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A historical and freedom-based approach**

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List of Abbreviations

ACP – African, Caribbean, and Pacific
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF – African Standby Force
AU – African Union
AUC – African Union Commission
DAC – Development Assistance Committee
EC – European Commission
EDF – European Development Fund
EEC – European Economic Community
EP – European Parliament
EPA – Economic Partnership Agreement
EU – European Union
GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNP – Gross National Product
HDI – Human Development Index
HPI – Human Poverty Index
IMF – International Monetary Fund
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
JAES – Joint Africa-EU Strategy
LPA – Largos Plan of Action
MDGs – Millennium Development Goals
NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO – Non Governmental Organization
OAS – Organization of American States
OAU – Organisation of African Unity
OCTs – Overseas Countries and Territories
ODA – Official Development Aid
OPEC – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAP – Pan African Parliament
RECs – Regional Economic Communities
SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals
STABEX - System for the Stabilisation of ACP and OCT Export Earnings
SYSMIN - System of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products
TEU – Treaty on European Union
TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN – United Nations
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
WTO – World Trade Organization
WW II – World War II

1. Introduction

“Africa and Europe are bound together by history, culture, geography, a common future, as well as by a community of values [...]”

In December 2007, African and European head of states and government gathered in Lisbon for the second EU-Africa Summit. The previous summit had been held seven years before and since then the circumstances had changed fundamentally. In 2007, for the first time the leaders of the European Union were facing an African counterpart which united 53 countries on the continent. Based on this summit the relationship between Africa and Europe should open a new chapter. As equal partners the African Union and the European Union announced a *Joint Strategy*, the *Africa-EU Strategic Partnership*, the above quote is the opening statement of the strategy.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and evaluate this partnership in two ways. It seeks to firstly to understand the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) in the light of a broad historical and political context and secondly to evaluate its potential effects on the people affected. The findings in this two areas show that although the AU and EU both follow self-interested visions for each continent, for the first time in history there are enough overlapping interests as well as the necessary institutional circumstances for a sustainable partnership based on equal footing. This partnership includes many priorities and measures, which are able to substantially improve the lives of many especially with regards to political participation and representation. Contrariwise, the design of the partnership may entail the risk of not living up to its full potential and/or perhaps even reducing the quality of life of the affected people. This is mainly in relation to the unproportioned use of economic concepts such as market liberalization and free trade, which have been highly criticized for more than two decades.

The described research focuses on three overarching questions. The historical part of the analysis is conducted based on the two following:

How did development cooperation evolve in a global context since World War II?

And more specifically:

How did the relationship between Europe and Africa develop in the same period?

The second part of the research interest, is only centered around one major questions which is further specified in chapter 3:

Is the Joint Africa-EU Strategy potentially expanding or reducing the freedoms of the affected people?

To answer these three questions, this paper is structured into four chapters: Chapter 1 provides a comprehensive, chronologic overview of 70 years of development cooperation. The seven decades are split up into six subchapters each representing a specific period. The subchapters are comprised of two parts: Firstly, all significant, international developments and secondly, all the events relevant for the Africa-Europe relationship.

The following chapter 3 is an outline of the theoretical framework which is used in chapter 4 and 5 to answer the third research question. Thus, it will take a close look at Amartya Sen's capability approach as well as its possible use in policy analysis.

In chapter 4 the analysis of individual development policies of AU and EU is conducted, whereas in chapter 5 the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its current Roadmap 2014-2017 are evaluated. This evaluation is focused on the strategic priorities outlined by these two documents as well as an identification of missing areas.

As noted before this thesis is methodically dichotomous. The first part is a historical analysis, whereas the second part is a policy analysis centered on the capability approach introduced by Nobel Prize Laureate Amartya Sen. In his book *Development as Freedom* (2009) he criticizes the longstanding focus on economic growth as overarching aim of development. For Sen economic growth as well as industrialization are merely means for development. The end of development however should be the reduction of unfreedoms and the expansion of freedoms of individuals. Through this lens (for an in-depth explanation see chapter 3), the analysis of the priorities in the JAES and the Roadmap was conducted. To identify the missing areas, the highly reputable book *Making Globalization Work* written by another Nobel Prize laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz in 2007 is used. In his book, he forms six major fields, in which reform is essential to build on fairer globalization.

In addition to the use of two highly influential approaches of two Nobel Prize Laureates this paper incorporates a wide range of secondary sources like monographies and journal articles as well as various primary sources in form of treaties, strategic documents and data, which is mainly due to the nature of policy analysis.

2. The Development of development and the relationship between the Europe and Africa

Development assistance and development aid are rather recent phenomena of international relations which emerged in the quickly changing world after the second world war. Following World War II, the motivation behind development related activity has constantly changed. This has been reflected by the formation of new institutions as well as the adoption of new treaties, strategies and paradigms on development. Europe was a target area for development aid at first, but it has changed its role over time to become the biggest donor of development aid today. This chapter will chronologically list the development of development assistance as well as the theories and paradigms behind it. For the purpose of this thesis, this chapter will pay special attention to the roles of Europe, the different stages of the European Union and Africa in this evolution.

a) 1940s and 1950s – Beginnings

In the Aftermath of World War Two, many countries gained independence from their former colonizers; some earlier (in Asia) than others (in Africa). The emerging Cold War played a significant role in this development. The United States and the Soviet Union had clear anti-colonialist policies although the intent behind their strategies were vastly different. The United States themselves had to fight for their independence from Britain, whereas, Lenin saw imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. In many colonies, independence movements consisted of communistic and western orientated groups. Thus, for both countries it was crucial to expand their sphere of influence in Asia and Africa (Lundestad, 2014:254-256). For the US one way of doing so was to initiate the first programs to support the emerging, so called Third World. Therefore, Truman's Point Four program is seen as a starting point of international development assistance (Maxfield, 2002:606). On January 20, 1949 president Truman pointed out these four points in his inauguration speech:

"[...] we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and

stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve suffering of these people."

In the above extract Truman spoke about the fourth point of his program, where he emphasized the importance of improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. Alongside the four point program, the US started an initiative to transfer the knowledge gained from the Marshal Plan to newly emerging countries in the 'Third' World. Similar programs such as the UN Technical Assistance Program (1949) and the British Colombo Plan (1950) came about in the late 40's to early 50's development efforts. During this period the other major institutions such as the World Bank (1944), International Monetary Fund (1945) and GATT (1947) paid little attention to the needs of the newly independent states and instead focused on industrialized counties. This has been cited as the reason for developing countries not joining GATT at the time (Lundestad, 2014:279).

In the early stages of European integration, former colonizing countries such as France and Denmark enshrined close links to their former colonies in the Treaty of Rome. Thus, the *Association of the overseas countries and territories* followed the notion of maintaining the *special (economic) relations* between these countries and to politically integrate them into the western society (Fröhlich, 2014:65). Currently, the article aforementioned article is still enshrined in EU Law under Art. 198 TFEU of the Lisbon Treaty which states:

*"The purpose of association shall be to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the **Union** as a whole. In accordance with the principles set out in the preamble to **the Treaties**, association shall serve primarily to further the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in order to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire."* (EU, 2007)

As one part of the implementation of this *association* the Treaty of Rome founded the European Development Fund (EDF), which has since been *"the EU's main instrument for providing development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to overseas countries and territories (OCTs)"* (European Commission, 2016b)

b) 1960s – Cold war and development optimism

In 1960 Walt Withman Rostow published his book: *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. In the book he describes the five possible stages of societies. In his theory the most advanced nations had already reached the last stage of high mass consumption, whereas the least developed countries were still in the first stage called traditional society. This Modernization Theory led to the universal conclusion that every country is on a unilineal path towards the economic and political model of the United States and some western European countries. As may be noted his theory was highly influential in the early 60s for the field of development assistance.

“Many economists felt that if only a specified investment level was reached, the developing countries could ‘take off’ and create a self-generating growth.” (Lundestad, 2014:280)

This *optimism* led to a sharp increase in development aid. By 1963 the three major donors France, Britain and the US had increased funding by 77 % in comparison to 1956. Aside from this newly gained *optimism* there are two other reasons that were crucial for this increase, namely, the stronger representation of *Third World* countries within the United Nations and the growing Soviet interest in these new nations (Lundestad, 2014:280). While the Western states invested more in development aid they refused to grant the developing countries more sway within the international trade regime.

“GATT [...] focused so heavily on advanced industrial countries that developing country leaders pushed for a separate forum, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in which to pursue their trade concerns.” (Maxfield, 2002:610)


The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which was founded in 1964 began to represent the economic demands of the developing countries. This development went hand in hand with the growing criticism of the Modernization Theory and the role other international actors like the International Monetary Fund, the US government and multinational corporations (Maxfield, 2002:610). Supported by this criticism the demands of the developing world led to some small changes such as more funds by the World Bank and the IMF (Lundestad, 2014:282). Alongside changes on the international platform in the 60's, regional agreements between the EC and ACP states were also adapted. The *Association of the overseas countries and territories* was further developed by the first Yaoundé Conventions 1964-1969, which was signed in 1962 by the EEC and 18 newly independent African States. It included economic cooperation as well as development aid provided by the EDF. By 1963 a total of 32 African

states had gained independence. In the same year on 25 May these countries founded the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It was the manifestation of the ideology of Pan-Africanism even though the extent of integration was modest due to the wishes of many countries to stay sovereign. Beside aims like harmonizing policies of the member states and promoting cooperation the OAU mainly became active in efforts to fully decolonialize Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014:25-26). Gradually newly independent countries joined throughout the remaining decades of the 20th century.

c) 1970s and 1980s – economic crises and stagnating ODA

As mentioned previously, the beginning of the 1960s was characterized by a high level of official development aid (ODA) by the countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). However, during the 60s the contributions of the biggest donors USA, UK and France declined. This led to the reduction of the overall development aid of DAC countries by exactly 50 % between 1961 (0,54 %) and 1973 (0,27 %). The following two decades were characterized by a stagnation at this low level, as shown in Figure 1. This stands in contrast to a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in October 1970, where the following words can be found:

Figure 1: Net ODA – total, % of gross national income, 1960 - 1990



Source: OECD (2016), Net ODA (indicator). doi: 10.1787/33346549-en (Accessed on 04 August 2016)

“In recognition of the special importance of the role that can be fulfilled only by official development assistance, a major part of financial resource transfers to the developing countries should be provided in the form of official development assistance. Each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 percent of its gross national product at market prices by the middle of the decade.” (UN General Assembly Resolution 2626, 1970)

Since then the 0.7 % target was integrated in many resolutions and agreements (Millennium Project 2006) but was not once reached on an agglomerated level. The two most important reasons for this reduction and stagnation during the 60s, 70s and 80s were on the one hand due to the slow growth rate of global economy and on the other hand due to the realization of the big donors that development aid doesn't always lead to political support of the targeted countries (Lundestad. 2014:281). Notably, the slow economic growth was closely linked to the two oil crises which occurred in the 70s. The 1960 founded Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) reduced its production of oil vastly in 1973 as a reaction to the western support for Israel in context of the Yom Kippur War. Five years later in 1978/79 Iran reduced its oil exports after the revolution and the fall of the Shah. Both events led to a sharp increase in global oil prices and global economic crises.

For many developing countries the 1980s was a difficult period due to the economic insecurities during the 1970s. Many countries had to cope with high foreign debts and inflation. For that reason, the 1980s are sometimes referred to as the lost decade of development (Stokke, 2009). An exception was Asian countries including the so called “four tigers” – South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. These countries managed to keep growth high and debt low due to their export led business model. The lost decade also provoked much criticism from the developing world. Exemplarily of that criticism is the outcome of the OAU Economic Summit in Lagos, Nigeria on 28 and 29 April 1980. The main outcome of this summit was the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). It noted that the unsated promises of global development strategies impacted Africa more than any other continent. Likewise, it claimed that successive strategies from the “developed” world such as structural adjustment and other conditionalities have led to Africa's economic stagnation and vulnerability to external crisis of the industrial world (Organization of African Unity, 1980: 4). The OAU's member states were very critical about the responsibility the developed countries had to the development of Africa. As the plan notes, developing states are owed appropriate contributions by the developed world since the development of Africa is a precondition for the continuous development of advanced countries

(OAU, 1980:15). These contributions should complement the self-sufficient development policies of Africa rather than dictate development policies for Africa.

The Monrovia Declaration is also mentioned through which the OAU committed itself to the promotion of economic and social development as well as economic integration in order to attain self-sufficiency. In the LPA the OAU had already acknowledged human development as fundamental to the overall development of the continent (OAU, 1980:4). Moreover, it noted that the development of economies is for the benefit of the people and that they ought to enable the people to undertake more charge for the achievement of development aims of states and the continent (OAU, 1980:5). In other words, it highlights that economic development is not an end on its own but rather a means to greater benefits of the people. In addition, it notes that food security is of crucial importance to the insurance of human development as well as economic development. Thus, an agricultural revolution is needed to ensure food supply is efficient and in order for this to be effective the youth needs to be involved, policies should be directed to improving living conditions on farms and to increasing farm real incomes as to make agriculture attractive and remunerative (OAU, 1980:8). With regards to industry development, the OAU noted that meeting the populations basic needs and the creation of jobs was necessary for industry to prosper in Africa (OAU, 1980:15). This highlights a shift in development thinking in Africa toward human development. Moreover, it underscores Africa's linking of human and economic development.

Although there was strong criticism from the OAU the relationship between Africa and the EU during the 70s and 80s was continuously characterized by the successively advancement of Yaoundé Agreement in form of the four Lomé Conventions. At the beginning of the 70s the relationship between the EC and African countries changed for several reasons. The most important is the joining of Great Britain to the European Community in 1973 which led to the inclusion of the former British Colonies into the ECs cooperation with African countries. The other two reasons can be found in a wider, global context. Firstly, the described oil crises led to the need of European countries to rebuild their relationships and African countries were seen as reliable compared to Latin American and Arabic countries (Muratori, 2013:98). Secondly, the 70s were defined by an ideological dispute between dependency and modernization theory in search for explanations for the continuing underdevelopment of many countries. This resulted in growing demands from the most affected countries for a fairer, global economic system (Fröhlich, 2014:66).

The Lomé Convention consisted of 4 parts:

- Lomé I: signed in 1975 and in force from 1976 to 1980 (five years)

- Lomé II: signed in 1979 and in force from 1981 to 1985 (five years)
- Lomé III: signed in 1984 and in force from 1985 to 1990 (five years)
- Lomé IV: signed in 1989 and in force from 1990 to 2000 (ten years)

Lomé I ... “[...] provided greater access to the European market by extending duty-free access and eliminating quota restrictions on a non-reciprocal basis [...]” Furthermore “[...] it included an export earning scheme known as the stabilization of export receipts on agricultural products (STABEX)” (Alusa & Omeje, 2014:318). It also introduced an institutionalized economic dialogue between the contracting parties which included conferences and meetings of ministers (Fröhlich, 2014:66). In Lomé II, in addition to STABEX a System of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products (SYSMIN) was introduced to provide loans during times of crisis, to countries that were heavily dependent on mining (Alusa & Omeje, 2014:318). In the third Lomé convention, a provision was added with the obligation to document the exact use of funds within STABEX (Muratori, 2013:100).

Within the first 15 years (1975-1990) the Lomé politics did not deliver the expected results. For example, during this period the Eastern African Countries Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania continued to be among the least developed countries and recorded a high trade deficit every year despite their preferential access to the European market (Alusa & Omeje, 2014:319).

d) 1990s – Neo-Liberalism and Human Development

The 1990s witnessed the end of the bipolar global order. As a result, the neoliberalist economic model spread alongside the emergence of the human development approach. In fact, in the 80s a shift towards the neo classical economic model with emphasis on the importance of markets already began. This was especially promoted especially by Reagan (US) and Thatcher (UK) (Stiglitz 2007:47). This was due to the poor performance of many developed and developing countries and the ineffectiveness of Keynesian policy tools during the 1970s (Maxfield, 2002:615). Overall this neoliberal approach was characterized by deemphasizing the role of the state. With regards to development this shift was embodied in the Washington Consensus;

[...] a consensus forged between the IMF (located on 19th Street), the World Bank (on 18th Street), and the U.S. Treasury (on 15th Street) – on what constituted the set of policies that would best promote development. It emphasized downscaling of government, deregulation, and rapid liberalization and privatization.” (Stiglitz. 2007:16-17)

The phrase – first used to describe the relationship between the Washington based institutions and Latin America in 1990 – still stands as umbrella term for policies promoted by the World

Bank, IMF and other international actors. These policies include: Fiscal discipline, Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base), Interest rate liberalization, A competitive exchange rate, Trade liberalization, Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment, Privatization, Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit) and Securing property rights (Center for International Development at Harvard University 2003). Starting in the 80s and continuing in the 90s this *policy promotion* was done in form of structural adjustment and conditionality. To gain access to funds from the IMF, World Bank and bilateral donors countries had to agree to certain terms or as Stokke (2009:319) describes it:

“With few other sources of finance available, individual debt-ridden Third World governments had little choice but to accept the conditions.”

This form of forced liberalization is highly criticized to this day. Especially in Africa since it did not deliver the expected results for various reasons.

“Liberalization opened up African markets to goods from foreign countries, but the African countries had little to sell abroad. Opening up capital markets did not bring an inrush of capital; investors were more interested in taking out Africa’s bountiful natural resources.”

(Stiglitz. 2007:41)

Natural resources are only one point of criticism. Another one is the fact the African continent is lacking highly skilled workers who can compete in the globalized economy. In order to acquire these skills, education and training is vital. In turn, education and training relies on a strong governmental sector and state investment. Both of which are cut short by said organizations and their policy of conditionality (Mesfin. 2014:34).

In associated with the neoliberal economic conditionality in the 90s, political liberalism became one of the guiding principles of development assistance and development aid (Stokke. 2009:224-229). Western countries made their tradition of democracy and government the guiding principle and tried to export this system to developing countries. Three dimensions were seen as essential and interconnected, the promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance. For democracy free and fair elections were seen as essential and the concept of good governance was built around the principles of rule of law, accountability, predictability and transparency.

The neoliberal shift in development cooperation and its sole focus on macro-economic indicators quickly provoked criticism, which led to the emergence of alternative approaches. Starting in the 80s the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was working on shifting the human and social aspects of development into the spotlight. In 1990 the first Human Development

Report was published and the Human Development Index was introduced. It was a “*silent revolution*” in terms of the definition of the aim of development (Stokke, 2009:344). In this new approach economic growth and wealth is only a means, but the end is human well-being.


“The human development approach, developed by the economist Mahbub Ul Haq, is anchored in the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s work on human capabilities, often framed in terms of whether people are able to “be” and “do” desirable things in life.” (UNDP, n.d.)

Figure 2: Dimensions and variables of the Human Development Index (HDI)

Dimension	Used Variables
Long and healthy life	Life expectancy at birth (years)
Knowledge	Mean years of schooling for ages 25 and above (years)
	Expected years of schooling (years)
A decent standard of living	GNI per capita (PPP US\$)

Source: Compiled from UNDP n.d., <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (Accessed on 04 August 2016)

In 1999 Amartya Sen summed up the philosophical position of this approach in his book *Development as Freedom*. As the title of the book suggests, in his view the aim of development should be to expand the freedom of humans. The next chapter (3) will elaborate his philosophical and scientific framework in more detail. Based on this foundation, the Human Development Index attempts to give a more comprehensive view on development in countries and regions. For that purpose, the HDI combines the three dimensions shown in Figure 2. Another relevant development in the 90s was that after two years of stagnation of development assistance it declined yet again as shown in Figure 2. There are two reasons for the decline in assistance at the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Firstly, the most important rationale for the West to spend money on development assistance disappeared; namely to prevent receiving countries to politically orientate towards the Eastern Bloc. Secondly, Western states wanted to support the transition of mainly Eastern European countries away from Communism, therefore a new form of aid was introduced which started competing with traditional development assistance (Stokke, 2009:323-324). All this factors led to the lowest level of development assistance provided by the DAC countries in the 20th century (see Figure 1 and 3). With around 0,2 percent of agglomerated gross national incomes the DAC countries were far from reaching the UN target of 0,7 percent. In addition to the decline of ODA provided by DAC countries, the development assistance provided by the Soviet Union and its allies disappeared due to the collapse of Eastern bloc. The overall shift towards a neoliberal paradigm and especially the rising political liberalism was also represented in the EU-Africa relations during the 1990s.

Figure 3: Net ODA – total, % of gross national income, 1990 - 2014

Source: OECD (2016), Net ODA (indicator). doi: 10.1787/33346549-en (Accessed on 04 August 2016)

With the Treaty on European Union or Maastricht Treaty which entered into force in 1993 the European Union was founded as legal personality. A new legal framework – namely the three pillars – removed the old structure. This included as the third of the pillars a new basis for the for the EU's external relations. For the first time the political field of development cooperation was officially within the (shared) competencies of the Union and thus should be implemented complementarily to the development policies of the member states (Bieber, Epiney & Haag, 2012:647). The treaty furthermore specified the field of development cooperation and laid out the following goals:

“Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation [...] shall foster:

- *the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them;*
- *the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy;*
- *the campaign against poverty in the developing countries; and*

Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.” (Treaty on European Union 1992: Article 130u)

The fourth Lomé Convention (1990-2000) was already influenced by this re-orientation of the EU in regards to development. In previous decades the ACP states refused any attempts to implement a political dimension within conventions with the EC but with the end of the Cold

War their ability to resist was fading (Sherriff & Kotsopoulos, 2014:306). Therefore, Lomé IV was the first convention to have political dialogue as well as human rights and cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) included.


e) 2000er – Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Doha Round

After more than 50 years of targeted efforts to reduce poverty and hunger the results at the beginning of the new millennium were modest. The last change of paradigms around the Washington consensus has not delivered the expected outcomes either.

“The world, certainly including the Third World, was simply too diverse to fit within a narrow, neo-liberal Western agenda.” (Lundestad, 2014:284)

The least developed regions had not been able to catch up and reduce poverty. In the 1990s in Sub-Saharan Africa for example, the share of people living under the poverty line stagnated, whereas the total number of people increased sharply as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990 - 2012



Source: Compiled from Poverty and Equity Database (2016), <http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/SSA> (Accessed on 04 August 2016)

“By 2003, even the IMF had conceded that, at least for many developing countries, capital market liberalization had led not to more growth, just to more instability.” (Stiglitz, 2007:16)

Two major innovations on an international level was to finally bring the desired change; namely the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) starting from 2000 and the Doha Development Round which was initiated in 2001. The MDGs were the major outcome of the Millennium

Summit of the United Nations which took place in September 2000. With representatives of 191 nations and 147 heads of state it was the biggest gathering of its type in history. The MDGs consisted of a commitment to a *new global partnership* as well as eight time-bound targets; all to be achieved by 2015. The eight goals were: (1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) Achieve universal primary education; (3) Promote gender equality and empower women; (4) Reduce child mortality; (5) Improve maternal health; (6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (7) Ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) Develop a global partnership for development. Every goal had sub-targets (in all eighteen), most of which were quantified and specified by 48 indicators to measure success against the baseline year 1990 (Stokke, 2009:445).

The Doha Development Round was the latest round of trade negotiations by the World Trade Organization (WTO) – the successor of GATT – and started in 2001. It was designed to further lower international barriers of trade, whilst paying special attention to the needs of developing countries including topics such as food security and rural development (Mengesha 2014:127). The success of the Doha Round so far is limited, mainly due to differences between USA, China and India and following the breakdown of the negotiations in 2008. For Europe, Africa and their relationship the first decade of the new millennium was an eventful time. In Africa, the African Union (AU) was founded and took over the legacy of the OAU, in Europe the Treaty of Lisbon took the EU to the next level of integration and between the two continents substantial economic and political agreements were concluded.

Driven by “*a new generation*” of Pan-Africanists and the idea of an “*African Renaissance*” articulated by Thabo Mbeki in 1999 (by the time new president of South Africa) the African Union came into existence in July 2002 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014:26). Fifty-three African countries agreed to create a number of new institutions and to widen areas of competencies of these. The major institutions are the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council of Ministers, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Besides economic integration in the form of a free trade area the AU and its institutions are also working on issues like peace and security, development and human rights (Furtak, 2015:2

The last Lomé Convention between the ACP states and the EU had undergone some trouble during its last years. The USA had petitioned the WTO to investigate if this convention was violating the rules of the organizations. The WTO guidelines ruled in favor of the USA stating that the EU-ACP agreements were not compatible with the principles of reciprocity and most-

favoured-nation and therefore had to be changed (Alusa & Omeje, 2014:320). With the Cotonou Agreement which was signed in 2000 and came into force in 2003 the ACP states and the EU reacted to this WTO ruling. Beside changes regarding the adaptation to WTO ruling, the Cotonou Agreement was designed to cover a period of 20 years and to strengthen the political dimensions in the Lomé Conventions even more. Henceforth, conditionality in political and economic terms was expanded to include good governance, transparency and regular control of development projects (Fröhlich, 2014:68-69).

In 2007 the relationship between Europe and Africa reached higher levels with the *Africa-EU Strategic Partnership*. This *Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)* was concluded between the EU and the AU and therefore includes the whole African continent except Morocco. The JAES lays out four main objectives which are: to reinforce the political partnership (1), to promote peace, security, democracy, human rights, gender equality as well as sustainable economic growth (2), to promote multilateralism and to reform the UN system (3) and to promote and incorporate non-state actors and civil society (4). A central tool for the implementation of the strategy are regular AU-EU summits as well as concrete Action Plans, the last of which is the *Roadmap 2014-2017*. This paper will examine the Strategy and the Roadmap in close detail in the following chapters.

In the first decade of the new millennium two other legal documents became relevant for the EU's approach to development: a decision by the European Commission in 2005 and the Lisbon Treaty which came into force in 2009. The decision set an individual target for ODA provided by EU countries on 0.56 % of GNI until 2010 and on the UN target of 0.7 % of GNI until 2015 (Fröhlich, 2014:64). With 0.44 % in 2010 (Eurostat, n.d.) and 0.47 % in 2015 (European Commission, 2016a) both targets were missed. Even though the EU was the biggest donor of development aid and exceeded the aggregated 0.21 % of GNI of DAC countries in 2015 by far. The Lisbon Treaty in 2009 brought some significant changes for the EU's foreign policy including development cooperation. Under Article 21 TEU and Articles 208-211 TFEU guiding principles such as human rights, rule of law and eradication of poverty were written down as well as the continuing commitment to sustainable economic development and further integration of the world economy (EU, 2007). Moreover, possible policy implementation tools like multilateral cooperation programmes are mentioned. Furthermore, with the Lisbon Treaty the last form of special treatment for development countries – in this case the Landlocked Development Countries (LLDC) of the ACP states – was abandoned (Fröhlich, 2014:69).

f) From 2015 – Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

With the year 2015 the MDGs have officially come to an end and were succeeded by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). To say the least, the (scientific) evaluation of the ambivalent. Even though overall a significant number of goals were met (UN, 2015), in the least developed regions e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa little or no progress was made. Furthermore, globally extreme poverty decreased within the time of the MDGs but some argue that it was mainly the economic success of countries like China, India and Brazil and not international goals on development which led to this reduction (e.g. Sandbu, 2015). Indubitably the MDGs have been able to focus resources on important development areas and increase awareness for global development issues overall. A comprehensive comparison of the MDGs' weaknesses and strengths was compiled by the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 Development Agenda in their *Review of the contributions of the MDG Agenda to foster development: Lessons for the post-2015 UN development agenda* (2012). This Task Force was an essential part of a process which was launched in 2010 and which ultimately produced the SDGs in 2015. Since then many have concluded comparisons between these two sets of goals (e.g. Fukuda-Parr 2016; Tiwari, 2015). The most obvious difference between these two are the number of goals.

The MDGs consisted of eight goals and 18 specific targets whereas the SDGs are composed of 17 goals and 169 targets. Most importantly, is the distinction in regards to the overall approach. Whereas the MDGs served as a Development Aid Agenda which was designed to help "poor" development countries the SDGs have the potential to be a Development Agenda which is relevant for all countries (Fukuda-Parr, 2016:). As mentioned above the SDGs were the outcome of a yearlong process where a large number of stakeholders and actors from economic, civil and political fields were involved whereas the MDGs were designed by a small number of technocrats within the UN General Secretaries Office. The MDGs therefore ignored the progress made during the 1990s where different Conferences tried to overcome the mistakes of the past: e.g. the Beijing Conference on Women's rights in 1995 or the World Food Summit in 1996. Hence the MDGs failed to be the big leap forward in regards to development priorities and overall paradigm.

Compared to the MDGs, the agenda of the SDGs is broader [...] and potentially more transformative. (Fukuda-Parr, 2016:47)

Due to the larger number of goals the SDGs include a wider range of priorities like *sustainable and inclusive growth* (Goal 8), *inequality* (Goal 10), *governance* (Goal 16), or *means of implementation* (Goal 17). On the one hand the large number of goals and targets might be the biggest

potential for the SDGs however it could also be their biggest risk. The MDGs were simple and measurable whereas the SDGs are called *sprawling and implausible* by its critics (Kenny, 2015). Only time will tell if the SDGs will live up to its expectations and or fulfil the

g) Closing remarks

70 years ago, in the aftermath of WW II nations came together and agreed on working together and making the world a better place. Under Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations the following words can be found:

Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. (UN, 1945)

To this day all of these topics are relevant even though overall progress has been made (e.g. in regards to extreme poverty). During the first decades after WW II, the international system was characterized by the emerging Cold War between East and West. Thus, development aid or development cooperation was mainly a tool of foreign affairs to widen the sphere of influence. With the 70s the recently gained influence of regions like South America and newly independent countries in Africa and South East Asia was reversed by global, economic crises. During the 80s the shift towards the neoclassical economic paradigm defined the following wave of globalization and the development relations between North and South. With the 90s *Washington Consensus* brought political liberalism and aid conditionality and as a counterweight the *human development* approach emerged which tried to shift the focus of development to the capacity for humans to live a happy, fulfilled life rather than purely on economic growth. At the beginning of the millennium, the MDGs kicked started a wave of international awareness and ambition to improve millions of lives around the globe. With start of the SDGs in 2015, hopes are high for an even more universal approach to development and international cooperation to enable human kind in general and each individual specifically to sustainably unfold on this planet.

Even though the international system today is still largely characterized by neoliberal economic globalization, the will of regions and states to cooperate in more areas than in economic fields is strong. This can also be seen in the relations between Europe and Africa. After WW II with the advancing decolonization of Africa, European countries tried to bind the newly independent

states closely to Europe mainly with economic measures. The European Economic Community mainly focused on cooperation with ACP states which were broadened in the 70s when the UK became an EEC member as well. From the 60s onwards this cooperation materialized in the Yaoundé Conventions and in following decades in the overall four Lomé Conventions. During the 90s alongside the neoliberal shift on an international level, the fourth Lomé Convention also included a political dimension which was carried on by the Contonou Agreement. With the founding of the African Union in 2002 the European Union became an African Counterpart which set the stage for a more comprehensive form of cooperation. The *Africa-EU Strategic Partnership* from 2007 with its recent *Roadmap 2014-2017* are the latest outcomes of this cooperation and point towards a partnership which covers more areas than ever before. The main innovation of the Partnership is the emphasized equality between the two unions. Throughout the previous decades and regardless of the various shifts, the paradigm guiding the development cooperation between Africa and Europe has always been characterized by having a donor and beneficiary relationship. Another major innovation which JAES meant for the EU-Africa relations is worth noting here. One of the four strategic objectives (see above) is to comprehensively incorporate non-state actors and civil society. This participatory approach was already reflected during the process that instigated the development of the strategy (Sherriff & Kotsopoulos, 2014:308-309). The intensified incorporation of civil society can also be seen in a wider global context in the same period. Overall, the influence of non-state actors within the field of global development cooperation has gradually increased since the start of the new millennium and has reached its preliminary peak with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals.

3. Development as Freedom

“Individuals live and operate in a world of institutions. Our opportunities and prospects depend crucially on what institutions exist and how they function. [...] their roles can be sensibly evaluated in the light of their contributions to our freedom. To see development as freedom provides a perspective in which institutional assessment can systematically occur.” (Sen, 1999:142)

The European Union consists of 28 member states and the African Union covers the whole African continent with 54 countries. Together these two organizations have impact on the lives of more than 1.5 billion people. In 2007 they announced a *Strategic Partnership* which is called the *Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)*. Combined with the current *Roadmap 2014-2017* the AU and EU have concluded ambitious priorities and targets for a new level of development cooperation (see Chapter 5). Will these goals potentially lead to an improvement of the many human lives affected? This question is central to this paper and to answer it the capability approach mainly developed by Amartya Sen will be used. This chapter will therefore take a close look at his book *Development as Freedom* (1999) where he describes his ideas and the analytical framework behind it.

a) Philosophical concept

Sen's analysis of what determines a life as good starts with Aristotle and continues with the concepts of Adam Smith, Utilitarianism and John Rawls. His process of thought leads him to the conclusion that development is the eradication of unfreedoms and therefore the extension of freedoms:

“Development can be seen [...] as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.” (Sen, 1999:3-4)

In Sen's definition of development other (older) definitions such as growth of income, industrialization and technological advance are merely means of expanding the freedom of people (Sen, 1999:3-4). Sen gives two specific motivations for focusing on freedom as central aspect to development (Sen, 1999:4):

1. *“Evaluative reason: assessment of progress has to be done primarily in terms of whether the freedoms that people have are enhanced;*
2. *“Effectiveness reason: achievement of development is thoroughly dependent on the free agency of people.”*

The first motivation is closely connected to the longstanding, predominant focus on economic growth as a main indicator. Even though Sen acknowledges the importance of markets (Sen, 1999:6-7) for Sen development *must go beyond* economic growth and the accumulation of physical and human capital (Sen, 1999:33). Sen cites Aristotle in support of this argument:

"[W]ealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else." (Sen, 1999:14)

Sen's philosophy is rooted in Aristotle's notion of *function*, which is considered as *various things a person may value doing or being* (Sen,1997:75). Moreover, the notion of function relates to Sen's second reason of effectiveness. A combination of functions thus reflects a person's actual achievements, which can only materialize within the pool of possibilities the person enjoys. The possibilities or – as Sen calls it – the capability sets or freedoms are linked to the functioning of the free agency of people which, reflects the will or choice of a person (Sen, 1999:75).

As noted before the main goal of development for Sen is the expansion of these freedoms. To grasp and evaluate this process Sen structures freedoms in five categories (Sen, 1999:10):

- Political freedoms
- Economic facilities
- Social opportunities
- Transparency guarantees
- Protective security

Political freedom is basically the ability of citizens to choose who governs them and on which principles (Sen, 1999: 38). Economic facilities are the prospects for citizens to use economic resources. Social opportunities refer to the provisions of public services for a good and healthy life. (Sen, 2000: 39). Transparency guarantees describe the trust within a society among the people. (Sen, 2000: 40). Lastly, protective security is the basic prevention of people from misery and death. These groupings are interconnected; thus they reinforce each other in various ways. Hence, development is comprised of a sustainable combination of them. Freedoms are not only the ends of development but can also be the means of it. Sen describes a possible, reinforcing connection as follows:

Political freedoms (in the form of free speech and election) help to promote economic security. Social opportunities (in the form of education and health facilities) facilitate economic participation. Economic facilities (in the form of opportunities for participation in trade and production) can help to generate personal abundance as well as public resources for social facilities. (Sen, 1999:11)

b) Impact

“The world's poor and dispossessed could have no more articulate or insightful a champion among economists than Amartya Sen. By showing that the quality of our lives should be measured not by our wealth but by our freedom, his writings have revolutionized the theory and practice of development.” (Kofi Annan, 1999)¹

As noted in the previous chapter, Sen's focus on capabilities and freedoms has inspired the development of the human development approach in the 90s which led to periodically published Human Development Reports and various new indices like the Human Development Index (HDI) or the Human Poverty Index (HPI). This practical materialization was accompanied by the progressive advancement of the capability approach by Sen and others. Combined this had and continues to have a major influence on policy making for more than two decades. Sen's biggest contribution to that shift was probably to show that growth in GNP per capita should not be equated with growth in living standards and the following dethroning of this afore universally used indicator.

c) Analytical framework

As noted before following Sen's theorem expanding freedoms or reducing unfreedoms should be the overarching objective of development. Sen himself gives various examples for freedoms and unfreedoms in his work as summarized in the following figure 5:

Figure 5: Categories of freedoms within the capability approach

1) Political Freedoms Opportunities to choose who should govern and on what principles	a) Democracy (political dialogue, voting rights, participatory selection of legislators and executives, ...) b) Civil rights c) Possibility to scrutinize and criticize authorities d) Freedom of political expression and uncensored press e) Freedom of political affiliation
2) Economic facilities Opportunities to utilize economic resources	a) Conditions of exchange (relative prices, working of the markets) b) Wealth c) Distribution d) Availability of finance (credits, microcredits, ...)
3) Social opportunities Preconditions for a good life	a) Education b) Health c) Availability of land

¹ As noted on the blurb of Development as Freedom (Sen, 1999)

4) Transparency guarantees Trust within a society	a) Principles of disclosure and lucidity b) Preventing corruption c) Accountability
5) Protective security Preventing people from misery and death	a) Social safety net b) Unemployment benefits c) Statutory income supplements d) Famine relief e) Emergency public employment

Source: Sen, 1999

According to Sen there should be no precise criterion or ranking of these freedoms. For the sake of valuation of freedoms each society needs to decide on its own. Therefore, participation is necessary and political freedoms of this kind are the foundation (Sen, 1999:33-34). That is the first reason as to why Sen views political freedoms as central and/or instrumental. The two other reasons are the constructive role and the direct importance (Sen, 1999:148). The constructive role describes the importance of public dialogue for the conceptualization and understanding of needs (also economic ones) of people. The direct importance refers to the intrinsic relevance of democratic participation and political rights (Sen, 1999:154). As Aristotle stated, humans are *political animals* because they are *by nature* equipped with speech *which enables them to communicate moral concepts such as justice* (Miller, 2011). Aside from freedoms, Sen also mentions various examples of unfreedoms such as economic poverty, lack of public facilities and social care or the absence of peace and security (Sen, 1999:4).

As noted, the five described areas of freedoms are highly interlinked and often reinforce each other. For the effective management and guidance of such a reinforcing interaction of freedoms, for the purpose of development institutions are critical:

"Corresponding to multiple interconnected freedoms, there is a need to develop and support a plurality of institutions, including democratic systems, legal mechanisms, market structures, educational and health provisions, media and other communication facilities and so on."

(Sen, 1999:53)

Institutions of all kinds have a major impact on the lives and freedoms of people. Therefore, the capability approach can provide guidance in analyzing and adjusting the impact of institutions. In this paper the focus is on two transnational institutions, namely the EU and AU and especially on their common policies. Hence a capability or human development orientated policy analysis is a fruitful approach.

"A human development approach to policy analysis is based on the notion that all areas of public policy promote human freedom and flourishing, and that the policy process itself should respect people's agency." (Spence & Deneulin, 2009:275)

All stages – evaluation, information and advocacy (Hill, 2005:5) – of such a policy analysis are conducted around two overarching questions: Are the chosen policies promoting the citizenries' freedoms and do they respect people's agency and ability to participate (Spence & Deneulin, 2009:295). Were people (especially people with little freedoms) able to contribute in the making of the chosen policies? Was data of human development taken into account in the making of the policies? Are the policies implemented in a way that people's freedoms are expanded? All these questions and more, are derivatives of this paper's two central questions. Thus, they play a crucial role in evaluating policies from a human development point of view.

d) Closing remarks

This work is based on the capability approach designed mainly by Amartya Sen. To evaluate the chosen common policies of AU and EU a policy analysis is conducted in the upcoming chapters. As described above political freedoms play a special role for development, therefore the analysis will pay special attention to this category.

“From a human development perspective, the major purpose of policy analysis is to bring policy change so that people's freedoms are expanded, and not reduced.” (Spence & Deneulin, 2009:295)

The capability and human development approach are highly normative ones. If used in a policy analysis the prioritized aim must hence be to change measures which are reducing freedoms or are restraining their unfolding. Therefore, after analyzing the strength and weaknesses of the relevant sources this paper will list the unconsidered possible solutions.

4. Current development strategies of AU and EU

Even though the African and the European Union share a common name, the structure and the level of integration differs widely. Due to the fact that European states have transferred competencies to the EU these member states also have to accept legislation produce on a supranational level.

“[...] one could conclude that the degree of integration within the EU is high, because the member states transferred many competences to the common EU institutions. The AU takes the EU as an example and tries to establish similar structures, but it does not reach this degree of integration [...].” (Furtak, 2015:1)

This also goes for the area of development cooperation where the EU – more specifically the Council of the EU and the European Parliament after a draft by the European Commission – can legally pass binding legislation. Moreover, the EU can conclude conventions or agreements with countries and other international organisations. Furthermore, non-binding commitments in the field of development cooperation done by an EU member on an international level are legally binding on a union level (Bieber, Epiney & Haag, 2012:647). Aside from the Commission, the Parliament and Council, a major EU institution is the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which can also sanction member states if they fail to implement concluded legislation.

As noted by Furtak (2015) the AU's level of integration is less than the one of the EU even though the AU is more integrated than other regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Organization of American States (OAS) (Furtak, 2015:4). A main reason for the lower level of integration is the fact that the AU institutions are not able to pass legally binding legislation, even though in some cases such as with crimes against humanity interventions it is possible. The AU consists of nine main institutions of which the Assembly of Heads of States is the central one due to its executive and legislative powers. The Pan-African Parliament has in comparison to the European Parliament only advisory functions and is not yet elected directly (Furtak 2015:2). As noted before, the member states of the AU have not transferred competencies yet, therefore the organizations main function is to coordinate and harmonize policies between its members. The same goes for the area of development cooperation as Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) notes:

“The objectives of the Union shall be to [...] promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples [...].”

The following parts of this chapter seek to analyse the main policies which the AU and EU have in place regarding development and development cooperation.

a) Policies of the AU

With the **2063 Agenda** the AU has designed an ambitious long term vision for the development of the African continent for the next 50 to come. The process of its creation was characterized by a bottom-up approach which was centred around the consultation of African citizens (AU, n.d.). The agenda is strongly entrenched in Pan Africanism, its seeks to address past injustice and unite in order to bring the African Renaissance (see chapter 2) into fruition. The Agenda entails the cultivation of transformative governance that can fulfil the objectives of the plan and protect African interest (AUC, 2015:1). The vision for the agenda is the pursuit of a free, united and integrated continent, in which all citizens may reach their full potential without terror, disease and poverty. It outlines seven aspirations for Africa that are to be attained by 2063:

1. A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development
2. An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance
3. An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law
4. A peaceful and secure Africa
5. An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics
6. An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children
7. Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner

Within the first aspiration the agenda seeks to eradicate poverty by transforming the social and economic landscape of Africa. It aims to allow Africa to have the resources and capability to manage its own development which is people centred (AUC, 2015:3). The agenda notes that human capital is Africa's most valuable resource which needs to be developed completely. It aspires to allow all Africans a high quality of life and standard of living, in which education, health and well-being are accessible to all. It emphasizes that education is a vital means to developing human capital. It envisions an Africa with modernized infrastructure and affordable housing with basic services to all (AUC, 2015:3). It will also be active in global climate change mitigation and focus its efforts on sustainable development.

The second aspiration of the agenda outlines the vision of a united Africa, which is self-sufficient, independent and peaceful. This entails appropriate infrastructure for economic and polit-

ical integration as well as mobility. By 2030, the form of continental government and institutions shall have been agreed upon (AUC,2015:4-5). It hopes to have all African territories under occupation to be emancipated by 2020 and that the barriers of discrimination of all kinds shall be ended.

Under the third aspiration the agenda seeks to entrench good governance, democratic values, justice, the rule of law and human rights into the continent. By which capable institutions are in place at the local, national and continental levels. Corruption is to be eradicated by 2063; the African citizenry is yearned to be active in all spheres of governance and governments are to be transparent and accountable (AUC, 2015:5-6).

With the fourth goal the agenda envisages that Africa will be peaceful and secure, in which it is a continent free from armed conflict, extremism, drugs, human trafficking, illegal arms trade and piracy. Peace shall be natured through the peace education of children. Moreover, it seeks to have the capability and instruments to protect and endorse its collective interest through collective external and security policies (AUC, 2015:6-7).

The fifth aspiration lines out the vision of fully entrenched Pan-Africanism by 2063. It plans to do so by implanting Pan-African ideals in school curricula and augmenting Pan-Africanist cultural assets. Moreover, it seeks to use African languages as a base for administration and integration. Artefacts, heritage and culture which has been claimed elsewhere is expected to be retrieved and secured (AUC, 2015:7). Lastly, it notes the importance of religion and spiritual beliefs in constructing African identities and interaction, however, it will continue to condemn politicization of religion and religious extremism (AUC, 2015:8).

By 2063 – the sixth aim describes that – African citizens are expected to have increased freedom of political affiliation and will be active decision makers in all regards of development. In other words, Africa will be more people centred (AUC, 2015:8). Moreover, it will be inclusive without any discrimination based on affiliation, gender, religion or ethnicity. It seeks to empower women and end all forms of gender based violence. Furthermore, the youth will also be empowered and unemployment will be eliminated and access to education among other freedoms will be guaranteed (AUC, 2015:9).

With the seventh and last aspiration Africa aims to be active and equal on the international platform and a catalyst for sustainability and peace. Additionally, it seeks to be a chief force in the global social, political and economic landscapes. Most importantly, it foresees itself as fully capable of driving its own development. It will continue to support reform of the UN and other international institutions, namely the Security Council in which Africa is not represented by a permanent seat (AUC, 2015:10).

These aspirations of the African people have been noted by the Heads of State and Government in January 2015 in Addis Ababa and has been adopted the agenda as the 50-year vision and roadmap for Africa.

In 2012 a more focused document was adopted by the AU, namely the second ***African Union Commission Strategic plan*** which runs from 2014-2017. Some lessons had been learnt from the old strategy, both good and bad. In a review process it was found that the 2012 plan was overall worthy retort to the Unions vision. It was considerably pertinent, in its entirety it encompassed all the priority areas under the Constitutive Act and there were great leaps of implementation of the various programs. However, some problem areas were also identified in the review namely that it was too ambitious, the plan had inadequate prioritization, implementation lacked definitive details and vague or impractical strategies. In light of the strengths and weaknesses the 2014-2017 strategy was created. The Commission decided to focus on eight key areas with tangible objectives with an annual review. These areas are considered to have direct impact on the lives, wellbeing and incomes of all Africans.

The plan recognizes the importance of human capacity building, therefore it stresses the need to prioritize the delivery of basic services such as health care, education, clean water and sanitation as well as the necessity of investing in research, innovation and skills development (AU Commission, 2014). The second area focuses on the expansion of agricultural production which includes increasing market entrée and the actualization of food self-reliance through improved natural resource management and the promotion of smaller farms. In order to pursue inclusive economic development, it accentuates the need to accelerate infrastructural development projects that would catalyze regional economic integration (AUC, 2014). Moreover, peace, stability and good governance is viewed as a vital building block for greater inclusivity, safety and the advancement of the African people as well as the continent. The Union, reiterates the prominence of all African people in the process of development as well as being the main benefactors of development. Hence, it aims to advance itself as a people centered Union by actively communicating the programmes of the AU to the broader public and allowing other stakeholders to participate in defining and implementing the Africa agenda (AUC, 2014). It also identifies the significance of solidifying the capacity of the AUC, RECs as well as other organs in order to allow more effective implementation of the framework. Target six of the framework is of substantial meaning to the external relations of the Union with regards to development, as it focuses on additional or alternative funding to finance African programmes and development (AUC, 2014).

Many major development efforts are promoted and implemented by the *New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)* as well, which was founded in 2001. However, the African Union only officially endorsed NEPAD as a programme of the AU in 2002. NEPAD's main purpose was to generate prospects for a people centered development paradigm which inter alia would entail more government culpability and the formation of additional choices to allow citizens more ways to attain their personal development (Karbo, 2014:62). It plans on refining the entire administrative, monetary and societal scene of Africa with a sustentative and promotional approach to human development. In its main objectives, NEPAD has highlighted good governance, partnership, regional integration and African ownership of its own development (Karbo, 2014:63). NEPAD has acknowledged the interrelation between governance, peace and security, economic growth and international cooperation with regards to development, if either is lacking it would undermine the development pursuits of Africa.

In its current workings NEPAD has launched four investment programmes in 2016 to address the emerging trends in Africa with regards to development. The programmes are (NEPAD, 2016):

- Human Capital Development (Skills, Youth, Employment and Women Empowerment)
- Industrialization, Science, Technology and Innovation
- Regional Integration, Infrastructure (Energy, Water, Transport) and Trade
- Natural Resources Governance and Food Security.

The first programme attempts to address the economic and social exclusion of youth in Africa. Inclusive in this programme is capacity development as well as education and training (NEPAD, 2016). The second programme accounts for the needed capability improvement in areas of science, entrepreneurship, technology and innovation. A vital element of the second programme is the Industrial Development Index. The third programme deals with regional and national policies on infrastructure, trade and market development with the hopes of harmonizing these policies to promote intra-regional trade (NEPAD, 2016). Lastly, the Natural Resources Governance and Food Security programme centers on promoting sustainable mining, the blue economy and reinforcing agriculture and nutritional security, a crucial focal point of the programme is climate change extenuation and adaptation plans (NEPAD, 2016).

African states restate their pledge to operate in a manner which is transparent and accountable to its citizens. Therefore, the current focus of the *NEPAD Strategic plan 2014-2017* is on the enablement and execution of priority projects and programmes in Africa, this includes seeking resources and new partners to support the enactment of these projects and to monitor progress as well as establish and organize research and information administration (NEPAD, 2014:1). The 2014-2017 plan covers a vast variety of areas, the main issues brought to note are:

- Employment issues necessitates concentration on training and enabling access to assets (NEPAD, 2014:22).
- Inequality concerns likewise requires change in access to resources and the circumstances of dispersal of revenues (NEPAD, 2014:22).
- Institutions spur transformation in the relationship between patrons by creating systems and processes that assure equitable redistribution guidelines, access to resources and the delivery of collective goods (NEPAD, 2014:22).
- Following number three, good governance of natural resources is required to ensure greater equality and employment opportunities, which requires greater institutional capacity to enforce rules (NEPAD, 2014:23).

The strategic plan is highly concerned with institutional capacity. Thus its four main bearings deal with creating new institutional arrangements and promoting collective rules which seeks to target issues of inequality, unemployment, sustainable development and integration into the global platform. It seeks to build more capable institutions of NEPAD with the capacity to monitor and evaluate Africa's priority programmes and projects (NEPAD, 2014:24). Moreover, it seeks to increase domestic resources, evolving African innovation and information and refining the in-house configuration of NEPAD as to allow the Agency to be effective and have full ownership over its own policy.

b) Policies of the EU

As noted in chapter 2 the ***Lisbon Treaty*** in 2009 set the guiding principles for the EUs external actions under Article 21 TEU which, also applies to development policies. These policies include: human rights, rule of law and eradication of poverty as well as the continuing commitment to sustainable economic development and further integration of the world economy. Furthermore, under Article 208 TFEU the overarching aim of development cooperation is described as the reduction and eradication of poverty.

One key document for political guidance is the strategy ***Europe 2020*** published by the European Commission (EC) in 2010. With this strategy the Commission responded to the difficult economic situation in the European Union, caused by the global financial and economic crisis during the previous years (Faure & Le Grand, 2014:1). This strategy outlines three major priorities which focused mainly on economic recovery: smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. This overall economic focus also materializes in the chapter regarding the EUs external policy (EC, 2010:21). The strategy describes a need for the European Union to use global growth and emerging economies to boost its own growth and reduce domestic unemployment. Therefore, the EU plans on ...

[...] shaping the future global economic order through the G20, and pursuing the European interest through the active deployment of all the tools at our disposal. (EC, 2010:21)

The strategy also mentions *tools* such as *high -level strategic dialogues* to discuss issues such as market access, regulatory framework, access to raw materials, global poverty and development. Furthermore, the *Europe 2020* strategy outlines its commitment to the MDGs and describes its relationship with Africa as *particularly close* (EC, 2010:22).

The ***European Consensus on Development*** adopted in 2006 by all major institutions – EP, Council and Commission – outlines a strategy more specific than the broad documents described above. In the introduction the document outlines the importance of sustainable development, eradication of poverty and describes *development policy* as *the heart of the EU's relations with all developing countries* (European Parliament, Council & Commission, 2006:1). The rest of the *Consensus* is separated into two parts, the first part describes the EU's vision on development and the second focuses on implementation and various policies and instruments. In the first part the document mentions aside from its commitment to the MDGs and the eradication of poverty also a definition of poverty:

The core dimensions of poverty include economic, human, political, socio-cultural and protective capabilities. [...] Therefore, combating poverty will only be successful if equal importance is given to investing in people (first and foremost in health and education [...]) the protection of natural resources [...] and investing in wealth creation [...]. (European Parliament, Council & Commission, 2006:3)

This definition is closely related to the human development approach and the human development index with its three dimensions' health, education and wealth. The *Consensus* even mentions the five fields of freedom and capabilities which Sen uses in his book *Development as Freedom* (1999; see chapter 3). Another area outlined in the document is the question of *ownership*. The EU institutions set out a strong commitment to development cooperation which is led by the beneficiary country itself with involvement of democratic bodies and civil society (European Parliament, Council & Commission, 2006:3-4). As noted in chapter 2 with this strategy the EU also set itself a target of 0,7 % agglomerated ODA by 2015 which it failed to achieve (European Commission, 2016). In the second part of the paper trade is one of the outlined fields of policies:

“The EU will maintain its work for properly sequenced market opening, especially on products of export interest for developing countries, underpinned by an open, fair, equitable,

rules-based multilateral trading system that takes into account the interests and concerns of the weaker nations. (European Parliament, Council & Commission, 2006:7)”

Moreover, the document describes the possible *approximation* of economic rules of development countries towards the EU single market regulations as *beneficial* (European Parliament, Council & Commission, 2006:12). In economic terms the EU also places emphasis on cooperation with the Bretton Woods Institutions with regards to economic and institutional reforms as well as effective public finance management to reduce corruption (European Parliament, Council & Commission, 2006:12). In addition to trade, the strategy mentions eight other *areas for community action* namely, good governance, human rights, rural development, capacity building, conflict prevention and environment (European Parliament, Council & Commission, 2006:11-15).

One of the more recent policy documents which outlines the EU's strategy on development is a *Council Conclusion* from 2015 about a ***New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015***. As the title suggests, it is about the Sustainable Development Goals and the Post-2015 Agenda. Hence, the overarching aim in the document is to *achieve sustainable development* in its economic, social and environmental dimension, to *eradicate poverty* as well as to *forge a new global partnership* for development (Council of the European Union, 2015:1-3).

To build this Global Partnership this strategic paper mentions eight specific means of implementation:

(i) establishing an enabling and conducive policy environment at all levels; (ii) developing capacity to deliver; (iii) mobilising and making effective use of domestic public finance; (iv) mobilising and making effective use of international public finance; (v) mobilising the domestic and international private sector; (vi) stimulating trade and investments; (vii) fostering science, technology and innovation; and (viii) addressing the challenges and harnessing the positive effects of migration. (Council of the EU, 2015:5)

The first measure includes a wide range of policies which are the foundation for a political environment to foster sustainable development. These policies include: effective institutions, transparency, rule of law, human rights, empowerment of women, accountability, good governance on all levels, access to justice, tackling corruption as well as labour rights and social dialogue (Council of the EU, 2015:5-6). Furthermore, it mentions the earlier noted *Europe 2020* strategy as an example for success on this level of implementary measures and the importance

of enabling effective participation of civil society which is also the vocal point of the second priority area (Council of the EU:9).

The means under points three to five, deal with financing for development from different sources. Thus, it mentions good governance, financial transparency and fighting tax havens as measures that enable domestic public financing (Council of the EU, 2015:10). Moreover, it states that stable financial systems is a precondition for mobilisation of the private sector to invest in development:

“Private sector-led economic growth is the principle creator of jobs and as such contributes to poverty reduction.” (Council of the EU, 2015:15)

Moreover, the importance of ODA and the EUs global contributions – which is providing most of it – is underlined (Council of the EU, 2015:11-12).

The sixth area deals with global trade and outlines the importance of it with regards to fostering growth and subsequently, support sustainable development. As one measure the Aid for Trade Initiative by the WTO is listed, which essentially refers to an international measure to decrease trade related constraints (WTO, 2016). In this section the document also reiterates the relevance of good governance and free market access:

“All developed countries and emerging economies should grant duty-free and quota-free access to their markets.” (Council of the EU, 2015:18)

The last two priority areas underline the significant role of science, technology and innovation as well as the potential which lies in well-managed migration (Council of the EU, 2015:19-20).

c) Closing remarks

The EUs current development policies show a clear focus on economic integration on regional levels and the international economic system as well as a continuous materialization of aspects of the human development approach. The first focus can be found in all key documents, although some emphasize economic globalization more than others. *The Lisbon* treaty as the core legal framework for the work of the EU already mentioned the *further integration of world economy* as well as the *European Consensus on Development* which claims it's important for developing countries to open their markets and to adapt their regulatory systems to that of the EU. Additionally, the more recent policy documents take a stance on economic measures. As noted above, the *Europe 2020* strategy in its section about external policy focuses mainly on the economic strength of the EU and also the Post-2015 vision of the EU mentions market liberalization of development countries and the WTO - Aid for Trade initiative.

The second aspect which can be found in all described EU strategic policy papers is a certain commitment to human development and the expansion of people's freedoms. The definition for poverty described by the 2006 *European Consensus on Development* is built around capabilities and therefore reflects the whole idea of Sen outlined in chapter 3. Furthermore, the *New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015* places a strong emphasis on different areas of freedoms describes by Sen, especially on political ones. It even acknowledges the foundational importance of such freedoms such as inclusive and accountable institutions as well as the broad participation of civil society.

The AUs development strategies are in this regard similar and even exceed the EUs ones. The making of the *Agenda 2063* indicates a fundamental commitment towards participation and political freedoms and so do the contents. Four of the seven aspirations take strong stances on the expansion of people's freedoms and the sixth one is especially noteworthy due to its focus on political participation on all levels. The same dedication for human development can be found in the *African Union Commission Strategic plan 2014-2017* and in the work of NEPAD. Another clear focus which can be found in all three analysed documents of the AU is a strong commitment to Pan-Africanism, not only in terms of economic integration but also in the sense of a shared identity.

The overall focus on human development and the expansion of freedoms of people seems be going into the right direction at the first glance. However, it seems to be inconsistent on the side of the EU especially due to the focus of its external actions outlined in the *Europe 2020* strategy. As noted the EU seeks to strengthen its own economy with *all (external) tools available* to it (EC, 2010:21). This approach – if successful – would surely expand the freedoms of people living in the EU but not necessarily the ones living in targeted developing countries. The same goes for its efforts to further approximate economies of developing countries to the EUs single market. This would surely increase the EUs ability to trade and therefore strengthen the European economies but not the affected development countries. As an example the first two Lomé conventions in respect to Eastern African states can be adduced. After 20 years of preferential access to the European market these economies had not achieved any considerable improvements in development and were still recording high trade deficits (Alusa & Omeje, 2014:319). Despite all that criticism, the strong commitment of both organisations to many elements of human development is an intense common denominator. Even though the EU focuses on its own economic recovery and the AU wants to further push Pan-Africanism, human development can open a chance for sustainable cooperation on an equal footing.

5. The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership in the light of human freedoms and capabilities

As seen in the last chapter the AU and EU have different priorities when it comes to their development policies. The AU focuses on integrating the African continent and catching up to the rest of the world with regards to economic prosperity and the EUs strategy has a strong emphasis on economic recovery and in this sense economic liberalization in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This chapter seeks to analyse the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) and the current Roadmap 2014-2017 in this context. Due to the foundational importance of political freedoms (see chapter 3), this chapter will place special focus on this field within Sens capability approach. It will further analyse the economic areas of the policies proposed because the capability approach is rooted in the criticism of the sole economic focus on growth as the end of development.

a) Making of the Partnership

The starting point of the making of JAES was in the year 2000, when the Cairo Summit was held, which 40 heads of state of European (EU) and African States (OAU) attended. In light of the end of the Lomé Convention and the newly concluded Cotonou Agreement (see chapter 2), the OAU pushed for debt relief and technological assistance whereas, the EU tried to advocate political dialogue, good governance and democracy (Sherriff & Kotsopoulos, 2014:306). The outcome of the summit was the Cairo Declaration, a joint document addressing security, debt, trade, development and political issues. In the following years, the OAU was replaced by the AU and NEPAD was launched (see chapters 2 & 4). Internationally, Africa was gradually seen as a more important actor. This development led, among other things, to a shift in the European view on Africa.

“[...] from one based on an image of Africa as a charity case to one of Africa as an opportunity.” (Sherriff & Kotsopoulos, 2014:306)

During the first years of the new Millennium, other geopolitical players became increasingly important partners for Africa as well. Among these were Russia, India and foremost China which had started to invest massively on African ground. In this geopolitical context, the EU and the AU agreed on lifting their relationship to a new level and started negotiating a new strategic partnership. In the negotiation process not only were the EU, AU Commission and the Member States involved but also the European and the Pan-African Parliament as well as civil society and NGOs from both continents (Sherriff & Kotsopoulos, 2014:308).

This inclusive approach used within the negotiation process is also reflected in the document itself, which gives various interest groups the continuous opportunity to participate in the partnership:

“Ongoing dialogue with civil society, the private sector and local stakeholders on issues covered by this Joint Strategy will be a key component to ensure its implementation.” (AU & EU, 2007:3)

With regards to political freedoms described by Sen this is a fruitful approach.

b) The Framework

The adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy is major change in the relationship between Africa and Europe. For many decades (as outlined in chapter 2) the majority of African countries were seen as dependent on help and development aid by the West. With the JAES, Africa is not only as treated as one actor but also as an equal partner as described on the homepage of the Africa-EU Partnership:

“[...] both sides are determined to overcome the traditional donor-recipient relationship, and to develop a shared long-term vision for EU-Africa relations in a globalised world, where they have many common interests on issues such as climate change, global security and the post-2015 development agenda.” (Africa-EU Partnership, n.d.)

The document itself formulates four strategic priorities with various specified objectives as shown in Figure 6 (AU & EU, 2007). With regards to the political freedoms and the economic facilities especially the priorities b) and c) are worth analyzing as well as the first and second field of priority d).

Under chapter b) the strategy describes a broad approach of promoting democratic governance, human rights, rule of law as well as building democratic capacities through institutionalized cooperation between AU and EU (AU & EU, 2007:7-8). All of these measures fall under Sen’s category of political freedoms and are therefore at the foundational level of development. For the successful implementation, the involvement of civil society is often mentioned which is another essential element of broad participation and consequently, political freedoms.

Priority c) describes various measures for strengthening the overall African economic performance. These measures range from improving the economic governance and a business friendly environment, promoting macroeconomic stability and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as well as reducing barriers to trade (AU & EU, 2007:9-11). Many of these processes are in line with a capability orientated approach, such as the efforts to implement a fairer global

trade system, to create more opportunities for women to participate in the market and the promotion of affordable medicines. Other measures have less potential to expand human freedoms or might even reduce them. First of all, the policies centered around private sector development show a strong focus on liberalization, market access and reduction of trade barriers which is in line with the neoliberal economic approach. This approach has widely been criticized for not delivering the expected result for many development countries (see chapter 2). One point of criticism related to the often used conditionality for developing countries to reduce their barriers for trade whereas many western countries used the said barriers themselves (Stiglitz, 2007:87-96). As noted in chapter 4, another point of criticism is the ambition to approximate African markets to the European one. Without significant efforts in the fields of education and industrialization, many African economies are not able to develop a comparative advantage (Alusa & Omeje, 2014:319). Integrated, transcontinental markets can have fatal consequences for developing countries especially when combined with escalating tariffs used by the advanced trading partner (Stiglitz, 2007:87).

Figure 6: Strategic priorities of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)

a) Peace and Security: Promoting a Safer World	1) Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa and Europe
	2) Common and Global Peace and Security Challenges
b) Governance and Human Rights: Upholding our Values and Principles	1) Common and Global Governance and Human Rights Challenges
	2) Cooperation between Africa and the EU on Democratic Governance
c) Trade and Regional Integration: Raising Potential and Using Opportunities	1) Private Sector Development
	2) Trade and Integration
d) Key Development Issues: Accelerating Progress towards the MDGs	1) Development Cooperation
	2) Human and Social Development
	3) Gender Equality
	4) Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change
	5) Migration and Development
	6) Agriculture and Food Security
	7) Infrastructure
	8) Water and Sanitation
	9) Energy
	10) Development of Knowledge-based Societies
	11) Cultural Cooperation
	12) Communication

Source: AU & EU, 2007

With regards to the efforts to better integrate the world trading system, the documents also build a connection between the effective use of trade for the promotion of growth and the eradication of poverty. The definition of poverty used is obviously based on solely economic indicators. Thus, it is in contrast to a definition of poverty based on the lack of human freedoms as defined by Sen.

Under priority d) the Joint Africa-EU Strategy describes actions for a wide range of development related topics based on the MDGs. The part about sustainable debt and debt cancellation is particularly noteworthy. Debt relief and debt cancellation are highly favourable in the light of human development. Debt of developing countries, especially in Africa, increased dramatically throughout the decades (Clements, 2014:254) leading to debt of more than \$ 1.5 trillion in 2007 for developing countries overall (Stiglitz, 2007:15). This has major implications for affected countries – of which many are in Africa - and their ability to finance public services that are essential for the development of human capabilities (Stiglitz, 2007:211-240). Due to all of these reasons debt cancellation plays a major role. Although this topic is mentioned in the strategy, the 2014 published report *2 Unions, 1 Vision* which sums up achievements of the of the first years of the partnership does not mention debt cancellation or relief nor does the Roadmap 2014-2017. Within the outline of priority d) another relevant action point can be found in the form of the Human and Social Development. The document pays special attention to education of various forms such as basic education, training of teachers, strengthening of the educational system in its entirety as well as employability and science. This broad approach is fully in line with Sen's approach since education is crucial for individuals to participate not only economically but also politically.

c) Current Roadmap 2014-2017

The current roadmap is the third one which was adopted on the fourth EU-Africa Summit in Brussels on the 2-3 April 2014. In comparison to the Joint Africa-EU strategy, there was a change in regards of priorities. The Roadmap mentions five instead of four priorities and the structure and partly the focus is different as seen in Figure 7. More specifically, the priorities a), b) and c) can still be found whereas the fourth priority which was mainly focused on the MDGs is now reflected in the Human Development chapter of the Roadmap. The priority about global and emerging issues was newly added. This can be viewed as an upgrading of human development ideals within the Africa-EU partnership, and it has clearly been affected by the Post-2015 agenda (see chapter 2). In the current roadmap the priorities which are relevant for political freedoms and economic facilities are b), c) and d).

Figure 7: Priorities and objective of the Roadmap 2014-2017

Priority	Strategic objective
a) Peace and Security	To ensure a peaceful, safe, secure environment, contributing to human security and reducing fragility, foster political stability and effective governance, and to enable sustainable and inclusive growth.
b) Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights	To ensure a transparent, democratic and accountable environment in the respect of Human Rights and the Rule of Law, contributing to reducing fragility, fostering political stability and effective governance, and enabling sustainable and inclusive development and growth.
c) Human Development	Promote human capital development and knowledge and skills based societies and economies, amongst others by strengthening the links between education, training, science and innovation, and better manage mobility of people. [...]
d) Sustainable and inclusive development and Growth and continental integration	Stimulate economic growth that reduces poverty, create decent jobs and mobilise the entrepreneurial potential of people, in particular the youth and women, [...] support development of private sector and SMEs; support the continental integration process, [...]
e) Global and emerging issues	Achieve common positions in global fora and international negotiations and jointly address global challenges.

Source: EU-Africa Summit, 2014

Due to the fact that many parts of the JAES are still represented in the current Roadmap, many points of positive and critical analysis can be transferred. This relates to many mentioned measures which increase political freedoms (EU-Africa Summit, 2014:3-4) such as inclusion of civil society, promotion of human rights and rule of law as well as the strengthening of democratic governance the last of which ...

“[...] remains at the core of our partnership.” (EU-Africa Summit, 2014:4)

It also relates to the positive measures with regards to education, which still broadly reflected in the roadmap (EU-Africa Summit, 2014:5-6). The same however goes for the criticism regarding the economic approach. The previously noted narrow definition of poverty in terms of economic growth is prominently reflected in the strategic objective of priority d). Furthermore, liberalization of world trade and harmonization are still outlined in a similar way as it was done in the JAES, hence the same criticism applies (EU-Africa Summit, 2014:7). Additionally, the roadmap outlines an effort to open up agricultural markets which is a sensitive topic. As mentioned above intercontinental, liberalized market between developed and developing often fail to deliver the expected results. Many advanced nations use agricultural subsi-

dies and escalating tariffs to foster the comparative advantage of their farmers. If market liberalization is conducted in such a way – which was also done by the EU (Stiglitz, 2007:88) it can have dramatic consequences for developing countries and thus reduce the economic facilities of farmers significantly.

d) Missing measures

Naturally strategic policies in the field of development cooperation do not lack idealism and therefore, include a wide range of ambitious goals most of them which are directed at expanding human freedoms or at least do not risk to reduce them. To fully grasp the value of specific policies in the light of the capability approach it is however, important to put the policies into a broader global context and to thus identify areas which the analyzed policies did not cover. To conclude this specific analysis, the much-noticed book *Making Globalization Work* written by Nobel Prize laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz in 2007 will be used. Stiglitz outlines in his book the major challenges the international community faces today as well as his idea of *reforming globalization* (Stiglitz, 2007:13). For his evaluation he draws on Amartya Sen and follows a people centred approach of development (Stiglitz, 2007:50). His concept of reform consists of six areas:

1. The pervasiveness of poverty
2. The need for foreign assistance and debt relief
3. The aspiration to make trade fair
4. The limitations liberalization
5. Protecting the environment
6. A flawed system of global governance

Within the first area Stiglitz notes the shift of international organisation such as IMF, World Bank more poverty centred approach. Combined with the multi-dimensional approach towards poverty which is enshrined in the MDGs Stiglitz identifies a major improvement. His analysis is simple: the longstanding focus of the IMF on economic stability and inflation instead of employment, led to more unemployment and poverty (Stiglitz, 2007:14). Poverty and employment are both mentioned in the JAES and the roadmap and therefore cannot be described as missing measures. However, as noted before, the approach towards poverty used in both policy papers is closely linked to economic growth and therefore inconsistent with Sen's and also Stiglitz' recommendations.

The second area is advocating unconditional development aid and debt relief, the latter was also discussed earlier and was not already identified as an existing but not implemented measure (Stiglitz, 2007:14-15). The first area, the topic of conditionality is not even part of the two analyzed documents. This fact has to be seen in the light of a long history of (aid) conditionality used by the EU to promote human rights and democracy. Often this conditionality for receiving

aid was not only promoting good governance and democracy but also included economic measures such as market liberalization (Fioramonti, 2014:326). In the latest action plan *Strengthening the African Human Rights System* (2015) within the framework of JAES this was not the case and can therefore be seen as positive example.

Stiglitz' third and fourth area of his reform agenda are highly interlinked. He reinforces his criticism regarding economic and trade liberalization and mentions in this context specifically the Washington Consensus (see Chapter 2) and the involved institutions (Stiglitz, 2007:15-17). To tackle this challenge Stiglitz proposes two major changes: first for developed countries to fully open up their own markets and secondly for the same states to stop dictating the way how developing countries should open up their markets. He argues that developing countries are not able to use the same tools to cope with globalization as developed countries have. As an example, he mentions agricultural subsidies which has been broadly used by the EU and the USA for them to protect their agricultural markets. Combined with conditionality for developing countries to open up their own markets this led to vast advantages for the developed states. Both of these proposed measures are nowhere to find in the JAES and in the Roadmap 2014-17. Whenever the documents mention market liberalization, it is always related to African markets and not to the European one as proposed by Stiglitz.

The fifth and the sixth area described by Stiglitz are both widely represented within JAES and its current roadmap and can therefore not be added to the list of missing measures.

e) Closing remarks

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy is on its first glance not primarily a development agenda but rather an attempt for a fully renewed, *equal* partnership between Africa and the EU. Only with a closer look, the broad focus on development related issues becomes visible. This chapter tried to analyse the development related content of the Strategy itself as well as the current Roadmap 2014-2017 in the light of Amartya Sen's capability approach and Joseph Stiglitz reform agenda for globalization.

With that said the concluding evaluation has to be a mixed one. Many of the measures outlined by documents can clearly be seen as freedom expanding ones. Most importantly the measures which are centred around political participation such as promoting democratic governance, rule of law and transparency as well as the wide scaled inclusion of non-state actors and civil society. Especially the last point is not only mentioned in the strategy itself but was also already visible in the making of the partnership due to the described participation of both transnational parliaments, NGOs amongst others.

The vast majority of measures which are in risk of reducing the freedoms of people as well as almost all missing measures can be found within the economic part of the strategical documents. Not only the narrow definition of poverty which is used but also the strong focus on market

liberalization seems outdated in the light of human development. The same goes for the missing measures identified which shows that the strategy and the current roadmap are thoroughly ambitious but also blank out important areas such as the stop of forced market liberalization and sustainable debt relief.

6. Conclusion

The establishment of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy was a historical milestone. Not only for the relationship between Europe and Africa but also for North-South Relations in general. As outlined in chapter 2, for decades the North-South relations were characterized by the notion of donor and beneficiary. At the time when the JAES was concluded in 2007, this notion was still the predominant one, which can easily be seen due to the design of the MDGs. Historically the relationship between Africa and Europe had been a rather encouraging factor of this exact notion. Also the analysis of various development policies from the AU and EU (chapter 4) shows contrasting priorities centred around continental self-interest, namely economic recovery on the side of the EU and a strong notion of Pan-Africanism promoted by the AU. With all of that said, it is all the more astonishing that the AU and the EU concluded a partnership which is strongly built around the merit of equality and can be seen as forerunner towards a global development partnership outlined as part of the SDGs.

Despite all the variances, a possible explanation for the emergence of the Africa-EU Partnership might be the strong commitment to many elements of human development by both Unions. This commitment acts like an intense common denominator within the individual policies. Hence, many features in accordance with Amartya Sen's capability approach can be found in the two major documents of the Partnership: The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2007) and the current Roadmap 2014-2017. More specifically, many of the priorities outlined by the document have great potential to expand the freedoms of individuals (see chapter 5). In this category, is particularly the incorporation of non-state actors and civil society, which originates as early as in the negotiation process and has been a strongly emphasized part of the JAES ever since. Other examples for positive measures in line with specifically the political and social freedoms, are the promotion of democracy and human rights (especially when promoted without economic conditionality) as well as transparency and education.

Despite the vast number of positive examples, many measures also have the potential to reduce certain freedoms as is in the instance the often repeated notion to fight poverty with only economic growth measures. Therefore, the underlying narrow definition of poverty was the foundation of Sen's criticism (see chapter 3). For Sen, missing economic growth is only one possible reason for poverty. In his definition, poverty is a multidimensional state which can be described by a lack of any freedoms (political, social, economic, protective) or all of them combined. Not only is the narrow definition of poverty seemingly outdated in light of human development but also the strong focus on market liberalization is likewise seemingly outdated. In addition to the potentially negative measures found within the analysed documents, there are some areas that

are missing. As soon as the JAES and the current roadmap are analysed through the lens of Joseph E. Stiglitz' reform agenda (see chapter 5) this missing measures come to light. Hence, especially in the fields of debt relief and a fairer international trade system the Africa-EU Partnership still has room for improvement.

7. Abstract English

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and evaluate the *Joint Africa-EU Strategy* (2007) in two ways. It seeks to firstly, understand this Partnership in the light of a broad historical and political context and secondly, to evaluate its potential effects on the people affected using a policy analysis centred around the capability approach designed by Amartya Sen (1999) combined with a reform agenda for globalization conceptualized by Joseph E. Stiglitz (2007). The findings in these two areas, show that even though the AU and EU both follow self-interested visions for each continent, for the first time in history there are enough overlapping interests as well as the necessary institutional circumstances for a sustainable partnership on an equal footing. This partnership includes many priorities and measures which are able to substantially improve the lives of many, especially with regards to political participation and representation. Contrariwise, the design of the partnership also entails the risks of not living up to its full potential or perhaps even reducing the quality of life of the affected people. This is mainly in relation to the unproportioned use of economic concepts such as market liberalization and free trade, which have been highly criticized for more than two decades.

8. Abstract Deutsch

Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es die *Joint Africa-EU Strategy* (2007) auf zwei Arten zu analysieren und auszuwerten. Der erste Teil fußt dabei auf dem Ansatz die Partnerschaft in einen breiten historischen und politischen Kontext einzuordnen und der zweite Teil bewertet die konkreten Auswirkungen der Strategie auf die betroffenen Menschen, wobei der von Amartya Sen entwickelte Capability Ansatz (1999) in Verbindung mit der von Joseph E. Stiglitz konzipierten Globalisierungs-Reform-Agenda (2007) verwendet wird. Das Ergebnis der Analyse dieser beiden Bereiche zeigt, dass obwohl die Afrikanische und die Europäische Union vor allem ihren eigenen Visionen für den jeweiligen Kontinent folgen, zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte genug Interessensüberschneidungen sowie die notwendigen institutionellen Voraussetzungen für eine nachhaltige Partnerschaft auf Augenhöhe vorhanden sind. Die Afrika-EU Partnerschaft umfasst viele Prioritäten und Maßnahmen welche das Potential haben das Leben Vieler substantiell zu verbessern. Dies gilt speziell in Bezug auf politische Teilhabe. In der Gestaltung der Partnerschaft verbergen sich jedoch auch Schwachpunkte, welche verhindern könnten, dass die Strategie ihr volles Potential ausschöpft und im schlimmsten Fall sogar die Qualität vieler Leben reduzieren könnte. Dies bezieht sich vor allem auf den unproportionalen Einsatz von wirtschaftlichen Konzepten wie Marktliberalisierung und Freihandel, welche nunmehr schon seit mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten stark kritisiert worden sind.

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