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Abstract

According to most scholars, the success of populist radical right parties depends on sociocultural factors and especially their rejection of immigration. The intentions of this thesis is to show that the ideology of populist radical right parties is more complex and broad than most scholars and analysts have been inclined to concede.

It is firstly argued that a shift towards preferences for redistributive policies of the populist radical right in Western Europe can be witnessed. Secondly is their welfare discourse characterized by chauvinism, which means that the national welfare state should only be available for its own citizens, which does not include immigrants or naturalized citizens. These two arguments are empirically tested through a quantitative and qualitative analysis of party programs, election manifestos and other party material.

It is concluded that these parties, especially in countries with a strong tradition of government security systems and a well-developed social welfare state, distanced themselves from their liberal economic preferences and critical view towards the welfare state in the 1980s and 1990s and developed increasingly into advocates of redistributive policies. This change is seen as a party strategic decision to maximize their voter support.

Abstract

Nach Ansicht der meisten Forscher hängt der Erfolg von radikalen rechtspopulistischen Parteien von soziokulturelle Faktoren und insbesondere der Ablehnung von Einwanderung ab. Die Absicht dieser Masterarbeit ist es zu zeigen, dass die Ideologie der radikalen rechtspopulistischen Parteien komplexer und breiter ist als die meisten Wissenschaftler und Analysten geneigt sind zuzugestehen.

Es wird zunächst argumentiert, dass eine Verschiebung zugunsten von Umverteilungspolitik der radikalen rechtspopulistischen Parteien in Westeuropa festgestellt werden kann. Zweitens ist ihr Wohlfahrtsdiskurs durch Chauvinismus gekennzeichnet, was bedeutet, dass der nationale Wohlfahrtsstaat nur für die eigenen Bürger zur Verfügung stehen soll, welches Einwanderer oder Eingebürgerte nicht beinhaltet. Diese beiden Argumente werden empirisch durch eine quantitative und qualitative Analyse der Parteiprogramme, Wahlprogramme und anderer Parteimaterialien getestet.

Es wird der Schluss gezogen, dass sich diese Parteien, vor allem in Ländern mit einer starken Tradition staatlicher Sicherheitssysteme und einem gut ausgebauten Sozialstaat, von ihren liberalen Wirtschaftsvorlieben und kritischen Blick auf den Wohlfahrtsstaat in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren distanziert haben und sich zunehmend zu Befürwortern von Umverteilungspolitik entwickelt haben. Diese Änderung werden als Partei strategische Entscheidung gesehen, um die Unterstützung der Wähler zu maximieren.

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List of Abbreviations

CHP	Chapel Hill Expert Survey
CMP	Comparative Manifesto Project
DF	Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's Party)
EU	European Union
FN	Front National (National Front)
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (Freedom Party of Austria)
FRP	Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party)
LN	Lega Nord (North League)
LPF	Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn List)
ÖVP	Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People's Party)
PRR	populist radical right
PRRPS	populist radical right parties
PS	Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party)
PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party)
PVV	Partij Voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom)
SAP	Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti (Swedish Social Democratic Party)
SD	Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats)
SDP	Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (Social Democratic Party of Finland)
SDDK	Socialdemokratiet (The Social Democrats)
SP.A	Socialisten en Progressieven Anders (Socialist Party Differently)
SPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich (Social Democratic Party of Austria)
SVP	Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People's Party)
TF	Perussuomalaiset (Finns Party)
VB	Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest)

Chapter I. Introduction

1.1 Background

In the European elections last year, populist radical right parties (abbreviated as “PRRPs” in the following) in France, Great Britain and Denmark became the most popular parties in their country. PRRPs in Europe have been successful since the 1980s and have long been a fixture in many European countries despite some ups and downs. In countries like Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands, populist parties have not only reached good election results, but were even coalition partners in the government at the national level. Those parties that have managed to obtain a visible appearance and electoral success include the UK Independence Party, the Front National in France, the Danish People’s Party, the Italian Northern League, the Sweden Democrats, the True Finns, the PVV in the Netherlands and the Freedom Party in Austria.

Although there is a tendency, particularly in the media, to present the new populist right as a recurring phenomenon, these parties are an emerging new reality. Parties of the populist right can be seen as reaction to globalization from the right. They reject migration, the loss of national sovereignty towards higher entities as the European Union, multiculturalism and specifically Islam, which is denounced as unassimilable.

Traditionally PRRPs are classified as “right” in the economic (redistribution vs. market) and socio-cultural (liberal vs. authoritarian) dimension (see e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008; Kitschelt 1995). These dimensions are frequently distinguished when analyzing the political market.

Unlike other parties which win their votes through both their economic as well as socio-cultural profile, it is widely assumed that PRRPs are mainly voted because of socio-cultural issues (Rydgren 2004).

For the political scientist Herbert Kitschelt, the attraction of these parties results from a “winning formula” of a neo-liberal and authoritarian program (Kitschelt 1995). On the other hand, more recent studies do not confirm this view and argue that PRRPs increasingly pursue more redistributive policies, which are characterized by exclusionist nationalism or nativism to appeal to a growing number of their electorate (Derks 2006; Ivarsflaten 2005). Anti-immigration plays a significant role in their welfare policy. Because immigrants are presented as the main scapegoats for social problems, only the “native population” should benefit from the welfare state. This interplay of advocacy of economic redistribution together with the refusal to distribute social benefits to immigrants is called “welfare chauvinism” (e.g. Van der Waal et al. 2010; Rydgren 2008).

1.2 Problem Statement

Right-wing populism has become a general political phenomenon as a result of the improved acceptance of right populist parties in Europe (Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen 2014: 1). These new parties have emerged as a response to the social, political and economic development of European societies and have had a significant political progress through their populist agenda (ibid.: 2).

Much of the scientific work on PRRPs focuses on sociocultural factors and mainly the anti-immigration issue (e.g. Mudde 2007; Van der Waal et al. 2010; Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen 2014), whereas the influence of their welfare state agendas finds little attention.

Furthermore, there is disagreement over the extent to which PRRPs support redistributive policies and free market economy. This is accompanied by the problem of the support of the working class, which make up a larger part of the PRRPs followers as in all other parties (see Oesch 2008). Another question that still requires investigation is the influence of the different types of welfare states on the success of PRRPs.

While some authors claim that PRRPs most likely arise in post-industrial societies with extensive welfare states (Kitschelt 1995), others claim the opposite and point out that universalistic welfare states reduce the share of PRRPs voters (e.g. Swank and Betz 2003).

While in the 1980s and even in the 1990s many PRRPs represented skeptical positions towards the welfare state and positioned themselves as opposed to ruling parties, it is worth knowing if some of them developed to its proponents.

1.3 Significance

The overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to the explanation of the phenomenon of the emergence of PRRPs in Western Europe and their success in the last years. It shall be investigated if PRRPs have shifted their discourse and strategy towards a more redistributive solidarity. This shall be done by analyzing and comparing the most important parties and their ideological development in the last years. The decision to focus this thesis on PRRPs in Western Europe has several reasons.

One factor is the relative geographical and cultural proximity. In addition, Western Europe has a relatively long democratic tradition that allows comparisons between different countries. Such frameworks are difficult to find for example in Eastern Europe. Not least because the new populist right parties are increasingly influential actors in European politics with growing influence on the political and public discourse, it is important to examine their strategies.

The phenomenon is further worth analyzing, since PRRPs managed to gain a broad appeal to both workers and middle class, although these groups have different economic interests. This has resulted in a growing influence of some of them in the politics of their respective countries since the 2000s. These parties have maintained a stable voter base, which shows that the right-populist phenomenon is not a temporary trend.

By examining their welfare state discourse, the PRRPs previous classification in the political spectrum is questioned. The thesis attempts to contribute to fill some of the addressed research gaps and provide insights for further comparative research on PRRPs in Western Europe. The specific research questions are:

1. *To what extent did PRRPs in Western Europe change their position on redistributive policies in the course of time?*
2. *How far is their redistributive policy characterized by welfare chauvinism?*

1.4 Hypotheses

This thesis hypothesizes that PRRPs have given the issues of redistributive policies more attention in their political agenda over time to appeal to new voters. In the socio-cultural dimension they continue to pursue classic authoritarian policies, but increasingly advocate a policy of economic redistribution and state intervention.

Accordingly, a paradigm shift occurred in the economic dimension away from the neo-liberal economic agenda. PRRPs are mono-ethnic and ethno-nationalist parties (Jamin 2012), which is why their most important topic of anti-immigration also shapes their welfare state agenda.

This policy is characterized by the anti-immigration issue of these parties, with the intention to exclude immigrants from welfare benefits. A large part of the population, particularly socio-authoritarian voters with economic fears support this welfare-chauvinism.

H1: PRRPs in Western Europe direct their political agenda increasingly on the expansion and maintenance of the welfare state

H2: Their redistributive policy is characterized by welfare-chauvinism.

1.5 Limitations

The research is insofar limited, as it considers a relatively small number of parties. The generalization of the results is thus comparatively restricted. Nevertheless, it represents a basis for further research and the wider European context.

Another limitation encountered whilst doing research relates to the language. Although the main part of the literature on the topic is in English, a lot of the niche research is compiled in other languages. I chose to respond to these limitations that might dilute and distract a readership's understanding of my research by also considering data and research published in German and Danish.

Due to economic and temporal constraints, self-collected empirical data will not be used in this project, therefore relying on published academic articles and official documents, reports and statistics.

1.6 Structure

The present thesis is structured in seven main parts. After the basic introduction, the second chapter gives a clarification of definitions and terms concerning the party family and critically deals with the state of the art on the populist radical right.

The characterization of these parties functions as the basis from which to analyze their welfare policy shift. This is done in Chapter 3, in which a categorization and characterization of their political ideology, goals and motives, as well as main reasons for their success are made.

It is assumed that the PRR has made a welfare policy shift. With this is meant that these parties have become more welfare-positive in recent years. Therefore, the rationales and the structural framework that has enabled and generated a welfare policy shift of PRRPs in Western Europe must be exposed and it must be clarified what is meant by “PRR welfare policy shift”.

This is done in Chapter 4. This part further explains the factors which have led the PRR to change their view on welfare issues and describes how the parameters that influence individual voting have changed. The following Chapter 5 describes the methodology and the data as the basis for the empirical analysis. The hypotheses are operationalized and empirically tested quantitatively in Chapter 6 and qualitatively in Chapter 7 through the examination of party programs, election manifestos and other party document. Using the above steps, this thesis is able to answer the posed research question.

Chapter II. Problems of Definition and State of the Art

2.1 Problems of Definition

The appearance of parties on the right of the political spectrum with certain similar features concerning their ideas and political style in a considerable number of European countries, led to the necessity to find a term that defines and adequately describes them.

The debate about how to name this new party family, with the implications that either name implies, has been so intense and lacking in consensus that it has been described as “the war of words” (De Lange and Mudde 2005).

When reviewing the literature on the subject, it is striking that each author proposes a different definition and a different terminology. What for some authors is the “radical right”, is the “populist right” for others and for still others the “far right”.

The problem is that there is no agreement on the elements that should be commonly associated with these parties. Moreover, approaches to the same phenomenon vary depending on a social, political or economic focus.

The first set of definitions takes the elements that define these parties out of their ideological discourse and the elements that position them at the end of the political spectrum or what Kitschelt called “right-right” (Kitschelt 1995). The second set of definitions is determined by the parties’ approaches concerning social and economic policies.

The populist character, as a common element is what ultimately distinguishes them from mainstream parties (e.g. Eatwell 2000; Golder 2003; Evans 2005).

The third and final group of definitions takes different ideological and policy parameters into account that identify a political party as belonging to the party family. Nevertheless, none of the definitions are mutually exclusive or conceptually closed. They depict rather different perceptions about the same phenomenon. Some of the authors themselves tend to not only use one term.

Among the terms that have been used by various authors at different times are extreme right, radical right, populist extreme parties, extreme right-wing populist, radical populist right, neo-populist, exclusionary populist, neo-fascist, anti-immigrant, radical rightwing populist, and new populist (Mudde 2007: 11-12).

However, the various debates and definitions that have accompanied these terminological disputes are useful when identifying the characteristics of this party family. One debate concerns the relationship between these new “right” parties and what some authors have termed the “traditional extreme right” (Ignazi 2003).

Regarding this relationship, political scientist Piero Ignazi (2003) believes that it is necessary to distinguish between two types of parties within the political space of the European extreme right from the eighties onwards. One type of parties would be those that the author describes as “traditional extreme right” and the other would be the parties that are defined as “post-industrial extreme right” or “new extreme right” (ibid.).

According to Ignazi, the first party family maintains links with fascist traditions and has experienced a rapid process of marginalization in favor of the new far-right parties (ibid.).

Accordingly, there has been a growing consensus in the specialized literature that, although there may be ideological proximity and certain points of contact between the “new” political groups and the extreme right, they are two families of parties that must be differentiated (Goodwin 2007).

Cas Mudde makes a distinction within the new party family by differentiating between the extreme right and the populist radical right. Mudde points out, that there are other formations that also have some type of nationalist ideology, but should nevertheless not to be confused with the PRR.

The PRRPs central ideological core is, according to Mudde, defined through a combination of “nativism, authoritarianism, and populism” (Mudde 2011: 11).

Nativism is seen as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group” (Ellinas 2008: 561), while authoritarianism is described as “the belief in a strictly ordered society” (ibid.) and populism as “reverence of the “little man’s” wisdom” (ibid.).

I will use the PRR concept of Mudde in this thesis because it is more specific than other more generic concepts as the radical right or extreme right.

Especially populism distinguishes PRRPs from other right formations. For Mudde, it “is a cause and result of the contemporary Zeitgeist in Europe, and therefore particular to this specific place and time (though it can, and does, exist in other places and times)” (Mudde 2009: 330). The concept of the PRR is therefore able to “define this specific spatial and temporal phenomenon” (ibid.: 331).

Similarly, Taguieff (2007) points out that we are facing a new and specific form of populism. According to this author, classic political populism was based on an appeal to the popular or lower classes against what was identified as a corrupt political class.

In the discourse of the new parties, these classes are addressed as a national interclass community and opposed against an external enemy (immigrants) and an internal one (political).

2.2 State of the Art

The PRR is a complex topic that has been subject to multiple interpretations. Not least because of its resurgence in recent years, reflected in concrete terms in the electoral gains of certain parties, numerous books, reports, articles, and analyzes have dealt with the PRR.

Few studies, however, examine them as political entities and their relationships with both other parties as well as voters and most analyzes have been made on the basis of a particular country or party. This has led to studies, which make the phenomena look isolated, whereby possible transnational links are hidden. Next to the focus on specific countries (e.g. Eatwell 2000; Norris 2005; Rydgren 2007), other major studies concentrate on the analysis of different parties (e.g. Mudde 2007) or the characteristics of their voters (Ignazi 2003; Klandermans and Mayer 2006).

In the following, I will give an overview of the numerous studies concerning the vote for the PRR and its correlation with different factors.

Lubbers et al. (2002), sought to establish a correlation between the increase in the number of immigrants and the increase in parties that promote restrictive measures towards this increase, which he generally considered as right-wing or radical-right.

Norris (2005) and Mudde (2007) evaluated the influence of economic factors on the preference for PRRPs. Klandermans and Mayer et al. (2006) analyzed the profile of right-wing voters.

For Kitschelt (1995) those parties that find a “winning formula”, one that combines nationalism, populism, xenophobic and anti-European attitudes and authoritarian neoliberalism, will achieve success in election results.

Kriesi et al. (2006) show that the media presence influences the decisions of the electorate. Van der Brug et al. (2003) emphasized the ideological components of the vote for the extreme right.

Most scholars analyzing the vote for the extreme right are in agreement that the protest vote explanation is not sufficient to explain voting decisions of the electorate. Other authors as Minkenberg (2000), comment that people who want to protest, vote blank or do not vote. As mentioned, various explanations have been sought to explain voting for the extreme right.

According to Kitschelt (2007), it is necessary to investigate the competitive strategy and the electoral development of the PRR. Among the many results of the listed studies is that there is a certain segment of the population, who vote for the PRR. They feel directly threatened by the presence of immigrants in the competition for increasingly scarce social benefits and are disillusioned with traditional left and right parties.

However, it should be emphasized that there is disagreement in terms of defining the typical right-wing voter. The different positions are far from inclusive and in many cases may have opposed results.

Chapter III. Ideology and Political Discourse

Party positioning on specific issues, for example immigration, law and order, foreign policy and welfare, are given increasing importance in party agendas. To some extent, this also explains why several scholars still consider populist radical right parties more as “containers” of single-issues, rather than parties with a defined “Weltanschauung”.

This is partly confirmed by the frequent use of classifications such as “anti-immigration” or “protest/populist” parties, which proliferated during the 1990s and clearly ascribed the electoral success of the PRR to the overwhelming popularity of a specific and selected number of issues (e.g. Van der Brug et al. 2000; Van der Brug and Fennema 2003).

Undoubtedly, one of the most distinct features of PRRPs - particularly in recent years - has been their strong opposition to immigration. In the literature on radical right wing parties, many scholars are cautious to use the word ideology when speaking about these parties.

Many scholars think that PRRPs lack a defined ideology, because they prefer opportunistically to follow the electoral disposition of the moment (e.g. protest/anti-establishment feelings), or because they rely almost exclusively on single issues (anti-immigration).

3.1 The New Right

It is obvious that the PRR has significantly gained importance, both at the media and political level. Today, none of these parties with realistic intentions of coming to power can be linked to fascism in the 1930's or similar totalitarian regimes. The representatives of the PRR today are not the Fascist of the Interwar period. There are no paramilitary groups that roam the streets and despite having controversial and charismatic leaders, there is no comparable personality cult as in the 1920s and 1930s.

The far-right has changed since the Second World War and has a different ideological basis today. Propaganda has been replaced by rhetoric. Nevertheless, their messages are easy to understand, explicit and mostly address the individual directly.

Although many of its representatives and members have repeatedly distanced from any political extremism, there are still similarities to the electoral program of older far-right parties.

Among the approaches of the New Right are concepts such as the Europe of nations, cultural differentialism and the “right to difference”, the importance of the state as a rector and corrector of the economy, the innate Christianity of the European peoples and the inability of multicultural societies to coexist harmoniously.

As mentioned, all of these parties share similar political and ideological criteria. Among them, anti-political-establishment populism and ethno-national xenophobia (Wilson et al. 2012: 11). A further common core is their propaganda against immigration (e.g. Scharenberg 2005; Bornschier 2011).

Because they claim that Europe's identity and cultural is in severe danger, the PRR “[...] promotes itself as the defender of difference and the fundamental right to cultural identity and Heimat” (Betz 2002: 196).

They believe that they have been able to develop a new political paradigm that goes beyond the old and outdated conceptions of the traditional right and left. The New Right blames modernity for much of the problems of the contemporary society, that is pluralism and multiculturalism, the loss of national identity and the loss of the sense of the “ethnic group”, equality and individualism, the absence of an organic community, the respect for the natural inequality, the Judeo-Christian humanism and tensions between Left and Right.

Therein lies a certain feeling of nostalgia, a return to the homogeneous nation state community in order to ensure harmony between its members, something that multiculturalism has proven to be unable to provide. Therefore, multiculturalism and the loss of identity are seen as the greatest threats to European civilization.

A final element of the discussion about the New Right concerns the political project of these parties and the relationship of them concerning the institutional framework of liberal democracies. One influential proposal in this regard is that these formations have a project and a political doctrine that can be understood as an “ethnocratic liberalism” (Griffin 2000).

The PRR have adopted a rights discourse, including the right to be different. According to Mudde, the fundamental difference is that the PRR “is democratic, in that it accepts popular sovereignty and majority rule and [...] also tends to accept the rules of parliamentary democracy” (2011: 12). They accept that there are different views than theirs, and accept the rules and outcomes of the parliamentary democracy.

Nevertheless, their political project pursues a permanent and legally stipulated exclusion of parts of the population. In this sense, the paradox of these parties and their greatest danger is that they have assumed the principles of the liberal democratic system, but only want members of the majority ethnic group to be considered as full members of society (Griffin 2000).

From this approach, both Griffin (2000) and Betz (2002) coincide when noting that the real danger of these parties is not the possibility to nullify freedoms and the democratic system, but that the system could accept and adopt their discriminatory and exclusionary proposals.

In the same vein, Rodriguez (2006) believes that these formations do not advocate the elimination of institutions and democratic freedoms and that they have accepted the democratic process structurally rather than as a mere cyclical policy strategy.

However, despite accepting the constitutional framework of their respective countries, some of the values of these formations are anti-democratic and their discourse can significantly erode the legitimacy of democratic institutions.

3.2 Populism

The definition and understanding of “populism” has been, and is, subject of major debates and disagreements. Although in the literature on the populist radical right are several ways to approach this question, most authors have interpreted populism more as a political style (Taguieff 2007) or a style of political communication (Jagers and Walgrave 2007) than as an ideology with its own specific content.

Populism is therefore not based on a particular ideological commitment on how to organize society socially and politically. It is essentially a strategic resource to achieve favorable political mobilization for electoral interests. This political mobilization is achieved through a discourse that makes a “double rhetorical move” (Betz 2004: 44).

In the first place it constructs an idealized form of “people”, who are represented as carriers of virtues and common sense. This discourse is extended to the political field.

Secondly, these “people” are presented as opposed to an external element, either the elite or the foreign population. This confrontational anti-establishment and anti-foreigner discourse is the real engine of the populist mobilization of PRRPs (Betz 2001).

To glorify the virtues of “the people”, some PRRPs proclaim loudly what they consider to be a true democracy, saying they were the only ones who respect and want to give voice to popular sovereignty. The party or its leader, present themselves as an instrument to lead a supra-ideological mobilization to return the voice and sovereignty to “the people”.

Mudde (2004) explains that there are two dominant interpretations of populism, a so called “bar” populism that is lacking any political and logical foundation and contains a simplistic and emotional speech. The other type of populism is used by the parties in their quest to attract vote’s fast and easy, thereby challenging the rationality of voters and trying to “buy” their support.

He defines both types of populism as demagogic and opportunistic (ibid.). For him populism polarizes society into two parts, elites and the “people”. Sovereignty should rest with the latter and be the expression of the general will.

If we follow the argumentation of Mudde, the mainstream parties belong to the first set of definitions, demagogues and opportunist, while the populist radical right presents itself as the real alternative for change. According to Mudde (2004), the populism of certain parts of society is increased by welfare chauvinism as well as a sense of belonging to the people, much like that of belonging to a nation that transcends class schemes and political affiliation.

Contrary to what one might think, the rise of populism is also caused by a greater awareness of people who do not want to receive and obey orders of the ruling elites blindly and obediently, but question these and want to take part in the decision making process.

Also, the distrust in parties has increased, what Coffe et al. call “social capital” (2007), the feeling that the world has become less safe due to the inability of parties to take drastic measures to ensure its citizens adequate protection against crime and terrorism. Thus populism or populist attitudes do not only belong to the populist radical right. The majority parties of the right and left can take such positions as well if they identify demand in the electorate (Kitschelt 2007).

3.3 Immigration Discourse

The rejection of foreign immigration is at the moment the factor that most clearly identifies PRRPs and “is one of the principal factors for predicting who will vote for a radical right-wing party” (Rydgren 2008: 737). The relevance of immigration has been increasing over the course of time and has become the most important factor of the political mobilization of the European populist radical right.

Furthermore, the rejection of Islam and the resident Muslim population in Europe acquired a major role in the discourse of these parties in recent years and further homogenized the political offer of PRRPs in Europe. Due to the importance of this topic, it should be examined what elements make up this discourse and how the PRRP has made it appealing for large segments of the electorate.

In order to understand why PRRPs use the anti-immigration discourse, the ideological context must be explained. In this sense, it should be noted that biological racism as a political tool did not promise success in the post-World War II decades. The remembrance of the Fascist experience and the progressive questioning of the division of mankind into races meant that a classification of human beings in hierarchically organized groups became heavily discredited in public opinion (Stolcke 1995).

This discourse, is known as “cultural racism” (Wieviorka 1992) and represents the foundation on which PRRPs have constructed and justified their positions against the immigrant population.

In order to legitimize the rejection of the foreign population without using the biological and hierarchical “old” racism, this new discourse develops arguments centered on the concept of culture. Race is replaced by culture in this discourse in order to classify individuals and differentiate groups. Culture is hereby understood as a mixture of lifestyles, values and traditions and is understood as static and internally homogeneous (Stolcke 1995). It is further considered that cultural belonging is fundamental to individuals and that there is little possibility of changing or moving away from this cultural background.

Finally, the nation is identified with a cultural identity that is built around elements associated with its past. The immigrant population is approached through their different cultural belonging and therefore seen as alien to the national body. Starting from these premises, it is concluded that the “excessive” immigration of people with different cultures represents a threat to the cultural integrity of the nation. Opposition to immigration is therefore presented as a defense of the cultural identity of the nation and therefore as a defense of the nation itself.

A key element in this argumentative scheme is that cultures are different but not unequal. Following this logic, the defense of one’s own cultural identity is the best way of defending cultural diversity (Taguieff 1993-1994). The culturalist discourse also points out that different cultures are mutually exclusive and physical coexistence leads to conflict (ibid.).

This assumption rests on the belief that xenophobic behavior is inherent in human beings. It involves the understanding that humans are highly regionalized beings, that have an instinctive tendency to form internally homogeneous groups, which are hostile to other groups.

Another element, which derives from the idea of cultural incompatibility, refers to the supposed “problems” that the presence of a foreign population brings with it.

The PRR argues that different cultures and “backward” societies have difficulties to adapt to the norms of the host society (Rydgren 2005). This situation will therefore inevitably cause problems and sometimes conflict. Such an approach has been used to link migration to social problems such as the decline in school performance of “native” students, the degradation of neighborhoods of the big cities and “problems of coexistence”, resulting in insecurity or “anti-social” behavior of young people.

Another part of the immigrant discourse is the complaint about the supposed harm on the material level through the arrival of immigrant population for the “native” population. This complaint concerns mainly two issues, the access to public resources and the labor market.

Regarding the access to resources it is mentioned that the immigration is a burden for the public cost through the misuse of the various services offered by European welfare states. This denunciation is based on an alleged overuse and misuse of public services by immigrants and an alleged favorable treatment by the government towards the foreign population at the expense of the autochthonous population.

With regards to employment, PRRPs relate unemployment and the increasing precarious labor market to the consequence of an “unfair” competition as a result of the immigrant population (Mudde 2007). The political answer of these parties to end the alleged damage for the autochthonous population on the economic level can be summarized under the concept of “national preference”. It is a proposal according to which access to public resources and jobs must be first given to the “native” population.

This policy proposal has been described as “welfare chauvinism”, which has been one of the most powerful weapons of propaganda for these parties (Perrineau 2005).

3.4 Globalization

It is widely believed that globalization processes can help to explain the emergence and development of PRRs in Western Europe. Equally it will be looked from the point of view of the PRR how globalization and multicultural processes alter the “essence” of the state and dilute the national identity. The phenomenon of the populist radical right in Europe is considered to have a transnational connotation, which means it can’t be considered as an isolated phenomenon limited to the borders of a country. There are elements at both the inter-European and global level that affect the development of these parties.

There is a lot of research regarding the connection between globalization and the electoral success of PRRPs. Some authors stress that there are aspects of globalization that can be directly linked to the rise of the populist radical right parties and believe that these links are worth to be analyzed. Kriesi et al. (2006) consider globalization as the process of increasing economic, political and cultural competition and mass immigration.

According to Cas Mudde there are three forms of globalization which right-wing populists reject, namely economic globalization, cultural globalization and political globalization. According to populist, economic globalization ensures that foreigners can exert influence on the domestic economy. In addition, globalization is seen as harmful to the work prospects of the national citizens through outsourcing work to low-wage countries. Mass immigration is widely blamed on economic globalization.

Cultural globalization is for populists' equivalent to a rampant Americanization of the typical national or European culture. The political globalization is rejected by right-wing populists, since they argue that the people are no longer master in their own house. The modern globalized world thus creates a social and cultural divide between educated "winners" and low-skilled "losers".

Contrary to the past, the winners are most likely voting for the left, whereas the losers tend to the right. They have become more susceptible to fear of strangers and national protection. According to Berezin (2009), the "winners" form the minority in most European countries. He states that a "convinced European" is no older than 39 years, higher educated and voter of the center-right or left. The vast majority of the population on the other hand, still sees the nation-state as a reference and not the transnational European Union (Berezin 2009: 8).

3.5 Main Explanations for the Electoral Success of PRRPs

The appearance of PRRPs with similar features in a number of countries over a relatively short period of time, has generated a wide range of explanatory hypothesis and theories. There is no single theory to explain the support for the PRR. Some authors emphasize economic factors (Norris 2005), while others see the economy as irrelevant (Mudde 2007).

Political authoritarianism and market conditions are named as reasons for the success of PRRPs (Kitschelt 1995) as well as welfare chauvinism (e.g. Ivarsflaten 2005; Van der Brug et al. 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006), the rejection of immigration (Lubbers et al. 2002) or even the charisma of the party leaders (Eatwell 2006).

It can be stated, that the resurgence of the PRR in Europe is made up of several factors, cultural, social and economic ones.

The aim of the PRR is to put European customs and traditions to the forefront and wants to return to a sense of “community”, where identity values are the cohesive factor. This responds to the need for identity of a certain group of people, which they consider is threatened by the influx of groups with different habits and traditions.

Finally, the financial crisis and the terrorist attacks of the recent years gave some individuals the impression of helplessness and abandonment by the political elite, which is perceived to be more concerned with making “high politics” than meet the needs of the ordinary citizen.

Unemployment as a result of the relocation of various industrial sectors and mechanization and automation compromise larger sectors of the working class than previously, which is increasingly excluded from these modernizing processes.

Others see immigration as a competition for increasingly scarce resources such as labor or welfare. In this way both the “losers of modernity” as the “welfare chauvinist” see immigration as one of the main threats for the integrity of society and cultural identity.

Further fears arise through the perceived worsened chances of accessing the labor market and growing competition for state resources. Phenomena such as Globalization, the deepening integration of countries in the European Union or the enlargement of the North-South divide, have contributed to a paradigm shift and a rethinking of a growing group of members of the society towards their relations with “others”.

Various studies have shown that the factors that influence the success or failure of the PRR are determined by three key aspects.

First what is known as “offer”, the proposals parties make and their feasibility that influences the public and the political system, as well as their image and perception by the public.

Secondly the unmet needs of the voters, known as demand, which is the ability of the major parties to address issues such as immigration, security, unemployment or welfare policies.

The last aspect is the political opportunity structure, which includes the pattern of party representation and the distance or proximity between the left and the moderate right.

The different parties are further influenced by each other and try to imitate the “winning formula” of other parties. Accordingly exist a variety of factors that made it possible that various populist radical right parties arose. Over the years, they gained importance and could present themselves as viable alternatives to other parties.

Chapter IV. Theoretical Reflections

4.1 Issue Voting and Issue Ownership

There are several basic theoretical positions with divergent understandings of voting behavior in the western world. All theorists agree, however, that the phenomenon of class-based voting belongs to the past. Green-Pedersen points out that class voting declined dramatically and is now almost disappearing (Green-Pedersen 2007: 608).

It can be stated that there is no agreement among researchers of what has replaced social-structurally determined voting (ibid.). Some newer analyzes of elections in the western world point to the increasing importance of the so-called “issue voting”.

The issue voting theory is used here, since it is believed that this theory is able to explain the PRRPs welfare policy shift. Furthermore, the concepts have been theorized and used for a relatively long time.

Next to issue voting, the concept of issue ownership will be introduced, which explains the significance of political parties appearing trustworthy on the relevant areas of voters if they want to take over government. The concept of issue ownership has close affinity to the idea of issue-voting.

Earlier the idea prevailed that voting depended predominantly on the social attachment to a particular political party. The first election surveys in the 1950s showed that habits and party identification played a large role in the voter's decision (Borre 2001: 12). A number of factors have contributed to transform the foundations on which individual voting takes place. Among these factors are for example the self-reflexivity of the late modern individual and greater political insights and knowledge that exist in today's society.

The theory of issue voting assumes that voters support for individual parties is linked to their position on those policy areas that are most relevant for the voters.

In relation to the specific issues, some parties appear better equipped and more credible in their policy formulation than others. If this is the case, the party claims to possess ownership of the topic, which is referred to as issue ownership in the literature. John R. Petrocik introduced the concept of issue ownership in his article "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections" (1996).

His starting point is that the average voter is generally uncertain about what constitutes society's actual political problems and does also not possess a clear preference on particular policy areas (Petrocik 1996: 829ff.). In other words, individual voters do not have a clear overview over the political landscape and rarely have set political positions. Petrocik's ideal voter recalls in many ways the fluctuating and pragmatically attitudes of marginal voters.

According to him "[...] most voters are pragmatic and instrumental, mostly interested in "fixing" problems, and they see differences in the parties' ability to fix current problems" (Petrocik 1996: 830). Accordingly, voting functions instrumentally and in correspondence to which parties appear most competent on the individually relevant policy areas.

In other words, voting is based on specific themes, in theory referred to as issue voting. From this basic understanding of voting behavior, Petrocik construct the theory of issue ownership.

Voting often takes place in a difficult and unclear political landscape. In this difficult process, issue ownership acts as some kind of thumb rule that can help voters to orient themselves in this complex political picture. Thus issue ownership acts as a form of guideline when the individual voter seeks consistency between his wishes and the strategies of political parties.

As it is evident from the name of the concept, the political parties “own” an issue. To possess issue ownership implies that a party appears to better manage or pay more attention to some policy issues than other parties. Issue ownership is therefore a kind of reputation that parties have in a specific policy area.

This reputation originated due to a certain policy, previous solution of the problem or just a significant interest and attention to the political field (Petrocik 1996: 826). The voter has therefore a presumption and a belief that a vote for the party with ownership of the issue will result in a certain political direction.

Belanger and Meguid describe how voters evaluate each party’s abilities in practice and formulate their wishes in accordance with the important areas for them. Therefore, the individual votes for the party that is considered the most competent and sincere in accordance with that issue (Belanger and Meguid 2005: 3). If the voter is interested in a high quality of welfare, he would therefore be tempted to vote for a party with issue ownership of welfare.

The concept of issue ownership thus describes, that some political parties appear to be better than others in addressing particular policy areas and voter wishes. The parties which own the issues that are essential for the voter, will as a consequence also receive their vote.

There are different ways a party can possess issue ownership. This is described by Belanger and Meguid with the terms valence- and position issues.

Valence issues cover the type of topics with large agreement on the objectives, but disagreement on the means (Andersen and Borre 2003: 21). Examples of this may be to combat crime, to strengthen health or increase employment. The welfare state has become such a valence issue, since most parties declare their support for it.

Belanger and Meguid point out that valence issues are central for the vote decision. It is therefore crucial for PRRPs to be considered competent in these areas.

In other words, issue ownership of a valence issue is important for a party affiliation (Belanger and Meguid 2005: 12). The second type of issues is what the literature refers to as position issues. Within these areas there is no clear consensus on the goals and hence an issue ownership on a position issue is not necessarily positive (Andersen and Borre 2003: 21). If, for example a voter does not support tax cuts, the probability that conservative parties own this particular issue would increase, but not the probability that voters vote for them.

This type of issue is therefore less important in electoral numbers than valence-issues. A subject can be more or less prominent or salient. Belanger and Meguid describe how issue ownership only affects voting, if the issue is vital for people (Belanger and Meguid 2005: 5). Both valence issues and position issues can be subject to saliency, and thus their significance on voters' political agenda changes. This means that there is little use in having ownership of an issue that is not currently at the top of voters' political agenda. It can be assumed that an issue as the welfare state is increasingly important for voters, why it is essential for a party to possess a certain degree of ownership over the welfare issue.

As illustrated, issue saliency is another factor that helps to make clear which areas are important to "own" if a party wants to receive votes. The reputation that can be assigned to a politician or a party in connection with an issue ownership is produced and created by the history of the problem of interest, innovation, initiative and attention to the issue.

This increased attention to the problem can result in the fact that voters perceive one party and its candidates as more trustworthy, capable and committed to solve the current problem than other parties and its candidates (Petrocik 1996: 826).

Petrocik describes how political parties enjoy a reputation in relation to a political topic. This is reflected in a party's historical ability to handle issues related to this particular policy area. The issue reputation of a party is regularly tested and strengthened through the dynamics of political conflicts (Petrocik 1996: 828).

According to Petrocik ownership of an issue is obtained in the wake of the ruling party's history and its stated and experienced focus on the issue. An issue ownership is relatively stable, but it contains nevertheless a dynamic element in the sense that one party does not necessarily have a monopoly position on this forever. This allows that individual parties issue ownerships change, which opens the possibility that an issue ownership can be acquired and conquered by one or more parties. In this context it is important to emphasize that an issue ownership is not necessarily only "owned" by a single party. In practice voters may be aware that several parties are competent and interested in a specific issue area. Different parties may therefore have a co-ownership over a political issue such as welfare.

As mentioned, issue ownership is often the result of a historical process in which a party has demonstrated long-term competence and interest in a particular policy issue. This strategy can be used not only to create ownership of an issue, but also to win an issue-ownership. The difficulty with this method is that it is characterized by inertia due to its extensive time span.

Therefore, parties who wish to win an issue that would not traditionally be accepted as theirs, would benefit from a more aggressive winning strategy. Both government and opposition parties may mutually accuse each other for lacking competence only to create doubts about the counterpart's ability to manage the issue properly.

Opposition parties often have an advantage in this respect as they can accuse the government for failed policies in the political field, without having to be accountable for these policies.

If the opposition parties are successful in demonstrating the government's inability to solve the political issues and even manages to produce proposals that appear reasonable, the opposition parties achieve a brief ownership of the political issue (Petrocik 1996: 827). This temporary ownership can then develop into an actual issue ownership if the party subsequently sticks to the focus over a longer period and - if it is voted into government - is able to solve issues related to the political topic.

Theoretical as well as in a long-term perspective exist a difference between whether the party's acquisition of an issue is temporary and whether it has become a real issue ownership, but this distinction is irrelevant in practice.

If a party tries to get hold of an issue, it is also essential that it is done credibly and sincerely. According to Petrocik, this is done by trying to reformulate and interpret the topic and the approach to the topic, so that the party appears to be better at handling the issue.

If the party's seizure of an issue is in line with its other political ideas, the credibility and the possibility to win the issue is stronger. For example, it is difficult for the Left to outbid the Social Democrats in the welfare area, without that the Social Democrats respond with an even more comprehensive welfare initiative, which will cause the regaining of the subject by the Social Democrats.

Therefore, it is necessary for PRRPs to try to seize welfare issues through their own political approach. In practice this is done, for example, by proposing the expansion of free choice schemes concerning welfare issue, in order that welfare expenditures do not rise. Thus, they have reinterpreted the welfare area in a direction where the focus lies on the outcome and not the economic input and the individual's opportunity to make its own decisions.

To conclude, the issue voting theory tries to explain how voting behavior can be characterized in the late-modern society. According to the theory, the circumstances political parties have concerning issues that are considered relevant in time are essential. Here it is important to keep in mind that, first, it is important that the party is very prominent on the issue, namely that the party has issue ownership. Secondly, it is crucial for voters that the position of a party is consistent with its policy with regard to the particular issue.

4.2 A New Winning Formula

The theory of Herbert Kitschelt is relevant for this thesis, because it explains the progress of PRRPs as a result of their changed economic policy. This theory choice is inspired by the Belgian political scientist Sarah De Lange, who used Kitschelt's theory in the article "A New Winning Formula" (2007). De Lange establishes a set of parameters used to measure the responses of different parties to economic and legal policy areas by using their Manifestos.

One drawback of the theory is that its starting point of explanation is based on diagrams, where West European parties are placed on a distribution and value scale. This schematic representation may reduce the explanatory power of the analysis results and creates a simplistic understanding of the PRRPs economic policies.

One advantage is that the theory can be operationalized relatively simple. By comparing the theory with past and present party programs and election materials adopted by the three parties, the thesis can provide a possible explanation for the PRRPs progress.

In the book “The Radical Right in Western Europe” (1995), Herbert Kitschelt describes that the Front National in France and the Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway achieved political success in the 1970s and 1980s through a policy of liberal economic redistribution and authoritarian values. Kitschelt named this populist right success recipe “A Winning Formula” (1995: 275).

In his article “Diversification and Reconfiguration of Party Systems in Post Industrial Democracies” (2004), Kitschelt describes that the PRRPs have a strategic incentive to change their economic policies. The basis for this assumption is that the working class changed its political preferences, determined by their wish for socio-economic and socio-cultural development (Kitschelt 2004: 2).

Kitschelt explains, that the working class increasingly oriented itself since 1990s towards a combination of authoritarian values and the desire for a responsible socio-economic redistribution policy (Kitschelt 2004: 8). These new political preferences are according to Kitschelt a consequence of the Social Democrats new political strategy to appeal to the middle class, thereby leaving behind a group of male low-skilled workers without a real party affiliation (Kitschelt 2004: 9). This alienation of low skilled voters therefore enables PRRPs to gain votes from this voter segment (Kitschelt 2004: 4). The challenge for the PRR is thus to adopt an economic policy that was previously liberal, but must now appeal to both bourgeois and working class voters.

Thus, PRRPs use a political rhetoric concerning their economic policy that satisfies the need of both voter groups (Kitschelt 2004: 10). In this way, these parties benefit from moderating their former liberal economic policy in order to appeal to both bourgeois voters and voters from the working class. Thus, there is a change of Kitschelts original winning formula in which a former liberal economic policy is replaced by a more moderate economic policy stance.

4.3 Welfare Chauvinism

At the end of World War II, consent to the democratic system was largely built on the ability of political parties to organize the distribution of national wealth through the welfare state or in some cases through structured patronage networks within party organizations. Therefore, political parties designed processes for granting people benefits in health, education or employment, mainly because of the rise of the public sector in many countries and the extension of the scope of action of the administration.

This management and sharing arrangements of the national wealth helped to establish and maintain ties between political elites and citizens. The evolution of modern societies has, in part at least, deprived the traditional parties of the ability to fulfill their representative function and the allocation and mediation of public resources, thus promoting the emergence of new movements and the partial decay of the traditional links between the masses and political elites.

In many Western European countries, political forces have undoubtedly seen their ability to define and implement social policies reduced. Reasons are significant changes in the demographic structure of contemporary societies, the globalization and liberalization of capital and trade and production (Scherman 2000; Esping-Andersen 1999) and more generally, the process of transition to a post-Fordist economy, gradually distancing from a situation of full employment, the essential foundation of the Keynesian Pact in the post-War area (Inglehart 1997).

The increasing number of socially excluded individuals can therefore be seen as a major factor of the de-legitimization and questioning of the effectiveness of the welfare state (Beland and Hansen 2000). Meanwhile, supranational integration mechanisms have imposed new obligations and profoundly changed both the national model of socio-economic governance and the content of public debate on the necessary adjustments in social protection systems.

Several of the member states of the European Union thus had to manage the recalibration of welfare, the impact of fiscal consolidation requirements, deficit reduction and reduction in public spending as a condition for joining the EU. In some countries, the adoption of austerity measures and the implementation of unpopular reform measures could also be justified by government parties as the inescapable consequence of the framework imposed by the membership stability pact during the preparation phase for the entry into the Euro (Moleno and Palier 2004).

Politically, a basic contradiction has developed between a growing demand of the public for social intervention by the state and the reality of interconnected external pressures, both real and perceived. Considering the significance of these needs, PRRPs have gradually managed to impose the idea that an alternative solidarity pact was conceivable outside the established norms of the social democratic post-1945 consensus, convinced that new ties could be created facing a traditional system undermined by its failures and described as a prisoner of all external constraints.

This is a central aspect of the dynamics of mobilization of populist radical right parties and a determining factor in their electoral success beyond the mere protest voting. Faced with the internationalization and liberalization of the economy, the promise to reduce social protection barriers helped to open a wider space for the success radical and populist parties (Swank and Betz 2003).

In this matter, the concept of “national preference” has been used by all of these parties in one form or another and has undeniably played a leading role for the foundation of a utopian alternative model for the distribution of national resources in the process of growing scarcity. In contrast with traditional welfare models, such a discriminatory concept was given credibility by the rhetoric of the leaders of the European xenophobic populists.

Embedded in a financial and economic rationality against the supposed cost of social protection of foreigners and a negative representation of the “distinctive” culture of the immigrant population, welfare chauvinism falls within the framework of a broader political struggle about the existence of public goods and the definition of those who can and can’t claim benefits in the specific context of resource depletion of the welfare state (Wimmer 1997).

Chapter V. Methodology and Data

5.1 Research Design

The thesis uses a mixed method approach, relying on empirical data and secondary literature for theoretical support. Particular attention is placed on primary sources such as election manifestos, party programs and official statistics. Characteristic of this research approach is the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. The qualitative research approach serves as a means to verify the validity of the research. It is believed that the combination of a qualitative and quantitative approach leads to a more complete picture of reality.

The quantitative approach relies on two of the most widespread empirical sources for the positioning of a political party’s policy, expert judgments (Chapel Hill database) and the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) database.

Expert judgments were developed by Castles and Mair (1984), Laver (2001) and later by Huber and Inglegart (1995) to position parties along a left-right axis. They were subsequently used to measure the position of parties on specific issues, including welfare policy.

The qualitative research approach supports the quantitative part and serves as a means to verify the validity of the research. The qualitative part is a comparative case study. The case study as a research design seems appropriate, because it provides a contextual knowledge of social conditions. The case study is furthermore ideal because cases create practical knowledge, which supports the generalized and theoretical knowledge. There are a variety of strategies for the selection of cases. I opted for an information-oriented selection of cases, in which the sampling and individual cases are chosen on the expectation of their information content.

The cases which are used are the Austrian *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ) and the Danish *Dansk Folkeparti* (DF). Denmark and Austria are seen as suitable case choices, because both of them represent different welfare state models according to the typology of Esping-Andersen, namely the social-democratic and conservative welfare model. The aim is to find out if the position of PRRPs regarding redistribution differ in a different welfare state model.

5.2 Method and Data

5.2.1 Party Programs and Election Manifestos

Party positions cannot be directly observed (Bakker et al. 2015). In “Measuring parties’ ideological positions with manifesto data: a critical evaluation of the competing methods” Elias Dinas and Kostas Gemenis propose that there are three general approaches to determine a party position, namely an expert research, a survey and analysis of party manifestos (2009: 1-2). Baker et al. further mention research on voting behavior in parliament as a possible approach (2015: 7).

Examining party programs is the most recommended and used approach. The reason for this is the achieved level of objectivity in studying party programs. Party programs are seen as the tip of the ideological iceberg (Flood and Usherwood 2007: 6-7).

Of course there are other sources than party programs that one might study to get information about party positions, such as parliamentary debates, speeches or interviews in newspapers. Party programs, however, have a number of advantages over other sources.

They unify the existing differences in opinions, values and attitudes within a party. The positions of the parties come about as a result of ideology and political practice. For the above reason, party positions are not confused or merged with the use of discourse in a context of electoral competition. These are two phenomena that should be analyzed separately, given the different causal relationships (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2003: 3). They contain no slips of the tongue or dissident views of solitary individuals within a party. Additionally, they are more or less similar documents in which political parties unfold a vision of the future in various policy areas. This reduces the risk that insufficient information is available for some parties.

A key motivation for using party programs and election manifestos to position political parties' policy dimensions is that they are the only authoritative documents which display the official party positions (Budge et al. 2001: 50).

The programs are used offensively by the parties, which means that they are written for the majority of the population and are thus very forthright (ibid.: 51). The concept of party programs and election manifestos has long been known and is an essential part of political parties' strategy to make their positions known. This makes them a useful tool to study the position of parties over time.

In contrast to work programs, which express the policy a party wants to pursue and implement in the short term, party programs and election manifesto expresses a party's fundamental position on a number of broad policy areas. They therefore express the basic normative principles and visions of political parties for the political development of the society.

These documents are for that reason appropriate to examine a party's welfare policy, because they clearly define what policies a party intends to implement. A further advantage of using these party materials is that they are easily accessible.

Finally, it can be a disadvantage that party programs and election manifestos do not describe the real politics that parties lead, but are rather a statement of intent. A combination of programs and political reality would give a fuller answer to whether PRRPs in Western Europe changed their position on welfare policy.

5.2.2 Comparative Manifesto Project

In order to systematically compare PRRPs position on redistributive policies, this thesis uses data from the Comparative manifestos Project (CMP), which offers the most developed analyzes of party programs and election manifestos and their evolution since 1945 (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2011).

The main purpose of the project, which started in 1979, is to measure political parties' political preferences over time and space. The source of the measurements are the election manifestos of political parties. Election manifestos have been analyzed by quantitative content analysis. More precisely, the parties' election manifestos have been broken down into individual arguments, so called quasi-sentences.

Each quasi-sentence is assigned to one of the 56 predefined categories of policy issues. The CMP looks at the frequency in which a phrase or quasi-sentence belongs to a specific category listed in the election manifesto. Then the score of the category is divided by the total number of sentences in the program. This number is multiplied by 100, resulting in the final score that a party has to a particular topic.

The results of the content analysis are thus a calculation and classification of all the arguments represented in the election manifesto. This method of encoding is largely based on the salience focus a party puts on a certain topic, rather than its position with respect to other parties. Through the summation of the number of quasi-sentences in each category, a picture of the political issues that a party attaches importance arises.

Since many of the categories are formulated neutrally without any expression of support or opposition to an issue, even the parties' relative positions are analyzed (Hellström 2009: 11-12). This coding has created a unique data set that has been used in numerous publications. The data set has achieved a quasi-monopoly status within the comparative analysis of party positions. Size wise, only some national election survey data sets have a similar scope as CMP data, but are far from covering the same time period.

However, the project quickly reaches its limits when it comes to study the politicization of specific issues such as welfare policies. The three categories "Welfare State [welfare]", "Welfare State Expansion [per 504]" and "Welfare State Limitation [per 505]" are not entirely accurate enough to grasp the evolution of the substance of welfare issues over time.

5.2.3 Chapell Hill Expert Survey

Another prominent way to measure party positions are expert surveys. One of their advantages is their relatively high level of reliability and easy availability. Their main strength lies in the ability to collect reliable and comparable data, without the need to resort to large samples. In political science in general and in the study of party positions in particular, expert surveys complement other measuring instruments such as public opinion surveys and the analysis of political manifestos.

One of the main questions of surveys is whether the response rate is sufficient to perform a descriptive and explanatory analysis. In the case of expert surveys, it can be assumed that the surveyed are highly specialized and knowledgeable about the subject, which increases the validity of the judgment.

Another advantage is the good quantification and comparability of the data, since the experts are usually asked to give their judgement on a structured scale. The main expert survey for the policy positioning of a party is the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2015), which is used in this thesis.

Besides the mentioned strengths, this method also has some weaknesses. They allow to obtain a quantitative measurement of party positions, but involve simplifying electoral competition and limitations of the issues discussed, since the issues that the experts analyze are preselected. Issues submitted to the experts are designed as “positional” and the possibility of the politicization of issues really high. Experts position the parties, but generally give no information on the importance of different issues for each party, with the exception of a few recent investigations (e.g. Steenbergen and Scott 2004; Benoit and Laver 2007). Furthermore, these studies are problematic because experts can not accurately determine their development in retrospective (Budge 2000).

More generally, the confidence level is low since the expert assessments are subjective and sometimes subject of serious disagreements, perhaps because of the heterogeneity of the used sources and the difficulty to establish a position in some cases. Because of the mentioned disadvantages, I decided to base the analysis additionally on a qualitative analysis of electoral programs and election manifestos.

Chapter VI. Quantitative Analysis

6.1 CMP Analysis

To examine how the positions of PRRPs regarding welfare state issues and its exclusionary aspects developed in the various cases, the concepts should be operationalized. Therefore, the indicators “welfare State Expansion” (per501) and “multiculturalism negative” (per608) from the Comparative Manifesto Project were used (Volkens et al. 2011). Welfare state expansion was used since it corresponds to affirmative statements for the expansion or maintenance of public responsibility for basic social rights and public services. This includes comprehensive pension institutions, appropriate social policies, a governmental promotion of wealth creation, social tax concessions, a comprehensive range of public infrastructure and a high level of social protection and public services.

The indicator multiculturalism: negative was used to operationalize the exclusionist aspect of redistributive politics. The aim here is to show if PRRPs increased the importance of policy issues which interpret everything national as positive and everything that comes from outside as a threat. An increase of these indicators would imply that the access and reach of welfare state solidarity should be made dependent on people and nationality. Welfare chauvinism is composed therefore as welfare state expansion + multiculturalism negative.

The following figures show the positions of different European PRRPs at national elections according to their election manifestos concerning the two indicators. For the creation of the figures, the data analysis and presentation software Origin was used. Besides the development of the two indicators in the various cases, also the change in the electoral success is examined.

Therefore, we will look at the percentage of votes obtained during the parliamentary elections, which are also displayed in the data of the Manifesto Project. These are the same elections in which the party manifestos are encrypted. Those percentages are used to measure the electoral success.


Only the countries with an electorally significant PRRP with more than 5% of the votes are mutually compared with each other. Such an electoral threshold can be found in many European countries and is also effective in the election of the European Parliament. Consequently, 10 parties from the following Western European countries are compared: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland. The electoral development is shown for all parties in one figure, whereas the development of the salience of the two core elements is shown for each party in a separate figure as well as combined in one figure.

Finally, it must be determined which measuring points (elections) are included in the research. For some of the more recent elections data is not yet available. In France, the parliamentary elections are held in two rounds, the percentage of votes are taken from the first round. The period of investigation ranges from 1980 to 2015. Some parties only emerged in the late 1980s as the Lega Nord and the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People's Party in the 1990s and the List Pim Fortuyn, the Party for Freedom and Vlaams Belang in the 2000s.

Table 1 - PRRPs and Elections (CMP Data)

Country	Party	Elections	Number of Elections
Austria (At)	Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ)	1983;1986;1990;1994;1995;1999;2002; 2006;2008	9
Belgium (BE)	Vlaams Block Vlaams Belang (VB)	1981;1985;1987;1991;1995;1999;2003; 2007;2010	9
Denmark (DK)	Dansk Folkeparti (DF)	1998;2001;2005;2007;2011	5
Finnland (FI)	Perussuomalaiset (TF)	2003;2007;2011;2015	4
France (FR)	Front National (FN)	1986;1988;1993;1997;2002;2007;2012	7
Italy (IT)	Lega Nord (LN)	1992;1994;1996;2001;2006;2008;2013	7
Netherlands (NL)	Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV)	2002;2003 2006;2010;2012	5
Norway (NO)	Fremskrittspartiet (FrP)	1981;1985;1989;1993;1997;2001;2005; 2009	8
Sweden (SE)	Sverigedemokraterna (SD)	2010	1
Switzerland (CH)	Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)	1983;1987;1991;1995;1999;2003	6


Figure 1 - Electoral Development (CMP Data 1980 – 2015)



**Figure 2 - Welfare State Expansion and Multiculturalism: Negative by Country
(CMP Data)**

Black line: Welfare State Expansion

Red line: Multiculturalism Negative










Figure 3 - Welfare State Expansion (CMP Data 1980-2015)





Figure 4 - Multiculturalism: Negative (CMP Data 1980 – 2015)



As can be seen in Figure 1, the election results of PRRPs in Western Europe have steadily risen in the period from 1980 to 2015. A similar picture would be seen for the European elections, with some even stronger gains. Although declines in the favor of the voters can be seen repeatedly, the overall trend is mostly positive. Among the most successful parties with strong gains in the last elections are the FPÖ, DF, FN, SD and SVP. Other parties as the PVV, FRP and PS have recently suffered only small losses and are still at a high level. The last group represent the parties LN and VB, which had their greatest electoral success in the 1990s and 2000s and experienced declining electoral approval.

When looking at Figure 2, there is no clear picture. In most countries, with the exception of France there is no uniform increase or decrease of the salience of welfare state expansion. A significant increase can be observed in Austria, France and Norway, a significant decline in Belgium and Switzerland. The parties of the other countries emphasize welfare state expansion sometimes more, sometimes less. Striking is a high level of salience in the Scandinavian countries and Austria, all of which have a well-developed welfare state.

The salience of multiculturalism: negative is also very different among the countries as Figure 3 shows. A high level in this case can be identified for the VB, DF, PVV, SD. A relatively low level for the FN, LN, FRP. The FPÖ, PS and SVP lie somewhere in the middle. A more detailed assessment is carried out based on Figure 1.

Austria

While the FPÖ devotes just over 4% of their 1983 manifesto to welfare states expansion, this value decreases continuously to 0% in 1994. Afterwards the share of the topic is growing again and reaches its highest level in 2006 and 2008 with more than 7%. The share of multiculturalism: negative in the manifestos of the FPÖ is in contrast represented either not at all or very low until 1999. Striking is the sharp rise in 2006 to just over 10% and the relatively strong decrease to just under 6% in 2010.

Belgium

Welfare state expansion is already relatively strongly represented in the manifestos of the Belgian Flemish Bloc in the 1980s and increases in the 1990s up until 2003 to about 9%. After the dissolution of the Flemish Bloc in 2004, these values fall and the issue can barely be found in the manifesto of the more moderate successor party Flemish Interest in 2010. The picture is reversed for the issue multiculturalism: negative. While it occupies only a very small proportion of the manifestos of the Flemish Bloc or is not even mentioned, the percentage increases in the first manifesto of the Flemish Interest in 2007 to 7% and is growing again slightly in 2010.

Denmark

The Danish People's Party devotes approximately 11% of their manifestos in 1998 and 2005 to welfare states expansion. The subject is, however, not mentioned in the 2001 manifesto. In 2007 and 2011, the percentage lies in between these two extremes with 8.5% and 6% respectively. In contrast, the values for the second indicator lie in all the manifestos about 15%. One exception is the 2005 manifesto, where only around 2% is devoted to multiculturalism: negative.

Finland

The True Finns start with a value of 6.4% for welfare state expansion in their first manifesto in 2003. After that, the percentage rises to 15% in 2007 and falls to 9.6% in 2011. The values for the second indicator multiculturalism: negative are more stable with a slight increase from 2003 to 2007 from 3% to 5%.

France

The increase of the indicator welfare states expansion is probably the most considerable one for all the cases. In the years from 1986 to 1997, the subject is not mentioned at all and in the years 2002 and 2007 only marginally. A significant increase can be seen in 2012, where 11.5% are devoted to this topic. At the same time, electoral approval rises from 4.3% to 13.6%. The indicator multiculturalism: negative remains rather low throughout the whole period and changes only slightly.

Italy

For the LN, both indicators play a relatively minor role in their election manifestos. Exceptions are the years 2006 and 2013, where the share of welfare states expansion is 9.6% and 6.6%.

Netherlands

In the Netherlands, welfare state expansion has a relative high value for the List Pim Fortuyn with 7% in 2002 and 2003 and multiculturalism: negative has little value. The PVV gives a little less space to the issue of welfare state expansion, however, a slight increase from 2006 to 2010 and 2012 can be seen. By contrast, multiculturalism: negative receives always more than 10% of the PVV manifestos, with a peak of just over 15% in 2006.

Norway

The percentage of both indicators increase for the FRP over time. Welfare state expansion has relatively low values until 1989, then increases sharply to 7.5% and decreases in the next manifesto to 3.5% and experiences a sharp increase again from about 6% to 11% from 1997 to 2001 and remains more or less at this high level ever since. The values for multiculturalism: negative are low until 2005 and rise in the last examined manifesto from 2009 to 4%.

Sweden

In the case of the Sweden Democrats only the manifesto from 2010 has been investigated. It should be noted that the value of 13.7% for welfare state expansion is the second highest in all the manifestos investigated. Also the value for multiculturalism: negative is with 7.3% comparatively high.

Switzerland

Welfare state expansion has the largest share of the manifesto of the Swiss People's Party in 1991 with just under 8% and declines thereafter with a small exception in 2007 continuously to 0% in the latest manifesto of 2012. Multiculturalism: negative on the other hand grows steadily since 1987 and amounts for 5% in 2012.

6.2 CHP Analysis

The analysis of the salience of welfare state expansion with the help of the CMP is a good way to show how important welfare state issues are for PRRPs over a certain period of time. In a second step, these positions are examined on the basis of the Chapel Hill expert survey to get a fuller picture. For this purpose, estimations of experts on the positioning of PRRPs and social democratic parties on the policy issues redistribution and immigration policy of the years 2006, 2010 2014 are used.

Redistribution reflects the views of the experts about the position on redistribution from rich to the poor, whereby 0 means that a party strongly favors redistribution and 10 that it strongly opposes redistribution (Chapel Hill expert survey 2006: 1).

In the case of the item immigration policy, 0 stands for a strongly opposition against tough immigration policy and 10 that the party strongly favors a tough position (ibid.). The Chapel Hill surveys were conducted in 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. The first time that the two policy issues, which are used here were included in the survey was in 2006, which is why only the last 3 surveys can be used. In 2006, 235 surveys were completed on the positioning of 227 parties by academics specializing in political parties (ibid.). 364 surveys were completed in 2010 (Chapel Hill expert survey 2010: 1) and 337 in 2014 (Chapel Hill expert survey 2014: 1).

The decision to include social democratic parties follows the argumentation of Herbert Kitschelt. He argues that the political crisis of social democracy in the 1990s is a condition and cause for the rise of the populist right (Kitschelt 2007). In particular, the inability of the more neoliberal Social Democrats to present themselves as a credible representative of the labor force. Accordingly, PRRPs have been successful because the left - especially the Social Democrats - have abandoned the working class and accepted the neoliberal consensus favoring the rich (ibid.).

Kitschelt argues that PRRPs have changed in line with changes in the world and the Western European party systems. The success of PRRPs in the 2000s is therefore based on a “new winning formula” consisting of authoritarianism, combined with a central position in the economic dimension (de Lange 2007).

The social-democratic parties which are analyzed here are the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich* (SPÖ) in Austria, *Socialisten en Progressieven Anders* (SP.A) in Belgium, *Socialdemokratiet* (SD/SDDK) in Denmark, *Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue* (SDP) in Finland, *Parti Socialiste* (PS) in France, *Partito Democratico* in Italy, *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA) in the Netherlands and *Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti* (SAP) in Sweden. These parties are the major social democratic parties in their country. Data of parties in Norway and Switzerland are not present in the survey.

Figure 5 - Redistribution Populist Radical Right Parties (CHP Data 2006 – 2014)

0 = Fully in favor of redistribution

10 = Fully opposed to redistribution




Figure 6 - Redistribution Social Democratic Parties (CHP Data 2006 – 2014)




Figure 7 - Immigration Policy Populist Radical Right Parties (CHP Data 2006-2014)

0 = Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration

10 = Fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration





Figure 8 - Immigration Policy Social Democratic Parties (CHP Data 2006 – 2014)



According to the experts, the majority of PRRPs has changed its position on redistribution between 2006 and 2014 in the direction that the issue is now advocated stronger. This is the case for the VB, FN, LN, PVV and SD. Particularly strong are the changes for the French FN and the Dutch PVV. Only in the case of the Austrian Freedom Party, the experts believed a stronger rejection of redistribution in 2014 than in 2006. The values of the Danish DF and the Finnish TF remained approximately the same during the investigation period, yet at a fairly advocating level.

In contrast, the values of the social democratic parties developed slightly towards rejection or remained constant. Only in Austria, the SPÖ has a lower value in 2014 than in 2006. It can thus be said that the positions of PRRPs and social democratic parties regarding redistribution have aligned in recent years, whereby the social democratic parties are still more in favor of redistribution.

The expert assessment further shows that the Scandinavian PRRPs advocate redistribution stronger than the continental ones. In Finland, the TF is considered stronger in favor of redistribution than the Social Democratic SDP. In Denmark and Sweden, the values of both party families are only slightly apart.

As expected, PRRPs are considered to be significantly more in favor of a tough immigration policy. The vast majority of the parties was given an assessment of 9-10 during the three reference years. Only the Italian LN and the Finish TF in 2006 have slightly lower values. Compared to the issue redistribution, the differences of the values between the years are much smaller and remain at a very high level.

The values of the social democratic parties are significantly lower. The most hostile attitude regarding immigration is attributed to the Danish SD, followed by the Austrian SPÖ, the Finish SDP and the French PS.

It can be concluded that while PRRPs kept their authoritarian position regarding immigration, the most parties changed their position on redistribution policies even in the relatively short period from 2006 to 2014 from a neo-liberal positions to a more moderate position and are now closer to the position of Social Democratic parties in this regard.

VII. Qualitative Analyses

The following section focuses on the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ) and the *Danske Folkeparti* (DF) as two cases of Western European PRRPs. In a first step it will be shown which concrete welfare arrangements exist in the two countries and how they developed. This was done in order to see whether the welfare policy of the both parties is influenced by their location in countries with two different models of welfare, the social democratic model in Denmark and the corporatist or conservative model in Austria. The following part of the analysis includes a description of the history and the characteristic of the two parties.

Finally, the party programs and election manifestos of the parties from the late 1990s to the most recent elections are analyzed. A hypothetical deductive approach is used because we analyze whether the two parties have changed their welfare policy. In the project document analysis, we seek to describe a process of change. Therefore, it is appropriate to provide some guidance as to when the FPÖ and DF have undergone a policy change. Basically, the process of change is established when the welfare policy has been moderated and its exclusionary aspects are stronger emphasized. This could be reflected in the abolition of the desire for outsourcing of health, lower income taxes and cutting public spending for the native population.

Based on inspiration from the Comparative Manifesto Project Section 402, 504 and 505, I have selected three policy areas: health policy, fiscal policy and public sector spending, to see whether the DF has changed its policy position. I have done so because the points express a party position on the design of the welfare state and thus provide a clear indication of whether the parties' redistributive policy should result in decreasing or increasing expenditure on welfare state benefits and tax levels.

In the case of the FPÖ the party documents will be analyzed in a more general context, since the three policy areas are not mentioned in all party documents. The main focus lies again on statements regarding the welfare state and welfare chauvinistic statements.

7.1 Denmark and the Dansk Folkeparti

7.1.1 The Danish Welfare State

The Danish case is well known as one of the best examples of the social democratic model of the welfare state in terms of Esping-Andersen (1990: 78). The Danish welfare state is characterized by a high level of collective welfare and equality. The Danes are proud of their system, which has been the role model for many countries and socialistic governments for many years.

There have been major changes in the Danish welfare state since 1940. After the end of the Second World War began an expansion of the Danish welfare state, which was characterized by a move towards an all-encompassing welfare state. Welfare benefits began to comprise an increasing part of the population after the 1940s. Given that more Danes were included in various welfare services, a growing number of these services were funded by taxes, why the tax burden was increased (Kolstrup 1996: 385).

In the 1950s and 1960s, social policy stood at the center of the welfare state expansion. The starting point was that all citizens should support themselves. Only when all possibilities for self-support were exhausted, public support could be paid. The Pensions Act from 1956 is seen as a watershed in the development of the welfare state. The state pension had widespread support in the Danish population, where the majority was in favor of a universal pension (Petersen 2003: 147).

In the 1960s, Denmark changed from an agrarian to an urbanized industrial country. Despite several subsidy schemes, funded by both the Danish taxpayers and the Community, the number of full-time agricultural workers decreased. At the same time women made their entry into the Danish labor market, particularly in the production and manufacturing industries. These changes meant that new requirements were posed for the public sector. Among other things, the public sector began to take care of childcare.

The Danish welfare consequently changed in the sense that public responsibility was expanded to many types of services. This development can further be seen in the disability law from 1956, when it became public responsibility to compensate the disabled (ibid: 79).

In the 1970s, a huge expansion of the welfare state happened. Virtually all public services rose, and many areas were either expanded or added to the Danish welfare state. From the end of the 1980s and to start of the 1990s there was a shift from welfare to workfare. Support in the event of unemployment was harder to receive and requirements for the receivers were tightened.

During the 1990s several shortenings of the period of unemployment benefit were made, from seven years in the first reform to four years in 1999 through the labor market reform.

In the 2000s an increase in the number of Danes with private health insurance could be witnessed. In the same period, the cost for public health remained fairly stable as well as unemployment benefits. The requirements for the rights and duties for the unemployed continued. (Sørensen 2006: 51). Control and possible sanctions even tightened for unemployed (ibid.).

It is clear to see that the extent and capacity range of the welfare state from the 1960s until the early 1980s increased. During this period economic protection, such as pension and unemployment benefits changed to universal services. At the same time childcare developed through the incorporation of women into the labor market.

From the end of the 1980s there is a change from welfare to workfare in Denmark. Requirement for recipients of public benefits were introduced. At the same time there are changes in the public sector, with an increased focus on the state's economic prosperity. Thus there is a change in Danish welfare policy, with growing focus on the economic aspects of the welfare state and the conviction that it is not possible to continue with massive investments in the public sector.

7.1.2 The Dansk Folkeparti

The *Dansk Folkeparti* (Danish People's Party) emerged from the Progress Party which was founded 22 August 1972 by Mogens Glistrup. He had by then become nationally known through the television program Focus, in which he said to have a zero tax rate. The Progress Party was elected in the parliamentary election in 1973. Glistrup was sentenced to three years in prison in 1983 for tax evasion. While Glistrup was serving the sentence, Pia Kjaersgaard became the substitute party leader. Kjaersgaard was later elected as the party's political spokeswoman and leader of the more moderate wing of the party (*slapperfløj*). This part of the party fought to moderate the party's policies and to keep Kjaersgaard in the position of party leader and political spokeswoman.

Kim Behnke led the radical wing (strammerfløjen) that aimed at maintaining the party as a protest party and to make Kim Behnke lead the party, while Kjærsgaard should remain spokeswoman. In 1994 the conflict accelerated when Behnke was chosen party leader. Kjærsgaard had by then made very clear that if Kim Behnke became leader, she would refuse to continue as a spokeswoman.

Kjærsgaard subsequently tried several times to spread the message that the new leadership was unreliable and unwanted. In 1995 Kjærsgaard left the party and formed the *Danske Folkeparti* with the three fellow party members Kristian Thulesen Dahl, Ole Donner and Poul Nødgaard. The DF's key issues were immigration, social, health and legal policy and opposition to the EU (Danmarkshistorien 2011). Their objective was to be a reliable political partner and unity within the party was considered a prerequisite to reach this goal.

At their first elections in 1998, the DF won 13 seats in parliament. After the parliamentary elections in 1998, they became more successful. At the general election in 2001 the government shifted from a Social Democratic to a Conservative one led by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, with the DF as a parliamentary member, which gave tacit support to the Liberal-Conservative coalition. Out of the position as a tolerated partner, the DF was now more closely involved in government policy and also had the opportunity to exert some influence. At the same time, the party could distance itself from positions with which they were not in accordance (Meret 2009).

The DF continued to grow until the general election in 2011. The Liberal-Conservative coalition was continued after the elections of 2005 and 2007. The DF influenced government policy mainly in the field of immigration and integration.

In 2007, a new party was founded in Denmark, the Ny Alliance (NA) with the main objective to prevent the success and influence of the DF, which they failed to do.

In the 2011 elections both DF and the Conservative People's Party lost seats and only the conservative-liberal Venstre party was able to maintain its share of votes. As a result, the Liberal-Conservative coalition had no longer the majority in parliament, even with the tacit support of the DF. The role of the DF as a tolerated partner ended with a new center-left coalition led by the Social Democrats.

The loss of the DF was largely attributed to the shifted focus from immigration and integration to economic issues, due to the economic crisis. This made it difficult for the DF to hold their success (Kosiara-Pedersen 2012). Nevertheless, they became the third largest party with 22 seats. After the elections of 2011 the DF therefore had to sit in the opposition.

The perception of the DF on immigration contains a number of right populist views. The Party links increased immigration to an undermining of the values of freedom, equality and democracy. The DF represents the principle of national sovereignty. Specifically, this means that intergovernmental cooperation is considered necessary in order to solve problems. Supranational cooperation, such as in the EU, however, are strictly refused on the grounds that it is no longer the people, but international institutions which decide about the policy.

Other problems or challenges that the DF mentions in their programs are immigration, imperialism, globalization and internationalization. Profile Issues for the *Danske Folkeparti* are restrictive refugee and migration policies, rejection of the supranationality of the EU, increased security through measures to lower crime and the reduction of taxes.

The DF is increasingly supported by the low-skilled and the working class. Therefore, they have adapted their policies more towards the left, when it comes to issues not related to immigration (Rydgren 2004).

7.1.3 Document Analyses

Immigration policy

The DF considers immigrants in their party program of 1997 mostly as unemployed and as exploiters of welfare resources. Furthermore, immigrants are seen as potential opponents of Western values.

“Den nuværende masseindvandring er en alvorlig trussel mod Danmarks fortsatte eksistens som fredelig velfærdsstat. Udlændingepolitikken er derfor af største vigtighed for hele befolkningen, hvorfor Dansk Folkeparti ønsker en folkeafstemning om spørgsmålet.” (Dansk Folkeparti 1997) (all translations from German are my own)

“The current mass immigration is a serious threat to Denmark's further existence as a peaceful welfare state. Immigration policy is therefore of utmost importance for the entire population, why the Dansk Folkeparti wants a referendum on the issue.”

The perception of the DF towards immigration is clearly negative as the excerpt from the party program 2002 demonstrates.

“Denmark is not an immigrant-country and never has been. Thus we will not accept transformation to a multiethnic society.” (Dansk Folkeparti 2002)

“Denmark belongs to the Danes and its citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of law, which develops along the lines of Danish culture.” (Dansk Folkeparti 2002)

These quotes demonstrate the parties' disapproval of immigration. It is considered as a threat for the Danish security because immigrants would be inclined to crime. Immigration leads to multiculturalism, which is threatening Denmark and Danish culture.

“Dansk Folkeparti vil arbejde for at øge forståelsen for, at ethvert samfunds udvikling er bestemt af det samlede indhold af dets kultur, og vi vil modarbejde ethvert forsøg på at skabe et multikulturelt eller multiethnisk samfund i Danmark, dvs. et samfund, hvor en betydelig befolkningsgruppe er tilhængere af en anden kultur end vores.” (Dansk Folkeparti 2009: 22)

“The Dansk Folkeparti will work to increase the awareness that each society's development is determined by the overall content of its culture, and we will oppose any attempt to create a multicultural and multiethnic society in Denmark, namely a society where a significant population belong to a different culture than ours.”

From the *Dansk Folkepartis* point of view, the integration of external cultures is conflictual as it creates social problems in Denmark. Multiculturalism is understood as being problematic and harmful to Denmark. Immigration is seen as a serious threat for the Danish welfare state.

Health policy

In the DF's party program from 1997 it appears that the party is in favor of letting free competition manage the supply of certain healthcare.

“En række serviceopgaver skal udliciteres, idet konkurrence er midlet til at sikre en tilfredsstillende kvalitetsmæssig service til den rimeligste pris.” (Dansk Folkeparti 1997)

“A number of service jobs should be outsourced, since competition is the means to ensure a satisfactory quality of the provision of services at the most reasonable price.”

“Dansk Folkeparti ønsker frit valg mellem offentlige sygehuse og privathospitaler.” (Dansk Folkeparti 1997)

“Dansk Folkeparti wants a free choice between public hospitals and private hospitals.”

The party advocates the liberal economic tool of outsourcing, which should be the key to ensure good quality in healthcare. The party program from 2002 sets out the objectives of its health policy, but it is not clear that outsourcing should be a tool to improve the quality of health services for the Danes. It becomes apparent that the DF's focus on health policy lies now on health care competence.

"Health care and the public hospital service must be of the highest standard and should, in principle, be publicly financed through taxation." (Dansk Folkeparti 2002)

"Help should be available through an efficient social and healthcare system to all who are in need of it." (Dansk Folkeparti 2002)

The program does not mention the use of outsourcing as a tool for a working health care system. The DF could thus have changed its position on the issue of whether the party is willing to use outsourcing for the creation of high quality welfare. In the work program of 2009, it appears that:

"Dansk Folkeparti er tilhænger af borgernes frie og lige adgang til landets sygehusvæsen. Det er imidlertid ikke længere muligt for sygehusvæsenet at stille gratis ydelser til rådighed for enhver, som uden at være dansk statsborger måtte ønske det." (Dansk Folkeparti 2009: 55)

"The Dansk Folkeparti is in favor of citizens' free and equal access to the country's hospital system. However, it is no longer possible for hospitals to provide free services available to anyone who wishes so without being a Danish citizen."

When comparing the three excerpts, it appears that the DF has abandoned outsourcing in the public sector and focused instead on a skilled and fully efficient health care system. The question of the method of financing is not clarified to the same degree as in the program from 1997.

The development of the DF's health policy shows that the party has changed its approach to healthcare financing. The party's economic health policy places larger importance on ensuring good treatment, only for Danish citizens, rather than a desire to ensure a high degree of competition between health care providers.

Taxation

The following quote expresses the tax policy of the party in the program from 1997.

“Dansk Folkeparti ønsker det samlede skattetryk nedsat væsentligt...”, “Indkomstskatten nedsættes kraftigt...”, og “At lade pengene forblive ubeskattede i virksomhederne er en langt bedre samfundsmæssig investering.” (Dansk Folkeparti 1997)

“The Dansk Folkeparti wants to significantly reduce the overall tax burden...”, “Income tax need to be reduced sharply ...” and “Letting the money of businesses remain untaxed is a much better social investment.”

The quote is very much an expression of a liberal economic policy, where personal and corporate taxes should be lowered to increase incentives to take a job and start a business. The work program from 2009 states that:

“Dansk Folkeparti er imod skattelettelser, som forringer grundlæggende velfærdsområder som ældreforsorg, folkepension, sundhedsvæsen, uddannelse, forskning og bekæmpelse af kriminalitet, men mener ikke, at sådanne forringelser automatisk følger af rationaliseringer.” (Dansk Folkeparti 2009: 137)

“The Dansk Folkeparti opposes tax cuts that impair basic welfare areas such as elderly care, pension, health care, education, research and the fight against crime, but does not believe that such deterioration is automatically a consequence of rationalization.”

Having been a supporter of tax cuts in 1997, the party's fiscal policy is since then based on the premise that financing of the welfare state is a core element of their policy and comes ahead of lowered taxes. The DF has moved away from an ultimate demand for tax cuts and represents now a more moderate fiscal policy.

Public expenditure

In relation to public expenditure, the DF states in 1997:

“De offentlige udgifter skal gøres væsentligt mindre. Og øgede offentlige indtægter som følge af konjunkturgevinster skal øremærkes til henholdsvis skattelettelser og gældsafdrag. Alle offentlige udgifter skal gennemgås kritisk med henblik på besparelser for at sikre overskud på såvel de samlede offentlige finanser som på statens budget, ligesom der skal gøres plads til skattelettelser“...“For at kunne nedsætte de alt for høje skatter og afgifter ønsker Dansk Folkeparti besparelser på de offentlige budgetter. Derfor skal en lang række opgaver privatiseres og udliciteres.” (Dansk Folkeparti 1997)

“Public expenditure should be substantially less. Increased public revenues as a result of the economic gains have to be earmarked respectively to tax cuts and debt repayment. All public spending must be critically examined in order to ensure a surplus of savings for both the overall public finances and the government budget, and there must be room for tax cuts.” ...“In order to reduce the excessively high taxes, the Dansk Folkeparti wants cuts in public budgets. Therefore, numerous tasks should be privatized and outsourced.”

According to the DF, the public sector is grown out of proportion and is too expensive to run and the party is willing to use both privatization and outsourcing to reduce the costs in the public sector. The DF is as above described supportive of tax cuts but it requires that the public sector becomes either smaller or more efficient. A skepticism of the public sector's size and role is thus expressed. A changed view of the public sector can be seen in 2009.

“Uden en holdningsændring vil mange opgaver i det offentlige ikke blive løst i fremtiden. Det skal være attraktivt, spændende og udviklende at arbejde i det offentlige.” ... “Det offentlige skal være en effektiv og attraktiv arbejdsplads for fremtidens unge.” (Dansk Folkeparti 2009: 19)

“Without a change in attitude, many jobs in the public sector will not be occupied in the future. It must be attractive, exciting and challenging to work in the public sector.” ... “The public sector must be an effective and attractive workplace for the future of young people.”

This quote indicates that the DF has changed its position from the previous support of a reduction of the public sector to stressing its role as an attractive workplace. The view of the DF concerning the public sector and its importance for the functioning of the welfare state is therefore more positive.

“En række offentlige serviceopgaver er blevet udskudt og forringet under indtryk af presset fra voksende overførselsindkomster og den øgede indvandring, der fandt sted især fra 1983 til 2002. Ved at reducere de offentlige udgifter på nogle områder vil det være muligt både at forbedre sundhedsvæsenet, retsvæsenet, politiet og ældreomsorgen og samtidig undgå at forøge skattetrykket og gerne over tid reducere skattetrykket.” (Dansk Folkeparti 2009: 20)

“A number of public service tasks have been postponed and reduced in the face of pressure from increasing transfer payments and increased migration, which took place mainly from 1983 to 2002. By reducing public spending in some areas it will be possible both to improve health care, the judiciary, police and the elderly while avoiding increasing the tax burden and would reduce the tax burden over time.”

The DF states in this point that by saving costs for cash benefits and other transfer incomes the performance in the mentioned areas can be improved while taxes increase and tax cuts can be avoided. The key difference between the 1997 program and the program from 2009 lies in the changed attitude towards the public sector.

The party previously wanted to reduce public sector tasks and later wanted to contribute to extend welfare services. In this way the resistance the party initially expressed against the size of the public sector more or less disappeared. The DF has apparently changed its position about the economic development in the public sector.

Summary

First of all, the DF sees immigration a threat to the ethnic and national identity. The claim is that immigrants try to impose their own national culture on the host country. Secondly, migrants are presented as particularly prone to commit crime and to exploit the social system. Furthermore, immigrants are accused to take away jobs and create unemployment for ethnic Danes in the country and exploit the generous Scandinavian welfare system, leaving fewer resources for Danes. From the analysis of the DF's election materials, we can conclude that the party has changed its social policy from a liberal starting point to a moderate welfare oriented policy.

This moderation could explain the party's increased affiliation. On the other hand, this moderation is part of a larger trend as the Left has also undergone a significant political moderation. It is apparent in the programs of the DF that traditional demands of the Left such as the emphasis on social justice and higher spending on the welfare state appear, which are combined with classic Right issues such as a requirement for lower immigration, the return to national values and the rejection of multiculturalism.

7.2 The Austrian Welfare State and the FPÖ

7.2.1 The Austrian Welfare State

The Austrian social policy during the Second Republic followed the conservative welfare state model (Esping-Andersen 1990). The Austrian system is based on compulsory social insurance. This is the most important access criterion for the majority of the monetary social benefits in Austria. Furthermore, exist benefits which supplement the social security benefits.

Besides all substantive differences and conflicts between decision relevant political and social actors the Austrian welfare state policy after 1945 continued the central principles that were established in the 19th century and is marked by a considerable expansion since the 1950s which extended into the 1970s. This expansion was driven by high economic growth during this period.

A comprehensive national insurance following the Scandinavian system was discussed only sporadically in the years after WWII. The decision was finally made with the creation of the General Social Security Act (Allgemeines Sozialversicherungsgesetz; ASVG) in 1955 following an income related social insurance model differentiated according to acquisition groups. Hence a high degree of standardization of the social security of workers and employees took place.

Moreover, this piece of legislation had later a leading role for the social security of self-employed as well as for health and accident insurance of officials. However, a complete harmonization or combination into one law has not taken place. The pension scheme of officials has preserved its completely unique character, although efforts to harmonize it with the ASVG can be seen in the 80s and especially the 90s.

While the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland extended their systems by an income-related second “pillar” and could therefore secure the living standards, Austria did not take over these uniform basic services as a social balancing component. A comprehensive civic care, was however nearly reached through a voluntary health insurance and co-insurance in the 1970s.

Family allowances as well as the Care Assurance (introduced in 1993) were designed as universal services. After the Austrian welfare state had experienced a considerable expansion until the 1970s, indications of change can be seen since the 1980s. This touched less the basic principles, but rather the extent and the range of welfare state policy. Selective measures to further strengthen the welfare state systems appear here next to benefit reduction and hindrance in access to benefits which became more important in the 1990s (Talos and Wörister 1998). This process accelerated with the establishment of a new government of the ÖVP and FPÖ in 2000.

7.2.2 The FPÖ

Democracy in Austria was established immediately after the Second World War, when the country was occupied by the allied troops and suffered a quadripartite division similar to that of Germany until 1955. After World War II, during the denazification policy, the two main parties - the social democratic SPÖ and the conservative ÖVP - began the construction of an autonomous national identity, prohibiting any attempt to claim Pan-German affiliations.

This repressive climate created a strong protest out of which the Federation of Independents (*Verband der Unabhängigen*, VdU) was established. Initially the VDU was more liberal than nationalist, but in the 1950s former members of the NSDAP became increasingly influential in the party and after increasingly strong internal discussions the FPÖ was founded as a successor party in 1955 (Ellinas 2010: 44).

For many years, the FPÖ gained only about 6% of the vote. In the beginning of the 1980s the FPÖ became suddenly a potential partner for the SPÖ, after they lost the absolute majority under Bruno Kreisky.

In 1983 FPÖ and SPÖ formed a government which lasted only three years. During this period, the party chairman Norbert Steger vainly tried to direct the party more to the left and give it a liberal image. Meanwhile, the party went its own way in Carinthia and kept its nationalist character (Sully 1997: 2-3).

1986 marks the rise of Jörg Haider, former leader of the Freedom Party from 1986-2000. Once party leader, Haider abandoned the previous strategy of adjusting to the Austrian party system and tenaciously brought forward a strong protest against the two main parties. In the early 90s, Haider launched a campaign called “Austria First” primarily designed to ensure the principle of national preference as it did Jean-Marie Le Pen in France. The end of the Soviet Union and the subsequent restructuring in Eastern Europe as well as the wars in the former Yugoslavia led to a rather great exodus of refugees seeking asylum in Austria.

As the issue of migration became more current in the late 1980s, the FPÖ adopted this topic before other parties were able to formulate a response to the concerns of the citizens (Ellinas 2010: 59). According to the FPÖ there was a clear link between unemployment and immigration and between immigration and rising crime (ibid.: 61).

During the 90s, the FPÖ was trying to distance itself from Pan-Germanism and presented a new party program in 1997. One of the main topics was the rejection of the EU, since the FPÖ was of the opinion that the planned Eastern Enlargement after the Austrian EU accession in 1995 would lead to a loss of jobs. The party further stressed that the cohesion of the nation is becoming increasingly important in order to preserve the own society. Haider also frequently criticized other parties out of populist reasons and denounced the high incomes of the SPÖ chairmen. As a possible consequence of this policy his party won 10% of SPÖ voters (ibid.: 69-71) in the 1994 election and reached a total of 22.5% of the overall votes.

During the legislative elections of 1999 the FPÖ of Haider reached 26.9% of the vote and overcame the ÖVP with a few votes. Their leader Schüssel, signed a pact with the party to form a government. The increase of the vote for the party caused a serious crisis within it. Due to the right-wing occurrence and racist remarks of the FPÖ the EU responded with sanctions and after subsequent conflicts between the two ruling parties, early elections were carried out in 2002 in which the FPÖ lost far more than half of their votes and only received 10%.

Even before the elections Haider had left the position as party chairman (ibid. : 40). One explanation for the failure of the FPÖ was according to Ellinas, that it could not meet the high expectations. In opposition, they were able to promise a lot without having to fulfill it. Added to this was that the FPÖ was no longer as flexible in government as it had to cooperate with the ÖVP and was observed by the EU (ibid.: 73-73).

After several years of debate within the party, Jörg Haider and other former FPÖ members founded the party *Bündnis Zukunft Österreich* (BZÖ; Alliance for the Future of Austria) in 2005. New chairman of the FPÖ became Heinz-Christian Strache, who stands out above all by its xenophobic campaigns and statements. The legislative elections of September 2008 marked an important event for the radical right in Austria. The FPÖ reached 18% while the party of Haider was evidently advancing to 11%. A little more than a month before the elections Haider died in a car accident causing great dismay. Lately the FPÖ is regaining more approval and reached 20,5 % at the last national elections.

7.2.3 FPÖ Document Analyses

Party Program of 1997 (Linzer Programm)

At the federal party congress in Linz 1997, the FPÖ announced a new party program which has a clear liberal economic program. Article 4 states that:

“Ziel eines freiheitlich geordneten Gemeinschaftslebens ist die bestmögliche Entwicklung aller schöpferischen Kräfte. ” (FPÖ 1997: 2)

“The aim of a liberal ordered community life is the best possible development of all creative forces.” (all translations from German are my own)

In order to ensure this development, the FPÖ calls for example for the comprehensive deregulation of economic activities (ibid: 18), low taxes and levies for employers and employees, a support of the middle class and tax incentives rather than subsidies.

“Faire Marktwirtschaft verlangt niedrige Steuern und Abgaben für Unternehmen und Mitarbeiter. Statt dirigistischer Subventionen sollen steuerliche Begünstigungen Investitionen fördern.” (ibid.: 19)

“A fair market economy requires low taxes for companies and employees. Instead of dirigistic subsidies, tax incentives should promote investments.”

A small government by means of an administrative reform and investment in research and development is demanded and state interference in matters of the economy should be as small as possible. The FPÖ wants a “limited and temporary employment for foreign workers” (Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs 1997: 21) to obtain a fair market economy.

In this understanding uncontrolled immigration leads to social tensions and distortions of the labor market. An essential element of the principle of a free society for the FPÖ is that “Austria is not an immigration country” (ibid.). The positions of the party with regard to the immigration issue is based on the statement that Austria is due to its “its topography, its population density and its limited resources not an immigration country” (*“seiner Topographie, seiner Bevölkerungsdichte und seiner beschränkten Ressourcen kein Einwanderungsland”*) (FPÖ 1997: 5).

High unemployment levels are an indicator of severely limited immigration regulations for the FPÖ. Only qualified and required workers are temporarily tolerated. Furthermore, the party sees the housing market at risk with rising immigrant numbers.

The program can be described as a synthesis of national and neo-liberal components. Its socio-political conception is generally directed against any social and egalitarian form of society and specifically against any form of the welfare state. The FPÖ sees the welfare state as a coercive measure and threat to freedom. The most important part of a “free society” for the FPÖ is private property.

“Privates Eigentum ist Ausdruck der Verwirklichung von Freiheit.” (ibid.: 1997: 2)

“Private property is expression of the realization of Freedom.”

The party program from 1997 criticizes the rest of the political establishment in a several points, especially concerning immigration, refugee policy and bureaucracy in the public sector. More severe punishment for criminals, decreased immigration and increased decentralization of the democratic system is mentioned.

2008 “Österreich im Wort”

The election manifesto of 2008 shows clear changes. Immigration continues to occupy a large space of the program. There is no talking about the public sector being too large. Instead the FPÖ advocates a public sector which guarantees, among other things, education, defense and social services (FPÖ 2008: 4). However, the party still believes that cultural clashes should be avoided because they imply that the basic value systems collide (FPÖ 2008: 3-4). Considered as the most serious threats to the nationalist principle are immigration and supra-nationalism (ibid.).

With regards to the economy, the party prefers a comprehensive market economy with long term goals, which should also take the ecology into account. Some protectionism is considered necessary. The family's weight in society is underlined and occupied a great space of the program.

The FPÖ also stresses that they want to relieve the factor labor. This relief should take place through a reduction of incidental wage costs (ibid.: 5). The program further states:

“Ausländer haben Beschäftigungsbewilligung und Aufenthaltserlaubnis zu verlieren, wenn sie über längere Zeiträume oder wiederholt arbeitslos sind.” (ibid.)

“Foreigners have to lose their work permit and residence permit if they are repeatedly or for extended periods unemployed.”

It is further visible that the party pleads for a strong welfare state.

“Österreichische Staatsbürger sollen in der Heimat vor existenzbedrohenden Risiken bedingt durch Alter, Behinderung, Krankheit, Unfall, Arbeitslosigkeit und schweren Schicksalsschlägen bestmöglich geschützt sein.” (ibid.: 4).

“Austrian citizens should be protected as best as possible protected in their homeland against threatening risks due to age, disability, illness, accident, unemployment and heavy strokes of fate.”

But the FPÖ rejects a demand-oriented minimum social income, because it allegedly constituted a grossly unjust form of redistribution and provokes the immigration of people who are exclusively interested in Austrian welfare services (ibid.).

Welfare chauvinistic statements can be identified in more points of the manifesto. Under the section “social justice” a separate social insurance for foreigners is demanded to prevent “a burden on our social welfare system due to economic migrants” (*Eine Belastung unseres Sozialsystems durch Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge muss aber verhindert werden*) (ibid.: 5) and to reduce taxes and charges.

2011 “Austria First”

In the party program of 2011 “Austria First” there are more extensive changes. Most expressions concerned with ethnicity and homogeneity disappeared. The party talks instead of cultural affinity and safeguarding of the Austrian cultural heritage (FPÖ 2011: point 2). The main task of the state is according to the party to preserve and protect their people’s culture and indigenous traditions.

“We are dedicated to protecting our homeland of Austria, our national identity and autonomy as well as our natural livelihood.” (FPÖ 2011: point 2)

A Population-wise homogeneous society is, according to the party, not possible because of the circumstances in Austria and the rest of the world. The nationalist principle should, however, be pursued as far as possible. Social aspects are more emphasized than in previous programs.

“We encourage achievements in a market economy with social responsibility, protect private property and advocate an equitable distribution of contributions and benefits for the general public.” (ibid.: point 5)

The party states that it is committed to a policy, which is oriented at the problems of the present and is free from ideological reservations. Low taxes and incentives are preferred over subsidies.

“The aim of a liberal budget policy is to relieve the pressure on citizens.” (ibid.)

“We are committed to all Austrians having the best living conditions in freedom and in a social environment enjoying equal opportunities.” (ibid.: point 4)

“The prosperity of Austria achieved industriously over generations must be preserved for the future. It must be used predominantly for those people and their descendants who worked to achieve it.” (ibid.)

However, this required expansion of social services does not apply to foreigners

“For foreign citizens, access to the services of Austrian health-care must be ensured by means of an independent social security system.” (ibid.: point 6)

“Social housing is designed primarily to cover the residential needs of Austrian citizens.” (ibid.: point 3)

Summary

The program of 2008 and especially the 2011 program put a greater emphasis on social protection and the expansion or at least maintaining of public services. There is a clear break between the statements in 1997 and 2008 when the FPÖ became more pro-welfare, but continued to be skeptical about multiculturalism. The fiscal policies have developed from pure neoliberal positions to a greater focus on redistribution. The party wants to safeguard the people's home idea and the welfare state concept in the long term. Therefore, national cohesion should be preserved.

7.3 Conclusion of the Document Analysis

The Analysis of the manifestos and the party programs of the DF and FPÖ illustrate that both parties supported a neoliberal anti-welfare position before the 2000s. After that, a gradual change of the parties' original liberal economic preferences to a more interventionist and redistributive agenda can be seen. The DF and the FPÖ travelled more to the left on the economic axis, while their positions concerning the cultural dimension of conflict remained at the right end.

While the FPÖ still follows a mixed strategy between economic liberalism and redistributive elements, a moderation of their strictly liberal policy is visible over the years. The stronger advocacy of a more extensive welfare state on the part of the DF can be derived from the social democratic welfare state tradition in Denmark.

The strategic positioning of both parties is characterized nowadays by an exclusionist model of welfare, defined by an increasing number of positions on the left economic dimension and an exclusionary authoritarian agenda on the cultural dimension.

These parties successfully included the social question in their programs and addressed in a ethno-nationalist manner. Instead of racism, the opposition against immigration is now justified by social chauvinism.

Chapter VIII. Conclusion

The populist radical right is a family of parties that despite the existence of differences between the parties share a number of common features. Among them is nationalism or nativism as an engine of political action, an ideology, a political style, populism and, according to some authors, an authoritarian conception of the social order. Their ideology is based on the goal of the exclusion of the foreign population and the establishment or maintenance of a system of ethnic domination (Betz and Johnson 2004). The greatest danger of their political proposal lies not in the ability or willingness to abolish the system of representative democracy, but in the possibility that their positions “contaminate” the system from within (Griffin 2000).

The PRRPs have increasingly managed to mobilize a broad cross-class electoral base, because their discourse on immigration and criticism of the major political parties have been connected with the concerns of broad parts of the population. In this sense, the electoral successes of some of these parties and their ability to influence the debates and the national political agenda have made the PRR a leading political player in Western Europe in the last three decades. All this demonstrates that it is a mistake to think that the successes of these parties are mere “accidents” and that their policy approaches do not have any connection with the debates and existing impulses in contemporary European societies (Norris 2005).

The research question asked at the beginning of this thesis can be confirmed for the majority of the analyzed parties, but not for all. One explanation for this is that the issues of the populist radical right in Western Europe are different depending on the specific national situation.

This thesis showed, that many PRRPs represented skeptical positions towards the welfare state and positioned themselves as opposed to ruling parties in the 1980s and even in the 1990s. Over time some of them developed more and more to welfare proponents. The populist radical right today presents itself as social democratic and neoliberal positions are advocated to a lesser extent. It was demonstrated that this social democratic positions show up in a nationalist way. They PRR sees themselves as advocates of the local people against migrants, emphasize the privileges of the local people and deny equality and social participation opportunities for migrants.

It is striking that PRRPs have specifically developed in nations which are long accustomed to the collective action of the state on social protection as e.g. Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France and Norway, where the most serious concerns have arisen about the sustainability of the system in place and its possible questioning.

For many voters, the principle of “national preference” carries the inherent promise of a comprehensive treatment of social issues in employment, family policy, health or education. It can therefore be assumed that the approval of people to the populist concept of “national preference” results from the competition with immigrant workers on the job market, the changes of post-industrial societies and fewer resources to deal with the increased risk level inherent in such a transition (Korpi 2003: 24).

Since the early 1990s, the working class and socially marginalized sections of society, seduced by the prospect of this new prophetic social order, were increasingly part of the electorate of PRRPs (Norris 2005). It was shown that parties like the Front National, the Dansk Folkeparti or the FPÖ have begun to adjust their electoral offer to a hybrid approach.

While they continued to propagate a free-market ideology at the domestic level, they started to integrate a set of anti-capitalist and anti-globalization themes directly borrowed from the ideological heritage of the left in their programs to approach voters supportive of these ideas.

In contrast to the working class, the traditional electorate of PRRPs came from the petty bourgeoisie, as craftsmen, traders, small businessmen, self-employed. They are traditionally attracted by a state drastically reduced to its sovereign functions and anti-tax programs, to release energy from the shackles of bureaucratic interventionism. Theoretically, this synthesis based on the integration of historically, politically and ideologically opposed social groups contradicts the assumption that capital/labor are the main cleavages that structure the formation of Western European party systems in terms of left/right opposition (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

In many European contexts, this ideological polarization has released a dual political space. In many cases, leftist parties accepted the market logic and the rigor Maastricht criteria and therefore partially abandoned their traditional economic profile for new libertarian themes in social policies (Quinn and Inclan 1997; Pennings 1999).

With the change to an economic “Realpolitik” and confronted with the need to expand their electoral base to the new middle classes, leftist parties correspondingly lost a substantial proportion of their traditional working class electorate. On the right of the political axis, the ideological refocusing process and support for the European project by almost all conservative parties, Liberals and Christian Democrats in Europe opened up a space for PRRPs to meet the increased demand for social order and authority in public opinion, as well as certain anxieties related to national identity and the development of contemporary multicultural societies.

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