

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER'S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

„Balkan Intellectuals and Plans for a Balkan Federation
in the 1860s and 1870s: American and Swiss models in
the political thought of Vladimir Jovanović and
Lyuben Karavelov“

verfasst von / submitted by

Vladislav Lilić

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master (MA)

Wien, 2016 / Vienna 2016

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme code as it appears on
the student record sheet:

A 067 805

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme as it appears on
the student record sheet:

Individuelles Masterstudium:
Global Studies – a European Perspective

Betreut von / Supervisor:

ao. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Thomas Fröschl



universität
wien

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit /Title of the master thesis

**Balkan Intellectuals and Plans for a
Balkan Federation in the 1860s and 1870s:
American and Swiss models in the political thought of
Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov**

Verfasser /Author
Vladislav Lilić

angestrebter akademischer Grad / acadamic degree aspired
Master (MA)

Wien, 2016

Studienkennzahl :

A 067 805

Studienrichtung:

Individuelles Masterstudium:
Global Studies – a European Perspective

Betreuer/Supervisor:

ao. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Thomas Fröschl

**“After all, it is in the deepest dungeons that the most
beautiful dreams of freedom are dreamt.”**

Friedrich von Schiller

“What men *do* must in part be what they can *say*.”

John Greville Agard Pocock

Abstract

This master thesis addresses a critical juncture in the intellectual history of the Balkans. By the mid-nineteenth century the first generation of native Balkan intellectuals returned to the region from their schooling in major European university centres and entered political arenas of their respective countries. They facilitated a process of transmission of modern Western institutional formats and political-cultural traditions into the Ottoman-ruled south-eastern Europe. By absorbing and re-describing the main intellectual currents of the time, they started to consider alternatives to the existing Balkan imperial order. The coming of political modernity into the Balkans, characterized by the adoption of constitutionalism and the principles of popular sovereignty and individual autonomy, dramatically widened the horizons of expectation among the circles of Balkan intellectuals.

In such a context, the Balkan *République des Lettres* nominated numerous political projects that were to complete the destruction of the obsolete imperial framework and erect a new Balkan social and political order. The protagonists of this thesis, the Serbian political writer Vladimir Jovanović (1833-1922) and the Bulgarian publicist Lyuben Karavelov (1834-1879), were the main proponents of one such revolutionary political vision – Balkan federalism. The main hypothesis of this thesis asserts that the plans of the two Balkan intellectuals from the 1860s and 1870s for the establishment of a post-imperial, multinational Balkan federation were not developed only out of pragmatism and immediate geopolitical reasoning but rather stemmed from the idealization of social and political systems of the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy. In this thesis I will strive to demonstrate how Jovanović and Karavelov conceptualized the American and Swiss historical experiences as the embodied *telos* of human progress. As far as they were concerned, what would transform static, pre-modern and un-free Balkan societies into “cultured” bastions of national independence, peace, social harmony, individual liberty, and human happiness was a transfer of modern federal forms of rule from what Jovanović and Karavelov understood as the two most liberal and progressive polities in the world - the American and Swiss federal republics.

Finally, I will argue that Jovanović and Karavelov’s faith that a transplantation of foreign institutional arrangements would enable the Balkan peoples to meet universal standards of Western civilization resulted directly from the coming of modernity. By so doing, I intend to stress the ideational foundations of mid-nineteenth-century Balkan federalism, in itself a dramatically overlooked historiographical theme, and establish a firmer link, largely absent from existing scholarships, between the Balkans as a peripheral European region and the general developments of nineteenth-century European (and extra-European) intellectual history.

Zusammenfassung

Diese Arbeit behandelt einen kritischen Zeitpunkt der intellektuellen Geschichte des Balkans. Bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts kehrte die erste Generation der am Balkan geborenen Intellektuellen von den wichtigsten europäischen Universitätsstädte wieder zurück in die Region, und wurden in den politischen Arenen ihrer jeweiligen Länder tätig. Sie ermöglichten den Prozess der Übertragung von modernen westlichen institutionellen Formaten in das vom Osmanischen Reich regierte süd-östlichen Europa. Indem sie die wichtigsten intellektuellen Strömungen dieser Zeit absorbierten und neu beschrieben, begannen sie Alternativen zu der existierenden imperialen Ordnung am Balkan zu erwägen. Die Ankunft der politischen Moderne auf dem Balkan, charakterisiert durch die Übernahme von Konstitutionalismus und die Prinzipien der Volkssouveränität und individuellen Autonomie, erweiterte den Erwartungshorizont in den intellektuellen Kreisen am Balkan auf dramatische Weise.

In diesem Kontext nannten die Balkan *République des Lettres* mehrere politische Projekte, um die Zerstörung des obsoleten imperialen Rahmens zu vervollständigen, und eine neue soziale und politische Ordnung am Balkan zu errichten. Die Protagonisten dieser Arbeit, der serbische politische Autor Vladimir Jovanović (1833-1922) und der bulgarische Publizist Lyuben Karavelov (1834-1879), waren die Hauptvertreter von einer solchen revolutionären politischen Vision – dem Balkan Föderalismus. Die Hauptthese dieser Arbeit geht davon aus, dass die Pläne der beiden Balkan Intellektuellen in den 1860er und 1870er Jahre zur Etablierung einer post-imperialen, multinationalen Balkanföderation nicht nur aus Pragmatismus und drängenden geopolitischen Überlegungen heraus entstanden, sondern eher aus der Idealisierung der sozialen und politischen Systemen der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und der Helvetischen Föderation. Ich werde versuchen mit dieser Arbeit zu demonstrieren, wie Jovanović und Karavelov die Amerikanische und Schweizer historische Erfahrung als *telos* des menschlichen Fortschritts konzeptualisierten. Ihrer Meinung nach würde die Übernahme von modernen föderalen Herrschaftsformen aus den zwei nach Jovanović und Karavelov am meisten liberalen und progressivsten Gemeinwesen, die Amerikanische und Schweizer Föderalrepubliken, die statische, vormoderne und unfreie Balkangesellschaften in „kultivierte“ Bastionen der nationalen Unabhängigkeit, Friede, soziale Harmonie, individuelle Freiheit und Glück transferieren.

Abschließen werde ich argumentieren, dass Jovanović und Karavelov Glaube an eine Transplantation von fremden institutionellen Arrangements als ein Weg für die Völker des Balkans zu universellen Standards der westlichen Zivilisation, direkt aus dem Einzug der Moderne resultierte. Auf diese Weise versuche ich die Grundlage der Ideenbildung des Balkanföderalismus in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, in sich selbst auf dramatische Weise von

der Historiographie übersehen, zu beschreiben und stelle eine stärkere Verbindung her, die weitgehend absent ist in der existierenden Fachliteratur, zwischen dem Balkan als eine periphere europäische Region und den generellen Entwicklungen der europäischen (und außer europäischen) intellektuellen Geschichte des 19. Jahrhundert.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	1
Chronologies.....	2
Introduction.....	4
Chapter One: Intellectual climate of the mid-nineteenth-century Balkans - Crumbling empires, looming nationalisms, and the quest for freedom	10
1. 1. Introduction.....	10
1. 2. From <i>reaya</i> to <i>nation</i> – Balkan national liberation movements in the first half of the nineteenth century.....	11
1. 3. Freedom-loving patriots of the mid-nineteenth century: the first generation of native liberal Balkan intellectuals	15
1. 4. Conclusion	21
Chapter Two: In pursuit of happiness - The meaning of federalism in political thought of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov	23
2. 1. Introduction.....	23
2. 2. “By dint of science”: Vladimir Jovanović and the sense of liberal patriotism.....	26
2. 3. The Herzen of the Balkans: Lyuben Karavelov and the purpose of liberty	38
2. 4. The fountainhead of federalism: Vladimir Jovanović, Lyuben Karavelov, and the Eastern question.....	50
2. 5. Conclusion	68
Chapter Three: At the gates of liberty and progress - The United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy as sources of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov’s federalism	70
3. 1. Introduction.....	70
3. 2. “Fifty confessions”, “three nations”, and out of many – one: Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov’s view of American and Swiss multi-nationality.....	72
3. 3. The hearthstones of social and human perfection: the American and Swiss republicanism in Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov’s ideas of a Balkan federation. 78	
a) Local self-governance	80
b) Separation of powers.....	83
c) Disregard of clericalism and aristocracy.....	85
d) Economic freedom.....	87

3. 4. To raise awareness of right and duty: the American and Swiss educational systems in Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov's federalism.....	89
3. 5. Conclusion	96
Conclusion	100
Bibliography.....	104
Annex.....	113

Acknowledgements

The completion of this thesis would have not been possible without the support of many. First and foremost, I extend a most honest gratitude to Saška, the best friend, companion, and a fellow dreamer I could ever hope for. Whenever I stand before one of life's many Fort Mulgraves, she urges me to charge. It is her faith that good must always prevail that drives my every endeavour forward.

I would then like to thank my mother and brother for their courage. They stand ever tall in the face of many a grave challenge. Their endurance is a constant reminder that no obstacle is insurmountable when one's heart is pure.

Furthermore, I thank this thesis' supervisor Professor Thomas Fröschl of University of Vienna's Institute for History. Had it not been for his incredible generosity, thoughtful guidance, and seemingly limitless intellectual encouragement, my research horizons would have certainly remained extremely restricted. He enabled me in pursuing my diverse scholarly interests and for that, and everything I have learned from him, I am ever grateful.

I also thank Professor Margarete Maria Grandner of University of Vienna's Department of Development Studies for commenting on a huge portion of my work. Her gracious insights vastly enriched my historiographical apparatus and helped me refine many sections of the thesis.

In addition, I express my utter gratitude to organizers and participants of two wonderful summer courses I attended while working on my thesis. I thank everyone from University of Helsinki's *Introduction to Conceptual History* summer school and the Florentine European University Institute's *Summer School on Comparative and Transnational History* for scrutinizing and debating parts of my thesis.

Last but not least, I thank two remarkable and kind young historians of Belgrade's Institute for Balkan Studies, Dušan Fundić and Veljko Stanić, for our many extraordinary intellectual exchanges. I would be thrilled to achieve but a fraction of their understanding of modern European history. They have been and shall remain an immense source of inspiration.

Finally, the fact that I could rely on so many brilliant minds to complete my work notwithstanding, the thesis is not without mistakes. All shortcomings and omissions are and must be seen as exclusively my own.

I dedicate this thesis to my maternal grandmother Vladislava, whose name I carry with endless pride, and to the loving memory of my late maternal grandfather Slobodan (Serbian Cyrillic: СЛОБОДАН, *one who is free*), who had stayed until the end of his days true to his name. They taught me to ask questions and to do so relentlessly.

Chronologies

Vladimir Jovanović

1833	Vladimir Jovanović was born an Ottoman subject in Šabac in the autonomous principality of Serbia
1848-1853	Jovanović moved to the Serbian capital Belgrade where he enrolled at the Lyceum and graduated in 1853 in philosophical and legal sciences
1854-1856	Having received a state-sponsored scholarship, Jovanović studied agronomy and political economy in Hungary and Württemberg
1858	Jovanović and his fellow liberals played a prominent role during St. Andrew's Day National Assembly which marked the emergence of liberalism as a coherent political programme in Serbia; the so-called Liberal Club, of which Jovanović was a member, called for constitutional reforms introducing the rule of law, individual, and political liberties
1860	As a persistent advocate of popular sovereignty and political liberties, Jovanović had been exiled from Serbia for the first time by Prince Miloš Obrenović; later during the same year he returned from London to Belgrade upon hearing of Prince Miloš's death
1862-1863	Jovanović again visited London where he tried to win over the British public for the cause of national liberation in the Balkans by publishing essays and newspaper articles; among others, he then met Gladstone, Cobden, Herzen, Bakunin, and Mazzini
1864	Jovanović was stripped of his duties as a professor of political economy at the Belgrade Grande École and exiled anew by Prince Mihailo Obrenović for propagating democratic ideas and calling for a firmer anti-Ottoman posture in Serbian foreign policy
1864-1866	Jovanović stayed in Geneva where he published a bilingual Serbian-French liberal newspaper <i>Sloboda/La Liberté</i>
1866-1872	Jovanović moved to Novi Sad in the Habsburg Monarchy where he co-founded the United Serbian Youth and published a plethora of newspaper articles, political commentaries, and essays
1868	Jovanović was falsely accused of complicity in the assassination of Prince Mihailo Obrenović in Belgrade, arrested in Novi Sad by the Hungarian authorities, and spent seven months in imprisonment in Varadin and Pest
1870-1873	Jovanović published the first five volumes of his political encyclopaedia - <i>Politični rečnik</i> (<i>Political Dictionary</i>); furthermore, he published <i>Les Serbes et la Mission de la Serbie dans l'Europe d'Orient</i> in 1870 in Brussels and <i>The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities</i> in 1871 in London and Geneva; in those three works he fully developed a vision of a future liberal Balkan federation based on American and Swiss models
1872	Jovanović returned to Belgrade, praising the Serbian 1869 Constitution as a crucial evolutionary step upholding at least some of the liberal principles that he had fought for
1876	Jovanović became the Finance Minister in a liberal Serbian government that would declare war against the Sublime Porte later during the same year; in 1877 Serbia waged another war against the Turks which ended in a decisive victory
1878	The Berlin Congress recognized Serbia as an independent state
1880s-1890s	Jovanović gradually retired from public life as his generation of liberal intellectuals lost political influence; in 1892 he was elected an honorary member of the Serbian Royal Academy
1922	Vladimir Jovanović died in Belgrade, four years after the First World War had resulted in the creation of a unified Yugoslav state

Lyuben Karavelov

1834	Lyuben Karavelov was born an Ottoman subject in the Bulgarian town of Koprivštica
1841-1852	Karavelov attended different Bulgarian and Greek schools, both secular and parochial, in his hometown and Plovdiv, the commercial hub of Ottoman-ruled Bulgaria
1853-1856	Respecting his father's wish, Karavelov resided in Edirne and Istanbul where he prepared for a career in commerce; however, in 1856, intrigued by the Crimean War, he developed a strong interest in politics
1857	Karavelov had decided to leave the Ottoman capital behind and move to Russia; in Odessa he was rejected as unfit for enrolment at a military academy
1857-1867	After having moved to Moscow, Karavelov audited classes in history and philology at the university and was immersed in the spirit of Russian populism; there, he adopted radical democratic ideas and cultivated notions of Slavic solidarity – the blend of the two resulted in his embrace of federalism as a political project of the future; during his ten years in Moscow, Karavelov established himself as a political writer, ethnographer, essayist, and novelist
1867	Karavelov came back to the Balkans as a correspondent of a Russian political magazine, resolved that he would set up a political journal of his own in Belgrade, a platform from which he could promulgate his political beliefs
1869-1874	After having been exiled from Serbia as a radical propagandist in 1867 and arrested in Novi Sad together with Jovanović in 1868, Karavelov settled in the Romanian capital Bucharest where he started to publish his life's work – the political and literary journal <i>Svoboda (Liberty)</i> ; as a publicist, he promoted and strongly advocated the idea of a future liberal Balkan federation replicating American and Swiss institutions and forms of rule
1875	Disappointed in the state of Bulgarian liberation struggle, Karavelov gave up political writing and started a purely educational magazine <i>Znanie (Knowledge)</i>
1876-1878	After hostilities against the Ottoman government had intensified in the Balkans, Karavelov returned to revolutionary struggle by organizing and aiding Bulgarian irregulars; in 1877 Russia declared war on the Turks and Russian imperial troops secured full Bulgarian autonomy; Bulgaria was formally recognized as an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire during the Berlin Congress in 1878
July 1877	Karavelov returned to Bulgaria for the first time in twenty years
1879	Lyuben Karavelov died from tuberculosis in the Bulgarian town of Ruse, just as he was preparing to restart <i>Znanie</i> and establish a new political journal, the first of its kind in liberated Bulgaria

Introduction

“What the historical record strongly suggests is that no one is above the battle, because the battle is all there is”, noted Quentin Skinner in 2002 in the introduction to his magisterial *Visions of Politics*.¹ His *battle* referred to the endless struggles of literary combatants, men and women of the pen, engaged in disputes about how human society should be arranged so as to secure the highest values of communal life - be those liberty, order, peace, justice, or glory. Political theoreticians and practitioners - orators, propagandists, pamphleteers, preachers, and prophets - have for millennia taken part in wars of words, waged to win recognition and legitimacy, to capture popular imagination and secure transformative social power. This thesis is embedded in such an understanding of the history of political thought; it presupposes that historical texts, no matter if political or not, should be studied as parts of contemporary debates, as moves and counter-moves in continual ideological conflicts within specific intellectual contexts. Finally, it acknowledges the fact that all battles must produce winners and losers; by side-lining the losers of past intellectual deliberations, one necessarily forgoes a broader sense of historical possibility - a fuller comprehension of a series of choices made at different times between different visions of social order that resulted in the values and institutional arrangements of today; a fuller comprehension of what *could have been*.² To seize the frail resonance of failed ideas from times past may not only inform current or future debates but also enable historians to step away from residues of old intellectual victories and to re-consider inherited commitments that many take for granted.

Accordingly, in this thesis I strive to illuminate a road not taken and, ultimately, to give voice to those on the losing side in a war of ideas. The protagonists of the thesis are two

¹ Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics, volume I: Regarding Method*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 7.

² Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”, *History and Theory* 8:1, 1969, pp. 3-53; James Tully (ed), *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics*, Cambridge and Oxford, 1988; Melvin Richter, “Reconstructing the History of Political Languages: Pocock, Skinner, and *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*”, *History and Theory* 29, 1990, pp. 38-70; Hartmut Lehmann and Melvin Richter (eds), *The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts: New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte*, Washington: German Historical Institute, Occasional Paper No. 15, 1996; Siep Stuurman, “The Canon of the History of Political Thought: Its Critique and a Proposed Alternative”, *History and Theory* 39:2, 2000, pp. 147-166; David Armitage, “The International Turn in Intellectual History”, in: Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds), *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 232-252; and Jan-Werner Müller, “On Conceptual History”, in: *ibidem*, pp. 74-93.

remarkable transmitters of modern Western political thought into the Ottoman Balkans,³ two liberal-nationalists and decisively cosmopolitan figures, the Serbian political writer Vladimir Jovanović (1833-1922) and the Bulgarian publicist Lyuben Karavelov (1834-1879). Their weapon of choice was federalism – the conviction expounded in the late 1860s and early 1870s that the principal act of regeneration of post-imperial Balkans was to be the creation of a federal state in which liberty would be guaranteed to all citizens as individuals and at the same time members of different nationalities. Such a future did not come to pass at the time when Jovanović and Karavelov anticipated it. Other choices were made and the idea of a Balkan federation, conceived in the nineteenth century, was unsuccessfully tried out in the twentieth, in historical circumstances far removed from those in which the two intellectuals lived. What is more, Balkan federalism seems utterly obsolete today and one of the aims of this research project will be to bring back to light a complex literary debate during which plans for the creation of a Balkan federation were made and analyse its relationship with the wider contemporary intellectual and social context. By doing so, I intend to highlight how political concepts, in this case that of federalism, are transmitted across contextual boundaries and mobilized to serve context-specific political aims.

This is why our story begins in one of the centres of Western modernity. Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-1859) frequented, throughout the summer months of 1851, the newly erected Crystal Palace of London's Hyde Park. There, at the venue of the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations, he admired the transforming power of the steam engine, the beauty, the completeness, the speed, and the precision of man-devised machinery. The great historian applauded the tokens of force of the human spirit; this Whig believed the Great Exhibition to be dazzling and exceedingly romantic, its success neatly corresponding with his own vision of history as a dramatic combat resulting in the ultimate triumph of good over evil. Macaulay could not but use the Crystal Palace exhibition to re-affirm his strong appreciation of the general advancement his country had made during the previous century and a half.⁴

As had Macaulay haunted the exhibition of 1851, so Vladimir Jovanović, a twenty-two-year-old student, marvelled at the 1855 Paris Exposition Universelle. Having successfully completed his summer semester at the Württemberg Royal Agricultural and Forestry Academy at

³ In this thesis the term Balkans refers to the territories in south-eastern Europe ruled over by the Ottomans at the beginning of the nineteenth century and their geographical extensions north of the Danube where co-nationals of the Balkan peoples resided as subjects of the Habsburgs.

⁴ Peter Gay, *Style in History*, London: Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1975, pp. 128-134.

Hohenheim, near Stuttgart, the young Serb arrived in Paris following a study journey through “the regions of Rhine and Belgium”.⁵ The international exhibition unveiled and imposed upon him “the differences that separated patriarchal, agricultural Serbia from the more advanced cultured states” of Western civilization.⁶ And yet, despite the abysmal divergence of historical condition from which the two men originated, what further linked Macaulay and Jovanović was a tremendous faith in the ability of humankind to escape its predicament and to change for the better, no matter the gravity of circumstance. Such anthropological optimism, fuelled by what Balkan observers from the mid-nineteenth century recognized as unstoppable human advancement occurring in the Western world, came to dominate the political languages of the emerging intellectual elites of the Balkans.

Therefore, visions of a future Balkan federation, put forward in the works of Jovanović and Karavelov in the 1860s and 1870s, were a powerful expression of that optimistic belief in inevitable progress. The two men, born in provincial Balkan towns as subjects of the Ottoman sultan, took on a re-description of their social worlds in search for viable alternatives. In so doing, they contrasted the reality of the Ottoman imperial order, where life, as far as they were concerned, remained ever poor, nasty, and brutish, with an image of a multinational federal Balkan state, independent and strong, which would secure for all of its citizens liberty and prosperity.

Such normatively re-described future had to be as distant as possible from the present in which the Balkan nations existed as mere imperial possessions. It had to be devised so as to represent an utter negation of the current state of backwardness and weakness. For Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov, only two polities stood at the other end of continuum of human progress and could serve as the ideal antithesis of Turkey-in-Europe – the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy.⁷ Having detected in these two Western republican federal states a full embodiment of free human life and a climax of social and political evolution of mankind, Jovanović and Karavelov developed their respective federalisms as the highest ideals of individual and social existence, as a panacea for what they considered to be the nineteenth-century Balkan quagmire.

⁵ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], edited by Vasilije Krestić, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1988, p. 67.

⁶ Ibidem

⁷ For the sake of coherence, and bearing in mind the fact that the two Balkan intellectuals did not acknowledge any differences between the governmental structures of the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy, the two polities shall henceforth be referred to as “federations”.

Hence, the main contribution of this thesis is to be found in an innovative reading of Balkan federalism of the 1860s and 1870s. Not only has this aspect of Balkan intellectual history been dramatically overlooked by historians,⁸ but even those outliers who acknowledge its importance have argued that the quest for Balkan federalism was at the time exclusively pragmatic.⁹ True enough, Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov did recognize the acute weaknesses of small Balkan nations in a monumental struggle against their imperial adversaries – the Ottomans *and* the Habsburgs. The Balkan federation that they sought was indeed to match the strength of the powerful enemies and to prevent possible conquering excursions of the Great Powers of Europe and their interference into purely Balkan affairs, which could have made the process of liberation from foreign rule even more difficult.

However, the main hypothesis that I set out to prove in this research project asserts that the plans of the two studied Balkan intellectuals from the 1860s and 1870s for the establishment of a post-imperial, multinational Balkan federation were not developed only out of pragmatism and immediate geopolitical reasoning but rather stemmed from the idealization of social and political systems of the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy. I wish to demonstrate exactly how Jovanović and Karavelov conceptualized the American and Swiss historical experiences as the *telos* of human progress and the ultimate end of all historical development, and why they urged the Balkan reading public to work as hard as possible toward that end. I will argue that Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov were convinced that the well-being of separate political communities depended neither on the specifics of their natural surrounding nor on divergent natures of their members, but rather on the application of proper sets of institutions. Accordingly, what would transform static, pre-modern and un-free Balkan societies into “cultured” bastions of national independence, individual liberty, and human happiness was the transplantation of modern forms of rule from what they understood as the two most progressive polities in the world - the American and Swiss federal republics.

Jovanović and Karavelov’s federalisms were integral responses to various questions that their contemporaries were faced with - how to achieve national liberation from foreign rule? How to secure peaceful coexistence of different Balkan nations after political independence has

⁸ The last extensive work that endeavoured to provide a historical synthesis of Balkan federalism as a political project was published seventy-two years ago. See: Leften S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times*, Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company, 1944, pp. 338 + x

⁹ Diana Mishkova, “Balkan Liberalisms: Historical Routes of a Modern Ideology”, in: Roumen Daskalov and Diana Mishkova (eds), *Entangled Histories of the Balkans. Volume Two: Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014, p. 151.

been obtained? How to arrange social and political life that would assure popular sovereignty, representative government, local autonomy, civil liberties, and security from external threats? They maintained that only a replication of the American and Swiss institutional patterns held the key to a peaceful advancement of the Balkan nations. In the following pages I will analyse just how the two political thinkers proposed that such replication should be done. By engaging in a discussion of transfers and translations of political ideas and concepts, of the intellectual relations between centres and peripheries, of the unexpected mental links between detached intellectual and geographical spaces, I will strive to deepen the general understanding of nineteenth-century Balkan federalism and stress its idealistic foundations, something that has yet to be done by scholars of modern intellectual history.

The material that I will utilize while endeavouring to argue in favour of the main hypothesis is structured around the original works of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov, mostly written in the period 1863-1875. I will analyse the former's essays, studies, and newspaper articles published in English, French, and Serbian, which are accessible either through a number of digital archives or in hard copy. When it comes to Karavelov's literary corpus, I will rely on two main sources - the serial publication of his collected works, including his correspondence, edited by Cveta Undzhieva in twelve volumes (1984-1992)¹⁰ and the digital archive of the St. Cyril and Methodius Bulgarian National Library. I dare claim with a fair amount of confidence that thus assembled research material has enabled me to examine every aspect of the two intellectuals' multi-layered written works that in any way referred to their visions of a Balkan federation stimulated by the American and Swiss models.

The first chapter of the thesis will serve as a backdrop for the analysis of Jovanović and Karavelov's federalisms and the great inspiration they drew from the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy. There I will first offer a brief overview of historical transformation of the Balkans in the first half of the nineteenth century. I intend to highlight the major factors of Ottoman decline and the events that led to the emergence of Balkan national liberation movements. Secondly, I will place the two political thinkers in a wider intellectual context of the mid-nineteenth-century Balkans. Jovanović and Karavelov belonged to the first generation of native Balkan intellectuals that transmitted modern notions of legitimacy and modern forms of rule into their respective societies. By analysing those self-styled Bulgarian,

¹⁰ Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya v dvanadeset toma* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works in twelve volumes], Sofia: Bălgarski pisatel, 1984-1992.

Greek, Romanian, and Serbian liberals, I will strive to familiarize the reader with the larger socio-political milieu from which the two protagonists of the thesis emerged.

In chapter two I will present concise portraits of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov, two political thinkers who shared the same intellectual circle but developed their systems of thought independently. This is to be followed by a thorough analysis of purpose and meaning of federalism in their written works. The main objective of the second chapter is to relate federalism as a political project that the two Balkan intellectuals developed during the 1860s and 1870s to other hubs of their political thought - the concepts and ideas of popular sovereignty, legitimate rule, liberty, progress, and social harmony.

Finally, the last and the most important analytical section of the master thesis, chapter three, pursues the two *Great Inspirations*; namely, the American and Swiss models and their conceptualization within Jovanović and Karavelov's plans for a Balkan federation. I will endeavour to identify the most significant sources of knowledge about the two Western federal republics that the Serbian and the Bulgarian thinker exploited. Ultimately, I will show how American and Swiss institutional arrangements were initially idealized and subsequently rhetorically mobilized to arouse Balkan popular imagination and provoke historical change.

Thus outlined, this master thesis need not be limited to a study of a neglected historiographical theme, what nineteenth-century Balkan federalism most certainly is. It is more than just a narrative of paradoxical blends of systems of thought, of assimilation and diffusion of concepts, ideas, and languages in the works of two remarkable historical actors. It can be all this - a story of coming to terms with modernity, of transmission and innovation, global centres and their peripheries, nationalism and imperialism, tradition and change, individual liberty and communal life, great hopes and failures, the old world and the new. It is a journey through the Scylla and Charybdis of the 1860s-1870s Balkan intellectual history, of a time when this geographical region was faced with a critical historical junction and its inhabitants brave enough to dream of a better world.

Chapter One: Intellectual climate of the mid-nineteenth-century Balkans

Crumbling empires, looming nationalisms, and the quest for freedom

1. 1. Introduction

Intelligentsia was virtually non-existent in early nineteenth-century Ottoman-ruled Serbia. In 1800 there were only two elementary and no secondary Christian schools in Pashalik of Belgrade, the Ottoman administrative territorial unit that encompassed much of what would later become the nineteenth-century autonomous, and eventually independent Serbia. Three generations later, around 1880, Serbia was an internationally recognized sovereign principality with its own Grande École, gymnasia, commercial, military, technical, and agricultural schools, and tens of thousands of literate citizens.¹¹

The first Bulgarian secondary school was established in 1835, just a decade or so after a fairly rudimentary network of modern secular elementary schools had started to spread over the parts of Turkey-in-Europe inhabited by Bulgarians. By 1878, however, Bulgaria did not only achieve full political autonomy, but also had more than 1500 institutions of elementary learning, a few specialized secondary schools and gymnasia, numerous reading rooms, and a public which called for the establishment of a national university.¹²

Such dramatic increase in literacy and learning was only a part of the all-encompassing radical transformation of the Balkans in the nineteenth century from a peripheral, almost forgotten province of the Ottoman Empire into a region of modern societies and nation-states eager to share in the fruits of Western civilization, for better or worse. This transformation had been initiated around the turn of the nineteenth century by the deepening crisis of the Ottoman state, the Napoleonic Wars which diffused the ideas of liberty, equality, and brotherhood across and beyond the European continent, and the rise of Balkan national liberation movements. However, it reached its climactic phase in the period following the Revolutions of 1848 with the

¹¹ Traian Stoianovich, "The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 1:3, 1959, pp. 248-249; and *Balkanska civilizacija* [A Study in Balkan civilization], Belgrade: Centar za geopolitiku, 1995, first published in English in 1967, p. 128.

¹² Konstantin Kosev, "Bugarski preporod" [The Bulgarian revival], in: Dimitar Popov et al, *Istorija Bugarske* [History of Bulgaria], Belgrade: Clio, 2008, pp. 182-184.

emergence of a native class of intellectuals who absorbed Western social and political models and transmitted them into the Balkans.

In this chapter I will provide a brief overview of general Balkan historical developments in the first half of the nineteenth century and subsequently focus my attention on the first generation of Balkan intellectuals who, having been educated in the major European centres of learning in the 1840s and the 1850s, disseminated the ideals of liberalism and democratic radicalism all across the Balkan Peninsula. By insisting on national independence and unification, social and cultural advancement, and a thorough modernization of domestic political institutions on the basis of popular sovereignty and individual liberty, these liberal propagandists, thinkers, writers, and politicians questioned the monarchic absolutism of external imperial domination and the rigid, centralist-traditionalist oligarchy that had controlled the Balkan political scenery since the early phases of the prolonged attenuation of Ottoman dominance.¹³

Usually of rural or small-town backgrounds, Balkan liberal intellectuals of the mid-nineteenth century were well-read in contemporary political literature and educated, among other places, in Paris, Vienna, Geneva, Berlin, Heidelberg, Kiev, and Moscow. They constituted an intellectual social context in which the works of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov, the main subjects of this thesis, must be understood. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is first and foremost to familiarize the reader with the broader socio-political milieu from which the two studied Balkan intellectuals emerged. Furthermore, the following pages are also to help embed Jovanović and Karavelov's systems of political thought and visions of a future Balkan federation modelled on the American and Swiss historical experiences and expounded in the late 1860s and early 1870s in a broader narrative of nineteenth-century Balkan modernization, a historical process strongly fuelled by the works of mid-century liberal Balkan intellectuals.

1. 2. From *reaya* to *nation* – Balkan national liberation movements in the first half of the nineteenth century

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire still ruled over vast territories spanning from Algeria in the west to Mesopotamia in the east. However, under the magnificent façade there lay a crumbling social, political, and economic structure. The effects of a centuries-long decline of the imperial order were clearly visible by 1800. Centralized administrative system

¹³ Diana Mishkova, "The Interesting Anomaly of Balkan Liberalism", in: Ivan Zoltan Denes, *Liberty and the Search for Identity. Liberal Nationalisms and the Legacy of Empires*, Budapest and New York: Central European University, 2006, pp. 400-404.

was in shatters, constantly challenged by regional military commanders or tribal groups. In effect, the Mamluks, and later Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769-1849), ruled Egypt; the Berbers of North Africa were *de facto* independent. Enormous territories in Arabia and Mesopotamia were controlled by local strongmen or religious movements whose members did not pay much attention to whatever happened in Istanbul. Moreover, the imperial military was more often than not in complete disarray, caused by the perpetual recalcitrance of the Janissary order. This made the Ottomans chronically unable to respond to external pressure of their rivals, chiefly major European powers. Finally, the peasantry all over the empire was increasingly brutally exploited by feudal landlords, warring parties, and outlaws of various kinds.¹⁴

Out of Ottoman Empire's twenty-six provinces, known as *elâyet*s or *pashaliks*, five were to be found in the Balkans, covering, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the landmass from the River Prut to the Dalmatian coast and from the Danube to the southernmost Greek islands. Despite the efforts of sultan Selim III (1789-1807) to reorganize the social and administrative structure of the empire, disorder prevailed. In the Ottoman Balkans it resulted in the period between 1800 and 1830 in a series of local rebellions that gradually grew into large-scale national revolutions directed against the imperial government.

These revolutions had sprung from social and economic struggles of the Balkan Christian peasantry against the Muslim landlords and regional governors who broke away from central political authority. However, they were also enhanced by the ideology of nationalism largely transplanted from Western Europe, another world region affected by dramatic social and economic revolutionary shifts. The ideas of the Enlightenment and the socio-political ideals of the French Revolution, transmitted by the small Balkan intellectual diaspora, channelled a transformation of the early Balkan nationalism, marked by peasants' religious and class confrontations with the Ottoman Turks and by their consciousness of a shared tradition of communal life, into a struggle for full political independence and national emancipation. Thus evolving Balkan nationalism adopted as its prime premise the conviction that the future of the Balkan peoples lay outside of the confines of the Ottoman imperial order.¹⁵

¹⁴ Leften S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, New York: NYU Press, 2000, first published in 1958, pp. 215-229.

¹⁵ Dimitrije Đorđević, *Ogledi iz novije balkanske istorije* [Essays in modern Balkan history], Belgrade: Srpska Književna Zadruga, 1989, pp. 24-26; and Miloš Ković, "Nacionalizam" [Nationalism], in: Miloš Ković (ed), *Srbi 1903-1914: Istorija ideja* [The Serbs 1903-1914: A history of ideas], Belgrade: Clio, 2015, pp. 204-212.

Balkan merchants who travelled north of the Danube, most of them either of Greek ethnic origin or thoroughly Hellenized,¹⁶ and the Serbian and Romanian subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy interested in the cultural life of their ancestral lands were rather receptive to modern conceptions of social and political change emanating from the West. These ideals in turn proved to have stood in a stark contrast to the gruesome reality of the Ottoman-controlled Balkans south of the Danube and powerful enough to spark the flame of revolution. By the 1840s not only did multi-faceted interactions between the Balkans and other parts of the European continent intensify, but there emerged a group of self-governing Balkan political entities in which the Ottoman sovereignty was either demolished or reduced to a mere fiction. These polities would eventually evolve into nation-states striving to consolidate their new regimes of rule by adopting the same sets of institutions only fairly recently developed in the Western world.¹⁷

The Serbian peasants and petty merchants of the Belgrade Pashalik were the first to mount a prolonged military campaign directed against the continued existence of Ottoman mastery. In two uprisings (1804-1813 and 1815), termed in 1829 by Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) “the Serbian Revolution”, they achieved limited but lasting autonomy, confirmed by sultan’s personal notes - *batti-i sharifs* of 1829, 1830, and 1833 - and the abolition of serfdom. Serbia, consisting of the former Belgrade Pashalik and six neighbouring *nahias*, smaller administrative Ottoman units, secured religious freedom, an administration headed by a prince, with the title being handed through the family of Miloš Obrenović (1780-1860), the right to maintain its own army, judiciary system, postal services, printing houses, and hospitals.¹⁸

Similarly, following the events of the turbulent 1820s and the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829, Greece became in 1830 the first post-Ottoman sovereign Balkan state. What is more, the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne), imposed by the Russian victors, abolished the Ottoman administrative control over Wallachia and Moldova, the two Danubian principalities that had taken up arms against the Ottomans in the early 1820s and that would form the unified

¹⁶ See: Traian Stoianovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant”, *The Journal of Economic History* 20:2, 1960, pp. 234-313.

¹⁷ Stevan Pavlović, *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945* [A History of the Balkans 1804-1945], Belgrade: Clio, 2001, first published in English in 1999, pp. 68-69; also Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920*, Seattle and London: Washington University Press, 1977, pp. 11-16; and Ljubinka Trgovčević, “The Enlightenment and the Beginnings of Modern Serbian Culture”, *Balkanica* XXXVII, 2006, pp. 103-111.

¹⁸ Sima Ćirković, *The Serbs*, Malden, Oxford, and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 191.

Romanian state in 1859, internationally recognized as sovereign in 1878.¹⁹ Thus, the Serbian Revolution of 1804-1815, the Greek War of Independence and the Wallachian Uprising, both of which broke out in 1821, all resulted from a breakdown of the Ottoman imperial order in the Balkans and in turn led to the establishment of self-rule in the affected region.

Apart from the Bulgarians, whose inability to achieve formally recognized autonomy was primarily caused by their geographical proximity to Istanbul and their corresponding detachment from the main routes of ideational exchanges in the first half of the nineteenth century, all other Christian nationalities of the Balkans succeeded in transferring political power from the Ottomans to local political classes.²⁰ However, nowhere during the first half of the century did this lead to the creation of a truly modern national, let alone liberal, state. The institutionalization of self-government, although absorbing traditional political elites and peasant populations into a proto-national culture and economy, did not challenge the monopoly of power of newly emerged Balkan princes and aristocratic (Danubian principalities) or bureaucratic (Serbia and Greece) oligarchies.²¹

Rivalry between monarchs - Prince Miloš of Serbia, King Otto of Greece, or Prince Alexandru II of Wallachia – and their oligarchies remained for long the sole possible form of political process in the newly established autonomous Balkan polities. What broke the deadlock of politics conducted in accordance with the formula *absolutism versus division of power between the prince and state bureaucracy* was the emergence of the first generation of native intellectuals – the Balkan liberals of the mid-nineteenth century. Their critique of royal absolutism was based on a vision of society in which personal freedom and legal security were guaranteed, in which sovereignty originated from the people and the government spoke on behalf and in the interest of all.

By the 1850s the Balkan liberals strongly questioned the existing political orders of their countries which, although having replaced the obsolete Ottoman framework of rule, could not promise a new social contract founded upon the ideals and values of Western liberal and radical

¹⁹ Stevan Pavlović, *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945* [A History of the Balkans 1804-1945], pp. 54-62.

²⁰ It is interesting to note that the Orthodox Christians of the mountainous Adriatic region Montenegro never fully succumbed to Ottoman rule. Despite important local variations, during much of the nineteenth century they shared a consciousness of belonging to the Serbian national corpus and established an independent, internationally recognized state in 1878. The Albanians, on the other hand, remained divided by faith and largely loyal to the Sublime Porte. In: Leften S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 222.

²¹ Diana Mishkova, "Balkan Liberalisms: Historical Routes of a Modern Ideology", p. 106.

democratic thought - popular sovereignty, personal and political liberty, the rule of law, and national independence. Their political struggles against domestic absolutism and foreign dependence would drastically alter the Balkan intellectual and political scenery of the mid-nineteenth century.

1. 3. Freedom-loving patriots of the mid-nineteenth century: the first generation of native liberal Balkan intellectuals

The Spring of Nations of 1848 found the educated urban youth of the Balkans ecstatically imbued with the spirit of liberalism. With the exception of Wallachia and Moldova, the 1848 revolutions did not spill over into the Balkan interior, but European liberal ideas and movements triggered the emergence of the first concepts of modern rule and the first modern institutions in the region.²² By mid-century independent Greece and autonomous Danubian principalities and Serbia were still far away from developing strong middle classes that had been the bulwark of liberal nationalisms in Europe. Nonetheless, a handful of Balkan men who had received higher education abroad returned home to polities ruled by a monarch and a narrow circle of conservative politicians. Some of them, inspired by the political and economic transformations of the places in Western Europe they had had the chance of visiting, did not believe that their countries' future lay in preserving the institutional arrangements cultivated after the Ottomans' demise in the first half of the century.²³ Instead, the liberals were convinced that their respective countries could prosper only if they introduced liberal socio-economic and political institutions of the flourishing West.

The so-called Organic Statutes regulated the political life of the Danubian principalities in the period between 1831 and 1858. In reality a Russian protectorate, the Romanian lands did not see the system of privilege abolished nor equality before the law introduced by the royal heads and assemblies of nobles. These facts served as catalysts of political radicalism of Western-educated idealists coming from the ranks of lesser gentry and boyar sons. Educated in Paris during the 1840s and animated by the events of 1848, the likes of Nicolae Bălcescu (1819-1852) Alexandru C. Golescu (1819-1881), the brothers Dumitru (1818-1892) and Ion Brătianu (1821-

²² Ibidem, p. 99; Stevan Pavlović, *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945* [A History of the Balkans 1804-1945], p. 76; and Traian Stoianovich, "The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880", pp. 251-252.

²³ Gale Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1975, p. xiii

1891), Alexandru Ioan Cuza (1820-1873), and Mihail Kogălniceanu (1817-1891) set the agenda of the first national-romantic generation of Romanian liberals. Their political message, mostly fed on the French revolutionary legacy, consisted of two central themes - democracy and nationalism.²⁴

In the summer of 1848 these young intellectuals helped the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government in Bucharest and declared a radical programme of reforms. As other Balkan liberals of the time, they presented a new concept of the nation, one that signified the people as a whole, and demanded the unification of all Romanian lands, those under Habsburg rule included, the abolition of feudal privileges of the boyars, land reform, popular representation, ministerial responsibility, independence of the judiciary, emancipation of minorities, freedom of the press and association, secularization of monastic estates, and free general education.²⁵

Although the revolution was eventually defeated and many liberal Romanian intellectuals had to flee the country and continue their activities as émigrés, the 1848 revolution offered the first programme for the creation of modern Romania. Its idealistic demands for liberal domestic reforms and national unification had survived the post-1848 reaction and by the 1860s again came to dominate the political landscape of the country. What is more, this first generation of native intellectuals presided over the inauguration the first modern Romanian constitution in 1866 and the formal recognition of the country's independence in 1878.²⁶

As already mentioned, the practical effects of 1848 were meagre south of the Danube. However, it was precisely the late 1840s and early 1850s that marked the appearance of the first generation of learned Serbs born in Serbia and educated abroad on state bursaries. The training of native intellectual elite was to liberate Serbia from its dependence on a class of educated bureaucrats and teachers imported from the ranks of Hungarian Serbs; moreover, it was also to free Serbia from the excessive intellectual tutelage of Austria.²⁷ However, and in a manner similar to the first Romanian liberals, these young intellectuals aspired to break the traditional rivalry between the monarch and oligarchy by conceptualizing a radically new political force – the sovereign people.

²⁴ Diana Mishkova, "Balkan Liberalisms: Historical Routes of a Modern Ideology", p. 114.

²⁵ Ibidem, pp. 115-116.

²⁶ Stevan Pavlović, *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945* [A History of the Balkans 1804-1945], pp. 78 and 129-140.

²⁷ Traian Stoianovich, "The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880", p. 250.

The ideas of liberalism were promoted by an intellectual circle whose leaders were Jevrem Grujić (1826-1895), Milovan Janković (1828-1899), Stojan Bošković (1833-1908), and Vladimir Jovanović. The liberal principles transmitted from Western Europe prompted in Serbia a struggle against autocratic rule. The liberals accused the old regime controlled by the prince and bureaucratic oligarchy of inability to provide either personal and political liberty or external freedom and complete national liberation.²⁸ Equally opposed to the reign of Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević (1842-1858), who was himself dominated by an oligarchic Council, and the restored Obrenović regime of Prince Miloš (1858-1860) and Mihailo (1860-1868), the liberals nominated in the late 1850s a radical democratic programme, grounded in the principle of popular sovereignty, and advocated constitutionality.

They favoured representative government, responsible to a national *demos* – an aggregate of autonomous individuals with the right of personal and collective self-fulfilment.²⁹ As had Bălcescu and Kogălniceanu done in Wallachia and Moldova in 1848, the Serbian liberal intellectuals also called for the completion of the national liberation struggle and the attainment of internal political liberty – local self-rule and democracy.³⁰ However, to legitimize their own inclusion in the political arena and to mobilize the inert peasantry whom they addressed, the liberals had to prove that their ideals constituted a true expression of the Serbian national spirit. That is why they strived to graft the Western social and political principles onto allegedly intrinsically democratic Serbian social institutions, such as local assemblies and patriarchal forms of communal village life. Such indigenization of the essential attributes of modern civilization, above all Western values and institutions, would be repeated by the first generation of Bulgarian liberal thinkers and politicians a decade or so later.³¹

Although persecuted throughout the 1860s by the conservative, autocratic regime of Mihailo Obrenović, the first generation of native Serbian intellectuals succeeded in legitimizing their project, and by the mid-1870s occupied the heights of the country's political authority. Not

²⁸ Sima Ćirković, *The Serbs*, p. 207.

²⁹ Miloš Ković, "Liberalizam" [Liberalism], in: Miloš Ković (ed), *Srbi 1903-1914: Istorija ideja* [The Serbs 1903-1914: A history of ideas], p. 163.

³⁰ Ibidem, p. 165.

³¹ To a certain extent, this differentiated the Bulgarian and Serbian intellectuals from their Romanian counterparts who could fight for the support of a limited, but viable commercial class. In: Diana Mishkova, "Liberalism and Tradition in the Nineteenth-Century Balkans: Towards History and Methodology of Political Transfer", *East European Politics, Societies, and Cultures* 26:4, 2012, pp. 681-683.

only had the Serbian liberals supported the Constitution of 1869,³² which limited the prerogatives of the monarch, but eventually led the government that would preside over the international recognition of Serbia's independence in 1878. Thus, in legitimizing their right to participate in politics, the liberals created a liberal-national ideology that could legitimize the coming into existence of the modern Serbian state as a whole.³³



Image 1. 1. A historical map of Turkey-in-Europe in 1850, showing autonomous Montenegro, Serbia, Wallachia and the southern part of Moldova (grey), and independent Greece (orange).³⁴

³² On the interplay between liberalism and nationalism in the 1869 Serbian Constitution, see: Ian D. Armour, "Killing Nationalism with Liberalism? Austria-Hungary and the Serbian Constitution of 1869", *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 21:3, 2010, pp. 343-367.

³³ Gale Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, p. xiv

³⁴ Source: William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913 via <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Balkans1840-1878.jpg>

Unlike the Romanians and the Serbs, the Greeks had a stronger tradition of literacy. Already in the second half of the eighteenth century there had emerged in Ottoman-ruled Greece a class of lay intellectuals that included many *phanariots* - members of the influential Greek “administrative nobility” absorbed by the Ottoman imperial system - and middle class merchants, usually schooled at Western universities.³⁵ Men like Adamantios Korais (1748-1833), who studied medicine in Montpellier and witnessed the outbreak of the French Revolution, laid the foundations of the Greek Enlightenment and opened their compatriots’ minds to the Western liberal ideas.³⁶

During the first two decades of the nineteenth century, these *phanariots*, merchants, and scribes, strongly inspired by the Italian Carbonari, established a wide network of secret revolutionary societies (*betairia*) which initiated the Greek War of Independence in 1821. The outcome of the national liberation war was indeed a sovereign Greek state, but one under the patronage of three great European powers - England, France, and Russia – and ruled by the absolutist King Otto (1815-1862), a Bavarian prince who received the Greek crown in 1832. Thus, by the 1840s the political situation in Greece started to resemble that of Romania and Serbia. The project of national liberation was not completed, as many Greeks in “unliberated” territories remained subjects of the Ottoman sultan; internally, the king behaved as an absolute monarch and relied on Bavarian regents and officials.³⁷

Even though a rebellion against the king resulted in 1844 in the introduction of a constitution, written to resemble the Belgian role model from 1831, a new generation of liberal political leaders, product not only of foreign schooling but also of the University of Athens (established in 1837), demanded radical democratic reforms. Their efforts led to the dethronement of King Otto in 1862 and the introduction of a new constitution in 1864. It severely limited the royal prerogatives of the new king George I (born as Prince William of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg), introduced universal manhood suffrage, and provided for a unicameral parliament.³⁸

Finally, the first generation of Bulgarian intellectuals also ascended around mid-century. The Bulgarian national revival occurred entirely within the Ottoman context and lacked a

³⁵ Traian Stoianovich, *Balkanska civilizacija* [A Study in Balkan civilization], pp. 132-133.

³⁶ Ibidem, p. 133.

³⁷ Stevan Pavlović, *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945* [A History of the Balkans 1804-1945], pp. 90-91.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 93; and Leften S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 295.

political entity across the border to guide its early visions of national liberation, something that Serbia and Romania had in the communities of their co-nationals living in the Habsburg realm.³⁹ In such circumstances, a deep schism surfaced among well-educated Bulgarians, many of whom either attended domestic Greek schools or Russian universities where they exposed themselves to the reinterpretations of the works of the French *philosophes*, the English constitutional historians, the German philosophers, and various utopian socialist by the Russian populist thinkers Pisarev, Chernyshevsky, Herzen, Bakunin, Nechaev, or Lavrov.⁴⁰

The reformists, well-to-do merchants based in Istanbul and benefiting from the Ottoman Empire's involvement in international trade, supported the idea of Bulgarian-Turkish dualism and adopted an evolutionary view of politics.⁴¹ The lower-middle-class émigrés, residing in great numbers in different Romanian cities, were linked to a more radical understanding of political change. They sought to erect an independent Bulgarian state embedded in a blend of Western liberal traditions and Russian radical social thought.⁴² Petko Slaveykov (1827-1895) and Lyuben Karavelov were the most prominent exponents of the militant revolutionary camp which prevailed by the mid-1870s. They detested the remnants of the Ottoman feudal system, the local Bulgarian authorities cooperating with the imperial government, and the Greek clergymen of the Constantinople Patriarchate who controlled the spiritual life of Bulgarian-speaking Orthodox Christians until 1870 and the declaration of the Bulgarian Exarchate. Furthermore, they shared the conviction of other Balkan liberals - Greek, Romanian, and Serbian - that the national liberation is the fundamental prerequisite for internal freedom and social advancement.

In 1878, as a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, Bulgaria was granted full autonomy and started developing domestic social and political institutions. The country's first constitution enforced in 1879 illustrates the strength of Bulgarian liberalism; the Tarnovo Constitution contained a number of radical-liberal provisions – universal manhood suffrage, a

³⁹ Diana Mishkova, "Balkan Liberalisms: Historical Routes of a Modern Ideology", p. 127.

⁴⁰ Diana Mishkova, "Liberalism and Tradition in the Nineteenth-Century Balkans: Towards History and Methodology of Political Transfer", p. 678.

⁴¹ Traian Stoianovich, *Balkanska civilizacija* [A Study in Balkan civilization], p. 134.

⁴² Diana Mishkova, "Balkan Liberalisms: Historical Routes of a Modern Ideology", p. 127.

single parliamentary chamber, prohibition of all titles and slavery, extensive political liberties – and provided the institutional matrix for the exercise of modern government and citizenship.⁴³

Hence, in Bulgaria, as in other Balkan countries, the first generation of native intellectuals, the mid-nineteenth-century self-styled liberals, translated, adapted, and re-imagined the Western forms of rule and institutionalized a new pattern of social being – *the Balkan modernity*. Its development was all but monolithic and fluid, its outcomes often unexpected. But had it not been for those freedom-loving patriots, there would not have emerged a group of Balkan self-governing polities taking on the remarkably difficult task of organizing their societies in accordance with the principles of liberty, equality, and brotherhood.

1. 4. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to succinctly examine the factors of Ottoman decline in the Balkans and the ensuing emergence of national liberation movements in Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Serbia during the first half of the nineteenth century. It has been shown how the collapsing imperial order of Turkey-in-Europe was gradually replaced by self-governing Balkan political entities claiming the right to liberate and unify the entire *nations* of which they were socio-political embodiments. The new political elites, whose outlook was traditionalist, conservative, and to a large extent autocratic, held that the future of their newly created autonomous and independent states lay outside of the confines of imperial subjugation and endeavoured to secure independent political lives for post-Ottoman Balkan societies.

However, around mid-century a generation of young liberal Balkan intellectuals, born after the autonomies of their polities had been attained and educated abroad, came forth to challenge the existing political and social dynamics. The first liberals of the Balkans constituted a trans-regional *République des Lettres* and acted as powerful transmitters of ideas. They absorbed the visions of radical democracy and the ideology of liberal nationalism during their stays in Western Europe and/or Russia. Having re-conceptualized the Western notions of popular sovereignty, legitimate rule, political representation, and individual and national rights, the Balkan liberals of the mid-nineteenth century sought to apply modern institutions of rule and communal life to their particular national contexts. Thus envisioned Balkan modernity was to be an outgrowth of

⁴³ Diana Mishkova, “Liberalism and Tradition in the Nineteenth-Century Balkans: Towards History and Methodology of Political Transfer”, p. 684.

liberalism, a result of shrouding the existing cultural patterns in modern socio-economic and political models.

By the 1860s the first generation of Balkan liberals was in open confrontation with the traditionalist political elites of their respective countries. The liberals were deeply engaged in an effort to legitimize their political values, and motivate the expanding Balkan political publics to accept, enforce, and sustain modern institutional forms - sovereign nation-states, written constitutions, popular representation, broad sets of personal and political liberties, systems of public education, and national commercial and industrial policies. And yet, during the 1860s, just as liberalism was taking hold over the Balkan political processes and further enhancing the extended anti-imperial national liberation struggles of the Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, and Romanians, a new political idea strongly occupied the minds of many an intellectual in the south-eastern European peninsula - federalism.

As an increasing number of Balkan political thinkers started to expound plans for the establishment of a multinational federal state that would replace the remnants of Turkey-in-Europe, enable collective empowerment and national liberation of Balkan peoples, and secure personal liberty of all of its citizens, their understandings of liberalism, nationalism, and federalism started to interact in remarkable, unexpected ways. In the remaining two chapters of the thesis I will scrutinize the works of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov, two prominent advocates of a Balkan federation in the 1860s and 1870s, and discuss the meaning and sources of their federalisms. There I will argue that federalism of these two liberal intellectuals must be understood as the culmination of their systems of political thought.

In the chapter that follows, I will firstly offer brief intellectual portraits of Jovanović and Karavelov and then turn to an analysis of the place and purpose of federalism in their works from the late 1860s and early 1870s. This will serve as a backdrop for the in-depth discussion of American and Swiss federalisms as sources of inspiration for the two Balkan political writers' visions of a post-Ottoman liberal Balkan federation.

Chapter Two: In pursuit of happiness

The meaning of federalism in political thought of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov

2. 1. Introduction

On 17/29 January 1869⁴⁴ the Novi Sad-based liberal organ of trans-riparian Serbs, *Zastava* (*The Banner*), let its readers know that “the telegraph has already widely disseminated jubilant word from Pest of Vladimir [Jovanović] and [Lyuben] Karavelov’s saying their final farewell to the wretched dungeon..., to that misery which had so undeservedly fallen upon them.” Having been released by the Hungarian authorities after 203 days of imprisonment in the Varadin Fortress (Peterwardein) and in Pest, the two were hosted for five days by the Serbian youth of the Dual Monarchy’s eastern capital. A cheer of elation could there be heard: “Long live national martyrs Vladimir and Karavelov. The torrent of corrupt souls could not eclipse the brightest stars on the Slavic sky. Long live liberty and her champions!”⁴⁵

In his memoirs, written in the period after the end of the Great War in 1918 and before his passing in March 1922, Vladimir Jovanović described the events of 1868/69 as follows:

“The Belgrade government, which used all means to fight the high-minded paladins of national thought, tried to exploit, in its well-known manner, the Topčider catastrophe [Jovanović’s reference to the assassination of the Serbian Prince Mihailo Obrenović in the spring of 1868] to discredit the liberal preachers of democratic ideas and national ideals, as if they would have had any moral complicity in the coming about of that tragedy.

Lyuben Karavelov, a Bulgarian writer and a patriot who at the time happened to be in Novi Sad, and I became the first victims of such a squalor. The Hungarian government gladly grasped the opportunity to use mine own and Karavelov’s friendly relations with the liberal patriots of

⁴⁴ All Eastern Orthodox countries of eastern and south-eastern Europe adopted the Gregorian calendar for civil purposes by the mid-1920. However, in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, Balkan polities had still adhered to the Julian calendar. That is why all dates hereafter will be offered both in Old Style (O.S; Julian) and the New (N.S; Gregorian). It is also important to note that in the period 1800-1900 the difference between the two calendars amounted to 12 days, meaning, for instance, that 29 January 1869 N.S. was 17 January 1869 O.S.

⁴⁵ *Zastava* (The Banner), IV, no. 8, 17/29. I 1869.

Vojvodina as a justification for stamping out the United Serbian Youth,⁴⁶ a movement that disturbed the expansion of Hungarian arbitrary rule over other nationalities by cultivating [Serbian] national consciousness ... Despite the fact that a fierce investigation had been conducted for seven months, no real evidence could be brought forward against us, so the Pest court had no choice but to rule to terminate our incarceration.”⁴⁷

In 1868, however, neither of the two Balkan “liberal preachers of democratic ideas” was a stranger to being placed under close scrutiny of the law. In May 1860, Jovanović, then twenty-seven years of age, had first been exiled from Serbia, for “immersing in secretive conversations“, which, as he reckoned, the authorities must have understood as having been directed against “the existing state of affairs“.⁴⁸ He returned to the Balkan principality in the autumn of 1860, only to be forcefully stripped of his duties as a professor of political economy at the Belgrade Grande École in 1864 and thereafter compelled to leave the country once more, this time “for publicly criticizing the abuses of power [of Prince Mihailo’s regime], and for preaching of liberty, of justice, and of the national idea“. He was not to return, find employment, and settle in Serbia before the autumn of 1872.⁴⁹

Karavelov, on the other hand, had been suspected of “reading forbidden manuscripts” and of “being in possession of the works of Alexander Herzen” and thus kept under police surveillance for six out of ten of his years spent in Moscow (1857-1867). He was subsequently exiled from Serbia twice, late in 1867 and then again in February of the following year. Later on, during his Bucharest years, he had first been forced to flee Romania in late 1872 under the threat of arrest and extradition to the Ottoman authorities, and then arrested in June 1875 and exiled

⁴⁶ United Serbian Youth (Serbian: Ujedinjena omladina srpska) was a political organization active in the period 1866-1871. Founded in Novi Sad in Habsburg Monarchy, it had a strong liberal-national and pan-Slavic orientation. It strongly advocated national liberation in the Balkans; its members insisted on the need to further spread public education; and, finally, it raised the question of women’s emancipation. The organ of the United Serbian Youth was *Mlada Srbadija* (*The Serbian Youth*), published in 1870-1872. Since its establishment in 1866, Vladimir Jovanović was a rather influential member of the organization. More will be said about the United Serbian Youth further in this chapter. On Jovanović’s engagement within the youth movement, see: Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], pp. 218-280.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 233.

⁴⁸ Ibidem, p. 105.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, pp. 186 and 281; Gale Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, pp. 63-66.

anew for aiding Bulgarian irregulars to cross the Danube and partake in the on-going uprising against the Turkish rule.⁵⁰

What could have possibly fuelled such continual personal struggles? What could have motivated such tenacity in vehemently clinging onto one's principles even in the face of a rather strong possibility of losing one's freedom or financial security? What could have driven these "high-minded paladins of national thought" to adamantly question the "current states of affairs" of the imperial Balkan order and call for liberty of men *and* nations? The following sections of this chapter are concerned with these questions. Here I will offer an analysis of the main features and sources of Jovanović and Karavelov's political thought and, subsequently, focus my attention on the general place of federalism in their works.

The purpose of so doing is to bring forward the dynamic links between these two authors' comprehension(s) of liberty, progress, justice, democracy, popular sovereignty, and nationalism, on the one side, and the idea of federalism which nourished their plans, hopes, and visions of a post-Ottoman, liberal and multinational Balkan federation, on the other. Before I turn in the last chapter of the thesis to the great inspiration Jovanović and Karavelov extracted from the American and Swiss federal republics, I intend to outline how federalism correlated with other hubs of their conceptual matrices and exactly what these two intellectuals strived to communicate to their respective publics by employing the concept of federalism or a Balkan federal state.

In the first section of the chapter I will offer a brief intellectual portrait of the Serbian political writer Vladimir Jovanović (1833-1922), which is largely to be based on his main works from the 1860s and 1870s. The life and works of Lyuben Karavelov (1834-1879), the Bulgarian publicist and revolutionary, will be concisely analysed in the second section, using his manifold published writings and correspondence. Finally, in the third section of the chapter, I will discuss the meaning of federalism in these two intellectuals' political thought and describe their 1860s and 1870s visions of a future liberal Balkan federation. The ultimate argument I wish to advance in this chapter is that Jovanović and Karavelov's federalism was conceptualized as the sole existing form of rule guaranteeing absolute national *and* individual liberty. By so arguing, I wish

⁵⁰ Mihail Dimitrov, *Ljuban Karavelov: Biografija* [Lyuben Karavelov: Biography], Sofia: Bŭlgarska akademiya na naukite, 1959, pp. 56-57; Mihail Arnaudov, *Ljuban Karavelov: Źivot, delo, epoha. 1834-1879* [Lyuben Karavelov: Life, works, epoch. 1834-1879], Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1972, pp. 252-253 and 394-395; Karavelov to Kraevski, 11/23 October 1867, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuban Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom dvanadeseti. Brošuri i pisma* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume twelve. Pamphlets and letters], Sofia: Bŭlgarski pisatel, 1992, p. 475; and Karavelov to Cankov, June 1875 – date unspecified, *ibidem*, p. 510.

to set the stage for the ensuing discussion of American and Swiss political models in the two Balkan intellectuals' works, which is to follow in chapter three, the main analytical part of the thesis.

2. 2. "By dint of science": Vladimir Jovanović and the sense of liberal patriotism

"History stands before us and teaches that force gradually gives way to the progress of experience and science, which are accumulated by human ability through countless generations."⁵¹ As so many other nineteenth-century thinkers who assumed that the realm of historical and social change could be dealt with by the same kind of powerful scientific weaponry that had unlocked the secrets of the natural world,⁵² Vladimir Jovanović too believed that lives of humans, once enlightened by positive science, can be manipulated into perfection, into full happiness. That belief remained the essential feature of his thought, of his *sociology*, during his rather turbulent and long life.

Born in September 1833 in the small Serbian town of Šabac, the son of a modest craftsman, Jovanović moved to Belgrade, the capital of the autonomous Ottoman principality, in the course of the eventful year of 1848. There he continued his schooling, eventually graduating in philosophical and legal sciences from the Lyceum in 1853. Looking back at his early years in Belgrade, Jovanović wrote that „1848 stirred up the nationalist and democratic thought in all of Europe. (...) The spirit of the time produced in Serbia a movement of ideas that, even if it proved unable to turn the domestic political situation for the better, still directed the public opinion into the consciousness of national solidarity of Serbia with other branches of Serbdom, and gave rise to the consciousness of Slavic solidarity...”⁵³

In the course of his studies at the Belgrade Lyceum, greatly encouraged by the teachings of young Serbian professors who had themselves been instructed abroad, mostly at German and French universities, Jovanović completely immersed himself in the life of the mind. Although his main interest lay in political economy, he was awarded a state-sponsored scholarship and sent in 1854 to the agricultural academy in Altenburg (Mosonmagyaróvár) in Hungary to take up the

⁵¹ Vladimir Jovanović, "Naš narodni položaj, naše narodno uzdanje" [Our national position, our national hope], in: *Za slobodu i narod: Pokušaji Vladimira Jovanovića, člana Ujedinjene omladine Srbske* [For liberty and nation: Efforts by Vladimir Jovanović, a member of the United Serbian Youth], Novi Sad: Platonova štamparija, 1868, p. 218.

⁵² Isaiah Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991, p. 239.

⁵³ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], p. 38.

study of agronomy.⁵⁴ He thus joined dozens of Serbian students educated abroad through a governmental scholarship programme which had originally been set up in 1839. They, 200 in number already by 1859, would soon come to form the first *native* generation of educated scholars, political thinkers, and activists that utterly transformed the Serbian political scenery.⁵⁵

However, in 1854 Jovanović was still only a student trying to come to terms with the world outside his home country and deeply dissatisfied with the instruction he was receiving at the Altenburg academy. Therefore, when the Serbian Ministry of Interior agreed to transfer him to the Württemberg Royal Agricultural and Forestry Academy at Hohenheim, near Stuttgart, Jovanović was able to continue learning about latest achievements in the fields of scientific agriculture, chemistry, technology, and political economy.⁵⁶ Before being ordered home in March 1856, the young Serb managed to enrich his educational stay abroad by undertaking two lengthy trips through Europe, during which he “observed economic and cultural institutions” of “the regions of Rhine and Belgium”, and then the Netherlands, Prussia, Saxony, Moravia, and Hungary.⁵⁷

In the course of his travels, Jovanović, accompanied by Ludwig Rau, his favourite professor and the son of the renowned German economist Karl Rau,⁵⁸ visited Paris just when the 1855 Exposition Universelle presented the wonders of modern technology at the Champs-Élysées in an attempt to surpass the grandeur of the 1851 Crystal Palace’s fair. It generated nothing but awe in the Serbian visitor. Recalling his first encounter with the French capital, Jovanović wrote down much later:

“Paris, with its World Fair, caused only admiration in my soul. (...) I held it in the highest of regards as the great hearthstone of civilization, and the capital city of the cultured world. (...) At the World Fair, as well as in Paris itself, I was offered an opportunity to get acquainted with the improvements of the cultured world by comparing the exhibited products of various nations, particularly in industry and other branches of economic life. There, a thought of differences separating the patriarchal, agricultural Serbia from the more advanced cultured states naturally

⁵⁴ Gale Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, pp. 10-12.

⁵⁵ Traian Stoianovich, “The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880”, p. 250.

⁵⁶ Gale Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, p. 12.

⁵⁷ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], pp. 67-68.

⁵⁸ Gale Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, p. 36; Branko Bešlin, *Evropski uticaji na srpski liberalizam u XIX veku* [The European influences upon Serbian liberalism in the nineteenth century], Sremski Karlovci and Novi Sad: Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, 2005, pp. 304-305.

imposed itself upon me. And yet, I was consoled by a conviction that Serbia too, although having culturally fallen behind progressive Europe in the face of the oppressive Turkish yoke, shall assume with the liberation and unification of the Serbian nation its place in the advanced cultured world.”⁵⁹

By Jovanović’s own admission, Serbia, a tiny, autonomous Balkan principality under the Ottoman sultan’s suzerainty, a polity of no more than one million Orthodox Christian peasants, could by no means match the spectacles of modern industry and science exhibited in London or Paris in the mid-1850s. And yet, there is more than a slight dose of optimism in the young Serbian student’s account of the Exposition Universelle. Not even when directly faced with divergences of the two worlds does he lose faith that, once liberated from foreign rule, the Serbian people too would ride the tides of history.

Jovanović held that “after having returned to the fatherland, it was only natural that the young Serbs who had been sent to foreign universities and academies would feel called upon to take up official positions in which they could further develop their capabilities and energies in the service of the common good.”⁶⁰ However, their return to Serbia and the openly displayed determination to actively partake in and shape the political life of the Principality in accordance with Western models was not enthusiastically met by the traditionalist oligarchy that ruled Serbia with a firm hand.

The young intellectuals, gathered around the likes of somewhat older Belgrade professors such as Dimitrije Matić,⁶¹ formed the so-called Liberal Club and strived to challenge the authority of Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević, who had ruled Serbia since 1842, and of his oligarchic State Council. Not too numerous but quite well-organized, the liberals believed in both of the basic aspects of the liberal thought in nineteenth-century Europe – the autonomy of the individual and representative government.⁶² Vladimir Jovanović, already publishing newspaper articles on the state of the national economy and Serbia’s foreign relations, occupied a prominent role in these early liberal attempts to transfer sovereignty from the monarch to the people. Jovanović’s son Slobodan (1869-1958), who in due course would become a prominent historian of the Serbian nineteenth century, wrote that the liberals, his father Vladimir included,

⁵⁹ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], p. 67.

⁶⁰ Ibidem, p. 73.

⁶¹ Dimitrije Matić (1821-1884) was Jovanović’s maternal cousin. A jurist, translator, educational reformer, political writer, and politician, he was awarded a doctoral degree in philosophy from University of Leipzig in 1847.

⁶² Gale Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, p. 18.

draw their political ideas from the great repository of the French Revolution which “furnished them with the utter faith in the institution of National Assembly.”⁶³

The first major signs of generational hostility came about during the 1858 St. Andrew’s Day National Assembly which marked the entry of modern liberalism into the Serbian political arena. Apart from re-instating the Obrenović dynasty to the Serbian throne, the 1858 National Assembly saw the promulgation of the liberals’ political programme. That set of proposals would, in a decade or so, topple the erstwhile norms of legitimacy and transform the political order of the country, albeit not without stern ideological strife.⁶⁴ Jovanović and his fellow liberals, although defeated in the short-term by the authoritarian-monarchical and conservative reaction of the post-1858 Obrenović regime, insisted upon the fact that the Serbian *nation* itself, through the assembly elected by all males of the country, was entitled to absolute sovereignty. Rejecting royal absolutism, the liberals called for constitutional reforms and the rule of law, the freedom of the press, individual, religious, economic, and political liberties, and the full responsibility of the executive to the national assembly.⁶⁵

Within the mid-nineteenth-century Balkan historical context such novel and essentially *foreign* concepts, norms, and institutions were not easy to domesticate. In Serbia, both liberalism and nationalism served the same ultimate purpose as in Western Europe – to help sovereignty migrate from the vice-regents of God on earth – the monarchs – to the people and their representatives. However, the first Serbian liberals hoped that the economic and social transformations that had upheld the strengthening of liberal social patterns and institutions in the West would be the outgrowth of liberalism as a ready-made political programme. In other words, once the social and political forms embracing popular sovereignty and civil liberties have been in place, a socio-economic metamorphosis of a largely static mass of peasants into a modern civil society would follow. To mobilize the peasantry, the only potential source of political support in the absence of a viable domestic middle class, and to legitimize the

⁶³ Slobodan Jovanović, *Moji savremenici* [My contemporaries], Windsor: Avala, 1962, p. 17. It is interesting to note that Vladimir Jovanović’s son and daughter were the first Serbs ever to carry the names Slobodan (b. 1869) and Pravda (b. 1871), the former meaning “one who is free”, the latter “justice”. In: Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], pp. 269-270.

⁶⁴ Diana Mishkova, “The Interesting Anomaly of Balkan Liberalism”, p. 405.

⁶⁵ Vladimir Jovanović (transliterated as Yovanovitch), *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, Geneva and London: H. Georg and Trübner & Co, 1871, pp. 80-81.

importation of modern political forms, the liberals had to discursively indigenize the concepts of legitimate rule.⁶⁶

Ever since Gale Stokes (1933-2012), the dedicated scholar of nineteenth-century Balkan liberalism and the author of the most significant work on Vladimir Jovanović in a non-Balkan language, denoted him in 1975 as a truly unoriginal yet an erudite thinker-synthesiser, there seems to have emerged a consensus among historians who continue to re-affirm such assessment.⁶⁷ However, it *is* possible to identify in all of Jovanović's literary efforts one remarkably innovative aspect. In his incessant political and literary struggles of the 1860s and the early 1870s, Jovanović constantly communicated a vivid vision of Serbian national history to legitimize the endorsement of liberal institutional formats. Traversing Western and Central Europe, either in political exile (1860, 1864-1866)⁶⁸ or as a willing traveller and a keen observer of social and political life (1855, 1862-1863, 1870-1871),⁶⁹ and continually opposed to the traditional, conservative political class supporting the absolutist rule of the old Prince Miloš (1859-1860)⁷⁰ and then Prince Mihailo Obrenović (1860-1868), Jovanović contended that Serbia's capacity to adopt and exercise modern political patterns stemmed from the existence of its *ancient* representative and democratic institutions.

⁶⁶ Diana Mishkova, "Balkan Liberalisms: Historical Routes of a Modern Ideology", p. 129; and Gale Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, pp. xii-xiii

⁶⁷ Ibidem, p. 33; e.g. Dušan T. Bataković, "Vladimir Jovanović: Ideolog liberalizma u Srbiji" [Vladimir Jovanović: An ideologue of liberalism in Serbia], *Nova srpska politička misao* 2-3, 1998, pp. 235-247; Branko Bešlin, *Evropski uticaji na srpski liberalizam u XIX veku* [The European influences upon Serbian liberalism in the nineteenth century], pp. 301-316; Boris Milosavljević, "Liberal and Conservative Political Thought in Nineteenth-century Serbia: Vladimir Jovanović and Slobodan Jovanović", *Balkanica* XLI, 2010, pp. 131-153.

⁶⁸ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], pp. 184-218.

⁶⁹ Ibidem, pp. 112-179 and 256-268.

⁷⁰ Prince Miloš Obrenović (1780-1860), the leader of the Second Serbian Uprising in 1815 and founder of the Obrenović dynasty, ruled Serbia twice – from 1815 to 1839 and again in the period 1858-1860. Soon after his abdication in 1839, the Obrenovići were deposed and Aleksandar Karađorđević was elected Prince of Serbia (1842-1858). For details, see: Sima Ćirković, *The Serbs*, pp. 190-221; and Slobodan Jovanović, *Sabrana dela* [Collected Works], edited by Radovan Samardžić and Živorad Stojković, tom 3: "Ustavobranitelji i njihova vlada (1838-1858)/Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila (1858-1868)" [volume 3: "Defenders of the Constitution and their rule (1838-1858)/The second reign of Miloš and Mihailo (1858-1868)"], Belgrade: BIGZ, 1990, pp. 25-29 and 273-284.

Proving that “there are no universal models in society and economy”,⁷¹ and rhetorically manoeuvring around the direct transfer of alien political forms, Jovanović extracted the maturity of the Serbs for representative liberal democracy from their “olden democratic constitution... by which the people ruled themselves on the basis of legal equality.”⁷² The entire national history, reaching deep into the pre-Ottoman period of Serbian independence, was thus presented as a dramatic struggle between *country* and *court*, between popular self-rule and the monarchical principle, which is perfectly alien to the *real* historical ontogeny of the Serbs. Jovanović demonstrates time and again that:

“The democratic element has prevailed among the Serbs since the origin of their political life, but in the opposition to it the institution of nobility was introduced into the ancient Serbian Empire (1346-1371) simultaneously with the adoption of the monarchical system. We have seen, further, how the ancient nobility perished with the downfall of the Empire and the Serbs became all equal before a foreign master, [the Turks]. Now, the institution of nobility is never more to be re-established among the Serbs.”⁷³

It was intrinsic to the Serbian national spirit and its historical development, argued Jovanović, to uphold the belief that both men and nations have the right to a separate and independent existence. A Serb could not but fight to protect the equality of rights and duties of all citizens as men, to safeguard the principle of free association, which lives through Serbian traditional communal institutions, to defend the inviolability of property held freely by well-armed smallholders, and to demand the national assembly as the proper form of government – a government of the people by the people equally represented.⁷⁴ From such a view of Serbian history it follows that there had been a set of original democratic principles that guided the national political life; those principles are now said to have declined as the result of corruption –

⁷¹ Cited in: Branko Bešlin, *Evropski uticaji na srpski liberalizam u XIX veku* [The European influences upon Serbian liberalism in the nineteenth century], p. 330.

⁷² Vladimir Jovanović, *Osnovi snage i veličine Srbske* [The foundations of Serbian strength and greatness], in: *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), I, no. 1, 15/27. IV 1870.

⁷³ Vladimir Jovanović, *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, p. 107; identical arguments are offered in: Vladimir Jovanović, *Srbski narod i Istočno pitanje* [The Serbian nation and the Eastern question], Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1863, published in English earlier that same year in London; and Vladimir Jovanović (transliterated as Yovanovics), *Les Serbes et la Mission de la Serbie dans l'Europe d'Orient*, Bruxelles: Librairie Internationale, 1870.

⁷⁴ Vladimir Jovanović, *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, pp. 103-119.

foreign rule and domestic oppression – and must in turn be restored. Having this in mind, the adoption of the liberal programme would then not be a step away from national tradition but, quite to the contrary, the re-discovery of fundamental values of public life.

Such fundamentalism is strongly displayed in the works of writers as diverse as Bolingbroke, Burke, and Paine,⁷⁵ but also in the works of Alexander Herzen and the Russian populists, those “fighting men” of the 1860s.⁷⁶ In Jovanović’s thought the “Norman” or the “Tatar” yoke is replaced by the “Byzantine-monarchical” and the “Turkish-barbarian”. Naturally, this could have sprung from the reading of contemporary Whig historians – Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1861), Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-1859), and John William Draper (1811-1882), but was doubtless also strongly motivated by the need to respond to a grave dilemma of properly relating a new political programme to the “prevailing social morality.”⁷⁷ Such challenges seem to have been historically shared by many a society adapting to revolutionary shifts in dominant political languages.

Indeed, the very complexity of conceptual translations that the Balkan intellectuals were engaged with is fully revealed by an interesting episode from the mid-1860s. Jovanović, then in exile in Geneva where he edited the Serbian-French political journal *Sloboda/La Liberté*, was criticized in a private conversation by a certain Russian imperial official Mikhail Bezobrazov for “the weakening of the ancient warrior spirit of the Serbs by Western ideas.” In reply, Jovanović confirmed that “those ideas you speak of are not transplanted from the West into Serbia, but derived from the healthy Serbian patriotism that had moved the heroic Serbian muscles in all eras of history. The Serbian patriots’ concepts about fatherland are inseparable from those of liberty and justice. The Serbian national spirit had always been, still is, and shall remain one of liberty and justice.”⁷⁸

This adaption, an on-going re-negotiation of meaning of extra-contextual political concepts and a continual adjustment of foreign sources to the existing discursive and practical political networks, is the prevailing attribute of Jovanović’s political thought. He appears to us as a prisoner held on a boat which restlessly moves between two shores – the one of the energized,

⁷⁵ J. G. A. Pocock, *Political Thought and History – Essays on Theory and Method*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 174.

⁷⁶ Isaiah Berlin, *Russian Thinkers*, London: Penguin Books, 1994, pp. 210-237.

⁷⁷ Quentin Skinner, “Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action”, *Political Theory* 2:3, 1974, p. 292.

⁷⁸ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], pp. 212-214.

urban-industrial Western mass politics and representative democracy and the other of imperially submitted and traditionally static rural Balkans. What is more, he is perpetually caught in a double dialogue – when writing for foreign audiences in English or French, Jovanović looks at the pre-modern Balkan political institutions through the prism of the European masters of liberal thought; when, on the other hand, he addresses the domestic public, his point of departure is the national spirit, gloriously expressed through romanticized traditional political forms and simultaneously completely compatible with universal historical progress - with civilization.

It is, therefore, hardly surprising that his most significant work was a liberal encyclopaedia - *Politični rečnik* (*Political Dictionary*) - which Jovanović had been tirelessly compiling from the late 1860s until the very end of his life.⁷⁹ *Politični rečnik*, inspired by similar undertakings of Maurice Block in France (1863) and Karl von Rotteck and Carl Theodor Welcker in the German lands (1834-1848),⁸⁰ stood as the corpus of political doctrines of the Serbian liberals and the United Serbian Youth - a cultural and educational organization set up in 1866 in Novi Sad to replicate the activities of *La Giovine Italia*.⁸¹ In the words of Slobodan Jovanović, the “systematic exploration of liberal-democratic ideals” of *Politični rečnik* “was the lone attempt at linking the Serbian liberal movement with the theory of Western liberalism.”⁸²

There Jovanović integrated deism and spiritual rationalism à la Voltaire with the political ideals of the French Revolution. *Politični rečnik* was an amalgam of the scientific positivism and evolutionary understanding of society of Comte and Spencer, the classical liberal thought of Tocqueville, the economic doctrines of Frédéric Bastiat and the Manchester school, the French republicanism of 1848, and the progressive elements of the old Serbian patriarchal life,

⁷⁹ Vladimir Jovanović, *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary] – the entries under the first six letters of the Serbian alphabet (A, B, V, G, D, and Đ/Dj) were published in Novi Sad and Belgrade in five notebooks (amounting to one thousand pages) in 1870-1873. Letters I to F have never been printed and are deposited in the Historical Archives of Belgrade.

⁸⁰ Dušan T. Bataković, “Vladimir Jovanović: Ideolog liberalizma u Srbiji” [Vladimir Jovanović: An ideologue of liberalism in Serbia], p. 241; and Branko Bešlin, *Evropski uticaji na srpski liberalizam u XIX veku* [The European influences upon Serbian liberalism in the nineteenth century], p. 755.

⁸¹ Jovan Skerlić, *Omladina i njena književnost (1848-1871): Izučavanja o nacionalizmu i književnom romantizmu kod Srba* [The youth and their literature (1848-1871): Studies in nationalism and literary romanticism of the Serbs], Belgrade: Prosveta, 1966, first published in 1906, p. 228.

⁸² Slobodan Jovanović, *Moji savremenici* [My contemporaries], p. 50.

principally its institutions of local self-rule.⁸³ In this, mature period of his work, the early German influences of Karl Rau and Wilhelm Roscher⁸⁴ were overpowered by that of John Stuart Mill, the author who features rather prominently in *Politični rečnik* and other of Jovanović's works of the late 1860s and early 1870s.⁸⁵

For Jovanović, human history is an ever-lasting process of "increasing sociability".⁸⁶ Society is not based upon contract, as Rousseau would have it, but upon human nature itself.⁸⁷ In other words, men and women only express their true selves in a society; they are unable to lead *human* lives and successfully pursue their manifold interests outside of it. By constant advancement of its intellectual abilities, humankind "slowly, step by step, progresses from barbaric enmity toward... brotherly harmony and solidarity."⁸⁸ Humans are not born perfect, but are able to learn, to develop their conscience, will, and reason, and subdue their passions: "Elevation of reason is the law of human progress whose objectives are liberty, equality, and brotherhood, and whose instrument is science."⁸⁹ The utilitarian foundations of society, of

⁸³ Jovan Skerlić, *Omladina i njena književnost (1848-1871): Izučavanja o nacionalizmu i književnom romantizmu kod Srba* [The youth and their literature (1848-1871): Studies in nationalism and literary romanticism of the Serbs], p. 228.

⁸⁴ Gale Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, p. 35.

⁸⁵ Not only had Jovanović suggested the translation into Serbian of Mill's *On Liberty* to Petar Karađorđević, the very man who would in 1903 become the king of Serbia, but he himself translated *Considerations on Representative Government* in 1876. In: Branko Bešlin, *Evropski uticaji na srpski liberalizam u XIX veku* [The European influences upon Serbian liberalism in the nineteenth century], p. 757. Other important works by Jovanović from the period include: "Obština" [Commune], *Glasnik srpskog učenog društva* 34, 1872, pp. 87-150; and "Socijalizam ili društveno pitanje – od najstarijih dana pa do danas" [Socialism or the social question – from ancient times until today], *Glasnik srpskog učenog društva* 39, 1873, pp. 1-116.

⁸⁶ Vladimir Jovanović, *Osnovi snage i veličine Srbije* [The foundations of Serbian strength and greatness], in: *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), I, no. 1, 15/27. IV 1870.

⁸⁷ On Rousseau: Vladimir Jovanović, "Socijalizam ili društveno pitanje – od najstarijih dana pa do danas" [Socialism or the social question – from ancient times until today], pp. 32-34.

⁸⁸ Vladimir Jovanović, "Društvo" [Society], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook G, D, Đ [Dj], Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1873, p. 832.

⁸⁹ Vladimir Jovanović, "Savez sila" [The Alliance of Powers], in: *Za slobodu i narod: Pokušaji Vladimira Jovanovića, člana Ujedinjene omladine Srbije* [For liberty and nation: Efforts by Vladimir Jovanović, a member of the United Serbian Youth], p. 52. There is hardly a better illustration of how important the concept of *science* was to Jovanović's political thought than the fact that he used it no less than 14 times in a three-page "Predlog za odluke omladinske skupštine"

communal living, gradually reveal themselves as mankind progresses – “individuals are the end of society; and society is only the instrument of their perfection.”⁹⁰

What is more, a dose of Hegelian philosophy of history is also present in Jovanović's thought: “If once men had fought each other and the strong oppressed the weak, experience united the victims and thereafter both sides understood that men are not created to subjugate but to assist each other in universal prosperity (...) Wherever liberty rules, the human ability grows... and humankind progresses.”⁹¹ Liberty, so understood, is the freedom of thought, action, and one's own fulfilment. Under such circumstances, the political authority that governs human society is bound to be a result of the “will of all”. This is, however, not the *volonté générale* that ruthlessly disregards any given minority, but rather the outcome of free public deliberation via which today's minority may easily become tomorrow's “will of all”. As Jovanović put it:

“One might ask if society was not prone to error - of course it is. But public gatherings, public word, and free press provide enough evidence [for reasonable men to decide upon]. A lie cannot rule for long where each and every one is able to express their opinion.”⁹²

And that becomes possible only within the political order of a democratic republic, a point to be further discussed in the following sections.

However, universal suffrage would not be enough. In this sense, Jovanović is not just a democrat; in the words of his son, he was “more of a liberal”.⁹³ To be fully responsible and able to daily take part in the business of ruling themselves, citizens must be educated. “We ask ourselves”, Vladimir Jovanović wrote, “what that force, that invisible power that led the world into this current state, up to this peak of glory and greatness, might be. It is education!”⁹⁴ All evil

[Proposal for the decisions of the United Serbian Youth Assembly] (1867) – given in: Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], pp. 224-227.

⁹⁰ Vladimir Jovanović, “Društvo” [Society], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook G, D, Đ [Dj], p. 832.

⁹¹ Vladimir Jovanović, “Šta je sloboda” [What is freedom], in: *Za slobodu i narod: Pokušaji Vladimira Jovanovića, člana Ujedinjene omladine Srbije* [For liberty and nation: Efforts by Vladimir Jovanović, a member of the United Serbian Youth], pp. 3-4.

⁹² Vladimir Jovanović, *Osnovi snage i veličine Srbije* [The foundations of Serbian strength and greatness], in: *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), I, no. 1, 15/27. IV 1870; and “Većina i manjina” [Majority and Minority], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook V, Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1872, pp. 502-503.

⁹³ Slobodan Jovanović, *Moji savremenici* [My contemporaries], p. 46.

⁹⁴ Cited in: Branko Bešlin, *Evropski uticaji na srpski liberalizam u XIX veku* [The European influences upon Serbian liberalism in the nineteenth century], p. 325.

comes from ignorance; hence, education and science shall pave the road to liberty. Science, which in Jovanović's positivistic thinking could not be differentiated from political ideology, tolerated only those social, political, and economic institutions based upon the free will of all citizens; accordingly, the state could find its sole function in serving the wishes of free individuals. Such understanding of political authority led Jovanović to denounce "the new fighters – the socialists", who were more often than not, in his view, willing to sacrifice individual autonomy in the spheres of economy and politics to a mystical "social revolution" that could easily lead to a "barbarous demolition" of life and property.⁹⁵

Ultimately, an intriguing question remains wide open - how could this entirely universalistic liberalism of Vladimir Jovanović have been reconciled with his insistent Serbian nationalism? To provide an answer, one should recall that Jovanović considered communal life as based upon utilitarian foundations. People live in a society, for they could by no means realize their numerous interests and aspirations outside of it. Ergo, a *nation* must be perceived only as a form of sociability. This particular structure of living together, in contrast to family or municipality, is built upon links of blood, territory, language, and history, but also on a shared consciousness of belonging to a separate social body.⁹⁶

In addition, Jovanović identifies nations as socio-political media endowed with democratic institutions through which personal and political liberty, equality, and international peace can best be obtained at the current level of historical development. Strongly influenced by Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), to whom Jovanović was introduced through Nikolay Ogarev (1813-1877),⁹⁷ Alexander Herzen (1812-1870), and Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876) in London in 1862, he held that political liberty was to be secured against the remnants of absolutism and imperial rule through nationalism. In accordance with Jovanović's anthropological optimism, nations, liberated within and without, would in turn bring about universal progress toward "common human consciousness".⁹⁸ That is why Jovanović identified "alliances of nations and

⁹⁵ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], pp. 270-277; and "Socijalizam ili društveno pitanje – od najstarijih dana pa do danas" [Socialism or the social question – from ancient times until today], p. 115.

⁹⁶ Vladimir Jovanović, *Osnovi snage i veličine Srbije* [The foundations of Serbian strength and greatness], in: *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), I, no. 1, 15/27. IV 1870.

⁹⁷ Nikolay Platonovich Ogarev (1813-1877), a Russian historian and a poet, Herzen's close friend and collaborator. See more in: Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], pp. 108, 145, and 257.

⁹⁸ Slobodan Jovanović, *Moji savremenici* [My contemporaries], pp. 24-25.

states”⁹⁹ as the next stage through which humanity would pass with the further strengthening of sociability and liberty:

“The ties of blood that attract related tribes into a nation, and nations into a race are strong indeed, but stronger yet are the ties of thought and conviction, mind and conscience, mutual needs and interests – the ties that bring closer together and unite all members of our species as sons of the universal fatherland: liberty. (...) The difference of nationality and race steps aside in the face of equality of freedom.”¹⁰⁰



Image 2. 1. Vladimir Jovanović (a photograph taken in Belgrade in the mid-1880s)¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Vladimir Jovanović, *Osnovi snage i veličine Srbske* [The foundations of Serbian strength and greatness], in: *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), I, no. 1, 15/27. IV 1870.

¹⁰⁰ Vladimir Jovanović, “Savez sila” [The Alliance of Powers], in: *Za slobodu i narod: Pokušaji Vladimira Jovanovića, člana Ujedinjene omladine Srbske* [For liberty and nation: Efforts by Vladimir Jovanović, a member of the United Serbian Youth], p. 53.

¹⁰¹ Source: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts via: <https://sr.wikipedia.org/wiki:Датотека:VladimirJovanovic.jpg>

Simply put, Jovanović's nationalism of the 1860s and 1870s was one of *freedom and right*, not of *supremacy and force*.¹⁰² He might have still insisted on the necessity of harmonizing individual interests, although, as Jovanović's favourite economist Bastiat would argue while summarizing the thought of Adam Smith, this process would have mostly been automatized under the conditions of liberty. It is, nevertheless, extremely doubtful that within Balkan liberalism, seen as a distinctive genus of political thought, the "prescriptive association with freedom, equality, and 'popular rule' became conceivable in the period of 1850-1870 only within the framework of the free and unified nation-state."¹⁰³ The fact is that Jovanović saw nothing paradoxical in a fusion of universalism, positivistic argumentation, scientism, and the projection of individual rights onto the collective national body. Even when supplied with a historical mission and aimed at collective empowerment, the nation remained a simple aggregation of free and responsible citizens.

As far as Jovanović was concerned, the liberating force of nationalism would clear the path for the next stage of human history – universal brotherhood of free and responsible individuals. And as will be shown, the Serbian political writer held federalism to be the most appropriate means of channelling the emancipatory energy of awoken Balkan nationalisms toward such a future phase of development. He preached that by dint of *science*, with the help of *truth*, the struggle against the darkness of ignorance and submission of all kinds could very well be won. In such a struggle, only those willing to embrace the ideas of liberty, equality, and brotherhood would achieve progress and validate their strength and greatness. This was the sense of Vladimir Jovanović's liberal patriotism.

2. 3. The Herzen of the Balkans: Lyuben Karavelov and the purpose of liberty

Born in late 1834¹⁰⁴ in the small Bulgarian town of Koprivštica, the son of a well-off imperial tax collector, Lyuben Karavelov spent his worry-free youth preparing for a career in commerce. Sent

¹⁰² Slobodan Jovanović, *Moji savremenici* [My contemporaries], p. 25.

¹⁰³ Diana Mishkova, "Balkan Liberalisms: Historical Routes of a Modern Ideology", p. 126; originally in: Imre Ress, "The Value System of Serbian Liberalism", in: Ivan Zoltan Denes (ed), *Liberty and the Search for Identity: Liberal Nationalisms and the Legacy of Empires*, p. 362.

¹⁰⁴ In the absence of his birth certificate, it had long been believed that Karavelov was born either in 1835 or 1837. However, since the 1950s, historians have been in agreement that the actual time of his birth must have been November or December 1834. Mihail Dimitrov, *Ljuban Karavelov: Biografija* [Lyuben Karavelov: Biography], pp. 25-

by his father to Plovdiv, the commercial hub of Ottoman-ruled Bulgaria, and subsequently to Edirne and the capital, Istanbul, Karavelov decided in 1857 that he would not settle for a dull merchant life. Instead he departed to Russia, first to try his luck in a military academy in Odessa, and then, upon failing to enrol, to Moscow where he would remain until early 1867.¹⁰⁵

After having spent a decade in Moscow, Lyuben Karavelov, a thirty-three-year-old publicist, returned to the Balkans in early 1867 as a political correspondent of the Saint Petersburg liberal newspaper *Golos* (*The Voice*). Choosing Belgrade as his base, he was to inform the Russian reading public on the developments in the “Slavic South”. In a letter to Vladimir Ivanovich Lamanski (1833-1914), the Russian Slavophile historian and philologist, dated 24 June/6 July that year, Karavelov wrote that “there is a bloody wedding cooking up in these parts”.¹⁰⁶ It seemed that the time of absolute *personal* and *national liberty* had come to the Balkans, and from his arrival in Serbia in 1867 until his premature, tuberculosis-induced death on 21 January/2 February 1879, during those twelve years of perpetual political and literary labour, the two principles that underpinned all of Karavelov’s efforts remained the same.

Writing for *Zastava* in 1869, he noted:

“The life of contemporary mankind is guided by *two ideas*: the idea of the *rights of man* and the idea of the *rights of nations* to independent political existence. (...) Serbia and Greece had been the first to raise the banner of nationality, and 1848 in Austria, the Italian war, and the Schleswig-Holstein issue followed suit. (...) The subjugated peoples fight for liberation, for independence, while divided nations strive to achieve political unification. (...) The importance of religion evaporates before the gains of civilization and its place is overtaken by the general concern for liberty and nationality.”¹⁰⁷ (emphases are mine)

For Karavelov, one of the most significant political writers of the nineteenth-century Bulgarian national revival, no interference may be allowed with the autonomy of the individual free will. Only those who know of no despotism can be said to really exist as humans: “Without liberty there is neither life nor happiness – and this is as true as two plus two equals four.”¹⁰⁸

26; Mihail Arnaudov, *Ljuban Karavelov: Život, delo, epoha. 1834-1879* [Lyuben Karavelov: Life, works, epoch. 1834-1879], pp. 38-39.

¹⁰⁵ Ibidem, pp. 45-91; Mihail Dimitrov, *Ljuban Karavelov: Biografija* [Lyuben Karavelov: Biography], pp. 45-53.

¹⁰⁶ Karavelov to Lamanski, 24 June/6 July 1867, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuban Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom dvanadeseti. Brošuri i pisma* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume twelve. Pamphlets and letters], p. 474.

¹⁰⁷ *Zastava* (The Banner), IV, no. 31, 7/19. III 1869.

¹⁰⁸ *Svoboda* (Liberty), I, no. 1, 7/19. XI 1869.

Therefore, the liberation of the Bulgarian nation from the Ottoman rule and a unison establishment of a liberal-national, democratic Balkan order in its place became Lyuben Karavelov's *primum movens*.

The years that Karavelov spent in Russia (1857-1867) were a part of the great social and intellectual ferment following the death of Tsar Nicholas I and the Russian humiliation in the Crimean War (1853-1856). Wherever one's ideological allegiances lay, no man or woman of the mind living in the vast Eastern Slavic empire could completely escape the powerful grip of Russian populism – a heterogeneous but widespread radical movement whose many sections shared the belief that the Russian social structure was a moral and political monstrosity – “obsolete, barbarous, stupid, and odious”.¹⁰⁹ In short, the populists' democratic ideals were those of the European (and American) radicals of the time – they held that all power corrupted and that all concentration of authority tended to perpetuate itself. Inequality, a brutal division into haves and have-nots, was the effect of coercive and evil centralization. The only hope for a just and free society remained in the peaceful conversion of *men*, in effect the Russian peasants and serfs who amounted to nine tenths of the total population, to freedom and justice through rational argument, education, and application of science.¹¹⁰ Put bluntly, as any other nation, Russia would also be able to avoid a tragic fate by the exercise of intelligence and will.

In sharp contrast, the intellectual current of Pan-Slavism stood against the populists' ideals. The Slavophiles emphasized the self-staying, self-generating, self-sustaining qualities, the *élan vital* of the divinely inspired Slavic race. They opposed laws which were not self-imposed through the conscience of the people and the medium of their communes; their protest was directed against the adoption of Western ways, of constitutional government and social differentiation, against the so-called Germanic custom of decision by majority, and of the attenuation of religion in political life. Aleksey Khomyakov, Konstantin Aksakov, and Mikhail Pogodin, to name but a few prominent authors widely known during Karavelov's stay in Moscow, were convinced that Russia's destiny was to lead all Slavic tribes through the fires of the coming racial struggle into a golden future of an Eastern Orthodox universal Slavic Tsardom.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Isaiah Berlin, *Russian Thinkers*, p. 210.

¹¹⁰ Ibidem, pp. 221-222.

¹¹¹ Ibidem, p. 213; Traian Stoianovich, “The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880”, pp. 259-260; Mihail Arnaudov, *Lyuben Karavelov: Život, delo, epoha. 1834-1879* [Lyuben Karavelov: Life, works, epoch. 1834-1879], p. 115.

It is here that the problem of *influence* surfaces. Not much about Karavelov's Moscow years can be argued with absolute certainty. It is known however, beyond any doubt, that he spent the first four years in Russia as an auditor of lectures at the University of Moscow's Historical-philological Faculty, at that time dominated by Slavophile professors.¹¹² There he must have embraced the idea of Slavic solidarity which he cherished until the end of his days. However, the Bulgarian Marxist historians of the second half of the twentieth century adored to stress the predominant impact upon Karavelov's intellectual development of the famous populist writers Alexander Herzen, Nikolay Chernyshevsky, Nikolay Dobrolyubov, and Dmitry Pisarev, themselves perceived by socialist scholars as precursors to Lenin and the "world revolution".¹¹³ Thus alleged, this direct impact upon Karavelov's works would no doubt fail Quentin Skinner's *influence test*. It remains unclear whether Karavelov developed parts of his body of thought independently from these authors, and whether any existing similarity could have been derived from other sources.¹¹⁴

The best one can do is paint with a rather broad brush a portrait of the general intellectual surrounding in which Karavelov spent his formative years in the old Russian capital, and to rely onto his original works without placing too much importance on his sources. However it might be, after having decided to terminate his status as a student, Karavelov fully committed himself to literary endeavours. Although he had started learning Russian only after his arrival in the country in 1857, by 1863 Karavelov already published, mostly in distinguished Russian newspapers and magazines, an extensive ethnographic study of Bulgarian national life, a number of short stories, poems, and many an article on European, Russian, Balkan, and Bulgarian literature and politics.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Mihail Dimitrov, *Ljuben Karavelov: Biografiya* [Lyuben Karavelov: Biography], p. 54.

¹¹³ Mihail Arnaudov, *Ljuben Karavelov: Život, delo, epoha. 1834-1879* [Lyuben Karavelov: Life, works, epoch. 1834-1879], pp. 119-130; Docho Lekov, *Ljuben Karavelov* [Lyuben Karavelov], Sofia: People's Education, 1977, p. 10; see also: C. E. Black, "The Influence of Western Political Thought in Bulgaria, 1850-1885", *The American Historical Review* 48:3, 1943, p. 511.

¹¹⁴ What I dubbed *influence test* was discussed in: Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", p. 26.

¹¹⁵ Karavelov to Kovalevski, 28 August/9 September 1864, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom dvanadeseti. Brošuri i pisma* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume twelve. Pamphlets and letters], pp. 465-466; Mihail Dimitrov, *Ljuben Karavelov: Biografiya* [Lyuben Karavelov: Biography], pp. 69-74; a list of Karavelov's early works is also given in: Georgi Konstantinov, *Ljuben Karavelov: Zhivot, tvorchestvo, idei* [Lyuben Karavelov: Life, work, ideas], Sofia: P. K. Ovcharov, 1936, pp. 44-47.

Many of the features of his later political essays, articles, and declarations were anticipated in a novel written in Russian and published for the first time in 1867. *The Bulgarians of old times* (Bulgarian: *Bŭlgari ot staro vreme*) was a manifesto of radical artistic utilitarianism and realism. As he also did in his next novel written in Serbian in 1868, *Je li kriva sudbina?* (*Is destiny at fault?*), which was strongly inspired by Chernyshevsky's 1863 *Čmo delam?* (*What is to be done?*), in his 1867 novel Karavelov strongly criticized all forms of radical idealism and speculative thinking. As Pisarev and Gogol had tried to contrast their critical realism with literary culture that lulled men into submission to corrupt bureaucrats, brutal landowners, and mystical religious doctrines,¹¹⁶ Karavelov rejected Ottoman feudalism, the greed of the Bulgarian merchant class, clericalism, and the values of old, under-educated Bulgarian notables who were, as a rule, oppressive toward their family members and prone to all types of superstition, prejudice, and parasitism. He glorified the life energies, the personal dignity, and the readiness to offer sacrifice to love and beauty of the young generation. His literary vision is one of antinomies, his sympathies clearly on the side of the new forms of human relations.¹¹⁷

Possibly having in mind that famous line that Chernyshevsky never said – the one about a book doing more good than a hundred guns – Karavelov was convinced that literature must develop in accordance with the actual needs of everyday life. In 1869 he wrote down: “Every translated and published book has only one goal: to spread knowledge and encourage the growth of intellectual capabilities. Every book needs to teach... to enable readers to extract strength for their own strivings.”¹¹⁸ In 1873 one still sees him holding onto this belief: “The objective of modern writers is to laugh at all the dirt which surrounds us from all sides, and to give courage to the honourable, chaste, humble, and those pressed down. In one word, we must be the sons of our times and fight the evils of today.”¹¹⁹ Having renounced “the orgies of imagination and

¹¹⁶ Isaiah Berlin, *Russian Thinkers*, pp. 223-224.

¹¹⁷ Lyuben Karavelov, *Bŭlgari ot staro vreme (povest)* [*The Bulgarians of old times: a story*], Sofia: Bŭlgarski pisatel, 1961, first published in 1867, pp. 5-14.

¹¹⁸ Cited in: Georgi Dimov, “Lyuben Karavelov i razvitiето na bŭlgraska nacionalna litraturno-teoreticheska i kriticheska misŭl” [Lyuben Karavelov and the development of Bulgarian national theoretical and critical literary thought], in: Cveta Undzhieva and Docho Lekov (eds), *Ljuban Karavelov – sbornik po sluchaŭ 150 godini ot rozŭdenieto mu* [Lyuben Karavelov – a collection of essays on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of his birth], Sofia: Bŭlgarska akademiya na naukite, 1990, p. 15.

¹¹⁹ *Nezavisimost* (Independence), III, no. 28, 31. III/12. IV 1873.

empty phrases”, Karavelov became one of the pioneers of positivism and realism in South Slav literary circles.¹²⁰

Happiness, personal and national, depends on enlightenment.¹²¹ By often referring to the credo *scientia potentia est* of Sir Francis Bacon, Karavelov united two of his biggest ideals – education and national liberation. His weapon of choice, serving both ends, is the printing press. After he had reached Belgrade, his main goal was to set up an independent newspaper through which he could advance his views in Bulgarian.¹²² It was not meant to be, however; the Serbian government would not stand his radical ideas and exiled him already in late 1867.¹²³ After a failed attempt to start a new organ in Novi Sad in 1868,¹²⁴ and after he had been arrested and kept in the Hungarian prison for seven months,¹²⁵ he finally settled in the Romanian capital Bucharest and set in motion in November 1869 a journal that would become one of the long-lasting legacies of the nineteenth-century Balkan political thought – *Svoboda* (*Liberty*).

Svoboda, after a temporary ban renamed *Nezavisimost* (*Independence*) in early 1873, was printed 208 times in Bulgarian, once every week until October 1874.¹²⁶ In countless articles, reviews, polemics, news reports, essays, and feuilletons Karavelov, certainly one of the most well-read inhabitants of the Balkans of the time, confidently exposed his conviction that the age of reason had begun. Accordingly, the organization of private and social life had to be in compliance with the truths cleansed by true science: “He who has not read Draper, Buckle, and Schlosser cannot say he knows history; he who has not read Vogt, Darwin, Huxley, and

¹²⁰ Jovan Skerlić, *Omladina i njena književnost (1848-1871): Izučavanja o nacionalizmu i književnom romantizmu kod Srba* [The youth and their literature (1848-1871): Studies in nationalism and literary romanticism of the Serbs], p. 247.

¹²¹ *Svoboda* (*Liberty*), I, no. 1, 7/19. XI 1869.

¹²² Karavelov to Gaj, 1/13 May 1867, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭčineniya, tom dvanadeseti. Brošuri i pisma* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume twelve. Pamphlets and letters], p. 473.

¹²³ Karavelov to Kraevski, 11/23 October 1867, *ibidem*, p. 475.

¹²⁴ Karavelov to Matica srpska, 1/13 May 1868, *ibidem*, p. 477.

¹²⁵ This episode was already mentioned. Karavelov seems to have been arrested only for belonging to the same circle as Vladimir Jovanović, whom the Serbian authorities falsely suspected of complicity in regicide and their Hungarian counterparts of subvertise nationalistic activity. In: Đorđe Ignjatović, *Svetozar Miletić, Ljuben Karavelov i bugarski nacionalnooslobodilački pokret 1867-1878* [Svetozar Miletić, Lyuben Karavelov, and the Bulgarian national liberation movement 1867-1878], Novi Sad, 1973, p. 63.

¹²⁶ For a while it also came out in Romanian as *Libertatea*; in: Mihail Arnaudov, *Ljuben Karavelov: Źivot, delo, epoha. 1834-1879* [Lyuben Karavelov: Life, works, epoch. 1834-1879], p. 401.

Humboldt cannot say he knows natural sciences; and he who has not read Tocqueville cannot say he knows the sciences of government.”¹²⁷ Particularly strongly inspired by the work of the English historian Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1861), Karavelov was convinced of the barrenness of moral and metaphysical theories. Human development was determined by the advances of the mind and its ability to tame the material world; and as the nineteenth century had brought remarkable achievements in the field of technology and natural sciences – chemistry, physics, and biology – it simply had to be the peak of history:

“The current century is one of education and progress; but at the same time it is a century of intrigues, metamorphoses, of life and death; in this century many a great nation shall be born, and many shall die; a multitude shall be buried forever, a multitude shall resurrect for a new historical life; in one word, our XIX century resembles the olden Persian faith of Zendavesta in which the good and the evil fight, but the good should always win.”¹²⁸

Only those on the side of progress and reason can hope to sustain the powerful waves of historical change. The ruthless exploitation by Ottoman feudal masters, their indifference to personal dignity of the empire’s Christian subjects, the pseudo-philosophical and obscure teachings of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the ignorance and rapacity of Bulgarian notables (*chorbajis*) had to make room for just and sensible social-economic and political arrangements which would be based upon the free will of the people.

“Freedom and progress might be secured by the French proletariat, the Italian bandits, the Spanish pirates, the Russian serfs or the Montenegrin warriors, but not granted by Wilhelm I and Franz Joseph I.”¹²⁹ A stable, happy, and progressive political body can never be founded on despotism, privilege, and violence, but only on true constitutional and liberal principles. Karavelov thus shared Jovanović’s republican ideal – the life of every monarchy is filled with villainy; emperors and clergy are neither the protectors of the people nor God’s messengers; finally, the aristocrats, the kings and princes, and the patriarchs cannot have anything in common with those beaten down who ask for civil, religious, educational, social, national, and personal

¹²⁷ Nezavisimost (Independence), IV, no. 19, 23. II/7. III 1874.

¹²⁸ Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 29, 2/14. VI 1870.

¹²⁹ Cited in: Kiril Gorov, *Socialno-ikonomicheskite vūzgledi na Ljuben Karavelov* [Socio-economic views of Lyuben Karavelov], Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1975, p. 218.

liberty. Not before having adopted laws by the free will of all of its citizens can a polity be truly free.¹³⁰

Where Karavelov and Jovanović slightly differed in their reasoning was the treatment of foreign social and political models. At times critical of vulgar imitation of Western fashions and habits,¹³¹ Karavelov has a somewhat simpler formula than that of Jovanović; less romantic in his approach and not feeling the need to legitimize his political views through a specific vision of history, the Bulgarian publicist defended a *reasonable method* – whatever “was of positive and unquestionable utility should be preserved”.¹³² For Karavelov, miming is a natural process, in individuals *and* societies. If an institution, an artistic form, or an everyday practice enriched the lives of citizens, then there should be no protest raised against it on the grounds of its strangeness, foreignness, or an imagined incompatibility with traditional ways of doing things.

Karavelov did not protect the right of nations to their own development and internal self-rule in order to preserve the inherited tradition of the Bulgarian nation. Every nation, he thought, was bound to adopt many a model shiny on the outside; it was up to well-informed critics, however, to determine upon strictly utilitarian basis if a practice was to be discarded or kept.¹³³ In other words, Karavelov encouraged his compatriots to keep an open mind and hunt high and low for possible inspirations and models. Although Karavelov did believe that the Bulgarian nation is democratic by its very nature, as all peoples everywhere had always been, he felt no need to devise an elaborate theory of history to justify the adoption of foreign models. Not least because, in his understanding, the Balkan nations were new-borns: “Every nation has its birth, childhood, maturity, old age, and death... Every state is like the sands of time, says

¹³⁰ Lyuben Karavelov, *Bŭlgarski glas* [The Bulgarian voice], in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuban Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom dvanadeseti. Brošuri i pisma* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume twelve. Pamphlets and letters], pp. 10-12.

¹³¹ Jovanović was also known to be rather cynical when it came to automatic, substance-less imitation. See: Vladimir Jovanović, “Srbenda i gotovan” [The true Serb and the idler], in: *Za slobodu i narod: Pokušaji Vladimira Jovanovića, člana Ujedinjene omladine Srbske* [For liberty and nation: Efforts by Vladimir Jovanović, a member of the United Serbian Youth], pp. 103-121.

¹³² *Svoboda* (Liberty), II, no. 20, 31. X/12. XI 1871.

¹³³ Discussed in: Diana Mishkova and Roumen Daskalov, “Forms without substance’: Debates on the Transfer of Western Models to the Balkans”, in: Roumen Daskalov and Diana Mishkova (eds), *Entangled Histories of the Balkans. Volume Two: Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions*, pp. 11-12.

Draper.”¹³⁴ The age of the old despotic empires was coming to an end and the young nationalities needed to align themselves with the spirit of the times - universal reason and positive science - and grow healthy and strong.

Besides, the absence of a Whig vision of history in Karavelov's work had to do with more than just the fact that he developed a thoroughly radical political ideology. Unlike Jovanović's Serbia, in which a more or less fully independent political order had been operating for decades and where bonds of feudal servitude had been broken by the early 1830s, Bulgaria was never granted autonomy, it never secured the chance of developing an internal political system, no matter how rudimentary, in which factions, if not parties, would nominate and strive to legitimize different political programmes. Having that in mind, it appears that Karavelov, free of considerations imposed by internal, formalized political battles, could adopt an even more universalistic outlook than Jovanović. The former appealed to the Bulgarian *reaya*, derived of all political rights and the fruits of their labour, the latter to proprietary rural *demos*, which could, at least theoretically, pressure the conservative Serbian oligarchy toward evolutionary policy. The gravity of circumstance could have very well influenced the measure of radicalism of our two Balkan intellectuals' thought.

It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Karavelov believed that Jovanović and the Serbian liberals were too insensitive to the so-called social question and reluctant to join the “literary war” with full force.¹³⁵ The issue at hand exceeds the scope of this work, but it should be noted that Jovanović was convinced that the Serbian social question had already been resolved, and that after political liberty had been taken, as it were, away from the monarchical arbitrary authority and national unification obtained at the expense of external imperial rule, social relations among free and equal smallholders would remain harmonious. In any case, energies should by no means be diverted from these imminent tasks and invested into the “atomization of Serbian intellectual strength.”¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Lyuben Karavelov, *Bŭlgarski glas* [The Bulgarian voice], in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuban Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom dvanadeseti. Brošuri i pisma* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume twelve. Pamphlets and letters], p. 18.

¹³⁵ Lyuben Karavelov, *Memoari* [Memoirs], in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuban Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom chetvŭrti. Stihotvoreniya, drami, memoari* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume four. Poetry, plays, memoirs], Sofia: Bŭlgarski pisatel, 1984, p. 548.

¹³⁶ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], p. 271.

The last decade of Karavelov's life saw him adhering to a fixed set of political goals – he argued for full national liberation of all Bulgarians from the Ottoman rule, for the protection of national, cultural, and linguistic rights through the replacement of the Greek clergy imposed upon the nation by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and for a just distribution of wealth and knowledge among the Bulgarians.¹³⁷ Less immutable, however, was his opinion on the proper instruments of that monumental struggle. Evolution through education or a full-scale national revolution – so was the dilemma.

In the period 1869-1874 Karavelov strived to the best of his abilities to reconcile the two sides of the same coin. In 1869 he wrote that “to reach full independence and to be worthy of the human name, one needs, first and foremost, education.”¹³⁸ Elsewhere, but during that same year, he indicated that “to be enlightened, the Bulgarians first have to be free. Freedom is what we need... and nothing more.”¹³⁹ It seems as if political independence was a pre-requisite for the progress of reason, which in turn simply had to be the first step toward liberty. And so, the circle closes.

During his years in Bucharest, Karavelov emerged as the intellectual leader of a group of Bulgarian émigrés.¹⁴⁰ These “Young Bulgarians”, as opposed to the conservative, Russophile “Olds”, established in late 1869 and early 1870 a Central Bulgarian Revolutionary Committee (BRCK) to coordinate the actions of the Bulgarian emigration and the internal revolutionary cliques within the Ottoman realm. The two statutes of BRCK written under Karavelov's auspices, the first from mid-1870 and the second from May 1872, do not help solve the problem of the preferred means in the national struggle. The older proclamation reads: “We shall use peaceful instruments against the Turkish government...; only in an extreme case shall we resort to weapons, knives, and fire.”¹⁴¹ In contrast, articles 1 and 2 of the 1872 programme stated “that

¹³⁷ Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 7, 14/26. V 1870; ibidem, I, no. 42, 16/28. IX 1870; ibidem, II, no. 42, 1/13. IV 1872; and Kiril Gorov, *Socialno-ikonomicheskiye vzhgledi na Lyuben Karavelov* [Socio-economic views of Lyuben Karavelov], p. 202.

¹³⁸ Narodnost (Nationality), II, no. 16, 9/21. III 1869.

¹³⁹ Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 1, 7/19. XI 1869.

¹⁴⁰ In the mid-nineteenth century Bucharest was home to more than ten thousand Bulgarians, mostly merchants and craftsmen, while as many as half a million of Karavelov's compatriots lived in Wallachia. In: Stevan Pavlović, *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945* [A History of the Balkans 1804-1945], p. 100.

¹⁴¹ Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 46, 14/26. X 1870.

the goal of BRCK is to liberate Bulgaria through a moral and violent revolution... Every means possible is allowed: propaganda, press, weaponry, flames, and death.”¹⁴²

However, such a revolution did not take place in 1872. What is more, after the Ottoman police had captured and executed in early 1873 Vasil Levski (born in 1837), the Bulgarian revolutionary in charge of organizing internal secret committees and Karavelov’s right-hand man, the entire endeavour lost traction. Our publicist went through a period of severe self-doubt; forced to leave Bucharest for a few months, in a chronically dire financial situation, and facing various intrigues directed against him, Karavelov struggled to keep *Nezavisimost* going through 1873 and 1874. The structure of BRCK had fallen apart and Karavelov’s leadership was ultimately questioned by the new generation of socialists and their leader, the energetic poet Hristo Botev (1848-1876).¹⁴³

A letter from March 1874 to his friend Ivan Drasov is a token of Karavelov’s mood: “If Alexander Humboldt himself, [the embodiment of a man of science], were to make an appearance among us, the Bulgarians would crucify him. I do my part without wanting to know of anybody else... Let them speak whatever they like. I will give up in six months’ time.”¹⁴⁴ And indeed, in October 1874 Karavelov ended his career as a political writer. Finally, the uneasy balance between educational work and revolution was resolved, albeit not without much sacrifice.¹⁴⁵ Determined to avoid the human cost of a revolution, deeply hurt by the loss of his comrades, frightened by the bravado and adventurism of Botev and his likes, and possibly having his ego bruised by the loss of leadership over the Bulgarian revolutionary movement, Karavelov finally renounced political action and established a purely scientific journal *Znanie (Knowledge)*.

¹⁴² Zahari Stoyanov, *Zapiski po bŭlgarskite vŭstaniya* [Notes on the Bulgarian uprisings], volume I, 1870-1876, chapter 2 – accessed via: <http://www.slovo.bg/showwork.php3?AuID=149&WorkID=3868&Level=3>

¹⁴³ Mihail Arnaudov, *Ljuben Karavelov: Źivot, delo, epoha. 1834-1879* [Lyuben Karavelov: Life, works, epoch. 1834-1879], pp. 445-453.

¹⁴⁴ Karavelov to Drasov, 1/13 March 1874, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom dvanadeseti. Brošuri i pisma* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume twelve. Pamphlets and letters], p. 506.

¹⁴⁵ Karavelov’s working schedule from his Bucharest days was found among his other private papers. It shows how Karavelov worked in his printing office from 7 o’clock in the morning until 7 o’clock in the evening. In his letters he would often note “I work like the Devil himself” or “I work through the day and then through the night”. *Iz arhiva na Ljuben Karavelov* [From the archive of Lyuben Karavelov], Sofia: Bŭlgarska akademiya na naukite, 1964, p. 607; Karavel to Drasov, 26 August/7 September 1873, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom dvanadeseti. Brošuri i pisma* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume twelve. Pamphlets and letters], pp. 500-501; Karavelov to Pogodin, 30 April/11 May 1862, *ibidem*, p. 463.

The fact that *Znanie* would not take “any contributions of political character and those that attack the dignity of individuals and governments”¹⁴⁶ need not have meant that Karavelov rejected the necessity of a national revolution. When it did come to pass, with the assistance of Russian arms, in 1877/78, he again worked to see it succeed. However, the tools chosen in 1874 thereafter remained the same: “Knowledge is power. Bacon said that man was capable only when he knew. It is true - practice and historical facts had long proved to humanity that the well-being of a nation or an individual exclusively relies upon the sum of knowledge they possess.”¹⁴⁷

Returning after two full decades to his homeland with the advancing Russian army in July 1877,¹⁴⁸ Karavelov continued to preach and denounce, deride and teach. In one of his last letters he expressed the hope of re-starting a political organ to be published in parallel to his *Znanie*.¹⁴⁹ Doubtless, Karavelov would have been assigned (or would have taken for himself) one the leading roles in the early post-1878 attempts at erecting a fully autonomous, modern Bulgarian state in the place of crumbling Ottoman despotism. However, illness and very soon death prevented it. Karavelov’s contemporary and the first historian of the Bulgarian national liberation Zahari Stoyanov thus described his demise in January 1879: “Enough with the torment and suffering, with so many fights and aspirations. The true heroes of an epoch always go down with the structure they strived to dismantle.”¹⁵⁰

Nine years prior to his death, in January 1870, Karavelov had reported in *Svoboda* on the death of Alexander Herzen, the “notable publicist and philosopher... the first among the democrats.”¹⁵¹ And even though *Svoboda*’s impact could not match that of *Kolokol*, nor do Karavelov’s *Travels* (1876) or his own *Notes from the Death House* (1870) approach the significance of Herzen’s magisterial autobiography *My Past and Thoughts*, there still prevails a link between the

¹⁴⁶ *Znanie* (Knowledge), I, no. 1, 15/27. III 1875.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibidem*

¹⁴⁸ Mihail Arnaudov, *Ljuben Karavelov: Život, delo, epoha. 1834-1879* [Lyuben Karavelov: Life, works, epoch. 1834-1879], p. 788.

¹⁴⁹ Karavelov to Lamanski, 20 Septemeber/2 October 1878, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom dvanadeseti. Brošuri i pisma* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume twelve. Pamphlets and letters], pp. 513-514.

¹⁵⁰ Stefan Velikov (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov v spomenite na sŭvremennicite si* [Lyuben Karavelov in the memory of his contemporaries], Sofia: Bălgarski pisatel, 1960, p. 159.

¹⁵¹ *Svoboda* (Liberty), I, no. 12, 22. I/3. II 1870.

two men justifying the above-set title of this section – it is *the purpose of liberty*. Lyuben Karavelov too realized that liberty must never be sacrificed to any horrific metaphysical construction - it is to be lived today, not tomorrow, by individuals pursuing whatever individual ends they find worth fighting for.




Image 2. 2. Lyuben Karavelov (most likely dating from the mid-1870s)¹⁵²

2. 4. The fountainhead of federalism: Vladimir Jovanović, Lyuben Karavelov, and the Eastern question

Historians must appreciate the irony of the fact that a plethora of plans for the *federalization* of the Balkans sprung up during the 1860s and 1870s directly from the strengthening of the

¹⁵² Source: Portrait des bulgarischen Schriftstellers Ljuben Karawelow, BI Handlexikon. Band 1. VEB Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig, 1982 - via: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ljuben_Karawelow.jpg

principle of *nationality*. Those plans were strongly linked to and had a potent predecessor in the post-1848 restlessness of the Habsburg realm. The failures of the 1848 Austrian Revolution(s) had forced a number of political thinkers and practitioners, subjects of the Austrian emperor, to contemplate a possible re-organization of the Habsburg-ruled lands along federal lines. Initially, the defeated Hungarian revolutionaries believed, as did many a Slavic and Romanian nationalist, that a (con)federal re-composition of Austria would palliate the tensions between the exclusive political projects of the empire's many nationalities and erect a strong barrier to the renewed centralist tendencies of Baron Alexander von Bach's absolutism. Immediately, however, a dilemma arose on whether such a federalization should occur within or outside of the confines of the Austrian Empire.¹⁵³

Such ferment in their neighbourhood quickly invigorated the national liberation movements of the Ottoman Balkans. Adding fuel to the fire, the powerful pattern of the Italian and German national unifications and the seemingly chronic crisis of the central imperial government in Istanbul further broadened the scope of thinking about possible alternatives to the survival of Turkey-in-Europe. Therefore, as a rather significant part of the Eastern question - the diplomatic conundrum *par excellence* of the nineteenth century - there emerged the uncertainty: what should become of the Ottoman possessions in the Balkan Peninsula in the face of the anticipated demise of the sultan's authority over that region and its inhabitants?¹⁵⁴

At the core of the problem lay a conflict of interests threatening to rock the foundations of the post-1815 European state system: all of the Great Powers of Europe sought, in one way or the other, to extend their influence over the Danube and Sava rivers deep into the Balkan landmass, and further toward the Straits of Istanbul, whereas the small Balkan nations felt called upon to dismember and divide the Ottoman inheritance among themselves. Balkan federalism surfaced thereupon as the possible breakthrough. Supported by the penetration of the mighty intellectual streams of liberalism, radicalism, and, eventually, socialism, it promised to wash away all existing obstacles to liberation and independent political life of the Balkan peoples. A Balkan federation, however organized, would limit the European interference into purely Balkan affairs, provide a powerful weapon for the final historical stand-off against the Turks, and serve to

¹⁵³ Dimitrije Đorđević, *Ogledi iz novije balkanske istorije* [Essays in modern Balkan history], p. 156.

¹⁵⁴ Although far from new, a comprehensive study on the Eastern question that remains rather authoritative and should still be consulted is: Vasilj Popović, *Evropa i srpsko pitanje u periodu oslobođenja: 1804-1918* [Europe and the Serbian question in the era of liberation: 1804-1918], Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1940, 163 pp. Anglophone readers might prefer Matthew Smith Anderson's classical and equally informative work *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations*, London: MacMillan, 1966, 464 pp.

harmonize the post-liberation intra-Balkan relations with the progressive ideals of personal autonomy, democracy, and national solidarity.¹⁵⁵

Having this in mind, the necessity of studying as potent a political concept as Balkan federalism of the 1860s and 1870s seems ever so pressing, not least because of the fact that the Balkan political ideologies of the time - nationalism, liberalism, and somewhat later socialism as well - found their full realization in the idea of a Balkan federation. And yet, there seems to have existed a yawning hole in this particular compartment of historical scholarship. Not since Leften S. Stavrianos' 1944 monograph *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times* has a thorough study of Balkan federalism seen the light of day.¹⁵⁶ With such a gap in place, it is not hard to grasp that both Balkan federalism as a universal idea and its manifestations in the years between the end of the Crimean War and the outbreak of the Italian war for unification, on the one side, and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877/78, on the other, await a new synthesis.

In this section, which addresses the basic characteristics of federalist thought of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov, and in the entire following chapter, where I discuss the two role-models that fuelled these authors' federalisms, I endeavour to nominate a model of analysis that, to my knowledge, has yet to be tried; one that strongly underlines the dynamic transnational exchanges of political ideas and concepts, and the appropriation of extra-contextual political languages, both of which supported the emergence of the idea of a Balkan federation in the 1860s and 1870s. If not truly *global*, this approach, I believe, has the capacity of transmitting a trans-regional comprehension of the specific branch of Balkan federalism expounded in the works of our two intellectuals.

¹⁵⁵ Dimitrije Đorđević, *Ogledi iz novije balkanske istorije* [Essays in modern Balkan history], pp. 173-175.

¹⁵⁶ Leften S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times*; a few far-reaching original works of lesser extent that were published in the meantime include: Kosta Milutinović, "Prvi ideolozi federalističke misli kod Južnih Slovena" [The first ideologues of federalist thought among the South Slavs], *RAD* 11, 1962, pp. 85-195; and Dimitrije Đorđević, "Projects for the Federation of South-East Europe in the 1860s and 1870s", *Balkanica* I, 1970, pp. 119-145 – re-printed in Serbian in: *Ogledi iz novije balkanske istorije* [Essays in modern Balkan history], pp. 152-175. Other, more recent works that should be consulted are: Andreja Živković and Dragan Plavšić (eds), *The Balkan Socialist Tradition and the Balkan Federation, 1871-1915*, London: Procupine Press, Revolutionary History 8:3, 2003; Loukianos Hassiotis, "The Ideal of Balkan Unity from a European Perspective (1789–1945)", *Balkanica* XLI, 2010, pp. 209-229; and Marko Lehti, "The Quest for Solidarity and Tamed Nationalism: Envisioning Sustainable Peace in the Balkans", *Peace and Change* 39:1, 2014, pp. 101-132.

Ever since, in the words of the Greek revolutionary of the 1820s Photios Chryssanthopoulos, “the French Revolution of 1789 awakened the minds of all men, all the Christians of the Near East prayed to God that (...) a war should be waged against the Turks, and believed that they would be freed.”¹⁵⁷ From the “enlightened” republican visions of Rhigas Velesinlis (1757-1798)¹⁵⁸ to the first incarnation of a Yugoslav state in 1918, throughout the “long” nineteenth century, Central, Eastern, and South-eastern European federalist projects had been devised as the means of achieving political, economic, and cultural emancipation from the Austrian, the Ottoman, and the Russian imperial sway.

As has already been stated, before the 1860s the central locus of federalist thought had remained with the Hungarian, Romanian, Italian, and Slavic subjects of the Austrian emperor and the wide-spread network of émigrés who strived to challenge the return to absolutism and centralism of the post-1848 Habsburg realm. After the *Ausgleich* of 1867 had sealed the fate of a possible “Central European” federalization, and having been previously exposed to the ideas of the likes of Czartoryski, Mazzini, Kossuth, Miletić, or Golescu, the Balkan liberals, radicals, and socialists, formally still Ottoman citizens, took over the role of main ideologues of federalism. In a federal “Balkan”, “Danubian”, or a “Yugoslav” state they saw the ultimate solution to the widened Eastern question, now also encompassing the fate of peoples subjugated by the newly arranged Austro-Hungarian dualism. In the following pages it will be shown how the idea of a Balkan federation integrated two major objectives - the expulsion of the Turks from the Balkans and the deliverance of the Austria-Hungary’s South Slavs and Romanians from imperial domination.¹⁵⁹

Vladimir Jovanović met Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894) in Turin in May 1863. After having been lectured by the leader of the defeated Hungarian revolution of 1848/49 on the desperate need of solidarity between the Balkan Christians and the peoples suffering under the Austrian

¹⁵⁷ Cited in: Leften S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times*, p. 18.

¹⁵⁸ See: Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “An Enlightenment Perspective on Balkan Cultural Pluralism: The Republican Vision of Rhigas Velesinlis”, *History of Political Thought* 24:3, 2003, pp. 465-479. Velesinlis was an important figure of the Greek Enlightenment; a republican revolutionary strongly influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution, he propagated the plan of a pan-Balkan uprising against the Ottomans. Arrested by the Austrian authorities, Velesinlis was delivered to the Turks and executed in Belgrade in 1798.

¹⁵⁹ Dimitrije Đorđević, *Ogledi iz novije balkanske istorije* [Essays in modern Balkan history], pp. 155-173.

yoke, the Hungarians included,¹⁶⁰ Jovanović answered that the idea of a Danubian Confederation had been known to the Serbian patriots and that they accepted it in principle.¹⁶¹ Previously, in London in 1862/63, Jovanović had discussed the matter of Balkan Christian solidarity directed against the Ottoman Turks with, among others, the British politicians William Gladstone and Richard Cobden.¹⁶² With Mikhail Bakunin and Giuseppe Mazzini Jovanović contemplated notions of a union of free and independent Slavic nations and of a union of sovereign nations of Europe. Jovanović agreed with both of the famous revolutionaries that the models upon which such political entities of the future were to be created were “the United States of America and the Helvetic (Swiss) Confederacy”.¹⁶³

However, Jovanović’s 1863 work in English, titled *The Serbian nation and the Eastern question*, originally written and published in London as a guide to the current predicament of the Serbs and other Balkan nations under the Ottoman rule, did not contain a developed federalist programme for the Balkans and Eastern Europe. There Jovanović only mentioned in passing that Serbia had to aspire to secure brotherly sympathies of “liberal peoples... of all Slavs and neighbouring nations”.¹⁶⁴ It would take another seven years before the Serbian author developed a complete project of a post-imperial Balkan federation. In his two major works from 1870 and 1871,¹⁶⁵ one in French, the other in English, Jovanović, now supported by the Serbian government but still living abroad, tried to publicize the work the Serbian liberals were doing to forward the national ideals.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, in both of these works, the differences between them being minimal, he stressed the fact that the “national and liberal movement of the Serbs could

¹⁶⁰ On the evolution of Kossuth’s federalism, see: Samuel J. Wilson, “Lost Opportunities: Lajos Kossuth, the Balkan Nationalities, and the Danubian Confederation”, *Hungarian Studies* 8:2, 1993, pp. 171-193.

¹⁶¹ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], pp. 166-167.

¹⁶² Ibidem, pp. 120-122.

¹⁶³ Ibidem, pp. 147-150.

¹⁶⁴ Vladimir Jovanović, *Srbski narod i Istočno pitanje* [The Serbian nation and the Eastern question], p. 27. Clearly, Jovanović here writes from the position of pan-Slavic solidarity and probably also has in mind the Western and Eastern Slavic peoples.

¹⁶⁵ Vladimir Jovanović, *Les Serbes et la Mission de la Serbie dans l’Europe d’Orient*; and *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities* – both works were already referred to.

¹⁶⁶ Gale Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, p. 191.

not but end in laying the basis of a Confederacy of free nations among the Slovenians (Slavs) and other Christians of Eastern Europe (the Romanians and the Greeks), having for object their common defence against every sort of military conquest, of enforced annexation, and of foreign domination and oppression.”¹⁶⁷ Never thereafter would he forsake such conviction, also expressed in his many conversations with a number of French democrats and republicans in Paris during 1870.¹⁶⁸

Already upon his arrival in Belgrade in 1867, Lyuben Karavelov had no doubt that “the South Slavs should establish a free federal state.”¹⁶⁹ Quite possibly imbued with the democratic aspirations of Herzen and Chernyshevsky, both of whom imagined a federal system in the Danubian lands that would render domestic oppression and foreign tutelage impossible,¹⁷⁰ Karavelov remained faithful to his federal vision throughout his publicist career. Time and again he urged that:

“As we have said many times before, we shall say today as well, that our salvation depends upon ourselves, the sultan’s own Christian subjects. The Serbs, the Montenegrins, the Romanians, the Greeks, and the Arnauts [Albanians] wish to obtain their freedom. (...) If all of us were true men, we would not need anyone’s help. We ask to be free, and to be so we need no one’s tutorship. Our salvation is in a Danubian federation...”¹⁷¹

Similarly, in an article from 1871 titled *Da se obedinim! (Unite!)*, Karavelov wrote:

“Today... the illusions of slavery and of historical, canonical, and monarchical rights have bowed their heads before liberty and the rights of man. Every ethnicity strives to secure its national rights and to live freely and independently (...) Should we submit ourselves to the dictates of the Great Powers, which deliberate on our destiny and decide upon the Eastern question, or unite ourselves and form a Danubian Confederacy – a healthy state that will secure the European peace? The eastern nations, the Romanians, the Serbs, the Bulgarians, and the Greeks, demand that their

¹⁶⁷ Vladimir Jovanović, *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, p. 143.

¹⁶⁸ The evidence for the resilience of Jovanović’s federalism is found in: Vladimir Jovanović (transliterated as Yovanovitch), “The Balkan Confederacy”, chapter VII in: *The Near-Eastern Problem and the Pan-German Peril*, London: Watts & Co, 1909, pp. 45-47. Among the men Jovanović met in 1870 were Gustave Chaudey, Jules Ferry, Jules Favre, Saint-Marc Girardin, and Henri Martin. In: Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], pp. 256-268.

¹⁶⁹ Karavelov’s report from the summer of 1867 in the Russian newspaper *Golos* no. 171; cited in: Mihail Dimitrov, *Ljuban Karavelov: Biografija* [Lyuben Karavelov: Biography], p. 133.

¹⁷⁰ Dimitrije Đorđević, *Ogledi iz novije balkanske istorije* [Essays in modern Balkan history], p. 154.

¹⁷¹ *Svoboda* (Liberty), I, no. 50, 18/30. XI 1870.

freedom and independence be acknowledged and secured, and to be left alone to decide on how to rule themselves, because whatever is made against the will of the people remains forever unstable.”¹⁷²

Behind these bracing proclamations of the two authors there stood a staunchly nuanced system of federalist thought. Jovanović and Karavelov started from the same premises – their liberal-democratic beliefs and the conviction that the Ottoman Empire was doomed to fall. In their view, no programme of reforms could ever hope to revitalize it; no *Tanzimat*, a series of futile attempts made to modernize the empire between 1839 and 1876, could ever slow down its internal decomposition. The Turkish tillage of the soil was of the very rudest nature, the commerce perpetually in the hands of strangers. All the principles of political economy were disregarded, the governance remained utterly disorganized and unjust, and the army lawless.¹⁷³ In Jovanović’s view the twelve million Christians were “slaves used for pleasure and profit of their masters.”¹⁷⁴

Vehemently opposed to what they understood as the essence of Islam’s political outlook – its indifference to science and technological advancement, deep-seated intolerance, and propensity for violence, both Balkan thinkers considered it, in its current form, as a shameful, barbaric negation of the principle of equality of human and national rights. What is more, they were convinced, under the sway of Buckle, Burckhardt, Draper, and Macaulay, that the Balkan Christians must have stood at a higher level of social and intellectual development. Karavelov was unequivocal:

“For a Turk, there is no fatherland, no governance, no humanity, only religion... Look carefully at Turkey, her rule, her laws, her newspapers, and the only thing you see is Mohammad, Koran, and religion where the sultan is the Mohammad’s pope! As long as he is a Mohammedan, the Turk cannot be a man and he would take a long, long time to change (...) Our future Union of the East would need citizens, capable of fully grasping what progress and civilization are, not religious fanatics like the Turks”.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² *Libertatea* (Liberty), no. 3, 20. I/1. II 1871.

¹⁷³ Vladimir Jovanović, *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, pp. 153-158.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 153.

¹⁷⁵ *Zastava* (The Banner), IV, no. 43, 9/21. IV 1869. In the numbers 43 and 45 of *Zastava* Karavelov responded to the criticism directed at him by the leader of the Vojvodina Serbian liberals Svetozar Miletić (1826-1901). The latter had previously accused Karavelov of being an anti-Turkish “fanatic”. On the debate, see: Đorđe Ignjatović, *Svetozar*

Real solidarity would be possible only among free citizens of equal rights and responsibilities. The seemingly irreconcilable animosity notwithstanding, Jovanović still lamented over the necessity and the price of the destruction of that enormous force the Ottoman Empire still embodied. With more consideration and wisdom, the empire could have secured universal liberty and human progress to all of its subjects, regardless of faith and nationality, and could have become “for South-eastern Europe what the Union of Free States is for the Americas.”¹⁷⁶ However, it was too late. The consolidation of the Ottoman Empire was rendered impossible. The imperial government showcased neither the will nor the capacity for improvement and this led Karavelov to protest against a possible Bulgarian-Turkish dualism proposed by a number of Istanbul-based organs: “the Bulgarians demand no laughable dualism, no unification [with the Turks], but a free life and a liberal, humane government.”¹⁷⁷ Thereupon, as Jovanović concluded, “the prolongation of the Turkish dominion in the East is... neither politically nor morally justifiable.”¹⁷⁸

In addition, both authors saw the post-1867 Dual Monarchy as equally tyrannical in its treatment of the Balkan Christians’ co-nationals living across the border of the two empires. In other words, the future of the “eastern nations”, without a shadow of a doubt, lay outside of the existing imperial framework. Still living in Novi Sad, at the mercy of Hungarian authorities, Jovanović was somewhat discreet in his criticism. Nonetheless, he held that “a true liberal transformation of Austria would require the abolition of every sort of exclusive privileges and the establishment of a Confederacy of free nations such as that of Switzerland and that of the United States of America.”¹⁷⁹ Wary that the Nationalities Law of 1868, which proclaimed the indivisibility of the Hungarian nation, might lead to an enforced de-nationalization of non-

Miletić, Ljuben Karavelov i bugarski nacionalnooslobodilački pokret 1867-1878 [Svetozar Miletić, Lyuben Karavelov, and the Bulgarian national liberation movement 1867-1878], pp. 72-77. On the hatred of the Turks among the Serbian romantic-national youth of the time, see: Jovan Skerlić, *Omladina i njena književnost (1848-1871): Izučavanja o nacionalizmu i književnom romantizmu kod Srba* [The youth and their literature (1848-1871): Studies in nationalism and literary romanticism of the Serbs], pp. 202-204.

¹⁷⁶ Vladimir Jovanović, *Osnovi snage i veličine Srbske* [The foundations of Serbian strength and greatness], in: *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), I, no. 3, 15/27. VI 1870.

¹⁷⁷ *Svoboda* (Liberty), I, no. 27, 14/26. V 1870.

¹⁷⁸ Vladimir Jovanović, *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, p. 158.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 149-150.

Hungarian peoples, Jovanović was certain that only the granting of equal rights and duties could re-establish order in that perfect storm of conflicting wishes and demands that the Dual Monarchy had turned into.

Understandably so, as he had moved to Bucharest in 1869, Karavelov was able to express a more radical assessment of Austro-Hungarian internal and external policies. In his view, the times when “entire nations had been conquered and oppressed for the love of the Habsburg household are gone.”¹⁸⁰ Vienna had ultimately and irrevocably lost the trust of the South Slavs in 1866 when, after the catastrophe of Sadowa, she failed to come to terms with her nationalities tenaciously calling for autonomy and national rights.¹⁸¹ Karavelov sarcastically portrayed the *divide et impera* governing techniques of Count Beust (1809-1886) in an 1869 article: “We believe that, wherever you look in Europe, Asia, and Africa, there are no two such states linked by so honest and mutually attractive a bond as Austria and Turkey... As two old women, they talk of nothing else but their young years and the proper graveyard for the coming burial. (...) Poor is Turkey! Poor is Austria!”¹⁸²

After having established that both the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian imperial states were at the brink of collapse, burdened by the grave dissatisfaction of the nations they dominated over, the two political writers went on to reject pan-Slavism and to underline the principle of non-intervention in Balkan affairs. In London, as early as 1862, Jovanović tried to convince the London Archbishop R. W. Denton, Richard Cobden, and the Member of Parliament for Carlisle Edmund Potter that “the Eastern Christians would never desire to substitute the Russian yoke for the Turkish”.¹⁸³ Later, in 1870, he was still fiercely arguing against “the Red Spectre of pan-Slavism”. If asked to abdicate their national liberty and independence in favour of Russian dominance, the Slavs and Christians of Eastern Europe would “by their twelve million voices answer twelve million *noes*.”¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁰ Svoboda (Liberty), III, no. 18, 28. X/9. XI 1872.

¹⁸¹ Mlada Srbadija (The Serbian Youth), II, no. 21, 30. VIII/11. IX 1871.

¹⁸² Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 2, 12/24. XI 1869.

¹⁸³ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], pp. 122-125.

¹⁸⁴ Vladimir Jovanović, *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, pp. 140-142.

In a similar manner, Karavelov sneered upon the mountains of gold and the heavenly happiness promised to the Balkan Christians by the Russian Slavophiles. The only reason, he opined, why any given European state would protect the unity of the Ottoman Empire is their fear of Russia. As Jovanović also strived to accomplish, the Bulgarian publicist asked the European states to understand that the Christian subjects of the sultan never wished to sacrifice their independence to the love for “elusive pan-Slavism”.¹⁸⁵ Criticizing the main Russian medium of pan-Slavism and his own former employers at the *Golos* newspaper, Karavelov claimed that no brotherhood could ever be tied together with an axe and a whip. Where there is brotherhood, there is no seniority, and the Slavophiles are wrong to assume that the only way in which the small Slavic nationalities can overcome their provincial self-obsession and rivalry is through Russian guidance. That is neither the feeling among ordinary Russians nor among the Balkan Christians: “If *Golos* has no sympathy for a Danubian federation, then we retain the right not to have any sympathy for pan-Slavism, which has already been condemned by conscientious Russians such as Chernyshevsky, Pypin,¹⁸⁶ and others.”¹⁸⁷

Therefore, it is easy to deduce that, as far as Jovanović and Karavelov were concerned, the only guarantee effective enough to prevent the disturbance of the European balance and secure the Balkans from the ambition and conquest of any Power was liberty and independence of the oppressed nationalities. And here one finds oneself at the threshold of their federalism. To surmount the centuries-long submission to the foreign invader and master, all of the Balkan nations had to work together, or as Karavelov would often put it: “The Balkan fifteen million¹⁸⁸ are either to be conquered by another foreign power”, presumably either Austria-Hungary or Russia, “or to come together and assume responsibility for their own fate.”¹⁸⁹ In addition to being (over)optimistic about the strength of the Balkan nations to liberate themselves from the

¹⁸⁵ *Nezavisimost* (Independence), III, no. 47, 11/23. VIII 1873.

¹⁸⁶ Alexander Nikolayevich Pypin (1833-1904), a Russian linguist, historian, and journalist, professor at the University of Saint Petersburg.

¹⁸⁷ *Svoboda* (Liberty), II, no. 1, 2/14. I 1871.

¹⁸⁸ Notice how often and how significantly Karavelov and Jovanović’s estimates of the number of inhabitants of the Balkans vary.

¹⁸⁹ *Svoboda* (Liberty), II, no. 42, 1/13. IV 1872.

Ottoman dominance in an all-out military confrontation,¹⁹⁰ Jovanović and Karavelov saw in the establishment of a united Balkan political body the sole solution to the Eastern question; the sole warranty of liberty – personal and national.

In such a liberal multinational federation every nationality would retain internal self-rule and national, cultural, and linguistic rights. Karavelov believed in the creation of four federal units – Serbia with Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro; Bulgaria with Thrace and Macedonia; Albania; and Romania in its current boundaries. The Greeks would be invited to join only after they had renounced the *Megali Idea* of resurrecting the Byzantine Empire. In a later stage, “after a quarter of a century or so” and the ultimate break-up of Austria-Hungary, Dalmatia, Croatia, Srem, Banat, and Bačka should join the Serbian federal unit and Transylvania the Romanian.¹⁹¹

In the case of the Turks residing in the Balkans, Karavelov offered directly conflicting proposals: in May 1870 he argued that the former imperial masters could stay where they were, provided that they were willing to obey the new laws to be created by the will of the majority, as the Tatars were in Russia or the Serbs in Hungary; accordingly, in September that same year he wrote that if a stable, happy, and progressive (federal) state was formed upon purely liberal principles, the national differences would cease to matter. However, in April 1869 and in July 1873 he called for the total eviction of the Turks to Asia where they could live as it pleased them.¹⁹² To forcefully seek for coherence in the works of any given political writer would be, as Quentin Skinner has argued, a methodological fallacy. Sometimes contradictions are just that – contradictions, and they must not serve the purpose of gaining “a fuller understanding” of the whole theory.¹⁹³ Nor, however, should political thinkers of the past be subjected to too harsh a criticism on the grounds of “incoherence”. What Karavelov, as so many others before and after,

¹⁹⁰ See, for example, the rather rosy appraisal of the Balkan nations’ military capabilities by Jovanović in: *Srbski narod i Istočno pitanje* [The Serbian nation and the Eastern question], pp. 34-38; and *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, pp. 163-169.

¹⁹¹ *Svoboda* (Liberty), I, no. 27, 14/26. V 1870; *ibidem*, II, no. 43, 8/20. IV 1872; and *Nezavisimost* (Independence), III, no. 42, 7/19. VII 1873.

¹⁹² Compare, on the one side, *Svoboda* (Liberty), I, no. 27, 14/26. V 1870; and *ibidem*, I, no. 42, 16/28. IX 1870. with *Zastava* (The Banner), IV, no. 45, 13/25. IV 1869; and *Nezavisimost* (Independence), III, no. 42, 7/19. VII 1873, on the other.

¹⁹³ Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”, pp. 16-22.

strived to accomplish was to present an applicable programme of political change within which specificities were often (re)modified in accordance with circumstance.

With the characteristics of Karavelov's project in mind, if one turned to Jovanović's works, a set of differences would instantly emerge. Vladimir Jovanović was explicit about the necessity of forming a free federation "to resist the enemies of liberty";¹⁹⁴ however, he stayed rather vague when it came to providing a detailed account of the future Balkan political arrangement. He seems to have excluded the non-South Slav peoples from his own vision and anticipated the "unification of the Southern Slovenians (Slavs), the Serbs with the Croats and the Bulgarians."¹⁹⁵ This is certainly due to his belief that "the time for the questions of internal political organization or reforms will come when the unity and independence have been assured."¹⁹⁶ It is for the Balkan peoples, the Romanians, the Albanians, and the Greeks seemingly omitted from this project, to decide through a free deliberative process whether they shall live under this or that constitutional form. However it may be, they still ought to be agreed that any sort of supremacy of one race¹⁹⁷ or nation over the others or any perpetuation of despotic and tyrannical oppression must be rejected and combated by all.¹⁹⁸

A further point of divergence from Karavelov's position is Jovanović's attitude toward the Balkan Muslims. Imre Ress of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences' Institute of History was mistaken to argue in his 2006 essay on the nineteenth-century Serbian liberalism that Jovanović "completely ignored the presence and needs of the Muslims of the region, whom the Serbs traditionally stigmatized as a people incapable of development."¹⁹⁹ In contrast, Jovanović, while

¹⁹⁴ *Zastava* (The Banner), V, no. 93, 12/24. VIII 1870.

¹⁹⁵ Vladimir Jovanović, *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, p. 171.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 174.

¹⁹⁷ The term "race", as well as his understanding of nationalism discussed above, leaves room for the assumption that Jovanović need not have been ready to exclude other Balkan nations from his federal scheme. Be it as it may, an open question there remains.

¹⁹⁸ Vladimir Jovanović, *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, p. 174.

¹⁹⁹ Imre Ress, "The Value System of Serbian Liberalism", pp. 363-364. What is more, Ress did not refer to any of Jovanović's numerous works when he made the claim in question. By forcing Jovanović into the "ideal type" of later aggressive Balkan nationalism, one might end up in a pitfall of intellectual non-history.

writing about the future of the region, actually stated that the principle of equality, individual and national, should be applied to the Balkan Muslims in the same manner as it would be to the Christians, without any distinction of religion and race: “the Musulmans must be invited to decide freely and independently if they will join the confederacy wherein each nation should retain its individuality.”²⁰⁰ Furthermore, the future relations between the Christians and the Muslims in South-eastern Europe could be cultivated upon the virtues of “prudence, tolerance, conciliation, charity, and forbearance”, if only the ‘Turks realized that the “Osmanlis were not the only men in the world to possess the knowledge of the truth and who therefore must look with horror, scorn, and contempt upon all other nations.”²⁰¹

Before more can be said on the possible internal organization of the proposed Balkan federation, it must be noted that neither of the two writers made a distinction between a *federation* and a *confederative state*. They used both concepts to signify a higher political entity whose authority is derived from grouped individual carriers of sovereign power. A thus constructed political body had no innate autonomy, no independent political life force. The only engine of its existence was the freely given licence by the member states, which, in the case of a clear violation of state-national rights, could be revoked at any time through already established institutional mechanisms.

Karavelov was notoriously indifferent to the possibility that there might be a difference between a federation and a confederacy. The distinction was simply absent from the matrix of his political language(s).²⁰² Jovanović, however, tried to come up with a working definition of a federal state, but still treated the concepts of alliance (*alijancija*), union (*savez*), federation, and confederacy as synonyms.²⁰³ This stemmed from his division of historical types of sociability where “unions of states”, offensive and defensive alliances, federations, and confederations as

²⁰⁰ Vladimir Jovanović, *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, p. 175.

²⁰¹ Ibidem, pp. 175 and 155.

²⁰² For an illustration, compare: *Svoboda* (Liberty), I, no. 13, 29. I/10. II 1870; ibidem, I, no. 50, 18/30. XI 1870; ibidem, II, no. 43, 8/20. IV 1872; and *Libertatea* (Liberty), no. 12, 26. III/7. IV 1871.

²⁰³ See: Vladimir Jovanović, “Socijalizam ili društveno pitanje – od najstarijih dana pa do danas” [Socialism or the social question – from ancient times until today], p. 113; *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, pp. 164-165; and “Alijancija” [Alliance], *Politički rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook A-1, Novi Sad: United Serbian Youth, 1870, pp. 69-71.

more or less identical political forms, simultaneously presented the peak of human development and the future of political life in the civilized world.²⁰⁴

For Jovanović, federation “marks only the association, union, alliance of states which are independent in their internal affairs, but which have installed for the protection of their universal (shared) interests a common constitution. Federal governments have no other authority than that conceded by separate governments of associated or unified states.”²⁰⁵ In other words, the federal government could act only after the citizens, their communal institutions, and the federal states themselves have exhausted all the means of protecting liberty and progress.²⁰⁶ In this view, every federation is a constitutionally-founded political society encompassing a multitude of different nationalities which are, regardless of ethnic origin, bonded primarily by the pursuit of common interests (happiness) under the condition of liberty.

As previously shown, Jovanović and Karavelov argued that the minute details of the future form of the federal government were to be decided by the people themselves in a free referendum on a federal constitution, organized on the basis of universal suffrage and majority vote.²⁰⁷ But if one dared to read between the lines and rely on the most important items of their wide conceptual toolboxes, it may be safe to assume that the future Balkan (Eastern, Danubian²⁰⁸) federation would be a union of republics. While Karavelov wrote many times that the republic is the uniform saviour from all misery, Jovanović held that, beside the fact that the

²⁰⁴ Vladimir Jovanović, “Asocijacija” [Association], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook A-2, Novi Sad: United Serbian Youth, 1870, p. 121. It is hardly surprising that Jovanović considered the United States and the Helvetic Confederacy as being alliance, unions of states, and federations. As long as they presented supra-national entities, the possible alterations did not bother him.

²⁰⁵ Vladimir Jovanović, “Vlada” [Government], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook V, pp. 526-527.

²⁰⁶ Vladimir Jovanović, “Obština” [Commune], pp. 96-97.

²⁰⁷ See: the articles 1 and 6 of the 1872 Central Bulgarian Revolutionary Committee’s programme, in: Zahari Stoyanov, *Zapiski po bŭlgarskite vŭstaniya* [Notes on the Bulgarian uprisings], volume I, chapter 2; and Vladimir Jovanović, *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, pp. 177-178.

²⁰⁸ The steadiness and constancy in employing geographical concepts from their arsenal was never a huge concern for these two men. Everywhere in their works, as one may have already noticed, the Balkans, (South-)Eastern Europe (as in *Eastern question*), Danubian lands, Oriental Europe, and the Old-Mountain-Peninsula are interchangeably used, which makes spatial boundaries of Jovanović and Karavelov’s thought rather elusive, almost impossible to fix.

Olden Serbs had lived in “an alliance of many republics”, thus exercised sovereignty is in the closest possible harmony with the principle of liberty.²⁰⁹ The Bulgarian publicist suggested that only after having enabled the potential of all citizens to be fulfilled through equality in freedom and active participation in political life could the Balkan federation assume its place among the far greater and more populous polities “with the strength of 50 to 70 million.”²¹⁰

Furthermore, both authors repeatedly underlined the importance of strong institutions of local self-rule. Accordingly, the Balkan federation of the future would be based on strongly decentralized forms of local government – communes or municipalities in constant communication with the higher, state/national and federal, levels of governance. Karavelov proposed that a one-chamber common parliament and a federal government with constitutionally limited authority should be in charge of foreign relations and all matters beyond the capabilities of the free, independent, and equal federal states.²¹¹ All public officials must be elected and fully responsible for their actions.²¹² The establishment of a Supreme Court would most certainly be proposed, for, as Jovanović held, there needed to be an organ to judge the general legality of any union and everything that might hurt it.²¹³ Finally, once the Ottoman grasp over European territories had been broken, Istanbul should be proclaimed a free port and the federal centre of commerce.²¹⁴

Jovanović and Karavelov were adamantly opposed to historical rights – they held that the federal units of the future Balkan federation had to be formed in accordance with the principle of nationality or what they termed *the ethnographic rule*. The former author, in Bakunin’s company, found himself in a fierce debate with a group of Greek émigrés in London, quite possibly in

²⁰⁹ Karavelov in: Svoboda (Liberty), II, no. 1, 2/14. I 1871; Jovanović in: Zastava (The Banner), V, no. 86, 26. VII/7. VIII 1870; and “Vlada” [Government], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook V, p. 539.

²¹⁰ Svoboda (Liberty), II, no. 42, 1/13. IV 1872.

²¹¹ Ibidem, I, no. 27, 14/26. V 1870; and Nezavisimost (Independence), III, no. 42, 7/19. VII 1873.

²¹² Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 45, 7/19. X 1870.

²¹³ Vladimir Jovanović, “Alijancija” [Alliance], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook A-1, p. 69.

²¹⁴ This, at best utopian, idea Jovanović and Karavelov probably took over from Mihailo Polit-Desančić (1833-1920), a graduate in law of Vienna University, the Serbian liberal politician and member of the Hungarian Diet, and another author calling for a “Confederacy of independent national Balkan states” in 1862: *Die Orientalische Frage und ihre organische Lösung*, Wien, 1863; more in: Vaso Čubrilović, *Istorija političke misli u Srbiji XIX veka* [The history of political thought in nineteenth-century Serbia], Belgrade: Prosveta, 1958, pp. 255-257.

1863, about a future Greco-Serbian union. The Greeks, led by a certain Neocles G. Mussabini, insisted upon the “legitimate historical boundaries of Alexander the Great’s empire”. In contrast, Jovanović argued that “one nation’s historical boundaries would always frustrate others’ historical rights. Thus, no just agreement would ever be reached.”²¹⁵ Therefore, all federal states would have their boundaries determined by the principle of nationality, whereas the civil rights and free development of national character and cultural life of minorities that had found themselves in an ethnically foreign state would be guaranteed.²¹⁶

Karavelov too opposed all proposals for the revival of the medieval Balkan empires. Historical right, the Byzantine Empire, Simeon’s Tsardom, and Dušan’s crown have no place where liberty and life should rule:

“A federation is possible only among those peoples and nations that... have the same strivings and are moved by the same idea. In one word, a federation is possible only when both this and that nation demand happiness and liberty. (...) And so, where there is no equality, brotherhood, human benevolence, and love for justice, neither a political union nor a political agreement can come to pass.”²¹⁷

Jovanović and Karavelov thought that the Balkan peoples had learnt the lessons of the past. Their passions and disunity, their original sin, had led to the well-deserved yet cataclysmic fall into slavery. Not without a pinch of millennialism, the two men of letters exhorted that the time had come for a new historical life.²¹⁸ Only with joined forces, hand in hand, would the Balkan nations succeed to prove their ability for such a renaissance.

“We, the Bulgarians, the Serbs, and the Romanians - even the Greeks, provided they gave up on their insane dreams and their rusty Byzantine Empire - are after the same goal, have *one destiny*, are driven by the same idea, and thus, must create a free Danubian federation and protect our national and personal liberty! All must keep in mind that, as we stand as the successors of the dead Turkish Empire and the destroyed Austrian Empire, we must immediately choose our path and write down

²¹⁵ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], p. 161.

²¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 152.

²¹⁷ *Nezavisimost* (Independence), III, no. 42, 7/19. VII 1873.

²¹⁸ On millennialism in the Ottoman Balkans, see the valuable contribution by the greatest Braudelian scholar of the region: Traian Stoianovich, “Les structures millénaristes sud-slaves aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles”, in *Between East and West: The Balkan and the Mediterranean Worlds*, volume IV, New Rochelle, New York: A. D. Caratzas, 1995, pp. 1-13.

the programme of our *new life*; if we slumber and intrigue among ourselves, it might so happen that we again fall under a wholly different yoke, *never to resurrect again*.”²¹⁹ (emphases are mine)

Not only were the Balkan nations capable of independent political lives, and strong enough to topple the corporate-imperial Ottoman order, but also willing to serve the universal cause of European peace and prosperity. Jovanović went to great lengths to show how an independent, stable, and progressive Balkan federation would be in the best of interests of all the Great Powers, the United States of America included, and humanity in general.²²⁰ Once free of the Ottoman straightjacket of disorder, the Balkan federation would occupy a crucial position in international trade, along the most important lines of communication and transport linking London, Vienna, Istanbul, and Calcutta.²²¹ “All quiet on the Danube” would be the credo of the post-Ottoman liberal multinational federation, in which all were equally free to pursue their personal interests and develop their sense of belonging to a greater whole, be it national, supra-national, or just universally human. In due course, the state of which Jovanović and Karavelov hoped to be citizens would doubtless become what in a remote context Kaiser Wilhelm II, in one of his precious lucid moments, called *the Seventh Great Power of Europe*.²²²

However, mistaking the prevailing optimism of the two Balkan intellectuals for naiveté would be a grave error. Jovanović was certain that it was scarcely possible to forecast with precision so dark and uncertain a fate as that of the Eastern Christians. Nonetheless, he maintained an utterly optimistic outlook and stated as many times as he could, across his various written works, that he had limitless confidence in the future.²²³ Be that as it may, by the mid-1870s both he and Karavelov in practice deferred to the empire of the possible – the former had

²¹⁹ Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 16, 19. II/3. III 1870.

²²⁰ Vladimir Jovanović, *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, pp. 159-162.

²²¹ Vladimir Jovanović, “Balkansko poluostrvo” [the Balkan Peninsula], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook B, Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1872, p. 174.

²²² If one adopted Jovanović and Karavelov’s assumption about the inevitable break-up of Austria-Hungary, then here analysed Balkan federation would have to be “the Sixth Great Power of Europe”.

²²³ Vladimir Jovanović, “Naš narodni položaj, naše narodno uzdanje” [Our national position, our national hope], in: *Za slobodu i narod: Pokušaji Vladimira Jovanovića, člana Ujedinjene omladine Srbske* [For liberty and nation: Efforts by Vladimir Jovanović, a member of the United Serbian Youth], pp. 255-256; *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, p. 125.

finally been allowed, from 1873 onwards, to occupy minor official positions within the Serbian bureaucracy and in April 1876 he was named the Minister of Finance in the liberal Serbian government that would declare war on the Ottomans in early summer that year.²²⁴ It has already been shown how, from 1874/75, Karavelov decided to follow a different path, one of people's education and enlightenment. He did live to see Bulgaria liberated, but could not partake in the post-1878 political life of his homeland.

As so often is the case, the abyss between the realm of Jovanović and Karavelov's political thought of the late 1860s and early 1870s and that of practical politics proved to have been insurmountable. Firstly, neither of the two had ever spoken and written in the name of any one government. Their federalism was utterly *un-official*, the result of independent thinking and more often than not in direct opposition to official Balkan circles.²²⁵ Secondly, the bloodbath in which the 1875 Bulgarian uprising ended, the devastating defeat of the Serbian forces at the hands of the Turks in 1876, the realization that without the help of the Russian military might the Ottomans would have never given in, the balance-of-power calculations of the 1878 San Stefano and Berlin Treaties, the fateful annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the eventual demise of the Balkan states into the hiatus of rivalry and confrontation in the era of high European imperialism had all contributed to rendering the idea of a Balkan federation unattainable. It never completely died away, but its later embodiments were of different nature and of other historical circumstance.

No matter how limited the *real* impact of these two Balkan intellectuals' works might have been, as long as there were *real* women and men receiving, despite the bans imposed by the Ottoman authorities, *Svoboda* and *Nezavisimost* or reading Jovanović's essays in *Zastava* or *Mlada*

²²⁴ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], p. 294.

²²⁵ It was the Serbian Prince Mihailo Obrenović who strived to bring about an alliance of Balkan peoples directed against the Ottomans. His assassination in 1868 prevented the possibility of setting into motion the elaborate, secretive scheme of already negotiated treaties and agreements from the year before. On the contacts between the Serbian government and the conservative Bulgarian Benevolent Society from Bucharest, and the potential creation of a Yugoslav Empire under Prince Mihailo, see: Grgur Jakšić and Vojislav J. Vučković, *Spoljna politika Srbije za vladu kneza Mihaila – Prvi balkanski savez* [Serbia's foreign policy under Prince Mihailo – the First Balkan Alliance], Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1963, pp. 363-368; on the Greco-Serbian and Serbian-Romanian negotiations, see: ibidem, pp. 448-455. What is more, a thorough overview of the attempts of the Balkan governments in 1867/68 to join forces without the promise of political unification and wage war against the Turks is given in: Leften S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times*, pp. 91-105.

Srbadija, and his articles of the *Politični rečnik*, whatever ideals they preached had a fighting chance. To think is to write and say; and to write and say is the first step toward being able to do. If a Balkan federation had not been thought of, written and spoken about, it could have never been a failed idea of the 1860s and 1870s liberal Balkan intellectuals. To fail trying is what that crooked timber of humanity is made of. Not to have thought, written, and spoken, on the other hand, would have simply been a-historical.

2. 5. Conclusion

In this chapter I have sought to establish a firm link between the more general aspects of the political thought of two Balkan intellectuals and the meaning of federalism in their works of the late 1860s and early 1870s. Faced with what they perceived as universal injustice and harshness of the obsolete Ottoman feudal-military system and the traditional, pre-modern domestic forms of political authority, being in a constant dialogue with the forceful currents of extra-Balkan social and political thought, Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov endeavoured to shatter the all-pervasive spiritual passivity of their respective nations.

Perhaps the most original feature of their thought is the insistence on the fact that the destiny of the Balkan peoples is intrinsically connected with that of the *civilized* world. Only by riding the tides of universal history might the subjects of the sultan (and the emperor) ever hope to obtain full human happiness. Personal and national liberty, social justice, equality and brotherhood, progress in science, education, technology, and culture, democracy and popular political institutions were not in any way foreign to the Balkan Christians, in whose name Jovanović and Karavelov spoke. Nor did they belong to any particular nation or section of humanity – they were universally human, the ultimate *telos* of all human development. And so, by the application of reason, hard will, and commitment the Balkan nations too would in due course assume their rightful place among the free and progressive nations and share in the gains of unstoppable progress. “We are capable of culture, of commerce, and of civilization”,²²⁶ wrote Karavelov, and, therefore, no force of tyranny, obscurantism, and ignorance could hope to stall the Balkan nations’ march forward.

I have further striven to prove that the principal act of the “regeneration” of the Balkans was to be the creation of a federal state in which liberty would be guaranteed to all citizens as

²²⁶ Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 35, 22. VII/3. VIII 1870.

individuals and members of different nationalities. It has recently been argued that the quest for Balkan or South-Slav federalism of the 1860s and 1870s was exclusively pragmatic. Diana Mishkova of Sofia's Centre for Advanced Study, a prominent scholar of nineteenth-century Balkan liberalism, asserted that such a proposed federation's goals were only "to match the strength of the imperial adversaries (the Ottomans and the Habsburgs) and protect the Balkan countries from turning into a colony of the European factories."²²⁷ However, above the level of pragmatism and *realpolitik*, which was doubtless present in the thinking of the two writers, there endured a higher level of idealism. The idea of a Balkan federation was not developed only to serve practical goals and treat the acute weaknesses of small nations in a monumental struggle against the imperial order and against possible conquering excursions of the Great Powers of Europe. It was, as a matter of fact, derived directly from Jovanović and Karavelov's understandings of universal human development – thus worked out federalism had the meaning of ultimate happiness, of absolute certificate of liberty, of the end of history.

Finally, the federalism of Jovanović and Karavelov was not without precedent. It built directly upon the idealized historical experiences of the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy. In the next chapter I shall advance this last argument by showing how robustly the institutional arrangement of the two Western federal states informed the federalisms of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov. Having detected in the vast transatlantic American republic and, at least for European standards of the time, tiny Alpine confederacy the full embodiment of free, prosperous, and happy human life, Jovanović and Karavelov not only developed their respective federalisms as the panacea for the complexities of the Eastern question but also as the highest ideal of human social and individual existence. By addressing just how those federations inspired the two Balkan intellectuals, I hope to deepen the general understanding of the 1860s and 1870s Balkan federalism and strongly underline its idealistic foundations.

²²⁷ Diana Mishkova, "Balkan Liberalisms: Historical Routes of a Modern Ideology", p. 151.

Chapter Three: At the gates of liberty and progress

The United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy as sources of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov's federalism

3. 1. Introduction

Mihail Madzharov (1854-1944), the man who was later to become a prominent Bulgarian politician and diplomat, arrived in his birth place of Koprivštica in March 1878. Upon learning that Lyuben Karavelov too was staying there in his family home, Madzharov immediately decided to try to meet in person the Bulgarian writer whose works “had left such a deep mark on (his) soul.”²²⁸ When Madzharov introduced himself to Karavelov as a former student of Istanbul's Robert College, the American Congregational-Presbyterian institution of higher education established in 1863 by Christopher B. Robert,²²⁹ the latter insisted on having a long discussion of the pragmatism of the American mind. Highlighting the immense qualities of the American educational system, particularly the absence of clerical control over schooling and the practical orientation of the curricula, the Bulgarian publicist assured his young visitor of the utter necessity to introduce those same values into the intellectual life of the newly liberated Balkan state.²³⁰

Some decade and a half earlier, following his removal by the Serbian authorities from the Belgrade Grande École, Vladimir Jovanović had established residency in Geneva in April 1864. There he would spend the following two years, enjoying the advantages of the Swiss “natural beauties and liberty.”²³¹ In one of his repeated conversations with James Fazy (1794-1878), a radical democrat and the former president of the Republic of Geneva, Jovanović expressed utter

²²⁸ Stefan Velikov (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov v spomenite na sŭvremennicite si* [Lyuben Karavelov in the memory of his contemporaries], pp. 150-151.

²²⁹ Christopher B. Robert (1802-1878) was a New York-born philanthropist who founded Robert College, the oldest American school outside of the United States. See: “A Millionaire's Will: Bequests of the Late Christopher B. Robert – A Fund for the Endowment of Robert College”, *The New York Times*, 15/27 November 1878.

²³⁰ Stefan Velikov (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov v spomenite na sŭvremennicite si* [Lyuben Karavelov in the memory of his contemporaries], pp. 152-153.

²³¹ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], p. 184.

admiration for free *Švajcarska* (Switzerland), a country perpetually peaceful and thus enabled to constantly develop the intellectual, moral, and physical strength of its citizenry and to serve as the world centre of cultural progress. In Jovanović's view, not only had the Swiss succeeded in liberating themselves from the foreign yoke of Austria by relying on their own abilities and determination, but they also fostered civic virtues which are the best guarantee of their internal liberty. The Serbs, Jovanović informed his acquaintance, envied the citizens of the "Swiss union of democratic republics" for their lives led in progressive development of culture and civilization, in equality, freedom, and justice, and still hoped it was not too late to reverse their own fate by adopting democratic ideas.²³²

As the two episodes well illustrate, Jovanović and Karavelov's respect for the social and political systems of the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy was unbounded. In this chapter I shall classify into three separate headings the many features of the American and Swiss historical experiences from which the two Balkan intellectuals drew inspiration. Firstly, I show how strongly the *multi-nationality* of the two Western federal systems informed Jovanović and Karavelov's belief that the coexistence within a single political entity of many a different nation is not only possible but may also be rather advantageous. Secondly, I explore the seemingly limitless confidence of Jovanović and Karavelov in the ability of the American and Swiss *democratic republican* systems to provide the basis for truly human lives of their citizens - free, equal, and prosperous. Last but not least, I strive to clarify just why the two Balkan thinkers held the American and Swiss systems of *public education* in such high esteem. The purpose of analysing these three streams of inspiration is to present how all of them merged into Jovanović and Karavelov's understandings of American and Swiss federalisms as the ideal forms of social and political life.

I will try throughout the chapter to point to the known sources the two Balkan intellectuals exploited in order to inform their readers of past and present occurrences in the United States of America and the Swiss confederative state. What is more, I will also strive to determine how well Jovanović and Karavelov had actually understood the reality of the two Western political systems before they undertook to convince the Balkan reading public of the necessity to emulate their social, political, and economic arrangements. Finally, I will argue that the American and Swiss federalisms were conceptualized by the two Balkan political writers as potentially applicable *ideals* and thus had to remain detached in their works from the *real* historical development of the two model federal polities. This would further mean that the

²³² Ibidem, pp. 184-188.

already discussed plans of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov for the establishment of a post-Ottoman Balkan federation were not only developed out of *pragmatism* and immediate geopolitical reasoning, but also stemmed from their *idealization* of social and political systems of the two Western federations. In other words, and as far as Jovanović and Karavelov were concerned, the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy stood as climactic embodiments of human evolution at the very end of history. What the Balkan nations needed to do was only to work toward that end as hard as they possibly could.

3. 2. “Fifty confessions”, “three nations”, and out of many – one: Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov’s view of American and Swiss multi-nationality

It is almost as if one can hear the November 1787 Publius²³³ reply to the objections raised by the opponents of ratification of the infant American republic’s federal Constitution resonating through the writings of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov. As James Madison (1751-1836) had forcefully argued some three quarters of a century earlier, so did the two Balkan intellectuals recognize the necessity of a Balkan Union as “the bulwark against foreign danger, the conservator of peace, the guardian of commerce... the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the old world, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction.”²³⁴ The fact that there is no hard evidence that either of the two men actually read or knew of the American, or Swiss for that matter, constitutional debates of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century notwithstanding, it is striking to learn that they too conceptualized the future Balkan federation as a defender of social order without strong centralizing tendencies, which they so despised in the Ottoman framework of rule.

As Publius had done before, Jovanović and Karavelov advanced a plan for a Balkan republican federal state as a means to achieve both size and security then believed only to be

²³³ Publius was a pen name used by Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804), James Madison (1751-1836), and John Jay (1745-1829) under which they promoted the ratification of the United States Constitution in seventy-seven articles published between October 1787 and August 1788 in *The Independent Journal* and *The New York Packet*. Along with eight other articles, these later came to be known as *The Federalist Papers*. Fully accessible via: *Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy* - http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/fed.asp.

²³⁴ James Madison, “The Federalist Papers: No. 14. Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered. From the New York Packet. Friday, November 30, 1787 – accessed via the Avalon Project’s website *Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed14.asp.

available to mighty monarchic states and despotic empires.²³⁵ Simply put, to design an institutional structure under which Balkan nations could live *together* was the condition *sine qua non* of replicating, to paraphrase Thomas Paine, what the Americans and the Swiss did in magnitude and what the Athenians had themselves been in miniature.²³⁶

However, such unity in diversity was not to be easily brought about during an era in which struggle for national emancipation would not automatically promise a future of harmonious co-existence among different nationalities of the Balkan Peninsula. As mentioned before, Karavelov was well aware of the fact that the memory of pre-Ottoman Balkan monarchies was detrimental to the objective of Balkan solidarity. Instead of pursuing a revival of any one of the medieval regional empires – be it Bulgarian, Greek, or Serbian – the process of *national* liberation of the Balkan peoples should converge with the creation of a *federal* system of government among them, fully in compliance with the principles of equality, autonomy, and interdependence. It comes as no surprise then that one of Karavelov's 1870 articles read:

“Let us, the Balkan nations, lock away our ancient history, on which we may look only as a source of evil and misery... the quarrels that prevailed among us 450 years ago are the real reason for our current predicament. The past should enlighten us never again to fall prey to the lie that we are capable of achieving anything alone; instead, we must offer a brotherly hand to each other.”²³⁷

Emilian Kavalski, Associate Professor at the Institute for Social Justice of the Australian Catholic University, has convincingly argued that the nationalism of Balkan liberal authors of the 1860s and 1870s, Jovanović and Karavelov included, primarily served to distinguish an individual nation's contribution to the prospective Balkan union without implying inevitable confrontation and rivalry:

“In this way, the idea of national self-determination as a step towards a Balkan union was planted in the minds of Balkan readers at the time. *Nationalism* was seen as the necessary *prerequisite* for the success of *federalism*. Incentive was that only independent and nationally mature countries could

²³⁵ A remarkable discussion of early modern republican theory and its climax in the founding of the United States of America is to be found in: Daniel H. Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007, pp. 161-189.

²³⁶ “What Athens was in miniature, America will be in magnitude.” In: Thomas Paine, *The Rights of Man*, in: Bruce Kuklick (ed), *Thomas Paine: Political Writings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, first published in 1791/1792, p. 185.

²³⁷ Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 16, 19. II/3. III 1870.

form a successful federation and have an idiosyncratic contribution to such a political project.”²³⁸
(emphases are mine)

It was exactly here that a vision of a peaceful multi-national Balkan federation emerged in the works of Jovanović and Karavelov. The two of them perceived the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy as full embodiments of stable and prosperous multi-national states and derived their federal institutional structures as the ultimate generator of such stability and prosperity. The images of the two Western federal systems were subsequently mobilized in erecting a narrative of Balkan unity and co-existence under the concept of shared citizenship in a common Balkan federal state.

Jovanović was convinced that the entire Eastern question had to be resolved on the basis of liberty and equality, in the same manner as “the national issues had been settled in the Helvetic Confederacy where no single nationality has an absolute predominance and can enforce its own collective will upon other national groups.”²³⁹ Furthermore, “there all are equal before the law. There are no subjects, only citizens. No one is privileged by birth, class, place of residence, or, most importantly, nationality. All citizens share the same personal and political rights and responsibilities, and everyone is free to confess religion of their choice.”²⁴⁰

Karavelov wrote in *Nezavisimost* in June 1874 that if the future Balkan federation were to be founded on liberty and equality, no Balkan nation needed to be afraid for its particular characteristics and individuality:

“I will say it for the thousand and first time – in *Shveitsarija* (Switzerland) three nations of perfectly un-compatible natures live together and among them there is no inter-national violence whatsoever.”²⁴¹

For our two Balkan intellectuals the state was not intrinsically to be linked to one nationality and one nationality only. Karavelov realized that “liberty entails more than having our own emperors who would wear huge golden crowns, command guards and gendarmes, and fight and conquer our neighbours – patriotism goes beyond separate national aspirations, and

²³⁸ Emilian R. Kavalski, “The Balkan America? The Myth of America in the Creation of Bulgarian National Identity”, *New Zealand Slavonic Journal* 38, 2004, p. 139.

²³⁹ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], p. 176.

²⁴⁰ Ibidem, pp. 184-185.

²⁴¹ *Nezavisimost* (Independence), IV, no. 34, 8/20. VI 1874.

advanced and happy states can go beyond one nation, as exemplified by America and Switzerland.”²⁴² Similarly, an 1872 entry to Jovanović’s *Politični rečnik* argues that:

“Difference of origin, language, nationality, and religion weakens sociability only where it leads to difference in responsibility and right (...) However, where equality in liberty is guaranteed for *all* nationalities and confessions, there the bond of mutual need and interest that ties all, regardless of faith and tribe, is stronger than the bond of blood that connects tribes into nations. In such places men are united as sons of universal fatherland: liberty (...) Switzerland and the North American Union stand before our eyes to enlighten us and teach that differences of nationality and religion are easily reconciled by liberty equal for all.”²⁴³

In other words, the United States of America, “where citizens of fifty confessions and fifty nationalities are more closely united than Catholics of France and Orthodox Christians of Russia”,²⁴⁴ and the Helvetic Confederacy were presented by Jovanović and Karavelov as emblems of strength and unity in diversity. Not only did they manage to secure peaceful internal co-existence of many a nation but also acted in Jovanović and Karavelov’s political thought as beacons of independence in the face of foreign foes. Karavelov professed to the readers of *Libertatea*, the Romanian version of his *Svoboda*, that America and Switzerland succeeded, albeit with huge sacrifice, in erecting healthy states, based upon true constitutional and liberal foundations – “those two states, no matter their size, flourish because every single one of their citizens is ready to protect his rights from foreigners who dare to threaten him, even at the price of his own blood. One lives for all, and all for one.”²⁴⁵ Jovanović too was adamant in his belief that only a federation can guarantee independent political life of small Balkan nations – “it is federation that provides strong enough warranty against external conquering force.”²⁴⁶

²⁴² Zastava (The Banner), IV, no. 31, 7/19. III 1869.

²⁴³ Vladimir Jovanović, “Vlada” [Government], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook V, pp. 523-524. Moreover, in the entry “Država” [State], Jovanović noted down: “The *state* can welcome into its bosom sons of *different nationalities* who desire to live together in one land under laws guaranteeing equal rights and duties for all. These laws render the will of all known and constitute what is called *national sovereignty* – the crown of civil equality.” (emphases are mine) In: Vladimir Jovanović, “Država” [State], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook G, D, Đ [Dj], p. 812.

²⁴⁴ Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 12, 22. I/3. II 1870.

²⁴⁵ Libertatea (Liberty), no. 3, 20. I/1. II 1871.

²⁴⁶ Vladimir Jovanović, “Socijalizam ili društveno pitanje – od najstarijih dana pa do danas” [Socialism or the social question – from ancient times until today], p. 113.

The analogies that the Balkan intellectuals were drawing seem to have been straightforward – like the two Western federations proved able to achieve liberty by taking up arms and maintain their independence whenever threatened by numerically superior enemies, so will the Balkan nations rise from centuries-long subjugation, seize liberty, and resist all attempts of extra-Balkan actors to intervene in Balkan affairs. It is a small wonder then that Jovanović glorified the American Declaration of Independence (1776), which “proclaimed that all are free to live, work, and enjoy the fruits of their labour”,²⁴⁷ while Karavelov admired the Swiss for preserving their freedom and unique political system in close proximity to much more powerful polities, France and the German states.²⁴⁸ Therefore, wherever the foreign threat to a Balkan federation might come from, by holding fast to the American and Swiss motto *E Pluribus Unum*, the Balkan peoples would prevail.

Finally, both Jovanović and Karavelov read out of the American and Swiss historical experiences the enormous significance of the principle of self-defence and civil disobedience. For them, there was no other available path but that of self-protection. Jovanović wondered:

“Would there be Swiss freedom if not for the heroic spirit stronger than any passion? Would liberty be maintained and perpetually strengthened if not for the consciousness of Swiss sons who never stop marking the Swiss flag with their credo: one for all and all for one? Would there be American freedom if not for Washington’s principle of *self-interest*, according to which the people have the right and the duty to stop obeying at any given time those who testify with their abuses and violence to the utter disregard of freedom and justice?”²⁴⁹

What the two Balkan intellectuals wanted to learn from the American and Swiss historical genesis, and subsequently preach to their compatriots, was that freedom is never granted. In Karavelov’s own words:

“Today, when Europe consists of polities of the strength of fifty to seventy million, every small nation is either to yield to a great power or to unify itself with other nations upon liberal principles, as Switzerland and America did, and to construct a *defensive federation* (...) The Balkan fifteen million

²⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 112.

²⁴⁸ In: Mihail Arnaudov, *Ljuben Karavelov: Život, delo, epoha. 1834-1879* [Lyuben Karavelov: Life, works, epoch. 1834-1879], p. 502.

²⁴⁹ Vladimir Jovanović, “Naš narodni položaj, naše narodno uzdanje” [Our national position, our national hope], in: *Za slobodu i narod: Pokušaji Vladimira Jovanovića, člana Ujedinjene omladine Srbske* [For liberty and nation: Efforts by Vladimir Jovanović, a member of the United Serbian Youth], pp. 242-243.

are either to be conquered by another foreign power, once the Ottomans have succumbed to forces of history, or to come together and take care of their own salvation.”²⁵⁰ (emphasis is mine)

To what extent the images of the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy, as (re)constructed by Jovanović and Karavelov, matched the reality of those distant - and to the colossal majority of their readers - unknown countries was of secondary importance. What really mattered was the fact that the two Balkan intellectuals offered visions of freedom, brotherhood, and justice, visions that were easily fed into the Balkan public imagination. Moreover, by stressing unity in diversity as the underlying sources of the two Western federations’ strength and resilience, these visions of remote lands breaking away from old European patterns of political development and following their own trajectories to greatness²⁵¹ tapped into an already existing awareness of similarity of custom, language, and religion in the Balkans.²⁵² Mobilized by Jovanović and Karavelov to serve context-specific political objectives by calling for an anti-imperial revolution, national liberation, and protection against foreign intervention, the idealization of independent and potent American and Swiss multi-national federations became a creative escape from the confines of the 1860s and 1870s Balkan reality – reality of chronic weakness to do away with imperial dominance and economic backwardness.

However, apart from providing evidence of harmonious inter-national relations within and of the ability to preserve independence without, the American and Swiss federal models played another important part in Jovanović and Karavelov’s political languages. They were utilized to prove that democratic republicanism of federal states was the sole possible warranty of personal liberty as well. Thus conceptualized, the federalism of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov, modelled on their understanding of the two Western federations, aimed at, as it were, killing two birds with one stone – it was to protect the Balkan nations from outside conquering forces *and* internal despotism and tyranny. In the following two sections I will delve into the dynamic relationship between republicanism and federalism, and show exactly why Jovanović believed that “civic and public life had genuinely begun to develop only recently in Switzerland and the Union of North America,”²⁵³ while Karavelov held that “there were no

²⁵⁰ Svoboda (Liberty), II, no. 42, 1/13. IV 1872.

²⁵¹ Vladimir Jovanović, “Amerika” [America], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook A-1, p. 80.

²⁵² The similarities between Balkan peoples upon which a future Balkan federation ought to be founded are discussed by Karavelov in: Zastava (The Banner), IV, no. 31, 7/19. III 1869; and Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 42, 16/28. IX 1870.

²⁵³ Vladimir Jovanović, “Država” [State], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook G, D, Đ [Dj], p. 815.

happier nations than the Americans and the Swiss.”²⁵⁴ To follow in their footsteps was, according to these Balkan intellectuals, the shortest way for Balkan peoples to happiness unbound.

3. 3. The hearthstones of social and human perfection: the American and Swiss republicanism in Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov’s ideas of a Balkan federation

Neither Vladimir Jovanović nor Lyuben Karavelov could ever come up with a form of Polybian anacyclosis – a cyclical view of political change in which benign forms of government sooner or later degenerate into their malign selves - monarchy into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and democracy into ochlocracy.²⁵⁵ They were far too optimistic in their understanding of human nature and far too deeply embedded into a liberal, teleological reading of historical development to be that sceptical. “When we compare the social and political state in which the world of today exists, we find that mankind moves ever nearer to the ideals of democracy... Historical development of today’s states approaches closer and closer to complete fulfilment of liberty and justice among men and nations,”²⁵⁶ wrote Vladimir Jovanović in 1873. Put differently, liberty is the ultimate purpose of history. Truly free are only those societies in which the people safeguard their own rights and rule themselves as they see fit. Seen in this way, democracy itself is not only a form of government but rather an ideal type of communal life where *all* are truly free. Therefore, in Jovanović and Karavelov’s political thought there existed only two possible forms of government – monarchy, its different, more or less despotic shades notwithstanding, and republic.

Jovanović argued that “monarchy, in its core, always implies rule of one over all members of society and cannot provide a single link to democracy.”²⁵⁷ Similarly, Karavelov believed that “monarchy is capable of nothing else but plotting against the liberty and well-being

²⁵⁴ Narodnost (Nationality), II, no. 16, 9/21. III 1869.

²⁵⁵ See: G. W. Trompf, *The Idea of Historical Recurrence in Western Thought: From Antiquity to the Reformation*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1979, pp. 4-59.

²⁵⁶ Vladimir Jovanović, “Demokratija“ [Democracy], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook G, D, Đ [Dj], p. 722.

²⁵⁷ Ibidem, p. 716.

of the people... only a republic may serve as the universal saviour from misfortune.”²⁵⁸ Thus established connection between liberty as the ultimate goal of all social forms and republicanism as its only generator coalesced in the works of the two Balkan intellectuals with their notion of federalism. For them, it could not have been a matter of circumstance that the two republics, the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy, were also federal states. Jovanović and Karavelov’s uncompromising republicanism invigorated their unreserved federalism, and vice versa.

“Unity provides strength, but only liberty leads to unity; [this fact] is confirmed in practice by the union of American states and the union of Swiss republics,”²⁵⁹ thought Jovanović. Karavelov expounded that if one looked at the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy, one “would see that human happiness is not based upon sceptres and thrones, crowns and monarchies, but upon pure human liberty.”²⁶⁰ American states and Swiss cantons were conceptualized by the two Balkan intellectuals as republican islands of liberty with self-governance, self-help, and material aggrandizement, bound together by an efficient, and yet smooth and simple systems of federal rule. This system of rule, which Jovanović termed “the state nexus”,²⁶¹ secured de-centralized theatres of liberty, the states and cantons, without and within, and enabled their rapid social and human progress. For Jovanović and Karavelov, American and Swiss federalisms were what enabled their republicanism – correspondingly, popular sovereignty realized through republican rule further reinforced the size, stability, and strength of the federal union. The American and Swiss federalisms and republicanism seem to have been perceived by the Balkan intellectuals as mutually enhancing poles of the same mechanism of reaching for ever greater liberty. That is why Jovanović and Karavelov could not have admired the two Western federal models without at the same time recognizing potential benefits for the Balkan nations and their future federation of American and Swiss republican institutional arrangements.

Furthermore, there are at least five features of American and Swiss democratic federated republics that the two Balkan intellectuals found not only exceptionally striking but also intrinsic

²⁵⁸ Cited in: Kiril Gorov, *Socialno-ekonomičeskie vŭzgledi na Ljuben Karavelov* [Socio-economic views of Lyuben Karavelov], pp. 205-206.

²⁵⁹ Vladimir Jovanović, “Država” [State], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook G, D, Đ [Dj], p. 818.

²⁶⁰ *Narodnost* (Nationality), II, no. 16, 9/21. III 1869.

²⁶¹ Vladimir Jovanović, “Obština” [Commune], p. 148.

to their form of government and worthy of replicating in a Balkan federation of the future: the perpetual enactment of popular sovereignty through local autonomy and self-governance, the separation of powers, the utter disregard of clericalism and aristocracy, the unprecedented levels of economic freedom and prosperity, and, last but not least, the unique qualities of American and Swiss public education. What follows until the end of the section is a brief overview of the former four's place in the works of Jovanović and Karavelov, while the latter deserves a separate sub-heading which will close this chapter.

a) Local self-governance

Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov both believed in what one would today call subsidiarity principle, which requires that nothing should be undertaken by a higher and more complex social organization which can better be done by more decentralized and smaller entities. Or, as Jovanović claimed, the (federal) state should act to promote general liberty and advancement only in those areas of social life that lie beyond the reach of citizens and local authorities.²⁶² Harshly criticizing the Serbian Municipality Act of 1866, which drew a lot from the French model of local administration, for its strong centralizing tendencies and incompatibility with the pre-existence of traditionally strong patriarchal forms of local self-government in Serbia and the Balkans, Jovanović asserted that “political and administrative centralization around the globe struck many a nasty blow to liberty, so much so that today one has to look at the new world and America (for consolation), where communes are fully functional small republics within bigger ones.”²⁶³ Karavelov would resolutely agree. The main factor of order and progress in America was the fact that “the people there are their own tutors and able to enforce local laws of their own desire, by which then their administrators at all levels of the polity are bound to the very last letter.”²⁶⁴

It is interesting to note that neither of the two men ever travelled across the Atlantic, but they both read and often referred in their works to Alexis de Tocqueville's monumental two-volume *De La Démocratie en Amérique* (1835, 1840) when discussing the advantages of the

²⁶² Ibidem, pp. 95-97.

²⁶³ Ibidem, p. 125.

²⁶⁴ Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 45, 7/19. X 1870.

American system of self-government.²⁶⁵ It was Jovanović who particularly strongly insisted on using de Tocqueville as the most credible source on American “township democracy”. In a remarkable essay published in Serbian in 1872, *Obština (Commune)*, he let his readers know that ordinary Americans do not expect much from their central government. Instead, they made their communal institutions the focal points of social improvement:

“Federal government’s authority in America is limited to the most general of affairs. Under the principle *to each their own*, the internal and domestic life of counties, communes, and individuals is completely free. There no one expects anything from the central government, as is the case in European monarchies, but rather relies on oneself. Any intervention of government into the lives of counties, communes, and individuals is considered as violence and outright attack against liberty of all. An American... is used to taking care of himself. The principle of self-rule, self-government, self-help, and self-defence²⁶⁶ has deeply penetrated the souls and hearts of free Americans. This principle is better applied to their communal life than anywhere in Europe.”²⁶⁷

The system of local governance in the Helvetic Confederacy, according to our Balkan intellectuals, was equally conducive to personal autonomy, socio-economic advancement, and general progress. The only difference was the fact that Jovanović actually spent some time in Geneva, one of the Swiss republics, in 1864-1866 and again in 1870, and could personally observe the mechanisms of Swiss local and cantonal autonomy. In his memoirs, he offered a detailed description of democratic processes occurring daily within each of the twenty-two [sic] sovereign Swiss cantons and added: “Each canton is sovereign and enjoys every right that it had not willingly transferred up to the common government... By virtue of their strength, the Swiss

²⁶⁵ *De La Démocratie en Amérique* was only partially and in a number of successive waves translated into Serbian in the second half of the nineteenth century. In: Branko Bešlin, *Evropski uticaji na srpski liberalizam u XIX veku* [The European influences upon Serbian liberalism in the nineteenth century], p. 743. Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov might have consulted either the original or Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen’s English translations, for they both could read French and English.

²⁶⁶ Vladimir Jovanović fiercely defended the right of Serbian smallholders to own and carry fire arms. In 1863 he described that particular political right of the Serbian people as “inviolable and sacrosanct.” From there he often drew analogies to the same, constitutionally-protected, right of American citizens. This motivated the Serbian scholar of nineteenth-century Balkan political thought, Dragan Simeunović, to wonder whether Jovanović might have read not only the 1787 Constitution of the United States but the 1776 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the accompanying Virginia Declaration of Rights as well. In: Dragan Simeunović, “Rani srpski liberalizam” [Early Serbian liberalism], *Novovekovne političke ideje u Srbu* [Modern political ideas and the Serbs], Belgrade: Institute for Political Studies, 2003, pp. 158-159.

²⁶⁷ Vladimir Jovanović, “Obština” [Commune], p. 129.

had liberated themselves from foreign yoke and secured internal liberty. I can only hope that Serbia, too, will, by its own civic virtues, manage to reach such a high degree of internal liberty.”²⁶⁸

Ultimately, it was precisely because public authority had originally sprung from the people that the two Balkan intellectuals believed it had always to remain close to them. By exercising their rights locally, engaging in public deliberation and taking care of their own and the interests of their communities, the Americans and the Swiss, at least in the eyes of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov, grew truly worthy of the name of free men. Thus, it cannot come as a surprise that Jovanović decided to conclude his essay on the significance of local self-governance by writing that:

“Liberty, as exemplified by American and Swiss local communes, enables one to educate oneself in living in society with others (...) Participation of all in the matters of society develops a consciousness of right and duty, a consciousness that forces everyone to carefully analyse every issue of common interest (...) And to what extent the free communal and social life matches the real needs of mankind is best seen when American and Swiss communes are compared to those less free. Where do education, diligence, and all that leads to the well-being of man flourish more than in American and Swiss communes? Where is man more advanced, more respectable, and happier than there?”²⁶⁹

In other words, the two Balkan intellectuals were certain that partaking in the affairs of autonomous local governments had no match in producing good citizens for the American and Swiss democratic-republican federations. What they wanted to *do* in their works was to urge and incite their readers to imagine a future in which the static, long-suffering mass of Balkan peasants has been transformed into an aggregate of independent and free citizens exercising popular sovereignty and constantly keeping in check their elected representatives. Consequently, if good citizens of a future Balkan federation were to be shaped into patriots able of nurturing public interest and the good of all, where better to do so than in free, vibrant, and vigorous *obština*, submitted to the state only for services of common utility and fully modelled on the system of

²⁶⁸ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], pp. 186 and 188. A meticulous depiction of Swiss cantons and their seemingly limitless democratic capacity is also given in: Vladimir Jovanović, “Obština” [Commune], pp. 129-133. In his memoirs Jovanović treated Obwalden and Nidwalden as Unterwalden, Basel-Stadt and Basel-Landschaft as Basel, and Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Appenzell Innerrhoden as Appenzell. Canton Jura was created only in 1979 as the twenty-sixth sovereign entity under the Swiss federal constitution. This explains why the Serbian writer had only twenty-two cantons on his list.

²⁶⁹ Ibidem, p. 150.

self-government of the two most progressive polities in the world – the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy.

b) Separation of powers

“Separation of powers not only leads to a better and more sophisticated functioning [of public administration] but also guarantees civic and political liberties. The harsher different branches of state authority are separated, the easier it is to keep them within boundaries of legality *and* force them to refrain from abuses of power.”²⁷⁰ So wrote Vladimir Jovanović, treating separation of powers as an ideal famously advanced in the works of the Englishman John Locke (1632-1704), the Frenchman Montesquieu (1689-1755), and the Lausanne-born Swiss-French political writer Benjamin Constant (1767-1830), all of whom he regarded as indispensable sources of his own political thought. In Jovanović’s view, the only two places where the ideal had turned into reality were the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy. “There the judiciary is separated from the legislature and the executive”.²⁷¹

Regardless of the fact that the two Balkan intellectuals had certain respect for the Westminster parliamentary system,²⁷² they still rejected constitutional or limited monarchy as a viable form of government. Jovanović was particularly uncompromising: “In most constitutional monarchies, the ruler occupies such a position that he can always subdue all branches of government (...) In constitutional monarchy the legislature depends on the ruler’s will. The executive is often the ruler himself. And it is said that the judiciary is independent, but its officials are chosen and promoted by the ruler as well (...) In monarchy the responsibility of those who rule is but an empty phrase.”²⁷³ Karavelov concurred fully and wrote in one of his *Svoboda* articles from 1870 that the only way in which people could ever accept their rulers is having an unrestrained right to *elect* them:

²⁷⁰ Vladimir Jovanović, “Deoba vlasti” [Separation of powers], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook G, D, Đ [Dj], p. 726.

²⁷¹ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], p. 185.

²⁷² See Jovanović’s long essay on the British political system: Vladimir Jovanović, “Velika Britanska sa Irlandskom” [Great Britain with Ireland], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook V, pp. 412-471.

²⁷³ Vladimir Jovanović, “Deoba vlasti” [Separation of powers], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook G, D, Đ [Dj], p. 727.

“We think that when a nation elects on its own a person, no matter if that person is elected for life or for a limited period of time, it will honour and respect that person. But, if that person is forcefully imposed upon the nation, they can never be honoured and respected. The American states elect their president every *three years* [sic], and we see that nowhere does the supreme political administrator occupy such an important role and receive such love from the people as does the president in the North American States.”²⁷⁴ (emphasis is mine)

The fact that Karavelov was not aware that the head of executive in the United States of America is elected every four years put aside, he was not at all bothered by the presence of a strong individual at the helm of the American republic. There, an independent Congress balanced against the threat of tyranny by conceiving “thoughtful, moderate, and benevolent laws of the country”²⁷⁵ and by constantly overseeing the acts of the president. That is why Karavelov suggested that a future Balkan federation should form a similar representative body - one elected by the majority of all citizens of the federal union, assigned with formulating foreign policy of the entire federation, and keeping in check all executive federal acts.²⁷⁶

Having this in mind, it is not difficult to understand why Jovanović and Karavelov admired the separation of powers mechanisms in the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy. In the early 1870s Bulgaria was still completely vulnerable to the arbitrary will of the Ottoman sultan in whose person all branches of imperial government were conjoined. Even the Serbian political landscape was at the time dominated by a strong monarch who controlled the national government and much of what was going on in the National Assembly, regardless of the fact that the country was an autonomous principality with a quickly developing domestic political system. Onto such bleak reality Jovanović and Karavelov projected an image of two democratic-republican federations where implementation of the separation of powers principle seemed to have led to justice, stability, and efficiency – everything that a Balkan federation was to bring about. Was there then a model more suitable upon which the future Balkan political system would be built to secure harmony among different branches of government and, consequently, liberty?

²⁷⁴ Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 45, 7/19. X 1870.

²⁷⁵ Nezavisimost (Independence), IV, no. 6, 24. XI/6. XII 1873.

²⁷⁶ Svoboda (Liberty), I, no. 27, 14/26. V 1870.

c) Disregard of clericalism and aristocracy

Both Balkan intellectuals whose works are analysed here highly valued Christianity as a doctrine of peace, brotherhood, and human dignity, but held in fierce contempt all types of dogmatism and clerical control over public space. Karavelov claimed that the message of Christ “softened all that is wild, rough, and callous in human nature,”²⁷⁷ while Jovanović believed that “the central ideas of Christianity, equality and brotherhood, had been the first step toward real consciousness of man and humanity, which was completed by secular philosophy.”²⁷⁸ However, every religious faith that in practice suppressed progress of reason and science was utterly foreign to the two men.²⁷⁹

Karavelov refused all dogmas which strived to transform men into numb, obeying, low creatures of weak character. The only way of limiting the influence of pseudo-philosophies that “erected for men idols and asked them to kneel before them without any critical thinking”²⁸⁰ was education. This is why he remained convinced that religion was to be confined to the private sphere. The United States of America, according to Karavelov’s reading of Célestin Hippeau’s²⁸¹ 1870 essay on American educational practices, served as the perfect example:

²⁷⁷ Cited in: Kiril Gorov, *Socialno-ikonomicheskiye vŭzgliedi na Ljuben Karavelov* [Socio-economic views of Lyuben Karavelov], p. 137.

²⁷⁸ Vladimir Jovanović, “Demokratija“ [Democracy], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook G, D, Đ [Dj], p. 712.

²⁷⁹ Remembering his father in an essay from 1948, Slobodan Jovanović wrote: “Vladimir was neither an atheist in the full sense of the word, nor a truly religious man... but, no one could hope to thunder more loudly against priests and superstitions that they sustained among the people.” In: Slobodan Jovanović, *Moji savremenici* [My contemporaries], p. 15.

²⁸⁰ *Nezavisimost* (Independence), III, no. 39, 16/28. VI 1873.

²⁸¹ Célestin Hippeau (1803-1883) was a French pedagogue and man of letters who travelled to America in 1868 and published a study on the American ways of upbringing and education in the Parisian political and philosophical journal *La Revue contemporaine* in March 1870. Hippeau’s works were a rather significant source of information on the United States of America for both Jovanović and Karavelov.

“The laws of God or the science of faith is left at home in America. Such science is not taught at school, for schools must offer only those teachings that are acceptable to all citizens regardless of their faith.”²⁸²

The American priest was a true friend of progress. Not only did he not preach against natural sciences, but more often than not taught mathematics, the queen of sciences, to pupils of parochial schools. Karavelov saw this as one of the reasons why “America today excels in every possible way.”²⁸³ Stories of community-oriented American clergy informed Bulgarians’ own efforts to spur the revival of an independent national church, something other Balkan nations had already done. To marvel at and idolize the simplicity and charity of different American churches, which all lived together in peace, was only to reflect the deep desire of Balkan peoples for social stability and justice, so wanting in that turbulent south-eastern European peninsula.

What is more, Karavelov could easily have had in mind not only the preponderance of the Greek Orthodox Christian clergy in Bulgarian lands but the forcefully imposed dominance of Islam in the Balkans as well when he repeatedly reported in *Svoboda* and *Nezavisimost* on the valiant attempts by the Swiss to expel the Jesuit order, the embodiment of evil for the two Balkan intellectuals, from the Confederacy.²⁸⁴ Again, the two Western federations clearly figure in the works of the Bulgarian and Serbian political writers as final realization of all human faculties.

In addition, while Karavelov glorified tolerance and the absence of clericalism, Jovanović argued that it was the absence of aristocracy that enabled the American and Swiss federations to prosper:

“In democratic countries, one of which is free America of course, people are brought up with no aristocracy in their midst and they are developing their economic and political lives, enjoying their human rights, and are more progressive and happier in all aspects of social life than those in aristocratic societies (...) One glance over the New World is enough to re-affirm that aristocracy cannot even be compared to democracy, let alone be superior to it.”²⁸⁵

²⁸² Lyuben Karavelov, *Za shkolските programi* [On school programmes], written in 1875, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Lyuben Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom deseti. Statii, nevklyucheni v rubriki* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume ten. Articles not included in rubrics], Sofia: Bălgarski pisatel, 1987, p. 340.

²⁸³ *Svoboda* (Liberty), II, no. 2, 11/23. I 1871.

²⁸⁴ *Svoboda* (Liberty), III, no. 15, 7/19. X 1872; *Nezavisimost* (Independence), IV, no. 7, 1/13. XII 1873; *ibidem*, IV, no. 15, 27. I/8. II 1874.

²⁸⁵ Vladimir Jovanović, “Aristokratija” [Aristocracy], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook A-2, p. 114.

Karavelov's views neatly supplement this. He opined that America "is cleansed of medieval boils and aristocratic habits... and manages to benefit from the real wealth of science. The Americans are destined to decide on the next stage of... civilization."²⁸⁶

As far as Jovanović was concerned, it was the "middle order", the bourgeoisie that had won the historical struggle for liberty and equality before the law, destroying along the way feudalism of ancient nobility and "freeing the oppressed".²⁸⁷ The industrious burghers of Geneva, Lausanne, and Zurich, of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, rich in knowledge and fond of science, wary of royal insignia and superstition, carried the standard of human fulfilment. Perhaps without even realizing that they belonged to only a tiny, almost negligible minority of Balkan urban dwellers, Jovanović and Karavelov saw the future of mankind as one of commerce and the city.²⁸⁸

Liberty and justice had sprouted in urban surroundings; the fact that neither of the Balkan nations had a truly formidable indigenous middle class by the early 1870s could not prevent our two intellectuals from believing. As a matter of fact, they had no doubt whatsoever – the backbone of a future Balkan federal state was to be a numerous, prosperous class of Balkan *citizens*, men and women as free and happy as those existing within idealized spaces of peace and justice, in the free American and Swiss cities of free American and Swiss states and cantons of free American and Swiss federal unions.

d) Economic freedom

Finally, many Balkan intellectuals of the third quarter of the nineteenth century depicted the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy as lands of material prosperity. This was due to their limitless and multi-faceted economic freedom, on the one hand, and divergent background of their citizens, on the other. Such combination of factors, Balkan intellectuals believed, decisively boosted the process of knowledge production and offered incentives for

²⁸⁶ Cited in: Kiril Gorov, *Socialno-ekonomičeskie vūzgledi na Ljuben Karavelov* [Socio-economic views of Lyuben Karavelov], pp. 186-187.

²⁸⁷ Vladimir Jovanović, "Buržoazija" [Bourgeoisie], *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary], Notebook B, p. 347.

²⁸⁸ The "imposing social prevalence of the village" in all Balkan countries of the mid-nineteenth century is analysed in: Diana Mishkova, "Balkan Liberalisms: Historical Routes of a Modern Ideology", pp. 104-105.

innovation and development.²⁸⁹ Karavelov, for one, wrote time and again that material prosperity is no more than a measure of liberty in a society: “Where there is no freedom, there can be no happiness, nor affluence. If there ever was a state in which people could enjoy full economic freedom, it is North America.”²⁹⁰

Jovanović subscribed to the same set of classical liberal assumptions. Under conditions of perfect freedom to venture and invest and complete security of property, the natural diligence of human beings will lead to growth. Having discussed in his different works the principles of personal autonomy and free competition delineated by the great political economists to whom he often referred, Adam Smith (1723-1790), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), and Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850), Jovanović also asserted that all notions of political liberty “emerged in European towns with the development of industry and commerce.”²⁹¹ Elsewhere he used the Swiss example to illuminate the natural link between liberty and economic advancement:

“Relative [to their numbers], the Swiss are the best fed, best dressed nation. They live in finest homes, produce and export the most, operate the biggest commercial market, live longer than anyone else, promptly send their children to school, have the smallest army but the biggest number of schools, have the least rotten characters of all people, pay lowest taxes but still enjoy more justice than anybody else, have smallest debts... and liberty unrestrained. Why? Because in Switzerland one acts reasonably and saves; one works to live freely and lives freely to revel in the progress of humanity.”²⁹²

To enjoy the fruits of one’s labour, to have one’s property secured against plunder and arbitrary acts of the authorities, to feel confident enough to invest in previously untested technological inventions, to serve societal utility by pursuing one’s interest, one must live in a free society. Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov did not feel the need to look for examples of free and thus prosperous societies further away from the American and Swiss

²⁸⁹ Also discussed in: Emilian R. Kavalski, “The Balkan America? The Myth of America in the Creation of Bulgarian National Identity”, p. 133.

²⁹⁰ Cited in: Kiril Gorov, *Socialno-ekonomicheskiye vūzgledi na Lyuben Karavelov* [Socio-economic views of Lyuben Karavelov], pp. 185-186.

²⁹¹ Vladimir Jovanović, “Pristup predavanju nauke o narodnoj privredi – septembar 1863” [Approach to teaching the science of national economy – September 1863], in: *Za slobodu i narod: Pokušaji Vladimira Jovanovića, člana Ujedinjene omladine Srbske* [For liberty and nation: Efforts by Vladimir Jovanović, a member of the United Serbian Youth], p. 9.

²⁹² Vladimir Jovanović, “Naš narodni položaj, naše narodno uzdanje” [Our national position, our national hope], in: *Za slobodu i narod: Pokušaji Vladimira Jovanovića, člana Ujedinjene omladine Srbske* [For liberty and nation: Efforts by Vladimir Jovanović, a member of the United Serbian Youth], pp. 252-253.

democratic-republican federal unions. Their colourful portrayals of the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy as lands of plenty speak volumes about how they hoped life in a future Balkan federal union might look like if moulded in accordance with the two Western republics.

Lastly, the previous four sub-sections have strived to show how the existence of a republican form of government in the United States and the Helvetic Confederacy only strengthened Jovanović and Karavelov's conviction that the American and Swiss federal unions are *the* models after which the planned future Balkan federation should be sculpted, rising from the ashes of imperial subjugation, violence, destitution, ignorance, and injustice. In the section that follows I will dedicate more space to the remaining segment of the American and Swiss republicanism that informed our two Balkan intellectuals' federalism – upbringing and public education of citizens.

3. 4. To raise awareness of right and duty: the American and Swiss educational systems in Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov's federalism

Education occupied an extremely important place in the political thought of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov. The two Balkan intellectuals believed that the ability to apprehend notions of liberty and justice was not given by birth. To live freely in a free society, one had to develop a consciousness of civil rights and duties. Standing in the shadow of the eighteenth-century rationalistic philosophy, Jovanović and Karavelov argued that only a mind liberated from prejudice, a pure reason, could lead to a fuller understanding of liberty and, eventually, its attainment.²⁹³ Hence, proper education was the true engine of elated personal life, communal utility, and liberty.

Karavelov thought that only good upbringing and education correctly answered the most challenging questions an individual could ever face – “how to develop in body and mind, how to improve the results of our daily endeavours, how to raise our children, how to act as citizens, how to benefit from the riches that were awarded to us by nature, how to be of utility to ourselves and those who are close to us?”²⁹⁴ Similarly, Jovanović concluded that “schooling

²⁹³ Vladimir Jovanović's son Slobodan deemed such “philosophical scientism” rather naïve but prevalent in his father's generation of thinkers. In: Slobodan Jovanović, *Moji savremenici* [My contemporaries], p. 55.

²⁹⁴ Znanie (Knowledge), I, no. 24, 15/27. XII 1875.

remains essentially related to the development and quality of democratic institutions.”²⁹⁵ Bearing this in mind, where else could our Balkan liberal thinkers look for the ideal type of a modern, progressive educational system than in the two countries of highest possible quality of democracy – the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy?

“In America one truth is universally acknowledged and cannot be denied – a nation that is called upon to manage its own destiny must be freely enlightened,”²⁹⁶ wrote Jovanović in a long, anonymously published 1870 article *Narodna prosveta u Americi* (*National education in America*). Elsewhere he found truly remarkable “the freedom of education, lecturing, and science” in the Swiss canton of Geneva.²⁹⁷ Furthermore, another anonymous, and far shorter, article that appeared in October 1870 in *Mlada Srbadija* (*The Serbian Youth*), a magazine to which Jovanović often contributed, stated that nowhere did children frequent school longer than in free Swiss cantons, and added: “Is it strange then that the Swiss are first and most advanced in all spheres of life? Is it strange that no one can withstand competition with them in animal husbandry, agriculture, crafts, skills, and science? [From all this] comes prosperity and liberty.”²⁹⁸

Karavelov was of the same mind: “America today is one of those countries that serve as exemplary of truly human upbringing and education.”²⁹⁹ Such identity of opinion between the two Balkan intellectuals was spurred less by personal interactions, limited, as previously shown, to the years 1867-1869, than by reading and analysing the same literary sources. Much can be said about the books and essays on education in the United States of America that Jovanović and Karavelov had read and referred to in their writings. Both of them reviewed the already mentioned 1870 report by Célestin Hippeau. Karavelov also utilized travelogues written by the Russian mathematician and passionate traveller Eduard Romanovich Zimmermann (Эдуард Романович Циммерман, born in 1822), published in Russian and offering extraordinarily popular accounts of his visits to North America in 1858-59 and 1870. In addition, both

²⁹⁵ *Mlada Srbadija* (*The Serbian Youth*), I, no. 6, 15/27. IX 1870.

²⁹⁶ *Ibidem*

²⁹⁷ Vladimir Jovanović, *Uspomene* [Memoirs], p. 185.

²⁹⁸ *Mlada Srbadija* (*The Serbian Youth*), I, no. 5, 15/27. X 1870. The language of this quote certainly reminds a careful reader of Jovanović’s thought and style. Still, and to my knowledge, the article has remained unattributed to any one regular contributor.

²⁹⁹ Lyuben Karavelov, *Za vŭzpitanieto vŭobshche* [On education in general], written in 1875, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Lyuben Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom deseti. Statii, nevklyucheni v rubriki* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume ten. Articles not included in rubrics], p. 263.

Jovanović and Karavelov at times referred to the works of the French republican Édouard René Lefèbvre de Laboulaye (1811-1883), the author of *Histoire politique des États-Unis, 1620-1789* (1855-1866), and the translator into French of Benjamin Franklin's autobiography.³⁰⁰

Finally, another significant source of information on the United States of America, its people and their habits, was the remarkable work of Samuel Smiles (1812-1904) *Self-Help*, the Gospel of mid-century liberalism from 1859.³⁰¹ Each of the Balkan intellectuals wrote at least one article entirely based on Smiles' *Self-Help*; Karavelov published an extensive essay on upbringing and education in eleven successive numbers of *Svoboda* in 1871, while Jovanović had a seven-part feuilleton on inventions and technology in *Mlada Srbadija*, also in 1871. Whenever they quoted from Smiles' work, their readers were informed about one feature or the other of American life.³⁰²

"In education lies the strength of their federal union",³⁰³ Vladimir Jovanović assessed the prime reason for American greatness. In truly democratic societies, one is afraid not of an external enemy, but rather of ignorance that would instigate people to neglect their responsibility for the common good. Quoting the American statesman Daniel Webster (1782-1852) via Hippeau, the Serbian political thinker concluded that the future of liberty everywhere depended on the expansion of education.³⁰⁴ What is more, Karavelov repeatedly pointed his readers' attention to the fact that the thirty-seven united American republics, as of 1871, managed to send to school six out of their thirty-five million inhabitants, had more than four thousand newspapers and magazines, and knew of almost no illiterate citizens.³⁰⁵ All this was an effect of an "unheard of" investment in education, which only some of the Swiss cantons could ever hope

³⁰⁰ Nothing allows one to suggest that Jovanović had ever met Laboulaye in person. However, both men were close, ideologically and at times physically, to the same democratic-republican circles around *Ligue de la paix et de la liberté* founded in 1867 in Geneva. More on the *Ligue* and how it inspired Balkan liberal thinkers is to be found in: Jovan Skerlić, *Omladina i njena književnost (1848-1871): Izučavanja o nacionalizmu i književnom romantizmu kod Srba* [The youth and their literature (1848-1871): Studies in nationalism and literary romanticism of the Serbs], p. 218.

³⁰¹ Accessible via Project Gutenberg's website: <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/935/935-h/935-h.htm>.

³⁰² *Svoboda* (Liberty), II, no. 7 to 17, 13/25. II 1871 to 4/16. X 1871; *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), II, no. 27 to 33, 31. X/12. XI 1871 to 31. XII 1871/12. I 1872.

³⁰³ *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), I, no. 6, 15/27. IX 1870.

³⁰⁴ Ibidem

³⁰⁵ *Svoboda* (Liberty), II, no. 2, 11/23. I 1871.

to match.³⁰⁶ The ever stronger link between American and Swiss freedom and education presented itself to our Balkan intellectuals as a self-fulfilling prophecy. All citizens of the two federations could consume their civil and political rights only after having been prepared for public life by public education; and they could fully grasp the importance of education only after having partaken in the democratic process. Ultimately, the fundamental value of American and Swiss education was not “the creation of professors extraordinaire or doctors of philosophy, but instruction of sciences that would enrich life, make existence pleasant and beneficial, lead to human happiness, and produce [good] citizens...”³⁰⁷

Such a political agenda could have only been realized by following a very specific curriculum. In Jovanović’s own words, “one should adopt knowledge which is useful in life and one should, instead of nurturing abstract thinking and speculative philosophy, develop skills to master the surrounding world.”³⁰⁸ Karavelov too was rather critical of classical education, rendered inadequate in the world in which all are to be equal and depend solely on their own exertion. What benefit can possibly be extracted from “quoting Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Ambrose, Ovid, Lessing,³⁰⁹ John Chrysostom, Hegel, Kant, Thierry,³¹⁰ La Fontaine, and their likes,”³¹¹ wondered the Bulgarian publicist. American pupils, on the other hand, are perfectly indifferent to abstruse reflection. Instead, two invaluable mental techniques are implanted in their minds by their teachers – scepticism and pragmatism. That is why “the Americans have invested all their faculties into positive sciences, mechanics, agronomy, and mathematics, and refrained from all other time-wasting subjects,”³¹² Karavelov noted. As hard-

³⁰⁶ *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), I, no. 6, 15/27. IX 1870; and *ibidem*, I, no. 8, 15/27. XI 1870.

³⁰⁷ Lyuben Karavelov, *Za vŭzpitanieto vŭobshche* [On education in general], written in 1875, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom deseti. Statii, nevklyucheni v rubriki* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume ten. Articles not included in rubrics], p. 264.

³⁰⁸ *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), II, no. 27, 31. X/12. XI 1871.

³⁰⁹ Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729 – 1781), a German Enlightenment writer, philosopher, and dramatist.

³¹⁰ Augustin Thierry (1795 –1856), a French Saint-Simonian historian.

³¹¹ Lyuben Karavelov, *Za vŭzpitanieto vŭobshche* [On education in general], written in 1875, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom deseti. Statii, nevklyucheni v rubriki* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume ten. Articles not included in rubrics], p. 277.

³¹² *Ibidem*

working, agricultural and, above all, commercial nations, the Americans and the Swiss treat poetic phantasies, useless theories, and spiritual inclinations as “hollow dreams”.³¹³

Physics, chemistry, and algebra instead of Latin, natural history and horticulture instead of Ancient Greek, and geography and simple and clear people’s history³¹⁴ instead of ecclesiastical chronicles – that was the formula of a new democratic education that would lead to human happiness. Such school and university programmes, in Jovanović and Karavelov’s minds at least, would inevitably shape a nation of energetic and honourable citizens of resolute and hardened characters and strong wills. A republican-democratic curriculum encourages determination and tireless effort, through which citizens accomplish the ultimate purpose of living together in a free society – individual liberty, brotherhood, and equality. It is future-oriented and favours humility, tenacity, and persistence in the face of aristocratic idleness, luxury, and ingenuity. Its main task, ultimately, is to mould solid characters and active, independent citizens who are not afraid of whatever horrible torrent or thorny obstruction personal and communal life can send their way.³¹⁵

Evidence of triumph of the republican system of education abounded in the two Western federations, particularly across the Atlantic. Firstly, only there could a “simple labourer”, a truly self-made man, hope to become “captain of the republican union”.³¹⁶ The

³¹³ Ibidem, p. 264.

³¹⁴ Both Balkan intellectuals held John William Draper (1811-1882), an English-American promoter of science and the author of the remarkably influential 1874 work *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science*, in highest esteem. It would not be an overstatement to claim that he, along with the Englishman Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862), was their favourite historian. Karavelov even planned to translate Draper’s *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe* (1863) into Bulgarian and called for other Bulgarian intellectuals to join the effort. Repeatedly in: *Svoboda* (Liberty), II, no. 7 to 17, 13/25. II 1871 to 4/16. X 1871; and *Znanie* (Knowledge), I, no. 24, 15/27. XII 1875.

³¹⁵ Had they participated, our two intellectuals would have certainly taken the side of Benjamin Rush (1748-1813), a prominent figure of the American Enlightenment, in the well-known debate with his friend John Adams (1735-1826) on “dead languages”. Rush had written, and Jovanović and Karavelov would agree, that: “By saving the time spent in teaching the speaking and writing of Latin and Greek, much time would be saved at school which might be employed in communicating the knowledge of things (...) The human intellects are brutalized by being stuffed in early life with such *offal learning*. It is the more necessary to *banish* it from our schools since *the late wonderful increase of knowledge in all useful arts and sciences*.” (emphases are mine) Quoted from: John A. Schutz and Douglass Adair (eds), *The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush, 1805-1813*, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001, first published in 1966, p. 193.

³¹⁶ *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), I, no. 6, 15/27. IX 1870.

principal message of three remarkable feuilletons written by Karavelov on the lives of Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790), George Washington (1732-1799), and Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) was that the mentality of American citizens, imbued by republican upbringing and education, was conducive to overcoming terrible obstacles. Only in such a setting could truly luminous and active personalities, such as Franklin, Washington, or Lincoln, spring forth from humble beginnings and take over responsibility for their own and the future of the entire republican union.³¹⁷ Not without some exaggeration, Jovanović also celebrated the fact that “the plainest of workingmen, as Lincoln and Johnson³¹⁸ certainly had been, could lead the great republic.”³¹⁹ This very claim was presented as proof not only of republican equality of opportunity but also as confirmation of value of the American educational system.

Secondly, Jovanović and Karavelov argued that the republican system of education had a thorough social-levelling effect, inasmuch as it managed to erase the difference of gender, nationality, religion, and race among American (and Swiss) citizens. Perhaps too optimistically, our Balkan intellectuals observed America from afar and understood the large number of female instructors and lecturers, the emergence of mixed-sex common education, the increase in numbers of African-American schools in the aftermath of the Civil War (1861-1865), the growing presence of Catholic immigrants, especially of Irish and German decent, and criminal offenders³²⁰ within the framework of public education, and the ever weakening grasp of sectarian groups over schooling, as clear signs of a continuing march forward to the ideal type of republican upbringing and education. Quoting Horace Mann of Massachusetts (1796-1859), the famous American politician, educational reformer, and the fierce proponent of the common

³¹⁷ See on Lincoln: *Svoboda* (Liberty), II, no. 9, 27. II/11. III 1871; on Washington: *Nezavisimost* (Independence), IV, no. 1 to 6, 20. X/1. XI 1873 to 24. XI/6. XII 1873; and on Franklin: *ibidem*, IV, no. 7 to 13, 1/13. XII 1873 to 12/24. I 1874.

³¹⁸ Andrew Johnson (1808-1875), the seventeenth president of the United States of America, preceded by Lincoln and succeeded in 1869 by Ulysses S. Grant.

³¹⁹ *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), I, no. 6, 15/27. IX 1870.

³²⁰ Karavelov also used the example of prison education in Philadelphia and New York to show how the American criminal system tried altering offenders' natures, and re-awaking good republican values, instead of imposing upon them an eternal physical and psychological punishment. The essay in question was conceptualized during Karavelov's imprisonment in Budapest in 1868, inspired by travelogues of a certain Frenchman, “A. Laquière”, who journeyed across North America, written in Bulgarian in 1870, and published in Serbian in *Mlada Srbadija* in 1871. See: Lyuben Karavelov, “Iz mrtvog doma” [From the Death House], *Mlada Srbadija* (The Serbian Youth), II, no. 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26 27, 28, 29, July to November 1871.

school system, the man behind the widespread modernization of the national educational system in the United States of America, Jovanović concluded: “*all* citizens of this great republic [are taught] to understand their civic duties and how to fulfil them properly”.³²¹ (emphasis is mine)

Finally, for Jovanović and Karavelov, the last proof of stability and strength of the republican system of education is its endurance in the face of social conflict and unrest. In Jovanović’s view, and even during the Civil War (the War of Secession) which threatened the very core of the American federal union, “no one sacrificed more to elevating people from ignorance than the republican union of America (...) In the teeth of terrible war expenses, townships and citizens continued offering more and more (resources) to their schools”.³²² At all levels of a federal polity – central, state, and municipal - there is a fine but firm balance between social policy and public investment in education, on the one hand, and individual initiative and private competition, on the other. Public libraries, completely liberated book markets, public lectures, reading rooms, and more than one million copies of thousands of different magazines and newspapers published every single day across the United States of America, confirmed, in the minds of our Balkan intellectuals, that an educated, hard-willed, critical, and pragmatic citizen can withstand *and* repel all personal hardship and crises of government.³²³ All that is needed, to paraphrase Victor Hugo, is to liberate the people and give them a well-organized republican educational structure.

Given these points, it is not difficult to realize that Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov saw republican values, sustained by a specific educational system, as crucial safeguards against the threat of disorder and servitude. To really comprehend and secure one’s rights and fulfil one’s duties, to enjoy the benefits of local governance, the separation of powers, and free commerce, one has to *know* them, to develop the full potential of one’s body and mind, and to rise up as a truly rational being. Therefore, the citizens of a future Balkan federation, if eager to live fully human lives in a society of the free, would simply have to receive a reasonable,

³²¹ Mlada Srbadija (The Serbian Youth), I, no. 6, 15/27. IX 1870.

³²² Ibidem

³²³ Karavelov, for example, wrote about the efforts of the American Congress to assist the state of California in modernizing its system of agricultural schools. In: Lyuben Karavelov, *Za vŭŭpitanieto vŭobŭŭte* [On education in general], written in 1875, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom deseti. Statiŭ, nevkŭyucheni v rubriki* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume ten. Articles not included in rubrics], p. 279. Jovanović wrote about the benefits of free competition between state-sponsored and private schools and universities. Unlike many others, he did not see a threat to democracy itself arising from such a competition. He noted: “Struggle brings no danger if everyone’s rights are guaranteed.” In: Mlada Srbadija (The Serbian Youth), I, no. 6, 15/27. IX 1870.

practical, and liberating education. Such development of human faculties, of mind and character, would “sooner or later have to germinate in our own schools as well”,³²⁴ thought Karavelov, and there could be no better way to accelerate its growth than to replicate the American and Swiss educational systems – to erect Balkan classrooms of democracy.

With this last point in mind I bring to an end the discussion of multi-layered interactions of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov’s federalism and republicanism, the apex of which was their limitless faith in the American and Swiss systems of education. In the previous three sections I strived to show how their ideas of a future Balkan federation were fed by the idealization of the two Western federal models. In the last, concluding section of this chapter I will offer an overall evaluation of our Balkan intellectuals’ federalism and the place that the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy occupied within it.

3. 5. Conclusion

In this chapter I endeavoured to illuminate how Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov’s celebration of American and Swiss social, political, and economic institutions drove them to accept democratic-republican federalism as the ideal form of rule and a model on which a union of Balkan nations should be established. The two Balkan intellectuals depicted the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy as lands where different nations lived together in peace, and where liberty and order were secured by the republican virtues of the citizens themselves. The Serbian political thinker and the Bulgarian publicist strived to implant into their readers’ consciousness a vision of federal utopia – of two powerful and prosperous countries in which sovereignty never travels far from the people, where local autonomy and self-rule is protected by custom *and* law, where one branch of government simultaneously prevents others from abusing authority and is kept in check by them, where clerical control over the public sphere has been but annihilated, where no aristocrat enjoys the produce of other man’s sweat, where all can invest, trade, buy and sell, and hope to earn a living freely, where difference of class, race, gender, and nationality matters as little as hard work, thrift, and modesty do, where each and every citizen is ready to take up arms in protection of the commonwealth and partake daily in the democratic process. Jovanović and Karavelov’s federal utopia highlighted the

³²⁴ Lyuben Karavelov, *Za vŭzpitanieto vŭobshche* [On education in general], written in 1875, in: Cveta Undzhieva (ed), *Lyuben Karavelov: sŭbrani sŭchineniya, tom deseti. Statii, nevklyucheni v rubriki* [Lyuben Karavelov: collected works, volume ten. Articles not included in rubrics], p. 288.

happiness, the affluence, and the justness of life in the transatlantic and Alpine republican unions. To them, it seemed that it was federalism in which the democratic ideal had finally reached its realization.

However, such portrayal of American and Swiss federalism was a construct. It floated in space and time, to a large extent divorced from the historical reality of the two Western federal unions. The ultimate purpose of Jovanović and Karavelov's writings was not to offer a grounded and accurate account of life in the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy, which was in any case far detached from an average Balkan reader of the time, but to create an antipode to the reality of Ottoman-ruled Balkans – passive, un-free, and backward. Such mythologization was to inspire and mobilize; it compelled readers to dare dream about a different Balkans, about what might and ought to be. In this way, Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov appear before us as agents of social change, historical actors who used the language of federalism to re-describe normative political frameworks and legitimize a new kind of desirable social action. What the two Balkan intellectuals wished to *do*, as Quentin Skinner would have it,³²⁵ was to convince the emerging Balkan reading public that only in a federation, a union of republics, there can be found true national *self-determination*, adequate *size and strength* to break the chains of imperial dominance, full *cultural autonomy*, *security* from potential foreign occupation, material *prosperity*, and personal and political *liberty*.

Naturally, a discrepancy between the idealized, forcibly normative concept of the American and Swiss federalism and its historical reality was bound to be present in the works of our Balkan intellectuals. Nowhere did they really acknowledge the destructive force unleashed by the American Civil War and the actual causes of such a tragic conflict. Not once did they address the Swiss *Sonderbundskrieg* of 1847 and the deep-seated Protestant-Catholic divisions of the Alpine republican union. Never did they discuss the issue of slavery in America, apart from proclaiming the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation the ultimate step toward all-encompassing liberty within that “great republic”. Nor did they recognize the incredibly aristocratic nature of the American south and the strong currents of American anti-Catholicism. As a matter of fact, Jovanović and Karavelov remained oblivious to the importance of great religious revivals transpiring in the United States of America throughout the nineteenth century.

Furthermore, neither of the two intellectuals seems to have been aware of the strongly grounded American elitism and mistrust of popular sovereignty as “a dreadful condition of

³²⁵ On texts that *do* things and how to study them, see: Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics, volume I: Regarding Method*, pp. 1-7.

things”,³²⁶ both of which were so prevalent in the so-called Whig generation of mid-century American political thinkers and statesmen. Finally, in a certain way, Jovanović and Karavelov’s federalism was less than unconditional, for they had turned a blind eye to other contemporary examples of federal system of rule. Hardly anything can be read in the plethora of the two Balkan intellectuals’ studies, essays, articles, and reviews on Mexico, where federalism was adopted through the 1857 *Constitucion Federal de los Estados-Unidos Mexicanos*,³²⁷ or the German Confederation – *Deutscher Bund*. What must have disqualified them in the eyes of Jovanović and Karavelov was the fact that in both cases the two authors perceived the monarchical principle at work, under which the sum of state powers, or sovereignty, was defined as the property of the ruler and his house and not vested in the people.³²⁸

Be that as it may, one must accept what Vladimir Jovanović’s son Slobodan termed a deliberate, “conscious beautification of places like Switzerland”,³²⁹ for federalism still added much to the political projects of our two intellectuals. Selective and idealistic as it may have been, their federalism, modelled on what they had understood as the *reality* of the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy, brought home a crucial idea and was as idealistic as it was pragmatic. And although it is never easy to determine the exact *intention* of a text, let alone an entire body of an author’s work, what Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov *intended* to communicate through their embrace of American and Swiss federalism was a boundless faith that the happiness of every society, no matter the circumstances, is determined by the application of a proper set of political institutions.

All men are indeed created equal. Differences in climate, landscape, culture, language, and habit cannot alter the same human nature shared by all. In other words, Jovanović and

³²⁶ Hermann E. von Holst, *The Constitutional and Political History of the United States*, Chicago: Callaghan, volume II of VIII: “1828-1846: Jackson's administration”, 1888, pp. 77-79. (accessed via: archive.org)

³²⁷ Mexico remains to this very day a federal polity. The 1917 *Constitucion Politica de los Estados-Unidos Mexicanos* confirmed in article 42 that “the national territory consists of parts integrated into a federation”. The 1857 Constitution is available via: <https://memory.loc.gov/service/lawlib/law0001/2010/20100028071365A/20100028071365A.pdf>. The 1917 Constitution via: http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/cpeum/CPEUM_orig_05feb1917_ima.pdf

³²⁸ Reinhart Koselleck, “Bund”, in: O. Brunner, W. Conze, and R. Koselleck (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, Bd. 1, Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1979, pp. 582-671; moreover, an interesting discussion of the German Confederation (1815-1866) is offered in: Peter Haldén, “Republican continuities in the Vienna Order and the German Confederation”, *European Journal of International Relations* 19:2, 2013, pp. 281-304.

³²⁹ Slobodan Jovanović, *Moji savremenici* [My contemporaries], p. 53.

Karavelov believed that the Americans and the Swiss were essentially *the same* as the Serbs or the Bulgarians. What differentiated them was the radically original system of government adopted by the former. Quoting from Tocqueville, Karavelov stated: “Show me the form of rule of a country and I will tell you all about the people’s condition there.”³³⁰ The two intellectuals needed to believe and make their readers believe that institutional social engineering could turn the tide of Balkan history. They looked for an institutional pattern potent enough to reverse the course of events in the late-Ottoman Balkans and a potent institutional pattern they found – it was exactly the selectively and carefully conceptualized federalism of the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy. Its application, the two men thought, depended only on the boldness, self-confidence, and resolve of the Balkan nations, and nothing more; and the American and Swiss federalism ever remained for them the symbol of transformative power of social and political arrangements.

There, far across the vast Atlantic Ocean and deep into the cold Alpine valleys, Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov saw the gates of liberty and progress wide open.³³¹ Through those gates now all could walk, flying high the “free man in free society” banner. The last step meant agreeing on the introduction of a democratic-republican federal system of rule. How hard could it possibly be?

³³⁰ Nezavisimost (Independence), IV, no. 7, 1/13. XII 1873.

³³¹ For reasons of clarity, “gates” has been used in this chapter instead of the original term “altar”. Jovanović wrote in his 1872 *Obština* (*Commune*) essay that when a friend of liberty looks at “the open altars of freedom and progress [in Switzerland and America], he can but cheer: [long live] free men in free society!” In the Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition, altar represents a sanctuary, a holy shrine separated from believers by the iconostasis, a wall of icons. By referring to “open altars”, Jovanović wished to illustrate that the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy were the only places on earth where all *barriers* to liberty, progress, and human happiness had actually been broken. Therefore, I believe that the use of the original term might have confused readers unfamiliar with the meaning of altar in Orthodox Christian religious thought and practice. See: Vladimir Jovanović, “Obština” [*Commune*], p. 150.

Conclusion

When Vladimir Jovanović visited the Exposition Universelle of 1855, he was but a drop in the ocean of men and women who flocked to Palais de l'Industrie. However insignificant it might seem in the long run, his stay in Paris epitomized a much greater encounter - the coming of modernity into the Balkans. As it has been shown in the first two chapters of the thesis, direct communication between Balkan societies and Western intellectual circles and socio-economic and cultural-political traditions intensified rapidly in the first half of the nineteenth century. Facilitated by intermediary intellectual networks, students and travellers who appropriated elements of Western social and political models, domestication of modern institutional forms generated a dramatic transformation of the Balkans.

The interaction between political modernity and existing Balkan cultural models was characterized in all Balkan societies by fluid, dynamic processes of institutional selection, exchange, and adaptation. These processes – the reconstitution of traditional identities, the consolidation of Balkan nation-states, emergence of Balkan variants of major intellectual currents and ideologies, introduction of constitutionalism, social reform in the fields of education, infrastructure, and land ownership - radically widened the horizons of expectation. Nurturing a strong faith in the existence of uniform standards of progress, the transmitters – the first generation of native Balkan intellectuals enchanted by the achievements of the “cultured” West – were convinced that their societies could easily pursue the same historical trajectories. The mid-nineteenth-century liberal intellectuals, Jovanović and Karavelov among them, had no doubts whatsoever about the translatability of non-Balkan models into Balkan terms; as far as they were concerned, modernity and its prime values – individual prosperity and national independence - could be imported with little or no hindrance.

Such widening of possibilities and growth in the number of conceivable new social worlds led to an intense contemplation of alternatives to the existing historical conditions in which the Balkan peoples had for centuries endured. Federalism as a form of rule and the plans for a future Balkan federal state expounded by Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov in the 1860s and 1870s emanated directly from Balkan intellectuals’ resolve, made possible by the coming of modernity, to construct their political communities anew.

Furthermore, Balkan federalism, as developed by the two protagonists of this thesis, offered solutions to many a crucial dilemma facing Jovanović and Karavelov’s contemporaries. It promised social harmony between members of different Balkan nations, a life in freedom from

external dominance and internal autocracy, and universal cultural and material advancement. Ultimately, it responded to the legacy of despotism and social strife by imagining a Balkan polity neither too strong to suffocate the creative individual and collective potential of its citizenry nor too weak to fall prey to outsiders and their conquering schemes. As *Tanzimat* offered no hope of radical change for the better and as federalization of the Habsburg realm remained a noble but failed concept of František Palacký (1798-1876) and Austro-Slavism,³³² something radically new was sought. In such circumstances, alternative visions of social and political order needed not be drawn from actual experience. On the contrary, they could be and were indeed structured with the help of far-removed models.

I have discussed in chapter three why the two Balkan intellectuals fixated on the examples of the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy. First and foremost, they recognized in those two Western federal republics possible answers to the grave questions about the future of the Balkans and stark antitheses to the circumstance they were confronted with. Moreover, the experiences of American and Swiss federalisms corresponded seemingly perfectly with their visions of good individual and communal life. Finally, by offering to their readers idealized models of social and political order, Jovanović and Karavelov strived to encourage and mobilize, to draw Balkan publics into the process of visualizing merrier futures of liberty and progress.

Therefore, our intellectuals' federalism occupied the middle ground between practical considerations of Balkan reality and its predicaments and an ideal future that was envisioned with the help of mythologized American and Swiss historical experiences and institutional patterns. By choosing not to see the dark sides of the two federal paragons - their crises and underlying tensions - Jovanović and Karavelov succumbed to the rampant optimism fuelling political thought of their entire generation, in the Balkans and beyond. What is more, they were willing to use every tool at their disposal to win over readers for the cause of Balkan unity in diversity. In that, they did not significantly differ from countless combatants in past intellectual struggles who had similarly glorified or - as Alexander Hamilton and James Madison had done³³³ - denigrated specific political models.

³³² See: Andreas Moritsch (ed), *Der Austroslavismus – Ein verführtes Konzept zur politischen Neugestaltung Mitteleuropas*, Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 1996, 210 pp.

³³³ In Federalist Papers no. 18 and no. 19, Hamilton and Madison criticized ancient and modern confederacies in order to strengthen their federalist argument. In: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, "The Federalist Papers: No. 18 and 19. The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union. From the Independent

Be that as it may, by examining the dynamic relations between federalism and other important aspects of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov's political thought and by focusing on the conceptualization of American and Swiss federal models in their works I endeavoured to validate the main hypothesis presented in the introduction. Namely, I showed that the plans of the two studied Balkan intellectuals from the 1860s and 1870s for the establishment of a post-imperial, multinational Balkan federation were not developed only out of pragmatism and geopolitical reasoning but rather stemmed from the idealization of social and political systems of the United States of America and the Helvetic Confederacy.

Not only did their federalisms have robust idealistic overtones based upon a fascinating rendition of American and Swiss models as ideal socio-political types, but they were deeply embedded in and derived from a limitless faith in the transformative power of institutional engineering. Such faith in the ability of mankind to project and shape its own future, different from the past and the present, such surge *forward* that replaced the previously held habit of constantly looking *back* at a "golden age" which had to be re-obtained, such denaturalization of time - what Koselleck would term *Sattelzeit* and Pocock a *Machiavellian Moment* - became possible in the Balkans only in the mid-nineteenth century with the coming of modernity.

In other words, federalisms of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov, bold and far-reaching mobilizing political projects, would have never been arrived at had it not been for the explosive widening of Balkan horizons of expectation, for the remarkable transmission, adoption, and re-negotiation of modern forms of social life. What men *do* must, at least in part, be what they can *say*; accordingly, the emergence of Balkan modernity was primarily an intellectual process, a series of linguistic and mental conceptualizations followed by attempts at their realization. Similarly, Jovanović and Karavelov's federalisms could only be conceived within a wider *ideational* context of Balkan nineteenth-century modernization, its intellectual battles and junctures; and it is exactly this last argument that I tried to substantiate in this thesis.

Finally, the peripheral Balkan political modernity, reflecting the changes in the centre leading toward the era of European imperialism, took a dramatic turn away from its liberal-nationalist phase in the early 1880s and thus marked an utter defeat of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov's federal visions. Regardless of this fact, my master thesis has not been an exercise in antiquarianism and a futile attempt to illuminate a historical road not taken, which may very well seem a dead end to most observers of today. As a matter of fact, the very opposite

is true - it has been a reminder that there once was a time in Balkan history, laden with arduous challenges and characterized by all-prevailing uncertainty, during which men of the pen were not reluctant to explore and suggest alternative social arrangements. And even though the optimism and intellectual audacity of Vladimir Jovanović and Lyuben Karavelov may today appear to us entirely alien, their federalism of the 1860s and 1870s still testifies to the fact that we must never despair in the face of failure but perpetually seek perfection.

Bibliography

Sources

a) Digital archives

- Digitalna nacionalna biblioteka Srbije [Digital National Library of Serbia], collection *Novine (Newspapers)* - <http://digitalna.nb.rs/>
 - *Mlada Srbadija (The Serbian Youth)*, I-II, 1870-1871.
- Digitalna biblioteka Matice srpske [Matica Srpska Digital Library], collection *Novine (Newspapers)* - <http://digital.bms.rs/ebiblioteka/>
 - *Zastava (The Banner)*, IV, 1869.
- Nacionalna biblioteka Sv. Kiril i Metodij [St Cyril and Methodius National Library of Bulgaria], collection *Bulgarian Periodicals from the Revival (1844-1878)* - <http://www.nationallibrary.bg/>
 - *Libertatea (Liberty)*, 1871.
 - *Narodnost (Nationality)*, II, 1869.
 - *Nezavisimost (Independence)*, III-IV, 1873-1874.
 - *Svoboda (Liberty)*, I-III, 1869-1873.
 - *Znanie (Knowledge)*, I, 1875.

b) Published sources

- Jovanović, Vladimir, *Srbski narod i Istočno pitanje* [The Serbian nation and the Eastern question], Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1863, published in English earlier that same year in London.

- *Za slobodu i narod: Pokušaji Vladimira Jovanovića, člana Ujedinjene omladine Srbske* [For liberty and nation: Efforts by Vladimir Jovanović, a member of the United Serbian Youth], Novi Sad: Platonova štamparija, 1868.
- *Les Serbes et la Mission de la Serbie dans l'Europe d'Orient*, Bruxelles: Librairie Internationale, 1870.
- *Politični rečnik* [Political Dictionary]
 - Notebook A-1, Novi Sad: United Serbian Youth, 1870.
 - Notebook A-2, Novi Sad: United Serbian Youth, 1870.
 - Notebook B, Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1872.
 - Notebook V, Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1872.
 - Notebook G, D, Đ [Dj], Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1873.
- *The Emancipation and Unity of the Serbian Nation or the Regeneration of Eastern Europe by the Reconstitution of the Nationalities*, Geneva and London: H. Georg and Trübner & Co, 1871.
- “Obština” [Commune], *Glasnik srpskog učenog društva* 34, 1872.
- “Socijalizam ili društveno pitanje – od najstarijih dana pa do danas” [Socialism or the social question – from ancient times until today], *Glasnik srpskog učenog društva* 39, 1873.
- *The Near-Eastern Problem and the Pan-German Peril*, London: Watts & Co, 1909.
- *Uspomene* [Memoirs], edited by Vasilije Krestić, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1988, completed in the early 1920s.
- Karavelov, Lyuben, *Bŭlgari ot staro vreme (povest)* [*The Bulgarians of old times: a story*], Sofia: Bŭlgarski pisatel, 1961, first published in 1867.
 - *Iz arhiva na Lyuben Karavelov* [From the archive of Lyuben Karavelov], Sofia: Bŭlgarska akademiya na naukite, 1964.
 - *Sŭbrani sŭchineniya v dvanadeset toma* [Collected works in twelve volumes], edited by Cveta Undzhieva, Sofia: Bŭlgarski pisatel, 1984-1992.

- *Tom četvrti. Stihotvorenija, drami, memoari* [Volume four. Poetry, plays, memoirs], 1984.
- *Tom deseti. Statii, nevklyucheni v rubriki* [Volume ten. Articles not included in rubrics], 1987.
- *Tom dvanadeseti. Brošuri i pisma* [Volume twelve. Pamphlets and letters], 1992.

Literature

a) Monographs and edited volumes

- Anderson, M. S, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations*, London: MacMillan, 1966.
- Arnaudov, Mihail, *Ljuben Karavelov: Život, delo, epoha. 1834-1879* [Lyuben Karavelov: Life, works, epoch. 1834-1879], Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1972.
- Berlin, Isaiah, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.
 - *Russian Thinkers*, London: Penguin Books, 1994.
- Bešlin, Branko, *Evropski uticaji na srpski liberalizam u XIX veku* [The European influences upon Serbian liberalism in the nineteenth century], Sremski Karlovci and Novi Sad: Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, 2005.
- Ćirković, Sima, *The Serbs*, Malden, Oxford, and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
- Ćubrilović, Vaso, *Istorija političke misli u Srbiji XIX veka* [The history of political thought in nineteenth-century Serbia], Belgrade: Prosveta, 1958.
- Deudney, Daniel H, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Dimitrov, Mihail, *Ljuben Karavelov: Biografija* [Lyuben Karavelov: Biography], Sofia: Bŭlgarska akademiya na naukite, 1959.

- Đorđević, Dimitrije, *Ogledi iz novije balkanske istorije* [Essays in modern Balkan history], Belgrade: Srpska Književna Zadruga, 1989.
- Gay, Peter, *Style in History*, London: Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1975.
- Gorov, Kiril, *Socialno-ekonomičeskie vñzgli na Ljuben Karavelov* [Socio-economic views of Lyuben Karavelov], Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1975.
- Ignjatović, Đorđe, *Svetozar Miletić, Ljuben Karavelov i bugarski nacionalnooslobodilački pokret 1867-1878* [Svetozar Miletić, Lyuben Karavelov, and the Bulgarian national liberation movement 1867-1878], Novi Sad, 1973.
- Jakšić, Grgur and Vojislav J. Vučković, *Spoljna politika Srbije za vlade kneza Mihaila – Prvi balkanski savez* [Serbia's foreign policy under Prince Mihailo – the First Balkan Alliance], Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1963.
- Jelavich, Charles and Barbara, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920*, Seattle and London: Washington University Press, 1977.
- Jovanović, Slobodan, *Moji savremenici* [My contemporaries], Windsor: Avala, 1962.
 - *Sabrana dela* [Collected Works], edited by Radovan Samardžić and Živorad Stojković, tom 3: “Ustavobranitelji i njihova vlada (1838-1858)/Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila (1858-1868)” [volume 3: “Defenders of the Constitution and their rule (1838-1858)/The second reign of Miloš and Mihailo (1858-1868)“], Belgrade: BIGZ, 1990.
- Konstantinov, Georgi, *Ljuben Karavelov: Zhivot, tvorčestvo, idei* [Lyuben Karavelov: Life, work, ideas], Sofia: P. K. Ovcharov, 1936.
- Kuklick, Bruce (ed), *Thomas Paine: Political Writings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Lehmann, Hartmut and Melvin Richter (eds), *The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts: New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte*, Washington: German Historical Institute, Occasional Paper No. 15, 1996.
- Lekov, Docho, *Ljuben Karavelov* [Lyuben Karavelov], Sofia: People's Education, 1977.

- Moritsch, Andreas (ed), *Der Austroslavismus – Ein verführtes Konzept zur politischen Neugestaltung Mitteleuropas*, Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 1996.
- Pavlović, Stevan, *Istorija Balkana 1804-1945* [A History of the Balkans 1804-1945], Belgrade: Clio, 2001, first published in English in 1999.
- Pocock, J. G. A, *Political Thought and History – Essays on Theory and Method*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Popović, Vasilj, *Evropa i srpsko pitanje u periodu oslobođenja: 1804-1918* [Europe and the Serbian question in the era of liberation: 1804-1918], Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1940.
- Schutz, John A. and Douglass Adair (eds), *The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush, 1805-1813*, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001, first published in 1966.
- Simeunović, Dragan, *Novovekovne političke ideje u Srba* [Modern political ideas and the Serbs], Belgrade: Institute for Political Studies, 2003.
- Skerlić, Jovan, *Omladina i njena književnost (1848-1871): Izučavanja o nacionalizmu i književnom romantizmu kod Srba* [The youth and their literature (1848-1871): Studies in nationalism and literary romanticism of the Serbs], Belgrade: Prosveta, 1966, first published in 1906.
- Skinner, Quentin, *Visions of Politics, volume I: Regarding Method*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Stavrianos, Leften S, *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times*, Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company, 1944.
 - *The Balkans Since 1453*, New York: NYU Press, 2000, first published in 1958.
- Stoianovich, Traian, *Balkanska civilizacija* [A Study in Balkan civilization], Belgrade: Centar za geopolitiku, 1995, first published in English in 1967.
 - *Between East and West: The Balkan and the Mediterranean Worlds*, volume IV, New Rochelle, New York: A. D. Caratzas, 1995.
- Stokes, Gale, *Legitimacy through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics*, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1975.

- Stoyanov, Zahari, *Zapiski po bŭlgarskite vŭstaniya* [Notes on the Bulgarian uprisings], volume I, 1870-1876, chapter 2 – accessed via: <http://www.slovo.bg/showwork.php3?AuID=149&WorkID=3868&Level=3>
- Trompf, G. W, *The Idea of Historical Recurrence in Western Thought: From Antiquity to the Reformation*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1979.
- Tully, James (ed), *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics*, Cambridge and Oxford, 1988.
- Velikov, Stefan (ed), *Ljuben Karavelov v spomenite na sŭvremennicite si* [Lyuben Karavelov in the memory of his contemporaries], Sofia: Bŭlgarski pisatel, 1960.
- Von Holst, Hermann E, *The Constitutional and Political History of the United States*, Chicago: Callaghan, 1888 - accessed via: archive.org.
- Źivković, Andreja and Dragan Plavšić (eds), *The Balkan Socialist Tradition and the Balkan Federation, 1871-1915*, London: Procupine Press, Revolutionary History volume 8:3, 2003.

b) Scientific articles and individual contributions to edited volumes

- Armitage, David, “The International Turn in Intellectual History”, in: Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds), *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Armour, Ian D, “Killing Nationalism with Liberalism? Austria-Hungary and the Serbian Constitution of 1869”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 21:3, 2010.
- Bataković, Dušan T, “Vladimir Jovanović: Ideolog liberalizma u Srbiji” [Vladimir Jovanović: An ideologue of liberalism in Serbia], *Nova sprska politička misao* 2-3, 1998.
- Black, C. E, “The Influence of Western Political Thought in Bulgaria, 1850-1885”, *The American Historical Review* 48:3, 1943.
- Dimov, Georgi, “Ljuben Karavelov i razvitiето na bŭlgraska nacionalna literaturno-teoreticheska i kriticheska misŭl” [Lyuben Karavelov and the development of Bulgarian national theoretical and critical literary thought], in: Cveta Undzhieva and Docho Lekov

(eds), *Ljuben Karavelov – sbornik po sluchaŭ 150 godini ot rozhdenieto mu* [Lyuben Karavelov – a collection of essays on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of his birth], Sofia: Bŭlgarska akademiya na naukite, 1990.

- Dorđević, Dimitrije, “Projects for the Federation of South-East Europe in the 1860s and 1870s”, *Balkanica* I, 1970.
- Haldén, Peter, “Republican continuities in the Vienna Order and the German Confederation”, *European Journal of International Relations* 19:2, 2013.
- Hamilton, Alexander and James Madison, “The Federalist Papers: No. 18 and 19. The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union. From the Independent Journal. December 1787“ - accessed via the Avalon Project’s website *Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy*, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/>
- Hassiotis, Loukianos, “The Ideal of Balkan Unity from a European Perspective (1789–1945)”, *Balkanica* XLI, 2010.
- Kavalski, Emilian R, “The Balkan America? The Myth of America in the Creation of Bulgarian National Identity”, *New Zealand Slavonic Journal* 38, 2004.
- Kitromilides, Paschalis M, “An Enlightenment Perspective on Balkan Cultural Pluralism: The Republican Vision of Rhigas Velestinlis”, *History of Political Thought* 24:3, 2003.
- Koselleck, Reinhart, “Bund”, in: O. Brunner, W. Conze, and R. Koselleck (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, Bd. 1, Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1979.
- Kosev, Konstantin, “Bugarški preporod” [The Bulgarian revival], in: Dimitar Popov et al, *Istorija Bugarske* [History of Bulgaria], Belgrade: Clio, 2008.
- Ković, Miloš, “Liberalizam” [Liberalism], in: Miloš Ković (ed), *Srbi 1903-1914: Istorija ideja* [The Serbs 1903-1914: A history of ideas], Belgrade: Clio, 2015.
 - “Nacionalizam” [Nationalism], in: Miloš Ković (ed), *Srbi 1903-1914: Istorija ideja* [The Serbs 1903-1914: A history of ideas], Belgrade: Clio, 2015.
- Lehti, Marko, “The Quest for Solidarity and Tamed Nationalism: Envisioning Sustainable Peace in the Balkans”, *Peace and Change* 39:1, 2014.


- Madison, James, “The Federalist Papers: No. 14. Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered. From the New York Packet. Friday, November 30, 1787” - accessed via the Avalon Project’s website *Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed14.asp.
- Müller, Jan-Werner, “On Conceptual History”, in: Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds), *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Milosavljević, Boris, “Liberal and Conservative Political Thought in Nineteenth-century Serbia: Vladimir Jovanović and Slobodan Jovanović”, *Balkanica* XLI, 2010.
- Milutinović, Kosta, “Prvi ideolozi federalističke misli kod Južnih Slovena” [The first ideologues of federalist thought among the South Slavs], *RAD* 11, 1962.
- Mishkova, Diana, “The Interesting Anomaly of Balkan Liberalism”, in: Ivan Zoltan Denes (ed), *Liberty and the Search for Identity. Liberal Nationalisms and the Legacy of Empires*, Budapest and New York: Central European University, 2006.
 - “Liberalism and Tradition in the Nineteenth-Century Balkans: Towards History and Methodology of Political Transfer”, *East European Politics, Societies, and Cultures* 26:4, 2012.
 - “Balkan Liberalisms: Historical Routes of a Modern Ideology”, in: Roumen Daskalov and Diana Mishkova (eds), *Entangled Histories of the Balkans. Volume Two: Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014.
- Mishkova, Diana and Roumen Daskalov, “‘Forms without substance’: Debates on the Transfer of Western Models to the Balkans”, in: Roumen Daskalov and Diana Mishkova (eds), *Entangled Histories of the Balkans. Volume Two: Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014.
- Ress, Imre, “The Value System of Serbian Liberalism”, in: Ivan Zoltan Denes (ed), *Liberty and the Search for Identity: Liberal Nationalisms and the Legacy of Empires*, Budapest and New York: Central European University, 2006.
- Richter, Melvin, “Reconstructing the History of Political Languages: Pocock, Skinner, and *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*”, *History and Theory* 29, 1990.

- Skinner, Quentin, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”, *History and Theory* 8:1, 1969.
 - “Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action”, *Political Theory* 2:3, 1974.
- Stoianovich, Traian, “The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution, 1830-1880”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 1:3, 1959.
 - “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant”, *The Journal of Economic History* 20:2, 1960.
- Stuurman, Siep, “The Canon of the History of Political Thought: Its Critique and a Proposed Alternative”, *History and Theory* 39:2, 2000.
- Trgovčević, Ljubinka, “The Enlightenment and the Beginnings of Modern Serbian Culture”, *Balkanica* XXXVII, 2006.
- Wilson, Samuel J, “Lost Opportunities: Lajos Kossuth, the Balkan Nationalities, and the Danubian Confederation”, *Hungarian Studies* 8:2, 1993.

Annex


1. Cover page of the first issue of Karavelov's *Svoboda (Liberty)* published in Bucharest on 7/19

November 1869



Source: Digital archive of the St. Cyril and Methodius National Library of Bulgaria; name of collection - *Bulgarian Periodicals from the Revival (1844-1878)*; accessed online via: <http://digital.nationallibrary.bg/DWWebClient/IntegrationSearch.aspx?DWSubSession=17039&v=1796>

2. Cover page of the first volume of Jovanović's *Politični rečnik* (*Political Dictionary*) published by the United Serbian Youth in Novi Sad in 1870



Source: Digital archive of the Matica Srpska Library (Serbian Cyrillic: *Матича српска*); name of collection – *Serbian books of the nineteenth century*; accessed online via: <http://digital.bms.rs/ebiblioteka/publications/view/2552>