additional funding would have to come from application-oriented sources.

7.3 The EU Policy Context

Many of the developments discussed in the previous chapter resonate with broader ones on a European level. Whereas the primarily economistic and application-oriented focus of EU research and higher education policies has already been demonstrated in chapter 3.3.1, the more specific focus of this chapter complements my analysis by showing that doctoral education only became a subject of EU policy rather recently.

> Before the emergence of the Bologna Process, and during its early stages, the policy emphasis had mainly avoided the specifics of doctoral studies. A big change occurred at the Bologna Process' Berlin Conference (2003). Ministers considered it necessary to go beyond the focus on the two main cycles (bachelor and master) to *include the doctoral level as the third cycle* in the Bologna Process. They called for increased mobility at the doctoral and postdoctoral levels and encouraged universities to increase their co-operation in doctoral studies and the training of young researchers (Bologna Process 2003). (Zgaga 2017: 5)

The inclusion of doctoral education in the Bologna process led to "a general shift in policy making for doctoral training and advanced research from the national to the supra-national level" (Kehm 2007: 119). Since then, "[t]he hegemony of 'innovation' in the EU discourse and its

particular articulation alongside research and education configure the landscape of doctoral education" (Magalhães and Veiga 2017: 5).

> In Europe as well as in North America doctoral training and education has moved more into the focus of scrutiny, policy formulation and reform initiatives in recent years. There is widespread dissatisfaction with the traditional forms of doctoral education and training. This is not only due to a considerable increase in the production of doctoral degree holders but also to changes in the policy context for this phase of advanced academic education. Globalisation, the shift towards knowledge-based economies and the resulting increase in competition for best talent have contributed to such a shift. Due to the increase in doctoral degree holders which is thought to be desirable in order to support the shift to a knowledge based society and economy, another policy change can be observed. It is expected that far more trained researchers than before will seek and will have to seek jobs outside academia and research institutions. (Kehm 2007: 111)

With policymakers increasingly considering doctoral education to be an important strategic resource and economic factor[209] it

> becomes a commodity and its shape acquires a more utilitarian approach. […] In addition, it is deemed so important a resources that it is no longer left in the hands of professors and departments but has become an object of policy making and has moved to the institutional and national, even supra-national level. (ibid.: 120)

In the course of this process two central issues emerged: (1) "providing doctoral education and training with more structure, i.e. embedding it into schools and programmes" (ibid.: 112) and (2) "'relevance' for a wider spectrum of professional work" (ibid.: 112), i.e. the acquirement of so-called "transferable skills". Early-career anthropologists are offered such generic courses at the Center for Doctoral Studies of the University of Vienna[210] as well as at the Graduate School of Social Sciences of the University of Copenhagen[211], with both institutions offering courses preparing PhD candidates to apply for non-academic jobs (titled "Trainings für Bewerbungen in und außerhalb der Universität" and "Prepare yourself for the labor-market"). Moreover, Kehm (2007) remarks that policymakers are unhappy with the duration of doctoral studies, with long time-to-degree and high drop-out rates having led to "criticism of the quality of supervision and increased quality control of doctoral programmes as such" (ibid.: 113). Correspondingly, the Salzburg Principles – established in the Bologna Process in 2005 as the basis for reforms of doctoral education – state that although focusing on "the advancement of knowledge through original research" doctoral education "must increasingly meet the needs of an employment market that is wider than academia" (EUA 2010: 4). They recommend, among other things, that "arrangements for supervision and assessment should be based on a transparent contractual framework of shared responsibilities between doctoral candidates, supervisors and the institution" and that doctoral programmes should "seek to achieve critical mass", "operate within an appropriate time duration (three to four years fulltime as a rule)", promote innovative structures "to meet the challenge of interdisciplinary training and the development of transferable skills"

[209] For example, the number of new doctorate graduates is the first indicator of the European Innovation Scoreboard (Hollanders and Es-Sadki 2017: 12).
[210] See <https://forschung.univie.ac.at/en/services/trainings/doctoral-candidates/> (accessed 20 August 2017).
[211] See <http://samf.ku.dk/phd-skolen/english/courses/> (accessed 20 August 2017).

and "offer geographical as well as interdisciplinary and intersectoral mobility and international collaboration" (ibid.: 4). This shows how the demands placed on universities to fulfil an increasing range of functions surface in doctoral education – as is well illustrated by the EU flagship programme Innovative Training Networks (ITN)[212]. ITNs provide "experience outside academia, hence developing innovation and employability skills. ITNs include industrial doctorates, in which non-academic organisations have an equal role to universities in respect of the researcher's time and supervision."[213] On that note, Balaban (2017) argues that

> [t]raditionally, doctoral education has been about acquiring and developing specialised knowledge in a particular field, exploring new ways of thinking, and more generally being immersed in a world of ideas. More recently, however, it has been claimed that this figure of the researcher is no longer 'enough'. The new policy discourse around doctoral education proposes that PhD fellows should be 'more' than 'just' researchers; that they should also be equipped with a wider range of competencies that would enable them to be more flexible on the labour market. (ibid.: 7)

With this policy context in mind, let us now turn our attention towards the more specific institutional environments of the two university departments in Vienna and Copenhagen.

7.4 The Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology in Vienna

The Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology is based at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Vienna[214], the biggest (i.e. most massified) and oldest of currently 22 universities in Austria with total revenues of 544.386 MM EUR (University of Vienna 2016b: 190) and 94,759 students in 2015 (ibid.: 93). It is the only university department for social anthropology[215] in Austria covering a wide subject area of the discipline and with 2,512 students (including PhD candidates) in 2015[110] – three quarters of them being Bachelor students – one of the biggest of its kind in Europe. In comparison, the department has relatively few staff members. As of October 2015, it employed nine administrative staff members[216] (excluding so-called student assistants who are temporarily employed on a modest salary to support the department in administrative and teaching matters), five full professors (one of them on a temporary contract),

[212] The ERA – remaining at the heart of the Europe 2020 strategy – pursues an "open labour market for researchers" by supporting "the setting up and running of structured innovative doctoral training programmes applying the Principles for Innovative Doctoral Training" (European Commission 2012: 10f.).
[213] See <http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/marie-sklodowska-curie-actions> (accessed 20 August 2017).
[214] The Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology is not to be confused with the Department of Anthropology based at the Faculty of Life Sciences of the University of Vienna.
[215] Ironically, the Austrian classification of academic disciplines (ÖFOS) knows all kinds of social sciences but not social anthropology, only ethnology and cultural anthropology as sub-categories of sociology (see <http://www.statistik.at/kdb/downloads/pdf/OEFOS_2012_Alphabetikum_A.pdf>, accessed 21 August 2017).
[216] However, four of them were formally not working for the department but for its directorate of studies ("Studienprogrammleitung").

five associate professors[217], one so-called academic civil servant ("wissenschaftliche Beamtin"), three senior lecturers, 36 "external" lecturers[180], seven Postdocs and nine PhD candidates.[218] What is more, these relatively modest numbers constitute a doubling of the department's academic staff since 2011 according to its homepage.[219] Correspondingly, the department notes in a self-assessment report drafted in 2013 that while "a more pronounced and continuing increase [in student numbers, author's note] started around 2000", its permanent academic staff "stagnated at 10 heads until late 2010". Since then the department obtained seven additional permanent positions in the form of three full professorships (including four internally funded PhD and four Postdoc positions) and four part-time senior lecturers. Consequently, Trow's (2005) description of mass higher education as "centered on the transmission of skills and knowledge through relations between teachers and students which are briefer and more impersonal, and […] designed to prepare students for relatively more modest roles in society" (ibid.: 12) with "formal instruction carried on through large lectures often taught by teaching assistants or the growing number of part-time instructors without strong or long-term connections to the institution" (ibid.: 20) pertains well to the department.

The department's limitation in personnel resources is matched by its limited facilities. Located on the fourth floor of the "Neue Institutsgebäude" (NIG), a rather unwelcoming eight-storey building, originally designed as the university library's book storage facility[220], its expansion in student and staff numbers was not compensated by an equal expansion in office space – although it acquired four additional offices from the Department of Geography and Regional Research in 2011.[221] In 2015, the department disposed of 20 offices for academic staff of which five were designated for early-career anthropologists. As office space is primarily made available to the department's "core" staff, "external" lecturers, project staff as well as the student representatives each had to share a single office (of approximately the size of a full professor's office). In general, the distribution of office space reflects the hierarchy between staff according to the curial structure[222] characterising the organisation of the university before the University Act of 2002, with most of the full professors having their offices in the corridor closest to the department's main entrance and most of the associate professors being situated in the adjacent corridor, whereas "external" lecturers, project staff and the student representatives are located at the other end of the department, mostly surrounded by lecture halls (and in the case of project staff a toilet). Although the university reform shifted decision-making powers from professors to high-

[217] In this category I subsume all permanent professorship positions without a full professorship who are basically those predating the current employment structure introduced in consequence of the University Act of 2002, i.e. ao. Univ.-Prof. as well as the only assistant professor at the department.
[218] These numbers are based on the department's homepage as well as on information from its administration.
[219] See <https://ksa.univie.ac.at/institut/geschichte/> (accessed 21 August 2017).
[220] See <http://geschichte.univie.ac.at/de/artikel/nig-das-neue-institutsgebaeude> (accessed 21 August 2017).
[221] For an overview of the layout of the department see <https://backend.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/f_psychologie/files/plan_nig.pdf> (accessed 22 August 2017). The map is not up-to-date as it does not include the additional office space acquired from the Department of Geography and Regional Research on that floor.
[222] The curial structure is based on the assignment of university members to a specific group of either full professors (the by far most powerful curia), the so-called "Mittelbau" (i.e. basically all academic staff except for full professors), students or administrative staff (cf. Österreichischer Wissenschaftsrat 2013: 20).

level university managers, full professors maintain their central position within the university's hierarchy as they constitute the biggest curia in the Senate (nine members of a total of 18) and the Faculty Conference (which only has an advisory function) as well as the distribution of funding at the Faculty of Social Sciences being largely based on their numbers. In fact, their influence appears to increase again with Praedocs and Postdocs now being assigned to them as "their" assistants after a period of enjoying a higher degree of autonomy.

Despite its recent expansion in academic staff and a simultaneous reduction in student numbers from 2,808 in 2010[109] to 2,328 in 2012[223] due to the expiry of the "Diplomstudium" in 2012, the department's ratio of teachers to students remains on a high level (with 20 academic staff members and 36 "external lecturers"[218] teaching 2,512 students[110] in 2015). Although the department therefore still depends on the labour power of a large number of "external" lecturers[224], this group has been affected most adversely by these two developments. Whereas previously becoming an "external" lecturer teaching up to eight "Semesterstunden"[225] per semester – so-called "ExistenzlektorInnen" – constituted an option for early-career academics of finding long-term employment at the department, this career path is de facto closed to (PhD) graduates now. However, we must bear in mind that "external" lecturers are emblems of a flexible workforce that is employed by university managers to teach alternating courses or those courses that are "left over" by the other academic staff. They are paid 7.7% of the salary of a university assistant without a PhD degree for every "Semesterstunde" they teach (Dachverband der Universitäten 2016: 33), amounting to ca. 420.58 EUR gross per month in 2017 for a regular course of two "Semesterstunden"[226] – 5.12 EUR below the marginal wage required to be covered by social security. Although becoming an "external" lecturer is a common means for PhD candidates of becoming formally affiliated with the department, it is clearly no PhD (nor Postdoc) position insofar as it does not provide them with funding for research – the activity that is crucial for obtaining most other academic positions.[227]

Their counterpart is externally funded project staff, a flexible workforce – each individually negotiating their employment contracts – employed for doing alternating research projects with an equally (or even more) marginal standing at the department. Like "external" lecturers, their access to the department is limited in the true sense of the word with their keys opening the doors to their offices but not to the building in which the department is located. When I started my fieldwork in 2012, externally funded staff was not represented on the department's homepage and had to share a single office of about 30 m^2 that also served as a meeting room (including

[223] See <http://slw.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/s_studienservice/Dokumente/Statistiken/studstat_72_2012W.pdf> (accessed 21 August 2017).
[224] In the academic year 2014/15, "external" lecturers did about 38% of the teaching at the department in Vienna.
[225] One "Semesterstunde" equals 45 minutes of teaching in the classroom per week for one semester; one course usually comprises of two "Semesterstunden", i.e. 90 minutes of teaching per week.
[226] See <https://personalwesen.univie.ac.at/kollektivvertrag/mitarbeiterinnengruppen/wissenschaftliches-universitaets personal/gehaltsschema/> (accessed 22 August 2017).
[227] The fact that research performance is considered to be significantly more important than teaching performance for having an academic career was not always the case. A hundred years ago, Weber (2008) stated that "[i]f it is said of a lecturer that he is a poor teacher, this is usually an academic death sentence, even if he should be the world's foremost scholar" (ibid.: 30).

seven desks of which two were reserved for the department's alumni association and the Austrian-South Pacific Society). Furthermore, they are not represented (as a group) at departmental meetings or the Faculty Conference and have no association representing their interests. Part of the reason for this marginal standing is that (unlike at the department in Copenhagen) external funding plays a minor role at the department in Vienna – at least when it comes to the senior academic staff (cf. chapter 7.6). Accordingly, a reviewer of a research evaluation conducted in 2013 commented that

> [t]he research funding acquired during the review period […] bears witness to successful grant-seeking activity but also to the fact that there is room for improvement in this department as well. Some senior researchers are very successful in obtaining research funds and are thus able to recruit and train junior researchers […]. But while funding opportunities for anthropological research in Europe are frustratingly elusive, and while European funding agencies are often biased against qualitative or interpretive social sciences research, one feels that other IKSA staff members need to be more proactive in seeking funding for their research. […] Among the weaknesses, the funding profile is in need of improvement and the lack of support and encouragement of staff members' (and graduate students') efforts to apply for funds is evident.

This relative lack in external funding can be partially explained by the fact that although the University of Vienna offers 3% of the 20% overheads to the project leader(s), it does not (at all or to the same extent as the University of Copenhagen) reward the acquisition of external funding by allowing senior academics to increase their research time by reducing their teaching obligations (of usually eight "Semesterstunden"). This in turn may be due to the fact that national external funding provides universities with relatively low overheads (ranging from zero to 20%) that do not suffice to cover all costs arising from a research project (cf. University of Vienna 2015b: 27). Accordingly, the Rector of the University of Vienna stated in a newspaper interview in 2015 that "[e]xternally funded projects are indispensable from a research perspective but from a cost perspective actually uneconomic. We have to bear part of the costs of each project ourselves".[228] Besides, the department competes with the Institute for Social Anthropology of the Austrian Academy of Sciences insofar as one professor is employed at both institutions, taking some of the external funding she acquires to the latter. Finally, the department addresses an "emerging division of labor among the staff members in internationally oriented 'top researchers' on the one hand, and 'teachers' and 'administrators' on the other, who mostly handled the burden of managing the high student numbers and administratively running the department" in the research (self-)evaluation of 2013 that constitutes another explanation for the shortcoming of some of its academic staff in obtaining external funding.

Such an increasing division between research and teaching activities of academic staff (that culminates in the positions of "external" lecturers and research project staff who are only paid to do one or the other) is reflected in the organisational division of research and teaching resulting from the University Act of 2002. Subsequently, the University of Vienna separated the administration of research from that of teaching with (heads of) departments now being responsible for

[228] See <http://diepresse.com/home/science/4695941/Wir-zahlen-bei-jedem-Projekt-drauf> (accessed 23 August 2017, my translation).

the administration of research, whereas newly created directorates of studies ("Studienprogrammleitungen") are responsible for administrating teaching issues – with the line of command in the first case running from the (Vice-)Rector (for Research and Internal Affairs) over the Dean to the Head of Department and in the second case from the (Vice-)Rector (for Educational Affairs) over the "Studienpräses" to the directors of studies. This weakened the authority of the Head of Department that is now mostly restricted to operational matters while personnel decisions are negotiated between the Dean – who is the immediate superior of the department's habilitated staff – and Rector, with one of them (depending on the amount) also signing contracts for externally funded research projects. Besides, the Head of Department is not remunerated for exercising that role and does not get a reduction of her teaching obligation.

7.5 The Department of Anthropology in Copenhagen

The Department of Anthropology is based at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Copenhagen[229], the biggest and oldest of currently eight universities in Denmark with total revenues amounting to 8,377.7 MM DKK (ca. 1,122.6 MM EUR) (University of Copenhagen 2016: 9, 22, 33) and 40,486 students in 2015 (ibid.: 48). Hence, the University of Copenhagen has more than double of the revenues of the University of Vienna with less than half of its students. This advantageous ratio is even more evident at the departmental level. As of October 2015, 603 anthropology students (including PhD candidates) – more than half of which were Bachelor students – as well as (to a certain extent) 212 Master students enrolled in two interdisciplinary MSc programmes[112] were taken care of by a staff consisting of 27 administrative staff members[230] (including a research consultant, a communications officer and a business relations officer[231]) as well as an academic staff consisting of seven full professors, thirteen associate professors, one senior advisor, nine external lecturers and six research assistants (who also teach courses despite their designation), fifteen Postdocs and 31 PhD candidates.[218] In other words, while having less than a fourth of the student population of the department in Vienna, the department in Copenhagen disposes of more staff in most categories – except for external lecturers[232]/research assistants – and more than twice as many Postdoc positions as well as more than three times as many employed PhD candidates. Another striking difference is that although the department in Copenhagen predominantly employs staff speaking Danish as their first language

[229] In addition, Aarhus University offers an anthropology degree as well, the University of Aalborg one – that is at least related by name – in "techno-anthropology" and the University of Southern Denmark one in "market anthropology".

[230] However, the Department of Anthropology shares (most of) its administrative staff with the Department of Sociology.

[231] The business relations officer is however attributed to the group of "Part-time Lectures and Research Assistants" on the department's homepage (see <http://anthropology.ku.dk/staff/part-time-lecture-and-research-assistant/>, accessed 25 August 2015).

[232] In contrast to Vienna, external lecturers play a minor role in the teaching of the department. Paid on an hourly basis, they are either employed elsewhere or Master/PhD graduates keeping themselves (more or less) afloat in order to acquire a position or external funding. However, being an external lecturer clearly does not constitute a career path on its own.

(just as the staff of the department in Vienna mostly consists of German native speakers), its lingua franca is English (with almost all e-mails and documents being either only in English or in both Danish and English). The department's more advantageous level of resources is reflected in the spaciousness of its premises. Located at the City Campus of the University of Copenhagen, the department had rooms on three floors in building 16 and on two floors in building 33 (that the department had only moved into in late 2013/early 2014).[233] Altogether I counted 55 offices for academic staff of which 30 were set aside for early-career academics – not to mention a range of lunch and meeting rooms (with a common lunch organised by the department on Tuesdays) as well as a large yard with a lawn. In fact, there was such an abundance of office space that during my fieldwork several offices were empty (not because their users were working at home but because no one had moved in yet).

Hence, it is little surprising that in comparison to Vienna, the education at the department resembles an elite higher education as characterised by Trow (2005) where ambition is encouraged (ibid.: 13), "[a] young person gains a heightened self-confidence from association with (and approval by) leading figures in the field" (ibid.: 15) and "teachers and students often meet outside the setting of formal instruction; their concerns when they meet are not confirmed to what is contained in syllabus and lectures" (ibid.: 10). This circumstance is illustrated by the fact (that probably pertains to the Danish higher education sector rather than being specific for the department) that professors are usually addressed by their first names and (more specifically) by a meeting I had with a senior academic in May 2015: I had given a presentation of my PhD project at one of the department's research seminars that she had missed. As she was nonetheless interested in learning about how my work on the department was going, we met some days later in her office. I had brought croissants and she made us some tea, taking two cups from the kitchen: a standard cup and a bigger one saying "I am the boss". When we sat down for our informal talk, she handed the "boss" cup to me with a naturalness as if we were old friends. Of course, I would not have been treated in such a collegial way by all of the department's senior academic staff. Yet I regard the incident as symptomatic for a less hierarchical interaction between academic staff of different career levels and students (in comparison to Vienna). Such an atmosphere may also explain my observation that the department appears to install more academic confidence and a stronger anthropological identity in its students. I have met quite a few graduates calling themselves anthropologists despite working in non-academic environments and "only" having a Master's degree – whereas from my experience graduates from the department in Vienna would refer to their education as having studied anthropology rather than being anthropologists.

Ironically, this more elitist environment does not prevent the department from facing strong(er) political pressures to counteract problems associated with the massification of higher education, i.e. demands of increasing societal and especially economic relevance. Accordingly, the department states in its "Strategy 2017–2020" that

[233] Later on that year, the department got additional rooms on the second floor in building 33 in exchange for rooms on the second floor of building 16.

> [w]ith rising public pressure on both our Department and on our graduates to demonstrate the contribution anthropologists make to society, we need to re-emphasize the discipline's character as a social science. Both on the BA and on the MA level, we need to strengthen our students' ability to articulate their competencies as anthropologists in relation to societal challenges.[234]

Therefore, the department both seeks to "enhance the impact of research conducted at the Department and to contribute to the development of relevant methods to define, measure, and document the impact of specific research projects"[234] as well as to "[i]mprove the employability and employment rate of graduates in anthropology"[234]. Regarding the latter, the department announced in September 2014 the establishment of a new employability group that was to facilitate the process from study to employment among its new Master students. Moreover, in April 2015 a "business relations officer" started her employment at the department with the aim of developing collaborative projects with the private sector as well as to contribute to the activities of AnthroAnalysis, the department's Center for Applied Anthropology. However, the endeavour to improve its students' employability was a contested matter – also among early-career academics. For instance, whereas one Postdoc argued that by evaluating themselves on such economistic terms they would kill the humanities and social sciences, asking her colleagues to not "assess yourself on those terms! Don't do it. Don't play the game. Because you're dead, you're dead if you do that. You cannot justify anthropology on the grounds of usefulness", another one remarked that

> *[t]here are a lot of students finishing here – they need some kind of jobs. And if there is this demand from organisations, public or private, why not educate people?! Not to live up to the demands of the organisations but to understand what is going on at least and maybe even make it better. [...] I think it's important that anthropologists are part of these discussions. And not only sitting and pointing: "This is bad."*

However, an increasingly economi(sti)c rationality was not limited to the issue – initiated by the Danish government – of graduates' employability. The key (or rather similar) conceptual vocabularies of academic capitalism identified by Hoffman (2011a) are (in comparison) highly visible in the department's activities: collaborative research with external partners for example through AnthroAnalysis; a focus on the needs of employers (and partly consumers) through an emphasis on business and organisational anthropology (for example by offering an MSc in Business and Organisational Anthropology, the appointment of an associate professor in 2012, the promotion of a Postdoc to an assistant professor in 2016 and the appointment of an externally funded professor in 2017); and interdisciplinarity both through interdisciplinary MSc programmes that "should also be regarded as a form of income generation for the Department"[235] as well as a series of interdisciplinary research projects.

This brings us to a salient feature of both academic capitalism and the department: an increasing reliance on acquiring income on the quasi-markets of external (research) funding – amount-

[234] See <http://anthropology.ku.dk/research/research_projects/research-vision/Department_Strategy_final_dec_2016_-_indhold.pdf> (accessed 26 August 2017).
[235] See footnote 234. In addition to the public funding the department receives for every student through to the taximeter system it can charge tuition fees from non-EU citizens.

ing to a projectification of academic work – which, together with a comparatively rigorous regulation of student intake[236], is part of the reason for the disparity in resources in contrast to the department in Vienna. In 2014, about one third of the wages of the department's academic staff was paid through external grants (coming with comparatively high overheads – in the case of the Danish Council for Independent Research even 44%[237] – that accrue directly to the department's budget): primarily those of early-career anthropologists whose salaries are directly paid through these grants, but also those of "internally" funded, permanently employed staff. On that note, a university manager told me that

> *[s]ome of the overhead which is coming in is for the salary of some of the permanent staff. We have more permanent staff than we have core funding. [...] Approximately one third [of the department's budget, author's note] is from external funding. [...] So it's not extra money which we can use for extra activities. It has become part of the core funding.*

This explains the impression of a Postdoc that

> *you get invited for this, "ah, there is a new initiative" […] – and the first thing they want to discuss before getting to know each other, what work you do, is: "Okay, so we should apply for funding." That seems to me the raison d'être of every kind of group that meets here. […] Everywhere you get the signal: funding first, your research interest second. And you get the signal that it's very important that you are capable of attracting funding.*

Apart from this economic necessity, external funding has another incentive: it allows those academics obtaining it to significantly reduce their teaching duties (from 420 hours to a minimum of 140 hours per semester)[238] and – in case of collective research funding – establish a research group of PhD candidates and Postdocs around them.

As already implied by the quote above, the significance of external funding and the concomitant demands for "relevance" is also reflected in the department's research priorities, with much of it being related to issues of migration, health and business (particularly in Denmark) or climate change – as opposed for example to art, history or religion. This is neither to say that the former topics are not studied according to high academic standards, nor that the latter (and other) topics are not addressed as well.[239] Yet it appears that research priorities are biased towards "useful" topics, a circumstance that a Postdoc commented on as follows:

> *In the first few years the rest of us [PhD candidates, author's note] who were doing "real anthropology" kind of looked down upon them [PhD candidates who worked on more application-oriented topics, author's note]. It was almost sad, like anthropology was falling apart. […] It was clear to everybody that if you want funding you cannot expect to get anything from the university*

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[236] Being admitted to the anthropology programme requires one of the highest grade averages of all fields of studies.

[237] See <https://ufm.dk/en/research-and-innovation/funding-programmes-for-research-and-innovation/calls/2014/call-files/final_dff_call_2014-2015_english.pdf>, p. 61; <http://ufm.dk/en/research-and-innovation/funding-programmes-for-research-and-innovation/calls/2016/files/DFF-call--autumn-2016-and-spring-2017.pdf >, p. 50.

[238] At a meeting in March 2014 it was announced that the term for this relief from teaching duties through research funding (paying for the staff's salary) –"frikøb" (meaning to buy oneself free) – should be replaced for reasons of political correctness by "externally financed research time" in order to not give the impression that staff would be free to do what they want in that time.

[239] Or that the former topics are not addressed at the department in Vienna as well, where particularly more recently employed academics appear to shift their research foci towards "relevant" fields such as biomedicine or economic, environmental and urban anthropology.

anymore or from the state. You have to really go there and write the applications and just bend over in a sense. And also start to employ this particular language of necessity which was also new to us. Before you didn't have to write about necessity in this welfare necessity sense. [...] This discourse was very new to us. And after a while it became clear that […] we were the marginalised ones. And suddenly we were the ones who had to defend our position. Like the table had turned completely.

This alignment of the department's research towards "relevance" is unlikely to change in the near future with the assumption formulated in chapter 7.2 that future funding would have to increasingly come from application-oriented sources being confirmed by the department's "Strategy 2017–2020" stating that

> [t]he Danish Council for Independent Research (DFF) has had its pool of funds cut substantially. In addition, government research funding is increasingly being directed towards "strategic" research that focuses on societal challenges, innovation, business, etc. The Department needs to develop new approaches to apply for this type of funding.[234]

Another striking characteristic of the department is a high degree of managerialisation and formalisation as evidenced by a comparatively high amount of evaluations (ranging from half-year PhD assessment reports and annual "Performance and Development Reviews"[240] over students' course evaluations, approximately annual (although not regular) work place evaluations and international research evaluations every five years to a "Teacher of the year" award) and strategic documents (such as the "Strategy 2017–2020"). In general, the workload of its academic staff is relatively clearly regulated according to a so-called norm scale, an elaborate system set by the department's management in consultation with employee representatives that defines how many (fictional) hours certain teaching and administrative activities correspond to.[241] The norm scale for the academic year 2015 is a five-page document, listing how many hours are assigned for each course taught at the department, supervision and examination activities (for example, the primary advisor of a PhD thesis receives 15 hours per semester for three years and being part of the assessment committee[242] gives 30 hours) as well as administrative tasks (for instance, the Head of the PhD Programme is awarded 150 hours). Academic staff ("VIPs") are expected to spend 50% of their working hours on teaching, 10% on general administration and 40% on research, amounting to a teaching obligation of 420 hours per semester. The Head of the Department – who is not elected (anymore) but appointed by the Dean[243] – is not required to teach and vested with extensive decisive power that is rather comparable to that of the Dean in Vienna. She signs the applications and contracts for research projects and although the Dean formally has the

[240] Including "good advice, a performance review form and a development plan that you can use before and during the review" according to the university's intranet.
[241] Although the norm scale gives the impression of being a tool of managerial control, a senior academic told me it stems from a labour union initiative in the 1950s. In fact, it appears to help limiting the access the department has on its academic staff's labour power – at least when it comes to teaching and administrative duties. However, this also means that if (new) tasks are not accounted for in the norm scale (such as developing a new Master's degree or the coordination of teaching in the researcher groups), they tend to not be acknowledged as work. Therefore, it is the academic staff that pushes for the recognition of their activities in the norm scale.
[242] The assessment committee of a PhD thesis comprises of two external members and one internal member.
[243] The current Head of Department has been in office since January 2007, having been reappointed in 2015 for another five years.

final say when it comes to the hiring of staff, the Head of Department plays a crucial role in the decision process. As she may also promote Postdocs to assistant professors it is substantially up to her who of the department's early-career academics has good prospects for a university career.

Following this introduction to the two departments under study, I will now elaborate on the specific working conditions of their early-career anthropologists who constitute the empirical basis of this thesis.

7.6 The Working Conditions of PhD Candidates and Postdocs at the Department in Vienna

The (marginal) position of early-career academics in the Austrian university system is well illustrated by a meeting held on 4 November 2016 at the University of Vienna. The Austrian Professors' Association (Österreichischer Universitätsprofessor/innenverband) had invited to discuss the question "What resources do universities and researchers need?" together with their colleagues from Germany and Switzerland. Although some of the speakers emphasised the importance of early-career academics (constituting the future academic generation), they were conspicuously absent from the event – both at the lectern and in the audience. Just as only two out of the fourteen (mostly male) speakers seemed to be below their mid-50s (who were both not employed at universities), so the great majority of the audience appeared to have already crossed that age threshold – giving the impression that (1) it is mostly non-researchers discussing what resources researchers need and (2) early-career academics are not granted much attention let alone resources, despite them constituting an increasing proportion of the academic staff.

This assumption is confirmed by a closer look at the working conditions early-career anthropologists encounter at the department in Vienna. The massification of higher education discussed in chapter 4.1 is reflected in the number of the altogether 165 PhD candidates who were enrolled in social and cultural anthropology in the winter term 2015 (68 in the old and 97 in the new PhD curriculum).[110] Yet only one out of these 165 finished her PhD studies that semester. This noticeable small number is (partly) explained by the fact that the access to a PhD programme in Austria is open to everyone with a Master's (or equivalent) degree in a related field. Therefore, it is safe to assume that not all of these 165 candidates "actively" pursued their PhD studies. In that regard, a university manager told me that

> *we assume that out of approximately 10,000 PhD candidates 3,500 to 4,000 are actively pursuing their studies. [...] Measured against the size of the university, we do have a very large number of PhD candidates – almost 10% of all of the enrolled students at the University of Vienna. [...] But if you take into consideration that approximately half of them aren't actively pursuing their studies and are therefore not likely to complete their doctoral thesis, things don't look as good anymore. Then we have to think about how to increase the number of those who enroll and who actively pursue their PhD projects.*

In addition, according to Schwarzenbacher et al. (2016), PhD candidates spend only 17.9 hours per week on average on their education and 30.1 hours on gainful employment (ibid.: 38) –

with 65% neither receiving a scholarship nor being able to pursue their education within the context of their employment (ibid.: 31). Thus, it is not surprising that despite high enrolment numbers "only" seven candidates graduated their PhD studies in anthropology on average every year in the five years between the winter term 2011 and the spring term 2016.[244]

Although these numbers still imply a remarkably high PhD cohort in relation to the size of the department's permanent academic staff, the terms that come to my mind first when thinking about their working conditions are loneliness and freedom – albeit not in their Humboldtian sense. With the vast majority of PhD candidates having no funding or only short-term (of up to a year) and part-time funding for their research, they are predominantly free both of the thematic preferences of funders and supervisors (with a number of them supervising a wide range of topics beyond their immediate thematic specialisations) as well as of specifications on how and how quickly to progress with their work. This opportunity to independently decide on one's research topic has the disadvantage that if it does not coincide with one's supervisor's expertise, her support may not be only limited regarding her textual feedback but also regarding the networks she can provide. As one senior academic put it:

> *At the end of your PhD you've got to be in a position where you're already known among fellow researchers. That's why it makes most sense if my PhD candidate is working on something where I'm well connected. Because it's difficult if this person has to build all this up from scratch.*

In any case, PhD candidates have to first manage to convince a senior academic to supervise their thesis. One of them – who was not employed at the department – described her odyssey as follows:

> *First, my supervisor was [D]. [D] was my fourth or fifth choice. At the beginning I wanted [A] as my supervisor. […] I went to [A] who patiently listened to me presenting my research project and then concluded that […] she somehow wasn't interested in my topic. […] So I went to [B]. [B] said she was interested in the topic – but with a different regional focus. […] She wasn't confident about supervising the project as she wasn't familiar with it [the region, author's note] and it would be too much of an effort for her to read up on it. Then they referred me to either [C] or [D]. So I first went to [C] to talk to her. But then she was really mean. […] So I left and she has never heard from me again. I thought that in this case I would rather go to [D]. And so [D] was who was left. […] I asked her if she would take time for my dissertation outside of her normal office hours that are really for everyone who wants to talk about anything to her. And then she said: "Yes, we can do that." But de facto […] she never did give me that time. We went for a coffee once but we didn't talk about anything substantial. […] She always said: Just finish your thesis. But that's exactly the point – I need supervision to get there! I don't need someone to hold my hand and help me with the actual writing. But I need someone like [her present supervisor E, author's note]: "Let's sit down [at this specific date, author's note] and by then you send me what you already have. And later on I want a dissertation proposal too." And then that's what I do. And then I know I'm being supervised: she takes a look at what I wrote, reads it and then gives me feedback. […] I don't need a lot. I only need a little push and then I continue working on my own anyway. But you need support in some shape or form. There has to be at least something like a fictive contact person. Where I can say: I write a proposal and I know who will read it – my supervisor. And that alone makes it already worth writing a really good proposal.*

[244] See <http://studienservice-lehrwesen.univie.ac.at/wir-ueber-uns/koordination-studienservices/statistische-daten/> (accessed 16 July 2017).

The quest of finding a supervisor was as time- (and nerve-)consuming for her as it was difficult to find a second evaluator for the finished thesis – an endeavour that finally took more than a year. Unsurprisingly, this PhD candidate considered her PhD studies to be

> *very lonesome. It's a complete desert and wasteland. […] I've been lonely working away for years. I'm not affiliated with any department and I don't have much of a substantial exchange with others either. I know a lot of people who work on their theses. We talk about what it's like to write a thesis. […] On a content level I don't have anyone to really talk to. […] Maybe I'm just that frustrated because I've never managed to get access. To me this picture is symbolic of the department […]: this corridor with these locked rooms and this sterile atmosphere. You feel like you're in a madhouse. Then you have these horrific lamps up there which remind you of a hospital and these locked doors, these eternally locked doors. To me this is simply symbolic for the department. I've always tried to just get in touch with someone… Okay, people there are overworked, because there's always too much work. But from my point of view it's frustrating if you just can't get in, if never get access.*

This institutional loneliness of the non-funded PhD candidate is reflected in the peripheral positioning of the externally funded PhD candidate. My first day of employment at the department as a PhD candidate was quite emblematic in that regard. Falling on the Easter holidays of 2012, I failed to acquire the key to my new office – that I shared with most of the other project staff – let alone a PC or printer. After vainly knocking on several doors of administrative as well as academic staff, I ran into a senior academic in a management position who told me to take my first days easy and come back in a few days after someone from the administrative staff returned from her holidays. Two weeks later, I was provided with an antiquated PC until I finally managed to use another, slightly newer one in the office that turned out to not have been used for more than half a year. In addition, just as the other staff employed in externally funded projects, externally funded PhD candidates were not represented on the department's homepage at the time – until they were included two years later as "project staff" in the category "academic staff". By 2017, they have become a category of their own termed "Prae Docs" together with their internally funded colleagues, a category that as of July 2017 comprises of twelve persons.

This number points to the expansion of both internally and externally funded PhD positions since the early 2010s resulting in the emergence of a cohort of employed PhD candidates pursuing their education in similar ways like their colleagues in Copenhagen, i.e. as a (if not formal at least de facto) full-time occupation with the according high commitment and ambition (that chapter 9.1 elaborates on). This is not to say that this was not the case with individual PhD candidates before. However, they were entirely dependent on their supervisors helping them to become part of a professional academic environment – which was not always the case as shown by the experience of the PhD candidate quoted above – and being able to develop a corresponding self-image as pointed out be a PhD candidate:

> *If you're part of a group of researchers, that's half the battle. You're being inspired, you learn incredibly much from one another – and most of all, you change your identity. […] Because in the beginning, you basically don't know who you actually are. Are you just a nobody who doesn't know anything at all and just floats around aimlessly? What does academia and or the institutionalisation of science even mean? Because we "free" PhD candidates [who are not employed in re-*

search projects or as Praedocs, author's note] at the University of Vienna, we're completely without an institutional affiliation. Only in the rarest of cases we manage to build and academic identity, which then enables or empowers us to gain a foothold within academia. That we're confident enough to apply for external funding. And not just for one project and then complain or fear that it might not work out. But to develop the courage […] to submit five projects. Four are not approved, never mind – one will work out.

The formation of a cohort of funded PhD candidates coincides with the commencement of a new, more structured and selective PhD curriculum in October 2009 reducing the "freedom" of PhD candidates as well as that of their supervisors. It introduced a public presentation of the PhD project ("FÖP") to a "doctoral advisory board" (consisting of five to six senior academics) that, if passed, is followed by a doctoral thesis agreement between the PhD candidate and her supervisor(s) specifying the planned work progress (that in turn is documented in annual progress reports). Whereas the former serves as a means of circumventing the "open access" to PhD programmes provided by the Austrian legislature (i.e. allows the university to prevent PhD candidates – if not from enrolling in at least – from progressing with their PhD studies), both mechanisms reduce the previously almost absolute authority of the supervisor – who in the new PhD curriculum is also not part of the assessment committee anymore – in accepting PhD candidates and granting them a PhD degree. While some supervisors welcomed the new model of quality assurance introduced by the PhD curriculum (criticising the fact that although supervisors could relatively autonomously grant PhD degrees, all habilitated professors would be held liable if the quality of the thesis was dubious), a senior academic criticised it for constituting

a disenfranchisement of supervisors. […] If I have obtained a habilitation and I assume that these persons are qualified to supervise a PhD candidate, then if they agree to supervise someone I have to allow that this will work out. And if this is the case then I don't have to put the FÖP in between. This constitutes a disenfranchisement of doctoral supervisors on the one hand, and on the other hand the goal is to streamline PhD candidates.

Apart from that, the new curriculum increases the required coursework from six "Semesterstunden"[225] (corresponding to roughly 10 ECTS) to 30 ECTS and formally moves the PhD programme from the departmental to the faculty level. Although it standardises (and increases) the demands candidates have to fulfil for obtaining a PhD degree, it does not equally standardise the resources those candidates have at hand, measuring part-time and full-time as well as (non-)funded PhD candidates by the same standard – a standard that is primarily oriented towards an academic career as the PhD programme in anthropology "serves the advancement of the ability to pursue independent academic work as well as the development and support of the future academic generation"[245]. This position was shared by most of my interlocutors, with a university manager for instance explaining that

we are of the opinion that doctoral studies, if you even want to call them studies, mainly serve the purpose to support people who have the potential to make science their occupation so they can make science their occupation. […] Basically, we hold that PhD education serves to support junior

[245] See <http://senat.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/senat/Konsolidierte_Curricula/DR/DR_Sozialwissenschaften.pdf>, § 1 Qualifikationsprofil (accessed 16 July 2017, my translation).

researchers. Not only for the university but also for non-university research institutions and for research in industry. This is our general definition. And then we say: Okay, if this is the general definition, what do we expect from a doctoral thesis? And we do expect that it contributes substantially in empirical and/or theoretical respects to the advancement of scientific knowledge. This is a general demand which is actually made of doctoral theses worldwide but which wasn't at the center of debate in Austria in the past, due to the fact that we have generally open access to doctoral education.

She added, referring to the developments discussed in chapter 7.3:

What is being heavily discussed at EU level at the moment is: For whom are we actually training PhD candidates for? The University of Vienna took a fundamental decision to support first and foremost PhD candidates who have the potential to make academia their occupation. […] We tolerate and legally we have to tolerate […] all kinds of PhD candidates, also those who do their PhD while also working and those who say, "I don't need the degree for working in academia later on, but I need the degree for example to be able to take on an executive position within a company or to have a competitive advantage as a lawyer" or whatever. […] We tolerate that. But when it comes to supporting PhD students individually, for instance, then we screen in the selection process whether the applicant has the potential to make academia their occupation. […] When the EU for example talks about considering the employability of PhD candidates outside of academia they also don't think of general self-improvement via doctoral education but they intend to bring specific academic expertise to industry, to companies. There are two considerations opposing each other here. On the one side the EU commission promotes joint PhD programmes between industrial companies and universities that are geared to a specific industrial sector. […] The other side argues: […] For example, the University of Vienna positioned itself insofar as we stated in our development plan: "We are a university where pure research happens, without specifying practical applications. That means we're not opposed to the application of research. On the contrary, we do encourage that. […] This is a certain... let's say, repositioning of the University of Vienna in this respect. But we don't think we should develop sectoral and company-specific PhD programmes.

I assume that most of the senior academics at the department share this notion of the purpose of a PhD education in anthropology that is reflected in the following statement made by one of them:

In principle, you certainly do a PhD because you want to stay in academia […]. Particularly now, with the three-stage system – a Bachelor, a Master and a PhD – I can hardly imagine that you'd particularly need it for anything else. […] When it comes to teaching people during their PhD, it can only be about academic work […] Why would people even do a PhD if they wouldn't want to stay in academia? I don't get that. […] You may have to do something else later on, that's another issue. But the doctorate I consider to be a very narrow academic training.

It follows that the PhD education is to entail more than is formally required in the PhD curriculum[246] if it is to prepare for such a career, as remarked by another senior academic.

[246] Although it considers "the dissemination of partial results of the PhD project in academic publications and their presentation at academic conferences before the submission of the thesis as desirable" (see <http://senat.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/senat/Konsolidierte_Curricula/DR/DR_Sozialwissenschaften.pdf>, § 6 Dissertation, accessed 16 July 2017, my translation). What the University of Vienna appears to find less desirable is to provide PhD candidates – at least unless they are internally funded – with adequate financial support to disseminate their research. While they cannot get funding for copy-editing, there is the possibility to apply for a subsidy if they present at an international conference abroad (up to 350 EUR within Europe and up to 650 EUR outside of Europe in 2017) – if they manage to send in their CV, a letter of confirmation, their original presentation and a letter of recommendation a few weeks or even months (the application deadlines are 1 February, 15 May and 15 October) before the conference (see <https://forschung.univie.ac.at/services/foerderungen/konferenzteilnahmen/>, accessed 3 August 2017).

After having finished her PhD, at the day of her promotion, a young Postdoc should be able to say: "I've published at least two to three reviews and have an article for a peer reviewed journal in the pipeline" – if it hasn't been published yet. Only then she'll be able to apply for external funding with good prospects. A Postdoc who has a degree but hasn't published anything yet has no chance at all when it comes to project acquisitions.

In a workshop on publication strategies, another senior academic of the department recommended PhD candidates not to waste their time with non-internationally peer-reviewed publications and to try to publish in top journals like American Anthropologist, American Ethnologist or Current Anthropology[247] – a quite ambitious aim for a PhD candidate from the University of Vienna. Yet although shared by a majority of the supervisors I talked to, some had a different standpoint. For example, one senior academic replied to my question whether she would reject a PhD candidate who claimed that she would not be interested in pursuing an academic career:

No. I wouldn't consider that a criterion at all when it comes to the question of whether to agree to be a supervisor. […] To me that doesn't matter at all. If someone wants to stay in academia afterwards or already hopes to do that – okay. I'm happy to support that. And if someone says she doesn't want that, she just wants to do a PhD so she can put the degree in front of her name, […] I don't mind that either. What I expect is enthusiasm for the topic.

However, I did not meet a single PhD candidate who was not hoping for having an academic career. While some appeared to pursue that goal with great determination, many expressed doubts along the way, often due to the uncertainty and personal sacrifices that such an endeavour entails (as shown in chapter 9). In fact, many were going back and forth between wanting to pursue an academic career and wanting to leave academia behind them.

Another feature of PhD candidates at the department in Vienna is their great diversity[248] – not only in terms of their academic backgrounds (with quite a few having their Master's degree from a university abroad) but particularly with respect to their funding sources and their concomitant working conditions. Those with no funding or with only short-term funding such as the completion scholarship ("Abschlussstipendium") awarded by the University of Vienna (for up to six months) or the Marietta Blau scholarship of the OeAD GmbH (for six to twelve months) are neither provided with an office space at the department nor with the opportunity to teach, to participate in departmental meetings or to be represented on the department's homepage. They constitute the majority of PhD candidates, with only nine out of the 165 PhD candidates enrolled in the winter term 2015 being employed at the department: three with internal and six with external funding.[249]

[247] However, she also pointed out that just as the job market is differentiated and stretches beyond the academia, so publications strategies may differ. Besides, even if PhD candidates were pursuing an academic career, aiming for a domestic market might be an option for some – although publications in regional journals would usually count less.
[248] Although those with funded positions were of similar age as their colleagues in Copenhagen, i.e. predominantly between their mid 20s and early 30s.
[249] However, that number has to be complemented by two PhD candidates employed at the Department of Methods in the Social Sciences (Fakultätszentrum für Methoden in den Sozialwissenschaften) that constituted a separate unit at the time as well as a number of PhD candidates employed in research projects at the Institute for Social Anthropology of the Austrian Academy of Sciences.

Those with longer-term external funding can be divided into two groups: those with individual funding, i.e. a DOC or DOC-team fellowship of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (ÖAW)[250] for two to three years, and those employed in research projects – mainly funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) for up to four years – acquired by senior academics.[251] Whereas the individual PhD funding of the ÖAW entails a clear salary (amounting roughly to an employment of 30 hours per week), the extent of the employment of a PhD candidate in a research project is essentially up to the project leader but limited to 30 hours per week by the FWF. In general, the funding for PhD positions (be it internal or external) in Austria is restricted to an employment of 30 hours per week.[252] Another difference in comparison to the department in Copenhagen is the fact that externally funded staff usually has neither the right nor the obligation to teach. Regarding office space, all of the externally funded PhD candidates have to "compete" for one of the five available desks in the "project room" – unless they prefer to work at home or manage to negotiate with some of the department's academic staff to share their (or their assistants') office.

However, in contrast to Copenhagen employment in research projects is a rather insignificant option for PhD candidates as such projects are rare at the department. In this regard, a senior academic criticised that with external funding only being of symbolic significance for the department (instead of a matter of survival) and only few senior academics obtaining such funding that creates PhD and Postdoc positions, the question of funding is considered to be an individual problem of PhD candidates. In that regard, one of her colleagues replied to my question how she supported her PhD candidates:

> *Encouragement. Definitely encouragement. Once I've decided to supervise someone I'm convinced that this can be done. That they can succeed. And then it's my main job to make it happen. And to achieve that I certainly won't disenchant them and […] tell them what they've all done wrong. But I'll rather encourage them to do something. And if they make mistakes on the way, I'm going to say: Okay, we've got to do this in another way. But positive encouragement. [When it comes to funding, author's note] I only get involved insofar that I offer certain recommendation letters and advocacy. At which programmes they apply, for which grants they apply – that is up to them.*

In contrast, the senior academic mentioned above thought that

> *without funding the promotion of young researchers in today's situation is little more than hot air. Those who do not also make an effort, with some priority, to obtain money for the young – they are just beating around the bush. [...] I know you should also be open to talk about mental problems of employees and to impart tips and tricks. [...] The reason why I talk so much about money is that most of the others don't talk about it.*

This circumstance appears to be changing though, among other things because of the new professors hired since 2010. One of them for instance made it clear that

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[250] Just like its Danish counterpart, the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) does not offer individual PhD funding.

[251] In theory, PhD candidates confident enough to do so can also apply for FWF stand-alone projects as they do not require a PhD degree. However, in order to fulfil the relatively high qualification standards the support of senior academics (at least as co-applicants) is de facto required.

[252] A common explanation for this is that PhD candidates should have unpaid "free" time available to write their thesis. However, I assume that the actual reason is rather one of insufficient funding that is being stretched to fund a larger number of PhD candidates.

it is my role to attract funding on a national as well as an international level with which I can employ Praedocs. Of course, they have to work for the project. But at the same time, they should also write their thesis. And it makes sense that this thesis should contribute to the project's objectives.

Her statement brings us to two other reasons why research projects acquired by senior academics do not play a significant role for the employment of PhD candidates at the department: they do not necessarily create positions for PhD candidates[253] and even if they do, those PhD candidates are expected to primarily work for the project (leader) while writing their thesis in their unpaid "free" time. Thus, a PhD candidate explained to me that

[a]ctually, the idea is that you write your dissertation without pay. Theoretically, there are many within a project who work as Praedocs but have completely different project-related tasks. Ideally, the topic of the project is in accord with the topic of the thesis. That's just like with the other Praedoc positions here. They do an incredible amount of teaching and project administration for the professors.

This assessment was in accord with the experience of another PhD candidate who told me that although her project leader wanted her to progress with her thesis, she entirely appropriated her work time for the project's purposes.

In the project I didn't find time to work on my thesis at all. And this is not how it was supposed to be initially. And I was only employed [part-time, author's note] within the project – just as someone with a Master's degree. And obviously, I was accordingly poorly paid – for working at least 40 hours a week.

Her experience corresponds with the observation of a university manager that supervisors have differing attitudes regarding the progress of their PhD candidates, depending on the funding they have.

It depends: What have I [as a supervisor, author's note] planned with this person or why is she my PhD candidate? There are those who were convinced by a young PhD candidate that they have an exciting topic that is of interest to her as well. That's a different role compared to when I get an EU project where the EU Commission is breathing down your neck and we've got to produce deliverables for the Commission or our project partners. Sometimes that creates conflicting goals. We can also observe that [...] [when it comes to the topic of, author's note] funding vs. graduation – this is very, very sobering: Several people who are relatively well funded for a relatively long period don't graduate. And among those who do graduate, only a portion do so during the period of their employment.[254]

Furthermore, a PhD candidate pointed to another disadvantage of trying to write a PhD thesis while being employed in a research project:

You always note when doing research, like with your thesis: that would be interesting, and I will go in this direction and take liberties when it comes to content but also time-wise. And I don't need anyone to agree to it. Because when I think it's interesting and the path takes me there, then I just do it. If you're part of a team or in an inflexible or relatively inflexible project that's not possible. Actually, even if you realise that the project as envisioned doesn't make sense, you've got to push through somehow. To a certain degree you can raise arguments. But it happens time and again

[253] But may also only employ "student assistants", Postdocs and/or staff working on special-order contracts ("Werkverträge").
[254] Another reason for this may be that there are no institutional consequences for the department (nor the university) whether its PhD candidates finish their studies on time or not (at all).

that you think: "Oh, it would be better to do that differently." But you can't change it accordingly. Writing a thesis I would have immediately done that.

Finally, there is the group of internally funded PhD candidates that consists of so-called Praedocs (or university assistants) – a position that is attached to a professorship – as well as those with uni:docs fellowships. While the first Praedocs took up their employment at the department in October 2011, the uni:docs programme was only initiated in 2013 – which means that from the early 2000s onwards until then the more or less only individual longer-term funding opportunity available to PhD candidates at the department consisted in a DOC or DOC-team fellowship of the Austrian Academy of Sciences – of which maybe one was awarded to PhD candidates in anthropology every year. Both positions entail an employment of 30 hours per week. However, Praedocs have four-year positions and are provided with an office space (located in a peripheral position in the corridor accommodating the offices acquired from the Department of Geography and Regional Research), whereas uni:docs fellowships only have a three-year employment and the same office conditions as externally funded staff. According to their employment contract, Praedocs are entitled to use a third of their working hours (i.e. ten hours per week) for their PhD studies, whereas the majority of their working hours is reserved for teaching and administrative duties. Their teaching obligation comprises of up to 1.5 "Semesterstunden" in the second and third year and three "Semesterstunden" in the fourth year – amounting to a maximum of six courses of two "Semesterstunden", with most of their teaching accumulating towards the end of their contract when they need to write up their thesis. Unlike former university assistants (and despite being formally assigned to the department), Praedocs are considered to be personal assistants of "their" professor (who selects and supervises them). Therefore, the amount of administrative (or assistance) work they have to do essentially depends on (1) how much their professors ask of them in this respect and (2) how well they manage to resist their claims – a rather difficult endeavour considering their double-dependency from a superior who is their supervisor at the same time. Uni:docs fellows on the other hand have a vague clause in their contract stating that they may (have to) teach if instructed to but de facto have no teaching and administrative responsibilities. Simply put, while Praedocs have more obligations diverting them from writing their thesis, uni:docs fellows have a shorter funded time frame for doing so – and a tendentially weaker linkage to the department as they are not assistants of a professor. In both cases, the university does not allow PhD candidates who have successfully acquired alternative (external) funding (such as a Marietta Blau scholarship) to interrupt and extend their employment for the additionally funded period. In addition, they are only granted a leave of absence for a maximum of two months at a time (preferably during the semester break) – no more than twice a year. This means that they can only do a limited amount of fieldwork a year (at least outside of Vienna) – a situation that would be inconceivable at the department in Copenhagen. However, it does not mean that they would not equally be expected to evince a high commitment to their work as well. For instance, a senior academic explained to me that the first question she asked all the applicants for a Praedoc position was:

Why did you apply for this position? […] And in her fourth sentence [the selected candidate, author's note] said: "I want to be a professor." This is extremely important to me when it comes to a Praedoc position. I don't want to award a Praedoc position to someone who is only looking for work for a few years. A Praedoc position from my perspective is a career-building position. I can't promise this person a career – that depends on a lot of factors. But in any case it's the best possible precondition to get there.

Although uni:docs fellows have more freedom in formulating and pursuing their research, they – just as their externally funded colleagues – usually have to invest a high(er) amount of unpaid working hours first in order to obtain their funding. While the Praedocs I talked to reported of taking between approximately one week to one month of intensive preparation work for their application that has to "only" convince the professor who selects them as her assistant (and then have their first year of employment to develop their projects), individually funded PhD candidates have to submit an elaborated project proposal that has to pass a multi-level selection process (including external reviewers). What is more, hardly any of them were successful the first time they applied. Instead, they were usually re-applying for a period of one or two years, sometimes even longer.

Let us now turn our attention to the funding conditions of Postdocs – a group that is significantly smaller than that of (funded) PhD candidates. Internally funded Postdoc positions are either designated as "assistant professors" (a tenure-track position that has not been established at the department yet[192]) or as (temporary) "Postdocs". In October 2015, there were three temporary Postdoc positions at the department[255] – less than half of the number of PhD graduates the department produces every year – that had all been introduced together with the new permanent professorships appointed from 2011 onwards (except for one which was assigned to an already existing professorship). Before, there was only one comparable "university assistant" position at the department, i.e. only one internally funded part-time Postdoc position for a decade – together with five former university assistants who had been automatically promoted to tenured associate professorships (ao. Univ.-Prof.) after completing their habilitation as well as one tenured assistant professor (Ass.-Prof.) without habilitation (cf. chapter 9.3). Internally funded Postdocs usually have a full-time, fixed-term position for six years (although one only has a four-year contract) with half the teaching obligation of professors, i.e. four "Semesterstunden" (although according to their contracts they can be assigned up to six "Semesterstunden" per semester). Like Praedocs (i.e. their junior counterparts), Postdocs funded by the university have an unclearly defined obligation to provide administrative support to – formally the department, but de facto – "their" professors, which leaves the matter open for negotiation and good will – as well as exploitation and ill will, depending whether one views them rather as independent senior researchers or personal assistants. Moreover, they are also only allowed to do fieldwork for two months twice a year and cannot prolong their contract (or reduce their teaching load) through acquiring external funding.

[255] Excluding one Postdoc situated at the Department of Methods in the Social Sciences.

When it comes to external funding, Postdocs have more opportunities to apply for individual funding (from ten to 36 months) than PhD candidates, as it also offered by the FWF in addition to the ÖAW. However, the ÖAW's APART fellowship has been suspended from 2015 onwards and the FWF's Postdoc fellowships are either reserved for female applicants (the Hertha Firnberg programme for junior Postdocs and the Elise Richter Programme for senior Postdocs) or for going abroad (Erwin Schrödinger programme) or coming from abroad (Lise Meitner programme). In October 2015, three Postdocs were employed at the department with individual funding: one (who had graduated from the department) with an AAS-CEE fellowship of the ÖAW (that is comparable to an APART fellowship and is an exception insofar as only two persons received it) and two (who graduated from universities abroad) with a Hertha Firnberg fellowship and a Lise Meitner fellowship. Besides, one Postdoc was employed in a FWF standalone project.

In comparison to Denmark, Postdocs in Austria receive much higher salaries than PhD candidates. Whereas internally funded PhD candidates receive a salary of 2,048.25 EUR gross per month[256] in 2017, the salary of (non tenure-track) Postdocs is 3,626.60 EUR (Dachverband der Universitäten 2016: 33). Correspondingly, the FWF pays PhD candidates 2,071 EUR gross per month and Postdocs 3,626.60 EUR[257]; the ÖAW raised its PhD fellowships from 30,000 EUR gross per year in 2011 (of which the employer contributions also have to be paid in case of an employment) to 38,000 EUR per year in 2017 (with a strong surge to 35,000 EUR per year in 2012) whereas APART fellows received 61,000 EUR annually in 2014.

7.7 The Working Conditions of PhD Candidates and Postdocs at the Department in Copenhagen

The admission to the anthropology PhD programme at the University of Copenhagen is highly selective with both funding and a high grade on the Master thesis being (formal and informal) preconditions. PhD candidates in Copenhagen are part of the department's staff insofar as they have a full-time position for three years, are provided with an office space (and required to spend at least one year at the department) and have to assume teaching and administrative responsibilities – regardless of their funding source.[258] This means that they are confronted with the transition from a student role into that of a professional academic (who is if not on a par with her more senior colleagues at least more so than most of their colleagues in Vienna) that one of them described as follows:

> *One of the things that has struck me [...] [was] that whole transition from being a Master student – and as such having that sort of position at the department – to suddenly being a PhD student where, although you are still a student, it is a regular job and you are part of the academic staff.*

[256] In Austria, monthly salaries are paid fourteen times a year, i.e. employees receive a thirteenth and fourteenth salary.
[257] See <https://www.fwf.ac.at/en/research-funding/personnel-costs/> (accessed 22 July 2017).
[258] However, as there always is a number of PhD candidates who are doing fieldwork abroad, are on maternity leave or work at another (research) institution, the number of PhD candidates who are present at the department is smaller than their total number.

You sort of go through this rite de passage which is very odd. And you start to teach students. I have taught students in the last couple of months whom I started my Bachelor with. That's really weird. [...] So that transitional period is very schizophrenic because as a PhD student you are, for better or worse, in this limbo thing: your identity becomes one of trying to find your ground as someone who is still... seeing yourself essentially as a student but having to take that responsibility of being an authority in a certain sense of your discipline, of anthropology.

Therefore, there is no need to distinguish between "active" and "pseudo" candidates like in Vienna. In fact, as we will see, the department makes sure that they are active. Of the 29 PhD candidates that were enrolled on average in anthropology between 2011 and 2015, about six were finishing their studies every year. This means that the department produces almost the same amount of PhD graduates while only having a fifth of the PhD candidates that are officially registered in Vienna. Unlike with Bachelor and Master students there is no upper limit (apart from the physical limitation of available office space) for the number of PhD candidates – as long as they can find funding, a supervisor and have their projects approved by the department. Hence, their number has been steadily increasing over the last years, already amounting to 31 PhD candidates as of October 2015 – of whom most of them had already done their Master's degree at the department.[259] Individual academic funding is relatively rare since the Danish Council for Independent Research | Humanities (FKK) stopped offering it and the department only announces one internally funded PhD position every year, basically leaving the industrial PhD programme of the Innovation Fund Denmark (the application-oriented counterpart of the Danish Council for Independent Research aiming "to create growth and employment in Denmark"[260]). Other options for individual funding include funding from ministries (such as the Ministry of Employment or the Ministry of Social Affairs at the time) as well as the option of external employers paying for the PhD education. This created a situation in which a significant number of PhD candidates are not selected according to criteria agreed by the department but by individual senior academics filling positions in (externally funded) collective research projects (as chapter 8.2 elaborates on). A senior academic described this situation as follows:

In my time in the 90s there were a lot of opportunities to apply for individual PhD funding. These days you can rarely find individual PhDs. […] The main route these days it seems is… If I was to prepare a collective research proposal, within that framework you can pre-identify candidates. Maybe you'll have a talented Master student and then you say: "Would you like to be part of writing this application?" […] So it's earmarked, the name is there. You don't have to advertise it.

In October 2015, out of the 31 PhD candidates only five had an internally funded PhD position, three were industrial PhDs, four had individual funding from (different) ministries and three were paid by their employer. The remaining sixteen PhD candidates were employed in collective research projects acquired by senior academics, twelve in externally funded projects (mostly from the Danish Council for Independent Research | Humanities) and four with funding of the UCPH Excellence Programme for Interdisciplinary Research (the so-called UCPH 2016 funds), a funding initiative of the University of Copenhagen that in 2013 granted nearly half a billion

[259] However, some of them were either on maternity leave or writing their thesis on unemployment benefits.
[260] See <https://innovationsfonden.dk/en/about-ifd> (accessed 26 July 2017).

DKK to 18 projects in order to strengthen interdisciplinary research[261]. Unlike in Vienna, these PhD candidates can focus their research activities on writing their thesis, i.e. their thesis is a recognised output of the research project.

It is important to notice that 22 out of these 31 PhD candidates were employed on external funding – even 26 if we consider that the UCPH 2016 funds rather function like externally funded research projects for the department[262], and that (at least) 16 out of these 26 PhD candidates did not apply for their funding themselves and could not choose their research topic freely (although they are usually free to design their own research within the project's frame). This is in line with a strategic decision made at the faculty, as explained by a university manager:

> *I very much try to convince the Heads of Department that all PhD students need to be closely related to a research group. [...] I also think that the PhD students very much prefer this system [...] and are prepared that this maybe reduces the type of PhD thesis that they can do. [...] I think that if you really have to do research on a high international level, a department has to make some prioritisation of which sub-fields they really want to develop. But still I think it is important that we have the possibility that if a very bright student comes up with some bright ideas there should also be room to hire PhD students who are more or less on their own. But still it's important that the PhD student gets supervision in relation to which type of courses you have to follow, where to go abroad and these sorts of things. I think that too many PhD students have been too much on their own.*

That the majority of PhD candidates is limited by strategic funding considerations was also indirectly confirmed by another university manager explaining to me that "[t]hat's why we still stick to the one stipend which is totally free, because we still want to have the individual, creative person that is not directed by strategic considerations on funding".

Yet there is also another reason for the high number of externally funded PhD candidates at the department: they bring money to the department that pays part of the permanently employed academic staff. The more externally funded PhD candidates the department employs, the more overheads it gets, which allows to create new "internally" funded positions that in turn need to generate overheads through acquiring research projects that generate new PhD positions. Put simply: If senior academics want to keep their (and/or their colleagues') jobs and do research, they have to generate PhD positions – no matter whether the department needs those graduates in the longer term or not. In addition, the department charges funding agencies for the education of its PhD candidates according to an internal taximeter system (along the lines of the public taximeter system for students). As a consequence, the department educates far more PhD graduates than the university sector can absorb – whose research clusters around (relatively few) topics like migration, health or climate change. Even if the department made sure that their research met high academic standards, the potential "relevance" of their research was striking (cf. chapter 7.5). Besides, noticeably many of the few PhD candidates coming from universities abroad (mostly from Northern European countries like Sweden, the Netherlands or the UK) had internal

[261] See <http://research.ku.dk/strengths/excellence-programmes/> (accessed 26 July 2017).
[262] Moreover, the remaining five PhD candidates (of whom one was about to finish her studies) with internal funding are a deceptively high number as the department only offers one new internal PhD position every year.

funding[263] – which means that external funding is used to recruit internal candidates, while internal funding is used to recruit external candidates.

Like in Vienna, the PhD programme is clearly oriented towards preparing for an academic career, aiming to develop the PhD candidates' research qualifications, teaching and dissemination skills.[264] However, in comparison to Vienna it is more structured and standardised: PhD candidates are supposed to have a so-called tripartite meeting with their supervisor and the Head of the PhD Programme no later than one month after enrolment in order to introduce them to the department (which they usually already know from their Master studies) and the PhD programme. They have to submit a study plan outlining their research project and planned progress within the first three months of their enrolment that is then reviewed and adjusted in semi-annual assessments. Like in Vienna, they must complete courses totalling 30 ECTS points. Furthermore, they are expected to stay at another university or research institution (preferably abroad) for at least three months, do ethnographic fieldwork of eight to twelve months, participate in and present their research at (at least) one major international conference, disseminate their research to researchers from other academic disciplines as well as to a non-academic audience (e.g. by means of guest lectures or contributions to the mass media), become active members of one to two of the department's eight researcher groups[265], attend the department's research seminars (that are usually organised every other Thursday) and participate in and present their work at PhD lunches (that are usually organised every other Wednesday), an annual three-day PhD retreat as well as an annual joint three-day MEGA seminar between the University of Copenhagen and Aarhus University (that are organised like conferences and give ECTS points) – not to forget the informal requirement of already having some publications (at least in the pipeline) if they want to (do what the curriculum trains them for and) continue their academic career. On top of that they owe the department 840 hours of work, half of which are allocated for their fieldwork and the other 420 hours for teaching and administrative activities. According to the norm scale, PhD candidates get four hours of preparation for every hour (i.e. 45 minutes) they teach. In other words, the vast majority of PhD candidates (i.e. those without internal funding) constitute a costless workforce for the department to the extent of at least 420 hours, i.e. eleven weeks of full-time employment. However, as the preparation of a course easily takes more than the conceded preparation time if one has little teaching experience, PhD candidates were encouraged to teach an already existing course rather than developing one on their research topic.

The reason for this is not so much that the university management would mind PhD candidates putting more unpaid effort into their teaching but rather that although PhD candidates are not formally affected by the study progress reform (as they are employees), they are nevertheless

[263] This is hardly surprising considering that it is more or less the only option for the department to hire PhD candidates from abroad as positions in research projects are usually filled with internal candidates (cf. chapter 8.2).
[264] See <http://anthropology.ku.dk/PhD/hojrebokse/readmore/2014__marts__Curriculum_for_the_PhD_programme_marts.pdf>, p. 2 (accessed 26 July 2017).
[265] See <http://anthropology.ku.dk/research/researchgroups/> (accessed 27 August 2017). In 2015, each researcher group could apply for up to 20,000 DKK (ca. 2,680 EUR) per calendar year to support activities/seminars/teaching experiments.

subjected to similar pressures to finish (more) quickly[266] – with an extension of their enrolment in the PhD programme beyond the designated three years becoming increasingly difficult. For instance, a PhD candidate who did not finish on time was not allowed to accept a part-time employment (if she wanted to remain enrolled in the PhD programme) – thereby confronting her with the dilemma that in order to receive unemployment benefits she was only allowed to work on her thesis for 20 hours per week (and use the rest of the time to look for a job), whereas the department wanted her to spend as much time as possible on her thesis in order for her finishing as soon as possible. In addition, the department stopped supporting PhD candidates who had not finished their theses in applying for (individual) Postdoc funding (a time-consuming endeavour detaining them from finishing on time) – which resulted in them becoming even more dependent on senior academics to employ them in research projects once they finished (if they did not want to face unemployment). Aside from that, the terminology that is used for such an extension is quite telling: When their funding runs out, PhD candidates can get on "death row", i.e. move to a separate office reserved for those who take longer.[267] A university manager described the situation as follows:

> *From society's point of view – thinking like the Produktivitetskommissionen [the Danish Productivity Commission, author's note] – the idea is that we should get people through their programs within the time frame stipulated for them. Because then they will go out and get a job, pay their taxes and in that sense be more productive for society. That is sort of the governmental thinking. Thus, we have restrictions that influence how we manage the PhD students. In the department, we also put pressure on them. And I'm sure they feel this pressure. And the reason why we do it is not that we want to be specifically harsh with them. It's also to say that in a sense it should be possible to finish within three years. If you keep on prolonging, prolonging, prolonging and you want to perfect your work more and more and more, then perhaps you haven't understood the task. In a sense it's trying to push them to be a bit pragmatic, saying: "Do whatever you can within the three years. Send it in for the evaluation. If you get it back and the committee tells you that you have to re-write a chapter or two, it's not a failure. That's how life is." [...] As an employer one of course has to reflect: Have we then chosen the right people to be PhD students if they cannot finish within a time frame? Or is it because the environment is so competitive that you never feel that you have done it well enough? There are both sides of this discussion. […] Of course, as an employer I would say: "Okay, but that's the conditions we have – all of us in academia." But we also have to be pragmatic and say: "I have an assignment for three years. I have to do the best I can within those three years."*

Accordingly, another university manager explained to a group of PhD candidates who had recently taken up their positions that the idea of obtaining a PhD degree should take eleven years is antiquated. Instead, they should be pragmatic rather than trying to be perfect. "It's a myth, it pulls people down." Such an attitude was not limited to university managers. For instance, a senior academic told me that

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[266] The university has introduced a so-called 4+4 scheme in addition to the traditional 5+3 scheme (i.e. three years of Bachelor studies, two years of Master studies and three years of PhD studies) which allows PhD candidates to be already hired in the second year of their Master studies so they have an additional year to work on their PhD project and consequently finish on time.

[267] However, during my stay at the department those PhD candidates were allowed to continue using their offices while the mentioned office was used to accommodate visiting PhD candidates. This may be due to the recent expansion of the department that generated an abundance of office space at the time.

I think that the PhD programme [...] has also been industrialised – there are some of the same tendencies that we see in the training for Bachelor and Master students. One thing of course is the focus on finishing on time. That sets the whole framework for: "Speed up and get people quickly through and just do what's necessary. Don't waste your time on reading a book that you may not use for your thesis in the end." [...] I as a PhD supervisor [...] told them that we should meet often [...] so that I could get a sense of where they are. And I said: "Finish on time – it's in your own interest." [...] Because I took way too long to finish my own degree and it wasn't good: it wasn't good for me, it wasn't good for anyone. [...] I mean it's their own responsibility, yes, of course. But it's also the responsibility of this department to give them a framework to work with a project that's realistic and doable in the time that they have. I don't care if it looks good on the faculty statistics that most students finish on time. It's really for their own sake. I don't think they should work for free. It's the responsibility of the supervisors to make these PhD students do realistic projects that are doable in three years. And I think sometimes [...] the expectations are too high.

Indeed, and in stark contrast to my first weeks as a PhD candidate in Vienna as described in the previous chapter, PhD candidates in Copenhagen felt the pressure to drive forward their thesis right from the beginning. For example, one of them told me that

[t]he first day I started or the first meeting I had with [my supervisor, author's note] she was like: "So could you just send me an outline of what you want to do in your thesis?" And I didn't have the guts to say: "Whoa, what are you talking about?" It just made me feel sort of not good enough or, like, behind already. [...] I didn't have a sense when I started of what project I actually was going to be doing. I felt like: Now is when I really have to think about what it is that I'm going to be focusing on. I felt a bit like it was a fake project description, just kind of make-believe you do to get the money – and then you really think about what you are supposed to do. And that was stressing me out.[268]

Interestingly, while this PhD candidate felt pressured by her supervisor to drive her thesis forward, her supervisor did not appear to intend to pressure her, at least not to finish on time, explaining to me that she would mind having to tell her PhD candidates to finish within three years instead of producing the best thesis possible.

This brings me to a crucial point which is contested insofar as the issue of the adequate time a PhD thesis should take is inextricably entangled with the question of what constitutes an adequate expectation regarding its quality.[269] Whereas some supervisors urge their PhD candidates to finish on time, others insist that "[e]veryone who says she writes her PhD in three years is bullshitting. It's not possible. And why should you".[270] Obviously, such an attitude encourages PhD candidates to write as good a thesis as possible, rather than as quickly as possible – particularly at a department that prides itself of being "the best anthropology department in Scandinavia and number two in Continental Europe according to the new QS World University Ranking"[3] and "being recognised as a world class centre of scholarship by international peers"[234]. In fact,

[268] Correspondingly, during the PhD course "From Analysis to Text" (the final one of a series of three compulsory courses) a participant complained that she had not had time to systematically go through her data because she had had so many deadlines of people wanting her to deliver preliminary findings without her feeling ready to do so – a complaint that according to the lecturer was quite common.

[269] After all, if a PhD education is to prepare for an academic career it is subject to expectations of a corresponding high commitment (cf. chapter 9.1).

[270] On that note, a PhD candidate remembered that when she had started her studies at the department, fulfilling the required ECTS norm was looked down upon as it indicated that one did not put enough effort in the courses.

hardly any PhD candidate at the department manages to finish within the designated three years[271] – just like most of their colleagues in countries like France, Luxembourg, Germany and Switzerland who according to the European Science Foundation

> [o]n average […] took […] 4.3 years to complete their doctorate. […] There were no gender differences in completion times. However, those who completed doctorates in Social Sciences and Humanities domain areas took significantly longer than those completing doctorates in exact science domains. (ESF 2015: 8)

The issue of finishing on (an externally predetermined) time was not only contested among senior academics. For example, there was one PhD candidate I talked to who did finish on time and who appeared to be doing well with respect to her academic career (despite the statement of her senior colleague that this would not be possible). She told me that

> *I have my own aim of trying to hand in on time. I have my own project plan, and it's working quite well. Maybe I'm seen as a shitty capitalist but frankly I don't want to work for four years and only get paid for three. I don't want to sit in my office and write for my employer or for myself, and be paid an unemployment rate by the government. So you are sitting in here for one year as an unemployed person working on your thesis. Of course, if you choose to do it, it's just fine with me; I don't have a problem. But I don't want to do it. […] Of course, this divide between home and work is sometimes blurred. So it's not that I'm going home and then I'm not working. But still I think that doing a PhD is a professional job to do in three years and I hope to do the best within these three years.*

Interestingly, this Postdoc also explained to me that she benefitted from using project management tools like having milestones, concrete goals and objectives. In that regard, the speed-up of the PhD education conforms well to the project-based "nature" of its funding that reinforces such a "deliver on time" logic. This approach to academic work as a "projectified" occupation differs from that of another Postdoc who contrasted the vocational approach she had pursued during her PhD education to what she felt was a "normalisation" (or, to refer to the term used by the senior academic quoted further above, an industrialisation – or managerialisation) of the working conditions at the department.

> *It's the complete opposite of the Weberian idea of a vocation. Where he says that one of those things that the academic has in common with a priest is the idea that we have been called to this position, that this is the greatest value in our lives. […] With this new paradigm supposedly […] people are starting to see this as a conventional job. They are producing knowledge and they have to publish a certain amount of articles, almost like a worker standing in a factory who is producing stuff. This idea of production is very alien to me. […] It doesn't really work for me because if this is just a job then I would rather do something else. Get a bigger office and a better view.*

Finally, when discussing the working conditions of Postdocs, we have to keep in mind that while in Vienna both internally and externally funded Postdocs are referred to as "Postdocs" (as long as they do not have a tenure-track position), "Postdocs" in Copenhagen typically are two-year positions that are externally funded whereas internally funded positions are designated as assistant professors ("adjunkt"). While calls for assistant professorships are announced, i.e. (at

[271] According to a PhD self-evaluation of 2012, the 38 PhD candidates who received their PhD degree between 2005 and 2011 spent on average three years and seven months from their enrolment to handing in their dissertation – not including maternal/paternal leaves (which are very common) and long term illness.

least theoretically) open for external applicants, the head of department can also promote an externally funded Postdoc to an assistant professorship (for instance if her teaching is required) without a formal selection process, thereby prolonging her contract with internal funding for a shorter period (of usually a year). This was quite common until 2014, when the department started to be more restrictive in the course of the introduction of a sharper differentiation between Postdoc and assistant professor positions at the university level that led to the assumption that Postdocs would (have to) leave the university after their contracts expire – or become an assistant professor (after one or more Postdoc positions) (cf. chapter 9.3). Consequently, the department stopped offering most Postdocs training for the teaching certificate ("adjunktpædagogikum") required for an associate professorship – unless their project leader managed to negotiate an exception – and allowing them to attend staff ("VIP") meetings. A Postdoc explained this development to me as following:

> *In other institutes [...] it is comme-il-faut that if you come with a Postdoc – say two years of funding – they will give you the third year and call you an assistant professor. […] But we are not given that year which we all want. […] It's pretty much a year ago now when it became public that in universities they are making a very sharp distinction between Postdocs and assistant professors. So the fact that the department refuses to give that last year – if you are in a very bad mood, you could read it as: "So you don't think I'm university material with this Postdoc." Because no matter how many Postdocs you get if you don't land the assistant professorship you don't have a career at the university lined up for you.*

Obviously, this caused a stir among the Postdocs who feared to be marked down (and treated) as second-rate early-career academics – particularly as they had the impression that other departments at the university (that did not necessarily face a better economic situation) were more accommodating in that regard. However, a university manager explained this stricter approach precisely with economic reasons – while (indirectly) linking it to the increasing number of Postdocs that the department employs.

> *Typical for the Postdoc is a two-year position. Then some departments add another year and then call them assistant professors. That has been the tradition. We haven't done that because […] if I would promise all Postdocs an extra year I would have to fire some of the associate professors. Because then I wouldn't have had enough money if that should be sort of a guarantee with an extra year.*

To understand this tension it is important to know that – just like PhD candidates – most Postdocs at the department are employed in (externally funded) collective research projects. In fact, most of the Postdocs in those research projects are PhD graduates from the department. In other words: their relatively large number has a common source – external funding. A senior academic described this underlying trend as follows:

> *I'll give you my structural analysis: In the 90s they made this serious PhD drive in Denmark. You could apply for individual PhDs from the research councils – they really managed to increase the number of PhDs. And then of course they realised that there are not enough assistant professorships in the system, so they pushed the problem upwards. Now you can't apply for individual PhDs but you can apply for individual Postdocs – and again, seriously successful programs. But again it's pushed the problem up.*

In 2016, the Danish Council for Independent Research (DFF) discontinued its individual Postdoc grant due to the funding cuts initiated by the Danish government – thereby continuing the trend to primarily employ early-career academics in collective research projects and exacerbating the issue of where they should find employment after their project funding runs out. Of the fifteen Postdocs employed at the department in October 2015, eleven were employed in (more or less) externally funded research projects: whereas only one had an individual Postdoc grant from the and the Danish Council for Independent Research | Humanities (FKK), five had UCPH 2016 funding (that technically is internal funding as it is granted by the University of Copenhagen yet applied for by senior academics like external funding); other funding sources included the Velux Foundations as well as the Carlsberg Foundation, the joint committee for Nordic research councils in the humanities and social sciences (NOS-HS).

While Postdoc positions used to be for consolidating one's PhD research (i.e. converting the thesis into a book), they increasingly morph into a new research project. This leaves it to the good will of the project leaders whether Postdocs may use some of their paid working time to turn their PhD material into publications (thereby acquiring the symbolic capital required for future employment). Like their externally funded PhD colleagues, Postdocs are also expected to teach – unless their project leader negotiates an exception to this rule for them. Conversely, project leaders may insist that "their" Postdocs teach assuming that this helps them to qualify for an associate professorship. In addition, at an informal meeting of Postdocs one of them remarked that it was very unclear what her job actually consisted of. Instead, she felt that she was asked to attend to many tasks that were not included in her job description (such as giving presentations). Later on that day, another Postdoc mentioned that whereas the tasks of PhD candidates were relatively clear (centring on writing the thesis), Postdocs would have to take care of so many responsibilities that they were left with little time to write publications.

Although constituting a much smaller group, assistant professors are a quite diversified group as well. Their contracts usually run for three to four years – or six years in the case of tenured positions (that were however not available at the department) or approximately one year if they are "promoted" Postdocs – and symbolise a certain investment (although no explicit promise) of the department to support them into becoming associate professors – the first permanent academic position available at the department. In October 2015, only four of the 15 Postdocs had an internally funded assistant professorship – one of which was an externally funded Postdoc who had been promoted to an assistant professorship.[272] Like more senior academics, assistant professors usually have to (except for one semester) assume teaching and administrative responsibilities to the extent of 420 hours per semester but have the possibility to go on research leave if they acquire external funding.

In Denmark, the salary difference between PhD candidates and Postdocs is less pronounced than in Austria. While the standard personnel gross salaries of PhD candidates at the University

[272] According to the departments homepage, by July 2017 that number had risen to 14 externally funded Postdocs while remaining at four assistant professorships (see <http://anthropology.ku.dk/staff/assistant-professor-and-postdoc/>, accessed 31 July 2017).

of Copenhagen amounted to 32,224 DKK (ca. 4,337 EUR) per month in 2016, those of Postdocs totalled 40,706 DKK (ca. 5,479 EUR), of assistant professors 42,514 DKK (ca. 5,722 EUR) and of associate professors 50,575 DKK (ca. 6,807 EUR).[273] However, industrial PhDs may for example negotiate a higher salary with their employer, as may assistant professors who bring external funding (i.e. overheads) to the department. Moreover, there are differences between the funding early-career academics have available for conference fees and travel expenses: For instance, whereas industrial PhDs may have funding for travel expenses to the extent of several monthly salaries, internally funded PhD candidates are provided with money for conference attendance but not to cover the costs of their fieldwork.

7.8 Conclusion

Recent university reforms in Austria and Denmark have increased the institutional autonomy of universities, i.e. the decision-making powers of university managers – *not* the academic freedom of academics. At the same time, they introduced control mechanisms to make universities more accountable to and susceptible for the needs of "society" (which appear to be primarily those of the private sector for "employable" graduates who generate economic growth through "innovation") such as competitively allocated, project-based funding, output-based funding (via university performance contracts) and (external) evaluations. While placing now "autonomous" universities in competition with each other and creating new (though certainly not less) hierarchies between both governments and "their" universities as well as within universities, governments leave it to a strengthened management – which in turn passes on the according responsibilities and pressures along a clear chain of command – to fulfil the multiplying, partly contradictory missions universities face.

Although both the Austrian and Danish university reforms are similar in their rhetoric and underlying neoliberal "spirit"[274], Denmark has implemented them more consistently, turning its universities into textbook examples of managerialised universities. At the same time, the Danish government (so far) endows "its" universities with significantly more financial resources. While the teaching at the department in Copenhagen is funded according to the number and performance of its students, its research is heavily dependent on its staff acquiring external funding – and thereby on demonstrating its "relevance". In Austria on the other hand, the state has committed to universities being widely accessible – thereby (formally) massifying higher education up to the doctoral level even more than Denmark – but not to fund them accordingly. This non-committal practice is then passed on from universities to their students, as without such laissez-faire conditions the "open access" to higher education could not function in "mass subjects" such

[273] See <https://uniavisen.dk/en/staff-and-researchers-salaries-2016-university-of-copenhagen/> (accessed 5 March 2017); regarding the salaries of PhD candidates, also see <http://www.dtu.dk/english/Education/phd/Applicant/Pre_acceptance-1-/Salary>.

[274] Although these reforms clearly follow an economistic logic, we have to keep in mind they are driven forward by (neoliberalised) states aiming to increase the "quality" and "efficiency" of universities rather than to economise them in the sense of immediate commercialisation and commodification (cf. Winter 2012: 27–29).

as social anthropology (cf. Pechar 2007: 77).[275] Consequently, with higher education (including doctoral training) in Austria still largely having the character of a part-time occupation (or even a hobby), we witness the formation of a new understanding of its quality more clearly in Denmark where a good student is increasingly not expected to spend as much effort as possible on a course or a thesis but rather as little time as possible in order to finish them quickly and find a well-paid job immediately afterwards.

Although the better – but decreasing – public financial support of universities in Demark is reflected in the working conditions of (consistently full-time employed) early-career anthropologists – as is the less tight managerial grip the Austrian government exercises on "its" universities – both groups face similar(ly) "schizophrenic" demands. On the one hand, their education is clearly oriented towards having an academic career and informed by an according vocational work ethic expecting them to display exceptional commitment to their work that does not end with their remunerated working hours. On the other hand, their superiors (who are not only likely to have incorporated a similar work ethic but also benefit from this arrangement) are unlikely to (be able to) reciprocate that commitment when it comes to their career prospects – at least in the case of a significant proportion of those early-career academics continuously working on temporary and part-time contracts. Viewed from this perspective, PhD candidates, but also Postdocs, appear as a (comparatively) cheap, easily replaceable labour force rather than the future academic generation. This impression is reinforced in the case of externally funded early-career anthropologists who – constituting the growing majority – in the case of the department in Copenhagen do not only provide it with overheads[276] and tuition fees but at the same time with "free" publications, teaching and administrative support. Whereas PhD candidates (and Postdocs) employed in externally funded research projects do not equally provide the department in Vienna with "free" teaching and administrative support, they are not in a position to focus on writing their thesis like their Danish colleagues but rather to assist a project leader. Internally funded PhD candidates on the other hand are obliged to use two thirds of their working hours to provide teaching and administrative services for their department respectively professor – therefore being only granted similarly little time to advance with their research and consequently their academic careers. Hence, early-career anthropologists find themselves in diverse and diverging roles, ranging from being (1) a student to being a colleague, (2) an apprentice on an academic career track to a knowledge worker on a production line (producing the outputs others require to justify their funding) on her way out of the university or (3) an unsalaried amateur over an externally, individually funded freelancer (whose supervisor is not structurally invested in her work) to an internally, individually funded assistant (with a high workload in teaching and administrative tasks) or an externally funded assistant in a research project obtained by a (more) senior academic (who

[275] This is not to say that (1) we cannot observes attempts of installing more of an audit culture at the University of Vienna as well (as evidenced for instance by a new PhD curriculum introduced in 2009) and (2) a wider access to doctoral education equals a wider access to having a permanent academic career.
[276] In a way, they appear to be a by-product of these overheads rather than the other way around.

has made commitments to a public or private funder).[277] In comparison, early-career anthropologists remain longer in a student role and are individually funded in Vienna, whereas they are in a rather collegial position and collectively funded in Copenhagen.

This diversity – one could also use the term inequality in that regard – continues when it comes to the working conditions they encounter. While basically pursuing the same kind of work, PhD candidates (but also Postdocs) are remunerated very differently – particularly if we compare those in Vienna to those in Copenhagen. Whereas many in Vienna have to pay in order to pursue their research as an education (for instance to do fieldwork or attend conferences), others are paid – a smaller or larger (proportion of their) salary – to pursue it as an occupation. In Copenhagen on the other hand many – but not all – Postdocs have to teach whereas only few are allowed to do the "adjunktpædagogikum" required to apply for an associate professorship. In addition, in both countries some early-career anthropologists are paid/allowed to do both teaching and research whereas those in the position of an external lecturer or project staff tend to either face a disintegration of the unity of research and teaching – (up to now) a cornerstone of academic work at universities – or pursue one of them as an unremunerated effort. With such diverging working conditions at hand, it is not surprising that it is difficult to rally them around a common purpose (cf. Ivancheva 2015: 44).

After having elaborated on the differences between the institutional conditions that early-career anthropologists encounter in Vienna and Copenhagen, chapters 8 and 9 focus on two tensions that significantly shape their work (though in different shades) both in Vienna and Denmark: (1) their need to collaborate as well as compete with peers and seniors and (2) their work being considered to be a privilege while at the same time involving a high degree of precarity.

8 Between Collaboration and Competition

The notion of competition has become one of the hallmarks of our times. Driven by a neoliberal imperative, it has become

> one of the most policy-relevant words of the early 2000s in Europe (compare Sum 2009). It now frames all spheres of life, be they private, cultural, social, political or economic. […] [M]aximisation of competitiveness has come to define and justify some of the most important policies and policy reforms in Europe (Compare Cerny 1997; Hall and Soskice 2001): all things that want to prosper or survive must compete. (Erkkilä and Piironen 2014: 177)

Universities are by no means exempt from this: Due to the developments outlined in the first part of this thesis[278], they have to increasingly compete amongst themselves (cf. Winter and

[277] In line with this, they face diverse expectations, for example that they are highly committed to their academic work and ready to leave it behind (once their contract has run out) or that their work should advance their discipline and solve interdisciplinary problems, be publishable in international journals and disseminated to the local society or prepare them for a non-academic job market as well as an international academic career.

[278] Such as the growing economic importance of scientific knowledge, the massification and differentiation of the higher education and research sector, international competition driven forward by university rankings or the shift from block grant funding to output-oriented, "competitive" state funding and private revenues.

Würmann 2012) as well as with other higher education and research (funding) institutions not only for ideas and prestige, but also increasingly for funding (that is to a lesser extent provided by the state and replaced by private revenues), visibility as well as staff and students in a globalised "higher education market", i.e. not only for symbolic but equally for economic and human "resources" (cf. Enders 1999: 73, Kleinman et al. 2013: 2394, Winter 2012: 29). Therefore, it is not surprising that the title of a "yellow book" created by the Austrian Rectors' Conference (now "Universities Austria") outlining the main thrust of the university reform reflects its programme: "Universities in competition" (Titscher et al. 2000, my translation).[279] At the same time, the need to collaborate with others – both on the level of institutions and individuals – is boosted by subjecting them to increasingly competitive relationships.

> As units become more responsible for self-financing, their members become more interdependent. Competition for resources requires that they collaborate with each other, that they capitalize on each other's strength while holding each other accountable for the production and quality efforts that are essential to the collective well-being. (Slaughter and Leslie 1997: 221)

Accordingly, at his speech commemorating the 650th anniversary of the University of Vienna the Austrian Minister of Science, Research and Economy at the time identifies (international) competition and (national) cooperation as two of the five major future developments affecting Austrian universities.[280] Elaborating on that dichotomy, the ensuing chapter reveals how it unfolds its – even more existential – force at the level of individual early-career academics.

8.1 The Myth of Individualised Meritocracy

Whereas collaboration and interconnectedness are praised as the ideals of research, academic career progress is closely linked to individual performance (Felt and Fochler 2010: 314). Therefore it is not surprising that – with the principle of meritocracy (literally meaning the rule of merit) establishing education rather than social origin as the criterion of selection in modern industrial society (Reinprecht 2005: 129, cf. Liessmann 2006: 50, Newfield 2008: 95, Sennett 2006: 107) – such a selective as well as hierarchical profession as the academic one is prone to the notion of meritocracy. As evidenced by the ubiquitous discourse of "academic excellence", this notion is accompanied by the assumption that it is those "surviving" a tough competition who are "the best" and therefore to prevail (cf. Beaufaÿs 2003:13). However, already on 7 November 1917 Weber noted that

> [w]hat has remained, however, and indeed has considerably increased, is a factor peculiar to the university *career*. Whether or not an adjunct lecturer, let alone an assistant, ever succeeds in achieving the position of a full professor, let alone of a head of an institute, is a matter of pure *chance*. Of course, chance is not the only factor, but it is an unusually powerful factor. I can think

[279] What is surprising is that only 15 years later, the then president of that same committee complained in a newspaper article that the competition that was established by the university reform would weaken Austrian universities by undermining their solidarity ("Konkurrenzstreben schwächt Unis" by Bernadette Bayrhammer, *Die Presse*, 9 December 2015, 11). It appears that the remedy that was proclaimed to render universities more efficient comes – sooner rather than later – with unwelcome side effects.

[280] See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFMGys7Xs8c> (accessed 18 September 2017).

> of almost no other career on earth in which it has such a large part to play. I am especially well placed to say this, as I personally owe it to a few instances of sheer chance that at a very early age I was appointed to a full professorship in a discipline in which at that time my contemporaries had undoubtedly achieved more than I had. And I feel that this experience has given me a keener awareness of the undeserved fate of those many others whom chance has treated unkindly and still does, and who despite all their ability failed to reach the position they merited as a result of this mechanism of selection. (Weber 2008: 28)

On top of that, his well-intentioned advice that neither women, Jews, people dependent on having a regular source of income, nor anyone profoundly convinced that performance ought to pay off (ibid.: 30) should consider writing a habilitation does not give the impression of academic careers being a particularly meritocratic endeavour but rather "a matter of the *aristocratic spirit*" (ibid.: 30). This was a hundred years ago, on the day the October Revolution heralded the ascent of the working class, a year before women were allowed to vote in Germany, and three decades before World War II confronted Germany and the world with the horrors of unleashed racist discrimination. Without doubt, societies and with them universities have fundamentally changed since then – not least because the access to them has become much less restrictive. Yet 60 years later Bourdieu (1988) observes that

> appointment to the professorial body is subject to arbitrary decisions by the authorities (and especially directors of research groups) […]. [C]hances of appointment to research posts and increasingly, posts in higher education tend to depend at least as much on the scope, diversity and quality of academically profitable social relations (and thereby on place of residence and on social origins) as on academic capital. (ibid.: 143)

In that regard, he points to the crucial role the choice of a powerful mentor plays for attaining a university career and the related role of the social origin of candidates for choosing the "right" mentor (ibid.: 93f.).

> There are surely few social worlds where power depends so strongly on belief […]. Thus we cannot entirely understand the phenomena of concentration of academic power without also taking into consideration the contribution made by the claimants, by way of the strategies which lead them towards the most powerful protectors. These strategies are of the *habitus*, therefore more unconscious than conscious. […] [T]he most cunning pupils, who are also the most favoured[281], have no need to calculate opportunities or weigh up chances before offering gratitude and custom to the most influential masters. It is another example of the way in which capital breeds capital. (ibid.: 91)[282]

While the child of privilege is likely to make those decisions that pay off without having to calculate or be calculating (Bourdieu 1998b: 24), it can at the same time "afford strategic confusion, a child of the masses cannot. Chance opportunities are likely to come to the child of privilege because of family background and educational networks; privilege diminishes the need to strategize" (Sennett 2006: 80). Their social future "does not depend entirely on their academic

[281] Interestingly, in the German translation (Suhrkamp 1988), Bourdieu refers to these pupils not as "the most favoured" but rather as "usually not the poorest".

[282] On that note, Beaufaÿs (2003) remarks that academics are usually selected by their mentors according to "the principle of resemblance" (ibid.: 14, my translation). Furthermore, she reminds us that there is no achievement – and hence no success – without its recognition by (established) colleagues (ibid.: 175, cf. Bourdieu 1998b: 23) and that such achievement is dependent on formal positions, access to resources, the support of mentors and networks as well as the paradigmatic context of where it is delivered (Beaufaÿs 2003: 246).

capital, for the economic or social capital at the disposal of their families allows them to obtain the maximum return for their academic diplomas on the labour market and thus to compensate for their (relative) failure by choosing alternative careers" (Bourdieu 1988: 163) whereas exactly those formerly excluded from the access to higher education are affected most by the "inflation of educational attainments" (Reinprecht 2005: 145, my translation, cf. Bourdieu 1988: 164). Therefore – despite the increase in temporary academic positions seemingly extending the prospect of having an academic career to groups beyond a traditionally narrow social elite – Ivancheva (2015) argues that

> [a] generation of young scholars who enters the market with minimum income but under maximum pressure for visibility has to pay their own way to stay afloat. This often means that, despite the mass entry into higher education in the post-war era, once again only those from privileged families can keep playing the academic game. (ibid.: 41, cf. chapter 9)

What is more, social origin is already a decisive factor in who attains tertiary education at all. In Austria, only 12% of the 25–44 year-old non-students whose parents have below upper secondary education and are native-born had attained tertiary education in 2012 – a number that is even dropping to 6% if their parents are foreign-born (OECD 2016: 85) – whereas 37% of those with parents who have tertiary education and are native-born – and even 53% of those with foreign-born parents – attained tertiary education themselves (ibid.: 87). Although also clearly in place, that disparity is less pronounced in Denmark, with 32% of the 25–44 year-old non-students whose parents have below upper secondary education and are native-born attaining tertiary education (ibid.: 85) as opposed to 65% of those whose parents have tertiary education and are native-born (ibid.: 87).

Nevertheless, the former Vice-Rector for Research and Career Development of the University of Vienna remarked in 2014 that

> [t]here is hardly a system which is as meritocratic, that is as achievement-oriented as academia and I think that there are a lot more mechanisms to minimise the influence of chance on academic careers today than there were in Max Weber's times.[283]

On the other hand, a senior academic in Copenhagen remarked that

> *[t]he academic job market must be one of the most unfair enterprises in this world. […] I have been so upset about it at so many points. But I think the problem from the outset is the expectation that it's fair and that it makes sense – because it really doesn't.*

Although these two statements are contradictory, they are both plausible. The first statement may become more comprehensible if taking into account the comparison of a senior academic in Vienna of the career regime she encountered as an early-career anthropologist to the current one.

> *It was more or less a nepotistic and social Darwinist system back then that merely provided some substantial amount of support to very few, while it ran down all the others sooner or later. […] In today's situation there is that one disadvantage that intense personal mentoring,- [...] operating almost like networks in politics, that you might have then if you were very lucky– isn't at all available today in our fields. Instead, the so-called free market, which is not very free at all, butts in and*

[283] "Unsicherheit stachelt zu Höchstleistungen an" by Klaus Taschwer, *Der Standard*, 30 April/1 May 2014, 14, my translation.

as a young graduate you're quickly being told: Well, you'll simply have to apply along with 15 or 50 others for this or that position or this or that project. This refers to the conditions of competition, of the labour market, but also of the peer review system that makes things much more difficult – but also fairer from my perspective.

Indeed, early-career academics have to pass an increasing series of increasingly competitive selection processes (cf. chapter 8.3), starting from them entering a study programme to their first permanent academic position. However, the sense of (having to prove that one is) being better than one's colleagues and therefore entitled to more (symbolic and economic) resources does not stop there. For example, the chairman of the Austrian Professors' Association (Österreichischer Universitätsprofessor/innenverband) argued in 2015 against associated professors[192] being promoted to full professors by an amendment of the university act as this position and the resources it entails should be reserved for "the best".[284] Nor is such a meritocratic stance limited to university managers and full professors. A representative of a major Austrian funding agency replied to my question which individuals and projects they aim at funding: "I can answer both questions with one word: the best."

Of course, we have to keep in mind that these are accounts given by the winners (or architects) of a harsh selection process. In that regard, a senior academic in Copenhagen noted that

I think even the ones who then succeed in this system, they are encouraged to look upon themselves as though they are superior, that they earned this. It is the higher justice of academia that handed down this judgement of their case and deemed them worthy.

Such an impression may be reinforced by the hesitation of the losers of this competition to publicly complain about unjust(ified) selection processes. As a senior academic in Copenhagen explained to me:

Those situations where this "not qualified" comes into the picture – and I have experienced it on a few occasions – can be very violating because it's quite a statement to be told when you feel that you have been working your ass off that you are not qualified. Because one would assume that I did my homework in terms of: I looked at this position, I looked at my background – and then to get that kind of message. [...] But I have never complained because [...] I know what assessment entails and that at the end of the day it's a negotiation and the position had been taken.

Besides, a more junior colleague of her told me that it

is always a source of complaint in recruitment procedures that the requirements are opaque. They are consistently opaque. […] And of course if you complain it's like shooting yourself in the foot. There are only […] four departments that teach anthropology. If you officially complain about the selection procedure your chances of getting a job in that same department are probably, I imagine, reduced to zero. So you just smile and say thank you very much. And wait for the next time and hope they don't have an internal candidate this time.

Following a meritocratic rationale implies that it is the individual's responsibility whether it succeeds or fails its quest for a university career. For example, the Rector of the Mining University of Leoben showed little compassion in a newspaper interview for Austrian early-career

[284] See <http://sciencev2.orf.at/stories/1760500/index.html> (accessed 13 September 2017). Ironically, although arguing that the appointment of full professors must entail an international selection procedure, the homepage of the Austrian Professors' Association is only available in German (see <http://www.upv.ac.at>, accessed 13 September 2017).

academics who are not able to keep up with their international competitors, arguing "if they are worse, then it is justified that they have to fear to lose their jobs".[285] Such a reliance on the meritocratic principle, i.e. the legitimisation of academic careers on the ground of individual performance, constitutes an "excellent" point of contact for the intrusion of neoliberal logics emphasising individualised responsibility as well as an audit culture. However, individual performance is (still) not the only decisive factor for awarding academic positions – which brings us to the second statement quoted above that questions the meritocratic "nature" of academic careers. In that regard, a senior academic in Vienna told me that with her changing supervisor (who in Austria used to assess their PhD candidates' thesis) the grading of her thesis changed as well

> *from "unsatisfactory" to "very good" without me having to change anything. Only the perspective [of the examiner, author's note] had to change. And this is an interesting experience. Then you know for the first time: Aha, science is something very relative. And how science is being produced is very relevant and decisive for people's lives. And it is not what it claims to be at all – that everything hinges on achievement. That's not the case. Then I realised that something else matters: it's about networks, about connections, about systems of support.*

Moreover, Science Europe notes that

> [s]everal studies have also established that the quality of the doctoral programme or host institution has a stronger effect on the quality of the first position held by doctorate holders than their productivity (Zubieta, 2009). Specifically, it is the prestige of the doctoral programme or host institution, and not individuals' past performance assessed through prior scientific productivity, which is commonly used to predict candidates' perceived potential or future performance, and therefore their suitability for hiring (Cruz-Castro & Sanz-Menendez, 2010). (Science Europe 2016: 83)

In line with this, Kawa et al. (2016) show that in the US graduates from a small number of universities departments constitute most of the tenured and tenure-track faculty in PhD-granting anthropology programmes.

> [G]raduates from the top five programs represent 30.0% of tenured and tenure-track faculty in the 103 PhD-granting programs in the United States. […] Together, the top ten programs placed 828 of their PhDs in faculty positions at other PhD-granting programs, representing 43.1% of positions occupied overall. The top 15 programs […] accounted for 1013 placements cumulatively, or 52.8% of faculty positions in the U.S. overall. By contrast, the bottom 15 programs contributed a total of 4 placements. (ibid.: 2f.)

In that regard, we have to keep in mind that despite its high selectivity, academia lacks an unambiguous agreement on the criteria that define who is best – particularly as the tasks, roles and expectations (early-career) academics face become increasingly diverse: Are "the best" those who publish most (in their first language) or in the most highly ranked journals (in English), attract most funding, receive the best student evaluations, are most internationally mobile, have degrees from the most prestigious universities, are best known to the (local or international) public or to esteemed representatives of their discipline, display the most adequate thematic

[285] "Ideen kann man nicht anschaffen" by Alice Grancy, *Die Presse*, 13 February 2016, 35, my translation. Whereas in his account it becomes clear that it is early-career academics who suffer the consequences of not being competitive enough, it disregards the issue of who is responsible for "their" failure (for example for the quality of their education).

specialisation or the highest commitment, fit best into a team, are the most active "citizens" of a department or are (easily) available at the right time? Is their qualification adequately defined through quantifiable output (for instance in the case of publications the bibliometric assessment of their visibility, activity and impact) or by the subjective assessment of peers (cf. Brenneis 2009)? Not to forget the question whether "the best" obtain the most prestigious positions equipped with the best financial resources or those become "the best" who are provided with the most adequate resources. This ambiguity does not only allow superiors to always justify that someone was not selected for a given position as she was lacking in one criteria or the other[286] – thereby simultaneously confirming and refuting the claim that academic careers are based on meritocratic principles – but at the same time makes the attempt of early-career academics to ascertain whether they perform well enough to have an academic career a hopeless one. Whereas this matter is discussed further in chapter 9.6, the following sub-chapter elaborates on the increasing dependence of (early-career) anthropologists on collaborating in order to obtain funding/employment.

8.2 Collaborative Arrangements

Although academia is considered to be a scholarly community bound by the logic of a gift economy (cf. chapter 2.2), academic activities are traditionally "loosely coupled" in the sense that

> it is possible to give a class without knowing which class the students had before or will have after, and it is also possible for a team of biologists to do their research without taking into account what the team next door is doing. In other words, most activities can be performed without cooperating and interacting actively with other members of the same faculty, since cooperation and coordination are not indispensable to do one's own work. (Musselin 2013: 1167)

Correspondingly, the collaboration between academics at the department in Vienna is rather characterised by its absence as evidenced by a lack of meeting places (except for a small kitchen and a small conference room that is mostly used for Master and PhD defences), with departmental meetings usually taking place in a lecture hall. Instead, most of them appear to pursue their academic endeavours independently of each other as pointed out by a Postdoc complaining that

> *at a department people do not meet regularly and ask: "Hey, what are you working on and how are you trying to achieve that?" Or: "I'm currently working on this and that. Do you have some advice?" And do that regularly and constantly. Instead, they all sit in their offices […] and nobody knows why they are there or whether they are actually there, because their doors are closed most of the time anyway.*

Likewise, collaboration at the PhD level remained relatively weak with most of the PhD candidates not belonging to the department's staff and having diverse working conditions. Although there were self-organised work groups among individual PhD candidates, a broader networking initiative launched in 2012 by two PhD candidates employed at the department soon petered out

[286] At least if they are left rather open. If they are on the other hand formulated very specifically, maybe even with one particular candidate in mind, this equally undermines the meritocratic legitimisation of the selection process by excluding most highly qualified candidates from the outset.

after the first few monthly meetings. Two years later, it was succeeded by an initiative focusing on the PhD candidates employed at the department that turned out to be quite fruitful, resulting in regular workshops in which they discussed each other's texts as well as a three-day international graduate forum in April 2017. Yet such collaborations tend to remain temporal and fragile with almost all of these PhD graduates leaving the department in 2017 – to possibly re-encounter each other as competitors for Postdoc funding.

In contrast, the research quality assessment of the department in Copenhagen of spring 2016 attests "a remarkable culture of collaboration". In fact, I had the impression of a more lively academic community there, with (more) academics – both junior and senior – having (PhD) lunches together, showing up at research seminars and guest lectures or participating in events like the PhD retreat or the MEGA seminar. Also, in spring 2015 an informal Postdoc group formed in order to discuss challenges they were facing as a group (for instance their uncertain career perspectives). At the same time, several PhD candidates at the department revealed to me that they felt left alone with their research and teaching, essentially having to do their fieldwork as well as write their thesis on their own, "sitting there and sensing that I am the only one working on this project so I need to drive it forward. I need to make the calls. I need to set the deadlines. I need to convince myself that it's important". Another one told me that she

> *knew that I had to teach. But nobody invited me to a meeting to say: "So this is the book that you have to get and this is the reading list. And this is what the course is about. This is what you have to be aware of in terms of technical things, for example Absalon [an e-learning platform, author's note]. This is how the exam works. This is how much time you will probably need for this." You know, all those practical things to ensure that the project goes smoothly. None of these things were in place. [...] So it was really sink or swim.*

I equally encountered this sense of being on one's own among Postdocs, with one of them remarking that "[y]ou also become aware that you're pretty alone. Because as a PhD you are part of the group whereas at least here we haven't been really good at being a group of Postdocs". Moreover, one of her colleagues expressed her disappointment in how

> *the university as an institution […] puts a premium on individual effort, but if you do something collectively it doesn't give you the same merit: If you write articles with other people, they don't have the same value. So collaboration is something that we call many things. But actual collaboration – I find that really difficult, to actually collaborate. And I really want to. I'm really tired of the lone researcher life. I yearn for somewhere where there is some kind of common focus.*

What is more, particularly those early-career academics coming from another university found it difficult to become part of the department (cf. chapter 9.4).

Consequently, I argue that collaboration at the department is of a rather specific, instrumental kind focused on the "entrepreneurial" aim of collaboratively competing for project-based funding. In that regard, the aforementioned research quality assessment of 2016 notes that the collaboration at the department is largely based on "the role of these researchers groups[265] in facilitating the development of externally-funded research projects" and adds that this "collaborative spirit is especially evident in the Department's inter-disciplinary work".

In that regard, we have to keep in mind that early-career academics at both departments depend on a hierarchical kind of collaboration in the form of receiving support of senior academics, either directly by being recruited by them or getting their help in drafting a funding application in order to obtain funding or indirectly by drawing on their networks – or their help to acquire the publications required – to achieve the former. Hence, managing to establish personal relationships with senior academics, thereby rising from the ranks of a nameless student to those of a familiar colleague, or even a friend, is (still) a central career capital in academia. As a Postdoc in Copenhagen put it:

> *Ideally, you ally with the professors because they are the ones with power that can help you do those tricky negotiations or whatever in the department. [...] There is a clearer career path if you are "somebody's". Whereas if you are not "somebody's", you are alone. You have to work it differently and figure out what alliances are fruitful for you. And [then you suddenly discover, author's note]: "Oh no, I joined that team, so what happens now? They don't like me, so they are not going to say that it's a good idea to employ me."*

Having networks is even more important in a setting where the majority of early-career academics is dependent on being employed in research projects acquired by senior academics. Therefore, although we can witness similar dependencies at the department in Vienna, the dynamics described below are more visible at the department in Copenhagen – with PhD candidates being well aware of them. One of them, having had tried for years to obtain funding for a specific research topic, explained to me that

> *[b]eing a junior person in this system you can really see how I can fight all I want but in the end I am just this little ant running around. Because there are just decisions being taken at a higher level that have nothing to do with my actual project. And there is only so much to do to influence it. So I just have to be extremely patient when I'm this demanding that I want to do my own project. I don't want to be somebody's PhD student and let them formulate a project for me.*

On the other hand, one of her colleagues (self-confidently) told me that

> *I've been quite realistic about the fact that in today's job market – and this also applies to academia and the university sector – a lot of the positions people get these days are through networks. People get them because they know someone. So if I hadn't gotten a PhD position here at that time I would have used some of the contacts I know from either here or from other places. For example, I had a really good relationship with […] from my time as a student. Because we had some beers and all that. […] And I wouldn't mind using the fact that they seem to like me as a person and I like them as a person to say: "Hey, can you help me out? What should I aim for? Is there a position opening?" There is no nepotism there in any sense at all. It's just trying to use your network in order to improve your chances of having a successful application. [...] Sometimes people think of networking as this crude cynical thing that is only done because you want to get something out of people. But for me networking is what happens when you just basically try to socialise, try to have a beer with someone. My best network contacts are from people I actually really enjoy being with. [...] And they just happen to be people who can also actually help me in my future career. And who wouldn't mind because they think I'm a bright, young and also a pleasant person.*

The importance of networks is heightened by senior academics assuming that they can strengthen their project application by already naming candidates, thereby showing that they can

draw on qualified staff who will successfully implement the project once it has been granted. As a senior academic explained to me:

> *At the moment of writing up the application, if I know that I have a qualified candidate, I can put that name in the application. Then I don't have to advertise it. […] Sometimes it's good if you have names for everything because you can prove that you can hit the ground running. [...] If I was to submit a collective application next week, then I would go and look in my […] graduate course for the smartest people who I knew would be able to do a great job. Generally, we are spoilt because we have so many smart students because of the admission criteria. So we tend to get the most qualified students and that makes it easy to identify gifted students who could enter the programme.*

As a consequence, most of the early-career anthropologists coming from outside of the department are recruited through (internal) individual funding rather than collective research projects, as in the case of the latter

> *[y]ou need to know that the people are there. […] I would have been happy to name the PhD student in my application if I had had somebody who was the right person. And then I wouldn't mind where they came from. I mean, whether they are from Aarhus or whether they are from London or... It doesn't matter. But of course, I need to know that they are there. But you can't advertise to put somebody into an application, that's the thing. There is only a 7% success rate at the Danish Research Councils. You can't advertise a 7% likelihood.*

This circumstance clearly reduces the competition for positions in collective research projects – even if they are announced as this can be done in a way that makes it highly unlikely that anyone else except for the pre-selected candidate can fit the required profile – while (1) increasing early-career academics' dependence on professors who successfully obtain funding for collective research projects and (2) bringing considerations into play beyond their general qualification when it comes to their selection. Regarding the latter, another senior academic answered my question according to which criteria she would select "her" PhD candidates as follows:

> *There is no transparency. [...] It's very rare that you can be there at the right time. Like, the next time I'm going to be applying in such a way that there is space for a PhD does not necessarily coincide with when I think: "Oh, I have this..." Like right now I have a couple of guys where I think: "Oh my God, these guys would be brilliant." But I tell them: "I personally have nothing."*

This is the reason why one Postdoc criticised that

> *Postdocs here are not assigned on merit. They are if they are [individually funded by, author's note] FKK or Carlsberg, but most of them aren't. Their Postdocs and PhDs come with a project. Which means they are not taking the best. For PhD students there is one competitive post here, one competitive funding allocation per year. And that has up to 60 applicants for one three-year funding. So obviously you are going to get one good student who gets that because that's highly competitive. You also have a great many very good students who don't get that. And apart from that, sources of PhD funding are projects, which creates a system whereby you are probably losing the best here in a way you are not in other places.*

Although this statement questions the meritocratic selection of some early-career positions at the department, it does criticise the underlying mechanism for the allocation of funding rather than the attitude of academics. In that context, a senior academic pointed out that

> *[a]ll these regulations are trying to take into account that we are just nepotists who want to hire people we know […]. But the thing is, when you've got a very specific project and that's how the*

funding flows go these days, then it's actually very difficult to bring it all together and get the right kind of people at the right time.

However, the Postdoc quoted above also (self-)critically observed that

[w]e are all human. We all favour people who we get on well with, who we find appealing or interesting. [...] Obviously, I am more likely to try to support my student who I like and get on with, who does stuff which interests me over the one who I don't get along with and who is constantly aggressive towards me. Even if they are much better than the other student is.

Her assessment was (at least partly) confirmed by the senior academic quoted above stating that

[s]ometimes you can tell that people are difficult people. [...] And when you are part of these collective projects, normal employability is actually also very important – things that would make it in other arenas. [...] I mean if you are just going on your own to study some exotic ritual somewhere in the Pacific – never mind. As long as you can get along with your informants. But in this case, in all these interdisciplinary projects being able to relate to other people means more.

This does not only add an additional facet to the meritocracy debate addressed in the previous chapter; it also means (as pointed out by a Postdoc) that although "there is a huge amount of competition for posts like the assistant professors, […] [t]he competition is implicit; one isn't allowed to mention it. There is an ethos of friendliness". Correspondingly, one of her colleagues argues that

competition has a very peculiar face in our line of work. And this has partly to do with the fact that we all need each other because it's through networks that we secure jobs. And this is true both in a more direct sense, when these networks actually recruit you when they have a job opening. But also through collective research projects that have now become more dominant compared to earlier. And in the looser sense, you know, in all the kinds of research events that you have to participate in in order to build your career: participate in conferences, be invited on publications – all these kind of things. They all require networks. So we depend [on them, author's note] for our survival. […] Because of this extremely heavy reliance on networks, we always have to always pretend that we are each other's best friends. And to some extent I think that's also what people experience. That it's very enriching to engage in these environments – also because people have to be friendly. […] People give each other positive comments and feedback. And they ask about one's life and work. So there is this kind of social build-up of a positive energy around these meetings. And then on the other hand, of course, there is the always-present competition between us as applicants for the same positions. And it's very rarely verbalised. So it creates a kind of subterranean stress where you know that your colleagues are both your strongest network and your fiercest competitors. And it's a very complicated situation to work with. It's a kind of a ying-yang situation. It goes together, it cannot be either or. It's a true dialectic: one produces the other and depends on the other.

This "true dialectic" – or paradox if the individual does not manage to resolve the contradiction – is partly the outcome of an increasingly "projectified" work environment in which networking and being able to collaborate, whatever the circumstances, become a conditio sine qua non for acquiring employment while the temporary "nature" of such a project employment simultaneously creates a continuous state of competition for the next, most likely again temporary employment – a matter that is explored in the following chapter.

8.3 Competitive Arrangements

According to Bourdieu (1998b: 64), the scientific community is rather a field of competition than a community with a highly selective academic elite competing for the best ideas and highest prestige.[287] Nevertheless, not only was this competition confined to symbolic rather than economic capital:

> Far from containing the threat of permanent revolution, the struggle of each against all which this permanent competition stimulates among those who have once entered the race, and who have the competitive dispositions both required and reinforced by the race, contributes by its own logic to the reproduction of the order as a system of temporal distances: on the one hand because the very fact of competing implies and elicits recognition of the common objectives of the competition; on the other hand because the competition is restricted at any moment to competitors placed at approximately the same point in the race, and because it is arbitrated by those who hold a more advanced position. (Bourdieu 1988: 87f.)

With the number of assistant professors having been equal to that of tenured professors, their "career was more or less completely predictable" (ibid.: 153). As it was therefore both

> necessary and sufficient to wait for one university life-cycle to draw to its close for another to commence […] it was more or less inconceivable that assistant lecturers could even conceive of categorial claims opposed to those of the professors. […] [I]dentical except for their separation by one university-lifespan, professors and assistant lecturers could not become competitors for the same posts, the same functions, the same powers. (ibid.: 153)

In that regard, a senior academic in Copenhagen told me that when she was an assistant professor in the 1990s,

> *[o]ur positons were basically always internally funded. So there was this almost guarantee that there will be a permanent position by the end of this temporary position. And then it is just a question of getting some publications done and getting some teaching experience so you are qualified and you can apply for that job. […] So it was much more secure.*[288]

Accordingly, PhD candidates/graduates who managed to obtain an internally funded position as a "university assistant" in Austria in the 1990s found themselves, unlike their contemporary successors, on a relatively certain way to permanent employment (cf. chapter 9.3). However, the competition for economic (and accordingly for symbolic) resources has drastically increased in the meantime as noted in the introduction to this chapter. Based on the assumption that competition promotes the productivity of universities (i.e. essentially of academics) (cf. Titscher et al. 2000: 701), the reputation of academics is increasingly measured according to their failures with the prestige of publications and funding growing with their rejection rates. Moreover, the duration of doctoral education has been considerably shortened from the ten to 15 years estimated by Bourdieu (1988: 154) to three to five years, resulting in an even higher number of doctoral degree holders competing for the academic employment they have been trained for.[289] This brings

[287] Which is admittedly not surprising considering that his social theory is characterised by power struggles.
[288] Although she adds that "[e]ven though there was uncertainty. It wasn't very nice neither".
[289] As pointed out by Bourdieu (1988: 154), the duration of the process of writing the doctoral thesis was closely related to the academic career path ahead. However, with the "break in the cycle of simple reproduction which

us to another structural source of the currently high competition in academia: the scarcity of economic resources, both in the case of (particularly permanent) university positions and external funding. In that regard, Science Europe (2016) points out that

> the number of PhD holders pursuing or wanting to pursue an academic career has risen in the last few decades. At the same time, the number of available permanent positions in the academic sector has not risen, or at least not at the same pace, and in some cases has actually declined. (ibid.: 9)

With both universities in Vienna and Copenhagen over-producing graduates in respect of their needs for reproducing their staff, they profit from a surplus of qualified applicants whereas early-career academics have few options for finding academic employment. In Austria, the only university department for social anthropology is that at the University of Vienna[290], offering highly limited employment possibilities to the seven PhD graduates it "produces" every year on average[244]. It is thus not surprising that the university's Vice-Rector for Research and Career Development (at that time) stated in 2014:

> We assume that a quarter of the PhD candidates obtain a Postdoc position. And a quarter of the Postdocs obtain a professorship in Austria or abroad. If we only looked at professorships in Austria, the proportion would be worse.[283]

In other words, the University of Vienna expects 6.25% of its PhD graduates to obtain a professorship (somewhere around the globe) – the more or less only permanent option for them to continue their academic teaching and research. Although international mobility appears to broaden the options of early-career academics, it simultaneously increases the competition for (permanent) employment. For instance, in line with the internationalisation processes discussed in chapter 4.3, as of April 2016 39.5% of the academic staff of the University of Vienna come from abroad (University of Vienna 2016a: 36) – a number that rises to 66% in the case of professorships (ibid.: 37).

In contrast, Denmark has – alongside the two Departments of Anthropology at the University of Copenhagen and Aarhus University – a number of university departments employing anthropologists at a variety of interdisciplinary research units[291]. However, these opportunities also do not suffice to absorb the number of PhD graduates produced by the two anthropology departments – a circumstance that is well illustrated by the statement of the Vice-Rector for Research and Innovation of the University of Copenhagen that the university trains between 800 and 900 PhD candidates per year whereas there is a need for approximately 60 new permanent academic staff members in order to maintain the staff[292]. In that regard, the Danish Ministry of Higher

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offered every assistant lecturer a future as professor" an "autonomization of the production of the thesis in relation to the temporal structures of the career" occurred (ibid.: 156).

[290] With the Institute for Social Anthropology of the Austrian Academy of Sciences being the only alternative academic employer in the narrower sense (except if one considers the World Museum Vienna – that was closed for three years between 2014 and 2017 – as an academic employer as well).

[291] Such as the Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies at the University of Copenhagen, the Department of Education or the Centre for Alcohol and Drug Research at Aarhus University, the Department of Learning and Philosophy at Aalborg University, the Department of Marketing and Management at the University of Southern Denmark and the Department of Society and Globalisation at Roskilde University.

[292] See <http://universitetsavisen.dk/videnskab/prorektor-vi-ligner-andre-topuniversiteter> (accessed 2 April 2017).

Education and Science observes that from 2011–2013, 17% of the male and 24% of the female (qualified) applicants for a professorship, 10% of the male and 16% of the female (qualified) applicants for an associate professorship and 5% of the male and 9% of the female (qualified) applicants for an assistant professorship in Denmark were successful (UFM 2015: 15). At the same time, a consultation letter (regarding the issue of "More talent – regardless of gender") sent out by the Human Resources Department of the University of Copenhagen in March 2014 stated that "background statistics show that every third professorship at UCPH in 2013 had only one applicant". This implies two things: Firstly, competition cannot only be circumvent for positions in collective research projects but also for permanent positions. Secondly, whereas competition for university positions is decreasing (for some) in the course of their academic careers, it still remains at a high level – with the impending losses in the form of insufficient alternative careers continuously increasing with every career step (cf. chapter 9.5).

With far too few university positions available, early-career academics are forced to turn to an alternative funding source constituting the second main aspect of the structural competition: external funding. In October 2015, two thirds of the PhD candidates and more than half of the Postdocs at the department in Vienna were employed on external funding and even nine tenths of the PhD candidates and three quarter of the Postdocs at the department in Copenhagen. Yet the competition for external funding is not necessarily much smaller than that for university positions with the average approval rates for funding by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) dropping from 23.6% in 2013 (FWF 2014: 20) to 21.4% in 2015 (FWF 2016: 26) and those of the Austrian Academy of Sciences rising from (a low baseline value of) 18% (ÖAW 2015: 103) to 29% (ÖAW 2016: 129). On the other hand, those of the Danish Council for Independent Research (DFF) dropped from 33% in 2006 to 19% in 2013 and 15% in 2015 (DFF 2016: 5) and those of ERC grants ranged between 12.2% and 14.9% in 2015[293]. With the quality of applications continuously rising (as attested by representatives from several funding agencies) and approval rates declining, applying for external funding means a high investment of (for some even unpaid) work time entailing a most uncertain return on this investment. This places early-career academics in a situation that was quite aptly depicted by an advice given on the last presentation slide at a workshop called "What to consider when applying for external funding" that was organised for early-career academics at the University of Copenhagen on 10 April 2014:

[293] See <https://erc.europa.eu/projects-figures/statistics> (accessed 20 September 2017).

As humorous and well-intended as this encouragement may be, it indicates that early-career academics are expected to desperately compete against all odds for external funding, giving their all – while bearing the economic consequences of their probable failures. After all, what alternatives do they have if they want to continue their academic careers, with funding agencies increasingly assuming the responsibility for funding (and thus selecting) them? For instance, a Postdoc in Vienna told me that

> *I have to acquire funding in order to make it. And the university won't care about me at all if I don't succeed. It doesn't matter how good I am – if I don't get an APART scholarship or an Elise Richter scholarship or an ERC grant, I'm done.*

Accordingly, a Postdoc in Copenhagen remarked that "the selection of who will make it is put in the hands of FKK and others funding Postdocs and people's willingness to put up with shitty – or at least insecure – working conditions".

Although external funding – just as temporary university positions – allows for more paid positions for academics at the beginning of their careers, it cannot compensate for permanent university positions due to its project-based, i.e. temporary "nature". Instead, it prolongs the competition for an academic career, thereby increasing precarious working conditions in the long run (cf. chapter 9.3). Besides, despite fostering new kinds of project-based collaborations, it simultaneously undermines collegiality by temporarily using individuals where they are needed and then dispersing them after the job is done (or rather the funding has run out) – particularly if combined with mobility pressures (cf. chapter 9.4). In that regard, Deem et al. (2007) note that

> [c]ollegiality amongst academic staff, in so far as it was ever present, has in any case been considerably undermined in the last decade or so by the growth of a range of types of contracts for academic staff. Contract researchers, part-time teachers, and teachers on fixed-term contracts are not new to universities but their numbers have increased considerably in recent years. (ibid.: 86)

These are not the only questionable consequences of the unleashed competition resulting from a lack of adequate funding in relation to the supply of adequately qualified applicants. Another one concerns the legitimacy of the selection process that such a high competition constitutes. Put simply: What happens if too many are competing for too little? After all, with approval rates roughly ranging between 15% and 25%, funding agencies cannot support all qualified applications – despite increasing preselection criteria such as academic age, willingness to be internationally mobile or publication requirements which already significantly reduce the number of potential applicants.[294] For instance, as of April 2016 the FWF could not fund projects that were approved by international reviewers in the amount of 80 MM EUR.[295] This does not only cause obvious frustration on the side of applicants, but on that of those selecting these applicants as well. For example, a representative of a major Austrian funding agency told me that

[294] In this regard, Science Europe (2016) remarks that "[f]unding systems are based on competition in order to support 'the best'. However, if the competition is too great, non- or extra-scientific factors tend to influence the outcome" (ibid. 9).

[295] "Schere zwischen Anträgen und Bewilligungen: FWF-Spitze warnt vor 'Lottospielzugang'" by Alice Grancy, *Die Presse*, 20 April 2016, 13.

[i]f you have an approval rate of 15% the frustration among members of the committee is already rather high. […] We awarded 40 scholarships and had ten people on the waiting list. And that were those who the committee decided must receive a scholarship at all cost. And then ten, 15 remained who reviewers thought deserve funding and who were assessed to be worthy of funding. But that was entirely impossible.

What is more, a highly competitive funding regime encourages applicants to "inflate" themselves and their work in order to stay competitive, i.e. to concentrate on improving its appearance (rather than its quality). As a Postdoc in Vienna put it:

It takes on dynamics of its own: You realise that there is incredibly much competition and the project proposals are written in a dumb way – so that you couldn't possibly fulfil [what you propose, author's note] within three years. But you've got to put in as much as possible so the proposal gets approved.

In line with this, a senior academic in Copenhagen told me that

we do write ridiculous promises in our applications as a way to be competitive. […] Actually, I have to do a report on my grant which just finished and I think I promised a bit too much. Not in totality but within the framework. […] Now I have the data. So […] after the grant is really where it pays off. And of course I'll write all this. But in the grant I said: "Oh, I'll have ten articles and one book proposal and..." So we kind of do it to ourselves to be competitive.

Such a "self-inflation" is not limited to funding proposals. When I asked a Postdoc in Copenhagen whether she shared my impression that people appeared to be keen on asking questions at the department's research seminars that showed how smart they were she explained to me that

[y]ou want to make sure that your colleagues hear how bright your questions are. It's all about those questions in the research seminars, it really is. […] I remember I was in this seminar at a university abroad […]. I was a PhD at that point and I sat in and participated in the research seminars. And I tell you that room was thick with almost fear or at least: "When are the assistant professors coming up with their questions and is hers better than the other ones?" You could feel the competition. And you could also tell how they, even if it was a topic where they were like "Oh my God, I don't give a damn", they try to use all the theoretical savviness and wisdom they had to get it into one question so that everybody could say: "Oh my God, so clever." […] That seminar does a lot of things. And selection of candidates for further career moves is absolutely one of them.

Interestingly, she refers to a research seminar at another institution to address competitive dynamics also present at her own institution. Maybe it was simply easier to characterise her own case by referring to another, in her eyes more pronounced case (just as this thesis does). Or maybe it was due to the fact outlined in the previous chapter that although the competitive setting at the department was quite obvious, it was not deemed appropriate to openly address this competition particularly because people had to find a way to co-exist and possibly collaborate with their competitors and were worried that their openly addressing this all-pervasive competition would result in open conflict that would hamper or even make such collaborations impossible.

Apart from "inflating" themselves, early-career academics were "inflating" their colleagues as well. According to a Postdoc in Copenhagen,

[w]e are inflating everybody. We all participate in this inflation. And it's part of what creates this competitiveness. That we always try to build each other up as high as possible and then hope that someone is building us up as well.

She ascribed this "inflation" to the constant comparison inherent in a setting that compels academics to continuously be on the look-out for opportunities to collaborate in order to compete for economic (and symbolic) capital.

> *I think it's a part of this dialectic between the network and the competition that you get these kinds of implicit and explicit comparisons that are going on all the time. And the problem is that they are most of the time implicit. Sometimes they are explicit. Like often you would hear during a PhD defence that this is an exceptional piece of work. And then you start to think: "So was mine also exceptional or was it only good?" Or you start thinking about the others, you know, what kind of words were they using? And afterwards you start talking about these things. […] But most of the time […] it's implicit. It's mostly the awe that you recognise that someone is very good and it creates the stress: "Oh, I should also be good. Can I formulate things in the way that person can?" And it also happens in the way we talk about each other. Because there is a tendency to always talk about each other as potential allies in a research collaboration rather than as, you know, people with particular skills. Because I think it's quite different. Sometimes you talk about people with particular skills, you know: "Oh, she is a good fieldworker." Or: "She has done this kind of stuff and lalala." […] But more often you get these more generalised acknowledgements or praising of people: "Oh, she is very good." Or: "She is brilliant." You get these things and it creates a kind of expectation that everyone should be brilliant. But it's not really stated why that person is brilliant. It's not something we discuss.*

Of course, when comparisons are made explicitly, the subterranean pressure they create to "inflate" one's performance is by no means lessened or more easily resisted. For example, another Postdoc in Copenhagen told me that

> *[t]he things that I don't like are things like, I'm in a meeting and someone says: "Well, you've all done so many articles. The one person who hasn't done any is you. How come you didn't do as many?" Or in a social meeting even, one of my colleagues whom I really like – I mean I like all of my colleagues, I have no bad words to say about them… But it's the coming together within that structure that freaks me out. Because that's where comments like: "Oh, this guy – how long has he been employed now? I haven't seen any articles from him. Have you?" You know, snippy little comments which erode the authority of that particular person. […] And there is a lot of that going on. […] That's because we are all competing. Because it's important that we all get as many publications as possible and as much funding as possible because part of our wages [...] are partly based on incoming funding.*

Moreover, comparison is not limited to peers on a similar career level (anymore) but also includes more experienced academics (who simultaneously assess and set the standards for early-career academics' performance). The performance pressures and high expectations ensuing from such continuous competitive comparisons – be they implicit or explicit respectively with one's equal or superior – are already clearly discernible at the PhD level. For instance, a PhD candidate in Copenhagen revealed to me that she

> *wasn't able to sleep at night. Or I was able to sleep at night but I didn't want to wake up, maybe. It just felt really not good. I was not feeling well about it. I was insecure of whether I could do it at all and do it properly. And I was worried that I wasn't able to make a good project. So a lot of emotions came into it. At that time, I had an idea that I'm not the kind of person that gets nervous. Normally I'm quite relaxed or confident or able to take one day at a time. And then suddenly finding myself in a situation where I wasn't able to relax and I couldn't take one day after the other was really confusing.*

Aside from the knowledge that many had failed where she had succeeded in getting funding and therefore would have to prove herself as more worthy than those numerous others, she attributed her anxiety to comparing herself with others:

[E]ver since I started studying anthropology in the first place I've been really looking up to... or putting anthropology, like the discipline, but also like the good anthropologists who were teaching me, on a pedestal. Like, really positioning them high: "Wow, these guys really know what they are doing." [...] That was up here. And that was like the professors, but also some of the PhDs who were doing interesting stuff. And suddenly from being a student looking up to these people getting the grant I suddenly felt that I had to be on that same level as they were. Which I didn't feel I was able to.

In that regard, a senior colleague of her pointed out that

[i]f you are in a culture or cohort of PhDs where there are one or two or three or four or five, however many – let's call them ambitious people – who have really decided that this is what they want to do and they understand the mechanisms, and so they are publishing and they are doing... Then of course everyone around is starting to think: "Oh, oh, this is what I should be doing." There is no question that that's driving

– particularly in combination with the digitalisation and internationalisation of academia and the concomitant unbounding of that constant comparison:

Online has made it possible to always constantly compare ourselves. So we are checking. And anyone who tells you otherwise I think is lying. Or maybe there is someone who doesn't. But in general we check.

I tried always to tell myself: "I have to focus on this idea of making myself a qualified applicant when the opportunity arises – whether that's in London, in Canada, in Copenhagen. I want to make sure that I am ready to apply and make a really good application." Now that of course is a lot of pressure on yourself. So you are pushing yourself. And that's part of the precarity mix. That we really push ourselves quite a lot. I mean, that's an understatement. We really push ourselves. Because the competition is there.

While such all-pervasive competition pushes (early-career) academics to continuously optimise their qualifications (i.e. their outputs and networks) in order to successfully obtain funding/positions, the respective requirements are constantly on the increase – which in turn pushes them to even harder self-optimise. In other words: While they have to "inflate" their qualifications, these qualifications are simultaneously inflated – resulting in a (depending on one's viewpoint virtuous or vicious) circle of continuous (self-)inflation. For example, most of the PhD candidates I met had been repeatedly applying for an individual scholarship, continuously improving their proposal until they managed to obtain funding. Many even applied for their PhD funding based on the experience of already having worked on their topic in a university position or a research project – adding up to one or two years (and sometimes even longer) of preparatory work. Likewise, this development can be observed at Postdoc level, for instance with external lectureships increasingly becoming stop-gap positions for PhD candidates waiting to obtain Postdoc funding (rather than a side line for someone with a job outside of the university) in Copenhagen or even a backstop for senior academics in Vienna. Also, Postdoc experience increasingly becomes a prerequisite for an assistant professorship in Copenhagen (cf. chapter 9.3).

In contrast, a senior academic in Copenhagen told me that in the early- or mid-1990s it was possible to be employed as an assistant professor on the basis of a yet-to-be-finished PhD thesis.

The demands [...] have risen a lot since then. [...] When people are doing their PhDs they are quite busy just doing the PhD. And then if we expect them to have the PhD and articles by the time they apply, those are very tough conditions, I think – and teaching experience, and they are supposed to be good colleagues and citizens turning up at meetings and being active in the department. I think we are demanding a lot now. And that's because there is more competition, so you can demand more – because there are more people around to apply for those positions than there were 20 years ago.

Her assessment was confirmed by another senior academic noting that

[f]or eight years now there have been more than 20, 25 PhD students at this department and it has meant that the thresholds have kept going up. Whereas in the old days they would say: "You need to write a good thesis and then if you can publish an article in Tidsskriftet Antropologi [the department's own journal, author's note], that would be great." I think there is now a different kind of expectation: I think that PhD students at this department would be looking to have two or three international articles in the pipeline when they finish. So the pressure has gone up. That's also why they are so stressed.

She continued:

To be employable in this day and time is to be able to do everything. So you have to prove that you can teach very well, supervise very well, you can publish very well and that you can attract funding. […] It is almost as if you are supposed to be able to do everything, isn't it? […] It's not a double bind, it's clearly a quadruple bind or whatever you want to term that. It does make you vulnerable because you have to do all these things at the same time. The PhD students sense that and that is what makes their heart jump: the thought that it's not just good enough to write a good thesis. That is a bit scary, isn't it?

Clearly, such pressure rather increases than decreases after obtaining the PhD degree. As two Postdocs in Copenhagen put it:

If the question is: "Does it get more competitive, more intense, more existentially crushing for people who are really wanting that job?" Yes, absolutely. It's much worse afterwards. The pressure to publish is unbearable. The sense that one is never keeping up.

In the PhD you are in a big bubble, and I think you only feel the competition out here. And the second you step into Postdoc life it becomes very clear to you […] how calculated other people are and how you should yourself learn to be as strategic very soon if you want to have a career here.

Accordingly, a Postdoc in Vienna told me that despite after many years having finally received a full-time position

[t]he stress is constant, it never stops. I still work nearly every weekend. I probably work even more now because this research is so incredibly intense. I teach less, that's somehow better. But no – you simply work all the time, there actually is no difference. In fact, it's even worse now because I have to travel more and am under more stress because my level of academic qualification is higher and the demands I face are simply higher. There is also more psychological stress

– a stress that is certainly not eased by the fact that early-career academics can never quite know whether they meet the requirements they face (cf. chapter 9.6). However, if the demands for obtaining academic positions continuously increase up to the point where successful applicants for a PhD scholarship or a Postdoc position already require PhD/Postdoc experience, the

question arises whether those funding schemes/positions do not defeat their purpose – particularly if we consider that while the requirements for having a permanent academic career increase as well, so does the price of failing to achieve one with few(er) adequate career alternatives available (cf. chapter 9.5).

Apart from that, a Postdoc in Copenhagen pointed out how the high competition (propelled by an excess of temporary positions) affected senior academics as well, intensifying performance pressures on all career levels.

> *We are in a situation of hyper competition. Competition has definitely been on the increase. This is mainly due to the balance of the temporarily employed vs. the permanently employed. It's taking kind of a rational economic logic to this: the higher the imbalance here, the more the securely employed will feel pressured to perform as well to stay in their positions – because no position is secure. It might be permanent, but it's not in that sense secure: you can be fired. And this creates downward pressure on all layers. [...] It re-creates a situation where we compete more and more – and legitimises this kind of behaviour.*

Accordingly (though not explicitly referring to the competitive aspect), a university manager in Copenhagen told me that in view of the low fluctuation of the department's permanent staff "I think it's a good combination of having a fairly large number of young scholars in the department who can push a bit" in order to create a more dynamic environment. Given these conditions, in the contemporary university temporarily employed (early-career) academics cannot docilely and submissively wait anymore for a permanent professorship as described at the beginning of this chapter. Instead, they have to actively compete with a growing number of other early-career academics in diversifying positions not only for the symbolic capital, but also for the economic capital allowing them to "survive" in academia: (more experienced) external lecturers compete with (less experienced) external lecturers for teaching assignments that are "left over" by (other) internal staff, PhD candidates compete with other PhD candidates for university and project positions, scholarships and opportunities to publish – as do Postdocs and assistant professors. Furthermore, competition also extends across status groups (particularly at more advanced career stages), with professors not only competing amongst themselves and with university managers for decision-making power, but also with less senior colleagues for symbolic and economic capital. In that regard, a Postdoc in Vienna told me that before obtaining her current Postdoc position she

> *had never been rejected for a conference. And then the rejections started coming. That's when I realised: The more you move up the ladder the more competition there is. […] For instance, at a panel of the AAA [American Anthropological Association, author's note] […] where [the discussant, author's note] basically invited me. And then I wasn't accepted, despite of the invitation. […] They probably prefer to take people who are 30 years old and who can still be shaped accordingly. […] And that's why people at my age switch to organising panels themselves.*

Besides, as there are currently more or less no permanent positions below a(n associate) professorship available at both departments, early-career academics are forced to continue competing for (more) senior positions that expose them to an even higher level of competition – including their former supervisors and/or superiors (while simultaneously continuing to depend on

their support).[296] The resulting situation echoes Engels' (2001) description of industrial capitalist English society over 150 years ago that resulted in the creation of an impoverished proletariat as an integral class:

> Competition is the completest expression of the battle of all against all which rules in modern civil society. This battle, a battle for life, for existence, for everything, in case of need a battle of life and death, is fought not between the different classes of society only, but also between the individual members of these classes. Each is in the way of the other, and each seeks to crowd out all who are in his way, and to put himself in their place. The workers are in as [sic] constant competition among themselves as the members of the bourgeoisie among themselves. The power-loom weaver is in competition with the hand-loom weaver, the unemployed or ill-paid hand-loom weaver with the man who has work or is better paid, each trying to supplant the other. But this competition of the workers among themselves is the worst side of the present state of things in its effect upon the worker, the sharpest weapon against the proletariat in the hands of the bourgeoisie. (ibid.: 144f.)

There is a particular irony in the fact that the higher the thematic overlap between the work of academics and consequently the more obvious their exchange is, the more competitive their relationship becomes from a structural perspective – especially if they are employed on short-term contracts. This creates the paradox situation that one's closest colleagues potentially become one's fiercest competitors who can hardly be avoided (anymore) despite – or because of – the internationalisation of academic careers. However, if one's support of others endangers one's own position, one may rather think twice what information and networks to share with them. As a senior academic in Copenhagen put it: "The structures are such that one has to look out for oneself. And this is not conducive for sociality." A telling example[297] was a discussion between "external" lecturers teaching the same course at the department in Vienna regarding the mutual access to their e-learning platforms (and consequently to the knowledge of how to design these courses). Replying to the proposal of a younger colleague to open access to each other's platforms, a more experienced lecturer raised concerns that this could result in colleagues "borrowing" contents without acknowledging their copyright (as she had already experienced a number of times). Subsequently, the idea of more broadly sharing each other's course materials was dismissed – a decision that is not surprising considering that with about half of the courses at the time being taught by "external" lecturers, experienced lecturers faced the unrewarding task of being expected to support their less experienced colleagues in preparing their courses – thereby strengthening their own competitors without even being paid for these efforts. Another example is a Postdoc in Vienna telling me that

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[296] As pointed out by Kreckel (2013) for the German university system, the "social mysticism of the professorial appointment" causes academic positions below the professorship to be regarded as a preliminary occupation that cannot be pursued as a profession itself (ibid.: 62, my translation). According to Peacock (2016), the resulting hierarchical dependence is a central characteristics of precarious forms of work (cf. chapter 9), together with "a neoliberal preference for temporary working contracts" (ibid.: 112). However, she concludes that "if a position of precarity in the form of temporary employment is equivalent to a social condition of hierarchical dependence, then it can no longer be an epiphenomenon of impersonal neoliberal forces" (ibid.: 113). This argument resonates with that of Ullrich (2016) that the problems of academic capitalism interfere with the traditional academic career paths characterised by the personal dependence of "academic feudalism" – as well as with the one I develop in this thesis that the contemporary precarious situation of early-career academics results from a combination of traditional and neoliberal elements of the organisation of academic work.

[297] Dating back to the time before the fieldwork this thesis is based on.

it happened to me only recently that I gave a colleague […] information on where I submitted applications for awards. And she got the awards and I didn't. And it was close between the two of us. And if I hadn't given her this tip, I would have gotten them. That's a tricky situation. […] And this is something that happens all the time.

Accordingly, a colleague of her in Copenhagen explained to me that "I try to be generous with thoughts and sharing of contacts and networks. But it has dawned on me that it might be a good idea not to be so generous anymore". Nevertheless, she continued: "That might be a good idea, but I refuse. [...] I'd rather be naive than to say: 'No, I'm not going to link you up because then you are going to move ahead.' Because I think that's silly and poisonous in terms of the collegial stuff." In line with this, her colleague in Vienna added to her quote above that "if you remain in that competitive situation, frustration and negativity will prevail at some point" and emphasised that

I think that for an academic career it's important to always show respect and gratitude to those who've helped you. And to help others yourself. […] It was just a good feeling to pass on the few things I could and to help others. At the same time, I think it is immensely important to be supported, either by counter-checking, by having a discussion...

How then do these early-career academics try to negotiate the tension between working in a highly competitive environment and keeping a good sociality with their colleagues who are at the same time their (potential) competitors? One way is trying to take oneself out of the competition as much as possible. However, by doing so one runs the risk of simultaneously removing oneself from the "game" of competing for an academic career by conveying the impression of lacking the devotion (or ambition) considered to be a prerequisite for deserving an academic career (cf. chapter 9.1). A Postdoc in Copenhagen described this strategy as follows:

I actually try not to be [...] controlled very much by the competitive spirit; that's part of my career strategy, that I try not to be careerist and competitive. That's because I believe that competition is most of the time a negative social relationship or a negative social phenomenon. I don't think that it produces good sociality. It might produce good products – but I don't think it produces good sociality. But that's of course a challenge because I'm not very interested in building my CV and my career – or I don't want to do it because I want to be competitive. I want to do what I think is interesting. And that kind of strategy is not optimal. So I think I manage to be less stressed, because I don't care so much about this competition. But it also, of course, is one reason why I'm still in that kind of position: because I don't work a lot – or network a lot – to get positions.

Another way is to demarcate one's expertise and networks as much as possible[298], for instance by developing distinct research foci or visiting different host institutions, thus avoiding competition for the same positions at a later stage. A third way is trying to cooperate with one's (potential) competitors – by collectively competing for research funding (against others). A Postdoc in Copenhagen tried to combine these two strategies:

Find out who your allies/competitors are and find a way to work with them. This is a strategy that I have tried. In the new project, we are [a number of people, author's note] at the same level of experience and we are competitors: we are all working [on the same region, author's note]. So we are competitors for the same positions. [...] We agreed that rather than compete against each oth-

[298] A strategy that also appears to be adopted by senior academics with each of them having their thematic "territories".

er, let's see if we can make it work with an application together. [...] Let's try to pool together our knowledge and see if something comes out of it that's better than if we compete against each other. I know that this is creating an artificial moment for as long as that application or the project runs. And at the same time: Yes, we are all going to apply to the same positions while we are working together. So it is artificial – but it's an experiment. Does it work? Does it make it more fun? Is it less poisonous? [...] At least it's good to know who your competitors are because then you can also see: So you are doing that kind of research – if I'm doing the same then it's the two of us who have to compete over those jobs. But if I do something that smells a little bit different then perhaps there is another place for me. You have to be very aware what kind of track you want to feed into.

Such a strategy stands to reason considering that one's closest colleagues are potentially one's fiercest competitors as much as one's fiercest competitors are potentially one's most obvious collaborators – an observation that brings us full circle to the ending of the previous chapter.

8.4 Conclusion

Although academic careers are based on and legitimised by meritocratic discourses demanding as well as claiming that those who manage to obtain an enduring academic position are "the best", such a rationale rests on shaky ground. On the one hand, the competition for relatively few economic resources (in the form of scarce university positions and competitively allocated external funding) has steeply increased over the last decades in the course of the massification, internationalisation and neoliberalisation of universities – particularly in the case of the younger academic generation(s). Whereas this expansion of the competition mechanism is indicative for an increase of the meritocratic aspects of academic careers (as opposed to their "aristocratic" foundation at Weber's time), the concomitant dependence of early-career academics on the support of and collaboration with established colleagues has – if not increased with the competition then at least – remained. While relatively few of them are kept in a traditional "relation of dependency" with a full professor as described by Bourdieu (1988: 88), an increasing number of early-career academics depend on being "somebody's" PhD candidate or Postdoc, i.e. on senior academics hiring them as their assistants or through (externally funded) research projects.[299] However, as the networks that play a crucial role in this process help circumventing the competition for externally (but as well internally) funded positions, they undermine the meritocratic argument mentioned above – particularly if these positions are part of a narrowly defined (research) agenda as is usually the case for research projects (but also positions assigned to a professorship).[300] This is not to say that the selected candidates are not qualified for the position – the question is whether they are the "best" candidate possible. However, with the increasing

[299] Remaining in subordinate positions – in Vienna rather as professors' (internally funded) assistants and in Copenhagen rather as professors' (externally funded) project assistants – early-career academics may therefore be no less dependent on "powerful" professors than in the former "University of professorial oligarchy".

[300] In fact, project leaders may have to actively approach and recruit candidates through their networks. Therefore, both junior and senior academics depend on networks for the recruitment process – although due to the oversupply of early-career academics a senior academic is more likely to fill a vacant position than a junior academic to find project employment.

competition being accompanied by a diversification of academic positions as well as of selection criteria the answer to this question remains inevitably ambiguous.

In such a context requiring to compete as well as collaborate with their peers and superiors – two opposing needs that nevertheless constitute and reinforce each other – (early-career) academics find themselves in the paradox situation that their (thematically) closest colleagues are simultaneously their (potentially) fiercest competitors – who can hardly be avoided (anymore) in the intensified competition for positions and funding. Consequently, they are pressured to avoid (open) conflict while strategically considering which networks and information (not) to share with their colleagues. What is more, the continuous competition fuels (1) a constant comparison among (early-career) academics as well as (2) a constant expansion of the requirements as well as time period for obtaining a permanent position, driving them to "inflate" their qualifications while these qualifications are simultaneously inflated – thereby generating a cycle of boundless self-optimisation. This constitutes a most convenient conjuncture for their employers – who are themselves under pressure to optimise output – who can offer them less (financially) secure positions while at the same time demanding more output. Whereas their dependency on superiors persists, early-career academics' prospects for an academic career deteriorate as the increasing competition results in increasingly precarious working conditions characterised by part-time and temporary employment, increasing mobility pressures and a lack of alternative career paths – developments that the next chapter elaborates on.

9 Between Privilege and Precarity

Working as an academic is a prestigious occupation reserved for a highly educated workforce and is assumed to entail the academic freedom (outlined in chapter 2.1) to self-determine one's work to a high degree (both concerning its content as well as its organisation) while enjoying security of employment. Overall, the early-career academics I met during my fieldworks felt privileged – and were told to feel that way (as illustrated by the one-day introduction course for PhD candidates at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Copenhagen mentioned in chapter 1) – for being able to pursue a work that they find genuinely interesting and that allows them to prove as well as develop their aptitude – particularly if it allowed them to earn their living. However, such accounts of privilege need to be complemented by accounts of the increasing precarity an increasing number of academics face.[301]

These insecure working conditions that early-career academics face are nothing new. It has become commonplace that an academic career is a risky endeavour, as already observed by Weber (2008) a hundred years ago in his speech "Science as a vocation" in which he states that under the German system

[301] Whereas in the US the terms "casual/-ised" or "contingent" appear to be commonly used, I (synonymously) use the term "precarious".

> the career of a man of science is, in practice, constructed on plutocratic foundations, for it is extraordinarily risky for a young scholar with no private means to embark on an academic career under such conditions. He must be able to sustain it for a number of years without having any way of knowing whether or not he will eventually get the opportunity to take up a position that will enable him to earn his keep. (ibid.: 26)

Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that he contrasts the German university system with the US where "the bureaucratic system is the norm. There the young man receives a salary from the beginning" (ibid.: 26). Besides, he relativises both statements insofar as he points out that while in the US the early-career academic can be dismissed, this is highly unlikely to happen to his German counterpart. "True, he makes no 'demands.' But he does have the understandable idea that, if he has been working there for years, he has a kind of moral right to be given consideration." (ibid.: 26) Correspondingly, Bourdieu (1988) reports that in the previous "University of professorial oligarchy" early-career academics had stable career perspectives in "a world without surprises" (ibid.: 153).

> The assistant lecturers who, in the previous state of the institution, were no more numerous than the tenured professors […] were separated only by age, that is by a time-lag, from the professors, from whom they differed as little as possible in every other respect. […] Indeed it is possible to get the assistant lecturers to resign themselves to have nothing for so long and to such an advanced age, to hold merely subordinate positions in a hierarchy where the intermediate degrees (which moreover are few enough) are defined only negatively through lack of certain attributes attached to higher positions, only because they are guaranteed eventually to have it all, and all at once, to pass without transition from the incompleteness of the assistant lectureship to the plenitude of the professorship, and, by the same token, from the class of impoverished heirs to that of legitimate title-holders. Just as the certainty of the compensations attached to their promised inheritance could lead the elder sons of noble families (or, in certain traditions, peasant families) to accept the sacrifices and servitudes of a prolonged state of tutelage, so the confidence of the rightful heir is, paradoxically, the reason for the resignation of the claimants to the post of professors. (Bourdieu 1988: 153f.)

However, the contemporary university does not resemble the gentleman's club described by Bourdieu. While the tenured professors were superseded by professors with regular employment contracts, the number of assistant professor fell behind that of permanently employed professors (at least in my field sites) – replaced by a growing number of PhD candidates and Postdocs employed on (mostly externally funded) temporary contracts.[302] Therefore, "[t]here is a growing concern that early-career researchers risk becoming a source of cheap labour without stable employment contracts, and worse, without sound career perspectives" (Science Europe 2016: 4). Already two decades ago, Enders (1999) notes that the academic profession faces "[d]ecline, erosion, deprofessionalisation" – a development that he links to "the massification of higher education and the long standing secular trend towards a 'knowledge' society" (ibid.: 73). Accordingly,

[302] This constitutes a significant difference between the historical condition of the university described by Bourdieu or seven decades earlier by Weber: While at Weber's time the numbers of precariously employed, non-professorial academic staff was relatively small, they have come to constitute the vast majority of academic staff at universities (cf. Kreckel 2013: 56). What is more, in Bourdieu's (1988) account the victims of the transformation of the mode of recruitment are assistant professors who have to be content with an "inferior career" "in the lower ranks of the hierarchy" (ibid.: 145). Yet they are victims who are able to continue the work they had been assigned with until they retire from it – unlike most of their contemporary colleagues.

Scott (2007) argues that "[j]ust as élite universities have been swallowed up in mass higher education, as well as post-secondary or tertiary education; so a proud professoriate has been swallowed up in a burgeoning academic proletariat" (ibid.: 206, cf. Bourdieu 1988: 164, Bousquet 2002: 84). It appears that whereas the university provided (most of) its academic employees with secure employment conditions and a high degree of freedom in determining their work as long as it primarily catered for a relatively small elite, these "privileged" working conditions changed when an increasing number of academics (with less distinguished family backgrounds) started teaching an increasing number of students (with less distinguished family backgrounds). In other words: to the extent that an increasing amount of temporary academic positions creates more promises of having an academic career, they become less promising. As Barcan (2013) puts it:

> Today, gaining professional entry into this world is at once easier and more difficult than it ever was. Easier, in the sense that academia is now open to, and welcoming of, a far broader cross-section of the population than was ever the case, including women, people of colour, and people from working-class backgrounds. Harder, though, because the days of getting a permanent academic job with a good first degree are long gone, academic work is increasingly casualized, and the pool of people who might aspire to an academic job has expanded alongside substantial growth in the higher education system. (ibid.: 2)[303]

It is consequently not surprising that Gill (2010) declares precariousness to be

> one of the defining experiences of contemporary academic life – particularly, but not exclusively, for younger or 'career early' staff (a designation that can now extend for one's entire 'career', given the few opportunities for development or secure employment.) […] While, in the past, short-term contracts were largely limited to research positions and tied to specific, time-limited projects, today they also characterise teaching posts which are frequently offered on a one-year temporary basis at the bottom of the pay scale. However, even these posts constitute the 'aristocracy of labour' when compared to the proliferation of short-term, part-time teaching positions, contracted on an hourly paid basis, in which PhD students or new postdocs are charged with delivering mass undergraduate programmes, with little training, inadequate support and rates of pay that – when preparation and marking are taken into account – frequently fall (de facto) below the minimum wage and make even jobs in cleaning or catering look like attractive pecuniary options. (ibid.: 232)

In that regard, Musselin (2013) shows how in the course of NPM reforms governments reduced protections they had so far provided for the academic profession, Ullrich (2016) points out that in Germany only 13% of the academic and artistic staff at universities had a permanent fulltime position in 2011 and Ivancheva (2015) that "[i]n Ireland alone, […] a growing number of casual academics win on average 10 000 € annual income for an average of eight and a half years after finishing their PhD" (ibid.: 41f.). Such accounts were confirmed by a panel of early-career anthropologists from various countries that met at the 13th biennial conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists (EASA) in 2014 (Follis and Rogler 2015) – a circumstance that resulted in the creation of the PrecAnthro initiative at the next biennial EASA

[303] Already in the 1980s Bourdieu (1988) attests a "devaluation of academic diplomas […] creating a structural hiatus between the statutory expectations – inherent in the positions and the diplomas which in the previous state of the system really did offer corresponding opportunities – and the opportunities actually provided by these diplomas and positions at the moment" (ibid.: 163).

conference[304]. A series of similar initiatives and petitions confirm this issue to be neither limited to anthropology nor a few (European) countries: for example a "Resolution on Contingent and Part-time Academic Labor"[305] submitted to the American Anthropological Association in 2013[306], the petitions of 2014 "For good work in academia"[307] and "Science as a vocation – for better employment conditions and predictable prospects"[308] in Germany as well as a statement by the German Sociological Association on the employment relationships in academia of 2016[309] or the "Bratislava Declaration of Young Researchers"[310] of 2016. Unsurprisingly, precarious working conditions of academics have also been addressed in recent years in a number of PhD theses – for instance at my own university by Nöbauer (2009), Sigl (2012) and Sutter (2012). Even a recent publication by the Austrian Council for Research and Technology Development warns young readers interested in science and research of "frustration causes in abundance" if they consider to pursue an academic career (Ahne and Müller 2016: 69, my translation).

Clearly, governments have become aware of the precarious situation of many (early-career) academics too. For instance, the Austrian Ministry of Science, Research and Economy notes that ca. 75% of the academic staff at Austrian universities is only employed for a few years with little prospect of a permanent position (BMWFW 2015a: 10), that Postdocs have few egalitarian opportunities for participation (ibid.: 12) and that the staff structure of universities has not kept up over the past 15 years with the distinctly increased demands they face (ibid.: 13). Moreover, there is no shortage in recommendations on how to improve the situation of early-career academics. More than a decade ago, the European Commission (2005)[311] remarked that "particular priority should be given to the organisation of working and training conditions in the early stage of the researchers' careers, as it contributes to the future choices and attractiveness of a career in R&D" (ibid.: 6). It advocates (among other things) that (1) "employers and/or funders should

[304] See <http://allegralaboratory.net/towards-a-transnational-anthropology-union-universitycrisis/> (accessed 3 June 2017).
[305] See <http://sunta.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Resolution-on-Contingent-Part-time-Academic-Labor.-.pdf> (accessed 6 October 2017).
[306] With regard to the US, Bousquet (2008) claims that "for decades, most Ph.D.s have systematically been destined for radical proletarianization or the scrap heap" (ibid.: XIV). Accordingly, Hyatt (2004) reports at a roundtable session organised by the American Anthropological Association of "the casualization of the academic workforce" with undergraduate classes "increasingly being taught by part-time and temporary itinerant academics, who do not enjoy any of the privileges of permanent tenure" (ibid.: 25). A year later, DiGiacomo (2005) remarks that "[i]ncreasingly, US university departments are staffed by faculty members hired on short-term contracts for one year, one semester or one course (for which the pay is abusively low)" (ibid.: 57).
[307] See <https://www.openpetition.de/petition/online/fuer-gute-arbeit-in-der-wissenschaft> (accessed 1 June 2017, my translation); for an overview of the initiative see Ullrich (2016).
[308] See <https://www.openpetition.de/petition/online/wissenschaft-als-beruf-fuer-bessere-beschaeftigungsbedingungen-und-planbare-perspektiven> (accessed 23 August 2016, my translation).
[309] See <http://www.soziologie.de/uploads/media/DGS-Stellungnahme_zu_Beschaeftigungsbedingungen_Februar_2016.pdf> (accessed 6 October 2017).
[310] See <http://www.eu2016.sk/data/documents/bratislava-declaration-of-young-researchers-final.pdf> (accessed 23 August 2016).
[311] In contrast to the (at least Austrian) academic tradition, it considers PhD candidates as professional researchers and states that "[a]ll researchers engaged in a research career should be recognised as professionals and be treated accordingly. This should commence at the beginning of their careers, namely at postgraduate level, and should include all levels, regardless of their classification at national level (e.g. employee, postgraduate student, doctoral candidate, postdoctoral fellow, civil servants)" (European Commission 2005: 16) – a statement that resurfaces in the Salzburg II recommendations (EUA 2010).

ensure that the performance of researchers is not undermined by instability of employment contracts, and should therefore commit themselves as far as possible to improving the stability of employment conditions for researchers" (ibid.: 17), (2) for "fair and attractive conditions of funding and/or salaries", emphasising that "[t]his must include researchers at all career stages including early-stage researchers" (ibid.: 18), (3) for specific career development strategies "for researchers at all stages of their career, regardless of their contractual situation, including for researchers on fixed-term contracts" (ibid.: 18) or (4) that "the entry and admission standards for researchers, particularly at the beginning at their careers, are clearly specified and should also facilitate access for disadvantaged groups or for researchers returning to a research career" (ibid.: 23). In comparison, the recommendations of the Austrian Science Board appear modest with advising the Austrian government and universities to improve the working conditions of PhD candidates by ensuring their financial security as well as a responsible personnel policy that provides qualified early-career academics with secure, permanent career paths three to five years after the completion of their PhD (Österreichischer Wissenschaftsrat 2007: 1–4, 17, cf. Österreichischer Wissenschaftsrat 2013: 95, 101). As well-intended as such recommendations may be, they primarily appear to prove that paper is patient whereas their implementation is remote and uncertain – a fact that may be explained by Bousquet's (2008) assertion that academics are not simply victims of this situation but its collaborators or even proponents as well.

> Most of what we do every day perpetuates – indeed, normalizes – every inequity and every abuse presently structured into academic employment. We have met the enemy, but we will not admit that it is us. (ibid.: XVIf.)

Nor is the externally driven economisation of the university – despite having been "a catalyst for the casualisation of the workforce" (Shore 2011: 498) that DiGiacomo (2005) considers to be "a direct outcome of neoliberalism and the new managerialism in higher education" (ibid.: 58) – its only cause. Quite the contrary, Bousquet (2008) argues that precarious working conditions are not a malfunctioning of the university system, but exactly what its functioning is based on: "the continuous replacement of degree holders with nondegreed labor (or persons with degrees willing to work on unfavorable terms)" (ibid.: 24, cf. Bousquet 2002: 88). Referring to the US' higher education system, he notes that "[f]or many graduates employees, the receipt of the Ph.D. signifies the end, and not the beginning of a long teaching career" (Bousquet 2008: 21). This observation is crucial, as from it follows that "the holders of the doctoral degree are not so much the *products* of the graduate-employee labor system as its *by-products*" (ibid.: 21). In other words, they are "the waste product of graduate education" – "the actual shit" (i.e. systemic waste) of a university system that "creates holders of the Ph.D. but doesn't have much use for them" (Bousquet 2002: 89) and thus churns them "inexorably toward the outside: not merely 'disposable' labor (Walzer) but labor that must be disposed of for the system to work" (Bousquet 2008: 27, cf. Bousquet 2002: 91).

However, "these things are rarely spoken of within the academy, and, if they are, they tend to be treated as individual, personal experience rather than structural features of the contemporary

university" (Gill 2010: 233). For instance, the Austrian Ministry of Science, Research and Economy describes a "typical academic university career" as follows:

> A typical scientific university career looks like this: After having finished a Master or diploma programme, the first step on the career ladder is employment as a university assistant for a limited period of four to six years. During this time, you should complete your doctoral studies. Before the contract expires, a conversation between employer and employee should clarify whether the latter has a chance at an academic career at the university in question. In case of a positive outcome he/she can apply for a so-called "Laufbahnstelle"[192], a Postdoc position limited to six years which carries the title of "Assistenzprofessor" ("Assistant professor").[312] (Kasparovsky and Wadsack-Köchl 2015: 33f., my translation)

I have not encountered one single early-career anthropologist in the course of my fieldwork – at least of the current academic generation – whose career trajectory matched that "typical" career. Instead, while the vast majority of PhD candidates had no academic funding at all, the "privileged" rest – be they university assistants or externally funded – had no prospect to apply for a so-called "Laufbahnstelle" after they successfully finished their positions.

If it is not the individual that is failing the system but the system that is failing the individual, why then is this issue not more widely discussed (at least by those who face precarious working conditions)? Part of the explanation may be that precarity serves as a category of otherness rather than of identity as observed by Thorkelson (2016)[313]. Another part may be that precariously employed academics dispose of little to no (enduring) institutional representation (in form of a trade union)[314] and are therefore dealt with by management – which profits from its staff's precarious dependency and has therefore little reason to make it a subject of discussion – on a case by case basis. Accordingly, a Postdoc in Copenhagen complained at an informal Postdoc meeting that when it comes to her rights and obligations, she felt strongly that she negotiated with someone who knew the rules (i.e. the head of department) whereas she did not. Referring to positions that only involve teaching, another Postdoc observed in an interview that

> *[t]hese [complaints about insecure employment conditions, author's note] are taken on a very individual level: individuals negotiating with their leader. It hasn't come out as a collective endeavour – partly because there are not a lot of people, to be honest, if you count the number of people who are actually employed here and also the number of doctoral students. If we are a special category of "the marginally employed", ours is relatively small. And we also have very different contracts. So it's not easy to unite around these issues.*

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[312] Yet the current poor attractiveness of an academic career due to its high uncertainty is no secret to the Austrian government (see for example Austrian Federal Government 2011: 15, BMWFW 2015a: 2, 9–13, BMWFW 2015b: 19) – which does not lack a certain irony considering that it regards universities to be institutions of central importance in the knowledge society (BMWFW 2015b: 7) that depend on their "human resources" (ibid.: 19).

[313] "[P]recarity in this world [of French academia, author's note] was often intimately outside, often strategically held at a distance. For lower-status workers who stood to benefit from contingent working arrangements, it was a category that was decoupled from their own identities and professional trajectories. For aspiring elites […] it resembled what psychoanalysts have called the 'extimate' or uncanny (Dolar 1991): a foreign body inside the self, a threatening incursion of the Other within." (Thorkelson 2016: 485)

[314] For example, as the employee representatives of the academic staff of the University of Vienna are elected for a period of four years, it is difficult for academics employed on short-term contracts to even run for such a position. "External" lecturers in Vienna can at least call on the "Interessengemeinschaft LektorInnen und WissensarbeiterInnen". At the department in Copenhagen, an initiative called RAWE ("Resist academic work exploitation") was not taken further as its founders had to focus their efforts on promoting their own, still precarious careers.

A final preliminary remark appears to be in order: While the victims of this casualisation appear to be early-career academics in the first place, the dichotomy between exploitative (senior) academics and exploited (junior) academics is too simplistic. Barcan (2013: 200) draws attention to the fact that although "the privileges of tenured staff are bought at the expense of the un- or under-valued labour of the equivalent of the academic 'proletariat' […] [t]he overworked permanent staff and the under-valued casual staff are two sides of the same coin". Likewise, Fanghanel (2012: 22) found in her research that senior academics have to concede to heavy workloads just as well as junior academics, and Shore and McLauchlan (2012a) note that if one expression of the introduction of a new commercial rationality at universities

> was casualisation of junior academic staff and the increasing number of new employees being placed on insecure, short-term and part-time contracts, another was the 'proletarianisation of the professoriat [sic]' itself through the disciplinary regimes of auditing and New Public Management (NPM). (ibid.: 271)

However, the "proletarianisation of early-career academics" and the "proletarianisation of the professoriate" constitute two sides of the same coin but not the same phenomena. While both groups are subjected to an intensification of both the extent and the managerial surveillance of their workload, the following sub-chapters focus on insecurities and uncertainties that particularly leave early-career academics vulnerable to (self-)exploitation such as low pay, insecure career prospects, pressures to be internationally mobile or the uncertainty whether they perform well enough and if not, whether they have viable alternatives to find work in another sector.

9.1 A Greedy Privilege

Academic work is widely considered to be a privileged kind of work allowing one to pursue topics of one's interest while leaving one the freedom to arrange one's own working hours. As a senior academic in Vienna put it:

> *People have to know that an academic career means a lot of work, which means certainly no 40-hour week or regular working hours. Instead, it dominates and occupies most of your life. But [...] personally, I prefer to work much more than 40 hours if this means that I can more or less set my own work. Of course, not all of it is self-determined, because you've got to do what the job requires. But that you can do something that doesn't feel like work, that you actually like doing.*

Along these lines one of her colleagues told me that

> *I chose to do something that brings me personal fulfillment. Something I enjoy. And to have the privilege to be able to do something you enjoy, that is maybe both a hobby and a job at the same time – to a certain degree [...] – that is a privilege I was, and I still am today, willing to put up with a lower salary for.*

Accordingly, a senior academic in Copenhagen explained to me that if one was to become an academic, one would not earn much money, but would be free to determine one's own working hours which would be worth a great deal; and a Postdoc in Vienna stated that

I haven't been studying for years to then have to be at work at quarter to nine. I do creative work and if I work through the night twice in a row, I certainly don't want to get up and be ready at half past eight. This is simply what I require: I want to be free.

However, such freedom comes with strings attached in the form of a greedy work ethic (cf. chapter 2.3) demanding a high degree of personal commitment and sacrifices (such as renouncing or neglecting social ties or enduring precarious working conditions), as well as increasing performance pressures. Put simply: academics are free to work according to their own schedule as long as they work all the time – an assertion that is supported by the reply of the Postdoc quoted above to my question whether I was allowed to use that passage in my thesis: "hahahhahah what an illusion... By now I sometimes work through the night and then get up at 7, because otherwise I won't manage to do everything I am supposed to... but sure, this is what I require. :-)"

Ironically, it appears that this greedy "nature" not only constitutes academic work "as so perfectly emblematic of this neoliberal moment" (Gill 2010: 240) but simultaneously constitutes (part of) its appeal: to offer academics personal fulfilment by investing all of their intellectual as well as emotional resources into producing not just any output but one carrying their name, allowing them to (im)prove their proficiency and (thereby even more so) earn the rare recognition of a highly selective community.

The greedy dynamics of academic work are already firmly embedded in the PhD education as evidenced by a PhD candidate in Copenhagen explaining to me that doing a PhD is not only unlike a regular job insofar as one cannot simply change employers (cf. chapter 9.2), but also as quitting can feel like a personal failure or like a believer losing her devotion. Moreover, she felt that

what's really stressful is that this PhD thing becomes such a huge part of your identity. I remember that one of the tasks you had to do quite early in the beginning was to do your profile on the university webpage, with a photo and your portfolio and your CV and describing your area of work. And that's like creating who you are academically. For the other people and the department to see and for yourself to convince yourself that: "Okay, I'm this." And then you have to live up to that or make that come true. At least I had difficulties feeling that I'm doing a PhD. But after five o'clock when I'm with my kids […] I was still a PhD. You can't take a break.

On that note, a Postdoc reported of

[t]he existential weight of a PhD, because of the humanities tradition and the idea that a PhD isn't just something you do but actually it's you. It's a measure of your worth as a human being. […] The PhD I think is still seen as a measure of your soul by the person doing it.

This weight appears to grow with the sense of being (expected to feel) privileged – a sense that both departments made sure to convey to their funded PhD candidates. For instance, a (part-time) funded PhD candidate in Vienna remarked that

[a]ctually, we are that immensely privileged elite group. At least this label is assigned to us and it's conveyed to us that we're supposed to see it that way: that it is an immense privilege to be paid for doing a PhD – especially in the social sciences. That is this burden of gratitude that we carry around on our backs.

This double-edged burden does not only pertain to individually funded PhD candidates like the one quoted above, but also to those employed in research projects (even if they are not paid for writing their thesis). As one of them in Vienna explained to me:

> *This is an unwritten law: Thousands are waiting for this job – take it or leave it. And if you take it, then be content with the conditions and be glad that you're the one who got it […] This develops dynamics of its own: On the one hand you're extremely proud that you're the one who is allowed do that and who is being asked. And then you start by writing a project proposal for three months for free.*

This sense of being privileged entailed an implicit expectation to show gratitude in the sense of not complaining while spawning a feeling of guilt for not living up to that privilege (or even renouncing it) – particularly when knowing that many had failed in getting that position. For example, a PhD candidate in Copenhagen who had succeeded in getting a highly competitive position told me:

> *I met a guy whom I did my Master thesis with one day in Copenhagen and I said that I would apply for the grant and he was like: "Oh, I'm applying too. So we're competing with each other." And I was like: "Oh well, take it easy. The best of us is going to get it." And then I got it. So I was quite aware that I was the lucky one getting it and, like, 50 other anthropologists who might deserve it just as much didn't get it. Of course, that is a kind of pressure because my fellow anthropologists didn't get it. I got it. Therefore I should both be grateful and do a proper PhD.*

On that note, one of her colleagues revealed to me that "[b]ecause there is this discourse that we are very privileged I also felt really guilty at the same time. [...] I felt guilty that I wasn't able to handle it, that I had these feelings of wanting to quit".[315] Thus, when a PhD candidate decided to quit her PhD position at the department in Copenhagen it sent shockwaves of (open) perplexity and (silent) admiration through her colleagues. As one of them told me later on: "I remember when she quit I felt really envious. And several people have told me that they felt the same way. Like: 'That is so bold! I wish I had the balls to do that.'"

Of course, even if early-career anthropologists have doubts – and they did, both in Vienna and in Copenhagen – they are well-advised (and well aware) not to show them as those senior academics allocating relatively rare academic funding/positions are likely to have embodied a vocational work ethic themselves and therefore expecting it of those they employ. For instance, a senior academic in Vienna emphasised the importance of a high commitment as a selection criterion for an internally funded PhD position:

> *To me it's important that a person is buzzing with motivation and ambition. [...] People have to have this drive from the very start, this will to do this. In reality having an academic career means sacrificing a lot on a personal level. Not minding that and being ready to do that is a very important prerequisite.*

Subsequently, she elaborated on the commitment an academic career requires and the price such an endeavour entails in the form of working long hours and the effect this has on private relationships:

[315] Such feelings of guilt are intensified by the "toxic shame" afflicting academics when faced with a negative review of their work (Gill 2010: 240, cf. chapter 9.6).

There are people who want to live a comfortable life. They do their job and go home at 5 pm and have every weekend off. A normal life, so to speak. And that doesn't work in academia. On the one hand it's a matter of working hours: 40 hours will never be enough for sure. In practice, you're engaged in your job day and night if you're doing it right. Especially nowadays, having all these modern information technologies: you're always connected and you can always react. Long field-works can be positive as well... but they're not easy, of course. And for some, an academic career means sacrificing a relationship. [...] You shouldn't delude yourself into thinking: "Great, I'm going to be in Vienna all my life, work 38 hours a week and then become a professor." That's not how it works. […] If you want to make a career in academia, then you should forget about work time regulations from the outset. […] If it's important to you to have a decent income while doing regular working hours, you should be doing something else.[316]

Hence, it appears that academics not only have to be passionate about their work in order to do it well, but also to be able to bear the (personal and economic) sacrifices it entails. Two senior academics, one in Vienna and one in Copenhagen, addressed this issue as follows:

People who in fact don't want to do this and aren't passionate about it are really in the wrong place […] Then the price you have to pay to work in this field is too high. If you lack passion, I think it's really better if you do something else. Because you're paid nothing, the social status isn't the best either. […] So why do it?

There is an element of: You are not doing this for that [to become rich] – so what are you doing it for? […] You have to love the anticipation of the supervisory session. You have to feel the nerves of the students in the lecture hall when you throw something new out on the table. You've got to love that stuff. And if you don't, if it's a drag every time you have to prepare a lecture and go through the bureaucracy of organising it […]; if that is bringing you down – it doesn't get easier. It gets worse. You get more courses. […] And the same with research. […] You can easily get dragged down. I mean there is bureaucracy like crazy here. If you don't have that drive it's going to be crazy that you are doing the boring stuff while not getting a kick out of it.[317]

One of the most vivid testimonies of high personal investment I encountered during my fieldwork was the account of a senior academic in Copenhagen of how she had pursued her academic career. Telling me that she "would have been really crushed" if she would not have succeeded in obtaining a permanent position, she continued:

But I have no regrets in the sense that I gave it my all. There is this famous scene in "One flew over the cuckoo's nest" where Jack Nicholson [...] is trying to get this gang of guys to [escape a psychiatric ward]: "Let's get out of here!" And he is just met with apathy. I don't remember the exact context. But then there is this... One thing that could facilitate their escape was to move a sink. But they didn't have any tools and the sink was bolted. So then he went to the sink and he started to [gestures tearing the sink out with her arms] and his veins were popping out. Of course, he

[316] That such an attitude is symptomatic for academia is not only illustrated by chapter 2.3 but as well (and more humorously) by a PhD comic entitled „Overtime" (see <http://phdcomics.com/comics/archive.php?comicid=1797>, accessed 23 September 2017) depicting the following conversation between a PhD candidate and his professor. PhD: "I had to pull several all-nighters and work around the clock, Prof. Smith, but I finished the project in time and submitted it." Professor: "Good, good. Now imagine if you worked that hard all the time and not just when you had a deadline. What do you think would happen?" PhD: "I'd probably be dead." Professor: "Yes, but you'd have a Ph.D."

[317] However, she remarked that "I'm trying to glorify it in the sense that […]: 'We are not doing it for money.' But that's bullshit. […] I don't want to live on the street and teach people. I want a job, nine to five. I want a house and all that stuff and certain standards of living. […] It's not idealism in the sense that at all costs I would... Because if I don't get a salary I am not going to be doing this".

couldn't move it – it was bolted. But then he said: "At least I tried. At least I tried." And that has really been very formative for me.[318]

With senior academics having incorporated a greedy work ethic it is not surprising that they expected the same from not only their PhD candidates but their Postdocs as well. In that regard, a Postdoc in Copenhagen was told

that I had a long range of obligations […]. I couldn't just write about anything. I had some mandatory tasks that I had to fulfil. And [her superior, author's note] said to me: "But at the same time you have this wonderful dissertation with all these fantastic ideas. You should remember to publish that also." And I asked: "Okay, how do I do that if I'm supposed to work […] at least 50 hours a week or something like that. She said: "I think you should take Sundays off and you could work then." That is so hard-core. "Take Sundays off." Like […] take it off, spend it with my family. But no, in order to publish your PhD.

When I asked one of her colleagues how many hours she was working per week, she answered that

[i]t varies, but I think around 45. [...] And I do realise that that is absolutely in the low end. Had you asked me as a PhD I would have laughed at you, at that number saying: "You're never going to get anywhere with that." [...] I think that's a realistic answer. I would love to say 60, but it isn't 60. [...] I am trying to be honest here, although I was thinking: "Should I be honest or should I say 50, 55?".[319]

Obviously, it is a convenient conjuncture for academic employers that such a greedy work ethic which encourages working long hours far beyond a regular full-time employment extends from tenured professors to less paid and even precariously employed "junior" staff. What is more, early-career anthropologists are expected to not only show commitment to their work but also to their workplace by behaving like "good citizens", i.e. that they invest their unpaid "free" time to participate in activities that go beyond their contractual obligations – a tacit prerequisite for accumulating the social capital needed to continue their academic career. A senior academic in Copenhagen put it like this:

Number one advice for any junior scholar is: make yourself visible! [...] Put your hand up. When no one is volunteering, volunteer. Because that visibility without a doubt is capital. There is no question. I don't care who you are: if you are doing your bit, if you are participating, if you are contributing as a citizen in your department, it becomes... Let's say at the end of the day you are just as qualified as the other candidate – that capital is worth every penny. Because you did your time. The other person didn't.

[318] However, unlike Jack Nicholson early-career academics try to frantically break into a highly selective institution which has its gates to permanent positions firmly bolted and tries to exclude rather than retain them (cf. Bousquet 2002, 2008) – in competition with "outmates" who are everything but apathetic.

[319] Her answer points to the difficulty that getting a reliable account of academics on how much they work constitutes in a profession that (1) blurs the boundaries of work and free time and (2) is subjected to the productivist imperative of the managerial university. As one of her colleagues noted: "Everyone is talking about how busy they are. No way – I don't believe that! It definitely seems like a discourse. You're not allowed to say that you're actually just checking your e-mails and Facebook all day long. And I know that happens to a lot of people, I know that. But here no one can say that: 'Oh, I had a shitty day, I wasn't very productive this week.' Because there is this competition, major pressure on people to always have this outward face of being effective and productive."

It is understandable that such greedy demands in combination with (relatively) little compensation (even more so in Vienna than in Copenhagen) give rise to concerns whether an academic career is worth the effort – particularly when taking into account the consequences this combination has for having a family. As an individually funded PhD candidate in Vienna put it:

I have to work my ass off if I want to have the slightest chance to continue. I know that. […] And at some point, you have to build a life as well. For us, at our stage, it's kind of easy: no kids, no family. But how long will you be happy with that?

In that regard, one of her colleagues told me that

I was shocked that we met for the first time on a holiday. Regardless of whether it's a Saturday, Sunday, a weekend, a holiday – you meet for these extra things [to write a project proposal, author's note] on a holiday because you don't have time for that during your normal working time. And that was somehow […] exemplary for what I then went on to experience about how academia works.

She added:

You're in a situation where you're constantly busy. But once you take a step back, you ask yourself: What for? I won't complete my PhD within these three years anyway. But apart from that, it doesn't matter whether I complete it or not: I don't have any guarantees for what comes next. And if you're about to have two children, so a four-person family, you're questioning everything related to being an academic. What for? The positive thing about it is the flexibility you have when it comes to how you use your time. But everything else: precarity, always having temporary contracts, always having to work more than you're being paid for, working without pay on the weekends, all these requirements – starting with mobility and this insecurity – all these very different things you've got to do: publish, teach, do research, tender projects... This is just so not family-friendly. It's simply so difficult to reconcile these things, especially with infants for whom you have care responsibilities, so that I now think: "I have to bow out." If you're not striving for a professorship, then... And if you do and you want to reach this goal you have to sacrifice a lot. And then you maybe reach it by the time you're 45 or 50. And who knows where. If you're not in it wholeheartedly, then I don't think it's the right path for you.

A Postdoc employed in a research project in Vienna pointed out another aspect of how the greedy "nature" of academic work complicates combining it with private and/or family life.

If you have children, particularly smaller ones, you're sick more often. Because they really do bring all kinds of illnesses home with them. This means that at the beginning the entire family is sick all the time until they have a base immunity. For my colleagues this means: They aren't sick, but you are – and somebody has to take over. That's just the way it is. And even if I'm entitled to sick leave – how do you deal with this problem? [...] This is also the reason why all of us are going to work sick. […] After all, I'm free to organise my time how I want. I was sick last week – for me this means zero hours of work. I don't take sick leave. Because there's no point – I have to catch up on my work anyway. Then I can do without the paperwork and a doctor's visit and all the official stuff. So I never take sick leave. I also don't take the care leave I'm entitled to. […] And de facto I haven't had a single day of holiday last year. And I don't know whether I will be able to go on holiday [until the end of the project, author's note].

Another Postdoc in Vienna revealed to me after an interview that she had decided against pursuing an academic career because she felt that she could not reconcile the high commitment this would entail with being a partner and a mother. This is not to say that having an academic career and a(n intact) family are mutually exclusive. Clearly, there are (senior) academics who have a

permanent position and children (and possibly even a long, fulfilled partnership). Besides, many early-career anthropologists in Copenhagen – where their income is higher – had children. My point here is to show that (1) struggling to reconcile work and private/family life is one of the greedy features of academic work and (2) being passionate about one's academic work is not enough if one is not ready – or able – to make the personal sacrifices it requires. In that regard, a PhD candidate told me that although she had realised when starting her position that she would have difficulties finding employment later on, she had not realised how much she would personally and mentally struggle with the demands her position entailed – demands that she also was not fully aware of first, for instance regarding the extent and personal consequences of her fieldwork.

In fact, I had the impression that it was sometimes those who initially pursued their research most passionately (rather than most ambitiously) who struggled most to bring their high motivation in accordance with a highly competitive everyday reality calling for prescribed performance rather than intrinsic passion.[320] It is therefore not surprising that I frequently encountered another piece of advice accompanying the one to be passionate: that to be persistent, i.e. to complement passion with toughness, self-confidence and ambition. Here are some examples drawn from interviews with different senior academics in Copenhagen:

> *I would advise a PhD student to be very enthusiastic and not take no for an answer. And every time you get a no or a rejection, take it as an inspiration to prove them wrong.*

> *The trick is to get out there and get bruised up. I remember the first couple [of articles, author's note] I submitted quite early on as a PhD student just got absolutely trashed and obliterated by the reviewers. It's very tough on the ego and the self-confidence and the esteem. [...] Just get beaten up, get a black eye. Because you learn through that there are some codes that you can crack.*

> *I would advise them to be thick-skinned. Take it on the chin. Resilience and perseverance. […] And don't let yourself be put off by a negative review or whatever. The academic world is full of egos that don't feel they get enough attention. And a lot of these egos, when they write anonymous peer reviews, that's only when they let off steam. [...] And you need to be able to stomach that.*

A fourth senior academic in Copenhagen gave me similar advice to not take rejections personal (rather than deeming them to be a provocation).

> *I said to myself: "I don't want to place myself in a situation that vulnerable where other people's decisions decide the quality of my life." Don't do that to yourself. Don't place yourself in a situation where everything – how you look upon yourself as a success or a failure – is entirely dependent on some committee. Because it's not worth it. Your life is really more important than the decision of some assessment committee. I sometimes think that people who are really keen on wanting to do an academic career […] they are putting themselves in such a vulnerable position. [...] And they become bitter. [...] It's not healthy. It's not healthy for those who are winning and it's not healthy for those who fail.*

This brings us to a challenging – if not schizophrenic – situation early-career anthropologists face in the contemporary university that demands of them the traditional high commitment while

[320] Drawing on the concepts developed by Boltanski and Thévenot (2007), we can conclude that early-career academics do not only have to conform to an inspired polity but to an industrial and market polity as well (cf. footnote 174).

increasingly (1) depriving them of the possibility to define their own research (if they are employed in research projects obtained by others) as well as (2) demonstrating little commitment to them.[321] With permanent academic positions being rare and the path to them cluttered with stiff competition, the demands for high specialisation and commitment are reinforced whereas the chances that they are rewarded are decreased. Consequently, they are on the one hand expected to highly invest themselves into their work (thereby taking it personal) and on the other hand to be ready to leave their work (place) behind once their temporary employment ends (thereby drawing a distinction between themselves and their work). This contradictory demand resonates in the advice given by a senior academic in Copenhagen to

> *look out for yourself. Don't be worried about the department in the sense of: "Oh, there are not enough teachers. I feel obligated." Don't. But do worry about the department because it's a place that you come to work and you want to be here and contribute and make life at the department fun and dynamic.*

Or, as she told me in another interview regarding how to handle rejections of funding or publication proposals: "Don't take things personal […]. Even when it's personal, don't take it personal. That would be my advice." On that note, a Postdoc in Vienna – who had also told me that "no one can write a good thesis unless it comes from the heart" as well as that "if you're not the epitomy of excitement and enthusiasm, you can't teach" explained to me:

> *This is my hypothesis: If you give up on everything, and you stop clinging at things, everything will suddenly start to work out. I really didn't care whether this works out or not. Or I thought it wouldn't anyway. But I accepted it: Okay, I won't get a job. What I've achieved so far is not enough. Okay – I won't die. I mean, I can work as a waitress as well. I don't shy away from any type of work. […] That's it. A complete reduction of your personhood to your basic needs: […] that you can really say goodbye to an academic career. I didn't want to identify myself with anything anymore, because I'm not that academia. I can live without it. […] And I can write books without an academic position as well. I'm just fed up with being dependent on institutions. […] If the system is that hostile towards knowledge and if it just dumps people who are good at what they do and who want to work, maybe it's better not to be part of the system. […] Now I'm in a different phase and a lot of things have worked out. […] But maybe I'll be unemployed in one year's time. […] You never know.*

In turning the pursuit of an academic career into a Zen-like exercise ("If you give up on everything, […] everything will suddenly start to work out.") of resolving the paradox of simultaneous persistent commitment and forced flexibility, the contemporary university is reminiscent of its ancestor, the monastery. Like the church, the university can ask much of its "members" without giving (most of them) much material support. To put it bluntly: If you tell people that they work for a higher purpose you do not have to pay them a high salary – as is shown in the next chapter.

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[321] Hence, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) note that as a result of academic capitalism faculty members may "have become committed less to the academic community and more to economic factors, the allegiance being to funding agents and outside employers" (ibid.: 227) – in line with Sennett's (2006) observation that "[c]ommitment is in increasingly scarce supply in the new capitalism, in terms of institutional loyalty" as "[t]he sentiment would be irrational – how can you commit to an institution which is not committed to you" (ibid.: 196). In a university system where institutional loyalty is already traditionally "weak and largely unrewarded" (Bourdieu 1988: 99) it is not surprising that academics may be highly committed to their work but not to their work place.

9.2 Insecure Presents

Temporary and part-time employment – often going hand in hand – characterise the employment relationships of early-career academics in many countries both in the EU and US.

> Like their corporate counterparts, university managers have reconfigured their labour force. They too are concerned with developing a flexible work force, which they see as necessary to restructure colleges and universities to integrate with the new economy. In academe, flexibility is attained by increasing the numbers of part-time or contingent faculty. Part-time teachers increased from 22 percent of the labor force in 1970 to approximately 50 percent in 1997 (Benjamin 2002). (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004: 18)

> In many advanced countries, a substantial proportion of academics are employed part-time for some period of their junior career, and employment on a short-term basis is more frequent than for persons of their age in other professional areas. […] Some observers assert that these features of 'precarious' and 'uncertain' employment for junior academic staff are on the increase as the academy becomes more market-driven under the influence of the 'managerial university'… (Teichler et al. 2013: 88)[322]

In that regard, Shore (2008) notes that

> [t]he social and psychological effects of these techniques and practices [introduced in the course of NPM reforms, author's note] on organizations and individuals should not be underestimated […]. These include a substantial increase in workloads and in stress-related illnesses. Management strategies geared to creating a more flexible workforce have resulted in a sharp increase in the number of casual staff on short-term contracts who now perform many of the core teaching and examining duties previously carried out by permanent and tenured staff, but at a fraction of the cost as no research component is included in their conditions of employment. (ibid.: 282)

When it comes to their remuneration, early-career academics are clearly more disadvantaged in Vienna than in Copenhagen. In Austria, 31% of "junior academics" at universities are employed part-time (Höhle and Teichler 2013: 255) – a suspiciously small number concerning that PhD candidates are more or less consistently employed part-time[323] – with part-time employment for early-career academics being on the increase (Haller et al. 2013: 131). At the University of Vienna, the 3,332 FTE of academic staff employed in 2015 amount to a headcount of 6,765 employees, meaning that a significant number of the academic staff – particularly at the junior level – is only employed part-time (whereas those groups depicted in the table with mostly permanent contracts appear to have almost only full-time positions).[39] That ratio is more favourable for full-time employment at the University of Copenhagen with 5,311 FTE of full-time academic staff facing only 520 FTE of part-time staff (University of Copenhagen 2016: 48). Particularly harsh are the conditions for PhD candidates in Vienna, most of whom are not funded at all, which

[322] However, Teichler et al. (2013) note that "an enormous variety can be observed in this respect in advanced countries, and it would be difficult to conclude that there has been a convergent trend across countries" (ibid.: 88). Furthermore, it is difficult to compare part-time and short-term employment across countries because of different employment practices. "In some countries, many doctoral candidates are university employees and thus contribute in the statistics to seemingly higher 'unstable employment' while they are financially and socially better off than doctoral students with or without fellowships." (ibid.: 91)

[323] In that regard, Höhle and Teichler (2013) add that "[o]ne must bear in mind, though, that junior academics are not a homogenous group in these respects. At German universities, 99% of junior academics without a doctoral degree who graduated less than 6 years ago are employed on a short-term basis, but this is the case for only 45% with a doctoral degree who graduated more than 12 years ago" (ibid.: 255).

means that they have to pay for doing their fieldwork or attend conferences rather than being paid for doing research. One of my interlocutors told me how she first had to overdraw her bank account until she had reached her overdraft limit and then go on borrowing small amounts of money from friends in order to be able to focus working on her thesis.

> *At Christmas I came back [from doing field work, author's note] to Austria and was completely broke. And then I really had to look for a job. […] Because I was too proud to go to my father and ask him for money. I had told him in a grand gesture that I wouldn't need his money anymore, because I had gotten the Marietta Blau scholarship. And then the balance from my account dropped further and further into the red. And I have an overdraft of 2,000 Euro – 1,500 now, I think, they limited it thereafter – so up to the point you can't withdraw money anymore. I then borrowed, I remember, 50 Euro [from a relative, author's note] and 50 Euro again... That was really a struggle.*

And how she accepted this and its consequences (and could resort to the support of her family in order to do so):

> *Luckily, I didn't have to pay any rent, because I could stay in the flat [of another relative, author's note]. […] If financial security were that important to me, I wouldn't have started with my PhD at all. I've managed to get along with 400 Euro a month for twelve years. Of course, to be somehow financially secure is going to be more important at some point – simply if you have children, you aren't just responsible for yourself anymore. […] But better have children later on and run all the risks imaginable then having children during your PhD. […] I wouldn't know how to manage financially to have a child while doing my PhD.*

Even if they do have funding, PhD candidates in Vienna are only employed up to a maximum of 30 hours a week amounting to an income of up to 2,048.25 EUR gross per month in 2017 (cf. chapter 7.6). A PhD candidate revealed to me that although she knew that she had the privilege of being funded at all, she would have constant financial difficulties at the same time due to the additional costs incurring through her fieldwork.

On top of that – and in line with the greedy conception of academic work outlined in the previous chapter – early-career academics (most notably in Vienna but also in Copenhagen) are expected to work on their thesis or publications (to a lesser or larger extent, depending on their superior) in their unpaid "free" time, as their working time comprises of a number of other obligations such as teaching or assisting their professor respectively project leader – next to informal obligations like participating in conferences and guest lectures at the department. As a PhD candidate in Vienna put it:

> *You don't look at it this way anymore: „Am I paid to do this and that specifically?" It is clear anyway that you're doing 100,000 things you're not being paid for. Then you think: "Okay, at least I'm being paid for [a part of it, author's note]."*

Although it is common for academics to work (unpaid) overtime, early-career anthropologists in Austria are particularly prone to working full-time and more while only receiving a relatively low (part-time) salary – a circumstance that may well continue after having obtained a PhD degree. A Postdoc in Vienna told me that she had been employed for 20 hours per week for years while in fact working full-time.

That's true, I've never thought about that: I've never had a real full-time job – although I've always worked more than full-time. […] Part-time work exists on paper only. You work full-time – at least forty hours. Part-time work simply is self-exploitation as well as exploitation by the university.

In this example, the thin line between exploitation and self-exploitation characterising academic work becomes apparent: No one was explicitly demanding of her to work full-time – but no one was preventing her from doing so either (or probably even realising how much unpaid work she did). Neither did she want to do all this unpaid extra work, consisting of heavy administrative and teaching duties, which left her even less space to do research and thus improve her track record. Yet she did not (know how to) refuse it as the hope for a permanent position in the future in combination with the sheer work load at hand pushed her to take on these unrewarding obligations.

The Head of the Department disapproved [of her doing so much teaching, author's note]. She said I should only publish, publish, publish – and supervise as little as possible. But the students basically beat down my door. […] How often I have been a second examiner (of diploma/Master theses, author's note) – it's unbelievable. I remember that I did fifty defences within six weeks, I think. […] I was so thankful that I got this job. […] And I just wanted to do a good job. […] I told the Head of the Department right away that I am not geared for that [for administrative tasks, author's note]. And she replied: "Yes, I know – but no one else is going to do it."

Likewise, early-career anthropologists employed in research projects are expected to work more hours than stipulated in their work contract as pointed out by another Postdoc in Vienna.

I always keep a timesheet and I'm always being laughed at or at least smirked at: "Sure, you can do that. But the milestones, the workload, the project targets have to be fulfilled." We all know this. It doesn't matter if you take your holiday and it's irrelevant whether you've done extra hours. It doesn't matter. In a scientific project it's not about working the time you're supposed to, but about fulfilling workloads.

Furthermore, early-career academics receive a lower salary than academics in more senior positions (for performing the same kind of work). For instance, if they teach a course as "external" lecturers they receive a salary around the marginal earnings threshold in Vienna[324] or are only paid by the hour in Copenhagen. If subcontracted in research projects, they are even completely dependent on how much the project leader is willing (and able) to pay them for their work. While the difference in the salaries of academics with and without a PhD degree is significant in Austria (cf. chapter 7.6), that disparity is somewhat less pronounced in Denmark (cf. chapter 7.7). A common justification for this disparity is that the work performed by less experienced academics (be it in research or teaching) is of lesser quality and that by being given the opportunity to do this work they increase their qualification – which in turn will lead to them receiving better (or more appropriate) salaries. Accordingly, as mentioned before, PhD candidates are not only expected to write their thesis in their unpaid "free" time but their publications as well. After all, it is in their own interest to have a series of publications when they graduate if they want to

[324] As their salaries were not adjusted to the marginal earnings threshold, in 2016 (recently employed) "external" lecturers faced the problem of their salary not qualifying them for state-insured social security anymore if only teaching one course.

be able to compete for Postdoc funding and/or positions – which is the basic premise of their education. PhD candidates employed in research projects are not exempt from this expectation, as one of them in Vienna explained to me:

> *You're being told: Well, you can't budget publications as part of the project. Publications usually come after the project has been completed – and they're for your CV, after all. So it's being conveyed over and over again – and this is no exception, many colleagues experience the same: "If you want to have a publication stemming from this project, you'll have to do it in your spare time." In fact, the project benefits from it or it's the conclusion of the project. But the implication is that it's valuable for you, for your career – so the time you spend on it is unpaid. I think […] it's blurry what this is for and whom this is for. […] Because: Do I want to work in a project where I can't publish anything from? Certainly not!*

Such an arrangement – working for symbolic instead of economic capital – turns out be be highly profitable for universities. For instance, a university manager in Vienna remarked that

> *[i]f I remember the figures correctly, more than fifty percent of all papers being published in Europe per year have PhD candidates as first authors or co-authors... so they were in any case produced by them to a large extent. More than fifty percent of the output, the visible output of scientific research is being produced by this group. […] If this group is shrinking, this also means that the overall publication output is going to decline. That's why it's being discussed heavily across Europe that, given demographic trends, enormous competition will develop between universities over who can attract the best and the most PhD candidates. […] How a university can in the future position itself will depend heavily on how many young researchers this university manages to attract.*

Hence, DiGiacomo (2005) denounces universities to

> make use of the intellectual production of adjunct and part-time faculty – for which they have no right to claim any credit because they have neither remunerated it properly nor created working conditions that facilitate it (ibid.: 58).

Similar dynamics apply to teaching. PhD candidates, be it in "official" PhD positions such as Praedocs in Vienna and internally funded PhD candidates in Copenhagen or as external lecturers, provide universities with cheap teaching – and in the case of externally funded PhD candidates in Copenhagen even with "free" teaching, i.e. teaching that costs the university no money but those PhD candidates a lot of time and effort. In that regard, Bousquet (2008) stresses that "*[c]heap teaching is not a victimless crime.* […] The cheapness and disorganization of flexible labor supports speedup throughout the system: assistant and associate professors teach more, serve more, and publish more in return for lower compensation than any previous generation of faculty" (ibid.: 41) and that low wages "aren't cheap to society; they're just cheap to employers. Students themselves subsidize this cheapness: by doubling the number of life hours worked, by giving up self-culture and taking on debt" (ibid.: 155).

As academic work requires continuous self-improvement, the narrative of academic work as a privileged education rather than an occupation ("learning years are not earning years") can conveniently – for those having to pay lesser wages, not for those receiving them – go on for dec-

ades.[325] This brings me to a crucial point: Despite their designation as "academics", the prefix "early-career" ascribes to them the role of apprentices who still need to earn their membership of the academic community and the respective rights and "privileges" – a fact that becomes evident when the Vice-Rector for Research and Innovation of the University of Copenhagen designates PhD candidates and even Postdocs as "research students in internships"[292]. Considering that early-career academics (in a way) continue the work they have done as unpaid students (or under-paid as PhD candidates) even a relatively poor salary appears as an improvement. In that context, Bousquet (2008) observes that graduate students in the US

> engage in various forms of unpaid labor (in keeping with various ideologies of "apprenticeship," "mentoring," and "professionalism," even though for most the term of mentoring and apprenticeship will not lead to professional employment). Nor can a graduate employee who doesn't like his or her working conditions quit the employer and go to an alternative employer in the usual fashion. (ibid.: 68)

This is another crucial point: If PhD candidates do not like the working conditions at the department where they are employed, they cannot simply switch their employer and continue with their work – a circumstance that increases the pressure for them to put up with precarious employment conditions. Moreover, the times when academic careers only knew an upwards trajectory concerning employment security are certainly past: well-funded PhD candidates, Postdocs or even professors may for instance find themselves in the less favourable position of an external lecturer – if they are among the lucky ones in whom the department is willing to "invest" once their funding ran out. However, such a shift is likely to only mean less income but not necessarily less work. As one Postdoc in Copenhagen explained to me:

> *I'm changing my employment position from being a fully employed researcher and teacher to being an external lecturer who only has to teach. [...] I am only going to be paid for a maximum of 100 hours per semester. I am probably going to work just as much as I did this year. I am going to be here every day. I am going to participate in all kinds of meetings. I'm hopefully going to write. My work is not going to change a bit. I'm just not going to be paid. [...] People who are employed in a situation like me [...] have to keep performing as if they were employed.*[326]

In line with her assessment, Barcan (2013) describes Postdocs as early-career academics who

> have completed their PhD and are now symbolically 'ready' for a market that is nonetheless unlikely to accommodate them in an immediate and secure future. They are, in a sense, liminal academics. […] They are often not remunerated for their research time but are nonetheless required to have an ever-expanding CV of research publications if they want to secure permanent employment. (ibid.: 201)

This demand to work as if one were in a more privileged position (even if one is not paid at all) – while at the same time knowing one's place and not in fact demanding these privileges – is connected to the vocational work ethic discussed in the previous chapter. It resonated in the

[325] Correspondingly, Thorkelson (2016) notes that in France "[p]recarious workplaces were full of improper pressures (to accept irregular pay, to work illegally, to work for free, not to complain, not to request unemployment benefits), even as they kept workers attached by exploiting their 'passions' for their trade" (ibid.: 477).
[326] Correspondingly, DiGiacomo (2005) notes that "as a condition for the possibility of continued employment, they [precariously employed academics, author's note] are required by those who hire them to demonstrate a consistently high level of scholarly productivity" (ibid.: 57).

advice that two senior academics at the department in Copenhagen (independently of one another) gave me for carving out an academic career.

> *Postdocs are supposed to behave as if they are permanent staff. But they aren't. Actually, that's how you build a career. You act as if you are permanent staff although you aren't. So you teach a lot, you play a prominent role in departmental life. And then you publish like hell.*

> *All along, we [as Postdocs, author's note] fooled ourselves into thinking that we are just part of the [permanent staff, author's note]. It makes for a nicer daily life just for oneself. The precarity is still there, the uncertainty is still there. But I still felt like I'm not just borrowing an office. I felt like I'm a colleague. […] I felt I was acknowledged, respected, people liked what I was doing. There was a mutuality. And I think that comes out of just pretending. If you really do act like you are borrowing an office then you will also feel like it and probably be treated like it and so forth.*

If the basis of an academic career is fostering a sense of belonging to the academic community by performing at the highest level possible no matter what the actual remuneration is in the hope of a future gratification of this (self-)exploitation (cf. Bourdieu 1988: 153f.), the question arises what remains of such an endeavour if the desired gratification (in form of a permanent and recognised academic position) fails to materialise; especially if we take into account that precarious presents pave the way for precarious futures with low income and (mobility) grants that do not provide for adequate social insurance leaving academics with no unemployment benefits at the end of their contracts and low pension claims at the end of their careers (cf. chapter 9.4). In that context, the next chapter elaborates on the increasing unlikelihood of the gratification of a permanent academic position and the simultaneous expansion of the period of uncertain employment, while chapter 9.5 discusses the difficulty of finding an alternative gratification outside academia.

9.3 Uncertain Prospects

One of the first things I notice on the first day of my second fieldwork at the Department of Anthropology in Copenhagen when I enter my old office – like the year before the department is nearly empty as I have again arrived during holidays – is that I hardly know any of the names on the doorplates of the offices around me. Has it really only been eight months since I left? My surprise is explained by a fact that is as simple as it is distinctive for the work of early-career academics: it is a temporary occupation at best – no matter how enthusiastically or successfully they carry out their work. In both of my field sites the situation of early-career anthropologists is characterised by temporary contracts that (for the most part) only leave them with the option to either rise to the next career level or to leave the university[327] in line with the principle "up or

[327] As with every rule there are exceptions: For instance, at the University of Vienna external lecturers can have their temporary contracts transferred into permanent contracts ("Entfristung"), either with the consent of the Vice-Rector for Research and International Affairs or by receiving a permanent position in the universities' administration, thereby incorporating their temporary contract into a permanent contract. It is consequently possible – although very rare – to achieve a permanent teaching position before graduating as a PhD. On the other hand, "early-career" academics who already have reached a more senior position may temporarily drop to a less prestigious position in the hope that by prolonging their stay in the system (for instance as external lecturer or project staff) they will be able to rise again to a more senior and most of all stable position.

out" (that is otherwise associated with business consultancies and hedge funds, typical occupations of Sennett's (2006) new capitalism). Yet a successful promotion[328] often entails the next series of temporary contracts, no matter if they have already proven their ability to pursue "independent academic work"[245] and "to contribute independently to the discipline's advancement"[264]. Turning into de facto self-employed workers, with de jure regular employment contracts, they constantly need to be in search for new income opportunities, selling their skills on the (external) funding "market". In that regard, Höhle and Teichler (2013) note that

> [f]or a long time, the stable employment of university professors has been seen across Europe as the major linchpin of academic freedom: if career-long employment was guaranteed and if all the working time could be concentrated on academic endeavours, university professors could devote themselves to exploring various academic avenues without fear and second thoughts. In recent years, however, the view that less employment stability could […] stimulate the quality and productivity of academic work is gaining momentum (ibid.: 254)

– adding that "the instability of employment of junior academics is widely viewed as a normal feature of early career stages in academia" (ibid.: 254). This circumstance is connected to three central characteristics of academic careers: (1) it takes remarkably long until they are consolidated[329], (2) they are highly selective up to this point and (3) show a discrepancy of reputation and remuneration – particularly during their long initial phase(s).

> While in other occupational areas university graduates might be considered to be fully competent professionals 1–3 years after graduation, the 'formative years' of academics (Teichler 2006) might comprise a period of 10–15 years after graduation in which they are assumed both to do productive academic work and enhance the competences considered necessary to be a full-fledged member of the academic community. […] Often, the transition from a provisional and partial learner status to a full-fledged member of the academic professional [sic] with all the academics right and a solid employment situation takes place at the age of about 40 years on average. […] While in most other profession [sic] the majority of those entering the profession will persist […] only a minority – in some countries as low as one tenth – of those opting for the initial steps of academic work will end up in a consolidated position within the higher education and research system. […] Academic employment and work is viewed in most countries as highly prestigious and respected. […] Yet, […] in various countries, remuneration of academics does not surpass substantially the average income of university-trained persons. (Teichler et al. 2013: 15, cf. ibid.: 75f., Höhle and Teichler 2013: 254, Haller et al. 2013: 128)

According to them, 68% of all "junior academics" at Austrian universities are employed on short-term contracts (Höhle and Teichler 2013: 255) – a number that is surprisingly low considering that according to the "University Report 2014" 77.3% of all academic (and artistic) staff at Austrian universities were employed temporarily in 2013 (opposed to 37.6% of the administra-

[328] There is a certain irony in the fact that the while the German term for receiving a doctorate is "Promotion" (deriving from the Latin term *promotio* for "promotion"), (1) instead of providing any guarantees that its recipient can continue the academic work that she just qualified for it rather equals the loss of her employment and (2) despite increasing performance requirements the appeal of such a "promotion" is increasingly replaced by the need for self-promotion (cf. chapter 8.3).

[329] In that regard, Bologna's (2006: 39) observation that – whereas wage work goes through a phase of insecurity during education and the introductory phase in a company that is followed by a phase of balance – self-employed work is precarious at the beginning but gets even more precarious during the phase of its consolidation equally pertains to academic careers nowadays.

tive staff) (BMWFW 2014: 104). An enquiry to the Austrian Ministry of Science, Research and Economy revealed that by 2015 that number had risen to 78.4% (opposed to a reduction to 32.1% regarding the administrative staff). By comparison, the number of permanently employed academics under 41 years (excluding project staff and external lecturers) had dropped by 61.3% (to 16.5%[330]) between 2005 and 2014 (Baierl 2016: 24).[331] The Austrian Science Board also notes that the proportion of teachers and researchers at universities that do not belong to the core staff ("Stammpersonal") has not only increased over the last decade, but also constitutes a "relatively high surplus" (Österreichischer Wissenschaftsrat 2013: 38, my translation) – a finding that is confirmed in a newspaper article from 22 August 2017[332]. While those temporary, "peripheral" employment relationships allow for financial advantages and a more flexible coverage of tasks for universities, they simultaneously threaten the appropriate fulfilment of university tasks if not kept to a certain extent (cf. ibid.: 88) and constitute insecure career perspectives (and often financial disadvantages) for academics (ibid.: 38).

In the case of the University of Vienna, even 84.8% of its academic staff was employed on temporary contracts in 2015 (opposed to 45.6% of its administrative staff).[333] More specifically, in its performance agreement 2016–2018, the University of Vienna reports that as of 31 December 2014 only 4.3% FTE of its academic staff had a "tenure-track" position ("Laufbahnstelle") – excluding lecturers[334] (amounting to 13% of its academic staff in FTE[335]), externally funded academic staff (accounting for 27.4% of its academic staff in FTE[39]) and student assistants (University of Vienna and BMWFW 2015: 14). These 4.3% are strikingly below the 50% that the Austria Science Board sets as a feasible maximum for "tenure-track" positions ("Laufbahnstellen") (Österreichischer Wissenschaftsrat 2007: 4). A university manager of the University of Vienna explained this lack of tenure-track positions as follows:

> *All in all, we are still relatively cautious with tenure-track positions right now. [...] We have a lot of people in the non-professorial academic staff who are in permanent positions – based on decisions made in the 70s, 80s, 90s. If I remember correctly, the last person who was appointed under this public sector employment law will retire in the year 2028. [...] And to the same degree that these positions decrease, we are slowly building up tenure-track positions. I say slowly because it*

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[330] By comparison, 94.7% of the jobholders in Austria aged 31–40 had a permanent position in 2014 (Baierl 2016: 26).

[331] Accordingly, a pilot study of the European Science Foundation found that "[o]nly 27% of those [doctorate holders, author's note] under 40 years of age had permanent full-time contracts" (ESF 2015: 8) and Science Europe (2016) notes that "[r]esearchers who started their current employment less than five years ago are awarded permanent positions less often than before" (ibid.: 76).

[332] See <http://derstandard.at/2000062967788/Unis-setzen-immer-weniger-auf-Stammpersonal> (accessed 24 August 2017).

[333] This imbalance is also reflected in the assignment of university's staff: While only 54.7% of the academic staff (in FTE) belong to the "Stammpersonal" of the University of Vienna (i.e. the "core" academic staff without lecturers, student assistants and externally funded staff), 95.3% of the administrative staff (in FTE) are internally funded (see uni:data: <https://suasprod.noc-science.at/XLCubedWeb/WebForm/ShowReport.aspx?rep=002+personal/001+universit%C3%A4ten/004+stammpersonal+an+universit%C3%A4ten+-+vz%C3%A4.xml&toolbar=true>, accessed 23 May 2016; the specification in % is according to my own calculation). This creates the impression that the administrative staff is more "central" to the university than – many – of its academic staff. As a Postdoc in Vienna put it: "Apparently, these are the current options: research/precarity or security/administration/management."

[334] In March 2017, of the roughly 2.700 lecturers teaching at the University of Vienna 52 had a permanent contract (see <http://brwup.univie.ac.at/aktuelles/newsletter/maerz-2017/>, accessed 2 April 2017).

[335] See University of Vienna and BMWFW (2015: 17) and footnote 39.

isn't our aim to have as many tenure-track positions as we had ao. professorships and assistant professorships [university assistants were promoted to these permanent positions once they completed their habilitation or even before, author's note]. But it's definitely our goal that about 25% to a maximum of 30% of the future non-professorial academic staff has a tenure-track position.

Alternatively we can observe an even lower number (in FTE) of assistant professors (0.9%) and associate professors (1.2%) based on the university's entire academic staff being listed in its annual report for the following year (University of Vienna 2016b: 37). Seen from this angle, the ministry's aim to increase "the number of tenure track positions at universities" (ERA Observatory Austria and BMWFW 2016: 23) appears relatively unambitious, with the University of Vienna and the ministry currently aiming to increase the headcount of its assistant, associate and "tenure-track" positions from 82 in 2014 (amounting to 1.2% of its academic staff in headcounts)[39] to 118 in 2018 (ibid.: 16). An article published in the newspaper of the University of Copenhagen suggests a similar trend there with the (absolute as well as relative) number(s) of temporarily employed staff being increasingly on the rise (among them that of PhD candidates more than quadrupling and that of Postdocs tripling between 2009 and 2013)[336] – an observation that is confirmed by a statement of the university's Vice-Rector for Research and Innovation that PhDs and Postdocs are research students in internships, who initially will not continue in a fixed position at the University[292].

This circumstance is driven by two developments: (1) university managers' increasing reluctance to permanently employ (early-career) academic staff and (2) the increasing dependence of academic staff on external funding characterised by a project logic that is by definition temporary (cf. chapter 3.2.2). Regarding the first point, the Rector of the University of Vienna stated in a newspaper article that early-career academics "should not have a permanent contract, but first go abroad after the PhD"[337]. In that regard, another manager of the university mentioned that

[w]e've had very bad experiences at the University of Vienna with awarding permanent positions immediately after the doctorate. The former university law enabled this. And this has led to a fast consolidation especially in the realm of Postdocs. Because – and this is true not only for Austria, but also for other countries – in the Postdoc realm, we do not have a culture of firing people.[338] *And we must not overestimate that even if someone has written an outstanding dissertation, it's far from sure that this person's academic potential is so highly developed that she can make science not just her occupation, but her lifelong occupation.*

[336] See <https://uniavisen.dk/kaempe-skred-loestansatte-nu-i-flertal/> (accessed 26 March 2017).
[337] See <http://www.zeit.de/studium/hochschule/2012-01/oesterreich-nachwuchs> (accessed 2 April 2017, my translation).
[338] She explained that fact as follows: "There is an ideology in Austria which says that all universities are equal. This means that if Postdocs at our university immediately received a permanent contract, but after two or three years we observe that they have not solved this long-term, complex scientific problem and we tell them 'Listen, we will terminate your contract' – then you will be completely cut off. Because if you are let go at the University of Vienna, the University of Salzburg won't accept you. [...] That means that if we were to develop a culture of firing people as in the US, we might send 80% of the people to Hades – in the sense that they really have no chance anymore. […] And it is quite arrogant to terminate contracts in such a fashion that makes it impossible for them to make science their occupation." On that subject see also an interview with a former Austrian Minister of Science: <http://derstandard.at/2000011896212/Beatrix-Karl-Es-gibt-an-den-Universitaeten-keine-Kuendigungskultur> (accessed 2 April 2017).

There is a certain irony in the argumentation that universities choose to not permanently employ younger academics (anymore) because they cannot dismiss them insofar as one can argue that having their contracts run out is technically also a way of firing them – even if they perform adequately. However, her statement includes two justifications for the explosion of temporary contracts among early-career academics: Firstly, that they in fact offer (at least short-term) opportunities for academic careers as without them there would be even fewer academic positions available at universities. This is due both to the fact that the number of permanent university positions has not kept up in relation to that of PhD graduates and the high job security academics on permanent contracts enjoy (so far). As the permanent academic staff does not display a high turnover, there are hardly any internal positions available for early-career academics. This becomes particularly evident at the department in Vienna, where the majority of the internal academic staff belongs to the same generation that is a couple of years away from retirement. Since this generation filled their positions in the 1990s/early 2000s, there have been almost no internal positions for early-career anthropologists at the department up to the 2010s – let alone permanent ones. But also with regard to the department in Copenhagen a university manager observed that

> *if you look at the profile of our permanent staff, many of them stay here for many, many years. They are not that mobile if compared with American universities where you move around all the time. We don't have that many universities in Denmark where you can get other employment in anthropology. Maybe we do, but the most prestigious is still the University in Copenhagen or Aarhus. So in that sense people tend to not be very mobile.*

The second justification is that even a well-deserved PhD degree is no sufficient proof of the aptitude to fulfil the requirements for a permanent university career – a claim that raises the question of what constitutes sufficient proof. As I argue in chapter 9.6., it is in fact impossible to prove that one is sufficiently qualified for a permanent position unless one has achieved one – a paradox that paves the way for a seemingly endless series of temporary employment contracts. There is yet another side to this argument: Not only would Postdocs not deserve secure employment conditions as they have not shown sufficient work performance – insecure employment conditions would in fact increase the quality of their work performance. In this context, the Vice-Rector for Research and Career Development of the University of Vienna (at that time) responded in an interview with a newspaper:

> Uncertainty is also something like the motor of success of sciences, on a general level as well as on the level of the careers of single academics. Because uncertainty stimulates top performance, and with each top performance you gain self-assurance. If you choose science as an occupation, you should be ready to endure this over a longer period.[283]

It is worth noticing that the German term used by the Vice-Rector for uncertainty ("Unsicherheit") compromises two meanings: uncertainty as well as insecurity. This allows her to equate the uncertainty of academic knowledge production with the insecurity of academic careers, thereby justifying the transformation of the epistemic uncertainty of the research process into the existential insecurity of (some) researchers. However, such an argumentation lacks legitimacy

insofar as it does not apply to all academics – especially not to those who usually put it forth, as pointed out by an early-career anthropologist in a response to the Vice-Rector's claim:

> It is easy to tell the young folks: "You have to be willing to make sacrifices for science! A good academic will endure it and a bad one is not worth it anyway! If you want a 9 to 5 job, then sell insurance." Easy to say when you have tenure of office and retire with 80% of your final salary.[339]

Besides, a pilot study of the European Science Foundation suggests that doctorate holders employed on permanent contracts are not just "significantly more satisfied with the scientific environment of their workplace, its organisational culture and the support available for their career development" but also more productive (in terms of societal and economic impacts)[340] (ESF 2015: 5). Therefore it concludes that

> [t]he pervasive employment uncertainty during repeated post-doctoral appointments is a critical problem that militates against both the attractiveness of research as a career to new and talented entrants, and the output of those researchers who have already commenced on that path. (ibid.: 5)

This finding resonates with the experience of a Postdoc in Copenhagen who explained to me that in her experience

> *I perform better when I'm in a secure or relatively secure position and people are actually nursing good results [...] and if I sense that the leadership has a plan with the people they hire. I don't think the market can handle it all for them.*

Yet temporary contracts entail further advantages for university managers: they increase their influence on how the university is run (in line with the logic of the managerial university discussed in chapter 4.5) by keeping their employees in a dependent position, while saving them from having to dismiss those employees – and having to legitimise that decision – with their contracts simply running out. Correspondingly, a senior academic in Copenhagen argued that uncertain career prospects put

> *a limit to what you can say and how critical you can be. Because if you are in a non-permanent position you don't want to be difficult, right? That's not very constructive in an academic environment. You have to be able to be difficult. Because sometimes out of being difficult comes something creative. But here you have to somehow comply and be gentle and be nice and be a good colleague – not difficult. Because otherwise you risk not being hired on a more permanent basis.*

In other words: dependent employees are more easily "encouraged" to be the dedicated but obedient "good citizens" that we already encountered in chapter 9.1. This view was shared by a senior academic in Vienna who remarked that temporary contracts create

> *opportunities to easily swap out those who don't conform. And it can be used as a threat. These are dependence-relations that have been created deliberately. [...] They don't want to change them because they produce docile subordinates.*

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[339] See <https://restlosgluecklich.wordpress.com/2014/05/12/mit-vollen-hosen-ist-leicht-stinken-uber-hochstleistungen-und-windeln/> (accessed 13 May 2017, my translation).

[340] "One of the most striking findings from the survey is that those on permanent contracts were more productive than those on temporary contracts in key areas, i.e. they were: Twice as likely to produce patents. Nearly three times as likely to have had a significant impact on policy or practice. More likely to have been awarded an academic prize. Nearly twice as likely to have undertaken public engagement activities." (ESF 2015: 9)

It is important to note that the paradigm of "unbounded" temporary employment constitutes a major turning point in the career paths of academics. From the 1970s onwards, early-career academics in Austria encountered a much less selective access to academic careers due to the expansion of higher education and a public sector employment law ("Beamtendienstrecht") that facilitated the permanent employment of early-career academics (even without habilitation) as civil servants ("Definitivstellung") (Österreichischer Wissenschaftsrat 2013: 22, cf. Baierl 2016: 9). Consequently, early-career academics who managed to get a foothold in the university could automatically expect a permanent, "tenured" academic career (Pechar 2013: 71f.). In 2001 however, permanent academic positions below the professoriate were abolished (ibid.: 68) leading to a surge in temporary employment particularly among younger academics (Baierl 2016: 9). Although they have been reintroduced (though in a different form) in 2009 through the collective agreement regulating the career paths of academics in the form of so-called "Laufbahnstellen"[192], many Austrian universities have been hesitant in introducing them – among them the University of Vienna (as already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, cf. Österreichischer Wissenschaftsrat 2013: 24). With no such positions at the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, a full professorship or a part-time senior lectureship (not including research activities) are the only permanent position (theoretically) available for Postdocs. In that regard, an internally funded PhD candidate told me of her disappointment towards the end of her contract. When she had obtained the position, many of her family and friends had been excited for her, congratulating her on the assumption that now that she had gained a foothold in the university, a university career would be lying ahead of her if only she would act competently – an assumption that now turned out to be incorrect.

This transformation of the career structure also explains why the age structure of the department's permanent academic staff is unevenly distributed with the vast majority of them being in their late 50s or early 60s. Since this generation took their positions, early-career anthropologists have had more or less no prospect of being able to continue their work at the department. Instead, fixed-termed employees have to leave the university after six years of full-time employment respectively eight years of part-time employment and can only get a new fixed-term contract after a one-year-break due to the way university managers handle the EU Directive 1999/70/EG for fixed-term work. Initially developed to prevent the "abuse of successive fixed-term contracts between the same employer and employee for the same work"[341], it has led to the practice of university managers not extending contracts over the legally possible period for temporary contracts (instead of converting them into permanent contracts). It is most doubtful that this practice is in line with the request formulated by the European Commission (2005) that

> [e]mployers and/or funders should ensure that the performance of researchers is not undermined by instability of employment contracts, and should therefore commit themselves as far as possible to improving the stability of employment conditions for researchers, thus implementing and abiding by the principles and terms laid down in the *EU Directive on Fixed-Term Work*. (ibid.: 17)

[341] See <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=706&langId=en&intPageId=199> (accessed 2 April 2017).

Instead, PhD candidates who have been continuously employed at the department (usually for three to four years) cannot expect to receive an internally funded six-year-Postdoc position after finishing their PhD. Accordingly, whereas in Copenhagen assistant professors can at least hope to be offered an associate professorships at their department once their contracts run out, their counterparts in Vienna most likely have to leave the university – and the country – if they do not manage to obtain a full professorship subsequent to the ending of their contract. Therefore, the only security early-career anthropologists have is that they lose their employment at their university after a maximum of eight years[342] – even if they are successful in acquiring external funding beyond that period. In other words, a decisive factor for their career is a matter of university policy rather than a matter of their work performance. In that regard, a senior academic referred to the structural problem that

> *when an externally funded project has been successfully completed, including a series of internationally recognised articles and the opportunity to run a follow-up project (or however else you may define success for the individual cases) […], the person concerned doesn't have much of a chance to obtain long-term employment – i.e., financed through the university's basic budget, regardless of that person's continued success. If this ever does happen it is at random, or because the central university administration has published a relevant call for applications, which rarely happens. In fact, it only happened once or twice within the last eight years.*

In Copenhagen, the perspectives for a university career are differently structured, although they too display an increase in uncertainty with an increasing number of early-career anthropologists being employed on external funding – thereby increasing the competition for those internally funded positions presenting the prospect of a permanent position. As a senior academic explained to me:

> *It is a political decision to create all these Postdoc opportunities and have all this external funding. But the problem of course […] is that it attracts young people into these positions and they can only be in a Postdoc position for four years and then they have to move into some kind of senior position. And preferably a permanent one. And there will not be permanent positions for all these Postdocs. Whereas in the old days we had this assistant professorship system where we hire assistant professors assuming that they will be able to stay and continue into positions as associate professors – and […] most would continue into associate professorships. Now we have a different situation because we are hiring with open eyes a lot of people who are not going to be able to stay in the university sector.*

A significant development in this regard is the introduction of new Postdoc rules at the University of Copenhagen in 2014, treating Postdoc and assistant professor positions as separate career steps.[343] Allowing for a maximum of four years as a Postdoc after the PhD followed by a maximum of four years as an assistant professor[344], this differentiation introduces the Postdoc

[342] Unless they agree to atypical employment forms that usually go along with even less income and job security.
[343] However, a year later there was still confusion among the Postdocs at the department on what these new rules entailed, for example on the fact for how long their contracts could be prolonged.
[344] An exception is if the assistant professorship is tenured – then it is limited to six years. However, like in Vienna, there were no such tenure-track positions at the department at the time of my fieldwork. A senior academic explained this circumstance as follows: "The reason why that construction was made was because some departments, particularly in the natural sciences, had trouble hiring people from abroad because the conditions are just not secure

position as an additional – temporary – career step (with Postdoc experience increasingly becoming a requirement for an assistant professorship, i.e. another temporary position) – respectively an additional selection step, as Postdocs are increasingly not intended (by the university management) to continue their academic career. While some years ago, PhD graduates could move to an assistant professorship and Postdocs would – just as assistant professors – receive the training required to obtain a teaching certificate ("adjunktpædagogikum") allowing them to apply for an associate professorship, now the positions of a Postdoc[345] or an external lecturer remain the only realistic – and far less promising – options. Accordingly, a senior academic gave Postdocs the well-intentioned – yet somehow cynical – advice to not look for security as a mind-set as this would constitute an incredibly stressful endeavour and consider the Postdoc as a good way out of the university rather than as a way in. Then they would be met with a supportive attitude from the department, whereas they would trigger resistance mechanisms when trying to ease in. In that regard, the Vice-Rector for Research and Innovation of the University of Copenhagen – referring to the composition of a research group in the natural and health sciences typically consisting of one professor, one to two associate professors, one to two tenure-track assistant professors, six postdocs, 12 PhD students and 15 graduate students – argued that

> [t]he University of Copenhagen has switched to the new economic reality of universities and thus approaches the staff composition like other international top universities have. This is good, as they are the ones we are going to compete with.[346]

Clearly, such an arrangement is more advantageous to university managers than to those in temporary positions, with "the dominators having it all easier when the market is more saturated, and the competition between the new entrants that much stronger" (Bourdieu 1988: 90). This allows them to keep most junior (and increasingly also senior) academics on the short leash of temporary contracts while having permanently employed staff know that there are more than sufficient others queuing up to replace them if they do not meet their expectations.

One of the Postdocs at the Department of Anthropology described the transformation of her career prospects as follows:

> *If I am able to do all my stuff and live up to the requirements – whatever that is because no one will tell me – then I will get a third year. And after that I will just be basically screwed because it will not turn into an assistant professor position. [...] They already told me that they are not going to pay for the adjunktpædagogikum. [...] If you had a Postdoc in the old days – which is last fucking year – […] you could say, "okay I will take some extra responsibilities" – for instance teaching a bit more – and you would get an up-grade: your Postdoc would get a third year paid from the institute and they […] would upgrade it to an adjunkt position.*

Asked how she would deal with that bleak prospect she responded:

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enough. So they create tenure-track positions for the attractive people they want to get from abroad and then at our faculty they continue hiring on the old terms."

[345] Not receiving the "adjunktpædagogikum" – except if the project leader successfully negotiates with the head of department for them to receive this training.

[346] See <http://universitetsavisen.dk/videnskab/prorektor-vi-ligner-andre-topuniversiteter> (accessed 2 April 2017, my translation).

I think it's like the way you deal with death or becoming old […] – you just don't think about it. But it's completely a part of my prospects. […] Nothing I do has to do with the future. I am not able to think about the future. I am just doing stuff. If I stop and think about the future for two seconds, I just get depressed. It's like I am unable to control my thoughts. [...] So I think I do what most people do: I just do my everyday stuff.

This reply corresponds to that of another Postdoc at the department when asked what she was planning on doing once her contract ran out: "I'm just blocking the thought for now and just doing my best. Also, I don't want to get stressed. It's a lot of work. So I'm just doing what I can."

Interestingly, although their uncertain career prospects clearly stress early-career anthropologists (provided that "death or becoming old" are nothing one is looking forward to) and restrict their ability to cultivate positive plans for their professional future, they do not appear to restrict their current work commitment. However, it seems that they replace (intrinsic) motivation with (externally imposed) pressure, a pressure which is at least twofold: While the qualifications required for permanent positions (as well as for temporary ones) rise, the period of uncertain employment is prolonged. In Copenhagen, this extension formally encompasses up to four years – and may even stretch far longer considering that professorships increasingly become temporary positions as well, and that academic careers are increasingly internationalised. For instance, one of my interlocutors moved from one Postdoc position abroad to an internally funded Postdoc position in Copenhagen, which allowed her to then apply for another externally funded Postdoc position – thereby expanding the period of temporary Postdoc employment far beyond the designated four-year-period. This mechanism (the extension of both the qualification of applicants and the period of their short-term employment) already applies at the PhD level as is illustrated by the example of a PhD candidate who first had a three-year scholarship abroad, then moved to an internally funded PhD position in Vienna and finally to another one in a third country. Considering that the application process for funding (particularly individual external funding) can take several months or even years[347], only the PhD period can therefore stretch to nearly a decade – with that pattern being reproduced in the Postdoc phase. Hence, both in Vienna and Copenhagen the period of uncertain employment now easily spans more than a decade until once (academically) young early-career anthropologists have become senior academics (who are well into their 30s[348]) while remaining in temporary, "early-career" positions, a fact that a Postdoc in Copenhagen commented on with the words: "You are treated as junior for a very long time. I mean we are all in our mid-30s and we are still junior. […] In academia you are in that limbo for a very long time."[349]

[347] I met several PhD candidates who tried for one or even two years until they finally successfully acquired funding – investing a substantial amount of unpaid work into their applications.

[348] In 2015, the average age of academics employed in FWF projects was 29.4 in the case of PhD candidates and 37.8 in the case of Postdocs (see <https://zenodo.org/record/56536>, table "ProjektmitarbeiterInnen_2009-2015", accessed 25 May 2017).

[349] This diagnosis is by no means limited to Austria and Denmark. At a panel (discussing the career prospects of early-career anthropologists) of the 13th biennial conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists, a discussant familiar with other European university contexts argued that "[f]rom postdoc to postdoc to postdoc is not a threat – it's the best that can happen to you!" (Follis and Rogler 2015: 101). Accordingly, Science Europe notes that "the substantial increase in the length of the postdoctoral experience has transformed it into a phase that

Although early-career anthropologists perceive this circumstance as burdensome, a university manager in Vienna considered it as not necessarily problematic.

> *Regarding employment law, you have to admit that the situation at a university is quite different to a company, and we basically give people six years' time. They can stay at the university for six years, as Praedoc or Postdoc, or for example as a person who may be doing her Praedoc in three years and then be a Postdoc for three years. [...] In these three years we, as a university, can also benefit from the research potential that person establishes in the sense of output. At the same time, the person is given the opportunity to prove that they are indeed capable of developing a complex scientific problem [which guides her work for six to ten years after the doctorate, author's note]. And then one might say: Okay, they'll get another six years. And that means that you can work at a university for twelve years after graduating – twelve years is reasonable – and within these twelve years the decision is made whether you apply to a tenure-track position or a professorship. Twelve years after graduation, it should be clear whether someone is going to make science her occupation, that she can become a professor. In my opinion, such a risk is easily managed for the person concerned. And I believe that this is the better solution than just saying: Let's remove all time limits on contracts [...], or let's simply hand out permanent contracts, and if we see the person is fit, then nothing will happen to these contracts. However, if we realise the person doesn't work out as hoped, we just kick them out.*

I doubt that most early-career academics would agree that twelve years of temporary employment are "reasonable" to keep their risk at a manageable level. However, such an arrangement is an effective way of excluding those who cannot (afford to) take that risk, offering those who can a better chance for their investment to pay off in the form of a finally permanent position. In that regard, a senior academic in Vienna told me that the

> *second critical phase after having finished a PhD [...] may under certain circumstances last up to six or seven years. This is tough and too long. I think this period has to be reduced to three, four years – but no less than that. You have to expect and anticipate this time period during which you have to keep yourself afloat with your savings or a side-job [...] because you can't rely on instantly obtaining the next externally funded project. This is tough, true enough. But I don't think it can be done without [that critical phase, author's note]. And it shouldn't be a cutthroat selection process. But on the other hand one has to be realistic enough for asking yourself during that phase: Does my failure in acquiring external funding reveal something about my career chances? Or does it rather reveal something about Austria and should I try my luck in France or Canada because I have good ideas that my supervisor and my network partners are convinced of as well? So, it is important to also use this time period for carrying out repeated, thorough self-checks in reality's daylight.*

This statement illustrates the tension between academia's interest in the best possible quality assurance on the one hand and academics' interest in secure employment (allowing them to concentrate on assuring the quality of their work). In that regard, it is rather ironic that while academics' careers are transferred into a series of project employments that extend the duration of their liminal status, with each project signifying a necessary qualification stage – from PhD candidate to Postdoc(s), from Postdoc(s) to assistant professor and finally from assistant professor to associate professor, a (hopefully permanent) position that finally attests academics to be good enough to allow them the continuation of their academic work – the time period of these

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can cover one-third or more of a research career (Foote, 2010). Often, researchers began their doctoral training more than 15 years earlier, and have held a doctorate degree for more than ten years, before they access a secure or quasi-secure position, or are awarded their first important independent grant (Levitt, 2010)" (Science Europe 2016: 76).

"sub-projects" is increasingly limited by being submitted to a project logic that demands a clear start and end date.

This brings me to the second point mentioned at the beginning of this chapter: (early-career) academics' dependence on external funding. With hardly any permanent Postdoc positions available, early-career anthropologists continuously have to acquire external funding in order to pursue an academic career (cf. ESF 2015: 30) – with average approval rates in 2015 ranging around 21% in case of the Austrian Science Fund and 15% in case of the Danish Council for Independent Research. A Postdoc in Copenhagen described this circumstance in the following way:

> *But then you may get the money or you may not get the money. And the chances are rather slim. If you don't already have a steady position then that'll just bring me back to zero, having spent maybe several weeks on a proposal – which is my free time that nobody pays. [...] And even if we get it, it's still just another two years. And then what?*

These concerns resonate with those of a PhD candidate in Vienna.

> *You never know what's next. After every scholarship, you think, "Okay, now it's over. Maybe it's just a year without a scholarship – but maybe it's ten years." [...] I find that totally exhausting. [...] And your whole career will be like this: [...] You don't know what's next. [...] You need so much more energy than just for doing research. [...] We are the proletariat. [...] Yes, that feels bad.*

From this point of view, while allowing (an increasing number of) early-career academics to temporarily continue pursuing an academic occupation, external funding does not provide them with stable career perspectives but keeps them in a liminal state[350] – transforming them into "scaffolding workers" as a senior academic in Copenhagen put it.

> *One of my colleagues, a fellow Postdoc [at the time] [...], went to a kind of intro day for new staff members at the university. [...] And then during the coffee break someone from the Chancellor's office asked her over coffee:*
> *"Who are you?"*
> *"I am a new Postdoc at the anthropology department."*
> *"Oh, Postdocs – you guys are the new scaffolding workers." [...]*
> *"What do you mean?"*
> *"Well, you know, very dangerous on the outside and you are always looking in."*
> *So the precarity and then this sense that you are looking into this very nice interior... She was absolutely right. Absolutely. [...] And at least she was honest. The most accurate portrayal of a Postdoc if you ask me.*

With this liminal status of neither being completely located inside academia nor outside of it while facing a possible academic future of having nothing or all at once, early-career academics are repeatedly confronted with a professional environment that simultaneously encourages them to engage with and leave it. While chapter 9.1 focuses on the former dynamics pulling early-

[350] Correspondingly, the European Science Foundation remarks that the growing reliance on externally funded posts "is a double-edged sword. On the one hand external funding creates more post-doctorate positions, on the other these tend to be of fixed-term duration and insecure in nature" (ESF 2015: 30). In that context, Science Europe (2016) points out that "[t]he early-stage researcher's need for employment security and academic freedom must be kept in balance with the institution's interest in the flexibility needed for recruiting the most talented, best qualified and most motivated researchers at all career levels" (ibid.: 8).

career academics into academia, the next two chapters elaborate on the latter ones confronting them with two options: to either leave their home university (and most likely their country) or to leave academia. As the Vice-Rector for Research and Innovation of the University of Copenhagen puts it:

> [T]hey [PhD graduates and Postdocs, author's note] should be out in the world and try out other environments, and like most others leaving an apprenticeship not return to KU for a permanent employment. It is the central topic of the career guidance we should give our research students, and there are already plans prepared for that.[346]

9.4 International Mobility

Whereas few would deny that academic work is inherently international in the sense of a knowledge exchange across national borders, currently not only the exchange of academic knowledge across borders but that of academics themselves is a defining feature of academic work – in a policy context which comprehends their international mobility as a "means to foster skills for innovation in a globalised economy" (Magalhães and Veiga 2017: 5, cf. Ivancheva 2015: 42). As early-career academics predominantly work on temporary contracts, they are repeatedly forced to change employer if they want to continue their line of work. With the number of academic employers being highly limited – particularly in the case of small countries such as Austria or Denmark and a "small" academic discipline like anthropology – having to leave one's university is likely to mean having to leave the country. This prospect especially pertains to early-career anthropologists in Austria, with the department at the University of Vienna being the only one of its kind there. Whereas in the early 2010s the academic staff of the department almost exclusively consisted of PhD graduates who had been (more or less) continuously employed at the department from their PhD education onwards (due to the employment regulations at the time described in the previous chapter9.3), a significant proportion of the academic staff recruited since then – and all of them having received permanent academic positions (with the exception of part-time senior lectureships) – exhibits an international background. This is in line with a more general development at the University of Vienna that a former Vice-Rector sums up as follows:

> The university-based labour market fortunately is one of the most international of all. Young academics have to be extremely mobile, and if you do not get a job in Vienna, there is still the opportunity of working abroad.[283]

This statement resonates with the explanation of a university manager that the University of Vienna would be willing to support academics who continuously attract external funding by offering them temporary positions –

> *always provided that the person concerned focuses on the international education and science market and not just on the University of Vienna. In other words, if this person were offered a job in Honolulu and she would say, "No, I do not accept this appointment. I want to be a professor at the University of Vienna" – that's an attitude we don't support. Instead, we would say: "We support you with every means we have at our disposal to give you the opportunity to position yourself on the international market in such a way that you will ultimately get a job that's not temporary."*

In comparison, a university manager of the University of Copenhagen sounded rather generous when she told me that "now we tell people if you want to be in academia you have to accept the whole of Northern Europe as the area you can go for." Yet not only university managers increasingly demand early-career academics to be geographically mobile, but also public funding bodies on the European and the national level link the selection criteria of academic excellence to the willingness to be internationally mobile – thereby transforming mobility from an *opportunity* into a *prerequisite* for having an academic career. As a survey of Science Europe (2016) reveals, 41 out of 104 Postdoc schemes of European research funding organisations "had either a prerequisite for (geographical) mobility or supported mobility. Of these, 28 aimed specifically to encourage international mobility" (ibid.: 22). For instance, "[m]obility of the researcher to another country is an eligibility criterion for receiving MSCA funding"[351] (i.e. Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, the EU's flagship programme for supporting early-career academics in the H2020 programme), and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) as well as the Danish Council for Independent Research (DFF) mostly offer individual funding for young Postdocs (both do not offer individual PhD funding) who are willing to go abroad.[352]

Two rationales underlie the current mobility regime: On the one hand the "pragmatic" rationale (apparent in the two quotes of university managers above) that it is a solution for scarce positions at one's "home" university. Yet, while deferring the problem of the shortage of university positions to other universities, this "solution" neglects the fact that these positions are likely to be equally scarce and contested there. As a senior academic in Copenhagen put it:

> *There is just a limited number of fixed-term jobs. [...] Of course, you can expand and go to the UK and be mobile. But still, even within that, language is limiting. So there are limits. And my argument would be that there are more people who are competing than there are jobs. There are no illusions. That's structural.*

On the other hand, there is also a "meritocratic" rationale underpinning mobility demands that academics broaden their skills and networks by working in a variety of academic environments until they are good, i.e. "excellent" enough to obtain a permanent position. However, the "meritocratic" argument aggravates the problem of scarce positions by (more or less explicitly) assuming that academics move to "better" universities (where positions are likely to be even more contested) – thereby reducing the "pragmatic" claim that mobility constitutes a solution for scarce positions to absurdity. After all, we have to keep in mind that just as the competition between universities for economic and symbolic capital is not a level playing field but favours prestigious and wealthy institutions (cf. chapter 4.4.1), so is the competition between the gradu-

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[351] See <http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/other/guides_for_applicants/h2020-guide-appl-msca-if_en.pdf>, p. 15 (accessed 10 May 2017).

[352] The FWF START Programme and the DFF Starting Grant are a rare exception to this rule, funding a few outstanding/excellent/very talented young researchers with up to eight years of Postdoc experience – although they also find it "desirable that candidates have completed a research stay abroad of at least one year" (see <https://www.fwf.ac.at/en/research-funding/fwf-programmes/start-programme/>, accessed 10 May 2017) and aim at "promoting the mobility internationally […] between research environments" (see <http://ufm.dk/en/research-and-innovation/funding-programmes-for-research-and-innovation/calls/2016/files/DFF-call--autumn-2016-and-spring-2017.pdf>, p. 13, accessed 10 May 2017). Another rare exception is the Hertha Firnberg programme of the FWF, supporting ca. 20 female early-career Postdocs (of all disciplines) per year.

ates and (temporarily employed) academics of these universities for positions. For instance, Kawa et al. (2016) show how in the US 43.1% of tenured or tenure-track positions at the 103 PhD-granting anthropology programmes are taken by graduates of ten PhD programmes – and that out of those 1,918 individuals only one had a PhD degree from the University of Vienna and none from the University of Copenhagen. Accordingly, a pilot study of the European Science Foundation showed that the movement of doctorate holders "tends to be one-way – from Southern or peripheral countries into Northern European countries" (ESF 2015: 5, cf. 8, 22), and a study of Marie Skłodowska-Curie doctoral fellows "showed a clear pattern of mobility with fellows moving from Central and Eastern European countries to Central and Western European countries" (Walakira 2017: 10). Moreover, DiGiacomo (2005) reminds us that there are "significant institutionalised barriers to real globalisation even within a discipline based on the crossing of cultural boundaries" (ibid.: 61) such as anthropology – for instance the dominance of the English language when it comes to the value of publications that "places anthropologists in the non-English-speaking world at a significant disadvantage in the high-stakes political economy of publication and professional advancement" (ibid.: 61). Other barriers for international mobility are that positions are usually not advertised internationally visibly, "recruitment often relies primarily on personal interaction and networks" and "external candidates find it difficult to identify or be aware of unofficially required criteria for a post" (Science Europe 2016: 80).

Considering the pressure to be internationally mobile, it is hardly surprising that I encountered numerous complaints of senior academics at both of my field sites that their junior colleagues were too unwilling to be mobile. In the words of a senior academic in Vienna:

> *Then there is obviously the German market [...] – even though to Austrians it sounds like a death sentence if they have to move to Germany. [...] Unfortunately, far too few people do that. Most of them want to stay in Vienna. I know, Vienna is a pleasant city. Yet I find it extremely unfortunate that people just don't want to leave Vienna. [...] This is a real problem here. People should apply in every – at least German speaking – one-horse town. [...] Otherwise, why bother at all.*

When I asked a university manager in Vienna after a meeting – in which she had likewise advised PhD graduates to leave the university – why the university would not (more) explicitly tell its graduates that they cannot hope to be able to stay, she explained to me that it was no (explicit) policy and there were a few people who would manage to stay nevertheless. Besides, people would still keep hoping – despite all of the empirical facts of the last years.

Why is that? Why would academics, people who base their work on facts, choose to ignore them when it comes to their own careers and hope for the improbable? Part of the explanation, I assume, is that they – particularly at the beginning of their careers when many of them are unfamiliar with the logics of academic careers – orient themselves towards the example of their senior colleagues who largely experienced different career paths (little characterised by mobility requirements). However, there is another, more fundamental explanation: academics are not simply devoted knowledge workers but human beings embedded in social relationships outside the university. A PhD candidate describes this fact as follows:

I had good conditions for my research – but I am paying the price as well. [...] I mean, in the last [...] years I had to look for a new flat in a new city in a new country for like [a couple of] times. Why should anyone think this is fun? [...] I don't like it. On top of that: Meet people, change places... I am a human being, you know.

A Postdoc (who was neither based at the department in Vienna nor in Copenhagen) aptly summed up the social costs of such a mobile mode of living as follows:

I have to say, the forced mobility issue is one that I find especially painful on a personal level, because it shatters your community, your social relationships, and then makes it difficult to reinvest in the people around you – why build close ties if you will just have to move somewhere else in a year or two for your next contract?[353] *I mean, I exaggerate, but only slightly.*

Correspondingly, another Postdoc told me:

I don't want to start my life over somewhere else when I turn forty. That's simply not my objective. Of course it has a lot to do with your private situation [...]. But [...] there is not only academia, academia is a part of life.

Obviously, such an attitude clashes with the greedy demands of practicing science as a vocation discussed in chapter 9.1. This circumstance brings us to another problematic feature of the combination of the expansion of the liminal period of temporary employment and of mobility pressures: It forces academics to leave their "home" at an advanced age when they are likely to have established long-standing and profound personal and family commitments[354], neglecting "the attachments that people develop in a given locality, including the friends they make, the families they may want to build and the manifold allegiances and obligations that tie them to a place" (Simoni 2016: 360, cf. Walakira and Wright 2017: 80). Instead, it transfers them to an unfamiliar – and highly competitive – environment where their peers are equally likely to have established extensive social obligations, making it difficult for the newcomer to re-establish the close ties she had to leave behind.[355] Accordingly, several early-career anthropologists who had moved to the department in Copenhagen from the outside (both Danes and especially non-Danes) reported that they found it difficult to have private conversations with their colleagues (who would usually leave the department in the afternoon to be with their families), let alone to make friends.

What is more, having a family that is prepared to (repeatedly) follow one abroad or relinquishing having a family or being with one's family for a significant time period becomes a crucial selection criterion for having a permanent academic career (cf. ESF 2015: 32). More than once PhD candidates told met at the end of their studies that they would like to stay in the academia but would start looking for a job outside the university because they were not prepared to

[353] Likewise, it makes it difficult for the co-workers of the mobile academic to invest in a relationship with her – why build close ties if you will just have to move somewhere else in a year or two?

[354] Whereas mobility is also demanded of academics in the US university system(s), unlike there academics in German speaking university systems (as well as in the Danish university system) are expected to leave their original academic environments in the final phase of their career (when they are in the fourth or even fifth decade of their lives) (Pechar 2013: 71).

[355] A study of Marie Skłodowska-Curie doctoral fellows. i.e. early-career academics who are still in an early phase of their (mobile) academic career revealed that nearly half of them "only felt integrated in their host university to some extent or not at all" (Walakira and Wright 2017: 71).

live a nomad's life or ask of their partners and/or children to lead one. As the early-career anthropologist who we already encountered in the previous chapter put it in her blog entry:

> What are the consequences of this uncertainty? From my observations, it leads to a selection process that massively obstructs many early-career academics and supports others, independent of their excellence. People like me who don't have a problem with moving once or twice a year and have adequate financial reserves can get along in this system, with certain reductions in their life quality: romantic relationships mostly work out if one of the two is not in this line of work and is ready to roam the world with you. Friends of mine who have children and are in relationships with people who also work with their brains but are less flexible however look for another profession after their PhD.[339]

On that note, Walakira (2017) found in her study of Marie Skłodowska-Curie doctoral fellows that

> [g]enerally, the fellows who were in their mid-twenties and/or single were more likely to become mobile that [sic] their older counterparts, and faced fewer challenges as a result of having fewer family commitments. (ibid.: 9)

Furthermore, (long-range) geographic mobility reduces the local social ties academics have outside their workplace: with people in the new environment mainly knowing them through work and them mainly knowing people through work, this work easily takes up all of their lives even more easily.[356] Accordingly, Kerr and Lorenz-Meyer (2009) found evidence in their study of bio- and social scientists in Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Slovakia and the UK

> of the high personal costs of being mobile and people's experiences of feeling rootless, sometimes isolated and unable to form long-term relationships, to get mortgages or to have children, especially from women scientists (ibid.: 150).

These considerations clarify how the current mobility regime displays both a "greedy" and "neoliberal" function by simultaneously socially uprooting its members and removing the separation between the private and the public sphere. Thereby its subjects are transformed into flexible "nomads" following the needs of a globalised academic labour market rather than their personal or intellectual needs. It is such an "economised" notion of mobility in the context of a global competition of higher education institutions that underpins the vision of the European Research Area that so many university managers and academics subscribe to:

> a truly open and excellence-driven ERA in which highly skilled and qualified people can move seamlessly across borders, sectors (e.g. academia and industry) and disciplines to *where their talents can be best employed to advance the frontiers of knowledge and support innovation* throughout Europe and beyond. (European Union 2015: 11, my emphasis)

Finally, greedy demands both for and of long-distance mobility are amplified in anthropology because of its preferred research method, ethnographic fieldwork. Usually entailing a longer stay (of approximately one year) abroad, it involves (and in fact aims for) a blurring of the boundaries between work and private life as "anthropological field-work is not usually a straightforward

[356] At the same time, this mobility is rather detrimental for establishing a sense of collegiality – at least if it is combined with temporary employment (as is usually the case with early-career academics), thus placing academics in a double peripheral position in their workplace.

matter of working. It is also a matter of living" (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 178) – while being "squeezed between endless grant and job applications, precarious teaching arrangements and growing publication pressures" (Ivancheva 2016: 359).

What the demands for mobility fail to acknowledge are not only the social needs of academics and the fact that they may in fact cause a separation of science and society (Felt and Fochler 2010: 324f.), but also that they – particularly in combination with short-term contracts and little administrative support – reduce the effective use of academic labour insofar, as it confronts early-career academics with the additional time-consuming task of having to strike camp in one place while setting up their every-day lives in a new place. For example, an international PhD candidate told me that her biggest problem at the time was a lack of research time due to her having to spend the first three months of her stay with organising her life (i.e. finding a proper apartment, sorting out her visa issues and work permit etc.) without receiving support from the university. Another one told me of how stressful it was for her to arrive in Copenhagen with no social networks and no one to help her – while already having to prepare for her fieldwork abroad next year. In line with this, a panel discussion of early-career anthropologists from several countries at the 13th biennial conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists revealed that

> a succession of postdocs traps early-career anthropologists in a repetitive cycle of time-consuming applications to secure the next position, interfering with research productivity and other aspects of professional and personal life (developing teaching experience, building an intellectual community, family, relationships and social life). (Follis and Rogler 2015: 102)

Considering these drawbacks helps to understand why many early-career academics do not willingly embrace the mobility that is demanded of them – especially if those who demand it did not (have to) meet that mobility norm themselves (cf. Kerr and Lorenz-Meyer 2009: 150). Nevertheless, mobility requirements fulfil an important function in the contemporary university: They may not solve the problem of the (far too) limited number of permanent university positions in regard to that of qualified applicants (as a disparity between the number of candidates and available positions is likely to prevail at the vast majority of universities), yet they significantly reduce the number of potential – especially female (cf. Science Europe 2016: 22) – applicants/competitors for those positions by excluding those who are not able or willing to be mobile.

9.5 Uncertain Employability

The PhD education at both anthropology departments is clearly oriented towards an academic career. Consequently, a Postdoc and a senior colleague of her remarked that

> *I know that PhDs nowadays get work in all kind of sectors of society – but it's a research education, right? And the failure of employing them in research is the failure of the research system in my opinion.*
>
> *Everyone knows that permanent positions are really really hard to get. And then if you don't get one of those or even if you don't get onto the track of either Postdoc or assistant professorship, then what are you doing here, basically?*

That question gets increasingly pressing for an increasing number of early-career academics as universities teach an increasing number of PhD candidates while decreasing the time they require to graduate – thereby producing much more doctorate holders than they require for reproducing their academic staff. Consequently, more and more of them (at different career levels) face the challenge of completing an education which prepares them for an academic career, while subsequently having to find alternative career paths – that should not amount to a social or financial decline. This brings the issue of employability not only of Master but also of PhD graduates and Postdocs on the agenda of university managers – particularly in Denmark (as shown in chapter 7.2).[357] As one of them in Copenhagen put it:

> *In the older days, we trained PhD students to get a job at our own university. Today we train PhD students to get a job either at our own university or at another university or research institution or outside the university. It is important that PhD students think that it is exactly as valuable to get a job outside the university as within the university system and we are very careful not to have a B and an A group of PhD students. […] We treat them exactly the same way.*

However, being prepared for both the academic and non-academic labour market is an endeavour that is easier to formulate than to implement, as it means that the competition among academics is not only increasing for positions in the academic labour market but in the non-academic one(s) as well. This means that as much as the non-academic labour market increasingly has to serve as an alternative for those pursuing an academic career, the academic labour market has to serve as an alternative for those who cannot find employment in the non-academic labour market. Many of the early-career anthropologists I talked to where at one point or another looking for employment outside the university – and were pushed back to the university by a lack of career alternatives. Especially in Austria, where enrolment into a PhD programme does not entail an (effortful) selection process, having the status of a PhD candidate may well be deemed preferable to being under- or even unemployed. To use the words of a senior academic at the department in Vienna:

> *Many want to write a thesis because they have no alternatives. Because they cannot find a good job. And then it allows them to perceive the job as a sideshow – because actually they wanted to write a thesis.*

In a newspaper article, a PhD graduate of the department reports how she decided to do a PhD after not having had found a job for more than a year after her graduation – to subsequently discover that her PhD education had only further reduced her chances of finding a (non-academic) job.[358] A Postdoc told me of a familiar experience of having been unemployed for several months after an academic position.

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[357] In that regard, Bousquet (2008) notes: "It is in the interest and logic of the system to have as many graduate students as it can employ while producing the fewest number of degrees – or, better yet, to produce persons with degrees who don't make a claim for permanent academic employment. This is one reason that graduate-school administrations have recently promoted the Marie Antoinette or 'let them eat cake' theory of graduate education: 'Why, if they cannot find teaching work, let them be screenwriters!'" (ibid.: 26, cf. Bousquet 2002: 90)

[358] "Die Leiden des Sisyphos im Elfenbeinturm" by Christina Jaritsch, *Die Furche*, 14 October 2015 (see <http://www.furche.at/system/showthread.php?t=71853>, accessed 22 April 2017). For a humoristic thematisation

I was sitting there at the AMS [Public Employment Service Austria, author's note] and I was almost always in tears: "What am I doing here?" I am working all the time anyway, and then I sit here and somebody who doesn't even know my field is supposed to advise me where to work. [...] [A colleague and she, author's note] really sat there for months [...] and sent out applications. We were job application machines, it was incredible. [...] This was really frustrating: you send out the applications, and nothing ever comes back. I applied not only for scientific positions, but also at international organisations, etc. I got two answers. […] And that was it. And we were really not incompetent. This was truly a dramatic experience. [...] It was a rude awakening realising that a female PhD who had a primarily academic career had practically no chance in other areas – or very few.

Such experiences are no isolated cases of a few unfortunate coincidences. Drawing on a survey conducted in 2007, Schwabe (2011) paints a relatively dark picture of the general career perspectives of doctorate holders in Austria.

> There is a large discrepancy between the aim of doctoral programmes and the absorption of doctorate holders in the labour market. Doctorate holders are keen to work in research, but they do not find adequate jobs. Furthermore, a relatively high proportion works in jobs where their studies are not relevant for their work. Neither can the knowledge in a specific research area be used for the job, and [sic] nor are general research skills required for the job considered as an additional asset by their employer. (ibid.: 165)

The "employability" of anthropology graduates appears to be especially problematic in Austria. According to a tracking of the career entry paths of graduates of the University of Vienna between 2003 and 2014, anthropology graduates take longer to find a job after finishing their studies and earn significantly less than the average. This (literally) poor performance is particularly evident in the case of PhD graduates who only earn ca. 63% of the average gross income of the university's PhD graduates after five years of employment (amounting to ca. 1,500 EUR) – with female PhD graduates (who constitute three quarters of all PhD graduates) earning even less than their colleagues who only have a Bachelor's degree in anthropology.[359] Although I do not have comparable numbers for the graduates of the department in Copenhagen, the situation appears to be more favourable there – specifically for PhD graduates who, according to a university manager, swiftly find employment after graduating. Yet a study looking at graduates from the years 2009 to 2013 showed that 23% of them did not have a regular job at the time of its conduct (Græsted Bjerring 2014: 8, 34). [360] Besides, in 2014 the Danish government demanded of the department to reduce its intake of Master students by 30% due to high unemployment rates of its graduates (calculated as an average over the last 10 years). In that regard, I heard a joking remark by a senior academic that the department would turn gold into lead, whereas the department of economics (located at the same faculty) would turn lead into gold, i.e. although the admission to the anthropology programme requires better school grades, the employability of economics graduates is higher. What is more, a panel discussion at the 13th biennial conference

(in German) of the poor job prospects of young anthropologists see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TKfrnEm3WXk> (accessed 20 May 2017).

[359] See <https://www.uniport.at/site/karriereberatunginfo/berufsinformation/_details/article/978.html> (accessed 17 April 2017).

[360] While 35 graduates (out of the 178 participating in the study) were unemployed, five were employed in a "løntilskudsstilling", i.e. a temporary position that is subsidised by the state.

of the European Association of Social Anthropologists revealed that far beyond the borders of these two countries

> anthropology PhDs rarely feel equipped for the job market outside academia. It was noted that senior anthropologists who mentor the next generation have very limited knowledge of opportunities beyond teaching and research, and consequently little ability (and possibly interest) to advise on alternative careers. (Follis and Rogler 2015: 104)

Ironically, one occasion at which the difficulties of PhD graduates finding employment outside academia became apparent was a three-day PhD course in Copenhagen termed "Getting ready for the labour market". Organised for PhD candidates from the faculty of social sciences, the course aimed at "preparing PhD students for working with real life problems, helping companies understand PhD students' skills, plus general matchmaking between PhD students and companies" and featured representatives of five different non-academic organisations that all offered some sort of research-based consultancy. On the first day, one of them told the participants how working in the "real world" turned out to be much more difficult than she had imagined. Having done her PhD to prove that she was one of the brightest, she discovered that in the private sector she had to prove her worth from the beginning whereas her colleagues who had left after the Master's degree had already received their first promotions. Her rather daunting remarks were continued by another speaker the next day telling us of barriers to hire PhD graduates (such as their higher costs, that their new environment may find it difficult to cope with them or that employers have no idea about their competences) – and that she herself would not hire a PhD graduate who, being asked in a job interview whether she could write her PhD thesis in a week, would object that this would negatively impact on the quality of her work.[361] Rather frustrated by the impression the three days had left me with, I asked a fellow PhD candidate of the department of anthropology how she had experienced the course. She responded that she had gone into it with high hopes but was put off, starting to think whether she would prefer staying at the ivory tower of the university after all rather than working in the "real world" (as she had intended to do before) because the message she had gotten was that having a PhD is not as prestigious as she thought and does not count for a whole lot.

She does not appear to be the only PhD candidate who shares that opinion, as is suggested by the finding of the University of Copenhagen (2016) that

> [t]he vast majority from the Faculty of Humanities, the Faculty of Law, the Faculty of Social Sciences and the Faculty of Theology find employment within the university sector, while a growing number from the Biotech Research and Innovation Centre, the Faculty of Science and the Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences find employment in the private sector (ibid.: 16).[362]

[361] A telling example of different approaches to problem solving in the academic and the private sector was a group of PhD candidates "failing" an exercise because they had tried to make a washing machine as functional as possible rather than making the client sell as many of them as possible. Drawing on Sennett's view of consulting work as the epitome of the culture of flexible capitalism (cf. Sennett 2006: 105), I argue that they failed their task because they were following a logic of craftsmanship (that they had acquired in their academic training) rather than a commercial logic.

[362] Likewise, a pilot study of the European Science Foundation revealed that the vast majority of doctorate holders "work in public sector institutions (82%) followed by non-profit organisations (7%), the private sector (5%), and others including public-private partnerships (5%)" (ESF 2015: 18).

The strained relationship between the academic and the non-academic labour market in the SSH is not surprising considering that (1) at least in my field sites, early-career anthropologists were primarily interested in doing academic work, motivated by traditional notions of science based and curiosity-driven research rather than an economic desire to increase their own income or the profits of their employers[363] and (2) that the capital required for an academic career (such as publications in/with prestigious academic journals/publishers, teaching experience and being known to influential actors within the university) is unlikely to be of the same or even sufficient value in the non-academic labour market – particularly with the latter becoming increasingly competitive as well.[364]

However, not all early-career anthropologists assessed their career perspectives outside the university as that bleak. One Postdoc in Copenhagen with a research focus in a rather application-oriented area for instance explained to me:

> *I'm passionate about the academic perspective on this area. And if not I would be working in another place. There is a lot of demand for anthropologists working out there in great companies as Lego, Novo Nordisk... So there is a lot of interesting jobs out there.*

Accordingly, one of her colleagues based at the Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies of the University of Copenhagen notes that

> I have many peers who have recently decided that life within academia is simply not worth the struggle. Many turn to consultancy jobs in public or private sectors, and they do great (and important) work there. (Frederiksen 2016: 361)

No matter whether early-career anthropologists who are contemplating to leave the university are pushed back by insufficient alternatives or not, they are (as well) drawn back to the university by (external) funding opportunities.[365] Take the example of a PhD candidate in Copenhagen who told me that

> *[e]ven when I was an undergraduate, I was already very engaged. [...] I had this naive fascination and I wanted to learn that thing and be really good at that. I think that was what was driving me. And the recognition. To have somebody recognise: "Oh, she is smart. She can become something."*

Although that fascination was dimmed towards the end of her Master studies, giving space to arising doubts whether to continue pursuing her academic ambitions, she was encouraged to do

[363] In other words, they appear to be attracted by reproduction ideologies of higher education "which convey conceptions of the virtue of education for its own sake […] and transmitting tenets of a discipline" rather than production ideologies "with a focus on the direct link between higher education and the world of work" (Fanghanel 2012: 7f.). Balaban (2017) suggest that this may be accurate for PhD candidates in general as "individuals who choose to pursue doctoral studies are usually the kind of people who like to immerse themselves in what they do, out of pure interest and need for intellectual stimulation" (ibid.: 8).

[364] Although the director of the Austrian Public Employment Service (AMS) states in a newspaper interview that "in principle, higher education is always of advantage at the labour market" ("Arbeitslosigkeit per se noch keine große Tragik" by Regina Essl et al., *Die Presse*, 9/10 January 2016, K1, my translation), the unemployment of academics increased in Austria by 11.9% in 2016 ("Arbeitslosigkeit sinkt erst 2020" by Christian Höller, *Die Presse*, 3 January 2017, 1) and reached a new record in June 2017 with 28,466 academics registered as unemployed (although still remaining at a relatively low level compared to the lower-skilled population) ("Jobs: Akademiker auf dem Abstellgleis" by Christian Höller, *Die Presse*, 26 July 2017, 13).

[365] After all, their relatively cheap labour force is – no matter how replaceable they are due to the increasing number of graduates they themselves help to produce – needed to keep underfunded universities running.

so by being invited to be part of a funding application – an invitation that she gladly accepted. After all, who would refuse an interesting job offer (amounting to a promotion) when facing unemployment? When she heard some months later that they had gotten the money she

> *was kind of happy. But I also had kind of mixed feelings. [...] I kind of thought: "That's brilliant, I get to do a PhD. That's what everyone wants to do." But I was feeling a bit ambivalent. [...] You asked about my motivation. Looking back now I think a lot of it has had to do with a kind of continuation of doing well as a student. And kind of a natural extension of that is to get a PhD scholarship.*

In addition, a colleague of her remarked at a research seminar that her identity as an academic had been shaped by an education that is completed by a product that she did not know how to accomplish, be it the Bachelor or the Master thesis. She pointed out that it was no wonder that students wanted to go on after finally figuring out how to resolve that challenge, encouraged and keen to take on the next academic challenge.

The pattern continues at the Postdoc level. A Postdoc in Copenhagen replied to my question why she had come back to the university after having found employment outside of it:

> *A desire to do anthropology. And what argued against that was the kind of working conditions for young scholars.*[366] *Then it was simply that some people called me and asked if I want to participate in a project. I think that's important when you are a young scholar that there is somebody who says: "Why don't you continue working on this or that together with me?"*

One of her colleagues revealed to me that she had started her position with the idea of a way out but had been "eaten" by the department by being encouraged to display the high commitment discussed in chapter 9.1. Besides, two other Postdocs told me that that they had applied for jobs outside of the academia but had not gotten them because they were seen as either too academic or lacking practical skills – and had then accepted positions in research projects. One of them told me that realising that her chances to stay in the academia were more than slim after the funding cuts announced in September 2015 felt like a break-up – but one where the ex keeps texting how one is, making it difficult to move on. In that regard, another Postdoc told me that after finishing her PhD she had said to herself:

> *"No matter what, I want to get away from university." […] I actually wrote an e-mail to all of my friends who have made it outside the university. I said to them: "If you want me, this is the time. I'm ready. I'm ready to take the jump. I'm willing to sell diapers, I'm willing to do anything – just get me out of here." Actually some of them responded and there were a few positions but it wasn't after [...] [my superior] had already called me […] and the decision had already been made: I was going to stay here. It's kind of difficult to get away.*

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[366] Later on, she elaborated on the matter: "I have my family here. I have children. So I was not so willing or able to move around the world for a job. So my options in terms of jobs after finishing my PhD were quite limited. And when I looked at the department here I thought: 'Well, they have hired two assistant professors within the past seven years or something.' […] And then I thought: 'You have all these Postdocs and people competing for the same positions; very few positions that is.' And I just didn't have the energy or I didn't feel confident that I could actually meet up to that kind of competition that was put up. And I felt that I would stand relatively worse on the rest of the labour market if I started doing more research and doing a Postdoc instead of taking a job in the private or public sector. Because then people outside the university would look at me as somebody who is not capable of working – which is how people outside academia tend to think about academics working in universities. For me it was simply a kind of valuation of the chance that I would be able to make it."

Moreover, the longer early-career academics remain in the university, the harder it is for them to switch to a non-academic career (Haller et al. 2013: 129), i.e. the greater their dependence on precarious academic labour markets gets – an issue that is exacerbated by the fact that the liminal period of temporary academic employment is expanding.[367] Science Europe (2016) sums up this dilemma as follows:

> Researchers are often left unsure about their future in academia, the final decision often coming rather late when it is more difficult to change career. In order to be able to move successfully to another profession, it would be helpful for the researcher to be adequately prepared. Yet postdoctoral training is strongly biased towards academia, and intersectoral mobility is hindered by the lack of career planning. Moreover, to achieve professional recognition and advancement, researchers are faced with the obligation to publish in the best international peer-reviewed journals. Thus, they are simultaneously confronted with different requirements which are rarely compatible. (ibid.: 9)

A Postdoc in Copenhagen summed up this difficulty as follows:

> *I don't know what happens to all these people who are not able to become associate professors at the age of 40. Where do they go? To the graveyard of failed academics? They have just spent so many years of their lives preparing themselves for this position and no other position. It's not like they can go into the private sector – no fucking way. They have become trained to produce articles, not to run a company. What is going to happen to them?*

A colleague of her in Vienna addressed this dilemma when explaining to me the disadvantages of externally funded research:

> *Ultimately, this project is a further step towards over-qualification, after which you really have fewer chances to find a job. Because what do I do as an unemployed lecturer with a habilitation? I mean, who wants me then? But it's just this way and you cannot go back on this. If you go on after the dissertation, it's really hard to turn back.*

At another point, she elaborated on the dynamics that (increasingly) draw her into the academic labour market while at the same time segregating her from the non-academic one.

> *The career is simply predefined. If you have done a doctoral thesis and continue researching or stay in academia, the habilitation is the next step. And if you do a habilitation, the next step is the professorship. This is simply the system – the academic life script is dictated by the system. [...] No one would tell me, "Come on, decline the professorship or don't even apply." Or... I don't know. "It's about you being happy." [...] Maybe I'm just stressed now, and I see everything bleaker than it really is. But I have no choice. I am now applying for a professorship, although I don't really want to. This is a fact. Because there is nothing else. My options are very limited. The higher you climb, the more limited your options are. You are overqualified for many things.*

My point here is not to pave the way for simplistic demands that universities need to make their graduates more "employable", but to argue that the education of anthropologists is primarily conceived as an academic training that does not – and possibly cannot – equally qualify for alternative career paths (especially in the private sector).[368] If a PhD education is to prepare for a

[367] On the other hand, it equally "seems that when doctorate holders embark on a non-research career there is little or no possibility to switch to a research career at a later date" (Schwabe 2011: 165) – a claim that is confirmed more broadly by Teichler et al. (2013: 81) for 19 other higher education systems.

[368] Accordingly, Balaban (2017) argues that "it is very hard to be both an outstanding researcher and a broadly-trained generalist at the same time. […] In reality, what has happened is that 'Mode 2' has been added on to 'Mode 1', creating an overload for the PhD fellows, who are struggling to complete their doctorates within the normative

highly competitive academic career, it follows that PhD candidates are expected to pursue it with the appropriate, i.e. extremely high dedication and effort. In the words of a senior academic in Vienna:

> *[T]he standards [of a thesis, author's note] have to be extremely high. In reality this isn't always the case. But I think if the demands weren't that high, nothing would ever come out of it. And the requirement from my point of view has got to be that you write at a global level. [...] The point is: It's a global discourse about a specific topic. And you have to be able to persist in it. […] Our goal has to be to play in the Champions League. At least we want to.*

Considering the highly selective as well as vocational "nature" of academic work it is not surprising that most PhD candidates I met aspired to meet this high standard, genuinely trying to write the best thesis possible (under the circumstances). In that regard, a PhD candidate in Vienna told me that although she worried about having to start looking for a job outside academia, she could not help focusing her efforts on writing a good thesis. After all, a thesis would be like a masterpiece: If you manufacture a table you do not stop a few hours before you are done and leave the fourth table leg unfinished – even if you would have to drive a taxi afterwards. Taking further into account the high competition early-career anthropologists are exposed to as well as the greedy work ethics, there is hardly any space left for them to openly voice their interest in and considerations for taking alternative career paths – at least as long as they want to keep their options for an academic career path intact. In this respect, a senior academic in Vienna advised early-career anthropologists to self-confidently convey their ardent desire to stay in academia when applying for or reporting on academic funding, leaving no (visible) space for intending to establish alternative career paths.

Yet, as established at the beginning of this chapter, the current employment policies of universities in combination with research policies promoting temporary external funding force (most of) them to leave their academic work(place) behind. This confronts them with a dilemma: Do they invest as much time and effort as possible into acquiring a high level of professional specialisation, withstanding (increasingly) long periods of financial insecurity in order to be able to one day compete for a permanent academic position – thereby hampering their chances for having an (adequate) alternative career? Or do they focus on creating alternative (hopefully less precarious) career paths for themselves outside the academia – thereby undermining the high commitment an academic career requires?[369] A Postdoc in Vienna formulated that dilemma as follows:

> *Some people hate institutions and they don't care about insecurity. Or they have other skills that I don't have. If someone is a travel guide or a translator – for her, imminent unemployment is less of a problem because they have something else. I don't have that. [...] And that's a mistake. It was a*

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time frame. Furthermore, […] the two approaches might even be incompatible in places, as they rely on very different assumptions about the roles of researchers and the kinds of people that are attracted to the doctorate" (ibid.: 7). In that regard, the attempt to bridge the fundamental differences of academic excellence and employability resembles that of reconciling basic with applied research (cf. chapter 2.1).

[369] For interesting comments in regard to the question whether to stay in academia after obtaining a PhD (in the natural sciences) or to pursue a career in industry see <https://www.quora.com/Is-academia-a-happier-life-than-a-life-in-industry> (accessed 18 June 2017).

mistake that I didn't acquire any other skills. But I didn't have the time. I simply didn't have the time. [...] [Her superior, author's note] always told me: "You'll certainly not get a job here. You need to publish, publish, publish." But that's easier said than done. And then it's also a decision whether you invest your last energy on weekends in writing texts or whether you try to build a second professional career. This is a fundamental decision. So I wrote texts and worked on the project.

Considering that the more one invests oneself into a task and sacrifices for it, the more one is bound to it (Coser 2015: 97), it stands to reason that the longer early-career academics pursue their work, the less willing they are to leave it behind (especially as finding alternative career paths constitutes no easy way out). Hence, (doctoral) degree holders are not just systematically expelled by the university but at the same time (rather unsystematically) attracted by being offered recognition (in the form of degrees) as well as positions. However, as those positions are now mostly temporary, they continue being both pulled and pushed between academic and non-academic job prospects – while not knowing whether they perform well enough in order to realistically pursue a permanent academic career as will be shown in the next chapter.

9.6 Uncertain Proficiency

In the previous chapters, I have discussed uncertainties of early-career anthropologists whether and where they will be able to make a living pursuing their academic work. These uncertainties are amplified by another one relating to the quality of their work that echoes in the question: "Am I good enough?" As natural as such a question may come to academic "apprentices" who have to continuously prove themselves worthy, we have to be aware that it plays out in a context characterised by a prolonged period of temporary employment, highly competitive career perspectives and panoptic assessment in which their professional adequacy is persistently questioned – with the outcome of these evaluations not only offering early-career academics the possibility to improve their work but deciding whether they will be able to continue pursuing it at all. Therefore, Samuel Beckett's aphorism "Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better" rings at best nostalgically in their minds in an environment in which every failed assessment may mean the end of their career. Obviously, this creates considerable stress and anxiety that a Postdoc in Vienna described as following:

What I have said so far sounds all great. But just imagine at the same time, I am terribly scared of every next step. And when I take a step: "Oh my God, can I do that?" [...] I'm telling you: I've been in such a bad state the last couple of weeks because I was so afraid of this application [for an academic position, author's note]. Sometimes... I shouldn't say that. Sometimes I really doubted [...] whether I should apply at all. [...] Because I thought that I wouldn't be a match for the task, qualification-wise.

As exhausting and pressing as such feelings of personal insufficiency may be, as difficult it is to resolve them because the uncertainty underlying them is entirely relational, i.e. depending on factors beyond their control such as the qualifications of other applicants, the preferences of evaluators or the diverging requirements of "schizophrenic" employees. Hence, Barcan (2013) argues that such doubts are not so much an individual issue rather than a result of the large-scale

institutional changes discussed in chapter 4 that "have produced work patterns, tacit expectations and affective relations that encourage a good many students and academics to think we are not good enough, or productive enough, or smart enough" (ibid.: 12). As much as self-doubts may be inherent to an occupation in which questioning one's own work, a work that "*is intended* to be surpassed and rendered obsolete" (Weber 2008: 34), having others question it and questioning the work of others certainly has a long and venerable tradition, they are structurally reinforced by a schizophrenic university in which academics can, "almost by definition, never be good enough" (Barcan 2013: 90) as they "never know which measuring stick will be wielded at any given time" (ibid.: 103). Accordingly, a university manager in Copenhagen told me that

> *in academia you never know. Even professors never know whether they are doing well enough. […] All scientific staff here are very nervous about whether they are good enough at teaching and at research. […] And I cannot set up criteria specifically for each group of employees because I don't know either when they are good enough. It's always dependent on who the other applicants are. […] I think that's just in a sense a burden for all academics. But it's also a driving force, because we want to improve all the time.*

Of course, the line between wanting and having to improve is often a thin one and that burden, although shared by most academics, weighs all the heavier on those without permanent contracts whose future employment is dependent on the outcome of such an uncertain evaluation. However, the statement, resonating with that of a manager of the University of Vienna that "[u]ncertainty stimulates top performance"[283], points to the prominent role of high competition in relativising and thereby "unleashing" the level of adequate qualification required for having a permanent academic career that another university manager at the University of Copenhagen addressed more explicitly:

> *It is also very difficult to know whether you are good enough because this is not a fixed point. We have a system where when you apply for a position, we have a committee saying: Are you qualified for a full professorship or are you not qualified? And a lot of people are declared qualified. But to get the position you compete with others and you see others become even more qualified during time. […] You really have to look at those people who have just become professors. What have they done? And if you wait you will see that the next professors have published even more, attracted even more funding and have even better teaching evaluations. So it's a moving target. [...] We work very hard so that the standard increases. And one way to increase the standard is to have the whole world apply for a position here and not only people from Denmark. So in that sense we as university leaders really try to push so it becomes even harder to become a professor.*

In such a context of enhanced and internationalised competition, there is always a potential genius from abroad with an even more impressive track record who may apply for the desired position (cf. Felt and Fochler 2010: 319). With not even the "best" peer one knows constituting a fixed point of reference for early-career anthropologists to assess their qualification, the possible requirements for being good enough become sheer endless – particularly as being good enough is not only relational in regard to the qualifications of current competitors but also to future standards. With the aspired qualifications not just remaining vague but also "a moving target", it becomes almost impossible for early-career academics to know the standards they will have to

meet when applying for a permanent position. A senior academic in Copenhagen addressed this fact as follows:

> *Say if you are a PhD student now, by the time you can get into a permanent position it will be maybe six years in the future or more. And it's impossible to say anything about what the qualifications required at that time will be. If you would try to set up some kind of standard for "here is what you need to do in order to get into a position in six or ten years times" that would be telling people lies basically. Because nobody can know. I guess that's part of what makes it difficult for them. They are going towards a goal, but they don't know exactly what is required to get there.*

However, being good enough is not only an individual matter or one of present and future competitors, but also dependent on the institution's and/or specific evaluators' interests and preferences. For instance, during a panel discussion at the Austrian Academy of Sciences on 22 February 2013, a university manager of the University of Vienna remarked that universities are not only looking for "excellent" academics – a vague term in itself – but for employees who do the work that needs doing regarding teaching, supervision and administration. Correspondingly, Postdocs at the department in Copenhagen may be offered an extension of their employment – including a promotion to an assistant professorship – if the department requires their teaching.

Yet, even if one were only to judge according to "academic excellence" (which is currently chiefly measured by academics' research performance), one would lack precise evaluation criteria "because excellence is not a fixed standard of judgment but a qualifier whose meaning is fixed in relation to something else" (Readings 1996: 24) – in an academic environment in which the roles and therefore demands early-career academics face are increasingly diversifying. In that regard, a senior academic in Copenhagen told me that "international standards" is little but an empty phrase when it comes to the assessment of PhD candidates and gave me the example of her once being on an assessment committee in Sweden where she argued that a thesis would not live up to international standards – whereupon a Swedish committee member countered: "Yes, it does – to Swedish international standards." Also, one of her colleagues replied to my inquiry what she would require of the early-career anthropologists she employs in research projects:

> *You want people to publish. Generally, I have the idea that if people could publish something in one area they will be able to publish in another area. But I'm not a sucker for high impact journals. As a project leader, I will be able to tell whether people have the necessary skills set to complete the job. I could easily imagine someone who had written a supposedly high-ranking article who I wouldn't deem fit for the task. In this lingo of internationalisation and finding the best candidates and the best talents there is this notion that you can define those terms without reference to anything – and I don't believe that. It's basically just nonsense. Especially given that we've got so few high impact journals that then one or two articles in JRAI [Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, author's note] would mean the world of difference. That's just bullshit. Obviously, some very very good scholars have published a lot in those journals. But you may also find that people have succeeded in getting one or two pieces out in high ranking journals although they are not very good researchers. There is so much more than your bibliography that will determine whether you are able to do research in a project environment. But the same goes for a department. So this detached version of what a researcher is, this notion that somebody is just a genius and they will hit the ground running wherever you put them – it's not a credible version of the world.*

Ambiguous standards not only characterise the selection processes at universities, but also those of the funding agencies that (early-career) academics increasingly depend on. In that regard, a representative of a major Danish funding agency explained to me that which applications will turn out to be successful in the end is

> *not a very clear-cut answer and […] not a clear-cut science. It's based on the perception and the subjective evaluation of the council members as to which one is better. And of course, for every deadline the competition is different. You never know who is going to apply and how many and for what areas and what projects and how qualified and not qualified they are. So having said that, it's really hard to pin-point exactly what the best way to go is.*

Apart from to the "subjective evaluation of the council members", the success of applicants depends on a series of other factors that are negotiated by the selection committee as remarked by a representative of a major Austrian funding agency:

> *You have to reach an agreement: Is it relevant how the studies have gone? Is it relevant whether someone was abroad? Is it relevant whether someone has been published? [...] In fact, it makes a big difference how well the person advocating for the applicant is versed in group dynamics: How well can they assert themselves in a discussion? How well can they argue?*

Finally, neither early-career academics and their superiors know whether their work is good enough, nor do their supervisors, as according to a senior academic in Copenhagen

> *they are somehow in the same position of not knowing when it's good enough; and being afraid that it's not good enough. They are also afraid of the situation of having told a PhD student: "Now I think it's good enough." I can sense that from myself. [...] Perhaps they [the PhD candidates] would have a committee that would point out things that never occurred to me would be a problem. Or a body of literature that I don't know. Or something that would just come up as a criticism and therefore they would say: "Actually, this has to be re-written and we'll give the student three months." […] As a supervisor I would feel awful.*

There is yet another reason why (some) supervisors are likely to increase their PhD candidates' doubts whether their work is good enough rather than ease it: the concern that if considered inadequate it would reflect negatively on their own reputation as an academic. Therefore, Barcan's (2013) comment that "no one in academia – no one – will ever tell you that you have done enough. They may tell you that you have done well; they will congratulate you on your successes; they may thank you for your hard work – but they will never tell you that you have done enough" (ibid.: 134) sounds most plausible.

As burdensome as this ambiguity of the selection mechanisms is for academics, as useful it is for their employers because it saves them from having to permanently hire them once they have lived up to predefined expectations, allowing them to stay flexible and more influential in their employment policy instead. However, the lack of clear performance standards does not only increase the room for negotiation of university managers but also that of early-career academics (confident to do so). For instance, a Postdoc in Copenhagen replied to my question whether it was specified how many articles she is supposed to publish:

> *No. And do I want to ask? No, I don't. Because of course, it has to be balanced against everything else: the teaching and the publishing and so on. Sometimes you think it would be nice with a very*

clear answer because you know what you have to live up to. And if you do that then you are good enough. But on the other hand I also like to be able to argue that I am qualified in my own way.

However, I would argue that they find themselves in a much weaker negotiating position considering that university managers are likely to pick from a larger number of applicants than those applicants have employers to choose between. Furthermore, in the case of funding agencies there is little room for negotiation due to a highly formalised selection process that usually offers no or little space for a dialogue.

Considering these reasons why early-career academics can in fact never know whether they are good enough to obtain a permanent position, the feelings of personal insufficiency expressed in the quote at the beginning of this chapter (that one "may hardly express") appear to be characteristic for a university context driven by the productivist imperative of managerialism that

> works to produce the academic subject as one who is always already inadequate. […] Academics are self-regulating professionals in a system without intrinsic limits in which hyper-productivity is contagious. And when hyper-productivity is contagious, so too is the feeling of fraudulence. (Barcan 2013: 199, cf. Gill 2010: 228f.)[370]

In addition to this, a Postdoc in Copenhagen pointed out to me that because of the hyper-productivist as well as hyper-competitive environment that the university constitutes, it

is not a place where you are recognised for what you do, I find. I would say it's probably one of the prime producers of complexes of insufficiency. I mean, I have never published an article and had somebody come over and say: "Hey, that was a great article!"[…] You know, it's the critical angle that's sort of the primary angle. [...] There is [...] a whole tradition of "if I criticise you then I'm a bit better".

Accordingly, one of her colleagues in Vienna remarked that

it's very, very rare in the academic business that one gets recognition for successes and that they're adequately celebrated. And vice versa, people are [rarely, author's note] sympathetic if one has setbacks, if one has failures. I believe we have an academic culture of learning that is very, very fixated on mistakes and failures.

This is another greedy – or rather miserly – aspect of academic work: While academics are rather generous when it comes to criticising their colleagues' work, eliciting their appreciation and recognition is a different matter entirely. I assume that most academics are familiar with the fact that no matter how much effort goes into writing a paper or proposal, it takes little time for that work to be nullified.[371]

I encountered expressions of fear of one day being found out to be a fraud who does not live up to the high (and in a competitive environment continuously increasing) demands of her supposedly privileged position from a number of academics at different career levels. Such an "im-

[370] For an extensive discussion of feelings of fraudulence in academia see Barcan (2013: 191–216).

[371] In that regard, typical critiques of PhD theses I encountered during my fielwork include "your work is not anthropological/ethnographic enough" and "your argument is not clear/strong enough" – critiques that are quickly formulated but necessitate a relatively large amount of additional work on the side of its recipient (without giving her a precise clue on what it actually is that she is expected to do – that she probably would have already done had she known).

postor syndrome" is likely to be reinforced by the increasing pressure to quickly produce output (cf. chapter 7.7). For example, a PhD candidate in Copenhagen told me how

> *I went on a PhD course [...] and I had to write a paper for it. And again I had the same feeling: "I'm writing a paper but I haven't done any research yet. So this is just bullshitting." I read some books and I'm just coming up with something because they have this course and my supervisor thinks I should go. And I felt really... I was really sick of it and starting to get really annoyed with academia, just feeling like, "I don't know what I'm talking about". And they are asking me to present. Like, how can I present when I don't know anything about this? [...] What I really wanted to be doing was to just read and not have to produce text and not have to come up with some idea [...] and prepare my fieldwork. [...] I didn't feel ready to present at all and I felt like the fact that I had to make this presentation anyway was just taking time away from doing real work.*

In addition, Gill (2010) points to the "toxic shame" academics feel when faced with a negative review of their work that she considers to be

> the outcome partly of the particular biographies most of us bring, which may sometimes include struggle, but *always* feature 'doing well' (passing exams, achieving plaudits, winning prizes). Being hard-working, self-motivating and enterprising subjects is what constitutes academics as so perfectly emblematic of this neoliberal moment, but is also part of a psychic landscape in which not being successful (or lucky!) […] is misrecognised […] in terms of individual (moral) failure. (ibid.: 240)

In other words, the contemporary university confronts ambitious people who are used to do well with an environment in which they can never quite know whether they do well enough. Such a combination helps to unleash an imperative of endless self-optimisation that all too easily turns into (self-)exploitation, while trying to feed the insatiable hunger of an already greedy institution. In that regard, the answer of a Postdoc in Vienna to my question how she would know at the end of the day that she had acquired enough publications, projects and awards concludes this chapter well:

> *I often wonder about it. It would be enough for me if I finally had a permanent position. [...] Until then, I keep on shovelling into a black hole. I don't know. I don't know how much is enough.*

This is a crucial point: For early-career academics, the question of being good enough is not so much a matter of personal satisfaction but one of existential pressure – with the impossibility of answering it in the affirmative paving the way for precarious working conditions. To use the words of a senior academic in Copenhagen:

> *I would say that junior scholars live in conditions of precarity. I don't want to over-analyse that because precarious labour is usually connected to people who are really in the shits, who have no money and are struggling. But precarity in the sense that... It's almost middle-class precarity, because most of us have okay living standards and so forth. But it's still precarity, because there are no clear indications, criteria which we can then somehow attune ourselves to and say: "As long as I do this there will be a certain [job security, author's note]."*

9.7 Conclusion

A discourse of privilege still pervades the education of early-career anthropologists, though the basis of this discourse has clearly been eroded since the early 1990s with the pendulum moving in the direction of insecure university employment after a period of high employment security. Driven by the high competition unleashed by the underfunded massification of higher education and in combination with a new funding regime based on competitively allocated project funding on the one hand, and a managerial governmentality empowering university managers to create a flexible – in the sense of easily "manageable" – workforce on the other hand, the employment period for which an increasing number of academics are remunerated become increasingly shorter. Put bluntly: early-career academics turn from tenured civil servants into (external) lecturers who are paid by the hour and (sub-contracted) project staff paid for delivering specific "work packages". Viewed in this light, the Austrian government and Rectors' conference (at the time) overachieved their aim of a "rigorous deregulation of the staff structures" (Schimank 2000: 111, my translation) with currently more than three quarters of their academic staff working on temporary contracts. However, by delegating the responsibility for attracting research funding to individual (early-career) academics, policy makers and university managers not only transform the traditional logic of their engagement from being employees enjoying job security (in combination with academic liberties) to being self-employed project managers carrying the entrepreneurial risk for the highly uncertain success of the investment of their labour power[372] – they simultaneously make the question of academic reproduction an individual matter rather than one of academic disciplines/communities.

Thus, Bourdieu's (1988) observation (referring to the situation of French academics in the 1960s) that the quest of candidates for academic positions "is inevitable (since nothing is impossible) as it is anguished (since nothing is certain)" (ibid.: 143) rings even more accurate nowadays. While some early-careers anthropologists face precarity in the immediate sense of having low (part-time) incomes "that – when preparation and marking are taken into account – frequently fall (de facto) below the minimum wage and make even jobs in cleaning or catering look like attractive pecuniary options" (Gill 2010: 232), almost all of them are confronted with a "middle-class precarity" (as on senior academic put it) in the sense of having no job security. Due to highly uncertain and insecure career perspectives (both within as well as outside of academia), they are robbed "of the ability to plan that future, economically, intellectually or personally, with any degree of certainty" (Barcan 2013: 114). As a Postdoc formulated it: "Nothing I do has to do with the future. I am not able to think about the future." This uncertainty does not only create anxiety but also disables "solidarity, face-to-face encounters, and the emergence of a sense of common culture and communal interest" (Bousquet 2008: 14). Instead, early-career anthropologists have to stay mobile in a global(ised) university context – or "light" to use Boltanski's

[372] Correspondingly, Felt and Fochler (2010) describe academics in the life sciences as "venture capitalists" that talk of "low and high risk projects" and diversify their "investment" according to different risk levels (ibid.: 309, my translation).

(2007) terminology – until they manage to reach a permanent position (when they are in their 40s or even 50s and have most likely internalised that virtue), either in the sense of practicing their academic profession in another country or in the sense of altogether changing their profession. However, international mobility – being driven forward by both university managers and funding agencies – does not constitute an easy solution for the precarity early-career anthropologists face, but rather an additional selection mechanism (in addition to their "excellence") that may well aggravate that precarity. For instance, funding schemes for international mobility are particularly prone to short-term funding and a lack of social security benefits (cf. Science Europe 2016: 15). Therefore, repeated international mobility easily results in relatively low pension claims (due to not providing periods of insurance at all and/or leaving academics with low pension claims in a number of countries that are difficult to bring together), rendering academics more vulnerable to precarious lives after they retire. In this context, the traditional greedy "nature" of academic work requiring academics to be ready to sacrifice everything that restricts availability is amplified by the "nature" of their contemporary employment conditions, demanding of them to either (repeatedly) leave behind their "home" (and to a certain degree the social ties embedded in it) or their profession – with limited options for alternative careers awaiting them in return for the high investment they have made. In that regard, quitting an academic career is difficult for three reasons: because of (1) the high commitment early-career anthropologists are expected to display and therefore pursue their work with, (2) a lack of alternative careers and (3) sufficient incentives in the form of temporary positions to keep them in the academic game for some more time – making it even more difficult to leave it behind.

Furthermore, greedy demands are intensified by a combination of the traditional boundless nature of academic work with the circumstance that in the contemporary university early-career academics can in fact never know whether they perform well enough in order to qualify for a permanent position. Accordingly, they can continuously be denied such a position (as only by obtaining a permanent position they can prove their adequacy for such a position) as well as appropriate salaries. Besides, if they reduce their efforts or even stop their work when not being (adequately) paid anymore, they stop accumulating the academic capital required to obtain a permanent academic position – a most convenient fact for their employers allowing them to (continue) siphon(ing) off the high outputs of their un- or lowly paid work. Therefore, early-career academics have to continuously push themselves to perform up or even beyond their maximum if they want to keep the chances alive of succeeding in a highly competitive environment, whereas their employers have to demonstrate little commitment to them (in the sense of offering them long-term perspectives in return for their efforts). In such a hyper-competitive and hyper-productive context, the line between support and exploitation becomes a thin one, leaving early-career academic vulnerable for the latter.

10 Conclusion: Science as a Greedy Vocation and Neoliberalised Occupation

Rather than concluding my thesis at this point, I had intended to elaborate on a third tension shaping the academic work (experiences) of early-career academics in the contemporary university: that resulting from the encounter of conceptions of academic freedom with increased managerial control and projectified working conditions. However, like its research subjects, this thesis is determined by the conditions of its formation. After having started to work on the funding application that constitutes the basis of my thesis in February 2011 and my resulting PhD position in April 2012, my PhD funding(s) ran out in March 2016. With my PhD curriculum expiring in November 2017 and after having been working on it for nearly one and a half years now alongside a full-time job it is high time to finish this "project".

Having said that, what does this result of five and a half years of work intend to convey to its readers? That neoliberalism and its institutional counterpart, managerialism, together with the massification and internationalisation of higher education have clearly left their mark on universities. If they ever were ivory towers (primarily) inhabited and ruled by an academic aristocracy, these days are gone. Instead, they have turned into quasi business consultancies expected to support companies in driving forward the knowledge economy and governments in solving "societal challenges". Yet the more traditional notions of higher education and basic research embodied by universities are not dead. Rather, they overlap – and clash – with these more recent demands (expressed by terms such as innovation, employability and interdisciplinarity), leaving universities as "schizophrenic" figures. This circumstance presents those who are educated by and working in them with a series of challenges. As university managers increasingly (have to) concern themselves with generating income, saving costs and boosting the "efficiency" of their institutions, early-career academics continue working in subordinate positions much longer hours than they are paid for – even if they are sick or on holidays – in order to handle an increasingly high workload and live up to the (ambiguously) high standards of their profession, while their work is at the same time devalued by their having to produce an increasingly (diverse) high output over a shorter time period: trying to meet an increasing set of (conflicting) demands, writing proposals, teaching growing numbers of students as well as publishing more (diversely and sooner). In that regard, Gill (2010) claims that a "punishing intensification of work has become an endemic feature of academic life" (ibid.: 234), turning the academic profession into one

> overloaded to breaking point, as a consequence of the underfunded expansion of universities over the last two decades, combined with hyperinflation of what is demanded of academics, and an audit culture that, if it was once treated with scepticism, has now been almost perfectly internalised. (ibid.: 235, cf. Barcan 2013: 93f., Hoffman 2011a: 457, Musselin 2007: 177)[373]

[373] However, Teichler et al. (2013) conclude in their comparison of the working conditions of academics in 19 higher education systems that academics appear to work less than 20 years ago, arguing that "an increasing number of academics seem to care more for a 'work-life balance' rather than for a strong devotion to academic work" (ibid.:

Although early-career anthropologists in Austria and Denmark experience similar processes of the intensification of their work – which is not surprising taking into account the internationalisation of the academic labour market – they are paid very differently. Whereas in Denmark they tend to have full-time employment and a better salary, the discrepancy between their effort and remuneration tends to be significantly higher in Austria, where they often work more than full-time while only having part-time employment far into their Postdoc career. Yet in both countries major parts of academic work are done without direct monetary compensation in line with a vocational work ethic, the logic of a gift exchange and/or a career logic that requires the accumulation of a vast amount of symbolic capital – considering academic work as "qualification work" rather than gainful work for an extended time period. In addition, the traditionally greedy "nature" of academic work is intensified by (1) pressures to be internationally mobile, forcing early-career anthropologists to renounce or at least neglect their attachments to their friends and (hoped-for) families as well as (2) the fact that they can never know whether their efforts will suffice to one day – a day that requires an increasing number of career steps and therefore time to be reached – qualify for a permanent position with the respective criteria becoming on the one hand increasingly diverse while remaining invariably relational (depending on one's competitors) and relative (depending on the interests of one's evaluators).

Another aspect early-career anthropologists in Austria and in Denmark have in common are their increasingly uncertain prospects whether their efforts will be eventually (adequately) rewarded by a permanent – and simultaneously better paid – position as they have to compete with a growing number of their peers who have been encouraged to pursue an academic career by temporary, externally funded positions.[374] Whereas these positions also allow those with less privileged backgrounds (who could otherwise not afford to do so) to embark on an academic career track, they simultaneously leave them to discover that such a track is increasingly characterised by a series of temporary employments that is likely to end in them having to leave academia – only to discover that finding adequate employment outside the university is a similarly challenging endeavour.[375] In other words: While on the one hand being expected to make science their vocation, they are not allowed to make it their permanent occupation (at least in the sense of an occupation that helps them earning their living). What is more, early-career academics' prolonged temporary employment means prolonged (economic) dependence on senior academics

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102). Of course, even then the questions remains whether academics work less (or more) in relation to the salary they receive.

[374] In this regard, one could argue that there is both too little and too much funding for academic work: too little (permanent) funding in relation to the number of qualified applicants and too much (temporary) funding in relation to the academic career prospects of the applicants who are encouraged to engage in a highly competitive and rather hopeless selection process.

[375] The question then arises whether it is indeed a (meaningful) sign of productivity if universities produce a growing number of PhD graduates at reduced costs (by employing these graduates on precarious contracts) in order to then force this highly specialised work force to leave academia, thereby not only forgoing their expertise but also confronting them with poor prospects of finding adequate (non-academic) employment. Questioning this circumstance is however not the same as arguing that their university education does not teach PhD graduates important skills. Just because skills are not acknowledged in the labour market does not mean that they are not worth being taught – but raises the question whether one can afford to learn them.

and university managers, turning their employment into a(n apparently) endless, panoptical job interview. As a Postdoc in Copenhagen sarcastically put it: "Potentially all your senior colleagues are your assessors – that's really lovely." The increasingly flexible and precarious "nature" of their employment, in contrast to the idealised notion of ivory tower academia, may in fact be paradigmatic for broader transformations affecting neoliberalised, post-Fordist work relations.

This amalgam of traditional notions of academic work demanding a high level of commitment on the one hand and increased competition, performance and mobility pressures as well as prolonged temporary employment and increased career insecurity on the other hand (cf. Barcan 2013: 6f.) creates an imperative of continuous self-optimisation while leaving early-career anthropologists economically and socially[376] vulnerable and therefore even more at the mercy of an already greedy occupation – prone to being exploited by their superiors (be they professorial overlords, academic capitalists and/or caring mentors)[377] and themselves. After all, which labour force lends itself better to exploitation than one that makes self-exploitation its work ethic (cf. Barcan 2013: 81, Gill 2010: 236) while depending on the active support of superiors (who are themselves prone to exploiting themselves) in order to keep their jobs? In that regard, I would distinguish between two closely interlinked kinds of (self-)exploitation: on the one hand that of overburdening oneself to (and over) the brink of complete exhaustion and on the other hand that of receiving (too) little remuneration for one's work effort and output.

The logic underpinning this development appears to be as follows: By "encouraging" early-career academics to be more productive, fewer of them are required to do a given amount of work and/or can be paid less to do that work. With (relatively) fewer positions and/or funding available, the competition for positions/funding increases – particularly as educating the next academic generation is a part of academic work, which means that being more productive equals creating a higher number of applicants for academic positions. This forces early-career academics to become even more productive in order to stay competitive, which allows their employers to further save costs, which in turn increases the competition for positions/funding and so on. Whereas superiors – who are themselves likely to have embodied a greedy work ethic and be subjected to performance pressures – profit from such an arrangement, which allows them to demand a high level of commitment from their staff while leaving them with little responsibility for what happens to that staff once their contracts expire, it leaves early-career academics hanging in the air, anxious and prone to precarity and exhaustion.[378] As a Postdoc put it at an informal meeting in Copenhagen where Postdocs discussed their concerns: "We are liminal and stressed – write that down!" On that note, one of her more senior colleagues argued that

[376] By undermining their (non-work-related) social networks.
[377] This is not to say that superiors intend to or do in fact exploit the work force of their junior staff, simply that they are situated in dynamics that encourage them to do so.
[378] In this respect, universities are greedy institutions in two ways: they are asking (increasingly) much of their early-career academics while investing relatively little in (many of) them. In other words: As academia becomes more demanding, it appears to simultaneously become less rewarding.

[t]he universities have worked all of this out. The Postdoc category itself is structurally designed to get people working like crazy because there is no job security. You are basically borrowing an office in a department and the department and the university is getting all the credit because you are really in your prime in terms of early-stage publishing. You are publishing a lot. So the university is getting all the credit, but they have no... You know, they can say: "No strings attached here."

However, such an increase in productivity comes at a cost, as pointed out by Barcan (2013):

The relentless focus on *output*, without regard for the processes, temporalities or engagements that *feed* us, puts input and output drastically out of balance. And what kind of body can do output without input? (ibid.: 104)

In that regard, a Postdoc in Vienna observed that

I have learned a lot [...] about the system – how it works, what makes people tick, how quickly you find yourself in a rat race, where you feel you have to do more, always more. And even further and further and yet another publication and yet another conference and another project and another proposal and another lecture and... This is total madness. And everything leads directly into burnout. [...] And I've got the impression that this is unstoppable. It was only stopped through my pregnancy, ad hoc. I am very grateful for that because I think I would have crashed in that system…

What creates this pressure to always have to do more?

It's a mixture. You know the system and you hear more and more: "There are few possibilities, there are few jobs, there is no funding..." It all boils down to this: very few have a chance – and even then a bad one. It's badly paid, you get no space, no office. [...] And if you get a tiny space inside (the system, author's note), you have to be extremely, extremely grateful. And very quiet, so that it won't be taken away. In this system it is almost a trivial offence to be pale, to have dark circles under your eyes and never to have gone on holidays for the last ten years. It's like a mantra for them. At least I have seen that, especially at the department during the project. [...] It's some kind of ideal: these completely exhausted academics who are giving it all. And saying: "I want to take a vacation", is repugnant! [...] They exert total pressure. And at some point you adopt it, if you enter that world too fast. And that happened to me. There is a strong identification of the people with the system. And suddenly I almost slid into a burnout.

An observation that one of her colleagues complemented by remarking that

I understand perfectly well that you should avoid having tenured people sit in their armchairs […], doing nothing. But this hyperproduction is simply hostile to the production of knowledge. So you [...] rarely have time to sit down and read for three months. But you cannot always produce. Knowledge and thought need to settle first so that something can come of it. And often, you don't have any time for that. I think if you have a permanent position, it's perhaps easier because you don't have to worry about economic livelihood and always have to reapply for each and everything. Like, I now just lost four weeks of my research time [because of submitting an application, author's note]. I worked for it all day and night and I couldn't do anything else. At the same time I should have handed in a paper [...] and that didn't work out. This is just an example. And of course you're exhausted as soon as you submitted. There is no time for rest – the next thing is already coming along. Or you are stressed out because you didn't write that text as planned and they're expecting it. This is simply hostile to the production of knowledge. One is simply a... It's expected that one becomes or is an output-machine.

Similarly, a Postdoc in Copenhagen told me that

I think the pressure is there all the time. I feel it in two ways. There is the pressure of performing on a certain level: a certain amount of publications, being good at giving lectures and these kind of things. And doing a lot of things all the time. I think that's horrible pressure that's very much with

me. I try to resist it, but it's very hard. And then there is of course the pressure of insecure employment. And that's a pressure that is peculiar to a certain category of researchers. And these two pressures together are horrible. Because they add up, or quadruple or whatever. Because then it gives rise to a more complex kind of questions. Questions like: "So am I in the right line of business? Am I good enough for this?" Or: "Do I have to produce something extraordinary to make myself relevant for people who hold the key to secure employment?" But then at the same time I don't like to perform that way, like I told you. So what do I do to stay here and become a researcher, which I still think is an interesting position? [...] How can I do that without ending up as an extremely competitive, very hard working person? I also do not think it should be necessary to work that hard. I think the balance between work life and private life is horribly upset. Part of this invisible competition goes on in the corridors when people brag about how much they work every night. And it's almost not okay not to work after hours or on the weekend. Particularly not for doctoral students. It's kind of known to be a liminal phase where you work extraordinarily hard. And that's kind of your rite of passage: showing that you are willing to renounce your private life in order to become a good employee and do the kind of work that's necessary for the community. And I think all these things […] are detrimental to actual research. [...] It does produce more research. [...] But also it produces a lot of redundancy. And it produces people who are basically unhappy and who produce research that is available more so than it is critical or interesting. Because they have to run after the money.

She added: "In order to be successful here you have to turn yourself into some sort of machine". In line with this, one of her colleagues explained to me that

[t]he best way to get a job is to be desperately hard working. To be just a machine. The kind of machine who gets up at 6:30, goes for a half hour run, sits down in front of their desk, finishes the chapter for that day, works solidly for four or five hours, then goes enjoys herself in the evening and the next day gets up at 6:30 and goes for a run and sits down and works again. […] It's kind of obvious that you need to be good as well. But that ability to sit down and produce and generate – and generate slick material – is the best and most sure fire route to a job. Of course, if everyone does it then... Whatever.

Obviously, we have to keep in mind that in an environment subjected to such a productivist imperative as the contemporary university we cannot take academics' accounts of how hard-working they are at face value. As a third Postdoc in Copenhagen observed:

I just find it fascinating that no one is willing to talk about their waste of time. It's as if everyone are like these machines that are just [makes a sound like a steam machine, author's note] completely structured, completely effective, efficient, lean, mean academic machines. Like no way do I believe in that.

I did not get the impression, however, that my interlocutors felt the need to construct a Potemkin village to depict their productivity in front of my eyes. They may have regarded it as an occasion to vent their frustration, but it is no accident that so many of them used the metaphor of a machine. A machine is a means of production rather than an end in itself, defined by its usefulness rather than its personal sensitivities. Although all the early-career anthropologists I met appeared very human to me, it became clear that many if not most of them felt that their work environment threatened not only their "humanity" – in the sense of feeling secure, appreciated or at ease, (learning by) making mistakes, being playful, idle, tired or simply more than the "useful" output they produce – but the quality of their work as well. This is not to say that they did not also enjoy their work and only did it because they could not earn money otherwise – although

that certainly is a factor. Nor is it to say that their predecessors were necessarily offered better working conditions. It certainly is a privilege to be paid to do a PhD and be(come) an academic – but an increasingly precarious, stressful and career-wise less rewarding one. Many early-career anthropologists are willing to pay these prices repeatedly – to work hard for a relatively low salary, not knowing whether and where they will find employment in the next year, to change their homes every few years and to continuously push themselves to work hard(er) in order to stay competitive, never knowing whether they are performing well enough. It is up to each of them to decide whether their careers have been worth the efforts and sacrifices in the end. What this thesis tries to reveal is how some of them experience the challenges identified here that characterise the contemporary, neoliberalised university – and how their room for manoeuver to negotiate them is limited (as long as they want to keep playing the academic game). After all, although these conflicts are rarely discussed as institutional issues (cf. Gill 2010: 236), they result from structural tensions and are therefore not possible to be solved by early-career anthropologists individually – no matter how much they commit to their work and optimise themselves according to its needs.

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12 Abstracts

12.1 English Abstract

Academic work has changed in crucial ways as neoliberal forms of governance and post-Fordist modes of production have taken hold in society and a global knowledge economy has emerged. These changes concern both the purpose of academic work (towards agendas determined by economic and political interests like generating economic growth or solving "societal challenges") and its organisation (towards more project- and output-oriented forms dominated by market and managerial logics of practice). At the same time, academia has preserved many of its traditional features, such as notions of academic freedom, the fact that academic exchange follows the logic of a gift economy or a vocational work ethic involving working long hours (irrespective of payment) and neglecting other (social) obligations. These developments have not only resulted in contemporary universities being fragmented, "schizophrenic" entities, but have affected those working in and for them in similar ways. Based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork at two departments of social anthropology – at the University of Vienna and the University of Copenhagen – this thesis describes how early-career academics experience their situation of being subjected to increasing competition, which puts pressure on them to secure the support of (senior) colleagues, be internationally mobile and continuously optimise their productivity (by optimising themselves), while simultaneously resulting in their working conditions growing ever more precarious and their academic career perspectives ever bleaker. Oscillating between the positions of (amateur) student, freelancer, (project) assistant and prospective permanent (or, conversely, unemployed) academic – positions that amount to being a (currently) cheap, easily replaceable labour force – they are confronted with new possibilities for (temporary) academic careers on the one hand and new hierarchies and dependencies on the other hand that leave them vulnerable to exploitation by their superiors as well as by themselves.

12.2 German Abstract

Neoliberale Regierungs- und postfordistische Produktionsweisen sowie eine globale Wissensökonomie haben ihre Spuren im universitären Betrieb hinterlassen – sowohl in Hinblick auf seine Zwecke (hin zu von ökonomischen und politischen Interessen bestimmten Agenden wie die Schaffung von Wirtschaftswachstum oder die Lösung „gesellschaftlicher Herausforderungen“) als auch seine Organisationsformen (hin zu projekt- und ergebnisorientierten Arbeitsformen, die marktorientierten und managerialen Handlungslogiken folgen). Zugleich hat die universitäre Arbeitswelt viele ihrer traditionellen Merkmale bewahrt wie Vorstellungen von akademischen Freiheiten, die zentrale Bedeutung einer Ökonomie der Gabe für den akademischen Austausch oder einen Arbeitsethos, der einen hohen Arbeitseinsatz (ungeachtet der Bezahlung) sowie die Vernachlässigung anderer (sozialer) Verpflichtungen erfordert. Diese Entwicklungen haben nicht nur Universitäten als zerrissene, „schizophrene“ Entitäten zurückgelassen, sondern hatten auch ähnliche Konsequenzen für jene, die in ihnen und für sie arbeiten. Aufbauend auf eine umfangreiche ethnographische Feldforschung an zwei Instituten für Sozialanthropologie – an der Universität Wien und der Universität Kopenhagen – beschreibt die vorliegende Dissertation die Erfahrungen von akademisch (relativ) jungen AnthropologInnen, einer zunehmenden Konkurrenzsituation ausgesetzt zu sein, die sie dazu zwingt, sich der Unterstützung (etablierter) KollegInnen zu versichern, international mobil zu sein und ihre Leistungsfähigkeit ständig zu optimieren (indem sie sich selbst optimieren), während sich gleichzeitig ihre Arbeitsbedingungen und beruflichen Perspektiven immer prekärer gestalten. In diversen Positionen, von Studierenden über FreiberuflerInnen zu (Projekt-)AssistentInnen und zukünftig unbefristet angestellten (oder arbeitslosen) AkademikerInnen – Positionen, die (gegenwärtig) billigen, leicht ersetzbaren Arbeitskräften gleichkommen – finden sie einerseits neue Möglichkeiten für (befristete) akademischen Laufbahnen vor und andererseits neue Hierarchien und Abhängigkeiten, die sie anfällig für (Selbst-)Ausbeutung machen.