

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER'S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

„Climate Migration as Political Ammunition:
The Political Use of the Academic Climate Migration
Debate by the Greens/European Free Alliance in the
European Parliament“

verfasst von / submitted by

Luka De Bruyckere

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master (MA)

Wien, 2016 / Vienna 2016

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme code as it appears on
the student record sheet:

A 067 805

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme as it appears on
the student record sheet:

Individuelles Masterstudium:
Global Studies – a European Perspective

Betreut von / Supervisor:

Univ.-Prof. Dr. Peter Schweitzer

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit /Title of the master thesis

Climate Migration as Political Ammunition: The Political Use of the Academic Climate Migration Debate by the Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament

Verfasser /Author

Luka De Bruyckere

angestrebter akademischer Grad / acadamic degree aspired

Master (MA)

Wien, 2016

Studienkennzahl : A 067 805

Studienrichtung: Individuelles Masterstudium:
Global Studies – a European Perspective

Betreuer/Supervisor: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Peter Schweitzer

Table of contents

ABSTRACT	4
INTRODUCTION	8
 CHAPTER I - The academic climate migration debate	13
1. Early debate	13
1.1 Early definitions	14
1.2 Environmental versus climate migration.....	16
1.3 Maximalism versus minimalism	17
2. A more nuanced debate	18
2.1 Voluntary versus forced migration	19
2.2 Agency	21
2.2.1 Migration as adaptation	22
2.2.2 Planned relocation.....	23
2.3 Security	25
2.4 Social factors.....	27
3. Quantifications	29
3.1 Criticism	31
4. Legal discussions	32
4.1 Broadening the Geneva Convention.....	34
4.2 A new (environmental) convention.....	35
4.3 Protection by current policies	36
4.4 Environmental policies	38
5. Minimalist concerns on climate refugee conceptualizations	39
6. Conclusion: evolved maximalism versus minimalist concerns	41
 CHAPTER II - Research use in policy making	44
1. Two-Communities theory	45

1.1 Complexity instead of homogeneity.....	48
1.2 Refuting rationalism.....	50
2. Transforming research.....	52
2.1 The role of values.....	52
2.2 The Advocacy Coalition Framework	53
2.3 The transformation of research into political arguments.....	54
3. The representation of academic research.....	55
4. Conclusion.....	56
 CHAPTER III - Methodology.....	 58
1. Methodological influence.....	58
1.1 Gibson's transformation theory.....	58
1.2 Critical frame analysis	59
2. Methodological structure.....	61
3. The Greens/ European Free Alliance in the European Parliament...62	
3.1 Selection of documents	62
4. Representation of the academic debate.....	63
4.1 Coding of the academic debate.....	63
4.2 Analysis of policy documents.....	65
4.2.1 Sensitizing questions	65
4.2.2 Answers to the sensitizing questions.....	67
5. Political use.....	67
6. Limitations.....	68
 CHAPTER IV - Research results.....	 70
1. Representation.....	70
1.1 Academic dimensions of policy texts.....	70
1.1.1 Conceptualization.....	72
1.1.2 Complexity	74
1.1.3 Advocacy	77
1.2 Greens/EFA policy documents	79

1.2.1 Refugees and the Environment: The Forgotten Element of Sustainability (Lambert, 2002).....	83
1.2.2 Nous Sommes à l'Origine du Problème, Nous Devons le Résoudre (Biermann, 2008)	85
1.2.3 Climate Change and Migration (Lambert, 2010)	86
1.2.4 Climate Change, Refugees and Migration (Flautre et al., 2013).....	88
2. Political use.....	90
2.1 Solutions.....	90
2.1.1 Mitigation.....	91
2.1.2 Adaptation: planned relocation	92
2.1.3 Legal solutions	93
2.2 Indirectly related issues	96
2.3 Research use.....	97
2.2.1 Concrete conceptualization for policy solutions	98
CONCLUSION.....	101
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	107
ANNEX.....	124
CURRICULUM VITAE.....	139

Abstract

Migration as well as climate change are currently two of the most pressing issues societies are facing. The link between both crises is easily made as exemplified by news reports positing a connection between climate change and the Syrian conflict. A vivid academic debate on the environment or climate migration nexus divides maximalist and minimalist scholars. The former analyse the plight of so called climate migrants and refugees while the latter reject these concepts by stressing the complex multicausality of migration. Minimalists fear the political instrumentalisation of the climate migration discourse, assuming a predominance of maximalist argumentations in the policy realm. Their concerns prompt questions on the relation between science and politics. Theoretical perspectives on research utilization expect a loss of complexity as academic arguments travel to the political debate. Furthermore, policy makers are depicted as selecting research findings on the basis of ideological values where after they transform these argumentations to fit their political purpose. At a time that is characterized by the omnipresence of discourses on climate change and migration it is essential to assess what (academic) arguments underpin which political stance. I conducted a case study on policy documents related to the Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament, guided by the following research questions: (1) How is the academic debate represented in policy documents? (2) How are academic arguments on climate migration used as political arguments? I first assessed the way climate migration is conceptualized, what degree of complexity the documents take over from the academic debate and what the documents advocate based on which argumentative support. I brought these characteristics of the

documents under analysis in relation with the respective influence of minimalism and maximalism. This assessment revealed the prominent influence of what I call 'evolved maximalism', a form of maximalism that has incorporated certain minimalist arguments. Most policy documents exhibit an awareness of the minimalist nuance but nevertheless retain the maximalist conclusion on the need for policy action in response to the growing problem of climate migration. Building on the assessment of the representation of the academic debate in policy documents, I discussed research transformation, transfer, addition or deletion. With this as a basis, I developed an interpretation of how central arguments, concepts and controversies characterizing the academic climate migration debate are used as political arguments. The research revealed that the discourse on climate migration is often used to advocate or oppose issues that are only indirectly related to climate migration. Furthermore, the way climate migration is conceptualized determines the type of solutions a document proposes. Generally, the more a document is influenced by minimalism, the less likely it is to propose concrete and intrusive solutions to climate migration. As such, the way climate migration is conceptualized matters. Analyses of these underlying conceptualizations can guide the evaluation of concrete solutions and thus provide arguments to support or oppose them.

Zusammenfassung

Migration und der Klimawandel sind derzeit die zwei vorrangigen Probleme, die die Gesellschaft zu bewältigen hat. Die Verbindung zwischen beiden ist sehr leicht herzustellen, wie es sich an Hand der Berichterstattung zum Klimawandel und dem Konflikt in Syrien leicht darstellen lässt. Eine lebhaft akademische Debatte über die Umwelt oder den Klima – Migrationsnexus teilt Wissenschaftler in Minimalisten und Maximalisten ein. Erstere untersuchen die Not der sogenannten Klimamigranten und Flüchtlinge, Letztere lehnen dieses Konzept mit dem Hinweis auf die komplexe Multikausalität von Migration ab. Minimalisten fürchten die politische Instrumentalisierung

des Diskurses über Klimamigration, und gehen von einer Dominanz der Argumentation der Maximalisten in der politischen Sphäre aus. Ihre Bedenken lösen Fragen zu der Beziehung von Wissenschaft und Politik aus. Theoretische Perspektiven zur Nutzbarmachung von Forschung lassen den Verlust von Komplexität erwarten, wenn akademische Argumente in die politische Debatte wandern. Dazu werden Entscheidungsträger so dargestellt, dass sie die Forschungsergebnisse auf Basis ihrer ideologischen Werte auswählen, und diese Argumentationen so transformieren, dass sie zu ihren politischen Absichten passen. In einer Zeit, die gekennzeichnet ist vom allgegenwärtigen Diskurs über Klimawandel und Migration ist es wichtig auszuwerten, inwieweit (akademischen) Argumente den politischen Standpunkt stützen. Ich machte eine Fallstudie zu den Strategiepapieren in Verbindung mit den Grünen/European Free Alliance im Europäischen Parlament, geleitet von folgenden Forschungsfragen: (1) Wie ist die akademische Debatte in den Strategiepapieren repräsentiert? (2) Wie wurden akademische Argumente zum Klimawandel und zur Klimamigration als politische Argumente verwendet? Ich bewertete zuerst wie Klimamigration konzeptualisiert wurde, zu welchem Grad die Dokumente die Komplexität aus der akademischen Debatte mithinüber genommen haben, und was diese Dokumente basierend auf welchen argumentativen Stützen als Politik vorschlugen. Ich brachte diese Eigenschaften der untersuchten Dokumente in Relation zu den jeweiligen Einflüssen der Minimalisten und Maximalisten. Diese Bewertung machte den prominenten Einfluss von jenen deutlich, die ich „entwickelte Maximalisten“ nenne, eine Form von Maximalisten die gewisse Argumente von Minimalisten inkorporiert haben. Die meisten Strategiepapiere zeigen ein Bewusstsein der minimalistischen Nuance, aber dennoch behalten sie die maximalistischen Schlüsse bei, welche politischen Aktionen es benötigt um auf das wachsende Problem der Klimamigration zu antworten. Aufbauend auf der Bewertung der Repräsentation der akademischen Debatte in Strategiepapieren, diskutierte ich die Transformation der Forschung, Transfer, Änderung oder Löschung. Darauf basierend entwickelte ich eine Interpretation, wie zentrale Argumente, Konzepte und Kontroversen, die die akademische Klimadebatte charakterisiert, als politische Argumente verwendet wurden. Die Forschung

legt offen, dass der Diskurs über Klimamigration oft dazu genützt wird, um Fragen die nur indirekt mit der Klimamigration in Verbindung stehen, zu verteidigen oder dagegen aufzutreten. Hinzu kommt, die Art und Weise wie Klimamigration konzeptualisiert wird, legt bereits die Art der Lösung fest, die das Dokument vorschlägt. Generell lässt sich sagen, je mehr ein Dokument von den Minimalisten beeinflusst ist, je unwahrscheinlicher ist es, dass es konkrete und eindringliche Lösungen zur Klimamigration enthält. Denn es zählt, wie Klimamigration konzeptualisiert wird. Eine Analyse dieser zu Grund liegenden Konzeptualisierung kann eine Evaluierung der konkreten Lösungen leiten, und daher Argumente geben um diese zu unterstützen oder ihnen entgegen zu treten.

Introduction

Migration as well as climate change are currently two of the most pressing issues contemporary societies are facing. Since summer 2015, Western media report of a refugee crisis reaching a proportion unseen since the Second World War. At the same time, anthropogenic climate change has been recognized as a pressing threat to all regions of the world, especially the poorest areas. The link between both crises is easily made. In November 2015, a month before the start of the 21th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21), Angela Merkel advocated climate policies that would prevent dangerous climate change by referring to the threat of even more daunting refugee crises (Associated Press, 2015). News reports, as well as Prince Charles and John Kerry posited a firm link between the climate change and the Syrian conflict, arguing that Syrian refugees are climate refugees (Miller, 2015).

Since the mid-1980s, so called ‘maximalist’ scholars have linked migration to environmental change (Gemenne, 2011; Jacobson, 1988). Gradually the focus shifted to climate change, which provided for concepts such as ‘climate migrant’ or ‘climate refugee’ (Biermann & Boas, 2012; Kniveton et al., 2008; Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009). These concepts have aroused much controversy among their counterparts, ‘minimalist’ scholars who questioned the empirical link between environmental degradation - later climate change - and migration. Minimalist scholars stress the multicausality of migration and argue that it is impossible to isolate one causal factor of migration (Black, 2001). Furthermore, specific social responses to environmental change are unpredictable. Due to this complexity, no definition or quantification of climate migration is deemed feasible (Jakobeit & Methmann, 2012). As such, minimalists reject the concepts of climate migrant

and refugee (Kibreab, 1997). In this dissertation I will use the term ‘climate migration’ to indicate the issue at stake, without engaging in the controversy surrounding this term.

Throughout the decades, maximalists increasingly incorporated parts of the minimalist discourse in their analyses. They recognize the multi-causality of migration and at times even the difficulty of isolating the climatic factor in migration decisions. Currently, many maximalist scholars exhibit a mix of maximalist and minimalist arguments. As a consequence, the distinction between both research strands is somewhat blurred. Still, maximalists continue to use the concepts of climate migrant and refugee to indicate what they view as a new and growing problem in need of concrete solutions. This conclusion distinguishes them from minimalist scholars up to this day.

The climate migrant and refugee concepts have been picked up by media and by the policy realm. Certain minimalist scholars voiced their concern about potential political instrumentalizations of this discourse they consider alarmist (Hartmann, 2010; Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009; McNamara & Gibson, 2009). Migration scholars implicitly lament the use of the maximalist climate refugee discourse for issues that may not be related to the refugee cause and may even run counter to this objective. Giam Kibreab (1997, p. 20) warned for the possibility of the environmental refugee concept to weaken asylum obligations. By portraying environmental factors as drivers of poverty and subsequent migration flows, instead of political conflicts, migrants lose the protection they would enjoy under the Geneva Convention. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), among others, fears a degradation of the traditional refugee concept that is reserved for people fleeing political prosecution (UNHCR, 2008, p. 8). Richard Black (2001, p. 12) indicates that the reason for scholars’ and policy makers’ attempts to isolate environmental reasons for migration, is linked to ecological concerns. By envisioning millions of environmental or climate refugees fleeing to Western countries, political pressure is raised to mitigate environmental degradation. “[T]o do something about the rising tide of environmental refugees also requires governments to do something about the causes of environmental degradation” (p. 12). With regard to climate change, Hartmann (2010, p.

239) points to the strategic use of climate refugee discourses to urge developed countries to reduce their emissions, but regards these efforts as counterproductive.

These minimalist observations on the political use of the climate migration discourse imply a certain concern about the predominance of maximalist argumentations in the policy realm, and the subsequent political use of this discourse. However, no systematic effort has been undertaken to document the assumed prevalence and political use of maximalist argumentations in the policy debate on climate migration.

Certain theoretical considerations on the relation between science and policy (the science-policy or research-policy nexus) support the expectation of maximalist prevalence in the policy realm. Theories on research use do not expect complexity, as introduced by minimalist scholars, to be transferred to policy debates. The dominant Two-Communities theory, for instance, envisions policy makers to prefer concise and simple conclusions that can inform the policy process in a straightforward manner (Pielke & Conant, 2003, p. 1351; Young et al., 2002, p. 215). Research utilization theorists such as Erik Albaek (1995) and Brendan Gibson (2003) regard values to be an indispensable part of policy making. Research influence is always mediated by political values. As such, they assume politicians to select those research findings that fit their argumentative purpose. Alarmist narratives of massive migration flows stemming from climate change can carry a useful message for politicians advocating climate mitigation. In addition to research selection, Gibson adds the presumption that policy actors transform scientific research as to fit their political positions. His theory on research transformation operationalises the role of values in policy making: “when research influences policy it is transformed [emphasis added] into knowledge-for-policy by being invested with meaning and power” (p. vii). Policy makers with a green signature are thus expected to select and transform maximalist research findings so as to use these to advocate emission reductions.

The minimalist concerns prompt questions on the political use of climate migration research in the policy realm. The aim of this research is to trace the way central arguments, concepts and controversies characterizing the academic climate migration debate, are used as political arguments. In order to investigate political use it is necessary to assess how the

debate at stake is represented in the policy realm. I attempted to access this policy realm by means of policy documents. Investigating the representation of the climate migration debate generally comes down to gauging which arguments were reflected in the policy documents as well as assessing the respective influence of minimalism and maximalism. I therefore propose the following related research questions: (1) How is the academic debate represented in policy documents? (2) How are academic arguments on climate migration used as political arguments?

I do not aim to provide an exhaustive overview of the representation of the academic debate in policy circles, nor do I aim to clarify all issues that could benefit politically from the climate migration argument. To reduce the scope of the analysis to a manageable part of the policy debate, I conducted a case study on one particular actor, the political group Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament (Greens/EFA). They represent progressive Members of Parliament (MEPs) in the European Parliament who could be expected to advocate more stringent climate policies by means of the climate migration argument. I selected four policy documents published between 2002 and 2013 that are related to this political group.

In order to assess the political use of scholarly arguments, I developed a methodology that is loosely based on the MAGEEQ research project (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007) and Gibson's theory of research transformation. First, I investigated the representation of the academic climate migration debate in the selected policy documents. After conducting a literature review on the climate migration debate, I assigned codes to all academic arguments. On the basis of this 'summary' of the literature review I developed 15 sensitizing questions that gauged at the representation of the academic debate in the policy documents. By means of the questions I aimed to appraise how the issue of climate migration is conceptualized, what degree of complexity the documents take over from the academic debate and what the documents advocate based on which argumentative support. According to a key of nine dimensions, I analysed the policy documents on the respective maximalist and minimalist influence. Second, based on the analysis of the representation of the academic arguments, I discussed the political use of research by drawing attention to

several instances of research transformation or examples of arguments that are added, left-out or directly taken over. This, in turn, formed the basis of an interpretation of how the academic arguments on climate migration are used as political arguments.

The concerns of the minimalist scholars point to essential questions on the role of science in policy making, the prevailing values of political actors as well as to an important underlying struggle to define what climate change means, and especially, what should be done about it.

In chapter I, I provide an overview of the academic climate migration debate that shows how minimalists introduced a certain degree of nuance to the debate that has been picked up by maximalists. I also assess the legal discussions that have been sparked by the climate refugee concept, as well as the concerns by minimalist scholars on the potential consequences of the climate refugee concept. Chapter II gives an overview of the theoretical debate on the science-policy nexus, thereby creating the necessary background to assess the use of the academic climate migration debate in policy circles. Chapter III describes the methodology that is used to analyse the policy documents. The last chapter presents the research results on the representation of the academic debate in the policy documents, followed by a discussion on the political use of academic arguments.

Chapter I

The academic climate migration debate

In this chapter I will provide an overview of the rich academic debate on climate migration with a special focus on the concepts climate and environmental migration. After elaborating on early controversies, I outline how the debate gained complexity. I furthermore give an overview of the legal discussions on the climate migration and refugee concepts.

1. Early debate

The debate on climate migration finds its origin in the discussion on environmental migration during the mid-80s. Shortly before, during the 70s, fears about a population explosion (Ehrlich, 1968) were joined by the emerging debate on anthropogenic climate change that rose to prominence after the publication of the report of the Club of Rome (Meadows et al., 1972). Furthermore, droughts struck the African Sahel region (Govaerts & Lattanzio, 2008) which attracted the attention of scholars who saw a link between periods of drought and migration flows (see Findley, 1994; Pedersen, 1995; Suhrke, 1993). Publications such as Lester Brown's 'Twenty-two dimensions of the population problem'¹

¹ The problematic of what Brown calls 'ecological refugees' is only briefly addressed in this report that mainly focusses on population growth. However, Brown is considered to be the first to identify a group of people as ecological or environmental refugees (Black, 2001, p. 1).

(1976), the United Nation Development Programme (UNEP) report 'Environmental refugees' by Essam El-Hinnawi (1985) or 'Environmental refugees: a yardstick of habitability' by Jodi Jacobson (1988) introduced a new type of refugee, fleeing the consequences of environmental degradation. Warning for large-scale population displacement as a response to environmental stress, these reports briefly moved the public debate (Suhrke, 1993, p. 6). The environmental stress they referred to includes desertification, water scarcity, deforestation, soil erosion, rising sea level, droughts, pollution and natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes or earthquakes. Jacobson (1988) also includes forced migration due to development projects or accidents such as the explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor. The first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) mentioned the threat of climate induced displacement, bringing the issue to the attention of the international community (Suhrke, 1993, p. 6)

1.1 Early definitions

El-Hinnawi (1985) is considered to be the first to define the concept of 'environmental refugees':

[P]eople who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affect the quality of their life. By 'environmental disruption' in this definition is meant any physical, chemical and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or the resource base) that render it temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life. (p. 4)

El-Hinnawi focuses on forced migration and does not include those people for whom migration is an option that is favoured over other responses to environmental change. While leaving out voluntary migration, his definition was still criticized for being so broad that it lost all meaning (Suhrke & Visentin, 1991). Within this definition, any change in environmental conditions of whatever origin is seen as sufficient ground for labelling

people as environmental refugees. Furthermore, by explicitly stating that “all displaced people can be described as environmental refugees” the analytic value is lost (El-Hinnawi, 1985, p. 4; Suhrke, 1993, p. 6).

Other early, oft-cited definitions are those by Norman Myers, an environmental scientist and activist who had a large influence on the environmental migration (policy) debate. Myers wrote on environmental and climate migration for more than two decades now and provided the debate with several variations of his definition. In ‘Environmental exodus’, a book he wrote together with Jeniffer Kent, he summarized his definition as follows:

Environmental refugees are persons who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their erstwhile homelands because of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change, also natural disasters such as cyclones, storm surges and floods. In face of these environmental threats, people feel they have no alternative but to seek sustenance elsewhere, whether within their own countries or beyond and whether on a semi-permanent or permanent basis. (Myers & Kent, 1995, pp. 18–19)

This definition focuses on economic factors and points to specific natural phenomena. Although Myers does not explicitly use the word 'forced' as El-Hinnawi does, his definition also seems to include only those situations in which migration is perceived as the only option.

Early estimates of the amount of environmental refugees ranged from 10 million in the 1980s (Jacobson, 1988) to 25 million in the early 1990s (Myers & Kent, 1995). Myers predicted that this amount could double by 2010 and envisioned the number of environmental refugees to reach 150 to 200 million by 2050 (ibid).

As Ashri Suhrke (1993) points out, the debate that followed was silenced fairly quickly. The reports were issued by UNEP and the World Watch Institute but were not deemed credible by social scientists, particularly migration scholars. They accused the reports of using the case of refugees to put sustainable development on the global political agenda

(Black, 2001, p. 12). Furthermore, the numbers that were cited lacked an empirical basis and the overly broad definitions created more confusion than clarification (Suhrke, 1993, p. 6). The policy community did not pick up the concept, which, according to Suhrke, is to be explained by a concern among policy makers “that alarmist thinking would frighten a public already suffering from ‘compassion fatigue’ towards refugees” (ibid). However, as I will elaborate on in the following chapters, the so-called maximalist discourse and its predictions did find its way to policy discourses.

1.2 Environmental versus climate migration

An important evolution within the environmental migration debate was the shift from a focus on environmental refugees in general to the subcategory climate refugees. The 1985 UNEP report that popularized the term environmental refugees did not refer to climate change yet. It focused on the overuse of resources leading to environmental degradation up to the point of the breakdown of ecosystems sustaining human populations (Faist & Schade, 2013b, p. 5). As a consequence of the increasing significance of the discourse on climate change, the debate on environmental migration is increasingly dominated by climate-induced migration. Rather than preventing this distinction to gain prominence, the difficulty of separating climate-related and climate unrelated environmental disruptions leads to a focus on climate migration. Since it is often uncertain whether environmental change is to be attributed to climate change, close to all environmental degradation could be attributed to climate change and thus produce climate migration (Gemenne, 2011, p. 17). Furthermore, the expectation that climate change will lead to more environmental refugees also fuels the focus on this type of migration, at the expense of other kinds of environmental change that affects migration flows. Research on climate migration is stimulated by the larger availability of funding as well as the prospect of putting pressure on the UNFCCC negotiations on climate change to create a legal framework that addresses the needs of climate refugees (see below) (ibid).

Another reason for the particularity of this sub-category of environmental migration might be its human-induced nature. The increasing proof of the anthropogenic nature of climate change introduces a much-debated element of responsibility that many other types of environmentally induced migration lack.

My research focuses on the political conceptualization of the narrower category of climate refugees. However, in light of a proper understanding of the debates on climate migration it is, in my view, important to continually refer back to the general category of environmental refugees. Therefore, in this overview of the environmental migration debate I will mostly refer to the broader category of environmental migration and only to climate migration when this is the explicitly subject of the discussion.

1.3 Maximalism versus minimalism

'Environmental refugees', as a concept, was introduced by researchers within governmental and non-governmental organizations who usually stemmed from natural sciences and security studies. Suhrke termed them the 'maximalist' or 'alarmist' school (1993). Alarmists view environmental change as the main driver of certain refugee flows.

The most fundamental critique on the concept 'environmental refugee' as well as on predictions of their numbers came from the field of migration studies. Migration scholars claim that there is no empirical evidence supporting the category of environmental refugees (Black, 2001). This criticism crystalized in the form of what Suhrke (1993) called the 'skeptical' or 'minimalist' strand. Minimalists argue that human migration is a complex and multi-causal phenomenon that cannot be reduced to one single driver. Environmental factors might have an influence on migration decisions but only in relation to other social, political and economic factors. Maximalist scholars such as Myers admit that environmental change has an influence on migration through its effects on, for instance, economies or by causing war. However, for Myers environmental degradation is the start of the causal chain.

In an important contribution to the debate, Gaim Kibreab (1997) reverses this chain. He argues that insecurity, in the form of war, political instability or scorched-earth

governmental policies, causes environmental degradation and not the other way around. People migrate because of this insecurity, which undermines their traditional way of cultivating the land, leading to environmental degradation, decreasing yields and eventually displacement. Furthermore, in some cases safer areas become overexploited causing further environmental degradation.

Since migration decisions are made on the basis of many interrelated factors it is hard, if not impossible, to isolate one determinant of migration flows. The complexity of the environment-migration nexus leads minimalists to argue that an agreement on a workable definition of environmental refugees is inconceivable (Black, 2001, p. 14).

Faist and Schade (2013b) warn against the term ‘sceptic’ scholar since this seems to imply that this group of researchers does not consider climate change as an issue. The minimalists are, however, very much concerned about the consequences of climate change but warn against “the shortcomings of the existing concepts and approaches, and are reluctant to draw premature conclusions” (p. 10).

While ever more articles on environmental and later on climate refugees are published, few publications deal with empirical research on the environment-migration nexus. Brown calls the majority of publications that produce figures “well-educated guesswork” (2008, p. 8). Research projects such as the European Union funded EACH-FOR project have started to close this gap but much work remains to be done (Warner, 2011).

2. A more nuanced debate

The contributions by minimalist scholars have introduced greater nuance to the academic debate on environmental and climate migration. Judging from a report by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (Kniveton et al., 2008) as well as from the cautious

language² of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Wilbanks et al., 2007, p. 365), the complexity of the relation between environmental change and migration decisions is increasingly recognized. Furthermore, within scholarly publications on the issue, environmental factors are more often regarded as proximate instead of ultimate causes of displacement. Typologies of environmentally displaced persons consider aspects such as the continuum between voluntary and forced migration, distinguish between temporary and permanent migration (Bates, 2002) and increasingly view migration as an adaptation strategy in the face of climate change (Vlassopoulos, 2013). Extensive attention has been given to the many aspects that make up migration decisions (Faist & Schade, 2013b), the impacts of migration flows on receiving areas (Kibreab, 1997) and the implication climate migration could have for international law and the international refugee regime in particular (Biermann & Boas, 2012).

2.1 Voluntary versus forced migration

The simplistic image of helpless people living in areas where environmental conditions have deteriorated up to the point that relocation is their only option, has been revised by many academic contributions (see Faist & Schade, 2013b; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Kniveton et al., 2008). Some communities have a long history of mobility (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012), especially in regions with rough environmental conditions. Migration functions “as an essential part of the economic and social structure” of particular regions, for instance in the African Sahel (Black, 2001, p. 6). Pastoralists that move along with the seasons, for instance, should not be considered environmental migrants or refugees (Faist & Schade, 2013b, p. 11). Furthermore, when confronted with gradual environmental degradation, families have time to consider different coping strategies of which permanent

² Faist and Schade (2013b, p. 6) note that the IPCC often puts terms as climate migration and environmental refugee into quotation marks which they see as evidence for the on-going scientific controversies among these phenomena.

migration is only one (Florémont, 2012, pp. 36–37). By sending some family members elsewhere, either far or near, either for longer or shorter periods, income diversification can enable other members to stay.

For Suhrke (1993, p. 9), this is an example of migration as opposed to refugee flows. She insists on the importance of the difference between environmental refugees and environmental migrants, a difference that is wiped out by broad definitions of environmental displacement such as the one proposed by El-Hinnawi (p. 6). In brief, she identifies environmental refugees as people who were forced to move in response to extreme environmental degradation undermining the society's economic foundation. In this case people mainly migrate in response to push factors. Often they have to go in order to survive. Examples include people that are displaced after a flood or a period of drought. Migrants, on the other hand, respond both to push and pull factors. They move before the environmental situation forces them to do so. As such, Suhrke sees them as a “part of the solution rather than the problem” (p. 9). One reason why this distinction has analytical value is the different impact of refugees and migrants on host communities. While refugees are more likely to be in need of assistance and are often perceived as a strain on the receiving area, they are considerably less powerful than migrants since they do not have the resources or numbers to organize themselves and make political demands. They are thus less likely to provoke social conflict in receiving areas than groups of migrants. Suhrke expects the latter group to be much larger. Migrants are more inclined to put pressure on the political system of the host society since they often possess the resources to do so. While they might become a part of the local labour market, they are therefore often seen as competitors for work. When migration flows overshoot the absorptive capacity of the host society, tensions are more likely to erupt (pp. 10, 15).

In order to clarify the distinction between vulnerable refugees and more powerful migrants, Suhrke makes use of the dichotomy forced versus voluntary migration (*ibid*). It could, however, be argued that migration out of economic necessity might also contain an element of obligation. As Hugo argues, forced and voluntary migration should rather be seen as a continuum (1996, p. 108).

2.2 Agency

Discussions of coping strategies and the voluntariness of migration decisions point to the introduction of individual agency into the environmental migration debate. Migration scholars have long insisted on the important role of agency of the migrants themselves when attempting to understand migration flows (Faist & Schade, 2013a). Migration decisions are taken within certain social, economic and political contexts. These do not lead to migration in a deterministic fashion but rather constitute a mix of interrelated factors to which an individual responds (Faist & Schade, 2013b).

When discussing climate migration, agency has not always been taken into account. Maximalist claims that people living in low lying coastal areas will inevitably have to flee lead to a determinism that cancels out the agency of the affected individuals (Kovach, 2013, p. 170). In an extensive account of the way the inhabitants of small island states, Tuvalu in particular, are used as a symbol for (future) climate migration, Farbotko and Larzus (2012) lament the negation of local experiences of climate change and mobility that ignores the islanders' agency when coping with climate change. Affected populations are portrayed as passive victims, a process that "can entrench vulnerable communities in inequitable power relations, redirecting their fate from their hands" (p. 1). Since the images that are produced by the climate refugee discourse do not match with Tuvaluan cultural reality and ideas about the future, they are denied a voice in the debate on climate migration. Tuvaluans mainly resist the label of future climate refugee and insist it has a negative influence on the community's strength and resilience (p. 3). The authors argue that Tuvaluans have a history of migration and do not fear relocation that much. Rather, they are worried about losing their self-determination if they were to lose their land (p. 16). Researchers and media continue to reproduce the image of passive victims "even if the interests of climate vulnerable populations are ostensibly at the heart of the crisis discourse" (p. 2).

Several scholars who focus on environmental migration do recognize the importance of individual agency. Faist and Schade (2013a), for instance, organized a volume around the concept of capabilities, developed by Amartya Sen (1981, 1992, 1999 in Faist & Schade , 2013b, p. 12). This should allow research to go beyond the deterministic concept of vulnerability that hides the active role of individuals and communities in relation to their environment. An approach that accounts for the possibilities persons have when confronted with climatic change, can recognize how migration can be a proactive choice (pp. 4, 11-12). The volume considers climate migration as “a case of spatial and social mobility, a strategy of persons and groups to deal with a grossly unequal distribution of life chances across the world” (p. 5). In this regard, mobility is not perceived as evidence for vulnerability but an expression of agency. However, as the volume draws heavily on the insights of migration studies and thus minimalist arguments, it might not fall into the category of researchers and media that Farbotko and Larzus pointed at.

Farbotko and Larzus (2012) do quote the definition of environmentally induced migrants as proposed by the IOM and praise it for representing them as “mobile subjects with agency in a changing environment” (p. 7):

persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad. (Kniveton et al., 2008, p. 31)

2.2.1 Migration as adaptation

One way of recognizing migration decisions as expressions of agency, is to conceive of migration as a form of climate change adaptation. Migration due to climatic change was long regarded as a failure of adaptation measures (Vlassopoulos, 2013). An alternative vision perceives migration as coping strategies that can be organized before environmental

change renders migration inevitable. As promoted by the IOM, circular migration of several family members leads to income diversification. Remittances can compensate for income loss in the face of deteriorating environmental conditions and create possibilities for adaptation measures (Faist & Schade, 2013b, p. 9).

2.2.2 Planned relocation

While income diversification is an adaptation strategy that is currently adopted by many communities, actors as the IOM, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and to some degree UNHCR³ extend the vision of migration as adaptation to the idea of controlled migration flows. They argue that migration, if guided in an orderly manner, can be a policy solution for social vulnerability in the face of climate change (p. 157). In addition to temporarily labour migration, facilitated by (inter)national organisations, the IOM mainly points to planned relocation, which can avoid crises when properly managed. “[A] global guiding framework for situations of cross-border displacement resulting from climate change and natural disasters” (UN News Centre, 2011 in Vlassopoulos, 2013, p. 160) as proposed by the UNHCR has, however, not been developed yet.

Gemenne (2011, p. 22) favours this approach if relocation is voluntary because it can prevent forced migration. He adds that the necessary proactive facilitation of this type of migration is still lacking. Robin Bronen, who developed a framework for an adaptive government response, also addresses this. To illustrate the need for such a framework, Bronen conducted an elaborate case study on the Alaskan village of Newtok. Climate induced processes such as coastal erosion, flooding and extreme weather events render life in many Alaskan villages increasingly difficult, which prompted inhabitants of Newtok to initiated a process of community relocation. Bronen argues that “the traditional responses

³ The way these organizations frame the issue of climate migration is very much linked to their mandates. Since the IOM is charged with “promoting humane and orderly migration for the benefit of migrants” (IOM, 2009, p. 23 in Vlassopoulos, 2013, p. 158) it is more fiercely pushing for a conceptualization of climate migration as an organized adaptation strategy. The UNHCR does not state that climate migration is to be seen as a solution. This organisation is more concerned with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and does not have a direct interest in framing climate migration as an adaptation strategy that benefits both the country of origin as the receiving country (Vlassopoulos, 2013, pp. 158-159).

of hazard prevention and disaster relief are no longer protecting communities despite millions of dollars spent on erosion control and flood relief. Community relocation is the only feasible solution to permanently protect the inhabitants of these communities” (Bronen, 2011, p. 356). In 2013, the Newtok relocation process was interrupted due to internal political difficulties and the subsequent suspension of governmental funds (Goldenberg, 2013). Currently, efforts to relocate the village continue arduously (The Associated Press, 2015).

Several minimalist scholars do not regard planned relocation as a feasible solution for communities that are affected by climate migration. Generally, minimalists argue that these communities risk losing their self-determination (e.g. Farbotko and Larzus, 2012). Planned relocation as a solution to extreme environmental degradation in the face of climate change is mostly put to the fore by (inter)national, centralized, managing agencies such as the IOM, UNDP or UNHCR. As such, Vlassopoulos questions whether “what is seen as a solution for international institutions [can] also be experienced as a solution by those who are invited to leave their homes and families” (Vlassopoulos, 2013, p. 160). McNamara and Gibson (2009, p. 481) as well as Rudiak-Gould (2013, p. 148) argue that part of the populations of small island states are not willing to leave their islands. Delegating the organisation of their relocation to certain agencies, for instance by means of an international treaty, could thus undermine their self-determination. Barnett and Weber posit that the experience with planned relocations has not yielded positive results: “groups who are resettled arguably face the greatest risks to their livelihoods and human rights, and assisting them will challenge the international community” (Barnett & Webber, 2010, p. 43). Furthermore, international representatives of Pacific Island states claim that discourses of climate refugees and seemingly ready-made solutions to the issue of climate migration affect their geopolitical position. Any such ‘solution’ to the consequences of climate change reduces the pressure they can exert on industrialized nations to reduce their emissions ((McNamara & Gibson, 2009).

2.3 Security

The broader debate on climate change received considerable attention within the field of security studies. Scholars researching security issues became increasingly interested in the potential effects of environmental change on conflicts. Apart from fuelling the debate on environmental migration, Norman Myers (1989) was also one of the seminal alarmist writers within security studies, arguing that environmental protection is an essential component of national security (Levy, 1995, p. 41). Those security scholars who considered a certain relation between environmental change and conflict as plausible, started to include environmental factors in their analysis. They examine whether and to what extent pressures of environmental change on a society's resource base, are likely to spark social tensions that can threaten regional stability. Intermediate variables that could explain the emergence of conflict include economic disruption or decreasing agricultural production (Homer-Dixon, 1991, p. 78; Levy, 1995, p. 48). In turn, migration flows resulting from this create security threats in receiving societies by potentially undermining political stability.

An important critique on the assertion that environmental change fuels conflict through scarcity points to the fact that violent conflict is likely to worsen this scarcity. As such, Goldstone argues that environmental change can spark tensions but these will most likely be resolved through negotiation (2001, p. 42).

Much in the same fashion as critics of the concept of environmental migration, other critiques point to the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating a causal relationship between environmental degradation and conflict (Jon Barnett & Adger, 2007, p. 640; Black, 2001, p. 8; Goldstone, 2001). They highlight the complexity and multicausality of conflicts (Black, 2001, p. 10) and question the analytical value of a focus on the link between environmental factors and conflict (Levy, 1995). According to Levy, the main reason for claiming a link between the environment and security is the prospect of raising public awareness of the severity of environmental degradation as well as pushing for harsher environmental policies (p. 36). Hartmann (2010) doubts whether this strategy can succeed and warns for the potential of the environmental refugee concept to naturalise "the

economic and political causes of environmental degradation and [mask] the role of institutional responses to it” (p. 239).

In spite of this criticism, some researchers, such as Barnett and Adger (2007), who themselves endorse the need for more empirical research, do include environmental factors in their analysis. Refugee flows constitute an important variable that is examined as a possible explaining factor for the emergence of conflict (Gemenne, 2011, p. 5; Reuveny, 2007; Suhrke, 1993, pp. 10, 15). Scholars such as Suhrke (1993) expect large refugee or migrant flows to have considerable impacts on host societies. This impact may range from environmental degradation (Kibreab, 1997) and pressure on basic societal services (Barnett & Adger, 2007, p. 643) to changes in the composition of the labour force (Suhrke, 1993, p. 15). These effects on receiving areas do not necessarily lead to conflict. As outlined above, Suhrke’s distinction between refugees and migrants provides a more nuanced image of the potential for conflict arising from environmental migration. Barnett and Adger (2007, p. 643) argue that the political as well as institutional response of the receiving area mainly determines the risk of conflict. They add that more research is needed to assess all the effects of climate change on conflict and human security in general.

Apart from the relation to conflict, climate change and environmental migration are also seen as threats to human security. This concept broadens the focus on violent conflict and state interests to include a preoccupation with the quality of life of ordinary citizens (life expectancy, the provision of basic needs, human rights, etc.) (Gasper, 2013). It is easy to see how effects of climate change, such as a higher risk of natural disasters or declining agricultural production, can jeopardize human security. With regard to climate migration, the uncertain situation of particular groups of environmental migrants as well as pressures of migration flows on host societies, affect human security. This indicates how environmental degradation can increase human insecurity, even without the eruption of violence. Barnett and Adger (2007, p. 642) elaborate on the example of rural-urban migration as a consequence of economic decline sparked by decreasing yields which is again caused by climatic change. The host cities might not be able to meet the needs of

these migrants. This situation puts the human security of the migrants as well as the inhabitants of urban areas at risk.

Some claims by security scholars who foresee large environmental refugee flows echo those of policy makers in the developed world (Kibreab, 1997, pp. 20–21). Both fear an ‘environmental exodus’ from developing to developed countries (Myers & Kent, 1995). However, this fear is not supported by facts. Most environmental migrants do not cross an international border and become Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) instead (Matera, 2014). One explanation is the high costs of international migration. Many scholars, therefore, increasingly point to the lack of empirical base supporting fears of an uncontrollable stream of environmental migrants (Kniveton et al., 2008, pp. 29–30; Matera, 2014).

2.4 Social factors

The understanding that mainly people with sufficient resources migrate adds another layer of complexity to the environmental migration debate. The poorest are often unable to cover the costs of relocation and might be forced to stay (Faist & Schade, 2013b, p. 11). This is especially the case when migration involves crossing an international border (Kniveton, 2008, p. 30). As studies on Mexican migration into the US and on the effects of the 1970s and 1980s drought for migration flows suggest, outmigration can decrease when environmental conditions worsen. One explanation could be that “food scarcity during drought leads to increased prices, forcing people to spend more money on their basic needs rather than on long-distance migration” (Black et al., 2008, p. 17). Therefore, mobility should be considered as a possible coping strategy bringing relief instead of desperation and crisis. The ones that are able to migrate might be better off than those who are compelled to stay behind.

Inequality is a theme that runs through many aspects of the climate change and climate migration debate. Climate change affects human societies in an unequal fashion.

Geographical and climatic conditions that determine whether and to what extent a region is hit by certain climate change related phenomena differ from region to region. However, equally if not more important, are socially determined factors (Faist & Schade, 2013b, p. 10). Similar environmental developments might have a very different destructive potential, depending on the capacity of the region to prepare and respond to it. Rising sea-level, for instance, is expected to hit Bangladesh much harder than it will affect the Netherlands since the latter is much more advanced in flood protection⁴ (Butzengeiger & Horstmann, 2004). Factors such as state capacity, the level of development of a region and the resources available determine the impact of natural disasters or environmental degradation (Faist & Schade, 2013b, pp. 10–11). Higher levels of development often correspond with a higher quality of infrastructure able to withstand the effects of some environmental change. Moreover, richer regions can invest in adaptation measures such as dikes that do not counter climate change itself but offer protection for its consequences. In case of gradual environmental degradation such as deforestation, the way industrial as well as subsistence farmers cultivate the land can have a decisive impact on the process of land degradation. This again often depends on social, political and economic conditions (Kibreab, 1997; Suhrke, 1993). Kibreab (1997) pointed out that maltreatment of land can be the consequence of insecurity which prevents communities to cultivate the soil in a sustainable way. Furthermore, the impact of refugees on the terrain they move to depends largely on the way the host country manages their stay. Refugees do not necessarily have a larger impact on their surroundings than other groups of people. However, practices such as assigning refugees to already degraded land or restricting their movement, are bound to result in further land degradation that is often mistakenly attributed to the refugees themselves (ibid).

The introduction of social factors into the debate counters simplistic, deterministic ideas of vulnerability that link environmental degradation directly to displacement. Factors such

⁴ Despite the high technological flood prevention, the expected sea-level rise will still have a considerable impact on the Netherlands so that extra protection measures will be needed. In contrast with Bangladesh, however, the Netherlands is financially and technically capable of dealing with the consequences (Butzengeiger & Horstmann, 2004, pp. 4-5).

as social, political and economic capabilities to improve conditions at home or the availability of resources to migrate, influence migration decisions. As Florémont put it “vulnerability is linked to a multitude of economic, social and cultural factors influenced by decisions and policies that have – or have not – been implemented in the past” (2012, p. 37).

In this regard, Farbotko and Larzus (2012) as well as Faist and Schade (2013b) point to unequal social structures and power relations within and between nations: “social structures determine to a large extent whether an extreme weather event turns out to be a human disaster or not” (Faist & Schade, 2013b, p. 10). The way a society deals with slow or sudden onset environmental change determines much of the overall damage. This is another argument countering approaches that see ‘the environment’ as the decisive factor determining migration flows.

The social dimension of environmental migration ties it firmly to the development debate. Highly developed regions are usually better equipped to cope with environmental change while the developing world is expected to suffer most from climate change (Kniveton et al., 2008, p. 32). However, the issue is more complex than a simple inverse relation between development and vulnerability. The way development processes evolve, especially in terms of resource use and ownership, has a decisive impact on environmental degradation and potential migration. In order to address the real causes of environmental degradation and migration, Suhrke urges to include a society’s political economy into the assessment of the causes of this degradation (Suhrke, 1993, p. 7)⁵.

3. Quantifications

Despite the greater complexity of the debate on environmental migration, the maximalist discourse did not disappear. While not deemed academically credible, Norman Myers

⁵ Apart from political economy, Suhrke also points to demography as an important factor determining a society’s pressure on its environment (1993, p. 7).

continues to write on the subject (Myers, 2002, 2005). In 2007, Christian Aid published a report in which Myers revised his forecasts to arrive at an estimate of 250 million climate refugees by 2050 (Christian Aid, 2007, p. 48). Estimates of people that have already migrated as a result of environmental, notably climatic, change vary from 10 to 50 million. According to Jacobson (1988), in the 1980s there were worldwide about 10 million people displaced due to environmental change. In 1995, Myers and Kent (p. 1) stated that there were already 25 million environmental refugees, a number they expected to see doubled by 2010. The IOM speaks of 20 million people displaced by climate-related natural disasters in 2008 (Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009, p. 9). Among other research institutes and NGO reports, Myers' and Kent's forecast of 50 million environmental refugees in 2010 was even taken up by GRID-Arendal, a centre that closely cooperates with UNEP (GRID-Arendal, 2012).

Clearly these numbers depend on the year they were carried out, usually the later, the more environmental refugees. However, this cannot explain all variation between the estimates: 25 million in 1995 compared to only 20 million in 2008. Obviously, some researchers speak of climate refugees while others refer to environmental refugees in general. As pointed out above, the distinction is not always clear since it is difficult to point to the exact causes of environmental change.

These numbers, as well as the accompanying maximalist discourse mainly lives on in media reports and policy circles (Gemenne, 2011). International organizations such as the IOM recognize the complexity of human migration but continue to quote numbers predicted by Myers (Kniveton et al., 2008). According to Brown, his forecasts have become "the generally accepted figures" (2008, p. 8). For instance, the famous Stern Review on the economic effects of climate change, commissioned by the British government, cites Myers' estimates of 150 million climate refugees by 2050 (Stern, 2007). NGO's such as Christian Aid (2007), Greenpeace (Jakobeit & Methmann, 2007), Friends of the Earth (2007) endorse the maximalist discourse, including Myers' forecasts, in order to make a case either for more stringent climate policy or to advocate protection of environmental refugees out of humanitarian grounds. The divide between the NGO world and academia is well illustrated by the fact that Jakobeit and Methmann (2007) quote the contested predictions in their

report for Greenpeace Germany but criticise them in an academic publication (Jakobeit & Methmann, 2012).

3.1 Criticism

Within academic circles Myers' estimates are harshly criticized, predominantly by minimalists. Generally it is argued that social science is not able to forecast the human response to environmental change (Jakobeit & Methmann, 2012, p. 302). The complexity of the phenomenon migration, as well as climate change itself, prevents precise quantification. The multicausality of migration impedes consensus on who qualifies for the labels environmental/climate migrant/refugee. As such, falsifiable quantification is not possible (Black, 2001, p .3).

More specific critiques are targeted at Myers' methodology. Myers used population estimates of regions vulnerable to climate change related phenomena, mainly sea level rise, to arrive at an overall number of people at risk of displacement (Myers & Kent, 1995, pp. 148-149). Minimalists criticize the use of population estimates, which are not available for all regions under consideration, as well as the assumption that all inhabitants of those areas will leave (Kniveton et al., 2008, pp. 29–30, 33). Black (2001, p. 7) notes that Myers only points to people at risk of displacement. Since other responses to environmental change are often available, his numbers cannot be accurate. In 2011, UNEP removed a map from its website that was based on Myers' predictions for the year 2010 (50 million climate refugees) since the predictions did not come true (Barnes, 2013).

Myers does acknowledge that his estimates should be considered as a "first-cut assessment" (Myers & Kent, 1995, p. 1). He then adds that they are at the same time "cautious and conservative" (ibid), indicating that there could be much more environmental and climate refugees today and in the future. He recognizes the scientific uncertainty that surrounds his forecasts but argues that an effort to quantify is better than

no quantification. Policy makers need numbers as a push to do something about the issue. As such, it is better to be “roughly right than precisely wrong” (p. 33).

A response to this kind of reasoning is found in Faist and Schade (2013b, p. 17). They accuse projections such as the one by Myers as an “attempt to be policy relevant at all costs” (ibid). Thereby the complexity of the environment-migration nexus as well as “the basic fact that persons are not simply passive victims of environmental change but change their environment by their social practices” (ibid) is ignored.

4. Legal discussions

The discussion so far revealed that a lot of disagreement and uncertainty remains characteristic of the debate on climate migration. The only aspects that currently enjoy consensus relate to the fact that climate change will have a stronger effect on poorer regions (Kniveton et al., p. 32) and that “the number of people affected by climate-related sudden onset disaster [and climate change in general,] is very substantially and likely to increase” (Kälin, 2010b, p. 82). For maximalists these conclusions imply huge migration flows. Minimalist stress that suffering from environmental change does not automatically lead to migration.

Burson arrives at a middle ground between both research strands:

If projections by the IPCC (2007: 13) as to the numbers of persons potentially affected by climatic change in the coming decades prove accurate, the issue [of climate migration] is only going to become more prominent. While it would be a mistake to assume that climate change will inevitably lead to widespread conflict or that all or even most people adversely affected by climate change will respond (adapt) by migrating externally (Piguet, 2008: 6–7), it would only take a small percentage of these persons affected to do so for

RSD [Refugee Status Determination⁶] systems, where they exist at all, to be placed under stress. ...[A]n increased sensitivity to environmental factors in research into complex migration may result in a greater number of migration flows being seen as having a significant environmental component (Burson, 2010, p. 14).

This observation leads Burson to conclude that many of the people displaced by environmental factors find themselves in similar circumstances as traditional refugees and should therefore be entitled to asylum.

The discussions on climate refugees did thus not remain limited to theoretical controversies about the way climate or environmental refugees should be defined. A lively debate emerged on possible legal responses to environmental and climate migration.

Despite the growing significance of minimalist scholars in the climate migration debate, the perspective that is predominantly reflected in legal discussions on the matter remains maximalism, flavoured with some minimalist insights. The dominant conceptualization thus framed climate migration as a serious and growing problem, exacerbated by current and future climatic change. Following minimalist scholars, legal scholars judged the concepts climate and environmental refugees as misleading since the Geneva Convention does not recognize environmental factors as grounds for protection. However, this argumentation fuelled maximalist discourses on the so-called 'protection gap' (Gemenne, 2011, pp. 9, 11). Both on the policy as on the academic level discussions continue on possible policy responses to this new challenge.

This section is concerned with the academic debate that emerged among mostly environmental law scholars. Given that environmental refugees are not protected by the international refugee regime, the controversy revolves around the best way to provide protection and humanitarian assistance in the face of this 'protection gap'. Does legal recognition serve this goal best? If so, should the current refugee regime be expanded to include environmental refugees? Or should a new convention be set up? In case of the

⁶ "The legal or administrative process by which governments or UNHCR determine whether a person seeking international protection is considered a refugee under international, regional or national law." (UNHCR, 2015)

latter, should this convention be negotiated under the current refugee regime or is the international climate regime better suited? A last issue revolves around the possibilities of current migration and environmental policies to assist environmentally displaced people.

Drawing on Gemenne's (2011) overview of the many proposals on possible protection mechanisms for climate refugees, I categorize the different perspectives into four groups favouring different options, followed by an overview of protection measures under environmental law and an assessment of minimalist concerns on the climate refugee concept.

4.1 Broadening the Geneva Convention

The first group of proposals endorse a broadening of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, also called the Geneva Convention (e.g. Conisbee & Simms, 2003; Cooper, 1997; Michelot, 2006). The Geneva Convention codifies the criteria that need to be fulfilled in order to be recognized as a refugee and thus be entitled to protection and asylum. A refugee is defined as "someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion" (UNHCR, 2010, p. 3). Broadening the Convention would mean that this definition is expanded to include environmental or climate refugees. Gemenne (2011) divides these proposals into those that consider environmental degradation as a kind of political persecution (Conisbee & Simms, 2003) and those that argue that the Convention should be modified since "the refugee definition no longer matches the realities of forced migration" (Gemenne, 2011, p. 19). Concretely, the existing refugee regime would be extended. States would be obliged to offer protection and asylum to environmental refugees and the mandate of the UNHCR, which organizes immediate humanitarian assistance to refugees, would be broadened to include assistance to people that flee slow onset environmental degradation, droughts, floods, rising sea-level or natural disasters.

This option is generally regarded as politically unrealistic. Since developed countries are already reluctant to grant asylum to refugees under the current definition, an agreement over the enlargement of this group does not seem plausible (Biermann & Boas, 2012, p. 294; Burson, 2010, p. 3). Furthermore, concerns are raised over a possible “trade-off between the (political) refugees ... and climate [or environmental] refugees” (Biermann & Boas, 2012, p. 294). Others foresee a general dilution of the obligations towards all refugees (Gemenne, 2011, p. 19).

4.2 A new (environmental) convention

Biermann and Boas (2012), who only speak of climate refugees, argue that a special kind of protection is needed. Most climate refugees will stay in their own country and will thus continue to enjoy the protection of their governments. In combination with the possibility of rough predictions of the areas that will be affected most, climate refugees find themselves in “exactly the opposite” (p. 294) situation of political refugees. In many cases their own government will be able to organize assistance and plan relocations, with the support of the international community (*ibid*).

Thus, a second group of proposals focuses on the organization of a new convention that grants a special legal status to environmental refugees (e.g. Biermann & Boas, 2012; Falstrom, 2001; Magniny, 1999). This means a new treaty would be negotiated which establishes an international regime that operates independently of the current refugee regime (Prieur et al., 2008). Some scholars recommend a convention based on principles of environmental law, such as the obligation to prevent environmental damage (McCue, 1993). Generally, a separate funding mechanism and separate operational rules and principles should avoid the trade-off between political and climate refugees (Biermann & Boas, 2012, p. 297).

However, the political viability of these proposals can be questioned as well. A new convention might lead to a long negotiation process to establish the principles on which

the protection of climate refugees should be based (p. 295). For that reason Biermann and Boas propose to organise the protection of climate refugees under the international climate regime.

This leads to the third group of proposals that argue for a new protection regime but under environmental rather than migration law (e.g. Williams, 2008). McCue (1993) and Falstrom (2001) could also be classified here because they base their proposal for a new convention on the principles of environmental law.

Biermann and Boas advocate⁷ for a new protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): “a Protocol on Recognition, Protection, and Resettlement of Climate Refugees (‘Climate Refugee Protocol’)” (p. 295). This way the agreement retains a connection with climate policy and can build on principles such as Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) and the compensation of “agreed full incremental costs” (GEF, 1996) that have been agreed on before. The authors insist on the importance of a “specific moral link between climate refugees and potential donor countries [... allowing] claims for compensation, liability, and responsibility against industrialized countries” (p. 297). While Biermann and Boas claim that “[s]uch a protocol could build on the political support from almost all countries as parties to the climate convention”, Gemenne notes that they do not indicate how the protection regime should be financed (2011, p. 13).

4.3 Protection by current policies

While many lament the lack of a legal response to the expected growth of environmentally displaced people, a fourth group of scholars points to the possibilities of the current refugee regime, in combination with humanitarian and human rights law, to assist

⁷ For instance, Frank Biermann (2008) addressed members of the European Parliament during a special conference on the issue of climate migration. Ingrid Boas (n.d.) manages the Policy Forum on Climate Refugees, under the interuniversity research program the Global Governance Project, where political developments on climate refugees are documented.

environmentally displaced people (e.g. Burson, 2010; Kälin, 2010). Human rights law, for instance, obliges every state to respect and protect the human rights of those that have migrated into its territory (Kälin, 2010a, p. 83).

This is also the case for IDPs who are furthermore protected under the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The document includes disaster-induced refugees in its definition of IDPs. While it is not legally binding, it enables the UNHCR to extend its operational mandate to include many victims of natural disasters (Gemenne, 2011, p. 20). Additionally, two legally binding mechanisms regulate the protection of IDPs regionally: the 2006 Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and the 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kälin, 2010, pp. 86-87).

In case a state does not provide assistance to a certain group of people “on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion in the context of disasters, violence or armed conflict triggered by the effects of climate change”, the Geneva convention conceives of them as refugees if they leave their country on these grounds (p. 94).

When people move on a voluntary basis in order to diversify family incomes in the advent of harsh environmental conditions, protection, but no asylum can be guaranteed by the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (p. 90).

Another example shows how some kind of refugee status is possible, also without qualifying as such under the Geneva Convention. The 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU)⁸ Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa⁹, as well as the 1984 Latin American Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, include “events seriously disturbing public order” (p. 88) in their refugee definition. However, according to Kälin states will be reluctant to consider natural disasters as disturbing public order. If violence erupts because a government is unwilling or unable to assist the victims of the

⁸ Now called the African Union (AU)

⁹ The OAU Convention is the only regional refugee treaty that is legally binding upon its signatories (Jastram & Achiron, 2001, p. 13).

disaster, people seeking safety abroad would qualify as refugees. (pp. 88-89) Generally, people fleeing violent conflict, whether caused by environmental degradation or not, become IDPs or are protected by the Geneva Convention if they cross a border (p. 92).

Displaced people that reach Europe or the United States can qualify for a Temporary Protection Status (Warner, 2012, p. 1073). Specific measures concerning environmentally displaced people include legislation in Finland and Sweden providing refugee protection for people moving in the wake of a natural disaster (Gemenne, 2011, p. 19).

4.4 Environmental policies

Nevertheless, nearly all people qualifying for refugee status in the above cited situations, were recognized on grounds other than environmental factors. Gemenne (2011) argues that environmental policies address environmental displacement more specifically than migration policies do. With this claim he refers to international disaster management¹⁰ that is, apart from disaster relief, also concerned with the resulting displacement. The most important, but non-binding, policy document addressing disaster-induced displacement is the Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters drafted by the Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC). Other examples include the fund of the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) that can unofficially be used to rebuilt houses of disaster-induced people that are displaced by a disaster as well as to organize their return. (p. 16)

Despite these efforts to specifically target disaster-induced displacement, Gemenne criticizes the disaster regime for being too strongly focussed on temporary displacement, neglecting long-term needs: “despite some recent progress, it continues to limit itself to an emergency response for displaced people, and fundamentally biases the conceptualisation of the displacement as short-term, whereas empirical evidence has often proved otherwise”

¹⁰ The international disaster regime is roughly made up by the IOM, the UNHCR, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs (OCHA), the Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC) and a variety of NGOs (Gemenne, 2011, pp. 15-16).

(ibid). Furthermore, current disaster management does not address the consequences of slow-onset climatic changes (Warner, 2012, p. 1073).

With regard to climate migration in general, one of the outcome documents of the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in Cancun

14. [i]nvites all Parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, by undertaking, inter alia, ... (f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels (Cancun Agreements, 2010).

Judgements on the importance of paragraph 14(f) are mixed. Warner (2012) calls it “a modest but significant milestone in addressing climate-change-related human mobility” (p. 1074). Gemenne (2011), on the other hand, only mentions the draft negotiating text at COP 15 in Copenhagen that eventually dropped the reference to climate-related displacement. He adds that “there is no sign that migration will be placed on the agenda of climate negotiations in the near future” (p. 18). While Gemenne seems to have overlooked the Cancun Agreements, even Warner, who is optimistic about further progress, acknowledges that there is currently no legal action on climate-induced displacement.

5. Minimalist concerns on climate refugee conceptualizations

Argumentations by the first three groups of legal scholars draw on predictions of future climate refugees and are, as such, clearly influenced by the maximalist discourse on climate migration. Despite side notes stating that these are only rough estimates due to

methodological difficulties, these forecasts remain an essential assumption of the legal discussions on climate refugees.

Nevertheless, several minimalist scholars argue against any proposal that draws on a maximalist conceptualization of climate refugees. On a practical level they question the possibility of a consensual definition of climate or environmental refugees that is needed to operationalize protection measures. According to Black, such a definition is unlikely “in a multi-dimensional world, in which people’s decisions to migrate (or stay) are influenced by a huge range of factors” (2001, p. 14).

On a more conceptual level sceptical scholars fear that the institutionalization of the terms in question will cause a general inflation of the refugee concept (Keane, 2003; Gemenee, 2011, p. 19). Kibreab (1997) argues that the concept of environmental refugees helps governments of developed countries to bypass their responsibilities towards refugees in general. It contributes to an image of an ever-growing group of migrants driven by poverty related to environmental degradation, instead of political persecution. As such, they can be classified as economic refugees that do not enjoy protection under the Geneva Convention¹¹ (pp. 20-21). Equally worried about this potential development, Castles states that an “emphasis on environmental factors is a distraction from central issues of development, inequality, and conflict resolution” (2004, p. 5). With regard to the environmental-security nexus, Hartmann (2010) adds that power relations are obscured by a focus on environmental factors generating conflict and displacement. The environmental refugee concept “naturalises the economic and political causes of environmental degradation and masks the role of institutional responses to it” (p. 235). These responses determine whether people can cope with environmental change. “Whether or not such measures are in place in turn depends on political economies at the local, regional, national

¹¹ However, as Black notes, discourses surrounding environmental and climate refugees generally attempt to push for protection measures, as the above cited proposals have shown. The concepts should not be regarded as inventions to consciously justify restrictive asylum policies (p. 11). On the other hand, by singling out one cause of forced displacement, the maximalist literature might unintentionally provide a selection criterion that revokes the right to protection from some that currently receive it.

and international levels that are often conveniently left out of the discussion of so-called ‘climate refugees.’” (pp. 237-238)

Furthermore, scholars as Larzus and Farbotko (2012), and McNamara and Gibson (2009) warn about the consequences of the discourses surrounding climate refugees as helpless victims in need of assistance. Enshrining this in an international agreement organizing relocation could lead to a loss of self-determination, as resettlement is against the will of many islanders (McNamara & Gibson, 2009, p. 481; Rudiak-Gould, 2013, p. 148). Ambassadors of Pacific island states regard these discourses as undermining them geopolitically (McNamara & Gibson, 2009, p. 481). Planned relocation as a ‘solution’ to the forthcoming refugee crisis on island states reduces their potential to pressurize industrialized nations to mitigate climate change.

With regard to the growing focus on climate-induced displacement, Lassailly-Jacob (2006) points to the risk of overlooking other environmental factors leading to displacement.

6. Conclusion:

evolved maximalism versus minimalist concerns

The greater nuance of the debate on environmental degradation provides for an interesting discussion on the consequences of climate change but also on the limits of social science. Minimalists by no means deny that climate change and environmental degradation in general have significant impacts on human societies. However, this impact is never linear. Social, economic, political and cultural factors have to be taken into account to assess the implications for migration flows. To some degree, maximalist scholars have always acknowledged this. Later on, they also incorporated certain minimalists’ insights which somewhat blurred the line between both research strands. Nevertheless, together with many policy actors maximalists frame climate migration as a serious, new, problem. They

do not hesitate to draw conclusions on the relation between climate and environmental change and migration flows. Minimalists, on the other hand, do not deny the existence of these links. They are ever more involved in research projects on climate migration, often funded by international organisations. Still, these scholars remain reluctant to conclude on general patterns or inevitable, automatic human reactions to environmental change. As such, their temporarily conclusion says that we cannot currently know “with any degree of precision what climate change will mean for human population distribution” (Brown, 2008, p. 8).

In spite of all legal instruments that entitle environmentally displaced people to some form of assistance, many legal scholars, influenced by maximalism, continue to argue that a protection gap remains (Warner, 2012). The existing assistance is usually derived from factors additional to or accompanying environmental circumstances. There is no right to asylum on the grounds of environmental degradation or natural disasters alone. Furthermore, additional reasons such as climate-induced violence might be hard to discern. As such, many environmentally displaced that cross a border are not entitled to asylum. Legal scholars emphasize that in these cases people risk to end “up in a legal and operational limbo”, despite the protection under human rights law (Kälin, 2010, p. 89).

In this regard, Gemenne (2011) argues that the term ‘refugee’ is a political construct. The way the concept is defined determines who is entitled to protection, “and yet it does so in a performative way: refugees are those who fit the criteria of the Convention; migrants in refugee-like situations that do not fit these criteria cannot be labelled refugees” (p. 19).

However, there seems to be little political will to design new legal instruments addressing climate migration, especially when this entails a modification of the Geneva Convention. This reveals a sharp contrast between the dominant maximalist discourse and the rather sceptic approach in practice.

On the minimalist-maximalist divide, I argue that the debate has been enriched by minimalist nuance that has been picked up by maximalist scholars, to greater or lesser extent. As a consequence, the two categories are harder to discern. Some scholars embody

a mix of both sets of arguments. I argue that it is still possible to divide both research schools. Contemporary maximalist scholars are to be characterized by what I call ‘evolved maximalism’¹². As opposed to ‘early maximalists’, who pioneered the environmental migration debate, these scholars are aware of the minimalist critique and incorporate this to greater or lesser extent in their analyses. Therefore, the difference between minimalist and maximalist scholars can be traced back to their conclusions. Maximalist scholars draw conclusions on the existence of climate migration, attempt to draw attention to the issue and often recommend policy solutions. Minimalists, on the other hand, remain very careful with regard to conclusions on the size or prospect of environmental migration. They recognize that environmental factors can have an influence on migration decisions but do not formulate policy responses for climate migration, as they judge this category as analytically useless.

Some minimalists are concerned about specific consequences of the concept of climate refugees and of the focus on environmental factors as causes of migration. They draw attention to risks of an inflated refugee concept, of an opportunity for governments to bypass their obligations towards refugees in general, of decreasing attention for development issues or power relations as environmental factors are emphasized, of a loss of self-determination of communities that are affected most by climate change and of a risk of an erosion of the geo-political leverage of small island states.

In the following chapters, I develop a methodology to assess the way this complex academic debate has been taken over and used by policy makers.

¹² Dominic Kniveton, the lead author of an important IOM publication on climate change and migration (2008) can be seen as an example of evolved maximalism.

Chapter II

Research use in policy making

The popularization of terms as environmental and later climate refugees resulted in discussions in the media as well as policy circles. As observed by Gemenne (2011), mainly the maximalist discourse found its way into the public debate. It is tempting to conclude that, therefore, the complexity of the environmental migration debate was not taken over by media accounts, nor by the legal and political discussions on possible responses to environmental degradation. At a first glance, this conclusion seems valid. Many newspaper articles as well as policy reports refer to Myers' predictions on future climate refugees. Forecasts on climate refugees also reached the European Parliament. They feature as an argument for an international climate agreement (European Parliament, 2015) and are quoted in a resolution on the impact of the European development policy (European Parliament, 2011).

However, throughout the literature overview on climate migration it became clear that, for instance, international organizations such as the IOM and the UNHCR do pay attention to evolving scientific findings. They issue reports on climate migration that are often written by academics, both minimalist and maximalist. This way, part of the nuance that has been added to the debate during the past decades seems to find its way into the policy discourse on climate migration.

With regard to politicians, the expectation is different. Apart from being genuinely concerned about an issue, it could be assumed that when politicians refer to controversial

terms as climate migration and the related research, this has a certain rhetoric purpose. The reference to academic research is meant to support a certain cause. Possible examples include legal protection for climate refugees, adaptation and mitigation of climate change or harsher asylum policies. Debating such issues publicly does not seem to invite for complexity. Rather, a clear and powerful message, inspired by the maximalist discourse and supported by concrete forecasts, could be expected.

Still, these claims remain based on a collection of unsystematic observations and assumptions. It does not allow for conclusions on the manner the climate migration debate is used in the policy realm. Therefore, systematic research is needed on the ways policy actors incorporate parts of the academic debate. In this thesis I limit the analysis to one particular actor. By assessing how the academic climate migration debate is represented in the policy documents of a political actor, the political use of academic arguments can be discerned. As such, I propose the following research questions: (1) How is the academic debate represented in policy documents? (2) How are academic arguments on climate migration used as political arguments?

Before outlining the methodology to answer these questions, I discuss several theoretical perspectives on research use. Where possible, I briefly apply their arguments on the dynamics of the academic climate migration debate.

1. Two-Communities theory

The field of the so called research utilization studies evaluates how academic research¹³ is used in policy making. How and to what extent is science able to influence the policy process? Many theories and analyses within this field try to answer these broad questions

¹³ The literature on research utilization includes studies on the impact of social science as well as natural sciences on policy making. Unless indicated otherwise, I do not differentiate between the both in this general overview.

(Bailey, 2010; Caplan, 1979; Estabrooks, 1999; Gibson, 2003; Martin, 2001; Neilson, 2001; Stone, 2002).

A common complaint of commentaries on the research-policy (or science-policy) nexus is the under- or even non-utilization of academic research in the process of policy making. Researchers who raise this issue attempt to identify the reasons for this neglect of scientific work. They develop recommendations for both policy makers and scientists to improve the use of research in political decision-making (see Martin, 2001; Caplan, 1979). The issue of under-utilization is linked to the Two-Communities theory that dominates the debate on the research-policy nexus. This approach was first theorized by Nathan Caplan (1979). Ever since, it received a lot of criticism and is, at times, rather seen as a metaphor instead of a firm theory (Wingens, 1990). However, since his study remains the “single most consistently reported finding from research utilization studies”, the theory still dominates the field (Gibson, 2003, p. 26).

Generally, the Two-Communities theory conceives of the policy and academic world as two separate spheres with distinct rules, social practices, values, worldviews, languages, time-frames and expectations of knowledge production (Bailey, 2010, p. 16; Caplan, 1979, p. 459). On a conceptual level, “[t]hose who inhabit the world of theory tend to ask questions different from those who inhabit the world of policy” (Streefland, 2001, p. 9).

According to the Two-Communities theory, scientists view their work as a quest for truth or, in post-modern times, at least as a quest for reliable, methodologically sound, contextual knowledge that contributes to the development of an understanding of the social world (Ginsburg & Gorostiaga, 2001, p. 177; Morgan, 2014, p. 39). Some versions of the Two-Communities theory accuse scientists of esotericism combined with a too strong focus on theoretical issues with little policy relevance (Bailey, 2010, p. 16; Caplan, 1979, p. 459). Others do grant researchers a concern for social issues and turn the issue around. According to the Danish Commission on Development-Related Research, for instance, “[r]esearchers tend to feel that they have made important observations and interesting explanations, yet there is no eager political audience for their work” (Streefland, 2001, p. 9). Some attribute this to the inadequate communication skills of scholars. Yet another

complaint is the poor ability of researchers to understand the policy process and thus provide (financially) realistic policy recommendations (Stone, p. 289). Still, however concerned about society, the typical scientist of the Two-Communities theory remains committed to a neutral scientific practice.

With regard to the academic climate migration debate, several scholars do value policy relevant research. Many maximalists attempt to convince policy makers about the need for action, while minimalists rather temper the alarmism and warn for hasty solutions. Maximalists depart from the classic image of truth seeking scientists. Minimalists, who emphasize the importance of scientific rigor, fit this image better. However, their concerns on the political consequences of climate refugee discourses departs from the idea of scientists as indifferent knowledge seekers.

Policy makers, on the other hand, want to undertake concrete action in the face of pressing problems. The academic discourse, combined with the slow process of knowledge production, is often deemed unsuitable for this purpose (Gibson, 2003, p. 30). Policy makers expect short conclusions that are quickly available in order to inform the legislative process. Policy relevant research should be able to predict and assess the consequences of certain policy choices, and therefore guide the technical side of the policy process (Pielke & Conant, 2003, p. 1351; Young et al., 2002, p. 215). Lengthy research reports that might clarify certain issues, often leave a lot of questions unanswered, thereby fuelling the need for more research.

The differences between the both ‘communities’ are well captured by Booth:

[I]ncentives [within the academic community] attach greater weight to knowledge-building as against policy-forming research; to authoritativeness rather than usefulness; to the pursuit of rigor as against relevance; to the values of scientific independence as against the virtues of policy involvement; and to understanding rather than action. (1988, in Nielson, 2001, p. 6)

Generally, the Two-Communities theory points to “a disconnection or ‘mismatch’ between the process and/or the products of research, on the one hand, and the knowledge needs and realities of policy makers and the policy making process, on the other” (Bailey, 2010, p. 16). Implicit in this analysis of the science-policy nexus is a critique of both the policy and academic world which lack an understanding of the functioning of the other. As such, both research and policy expect too much of each other (Stone, 2002, p. 286). As a general path to more research utilization, the Two-Communities theory prescribes more and more intense contacts between researchers and potential practical users of their work. This means that the initially small overlap between the two spheres should increase (Gibson, 2003, p. 27; Morgan, 2014, p. 40).

1.1 Complexity instead of homogeneity

Although the main ideas of the Two-Communities theory still dominate the field of research utilisation studies, it has been criticised by many scholars. One of the main critiques is its conception of both the academic as the policy community as homogeneous blocks (Morgan, 2014, p. 40).

Firstly, an important characteristic of scientific debate is the way scientists openly challenge the conclusions of their colleagues. As such, competing visions exist on almost every issue under scientific scrutiny (Bailey, 2010, p. 16). Minimalist and maximalist scholars exemplify this with regard to the academic climate migration debate.

Furthermore, despite the growing importance of interdisciplinary research projects, the many scientific disciplines remain influential in terms of shaping the set of assumptions a researcher holds. The dividing force of these specific and at times competing paradigms related to scientific disciplines, contributes to the problematic nature of the perception of the scientific community as a homogeneous community (Morgan, 2014, p. 39). Scholars debating climate migration are no homogeneous community. The maximalist research

school emerged from natural sciences and climate science in particular. Minimalists on the other hand are generally influenced by social science, especially migration studies.

Another important division within the scientific community can be characterized by the way scholars view their role in the policy making process. In other words, their attitudes towards advocacy. Gibson (2003, p. 6, 273) notes that scientists are generally viewed by the Two-Communities theory (and much of the research utilization literature) as neutral knowledge producers who choose 'pure' science over politics. According to him, this means that the theory draws a false picture of reality. Some scientists definitely do attempt to draw public attention to potential political measures that are in accordance with the conclusions of their research. Depending on their view on the role of science in society and politics, some scholars are more eager to reach out to the policy community than others (Callison, 2014). I argue that the difference between scientists that are in favour of an active political role and those that are not points to another divide that makes the homogenous blocks of the Two-Communities theory an unrealistic assumption. Maximalists usually view scientists as providers of information and advocates of political measures to remedy certain problems they have documented. Their political message might be easier picked up by the policy community. Minimalists, on the other hand, insist on the complexity of migration decisions, the difficulty of circumscribing a climate refugee or migrant category and the potentially adverse consequences of such a category. As such, minimalists exhibit political involvement by pointing to the problematic use of the concept as a foundation for policy making. Furthermore, many minimalist scholars are bothered about the way the relation between environmental factors and migration is conceptualized, and thus how the maximalist discourse could frame possible solutions to climate migration.

Following from all of the above, we can speak of different scientific communities, instead of one single community as the antipode of the policy community.

On the part of the latter, it needs little explanation that neither this group can be seen as a uniform community due to political differences (Morgan, 2014, p. 41). Political orientation might determine the kind of research that is consulted. This claim is recognized by Ginsburg and Gorostiaga (2001). In their version of the Two-Communities theory

scientists often regard the culture of policy makers “as valuing research that addresses particular questions on their agenda; [and] generates conclusions that are compatible with their beliefs, ideologies, and preferred practices” (p. 178). The Two-Community theory thus contrasts neutral scientists with biased policy makers, no matter what research the latter prefers. However, as I will elaborate on below, scientists cannot be characterized as completely neutral, while policy makers inevitably need to select from the huge amount of information and its interpretations (Albaek, 1995, pp. 91–92; Callison, 2014; Gibson, 2003; Miller, 2001, p. 482).

Morgan (2014, p. 41) stresses that the Two-Communities theory disregards the role of other stakeholders within the decision-making process, such as industry and local communities. This also holds true for knowledge production. With the rise of consultancy firms and think tanks, research is no longer the field of academics alone (Stone, 2002, p. 287). The large amount of ‘grey’ literature on climate migration, published by governments, NGOs or international organizations confirms this trend (Gemenne, 2011, p. 2).

In conclusion, the Two-Communities theory fails to acknowledge the complexity of both the process of scientific knowledge production as well as political decision making. Both ‘communities’ should be characterized as an amalgam of differing groups with overlapping as well as contradicting aims (Morgan, 2014, p. 41).

1.2 Refuting rationalism

In line with the conclusion above, Gibson (2003) refutes the Two-Communities theory because it oversimplifies the dynamics of the research-policy nexus. Research influences policy in many complex ways that cannot solely be explained by the interaction between scholars and policy actors (p. 3). As such, he challenges one of the fundamental assumptions of the Two-Communities theory, namely that interaction between the both communities determines the impact of research on policy (p. 26).

Along with many other commentators (Albaek, 1995; Sarewitz, 2006; Weingart et al., 2000), Gibson criticizes the rationalistic assumptions of the Two-Communities theory. These predict an increase of the direct transfer of scientific facts to the policy realm when the interface between researchers and policy actors improves. This strict interpretation of research use would imply that research findings become the basis of concrete policies. However, research utilization rarely follows the linear path of “direct, demonstrable, instrumental use ... to solve clearly predefined problems” (Albaek, p. 85). More often, the impact of science on policy is conceptual in the sense that it contributes to the way policy actors see the world. Carol Weiss (1977) calls this broad interpretation of research use the ‘enlightenment function’ of research. This conceptual function of research influences “what is perceived as a politico-administrative problem, the way it looks, its extent, and the solutions provided to it, etc” (Albaek, 1995, p. 92). As such, the way an issue is conceptualized matters since it becomes part of politics. By defining issues research shapes possible responses and precludes others (Paris, 2011, p. 4).

The climate migration debate exemplifies this conceptual influence of research on policy making. Up to this date, few concrete policy measures have been put into place to accommodate climate refugees. The academic discourse did penetrate political argumentation but this did not materialize in political action. The conceptual influence is reflected in the specific solutions policy makers propose.

The conceptual use of research also implies that research

is not applied in ‘pure form’ but through translation into other contexts than the one in which it was produced; by being synthesized with other types of knowledge; and by being integrated into existing views of problems and solutions, which, in turn, undergo constant transformation (Albaek, 1995, p. 85).

In order for scientific knowledge to be relevant to policy “it must be integrated into, or perhaps rather subordinated to, action-oriented knowledge” (p. 88). Here, Albaek touches upon the essence of Gibson’s theory on the dynamics of the research-policy nexus. Gibson

(2003) goes a step further than explaining the research-policy nexus by referring to selective research transfer. He argues that “when research influences policy it is *transformed* [emphasis added] into knowledge-for-policy by being invested with meaning and power” (p. vii).

2. Transforming research

2.1 The role of values

Values are essential in Gibson’s analysis of the dynamics of the science-policy nexus. As Albaek stresses, neither policy making nor scientific knowledge production proceed independently of values and belief systems (1995, pp. 91-92). Normative choices influence both the way research is conducted as its selection and use as “political ammunition” (p. 85). Contrary to many complaints of this process that are accompanied by calls for the rational implementation of research results by policy measures, Albaek does not view the partisan use of research as something harmful. Due to the open-ended nature of social science and the continuous uncertainty of scientific findings that follows, science can rarely deliver unanimous scientific facts. Often, this disagreement is transferred to the policy realm (Albaek, 1995, p. 92; Sarewitz, 2006, p. 105). Albaek argues that this is a necessary and desirable consequence of the democratic process. The straightforward, rational implementation of research recommendations that many wish for, comes down to an undemocratic technocracy (p. 86).

When policy makers are influenced by inquiries that are in line with their own belief-systems, the eventual struggle is one between values. However, Sarewitz stresses that when “opposing scientific views become a proxy for the conflicting values that underlie the conflict” (Sarewitz, 2006, p. 106), these values should be made explicit instead of hiding behind ‘neutral science’. Politics, by means of democratic debate, should decide what social aspirations merit political action (p. 106). Furthermore, democracy has institutionalized this

debate by guaranteeing all stakeholders a voice, however unequal the power relation among them. As such, argumentation, and rational debate still have their function within political decision-making (Albaek, 1995, pp. 90-91).

2.2 The Advocacy Coalition Framework

According to Gibson (2003, p. 32), research utilization should be seen as a social and political process, instead of a rational process of research transfer. His doctoral study on the manner research influences Australian public health policy is based on three theoretical perspectives¹⁴ that capture the influence of values and power on the ways in which research is transformed into political arguments. Especially the way Gibson adopts the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) provides important insights on the reasons and limits of the selective use of research in policy debates.

The ACF focusses on groups of people, so called ‘advocacy coalitions’, that attempt to influence and even control ‘policy subsystems’¹⁵ (p. 34). Within a policy subsystem actors form “advocacy coalitions on the basis of shared belief systems i.e. a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions” (p. 35). An important means for advocacy coalitions to influence policy making is the construction of scientifically grounded arguments that support their position. Furthermore, they turn to science to counter the arguments of adversaries in the competition for power over the policy subsystem (p. 34).

Within this perspective, values and beliefs about causal relationships shaping the policy problem inform the sort of research advocacy coalitions engage in as well as the selection

¹⁴ The Advocacy Coalition Framework by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), the Policy-making Organisation Framework by Dery (1990) and the Governmentality Framework based on the work of Foucault.

¹⁵ An ensemble of

‘actors from a variety of public and private organisations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue...’ including ‘...actors at various levels of government active in policy formulation and implementation as well as journalists, researchers and policy analysts who play important roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas.’ (Sabatier, 1993, p. 17 in Gibson 2003, p. 35)

and interpretation of research findings (p. 36). However, the selective use of science as a 'political resource' does not entirely preclude attention for research that counters the beliefs of advocacy coalitions:

research can act somewhat independently in the policy process and prompt change to beliefs and to policy. This happens because advocacy coalitions can not afford to be too far out of step with credible research if it makes them liable to attack from opponents. (p. 36)

The ACF enriches perspectives on the research-policy nexus by drawing "the line of resistance to new data" between different advocacy groups instead of between scholars and policy actors (p. 228). In contrast to the Two Communities theory, ACF allows for the possibility that researchers and policy makers belong to the same group, depending on their beliefs and values. These groups resist some data, while embracing other data. As such, the ACF politicizes both the production as the utilization of science:

[t]he central dynamic of the research–policy nexus is identified as a power struggle [between advocacy coalitions in a given policy subsystem] to realise beliefs and values and it is within this struggle that research is taken up and used in policy arguments. (Gibson, 2003, p. 229)

2.3 The transformation of research into political arguments

Both Gibson and Albaek hold a remarkable position on the selective use of research. Selectivity is something normal and even beneficial for the policy making process. However, as Gibson (2003) argues, the process by which research influences policy is more complex than the mere selection of facts that fit interests. Research findings often suit several interpretations (p. 272). What follows is a political "process of selecting between

competing interpretations of the available research” (p. 272). As such, those research findings that have an impact on policy making are transformed “by a contested and political process ... into evidence and arguments” (Gibson, 2003, p. 242). Rationalist models, such as the Two-Communities theory, often see this as the partisan and deforming utilization of facts with detrimental consequences for sound policies (p. 242). However, for Gibson the “process of transformation is part and parcel of use. To wish that research should not be ‘distorted’ by use in policy is to condemn it to irrelevance” (p. 242). In order to attain policy relevance, research findings must be “infused with the beliefs and values of policy actors [and as such become] invested with new or additional meaning and power through social and political processes” (p. 243).

3. The representation of academic research

Theories of research utilization studies, both the Two-Communities theory as its critiques, do not envision a nuanced representation of the academic arguments in climate migration in policy debates. They expect that the use of research as a political, argumentative tool could lead to a loss of complexity.

For the Two-Communities theory, policy makers remain a separate community. Even in case of intense interaction between scholars and policy makers and thus extensive research utilization, the latter still have a specific vision on what useful research looks like: it should serve the need for action and preferably be in line with how they view the world. As such, research is taken over on a selective basis. Despite recommendations by the Two-Communities theory to improve direct research transfer and counter selectivity, its image of the research-policy nexus does not envision the policy debate on climate migration to exhibit much of the academic complexity.

For Gibson and Albaek, the selectivity and subordination of academic knowledge to action-oriented knowledge lamented by the Two-Community theory, is an obvious consequence of research use. Combined with Gibson’s theory on research transformation,

neither these ideas on the science-policy nexus create an expectation of an accurate representation of academic arguments in policy debates. However, research transformation does not automatically lead to simplification. Whether minimalist nuance is lost through political use of scientific arguments thus depends on the specific way of research transfer and transformation in a particular debate.

4. Conclusion

Critiques on the Two-Communities theory highlight issues such as the heterogeneity of research and policy communities, the view of scholars on advocacy and the flawed division between biased politicians and neutral scientists. These made clear that the dynamics of the science-policy nexus are more complex than the Two-Communities theory can account for.

However, despite the many valid critiques, the contrast between political, action-oriented and academic, knowledge-seeking discourses that was highlighted by the Two-Communities theory remains relevant. Still, these different knowledge objectives do not necessarily map onto the difference between policy makers and scientists as proclaimed by the Two-Communities theory. Within the academic climate migration debate maximalists tend to produce action-oriented knowledge while scientific rigor, combined with political concerns, is characteristic of minimalists.

Gibson counters the assumptions of the Two-Communities theory by proposing a different explanation of the relationship between research and policy. Accordingly, research findings are not mechanically transferred to the policy realm. More often, research influences policy debates on a conceptual level. For Gibson, research can only be influential when it is transformed into political arguments by acquiring “new and additional meaning and power through social and political processes” (p. 243). Advocacy coalitions attempt to conduct, select and transform research in such a way that their positions are supported. This should be seen as a normal consequence of the open-ended and uncertain nature of the scientific process.

Research utilization studies generally envision large parts of academic complexity to vanish when scholarly arguments travel to the policy realm. I will assess whether this is the case for the climate migration debate by looking at the representation of the academic debate in political argumentation.

In chapter III, I outline how I assess the use of the complex academic climate migration debate in political discourses, according to Gibson's transformation theory as well as other methodological frameworks.

Chapter III

Methodology

The aim of this research is to trace the way central arguments, concepts and controversies characterizing the academic climate migration debate, are used as political arguments. As outlined in the previous chapters, concepts such as ‘climate refugee’ or ‘environmental migrant’ feature in a lively and complex academic debate. In order to understand how these concepts are used in policy circles, I look at the way the academic debate is represented in certain policy documents.

1. Methodological influence

1.1 Gibson’s transformation theory

My methodology departs from Gibson, who conducted interviews to reconstruct the concrete political and social processes that enabled the transformation of research into political arguments. As I focus on one particular actor within the political climate migration debate, I will not reconstruct the dynamic between advocacy coalitions that mobilize political action with regard to climate migration.

Rather, I focus on policy documents in which scholarly arguments are taken over and transformed. In line with Gibson, I conceive of the broad interpretation of research use as a form of transformation. However, I do not take these transformations for granted. While agreeing with Gibson that transformation is an ordinary feature of research use, I do not preclude the possibility of ‘research transfer’. Scientific findings might be taken over in their entirety, without much transformation.

As acknowledged by Gibson (2003, p. 268), the generalizability of his research is limited, since his case studies focus on very specific medical screening programs. It is possible that research and policy interact differently in different contexts. As my research focusses on the utilization of a body of social science research, it might differ significantly from Gibson’s case studies. However, Gibson’s main objective is the development of a theory on the dynamics of the science-policy nexus. He succeeds remarkably well in abstracting from specificities of the context of health care. As such, it becomes possible to adopt his concept of research transformation within the scope of social science research on migration.

As such, despite my departure from Gibson’s method and research setting, his concept of research transformation remains useful. By looking at the way the academic debate is represented in the political debate, it is possible to trace instances of research transfer and transformation. Arguments that are transformed, left out, added or directly taken over from the academic debate can indicate the political use of the latter.

1.2 Critical frame analysis

I loosely base my methodology on the critical frame analysis adopted by MAGEEQ, a research project funded by the European Union “on the framing of gender inequality as a policy problem” (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007, p. 21). Especially the concept of ‘sensitizing questions’ proves useful.

The MAGEEQ project aims to explore different understandings of gender (in)equality in European policy documents. Reconstructing the different policy frames¹⁶ on gender equality enables a comparison of the way these conceptualizations framed both the problem of, as well as the solutions to, gender inequality. On the basis of a general review of the political and theoretical feminist literature, the research identified three contrasting conceptions of gender equality. By confronting the policy documents with sensitizing questions, which emerged from “issues that are highly present in the current feminist debates”¹⁷ (p. 35), the researchers attempt to discern these different conceptions in policy texts. The questions are designed to reveal general characteristics of policy frames, along the lines of predefined ‘dimensions’¹⁸ of the policy frames. Analysis of the policy documents is conducted through “open-ended” (p. 39) coding of the dimensions of the policy documents, based on the sensitizing questions. An analysis of the ‘answers’ to the questions, which fill the dimensions with content, can reveal the vision on gender equality that is hidden in policy texts.

Reconstructing, comparing and evaluating different policy frames through which policy actors conceptualize the problem of climate migration goes beyond the scope of my research. It would require the analysis of much more documents, actors and aspects of framing (Dombos et al., 2012), while not illuminating the political use of academic research. However, the sensitizing questions prove a useful methodological instrument for assessing a limited amount of policy documents on their specific interpretations and conceptualizations of a policy problem. By developing such questions on the basis of the literature review on climate migration, it is possible to explore how the academic debate is represented in these policy documents. A subsequent assessment of which arguments are

¹⁶ A policy frame is defined as “an organising principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included” (Verloo, 2005, p. 20 in Verloo & Lombardo, 2007, p. 33).

¹⁷ These include “the meaning of gender, the treatment of intersectionality, the inclusion of voice, or the structures reproducing gender inequalities” (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007, p. 35).

¹⁸ Examples include ‘diagnosis’, ‘prognosis’ or ‘voice’, leading to questions as “what is the problem?”, “what is the solution?” (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007, p.33) and “who has/should have a voice in the political debate to say what is gender equality and how the problem of gender inequality could be solved” (p. 34).

taken over or transformed allows for an evaluation of the political use of climate migration research.

2. Methodological structure

In order to answer both research questions, the analysis consists of two phases. First, to analyse the political use of academic arguments, it is necessary to know to what extent the academic debate is represented in the political debate. By means of a detailed coding process of the academic debate, the relevant themes could be divided into three clusters, each containing three sub-clusters. After coding the policy documents under analysis, this schematic overview of the academic debate was tested against the policy documents using sensitizing questions modelled on the methodology of the MAGEEQ research project. As the difference between minimalism and maximalism appeared as an ideal-typical cleavage within the academic debate, the assessment of the representation of the academic debate in the political climate migration debate mainly gauges at the respective influence of minimalist and maximalist research.

The second step entails a discussion on the consequences of research influence for the political use of academic arguments. The way these arguments were taken over, transformed or left out provides for an assessment of the political purpose of these (transformed) arguments.

In order to capture a manageable part of the political debate, I focus on one actor within the fields of climate and migration policies. I conduct a case study on policy documents by the Greens/ European Free Alliance in the European Parliament (Greens/EFA).

3. The Greens/ European Free Alliance in the European Parliament

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to reconstruct every aspect of the transformation of the entire academic debate into political arguments. This transformation occurs, among others, throughout many different policy subsystems, institutions, debates on specific issues, political practices and media stories. Consequently, I focus on one particular actor within the enormous fields of climate and migration policies that touch upon the issue of climate migration: the Greens/ European Free Alliance in the European Parliament (Greens/EFA).

This parliamentary group consists of the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) of two political families: the European Green Party (EGP) and the European Free Alliance (EFA). The first “is a transnational political party having as its members Green parties from European countries (although not necessarily from European Union member states)” (EGP, n.d.). The second family consists of parties representing “Europe's stateless nations, regions and disadvantaged minorities” (EFA in the European Parliament, n.d.). Both families found each other on progressive themes and formed a parliamentary group in 1999 (The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament, n.d.). While the issue of climate migration was mainly taken up by the Green MEPs, both groups support environmental sustainability. Since many of the selected documents were either drafted or supported by the larger parliamentary group, I focus on the Greens/ EFA in the European Parliament instead of the EGP alone.

3.1 Selection of documents

Green MEPs generally advocate the recognition of environmental refugees. In 2001 they introduced the issue in the European Parliament but, despite their advocacy, the term ‘environmental refugee’ was never included in a parliamentary resolution (Sgro, 2008).

I selected four documents that demonstrate this advocacy in different ways. An early report on the issue by MEP Jean Lambert (2002), a speech by Frank Biermann at the conference ‘Climate Migrants: How to Protect the People Who Are Affected by Climate Change’ (2008), a speech by Lambert at the Doctors of the World Annual UK Conference (2010) and a position paper by the Greens/EFA on ‘Climate Change, Refugees and Migration’ (Flautre, Lambert, Keller, & Lochbihler, 2013).

Every document deals specifically with the issue of climate or environmental migration. The position paper is drafted in name of the Greens/EFA. The report by Lambert is supported by the parliamentary group and the speeches by Lambert and Biermann are related to the group because they are held respectively by a Green MEP and by a professor speaking at a conference organized by the Greens/EFA.

4. Representation of the academic debate

4.1 Coding of the academic debate

The thorough literature overview of the academic debate on climate and environmental migration presented in chapter I represents the academic side of the research-policy nexus. A first step in the analysis entailed the creation of a comprehensive and manageable synopsis that could be the basis for an examination of the arguments represented in the selected policy documents. Therefore, through a data-driven coding procedure, conducted with the Atlasti© software, I divided all the elements of the literature into a long list of codes. This means that every meaningful quote is coded with a label indicating its content ranging from ‘migration as adaptation’ to ‘broadening the Geneva Convention’. The coding procedure is ‘data-driven’ in the sense that no pre-defined labels were developed to be assigned to the content of the text. Codes are thus directly derived from the text (Gibbs,

2008, p. 45). This detailed coding of the literature overview resulted in well over 200 codes. A revision of the codes brought those that indicated the same content together, reducing the number of codes to little less than 200.

On the basis of the research questions, I divided the codes into three overarching clusters: ‘conceptualization’, ‘complexity’ and ‘advocacy’. Each cluster contained three related sub-clusters, which created the following structure:

- Conceptualization:
 - Definition
 - Agency
 - Security
- Complexity:
 - (Un)quantifiability
 - Scientific uncertainty
 - Social factors/inequality
- Advocacy:
 - Legal proposals
 - Recommendations
 - Arguments

The cluster ‘conceptualization’ aims at revealing how climate migration is conceptualized by the policy documents. ‘Complexity’ explores whether and under what form the nuance that was introduced by minimalist scholars, is picked up by the documents. By assessing the way climate migration is conceptualized and to what extent complexity is accounted for, it is possible to see how academic research is reflected in the policy discourse of the documents under analysis.

The cluster ‘advocacy’ specifically gauges at the political use of academic arguments and concepts by inquiring what the documents advocate by which argumentative support. As such, this cluster prepares for an assessment of the political use of academic arguments.

One single code could be allocated to different sub-clusters. For instance, the code ‘environmental degradation = political persecution’ was placed both in the subfamily ‘legal proposals’ and ‘arguments’. The code refers to an argument for a specific legal proposal,

namely the broadening of the Geneva Convention to include environmental or climate refugees, since environmental degradation is seen as a form of political persecution by several scholars. The code 'difficulty of definition', refers to the minimalist assertion that defining climate or environmental refugees is nearly, if not completely impossible. This code was categorized under 'scientific uncertainty' since the uncertainty on different factors precludes a solid definition. Obviously, the code was also allocated to 'definition' and thus under the cluster conceptualization. These overlaps demonstrate how the different clusters and sub-clusters are linked to each other.

4.2 Analysis of policy documents

4.2.1 Sensitizing questions

Through the coding process I was able to classify every element of the literature overview in clusters and sub-clusters, thereby creating a schematic synopsis of the literature. On the basis of the content of these clusters, I developed a collection of 15 sensitizing questions that carried a concise but comprehensive skeleton of the literature (see overview on the following page).

The sensitizing questions closely guide the analysis of the policy documents. By allowing for more targeted coding of the policy documents, the answers to the questions can demonstrate how the literature review is represented in the policy documents. The clusters inspire the development of dimensions that group the answers on the sensitizing questions in meaningful categories, thus allowing for comparison on academic influence and political use of academic arguments.

CONCEPTUALIZATION	Definition ➤ Which terms are used? ➤ Is a definition deemed possible? ➤ If so, how is climate migration defined? ➤ Is the climatic aspect emphasised over other environmental factors?	Agency ➤ Is climate migration seen as an expression of agency or rather as a predetermined reaction to environmental change?	Security ➤ What is the relation between climate change, migration and conflict or human security?
COMPLEXITY	(Un)quantifiability ➤ Does the document quantify the amount of current climate migrants? ➤ Does the document predict the amount of climate migrants?	Scientific uncertainty ➤ Does the document recognize the scientific difficulties surrounding: ○ Quantifications of current and future climate migrants? ○ Isolating one factor in migration decisions ➤ Does the document recognize the general lack of empirical evidence? ➤ Does the document call for more research?	Social factors/Inequality ○ How does the document portray the influence of social, economic and political factors on climate migration? ○ Does the document recognize the influence of unequal societal structures on the occurrence of climate migration?
ADVOCACY	Legal proposals/ recommendations ➤ What does the document advocate?	Arguments ➤ What arguments are used?	

4.2.2 Answers to the sensitizing questions

In order to answer the sensitizing questions, I coded the policy documents in the same detailed fashion as the literature overview. In certain instances I could use codes from the literature overview. However, coding at this level of detail mainly required new codes to capture the (slight) differences in argumentation. Thereafter, I grouped all codes in four clusters for each document (conceptualization, complexity, advocacy and arguments¹⁹).

After being distributed among the pre-established clusters, the codes serve as a guide to answer the sensitizing questions. The categorized codes function as textual clues for answers. Codes as ‘forced’ and ‘vulnerable’ in the cluster ‘conceptualization’, for instance, point to a conceptualization of climate migration as a rather predetermined reaction to environmental change instead of an expression of agency. The latter is indicated by codes as ‘migration as adaptation’ or ‘income diversification’. In this manner, the codes can provide clues as to how the document conceptualizes the problem.

5. Political use

On the basis of the assessment of the representation of the climate debate in policy documents, I analysed the way academic arguments are used for specific political purposes. While all clusters gauge at the representation of the academic debate, the clusters ‘advocacy’ and ‘arguments’ specifically explore the political use of academic arguments. The analysis is thus mainly based on, but not limited to these dimensions. By comparing how academic arguments are transformed, and what arguments are left out or added to support specific causes, I traced the political use of academic research on climate migration. Transformations of arguments linked to complexity or conceptualization are also considered in order to assess the political use of academic arguments.

¹⁹ The cluster ‘arguments’ belongs under ‘advocacy’. However during the coding process I treated it as a separate cluster in order to capture the specific arguments each document brings to the fore to support its cause.

6. Limitations

My approach has several potential limitations. Firstly, I focus on one particular actor, which precludes a complete picture of the political debate on climate migration. I cannot compare the political use of arguments by different political strands, nor is it possible to analyse the dynamic between different advocacy coalitions. An assessment of opposite views on climate migration could provide for useful insights on research use and selectivity. However, this approach proved impossible due to a lack of data. Generally, other political groups in the European Parliament that might disagree with the Greens/EFA, did not produce policy documents on the matter. While the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D) works on climate migration, for instance by organising a seminar on the issue (Socialists & Democrats, 2011), their view proved rather similar to the Greens/EFA position and can thus not provide for an interesting comparison.

Secondly, the selection and coding of documents, the process of clustering the codes and the development of the sensitizing questions was entirely carried out by one researcher. Therefore, it could be argued that this was done on the basis of a certain predefined interpretation of the climate migration debate. Obviously certain assumptions guided my research. For instance, by selecting a Green political perspective, which I expected to take over the maximalist discourse. However, the overview of research utilization literature provided several theoretical perspectives on the issue that were subsequently integrated in the methodology. Consequently, throughout the research process I realized that the transfer of complexity and the political use of scientific arguments involve intricate processes, which are not easily reducible to mere partisan utilization of science. Eventually, an empirical assessment is needed to decide how certain documents use academic arguments.

Thirdly, the accuracy of the reduction of the academic debate to minimalist and maximalist scholars can be questioned. I therefore explain this characterization as ideal-typical, as outlined in the next chapter. Many scholars integrate arguments from both research strands. This prompted me to introduce the concept of ‘evolved maximalism’. Evolved maximalists are those that are still to be situated in the maximalist tradition but have incorporated parts of the minimalist nuance, in greater or lesser extent. By classifying the debate this way, I was able to assess its representation in the policy domain.

The fourth limitation is also related to selectivity. I have written the literature review, which I subsequently coded and reduced to sensitizing questions. An overview of the relevant literature is inevitably selective, since it is a synopsis of a larger academic debate. Despite my effort to comprise all central aspects of the debate, it is possible that certain scholarly arguments were not included. I solved this problem by adjusting and completing the literature overview, whenever a policy document touched upon a relevant academic argument that I had not included in the literature overview for reasons of parsimony.

Lastly, my approach is rather lengthy and complicated, which might obstruct replicability. I do not deny this allegation. I have developed this approach myself due to a lack of comparable studies. I did use certain theoretical perspectives as well as the MAQEEQ research project, to support the design of the methodology. However, the methodology could potentially be refined and simplified.

Chapter IV

Research results

In this chapter, I present the results of the analysis of the selected policy documents. In the first phase, I assess how the academic climate migration debate is represented in the policy documents under analysis. Building on this, the second phase evaluates the political use of the academic arguments.

1. Representation

1.1 Academic dimensions of policy texts

To get a grip on the relevant content of all documents, I first drafted a dense schematic chart for each document presenting extensive answers to the sensitizing questions. In these charts I quote the most important examples that hint at the way the academic debate is represented in the documents under analysis. These form the basis of a second, more condensed overview of the answers, allowing for a comparison between the different documents. The detailed charts can be consulted in the annex.

In order to get an overview of the representation of the academic climate migration debate in policy documents, I grouped the shortened answers in nine core dimensions that gauge at the influence of minimalism or maximalism. The dimensions range from the term and definition the document uses, the way agency, security, quantifications, scientific uncertainty

and socio-economic factors are touched upon, to the proposals the texts put to the fore. They mostly mirror the sub-clusters derived from the literature review and are arranged around the overarching clusters ‘conceptualization’, ‘complexity’ and ‘advocacy’²⁰. As the sensitizing questions and clusters are derived from the coding process of the literature overview, the table of answers roughly exhibits the way the academic debate is reflected in the policy documents.

The dimensions contain textual clues as to whether and to what extent a text is influenced by maximalism, minimalism or both. Based on the literature overview I developed a key that indicates what clues point to what research school and why.

It should be noted that the maximalist-minimalist divide is somewhat artificial. Some scholars embody a mix of both sets of arguments. Policy makers are even more likely to be exposed to a combination of influences. The list of clues pointing to either maximalism or minimalism is thus based on ideal-typical representations of the research schools. Furthermore, some issues such as the increasing focus on climate change at the expense of other environmental causes, apply for both maximalist and minimalist scholars. To refine the rigid maximalist-minimalist distinction I developed notions such as ‘minimalist nuance’, ‘early maximalist’ and ‘evolved maximalist’. ‘Minimalist nuance’ refers to elements that have been emphasized by minimalist scholars to enrich and refine the academic and policy debates on environmental migration, such as the complexity of migration decisions. ‘Early maximalists’ are those scholars who were pioneers of the environmental migration debate. ‘Evolved maximalists’ include all scholars that incorporate minimalist nuance without rejecting the categories of climate migrant or refugee. Early maximalists can thus be viewed as scholars that have not been influenced by the minimalist research project. As outlined below, these scholars are not devoid of any form of awareness of complexity, but tend to override this with arguments that reinstall environmental change as the most important factor triggering displacement. Evolved maximalists have incorporated much more of the minimalist nuance. Despite this, they cannot be seen as minimalists. Evolved maximalists perceive climate migration as a pressing problem that requires strong solutions. Minimalists, on the other hand, recognize the issue of (forced) migration, but do not believe that the category of climate of

²⁰ The cluster ‘argumentation’ was useful to code documents on what issues they argued for and what arguments they used for it. When presenting a concise overview, this cluster was again classified as a dimension under ‘advocacy’.

environmental migrants can be of any significance when dealing with migration because the category cannot be scientifically determined.

In what follows I first present the key that outlines per dimension which clues indicate what type of research influence, on the basis of which I analyse the influence of academic research in each document. This in turn provides a basis for the analysis of the political use of academic arguments.

1.1.1 Conceptualization

A. Term

Climate or environmental, migrant or refugee? The specific terms that are used to refer to the issue at stake can indicate which academic discourse had an influence on the author. Going back to the distinction made by Suhrke (1993), refugees are forcibly displaced by natural disasters or extreme environmental degradation while migrants decide to move before they are forced to do so. The sole use of the terms climate or environmental refugee indicates a decisive influence of maximalism. Minimalists as Gaim Kibreab (1997) argue that the terms environmental or climate refugee²¹ as such are misleading and should therefore be avoided.

The moderate term ‘migrant’ points to the recognition that relocation in the face of climate or environmental change can be voluntary and indicates minimalist nuance.

Early maximalists focussed on environmental migration in general, which encompassed climate change as one cause among many. Throughout the decades climate migration became a meaningful concept in itself, mostly featuring in maximalist writings. Certain minimalist scholars question this evolution, as environmental factors which are not linked to climate change might still contribute to displacement (Lassailly-Jacob, 2006). However, many maximalists as well as their minimalist critics increasingly focus solely on displacement linked to climate change. There has thus been a gradual narrowing down of the issue at stake. Displacement due to development projects, for instance, ceased to be part of the academic and political discourse.

²¹ Kibreab only refers explicitly to environmental refugees. Given his argumentation that revolves around the way this concept exempts states of their obligation to provide asylum, I assume he equally rejects the concept of ‘climate refugees’.

B. Definition

The chosen definition of climate migration indicates how the scope of the problem is perceived. A definition includes certain groups of people and excludes others. This is especially relevant when solutions are formulated.

For early maximalists, defining environmental migration was one of the main purposes of their work. Evolved maximalists, on the other hand, recognize the difficulties of defining environmental migration. However, as many maximalists seek to provide solutions to the issue of climate migration, a definition of the problem is necessary. Therefore, evolved maximalists often still attempt to formulate a definition.

Minimalists do not consider an exhaustive definition to be possible due to the multitude of factors at play. Some explicitly claim that the environmental or climate refugee concepts should be avoided and thus reject any endeavour to define environmental or climate migration.

C. Agency

This dimension gauges at whether a document conceptualizes migration as an expression of agency or as a predetermined reaction to environmental change. The literature review pointed out that agency with regard to environmental migration is increasingly regarded as a continuum with on the one end forced migration and on the other voluntary migration decisions. The conception of agency as a continuum indicates the complexity of determining to what extent displacement is voluntary. Therefore, I searched for clues that point to a certain degree of agency. These include references to migration as a personal decision which can differ among people facing the same circumstances. Perceiving migration as an adaptation strategy, for instance as a way to diversify household incomes, points to agency as well.

While it can be questioned whether these situations entail completely voluntary decisions, they imply a certain degree of agency. Most fundamentally, these clues indicate that displacement is not seen as an automatic, inevitable response to the consequences of environmental change. This insight was introduced by minimalists. As such, in terms of the ideal-typical maximalist-minimalist divide, the more climate or environmental migration is regarded as forced, the more maximalist influence. The more aspects of agency that are

recognized, such as personal decisions or rational migratory adaptation strategies, the more influence of minimalist nuance.

D. Security

Certain security scholars link security concerns to climate change. This is picked up by maximalist scholars who see security, notably conflicts, as the missing link between climate change and migration. Furthermore, climate migration is in turn viewed as a security threat for receiving societies. Minimalists generally align with the critics of a security-climate change link. Important counter arguments echo much of the minimalist critiques on the concept of climate migration, namely the lack of empirical evidence as well as the multicausality and complexity of conflicts. Another similarity is the claim that the security-climate change nexus is mainly brought to live to stress the severity of climate change and environmental degradation, which creates political pressure to mitigate climate change.

As such, the way policy makers refer to the relationship between security issues and climate change indicates maximalist or minimalist influence. This dimension must be seen as supplementary as not all scholars or policy makers discussing climate migration devote attention to the security aspect. Minimalist will often ignore the security dimension as they do not deem it very relevant, while not all maximalists touch upon the issue.

1.1.2 Complexity

E. Quantifications and predictions

This dimension is most straightforward with regard to the differentiation between minimalist and maximalist influence. The influence of maximalism is apparent when numbers of climate migrants are quoted. Because of the complexity of migration decisions, minimalists do not perceive quantification to be possible. Quantifications are thus not expected in documents that are mainly influenced by minimalism. However, documents that quantify climate migration can still be influenced by the minimalist discourse in the form of caveats that indicate the difficulty and controversy surrounding those numbers.

F. Scientific uncertainty

This dimension relates to the above mentioned quantifications of climate migration. Awareness of the difficulties surrounding climate migrant quantifications, implies a certain recognition of the broader scientific uncertainty that permeates research on climate migration. Clues pointing to this recognition include references to interrelated factors influencing migration decisions, assertions of the impossibility of analytical isolation of the specific influence of climate change on migration decisions and complaints of the lack of empirical evidence for a scientific category classifying climate refugees.

However, due to the mixture of maximalist and minimalist influence, the issue is more complex. Policy makers can recognize scientific uncertainty while still drawing maximalist conclusions. Furthermore, with regard to the recognition of interrelated factors, early maximalist writings are not devoid of any understanding of multiple factors influencing migration. This is well exemplified by Norman Myers. While recognising the impact of non-environmental factors, the main difference with minimalist writings is the importance attached to this multicausality. For Myers, environmental change is the most important causal factor that has an impact on all other factors. This creates a complex of several interrelating causal factors, as emphasised by minimalists as well. By conceptualizing environmental change as the start of the causal chain, Myers can do away with these complexities and frame environmental migration as a serious problem demanding strong political action.

The mere recognition of interrelated factors is thus not solely linked to minimalist academic influence. The importance that is attached to environmental change compared to other factors is decisive. This is not at all times evident in policy documents on climate migration.

G. Socio-economic factors

Socio-economic factors constitute an important group of determinants influencing migration decisions. This cluster includes a large set of elements that impact living conditions, ranging from poverty and state capacity to conflict. Minimalist writings emphasize their role and succeeded in making these considerations part of the academic debate on climate migration. Partly due to the minimalist influence on maximalist scholars, socio-economic factors play an critical role in both minimalist and maximalist analyses, respectively as determining or

intermediate factors. Therefore, it can be rather complicated to determine whether texts are influenced by minimalism or evolved maximalism. However, the analyses of both approaches still imply different conclusions.

Minimalist scholars argue that socio-economic conditions might be exacerbated by environmental change but that, generally, socio-economic factors determine to what extent a community is vulnerable to the adverse consequences of environmental change. They mainly point to a communities' capacity to cope with environmental change and emphasize the role of the post-disaster response in case of environmental emergencies. Minimalists thus revise the causal chain put to the fore by maximalist scholars. Socio-economic factors are of greater importance when analysing migration decisions. Furthermore, these are personal decisions influenced by a combination of factors, among which the financial means people have at their disposition. Essentially, a causal relationship between environmental change and poverty leading to migration is hard to demonstrate. For minimalist scholars, the interrelation between climate change and social conditions thus demonstrates the complexity of climate migration, which prevent strong conclusions that call for political action.

According to maximalists, on the other hand, climate change influences socio-economic factors to such an extent that climate migration becomes inevitable at some point. While (early) maximalists tend to envision a linear relationships between environmental change and migration, social factors are envisioned to mediate the concrete materialisation of climate change. Apart from causal explanations for a new and growing problem, the maximalist conceptualization of climate change as the driving force of many population displacements, implicitly carries a call for (political) action addressing climate change.

Within the realm of this dimension, the most important clue indicating maximalist influence are various assertions on the exacerbating impact of climate change on social conditions that eventually lead to displacement. As poor people are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change, maximalist foresee that they will be the dominant group that is forced to migrate. Minimalist influence is reflected in statements that conceptualize socio-economic factors as determining migration decisions, in which climate change is only an accompanying factor. In minimalist analyses, poverty is mostly a factor preventing migration since relocation is a costly matter. Furthermore, emphasis on the significance of inequality, both globally as within

countries, as a factor determining the severity of climate change impacts, points to influences of minimalism as well.

1.1.3 Advocacy

Several of the dimensions outlined so far indicate the implicit potential of certain conceptualizations to feature as political arguments. This potential is most evident with regard to maximalist conceptualizations that carry an implicit argumentation for stronger mitigation measures. The cluster ‘advocacy’ explores this potential further by gauging at what the texts propose and which arguments are put to the fore to support their recommendations. Certain proposals and arguments are inspired by maximalist or minimalist research. More importantly, these dimensions are essential to explore the political use of academic arguments on climate migration. When discussing the specific Greens/EFA policy documents, I analyse how they utilize the academic discourse to support certain causes. Here I briefly outline the relation of both research schools with the main political arguments featuring in the Greens/EFA documents by indicating clues for maximalism and minimalism.

H. Proposals and recommendations

This dimension gauges at the potential solutions a policy text proposes to address climate migration. As not all texts come up with concrete solutions, the dimension encompasses all proposals and general recommendations. These might concern issues that are only indirectly related to climate migration and thus indicate the political use of the arguments surrounding climate migration for different political purposes.

The proposal legally recognise environmental or climate refugees is taken over from legal scholars that were mainly inspired by maximalist writings on climate migration. Minimalist arguments do not offer argumentative support in this regard as they do not consider the category to be determinable, which is a prerequisite for any legal solution. The same goes for humanitarian assistance. Legal scholars that are influenced by maximalists argue for a special protection regime, that would, among other things, organise the relocation of future climate refugees. Such measures are not feasible according to minimalists as the special category ‘climate refugees’ is hard to circumscribe. Furthermore, planned relocation would require the

consent of all people concerned, which is difficult to attain given the particular character of individual migration decisions. Planned relocation means to hand over control to governments or international bodies, away from the community itself. As McNamarra and Gibson (2009) illustrate, this is generally opposed by international representatives of Pacific Island states who regard the entire climate refugee concept as a waiver of sovereignty and geopolitical leverage to advocate emission reductions.

Preventive measures can be supported by both minimalist and maximalist arguments, depending on their specific form. As minimalists focus on the prevalence of socio-economic factors over environmental factors determining migration flows, preventive measures that enhance peoples living conditions can be supported by minimalist reasoning. Measures that emphasize mitigation are not discouraged by minimalists but their reasoning will not provide support either. As there is no direct link between climate change and migration a focus on mitigation as a solution is misleading.

Maximalist reasoning can underpin the political call on developed countries to reduce emissions and to provide financial assistance to prevent environmental degradation and promote development and thus resilience of vulnerable communities.

The minimalist emphasis on the fact that migration merely occurs within developing countries can weaken the potential of certain discourses on climate migration to spur anti-migration sentiments.

I. Arguments

Maximalist arguments supporting these proposals include claims of environmental factors driving migration, assertions of climate or environmental migration which will increase as climate change becomes worse, allegations of climate refugees creating a security threat, statements on a protection gap between political and climate refugees, insistence of the particular difference between climate and political refugees necessitating a special protection regime for climate refugees and of vulnerability that forces poor people to migrate. Arguments that picked up minimalist nuance generally point to other determinants than environmental factors. Furthermore, emphasizing agency by conceptualizing climate migration as an adaptation strategy or by mentioning that many people are reluctant to move, indicate the influence of minimalist research.

1.2 Greens/EFA policy documents

The chart on the following page presents a schematic and condensed overview of the answers to the sensitizing questions, grouped according to the nine dimensions for each document under analysis. Before assessing the political use of academic arguments in the different documents by analysing how the documents take over, transform, add or leave out academic arguments, I first contextualize each document and show to what extent minimalist and maximalist arguments influenced the text. I discuss how climate migration is conceptualized, to what extent and under what form the minimalist nuance is picked up and how certain proposals are advocated by assessing which (academic) arguments are used for what political purpose.

		Lambert, 2002	Biermann, 2008	Lambert, 2010	Flautre et al., 2013
C O N C E P T U A L I Z A T I O N	Term	- EM/ ER - E migration/E displacement	CR	- CM - C migration	- CR - CM
	Definition	<u>ER</u> : person displaced by natural disaster or slow-onset degradation undermining life sustenance <u>EM</u> : all those for whom an environmental factor is a direct or indirect motive for migration	None	“[D]isplaced by climate change” (p. 1)	<u>C migration</u> : “the displacement of individuals or groups of people fleeing a slow-onset change in their environment or a sudden disaster, which are directly triggered, partly caused or at least exacerbated by climate change” (p. 4)
	Agency	Migration is a predetermined reaction to environmental change	Migration is a predetermined reaction to climatic change	Migration is an expression of agency	Certain degree of agency although C migration is often forced
	Security	Environmental degradation can lead to violence and/or declining quality of life	Not elaborated on	Consequences of climate change, mediated by situational factors, can lead to conflicts and/or decreasing quality of life	Not elaborated on
C O M P L E X I	Quantifications & predictions	Quantifications & predictions with only few caveats	None but deemed possible	Quantifications & predictions in careful language	Quantifications & predictions with caveats
	Scientific uncertainty	- Interrelated factors recognized - Isolating one causal factor is possible - No lack of empirical evidence	- Isolating factor climate is possible - No lack of empirical evidence	- Interrelated factors recognized - Isolating factor climate is difficult - More research needed; sufficient evidence to draw conclusions	- Interrelated factors recognized - Isolating factor climate is difficult - Definition assumes that the degree of ‘climate-relatedness’ can be determined - No lack of empirical evidence

T Y	Socio-economic factors	- Poverty influences E migration - Climate change exacerbates social problems/poverty - Uneven effect of climate change on migration patterns related to global inequality	Not elaborated on	- Socio-economic factors influence concrete climate change impact - In turn, impact of climate change & socio-economic factors influence migration flows - Unequal societal structures influence C migration - Limited financial resources prevent poorest to migrate	- Poverty influences C migration - Climate change exacerbates social problems/poverty - Unequal societal structures influence C migration - Limited financial resources cause most CRs to become IDPs
A D V O C A C Y	Proposals & recommendations	(1) Legal recognition ER (2) Assistance EM (planned relocation) (3) Prevention a. Development b. Mitigation (4) Actions by developed world (5) Indirectly related issues a. Contra economic globalisation b. Specific environmental protection measures c. Social/progressive activism	(1) Legal recognition CR (protocol under UNFCCC) (2) Assistance CR (planned relocation) (3) CBDR (4) Actions by developed world (5) Finance according to climate-relatedness (6) No extension Geneva Convention	(1) C migration is a serious problem (2) We should not be afraid/create fear of in-migration (3) Policies and legislations should be adapted to C migration (4) Prevention (5) Migration should be voluntary (6) Indirectly related issues (7) EU membership is beneficial for UK citizens (8) EU/UK should not act against global migration movement	(1) Legal recognition (2) No extension Geneva Convention (3) No protocol under UNFCCC (4) Prevention a. Adaptation b. Mitigation c. Disaster risk reduction (5) Planned relocation (6) EU actions (7) Actions by developed world (8) Actions by international community

	Arguments	- Developed country responsibility - E migration will increase - Economic globalization harms environment - Governmental policies harm environment - Security threat - Natural scientific predictions - Vulnerability - Protection gap	- Developed country responsibility - Difference between CR & political refugees requires special kind of protection - Rough predictions can determine what areas people will migrate from - Climate-induced-displacement is permanent	- C migration will increase - Natural scientific predictions - Environmental factors are important drivers of migration - A complex mix of socio-economic factors influences migration decisions - Migration as adaptation strategy - People prefer not to migrate - Climate migrants will not especially come to the UK - UK gains from EU right to free movement	- Developed country responsibility - E/C migration will increase - Protection gap - Vulnerability/inequality - Rough predictions can determine what areas will be affected by climate change - Income diversification can preclude the need to move - Developing countries lack funds to deal with climate change & C migration - Many (potential) CRs are considered economic refugees - No political support to extend Geneva Convention - Reluctance of states to grant asylum
--	-------------------------	---	--	---	--

E migration: environmental migration EM: environmental migrant ER: environmental refugee E displacement: environmental displacement	C migration: climate migration CM: climate migrant CR: climate refugee
---	--

1.2.1 Refugees and the Environment: The Forgotten Element of Sustainability (Lambert, 2002)

Counting 13 pages, this report is the earliest Greens/EFA document of this scope that is entirely devoted to environmental migration. It was published on the website of the author, Green MEP Jean Lambert, who conducted much parliamentary work on environmental migration (Lambert, 2014). The report elaborates on the scope and causes of environmental migration and links it to economic globalization and several issues concerning social justice. A broad range of possible solutions include specific measures to mitigate environmental change and protect the environment, a special legal status for environmental refugees and a transformation of the dominant economic paradigm.

Lambert's report is strongly influenced by early maximalist discourses. She mainly uses maximalist arguments and refers to issues that were raised by early maximalists. For instance, Lambert focusses on environmental migration that is caused by a broad range of environmental factors. As such, climate change appears as one environmental factor among many others leading to migration. This alludes to early maximalist discourses characterized by the writings of El Hinnawi (1985) and early works by Myers (Myers & Kent, 1995). She uses both the terms 'environmental refugee' and 'environmental migrant'. After circumventing some difficulties Lambert arrives at certain definitions of both terms. Evidence of direct influence of early maximalists is found in her classification of development projects as drivers of environmental displacement, which is taken over from scholars as Jodi Jacobson (1988). Furthermore, the report conceptualizes environmental migration as a predominantly forced, inevitable response to push factors, which mainly affect vulnerable, poor communities. Their low adaptive capacity was lowered even further by economic globalization and the socio-economic impact of environmental change itself. In order to put a concrete number on the current and future scope of environmental migration, Lambert quotes the Red Cross and refers to quantifications made by Myers. Lastly, the report links environmental degradation to security threats, which is another indication of maximalist influence.

Lambert recognizes that migration is influenced by many interrelated factors, ranging from political to socio-economic issues. She asserts that this complicates the identification of a direct

causal relationship between environmental change and migration, and thus a straightforward definition and quantification of the problem. However, she envisions that exact quantifications will soon be achievable. Furthermore, in line with many maximalists who are aware of certain complexities regarding migration, she still draws conclusions on the reasons and scope of environmental migration despite the scientific difficulties: “Environmental refugees exist. Even if we cannot *yet* [emphasis added] provide the fine statistical details regarding the number of such refugees and the precise factors which cause them to move, it is clear that there is a significant and growing problem” (p. 12). After recognizing that it is difficult to identify “direct cause and effect relationship between the environment and migration” (p. 4), Lambert continues by asserting that in case of slow-onset degradation “you can demonstrate immediate causal agents of your situation and a coercive factor to the resulting migration” (p. 6). As such, Lambert recognises certain complex aspects of climate migration but still draws general conclusions on the existence, scope, reasons and forms of environmental migration.

In line with early maximalists as Myers, Lamberts thus first identifies the many interrelated factors influencing migration patterns, where after she firmly reinstalls a causal link between environmental change and displacement. This leads to her conclusion on the significance of the environmental refugee problem, which is the fundamental basis of maximalist reasoning. By further determining the scope and definition of the problem, maximalists establish an argumentative basis that can support specific solutions to the problem. Lambert’s pragmatic reasons for defining environmental migration, in spite of conceptual vagueness, reveal the importance of the maximalist conclusion when advocating for the legal recognition of climate refugees:

coming up with a clear definition of an ‘environmental refugee’ will [not] be an easy task. However, if we do not officially recognise that there is such a person as an ‘environmental refugee’, no one is going to take responsibility for the people affected. If they are identified as ‘refugees’, host nations have responsibilities for their well being and they have access to greater rights. (p. 5)

In short, Lambert’s report recognizes a certain degree of complexity that maximalist scholars have always done. Defining environmental refugees is therefore difficult, but as

environmental migration exists, a definition is needed to enable action on environmental displacement and environmental protection.

In further analyses I refer to this document as ‘the report by Lambert’ or by ‘Lambert (2002)’.

1.2.2 Nous Sommes à l'Origine du Problème, Nous Devons le Résoudre²² (Biermann, 2008)

This document is a transcript in French of a speech by Frank Biermann, professor in political science and environmental policy sciences at the VU University of Amsterdam. The speech was held at a conference in the European Parliament, organized by the Greens/EFA, on ‘Climate Migrants: How to Protect the People Who Are Affected by Climate Change’ (Rossignol, 2008). It is the shortest document I analysed and focusses on one issue: advocating the proposal by Biermann and Boas (2010; 2012) for a protocol to the UNFCCC that would organize the protection, recognition and relocation of climate refugees. This focus thus excludes any consideration of non-climate related environmental migration. As referred to in the title, the main argumentation supporting a protection scheme for climate refugees is the historic responsibility of developed countries for causing climate change.

The speech is the clearest example of maximalist influence on the policy debate. The author of the speech is a maximalist scholar himself. However, in academic publications he presents the issue in a more nuanced way. The opportunity to briefly introduce his proposal to policy makers transforms his academic discourse significantly. Apart from incorporating cases in which migration is only partly related to climate change, all complexity surrounding migration decisions is left out in favour of a clear and direct conclusion: climate refugee flows are a significant and growing problem that needs to be addressed by a protocol to the UNFCCC which recognizes their rights. Biermann’s speech is the only document that exclusively refers to climate refugees without any clarification or recognition of the controversy surrounding the concept.

Biermann conceptualizes climate migration as forced and permanent. He therefore views climate migration as an inevitable response to certain consequences of climate change, rather

²² We are creating the problem, we must solve it.

than an expression of agency influenced by a myriad of interrelated factors. Climate refugees are victims in need of assistance who cannot organize adaptation strategies or relocation options themselves.

Biermann's proposal exhibits maximalist confidence that research will be able to quantify and predict climate migration. While he does not quote numbers, he assumes that rough predictions can determine what areas will be affected by climate change leading to out-migration. The distinction between displacement that is entirely related to climate change and displacement that is only partly climate-related is part of the general architecture of Biermann and Boas' proposal. By envisioning a solution that only compensates refugees to the extent their displacement is climate-related, Biermann considers that research is able to distinguish climate-related from climate unrelated factors.

Biermann highlights the distinction between political and climate refugees to argue for a separate protection regime. Assuming that it is possible to determine the difference between both categories is another indication of his maximalist inspiration.

1.2.3 Climate Change and Migration (Lambert, 2010)

This document is the transcript of a speech by Jean Lambert at the 2010 Doctors of the World Annual UK Conference. Politically the speech conveys a rather complex message. Climate migration is a serious and growing problem. However, one should be careful with regard to unwanted conclusions this message might carry. It should not be misused politically to create fear and reinforce sentiments against migration.

Lambert mainly draws on the results of the EACH-FOR study that were presented a year earlier. This type of research is very much influenced by minimalism but still views climate migration as a tangible phenomenon that can be documented. It is thus a prototypical example of what I call 'evolved minimalism'.

While Lambert's speech cannot be called minimalist in the purest sense as climate migration is considered a meaningful category, it comes closest to minimalism compared to the other policy documents. Therefore, I argue that Lambert's speech displays a version of evolved maximalism that embraces minimalist nuance to a rather large extent.

The issue at stake is limited to climate-related migration, for which Lambert uses the most neutral terms: climate migrant and climate migration. Furthermore, the phrase "displaced by

climate change” is the closest Lambert gets to a definition of climate migration. She does not mention anything on the difficulty of defining the issue.

The minimalist nuance Lambert incorporates in her speech mainly revolves around the recognition that migration decisions are often made in complex contexts, which prevents the identification of direct and inevitable links between climate change and potential human responses such as migration or violence. The specific impact climate change has on societies depends on factors as societal capacities to anticipate, adapt and respond to the consequences of climate change as well as societal structures that determine the uneven level of resilience of different communities. While the impact of climate change influences the likelihood of migration, the decision to migrate is mediated by many factors such as economic resilience, individual adaptation options and the capacity of the state to adapt to climate change. Lambert even refers to a counter-intuitive case of migrants who return in the face of worsening environmental degradation. As opposed to early maximalists who tend to recognize a certain degree of complexity but disregard this in final analyses of the environment-migration nexus, Lambert recognizes that political and economic factors can override environmental push factors. With regard to security, a relation between climate change and violence is deemed real. However, the speech posits that eruption of climate-related violence is mediated by factors such as the diplomatic management of resources. These examples demonstrate that Lambert embraces the minimalist insight that the link between climate change and migration is far from direct and inevitable.

To a certain extent, migration is conceptualized as an expression of agency. Similar push and pull factors can lead to different decisions with regard to the timing or type of migration. Furthermore, short- or long-term migration can be an adaptation strategy to diversify household incomes. However, limited financial resources often prevent poor people to adopt this strategy. In case they do migrate, movement remains within their own country, which makes the majority of climate migrants IDPs. The latter nuance indicates minimalist influence.

In short, in the speech migration is not conceptualized as an automatic reaction to the consequences of climate change. The latter can have different impacts across societies. Not all people are able to migrate, even when they consider it necessary to move.

Minimalist influence is less apparent with regard to quantifications of climate migrants. “The estimates by Professor Myers for potential climate migrants that are often quoted would

mean that by 2050 one in every 45 people in the world will have been displaced by climate change. Other estimates are even higher” (p. 1). Apart from using conditional language, Lambert does not elaborate on the difficulties surrounding these quantifications. Furthermore, on the basis of the EACH-FOR results Lambert deems it possible to draw a careful, relatively vague conclusion on the existence of environmental migration: “[a]lthough the environment is often not the only trigger for migration, the EACH-FOR case studies show that it is an important factor and with the expected impacts of climate change it will grow in importance” (p. 4). Consequently, certain maximalist elements are retained. Environmental factors are considered an important drive of migration. As further expanded on in the section on political use, this basic maximalist claim constitutes an argumentative foundation on which one can argue for and against certain societal responses to climate migration and climate change in general. Lambert (2010) uses the climate migration argument to argue for specific issues, but with regard to concrete conclusions, she does not go further than advocating policies that are adapted to the challenge of climate migration. Its firm denunciation of certain political arguments carried by maximalist rhetoric, sets the text apart from other maximalist writings.

I further refer to this document as ‘Lambert’s speech’ or ‘Lambert (2010)’.

1.2.4 Climate Change, Refugees and Migration (Flautre et al., 2013)

This position paper was published in 2013 and is as such the most recent document under analysis. It was written by four Greens/EFA MEPs to position the political group on climate migration. The authors comment specifically on many concrete proposals that attempt to address the issue. Generally, the MEPs lament the lack of legal recognition and protection of climate refugees. They announce to support any proposal gaining political momentum, apart from a few exceptions.

While mentioning environmental degradation as a cause of migration, generally only climate change is considered as a problematic cause of migration. The MEPs conceptualize climate migration as “more often forced than voluntary” as most people prefer not to move. Poor communities are affected most by climate change, which leads to greater poverty and forced migration. These people who make up the largest group of climate migrants tend to move predominantly within their own country due to a lack of financial resources.

This conceptualization of climate migration is a mix of maximalist and minimalist elements. The recognition of the lack of financial means of those that are most affected by climate change reflects minimalism. The focus on forced migration echoes maximalism, despite a mentioning of the minimalist insight that most people are reluctant to move. By stating that reluctant populations are forced to move, the minimalist insight is turned into a maximalist argument. The claim that most climate migrations are IDPs synthesizes both research schools: the minimalist element of financial means is recognized while eventually the act of migration is still emphasized. A certain degree of agency is recognized by referring to climate migration as a potentially voluntary adaptation strategy, for instance by diversifying household incomes. However, it is added that this strategy can only be successful if relocation is well organized. Therefore, minimalist insights on migration as an adaptation strategy still leads a maximalist solution, namely planned relocation.

With regard to their views on the causes of climate migration, the MEPs embrace minimalist nuance. They elaborate extensively on the many interrelated factors influencing migration as well as the difficulty of identifying general causal relations among environmental factors and migration. Furthermore, the authors recognize the many difficulties surrounding definitions and quantifications of climate migration:

Numbers largely depend on how the group of affected people is being defined. Experts speak of 15 million in 2009 and 38 million in 2010. According to recent estimates, between 250 million and one billion people might be affected by 2050. But there are clear limitations to such predictions, which should therefore be handled with caution. (p. 3).

However, maximalist elements remain part of the Greens/EFA position paper. After having considered minimalist insights, the authors argue that in a political debate, a pragmatic decision has to be made on the best suited definition. This is needed in order to provide

a straight-forward, easily understandable and translatable label to a complicated issue: the displacement of individuals or groups of people fleeing a slow-onset change in their environment or a sudden disaster, which are directly triggered, partly caused or at least exacerbated by climate change. (p. 4)

This definition of climate migration assumes that the degree of ‘climate-relatedness’ can be determined when assessing whether people qualify as climate refugees or not. Furthermore, the authors do not refrain from quoting numbers as to demonstrate the growing nature of the problem. Generally, these maximalist elements rely on an underlying assumption that establishes a causal link between climate change and migration: “Climate change and environmental degradation have had a significant impact on population movements worldwide – and this is still to increase” (p. 1).

Due to this combination of both perspectives the Greens/EFA position paper can be recognized as evolved maximalism. However, the specific type of evolved maximalism is different from the 2010 speech by Lambert as more maximalist elements are retained.

2. Political use

After having assessed the representation of the academic debate on climate migration in several policy documents, I turn to the overarching research question on the political use of academic arguments on climate migration. Mainly guided by the dimensions ‘proposals and recommendations’ and ‘arguments’, I compare how the different policy documents transform, take over, leave out or add arguments to support specific causes, which allows for an assessment of the political purpose of these (transformed) arguments.

I focus on specific solutions the documents bring to the fore, as well as the many issues that only indirectly relate to climate migration, but are connected to the issue to gain argumentative support.

2.1 Solutions

A general feature of all documents under analysis is their conceptualization of climate migration as a serious problem that needs to be addressed. This problematization is solicited with various intensity. Lambert’s report (2002) and Biermann’s speech present climate migration more dramatically than Lambert’s speech at the Doctors of the World annual

conference (2010). Subsequently, Lambert and especially Biermann propose further reaching solutions to the problem.

All documents remain in line with a certain form of maximalist reasoning by conceptualizing climate migration as a problem. This implies that the mere linking of climate migration to specific issues, such as rising emissions or a certain economic system, can be used to denounce these issues. Furthermore, maximalist quantifications combined with the prediction that this type of displacement will increase as climate change worsens, serve as arguments for strong solutions to the problem. Climate migration can thus create powerful arguments for or against certain issues at stake.

The way climate migration is conceptualized determines the type of solutions a document proposes. The more a document incorporates minimalist nuance, the less concrete the solutions it proposes.

2.1.1 Mitigation

While not often mentioned by climate migration scholars, the most obvious political issue that can be supported by the maximalist climate migration argument is mitigation of climate change. However, not all documents explicitly advocate emission reductions. Biermann, Lambert (2010) and the Greens/EFA position paper do not mention mitigation as a potential solution to climate migration. Biermann only focusses on his legal proposal. The position paper indicates that mitigation efforts will not be enough to counter climate migration and therefore concentrates on measures that can assist climate migrants. Lambert's speech (2010), which is most influenced by minimalism, even argues against the use of the climate migration argument to advocate mitigation. According to her, an emphasis on the advent and scope of climate migration might be easily used as a political argument against immigration (see below). Lambert's report (2002) is the only document that advocates mitigation, although rather implicit. By describing the devastating effects of anthropogenic climate change and by linking these effects to the displacement of millions of people, Lambert uses natural scientific predictions as an argument for emission reductions. She urges governments to act, which, among other measures, includes mitigation. In particular, she calls upon the US to sign the Kyoto Protocol and advocates the development of comprehensive emission trading systems.

Lambert mainly urges industrialized countries to reduce their emissions as she argues that these countries are responsible for creating the climate problem. Linking this to the displacement of millions of people results in a powerful argument for mitigation as well as for preventive measures and assistance for those who are still forced to move (see below). Developed country responsibility is an important argumentation in policy circles but is less voiced in academic publications on climate migration. The attribution of responsibility can be based on certain methodologies but the underlying assumptions remain political²³. As such, I perceive it here as a political claim that is added to the debate instead of taken over from the academic climate migration debate.

2.1.2 Adaptation: planned relocation

Adaptation measures are more intensely emphasized as potential solutions in the policy documents on climate migration. These include disaster risk reduction and development aid to improve living conditions and climate resilience. All documents apart from Lambert (2010) use the political argument of developed country responsibility to claim that developed countries have an obligation to support these measures financially.

The most far reaching solution within this realm is the relocation of entire communities. Planned relocation is a solution that has been introduced by several maximalist scholars. It has been taken over by all documents except by Lambert (2010). The documents that advocate planned relocation have incorporated minimalist concerns about the self-determination of the communities involved, but only to a very limited extent. The position paper posits that migration should be planned and voluntary, which indicates an apprehension of the importance of self-determination. Biermann stresses that the concrete protection and relocation of climate refugees should be organized on the national level, supported by the international community. However, self-determination as emphasized by minimalists entails much more than what these documents envision. The agency of the affected communities is not recognized by intrusive proposals, such as the scheme presented by Biermann. His conceptualization of climate refugees as helpless victims exactly echoes the narrative Farbotko

²³ Developed country responsibility is a theme in literature on the ethics of climate change (see Shue, 1993; Baer 2002; Gardiner, 2004, 2006; Hayward, 2007; Posner and Sunstein, 2008, 2009)

and Larzus (2012) oppose. These minimalists would argue that his proposal has the potential to perpetuate unequal power relations.

Other minimalist arguments on potential negative effects of the climate refugee concept, as well as the related solutions envisioned by policy makers, have not been taken into account. The argument underlined by McNamarra and Gibson (2009) on the way the climate refugee concept and solutions such as planned relocation can diminish geopolitical leverage of low-lying island states, is not mentioned by any of the policy documents. Neither was Castles' concern about the risk of averting attention from development issues by conceptualizing environmental factors as the major cause of migration.

2.1.3 Legal solutions

Before assessing the legal solutions to climate migration it is important to mention the conceptual differences surrounding the relation between poverty and climate migration. According to maximalists, poverty is intensified by climate change which prompts poor people to migration. Minimalists claim that the poorest often do not have the means to migrate. This conceptual difference matters as the maximalist version implies mass migration, while the minimalist version does not. The first needs a legal solution for the many climate refugees it envisions, while the second stresses the need of adaptation measures to improve the living conditions of the large group that cannot afford to move. This is a clear example of how the force of the maximalist argument to support legal solutions or other measures is diminished by the implications of minimalist nuance.

Lambert's report (2002) clearly uses the maximalist argument according to which poor people are the first and largest group of climate migrants. Biermann does not address the issue. Lambert (2010) is the only document that takes over minimalist nuance by stating that financial reasons prevent the poorest to migrate. The Greens/EFA position paper transforms the argument by stating that most climate refugees will be IDPs due to the lack of financial resources. As such, they retain the minimalist nuance that points to the importance of financial resources while still arguing that climate migration is becoming a serious problem requiring political action.

The legal part of the academic debate on climate migration has been reflected most in of the policy documents. The most prominent legal solution that is advocated by three out of four documents is legal recognition of the climate refugee category. Apart from Lambert (2010), all documents advocate several variations of legal protection, either under the international refugee regime, under the UNFCCC or by setting up a new regime addressing the needs of climate refugees. These proposals are often directly taken over from legal scholars, who are in turn inspired by the maximalist strand of the academic climate migration debate.

The Greens/EFA favour safe and legal migration possibilities for refugees in general (The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament, 2015). By advocating for an expansion of these rights to climate refugees they strengthen their position on immigration. Displacement is pictured as a wrong that should be accommodated. This argument remains valid outside of the climate migration debate.

The Greens/EFA position paper uses the climate migration issue not only as an argument for strong EU advocacy to recognise climate refugees, but also for looser migration regulations for climate refugees coming to the EU.

Minimalist nuance with regard to legal protection is not picked up by the three texts advocating legal recognition as this would weaken their main argumentation. However, Lambert's speech (2010) reflects a certain transformation of minimalist nuance that was added by scholars such as Kibreab (1997). She does not go at length to spell out Kibreab's argument on the way policy makers can use the climate refugee concept to deny asylum rights, by depicting environmental refugees as economic refugees. Rather, she presents a simplified version of the argument by warning against the potential of the climate refugee discourse to spark anti-immigration sentiments. She hereby addresses her political allies as well:

But let us also take care that we in the environment and development movements don't also support this approach [creating fear of immigration] by talking up numbers and predictions of mass-movements across borders and continents. It is sometimes done with the best of intentions in order to wake-up decision-makers to the need to take action on climate-change: unfortunately, it can also wake-up the very forces we would want to stay asleep! (p. 6)

Lambert uses the minimalist nuance that points to the dangers of the climate refugee discourse to argue against restrictive asylum policies and to criticise current migration policies. By insisting that the climate migration argument should not be used for certain political purposes she uses the argument for her own political objectives. As she attempts to temper alarmism on migration to the UK, she simultaneously advocates humane migration policies.

The developed country responsibility argument is used by all documents apart from Lambert (2010) to argue for legal solutions. Lambert (2002) phrases it as follows:

The USA and the EU each produce over 20% of the world's climate change gases, but there is no sign of either being prepared to take any of the millions of Bangladeshis who will be displaced by rising sea levels, or even to provide adequate aid. (pp. 11-12)

The political claim of developed country responsibility backs Biermann's proposal entirely. Financial assistance to climate refugees is determined in proportion to climate-relatedness as the developed world carries all responsibility for the climate problem. When displacement is caused by environmental factors other than climate change, no assistance is offered. As such, his conceptualization excludes certain people from any assistance. This exemplifies the solutions several minimalists oppose. Apart from disregarding agency, the conceptualisation of climate migration as directly caused by climate change with only insignificant interference of other societal factors leads to intrusive solutions that exclude certain groups. Furthermore, when developed countries only take responsibility for what is proven to be climate-related, certain groups are overlooked because climate-relatedness is hard to demonstrate. In addition, development issues that are not directly related to climate change might lose support from developed countries as they would not regard these issues as their responsibility any longer.

The authors of the position paper argue that many climate-unrelated cases of displacement are already covered by existing protection schemes. This echoes Kālin's (2010) and Burson's (2010) claims on the possibilities of the current refugee regime to protect climate migrants. However, the MEPs transform their argument. They state that environmental displacement which is not climate-related is already covered by existing protection schemes. This demonstrates that the MEP's conceptualize climate migration as a new phenomenon that requires specific solutions.

2.2 Indirectly related issues

Many of the documents highlight and advocate more issues than the protection of climate refugees. In this section the political use of the climate migration debate is best exemplified. As outlined above, by conceptualizing climate migration as a problem, the mere linking of climate migration to specific problems can be used to denounce these issues. This strategy is also adopted in relation to problems that are not directly linked to climate migration or refugee rights.

The report by Lambert (2002) links climate migration to certain effects of economic globalization, as well as the dominance of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and thereby denounces both. The arguments on the devastating effects of both economic globalization and governmental policies are added to the debate. I did not come across similar arguments in the academic debate. While an ample body of literature investigates the impact of economic globalization and to a lesser extent its connections with climate change (see O'Brien & Leichenko, 2000), the link between economic globalization and environmental migration has not been studied. Apart from considering climate migration as a serious problem in itself, the report conceptualizes certain causes, such as economic globalization and certain governmental policies, as even larger problems. As such, environmental migration as a growing problem is used as an opportunity to denounce the current global economic structure.

Furthermore, the problem of environmental migration is used to raise attention and provide additional arguments for a long list of issues that are only indirectly related to climate migration. Firstly, these include specific measures to reduce emissions or protect the environment such as comprehensive emission trading systems, supporting fair trade as this can contribute to sustainable development and pressurizing the US to sign the Kyoto protocol. Secondly, human rights and other social and progressive issues are addressed: the right of the Ogoni people in Nigeria to be compensated by Shell for the environmental damage it caused, the responsibility of states to spend 0,7% of their GDP on Official Development Assistance (ODA), the plight of Indian communities affected by the construction of the Narmada Dam Project and the need to include social and environmental concerns in structural adjustment policies enforced by international financial institutions. Lastly, economic globalisation has to

be governed by a different paradigm, for instance by creating a World Environmental Organisation (WEO) to counter the dominance of the WTO. Lambert thus broadens the scope of advocacy to many different topics for which the climate migration argument is useful.

Biermann barely addresses issues that are not directly related to climate migration. The only issue he raises is the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) which he champions as a basis for funding the implementation of his proposal.

Following from her reflection on the negative consequences of restrictive migration policies which could be sparked by climate refugee discourses, Lambert (2010) emphasizes the benefits of EU membership for UK citizens, especially the free movement within the EU. She thus uses the climate refugee cause to denounce restrictive border policies and to advocate EU membership.

The Greens/EFA position paper mainly raises financial issues that are indirectly related to climate migration. The authors emphasize the EU's obligation to fulfil its financial promises to the Green Climate Fund and the commitment developed countries made to spend 0,7% of their GDP to ODA. Furthermore, they argue that additional development funds should be made available to support communities that receive considerable amounts of migrants, and to support the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

On a side note, the MEPs also denounce the EU's Common Fisheries Policy which leads to over-fishing and subsequent malnutrition of coastal communities. In combination with climate change this can lead to migration.

2.3 Research use

Generally, policy documents related to the Greens/EFA in the European Parliament are most influenced by maximalism, despite a clear evolution towards more minimalist nuance. Minimalist nuance is mostly reflected in Lambert's speech for the Doctors of the World annual conference.

It can be argued that policy documents that are inspired by a Green political ideology are inevitably drawn to maximalist reasoning. If research is selected on the basis of values governing political ideology, as posited by Gibson, Albaek and other research utilization

scholars, alarmist argumentations that foresee millions of climate refugees might fit best with a Green, left political ideology that is concerned about the consequences of climate change. Furthermore, maximalist arguments are simpler than minimalist reasoning and support intuitive assumptions on the link between climate change and migration.

Accusations by Black (2001) and Kibreab (1997) on the political use of the climate refugee concept are based on the presumption that sustainable development and mitigation can be supported by a maximalist discourse on climate migration. However, mitigation is only explicitly advocated in one of the four documents. Other documents do mention the devastating effects of climate change, which could be broadly interpreted as a call for emission reductions. Still, these documents do not explicitly call for mitigation but rather focus on potential solutions for those climate refugees that they foresee as inevitable, given the scope of irreversible climate change already set in motion. As such, the adaptation perspective clearly overrides calls for mitigation. Along with an ever stronger emphasis of climate-related migration at the detriment of the broader category of environmental migration, the policy documents evolve towards an adaptation perspective that allows for certain minimalist influences. As such, ‘evolved maximalism’ gains prominence. A more complex narrative is possible but the eventual conclusions remain essentially maximalist as they demand solutions for a complex problem.

2.2.1 Concrete conceptualization for policy solutions

The inevitability of maximalism can thus not be explained by an intrinsic link to mitigation. The theories on research use highlight another feature of the dynamic between science and policy making, which is unrelated to political ideology. This feature might clarify the predominance of maximalism.

Policy makers are looking for concrete information that can inform potential solutions to a well-defined problem. Firstly, in order to solve a problem, the issue at stake needs to be recognized as a problem. This corresponds with the maximalist assumption that climate migration is a reality that needs a solution. Secondly, the problem should be defined and studied as to develop the right solutions. The maximalist conceptualization of climate migrants and refugees as meaningful categories which can be studied leads to attempts to define and

quantify climate migration. Minimalist emphasis on the complexity of migration decisions and their occasional questioning of the climate refugee concept is at odds with the epistemological need of a clear and concrete conceptualization of the issue. As such, Lambert's speech (2010), which is most influenced by minimalism, proposes the least concrete solutions²⁴.

This epistemological need is in accordance with a maximalist vision on the role of scientists in policy making, while rather opposed to the view of certain minimalists. Maximalists warn the policy community about a new and growing problem, while minimalists insist on the complexity of the relation between environmental change and migration.

For instance, in order to make policy makers aware of the need for action, Norman Myers presents his findings as straightforward forecasts of the amount of climate refugees by 2050. In line with the Two-Communities theory, he assumes that policy makers need a clear scientific message containing concrete numbers. As such, the urgency of the problem legitimates these rough estimates in spite of considerable scientific uncertainty. Convinced of the importance of advocacy by scientists Myers states that, in the face of "issues with policy implications of exceptional scope ..., it will be better for us [scientists] to be roughly right than precisely wrong" (Myers and Kent, 1995, p. 33).

Several minimalists reject these forecasts as guesswork fitted into reports or scholarly articles that "attempt to be policy relevant at all costs" (Faist & Schade, 2013b, p. 17). Scientific rigor and refraining from simplistic conclusions based on scarce evidence should prevail on reaching policy makers. Due to this concern about scientific accuracy, minimalist scholars fit more into the image of neutral, disinterested scientists drawn by the Two-Communities theory. However, minimalists do not scare away from the policy process. They are bothered about the way the relation between environmental factors and migration is conceptualized, and thus how the maximalist discourse could frame possible solutions to climate migration. Its simplicity could lead to a one-size-fits-all solution (Jakobeit & Methmann, 2012). Maximalist quantifications could give politicians a reason to weaken asylum obligations (Kibreab, 1997). A risk exists that environmental factors overshadow pressing problems as inequality, development and peace-building (Castles, 2004). Furthermore, a focus on environmental factors can conceal power relations generating conflict and displacement. To solely blame the environment obscures the

²⁴ Lambert (2010) does not go further than stating that policies should be adapted to the challenge of climate migration.

potential for political measures enhancing a community's coping capacities in the face of environmental change (Hartmann, 2010). When concepts as climate refugee gain the attention of the international policy community, global, top-down solutions such as planned relocation could undermine the self-determination of those affected by climate change (Farbotko & Larzus, 2012). Such solutions could also weaken the geopolitical leverage of arguments for mitigation and thus prevention of climate migration (McNamarra & Gibson, 2009). However, these concerns have not been picked up by the Greens/EFA, which indicates the limits of the minimalist nuance on the policy debate.

Conclusion

Climate migration research is being used in the policy debate on climate migration. This general observation on the interface between the academic and policy debates on climate migration disproves one of the main complaints of the Two-Communities theory. However, some research strands are quoted more intensely than others.

As pointed out by several critiques on the Two-Communities theory, the scientific community is rarely a homogeneous group of scholars, equally committed to scientific rigor. Within the academic climate migration debate I discerned two competing perspectives. These diverge on content but also on epistemological issues such as the strictness of the scientific method and the role of scientists within the policy realm. Maximalist scholars regard scientific accuracy as subordinate to policy relevance, while minimalists remain within what Jakobeit and Methmann (2012, p. 302) termed the limits of social science. The latter prefer incomplete conclusions that respect complexity over narratives that can guide political action on unstable methodological grounds.

As minimalist scholars influenced their maximalist colleagues, the difference between both positions should be traced back to their conclusions. Maximalists assert that climate change leads to migration by influencing socio-economic factors. Worsening climatic change thus sparks greater migration flows. Minimalists stress that more often a mix of determinants, among which socio-economic factors, determine the magnitude of climate change impacts as well as migration decisions. Due to this complex mix of factors, combined with the need of financial resources to migrate, climate migration cannot be conceptualized as a meaningful category. The difference between minimalism and maximalism thus comes down to either recognizing the categories 'climate migrant' and 'climate refugee', or not.

Both perspectives on climate migration influenced the policy debate through their impact on policy makers related to the Greens/EFA in the European Parliament. By means of a set of sensitizing questions that were derived from a coding process of the literature overview on climate migration, I assessed the representation of the academic climate migration debate in policy documents by the Greens/EFA. On the basis of this assessment, I developed a detailed overview of the way climate migration is conceptualized in the policy documents, the way the documents incorporated complexity, the specific issues that were advocated and the arguments supporting this advocacy.

The maximalist research strand proved more dominant. However, throughout the decade between the earliest and latest document, minimalist nuance gained influence. This is strikingly exemplified by the conceptual evolution of documents written by one author. Jean Lambert, who wrote the earliest and co-authored the latest document, is at first mainly influenced by early maximalism and later by evolved maximalism. Especially Lambert's 2010 speech exhibits many minimalist insights. However, none of the documents can be classified as truly minimalist. All documents eventually draw the maximalist conclusion that climate migration is a serious problem demanding political action. Despite difficulties with regard to defining and quantifying climate migration, all documents consider climate migrants or refugees as meaningful categories that can be studied.

Minimalist influence differs in all policy documents. Lamberts' report (2002) is characterized by early maximalism and only displays minimalist nuance to a very limited extent. Biermann is most influenced by maximalism as his short speech does not consider complexity. Lambert (2010) and the position paper are greatly influenced by minimalism. As such, they exhibit a mix between maximalism and minimalism which I call evolved maximalism.

The overview of the representation of the academic debate in policy documents provided for an interpretation of the transformation of arguments, of direct research transfers, of additional arguments and arguments that are left out, which indicate the political use of academic arguments. I discussed the political use of academic arguments by the Greens/EFA by looking at the specific solutions they proposed as well as the way the documents advocate issues that are only indirectly related to climate migration.

With regard to the solutions, mainly maximalist arguments were used. The analysis demonstrates that the way climate migration is conceptualized determines the type of solutions

a document proposes. Generally, the more a document is influenced by minimalism, the less likely it is to propose concrete and intrusive solutions to climate migration. As such, the way climate migration is conceptualized matters. Those documents that conceptualize climate migration as a new and exceptional problem tend to use the maximalist discourse to argue for solutions that disregard the agency of the communities involved. An example includes planned relocation, organized by international organisations or state bodies. Lambert (2010), the document that is most influenced by minimalism, does not propose concrete solutions to climate migration. Furthermore, the conceptualization of climate migration determines the concrete reach of policy solutions. For instance, Biermann's proposal provides assistance to communities that have been confronted with climate change while excluding groups that are coping with different environmental or development issues.

The predominance of maximalist arguments in the policy documents by the Greens/EFA was expected by research utilization perspectives that assume policy makers to select research findings according to their political vision. As envisaged by several minimalist scholars, maximalist images of mass migration due to climate change provide strong arguments for mitigation. However, only Lambert's report (2002) uses the climate migration argument to advocate mitigation. Eight years later, Lambert (2010) even argues against this potential argumentative link. The documents more intensely advocate adaptation measures, as well as legal recognition for climate refugees.

An additional flaw to the assumption of research selectivity is the significant minimalist nuance that is taken into account by some of the documents. As emphasized by the Advocacy Coalition Framework, policy makers cannot only rely on arguments that support their political vision. They have to incorporate scientific developments in order to retain credibility. When Lambert (2010) warns for anti-migration sentiments sparked by maximalist forecasts of mass migration, an interpretation of the minimalist perspective is even explicitly used to argue against a certain interpretation of the maximalist discourse.

Still, minimalist influence is limited. Specific concerns on potential political consequences of climate migration narratives are generally left out of the Greens/EFA documents. Concerns about the self-determination of affected communities, the plight of people affected by climate unrelated environmental change, the consequences of the climate refugee concept for refugee rights in general as well as for the geopolitical leverage of small island states, the risk of

declining attention for development issues and the risk of obscuring political reasons of environmental degradation are not mentioned by the Greens/EFA. By stressing the multicausality of migration and the importance of socio-economic conditions independently of climate change, minimalist arguments support local adaptation measures and the improvement of living conditions to accommodate the large group of people that cannot afford to move. Rather than recognizing an inconsistent category of refugees or implementing far-reaching measures such as planned relocation, improving socio-economic conditions should be the core of development policies. This approach is more in line with reality as climate change is only one factor causing migration.

This reasoning is not taken over by the Greens/EFA. As research selectivity can only partly explain maximalist preponderance, I turn to a loose interpretation of the Two-Communities theory. The theory states that politicians prefer concise and simple conclusions in order to solve concrete problems. This characterization of research use is too simple as well, since the Greens/EFA documents incorporate minimalist nuance that adds to complexity. However, the specific minimalist concerns on the political consequences of climate refugee narratives might complicate the story on climate migration too much to be reflected in policy documents. Furthermore, many of these concerns question the solutions proposed by the Greens/EFA.

The Two-Communities theory points to the need for action-oriented knowledge to inform the policy process. The theory regards this epistemological need as complicating scientific influence since scientific knowledge production is not presumed to be action-oriented. However, the dynamic between the academic climate migration debate and the policy debate reveals a different pattern. Maximalist scholars tend to produce reports that define and quantify concepts which minimalists regard as undefinable and unquantifiable. Following the assumption of the Two-Communities theory on the need for action-oriented knowledge, I argue that the maximalist conceptualization of climate migration has a greater potential to influence the policy debate. Policy makers attempt to provide solutions to well-defined problems. As such, minimalist nuance can only be integrated to a limited extent. Some Greens/EFA documents mention the difficulty of defining and quantifying climate migration but do not adjust their conclusion on the existence and importance of the issue to this nuance.

While the minimalist concern on the use of the climate migration narrative for mitigation purposes is not entirely valid, climate migration has been used politically. Most often it has

been used for other purposes than advancing the refugee cause. Conceptualizing climate migration as a problem not only justifies concrete solutions. Linking climate migration to issues that are unrelated to climate migration also provides for a powerful argument in favour or opposed to these issues. Lambert's report (2002) uses the climate migration argument for a wide variety of issues, ranging from environmental protection measures, over human rights, social and progressive issues to the denunciation of the current economic paradigm and the accompanying globalisation. In her speech, Lambert (2010) skilfully links climate migration to detrimental asylum policies which even leads her to applaud the EU membership. By insisting on the responsibility of developed countries for creating climate change, the Greens/EFA position paper advocates development aid for host communities, compliance with the 0.7% ODA target and funds for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. This clearly exemplifies how the climate migration argument is used for specific political purposes.

Along with research use, several academic arguments have been transformed. However, many arguments have been directly taken over. Gibson's theory on research transformation thus proved useful as a methodological tool but could not be entirely validated. Research transformation did not seem to be inevitable in order to gain significance in the policy realm. The debate as a whole has been transformed by the Greens/EFA documents since certain arguments were left out, added and in some instances transformed.

As I did not confront the position of the Greens/EFA with other political visions on migration, it is not possible to draw general conclusions on the use of climate migration research in policy making. An analysis of different sources, such as parliamentary speeches or a focus on different types of actors, such as the anti-migration blog Refugee Resettlement Watch²⁵ might illuminate more on research use, selectivity and transformation. Assessing how minimalist arguments can be used to argue against climate migration discourses by an anti-migration rhetoric, might provide for interesting insights.

At a time that is characterized by the omnipresence of discourses on climate change, it is important to assess what (academic) arguments underpin which political stance. Specific conceptualizations of a pressing issue such as climate migration support certain solutions.

²⁵ refugeeresettlementwatch.wordpress.com

Analyses of these underlying conceptualizations can guide the evaluation of concrete solutions and thus provide arguments to support or oppose them.

Bibliography

- Albaek, E. (1995). Between Knowledge and Power: Utilization of Social Science in Public Policy Making. *Policy Sciences*, 28(1), 79–100.
- Baer, P. (2002). Equity, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Global Common Resources. In S. H. Schneider, A. Rosencranz, & J. O. Niles (Eds.), *Climate Change Policy: A Survey* (pp. 393–408). Washington, DC: Island Press.
- Bailey, T. (2010). *The Research-Policy Nexus: Mapping the Terrain of the Literature* (Paper prepared for the Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa (HERANA)). Wynberg, UK: Centre for Higher Education Transformation (CHET).
- Barnes, H. (2013, September 3). How Many Climate Migrants Will There Be? Retrieved April 27, 2015, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-23899195>
- Barnett, J., & Adger, W. N. (2007). Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict. *Political Geography*, 26(6), 639–655.
- Barnett, J., & Webber, M. (2010). *Migration as Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits*. Hart Publishing. Retrieved from <http://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/30253>

- Bates, D. C. (2002). Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change. *Population and Environment*, 23(5), 465–477.
- Biermann, F. (2008). Nous Sommes à l'Origine du Problème, nous Devons le Résoudre. Presented at the How to Protect the People who are Affected by Climate Change?, European Parliament, Brussels: glogov.org. Retrieved from http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/Speech_Frank_BIERMANN_European%20Parliament.pdf
- Biermann, F., & Boas, I. (2012). Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees. In J. Scheffran, H. G. Brauch, J. Schilling, M. Brzoska, & P. M. Link (Eds.), *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict* (pp. 291–300). Springer.
- Black, R. (2001). *Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?* (Working Paper No. 34). Geneva: UNHCR. Retrieved from <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/18197/>
- Black, R., Kniveton, D., Skeldon, R., Coppard, D., Murata, A., & Schmidt-Verkerk, K. (2008). *Demographics and Climate Change: Future Trends and their Policy Implications for Migration* (Working Paper No. T-27). Brighton:UK: Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty. Retrieved from <http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/MigrationGlobPov/WP-T27.pdf>
- Boas, I. (n.d.). Policy Forum on Climate Refugees. Retrieved from <http://www.glogov.org/?pageid=80>
- Bronen, R. (2011). Climate-induced Community Relocations: Creating an Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine. *New York University Review of Law and Social Change*, 35, 357.

- Brown, L. R., McGrath, P. L., & Stokes, B. (1976). Twenty-Two Dimensions of the Population Problem. Worldwatch Paper 5, Washington: Worldwatch Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.popline.org/node/446333>
- Brown, O. (2008). The Numbers Game. *Forced Migration Review*, 31(8), 8–9.
- Burson, B. (2010). Environmentally Induced Displacement and the 1951 Refugee Convention: Pathways to Recognition. In *Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability* (pp. 3–16). Springer. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-12416-7_1
- Butzengeiger, S., & Horstmann, B. (2004). Sea Level Rise in Bangladesh and the Netherlands: One Phenomenon, Many Consequences. Bonn: Germanwatch.
- Callison, C. (2014). *How Climate Change Comes to Matter: The Communal Life of Facts*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Cancun Agreements. (2010). The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. Decision 1/CP.16. Retrieved from http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf
- Caplan, N. (1979). The Two-Communities Theory and Knowledge Utilization. *The American Behavioral Scientist (pre-1986)*, 22(3), 459.
- Castles, S. (2004). Confronting the Realities of Forced Migration. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. Retrieved from <http://www.geocities.ws/iaclaca/ForcedMigration.doc>
- Christian Aid. (2007). *Human Tide: the Real Migration Crisis*. London: Christian Aid. Retrieved from <http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/human-tide.pdf>

- Conisbee, M., & Simms, A. (2003). *Environmental Refugees: The Case for Recognition*. London: New Economics Foundation. Retrieved from <http://www.opengrey.eu/item/display/10068/403157>
- Cooper, J. B. (1997). Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition. *New York University Environmental Law Journal*, 6, 480.
- Dombos, T., Krizsan, A., Verloo, M., & Zentai, V. (2012). *Critical Frame Analysis: A Comparative Methodology for the "Quality in Gender Equality Policies" (QUING) Project* (CPS Working Papers). Center for Policy Studies.
- EFA in the European Parliament. (n.d.). Presentation. Retrieved from <http://efa.greens-efa.eu/267-presentation.html>
- Ehrlich, P. (1968). *The Population Bomb*. New York: Ballantine.
- El-Hinnawi, E. (1985). *Environmental Refugees*. Nairobi: UNEP. Retrieved from <http://bases.bireme.br/cgi-bin/wxislind.exe/iah/online/?IsisScript=iah/iah.xis&src=google&base=REPIDISCA&lang=p&nextAction=lnk&exprSearch=123075&indexSearch=ID>
- Estabrooks, C. A. (1999). The Conceptual Structure of Research Utilization. *Research in Nursing & Health*, 22(3), 203–216.
- European Green Party (EGP). (n.d.). Learn about the EGP. Retrieved September 6, 2015, from <http://europeangreens.eu/learn-about-egp?q=learn-about-egp>
- European Parliament. (2011). European Parliament Resolution of 5 July 2011 on Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy, 2011/2047(INI), Provisional edition, P7_TA(2011)0320. Retrieved from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=->

%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT%2BTA%2BP7-TA-2011-

0320%2B0%2BDOC%2BXML%2BV0%2F%2FEN&language=EN

European Parliament. Towards a New International Climate Agreement in Paris (2015).

Retrieved from

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20151014&](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20151014&secondRef=ITEM-014&language=EN&ring=A8-2015-0275)

[secondRef=ITEM-014&language=EN&ring=A8-2015-0275](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20151014&secondRef=ITEM-014&language=EN&ring=A8-2015-0275)

Faist, T., & Schade, J. (Eds.). (2013a). *Disentangling Migration and Climate Change:*

Methodologies, Political Discourses and Human Rights. Springer Science &

Business Media. Retrieved from

[https://books.google.be/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=cIRsVXNfDtkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA192](https://books.google.be/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=cIRsVXNfDtkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1924&dq=faist+schade+1+The+Climate%E2%80%93Migration+Nexus:+A+Reorientat)

[4&dq=faist+schade+1+The+Climate%E2%80%93Migration+Nexus:+A+Reorientat](https://books.google.be/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=cIRsVXNfDtkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1924&dq=faist+schade+1+The+Climate%E2%80%93Migration+Nexus:+A+Reorientat)

[ion&ots=3lidD9RcGg&sig=dax6gO5isymJsypSTL-LJNnZEDo](https://books.google.be/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=cIRsVXNfDtkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1924&dq=faist+schade+1+The+Climate%E2%80%93Migration+Nexus:+A+Reorientat)

Faist, T., & Schade, J. (2013b). The Climate–Migration Nexus: A Reorientation. In

Disentangling Migration and Climate Change (pp. 3–25). Springer. Retrieved from

http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-6208-4_1

Falstrom, D. Z. (2001). Stemming the Flow of Environmental Displacement: Creating a

Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the Environment. *Colorado Journal of*

International Environmental Law and Policy, 2001, 1–215.

Farbotko, C., & Lazrus, H. (2012). The First Climate Refugees? Contesting Global

Narratives of Climate Change in Tuvalu. *Global Environmental Change*, 22(2),

382–390.

Findley, S. E. (1994). Does drought increase migration? A study of migration from rural

Mali during the 1983-1985 drought. *International Migration Review*, 539–553.

- Flautre, H., Lambert, J., Keller, S., & Lochbihler, B. (2013). Climate Change, Refugees and Migration. The Greens/ EFA in the European Parliament.
- Florémont, F. (2012). Migratory Issues in Climate Adaptation Policies: A New Conceptualisation of Population Displacements? In *Forum for Development Studies* (Vol. 39, pp. 31–49). Retrieved from <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08039410.2011.635382>
- Friends of the Earth. (2007). A Citizen's Guide to Environmental Refugees. Friends of the Earth.
- Gardiner, S. M. (2004). Ethics and Global Climate Change. *Ethics*, 114(3), 555–600.
- Gardiner, S. M. (2006). A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption. *Environmental Values*, 15(3), 397–413.
- Gasper, D. (2013). Elements and Value-added of a Human Security Approach in the Study of Climate Change. *Handbook on Climate Change and Human Security*, 41–66.
- GEF. (1996). *Incremental Costs* (No. C.7/Inf.5.). Global Environment Facility. Retrieved from https://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/C.7.Inf_.5-Incremental-Costs.pdf
- Gemenne, F. (2011). How They Became the Human Face of Climate Change. Research and Policy Interactions in the Birth of the “Environmental Migration” Concept. In E. P. Piguet, A. Pécoud, & P. de Guchteneire (Eds.), *Migration and Climate Change*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from <http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/141894>
- Gibbs, G. R. (2008). *Analysing Qualitative Data*. SAGE.

- Gibson, B. J. J. (2003). *From Transfer to Transformation: Rethinking the Relationship between Research and Policy* (PhD Thesis). Australian National University, Canberra. Retrieved from <https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/47083>
- Ginsburg, M. B., & Gorostiaga, J. M. (2001). Relationships between Theorists/Researchers and Policy Makers/Practitioners: Rethinking the Two-Cultures Thesis and the Possibility of Dialogue. *Comparative Education Review*, 45(2), 173–196.
<http://doi.org/10.1086/447660>
- Goldenberg, S. (2013, August 5). Relocation of Alaska's Sinking Newtok Village Halted. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/aug/05/alaska-newtok-climate-change>
- Goldstone, J. A. (2001). Demography, Environment and Security: an Overview. In M. Wiener & S. S. Russell (Eds.), *Demography and National Security* (pp. 38–61). New York: Berghahn Books. Retrieved from [https://books.google.be/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=J9nuv7MGQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA38&dq=Goldstone,+J.+\(2001\).+Demography,+environment,+and+security.&ots=dn1Qfg2naN&sig=0L2ruT9jIpiDWB5bz9lP8M-Joag](https://books.google.be/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=J9nuv7MGQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA38&dq=Goldstone,+J.+(2001).+Demography,+environment,+and+security.&ots=dn1Qfg2naN&sig=0L2ruT9jIpiDWB5bz9lP8M-Joag)
- Govaerts, Y., & Lattanzio, A. (2008). Estimation of Surface Albedo Increase During the Eighties Sahel Drought from Meteosat Observations. *Global and Planetary Change*, 64(3–4), 139–145. <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloplacha.2008.04.004>
- GRID-Arendal. (2012, February 27). Fifty Million Climate Refugees by 2010. Retrieved April 24, 2015, from http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/fifty-million-climate-refugees-by-2010_71db#

- Hartmann, B. (2010a). Rethinking climate refugees and climate conflict: rhetoric, reality and the politics of policy discourse. *Journal of International Development*, 22(2), 233–246.
- Hartmann, B. (2010b). Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse. *Journal of International Development*, 22(2), 233–246.
- Hayward, T. (2007). Human Rights Versus Emissions Rights: Climate Justice and the Equitable Distribution of Ecological Space. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 21(4), 431–450.
- Homer-Dixon, T. F. (1991). On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict. *International Security*, 16(2), 76–116. <http://doi.org/10.2307/2539061>
- Hugo, G. (1996). Environmental Concerns and International Migration. *International Migration Review*, 105–131.
- Jacobson, J. L. (1988). Environmental Refugees: a Yardstick of Habitability. Worldwatch Paper 86, Washington: Worldwatch Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.popline.org/node/360665>
- Jakobeit, C., & Methmann, C. (2007). *Klimaflüchtlinge. Die Verleugnete Katastrophe*. Hamburg: Greenpeace. Retrieved from http://epub.sub.uni-hamburg.de/epub/volltexte/2014/33552/pdf/klimafluechtlinge_endv_0.PDF
- Jakobeit, C., & Methmann, C. (2012). “Climate Refugees” as Dawning Catastrophe? A Critique of the Dominant Quest for Numbers. In J. Scheffran, H. G. Brauch, J. Schilling, M. Brzoska, & P. M. Link (Eds.), *Climate Change, Human Security and*

- Violent Conflict* (pp. 301–314). Springer. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-28626-1_16
- Jastram, K., & Achiron, M. (2001). Refugee Protection: a Guide to International Refugee Law. Inter-Parliamentary Union. Retrieved from <http://www.popline.org/node/240015>
- Kälin, W. (2010a). Conceptualising climate-induced displacement. *Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Retrieved from <http://www.legalanthology.ch/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Kalin-Conceptualising-Climate-Induced-Displacement1.pdf>
- Kälin, W. (2010b). Conceptualising Climate-induced Displacement. In J. McAdam (Ed.), *Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives* (pp. 81– 104). Oxford: Hart Publishing. Retrieved from <http://www.legalanthology.ch/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Kalin-Conceptualising-Climate-Induced-Displacement1.pdf>
- Keane, D. (2003). Environmental Causes and Consequences of Migration: A Search for the Meaning of Environmental Refugees, The. *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review*, 16, 209–223.
- Kibreab, G. (1997). Environmental Causes and Impact of Refugee Movements: a Critique of the Current Debate. *Disasters*, 21(1), 20–38.
- Kniveton, D., Schmidt-Verkerk, K., Smith, C., & Black, R. (2008). *Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows* (IOM Migration Research Series No. 33). Geneva: International Organization for Migration. Retrieved from <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/18162>

- Kovach, T. (2013). Stop Using the Term “Environmental Refugee.” In H. W. Wilson (Ed.), *The Ocean* (Vol. 86). Ipswich, Massachusetts: Grey House Publishing. Retrieved from <http://people.stfx.ca/rscrosat/trs14.pdf>
- Laczko, F., & Aghazarm, C. (2009). *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. Retrieved from http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/migration_and_environment.pdf
- Lambert, J. (2002). *Refugees and the Environment. The Forgotten Element of Sustainability*. London/Brussels: The Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament.
- Lambert, J. (2010). Speech: Climate Change and Migration. Presented at the Doctors of the World Annual UK Conference, London: jeanlambertmep.org.
- Lambert, J. (2014). Issue: Environmental Migration. Retrieved September 7, 2015, from <http://www.jeanlambertmep.org.uk/jeans-issues/environment/environmental-migration/>
- Lassailly-Jacob, V. (2006). Les Réfugiés Écologiques: Une Nouvelle Catégorie de Réfugiés en Débat. *Revue Européenne de Droit de l'Environnement*, (4), 374–380.
- Levy, M. A. (1995). Is the Environment a National Security Issue? *International Security*, 35–62.
- Magniny, V. (1999). *Environmental Refugees Legal Hypothesis Regarding an Ecological Threat* (PhD Thesis). University of Paris I.
- Martin, R. (2001). Geography and Public Policy: the Case of the Missing Agenda. *Progress in Human Geography*, 25(2), 189–210.

- Matera, C. E. (2014). *Climate-Induced Migration: A Cross-National Investigation of the Effects of Climate Change on International Migration*. North Carolina State University, Raleigh. Retrieved from <http://repository.lib.ncsu.edu/ir/handle/1840.16/9512>
- McCue, G. S. (1993). Environmental Refugees: Applying International Environmental Law to Involuntary Migration. *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review*, 6, 151–190.
- McNamara, K. E., & Gibson, C. (2009). “We Do Not Want to Leave Our Land”: Pacific Ambassadors at the United Nations Resist the Category of “Climate Refugees.” *Geoforum*, 40(3), 475–483.
- Meadows, D., Meadows, D., & Randers, J. (1972). *The Limits to Growth: a Global Challenge; a Report for the Club of Rome Project on the Predicament of Mankind*. New York: Universe Books.
- Michelot, A. (2006). Enjeux de la Reconnaissance du Statut de Réfugié Écologique pour la Construction d’une Nouvelle Responsabilité Internationale. *Revue Européenne de Droit de l’Environnement*, 428–445.
- Miller, C. (2001). Hybrid Management: Boundary Organizations, Science Policy, and Environmental Governance in the Climate Regime. *Science, Technology & Human Values*, 26(4), 478–500.
- Morgan, E. (2014). Science in Sustainability: A Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Science-Policy Interface in Sustainable Water Resource Management. *The International Journal of Sustainability Policy and Practice*, 9, 37–54.

- Myers, N. (2002). Environmental Refugees: a Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences*, 357(1420), 609–613.
- Myers, N. (2005). Environmental Refugees: an Emergent Security Issue (pp. 23–27). Presented at the 13th Economic Forum, Prague: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
- Myers, N., & Kent, J. (1995). *Environmental Exodus: an Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena*. Washington, DC: Climate Institute. Retrieved from <http://bases.bireme.br/cgi-bin/wxislind.exe/iah/online/?IsisScript=iah/iah.xis&src=google&base=REPIDISCA&lang=p&nextAction=lnk&exprSearch=56307&indexSearch=ID>
- Neilson, S. (2001). *Knowledge Utilization and Public Policy Processes: A Literature Review* (IDRC-SUPPORTED RESEARCH AND ITS INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC POLICY). Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.
- O'Brien, K. L., & Leichenko, R. M. (2000). Double exposure: assessing the impacts of climate change within the context of economic globalization. *Global Environmental Change*, 10(3), 221–232.
- Paris, R. (2011). Ordering the World: Academic Research and Policymaking on Fragile States. *International Studies Review*, 13(1), 58–71.
- Pedersen, J. (1995). Drought, Migration and Population Growth in the Sahel: The Case of the Malian Gourma: 1900–1991. *Population Studies*, 49(1), 111–126.

- Pielke, R. A., Jr., & Conant, R. T. (2003). Best Practices in Prediction for Decision-Making: Lessons from the Atmospheric and Earth Sciences. *Ecology*, 84(6), 1351–1358.
- Posner, E. A., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Climate Change Justice. *The Georgetown Law Journal*, 96, 1565–1612.
- Posner, E. A., & Sunstein, C. R. (2009). Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Capita Basis? *California Law Review*, 97, 51–93.
- Prieur, M., Marguenaud, J.-P., Monédiaire, G., Bétaille, J., Drobenko, B., Gougnet, J.-J., ... Roets, D. (2008). Projet de Convention relative au Statut International des Déplacés Environnementaux. *Revue Européenne de Droit de l'Environnement*, 2008(4), 381–393.
- Reuveny, R. (2007). Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict. *Political Geography*, 26(6), 656–673.
- Rossignol, C. (2008, May 29). How to Protect the People Who Are Affected by Climate Change. Retrieved from <http://lesverts-lavie.over-blog.com/article-19992552.html>
- Rudiak-Gould, P. (2013). *Climate Change and Tradition in a Small Island State: The Rising Tide*. New York: Routledge.
- Sarewitz, D. (2006). Liberating Science from Politics. *American Scientist*, 94(2), 104–6.
- Sgro, A. (2008). Towards Recognition of Environmental Refugees by the European Union. *Revue Asylon(s)*, (6). Retrieved from <http://www.reseau-terra.eu/article844.htm>
- Shue, H. (1993). Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions. *Law & Policy*, 15(1), 39–60.

- Socialists & Democrats. (2011, March 2). Climate Refugees: a New Arena for Human Rights. Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats in the European Parliament. Retrieved from http://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/sites/default/files/3636_EN_programme_Climate_Refugees_110302_0.pdf
- Stern, N. H. (2007). *The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Stone, D. (2002). Using Knowledge: the Dilemmas of “Bridging Research and Policy.” *Compare- A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, 32(3), 285–296.
- Streefland, P. H. (2001). *Partnerships at the Leading Edge: A Danish Vision for Knowledge, Research and Development*. Copenhagen, Denmark: Commission on Development-Related Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Danida. Retrieved from <http://www.narcis.nl/publication/RecordID/oai:uva.nl:202771>
- Suhrke, A. (1993). *Pressure Points: Environmental Degradation, Migration and Conflict*. Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Retrieved from http://www.cmi.no/publications/1993/pressure_points.pdf
- The Associated Press. (2015, October 3). Alaska Seeks Federal Money to Move a Village Threatened by Climate Change. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/us/alaska-seeks-federal-money-to-move-a-village-threatened-by-climate-change.html>
- The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament. (2015, September 21). The Refugee Crisis and the EU - A Green Response [The Greens/European Free Alliance in the

- European Parliament]. Retrieved December 31, 2015, from <http://www.greens-efa.eu/the-refugee-crisis-and-the-eu-a-green-response-14514.html>
- The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament. (n.d.). Who We Are. Retrieved from <http://www.greens-efa.eu/staff/press-webcommunications-and-multimedia/about-us/48-who-we-are.html>
- UNHCR. (2008). Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Human Displacement: a UNHCR Perspective. United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees.
- UNHCR. (2010). *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html>
- UNHCR. (2015). Refugee Status Determination. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1d06.html>
- Verloo, M., & Lombardo, E. (2007). Contested Gender Equality and Policy Variety in Europe: Introducing a Critical frame analysis approach. In *Multiple Meanings of Gender Equality. A Critical Frame Analysis of Gender Policies in Europe* (pp. 21–49). Retrieved from http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Emanuela_Lombardo/publication/241877439_Contested_gender_equality_and_policy_variety_in_Europe_Introducing_a_critical_frame_analysis_approach/links/542acd9b0cf27e39fa91652c.pdf
- Vlassopoulos, C. A. (2013). Defining Environmental Migration in the Climate Change Era: Problem, Consequence or Solution? In *Disentangling Migration and Climate Change* (pp. 145–163). Springer. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-6208-4_6

- Warner, K. (2011). Environmental Change and Migration: Methodological Considerations from Ground-Breaking Global Survey. *Population and Environment*, 33(1), 3–27.
- Warner, K. (2012). Human Migration and Displacement in the Context of Adaptation to Climate Change: the Cancun Adaptation Framework and Potential for Future Action. *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 30(6), 1061 – 1077. <http://doi.org/10.1068/c1209j>
- Weingart, P., Engels, A., & Pansegrau, P. (2000). Risks of Communication: Discourses on Climate Change in Science, Politics, and the Mass Media. *Public Understanding of Science*, 9(3), 261–283.
- Weiss, C. H. (1977). Research for Policy's Sake: The Enlightenment Function of Social Research. *Policy Analysis*, 531–545.
- Wilbanks, T. J., Romero Lankao, P., Bao, M., Berkhout, F., Cairncross, S., Ceron, J.-P., ... Zapata-Marti, R. (2007). Industry, Settlement and Society. In M. L. Parry, O. . Canziani, J. . Palutikof, P. . van der Linden, & C. . Hanson (Eds.), *Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007* (pp. 357–390). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, A. (2008). Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law. *Law & Policy*, 30(4), 502–529.
- Wingens, M. (1990). Toward a General Utilization Theory A Systems Theory Reformulation of the Two-Communities Metaphor. *Science Communication*, 12(1), 27–42. <http://doi.org/10.1177/107554709001200103>
- Young, K., Ashby, D., Boaz, A., & Grayson, L. (2002). Social science and the evidence-based policy movement. *Social Policy and Society*, 1(03), 215–224.

Annex

Refugees and the Environment: The Forgotten Element of Sustainability (Lambert, 2002)

CONCEPTUALIZATION

Definition

- **Which terms are used?**
 - 'Environmental migrant'
 - 'Environmental refugee'
 - 'Environmental migration'
 - 'Environmental displacement'
- **Is a definition deemed possible?**

Yes. A definition is difficult due to complex causal links between variables influencing migration. However, environmental migration exists so a definition is needed in order to act on environmental displacement and to grant protection and rights to the displaced.
- **If so, how is climate migration defined?**
 - Environmental refugee: a person displaced by a natural disaster or by slow-onset degradation that makes sustaining life impossible.
 - Environmental migration: caused by a disaster, slow-onset environmental change, conflict causing or resulting from environmental degradation, industrial accidents or development projects.
 - Environmental migrant: all those for whom an

Agency

- **Is migration seen as an expression of agency?**

No.
- **Or as a predetermined reaction to environmental change?**
 - Environmental migration is generally seen as a forced response to push factors that mainly affect vulnerable, poor communities.
 - The document makes no mention of migration as a personal decision.

Security

- **What is the relation between climate change, migration and conflict?**
 - Environmental degradation can lead to violence and thus be a threat to security.
 - War is both a cause and a result of environmental degradation.
- **What is the relation between climate change, migration and human security?**
 - No mentioning of term 'human security'.
 - Mentioning of aspects of human security: e.g.: "We could see outmigration as a result of a decreased quality of life in these areas [European sites that will be affected by rising sea-level]" (p. 2).

	environmental factor, whether direct or indirect, is a motive for migration. ➤ Is the climatic aspect emphasised over other environmental factors? No. The general focus lies on environmental migration with a special mentioning of climate change as an important cause among other causes.		
	(Un)quantifiability ➤ Does the document quantify the amount of current climate migrants? Yes. The document quotes the quantification by the Red Cross: more than 25 million environmental refugees in 1998. ➤ Does the document predict the amount of climate migrants? Yes. The document quotes predictions by Myers: “[s]ome estimates predict that by 2050, the number of environmental refugees will have increased to 150 million” (p. 1).	Scientific uncertainty ➤ Does the document recognize the scientific difficulties surrounding: • Quantifications of current and future climate migrants? Not systematically. • Many different quantifications are quoted without indicating their limits. • The report adopts the same methodology as Myers when it refers to possible displacement in the face of 1-metre sea-level rise. • When stating that exact quantifications are not possible, it is envisioned that this will soon be achievable: “Even if we cannot <i>yet</i> [emphasis added] provide the fine statistical details regarding the number of such refugees and the precise factors which cause them to move, it is clear that there is a significant and growing problem” (p.12). ⇒ isolating one factor in migration decisions?	Social factors/Inequality ○ How does the document portray the influence of social, economic and political factors on climate migration? ○ There are many interrelated social, political and economic factors at play. ○ Especially economic factors are influenced by policies in richer parts of the world. ○ Poverty has a decisive influence on environmental migration since the poorest are most vulnerable to environmental change and thus tend to be forced to migrate first. ○ Social problems such as growing slums can be exacerbated by climate change. ○ Does the document recognize the influence of unequal societal structures on the occurrence of climate migration? Yes. ○ Especially the global inequality between developed and developing nations is criticized. ○ Economic policies in developed nations and global trade in general, influence socio-

		Yes. • The report recognizes the many interrelated factors influencing migration as well as the difficulty of identifying general causal relations among environmental factors and migration. • However, the report does draw conclusions on the size, prospect and earnest of environmental migration and states at some point that “you can demonstrate immediate causal agents of your situation and a coercive factor to the resulting migration” (p. 6). ➤ Does the document recognize the general lack of empirical evidence? No. While the report calls for more research, it does not hesitate to draw conclusions.	economic and environmental conditions in other countries that have an impact on migration patterns. ○ Still, the developed world is also affected by environmental degradation and climate change.
	Legal proposals/ Recommendations ➤ What does the document advocate? (1) Recognition of environmental migration: a special legal status for environmental refugees and assistance for environmental migrants (planned relocation, loss compensation, etc.). (2) Prevention of environmental degradation through a. development initiatives (financial assistance, agricultural adaptation, strengthening of existing migration networks, prediction of areas of out-migration, disaster preparedness, ...). b. mitigation, sustainable development.	Arguments ➤ What arguments are used? ○ Global environmental problems as climate change are mainly the responsibility of developed countries. ○ Environmental migration will increase: quantifications of current and future environmental migrants. ○ Economic globalization has devastating effects on the environment and thus on migration flows. ○ Certain governmental policies have devastating	Links to advocacy (1)(2)(3)(4.e) (4.f) (1)(2)(3)(4.a) (4.b)(4.c)(4.e)(4.h)(4.i) (2)(3.b)(4.a)(4.c)(4.h)(4.i) (2)(3.b)(4.d)(4.g)(4.h)(4.i)

(3) Developed countries should a. Increase development funds and finance prevention of environmental degradation. b. Take the effects of its policies on displacement into account. (4) Indirectly related issues: a. Weakening World Trade Organization (WTO) by creating World Environment Organisation (WEO). b. Developing broad-ranging emission trading schemes. c. Strengthening fair trade for its potential to protect the environment. d. Loss compensation for the Nigerian Ogoni people by Shell. e. Pressurizing the United States to sign the Kyoto Protocol. f. Pressurizing governments to fulfil the norm of spending 0,7% of their GDP on Official Development Assistance. g. Denouncement of Narmada Dam Project. h. Denouncement of structural adjustment policies. i. Advocate a shift of economic paradigm.	effects on the environment and thus on migration flows. ○ Security threat. ○ Natural scientific predictions. ○ Vulnerability: poorest are hit hardest and are forced to migration. ○ Protection gap	(1)(2)(3)(4.b)(4.e)(4.f) (2)(4.b) (4.c)(4.e)(4.i) (1)(2)(3)(4.b) (4.c)(4.e)(4.f)(4.h) (1)(4.d)
--	---	--

Nous Sommes à l'Origine du Problème, Nous Devons le Résoudre (Biermann, 2008)

CONCEPTUALIZATION	Definition ➤ Which terms are used? 'Climate refugee' ➤ Is a definition deemed possible? Climate refugees are not defined. No mentioning of impossibility to define. ➤ Is the climatic aspect emphasised over other environmental factors? Yes.	Agency ➤ Is migration seen as an expression of agency? No. ➤ Or as a predetermined reaction to environmental change? ○ Climate refugees are forced to move. ○ Climate-induced displacement is permanent. ○ The document makes no mention of migration as a personal decision.	Security ➤ What is the relation between climate change, migration and conflict? ○ The document does not elaborate on security issues. ➤ What is the relation between climate change, migration and human security? ○ The document does not elaborate on human security.
COMPLEXITY	(Un)quantifiability ➤ Does the document quantify the amount of current climate migrants? No. ➤ Does the document predict the amount of climate migrants? No.	Scientific uncertainty ➤ Does the document recognize the scientific difficulties surrounding: • Quantifications of current and future climate migrants? No. The document assumes that rough predictions can determine what areas will be affected by climate change leading to out-migration.	Social factors/Inequality ○ How does the document portray the influence of social, economic and political factors on climate migration? Not elaborated on. ○ Does the document recognize the influence of unequal societal structures on the occurrence of climate migration?

		⇒ Isolating one factor in migration decisions? No. • The document assumes that climate change directly leads to refugee flows. • By referring to a distinction between displacement that is entirely related to climate change, such as sea-level rise, and displacement that is partly climate-related, the document assumes that research is able to draw this distinction. ➤ Does the document recognize the general lack of empirical evidence? No. It does state that it has not elaborated on many issues surrounding climate refugees but adds that “ce n'est pas parce qu'il y a des problèmes que nous ne devons pas les résoudre” (p. 2)	Not elaborated on.
A D V O C A C Y	Legal proposals/ Recommendations ➤ What does the document advocate? (1) Recognition, assistance and relocation of climate refugees in the form of a protocol under the UNFCCC. a. Recognition of collective rights. b. Local governments should organize protection on their own terms with support of the international community. c. Planned relocation on a permanent basis d. Preferential assistance according to predicted vulnerability.	Arguments ➤ What arguments are used? ○ Global climate change is mainly the responsibility of developed countries. ○ Climate refugees are different from political refugees and are thus in need of a special kind of protection: the Geneva Convention should not be extended. ○ Climate migration has a collective dimension	Links to advocacy (1)(2)(3) (1.a) (1.b)(1.c)

	(2) Common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) (3) Developed countries should solve the climate refugee problem by recognising them (1) and by providing financial assistance a. According to the CBDR norm. b. All financial assistance will be covered by international community when the causes of displacement are entirely climate-related. c. Financial assistance will be supplementary when the causes of displacement are partly climate-related.	○ Rough predictions can determine what areas will be affected by climate change leading to out-migration. ○ Climate-induced-displacement is permanent.	(1.a) (1.d)(3.a)(3.b) (1.c)(3)
--	---	--	---

Climate Change and Migration (Lambert, 2010)

C O N C E P T U A L I Z A T I O N	Definition ➤ Which terms are used? - Climate migrant - Climate migration ➤ Is a definition deemed possible? Not elaborated on. ➤ If so, how is climate migration defined? “[D]isplaced by climate change” (p. 1) ➤ Is the climatic aspect emphasised over other environmental factors? Yes.	Agency ➤ Is migration seen as an expression of agency? Yes. ○ Migration can be an adaptation strategy. ○ Migration is the result of an individual decision. ○ Migrants are driven by a mix of push and pull factors. ➤ Or as a predetermined reaction to environmental change? No. ○ Not everyone migrates when confronted with the same push and pull factors. ○ The decision to migrate depends on many factors such as economic resilience, adaptation options and the capacity of the state to adapt to climate change.	Security ➤ What is the relation between climate change, migration and conflict? ○ Consequences of climate change such as water scarcity can lead to conflicts. ○ However, the eruption of violence depends on factors such as the diplomatic management of the water supply. ➤ What is the relation between climate change, migration and human security? ○ No mentioning of term ‘human security’. ○ Mentioning of aspects of human security such as the possible impact of climate change on livelihoods, water and nutrition supply, and quality of life.
C O M P L E X I	(Un)quantifiability ➤ Does the document quantify the amount of current climate migrants? Yes. The document states that “2008 saw more than 20 million people displaced as result of climate – related, sudden – onset disasters, such as	Scientific uncertainty ➤ Does the document recognize the scientific difficulties surrounding: • Quantifications of current and future climate migrants? Not systematically but predictions are presented	Social factors/Inequality ○ How does the document portray the influence of social, economic and political factors on climate migration? ○ Many social, political and economic factors are interwoven with environmental factors.

T Y	floods and storms” (p. 3). ➤ Does the document predict the amount of climate migrants? Yes. The document quotes predictions by Myers: “The estimates by Professor Myers for potential climate migrants that are often quoted would mean that by 2050 one in every 45 people in the world will have been displaced by climate change. Other estimates are even higher” (p. 1).	in careful, conditional language: “The estimates...<i>would</i> [emphasis added] mean that by 2050 one in every 45 people in the world will have been displaced by climate change” (p. 1). ⇒ Isolating one factor in migration decisions? Yes. ○ "[P]icking out the role of climate change from other environmental, economic and social factors requires an ambitious analytical step into the dark" (p. 1). ○ The document refers to the counter-intuitive case of migrants who return even in the face of worsening environmental degradation. ○ However, the report does draw conclusions on the size, prospect and earnest of environmental migration. ➤ Does the document recognize the general lack of empirical evidence? No. While the speech calls for more research to complement the EACH-FOR study, it does not hesitate to draw conclusions.	○ Similar events can have different outcomes in different places, depending on state capacity, poverty (resources), adaptive capacity, ... ○ Migration flows depend on the impact of climate change, resources, migration networks, ... ○ Does the document recognize the influence of unequal societal structures on the occurrence of climate migration? Yes. ○ The document recognizes the influence of unequal preparedness and resources to recover or migrate. ○ The poorest often do not migrate because of a lack of financial resources.
A D V O C A C Y	Legal proposals/ Recommendations ➤ What does the document advocate? (1) Climate migration should be seen as a serious problem.	Arguments ➤ What arguments are used? ○ Climate migration will increase: quantifications of current and future environmental migrants.	Links to advocacy (1)(3)(4)

(2) However, we should not be afraid, neither create fear, of in-migration. (3) Policies and legislations should be adapted to the challenge posed by climate migration. (4) Climate migration should be prevented by improving living conditions. (5) Migration should be voluntary. (6) Indirectly related issues a. EU membership and the free movement of EU citizens it brings along, is beneficial for UK citizens. b. Europe/UK should not fear the global migration movement. i. Reactive policies (e.g. fences) should be abandoned. ii. Alarmism on migration to the UK should be nuanced. c. EU's Common Fisheries Policy worsens over-fishing	○ Natural scientific predictions. ○ Environmental factors are important drivers of migration. ○ A complex mix of factors influences migration decisions: ▪ Factors such as differing state capacity, resources and adaptive capacity determine the impact of similar climatic events. ▪ Socio-economic factors such as financial capacity and migration networks determine whether a person has the possibility to migrate: the poorest often do not migrate. ○ Migration can be an adaptation strategy to diversify the sources of income. ○ People prefer not to migrate. When they do it is often out of necessity. ○ Climate migrants will not especially come to the UK due to specific characteristics of climate migration: ▪ Most climate migrants are IDPs. ▪ Migration is a decision: not everyone migrates (depends on networks, resources and adaptive capacity). ○ UK gains from EU membership because it gives the right to free movement.	(1) (1)(3)(4) (4)(6.b.ii) (2)(3)(6.b.ii) (4)(5) (2)(5)(6.b.ii) (2)(6.b.ii) (5)(6.a)
---	--	---

		○ Climate change combined with existing problems such as overfishing, negatively impact nutrition of coastal communities	(6.b) (6.c)
--	--	--	---------------------------

Climate Change, Refugees and Migration (Flautre et al., 2013)

C O N C E P T U A L I Z A T I O	Definition	Agency	Security
	➤ Which terms are used? - Climate refugee - Climate migrant ➤ Is a definition deemed possible? Yes. A definition and decision on the exact terminology is difficult due to discussions on the legal implications of terms such as ‘refugee’. However, in a political debate a pragmatic decision is needed in order to provide “a straight-forward, easily understandable and translatable label to a complicated issue” (p. 4).	➤ Is migration seen as an expression of agency? Several clues point to a vision of migration as agency: ○ Migration as adaptation: “Migration can be a possible adaptation strategy, but only if it is well organised. Indeed, especially when fleeing slow-onset changes of the environment, the decision to migrate should be voluntary and planned” (p. 5). ○ People prefer not to move. ○ In some instances, the document mentions migration as a personal decision.	➤ What is the relation between climate change, migration and conflict? Not elaborated on. ➤ What is the relation between climate change, migration and human security? Not elaborated on.

N	➤ If so, how is climate migration defined? - <u>Climate migration</u>: “the displacement of individuals or groups of people fleeing a slow-onset change in their environment or a sudden disaster, which are directly triggered, partly caused or at least exacerbated by climate change” (p. 4). - <u>Climate refugees</u>: people who are forced to move due to “a slow-onset change in their environment or a sudden disaster, which are directly triggered, partly caused or at least exacerbated by climate change” (p. 4). ➤ Is the climatic aspect emphasised over other environmental factors? Yes. The term ‘environmental’ migration is considered to be too broad: many incidents are clearly not related to climate changes and are already covered by existing protection mechanisms. As such, the document focusses on climate-induced-migration and on the creation of new protection mechanisms for the new phenomenon of climate migration.	➤ Or as a predetermined reaction to environmental change? However, ○ climate migration is seen as “forced rather than voluntary” (p. 3), which diminishes the degree of agency that is attributed to climate refugees. ○ mainly poor communities in vulnerable situations are affected by the effects of climate change and tend to become IDPs.	
C O M P L E X I T Y	(Un)quantifiability ➤ Does the document quantify the amount of current climate migrants? Yes. “Experts speak of 15 million in 2009 and 38 million in 2013” (p. 3). ➤ Does the document predict the amount of	Scientific uncertainty ➤ Does the document recognize the scientific difficulties surrounding: • Quantifications of current and future climate migrants? Yes. “Numbers largely depend on how the group of affected people is being defined.... there are clear	Social factors/Inequality ○ How does the document portray the influence of social, economic and political factors on climate migration? ○ There are many interrelated social, political and economic factors at play. ○ Poverty has a decisive influence on climate migration since the poorest are most hit

	climate migrants? Yes. The document quotes predictions by Myers: “According to recent estimates, between 250 million and one billion people might be affected by 2050” (p. 3)	limitations to such predictions, which should therefore be handled with caution.” (p. 3) ⇒ Isolating one factor in migration decisions? Generally yes. • The document recognizes the many interrelated factors influencing migration as well as the difficulty of identifying general causal relations among environmental factors and migration: “The links between these [climate] processes and migration are complex, overlapping and difficult to identify, particularly in the case of slow-onset developments” (p. 2). • The document refers to the counter-intuitive case of migrants who return even in the face of worsening environmental degradation. • By defining climate migration as “triggered, partly caused or at least exacerbated by climate change” (p. 4), the document recognizes that other factors can contribute to migration decisions. • However, this definition of climate migration assumes that the degree of ‘climate-relatedness’ can be determined when assessing whether people qualify as climate refugees or not. ➤ Does the document recognize the general lack of empirical evidence? No.	hardest by climate change that in turn exacerbates poverty even more. ○ Does the document recognize the influence of unequal societal structures on the occurrence of climate migration? Yes. Financial resources influence the distance of migration. As a consequence, the largest group of climate refugees become IDPs. This group contains the poorest, most vulnerable people who cannot afford to move abroad.
--	--	--	---

Legal proposals/ Recommendations	Arguments	Links to advocacy
What does the document advocate?	➤ What arguments are used?	
(1) A binding legal framework to deal with environmental migration should be agreed on: “depending on where the strongest momentum is possible, we are willing to support these options – be it [a] an additional protocol to the Geneva Convention, [b] an expansion of the [UN] Guiding Principles [on Internal Displacement], [c] entirely new legal structures [d] or any other option not explicitly excluded [in this position paper, mainly changes to existing protection mechanisms]” (p. 10). e. the document explicitly excludes i. An extension of the Geneva Convention ii. An additional protocol under the UNFCCC (2) Prevention of climate migration through a. Adaptation. b. Disaster risk reduction. c. Planned relocation. (3) The EU should a. Take the lead in the process towards a legally binding protection and assistance for climate refugees. b. Fulfil its financial promises to the Climate Fund.	○ Global environmental problems as climate change are mainly the responsibility of developed countries. ○ Environmental migration will increase: quantifications of current and future environmental migrants. ○ Protection gap ○ Environmental factors are important drivers of migration. ○ Vulnerability/inequality: poorest are hit hardest. ○ Rough predictions can determine what areas will be affected by climate change. ○ Income diversification in the face of climatic change can preclude the need to move. ○ Developing countries lack the funds to deal with climate change and climate migration. ○ An additional protocol to the UNFCCC could slow the decision-making process on a global agreement to bring down emissions. ○ “Tackling climate change is about global	(1)(2)(3)(4)(5) (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) (1)(3.a)(3.c)(3.d)(4.b)(5) (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) (2)(3.d) (4)(5) (3.d) (2.a)(3.c)(3.d) (3.b)(3.d)(4.) (1.e.ii)

	c. Loosen its tough migration regulations for climate refugees. d. Enable legal, circular labour migration granting preferential access on the basis of predicted vulnerability. (4) Developed countries should provide financial, technical and political support to geopolitically weaker countries that suffer from climate change and the resulting displacement a. by fulfilling the norm of spending 0,7% of their GDP on Official Development Assistance. b. by providing additional development funds in order to i. Support the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. ii. Support the host communities. iii. Create a new income for climate refugees. (5) International community should a. Support the local, national and regional initiatives that form a bottom-up evolution towards a binding international climate migration regime. b. Tackle climate migration on a higher political level.	solidarity and this has to be extended to the people concerned” (p. 12). ○ There is no political support to extend the Geneva Convention. ○ The Geneva Convention protects people on an individual instead of collective basis and is thus not suited to accommodate climate refugees. ○ Reluctance of states to grant asylum	(1)(2)(3)(4) (1.e.i) (1.e.i) (1) (1.e.i)(3.c)(3.d)
--	--	--	--

CURRICULUM VITAE

29/05/1990
+32 474 05 81 51
luka.debruyckere@gmail.com
Nationality: Belgian
Gender: female

LUKA DE BRUYCKERE

67, Toekomststraat
9040, Ghent, Belgium

Work experience

European Commission, DG Climate Action, Brussels, October 2015 – February 2016

Trainee - Unit B1 EU ETS Policy Development

Reporting on stakeholder views on ETS revision; drafting press statements; drafting meeting minutes; research on issues related to ETS

Flanders International Film Fest, Ghent, September 2011 – December 2012

Ticket Manager

Responsible for own cash register and accounting; worked efficiently in a stressful environment

Natuurpunt, Mechelen, January 2010 – August 2011

Membership recruitment

Persuaded a higher than average number of people to become a member of Natuurpunt; social skills and perseverance were essential

Volunteer work

Bouworde vzw, Louvain, August 2008

Maintenance of national park Parcul Național Buila-Vânturarița, Romania

Team-play and organizational skills were essential

JH Achterban, Ghent, July 2008 – August 2010

Member of the youth club management team

Organizing events and managing the weekly opening evenings; flexibility and team-play as well as social and organizational skills were essential

Education

European MA in Global Studies, 2013 – 2015, University of Leipzig and University of Vienna

MA-Dissertation on Climate Refugees; International Relations; Research Methodologies; EU Financial Crisis; Oil, Power and Climate in a Global Perspective; Simulation of a UN Conference on the SDGs

Preparatory Course MA in Political Science: International Politics, 2012 – 2013, University of Ghent; graduated with Great Distinction

European Political Integration; EU Policy; International Public Law; Political Economy

European Law in an International Context, February 2013 - June 2013, Vrije Universiteit Brussel

MA in Moral Sciences, 2011 – 2012, University of Ghent; graduated with Great Distinction

MA-dissertation on the distribution of emission rights; Social and Political Philosophy; Global Ethics

Erasmus exchange program (BA Moral Sciences), 2010 – 2011, University of Florence

BA in Moral Sciences, 2008 – 2011, University of Ghent; graduated with Great Distinction

Ethics; Political Science; Statistics; Economy; History; Sociology

General Secondary Education, Latin Modern Languages, 2002 – 2008, Freinetatheneum De Wingerd, Ghent

Languages

Dutch: mother tongue

English: excellent spoken and written command

German: fluently spoken and good written command

Italian: fluently spoken and good written command

French: good spoken and written command

Recommendations

Jan Wouter Langenberg

Policy Officer

DG CLIMA

Jan-Wouter.LANGENBERG@ec.europa.eu

+32 229 81753

Prof. Dr. Sigrid Sterckx,

University of Ghent

sigrid.sterckx@ugent.be

+32 473 242458