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MAGISTERARBEIT

Titel der Magisterarbeit

„The Political Theory of State Failure
using the Example of the
Rwandan Genocide in 1994“

Verfasserin
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angestrebter akademischer Grad
Magister der Philosophie (Mag.phil)

Wien, im März 2009

Studienkennzahl laut Studienblatt: A300
Studienrichtung laut Studienblatt: Politikwissenschaft
Betreuer: Doz. Dr. Johann Wimmer

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Map of Rwanda



“United Nations Map showing Rwanda prior to the reform of its subdivision in 2006” (Wikipedia, 2009)

1. Introduction

1.1. Research Question and Systematic Approach

In literature about state failure in Africa, Rwanda is often mentioned along with countries like the DRC or Somalia, as an example for a failed state.

Rwanda obviously presents features that make it seem like a case typical of a weak state or even a failed one. But was Rwanda really a failed state prior to genocide?

The question that then presents itself when looking closer into the theories of genocide is, if a failed state can really be the scene for a genocide of this dimension. This is what shall be analyzed and answered with this thesis.

One of the main objectives of this paper is to analyze whether the Rwandan state already was a failed state prior to the genocide or not. This question shall be answered by looking at the theories of state failure and genocide thoroughly.

By researching certain factors that are considered to be a sign of state failure, this paper shall give an answer to the question if state failure in Rwanda followed or preceded the genocide, or if genocide – since it is defined as a state controlled event – excludes state failure.

The main goal of this paper is to analyze necessary events and criteria that are then succeeded by state weakness or failure. These criteria will then be examined and put into relation to the tragic events that happened during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

These events will be shown on the example of the Rwandan media, not only because the Rwandan media played an important role in the genocide that was about to happen and also while it happened, but also because the hate media in Rwanda were directly linked to the government, the same government that was responsible for planning and executing the Rwandan genocide. Moreover the role of the media in Rwanda is especially interesting, since it is considered one of the roots of the extreme explosion of violence and killings in the small Central African state.

Another fact that makes the Rwandan hate media particularly interesting for this paper is the fact that they have been well documented due to the fact that the ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) decided to take a closer look at the role of the media and those responsible and linked it directly to the acts of genocide that took place.

This paper seeks to link external and internal developments that might be considered major factors for the Rwandan genocide.

The first part of the paper concentrates on analyzing state failure and political theories that deal with weak states, whereas the second part of the paper gives an overview of the events, with – as already mentioned – a focus on the role of the media.

In the final chapter of this paper I will connect the events of state failure and state collapse with the events during the Rwandan genocide and seek to relate these factors with each other.

1.2. The Rwandan Genocide

When in late 1994 the whole extent of the massacres that had taken place in Rwanda between April and July 1994 became public, the world was stunned with horror. Following the disbelief and shock about the atrocities that had happened in the small Central African Republic inculpation started. Mixed with the disbelief about the tragedy of the genocide came the blame, since nothing really had been done to avert or end the killings. It was not the first time that the words: „Never again!“ were uttered and new research groups to avoid such events in the future were called for.

It cannot be denied that genocide is a worldwide danger, not restricted to a single continent, which has been shown by history, especially the history of the 20th century. Rwanda was not the first time one was confronted with such a tragedy.

As early as in late 1994 the ad-hoc Tribunal for Rwanda was set up in Arusha, Tanzania by the UN Security Council (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda – ICTR). This tribunal is trying to judge the main figures of the 1994 genocide up to now. Rwanda furthermore installed the – quite controversial – Gacaca-Courts in order to deal with the alleged participants of the genocide on a

regional basis. Until today the Rwandan prisons are filled with possible participators of the genocide, awaiting their trial.

Next to the ICTR and the local courts that are still trying to process the elements of crime during the months of genocide, more and more scientists have started to research the obvious questions, asking about the „Why?“ and „How?“, of the massacres; questions, which – if at all – cannot easily be answered.

Furthermore, one of the main factors that have been recognized in the last years of discourse is the issue of the anti-Tutsi propaganda that had been enforced by the Hutu extremists (génocidaires), an issue that, as already mentioned, will also be addressed in this paper thoroughly.

The focus will especially be on the *Kangura* newspaper and the radio station „Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines“ (short: RTLM, sometimes in literature also referred to as RTLMC). Both of the media identified here had launched campaigns against the Tutsi minority, also including all the Hutus that were affiliated with Tutsis in official or private matters; defining the population group that was to become the victim of the following atrocities. Even the ICTR found these media guilty of genocide and tried four people on that account. Three of whom in the so called „Media Trials“ and another one separately. All four of them were found guilty of the propagation of hate speech and of playing a major part not only in the planning but also the execution of the genocide.

The initial portrayal of the conflict as a simple civil war in the international media does not uphold a closer examination of the events.

The causes of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda root deep in Rwandan history. Many articles have been events written about these potential reasons. That is why in the following paper the causes that culminated in the genocide shall be researched under the perspective of the theories of state failure. The paper shall analyze what features of state failure Rwanda had developed until the outbreak of the killings in 1994 and how they were related to the genocide.

1.3. African States between Democracy and State Failure

The notion of a modern state in Sub-Sahara Africa is relatively young, especially since before 1950 only Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa were recognized as

independent states, while the rest of the Sub-Saharan states gained their independence only after the 1960s (ACPCC, 2005).

This part of the paper analyzes certain developments that have taken place on the African continent during the last decades up to now. When referred to Africa in general hereafter, it is thought of Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA); except when it is explicitly stated otherwise. The main focus is to be put on certain phenomena that can be identified in the SSA-region, namely the issue of state failure and the criteria that led to those events. In the past years state failure has become a keyword when it is referred to the many shortcomings of the African states.

In the beginning it has to be noted, however that in the last decades considerable progress has been made, especially in Southern Africa and many Western African countries, such as Mali, Benin or South Africa. These accomplishments shall neither be forgotten nor negated, but will not be the main focus of this paper.

It is much more thought to discover certain factors and events that may lead to the extreme event of state failure or even genocide, as it took place in Rwanda.

“Democratic forms of governance were generally few and short-lived through the decolonialization and Cold War periods; most African regimes were autocratic and well over half of African regimes were ruled by ethnically exclusive political elites.” (ACPCC, 2005:2)

In 2004 there were only 5 autocratic regimes identified (out of 43 states), whilst in 1989 36 out of 41 countries were considered to have autocratic regimes.

Next to the accomplishments that led to democratic developments and transitions in some African states, there are four main criteria to be identified that block or even decline any indication of democracy and development and leave the countries in an abominable state.

Furthermore, it has to be noted that most regimes in Africa nowadays are identified as mixed regimes with democratic as well as autocratic features. Only about 13 countries were identified as democratic states in 2004, since “The problem of extreme failures of states doubled in the 1990s, affecting about 10% of African countries.” (ACPCC, 2005:3).

The following criteria are considered to weaken many African states:

- Political violence, civil wars and bloody conflicts between ethnic and religious groups, which can even culminate in genocides or so called politicides (political mass murder).
- Stagnating or declining economies, low investments and exploding state debts, followed or preceded by high unemployment rates and a growing black economy, as well as organized crime.
- The explosion of the AIDS/HIV-pandemic (as well as others), destroying whole regions as well as “human capital”, leaving thousands dead each year, will pose a serious threat to the economies of many African nations in the future.
- And finally the growing tendencies of state failure, state collapse and state decay (also referred to as the “Apocalyptic Trias” in this paper), three events that will be thoroughly discussed in this paper
(Tetzlaff, 2002)

These four factors can be related to one another; in many cases they reciprocate each other. Still, the most destructive form is to be found within the collective – and often politically motivated – violence, often brutally unleashed, that unsettles many African states. On the other hand, interstate conflicts are not to be found very often, with some very bloody exceptions like the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, or the so called African World War that involved eight nations in the Great Lakes Region and cost millions of lives, mainly in the eastern province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kivu, a war that was fought especially brutally over the vast natural resources that are situated in that region (Tetzlaff, 2002).

Still, at the beginning of the new millennium 13 of the worldwide 35 civil wars took place in Africa and another 12 violent inner-state conflicts were identified there.

The genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994 has to be considered one of the biggest catastrophes of the last decades. The killings lasted a hundred days and left an estimated 800.000 people dead (Tetzlaff, 2002).

2. State Failure

2.1. The Theory of State Failure

Finding a single definition that thoroughly describes the multitude of theories on failing and failed states is not really easy, especially when talking about developing or so-called “Third World” countries. There are multiple theories concerning the issue, but not a specific one that is universally recognized. The lack of development has, for many years, been blamed mainly on economic conditions. This is why the criticism that was raised was especially directed against the dependencia theory and modernization theory. The not only non-existent, even negative development of most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa therefore cannot be accounted for satisfactorily with these development theories (Wimmer 2000).

Since then, the theories of failing and failed states have become sort of a “catch-all concept” describing the various shortcomings in the development theories for the negative development throughout the “Third World”.

Reading papers and materials concerning the topic of failed states and state failure, most of the theories name the same or similar aspects that most of the times differ only slightly from each other. In the following paper the author will give an overview of the most important appendages that are important in the context of the topic of this paper.

2.2. Approaching the Theory of State Failure

One of the main issues that have to be clarified at the beginning is the meaning of the concept of “state”. There are two quite different approaches to be found in the discourse of failing and collapsed states, which build on either the Lockean or the Weberian definition of state (Eriksen, 2006:1).

Furthermore, the view of how countries in the “Third World” should address their future has changed throughout time. While modernization theory during the 1960s

considered the state as the vital actor in its developmental efforts, this perception changed in the 1980s and 1990s, when more neo-liberal theories entered the development discourse. Many states in the “Third World” by then were identified with kleptocratic features like corruption and organized crime, as well as serious problems in being bureaucratically inefficient. The most obvious changes in the strategies concerning development that mirrored this alteration of perception were the neo-liberal structural adjustment programs (Eriksen 2003).

Highly recognized authors like Zartman and Rotberg have used the Lockean perception of the state, which is a quite ideological approach and not really useful in the following discourse on state failure, since by this definition the state is considered a service provider and as soon as it becomes impossible for the state to provide all the services, it can be identified as a collapsed state- an approach that by definition includes many states in the concept of state failure, because these services include not only the assurance of security, but also political participation, infrastructural as well as social services in the area of health and education.

Eriksen considers this perception of the state “... more ideological than analytical useful.” (Eriksen, 2006:3). This builds on Rotberg’s perception of the state where Rotberg, as explained earlier, defines the failure of statehood on account of the inability to provide certain goods and features to its citizens (Eriksen, 2006:2ff). Eriksen criticizes that if the state does not cope with all these responsibilities, one cannot really call it a collapsed state yet, since the definition of failure used by the authors Zartman and Rotberg would imply that most of the states could be classified as collapsed states, including many of the western states.

On that account a discussion in this discourse has taken place, marking certain gradations in the effectiveness of statehood and defining strong, weak, failing and failed states (Eriksen, 2006:3).

One also has to take into consideration that the rise of the modern state in Europe was not really aligned to the providing of services to its inhabitants in the beginning either, but more to the correlation of the militarization of rivalries between European despots. Only in the following development were administrative adjustments pursued by the state, in order to provide the basis to collect taxes and create a functional financial structure to account for certain expenses (Eriksen, 2006:4).

The other approach, as already mentioned above, is designed on the Weberian concept of “state”, where the state is the institution executing effective monopoly of power over its political territory. Only the collapse of this ability – of maintaining power over its territory – would define a state as a failed one. In addition to this definition of the state’s monopoly of power in the discourse of failed state theories, Jackson, Krasner and Giddens add the failure of pacification within the state as a means of measurement (Eriksen, 2006:4).

Another important aspect that needs to be clarified at the beginning of this paper is the term “failed state” or “failing state”, since the term of “failed state” implies there had to be an effective state to begin with. But there are so far no examples of failed or failing states, where the state addressed its responsibilities effectively before the collapse (Clapham 2000, Lange 2004, Eriksen 2006). Clapham criticized, that: ” ... ‘failed state’ is one of those unsatisfactory categories that is named after what it isn’t, rather than what it is.” (Clapham 2000:1).

Many states, especially through the process of decolonialization, became states only by being engaged in diplomatic relations with other states, but with no feature of having executive power over their territory. Moreover, lots of them have never possessed any necessary attributes of a functioning state whatsoever. This would by definition include the possibility to secure and execute a universally valid legal system or even security for its inhabitants – considering internal, as well as external security. On the contrary, many regimes that seized power after independence used this illusiveness of national sovereignty to exculpate them from their political actions to any outside criticism (Lange, 2004:1).

Lange adds furthermore that nation-building in the former colonies is a very complex process that is always influenced by external as well as internal factors. He states that many countries hitherto have not been able to develop a social, economic and at the same time a political system, since these adjustments rely on a certain stability within the country (Lange 2004).

2.3. Factors for State Failure

The collapse of a country mostly entails the partial or complete collapse of the country's economy and existing state structures, at least these that still existed before the collapse. Likewise it connotes the breakdown of state authority, especially in countries where the governments only possess little or no legitimacy or competence to govern the country. These states can in many cases be associated with rampant criminality, armed conflicts, serious violations of human rights or/and a humanitarian crisis. In most of the cases these countries and their collapse, often accompanied by an all-consuming wave of violence, constitute a serious threat to the whole region (Kassem 2004, Fituni 2004).

Assad Durani states that with the collapse of these state-assigned responsibilities existing clan structures might take over in order to provide for the basic needs of the population. These structures were to be found in Afghanistan (Durani 2004:22ff) as well as in the Rwandan refugee camps. In response to the collapse of the economy the underground economy is also flourishing, which leads to the problem that without state supervision and regulation there are no taxes to rebuild the collapsed state economy. In most cases financial aid of donor countries is necessary, but it is prevalently not effective, since these financial sources ooze away into inefficient and in many cases corrupt state machinery, especially in countries that possess vast natural resources (Durani 2004).

In the case of Rwanda, the institution of the state was never really favored by the Rwandan people, since in the beginning it stood for the brutal colonial regime of the Belgians and after independence for the discriminating Rwandan Hutu-regime.

Nation states exist to ensure certain securities and needs for its inhabitants and, depending on its ability and level to perform these services, can be evaluated as strong, weak, failing or failed states (Kassem 2004, Abramova 2004).

Furthermore, Kassem (2004) creates a hierarchic structures classification of the importance of a desideratum that can be ensured by the state. These structures include basic securities such as safety within a country and against outside threats, enforceable and actionable justice structures and laws, as well as basic needs like infrastructure, accessible health- and educational systems. These fundamental securities can be endangered in a state where neo-patrimonial structures weaken

governmental requirements and block further development (Kassem 2004:38ff; Abramova 2004:47f). The concept of neo-patrimonialism mentioned here will be addressed more thoroughly later in this paper.

2.3.1. Why do states collapse?

As already mentioned before, there is a wide range of various reasons that can be found in the literature on state failure, with a very broad range of views on what triggers a states collapse.

Fituni (2004) for example considers capitalism and the pressure that results of it major factors for state failure, especially when western fiscal institutions impose their conditions on those weak countries. Fituni also identifies neo-patrimonial structures as one of the main reasons, though market failure is considered especially important by him. Therefore he names patterns like privatization, structural adjustments or economy measures as activators of economic stagnation and/or failure, growing violence through government forces as well as the explosion of socio-economic costs (Fituni 2004).

It becomes obvious that the idea of the state as a functioning main actor and regulator concerning countries' economic and social development had to be abandoned for many countries; especially in Africa many countries in Sub-Saharan-Africa could not even be considered Third World countries anymore. Finally the inefficiency of the state sector became highly visible and the incompetence of many African political leaders made it impossible for most countries to cope with the challenges of decolonialization, leaving them highly vulnerable in aspects of political, social and economic demands. Especially in Africa, since the "historic" leaders were replaced by new power elites, politics has become the battle field for absolute power. The group that received it, either through elections or through force, this group in most cases intended to keep it, leaving other problems like ethnic conflicts unattended, or worse, even used it for its own purposes. The creation of small power elites, in many cases colliding with the oppression of all the other social groups, created or deepened the crater of psychosocial differences.

Changes in the developmental theories and strategies of the west and the emergence of neo-liberalism made it even easier for plutocratic governments to use their power for their own purposes, being the perfect breeding ground for organized crime, kleptocracy and clientelism (Abramova 2004). These weak, failing or failed states often yield large financial profits, especially if the countries own vast natural resources. Hence these profits are only reserved to criminal organizations and some privileged elites in the country, who therefore adopt arbitrary laws in order to maximize their own profits.

In a failed state there is a power vacuum, which means that real social and political needs of the civil population can only be seconded on an ad-hoc and private basis (Kassem 2004).

Kassem (2004) additionally defines three fundamental, geopolitical factors that he considers activators for state failure. First he names colonialism, wherever it destroyed traditional structures without implementing effective constitutional structures instead. Without these foundations no national identities could build on that and the industrial revolution could not take place in these countries. Here important examples are above all the Levantine states.

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War led to the collapse of the dictatorial regimes that had been backed by one of the superpowers without having any legitimacy to be in power.

Additionally these countries had been militarized through armament supplies, leaving vast parts of Africa heavily armed.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall democratic systems were not useful for many dictators and one-party governments throughout Africa. Polls were simply not accepted when it meant a reduction or loss of power for the regimes.

In addition, many of them had no scruples whatsoever to use violence against anyone opposing their regime. Kassem thinks that contrary to the problem of the 20th century, when only a few countries had too much power, the problem of the 21st century is that too many countries have too little power (Kassem 2004:40).

Finally Kassem also names the process of modernization as one of the triggers of state failure. These new developments provide more mobility, socially as well as geographically, but for weak states the necessary process of stabilization cannot be provided (Kassem 2004:41).

One of the main occurrences that precede state failure is the lack of ability of a state to conserve the monopoly to force – within as well as beyond state territory. Reasons for the lack of competence can be internal violent conflicts, the emergence of non-state forces, black marketing, often in correlation with arms trade and the illegal exploitation of resources, in many cases leading to an armament of major parts of the civil society.

These developments most times go hand in hand with corrupt regimes and their struggle for power, a combination that makes a country veer from one catastrophe to the next (Kassem 2004:41).

Tragically in many cases single characters can be pointed out to be responsible for the collapse of a whole state, famous examples being Mobutu SeSe Seko of Zaire, Siad Barré in Somalia or Liberia's Samuel Doe, just to name a few. All of them had constricted all forms of democratic achievements, since these were considered dangerous to their own power. Their positions of power were promoted and secured by neo-patrimonial features like personality cults and clientelism, as well as kleptocratic features and, in all cases, horrible violations of basic human rights.

When all these existing and hitherto weak governmental institutions finally collapse, the whole state, as a consequence, goes as well. With the collapse of all state features the brutality and intensity of violence increases even further, and the whole society lapses, as Kassem puts it, into a form of collective insanity (Kassem 2004:41).

Furthermore, Kassem defines momentum and a high degree of incalculability as characteristic features of these internal conflicts, in many cases attaining a stringent level of systematically radicalized and politicized violence. State collapse is preceded by the decay of power structures that originally should preserve law and order. The triggers for these phenomena can be manifold: poverty, ethnic as well as social tensions, exploitation, incapable authorities, malicious intrusion through outside actors and the neglect of the development of certain relevant sectors, just to name a few. The real power is culminated outside the governmental centre, which is unable to act because of numerous power struggles. In many of the African countries, e.g. the DRC, local forces sense their chance and seize power. This is followed by a dramatic loss of control for the

present government, which is trying to keep the power within its own entourage, which can consist of ethnic, regional or religious affiliations, or even functional networks like military squads.

Ultimately, these minority groups concentrate on their own needs and vantages, while oppressing the needs of the majority. Decisions and necessary measures that are not primarily in the interest of their own entourage, or might reduce their own power, are not taken, due to lack of political will or audacity. State failure becomes inevitable when the centre loses control over its own authorities, which start to act on their own terms, corrupting capital and using law and order in their own personal interest.

Once more, one of the most vivid examples for plutocratic features is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Under Mobutu's reign public property and state finances were plundered, development aid payments were transferred to private accounts, leaving all infrastructures in ruins (Abramova 2004:48).

The collapse mostly culminates in the eruption of anarchic, violent conflicts, and in many cases includes the destruction of the last remaining infrastructures; usually leaving the educational elites, opposition, as well as experts, dead or fleeing the country (Kassem 2004). In Rwanda this included the opposition, doctors, teachers, priests, the Tutsi population and in parts also the Hutu elites.

Africa, with its about 3.000 different tribes and about 1.000 different languages, develops in the direction of being especially complicated while forming some kind of minefield for ethnic divisions and conflicts. Especially since the 1980, the political elites have started to compartmentalize on account of ethnic affiliation. In the following years the polarization between ethnic groups acuminated into ethno-nationalism, marking the 1990s with a series of bloody conflicts, not only in Rwanda, but also Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Chad, Nigeria, ... (Abramova 2004:53ff).

2.3.2. Using Erdmann's "Apocalyptic Trias"

Erdmann defines three stages of a failing state that seem useful to analyze events in SSA countries, especially since he adapted his theories especially to African countries. His theories find that these three stages often follow each other, since massive state failure often leads to the decay of the state and, in the worst case, to its collapse. This progression is not mandatory, though; one stage is not necessarily followed by the other (Erdmann 2003).

- **State failure (Staatsversagen):**

State failure includes structural activity and achievement deficits of the state, without constricting its monopoly of power or sovereignty over its territory and inhabitants lastingly. These developments inevitably lead to a lack of legitimacy of the country, which can concern the legitimacy of the government, the regime or the whole state. This stage of state failure includes the collapse of public infrastructures, such as educational and health systems, problems of the implementation of general administrative issues due to endemic corruption, as well as the rampant decay of physical infrastructures, exploding crime rate and the repression of the monopoly on the use of force.

Almost all of the SSA countries can be included in this category (Erdmann 2003:271).

- **State decay (Staatsverfall):**

The stage of state decay follows the stage of state failure. Per definition of Erdmann, state decay includes the loss of the monopoly on the use of force by the state over a certain territory. This happens without questioning the legitimacy of the state, so without the intention of secession, while some sort of parastatehood develops ("Parastaatlichkeit"), taking over some or most of the state services, creating a process of informalization and decentralization (Erdmann 2003:271).

- **State collapse (Staatszerfall):**

State collapse describes the complete collapse of state authority. Here, we have to distinguish between two different types of state collapse.

- a. Partial state collapse: This connotes the loss of power over parts of the state territory, accompanied by the decay of the legitimacy of the state and the complete loss of state power. This form of state collapse is found in countries that are shackled by civil wars (e.g. Angola, Sudan, Burundi, etc.). While the government still controls substantial parts of the territory and is even able to fight against the aggressor in the country, the monopoly of power in these parts is only nominal, giving way to features of a parastatehood (Erdmann 2003:272).
- b. Absolute state collapse: Means that in a country there is no or only a minimum of a central instance left, controlling only a small part of the state territory. Best examples are Somalia up to now, or Liberia during the war (Erdmann 2003:272).

2.3.3. Ethnicity as a Trigger for Violence?

The topic of ethnicity as one of the root causes of conflicts in Africa is a vast topic that in order to go into detail would require a whole paper alone. Since when one is talking about Rwanda, the issue of ethnicity is inescapable, I will address it, but without being able of going into too much detail.

Ethnicity seems to have become one of the main reasons for violence today.

“Ethnic conflicts” are all over the news. Violent conflicts and internal fighting are more and more often blamed on “ethnic differences”, leaving other possible reasons unattended or even concealing the real issues (Schlee 2006). In respect of state failure, with the process of the disintegration of governmental control, the allegiance of the population towards the state declines as well. When the cohesion between the state and its society vanishes, people try to find other terms to identify themselves with others. This can be through language, religion, or often through ethnicity (Langfold, 1999.62).

„'Ethnische Konflikte' ist, besonders seit dem Ende des Sozialismus und der Abkehr von einer klassenkämpferischen Perspektive, zu einer selbstverständlichen Phrase geworden. Keiner fragt was eigentlich ethnisch an ethnischen Konflikten ist. (...) Ethnizität ist in dieser Sicht ein zeitkonstanter Faktor, der Konflikte generiert.“ (Schlee 2006:8).

Schlee especially criticizes the view that in an ethnic conflict „...uralte und tief verwurzelte Gegensätze...“ (Schlee 2006:12) collide with each other. He finds that ethnicity is nothing that can be considered constant and unalterable, since it is something that has to be redefined all the time. The concept of ethnicity is not only dependent on its cultural contents, but also on the collective of persons related to it. These define the range of what is understood by “Us” and “Them” continuously anew (Schlee 2006:12). With the shifting of these concepts the causes for conflicts and their constellations also change again and again. The borders of what is understood as “Us” and “Them” also shift with the standpoint of the observer. There are cases in SSA where different tribes, which in extreme cases can even belong to a different language family, align to one clan (Schlee 2006,13ff). These differences are often only created or tightened by political elites in order to receive the support of a certain population group or to explain existing inequalities (Maquet 1961, Schlee 2006).

„‘Types‘ and ‘traits‘ incautiously and sometimes fancifully ascribed by social scientists and bureaucrats have often taken on a terrible social reality as the reification and essentialization of cultural difference have been harnessed to deadly political visions.”
(cited in: Igwara, 1995:7).

An obvious example for such a case would be that of the Kalenjin in Kenia:

„Die heutigen alten Leute unter den Kalenjin wussten in ihrer Jugend nicht, dass sie Kalenjin waren. Dass diese Kalenjin nicht weiter zurückverfolgt werden können als in die Kolonialzeit und dass es ursprünglich nur den Gebildeten unter ihnen bekannt war, wie die europäischen Linguisten hier die Dialektgrenzen zogen und größeren sprachlichen Zusammenhalt definierten, ändert nichts daran, dass die

Kalenjin heute eine hoch politisierte Ethnie sind, auch wegen der Protektion, die sie unter dem Präsidenten Daniel arap Moi genossen haben.“ (Schlee 2006:12).

2.3.4. The Impact of the Absence of External Conflicts in Africa

As discussed before, the militarization and armament of many African states during and after the Cold War made Africa the main area of conflicts, with internal violence in most of the SSA countries during the 1990s.

But since the fall of the Berlin Wall, dictatorships and military regimes have become unfashionable, even in Africa (Pelda, 2007:5). Pelda states that nowadays African countries elect their dictators every four to five years, though once in power, democratic elections are not always guaranteed by the regime.

Just a while ago the elections in Nigeria made this obvious once again, even more so the recent elections in Zimbabwe in 2008. Democracy does not change the style in which African leaders govern their countries too much (Pelda 2007:5). Until today, for a vote during the elections in many African countries it is not necessary to get as many supporters within the population as possible, but it is crucial to gain the support of local clan leaders, thus ensuring the vote of the whole area. The support of these clan leaders can either be bought by money or promises. Furthermore, since people are poor, votes are usually cheap.

Still, one cannot help but wonder why democratic structures and economic power of their country are not of more importance to the African elites and why corruption is still growing like an epidemic.

Pelda, among others, blames the absence of external conflicts as one of the main reasons. The danger of external absorption forces a state and its government to restrain (neo-) patrimonial structures like corruption to prevent a hostile takeover. It has been well documented that in Europe – as history shows – those despots who were neglecting their armies or were losing too many taxes into the channels of corruption were in danger of being deposed. Statehood then was directly linked to warfare.

Furthermore, the military tensions between European countries made not only military and scientific developments necessary, but despots also had an interest in developing such things as property or contract laws. Progress was crucial for a country's survival (Pelda, 2007:5), weak states simply ceased to exist (Eriksen, 2005:3).

Moletsi Mbeki, brother of the former South African president even stated that:

”In Europa war die Furcht vor vernichtenden zwischenstaatlichen Kriegen ein entscheidender Faktor für die wirtschaftliche Integration des Kontinents. Dies ist nicht der Fall in Afrika. Zwischenstaatliche Kriege haben in Europa außerdem dazu beigetragen, ein Nationalbewusstsein zu entwickeln. Ein solches fehlt hingegen in Afrika weitgehend. Hinzu kommt, dass ein Staat mit äußeren Feinden gezwungen ist, sich besser zu organisieren, um große Armeen auszurüsten, ohne zugleich die wirtschaftliche Produktion absacken zu lassen. Zwischenstaatliche Kriege zwingen die Regierungen darüber hinaus, Minderheiten im Land Konzessionen zu machen, um eine einheitliche Front im Angesicht der äußeren Bedrohung zu schaffen. Die große Zahl der innerstaatlichen Konflikte in Afrika hat hingegen eine völlig gegenteilige Wirkung. Sie fragmentieren die Gesellschaft, statt sie zu vereinen. Sie untergraben das Vertrauen in den Staat und dessen Legitimität. Insgesamt schwächen sie den Staat.“ (Pelda, 2007:5).

It can be assumed as obvious that internal conflicts weaken a. It has to be noted though, that internal conflicts in Africa – at least in most of the cases– never reached the same extent as interstate conflicts in Europe. Most of the times these rebel groups control border areas that are of little or no real interest to the regimes in the centre, the chance that one of these rebel groups might seize power is very slim (Pelda 2007).

One of these exceptions is the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) in Rwanda, whose former leader Paul Kagame became Rwanda's new president in 2000. The former acting president, Pasteur Bizimungu, who was also a member of the RPF, stayed in power from the end of the genocide in 1994 until 2000 when Kagame was elected with over 90% of the votes.

At the end of the 1960s, the Organization of the African Union codified the national borders, and the acting heads of the states agreed not to interfere in each other's domestic affairs. Pelda describes this as the emergence of a cartel of the powerful with the goal to exploit their own territory as far as possible, discarding the violent struggle between former colonies.

The absence of the effects of conflicts has been thoroughly discussed in the last years, by authors such as Luttwalk ("Give war a chance", 1999), Ottaway ("Keep out of Africa", 1999) and Herbst ("Let them fail", 2004), as well as in the discourse about the failure of humanitarian interventions of (UN) peace keeping missions like in Rwanda 1994 or Somalia 1993, just to name the most tragic ones (Eriksen 2005).

Thus it has to be noted that there is a discussion going on in the scientific community if today's wars would still have the same nation-strengthening effect as they had on Europe. Moreover, the question is raised whether in our contemporary world order a state's survival is still dependent on its (Clapham 2000, Eriksen 2005).

2.3.4.1. Insertion: Can War Still Strengthen States? –

The Impact of Genocide and the War in the Great Lakes Region on Rwanda

To take a closer look at this discussion, one can look at the war in the Great Lakes Region in this context, since Eriksen raises the question in his paper "The Congo war and prospects of state formation" if the conflict, which has also been referred to as "the African World War", has had a strengthening effect on Rwanda and Uganda.

In this discourse Rwanda is a special case, since the exodus of millions of refugees, among them many of the "génocidaires", was one of the main reasons for the outbreaks of violence in the Democratic Republic Congo (Eriksen 2005).

While the wars in Europe were mainly about territory, this was not the case in the conflict of the Great Lakes Region. Although countries invaded each other's territories, none of the parties ever made any territorial claims.

The situation in the Congo represented a serious problem for Rwanda, since the refugee camps had become reception points for the Hutu militia, who had vowed to take Rwanda back and kill the remaining Tutsi, as well as all the Hutu who might support the new Tutsi regime. While Rwanda, alongside Uganda, first supported Kabila and acted as his allies in order to overthrow Mobutu, they soon changed their position, then supporting the RCD-Goma rebel forces in the eastern Congo.

For Rwanda this decision was based on the reason that Kabila did not – as promised – disarm the Hutu militias. Moreover, the presence of these large numbers of foreign troops in the Congo made Kabila try to get rid of his former allies.

Therefore Rwanda and Uganda chose to support the RCD-Goma, soon taking over control of nearly one third of the territory, and along with this territory also most of the vast natural resources located in the DRC. Rwanda proved to be a major military player in the region, not only being highly equipped for war after the many violent conflicts prior to and also during the genocide, but also the RPF, which had invaded Rwanda and seized power during the genocide, was considered to be one of the best trained military forces in the area.

Not only was the Rwandan army, which had just waged a major war in Rwanda, able to beat Mobutu's army, which was in poor condition, but later on succeeded in driving away the Ugandan forces and taking control over Kisangani city. The fact that a tiny country like Rwanda could gain control over such a vast area is not only a sign for Rwanda's military strength, but also for the power vacuum that can be found in the DRC (Eriksen 2005).

Rwanda is also one of the African countries with the highest spending on the military sector, using between 4 and 5.5 % of the GDP, placing Rwanda on the third place after Angola and Eritrea. Real figures of what is spent on military equipment are to be considered much higher, though. Experts measure that Rwanda finances its expenditure by exploiting the DRC's mineral resources.

Despite the external security threats through the Hutu militias, Rwanda is still able to control its internal violence. Still, it is not really possible to connect this stability to the existence of an external conflict, since before the war Rwanda had

also been one of the stable states in the region, especially since the strength of today's Rwandan army had been established before the war and not only after it (Eriksen 2005).

Eriksen cites Reyntjens:

“A mere two years after the extreme human and material destruction of 1994, the Rwandan state had been rebuilt. Rwanda was again administered from top to bottom, territorial, military and security structures were in place, the judicial system was re-established; tax revenues were collected and spent. The regime was able in a short time to establish total control over state and society. ... While many other African states tend towards state collapse, the Rwandan state has reaffirmed itself vigorously (Reyntjens 2004:209).” (Eriksen, 2005:6).

Eriksen (2005) finds that the strength of today's Rwandan army, the former RPF, is to be found in its purpose as well as in the 1994 conflict, where it was the main actor to stop the Hutu regime and its militias by invading the country from northern Uganda, where it was located.

Rwanda is also a unique example for the strength and weakness of an African state, since it has had a long tradition of statehood leading back to pre-colonial times even (Eriksen 2005).

Another significant feature of the Rwandan state, which has been exploiting minerals and other natural resources from the DRC, is that the Rwandan government was able to keep a large scale corruption and kleptocracy of its officers under control, making the benefits of this exploitation available to its country's economy.

Furthermore it has to be noted that, as often mentioned e.g. by Romeo Dallaire (Dallaire 2004), the Rwandan army today consists of the highly trained and disciplined RPF fighters.

Eriksen (2005) states that the Rwandan government even developed a specialized taxation system for the occupied Congo regions, ensuring the flow of capital into the state treasury, making the Congo War a profitable rather than an expensive business for the country.

Moreover, the state is collecting a special war tax – in this case for the Congo War – from its inhabitants. It is not really clear if this really can be connected to the war per se though, since this trend can be found prior to the beginning of the war.

For Rwanda the Congo War has become one of its main sources of income, creating an incentive for the Rwandan state to keep its control over the eastern regions of the Congo. When in 2002 the Rwandan forces, along with the Ugandan and other still remaining foreign military forces, were pulled out of the Congo, after the signing of the peace accords in Pretoria, it has yet to be seen if Rwanda really has given up its influence and access to the natural resources in this region, especially since the RCD-Goma, Rwanda's ally in the region is still in control of the areas that were controlled by Rwanda before. The events that take place in the Great Lakes Region today, however, make it seem unlikely.

The absence of neo-patrimonial features as discussed above has to be understood only for issues related to the military though, as the rest of Rwanda shows strong patrimonial features, especially since – once again – power, profits, as well as benefits are in most cases reserved for a small group, a Tutsi elite, where the inner core of this elite is – once again – connected through their past in the Ugandan refugee camps.

This again leaves the majority of the population excluded from certain benefits that might arise –on grounds of ethnicity again.

Still, Rwanda can be considered a unique example, since it combines different features, like strong military forces, a strict and centralized control over these forces combined with patrimonial governmental practices. Centralized power coexisting with patrimonial structures makes the state nonetheless less patrimonial, but awards it a special feature:

“...the logic of regime survival has not undermined central control.” (Eriksen 2005:9).

If one combines all the attributes of the Rwandan regime, the strength of the Rwandan state cannot be attributed to the effects of the Congo War, or be considered a direct result of warfare however. Therefore Eriksen states, that:

“A puzzling fact about Rwanda, however is that this strength, in terms of military power and central political control, co-exists with widespread patrimonialism. Given the virtual consensus about the detrimental effects

of patrimonialism on state capacity, the existence of an apparently strong patrimonial state is something of an anomaly. However, the fact that power, and thereby control over resources used for patrimonial purposes, has been centrally controlled in Rwanda, may have limited the damage of patrimonialism for the state capacity. Centralised (sic!) corruption if (sic!) the kind seen in Rwanda is likely to be less detrimental for the state power than decentralized corruption.” (Eriksen, 2005:10).

Eriksen includes in his conclusion the arguments of Shleifer and Vishny (1999), which state that centralized corruption is less damaging than decentralized corruption (Eriksen 2005:10).

3. The Concept of Neo-patrimonialism

There are two features to be considered when talking about states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly, it has to be noted that modern African states are modelled after European paradigms of statehood, meaning that African states are based on institutions such as parliaments, courts, bureaucracy, etc. Those institutions were introduced to the colonial countries either during colonialism or after gaining their independence. Either way it can be said that the main features of modern statehood do not originate in those countries but were imported by the respective colonial power, based on European understanding of statehood. Still, to this day they have constituted the foundations of modern statehood in Africa (Eriksen, 2004).

Secondly, it can be found that in many states in SSA certain features of state practice have become distinct. Analysts agree that state practices in many cases do not correspond to the principles of formal institutions and modern statehood, since African states tend to exhibit more and more features of what is often defined as patrimonialism or, to be more precise, what is considered a new form of it and referred to as neo-patrimonialism.

“Patrimonialism” was originally used by Max Weber and describes a system where the lines between private and public interests become blurred, especially when public resources are misused for private usage (Eriksen, 2004).

Eriksen furthermore finds that:

“For Weber, patrimonialism is one form of traditional domination, together with feudalism and patriarchy. (...) What distinguishes patrimonialism as a form of traditional domination from patriarchy and feudalism is first, that power is exercised beyond the domestic group of the family, clan or village, and second, that power is relatively centralized.” (Eriksen, 2004:33).

Neo-patrimonialism therefore refers to the ideal of traditional leadership as defined in Max Weber’s “Herrschaftssoziologie” (Wimmer 2000).

The democratic transition after the end of colonial rule seems to have worked for very few countries in Sub-Saharan-Africa only. Most of the countries today occupy a hybrid version of rational and legal governments that are tangled by neo-patrimonial regime structures. In many countries decisions are based on personal relations and private interests rather than on institutionalized laws and regulations. Elections additionally often serve the sole purpose to make the world believe a regime has legitimate power and follows the globalized idea of “good governance”, in order to preserve its entitlement to developmental aid payments. This frequently entails the existence of bloated ministries and cabinets in most African countries (Wimmer 2000, Erdmann 2001).

Erdmann (2001) furthermore states that these structures can be called neo-patrimonial, defining this concept by contrasting it with Max Weber’s (1921) concept of patrimonialism. Patrimonialism constitutes the personal rule of a despot over military and administrative resources, making neo-patrimonialism a new, hybrid version of this concept. Erdmann states that within neo-patrimonialism one can find not only patrimonial elements, but also a rational-bureaucratic authority. Nevertheless, opposed to the patrimonial system, the neo-patrimonial system recognizes the division between Public and Private Domains, at least in a formal sense. In neo-patrimonial systems it might often appear as if there were two systems subsisting in parallel worlds. However, this perception is decisive since these two systems do not only fail to coexist, but the patrimonial structures infiltrate into the legal-rational of the bureaucratic spheres and continue to deform its ability to function. Moreover, neo-patrimonialism entails a different

form of clientelism than patrimonialism. While patrimonialism entails the direct exchange between the patron and the client, neo-patrimonialism is more about the transfer of services and resources. Another difference between these two concepts is the origin of the services and resources that are to be transferred (Erdmann 2001). Weber's concept describes a form of traditional domination, mixed with feudalism and patriarchy (Eriksen 2006:10). Unlike in patrimonialism, where there are private services and resources of the patron transferred on a reciprocal basis to the client, neo-patrimonialism transfers public resources and services. Like in patrimonialism this specification of clientelism can be connected with kinship, but it can also exist without these ties. It may entail traditional social relations, but should by all means be considered a modern phenomenon (Erdmann 2001).

Eriksen adds to this that:

“The problem is rather that such an approach tends to undercommunicate the distinctively modern aspects of African states. It is a fact that all modern states, in Africa and elsewhere, present themselves as representing the community as a whole, claim to follow formal procedures, accept the principle of the rule of law, acknowledge citizens' rights, presents itself as promoting development etc. These are specifically modern features. While it is true that such formal institutions operate in different ways in Africa than in Europe, it cannot simply be assumed that the “real” character of African states are found in the “informal” or “traditional”, and that the formal and modern aspects of the state are of no importance. Moreover, the “traditional” or patrimonial features of the African state are themselves shaped by the arrival of modern institutions. It has been conclusively shown that what goes by the name of “tradition” is continually changing. One relevant example of this is how the institution of chiefdom changes character with the arrival of colonialism and the system of indirect rule. The colonial state codified “tradition”, and made it the basis of their rule. This codification was based on a selective interpretation of “tradition”. But whether tradition was correctly interpreted or not (and often, it was not), its codification by the state changed it into something new. By using its selective interpretation of tradition as the basis of state policies, tradition becomes

objectified. Furthermore, when the chiefs were incorporated into the state, the basis of their power changed. Through their access to state resources, they obtained a new kind of power base. This does not mean that their traditional legitimacy disappeared. On the contrary, it was a precondition for the chiefs' access to the state in the first place. However, the character of the chiefs' power changed, and was no longer exclusively based on "tradition". Thus, in order to understand these aspects of the African state, it is necessary to take more seriously the fact that the contemporary African state is a hybrid, with distinctly modern as well as patrimonial features." (States in Africa, Eriksen 2004:34)

In the case of Rwanda, these neo-patrimonial features, especially the feature of political clientelism, were to be found between the Hutu, to specify the Hutu from the northern region, even more so between the entourage of the family of the president's wife, consisting of a group of hardliners that are called "Akazu", meaning "little house".

Wimmer finds that the three main features of neo-patrimonialism are personal rule, political clientelism and endemic corruption (Wimmer 2000).

3.1. Personal Rule

The leadership in the sense of personal rule entails highly personalized and autocratic features. Furthermore, the acting regime in most cases lacks charismatic personality features, culminating in an unhealthy form of personality cult, for example Mobutu in Zaire.

Personal rule undermines the core of governmental institutions, and degenerates them until only a relic of what they are supposed to be is left, while the country is controlled on an informal level, relying on personal relations. Personal rule leaves all the power with the governing person, leaving the future of the country to the will of an - in many cases omnipotent - despot. As already mentioned before, in more than one case this resulted in the destruction of a whole country on account of one person. The most famous examples are Liberia's Samuel Doe, Jean-Bédél

Bokassa for the CAR and both Milton Obote and Idi Amin in Uganda (Wimmer, 2000:126).

3.2. Political Clientelism

This comprises the personal criteria the despot of a country uses in order to assign the ministerial and other high, governmentally related, positions. The structures work from top to bottom, each minister assigning the positions under his power on personal accounts. In most cases these are based on family, origin, and ethnicity, or through other networks such as the military. Qualification and achievements form no relevant objectives for recruitment reasons. This also accounts for the fact that nearly all Sub-Saharan countries have a bloated state apparatus, which forms a breeding ground for corruption, opportunism and patronage, leaving serious governmental issues untackled, or decided purely on the personal perception of the person responsible (Wimmer 2000:131).

3.3. Endemic Corruption

This facet of neo-patrimonialism describes the economic self-destruction of a state through the rampant greed of a marginal governing elite. The vast form of state-run corruption and robbery that can be found in many African countries is accurately addressed as kleptocracy. This becomes even more visible in countries that own vast natural resources, e.g. Nigeria, Angola, Sierre Leone, the DRC – all of those countries have seen bloody conflicts in the previous years. Their mineral abundance has always been the - or at least one of the main factors - for endemic corruption and violence.

There is a little story that is often told when it comes to the issue of corruption in Africa. This story was also once told to me by the head of the anti-corruption department of the UNODC when he tried to illustrate the problem of kleptocracy for the development of African countries:

“An Asian and an African become friends while they are both attending graduate school in the West. Years later, they each rise to become finance minister of their respective countries. One day, the African ventures to Asia to visit his old friend, and is startled by the Asian’s palatial home, the three Mercedes-Benz in the circular drive, the swimming pool, the servants. ‘My god!’ the African exclaims. ‘We were just poor students before! How on earth can you afford all this?’ And the Asian takes his African friend to the window and points to a sparkling new elevated highway in the distance. ‘You see that toll road?’ says the Asian, and then proudly taps himself on the chest. ‘Ten percent.’ And the African nods approvingly.

A few years later, the Asian ventures to Africa, to return the visit to his old friend. He finds the African living in a massive estate sprawling over several acres. There’s a fleet of dozens of Mercedes-Benz in the driveway, an indoor pool, a tennis court, an army of uniformed chauffeurs and servants. ‘My God!’ says the Asian. ‘How on earth can you afford all this?’ This time the African takes his Asian friend to the window and points. ‘You see the highway?’ he asks. But the Asian looks and sees nothing, just an open field with a few cows grazing. ‘I don’t see any highway,’ he says, straining his eyes. At this, the African smiles, taps himself on the chest, and boasts, ‘One hundred percent!’”
(Richburg, 1998:174f).

This story sums up the problem of African corruption, since there is a huge difference between still productive corruption, as it can be found in many countries of the world, and malignant corruption, as it especially occurs in Sub-Saharan Africa. The corruption in many African states does not only drain the state and its institutions, but even undermines its very existence.

Corruption has directed the incomes from the natural resources and developmental aid into the pockets of a few. The most famous example would be Zaire’s Mobutu:

“‘Estimates by Western diplomats of the private fortune Mubutu [Sese Seko] has hijacked from the central bank fluctuate between \$4 billion and \$11 billion: ‘At any rate,’ an American envoy to the country told me, ‘he could clear the national debt by writing a personal check.’”
(Langford, 1999:63).

Political leaders such as Angola's Dos Santos, Kongo's (Brazzaville) Sassou Nguesso or Gabon's Omar Bongo have embezzled sums in the dimension of corporate companies. Many of them have invested in natural resources, real estate, etc. within and outside their country, often making them successful entrepreneurs. Still, their fortunes come out of the public accounts of their countries (Nanga).

These extreme forms of corruption cannot only be charged to local politicians, but also to many of the companies doing business with them.

A very vivid example for the problem of neopatrimonialism with all its features of clientelism, personal rule and corruption was shown during the elections in April 2007 in Nigeria. More than 200 people died in uprisings of politically motivated violence during that period. An article of Human Rights Watch finds that:

“Das Benehmen vieler Regierungsstellen sei ‘derart von Gewalt und Korruption durchdrungen, dass es mehr nach krimineller Aktivität als nach demokratischer Regierungsführung aussieht’.” (Dumbs, 2007).

Chabal and Daloz put it in an even more radical way: “...the State in sub-Saharan Africa is nothing but a relatively empty shell.” (Daloz, Chabal 1999).

This problem is furthermore fuelled by the neopatrimonial feature of personal rule that can be found in Nigerian politics. Most of the small political actors in the provinces who hope to make it to the big scene are backed by local powerplayers, who not only provide financial resources for election campaigns, but also use their hitmen to hector possible political opponents. For this help the repayment does not only include high sums from public accounts, but also the allocation of public positions to the benefitor's entourage. Human Rights Watch (HRW) moreover states in an article about the elections 2007 in Nigeria:

“An Stelle eines demokratischen Wettbewerbs wurde der Kampf um Ämter oft auf den Straßen ausgetragen, von Schlägertrupps, die von

Politikern rekrutiert wurden. ‘ Hoffnungen, dass mit dem neuen Präsidenten Umaru Yar’Adua die Lage besser wird sind gering: Er war früher Gouverneur von Katsina. Die dortige Regierung hat das Programm gegen die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit laut dem HRW-Bericht auf ihre Weise interpretiert: Mit dem Geld sollen jugendliche Schläger bezahlt worden sein.“ (Dumbs, 2007).

Examples like these are manifold in SSA’s everyday politics, making endemic corruption one of the main features of state failure.

3.3.1. Insertion: Is Developmental Aid aiding Neo-Patrimonial Structures?

The question about the development of most of the countries in Sub-Sahara Africa that is not only missing, but in most cases even declining has created a lot of theories in the last decades. But none of these theories, like the dependencia and modernization theories and all the others, and also none of the newer appendages that are to be found in the developmental discourse are able to give a really satisfactory answer to those problems either and worse, none of them seems to be able to counteract the spiral of declining development. The trend of appendages like “neo-colonialism” to blame the catastrophic state of development on the capitalistic features of the world economy, miss out on including the factors and developments of the political conditions in these countries (Wimmer 2000).

Massive criticism, especially from African economists such as James Shikwati or Axelle Kabou, against western developmental aid has risen in the past few years. There are an estimated 40.000 westerners working in the aid business in SSA today. The business with aid is booming, criticism as it is expressed by Shikwati or Kabou hardly ever welcome.

James Shikwati, for example, calls for a complete stop of developmental aid payments.

So far, about half a billion US-Dollars were given to African countries during the last 45 years, a total of four Marshall-plans. Still, there has been no recognizable

improvement in the Sub-Saharan countries. Much worse – even the percentage of African goods in the world trade – except for oil exports – is declining, while national debts and poverty are growing continuously. The usual answer to this problem is to donate even more developmental aid to those countries. At the last G8 summit, donor countries were promising more money – yet again.

For critics like Shikwati this is one of the roots of all problems.

He and like-minded people acknowledge the damage that was inflicted by colonialism and find that the answer is not foreign money flooding the country. Shikwati, for example, even goes further, stating that the structures of corrupt states are kept afloat with these development payments. The problem is, according to Shikwati that the power elites do not have to build democratic institutions or infrastructure, since with or without those things there is money coming into the country anyway.

Critics of development theories find that development aid much more abets corruption, armament and ecocide in the recipient countries. They even go as far as to say that these payments fuel neo-patrimonial structures and preserve them instead of changing them.

It is a misconception that just because the donors demand the creation of democratic features in a state that those can be created by simply pumping money into a country, especially when the country does not have the institutions to use the money expediently (Die Zeit 2006).

It is hard to tell if the end of development payments would trigger a restoration and/or creation of democratic features in SSA countries, but it seems – if one considers the lack of results of developmental aid – that this should at least be considered a serious topic for discussion. It also has to be noted that this discussion does not include humanitarian relief aid.

It has to be acknowledged that the issue of humanitarian aid also raises a lot of criticism in the developmental and humanitarian aid discourse. These issues shall not be addressed in this paper though.

4. Violence and Conflict in Relation to State Failure

Violent conflicts in Africa are one of the major factors for state failure and state erosion. The other way round, the failure of states has also led to internal as well as regional conflicts.

During the period of de-colonialization from the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s the number of violent conflicts in SSA increased strongly and finally exploded during the 1980s and reached its peak in the year 1991. Since then the number of armed conflicts has halved. Nearly all of the African wars and conflicts have been fought on counts of societal issues, such as ethnic, communal or revolutionary reasons. Today we find an estimated 15 million “forcibly displaced persons” worldwide, mainly “internally displaced people” (IDPs). Only an estimated 3.5 million of these 15 million displaced persons are thought to be transnational refugees (ACPCC, 2005).

A state’s collapse is rarely a sudden event but has to be considered – as discussed earlier – a long-lasting process. This process is then accompanied by state erosion, mainly in countries that have never shown strong features of statehood in the first place.

One of the most important aspects of state failure is the deterioration of the security sector; this applies to internal as well as external security. In addition to a lack of security the states find themselves unable to provide necessary infrastructure, which as a result usually leads to the state’s collapse.

These breakdowns are then accompanied or/and followed by a struggle for power and resources between different groups and alliances, who – again – in many of the cases define themselves along the lines of ethnicity. These conflicts and power struggles are not necessarily resolved by one group overpowering the other.

Violence can take different forms, each with its own unique set of causes and circumstances. Those forms and their effects and impacts are to be discussed more thoroughly in the following part of the paper

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The number of conflicts has dramatically increased during the last decade, and in 2000 about half of the African countries were affected, either directly or indirectly, by violent conflicts, costing as many lives as epidemics and natural disasters. But

not only direct forms of violence cost lives, also the events that follow and accompany those conflicts (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001).

After the end of the Cold War when the proxy regimes that had been supported by either western or communist countries became obsolete, many of the autocratic potentates lost their power. When the external support was stopped most of the already ramshackle regimes collapsed and many of those states became centres of regional insecurity (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001).

“By 2000, over half of the countries in Africa and 20% of the population were affected by conflict. There were eleven major conflicts with more than a thousand war related deaths a year. The extent of conflict was greater than in any other region in the world.”

(“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:8).

4.1. The Different Forms of Conflicts in Africa

There are different kinds of warfare to be identified in Africa. Moreover, the character of conflict has been changing within the last decades. The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is considered the only conventionally fought war in the last decade in SSA, conventionally fought meaning that targets were mainly strategic and military points.

This kind of conventional warfare is based on high technology weapons and strategies and therefore extremely expensive. Most of the wars and conflicts in Africa have a factional character, the enemy lines are often fluid. They are mainly fought with small arms and light weapons and are therefore easier to finance.

Small arms and light weapons means by definition all arms that can be operated by only one or two people.

These kind of conflicts tend to be rather opportunistic than strategic and in most cases evolve rapidly from the original cause to other, mainly economic and political reasons such as the exploitation of (natural) resources (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:12ff).

Many of the conflicts in the last decade in Africa have shown features of genocide and ethnic violence, in most cases they were preceded and/or accompanied by a serious amount of propaganda.

Especially the media in Rwanda were a tool known for ethnically motivated propaganda. Ethnic conflicts additionally tend to spread rapidly, almost always leaving behind a massive death toll.

Another feature of SSA conflicts is the use of mainly low tech weapons, such as knives and machetes, as they were used in Rwanda.

Such conflicts can be found in the Sudan today and also periods of genocidal attacks occur regularly in the DRC, mainly in the Kivu region, just to name a few. The issue of ethnicity is nothing new to SSA countries; it was already introduced during colonialism. The division between ruling and non-ruling ethnicities by colonial powers has created deep crater within societies and can be found in countries like the DRC, Rwanda or Burundi. These artificially created differences are in many cases burned deep into societies and are still used as a reason for maintaining power on counts of ethnicity. When prejudice and hatred are firmly entrenched in history they are nearly impossible to overcome.


Ethnicity is still abused by governments and local leaders today, for example in the DRC. There ethnic conflicts were even openly provoked in the Kivu region

“...with the intention of destabilising areas under Rwandan influence. Equally, elements of the Ugandan armed forces exploited ethnic differences in order to benefit commercially from the conflict. In both instances community divisions have been deepened and there have been greater numbers of fatalities and injuries than experienced in more conventional fighting.” (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:15).

All the features of warfare mentioned above have coalesced in the recent years, melting into a “new” form of warfare in Africa. In these conflicts not only state forces engage, but also factional forces that are then often supported by state

forces or even substitute them. These factional forces are, in many cases, self-sustaining through pillaging of natural resources.

Ethnicity as a cause of conflict becomes more and more common and is in many cases used to gain support for the violence that is led by the participants. (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001).



(Table #1: “The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001)

4.1.1. Genocide and Political Mass Murder (Politicide)

Since the 1990s violence in Africa has reached terrible heights, often connected to ethnic violence and genocide. Such heights were e.g. the Rwandan genocide in 1994, but also the genocidal massacres in Burundi, or also in Sudan today.

These conflicts follow the abuse and exploitation of ethnic discrimination in Africa that dates back to colonialism.

Violence has been used to sustain conflicts and/or to legitimate that the power is held by a certain ethnic group. Still, ethnical differences as such conflicts are not the primary cause of conflict (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001).

4.1.2. Genocide

When talking about the events that took place in Rwanda in 1994, one has to take a closer look at the features that make this conflict a genocide.

“Der Genozid ist ein vorsätzliches Verbrechen, systematisch organisiert und ins Werk gesetzt zur Ausrottung bestimmter, nach Kriterien der Nationalität, der Rasse oder der Religion ausgewählter Zivilgesellschaften.“

(Kapuscinski, 16.03.2001)

Genocide was first defined by Raphael Lemkin during the Second World War in his book “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe” and in 1946 was also in the UN General Assembly discussed for the first time. Two years later the UN Genocide Convention was passed, but it took until 1951 to come into force (Chalk/Jonassohn, 1990:8).

Genocide, as it is defined in Article II of the UN Genocide Convention:

“Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

(UN Genocide Convention)

One of the main loopholes of the UN Genocide Convention is the fact that political groups that become victims of genocide and are killed or prosecuted because of their political affiliations are not included. This deficiency goes back to the veto of the UdSSR against the first draft of the Convention, which still included political groups. The UdSSR furthermore vetoed any reference to the issue of political mass murder.

Other objects of criticism are the phrases “mental harm” and the “intent to destroy” as well as the absence of inter-state actors as perpetrators (see Serb nationalists in Bosnia, militias in Sudan or the DRC, etc.).

The problem with “mental harm” is the fact that only when the physical life of a group is endangered does it fall into the definition of genocide.

Whereas the problem with the phrase “intent to destroy” is obvious, since the governments involved in genocide or acts of genocide never really make their plans public in advance.

In regard to this, the Hutu regime in Rwanda is a rare exception since in the Rwandan media these intentions of genocidal acts were quite explicitly made public (Harff, 2003).

It also has to be noted that in the case of Rwanda in Resolution 955 (1994), which builds the foundation for the ICTR, political affiliation is included on account of Crimes against Humanity under Article 3:

“Crimes against humanity

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:

- (a) Murder;
- (b) Extermination;
- (c) Enslavement;
- (d) Deportation;
- (e) Imprisonment ;
- (f) Torture;
- (g) Rape;
- (h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
- (i) Other inhumane acts.” (S/RES/955 (1994))

The question of how an atrocity such as genocide is possible has been asked many times in the last decades, especially since the Holocaust.

Chalk and Jonassohn discuss the question how such cruel and inhumane acts are even possible and they find that:

“... it is not possible, at least not as long as the potential victims are perceived as people. We have no evidence that a genocide was ever performed on a group of equals. The victims must not only not be equals, but also clearly defined as something less than human.”

(Chalk/Jonassohn, 1990:28).

Before and during the Rwandan genocide the media played a major role in the de-humanization of the entire Tutsi-population and additionally also the people that were (thought to be) opposed to the ruling regime. The techniques used by the media shall be described and analyzed in chapter 5.3.

TABLE 1. Genocides and Politicides from 1955 to 2001		
Country and Dates	Nature of Episode	Estimated Number of Victims
Sudan, 10/56–3/72	Politicide with communal victims	400,000–600,000
South Vietnam, 1/65–4/75	Politicide	400,000–500,000
China, 3/59–12/59	Genocide and politicide	65,000
Iraq, 6/63–3/75	Politicide with communal victims	30,000–60,000
Algeria, 7/62–12/62	Politicide	9,000–30,000
Rwanda, 12/63–6/64	Politicide with communal victims	12,000–20,000
Congo-K, 2/64–1/65	Politicide	1,000–10,000
Burundi, 10/65–12/73	Politicide with communal victims	140,000
Indonesia, 11/65–7/66	Genocide and politicide	500,000–1,000,000
China, 5/66–3/75	Politicide	400,000–850,000
Guatemala, 7/78–12/96	Politicide and genocide	60,000–200,000
Pakistan, 3/71–12/71	Politicide with communal victims	1,000,000–3,000,000
Uganda, 2/72–4/79	Politicide and genocide	50,000–400,000
Philippines, 9/72–6/76	Politicide with communal victims	60,000
Pakistan, 2/73–7/77	Politicide with communal victims	5,000–10,000
Chile, 9/73–12/76	Politicide	5,000–10,000
Angola, 11/75–2001	Politicide by UNITA and government forces	500,000
Cambodia, 4/75–1/79	Politicide and genocide	1,900,000–3,500,000
Indonesia, 12/75–7/92	Politicide with communal victims	100,000–200,000
Argentina, 3/76–12/80	Politicide	9,000–20,000
Ethiopia, 7/76–12/79	Politicide	10,000
Congo-K, 3/77–12/79	Politicide with communal victims	3,000–4,000
Afghanistan, 4/78–4/92	Politicide	1,800,000
Burma, 1/78–12/78	Genocide	5,000
El Salvador, 1/80–12/89	Politicide	40,000–60,000
Uganda, 12/80–1/86	Politicide and genocide	200,000–500,000
Syria, 4/81–2/82	Politicide	5,000–30,000
Iran, 6/81–12/92	Politicide and genocide	10,000–20,000
Sudan, 9/83–present	Politicide with communal victims	2,000,000
Iraq, 3/88–6/91	Politicide with communal victims	180,000
Somalia, 5/88–1/91	Politicide with communal victims	15,000–50,000
Burundi, 1988	Genocide	5,000–20,000
Sri Lanka, 9/89–1/90	Politicide	13,000–30,000
Bosnia, 5/92–11/95	Genocide	225,000
Burundi, 10/93–5/94	Genocide	50,000
Rwanda, 4/94–7/94	Genocide	500,000–1,000,000
Serbia, 12/98–7/99	Politicide with communal victims	10,000

Note: This list of episodes was compiled in a long-term research effort (see Harff 1992), has been updated and modified for the State Failure Task Force, and is posted on the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management Web platform, <http://www.bcos.umd.edu/oidcm/vnscr/stall>. The list and analysis reported here exclude a few episodes identified in previous studies, for example, in Angola in 1961–62 (because it was then a colony), in Equatorial Guinea in 1969–79 (the country was below the 500,000 population threshold used in the State Failure analyses), in Paraguay against the Ache Indians in 1962–72, and in Nigeria against Ibos living in the North in 1966 (in the latter two cases the government was not complicit in killings carried out by private groups). Estimates of victims are invariably imprecise and often vary widely among scholars, journalists, human rights observers, and spokesmen for the victimized groups. Some of the figures are little more than guesses. If a detailed and reliable study is available, a single figure is used. A single figure is also used when several sources offer similar estimates. When different estimates are reported and there is no basis for choosing among them, a range is shown.

(Tab.#2: Harff, 2003:60)

4.2. The Impact of Conflict in Africa

The impact of these violent conflicts influences the SSA civil population on more than one level, since these conflicts do not only leave people dead and uprooted, but whole societies as well as economies distressed.

Over eight million people were killed – directly or indirectly – as a consequence of warfare in Africa. While in Africa in general, one out of 20 deaths is clearly related to war; in Sub-Sahara Africa one in six males is killed through warfare. Moreover, ten of the countries most affected by conflict worldwide are in Africa, with five of them being considered full-scale wars.

Especially the increasing level of targeting civilians has taken new, tragic heights, leaving millions not only dead but also displaced, abused and mutilated. The intensified attacks especially against women and children instead of armed groups are the most tragic development in African warfare, whereas in the rest of the world civilian casualties are declining.

Moreover, African conflicts tend to become more and more brutal, since mutilation, torture as well as the use of family members and children in killings and rape are increasingly becoming more common and are even used strategically. The RUF in Sierra Leone and other militia groups, but also state forces tend to use intensified violence, not only to fuel fear within the population, but also as a form of binding ritual, making it even harder to reintegrate former militias or child soldiers back into society. Additionally, extreme violence is also used to intimidate the population and secure votes, but also on account of humiliation and revenge in an ethnic context especially (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001).

“... extreme violence of this kind will erode the social fabric of African societies and further hasten state collapse.”

(“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001)

The issue of child soldiers as mentioned above is also becoming a serious problem in African conflicts, since they can be used as a specific and especially brutal tool

of warfare. Child soldiers are exceedingly used by warlords. The most famous example for such practices is the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda, but also the Interahamwe militias in Rwanda included many children and young men. There are an estimated 100.000-200.000 child soldiers in Africa today (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa”, 2001).

The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant against the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony. The ICC just opened its first case against the Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who is also accused of having abused children as soldiers.


Next to the human tragedy that results from these conflicts, there is also an economic aspect to it, as a consequence also resulting in tragedies such as displacement and epidemics.

Armed conflict is to be considered as one of the main reasons for the decline and erosion of African statehood. “Continuous economic decline plays a major part in state collapse and conflict.” (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa”, 2001:14).

The most obvious impact is the denial and loss of land through warfare. This can be related to either direct warfare, but also to the use of land-mines, making important agricultural areas unavailable and creating even more flows of IDP’s and Refugees.

“Africa has the highest level of internal displacement in the world and some of the largest refugee flows, the majority from countries in conflict. In 2000 almost eleven million people in Africa were internally displaced. This is an increase of two million over the past year and is the second consecutive increase in two years, after five years in which the numbers remained relatively stable. (...) Internally displaced people now outnumber refugees by a ratio of three to one. Taking refugees and internally displaced people together, 14 million people in Africa are uprooted.”

(“The causes of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa”, 2001:9)



(Tab. #3: UNHCR, 2006)

1. Population of concern to UNHCR, end of year										
Category	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Refugees*	4,361,232	3,489,525	3,345,407	3,523,393	3,627,130	3,283,863	3,343,663	3,135,792	3,022,606	2,767,575
Asylum-seekers	25,688	36,228	63,269	61,095	90,541	107,159	159,570	166,071	206,816	252,368
Returned refugees**	1,648,912	628,246	695,317	291,944	253,638	266,804	345,261	345,073	329,711	281,401
Internally displaced	2,057,500	1,643,960	1,720,445	640,584	1,845,194	421,574	701,843	571,625	1,199,762	1,532,307
Returned IDPs	..	-	1,100	892,361	213,361	42,000	13,272	-	33,050	266,744
Stateless persons	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	124	100
Others of concern***	..	50,000	64,170	40,516	30,242	30,920	29,600	66,524	66,951	68,675
Total	..	5,847,959	5,889,708	5,449,893	6,060,106	4,152,320	4,593,209	4,285,085	4,859,020	5,169,170

* Includes UNHCR estimates for most industrialized countries. ** Based on country of asylum and origin reports. *** Includes stateless persons up to 2003.

(Tab. #4: UNHCR, 2005)

Violent conflicts have led to production losses of sometimes up to 45% e.g. in Angola, making it necessary for African states to import food and food aid in many cases.

Other reasons for violence are also provided by the exploitation of natural resources, the control of land and also water rights.

Water is a resource that is becoming more and more valuable all over the world and is therefore considered to become one of the main factors of conflict in the future.

Also the exploitation of resources, especially resources like diamonds, oil, cobalt, etc. make conflicts for many factions self-paying or even an enriching business. Therefore the armed forces are frequently not interested in ending a conflict and mediation then becomes (nearly) impossible. Also:

“When either party to a conflict feels that it has a perceived advantage or disadvantage, it continues to fight, spurred on the prospect of victory or

the desire to negotiate from a more advantageous position. A “hurting stalemate” where all the belligerents have lost, provides opportunity for resolution of conflict. In many cases, the opportunities for resolution are lost because of the lack of credible external guarantors to the peace process.”

(“The causes of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa”, 2001)

On the economic level, countries distressed by violent conflict become unattractive for outside investors, whereas on the other hand they attract organized crime. It is therefore common to these countries that armed and organized crime sky-rockets.

“This is followed by a downwards spiral in both domestic savings and inward investment. The economy becomes dependent on the exploitation of easily extractable natural resources. Government revenue suffers and the state becomes criminalised. Commercial and state interests can become combined in sustaining conflict, as dual economies develop in which military business partnerships jointly trade, exploit resources and pay for conflict.”

(“The causes of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa”, 2001:12)

Africa loses an estimated 2% of its annual economic growth on this account (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa”, 2001:11).

Additionally war also leads to a destruction of the state’s infrastructure, since either maintenance or investment become impossible, leaving schools, telecommunication systems, hospitals, roads, electricity, water supply, etc. in ruins.

In many cases, if roads are not destroyed they become unpassable due to roadblock controls by militias, making it also nearly impossible for human relief agencies to reach their destination. Moreover, a country without a functioning infrastructure is not attractive to any international investors and businesses.

“Over the past twenty years Africa has lost over fifty per cent of its transport infrastructure, many of the losses due to conflict. This loss has both an immediate and a long-term impact on African economies.”
 (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:11).

On top of causing serious harm to the country’s economy, it also affects the economies of the region, especially refugee flows have a heavy impact on a region’s economy and also lead to a loss of trade between the countries.

IDP’s mostly squat in and around cities. Their loss of access to their own means of production connotes another serious impact on a country’s structural service such as housing, but also on the provision of resources like water and food. During the past years social infrastructure has also become increasingly targeted by militias, especially health centres and schools. In Mozambique, for example, the 15 year war has destroyed over 40% of these institutions. This results in a high number of uneducated young men, who in combination with sky-rocketing unemployment rates pose a huge recruitment pool for militias. The militias in most cases consist “...of marginalized or socially excluded young men” (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:15) who have no hope for a better future.

In Rwanda the Hutu-militia, the so called Interahamwe, mainly consisted of such young men, especially from the rural areas. Societies with extraordinarily high numbers of uneducated and unemployed young men are more likely to experience violent outbreaks (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001).

Such an outbreak, for example, followed the explosion of food prices in Haiti in 2008 and is in another form to be found in the violent outbreaks in the South African slums, which were directed against foreigners due to the hopeless job-situation for young people.

The economic shock that follows state failure and state erosion can also often be one of the activators of violence and warfare. Economic break-downs can also be related to natural catastrophes as well as a “... sudden large shift in terms of trade and commodity prices.” (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:14).

These economic collapses then are often followed by famine and/or mass displacement, as for example the famine in Ethiopia in 1974, which resulted in the overthrow of the Ethiopian regime and was followed by years of conflict. (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001).

The plummeting prices of coffee on the world market and the collapse of the coffee agreement are considered to be among the main factors of the violent outbreaks in Rwanda.

On an international level, the violent conflicts in Africa also have a serious impact, since organized crime benefits from these developments. Illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, money laundering and drug trafficking are serious issues that also concern the rest of the world. Especially the ready availability of small arms and light weapons is thought to be one of the main roots of the extreme cruelty of African conflicts.

Evidently after the end of the Cold War arms traders from the former Soviet Union discovered Africa as one of the main purchasers of arms and ammunition. Many African countries now own enormous arms caches, in most cases from previous wars, and those weapons are circulating in conflict regions.


“Throughout Africa the usual market price for the ubiquitous AK-47 assault rifle remains steady at US \$25.” (“The causes of conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa”, 2001:15).

Throughout the last decade a network of national and international dealers has emerged, trading arms for minerals. This is leading to an uncontrollable exploitation of natural resources and a massive flow of weapons and ammunition into the conflict zones, often making conflicts self-sustaining.

On an international level these illegal tradings of weapons and natural resources along with an increasing flow of asylum seekers and migrants have to be tackled by the international community.

On the other hand pre- and interventional military missions have become exceedingly unpopular within the international community; especially for the UN, the failure of many of their peace-keeping missions to Africa has scraped the credibility and power of the organization.

One of the several failed missions was the UN mission UNAMIR I that was established in 1993 in order to monitor the peace process between the Rwandan state and the RPF rebels. The Rwandan UN mission furthermore failed to intervene during the 1994 genocide, rendering the UNAMIR personnel bystanders to the raging genocide.



(Tab. # 5)

5. Rwanda

5.1. The Rwandan Genocide

“The road to genocide in Rwanda was paved with hate speech.”

(Schabas, 2000:14)

5.1.1. An overview of the Rwandan history

In 1894 Rwanda was annexed for the first time by Europe, to be exact by Germany. The region was assigned to Germany during the Berlin Conference and the new colonial rulers decided to keep the political system they found in Rwanda and to govern the country through the system of “indirect rule”. Rwanda had – by European standards – a highly developed political system with feudal structures. Moreover, the European colonial rulers believed that the ruling group of the Tutsi people was more highly developed since in their opinion, the Tutsi descended from the Europeans, whereas Bantu descent was ascribed to the working classes, who mainly consisted of the Hutu people.

Up to now anthropologists have neither concurred in how the political system in Rwanda was constructed nor on the issue of how deep the impact of differences of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa actually was.

The most common view on what the system in Rwanda looked like before 1894 is comparing it to a form of caste system. In this system the Tutsi people represented the aristocracy and therefore “ruling caste”, whereas the Hutu people represented the working class mainly consisting of farmers. Trade and Warfare were ascribed to the Tutsi.

Still, it was possible for Hutu people to ascend to the “ruling-caste” by accumulating cattle and property as well as through marriage. These rises to the “ruling class” are not considered to have been very common, though.

Another unique thing about Rwanda is the fact that unlike in other African countries where the colonial rulers encountered many different tribes and even more different cultures and languages. Sharing one history the Rwandan people

thought of each other as Rwandans with one common history, territory, language (Kinyarwanda) and culture (Pottier, 1995:53).

Nevertheless, it can be established as a fact, that the differentiation between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa had already existed before the European powers arrived.

After the end of the First World War Belgium took over the power from the Germans and began to change the political system from “indirect rule” to “direct rule”. As early as 1933 the Belgians began to establish principles that divided the Rwandan population into Hutu, Tutsi and Twa on counts of physical characteristics. Already existing differences were not only strengthened but also put in printing through the creation of identification cards. During the brutal rule of the Belgian colonial power thousands of Hutus fled into neighboring Uganda (Pottier, 1995).

The population in the north of Rwanda was the part that in the beginning was able to fight against the German colonial rule the longest, but in the end was conquered with the help of the Tutsi military, who also during colonization made up the biggest part of the army. In the course of resistance a group of hardliners formed in the north, creating their own, extreme form of Hutu culture (the “Hutu-Power”). The main goal of their belief was to end the dominance of the Tutsi population.

In 1957 the first political manifest was published on this account. In the wake of independence they were also the first to demand a government run by the majority, not the minority. Still, their idea of the governing Hutu majority mainly included the Hutu people from the north, and finally they managed to direct the political power into the hands of a small group of northern Hutu extremists (Melvern, 2007:7).

While the Hutus account for 85% of the Rwandan population, Tutsi are 14% and Twa only 1% (Banton, Igwara, Pottier 1995).

Kressel describes the differences between these three groups as follows:

“According to stereotype, the three groups have profoundly different physical appearances: The Tutsis are very slender, very tall, straight-nosed and light brown in complexion; the Hutus have Bantu features including wooly hair, broad noses, and full lips. They are generally of medium height and somewhat stockier than the Tutsis. The Twa, related

to the pygmies, are very short, with pronounced cheekbones, bulging foreheads, and flat noses. At one time, these stereotypes corresponded closely to reality, and it is still easy to find prominent illustrations. (...) Still, intermarriage has greatly diminished the once large physical differences among groups.” (Kressel, 1996:94).

In intermarriage families the classification of the father decided to what group the children were aligned. Intermarriage was much more common between – in most cases very successful – Hutu men with Tutsi women, than the other way round. Kressel states that: “The mother’s blood is irrelevant. During genocide, the government issued identity cards became, for many, the final arbiters of life and death.” (Kressel, 1996:94).

After the publication of the manifest mentioned above and even more so after independence from Belgium on July 1st, 1962 the fight for political power in Rwanda began. These struggles did not only take place between Hutus and Tutsis, but also between different Hutu groups.

Episodes of massacres against Tutsi people can be found from that time on and become more common after independence in 1962. These episodes finally culminate in the tragic events of 1994, leaving hundreds of thousands dead.

Although much of the violence in Rwanda after independence can be assigned to the struggle for political power, it also has to be noted that it was not the sole reason for violence.

The causes of the bloody tide of events root deep in the history of the country and Rwandan society and have more than just one origin.

5.1.2. Rwanda after Independence

Like in many African countries after independence also in Rwanda political clientelism was to be found. As noted before, Rwanda did not consist of different languages, cultures or religions; therefore the attribution of features of political clientelism was based on different reasons. Rwanda was mainly catholic after colonialism. This has been changing in the last years, especially since the

genocide Islam has been growing rapidly and also natural religions have been on the increase again.

The most important positions within the government were assigned within one group, who called themselves “Akazu” in Kinyarwanda. “Akazu” means “Little House”, which and in this case identifies the family of the wife of the then incumbent president, Habyarimana, and their entourage. They formed the hard core of the Hutu-extremists from the north. Through keeping all the power within the entourage of the “Akazu”, the Hutu hardliners were able to secure all the power and influence.

The first attempts to divide the power between the Hutus of different regions were followed by genocidal episodes that were in most cases directed against the Tutsi. These violent outbreaks were always accompanied by waves of refugees who fled the neighboring countries, mainly Uganda. Finally the Hutus from central and southern Rwanda lost their power to the “Akazu” from the north. General Juvenal Habyarimana seized power and was able to hold on to it – with some short disruptions – until 1994.

As already mentioned above, due to regular massacres huge numbers of Tutsi refugees fled into neighboring Uganda. The first big refugee wave already took place in 1959. From 1963 onwards Tutsi refugees started to invade Rwanda, trying to resize power over the country.

Code name of the first invasion was “Inyenzi”, which means “Cockroaches”, because they were attacking silently in the dark of the night.

The name “Inyenzi” later became one of the main propaganda synonyms for all Tutsi people (Mullen 1995).

Rwanda, being a state without any commodities or other resources has always been solely dependent on the agricultural sector and was able to achieve huge economic growth after independence.

From 1973 to 1980 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew an estimated 5.7% per annum and between 1980 and 1987 still an estimated 2.4%. With the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement and the following inflation of coffee prices the growth of the Rwandan economy started to decline slowly at first and soon

plunged down. The subsequent inflation finally led to the complete break-down of the Rwandan economy (Mullen, 1995).

The collapse of the economy left the country with masses of unemployed, the state being unable to absorb these huge numbers. In 1990 the Rwandan state was only able to employ 7.000 people, leaving masses of mainly young men with no hope.

Additionally, the unemployment rate was growing an estimated 80.000 each year. The fast growing erosion of the state's economy and the exploding financial debt left the Rwandan state with no other option than to turn to the IMF for help. Rwanda was granted a credit in 1990 on the condition that it had to extend the state's democratic features. Up to that point Rwanda had been a one-party ruled state without free elections.

In order to make sure these transitions happened the way the IMF intended, teams of experts were sent into the country in order to monitor and advise on the political transition into a multi-party system. This included the abolishment of many of the discriminating regulations that persisted in Rwanda.

During that time the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) still attacked Rwanda from neighboring Uganda. The attacks of the RPF were feared by the whole Rwandan population, Hutus and Tutsis alike.

At the beginning of the 1990's a violent conflict exploded between the Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi, sending waves of Hutu refugees into Rwanda and other neighboring countries (Mullen, 1995). These developments created even more tensions in Rwanda and posed an additional burden for the Rwandan economy.

“In allen Fällen ist der Vernichtung und Ausrottung der verfolgten Gemeinschaft eine Phase des Leidens, des Hungers, der Erniedrigung bzw. des Terrors vorausgegangen, um zu suggerieren, dass der Tod den Opfern als eine Geste der Barmherzigkeit – als eine Erlösung – erscheinen könnte.

Schließlich wurden alle diese Völkermorde im gesellschaftlichen Kontext einer tiefen ökonomischen, politischen und moralischen Krise vorbereitet und begangen, zu einem Zeitpunkt, da das religiöse Gewissen ausgeschaltet, die Gefühlswelt verarmt und die Fähigkeit, Gutes vom Bösen zu unterscheiden, völlig verkümmert war. (Kapuscinski, 16.03.2001)

In order to end the conflict between Rwanda and the RPF the Organization of the African Union (OAU) finally decided to intervene. The OAU intended to end the conflict between the two fighting parties and to also to (re-)integrate the RPF into Rwanda and in parts even into the Rwandan army.

Due to the growing pressure through the OAU and the IMF, Rwanda's leading party, the MRD, finally agreed to sign a cease fire agreement with the RPF, which then led to the "Arusha Peace Agreements". During the process of peace negotiations that were held in Arusha, Tanzania, one of the main issues was the (re-)integration of refugees and also the RPF into the country.

The issue of integrating the RPF soldiers into the Rwandan army was especially hard fought over, especially since, with exception of the Garde Présidentielle, the rest of the Rwandan army (Forces Armées Rwandaises – FAR) was in a disastrous condition, poorly trained and paid and sometimes even starved, whereas the RPF was known to be well equipped and efficiently trained.

The main reason that the RPF had not been able to seize power so far was that the French army had sent troops to back up the FAR. Therefore the thought of integrating the RPF into the FAR was frightening for the leading regime.

In addition, due to the collapse of the coffee market, Rwanda was experiencing food shortages; especially in rural areas, the population was starving.

For the hardliners within the MDR government party the contents of Arusha Accords were unacceptable and by signing the Arusha Accords president Habyarimana became a liability for the Hutu regime. A strong polarization within the party followed, since the hardliner wing within the MDR was strictly against sharing power with anyone else and even more against the integration of the RPF into the Rwandan state and army. According to the Arusha Accords Rwanda had to transform itself into a multi-party system.

In addition to the creation of the liberal parties, the hardliners within the MDR also founded their own party, the extremist CDR. The members of the more liberal parties were also targeted by the "génocidaires" during the genocide and a lot of the opposition leaders were killed in the beginning (Mullen 1995). The genocide of 1994 was also one last, cruel attempt of the Hutu-hardliners to create what they thought was a pure Hutu-nation.

During the years prior to the genocide Rwanda had already become one of the main importers of weapons (Melvern, 2000).

The most important actor during the 1994 genocide was primarily the Hutu militia, the so called Interahamwe, which mainly consisted of young and unemployed men. When in 1994 the FAR was foremost engaged in fighting against the invading RPF, especially the Interahamwe was involved in the genocidal killings (Dallaire, 2003).

The portrayal of the Rwandan genocide as a civil war by the international media, or even as tribal fighting, as it was described at the beginning, created a completely wrong picture of the conflict. There is a huge difference between a genocide and civil war, since a genocide is always a (state) planned event and never one that takes place coincidentally (Third Reich, Cambodia,...).

5.1.3. The Burundian Genocide

The brutal conflict in Burundi in 1993 was used effectively for anti-Tutsi propaganda, as was the Rwandan (colonial) history and the RPF attacks. All these events were used to create fear and insecurity amongst the Rwandan population.

The demographics and history of Burundi were similar to Rwanda, with one huge difference: After independence the Tutsi minority was able to hold on to political power. The percentage of Hutu and Tutsi was similar to the demographics of Rwanda.

Burundi had experienced outbreaks of violence in the past decades, all showing numerous features of genocide, even before the massacres in 1993 there had been episodes of killings, reaching their climax in the Burundian genocide in 1972 with an estimated 150.000 victims (Banton, 1995).

In 1993 for the first time a Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was elected in Burundi, but was assassinated soon after. This led to a series of massacres of Hutu hardliners against Tutsi people, which resulted in massacres of Hutus, where also the mainly Burundian army – consisting mainly of Tutsi – was involved. Thousands of Hutus left Burundi, fleeing to Rwanda and Tanzania. For the Rwandan extremists the Burundian Hutu refugees offered a huge recruitment pool for the following genocide in Rwanda.

What Lisa Malkki finds in her study about the refugee camps in Tanzania also accounts for Burundian refugee camps in Rwanda and did not only influence the Hutus in the camps, but also the Rwandan Hutu population:

“The most unusual and prominent social fact about the camp was that its inhabitants were continually engaged in an impassioned construction and reconstruction of their history ‘a people’. The narrative production of this history ranged from descriptions of the ‘autochthonous’ origins of Burundi as a ‘nation’ and of the primordial social harmony that prevailed among the originary inhabitants (the Twa and the Hutu), to the coming of pastoral Tutsi ‘foreigners from the north’ to the Tutsi theft of power from the ‘natives’ (Hutu and Twa) by ruse and trickery, and, finally, to the culminating mass killings of Hutu by Tutsi in 1972. These narratives, ubiquitous in the camp, formed an overarching historical trajectory that was fundamentally also a national story about the ‘rightful natives’ of Burundi. The camp refugees saw themselves as a nation in exile, and defined exile, in turn, as a moral trajectory of trials and tribulations that would ultimately empower them to reclaim (or create anew) the ‘homeland’ of Burundi. Never intended as such by its architects, the camp had become the most central place from which to imagine a ‘pure’ Hutu national identity (1995:3).” (cited in: Igwara, 1995:9)

This idea of “Hutu-Power” was furthermore strengthened by the Rwandan propaganda machinery, the radio station RTLM and the *Kangura* newspaper to be exact.

“Hutu-Power” soon became an ideology that included, similar to National Socialism, psychological as well as physical features in order to create and deepen differences between “Them” (the Tutsi) and “Us” (the Hutu).

For the Rwandan Hutu population the events in Burundi were the manifestation of their biggest fears and these events were used by the government and especially by the hardliners within in order to fuel the fear within the population.

All the events that followed the shooting of the plane of the Rwandan president supposedly came as a complete surprise. After only a hundred days an estimated

500.000 were already dead when the killings were ended by the absolute victory of the RPF.

Considering the events before 1994 it can be said that what followed the assassination of the Rwandan president on April 6th, 1994 did not come as a complete surprise. The episodes of genocidal killings that each time had cost thousands of lives had already shown the danger of how close the country was to genocide.

These indications intensified during the months prior to the genocide and should have given the international community ample cause to take action, especially after the warnings of the leading head of the UNAMIR I, Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, who had not only received training plans for the militia, but also information about illegal imports of weapons and also lists of names of future victims. In addition also members of numerous fact-finding missions and the special UN-Rapporteur to Rwanda had warned about the possibility of genocide in Rwanda (Schabas, 2000:143).

The end of the killings in Rwanda was as already mentioned above due to the absolute victory of the RPF, causing masses of Hutu refugees as well as the “génocidaires” to flee the country.

The UN troops only played a small, even marginal role in the Rwandan conflict. They more or less became witnesses to the genocide, since the UNAMIR I (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) was only a Chapter IV mission, meaning the UN personnel was only there to see to the implementation of the “Arusha Accords”.

An extension of the mandate of UNAMIR I to become a Chapter VII mission failed mainly due to the political will of the international community to intervene, especially because of the “Veto” of the Veto-powers within the UN.

One of the main reasons for the decision not to intervene was the failed US-mission “Restore Hope” in Somalia in 1993, posing a catastrophic defeat to the US-American troops. Moreover, the US, for that matter, had no real political or economic interest in Rwanda and therefore saw no good reason to take action and risk another “Somalia”.

5.2. History and Influence of the Media

As already mentioned before, the two main media for anti-Tutsi propaganda were the radio station RTL (Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines) and the *Kangura* newspaper. These two media will be introduced now and their role and impact will be analyzed in the following part of the paper.

5.2.1. *Kangura*

**"Let us learn about the inkotanyi plans,
and let us exterminate every last one of them."**

(*Kangura* magazine)

In the issue of November 1991, a picture of a machete was on the cover of a newspaper called *Kangura*, the headline asking the question: "What weapons shall we use to conquer the *Inyenzi* once and for all?" (Benesch, 2004:62).

Kangura was to become a major propaganda tool in the anti-Tutsi propaganda. In the years prior to the genocide *Kangura* had been the most widely read Rwandan newspaper.

Kangura, founded by members of the *Akazu*, established itself next to other independent media in Rwanda. Whereas most of these papers struggled with hard restrictions of the government, *Kangura* did not have these problems. The paper soon became famous for its racist attacks against the Tutsi population and used terms of hate speech so naturally that it soon became the norm for the paper.

Furthermore, the slogan used by *Kangura* was already suggesting the violent contents the paper published.

In original it said: "ijwi rigamije gukangura no kungereya rubanda nyamwinshi'...", meaning: "the voice which seeks to awaken and defend the 'majority people'." (Article 19, 1996:35).

In addition to the violent and often explicit contents of their articles, *Kangura* underlined them with even more explicit and brutal illustrations.

It was also *Kangura* that published the “10 Hutu Commandments” (see Appendix page 89) in issue Number 6 in December 1990. These “10 Hutu Commandments” were part of an article with the headline: “Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu” and it stated that:

“The enemy is still there, among us, and is bidding his time to try again, at a more propitious moment, to decimate us. Therefore, Hutu, wherever you may be, wake up! Be firm and vigilant. Take all necessary measures to deter the enemy from launching a fresh attack...” (ICTR, 2003a:3).

In order to make it look as if *Kangura* was not being one-sided and inciting anti-Tutsi violence, Ngeze, the chief editor of *Kangura* and also one of the accused at the media trials at the ICTR, published the so called “19 Tutsi Commandments”. These “19 Tutsi Commandments” were “addressed” to the Tutsi population and called upon them to “...’show them they are incapable’, ‘ridicule the civil servants under our authority as ignorant Bantu people...’” amongst others – all supposedly directed against Hutu. Also “...and Commandment 16 issued a special call to the ‘youth Tutsi’, stating that if ‘we fail to achieve our goal, we will use violence’.” (ICTR, 2003a:4). These so called “19 Commandments” served the sole purpose of fuelling the fear and hate amongst the Hutu and to enforce ethnic division. They created an atmosphere of looming, imminent danger.

Additionally the Tutsi were portrayed as “blood thirsty”, but especially the Tutsi women were one of the main targets of *Kangura*’s propaganda. Tutsi women were depicted as the “secret weapon” against the Hutu and Hutu men who got married to Tutsi women or even as much as hired a female Tutsi were branded as traitors. *Kangura* actually called for the Hutu “...to cease feeling pity for the Tutsi!” (ICTR, 2003a:4). Tutsi women and children were especially targeted during the Rwandan genocide, with the goal to make sure that there was no next generation attacking from Uganda.

Since the illiteracy rate in Rwanda was extremely high, a radio station was founded in addition. It was solely created to spread anti-Tutsi propaganda

amongst the Rwandan population and was called “Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines” (RTLM), which means “Radio Station of the Thousand Hills”.

After the outbreak of violence in April 1994, *Kangura* only played a minor role in spreading propaganda, since during the war the infrastructure necessary for the circulation of the paper did not exist anymore.

5.2.2. Radio Télévision des Mille Collines – RTLM

RTLM (*Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines*) was founded in 1993 and went on air in April of the same year, exactly one year prior to the outbreak of the genocide.

Originally RTLM was created consisting of democratic features, which were to be ensured by a democratically elected board of directors. The members of this board, however, were never appointed.

One of the accused at the Arusha “Media Trials”, Ferdinand Nahimana, is considered the main force behind the hate messages propagated by RTLM.

It is obvious that the main goal of RTLM was the incitement of hate speech and ethnic division.

The broadcasts of RTLM concentrated on the Tutsi rebels, the RPF. In the beginning they started by using the name of a former RPF operation: “*Inyenzi*” (“Cockroaches”). *Inyenzi* soon became a buzzword and the term “cockroaches” soon was applied to the whole Tutsi population. Furthermore all the deeds that were formerly ascribed to the RPF, for example being blood-thirsty or planning the extinction of the Hutu population, especially of Hutu women and children, soon devolved and became associated with the whole Tutsi population. Moreover, the role of the Tutsi during colonialism was used to fuel the hatred against the Tutsi, by equating them with the brutal former Belgian colonial power.

In order to create all these prejudices, different kinds of propaganda mechanisms were used by RTLM and also *Kangura*. Those mechanisms will be analyzed in the following part of this paper.

After the presidential airplane was shot down over the Rwandan capital Kigali, the aggression and brutality of RTLM's broadcasting erratically increased. It reached terrible heights when the radio station started broadcasting names as well as address lists and even called for the militia to search for certain individuals. Additionally RTLM was used as a tool to coordinate the *Interahamwe* militia during the genocide.

What made RTLM especially dangerous was the level of legitimacy the radio station had reached within the population since in the evenings RTLM was also broadcasting through the frequency of the public Rwandan radio station, Radio Rwanda.

In most African countries the radio is the one media with the highest coverage and in most African countries also state controlled up to now.

One of the main reasons for the importance of the radio is the fact that many African countries still have extremely high rates of illiteracy.

In the 1990ies analphabetism in Rwanda was estimated at about 70%, especially amongst the rural population.

Television was not really widespread and didn't play a major role in the propagation of information in Rwanda. Furthermore, radio in Africa is often referred to as "voice of god", especially in the poor rural areas where illiteracy rates are extremely high (Article 19, 1996; Gulseth, 2004).

RTLM broadcasted in two languages, in French as well as in Kinyarwanda, although the content that was broadcasted in Kinyarwanda, a language that is solely spoken in the Rwanda region, was far more explicit. The bilingual broadcasting also had the effect that it made the station seem more professional and increased the legitimacy of the station amongst the Rwandan population even more (Intermedia, Case Study Rwanda).

5.2.3. Main Goals of Kangura and RTLM

The main goal of the contents broadcast by both RTLM and *Kangura*, was to create a certain enemy image. The image that was created by the media concentrated not only on the RPF rebels dreaded already but was also directed against the Tutsi population as a whole and furthermore was directed against Belgians as well as moderate Hutus.

Still, the propaganda not only consisted of the creation of an enemy image, but also used, for example, inclusion-exclusion mechanisms. As mentioned before, after the death of the Rwandan president also open calls for violence became omnipresent in the broadcastings of RTLM.

5.2.3.1. Freedom of Speech and State Sovereignty - Jamming RTLM

The Human Right to “Freedom of Speech” is one of the greatest achievements of our time, including not only the right of individuals to speak freely, but also the right to free media. The right to “Freedom of Speech” is especially valued in countries like the United States and also amongst Western European Countries and is one of the main indicators of a country’s level of democracy and independence.

Still, the human right to freedom of speech reaches its limits as soon as it starts to interfere with more fundamental human rights such as the right to life.

In the years prior to the genocide, and even more intensified in the months before, sign of the existence of hate speech in the Rwandan media became undeniable. Many of the delegates that visited Rwanda in the process of securing peace and security detected those threats and called for immediate action, nationally as well as internationally. An intervention not only into a state’s sovereignty but furthermore the incision into a valued human right, were out of question for international governments but also international organizations. Contrariwise, it even seems that the real power and influence of the media is often underestimated. In the case of Rwanda the propagated contents of *Kangura* and RTLM were either not taken seriously or just ignored by the international community.

The head of the UNAMIR I mission, Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire criticized the contents of RTLM broadcast, but did not have the mandate to intervene accordingly.

The Canadian ambassador to Rwanda stated about RTLM for that matter:

“The question of Radio Mille Collines’ propaganda is a difficult one. There were so many genuinely silly things being said on the station, so many obvious lies, that it was hard to take seriously. It was like relying on the National Enquirer [a US supermarket tabloid] to determine our policy in outer space.”

(Article 19, 1996:49).

Not only was the professionalism behind RTLM underestimated, but also the fear that rooted deep in crisis-ridden Rwandan society. Despite of urgent calls of some human rights organizations to shut the station down, there was no real interest on the international level to take action against the radio. These were to follow later during “Opération Turquoise”, when first the US and later also France tried to shut down the station. Before “Opération Turquoise” all those ambitions failed due to reasons that included various technical difficulties and also arguments of international law, since the jamming of a station would pose a serious intrusion into another state’s sovereignty.

The argumentation also included that the station was either untraceable or even shut down already, which was not the case. France was also concerned that they did not have a suitable mandate within “Opération Turquoise” to take such measures. Therefore RTLM was able to keep on broadcasting out of the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire (RSF, 1995:4).

Some of the non-permanent members of the Security Council also called for action against the station. The issue of jamming of RTLM even became the subject of a meeting of the UN Security Council. Still, no measures were agreed upon.

The country best equipped for such an operation would have been the US. The US government drew up an estimate of the costs of jamming the station and found that it would by far be too expensive.

“We have looked at options to stop the broadcasts within the Pentagon, discussed them interagency and concluded jamming as an ineffective and expensive mechanism that will not accomplish the objective the NSC advisor seeks. International legal conventions complicate airborne and ground based jamming and the mountain terrain reduces the effectiveness of either option. Commando Solo, an AIR National Guard asset, is the only suitable DOD jamming platform. It costs approximately \$8500 per flight hour and requires a semi-secure area of operations due to its vulnerability and limited self-protection. I believe it would be wiser to use air to assist in Rwanda the [food] relief effort...”
(Power, 2001:19).

During some of these meetings Prudence Bushnell, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at that time, tried to address the issue of “Jamming RTLM”. The “State Department Legal Advisors Office” concluded, though, that such an operation wouldn’t only pose a breach of the “International Broadcasting Agreements” but would also oppose the US-American understanding of the concept of freedom of speech (Power, 2001:19). When Bushnell still tried to push action against RTLM, she was then criticized by one of the members of the Pentagon for being naïve: “Pru, radios don’t kill people. *People* kill people!” (Power, 2001:19f).

5.3. The Techniques of De-Humanization

5.3.1. Ethnicity as cause for conflict?

Ethnicity as root of violence and also “ethnic violence” has become a kind of “catch-all-concept” in the past decades. Violence and warfare are often linked to the existence of ethnic differences. In many cases the real reasons for conflicts are disguised or even denied (Schlee, 2006:8).

“‘Ethnische Konflikte’ ist, besonders seit dem Ende des Sozialismus und der Abkehr von seiner klassenkämpferischen Perspektive, zu einer selbstverständlichen Phrase geworden. Keiner fragt was eigentlich ethnisch an ethnischen Konflikten ist. (...) Ethnizität ist in dieser Sicht ein zeitkonstanter Faktor, der Konflikte generiert.“ (Schlee, 2006:8)

Ethnicity is identified as the main feature and root of conflict in Rwanda by the international media as well as independent observers. This view has always been criticized sharply by specialists and researchers.

Ethnicity as single cause of the Rwandan genocide does not uphold a closer look at the root of the conflict, especially, since in Rwanda only a single language and a collective culture are to be identified (Igwarra et al, 1995).

Schlee also criticizes the common theory that in an ethnic conflict “...uralte und tief verwurzelte Gegensätze...” (Schlee, 2006:12) collide with one another.

Schlee finds that ethnicity is nothing constant, nothing that is unalterable, but on the contrary an always moving concept that is permanently redefined by the collective addressed. The line between “Us” and “Them” is constantly drawn anew (Schlee, 2006:12ff).

Therefore the cause of conflict keeps also changing. In many cases these differences are created artificially by the people in power, for example in order to obtain political backup of a certain group or to explain existing inequalities (Maquet, 1961; Schlee 2006).

“‘Types’ and ‘traits’ incautiously and sometimes fanciful ascribed by social scientist and bureaucrats have often taken a terrible social reality as the reification and essentialization of cultural difference have been harnessed to deadly political visions.” (Igwarra, 1995:7).

A good example for that is again the case of the Kenyan Kalenjin that has already been described at the beginning (page 21).

In the context of the Rwandan genocide Igwara cites Alex de Waal, who finds that:

“Specialists on Rwanda protest in vain that Hutu and Tutsi are not separate ethnic groups. But sixty years of colonial and Tutsi rule, and thirty-five years of Hutu supremacy following the 1959 revolution, which consigned half the Tutsi population to exile, have fundamentally changed the nature of the relationships between them. Potential conflict, punctuated by intercommunal violence, has created distinct and mutually opposed Hutu and Tutsi identities, which, for all the hesitation of social scientists, are identifiably ‘ethnic’ (1994b:3)”

(cited in: Igwara, 1995:2)

It also has to be considered that an ethnic group is nothing with a fixed external frontier, but something that changes in the eye of the beholder. There are some cases in Africa, where members of different tribes and in more extreme cases even from different language families align to a clan (Schlee, 2006:13ff).

In the Rwandan case language as cause for disparity can be excluded, since only a single language is spoken by the Rwandan people. Therefore other mechanisms were used in order to create differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Once more it has to be stated that in reality this did not only include people with the ascription “Tutsi” in their passes, especially since differences of physical features, had become nearly extinct. The name “Tutsi” also included Belgian nationals as well as those Hutu that seemed not to meet the perception of the “optimal Hutu”. The assertion of Hutu as “Tutsi” was based on political affiliations, sometimes even physical features, but also on success or wealth (Igwara, 1995). Many of the victims were also moderate Hutu, who were opposed to the violence or/and separation.

5.3.2. Enemy images and the Rwandan genocide

The question that is inevitable when talking about genocide and has already been addressed earlier in this paper is the question of how such atrocities are at all even possible.

As cited earlier, the answer the genocide researchers Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) give, is that genocide can not be possible, as long as the potential victims are still thought of as equal human beings. During genocide its victims are never viewed as equal, in many cases not even as humans. Before and during genocide the humanity of the victims is deconstructed – in parts or even in whole – by those who then become the perpetrators.

Chalk furthermore argues that humans always had names for themselves, such as humankind, people, etc. These names are related to the attributes that are identified with these groups. These can be connected to things like religion, language, ethnicity, etc. People who are excluded from such a group are often associated with certain (in many cases even fictional) characteristics, such as witches, savages, or even animals by which this group or individual is dehumanized.

Still, in order for such a cruel event as genocide to happen, the responsible actors first have to define the group of victims and then make them seem worthless, dangerous or even not human.

In order to establish the dehumanization of the Tutsi, the Rwandan government used the media openly and also massively. These dehumanization mechanisms in the Rwandan media will be examined in the following chapters in order to establish how they were used in Rwanda.

Furthermore, there are other things necessary for genocide to happen, such as centralized, undemocratic and semi-bureaucratic features of a state.

Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) define four criteria of genocide. In most of the previous genocides more than one of these features could be identified.

- “1. to eliminate a real or potential threat;
 2. to spread terror among real or potential enemies;
 3. to acquire economic wealth; or
 4. to implement a belief, a theory or an ideology.”
- (Chalk, 1990:29)

5.3.3. The necessity of inclusion and exclusion

Schlee (2006) distinguishes two different kinds of conflict in his book “Wie Feindbilder entstehen” on the basis of Machiavelli’s theories.

The first and most brutal and desperate form of violence is defined – in relation to Machiavelli’s theories – the fight for survival of a population, as they were for example found in Europe in the past. During these conflicts it was possible that after the occupation of a national territory its population was either displaced or even exterminated (e.g. the Gauls).

In the second form of conflict Schlee finds that there are different kinds of reasons to be found, such as political or economic power. He furthermore states that in these conflicts the “Prinzip der *minimal winning coalition*” applies. This principle means that only so many supporters are acquired as are necessary to take over power – therefore not having to share it with too many others. Due to this principle, alliances are formed by including people for one’s cause by creating and defining communalities. Collective goals are used to define new and common characteristics. Therefore a lack of resources, such as water, but also other reasons such as the striving for political supremacy can lead to the creation of communality or disparity and furthermore even lead to bloody conflicts (Schlee, 2006).

5.4. Enemy Images and the Creation of Enemy Images

5.4.1. The Construction of “the Others” – Techniques of Anti-Tutsi Propaganda

The usage of highly emotional language, in order to provoke intense emotions amongst its audience was characteristic of the contents that were broadcasted by RTLM. The staff of RTLM used different techniques, such as intonation or the description of one’s “good intentions” versus the “other’s bad and evil intentions”, e.g. by describing them as “wicked savages” who had the sole plan to kill innocent (Hutu) people (RTLM May 23rd, 1994).

RTLM was also preferred amongst the population to the state owned Radio Rwanda, since its program did not consist of long newscasts and reports, but played a lot of (Rwandan) contemporary music.

Anti-Tutsi propaganda was spread through the lyrics of the music that was aired on RTLM.

One of the musicians, Simon Bikindi was also accused of inciting hate speech at the ICTR in Arusha. Bikindi for example wrote the hit-song “I hate these Tutsi”, which was sung in Kinyarwanda (original title: “Nanga Abahutu”). Simon Bikindi was, amongst other counts, accused of “Conspiracy and Complicity to Genocide” (Trial Watch – Simon Bikindi). His case created a fierce debate about the freedom of speech and even more so about the freedom of arts (Gulseth, 2004).

Many researchers who address the topic of propaganda in Africa state that music can be used as a very effective tool for propaganda, since music plays a very special and exclusive role in all of Africa. These forms of propaganda can also be found in other African nations such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, former Zaire), Congo-Brazzaville or Cameroon.

The anti-Tutsi songs of Bikindi were to be heard several times a day on RTLM.

The colourful program of RTLM consisted of a lot of music with short comments of the host in between, as well as short interviews. This form of program especially attracted the young male population (Internews – Case Study Rwanda).

The actual effectiveness and power of RTLM are debatable. Still, it is agreed that the broadcasts were used as a heavy propaganda tool, but there was no status quo

on the actual consequences. It has to be stated though, that the broadcasts alone would not have sufficed in order to provoke the outbreaks of violence and genocide. RTLM and also *Kangura* probably did not cause the violence to explode with their broadcasts and articles – but still they both provided a powerful tool and also justifications for the violence that was about to follow (Gulseth, 2004).

Violence in the end would also have broken out without the existence of RTLM or *Kangura*. But the enormous amount of hate that had built up after all those years of anti-Tutsi agitations is likely to be responsible for the extremely bloody and violent form the genocide took (Gulseth, 2004:28).

It was also the goal of the propaganda in Rwanda to create and provide “the audience with a comprehensive conceptual framework for dealing with a social and political reality.” (cited in: Gulseth, 2004:32). Propaganda, especially in the context of the Rwandan genocide, can not be viewed as an isolated event but has to be put in context with the political, social and historical structures that can be identified in Rwanda, but also in the neighbouring state Burundi at that time.

5.4.2. Stereotypes, Prejudice and Concepts of the Enemy – “Us” against the “Others”

An important propaganda mechanism were the inclusion (“Us”) and exclusion (“Them, the Others”) strategies as they were used by both, by RTLM as well as by *Kangura*. This meant that there were positive features and strengths attributed to everybody included in the term “Us” (the Hutu) in order to strengthen the unity of the Hutu. The usage of hate speech against “Them” (the Tutsi) and therefore the creation of a common enemy were again multiplied by stereotypes (Gulseth, 2004:37). Not only physical features were used accordingly but also colonial history.

In order to create such a concept of an enemy seven characteristics necessary for propaganda were defined by Spillman and Spillman (1991:57): 1. Distrust; 2. Allocation of Blame; 3. Negative Anticipation; 4. Identification with Evil; 5. Zero-Sum thinking (everything that is bad for the enemy is good for us and vice-

versa); 6. Deconstructing the Individual; 7. Refusal of Compassion (Gulseth, 2004:42).

RTLM and *Kangura* only identified the Tutsi with negative features, their reporting about the Tutsi made them seem inhuman, since they were only associated with negative features and/or events.

“...Rwandan hate radio sought to demonize and ‘dehumanize’ Tutsi in order to create the impression that killing was not akin killing other humans, thus making the act somehow more acceptable and easier to carry out.”

(Gulseth, 2004:43)

Some of the journalists, especially those working for RTLM were also quite skilled, so it can be considered a fact that they knew what they were doing (Gulseth, 2004:42). They used the concept of “the enemy” for their own intentions, as Sam Keen also describes in his book “Faces of the enemy” (Gulseth, 2004:41).

“‘In the beginning we create the enemy. Before the weapon comes the image. We think others to death and then invent the battle-axe or the ballistic missiles with which we actually kill them. Propaganda precedes technology’, Sam Keen (1986:10)...”

(cited in: Gulseth, 2004:41).

5.4.3. Blaming “the Other” – The creation of a Scapegoat

Another thing was that it was also common to blame “the Tutsi” for all the shortcomings and problems, such as the catastrophic shape of the Rwandan economy. As already mentioned, history and colonial past were also popular propaganda tools. When broadcasting contents about the colonial past of Rwanda not only the Belgians but especially the role of the Tutsi was decried.

RTLM for example broadcasted that:

“These people [the Inkontanyi] and all the other accomplices in the country have ruined this country, plunging it in such misfortunes’ (RTLM April 12th, 1994).”
(cited in: Gulseth, 2004:46).

5.4.4. The Danger and Threat posed by “the Others”

Furthermore, the events that took place at the same time in Burundi are not to be forgotten since they had a deep impact on the Rwandan every day politics. In this case the massacres that took place after the assassination of the Burundian president in 1993 are of special significance. The attacks by Tutsi on the Hutu people in Burundi were exploited not only to generate a lot of public attention but mainly in order to fuel the fear within the Rwandan Hutu population.

Additionally, some of the attacks on Hutus in Rwanda that were ascribed to the RPF are thought to have actually been carried out by the Rwandan presidential guard itself, in order to stoke the fear within the population (Dallaire, 2003).

“Die Wahrnehmung des Anderen als Bedrohung, als Repräsentant fremder und Destruktiver Kräfte, ist allen nationalistischen, autoritären und totalitären Regimen unererter Epoche gemeinsam. Sie ist ein universelles, kulturunabhängiges Phänomen. Keine Zivilisation war in der Lage sich des (con den verschiedenen Machthabern in allen Breitengraden propagierten) pathologischen Hasses, der Verachtung und der Zerstörung zu widersetzen. Im Extremfall hat diese krankhafte Entwicklung die unheilvolle Form des Völkermordes angenommen – einer der wiederkehrenden tragischen Züge unserer heutigen Welt.“ (Kapuscinski, 16.03.2001)

Especially cruel stories of atrocities allegedly committed by the RPF were later really comitted by the Hutu militias the Interahamwe. The stories about the alleged atrocities committed by the RPF were another mechanism to dehumanize them further and make the RPF seem like unrivalled bloodthirsty animals. One of

these fabricated stories broadcast by RTLM stated that RPF soldiers cut out a pregnant woman's child and then forced her to cook it for the soldiers (Intermedia, Case Study Rwanda). Later it was proved that the story was invented by RTLM through broadcasting an interview with a fake witness.

The tragic fact about that is that this story should then become reality during the genocide in 1994. Such atrocities as cutting out the foetuses of pregnant women were committed later by the Interahamwe militia during the genocide (Kressel 1996, Dallaire 2003).

5.4.5. The Construction of “the Others Intentions”

In addition to praising their own journalistic qualities and political knowledge the journalists of *Kangura* as well as RTLM also depicted the “obvious evil intentions” of the Tutsi people in their reporting. The journalists legitimated their views and assertions with both their history and their education, such as university degrees.

They always predicted violent acts that were planned by the RPF. These – in many cases false – news items were accompanied by false interviews and unproven assertions from the journalists as well as their recipients.

The audience was included in the program by having the possibility of calling the radio station and stating their thoughts and views on the political situation or on anti-Tutsi topics. These calls were often fiery speeches about the threat that “the Tutsi” posed to Rwanda and “the Hutus”.

Especially during the peace negotiations between the Rwandan government and the RPF in Arusha the commentators highlighted that the plan of the RPF was not to enter into a democratic political system, but to conquer the country and to establish a RPF led rule. This furthermore fuelled the insecurity about the political events that took place outside as well as within Rwanda.

“... the party using terror will accuse the enemy of using terror. With such tactics, propagandists can persuade listeners and ‘honest people’

that they were being attacked and are justified in taking whatever measures are necessary for legitimate self-defence”
(Gulseth, 2004:45)

The Anti-Tutsi hatred had already claimed many lives before the genocide of 1994 ever took place, for example in the case of the Bugesera massacres in 1992. Already then the Hutu extremists had managed to implement the belief in the local population that the main goal of the Tutsi was to extinguish all Hutu people. This alleged “plan of extinction of the Hutus by the Tutsi” was the most frightening part of the anti-Tutsi propaganda that preceded and accompanied the genocide (Gulseth, 2004).

5.4.6. The Tactics of “Name-Giving”

The tactic of “name-giving” became an especially efficient tool of anti-Tutsi propaganda.

The most popular names were, for example, “Inyenzi” meaning “Cockroaches”, “Inkontanyi” meaning “family of killers”, just to name the two most common expressions (Gulseth, 2004:78ff). At first these names were only ascribed to members of the RPF, but soon were used for all the Tutsi people. This was possible due to permanent repetitions and connection of the RPF and the Tutsi as a whole.

Typically, only names with bad associations were used. This meant that the Tutsi were called names like: animals, killers, dictators, terrorists, criminals, contract-killers, army, etc. in order to create fear and hate amongst the population. The goal was to motivate the Hutu population to take action against the “looming attack of the Tutsis”.

“Name-calling” is an important tactic of de-humanizing a group of people as well as individuals.

As already mentioned before, these potential attacks of the RPF were sometimes exaggerated – or in the worst cases even created – by the journalists of RTLM and *Kangura*.

When they created rumours of attacks or reported about attacks they often used fake eye-witnesses and cited false sources.

The role of the Tutsi during the Rwandan history, especially during colonisation was also used to portray the Tutsi as adherents to feudal structures, who supposedly had one main goal: to seize power again and subject the Hutu people to slavery.

Additionally, the fact that the RPF consisted mainly of very young men and the fact that many of them had been born in exile and often didn't even speak Kinyarwanda or even French was used as a factor to depict the RPF as a foreign terrorist group with no connection or right to return to Rwanda (Gulseth, 2004:98ff).

5.4.7. Public Calls for Violence

Today the role and influence of RTLM during the genocide is widely acknowledged. This is not only due to the numerous reports and papers on the topic but furthermore also acknowledged by the International Tribunal for Rwanda, where some of the persons responsible were prosecuted and found guilty. These cases shall be discussed in the paper later on.

The moderators of RTLM not only inflicted hatred through their reporting, but after the outbreak of the genocide even called for violence and murder openly.

“‘ During the genocide, it [RTLM] became what one listener at the time called ‘vampire radio’ openly calling for more blood and massacres’”
(Gulseth, 2004:50).

It furthermore became typical of RTLM to attack certain individuals personally. Next to general denunciations of the RPF, the Tutsi and everybody else that was considered close to the Tutsi, direct attacks against individuals such as priests, doctors, etc. became very common in the reports of RTLM.

RTLM defended itself against criticism by stating:

“...The read on why our radio surprises you is because you were not used to this kind of talk on Radio Rwanda. We can understand that this is why you hear people complaining: ‘RTLM is talking about me!’ It will say even more. Now we are just making you familiar. We will keep on increasing, increasing.”
(Article 19, 1996:54)

A good example for these kinds of practices was the direct attack against the liberal Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana in December 1993:

“The Prime-Minister has created a bad atmosphere because she co-operates with the RPF. She should remember that the scar she has was previously a wound.” (Article 19, 1996:54)

Such threats against the Prime Minister were repeatedly transmitted by RTLM, furthermore stating that she should not forget that she was not an immortal (Article 19, 1996:54).

The Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana finally was to become one of the first victims of the Rwandan genocide.

Alongside her ten Belgian UN blue helmets died who were supposed to protect her (Dallaire, 2003). The killings of these blue helmets posed the main reason for Belgium to pull its troops out of Rwanda. Belgium had supported UNAMIR I with the most troops and resources until that point.

RTLM often recited “scientific” papers and transmitted public speeches of Léon Mugesera. Mugesera was vice-president of the MDR and held anti-Tutsi rallies all over the country on regular bases. Furthermore, his position as a leading politician in Rwanda granted the contents of his hate-speeches a special form of legitimization. Parts of his speeches were constantly repeated on RTLM.

The fact that during the genocide many of the corpses were thrown into the Nyaborongo River is also accredited to Mugesera’s speeches, since in one of them he states that:

“Should (sic!) justice system fail to carry out the punishment, Mugesera explained, people needed to take the law into their own hands as justice was executed ‘in the name of the people’. – invoking religious authority, Mugesera also incited genocide against the Tutsi: ‘we ourselves will take care of massacring these gangs of thugs. You know, it says in the Gospel that the snake comes to bite you and, if you let it stay, you are the one who will perish.’ He concluded: ‘the mistake we made in 1959 ... is that what let you [the Tutsi – notation of the author] get out safe and sound... your country is Ethiopia and, soon, we will send you home via Nyaborongo [river in Rwanda], on an express trip’.” (Article 19, 1996:19).

The contents of his speech are very direct and, as already mentioned, closely connected to the thousands of bodies that were to be found in the Nyaborongo River during the genocide. It was also often repeated by other politicians and also by the journalists of RTLM.

Mugesera himself never committed any direct act of violence or killings, his crimes were solely committed through his speeches. He had already left Rwanda one year before the genocide started.

Still, he was also named as one of the people responsible for the Rwandan genocide by the International Tribunal for Rwanda during the case *Prosecutor vs. Akayesu* (Schabas, 2000:144).

5.5. The Possible Reasons for the Extreme Influence of Propaganda in Rwanda

The propaganda and hate speech that was incited through reports of RTLM as well as *Kangura* obviously played a major role during the genocide in Rwanda, mainly due to the high acceptance that these topics received by its recipients, especially in the case of RTLM.

As described above, one of the main reasons for the high acceptance of RTLM is considered the high rate of illiteracy amongst the Rwandan population, especially in the rural areas. Stories and rumours always played an important role amongst

the rural population, news still mainly travelled through mouth-to-mouth propaganda in many African countries.

For many people stories and rumours are legitimate sources of information and to even question facts and reports that were broadcast by the media would have seemed strange and in most cases would have been impossible anyway. This is one of the main reasons why the reports and stories that were broadcasted on RTLM were absorbed without questioning in many cases.

Furthermore, since many of the politicians and prominent persons such as singers and community leaders also repeated these contents publicly, rumours became truth (Kressel, 1996).

Even more so, the practice of permanently repeating certain names and expressions made the whole effect of propagated contents become even stronger and sink deep into people's minds. Kotnik (1997) and Brown (1963) both stated that the permanent repetition of certain words, phrases or names is one of the most effective and intense forms of propaganda techniques, since it does not create topics for discussion or possible distrust, but simply blends into the minds and vocabulary of the audience (Gulseth, 2004:51).

5.6. Excursion – Hate Speech and the “International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda”

The “International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda” (ICTR), situated in Arusha, Tanzania, is prosecuting the main perpetrators of the Rwanda genocide to this day.

5.6.1. The Accused

At the so called “Media Trials” three people were accused and tried by the ICTR. These cases, the individuals, the accusations and the verdicts are to be presented in the following part of the paper.

Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was not only a high-ranking member of the MDR but also one of the founders of the “*Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines*”. The accusations against Barayagwiza included that he had chaired in numerous meetings where the assassinations of not only Tutsi but also moderate Hutu had been discussed and also planned. At those meetings the funding of the Interahamwe was also discussed, as well as the distribution of weapons to the members of Interahamwe militia.

Another count of accusations against Barayagwiza was that RTLM was founded mainly to broadcast anti-Tutsi propaganda with the purpose of deepening the ethnic division between Hutus and Tutsis and also to enforce the violence against the Tutsi.

Barayagwiza was accused on counts that included: “...conspiracy to commit genocide, genocide, complicity to genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, as well as crimes against humanity and serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II...” (ICTR, 2003b). He pleaded not guilty to all counts.

The second accused was Hassan Ngeze, the chief editor of the *Kangura* newspaper. Ngeze is considered responsible for many of the anti-Tutsi articles that were published in *Kangura*. Furthermore, he also held political power in the Interahamwe militia, the forces that were considered to have been one of the main actors in the killings of civilians during the genocide.

Ngeze was accused of having authorized the publishing of contents that had the main goal of creating ethnic tension and violence and in addition even called for more brutality and inhumanity.

One of the accusations also included that the publishing of explicit violence in *Kangura* had led to direct forms of physical as well as psychological violence. These accusations were evidenced through articles that were published in *Kangura*, including not only comments and cartoons, but also names and personal details about people who were considered as the enemy and therefore supposed to be assassinated. Those cartoons just mentioned also displayed an unbelievable grade of brutality, harassment and violence. Ngeze was accused in seven counts by the ICTR that included: “...conspiracy to commit genocide, genocide,

complicity to genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and crimes against humanity...” (ICTR, 2003b).

The third accused was Ferdinand Nahimana, who was a professor of history at the National University for Rwanda, located in Butare. He was also one of the founders of RTLM.

The accusations that were brought against him also included the broadcasting of hate messages that called for the killings of Tutsis and the incitement of ethnic violence. Moreover, he had called on the youth to organize themselves in armed self-defence groups in order to fight against the RPF.

Like Barayagwiza, he chaired meetings where the assassination of Tutsi and moderate Hutu was discussed and had also played a major role in the distribution of arms to the Interahamwe militia.

Nahimana had also published articles, books, essays and a dissertation that delivered the ideological background for the 1994 genocide.

He was accused on the same seven counts as Ngeze (ICTR, 2003b)

5.6.2. The Verdict

The ICTR found Nahimana as well as Ngeze unanimously guilty on five counts and not guilty on two and both received a life sentence.

The verdict was as follows:

“Count 1: Guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Genocide
Count 2: Guilty of Genocide
Count 3: Guilty of Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide
Count 4: Not Guilty of Complicity in Genocide
Count 5: Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Persecution)
Count 6: Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Extermination)
Count 7 Not Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity (Murder)”
(ICTR, 2003a:28)

The third accused, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was also found guilty on the same five counts as Nahimana and Ngeze and was furthermore found “...not guilty in

the two counts of Serious Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II...” (ICTR, 2003a:30). Barayagwiza also received a life sentence, but the verdict was reduced to 27 years by the Appeals Chamber, since his rights had been violated during his imprisonment and transfer to Arusha (ICTR, 2003a:30)

The – arguably – most important case that preceded the media trials was the case against the German Julius Streicher at the “Nürnberger Prozess”.

Streicher published the newspaper “Der Stürmer” during the Second World War. His paper had also called for violence and he had published racist and anti-Semitic contents.

It was the first time that a journalist was held responsible for publishing contents that called for violence while never being directly involved in the actual violence. The “Nürnberger Tribunal” found that:

“... die Tatsache, dass Streicher zu Mord und Ausrottung aufhetzte, in einer Zeit, in der Juden im Osten unter unbeschreiblichen Umständen massakriert wurden, offensichtlich eine Verfolgung aufgrund politischer und rassistischer Gründe dar, in Verbindung mit Kriegsverbrechen im Sinne des Status und ein Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit.”

(Jewish Virtual Library)

5.7. An Evaluation of the Role of the Media in Rwanda

Despite being officially independent RTLM and *Kangura* can be clearly attributed to the Hutu power elite from the north of Rwanda and are closely connected to members of the “Akazu” and the MDR. All the accused of the “Media Trials” were not only involved in the propagation of hate speech and anti-Tutsi propaganda, but were also high ranking political actors and all three of them were actively involved in the planning of how to execute of the killings.

Furthermore, both of the two media lacked democratic structures and recruited their journalists and publishers from within the Hutu extremists, therefore both of them were strongly involved in the broadcasting of anti-Tutsi propaganda.

When analysing the contents that were published by *Kangura* and RTLM and also the verdicts of the ICTR's "Media Trials", one can see that both of them were important instruments in the creation of an anti-Tutsi sentiment and a fundamentalist Hutu ideology.

Kangura, but even more so RTLM created the framework for actions that are by no means justifiable. They did so by creating an enemy concept that rooted deep in the society's minds and fears. Not only had the propaganda laid the groundwork that violence seemingly can be justified, but had even made it seem necessary in order to survive.

Although the media were one of the main creators of anti-Tutsi hatred and ethnic division it was not the sole activator for the genocide.

History, the struggle for political power and the dramatic state of the Rwandan economy were also major factors for the insecurity and fear that was found within the Rwandan population.

Instead of trying to minimize these fears the government, RTLM and *Kangura* used them for their own intentions.

The final trigger for the outbreak of the violence was the assassination of the president, although up to this day it is not really sure who was really behind it – if it was the RPF rebel or the hardliners within the government. In order of being able to understand the shock that was connected with the killing of the Rwandan president, one once again has to take the events that took place in Burundi into consideration. Still, as already mentioned, the political (Arusha Accords, democratic transition, etc) and economic (high rates of unemployed, massive inflation, etc.) developments were the main cause for the high acceptance of hate speech and violence.

To this day there are discussions going on about the right to freedom of speech and free media. One of the main discussion points is still the decision not to jam the radio station RTLM. Especially in the United States there are many groups and organizations to be found that advocate for free speech and free media, no matter what. Others are a little more moderate in their views and admit that after the events of April 6th, 1994 the radio station should have been shut down, since it additionally became a tool for the coordination of the genocide.

Many organizations think that hate speech and the abuse of free speech are best met by the broadcasting of counter information instead of censorship or jamming of the media. There is a justified fear that jamming such a station might even have the opposite effect since it might create the feeling amongst its audience that their own freedom (of speech) and independence is at stake (Gulseth 2004).

5.8. Freedom of Speech in Rwanda Today

The abuse of the power of the media before and during the genocide left the Rwandan society with a deep mistrust towards the media. In the name of freedom of speech *Kangura* and even more so RTLM had incited hate speech and called for the assassinations of thousands of people – a legacy that is not easily forgotten.

These events have had a serious impact on the media scene in Rwanda today. Only in 2004, ten years after the genocide, the first private radio station was permitted by the Rwandan government. The first ten years after the genocide there was only one state controlled station and a handful of foreign stations such as the BBC. Free media are hardly to be found in Rwanda, opposition media are state controlled and have to follow strict censorship rules.

The role of the media during the genocide offers a seemingly legitimate reason for the acting government to put restrictions on the media and to keep it under their control, even more so since in the refugee camps that still exist in the neighboring countries, especially in the DRC, there are still active Hutu extremists who have not given up on the plan of returning to Rwanda and re-seizing political power (Gulseth, 2004).

RTLM managed to keep on broadcasting out of the refugee camps until 1996. It took two more years, before RTLM was finally jammed by the Burundian government (Internews Rwanda).

6. Conclusion

As the paper has shown, the events in Rwanda were highly organized and (state) controlled. Genocide, as it was argued earlier, requires state structure and organization since genocide is not an event that happens by accident. Military training, the import of weapons and especially the efficient use of the media for propaganda shows that the Rwandan state still possessed enough features of a functioning state. In Rwanda even during and after the genocide strong features of state led organization can be detected.

The alert points before the genocide also were unmistakable and the role of the international community is up until today cause for discussion. The killings initially were portrayed as tribal fightings, especially in the international media. A fact that can be denied. Rwandan society slid into a collective eruption of violence, as it is depicted also in connection with state failure, that is true. Still, this collective explosion of violence was still organized and controlled by a certain part of the state and included infrastructures like media and military.

“..., just as ‘tribalism’ is being reaffirmed by the media as the bane of the continent, Rwanda’s descent into hell makes it a society not unlike others in Europe or Asia where genocide has been intrinsic to their recent historical experience.” (Lemarchand, 1995:59)

Dozens of papers have been published, examining the intelligence that some states might have had. Also there were reports published before the genocide warning about a possible catastrophe.

When the RPF seized control over Rwanda after their absolute victory against the Hutu extremists, they again quickly introduced structures that identify a state.

But the extremists who fled the country alongside thousands of Hutu refugees also managed to re-organize themselves in the camps and still operate out of those camps, mainly from the DRC.

Rwanda has possessed strong features of neo-patrimonialism but it cannot be considered a failed state per se. Most of the structures never ceased to exist and the grade of organization of both of the conflict parties is rather high.

Mainly clientelism can be identified in Rwanda prior, but also as shown in chapter 2.3.4.1., after the genocide. Not only the governing group of the “Akazu” showed

strong clientelistic features, also the governing group today is closely connected to former-RPF members.

Other neo-patrimonial features, such as corruption or personal rule are not too common.

The genocide in Rwanda roots deep in history, but was in the end still artificially created. First the diversion was deepened by the Germans, who favoured the Tutsi and later by the Belgians who tried to change this imbalance by reversing the power artificially and furthermore strengthening the divide through the adoption of the identity cards. After independence the balance of Rwandan society deteriorated even further due to the additional power struggle between the Hutu from the north and the south, already leading to the first massacres.

After gaining power the Rwandan government planned on keeping it and the creation of a common enemy were of course very helpful. The enemy was created and fear was deepened through the usage of propaganda as it was thoroughly depicted in this paper.

One point that also becomes very obvious when looking at the history of the Rwandan media is, that the power and danger of the media and propaganda is up until this point still not really recognized. No one in the international and in many cases not even the people in Rwanda really believed the influence hate speech can have. Just as during the Holocaust and other genocides, it still seems hard for the outside world to grasp the reality of atrocities that take place, since they seem too cruel to be real.

The most important event that precedes genocide is as discussed in chapter 4.1.2. the dehumanization of the victims. The Tutsi and everyone else who was opposed to the ideas of the ruling elite were dehumanized by the Rwanda media for years, in many cases in such an open and direct form, that nobody really thought this could be believed by anyone. This is, as long as you ignore the events that took place during that time in Rwanda and build the framework for the events that were about to follow.

While the events that took place in Rwanda prior and during the genocide might present features of state failure, but in the end genocide denies state failure since it needs the framework of a (at least partially) working state to take place in this extent. Also the usage of the media and the very specific creation of enemy

images and future victims show that a state failure cannot have taken place in Rwanda.

7. **The ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’**

as published in *Kangura*, No. 6 (December 1990)

1. Every Hutu must know that the Tutsi woman, wherever she may be, is working for the Tutsi ethnic cause. In consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who:

- Acquires a Tutsi wife;
- Acquires a Tutsi concubine;
- Acquires a Tutsi secretary or protégée.

2. Every Hutu must know that our Hutu daughters are more worthy and more conscientious as women, as wives and as mothers. Aren't they lovely, excellent secretaries, and more honest!

3. Hutu women, be vigilant and make sure that your husbands, brothers and sons see reason.

4. All Hutus must know that all Tutsis are dishonest in business. Their only goal is ethnic superiority. We have learned this by experience from experience. In consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who:

- Forms a business alliance with a Tutsi
- Invests his own funds or public funds in a Tutsi enterprise
- Borrows money from or loans money to a Tutsi
- Grants favors to Tutsis (import licenses, bank loans, land for construction, public markets...)

5. Strategic positions such as politics, administration, economics, the military and security must be restricted to the Hutu.

6. A Hutu majority must prevail throughout the educational system (pupils, scholars, and teachers).

7. The Rwandan Army must be exclusively Hutu. The war of October 1990 has taught us that. No soldier may marry a Tutsi woman.

8. Hutu must stop taking pity on the Tutsi.

9. Hutu wherever they be must stand united, in solidarity, and concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers. Hutu within and without Rwanda must constantly search for friends and allies to the Hutu Cause, beginning with their Bantu brothers.

Hutu must constantly counter Tutsi propaganda.

Hutu must stand firm and vigilant against their common enemy: the Tutsi.

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10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961 and the Hutu Ideology must be taught to Hutu of every age. Every Hutu must spread the word wherever he goes. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for spreading and teaching this ideology is a traitor.

(Quelle: <http://www.trumanwebdesign.com/~catalina/commandments.htm>)

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Case against Georges Ruggiu – Quelle: ICTR, Arusha, Tanzania

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Ausbildung

2003 - 2009	Universität Wien – Politikwissenschaft (Magister Studium)
2002 - 2009	Universität Wien – Publizistik u. Kommunikationswissenschaften (BA)
1992 – 2000	AHS (“Maria Regina”), Wien: Abschluss AHS- Matura

Tätigkeiten

11/2008-	Promotion & Management für die Band „Tanz Baby!“
04/2008-	Organisation und Hosting des wöchentlichen Clubs “Club New Amsterdam” in der Roten Bar, Volkstheater
09/2007-	Ausbildung zum Make-Up Artist , seither verschiedene Projekte mit Fotografen
06/2007 -	Musikagentin bei der Booking Agentur “Miooow”
01/2007 – 06/2007:	Praktikum bei der „International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights“ , Wien – Aufgabenbereich: Recherche
11/2005 - 01/2007:	Volontariat in der Abteilung für „Public Education“ von Ärzte ohne Grenzen , Wien
08/2005-06/2006:	Volontariat in der Kommunikationsabteilung des Österreichischen Roten Kreuz , Generalsekretariat - Wien
2001-2005:	Organisation des jährlichen „SummerRise“ Benefizevent
2003-2004:	Promotion und Hosting für die Agentur PEP
September/Oktober 2002:	Promotion-Tour durch Österreich für die Firma OPEL
10/2002	Promotion & Hosting für diverse Events des Magazins GEWINN
2001/2002	Diverse Tätigkeiten für die Eventabteilung der NEWS Gruppe

Sommer/Herbst 2001	Hosting von Präsentationen zum Launch der neuen Zeitschrift WOMAN
2000	Im Verkauf bei MANGO
1998-1999	für das Meinungsforschungsinstitut INTEGRAL
Sommer 1997/1998	Ordinationshilfe für Dr. Christine Eisterer

Sprachkenntnisse

German	Muttersprache
English	Fließend; TOEFL (iBT) score: 112
French	Grundlagen

Computerkenntnisse

Kenntnisse der gängigen Softwareprogramme (Windows): Microsoft Word, Excel, Power Point, sowie das Lotus database programme und Grundkenntnisse folgender Programme: Adobe Writer, Adobe Premiere, Studio DV, Adobe Indesign and Adobe Photoshop.

Weitere Aktivitäten

Aug '06:	Teilnahme am "Vienna International Model United Nations" (VIMUN) als Vertreter für Uganda beim CCPCJ zu dem Thema "Trafficking Small Arms and Light Weapons"
Seit '06:	Mitglied der "United Nations Youth and Student Association of Austria- Academic Forum for Foreign Affairs" (UNYSA- AUSTRIA-AFA) und Amnesty International (Working group on Western Africa and China)
Feb. '06:	Rhetorik-Workshop (Basiskurs)
Sommer '01:	Reise nach Jamaika, organisiert vom Institut für Geschichte der Universität Wien
Frühling '01	Konversationskurs am Institut Francais, Vienna
März '99:	Sprachreise nach Frankreich (Paris/Cannes)
Feb. '99:	Teilnahme am 1. "Model of United Nations General Assembly" in Kooperation mit South Africa
Sommer '96:	Sprachreise nach England