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Statement of Confirmation

I declare that this thesis entitled: “Political Identities of Pakistani Students in Lahore” is my own original work, and hereby certify that unless stated, all work contained within this thesis is my own independent research and has not been submitted for the award of any other degree at any institution, except where due acknowledgment is made in the text.

Sana Shah

Date

Dedication

I would like to dedicate my thesis to my grandfather Habibullah Sajid, who passed away on 1 March 2009, and whom I have loved dearly, for he respresented everything that I would wish for Pakistan: tolerance, love, respect and discipline.

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1. Introduction and research approach

As a student of political science and international development there were common major themes and topics that captured my interest throughout the duration of my studies. Of these, the search for a postcolonial identity in developing states stood apart from the rest. The case of Pakistan, in particular, is of great interest to me. Since its birth in 1947, Pakistan's search for a postcolonial identity has been confronted by numerous challenges such as the radicalization of Islam, the instability of domestic politics and the social structure of the nation.

Working in such a broad thematic field makes it difficult to grasp an authentic and core-touching picture on the political situation in Pakistan. This presented me my biggest challenge as I endeavoured to find a topic that was innovative and operative in the sense of offering some enlightening information that would validate my research.

Starting from this basis I decided to undertake a survey in Lahore, the capital of Punjab and second largest city in Pakistan, which would help me on the authentic and core-touching approach of my research. I prepared a questionnaire of twelve pages, outlining questions on Pakistani identity and political attitudes of students, as well as a draft of an interview outline that I wanted to analyze in view of the recent political events in Pakistan in order to understand their political opinion as they are an important part of the Pakistani civil society.

Students are not only generally a very dynamic audience when it comes to analyzing public attitudes, but they have been a key figure throughout the entire revolutionary history of almost every postcolonial state as they are being caught in a sensitive field between an education system, which horizontally and vertically tears the country apart¹, generational conflicts between a youth that is at the same time part of secularization and radicalization trends in the country, and their families as well as a group which is entangled within individual identity formation processes.

¹ Tariq Rahman, the most famous linguist and distinguished professor in Pakistan states that there are two levels of inequality, one which works horizontally which favours or discriminates people according to their ethnic and linguistic differences, and the second one which works on a vertical basis which creates major divergences between students of the three education systems in Pakistan: the Urdu medium, the English medium and the madrassah system ("madrassahs" designate schools with a primarily religious syllabus). See therefore: Rahman, Tariq: *Denizens of an Alien World: "A Study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan"*, Oxford University Press, Karachi: 2004, p. 20.

In the recent political events² in the last couple of months, the rise of this part of an active civil society in the fight against authoritative actions of a government or rather a military regime and in the establishment of their position in the Pakistani society has certainly given them a new power inside the Pakistani society.

Subsequently, my thesis will focus on the following two-part question: What are the different political identities of the Pakistani students in Lahore? And what is their role in and their attitude towards the recent political events in Pakistan?

This is the question I will try to answer in my personal analysis of the political situation of the students in Pakistan in the following chapters. However, before doing so it is only appropriate to give a short introduction to the methodological approach of my research.

1.1 Preview of literature and finding hypotheses

Before being able to start preparing a questionnaire, I began with an intensive survey and analysis of literature on Pakistani history. Understanding the creation of the Pakistani state is a necessary precursor to understand the recent political situation in Pakistan. History plays an essential role in the analysis of any political developments of the country. The importance of history, the creation of Pakistan, is a core motif that is deeply connected – directly or indirectly – with the personal identity of every Pakistani citizen. It is however difficult to start writing about a national identity as the term “national identity” itself is problematic because it understands “nation” as the central reference frame and tends to blind out other central – transnational as well as sub national – elements in the construction of both communities and subjectivities.³ Therefore the term “identity” as used here in my analysis is a term that refers to the common values and attitudes that are used as frame for the definition of an identity; “national identity” hence designates those values and attitudes that are retraceable in the identity construction of an individual but based on national discourses on identity. Pakistan, as a victim of sectarianism and separatist movements, nevertheless has common features or traits which are retraceable in the concept of a Pakistani citizen. The story of the creation of Pakistan is a story of an ideology that is deeply involved in a web of feelings like insecurity in regard of the Hindu-Muslim escalations on the British subcontinent, of Muslim pride – a strong Muslim history in Asia throughout the centuries - of

² The recent political events which will be taken account of in this paper are: the Lal Masjid operation of the government against the rise of the Islamists in the country in July 2007, the impeachment of the chief justice of the Supreme Court Iftikhar Chaudry in March 2007 by president General Pervez Musharraf and the imposition of a state of emergency in Pakistan in November 2007.

³ Kaelble et al. (Ed.): “Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert“, Campus, Frankfurt/Main:2002, p.7-33.

independence and national autonomy in view of the British colonialism and specifically a strong inherent fear of the “other”, particularly being expressed through a great feeling of distrust and suspiciousness. These feelings were bunched together in an ideology which would be the basis for the creation of Pakistan: the *two-nation theory* generated by the “Guide”⁴ of the Pakistani people (also known under the Urdu equivalent: Quaid-e-Azam), Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The two-nation theory does not only justify the creation of Pakistan, but it has become a leading *motif* in the establishment of a Pakistani nationhood:

Javid Iqbal, Pakistani scholar and author of the book “Ideology of Pakistan”, confirms that:

Pakistan claims that it is an ideological State and therefore, it can survive as long as its ideological integrity is maintained. The Ideology is based on the two-nation theory which raised the edifice of our nationhood. Therefore it is the source and expression of our political, economic, cultural and religious and moral values.⁵

According to Iqbal, the ideology of a nation “reflects the state of a people’s minds, their emotions, hopes, aspirations, ideal or objectives and a subsisting will to realise them”.⁶ The fusion of political aspirations, with personal feelings, has created a very difficult and sensitive field of research. On the one hand it demands a detailed knowledge on the history of Pakistan and on the other hand a sensitive approach towards Pakistani culture and Islamic religion. This implicated for me especially two main thematic fields: First, a deeper look on the discourse on Pakistani history as well as attitudes and identities developed by its citizens, especially among students within this process, and second a constellation analysis of the most important political actors and elements resulting in a radicalization of Pakistani society along with a militarization of Pakistani politics. For the initial stage of my research, I could only rely on literature about Pakistan, to derive my initial hypotheses, which would then be the basis for the designing of a questionnaire and a draft of an interview outline, to identify in a second step the most important units of analysis within my research context. The third major part represents the localization of these identities and attitudes found within my field research in order to embed them in a framework of the current⁷ political, social and religious situation in Pakistan. This is followed by a deeper analysis of the political situation in Pakistan by picking out one major problem field in Pakistan – corruption within the state apparatus and within the army. This problem field needs to

⁴ The Pakistani people lovingly call him “Quaid-e-azam” which means “The Guide of the Pakistani People” in Urdu, official language of Pakistan.

⁵ Iqbal, Javed: “Ideology of Pakistan”, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore: 2005, p. 8.

⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

⁷ The term “current” refers to the three major events in 2007: the chief justice affair in march 2007, the Lal Masjid Operation in July 2007 and the imposition of a state of emergency in November 2007, which will all be discussed in chapter four.

be taken serious and strategies to cope with the situation are needed in order to achieve development in the country. For this reason I have conducted an expert interview with Alexandra Souza Martins, expert on crime prevention working for the UNODC (United Nation's Office on Drugs and Crime). The findings of this analysis as well as a detailed analysis of the political situation in Pakistan are all included in my fourth chapter.

I will pursue by giving a short content-oriented introduction to my first step, which is the identification of the most important hypotheses within the discourse on Pakistani history.

1.2 Historical discourse on Pakistan

As mentioned before it is important to grasp the idea of how Pakistan came into existence to further analyze the creation of a so called national identity. Johann Galtung, renowned peace researcher once wrote:

History is an inexhaustible reservoir that can be mined for the construction of identity, for meaning. (...) The question then becomes: looking backward, mining history for nuggets that can serve the purpose of identity construction, on what would a people focus on its quest?⁸.

I have started my quest on Pakistani identity, therefore, by a detailed look at the literature on Pakistani history. But this highlights another difficulty, a sensitive approach towards the discourse on Pakistani history.

There are many scholars working on this issue analyzing the history of this country with different analytical perspectives: one finds many foreign scholars working on this region, such as Ian Talbot, a well known British historian working on the history of India and Pakistan, in addition to political scientists such as Christophe Jaffrelot, a French scholar focussing on nationalism in India and Pakistan, as well as Stephen P. Cohen, an American political scientist concentrating on matters of security in India and Pakistan. But next to a historic-genetic and political-analytical approach it is ultimately important to include a psychological account in the research on the creation of Pakistan and the historical and political aftermath, which I found well documented in the works of Sudhir Kakar, an Indian psychoanalyst, who focuses on the phenomenon of communal violence in South Asia, and in the works of Ashis Nandy, a political psychologist

⁸ Galtung, Johann: "The Construction of National Identities for the Cosmic Drama: Choseness-Myths-Trauma (CMT) Syndromes and Cultural Pathologies", in: S.P. Udayakumar (Ed.): "Handcuffed to History: Narratives, Pathologies, and Violence in South Asia", Greenwood Press, Westport/Conn [et.al.]: 2001, pp. 61-77, here p. 60.

working in the field of post-colonial studies and Djallal Heuzé, French sociologist working on communal violence in South Asia.

These were the authors that shaped my theoretical knowledge on Pakistan and at the same time offered me the foundations upon which to develop my own hypotheses to continue my research. In the following I will present the main hypotheses concerning the political and historical dimension and the psychological dimension of the historical discourse on Pakistan.

1.2.1 The dimension of the politics of history

Politics is almost always legitimized with historical references, as well as the interpretation of history is always politically biased. Based on this general diagnosis, politics of history can be defined as “any social agency that is essentially based on historical references and/or tries to intervene in the interpretation of history”⁹. In this regard, it is important to analyze the historical developments from a political perspective.

Pakistan was founded on the 14 August 1947 as a consequence of the end of the British empire in South Asia. The creation of Pakistan was a result of intensive Muslim lobbying, demanding a nation state for the Muslim population on the Indian subcontinent. The intensive nature of the movement for a separate nation state was due to a strong wave of communal violence between the Hindu and Muslim communities in India under British colonial rule. The leader of the All India Muslim League (AIML), the strongest political organization of the Muslims in India, Muhammad Ali Jinnah – founding father of Pakistan – was the most active Muslim politician demanding the creation of a Muslim nation state. Jinnah argued, in his two nation theory, that coexistence between Muslims and Hindus living in one nation was impossible, as these two religious communities are two “distinct social orders”¹⁰, two civilizations which thus cannot live together as one nation. Based on this ideology, the new Muslim nation state, Pakistan, came into existence and fought for its international autonomy and independence, especially concerning its new neighbour and enemy state¹¹ India. This demanded a new political, cultural and religious orientation of these new Pakistanis, which was strongly based on Islam. As these Muslims were coming from all over India with different ethnic, regional and linguistic backgrounds, Islam was the only common factor that would create a bond between these new Pakistanis, or as Iqbal

⁹ Molden, Berthold: “Mnemohegemonics. Geschichtspolitik und Erinnerungskultur im Ringen um Hegemonie“, in: Molden, Berthold/Mayer, David (Ed.): “Vielstimmige Vergangenheiten. Geschichtspolitik in Lateinamerika”, LIT, Vienna: 2009, pp. 31-56, here p. 45.

¹⁰ Jinnah quoted in Azam, Ikram: “Pakistan’s Political Culture“, Polymer Publications, Lahore, 1992, p. 16.

¹¹ India is due to the difficult and even dangerous Indo-Pakistani relations within the past 50 years often referred to as an enemy state in the context of Indo-Pakistani political relations. See Jaffrelot, Christophe: “Le Pakistan”, Fayard, Paris: 2000, p. 11.

emphasizes, a “consciousness among the people of belonging to each other because a large majority of them adheres to a common spiritual aspiration, i.e. faith in Islam.”¹²

Thus Muhammad Ali Jinnah proclaimed in one of his public speeches in Dacca on 21 March 1948:

Islam has taught us this and, I think, you will agree with me, for whatever else you may be and whatever you are, you are a Muslim. You belong to a nation now: You have carved out a territory, it is all yours; it does not belong to a Punjabi, or a Sindhi, or a Pathan, or a Bengali; it is all yours.¹³

But as much as the importance of Islam has been stressed in the view of the construction of a national identity in Pakistan after 1947, as important was also the fact of building a modern state based on Islamic as well as democratic principles. Pakistan can be seen as an ideological state¹⁴ but not as a theocratic state, because “Islam is essentially a polity and aspires to create a civil society”¹⁵.

The vision of Pakistan as proclaimed and propagated by its ideological leader, Jinnah, is one that envisions Pakistan as a free country, a country which is based on one religion but exerts no political pressure on people belonging to other religious communities:

You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State (...) We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State (...) Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense of the State.¹⁶

Islam is a major factor for the creation of Pakistan, and it surely is a source of orientation for this state, in every sense, in the religious, political and social sense, but when it comes to the political structure of the state, Pakistan is based on democratic principles combining Islamic elements of a

¹² see Iqbal (2005): 12.

¹³ Punjabi, Sindhi, Pathan and Bengalis are/were the different Pakistani ethnic tribes at that time. Apart from the Bengalis the rest are still considered as Pakistani ethnic tribes. See Iqbal (2005): 12.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁶ M.A.Jinnah, presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan at Karachi, 11.August 1947; See in: Ziadi, Z. H. (Ed.): “Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers. Pakistan at last 26 July – 14 August 1947”, First Series, Volume IV, Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad: 1999, p. 537f.

state structure. The constitution of the state of Pakistan stresses this dual importance of Islam as orientation of social and religious life and also its share in the democratic structure organization of the state and its constitution:

Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust (...) Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed (...) Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah (...) Now, therefore, we, the people of Pakistan (...) Do hereby, through our representatives in the National Assembly, adopt, enact and give to ourselves, this Constitution.¹⁷

Political scientist Ikram Azam, confirms this dual dilemma by stating that it was in the end the “democratic ideals and aspirations which have unified the nation’s people and regions and kept it integrated and one”¹⁸. The importance and role of Islam in the historical nation-building process and its continued presence are greatly debated¹⁹ in the actual political decision-making process, as the British historian, Ian Talbot, highlights:

The freedom struggle had left unresolved the question of whether Pakistan should be run on secular or Islamic lines. Indeed, the debate about Islam’s role in Pakistan’s public life still rages on over half a century since independence.²⁰

Thus my first derived hypothesis concerns the situation of Islam in Pakistan. On the one hand, it is clear that Islam is one major, if not the sole, common ground of these Indian Muslims coming to Pakistan or becoming Pakistanis after Partition 1947. Therefore Islam became the only source for the construction of a national identity. Hence, my first hypothesis concerns the ideological nation- and identity-building process of Pakistan:

1. *Pakistani identity is strongly based on Islamic values which becomes the outline of Pakistani lifestyle and policy.*

Islam was supposed to bunch together these new “Indian Muslim refugees” who were all coming to this newly created country Pakistan, with no regard to their ethnic and linguistic background.

¹⁷ The constitution of Pakistan: <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/preamble.html>, 12.07.2008.

¹⁸ Azam (1992): 115.

¹⁹ Pakistan had in the course of its political history various leaders with very different stand on Islam, ranging from more liberal and secular leaders to more authoritative and orthodox-conservative leaders.

²⁰ Talbot, Ian: “Inventing the Nation. India and Pakistan”, Arnold, London: 2000, p.197.

Christophe Jaffrelot, a well known French scholar who focuses on the question of nationalism in South Asia with particular interest to India and Pakistan, confirms my second hypothesis in the regard of the use of Islam in the hands of politicians as a means of national mobilization:

Jinnah and most of his lieutenants aren't religious but use Islam as a method of national mobilization, playing with emotional power to put Muslims in the street feel down. (...) Islam, therefore, is becoming a *lingua franca*, and creating a division between the Muslim minorities and the (other) residents of Punjab.²¹

This brings me towards my second hypothesis which is as follows :

2. Pakistani identity is strongly based on Islam, which becomes the basis for Pakistani nationalism.

These were my two main hypotheses concerning the political-religious ideological dimension on the discourse of the history of Pakistan. The ideological dimension is important to understand, as it touches the core of the nation-building process in Pakistan and thus gives the valid approach for the analysis on any kind of identity discussion concerning Pakistan.

But the ideology that stands behind the creation of Pakistan is not the only sole element when it comes to understanding the history of the country. It is also important to look at the psychological dimension in this process, which helps to explain the emotional commitment and compassion that many Pakistanis today feel towards their own identity.

1.2.2 The psychological dimension

Several strong feelings underpin the creation of Pakistan. First, a feeling of insecurity due to Hindu-Muslim communal violence in India, an inherent fear of the “other” resulting from the insecure situation among the communities, leading to a great feeling of mistrust and scepticism towards the “other”. Second, a feeling of humiliation and deprivation of freedom and independence, resulting from the long British colonial rule. Third, a great feeling of Muslim pride – especially considering the long Muslim history on the Indian subcontinent.

It is extremely difficult to give an analytical account of this emotional situation in the context of Partition and the creation of Pakistan and especially of the political and social aftermath of it.

²¹ Original quotation: “Jinnah et la plupart de ses lieutenants ne sont pas religieux, mais utilisent l’islam à des fins de mobilisation nationaliste, jouant de son pouvoir émotionnel pour faire descendre les musulmans dans la rue. (...) L’islam devient alors une *lingua franca* permettant d’établir un front entre les musulmans « minoritaires » et ceux du Pendjab ” ; see Jaffrelot (2000): 27. Jaffrelot is referring in his last sentence to the ethnic and linguistic power divergences in Pakistani politics, the Punjabis being so far the most powerful ethnic and linguistic ethnic tribe in Pakistani politics.

This becomes only feasible by choosing one important unit of analysis, which is the Indo-Pakistani relationship, that I turn to as my main parameter for measuring these emotions in this stage of my research.

Ashis Nandy, Indian psychoanalyst, cites one interesting observation made by an Indian diplomat, with which I would like to start the discussion on this topic:

Before the war the late Sisir Gupta, scholar and hard-eyed Indian diplomat, used to claim that the crisis of Pakistan's identity was mirrored in the inability of Pakistani children to even draw the map of their country without drawing India.²²

Pakistan's creation in 1947 involved immediate conflict-oriented implications with India, as many questions such as administrative matters of the two new countries, were not resolved under British rule. One of the unsettled issues concerned the princely states in India, which under British colonial rule had a quasi personal union agreement with the British crown which dealt with the distribution of power. The princely states were autonomous in internal affairs as long as they offered their loyalty to the British Crown in matters of foreign affairs and defence.²³ The Independence Act of the British government, guaranteeing independence to India and Pakistan, demanded that the princes of each princely state take a decision before 15 August – Independence Day of India – which country, India or Pakistan, they would accede to.²⁴ In most cases the princely states acceded according to their Hindu or Muslim majority to either Pakistan or India. With three princely states this was not the case: The Princes of Hyderabad, Junagahd and Kashmir did not decide until the 15 of August 1947. The princely states of Hyderabad and Junagahd, were subsequently annexed by India, due to their Hindu majorities, while Kashmir, with a Muslim majority eventually became the big issue between India and Pakistan. The Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir decided to join India, which led to huge protests among the Muslims in Kashmir, leading to the deployment of Pakistani armed forces to support the Kashmiri Muslims.²⁵ This sparked the first Indo-Pakistani war that created long lasting negative resentments on both sides against the opponent. For the newly established and economically-

²² see Nandy, Ashis: "Bonfire of Creeds. The Essential of Ashis Nandy", Oxford University Press, New Delhi: 2004, p. 234.

²³ see Korbel, Josef: "Danger in Kashmir", Oxford University Press, Karachi: 2005, p. 46.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 48.

²⁵ see Lamb, Alastair: "Kashmir. A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990", Oxford University Press, Karachi: 1992, p. 121- 141.

weak state of Pakistan, the accession of Kashmir to India was part of an Indian policy “that would make sure that Pakistan would not survive at birth”²⁶.

Pakistan and India have already fought four wars against each other, always putting the whole international community in fright, as both of these countries are in possession of atomic weapons. These tensions between India and Pakistan, which since the first day of independence of these two countries are prominent, continue to shape the domestic and foreign policies of this region. This political situation influences the social perception of the people of these two countries, which can end up being biased or even worse hostile towards the other country. Many scholars such as Jean-Luc Racine, French political scientist, even go further in their analysis on the social consequences of the Indo-Pakistani relationship and talk about a so-called “India-Syndrome” that reaches its peak in Pakistani patriotism, which is defined by a negation of everything that is Indian: “In Pakistan <patriotic> is often a synonym for <anti-Indian>”, writes Jaffrelot adopting the same logic.²⁷ Jean-Luc Racine, French expert on South Asia, explains that the birth of Pakistan created a “culture of mistrust, which sets the tune of the mainstream perceptions about India”²⁸.

Thus my most important hypothesis for the analysis of Pakistani perceptions of the “other”, India in particular, is:

3. *Dominant Pakistani self-images are strongly defined by a negation of India.*

Ashis Nandy, working in the field of post-colonial studies, especially concerning the region South Asia, confirmed this idea by including a new interesting factor of analysis. According to him, the image of India that is present in Pakistan is a Pakistani product, independent from the political and social reality of India but which has still a considerable influence on the Pakistani psyche:

Pakistan’s India, the image of India Pakistan lives with, is also mostly Pakistan’s own. It has almost nothing to do with what India is or might have been. It tells us what Pakistan is, feels it should be, or could have been.²⁹

²⁶ see Malik, Iftikhar H.: “Islam, Nationalism and the West. Issues of Identity in Pakistan”, St. Anthony’s College, Houndmills: 1999, p. 181.

²⁷ see Jaffrelot (2005): 141.

²⁸ See Racine, Jean-Luc “Pakistan and the ‘India Syndrome’: Between Kashmir and the Nuclear Predicament” in: Jaffrelot, Christophe (Ed.): “Pakistan. Nationalism without a Nation”, Zed Books, London: 2002, p. 195-225 p. 196.

²⁹ see Nandy: (2004): 240.

Jaffrelot comes to a similar conclusion by stating that a constant fear of India since Pakistan's birth has been the consequence of creating a strong army in the country.³⁰

Thus my next hypothesis focuses on the consequences of this India-image in Pakistan, which I believe to create a feeling of insecurity in the country:

4. *The postulated "Indian danger" manifests itself in a general feeling of insecurity in the Pakistani society.*

Jaffrelot argues that the construction of the Pakistani state accompanies the development of a strong Pakistani army driven by a "security obsession"³¹ of Pakistan.³² Thus the process of constructing a national identity and furthering the process of nationalism is strongly interconnected with an inherent fear of India, which leads to my next hypothesis of analysis:

5. *The phenomenon of nationalism in Pakistan and the fear of India create a feeling of insecurity, which lead to a higher disposition for violence.*

Pakistani politics have tried to capitalize on feelings of insecurity by strengthening the army. This, however, has only led to greater political instability, as highlighted by the four military dictatorships since Pakistan's existence. The population has been left to bear the brunt of arbitrary politics under Pakistani military leaders. The subsequent political environment has had two major effects: the rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan and the rise of the civil society – both strategies to cope with an unsatisfied situation within the country.

Fundamentalist parties, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)³³, which today counts among the biggest Islamist parties in South Asia³⁴, have gained considerable influence in Pakistan, which is not least due to their "campus-policy"³⁵ that politically mobilized a new part of the Pakistani society: the students.

Given the history of the student protests in Pakistan, I have thus derived my final hypothesis, which concentrates upon the political potential that lies within students:

³⁰ see Jaffrelot (2000): 122.

³¹ Ibid., 167.

³² Ibid.

³³ The Jaamat-e-Islami is a political party in Pakistan and counts among the most important Islamist parties in Pakistan.

³⁴ see Cohen, Stephen Philip: "The Idea of Pakistan", Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C: 2004, p. 165.

³⁵ see Musa Khan Jalazai: "Sectarianism and politico-religious Terrorism in Pakistan", Tarteel Publishers, Lahore: 1993, p. 255.

6. *The student milieu is a fertile ground for retrieving a great political potential that lies within the Pakistani society.*

These hypotheses form my main hypotheses of analysis when it comes to the psychological account of my field of research. In order to understand the scope that is hidden within the concept of political identities it is necessary to understand certain elements of identity itself, which I have tried to cover in its two most important core elements: the history and development of an identity due to certain historical and political factors and the psychological and ideological background that has led to certain developments in the creation of an identity. Thus, it was important to highlight these two dimensions of analysis, which will be reflected in my study of political identities of Pakistani students in Lahore.

1.3 Conditions of research

My next step is to discuss the conditions of my research. After having discussed my main hypotheses that were shaping my theoretical knowledge on Pakistan, I will now describe four main parts of my research: a) my position as a researcher b) my city of research: Lahore, c) my audience: students, d) my method: questionnaires, semi-structured interviews and one expert interview.

Each of these four points are necessary to understand the background of my research and following also the results I drew from my study.

1.3.1 My position as a researcher

I am an Austrian national with a Muslim Pakistani background, born and raised in Austria and grew up with the Pakistani value and cultural system. The majority of my extended family still lives in Pakistan, the reason for which I regularly travel to my country of origin. I have thus grown up with Urdu and Punjabi as my mother tongues.

These conditions have put me in a sensitive position as a researcher: it has at the same time made my job both easier and more difficult. Knowing the local language has been a particularly good advantage, as many of my interview partners and those responding to my questionnaires felt more at ease when talking to me in Urdu, although many of them used to switch languages

between English and Urdu during the interview situation³⁶. Moving back and forth between the two languages is due to two reasons: first, it was easier to talk about politics, educational systems, and other technical issues in English as it offered most of the technical terms for describing situations and conditions referring to these thematic areas. Urdu was often used in conversations, when people started telling me about Pakistani culture in general, about their families and about religion. Hence, I have made the observation that when it comes to supposedly objective non-personal issues like the assessment of particular politics I was often being spoken to in English, while I was confronted with Urdu when my respondents were sharing their emotions and their emotional commitments regarding their family, culture and religion. This linguistic observation partly shares my own separation of my two levels of analysis which was the political-ideological and the psychological dimension of my research.

Second, I observed that many of my respondents, knowing that I was born and grown up in a non-Pakistani environment, started speaking extensively in English with me – my personal feeling here is that some were trying to impress me with their “foreign language”³⁷ skills – although their English was too poor to really communicate properly with me in English. In such situations I often started to speak in Urdu, in order to indicate to my respondent that we can have this interview in Urdu as well, but which was often ignored, as the respondent continued to speak in English, which led to weak outcomes in regard of the interview and hence for my research. The attitude towards the own language is also an attitude that is shown towards foreigners. Although I have noticed a pride especially towards Urdu among my respondents, particularly in regard of its high literary culture, English is often perceived as a more important and powerful language, which I see as one major reason why I was also often spoken to in English, once my non-Pakistani background was clear to them.

Another major issue that became apparent during my research was that people, often knowing that I was a “foreign researcher” working on Pakistani identity, had a tendency to gravitate to either uncritical praise or harsh condemnation of Pakistan. In the former, I had the impression that my respondents wanted to impress me with their country and culture, while the correspondents on the latter category, knowing that I am a researcher from an industrialized country, may have felt that I would have a negative approach towards the developmental stage of

³⁶ My questionnaire was prepared in English but included some specific Urdu terms. Almost all respondents wrote in English, but I have also received some Urdu answers in my open-ended questions. As to the interview situation, I started every interview by asking my respondents in Urdu, whether they want to speak in Urdu or in English, according to which I adapted myself during the interview situation.

³⁷ As English is one of the official languages in Pakistan, it would be wrong to refer to English as a “foreign language”. I am using this term in this context here, because in these specific situations, English was neither their mother tongue nor used entirely in their everyday life.

Pakistan and thus wanting to hear negative attitudes towards their country. Aware of this paradox, which I put forth as part of my experience as a researcher, I can only stress one more time the hypothetical character of this observation. One major issue that is certainly part of the outcome of my results in my interviews, is my position as a Muslim women, interacting with Muslim males in Pakistan: This was a critical issue as to the scope of the respondents available to me. As I was researching in three different universities, with students from different social backgrounds, this was especially an issue in two of my target universities: The Punjab University of Lahore and the King Edward's College, Lahore. The Punjab University of Lahore is known to be a conservative institution, which can already be noticed by the separation of sexes within the institution and on campus, such as separate study rooms for men and women. The King Edward's College in Lahore is one of the oldest higher education medical institutions on the Indian subcontinent and has a very mixed background of students, which shows quite conservative patterns as to male female interaction as well. These two institutions became a challenge for me in regard of meeting males publicly and distributing my questionnaires to male students, as well as finding male interview partners. I can only presume that those who were ready to talk with me and accepted my questionnaires were open/liberal enough in their attitudes towards women to help me with my research. In some cases I had to ask male students, to whom I had already build contact, to help me distribute my questionnaires to other male students, as it was not perceived well if I interact openly with men.

These were the most important observations made that have an impact on the outcome of my results, due to which it is important to consider the context of this research for further analysis.

1.3.2 My city of research: Lahore

Lahore is the cultural capital of Pakistan and the most important city in Punjab. Pakistan is divided into four provinces: Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan.

These provinces have their own provincial capitals with corresponding administrations. The province Punjab is the most powerful province, as Punjabis have a high position within Pakistani politics and administration. This is a major cause of inner-ethnic conflict within Pakistan, which

manifests themselves in language conflicts³⁸ as well as in political conflicts, resulting, in the worst case, in radical separational movements.

Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, is also located in Punjab and is seen as the diplomatic city of Pakistan, hosting all important government offices as well as numerous embassies, whereas Lahore as the biggest city within Punjab is seen as the cultural capital and the "heart" of Punjab.

"Lahore, Lahore hai!" – a famous Pakistani saying which means "Lahore is Lahore!" which alludes to its unique status within Pakistan and among Pakistanis who recognize its high cultural value. Most of Pakistan's vibrant culture – its music, literature, cuisine as well as its cultural heritage, which goes as far back as Mughal history, finds its navel of inspiration in this city. It is thus not only a culturally exciting city but an important strategic city, as it hosts the country's most renowned institutions of higher learning as well as important cultural and social institutions. All these factors combined make Lahore to the focal point of Pakistan's most dominant culture.

This is why I have chosen Lahore as the city of my research. The city provided me with not only the most important research infrastructure, such as an amount of relevant libraries and book stores but it has also inspired me with its vibrant culture – mirror of conservative as well as modern trends within the city and its culture – which helped me understand the ambivalence and diversity within the notion of Pakistani identity as found within my research outcome. Lahore, the city that hosts several institutions of higher learning and an array of students from various social and cultural backgrounds, has the diversity, paradoxes and ambivalence which underlies the concept of Pakistani identity itself.

1.3.3 My respondents: students

There are several reasons why I chose students as the target group for my research. The most important reason for this was that students can be seen as the future political elite of the country, which will shape the country's future social, political and religious development.

There is however another important reason for choosing this group. Students are generally a relatively young and dynamic group within civil society and are shaped by the political and historical education of the country, in addition to the social and religious education of their environment.

³⁸ It is important to note that Pakistan has major language conflicts on a horizontal level between Urdu and English – both official languages in Pakistan – and on a vertical level between the various regional and ethnic languages, which in every province have a separate conflict situation. As to Punjab, there is a big controversy between the use of Urdu and Punjabi whereas the language conflict in Sindh relies on the conflictive situation between Urdu and Sindhi.

Ruth Wodak, as a renowned Austrian historian and linguist researching among other topics on social and historical linguistics, formulated interesting and significant discourse-analytical contributions to the broad debates on collective remembrance that have entered human sciences since the linguistic turn and post-structuralism.³⁹ Her theory tries to analyze the various power and interest constellations within political and historical frames. As an Austrian, she uses one of Austria's most famous export products to conceptualize her theory: the *Mozartkugel*.⁴⁰ The *Mozartkugel* is a famous Austrian chocolate praline, named after Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, historical Austrian key figure and musical prodigy child, contributing to Austria's self-image as well as foreign image of Austria as the birth country of many of the most famous classical music composers in the world. The speciality of this chocolate lies in its ingredients and composition: It consists of various layers with different substances, which in Wodak's metaphor stand for a sphere of concentric layers that represent the grades of the more or less mediated relation between a historical event and its historical traces (sources) on the one hand, and those who later construct meaning (history) around these objects. The centre consists of a layer of pistachios which is supposed to represent the available historical sources. This layer is followed by a layer of marzipan representing the professionals (historians) analyzing the pistachio layer (historical sources) and offering diverse discourses and interpretations of history. The marzipan layer is covered by nougat creme which represents the non-specialized intelligence which teaches the society its history. This non-specialized intelligence is disseminated by teachers, journalists, researchers who derive their notion of history from history books that were written by professionals in the marzipan layer. This layer of intelligence is equally part of the political culture and values being expressed and shared within their own notion of history. The last layer is a chocolate layer, which represents the general society, which develops its social and cultural mind of history derived from their friends and families as well as from their education, books and electronic media.

The general idea of the *Mozartkugel* model is to show the importance of the different layers and processes within a society in the formation of a historical, and thus present, social and cultural mind of its society. Applied to my research, I see students as the nougat layer representing the future elite of its country, which draws its significance from deeper intelligence processes (deeper layers of the *Mozartkugel*) on the reproduction and development of historical and social frames. At the same time they have a significant role as being an important elite being educated through the professionals in the marzipan layer. The students shape the appearance of the society as the

³⁹ Concerning the topic of this paper see Cillia, Rudolf de/Reisigl, Martin/Liebhart, Karin/Wodak, Ruth: "The Discursive Construction of National Identity", Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh: 1999.

⁴⁰ see Wodak, Ruth: "Die Sprachen der Vergangenheit", Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main: 1994, p. 15f.

nougat represents an important significant part for the taste of the *Mozartkugel*. They are the ones who are reproducing historical discourses and forwarding these to the chocolate layer. Only later, the other ingredients and hence other constitutional parts for the construction of various power and interest constellations can be noticed.

Gaining a firm understanding of the attitudes of this particular group of society was therefore critical to my research. In order to get various types of political attitudes and thus identities developed within this group of society, I chose three different universities in Lahore, which are attended by students of various social backgrounds. In the following, I shall give a brief introduction and personal observance of the three universities visited as part of my research.

1.3.3.1 The University of Punjab (PU), Lahore⁴¹

The University of Punjab, also often referred to as Punjab University, built in 1882, is the oldest and largest university established in Pakistan. It consists of two campuses, the old historical campus, Allama Iqbal campus, named after the famous Pakistani poet, and is located in the middle of the old historical town in Lahore. Its architecture is the typical British colonial architectural style which is often found in Lahore, in the form of the General Post Office, the Government College University Lahore, the railway station and many other famous buildings and institutions built under British colonial rule. The second campus, Quaid-e-Azam campus, named after Mohammed Ali Jinnah, represents the newer part of the university with modern architecture, which hosts students in separate male/female student residence buildings. Apart from this, the university also constructed two other campuses located in Lahore, the campus of Gurjanwala and a summer campus at Khanaspur. The university comprises 13 faculties, 9 constituent colleges, 64 departments/centres/institutes and 434 affiliated colleges.⁴²

The Punjab University has relatively low tuition fees⁴³, which promotes the possibility for education for a large public and at the same time offers a huge variety on study programmes.

It is probably due to this large scope of students being offered a study place at this university, that popular Islamist parties, such as the Jaamat-e-Islami (JI), known for their famous “campus policy”⁴⁴, could establish a certain power within this university. Stephen P. Cohen describes the

⁴¹ For information on the University of Punjab see its homepage: <http://www.pu.edu.pk/>, 05.12.2008.

⁴² see for a more detailed description of the history of the university: <http://www.pu.edu.pk/about/>, 05.12.2008.

⁴³ see the tuition fees according to different study programmes: <http://www.pu.edu.pk/fees/default.asp?feeid=1>, 04.02.2009.

⁴⁴ see Jalazai, (1993): 255.

Punjab University campuses as being under the influence of the widespread JI student wings⁴⁵, which have a certain “social control”⁴⁶ on the students in terms of conduct.

My personal observation of the Punjab University, particularly of the Quaid-e-Azam campus, affirms this above mentioned conservative atmosphere. Many of the female students are either totally covered in a burqa⁴⁷, or wear the traditional Pakistani dress, *shalwaar kameez*, with a *dupatta* – a long scarf used to cover the body – which was in this university also often used by female students to cover their heads. In many of the informal conversations I had with various girls studying at the university, I was told that wearing the dupatta on their head or being covered by a burqa, was an additional protection to avoid social harassment from male students or more specifically to acquire a certain respect and seriousness among other students and teachers. I was also told that in family gatherings or even when being out with friends, they would often disregard such conservative clothing rules, and even wear jeans or sleeveless clothes, if permitted by their families.

The conservative conduct observed at the university is reinforced through the division of gender between particular university buildings. The main library of the Punjab University offers, for example, separate study rooms for males and females, and also one big common room, which is rarely used by female students.⁴⁸ Moreover, there are separate cafeterias for male and female students. Interaction between male and female students is nevertheless not impossible, but is often strongly being surveyed by the surrounding staff or other students. It is equally important to note that not only students are covered in burqa but also some of the teaching staff.⁴⁹

For the purpose of this research, the interaction with male students represented a difficult task for me sometimes, for which I had to rely on female acquaintances asking their male class fellows to fill out my questionnaires and being ready for an interview situation.

⁴⁵ see Cohen (2004): 178.

⁴⁶ see Jalazai (1993): 266.

⁴⁷ “Burqa” is the Arabic term used to signify the long (often) black robe worn by women to cover their whole body.

⁴⁸ In my first day at the library of the Punjab University, I was being shown the library by a male librarian, who – most probably due to the strong separation of sexes – did not show me the female study rooms, due to which I started using the big common room as study area, where I was the only or one of the few girls studying there. It was only later by the acquaintance of some female students that I learned that there were separate female study rooms, where most of the female students used to spend their time.

⁴⁹ I even met female teachers who were entirely covered in burqa, only displaying their eyes and even covering their hands with gloves.

1.3.3.2 King Edwards College (KEC), Lahore⁵⁰

King Edward's College (KEC) in Lahore was established in 1860 and is the second oldest medical college on the Indian subcontinent. KEC is located in the old city centre of Lahore and as one of the oldest buildings in Lahore still exhibits much of its original colonial architecture. It is next to other universities located in the old city centre such as the Allama Iqbal campus of the Punjab University and the Government College University Lahore.

KEC consists of 46 departments, 8 institutions/schools/centres and of three attached hospitals⁵¹. Tuition at King Edward's College is slightly higher than at Punjab University, with a 12,000 rupees maximum⁵² according to the year in which the student is studying.

My personal observation of KEC has shown me also a relatively conservative atmosphere but not comparable with that of the Punjab University. The library and canteens offer separate sections for male and female students but do have a common room for both sexes as well.

The dress code is also reflective of the wide ranging socio-economic backgrounds of the students. However, I noticed that most of the female students wear the traditional Pakistani *shalwaar kameeze*. There are even many girls who resign to covering their head with scarfs and dupattas. However, it is also possible to see some girls wearing western clothes such as jeans and long shirts. Due to their study field, most of the students have to wear long white lab coats which cover most parts of their body anyway.

In regard to male female interaction between students, it is difficult in the first two years of study. In the first two study years students are being taught in separate groups of male and female students, which changes from the third year on when the groups are mixed.

The university also offers two student residence houses which are separated according to gender.

1.3.3.3 Lahore University of Management and Science (LUMS), Lahore⁵³

The Lahore University of Management and Science is one of the most renowned universities in the entire country educating the future political and administrative cadre in Pakistan. It is in comparison to the Punjab University and the King Edward's College a private university. It was

⁵⁰ see the homepage of KEC online: <http://kemu.edu.pk/>, 06.12.2008.

⁵¹ see online a list of all departments, institutions and hospitals: <http://kemu.edu.pk/faculty.html>, 06.12.2008.

⁵² see annual fees according to each year online: <http://kemu.edu.pk/Prospectus-2007-08.pdf>, 06.12.2008, pp.32-34.

⁵³ see the LUMS homepage: http://www.lums.edu.pk/financial_assistance/overview.php, 06.12.2008.

established in 1985 and is located in an elite area of the city (Defense). It consists of three schools: the Suleman Dawood School, School of Humanities, Social Sciences and Law and the School of Science and Engineering and five departments in the area of computer science, mathematics, law and policy, economics and social sciences.

Admission in LUMS is very competitive, and only the best students are admitted. This goes along with a very high annual fee varying in the different study programmes⁵⁴, which in many cases only allows rich families to send their children to this university. The university does however offer various student loans and scholarships to give less wealthy students the possibility to study in this institution⁵⁵.

LUMS students have a very mixed profile, as it also has many non-Pakistani students, or Pakistani students brought up abroad or those who have a foreign family background among its students. The atmosphere in LUMS appears in comparison to PU and KEC as very open and liberal. This is already recognizable by the students' dressing. The clothing of the students varies from Western clothes such as jeans and T-shirts, to sleeveless shalwar kameezes, as well as traditional shalwar kameezes which cover most part of your body. Girls wearing burqa or a head scarf are seen far less on the campus than at the other two universities described earlier. There are no separate study rooms for males and females in the libraries and there is one common cafeteria and common room for everybody. Interaction between male and female students is not a problem and is part of everyday student life. The only separation between sexes is found in separate residence houses for male and female students.

The atmosphere of LUMS is also open insofar as many cultural activities are organized, such as concerts on campus, or other similar events.

The more liberal international orientation seen in the students can also be witnessed in the institution's professional staff. Many of the teachers have a foreign background or are of Pakistani origin but educated abroad. This goes along with the language skills of the students who almost entirely speak in English among each other, often even without accent, giving me the impression as if they were educated and brought up abroad or in an entirely English-speaking environment.

⁵⁴ Admission fees of graduate and phd programmes are accessible through this link:

http://www.lums.edu.pk/graduate_programmes/programmes.php, 06.12.2008.

admission fees of undergraduate programs are accessible through this link:

http://www.lums.edu.pk/undergraduate_programmes/programmes.php, 06.12.2008.

⁵⁵ The LUMS homepage states that a minimum of 40% of students are in some form receiving financial aid; see online: http://www.lums.edu.pk/financial_assistance/overview.php, 06.12.2008.

My personal observance of LUMS stood in complete opposition to what I had experienced in the two other institutions, as LUMS seemed to me to be the most “Western” institution and environment I had seen in Lahore. For my research, this meant that the distribution of questionnaires and the finding of appropriate interview partners was not perceived as problematic in this institution.

1.4 Methodology

This part of the chapter focuses entirely on the applied methodology used for my survey. I was basically using two different methods and three different methodological approaches: 1) a questionnaire 2) a semi-structured interview outline and 3) an explorative expert interview.

In the following, I will discuss both methods:

1.4.1 Questionnaire⁵⁶

My questionnaire was prepared according to the hypotheses I drew during the intensive phase of discourse analysis on works dealing with Pakistani history and society. My questionnaire was distributed to the students of the different universities in the months of August and September 2007.

Therefore, my main aim was to retrace the most important dominant Pakistani self-images and attitudes existing among Pakistani students concerning their national identity and their country. I have hence structured my questionnaire along various themes, which are the following:

- I. Personal information
- II. General information
- III. Attitudes towards the nation
- IV. History
- V. Kashmir
- VI. Pakistani self-images
- VII. Muslim identity
- VIII. Perception of the “other”: a) Pakistan and India b) Pakistan and the United States
- IX. Emotional commitment
- X. Culture
- XI. Society

⁵⁶ A copy of my questionnaire can be found in the attachment.

Inspiration for the design of this questionnaire was drawn from an American questionnaire on national identity⁵⁷, which consists of 11 pages including 24 questions, though is not divided along different themes.

My questionnaire consists of 12 pages with 11 thematic sections. It includes questions with different levelled responding scales, depending on the question. Next to these questions I have also included several open-ended questions, allowing the student to lead me towards his or her personal impression or idea of the given problem/question.

The questionnaire was distributed in the three above mentioned universities. I have received 34 questionnaires from students at the Punjab University, 20 from students of the King Edwards College, and 23 from students of the Lahore University of Management and Science. In each case more questionnaires were distributed as actually returned to me in the end, which explains the different number of questionnaires received from each university. At the Punjab University I chose myself to distribute more questionnaires as it was the university with the most students.

In every case, the amount of questionnaires was distributed along a 50:50 division of male and female respondents. I have a total of 77 questionnaires, which will be analyzed in terms of two main core questions, which I want to answer in my succeeding chapters, namely: 1) How do Pakistanis view/understand their nation? 2) What are specific threats perceived by them?

1.4.1.1 Sampling methodology

The questionnaires were distributed randomly to students at the three different universities. In each case this meant that I distributed with the help of one student studying at the particular university the questionnaires to random people I met on the campuses. The questionnaires were either returned to me directly or to my contact person in the specific university. I tried to have a 50:50 sample of male and female respondents, which I achieved to have at PU (17:17) and KEC (10:10), but in LUMS I have 10 male and 13 female respondents.

1.4.2 Semi-structured interviews

My interviews were conducted after the distribution of all questionnaires. It was inspired by answers I derived from my questionnaires in a first initial step. The main questions asked of my interview were the following:

⁵⁷ see the USA ISSP 2003 – National Identity II, Questionnaire online:
<http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/questionnaires/q2003/US2003.pdf>, 06.12.2008.

- 1) When you think of Pakistan what are your first thoughts? How do you view your country?
- 2) According to you, what are the most important features/elements that make you a Pakistani?
- 3) Do you personally feel that there is any other country or nation that stands in opposition to Pakistan?
- 4) What are your thoughts concerning India?
- 5) According to you, do you think the horrible incidents of Partition 1947 still have an impact on the Pakistani people, culture and society?
- 6) What are the biggest problems encountered in Pakistan in your opinion?
- 7) Do you think that Pakistan has a problem with religious fundamentalism?
- 8) According to you, does the rise of fundamentalism have any impact on Indo-Pakistani relations?
- 9) What is your opinion on the recent Lal Masjid happening? What is your opinion on Jamia Hafsa and other similar groups and the Pakistani government?
- 10) When you think of the Kashmir conflict, what is your personal opinion on this conflict?

In each of the three institutions I randomly chose one male and one female interview partner. The interview lengths ranges from thirty minutes minimum to more than one hour. The interviews were conducted between August and September 2007 in the different universities with only one person at a time. In one interview situation at the Punjab University, I could not avoid the interference of one other female student so that the interview turned to a “group” interview presenting answers from two students.

Although the interview outline was designed by 10 core questions, every interview had its own individual turnout as every student has his or her individual perception on their identity and of the political, social and religious situation in Pakistan. It is thus very difficult to compare these interviews, due to which I have decided to filter specific units of analysis out of my interviews, which are in accordance with the themes asked in my questionnaires and will be presented as joint result of my study.

1.4.2.1 Sampling methodology

The interview partners at the different universities were chosen randomly. In every case I approached the person with my contact person on the campuses of the different universities and asked whether the person was willing for an interview or not. All interviews were conducted on

campus. In total eight interviews were conducted, two from each university, choosing every time one male and one female student from the specific university.

1.4.3 Expert interview with UNODC expert on crime prevention

The expert interview was an another important step in my methodological approach. The expert interview was conducted with Alexandra Souza Martins, expert on crime prevention, working in the “Justice and Integrity Unit” of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The interview was conducted on the 18th January 2009, in the UN Headquarters in Vienna.

The main aim was to find out more about the UNODC’s work on corruption, as Pakistan’s major political problems that are analyzed in my part on the analysis of the political landscape in Pakistan can be related to the field of corruption. Therefore, I conducted an explorative interview with Mrs. Souza Martins, learning not only about the UNODC’s work in this regard, but also about the different aspects important in order to combat corruption on a national scale.

2. Pakistan's political culture – a historical, political, psychological and social genesis

Strategic and operational level

This chapter will analyze the most important outcomes in terms of a Pakistani identity through an analysis of the historical, political, religious and social perception in the discourse on the creation of the Pakistani state. An extensive hermeneutical interpretative analysis of relevant literature will therefore be presented. This initial part is also intended to give the adequate normative and ontological framework to the reader as a source of orientation towards the topic.

2.1 The birth of Pakistan – The ideology of Pakistan

The creation of Pakistan is a product of the historical independence of the Indian subcontinent from the British colonial rule. The presence of the British in India started extensively through the creation of the East India company in 1757 whose main aim was to establish an economic link between the British Empire and the Indian subcontinent. Subsequently, the influence of the East Indian company grew immensely, which gradually led to the establishment of the British crown in India in 1858 and the colonization of the Indian subcontinent. It would break the framework of this paper to go into detail of the history of the British colonialism due to which, the most important elements for the creation of Pakistan will be the main references for this chapter.

The creation of Pakistan is a complex process, which has had influence on various factors of the historical, political, religious and social constitution of the present situation in South Asia and Pakistan in particular. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, envisaged the creation of one country which would be based on the principle of one nation, one culture and one language.⁵⁸ On this basis, the independence of the Indian subcontinent which was shadowed with intensive blood-shed riots between Hindus and Muslims, which made the country impossible to rule for the British, the newly established state Pakistan was supposed to create a home for millions of Muslim “refugees”⁵⁹ on the Indian subcontinent. This new home Pakistan –

⁵⁸ see Jaffrelot (2000): 19.

⁵⁹ It is critical to use the word “refugee” in this context due to two reasons: First of all, the definition of a “refugee” was only established one year after Partition 1947, namely in 1951 by the Genève Refugee Declaration, and secondly because as the creation of Pakistan resulted from one territory ruled by the British crown it can be argued that these Muslims fleeing to Pakistan were not refugees but in fact internally displaced persons. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to use the vernacular term for these people, which is “mohajir”, meaning migrant, and carrying a specific notion of distinct social and ethnic characteristics.

an artificial state construction⁶⁰ – was the object of widespread scepticism from the international community, not at least due to the construction of the state in West Pakistan (representing today's Pakistan) and East Pakistan (representing today's Bangladesh), which was divided through its enemy state, India.⁶¹

The high level of scepticism was followed by the difficulty of defining Pakistan's history and consequently its identity throughout time. The problem starts with divided opinions of today's historians as to when Pakistan's history actually begins. Some historians start from the early Indus civilizations whereas others start from the first Islamic movements present on the Indian subcontinent.⁶²

Still others believe it is due to this complex character of this process that my analysis regarding the creation of Pakistan will be divided along the following factors: a) the historical factor, giving a short account on the historical events within this process; b) a political factor, giving an account on the political developments within this process; and c) a psychological factor, giving an account on the psychological components inherent in this process.

2.1.1 The historical factor

The partition of India in 1947 into a Hindu-majority country, India, and a Muslim-majority country, Pakistan, is part of an intensive historical debate as to what can be seen as the main reason for Partition. Whereas the official historiography of Pakistan suggests that the two-nation-theory of Muhammed Ali Jinnah, according to which Hindus and Muslim are two separate communities and thus cannot live together under one centrally administered country, was the main cause for the creation of Pakistan, official Indian historical resources blame the drawing of ostensible religious lines⁶³ and the “divide and rule”⁶⁴-policy of the British for Partition.⁶⁵ Both approaches are viable explanations for the creation of Pakistan. However, it is important to stress the strong Muslim lobbying that was part in this process to proclaim a separate Muslim nation state. This strong lobbying efforts resulted from the big potential that has been located within

⁶⁰ see Jaffrelot (2000): 9.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 11.

⁶² Ibid., p. 12.

⁶³ It were the British who for the means of ruling the country set up different categories of the religious communities in India – not only inventing the term “Hindu” – but also generally categorizing Indians. See Aziz, K. K.: “The making of Pakistan. A study in nationalism”, third edition, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore: 2005, p. 93.

⁶⁴ The “divide and rule”-policy is a policy used by British colonialists, which divided the religious communities, Hindus and Muslims, socially, religiously and geographically in order to rule easier over the different communities on the Indian subcontinent.

⁶⁵ see Bosa, Sugata/Jalal, Ayesha: “Modern South Asia. History, Culture, Political Economy”, second edition, Oxford University Press, New Delhi: 2004, p. 135.

Muslim revolts, which were one of the first separationist tendencies⁶⁶ on the Indian subcontinent. This Muslim revolts have several major reasons: First, the end of the Mughal empire had economically weakened the Muslims as well as placed Hindus in more favourable positions for the British colonialists.⁶⁷ Second, the democratisation process in the Indian subcontinent allowed Indians to vote for their municipal leaders, which put the Muslim minority – representing one fifth of the British raj – under fear of being reduced to “the status of a perpetual minority in any constitutional arrangement”⁶⁸. It is this weak political situation of the Muslims that resulted in early revolutionary movements among Indian Muslims, especially given the fact that the Indian National Congress (INC) – Indian's key figure and main actor within the independence movement that was mainly dominated by Indian Hindus – developed not only more radical tendencies and ideologies under the influence of its Hindu leaders, but also marginalized more and more Muslims within the congress.⁶⁹

Consequently, the Muslims founded – after being promoted by the Viceroy Lord Minto, who demanded the creation of separate electorates for Muslims – their own party. This party, the All India Muslim League (AIML) was founded in Dacca in 1906 in an effort to secure Muslim electorates in legislative elections.⁷⁰ The political developments after the first World War, which among others consequences led to the elimination of the Ottoman caliphate, created a strong emotional shock for the Muslims on the Indian subcontinent, who formed a movement in Aligarh to defend the caliphate.⁷¹ This movement was strongly supported by Mohandas Gandhi, and at the same time evoked strong criticism and hostility from leaders of the Indian National Congress, who eventually formed their own movement with nationalist Hindustic ideologies, called the Hindu Mahsaba.⁷² This led to stronger communal violence among the two religious communities in various areas in India. The communal violence was one of the central factors prompting Jinnah to use the All Indian Muslim League as a vehicle for a Muslim-based nation state. The story of the creation of Pakistan is strongly interlinked with Jinnah, whose personality

⁶⁶ see Jaffrelot (2000): 20.

⁶⁷ Among others Hindus were the first to have been in a majority-lead of the most important havens such as Bombay and Madras and have thus started to interact earlier with the British. See Türkkaya, Ataöv: “Kashmir and Neighbours. Tale, Terror, Truce”, Ashgate, Burlington: 2001, p. 39; Jaffrelot also points out that the participation of the Muslims during the Sepoy-revolt in 1858, which represents the first major independence revolt against the British on the Indian subcontinent, in which Indian Muslims had an important strategic point (as the revolt was for example endorsed by the last Mughal emperor Bahadur Zafar Shah), led to great suspicions from the British side towards the Muslims; see Jaffrelot (2000): 20.

⁶⁸ see Bose/Jalal (2004):139; see also: see Jaffrelot (2000): 21.

⁶⁹ see Gaier, Malte: “Religiöser Fundamentalismus im Prozess der Staatswerdung Pakistans”, master thesis, University of Vienna: 2008, pp. 37-39.

⁷⁰ see Jaffrelot (2000): 23.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

strongly influenced the outcome of this historical process and who still shapes the images and perceptions of many Pakistanis to whom he has become a legend. Jinnah was the most important key figure in the All India Muslim League. He is originally from a predominantly Hindu populated area (near Bombay) and belonged to the liberal intelligentsia on the Indian subcontinent. Like many of those adhering to the intellectual Indian elite at that time, he had studied law in England and worked as a lawyer in India.⁷³ He was a member of the Indian National Congress and joined the AIML in 1913. In 1930, the British government ordered the Simon Commission to study the new constitutional reforms in India, which created strong mistrust among the Indians, who under the Nehru report⁷⁴, demanded the principle of separate electorates. This demand was rejected by the British under the argument that it would tear the nation apart.⁷⁵ The All India Muslim League strongly endorsed this suggestion by not only demanding separate electorates, but also demanding one third of seats within the national assembly, which would help ensure the political significance of Muslims on the Indian subcontinent within the National Assembly.⁷⁶ It was, however, only in 1935 through the Government of India Act, that Jinnah and his Muslim followers found some kind of satisfaction, as this act envisaged a federal system, which theoretically created the infrastructural settings on a provincial level to bind together most of the predominantly Muslim provinces such as the north and north-west India as Muslim dominated areas.⁷⁷ Jinnah's argument for the creation of separate Muslim states was postulated by his own theory: the two-nation theory. This theory had at its core the inherent argument of the communal character within Islam and the Muslim ummah (= Muslim community) which cannot be achieved through the co-existence with an entirely different religious and social system such as Hinduism:

Islam and Hinduism – they are not religions in the strict sense of the word but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. (...) Indeed they belong to two different civilizations, which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Mussalmans [the Urdu term for “Moslem”, S.S.] are not a minority according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homeland, their territory and their state.⁷⁸

⁷³ Ibid., p. 24.

⁷⁴ Jawahrlal Nehru is one of the most important key figures of the Indian National Congress. He can be seen as Jinnah's opponent in the process of partition, where he was defending Hindu Interests, whereas Jinnah was representing Muslim interests.

⁷⁵ Jaffrelot (2000): 24.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 25.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ see Azam (1992): 16.

The idea of a separate Muslim state was however one that Jinnah had elaborated from the ideas of Mohammed Iqbal⁷⁹ – Pakistan's most famous national poet. Mohammed Iqbal is often seen as the creator of the idea of a separate Pakistan, which represents one of the most popular Pakistani myths, which in fact is not entirely true. Iqbal only stressed the importance for the creation of a separate "Muslim *bloc*" within India. K. K. Aziz, one of Pakistan's most famous historians with a critical stance on Pakistan's history as taught within schools in Pakistan, states:

It is grossly misleading to call him the originator of the idea of Pakistan or the poet who dreamed of partition. He never talked of partition and his ideal was that of a getting together of the Muslim provinces in the north west so as to bargain more advantageously with the projected Hindu centres. It is one of the myths of Pakistani nationalism to saddle Iqbal with the parentage of Pakistan.⁸⁰

Iqbal's speech in Allahabad in 1920, later became known as the "Pakistan speech" because it brought-up for the first time the separate structures of Islam and Hinduism.⁸¹ In 1930 he consequently asked the AIML council to endorse the idea of a Muslim state⁸² compromising the regions Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan. Three years later, a Cambridge student (Chaudry Rehmat Ali), inspired by Iqbal's vision created the name "Pakistan" alluding to two puns: The first one is to signify "pak-stan", which means "the land of the pure" and the second one the alliteration of letters of the Muslim dominated provinces in the north west which would eventually create the name "PAKISTAN": P for Punjab, A for Afghan (NWFP), K for Kashmir, S for Sind, and "tan" for Baluchistan.⁸³

This demand of separate Muslim administration only found its valid representation in the Lahore Resolution 1940, drafted by the AIML. The Lahore Resolution demanded "that all future constitutional arrangements be 'reconsidered de novo' since Indian Muslims were a 'nation' and not a minority"⁸⁴. It suggested rather the promotion of independent Muslim states as constituents

⁷⁹ Mohammad Iqbal plays an important role for the comprehension of the process for the creation of a Pakistani identity. At this point it is nevertheless important to point out the ambivalence that lies within the perception of Iqbal as the generator of the idea of Pakistan and of the perception of Iqbal as the postulator of separate Muslim federations, which if differently interpreted as it was by Jinnah, could also only suggest an autonomous Muslim administration of Muslim provinces within one big Indian federal union.

⁸⁰ see Aziz (2005): 54.

⁸¹ see Schimmel, Annemarie: "Muhammad Iqbal. Prophetischer Poet und Philosoph", Diederichs, Munich: 1989, p. 88f.

⁸² Aware of the paradox that lies within the comprehension of Muhammad Iqbal's vision, different analytical sources speak of a "Muslim state" that was propagated by Iqbal in 1930; see for example Jaffrelot (2000): 26 and Bose/Jalal (2004): 143.

⁸³ see Bose/Jalal (2004): 143.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 144.

of a federal unit.⁸⁵ The consequence of this resolution was that the All India Muslim League, with its presumption to speak for all Indian Muslims, sought federal solutions for the creation of a “constitutional arrangement in which Muslims would have an equitable share of power at a centre reconstituted on the basis of a partnership between two essentially sovereign states, Pakistan (representing the Muslim-majority provinces) and Hindustan (representing the Hindu-majority provinces)”⁸⁶. Through the adoption of this Pakistan-idea, the birth for Muslim nationalism was finally given. K. K. Aziz writes on this long historical process of Muslim emancipation on the Indian subcontinent:

It had taken the Muslims three-quarters of a century finally to decide what they wanted. They had tried everything: a revolt in 1857 [the Sepoy revolt; S.S.], friendship with Britain, opposition to Congress, extremist agitation, co-operation with the Congress, belligerent neutrality, negotiations, appeals and threats. (...) The march of history had made a nation of a community.⁸⁷

The first victory⁸⁸ of Muslim nationalism came in 1942 when the British War Cabinet accepted the idea of Pakistan, which was declared by Sir Stafford Cripps in a Draft Declaration in March 1943 which stated that “any province could stay out of the proposed Indian Union with the right of forming its own independent government”⁸⁹ – the so called “non-accession clause”⁹⁰. Eventually Jinnah expanded his power through the improvement of the Muslim League’s organizational structure and the expansion of its publicity.⁹¹ “Jinnah was no longer a Muslim leader. He was now *the* leader, symbol of Muslim nationalism.”⁹²

Jinnah gathered more and more strategic importance and power as one of the most important political actors in India. He was increasingly included in political consultations among the British Viceroy, Gandhi and many others.⁹³ At the same time, the Congress as being opponent to the

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 146.

⁸⁷ see Aziz (2005): 60.

⁸⁸ There are several theories as to why the British government accepted the proposal of a separate Muslim state: First of all, it is argued that the British were too scared of alienating the Muslims as they represented “the flower of the Indian Army”. Second, it is being argued that its non-accession clause was not meant seriously and only seen as a means to force Hindus into a compromise with Muslims. Third, it is argued that the decision of the British War Cabinet was indeed a genuine decision and promoted by politicians who were in favour of autonomous Muslim demands. For this explanatory theories see Aziz (2005): 62.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 61.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid., p.63.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

Cripp's Declaration, was politically weakened, which was enforced through the arrest of its Hindu leaders by the British government during the "Quit India"⁹⁴-movement.⁹⁵

The arrest of the Hindu leaders gave Jinnah greater room in which to manoeuvre. In time, he was able to the AIML to a powerful political party. Gandhi and other Hindu leaders from the Congress saw themselves forced to negotiate with Jinnah on the future of the Indian subcontinent.⁹⁶ The Jinnah-Ghandi talks in 1944 failed, however, as Jinnah was not ready to trust Hindu leaders and Gandhi to actually implement Partition once the British had departed. On the contrary, Jinnah demanded that Partition ought to be implemented before independence was given to India by the British. Gandhi who finally recognized this decision helped turn Jinnah's demand of a separate nation state into a personal victory for Jinnah⁹⁷:

Jinnah had won a clear victory by getting Gandhi to recognize Pakistan. This also gave wide publicity to his two-nation theory.⁹⁸

Consequently, the British Viceroy, Lord Wavell, organized the Simla conference to form an Executive Council and to discuss the balanced representation of Hindus and Muslims within the partition process. This conference turned into a failure as the British accepted neither Jinnah's idea of parity between Hindus and Moslems, nor his idea on the nomination of Muslim councillors by the AIML.⁹⁹ The political quarrel between the AIML and the INC was not resolved, as the INC demanded independence of India without partition, whereas the AIML demanded independence of India with partition. The solution of India's future was to be decided according to the legislative elections in 1945, in which both parties had a strong support – AIML winning every Muslim seat in the central legislature and the INC winning all the "general (non-Muslim) constituencies"¹⁰⁰ in India.¹⁰¹ Due to this irreconcilable political developments, the British Government created a Cabinet Mission, led by the Secretary of State to resolve the matter. The Cabinet promoted the idea of an "Indian Union arranged in three tiers – provinces, sections and the federal centre"¹⁰² and rejecting the idea of an autonomous Pakistan.¹⁰³ Jinnah refused to accept this decision. Within one year, 1946-1947, several plans were drafted for the independence

⁹⁴ The "Quit India"-movement was a movement inspired by Gandhi against the British rule in India, which by Jinnah was interpreted as being not only anti-British but also anti-Muslim. See Aziz (2005): 64.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 64.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 64f.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 68.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

of India, which were accepted or rejected by different parties, often underrating Muslim nationalism on the subcontinent.¹⁰⁴ It was largely due to Jinnah's obsession with the Pakistan idea¹⁰⁵ that in 1947 Lord Mountbatton, British Viceroy of that time, decided to opt for independence with Partition. The eruption of great violence between Hindus and Muslims and the political rift between INC and AIML made Partition inevitable. The Partition plan was drafted on 3 June 1947 and was finally accepted by all parties.¹⁰⁶ It was decided that the biggest Muslim-populated areas in the north and northwest were bunched together in an East Pakistan (today's Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (today's Pakistan), which got its independence on 14 of August 1947¹⁰⁷. Since the princely states had a semi-autonomous status within the British administration, they were allowed to choose whether they wanted to accede to India or Pakistan.¹⁰⁸ This created a new conflict on the subcontinent as the fate of Kashmir – a Muslim majority region with a Hindu Maharaja (= princely ruler) bordering both India and Pakistan¹⁰⁹ – was not resolved until the eve of independence which eventually led to several future Indo-Pakistani wars. It would break the framework of this paper to discuss all the events that have happened after Partition. This is why only the most important elements for the comprehension of the future outcome of the Pakistani history are presented here. After the first Indo-Pakistani war on Kashmir in October 1947, an independent United Nations Committee for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was created, suggesting a plebiscite in Kashmir to decide on the future of the region, which was never carried out.¹¹⁰ After several years of conflict in this region and between both countries, the Simla Agreement in 1971 offered an operational solution to the problem: The Line of Control. It was decided that Kashmir was divided in Azad Kashmir, adhering to Pakistan, and the rest of Kashmir, accessing to India. These two regions were divided by the Line of Control (LOC).¹¹¹ 1971 was equally the year when East Pakistan separated with the help of India from Pakistan and become an autonomous state, Bangladesh.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ see Lamb, Alastair: "Birth of a Tragedy. Kashmir 1947", Roxford Books, Karachi: 1994, p. 13.

¹⁰⁶ see Aziz (2005): 69.

¹⁰⁷ India got its independence one day after that on 15 August 1947.

¹⁰⁸ see Lamb (1994): 4f.

¹⁰⁹ During Partition the various districts of India were supposed to be allocated by the British Government according to their Muslim/Hindu-majority either to Pakistan or to India. The Gurdaspur district, was a Muslim-majority district in the northwest of India. This district was – unlike the logic of allocation of districts – allocated to India by the British, through which the Indians eventually had access to the Kashmir region. See for a more detailed analysis on this: Lamb, Alastair: "Kashmir. A Disputed Legacy 1846- 1990", Oxford University Press, Karachi : 1992, p. 104.

¹¹⁰ Hönig, Patrick : "Der Kashmirkonflikt und das Recht der Völker auf Selbstbestimmung", Dunker und Humblot, Berlin: 2000, p. 51.

¹¹¹ see Ataöv (2001): 68.

The various violent events between India and Pakistan, beginning with a wave of violence during Partition that has created a huge wave of mohajirs emigrating to Pakistan under the most difficult conditions and evoking a holocaust-like situation between the two communities, Hindus and Muslims, have marked Indo-Pakistani relations. The four wars¹¹² fought between these two countries since then, have always aggravated a new violent dimension in Indo-Pakistani relations, which resulted in the formation of India and Pakistan turning towards nuclear weapons – destabilizing the entire region through its political conflicts.

2.1.2 The political factor

The political factor is going to analyze the creation of the Pakistani state from a political perspective starting off with the beginning of a Muslim self-perception on the Indian subcontinent to the establishment of a Pakistani nation state and the ideology which was given to this state. Additionally, this chapter is also going to analyze the history of political developments in Pakistan, as well as Pakistan's political system. It will also look upon Pakistan's realpolitik in regard to the Kashmir conflict.

2.1.2.1 Muslim self-perception in the pre-Partition phase and during Partition

This chapter will present the most important political factors leading to the result of independence in India and its Partition in 1947. The various political developments are based on a lot of psychological factors inherent to the political self-perception and demand of the various communities involved in this phase. These initial political attitudes, declarations and developments are necessary to understand the creation of the Pakistani nation and the ideology on which it is based.

For this, it is utterly important to grasp the political concept of Muslim nationalism and how it came into existence. Muslim nationalism on the Indian subcontinent found its start with Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Communal Muslim sentiments were, however, already present on the Indian subcontinent long before. K. K. Aziz, Pakistani historian, argues that Muslims on the Indian subcontinent have established a certain "imperial pride"¹¹³ throughout their history on account of the Mughal empire:

¹¹² The four wars took place in: The first Kashmir war in 1947, the second Kashmir war in 1965, the war on East-Pakistan in 1971, and the Kargil War in 1999.

¹¹³ see Aziz (2005): 75.

The Muslims had come to India as conquerors and had established an empire which lasted for hundreds of years. This factor moulded their outlook in many ways.¹¹⁴

Aziz goes so far as to speak of Muslim imperialism, which not only has become part of India's reality in the past but also forced the Hindus to accept Muslim rule on the subcontinent.¹¹⁵ The fact that Muslim rule was put to an end through British colonialism put Muslims in a "bitter and truculent" state¹¹⁶. During the following political events such as the Sepoy-revolt in 1858 against the British, which can be seen as first revolutionary element in the fight against British rule and at the same time the attempt to reconquer a "glorious past"¹¹⁷ of the Muslims on the subcontinent, a huge anti-British and thus anti-Western sentiment was developed.¹¹⁸ This bitterness of Muslim failure was enforced through the fear of Hindu majority and "Hindu polity"¹¹⁹, who throughout history have been the "subject race"¹²⁰, whereas Muslims were the "ruling race"¹²¹ on the Indian subcontinent, and could under no circumstances accept the fact of being ruled or governed by these "*ci-devant* slaves"¹²². According to Aziz, such attitudes prevented the syncretistic mixture of Islam and Hinduism on a broad scale in India and secured the orthodoxy of both religions.¹²³

The Hindu-Muslim rift can be defined as a religio-political problem that found its great eruption during the British rule. It is often argued that before British rule Hindus and Muslims were living together on the Indian subcontinent peacefully, but this is only partly true. As the Muslims arrived in India as conquerors, their Hindu subjects dared not show open enmity towards them.¹²⁴ It was through the British rule and particularly through the "prospects of self-government" that this rivalry found its peak.¹²⁵ The conflict between Hindus and Muslims also found its way into the question of representation within Indian politics during British colonialism. The All India Muslim League proclaimed to represent all Muslim Indians on the subcontinent. This argument was often contested through the Congress who denied this approach of representation of the Muslim League and reproached it to be conservative old Muslim imperialists.¹²⁶ The AIML in its political history had a long struggle as to win not only the

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 77.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 78.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 86.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 88.

Muslim votes but also the support for its ideology such as the two-nation theory. The party had to form several alliances with other (Muslim) communities in different parts of India to spread its popularity and justify its ideology. This was feasible through the pro-Khilafat movement¹²⁷ which allied the Muslims together in an unprecedented emotional attachment to a Muslim cause as well as helping to building the future cooperation of Muslim solidarity on the Indian subcontinent. At the same time, it contested the ideology of the AIML as Gandhi, promoting Indian independence and Hindu-Muslim unity, joined this cause with his mobilization of masses and thus contradicted the idea of the neglect of Muslim politics in the pre-Partition phase.¹²⁸

As to the question of representation, the Indian National Congress with its Hindu majority on the other side could not democratically represent all Indians.¹²⁹ This helps explain the outcome of the 1937 legislative elections in which neither the AIML nor the INC won the expected results, but in which the INC nevertheless had a leading position and continued to insist to represent all Indians.¹³⁰ Through this persistence of the Congress statement that it represented alone all Indians and that the AIML was not even representing all Indian Muslims it forced the Muslim elite into the re-thinking of their self-perception and in designing the idea of a separate nation:

By declaring repeatedly that there was only one brand of nationalism in India, the Congress brand, it forced the Muslims to proclaim themselves as a separate nation. Such claims created fear and hatred in the Muslim mind. And hate and fear are potent ingredients for militant nationalism.¹³¹

This was the beginning of Muslim nationalism and the Pakistan Movement, led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah. In the following section I will analyze the question on which basis the Pakistani nation state under Jinnah was built.

2.1.2.2 Jinnah and the Pakistani nation state

The concept of the Pakistani nation state and its birth is incomprehensible without a closer look on Pakistan's founding father itself. Jinnah was throughout the historical debate torn between secularist and fundamentalist mainstream groups, both of whom lay claim to providing the ideological framework of Jinnah's beliefs. In short, I will try to give the most important analysis of his persona and reflect this debate on the present analysis of Pakistan's identity.

¹²⁷ The Khilafat movement is the vernacular Urdu/English term to speak of the movement for the rescue of the Ottoman califat.

¹²⁸ see Bose/Jalal (2005): 139.

¹²⁹ see Aziz (2005): 89.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

The year 1947 and especially the years before stand in a very bloody light: This constitutional phase of Pakistan is often shadowed by the “communal holocaust”¹³² between Hindus and Muslims and the great refugee wave leaving millions of Indians without home:

When India was partitioned there were nearly a hundred million Muslims in the subcontinent, or more than one person in five. Of these about sixty million were to live in Pakistan, both east and west, making it the largest Muslim state.¹³³

Although the Indian Muslims had one common ground, which is their religious background, hardly any other facts, such as their ethnic or linguistic identity were taken into account when Jinnah mobilized the Muslims all over the Indian subcontinent. This is one of the reasons why he has often been “accused and denounced in unison for tearing apart the historic unity of the Indian subcontinent”¹³⁴.

Historians often argue that Jinnah during his demand for Pakistan never clearly stated the grounds of his demand:

While the leaders remained tight-lipped about what Pakistan actually entailed, the followers were allowed to make of it what they wished. Naturally, a host of conflicting shapes and forms, most of them vague, some utopian, others simply fatuous, were given to what was little more than an undefined slogan.¹³⁵

It is suggested that this move of Jinnah was done deliberately so as to hide that “Jinnah’s appeal to religion was not characteristic of his earlier politics”¹³⁶, nor indeed of his personal convictions”¹³⁷.

Historians and political analysts are certain that the use of Islam as a means of national mobilization was only a tactical step, used as a “lingua franca”¹³⁸ by Jinnah.

Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, historians from India and Pakistan, argue that religion as common cultural ground has always played an important role for Muslims, but in the context of the

¹³² see Bose/Jalal (2005): 162.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 158.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 158f.

¹³⁶ Jinnah was between 1913 to 1937 for a combined Congress-League political programme and also demanded Hindu-Muslim unity. See Bose/Jalal (2005): 158.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 159.

¹³⁸ see Jaffrelet (2000): 27.

Pakistan Movement there has been no agreement whatsoever on the use of religion as a political ideology.¹³⁹

Jinnah's strategy thus only achieved to mobilize the Muslim provincial bosses and thus seemed to have mobilized the Muslim masses. But in fact, most Muslims, whose local and cultural background did not find any representation within the AIML ideology did not feel represented by Jinnah and his party. Jinnah's main aim was to give political power to the Muslims on the Indian subcontinent and thus to "win an equitable share of power for Muslims at the all-India centre"¹⁴⁰. Jinnah's political strategies can therefore be seen as being purely political and secularist and not religious. His famous speech held on 11 August 1947 proves this secularist tendency of Jinnah:

You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State. (...) We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. (...) Now I think, we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.¹⁴¹

This speech, which was given three days before the inauguration of the Pakistani state, is probably the most viable proof that Jinnah in his political understanding did not compass entirely Islamic principles of an Islamic state and of an Islamic society, and that he is in fact tolerating the mixed religious composition of the Pakistani society.

Contested in his political personality, he is also often put in separate ideological frameworks. Among historians there is a heated debate going on, whether Jinnah can be seen as secularist or fundamentalist. Fact is that he constantly used religious references and arguments¹⁴² which makes Jinnah a hero for religious-fundamentalist Pakistani political parties such as the Jaamat-e-Islami.

At the same time, fundamentalists feel uneasy with Jinnah's religious tolerance and attitudes close to Western liberalism, which explains why Jinnah himself married a Parsee¹⁴³ or why he allowed

¹³⁹ see Bose/Jalal (2005): 159.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 160.

¹⁴¹ see Zaidi (1999): 537f.

¹⁴² see Ahmed, S. Akbar: "Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity. The search for Saladin.", Oxford University Press, Karachi: 1997, p. 194.

¹⁴³ A Parsee is a member of the Zoroastrian community in India.

his only child to marry a non-Muslim¹⁴⁴. These tendencies make Jinnah turn to a hero for secular-democratic parties in Pakistan such as the Pakistan People's Party (PPP).

Apart from this discourse on Jinnah's personality, Jinnah nevertheless remains the political and historical figure – “the man born once in a million”¹⁴⁵ – who shaped and formed this country Pakistan in its ideological background and who died at the peak of his greatest triumph in 1948, leaving a country behind that is until today struggling with its identity.

2.1.3 The psychological factor

Pakistan is caught in a cycle of violence from which it has not found any exit yet: It has not only led four wars against India since its creation, but is also in perpetual conflict situation with India due to the unresolved Kashmir conflict. Additionally, Pakistan has become a country of high geo-strategical significance due to its nuclear armed power and the constant political instability within the country, often in terms of rising religious fundamentalism.

The roots of all these problems are hard to make out, but as a fact Partition 1947 and the political and social aftermath have left a great psychological trauma within its citizens that is still governing the minds of its people and the country's history since its creation. Pakistan's foreign relations with India since 1947 can be seen as a pure failure that has only led to more violence than amical approach towards each other. Jaffrelot argues that Pakistan was born out of a feeling of insecurity and the strong belief in a fundamental difference between Hindus and Muslims. This has had the consequence that Pakistan has since its inception regarded India as its “enemy” and has thus demonised his big Indian neighbour.¹⁴⁶ The Kashmir conflict is thus per se not only a geo-political conflict, it is also an ideological conflict between two countries which stand in ideological opposition towards each other. Pakistan is still struggling with the question of how to treat India. Jaffrelot concludes Pakistan's dilemma towards India in following questions:

Does it have to construct a future in a position of opposition towards India ? Is it better to turn its back to it, for privileging the relations with its “brothers” – countries with Islamic faith? Or does the logic of its geographical situation order it to revise its politics and prepare a better future based on a dialogue and cooperation? In other words, does Pakistan face India ?¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ see Akbar (1997): 199.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 187.

¹⁴⁶ see Jaffrelot (2000): 199.

¹⁴⁷ See original quotation : « Doit-il construire son avenir dans une posture d'opposition à l'Inde ? Vaudrait-il mieux lui tourner le dos, pour privilégier les relations avec les « pays frères » en Islam ? Ou la logique géographique lui commande-t-elle, au prix d'une difficile révision de sa politique, de préparer un meilleur avenir fondé sur le dialogue et la coopération ? En d'autres mots, le Pakistan doit-il se penser face à l'Inde en dehors d'elle, ou avec elle ? » Ibid.

In the following, I will try to portray the events that have led to this dilemma within Pakistan's self-perception and politics.

2.1.3.1 Partition 1947 – Memories of violence

In order to grasp the whole picture on the psychological aftermath of Partition, it is extremely important to understand the view of the opposite side, which in our case is India and especially the “Hindu perception” of the situation. Therefore, I will in the following conclude the results of Djallal Heuzé, French anthropologist, researching among others on violence on the Indian subcontinent.

In his article “La violence indienne aux prises avec l’imaginaire” he analyzes the ideological basis that is hidden behind the communal violence in India. Although the situation in India between Hindus and Muslims is more different than the overall situation between the two predominantly Hindu and Muslim states, India and Pakistan, his conclusions touch the fundamental basis of the Hindu and Muslim belief as to which I can use his conclusions as well as a mirror to understand the relationship between India and Pakistan on a religious and psychological basis.

Heuzé understands violence as a force that derives from different conceptions of the “humane” and of its limits. It is equally a force that can erupt when it is impossible to speak.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, Heuzé sees violence as a “historical creation and a matrix of history and its apprehension”¹⁴⁹.

The violent events he analyzes is the Ayodhya conflict where for years Hindu's and Muslims are not only struggling for their right to construct a Hindu temple by destroying the historical Babri mosque but which has already led to bloody fights between both communities. In his understanding of violence, Heuzé argues that the violence which is expressed in this conflict derives from a historical reference, which has structured the myths, symbols, imaginations, scientific arguments, traditions and identity elements of the people.¹⁵⁰ This violence is thus, so the author's conclusion, a “cultural matrix”¹⁵¹. In his analysis on communal violence, one of the most used violent forms of crime on the Indian subcontinent is that of rape. But the fear of rape is not only a fear of a physical or psychological harm but it has even a bigger harm on a social level, where rape is seen as loss of honour.

¹⁴⁸ see Heuzé, Djallal: “La violence indienne aux prises avec l’imaginaire“, in: *Revue Tiers Monde* “Entendre les violences – II”, (2003) 176, t. XLIV, revue trimestrielle, pp. 771-802, here p. 772

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 773.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 774.

In a severely masculine dominant universe, for Hindus and Muslims, where a communal family (an endogamy model for the Muslims, and one of exogamy for the Hindus) is an ideal that's rarely realized, and more and more abused, violence against women's reproductive organs robs them of their reproductive identity. From the perception of many perpetrators, women's breasts are also a source of power, which are seen as the equivalent of the male penis. In this way, women are reconstructed as sex objects, and in suffering, destroyed as human beings.¹⁵²

Rape is not only against one person, one woman, but it touches the whole community, as the sense of community and family is very strong on the Indian subcontinent. It thus holds a "collective power" that lies within one violent act.¹⁵³

Rape is therefore not only a powerful violent strategy against another community, it is also "justifiable" through the perception on the history of the Indian subcontinent. In the Hindu perception, where India as the fertile ground, also often referred to as "bharat-mata" (= Mother India), represents something sacred and untouchable, Partition 1947 has been perceived by orthodox Hindus as a rape of their motherland India.¹⁵⁴

Rape has hence already been performed at the day of Partition 1947 and then carried on as "ethnic rape" in form of a sexual intimidation.¹⁵⁵ It has also been the result of a wish to externalize violence in the longest possible way, which would destroy *izzat* (=honour) of a family:

The woman is made to suffer twice: first from the brutality of the rape itself and then from the horror of her family. It is a double burden. It violates the woman and it also alienates her from her own society as she is considered 'impure'. Honour modesty and motherhood are all deemed to have been violated. (...) Rape is thus deliberately employed by ethnic neighbours who are fully aware of its expression as political power and cultural assertion to humiliate the internal other.¹⁵⁶

This violence also separates both communities as the violence performed creates the utmost hatred for the "other" and starts a spiral of violence between both communities. This has created a new problem of warfare and of soldiering in conflict situations:

¹⁵² Original quotation: "Dans un univers prédominance masculine sévère, chez les hindous et les musulmans, où la famille communautaire (de modèle endogame chez les musulmans, exogame chez les hindous) est un idéal rarement réalisé et de plus en plus malmené, la violence contre le ventre des femmes ramène ces dernières à une identité procréatrices. La poitrine est aussi, dans les perceptions de nombreux participants, une source de la puissance, l'équivalent du pénis masculin. Les femmes sont recinstruites en tant que terreau fertile et souffrant, en même temps que détruites en tant qu'êtres humains"; see Heuzé (2003): 779.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 781.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ see Ahmed (1997): 160.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 161.

Rape today is a modern instrument of war. In areas such as Bosnia and Kashmir, the modern soldier, it appears, marches with gun in one hand and penis in the other. His victories and main activities are not in the battlefield.¹⁵⁷

This extreme violence is still in the minds of millions of Indians and Pakistanis who have lived the horrors of Partition 1947 and which have shaped their image of the “other”. In the following I will analyze more concretely the image of India in Pakistan.

2.1.3.2 The “India-syndrome”

Jean-Luc Racine, French political scientist, has introduced this term “India-syndrome” which he uses to describe Pakistan’s “obsessive” behaviour towards India:

Born of Partition, Pakistan has been self-defined at its birth as a Promised Land for the Muslims willing to escape from what the Muslim League defined as the ‘Hindu rule’ in India. However, its successive leaders have not been able to free the national mind from its Indian obsession – rather they used it deliberately for their own purposes. A feeling of insecurity has been nurtured constantly since 1947, partly by India’s realpolitik, but perhaps mostly by Pakistan’s eagerness to take to task a much larger neighbour.¹⁵⁸

Pakistan’s “obsession” with India is especially analyzed in the works of Ashis Nandy, working in the field of political psychology and looking at post-colonial states such as India and Pakistan. Ashis Nandy explains that Pakistan carries an “unofficial India”¹⁵⁹ within its citizen’s minds, which unconsciously influences Pakistan’s self-image and “defines Pakistan’s boundaries and origins, loves and hates, past and future, its very core”.¹⁶⁰ Nandy goes even further by saying that this unofficial India would in fact constitute Pakistan’s unofficial culture.¹⁶¹ Due to Pakistan’s ideology which constitutes Pakistan as a predominantly Muslim country that feared that India would not be a pluralistic multi-ethnic society due to its Hindu majority, it has turned anti-Hindu sentiments as a part of its ideology.¹⁶² Furthermore, he concludes that the Muslims in Pakistan do have in fact among others two inherent fears, which justify the fear “that Hinduism was not something outside, but a vector within”¹⁶³.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ see Racine (2002): 198.

¹⁵⁹ see Nandy (2004): 240.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 243.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 140.

These two reasons, are first of all the recognition, that Hinduism on the Indian subcontinent is older than Islam, which means that every Indian's forefathers have converted from Hinduism or Buddhism to Islam and thus creates a feeling of hatred within the "self":

The Muslim hatred of Hindus is actually the hatred of what they have rejected in their genealogical history. The Hindu hatred of Muslims is a direct result of this betrayal – a betrayal reinforced by the partition of India and creation of Pakistan.¹⁶⁴

Another reason is that Pakistan as a Muslim state cannot claim the authenticity of Islam on the South Asian continent, because of the fact that South Asian Islam is too influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism and other South Asian faiths.¹⁶⁵

Apart from this Nandy concludes that Pakistan does in fact need India as its enemy state, as the country that contests its ideology and its existence because without this contestation the existence of Pakistan would not be justified:

India, to qualify as India for Pakistanis, must interfere in and try to subvert the Pakistani state. For Pakistan needs India to be its hostile but prized audience which, after trying out all its dirty tricks, will have to admit someday that Pakistan has made it, that Pakistan is not the failure that the Pakistanis themselves secretly suspect it to be. That acceptance by India and, by implication, the Hindus is even more important for the ideologues of Pakistan than what the common run of Pakistani citizens think of Pakistan. For, everything said, India is the exiled self of Pakistan, by exteriorising and territorializing which Pakistan has built its identity and it remains fifty years after its creation, the final measure of the worth of Pakistan.¹⁶⁶

Jaffrelot has a similar finding of his analysis on Indo-Pakistani relationships and suggests that this "difference" that was promoted between India and Pakistan since their independence has in fact defined both identities and constructed them politically.¹⁶⁷

In the following, I want to discuss the result of this Indo-Pakistani ideological battle on a political level, looking at Pakistan's realpolitik in two major fields: the Kashmir conflict and Pakistan's nuclear power politics.

¹⁶⁴ See Ziauddin Sardar quoted in: Nandy (2004): 243.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

2.1.3.3 Pakistan's realpolitik

If we look at Pakistan's realpolitik after 1947, we see that there are several major political events¹⁶⁸ which are entirely defined by Pakistan's relationship to India. One of these events is the Kashmir conflict. It would break the framework of this paper to analyze all the political events involved in this conflict. This is why I am only going to portray the psychological components of the political developments inherent in this event.

2.1.3.3.1 The Kashmir conflict

As already discussed Pakistan is strongly marked by a perception of Muslim-Hindu difference, which contributes to a reductionist social policy that often defines India as the Hindu country, ignoring India's religious and ethnic pluralism. According to Jaffrelot, Pakistan needs this reductionist simplification of India so as to legitimize itself as a Muslim country.¹⁶⁹ This politics of difference resulted into the demonization of India, and Pakistan's existence in the light of a strongly perceived feeling of insecurity, has led to the establishment of a strong army in Pakistan.¹⁷⁰ Focal point of these fears is the Kashmir conflict, which per se becomes a present quasi-battle of the historical Muslims struggle for power, independence and security on the Indian subcontinent under British rule. The fact that Kashmiri Muslims are forced to live and suffer¹⁷¹ under the controlled Indian territory, confirmed many Pakistanis that a "co-habitation" between Hindus and Muslims, especially under Hindu dominance, would not have been possible.¹⁷² This has strongly activated the spirit of defence¹⁷³ among Pakistani policy-makers and justified Pakistan's wars on Kashmir with India. Next to this religious component of this historical conflict on Kashmir, Kashmir is also in itself a topos¹⁷⁴ for wealth, beauty and particularly a metaphor used for paradise. *Jannat*, the Urdu term for signifying Garden Eden, paradise, has often been compared with the valley of Kashmir, due to its immense beauty and popularity on the Indian subcontinent throughout time.

The loss of a region which bears such a tremendous significance on a political, religious and psychological level has charged the Kashmir conflict with an ideological burden which both

¹⁶⁸ To grasp the whole picture on Indo-Pakistani relations it would be necessary to at least look at the different wars between India and Pakistan, the secession of Bangladesh in 1971, and Pakistan's armament as a nuclear power, on a historical basis.

¹⁶⁹ Jaffrelot (2000): 202.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ The Kashmir conflict is especially shadowed by strong human rights violation in the region.

¹⁷² see Jaffrelot (2000): 202.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ The term "topos" is used here in a simplistic linguistic understanding of this term, which understands "topos" as a stereotyped idea. See Bergez, Daniel/Géraud, Violaine/Robrieux, Jean-Jacques: "Vocabulaire de l'analyse littéraire", Armand Colin, Paris : 1994, p. 129.

countries cannot give up. For India, the region Kashmir is ultimately important, so as to portray themselves as a secular pluralistic country that is capable of dealing with religious minorities:

A number of writers have linked India's unyielding stance on the Kashmir dispute to the fear not only of Balcanisation if the region became independent or went to Pakistan, but to the importance for India's secular self-image of having this sole Muslim majority state safely within the Union. It could be argued, however, that the Kashmir issue has been far more important to Pakistani than Indian nationalism, because it has provided a rallying point in an otherwise fractious political environment.¹⁷⁵

On the other hand, the Kashmir conflict for Pakistan is also often seen as a question of honour and a question of Pakistan's acceptance as a Muslim country and of the recognition of injustice lived by India.¹⁷⁶

2.2 Pakistan – a nation in the quest of its identity

Pakistan has long been on the quest of its identity as this was never really defined. Pakistan – “the state of refugees”¹⁷⁷ – provided a home for millions of Indian Muslims throughout the Indian subcontinent. Today, Pakistan is often being referred to as a “country without a nation”¹⁷⁸.

To quote one famous Pakistani artist on Pakistan's quest for its identity:¹⁷⁹

Ik mulk ki talaash us waqt thee qaum ko
Ab mulk dhoonta hai meri qaum hai kahaan

‘At that time, the nation was searching for a state,
Now the state searches for its nation.’

Before I start the analysis on Pakistan's identity problem, I want to give some theoretical input as to what are the most important and contested elements that create a so-called, “nation” and “collective identities”.

The concept of a “nation” is per se a very contested one. Ernest Gellner argues that nations are not “an inherent attribute of humanity”¹⁸⁰, moreover both the “nation” and the “state” have to

¹⁷⁵ Ian Talbot: “India & Pakistan“, Arnold, London: 2000, p. 168.

¹⁷⁶ see Lamb, Alastair: “Incomplete Partition. The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947- 1948”, Oxford University Press, Karachi: 2003, p. 345.

¹⁷⁷ Jaffrelot (2000): 33.

¹⁷⁸ see the book of Jaffrelot, Christophe: “Pakistan, Nationalism without a Nation”, Zed Books Ltd., London: 2002.

¹⁷⁹ see Jaun Aelia in Abbas, S.M. Ali: “Pakistan: The state searching for its nation” in: *The Ravi*, Centenary Issue 2006, GCU Lahore, pp. 45-48, here p. 45

¹⁸⁰ see Gellner, Ernest: “Nations and Nationalism“, Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited, Oxford: 1983, p. 6

emerge independently so as to consolidate nationalism.¹⁸¹ He further argues that the state often develops itself before the nation in an independent and contingent way, however it is also possible to find states “that have certainly emerged without the blessing of the nations”¹⁸². To conclude, he answers the question on the state of the nation by giving two viable possibilities on how to define a nation: Either two men who share the same culture¹⁸³ can call themselves as citizens of the same nation, or if two men “*recognize* each other as belonging to the same nation”¹⁸⁴.

Whereas Gellner lets this question unanswered, Benedict Anderson in his theoretical work “imagined communities” presents a clear understanding of a nation. Anderson strongly focuses on the semantical concept of nationhood that is according to him strongly defined by the print media, which again is the result of a long capitalist process. Anderson locates the selection of one privileged language as the access to the ontological truth¹⁸⁵ as a prerequisite condition to establish a print-media which eventually contributes to the profound faith in a new autonomous imagined community, a nation.¹⁸⁶

Basis of every nation is a “collective memory” – a concept defined by the French philosopher Maurice Halbwachs. This concept ascertains that each individual in every society becomes part of a socialization process in which he acquires the memory of its society, which becomes his own national reference.¹⁸⁷ Jan Assmann pursues the theoretical understanding of Halbwachs and creates the concept of a “collective identity”. This concept consists of three major references, which are a) a time/space reference which embeds memories in a concrete geographical space and locates it on a historical timeline, which then provide vectors of identity and build a “home”¹⁸⁸, b) a group-reference that defines the “self” and the “other”¹⁸⁹ and last c) a reference to the reconstructivity of history as it also structures the past and the present.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ “Culture” is defined by Gellner by “a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating”. See Gellner (1983): 7.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ see Anderson, Benedict: “Die Erfindung der Nation. Zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzeptes.“, Erw. Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/Main: 1996, p. 42.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ see Assmann, Jan: “Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen.“, second edition, Munich: 1999, p. 35f.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 38f.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 42.

In the case of Pakistan all these concepts should be kept in mind as they will be discussed later according to the hermeneutical and empirical output. We can however already argue that Pakistan, as a state constructed on an ideological basis, will find most probably its theoretical background in theories of Ernest Gellner, although their application on Pakistan still remains ambivalent. As Gellner argues in one of his definitions a nation is only then a nation if two men share the same culture. This would steal the ideological justification for the existence of the state Pakistan, as the Indian subcontinent is a pluralistic society sharing different cultures in one territorial space. It is therefore not applicable for Pakistan if we look at Pakistan's different ethnic cultures. It might be applicable if we change culture by religion and accept religion as "a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating"¹⁹¹ as Gellner defines "culture". But, if we consider on the other hand, that India has more Muslims than Pakistan does, the ideological justification for Pakistan is still missing. Pakistan's major claim as being an ideological state, based on Islam, would equally not allow Gellner's first definition of a nation, as more than half of the Indian Muslims still live in India at the time of Partition, which would mean that these Indian Muslims would probably share the same culture as Pakistani Muslims but do not belong to the same nation.

As to Anderson's understanding of an imagined community, his argument on the selection of one privileged language as the access to one ontological truth can also be heatedly debated. First of all, this presumes that most of the countries follow a literary tradition, which in regard of Pakistan is only partly true. Pakistan has always had a strong oral tradition, where many languages, such as Punjabi, the biggest ethnic and linguistic group in Pakistan, is not commonly used to converse in a written way. On the other hand, it can be argued that Pakistan, did however select Urdu as its national language, which has always been regarded as the language of the Muslims, and thus does have the power to bind a nation together on grounds of this language. The only problem here lies within the fact that Urdu itself is a contested element of a language and ethnicity problem in Pakistan and does not have the necessary potential to bind these Pakistanis together on grounds of one privileged national language.

As to Jan Assman's ideas on a collective identity it certainly finds its fertile ground in Pakistan, where the education system tries to define the time/space-reference along with a group-reference, which also shape the perception of Pakistan's citizens and thus does have a reconstructivity effect on the present and the future. His theories on a collective mind are thus applicable and operational conceptions for the analysis of a Pakistani nation.

¹⁹¹ Gellner (1983): 7.

In the following, I will present Pakistan's most contested aspects included in the theoretical findings of a nation and an identity, along two major levels: Pakistan's contested ideology behind an Islamic identity versus a historical, traditional and cultural pride of the own ethnic identity.

2.2.1 Islamic identity

This chapter is going to discuss the notion of Islamic identity in Pakistan. This analysis will be divided along two lines, which will look at the different implementation of Islam on a) a political level in regard of the nation state and its constitution and b) on a social level in regard of basically two outputs of culture: language and education.

2.2.1.1 Political implementation of Islam

In this part, I will primarily focus on the works of Javid Iqbal, who pursues a critical stance towards the ideology of Pakistan and Pakistan's contested identity.

Due to the historical background of the creation of the state of Pakistan, and Jinnah's constant demand for a Muslim state on the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan is often seen as an ideological state, which derives its significance and identity from the two-nation theory it is based on. After the death of Jinnah, hardly any "service was rendered to the Ideology"¹⁹², as no one really implemented the two-nation theory in the different domains such as politics, education or economy. According to Iqbal this was one of the major reasons why the "anti-ideological forces"¹⁹³, such as Muslim extremists, regional groups or sectarian movements threatened a disintegration of Pakistan. The different regional, cultural and linguistic traits of the Indian Muslims were not taken into account, when the state Pakistan was founded. Therefore, the only viable ideology that could be given to this newly created state, was that of Islam. But does this turn Pakistan into an Islamic state?

Islam has thus become the one and only "nation-building force"¹⁹⁴ for the establishment of Pakistan. Contrary to nations that give birth to states, in Pakistan it is the state that gives birth to a nation:

Pakistan by herself did not give birth to any nation; on the contrary, the Muslim nation struggled for and brought Pakistan into being. Therefore, Pakistan is not technically the cause of any kind of nationhood. It is only an effect, a result or a fruit of the struggle of the Muslim nation for territorial specification.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹² see Iqbal (2005): 8.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

The Islamic principle on which Pakistan is based is the overall sovereignty of God and the concept that the “authority delegated to the State is a sacred trust”¹⁹⁶, which has to envisage the democratic recognition of its citizens and guarantee the most fundamental rights of every citizen:

(...) equality of status and of equality before law, freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, association, assembly, movement, trade, business or profession, and the right to hold and dispose of property, subject to law and public morality; it must secure the complete independence of the judiciary and uphold the supremacy of rule of law.¹⁹⁷

These are the most important fundamental rights based on the Qur'an and Sunnah¹⁹⁸, which are grounded in Pakistan's Islamic self-perception of the state and which were also promoted by Jinnah.¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless, the question of the relationship between the state and religion in Pakistan was not solved, which presented major challenges in the constitution-making years between 1947-1956. The first Constituent Assembly in Pakistan drafted in 1949 an Objective Resolution, where democratic principles such as freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice should be followed according to Islamic principles. For the constitution of such a document, the different power/elite groups, such as politicians, religious scholars and intellectuals in the Pakistani state had to answer the question on how the concept of an Islamic state looks like. The ulema²⁰⁰ envisaged an Islamic state such as the early caliphate and demanded it to be the basis for the Islamic constitution in Pakistan.²⁰¹ The views of the ulema, seen as the traditionalists in this debate, were not accepted by the Government of Pakistan, as their vision on an Islamic state seemed “dead, unprogressive and a state collection of injunctions and prohibitions”²⁰². This group also integrates the religious groups such as the Jaamat-e-Islami, who under his founder and leader Maulana Maududi, demanded equally medieval Islamic concepts according to the Islamic caliphate in the past and the introduction of the Sharia in Pakistan.

The modernists, who were recruited from the members of the AIML, preferred the Arab model, the concept of “ijma” – a consensus of elected Moslems on a state level who try to bridge the gap

¹⁹⁶ see the resolution quoted in Iqbal (2005): 16.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ “Sunnah” is the term to refer to the accumulated actions, sayings and orders of the Prophet Mohammed that are preserved through a chain of narrators and through texts.

¹⁹⁹ see Iqbal (2005): 17.

²⁰⁰ “Ulema” is the Arabic term to define a community of religious scholars.

²⁰¹ see Chaudhry, G.W.: “The Islamic Concept of State in Pakistan”, in: Grover, Verinder: “Pakistan. Government and Politics in Asian countries”, Deep & Deep Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi: 2000, pp. 483-487, p. 484.

²⁰² Ibid., p. 484.

between old Islamic political concepts and institutions and the modern world.²⁰³ The Pakistani intelligentsia as third important group in this debate, seen as the secular elite on the other side tried to elaborate a modern concept of an Islamic state. According to the Pakistani intellectuals, the Qur'an and Sunnah provided no real concept of an Islamic state. On the other hand, the Sharia allows a "great latitude in governmental method and administration"²⁰⁴ due to which it would be more necessary to "define the principles which should actuate an Islamic polity"²⁰⁵.

The Objective Resolution presented in 1949 can be seen as a resolution drafted very openly as "both traditionalists and the modernists could read in it the embodiment of their version of Islamic state"²⁰⁶ and which presented the draft of a future constitution with an Islamic character.²⁰⁷ Another major reason for this is that neither traditionalists nor modernists had really clearly pointed out their views on an Islamic state, because of which their contradictory discourses could not be clearly made out.²⁰⁸

The process of establishing a constitution in Pakistan took eight years, from 1947 to 1956. Both traditionalists along with religious groups and leaders such as Maulana Maududi – leader and founder of the Islamist party Jaamat-e-Islami – and modernists presented various different aspects for the formation of a Pakistani constitution. In 1956, Pakistan was finally declared as an "Islamic Republic" with its constitution which was seen as a compromise for both modernists and traditionalists. The constitution of 1956²⁰⁹ had the Objective Resolution as its preamble, which affirmed the sovereignty of Allah and guaranteed its citizens to have the possibility to live according to the Islamic law. Other important aspects of the constitution 1956 are the *Principles of Policy* which seek to develop cooperation with other Muslim countries, the promotion of Islamic education and institutions within Pakistan as well as the promotion of Islamic morals within the Pakistani society. As to the president of Pakistan, he is supposed to create infrastructural settings for the establishment of an Islamic society. Next to this, the formation of a consultative commission whose members are elected by the Pakistani government, was decided, which similar to a check and balance-system checks whether the laws voted by the parliamentarians are according to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. This commission only had a consultative role, the legislative power still lied within the Pakistani government. In 1958, general Ayub Kahn took

²⁰³ see Jaffrelot (2009): 406.

²⁰⁴ see Chaudhry in Verinder (2000): 485.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ see Lakhi, M.V.: "Islamic State Controversy in Pakistan", in: Grover, Verinder: "Pakistan. Government and Politics in Asian countries", Deep & Deep Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi: 2000, pp.489-503, p. 494.

²⁰⁷ see Jaffrelot (2000): 411.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ see various aspects of the constitution 1956 in Jaffrelot (2000): 412f.

over the government and established the first martial rule in Pakistan. Ayub Kahn tailored his own new constitution in 1962.²¹⁰ This constitution strengthened the role of the president, to which he accorded the power of leading a presidential regime. At the same time he modified the voting system to a pyramidal voting system and tried to de-politicize the society. He additionally deleted the word “Islamic” from Pakistan’s title as an “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” and changed it to the “Republic of Pakistan”. Because of the protests coming from the religious parties, he had to change it back to its previous title. He was not able to secularize the country, but he still managed to lead a relative modern course by establishing the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, which restrained polygamy and strengthened the rights of women.

In 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, head of the PPP came into power in Pakistan and amended the constitution in 1973.²¹¹ He left the Islamic clauses of the constitution such as the role of the consultative commission untouched and did only one major change: He changed the political system by introducing a parliamentary regime, replacing thus the presidential regime introduced by Ayub Khan.

This is still the very same constitution which is applied in Pakistan today. However, this constitution has been amended through Pakistan’s various leaders through different decrees and amendments. Although Bhutto changed the political situation, the perpetual political crises in Pakistan always invited military rulers to overthrow the government and establish a martial rule.

2.2.1.2 Social implementation of Islam

The social implementation of Islam will be analyzed along two important criteria: the use of Urdu as official Muslim language in Pakistan and the education system in Pakistan which has a strong focus on Islamic teaching.

2.2.1.2.1 Urdu as Muslim language

The social implementation of Islam becomes visible in the promotion of several Muslim outputs, that after Partition 1947 have been added by a national attribute “Pakistani” after the conflict. As Urdu is known to be the language that was developed and derived within Moslem rule in India and used during British rule by the religious scholars and Islamic clerks to propagate the message of Islam,²¹² Pakistan officially implemented Urdu as its national language.²¹³ Nevertheless, Urdu cannot be seen as an entirely Muslim product, as it was in fact a language that was influenced by

²¹⁰ see the constitution online: esp. see the various aspects of the constitution 1956 in Jaffrelot (2000): 414f.

²¹¹ see the constitution online: <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/preamble.html>, 20.12.2008.

²¹² see Jaffrelot (2000): 425.

²¹³ Ibid., p. 423.

various languages such as Arabic, Persian, Turkish and English and basically compromises vocabulary from the “Sanskrit” group, such as Hindi. Urdu can be seen as a “product of Hindu Muslim amity and also the confluence of their cultures”²¹⁴. Nevertheless, both languages, Urdu and Hindi, became part of an avid conflict during Partition 1947 and especially in the policy-formation processes afterwards. Jaffrelot argues that both languages have become cultural symbols, which have been turned to national languages of India (Hindi) and Pakistan (Urdu).²¹⁵ This, he concludes, is the reason why those languages became identity markers, and thus the vectors of identity for either country:

The manipulation of cultural symbols focused not only on Islam, but also on Urdu. The command of this language by the Muslims would have helped them to preserve their privileged positions, had not Hindi become an official language too. While it was almost indistinguishable from Hindi as a spoken language – both were the two faces of the same coin, Hindustani – and while it was used by many literate Hindus, the ideologues of Aligarh and the Muslim League, like the zealots of Hindi at the same time, tried hard to present it as *the* language of the Muslims. This is one more indication that Muslim nationalism did not derive from ‘primordial’ identity makers, but was an ideological construction.²¹⁶

Jaffrelot follows Benedict Anderson’s theory – the most important author in the analysis of nationalism – that one of the most important elements of creating a nation is to “elect” one privileged language that becomes part of the formation of a national identity.²¹⁷ Official language in Pakistan however is English, whereas national language of Pakistan is Urdu. The paradox that lies within this is that Pakistan as a multi-linguistic country only holds 6% of Urdu mother tongue-speakers. But it is still used on various levels: in schools, in the media, in the military, in various institutions, as well as a means of communication between the different provinces.²¹⁸

2.2.1.2.2 Religious instruction in schools

Education is another important parameter to look at in terms of social implementation of Islam in Pakistan. Pakistan has a highly diverse education system, which will be analysed in detail in the following chapter. It is important to note that Pakistan has a three-dimensional education system:

²¹⁴ see Fatehpuri, Farman: “Pakistan Movement and Hindi-Urdu Conflict“, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore: 1987, p. 32.

²¹⁵ see Jaffrelot, Christophe: “Nationalism without a Nation. Pakistan Searching for its Identity.” in: Jaffrelot, Christophe (Ed.): “Pakistan. Nationalism without a Nation?”, Zed Books, London: 2002, pp. 7-47, here p. 10f.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ see Anderson, Benedict: “Die Erfindung der Nation. Zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzeptes.“, new edition, Campus-Verlag, Frankfurt/Main: 1996, p. 42.

²¹⁸ see Jaffrelot (2000): 425.

1) The English vernacular school system 2) The Urdu vernacular school system and 3) The madrassah system.

The English vernacular system is relatively expensive which is why most of upper and middle class families send their children to these schools.²¹⁹ Those in lower classes send their children to low-cost English vernacular schools or to Urdu medium schools.²²⁰ Poor families send their children to madrassahs, where education is free for boys.²²¹

Religious education in Pakistan is seen as extremely important for the education of its citizens. The Commission on National Education 1958 in Pakistan states that:

As education aims at the integrated and balanced development of the whole man, body and spirit – it must create an appreciation of the fundamental moral and spiritual values that constitute the foundations of civilization, towards which all human endeavour should be directed. In performing this task a system of education must benefit from the humanizing influence of religion, which broadens sympathies, inculcates tolerance, self-sacrifice, and social service, and removes artificial distinctions between man and woman. Reverence for God and the prophets has an ennobling effect on the soul and opens the mind to an appreciation of the unity of mankind.²²²

The question of the ideological basis of education has long been a contested issue in Pakistan. Its most important aim was to “contain, oppose, and eliminate ethnic threat”.²²³ Following the logic of Pakistan's ideological basis, it was thus decided to include “Islamic studies” in the Pakistani syllabus and make the rest of the syllabus also confirm with Islam, as well as make Urdu compulsory for everybody along with English as compulsory language in schools.²²⁴ The madrassahs, which filled an “educational and social vacuum” in terms of inaccessible national school systems, especially in the northern parts in Pakistan and in terms of social rise through education, indoctrinated the children according to the ideology of religious political parties, to which these schools were allied.²²⁵ Due to this educational problem through the madrassahs, politicians tried to counteract by suggesting that the syllabus of madrassah schools should be

²¹⁹ see Candland, Christopher: “Religious Education and Violence in Pakistan“, in: Kennedy, Charles H./Botterin, Cynthia: “Pakistan 2005”, Oxford University Press, Karachi: 2006, pp. 230-255, here p. 236.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Commission on National Education quoted in: Rauf, Abdur: “Renaissance of Islamic Culture and Civilization in Pakistan“, Kashmiri Bazaar, Lahore: 1965, p. 181.

²²³ see Rahman (2004): 7.

²²⁴ see Rahman (2004): 8f.

²²⁵ see Candland in Kennedy/Botterin (2005): 238f.

structured according to the general education in Pakistan, which still has not been achieved, since madrassahs are funded by charity and endowments and not through the government.²²⁶

Religious education in Pakistan especially thrived under General Zia-ul-Haq's martial rule. His educational policy contained among others "to foster in the hearts and minds of the people in Pakistan and the students in particular a deep and abiding loyalty to Islam and Pakistan" as well as "to create awareness in every student that he, as a member of the Pakistani nation, is also part of the universal Muslim Ummah and that it is expected of him to make a contribution towards the welfare of fellow Muslims inhabiting the globe on the one hand and to help spread the message of Islam throughout the world on the other".²²⁷ Thus textbooks and other materials were all "islamized" under the regime of Zia-ul-Haq and served as a propaganda-means for his regime:

Moreover, Islam was used to support the state's own militaristic policies in such a way that it appeared to the readers of these textbooks that Pakistan, the Pakistan movement, Pakistan's wars with India, the Kashmir issue were all connected not only with Pakistani nationalism but with Islam itself.²²⁸

The civilian governments which followed the regime of Zia-ul-Haq basically took over the educational policies:

The trend towards privatization, started by Ziaul Haq and promoted by all subsequent governments, was to be encouraged even further.²²⁹

Tariq Rahman states that the education system was basically the "vehicle for creating nationalism"²³⁰ and in guaranteeing "a unified Pakistani nation"²³¹.

2.2.2 Ethnic identity

In Pakistan, the state is controlled by the military²³², traditional legalislatic Islam has reasserted itself, and the largest ethnic community prevails over all the others. It is not apparent that this system is unusually exploitative or that any other feasible arrangement could be more effective. Nevertheless, Pakistan is not a

²²⁶ see Rahman (2004): 9.

²²⁷ National Educational Policy and Implementation Programme (1979b) in Rahman (2004): 17.

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 18.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Pakistan has had four military rules throughout history in 1958 under General Ayub Khan, 1977 under Zia-ul-Haq, 1999 under General Pervez Musharraf and most recently in 2007 again under General Pervez Musharraf.

democratic state; Islam is not, in Pakistan, a driving moral force; and neither political nor religious institutions have succeeded in diminishing interethnic conflict.²³³

This statement by Leonard Binder, author of the article “Islam, Ethnicity, and the State in Pakistan” gives a good overview over the ethnic situation in Pakistan. In the Indian subcontinent the ethnic identity, has been the first and foremost identity marker, followed by religion, and only then, according to the historical process, the state. In Pakistan, where Indian Muslims all over the Indian subcontinent were bunched together under an artificial state constellation with an ideological basis, the problem of ethnicity soon posed a problem to national politics and society. This is especially due to the fact that the Pakistani state has always used religion – the common major trait - to suppress any ethnic movement in order to maintain the national solidarity.

The government of Pakistan has consistently denied the legitimacy of politicised ethnicity, and it has attempted to use the twin instruments of Islam and the state to overcome this subversive force.²³⁴

As this ethnic problem was therefore never resolved throughout history, Pakistan is still and often been described as a country that is in quest of its identity. To analyze this problem, this issue has to be viewed according to two different parameters which are: the provinces and ethnicities and languages.

2.2.2.1 Provinces

Pakistan consists of four provinces which are: Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), along with two regions who have an autonomous status which are the Northern Areas and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. These last two regions are still in contestation between India and Pakistan and still pose a problem to the foreign policies of both countries. The Northern Areas are still administered by the Central Government of Pakistan, whereas the Azad Jammu and Kashmir have its own parliament and its own government and thus can act autonomously except for economical and foreign policy-matters as well as matters concerning the Pakistani currency.²³⁵

²³³ see Binder, Leonard: “Islam, Ethnicity, and the State in Pakistan“, in: Banuazizi, Ali/Weiner, Myron: “The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics. Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan“, Vanguard, Lahore: 1987, pp.259-266, here p.259.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ see Scholz, Jorge: “Der Pakistan-Komplex. Ein Land zwischen Niedergang und Nuklearwaffen“, Pendo, Munich/Zürich: 2008, p. 41.

Similar political status is accorded to the Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan, which are being governed by “political agents” of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.²³⁶ These areas are often described as a no-rule area because the common law of Pakistan is not being applied here.²³⁷ That is why these regions are controlled by so called “jirgas” – which define tribal councils – who make the most important judicial, political and social rules in the various regions, which cover very traditional, often not even Islamic, attitudes.

The most important province in Pakistan is Punjab. This province not only holds Islamabad as its capital but also contains the biggest cities in Pakistan such as Lahore and Faisalabad. Often it is being spoken of the “Punjabi hegemony” because Punjabis are the most powerful ethnic groups as they control the state through their widespread representation within Pakistani politics, the army and several other strategic important institutions. The Punjab is not only politically a very important province but also economically as it is the most fruitful region, which contains five rivers and has two of the most important industry businesses in Pakistan: textile and rice.

Sindh is next to Punjab the second most important region in Pakistan, as it has as its capital Karachi, which is the largest city in Pakistan and which can be seen as an industrial haven with many business domains. Most of Pakistan's economic policy is being defined by Karachi.

Baluchistan's capital is Quetta. The province is widely unpopulated due to its desert-like topographical situation, which on the other hand makes it rich for resources such as gas, coal, and copper.

The NWFP has its capital in Peshawar, which borders Afghanistan and often becomes a focal point of the political tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The province is a region which mainly lives from agriculture and livestock farming.

Main problem of all provinces are the finances: Most of the finances flow into Punjab and Sindh, as it contains the most important cities, due to which the other provinces hardly get any financial share.²³⁸

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ see Akhtar, Nawaz Haq: “If Truth Be Told. An Alternate History of Pakistan”, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore: 2007, p. 347.

2.2.2.2 Ethnicity and language

In these four provinces and the three allied regions with quasi-autonomous political status many different ethnic groups are found, which speak more than 20 languages.²³⁹ As political units of identity, Pakistan is structured from “family to neighbourhood to clan and tribe and then to larger entities defined by cultural or lingual unity”.²⁴⁰

Haq Nawaz Akther, who analyses the history of military rule in Pakistan, sees the first military coup in 1958 as responsible action for the non-creation of national solidarity in Pakistan as it hindered the development of sovereignty of the people in Pakistan:

Alas, the army coup 1958 by Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan arrested the political development. Military organization is based on centrality of a command organization. The person of the commander is the centre of loyalty and blind obedience ‘Theirs not to reason why. Theirs but to do and die’. This philosophy serves ill the cause of populism and democracy. So a system of selection replaced elections. By depriving people of the exercise of sovereignty, the nation had to be managed through hand-picked feudals;²⁴¹

This is why under Ayub Khan the movement of the Bengalis (East Pakistan) gradually gained more importance. This conflict was also strongly caused by a linguistic issue, as Urdu was declared national language in 1951 and the Bengalis, proud of their language and especially their literary culture, refused to replace Bangla (language of Bengalis) with Urdu, which resulted in a big protest movement in 1952.²⁴² Together with an economic and social neglect of the province East Pakistan, eventually strong separationist movements could be established which led to the India-supported secession of Bangladesh, and to the second Indo-Pakistani war.

The Punjabis have always been a very powerful ethnic group since the inception of the state Pakistan. Jaffrelot argues that the reason why Punjabis are so powerful within Pakistani state politics is that the Punjabi Muslims have throughout the Pakistan Movement been the most receptive group as to the idea of Pakistan and were seeking to maintain and expand their power over the whole country.²⁴³ Punjabis do not only control the state apparatus but also the army.²⁴⁴

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who became president of Pakistan in 1971, was himself a Sindhi and changed the constitution in favour of a federal system to strengthen the parity within the

²³⁹ see Scholz (2008): 43.

²⁴⁰ see Akhtar (2007): 347.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 348f.

²⁴² see Jaffrelot (2000): 41.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

²⁴⁴ 70% of the army posts are in the hand of Punjabis. See Jaffrelot (2000): 47.

different groups, promoting especially Sindhi Punjabi accord.²⁴⁵ Nevertheless Sindhi nationalism awakened due to their weak political situation demanding a provincial autonomy along with more supply of water, which turned into a big political issue. Until today the Sindhi conflict marks the local scenario in terms of ethnic conflicts with other ethnic groups in urban Sindh.

The Baluch and Pashtun issue also goes back to the beginning of the consolidation of the state Pakistan. Already in 1948 Baluchi leaders tried to claim their right for sovereignty for the entire region in the Baluch army struggle.²⁴⁶ Baluch nationalism kept on surfacing, with a new peak in 1973 under Bhuttos regime, but their aim of Baluch sovereignty was never achieved. Until today, Baluchis are demanding their own homeland.

The Pashtun issue is similar to the Baluchi issue. From the very beginning, the Pashtuns were against an integration of their region into the state Pakistan. Furthermore, they even demanded a separate autonomous provincial state "Pakhtoonistan". It was only under the regime of Zia-ul Haq that the Pashtuns found some satisfaction, because he provided a certain quota of Pashtuns access to the state and the army, in return for their help against the Sovjets in Afghanistan.²⁴⁷ Today, the Pashtun nationalism often stands in the light of Islamic militarization as the "talibanization of Aghanistan" is often combined with the "pashtun tribalism".²⁴⁸

One major separatist tendency that still needs to be discussed here is that of mohajirs. Mohajir is the Urdu term for migrant and defines those Indian Muslims coming from different provinces of the Indian subcontinent who settled down in the state of Pakistan. Although they have no particular common ethnic ground, they all have an Urdu-speaking background which made them build up their own community and eventually form their own political party, Mohajir Qaumi Movement. This party tried to balance out the ethnic inequality between the different ethnicities in Pakistan and even became a radical agent in this demand.²⁴⁹ Until today the MQM is still one of the major important political parties in Pakistan.

2.3 Pakistan's political culture

Pakistan's political culture is difficult to describe and can be analyzed according to various different parameters. One of the most striking re-occurrences of the history of Pakistani politics is its almost periodical fall into a military rule and the follow-up of undemocratic principles. A

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 47.

²⁴⁶ see Akhter (2007): 350.

²⁴⁷ see Jaffrelot (2000): 59.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 59f.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 61f.

closer and more narrow analysis of the political situation in Pakistan in the given time framework, will be analyzed later in chapter four in “The political situation in Pakistan – a country in perpetual crisis”, where I will give an analytical approach towards the political situation in Pakistan. For now, I will present the two most important factors inherent in the development of the political culture in Pakistan, in order to understand in a second step the findings of my questionnaire and interviews results, to which this part shall only become a referential framework for the reader.

2.3.1 History of political developments in Pakistan

Since Pakistan's existence in 1947, Pakistan has had three different constitutions and four military rulers. In total, military regimes have in Pakistan survived longer than civilian regimes. Democracy seems still to be an unachieved goal of this young country, which is prone to military rulers.

In the following, I will give a very brief history on the political developments by highlighting the different eras of Pakistani politics, by characterizing the politics of the Pakistani leaders and the most important political parties and its opponents in the different eras.

After the creation of Pakistan, Jinnah became the first Pakistani political leader by designating himself the title of the governor general in Pakistan. Jinnah was especially in favour of a centralization of politics along with a strong personalization of power in the form of the governor general.²⁵⁰ He justified the strong power accorded within the position of the governor general by the argument, that it would be important to first construct the state and to deal with other problems later on.²⁵¹ By saying so, he also dismissed the governors of NWFP and Sindh, who were opposing to Jinnah's politics. After Jinnah's death, Liaquat Ali Khan became the new prime minister. Under Liaquat Ali Khan's political era, the first separatist movements and parties started to get more politically involved on the political landscape. As Liaquat Ali Khan himself, was the leader of the All India Muslim League, which according to him had the sole legitimacy to speak for the Pakistani people, he was strictly against all other political formations, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, whose leader, Maulana Maududi, was being arrested by him. His policies led to a rising number of enemies, which eventually led to his assassination in Rawalpindi in 1951. Khawaja Nazimuddin became then the new governor general of Pakistan. His policy especially concerning West Pakistan, created a big political crisis with countrywide protests. Combined with economical problems in forms of a food crisis under his regime, the political

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 111.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

crisis in Pakistan became gradually bigger, which led to big riots within the country. Eventually, his cabinet got dismissed by the prime minister of Pakistan. Mohammed Ali Bogra became the new Prime Minister of Pakistan and set up the "One Unit Scheme", integrating all the different regions into West Pakistan and established a political and cultural balance in East and West Pakistan. The political era under his regime was also marked by strong political dissent which among others led to the establishment of a state of emergency in Pakistan. 1956, the first constitution of Pakistan was being adopted under Iskander Mirza, the new General Governor, who later became the president of Pakistan.

In 1958, General Ayub Khan established for the first time military rule in Pakistan and later became the next elected president of Pakistan. Ayub's politics were marked by a strong de-politization of society and of "political tutelage through indirect elections and official nomination of representatives"²⁵². His two orders, the Public Offices Order and the Elective Bodies Order, allowed to withdraw politicians who had misconducted. Further Ordinances such as the Public Safety Ordinance and the Press and Publications Ordinance allowed to suppress and control the media and to use it for his own political propaganda. But among other things, his political era was also known to have modernized the country as his social reform, the Family Laws Ordinance 1961, strengthened women's rights particularly in regards of divorces. He equally engaged himself in the economic development of the country through land reforms and actually pushed the Pakistani economy during his military rule. Nevertheless, his military rule raised more and more social and regional tensions especially concerning the imbalances between East and West Pakistan. Due to this mounting opposition, his successor, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, established the new government of Pakistan with his political party, the Pakistan's People's Party (PPP). The party was ideologically following "Islamic socialism" and understands itself as a secular-democratic party. His party became relatively popular in East Pakistan, but could not build alliance with the Awami League, the most popular party in West Pakistan, which eventually led to the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Bhutto's domestic policy focused especially on land and labour reforms. The political changes he made were particularly the strengthening of the parliamentary regime in Pakistan in the new constitution of Pakistan in 1973. Bhutto's politics of populism which was only half-heartedly following Islamic socialism, and his authoritarian character eventually led to the next military coup by Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. Zia-ul-Haq had Bhutto executed and swamped the country through his Islamization policy. Under his regime the position of the president was strengthened again, arguing that this would be

²⁵² see Talbot (2000): 205.

the closest to Islamic dogma. In the same logic political parties were considered as un-Islamic,²⁵³ as this would challenge the Muslim unity and solidarity. In fact, the sectarian movements grew stronger under Zia's regime culminating in sectarian violence between different groups. Zia's Islamization policies also raised the violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims, as his policies favoured in the first line Sunni Muslims. Zia's *zakat* (Muslim alms) Ordinance created a big conflict as Shias had objections against making the *zakat* compulsory and feared that the money would all go to Sunni charity activities.²⁵⁴ Zia's policies thus created country-wide protests and objects raised by sectarian, regional movements as well as the civil society in Pakistan, such as human rights organizations and the media. Minorities and women were suffering under his severe policies and political decisions against these groups through the Blasphemy Ordinance, which made minorities vulnerable towards political charges and the Law of Evidence that stated that the evidence of one man was equal to the evidence of two women. This became especially critical in rape cases, which were punished according to the Hudood Ordinances which laid down the Islamic punishment of such crimes. Zia's era was thus a legacy of sectarian violence, ethnization of politics (through the Punjabization of Pakistani politics, as Zia was particularly favouring Punjabis), and the emancipation of secular elites in Pakistan.²⁵⁵ Zia died in 1988 in a plain crash that until today is still a mystery to many Pakistanis as it is unsure as this was a planned murder or an accident. Following his death, Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, became prime minister of Pakistan (1988-1990) and at the same time the first female leader in the history of a Muslim state. Benazir Bhutto's government tried to present Pakistan as a "moderate Islamic democracy which was open for business and willing to assist the West in the struggle against drugs and terrorism"²⁵⁶. Sectarian violence and Pakistani militancy still rose under Bhutto's government. In 1990, Nawaz Sharif came into power (1990-1993) and continued some of the Islamization policies of Zia-ul-Haq. His political era was marked by the attempt to liberalize the economy. His policies were similar to that of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's populism politics and also showed the same degree of authoritarianism. He pursued nepotism and encouraged corruption through these political decisions and at the same time charged Benazir Bhutto on grounds of corruption.

Nawaz Sharif was toppled by a military coup of General Pervez Musharraf in 1999. Musharraf suspended the constitution and the government and sent Nawaz Sharif into arrests and Benazir Bhutto into exile. He justified his military coup by the corruption charges he pursued against

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 210.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 211.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 212.

Nawaz Sharif and by the pronounced necessity to create order in the country. Although Musharraf let a certain liberty to the press, the Supreme Court became his political target. A certain number of judges refused to legitimize Musharraf's military coup due to which Musharraf re-organized the composition of the Supreme Court by positioning judges favourable to him. With this "judicial support", Musharraf eventually became the new president of Pakistan in 2001. Whereas the economy thrived under Musharraf's regime, Islamic militancy grew perpetually stronger, especially after Musharraf's pro-U.S. policies after September 11th. In the course of several inner political events such as the Red Mosque affair, in which Musharraf showed severe action against an Islamist grouping in Islamabad, criticism against Musharraf grew stronger. His actions were interpreted as purely strategical in order to guarantee his re-election as president in the coming presidential elections. His strategy, however, backfired and raised more criticism against him. Prior to the Red Mosque affair, Musharraf weakened one more time the judiciary by suspending the chief justice Iftikhar Chaudry, as he was objecting to legitimize his re-election. In the consequence of all these events, Musharraf was forced to give up his position as general of the Pakistani army. In the following, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif's return to Pakistan both in 2007/2008 destabilized the country one more time and challenged the political landscape of the country.

2.3.2 Pakistan's political system

Pakistan is an Islamic Republic and consists of a two-chamber parliamentary system, the Senate and the National Assembly. The National Assembly elects the Prime Minister who heads the cabinet. The president chairs the National Security Council which consists of cabinet ministers and of military chiefs. The president has the right to dissolve the government and the two houses of parliament in case of a state of emergency.

Senators represent their provincial region and are elected for a six year term. Provinces usually have their own chief minister and a governor elected by the government, who has the power to dissolve the provincial government. Provinces are equally represented in the National Assembly according to proportion of the populations in the various regions. Members of the National Assembly are elected in a five-year term on basis of a majority voting system. Next to this, Pakistan also has its own provincial parliament located in the capital of the various provinces.

The judiciary of Pakistan is per se independent, but is restricted in its autonomous independence as the judiciary gets elected by the president.

This shows that the political system in Pakistan has a strong executive power in which the president can easily misuse the power and establish an authoritarian regime. This is the structural prerequisite why Pakistan has such a circular history in terms of military rules and unachieved democratic goals.

2.4 Pakistani education system – spaces of interaction between different identities

This chapter is going to portray the different education systems in Pakistan, which have an influence on the identity formation of Pakistani students. In this part, I will primarily focus on the work of Tariq Rahman, distinguished national professor teaching at the Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad. Tariq Rahman is known to be the most famous linguist in Pakistan who has written several books on the education system in Pakistan. In his latest book “Denizens of alien worlds. A Study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan” he not only historically analyzes the development of the different educational systems but also presents the results of his survey, where he analyzed the political attitudes, attitudes on self-perception of students studying in different education systems.

I will in the following present very shortly the three different education systems: the English vernacular, the Urdu vernacular²⁵⁷ and the madrassah system. Consequently, I will present the most important outcomes of this survey in these different education sectors and continue with this survey on secondary and tertiary education level, as to college and university systems in Pakistan. At this point, I will present my own survey.

2.4.1 The Urdu vernacular system

The Urdu medium schools are the most frequented schools in Pakistan, as they are affordable by the low and middle class in Pakistan. According to the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey, the number of enrolled students in the Urdu medium schools for the school year 2001-2002 were 42%.²⁵⁸ Tariq Rahman argues that the Pakistani education system is per se a very polarized system that disfavours poor students in terms of education. Only 27% of the poorest people manage to send their children to public schools, whereas 56% of the richest class send their children to school.

²⁵⁷ The Urdu vernacular medium school is the most spread vernacular school system all over the country. There are however also other vernacular medium schools, especially in Sindhi and in Pushto. See Rahman (2004): 24f.

²⁵⁸ see Rahman (2004): 25.

The Urdu medium schools are basically meant for working class children and also the lower middle class. The same logic applies also to teachers who come from these classes. The language of instruction in these schools is Urdu, although English is obligatory. Fact is, however, that hardly any student can really converse fluently in English. The schooling in Urdu medium school takes 10 years, which ends the secondary education. The exams are held in Urdu.

The social problem that comes with these schools is that they are often far away from their homes, so that students have to travel a long way to reach school, which affects their time schedule, personal energy and money. The conditions in school and of the education in these schools are additionally very low:

Schools are generally dull, stringent places, often painted a dirty yellow with blue doors and windows with broken glass panes. They are highly regimented with semi-educated teachers forcing their pupils to memorize passages out of poorly written, poorly printed and extremely dull books. Classrooms are overcrowded with forty-one girls and thirty-eight boys per teacher (...)²⁵⁹

Furthermore, the conditions in summer are extremely hard as there is no air-condition. In rural areas classes are often held in the open field as there is too little space in the classrooms. Another major issue of these schools is that corporal punishment is often part of the pedagogical use of teachers, which becomes a major reason to why students drop out of school.²⁶⁰ Often the drop-out rate, which is the highest among the poorest students, is often made out as a lack of motivation of teachers.

Urdu-medium schools are generally funded by the state and teachers get usually a very low salary, which only attracts “those who fail to get other jobs”²⁶¹.

The textbooks used in Urdu medium schools were analyzed in ‘T. Rahman’ survey on the different education system. He analyzed the policy guidelines to which the textbooks were written and which educational values were presented in these books. According to Rahman, the general values presented in these books belong to an “in-group” which define the nation and national identity. At the same time, an “out-group” is being defined which stands in opposition to the in-group. The “other” in those textbooks is therefore always either romanticized or demonized.²⁶²

²⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 26.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 34.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid., p. 27.

Rahman further argues that ethnicity is widely ignored in order to create one Pakistani identity:

Ethnicity is ignored to create a Pakistani identity, although these centrist policies have been resented by ethnic communities (...) There is also much glorification of war and the military and many anti-Hindu and anti-India remarks and religious bias interspersed throughout the books.²⁶³

According to Rahman, these textbooks influence the students' world view. The objectives for the teaching curriculum are defined by the Pakistani government. These objectives often mark Islam "as a marker of identity and define the boundaries of the self"²⁶⁴. At the same time, the "other" is defined as non-Muslim. Rahman argues that this is one reason why students exposed to these textbooks "tend to be intolerant of Hindus, Christians and non-Muslim minorities".²⁶⁵ Another factor that can be made out to understand the view of Urdu-medium students which stands apart from the influence of the textbooks used in schools, is their socio-economic background. As already described, the student of Urdu-medium schools often come from upper working class and lower middle class families and are thus often "less exposed to Western discourses available on cable television, English books and conversations of peer group members, family and friends who have been abroad"²⁶⁶. Their families can be described as conservative and religious, who often read Urdu newspapers and watch Urdu programmes at television.²⁶⁷

Rahman explains that in these social classes students are often found to be relatively emotional as to religious issues, which even favours the Islamization of the state although they do not want to be ruled by religious clergy.²⁶⁸

A corollary of this Islamic outlook is emotionality about religious issues and hence, intolerance for the religious 'other', i.e. the Hindu, the Ahmedi and, to a lesser degree, the Christian. Part of this emotion has also been transferred to Pakistani nationalism.²⁶⁹

These are generally the observations made and attitudes found within Urdu-medium school students, which appear to be quite conservative, very patriotic and bear a potential of religious intolerance.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 35.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

2.4.2 The English vernacular system

English medium schools are quite popular and advertisement for these schools can be found everywhere on the streets.²⁷⁰ These schools can be divided into state-influenced elitist public schools, private elitist schools and non-elitist schools. English is often seen as the provider for a brighter future for students. The state-influenced English schools belong to the best schools and colleges in the country. Enrolment fees are much higher than those of Urdu medium schools and depend on the professional background of the parents:²⁷¹

This means that English medium schooling can be bought either by the elite of wealth or that of power. And this has not happened through market forces but has been brought about by the functionaries or institutions of the state itself. Indeed, the state has invested heavily in creating a parallel system of education for the elite, especially the elite that would presumably run elitist state institutions in future. This leads to the conclusion that the state does not trust its own system of education and spends public funds to create and maintain the parallel, elitist system of schooling.²⁷²

The medium of instruction in these schools is both Urdu and English, depending on the teacher.

Elitist English medium schools can be public schools run by the state as well as private institutions with very high fees. The teachers come generally from the middle classes. The conditions of the English-medium schools are defined as “more humane, modern, innovative and interesting than in the Urdu-medium schools and the madrassas”²⁷³.

The textbooks are mostly imported from other countries and the syllabus contains the classics of the English language. Although Pakistan studies, Islamic studies and Urdu are compulsory, the focus lies on world history.²⁷⁴

Rahman argues that students from these schools have broader access to Western discourses through literature, TV and relatives abroad and thus tend to be more tolerant towards an “other”:

They are tolerant of people from different religions (such as Hinduism) and of different countries (such as India). These children are much less supportive of militant policies in Kashmir than their counterparts in other schools.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 42.

²⁷¹ State-controlled English schools often have a lower enrolment fee for students whose parents work for these institutions than those who do not. See Rahman (2004): 52.

²⁷² Ibid., p. 53.

²⁷³ Ibid., p. 60.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

The private non-elitist English medium schools. The medium of instruction is predominantly English and the English taught in these schools are from a higher level than that in Urdu-medium schools. Students attending these schools are often from “modest backgrounds”²⁷⁶, due to which the language of instruction and communication is also often Urdu. Additionally these schools are also part of the chain of “Islamic schools” as the Siqara system, where books are checked for their anti-Islamic content and female teachers and students are forced to wear a headscarf.²⁷⁷

It seems that the Islamic revivalist thinkers have realized how empowering English is and want to attract lower income groups through it. (...) While the percentage may be contested, there is no doubt that Islamists, especially those who are politically oriented, teach English because it enables students to enter the mainstream for positions of power in the salariat. This policy has also been endorsed by the Jamaat-i-Islami which, while being against English-medium elitist schools, does not deny either secular education or English to the students who study in its institutions.²⁷⁸

Thus the students from English medium schools are according to the schools they attended, elitist or non-elitist, more or less westernized. Rahman argues that the negative consequence of those who are more westernized is, that they get “alienated from Pakistan, especially from its indigenous languages and cultures”.²⁷⁹ This can turn to “arrogant” attitudes towards the own country, but at the same time makes them often open towards “liberal-humanist” and “democratic” values.²⁸⁰ They are equally more tolerant towards other countries, especially India, and often do not glorify the past of Pakistan as students from other countries do. The other group of students from non-elitist schools, however, can turn out to be equally arrogant or ignorant towards the own indigenous culture, but, are more nationalistic and militaristic and thus often pursue an anti-India attitude and are in favour of the military.²⁸¹

What is common in both groups, is their understanding of themselves, of belonging to the elite-group in Pakistan – “not of money and power, which they are, but of talent and knowledge”²⁸².

I would like to conclude with Rahman's description of these students of being “foreigners” in their own country.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 65.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 71.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid.

What is worse is that it is not only certain values and or customs, which these “foreigners” living in Pakistan dismiss derisively; they hold all Pakistanis, except Westernized ones, in contempt. They are what people call ‘brown Englishman’ (...) This kind of dismissal of everything ‘native’ is one of the worst legacies of colonial, Western rule.²⁸³

2.4.3 The madrassah system

The madrassah system has especially become an issue on international and also again on national level after 9/11 where these schools were alleged to educate children towards the Islamic fundamental ideology. Since then, many analyses and reports have been brought forward. It is nevertheless still difficult to acquire useful data on the madrassah system as the data are often not registered. However, it is registered, when these madrassahs are allied to the Central Boards of Madrassas in Pakistan, which are under the control of following political parties or sub-sects: Deobandi, Bareilvi, Shia, Jaamat-i-Islami or the Ahl-i-Hadith.²⁸⁴

The number of madrassahs has increased especially under Zia-ul-Haq's military regime (1977-1988). The United States as supportive to the Taliban in Afghanistan, sent money, arms and ammunition to Pakistan, which was equally used to finance the madrassahs in Pakistan.²⁸⁵

Madrassahs are always funded by charity or other donors, money also often comes from rich businessmen settled in the west.²⁸⁶

Admission fee of madrassahs is extremely low, students come from the poorest class and sometimes even receive a sustenance from the schools. Reasons for sending their children are often on a financial basis, as parents often cannot afford “to feed them and educate them in government schools”.²⁸⁷ Madrassahs provide children with food, education and often also a place to sleep due to which these schools become relatively popular among poor families.²⁸⁸ Another reason why parents send their children to these schools is that they try to “keep them protected from gangs, drugs and the violence of everyday life”.²⁸⁹ Most of the madrassahs are single-sex institutions only educating male students, although there also few madrassahs who educate female students.

The curriculum is entirely according to Islamic dogmatic ideology and is taught in Arabic:

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 78.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 79.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 91.

²⁸⁸ see Candland in Kennedy/Botteron (2006): 234.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 235.

Their curriculum is broadly similar throughout South Asia. Twenty subjects are covered using about eighty standard textbooks. Twenty books might be used in any given madrasa. Textbooks are written in Arabic and subjects include Logic, Mathematics and Astrology, Philosophy, Theology, Jurisprudence, Quranic exegesis, Rhetoric, and Grammar.²⁹⁰

One important characteristics is the teaching method that is designed to have students recite mindlessly the Quran:

Recitation and memorization is a common pedagogical device. Indeed, to aid in their memorization, many standard madrasa textbooks are written in rhymed couples. However, the Quran is not typically the principal text and madrasas rely heavily on books of fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence].²⁹¹

In a study on madrassahs by Candice Lys, the author points out that children take harm on an educational level, being exposed to low quality education that hinders the development of students, on a physical level, often being the victims of physical harm or even sexual abuse, and on a psychological level, as suffering from humiliation, terrorizing and other emotional neglecting behaviour.²⁹² The author concludes that the result of these harms along these three levels can lead to an overall violent behaviour:

Possible results of exposure to violence include psychological problems such as increased aggression, anti-social behaviour, defensive and offensive fighting, deficient emotional regulation and difficulty expressing feelings, negative self images, alcohol and drug use, as well as depression and anxiety. Through military training and the promotion of violence against the "other", children exposed to "prolonged desensitization and lack of empathy for others may have adverse and long term social and emotional consequences" (Buka, et al., 2001:303) that negatively affect their growth into healthy adults.²⁹³

Tariq Rahman comes to a similar conclusion, where he points out that madrassah students are the "most intolerant of all other students groups in Pakistan".²⁹⁴ Additionally, they strongly

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² see Lys, Candice: "Demonizing the "Other": Fundamentalist Pakistani Madrasahs and the Construction of Religious Violence", in: *Marburg Journal of Religion* 11 (2006) 1, pp. 6-9.

²⁹³ Ibid, p. 8.

²⁹⁴ see Rahman (2004): 93.

approve of aggressive, offensive foreign policy in terms of Jihad, in regard of the Kashmir conflict for example.²⁹⁵

Former president Musharraf declared in 2005 to combat extremism by controlling the funding and curriculum of madrassahs and providing more scrutiny in this regard.²⁹⁶ The madrassah system and the consequences of religious extremism in Pakistan have since Musharraf's last statement not been resolved yet and perpetually posed a problem to Pakistan on a national and international level, always leading to major political crises within the country.

2.4.4 Higher education in Pakistan

This chapter looks at the education system in Pakistan in regard of higher education, which will not only focus on university level, but also on college level. Higher education in Pakistan includes secondary higher education in colleges and tertiary higher education at universities. Students attending higher education in Pakistan come from Urdu-medium or English medium schools. Colleges can be seen as an "extension of the schools, but the two-years a student stays here are the years of transition from the Urdu-medium to the partly English medium type of study"²⁹⁷. It is only after this transition of two years²⁹⁸ that the student either chooses professional colleges, such as engineering and medical studies, or goes to degree colleges, where he does his master. Real intensive study starts with the level of Masters in Pakistan, which is usually taught in universities, although more and more colleges also offer MA courses.

Rahman argues that Pakistan's universities lack in academic standards. They are often of "low quality of academics and lack of good laboratories, libraries and other facilities of research"²⁹⁹. This often leads to several social problems, such as student frustration which is expressed in (violent) student protests. These protests are a result of a stereotyped system of evaluation that is prone to corrupted decision-making processes.³⁰⁰ Due to this crisis which was mainly located in public universities, the first private university, the Aga Khan University in 1983, followed by the establishment of LUMS in 1985, were established. Today the "mushrooming of private universities"³⁰¹ continues, as the problem of public universities has still not been solved yet.³⁰²

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ see International Crisis Group (ICG): "Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism", Asia Report N. 73, 16. January 2004, Executive Summary.

²⁹⁷ see Rahman (2004): 100.

²⁹⁸ BA courses in Pakistan usually last two years. See Rahman (2004): 100.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 118.

³⁰¹ Ibid., p. 119.

³⁰² Ibid.

Here too one can differentiate between public and private institutions. The Lahore University of Management and Science is the second largest private higher institution in Pakistan. Along with this privatization came also the liberty “to deviate from the curriculum of state-run school systems”³⁰³. Rahman speaks of an “educational apartheid”³⁰⁴ that segregates the students from these different education systems. Along with this comes the lack of funding from the state which results in universities “charging exorbitant tuition fees from students”³⁰⁵.

Rahman locates the crisis of Pakistan's education system also in the demotivation of students to seek academic excellency in universities, due to these countless problems in the university system in Pakistan.³⁰⁶ This is the reason why private universities, which are often donor or institution driven, such as universities administered and funded by the Pakistani army, create parallel educational hubs in the country, which offer high academic standard comparable to higher institutions worldwide:

Because of the lack of high-quality in the public universities as well as the population pressure, private entrepreneurs as well as the armed forces have established their own universities. (...) However, since they cater to the affluent classes they are attractive for young people who are educated in English medium schools. Thus, the educational apartheid established in schools, (...), now continues throughout the student's career. This development ghettoizes the public university, alienating the affluent classes from the less affluent classes more markedly than before.³⁰⁷

This leads to the conclusion that the state willingly spends more money in the elite classes than in the masses, as state institutions often are the sole or most prominent donors for the education system. If this is not the case, schools, colleges and universities are little sponsored by the state, which leads to greater social problems and the educational segregation and thus the future social and economical separation of the different classes. The Pakistani education system is strongly structured along social-economical classes. Madrassahs, which are not stately funded at all, but educate the largest number of students in Pakistan, thus fall in the hands of generous Islamist parties and/or sects who take over the religious education of the student and thus de-stabilize the country by promoting the violent and aggressive potential found within attitudes of the madrassah system, as presented in the study. It is due to all these facts that the title of Rahman's

³⁰³ see Tamar, Omar Nadeem: “Globalisation and Higher Education in Pakistan”, in: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 09.12.2006

³⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 101.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 116.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 124.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 127.

book gives the most adequate designation of the societal consequences of such an education system, that creates “Denizens of alien worlds”.

3. Political identities of Pakistani students in Lahore

Strategic and operational level

This chapter is going to analyze the results of my questionnaires and my interviews in view of political identities of Pakistan. I will discuss mainly three important questions. The first question will try grasp the scope of how Pakistani students understand their own identity and how they view the identity of their country. The second question is going to depict their attitudes towards the Pakistani state and government. Finally, I will answer the third question on what the perceived threats, fears and dangers are from the Pakistani student's view.

For every question, I will first put forth the results of my questionnaire and then interpret them using the results of my interviews for comparison and supporting evidence.

These results will be interpreted according to three major content-oriented items: 1) identity 2) attitudes towards the Pakistani state and government and 3) threats. In the end I will give an analysis on how the political attitudes and thus identities of the different student bodies can best be described in the three universities in Lahore: Punjab University, King Edwards College and Lahore University of Management and Sciences.

3.1 On Identity

This chapter is going to be structured according to two major steps of my empirical work. In a first step I will present the results of my interviews concerning different elements of Pakistani identity. For this I have chosen two variables of my questionnaire.

These variables are:

- a. Importance of your religion
- b. Importance of being a Muslim in order to define yourself as Pakistani

In a second step, I will analyze and interpret these results according to similar items present in my interviews and try to draw a picture on their attitudes of their identity from the students of the different universities.

3.1.1 Importance of your religion³⁰⁸




Figure 1: Importance of your religion

31 out of 34 Punjab University students have given an answer to this question. 30 students out of 34 PU respondents answered this question with “Very Important” and only one student with “Fairly Important”. 98.6% of Punjab University students thus esteem religion very important for themselves and 3.2% fairly important.

King Edwards students have answered on a broader scale. All King Edwards students have given an answer to this question. 16 out of 20 students answered this question with “Very Important”, 2 with “Fairly Important”, 1 with “Not Very Important” and 1 with “Not Important at All”. 80% of K.E. students thus consider their religion as very important and 10% as fairly important; 10% of K.E students did not express so much importance towards religion and have thus voted for “Not Very Important” or “Not Important at All”.

In LUMS, 23 out of 23 students have answered this question. 15 have answered this question with “Very Important” and 5 with “Fairly important”. 3 students have chosen the option “Not

³⁰⁸ Participants: PU 31 out of 34, KE 20 out of 20, LUMS 23 out of 23.

Very Important”. On the whole, 65.2% of LUMS students esteem religion as very important for them and 21.7% as fairly important and only 5% attribute it unimportant status.

3.1.2 Importance of being a Muslim in order to define yourself as Pakistani³⁰⁹




Figure 2: Importance of being a Muslim in order to define yourself as Pakistani

33 out of 34 Punjab University students responded to this question. 93.9% of the students answered with “Very Important”, 3% with “Fairly Important” and 3% with “Not Very Important”. In total, 96.9% of P.U. students think it is important to be a Muslim in order to define themselves as Pakistanis.

At the King Edward's College 19 out of 20 students answered this question. Again the answers at King Edward's are on a broader scale. 68.4% responded with “Very Important”, 21.1% with “Fairly Important”, and 10.5% with “Not Very Important”. Thus, 89.5% of K.E. students think it is very important to be a Muslim in order to define oneself as Pakistani.

The answers of the LUMS students vary a lot. All LUMS students have responded to this question. Only 39.1% answered with “Very Important”, 26% with “Fairly Important”, 26.1%

³⁰⁹ Participants: PU 33 out of 34, KE 19 out of 20, LUMS 23 out of 23.

with “Not Important” and 8.7% with “Not Important at all”. In total, only 65.2% of LUMS students thus think it is important to be a Muslim in order to define themselves as Pakistani.

3.1.2 Analysis and interpretation

This part will not only discuss the results of my questionnaires but also include the statements of the interviews with the students from the three different universities to help me analyze and understand the results of my questionnaires.

As religion has played an extremely important role in the state formation of Pakistan and policy-makers later on attempted several times to use it in the formation of the identity of the Pakistani people, the significance of religion as judged by the students of the different universities has been a very important parameter for analyzing and measuring their identity. My first question was generally asking about the importance they give to religion, whereas my second question more importantly focused on the question whether being a Muslim is important to them in order to define themselves as Pakistanis. The results are striking, as the questionnaires from the three universities have different outcomes. In the following, I will discuss in short the results by using the interviews I have conducted.

The Punjab University holds the highest percentage of students (96.8%) allocating a great importance to their religion. As I have discussed in the chapter on my conditions of research³¹⁰ the Punjab University has, according to my own observations, a very conservative student atmosphere. The openness or conservativeness of students is measureable through the dress code and the male female student interaction at the university. As female students of the Punjab University predominantly cover up their hair through a dupatta, scarf or covering their whole body by burqa, their dress code already suggests that religious dressing is important to them. The same observation can be made through the male female interaction, which is institutionally separated through reading rooms for male and female students only and separate cafeterias for male and female students, and which is also socially rather separate depending on the individual attitude of each student. This would also explain why, for an almost equally high percentage of students (93.9%), it is important to be a Muslim to define themselves as Pakistani. This observation is also supported by my interviews. Both PU students I conducted an interview with emphasized the importance of Islam in their identity. My male PU respondent, student of space sciences, gave me this answer in regard to his identity:

³¹⁰ See chapter 1.3.3. “My respondents: The students”

There is only one important thing for us: We are Moslems. And we are supposed to live according to that. That's our religion.

The female PU student, a student of library sciences, also stressed the importance of culture and religion and defined them as the most important parameters for understanding life in Pakistan:

My first association of Pakistan are my family, my relatives and my culture, my religion. These are the things that help you understand what it means to live in Pakistan.

The importance of religion is stressed further by the same student as she even regrets the fact that Pakistan has not become a real Islamic Republic yet, because of various social, economic and political problems in Pakistan:

When I think of the country I think that we are not achieving what we were supposed to achieve. Our destination was to become an Islamic Republic, what we haven't become yet. (...) That's because of the social and economic problems in Pakistan, nepotism, bribery, injustice...the main problem is injustice. There's no justice in Pakistan!

Their attitudes towards religion are very positive and appointed. Deep down there is a strong belief in religion as being an important guiding element for the personal identity and that of the Pakistani state.

At the King Edward's College, 80% of the students stressed the personal importance of religion, which is also a high percentage of students. Combined with those who answered with "Fairly Important" that shows that in general 90% of students esteem religion as very important or fairly important. The percentage of students thinking that it is important to be a Muslim in order to define themselves as Pakistanis is smaller (68.4%) but is still the majority of the K.E. students. Thus, we can say that also here the importance of religion and its role in identity formation can be very important to this student body. My personal observation of the dress code and the male female interaction also showed me a relatively conservative atmosphere, but not comparable to that of the Punjab University. Shalwaar Kameeze and dupatta and/or scarf are still very common but interaction between male and female students does not seem so hard. I would therefore suggest that the King Edward's College has a moderate conservative atmosphere allowing both trends to be expressed. My interviews have shown me similar oscillating results. My male K.E. interview partner, a student of medical studies, with big musical interests in the form of classical dance, allocated a very minor and almost unimportant role to religion:

I am not religious at all. I don't look so much at the religious perspective. I love music – my aesthetic sense gets satisfied through that and I like that. I am not religious because I don't pray, nor anything else. I don't know so much about religion or Islam and don't have so much information on it. If I am forced to pray, then I pray, but then I don't understand why I am praying. I don't have any logic of this.

Although he personally cannot relate very much to religion, his statement does however show how present Islam seems to be in his environment and to what degree he is confronted with it. He continues by saying that because of his strong interest in music and dance he is often insulted, as socially and religiously the use of music and dance for artistic purposes is not very well seen in all circles in Pakistan:

I often feel alienated in Pakistan, because all my interests like music are not accepted in Pakistan.

This strong religious pressure did however leave its imprints on him, causing him to say that Islam did in fact have an important role in the formation of his identity:

Islam is a big part of my identity, because my ideas and values are influenced by this. I have this basic concept of that there is one God and to be righteous and that I have to account for my actions. I believe in punishment if I do bad things. These are the basic things that were imposed on me since my childhood. That does naturally influence me.

My second K.E. interview partner, a student of pharmacy, had a very similar position towards the role of Islam in her life and for the future of the country:

I think that Pakistan is a country where everybody, as a Muslim, can live freely. And Pakistan is very protective in regard of its citizens.

The main point of her statement, Muslims can live in freedom in Pakistan, suggests that somewhere else this is not the case, although this has not been specified in her statement. In every regard this statement shows pride towards the own country and the potential that lies in Pakistan for the future and safety of Muslims on the Indian subcontinent.

Generally, I would say that the students of King Edwards do stress the importance of religion and especially of Islam in their life throughout my results. I find both very assertive attitudes towards Islam in their life as well as almost indifferent attitudes towards Islam for their personal identity, although the first presumption prevails, especially as demonstrated by the results of my questionnaires.

When it comes to LUMS students, the results are strikingly different from both previously discussed institutions. Although 65.2% of LUMS students esteem religion as very important and 21.7% as fairly important, which is quite a high percentage if put together, only 39.1% of students think that it is important to be a Muslim in order to define themselves as Pakistani. We can therefore presume that religion is personally important to them out of different reasons, which were not analyzed in the questionnaire, but it is not necessarily important to define themselves as Muslims. This shows sort of a kind of respect towards religion, but not necessarily an importance when it comes to the personal identity formation. My personal observation of the dress code and male female interaction at LUMS has shown me a very open atmosphere. It is not only very common to dress in a Western manner, but also to interact with males openly, as there are no separate institutional settings for male and female students, except for the students hostels of course. Next to this, LUMS has the most diverse student body in the sense of international students or Pakistani students who have partly lived abroad or even grew up abroad, or just have an intensive contact with the foreign world through relatives and the media they use. My interview partners both have shown quite open attitudes in regard to the definition of their personal identity. My male LUMS interview partner, a student of social sciences, answered my question of how he would define his identity:

I define identity by relating to people. And what gives me a sense of Pakistani identity is the common values I share with most of the people. I know it doesn't fit into the definition very well, but I have developed this, because I tried to find some sort of identity, reconcile things and I found yes, that I do share a Pakistani identity. I do have a Pakistani identity in terms of likes and dislikes, values, religious values, a lot of other things, yes, values in general; they are what make me Pakistani from the core.

Although this is a very open definition to their personal identity it does however stress the culture aspect of identity and different values that lie underneath and do not explicitly focus on religion. He does however later also stress the importance of Islam as a source for his identity formation:

I try to take guidance from religion. There's a lot of flexibility, yes, but it's from there. It allows for each aspect of behaviour, not just, you can start with how you greet each other, etc. etc. (...) there are a lot of things! Everything has a lot of answers to it. You can't have one answer to everything!

But it is definitely not the sole source of "inspiration" for his identity, as he also mentions "Western influence" as an important parameter for his personal identity:

Part of my identity is also inspired, also comes from the West, yes, but people who entirely forget their identity don't share the common values. For people who have grown up and lived abroad for them it's a different thing. I say this as reference to people who live here. They don't represent Pakistan, not even the values, yes, not even the upper-middle class values!

As discussed, LUMS students are widely more exposed to "Western influence" as PU and K.E. students. Therefore the conflict which is hidden between such an intensive exposure to the Western world also comes out in the same interview:

I haven't been torn apart, yes, but I have tried to sort of balance these things. And that is also because of the fact that my circle or my society that I DIRECTLY associate with has a degree of respect attached to Western identity.

My second interview partner, a female law student, has shown an equally open attitude towards religion and her own identity:

We do have this overarching Muslim identity, supposedly symbolic. In the Pakistani identity we're supposed to be united by Islam. I don't think it literally happens that way, but in the symbolic it exists in that way, so then what happens is that people who ascribe to this, expect other people to do the same. (...) So you have this sort of a conflict, that is there.

Although she recognizes the structural significance of Islam in the Pakistani identity, she personally does not believe in the effect it has on the formation of the people. What is important for her to really create a "Pakistani identity" is the common idea of "Pakistan" as a nation state:

Frankly speaking, I don't think that there is something that holds us together. I know that a lot of people will disagree with me, because, yeah, actually the only thing that does bring us together is maybe when you grow up with the idea of Pakistan and not everybody does! For those people who are, yes we are connected through this, but for those people who are not, they're not.

She sees the problem of the formation of one common Pakistani identity in the deep differences between the Pakistani people, which are rooted ethnically and linguistically within the people. She admits herself that, when she was younger she did not realize the big differences between the people. That is something she only realized when coming to university and being confronted with students from all over Pakistan. She blames Pakistan's "closed ideological existence" for this, which is being promoted through propaganda and manipulation through the media. These differences could only be bridged through religion, which she sees as a mere strategic and

operational element for the construction of an identity in Pakistan, but not as a sustainable, inspirational source of identity.

Now we can't relate to each other and this alienation, this deep chasm, I would say, was created, not exactly created, but encouraged through the government. It was in their benefit so that people can't interact, so that the people don't rise again and in order to make them not rise again, all those spaces where people could interact in this way needed to be crushed! That's the reason why people get so emotional about religion, because that's the only space they have for expression! Political space we've never had, it's been created now after the chief justice issue, sort of a little bit and even then the government tries so hard to control it, but couldn't!

Furthermore she suggests that this actually creates further social problems such as a diverging Pakistani society, falling apart, alienating, in regard to different lifestyles, attitudes and incomprehension of the "other".

In short, we can therefore say that the openness, the Western lifestyle pursued by some of the LUMS students or just the simple exposure to Western lifestyle did in one way or another have an effect on the openness towards their own identity and towards the attitudes they bear in regard to their own country, and their own identity.

3.2 Attitudes towards the Pakistani citizenship, government and the army

This chapter is going to portray the results of my questionnaires and my interviews concerning the Pakistani citizenship, government and the army. In a first step, I will present the results of my questionnaire by depicting the results of following variables:

- a. Importance of voting at Pakistani elections
- b. Proudness towards the Pakistani government
- c. Proudness towards the Pakistani army

In a second step, I will then put these results together with the statements that were presented to me in my interviews regarding the same topic.

3.2.1 Importance of voting in Pakistani elections³¹¹




Figure 3: Importance of voting in Pakistani elections in order to define yourself as Pakistani

All Punjab University respondents have answered this question. 44,1% of PU students esteem voting in Pakistani elections as “Very Important”, 26,5% as “Fairly Important” and 14,7% esteem both times voting in Pakistani elections as “Not Very Important” or “Not Important at All”. In total we can say that the importance of voting in Pakistani elections in order to define themselves as Pakistanis lies with 70,6% of PU students.

In King Edward’s, 19 out of 20 students have responded to this question. 26,3% of the students have answered with “Very Important” and 15,8% with “Fairly Important”. The most chosen answer among K.E. students was however “Not Very Important” which represents 47,7% of the K.E. students. 10,2% have answered with “Not Important at All”. In total, only 42,1% think it is important to vote in Pakistani elections in order to define themselves as Pakistanis. We can therefore say that the majority of K.E. students does however think that it is not important to vote in Pakistani elections in order to define themselves as Pakistanis.

³¹¹ Participants: PU 34 out of 34, KE 19 out of 20, LUMS 23 out of 23.

In LUMS every student has answered this question. 17.4% have answered with “Very Important” and 47.8% have answered with “Fairly Important”. 13.0% have answered with “Not Important” and 21.7% with “Not Important at All”. We can thus say that in total 65.2% think it is important to vote in Pakistani elections in order to define themselves as Pakistanis.

3.2.2 Proudness towards the Pakistani government³¹²




Figure 4: Proudness towards the Pakistani government

At the Punjab University, 31 out of 34 students have answered the question how proud they are of the current Pakistani government. Only 3.2% have answered this question with “Very Proud”, 6.5% with “Somewhat Proud”; 45.2% have answered with “Not Very Proud” and 35.5% with “Not Proud at All”. 9.7% of the students were uncertain and responded with “Can’t choose”. In total, only 9.7% of the students were proud of the Pakistani government and a big percentage of students, namely 80.7% are not proud of the current Pakistani government.

In King Edwards all students have responded to this question. Nobody answered with “Very Proud”, 10% however with “Somewhat proud”. 25.0% answered with “Not Very Proud” and 65.0% with “Not Proud at All”. The majority of K.E. students, namely 80% of K.E. students, are thus not proud of the Pakistani government.

³¹² Participants: 31 out of 34, KE 20 out of 20, LUMS 22 out of 23.

In LUMS, 22 out of 23 students responded to this question. Nobody answered with “Very Proud”, although 31.8% answered with “Somewhat Proud”. The majority, 45.5%, answered with “Not Very Proud” and 18.2% answered with “Not Proud at All”. 4.5% of LUMS students answered with “Can’t choose”. There’s a relative balance between those who are somewhat proud and those are not very proud of the Pakistani government.

3.2.3 Proudness towards the Pakistani army³¹³




Figure 5: Proudness towards the Pakistani army

31 out of 34 PU students responded to this question. Among them, 48.4% are very proud of the Pakistani army, 25.8% “Somewhat Proud”, 16.1% are “Not Very Proud” and 6.5% “Not Proud at All”. 1 Student, 3.2%, was uncertain and chose to respond with “Can’t Choose”.

From the K.E. respondents, all students answered this question. 25% answered with “Very Proud”, 65% with “Somewhat Proud” and each time 5% with “Not Very Proud” and “Not Proud at All”. We could therefore presume that the majority of K.E. is relatively proud of the Pakistani army.

³¹³ Participants: PU 31 out of 34, KE 20 out of 20, LUMS 22 out of 23.

In LUMS, 22 out of 23 students responded to this question. 27.3% are very proud, and 31.8% are “Somewhat Proud”. 22.7% are “Not Very Proud” and 18.2% are “Not Proud at All”. Here again, there is a relative balance between those who are proud and those who are not, although the majority, 59.1% are proud of the Pakistani army.

3.2.4 Analysis and interpretation

Attitudes towards the state and the government were analyzed through three questions. The first question was to measure the importance they put into elections to measure their own political responsibility in regard to their Pakistani citizenship by asking them whether it is important for them to vote in Pakistani elections in order to define themselves as Pakistanis. The second and third question both refer to the government and the state by asking them how proud they are of the current Pakistani government³¹⁴ and the Pakistani army – as one of the state’s most important institutions and the executive arm of the government.

The students of the Punjab University showed a high result as to how important voting in Pakistani elections means to them in order to define themselves as Pakistani. Put together the results of those who responded with “Very Important” and “Fairly Important”, we have a percentage of 70.6% of PU students giving significance to their Pakistani citizenship by voting at Pakistani elections. As to the proudness towards the Pakistani government and the Pakistani army, the results differ. Regarding the Pakistani government, we have an extremely negative outcome with 80.7% of PU students who are not proud of the current Pakistani government. Surprisingly, the outcome in regard to the Pakistani army is relatively high, as 48.4% of PU students are “Very Proud” of the Pakistani army, 25.8% “Somewhat Proud”. We can discuss these results from two perspectives. In regard to the current Pakistani government, which at that time was headed by President Musharraf, who at the same time was the chief general of the Pakistani army, the army and government were thus both in the hands of the same person: General Pervez Musharraf. Seen from that angle, it is hard to explain how such a high percentage of PU students are not proud of the government, but at the same time a high percentage of the PU students is very proud, or somewhat proud of the Pakistani army. The only conclusion I can draw from this is that the significance of the army was not seen in the light of the current Pakistani government but rather seen generally, especially on the historical and sociological

³¹⁴ As the survey was conducted in summer 2006, the term “current” Pakistani government, refers to the government of Musharraf, a presidential cum parliamentary government, legitimized through parliamentary voting. If we consider that as army chief Musharraf would never even have had the possibility to run for a presidency, his presidency is not legitimate, however through parliamentary voting and through the legitimization of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, you can however say that his presidency became legitimized.

significance of the army as the protector of the state Pakistan. Another reason could be that politicians, such as Musharraf, with their policies, are much more present in people's minds than an institution as a whole. It is much easier to blame one person, Musharraf, as the representative of the Pakistani government, than a whole institution such as the army, that historically and socially has also maintained a certain respect until the day of research.

This ambivalence is also partly portrayed in my interview results where only one of my two PU students commented on the Pakistani army. My male PU interview partner had a very critical position towards the Pakistani army, but affirmed his trust towards the army in one regard:

What is the meaning of the army? If the meaning of the army is to protect the borders then we can trust the Pakistani army. We trust them as we trust our roots. They want to protect us. But not everybody has made sufficient experiences. (...) Everybody should maintain his own field and not interfere in different fields.

At the same time, he brings out that the army should not interfere with other domains such as politics, which he also affirms in another statement:

There is so much emphasis on the army in Pakistan, because during the first war, the government found it right to give so much power to the Pakistani army, because it suggested that the army can protect the country. Now they can do whatever they want and change the country as they want to.

My second PU student showed a very similar negative attitude towards the Pakistani government and admitted that she is very "sceptical" towards the government, but more due to its America oriented politics and the secular orientation of its policies.

Generally, we can say that the outcome of the PU students' survey shows that they do feel a political responsibility in their citizenship, and therefore are even quiet critical towards the Pakistani government, without forgetting the significance of one institution, the army, that did achieve to save its popularity among people, especially under PU students.

At the King Edwards College, only 42.1% of the students consider it important to vote in Pakistani elections in order to define themselves as Pakistani. The political significance they combine with their citizenship is therefore very low. As to the Pakistani government, the results are similarly low; the majority of students are either not very proud (45.2%) or not proud at all (35.5%) which is a very negative opinion of the current Pakistani government. Contrary to this negative opinion of the government, the attitude towards the Pakistani army is nevertheless relatively positive, following a similar trend of the results of the P.U. students. If we combine the results of those who are very proud and those who are somewhat proud, we will find that in total

90% of the students are proud of the Pakistani army. I suggest that the differing results towards the government and army can be read here in the same light as the results of the Punjab University.

As to my interviews, only one from my two K.E. students commented on the current Pakistani government, which highlights her scepticism towards Musharraf's government:

I am very sceptical towards our government, because I think that the people of the army should stay in the army. For example Pervez Musharraf, he holds two positions. He is head of the army and has all his forces underneath and at the same time he is also head of the government. Army and government should rest separate and one should not mix these two.

This is a well appointed statement towards the belief that these two branches of the state should not be mixed, but stay separate. Similar to the statement of the male P.U. student, this depicts the scepticism of the students towards Musharraf's government.

In general, we can thus say, that K.E. students feel less political responsibility towards their citizenship than P.U. students for example, but are not less critical towards the government and the Pakistani army.

In LUMS 65.2% of the students recognize the importance of voting in Pakistani elections for their political responsibility as Pakistani citizens, which represents the intermediate value between the results of the PU students and those of the K.E. students. As to their attitudes towards the Pakistani government, we have quite unbalanced results among LUMS students. Whereas in the two other institutions, the students had a strong tendency to show little proudness towards the Pakistani government, the result of the LUMS students show quite scattered results, portraying both proudness (31.8% answered with "Somewhat Proud") and little proudness (45.5% answered with "Not Very Proud"). Although this result is difficult to interpret, one of the reasons for this could be that LUMS has many study fields referring to politics, economy and law, which encourage students to be more critical or sensitive towards the government; the economical aspect of the government was also expressed positively in one of my interviews at LUMS.

As to the army, we have a majority (59.1%) who is proud of the army. One of the reasons could be that some army families are quite well-earning so that there are many students of army families among the LUMS student body, which would explain the positive attitude towards the army. On the other hand, we can conclude the positive attitude towards the army in the same way as in the previous two institutions.

As already suggested earlier, the outcome of the LUMS students' questionnaires might also be explained by one of the statements that I received from my male interview partner who described to me his attitude towards the government in the following way:

In terms of economic reforms, future economic growth etc., in that sense I do find confidence in our government, but in other accounts such as the moral aspect of the society, I don't think the government is morally enough to really care about that. It's more a utility thing for them. (...) Right now for the good of the economy, I do think the government is functioning well. But if you consider the different departments of the government, the arm of the government – the executive – there's still a long way to go. It's very inefficient and we have a lot of corruption issues.

This would explain why still a positive attitude towards the Pakistani government can be made out, but why at the same time there is also a lot to criticise. The criticism towards the military also openly comes to surface in the second interview with my female LUMS student, who explains why the military has always enjoyed so much popularity and tolerance among the people in Pakistan:

The Pakistani military took like 70% of our GDP openly and the only reason it was able to do so was because of the big Indian threat. You know like 'India is going to attack!' so there's no point in education, no point in development, no point in getting food for the people if we don't exist anymore. (...) It was in the best interest for the military that India existed! (...) They always want this threat to be looming from behind!

At the same time she also stresses the undemocratic principles of every military regime, which stop the politicisation of people:

They have been suppressing politicisation of people. They have not wanted people to get political. Parties have been discouraged ... the first thing that the military does, when it comes to power is ban parties, ban politicisation.

In general, I would say that LUMS students show quite a critical, reflective approach towards the government, which is why it is difficult to clearly point out the differences in their attitudes in regard to the students of other institutions, as the results of LUMS students appear in comparison unbalanced and/or scattered. The interviews I conducted alone led me to suggest this, as there are no other data to prove my assumptions.

3.3 Threats

This chapter is going to portray the results of my questionnaires and my interviews concerning various threats and fears which may be perceived by Pakistani students. In a first step, I will present the results of my questionnaire by depicting the results of following variables:

- Western Hostility perceived towards the Muslim world
- India is Pakistan's biggest enemy
- Pakistani Muslim identity needs to be defended through Jihad

In a second step, I will then put these results together with the statements of my interviews regarding the same topic.

3.3.1 Western hostility perceived towards the Muslim world³¹⁵




Figure 6: I feel that the Western world is hostile towards the Muslim world

At the Punjab University, 29 out of 34 students responded to this statement. The answers of the PU students are quite scattered. 27.6% of PU students agree strongly with that statement, 37.9% just agree with it and 17.2% both times disagree or disagree strongly with this statement. On the

³¹⁵ Participants: PU 29 out of 34, KE 19 out of 20, LMS 21 out of 23.

whole we can say that if we put the results together of those who agree we have a majority of 65.5% of PU students who agree with this statement.

At the King Edwards College, 19 out of 20 students responded to this statement. A tremendous majority of 70% agrees strongly with this statement, and 25% just agree. Only 5% disagree strongly with the statement. We have a high percentage of 95% who totally agree with this statement.

In LUMS, 21 out of 23 students have responded to this statement. Here we have again scattered results. 33.3% of students agree strongly and 61.9% simply agree. Only one student chose the option “Can’t choose”

3.3.2 India is Pakistan’s biggest enemy³¹⁶




Figure 7: India is Pakistan's biggest enemy

32 out of 34 PU students responded to this statement. 34.4% chose “Agree strongly” and 37.5% simply agree and only 28.1% disagree. On the whole we can say that 71.9% of PU students agree with this statement.

³¹⁶ Participants: PU 32 out of 34, KE 20 out of 20, LUMS 22 out of 23.

At the King Edwards College, 20 out of 20 students responded to this statement. 15% agree strongly, 35% simply agree, whereas 45% disagree and 5% choose the option “Can’t choose”. 50% of the students agree with this statement, which is followed by 45% of students who disagree on it. There is almost a balance between these two options, with a majority agreeing with the statement.

In LUMS, 22 out of 23 students responded to this statement. 13.6% each time opted for “Agree strongly” and “Agree”, whereas 40.9% disagree and 22.7% disagree strongly, and 9.1% are uncertain and chose the option “Can’t choose”. We have thus a majority of 63.7% of LUMS students who disagree with the previous statement.

3.3.3 Pakistani Muslim identity needs to be defended through Jihad³¹⁷




Figure 8: I believe that Pakistani Muslim identity needs to be defended through Jihad

At the Punjab University, 30 out of 34 students responded to this question. Out of these 43.3% agree strongly with this statement and 20% simply agree, whereas 30% disagree and 6.7% cannot choose. We have hence a majority of 63.3% of PU students who agree with this statement.

³¹⁷ Participants: PU 30 out of 34, KE 20 out of 20, LUMS, 22 out of 23.

At the King Edwards College, 20 out of 20 students responded to this statement. Among these 15% “Agree strongly”, 20% simply “Agree”, whereas 50% disagree and 10% disagree strongly, and 5% can’t choose. Thus, in King Edwards we have a majority of 60% of students disagreeing with this statement.

In LUMS, 22 out of 23 students responded to this statement. Only 9.1% agree, whereas 50% disagree and 40.9% disagree strongly. We have thus a majority of 90.9% of LUMS students to disagree strongly with this statement.

3.3.4 Analysis and interpretation

As to possible threats perceived by Pakistani students, I chose three statements out of my questionnaire which would provide me with information on their attitudes and feelings towards their Muslim identity in contestation with the “Western”³¹⁸ world and the big Indian “enemy”. As to the third statement, my intention was to measure their commitment towards their Pakistani Muslim identity and the degree of importance they attach towards the defence of this identity through Jihad³¹⁹.

A majority of the students of the Punjab University agreed with all three statements. If we look at the first statement in regard to the hostility of Western countries perceived by Pakistani students towards Muslims, we find a majority of 65.5% of PU students agreeing on this. This threat is also identifiable in my interviews. My female PU interview partner had a very critical opinion towards Western countries and regions such as the United States and Europe:

We are physically free, but we are not mentally free. We are mental slaves. The slaves of foreign countries, Europe, America ... most of it America! (...) We will only become mentally free if we are educated. For this we have to change our education system. We need our own public personalities and not those chosen by America to rule the country.

This statement almost appears to be demonizing the big “Western” representatives, such as the United States and European countries. These two regions are perceived as an actor involved in

³¹⁸ The term “Western” was not defined in the questionnaire and used in the most common sense. In Pakistan, the general sense of “Western” predominantly comprises the United States and Europe, putting emphasis especially on those countries who dominate most Western discourses represented in Pakistan through the media, export culture coming from these countries and sweeping the economic market and influencing the visual landscape of the country. Although the United States and Europe were the countries or regions that my respondents referred to most in my open-ended questions in the questionnaire and in my interviews, I am certain that the students do have a distinct understanding of the “Western world”.

³¹⁹ The term “Jihad” per se is a very contested term and was not defined in the questionnaire. As to this, the term can be understood in every sense as the mere defending of the Islamic belief in a verbal sense, or the defending of the Islamic faith through more radical physical means.

the enslavement of Pakistan. This harsh statement is also followed by very negative attitudes towards their Indian neighbour, to which actually 71.9% of PU students ascribe a feeling of animosity between India and Pakistan. The same student shared many fears and resentments towards India with me:

When we look at India from a political perspective, when we look at their politics, their strategies, their activities, they all do that against Pakistan. So it is natural than, in our hearts we also turn against them. From the beginning they were doing such things, that's a reality, everybody knows that, that they were and are against Pakistan. They have this concept of *devi mhata*, the goddess mother, and they think that through Partition 1947 the holiness of their country was destroyed. Now they are trying to recover these pieces.

This statement almost portrays a very self-confident and self-righteous attitude of this Pakistani student towards the Indian neighbour. It shows that there is strong sense of injustice perceived through India, which justifies the feeling of animosity towards India.

My male PU interview partner shared very similar attitudes towards India, based on negative perceptions and experiences in Pakistan's history:

If you look at the different wars between India and Pakistan, it is clear that these two countries can never become friends. India will always interfere in our affairs. India will always highlight our negative things in their media!

As to the third major statement concerning whether Pakistani Muslim identity needs to be defended through Jihad, PU students have the highest percentage of agreement with this statement. This can, on the one hand, be linked to their strong compassion regarding their religion and their strong sense of Muslim identity³²⁰. It can also be interpreted on the basis of their social background, as already elaborated through the economic background of the Pakistani students, shown via the university fees³²¹, and through the fact that most of the students attending the PU have finished lower English medium schools or Urdu medium schools and thus share different values regarding their religion than students of higher English medium schools.³²²

We have hence a majority of 63.3% of PU students who agree with this statement. In that case their strong Muslim identity and their fears towards the Western World and India, and especially

³²⁰ see chapter 3.1 "On Identity".

³²¹ see chapter 1.3.3. "My respondents: The students".

³²² see chapter 2.4.4 "Higher education in Pakistan".

the feeling of injustice perceived through the “Hindu neighbour”, India, could help explain this result.

The results of the King Edward’s students’ questionnaires are more diverging in the sense that there is not one major pattern as to agreeing to all three questions as was the case with PU students for example. Interestingly, it are the K.E. students and the LUMS students (95.2%) who agree the most (95%) on the first statement about the Western hostility perceived towards the Muslim world. Although the Muslim identity is the strongest among PU students³²³, K.E. students with very similar results, have – concerning this statement – the highest vote. The second statement on the animosity felt between India and Pakistan, shows an almost balanced share of those agreeing and those disagreeing, differing only through 5%, which make those agreeing on this statement the majority. We can therefore conclude that due to the results concerning their Muslim identity, the feeling of hostility towards the Muslim world is stronger than the hostility towards India. Hence when it comes to their Muslim identity, they feel more challenged and feel a greater threat than when it comes to their nationality and their enemy from historical times.

My interviews have given me similar statements as to these two threats. My female K.E. interview partner shared her feelings towards the Western influence with me, which she esteemed as rather harmful for the development of Pakistan’s:

I think for Pakistan at THIS stage Western influence is harmful. Pakistan should focus on Islam, but not in the sense that we should all cover up and cut off with everything and everybody. It’s in the other sense, in the sense that we should try to do everything, go in every direction, in the information technology fields or others. We should do everything but it should all be in a limit and that limit was given to us by Islam.

There is a strong sense towards the Islamic orientation of Pakistan and the fear of the alienation of Pakistan through the Western influence. Following the same fear of alienation and less patriotism among Pakistanis, my male K.E. interview partner linked this Pakistani “emigration” not to the Western influence in general, but to the economic weakness of Pakistan:

I don’t think that there is so much patriotism in Pakistan, because once you get an offer to go abroad then you go abroad. There is not enough food and money in Pakistan so that’s normal that people opt for foreign countries.

³²³ see chapter 3.1.2 "Analysis and interpretation"

In regard to India, I did however find both – acceptance and appreciation towards India, as well as harsh criticism - which would also explain the results of my questionnaires, which is almost a balanced results between those agreeing (50%) and those disagreeing (45%) with this statement. My male K.E interview partner told me in regard to India:

India and Pakistan used to be one country, they just got separated a little later.
According to me they have the same culture.

This was followed by him concluding with the fact that India and Pakistan “should live in peace”.

My female K.E. interview partner came to the same conclusion in regard to India by saying that India and Pakistan would have the same culture and traditions:

There is not so much difference between Indian and Pakistani traditions, because we used to be one country once. So we automatically took these traditions with us when Pakistan was founded. So there is no such problem, but on a personal level I feel that in India Pakistanis are not perceived very well. (...) But personally, I myself think that Indians are simply “ok”, but I don’t perceive them very well either.

At the same time she confessed a little bit later:

Yeah, I sort of feel that India is our enemy country, because India is always thinking of how to harm Pakistan.

We can see therefore that we have both here, we have the (cultural) acceptance of India, but at the same time the hostility towards India is still perceived.

As to the last statement concerning whether Muslim Pakistani identity needs to be defended through Jihad, we have a very big number (60%) of students disagreeing on this statement. This is opposite to the outcome of the PU students who were with almost the same percentage agreeing at this stage. Compared to the results of LUMS students, with (90.9%) disagreeing, we have at the King Edward’s College hence a moderate outcome.

In the LUMS student body we can at this point recognize a pattern of disagreeing highly with two of the three statements. The first statement on the Western hostility perceived towards the Muslim world has surprisingly among all three institutions the highest degree of agreement at LUMS, although the difference to K.E. students is only 0.2%. One reason for this could be that LUMS students are the most exposed to Western culture and lifestyle as elaborated in my

observations and in previous analysis so that they are more conscious towards the Western world. In regard to their identity, they do have a strong sense of identity; the conversations and statements collected on identity were the most present in my two LUMS interviews, indicating to me that these students were indeed were the most reflective towards their own identity.

My male LUMS interview partner highlighted his tolerance towards the Western countries by sharing equally the belief that the image of the West can be very deceiving:

People who follow different values are not betraying Pakistan and it's better they go abroad, because they have this image of the West of being something special. I think they have their own choices. And I think they should go abroad and once they go abroad they will realise how special this is.

Although quite subtle, the irony which is hidden in this statement shows a slight hostility, disappointment or other resentments towards Western countries. This irony could of course have various motives which are not identifiable through the interview.

In regard to the two other statements, we have the majority of LUMS students disagreeing with both statements. 63.7% of LUMS students disagree with the statement that India is Pakistan's biggest enemy. The tolerance of India has definitely also been identifiable in my interviews. Interestingly, both my interview partners had close friends in India, therefore their attitude towards India was connected with personal experiences with Indians, which were in both cases positive. My male interview partner told me:

I have some very close friends in India, so I do have an idea how life is in India. I think India is modernizing and has modernized quite a bit. (...) I think there are far more poor people in India than in Pakistan, but the system in India is also much more promising.

There is not only a personal connection to India through friends, but there is also an appreciation of the economic and social system in India.

My female interview partner had a very open and liberal attitude towards India and did in fact rather criticize the reception of India in Pakistan by stressing the degree of manipulation and propaganda in Pakistan in this regard:

Personally, I don't know India. I have never been there, I know some people and I have a very good friend from India. I don't hold any prejudices against it, I don't hold any notions against it, because I know that the things we do here are very

much edited and they are very much suited to whoever is in power. (...) I know that our history is so distorted, about the way Partition happened, everything. If you read a Pakistan studies textbook and then go in search of the fact what happened and try to connect things for yourself, you would be blown away about how much difference exists.

As to the last statement as to how many LUMS students think that Pakistani Muslim identity needs to be strengthened through Jihad we have a tremendous majority of 90.9% of students absolutely disagreeing with this statement. This negation of violence stands in line with the tolerance accorded to India as well and would depict LUMS students as the most tolerant and peaceful group in these two regards in comparison to the other student bodies.

3.4. Political identities of Pakistani students in Lahore

“We don’t know who we are frankly. We’ve just ghettoized differences!”

This statement, made by one of my LUMS interview partners, depicts best in my mind the situation of the different identities inherent in Pakistani students, and the Pakistani society in general.

Although one can probably make out common economic backgrounds of the various students in the different universities, and also analyze their attitudes according to the previous education they have had (as was analyzed by Tariq Rahman)³²⁴, it is hard to classify the attitudes of the three different student bodies according to the three options conservative – moderate – liberal. The data received and analyzed in the three different sections of this chapter show that the data of each university itself is so diverse that it would need a second or third assessment through quantitative and qualitative data in order to locate the political identities of these different student bodies. As my study has no general representative demand due to the small number of samples in each university my conclusions in this chapter are all of hypothetical nature. In terms of identity I have noticed that in all three universities identity was a very sensitive point, which was an important issue to each and every student with whom I conducted an interview. The degree of importance that was given to Islam was however oscillating, depicting PU and K.E. students as much more aware of their Muslim identity than LUMS students for example. In regard to their political attitudes beginning with the felt political responsibility inherent in their citizenship or their attitudes towards the Pakistani government and army, we have quite shaky results. The

³²⁴ See chapter 2.4. “Pakistani education system – spaces of interaction between different identities”.

political responsibility of their citizenship is certainly the highest among PU students, whereas the proudness towards the Pakistani government is the highest among LUMS students, and the proudness towards the Pakistani army among K.E. students. This shows that the political awareness of these three political elements on a state-level is perceived differently within the different student bodies and does not really allow to conclude on the political responsibility, awareness or sensibility of these students.

As to the threats perceived in regard to Western hostility towards the Muslim world, LUMS students have, closely followed by K.E., the most receptive attitudes. As to attitudes towards India LUMS students have by far the most tolerant attitudes, followed by K.E. students and in opposition to PU students who show the least amount of tolerance towards India, as they perceive India most as their enemy. As to the attitude whether Pakistani Muslim Identity needs to be defended through Jihad, PU students show the highest degree of agreement, followed by K.E. students and strongly opposed by LUMS students, who show the most peaceful attitude in this regard.

It is difficult to classify these three student bodies, as to which I can only highlight the diverse nature of the political attitudes that were found within my results. It becomes even harder due to this very same reason to make out what the different political identities of the different student bodies are, but on the other hand this highlights the difficulty of depicting a consolidated “Pakistani identity” which in itself is a very inherent, diverse and complex concept.

I would thus like to conclude with the statement that the problem of no existing single consolidated common identity in Pakistan is due to the fact that different communities or groups coexist together but do not interact, but in fact only provoke social, political and religious tensions between them.

4. The political situation in Pakistan – a country in perpetual crisis

Strategic and operational level

This chapter is going to work out the political situation in Pakistan. As a time reference, I will summarize the political events that took place shortly before, during and shortly after my research. After the description of the political situation in Pakistan in this period (March 2007 – December 2007), I would like to outline the developments of a protest movement coming from Pakistani students. Next, I would like to locate the main problems of the political situation in Pakistan, which are most likely linked to a corrupt system. Therefore, I will present prospects for development through the UNODC's work against corruption in member states.

4.1 The political situation in Pakistan – three major events in 2007

This chapter will discuss the political events that have happened during March 2007 and December 2007 – events that took place shortly before, during, or after my research and have helped me to develop my question of research. The discussed events will be: 1) chief justice Affair in March 2007, 2) The Lal Masjid Operation in August 2007 and 3) the imposition of a state of emergency in Pakistan in November 2007.

I will discuss the events by presenting the issue of each of these three events and then later present a constellation analysis of the most important actors involved in these scenarios. The sources used for the depicting of these events will primarily be newspaper articles of *DAWN*, the most widespread left English newspaper in Pakistan, *The Nation*, a right English newspaper, analytical articles from BBC and Pakistan reports of the International Crisis Group.

4.1.1 The Chief Justice Affair, March 2007

Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudry was appointed by president Pervez Musharraf as chief justice of the Supreme Court in Pakistan on 7 May 2005.³²⁵ On 9 March 2007, Musharraf suddenly suspended the chief justice Iftikhar Chaudry and replaced him by the new judge appointed by him, justice Javed Iqbal. This was seen as drastic and sudden move and as a direct attack on the judiciary by the president. As reasons for his decision Musharraf presented allegations of corruption and misconduct against the chief justice. No such action of that degree, that a chief justice had been

³²⁵ see Staff Reporter, "Chaudry Iftikhar named new CJ", *DAWN*, 08.05.2007, see online: <http://www.dawn.com/2005/05/08/top4.htm>, 09.01.2009.

turned “non-functional” by the president has ever happened before. DAWN reports that this was the first case ever:

Although the country’s judicial history has been a chequered one all along, and judges have been removed by various methods, this is the first time that the chief justice of Pakistan has been made, in the words of the official handout, ‘non-functional’ and his case has been sent to the Supreme Judicial Council for action.³²⁶

Musharraf’s decision shocked the whole country and led to countrywide protests from the judiciary and the civil society. Lawyers protests took place in Islamabad and in Lahore, which ended in violent clashes between lawyers and the police.³²⁷ Through countrywide protests of lawyers, media representatives, students, human right activists, as a never seen protest movement of that constellation before, the judiciary gained a lot of national support whilst Musharraf’s popularity was continuously sinking. On 20 July the Supreme Court of Pakistan thus restored the chief justice Iftikhar Chaudry, ignoring the president’s orders. The majority of judges in the Supreme Court decided “that the orders to suspend the chief justice, or to even send him on forced leave, and the appointment of an acting chief justice in the present situation were illegal”³²⁸. The DAWN article also stated that this was the first time in the country’s history, that the Supreme Court had thus overruled a presidential/military³²⁹ order.

According to human rights activists such as Asma Jahangir, this was thus the beginning of the rupture between the military and civilians:

‘President Musharraf should have resigned much earlier, but now he owes an apology to the nation for all the tension and unrest in the country,’ Asma Jahangir, chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRC), said while talking to DAWN. ‘It is now a clear divide between the civilians and the military.’³³⁰

The chief justice affair was only one of the different actions of Musharraf that created great dissent between the civil society and the army/government in general.

³²⁶ see Iqbal, Nasir: “CJ suspended, escorted home: • Justice Iftikhar summoned by SJC on 13th for reference hearing • Ex-judges call it a blow to judiciary’s independence; minister defends decision • Whither judicial activism?”, DAWN, 10.03.2007, see online: <http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/10/top1.htm>, 09.01.2009.

³²⁷ see Iqbal, Nasir/Shahzad, Asif: “Nationwide protest by lawyers; 40 hurt in Lahore baton-charge”, DAWN, 13.03.2007, <http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/13/top1.htm>, 09.01.2009.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ As Musharraf was holding both positions: presidency and chief of army it is appropriate to mention both here.

³³⁰ Ibid.

4.1.2 The Lal Masjid Operation, July 2007

Lal Masjid is the Urdu term for “Red Mosque”. This mosque is located in Islamabad and was known to be a madrassah for Jamia Hafsa students. The mosque was described as a mosque with “a reputation for radicalism, mostly attracting Islamic hard-line students from North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and tribal areas where support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda is strong”³³¹.

After several days of standoff between the government and the militants who had taken hundreds of madrassah students as hostage, the army launched a direct attack at the Lal Masjid and arrested the two leaders Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who were trying to escape in a burqa. Throughout its history the Lal Masjid has always been tolerated or even promoted by the Pakistani political elite, especially under the Islamic regime of Zia-ul-Haq.³³²

The attack of the government at the Lal Masjid caused the death of about 200 civilians. Although the public did in fact have problems tolerating the growing influence of Jamia Hafsa in Islamabad, which manifested itself through social harassment of the capital’s citizens and the kidnapping of prostitutes. Nevertheless the critique was oriented primarily against Musharraf who did have a bad “crisis management”:

In the Pakistani population the radical clergy men of the red mosque were rejected. The public critique hence was not against the occupation of the mosque, but was directed towards the bad crisis management and the late intervention of the government. It had tolerated for months, how armed students of the madrassah next to the red mosque have been attacking music- and video stores, threatening people with suicide attacks and taking policemen and prostitutes as hostages. The media and the political opposition thus blamed Musharraf’s “conciliation policy” as responsible for the emergence of this crisis.³³³

This created even more dissent in regard to the army’s policies, which over the years have been supporting Islamic militancy, as the support of these groups were open-sanctioned policies from

³³¹ see Hasan, Syed Shoaib: “Profile: Islamabad’s Red Mosque”, BBC News, 27 July 2007, see online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6503477.stm, 09.01.2009.

³³² Ibid.

³³³ Original quotation: “In der Bevölkerung stießen die radikalen Kleriker der Roten Moschee überwiegend auf Ablehnung. Die öffentliche Kritik richtete sich daher weniger gegen die Erstürmung der Moschee an sich, sondern vielmehr gegen das schlechte Krisenmanagement und das viel zu späte Eingreifen der Regierung. Diese hatte monatelang tatenlos zugesehen, wie bewaffnete SchülerInnen und Schüler der an die Rote Moschee angrenzenden Koranschule Musik- und Videoläden stürmten, Selbstmordattentate androhten und Prostituierte und Polizisten als Geiseln nahmen. Medien und Oppositionsparteien machten Musharraf daher wegen seiner “Beschwichtigungspolitik” für die Entstehung der Krise mitverantwortlich”; see Effner, Henning: “Pakistan vor den Wahlen: Ausrufung des Notstandes oder Rückkehr zur Demokratie? ”, in: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Hrsg.): “Kurzberichte aus der internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit Asien und Pazifik”, Islamabad, August 2007, p. 2

the government.³³⁴ The Lal Masjid affair thus sharpened the critique of the media and the public against the army and reproached them of deliberately tolerating Islamic extremism, which was no longer controllable neither through the state nor through the army.³³⁵

4.1.3 The imposition of a state of emergency in Pakistan, November 2007

On 3 November Musharraf – in his position as army chief - declared a state of emergency in Pakistan³³⁶, thus suspending the constitution and setting up a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO). Musharraf held at that time both positions: presidency and chief of army. This political act of imposing a state of emergency – which Musharraf justified due to the rising militancy in the country, as was the case prior with the Lal Masjid operation and the rising suicide attacks in the northern areas of Pakistan – was widely seen as an act to secure his position as a president which was due to expire in the following weeks. The coming presidential elections at that time were foreseen for 6 October 2007. Through the imposition of a state of emergency Musharraf suspended the constitution, and thus the most basic human rights, sacked the chief justice Iftikhar Chaudry and all other judges who declared his act as illegal and put a ban on the free media. Through the martial law, the Army Act 1952, the army now gained a lot of powers as reported by DAWN:

Under the amended act, the Army can now try civilians on charges ranging from treason, sedition and attack on army personnel to “assaulting the president with intent to compel or restrain the exercise of any lawful power” and “giving statements conducive to public mischief”. The unamended Army Act, too, had a provision to hold court-martial of civilians but only when at least one of the accused belonged to the armed forces.³³⁷

There was a censure and ban on the media, and only state-sponsored television channels, such as PTV (Pakistan Television), were allowed to broadcast.

In the course of emergency thousands of lawyers, human right activists, politicians of opposition parties and students took to street and protested against the imposition of emergency and the

³³⁴ see Hasan, Syed Shoaib: “Profile: Islamabad’s Red Mosque”, BBC News, 27. July 2007, see online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6503477.stm, 09.01.2009.

³³⁵ Effner (2007): 2.

³³⁶ see the text of the proclamation of emergency online: <http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/04/top16.htm>, 12.01.2009.

³³⁷ see Iqbal, Nasir: “Civilians can be court-martialled: Army Act amended”, DAWN, 11. November 2007, see online: <http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/11/top1.htm>, 10.01.2009.

political arbitrary of the army. Musharraf's decision also evoked protests from international "partners" of Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, like the United States for example.³³⁸

Many politicians, lawyers, students, journalists and other key figures got detained during the protest movements. Benazir Bhutto, political opponent of Musharraf, declared the decision of Musharraf illegal and commented that this was a dangerous development of the country.³³⁹

Nawaz Sharif, second opposition leader of Musharraf's regime, said that Musharraf would lead the country towards anarchy.³⁴⁰

During the state of emergency Musharraf finally resigned from his position as a chief of army due to great national and international pressure forcing him to give up this post in order to be legitimized to run for presidency. On 15 December Musharraf finally ended the state of emergency by replacing the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) with the 1973 Constitution after having made amendments to it through presidential decrees. These amendments were seen as providing Pervez Musharraf "a blanket cover to the president against any challenges to his re-election, proclamation of emergency order of Nov 3, introduction of the PCO and all actions taken from Nov 3 to Dec 15"³⁴¹.

The general elections were planned to take place in January, but due to various events within the country, such as the assassination of one of the opposition leaders, Benazir Bhutto, in February 2008, the elections were constantly postponed.

4.2 Constellation analysis of the most important political actors and fields of the political crisis in Pakistan

In order to understand these events and the political consequences they bear, it is important to understand the problematic issues behind these different developments. It is first of all necessary to look at the different actors, the different power groups, in the political landscape of Pakistan involved in these issues. For this, I will focus on three major actors and fields which are important to understand the crisis: 1) President Pervez Musharraf as a key figure in this scenario,

³³⁸ "Gen Musharraf second coup: Charge sheet against judiciary; Media 'promoting negativism'; 'Country's 'integrity at stake'; Legislatures intact', *DAWN Report*, 04.11.2007, see online: <http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/04/top1.htm>, 10.01.2009.

³³⁹ ur-Rahman, Shamim: "Benazir calls it martial law on dash back home", *DAWN*, 04.11.2007, see online: <http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/04/top6.htm>, 12.01.2009.

³⁴⁰ see: <http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/03/welcome.htm>,

³⁴¹ see Khan, Iftikhar A./Iqbal, Nasir: "Amended Constitution restored: Emergency lifted; Judges take fresh oath; PCO revoked", *DAWN*, 16.12.2007, see online: <http://www.dawn.com/2007/12/16/top1.htm>, 16.01.2009.

2) the army and its role in these events and 3) the rising civil society and especially the students in this political scene.

4.2.1 General Pervez Musharraf's regime

Musharraf's policies have widely created a lot of dissent in the country, especially from the religio-political parties, who were especially against his policy towards the United States. Musharraf who has gained important value for the United States as an important ally in the fight against international terrorism, reaped a lot of criticism and anger among his own nationals. His political actions in the year 2007 hit on his popularity: the suspension of chief justice Iftikhar Chaudry that resulted in a big lawyer's protest, his attempt to control the violence from fundamentalist groups in Pakistan's capital through the Lal Masjid operation and the overall problems of tackling extremism within the country through military control have all resulted in the degradation of the military's image in Pakistan and the loss of popularity for president Musharraf.³⁴²

The International Republican Institute carried out a public opinion survey between 29 August and 13 September 2007, which shows that during the months between June and September 2007 the popularity of Musharraf sank rapidly due to the already mentioned events.

³⁴² see International Crisis Group (ICG): "Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan", Asia Briefing No.70, Islamabad/Brussels, 12.11.2007, p. 6.



Do you approve or disapprove of the job President Musharraf is doing?




Figure 9: Approval of President Musharraf³⁴³

Furthermore, the survey shows that within these three months, where criticism grew louder in regard of Musharraf holding two positions and resigning his chief of army position, the improvement towards the resignation of Musharraf's army post grew by 14%.



Agree or disagree? Musharraf should resign as Army Chief of Staff




Figure 10: Agreement/Disagreement on Musharraf's resignation³⁴⁴

His political actions, all three major events as analyzed below, have been perceived as acts to secure his position as president of Pakistan. As the Supreme Court, especially the chief justice Iftikhar Chaudry, was a declared criticizer of Musharraf's political moves and as the Supreme Court was to decide on the legitimacy of his presidency, he declared a state of emergency, suspended the judges and lawyers of the Supreme Court before they could declare their decision:

On 15 November, his term as president was due to end, as was parliamentary approval for his dual responsibilities. It was increasingly clear that the Supreme Court, which was to resume its hearing on the legality of his presidential election on 5 November, would rule against him on at least one of two grounds: that it was illegal for him to hold both offices and that he was bound by the bar on senior military officers standing for public office until they have been retired for two years.³⁴⁵

His policies were thus seen as an act of “self-preservation”³⁴⁶ in order to gain more international support and raise his popularity, which both backfired and in the contrary raised more international and national criticism, destabilizing the country even more and degrading the popularity of the army within the country.

4.2.2 The role and position of the army

To understand the role and the position of the army in Pakistan it requires a detailed look on Pakistani politics and the historical significance of the army. Mazhar Aziz, the author of “Military control in Pakistan: The parallel state”, presents in this work an analytical account on the Pakistani military, by depicting the influence of the Pakistani army in the Pakistani policy through political sources, such as the political decision-making processes in regard of the army, through data of the National Defence College, which educates the future military rulers in Pakistan and through internal publications of the army portraying various perception's of the Pakistani military concerning nation-building and national security in Pakistan. On the other hand, his work also provides a theoretical approach towards the problem of the military in Pakistan by allying it to two theoretical frameworks, the “path dependency” and “the historical institutionalism” of the army in Pakistan. His analysis is thus helpful to depict the army's situation in Pakistan.

³⁴³ The survey polled 4,009 adults in 256 rural and 144 urban locations between 29 August and 13 September 2007. See online: www.iri.org/mena/pakistan/2007-10-11-pakistan.asp, 16.01.2009.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ see ICG (2007): 3.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

The army's role in Pakistan has always been a very powerful one. Throughout Pakistan's history the military has been accorded a lot of power in terms of financial aid from various national sources, such as its major share from the national budget³⁴⁷ like military aid from the United States for example.³⁴⁸ Although financial aid to the military can be seen as an important pre-requisite condition for the Pakistani military to grow strong and powerful, it can also be argued, that through the historical presence of the army in Pakistan's politics, the military's control over Pakistani politics could widely expand. This is historically explicable through Pakistan's history of creation where "the idea of threat perception and state survival"³⁴⁹ has strongly shaped Pakistan's relation to its neighbours, especially India, unfolding a problem of national security. The various challenges resulting from this, a feeling of insecurity and the political and institutional deficiency in the first years of Pakistan's existence has thus been filled by Pakistan's military trying to cope with the various problems on a national and international level. The army has hence effectively contributed to a nation-building process in Pakistan, bunching the fears of insecurity and the fear of India together and providing strategies for state survival.³⁵⁰

Pakistan's rulers have thus often used the army to get control over the country. Imposing martial law has often been used in the country's history, starting off with Iskander Mirza in 1958. Mazhar Aziz argues that every "transition from a military rule to an elected form of government in Pakistan is likely to produce weak civilian governments due to the presence of a strongly institutionalized military"³⁵¹. He therefore argues, that this has shaped the future country's political development as it predestined a "path dependence" and a "historical institutionalism" of the army. These concepts, both relating to the political power within one institution and the power relations within such developments which can lead to dependence of this certain institution through political decisions which can generate the same pattern of future policy choices.³⁵²

The army thus achieved to penetrate all important spaces in Pakistan and almost create a "parallel state" influencing socio-economic structures in Pakistan. Until today, the army has its separate education and training institutes, hospitals, housing areas, etc. The army, in many parts in Pakistan, thus gained a high prestige and also respect coming from many Pakistanis. This

³⁴⁷ see Aziz, Mazhar: *Military control in Pakistan: The parallel state*, Routledge, New York: 2008, p. 36.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

changed throughout the time and culminated in a big loss of popularity in Pakistan especially among Musharraf's regime.

Corrupt and unlawful policies, such as Musharraf's self-preservation policies before and during the imposition of a state of emergency, have severely damaged the image of the army in Pakistan:

The drawn-out battle to end Jihadi control of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the heart of the capital in July proved a deep embarrassment and highlighted how little the military government has done to control extremism. Worsening violence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the Swat district of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and across Balochistan has seriously undermined the military's image and popularity. Inflation, inequality and an explosion of corruption scandals have blown apart the argument that the military offers a safe pair of economic hands than civilian politicians.³⁵³

The opinion survey poll of the IRI shows similar results as to the popularity of the army among the Pakistani respondents:




Figure 11: The army's role in the government³⁵⁴

This shows that within four months those agreeing on a non-interference of the Pakistani army in Pakistani politics have risen by 7% showing a total result of 62% of those agreeing with such a statement in September 2001.

³⁵³ see ICG (2007): 6.

³⁵⁴ see online: www.iri.org/mena/pakistan/2007-10-11-pakistan.asp, 16.01.2009.

It can therefore be concluded that the popularity of the Pakistani army has perpetually fallen, with a strong loss of popularity within the months of emergency from November 2007 to December 2007.

4.2.3 The judiciary

Pakistan's inner political problems can strongly be made out through the legal situation in the country, not only in terms of ineffective laws, that allow the discrimination against certain groups of the society and the protection of politicians and army officers through several orders, decrees and amendments through the constitution, but also through the country's long tradition of corruption in various institutions, also within the judiciary. The International Crisis Group summarizes the situation of the judiciary in the following words:

Motivated by self-preservation and self-interest, Pakistan's superior judiciary has not just failed to oppose Islamic legislation that violates fundamental rights but has also repeatedly failed to uphold the constitution. While superior courts have validated military interventions, military regimes have manipulated judicial appointments, promotions and removals, steadily purging higher court benches of independent-minded judges. This has pushed the judiciary further to the ideological right. Today, judicial independence is hampered not only by the state but also by right-wing religious groups.³⁵⁵

Transparency International, the leading anti-corruption NGO worldwide, has evaluated Pakistan's judiciary as extremely receptive towards corruption, which is due to the political history of the country, which has "demoralised" the country's judges and lawyers:

Since the 1950s, Pakistani history has been divided into periods of authoritarian military rule, alternating with brief bursts of civilian government. Almost every regime has altered the constitution in terms of the relationship between the judiciary and the executive, the provisions of emergency rule and the extension of presidential authority. Each also forced the judiciary to 're-swear' its loyalty to the ruling junta, rather than the constitution. This has destroyed the institution, demoralised the judges and made them prone to improper influence. The civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto (1988–90 and 1993–96) and Nawaz Sharif (1990–93 and 1997–99) were unable to break the links between the military, religious leaders and military-backed politicians since their own power also depended on army support.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁵ see International Crisis Group: "Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan", Asia Report No.160, 16.11.2008, p. i.

³⁵⁶ see Siddiqui, Jawed A.: "A tradition of judicial subservience", in: Transparency International (Ed.): "Corruption and Judicial Systems", p. 245 see online: http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2007#acknowledge, 18.01.2009.

In the course of Musharraf's regime, Musharraf several times made judges swear an oath to a Provisional Constitutional Order, which hinders the judiciary to challenge the authority in form of the chief general and the executive, as was the case during the state of emergency in Pakistan. Those who refuse, have always been suspended by the government. Transparency International thus criticizes the control of the government on the judiciary, due to which there is a lack of security for judges which makes them susceptible to corruption by the government.³⁵⁷ Next to this, every military regime of Pakistan has so far tolerated corrupted judges as they would not challenge the military regime.³⁵⁸

Due to these developments within the judicial system in Pakistan, the International Crisis Group has seriously asked for the reform of the judicial system in Pakistan.³⁵⁹

4.2.4 Civil society: A student's movement in rise

Musharraf's action in declaring a state of emergency has created a loud outcry in the whole country, mobilizing effectively the intellectual class in Pakistan: lawyers, journalists, bureaucrats and also the youngest layer of this class: students. United in the fight for justice, the students from different universities soon organized big student rallies and protests demanding the reinstatement of the chief justice Iftikhar Chaudry, the lifting of emergency and the re-establishment of rule of law in Pakistan. Musharraf's illegal act which was performed under the cloak of fighting the rising extremism within the country was perceived as an act of regaining his control and power over Pakistan that was dwindling due to his own policy. The destabilizing of democracy through his ambivalent policies to fight Islamic threats in Pakistan and his direct attack on the Supreme Court deteriorated not only his own image and popularity within the Pakistani society but also that of the army. The army, which next to various military interventions in Pakistan still enjoyed a certain degree of popularity and prestige within the society, rapidly lost its popularity after Musharraf's actions.

Musharraf's decision did have a direct impact on the student's life, who not only lost their most basic fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and a fair and just trial, but who also saw their student fellows and teachers arrested, who had a critical stance towards Musharraf's regime. Throughout the student protests, which by *THE NATION* was defined as the "biggest protest

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ see the recommendations of the ICG (2008): ii.

to date”³⁶⁰ coming from students, Musharraf was criticised as a “Pakistani dictator” who through the suspension of the Pakistani constitution exposed the Pakistani society to his political arbitrariness.

Protests took place on the various campuses of the different universities. One of the biggest students protest was that organized by students of the Lahore University Management and Science, which took place on 5 November 2007 and was called “black day” from the LUMS students, resulting from the arrest of several teachers of the institute:

Student leaders had earlier circulated e-mails calling for a “black day” and urging members of the LUMS student body to attend classes, wearing black clothing. The rally, first of its kind on LUMS campus, follows the arrests of Prof Dr Cheema, Head of the Economics Department, Prof Dr Parvez Hasan, a member of the LUMS Management Committee, Mr Bilal Minto (adjunct faculty in the Department of Law & Policy) and Mr Aasim Sajjad (Social Sciences) on Sunday night for participating in an anti-government meeting held at the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) office where police conducted a massive raid arresting 70 civil society activists.³⁶¹

The students soon established a network of cooperation between the different universities. One of those actions was the creation of a Student Action Committee (SAC). According to *THE NATION* the SAC Lahore comprises several colleges and universities in Lahore.³⁶² Sundas Hurain, pursuing her law degree at the Lahore University of Management and Science and an active member of the SAC describes the number of the SAC members and activists as following:

Well, if you want to judge our size by our turnout at rallies, then the biggest one, our protest at Liberty Chowk had roughly 500+ students. If you want to judge our size by how many are regular at our meetings then that number ranges between 40-70 students.³⁶³

The SAC soon initiated its activism on the internet by supporting the emergency-blog (<http://pakistanmartiallaw.blogspot.com>), which publishes weekly its own pamphlet called “The

³⁶⁰ see Vora, Jayati: “Students for a free Pakistan”, *THE NATION*, 30.11.2007, see online: <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20071217/vora>, 24.01.2009.

³⁶¹ see Staff Reporter: “Students’ rare show against emergency”, *DAWN*, 06.11.2007, see online: <http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/06/nat27.htm>, 24.01.2009.

³⁶² see Jayati Vora speaks in her article of a minimum of 15 universities who support the SAC; see Vora, Jayati: “Students for a free Pakistan”, *THE NATION*, 30.11.2007, see online: <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20071217/vora>, 24.01.2009; The Emergency Times, the pamphlet of the SAC, speak of 21 colleges and universities who join the SAC’s political fight, The Emergency Times, 03.12.2007, see online: http://www.scribd.com/word/full/902813?access_key=key-2cck18c048ud78wh3tyy, 24.01.2009.

³⁶³ Information obtained from an inquiring email on SAC from me to Sundas Hurain on 13 January 2008.

Emergency Times³⁶⁴, which is mainly run by LUMS students, but where other universities also have their share. The demand of the SAC is based on several points which are stated in “The Emergency Times” of the 27 November 2007: “1. The restoration of judges as on 2nd Nov., 2. Restoration of pre-emergency constitution, 3. Freeing the Media, 4. Release of Protest Prisoners”³⁶⁵.

Additional action to facilitate the communication between the different student bodies was taken through the help of online social-networking sites such as *Facebook* and *Orkut*, where groups were formed to support the students’ movement. The students’ movement have thus not only joined the rest of the Pakistani civil society but portrays a big political potential that lies within this layer of society, that is gaining more and more political significance in the fight for a just Pakistan governed by the rule of law.

4.3. Prospects for development: corruption in Pakistan

Development is an important underlying theme for the restoration of justice and the promotion of democracy in Pakistan. Corruption, as one of Pakistan’s major political problems, can be seen as a huge hindrance towards the political and social development of the country. It is therefore an important unit of analysis for understanding Pakistan’s political situation today and also an important aspect in order to restructure Pakistan’s future. To begin this debate, I will hence give a brief introduction of the problem of corruption by presenting the United Nations’ work in this field. Pakistan is a member of the United Nations and has ratified its most important instrument in countering corruption which is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Thus, I will present my analysis in two main parts. I will in my first part give a general account on the UNODC’s (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) role in the fight against corruption, by presenting the findings of an explorative interview with an UNODC expert on crime prevention specialized on corruption, Alexandra Souza Martins.

The second part will then look at the concrete problem of corruption in Pakistan and give a short analysis of this problem.

³⁶⁴ <http://www.pakistanmartiallaw.blogspot.com/>, 24.1.2009.

³⁶⁵ The Emergency Times, 27.11.2007, see online: http://www.scribd.com/word/full/902808?access_key=key-2c30brjwpy9wdgazimv7, 24.01.2009.

4.3.1 The UNODC's role in the fight against global corruption.³⁶⁶

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is committed towards combating transnational crime such as drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, money laundering, corruption, terrorism and various other crime-related sectors. For this it has developed a set of instruments to provide member states with technical assistance and field-based cooperation. This help ranges from legal advice to help in terms of implementing legally binding instruments of the United Nations. One of these instruments is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) which provides strategies to counteract corruption in different sectors and agencies.

Alexandra Souza Martins, UNODC crime prevention expert, mentions that, with regard to the area of anti-corruption, UNODC is mandated to support member states in implementing the provisions of the UNCAC. She also mentioned that UNODC is the Secretariat of the Conference of States Parties to the Convention and provides technical assistance upon request to assist member states in controlling and preventing corruption. Technical assistance activities are delivered based on the Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). This convention is divided in four main pillars: 1) Prevention of corruption, 2) criminalization and law enforcement, 3) international cooperation, and 4) asset recovery. The UNODC is thus working in these four basic sectors.

According to Mrs. Souza Martins many countries request the help of the UNODC in the fight against corruption:

Many countries have been requesting UNODC to provide technical assistance to help them implement the provisions of UNCAC. Countries who have ratified this convention are obliged to implement the provisions of the convention. Some of the provisions are quite complex and it happens that governments face challenges in translating the legal provisions into actions. Some countries that lack the expertise to understand how to implement the provisions of the UNCAC request the United Nations to help them implement these provisions.

The concrete help which is provided by the UNODC depends on the specific request of the country and varies from country to country.

After receiving a request, UNODC has to first make sure that the necessary resources are available for providing the requested assistance. With sufficient resources the UNODC can, for example, send experts into the country to conduct a “technical assistance needs assessment mission” where the most important gaps in the legislation of the country compared to the

³⁶⁶ The information used in this chapter is derived from an interview with UNODC expert on crime prevention, Alexander Souza Martins, on 8 January 2009 at the UN Headquarters in Vienna.

provisions of the UNCAC are being assessed, as well as an analysis of previous and present anti-corruption policies and institutions of the specific country. After one of these missions, a technical assessment needs analysis can be presented, focused on either the prevention of corruption or the law enforcement of specific agencies and sectors in order to prevent and fight corruption. To guarantee the sustainable aspect of the UNODC's technical assistance, the office locates through evidence-based analysis the causes of corruption and the most important factors for the vulnerability to corruption in a country, the strengths of the specific country and consequently provides the necessary missing assistance.

The cooperation partners of the UNODC are different from country to country, however Mrs. Souza Martins stresses that the UNCAC specifically demands the creation of an anti-corruption body:

Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies, as appropriate, that prevent corruption (...)³⁶⁷

According to Alexandra Souza Martins it also happens that the requesting country asks the UNODC for help in order to integrate civil society into the process of preventing and fighting corruption, which stands in accordance with Article 13 of the UNCAC which requires the active participation of the civil society in this process.³⁶⁸ For this, so Mrs. Souza Martins, it is important to find the most important and relevant actors in the combating of corruption in a country, which starts from the individual responsibility of every person:

No one alone is able to fight corruption. Even if you have a very committed government, the government alone will not be able to fight corruption. There are various counterparts and everybody should address efforts in the same direction. You, as an individual have the obligation to say "NO!" to corruption and combat corruption in your small circle. (...) We do not only work with the civil society but we try to involve all the stake holders in this context.

Mrs. Souza Martins stresses the importance of education in such a process.: "Education is the key to change values and to decrease the tolerance of corruption in a given context". Therefore it is extremely important to include the youth into this debate in order to effectively change the future

³⁶⁷ see UNODC: The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Article 6, see online: http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf, 29.01.2009

³⁶⁸ see UNODC: The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Article 13, see online: http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf, 29.01.2009

political and social development of the country. Therefore, UNODC has not only developed teaching programmes including the youth and teachers but it has also developed several awareness raising campaigns to reach an even wider audience through TV commercials which are being shown at CNN for example and which create awareness that “every individual can contribute to this process of fighting corruption”.

As to the measurement of corruption, Mrs. Souza Martins, responds to the difficulty of doing so. Leading international anti-corruption NGO's, such as Transparency International, work with a “Corruption Perception Index”³⁶⁹, which is conducted through interviews and surveys which take place in order to measure the perception of corruption in the specific country.

The UNODC has itself developed a methodology to assess corruption in the justice sector through a questionnaire. This questionnaire was sent in the specific country to different actors of the judicial system, which are judges, lawyers, prosecutors, prisoners, court clerks, etc. “asking them about objective facts which have or have not happened in a specific country”. This questionnaire³⁷⁰ helps to assess “the integrity and the capacity of the justice sector”, so Mrs. Souza Martins. According to Mrs. Souza Martins it is important to make a distinction whether “you talk about corruption in a system or about the inefficiency of a system”. So a needs analysis of the UNODC is not only about measuring corruption, it's about identifying the factors of an ineffective system and the location of factors which make a country vulnerable to corruption.

One of the obstacles faced by many countries in curbing corruption can be for Mrs. Souza Martins the lack of political will in the legislative, executive and judiciary branches. It is often difficult to find a political will located in all these three branches at the same time, explains Mrs. Souza Martins.

To summarize the outputs of this interview, I can therefore say that corruption is a very sensitive field to analyze and to work in. For the location and identification of the most important factors that lead to corruption it is hence important to develop a detailed field-based assessment of the situation in a country and locate the factors and also sectors which are most important to fight corruption. Apart from this, effective anti-corruption needs to integrate the most important

³⁶⁹ see the Corruption Perception Index, carried out by Transparency International online: <http://www.transparency.de/Tabellarisches-Ranking.1237.0.html>, 29.01.2009.

³⁷⁰ The study related to this questionnaire can be found here: UNODC: “Assessment of the Integrity and Capacity of the Justice System in Three Nigerian States“, see online: http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/publications_nigeria_assessment.pdf, 29.01.2009.

stakeholders of a country, as well as a broad and engaged civil society to create an anti-corruption body and especially education on this subject, which is the most important and sustainable fact for promoting the development of a corruption-free country.

4.3.2 A short analysis on Pakistan's situation of corruption

Transparency International, as the biggest international anti-corruption NGO, has developed effective tools and methods in order to measure corruption in the various countries. One of these tools is the “Corruption Perception Index (CPI)”, which is carried out annually. The CPI 2008 has done a ranking of all countries based on sources taken from and surveys conducted with 12 different leading institutions, and analyzed by country experts to evaluate and measure the extent of corruption in the various countries.³⁷¹ According to this ranking of Transparency International, Pakistan is hence ranked with number 139 from 183 countries in total. A “National Perception Corruption Index” was carried out by Transparency International Pakistan asking 4000 respondents in urban and semi-urban areas in Pakistan 2006 through questionnaires about their perception of corruption in the different sectors in Pakistan. The survey identified the “Police, Power, Judiciary and Land” as the most corrupt departments:

2006 Ranking	2002 Ranking
1. Police	1. Police
2. Power	2. Power
3. Judiciary	3. Taxation
4. Land	4. Judiciary
5. Taxation	5. Custom
6. Custom	6. Health
7. Health	7. Land
8. Education	8. Education
9. Railway	9. Railway
10. Bank	10. Bank

Figure 12: Corrupt departments in Pakistan 2002/2006³⁷²

The report makes out following main reasons which were indicated by the respondents of this survey: A moral misbehaviour in terms of a lack of accountability and discretionary power and in terms of inefficient socio-economic structures such as a low salary of government employees.³⁷³

³⁷¹ For the exact methodology carried out by TI see: <http://www.transparency.de/Methodologische-Hinweise.1078.0.html>, 29.01.2009.

³⁷² The category “Power” refers to the different “power agencies” such as WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) as well as the KESC (Karachi Electric Supply Corporation); see the National Perception Corruption report online: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2006/2006_08_11_ti_pakistan_national_survey, 29.01.2009.

³⁷³ Ibid.

The National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) 2002 carried out by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) gives a detailed report on the situation of corruption in Pakistan.

The NACS points out that causes of corruption in modern-day Pakistan lie in the “need or greed”³⁷⁴ of the people, which again have to be seen in a wider context. This means that corruption in Pakistan needs to be analyzed in different sectors and the conditions within these sectors. This analysis of the NACS thus presents following reasons for the overall prospering in Pakistan:

Economic: Inadequate pay, pensions and public service provision, plus large families;

Social/cultural: Conflict between demands of modern bureaucracy and demands of baradri [=caste, S.S.], family, ethnic and other ties; social pressures for ostentatious demonstration of wealth, dowry and to provide for one’s children ;

Developmental: Low rates of literacy, social empowerment and opportunities for self-improvement; inequitable distribution of wealth and economic growth;

Political: the feudal power structure at the rural level; low levels of political competition; political instability, and intermittent military rule, have weakened institutions; with poor example set by politicians;

Legal and judicial: Justice is inaccessible, slow and selective, encouraging contempt for the law and an attitude of “everyone for themselves.”³⁷⁵

Additionally, NACS argues that the various institutions in Pakistan are extremely weak and ineffective. My focal point will lie on the situation given in the judiciary as briefly discussed before and because it is perceived as one of the most corrupt sectors in Pakistan, which has following the analysis given in this chapter also the biggest relevance in the political situation in Pakistan in the given time framework.

The judiciary in Pakistan is a very vulnerable sector as to corruption in Pakistan. The NACS states that:

The problem of corruption is **acute in the subordinate judiciary**, where money has to be paid at virtually every step of the judicial process in order to make it move forward or halt the process altogether.³⁷⁶

Causes for this are seen in the demotivation of clients by lawyers, in weak legal education of law students which result in “shallow knowledge of law”³⁷⁷ of these students and a “lack of control

³⁷⁴ see National Accountability Bureau (NAB): “National Anti-Corruption Strategy”, Islamabad: 2002, p. 14.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 15.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 57.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 58.

and discipline of practicing lawyers”³⁷⁸. Next to this it is often argued that the judiciary is neither independent enough and that there is a decline of standards within the judiciary.³⁷⁹ Infrastructural settings such as the poor salary of judges and the perceived nepotism in the selection of judges can be seen as further problems for the prospering of corruption.³⁸⁰

The corruption within judiciary³⁸¹ becomes especially a big political issue whenever there is a new military intervention and martial law imposed in the country, which has the result that the judiciary is actually giving legitimacy to such political actions:

The government exerts tight control over judicial appointments, transfers and dismissals, particularly at the level of the superior judiciary³⁸².

The International Crisis Group³⁸³ and Transparency International have thus demanded a reform of the judicial sector in Pakistan to prevent negative future political developments within the country.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ The judiciary is every time used to re-swear an oath to the amended constitution by the various military rulers; see: Siddiqui, Jawed A.: “A tradition of judicial subservience“, in: Transparency International (Ed.): “Corruption and Judicial Systems”, p. 245 see online: http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2007#acknowledge, 29.01.2009.

³⁸² Ibid.

³⁸³ See the recommendations of the International Crisis Group in: ICG (2007): p. ii-iii.

5. Conclusion

My thesis offers a hermeneutical and empirical approach towards the issue of identity formation in Pakistan. The hermeneutical part of this thesis focuses on the different political, historical, social and psychological components within this debate and provides the reader with the necessary ontological framework to understand the empirical part of my thesis which consists of my study on the political identities of Pakistani students in Lahore.

Thus, my thesis starts with an introduction of my research methodology depicting the various steps that have led me towards my research. Beginning from a preview of literature, it concludes with my six main hypotheses which have guided me in my research plan:

1. *Pakistani identity is strongly based on Islamic values which become the outline of Pakistani lifestyle and policy.*
2. *Pakistani identity is strongly based on Islam, which becomes the basis for Pakistani nationalism.*
3. *Dominant Pakistani self-images are strongly defined by a negation of India.*
4. *The postulated “Indian danger” manifests itself in a general feeling of insecurity in the Pakistani society.*
5. *The phenomenon of nationalism in Pakistan and the fear of India create a feeling of insecurity, which leads to a higher disposition for violence.*
6. *The student milieu is a fertile ground for retrieving a great political potential that lies within the Pakistani society.*

These hypotheses have equally structured the hermeneutical part of my paper, chapter two and the empirical part of my paper, chapter three. Chapter two generally gives a picture on Pakistan’s political culture by trying to recreate the genesis of Pakistan’s debate on identity. The birth of the Pakistani nation is shown through the various factors inherent in this debate. The historical factor depicts the political landscape of India in the pre-Partition phase and identifies the most important actors that have led towards the independence of India and the creation of Pakistan. Muhammed Ali Jinnah becomes here the most important person, who, as shown in the part on the political factor, has given a name to Muslim nationalism on the Indian subcontinent and promoted and reinforced the idea of Pakistan. The psychological factor is equally a very important part in this debate, as it looks at Partition from two different perspectives. From a sociological perspective by discussing the concept of violence in the context of Partition, which in itself has been seen as the “rape of mother India” which has resulted in intensive sexual

violence in the aim of destroying the honour of the “other”. On the other hand, Partition 1947 has led to the creation of the “India-syndrome” which shapes the discourse on Pakistani identity by negating India as part of the Pakistani identity. Pakistan’s realpolitik, especially Pakistan’s role and its policies in the Kashmir conflict mirror several psychological aspects that have their origin in Partition 1947.

Chapter two equally depicts Pakistan’s quest for its identity. On the one hand, Pakistan’s identity is strongly influenced by Islam and often propagated as “Islamic identity”, which is justified by the political implementation of Islam in Pakistan through the various constitutions and constitutional amendments that Pakistan has had and in which Islam was always given a different status. Islam has also become part of the social structure in Pakistan, as the official language of Pakistan – Urdu – as the identity marker of the Pakistani people has been interpreted as the language of Muslims and thus has been promoted in Pakistan. Religious instruction in schools has equally been structured according to the Islamic understanding of the Pakistani nation and its identity.

Almost opposed to the “Islamic identity” stands the concept of “ethnic identity”: In many regions, the ethnic identity has been much more developed due to long historical processes than the Islamic identity itself. These ideological divergences between these two concepts have had its eruptions in various political events throughout Pakistan’s political history where different leaders have tried to islamize the country in order to appease ethnic nationalism or separatism. This has, among others, also led to the growing power of the army in Pakistan and marked Pakistan’s history of military regimes.

The last part of chapter two is dedicated to the education system in Pakistan – a threefold system of an English vernacular education, an Urdu vernacular education or a madrassah education. The education received in these different systems shapes the formation of the various different identities of Pakistani students according to the school system they have attended.

At this point my own study finds its justification, which is shown in chapter three. Along three different units of analysis – 1) identity, 2) attitudes towards the Pakistani citizenship, government and the army, and 3) threats – I have presented the results of my questionnaire and my interviews. This data was collected in three different universities, at the Punjab University, a public university with relatively low student fees providing a large number of students from different social classes higher education, at the King Edward’s College, a public medical

university with medium high tuition fees with a very mixed background of students, and at the Lahore University of Management and Sciences, a private university with very high student fees, attended by students from rich families. The results have shown that indeed the student bodies from the different universities show different patterns of opinions and attitudes that constitute a mainstream thinking, but which are too diverse to classify three different consolidated political identities of these student bodies in Lahore. Conservative or liberal trends can be found in each of these three universities.

The fourth chapter analyzes three major political events, the chief justice affair in March 2007, the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, and the imposition of a state of emergency in November 2007, which have taken place before, during or after the collection of my data (July – September 2007). This political analysis, especially a constellation analysis of the most important actors in the political landscape, helps locate the student's opinions and attitudes and shows their position in the Pakistani society, where they have constituted to a major protest movement against the then current military regime of Pervez Musharraf. The final part of my paper then identifies corruption as one of the most important problem fields within the political crisis in Pakistan and draws first a general picture on how corruption can be fought by introducing the work of the UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) and second by a closer look on the corruption scene in Pakistan.

To conclude with the methodological structure of my thesis it is hence important to come back to my initial hypotheses and discuss them in the light of my results.

My first two hypotheses are strongly based on the Islamic orientation of the Pakistani identity and its influence on Pakistani lifestyle and nationalism:

1. *Pakistani identity is strongly based on Islamic values which become the outline of Pakistani lifestyle and policy.*
2. *Pakistani identity is strongly based on Islam, which becomes the basis for Pakistani nationalism.*

The hermeneutical and empirical parts have shown that indeed Islam does play an important role for the identity of this country and its citizens. Although I can definitely conclude from my study, that Islam is an important source for the formation of the personal identity, it is important to highlight that the use of Islam for constructing the personal identity and for structuring ones personal lifestyle is very diverse and dependent on various individual attitudes.

As to the second hypothesis, the hermeneutical part of my paper has shown that for discussing Pakistan's identity it would be wrong to omit the ethnic identity of the Pakistani people, as ethnic movements and separatistic movements based on ethnic demands have a high potential for raising nationalistic tendencies and constituting Pakistani nationalism.

My next three hypotheses are entirely focused on India's image in Pakistan. As the literature often highlights the "enemy"-image of India, I have given India an important role when it comes to Pakistani identity, when it comes to explaining the feeling of insecurity in Pakistan and thus the violent disposition of the Pakistani society, as manifested in various violent events in Pakistan.

3. *Dominant Pakistani self-images are strongly defined by a negation of India.*
4. *The postulated "Indian danger" manifests itself in a general feeling of insecurity in the Pakistani society.*
5. *The phenomenon of nationalism in Pakistan and the fear of India create a feeling of insecurity, which lead to a higher disposition for violence.*

After conducting my survey, though, I have to falsify each of these three hypotheses. My results have shown that my students at least have a very tolerant image towards India, and that the feeling of insecurity can be made out in other factors, such as Pakistan's domestic politics and the country's perpetual fallback into military regimes.

My last hypothesis focuses on the role of the students in Pakistan:

6. *The student milieu is a fertile ground for retrieving a great political potential that lies within the Pakistani society.*

As the youngest intellectual layer of the Pakistani society, the potential that can be found within this group is very big. My survey has shown that students are very "politicized": They are very interested in politics and show a lot of interest towards political affairs. The recent political events, especially the chief justice affair and the imposition of a state of emergency in Pakistan, have shown that there is indeed a great political potential hidden within the students in Lahore.

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Attachment

Questionnaire on Pakistani Identity

Interview no.: _____

I. Personal Information:

- a) Age: _____
- b) Sex: ☐ Male ☐ Female
- c) Study Program: _____
- d) Study Year: _____
- e) Nationality: _____
- f) Religion: _____
- g) Mother tongue: _____
- h) city of birth: _____
- i) Marital Status: ☐ single ☐ engaged ☐ married ☐ divorced ☐ in a relationship
- j) Profession of Parents: Mother: _____
Father: _____

II. General Information:

1. We are all part of different groups. Some are more important to us than others when we think of ourselves. In general, which in the following list is most important to you in describing who you are?

	Very Important	Fairly important	Not very Important	Not important at all
a. Your nationality				
b. Your ethnic background, which is: _____				
c. My mother tongue, which is: _____				
d. Your religion, which is: _____				
e. Your sex, which is: ☐ Male ☐ Female				
f. Your family				
g. Your marital status, which is ☐ single ☐ engaged ☐ married ☐ divorced ☐ in a relationship				

h. Your friends				
i. Your studies				
j. Your preferred political party or movement, which is: _____				
k. The city you live in, which is: _____				

III. Nationalism

1. How close do you feel to

	Very close	Close	Not very close	Not close at all
a. Pakistan				
b. India				
c. The United States				
d. The Muslim World				
e. Islam				
f. Urdu				
g. Your mother tongue				
h. English				
i. Arabic				
Other things I feel close to: _____				

2. How important are the following things for you to define yourself as fully Pakistani?

	Very important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not important at all	Can't choose
To be a Muslim					
To be patriotic					
To have a Pakistani nationality					
To speak Urdu					
To vote in Pakistani elections					

Being part of a political organization or movement, which is: _____					
Other criteria: _____					

3. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
a. It is my duty to honour Pakistan's history.				
b. I am proud of the Pakistani nationality.				
c. When I see the Pakistani flag, I feel overwhelmed by pride for my country.				
d. I love Pakistan.				
e. I have a strong emotional commitment towards Pakistan.				
f. Pakistan's victories in sports are important to me.				
g. I wish that Pakistan becomes more powerful on the international level.				
h. I think that there should be more patriotism in Pakistan.				
i. India should learn from us.				
j. Western countries should learn from us.				
k. Pakistan should only help other countries if it is of national advantage for Pakistan.				

4. In every country there are things which one is *proud or ashamed of*. If this is the case can u please state what these elements are?

a) I am proud of:

b) I am ashamed of:

IV. History:

1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Can't choose
a. Partition 1947 was an important step towards promoting Muslim Identity on the Indian Subcontinent.					
b. The communal riots in British India and today India show that Hindus and Muslims cannot live together in one country.					
c. I feel the creation of Pakistan was a legitimate step to secure Muslims safety on the Indian subcontinent.					
d. I feel that Bangladesh was in the wrong to get separated from Pakistan.					
e. I feel that the Islamization policy of Pakistani governments were a good thing for Pakistan.					
f. I feel that Pakistan has suffered from a lot of injustice during partition.					

2. When you think of the history of Pakistan since Partition 1947, which is according to you the event that has mostly marked Pakistani society?

3. Every country is scarred by societal conflicts. Which conflicts according to you mark most your country?

4. Which are according to you the most important historical events in the history of Pakistan?

5. Is there according to you any historical Pakistani figure that you would want to still be alive today? If yes, please state who and why this person is important to you.

V. Kashmir:

1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Can't choose
a. Pakistan has full right to claim all of Kashmir.					
b. India is doing injustice to the Muslims living in Kashmir.					
c. The Muslims in Kashmir need a strong military support from Pakistan.					
d. Pakistan should continue the fight over Kashmir with India.					
e. I think that the UN should play a greater role in the Kashmir conflict.					
f. I believe that the Kashmir conflict violates Pakistan's izzat.					
g. The only way to establish the <i>izzat</i> of Pakistan is to recover Kashmir from India.					
h. Pakistan has to do Jihad in order to free Kashmir from the Indian invaders.					

2. Do you think the Kashmir - conflict justifies the animosity between India and Pakistan? Please explain your answer.

☐ yes, because

☐ no, because

3. How would you react, if Kashmir was lost by Pakistan and went to India?

Pakistani Self –Images

1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Can't choose
a. I would rather be a citizen of Pakistan than of any other country in the world.					
b. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Pakistanis.					
c. Generally speaking, Pakistan is a better country, than most of the other countries.					
d. People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong.					
e. If Pakistan does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be a Pakistani.					
f. Urdu and Hindi is one language with two faces.					
g. I am proud of Political Parties and movements who want to islamize the country.					
h. Pakistan needs a stronger army so as to defend itself.					

2. How proud are you of Pakistan in each of the following?

	Very Proud	Somewhat Proud	Not very proud	Not proud at all	Can't choose
a. The current Pakistani government					
b. The political system in Pakistan					
c. Pakistan's political influence in the world					
d. The Pakistani army					
e. Pakistan's foreign policy towards India					
f. Pakistan's foreign policy towards the United States					
g. Pakistan's history					
h. Pakistan's achievement in literature					
i. Pakistan's achievement in art					
j. Pakistan's achievement in music					
k. Pakistan's achievement in sports					
l. Other:					

Muslim Identity:

1. In case you are Muslim, which of these elements are very important, fairly important, important, not important at all to define yourself as a Muslim?

	Very important	Fairly important	Important	Not important at all
a. To pray 5 times a day				
b. To fast in Ramadan.				
c. To dress in an Islamic way.				
d. To obey your parents				
e. To defend your country				
f. To respect Pakistani traditions				
Other:				

2. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Can't choose
a. Thinking of the controversy on the Mohammed cartoons I feel that Muslim Identity is at stake.					
b. Thinking of the Pope's statement on Islam I feel that Muslim Identity is constantly at stake.					
c. I feel that the Western world is hostile towards the Muslim world.					
d. I feel that Muslims all over the world suffer a lot of injustice.					
e. When I think of the injustice suffered by Muslims around the world, I get angry.					
f. I believe that Pakistani Muslim Identity needs to be defended through Jihad.					
g. I believe that Muslim Identity needs to be strengthened.					

Perception of the other

Pakistan and India

1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Can't choose
Islam is an important factor so as to differentiate Pakistan from India.					
Hinduism is a national threat to Islam.					
I believe that Hindus and Muslims cannot live together peacefully in one country.					
Pakistan has more in common with other Muslim countries than with India.					
When I think of India, I think of all the injustice that India has passed on Pakistan.					
India is Pakistan's biggest enemy.					
I believe that there can never be peace between India and Pakistan.					
History has proven that India has no intention to be friendly with Pakistan.					
A dialogue between India and Pakistan is not possible, as they are too different.					
I feel that India has more political power on the international level than Pakistan does.					
India always blames Pakistan for every bomb blast in their country.					

3. How would you feel if India gets a permanent seat in the UN-security council?

4. Imagine there was a current war between India and Pakistan. Would you consider joining the army to defend your country?

☐ yes ☐ no

5. In case of a war between India and Pakistan, would you approve the help of Islamist organizations to fight India?

☐ yes ☐ no

6. How would you feel if in a war between India and Pakistan, India was supported by the United States?

7. How do you feel when India falsely accuses Pakistan for any violent attack (like a bomb blast) in India?

7. If you were the president of Pakistan and had the power over the Pakistani army, how would you react in case of a war between India and Pakistan?

Pakistan and the United States

1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Can't choose
I believe that the United States of America and Pakistan should have more political ties.					
I believe that the USA is an important ally of Pakistan in the fight against terrorism.					
I believe that the USA is an important political partner for Pakistan against India.					
I think that the United States should cooperate less with India and more with Pakistan.					
America's foreign policy helps to fight international terrorism.					
I believe that Bush is a good American president.					

Aggression Potential

1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Can't choose
"We should fight Indian soldiers who torture our Muslim brothers and sisters in Kashmir!"					

"The only way we can get respect from India is, when we show them who is stronger!"					
"Pakistan aur India ke darmian kabhi nahin dosti ho sakti hai isle andaar se ek dusre se nafrat karte hai!"					
I approve a defensive Pakistani foreign policy towards India.					
I would approve a military strike against India in case the violence in Kashmir reaches an unexpected intensity of violence.					

2. Can you sympathize with Moslems living in India?

☐ yes ☐ no

3. What do you feel, when you hear about Hindu-Muslim escalations in India?

4. How would you react, if your university would allow Hindu students to study at your University?

5. How would you react if you had a Hindu as a neighbour?

Culture:

1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Can't choose
Increased imports of Indian Films and Music is damaging our national and local culture.					
Increased imports of Western Films and Music is damaging our national and local culture.					
I feel it's a shame that Pakistani actors and actresses play in Indian dramas and movies.					
I feel that India is more modern than is Pakistan.					
I think Pakistan should promote more the film- and music sector.					
I prefer that famous Pakistani artists stay in Pakistan and don't go to India to make more money.					

2. Would you like to visit India one day?

☐ yes ☐ no

Society:

1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.

	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Can't choose
I feel that my country has very strict social and religious norms so as to how behave with other people.					
I have difficulties following traditional roles as how to behave.					
Children should always honour their parents, even if they are in the wrong.					
I approve of the strong separation of sexes in Pakistan.					
Girls need to cover properly so as to be protected from assaults from the male sex.					
I approve of arranged marriages.					
I approve of love marriages.					
Girls have equal chances like boys in Pakistani society.					
The reputation of Girls is particularly interesting as it clings/rests upon the <i>izzat</i> of a family.					

2. Would you like to move to another country one day? If yes, in which one and why? If not, why not?

☐ yes in _____, because

☐ no, because

Abstract

This paper presents a study on the political identities of Pakistani students in Lahore. Through a self-conducted study in a field research in Lahore from July to September 2007 the attitudes and opinions of three different student bodies in Lahore in regard of Pakistani politics and Pakistani identity were gathered and analysed in the light of the identity formation discourse in Pakistan. Thus, this paper starts with a hermeneutical approach analysing Pakistan's political culture through a close look on the genesis of Pakistan's creation and the following national identity discourse. This genesis is being looked at through different parameters such as political, historical and psychological components within this debate, which influences the education of young people in Pakistan. The education in Pakistan which is characterized by a threefold system: an English vernacular system, an Urdu vernacular system and a madrassah system, is the outcome and core of a big identity issue in Pakistan, which significantly shapes a student's view on the world.

This is where the empirical part of the paper connects. The study which was carried out through a questionnaire and with additional semi-structured interviews with students analyzes their responses and portrays the results of the survey along three different units of analysis: 1) identity 2) attitudes towards the Pakistani government, citizenship and army, and 3) perceived threats. The study shows that the students from different social backgrounds do show a core mainstream thinking towards specific issues, whereas one consolidated identity even within one student body cannot be made out, as all nuances from conservative to very liberal can be found in each institution.

The political potential of students is not only remarkable through the presented study but shows itself within their political activism, which gathered high relevance during the events of the chief justice affair in march 2007 and the imposition of a state of emergency by president Pervez Musharraf in November 2007. The political potential located within this group finds its place within Pakistani civil society in the demand for a just Pakistan. A constellation analysis of the Pakistani political landscape, its major actors and its biggest problem fields, such as corruption, embed the student's initiative in the current debate on Pakistan's political development.

Im Zentrum dieser Arbeit liegt die Präsentation einer Studie über politischen Identitäten von pakistanischen StudentInnen in Lahore. Die von Juli bis September 2007 selbst durchgeführte Studie im Rahmen einer Feldforschung vor Ort zeigt die unterschiedlichen Einstellungen und Meinungen von StudentInnen in Bezug auf pakistanische Politik und ihre eigene Identität auf und analysiert sie im Rahmen von Identitätsdiskursen in Pakistan.

Der hermeneutische Teil der Arbeit identifiziert die pakistanische politische Kultur als zentrales Analyseelement und betrachtet sie anhand verschiedener politischer, historischer und psychologischer Parameter in der Auseinandersetzung der Debatte um eine pakistanische Identität, welche ausschlaggebend für die Erziehung junger Menschen in Pakistan ist. Das dreigliedrige Bildungssystem in Pakistan – ein Englisch geprägtes Bildungssystem, ein Urdu geprägtes Bildungssystem und ein Madrassah Bildungssystem - ist nicht nur Ursache sondern auch Problem einer Identitätsdebatte in Pakistan, welche die Ansichten und Weltanschauungen jener StudentInnen signifikant formt.

An dieser Stelle setzt die Arbeit mit einem empirischen Teil fort: Die Analyse und Auswertung eines Fragebogens und zusätzliche semi-strukturierte Interviews mit StudentInnen von drei verschiedenen Universitäten, die alle unterschiedliche Schichten von StudentInnen unterrichten. Die Auswertung fokussiert vor allem auf drei spezifische Analyseeinheiten: 1) Identität, 2) Einstellungen gegenüber pakistanischer Regierung, Staatsbürgerschaft und Armee sowie 3) wahrgenommenen Bedrohungen. Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeichnen ein Bild von drei verschiedenen Studentenkörpern, die zwar ein jeweils unterschiedliches Mainstream-Denken in Bezug auf bestimmte Fragen aufzeigen, jedoch aufgrund unterschiedlicher sozialer Hintergründe und verschiedener Nuancen politischer Einstellungen von konservativ bis liberal keine konsolidierte politische Identität repräsentieren.

Das politische Potenzial, das in dieser Gruppe steckt, findet sich nicht nur im empirischen Teil wieder, sondern ist erkennbar in dem politischem Aktivismus der StudentInnen, was vor allem in den letzten Jahren auf Grund der Absetzung des Richters des Obersten Gerichtshof im März 2007 sowie durch die Verhängung des Ausnahmezustandes in Pakistan durch Präsident Pervez Musharraf im November 2007 an hoher Relevanz gewonnen hat. Jenes politische Potenzial innerhalb der StudentInnen ist somit Teil der pakistanischen Zivilgesellschaft im Kampf für ein gerechtes Pakistan. Eine Konstellationsanalyse der politischen Landschaft Pakistans, ihrer wichtigsten Akteuren, sowie der größten politischen Problemfelder Pakistans wie etwa Korruption, bettet den politischen Aktivismus jener StudentInnen in die aktuelle Debatte um Pakistans politische Entwicklung ein.

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