DISSERTATION / DOCTORAL THESIS

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„Imperial Power Structure and the innate destabilisation of empire. The case of the Habsburg and Russian Empires,1854-1914.“

verfasst von / submitted by

Ashley Hurst, MA

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Chapter One

1.   Introduction: better understanding 'empire'

A fundamental tenet of historical scholarship is framing the timescale of an investigation. For some investigations this means an understanding of endings. Nowhere is this more evident than with the study of *empire* – one of the dominant forms of social and political organisation in human history. When one considers that formal empires departed the world political map in the mid 1970s with the dissolution of the Portuguese colonial empire, it is no surprise that until now 'the end' has been the logical investigative starting point. All empires have ended, ergo all historians of empire have 'endings' to work with. The corpus of historical writings holds ample accounts of the fall of specific empires, arguably popularised in the modern academy by Gibbon's seminal study of the Roman Empire, which through ironic accident was published between 1776 and 1789.[1] These years are rightly considered as tipping-points for world history, where paradoxically the seeds of the eventual demise of traditional empire were sown before the final, and by far the most global, era of European imperialism had begun.

A cluster of imperial falls marked the end of the Long Ninetieth Century. The dynastic Habsburg and Russian Empires were, along with the Ottoman, 'old-school' imperial entities, that would be subdued by dynamics resulting from the modern nation-state system in which they had to exist. The Habsburg and Russian Empires were intertwined in a geopolitical system and networks of transnational political, economic and social ideologies, which together evolved around them, in spite of them, and in some respects because of them. Their fall, whilst upending the European 'great power' system, more subtly indicated a final 'changing of the guard' for empire itself. On the surface, this phenomenon appeared evolutionary. In vanquishing traditional modes of empire that no less a player than Emperor Franz Josef considered 'anomalies',[2] these newly styled nation-states with colonial empires were seen by some as the next natural, progressive step. The benefit of history tells us otherwise: these forms of empire would themselves expire in around two generations.

In the years leading to the First World War, numerous internal and external observers believed the Habsburg Empire (and to a slightly lesser extent the Russian Empire) to be so regressive and backward that they were seen as, in the words of Dominic Lieven, "moribund and

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[1] Alexander J. Motyl, *Imperial Ends. The Decay, Collapse and Revival of Empires* (New York, 2001), p. 1, made the argument that such interest goes back to "at least" Gibbon.
[2] He said in 1916: "I have been aware for a long time how much of an anomaly we are in the modern world." Quoted in Solomon Wank "The Habsburg Empire", Section: Collapse of Empires: Causes, in K. Barkey and M. von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire. Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, CO, 1997), p. 48.

ripe for dissolution".[3] The history profession has mostly run with this narrative; turning this into what Alexey Miller called the "common wisdom".[4] In turn, this must be seen in the context of a professional dynamic: since *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,* historians have focused on the analysis of diachronic progression of events, which invariably led to a search for a single qualifying episode, dynamic, or sequence or combination thereof, to explain the cause of 'endings'. Whilst not pure teleology, this can lead to "teleological biases"[5] – a fine line that can result in the implication that, in the words of Alan Sked: "all would have been different – and usually better – had only this or that occurred instead".[6] Dismissing such empires as anachronistic failures meant that in a self-fulfilling way, their ends would provide the very backdrop and context for such a narrative.[7]

One shared feature of the falls of the Houses of Romanov and Habsburg in February 1917 and October/November 1918 warrants emphasis: on a large scale theirs was not so much a violent end as an ending amidst violence. These imperial regimes were indirect casualties of a conflagration the likes of which the world had never seen: The First World War. This highlights the pitfalls in relying solely on the 'endings approach' – as robust and invaluable as it has been. What happens when such entities run headlong into world historical events of unprecedented magnitude? In this instance, events they charged head first into of their own volition.[8] This creates a conundrum. Whilst defeat in war has often been given as the actual

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[3] Dominic Lieven, "Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918. Power, Territory, Identity", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr. 1999), p. 190. Also see Solomon Wank, "Desperate Counsel in Vienna in July 1914: Berthold Molden's Unpublished Memorandum", *Central European History*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1993), p. 293. Molden, editor of *Fremden Blatt*, made this clear in a memo of 6 July 1914, stating: "Everywhere one find doubts about the future of the monarchy, which is torn by conflicts internally and no longer respected even by its smallest neighbors." Similar thoughts abound about Russia, reaching a crescendo around the time of 1905 Revolution and Russo-Japanese War. E.J. Hobsbawm, "The End of Empires", in K. Barkey and M. von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire. Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, CO, 1997), p. 13, noted that: "one can reasonably place Ottomans, Habsburgs, and Romanovs into the same pigeon-hole; all were obsolescent political entities […] all were regarded as doomed, or at least as on the slide for many decades before they actually fell".

[4] Alexey Miller, "The Value and the Limits of a Comparative Approach to the History of Contiguous Empires on the European Periphery", in K. Matsuzato (ed.), *Imperiology* (Sapporo, 2007), p. 19.

[5] Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power. Volume II. The rise of classes and nation states, 1760-1914* (Cambridge, UK, 1993), p. 332. He wrote this with respect to the Habsburgs, that because they "were reactionaries who failed, they seem to have been doomed".

[6] Alan Sked, "Historians, the Nationality Question, and the Downfall of the Habsburg Empire", *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Fifth Series, Vol. 31 (1981), p. 177.

[7] For an excellent rebuttal along these lines, see Ulrike von Hirschhausen & Jorn Leonhard, "Introduction: Beyond Rise, Decline and Fall – Comparing Multi-Ethnic Empires in the Long Nineteenth Century", in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.), *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), especially pp. 11-13.

[8] F.R. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo* (London, 1972), p. 370. He wrote that when faced with the choice, the Habsburg and Romanov regimes chose prestige. For the Austrians: "inaction would mean the total collapse of Austria-Hungary's diplomatic position and of any hopes of saving it by diplomacy: action would equally inevitably entail the total destruction of Russia's diplomatic position – which St. Petersburg could hardly accept without a fight".

reason for their final collapse,[9] the historiography is replete with the search for more specific, 'true' causes and events/dates to which their respective collapses can be attributed.

This begs the question: how valid are the numerous triggers cited for the failure of these imperial projects in the face of such a maelstrom as the First World War? For example, can Hungarian manipulation of *Ausgleich* negotiations, or Habsburg foreign policy,[10] or the Tsar's deft retention of his autocratic grip on the four Imperial Russian Dumas, or modernisation lag,[11] be root causes (or even *a* cause) of imperial collapse in such circumstances?[12] The War would change everything, and had it turned the other way (as it appeared it would in the Allies' darkest days of April 1918) would the Habsburg Empire not have only survived, but also thrived as a junior partner to Germany in a new European order?[13] Or, with imperial Russia out of the way, would the absence of the need for a protective Habsburg blanket over its various nationalities render it no longer necessary in that same European order? Counterfactual historical scenarios these may be, however the same factual triggers would have preceded them.

It is also worth considering that after such a melee, the resulting perception of grand change failed to match reality. The transmogrification of the Russian Empire into the Soviet Union, arguably a successor imperial entity, albeit with different governing ideology and the absence of hereditary stewardship, or the creation of the imbalanced, multi-national states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia from the rump of the imbalanced, multi-national Habsburg (and originally in the latter case, Ottoman) Empires, boldly challenges the common notion that empire, or any ethnically-heterogeneous entity with a core/periphery structure, were 'outmoded', or would be unable to co-exist in the modern nation-state system.[14] If one agrees with the historian Hans Kohn, that: "after the fall of the monarchy the nationalist conflicts in the Successor States – in Poland and Czechoslovakia, in Yugoslavia and Rumania – grew even more bitter and violent",[15] then life in the nation-state system for nation-states could be at least equally as fraught.

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[9] Dominic Lieven, "The Collapse of the Tsarist and Soviet Empires in Perspective", in E. Brix, K. Koch & E. Vyslonzil (eds.), *The Decline of Empires* (Vienna, 2001), p 103, argued that this was the "usual reason for empire's collapse".

[10] Hans Kohn, "Was the Collapse Inevitable?", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Volume 3, Issue 03, January 1967, p. 251. Arnold Suppan, "Foreign Policy and Nationalities Problems: Habsburg Empire, Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire", in E. Brix, K. Koch & E. Vyslonzil (eds.), *The Decline of Empires* (Vienna, 2001), p. 47, would conclude that: "Most historians agree today with the thesis that the decline and break up of the Habsburg Monarchy […] was caused more by unsolved national problems and major failures in foreign policy than by centrifugal forces of feudalism or the land famine of the peasants."

[11] György Ranki, "On the Economic Development of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy", in J. Komlos (ed.), *Economic Development in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century* (Boulder, 1983), p. 47, cited that the failure to 'modernise' "is practically a commonplace of literature" on the Habsburg collapse.

[12] Emil Brix, "The Role of Culture in the Decline of European Empires" in E. Brix, K. Koch & E. Vyslonzil (eds.), *The Decline of Empires* (Vienna, 2001), p. 16. He outlined that the most agreed upon causes of decline were "social injustices" for the Russian Empire and "ethnicity" for the Habsburg.

[13] A point emphasized repeatedly by Mann. See Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.,* p, 350. He went as far as to state that "had the Central Powers won, Austria would have survived".

[14] However, the subsequent break up of these entities brings that into question again.

[15] Kohn, Collapse, *op.cit.,* p. 253. He would go on to argue that "none of the Successor States solved the nationality problem better than Austria has by around 1910". *Ibid.*, p. 255.

Making the study of 'imperial ends' even more tantalising is the sheer magnitude – and majesty – of empires throughout history, which adds a "world-historical resonance" to their fall, a phenomenon that Emil Brix noted: "records for all the fallibility of seemingly unshakable human enterprises".[16] In order to better understand not only fall, but the imperial condition,[17] we must look beyond unforeseeable events and consider how these empires were actually performing. This will lead to 'decline', 'stand-still' or 'progress', invariably in combination. Specific to the Habsburg and Russian Empires, the question becomes just how healthy were these entities in spite of and irrespective of the Great War? Indeed, in contrast to how the historiography has analysed these two entities, just how healthy were these empires when considered in isolation from their contemporary 'great powers'?

Comparing contemporary entities to judge comparative position has of course been highly invaluable, but does not necessarily enlighten the scholar of broader, thematic issues such as the nature of empire, or the imperial condition of a specific empire. For example, when a nation in a system or 'club' far outstrips the others in that grouping, such as the contemporary United States with regards to military spending, or the Royal Navy of the nineteenth-century, relative disadvantage can appear as a weakness and muddy the waters. The German Empire of 1914 is a case in point: Nachum Gross made the salient point that although "economists and politicians in the Habsburg Monarchy were conscious mainly of its lag behind the German growth, and much of our historical work has tended to follow them, in the longer run it may well turn out that the German case was the exception in nineteenth century Europe".[18]

The question should be about condition: more specifically, in what condition was the Habsburg Empire when Count Conrad von Hötzendorf made his fateful push to invade Serbia, and Russia, when it doubled down, sending the continent to war?[19] Gauging the health of these empires at any one time is a difficult task, clouded by four dynamics: the nature of their respective roles in the international system leading up to the War; the destinies of the entities that rose from the dust of both empires; their residual legacies across the region and the globe; and the nature of historical determinism that plagued many of the histories of both empires well after their dissolution. With regards the the Habsburg example, Dennison Rusinow rightly concluded that "probably most historians now agree that the inevitability-of-disintegration thesis was based

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[16] *Ibid.,* p. 10.
[17] von Hirschhausen & Leonhard, Beyond Rise, *op.cit.,* p. 12.
[18] Nachum T. Gross, "Austria-Hungary in the World Economy", in J. Komlos (ed.), *Economic Development in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century* (Boulder, CO, 1983), p. 39. As Mann again bluntly put it, referring to Austrian economic growth falling behind Germany after 1850, "but then so did almost all countries". Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.,* p. 333.
[19] Norman Stone, "Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1900-1914", *Past & Present*, No. 33 (Apr., 1966), p. 110. After the Balkan Wars, Conrad stated that "The trial of strength must be borne, and if it is decided in the Monarchy's favour, then the Slavs of Austria-Hungary will at once attach themselves to the victor […] all hostile aspirations, Italian, Russian, pan-Rumanian, will be silenced like the pan-Serb."

on *post hoc propter hoc* reasoning, or at best a selective and often nationally prejudiced reading of the evidence".[20]

To ensure the clearest possible picture, an internal diagnosis of both empires is required. For this, it's worth coming back to the fact that empires are entities – forms of social and political organisation with particular characteristics and conditions. In addition, the impression that empires such as the Russian and Austrian were doomed is masked by the fact that they were not so different to their still-thriving kin, sharing many of the characteristics of formal imperial rule including, most importantly, what actually 'made' them empires. Understanding these two points will help address a plethora of questions posed by Ulrike von Hirchhausen and Jörn Leonhard, scholars currently at the forefront of multi-disciplinary analysis of empires: "*why* did these empires last for so long, *how* were they able to function fairly successfully, *in which ways* have they stabilised the international order between 1815 and 1914, and *where* are the limits of their potential for integration?".[21] If we take these questions two steps further, just how did both empires find themselves in such a condition of comparative disadvantage leading into the First World War? In turn, was their condition due to them actually 'being' empires?

As with all forms of political unit, empires have conventions and organisational structures of varying intensity and formality, with different and overlapping groups working within, and without the system, officially or otherwise. This system describes the working structure of an imperial entity. And if we turn toward sociology and political science, we can identify the logical element that metaphorically 'made them tick' – the abstract concept of power. For example, no one would dream of analysing the modern day United States holistically without approaching the health of the collective national body, and the power machinations within it. When analysed together the Executive, Congress, Supreme Court, state and local governments, special interest and lobby groups, the media, minorities, trade unions etc., can tell us so much about the health of the United States at any one given point at time, both standalone and as a platform for comparison with other nations. Analysis between two points of time can provide change markers.

There is no reason this all-inclusive, multi-disciplinary approach cannot be applied historically. With regards to this work, this means imperial 'bodies' – the Imperial Power Structures of the Habsburg and Russian Empires. Structures can provide the analytical framework and new perspectives as to why these two entities could appear 'damned if they did, and damned if they didn't'. Alexander Motyl argued that structures can help uncover how "endogenously generated change" can "both derive from the system and be consistent with its bias for stability".[22] In other words, they can show how change from within can at once be caused by the structure, and yet not necessarily affect its overall stability. Utilising structure brings together states and their apparatuses, various competing organised groups, and the people they represent

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[20] Dennison Rusinow, "Ethnic Politics in the Habsburg Monarchy and Successor States: Three Answers to the National Question", in R.L. Rudolph and D.F. Good (eds.), *Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union* (Minneapolis, 1992), pp. 255-256.
[21] von Hirschhausen & Leonhard, Beyond Rise, *op.cit.,* p. 11. Original emphasis.
[22] Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.,* p. 24.

(or claim to represent) into one analytical framework, as they represent the component parts of an imperial structure.[23]

1.1. Objectives

From the very general to the very specific, an enormous body of work exists on the Habsburg and Russian Empires, and there are ample works theorising on power structures and social and political organisation, nationalism and the 'nation'. The number of thematic works on empire is growing from an admittedly far smaller base. However, large scholarly gaps remain where these approaches intersect. This work aims to fit into that gap; adding a structural perspective of empire to the body of work on Russian and Habsburg Empires, to investigate whether their perils can be attributed them 'being' empires. In doing so, the Imperial Power Structure will be introduced as an analytical framework, not only for the study of these two entities, but also for consideration when reviewing other empires throughout history as well as entities that resemble, or are designated by, the monikers 'empire' and 'imperial'. Ideally this will help build a bridge between the robust empirical histories of both empires and broader, multidisciplinary approaches to the concepts of empire and imperialism.

In his seminal 1982 work, *The Politics of Aristocratic Empires*, John Kautsky hoped "to discover 'causal regularities across the various historical cases,' to develop generalizations about politics in traditional aristocratic empires", adding the caveat that he was "well aware that, in fact, all I can produce is tentative hypotheses".[24] This work aims to modify this approach, to identify such regularities on the more narrow base of a two-unit, time-limited case study, with the objective of producing a tighter hypothesis: a platform from which to embark on future broader meta-analyses. This work will demonstrate that analysis of these two empires between two fixed points in time, through investigating changes to conditions 'on the ground' and to the Imperial Power Structure itself, will help outline the true health of both entities, as well as any patterns and trajectories that they demonstrate. Importantly, this will not be from a beginning to an end, but from one point to another in an existing entity.[25] It will chart how these empires operated – formally and informally – throughout the intervening period and how society responded, aiming to uncover how power was divested amongst differing groups competing within their respective imperial confines, and what caused emerging disparities.

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[23] Miroslav Hroch interview: by Daniel Esparza, Tensões Mundiais, Fortaleza, Vol. 3, Ed. 4, http://tensoesmundiais.net/index.php/tm/article/viewFile/133/186, last accessed 1 December 2014, p. 55. He stated that it is important "to pay attention to the social structure and social origins of national activists, i.e. of those who are formulating 'national interests' and 'programs'".

[24] John H. Kautsky, *The Politics of Aristocratic Empires* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1982), p. xii.

[25] It will endeavour to keep the sage words of Jürgen Osterhammel in mind: "Historians can never entirely avoid the problem of hindsight, but they have to be in careful control of the decision when to argue in a teleological way and when to sidestep the temptation of envisaging an imperial trajectory from beginning to finish." Jürgen Osterhammel, "Commentary – Measuring Imperial 'Success' and 'Failure'", in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.) *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), p. 472.

1.2.   Questions to be addressed

When approaching such a broad thematic topic in a multi-disciplinary manner, there are numerous questions to address. Although some are more fundamental than others, questions regarding the Habsburg and Russian empires are intended as a platform for the 'higher' questions of this work. With regards to the two empires, there are two general questions. First, what was the actual condition of these two entities? In short: 'how were they doing'? Just how 'healthy' were they? Second, how did they find themselves in the condition they were in? In turn, these raise the question of whether and how said conditions were a result of their responses to the spectre of the 'nation-state'. Indeed, as they could appear 'damned if they did, and damned if they didn't', just how much control did they/could they have over their own destiny? The common narrative – formally universal and now still dominant – is that these two empires were in decline, which raises the question, were they in decline when considered on their own merits? In addition, a common point made of Austria-Hungary is relevant to both. Was the First World War the "final blow in the long process of dissolution",[26] in the words of Max Stephan-Schulze and Nikolaus Wolf, or was this dissolution specifically as a result of the War? Indeed, was their fall inevitable?[27]

More specifically, this work will attempt to ponder a core question posed by Dominic Lieven, of whether these Empires could "hold together polities of great territory, population and therefore power" whilst squaring "this priority with satisfying the demands of nationalism, democracy and economic dynamism".[28] How important was keeping individual 'nationalities' on side, and how much did these regimes need to work on (in the words of Gary Cohen concerning Austria) developing "a broader civic identity and loyalty to the state to counter the rise of nationalist demands for self-government"?[29] Indeed, this raises the most controversial of questions that has been taken as a given: Did the nationalities problem in the Habsburg Empire and later in Russia actually require a solution, considering the geopolitical situation of the day?[30] At the opposite ends of the spectrum, how viable were federalism/confederalism and deepened centralisation, which were often mooted as possible ideological and practical solutions? Using Clemens von Metternich's famous quote: is there any truth in his contention that "only by centralizing the various branches of authority is it possible to establish its unity and hence its

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[26] Max-Stephan Schulze & Nikolaus Wolf, "Harbingers of Dissolution? Grain Prices, Borders and Nationalism in the Habsburg Economy before the First World War," http://www.lse.ac.uk/economichistory/pdf/wp93.pdf, last accessed 4 December 2014, p. 4.

[27] A question raised by Joachim Remak with respect to empires such as the Habsburg: "Was the end of such an empire inevitable?". Joachim Remak, "The Healthy Invalid: How Doomed the Habsburg Empire?", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 41, No 2 (Jun., 1969), p. 132.

[28] Lieven, Dilemmas, *op.cit.*, p. 165.

[29] Gary Cohen, "Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914", *Central European History*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jun., 2007), p. 241.

[30] Sked, Historians, *op.cit.*, p. 175, in acknowledging the immense importance of the nationality issue in Austria-Hungary, raises whether a viable solution was actually possible (and whether historians should search for what might have worked).

force"?[31] These all lead to one of the fundamental questions of this work – was it possible for these two Empires to remain essential to their subject populations, whilst remaining essential to the 'great power' system to which they belonged?

These lead to a series of connected, more general questions on empire and imperialism: Does the accepted notion that empires or imperial systems are not viable in a system of modern nation-states still hold water? Could empires develop their imperial power where applicable to mimic as closely as possible the nation-state model, whilst remaining true empires? In essence, could their imperial systems bear the importation of nation-state ideological frameworks into a population already discovering core and peripheral nationalism? How able is the Imperial Power Structure to resist the destabilisation that flows from such changes? Finally, how much guidance can be garnered from analysing both the Habsburg and Russian Empires when analysing other empires or entities that not only resemble but are labelled with the epithet 'empire' or 'imperial'? Indeed, will it help tackle the fundamental "first problem" of Susan Reynolds when comparing empires, which is "what kind of polity, and which individual polities, we are to count as empires."[32]

1.3. Settings

1.3.1. Choice of empires for study

The Habsburg and Russian Empires provide the perfect comparative platform from which to instigate an investigation into Imperial Power Structures. They were direct competitors in a global system (indeed slaves to it) that shared a long border and a growingly intertwined history. In addition, Austria (and Hungary) would become infamous for their nationality problems, a dynamic shared (albeit less intensively) by Russia, where its importance in history has been somewhat overshadowed by the machinations that eventually led to the 1917 revolutions and the Bolshevik takeover of power.

In striving to manage and control their imperial orbits from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, both regimes utilised a number of nation-state ideological frameworks in order to 'catch up' with the other members of an ever-demanding power system. For Russia, this appropriation was a return – albeit enhanced – to a cyclical pattern dating back to at least Peter the Great, of importing ideas and institutions from Western Europe in batches, followed by periods of reaction and regret. For Austria, this was a new phenomenon; indeed in some instances they would be using these to enhance existing frameworks that although 'national' pre-dated the 'nation-state' phenomenon – specifically state education and the central bureaucracy. Jane Burbank and

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[31] Quoted in Sked, Historians, *op.cit.*, p. 188.

[32] Susan Reynolds, "Empires. A problem of comparative history", *Historical Research*, Vol. 79, No. 204 (May, 2006), p. 151. She actually foresees many problems with comparing empires.

Frederick Cooper summarised well what both empires (and the Ottoman) did to keep up, and what they considered the response. Their leaders:

> took measures to revitalize their polities – increase their revenues, shore up loyalties, and beef up their armies […] each experimented with political institutions […] each empire looked with jaundiced but attentive eyes at the "colonial" policies of the British and French […] each empire encountered unexpected and destabilizing responses to its efforts to update people and resources.[33]

They found themselves in an increasingly complicated balancing act, trying to, as Alexey Miller stated, "survive by adopting new techniques of imperial management and the mobilization of resources, while maintaining some elements of the traditional regime and its social order".[34] They would also face increasing calls for democratic representation, social mobility and the emergence of internal 'nations', whose populations were for the most part bound to their sovereign and empire, which in turn was an imperial *raison d'être*.[35] Notably, they also shared a distinct dearth of internal 'nations' espousing a practical form of independence ideology. Finally, both imperial economies would experience relatively similar regionally imbalanced modernisation and industrialisation, albeit at varying times and intensities, whilst never really achieving the efficient integration of primary, secondary and tertiary industries that helped propel the German Empire, for example.

Nonetheless, what makes these two empires particularly fascinating for comparative study (and as a basis for analysis of empires) is that in the sphere of politics and societal management, the Habsburgs (in Cisleithania) and Romanovs would follow almost diametrically opposite strategies to pull their spatial structures into line behind them, to best enable them to 'catch up', as will become apparent throughout this work. At the same time, these divergent strategies would share a reliance on utilising nation-state ideological frameworks, and included "shared sovereignty", albeit to vastly different degrees.[36]

In addition, both halves of the *same* empire diverged after 1867, with in many ways the Hungarians moving closer to the Russian position than the Austrian. That Austria pursued one path and Hungary and Russia different paths altogether, at least until 1905 in the latter case, and yet both empires struggled equally with respect to their comparative 'great power' standing and the management of the Imperial Power Structures, is what makes the question of whether nation-state paradigms could work in empires so important.[37]

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[33] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and Politics of Difference* (Princeton, 2010), pp. 332.

[34] Alexey Miller, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

[35] Katherine Arens, "Central Europe and the Nationalist Paradigm", Centre for Austrian Studies Working Paper, March 1996, http://www.cas.umn.edu/assets/pdf/WP961.PDF, last accessed 28 November 2014, stated that the Habsburg Empire "must be taken more seriously as the ultimate 'imagined community,' a community that existed almost solely because the rules around which it was imagined were shared even by large groups of dissenters". p. 36 of 43.

[36] To use a term from Burbank and Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 362.

[37] Lieven, Dilemmas, *op.cit.*, pp. 196-197, contrasts the paths taken by Austria, on the one hand, and Russia and Hungary, on the other, and bluntly concluded that "the alternative homogenizing, centralizing trend, pursued by the Russian governments, was not merely much less humane, it was also no more successful".

1.3.2. Time – period of study

This work covers the period from 1854 to 1914, when discernable signs of falling behind nation-states to the west become apparent. Several well-known phenomena converged here, such as state-led and stake-seeking nationalism (to use terms from Charles Tilly),[38] a steadily urbanising, more-educated population, professionalising military and maturing political institutionalisation, and the awareness when the latter did not meet satisfactions, at a number of levels of society. More specifically the year 1854 was selected for four reasons. First, it marks the historical event that was the catalyst for unprecedented change in the Russian Empire – the Crimean War. This catastrophe set the regime off onto a journey of no return, beginning with emancipation. Second, for the Habsburg Empire it falls in between the revolutions of 1848/49 and the unravelling of neo-Absolutism from 1860/61, also in response to military defeat, to France in 1859. It is right in the middle of what Richard Evans called the "sole decade of Austria in its fullest designation".[39] The end of neo-Absolutism coincided with the first tranche of major reforms in the Russian Empire. Third, both empires as imperial entities were arguably the most similar in 1854, driven by absolutism, with the organised nationalities of the revolutions in Austria relatively repressed, as was the only true competing 'nation' in the Russian Empire at this time, the Poles. Finally, this is roughly when Prussia would begin its ascent to the pinnacle of continental power, which directly affected the fortunes and trajectory of both the Russian and Habsburg Empires.

The period between 1854 and 1914 saw enormous change in these empires; in some respects, especially with regards to society, more so than even Germany and Italy, entities that did not even exist in their final (1914) form in 1854. The rise of the nationalities as collective outlets for group formation in both empires, at both core and peripheral level, dominates this time period. The choice of 1914 as the end point of the study is clear – taking the empires up to the point before the War from which they would not emerge, intentionally neutralising it as an influencing analytical factor and thereby allowing us to judge the actual condition of these empires and the systems that supported them and that they worked by, without prejudice or distraction.

1.3.3. Space – geographic and human

Ideally, any analysis of imperial power based upon a case study of the Russian and Habsburg Empires would include the Ottoman Empire. The limited scope of this work renders

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[38] Charles Tilly, "States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992", *Theory and Society,* Vol. 23, No. 1 (Feb., 1994) pp. 137-138.

[39] R.J.W. Evans, "Comparing Empire: The Habsburgs and their Critics, 1700-1919", *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (Sixth Series)*, Vol., 19 (Dec., 2009), pp. 117-134, https://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=...9&issueId=-1&aid=6598804&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0080440109990065, last accessed 4 December 2014, p. 3 of 7.

this impossible; but the Ottoman Empire would be the logical next port of call in any future expansion of this study. It will be briefly introduced before the conclusion. The most notable exclusion from this study with respect to the two empires in question concerns space: some territories and nationalities from both empires are not touched on as primary space in this study. For the Habsburg Empire, this is mostly in response to the limitations of the scope of this work. Hence the Slovenes, Slovaks and the peoples of Bosnia & Herzegovina are not addressed unless emphasising a point about their respective hegemons, relationships with other groups, or in direct reference to the ramifications of reforms, such as access to education. The Serbs fall into this category as well, although clearly by these parameters they are far more prominent. It is more important to emphasise how Russia is treated. This work will only look at the western borderlands and the European Russian core of the Romanov realm. Primarily this is due to the themes explored in this work, and aligns with the Russian Empire's primary geopolitical considerations. As Dominic Lieven's outlined, "the western borderlands covered the political and economic heartland of Russian power against its only major threat – which came from Europe".[40] In addition, the borderlands were the fuel for Russian national formation by providing it contrasting 'others' – 'Polonism' and the twin bogeymen of Latin and Greek Catholicism. Non-Russian peoples to be analysed in this study are Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Baltic Germans, Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians.

Another reason for limiting the Russian 'space' in this work is the nature of the comparative study itself. At the levels investigated in this work, it is the 'European' part of the Russia Empire that is most directly comparable with the Habsburg Empire. This does not mean that the remainder of the Russian Empire is any less important to understanding 'empire'. On the contrary, any follow on study on 'empire' that incorporates maritime empires such as the contemporary British or French would ideally include Russian activity in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia and the Far East – especially as some of the most typical characteristics of maritime empires were displayed in the Russian Empire in these regions, such as military expansion over large, often sparsely populated areas thousands of miles from the core, long distance resource extraction and asymmetric flows, colonial settlement, and the civilising missions that accompanied them. Interaction with a rising Japan and a stagnating China was also a shared characteristic.[41]

1.3.4. Further exclusions

Core and peripheral nationalities are heavily emphasised. This is not to downplay the role of (for example) non-national radicals and intelligentsia, trade unions, students and the peasantry in the workings of these empires, but rather to highlight a common and important dynamic

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[40] Dominic Lieven, *Empire. The Russian Empire and its Rivals from the Sixteenth Century to the Present* (London, 2003), p. 222.
[41] Lieven has made these comparisons in his work *Empire. Ibid.*

between the two. When it comes to the nationalities, Russia did not have as many problems, on the surface. However, this was partly because non-ethnic Russians, as organised groups, had demonstrably less access to political power in an organised form than non-Germans in Austria, and even non-Magyars in Hungary, until as late as 1905. Where non-Russians did have such access, it was a feudal residue, through the Baltic *Landtage* for example. Access to other building blocks of the nationalities, such as education in native languages, was variable. What the Russians did in order to quell non-Russian nationalities, however, had a huge indirect effect on nationality issues in the empire, indeed on the health of the empire itself.

In addition, there is nothing this study could add to the enormous body of work covering the rise of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in Russia, or Social Democrats in Austria, for example. They are referred to when emphasising the dynamics overviewed here, as are lower organs of Russian governance such as the *zemstva*, which have a more prominent place in this narrative as they had a specifically defined role in the formal political structures of the empire. Indeed, as they existed under imperial sanction, they were a component part of the formalised structure itself. The aforementioned groups could be considered in further studies as non-national peripheries, utilising this work as a platform. The same can be said for the churches, and the Jews.

Jewish communities and (for the most part) the various churches have also been excluded from this study. This is partially due to limitations of scope. In addition, the former faced vastly differing degrees of integration and acceptance making it difficult to pinpoint their direct effects on the Imperial Power Structures. They were at times assimilated, accepted and protected (by groups if not necessarily by authorities); and at times discriminated against, socially excluded and in Russia, victims of deadly pogroms, as well as the restrictions of the Pale of Settlement. To give an example of the contradictions faced by the Jews: the *fin de siécle* Vienna of publicly anti-Semitic *Burgermeister* Dr. Karl Lueger – who would gain a fan in a young Adolf Hitler[42] – saw Freud, Mahler and Zweig flourish in the same environment in which Theodor Herzl formulated political Zionism. Further study would take the Jewish communities into account, including the General Jewish Labour Bund of Lithuania, Poland and Russia.

Finally, the reader will notice more references to the Orthodox Church in the Russian Empire than the Catholic Church in Austria and Hungary. Quite simply, during this era, the Church was far more prominent in the Russian Imperial Power Structure. The Catholic Church in Austria, despite being the denomination of a great number of imperial subjects, progressively lost much of its influence as an organisation in imperial matters. After recovering somewhat from the liberal anti-clericalism of the revolution, the Church would be harmed by the refuting of the short-lived Concordat in 1870. Arguably, its major influence in Austria would be as a religion identified with political parties in Cisleithania (as well as cities like Vienna) after the Liberal era

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[42] John W. Mason, *The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 1867-1918* (London, 1985), p. 37. Hitler would write in *Mein Kampf* that: "If Dr. Karl Lueger had lived in Germany, he would have been ranked among the great minds of our people; that he lived and worked in this impossible state was the misfortune of his work and of himself." Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf,* English edition (London, 1974), pp 111-114, quoted in Mason, *ibid.,*

ended in 1879, such as through the likes of the Lueger's *Christlichsoziale Pareti*. The Catholic Church in Hungary, whilst closer to the implementation of government in Transleithania (for example, Hungary retained a church-run education system in conjunction with other faith and secular schools), as opposed to the secular one in Cisleithania), was never at the heart of power to the degree of the Orthodox Church in Russia. Indeed, there was a peculiar Hungarian connection between Magyar patriotism and anti-clericalism, which was driven by Hungarian disquiet about papal influence in their domestic affairs, that would come to a head in the 1890s.[43]

1.4. Methodology

It must be emphasised at this point that this is not intended to be *a* history of the Russian and Austrian Empires, nor is it a specific history of any of their particular elements or features. These empires are the setting for a thematic analysis of the nature of Imperial Power Structures. To that end, although it is debatable by geographic scale whether this is a world or global history, it is founded upon the methods of those sub-disciplines. Such an approach will engage with a broader subject field than traditional history, through utilising historical sociology, political science and international relations, and economic history. In the words of Patrick Manning, one of the pioneers of world historical method, "the very breadth of interdisciplinary work presents certain advantages; one can see problems from differing perspectives, and one may see the parallels and linkages from one discipline to another".[44] In addition, it is focussed on a theme of global significance. Any contention as to whether this is a world or global history can be attributed to whether one accepts the perspective of what can best be called the 'Atlantic' or the 'European' school.

Both schools are driven by the admirable goal of redressing the Eurocentric histories of the past; at their forefront are themes, movements or patterns of global significance. The European school tends to avoid such histories geographically centred within Europe whilst including histories based in Latin America, Asia and Africa. However, European interaction with these regions of the world, as well as trade, and cultural and knowledge transfer to and from Europe, are included. In addition, this view of world and global history has incorporated the older area studies disciplines. For example, the subject group 'world history' on the Cambridge Faculty of History website states that: "World History at the University of Cambridge combines the study of global and imperial history with the study of Asian, African and Latin American histories."[45] The Atlantic school is not so bound to area studies and is at times broader in its

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[43] A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918* (London, 1990), p. 195, outlined how the Habsburg Foreign Minister Count Kálnoky, trying to bring the Vatican to the Habsburg side in response to the Franco-Russian alliance, attempted to stem Magyar anti-clericalism which he believed would endanger his endeavours. Hungarian protests would lead to Kálnoky's resignation. Taylor noted at this time that anti-clericalism "had become the latest sounding board for Magyar chauvinism".

[44] Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History. Historians Create a Global Past* (New York, 2003), p. 144.

[45] University of Cambridge, World History, http://www.hist.cam.ac.uk/directory/subject-groups/world-history, last accessed 13 January 2015.

analysis of world historical themes, and is more willing to look at histories regardless of 'foundation region'. Both schools complement each other and co-exist comfortably.[46] This work aims to sit comfortably within that list, listing toward the Atlantic school, as the major theme of empire and imperialism is analysed using two European entities as the initial case study. In effect, this is a multi-disciplinary thematic history, on a theme of global significance, utilising world and global history methods.

The primary discipline underlying the theoretical framework is historical sociology, with strong elements of economic history, political science and traditional history. This, as well as the meta-scale of this work, is why the reader will find a mix of primary and secondary sources, more theory and content ranging from the very detailed to the very general. Patrick Manning argued that writers of world history "need to specialize, generalize, and balance between the two tendencies."[47] This work aims to do that, whilst striving to follow Marshall Hodgson's call to address "large-scale questions" – questions "for whose sakes the historical profession exists".[48] This is an endeavour where the "complexity of the inquiry [and] the breadth of the questions it asks, is such that it can no longer be a question of marshalling all evidence bearing upon a single occasion, but of selecting and arranging the evidence bearing on the wider questions at issue".[49]

When analysing these two entities as 'empires', there are only so many examples that can be given of – for example – disruptive *Reichsrat* or Duma debates; only so many references to Czechs being unhappy with the Dualist system; only so many reports of the Polish Rebellion of 1863, and so on. These are unquestionably components of this work, but to focus on such histories exclusively at Rankean depth would result in a work that is at once too deep and too shallow: too deep to provide enough breadth to address the fundamental questions posed by this work, too shallow to satisfactorily address *enough* of the plethora of historical dynamics in sufficient detail to form a synthesis. A fine balance is required to ensure that the wood is not missed for the trees, or the trees not missed for the wood. By finding such a balance, sixty years of two empires, with an almost infinite number of verifiable primary sources, can be amply covered in such a study. Especially (as noted in the introduction) when utilising comparative method.

Understandably, the idea of comparing two enormous historical entities in the context of a larger conceptual idea of empire is daunting. Until relatively recently, historians attempting broader conceptual viewpoints on empire have been loathe to employ comparison – hence the focus on the 'empire in question' rather than 'empire' itself. This is a manifestation of some long-held scholarly principles of the history profession, such as fears of 'breadth', locating two or more

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[46] For one example of many, this coexistence can be seen in the themes of the Fourth European Congress on World and Global History, held in Paris in 2014. http://research.uni-leipzig.de/eniugh/congress/fileadmin/eniugh2011/dokumente/2014/Programm_web_140731.pdf, last accessed 14 March 2015. Conference themes are listed on page 8 of the pdf file.

[47] Manning, *op.cit.*, p. 143.

[48] Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *Rethinking world history. Essays on Europe, Islam, and world history* (Cambridge, UK, 1994), p. 255.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 260.

entities close enough to be compared, suspicion of historical meta-narrative and avoidance of both learned conclusions and anything approaching a model.

Such works have therefore been the province of the social sciences, for the most part. What began in the history profession as a trickle from the likes of Dominic Lieven has by no means become a flood, however in world and global history in particular, works on 'empire' and 'imperialism' have gained a much wider acceptance. This work aims to join this recent corpus of historically founded, yet thematic and multi-disciplinary, analyses of empire. It will employ comparison not to rank entities, rather to better understand the nature of the institution of empire. In this, this work will follow the simple advice of Miroslav Hroch: "use comparative approach as much as possible".[50]

There are a few particularities with the comparative framework used in this work. First, although the overall units of this study are the Habsburg and Russian Empires from 1854-1914 – which follows the standard historical convention of analysing two comparative units – the differences between the paths taken by the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the Habsburg Empire after 1867 will at certain points in this work effectively turn this into a three-way comparison. By political unit, this means the Russian Empire and what was unofficially called Cisleithania and Transleithania (the lands under the jurisdiction of Vienna and Budapest respectively). This does not change the overall comparison between two empires; in fact, the differences in the Habsburg Empire emphasise the peculiarities of Imperial Power Structures under certain conditions. Second, the comparison here is as multi-tiered as the Imperial Power Structures being analysed. Hence Hungary can at once be treated as a periphery of the overall Habsburg Empire and a core of Transleithania. Third, as the structural unit is imperial, *i.e.* a heterogeneous system political and social organisation, there are a number of second-level comparisons that need to be examined. These will be seen in Chapter 8, where five comparative micro-studies are undertaken concerning units within the respective empires: covering the Baltic and Adriatic provinces, the Poles in Galicia and the Kingdom of Poland, the Finns and the Czechs, the Ukrainians/Ruthenes, and the Lithuanians and Romanians. These comparisons will enable analysis of the finer nuances of like imperial structures, in turn fortifying the overall comparative objective as contributing component units of it.

1.5.   Primary sources

During the period covered by this study, the proliferation in Europe of printed media, statistics and government bureaucracy and reporting resulted in an enormous body of potential source material for historians. Much of this became (quite literally) easier to decipher around the

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[50] Hroch, Interview, *op.cit.,* p. 55. Also see Alexey Miller, *op.cit.,* p. 24. Ideally, this will enable the uncovering of patterns that may have slipped through the cracks, a point Miller made whilst lamenting that a "lack of comparative perspective" led to a failure to uncover that state-led Russian nationalism made distinctions between the land/territory of Russia and the Russian Empire, for example.

turn of the twentieth century, due to the uptake of commercial typewriters. When approaching a broad multidisciplinary study spanning sixty years of two empires, covering numerous topics, this presented a conundrum. Which archival sources would provide the most appropriate level of information needed for such a study? In turn, when located, could the information contained therein add to the existing base of knowledge, as captured in the seemingly endless corpus of works on the Habsburg and Russian Empires?

It was important to take a step back and assess the role of primary source research in the formulation of this work. Archival sources would naturally be imperative for 'discovery', but would also have to serve two other functions. Due to the nature and scope of this work, ideally archival sources would also corroborate – at different levels – the large dynamics at play. It is all well and good to try to uncover broad historical phenomena through theory and research, but as empires are the 'sum of their parts', these dynamics should be testable regionally or locally – when the 'parts' are analysed. Archival research, as it characteristically provides a sense of the 'feelings' of the respective times, should also ideally add colour and life to an enormously complex topic, bringing a much needed human element to a meta history where the actors are as important as the organisations they represent. In effect, primary research was needed both to 'discover' and 'confirm', and to ensure everything worked together.

In addition, we need to consider the 'large' nature of this work. If approached as a 'traditional history', arguably each chapter could warrant its own individual thesis based upon individual archival research. However, this is not a 'traditional history'. Such a research approach would stretch human endurance at the best of times, and result in multiple volumes rather than a single opus. Within the parameters of this dissertation it would have been physically impossible, not to mention unnecessary. A different approach was required. In this respect, and understanding the constraints outlined, the decision was taken concentrate on British diplomatic archives.

Some readers from a traditional history background may balk at the thought of a work focusing on two empires which does not (directly) source archival research located in the respective modern day regions and countries. Initially, lack of Russian language skills and difficulties with German printed in gothic type was behind the decision to think outside the square with regards to archival sources. Of course, focussing entirely on external archives for primary source information has its limitations. Utilising multiple archives, originating from all relevant players and sides, helps a researcher 'get into the minds' of actors big and small, making it easier to reach a solid depth of understanding on any particular historical phenomenon. In addition, there are inevitably gaps in any archive that have to be picked up by searching through other archives, or indeed secondary sources, depending on the type of information required. These overall weaknesses can be somewhat abrogated by utilising sources reproduced in collected and secondary works – indeed for this work far more so as the British archives provide a rich vein of directly reported interviews with actors from the machinery of the Habsburg and Romanov empires, as will be elaborated on below.

Taking these limitations into account, finding the British archives, in all their variations, was a revelation. They provided the depth and breadth of source information that a study of this kind requires, and worked in harmony with other research and theory. In short, they satisfied the three purposes for primary sources for this work, and would prove a veritable goldmine of information.

It was an encounter with the British Documents on Foreign Affairs (BDFA) series at the British Library that set me out on this path. As Dominic Lieven outlined in his BDFA introduction, making a case for the potential of diplomatic archives in general, beyond researching diplomatic history: "European embassies and legations were required to report regularly on domestic politics, the press, the state of the economy, the condition of minorities, and so on".[51] A quick review of the BDFA documents on Russia proved this to be the case. The BDFA was comprised of the "Foreign Office Confidential Print", upon which Lieven commented:

> *The British archives contain one source that no other archive can match, the product of a practice without exact parallel in the machinery of government of any other major power. This is the so-called Foreign Office Confidential Print. This comprises diplomatic despatches and other papers which [...] were printed for internal circulation within the British government.*[52]

The encounter with the BDFA led the writer to the National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), which houses an enormous body of dispatches and reports (mostly handwritten) from British missions to both Empires, as well as consulates. Most consulates in the Habsburg Empire focused on local British interests in their particular region – for example the Consul in Trieste would report on commercial and shipping interests, the legal travails of British citizens, along with deaths and marriages. They would report to London through the Embassy in Vienna, including the Budapest Consul. The numerous British consulates in Russia appeared to have much more leeway in reporting events on the ground, as evidenced in this work from a number of citations from the Consuls in Warsaw and Helsinki.

For the benefit of this work, apart from reporting in sometimes florid English, what was immediately striking was that the British diplomats would in official reports vent their feelings and openly criticise the many sides of a particular issue. This was especially notable where they saw fault with every side, for example when reporting on the machinations in the Habsburg Delegations and the Polish troubles in 1861-1863. As will be seen throughout this work, reportage of the latter by St. Petersburg based Ambassador Lord Napier and the Consul General in Warsaw, Edward Stanton, was brutally frank about the missteps of the imperial administration in response to the revolt, of which they were deeply unsympathetic to. Yet they remained steadfast in reporting the positions, ideologies and grievances of both the Russians and the Polish

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[51] British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part 1: From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War (BDFA). Series A: Russia, 1859-1914. K. Bourne and D. Cameron Watt (General Editors), D. Lieven (ed.). Volume 1, p. ix.
[52] *Ibid.*

'rebels' throughout. That they could report on and 'editorialise' about all sides resulted in a rich source of excellent multi-dimensional perspectives on given issues.

In addition, British diplomats would be given frequent audiences with ranking officials of the imperial cores, including key ministers and parliamentary leaders. Ambassadors had such access to the sovereigns themselves. Reports of these discussions have provided a window into key players at key times in the history of both Empires, including a number of examples of directly reported speech; information that whilst clearly tailored to the (British government) audience, would prove invaluable. Notably, in contrast to the British diplomats reporting critically on both sides of certain issues, the respective imperial representatives would rarely apportion any blame on their policies or ideologies in the presence of the British representative. They also provided reports from the gallery of the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest and (eventually) the Russian Duma, regional Diets in both Empires, as well as from the sidelines of assemblies such as *zemstva* congresses. These were particularly pertinent in times of crisis or destabilisation, and as will be seen in this work, they were enthusiastic in reporting 'who threw the first punch' – metaphorically and sometimes literally.

Finally, British diplomats forwarded relevant polemical pieces to the Foreign Office in London, ranging from political manifestos through to declarations in the press. These exposed just how emotionally heightened debates were at the time. Many displayed an enormous degree of nationalist hyperbole, some from highly respected people, which would go on to prove incredibly vital to this work. An illustrative example was a 1906 diatribe by the expatriate Hungarian academic Emil Reich that by today's standard is eye-watering for its parochialism. The nationalist hyperbole was breathtaking – intimating amongst other things that Transleithania had no nationality problems, that Magyarisation was successful due to Magyar "superiority," and that "universal suffrage […] will in Hungary only contribute to stiffen the back of the nation." Finally, he contended that Austria was no military threat to Hungary, ignorant of the attitude of all non-Magyar nationalities towards the Hungarians in the Empire.[53]

Of course, even though the purpose of diplomatic reports was to enable an outside government to make informed third party policy decisions, these reports could show a degree bias and partiality. The British Government itself had distinct and sometimes fluid relationships with both empires within the European 'great power' system, which could on occasion change dramatically. Generally the British had fairly warm relations with the Habsburg Empire for most of the period in question, and they at times cooperated well, for example as co-signatories to the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887. Relations were badly tested in 1908 over the annexation of

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[53] The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA): Memo to the Foreign Office in London, July 1906, FO 371/7 (no number). Amongst other things, Reich wrote that: "There is no serious strife between the non-Magyar and the Magyar nationalities in Hungary. Any statement to the contrary is a misstatement. There are local or individual grievances; but no nationalist strifes. There is absolutely nothing in Hungary remotely resembling the nationalist troubles in Austria."; "This process of Magyarization (-to which, in Austria, there is no analogous position of Austriacization or Germanisation at all-) is <u>not</u> a matter of legislation; it is eminently a matter of the superiority and greater power of assimilation inherent in the Magyars, who have, these thousand years, held their own in Hungary". Emphasis in original.

Bosnia, although they would return to a point where Britain was "not actively ill-disposed towards the Monarchy". [54] They would also change depending on the priorities of the government of the day on London, especially during what could be termed the revolving door period of Gladstone/Disraeli as Prime Minister (1868/1885).[55]

By contrast, relations with Russia were often poor, badly straining during the Polish Rebellion of 1863 and the Russo-Turkish War in 1877 and its aftermath. For example, the British sent warships to the Straits as a threat to stop the Russian takeover of Constantinople, and they protested loud and successfully about the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano. Various overlapping 'sphere-of-influence' disagreements simmered for many years over Persia and Afghanistan, and were arguably as equally damaging to Anglo-Russian relations as any European issues.[56] However, as with Habsburg-British relations, a change of government in Westminster could change priorities. This would happen in 1880 with the election of the Liberal Party of Gladstone,[57] and later co-operative efforts during the Boxer Rebellion, and then in 1907 with the signing of the Anglo-Russian Entente, displayed the overall fickleness of European 'great power' politics. It is important to remain cognisant of these relationships when reviewing and utilising British diplomatic reports.

It is also important to recognise that some of the prejudices common to the era would sometimes seep into their opinions (e.g. fear of organised labour and militant agrarian movements, and general suspicions of the Jews). In addition, some regions or peoples received disproportionate reporting, such as the Italians in the Habsburg Empire, and others far too little, like the Ukrainians in the Russian Empire (but not the Ruthenes in Galicia, who were generously represented). Overall, the above characteristics were relatively easy to identify and compensate for, as was the point that although they were all working for the same government, they were not necessarily all one voice. As noted, at the very least the diplomats were dedicated to presenting multiple positions and arguments.

Finally, it should be noted that only a small number of direct citations from British diplomatic correspondence could be found across all the secondary sources examined for this work, in total. Of course, there are many others works on these empires that are not cited here, and British archives have been well mined by diplomatic and military historians, and by international relations scholars. The absence of citations from such a wide list indicated that these archives would be pertinent for a work on empire, especially one with a focus on the *internal*

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[54] See Jiri Koralka, "The Czech Question in International Relations at the Beginning of the 20th Century", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 48, No. 111 (Apr., 1970), p. 252. He notes that aside from during the 1908 Bosnian Crisis, the relations between Austria-Hungary and Britain were "correct, at times even friendly". Quote is from F.R. Bridge, "The Foreign Policy of the Monarchy", in M. Cornwall (ed.), *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary. A Multi-National Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe* (Exeter, 1990),

[55] see Taylor, *op.cit.,* pp. 179-180.

[56] for summaries of Anglo-Russian relations see Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire. 1801-1917* (Oxford, 1967).pp. 433-434, 451-459, 569 & 680-681.

[57] Bridge, Foreign Policy, *op.cit.,* p. 18.

workings of empire, considering just how much relevant information, and differing perspectives, were contained therein.

There is one final benefit to using British archives that at first may appear insignificant: the British archives always used the Gregorian calendar, unless reporting on a document verbatim. When there are two dates shown here (for example 12/24 March 1889), the latter day is the Gregorian. There are two final things to note. Some documents are unsigned and there is no indication of the identity of the sender, by way of initialling, or content. This was particularly noticeable during the Ambassadorship in Vienna of Sir Edmund Monson (1893-96). How such documents are cited is outlined in the bibliography. Finally, direct quotes from primary sources are repeated here verbatim, spelling errors and all, except for abbreviations of handwritten words such as "gvt", which are spelled out.

To supplement the British diplomatic archives, there are some primary documents cited from published works, of which particularly from Russia, there are numerous archive collections. In addition, the French language *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, the government journal of the Russian Empire, was invaluable for the original versions of Imperial *Ukases* (edicts) as well as declarations by regional Governors General and Governors.

1.6.   Secondary sources

The great majority of secondary sources used here are published in English, with some published in the French language. This again is reflective of the breadth of this study and availability of English language histories, and the ample works printed in English on the themes of empire, on related themes, and on the Russian and Habsburg Empires. Indeed, many of the great works on these Empires have been translated from the original Russian and German, including some used in this thesis.

With regard to works on these empires, they have become much more reliable in the last few generations. Writers who lived through their dissolution and aftermath, or had personal ties, often clouded older historical debates – an argument outlined in great detail by Alan Sked on Habsburg historiography in a speech to the Royal Historical Society in London in 1981.[58] This is not to denigrate the importance of such invaluable works; indeed many of these have been cited here. Rather, it is to point out that diligence was required when reading. Similar problems can also be found with some works (especially those written in the decades immediately after the First World War) that come across as 'winners narratives', and works written under the spectre of the Cold War.

Works on empire and imperialism can tend to be heavily theoretical, and as can be expected when theory meets concepts that have aroused a myriad of emotional responses for centuries. Some will project an ideological focus. Others are almost 'dripping' in ideology, highly

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[58] Sked, Historians, *op.cit.*

philosophical, or both. The most notable of these is *Empire*, by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri.[59] Again, this is not highlighted to criticise excellent works, but rather to emphasise that the reader must be aware of the context behind their writing. Finally, due to the often liberal and inconsistent interpretation of the terms 'empire' and 'imperialism' in works crossing multiple disciplines, what might purport to concern 'empire' or 'imperialism' may instead focus on only one of their forms, or on adjunct subjects such as 'colonialism'. For the former, the theories of Lenin and John Hobson are examples; from the latter – an enormous corpus of work – examples include books from Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire.[60]

The reader will come across a number of different types of works. These can be broken into a number of different categories: general works on the Habsburg and Russian Empires; more detailed works on themes concerning one or both Empires; a number comparing both Empires, or regions/peoples within one or both of these entities, a few specifically looking at the Habsburg and Russian Empires *as* empires, or analysing common themes or frameworks; and theoretical works on the concepts of empire and imperialism, nationalism and the 'nation', and power. This veritable plethora of literature streams is due to the nature of the questions to be addressed in this work, and that there has been little specifically approaching empire, or these two empires, from this perspective, as will be shown in the following literature review. For this work, some writers were chosen for background, such as others for detail, and still others for perspective. Individually, none of the categories of secondary works were alone enough to satisfy the requirements for this study. Although not a perfect fit, in combination they provided the tools from which to attack the questions at hand.

1.7. State of the Art

The starting point for this research was the neglect of the study of empire as organisational entities by historians, an impression that came from the difficulty in finding literature specifically addressing the core questions outlined above. Most existing works would either address one form of empire, or literature on the Habsburg and Russian Empires would rarely focus on them 'being' empires. As Solomon Wank noted about Austria-Hungary, "research agendas concentrating on the nationalities problem and attendant cultural and social issues miss the significance of the Habsburg Empire *qua* empire", and that they "usually take the imperial

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[59] Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA, 2000)
[60] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism" Chapter X: The Place of Imperialism in History, http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ch10.htm, last accessed 4 December, 2014. John A Hobson, *Imperialism, A Study* (London, 1902), sourced from http://www.marxists.org/archive/hobson/1902/imperialism/intro.htm, last accessed 29 November 2014. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York, 1963) & Aimé Césaire, *Discours sur le colonialisme* (Paris, 1955), whilst focused on the social misery of colonial rule, had their basis on the capitalist exploitation of the colonies.

structures for granted".[61] It became clear through analysing the literature on empires that much of what was being presented was not specifically about 'empire', per se.

The book that broke the seal was Dominic Lieven's *Empire. The Russian Empire and its Rivals,* published in 2003. Not only did *Empire* include a comparison between the Romanov and Habsburg realms, but it also crossed the 'imperial historiographical divide' by comparing the Russian Empire to the British.[62] *Empire* directed me to some older collected works, such as *After Empire* (1997) and *The Decline of Empires* (2001).[63] Whilst Lieven's work used Russia as a platform, *After Empire* and *The Decline of Empires* concerned 'collapse' and 'decline', the latter also crossing the imperial 'divide'. Neither specifically focussed on empires as structures, although one work that preceded these had done so, *The Political Systems of Empires*, by political scientist S.N. Eisenstadt (1969).[64] This covered major pre- and early-modern empires from antiquity to the eighteenth century in a highly complex, almost impenetrable manner. Less daunting was Maurice Duverger's edited work, *Le concept d'empire* (1980), which again focussed on one type of empire, as would perhaps the most famous work in this narrow band, Michael Doyle's *Empire* (1983), which compared maritime empires after having set up a sociological framework from Athens, Sparta and Rome, and then the Ottoman, Spanish and English (or 'First British') Empires.[65] Overall, these works were limited to a narrow sector of academia, so much so that Duverger's work, although oft cited, has yet to be translated into English.

As this had been a neglected field, many themes and 'angles' had not been explored. However, the multi-disciplinary study of empire has taken off since the turn of the millennium, and two examples stand out. The first was from Alexander Motyl, a political scientist influenced by Johan Galtung, who published *Imperial Ends: The Decline, Collapse and Revival of Empires* (2001).[66] This work was notable for its conceptual braveness, theorising about empires as systems that follow a cyclical pattern that would not have been out of place coming from Arnold Toynbee. Absent were most of the problems of Toynbean metaphysics, making this work robust enough to become, and remain, a regular entry on course reading lists. Motyl's analytical framework of the 'core-periphery' model was one of the first that included all forms of empire from antiquity to the twentieth century on an equal level. From the history academy, Jörn Leonhard and Ulrike von Hirschhausen's edited work, *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (2012) approaches the question of the

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[61] Wank, The Habsburg Empire, *op.cit.*, p. 45. He goes on to criticise historians for overlooking "theories of empire" from the likes of S.N. Eisenstadt, Michael Doyle & Alexander Motyl. Primary works: S.N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York, 1969), Michael Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, 1986), Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.*

[62] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.*

[63] *After Empire. Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires*, *op.cit.*, E. Brix, K. Koch & E. Vyslonzil (eds.), *The Decline of Empires* (Vienna, 2001)

[64] Eisenstadt, *op.cit.*

[65] Maurice Duverger (ed.), *Le Concept d'Empire* (Paris, 1980). Doyle, *op.cit.*

[66] Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.*

'imperial condition', as opposed to studying 'decline and fall',[67] with a focus on Central and Eastern Europe.

This work aims to combine elements of Motyl's approach (as well has his boldness) with a study of the 'imperial condition', utilising the Habsburg and Russian Empires as a case study to formulate a theoretical platform. Underlying this is the consideration that empires have an organisational structure, and the benchmark in understanding the machinations of such structures is Michael Mann. His books, *The Sources of Social Power Volumes 1-II* (1991, 1993), are by no means the only studies of power, but their avoidance of postmodern theorising, and grounding in logic, make them a highly accessible (if heavy) introduction into social group formation and organisation.

The literature on nationalism and the 'nation', themes that frequent this work, has been far more extensive than work on empire. The best-known works, from the likes of Miroslav Hroch, Ernest Gellner, Anthony Smith, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, Liah Greenfield and John Breuilly,[68] cover most of the extremely broad academic debates on nationalism and the 'nation', which are headlined by disagreements on the root causes of nationalism and the beginnings of the 'nation-state.' At its heart is a schism between 'primordial' views – which emphasise the historic, emotional notion of nationality – and constructivist (or instrumentalist), which see nations as social constructs designed to elicit group formation for claims making. Overlapping this is a debate between modernists (who see the 'nation' as forming in conjunction with the industrial revolution) and perennialists (who believe in the eternal continuity of the nation throughout history).[69] This will be expanded upon in the following chapter.

There has been a growing trend in the history profession of reconnecting with global metanarratives, which by their very nature cover empires. John Darwin's *After Tamerlane* (2007) stands out here. As an indication of the elevation of the topics of empire and imperialism as concepts within the history profession, the first general work that could be considered a text book for tertiary students was released in 2013, *Empires in World History*. Here Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper present a comprehensive overview of empires that considers the nature and condition of empire as well as providing a thorough narrative across human history, from the Roman and Chinese empires BCE through to touching on the "the present of the imperial pasts" of modern day entities, such as the United States, Russia, China and the European Union.[70]

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[67] Leonhard & von Hirschhausen, Comparing Empires, *op.cit.*

[68] Selected examples used here: Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge, UK, 1985); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983); Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism* (London, 1998), which is essentially a 270 page 'state-of-the-art' on nationalism; E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, UK, 1992); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983); Liah Greenfeld, *Nationality. Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA, 1993); John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester, 1993).

[69] For details see Daniele Conversi, "Mapping the field: theories of nationalism and the ethnosymbolic approach", in A.S. Leoussi & S. Grosby (eds.), *Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations* (Edinburgh, 2006), pp. 15-30.

[70] Burbank and Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 455.

Literature on the Austrian and Russian Empires is immense. History continues to passionately debate the 'end' of these empires, although still rarely from the perspective of 'empire'. Indeed, most works on these two empires do not look at them specifically as empires, or if they do it is secondary or superficial. With regards to an overview of the Habsburg Empires during the period in question, for pure facts and narrative (and despite their age) it is still hard to beat Robert Kann's *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918* (originally published 1974) and A.J.P. Taylor's *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918* (originally published 1948).[71] Their styles couldn't be more different: Kann's clinical, almost Rankean approach contrasts with Taylor's typically florid, opinionated account, yet both were empirically strong and offer an exceptional picture of the travails of the realm.[72] For the Russian Empire another classic, Hugh Seton-Watson's *The Russian Empire 1801-1917* (1967) offers a good starting point for study, one Lieven cites as "indispensible".[73]

When it comes to specific thematic areas with the two empires, there is almost always a scholar or two who stand at the forefront. To give but a few examples, with regards to the Russian Empire: for Russification it's Andreas Kappeler, Theodore Weeks and David Saunders, who overlap with the likes of Juliette Cadiot and Mikhail Dolbilov on Russian statehood and nationality.[74] Peter Gatrell's work on Russian economics dovetails the older works of the prolific Theodore von Laue.[75] David Good and John Komlos remain giants in the study of Habsburg economics, recently joined by the likes of Max-Stephan Schulze and Marc Flandreau, who have made a convincing case that the Habsburg economy can offer a template guide for the European Union.[76] Gary Cohen, Tara Zahra and Joachim von Puttkamer have raised the issue of

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[71] The Kann version cited throughout this work is the first paperback printing: Robert Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918* (Berkeley, 1980). For Taylor see *op.cit.* The version cited in this work is the 1990 Penguin paperback reprint.

[72] A.J.P. Taylor's criticism of Kann – that his *Multinational Empire* operated by the "delusion that if only we know enough facts, we shall arrive at the answer". See Sked, Historians, *op.cit.,* p. 176. Hans Kohn notably called Taylor "no friend of the monarchy", which is discernable in his writing without overshadowing the content itself. Kohn, Collapse, *op.cit.,* p. 257.

[73] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*

[74] Selected examples used here: Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History* (Harlow, 2001); Theodore R. Weeks, "Russification and the Lithuanians, 1863-1905, *Slavic Review,* Vol. 60. No. 1 (Spring, 2001), pp. 96-114; David Saunders, "Regional Diversity in the Later Russian Empire", *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society"* Sixth Series, Vol. 10 (2000), pp. 143-163; Juliette Cadiot, "Searching for Nationality: Statistics and National Categories at the end of the Russian Empire (1897-1917), *Russian Review,* Vol. 64, No. 3 (Jul. 2005), pp. 440-445; Mikhail Dolbilov, "Russian Nationalism and the Nineteenth-Century Policy of Russification in the Russian Empire's Western Region", in K. Matsuzato (ed.), *Imperiology: from empirical knowledge to discussing the Russian empire* (Hokkaido, 2007), pp. 141-158.

[75] Selected examples used here: Peter Gatrell, "Economic Culture, Economic Policy and Economic Growth in Russia, 1861-1914" *Cahiers du Monde russe*, Vol. 36, No. 1/2, Cultures économiques et politiques économiques dans l'Empire tsariste et en URSS, 1861-1950 (Jan.-Jun., 1995), pp. 37-52; Theodore von Laue, "The High Cost and the Gamble of the Witte System: A Chapter in the Industrialization of Russia, *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Autumn, 1953), pp. 425-448.

[76] Selected examples used here: David F. Good, "The Economic Lag of Central and Eastern Europe: Income Estimates for the Habsburg Successor States. 1870-1910", *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Mar., 1986); John Komlos, *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union: Economic Development in Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, 1983); Max-Stephan Schulze, "Origins of catch-up failure: Comparative productivity growth in the Habsburg Empire, 1870-1910", *European Review of Economic History*, Vol. 11, Issue 2,

education.[77] The likes of regional specialists such as Matti Klinge (Finland), Borut Klabjan (Slovenia), Mark Cornwall (Bohemia) and Andriy Zayarnyuk ('Ruthenia') is almost endless.[78]

When considering this endeavour, each of these invaluable works touches upon the questions raised in this thesis, some more than others, but none directly. For example, there is no stream of literature that addresses the topic as specifically as this one does. As noted, most histories of the Russian and Habsburg Empires do not primarily focus upon their 'imperial being', indeed there are not that many works that concern 'imperial being' overall. There is still plenty of room in the history for a work such as this. In effect, if compared to the antecedents in the literature, this work is a hybrid.

1.8.   Chapter overview

This work is broken into four parts, with nine chapters. The first part has four chapters, including this introduction. As this work has strong, complicated theoretical elements, Chapter 2 offers a detailed outline of definitions and reviews theories encompassing the core concepts upon which this work is based: empire, nationalism and the 'nation', and power. It will set up the key analytical framework – the "Imperial Power Structure". Chapter 3 is intended to briefly set the scene for this work, introducing the Imperial Power Structures of the Habsburg and Russian Empires in 1854. Chapter 4 will provide a very brief overview of the European 'great power' situation over the period of this study. This is a set up chapter, which has been kept brief for three reasons: 1) space – to have taken this to its fullest extent would have added hundreds of pages to this work, and for the requirements of this study that level of detail is not necessary; 2) familiarity – most of the events will not be unfamiliar to the reader of history; and 3) function – the international machinations are outlined here to provide the international context for the historical narrative to follow.

(2007), pp. 189-218.; Marc Flandreau, "The logic of compromise: Monetary bargaining in Austria-Hungary, 1867-1913", *European Review of Economic History*, 10 (2006), pp. 3-33.

[77] Selected examples used here:, Gary Cohen, "The Politics of Access to Advanced Education in Imperial Austria", Centre for Austrian Studies Working Paper 93-6, September 1993, www.cas.umn.edu/assets/pdf/WP936.PDF, last accessed 28 November 2014; Tara Zahra, "Reclaiming Children for the Nation: Germanizaton, National Ascription, and Democracy in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1945", in *Central European History*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2004), pp. 501-543; Joachim von Puttkamer, "Schooling, Religion and the Integration of Empire – Education in the Habsburg Monarchy in Tsarist Russia", in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.) *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), pp. 359-372.

[78] Selected examples used here: Matti Klinge, "Finland: from Napoleonic legacy to Nordic co-operation" in M. Teich & R. Porter (eds.), *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context* (Cambridge, UK, 1993), pp. 317-331; Borut Klabjan, "'Scramble for Adria': Discourses of Appropriation of the Adriatic Space Before and After World War One," *Austrian History Yearbook,* Vol. 42 (2011), pp. 16-32; Mark Cornwall, "The Struggle on the Czech-German Language Border, 1880-1940", *English Historical Review*, Vol. 109, No. 433 (Sept, 1995), pp. 914-955; Andriy Zayarnyuk, "Obtaining History: The Case of Ukrainians in Habsburg Galicia, 1848-1900", *Austrian History Yearbook 36* (2005), 121-147.

Parts 2 and 3 make up the main body of this work, providing a multi-disciplinary analysis of sixty years of these two empires. Part 2 is made up of two chapters: Chapter 5 introduces the push for reform, and introduces nation-state ideological frameworks. It will then focus on nation-state inspired reform in what is called the 'engine room of empire': economics, politics and the military. Chapter 6 examines initiatives developed to help these reforms, and the overall objectives of imperial 'catch-up', to be met. These cover education, data science, legal and censorship reform, and civil liberties.

Part 3 is also broken into two chapters. Chapter 7 examines the effects, and outputs, of nationalism and the 'core', and is far more focussed on group formation. Chapter 8 examines the same dynamic in the peripheries, including those groups that straddled the imperial core and the periphery. These two chapters will examine the role of the nation in all its manifestations on both empires, and includes individual comparisons of selected national movements, and regions, on both sides of the imperial border.

The first half of Part 4 is set up to mirror Chapter 3. Chapters 9.1 and 9.2 provide an outline to the respective Imperial Power Structures in 1914, whilst identifying the major changes between 1854 and this year. Finally, Chapter 9.4 introduces a brief overview of the Ottoman Empire of the same period as this study. It is a preliminary analysis; included to test the viability of this study, and explore whether it is possible to extend this study to other imperial entities. The conclusion will follow.

Chapter Two

2. Definitions and frameworks

2.1. Behind 'empire'

Consensus on definitions of empire, as well as which historical entities actually belong to the family of empires, remain elusive. The general nature of the origins of the term – 'empire' derives from the Latin *imperium*, which essentially denoted the legitimised power, or authority, to command[79] – and its rather liberal application throughout history, both contemporaneously and by historians, make it difficult to 'pin down'.[80] As Maurice Duverger describes it: "The word evokes a distant goal, a general direction, rather than an objective achievable in a reasonable time. The process is more important than the project."[81]

In the past hundred years, the transformation of the terms 'empire' and 'imperialism' into mostly negative rhetorical tools, strategically deployed in debates covering the post-colonial condition, to the Cold War, to the globalised, multinational world of today, has muddied the waters.[82] The imperial status of a number of historical entities that have carried the title 'empire' is also in dispute. The Habsburg Empire, for example has many scholars who, if they do not outright deny its 'imperial being', certainly gloss over it – as evidenced by the frequently referring to its post-1867 manifestation as the "Dual Monarchy" or merely "Monarchy", a designation one will *never* find for the Romanovs.[83] Some scholars also discount the European maritime empires of the nineteenth and twentieth century. The absence of a dynastic 'emperor' is one of the disqualifiers.[84]

Rather than directly join these debates, a brief overview of descriptions of empire will be provided as a platform for this work, then more importantly, the primary conditions which have 'qualified' historical entities as accepted empires will be summarised relevant to the subject at hand – the late period Habsburg and Russian Empires. A detailed, concrete definition will be avoided: in this respect this work will follow in the footsteps of Duverger and Lieven, in that any

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[79] Reynolds, *op.cit.,* p. 153, noted that the word was used "for all kinds of authority and power from that of heads of households up". See also Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires. American Ascendency and its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA, 2006), p. 36.

[80] For an excellent overview, see Lieven, Empires, *op.cit.,* pp. 3-26.

[81] Duverger, *op.cit.,* p. 6. Author's translation.

[82] Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.,* 2. For the Cold War in particular, see Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 3.

[83] For example, see Suppan, *op.cit.,* p. 49, who claims the entity changed from Empire to "Dual Monarchy" after 1867, using Motyl's contention that empire is "a relationship of absolute control by a core elite and state over a peripheral elite and distinct society".

[84] Such as Emmanuelle Jouannet, "The Disappearance of the Concept of Empire. Or, the Beginning of the End of Empires in Europe in the 18th Century", Conference Presentation to: A Just Empire? Rome's Legal Legacy and the Justification for War and Empire in International Law, Commemorative Conference on Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), New York University School of Law, March 13-15, 2008, http://www.univ-paris1.fr/fileadmin/IREDIES/Contributions_en_ligne/E._JOUANNET/The_Disappearance_of_the_Concept_of_Empire_E._Jouannet-2.pdf, last accessed 12 January, 2015.

tight definition would only hinder investigation into such diverse entities.[85] Empires were not regimentally pressed from the same, relatively consistent template in a way one could argue nation-states are, and the imperial idea has been extremely fluid throughout history. To insist on such a definition could lead to the mass deletion of historical entities from the family of empires – a family whose 'members' have had quite diverse ideological and structural platforms. By far the more beneficial approach in understanding 'what is empire' would be to outline shared conditions – in effect, discovering what is common about these entities that qualify them as empires. In the words of Susan Reynolds, it's important to decide "which phenomena – which actual polities, past and present – that those who use the word refer to, and deciding what characteristics these phenomena share that make them a category".[86]

It is universally agreed that formal empire is a distinct type of political organisation – a type of 'state'.[87] How are empires distinguished from other forms of state? At its fundamental human level, Michael Doyle characterises empire as the manifestation of the "effective control, whether formal or informal, of a subordinated society by an imperial society".[88] Societal stratification on a variety of levels is paramount, as Charles Maier shows:

> The elites of different ethnic or national units defer to and acquiesce in the political leadership of the dominant power. Whether out of constraint, convenience, or conviction, they accept the values of those who govern the dominant centre or metropole, although they often seek to implant or influence those very values […] The influential classes in each national or regional capital defer to the projects of the imperial capital.[89]

This "hierarchically organised political system", Motyl argues, is defined by "a hublike structure – a rimless wheel – within which a core elite and state dominate peripheral elites and societies".[90] The core refers to the centre of the wheel and the peripheries the spokes. The lack of a rim for the wheel ensures there is little to no collective organisation amongst the peripheries, thereby guaranteeing the core primacy by keeping the peripheries as far apart form each other as possible.[91] As the number and type of peripheries, and their importance regarding the core wax and wane over time, imperial systems are both notoriously fluid and notable for, as Peter Turchin argued, the complexity of their power structures.[92]

At this point it bears differentiating 'empire' from 'imperialism'. Although enormously valuable, the early and still very influential introductions to imperialism from the likes of Hobson

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[85] See Duverger, *op.cit.,* especially pp. 6-7. Lieven, Empires, *op.cit.,* p. 417, stated that "Like Maurice Duverger, I strongly suspect that such a definition would prove unusable."

[86] Reynolds, *op.cit.,* p. 151. She continued: "and second, considering whether there are other phenomena that share significant characteristics with the first group and therefore ought to be brought into the discussion even if they are not usually called empires".

[87] Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.,* p. 1.

[88] Doyle, *op.cit.,* p. 30.

[89] Maier, Among Empires, *op.cit.,* p. 33.

[90] Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.,* p. 4. They do this by "serving as intermediaries for their significant interactions and by channelling resource flows from the periphery to the core and back to the periphery".

[91] *Ibid.,* pp. 16 & 17.

[92] Peter Turchin, *War and Peace and War: The Life Cycles of Imperial Nations* (New York, 2007), p. 3.

and Lenin essentially conclude that empire is imperialism, which in turn is the result, and the "highest stage", of capitalism.[93] This hypothesis was directed at colonial exploitation by maritime powers, which to other more recent scholars, like Emmanuelle Jouannet, do not represent empires at all; rather new states that raise the "imperial impulse" in their "desire to build anew a fantasised empire".[94] To cut through the confusing antecedents, put simply, empire is an entity and imperialism is an action. That is why empires must practice imperialism to be empires, whereas any organised entity can theoretically practice imperialism – hence the contemporary confusion caused by states and multinational organisations 'acting in the manner of an empire' on a transnational level.

2.1.1   What makes an empire?

A review of primary qualifying conditions will confirm that the Habsburg and Russian Empires are legitimate subjects for investigating empires and imperialism, as well as ideal comparative units. Eric Hobsbawm – in looking back at a century that saw the end of the age of empire – reflected a common theme in the historiography; one that has curtailed further investigation into empires by historians: "The empires that have collapsed, or have been liquidated, in our century belong to several types; they seem to have little in common except that in them some outlying region or regions are ruled from a more or less remote centre which is not believed to represent the interests of their inhabitants or local rulers."[95] This section will strongly dispute Hobsbawm's position. Of course, not every 'common condition' is exclusive to empire – nor do all empires have to tick every single box, per se. Some may even appear contradictory. It is the overall combination of these characteristics in synthesis that makes an empire. These characteristics will be listed here, in no particular hierarchy of importance, with a quick reference to the Russian and Habsburg Empires. These connections will be elaborated upon in much greater detail, and become apparent, throughout the body of this work.

a. Empires are noted for their geographic scale and human diversity

Geographic extent is almost a given in the historiography of empire.[96] Even though Peter Turchin is entirely correct to note that "the key variable is size. When large enough, states invariably encompass ethnically diverse people; this makes them into multiethnic states",[97] it must be stressed that size is also a relative concept, dependent on for example, the modernity of

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[93] Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.,* p. 2.

[94] Jouannet, *op.cit.,* p. 3.

[95] Hobsbawm, The End of Empires, *op.cit.,* p. 12.

[96] To Duverger, "the extent of territory constitutes a fundamental criterion of empires". Duverger, *op.cit.* p. 8. Author's translation.

[97] Turchin, *op.cit.,* p. 3. Also see Sviatoslav Kaspe, "Imperial Political Culture and Modernization in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century", in J. Burbank, M. von Hagen & A. Remnev (eds.), *Russian Empire. Space, People, Power, 1700-1930* (Bloomington, IN, 2007), p. 456, who uses as "critical attributes", "a considerable territorial scale" and "ethno-cultural and ethno-political heterogeneity".

transport and communications.[98] The sheer size of the Russian Empire was even more breath taking than that of the Russian Federation today, and its diversity such that ethnic Russians constituted a minority of the imperial population at the only time an empire-wide census was taken, in 1897. With regards to Habsburg Empire, its relative size was enormous. The almost unprecedented diversity of the realm needs no elaboration, and due to the unequal development of transport links, the many corners of the realm must have felt worlds away from Vienna and Budapest, especially at the beginning of the period of this study. For example, transport links to and throughout Dalmatia province were unsuitable for mass military supply, leaving the numerous Adriatic garrisons vulnerable, which led to the formulation of plans to seize Bosnia in 1854.[99] Indeed, an insurrection in southern Dalmatia in 1869/70 had to be quelled by more than 10,000 imperial troops sent by sea, as the only direct land route to South Dalmatia was through Ottoman territory.[100] This is reminiscent of the supply of Japanese troops to Korea, or French troops to Algeria, for example. All three were examples of imperialism at work: acts of being and maintaining an empire. Finally, how territory was accumulated, and the nature of those territories, can add complexity: Turchin has noted that building up territory and populations over a long time-span in fits and starts can lead to complicated "chains of command and the coexistence of heterogeneous territories within one state".[101]

b. Empires are noted for having a 'core' (or 'cores') and 'peripheries'

Although this typology originated in world-systems and regional development theory, leading to its natural application to maritime empires, it is still a noticeable phenomenon in all forms of empires. In the historiography, the core and periphery are geographically delimited.[102] Motyl contends that "a core is a multidimensional set of territorially concentrated and mutually reinforcing organizations exercising highly centralized authority in a state. In contrast to cores, peripheries are the territorially bounded administrative outposts of central organizations".[103] Geographic delimitations of 'core' and 'periphery' are however one-dimensional; this can be alleviated by focussing on organisation, which allows socio-political considerations such as class

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[98] Reynolds, *op.cit.,* p. 158-159. She wrote: "Size, to start with, has to be relative, depending on the technology of communications and the nature of economies: polities comprising areas that support only thinly scattered populations look more impressive empires on a map than those that cover smaller but more densely settled and intensively exploited areas." Also see Duverger, *op.cit,* pp. 8-9. "Physical distance led to cultural diversity, as long as the movement of men and the dissemination of ideas collided with material obstacles, overcome only in the twentieth-century." Author's translation.

[99] Alan Palmer, *Twilight of the Habsburgs: The Life and Times of Emperor Franz Josef* (London, 1994), p. 197.

[100] Lawrence Sondhaus, *The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary 1867-1918. Navalism, Industrial Development, and the Politics of Dualism* (West Lafayette, IN, 1994), p. 13.

[101] Turchin, *op.cit.,* p. 3.

[102] Alexander J. Motyl, "Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Respective, *Comparative* Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jan., 1999), p. 128, stated that empires "consist of distinct regions, the 'core' and the 'periphery'".

[103] Alexander J. Motyl, "Thinking About Empire" Section: Collapse of Empires: Causes, K. Barkey & M. von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire. Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, CO, 1997), p. 20.

to be taken into account. To give a supporting example: in the British Empire of 1880, dock workers receiving raw materials in England were barely a part of the core, except that they lived in the geographic metropole and spoke the same language as the elites. As this was before the Third Reform Act, it was likely that most were ineligible to vote. Arguably, they were just as much the 'engine room' of the imperial project – the worker drones as it were – as the dock workers sending those same goods from, for example, Lagos. The one arena where these two groups would come together was on the battlefield, and even then there were barriers. Although many millions of men jumped the trenches for their homeland, could anyone argue that the French soldiers on the Western Front showed any more or less dedication to France than the Tirailleurs Sénégalais? How different were these two groups when it came to empire?

Both the Russian and Habsburg Empires had well known geographic and social cores – St. Petersburg for Russia, Vienna for Austria, with particularly strong 'sub-cores' in Moscow, Budapest and Lviv (the latter two were respectively the 'core' cities for regional Hungarian and Polish hegemony).[104] The Tsar stood at the peak of the Russian Imperial Power Structure, surrounded by an organised cadre of elites including non-Russians. The Kaiser – although in what would prove a much more pluralistic and divided model – was ultimately likewise in the Habsburg Empire. This primary structure is essential in defining empire, and will be outlined in Chapter 3.[105]

c. Core elites are generally of the same socio- or ethno-linguistic group as the ruler or ruling clique

Although acute in the modern maritime empires, in traditional empires this was more specific to social elites, with ethno-linguistic conformity later encroaching on the core by degrees in both the Russian and Habsburg Empires, especially after the rise of the 'nation' and the slow decline of the estates. The key term here is 'elites', both a tool and a crutch of empire, as Charles Maier noted with his characterisation that empires have "a regime that centralizes power but enlists diverse social and/or ethnic elites in its management".[106] As the nineteenth century wore on, three dynamics could be observed in these empires: 1) some Russian elites identified more as ethnically and culturally Russian, and in turn others became troubled by sharing their elite 'space' with Baltic Germans; 2) Hungarian elites, who had already cemented their national identity well before they revolted in 1848, if anything strengthening their Magyar resolve; and 3) Austrian German elites, a smaller number of whom would identify more as German (especially after the rise of the German Empire after 1871) but would be disappointed by their sovereign (and numerous conservative Austrian German politicians). To their chagrin, they found that identifying as German was demonstrably less important to the Emperor than doing whatever was needed to remain a 'great power', such as dampening any Austrian German ethno-linguistic exceptionalism.

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[104] Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.*, pp. He claimed that outside the core – the Habsburg crown lands – was the non-German periphery.

[105] *Ibid.,* p. 21.

[106] Maier, Among Empires, *op.cit.*, p. 31.

In many instances, elites from the various component nationalities may not have aligned with their 'nation' at all, or they adopted multiple loyalties. As Paul Magosci has argued, "in multinational states, it was and still is natural to find individuals who feel perfectly comfortable with one or more 'national' loyalties or identities".[107] Overall, although German would remain the Habsburg lingua franca, the Austrian Germans never established an ethno-linguistic hold on the Habsburg core – something some Russian elites – and practically the entire body of Hungarian elites – would strive for after the mid-nineteenth century. Social status arguably remained more important on an imperial level: only the Hungarians really took ethno-linguistic conformity seriously. This was unsurprising, as they were heavily influenced by French 'nation building'.[108] Much of the reason for the polar opposite approach in Cisleithania was that Franz Josef – although at heart a "German prince"[109] – genuinely saw himself as ruler of all component nationalities and was ever cognisant of trying to live up to his unwieldy title, as we will see.[110] The logic here is obvious – as Lieven has argued: "An empire's survival depends crucially on its relationship with the core, majority population. If the latter's elites begin to adopt a narrow ethnic nationalism rather than a broader imperial patriotism, then the empire's stability will be undermined."[111] Finally, as proven when Hungarian and Polish elites frustrated Czech attempts at their own *Ausgleich* with Franz Josef, peripheral elites would prove more likely to be competitors within imperial parameters, not collaborators against it.[112]

d. The relationship between core and peripheries is asymmetric

Although manifesting through trade and resource extraction and allocation – the focus of classical imperialism theorists like Hobson, Schumpeter and Lenin[113] – asymmetric imperial relationships should be seen with respect to the imperial endeavour itself. Eisenstadt attributed this to "the continuous needs of the rulers for different types of resources and especially their great dependence on various flexible resources".[114] This can include provision of peripheral subjects for taxation or military service – which could be ideologically 'fulfilling' for the imperial

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[107] Paul Robert Magocsi, "A Subordinate Or Submerged People: The Ukrainians of Galicia Under Habsburg and Soviet Rule", in R. L. Rudolph & D. F. Good (eds.), *Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union* (Minneapolis, 1992), p. 97.

[108] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 195.

[109] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 181, wrote that "when it was first suggested to him that he should appeal to the Croats by being crowned King of Croatia, he replied in shock surprise: 'But I am a German prince'".

[110] For a summary of his titles, see Remak, *op.cit.,* p. 128. It runs to *twelve* lines of text, and even includes redundant titles such as "King of Jerusalem" and the even older "Duke of Lotharingia".

[111] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 156.

[112] Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.,* p. 23.

[113] Lenin, *op.cit.,* Hobson, *op.cit.,* Joseph Schumpeter, "State Imperialism and Capitalism" – passages from "Sociology of Imperialism", originally published in *Acrhiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 46* (1919), http://www.panarchy.org/schumpeter/imperialism.html, last accessed 4 December 2014.
For an excellent summary of all three viewpoints, as well as other perspectives, see Doyle, *op.cit.,* particularly pp. 22-24.

[114] Although referring specifically to pre- and early-modern empires, this point is pertinent for empires like the Habsburg and Russian of the nineteenth century, and arguably for all forms of empire. See Eisenstadt, *op.cit.,* p. xviii.

core as it confirms them as the protectors, empowerers and commanders of a multitude of diverse peoples, not to mention reinforcing the threat of state control of violence. Indeed, the asymmetry can refer merely to 'ideological relationship'.

In addition, access to power is different for different groups.[115] Motyl elaborates the different roles of core and peripheral elites in an Imperial Power Structure that in itself defines an asymmetric relationship: "Core elites craft foreign and defence policy, control the armed forces, regulate the economy, process information, maintain law and order, extract resources, pass legislation, and oversee borders. Peripheral elites implement core policies."[116] To the latter should be added 'pertaining to the imperial project'. This implies correctly that asymmetry is a condition of having peripheries reinforcing the core, and that the peripheral elites are reliant on the good graces of the core, *with respect to* the imperial project.

On the surface, in Russia in particular, this relationship might appear absent. However, the Baltic *Landtage* for example, were instrumental in managing vital borderlands, and their own Estonian and Latvian populations, on behalf of the empire, as well as providing revenue and human capital to the imperial project. The same can be said for the people of Finland, who also provided nautical expertise to help grow the imperial Russian navy. Moving out of the 'national' realm, new organisations such as the *zemstva* provided a classic example of this dynamic. One of their roles – as envisaged by the Emperor on their creation – was to manage the provision of the needs of the imperial realm within their allocated region. In short, to govern at a level St. Petersburg had no interest in becoming deeply involved in. They would continue to do this until the end of the time period of this study, even though they very soon drifted into the realm of internal periphery, as we will discover later. As for the Habsburg Empire, it pays to touch on the dynamic between the imperial core and the strongest imperial periphery, which itself acted as a core over nearly half of the realm. Hungary after 1867 was undoubtedly one of the most powerful peripheries in the world history of empire, perhaps unsurpassed since the rise of the Constantinople in the fourth century Roman Empire. It is true that the Hungarians, with respect to the imperial project, may have manipulated the *Ausgleich* to ensure a free hand in Transleithania, and used the decennial Quota negotiations as both a bargaining chip and a ransom. With these and numerous other examples that will be outlined, the relationship does not appear asymmetric.

However, they still provided the Empire with men and military resources to an army (and navy) they had no control over – a military that was *the* centrepiece of this Empire, as it was with all empires in history. They also provided imperial bureaucrats from ministers down, in this instance more than willingly. They had to accept imperial institutions under the power of the sovereign within their borders – most importantly, the imperial army. They had no standing army of their own, their parliament was subject to veto and proroguing powers, and their king, who was of course the Habsburg emperor, could sack ministers. For their recalcitrance, Hungary was nearly invaded

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[115] Turchin, *op.cit.*, p. 5.
[116] Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

by the Imperial Army in 1905 and threatened with universal suffrage, actions from which they would have had no official recourse. This is a reminder that irrespective of increasing Hungarian influence within the empire, and a great degree of growing power, they were still an imperial periphery. On empire-wide issues, they were still providing for the imperial project. The Imperial Army that would have invaded in 1905 would have included soldiers from other non-German nationalities, such as Czechs, Poles and Croats, who had more bones to pick with the Hungarians than with their sovereign, in part resulting from another imperial trait: 'divide and rule'.

e. Empires rely on varying combinations of direct and indirect rule, status group creation and mastery of 'divide and rule'

This is a natural consequence of both the size and diversity of empires. Without the support of various elites across imperial realms, empires can falter. This also requires a degree of "group tolerance" from the top down, much more than in homogenous nation-states.[117] At the same time, some direct rule is an absolute necessity, to prevent too much local independence, not to mention revolt.[118] Such demarcation and behaviour bred imbalance between and within groups, and fuelled their development, and this was the case – in abundance – for both the Russian and Habsburg Empires. Hand-in-hand with balancing direct and indirect rule was status-group creation and mastery of 'divide-and-rule', which the Russian and (particularly) the Habsburg empires practiced with distinction. Residues from a long line of aristocratic empires, these strategies aimed to ensure adequate loyalty in selected regional rulers so they could "use existing practices, understandings, and relationships to extract the minimum of tribute, military support, and loyalty for the centre's benefit".[119]

Although considerably different in motivation and execution, Russian efforts in Finland after 1862 and the Baltic provinces from the 1880s both exhibit a balance between direct and indirect rule, status group creation and divide-and-rule policies in abundance, as will be seen in this work. Vienna's politics post-1867 alone is a veritable encyclopaedia of these conditions; William McCagg argues convincingly that the Habsburgs "proved themselves master of the game of playing one nationality against another",[120] which they showed during after the emergencies of 1848/49,[121] and which they would go on to perfect – in Cisleithania at least – after *Ausgleich.*[122]

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[117] Maier, Among Empires, *op.cit.,* p. 30. Also see Amy Chua, who based her entire thesis on imperial decline and fall on 'tolerance'. Amy Chua, *Day of Empire. How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance – and How they Fall* (New York, 2007)

[118] Duverger, *op.cit.,* p. 11, states: "An administrative and military centralisation is necessary to prevent revolts of the dominated classes and the transformation of local governors into independent feudal lords." Author's translation.

[119] Charles Tilly, "How Empires End", in K. Barkey and M. von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire. Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, CO, 1997), p. 4.

[120] William O. McCagg, "The Soviet Union and the Habsburg Empire: Problems of Comparison", in R.L. Rudolph and D.F. Good (eds.), *Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union* (Minneapolis, 1992), p. 50.

[121] John-Paul Himka, "Nationality Problems in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union: The Perspective of History", in R. L. Rudolph and D. F. Good (eds.), *Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union* (Minneapolis, 1992), p. 82. He states that they were successful in "playing the the 'non-historic' nationalities off against the 'historic' nationalities".

As with so much in Habsburg history, it was a matter of priorities, and expedience: as A.J.P. Taylor argued: "Francis Joseph himself had not hesitated to manoeuvre between the nationalities and even to encourage their rivalry; his sole aim had been to resist any interference with the army and with foreign affairs."[123] In addition, both Empires clearly understood what Motyl described as vital for imperial health – the segmentation, manipulation and separation of peripheries.[124] Included in this manipulation was the use of Diets and other forms of demarcated governance such as the *zemstva* when the need arose or when faced with no other choice. These bodies understood this allocated power and knew how to turn it back on those by whose graces they existed – both imperial (and the Austrian) governments.

f. Empires are inherently militaristic

For empires, the military was at once the source of expansionary power, a stabilising or defensive institution, a means of population management and subversion, and the pinnacle from which imperial rulers (emperors, constitutional monarchs and elected leaders and cliques) drew prestige and purveyed ideological guardianship. The military was arguably the platform upon which entire empires were built. In the words of Maurice Duverger: "Classical empires and colonial empires look the same on an essential point: the role of the army in their formation and maintenance."[125] The militarism, and reliance on military regalia and symbolism, of both the Russian and Habsburg Empire is without question – to remain a 'great power' both empires required a strong military, and to retain an imperial air, both Franz Josef and the four tsars covered by this study (Nicholas I, Alexander II, Alexander III and Nicholas II) considered their armies as by-right dynastic tools. Nor were they shy in interacting with their populations from horseback in overladen officers uniforms.[126] Finally, empires were militaristic regardless of whether they were formed through conquest, negotiation ("coercion" in Maier's words)[127] or dynastic intermarriage. The latter two were the predominant modes of territorial accumulation for the Habsburgs, whereas the first two were the primary means for the Russians.[128]

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[122] Rusinow, *op.cit.,* p 254.

[123] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 189.

[124] Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.,* p. 17.

[125] Duverger, *op.cit.,* p. 20. He added: "Necessary for the establishment of empires, armies are also necessary for their conservation." Author's translation.

[126] For the example of Franz Josef, and also how much he lived the 'military lifestyle', see Paula Sutter Fichtner, *The Habsburg Empire: From Dynasticism to Multinationalism* (Malabar, FL, 1997), p. 97.

[127] Maier, Among Empires, *op.cit.,* p. 24.

[128] Lieven, Dilemmas, *op.cit.,* p. 188, only referred to dynastic marriage and conquest, yet there was also a considerable history of 'negotiated expansion' for both empires. Jean Bérenger argued in the Habsburg case that, with the exceptions of Galicia and Bosnia-Herzegovina: "The basis of the Empire was never military conquest, but the voluntary unions based upon the contract between the nation (Czech or Hungarian) and the Habsburg monarch." Jean Bérenger, "L'Empire austro-hongrois" in M. Duverger (ed.) *Le concept d'empire* (Paris, 1980), p. 311. Author's translation.

g. Empires are particularly sensitive to, and yet reliant on, geopolitics

Hand-in-hand with militarism is the imperial sensitivity to, and reliance on, geopolitics. As George Steinmetz remarked, in a comment equally valid for the maritime forms, "traditional ones combined militarization with restless expansion and various mechanisms aimed at stabilizing and pacifying geopolitical relations".[129] Although Lenin famously wrote about monopoly capitalism, after reaching 'capacity', resorting to the "'free grabbing' of territories", leading to a "particularly intense struggle for the division and the redivision of the world", one can argue that, from the 1880s to 1910 at least, this struggle was indeed stabilising and pacifying to the global system, if not the colonies themselves.[130]

Empires exist under pressures from competing states and external forces representing peripheral groups contained within – and yet they rely on geopolitics, as international success provides new resource opportunities, and fuels the pomposity and hubris that helps keep subjects 'on side'. In short, Dominic Lieven contends that empires must be great powers,[131] and as such, a "loss of pre-eminence" can be devastating.[132] Historians agree that for both empires, maintenance of 'great power' standing was their *raison d'être*.[133] External pressures and pressures to be 'external' would affect Imperial Power Structures as well,[134] bringing to pass the words of Jürgen Osterhammel: "Empires are mortal and aware of their mortality."[135]

2.1.2. The great modern imperial divide

There remains one major distinction: formal empires from roughly the last 200 years are generally split into two distinct categories: 'contiguous/land' and 'non-contiguous/maritime'.[136] The former include the Russian, Habsburg as well as the Ottoman, and arguably the Chinese and

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[129] George Steinmetz, "Return to Europe: The New U.S. Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective", *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), p. 342.

[130] Lenin, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

[131] Dominic Lieven, "The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 30, No 4 (Oct. 1995), p. 608. With regards the Habsburg Empire, he argued that: "Apart from inertia, the strongest single force holding the various nationalities within the monarchy was the belief that in its absence they would become subject either to a universal Russian autocratic dominion or to the rule of a Greater German nationalist state." Lieven, Dilemmas, *op.cit.*, p. 191.

[132] Carlo M. Cipolla, "Editors Introduction" to C. Cipolla (ed.), *The Economic Decline of Empires* (London, 1970), pp 1-2. Cipolla's entire argument is that the economies of declining empires were "generally faltering", which meant loss of pre-eminence.

[133] Regarding the Habsburg Empire, see John A. Hall, "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained", *Daedalus*, Vol. 122, No. 3, Reconstructing Nations and States (Summer, 1993), p. 12. Also see Solomon Wank, "The Nationalities Question in the Habsburg Monarchy: Reflections on the Historical Record", Franklin & Marshall College, April 1993, Working Paper 93-3. p. 9, and Dominic Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.*, p. 159.

[134] Eisenstadt, *op.cit.*, p. xviii. In referring to pre- and early-modern empires, Eisenstadt highlighted a point relevant to all forms: "the great and continuous sensitivity of the internal structure of these societies to various external pressures and to political and economic developments in the international field".

[135] Osterhammel, *op.cit.*, p. 472.

[136] Maier, Among Empires, *op.cit.*, p. 32. Steinmetz would add another: "expansionist nation-states such as early modern- and modern-century France enfolding the hexagon into the state or the United States in its westward continental expansion." Steinmetz, *op.cit.*, p. 342.

Ethiopian Empires – entities that exercised differing degrees of demonstrable control over a contiguous land mass, with an Emperor or equivalent as a unifying force.[137] Peripheries – regardless of treatment – were notably part of the 'imperial whole', hence it can be said they were empires of *inclusion*. Oppressed peripheries, for example the Lithuanians in the Russian Empire and the Transylvanian Romanians under Hungarian rule, may not have felt included, but they were as much a part of the empire as empowered peripheries, such as the Baltic Germans and Hungarians.

Maritime empires became the dominant imperial form from the mid- to late-nineteenth century. These also held territories under varying degrees of control, however their colonies were geographically separated from the core, almost always by sea, and also by ideology, as the peripheries operated under an 'adjunct' form of rule rather than as part of the whole. Imperial cores were standalone nation-states in the Imperial Power Structure, with relatively liberal governance the likes of which the colonial peripheries could only dream. In effect, they were empires of *exclusion*. Although Maier's insinuation that 'landed' types *were* empires, and that 'maritime' types *had* empires, is an excellent analogy, [138] the latter does not account for the imperial *whole* that was the sum of the metropole and the periphery.

Clouding this typology is the fact that most empires from the nineteenth century on don't fit neatly into one of these two designations, as few were entirely one type or the other (those that were, such as the Belgian and Danish maritime empires, and the Ethiopian, are often excluded from the 'family' of empires and overlooked in such studies). Examples of how empires could cross over include the British in Ireland acting like a traditional empire, and the Habsburgs in Bosnia acting like a maritime one.[139] Some empires overlapped more than others: The Russians are considered by many to be a hybrid,[140] due to their expansionist policies in Central and East Asia. Japan could be considered another – how it managed territories such as the Ryukyu Islands, Korea and Manchukuo across a sea distance that would be the envy of most European maritime empires (and Russia), and the nature of their imperial project, showed distinct features of both types.

Until now, this distinction has been a barrier to comparative study – in the blunt yet entirely accurate words of Alexey Miller, "historians used to imply total opposition to their modern maritime rivals".[141] However, as summarised here, although there are differences from empire to empire (naturally, as they are all unique historical phenomena), they share enough foundational characteristics and principles to be worthy of analysis and comparative study, at least

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[137] Jouannet, *op.cit.*, p. 13, believes *all* empire must be "characterised in the personalisation of power in the person of the emperor."

[138] Maier, Among Empires, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

[139] Robin Okey, "A Trio of Hungarian Balkanists: Béni Kállay, István Burián and Lajos Thallóczy in the Age of High Nationalism", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Apr., 2002), pp. 246-247, described the 'civilising' initiatives of the Habsburg Minister responsible for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Béni Kállay, including "publishing Muslim folk-songs and the Muslim-edited weekly *Bosnjak*, together with the representational precedence of Muslims as mayors". This was due to his doubting "Islam's capacity to flourish in society", with the hope that Bosnian Muslims would return to Christianity and show allegiance to the Dynasty.

[140] such as Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.*

[141] Alexey Miller, *op.cit.*, p. 21.

from the perspective of their structures of power and how they worked.[142] As Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Jörn Leonhard have emphasised: "specific experiences […] ranging from conversions of imperial means, a situational interplay between colonial and imperial agency, to the ambivalent consequences of importing the nation-state model by imperial elites, were – at different times and to varying degrees – constituent elements for all empires".[143] They took this to its natural conclusion: "We can therefore no longer perceive maritime or continental empires as isolated entities which stand for an allegedly 'Western' or 'Eastern European' experience."[144]

Finally, there is a distinction between formal and informal empire. This only need be touched on here. The main distinction of the formal empire is that the core maintains a degree of direct political sovereignty over the periphery. An informal empire is a relationship between two nominally sovereign units, where the stronger exerts influence internally and externally.[145] Two of the most robust historical examples include British interference in Argentina, and British and French control over Ottoman finance, both in the nineteenth-century.[146] Informal empire is a far more recent concept, and brings modern entities into imperial discourse, helping keep alive the terms 'empire' and 'imperialism' in modern geopolitical debates. In conclusion, it should be stated that from the perspective of Imperial Power Structures, if there is an imperial divide, it is a *temporal* one – between what is best termed 'pre- and proto- modern' and 'empires in the nation-state system'. The dividing line comes into play in the nineteenth-century.

2.2. Nationalism, the nation-state, and the 'nation'

We know that there are no nation-states, indeed no 'nations', without nationalism, which Benedict Anderson called "the pathology of modern developmental history, as inescapable as 'neurosis' in the individual".[147] What role did nationalism play in the rise of the nation-state, and the 'nation' as an idea? Indeed, how are all three concepts related? The etymology of the word 'nation' is revealing – *natio* in Latin means 'something born'.[148] As Ernest Renan argued in the nineteenth century, "a nation is not 'natural.' It develops in large part through historical accident, through a communality of experience".[149] It could be argued that a nation is therefore a construct borne from an *unnatural* birth, albeit difficult for the modern mind to comprehend, so dominant the nation-state has become.

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[142] This was emphasized by Miller, who stated that: "in reality, these 'modern' sea-based empires had plenty of elements of traditional social order or patterns or rule". *Ibid.*
[143] Von Hirschhausen & Leonhard, Beyond Rise, *op.cit.,* p. 33.
[144] *Ibid.*
[145] see Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.,* pp. 19-20.
[146] For Argentina, see Doyle, *op.cit.,* pp. 223-224. For the Ottoman Empire, see Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 344.
[147] Anderson, *op.cit.,* p. 14. Also see Peter N. Stearns, "Nationalisms: An Invitation to Comparative Analysis", *Journal of World History,* Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring, 1997), p. 59.
[148] Liah Greenfeld, *op.cit.,* p. 4.
[149] as described by Katherine Arens. Arens, *op,cit.,* p. 2 of 43.

Nationalism and the nation-state story are inseparable. Johann Gottfried Herder introduced the term 'nationalism', which to him signified a movement based on, and driven by, the constructive power of a common language (German), which in turn was the fuel for patriotic cultural development and primacy. Although neither a true standardised German language nor a united German 'nation' existed at the time of his writing, he treated both as if "age-old".[150] Unlike later, exceptionalist incarnations, his was a nationalism based upon liberalism, defending "the rights of *all* nations".[151] He also believed, in the words of Alan Patten, that "nations and peoples are contexts of socialization and education for their members".[152] Herder's ideas would permeate throughout Europe and were highly influential to a number of national movements, such as the Czech. The modern nation-state would concurrently emerge around the time of the Industrial Revolution, as it became evident that a (more) compliant population would be the key to better resource allocation – emerging nation-states, such as France, began to realize that, in the words of Peter Stearns, "people in combination might be more than the summation of the individual parts".[153] Hence the drive for a 'relatively' homogeneous subject population that identified with the ruling clique, and the manufacture of ideological and organisational frameworks used to achieve that.

They key denominator here is people: in sixteenth-century England, the term 'nation' became connected to the word 'people', which Liah Greenfeld argued, "launched the era of nationalism".[154] Karl Deutsch deftly defined 'people' in its ideal form as being "a community of shared meanings, or more broadly still, a group of people who have interlocking habits of communication. When a man receives a message from another member of his country, it clicks with him. He understands it readily and with a very good chance of seeing what the speaker actually intended".[155] This is particularly important when studying empire, especially ones with an increasing number of competing 'voices'. The desire to master this message chain, in order to form 'communities of shared meaning', can be seen – in abundance – in both empires analysed in this work, originating from the state and its apparatus, from the numerous organised groups therein, and from groups striving to organise.

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[150] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London, 1995), pp. 32-33.

[151] For a good modern interpretation of Herder, see Alan Patten, "'The Most Natural State'; Herder and Nationalism", Department of Politics, Princeton University, June 2010, https://www.princeton.edu/~apatten/_The%20Most%20Natural%20State_-%20Herder%20and%20Nationalism%20-%20final%20accepted%20version.pdf, last accessed 4 January 2015. Quotation is on p. 1. Also see Stearns, *op.cit.,* pp. 61 & 63.

[152] Patten, *op.cit.,* p. 16.

[153] Stearns, *op.cit.,* p. 61.

[154] Liah Greenfeld, *op.cit.,* p. 6. More specifically, "the word 'nation' in its conciliar meaning of 'an elite' was applied to the population of the country and made synonymous with the word 'people'".

[155] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and its Alternatives* (New York, 1969), p. 14.

Nationalism is first and foremost a political ideology[156] that provided vindication for state actions, or group formation and claims making for non-sovereign actors.[157] Its core philosophy was ethnic and linguistic uniformity, manifest in the freedom and ability of expression through both cultural symbolism and institutional formation.[158] It would become, as Hobson observed, a *raison d'être*, "an inner motive in the life of masses of population".[159] It required unique forms of political units;[160] indeed many scholars tie nationalism to the formation and maintenance of democracy. Greenfeld argued that: "democracy was born with a sense of nationality. The two are inherently linked […] Nationalism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon".[161] However, it was not always a two way street: for example, was a sense of nationality born with democracy in mind? The experience of the Habsburg and Russian Empires tells us the answer would be that democracy was rarely high on the pecking order of nationalities. Significantly for this study, power maintenance or power seeking was in most cases far more important for the 'nation'.

Although challenged in recent years by re-examining pre-existing spatial identities, as well as the debates between 'modernists' and 'perennialists' and more,[162] the following definition by Anthony D. Smith defines the relationship between 'nationalism' and the 'nation' well:

> By 'nationalism' I shall mean an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential 'natio'. A 'nation' in turn I shall define as a named human population, sharing an historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass, public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members.[163]

Further to this, the 'nation' is clearly, in Benedict Andersons's words, 'an imagined community', "*imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members".[164] As Renan so beautifully articulated, pre-empting Anderson by almost a century: "Alas, the very essence of a nation is that all individuals have a lot of things in common, and also

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[156] Breuilly, *op.cit.,* p. 1. He begins his book with the contention that nationalism is "a form of politics". See also Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, *op.cit.,* p. 1, who noted that "nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent".

[157] For the former, see Breuilly, *ibid.,* p. 3, who also noted that a nationalist position assumes that "the interests and values if this nation take priority over all other interests and values." Also see Gellner, *ibid.,* who called nationalism a "theory of political legitimacy".

[158] Brendan O'Leary, "On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism", *British Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 1997), p. 191. Also see Anthony D. Smith, "Nations and their pasts", Anthony D. Smith's opening statement, the Warwick Debates, 1995, http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/units/gellner/Warwick.html, last assessed 29 November 2014, p. 5.

[159] Hobson, *op.cit.,* p. 1.

[160] Stearns, *op.cit.,* p. 61, which he stated were not entirely without historical precedent.

[161] Liah Greenfeld, *op.cit.,* p. 10. She added: "nationalism developed *as* democracy […] but as nationalism spread in different conditions and the emphasis in the idea of the nation moved from the sovereign character to the uniqueness of the people, the original equivalence between it and the democratic principles was lost".

[162] Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, *op.cit.,* pp. 22-23, gives an excellent breakdown of the dichotomy of the core modernist and perennialist positions, and an extremely helpful summary of the positions of primordialists, perennialism, ethno-symbolism, modernists and postmodernists, *ibid.,* pp. 223-224.

[163] Smith, The Warwick Debates, *op.cit.,* p. 2.

[164] Anderson, *op.cit.,* p. 15.

that all have forgotten many things."[165] For a nation to be imagined, to paper over the 'forgotten' things, it also needs to be manipulated.[166] In turn, and due to its 'imagined' foundation, it can be argued that the legitimacy of any particular nation is in the eye-of-the beholder. Hobsbawm went as far as to assert for his work *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* that "any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a 'nation', will be treated as such".[167]

Nation-states formalised and institutionalised a 'national' kinship from above – often but not always built upon existing societal commonalities such as language – and used this a rallying point for their premeditated call for national unity. Playing on kinship meant that their demands to citizens would become the citizens' priority. To do this, all subjects would need to become stakeholders of the national idea, and (ostensibly) vice versa, which necessitated breaching the traditional chasm between the state and its subjects. The respective dominant church had to be supplanted as the primary source of shared identity (whilst being manipulated to ensure religion became a subservient component of a national identity) and localism in all its forms had to be either removed or commandeered in the service of the state. In the words of Hobsbawm, the evolution of a more direct relationship between state and subject "tended to weaken the older devices by means of which social subordination had largely been maintained".[168] Nation-states also required, as Andreas Kappeler argued, "social mobilisation and the complementary development of social conditions".[169] Although clearly an objective of the 'nation builders' – who employed a deft blend of the new ideas of rationalism and science with elements of what it purported to seek to replace, such as religion and folklore – whether a nation-state is a true community any more than an empire is the matter for debate, as is whether it represents any more of a spatial group than any empire. The 'nation' can therefore be considered an outlet for collective identity: an imagined collective, and the 'nation-state' the formalised political and social organisation of an imagined collective in sovereign form.[170]

As noted, the debates concerning 'nations' can be broken down into two camps: 'perennialists' and 'modernists'. As Daniele Conversi has summarised: "*modernists* date their formation to the rise of modernity, in whatever form the latter is defined; *perennialists* see them as enduring, inveterate, century-long, even millennial phenomena, certainly predating modernity".[171]

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[165] Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?", *Œuvres Complètes, 1,* p. 892, quoted in Anderson, *op.cit.,* p. 15. Author's translation.

[166] It is pertinent to note Hans Kohn: "nations and classes are partly real but partly also manipulated entities." Kohn, Collapse, *op.cit.,* p. 252.

[167] Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, *op.cit.,* p. 8.

[168] E.J. Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914", in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.)., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, UK, 1983, Cambridge University Press), p. 265.

[169] Andreas Kappeler, "The Ukrainians in the Russian Empire, 1860-1914", in A. Kappeler (ed.), *The Formation of National Elites.* Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, Vol. VI (Aldershot, 1992), p. 109. In turn he noted that Karl Deutsch believed these to be the "decisive preconditions for a national movement".

[170] Liah Greenfeld, *op.cit.,* p. 3, stated that "nationalism locates the source of individual identity within a 'people'".

[171] Conversi, *op.cit.,* p. 18. Also see Hroch, Interview, *op.cit.,* p. 47, Ernst Gellner, "Do nations have navels?" Ernst Gellner's reply to Anthony D. Smith, the Warwick Debates, 1995, http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/units/gellner/Warwick2.html, last assessed 29 November 2014, p. 1,

The latter most definitely take their legitimacy from the long-distant past. When analysing the histories of these two multi-ethnic nineteenth century empires, however, both have to be taken into consideration. During this period, national movements evolving into nation-states and non-sovereign national movements were formed during the processes of modernisation and industrialisation (a phenomenon best theorised by Ernest Gellner).[172] At the very least, if one does not agree at all with the modernist approach, they would have to concede that their development as actual ideologies and movements was at least concurrent. And yet, those pushing national causes were almost always 'perennial' in their approach. Even the most strident modernist could not argue with that the historical record was being used – sincerely or not – in forming 'perennial' narratives. John Stuart Mill wrote that the resonance of perennialism in practice was most caused by the "identity of political antecedents, the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections, collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past".[173]

When considering 'state-led' nationalism as a movement of ideological perennialists that evolved during modernisation and industrialisation, and was most probably resultant of them,[174] one can see the mechanisms of modernisation driving it. State-sponsored education systems, standardised for (practically) all students of the nation, were implemented to build an ideologically loyal population, as well as a trained labour force that could perform the work needed to maximise economic development at a time of industrialisation. This in turn needed to continuously expand to service the growing, now professional, permanent-standing armies. All of which needed infrastructure – roads, railways, and buildings.[175] In order to pay for all this, state administration had to be turned upside down by means of efficient bureaucracy; a move to more direct, centralised rule combined with effective demarcation of power; national currencies; commitment to social mobility; censuses, to locate opportunities; higher and more regulated taxation; and codified, modern legal systems. Finally, to ensure subjects willingly participated, the imposition or encouragement of national culture and mythology was important. The nation-state would strive to become the 'ultimate' imagined community with a 'forged' common imagination.

& Anthony D. Smith, "Nationalism and the Reconstruction of Nations", http://www.nationalismproject.org/what/smith1.htm, last accessed 4 December 2014, who adds 'post-modernism' to the mix.

[172] Gellner, Reply, *op.cit.* Hobsbawm's theories of the nation generally match Gellner's, see Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, *op.cit.,* especially pp. 5-12, with the notable difference that Hobsbawm saw nation-building as a phenomena built from above and below, whereas Gellner focuses on nations being driven from above.

[173] John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government,* originally published in London, 1861, e-copy available on http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5669/5669-h/5669-h.htm, last accessed 12 January 2015, quotation is in paragraph 1 of Chapter XVI.

[174] Charles Tilly, "States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992", *Theory and Society,* Vol. 23, No. 1 (Feb., 1994) pp. 137-138. His much-used typology divided nationalism into 'state-led' and 'state-seeking'.

[175] Maier was blunt about just how important the railways were: "At one and the same time the railroad was the foundation of economic development, peopling hitherto remote areas, providing the transport infrastructure for commerce, creating a new demand for iron and steel manufacturers and machinists, promising moral and political progress, supplying a tangible image of energy radiating through the national space." Charles S. Maier, "Transformations of Territoriality 1600-2000", in G. Budde, S Conrad & O. Janz, *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien* (Göttingen, 2006, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), p. 46.

In the words of Andrea Komlosy, "real, existing ethnic differences within the states were overcome by suppression, assimilation, or a combination of the two, ultimately leading to a convergence between the state and nation in the eyes of citizens".[176] Finally, these initiatives required nation-state ideological frameworks to affect them – the subject of Chapters 5 and 6.

In addition to sovereign entities, emerging social groups under the yoke of 'domination' emerged in their wake. This was a manifestation of what Tilly called 'state-seeking nationalism'.[177] According to him, such nationalism comes from practical necessity, when groups feel they have no prospect of being fairly treated, a phenomenon at centre-stage in both the Habsburg and Russian empires. It was fuelled by successful nation-state building by external states, nation-state building and/or nationalist movements outside the imperial borders by social groups with a shared identity, and as a reaction to empires adopting nation-state paradigms, which at once threatened and helped define new identities.

Once 'nations' began to take on a life of their own, they propagated in reaction to both opportunity and threat, and started to take on a somewhat religious fervour: spiritually united with an unquestionable righteousness. The following example from early twentieth-century Hungary illuminates this, from the "Manifesto of the Nation of the Executive Committee of the Coalition":

> *The moral force of a nation is more irresistible than violence and the moment will surely come when, – with one soul, with proved strength and with the power accruing from the union, in time of danger, of all aspirations – the Nation will arrive at an understanding with a Ruler, (convinced of the rights of the people) and will undertake the great task of regeneration – With confidence and with patience victory is assured.*[178]

This comment also illustrates that in complex Imperial Power Structures, when there is genuine devolved power, it is possible for nationalism to manifest as both 'state-led' and 'state-seeking' simultaneously.

Miroslav Hroch developed a typology that became a standard tool of scholars of the nation, segmenting the development of national movements into three phases: Phase A, which he calls "scholarly interest"; Phase B, "national agitation"; and Phase C, "mass movement". [179] All three of these phases were integral to the development of movements in the two empires analysed in this work and will be addressed throughout. To briefly summarise: Phase A indicated the intellectual beginning of national movements, primarily driven by scholars such as university

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[176] She made this comment with respect to the Habsburg Empire. Andrea Komlosy, "State, Regions, and Borders: Single Market Formation and Labor Migration in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1750-1918", *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2004), p. 173.

[177] *Ibid.*, p. 133.

[178] TNA: quoted in Clarke to Goschen, Vienna, March 1 1906, FO 371/6/30.

[179] Miroslav Hroch, "Why did they win? Preconditions for successful national agitation", *Journal of Belgian History*, 2004, Volume 4., p. 646. He also defined the difference between a state-nation, "encompassing all classes and social groups corresponding to the nation's then stage of social and economic development", with the traditional type, where "a non-dominant ethnic group […] organised itself as a national movement". *Ibid.*, p. 645.

professors, librarians and religious order members. [180] They were often "close to the ruling classes".[181] The expansion outside this group indicates Phase B, where the likes of literate artisans and lesser merchants began to attend meetings and read periodicals in which activists from Phase A were involved.[182] Phase C was the breakout amongst the masses who had enough geographic concentration and literacy, spurred on by the petit bourgeoisie taking a role as 'advocates for the masses'.[183] There were consequences of the transition to Phase C, which were outlined by Andreas Kappeler: "toward a greater differentiation of the organisation and its goals, thereby resulting in more conflicts within the national movement. Finally political programmes gained priority over cultural, recreational and economic goals".[184] This is central to the dynamics of the two empires in this study.

By Phase B, emerging nationalities would begin to search for a geographic heart for the nation, both as a territorial base and a beacon to national kin.[185] These would become the base for – in most cases – national organisations, which were in turn the most important catalyst for national elite formation.[186] Exceptions only proved the rule; both sides of the emerging Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire, especially the Ukrainophiles, would have to settle for the relatively unhindered environment of the Galician capital, Lviv. Importantly, trying to suppress national group formation could merely delay, not prevent, their eventual flowering.[187]

Immediately, the desire to control education – especially history and language – in a modernising state becomes understandable.[188] The same state-run education systems boosting the working skills of the population also produced the educated, literate populations required for the fulfilment of all three of Hroch's stages,[189] as well as cultural awareness which John Breuilly argued fed on the cultural identity that it built.[190] The growth of industrial sectors also led to mass urban migration, resulting in a historically denser collection of like subjects.[191] Eventually, these various phenomena intersected and not only was there a critical mass of co-nationals who could

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[180] Miroslav Hroch, "Social and Territorial Characteristics in the Composition of the Leading Groups of National Movements" in A. Kappeler (ed.), *The Formation of National Elites.* Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, Vol. VI (Aldershot, 1992), p. 257.
[181] *Ibid.*
[182] *Ibid.,* p. 261.
[183] *Ibid.*
[184] Andreas Kappeler, "National Organisations" in A. Kappeler (ed.), *The Formation of National Elites.* Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, Vol. VI (Aldershot, 1992), p. 307.
[185] Hroch, Social, *op.cit.,* p. 271.
[186] Kappeler, National Organisations, *op.cit.,* p. 306.
[187] *Ibid.*
[188] Hroch, Why did they win?, *op.cit.,* pp. 649-650. He emphasised that national movements required a "sufficiently dense network of social communication".
[189] O'Leary, *op.cit.,* p. 194. Which in turn was supported by the 'nation' at home. He wrote, in analysing Gellner, that: "Literacy, an essential aspect of a normally socialized human being, is generated by state-sponsored educational systems, which are multiply facilitated if the idioms of the home and the school are the same."
[190] Breuilly, *op.cit.,* p. 35.
[191] John A. Hall, *op.cit.,* p. 10. He added that: "the destruction of the traditional segmentary cultures of such people made them available for nationalist propaganda".

support the setting up of nationalist literature by national intelligentsia, they could read and comprehend it, and actually afford the texts.[192] Thus, the relaxation of censorship at times in both empires was critical, a delicate balance between progress and subverting opposing attitudes.

Both imperial non-sovereign national groups and empires employing nation-state paradigms are offshoots of the multifaceted concept that is the 'nation'. To make an illustrative example: Czechs organising after 1850 on an ethno-linguistic basis as a common community was as legitimate a display of the 'nation' as the Russian Empire appropriating the Census from the nation-states to the west as a means of establishing effective community resource allocation. Both were reactive to the outputs of the 'nation' in its sovereign and ideological forms – the nation-state and nationalism respectively. In the Czech example, they were striving to become as much of a nation-state as their circumstances would allow, whereas the Russians were striving to mimic as much of a nation-state as their systems would bear. Finally, if it wasn't for competition between states, the need to appropriate nation-state ideological frameworks may not have been as intense, and the resultant growth of nationalist agitation, or state-led efforts in nation-building, may not have occurred.[193]

2.3. Power: Fuel for empires, fuel for nations

Reviewing empire and the 'nation' raises the question: what drives these entities? What is at their heart? It is 'power' – a seemingly innocuous term with variable meanings. International relations theorists use states as frames of reference, hence definitions such as those of John Mearshimer: "power […] represents nothing more than specific assets or material resources that are available to a state". This might appear one-dimensional from a sociological perspective,[194] but, in principle if not in scope, it remains correct. The following pure definition from Michael Mann is far broader: "in its most general sense, power is the ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one's environment". [195] More specifically, *social* power is "mastery exercised over other people". [196] This can be broken down into a distributive element, a "'zero-sum game' where a fixed amount of power can be distributed among participants", and a collective element, where "persons in cooperation can enhance their joint power over third parties or over nature".[197] The key point here is "persons in cooperation". Power in the context of this work will represent the dynamic where the behaviour or actions of one group are determined by the behaviour or actions of another more dominant group and the scope for influencing decision-making processes to either maintain or redress this imbalance. In other

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[192] Hroch, Why did they win?, *op.cit.,* pp. 649-650.
[193] John A. Hall, *op.cit.,* pp. 5-6.
[194] John Mearshimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, 2001), p. 57. As Breuilly simplifies it: "Power, in the modern world, is primarily about control of the state." Breuilly, *op.cit.,* pp. 1-2.
[195] Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power Vol. 1. A History of Power from the beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge, UK, 1986), p. 6.
[196] *Ibid.*
[197] *Ibid.*

words, power is a description of control and influence, and the means of achieving such. Power is, in effect, the fuel of all forms of organisational systems, including imperial.

Power is the ideal analytical indicator for capturing and understanding influence, and the ability to 'make things happen' at all levels of an Imperial Power Structure – through official channels or otherwise. Mearshimer argues that, "defining power clearly […] gives us a window into understanding state behaviour"[198] which, when approached from the broader, sociological perspective, can be extrapolated to include 'behaviour within a state'. This should also uncover various degrees of 'tempered' power, such as that held by subservient social and political groups and civil society, which enables them a degree of influence and control within an overall power structure or in a section of it. Power is also relative to level, be it political or societal. If one takes Robert Dahl's power definition: "A has power over B to the extent that [A] can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do"[199] and extends it to the multitude of relationships within an Imperial Power Structure, the subtleties of power become more obvious. For example, utilising the relationship between the Russian core and the Polish elites, it is clear that A (Russians) has power over B (Poles), increasingly so after 1863. However, this does not mean that the Poles were powerless – in fact Polish elites had power over third groups, for example Lithuanian peasants on Polish estates (C). Both A and B have different types of power over C.

Yet the nature of the power of B over C enables B to have a degree of power over A – specifically through 'indirect' power. This dynamic is so important in Imperial Power Structures, describing what happens when discordant groups 'force' reactive decisions from the 'core'. It could be argued that the Hungary forced a needy Franz Josef into *Ausgleich* in 1867, as did their 'hold' over land and populations, and that the Poles by their very existence as an 'other', pushed the Russians into policies there and in the western borderlands that were both counter-intuitive, and counter-productive to their Imperial Power Structure. Finally, power can be a marker-point – as there is limited scope for power in any territorial entity at any one point in time (in other words, there are only so many decisions that can be made, or influenced, in a fixed entity at a single point in time), using power as a mode of analysis should provide a panoptic view of empires and therefore help unlock the key to their 'health'.

In his meta-analysis of ancient and maritime empires, Michael Doyle argues that the nature of imperial power that supports an imperial structure is what actually defines the structure as imperial. In other words, power is the key. To qualify this, he uses the following parameters: "domain, the population affected; scope, the types of behaviour influenced; range, of rewards and punishments; weight, or effectiveness; and duration"[200] – dimensions which are all determined by where that power originated, how it came about and in what direction it is moving. A key to his analysis is the differentiation between the imperial core, which he calls the domestic order, and

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[198] Mearscheimer, *op.cit.*, p. 13.
[199] Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power", *Behavioural Science* 2, No. 3 (Jul., 1957), pp. 202-203, quoted in Mearscheimer, *op.cit.*, p. 57.
[200] Doyle, *op.cit.*, p. 35.

the relationship between the core and its peripheral regions, which he calls the international order.[201] The motivation for participation in the imperial project is different for those in the imperial core than those in the periphery. This becomes difficult when analysing the Russian and Habsburg Empires (indeed, *all* empires). What happens when peripheries form within a system over time?[202] What happens when 'nations' evolve within a state system where they had not previously existed as spatial entities, or were never organised, formalised, constructed and mythologised? Using his typology, what happens when an international order develops within the domestic order?

If one accepts Eisenstadt's fundamental hypothesis of how power should manifest in pre- and early-modern empires and applies it across all imperial systems, it becomes apparent that the distribution, or commandeering of, levels and aspects of power becomes problematic for imperial regimes. He argues that, "the holders of power are able (1) to use various resources for the implementation of different goals and (2) to mobilise human resources at will – those who exercise power (the 'rulers') can impose their will on others".[203] Metternich was only partially right with his famous quote that "power distributed is no longer power".[204] Power distributed is no longer absolute or autocratic power – in the face of growing poles within an Imperial Power System, power becomes fragmented, but remains entirely real. In analysing different times of history, power does not need to be absolute to be power. For example, during Metternich's nearly twenty-seven years of reactionary stewardship of the Austrian government, the Hungarian Diet convened six times, using association as a means to air grievances and demand concessions, such as recognition of Hungarian as the official language in the Kingdom, which was finally granted in 1844 (ironically this movement was kick-started by Joseph II's ill-fated attempt to make German the official imperial language in 1784).[205]

2.3.1. Michael Mann's *Sources of Social Power*

For a means of looking at all empires as individual and yet related and comparable entities through the prism of power, we need to turn to Michael Mann. His *The Sources of Social Power* offers a systematic approach to "history and theory of power relations in human societies",[206] in order to analyse any human system and power relations ranging from the smallest possible relationship (between two people) to the entire globe. Mann, in focussing on social change, sets

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[201] *Ibid.,* p. 36.
[202] This question is pertinent for all forms of historical empire.
[203] Eisenstadt, *op.cit.,* p. 364.
[204] Quoted in Sked, Historians, *op.cit.,* p. 188.
[205] Joseph was not aiming at the Magyar language, rather it was an attempt to extinguish Latin, a move Richard Evans noted was driven by the Emperor, "dismissing as a disgrace the country's continuing thraldom to a dead language". Latin was the preferred language of Hungarian nobles. R.J.W. Evans, Language and State Building in the Habsburg Monarchy, *Austrian History Yearbook,* 35 (2004), p. 9.
[206] Mann, Vol. I, *op.cit.,* p. 1

out to "'quantify' power, to trace out its exact infrastructures".[207] In doing this, it becomes "immediately obvious that quantities of power have developed enormously throughout history".[208] This immediately brings empires, with their fluid, multi-faceted natures, to mind. Empires in the modern era had far more complex, and delicate, balance of power relationships than nation-states, due to their multiple nationalities (and often religions).

Due to the complexity of Mann's arguments, this summary will be notable for its brevity. Following are the core foundational elements of his theoretical framework. For a start, Mann asserts that there is no such thing as a unitary society – there are always areas where people identify with others on certain points of identity and necessity.[209] This is no surprise, as "human goals require […] social cooperation",[210] which merges diversity and difference in the pursuit of goals. To that end, there is no 100% pure form of power either. Power systems are intercessions between types of power – even something as stark as military power carries elements of economic, political and ideological power.

From this platform, Mann separates power into three sets of two contrasting modes of equal importance. He differentiates *distributive* power, which represents the control of one group over another, where the masses comply because they lack the collective organisation to do otherwise, in turn because they are embedded in the system, with *collective* power, which is gained by people entering into co-operative power relations with each other in pursuit of common goals.[211] *Authoritative* power is inspired by ruling groups – as commands, edicts and laws – and the rest of society, which wills direction. This is contrasted with *diffused* power, which results from the growth of shared belief sets and practices; an understanding that these are righteous practices stemming from "self-evident common interest".[212] Finally, *extensive* power, the ability to organise, to an acceptable level, many people over a large and/or diverse land area, contrasts with *intensive* power, which indicates the ability "to organize tightly and command a high level of mobilization or commitment from the participants".[213]

Power at all levels in socio-political structures, but *especially* imperial structures, is a delicate balance of all six types. These structures are highly sensitive to changes in the status quo, especially regarding foundational modes of power, as differing (i.e. non-core) groups also control degrees of these forms of power, in different combinations. The extent and impact of imperial 'heterogeneity' becomes apparent when considered from this perspective. From these six modes of power Mann established four sources of social power: political, military, ideological and economic, which manifest as "networks of social interaction".[214] These are the

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[207] *Ibid.,* p. 30.
[208] *Ibid.*
[209] *Ibid.,* p. 1. He also states: "Societies are confusing battlegrounds on which multiple power networks fight over our souls." Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.,* p. 28.
[210] Mann, Vol. I, *op.cit.,* p. 5.
[211] *Ibid.,* pp. 6-7.
[212] *Ibid.,* p. 8. In addition, *diffused power* is not necessarily commanded.
[213] *Ibid.,* p. 7.
[214] see *Ibid.,* pp. 22-28.

cornerstones to his theories: "A general account of societies, their structure, and their history can best be given in terms of the interrelations of what I will call the four sources of social power."[215] The importance of these sources is that "they give collective organization and unity to the infinite variety of existence",[216] opening up the possibilities for different and better "organizational means of social control".[217]

Different sources of power – for example military – utilise different combinations of the six modes depending on the nature of the entity in question. For example:

> *The power of the high command over its own troops is concentrated, coercive, and highly mobilized. It is intensive rather than extensive – the opposite of a militaristic empire, which can cover a large territory with its commands but has difficulty mobilizing positive commitments from its population or penetrating their everyday lives.*[218]

As noted, military power has both intensive and extensive aspects, and is markedly authoritative whilst striving for diffusion, which is also the case for political power, which is driven by the realisation of just how useful and beneficial "centralized, institutionalized, territorialized regulation" can be to managing social relationships.[219] Economic power is the result of "the need to extract, transform, distribute, and consume the resources of nature", and combines elements of intensive power (essentially labour participation) with the "extensive circuits distribution, exchange and consumption of goods".[220]

Ideological power is primarily diffused power, and the control of ideology is one of the central themes of the period in question here. In Mann's words, "we require concepts and categories of *meaning* imposed upon sense perception". Also necessary are: "*norms*, shared understandings of how people should act morally in their relations with each other, and necessary for sustained social cooperation", as well as "*aesthetic/ritual* practices".[221] Norms, meaning and (most strikingly) aesthetic/ritual practices are central to the national issues that burdened both Russia and Austria-Hungary, and the machinations concerning the maintenance of imperial power.

Overall, the major problems of society concern the manner of its organisation, such as maintaining control, managing logistics, and mastering communications, which when overcome enable the 'organised' control of people, resources and land.[222] This is very much an issue with empires, and the Habsburg and Russian Empires in particular. With regards to empire, the more power relationships within a system, the more competing forms of power, leads to a greater potential for both diffusion, and fragmentation, of power. All groups within a system have degrees of all four sources of power; even a small amount of military. The most effective exercises

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[215] *Ibid.,* p. 2.
[216] *Ibid.,* p. 28.
[217] *Ibid.,* p. 3.
[218] *Ibid.,* p. 8.
[219] *Ibid.,* p. 26.
[220] Mann, Vol. II., *op.cit.,* p. 7.
[221] Mann, Vol. I., *op.cit.,* p. 22.
[222] *Ibid.,* pp. 2-3.

of power combine collective and distributive, extensive and intensive, authoritative and diffused power. That is why a single power source – say the economic or military – is rarely capable of solely determining the overall structure of societies; in turn this provides the opportunity for new social power relationships – such as competing national groups in an imperial system – to make themselves felt.

2.3.2 What is the Imperial Power Structure?

As noted there is limited scope of power in any territorial entity at any one point in time. In other words, there are only so many decisions that can be made, or influenced, in a fixed entity, as entities that are fluid are static at a fixed point in time. An Imperial Power Structure therefore maps how power is structured amongst the collective of organised groups in a static entity – the empire itself. In citing Austria, Hegel identified the formal, *sovereign* part of the structure in *The Philosophy of History*: "Austria is not a kingdom but an empire, i.e. an aggregate of many political organizations (*Staatsorganisationen)* that are themselves royal (*königlich*)."[223] By adding the component parts of that structure, such as state apparatus, supporting and competing organisations, and manifestations of informal and indirect power, you have an Imperial Power Structure. If it were to be drawn up, it would represent an operational model that outlined which groups have the power – direct and indirect – to make decisions to frame the lives of the subjects of that particular empire, who makes decisions (and who acquiesces to them) at different levels of society, who has influence and what level of influence they have. In effect, this maps the relationship between 'power' and 'people': the most essential – and *fundamental* – dynamic of empires, where access to power is different amongst different groups.[224] The drivers are often but not always 'elites' – a condition of such social structures in general, which, as Liah Greenfeld argued, "are relatively stable systems of social relationships and opportunities in which individuals find themselves and by which they are vitally affected, but over which most of them have no control and of the exact nature of which they are usually unaware".[225]

The nature of the structure itself, and how groups 'balance' within it, is uniquely complex, as Peter Turchin notes, because of the notoriously multifaceted nature of its component groups.[226] Although organised groups don't have to be outwardly political, the system is inherently that way, as the structure represents a formal political entity in which decisions are made on behalf of subjects.[227] Groups within an Imperial Power Structure don't have to correspond to nationality, per se, even though this is common in the historiography of empire. Groups such as trade unions, landholders and the peasantry have played such roles throughout history, most clearly here in the case of early twentieth-century Russia. In terms of the two

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[223] quoted in Wank, The Habsburg Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 45.
[224] Turchin, *op.cit.,* p. 5.
[225] Liah Greenfeld, *op.cit.,* p. 19.
[226] Turchin, *op.cit.,* pp. 4-5.
[227] Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.,* p. 1.

empires in question however – where state-led and state-seeking nationalism overlapped with traditional imperial core-periphery relationships – these groups can tend to dominate such structures, especially that of the Habsburgs. Unsurprisingly, nationalism was a primary element of its structure.[228] Even in the case of the Russian Empire, where competing groups in the last generation of the Romanov reign were a broad mix of which nationalities were only a part, much of what inspired this 'non-nationalist' group formation was fuelled by the nation-state institutional frameworks that Russia started employing after the Crimean War.

As the Imperial Power Structure offers a 'snapshot' at a moment in time of a static entity, it helps make clear where external influences on the Imperial Power Structure are coming from. It also shows the success or otherwise of institutionalised control, of which Mann has outlined, is vital to their success as rulers: "the few at the top can keep the masses at the bottom compliant, provided their control is *institutionalized* in the laws and norms of the social group in which both operate".[229] It also enables us to gauge whether, and to what degree, the imperial system managed to develop unencumbered imperial power in light of the higher reliance of imperial systems on the acquiescence of subject society. [230]

Although retaining a degree of fluidity over time, the Imperial Power Structure can generally be demonstrated with a degree of certainty. For example, it is abundantly clear that Armenia as a region, and Armenians as a population, assumed a peripheral role in the Russian and Ottoman Imperial Power Structures. As we will see, in the Baltics with regards to ethnic Germans, as with the Swedes in Finland, the elites of former 'core' nationalities in Russia could also become peripheries, as arguably, the Austrian Germans *as a German nation* would in the Habsburg Empire. Peripheral 'peaks' of the structure can assume the role of a (pseudo) core to other groups within their specific region. In the structure of the Habsburg Empire in 1854 for example, the Italian population of Trieste, the Littoral and Dalmatia (where they made up only 3% of the population, and would retain official language rights),[231] were peripheral to the empire as a whole, but themselves dominated the Slovene, Serb and Croatian populations of those regions – economically, politically and culturally. Imperial systems had to adapt to such historical residue: to the aforementioned Baltic German and Swedish hegemonies can be added the Poles in Galicia and parts of the borderlands inhabited by Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians.

By utilising Imperial Power Structures we are not chasing a deterministic model of imperial collapse. The most appropriate term, as we are talking about 'health' of empires, is 'destabilisation' – referring to both destabilisation on the ground as well as to the structure of the empires themselves. As Alexander Motyl argued, "imperial structure holds the key to the secular

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[228] for example, Wank, The Nationalities Question, *op.cit.*
[229] Mann, Vol. 1, *op.cit.*, p. 7.
[230] Eisenstadt, *op.cit.*, p. 364 & 366. He wrote: "The rulers of the historical bureaucratic societies became, in terms of the maintenance of their legitimation, in a way more dependent on societal forces that were the rulers of more traditional societies […] the legitimation of the rulers was largely contingent on the expectations and demands that were often couched in the terms of these value orientations."
[231] Erich Zöllner, "The Germans as an Integrating and Disintegrating Force", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Volume 3, Issue 01, January 1967, pp. 228-229.

tendency of core-periphery relations to loosen and thus to decay."[232] In other words, he claims that the nature of imperial structure itself is responsible for machinations of competing groups within it. This premise – although a little deterministic itself – is intriguing, and will be revisited in the conclusion.

2.4.   Further definitions, and the role of actors

The term 'geopolitics' and its derivatives will be found throughout this work. To ensure that this is not mistaken for a return to the deterministic, pre-Second World War German *Geopolitik* school, it must be emphasised the term here is used in its modern parlance, established by the likes of Henry Kissinger. As argued by Alan Henrikson, for Kissinger the term referred to a "*strategic* doctrine" where "the interests of the United States, like those of other countries, are best defended through accurate reading by the country's leadership of the changing international balance of power".[233] In this work 'geopolitics' will refer to the international political power system in which such dynamics occur. Although the term remains uncomfortable to many due to its *Geopolitik* past, in a more general setting there is no better descriptive term for the context of this work. Indeed, the reader can substitute 'international political power system'. Specific to the environment in which the Habsburg and Russian Empires were operating, it can also be substituted with 'European political power system', and of course, 'Great Power system', a term common in the historiography that will also be found in abundance in this work.

The 'geo' refers to geography; specifically geographic boundaries such as national borders, the impact of natural resources, land geography and human geography on politics. Henrikson's summary adds that "it is also informed by the geographic distribution of resources and assets, especially at the regional level".[234] The term in the context of this work remains true to the geographic foundations of the term in the American academy. It would be naïve to think that international politics is not driven historically, to a large degree, by geography, particularly geographic space.

The term 'pre-modern' also requires clarification. Without falling into the immense debates about segmentation of human time, this work uses 'pre-modern' as a general reference to the era before 1500, and 'early-modern' to represent the time between 1500 and the beginning of the the *longue-duree* (1789). These terms have not been chosen to take a position, or make a point, merely to use a common typology for convenience.

Finally, although the Imperial Power Structure consists of groups and their individual actors, it is worth recalling Michael Mann's contention that power relationships can only occur when more than one person is involved, hence the *relationship*. As such, actors in, and relevant to,

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[232] Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.*, p. 9. This was problematic, as "empires are thus structurally centralized political systems", p. 21.
[233] Henrikson, Alan K., "Henry Kissinger, Geopolitics, and Globalization", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 27:1 (Winter/Spring 2003), p. 95.
[234] *Ibid.*

an Imperial Power Structure are *always* representative of a group, and due to the enormous size and power footprint of an empire, they are going to represent significant, organised groupings – from the dynasty itself through to for example national groups and organised labour. On this note, analysing the Imperial Power Structure means analysing groups *and* actors, and this work will take the position that actors are extremely important. This is highlighted when it comes to the two Imperial Power Structures in the spotlight; as their component organised groups are constantly fluid during this period (reforming, reacting, defending, growing), there is always a role for significant actors, with reference to the fomentation of ideological power, in particular.

Chapter Three

3.   Setting the scene

3.1.   The Habsburg Empire in 1854

The Habsburg Empire of 1854 was an acknowledged European 'great power', at the vanguard of reaction that swept over Europe after the revolutions of 1848/49. It was a dynastic empire that had recently turned to neo-Absolutist rule under the young emperor, Franz Josef, in response to its 'near-death' experience five years previously. Symbolic elements of the Imperial Power Structure were relatively new. For instance, the official designation *Kaiserthum Österreich* (Empire of Austria), not to mention "Emperor of Austria", only dated back to 1804. Formed in response to declaration of the Napoleonic French Empire, "Austria" consisted of the dynastic lands of the Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor Francis II, and would soon be freed from any overlap with the Holy Roman Empire, if not its constituent German states, after that body was dissolved after defeat to Napoleon at Austerlitz in 1806.[235] The structure of the Habsburg Empire remained legitimised by the Pragmatic Sanctions of 1712 and 1723, which mandated succession order across all Habsburg lands, including most importantly Hungary, who in the eighteenth century belatedly consented to a female monarch, in the person of Maria Theresa.[236]

The Revolution will only be touched upon briefly here to establish background, as it falls outside the timescale of this work. Having been in the circuit of ideas that traversed Europe far more than Russia, Austria was particularly conducive to revolutionary thinking. Habsburg society had grown weary of the reactionary Metternich era, and after what were initially liberal revolts combined with rebellion in Lombardy/Venetia in 1848, the revolutions would soon add national and class dimensions, making them demonstrably more complex and dangerous for the regime.[237] The final stage of the revolution was in Hungary, in 1849, and its aftermath would cast a number of shadows over the future of the Empire. Among the numerous reasons for the survival of the dynasty in 1849 was the support from non-German speaking peoples of the empire, such as Galician Poles and the *Grenzer* from Military Border, the dedication and independence of a few key military figures,[238] the unwillingness of eastern nationalities to accept Hungarian suzerainty, as well as military intervention from Russia, who on request of the new emperor marched on

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[235] Thomas O. Hüglin, "The Idea of Empire: Conditions for Integration and Disintegration in Europe", *Publius,* Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1982), p. 32.

[236] *Ibid.,* p. 34.

[237] For a good summary, see Taylor, *op. cit.,* pp. 63-90. Also see Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.,* pp. 339-340. In Joseph Redlich's words: "Nationalism and liberalism cooperated and the last hour of the Empire seemed to have come." Joseph Redlich, "The End of the House of Austria", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Jul., 1930), p. 603.

[238] Stone, Army, *op. cit.,* p. 95, contends that the empire was saved "by the indiscipline of three generals, Radetzky, Jellacic and Windischgrätz".

Budapest in 1849.[239] All of these events would set precedents that would impact the trajectory, and stability of the Empire up until the First World War.

The 1850s, in the words of Richard Evans, were notable for "the one and only attempt to rule all the Habsburg lands through a single language; and also the only period when the entire realm was officially described as 'Austria'".[240] This was the high point of the neo-Absolutist era, and as such, political power was held squarely in the hands of the Emperor and his advisers. It was also the year that post-revolutionary martial law finally ended in most of the empire (it had ended in Vienna and Prague the previous September).[241] An empire that was already well centralised with a heavy bureaucracy, thanks to the eighteenth century reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, had become even more so, especially after the suspension of regional Diets.[242] These assemblies of nobility had historically been charged with making decisions at local and regional level *as well as* providing for the requirements of the sovereign who summoned them, a typical imperial power demarcation between core and periphery. The imperial bureaucracy, originally institutionalised to keep the Diets in line, would ironically fulfil many of their administrative tasks during this period.

Although the revolution begat a very liberal Kremsier Constitution,[243] which was circumvented by Minister-President von Schwarzenberg before it was enacted, and for its time a still relatively liberal Stadion Constitution of March 1849, once the dust had settled from the Hungarian defeat almost all aspects of revolutionary liberalism had been set aside by retributive autocracy. At the municipal level, the gains of 1849, which allowed for self-government for elected bodies, were dismantled with the Emperor's suspension of the Stadion Constitution through the Sylvester Patent of 31 December 1851.[244] The Emperor was now *the* law. Indeed, he had commissioned Metternich ally Karl Friedrich von Kübeck, as Alan Sked noted, to review the corpus of imperial laws, in order to cancel "anything which smacked of the principle of popular representations or had its origins in the revolutions".[245] Very little of consequence at the lower level of governance made it through without review by the Imperial administration, even though the remit for municipal bureaucracy had increased enormously to fill the void left by the suspension of Diets.[246] Concurrently, at the national level the provisions for

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[239] Palmer, *op.cit.,* p. 93.

[240] Evans, Language, *op.cit.,* p. 13.

[241] Robert Gildea, *Barricades and Borders. Europe 1800-1914* (Oxford, 1987), p. 171.

[242] such as those in Budapest. See Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 346.

[243] The key clause of the Kremsier Constitution read as follows: "All peoples of the Empire are equal in rights. Each people has an inviolable right to preserve and activate its nationality in general and languages in particular. The equality of rights in the school, administrative and public life of every language in local usage is guaranteed by the state." John A. Hall, *op.cit.,* p. 11. For summaries of both the Kremsier and Stadion Constitutions, see Mann, Volume II, *op.cit.,* p. 341.

[244] Alan Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918* (Detroit, 1989), p. 149.

[245] *Ibid.*

[246] Jeremy King, "The Municipal and the National in the Bohemian Lands, 1848-1914", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 42 (2011), p. 96, added that as "new elections became overdue in 1854, council terms were extended by decree […] When council members resigned or died, replacements were appointed".

representative institutions were also dismantled, and the strong Ministerial advisory bodies that were established by von Schwarzenberg, in order to expertly guide the new and very young (eighteen at time of ascension) sovereign, were watered down to a less forthright, more compliant conference. The Emperor took responsibility for policymaking, with individual ministers forced to report to him directly.[247]

The exceptions to this reactionary turn were two very important, and related changes. In 1848 the Estates (*Stände*) were abolished, removing the remaining feudal rights from the nobility, and the Robot (in effect, a variant of serfdom) was finally, for the second time, abolished.[248] With regards the latter, liberalism was the prime motivator, unlike emancipation in Russia, which was equally driven by economic considerations.[249] The effects of these abolitions were felt differently in different parts of the Empire, yet they would change the realm forever. One area where the effects of these would be felt would be in economics.

Austrian economic performance had been gradually 'falling behind' that of Prussia since the early nineteenth-century, when Max-Stephan Schulze contended that it could have been the stronger of the two[250] – the caveat being the extreme difficulty in comparing economic health between entities at this time, especially when their geographic footprints were constantly changing. To that end, he found that in 1820, what constitutes modern-day Austria had a per capita product two per cent above the average in Western Europe, and what would become Cisleithania some ten per cent below. German per capita output was in between both figures, indicating that by this year, the dynamics for Habsburg 'falling behind' had already begun.[251] Austria was also heavily indebted.[252] The economic trajectory of the Habsburg Empire was very definitely west to east[253] – some western regions, such as the Austrian alpine lands, Vienna and Bohemia, were highly industrially advanced and well integrated into the European economy.[254] Arguably the first railway of any distance on the European continent had been built between

[247] Roy Austensen, "Austria and the 'Struggle for Supremacy in Germany,' 1848-1864", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Jun., 1980), p. 200.

[248] William D. Godsey, jr., "Quarterings and Kinship: The Social Composition of the Habsburg Aristocracy in the Dualist Era", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 71, No. 1 (Mar,. 1999), pp. 60-61. Abolished briefly in 1789 by Joseph II, to be reintroduced after his death a year later. Taylor, *op. cit.,* pp. 20-23. The emancipation was legally enforced in 1853, Sked, Decline, *op.cit.,* p. 158.

[249] Peter F. Sugar, *Nationality and Society in Habsburg and Ottoman Europe* (Aldershot, 1997), p. 7. Interior Minister von Bach made it clear that this was more a moral and political issue than an economic necessity.

[250] Max-Stephan Schulze, "Origins of catch-up failure: Comparative productivity growth in the Habsburg Empire, 1870-1910", *European Review of Economic History*, II, (2007), p. 189.

[251] *Ibid.*

[252] Richard M. Ebeling, "Austria-Hungary's Economic Policies in the Twilight of the 'Liberal' Era: Ludwig von Mises' Writings on Monetary and Fiscal Policy before the First World War", mises.org/journals/scholar/ebeling3.pdf, p. 13. A cycle of large debts would waver between 145,700,000 and 294,200,000 florins throughout the 1850s.

[253] Good, Economic Lag, *op.cit.,* pp. 11-12 of 41.

[254] Jiri Koralka, "The Czechs, 1840-1900", in A. Kappeler (ed.), *The Formation of National Elites.* Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, Vol. VI (Aldershot, 1992), p. 81. Indeed mostly in the predominantly German speaking regions from north west Bohemia, northern Moravia, Silesia, Prague and Brno.

Linz and Ceské Budejovice in 1832, all of fifty-three kilometres,[255] and yet, overall, transport and communications, especially in Hungary, were poor.[256]

Other parts of the Empire were heavily agricultural, including most of the eastern part of the Empire, especially Galicia and Bukovina provinces, Transylvania, parts of Hungary and the Balkan provinces. Much of Galicia and Hungary was characterised by the large magnate estates that drove their respective economies, and thus it was in the east where the effects of the abolition of the Robot was felt the most.[257] However, the pre-Revolutionary tariff wall between Austria and Hungary had been dissolved, creating a common market – in effect, what was a means of diminishing Hungarian economic independence created a true national market.[258] With respect to the Imperial Power Structure, these ex-bonded peasants, having been freed without land in Hungary, were some years away from anything resembling social mobility.[259] In order to kick-start the post-revolutionary economy, concepts such as the introduction of Chambers of Commerce, and a stronger system of savings banks, were coming to fruition.[260]

"The sinkholes of nationality", to use a term from John Boyer, had not reached the levels of intensity they would later in the century.[261] The nationalities issue that would come to dominate Habsburg life had been somewhat tempered by the aftermath of the revolutions, although the nature of competing national groups before 1848 was far different from what they would become later in the century. In addition, most of the towns were still 'German' in character and predominately German speaking, with some notable exceptions.[262]

This subduing of nationality was mostly seen at an official organisational level – where it had developed, national feeling did not extinguish on an underground or personal level, per se. Although all nationalities were restrained to differing degrees by neo-Absolutism, it was the Hungarians who had fallen the furthest from their pre-revolutionary power position in the Empire. In the eyes of the regime, they had "forfeited" their historic rights, and deserved to be fully integrated into the Habsburg machine.[263] When analysing the Habsburg Empire of 1854, it is worth considering Maier's designation of empires as being entities of 'elites': core elites and

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[255] Alan S. Milward, and S.B. Saul, *The Development of the Economies of Continental Europe 1850-1914* (London, 1977), p. 302.

[256] Regarding Hungary, see Iván T. Berend & György Ránki, "Economic Factors in Nationalism: The Example of Hungary at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 3, Issue 03 (Jan., 1967), p. 166. They gave the background as to why this was so poor in Hungary.

[257] Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 199. See also Milward and Saul, *op.cit.*, pp. 275-276.

[258] See Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.*, p. 153.

[259] Sugar, *op. cit.*, p. 7. Being freed without land left "the overwhelming majority of the Magyars still at the mercy of the nobility".

[260] Driven directly by the government in Vienna. Catherine Albrecht, "The Bohemian Question" in M. Cornwall (ed.), *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary. A Multi-National Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe* (Exeter, 2002), p. 77.

[261] John W. Boyer, "The End of an Old Regime: Visions of Political Reform in Late Imperial Austria", *The Journal of Modern History,* Vol. 58, No .1 (Mar., 1986), p. 172.

[262] Rusinow, *op.cit.*, p. 246. These included the Polish speaking Galician towns such as Lviv and in the Italian speaking towns of the Tyrol and Dalmatia.

[263] László Kontler, *A History of Hungary* (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 264-265. He wrote that the dynasty applied the *"Verwirkungstheorie"* that they had used to punish the Czechs after the Battle of White Mountain in 1620.

peripheral elites.[264] Habsburg elites did not necessarily identify with either their 'national' kin or tongue, and apart from some exceptions (most notably, some Hungarian, Polish and Croatian elites), many preferred the comfort of court to the company of their 'masses'. Other nationalities, such as the Czechs and Serbs, were just fully 'rediscovering' their national past – for example the Czech national history, on bookshelves of this time, by the Czech revival movement patriarch František Palacký, was written in German, as that was still the dominant language for Czech elites at the time.[265] There were still more nationalities that were only just beginning to develop their own national identity and stories. For the most part, the Habsburg 'wheel', as per Motyl's, typology, remained typically free of a solid rim, with peripheries all working through and on behalf of the 'core', or working against each other.

3.2.   Habsburg Imperial Power Structure 1854

In short, the Imperial Power Structure of the Habsburg Empire in 1854 can be approximated thus: at the 'peak' of the core was the Emperor Franz Josef. In support, in the 'sub-core', was the Inner Court, significant for having the ear and the confidence of the young Emperor. Amongst this group were the Archdukes and Archduchesses, all direct descendants from Maria Theresa and Joseph II,[266] the Army High Command and the selected members of the upper nobility, as well as trusted imperial ministers. Of the latter, it is worth noting that after the Sylvester Patent, the body of (full) imperial minsters was reduced to merely *six*, who (with perhaps the exception of Interior Minister Alexander von Bach) had seen their influence diminish to varying degrees.[267] As the Court was so *indirectly* powerful, the next level of the 'sub-core' consisted of the remainder of the 'high' Court in Vienna, at this stage populated entirely by further members from the upper nobility (*Hochadel* or *Aristokratie*).[268] All other army officers had retained their court privilege dating back to 1751.[269] Some traditional advisors to the Emperor, such as some Hungarians like Andrássy, were effectively 'under suspension' at this time, in retribution for their revolutionary turn. Others would never have their privileges returned.[270]

It is arguable that the high bureaucracy (*Hofrat*) and the court bureaucracy (for example, the Grand Master of the Court, who controlled access to the emperor at Court) belong at this

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[264] Maier, Among Empires, *op.cit.,* p. 34.
[265] Robin Okey, "Central Europe/Eastern Europe: Behind the Definitions", *Past & Present*, No. 137, The Political and Cultural Construction of Europe (Nov., 1992), p. 112.
[266] William A. Johnstone, *The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History 1848–1938* (Berkeley, 1983), p. 40.
[267] C.A. Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918* (London, 1971), p. 455. They were Buol, Bach, Thun, Krausz, Baumgartner and Thinnfeld.
[268] *Ibid.*, p. 39. The *Hochadel* had complete court privileges.
[269] Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Nobility and Military Careers: The Habsburg Officer Corps, 1740-1914", *Military Affairs*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec., 1976), p. 182.
[270] Arens noted this included 'honour code': "Elemer Batthany, son of one of 1848 rebels who was hung by Franz Josef, could join his emperor on the hunt and at table but not greet or speak to him." Arens, *op.cit.*, p. 32 of 43.

level.[271] The summary to this point should serve to emphasise that in this traditional, autocratic model of the Imperial Power Structure, the Court was paramount with regards to distribution of power. Members of political bodies (even if their members were traditionally nobles) would take a back seat in their capacity as representatives of those bodies. For example, by 1854 the former Imperial Council had morphed into a mostly rubber-stamp *Reichsrat*, which with the individual ministries, were simply advisory.[272] In such an environment, these bodies were implementers, not leaders. Their members retained their *Hausmacht* rights, however, in their capacity as nobles. Even though all nobles had lost their feudal rights on the land, all remained insulated by their *Hausmacht*.[273] This was a quite normal imperial phenomenon, as Mann had stated that monarchs:

> sought to counter this embedding by segmentally dividing and ruling, using kin and client networks to split the dominant class into loyal "in" and displaced "out" parties. As society and state became more universalistic, the strategy shifted to embedding monarch and court in the old regime, a court-centred party alliance between monarch and the old landed, rentier class plus the hierarchy of established churches and the officer corps.[274]

Some from the public service and business were included, provided they were from the nobility. This group could be summarised as the "Second Society" (*zweite Gesellschaft*),[275] and were arguably, with landowners, straddling the 'sub-core' and the higher periphery – for this exercise to be called the 'organised/sanctioned periphery'. Where the Catholic Church stood here is open for debate. Much weakened after the revolutions, there was nevertheless a Concordat in the offing in just one year (1855): which would embed the Catholic Church in the lives of the (Catholic) inhabitants of the empire. However, this was more of a confirmation of existing dynamics – a reaction to the revolutionary constitutions of Austria and Hungary, whose liberalism had attempted to overturn the special role of the church in the running of the Empire.

The 'core-in-periphery' – representatives of the core in the peripheral territories – included the Imperial Army, provincial governors, many of whom were generals and administrators,[276] and the imperial bureaucracy. The general, or lower, periphery included the masses (of all nationalities) and some high elites of non-German background (those shunned over the revolution, a few intellectuals of the nationalities themselves, and representatives of national groups and movements, where they existed, such as in Hungary). Some nationalities could be counted amongst both peripheral groups – depending on how they were organised. It should be noted that loyalty to the regime trumped any national pretence – the aforementioned Palacký was neither shunned nor discouraged in 1854, nor was Jelačić, the Croat hero with an

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[271] Johnstone, *op.cit.*, p. 33, He goes on to outline that: "The grand master of the court stood first in command among the four high officers, ranking above the grand chamberlain, the grand marshal of the court, and the master of the stable." *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40. Also see Godsey, Quarterings, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

[272] Gildea, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

[273] Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.*, p. 331. He wrote that: "Monarch, court, ministries, and high command comprised an fairly autonomous and insulated state elite, exercising despotic powers."

[274] *Ibid.*, p. 64-65.

[275] Godsey, Quarterings, *op.cit.*, p. 61. He called them the "bureaucratic and entrepreneurial nobility".

[276] Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.*, p. 341.

almost schizophrenic relationship with the dynasty, whose actions were a large reason why there was still an Empire in the first place. Naturally, peasants and the *Grenzer* soldiers from the Military Border belong to the periphery as well. At this stage the latter were still truly loyal supporters of the dynasty.[277] As is abundantly clear, this was still a traditional, elite-based, (mostly) non-national Imperial Power Structure.

The dynasty naturally commanded distributive, extensive and particularly authoritative power. There was far less diffused power at the disposal of the Emperor than in Russia. In the Imperial Power Structure of 1854, the dynasty exercised almost practically absolute military power. What stopped the Kaiser from entirely controlling military power was the nominal local power over the supply of soldiers to the imperial army, as well as the release of funding through taxation and resources – typical to empires throughout history. Notably, there was considerable recalcitrance on behalf of Hungarians. Indeed, Hungary was still under military occupation at this time, and its role in the imperial army at officer level had yet to be ascertained. At the imperial level, the dynasty held practically absolute economic and political power. It should be noted that imperial control here was even greater than in Imperial Russia at the time, due to the organised, well-populated and generally efficient imperial Habsburg bureaucracy, indeed there was far more governance and administration *overall* than in Russia. Hence, on the regional and local level, there was less autonomy.

The imperial hold over ideological power was rather less uniform. The persona of the Emperor would not summon the loyalty that would be evident later in the century – amongst certain nationalities, at least. Hungarian elites, of whom Franz Josef was their (uncrowned) King, held the empire in low regard.[278] Others, like Croatian elites, for example, vacillated between being grateful for the (what would turn out to be temporary) removal of Hungarian hegemony and being disappointed at the suspension of the Diet in Zagreb and the apparent lack of gratitude shown by the Emperor, in return for their service during the revolutions. In 1854, the Army essentially ruled Croatia, Lombardy-Venetia and Hungary, on the ground.[279] There were numerous poles of ideological power forming, some continuations or variations of those that existed in the *Vormärz* period.

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[277] The *Grenzer* had had a difficult relationship with the dynasty throughout the revolutionary troubles of 1848-1849, eased by the granting of concessions in 1850, including land reforms and access to civil employment. Gunther E. Rothenberg, "The Struggle over the Dissolution of the Croatian Military Border, 1850-1871", *Slavic Review,* Vol. 23, No. 1 (Mar., 1964), pp 64-65.

[278] Hungarian animosity was evident in the revolutionary Hungarian Declaration of Independence, which among many passages, stated that: "Austria upon its throne, in accordance with stipulations made on both sides, and ratified by treaty. These three hundred years have been, for the country, a period of uninterrupted suffering." "Hungarian Declaration of Independence, April 1849", https://ecommons.library.cornell.edu/bitstream/1813/1446/1/Hung_Independence_1849.pdf, last accessed 18 December 2014.

[279] Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.,* p. 172.

Diagram 1: Approximation of the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure, 1854 .

CORE	Emperor Franz Josef I

SUB-CORE	• Inner Court / • High Nobility • Army High Command / • Imperial Ministers	CORE-IN-PERIPHERY
	• High Nobility (remainder) / • Officer Corps (remainder) / • Court Bureaucracy • High Bureaucracy / • Diplomatic corps	• Provincial governors / • Imperial army / • Imperial bureaucrats
	• Catholic Church • *Reichsrat*	

SUB-CORE / PERIPHERY	• Landowners / • Industrialists/financiers / • Nobles under 'suspension' from court

ORGANISED / SANCTIONED PERIPHERY	National Groups (all factions) / • Hungarian • Polish • Italian

GENERAL PERIPHERY	Other national groups and their 'leaders' and intellectuals / • Czech • Serb • Slovene • Croat • Romanian • Ruthene Soldiers, *Grenzer*, peasants, workers, some students – all nationalities

3.3.   The Russian Empire in 1854

The Russian Imperial Power Structure of 1854 bore some striking similarities with the Habsburg, as it was also traditional, elite-based, and not specifically fractured into organised national peripheries. The Russian Empire was a classic old-world absolutist empire that owed its status as one of the great powers to a combination of sheer scale, geopolitical location and most importantly, reputation hard won on past battlefields, most particularly their role in the downfall of Napoleon I. Since that decisive victory, they had somewhat rested on their laurels, defenders of reaction and the old order.[280] Unlike the Habsburg Empire, Russia was still expanding geographically to the east and in the south – in this year they were still fighting for control of the Caucasus and many Central and East Asian conquests were still to come. As they had escaped the revolutionary troubles of 1848/49, the Tsar outwardly displayed an unthreatened, almost aloof confidence as "the gendarme of Europe".[281] Inwardly, however, the regime was concerned enough about the spread of dangerous revolutionary ideas from the west to call back Russian scholars from Western European universities, and to remove philosophy and constitutional law from the tertiary education curriculum in Russia itself.[282] They had missed the boat somewhat – intellectual life at the universities was still actively healthy, albeit relevant to a tiny minority of the population.[283]

There was relatively little central governance in itself, nor the cohesive, centralising and unifying effects that accompany it. Peter Gatrell called it "under-government".[284] The Tsar, Nicholas I, was naturally conservative and protective of traditional Russian autocracy. In the words of Nicholas Riasanovsky, he had done "much to block its political, social, and economic evolution, to 'freeze' everything for thirty years".[285] An example of the typical 'laziness' of Russian governance (and in law) was the institution of serfdom. There was never an official edict enserfing peasants, and landowner ownership of serfs was never validated by St. Petersburg.[286] It became accepted convention, merely by 'happening'. Much governance, as it were, was in the hands of the landed nobles, who were autocrats over their estates, including wielding police and judicial powers.[287] Russia was still a land of estates (*soslovie*) and serfdom. Almost all subjects

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[280] David L. Ransel, "Pre-Reform Russia", in G.L. Freeze (ed.), *Russia. A History* (Oxford, 1997), p. 154. He wrote that "the stunning victory over Napoleonic France resolved the earlier doubts on the part of most of Russia's leaders about the country's administration and social system".

[281] Evgeny Bazhanov, "Transformation of Russia: Yesterday, Today and Prospects for the Future", in E. Brix, K. Koch & E. Vyslonzil (eds.) *The Decline of Empires* (Vienna, 2001), p. 65.

[282] Censorship was made even more burdensome. It was during this period that Dostoevsky was both sentenced to die and reprieved just before the deed was undertaken. Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 338.

[283] *Ibid.*, p. 336.

[284] Gatrell, Culture, *op.cit.*, p. 42. Martin McCauley & Peter Waldron, *The Emergence of the Modern Russian State 1855-81* (Basingstoke, 1988), p. 7, called it "chronically under-governed".

[285] Nicholas V. Riasonovsky, "The Russian Empire as an Underdeveloped Country", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Dec., 1961), p. 591.

[286] Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (London, 1995), p. 179.

[287] The nobility class itself wasn't completely off limits – the emperor (naturally) could ennoble, or people could reach an ennobling level in the military or bureaucracy, for example. Gary M. Hamburg, *Politics of the Russian*

belonged to a defined *soslovie* category, which can best be defined as a form of institutionalised social segmentation and segregation, introduced by Catherine the Great, who in turn was inspired by Montesquieu.[288] Categories included the nobility, merchants, the Church and the peasantry, with the highest privileges, naturally, held by nobles (*dvorianstvo*).[289]

A romantic tie to the land and the 'simple life' was ever present, which is unsurprising, as the Empire was dominated by agricultural production and worked by serfs and state peasants. Both groups were mostly confined to a single locality (in the case of many serfs a single landed estate) unless sent out-of-season to work in the coalmines of the Urals, or press-ganged into the army. Although the number of serfs working outside their estate had been increasing, the great size of the Empire was a mystery to most of them, best exemplified by the moniker that ex-serfs gave to the communes pre- and post-emancipation – *mir*, or 'world'.[290] They were, however, intensely loyal to the dynasty, regarding the tsar, in the words of Richard Pipes, as "God's vicar on earth, a bolshak of all Russia, created by the Lord to give him orders and to take care of him".[291]

Centralised government bureaucracy was small although growing: Alexander I was inspired by the civil service of Napoleonic France, although not committing to the large bureaucratic labour force that made the latter so effective.[292] Around sixteen per cent of government officials in the 1850s were from a non-Russian ethnic background.[293] The Russian Empire of 1854 did not have much trouble from subdued or emerging nationalities, with the notable exception of a bubbling Polish situation, which stemmed from the partitions and the Polish revolution of 1830. At this stage, the Poles still had some autonomy, including a separate legal system for example, however what they had experienced since 1830 could be considered nascent Russification.[294] The subjects of the Grand Duchy of Finland could be counted as a regional periphery (and two national peripheries) even though their Diet had been mothballed for 40 years. The Baltic Germans, however, were at the elite level at the very heart of the empire, and as a 'nation' they could not be considered a periphery at all. The example of the Baltic Germans offers perhaps the best example that apart from the Poles, ethnic 'nationality' had not bothered

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Nobility 1881-1905 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1984), p. 9.

[288] Ingeborg Fleischhauer, "The Nationalities Policy of the Tsars Reconsidered – The Case of the Russian Germans, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 53, No. 1, On Demand Supplement (Mar., 1981), p. D1067.

[289] Jane Burbank, "Thinking Like an Empire: Estate, Law and Right in the Early Twentieth Century", in J. Burbank, M. von Hagen and A. Remnev (eds.), *Russian Empire. Space, People, Power, 1700-1930* (Bloomington, 2007), p. 197. For a full summary see Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.*

[290] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 232.

[291] Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.*, p. 161.

[292] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 333.

[293] Boris N. Mironov, "The Price of Expansion: The Nationality Problem in Russia of the Eighteenth-Early Twentieth Centuries", https://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/sympo/97summer/mironov.html, last accessed 4 December 2014, p. 4. In the 1730s this figure was around 30%, so this was in decline.

[294] For a summary of how the Russians wound back Polish autonomy after 1830, see Leonid I. Strakhovsky, "Constitutional Aspects of the Imperial Russian Government's Policy toward National Minorities", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Dec., 1941), pp. 489-490.

the core.[295] For example, in the aftermath of the Decembrist Revolt of 1825, where a number of officers exposed to the revolutionary ideas flowing in post-Napoleonic Europe had tried to overthrow the dynasty after the death of Tsar Alexander I.[296] As the Army General Staff had such a large representation of ethnic Germans, naturally many Germans were involved in the plot.[297] The incoming Tsar, the normally retributive Nicholas I, refused to reduce the number of Germans on that body, and no anti-German measures were taken in the Baltic provinces.[298]

Aside from the Poles (and disregarding the Baltic Germans, for now), minority 'nationalities' in the Russian Empire of 1854 generally fell into the first grouping in Hroch's nationalism scale: Phase A, where the groundwork to actually build their platform for a national identity was being undertaken by a small group of intelligentsia. These were at this time undeveloped or underdeveloped nationalities founded, or 'rediscovered', on the basis of variable shared histories and a common dialect. In European Russia, these included the Latvians (at this time – for all intents and purposes – Latvian speakers from Kurland and Livonia), Estonians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, and the Romanians of Bessarabia. Sitting with them were the Lithuanians, historically the junior partner in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from 1569 to 1795. The Lithuanian region, as well as parts of the Ukrainian and Belorussian provinces, had retained a substantial Polish land ownership, and was also connected to the Catholic Church. In the case of Lithuania, most of the few Lithuanian nobles spoke Polish, as was the case with the Czech nobles regarding German.

Again, the Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Belorussian populations were almost entirely peasants, and they would be, along with the Latvians and Estonians, connected with the Empire through localised hegemons.[299] This resulted in regional multi-tiered systems with – in a rudimentary sense – three levels of nationalities. In the Baltic Provinces, the Germans held a long-standing hegemony over the Latvian and Estonian populations – also almost entirely peasants in 1854 – with little interference from the Russians. In Finland, the Swedes dominated society with a population numbering just less than fifteen per cent of the region, with slightly more Russian stewardship.

On numerous economic indicators, the Russian Empire had begun to fall behind the nation-states to the west. Due to several factors – none the least serfdom – agricultural yields were extremely poor. There was little industry and few corporations; indeed only around one per cent of the population worked in the industrial sector.[300] In addition, railway building was

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[295] Andreas Kappeler, "Mazepintsy, Malorossy, Khokhly: Ukrainians in the Ethnic Hierarchy of the Russian Empire", in A. Kappeler, Z. E. Kohut, F. E. Sysyn & M. von Hagen (eds.), *Culture, nation, and identity. The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter, 1600-1945* (Edmonton, 2003), p. 164. By the mid 19th century, "the Poles, Jews, Crimean Tartars and North Caucasians were at the bottom of the hierarchy of political loyalty, while the German Balts, Armenians and Finns were at the top".
[296] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 335 & Ransel, *op.cit.,* pp. 156-157.
[297] Around 18 of the 112 conspirators. Fleischhauer, *op. cit.,* p. D1079.
[298] From the conspirators, five officers were executed, and others were sent to Siberia. Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 335.
[299] Kappeler, Mazepintsy, *op.cit,* p. 167.
[300] Walter G. Moss, *A History of Russia. Volume I: To 1917* (London, 1997), p. 376. In 1855.

shunned (for example, the St Petersburg to Moscow track had only been completed two years previously).[301] A population that had almost doubled since 1796 exacerbated these problems. Much of the harvest was retained for consumption of the estate, or commerce at a very localised level. Hampered by the poor infrastructure network, whatever surplus was harvested for trade tended to take much longer to reach market, even if an estate was lucky enough to have access to the river or canal system.[302] In addition, the domestic banks were primitive (banks that existed were not networked) and Russia's reputation on the international money markets was poor, so capital for developing infrastructure, indeed industry in general, was difficult to obtain privately. Realistically, this could be traced to one factor: there was just not that much call for such assistance.

The military was also very backward for its time, manned by under-educated peasants in an army where drilling was considered training and where the Crimea battlefields were still supplied by ox cart.[303] Finally, outside of a relatively small (for an empire of this size) elite class, and the tiny bourgeois class, organised education was rudimentary, if it existed at all. Education was one reason why there was such a disproportionate number of Baltic Germans in public service, the high command and at court.[304] Much of the foundations of competing poles of power in the Imperial Power System were yet to be established.

3.4. Russian Imperial Power Structure 1854

In short, the Imperial Power Structure of the Russian Empire in 1854 can be approximated thus: the 'peak' of the core was the Tsar Nicholas I in the last year of his reign.[305] If anything, his autocracy was even more extreme than that of Franz Josef in Austria; Nicholas I could confirm laws orally, for example.[306] Typically for a traditional empire, the 'sub-core' consisted of the Imperial Chancery, which included the notorious Third Department,[307] the Army General Staff, and imperial ministers, who could report directly to the Tsar.[308] With regards to ministers, due to the depth of the governance deficit they had some authority and considerable autonomy. The remainder of the Inner Court sat at this level, almost entirely consisting of the 'great nobility', who were mostly non-national in outlook.[309] Also at the centre

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[301] Saunders, Regional Diversity, *op.cit.*, p. 147. The first metalled road between them was not built until 1833.

[302] Moss, *op.cit.*, p. 378. Canal building took off between the late 1790s and around 1830, however even when there was access, it was not easy to take advantage of. For example, on the Volga in the late 1850s, as Moss writes "most cargoes continued to be pulled up it by the back-breaking labor of hundreds of thousands of boat haulers".

[303] Ransel, *op.cit.*, p. 167.

[304] Marc Raeff, "Patterns of Russian Imperial Policy Toward the Nationalities", in E. Allworth (ed.), *Soviet Nationality Problems* (New York, 1971), p. 35. This was especially the case in the eighteenth century, when the Baltic Germans got their foothold in such high imperial positions.

[305] The geographic cores were Moscow and St. Petersburg. Motyl, Imperial Ends, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

[306] McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

[307] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 206. It was part of "His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancery".

[308] McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

[309] Raeff, Patterns, *op.cit.*, p. 35. At least with respect to the Baltic Germans.

of the structure was the Russian Orthodox Church – far more powerful than the Catholic Church in Austria. Arguably, the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod would become the second most powerful person in the realm.[310]

Below them sat the Committee of Ministers, which was made up of ministers and select State Council members.[311] The Council itself examined laws proposed by ministers, a legislative filter to the tsar. Nicholas I maintained that the Council existed to "provide conscientiously for me its opinion on questions which I put before it, no more, no less".[312] The Committee had the added remit of acting on the Tsar's wishes.[313] Underneath them were the small number of state bureaucrats – the *gosudarstvenniki* – who would soon become important drivers of reform,[314] as well as the Senate, an administrative body that examined laws post-issue to ensure there were no legal conflicts, important as the Russian legal code was a veritable mess.[315] In the middle of the century, the imperial civil service was between three and four times smaller per capita than that in the general level in Western Europe.[316] As with all levels of the structure, they were entirely dependant on the Tsar.

The 'core-in-periphery' included regional Governors General, who were at times independent from the Ministries for whom they were implementing policy, and had a direct line of contact with the Tsar. Indeed, they were quite autonomous – again due to the governance deficit.[317] These ranks included the Viceroy (*Namiestnik*) of Poland and the Governor-General of Finland. At a more local level sat the Governors of *Guberniyas* – the imperial conduits to the great landowners, who themselves would provide their serfs to the empire at times of war, as the military was not professionalised at the non-officer level. In effect, they were localised autocrats. The Governors and landed nobility were complemented by the "Marshals of the Nobility", responsible directly to the Assemblies of the Nobility at *Guberniya* level.[318]

The peripheral elites of the Baltic provinces had a level of localised power that could be compared to that of the aforementioned Governors-General and Governors. The three Baltic *Landtag*e, covering Estonia, Livonia and Courland, had almost complete administrative power over their provinces. The Poles had had similar until the 1830 revolt; their power had lessened by 1854 but they still had some administrative autonomy. Less officially, the Swedish minority had

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[310] Dominic Lieven, "Russian, Imperial and Soviet Identities", *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Sixth Series, Vol. 8 (1998), p. 257. He wrote "behind both dynasty and army stood the Orthodox Church, which undoubtedly played the greatest role in creating a sense of unique national identity and community among the Russians".

[311] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[312] *Ibid.*

[313] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 205.

[314] Gregory L. Freeze, "Reform and Counter Reform" in G. L. Freeze (ed.), *Russia. A History* (Oxford, 2002), p. 173. Starting with Emancipation, which "was to a great extent the production of the Bureaucrats, who then assumed the position of arbiters between Lord and the Serfs to be enfranchised". Memorandum on Social and Material State of Russia, St Petersburg, February 1 1865, TNA FO 181/435.

[315] McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

[316] Pipes, Old Regime, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

[317] Lieven, Empires, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

[318] McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

retained its historical hegemony over the majority Finnish population (the Diet in Helsinki had not met for over forty years), and Polish landowners – also carrying over from feudal times – had seigniorial power over peasants on numerous estates in the Lithuanian, Belarusian and the Ukrainian provinces, not to mention in the Kingdom of Poland. These latter two vacillated between 'sub-core' and the higher periphery. Finally, the general periphery itself consisted of the masses, regardless of nationality. The small yet burgeoning intelligentsia class could, depending on ideology and social position of the individual in question, sit amongst the sub-core (especially in the bureaucracy) or languish in the general periphery, as could students. The intellectual leaders of the embryonic national movements – what few there were in 1854 – were very definitely peripheral, as were the peasants/serfs, soldiers, and workers, including proto-socialists.

As with Austria, the Russian Empire was still a traditional, elite-based, non-national Imperial Power Structure. Typical of such empires, the power of the regime was distributive rather than collective and extensive rather than intensive. Notably in this instance, there was also a delicate balance between authoritative and diffused power – the latter represented by the shared belief sets and practices of the imperial peasantry, that the person of the tsar was their intermediary with god. In the Imperial Power Structure of 1854, the dynasty exercised almost entirely absolute military power; as with Austria, the only element that stopped the tsar from controlling military power entirely was the nominal power of localised elements such as landowners over the tax and the supply of soldiers to the imperial army. The regime held practically absolute economic and political power *at an imperial level*. On the regional and local level, elements of economic and political power were in the hands of semi-autonomous bodies and persons, however, this again is standard for such a traditional system. The imperial hold over ideological power was mixed. Control of ideology through tradition and association with the Orthodox Church, across an almost entirely illiterate population, through controlling accessibility to education, strengthened the regimes ideological power. However, as noted, there were both existing streams (Polish nationalists, university-educated intellectuals) that controlled smaller, yet important, poles of ideological power, in competition to the core.

Diagram 2: Approximation of the Russian Imperial Power Structure, 1854.

CORE	Tsar Nicholas I

SUB-CORE

- Inner Court
- Orthodox Church
- Great Nobility
- Army High Command
- Imperial Ministers
- Imperial Chancery

- Committee of Ministers
- State Council
- Senate

- State Bureaucracy

CORE-IN-PERIPHERY

- Baltic German elites

- Governors General
- *Guberniya* governors
- Marshalls of the Nobility
- Landowners
- Imperial army garrisons

SUB-CORE / PERIPHERY

- Intelligentsia (some)
- Students (some)

- Swedish elites in Finland
- Polish landowners

ORGANISED / SANCTIONED PERIPHERY

GENERAL PERIPHERY

- Peasants/serfs
- Soldiers
- Workers
- Intelligentsia (some)
- Students (some)
- Proto-Socialists
- Nascent nationalist movements

Chapter Four

4.   The systemic pressures of European 'Great Power Club' membership

This chapter will review the external situation and the role of the Habsburg and Russian Empires therein, in order to provide a geopolitical contextual foundation for the main body of this work. When looking at external events with regards to the Imperial Power Structures, there are two considerations. The first is the role of the 'great power' system on the developments in both Empires. This covers alliance systems and statist conflicts, such as the Franco-Prussian and Austro-Prussian Wars, developments such as the unification of Germany and Italy, and comparative economic modernisation and growth. The second concerns external pressures from the related dynamics of emerging nation-states (whether real or perceived) in the Balkans, and the slow decline of the Ottomans in Europe. In addition, it is important that international political dynamics are understood, as they created the environment that directly or indirectly affected these Empires *internally*. Eisenstadt's description of this effect on pre- and early-modern imperial systems fits the two empires in question perfectly:

> *Geopolitical factors, in the broadest sense, provided not only the general setting for these polities, but also constituted sources of many concrete pressures, such as external pressures of population and problems of military security […] these geopolitical settings indicated […] the nature of the international system within which the rulers of the Empires worked and the type of problems to which they were especially sensitive.*[319]

Leading into the middle of the nineteenth-century, the reactionary order in Central and Eastern Europe – the Habsburg, the Hohenzollern of Prussia and the Romanov dynasties – remained tied to the Metternich system that followed the defeat of Napoleon. The year 1848 caused an enormous shock to this system, and although they would prevail, Europe would never be the same again. The two German dynasties would suffer directly as the Russians indirectly, through the hubris that came from not having to face revolt on their soil, as well as having to deal with the transfer of liberal and radical ideologies.

The revolutions of 1848/1849 fall outside the scope of this study, and are referenced when relevant as background in the rest of this work. In short, this was not a clash of sovereign powers, rather a series of disturbances from within, that spread across the continent in a similar, but more violent manner, to the 1830 uprisings that followed the second fall of the Bourbon dynasty in France. There were numerous reasons for their eventual faltering, not the least the disparate nature and ideologies of the revolutionary groups. For example, in Austria, there were at least four such groups with different grievances – Italians, Hungarians and radicals from Vienna and Prague.[320] Austria had the recourse of relying on other subject nationalities that fought to defend the existing order, some in hope of betterment or in fear of the alternatives,

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[319] Eisenstadt, *op.cit.,* p. xviii.
[320] Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.,* p. 340.

and the Russian Empire, who answered the call to help extinguish the final flame of the revolution, in Budapest, in 1849. Russia would be central to the next large shock to the European system – the Crimean War.

This was the first 'great power' statist conflict in Europe since 1815, although it took a very different turn. The battles themselves, although brutal, with enormous casualties, were geographically limited. The diplomatic machinations behind them provided an eye-opening preview of the next sixty years of 'great power' politics. In the lead up to war, a machismo France under the newly self-crowned Emperor Napoleon III was looking for opportunities to reassert itself on the international stage. He would aim directly for what he considered the peak of the European system – the Russian Empire, by hitting it in its soft underbelly – the Ottoman controlled Holy Land. As Robert Gildea summarised:

> *He saw Great Britain standing over Belgium, Prussia standing over the Rhineland, Austria standing over Italy, and standing behind them all, Russia, the 'bastion of reaction'. France must go to the root of the problem, and challenge Russia. By challenging Russia at Constantinople, Napoleon would provoke confusion in the Ottoman Empire.*[321]

To achieve this, Napoleon III strove to overturn the traditional Russian protection of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Confusion inevitably led to war between the Russians and Ottomans in 1853: the Russian destruction of the Turkish Fleet at Sinop in November was the trigger for Britain and France to threaten war, which they would declare the following March. The Austrians, concerned about the Russian advance, refused to support them, disappointing the Tsar who automatically expected their backing, in part as repayment for the aforementioned intervention in Hungary. This was just the beginning of their disappointment.

In an effort to formalise the cessation of hostilities, the Russians withdrew from the Danubian Principalities, but the British and French wanted to continue the war. To that end, the Allies, including Austria, drew up the "Four Points Memo", which made demands that Russia thought unacceptable.[322] That Austria was involved, and Austrian Foreign Minister Buol the issuer of the demands (with the French Foreign Minister) was a pivotal moment in Russian-Austrian relations, and in turn 'great power' politics leading to the First World War.[323] Indeed, they would never truly see eye-to-eye again. Nicholas I was reported to mark the reverse of a portrait of Franz Josef with "*Du Undankbarer!*" (You ingrate!),[324] to have given the statuette of the Austrian Emperor that sat in his study to his valet, and to have "told the Austrian ambassador

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[321] Gildea, *op.cit.*, p. 178.

[322] *Ibid.*, p. 180. Russia had to renunciate its protectorate in the Danubian Principalities, the Straits Convention of 1841 was enhanced to close the straits to warships *even* in peace time, the Danube delta, under Russian control for 25 years, was to be opened again, and Russia's 'protection' of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire was to end.

[323] Katherine Schach Cook, "Russia, Austria and the Question of Italy, 1859-1862", *The International History Review*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Oct., 1980), pp. 543-544. She made a point of Prince Gorchakov's "strong antipathy to Austria in general and to Buol in particular", and that the emperor, the court, the imperial family and indeed public opinion was "at least as anti-Austrian".

[324] Moss, *op.cit.*, p. 370.

that he and John Sobieski of Poland were the two most foolish kings in history since they had both saved Austria".[325]

This schism between two of the old order would also become a pressing issue for the third, the Prussians. At this time, they were in no position to intervene to bring Austria and Russia to rapprochement. The 1850s were a tricky decade for Prussia. Although the economy and middle classes were growing impressively, the ruling clique of aristocrats and landholders were preoccupied with ensuring the revolutions would never happen again.[326] It was not until Bismarck began transforming Prussian politics in the early 1860s that they moved onto the path that would make them the dominant European power, as unified Germany. For example, Bismarck and Prussia stayed out of the next 'great power' conflict, the Franco-Austrian War of 1859.[327]

In the time between the Crimean War and 1859, Austria had continued to annoy the Russians with its strict interpretations of the Treaty of Paris, a "peace treaty whose abrogation had become such an obsession with the Russians that it would totally dominate their foreign policy for the next fifteen years".[328] The 1859 conflict was notable for the Russian snubbing of Austrian calls for assistance. Not only was Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov wary of offending the French Emperor, Alexander II was still simmering over the Crimea 'betrayal'; indeed anti-Austrian feeling was widespread in Russia. [329] The Russians declared their indifference with much gusto. David Mackenzie wrote that: "Russia remained benevolently neutral as its leaders gloated at Vienna's discomfiture. This promoted Russia's long term aim of splitting the Crimean coalition and ending her isolation." [330]

The Austrians would lose nose numerous battles, and arguably the peace negotiations as well, by relinquishing much of the province of Lombardy, an important stage in the unification of Italy. Foreign Minister Buol would lose his job.[331] Much of the original damage was done by the harsh Austrian conscription policy in Lombardy and Venetia, which led to hundreds of draft-eligible men escaping into Piedmont[332] – an unsubtle policy that would cause similar problems, and have similar results, for the Russians in Poland in 1863. The damage to military prestige within the Habsburg Empire, not to mention the imperial treasury, would help end the neo-Absolutist era in Austrian politics, and give impetus for the nationalities to challenge the status quo. It also helped cement the isolation of Austria that would continue until offered a lifeline by Bismarck in 1871, as we will see.[333]

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[325] Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.*, p. 170.

[326] Gordon A. Craig, *Europe, 1815-1914* (Hinsdale, IL, 1972), p. 205. He wrote: "For a decade after the revolutions of 1848, Prussian policy, both domestic and foreign, was completely negative in character."

[327] Although fear that the Prussians would force a peace settlement between France and Austria if insurrection spread to Hungary led Napoleon III to put a stop to the war. The French Emperor was reported to state: "I can't hang on in this position. I must get out of here." Palmer, *op.cit.*, pp. 111-112.

[328] Cook, *op.cit.*, p. 545.

[329] *Ibid.,* pp. 545-546.

[330] David Mackenzie, I*mperial Dreams. Harsh Realities. Tsarist Foreign Policy 1815-1917* (Fort Worth, 1994), p. 63.

[331] Cook, *op.cit.*, p. 545.

[332] Craig, *op.cit.*, p. 196.

[333] Palmer, *op.cit.*, p. 176. A lifeline that took a memo by Count Beust, a mere eight days after the peace was

Their isolation would extend to their traditional sphere of influence – the German Confederation – an influence traceable to the traditional Habsburg monopoly of the Holy Roman crown. In the 1860s, it would suddenly be challenged by a resurgent Prussia that had thrown off the reactionary shackles of the 1850s, in a far bolder manner than the Austrians who had since the revolutions showed little urgency in reforming the Confederation, hoping to keep it as it was.[334] The Austrians, successors of Metternich, were masterfully outmanoeuvred by Prussia. They were also outmanoeuvred bilaterally – attempts to conclude a defensive alliance with Prussia in 1860/61 were shunned. The Prussians would only negotiate from a platform of future military control of Germany and at least an equal position in the Confederate Diet in Frankfurt.[335] Bismarck would tell the Austrian envoy in Berlin, Count Károlyi, in 1862, that it was time "for Austria to shift her centre of gravity from Germany to Hungary", offering Prussian support only in Italy and the Balkans.[336] As we will see, it was an offer Prussia would spectacularly walk back from in 1866.

The Polish rebellion of 1863 will be covered later in detail in, however it is worth considering the Austrian reactions to the crisis. Although amounting to very little, there was much bluster from France and Britain as to intervening on Poland's behalf – empty threats, but threats still.[337] Apart from driving a wedge between the Russians and the French, it caused a great dilemma for Austria, with the considerable Polish population in Galicia. Austria was 'estranged' from the Russians, and could not support the British and French positions, as could be seen from this Austrian Cabinet document from March 1863, which outlined their dilemma. Action would mean that they:

> *would thus create a new and dangerous neighbour, to which Galicia could not be denied in the long run. If Austria desires to support the resurrection of a Polish kingdom, it must at once accept the loss of Galicia (a province which is so important financially and militarily and which has given so many proofs of its loyalty and devotion), or at least to accede to this cession only after we are in possession of an equivalent territorial compensation.*[338]

Franz Josef decided on a containment strategy, which consisted of emergency measures in Galicia, including the proroguing of the Diet in Lemberg (Lviv).[339] As Richard Elrod argued, the Emperor and Foreign Minister Rechberg lost their nerve, worried about a second Piedmont. This time, Austria's position would disappoint both Britain and France on the one side and the

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signed between the now German Empire and France on 10 May 1871, to get Franz Josef to even consider accommodation. Beust, in Palmer's words, addressed the memo to the Emperor "setting out a strategy to enable Austria-Hungary to become Europe's pivotal Great Power once more: the Emperor should seek reconciliation with the new German Empire".

[334] Austensen, *op.cit.,* p. 210.

[335] *Ibid.,* p. 217.

[336] Palmer, *op.cit.,* p. 131. Bismarck warned that the Prussians would ally with France if this offer was rejected.

[337] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 433.

[338] Memo in Richard B. Elrod, "Austria and the Polish Insurrection of 1863: Documents from the Austrian State Archives", *The International History Review,* Vol. 8. No. 3 (Aug., 1986), p. 432.

[339] *Ibid.,* p. 418.

Russians on the other.[340] In addition, the revolt would sour Franco-Russian relations, which drew Russia into Prussia's orbit until well into the 1880s. [341]

Further setbacks for the Austrians would occur in Schleswig-Holstein. Again, a tepid policy of containment of both Prussia and Denmark over the Duchies failed, and the Austrians found themselves drawn into the war and future occupation, in concert with the Prussians and against the wishes of the Confederation.[342] This was a grave mistake – disputes over the administration of the provinces were the pretext for the final showdown between Austria and Prussia. Prussia would nullify the Confederation after that body voted to mobilise against the Prussians, who had invaded Holstein in response to Austria bringing the original dispute before the Frankfurt Diet. The Austro-Prussian War had begun, and would spill over into Italy, and become the catalyst for the reorganisation of Germany, the full unification of Italy, and the eastward turn that the Habsburg Empire would take until the First World War.

Three points bear emphasis. First, the Austrian Emperor practically 'fell' into war, in an almost old-fashioned manner, with an opponent sporting a far more modern, 'professional' philosophy. As Franz Josef stated in May, 1866: "better a war than prolongation of the present situation […] In any case we must have a result, after spending so much money and making so many sacrifices".[343] Second, Habsburg Venetia province, which Italy offered to buy in 1865,[344] would be lost to the Austrians *regardless* of what happened in the war. The Emperor entered into a treaty with Napoleon III whereby he would surrender the province if they defeated Prussia.[345] The Italians would be roundly defeated in this arena of the war, but Venetia was surrendered anyway. As Lieven stated, it was "considered dishonourable to cede or sell Venetia to the House of Savoy without a war but acceptable to do so once thousands of soldiers' lives had been sacrificed in its victorious but politically hopeless defence".[346] A.J.P. Taylor was typically blunt: "Austria committed a brainless suicide."[347] The final point was how military and infrastructure deficiencies were highlighted – for example Prussian mastery of the railways enabled fast troop supply, whereas the Austrians only had one railway running towards the battle zone, which became instantly clogged.[348] This defeat would be a catalyst for a number of reforms in the Habsburg Empire, as will be seen in the next chapter.

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[340] *Ibid.,* pp. 430-431.

[341] Mackenzie, Imperial Dreams, *op.cit.,* pp. 63-64.

[342] Austensen, *op.cit.,* p. 218.

[343] Palmer, *op.cit.,* p. 142.

[344] Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.,* p. 179.

[345] Palmer, *op.cit.,* p. 143. Franz Josef "believed that if the Austrians could gain a victory in the field against Victor Emmanuel's army, the defeat would prevent the Italians from persisting with future demands for other Italian-speaking regions".

[346] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 162.

[347] He wrote this specifically as selling the province would have ensured Italian neutrality in any conflict with Prussia, Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 136.

[348] Craig, *op.cit.,* p. 213.

Initially Franz Josef, and the army officer corps as a whole, would seek revenge: as Frank Bridge would write, rapprochement was "psychologically impossible".[349] However, Foreign Minister Beust would tread carefully. The French instigated alliance discussions with Beust almost immediately, and these would continue until the eve of the Franco-Prussian War.[350] The failure of these discussions exemplified the complex nature of the Great Power system, as outlined by A.J.P. Taylor:

> *The Franco-Austrian alliance was, however, wrecked on the question of Rome. The Austrian generals would not face a new war against Prussia, unless secure from an Italian attack; Italy would not enter the alliance unless the French troops were withdrawn from Rome; Napoleon III could not give up the protection of the Pope, which was the last remaining point of his prestige. Beust, a Protestant from Saxony, would have had no scruples in abandoning the Papacy; the deep-rooted loyalty of the Habsburg House to the Catholic cause tied his hands, and the tradition of the Counter-Reformation deprived the dynasty of its last chance to recover its German position.*[351]

Another point could be added to this: the war weariness of Franz Josef, who had lost his stomach for offensive militarism. The Prussians steamrolled the French in 1870; Sedan became the French Königgrätz. The German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles in 1871, and the Russians were freed from the French oversight of the Treaty of Paris, having their naval rights in the Black Sea restored.[352] As noted, Beust would go on to recommend reconciliation with the Germans, which was taken up by his successor, the rehabilitated Hungarian magnate Count Andrássy.[353]

In one respect, the Austrians realised correctly that they had no future in opposition to Prussia, and accommodation was essential; in the blunt words of Nicholas Der Bagdasarian: "for the simple reason that the revamped European balance of power no longer made it safe to remain an enemy of the country".[354] Relations between Berlin and Vienna blossomed during the 1870s, driven by Andrássy.[355] Bismarck was ever forward about his need to support the Habsburg dynasty, and the latter's role in his ideal European system: "imagine no future state of affairs acceptable to us if the lands forming the Austrian monarchy were to be destroyed or placed in a state of permanent dependency by Hungarian and Slav rebellions".[356] He continued: "What was one to put in that region of Europe that has been filled, so far, by the Austrian state, from the Tyrol to the Bukovina? New formations in this area could only be of a permanently revolutionary character."[357] Bismarck's concern for stability in Central and Eastern Europe would come to pass

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[349] Bridge, Sadowa, *op,cit.* p. 33. Also see John Omre, "The Unexpected Origins of Peace: Three Case Studies", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), p. 108.

[350] For details, see *ibid.*, pp. 108-109.

[351] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 156.

[352] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 437.

[353] Palmer, *op.cit.,* p. 176.

[354] Nicholas Der Bagdasarian, *Austrian-German Rapprochement, From the Battle of Sedan to the Dual Alliance* (London, 1976), p. 44, quoted in Omre, *op.cit.,* p. 109.

[355] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

[356] Otto von Bismarck, *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* (Stuttgart, 1911) II, 64, quoted in Remak, *op.cit.,* p. 131.

[357] *Ibid.*

during the decade, with the Balkans engulfed in a series of revolts, the Russo-Turkish War and the rise of new nation-states driven by well-organised and supported nationalist movements. To that effect, he strove to reaffirm the traditional conservative order from the Metternich Age, through the "Three Emperors' League", between Germany, Russia and the Habsburg Empire.

Driven by taxation grievances, 1875 saw an enormous peasant uprising in Herzegovina. This was merely the opening act. Bulgarian revolutionaries revolted in the following year, against the wishes of their 'sponsor' Russia. The severity of the Ottoman response fomented Europe-wide revulsion, and the Serbian and Montenegrin Principalities unilaterally declared independence and invaded Turkey, in June 1876.[358] The worsening situation managed to bring the Russians and the Austrians, mildly reconciled through the Three Emperors' League, to the diplomatic table; fears of unrest in their 'spheres of influence' inspired them to work as one. Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov and Andrássy – who said in this year that "Turkey is almost of providential utility to Austria"[359] – had already agreed in December 1875 to petition the Porte to make reforms that would benefit the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire.[360] On January 15 the following year, at a meeting in Budapest, they agreed that if Turkey collapsed, Russia was to move into Bulgaria, and Austria into Bosnia.[361] After this, Bismarck encouraged the Russians to declare war.[362]

War between the Russians and the Turks began in 1877, although the Tsar and Gorchakov (a player of *realpolitik*) had tried to delay it as much as possible – uncertain as to the overall purpose of such an undertaking.[363] Despite some setbacks, particularly the Siege of Plevna, and with help from the (Wallachian) Romanians, the Russians inexorably drove towards Constantinople. Fears of English intervention, and whether Russia should take on the 'imperial burden' so deep into the region, held the Russians from the city.[364] Eventually, a peace treaty was signed at San Stefano in March 1878. The treaty – driven by Russian Pan-Slavist diplomat Count Ignatyev – was demonstrably over-favourable to Russian interests in the Balkans, creating an enormous Bulgarian client state, including most of Macedonia, except Salonica.[365] Unsurprisingly, this annoyed the Austrians and the British, who were fearful of Russian expansion and a weakened Turkey. This led to the Congress of Berlin, which took place in June/July 1878, the outcomes of which would overshadow the Balkans until the First World War and beyond.[366]

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[358] Gildea, *op.cit.,* p. 239. Between 12,000 and 30,000 Bulgarians were massacred.
[359] M.E. Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East 1792–1923* (Harlow, 1996), p. 77.
[360] *Ibid.*
[361] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 452.
[362] Mackenzie, Imperial Dreams, *op.cit.,* p. 66-67.
[363] Kaspe, *op.cit.,* p. 482.
[364] *Ibid.*
[365] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 457.
[366] For an excellent summary of the backdown from San Stefano to the Treaty of Berlin, see David Mackenzie, "Russia's Balkan Policies under Alexander II, 1855-1881", in H. Ragsdale (ed.), *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, UK, 1993)*,* pp. 241-243.

Serbia and Romania gained full independence, creating potential beacons to subjugated nationalities within Habsburg borders.[367] The Habsburg Empire also occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina (and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar), which had been coveted by Austrian generals since the 1850s. This created a potential source of conflict for imperial Serbian and Croatian populations, who had ethnic kin in the provinces. This occupation would also create a political headache for post-*Ausgleich* Austria-Hungary, necessitating an occupation administered through the Habsburg Ministry of Finance, placing the province at the mercy of the Delegations, and decennial Quota negotiations.

Bulgaria itself would remain an Ottoman tributary, albeit a loose one. For this the Russians would feel the brunt in three ways. First, naturally, was the loss of international prestige, especially as it was Russian public opinion that cornered the Tsar into action.[368] Second, reactionaries and Pan-Slavists within Russia were aghast at what they perceived as their regime's back down and a "dishonourable peace".[369] Finally, the acquiescence of the Russians to a liberal Bulgarian National Assembly, with an equally liberal constitution based on the Belgian, would aggrieve numerous liberal and radical groups in Russia – from certain *zemstva* who would openly question why such an arrangement was good enough for Bulgaria but not for Russia, through to the growing radical left. These problems would exacerbate over the next decade, as the Habsburgs established close, if not vassalage, relationships with Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria.[370] Indeed, Russian vitriol, particularly through the press, helped convince Bismarck of the need to formalise an alliance with the Habsburg Empire.[371]

In this he had the support of Andrássy, who was more fearful of Russia: signing the Double Alliance in 1879 was the final major act of his international career.[372] Notably, this was a 'great power' alliance, in that Habsburg policy in the Balkans fell outside its remit.[373] Italy joined the alliance in 1882, partially out of spite caused by France taking Tunisia the previous year.[374] This would have long lasting repercussions in the Habsburg Empire, with growing fears of Italian irredentism and the fate of the ethnic Italian populations in the Empire at the root of a difficult relationship that blew up in the face of the Triple Alliance in 1915. Forming the Double/Triple Alliance was only part of Bismarck's plan; another was reaffirming the Three Emperors' League, as the Three Emperors' Alliance, in 1881 (a 'body' that Andrássy had hoped was buried by the

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[367] Montenegro also gained independence. The Serbs had had full autonomy since 1830 and there had been no Ottoman garrisons there since 1867, see Yapp, *op.cit.,* p. 61.

[368] Kaspe, *op.cit.,* p. 482.

[369] Mackenzie, Russia's Foreign Policy, *op.cit.,* p. 243.

[370] Bridge, Foreign Policy, *op.cit.,* p. 9.

[371] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 459.

[372] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 168. This was also a means of guaranteeing against "the breakup of the multinational state". George Barany, "Hungary; The Uncompromising Compromise", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 3, Issue 01, (Jan., 1967), p. 247.

[373] Bridge, Foreign Policy, *op.cit.,* p. 9, wrote that in the "German view it was not designed – as Bismarck frankly informed the Austrians – to support any Balkan policy whatsoever".

[374] Mearshimer, *op.cit.,* p. 206.

Alliance with Berlin once and for all).[375] This time, if one of the three was involved in a war with a fourth party, the others promised to stay out of it, and try to contain the conflict as much as possible.[376] Bismarck was determined not to put all his eggs in one basket – that basket being the Habsburg Empire – nor did he want an enemy like Russia.[377] As Robert Kann noted, Bismarck outlined in the *Reichstag* in December 1878 that: "the whole Balkan problem was not worth the sacrifice of the straight limbs of a single Prussian grenadier. The best means to protect and to restrain Austria seemed to him to bring her and Russia to an understanding based on the foundation of monarchic solidarity".[378]

Although the Three Emperors' Alliance was allowed to lapse in 1887, there were instances of perceptible cooperation between the Habsburgs and Russians in the Balkans. For example, when the Bulgarian Army, stripped of its Russian general staff officers who had been withdrawn by St. Petersburg, successfully repelled a Serbian invasion in 1885, then turned around and marched on Belgrade, the Austrian minister in Belgrade ordered them to stop. This came in the form of a threat to Prince Battenberg, the first Bulgarian Prince, that if they failed to do so, Austrians would occupy Serbia and Russia would occupy Bulgaria.[379] Russia, suspicious and fearful of German growth, also looked toward France. Indeed, it was a rare misstep by Bismarck in late 1887 that pushed together France and Russia, as explained by Hugh Seton-Watson:

> *He forbade the Reichsbank to accept Russian securities as collateral for loans. This action, known to historians as the Lombardverbot, was a reprisal for a Russian decree of May 1887 forbidding foreigners to hold land in border areas of the empire, which had fallen most heavily on German subjects resident in Russian Poland. The ban, maintained until 1894, had the effect that Russian securities were bought in France, and that the French financial interest in Russia greatly increased.*[380]

This was a vital turn for Russian industrial development – by the time of the overturning of the ban, the Witte era had begun in earnest, supported by French capital.

Concurrently, Habsburg-Russian relations had hit another nadir over Serbia, where after the 1889 death of King Milan, pro-Russian factions in Belgrade began to assert themselves over Austrophiles, a change that would only intensify into the twentieth century.[381] The 1903 coup that overthrew the pro-Austrian Obrenovíc dynasty was the final straw.[382] From now on, Vienna and Belgrade were enemies, a volatile situation with such a strong Serbian component in the Habsburg Empire. The new King Peter I Karadjordjevic brushed off a 1906 Austrian ban on the

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[375] Bridge, Sadowa, *op.cit.,* p. 107, wrote that the Dual Alliance for Andrássy was "the tombstone of the Three Emperors' League".
[376] Mackenzie, Imperial Dreams, *op.cit.,* p. 116.
[377] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 459.
[378] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 407.
[379] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 570.
[380] *Ibid.,* p. 571-572.
[381] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 411.
[382] The dynasty was replaced by "Austrophobe nationalists with territorial aspirations at the expense of the Monarchy", Bridge, Foreign Policy, *op.cit.,* p. 10. For a summary of how the King and the Habsburg Empire got off on the wrong foot, see Bridge, Sadowa, *op.cit.,* pp. 262-264.

importation of animals from Serbia, which made up 83 per cent of Serb exports, by resorting to emergency French capital. Kann called this "Pig War": "A short-sighted economic embargo for the import of Serbian pigs and grain, primarily in the interest of Magyar aristocratic estates owners, [which] aggravated the conflict."[383] It was an unmitigated disaster for Austria-Hungary: in addition to French capital, Serbia found new markets in Italy and munitions from France, whilst returning to Russia's geopolitical orbit.[384]

By this time the Bismarck era had passed. Kaiser Willhelm II had dismissed him as Chancellor and Minister President in March 1890, ending all hopes of the conservative alliance. Not only would the European order, modelled by Bismarck, lose its compass, but Germany would move on from Bismarck's cunning game playing, isolating Russia and driving her more and more into the arms of the French, and ironically, for a time, the Habsburgs. It could be argued that, alliance systems or not, it was now 'every man for himself'. The Russians were becoming very wary of the German Empire: in response to a French military proposal in 1892, Alexander III remarked to his Foreign Minister, Giers: "We really do have to come to an agreement with the French. We must be prepared to attack the Germans at once, in order not to give them time to defeat France first and then to turn upon us [...] We must correct the mistakes of the past and destroy Germany at the first possible moment."[385]

Indeed, in 1897 the Russians and Habsburgs concluded an agreement that, in the words of Alan Sked, "put the Balkans on ice".[386] For the next eleven years they kept out of each other's way in the region, which allowed the Russians to focus more on the Far East.[387] They would keep out of each other's way over the war between Greece and Turkey concerning Crete, possibly to the long-term detriment of the region. Although the Turks were successful on the battlefield, they won next to nothing from the negotiated settlement, and Crete was lost. Alas, as Seton-Watson stated: "The Powers' action was bound to encourage the Christian subjects of the Sultan to rebel again, and the small Balkan states to pursue their own aims at Turkey's expense."[388]

France and Russia, already fearful of Germany, would slowly be joined by the United Kingdom, who became worried about Europe's balance, especially after Russia's defeat to Japan.[389] History has been perhaps unkind to Tsar Nicholas II concerning the Japanese War, creating the image of a 'weak' autocrat. During negotiations in Portsmouth, Theodore Roosevelt would go so far as to write: "The Czar is a preposterous little creature as the absolute autocrat of 150,000,000 people. He has been unable to make war, and he is now unable to make peace."[390]

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[383] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 411.
[384] Janko Pleterski, "The Southern Slav Question" in M. Cornwall (ed.), *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary. A Multi-National Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe* (Exeter, 1990), p. 82.
[385] Quoted in Mackenzie, Imperial Dreams, *op.cit.*, pp. 120-121.
[386] Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.*, p. 252.
[387] Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 196.
[388] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 575.
[389] Mearshimer, *op.cit.*, p. 215.
[390] Raymond A. Esthus, "Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War", *Russian Review*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct., 1981), p. 401.

However, it was the Tsar's refusal for concessions, including loss of territory and indemnities, which kept the negotiations going for so long and resulted in a relatively mild peace settlement with the Japanese.[391] Regardless, coming on top of the 1905 Revolution, the international prestige of the Russian Empire was severely damaged.

The formation of the Triple Entente put the Habsburg Empire in a difficult position. Overall, relations between the British and Habsburg Empires had remained warm. Indeed, Vienna had forlornly hoped that Britain would join the Triple Alliance.[392] Events both in and out of their control would render such aspirations moot, for example the 1908 Bosnian Crisis, which was perhaps the most influential (to the Great Power system) moment in Balkan history since the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. The Habsburgs, driven by Foreign Minister Aehrenthal, were keen to dampen Serbian nationalism in the province, and were fearful that if Turkey collapsed, their occupation of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar (in between Serbia and Montenegro), which had no real strategic value, might drag them into the mess.[393] Annexation was approved in August, in concert with renunciation of the occupation of the Sanjak.[394] Aehrenthal completely outmanoeuvred Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky, making the Russians look foolish on the international stage whilst lessening their lustre amongst the emerging national groups in a region they had fought so hard to influence.[395] After meeting in Buchlau in Bohemia in September of that year, Izvolsky left convinced he was party to a gentleman's bargain – Russia would support the Habsburg annexation of Bosnia & Herzegovina in return for their support in reopening the Turkish Straits to the Russian navy.[396] However, thinking the issues would be taken to a conference (and without written notes of their meeting as proof of agreement), Aehrenthal caught him off guard: Austria Hungary unilaterally announced the annexation on October 7, leaving Russia with nothing.[397]

The annexation was a disaster to the European power system, ending forever hopes of a Russian-Habsburg entente, and finally tying Habsburg fortunes to Imperial Germany.[398] As for the Habsburgs, Joseph Redlich was typically pointed in his analysis: after already having "engendered the lasting hostility of Tsarist and Pan-Slav Russia" by the 1878 occupation, the final annexation "showed that the alliance of Habsburg-Lorraine with Hohenzollern was the last diplomatic and military safeguard for the maintenance of the empire".[399]

At the same time, Serbia was further aggrieved, and moved to full blown agitation against the Habsburgs, including open irredentism. Serbia did this with full support of the Russian Empire, and the tacit approval of the British.[400] To force the Serbs to accept the annexation,

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[391] *Ibid.,* pp. 406 & 410.

[392] Koralka, The Czech Question, *op.cit.,* p. 252.

[393] Bridge, Foreign Policy, *op.cit.,* p. 11.

[394] *Ibid.*

[395] Bridge, Sadowa, op.cit., p. 205, stated that "Izvolsky's rage defies description".

[396] Mackenzie, Imperial Dreams, *op.cit.,* p. 162.

[397] *Ibid.,* & Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913. Prelude to the First World War* (London, 2000), p. 7.

[398] Bridge, Sadowa, *op.cit.,* p. 13. Bridge wrote that "the entente with Russia was lost without recall".

[399] Redlich, *op.cit.,* p. 607.

[400] Kann *op.cit.,* p. 414.

Austria-Hungary issued a German backed ultimatum to Belgrade in 1909, which included demands to: "confine the activities in Belgrade of the newly formed *Narodna Odbrana,* or National Defence organisation of volunteers from Serbia proper, to support Serb culture and education".[401]

The Austrian difficulties in balancing their frosty relationship with Italy with their 'needs' in the Balkans came to a head in 1911. Aehrenthal desperately tried to limit the Italo-Turkish War to the Mediterranean, and would go so far as to warn Rome that any expansion of the fight into the Balkans would be a breach of their Triple Alliance obligations.[402] He was unimpressed that the Italians began the conflict, with an ultimatum to surrender Tripoli in 1911,[403] as a Turkish defeat would only serve to whet the appetites of the Balkan nationalities further. Even worse would be defeat to Italy, acknowledged as a comparatively poor fighting force. Bismarck had once remarked that : "Italy had a large appetite and rotten teeth."[404] If the Italians could beat the Turks then the Balkan nations could hope to do the same.

The decline in Russian influence and the desperation of the Habsburgs were further demonstrated during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. The Russians, who were at once disorganized, tepid and overconfident, were essentially sidelined from the conflicts. The overarching Russian position for the region was pacifism through negotiation, taking the lead from Stolypin's overall foreign policy edict.[405] Under the lead of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov, the Russians encouraged the formation of the Balkan League, as a means of maintaining the status quo in the region – which for them meant hindering Habsburg plans in the region and ensuring the right for their ships to use the Straits was not interrupted.[406] For the Russians, the Straits had become an economic as well as military lifeline: for example, most of their grain exports (ranging between 75% and 90% from 1910 and 1913) relied on secure passage.[407] They had first hand experience of how much damage could be inflicted on the Russian economy when the Straits closed briefly in 1911 after the beginning of the Italo-Turkish War.[408]

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[401] John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country* (Cambridge, UK, 1996), p. 84. Wayne S. Vucinich, "The Serbs in Austria-Hungary", *Austrian History Yearbook,* Vol. 3, Issue 02 (Jan., 1967), p. 47, noted that "for Austria-Hungary to control Serbian nationalism at home it had to control it abroad. For this reason, in a number of so-called 'Eastern crises,' Austria-Hungary ranged itself against Serbia".

[402] Bridge, Foreign Policy, *op.cit.,* p. 14.

[403] Italian Prime Minister Giolitti, who took the country to war, was prescient to a fault: "What if, after we attack Turkey, the Balkans move? And what if a Balkan war provokes a clash between the two groups of powers and a European war? Is it wise that we saddle ourselves with the responsibility of setting fire to the powder?" Quoted in Gildea, *op.cit.,* p. 415.

[404] Quoted in Mearscheimer, *op.cit.,* p. 205.

[405] David M. McDonald, "A lever without a fulcrum: domestic factors and Russian foreign policy, 1905-1914", in H. Ragsdale (ed.), *Imperial Russian foreign policy* (Cambridge, UK 1993), pp. 295-302.

[406] The Balkan League began with a secret treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria (March 1912), and was extended to include Greece and Montenegro by September that year. Gildea, *op.cit.,* p. 415. For details on the background and formation of the Balkan League, see Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913. Prelude to the First World War* (London, 2000), pp. 9-13. Also see Alan Bodger, "Russia and the End of the Ottoman Empire", in M. Kent (ed.), *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1996), p. 88.

[407] Bolger, *op.cit.,* p. 79, who added that between a third and a half of all exports from the Russian Empire used that route between 1900 and 1909.

[408] *Ibid.,* p. 80. He wrote that "grain began to pile up rapidly at Russian ports, prices fell by 15-20 per cent, freight charges rose accordingly," adding that "banks stopped handling bills of exchange, and the Ministry of Trade and

However, the body they helped bring together, and hoped would do their bidding in the region, would against their (and Austro-Hungarian) wishes not only attack the Ottoman Empire, but convincingly win the First Balkan War.[409] The Balkan League was no longer under any Russian control, if indeed it ever truly was. In addition, their ambassadors were working behind-the-scenes with varying agendas not always in line with St. Petersburg, especially Nicholas Hartwig in Belgrade and Anatoli Neklyudov in Sofia, both ardent Pan-Slavists. They encouraged aggressive action against the Turks against the wishes of their superiors in the Ministry.[410] Alan Bodger went as far as to claim that though his actions Hartwig had "indeed, helped bring about the First Balkan War […] and he was the driving force behind the Second Balkan War".[411]

After the conclusive Balkan League victory, "its members then fell out over the spoils," as Paul Kennedy stated.[412] The division of winnings amongst a disparate group of victors (without a clear 'leader' and untroubled about treading on Russian or Habsburg toes) would lead to the conflict reigniting. For different reasons, Macedonia and the newly-formed state of Albania became the nexus of new grievances.[413] In the interbellum, Russia planned to mobilise in support of Serbian claims to Adriatic access, only to back down under impetus from Sazonov, who brought the Tsar around to his side.[414] The Second Balkan War would break out in June, 1913. Much blame could be laid at the feet of Austria-Hungary for its insistence on the creation of Albania as a buffer against Serbian expansion to the Adriatic, and the overall Russian strategy, upon which Richard C. Hall commented: "The Russians failed miserably to promote a sense of fairness and moderation between Bulgaria and Serbia. Their representatives in Belgrade and Sofia gave conflicting advice. As a result, St Petersburg lost its firm position in Sofia and with it a realistic opportunity to finally establish physical control of the Straits."[415]

Of the numerous outcomes of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, five have special pertinence to this work: 1) the final end of a significant Turkey-in-Europe; 2) shifting alliances amongst the emerging belligerent nations, such as Bulgaria, which would help frame the Balkan theatres of the First World War; 3) further alienation of Austria-Hungary to Serbia; 4) the aggrandisement of Serbia, even without its' desired Adriatic access,[416] and; 5) the Russians losing the ability to command loyalty and obedience from smaller nations nominally in their sphere of

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Industry was flooded with panic appeals for help from local authorities and merchants". Another closure in 1912 resulted in further damage.

[409] Mackenzie, Imperial Dreams, *op.cit.*, p. 164.

[410] *Ibid.*

[411] Bodger, *op.cit.*, p. 88. He wrote of Hartwig: "He identified with Serbian aims and made and carried out Serbian rather than official Russian policy, completely sabotaging Sazonov's efforts to preserve the Balkan alliance.", *ibid.*, p. 78. They were officially tasked by the Russian Foreign Ministry with bringing them together, Richard C. Hall, *op.cit.*, p. 11

[412] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflicts from 1500 to 2000* (London, 1989), p. 327.

[413] Mackenzie, Imperial Dreams, *op.cit.*, p. 164.

[414] Gildea, *op.cit.*, pp. 415-417.

[415] Richard C. Hall, *op.cit.*, p. 139.

[416] After the Treaty of Bucharest (10 August 1913), Serbian territory was more than doubled, from 39,000 to 87,000 square kilometers. Pleterski, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

influence. To that could be added the humiliation of Russia during the First Balkan War when the Bulgarians nearly took Constantinople, something the Russians had not achieved after so many years of fighting the Ottomans.[417] It is also worth considering that to add insult to Serbian injury, Albania was secured as imagined by the Habsburg Empire under threat of Austro-Hungarian (and Italian) invasion.[418] This would also help push the ideal of 'Greater Serbia' further towards that of Yugoslavia – a process that had been fraught and was still struggling to gain lasting traction, after some fifty years.[419]

By this stage, the Triple Entente was beginning to 'work', as proven in Morocco during the Agadir Crisis. After the German's gunboat retaliation to the French occupation of the interior of Morocco in 1911, the British evoked the spectre of the Entente, although they were not willing to fight – yet. France would end up ceding some Congolese territory to Germany, and the crisis would pass.[420] However, it would likely have been comforting to the Russians, who by this stage were openly warning of German expansion, as exemplified by this comment by the Russian Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Count Beckendorff:

> *I see the gigantic force of expansion of Germany which carries along with it its influence and inevitably its flag […] This expansionist force in no way necessarily means the Berlin cabinet is deliberately waging an aggressive policy, but it entails counter-measures on the part of the other powers which always create the danger of conflict.*[421]

As the First World War dawned, it was clear that both the Habsburg and Russian empires were caught in a cul-de-sac of their own making. Desperate to remain viable 'great powers', they mishandled numerous situations and missed numerous opportunities to ensure that, at the very least, their own backyard (the Balkans) would be more timid. There were times of *realpolitik* when the likes of Andrássy and Gorchakov prevailed, but on both sides, the temptations were just too great to sit idle. This was especially true as the nineteenth-century wore on, with the need to juggle the emergence of Pan-Slavist and nationalist ideologies, in an environment that was more exposed every day to the successes of Balkan national movements, the failings of their Ottoman imperial cousin, and their respective inability to ensure the region would fall into line behind them. The international politics of both regimes at once got caught up in the 'nationalist wave' crashing through Central and Eastern Europe and became reliant on alliances with 'greater' powers – alliances so essential that they would be at the vanguard of the very war that would seal their dissolution.

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[417] Richard C. Hall, *op.cit.,* pp. 34-36.
[418] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 416.
[419] Lampe, *op.cit.,* pp. 89-92.
[420] Gildea, *op.cit.,* p. 414.
[421] Lieven, Dilemmas, *op.cit.,* p. 171.

5.   Reforming the engine room of empire

This chapter will introduce the main motivations for reform in the Habsburg and Russian Empires and the nation-state ideological frameworks that were the focus of reform, and then look at the effect of the importation of nation-state ideological frameworks on three areas which have been defined here as the "engine room of empire": economics, politics and the military. It is important to consider that these reforms did not work in isolation, and there is considerable overlap, as will be seen. The following chapter will analyse the nation-state ideological frameworks introduced in order to secure the most efficient governance, resource allocation, and an educated and productive subject population – in effect, the reforms intended to ensure they got the most out of the 'engine room'.

5.1.   The need for reform

During the 1850s and 1860s, the Habsburg and Russian Empires found themselves facing an unexpected dilemma. How could they ensure their continuing relevance as 'great powers' under the pressure from rising nation-states to the west? Underlining this was another equally great dilemma: how, as regimes, were they to remain essential to their subject populations? Eisenstadt, in reviewing pre- and early-modern imperial systems, outlines two factors behind processes of change that reflected the Habsburg and Russian conundrum:

> *The great and continuous sensitivity of the internal structure of these societies to various external pressures and to political and economic developments in the international field [...] the consequent needs of the rulers to intensify the mobilization of various resources in order to deal with problems arising out of changes in military, diplomatic, and economic international situations.*[422]

In other words, the external pressures that drove empires to maintain their position in the international system, and specific imperial responses to those pressures, would affect empires internally. For example, the drive for more direct, centralised imperial rule, a phenomenon of all emerging and modernising states outlined by Charles Tilly, would have to contend with need to keep more educated subjects onside.[423]

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[422] Eisenstadt, *op.cit.,* p. xviii.
[423] Tilly, States and Nationalism, *op.cit.,* p. 140, argued that "almost all states erected wider, deeper, more direct systems of control. [...] rulers stopped relying on highly autonomous magnates and pressed towards direct rule, toward the creation of administrations extending directly from the central power down to individual communities and households".

It is prudent to note that reform in both Empires began from two vastly different starting points. The Habsburg Empire as a whole was far more advanced industrially than Russia and consequently far more integrated into the European economy. Some of its economic sectors set world standards in terms of output quality, something that was far less true of Russia. However, the Habsburgs had a more specific geopolitical issue to address – the slow ebbing away of Habsburg power by the Prussians in the German Confederation.

The Habsburg response to the Revolution was a curious mix of bold and timid reform with a retreat into the comfortable absolutism of an imagined past – an imperial form that had never truly existed. As briefly mentioned before, they initially played lip service to constitutionalism until 1851. Such western-liberal machinations were completely absent in Russia. Overall, the neo-Absolutist period would last eleven years, and despite some initial positive reforms, numerous segments of Habsburg society would be disaffected. These would include Austrian German liberals. However, it would take military defeats to the French in the Italian Wars of 1859, and more devastatingly, the vanishing control over the German Confederation that was finalised by defeat to the Prussians in 1866, to drive the true reform push. The motivation, like everything in the Habsburg annals, was to be and remain a 'great power'.[424]

The seismic event that so shook the Russian Empire was the Crimean War, where the supposedly mighty Russian army lost a campaign of attrition on its home soil, and Russian diplomats lost a similar diplomatic campaign. What the Russian regime, and the rest of Europe saw was a tactically weak high command, with ill-equipped troops hamstrung by poor, out-dated weaponry; a soldiery that, although numerous, was comprised, almost to a man, of illiterate peasants whose training was marked by brutal and often lethal discipline, and whose numbers would be more likely to perish by illness or malnutrition than be killed in action.[425] Corruption was endemic, with paymasters through to suppliers all engaging in flagrant profiteering.[426] Some generals, such as Dimitri Miliutin, were fast to point the finger at the institution of serfdom and its overall effect on the Russian economy and society. The new tsar, Alexander II, who was embarrassed at this loss of face and honour and wary of giving the other European powers a future display of ineptitude, embraced the need for systemic reforms.

Reform would not be easy – not only would they have to work together in harmony to produce positive momentum with what Soviet-era historian B.G. Litvak called "a chain reaction of reform",[427] but also they would have to co-exist with Russia's imperial ideology of "virtue, obedience, and Christianity".[428] This ideological power platform had been formalised by Deputy

[424] Wank, Nationalities, *op.cit.,* p. 10, wrote that "playing the role of a Great Power was the sole justification for the Habsburg dynasty's existence".

[425] Ransel, *op.cit.,* p. 167.

[426] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 331.

[427] Alesksei Volvenko, "The Zemstvo Reform, the Cossacks, and the Administrative Policy on the Don, 1864-1882, in J. Burbank, M. von Hagen and A. Remnev (eds.), *Russian Empire. Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* (Bloomington IN, 2007), p. 348.

[428] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 335. Alexander J. Motyl, "Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Respective, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jan., 1999), p. 133, expanded

Minister of Education, Count Sergei Uvarov in the 1830s under the slogan "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality."[429] Hence, reform would require, in the words of Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, a "revolution from above", one that circumvented the vested interests of the nobility.[430] It would take some doing: Miliutin, one of the key reformers in the Tsar's circle, would write of the challenge in 1858: "The nobility is self-interested, unprepared, underdeveloped […] it is impossible not to be amazed at the rare firmness of the Emperor who alone curbs the present reaction and forces of inertia."[431]

Alexander II, typically a cautious conservative man and staunch defender of the autocracy, would need to find a delicate balance between the old and the new. He could not afford for Russia to be disgraced in battle and the empire would need to grow economically, politically and socially in order to 'catch up', whilst ensuring that autocratic order remained secure, presenting a firm 'in-control' face to the world. Gregory Freeze has argued that "given what we know about Alexander II and leading 'reformers', it is hard to imagine that they intended to reconstruct the whole social system," but rather that their "objective was to maximise resources and efficiency".[432] Alexander set his sights on Prussia, especially the institutions he admired – being half Hohenzollern on his mother's side, he had hoped to 'Prussianize' his realm.[433] Often labelled 'The Great Reformer', Alexander's desire for change was entirely pragmatic. It was with pragmatism that the more liberal-minded (but naturally conservative) reformers in his court, such as his brother Grand Duke Constantine, and the small number of state bureaucrats who took their role as servants of the 'needs of state' very seriously, would look to Europe for inspiration.[434]

The "Golden Age of Russian political thought" had begun: the manifestation of the evolution of conservative ideology driven by the small yet influential intelligentsia.[435] Although Richard Pipes contends that at this time "Russian conservatism ceases to be a static doctrine dedicated to preservation and becomes a theory of change", it must be emphasised that this change was brought about to preserve *through* progress.[436] In effect, although still conservative, much of its ideological output was indistinguishable from nineteenth-century liberalism. The likes of Mikhail Katkov, the inflammatory journalist, were driving for reform for this very

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upon this: "'Orthodoxy' denoted loyalty to the Orthodox church; 'autocracy,' the unquestioned authority of the tsar; and 'nationality,' the primacy of the Russian national heritage."

[429] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 335.

[430] *Ibid.*, p. 353.

[431] Miliutin, in a letter to his uncle Kiselev, quoted in W.E. Mosse, *Perestroika under the tsars* (London, 1992), p. 32. Dmitrii Miliutin also wrote in 1864-65 that, "reform can be carried out only by authority. We have too much disturbance and too much divergence of interests to expect anything good from the representation of those interests." Gildea, *op.cit.*, p. 183.

[432] Gregory L. Freeze, "The *Soslovie* (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 91, No. 1 (Feb., 1986), p. 26.

[433] Mosse, *op.cit.*, p. 51.

[434] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.*, p. 173 & Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 335.

[435] Richard Pipes, "Russian Conservatism in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Mar., 1971), p. 121.

[436] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

outcome of 'preserve and progress'.[437] The 'reform conservatives' were also stimulated by public opinion, as demonstrated by amount of letters and printed material clamouring for reform that disseminated throughout educated society.[438] These helped counter the common idea that reform would confuse the peasantry's traditional disposition toward the regime, challenging their loyalty which played on their 'simplicity'.[439]

As Freeze summarised, the main principles behind reform were *vsesoslovnost* (the participation of, and coverage of, all estates), *glasnost*, which simply defines 'openness', and an acceptance that they needed to learn from Western European models.[440] They would frame the implementation of some of the ideological frameworks that had helped nation-states modernise and pull away from Russia. The term 'ideology' is important here; as the empire was not a homogeneous nation-state, reforms could not be copied verbatim. Their success would rely on integration and interdependence, as no one reform could exist without an entire suite of complementary reforms. As philosopher A.N. Medushevskii noted, the combination of upcoming reforms was intended to serve "as a real foundation for the gradual rationalization and Europeanization of social relations, and for liberation from traditional institutions".[441] They also created discontent amongst many powerful advisers to the tsar, and set into train a movement of reaction. A younger Konstantin Pobedonostev, who would become such a powerful point-man in the empire of Alexander III, reflected in 1864 in a personal letter: "You will not believe how disgusted we are here with the reforms, how we have lost faith in them, how much we would like to stop at something stable."[442]

Of course, Austria was more central to Europe. What Austria was not, however, was a nation-state. Hence the Habsburg Empire would find it no easier than the Russians to adapt, even though with some reforms, they had had a head start.[443] Their biggest two hurdles were interrelated: a system of regional elites demanding more and more political and economic power, and in a couple of cases military power, and the growing issue of nationalities, demanding more political, economic and ideological power. Emperor Franz Josef, emperor for the entire period of this study, was cut from the same cloth as Alexander II – traditionalist, deeply conservative, a true

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[437] Andreas Renner, "Defining a Russian Nation: Mikhail Katkov and the 'Invention' of National Politics", *The Slavonic and East European Review,* Vol. 8, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), p. 671, commented that Katkov, in 1863, "urged implementation of the very reform previously undertaken by the European nation-states: a standardized bureaucracy and judiciary, a system of state-controlled education (with Russian as the *lingua franca*), a reduction of local and estate privileges, and the 'national will' as the principal legitimation for state politics".

[438] Kaspe, *op.cit.,* pp. 460-61.

[439] Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.,* p. 162.

[440] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.,* p. 180.

[441] Quoted in Kaspe *op.cit.,* p. 462.

[442] Konstantin Pobedonostsev, letter to Anna Feodorovna Tjutceva, December 1864, in Hans Rogger, "Reflections on Russian Conservatism: 1861-1905", *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Neue Folge, Bd. 14, H. 2 (Jun., 1966), p. 197.

[443] Centralised bureaucracy and primary school education.

Habsburg believer in the divine righteousness of absolutism.[444] The path of his dynasty, according to Peter Sugar, "followed a purely dynastic policy of protecting their *Hausmacht* (patrimonial rights), emphasizing *Kaisertreue* (loyalty to the emperor and his family), and promoting a sort of dynastic patriotism".[445]

Although Franz Josef would turn out to be less allergic to national assemblies as any of the tsars, this was a pragmatic change: during the neo-Absolutist era, he showed a ruthless anti-representative streak that would not have been out of place coming out of St. Petersburg. Historically, the very nature of the Habsburg Pragmatic Sanction had left enormous power in the hands of the feudal lords of the assenting territories, who retained all of their pre-Sanction powers and autonomous privileges, something the Habsburg monarchs had railed against ever since.[446] Emperor Franz Josef was just as reliant on his imperial court and the advice of a select inner circle of aristocrats as the tsar. His court was also a metaphorical barrier, controlling who and what came before him.[447] Franz Josef was willing (repeatedly) to swallow his pride for what he believed to be the greater good. He came to power after the abdication of his uncle Ferdinand in 1848 – an abdication manipulated by conservative forces inside the Empire such as Princes Windischgrätz and Schwarzenberg. The first year of his reign was even more tenuous and fraught with danger than Alexander II's, something that would colour his future thinking. The Kaiser never waivered from his conviction regarding his role in the empire, as Joseph Redlich noted: "he was convinced from the first of his divine right of unlimited monarchical power, but in his sober sense he was aware that his rule must, before all, produce the best possible results for the peoples of his realm".[448] He would consider most options but, typically for an emperor, the only non-negotiable element was the army. He would never relinquish his military power, whatever the argument put forward.

5.2.   Nation-state ideological frameworks

The suite of reforms undertaken were largely modelled on, and inspired by, what were considered the building blocks of Western European nation-states. If the institutions themselves weren't directly copied, then the modernising principles that had helped them move forward were. There were clear differences, however; mostly determined by how far the regimes could 'go'. When comparing both empires, most reforms in Russia were designed to work collectively and on an individual level, whereas they gave at least the impression of being more piecemeal in the Habsburg Empire. Regardless, in both cases they were interdependent, and as such many

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[444] This is most evident throughout all of Alan Palmer's work. Palmer, *op.cit.* See also Ebeling *op.cit.*, p. 5. Ebeling cites Josef Redlich's much-quoted description,"(he had) a cool and sober mind, almost wholly devoid of imaginative power, a realist, looking dryly at the world and at his work".
[445] Sugar, *op.cit.*, p. 2.
[446] Hüglin, *op.cit.*, p. 34.
[447] Godsey, Quarterings, *op.cit.*, p. 59.
[448] Redlich, *op.cit.*, p. 605.

would display natural time lags before their full effects could be felt. For example, some military reforms would take years to properly evaluate, as the military was an end user of equipment, logistics and communications (that required the modernisation of industry) and knowledgeable recruits (that required education). One core difference between the two entities was the status of the 'estates'. The Russian bedrock of the *soslovie* was retained, a decision that would hinder the path of reform,[449] and (later) the desire for a more homogeneous Russian 'nation'. The failure to abolish *soslovie* would become a bone of contention for some liberal Russian reformers.[450]

The following two chapters are broken down to examine the importation of the following, overarching, nation-state ideological frameworks: modernising the economy through societal restructuring and through direct, centralised economic intervention; the demarcation, centralisation and layering of politics; mobilising the population for the benefit of the state by indoctrination and training through delivery of education; elevating and prioritising data science; modernising and professionalising the military; and legal reform, relaxation of censorship and improving civil liberties. A number of smaller (or underlying) frameworks will also be covered in the relevant parts of the chapters. These are not presented in any order of importance, other than the emancipation reforms, which are analysed first as they were the most jolting rupture to Russian society at the immediate time of their implementation, and the first of the reform cards to be played.

The following table outlines all the nation-state ideological frameworks examined in this work. Although there are others, these ones were chosen as the most important for this analysis.

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[449] Jane Burbank argued: "that the practice of allocating particular and various rights to groups defined by acknowledged social differences inhibited the formation of a democratically minded public and a politics based on equal citizenship". Jane Burbank, "The Rights of Difference: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire", in A. L. Soler, C. McGranahan & P. C. Purdue (eds.), *Imperial Formations* (Santa Fe, NM, 2007), p. 78.

[450] Burbank, Thinking, *op.cit.*, p. 198. Burbank noted that Rubakin [author of *Russia in Numbers*] observed that *soslovie* mechanisms barely existed in Western Europe any longer, leading him to write that the failure of Russian leaders to abolish it put "contemporary Russian legislation […] in a strange contradiction with the factual conditions of Russian life".

Diagram 3: Nation-state ideological frameworks

Arena	Framework
Economic	Build a modernised industrial economy to serve the tactical needs of the state.
	Modernise the economy through societal change, land and labour reform (emancipation).
	Promote social mobility in order to drive and populate a more modernised economy.
	Build a more efficient revenue collection infrastructure.
	Centralise economic policy and development.
	Structure an economy to work as a single, complementary whole.
Political	Promote a combination of streamlined, centralised and multi-layered, devolved governance, to best manage the polity and to assist in maximising extraction.
	Empower representative bodies, in order to give a voice to (selected) stakeholders in the trajectory of the 'national' project.
	Create a 'national' political solution to create a unified force in international politics and diplomacy (*Ausgleich*).
	Develop a centralised bureaucracy with a sphere of jurisdiction sanctioned by the state, in order to control regional interests and maximise extraction.
Education	Mobilise the population for the benefit of the state through indoctrination and training, by the delivery of education.
Military	Build a strong, modern professional military whose members march to the same ideological drum as the government.
Data Science	Condition the state apparatus to rely on data science as an efficiency tool.
	Segment populations in order to ensure the most efficient allocation, extraction and disbursement of resources.
	Map the assets of the nation to establish benchmarks for 'modernisation'.
	Prioritise data when planning industry and infrastructure, and the military.
Judicial	Introduce due process and promote justice, to build confidence in the institutions and systems of the country.
Civil Liberties	Enshrine freedom of the press, freedom of association and promote basic human rights, in order to enable the development of a robust civil society.
	Better control the social and political landscape, by being more informed.

5.3.   Modernising the economy through societal change, land and labour reform

5.3.1   The Russian Empire

In 1842, Tsar Nicholas I went so far as to label the institution of serfdom "an evil, palpable and evident to all".[451] Yet he refused to consider altering the status quo with respect to the landowning class – serfdom was just too much a part of the established order in Russia for the Tsar to muster the courage to seriously address it.[452] The final imperial *revizii* (tax census) in 1858 estimated that there were 22,500,000 serfs, out of an imperial population of 60 million.[453] Small steps toward abolition had been taken, some direct and some indirect. In the three Baltic provinces, where the *Landtage* controlled land policy, serfdom had been abolished in between 1816 and 1819,[454] which impressed Alexander I enough to have asked his confidant Count Aleksey Arakcheyev to draw plans from it for the rest of the empire.[455] Reforms covering state *muzkik* (peasants) by Nicholas I, in essence emancipated about half of the empire's peasants.[456] Then in 1849, the first land acquisitions by ex-serfs from their landlords were mandated in Livland.[457]

The institution of serfdom had been abolished in fourteenth century France and in England in 1574 respectively: notably *before* 'full-blown' serfdom was introduced in Russia in the seventeenth century.[458] More recently the institution was abolished in the final German state (Saxony in 1832) and Austria and Hungary (separately) in 1848, where they had long been declining in economic importance. In some places it had never been introduced, such as the Grand Duchy of Finland.[459] Emancipation would become a classic example of a Russian reform that pleased few stakeholders and alienated many – including most of the main actors. It was the liberal supporters of reform, such as the University of Moscow law professor Boris Chicherin, who were most impressed. While noting the difficulties of satisfying two such disparate groups, he stated that emancipation was "a spectacle worthy to attract the attention of the civilised

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[451] Quoted in Moss, *op.cit,* p. 357.

[452] Takeshi Matsumura, "To What Extent Could the Empire be Constructed? Objective Limitation on Agrarian Discourse in Nineteenth-Century Russia: The Baltic Provinces, the Russian Black Soil Region and Right-Bank Ukraine" in K. Matsuzato (ed.), *Imperiology* (Sapporo, 2007), p. 167, describes how it worked in the most intense area for serf labour, the Russian Black Soil Region: "communes held plowed land and periodically redistributed it. Landholdings per capita were nearly equal, regardless of the number of able-bodied members in a household. Communes also distributed feudal obligations to households, while the serf owners' intervention in this matter was minimal. The more allotment a peasant household held, the more labour obligations for the manor it bore. To distribute duties, communes considered, above all, households' composition; marriages and deaths immediately affected it. When a young couple married, they formed a new work team and received access to a plot of land."

[453] Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.,* pp. 144.

[454] For details see Andrejs Plakans, "Peasants, Intellectuals, and Nationalism in the Russian Baltic Provinces, 1820-1890", *The Journal of Modern History,* Vol. 46, No. 3 (Sep., 1974), p. 450.

[455] Of which nothing came. Hamburg, Nobility, *op.cit.,* p. 12.

[456] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 336.

[457] Matsumura, *op.cit.,* p. 165. Followed by Estland in 1856 and Kurland in 1863.

[458] Versions of localised serfdom survived in France until 1789.

[459] Edward C. Thaden, "The Russian Government", in E. C. Thaden (ed.), *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914* (Princeton, NJ, 1981), p. 6.

world".[460] The overarching nation-state ideological framework behind emancipation was to build a modernised industrial economy to serve the tactical needs of the state. More specifically, two further nation-state ideological frameworks drove emancipation: The first was the the promotion of social mobility in order to drive and populate a more modernised economy, and the second was to build a more efficient revenue collection infrastructure.

The academic and tutor to the future Alexander III, K.D. Karvelin, whose 1856 writings would get him sacked from the latter position, offered an example of the abolitionist position. He wrote that "serfdom […] gives rise to artificial phenomena in the national economy which have an unhealthy influence on the whole organism of the state […] In the moral sphere, the influence of serfdom is just as pernicious, if not more so".[461] He would go on to correctly identify the importance of emancipation for all reform efforts, stating that "serfdom is the stumbling-block to all success and development in Russia […] All significant internal changes in Russia are without exception so closely linked to the abolition of serfdom that one is impossible without the other".[462] Contrasting this position were some landowners (not all were in opposition), as can be seen in this letter extract from a Tambov landowner one year later,

> If there exists any sort of order amongst the people of Russia, it will be completely destroyed if serfdom is abolished […] Our peasants still have traces of their primitive, semi-bharbarian {sic} life, and are still not sufficiently developed to receive new rights […] the Tsar is signing a death warrant for me and many thousands of landowners. A million troops will not stop the peasantry's fury.[463]

The *Northern Bee* (St. Petersburg) reported in 1860 that: "at the commencement of this affair, many, very many, openly stated, that we should perish without our rights over the serfs, we should lose our power and importance in the scale of European nations, and that we should be obliged to relinquish our independence".[464] In such an atmosphere, it's not surprising that Alexander II deliberately and methodically played his cards close to his chest, fearful of angering landed elites and, perhaps more so, of raising the expectations of the serfs. Not all reform minded officials were so backward in coming forward; General Gorchakov, Polish Viceroy, publicly stated that "the first thing is to emancipate the serfs, because that is the evil which binds together all the things that are evil in Russia".[465] There could be no reform of anything without addressing serfdom first, as noted by emancipation supporter Yuri Samarin: "Wherever we were to begin our internal reconstruction, we inevitably come up against it."[466]

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[460] Quoted in Gary M. Hamburg, "Peasant Emancipation and Russian Social Thought: The Case of Boris N. Chicherin", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Winter, 1991), p. 901.

[461] K D Karvelin, *Sobrannye sochineniya,* vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1898) cols 5-34, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.,* p. 101. He goes on to mention conscription reform, changing the tax system, extending education to lower levels of society, fixing the passport system, legal and court reform, and police, administrative and censorship reform.

[462] *Ibid.*

[463] "Na zare krestyanskoy svobody', *Russkaya Starina,* Vol. 92 (1897), pp. 237-238, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.,* pp. 105-106.

[464] TNA: quoted in Crampton to Russell, St. Petersburg, January 1860, FO 181/374:12.

[465] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.,* p. 173.

[466] Yuri F. Samarin, "O krepostnom sostoyanii i o perekhode iz nego k grazhdanskoy svobode', *Sochineniya*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1878) pp. 17-20, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.,* p. 100.

As the details of the emancipation reforms have been amply studied, only a brief summary is necessary. Alexander II convened a secret commission in 1857 to examine the range of reform options. This backfired as reactionary gentry who dominated the commission attempted to hijack the reforms to suit their own interests.[467] Alexander II was then persuaded to circumvent them by the Main Committee, which had become a more liberal body through attrition. The Committee designed the final reforms, which were signed into law on 19 February 1861 but not announced for another two weeks, until Lent, in order to catch the peasantry in a "more sober and docile" condition.[468] Almost to a man, nobles feared for their livelihoods as well as their place within Russian society, having lost not only their (nominally) free labour, but also their policing and judicial powers – in effect their power over people.

They felt their sacrifices were unwarranted, and the language of the proclamation was small comfort for them, for example: "And now we hope with confidence that the freed serfs, in the presence of the new future which opens before them, will appreciate and recognize the tremendous sacrifices that have been imposed upon the nobility in their favour."[469] The serf owning nobility had been a plutocracy, with massive levels of inequality in its ranks (for example, in 1858-59, the wealthiest 1.4 per cent of serf-owners – about 1,400 landowners – held 3 million serfs, the next 20.2 per cent held 17.5 million serfs, whereas the poorest 78 per cent held of landowners – approximately 81,000, held only 2 million serfs combined).[470] All levels of landed nobles were affected, and as a large number were dangerously indebted, they would struggle just to make ends meet, redemption payments or not.[471] Many serf owners were so poor that their lifestyles could be hard to distinguish from those of their serfs. [472]

In the words of Pipes, emancipation destroyed "the economic foundation on which gentry authority and privilege have rested and renders meaningless the ideal of a diarchy".[473] Landowners faced the need for capital to pay for labour and machinery, whilst facing new competition on the land, from non-commercially minded (indeed, in many cases non-commercial) peasants who would "sell at prices regulated only by their necessities."[474]

The ex-serfs, from whom the regime was hoping for staunch support, were equally incensed by the terms of emancipation. They had always considered the land they worked as rightfully theirs – not being granted title unconditionally was betrayal enough, without even

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[467] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.*, p. 174.

[468] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

[469] TNA: *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg, Ukase* of 6 March 1861, in Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, March 19, 1861, FO 181/387:17. Author's translation.

[470] Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.*, pp. 144 & 175 & Moss, *op.cit.*, p. 379.

[471] McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, p. 34 & Milward & Saul, *op.cit.*, p. 362, who noted that two-thirds of all serfs in 1860 were mortgaged.

[472] For example, Moss, *op.cit.*, p. 379, noted that: "A Riazan noble spokesman in 1857 claimed that one-fourth of all his province's noble households were so impoverished that they lived in the same hut and ate at the same table as their serfs."

[473] Pipes, Conservatism, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

[474] BDFA: Memorandum on the Political State of Russia, February 1865, BDFA V1, pp. 81-84.

considering the crippling effect of the mandated 49 years of redemption payments.[475] The number of reported peasant disturbances would soar, from 126 in 1860 to 1,889 in 1861.[476] Part of the problem was the delay in announcing the change, as officials were unsure just what to tell the peasants, and the serfs did not respect the authority of those officials. This example comes from Saratov on the Volga:

> *We have still not received the full text of the law. This has given the opportunity for everybody to interpret it in his own way. Confusion has begun [...] the peasants interpreted the manifesto to mean that, as they had been given freedom. There was no more labour services [...] and stopped working for the landlords [...] The district administrator was sent to try to persuade them, but without success. The peasants respectfully told him 'Sir, we cannot disobey the Tsar's orders,' and did not go to work.* [477]

To make matters worse (and a disincentive to the social mobility required to maximise the residual benefits of emancipation), ex-serfs would remain subject to movement restrictions until 1906, essentially anchored in communes (*mir*).[478] The government would regularly try to stop ex-serfs from moving above their place in Russian society, for example forbidding the transfer of land between serfs, which in many cases was desperately needed to redress the ill-suited plot sizes that resulted from the communal division of land.[479] As Peter Gatrell argued, the government deliberately intended "to minimize the extension of modern property rights in land", because "to maintain traditional peasant attachment to the soil was to guarantee social stability".[480]

Over time, both landowners and ex-serfs would become thorns in the side of the Empire. Belated concessions to the ex-serfs in particular, for example a reduction in redemption payments in 1881 following a pre-mandated review built into the original legislation, would neither assuage nor pacify them.[481] A year later, the regime considered further aid to peasants, alas the process of segmenting and classifying such a broad group would become mired in arguments over demarcation between St. Petersburg and regional and local authorities over the rather bureaucratic questions of how to categorise and demarcate land.[482] Most peasants' situations remained dire at the turn of the twentieth century; farming alone was not enough to support their families – indeed it's been estimated that only between a quarter and half of a typical peasant's income requirements would come from farming.[483] The debasement of allotment size through

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[475] Moss, *op.cit.,* pp. 420-421.

[476] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.,* p. 176. Endangering the harvest, especially in 1861 when the reform was fresh. TNA: Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, June 4, 1861, FO 181/388:151.

[477] I.A. Zhelvakova (ed.), 'Saratovskiy pomeshchik o khode reform 19 febralya 1861 g." in *Revolutisionnaya situatsiya v Rossii v 1859–1861 gg.* (Moscow, 1965), pp, 451-452, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.,* p. 113.

[478] Passports for serf movement outside the estate were introduced in 1719. TNA: Crampton to Russell, St. Petersburg, January 1860, FO 181/374:12

[479] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* pp. 399-401.

[480] Gatrell, Culture, *op.cit.,* p. 42.

[481] Steven L. Hoch, "On Good Numbers and Bad: Malthus, Population Trends and Peasant Standard of Living in Late Imperial Russia", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), p. 73, argued that this reduction was the natural first step in changing the emphasis from direct to indirect taxation.

[482] Saunders, Regional Diversity, *op.cit.,* p. 149.

[483] Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.,* p. 167.

family growth and break up was magnified by, as rather bluntly noted by British diplomat Thomas Michell in 1888, "the rude, primitive mode of cultivation which they stubbornly pursue".[484] By this stage, the traditional bond the peasants felt toward the Tsar remained mostly intact. Michell continued: "the Tsar remains incapable of doing wrong, and if they are oppressed with taxes and steeped in poverty their 'Little Father' is not held in blame, as their misery is unknown to him".[485] Peasants would never achieve legal equality, i.e. citizenship, even though then Finance Minister Sergei Witte pushed for this in the late 1800s – ex-serfs still required passports in order to leave the commune. [486]

The bodies that emerged in the wake of emancipation streamlined the government's revenue collection mechanism, and revenue would increase markedly. However, the move to indirect taxation from the 1880s rendered this somewhat less important. The improved revenue collection was largely due to the principle of shared responsibility (*krugovaia poruke*), and the *mir*.[487] These communes would give peasants a chance to organise, which was further helped by a growth in rudimentary schooling, completion of which ensured a drastically shorter term of military conscription – hence keeping more military aged men on the land at a time of strong population growth. The communes were also represented in *volost'* – local courts designed to replace feudal police and judicial powers, and in the *zemstva* systems as the junior member of the curia.[488]

Peasant disturbances would occur periodically in the fifty years after emancipation, reaching a pinnacle during the 1905 Revolution and beyond. This is significant, as they had hitherto always provided unwavering mass support to the dynasty, if not the 'state', per se.[489] By 1905, as with the rest of the Russian Imperial Power Structure, peasant organisations began to make themselves felt, by looking at new solutions to their main goal – land reform.[490] A Peasant Manifesto of December 1905 complained that, "the Government has brought Russia to the verge of bankruptcy […] this can only be averted by the overthrow of the autocracy and the convocation of a constituent assembly which should examine the situation and frame a regular budget".[491] In addition, they were still bearing the brunt of repressive taxation – tax relief was championed by *zemstva* on behalf of the peasantry for decades, to little avail.[492]

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[484] BDFA: Memorandum by Consul-General Thomas Michell on the present Economic Condition of Russia, St Petersburg, September 21 1888, BDFA V2, pp. 218-232.

[485] BDFA: Memorandum by Consul-General Michell on the Political Aspect of the Economic Condition of Russia, St. Petersburg, September 21 1888, BDFA V2, pp. 232-234.

[486] Theodore H. Von Laue "The Industrialization of Russia in the Writings of Sergei Witte", *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Oct., 1951), p. 186.

[487] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.*, pp. 175-176.

[488] Burbank, Thinking, *op.cit.*, pp. 200-201 & 207-208.

[489] Kennedy, *op.cit.*, p. 305.

[490] TNA: As the British Chargé d'Affaires reported, "they have but one political idea […] to take possession of the land". Memorandum on the Organization of Parties in Russia, December 3 1905, in Spring Rice to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, December 4 1905, FO 181/856/1:722.

[491] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St. Petersburg, December 17 1905, FO 181/828:778. The Manifesto was published by the "Council of Labour Deputies and the Central Committees of the Pan-Russian Peasants Union, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party and the Social Revolutionists."

[492] V.M. Khiznyakov, *Vospominaniya zemskogo deyatela* (Petrograd, 1916) pp. 120-131, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, 66-68. V.M. Khiznyakov, former chairman of the Chernigov *zemstvo*, explained: "In one of the first

British Embassy Secretary Cecil Spring Rice made a highly prescient warning as 1905 drew to a close:

> *The time is however approaching, owing to outside influences and to the effects of mal-administration [...] when the peasant's faith in his Tsar will be called in question and he will begin to wonder for himself whether he and his father and grandfather before him have been duped by a figurehead of the state, which their natural simplicity, superstition and religious training have hitherto led them to regard as a semi-divine power and an omnipotent being.*[493]

Some of this change, argued Nicolaiev-based Vice-Consul Bosanquet, could be traced to the "policy of keeping the peasants in ignorance, so that they might be more easily controlled", leaving them "reacting in an unlooked-for way, as it has left them susceptible to other influences hostile to the established social order".[494]

When the first Duma elections occurred in 1906, it was reported that the peasantry were reluctant "to vote, owing to ignorance and to their fear of the authorities".[495] This would slowly change over the next three elections. The Stolypin land reforms that began in 1906 would see a slow yet noticeable uptake in private land purchases by peasants (as opposed to allocations). The building blocks for the organisational power of the peasantry had (finally) been laid – intensive, diffused and collective power.[496]

5.3.2. The Habsburg Empire

The immensity of Russian emancipation would dwarf the prior abolition of the Robot in the Habsburg Empire. This is not to suggest the impact of reform was not substantial in Austria, though the ten years plus head start that Austria had (their emancipation was legislated of 7 September 1848 in Austria and 19 March 1848 in Hungary) would be significant for the trajectories of both economies. In addition, serfdom in the Habsburg Empire since the reign of Joseph II (1780-1790) had allowed a degree of labour mobility that was far in excess of the

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Zemstvo meetings [...] the extreme injustice of imposing taxes in kind solely on the rural population was vigorously demonstrated and the provincial executive board was instructed to investigate the conversion of these dues into money taxes, and their levying on all classes. To the shame of our Zemstvo, I have to say that even a half century later, most of these taxes in kind are levied, as before, exclusively on the Cossacks and peasants."

[493] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St. Petersburg, December 30 1905, FO 181/828 (no number).

[494] BDFA: Bosanquet to Smith, Nicolaiev, March 12, 1906, BDFA V4, pp. 14-21. He added: "The peasant has a good memory for old grievances, For instance, there are large woods in a district of the Kharkov Government, which (according to tradition) were taken possession of a hundred years ago by an unscrupulous land-owner. The peasants still nurse the old grudge, and an early sign of trouble last year was that they began to fell the timber in those woods."

[495] BDFA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, March 28 1906, BDFA V4, p. 36.

[496] TNA: Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, December 7 1908, FO 181/919:569. He outlined the speech of Assistant Minister of the Interior Lykoschin, who highlighted that; "400,000 peasants have already left [the communes] and become owners of, roughly, 3,000,000 dessiatines (8,250,000 acres) of communal land. In comparison with the 130,000,000 dessiatines which are in the hands of the communes these figures do not seem imposing, a little more than 2 per cent, but they, nevertheless, do show that a movement has decidedly begun in favour of emancipation from the communes."

nineteenth-century Russian experience.[497] Indeed, David Good argued that it had become clear in the eighteenth-century that the Robot was incompatible with modernisation, arguing that Habsburg 'serfdom' was inefficient, as serfs:

tended to shirk and use inferior capital during forced labor; it immobilized labor and retarded the growth of a consumer market; its incentive structure discouraged capital formation and technological change; and its value system sharply retarded the development of the entrepreneurial spirit.[498]

The reform, as implemented in neo-Absolutist Austria by the Minister of the Interior, Alexander von Bach,[499] abolished the hereditary feudal rights of the nobility, while the peasants were freed with tenured occupation rights on the estates, which could be bought or sold, although they still had to pay indemnities to the previous landowners, ostensibly for loss of labour services.[500] Many Austrian peasants moved to urban areas across the empire, leaving wealthier peasants to buy up available tenancies, including in some cases non-ethnic German peasants, as would happen in Bohemia.[501] This occurred much faster, and in much higher per capita numbers, than in Russia and in Hungary. In Austria, the share of indemnities was lower than the Russian ex-serfs, being precisely one-third (to be paid over twenty years). The other two thirds was divided between the crown and their former feudal lords themselves (who waived them in return for no longer undertaking their seigniorial responsibilities) – in effect they were paying a proportion of their own indemnity payments, reducing their redemption income by one third.[502]

The situation was different in Hungary, where the large body of freed peasants owed no compensation. However, as Hungarian magnate estates – overall in far healthier condition than commensurate post-emancipation Russian properties – still required labour, with a choice from a now enormous pool of unemployed peasants, landowners could dictate labour terms. Indeed, many of the freed peasants only received their original land plot in the settlement.[503] It was and would stay a 'buyers market'. Hungarians peasants would remain, in the words of Peter Sugar, at "the mercy of the nobility".[504] Magnates across the Habsburg Empire (concentrated in Hungary, Galicia, Bukovina and smaller parts of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) thrived at the expense of the smaller landed nobles. As was the case in Russia, many of these lesser nobles had, in pre-emancipation times, experienced similar living standards as their Robot peasants.[505] The

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[497] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 298.

[498] David F. Good, "Uneven Distribution in the Nineteenth Century: A Comparison of the Habsburg Empire and the United States", *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), p. 150.

[499] The *Grundentlastung* was not legally enforced until 1853 – as with many initiatives after the Revolution, it had to wait for the partial lifting of martial law. See Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.,* p. 158.

[500] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 324.

[501] Taylor, *op.cit.,* pp. 80-81.

[502] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 324. Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.,* p. 159.

[503] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 275.

[504] Sugar, *op.cit.,* p. 7.

[505] Éva Somogyi, "The Age of Neoabsolutism, 1849-1867", in P. Sugar, P. Hanák & T. Frank (eds.), *A History of Hungary,* (Bloomington, IN, 1990), p. 239. He wrote with reference to Hungary: "Even before 1848, it was only their privileges that differentiated the remaining one hundred thousand [out of around 130,000, *ed.*] from the peasantry. They lived like peasants or made a living as artisans in the villages or as civil servants."

enormous lump sum compensation received by magnates enabled them to build their industrial holdings. For example Bohemian magnates in 1880 would own over sixty per cent of all breweries, two thirds of all sugar factories, and three quarters of distilleries.[506] This strengthened their position in their respective regions, although it would not necessarily see them prevail politically against the urban gentry, especially in Hungary.

As compensation was proportional in Hungary, for small landowners it was not enough to enable them to diversify, leading to their aforementioned offloading of land to magnates.[507] The petty rural gentry would practically vanish from the Hungarian landscape – over 100,000 independent landowners left the land between 1867 and 1900, leaving over one-third of Transleithania land under magnate control.[508] Just as in Russia during the Stolypin era, the Hungarian government belatedly tried to bridge this gap, with the Farm Labourers' Act of 1907 and the establishment of the National Federation of Land Mortgagees in 1911.[509] Although difficult to evaluate due to the onset of the First World War, Hungarian magnates had a history of 'bending' any policy that would directly affect them, although by this stage, their influence in Budapest was being further eroded by the new industrial bourgeoisie.

The direct, measurable effects on the economy of the abolition of feudalism and the removal of the Robot were modest, due to its importance to the agricultural economy as a whole. For example, before abolition, less that 5 per cent of labour days on arable land in Hungary – where many of the large properties were – were Robot days.[510] This was demonstrably lower than in the Russian Empire, and hence abolition was nowhere near as "seismic".[511] From a mere economic standpoint, John Komlos argued that: "the reform should be viewed as a purely formal act rather than a turning point in Austrian economic history".[512] He estimated that agricultural output increased by only 1.2 per cent due to emancipation.[513] He differs strongly from David Good, who argues that its removal was necessary for the "eastward diffusion of development in the Empire".[514] However, as previously noted, many of the follow-on effects from such reforms would take some time to make an impact: the removal of the *Stände* and the Robot was no

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[506] Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 81. Specifically, "500 out of 800 breweries, 80 out of 120 sugar factories, and 300 out of 400 distilleries".

[507] *Ibid.*

[508] *Ibid.*, p. 199. Indeed, one fifth of the land mass of the Kingdom was owned by just 3,000 families. For example, in 1867, there were 15,000 estates of 200-1000 holds (1 hold = 0.57 Ha), a number that reduced to 10,000 by 1900. See Berend and Ranki, *op.cit.*, p. 167. Hungarians would own 91.4 per cent of estates over 1000 holds by 1913. Berend and Ranki, *op.cit.*, p. 179.

[509] Sugar, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

[510] Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.*, p. 160. The exact figure was 4.4% across Hungary and 9% in the Austrian crown lands.

[511] Komlos, Customs Union, *op.cit.*, pp. 236.

[512] *Ibid.*, pp. 50.

[513] *Ibid.*, p. 236. Some of this was arguably down to farming practices. For example, because ex-Robot peasants retained the annual three-field system (one fallow), restricting them to mostly cereal growing, Somogyi, *op.cit.*, p. 239.

[514] Good, Uneven, *op.cit.*, p. 150. Komlos stated that: "Only a mechanical deterministic view of history would consider the legal reforms of 1848 as either an inevitable consequence of economic development or alternatively, a necessary prerequisite for further economic progress." Komlos, Customs Union, *op.cit.*, pp. 50-51.

exception. As for the formation of an empowered group in the Imperial Power Structure – movements based upon this group alone would take a back seat to the nationality disputes of the time. Efforts by nationalists to appropriate the peasantry were intense and the results patchy, as we will see in the following chapters.

One more section of the indentured Habsburg population bears mentioning – the *Grenzer*, the entire male population of the Military Border in Croatia-Slavonia. Technically, they were personal serfs of the Emperor, although their status and the respect afforded to them made a somewhat 'storied' periphery. The *Grenzer* had patrolled the Military Border as a buffer against Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, and as proven during the revolution in Hungary, they could easily turn around and quell internal revolts. Like the Russian serfs, they had a peculiarly mystical bond with their monarch, and just like the Russian serfs they would be disappointed by the terms of their own 'emancipation' as an indirect result of *Ausgleich*, which although transferring units to the regular Imperial Army, left their homes and families on the Border under the control of the Hungarians.

5.4. Modernising the economy through central government intervention

5.4.1. The Russian Empire

The mid-century Russian Empire had neither the large regions of economic modernity nor strong links to European trade networks that were to be found in Bohemia or the Austrian crown lands. In addition, much of the groundwork from reforms based upon other nation-state ideological frameworks required maturation time to position the population and the economy to move forward. In the earlier years of the reign of Alexander II, it was appreciated that this task, above all, would take time, however when some of these pre-conditions, such as increased education and training, and changes to governance, began to bear fruit, the government notably increased the urgency of economic reforms – at a time when the continuing progress of Germany had become all too apparent. The overarching nation-state ideological framework that they would follow would be the same as for emancipation: build a modernised economy to serve the tactical needs of the state. More specifically, they would try to achieve this by centralising economic and development policy.

The government saw industrial expansion as a means to improve their military status in Europe, not to mention to redress the treasury shortfall caused by the Crimean War.[515] The imperial economy of the 1860s and 1870s displayed a slow but noticeable expansion in a mix of low-level capitalist sectors, such as cloth, as well as infrastructure building, mining and metallurgy. These sectors were first targeted by the government, in conjunction with policies such

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[515] McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.,* p. 33.

as tariff reform. High tariffs, hitherto highly restrictive to international trade and investment, had been reduced in 1850, and then further again in 1856 and 1857.[516]

Greater access to imports was a boon for nascent Russian industrialisation. For example, raw cotton imports grew from 1,100,000 poods in 1863 to 9,700,000 poods in 1881, in part to supply growing textile industries, which in turn were supplying a fast growing workforce.[517] Conversely, the importation of processed cotton yarn and combed wool fell dramatically, whereas the importation of materials needed for manufacture increased 50 per cent between 1850 and 1865 alone.[518] In addition, Alexander II began to push the growth of the railways as a "national endeavour",[519] inspired by the vital role of the Warsaw-St. Petersburg railway in the supply of troops to fight the Polish rebellion in 1863.[520] To give an example, the Tsar, in addressing the Finnish Diet in Helsingfors in 1872, would place the highest priority on constructing a railway which: "connects the Imperial Residence with the Capital of the Grand Duchy to the evident interests of commerce and industry, by drawing the inhabitants of distant tracks near to each other".[521] The government would offer incentives for private investors to use their capital for railway construction, in addition to direct investment. If a suggested route were strategically valuable, they would often find the required funds (at least until the mid 1880s).[522] The result was a more than tenfold increase in railway track laid between 1861 and 1881, which began to remove some obstacles to market,[523] and increased incentives for forming joint stock companies, which rose from 78 to 357 between 1861 and 1873.[524]

However, there were still many difficulties facing the imperial administration. The more reasonable tariffs, whilst helping push the first phase of industrialisation, did little to help treasury revenue, a constant source of angst.[525] Institutional venture capital from abroad remained elusive, as the Russian banking network remained far inferior to other European countries, and the reputation of the rouble was still poor. For example, in 1877 the imperial treasury would have to rely on previous goodwill to obtain a loan of 20 million sterling in gold from the Bank of France – essentially the French were returning the favour of the Russians who had helped them when

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[516] BDFA: Memorandum of M. de Reutern, Russian Minister of Finance, on the subject of Tariff Reform in Russia, July 11 1867, BDFA V1, pp 213-216.

[517] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 407. 1 *pood* = approximately 16.38 kg.

[518] BDFA: Since 1850, while that of cotton yarn decreased to 72,000 from 280,000 poods, and that of combed wool increased to 90,000 from 67,000 poods. Memorandum of M. de Reutern, *op.cit.*

[519] Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, "Mastering Imperial Space? – The Ambivalent Impact of Railway-Building in Tsarist Russia", in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.) *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), p. 62.

[520] *Ibid.* p. 64.

[521] TNA: Campbell to Ford, Helsingfors, February 16 1872, FO 181/499: (no number).

[522] Schenk, *op.cit.*, p. 62.

[523] McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, p. 33. Rising from less than 1,500 km in 1861 to nearly 20,000 km in 1881.

[524] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

[525] BDFA: Memorandum of M. de Reutern, *op.cit.*

their central bank was in difficulties during the Orléanist period.[526] In addition some industries, especially mining and metallurgy in the Urals, such an important sector for an industrialising economy, had lost their pre-emancipation serf labour force, which had hitherto been commandeered from large landed estates.[527] To compound issues, the Russian economy was for the first time truly vulnerable to international business cycles – partially due to increased trade. It suffered a downturn in the mid 1870s coming off the back of one in Western Europe. Throughout the entire period of this study until the Witte era, the Empire was burdened with considerable budget deficits: these would be overcome, apart from a few years around 1905 where deficits returned due to war and revolution.[528]

The drive to grow economic output of the secondary and tertiary sectors from the 1880s were directed by Finance Ministers, a position that attracted both strong praise and heavy criticism for the role they played in changing Russian society. N.K. Bunge, the Minister from 1881 to 1886, began raising import tariffs, moving Russia back to protectionism, and increased the states' share of the railway system through construction and acquisition. He also introduced banks specifically for peasants and nobles, in order to facilitate the flow of capital for enterprise at multiple levels. Peasant taxes were decreased whilst those levied on the wealthy increased, through such initiatives as inheritance taxes, and the balance between direct and indirect taxation changed dramatically after the removal of the Poll Tax – with revenue raised by direct taxes eventually falling well behind most of the rest of Europe.[529] Gatrell added that Bunge's tenure: "heralded a revolution in policy-making and in government attitudes towards industrial development. Bunge made a deliberate and concerted attempt to reduce the importance to the budget coffers of taxes based on estate privileges".[530] He also tried to shift the burden of industrialisation to private hands, from the state, believing the role of government was to "create a stable legislative framework for private enterprise, and not to rely on government grants, loans and subsidies as an instrument of industrialization."[531] The extraordinary growth in the number of private businesses, from 15,000 at the time of emancipation to 38,000 in 1887, was testament to this.[532]

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[526] TNA: Loftus to Salisbury, St. Petersburg, March 18, 1877, FO 181/558:121. This loan was badly needed, as since the beginning of 1876 the Russians had to use 80 million roubles of its gold reserves to prop up the value of the currency.

[527] McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, p. 33. Although this was more of an obstacle to revenue raising rather than growth, per se. For example coal mining boomed between 1861 and 1881.

[528] Gregory M. Dempster, "The fiscal background of the Russian revolution", *European Review of Economic History*, 10 (2006), p. 35 & Alan Sked, "The European Empires: A Case of Fall Without Decline?" in E. Brix, K. Koch, & E. Vyslonzil (eds.), *The Decline of Empires* (Vienna, 2001), p. 169. Sked puts all years between 1892 and 1914, excepting 1904-1906, as showing budget surpluses.

[529] By 1913, direct taxation would account for 17% of revenue, below France at 20% and demonstrably behind Germany and the Habsburg Empire, at 28%, and Britain and Italy, for whom it accounted for over 30%. Gatrell, Culture, *op.cit.*, p. 46. Also see Moss, *op.cit.*, p. 440, who wrote that Bunge believed: "Russia's tax policy placed an unrealistic burden on the peasants and that it had to be overhauled if the Russian economy was to be healthy."

[530] Gatrell, Culture, *op.cit.*, p. 46.

[531] *Ibid.*

[532] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

The Empire would continue to suffer from a heavy foreign debt and continuing high budget deficits, and Bunge was unable to make a dent in these, which helped lead to his resignation.[533] His replacement, I.A. Vyshnegradsky, who considered Bunge a liberal, further increased indirect taxes, especially hitting the low-income groups, and tried to implement an export led solution to both the debt and the deficit, whilst lifting import tariffs to the highest amongst the European powers.[534] What was a 10 per cent general tariff in 1881 grew to 20 per cent in 1885 and 33 per cent in 1891.[535] He was far more traditional than Bunge, evidenced by his return of some peasant travel controls,[536] and how he strove for and eventually balanced the budget.[537] In the quarter century before his tenure, railway lines increased nearly thirteen fold,[538] but during Vyshnegradsky's six years in office, railway building almost ceased – in 1891 there was only *127* kilometres of track built.[539] This reversal frustrated the War Ministry, which had been pushing for the urgent increase of track in the western borderlands for decades, a desire that would never quite be satisfied.[540] The canal system – the other option of mass primary resource transport – remained important but suffered from geographic inefficiencies.[541]

To achieve the growth the Russian economy required, they would have to turn it upside down. Total economic output grew by an average annual rate of around 2 per cent between 1860 and 1885, but when the other 'great power' economies were considered, this barely scratched the surface.[542] The economic historian Arcadus Kahan argued that they put themselves in a bind: that taking so much revenue from low-income groups, "severely limited the purchasing power of those social groups and affected their level of saving and consumption".[543] However, they left themselves with little choice, as that "form of government, its militaristic orientation and authoritarian-bureaucratic mode of governing […] explains the incessant pressure to increase the volume of taxation".[544] For Vyshnegradsky, benefits came to the state before subject wellbeing. His 'export-first', high indirect taxation agenda had worsened the effects of famine, and he refused to acknowledge that it would be extremely difficult to extract more revenue from peasants.[545] That well had almost gone dry.

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[533] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, pp. 517-518. When the Bulgarian crisis in 1886 caused the need for yet more revenue, Bunge was reluctant to increase the tax burden.
[534] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.*, p. 386 & Moss, *op.cit.* p. 441.
[535] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.*, p. 185.
[536] For example, the head of the peasant household could once again withhold passports from family members. Gatrell, Culture, *op.cit.*, p. 48.
[537] von Laue, High Cost, *op.cit.*, p. 427.
[538] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.*, p. 184. From 2,258 versts in 1861 to 28.240 versts in 1887. 1 *verst* = 1.0688km.
[539] von Laue, High Cost, *op.cit.*, p. 427.
[540] Schenk, *op.cit.*, p. 70.
[541] Hamburg, Nobility, *op.cit.*, pp. 86-87. For example in 1884 27.5% of cereals shipped to market went by barge, although this was mostly inefficient, except for in the Volga region, where there was a large natural river system.
[542] Gatrell, Culture, *op.cit.*, p. 39.
[543] Quoted in Dempster, *op.cit.*, p. 36.
[544] *Ibid.*
[545] Milward & Saul *op.cit.*, p. 386 and Moss, *op.cit,* p. 441.

As impressive as the economic growth would become in the twenty years leading up to the First World War, two things must be remembered: just how small a base it grew from, and the very strong economic expansion of the nation-states to the west. By the end of Vyshnegradsky's tenure, Russia still had a long way to go. For one, the Kingdom of Poland was by far the most industrialised part of the empire until the 1890s, a dangerous situation as it was a volatile periphery in the Imperial Power Structure, as would be proven in 1905.[546] Wide-scale industrialisation was not promoted until the 1890s, in fear of "the cancer of the proletariat".[547] The Finance Ministry commissioned a statistical study comparing Russia of the time of Alexander III to the other major states, including the United States, which was published in 1905. It found that on numerous indicators of 'modernity', Russia was demonstrably behind its rivals. To give but two examples, there were 29 telephone networks in Russia as opposed to 51 in Italy, 213 in Britain, 194 in France and 1,351 in the United States. As for the number of letters sent by mail: the 620 million in Russia were dwarfed by the 3.2 billion in Britain, 4 billion in Germany, 2.2 billion in France and the 1.4 billion in the Habsburg Empire.[548] As Gregory Freeze outlined, if industrial production in 1913 equated to a denominator of 100, in 1885 it was merely 21.[549] The driver of this extraordinary economic expansion after 1892 was the controversial next Minister of Finance, Sergei Witte.

Witte was the Minister for eleven years. He saw much unfulfilled industrial potential in the empire and would run headlong into industrial development, utilising the platforms left to him by his predecessors, such as Vyshnegradsky's tariff and taxation policies, with a new emphasis on borrowing.[550] He was blunt about the weaknesses of the empire, and always looked to the west as a comparative marker and for inspiration.[551] On paper at least, his achievements looked impressive – state annual revenue roughly doubled, helped in no small part by the conversion of the rouble to the gold standard in 1897 (another ideological carry over from Vyshnegradsky),[552] which further opened up Russia to the international money markets. During the 1890s, industrial production

[546] Jacek Kochanwicz, "The Economy of the Polish Kingdom: a Question of Dependence", in M. Branch, J.M. Hartley & A. Maczak (eds.), *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A Comparative Study* (London, 1995), p. 132.

[547] Gildea, *op.cit.,* p. 158, adding, "whatever spectre it imagined by that term".

[548] Theodore von Laue, "Imperial Russia at the Turn of the Century: The Cultural Slope and the Revolution from without", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Jul., 1961), p. 357.

[549] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.,* p. 184.

[550] von Laue, High Cost, *op.cit.,* p. 426.

[551] von Laue, Industrialization, *op.cit.,* p. 181.

[552] von Laue, High Cost, *op.cit.,* p. 426, and regarding the gold standard, TNA: Hardinge to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, September 11 1905 FO 181/857/5: Affairs of Russia: 1. Hardinge outlined the size of the change: "the introduction of the monetary reform of 1897, which necessitated the redemption of about 60,000,000*l.* of irredeemable paper money and the accumulation of large quantities of gold amounting, at the beginning of 1904, to nearly 100,000,000*l.* of gold against a note issue of about 60,000,000*l*". *l* = Pound Sterling.

increased at a rate higher than that of even the United States, at about 8 per cent per annum.[553] Oil production exceeded that of the United States by 1900, an astonishing turn of events.[554]

A disciple of Friedrich List, Witte believed that 'civilisation' came through modern industry, and the knock on effects to the government and the people.[555] He was not afraid to magnify the tax burden on the population to do it, through high taxes on basic goods, like sugar and matches; the burden falling on the peasant classes who concurrently were forced to market more and more of their grain.[556] The vodka monopoly he created was essentially a flat tax with the majority of the burden carried by the lower classes.[557] Unlike the emancipation proclamation, and perhaps wary of facing such a broad uproar from the rural population, the monopoly was introduced in three stages: trialled in just four provinces in January 1895, followed by its mass rollout in July 1896 and July 1897.[558] Witte was also attracted to huge infrastructure projects, like the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was spearheaded by his ministry. A former railway executive, his actions served to highlight Vyshnegradsky's disinterest in railway expansion. By 1900 the imperial railway network was the second largest in the world.[559] Witte also promoted Russia as a viable, even lucrative destination for venture capital through lavish participation in the great World's Fairs of the time.[560]

One sector of the economy that had been left behind to a great extent was agriculture, a sector at the 'heart' of romanticist notions about Russian life.[561] Agriculture had suffered from a combination of low direct investment (there was enormous indirect investment that *should* have been of benefit to the land, like the expansion of the railways) and an export-at-all-costs mentality designed to raise enough capital to fund further industrialisation. It was not a new phenomenon: Thomas Michell reported in 1888 that "this principal, fundamental source of wealth has, on the whole, not only received no development since the emancipation of the serfs, nearly thirty years ago, but, on the contrary, now exhibits a decline".[562]

Witte was much criticised for this perceived abandonment of agriculture in favour of industry.[563] His approach to the agricultural sector was influenced by List, being *laissez-faire* to

[553] Reginald E. Zelnik, "Revolutionary Russia, 1890-1914" in G. L. Freeze (ed.), *Russia. A History* (Oxford, 1997), *op.cit.,* p. 206.

[554] Mosse, *op.cit.,* p. 97. In 1860 it was 70,000 tons of petroleum produced in Russia against 1,300,000 tons in the United States.

[555] von Laue, High Cost, *op.cit.,* p. 428.

[556] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 387.

[557] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 529.

[558] TNA: O'Connor to Salisbury, St. Petersburg, January 14, 1897, FO 181/741:8. The four *Guberniya* were Perm, Ufa, Orenburg and Samaa.

[559] Schenk, *op.cit.,* p. 62.

[560] von Laue, High Cost, *op.cit.,* pp. 431.

[561] Lieven, Identities, *op.cit.,* p. 258.

[562] BDFA: Memorandum by Michell on the present Economic Condition of Russia, St Petersburg, September 21 1888, BDFA V2, pp. 218-232.

[563] General Lobko, the State Comptroller, wrote in a 1902 memo: "The economic condition of our agriculture cannot be called satisfactory. The strenuous efforts of the government to plant industries has not been accompanied by equally intensive measure for the support and raising of the agricultural base of the welfare of the

the extreme – he believed agricultural prosperity would come through industrial prosperity.[564] Witte was not interested in stabilising the grain price, buying the surplus or providing storage for that surplus.[565] Indeed, peasants were pressured to sell their grain at a low price, another follow on from a policy of his predecessor. During Witte's tenure, the agricultural sector provided more and more tax revenues for the treasury, increasingly well above any output or revenue rises, which made it harder for agriculture to reinvest. Peasants were left with little to no surplus, both because of the famine combined with such an export-first mentality, bringing Vyshnegradsky's infamous words to pass: "We may under eat, but we will export."[566] In 1903, Ambassador Scott reported on an article in *Novosti* that summarized the situation well: "while the income of the State has immensely increased the productive power per head of the agricultural population is less than it was ten years ago, while the taxes are raised chiefly on articles of general consumption".[567] As a result, the Russian Empire would become notorious for enormous balance of trade surpluses.[568] Until the First World War, support for improving agricultural efficiencies, and the agricultural supply chain, had been lukewarm at best, even though it was policy to offload the (quite liberally interpreted) surplus onto the world market in exchange for industrial development capital.

Unfortunately for Witte's reputation, many of his progressive policy stances or proposals tend to get lost in the historiographical ether. He proposed legislation for labour unions and strikes, noting they were well behind Western Europe, for example, and his views on workers' health and education – whilst not surprising perhaps for such a List follower – were radical for Russia.[569] He favoured the establishment of a model charter, workers self help agencies for sickness, educational programmes, and other common benefits. He also insisted, to no avail, that the peasants be given complete legal equality with other Russian subjects. He was frustrated at what he considered gross overspending on the military.[570] Finally, after becoming Prime Minister in 1905, he railed against *soslovie* barriers, specifically planning to change how communal landholdings were distributed and dispersed, and forming a lower level administration and judiciary balanced across all estates, without *soslovie* priority or preference.[571]

Russian people. In view of the inadequacy of the government measures the negative sides of the protective system, show up all the more strongly in the agricultural population." von Laue, High Cost, *op.cit.* p. 442.

[564] *Ibid.,* p. 428 & von Laue, Industrialization, *op.cit.* p. 178.

[565] Zelnik, *op.cit.,* p, 203.

[566] Quoted in Moss, *op.cit.,* p. 441.

[567] TNA: Scott to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, September 16 1903, FO 795:285. Adding that: "at the same time the high rate of the Russian tariff bears heavily on the poorer classes, who have to pay a yearly tribute of several hundred millions of roubles to the government in the form of the enhanced prices of goods".

[568] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, March 27 1906, TNA FO 371/121/213. According to Russian statistics, exports exceeded imports over 1899-1903 at an annual average of 17,000,000*l*. In 1905, this was almost 50,000,000*l*. According to foreign statistics, this imbalance was much larger, by 1904 already 94,000,000*l*.. *l* = Pound Sterling.

[569] Theodore H von Laue, "Tsarist Labor Policy, 1895-1903", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 1962), pp. 144-145, and von Laue, Industrialization, *op.cit.,* p. 187.

[570] von Laue, Industrialization, *op.cit.,* p. 187.

[571] Freeze, Soslovie, *op.cit.,* p. 33. Stolypin would further expand on these policies.

As critical as he was with the palette with which he had to work, he himself was subject to enormous criticism from powerful interests in the government throughout his tenure.[572] Many Russian elites despised him: in addition to 'ignoring' the land, he was also vilified for selling out Russia and her peasantry to foreign capitalists.[573] The vitriol would follow him after he left the Ministry – as the chief negotiator who managed an extremely mild peace settlement with the Japanese at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in 1906, he was made a Count on his return, only to be taunted with the name "Count Half-Sakhalin".[574] For a brief time in February 1899, he even alienated the Tsar himself, and needed "quick efforts" to get back on side. Four years later, he was forced to leave the Ministry under the weight of immense public criticism.[575]

What such industrial programmes did help propagate almost goes without saying. They brought together workers with similar educational levels in urban factories where they would share the experience of working in intensely challenging capitalist enterprises – often working above and beyond their means in order to help the overall economy catch up. As noted, such enormous growth was not founded on a solid footing, nor did it develop organically. As Richard Pipes has argued, it was the "result of the transplantation of western money, technology and above all, management".[576] The benefits of this growth were mostly confined to the highest strata of society, to the expense of the masses, and the middle class explosion so typical of modernising economies was notably absent. In 1903, the *Novoye Vremya* distilled the situation well: "the country is rich but the individual is poor".[577]

This dichotomy would intensify in the lead up to the 1905 revolution and would generally remain until the First World War. That revolution, as well as war with Japan, made catch-up even more difficult; indeed it is a testament to the state that industrial growth was as strong as it was. The treasury suffered a drastic revenue shortfall typical of such revolts, exacerbated by the refusal of large swathes of the population to pay taxes[578] and compensation payments to affected landowners, which as early as March 1906, were estimated at nearly a million pounds sterling.[579] The new parliamentary era threw up different barriers: In the Third Duma, Prime Minister P.A. Stolypin's career would become noted for failures to form a consensus over the introduction of *zemstva* in the western borderlands, and reforms for Finland, that would have had immense economic implications, as would have his attempts to lift restrictions on the Jews. He was envious of how beneficial Jewish populations with full rights in other European countries had been to their respective economies.[580]

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[572] Criticism of the Minister of Finances was nothing new in Russia – Bunge and Vyshnegradsky had to face it too. For an example of what Bunge had to deal with, see Gatrell, Culture, *op.cit.,* p. 47.
[573] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 531 & von Laue, High Cost, *op.cit.,* p. 432.
[574] Esthus, *op.cit.,* p. 411.
[575] von Laue, High Cost, *op.cit.,* p. 432.
[576] Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.,* p. 219.
[577] TNA: Scott to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, September 16 1903, FO 181/795:285. The *Novoye Vreyma* was a government-supporting newspaper.
[578] BDFA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, December 28 1905, BDFA V3 p. 288.
[579] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, March 27 1906, FO 371/121:213. 800,000 *l.*
[580] Mosse *op.cit.,* p. 243.

How successful were Russia's modernisation attempts? It can be argued that the trajectory of economic modernisation might have made real inroads into the overall objective of 'catching up' had the First World War been delayed, at least when balancing the budget is taken into account.[581] However, balanced budgets were but one element of the economy. The domestic product of (and exports from) the Russian Empire was still predominantly agricultural until the end. As late as 1913, for example, 74 per cent of all exports were from agricultural produce and timber.[582] Urbanisation was considerable but to nowhere near the extent –percentage wise – that the other 'great powers' had achieved in their comparable period of their modernisation. Whereas the urban population of the Russian Empire grew from around 10 per cent in 1855 to about 18 per cent in 1913, the overall imperial population growth over the same period (around 76 million to 168 million) shows that rural and regional populations continued to grow at a high rate.[583] Agricultural statistics indicate that sector was being left behind in the rush to industrialise, even though, as late as 1913, seven out of ten workers were still peasants (the largest industrial labour force was in textiles and metal machine working). They were working on farms that had badly lagged, technology wise. In 1911, for example, there were only 166 tractors being used in all of European Russia, compared to around 14,000 in the United States.[584] To further put this into perspective, in 1910 – in European Russia alone – were 6,454,119 wooden and 4,607,010 iron plows.[585]

However, there was 14 times as much pig iron and 120 times as much coal being produced in 1913 as compared to 1860, during which time railway track increased from around 2,000kms to around 70,000kms.[586] There was an exponential increase in building rail stock (wagons in particular) in the years leading up to the First World War.[587] After the twin shocks of 1905, Russia had managed to return the budget to surplus (indeed, in 1910 there was a surplus without any recourse to loans), although this was partly down to the extreme extraction policies employed by the Finance Ministry, and partly to a bountiful 1909 harvest.[588] The 33 per cent tariff remained restrictive, as well, as the economy was not set up for import substitution. In 1903 the *Novosti* noted that despite the tariff, "our goods cannot compete with foreign products owing to the greater skill of foreign workmen, the cheapness of capital, the technical education of the masses and the improvement in the ways of communication."[589] At the same time, they struggled to compete internationally. As Alan Bodger noted, by 1913: "manufactures still comprised only

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[581] Dempster, *op.cit.,* p. 49, argued that: "Russia had indeed obtained a sustainable peacetime fiscal and economic balance that was thwarted by the untimely events of World War I."

[582] Kennedy, *op.cit.,* p. 302. That figure breaks down to 63% agricultural produce and 11% timber.

[583] Moss. *op.cit.,* pp. 507-508.

[584] *Ibid.,* p. 519.

[585] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 654.

[586] Moss., p. 513. For the latter figure, see Gatrell, Culture, *op.cit.,* p. 39.

[587] Peter Gatrell, "Industrial Expansion in Tsarist Russia, 1908-1914", *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Feb., 1982), p. 103. Wagon production: 1911, 8,878; 1912, 12,033; 1913, 20,492; 1914, 33,355.

[588] Mosse, *op.cit.,* p. 252.

[589] TNA: as reported by Ambassador Scott. Scott to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, September 16 1903, FO 181/795:285.

5.6 per cent of all her exports, and their price and quality made them competitive only in markets naturally or artificially isolated from European competition".[590]

On paper, total industrial output had grown to rank behind only the United States, Germany, France, and Britain, and foreign trade made up around four per cent of the global total (although considerable, this was a natural result of the strong Russian export focus).[591] On the other hand, although national income in 1913 was about four times higher than in 1861, in per capita terms it was less than double, and only 20% of it came from industrial production.[592] When measured against the major powers, the Russian per capita income growth rate was by far the lowest.[593] Whilst the Russian Empire (excluding Finland) had the largest GDP of the six European 'great powers' (excluding colonies) in 1913, it had the lowest GDP per head, by a considerable distance.[594] In essence, the gap they strove to narrow, upending Russian society in the process, had increased. Russian share of world manufacturing actually declined – from 8.8 per cent to 8.2 per cent – from 1900 to 1913.[595] With regards to core commodities, although their output growth had been impressive, especially oil, as noted above, they still only produced 1/18 of the coal, 1/13 of the electricity and 1/7 the steel when compared to the United States in 1913 – a large country which expanded from coast to coast with abundant (although not always easy to reach) natural resources in a manner similar to the Russian Empire.[596] In addition, the imperial treasury had developed a reliance on massive foreign loans, particularly after 1900, from France.[597]

Michael Mann calls what happened in Russia after 1900 the Second Industrial Revolution, "while the first one was still in its infancy",[598] which would, in the words of Gregory Grossman, "outpace the modernization of society".[599] An illustration of this was that by 1914 there was still no model charter for joint stock companies – the only way to set one up was by having connections at the imperial court.[600] There was yet another spurt that in some ways

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[590] Bodger, *op.cit.,* p. 80.

[591] Moss, *op.cit.,* pp. 514-515.

[592] *Ibid.,* p. 515 & Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 424.

[593] By 1913, per capita growth in national income was around one tenth of that of the United States, one fifth of Britain and less than two fifths of the French and German rate. Moss, *Ibid.,* p. 515.

[594] Stephen Broadberry & Mark Harrison, "The Economics of World War 1: A Comparative Quantitative Analysis", http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/papers/ww1toronto2.pdf, last accessed 15 June 2015, pp. 23 & 25. Descending figures for 1913 GDP overall, in 1990 international dollars: Russia (ex. Finland) 257.7 bn; Germany (ex. colonies) 244.3 bn; Britain (ex. colonies) 226.4 bn; France (ex. colonies) 138.7 bn; Austria-Hungary 100.5 bn; Italy (ex. colonies) 91.3 bn. Comparable figures for GDP per head, descending: Britain 4,921 bn; Germany 3,648 bn; France 3,485 bn; Italy 2,546 bn; Austria-Hungary 1,986 bn; Russia 1,488 bn.

[595] Kennedy, *op.cit.,* p. 306.

[596] Moss, *op.cit.,* p. 514.

[597] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, April 25 1906, FO 181/869: 284. Spring Rice commented that a particularly large loan to the Government: "for the present puts an end to the financial embarrassment and renders it independent of the popular house". This was a consortium loan from a pool of banks including 6 from Paris, 1 from London, 6 from Vienna, 1 from Budapest and 2 from Amsterdam. *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, *Ukase* of 4 April, 1906, attachment in Spring Rice to Grey, April 24 1906, FO 181/869:278.

[598] Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.,* p. 660.

[599] Quoted in Kennedy, *op.cit.,* p. 303.

[600] Geoffrey Hosking, "Patronage and the Russian State", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Apr, 2000), pp. 312.

resembled the 1890s – for example there was a 7.5 per cent per annum rise in industrial production between 1910 and 1913.[601] This rise came with a growing concentration of industrial workers – an important dynamic affecting group formation within the Imperial Power Structure.[602] Mining, as well as the secondary industries of manufacturing, transport and construction, went from consisting of less than one quarter of total economic output in the mid 1880s to around one-third by 1914.[603] This was exceptionally low when compared to the other great powers with which the Russian Empire were 'competing'. Stolypin himself was well aware of this, complaining openly in 1911, "if one compares Russian industry with that of such other countries as Germany, Austria-Hungary, England and others, the picture is dismal".[604] One transition was without question: due to the policies of Finance Ministers going back to Bunge, the Russian Imperial Power Structure had far more stakeholders than ever before. This included a working class – demonstrably larger and more concentrated – that would evolve as critical to the future of the dynasty, its fall and the fall of the successor Provisional Government in 1917.[605]

5.4.2. The Habsburg Empire

Austria also made notable moves toward empowering their imperial economy – although differing in strategy and activity from the Russian Empire, they too were inspired by the emerging nation-states to the west. To add to the aforementioned examples from Max-Stephan Schulze, in 1841, national product per capita was roughly 75 per cent of that in the *Zollverein*.[606] At the middle of the century, the Habsburg economy was slowly but steadily falling behind the other 'great powers' (other than Russia) and would continue to do so.[607] In addition, they already had a strong and discernible west-to-east economic lag,[608] notable for a mix of modern/industrial and traditional/post-feudal regions.

These trends would continue, as the revolution and the constant war footing of the state continued to drain the imperial coffers, seriously stifling progress. In 1859, for example, the crippling debt the government held to the National Bank, which had been lowered to 145,700,000 florins (*fl*), almost doubled to 285,800,000 after the Italian war began.[609] Michael

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[601] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 414.

[602] *Ibid.,* p. 416. For example, "of over 2 million workers in factories of above twenty employees, over 40 per cent were in establishments employing more than 1,000 workers. This may be compared to the United States where of over 6 million such workers only 20 per cent were in 1,000 worker plants".

[603] Gatrell, Culture, *op.cit.,* p. 39.

[604] Quoted in Mosse, *op.cit.,* p. 243.

[605] Zelnik, *op.cit.,* p. 210.

[606] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 296.

[607] Good, Economic Lag, *op.cit.,* p. 11 of 41, tracks this. By 1870, GDP per capita in the Habsburg Empire was at less than one-third that of Britain, "a gap that was surely not this large a century before".

[608] *Ibid.,* pp. 11-12 of 41. Good added: "Furthermore, regional disparities within the Empire mirrored the larger economic gradient in Europe; income levels were two to three times higher in the Empire's western lands than in its eastern lands. For example, on the territory of present-day Austria the level of GDP per capita was over 50 per cent of the UK, while on the present-day territory of Western Ukraine it was barely 20 per cent of the UK."

[609] Ebeling, *op.cit.,* p. 13.

Mann made the salient point that: "Austrian finances were like those of old regime France; not in the sheer level of extraction, but endless negotiations with particularistic power groups resulted in visibly 'unfair' tax burdens, fiscal-political crises and excessive borrowing."[610] Even the neo-Absolutist atmosphere could not overcome interest groups exercising what limited economic power they could muster, as will become evident in the section on politics to follow.

Positive reforms had come out of the revolutionary era, specifically the lifting of internal tariff barriers in 1850/51. Ostensibly to strengthen centralisation in the neo-Absolutist era, this move to remove any semblance of Hungarian independence from Vienna created an effective national market.[611] Following in 1855 was the *Creditanstalt,* inspired by the French Crédit Mobilier concept. The *Creditanstalt,* a Rothschild initiative, was introduced to extend investment capital to industry, tailored to meet the specific needs of the applicant in question.[612] The declining Guild system, which had slowly become subject to more government oversight, was officially abolished with the Commercial Law of 1859 (*Gewerbeordnung*).[613] Railway funding was increased enormously in the late 1850s (helped initially by the *Creditanstalt*), incorporating for the first time a strong effort in Hungary, and would pick up again between *Ausgleich* and the stock market crash of 1873.[614] Indeed, this state-led railway boom would see a continent-leading 7,600 plus kilometres built between 1867 and 1872, connecting almost all major towns in the empire.[615] In addition, the taxation system was centralised, and in 1858, they introduced an empire-wide silver gulden/florin (forint in Hungary).[616]

After the defeat to the Prussians in 1866, which followed a four year contraction in industrial production, the economy would become one of the key areas addressed by the *Ausgleich* with Hungary.[617] One of the hindrances to industrial progress in the Habsburg economy in 1867 was the high number of peasants and low numbers of industrial workers, who had a lower standard of living and therefore lower levels of consumption.[618] For example, in Hungary in 1870 only a mere 8.6 per cent of the labour force was in industry, mostly milling.[619] At the same time,

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[610] Mann, Vol. I, *op.cit.,* p. 334.

[611] Komlos, Customs Union, *op.cit.,* pp. 4-5.

[612] Eduard März, "The Austrian Crédit Mobilier in a Time of Transition", in J. Komlos (ed.), *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union. Economic Development in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century* (Boulder, 1983), pp. 117-118. They began with 60 million guilders in share capital. Mason, *op.cit.,* p. 24.

[613] For more details of their decline, and they system of compulsory associations that replaced them, see John W. Boyer, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897* (Chicago, 1981), pp. 55-56 & Josef Ehmer, "Guilds in Early Modern Austria" in S.R. Epstein, H.G. Haupt, C. Poni and H. Soly (eds.), *Guilds, economy and society* (Madrid, 1998), pp. 121 & 126-127.

[614] März, *op.cit.,* p. 118-119 & László Katus, "Transport Revolution and Economic Growth in Hungary", in J. Komlos, (ed.), *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union. Economic Development in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century* (Boulder, 1983), p. 191.

[615] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 303. The exceptions were the towns of Dalmatia.

[616] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 325.

[617] Max-Stephan Schulze, "Patterns of growth and stagnation in the late nineteenth century Habsburg economy", *European Review of Economic History,* Vol. 4, Issue 3, (2000), p. 325, argued that this was closely tied to huge falls in cotton imports from across the Atlantic, which was caused by the American Civil War.

[618] *Ibid.* pp. 344-345.

[619] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 314. There was some metallurgy as well.

this hindrance could have been beneficial if properly managed, as the Empire as a whole formed a diverse 'domestic' market with multi-layered, regional comparative advantages. It had the backward agriculture of Dalmatia (where a staggering *86.1* per cent of the 1890 population worked on the land),[620] Transylvania and Bukovina, the world class industrial economies of Bohemia, Styria and Carinthia, and everything in between, effectively matching the same patterns found in a homogenous nation-state – including a healthy number of joint stock companies and banks, whose growth was considerable until the 1873 crash.[621]

In order to maximise this potential, provisions for a single currency and joint monetary policy were included in the compromise, to be added to the common market.[622] The Habsburg Empire at the time of *Ausgleich* already had, to use a phrase of Joachim Remak, "a common market area before the term was invented".[623] Indeed, several historians of the Habsburg Empire have argued that these three initiatives created complementary economies and financial systems not unlike their contemporary nation-states, such as K.R. Stadler, and the economic historian Marc Flandreau.[624] David Good would even compare the patterns of the Austro-Hungarian economy to those of the contemporary United States, writing that: "in the United States, too, a national capital market evolved to channel funds from the surplus east to the deficit west."[625] In concert, the primary Habsburg sea-port at Trieste was expanded to help trade the fruits of these initiatives.[626] Now the Habsburg Empire had a combination of nation-state economic frameworks that together made the imperial economic structure resemble the 'national' economies of the nation-states to the west. In effect, they were following the nation-state ideological framework to structure an economy to work as a single, complementary whole.

Alas, these initiatives would become poisoned by the politics of nationality, as would the Austro-Hungarian Bank, proposed in the wake of *Ausgleich* but not chartered for another ten years, in 1878. The tedious, drawn-out negotiations on the foundation of the bank make for eye-popping reading.[627] On the surface, it appeared that two identical halves were just fused together, chartered so very carefully to be seen to be equal in its mission. Everything was literally split down

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[620] Mirjana Gross, "The union of Dalmatia with northern Croatia: a crucial question of the Croatian national integration in the nineteenth century" in M. Teich and R. Porter (eds.), *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context* (Cambridge, UK, 1993), p. 277.

[621] Mason, *op.cit.*, p. 24. Between 1867 and 1873, 1,005 joint-stock companies were created.

[622] Jürgen Nautz, "Ethnic Conflicts and Monetary Integration in Austria-Hungary, 1867-1914", http://www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/fallstudie/JNautz1.pdf, accessed 20 May 2011. <broken link, hard copy available on request, or can be downloaded from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=259907, last accessed 4 December 2014, p. 3.

[623] Remak, *op.cit.*, p. 130.

[624] For specifics on monetary policy, see Flandreau, Logic, *op.cit.*, p. 3-33. For a more general commentary see K.R. Stadler, "The Disintegration of the Austrian Empire", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Oct, 1968), pp. 184-185.

[625] Good, Uneven, *op.cit.*, p. 146.

[626] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 427. The expansion of Trieste's port capacity was one of numerous policies upon which the government in Vienna relied on Polish votes.

[627] Eventually pushed through after threats that "the terms must be accepted as a whole; and that the rejection of any one or the other would involve the failure of the entire engagement". TNA: Elliot to Salisbury, Vienna, May 7 1878, FO 120/554:361.

the middle – the Governor was to be chosen by Franz Josef acting as both Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, after receiving nominations by the Austrian and Hungarian Finance Ministries.[628] There would be two vice-governors, one Austrian and one Hungarian, appointed by each respective government.[629] Twelve directors would be split six apiece, and there were two head offices – one in Vienna and one in Budapest.[630]

However, the journey was fraught with the political game playing that would come to characterise the relationship between Austria and Hungary. Negotiations were called off on numerous occasions, and both sides would use brinksmanship and showmanship in order to gain a favourable outcome. This would be played out in their respective chambers. The British representative in Budapest, commenting on some hijinks in 1877, noted that the Hungarian Government threatened the Emperor with resignation if the Government in Vienna didn't respond to their offer "within a few days". This was rejected, as it was "looked upon as a mere parliamentary manoeuvre to cover the responsibility which they have incurred to the chambers by their past language on the subject".[631] Another bone of contention was the perceived attitude of "National Vanity" of the Bank of Austria in the years leading up to the foundation of the imperial bank, supposedly in favour of Austrian business, and the language used on the Austrian currency of the time.[632] Such machinations, and claims of favouritism, would plague imperial finances and the Bank itself until the First World War.

The 'down-the-middle' division itself was long in negotiation. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Kálmán Tisza even resigned to the Emperor in 1877, aggrieved the Austrians had suggested that only four of twelve directors would be Hungarian. His counter proposal, fair in principle – four Austrians, four Hungarians and four elected by shareholders – was unacceptable to the Austrians and the Emperor.[633] It may have been *politically* fair, but the larger percentage of branches was far in Cisleithania's favour at the beginning. In effect, the Hungarians began to ebb away at that too. By 1900 they had 42 per cent of the bank's branches, and due to the charter they controlled 50 per cent of the bank, and yet they had only about 30 per cent of Habsburg GDP.[634] This would not stop the Hungarians from agitating to improve the deal, to the displeasure of the other nationalities.[635]

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[628] Flandreau, Logic, *op.cit.,* p. 7.

[629] *Ibid.* In addition, the Emperor had veto provisions over bank officials. TNA: Elliot to Salisbury, Vienna, May 7 1878, FO 120/554:361.

[630] Nautz, *op.cit.,* pp. 4-5. There were two more provisions of note: "5. The deputy governors were to be appointed by the monarch upon recommendation of the Austrian and Hungarian finance ministers," and "7. The two governments appointed one commissioner each and one deputy."

[631] TNA: Dispatch to Stanley, Budapest, January 16 1877, FO 120/540:47.

[632] TNA: Buchanan to Stanley, Vienna, January 13 1876, FO 120/527:17.

[633] TNA: Dispatch to Stanley, Vienna, February 28 1877, FO 120/540:128.

[634] Flandreau, Logic, *op.cit.,* p. 9.

[635] *Ibid.* p. 6. Or try to set up a breakaway National Bank of Hungary: as the *Neue Freie Presse* reported in 1907: "Hungary will not hesitate to take advantage of the lapsing of the Common Bank agreement in order to carry out the immediate foundation of a separate Hungarian National Bank." They were correct in motivation if not outcome. TNA: *Neue Freie Presse*, March 17 1907, in Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 20 1907, FO 120/840:27.

Although the entire empire would benefit from the synchronising of business cycles that resulted from the above reforms,[636] it is arguable that the Hungarians profited more from the common market, customs union, currency and bank, especially as these institutions and activities complemented their intra-market agricultural advantage. Their magnate driven, broad acre dominated agricultural economy had a natural market in Austria.[637] The Habsburg Empire had perhaps more 'autarchy' potential than any economy in Europe apart from Russia. The above initiatives potentially maximised the natural division of capital and industry throughout the empire, as well as the division of labour. Whether each segment would be happy with these divisions would be another matter.[638] It was also balanced from a geopolitical viewpoint – the industrial west was well protected by the agricultural east, a great distance from the border with the Russian Empire.[639]

One of the calling cards of intra-empire disputes was the claiming economic discrimination by those for whom the system was favourable.[640] As with the aforementioned Bank manoeuvres, it was mostly bluster – political grievances to be used in negotiation or polemics for firing up co-nationals. As William Jenks argued: "German and Czech bankers and industrialists, with their thousands of employees and dependents, realised the value of investments and sales in Hungary. At the same time, the great agrarian interests of Hungary were aware of their probable destiny if they lost their Austrian customers."[641] More specifically, the Hungarian advantage came from tariff-free outlets for the Hungarian grain surplus, which meant landowners didn't have to compete on the international grain market: Cisleithania was a captive market that soaked up grain exports to such a degree that by the 1890s almost no Hungarian wheat was being traded outside of the empire.[642] Indeed, some 74.9 per cent of *all* Hungarian exports in 1913 went to Cisleithania, a figure that had increased since the turn of the century.[643] Such an arrangement did no harm to the prices received by the Hungarians. Processed products were also staples of Hungarian exports to the west, such as cotton, wool, beet sugar and beer.[644] Sadly, national issues dictated that the expansion in railways needed to carry these goods meant that the new tracks laid on the Hungarian side were kept as far away

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[636] Marc Flandreau & Mathilde Maurel, "Monetary union, trade integration and economic fluctuations: Lessons from the Habsburg Experience (1867-1914), http://pdfcast.org/pdf/monetary-union-trade-integration-and-economic-fluctuations-lessons-from-the-habsburg-experience-1867-1914, last accessed 29 November 2014, p. 11. Specifically they concluded that "mutual trade was intensified".

[637] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 291.

[638] Stadler, *op.cit.,* pp. 184-185, outlined how "conflicting economic interests" spurred on by the relatively favourable conditions of the internal market would cause displeasure, and occupy "much of the time of parliaments and governments".

[639] As highlighted by Komlosy, *op.cit.,* p. 172.

[640] Nautz, *op.cit.,* p. 5, who noted that this was especially acute amongst the eastern regions of Hungary and Galicia, who conversely had very strong political influence.

[641] Quoted in Remak, *op.cit.,* p. 131.

[642] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 295.

[643] William A, Jenks, "Economics, Constitutionalism, Administrative and Class Structure in the Monarchy", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 3, Issue 01 (Jan., 1967), p. 36. The figure for 1901 was 72.4 per cent.

[644] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 345.

from the Austrian border as possible – hardly the most efficient means of benefitting from this time-and-cost saving means to market.[645]

With respect to the Czechs, their elites would look for opportunities on the fringes of the formal dualist-dominated economy for unobstructed economic opportunities. For example, anticipating that they would fail an equal partner in a 'three pillar' Bank, they decided to take control of their own 'national' banking destiny, by looking to fill the gaps left by the neglect of Austrian and Hungarian banks. They formed their first commercial bank, *Zivnostenská banka pro Čechy a Moravu* in 1869, which would follow another Czech bank (*Slavia*) in expanding from Czech-to-Czech business finance to leading the movement of Czech banks in Trieste, the largest Habsburg port and home to the largest shipping line in the Mediterranean.[646] The objective was to export Czech capital outside *and* within the official imperial system. The Czechs were striving to foment "slavic solidarity" by providing a natural (meaning neither Austrian German nor Hungarian) partner to the Slavic businesses in the region.[647] They were well aware that their province – Bohemia – was the industrial powerhouse of the empire. After overcoming a huge downturn in the mid 1870s,[648] Czechs would then start to contribute to Slavic enterprises as partners, for example *Jadranska banka* – the Slovene bank that was supported by Czech, Croat and Serb capital that opened in 1905.[649] This phenomenon was repeated with Slavic financial institutions as far south as Dalmatia.[650] As per Motyl's typology, this was an example of a partial rim connecting certain peripheral spokes on the Habsburg 'wheel', which denotes the emergence of potential threats to the Imperial Power Structure.[651]

The economy bubbled in the years between *Ausgleich* and 1873, driven in part by unsustainable borrowing and state investment, which helped lead to the overconfidence that was behind the Vienna stock market crash.[652] Whilst historians are in disagreement as to whether this brought on an actual 'depression',[653] it definitely preceded a noticeable downturn. To give but one example, 376 joint stock companies were formed in Cisleithania in 1872 and merely 43 in the

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[645] *Ibid.* Also see Hoffman, *op.cit.,* pp. 136-137.
[646] Nautz, *op.cit.,* p. 1 & Klabjan, *op.cit.,* p. 22. *Zivnostenská* became the first investment bank in the empire to raise all of its capital domestically, see Fichtner, *op.cit.,* pp. 64-65.
[647] Klabjan, *op.cit.,* p. 22.
[648] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 321. All thirty three banks that were founded in the Czech lands in 1872 were bankrupted in the following year.
[649] Klabjan, *op.cit.,* p. 23.
[650] *Ibid.* He wrote that: "Jaroslav Preiss, an intellectual, journalist, and one of the most important Czech bankers, wrote that 'banks in Ljubljana/Laibach, Trieste/Trst, in Croatia, and in Dalmatia fix their eyes on Prague, as a natural center of monetary commerce of the Slavic world'." Klabjan added that at the 1908 Prague neo-Slavic congress, Preiss praised Trieste's place as "one of the dominant positions of Slavic capital in the struggle against German penetration".
[651] Motyl. Imperial Ends, *op.cit.,* p. 21. He states that "Metropoles that command peripheries to interact significantly would in essence be withdrawing from empire."
[652] Kann, *op.cit.* p. 343. Added to this was deep corruption going as high as minister-level.
[653] John Komlos, "Is the Depression in Austria after 1873 a "Myth"?", *The Economic History Review.* New Series, Vol. 31, No. 2 (May, 1978), pp. 287-289. He counters the argument of David Good, who ruled out a depression by charting subtle yet noticeable GNP growth throughout the empire during this entire period. Komlos' position is the more common in the historiography.

next eight years.[654] The downturn coincided with the strong growth of per capita industrial product, especially in Hungary.[655] The economy as a whole took many years to right itself (the commonly-agreed end point being in the 1890s). The eventual recovery was impressive, resulting in faster Austro-Hungarian economic growth than most European economies towards the end of the nineteenth century.[656] Railway track construction expanded at great pace, harvests increased (between 1867 and 1890, wheat production was up 96 per cent and corn, potato and sugar beet doubled).[657] Economic advancement was complemented by modern reforms including worker health and accident insurance – initiatives Nachum Gross called "protection of the 'smallest' man by social insurance" – as well the limitation of working hours, and very forward-looking limitations on child employment.[658] Inspectorates were also formed to manage and police these regulations.[659]

The next major reform came in 1892 with the move to the gold standard with a new, 'national', convertible currency – this was to enable better access to global money markets and to smooth international trade.[660] As Carl Menger, one of the committee putting forward the recommendations (and founder of the Austrian school of economics) noted: "Gold is the money of advanced nations in the modern age. No other money can provide the convenience of a gold currency in our age of rapid and massive commodity exchanges. Silver has become a troublesome tool of trade. Even paper money must yield to gold when it comes to monetary convenience in everyday life."[661] The new currency would inspire what was becoming typical – nationalist bartering over mostly symbolic things, such as the design of the banknotes.[662] That commotion was in the contested ideological power space of the empire.

In turn, the debates in the *Reichsrat* concerning the introduction of the currency would display frustrations concerning political and economic power, resulted in manifestations of ideological power. For example, the Czechs in the *Reichsrat* accused the Austrians and Hungarians of yet again dividing the spoils amongst themselves. A spokesman said: "This absolutist centralism, framed by Germanising allures has also produced the almost immortal twins, i.e. a chronic deficit and paper economy!"[663] Another remarked: "Ask all the peoples of

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[654] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 321.
[655] *Ibid.,* p. 296 & Schulze, Origins, *op.cit.,* p. 206. Schulze noted that this was opposed to Austria, where admittedly aggregate output per worker still grew, but at a demonstrably lower rate than Hungary.
[656] Including Germany. Good, Economic Lag, *op.cit.,* p. 12 of 41.
[657] Ranki, *op.cit.,* p. 56. About 10,000 km of new railway track was built during this time.
[658] Margarete Grandner, "Conservative Social Policies in Austria, 1880-1890", Center for Austrian Studies, Working Paper 94-2 (Jul., 1994), http://www.cas.umn.edu/assets/pdf/WP942.PDF, last accessed 25 November 2014, provides an excellent overview of advances made though the Iron Ring era. Also see Nachum Gross, *op.cit.,* p. 25.
[659] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 427.
[660] Nautz, *op.cit.,* p. 3.
[661] Ebeling, *op.cit.,* pp. 16-17. Wieser, another member of the commission, added after the implementation that "If Europe errs in adopting gold, we must still, for good or evil, join Europe in her error, and we shall thus receive less injury than if we insist on being 'rational' all by ourselves."
[662] Nautz, *op.cit.,* p. 3.
[663] *Ibid.*

Austria and they will tell you this is a capitalist dungeon, but the Slavs consider it a Dantian inferno, at the gates of which all national hopes whither!"[664] However, as with most *Reichsrat* fracas, this had become common operating procedure in Vienna and would remain so until the First World War.

Further bluster surrounded the Quota negotiations, which will be analysed further in the next chapter. Suffice to say, even British diplomats were aghast at the insignificance of the demands, on a purely economic basis. In 1896, the British Embassy noted that the proposed additional 3 to 4 per cent being asked of the Hungarians was so insignificant that a refusal could only be "one of principles", and that "the jealousy in each country is such that the feeling is principally one of avoiding even the semblance of granting any concession to each other".[665] In 1899, Ambassador Sir Horace Rumbold was incredulous enough to convert the 0.27 per cent difference in negotiating figures to Sterling – a mere *£25,000:* "The Austrians claimed 33 per cent as the lowest figure they could accept, but finally reduced their pretensions to 34.52 per cent. The Hungarians would not go beyond 34.25, and this difference the attempt at an agreement failed."[666] To be fair to the Hungarians both sides played by the same rules and conventions, and they made the most advantage of their position in the Imperial Power Structure that was allowed to them in the first place by the Emperor. Neither were shy in wielding their economic, political and ideological power.

As the new century rolled in, it became abundantly clear that economic progress would become inexorably tied to the national issue.[667] In Cisleithania, Minister-President Ernest von Koerber (in office 1900-1904) even tried to use economic and infrastructure development as a tool to foster common and collective action in spite of nationality, but was in the long run unsuccessful.[668] Another round of railway (and canal) building just gave more ammunition to national agitators, especially after capital dried up around 1909 and promised projects had to be cancelled.[669] There would be no 'growth-at-all-costs' strategy along the lines of Witte in Russia, and although some of that can be attributed to the intransigence of the nationalities, the fact remains that Habsburg industry was still impressive when compared to Russia's at the turn of the century.

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[664] *Ibid.* The Austrians also piled on the vitriol, with an Austrian delegate complaining that too much was being given away to the Hungarians yet again: "The Hungarian government is the pilot who directs the ship [...] the Austrian finance minister is merely the stoker who feeds the engines with our taxes."

[665] TNA: It represented 3-4 million florins: Dispatch to Salisbury, Vienna, December 2 1896, FO 120/725:386.

[666] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, November 16 1899, FO 120/751:268.

[667] Ranki, *op.cit.,* p. 49.

[668] Taylor, *op.cit.,* pp. 213-214.

[669] Lothar Höbelt, "Well-tempered Discontent': Austrian Domestic Politics" in M. Cornwall (ed.), *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary. A Multi-National Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe* (Exeter, 2002), pp. 49-50. Kann stated that Körber "could not make the parties agree to a concept of economic priorities before national priorities". Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 429.

Parts of the Austrian crown lands would remain a hub of industrial manufacture and fine goods and "might seem very Central European",[670] with world-class quality wares being produced in Pilsen (SKODA), Steyr (armaments), Carinthia (chemicals), Lower Austria and Vienna (fine luxury goods).[671] The Lloyd Triestino/Österreichischer Lloyd line had become the largest shipping company in the entire Mediterranean.[672] Bohemia (by 1870) and Moravia (by 1890) saw the share of their labour force in agriculture fall below 50 per cent and young people moved straight into industrial employment on the completion of education – an enormous gauge of economic modernisation.[673] Agriculture was little changed – Austrian farms were still primarily small homesteads whereas the real clout in the empire was with the 3,000 or so large farmers and farm corporations that owned half the arable land in Transleithania.[674]

In addition, any economic successes were tempered by the seemingly unsolvable negotiations between Austria and Hungary. We have mentioned the Austro-Hungarian Bank; another bone of contention was the customs union, which had been in place since 1850, and was undoubtedly of benefit to the great landowners of Hungary. This became acute during Coalition party rule in Hungary, between 1906 and 1910, driven by the strong influence in the coalition of the Party of Independence and '48, who had won the 1906 Hungarian election in a landslide but were barred from taking office by the Emperor, having to settle for accepting being a junior coalition partner. They were political adversaries of the magnates, thinking those magnates had compromised Hungarian independence by agreeing to, and maintaining, *Ausgleich*. This shows how much the political environment overlapped into the economic. Béni Kállay had noted in 1899 that, in the words of Ambassador Rumbold, "all parties, save a few extreme chauvinists, were in favour of the maintenance of the economic bond between the two countries".[675] The Croatians of Transleithania, whose imperial link was purely economic at this stage, were likely strong objectors to separation, as well.[676] Politics would trump efficiency, as it would in the imperial realm time and again.

In 1906, Hungarian Prime Minister Wekerle proposed to parliament the winding up of the common tariff, to be replaced by a separate Austrian and a Hungarian tariff *that would be identical*. He had imperial sanction for this move, most likely by a frustrated Emperor looking

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[670] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 164. Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia contained 37% of Cisleithania's population in 1880 and yet was responsible for 64% of industrial production, Koralka, The Czechs, *op.cit.,* p. 81.

[671] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 464.

[672] *Ibid.* p. 465

[673] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 285. Bohemia also had 3/5 of all Austrian industrial businesses and accounted for almost 2/3 of industrial employees. Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 464.

[674] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 282. An exception was Polish Galicia, which maintained a strange combination of large, magnate-run estates and small land holdings (with little in-between).

[675] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, June 20 1899, FO 120/750:151.

[676] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, December 10 1897, FO 120/734:417. As Ambassador Rumbold noted: "notably the Croatians would probably offer very strong objections to a commercial separation from Austria with its attendant financial loss."

for closure.[677] The Parliament saw the weakness of their sister body at Vienna and went for the jugular, as conveyed by Ambassador Edward Goschen, who stated that they appeared:

> to have realized that an unrepresentative Government with no party behind it and a Parliament perpetually and exclusively engaged in nationalist and party quarrels […] have no chance of competing with Hungary with its Parliamentary Government, backed by a large and compact majority in the House of Deputies, and enjoying the confidence of the country at large. [678]

The following year the Hungarian Minister of Commerce, Kossuth (*fils*) would take this one step further, promising that there would be a customs barrier erected in 1917.[679] Many in Austria had given up well before this, as exemplified by *Fremden Blatt* in 1906, which belligerently commented that "until the end of the year 1907 the Common Customs Territory and the Customs and Commercial Union remain as before. From 1908 a new house must be built". [680] Typical of Habsburg economic relations, cooler heads prevailed at the eleventh hour – bolstered by the return of Khuen-Héderváry as Hungarian Prime Minister in 1910.

As noted, David Good compared Habsburg regional disparities of the turn of the century with those in the United States, finding that similarities in the geographic segmentation of their economies was mutually beneficial to their respective regions. Michael Mann took this up, arguing that due to this dynamic, the perception of Austro-Hungarian economy as weak should be reconsidered. He went as far as to pose the question: "Was the United States a capitalist failure during this period"?[681] However, due to the requirements of the Imperial Power Structure, and the 'great power' system, being a capitalist failure or success was not necessarily the correct gauge with which to judge the success of the regime's efforts at catching up.

Jürgen Nautz introduced the notion of the Habsburg "destabilisation potential", which overshadowed the Empire because it could or would not adjust its political system sufficiently to match the requirements of social and economic change.[682] This was marked with the *Ausgleich* split (he was writing in reference to the monetary union), which did drag on the Austrian and Hungarian economies, although the individual economies on either side of the Leitha – especially in Cisleithania – do not show this as much. For example, the success of the Bohemian economy as a whole, and Czech business in particular, brings into question whether any level of political adjustment, or economic success, can thwart the potential for destabilisation. The Czechs were bitter without their own *Ausgleich* with the crown, to be sure, however it is debatable whether the political system was skewed against them, with Czech parties supporting the Vienna government, and a common market that enabled Czech businesses to expand across the realm. Regardless, the gist of Nautz's point bears analysis. Could the political system drive the changes the economy so

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[677] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, May 31 1906, FO 371/7/61.

[678] *Ibid.*

[679] TNA: *Neue Freie Presse,* March 17 1907, in Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 20 1907, FO 120/840:27.

[680] TNA: From *Fremden Blatt,* July 7 1906, referenced in Goschen to Grey, Vienna, June 12 1906, FO 120/831:95.

[681] Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.* p. 335.

[682] Nautz, *op.cit.,* p. 6.

badly needed in order to 'catch up' with the other European 'great powers', and was the political system up to the task of fully supporting the economy? For all the economic progress made, there were still numerous stumbling blocks.

For starters, the population was still overwhelmingly in the agricultural sector. 58 per cent of the working age population to the west of the river Leitha and 68 per cent to the east were still employed on farms in 1900, whereas only 22 and 14 per cent respectively were in manufacturing and less than 10 per cent for both in transport and communications.[683] The census of 1910 even showed a jump in agricultural sector workers in the west of the Empire – to 56.9 per cent – and a modest rise in industrial workers, to 23.5 per cent. When compared with the German Empire, whose numbers in 1907 were respectively 35.2 per cent and 39 per cent, it is not difficult to conclude that, in this arena at least, this was a catch-up that never was.[684] Indeed, the total workforce of Bismarck's Germany in 1874 had proportionally less agricultural workers than Cisleithania had just before the First World War.[685] Large estates servicing captive, domestic markets, especially in Hungary and Galicia, still predominated.[686] By 1913, the percentage of the Hungarian wheat harvest that was exported outside the empire had fallen to *less than* one per cent.[687] One can assume that the profitability in large agricultural exports to the west of the empire due to the terms of the common market made it a too attractive market to disturb. It would explain the enormous increase in arable Hungarian land harvested between 1850 and the First World War (from 6.3 million to 11.8 million hectares).[688]

Peripheral 'nationals' in Transleithania found it difficult to access the 'labour ladder'. For example, if one were to look at their working population in 1910: the ratio of Hungarians on the land was 55 per cent, that of Germans 50 per cent then it rises to 70 per cent for Slovaks and Croats, 86 per cent for Romanians and 89 per cent for Ruthenes. When it came to trade and industry, the figures were 31 per cent for the Hungarians, 37 per cent for the Germans, then 21 per cent for the Croats, 20 per cent for the Slovaks and only 8 per cent and 4.8 per cent for the Romanians and Ruthenes respectively. Less than 1 per cent of the latter two nationalities working age populations were professionals.[689] As can be seen, the division of labour in both an interdependent national market, and the component regional markets, was often on national lines, and this was another contentious issue. With regards to finance, Good suggests that this was one sector of the Habsburg economy "being welded into a coherent unit", alas he argues that the resultant regional financial interdependence "may have stimulated the forces of nationalism

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[683] Kann, *op.cit.*, pp. 462-463.

[684] Grandner, *op.cit.*, p. 4 of 19.

[685] Schulze, Origins, *op.cit.* p. 194.

[686] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.*, p. 282. In 1910, around 50% of Galician estates were between 50-200 Ha.

[687] Mason, *op.cit.*, p. 27.

[688] Katus, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

[689] Peter Hanak, "A National Compensation for Backwardness", *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 46, No. 1/2, Nationalism and Social Science (Jun., 1994), p. 40.

among the regionally dispersed nationality groups, thereby eroding the foundations of the multi-national express".[690]

'Interdependence' and 'division of labour along national lines' also imply that the historical imbalance and the lag from west to east were still in effect. This relative imbalance would improve before the First World War, as did "trade frictions", which manifested in a closing of the traditional gap between Austrian and Hungarian per capita incomes.[691] However, peoples from the faster growing regions would not share any benefits. A case in point is Hungary, where from a very low base, industrial production was booming. It grew annually 6.2 per cent on average from 1870 to 1900 and 5.1 per cent from then until 1914.[692] From the 1880s, Budapest became the largest flour-milling centre in Europe (and second largest in the world), and the city itself was fastest growing in Europe between *Ausgleich* and the beginning of the First World War.[693] Not surprisingly in a modernising economy, low-income regions grew faster than its high-income regions.[694] Most of the former were under control of Hungary. However, most non-Magyars in Transleithania (Saxon Germans and Jews excepted) remained firmly embedded in the peasantry, even with modernisation programmes in Transylvania, for example.

Even though the majority of working subjects of both halves of the empire remained in agriculture, between 1870 and 1910 the share of GDP of manufacturing more than doubled for Hungary (6.5 to 13.3 per cent) and made significant gains in Cisleithania (18.9 to 24.9 per cent).[695] Industrial output from 1890 grew at the same rate as in Germany, although relative difference remained stable.[696] GDP per worker was also similar by growth rate, although in overall terms it remained less than half that of the German Empire.[697] To actually 'catch-up', they would have to have growth rates across the board of indicators way in excess of Germany. According to Max-Stephan Schulze, utilising the growth rate between 1870 and 1914, "it would have taken seventy years for Austrians to see their average real incomes double. Their German counterparts north of the border experienced this within forty years".[698] This is how such Habsburg economic growth could presumably grow faster *year on year* than even for example, Germany of Britain in the late nineteenth century and yet could remain well behind.[699] For

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[690] David F. Good, "Financial Integration in late Nineteenth-Century Austria", *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Dec., 1977), pp. 909-910.

[691] Nikolaus Wolf & Max-Stephan Schulze, "Borders, language, and the future of European integration: insights from the 19th century Habsburg Empire", http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/362, last accessed 4 December 2014, p. 3 of 7. Also see Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* pp. 315-316.

[692] Milward & Saul, *ibid.,* p. 315. In addition, the growth in Hungarian rail lines was enormous, from 557 km in 1855 to 22,229 km in 1915. Katus, *op.cit.,* p. 192.

[693] William O. McCagg, "Hungary's 'Feudalized' Bourgeoisie", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Mar., 1972), p. 71.

[694] Good, Economic Lag, *op.cit.,* p. 12 of 41.

[695] Schulze, Origins, *op.cit.,* p. 195. By 1910, the percentage of the Hungarian labour force in the industrial sector up rose to 17.1 per cent. Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 314.

[696] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 296.

[697] Schulze, Origins, *op.cit.,* p. 198.

[698] *Ibid.,* p. 190.

[699] Good, Economic Lag, *op.cit.,* pp. 12 of 41.

example, in 1910 GDP per capita was merely 43 per cent of that of the United Kingdom.[700] Schulze has found that whilst GDP per capita in Cisleithania was 93 per cent of the European average in 1820, it fell to only 63 per cent in 1913.[701] Revenue was insufficient to maximise the growth potential of increased output, as well.

The 'revenue question' was enough to topple parliaments in Vienna, including in 1911, on which the British Ambassador, Sir Fairfax Cartwright, commented:

> *The present system is no longer able to supply the need of the State, for though the revenue has increased automatically by about 3 per cent every year, this increase will never suffice as long as it is so largely outstripped by the more rapid growth of expenditure which has characterised the Austrian financial system in the last decade.*[702]

As for Hungary, impressive industrial growth could not mask the fact that the overall imperial economy had not moved on far enough from its foundations in large agricultural holdings.[703]

On the eve of the First World War, the empire had 13 per cent of Europe's population and about 10 per cent of its GDP – so although the comparative decline was noticeable, it was by no means a small economy in the scheme of things.[704] International trade was also still comparatively weak, but David Good argues that the "low export-to-GNP ratio reflected a large internal market built on specialization and trade between the industrial areas of Austria and the agricultural areas of Hungary".[705] Raw material production was also comparatively weak[706] and there was a high emigration of available workers to the United States in particular.[707] However, the railways had boomed, especially in Hungary: by 1913 there was 43,280 kilometres of track in the empire, the third most in Europe.[708]

Overall, the more the economy grew, and the more economic power was on display, the stronger the organised push for that piece of economic power became. In effect, affluence and prosperity (what little of the populations in certain areas actually saw this) did not hurt the empire's economy overall but did not help it catch up either. This overlapped with the nationality issue on another indicator – the still-strong 'ethnic German' ownership of industry in mixed and non-German provinces, such as Bohemia and Galicia.[709] This is an inherent problem of an

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[700] *Ibid.* In 1913, out of the six European 'great powers', it was only ahead of Russia, and only about 80% that of Italy. Broadberry & Harrison, *op.cit.,* pp. 23 & 25.

[701] Schulze, Origins, *op.cit.,* pp. 205-206. Much lower still if compared directly to Germany.

[702] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, May 10 1911, FO 120/883:76.

[703] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 289. In 1914, 49.1% of landholdings were of 200 or less *jochs*, (1 *joch* = 0.575 Ha) whereas 39.7% were about 1,000 *jochs* – of which an enormous 19.4% were above 10,000 *jochs.*

[704] Schulze & Wolff, Borders, *op.cit.,* p. 2.

[705] Good, Uneven, *op.cit.,* p. 146.

[706] George W. Hoffman, "The Political-Geographic Bases of the Austrian Nationality Problem", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 3, Issue 01 (Jan., 1967), p. 132. For example, in 1907, by value, mining outputs were less than one fifth of those of the German Empire.

[707] *Ibid.,* p. 134. Slovaks were particularly heavily represented, and after 1900 Hungarians would emigrate in increasing numbers. After 1905, the largest number of Transleithanian citizens emigrating to the United States were ethnic Hungarians. Barany, *op.cit.,* p. 267.

[708] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 303. Behind Russia and Germany.

[709] Andrew G. Whiteside, "The Germans as an Integrative Force in Imperial Austria: The Dilemma of Dominance", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 3, Issue 01 (Jan., 1967), p. 162. For example, the Bohemian lands

Imperial Power Structure absorbing nation-state ideological frameworks. Nautz has concluded that, "neither the economic union nor the single currency were able to give the peoples of the Monarchy a shared ideal".[710] This is predominant view in the historiography, but is a narrow one, as the union and currency were manifestations (or reminders) of the shared ideal of the sovereign. Like most of the Habsburg Empire when viewed from a panoptic perspective, it worked. Andrea Komlosy went as far as to argue that: "the integrative management of regional imbalances within its cores was the key to the Empire's economic success".[711]

5.5   Political centralisation, demarcation and layering of power

In 1854, the Russian and Habsburg Empires had relatively similar forms of governance. Both were autocratic empires whose policies were carried to the regions through unelected provincial governors – civilian and military. 'Historic' regions were represented by Diets (the Baltic *Landtage*) elected by a narrow curia, had Diets in limbo (Finland), or had Diets in suspension (all Diets in Austria). There was neither democracy, nor political representation at the imperial level. The respective regimes were forced through various circumstances such as military defeat, and as a result of reforms such as emancipation, to fulfil the greater needs of managing a modernising polity in an imperial system. As this became more perilous, and population rates soared, there was no way that the imperial governments could continue to manage such complexity whilst standing still, and with the need to push further reform, some form of political centralisation and demarcation and layering of power was required.

By the 1860s news forms and layers of governance would be introduced in both empires, formalising the move of responsibility from the state to society, allocating real power at a local level. As this form of 'separation of powers' was done for the benefit of the empire, with these new outlets ideally working on behalf of the empire with regards to imperial issues, and taking on the local governance 'burden', this expansion of political and ideological power, driven by new collective and authoritarian power, would also create competing poles-of-power. Michael Mann has argued that this focus on 'separation of powers' was typical of nineteenth century empires, and an extension of divide and rule policies, which now "had to include classes and nations."[712]

The overarching nation-state ideological framework employed by both regimes was to promote a combination of streamlined centralised and multi-layered, devolved governance, to best manage the polity and to assist in the maximum extraction of resources. Neither democracy, nor broad representation and universal participation, were preconditions for this framework. The different routes taken by both empires, and within the Habsburg Empire itself, display one of the two most fascinating imperial paradoxes (the other being treatment of nationalities, the subject of

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that would go on to become known as the Sudetenland, where more than 90% of the population was German, held "the greatest concentration of industry in the monarchy".

[710] Nautz, *op.cit.*, p. 7.
[711] Komlosy, *op.cit.*, p. 172.
[712] Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.*, p. 343.

the chapters 7 and 8). The Russian Empire would open up the political landscape at local level just as the Habsburgs would, however from this point there was a divergence. The Russian Empire resisted any form of empire-wide representation for as long as possible, until the 1905 Revolution forced their hand. The Austrian and Hungarian governments went the other way, opening up national politics to the various competing peripheral groups within their lands, to admittedly differing degrees.

The Austrians, on the one hand, were sincere about letting the nations 'in' – this was not the Emperor's preference however, but driven by necessity, the crown tried to make it work to their advantage. The Hungarians, on the other hand, paid lip service to national representative politics, putting on a show whilst gerrymandering non-Hungarians out of any position of influence whatsoever. [713] Yet, the closest to a true national parliament (in an operational sense) both empires would see was the Hungarian, in that it settled into a combative, pseudo major-party system chamber reminiscent of many liberal democracies today, albeit one with a dominant party for most of the period in question. The machinations of centralisation whilst opening up their political systems changed the nature of imperial divide in rule, and created multiple poles of sovereignty, political claims making and 'grabs for spoils' – as proven by a journey through the National Archives of the United Kingdom, where it felt that every book and carton of documents was full of reports headlined "ministerial crisis" or "parliamentary crisis".

5.5.1. The Russian Empire

In the wake of emancipation, the Russian Empire needed an institutionalised form of governance at a local level, to fill the void left by the removal of feudal responsibilities from landowning nobles, not to mention the general 'under-government' across the realm. In effect, they needed to offload a degree of responsibility to a society where it had never really existed before on an organised level. Thus the *zemstva* (singular: *zemstvo*) were created. [714] Representatives would be elected from a curia of three: private landowners, peasants and industrial property owners, although with a disproportionate number of representatives from the first group. There were, naturally, limits. The *Zemstvo* Statute of 1864, whilst outlining their independence within their 'sphere of activity', ensured that that independence would be dependent on the graces of the relevant Governor, who could veto *zemstva* decisions "contrary to the law or to the general welfare of the state".[715] Regardless, they were given considerable local autonomy; intended as a vehicle to ensure government policy actually took effect on the ground at the micro-regional level – especially the suite of Alexandrian reforms.[716] In essence, they were the

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[713] Sked, Historians, *op.cit.,* p. 183.

[714] Volvenko, *op.cit.,* p. 348. Volvenko called the creation of *zemstva* one of the "links in this chain" of reform.

[715] The Zemstvo Statute, 1 January 1864, in *Polnoe Sobranie Rossiiskoi Imperii,* 2nd Series, vol. 39, pt. 1, no. 40457, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.,* pp. 64-66.

[716] Saunders, Regional Diversity, *op.cit.,* pp. 156-157.

first organised attempt at centralised governance through decentralised institutions; the first institutionalised governance on any level in the ethnic-Russian heartland of European Russia. Their scope was similar to the Baltic Diets, but their ideological objective was new – it was hoped that the *zemstva* would calm discontented nobles and peasants who had felt hard done by the scope of the reforms.

There had been calls for such bodies for many years, albeit with far broader remits than would eventuate, as this 1862 call by liberal 'Slavophil' Alexander Koshelev outlined that:

> *a Zemskaya Duma is […] the only way out of the critical and unbearable position in which we now find ourselves. The Duma should be summoned by means of a manifesto in which the Tsar […] declares to all that from this time hence there is no authority higher than, or outside of, the law; and all laws will now be given a preliminary examination in a Zemskaya Duma.*[717]

Such sentiment would become common in political discourse. It was not long before such local level representation awakened political sensibilities where hitherto they were suppressed or non-existent. The *zemstva* would become a thorn in the side of the Empire, claims making almost from their inception.

Overall, nineteen *zemstva* commenced operations in 1865 and their number had reached thirty-five by 1875. Notably, they were not extended to the western borderlands until as late as 1911. The *zemstva* principle was extended to the cities, with the *uzed* (decree) founding the City Councils in 1870, with a notably decent franchise.[718] Having real decision-making powers within the Imperial Power Structure, even at the behest of the imperial core, enlightened and emboldened their participants, and it took almost no time at all for the Moscow municipal duma to petition the Tsar for further reform.[719] They would become the focus of counter-reform measures aimed at curbing their 'questioning' spirit, and time and again they would need to be reminded by the Tsar that such proposals had no place in the autocratic order.

Matching the *zemstva* in claims making was what at first may appear as an unlikely source – the older Assemblies of the Nobility. However, these former bastions of the old order had been caught in a pincer movement, with growing liberal attitudes amplified by the change of responsibility and circumstance of the imperial nobility after emancipation. Indeed, these semi-formal bodies would be joining the *zemstva* at the forefront of calls for a national representative

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[717] A Ya. Koshelev, *Konstitutsiya samoderzhavie i zemskaya duma* (Leipzig, 1862) pp 18-21; 22-23; *Kakoy iskhod dlya Rossii iz nyneyshnego ee polozheniya?* (Leipzig 1862) pp. 38-39, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, p. 72. He added that: "the people's representatives will have the right to submit for the Duma's discussion the views of their provincial assemblies and to send petitions from the Duma to the sovereign".

[718] The Municipal Statute 1870 (16 June), in *PSZ*, 2nd series, vol. 45, pt. 1, no. 49498, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, p. 138. Point 17, on voter qualification, states "1) if he is a Russian subject; 2) if he is at least twenty five years of age […] he owns property within the city that is liable to taxation by the city, or has a commercial or industrial establishment under merchant's licence or having lived in the city for two years, is a taxpayer on merchants' licenses."

[719] With a petition signed by 110 members, presented November 1870, which was rebuked. The Moscow Municipal Duma, Address of November 1870, in S.N. Sukhotin, 'Iz pamyatnykh tetradey S. N. Sukhotina', *Russkiy Arkhiv*, vol. 32 (1894) pt. 2 p. 248, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, pp. 150-152.

assembly: one with a noticeably flat imperial structure. The Moscow Province Nobles Assembly of 1865 sought to abolish:

> *The legislative competency of the Diet of Finland and the special rights of the Baltic Provinces, as well as a recommendation that the Kingdom of Poland should be included in a general system of Imperial legislation. The views of the assembly on those points were, that [they] should be restricted in their jurisdiction by the competency of a Provincial Assembly of Russia [...] The Poles, the Finns, and the Baltic Germans would elect Representatives like the Hungarians in Austria.*[720]

Such independent thought in areas historically the province of the sovereign brought about a strong rebuke from Alexander II, although not for the first time, this would only encourage wishful thinking – the nature of the autocrat was that he could always change his mind.[721] A vote in the aforementioned assembly to petition the Emperor to introduce a bicameral legislature was passed with a majority of 233 votes.[722] One of the common grievances of the *zemstva*, city councils and nobles' assemblies was the growing imperial bureaucracy – which we have seen drove reforms such as emancipation.[723] For example, British diplomat Michell noted that Count Davidoff, at the aforementioned Moscow Assembly, stated that: "the common desire of all parties in this assembly is to penetrate that dark, sinister gloom of Bureaucracy that hangs so heavily over Russia, and to enable the truths to reach the Emperor without perversion".[724]

Of course there were natural ideological differences between direct organs of central government, and government mandated organs with hopes for more influence. Another issue was bureaucratic efficiency, as explained by Kaznacheev, a governor in the 1860s and 1870s:

> *The provincial administration costs about 30,000 rubles a year and it is filled with eighty civil servants who deal with up to 1,500 matters a year. I have counted fourteen steps through which each document in the general provincial office has to pass, and have noted the low level of literacy, ability and honour of the instruments of this complex machine. The advisers give no advice, they do not read documents from other departments but sign them unread. Understandably, I have concluded that the provincial administration stifles life, that it has outlived its time and that it only exasperates by its fruitless, antiquated babble.*[725]

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[720] BDFA: Report of Meeting of the Nobility of the Province of Moscow, Mr Michell, enclosure in Buchanan to Russell, St. Petersburg, February 1 1865, BDFA V1, pp. 88-91.

[721] TNA: Buchanan to Russell, St Petersburg, February 15 1865, FO 181/435:63. "Some are however sanguine enough to discover in the Autocratic language of the Emperor a vague indication, that though he admonishes the nobles against interfering illegally with his prerogatives he may of his own accord takes measures for laying the foundations of representative institutions in the Empire."

[722] TNA: Buchanan to Russell, St Petersburg, January 25 1865, FO 181/435:31. The vote was 270 to 34 against.

[723] Saunders, Regional Diversity, *op.cit.*, pp. 156-157. The size of the bureaucracy would grow seven fold between 1796 and 1851 and again between 1851 and 1903, with the first real growth spurt coming under Nicholas I. See Marc Raeff, "The Bureaucratic Phenomena of Imperial Russia, 1700-1905", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Apr., 1979), p. 401 *fn* and 407.

[724] BDFA: Report of Meeting of the Nobility of the Province of Moscow, Mr Michell, enclosure in Buchanan to Russell, St. Petersburg, February 1 1865, BDFA V1, pp. 88-91.

[725] A.G.Kaznacheev, 'Mehzdu strokami odnogo formulyarnogo spiska' *Russkaya Starina*, vol. 32 (1881) pp. 861-2; in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, p. 62.

The *zemstva* would take over the mantle as 'sanctioned' bodies that would challenge the status quo for the next forty years or so – indeed after the Congress of Berlin the Tver *zemstvo* would even pass a resolution highlighting that Alexander II played a part in the establishment of a representative assembly and a liberal constitution for the new state of Bulgaria, in the hope that the Tsar would "see fit to grant his own people a similar benefit".[726] Remarkably, considering their constant agitation, only one *zemstvo* was ever dissolved, the Don Oblast in 1882.[727] Periodically, the *zemstva* would have their powers curtailed, and have to survive attempts to squeeze them from above, but their resolve for reform, as a body originally conceived out of reform, never dimmed.[728]

They had a taste of political, economic and ideological power, and were not satisfied to see it curtailed. More importantly for the Russian Imperial Power Structure, they made themselves indispensible – what they actually achieved on the ground was just too important for the running of the empire (details of which will be addressed throughout this work). Never was this more apparent than during the great famines of the early 1890s. Having had their remits seriously reduced in the 1880s, once again the government turned to the *zemstva* to help alleviate famine-related problems on the ground. They would remain at the vanguard of liberal opposition to the regime until not long before the 1905 revolution – indeed political liberals had hoped the *zemstva* would become the glue that held together the numerous distinct liberal 'opposition' groups.[729] *Zemstvo* representatives would become active members of a new organisation intended to be this 'glue' – the Union of Liberation. They worked with academics, professionals, former legal Marxists, Social Democrats and other socialists, as a component part of a bigger struggle.[730]

Naturally, when the opportunity for more power was on offer after the 1905 Imperial Manifesto, they would increase and intensify their demands even more. For example, a December 1905 congress passed a resolution that stated:

The Congress considers that the best method of pacifying the country would be the publication of a Proclamation for the assembly of a Parliament elected by universal suffrage. This Parliament would be intrusted with the task of framing a Constitution, with measures for local self-government and with land and labour laws.[731]

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[726] Moss, *op.cit.,* p. 432.

[727] Volvenko, *op.cit.,* p. 348.

[728] Zelnik, *op.cit.,* p. 205. He argued that although they were not overly successful, their efforts boosted their "self-confidence, self-assertion and self-importance".

[729] Gregory L. Freeze, "A National Liberation Movement and the Shift in Russian Liberation, 1901-1903", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Mar., 1969), p. 87. Peter Struve, amongst others, appealed to the *zemstva* "to provide hegemony to the struggle".

[730] *Ibid.,* p. 90. The Union of Liberation was dissolved in 1905. The Kadets followed as 'leaders' of Russian liberalism.

[731] BDFA: Memorandum by Lord Cranley respecting proceedings of the Representatives of the Zemstvos [*sic*] and Towns in Congress and Moscow, St. Petersburg, December 1 1905, enclosure in Spring Rice to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, December 1 1905, BDFA V3, pp. 262-263.

It can be argued that the value, and economic power, of the *zemstva* both in the regions and the cities was somewhat offset by the resultant loosening of the tsar's iron grip on ideological power, due to the rise of competing poles of collective, intensive and diffused power.

Reactionary voices began to resonate more with Alexander II in the 1870s, especially Count Shuvalov, the Chief of the Gendarmes from 1866 to 1881. Dimitri Miliutin painted a vivid picture of a man who used his daily briefing with the Tsar to chip away at any chance of further reform: "Everything is done under the exclusive influence of Count Shuvalov, who has terrified the emperor with his daily reports about frightful dangers, to which allegedly the state and the sovereign himself are exposed. All Shuvalov's strength is based upon this bogey."[732] At the same time there was still a healthy movement toward further reform amongst certain elites and government officials, accelerated by the outcome of the Congress of Berlin of 1878, where the Russian capitulation – virtually acquiescing to the reversal of the majority of the Treaty of San Stefano – was seen as meek and weak; to some a sign that reform had not gone far enough. In the year before his assassination, Alexander II appointed a Supreme Administrative Commission headed by Mikhail Loris-Melikov and supported by the formidable figure of Miliutin. The increasingly educated society, with its conservative elements, had been demanding constitutional reforms and a national assembly, putting them in line with the majority of *zemstva* and city councils. The Commission recommended more powers to the *zemstva* and elected delegates to the Tsar's State Council, and elected committees that would discuss fairly substantial policy.[733] In effect, this created a low but very real level of adjunctive collective power at a national level. On 1 March 1881, the day he was to sign the decree for the aforementioned committees, Alexander II was assassinated.

The new Tsar, Alexander III, was content to continue with his father's vision, at first. For example, the Council of Ministers was asked to vote on Loris-Melikov's proposals less than a month into the new reign. They voted to proceed, then, in the words of British Ambassador Lord Dufferin: "after complimenting Ct. Loris-Melikov, the Emperor declared that he adhered to the opinion of the majority, and instructed the Minister of the Interior to prepare a *Ukase* sanctioning the scheme which was to be ascribed to His Majesty's late father".[734] However, it was not long before the forces of reaction would take control. Within a year of coming to the throne the Tsar had rejected the Commission's findings and effectively pensioned off both Loris-Melikov and Miliutin (they had both resigned after their positions became untenable).[735] To no avail, Loris-Melikov had gone to great pains to differentiate his plans with anything that existed in Western Europe, in a demonstrably different tone to his preceding reformers.[736]

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[732] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 387.

[733] The Committees would discuss such topics such as imperial finance, provincial administration and the peasant economy. Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.*, pp. 304-305.

[734] TNA: Dufferin to Granville, St. Petersburg, March 28 1881, FO 181/641:123. Vote was 9 to 5 for.

[735] Mosse, *op.cit.*, p. 78-82. Pobedonostev turned Alexander III against Loris-Melikov.

[736] Loris-Melikov's Plan for a Constituent Assembly, 'Konstitutsiya grafa Loris-Melikova', *Byloe* (1918) nos 4-5, pp. 163-5, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, p. 74. He would write: "It is unthinkable that Russia should have any

Alexander III didn't entirely abandon nation-state ideological frameworks – he was more than aware that they had come too far, and the reforms were too important as a whole. Some reforms would be preferred over others, and reaction by legislation (or obfuscation) was preferred to outright abolition. He relied on a far smaller and far more reactionary coterie than his father. His closest confidant and adviser was Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod, Konstantin Pobedonostev, a fanatical reactionary who believed in a dualist society consisting of a small plutocratic aristocracy and the "vulgar" majority who were incapable of thinking intelligently enough to be of any influence or consequence.[737]

As tradition dictated, the new Tsar released a Manifesto in 1882, much influenced by Pobedonostev, which steadfastly outlined his belief in the sanctity of absolutism. Pobedonostev (called an "arch-bigot" by British military attaché Lt. Colonel Waters)[738] also despised any form of parliamentary representation, stating that in non-homogeneous states, such bodies become forums for "racial hatred, both to the dominant race, and to the sister races, and to the political institution that unites them all".[739] The Habsburg Empire was very much in his mind. He also encouraged further winding back the powers of the *zemstva* and the city councils, followed through by the like-minded Minister of the Interior, Dmitry Tolstoy, who took the very regressive step of introducing 'land captains' – a landowner who essentially had executive powers over the *zemstva* – and adding a fourth, separate *zemstvo* curia specifically for the gentry.[740] His successor, Ivan Durono, followed this by overseeing the restriction of the franchise for the city councils, in 1892.[741] These particular moves succeeded in further mobilising opposition from these two bodies of regional governance.

At the national level there was still considerable jurisdictional overlap. As much as administrative centralisation was attempted, the Ministries still had an inordinate amount of autonomy and could easily pass as governments of their own. This was perfectly adequate as long as the Ministries were working toward the will of the regime, in which case the administration would essentially leave them to their business. There was also much ministerial overlap, which led to clashes detrimental to the stability in the empire itself. Reactions to the waves of strikes that swept through Russia at the turn of the century were a case-in-point. Disagreement between the Ministries of the Interior and Finance, who both had nominal jurisdiction over labour relations,

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form of popular representation borrowed from the West; these forms are not only alien to the Russian people, but they could even […] introduce total discord."

[737] Moss, *op.cit.,* p. 437. He quoted Pobedonostev as calling the masses the "herd".

[738] BDFA: Lt Colonel Waters to Goschen, St Petersburg, October 13, 1896, BDFA V2, pp. 305-311.

[739] Moss, *op.cit.,* p. 474.

[740] Rogger, Reflections, *op.cit.,* p. 200, who wrote that "these were pragmatic measures, taken as part of the government's anxious search for men to do its work". Hosking, Patronage, *op.cit.,* p. 313, expands on land captains (or land commandants), who were: "authorized to amend or veto the decisions of village and *volost'* assemblies, to appoint their personnel and countermand the verdicts of their courts".

[741] Michael H. Haltzel, "The Baltic Germans", in E. C. Thaden (ed.), *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland 1855-1914* (Princeton NJ, 1981), p. 158.

led to such confusion that the army, assets of the Ministry of War, had to be employed in increasing numbers to quell strikes.[742]

Where the Ministries stood with regard the Governors General and Governors of *Guberniya* – with regards to decision-making autonomy – was also confusing, causing an organisational nightmare in the borderlands. Many of the Russification policies from Finland to the Black Sea originated in Ministries, or with local Russian officials, or sometimes both in concert, without any real imperial authority.[743] These varied and confusing levels of authority did not go unnoticed. Governor Urusov of Bessarabia province notably remarked in 1903 to the King of Romania that there were "as many governments as there were ministries" in the Russian Empire.[744] Such complexity was counterintuitive when the policies in question were so sensitive they could determine the health of the Imperial Power Structure. The actual role, and position within the structure, of Governors General, made it even more complicated. They did not really fit in a system of stronger centralised governance with the *Guberniyas* and devolved power at regional and local levels. Some districts would be abolished from the reign of Alexander II, whereas others continued to operate as before – mostly dependent on whether they were in the borderlands or the Russian 'core lands'.[745]

Details of the 1905 Revolution will be scattered throughout this work. By means of a very short introduction, the destabilisation at multiple levels of society that had been brewing had boiled over and piece-by-piece Nicholas II was forced against his better judgement to grant concession after concession until some semblance of order was restored. The revolution itself was more of a collection of disturbances involving a considerable increase in civil disobedience, strikes, peasant disturbances, nationalist agitation and even military mutinies. It was effectively ended with the October Manifesto of 1905, which split the revolutionary opposition into two groups: liberals who supported its points, and the radicals (especially socialists) and peasants, who would continue the fight well into the next year.[746] When one considers just how radical the three clauses of the Manifesto were in respect to the Russian Imperial Power Structure, this break is unsurprising: the first, promising civil freedoms and fundamental human rights; the second, transforming the Duma into an elected body of representatives; and the third, promising the new Duma real powers, including consent over all laws, and freedoms of speech, religion and assembly.[747] As British Ambassador Sir Charles Hardinge wrote, "the fact cannot be concealed

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[742] von Laue, Tsarist, *op.cit.,* pp. 141-143.

[743] See Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.* & Weeks, Lithuanians, *op.cit.,* pp. 96-114.

[744] Quoted in Saunders, Regional Diversity, *op.cit.,* p. 159.

[745] Kaspe, *op.cit.,* p. 478. Eight governor-general districts were abolished during his reign. As Kaspe argued, "a complete abolition of the institution did not occur, because the very size of the empire, combined with underdeveloped communications as well as tensions in internal politics, did not permit a complete renunciation of strong regional authority".

[746] Zelnik, *op.cit.,* pp. 217-218.

[747] BDFA: Imperial Manifesto, St. Petersburg, October 18 1905, enclosure in Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, October 31 1905, BDFA V3, p. 231. The third point was: "To establish, as an unalterable rule, that no law can have force without the approval of the Imperial Duma, and that the possibility of actual participation in the

that the autocracy has sustained a blow".[748] The Manifesto was another, more desperate attempt to use distributive and authoritative power to foster collective and diffused power. In truth, it was intended to head off the formation of further collective, intensive and diffused power amongst the plethora of groups who had revolted in 1905, and those with the potential to follow in their example. The concept of a national Duma, the ultimate manifestation of that change, was another, more specific nation-state ideological framework, the institution of a representative 'national' parliament, in order to give a voice to (selected) stakeholders in the trajectory of the 'national' project.

The government was well aware of the potential problem of representation of the nationalities, even before the October Manifesto.[749] Loris-Melikov had warned a generation before that it was important that any move to representation wasn't reactive, as it would "appear as having been forced upon the government by circumstances, and would be so interpreted in Russia and abroad".[750] During the preparations for legislation on the workings of the Duma and the State Council, S.E. Kryzhanovskii wrote that due to the large number of non-ethnic Russians in the realm: "a percentage not seen in a single Western European power other than Austria [...] A strong majority inconvenient for the government may form in the Duma on questions touching on the interests of non-Russians".[751] Once again, the government looked over its shoulder; taking cues from the Habsburg Empire.

In December 1905, new laws came into being, in response to continued strikes that it was feared would derail progress. They were careful to differentiate the strikers, for whom punitive punishments were outlined, from non-strikers and their families: "who, not taking part in the strikes, suffer from violence which they are subject to because they had not taken part".[752] This multifaceted approach can be as seen in the Fundamental Laws that followed in February 1906, which declared that the Tsar had supreme autocratic power.[753] These laws mostly limited the Duma to a reactive body to proposals from the Tsar, the State Council and Ministries – ironically Nicholas II gave himself a more extreme set of Franz Josef's reserve powers according to the Austrian and Hungarian constitutions. The Fundamental Laws went against the very strong advice of Witte, who had written in the previous year that, "the Government must not be an element of opposition to the decisions of the Duma," adding that he would strive "for the

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supervision of the legality of the acts of the authorities appointed by us should be guaranteed to the representatives of the people."

[748] TNA: Hardinge to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, August 20 1905, FO 181/857/5:504.

[749] TNA: *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, 7/20 August 1905. The planning was considerable, and for Russia, the turn around was fairly fast. The Emperor would say in August: "Currently the time is ripe, to follow their good intentions, to call elected representatives from across Russia to take a constant and active part in the development of laws." Author's translation.

[750] Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.*, p. 304.

[751] quoted in Rustem Tsiunchuk, "Peoples, Regions, and Electoral Politics: The State Dumas and the Constitution of New National Elites" in J. Burbank, M. von Hagen and A. Remnev (eds.), *Russian Empire. Space, People, Power, 1700-1930* (Bloomington IN, 2007), p. 369.

[752] TNA: *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg, Ukase* of 2 December 1905. Author's translation.

[753] Article 10 of the Fundamental Laws proclaimed that: "the authority of administration in all its scope belongs to the Sovereign Emperor within the boundaries of the entire Russian state." Tsiunchuk, *op.cit.*, p. 368.

abolition of exceptional legislation".[754] Spring Rice was incredulous, noting that "in spite of all warnings the Government […] published the 'fundamental laws,' which were evidently designed to restrict the competence of the Duma, and were accordingly regarded as one of the familiar devices of the Administration to take back with one hand what was given with the other".[755]

Even so, the Duma was an attempt to quell dissent, and make the empire 'work' better. It was bound to struggle for the start. For one, the expected influx of members in the same ideological and political orbit as the regime never materialised.[756] Having a hostile audience did the Emperor no favours: his opening speech in 1906 was poorly received. As Spring Rice surmised, "perhaps the reason for this was the absence of any mention of amnesty; and almost all the members had friends or associates who are in prison, by 'administrative process' and on mere suspicion".[757] However, the new members resolved not to revolt and nullify their opportunity for a platform. The Duma as a body calmly delivered a reply to the Emperor, which was "an outline of the wishes of the people, which had, at last, after centuries of repression, found free utterance".[758]

Representatives of some non-Russian nationalities took advantage of this new opportunity, essentially to stake positions and air grievances, At the head were the Poles, who after two generations of political Russification suddenly found themselves in the inner workings of the empire, although unlike their kin in Galicia, they did not have any commensurate power in their provinces.[759] Before long, different political parties from the nationalities worked together to form voting blocs and alliances, formalising and institutionalising the peripheries in a way that had already been seen in Austria and to a lesser extent Hungary. Party formation and formalisation was a natural outcome of the opportunity, including for Russian parties. Indeed, many non-Russians aligned themselves with larger party groups – including Poles, Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians and Ukrainians.[760]

Alas, the First Duma – far too progressive for the regime – lasted less than three months. State Comptroller Schwanebach would remark that, "the Duma consisted of ideologues, ignorant peasants, and extreme Radicals, with a few intelligent and moderate men who were swamped in

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[754] BDFA: The most humble Report of the Secretary of State, Count Witte, St. Petersburg, October 18 1905, enclosure in Spring Rice to Lansdowne, St Petersburg, October 31 1905, BDFA V3, pp. 232-233.

[755] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St. Petersburg, May 23 1906, FO 371/125/323.

[756] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St. Petersburg, April 11 1906, FO 181/869:257, who reported that: "of 170 members whose election is declared only 25 are avowed supporters of the Government." This would worsen, when finalised Spring Rice claimed that: "the Government at the opening of the Session found itself with barely six supporters in a House of nearly 500." TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, May 23 1906, FO 371/125/323.

[757] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, May 23 1906, FO 371/125:323.

[758] *Ibid.*

[759] The election law of 11 November 1905 allowed for 36 Duma representatives from the 10 Polish provinces. Theodore R. Weeks, "Defending Our Own: Government and the Russian Minority in the Kingdom of Poland, 1905-1914", *Russian Review*, Vol. 54, No 4 (Oct., 1995), p. 546. Provisions for additional representatives from certain provinces were made one month later.

[760] BDFA: Biographical Notices of Principal Members of the various Parties of the Duma. Mr B. Pares, enclosure in Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, June 12, 1906, BDFA V4, pp. 90-94.

the whirlpool of the turbulent element".[761] An extreme reactionary, he barely concealed his disdain for the concept of representative parliament. Ambassador Nicolson reported that he spoke with derision of any practical measure issuing from such an assembly, and thought it was prudent to humour the members – he appeared to consider that it would be well to allow them to "expend their eloquence in lengthy debate".[762]

The Second Duma fared little better, being dissolved after just five months (2 June 1907), after which the rules were changed to ensure a more regime friendly body, a move that would turn out to have an enormous effect on the future health and trajectory of the Empire. This significance of this move should not be underestimated: Stolypin carried through his threat to dissolve until the right body was formed, and as he told Nicolson at the time: "If […] the Duma exhibited the same temper and characteristics as the last, a dissolution would invariably ensue, and subsequently a third or fourth dissolution, if necessary, or 'other measures'".[763] A sentiment towards a democratic, federalist model for the empire with a higher degree of cultural autonomy for all nationalities,[764] not unlike various models floated unsuccessfully (in party manifestos) by periphery nationalities in the Habsburg Empire, worried the regime. The Tsar – who kept a keen eye on the dysfunction of the Austrian *Reichsrat* – blamed the 'failure' of the Second Duma on, in the words of Juliette Cadiot, "the excessive number of non-Russians, whose level of 'civic mindedness' (*grazhdanvennost*) was too weak".[765] For all its faults, the ratio of deputies to regions in the First and Second Dumas by population was fair for its era.[766]

On the dissolution of the Second Duma, the regime affirmed its commitment to the body, albeit in a far more Russian form, stating that although: "Other nationalities […] must have representatives of their needs in the State Duma […][they] must not and will not be represented in it in numbers which enable them to decide on purely Russian questions."[767] The dynasty didn't abandon the Duma; instead they changed the representative structure for the Third Duma, as outlined in the Manifesto of June 3, 1907,[768] to include more Russians and more Orthodox

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[761] TNA: Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, June 8 1906, FO 371/125:353.

[762] *Ibid.*

[763] BDFA: Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, November 30 1906, BDFA V4, pp. 265-266.

[764] Mark von Hagen, "Federalisms and Pan-movements: Re-imagining Empire", in J. Burbank, M. von Hagen and A. Remnev (eds.), *Russian Empire. Space, People, Power, 1700-1930* (Bloomington IN, 2007), p. 495. He outlines the different models of federalism favoured by non-Russian deputies, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Kadets.

[765] Cadiot, Searching for Nationality, *op.cit.,* p. 447.

[766] Tsiunchuk, *op.cit.,* p. 371: There were 414 positions for European Russia (79% of positions for 75% of the imperial population); 37 for Poland (7.1% for 7.5%); 29 for the Caucasus (5.5% for 6.7%); 21 for Siberia and the Far East (4% for 4.6%); and 23 for Kazakhstan and Central Asia (4.4% for 6.2%).

[767] Statute 29240 extract, quoted in Saunders, Regional Diversity, *op.cit.,* p. 160.

[768] Which clearly stated that the nationalities had no place deciding on issues of importance to 'Russia' It also stated: "Created for the strengthening of the Russian state, the State Duma must be Russian also in spirit. Other nationalities (*narodnosti)* under our authority must have representatives of their needs in the State Duma, but must not be present in numbers giving them the possibility of being decision-makers in purely Russian questions." Quoted in Tsiunchuk, *op.cit.,* p. 381.

nobles and fewer workers, peasants and minorities.[769] To ensure this, half of its seats would be reserved for a mere one per cent of landowners.[770] The strong willed and wily Stolypin reminded everyone that the Tsar's "historic Autocratic Power" was destined to "save Russia and guide her on the path of order and historical truth," and that these competing voices would not get in its way.[771] In effect, the regime had swapped the principle of the Austrian model for the practical application of the Hungarian. Nicolson reported meeting Stolypin, who outlined that real change would take time: "His own ideal was the British Constitution, but it was impossible to cast Russia at once into that mould. In some years she might possibly reach that goal, but sudden and impetuous changes would work ruin."[772]

The primarily Russian parties in the Duma took a different approach to the nationalities. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party (which participated in the Second Duma only) co-operated well with them, as they favoured a form of imperial federalism, a position similar to that of the RSDRP.[773] The Kadets were sympathetic (their platform included a non ethno-territorial model with regional power sharing) but subdued in their support.[774] The Oktobrists (The Union of October 17), who were centre-right and saw the minorities as a threat to their newly found influence in Russia (although they did contain a considerable Baltic German membership, enough for there to be a specific 'German' branch of the party)[775], were "inclined to think of other Slav peoples as brothers, even as equals, and sympathized also with those Slav peoples who were not Orthodox".[776] They expanded upon this in the Second Duma.[777] The Agrarian Socialists

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[769] Burbank and Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 357.

[770] Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.*, p. 664.

[771] Geoffrey A. Hosking, "P. A. Stolypin and the Octobrist Party", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 47, No. 108 (Jan., 1969), p. 141.

[772] BDFA: Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, July 2 1906, BDFA V4, pp. 114-116.

[773] Programme of the All-Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDRP), 1 August 1903. In *Resolutions and Decision of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, general ed. R.H. McNeal, vol. 1: *The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, 1898-October 1917*, R.C. Elwood (ed.), (Toronto, 1974), pp, 42-45, in Martin McCauley (ed.), *Octobrists to Bolsheviks. Imperial Russia 1905-1917* (London, 1984) pp. 25-28. RSDRP party Programme 1903 included "7. Elimination of class privileges and the complete equality of all regardless of sex, religion, race or nationality. 8. The right of any person to obtain an education in their native language […] ; the use of the native language together with the state language in all local, public and state institutions 9. National self-determination for all nations forming part of the state."

[774] Party Programmes: The Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets), 1905, in V.V. Vodovozov (ed.), *Sbornik programm politicheskikh partiy v Rossii*, edition 1. (St. Petersburg, 1905) pp, 40-49, in McCauley, *op.cit.*, pp. 33-35. The Kadets party programme 1905 included "All Russian citizens, irrespective of sex, religion or nationality, are equal before the law […] All peoples of the Russian Empire shall be guaranteed, through complete civil and political equality, the right to cultural self-determination."

[775] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St. Petersburg, February 3 1906, FO 371/123:93.

[776] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 688. On the German membership of the party, see Anders Henriksson, "Nationalism, Assimilation and Identity in Late Imperial Russia: The St. Petersburg Germans 1906-1914", *Russian Review*, Vol. 52, No 3 (Jul., 1993), p. 350. He wrote that: "nine of the twenty-four men on the initial Octobrist Group executive board were among the forty-one founders of the Union. Felix Schottländer, first chairman of the Octobrist Group, was married to a Union vice-president." The *St. Petersburger Zeitung* served as an unofficial mouthpiece for both bodies". Also see Party Programmes: The Union of 17 October, November 1905, D.N. Shipov, *Vospominaniya i dumy o perez hitom.* (Moscow, 1918), pp. 404-406, in McCauley, *op.cit.*, pp. 35-3, who wrote that they strove for "the preservation of the unity and indivisibility of the Russian state, whilst allowing individual nationalities significant rights in the cultural field".

(naturally) strove for federalism.[778] Even the platform of the anti-Semitic Union of the Russian People highlighted equal civil rights for "other nationalities, with the exception of the Jews".[779] It was left to the Nationalists to carry the flag for the Russian nation and policies of Russification.[780] This government had opened a can of worms.

By the time of the Third Duma, government hopes for unqualified peasant support had been dashed, proving once and for all that the almost spiritual bond between the tsar and the peasantry was gone. Imperial *diffused* power had been weakened, which in turn damaged the hold of the regime's ideological power on the peasantry, which manifested in political power on the floor of the Duma. Being 'more Russian' (for instance the Fourth Duma was 83.4 per cent Russian, as opposed to 58.5 per cent for the First) no longer guaranteed a body falling into line with the will of the Tsar.[781] In addition the pulpit remained, and regardless of how little their votes in the chamber counted, minority parties who had finally received a taste of political power were not at all interested in letting it dissipate.

Imperial politics was becoming more 'national' in its outlook: not only did the Duma empower national political groups from across the Empire, but also national considerations were creeping more and more into Russian policy. One of the most virulent parliamentary debates in the history of all four Dumas began in 1910, when Stolypin attempted to introduce *zemstva* to selected western borderlands. The proposed *zemstva* would benefit the Russians, naturally at the expense of Polish elites.[782] It was passed by the Duma, but rejected by the State Council the following March, which resulted in the proroguing of the Duma and the reluctant passage through Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws, an emergency tool as Article 14 was in Austria.[783] Not before Stolypin threatened to resign, which the Tsar refused.[784] As reported by Ambassador

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[777] BDFA: Report of Mr Norman, enclosure in Nicolson to Grey, St. Petersburg, August 16, 1906, BDFA V4, pp. 180-188. The new Oktobrist programme stated: "The non-Russian peoples of the Empire are to be endowed with wide local self-government and educational freedom, and their languages to be admitted in the lower Courts of Law; but Russian is to remain the language of the Administration and to be compulsorily taught in the lower schools."

[778] Party Programmes: The Social Revolutionary Party (PSR), November 1905. In V.V. Vodovozov (ed.), *Sbornik program politicheskikh partiy v Rossii*, edition 1. (St. Petersburg, 1905), pp, 20-21, in McCauley, *op.cit.*, pp. 32-33. The PSR (agrarian socialist) party programme of 1905 included "The establishment of […] the widest possible application of the federal principle to relations between the separate nationalities; the recognition of their undoubted right to self-determination; […] equality of languages."

[779] Party Programmes: The Union of the Russian People. In V.V. Vodovozov (ed.), *Sbornik program politicheskikh partiy v Rossii*, edition 6. (St. Petersburg, 1906), pp, 17-30, in McCauley, *op.cit.*, pp. 32-33.

[780] Party Programmes: The Nationalist Party, from R. Edelman, *Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution*, (New Brunswick, 1980), p. 94, in McCauley, *op.cit.*, p. 36. Its 1905 programme included: "1. The unity of the empire, the protection of Russians in all parts of the Empire and Russia for the Russians; 7. Development of local government in Russia to protect Russians in areas in which they are a minority; 10. Development of Russian national self-consciousness in the schools."

[781] Tsiunchuk, *op.cit.*, p. 387.

[782] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 632.

[783] *Ibid.*, p. 632-633. It badly damaged Stolypin's relationship with the Emperor. Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 357, noted that most important legislation was enacted this way.

[784] McDonald, *op.cit.*, p. 297.

Buchanan, Stolypin's proposals "were marked by so narrow and uncompromising a spirit of nationalism that many Moderate deputies found themselves unable to support them".[785]

In 1913 Nicholas II even considered removing legislative powers from the Duma entirely, but he was talked out of this course of action.[786] As 1914 approached, the regime was losing support from the rightist parties as well, such as the Oktobrists. Members of the latter party had even moved against the imperial bedrock of the *soslovie*.[787] Alliances were forming against government policy that would have been unheard of in the first two Dumas – Oktobrists, Kadets, Social Democrats, Labourites and Centrists for example formed a coordinated, tactical opposition at times during 1914, concerning the very nature of the Duma itself.[788] Alexander Kerensky remarked that, "even the most conservative and moderate representatives of the middle class, with Guchkov [head of the Oktobrists] at their head, began an open fight for the extension of the rights of the representative assembly and openly passed into opposition to the Government".[789] This resulted in a 'disconnect' between the Duma and the Imperial Court, which was becoming more and more reactionary. An Austrian diplomat in St. Petersburg, Count Otto von Czernin, remarked that, "A fire is burning under a relatively calm surface […] an unskilled hand may fan the flames and start a conflagration if the nationalist hotheads, together with the extreme Right, bring about a Union of oppressed nationalities and the socialist proletariat."[790]

Overall, the Duma changed the Russian Imperial Power Structure forever, as did the introduction of the *zemstva* and city councils. The Duma, in addition to the pulpit itself, provided official arena for seeking more of a share of the available political power. The mobilising power of the election campaign should not be underestimated, a means of state-sanctioned group formation through ideological expression. National groups after 1905 had a means of putting intensive, diffused and collective power to use, and by doing so could feed the growth of those same streams of power. The Empire tried to curtail many of these outlets in 1907, as we saw above.

5.5.2. The Habsburg Empire

By 1858, Austrian Minister of the Interior Bach, Roy Austensen argued, had realised that with regards to political power, neo-Absolutism was at a dead end: "Bach, the supposed creator of the system, complained that Austria's internal affairs had become paralyzed. Not only were many basic legislative acts lying around unsigned, but the empire was millions in debt and virtually bankrupt," adding that, "after a conversation with Bach, one Austrian diplomat

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[785] BDFA: Russia. Annual Report 1910. Enclosure in Buchanan to Grey, St Petersburg, March 22, 1911, BDFA V6, pp. 98-145.

[786] Moss, *op.cit.,* p. 495.

[787] Freeze, Soslovie, *op.cit.,* p. 31. He wrote that an Oktobrist deputy in 1907 had noted that "'the *sosloviia* have outlived their time', at least politically, for 'the recognition of equality exists among the entire people'".

[788] Hans Rogger, "Russia in 1914", *Journal of Contemporary History,* Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), p. 97.

[789] Alexander Kerensky, "Why the Russian Monarchy Fell", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 8, No. 24 (Mar., 1930), p. 501.

[790] Quoted in Rogger, Russia in 1914, *op.cit.,* p. 96.

commented simply, 'It seems hopeless'".[791] Two events in 1859 – defeat to France in Italy and the predictable near-bankruptcy of the Habsburg treasury that followed – further exposed severe failings in the neo-Absolutist philosophy, namely that such a diverse and growing population, over such a relatively large landmass, could withstand a significant governance deficit.

Franz Josef needed the help of elites of all groups to overcome these travails, which at the very minimum meant listening to their requests, for the first time since before the Revolution.[792] This in turn meant formalising structured political power. Anselm Rothschild, the Emperor's banker, is rumoured to have told Franz Josef: "No constitution, no money."[793] Solomon Wank has argued that, "their rule had become overextended, and holding on to their possessions now compelled them to decentralize their power [...] decentralization led to the formation of constituencies among the nationalities that vied with the imperial centre in Vienna for power".[794] However, it would be Hungary that finally forced Franz Josef's hand. Austria's swift defeat in the Italian War of 1859 meant that plans for an uprising in Hungary supported by Hungarian émigré fighters and French troops, promised to Kossuth by Napoleon III in person during the War, were thwarted.[795] However, symbolic demonstrations got out of hand, such as one commemorating author and Hungarian language revivalist Ferenc Kazinczy that October, and there was a notable increase in peasant violence over land claims.[796]

Two tentative remedial steps were taken – the expansion and 're-powering' of the *Reichsrat* in March 1860 and the October Diploma of 1860. With regards to the former, the *Reichsrat* had since 1851 been essentially an advisory body, with six Austrians and two Hungarians. Within the expansion, additional members with lifetime tenure were added, and a second group of 38 non-tenured advisors would join them, including six Hungarians, two Croats and two Serbs.[797] It was still an advisory body that left all decision-making in Franz Josef's hands, disappointing liberal hopes for true change.[798] As limited as it was, it did provide a notable platform for raising questions of language use in the realm.[799] Not long after this restructure, the April suicide of the Hungarian patriot, Count István Széchenyi, created another martyr to the Hungarian cause, and things on the ground in Hungary became even more fraught. The traditional St. Stephen's Day march to Pest from Buda, on August 20, a procession which Governor Benedek had originally tried to prohibit, saw a crowd of 88,577 follow the Prince-

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[791] Austensen, *op.cit.,* p. 201.

[792] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* p. 247.

[793] Quoted in Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 348.

[794] Wank, Nationalities, *op.cit.,* p. 10.

[795] Kontler, *op.cit.,* pp. 272-273.

[796] *Ibid.*, p. 273 & Alice Freifeld, *Nationalism and the Crowd in Liberal Hungary, 1848-1914* (Washington DC, 2000), pp. 184-185.

[797] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 326.

[798] *Ibid.*

[799] TNA: *Donau Zeitung,* reporting on *Reichsrat* sitting of September 21, 1860, in Loftus to Russell, Vienna, September 26 1860, FO 120/382:445. It reported from the floor that in response to a question from Reichsrat member Krainski about language use, "with special reference to Galicia", counts including Rechberg and Lichtenfels "agreed that each nationality ought to have its own language used in official matters, but proposed that German should be the language of general commerce".

Primate – leading his first procession since the revolution – across the Danube. This was followed by a provocative folk festival, and a overtly nationalist, although mostly peaceful demonstration in the evening.[800] Alice Freifeld argued that the ideological gap between disparate Hungarians was being closed, writing that "the chastened crowd and chastened were singing from the same songbook. Civil society was empowering itself".[801]

The October Diploma would allow for Diets to reconvene, with reasonable local powers (with judicious supervision). These bodies would also representatives to a broader *Reichsrat,* where the word of the Kaiser would remain final, and provisions were made for a narrower *Reichsrat* for Austria.[802] The ink on the October Diploma was barely dry before a major tax revolt put the imperial treasury further in the red (by June 1861, 89 per cent of Hungarian taxes to the imperial treasury were in arrears).[803] The revolt was encouraged at a regional level, with many counties – freed from some of the shackles of neo-Absolutism – declaring 'illegal' any taxation revenue to the Crown that had not been first approved by Budapest.[804] This deteriorating financial situation forced the Emperor to take a much bolder step – the February Patent of 1861. This divided the *Reichsrat* into a House of Lords, who were appointed by the crown, and a House of Representatives, consisting of some 300 members elected by the regional Diets.[805] Especially interesting is Section 11, which clearly delineates the responsibilities at nationality and regional level.[806] Of course, the curiæ for these Diets remained restrictive, and when this was combined with some gerrymandering on behalf of the Austrian Germans for the *Reichsrat* proper, these would not be true representative bodies.[807] Ambassador Bloomfield, referring to an article in *Die Presse*, argued that: "what it says if translated into plain language is to the effect that as centralisation had been tried too late in the day, one must be more liberal now and must form Austria into a federal State, perhaps a 'centralisation' feeling may then arise at some future time".[808] In a portentous omen, the *Reichsrat* was boycotted by the Hungarians, Croats and Italians and opposed as too liberal by Czech and Polish conservatives in Bohemia and Galicia, as

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[800] For details see Alice Freifeld, "Conflict and De-escalation – The Hungarian People and Imperial Politics from 1848-1849 to the *Ausgleich* of 1867", in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.) *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), pp. 419-422, & Freifeld, Nationalism and the Crowd, *op.cit.,* pp. 184-185. The prince primate was the Archbishop of Esztergom, the head of the Catholic Church in Hungary.
[801] Freifeld, Nationalism and the Crowd, *op.cit.,* p. 185.
[802] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 327 & Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 109.
[803] Freifeld, Conflict, *op.cit.* p. 422. This was more than double the amount in arrears from what was originally a terrible 1860 tax take.
[804] Somogyi, *op.cit.,* p. 244.
[805] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 329.
[806] February Patent, 1861, Section 11 mandated *Reichsrat* responsibility for military service; formulating the budget, including setting the levels of taxes and duties; financial affairs legislation and monetary regulation, public health, general rights of subjects, education, justice and policing, as well as "legislation concerning the manner of handling matters which, through the agreement with Hungary, are recognized as common to the two parts of the empire". *The Constitutions of the States at War*, Herbert F. Wright, ed. (Washington, 1929) https://archive.org/stream/constitutionsst00wriggoog#page/n40/mode/2up, last accessed 2 February 2015.
[807] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 329.
[808] TNA: Bloomfield to Russell, Vienna, September 24 1861, FO 120/395:519.

well as by Serbs and Slovenes.[809] Bloomfield outlined that "the jealousies of former times are reviving between the Hungarians and their neighbours, and if this feeling increases, it may become a source of strength for the Government and perhaps lend to diminish the power and influence of the Magyar party".[810]

Another reform was the belated introduction of elected municipal governments in Austria after nine years in limbo. Local government elections, as per the Stadion Constitution (*Oktroyierte Stadionverfassung*) had occurred and councils had been formed before the Sylvester Patent of 1851 had dissolved them. Their importance to the trajectory of the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure would become immense, although this only pertained to Cisleithania. Municipal governments fulfilled their assigned role with as much enthusiasm as the *zemstva* did in Russia. They too would provide primary education, utilities, local infrastructure, policing and other tasks associated with local and regional governments of today[811]– in conjunction with, and sometimes independently of Diets. This created a three-tiered system of governance with two tiers elected by curia. The municipalities would also work directly with the ministries in Vienna or with provincial governors, who had nominal responsibility and legislative oversight for many of the aforementioned services.[812] With the huge increase in urban populations in the latter half of the nineteenth century, their responsibilities increased, such as running the imperial censuses and administering elections for all levels of government.[813] In that regard, they would become in some ways a surrogate imperial bureaucracy.

Local government became a legal, legitimate battleground on which national 'wars' were fought. The ceding of some political power by the regime was meant to make the empire work smoother. Their power, though real, was qualified, "triply checked by higher self-governing bodies, by the state administration, and by individuals defending their rights through appeals to the courts", [814] through what Jeremy King called "delegated jurisdiction".[815] Franz Josef would try anything to restore the peace, to improve the chances of his realm remaining a 'great power'.[816] This desire would lead through to what would prove to be merely the interim stages to *Ausgleich* (or compromise), a most radical example of power redistribution within an Imperial Power Structure.

In terms of nation-state ideological frameworks, the *Ausgleich* can be seen as an effort to create a 'national' political solution to create a unified force in international politics and diplomacy. Initial motivations included positioning the Empire to reassert their historical hegemony over the German states, to head off Prussian hegemony in the process. Although

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[809] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 330.
[810] TNA: Bloomfield to Russell, Vienna, March 7 1861, FO 120/392:86.
[811] Jeremy King has called their remit "unusually broad" for Europe of that time. King, *op.cit.,* p. 100.
[812] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.*, p. 256.
[813] King, *op.cit.,* p. 100.
[814] King, *op.cit.,* p. 92.
[815] *Ibid.,* p. 96.
[816] In the words of Alan Palmer, "he wanted internal peace among the nationalities of the Empire in order to raise the Monarchy once more to the status of a European Great Power". Palmer, *op.cit.,* p. 153.

coming into effect after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, negotiations had begun beforehand. Demonstrations in Hungary had relented as Magyar elites changed strategies, to agitating for negotiation.[817] The circuit breaker was the attendance of the Emperor – still not crowned King of Hungary per the dictates of the Pragmatic Sanction – at the 1865 Pest Agricultural Fair,[818] closely followed by the re-opening the Hungarian Diet in 1865. Franz Josef then began secret negotiations with Ferenc Deák and Julius Andrássy concerning the viability of the revolutionary 1848 Hungarian constitution.[819]

The Hungarian negotiating position was rooted to the Pragmatic Sanction, that mandated a common defence rather than a common army, and this would remain a sore spot between the two sides for the remainder of the life of the empire.[820] The Emperor would never accept a division of the military and the resulting loss of military power, so Hungarian negotiators worked for compromise – a joint imperial army with numerous concessions.[821] It was agreed that the Hungarian parliament would be responsible for the army inside its territory, as well as supply and recruitment, but it would be commanded exclusively by the Emperor as one united fighting force.[822] As for the rest of *Ausgleich*, Joint Imperial Ministries for Foreign Affairs, War and Finance were established – the only true empire-wide departments. As with the Austro-Hungarian Bank, the official workings of the Imperial Ministries were studiously set-up to be the equal responsibility of the two halves of the Empire. Ministers were nominally answerable to the Delegations that met once a year. These meetings, which alternated between Vienna and Budapest, were made up of twenty upper house and forty lower house members from both the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments (120 in total).[823] Notably for Hungary, any legislation that fell outside the scope of the aforementioned joint imperial bodies was to be the sole responsibility of the parliament in Budapest.[824]

The direct working relationship of the Kaiser and Imperial Ministers often clouded or superseded the work of the Delegations. The positions of the Finance and Foreign Minister were open to the elites from all nationalities, for example three consecutive Imperial Finance Ministers were Hungarians – József Szlávy, Béni Kállay and István Burián – whose combined tenure went from 1880 to 1912.[825] Heads of the Foreign Ministry were more diverse: Andrássy, the Hungarian magnate (1871-1879), Haymerle, from Vienna (1879-1881), Kálnoky, an ethnic Transylvanian from Hungary (1881-1895), the Pole, Gołuchowski (1895-1906), and the Bohemian German, Aehrenthal (1906-1912) were followed by Count Berchtold, the Foreign

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[817] Freifeld, *op.cit.*, p. 423. Driven by Ferenc Deák.
[818] *Ibid.*
[819] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 331.
[820] Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Toward a National Hungarian Army: The Military Compromise of 1868 and Its Consequences", *Slavic Review,* Vol. 31, No. 4 (Dec., 1972), p. 806.
[821] *Ibid.*
[822] *Ibid.*, p. 807.
[823] Hüglin, *op.cit.*, p. 36.
[824] Macartney, *op.cit.*, p. 553. As per the dictates of the Pragmatic Sanction.
[825] Okey, Trio, *op.cit.*, p. 249.

Minister made infamous by the First World War. The latter was a Hungarian subject, whose assent to the post meant that Burián would have to resign as Finance Minister, to ensure the Ministries were dispersed amongst the nationalities.[826]

In addition, the customs union would continue, with currency and banking 'nationalised' as well. Imperial governance and financing would become subject to decennial negotiations called the Quota – negotiations meant to assuage both sides that would naturally be unhappy with the positions and ideologies of the other. In effect, the Quota added a millstone around the neck of the empire.[827] Further details of the compromise will addressed throughout this work.

This drastic alteration to the Imperial Power Structure concentrated a degree of political, economic, ideological and even military power in the hands of an imperial periphery – Hungary, whilst inevitably disappointing other peripheral elites, such as the emerging Czechs, whose chance of an *Ausgleich* of their own would be scuttled by the Hungarians.[828] Peoples who had relied on Austrian 'protection' within the empire, such as the Croats in Croatia-Slavonia, the Romanians and the Saxon Germans, were essentially abandoned to the Hungarians. No longer were all subjects equal, nor was their access to their emperor.[829] *Ausgleich* can't be compared to the series of 'compromises' that unified Germany up to 1871, which was of course an effective takeover of the German states by Prussia. In the German Empire, this was a sign of Prussian strength. In the Habsburg Empire, it was a sign of core weakness and peripheral strength, exemplified by the fact that its details were finalised on the run. Indeed, Alan Sked hypothesised that "Franz Josef possibly never read the document's fine print."[830]

Criticism would resonate in all corners of the Empire for the rest of its life span, with some of the most pointed examples coming from its instigators. For example, Andrássy, who would profit as Imperial Foreign Minister from 1871 to 1879, called the compromise the "sword of Damocles suspended over our heads".[831] However, it is important to remember there was much bluster amongst the reality, both at the time and in the history. Alexander Motyl's following argument offers an example of this. He contended that as a result of *Ausgleich*, "Czech, Polish, Hungarian, Ukrainian, and South Slav nationalisms emptied the ideology of most of its imperial content, reducing it to a cult of Franz Joseph. While the emperor was revered, his realm generally was not, being labelled a prison of nations by nationalists and Kakania by intellectuals."[832] When stripped of hyperbole, his general points stand, however, this ignores two major considerations: first, in many instances, nationalists and intellectuals were rather thin on the ground, meaning

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[826] *Ibid.,* p. 254.

[827] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 334.

[828] Hungarian Prime Minister Andrássy, on the potential 'compromise' between Vienna and Bohemia, threatened: "Are you willing to carry through the recognition of Bohemian State rights with cannon?'" see Palmer, *op.cit.,* p. 168.

[829] Gildea, *op.cit.,* p. 211.

[830] Sked, Historians, *op.cit.,* p. 179.

[831] Rothenberg, Towards, *op.cit.,* p. 804.

[832] Motyl, Why Empires Reemerge, *op.cit.,* p. 134. *Kakania* was a term that summarised the unique 'Habsburg' feeling, a generally foreboding state-of-mind. It was made famous by Robert Musil in his 1930 novel, *The Man Without Qualities.*

they were not always representative of the masses, and second, many nationalists actually saw this 'prison' as a gateway to opportunity. Take the Galician Polish elites, for example. After 1870, they would not have swapped their situation for their brethren in the Kingdom of Poland for anything. That there was discontent is without question. How one balances, for example, Czech disappointment of having its attempt at *Ausgleich* torpedoed by the Hungarians with the opportunities afforded Czech businesses in the common market, or for Czech speakers in the public service, is up for question.

Perhaps this tendency for overstatement should come as no surprise, as so many were speaking of disappointment and disillusionment at the time. Coming from so many different directions will have contributed to this impression. For example, Augustus Paget, reflecting on a conversation with the President of the Austrian Upper House in 1886, noted the latter's comment on the Home Rule bill discussions regarding Ireland:

> *I remember that when recently a somewhat similar dualistic scheme was advocated in our own country, the President of the Austrian House of Nobles* [ed. House of Lords/Herrenhaus] *once observed to me some bitterness that what filled him with amazement was that any People who have but to submit to the doubtful blessings of Dualism, and who yet had the opportunity of watching its working in this Empire should for one moment contemplate inventing it for themselves.*[833]

In other words, who would be so crazy as to try this again? Again, this is not to underestimate grievances, rather to give them some perspective. It also bears commenting that to have such grievances, and to be able to air them in multiple platforms (in Austria, at least) is a sign of progress.

Overall, it remains true that the Hungarians would have disproportionate influence after *Ausgleich*, especially considering the nature of its economy. This was well summarised by Louis Eisenmann at the turn of the twentieth century. In his eyes, Ausgleich meant: "Two-thirds of the load for Austria, three-quarters of the influence for Hungary."[834] To underscore how complicated it was to have two countries 'within' one country with a single example; it took decades to work out how to deal with international agreements or treaties. This impacted both the Empire as a whole, and its two halves individually. It was only with the signing of international sugar agreements in 1902 that this was resolved – the Empire, plus the governments in Vienna and Budapest, signed separately. In was not until 1906 that the Empire withdrew, with the renewal of the World Postal Union treaty. The signatories were Austria, Hungary, and the imperial administration on behalf of Bosnia & Herzegovina.[835]

The post-*Ausgleich Reichsrat* in Vienna (that served Cisleithania) was in principle a reasonably modern pluralistic parliamentary democracy, conceding that the franchise at the beginning of the period for the House of Deputies (*Abgeordnetenhaus*) was extremely limited.

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[833] TNA: Paget to Iddesleigh, Vienna, November 9 1886, FO 120/644:421.

[834] Louis Eisenmann, *Le Compromis austro-hongrois de* 1867, (Paris, 1905), pp. 651, quoted in Norman Stone, "Constitutional Crises in Hungary, 1903-1906," *The Slavonic and East European Review,* Vol. 45, No. 104 (Jan., 1967), p. 163. Author's translation.

[835] Koralka, The Czech Question, *op.cit.,* pp. 249- 250.

Political parties would proliferate; group organization was along mostly national lines – a phenomenon that would come to dominate the life of the empire. The mix of pluralism and national parties did not bode well for seamless governance: an early example from the *Reichsrat* floor in 1873 exemplified this: "One member proposed that the oath to be taken by the members should be read in Slovenish and another that it should be read in Croatian. The last proposal was not adopted but the formula was read in the German, Italian, Polish, Ruthenian and Slovenish languages."[836] The body had barely sat before the jockeying over nationalities and languages had begun.

This phenomenon of political organisation would intensify in concert with several stages of franchise expansion, the first of which was the Electoral Reform of 1873, which saw direct election of *Reichsrat* deputies replacing selection by regional Diets.[837] In effect, this marked the creation of the national franchise. However, voters were limited to the same restrictive curia that elected Diet representatives – one dependent on landed property or tax contributions. This coincided with the stabilisation of the liberal governments in Vienna, after witnessing *six changes of* Minister-President in the years 1870-1871.[838]

This reform would support the liberal governments that helped initiate it in Vienna until 1879, when they would be replaced by a conservative coalition led by Count Eduard Taaffe, which would hold for fourteen years. His long tenure was secured by the continual support of three large blocs of conservatives – Austrian German (including clericals), Polish and Czech,[839] what was known as his "'three legged' majority".[840] This coalition was bolstered by smaller national groups, such as the conservative Slovenes, who would be rewarded for getting into bed with Taaffe.[841] A.J.P. Taylor would somewhat over-optimistically describe this period as one when "bitterness left public life" and where "nobles and bureaucrats, old enemies, were reconciled".[842] Taaffe was the master of coalition forming and of papering over cracks. As Paget noted, "Taaffe has always shown himself as a master of intrigue and as well as a consummate opportunist."[843]

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[836] TNA: Buchanan to Granville, Vienna, November 6 1873, FO 120/502:312.

[837] Kann, *op.cit.*, pp. 357-358.

[838] Taaffe, von Plener, von Artha, Potocki, von Hohenwart, von Holzgethan, von Auersperg. The latter managed to stay in office until 1879.

[839] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 361. Grandner, *op.cit.*, p. 4 of 19, noted that this group "endorsed anti-liberalism, anti-capitalism, anti-socialism, and anti-centralism," although she concluded that this anti-capitalism (and anti-industrialisation) "remained tame in practice". Grandner, *op.cit.*, p. 12 of 19.

[840] TNA: Paget to Rosebery, Vienna, February 7 1893, FO 120/702:28.

[841] John K. Cox, *Slovenia. Evolving loyalties.* (Abingdon, 2005), pp. 15 & 18. For example, he wrote that: "Taaffe did see to it that Slovene became a language of instruction in the schools of Ljubljana, the Slovenes' cultural capital". In addition, the Slovene language was added to German as an administrative language in Klagenfurt, even though the ratio of Germans to Slovenes in the city was around 18 to 1.

[842] Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

[843] TNA: Paget to Salisbury, Vienna, October 16, 1888, FO 120/661:320. He was called a "juggler" by Phipps, as was Hungarian Prime Minister Kalman Tisza. TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, 15 August 1889, FO 120/672:237.

Further suffrage reform followed in 1882, giving the vote to the 'five-guilder men' (subjects whose minimum annual tax contribution was actually five florins in coin). At once this strengthened the conservative hold on government, with the addition of many new conservative voters, worried how industrialisation and modernisation would directly affect them.[844] As with the 1873 extension, this was designed to assist the government. As Paget wrote in 1884: "The great opposition to the government is to be formed in the richer German manufacturing classes whereas the poorer classes are likely to vote for the nationalist policy of the present administration, especially in the Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia."[845] Calls for further broadening of the electorate increased. Taaffe's conservative bloc resisted, although not Taaffe himself. They were worried about maintaining their power.[846] Taaffe became isolated – he believed further extension of the franchise would help quell national conflicts, giving a voice to the likes of industrial workers who may not necessarily have already thrown their lot in with their 'nation'.[847] Indeed, it would be franchise reform that would finally topple Taaffe.[848] Finally in 1896, Minister-President Count Badeni achieved further franchise extension, allowing the peasant and working classes to vote in *Reichsrat* elections (but not in local Diets).[849] There were by this stage movements for drastically increasing the franchise – matching those in other European countries – and considerable demonstrations in support in Vienna in 1893.[850]

It was not until 1907 that the franchise became universal for adult males in Cisleithania.[851] The Christian Socials and Social Democrats supported universal male suffrage.[852] Dr. Karl Lueger, *Burgermeister* of Vienna and founder of the Christian Socials, remarked in 1901 that: "The bourgeoisie must learn to swim and really swim in the stream. A boat made out of legal privilege is merely a paper vessel, on which only fools would rely."[853] Debates concerning the proposals were enlightening, bringing into focus questions on exactly what Austria, and the Empire, was.[854] Ambassador Goschen reported on the speech of the landed proprietor and member of the German conservatives, Count Stürghk, in 1906. He:

> *dwelt upon the disastrous effect which the Government's "leap in the dark" would, in the opinion of his party, have upon the three cardinal points of Austro-Hungarian politics—namely, their relations with Hungary, their military power, and their foreign policy […] he expressed the most serious*

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[844] Grandner, *op.cit.,* p. 4 of 19.
[845] TNA: Paget to Granville, Vienna, September 30 1884, FO 120/628:263.
[846] TNA: Dispatch to Rosebery, Vienna, November 2 1893, FO 120/702:197. As reported by the British Embassy: "the three powerful groups of the Conservatives, the German liberals, and the Poles see in the farscape of such a measure either their complete extinction or at least their reduction to comparative insignificance and impotence".
[847] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 425.
[848] Fichtner, op.cit., p. 77.
[849] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 425 & Grandner, *op.cit.*, p. 4 of 19.
[850] TNA: Barrington to Rosebery, Vienna, July 19 1893, FO 120/702:138.
[851] For men over 24 who had a permanent residence, see Albrecht, op. cit., p. 85.
[852] Boyer, Old Regime, *op.cit.*, p. 168.
[853] Dr. Karl Lueger, quoted in *ibid.,* p. 169.
[854] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, February 18 1906, FO 371/7:12. For example, Goschen reported that in reposnse to a comment in the *Reichsrat* from Count Sternberg: "Who believes in Austria any longer?", Minister-President Baron Gautsch replied: "To that question I answer that millions and millions do so."

misgivings as to the manner in which these vital national questions would be handled by a Government depending upon what he called "a heterogeneous radicalized Slav majority". [855]

Even more hyperbolic was Tyrolean landowner von Grabmayr. Goschen reported that he warned of "the triumph of the Proletariat over the Bourgeoisie; the abdication of the German National Party in Austria; and the placing of the country under the domination of the Slav party and the working classes".[856] Minister-President Beck, by contrast, "maintained that Radicalism […] was a far greater danger outside than inside the walls of Parliament".[857]

Beck performed some miracles in the manner of Taaffe; forming a cabinet with a broad national base and corralling the votes of selected Czech and German members who would work together prioritising imperial issues over national ones. The spectre of the Social Democrats was beneficial for this new 'co-operation', as well as what Ambassador Goschen called a "mutual dislike and jealousy of Hungary".[858] On top of this, he persuaded Galician Poles that they would not be disadvantaged by the changes. Universal suffrage finally came to pass in 1907, after the Poles manoeuvred to ensure their regional hegemony in Galicia would remain, through the redrawing of districts, as well as the retention of curial elections to the Diet in Lviv.[859] Universal suffrage resulted in more fragmentation, which watered down 'divide-and-rule' opportunities and made governing all the more difficult. It would only intensify national conflicts, helping the formation of more radical parties whilst increasing division between peripheral organised groups between established elites and new intellectuals, in turn making prospects of interregional party formation – extremely difficult due to national voting rolls – even more unlikely.

The *Reichsrat* – moulded by the national registers policy – was notable for what on paper appeared to be strange alliances. By the late nineteenth-century, the House of Deputies had morphed into an unruly body that somehow still worked – Taaffe had commented famously on the benefit of "keeping all the nationalities of the Monarchy in a condition of even and well-modulated discontent".[860] By 1890, his alliance was propped by a tenuous alliance of smaller national interests:

> *The "concentration", for it cannot be termed a party, on the Right side of the Parliament is composed of Poles of Galicia, Slovenes of Carniola and Styria, Dalmatian Croats, Clericals, of some Tyrolese Italians and finally of the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia and all these composite bodies had to be kept in good humour by the accordance of privileges and even material advantages.* [861]

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[855] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 27, 1906, FO 371/6:28

[856] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, September 14 1906, FO 120/831:128.

[857] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, November 19 1906, FO 120/831:177.

[858] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, July 23, 1906, FO 371/6:96.

[859] Piotr Wandycz, "The Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy", in A.S. Markovits & F.E. Sysyn (eds.), *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism. Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, MA, 1982), p. 89.

[860] Quoted in Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.,* p. 346.

[861] TNA: Paget, Memorandum on German Czech Discussions at the Conference of Reconciliation, Vienna, January 31, 1890, FO 120/683.

However, nationality differences only intensified, [862] and as a side effect, it angered the Hungarians, who viewed the abrogation of regional power to the Poles and the potential for it for Bohemia and Moravia as a great threat to their position in the dualist system.[863]

No genuine ethnic group was barred from the forum, and for the most part elections were fair as were representation ratios. However, it was possible for larger blocs to circumvent the system and manipulate it to their advantage. Lothar Höbelt contended that the Czechs had an effective 'balance-of-power': "As the Poles could always be had for the asking and the two German middle-class blocs […] might be lukewarm but never pursued entirely different courses of action from 1907 onwards, parliamentary politics really boiled down to whether or not to include the Czechs in the working majority."[864] Not that this would quell Czech national dissent, which became more problematic after the crushing of the Old Czech party by the Young Czechs in the early 1890s, after Czech voters revolted against the Old Czechs for working for compromise with Taaffe and the Bohemian Germans.[865]

The number of competing national groups in the political system had risen exponentially, with growing extensive power in some cases. It bears considering how this affected the only true multi-national party movement in the Empire – the Social Democrats. The purveyance of the 'nation' was so strong that the ideological internationalist position of the Social Democrats had to bend to align with the realities of Habsburg political space. Jakub Benes concluded that: "'the socialist workers' movement in east central Europe developed around 1900 not […] as an antidote to nationalism, but as a 'vehicle' for it".[866] The first All-Austrian Social Democratic Congress, which was held in Brno in 1899, adopted a nationalities position contradictory to international socialist tenets. Autonomous regions within the Empire were called for, specifically demarcated by 'nationality'.[867] Six years later, Otto Bauer would go so far as to make socialism a pre-condition of national self-determination.[868] The natural outcome of this peculiar Habsburg

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[862] TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, 18 September 1889, FO 120/672:256. Phipps would write that: "it cannot be denied that Count Taafe [sic] whose programme was to pacify the nationality differences finds them after a 10 years tenure of office more violent than they previously were".
[863] TNA: Paget, Memorandum on German Czech Discussions at the Conference of Reconciliation, Vienna, January 31, 1890, FO 120/683.
[864] Lothar Höbelt, "Parties and Parliament: Austrian Pre-War Domestic Politics" in M. Cornwall (ed.), *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary. Essays in Political and Military History 1908-1918* (Exeter, 1990), p. 50.
[865] TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, 7 December 1891, FO 120/691:269, reported that "This compromise when signed by the latter was repudiated all over Bohemia Hr Rieger the head of the Old Czechs lost his seat and the whole party has been swept from the political arena."
[866] Jakub Benes, "Socialist Popular Literature and the Czech-German Split in Austrian Social Democracy, 1890-1914, *Slavic Review*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Summer, 2013), p. 327.
[867] Kogan, p. 210. Amongst the Resolutions: "1. Austria can exist only in the form of a democratic federation of nationalities. 2. The historic provinces (crown lands) shall be replaced by nationally delimited, self-governing areas in each of which legislation and administration shall be entrusted to national chambers, elected on a basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage. 4. The rights of national minorities shall be protected by a special law to be adopted by the parliament of the empire."
[868] Benes, p. 334. Bauer wrote: "only socialism can give the nation full autonomy, true self- determination" and that "drawing the people as a whole into the national community of culture, achieving full self-determination by the nation, growing intellectual differentiation between the nations—this is what socialism means".

tangent of socialism was fulfilled in 1911, when Czech social democrats seceded from the party in protest of Austrian German influence at the executive level.[869]

In Budapest, Hungarian elites contrived to control both political institutions and territory as part of a 'Magyar' homeland. County and municipal governments were regulated in 1870. The confirmation of these institutions "as the only legitimate bodies of political discussion outside the parliament", in the words of László Kontler, came with a cost – the municipalities would be closely supervised by the Hungarian government, with disciplinary powers.[870] These restrictions were reminiscent of those placed on the *zemstva* by St. Petersburg. Their reform of local government was extremely tepid compared to in Cisleithania – Richard Evans noted that:

> *Most Hungarian counties, with their boundaries and names commemorating many long-lost fortresses of the early Magyars, survived intact […] The refusal to adapt county boundaries in Hungary frustrated the desire of Slav and Romanian minorities to achieve a division of the country on ethnic lines; though non-Magyar leaders likewise sought, in the first instance, to take over existing historic entities.*[871]

In addition, the domination of Hungarian elites at a 'national' level (over other Hungarian groups, as well as non-Magyar peoples) was enhanced by the manipulation of a very limited franchise (around 7 per cent of the Transleithanian population) through 413 gerrymandered districts.[872]

For most of the period in question, manifestations of the Resolution Party (Party of 67), who wanted to squeeze concessions and work with the *Ausgleich*, were in the ascendancy, with the Independence Party (Party of 48), which wanted dynastic ties with the Emperor only, in opposition.[873] István Deák traced this split – which could be observed across the full spectrum of Hungarian society – to the actions of Kossuth after his escape to the Ottoman Empire in 1849.[874] In addition, Croats – already subdued by the *Nagodba* compromise, which left them with the low levels of local autonomy[875] – were practically powerless in Budapest, limited to 40 deputies, although this was far more than the Romanians.[876] For example, after 1907, there were as many Romanian deputies in the Vienna Reichsrat (5) as there were in the Hungarian Parliament, even though there was twelve times the number of Romanians in Hungary.[877]

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[869] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 437.
[870] Kontler, *op.cit.,* pp. 284-285.
[871] R.J.W. Evans, "Essay and Reflection: Frontiers and National Identities in Central Europe", *The International History Review*, Vol. 14. No 3. (Aug., 1992), p. 498.
[872] F. Tibor Zsuppán, "The Hungarian Political Scene" in M. Cornwall, (ed.), *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary. A Multi-National Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe* (Exeter, 1990), p. 66.
[873] Kann, *op.cit.,* pp. 352-353.
[874] István Deák, "The Revolution and the War of Independence, 1848-1849", in P. Sugar, P. Hanák & T. Frank (eds.), *A History of Hungary* (Bloomington, IN, 1990), p. 233, wrote of Kossuth: "As soon as he was on Ottoman territory, he again assumed the title of governor-president, demanded unconditional loyalty from all Hungarians, and denounced Görgey as a renegade and a traitor. The result was the division of the Hungarian public into those unalterably opposed to the House of Austria and those willing to compromise." Artúr Görgei (Görgey), who became leader of the Hungarian rebellion after the flight of Kossuth, surrendered to the Russians at Világos in August 1849.
[875] Rothenberg, Toward p. 813.
[876] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 363.
[877] Sugar, *op.cit.,* p. 25.

The Hungarian parliament, which had been relatively calm for decades compared to its Vienna counterpart, inflamed at the turn of the century. Debates began to resemble (indeed, surpass) the fiery ones in Vienna.[878] The final step to universal male suffrage was never taken in Hungary, although it was very much a part of political discourse in the Kingdom. Franz Josef would threaten its introduction in order to break through the Quota impasse that lasted from 1897 until nearly 1907, knowing full well that that would shatter the Hungarian elites hold on parliament. As the crises ended, the Hungarians backed down and universal suffrage was not introduced – even though the Independence Party, part of the coalition that ruled Hungary at this time, had held universal suffrage at the heart of its party manifesto since its formation.[879] There was a small token franchise reform that made little difference to the workings of the Hungarian parliament.

It must be remembered that for all of the pluralism and demarcation in the western half of the empire after 1861, it remained an empire. Political power still overwhelmingly rested in the hands of the Emperor. It was the right of Franz Josef to appoint or dismiss ministers and he could veto any law or measure, even if passed by both houses (an upper house of both high nobility and tenured imperial appointments, no less) and he could enact emergency government by decree according to Article 14 of the December 1867 Fundamental Laws.[880] Although the Emperor's powers were not so generous over the Hungarian parliament, they were still very real – he could prorogue parliament or dismiss ministers, for example.

Turning to day-to-day operation, Austria was at the vanguard of developing mass, centralised bureaucracies in Europe, first instigated by Maria Theresa in the eighteenth century to counter the troublesome, independent streak of the local nobility and their Diets.[881] In this respect, they were ahead of the emerging nation-states to the west with what would ironically become a nation-state ideological framework, which here represents one of two instances in this work where these empires enhanced such a framework they had developed in advance of the other 'great powers' (the other concerned primary education). The framework is the development of a centralised bureaucracy with a sphere of jurisdiction sanctioned by the state, in order to control regional interests and maximise extraction from the subject population.

The changes in Cisleithania further enriched a bureaucracy already bloated by the time of *Ausgleich* and whose inefficiencies were the stuff of legend – it was a hive of nepotism and, due to its generous provisions and social standing, would become another battleground of the 'nation'. A report commissioned by the monarchy just before the First World War found that the massive (almost 200 per cent between 1890 and 1911) growth in its budget did not show a commensurate

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[878] TNA: See Plunkett to Lansdowne, November 28 1904, FO 120/809:240, for a detailed summary of a particularly fiery debate, and Plunkett to Lansdowne, June 26 1903, FO 120/795:180, for a summary of an extraordinary session forced by the opposition, after the resignation of Prime Minister Szell. Ostensibly to criticise the Emperor's absence from Budapest during the crisis, the session turned into a "spectacle" where the Emperor was attacked by Independence Party members.

[879] Stone, Constitutional, *op.cit.,* p. 165.

[880] Palmer, *op.cit.,* p. 163 & Sked, Historians, *op.cit.,* p. 182.

[881] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 346. Also see Lieven, *op.cit.,* p. 163.

growth in productivity or staffing levels (elusive jobs remained competitive).[882] As reported by John Boyer, the inspector, Haerdtl assembled labour productivity data across tenured officials in Vienna: "His data demonstrated that of 370 officials in his sample, 32 per cent processed on average less than one file a day, and 36 per cent fewer than two files a day, whereas only a pitifully small minority actually seemed to put in a full working day (which itself was only 5.5-6 hours long)."[883] The findings of the report matched the expectations of Ambassador Cartwright, who when reporting on the appointment of the commission remarked that grievances included: "antiquated and dilatory methods", "excessive cost of maintenance" and a bloated workforce who "retire at a comparatively early age in the full possession of mental and physical activity when they should still be serving the State, on comfortable pensions which impose an unnecessary burden on the taxpayers".[884]

With such an large labour force, covering such a diverse imperial space, in such a 'hyper-legalised' Empire, it is no surprise that bureaucratic guidelines and regulations would reach a similar level of excess. William Johnstone recounted a story that exemplifies this perfectly: "About 1905 a train dispatcher, who was being tried for negligence, won acquittal when his lawyer hauled thirty tomes into court, declaring 'The regulation my client is accused of breaking is somewhere in these thirty volumes'."[885] The bureaucracy was considerable in Transleithania as well; many were administrative personnel employed directly by the counties, in far greater numbers than ministerial employees in Budapest.[886] The resources expended on the civil services would frustrate many, including for example the hawkish Army Chief of Staff Conrad, who, frustrated that he couldn't get enough resources for the army before the First World War whilst the civil service remained exceptionally well funded, bemoaned that the Habsburg bureaucracy was "the administrative machine with its innumerable officials."[887]

The centrality of the Habsburg civil service to imperial life would time and again show how allowing political power dispersed throughout the Imperial Power Structure could affect that system. Particularly when (in theory) Austrian Germans were shown no favouritism.[888] This was never more apparent than in Bohemia, where changes to civil service language laws in 1897 caused one of the greatest crises of the era. Minister-President Count Badeni (himself an ethnic Pole) proposed that all civil servants in the province be proficient in both German and Czech, which for the Czechs would come naturally as most educated Czechs were bilingual by necessity, whereas very few Germans had bothered, or needed, to learn Czech. It caused huge uproar amongst German speakers throughout the empire, and equal pressure from Czechs not to reverse the policy; the end result was to scrap it. Lacking Taaffe's skills – he could not form a majority

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[882] Boyer, Old Regime, *op.cit.*, p. 178.
[883] *Ibid.*
[884] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 2 1911, FO 120/883:87.
[885] Johnstone, *op.cit.*, p. 48.
[886] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.*, p. 255.
[887] quoted in Stone, Army, *op.cit.*, p. 96.
[888] Remak, *op.cit.*, p. 138.

coalition needed to pass the policy[889] – Badeni was toppled as Minister-President before the end of the year.[890]

The administration understood these difficulties as they were unfolding. Taaffe said in 1891, "we have reached a phase in politics where the development of the country depends on the moderation, just appreciation and prudence of certain parties in the Chamber".[891] Phipps reflected this in the same year.

> *The nationalistic and linguistic aspirations so rife in this country have had as usual full play and according to custom much valuable time has been wasted in discussions conducted with considerable acrimony as to the areas under which the numerous languages spoken are to be accorded preferential advantages in educational matters or in administrative or legal proceedings.*[892]

The parliaments in Vienna and Budapest soldiered in the lead up to the First World War. Although calls for federalism continued, sold as the panacea for the ills of the Empire,[893] the main actors had learned how to work the system. As Höbelt noted, members and officials "learned to deal with the frequent interruptions in legislative business and used the periods during filibusters and adjournments for vigorous, multi-sided negotiations about actions to be taken by the bureaucrats or the parliament and diets when they reconvened".[894] Due to (overly fair) national electoral rolls, the Vienna chamber was a recipe for confusion: for example, examine the makeup of the *Reichsrat* at the time of the ordinance that brought Badeni down and Cisleithania to its knees. Ambassador Rumbold reported on its opening: "The 2nd Chamber […] presents a spectacle quite in keeping with the composite character of the half of the Monarchy which it represents, its 425 members being split up into 32 more or less national groups, 5 of which, it is true, are composed of one single deputy."[895] 196 German deputies faced 191 Slavs, supplemented by Italians, Romanians and Social Democrats.[896]

Despite such machinations, the political system in Vienna engaged the electorate to a degree that would impress any modern democracy. This was spurred on by universal male suffrage. For example, voting returns for the first election under that franchise saw over 80 per

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[889] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, April 6 1897, FO 120/732:130. Rumbold reported that: "the majority he had hoped to get together would have been composed of the Poles, the Young Czechs, and the German Liberals with a few smaller cognate groups. His ill-success was caused at the last moment by the objections offered by the group of moderate Liberal German landowners". Badeni had to carry on with a minority.

[890] For details see Kann, *op.cit.,* pp. 440-441.

[891] TNA: Paget to Salisbury, Vienna, 22 June 1891, FO 120/691:119.

[892] TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, 23 November 1891, FO 120/691:253.

[893] TNA: Monson to Kimberley, Vienna, June 28 1895, FO 120/716:209. For a specific example, in 1895 the British Embassy reported that "the Christian Socialists, the Slavs, Ruthenians and Young Czechs adverted the fall of the Coalition Govt […] Dr Gregr [leader of the Young Czechs] […] insisted that all the evils and difficulties which render the administration of the country laborious arise from the system of centralisation; and that the only possible remedy is 'federation'".

[894] As relayed by Gary Cohen. Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* p. 269. Diets were no better. As Plunkett would report in 1901: "Out of 17 Provincial Diets no less than 5 have broken up without having accomplished anything. In fact the Provincial Diets have followed only too faithfully the bad example set them by the Reichsrat." TNA: Plunkett to Lansdowne, Vienna, August 1 1901, FO 120/772:188.

[895] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, April 2 1897, FO 120/732:126.

[896] *Ibid.*

cent of the electorate place their vote.[897] Voters were not perturbed by what had become banal. In Austria, after 1911 in particular, this meant the frequent dissolution of parliament and government by emergency decree under Article 14. As Gary Cohen pointed out, what usually began as emergency measures (causing the initial dissolutions) were normally ratified second time around with ease – he would call Article 14 a "round-trip ticket for the constitution".[898] Amongst all that, it worked: In 1900, a correspondent from the Economist wrote this now-famous perspective (with comments by Hans Ebeling):

> *Compromises, shortcuts, and evasions kept "the noisy, creaking and grinding" wheels of the political process functioning without breaking asunder. "How long Austria–Hungary will hold together we do not know." But, he continued, if the Austrian Empire "had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent her, for she alone, so far as one can see, can render the common service of welding together certain diverse elements of race, language, creed, and separate interest, which would otherwise be flying at one another's throats.*[899]

As time passed and the First World War approached, views on *Ausgleich* were at best muted, and worst vile – the latter being more common. Karl Lueger delivered this stinging indictment on the floor of the *Reichsrat* in 1895: "I consider Dualism as a misfortune, indeed as the greatest misfortune which my fatherland has ever had to suffer, a greater misfortune even than the wars we lost."[900] Many in Austria were aggrieved at what they saw as the giving of endless concessions to the Hungarians with nothing to show for it in return.[901] The Hungarians felt aggrieved as well, particularly concerning the army, which will be reviewed later in this chapter.

When compared to 1854, it is unquestionable that the political sphere had improved for the better, despite the aforementioned 'behaviours'. This was due to the Empire remaining essential to its key stakeholders, and not turning back on the paths chosen after 1867 with respect to the Imperial Power Structure, and those of the two halves of the Monarchy (including Hungary, who during the Coalition period were hardly breaking new ground by so boldly challenging *Ausgleich*). The customs union was always renewed, for example, because for most it was not worth the pain dissolving it would cause – Austrian markets were just too important for the Hungarian economy.[902] The prelude to universal male suffrage in Austria, and its very threat in Hungary, spurred on politicians to miraculously increase their workload and productivity.[903]

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[897] TNA: In Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, February 16 1909, FO 120/864:23. More specifically, 84 per cent of the electorate (4,676,636) voted.
[898] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.*, p. 270.
[899] Ebeling, *op.cit.*, p. 4.
[900] Sked, Historians, *op.cit.*, p. 180.
[901] TNA: Dispatch to Salisbury, Vienna, April 22 1898, FO 120/741:135.
[902] Schulze & Wolf, Harbingers, *op.cit.*, p. 5.
[903] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, January 25 1907, FO 120/840:2. He reported that: "An almost febrile activity has been displayed in the Reichsrath during the past fortnight, standing in marked contrast to the legislative sterility which has characterized the present Parliament since it met in 1901. This burst of energy is generally ascribed to a desire to curry favour with that portion of the electoral body which, it is supposed, may have a controlling voice in the next elections, viz, the middle and industrial classes. So large indeed has been the number of Bills of an Industrial or Mercantile nature before Parliament during the past fortnight that it was found

Even Quota imbalances, that meant in 1867 Austria paid for 70 per cent of the imperial budget and Hungary 30 per cent, could not derail the compromise, indeed it was seen as a minor triumph when Quota contributions were reset in 1907 to 63.4 per cent to Austria and 36.6 per cent to Hungary.[904] Was there anything left in the tank? The system still worked, perhaps because the vitriol tended to be amongst and between elites. Ambassador Rumbold conveyed the prevailing opinion in 1897, when he retrospectively argued that Taaffe "had in fact squeezed the last drops out of the lemon leaving nothing but the rind to his successors".[905] As shown throughout this work, this was an overstatement.

5.6.   Modernising and professionalising the military

Although both traditional arms of the military – the army and navy - were hugely important for both Austria and Russia, in traditional landed empires, the relationship between the army and the dynasty was supreme, from both from a romantic and practical standpoint. Therefore this section will focus on the army. For the Habsburg and Russian Empires, in the cauldron of nineteenth- and early-twentieth century geopolitics, the army was the key to their position as a 'great power'. Ensuring the army would be competitive in any conflict that could arise was paramount. In addition, both regimes required the appearance of a strong military to maintain a certain ideological power amongst their subject populations – that of the powerful monarch who would protect them when feeling benevolent, and crush them when wronged. Both armies had catching up to do with the other 'great powers', to remain viable instruments of military power in Europe. The nation-state ideological framework to which this refers was to create a strong, modern professional military whose members march to the same ideological drum as the government.

5.6.1.   The Russian Empire

As noted, the jolt that awoke the military reform movement was the Crimean War. The Russian army had to operate in the shadow of what David Rich called "Nicholas's jaundiced view of the general staff and academy's usefulness […] and loyalty," which "cast a pall over service in the general staff corps."[906] This helped lead to a general neglect, which was dramatically exposed when compared to the invading forces. For example, it took three weeks for British and French troops to arrive at Sevastopol by sea from their homeports, whereas troops from the Moscow military region took three months.[907] Five years previously, the Russian troops invading Hungary

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necessary to request that, with a view to expediting business, speeches might be cut short or even entirely dispensed with."

[904] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 422.
[905] TNA: Memorandum of Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, December 10 1897, FO 120/734:417.
[906] David Rich, "Imperialism, Reform and Strategy: Russian Military Statistics, 1840-1880, *The Slavonic and East European Review,* Vol. 74, No. 4 (Oct, 1996), p. 624.
[907] Gildea, *op.cit.,* p. 181.

arrived in Vienna from Warsaw on the train – clearly this had not impressed on them enough the necessity of railways for troop movement.[908]

The first area to be addressed was the almost absurd size of the standing army in war footing. One year after the first, timid attempt at this – specifically in response to emancipation[909] – Miliutin would note: "The enlargement of the army in time of war by this mass of recruits leads in reality to a weakening in military strength; but as well it exhausts the state to a large degree", adding that "the sudden disruption of work in hundreds of thousands of households, completely unprepared for it, the sudden increase in the demand for all the materials needed to supply the army leads to an enormous rise in prices, all depress the economy of the state in a single blow and makes entry into a war a very difficult matter."[910] British diplomat John Lumley added another perspective to this in an 1862 dispatch, noting how reducing the size of the standing army would reduce the burden of both government levies and the loss of farm labour, "exchanging the Stripling for a man still in the prime of his life who has probably improved by twelve years exposure of order and discipline".[911]

The western armies were used as a template, inspiration initially coming from the French army of Napoleon III. Military districts were modelled to resemble that system, starting with four in 1862 and then six more in 1864, vastly reducing the size of the army to 553,000 (by 1870), and the changing the regional army commands structure with far clearer demarcation.[912] Officers at the General Staff Academy – whose intake was greatly increased – were required to master statistical theory before graduating, and to use that knowledge when commissioned. According to Bruce Lincoln, Miliutin reshaped: "the General Staff into a centre for military planning and war preparation", in doing so streamlining and "cutting nearly a thousand positions from the ministry's tables of organization".[913] This came with a commensurate improvement in the basics of organisational efficiency. In addition, the traditional direct channel from officers to the tsar was closed: the Minister would become the gatekeeper to Court.[914]

In the 1870s the Russians would turn their gaze toward the Prussian system, whose army the Russians at once so admired and feared.[915] The most groundbreaking reform would be the

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[908] Schenk, *op.cit.*, p. 64.

[909] TNA: Lumley to Russell, St. Petersburg, September 10 1862, FO 181/406:106.

[910] DA Miliutin, 1862 report *Stoletie voennogo ministerstva*, vol. 1, *Prilozheniya* (St. Petersburg, 1902), pp. 71-83, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, pp. 83-85.

[911] TNA: Lumley to Russell, St Petersburg, September 26 1864, FO 181/429:65.

[912] W. Bruce Lincoln, *The Great Reforms: Autocracy, bureaucracy, and the politics of change in Imperial Russia* (DeKalb, 1990), p. 151. The four were set up in 1862 in response to unrest in the western borderlands. Regarding the size of the army, see Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 386.

[913] Lincoln, *ibid.*, p. 152. As a result, in the twelve years to 1875, the War Ministry processed over 200,000 *fewer* official documents (446,055 in 1863 vs. 244,291 in 1875), much of this reduction coming from Mitiutin's insistence that the War Minister should no longer be copied in on all military matters. As had become practice during Nicholas I's reign, practically *everything* passed the desk of the Minister, regardless of how small and trivial the issues they referred to might have been.

[914] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 386.

[915] BDFA: Memorandum on the Influence of the Russian People of the late Measures of Government, Rumbold, St. Petersburg, enclosure in Buchanan to Granville, December 6 1870, BDFA V1, pp. 227-228. He recounted being told by an 'insider' on the household of an Imperial family member: "To begin with, the Minister of War,

1874 Universal Military Statute, notably proclaimed after a period of government reaction against the other Alexandrian reforms. This was also inspired by Prussian success in the wars of 1866 and 1870.[916] The nobility's exemption from conscription – a long and dearly held *soslovie* 'privilege' – was removed, and terms of service for non-career officers would now be based on education instead of estate. The longer and more recognised the education, the shorter the term of service. University graduates would only have to serve six months, and even completing primary schooling reduced a term to four years.[917] This had the knock on effect of encouraging peasants to formally educate their children, which reinforces the interdependence of the reforms. This also helped the bureaucracy: as Ambassador Rumbold remarked in 1870: "an absolute dearth existed of employés for the civil service of the State, and it was difficult to imagine how the ranks of those employés would be filled up when every one was bound to military service".[918] The opening of officer schools to non-nobles led to a huge decrease in hereditary nobles in the officer corps – from 81 per cent in the 1860s to a mere 12 per cent in 1900, a phenomenon repeated in the Imperial Habsburg Army.[919]

Finally, in 1877, there was a further reform modelled on the Prussian system – the formation of *corps d'armée,* altering the French inspired district model. However, command of army corps would remain the province of the relevant (political) Governor General.[920] This year also offered an example of the intersection of multiple reforms coming back to affect the Empire. In this instance, it was the press reporting on war conditions. As relayed by Ambassador Loftus: "The loss of life as well as the treatment inflicted on the Prisoners and the horrors related by the Press have produced a great reluctance on the part of the population to be enlisted in the ranks of the army."[921] In effect, a freer press reporting to a population with improved literacy about conditions in a war affecting the prestige of the Empire, in a more modern military, in more modern warfare, was turning off the very people who would be needed to provide manpower.

The army was not spared Russification, and it was in this arena that such tactics came up against the strongest opposition, from ethnic Russian officers in particular.[922] Its application was uneven. The special status enshrined by the Finnish Military Service Law of 1878, which

General Milutine *[sic]*, had not long ago organized the army on the French model, and now all organization would have to be changed to something resembling the Prussian system." Also see TNA: Maude to Stanley, Warsaw, March 6 1877, FO 181/561:5.

[916] Mark von Hagen, "The Russian Empire", Section: Collapse of Empires: Causes, K. Barkey & M. von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire. Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, 1997), p. 61.

[917] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 388.

[918] BDFA: Memorandum on the Influence of the Russian People of the late Measures of Government, Rumbold, St. Petersburg, enclosure in Buchanan to Granville, December 6 1870, BDFA V1, pp. 227-228.

[919] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.,* p. 185.

[920] TNA: Maude to Stanley, Warsaw, March 6 1877, FO 181/561:5.

[921] TNA: Loftus to Stanley, St Petersburg, August 28 1877, FO 181/559:67.

[922] They were especially furious when considering recommendations after 1905 to limit the number of Baltic Germans in the officer corps. Gregory Vitarbo, "Nationality Policy and the Russian Imperial Officer Corps, 1905-1914", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Winter, 2007), pp. 684 & 693-695. Notably, this group still included Polish elites. Stefan Berger & Aleksey Miller, "Nation-building and regional integration, *c.* 1800-1914: the role of empires", *European Review of History* (Vol. 15, No. 3), June 2008, p. 322.

guaranteed the independent status of the Finnish army from the common imperial army, shows this; one that upset Miliutin.[923] The officer corps had always been multi-ethnic and multi-religious, a vestige of the *soslovie* system. Always a helpful assimilation tool to escort non-Russian elites into the 'imperial core',[924] neither the honour nor loyalty to the tsar of most non-Russian officers (with the exception of some Poles after the uprisings) had ever been questioned. This would not change amongst the General Staff and the Ministry, with a few exceptions, even after the rest of Russian elite society was beginning to fear the rising German empire. Imperial officers (including Russians) hitherto never really needed, nor did they receive, any ideological indoctrination, be it in monarchical, religious or national loyalty.[925] Even though limits were set to restrict the number of non-Orthodox officers in 1888,[926] discrimination within the corps on ethnic or religious lines remained small. Some Baltic German and even Polish officers had also 'russified'.[927]

The atmosphere post-1905 revolution, which encouraged a more even-handed approach to nationality policies in general, saw more scientific attempts to investigate a way through a morass that was far more perceived than real, at officer level. The main target was addressing the large number of Baltic Germans in the officer corps, who had proven immune to any ideological pull from a strengthening German Empire. A memorandum from the Main Staff in 1905 set out the parameters for methodically organising by nationality, emphasising "the need to protect the status of the officer corps as an imperial and Russian institution, while reconciling the corps with the new legal and political realities, such as the manifesto on the equality of citizenship and the *uzad* on freedom of confession issued in December 1904".[928]

Of particular note was the Dukmasov Commission. One of its sub-committees was charged with working out the ideal ethnic composition of the army. By manipulating the data from the 1897 Census, it deemed that the ideal ethnic composition of the army was 82 per cent Russian, 7 per cent Polish, 3 per cent Lithuanian, 3 per cent Turko-Tartar, 2 per cent German, 1 per cent Armenian and 1 per cent Finnish.[929] This was concluded from census data that found that Russians speakers made up just over 40 per cent of the imperial population.[930] Although the same report recommended and made pains to state that this was an ideal situation, this and their recommendations on the officer corps (no fewer than 75 per cent Russian) caused outrage amongst the General Staff, almost to a man according to Gregory Vitarbo.[931] Officers complained of the

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[923] J.E.O. Screen, "The Military Relationship between Finland and Russia, 1809-1917", in M. Branch, J. M. Hartley & A. Maczak (eds.), *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A Comparative Study* (London, 1995), p. 263.

[924] Berger & Miller, *op.cit.,* p. 322.

[925] Vitarbo, *op.cit.,* p. 684.

[926] *Ibid.,* p. 687.

[927] Berger & Miller, *op.cit.,* p. 322.

[928] Vitarbo, *op.cit.,* p. 686.

[929] *Ibid.,* p. 690. They did emphasise that these figures would be impossible to achieve exactly due to the vagaries of military requirements.

[930] For breakdown see Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 469.

[931] Vitarbo, *op.cit.,* pp. 690 & 692-693.

"collective insult" to fellow men of social rank, "true sons" as they were often called, others of the counterproductive nature of setting a quota system for an army so large from so diverse an area in such geopolitical conditions.[932] Suffice to say, these recommendations were neither implemented, nor any actual decision made in their favour, before hostilities began in 1914; the project's more contentious recommendations having been palmed off to another Commission in the vain hope that they would have more success.[933]

Changing the structure of a traditional imperial army to foster dynastic loyalty and a form of 'united cause', whilst satisfying the needs of traditionally loyal non-Russian national officers and Russian core nationalism, would become perhaps the most difficult juggling act of the entire imperial project. Even though in Russia there was hitherto no true national problem in that army, the Officer Corps would become more 'Russian'. As Boris Mirinov has uncovered, a body that in 1867-68 had 23 per cent non-Orthodox officers, and where at least 27 per cent of the highest generals were Protestant, saw these shares decline to 20 per cent and 15 per cent respectively in 1903. By 1912, the share of the former had plummeted to just 11 per cent, removing valuable assets from an army when it would need all the assets it could get.[934]

Another series of reforms in the post-1905 era focussed on ensuring adequate funding levels. The needs of the modern army and navy after the turn of the century, as well as the abolition of the independent Finnish army in 1900, added huge cost requirements to the organisation.[935] Expenditures had been growing since the Crimean War and exponentially so since the 1880s, and yet in many areas this hadn't trickled down to the men on the ground, highlighting the extraordinary expense of maintaining a professional army of such size and geographic footprint. The Ministries of Finance and War had been stretching the imperial military budget by skimping on the minutiae. For example, soldiers spent much of their time making their own uniforms and boots from cloth and leather bought using funds assigned to each regiment. They also had to buy basic foodstuffs, such as flour, to make food.[936] In this respect, the army remained stuck in the past, and this had a hugely significant secondary effect of stifling the formation of state-run and capitalist military supply enterprises, which were so important in the maturation of nineteenth-century nation-state economies. This would play a part in the weakness of bourgeoisie formation in Russia. It was estimated in 1907 that around two-fifths of soldiers were engaged in non-military activities in order to make ends meet. [937] Efforts to alleviate this were significant but would naturally take time – time they didn't really have leading into 1914. Armaments expenditure, however, boomed in the seven years before the War.[938]

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[932] *Ibid.,* p. 695.
[933] *Ibid.* The Lukomskii Commission.
[934] Mironov, *op.cit.,* p. 4.
[935] Erkki Pihkala, "The Finnish Economy and Russia, 1809-1917" in M. Branch, J. M. Hartley & A. Maczak (eds.), *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A Comparative Study* (London, 1995), p. 164.
[936] Gatrell, Culture, *op.cit.,* p. 41.
[937] *Ibid.* Such as "tailoring, cobbling, baking or tending cattle".
[938] Gatrell, Industrial, *op.cit.,* p. 105. From 608.1 million roubles in 1906 to 959.6 million roubles in 1913. Overall defence expenditures would boom from 1908 – by using an index where 1900 defence expenditures = 100, they

Finally, this work has avoided focussing on the military mutinies that were a feature of the 1905 revolution. Their story has been well told. However, it bears conveying one anecdote from January 1906, to show just how important a healthy, buoyant, successful army is to an Imperial Power Structure. This was military attaché Lieutenant Colonel Napier, reporting on his visit to the War Office in January 1906:

> *I had to push my way through a crowd of about 100 reservists and invalided men from various East Siberian regiments. They were slovenly, unkempt, and insolent, and many of them were lounging on the staircase smoking, unchecked by officers going in and out. At the door several greeted their comrades, saying, "It's no use, they won't give us anything. We go to Siberia and get our heads broken for nothing!"*[939]

5.6.2. The Habsburg Empire

Reform had begun slowly during the 1850s, with the subsuming of the Court War Council into the Ministry of War, which itself was merged with Army High Command, and making the service obligation a lot more equitable.[940] However, they were slow to update training methods, or increase the balance of infantry to cavalry, which Robert Kann noted contributing to them falling behind the other 'great powers'.[941] Unlike imperial education policy, the military effectively stood still during the neo-Absolutist era, even though the army was the cornerstone of the Empire. In a way, this period could be referred to as the army's 'reactionary era', spurred on by the false confidence that came from the defeat of the revolutionaries. The high nobility maintained its stranglehold on the military establishment, in step with the confidence in the 'old-order' that purveyed in the empire from Franz Josef down.[942] This confidence overlooked the role of various non-Austrian German troops in turning the tide for the dynasty, such as the Croatians and the Russians.

Reaction would turn out to be a disastrous path, as the War with the French caught the Austrians unprepared. Part of the problem was the culture of nepotism in the Army General Staff. In 1859, still almost 90 per cent of imperial generals were from the high nobility, and change was negligible by the eve of the Austro-Prussian War. For example, among the active Feldmarshall Leutnants in 1865, there were still eleven Archdukes, three Princes, sixteen Counts, thirteen lesser nobles and just two commoners.[943] Corresponding Prussian officers, from the High Command down, were encouraged to approach their task thoughtfully and professionally,[944] traits that ran counter Franz Josef's contention that "the strength of the army lies less in educated

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were just 98 in 1907, rising to 162.6 by 1913. *Ibid.,* p. 104.
[939] BDFA: Napier to Spring Rice, St Petersburg, January 3 1906, BDFA V3, pp. 312-313.
[940] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 323.
[941] *Ibid.*
[942] Rothenberg, Nobility, *op.cit.,* p. 183.
[943] *Ibid.*
[944] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 169.

officers than in loyal and chivalrous ones".[945] Ironically, the first commoner Chief of General Staff – Benedek – was appointed just in time for him to become a scapegoat for the disaster at Königgrätz in 1866, where he was Army Commander.[946] Although the high nobility were spared the shame reserved for Benedek, fast moving events within the Empire culminating in *Ausgleich* would change the nature of the Imperial Army forever.

The October Patent of 1860, which came on the heels of defeat to the French (which also caused the reintroduction of the War Ministry in 1859), laid the basis for conscription in Hungary, who had previously provided soldiers by feudal tribute method.[947] This would create, for the first time, a true 'national' military body, albeit of questionable willingness. It would be answerable directly to the Emperor, as opposed to by proxy of the Hungarian Diet.[948] The loss of Diet control would be the foundation for one of the greatest sticking points for the Imperial Army to come.

Three different reforms would transform the Habsburg military space, post-October Patent. To become a fully professional body, the Imperial Army would need to change its manning policies, as had recently happened in the Russian Army. For example, the bulk of common soldiers who would lose in Italy in 1859 were poorly educated, harshly disciplined peasants – they would have fit in perfectly in the imperial Russian Army at Sevastopol. After the defeat, terms of service were limited to eight years plus two more in reserve, and as opposed to being 'press-ganged', conscripts would be chosen by ballot.[949] While this method may have been fairer, it did not make the army more professional, per se.

The second reform came as a residual to *Ausgleich* – the formalisation of the joint imperial army (*k.k. – kaiserlich königlich*), the conditions of which would bring the army to the apex of imperial political life every ten years during Quota negotiations. The third was the introduction of the universal conscription via the Law on General Conscription of December 1868, which built a permanent professional standing army with an annual intake of 95,600 conscripts. This replaced the previous system, whereby the regions were assigned with providing conscripts, with terms varying depending on the territory in question.[950] The new army had a large built-in personnel churn, by setting out a quite modest three years of active service and nine further years in the reserves.[951] The initial motivation was to raise the fighting standard of the army so it could avenge the Prussians, ideally before the smaller German states gravitated closer to the Prussian orbit.[952] Conscription would not come with accompanying army education programme, hence the

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[945] Quoted in *Ibid.*

[946] Rothenberg, Nobility, *op.cit.,* p. 183.

[947] TNA: Loftus to Russell, Vienna, October 25 1860, FO 120/382:482. Previously the Hungarians would provide 30,000 men to the army. See also Laurence Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism in Late Imperial Austria* (Oxford, 2014), p. 114.

[948] TNA: Loftus to Russell, Vienna, October 25 1860, FO 120/382:482.

[949] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 323.

[950] Cole, *op.cit.,* p. 114. For a summary of the changes in army structure and conscription since the seventeenth century, see pp. 110-121.

[951] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 357.

[952] *Ibid.,* p. 277.

improvements in professionalism would have to wait for improvements in general education throughout the empire to filter through to new recruits. William Johnstone has outlined that in the first years after the law was enacted, only around one-quarter of the peasantry had to serve the full three-year term as a result of poor literacy and health pre-qualifications. After a treaty of 1870, any male living for five years in the United States would qualify for an exemption, becoming an incentive for peasants to emigrate, especially from Galicia and Hungary.[953]

Finalising the imperial army structure took many months, dragging them well into 1868. At issue was what degree of independence the Hungarians would have within the body, how 'German' that body would be, and what avenues would there be for an independent Hungarian military force of any type. Colonel Beck, the Emperor's attaché, told the Hungarians (who based much of their revolutionary activity on the quest for an independent army) that such a concession would encourage the Slavic peoples to ask for the same.[954]

Eventually, the Hungarians accepted that German would be the language of command and the Emperor would control the army. When it came to a vote in the Hungarian Parliament, they voted 255 to about 40 in favour, after the Emperor ordered that, "Hungarian officers shall <u>as far as possible</u>, be placed in Hungarian Regiments."[955] Franz Josef would reassert for the rest of his life that primacy over the army was his and his alone. As he put nearly forty years later in 1903: "My Army shall know above all [...] that I will never abandon my rights and prerogatives entrusted to the Supreme War Lord. My Army shall remain joint and united, a strong force to defend the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy from all its foes."[956]

To assuage the Hungarians, two national guard units would be established, the *Landwehr* in Austria and the *Honvédség* in Hungary – the latter the complete responsibility of the Hungarian parliament, with Hungarian regalia including flags and insignia, but no artillery – Franz Josef would not allow too strong an internal militia within the borders of the empire.[957] The *Honvédség* in turn had its own Croatian militia, the successor to Jelačić's counter-revolutionary army (Croatians in the imperial army were not organised on national lines). The Hungarian parliament, although voting overwhelmingly in favour, was unhappy with the details of the compromise, which forced Andrássy, the chief Hungarian negotiator, to return with more demands, which were not met. Eventually he pushed this through parliament on the promise that further autonomy would be the primary issue of any future discussions concerning the army.[958]

Franz Josef made it very clear where the militias would stand with his order of the day on December 5, 1868:

> *The Landwehr (Honvédség) [...] today joins the army as a valuable augmentation of the common defence [serving] the same purpose as the army [...] and I expect that all officers [...] and in particular*

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[953] Johnstone, *op.cit.,* p. 52.
[954] Rothenberg, Towards, *op.cit.,* p. 808.
[955] TNA: Bloomfield to Stanley Vienna, August 11 1868, FO 120/468:180. Original emphasis.
[956] Quoted in Stone, Constitutional, *op.cit.,* p. 169.
[957] Rothenberg, Towards, *op.cit.,* pp. 808-810, also see Stone, Army, *op.cit.,* p. 97.
[958] Rothenberg, *ibid.,* p. 810.

the generalcy will do their utmost to further the bonds between all components of My Army and they will strengthen the spirit of order and discipline and combat any potentially divisive and dangerous influences from the very start.[959]

The nature and conditions of both the army and the *Honvédség* were a major reason for the acrimonious Quota negotiations that would blight the Empire until the Great War. The Hungarians would view the laws behind these changes as "merely provisional".[960]

This militia would technically become an active reserve, although their activities were fairly minimal over the course of a year.[961] However, even though the *Landwehr* was not taken too seriously by Vienna, being barely 'tolerated', as Gunther Rothenberg claimed, so long as it showed 'parity with the Hungarians',[962] the opposite was the case for the *Honvédség*, which became a beacon of Hungarian national pride. The Hungarians would fight for its aggrandisement and an enlarged remit (and artillery) in conjunction with its constant demands for more autonomy within the imperial army. Artillery aside, the *Honvédség* had cavalry, infantry, and Hungarian language of command, and swore an oath to the Hungarian constitution and king.[963]

Hungarian officers felt that the Emperor was 'rubbing-in' the 'humiliation' of 1849 by imposing such a Germanic 'nature' on the imperial army. Most contentious was the seventy-word German vocabulary that officers would have to use and soldiers – irrespective of nationality – would have to learn.[964] Close behind were standards, uniform designs, indeed anything that signified 'Austrian Germans', such as statues and monuments to the fallen of the revolution. Michael Miller demonstrated this with his study of the fifty years of the Hentzi Statue in Budapest. It was a lightning rod for Hungarian nationalists from the time of its unveiling on St. George's Hill (where Hentzi was killed) in 1852 to the end of the First World War, long after it had been moved and hidden inside the grounds of a military academy in 1899 (when it became the turn of Hungarian imperial army troops to resent it).[965] Even its transfer caused another fracas, as reported by Ambassador Rumbold:

The streets of Budapest were yesterday again the scene of one of those unedifying spectacles which are from time to time interred in the Hungarian capital when the extreme chauvinists choose to consider that the Hungarian nation is treated by the Imperial Authorities in a manner to the national susceptibility.[966]

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[959] *Ibid.*

[960] Quoted in Michael Lawrence Miller, "A Monumental Debate in Budapest: The Hentzi Statue and the Limits of the Austro-Hungarian Reconciliation, 1852-1918", *Austrian History Yearbook,* Vol. 40 (2009), p. 222.

[961] Rothenberg, Towards, *op.cit.*, p. 811. Essentially, "called out for an annual muster, a two-week drill period, and biannual battalion exercises".

[962] *Ibid.,* p. 812.

[963] Michael Miller, *op.cit.,* p. 222.

[964] Johnstone, *op.cit.,* p. 51.

[965] Michael Miller, *op.cit.,* pp. 215-237. General Heinrich Hentzi was the regime commander holding out on St. George's Hill against the Hungarians in 1849, notorious for his bombardment and virtual destruction of Pest.

[966] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, August 13 1899, FO 120/751:191.

The *Ausgleich* 'pushback' from the Hungarians intensified with every round of Quota negotiations; their claims became bolder each time (although ironically, they passed the 1879 Army Bill well in advance of the parliament in Vienna).[967] The pattern was one of constant compromise and meeting half way, which is why it appeared that change was piecemeal and half-hearted. Every army issue could be turned into a 'national' one, as could every concession. For example, in 1882, the army was charged with drawing new recruits from specially designated regions, and ensuring that standing units spend more time at, or near as possible, to their regimental home bases.[968] Other reforms that may appear underwhelming from a third-party perspective included the Emperor allowing the Hungarian flag to be flown in concert with the Imperial one on army buildings in Transleithania.[969]

Passage of the 1887 Quota was only assured after Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza had forced a change of the official title of the Austro-Hungarian Army from *kaiserlich-königlich* to *kaiserlich und königlich* (*k.u.k.*).[970] The controversies that began in the 1897 round dwarfed those that preceded them. In short, the ongoing negotiations had dovetailed into the constitutional crisis that began in 1903. As with the overall Quota, it was the perceived imbalance that aggravated those west of the Leitha. Ambassador Sir Francis Plunkett paraphrased the speech of Prince Schönburg on the Reichsrat floor in 1903: "Austria, which paid 70% towards the upkeep of the common army, would not, he said, allow the opinion of Hungary, which paid only 30%, to be the deciding factor as regards its organisation."[971]

One of the results of the turmoil in Hungary was that the ruling Liberal Party lost power in Budapest for the first time in 1905, parliament was prorogued and a non-affiliated cabinet was installed by the Emperor (as was his prerogative), and after this had failed, yet another government, a coalition of the Constitution Party and the Party of Independence and 48 (with a far more hostile policy toward the Austrians than the Liberals) formed.[972] They would demand an effective partition of the army.

Again, the nature of the position of the Hungarians would frustrate the Austrians. Goschen wrote in 1906 that:

> It is difficult to find in the truculent communication to the Crown […] any trace whatsoever of concessions; unless, indeed, the Coalition leaders consider it to be a concession to say that they are willing to drop the "words of command" question and other military matters until the nation can give its opinion on those subjects through Parliament after a general election […] They may call this a

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[967] TNA: Elliot to Salisbury, Vienna, November 15 1879, FO 120/574:738. Indeed, it had been passed in Budapest whilst it was stuck in committee in Vienna, which was well before any "more serious discussions" on its content and passage on the *Reichsrat* floor.

[968] István Deák, "Comparing Apples and Pears: Centralization, Decentralization, and Ethnic Policy in the Habsburg and Soviet Armies", in R. L. Rudolph & D. F. Good (eds.), *Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union* (Minneapolis, 1992), p. 231.

[969] *Ibid.*

[970] Rothenberg, *Towards*, *op.cit.*, p. 814.

[971] TNA: Plunkett to Lansdowne, Vienna, February 27 1903, FO 120/793:63.

[972] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 456.

concession, but they must have known perfectly well that nothing they could have suggested would have been more likely to exasperate their King and to aggravate the situation.[973]

The Hungarian delegation in 1906 made their position crystal clear. The Plenary discussion on the military budget of the same year noted that, "the army must be one in feeling and language with the people for whom it was recruited".[974] It was enough to frustrate Ministers toward retirement, including the Imperial War Minister, General von Pitreich.[975]

The aforementioned 1906 invasion plans (Case U) included the installation of a military government covering all of Transleithania.[976] Franz Josef declined to take this path, and eventually got his way by threatening to introduce universal male suffrage into Hungary.[977] This showed that despite the drawn out nature of the negotiations, Hungary was, due to the imperial tool of a common army, necessarily "dependent on the dynasty".[978] Hungarian intransigence (at a mostly political level) glossed over the fact that for the Magyar masses, service in the imperial army was far more preferable and prestigious than service in the *Honvédség* – the ideological pull of being a part of a large imperial army was far greater than the national pride Hungarian elites were trying to instil into their 'national' militia, and with regards to military service, at least, the pull of collective, diffused and intensive power held by the sovereign was just too strong.[979]

The language situation, whilst favourable to German, was hardly the disaster preached by the Hungarians. The common army segmented language into three official types – "language of command" (*Kommandosprache*), "language of service" (*Dienstsprache*) and "regimental language" (*Regimentssprache*).[980] Officer corps army cadets had to learn – at the minimum – one of the other languages of the Empire (other than German and/or their own), and French as well, as part of their training.[981] Existing officers were given three years to learn the languages of their respective soldiers, under threat of dismissal if they failed.[982]

Notable examples of officers who used multiple languages of the realm, without prejudice, were Admiral Anton Haus (from a Slovenian family), fleet commander of the *k.u.k. Kriegsmarine* during the First World War, who spoke eight of the Empires' languages, and Conrad, the aforementioned hawkish Chief of Staff, who spoke seven.[983] In addition, if twenty per cent or more of a regiment spoke a mother tongue other than German, that language would also be used

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[973] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, February 8, 1906, FO 371/6:9.

[974] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, July 9 1906, FO 371/7:92.

[975] TNA: Boothby to Grey, Vienna, October 26 1906, FO 371/7:164. Boothby reported that the General had: "for some time been anxious to retire. He found his post impossible on account of the deadlock produced by the persistent refusal of Hungary to provide the number of recruits which, in his opinion, was indispensible".

[976] Rothenberg, Towards, *op,cit.,* p. 815.

[977] Zsuppan, *op.cit.,* p. 102.

[978] Sked, Historians, *op.cit.,* p. 183.

[979] Bruckmüller, Habsburg Society, *op.cit.,* p. 2. Here he cites István Deák.

[980] Stone, Army, *op.cit.,* p. 100.

[981] Wolfgang Grassl & Barry Smith, "A Theory of Austria", in J.C. Nyíri (ed.), *From Bolzano to Wittgenstein. The Tradition of Austrian Philosophy. (Proceedings of the International Wittgenstein Symposium).* (Vienna, 1986), https://www.academia.edu/2731754/A_theory_of_Austria, last sourced November 29 2014, p. 3.

[982] Stone, Army, *op.cit.,* p. 100.

[983] *Ibid.*

in parade, drills and for instruction. In Transleithania, apart from numerous Hungarian-based regiments operating like this, Norman Stone also identified two Slovak speaking regiments, three Romanian, six German/Hungarian hybrids, one German/Slovak, three German/Romanian, five Hungarian/Romanian and one with three languages – Hungarian/Romanian/Ukrainian.[984]

The Army General Staff also threw off the feudal reliance on commanders from the high nobility, allowing citizens from all classes to rise in the officer corps. This was on the surface a risk, as the army was a security that the dynasty would need to rely on if the nationality question ever got out of hand. At times they threw it off too much, to the disgust of the regime, which was adamant that politics and the military should not mix.[985] As Inspector General Archduke Albrecht had previously declared, "In no other country is unity, uniformity and the dynastic soldierly spirit as all important […] because only the dynasty and the army can hold this monarchy together."[986] Looking at the army lists of 1905, one is struck by the fact that out of the 129 members of the two highest ranks (*Generale der Kavallerie und Feldzeugmeister* and *Feldmarshall Leutnant*), only sixteen were from the high (or old) nobility. In addition, the service nobility (professional soldiers of noble background) and commoners held eleven of the fourteen corps commands.[987] The army, which had been set up with social mobility in mind, had become a meritocracy. Approximately 89 per cent of General Staff Officers from the period from 1867 to 1918 were from the middle or lower-middle classes.[988] One of these was Conrad.[989]

Most professional officers remained Austrian German – 78.7 per cent in 1910 – with Hungarian and Czech officers a very distant second and third. Some nationalities hardly dented officer lists.[990] At the lower level, in the years before the First World War, the authorities tried to inspire supranational loyalty in the corps.[991] The Army High Command was also deft at managing the nationalities at a lower level, effectively using distribution of soldiers as a passive security device to dampen conflict, for example they often would station Slav soldiers, under German officers, as far away from the nationalist rhetoric on the ground in their respective home territories as possible.[992]

How successful was military reform? To start with, like everything else in the Empire, it had to climb the mountain of the nationality conflict. As noted in a 1912 report to Ambassador

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[984] Stone, Constitutional, *op.cit.,* p. 167.
[985] TNA: Paget to Salisbury, Vienna, August 17 1888, FO 120/661:275. For example, Paget reported on a general, who had "attained some celebrity as a pamphlet writer and as the author of leading articles on foreign policies in the principal German paper of Hungary. Political Generals are not in favour in the Austrian Army and his permanent withdrawal from active Service may now be regarded as an accomplished fact".
[986] Rothenberg, Towards, *op.cit.,* p. 806.
[987] Rothenberg, Nobility, *op.cit.,* p. 184. The 16 from the high nobility were made up of 6 archdukes, 3 princes and 7 counts.
[988] Calculated by Nikolaus von Preradovich. Stone, Army, *op.cit.* p. 98.
[989] Rothenberg, Nobility, *op.cit.* p. 184.
[990] Stone, Army, *op.cit.,* p. 99. This 1910 cohort included zero Slovaks and less than one per cent of its body were Italian, Romanian, Ukrainian or Slovene. Hungarians made up 9.3% and Czechs 4.8%. This breakdown was demonstrably different to that of the Court Nobility, as Godsey, Quarterings, *op.cit.,* pp. 94-104, lists.
[991] Stone, *Ibid.,* p. 100.
[992] Johnstone, *op.cit.,* p. 50.

Cartwright, "the votes of each national or political party have in fact to be bought by concessions either political or material, and while the various factions are haggling over their bargains, the defensive forces of the Monarchy are obliged to suffer".[993] Slow progress continued to be made in the Hungarian struggle for military autonomy. In conjunction with István Tisza becoming Prime Minister, the Emperor sanctioned the use of the Hungarian language in Transleithanian military academies, the rearrangement of regiments so that as much as possible, Hungarian officers would serve in Hungarian regiments, and the regalia for such regiments, such as regimental colours, being brought into "harmony with the political claims of Hungary".[994] Finally, in 1912 the *Honvédség* received their long fought-for artillery, as did the *Landwehr*.[995]

The Common Army in 1910 had 183,000 infantry, 57,000 cavalry, and 79,000 gunners, supplemented by 62,000 men in the *Landwehr* and another 42,000 in the *Honvédség*.[996] From 1871 to 1914, for various reasons (none the least that the Hungarians repeatedly held up appropriations), military spending trebled in Russia but didn't even double in Austria-Hungary.[997] It was only towards the very eve of the First World War that investment skyrocketed. The British Military Attaché in Vienna issued a report in 1913 which, after outlining that "past neglect" was behind the urgency of increasing investment, concluded that: "From the foregoing considerations it will be seen that there is every indication that the Austro-Hungarian Army is to be thoroughly overhauled regardless of expense, and this contingency should be taken into account in assessing the Balance of Power in Europe in the Near Future."[998] The investment deficit would be felt in the War to come: as with the Russians often deficient on the small things. When marching into Italy in 1915, for example, the Imperial Army did so without reliable maps, intelligence or a robust supply system.[999]

Regardless of these problems, it was still a multinational military with national militia support, and would generally hold together until the end of the First World War. Norman Stone emphasised that the army remained dedicated, comparing it to that of France which was crippled by mutiny: "had France been a 'nationality state' no doubt the Nivelle mutinies would have been ascribed to motives less basic than disgust at the futility of war".[1000] It was for many Habsburg subjects their most direct, actual connection to the Empire, and this connection was cultivated and encouraged. For example, the Army Chief of Staff wrote in 1907 that it was imperative "that every recruit, whatever his nationality, should feel that he has equal rights in the armed forces, and that nothing should give rise to an impression that there exists in the army a privileged

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[993] TNA: Dispatch to Cartwright, Vienna, March 14 1912, FO 120/895:1.
[994] TNA: *Neue Freie Presse*, February 17 1908, in Goschen to Grey, Vienna, February 21 1908, FO 120/851:23. These concessions did get caught up in the larger overall sticking points, such as language of command.
[995] Déak, Comparing, *op.cit.*, p. 231.
[996] Stone, Army, *op.cit.* p. 98.
[997] *Ibid.*, p. 96.
[998] TNA: British Military Attaché in Vienna to Cartwright, Vienna, February 1 1913, FO 120/906.
[999] Craig, *op.cit.*, p. 196.
[1000] Stone, Army, *op.cit.* p. 103.

Herrenvolk".[1001]   Regardless of background, the officer corps would show intense loyalty to the Emperor. [1002] The common military also had an impressive breadth of service skills, made up from the disparate peoples of empire – the *Kriegsmarine*, for example, had a large proportion of Croat and Italian members at home on the Adriatic, not unlike the Imperial Russian Navy with its high proportion of officers from Finland.[1003]

The joint Imperial Army would become something of a point of identification for nationalities from throughout the empire, providing a common experience and a common training for the most varied of nationalities, frequently bringing recruits from some of the empire's more rustic regions into the modern age; sometimes, as reported by Joachim Remak, making him "reluctant to return to his native village when his term of service had ended".[1004] At the same time, the army was, as Ernst Bruckmüller has noted, intended as a vehicle for indoctrinating imperial patriotism: "For many—though not all—the common memory of the years spent in the army represented a process of patriotic socialization, the symbolic resonance of which could last a lifetime. Official sponsorship of veterans' associations consciously sought to strengthen this trend."[1005] That the military had to issue mobilisation posters in fifteen languages in 1914, whilst speaking nothing of the respective condition of the Habsburg military to those of the other 'great powers', spoke volumes about the successful transformation of the Austrian military of 1854 into the *k.u.k Armee* and *Kriegsmarine* of 1914.[1006]

[1001] *Ibid.*, p. 98.
[1002] Zöllner, *op.cit.*, p. 222, wrote that they "were dominated by 'black-yellow' sentiments", referring to the colours of the imperial flag.
[1003] Déak, Comparing, *op.cit.*, p. 234 & Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.*, p. 301.
[1004] Remak, *op.cit.*, p. 138.
[1005] Bruckmüller, Habsburg Society, *op.cit.* p. 9.
[1006] Stone, Army, *op.cit.* p. 100.

Chapter Six

6.   Securing Reform Initiatives

6.1.   Education: indoctrination and training

Emerging economies require workforces with the ability to undertake a wide diversity of vocations, and enough people who can master differing and multiple technical processes. Emerging nation-states require wilfully compliant populations and the 'cultural control' to enhance the collective impression of the 'nation'.[1007] Emerging nationalities require enough critical mass to maximise their competing ideological power within the particular system in which they belong. All three require educated populations, and for the latter two, language was the key. As Hroch stated, "the idea of linguistic identity brought together, new ties among people belonging to different social groups and political camps".[1008] From the mid-nineteenth century, both the Habsburg and Russian Empires would, in the words of Joachim von Puttkamer, establish: "a comprehensive and highly differentiated system of education [that] came to be a common project that united the state with large segments of society, rather than a factor of alienation".[1009] They were well aware that this "offered incentives to formulate competing visions of politics and society",[1010] creating subjects with a differing ideological perspective of the accepted order, but in order to keep up with the other 'great powers', they had little choice. The overarching nation-state ideological framework for educational reform was the mobilisation of the population for the benefit of the state through indoctrination and training by the delivery of education.

The differences in the Cisleithanian approach, on the one hand, and that taken in Russia and Transleithania, on the other, were stark. The Russians and Hungarians tried to ensure that the curriculum and language used, especially in secondary and higher education, would help develop subjects aligned with the ideological 'national' position, whereas in Cisleithania the opposite occurred – access to education in the subjects' mother tongue was guaranteed in the constitution (as it was in Hungary) but they actually allowed, indeed encouraged, freedom of education at all levels. In effect, the Austrians were trying to develop subject loyalty through pluralism and tolerance. The Imperial School Law of Austria stated: "The task of Elementary Schools is to bring up the children morally and religiously, to develop their spiritual activity, to furnish them with the necessary knowledge and capacity for a further preparation for life, and to lay the foundations for the formation of good citizens."[1011] By contrast, Erich Hoffman made an

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[1007] Tilly, States and Nationalism, *op.cit.,* p. 40.
[1008] Miroslav Hroch, "Language and National Identity", in R. L. Rudolph & D. F. Good (eds.), *Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union* (Minneapolis, 1992), p 72.
[1009] von Puttkamer, *op.cit.,* p. 371
[1010] *Ibid.*
[1011] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 8 1907, FO 120/840:22.

argument pertinent to Russia, and Hungary in particular, putting the onus of national conflict on the imposing state:

> *The dominant state often used school supervision as an instrument for the attempt to enforce the national identity of state, population and nation, for assimilating those parts of the population which had different nationality. Lessons and the compulsory use of a single language were a means to this end.*[1012]

The Habsburg and Russian Empires would succeed in advancing primary age education, but as late as the beginning of the First World War, academic secondary and tertiary education were still the province of the privileged few, especially in the latter realm. The provision of education would become a battlefield of nationalities in both empires, and its role in the dispersal of knowledge paramount. It should be emphasised that, in this area, nationality conflicts and grievances were *at least as* intense in the Russian Empire as in the Habsburg Empire, although the nature of the battles was different. Much of this was due to the ideological power dynamic of organised education; meaning it captured national groups at all three stages of the Hroch scale. It is also pertinent to turn to Michael Mann, who argued that nine different 'arenas' carry "discursive literacy": churches, the military, state administration, commerce, the law profession, universities, literature, periodicals and "discursive discussion centres".[1013] Of these nine, eight were either developing or intensifying in these two empires at this time, and the other – churches – had lost little of their ideological power over imperial subjects, and would become further involved in education where allowed. Both regimes had to face this convergence amidst far more heterogeneous subject populations than traditional nation-states.

6.1.1. The Russian Empire

Education reform was identified as a necessary and complementary step to the Russian reforms of the 1860s, providing competent resources to 'oil the wheels' of modernisation and industrialisation programmes. It would affect the Russian Imperial Power Structure through its effect on national and non-national group formation, as well as its provision of educated workers and soldiers to the system. There had been previous attempts at encouraging elementary education: amongst her eighteenth-century reform programmes, Catherine II had employed Teodor Janković – an Austrian Serb reformer sent by Habsburg Emperor Joseph II – to formalise primary education in Russia.[1014] In a reverse only too typical in imperial Russian history, this initiative was neglected after her death, and tsars Alexander I and Nicholas I would divert their attention to *gimnazii* and universities. In effect, they retreated from the broadening of the

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[1012] Erich Hoffmann, "The Role of Institutions of Higher and Secondary Learning" in A. Kappeler (ed.), *The Formation of National Elites*. Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, Vol. VI (Aldershot, 1992), p. 288.
[1013] Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.,* pp. 36-38.
[1014] von Puttkamer, *op.cit.,* p. 367.

education footprint to expanding opportunities for a minute elite.[1015] In addition, Russian speaking children had a literacy deficiency when compared to Lutheran non-Russian speakers in the empire, whose church-run elementary schools had long helped non-core languages to flourish (including with Latvian and Estonian).[1016] Russian language education was being superseded at a time when some national activists were beginning to imagine the empire as a *Russian* one.

We have already seen how Nicholas I reacted to the 1848 revolutions by restricting university autonomy, eliminating 'dangerous' courses in law and philosophy departments, and recalling Russian university students studying in Europe. However, after his death, St. Petersburg would rekindle its interest in the possibilities of secondary and tertiary education. Enrolment limitations, designed to keep the university-educated population small, were lifted in November 1855. [1017] Slowly, European government and philosophy classes returned in 1857 and 1860 respectively. [1018] 1861 saw the increase in the number and scope of *gimnazii*, the introduction of university bursaries, and training schools for teachers.[1019] Next was the University Statute of 1863, which drastically reduced government oversight in the universities, giving professors the same academic freedoms and autonomy as, for example, American professors.[1020] Of note was how much this statute was influenced by other European university systems – liberal lawyer K.D. Kavelin, recently removed as the tutor to the tsesarevich, was sent to Europe to study how the French and Germans organised higher education, and the proposal drafts, written in German, French and English, were "submitted for comment to Russian and foreign academic institutions, to education specialists and officials of both state and church".[1021]

The following year it was the turn of elementary education, which was put under the auspices of the *zemstva*. The western borderlands, as well as Finland and Poland, would – for the time being – retain their existing systems. A law of July 1864 also made Russian the language of instruction in all primary schools in the geographic Russian core, which was designed to specifically prevent, in David Saunders' words, "cultural diversification".[1022] Education came to be seen as a means of instilling subject loyalty at an early age, as well as creating a new base of productive workers. The Tsar's address to the Polish Viceroy Count Berg regarding Polish education, betrays how it was seen as a tool of state:

> *The main efforts of the government must aim, from an educational perspective, to spread sound concepts among the youth and to develop in them the love of work and a wise and solid education: and without permitting either themselves or others to transform the breeding grounds of science into*

[1015] *Ibid.*

[1016] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.*, p. 221. This resulted in Finns, Estonians and Latvians already having "a dense network of native language elementary schools and the highest literacy among all the ethnic groups of the Russian Empire".

[1017] Seton-Watson*, op.cit.*, p. 357.

[1018] *Ibid.*

[1019] TNA: Napier to Russell, St Petersburg, October 27 1861, FO 181/390:358.

[1020] John Darwin, *After Tamerlane. The Rise & Fall of Global Empires 1400-2000* (London, 2008), p. 232.

[1021] Mosse, *op.cit.*, pp. 49-50.

[1022] Saunders, Regional Diversity, *op.cit.*, p. 159.

political instruments, the school authorities must have the selfless service of civilization in view; they must constantly strive to improve public education in Poland and to raise the level of education.[1023]

The Russian Orthodox synod would become responsible for about one third of elementary schools following the reform, acting as the surrogate for state provided education. The quality of these schools was notoriously poor and children would often only attend for the minimum of two years.

The *zemstva*, however, took to their task with passion, running around 18,000 primary schools in European Russia in 1881, a number that compares favourably to 8,000 primary schools that had existed in the entire empire in 1856.[1024] They were responsible for staffing, managing school standards and levying taxes to help pay for their construction and maintenance (these funds also went to church and private peasant schools under their jurisdiction).[1025] In addition, after incorporation city councils increased funding for municipal schools tenfold between 1871 and 1881.[1026] Enrolments in the *gimnazii* also grew, but still only catered to a tiny number of students, of which almost half were from the upper classes (of 65,751 students in 1882, 47 per cent were children of nobles and government officials).[1027] Attempts by Alexander III's Minister of Education, Ivan Delyanov (1882-1897) to hinder access to *gimnazii* were a success: enrolments actually fell during his tenure.[1028]

With regard to the minority nationalities in the empire, the government saw schools as a homogenising tool, not to make 'Russians', per se (the exceptions being what they considered 'Little and White Russians' – Ukrainian and Belarusians), but rather to instil dynastic loyalty. For example, D.A. Tolstoy, later Minister of the Interior, remarked in 1868 how the regime looked to the west for inspiration, and how they believed forcing education in the Russian language was benevolent and beneficial to non-Russian communities:

The Sovereign Emperor, who is so generously spreading the means of education in this region, is fully justified in his hope that this will serve not to alienate it, but to bring it closer to other parts of Empire. The introduction and intensification of the teaching of Russian is designed with this goal […] This measure is by no means new; you can see it in all European states where the national consciousness is strong; where the numerousness of the pre-eminent tribe naturally attracts other peoples to it, and therefore where the state language becomes the school language.[1029]

Poles, those 'tainted by association' with Poles (Catholics), or those perceived as under the hegemony of Polish landowners, such as Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians, bore the brunt of early Russification of education. Count Mikhail Muravyov, Governor General of Northwestern Krai province, was a strong driver of the opening of new schools and the

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[1023] TNA: *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, 7 September 1864. Author's translation.
[1024] Moss, *op.cit.*, p. 424.
[1025] von Puttkamer, *op.cit.*, p. 368.
[1026] Moss, *op.cit.*, p. 424.
[1027] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 476.
[1028] *Ibid.*
[1029] Quoted in Kaspe, *op.cit.*, p. 467.

complete removal of the Polish language.[1030] By 1870, the Warsaw school district had already been set up as an arm of the Ministry of Education, and Warsaw University had been opened: a Russian language university established out of the Polish "Main School" (*Szkoła Główna*).[1031]

The suppression of the Polish language at schools of all levels followed, and the 'Polish education template' would, like other Russian attempts to manipulate ideological power, eventually be adopted throughout the western borderlands and beyond. As Edward Thaden contended, it would backfire, stimulating "resistance to so-called Russification and to intensify anti-Russian feelings among both students and teachers".[1032] National groups would try and circumvent regulations, which in turn would inspire more regulations, and so on. Private teaching was taken up in Poland and other western provinces, inspiring a retributive *Ukase* in 1900 with "maximum penalties for the establishment and maintenance of schools without the permission of the Government at a fine of 300 roubles or three months arrest."[1033]

As with other reforms, a reactionary wave was not long in the offing, coinciding with the beginning of Tolstoy's tenure as Education Minister in 1866.[1034] Reaction would briefly ease after Tolstoy left the post in 1880, and then intensify again under Alexander III's reign. To give an example of the fickleness of the times, in 1880 Tolstoy's successor A.A. Suburov wrote a report to Minister of War D.A. Miliutin proposing sweeping progressive reforms to university student life.[1035] The report was not acted upon, and merely four years – and one sovereign – later university autonomy was further curbed as fears of campus radicalism grew. The 1884 restrictions came with a not-too-subtle reminder to professors that teaching was a patriotic honour and the content of classes should reflect this. To this end, professors were now appointed directly by the

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[1030] Weeks, Lithuanians, 1863-1905, *op.cit.*, p. 106. Muravyov would write that the Russian government should open "the largest possible number of elementary schools" run mostly by the Orthodox church, with a curriculum that would cover "principally Russian and Slavic literacy, basic arithmetic, prayers, and elementary teachings on the dogmas of the Orthodox faith". Northwestern Krai covered six *Guberniyas*, mostly over modern day Lithuania and Belarus.

[1031] Alexey Miller and Mikhail Dolbilov, "The Damned Polish Question. The Romanov Empire and the Polish Uprisings of 1830-1831 and 1863-1864", in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.), *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), p. 447.

[1032] Thaden, The Russian Government, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

[1033] TNA: Translation of Imperial Ukase of May 28/June 8 1900, attachment to Wardrop to Salisbury, Warsaw, July 4 1900, FO 181/766/3-5: No 16 Political. As Wardrop noted: "In other words the instruction of the young when carried on otherwise than under government control will be punished in Poland itself in the same manner in which it is punished in those provinces (Vilna, Kovno, Grodno, Minsk, Vitebsk, Mohilev) where it is supposed that a Polish propaganda is being carried on among a population alleged to be mainly Russian."

[1034] Mosse, *op.cit.*, pp. 58-59. Amongst other things, he would push for banning science instruction and reducing other more modern instruction at the *gimnazii*, returning to a curriculum that was heavy on the classics. He would also make teachers become informers for the police.

[1035] G O Shchetinina, 'Novyy document po istorii vnutrenney politiki Rossii", *Problemy istochnikovedeniya*, vol 9 (Mosvow, 1961), pp. 11-14, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.*, p. 183. These included "1. To allow university students to set up funds, cheap canteens and organized assistance in finding work […] 2. To allow them to assemble to elect individuals empowered to manage these institutions and to discuss questions arising both out of these institutions and subjects of academic concern which are suggested by the university administration."

Minister.[1036] Further, in 1887, university and *gimnazii* fees were increased, with the aim of keeping 'undesirables' out (which meant the lower classes). [1037]

Pulling the strings from the shadows was Pobedonostev, who was behind a change of focus from government run schools to parish schools, which he believed would churn out good loyal Russians: 'assets' that would hopefully be developed without progressive, questioning thought. These parish schools were substandard but numerous; the number of church parish schools directly run by the synod during the reign of Alexander III rose from 4,064 (105,317 pupils) to 31,835 (981,076 pupils).[1038] This would work against the efforts of the *zemstva,* "with the result that knowledge makes but scant progress, owing to the inaptitude for secular teaching of the country priesthood".[1039] He despised secondary schools – believing that graduates had "unlimited and perverted self-love, which demands everything from the state, but does not contribute anything to it".[1040] Lt. Colonel Waters rather pointedly wrote in 1896 of university and *gimnazii* students, in a missive that betrays some common nineteenth century ideas on mass higher education:

> *Its light dazzles too often their brains, and non-constructive and atheistical ideas result. This has lately been affirmed by one of the leading professors at the University of St. Petersburgh [sic]. M. Pobedonostev is well aware of this, and strives with all his might to root out the evil. He seems to feel it his duty to act as a break on the spread of education against his own persuasions, favouring, at the same time, the development of industry where none but manual accomplishments are required.*[1041]

Pobedonostev was too late – the tide could not be stemmed. The Census of 1897 indicated that 33 per cent of men and 14 per cent of women were literate in European Russia, which although sounding unimpressive, was a major step forward, as was the fact that for 10-19 year olds almost 75 per cent of boys and 50 per cent of girls had achieved literacy.[1042] Also, elementary school attendance passed over 50 per cent around 1900, and stayed there.[1043] Nearly 40 per cent of all schools were run by *zemstvos*, which used 20 per cent of their expenses funding them.[1044] However, enrolments in tertiary education were still poor – not long before the Census (in 1893/94), the fifty-two higher learning institutions in the empire were attended by only 25,000 students out of an imperial population of around 125,000,000.[1045] The still-low literacy rates shocked British consul Henry Cooke: "this startling total of over 99,000,000 of both sexes

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[1036] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 475.
[1037] TNA: Dispatch to Salisbury, St. Petersburg, 4 September 1887, FO 181/682/1:304. It reported between 1862 and 1887, whilst the number of students in the "grammar schools" from the upper classes had remained stable, the "percentage of pupils in them belonging to the shopkeeping and peasant classes has risen from 36 to 60".
[1038] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 477.
[1039] BDFA: Waters to Goschen, St Petersburg, October 13, 1896, BDFA V2 pp. 305-311.
[1040] Quoted in Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 477.
[1041] BDFA: Waters to Goschen, St Petersburg, October 13, 1896, BDFA V2 pp. 305-311.
[1042] von Laue, Imperial Russia, *op.cit.,* p. 355.
[1043] von Puttkamer, *op.cit.,* p. 369.
[1044] *Ibid.,* p. 368.
[1045] Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.,* p. 263.

unable to read or write, and this in a European country at the end of the nineteenth century, stands prominently forward itself without reference to details".[1046]

In May 1905, under the shadow of revolution, the Committee of Ministers changed tack, decreeing that "under no circumstances should the schools [in the Baltic] be made into tools of an artificial execution of Russificatory principles".[1047] Russification of education was reversed, and the relaxation of autocratic rule with the October Manifesto of 1905 and the 1906 Constitution eased restrictions on teaching in non-Russian languages in the western borderlands – at least at primary school level. Teaching of these languages was also helped by the new freedom of religion, which saw mass reconversions to Catholicism, which in turn strengthened non-Orthodox religious schools.

The government was growing ever more wary of student strikes – there were almost six years of non-stop campus disturbances before the 1905 revolution – as well as the newer, academic professional associations.[1048] An attempt in 1910 to put universities – staff, curriculum and administration – under the autocratic control of the Minister of Education was stifled from above.[1049] The number of universities remained steady at ten (not counting Helsinki and a private university in Moscow) and the tertiary focus of the government had changed to higher technical colleges, due to their supposedly less radical atmosphere (in addition, graduates could be seconded almost immediately to the industries they had identified as ones of need).

6.1.2.   The Habsburg Empire

The Austrians were well ahead of the curve, introducing compulsory elementary schooling during the reforms of Maria Theresa under the General School Ordinance for the German Hereditary Lands of 1774. In this field, Austria was over *one hundred years* ahead of England, for example.[1050] This ordinance also introduced a three-tiered system of elementary schools, general schools, and normal schools, which were at once 'model schools' and teachers training institutes.[1051] Interest in expanding education into secondary and tertiary levels waned during the

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[1046] TNA: Henry Cooke, note respecting Elementary Education in Russia and Population Statistics, Moscow, August 24, 1906, in Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, August 25 1906, FO 371/128/550. He would go on to write that there were two arguments: "The one being that Russia is utterly unfit and unprepared for Constitutional or Representative Government, and that a population, the vast majority of which are ignorant peasants unable to read or write, can only be ruled by force. The other being that such a state of affairs is in itself an all-convincing condemnation of the ruling system prevailing, and that only a Constitutional or Representative Government can or will educate the masses and raise the level."

[1047] Haltzel, *op.cit.,* p. 173.

[1048] Zelnik, *op.cit.,* p. 212. Such as those for journalists, academics, lawyers and doctors.

[1049] BDFA: O'Beirne to Grey, St Petersburg, October 14 1910, BDFA V6, p. 70. O'Beirne would report that "M. Schwarz's Education Bill is in reality a radical revision of the charter given in 1884 to the Russian universities, and is avowedly drawn up so as to enable the Minister to exercise almost unlimited control over the universities, the governing and teaching staff, the students, and the actual programme of instruction, and thus to banish politics from the universities."

[1050] Miroslav Hroch, "Why did they win?", *op.cit.,* p. 650.

[1051] von Puttkamer, *op.cit.,* p. 361, argues that these reforms led to "stabilized diversity" and had "an impact on the codification of vernacular languages such as Czech, Ruthenian (Ukrainian) and Slovenian".

Metternich age, as did many enlightenment era ideals. The Revolution was a wake up call. In the words of Gary Cohen, "decades of conservatism and stagnation in public policy had allowed enormous gaps to develop between state and society and had almost fatally weakened the government's ability to assure its own power".[1052]

Not surprisingly, the first reform post-Revolution was the *Organisationsentwurf* of 1849, which established a secondary school system to produce bureaucrats for the Austrian civil service, an already large body destined to grow enormously under the burdens of neo-Absolutism.[1053] This was highlighted by a common German curriculum. Count Leo Thun's following reforms of the 1850s showed an unusual deftness in attempting to balance the centralising needs of a state by adopting of a 'core' language, with the continuance of other language instruction the responsibility of individuals or 'national' organisations. In 1854, German would officially become the primary language of secondary education, balanced by the belief that that home life, primary schooling and the Lower Gymnasium would provide sufficient knowledge (and an arena for use) of any native non-German languages, and that the Lower Gymnasium would also provide an appropriate background in Latin and Greek.[1054] Access to lesson materials was paramount, and if available in a non-German language, then they would be used, otherwise, the curriculum was Germanised. As German was the lingua franca of both the Austrian bureaucracy and educated society at all corners of the empire, and as students would move on to that bureaucracy, intra-empire commerce, or the military, it was a fairly logical policy, albeit one that would be the catalyst for numerous 'national' battles to come.

Thun battled for nearly five years, including against the Church, in order to get his curriculum adopted across the realm. He prevailed in 1857, and his vision (in principle) would be followed until 1918.[1055] As William Johnstone argued, "stress fell no longer on religion or obedience to the state, but on training students to engage in research at the university".[1056] Of course this was for the lucky few students who made it to higher secondary schooling, but was a genuine attempt to educate children for the needs of the state as they were seen at the time. Notably, just two years later, non-German *Gymnasien* no longer had to give preference to the German language – a sop to the Hungarians when the demise of neo-Absolutism became apparent.[1057] Further reforms followed after *Ausgleich* – which separated the education systems of the two halves of the Empire – helping further conflate schooling with national politics.

Article 19 of the 1867 Fundamental Law Concerning the General Rights of Citizens, which concerned ethnicity and language in Cisleithania, famously had a sentence added to the end on the insistence of Bohemian German liberals: "In those Crownlands inhabited by more

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[1052] Cohen, Politics of Access, *op.cit.,* p. 2 of 24.
[1053] von Puttkamer, *op.cit.,* p. 362.
[1054] Arens, *op.cit.,* p. 25 of 43.
[1055] *Ibid.* Thun himself was dismissed in 1860.
[1056] Johnstone, *op.cit.,* p. 67.
[1057] Walter Goldinger, "The Nationality Question in Austrian Education", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 3, Issue 03 (Jan., 1967), p. 140.

than one nationality, public institutions of education shall enable each of the nationalities to be educated in its language, without being compelled to learn a second language of the land."[1058] This was seen as a mandate for school infrastructure, teacher training and curriculum development, and where there was a mix of nationalities, such as in Bohemia, it would legitimise nearly fifty years of 'battling' over legally protected education rights.[1059] It was a death knell for mixed-language schools, however.[1060]

The first major reform in Cisleithania to follow *Ausgleich* was the General Law on Elementary and General Education of 1869 (*Reichsvolksschulgesetz*), which removed the clergy from state education and gave control of curriculum to the Crownlands – in effect, dictated from Vienna, but managed locally. In addition, if forty students in a school district required elementary education in their language, the state would be obliged to provide a school for them.[1061] Primary schools, by teaching in the dominant mother tongue of the region, helped reinforce national messages from the home. This would then be overlaid, for students that got there, by the secondary school historical curriculum, which was designed, as Ernst Bruckmüller argued, to "inculcate a state-wide sense of patriotism".[1062] The results at primary level were impressive. By 1880, over 95 per cent of Austrian and Bohemian school aged children were at school, and even 67 per cent in Dalmatia, still a very poor province.[1063] In addition, all languages were represented by their own primary schools: in 1903/04 for example, there were 7,944 German language schools; 5,320 Czech; 2,356 Polish; 2,239 Ruthenian; 779 Slovene; 683 Italian; 504 Serbo-Croat; 123 Romanian and 3 Hungarian. To exemplify how efficient the authorities were in segmentation (and how problematic national segmentation was) there were only 301 mixed primary schools.[1064]

As with the Russians, the Austrians were wary of having too large an educated population reach the economy before it was able to accommodate them, as well as the greater competition for prized civil service jobs. Thus, they tried to implement measures tempering the growth of secondary education. For example, the Austrian Ministry of Religion and Instruction worked to limit enrolments in the *Gymnasium* and *Realschule*, by counselling parents of prospective students

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[1058] Regarding the Bohemian German Liberals, see King, *op.cit.,* p. 99. The first two clauses of Article 19 were: "All ethnic groups in the state have equal rights and every ethnic group has the inviolable right to preserve and cultivate its nationality and language" and "The equality of all languages customary to the crownlands are recognized in schools, government agencies, and public life." See Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 339. An English translation from 1919 that remains in common circulation – "Fundamental Law Concerning the General Rights of Citizens", The Constitutions of the States at War, *op.cit.,* p. 19 – uses the term 'race' instead of 'ethnic groups', a dated translation of the term "*Volksstämme*".
[1059] Zahra, *op.cit.,* pp. 501-543.
[1060] Goldinger, *op.cit.,* p. 138, remarked that anti-mixed-school activists argued that learning two languages would be of a disadvantage to children, and would affect their other school work.
[1061] for more details, see Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 184, Zahra, *op.cit.,* p. 503 and Goldinger, *op.cit.,* pp. 144-145.
[1062] Ernst Bruckmüller, "Was There a "Habsburg Society" in Austria-Hungary?" *Austrian History Yearbook,* Vol. 37 (2006), p. 7.
[1063] Gildea *op.cit.,* p. 247. Even in Bukovina, a province well behind the 'modernisation curve', 36 per cent of such children were at school.
[1064] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 8 1907, FO 120/840:22.

who performed only moderately well in the admission examination, particularly the poorest or least 'academic', to pursue alternative vocational education.[1065] However, as responsibility for education had been partially divested to local and regional governments, those bodies could simply start new schools at their own cost.[1066] The exception, notably, was in Lower Austria – there was a good thirty years of disputes there regarding the attempted establishment of Czech language schools in Vienna.[1067] Of course, much of the reason behind minimalising access to education was class-based, as this anonymous comment from 1899 demonstrated:

> *This aiming high above one's status, often notwithstanding all conditions, is, in fact, a dark side of our social conditions, for it corresponds to a basic misjudgement of the value and importance of an educated agricultural and craft element, a sad delusion about the good fortune of becoming something "better," a mistake, which often must be paid for with the bitterest disappointment, with a mongrel life, and dire circumstances of pressing occupational responsibility and an increasing struggle for survival, and which raises up that multifarious proletariat in official garb that is worse off than the proletariat with the calloused hands of labor.*[1068]

The juxtaposition of enabling and stifling education of groups of co-national children, and the related debates, would come to dominate politics in Vienna and the regions. This could be seen in Galicia, where efforts to 'Polonise' education went against the constitutional guarantees offered the Ruthenian population, who would seek recourse in German as well as Ukrainian language instruction.[1069] Outrage was not confined to peripheral nationalities: for example, the Windischgrätz cabinet was toppled in 1895 after attempts to assuage Slovenian nationalists by allowing Slovenes to run parallel classes in their language in a single gymnasium in Styria caused violent opposition amongst Austrian German nationalists.[1070]

In effect, the government became 'damned if they did, and damned if they didn't'. Joachim von Puttkamer outlined their dilemma well: "The introduction of a constitutional order based upon freedom of speech and political participation fuelled national conflict over educational matters, and therefore, posed much more of a challenge to empire than the actual development of the educational system itself."[1071] National organisations invested in educating their 'peoples'. This fed the national 'machine' with more activists, especially when considered in concert with the decennial censuses that began in 1880, the aforementioned competition for civil service positions, and the geographic anomalies of language 'borders'. [1072]

[1065] Cohen, Politics of Access, *op.cit.,* p. 9 of 24.

[1066] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* pp. 257-258.

[1067] Goldinger, *op.cit.,* pp. 148-152.

[1068] Cohen, Politics of Access, *op.cit.,* p. 9 of 24.

[1069] For an example of this dynamic in one town, see Börries Kuzmany, "Centre and Periphery at the Austrian-Russian Border: The Galician Border Town of Brody in the Long Nineteenth Century", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 42 (2011), pp. 67-88. Also see Wandycz, *op.cit.,* p. 85. For example, the universities in Krakow and Lviv were Polonised in the early 1870s, after a school board was instituted in 1867 which allowed for "education in accordance with national ideas," i.e. not German.

[1070] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 439, and Taylor, *op.cit.,* pp. 185-86.

[1071] von Puttkamer, *op,cit.,* p. 372.

[1072] For an overview of the issue of these 'borders', see Cornwall, *op.cit.,* pp. 914-955.

The more advanced the region, the more diverse the population, the more intense the clashes. Naturally, this would become most heated in Bohemia. Tara Zahra outlines the nature of these 'battlefields': "Because children could learn any language easily, nationalists feared that those children allegedly 'born' to their nation could be exchanged, lost, or stolen through education in the 'wrong' national milieu or because their parents were indifferent to their nationality."[1073] All of which was intensified by the generous segmentation of the educational bureaucracy enshrined in the Austrian constitution.[1074] Nationality was "dangerously malleable" not only with children, but also with their pragmatic parents, many of whom, on the Czech side, would have rather sent their children to German language schools, if practical, than 'fly the national flag'.[1075]

By contrast, Hungarian schools would slowly become a tool of Magyarization. The 1868 Hungarian law on elementary education – which made schooling compulsory for six to twelve year olds – placed responsibility for managing primary education on the Catholic Church through their existing network of "backward" confessional schools,[1076] to constitutional guidelines (meaning minority language primary education was protected). To the chagrin of the Church, village and municipal schools, run by the state directly, supplemented the confessional schools[1077] and they would be subject to strict government oversight.[1078]

The divergence began after that, with secondary education, where the government in Budapest worked to reduce, even eliminate, opportunities for education in non-Magyar languages. These peoples were not cut off from education, per se; they were cut off from their language. The Slovaks, for example, suffered greatly, having their *gymnasia* closed in 1874, as well as the educational society *Matice slovenská* the following year, as it was believed they were responsible for the teaching and proliferation of "'unpatriotic' and Pan-Slavist ideas".[1079] Such a strategy would be repeated across Transleithania.[1080] 1879 saw the introduction of mandatory Hungarian language teaching in primary schools, with the law extending to secondary schools in 1883.[1081]

Another tactic was state control of teachers: various laws enacted after that year mandated such a high level of pay for teachers that only the state could afford to pay them, thereby keeping

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[1073] Zahra, *op.cit.,* pp. 503 & 505.

[1074] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 8 1907, FO 120/840:22. For example, Goschen reported that: "Every Kingdom or Province of the Empire has a Provincial School Council to which is entrusted the general management of education within its borders. Under this Council are County School Councils for each County, and under these again District School Councils for each District."

[1075] Zahra, *op.cit.,* p. 503.

[1076] von Puttkamer, *op.cit.,* p. 363 & Kontler, *op.cit.,* p. 285, who called them "the backward system of confessional schools".

[1077] Tibor Frank, "Hungary and the Dual Monarchy, 1867-1890", in P. Sugar, P. Hanák & T. Frank (eds.), *A History of Hungary* (Bloomington, IN, 1990), p. 258.

[1078] Kontler, *op.cit.,* p. 285.

[1079] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* p. 262. Also see Emil Niederhauser, "The national question in Hungary", M. Teich & R. Porter (eds.), *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context* (Cambridge, UK, 1993), pp. 260-261.

[1080] Cohen, *Ibid.,* pp. 262-263.

[1081] Barany, *op.cit.,* p. 248 & Niederhauser, *op.cit.,* p. 260.

them under the government's umbrella.[1082] By the twentieth-century, the onus was put on those individual teachers to appropriately educate their students from a Hungarian perspective. This manifested in the harsh Apponyi Education Law of 1907, which required teachers to take an oath of loyalty and made it possible to dismiss them if their students did not know the Hungarian language, thereby endangering all primary education in non-Hungarian language schools.[1083] This was a typically deft but insincere government sidestep of the 1868 Constitutional protections afforded the nationalities, but was not applied with heavy hands.

In 1906/07, out of the 205 *gymnasia* in Transleithania, 189 used the Hungarian language exclusively, with the rest mixed between the other minority languages, except Slovak or Ukrainian, which had none.[1084] These were being fed by the primary school system, of which by 1914 there were still 2,900 teaching in the Romanian language that had managed to evade or ignore the Apponyi Laws.[1085] There was no dividing of universities like the Austrians had allowed in Prague and Lviv either – all tertiary education was conducted in Hungarian. This justification, from Hungarian Liberal Party spokesman József Sandór, shows the stark differences between Vienna and Budapest: "Since patriotism is inconceivable without a common language, our task must be to create one [...] What we expect from them is not only that they speak the Magyar vernacular but that they start to feel like Magyars themselves."[1086] The overall results of these initiatives can be measured through the results of Imperial Censuses. In 1910, for example, out of 8.3 million non-Magyars in Hungary, only 1.8 million knew the Hungarian language.[1087] The regime would have a long way to go to bridge this gap, although in this era of heated language nationalism, garnering even 1.8 million Hungarian speakers from non-Magyar citizens could be argued to represent at least a partial success.

Overall, education would take off for certain parts of the population in both halves of the empire. If a person was in a position to qualify for higher education, they could access it. A stunning comparison can be made with Russia. In 1861-62 year at the Universities of Vienna and Graz, there were 359 Southern Slav enrolees, whereas in the entire decade between 1851 and 1861 – during the rise of the Pan-Slavist movements in Russia – there was exactly *one* student of this type enrolled at Moscow University, although these were the very students Pan-Slavists were trying to indoctrinate.[1088] Cisleithanian *Gymnasium* and *Realschule* enrolments would increase nearly five-fold between 1851 and 1910, and matriculated university students rose from 5,646 in 1850-51 year to 23,058 in winter semester 1909-10. Those graduating from technical colleges rose by about the same ratio.[1089] The aforementioned five fold increase in academic secondary

[1082] Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.,* p. 209
[1083] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 200.
[1084] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* pp. 262-263.
[1085] Zsuppán, *op.cit.,* p. 67. In Slovakia that year, 16 per cent of young children were taught only in Slovak.
[1086] Quoted in Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* p. 263.
[1087] Géza Jeszensky, "Hungary through World War 1 and the End of the Dual Monarchy", in P. Sugar, P. Hanák & T. Frank (eds.), *A History of Hungary* (Bloomington, IN, 1990), p. 270.
[1088] Okey, Central Europe, *op.cit.,* pp. 118-119.
[1089] Cohen, Politics of Access, p. 17 of 24.

school pupils constituted 3.06 per cent of the total of eleven-to-eighteen year olds in Cisleithania, whilst in winter 1909-10, 1.2 per cent and 0.42 per cent of relevant aged young adults were matriculated in the universities and technical colleges respectively.[1090] Universities operated in seven cities in Cisleithania – Vienna, Graz. Innsbruck, Prague (split), Lviv, Krakow and Czernowitz (Chernivtsi), covering a number of nationalities, but not all, to the annoyance of the Italians, [1091] and still with a German predominance. [1092] However, there were benefits at elementary and Lower Gymnasium level, due to the fact that attendance at these was compulsory for children aged 6 to 14.[1093]

Gary Cohen has shown that before the First World War, Austria's higher education enrolment rate was the highest *per capita* of the major Europe countries. For example, he found that in winter 1910-11, Austria's attendance rate in was "thirty per cent higher than for France, seventy five per cent higher than for England, nearly twice that of Italy, more than double for Hungary, and more than three times that for Russia."[1094] However, somewhat contradictorily, the labour force overall was less educated than that in Germany,[1095] which suggests an educational 'lag' that might have taken another generation to overcome. Hence, whether this increase was enough to feed the economy with the right amount of qualified people for their needs is up for question – as is whether it was worth the destabilisation to the Habsburg Imperial Power structure that it would cause.

6.2.   Elevating and prioritising data science

Industrialisation, as given impetus from – or commandeered by – the state apparatus, raised an enormous amount of organisational questions for nation-states and empires alike. Challenges included how to 'fuel' modernisation, and with which resources. A fundamental issue was where to encourage or locate industry; and in turn what industry was necessary and viable. Other questions included how to organise the bureaucracy and where to place the army. In addition, how to ensure transport and communications that would cost-effectively connect the realm, and how to ensure the maximum extraction of revenue in order to pay for them. Emerging nation-states would turn to science in order to maximise the potential of their state. This entailed

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[1090] *Ibid.,* p. 16. For the universities, this covered nineteen-to-twenty-two-year-olds, and for the technical colleges, eighteen-to-twenty-two-year-olds.

[1091] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 8 1907, FO 120/840:22. Indeed, the Czech University in Prague was the second largest in teachers and students, the mixed Polish/Ruthene university in Lemberg the third largest in students, and the Polish university in Krakow the third largest by teachers.

[1092] Whiteside, *op.cit.,* p. 164. In 1914, Germans made up 38% of *Gymnasium* enrolments, 45% in the *Realschule*, 47% in vocational training schools and 65% in business schools. In the universities and technical institutes of Cisleithania in 1914, there were 17,000 German students, 5,900 Czech, 8,700 Polish, 1,200 Serb/Croat, 1,500 Ruthene, 700 Slovenes and only 900 Italians.

[1093] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 8 1907, FO 120/840:22. Of school age children in 1904: 87.89% attended Public Elementary Schools, whereas just 2.98% attended Private Schools and 1.99% were in Technical Schools or being home schooled.

[1094] Cohen, Politics of Access, *op.cit.,* p. 3 of 24.

[1095] Schulze, Origins, *op.cit.,* p. 207.

reliance on statistical analysis for management of government assets, including people. In short, the census became a "major means of modernizing the state." [1096]

The obvious, but by no means only mechanism, are censuses, adopted after 1850 by most states to be, as Ulrike von Hirschhausen argued, "a key tool of political rule, national integration and social stratification". [1097] The overarching nation-state ideological framework here is conditioning the state apparatus to rely on data science as an efficiency tool. There are three more specific frameworks: segment populations in order to ensure the most efficient allocation, extraction and disbursement of resources; map the assets of the nation to establish benchmarks for modernisation; and prioritise data when planning industry and infrastructure.

In the late nineteenth- and early-twentieth century environment, it was unavoidable that language would take on such significance to the census. It was a multi-lingual state that in 1846 first introduced a language as a census question – Belgium. What was designed to help understand the distribution of the Dutch, Flemish and German speakers of Belgium would become a political hand grenade in Austria and Russia. The census, as noted by Kertzer and Arel, "emerged as the most visible, and arguably the most politically important, means by which states statistically depict collective identities."[1098]

6.2.1.   The Russian Empire

The Russian Empire under Nicholas I would investigate formalising statistics as a tool of imperial management. There has been some historical foundation – *revizii* had been conducted periodically since the eighteenth-century as a means of establishing a basis of eligible taxpayers, although the statistical (if not fiscal) outcomes were rather limited, as exemptions by estate and outright evasion meant accurate numbers were sketchy at best.[1099] The final *revizii* (the tenth) was held in 1858, and like all others, only measured summary male population totals.[1100] The Imperial Geographical Society was founded during his reign (1845), ostensibly to investigate the diversity of imperial subjects across the empire.[1101] This dovetailed with the Russian Academy of Science, which would notably see its ranks swelled by German scientists enticed there by Count

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[1096] David I. Kertzer, and Dominique Arel, "Censuses, identity formation, and the struggle for political power", in D.I. Kertzer and D. Arel, *Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses* (Cambridge, UK, 2002), p. 6.

[1097] Ulrike von Hirschhausen, "People that Count. The Imperial Census in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Europe and India", in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.), *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012) p. 145.

[1098] Kertzer & Arel, *op.cit.,* p. 3.

[1099] von Hirschhausen, *op.cit.,* p. 153. Don Karl Rowney & Edward G. Stockwell, "The Russian Census of 1897: Some Observations on the Age Data", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), p. 217, noted that they completely lacked socioeconomic data. Also see Steven L. Hoch & Wilson R. Augustine, "The Tax Censuses and the Decline of the Serf Population in Imperial Russia, 1833-1858", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sept. 1979), pp. 403-425 (especially pp. 404-406) for an overview of why the data from *revizii* was both limited and flawed.

[1100] Hoch & Augustine, *op.cit.,* p. 405.

[1101] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 336.

Uvarov.[1102] Modern military statistical analysis would also move ahead with the publishing of the *Military-Statistical Survey of the Guberni and Oblasti of the Russian Empire* in 1836.[1103] However, their remits were narrow, and Nicholas I was distrustful of their outcomes. The result was that in the period up to the Crimean War, there was either a dearth of statistical analysis, or what data that existed was poorly analysed, co-ordinated or applied, across all Ministries. Bruce Lincoln outlined an example of the shortfalls, in this instance a contemporary bureaucrat comment analysing peasant uprisings in 1855:

> *He described the failure of officials to make proper use of reports on social unrest filed in St. Petersburg's chanceries: "It has never occurred to a single official to classify all files bearing the designation 'concerning peasant revolts' (which we consider to be files of critical importance) according to province, reasons for revolt, [or] types of revolt […] Such a digest ought to be essential for various administrative reasons."* [1104]

Around the time of the Crimean War, various government figures had come to realise how helpful statistics could be in managing the empire. Grand Duke Constantine, the Tsar's brother, would take the lead on geographic and ethnographic fronts, and General D.A. Miliutin on the military. In 1855, Constantine authorised an ethnographic expedition throughout the empire, primarily conceived to help with naval conscription and recruitment. This expedition was also charged with identifying potential reform roadblocks, or challenges to unity and imperial authority, and one of its main conclusions was that benefits of imperial rule should be better promoted to all levels of society without putting the national minorities off side.[1105]

The War Ministry took the lead amongst the Ministries. D.A. Miliutin was shocked to find when analysing the failure in the Crimea that there was practically no accessible data for him to review, which led him to make statistics central to General Staff study.[1106] In a 1863 letter to Miliutin, General Golitsyn outlined the importance to reform statistics would be, "Everything begins in the General Staff Academy, however, a general military statistical education should be supplemented by the study of theory and sources of military statistics."[1107] Other ministries followed around 1860, specifically in the case of the Ministry of Internal Affairs out of necessity caused by the upheaval of emancipation.[1108] Overall, administrative practice would increasingly utilise statistical method. For example, future Emperor Alexander III, when in command of the

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[1102] Nathaniel Knight, "Science, Empire, and Nationality: Ethnography in the Russian Geographical Society, 1845-1855", in J. Burbank & D. L. Ransel (eds.), *Imperial Russia. New Histories for the Empire* (Bloomington, IN, 1998), pp. 111. The work of the academy at this time was notably mostly published in French and German.

[1103] Rich, *op.cit.*, p. 624.

[1104] From the diary of Aleksandr Ivanovich Artem'yev (1855 entries), a Kazan statistician in the Provisional Statistical Committee in the Interior Ministry, W. Bruce Lincoln, "Russia on the Eve of Reform: A Chinovnik's View", *The Slavonic and East European Review,* Vol. 59, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), p. 268.

[1105] For more details see Catherine B. Clay, "Russian Ethnographers in the Service of Empire, 1856-1862", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), especially pp. 47-78.

[1106] Rich, *op.cit.,* pp. 632-633. Indeed, Miliutin would use statistics to basically destroy the counter-arguments of the reactionary members of the General Staff and Ministry, p. 634.

[1107] Quoted in *ibid.,* p. 625.

[1108] *Ibid.,* p. 630.

St. Petersburg military district in 1880, inspired the formation of the *Statistical Review*, as he was "impressed by the urgent necessity of a careful survey and study" of the district, "in view of its great strategical importance," as it not only contained the imperial capital but also sat on its "maritime political boundaries".[1109] However, there would be one final mountain to conquer – an empire-wide census. This would finally come to pass, in 1897, as the Great Russian Census.

The Census, conceived, developed and organised by the Ministry of the Interior, took many years to come to fruition.[1110] Discussions began in 1860, and in 1874 a commission was summoned to investigate the best way to conduct an empire-wide census.[1111] However, it did not occur until 1897, as government was fearful of the unrest and dissent that it could cause, their feelings intensified after having examined the fracas over language questions that plagued the Habsburg censuses of 1880 and 1890. They were also wary of publishing the results, rightly fearing they would be used as a tool for national mobilisation (including, as it would turn out, by Russians), as well as highlighting human and technical weaknesses.[1112] When it was finally conducted, in 1897, its dozen questions avoided any specific enquiries on nationality, due to fears that people would either not know how to answer, or give such poor answers as to render them unreliable.[1113] Religious affiliation and spoken language were used instead, and this gave the regime some answers on nationality by stealth – for example Orthodox/Russian speaker instantly meant Russian, Protestant/German speaker meant German, and so on.[1114]

Other questions addressed *soslovie*, economics, employment and production, literacy and personal levels of educational and health. Notably, the only question asked about literacy was: "Can you read?"[1115] The result they most feared (and almost certainly expected) came about – self-reporting Russians made up less than 50 per cent of the population. In response, the regime – with Austria in mind – would consider the already-published Ukrainian and Belarusian components belonged to theirs, thereby giving 'Russians' a majority.[1116] In effect, this proves the argument of Kertzer and Arel, that: "The census does much more than simply reflect social reality; rather, it plays a key role in the construction of that reality."[1117] According to the

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[1109] TNA: Memorandum of Michell, Warsaw, July 5 1888, FO 181/688 (no number).

[1110] Rowney & Stockwell, *op.cit.,* pp. 217-219 & Juliette Cadiot, "Le recensement de 1897: Les limites du contrôle impérial et la représentation des nationalités", *Cahiers du Monde russe,* Vol. 45, No 3 /4 (Jul-Dec 2004), pp. 442-444.

[1111] Cadiot, Le recensement de 1897, *op.cit.,* p. 442.

[1112] von Hirschhausen, *op.cit.,* pp 154 & 157. The results were published an astonishing *eight* years after the Census was held.

[1113] Cadiot, Searching for Nationality, *op.cit.,* p. 440. For an excellent contemporary review, published less than six months after the census was conducted, see also P.K., "The Census of the Russian Empire", *The Geographical Journal,* Vol. 9, No. 6 (Jun., 1897), pp. 657-659.

[1114] von Hirschhausen, *op.cit.,* p. 156. According to Cadiot, "statisticians […] decided not to ask individuals a direct question on nationality, arguing that the population would not know how to respond to such a question, or would answer the question so poorly that the results would not be a true reflection of 'reality'". Cadiot, Searching for Nationality, *op.cit.,* 441.

[1115] von Laue, Imperial Russia, *op.cit.,* p. 355.

[1116] More specifically, the figures were Great Russians 55.673m (43.3%), Ukrainians 22,415m (17.41%) and Belarusians 5,886m (4.57%). Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 469.

[1117] Kertzer & Arel, *op.cit.,* p. 2.

government's wishful interpretation, Russians made up nearly two-thirds of the population and therefore being a 'Russian' empire was perfectly justified in the eyes of the regime. This was not necessarily insincere: to quote Lieven: "Russia's rulers, and indeed much of educated society, regarded Ukrainians and Belorussians as simply offshoots of the Russian tribe who spoke somewhat strange dialects."[1118] They had manipulated the results of a census of questionable methodological accuracy for their own ends, ignoring the overall lesson of the exercise: in a volatile geopolitical period with rising ideological discord, the non-Russian majority was formalising as peripheries within the Imperial Power Structure.

Theodore von Laue outlined a number of further problems with the execution of the census. The Government did little to educate the population as to what it was all about, and unsurprisingly many people, suspicious of its true objectives, saw it as a prelude to new taxes (as previous regional surveys had been). In addition, respondents were well aware from experience of the "dire consequences of religious dissent",[1119] and the timing of the Census, in January, meant that many peasants were undertaking seasonal work in the cities and were therefore not in their home region to start with.[1120] For the government, the results were not so promising; providing evidence that there was still a very long way to go to bridge the gaps with the other European powers. We have already seen the literacy results: to this it bears adding that of the just over 100,000 current or ex-university students, 73 per cent were children of nobles or non-noble officials, 20 per cent from the urban classes and a mere 2 per cent – in the range of 2,000 – were peasants. The overall experience of the census was troublesome enough for them to delay a second until 1915 (due to the War, it did not occur).[1121]

6.2.2   The Habsburg Empire

The major shocks sustained by the Habsburg Empire in the middle of the nineteenth-century were not so much the result of poor data. An enormous bureaucracy was helpful, although they too suffered from inefficient revenue collection, resource extraction and allocation, in this instance, due to extreme diversity, and claims making. The only way the regime could establish an accurate gauge of their empire, in order to improve this was to turn to a formal census. Both census results, and how the censuses were run and managed, would quickly become notable (particularly in Cisleithania) for nationalist jockeying. They provided the catalyst for competition over ideological, political and economic power through the employment of collective, diffused and intensive power.

[1118] Lieven, The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, *op.cit.,* p. 623.

[1119] von Laue, Imperial Russia, *op.cit.,* p. 355. P.K., *op.cit.,* p. 659, concluded four months after the census that it "was a decided success. There were, of course, some regretful incidents, due to the hostility of the population to all censuses, which are considered as preliminary to new taxes".

[1120] von Laue, Imperial Russia, *op.cit.,* p. 355.

[1121] Cadiot, Searching for Nationality, *op.cit.,* p. 440.

Imperial censuses occurred in 1869, 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910. The regime believed they would provide the empirical evidence needed to adequately (and fairly) deal with nationality issues at a local level.[1122] It was fitting that the questions pertaining to nationality would be the most problematic. The authorities in Vienna decided to use the notion of *Umgangsprache* (the language of daily use) as the criteria for determining nationality, which would be ascertained by the to-become-notorious Question 13.[1123] This enabled them to avoid mentioning it specifically, under the naïve assumption that asking people to specifically choose their 'nation' would have inflamed the nationality issue even more (in many regions language was already being used to determine nationality, for example by the Czechs and Germans in Bohemia). [1124] The fundamental problems with this approach are apparent – in an empire where German was a pseudo-lingua franca, where German was required for working in the civil service bureaucracy, and where many children, in particular, were sent to German schools as a means to better themselves, how could *Umgangsprache* possibly be used as a means to determine nationality?

Nowhere was this problem more acute than in Bohemia.[1125] The Czechs, as Mark Cornwall noted, rebelled against *Umgangsprache*, as they were convinced that Czechs who felt 'inferior' could be persuaded to answer the Census question as 'German', or Czechs of low education who worked in a German factory or town and used it daily would unknowingly do the same.[1126] In addition, there was the question of how to judge genuinely bilingual people, for whom German and Czech were interchangeable.[1127] Hence, the census became a lightning rod for national activists as they knew its results could determine such things as local language rights and education funding, the number of schools and conscription lotteries, whilst at the national level would help determine political representation and reform, as well as investment in railways and public services.[1128] Typically of a Habsburg bureaucratic programme, it also helped determine the minutiae, such as in which languages a town's official signage, for example at railway stations or on government buildings, had to be presented.[1129]

Censuses and education intersected when it came to nationality, and as a result, the Czechs campaigned for the replacement of *Umgangssprache* as a category by 'mother tongue'. As Badeni would find out in 1897, to the detriment of his career, the number of Czechs who needed to use German every day was exponentially more than the number of Germans who needed to use Czech. Not only had Prague transformed into a Czech city in the nineteenth century, but also

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[1122] von Hirschhausen, *op.cit.,* p. 149.
[1123] Z.A.B. Zeman, "The Four Austrian Censuses and their Political Consequences", in M. Cornwall (ed.), *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (Exeter, 1990), especially pp. 31-32.
[1124] Zahra, *op.cit.,* p. 503.
[1125] Cornwall, *op.cit.,* pp. 919-920.
[1126] *Ibid.*
[1127] von Hirschhausen, *op.cit.,* p. 151.
[1128] *Ibid.,* p. 152, also see Zeman, *op.cit.,* p. 33-35. Zeman stated, for example, that: "If it could be established that at least fifty school children over a five years' average had to attend a school more than an hour's walking distance, then a more accessible school had to be established." *Ibid.,* p. 34.
[1129] Zeman, *ibid.,* p. 33.

numerous Czechs could be found working in Vienna and Trieste, for example.[1130] In both places, they had to speak German as the lingua franca of government and business.

The nature of the Budapest government meant that the census results were used for differing purposes in Transleithania. It would help with the allocation of funding for primary schools on the basis of language. However, not only did the Hungarians use *Umgangssprache* figures to boast about the total of ethnic Magyars in the Kingdom, but also to champion voluntary conversions to the Magyar nationality. Many Saxon Germans and Jews, for example, were shown through these censuses to have 'become Hungarian', a number that would be loudly trumpeted by the Hungarian government. Unsurprisingly, the results of the censuses had no effect in changing the gerrymandering of the Hungarian parliament.

6.3.   Legal reform and improvement of civil liberties

Freedom from censorship, and other fundamental human rights that we now consider universal, such as freedom of association, were notoriously regressive in the Habsburg and Russian Empires of 1854. In the legal arena the Austrians were considerably further advanced than the Russians, although there was still considerable room for modernisation. These were identified as areas ripe for reform, primarily as they would be key contributing elements to the entire suite of reforms, which were to a degree reliant on them. The nation-state ideological framework behind reforming legal practices was to introduce due process and justice, to build confidence in the institutions and processes of the country. In respect of the relaxation of censorship and improving human rights, it was to ensure freedom of the press, freedom of association and promotion of basic human rights, in order to enable the development of a robust civil society. Arguably, freedom of the press and freedom of association make public issues at all levels of the (literate) subject population, in turn bringing both opponents and allies of the regime out into the open. The latter also infers another framework, enabling the regime to be in a more informed position to control the political landscape of the polity. The latter two frameworks would be delivered in a much patchier fashion in both empires, and there would be notable periods of reaction.

6.3.1. The Russian Empire

The first true codification of Russian laws was undertaken under Nicholas I in the 1830s, however what was codified was the existing Russian legal system, with such features as no trial by jury, no right to legal representation and suppression of the publication of verdicts. There was no prioritising or segmentation of laws, which were just listed in chronological order.[1131] During his

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[1130] Klabjan, *op.cit.,* pp. 22.
[1131] Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.* p. 289.

reign a legal school was opened in order to supply the bureaucracy, the numbers of which were slowly beginning to grow from a very small base.[1132] Amongst this group were some of the legal experts who would write the 1860s legal reforms for his son, Alexander II.[1133]

One of the cornerstones of the reforms would become the Judicial Reform of 1864, heavily influenced by Western European legal systems, such as the French.[1134] This introduced the notion of equality before the law, trial by jury, complete separation of the judiciary from the state, the establishment of a bar, publication of court verdicts, and tenure. The introduction to the relevant *Ukase* offers a good example of the classical European liberalism that drove the reforms: "After having examined these projects, we find that they completely respond to our desire to establish in Russia an administration of justice that is prompt, equitable, favourable and equal for all our subjects; to raise judicial power; to give it the necessary independence, and in general to strengthen respect for the law in the nation."[1135]

In addition, anomalies, such as how imperial laws would go into effect without being made public, or the fact that, as Richard Pipes has argued, there was no recognisable "distinction between laws, decrees and administrative ordinances", were removed.[1136] This was complemented by the introduction of the township (*volost'*) courts – peasant regional courts that superseded the judicial powers of landowners removed by emancipation.[1137] In effect, these were petty claims courts in which peasants had rights of petition and representation.[1138] In addition, military justice was reformed in 1867, with the introduction of a three-tier system of courts set up to adjudicate based on the nature of the proceedings.[1139]

The reform was a boon for the legal profession, and the number of university students majoring in law would grow enormously, including the likes of Lenin.[1140] The Government would come to rue many of the reforms to the judiciary, as well as the number of people educated in the law, and would take steps to reverse some of them by the end of the 1870s. The nature of the justice system – which had incensed reactionaries after a female terrorist was acquitted by a jury in 1878 of the shooting of the St. Petersburg police chief – was amended to allow for special closed trials of people suspected of breaking laws 'of the national interest'.[1141] This was followed

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[1132] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 336.

[1133] Raeff, Bureaucratic, *op.cit.,* p. 407.

[1134] Moss, *op.cit.,* p. 425 & Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 355. Mosse, *op.cit.,* p. 42, noted that Alexander II directly briefed the committee to "reorganize the judicial institutions of the empire in the light of 'those fundamental principles, the undoubted merit of which is at present recognized by science and the experience of Europe'".

[1135] TNA: *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, *Ukase* of 20 November 1864. Author's translation.

[1136] Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.,* p. 289.

[1137] Burbank, Thinking, *op.cit.,* pp. 200-202. They were solely peasant courts until 1889, when their scope was extended, p. 201.

[1138] *Ibid.,* p. 201. Jane Burbank wrote that the courts were designed for "adjudicating 'quarrels and suits about property' and 'misdemeanours' for the rural population".

[1139] William C. Fuller, "Civilians in Russian Military Courts, 1881-1904", *Russian Review*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 1982), p. 289. The three were: Regimental courts for small cases, Military District Courts – one for each of the five military districts, and the Chief Military Court.

[1140] He attended Kazan University, taking his final exams at the University of St. Petersburg, graduating in 1890.

[1141] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 423. For example, "resistance to the authorities, rebellion, assassination or attempts on the lives of officials".

by changes to the legal system connected to the 'Temporary Regulations' of August 1881. Where it was too difficult to undo a previous reform, there was still dissent. For example, regarding the *volost'* courts. Michell remarked in 1888 that, "the elective Magistracy, introduced, among other ultra-liberal reforms, by Alexander II, is being widely condemned as an institution that has not only failed to maintain and enforce the law, but as one that has degraded the law in the eyes of the masses".[1142]

Censorship and controls over freedom of association were relaxed during the period of the Alexandrian reforms.[1143] The former had become even more draconian during the reign of Nicholas I: during the revolutions in Europe, he created another body of censors – the 'Committee of 2 April' – to essentially double check the work of the censors in the Third Sector and the Ministry of Education.[1144] Indeed, the period between the 1848 Revolution and his death were regarded at the time as "the era of censorship terror".[1145] His successor, however, saw censorship as a barrier to reforms and modernising society, and as Bruce Lincoln argued, was warned that: "pervasive censorship had given birth to a widely and clandestinely circulated body of manuscript literature in Russia over which the government had no control".[1146]

There was a surge of licensed, sanctioned periodicals in the time from Alexander II's ascension to 1864. For example, the number of newspapers licensed in this period was 66, 60 more than for the previous nine year period. As for periodicals, 156 were authorised between 1855 and 1864, as opposed to only 19 in the nine years to 1855.[1147] Their remit also expanded enormously. Within a year of Alexander II's reign, all publications were permitted to report on the Russian Government's foreign and domestic policies, whereas only *four* were allowed to do so before 1855.[1148] That being stated, by the eve of the formalisation of the press reforms in 1865, as reported by the British Ambassador:

> *The Journals published at St Petersburg are entirely in the hands of the administration and devoted to it; the ultra conservative but constitutional organ has been suspended, and the Government is forced by public opinion to tolerate the frank criticisms of the Moscow Gazette, which has for two years past advocated common representative institutions for the Empire and the fusion of all interests at one legislative centre.*[1149]

[1142] BDFA: Memorandum by Michell on the Present Economic State of Russia, St. Petersburg, September 21 1888, BDFA V2, pp. 218-232.

[1143] Although notably not in Finland, where in a reverse their relatively relaxed rules were suddenly severely restricted, most likely in response to the Polish revolt, although possibly due to the reconvocation of the Finnish Diet. TNA: Woodfall Crowe to Napier, Helsingfors, 20 May 1863, FO 181/420:4.

[1144] Paul Foote, "Censorship Practice in Russia: Circulars of the Directorate of Censorship 1865-1904", http://web.princeton.edu/sites/english/csbm/papers/censorship/censorship_russia.pdf, last accessed 29 November 2014, p. 3.

[1145] Lincoln, The Great Reforms, *op.cit.,* p. 122.

[1146] *Ibid.*

[1147] Mosse, *op.cit.,* p. 50.

[1148] Lincoln, The Great Reforms, *op.cit.,* p. 123.

[1149] TNA: Memorandum on the State of the Press in Russia, St Petersburg, February 1 1865, FO 181/435.

We will return to the *Moscow Gazette* in the section on Russian nationalism. As with the Habsburg Empire, these relaxations were not universal; the regime reserved the right to target specific extremists throughout this period, especially as the remit for censorship had passed from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of the Interior in 1862.[1150]

In conjunction with these organisational changes, pre-publication censorship of scientific and academic publications was removed.[1151] This would be followed by the 1865 press laws, which were specifically modelled on France's press law of 1852.[1152] They were an improvement on previous conditions, but overall a reasonably heavy atmosphere of censorship remained. The largest reform was the introduction – in certain circumstances – of corrective censorship as opposed to preliminary censorship.[1153] In this instance, publications would only be liable to judicial prosecution after publication, although notably there were two different sets of exemptions – one for St. Petersburg and Moscow and another for the rest of the Empire.[1154] In addition, the new Directorate of Censorship, in the Ministry of the Interior, supported by regional committees, could issue warnings; three of which could mean suspension or termination of a publishing license. Journalists as well as editors and publishers were personally liable for prosecution if there was a breach, although they could escape with a fine from the Directorate (who had discretionary powers). Notably, publishers needed to post a heavy security in order to be able to meet these fines should they come to pass, an effective reminder and an ever-present threat.[1155] When it came to the regions, two regulations that predated the 1865 law stood out. Publishing in the Ukrainian language was banned, although periodicals could be imported from across the imperial border with Austria. Lithuanian books in Latin letters were also banned, and those in Cyrillic were completely controlled by the Russian authorities, which would determine what could be published and in what quantities.[1156]

The aftermath of the assassination of Alexander II saw the introduction – under the guidance of Pobedonostev – of the aforementioned Temporary Regulations. Ostensibly put in place to deal with the perceived terrorist threat, these regulations granted emergency powers at multiple levels, including the disruption of civil liberties, the potential for long terms of

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[1150] Foote, *op.cit.,* p 3.

[1151] Derek Jones, "Muscovy and the Russian empire, 1552-1917", in D. Jones (ed.), *Censorship. A World Encyclopedia*, Volume 3 (L-R), (London, 2001), p. 2080.

[1152] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[1153] *Ibid.*

[1154] TNA: *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg, Ukase* of 17/29 April 1905. Point II of the reform stated "Publications of any kind, periodicals or not, original or in translations, which are freed from prior censorship, will be prosecuted judicially in cases of infringing existing laws." Author's translation.

[1155] Foote, *op.cit.,* p. 4 & Lincoln, The Great Reforms, *op.cit.,* pp. 132-133.

[1156] Lorenz Rerup, "Channels of Communication" in A. Kappeler (ed.), *The Formation of National Elites.* Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, Vol. VI (Aldershot, 1992), p. 322 and Vytautas Merkys, "The Lithuanian National Movement; the Problems of Polonization and Russification" in M. Branch, J. M. Hartley & A. Maczak (eds.), *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A Comparative Study* (London, 1995), p. 277.

imprisonment without trial, arbitrary fines and seizure of property. [1157] This was in response to the overall threats to the government (which were exaggerated by Pobedonostev, Shuvalov and others), causing the regime's over-reaction. A year before the Tsar's assassination, the police estimated less than one thousand active cases of anti-state crimes in the entire empire.[1158] The nature of these regulations stifled open opposition to the government and yet added more fuel to the fire, becoming a bone of contention right through to the First World War, when they were still in place and *still* 'temporary'. In addition and in concert, censorship reared its head again in 1882, with a return to pre-censorship.[1159]

Censorship would remain strong until the 1905 Revolution, although preliminary censorship had been abolished, with the government deciding to take recourse through the courts instead. The press ordinance that followed the October Manifesto in 1905 officially moved ultimate censorship powers from the Ministry to the courts, and expressly allowed for the discussion of "the action of officials of the Government".[1160] Another *Ukase* of 27 November/10 December 1905 promised the future ratification of freedom of press laws. [1161] However, publication of opposition manifestos, for example, would bring government crackdowns. As Spring Rice reported in December of that year, the: "provisional press law was published, which gives 'the Government widely extended powers to suppress all attempts to excite public opinion against the forces which made for order. Offending newspapers were confiscated, the editors arrested, and nearly a hundred prosecutions were initiated.'"[1162] Foreign papers were also liable to interception, with the copies delivered with 'offending' articles considerably redacted.[1163]

As the Empire entered the Duma era, the delicate balance continued. Conditions for the press were still better than before the revolution, and criticism of the government itself was mostly permitted. [1164] After the death of Stolypin in 1911, there was further easing of censorship.[1165] However, from some corners, attempts were made to curb any advances. For example, in 1912, the new Minister unsuccessfully proposed a bill that contained draconian pre-censorship regulations, including censorship by the Church. In effect, this would have been a

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[1157] Its full title was "Regulation concerning measures for the protection of the [established] system of government and of public tranquillity, and the placement of certain of the Empire's localities under a state of Reinforced Safeguard," see Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.,* pp. 305-307.

[1158] *Ibid.,* p. 307.

[1159] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 480. After three warnings, a newspaper would be required to submit for pre-censorship *the day prior to publication.*

[1160] BDFA: Spring Rice to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, December 12, 1905, BDFA V3, pp. 271-272.

[1161] TNA: *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, 27 Nov/10 Dec 1905. The second paragraph of the *Ukase* stated: "A regulation on the press guaranteeing freedom of speech will in time become law when we ratify it in the legislative agenda." Author's translation.

[1162] BDFA: Spring Rice to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, December 20 1905, BDFA V3, pp. 277-278.

[1163] BDFA: Report of Mr Norman, enclosure in Nicolson to Grey, St. Petersburg, August 16, 1906, BDFA V4, 180-188.

[1164] BDFA: Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, June 15 1909, BDFA V5, pp. 291-296. As Nicolson reported: "On the whole, the press, certainly in the more important towns, enjoys a freedom which did not previously exist, and the best evidence of this is the fact that the Government are being continually attacked and criticised without fear, and their policy and acts subjected to searching analysis, and in many instances to the severest reproach."

[1165] Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.,* p. 665.

return to the time of the censorship Directorate, with exceptional powers given to the Ministry of the Imperial Court, in particular.[1166]

On the legal front, as a result of the Temporary Regulations of 1881, the Minister of the Interior could 'safeguard' areas, in essence declaring localised martial law.[1167] In such areas, civilians considered a threat to the state could be tried under the extreme military laws only applicable during wartime, meaning that for equivalent crimes, soldiers would face less strenuous punishments, leading to unequal punishments.[1168] The right of association bore the brunt of the Temporary Regulations. Now the army could be called on to disperse crowds by a simple decision of the respective governor. Theodore von Laue has identified that these interventions rose from 28 in 1896 to 522 in 1902, and even though they declined to 427 the following year, 160,000 soldiers were required, a record to that date.[1169] Strikes were one target (although how to deal with this caused much conflict between the two responsible ministries, Finances and Interior).[1170] The other targets were non-labour related demonstrations. Indeed, there would be around two thousand interventions by the army against strikes and demonstrations in the ten years to the 1905 Revolution.[1171] Of course, the one history remembers most happened on Bloody Sunday – where protestors were fired upon when approaching the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg on 22 January 1905, sparking the 1905 Revolution.

6.3.2.   The Habsburg Empire

The Habsburg Empire exhibited a similar pattern: a platform of reform based on some quite progressive ideas, but without some of the reactionary rollback that happened in Russia. During the Metternich Era, it was very difficult for 'nationality' based groups to meet or form official organisations, due to Habsburg restrictions on association, and censorship was highly restrictive. Of course, embedded within the Imperial Power Structure were the historic feudal Diets, which by their very existence made such associations unavoidable – which would be driven home with the competing collective and extensive power wielded by the Hungarian parliament during the Revolution. Censorship regulations introduced in 1850, which transferred responsibility for censorship from the military to regional governors, would mostly remain in place until the First World War.[1172] Although the overall platform remained, restrictions would be increased periodically and sometimes dramatically, dependent on circumstances at the time.

[1166] BDFA: O'Beirne to Grey, St Petersburg, June 11, 1913, BDFA V6, p. 323.

[1167] Fuller, *op.cit.,* p. 292.

[1168] *Ibid.* He gives an example: "If a soldier murdered his commanding officer, the most he could receive from a military court was a lifetime of hard labor; however, if a civilian drew a knife in a policeman, the same military court would be constrained to put him to death."

[1169] von Laue, Tsarist Labor, *op.cit.,* p. 138.

[1170] Gatrell, Culture, *op.cit.,* p. 45.

[1171] Mann, Vol II, *op.cit.,* p. 662.

[1172] Markus Reisenleitner, "The Austrian Empire, 1804-1918", in D. Jones (ed.), *Censorship. A World Encyclopedia*, Volume 1 (A-D), (London, 2001), p. 150.

For example, censorship and restrictions on freedom of association would be intensified after an attempt on the life of the Emperor in February 1853.[1173] However, the strong bureaucratic and legal traditions and institutions in the Empire would provide a platform for the major reforms that were written into the respective laws of each half of the post-*Ausgleich* empire.

In Cisleithania, jurisprudence was strengthened and modernised, as were safeguards of liberty and freedom of association and the press. For example, the third bill of the compromise established an imperial court to safeguard the rights of the individual, and the fourth bill was a separation of judicial power initiative.[1174] An updated criminal code was introduced in 1873, which allowed for trial by jury, the right to defence attorneys (and the right for the state to use a prosecuting attorney), and equality before the law, but with a catch – these conditions were dependent on class.[1175] With respect to the latter, the judicial reforms in Russia on paper went way further (and were introduced earlier). However, the legal profession in Cisleithania boomed, as recourse through the courts would become a part of the landscape. People and organisations made full use of their protections under the judicial codes, leading Arens to comment: "in a certain sense, litigation became a national sport after the Compromise".[1176]

The language protections built into the Fundamental Law of 1867 turned the courts into a major battlefield over language rights, and trust in the law was extremely high, helped by the fact that the courts, for the most part, were unbiased advocates who followed the letter of the law.[1177] Popular expectations about guarantees of justice were sufficiently high by the 1880s and 1890s that blatant governmental abuse of the judicial system would be countered by citizens, under the knowledge that there would be no retribution for their actions. For example, the bureaucrats convicted of perverting the course of justice during the Omladina trials in Prague in the early 1890s were pilloried in the *Reichsrat* and the press, in a manner that would not be out of place in the present day.[1178]

However, the government in Vienna also reserved the right for exceptional legal legislation. In 1884, for example, they promulgated the suspension of trial by jury in Vienna, on the premise of "Public Peace", for a number of offences ranging from the extreme – treason and murder – through to the more benign, including theft and libel.[1179] Similarly, in 1888, trial by jury was suspended in the major towns specifically for anarchists,[1180] and again in 1893 in Prague, for

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[1173] Macartney, *op.cit.,* p. 472. The perpetrator was János Libényi, a Hungarian tailor.

[1174] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 340.

[1175] *Ibid.*

[1176] Arens, *op.cit.,* p. 29 of 43.

[1177] King, *op.cit.,* p. 106. For example, he stated: "In 1883, in a case concerning Budweis/Budějovice, the Administrative Court of Justice in Vienna, finding a violation of Article 19 of the General Rights of Citizens, overruled an attempt by the German majority of the municipal council to prevent members from speaking in Czech if they were capable of speaking in German. Subsequent decisions established the right of citizens to communicate in whichever language of the land they wished with municipal authorities and to be communicated with by those authorities in that language as well."

[1178] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* p. 252.

[1179] TNA: Paget to Granville, Vienna, February 2 1884, FO 120/627:45.

[1180] TNA: Dispatch to Salisbury, Vienna, August 2 1888, FO 120/661:264.

the likes of treason, political disturbances, disturbing the peace, "contempt of authoritarian orders" and crimes such as homicide, serious assault and "incitement to hostilities."[1181]

Regardless, by the European standards of the era, the Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy after the Ausgleich enjoyed broad freedom of speech, the press, association, and assembly, in addition and widely respected guarantees of legal process. Political groups representing the nationalities had the threat of legal embargo or dissolution removed from the 1880s. Gary Cohen has argued that from that time, there were "no further efforts to outlaw opposition political forces outright. Short of creating civil unrest, engaging in criminal action, or threatening the discipline of the military and police forces, the various mass-based parties were free to develop opposition politics".[1182] A result of these initiatives, whether intentional or not, was the deeper embedding of the national peripheries as active components of the Imperial Power Structure.

When the legal system failed, or was ruthlessly manipulated, as happened in Zagreb in 1908, the Emperor could, and would, wield his authority as arbiter of last recourse, including over decisions in Transleithania. Efforts to encourage the Empire to go to war over the Bosnian crisis had led to "trumped up" changes against fifty members of the Coalition party in the Croatian Sabor (Croats and Serbs). It backfired badly, with newspapers across the empire and the continent having a field day with the astonishingly poor evidence supporting the prosecution case, and the clear lack of judicial neutrality,[1183] and as soon as what A.J.P. Taylor called "a farcical treason trial in Zagreb, before a tame Croat judge" resulted in a conviction, the Emperor immediately pardoned them to a person.[1184] Indeed, in the aftermath, the deputies took recourse to libel against the historian Friedjung – whose was asked by Aehrenthal to use the very same "shoddy evidence" which was originally supplied by the Foreign Office – in Vienna, where it could easily be proven that the documents were crude forgeries.[1185] The plaintiffs were fully exonerated. This is but one of many examples of the system working, in spite of efforts to circumvent it.

Censorship was vastly reduced – in stages – specifically from 1867, giving the nationalities freedom to publish their ideological polemics at a time when the numbers of literate community members and national clubs was rising.[1186] This relaxed the restrictive neo-Absolutist era regulations, which were repressive, as this 1859 article from *Die Presse* complained: "The publication of any news 'which could only have been obtained by a breach of duty on the part of some official' is punishable. How is an editor to know whether any piece of intelligence he may

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[1181] TNA: Monson to Rosebery, Vienna, September 13 1893, FO 120/702:155.

[1182] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* p. 252.

[1183] *Ibid.,* p. 253.

[1184] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 235.

[1185] *Ibid.,* pp. 235-236.

[1186] Joseph II originally relaxed censorship in the 1780s, only for it to return to differing degrees in the reactionary post-Napoleonic era. Derek Sayer, "The Language of Nationality and the Nationality of Language", *Past & Present*, No. 153 (Nov., 1996), pp. 187-188, gives examples of how the Czech intelligentsia got a kick start from these original reforms.

receive will not be classed under this category?"[1187] Acts that could be considered seditious by the regime were the hardest hit, and the penalties could be considerable, for example, the editor of *Glos* in Galicia received a five year sentence for publishing "an appeal to the Polish people to adopt a system of passive resistance to the Government which had been sent under cover to him by post from Gromza, a frontier station between Austria, Prussia and Poland."[1188]

As with much in the empire, the great change came in 1867. The definitive reform was the famous Article 13 of the Austrian Constitution of 1867, which stated that:

> *Everyone shall have the right, within legal limits, freely to express his thoughts orally, in writing, through the press, or by pictorial representation. The press shall not be placed under censorship, nor restrained by the system of licenses. Administrative prohibitions of the use of the mail are not applicable to matter printed within the country.*[1189]

For the most part, the Austrian authorities followed the spirit of the regulations and allowed fairly free publishing, especially during the Liberal government era of 1868-1879. As a result, publishing boomed. For example, at the end of the *Vormärz* era (1847) there were only 79 official periodicals in Austria; by 1873 this number had reached 866. Political themed periodicals increased more than seven-fold in the twenty years leading to 1872.[1190] They offered a sometimes incendiary but overall non-violent political battleground, where inflammatory rhetoric was the accepted norm.

The tone of media would reflect the tone of politics, and vice versa. Following is an illustrative example of such rhetoric, from the *Neue Freie Presse* (at the time Vienna's largest periodical) from November 1868 – in this instance, stridently opposing the pluralistic bent sweeping Austria.

> *It is a matter of indifference to us how the Magyars sort things out with the Slovaks, Serbs, Romanians and Croats. On the contrary, the harder the glorious nation of Magyars handles its Must-Be-Magyars, the more blatant becomes the impudent swindle that our nationalities [i.e. in Austria] practise with their complaints about lack of equality.*[1191]

Although the right to publish and distribute was maintained, the government would test the spirit of the law as the century wore on. They would evoke the notion of being "within legal

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[1187] TNA: in Loftus to Russell, Vienna, December 8 1859, 120/372:820. Loftus added: "It is inconceivable that a Ministry professedly liberal should have selected the present moment when it so essentially requires the support of public opinion to introduce measures of so illiberal and so deplorable a nature, and which, in lieu of requiring for it the confidence of the Nation, will only tend to exasperate the public mind and to increase the present want of confidence now felt in the Government and in the system which it pursues."

[1188] TNA: Bloomfield to Russell, Vienna, October 17 1861, 120/395:546.

[1189] Fundamental Law Concerning the General Rights of Citizens, *op.cit.*. Indeed Articles 11 and 12 also strongly enshrined such rights as freedom of association. "Article 11. The right of petition is free to everyone. Petitions under a collective name should emanate only from legally recognized corporations or associations. Article 12. Austrian citizens shall have the right to assemble together, and to form associations. The exercise of these rights is regulated by special laws."

[1190] Robin Okey, "The Neue Freie Presse and the South Slavs of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Jan., 2007), p. 80. Those more specifically of a political tendency went up from 22 to 163.

[1191] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

limits" to varying degrees, and blatantly ignoring the clause of Article 13 that forbade censorship and licensing. This circumvention of the law allowing the Board of Censors to licence and monitor publishers, whilst forcing them to deposit a sizeable bond (*Kaution*), without which they could not operate. Licenses could be refused on character or political affiliation. This policy was revoked in 1894, nine years before the revocation of another law that required newspaper sellers to hold a licence.[1192]

In addition, specific regulations would be introduced 'temporarily' in response to what the government considered dangerous situations. The aforementioned suspension of trial by jury in Vienna in 1884 and Prague in 1893 came with a return to restrictive censorship. The former saw the police being empowered to open and read mail before delivery, with the rather spurious caveat that the letters had to "appear suspicious and likely to endanger the public peace".[1193] Regarding the latter, periodicals had to take the regressive step of submitting proof sheets for pre-censorship.[1194]

In addition, sample copies of the papers were sent to the censors every morning before final publication. Individual stories could be confiscated. Obviously, and in spite of the enormous size of the Habsburg bureaucracy, there was no way everything could be checked. As William Johnstone has commented, in the place of a rejected story "would appear an empty space bearing the word *konfisziert* […] frequently a story in one paper would be overlooked in another. In such cases, every paper was allowed to reprint the story, citing the unconfiscated story as its source".[1195] Publications could also be withdrawn after distribution. The inconsistency was legendary, as Mark Twain would write after a visit in 1898, in his famous essay "Stirring Times in Austria":

> *Sometimes the censor sucks all the blood out of a newspaper and leaves it colorless and inane; sometimes he leaves it undisturbed, and lets it talk out its opinions with a frankness and vigor hardly to be surpassed, I think, in the journals of any country. Apparently the censor sometimes revises his verdicts upon second thought, for several times lately he has suppressed journals after their issue and partial distribution. The distributed copies are then sent for by the censor and destroyed.*[1196]

With regards to Hungary, after the brief flourish of liberalism during the revolution, the neo-Absolutist era saw enormous restrictions on civil liberties. In short, Hungary under direct imperial administration became a form of police state, supported by military occupation, surveillance networks and harsh censorship, not to mention "Bach's Hussars", the German-speaking administrators parachuted in to look after the Hungarian public service.[1197] Such an environment helped spur growth in Hungarian literature and the arts, partially as a means to skirt

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[1192] Johnstone, *op.cit.*, p. 103.
[1193] TNA: Paget to Granville, Vienna, February 2 1884, FO 120/627:45.
[1194] TNA: Monson to Rosebery, Vienna, September 13 1893 FO 120/702:155.
[1195] Johnstone, *op.cit.*, p. 49.
[1196] Mark Twain, "Stirring Times in Austria", p. 2 of 7, originally published in *Harpers Magazine*, Vol. 96 (March, 1898), pp. 530-540, first sourced 13 September 2011,
http://ecommons.library.cornell.edu/bitstream/1813/2170/1/Twain_Austria_1898.pdf, last sourced 16 December, 2014.
[1197] Kontler, *op.cit.*, p. 266.

around regulations, which was helpful in securing the continuation of Magyar culture under difficult conditions.[1198]

After *Ausgliech,* the government in Budapest tried to do everything by the book – which meant that for Hungarians the similar protections were there; and in most cases, even for non-Hungarians (although as 'individuals' as opposed to 'collective bodies', whose existence was effectively denied by Law XLIV of 1868).[1199] The 1868 proclamation of the equality of citizens came with rules ensuring the independence of the judiciary.[1200] One year later, these rules would be clarified: judges were tenured, on the condition that they remained aloof from politics. Attempts by liberals to institute a new criminal code, including universal application of juries, were defeated by conservatives.[1201]

The fight against censorship had a special place in the Hungarian national struggle: notably the first of the famous "Twelve Points" of 15 March 1848, to which Emperor Ferdinand assented, demanded the abolition of censorship.[1202] Andrássy's government, whilst proclaiming civil liberties, sent out mixed signals about its intentions concerning the press. The deposit to start a periodical was reduced, but the government gave itself more leeway to interfere in libel cases, including having press-related cases subject to trial by jury.[1203] The government themselves could instigate legal proceedings against writers post publication, although this would only happen rarely in Hungary itself, in cases when the Monarch was 'slandered' or writings were felt to be seditious.[1204] Not before long, and not unlike what happened in Austrian, high deposits to permit the founding of a newspaper would return.[1205] In addition, new laws in 1878 would forbid incitement against any segment of the population in all manifestations – including national, class or religious affiliation.[1206] This would be used by the government in Budapest to legitimise harassment, not only of newspaper journalists, but also opposition politicians.

In addition, the Andrássy government decided to deal by decree with rights of assembly and association, giving them enormous flexibility in these matters when it suited them, and making it almost impossible for violated parties to seek redress through the courts.[1207] This was aimed at all multiple sectors of Transleithanian society: in the words of Tibor Frank, "the leading elements tried to restrict the rights of assembly and association of peasants, workers and the nationalities."[1208] At times, the Hungarian government took full advantage of the leeway they had

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[1198] *Ibid.*, p. 266.
[1199] *Ibid.*, *op.cit.*, p. 280 & Frank, *op.cit.*, p. 255. Frank wrote that Law XLIV "did not recognize the existence of separate nationalities and did not grant them collective national rights or political institutions. The law was liberal only as far as the use of languages was concerned."
[1200] Kontler, *op.cit.*, p. 284.
[1201] Frank, *op.cit.*, p. 256.
[1202] Freifeld, Nationalism and the Crowd, *op.cit.*, p. 50.
[1203] Kontler, *op.cit.*, p. 284 & Frank, *op.cit.*, p. 256.
[1204] George Gömöri, "Hungary", in D. Jones (ed.), *Censorship. A World Encyclopedia*, Volume 2 (E-K), (London, 2001), p. 1121.
[1205] Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.*, p. 210.
[1206] *Ibid.*, p. 210.
[1207] Kontler, *op.cit.*, p. 284.
[1208] Frank, *op.cit.*, p. 256.

allowed themselves with regards civil liberties, for example during during the prime ministership of Baron Dezső Bánffy (1895-1899). As outlined by Alice Freifeld: "Under Bánffy a camouflaged censorship, a sense of liberalism withering in a police state where rights depended on the whims of the bureaucracy, and the ritualistic conjuring of the revolutionary crown of yesteryear reached its apogee."[1209]

The environment would not improve for the nationalities, For example, the rarely used procedure of government sanctioned press prosecutions would become more common in Transylvania: the publishing of Romanian political demands would often end up in imprisonment for the perpetrators. For example, in the "Memorandum Trial" of 1894, which will be explored later, fourteen activists were sentenced to up to to years, with one getting five years.[1210] The situation would only get worse in the years leading to 1914, driven by fear caused by the volatility of the international political situation, and the related fears of irredentism.[1211] It was not just non-Magyars that suffered from government restrictions on civil liberties. For example, the Fejerváry government, in the lead up to the 1906 election during the constitutional crisis, imposed draconian restrictions on freedom of association and assembly, and increased press censorship, going as far as to ban the sale of newspapers on the street.[1212] Even the March 15 rallies, a rallying point for Hungarians since the aforementioned "Twelve Points", were tightly monitored or even banned outright. [1213]

Laws and decrees in both halves of the Habsburg Empire meant that with regards the formulation and application of law and civil liberties the respective governments appeared quite liberal, at least on paper, and were relatively forward for their time. However, mechanisms to clampdown were always at hand, and could be instigated with ease. Overall, in practice legal and civil rights protections were stronger in the Austrian half of the Empire, and at selected times even the sovereign himself proved his appreciation of the value of such frameworks. There was one characteristic shared in both Austria and Hungary, and the Russian Empire – when people and/or organisations were given the opportunity to exercise new rights, they would exercise those to the limit of the law, and would often seek to push even father.

[1209] Freifeld, Nationalism and the Crowd, *op.cit.,* p. 283.

[1210] Gömöri, *op.cit.,* p. 1121.

[1211] Cohen, Nationalist, p. 274. After the return of István Tisza to the Prime Ministry in 1913, and the beginning of the First World War, Tisza "pushed through parliament legislation to provide for far-reaching emergency powers during wartime, narrow citizens' rights to jury trials, toughen the press and libel laws, and tighten control on associations and public assemblies".

[1212] Freifeld, Nationalism and the Crowd, *op.cit.,* p. 293.

[1213] *Ibid.,* p. 293.

Part Three
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Chapter Seven

7.   The spectre of the 'nation' on the Imperial Power Structure

In 1862, as the Polish crisis was beginning to turn into a full-blown rebellion, Lord Acton pondered the fate of states which turned to state-led nationalism and discrimination based on nationality: "A state which is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself; a State which labours to neutralise, to absorb, or to expel them, destroys its own vitality; a State which does not include them is destitute of the chief basis of self-government."[1214] When one considers the vastly different strategies employed by and within both empires to manage nationality, and the respective results, one is led to question Acton's very premise. What exactly constitutes 'satisfaction', and how is that judged? What if satisfaction is unreachable, regardless of state action, or if satisfaction, once reached, fuels the desire for *more* satisfaction? To take this further, what happens if a state labours to legitimise, reinforce, or include, in Acton's words, "different races", and yet ends up 'condemned'? This is exactly what happened with the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire after 1867.

As we have seen, the Russian dynasty had originally not discriminated on nationality, except against certain Polish elites (which was driven by feelings of betrayal after 1830, as opposed to Polish ethnicity, per se). The primary social distinction made in the Russian Empire was by *estate*, as it was with the Habsburg Empire. The latter's tolerance of difference was legendary – for example, after 1781 the major Christian faiths were equal before Austrian law and Jews faced far fewer restrictions than in most of the rest of Europe.[1215] For both empires, social standing would trump ethnicity, especially at the time of Acton's comment. However, this was not long before a noticeable change: when tolerance in a ethno-linguistic context was forced to face the new dynamic of ethno-linguistic *challengers*. By standing still, or taking to the sword (as with what occurred in the Kingdom of Poland), both empires had gone backwards. This trajectory would reverse again with *Ausgleich*, in Austria at least, and to a lesser extent Hungary. Indeed in the year of Acton's comment, tentative steps towards this uniquely Habsburg compromise were well underway.

From the middle of the nineteenth-century, both imperial regimes needed to contend with the growth of nationalism, both within the nominally core imperial 'nationalities' (Russian, German and Hungarian) and amongst peripheral populations, some of whom by 1854 had neither formalised as a 'nation' nor as an organised periphery. We have reviewed how the

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[1214] J.E.E Acton, "Nationality", first published in *Home and Foreign Review* (London, 1862), quoted in Grassl and Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

[1215] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 347, wrote that: "Joseph's Edict of Toleration gave Protestants, Orthodox, and Uniates the same rights as Catholics and reduced restrictions on Jews."

Habsburg and Russian Empires imported nation-state ideological frameworks in order to transform their realms; in effect, co-opting ideology and policy from the 'nation'. This section will analyse the rise of competing groups within their respective Imperial Power Structures, and the relationship of this phenomenon to the aforementioned nation-state framework dynamic.

Before embarking on this analysis, it is important to note one crucial difference. Historians agree unanimously that periphery nationalism was a more advanced and invasive problem within the Habsburg Empire than the Russian, just as core nationalism was far more pervasive in Russia than Austria, with Hungary at the same level as Russia, if not a higher still. This work, by focussing on the 'nation', is not trying to underestimate or downplay the impact of non-national peripheral groups, the most famous of which was of course Russian labour. At the same time, the common narratives of the Russian revolutions have often downplayed the role of the 'nation' in these events, or their contribution – directly and indirectly – to the environment in which they occurred. As had already happened in the Habsburg Empire, by 1905, every 'nation' in European Russian had organised national movements to some degree, including many with multiple and often contrasting factions. In addition, non-ethnic-Russian subjects (in the name of the nation, worker or peasant, or a combination thereof) had become disproportionately involved in anti-Government/anti-elite agitations. [1216]

The Imperial Power Structures of the Habsburg and Russian Empires also had multiple 'poles' or 'sub-cores': some historic and some new.[1217] When it came to empires however, there are additional levels of complexity to be considered. The nationalities had increased their intensive, diffused and collective power, at a time when regimes were hoping to do the same. Much of this was as a result of political participation; either direct involvement, or as a reaction to being on the receiving end of the nationality politics of others, in conjunction with rising educational and economic levels. At the same time, the issue was not so clear cut, as we will see – for example, traditional imperial elites from across the nationality spectrum would in many instances not leave their privileged positions in the imperial court, the diplomatic services or the military; nor would the 'nationalities' find it easy to reach a united position or a critical mass. This was one of the many reasons that what appears on the surface as 'state-seeking' nationalism,[1218] in fact manifested as 'power-seeking'.[1219] 'State-seeking' might have been the ideological utopia, whereas 'power-seeking' became a realistic, workable objective, one that had the side effect of maintaining dynastic loyalty, much cherished by great masses of the numerous national groups.

This chapter will focus upon the nominal core peoples of these Empires – Russians, Germans and Hungarians, the latter in their capacity as the sub-core in Transleithania. Chapter 8

[1216] For example, of exiled revolutionaries in Russia between 1907 and 1917, 17.6% were Poles and 8.2% were Latvians, far in excess of their respective 6.2% and 1.1% of the imperial population. Mirinov, *op.cit.,* pp. 10-11.

[1217] As noted, Poles in Galicia, Italians in the Littoral, Germans in the Baltic etc.

[1218] In the case of Hungary, uniquely, concurrently state-led and state-seeking.

[1219] Stadler, *op.cit.,* p. 178, noted that of the national movements, at the commencement of the First World War, "the great majority of their leaders and spokesmen were content to exact a high price of reforms for their support in the war effort".

will focus on peripheral nationalities in both realms. There is considerable overlap: for example this chapter will include the Hungarians and Austrian German liberals, acting as a periphery in the Imperial Power Structure, whereas Chapter 9 will compare the Polish populations of the Kingdom of Poland and Austrian Galicia. With regards to the Poles, arguably the Galician Poles belong in this chapter, due to their hegemonic behaviour in their region. However, they are in the chapter focussing on the periphery, in order to provide a contrast between their position, and that of their Polish kin over the imperial border, who were very definitely peripheral in the Russian Imperial Power Structure.

7.1.   Core nationalism through collective, diffused and intensive power: emerging core Russian nationalism

The growth trajectories of Russian, German and Hungarian nationalism in the Habsburg and Russian Empires displayed considerable variations. Core nationalism grew at an impressive pace in the Russian Empire in the effort to unite the empire under a common Russian hegemony, yet grew demonstrably weaker in Austria under the weight of pragmatism and history, and the Prussian/Austrian dichotomy. Russian national identity developed from a low base in the period of this study, whilst the German *Geist* had been doing the rounds of intellectual circles since the Enlightenment. Even though signs of effective core German nationalism at a state level would eventually become limited to Hohenzollern lands, at the middle of the nineteenth-century it could be argued that the core German 'national feeling' in Austria was far stronger, albeit in a fairly rudimentary manner, than Russian nationalism in the Romanov realm. Hungarian nationalism at this time was entirely 'state-seeking', in that the Hungarians had neither a parliament (suspended) nor any control over the Kingdom of Hungary, which would arguably lead them to go further than both the Austrian Germans and Russians when *Ausgleich* thrust the appropriate political and ideological power upon them. Although all three core nationalisms evolved utilising degrees of collective, diffused and intensive power emanating from the core (or sub-core), this section will focus on emerging Russian nationalism. In contrast to Russian nationalism, German nationalism never truly enveloped the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure, and the Hungarians were never a true 'imperial core'.

As noted, by the mid-nineteenth century, there was still no real agreement on what it actually meant to be Russian, indeed what exactly Russia was, or stood for. Indeed, the English word 'Russian' derives from different terms, *rossiyskiy* and *russkiy*.[1220] N.A. Rubikin exemplified this national ambiguity in his *Introduction to Russia in Numbers*. "What is Russia?" he posed, answering "above all [it's] the Russian people [*russkii narod*] and other peoples [*narody*], living on the territory of the present Russian [*russkoe*] state – in other words – the population of our

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[1220] Lieven, Identities, *op.cit.*, p. 254. *Rossiyskiy* referred to the "Russian dynasty and the state," whereas *russkiy* covered the "Russian people, culture and language".

country".[1221] Of course, such confusion can be symptomatic of developing nationalities; indeed a robust debate within the national space can be healthy for formulating ideologies. That this can be true of the nationality of the ruling dynasty of a multinational empire emphasises just how estates-based the Imperial Power Structure had been. The entrenched *soslovie* system, in which even (before 1830) Polish nobles would be treated at levels far exceeding that of the ordinary Russian subject, would weather the reform storm.

Nicholas I was the first monarch who worked on developing what Ronald Suny called, "a particularly Russian discourse of the nation through elaboration of 'official nationality,' ceremonies, rituals and the repression of the alternative ideas of civic nationhood".[1222] At its core was the Orthodox Church: indeed, faith would become the key characteristic for how the imperial administration would define the different nationalities across the empire. However, by mid-nineteenth century, there was still no general consensus on a delineated geographic Russian 'core', or a contiguous Russian historical narrative. Agreement on the actual geographical boundaries of the Russian 'heartland' within the empire remained elusive, however, as an abstract concept the typology would eventually settle for "interior Russia" (*vnutrenniaia Rossiia*), "native Russia" (*korennaia Rossiia*), or "central Russia" (*tsentral'naia Rossiia*).[1223]

The grand Russian narrative would begin to take shape around 1850, from multiple inputs and perspectives. Alexander Herzen's description of Russia, which he described in a letter to Ivan Turgenev in 1857, was heavy on romantic agrarian socialism: "Russia appears as an absolutely special world, with its *own* natural way of life, its *own* physiological character – not European not Asiatic, but Slavonic." [1224] He continued:

> *She participates in the fate of Europe, but without its historical traditions, free from its obligations to the past […] Nowhere do we have those deeply ingrained prejudices which in Western man have, like paralysis, taken over half of his organs. At the basis of Russian popular life lies the village commune with its division of fields, its communist ownership of land and elected administration […] On our expanding, simple soil there is nothing but the conservative – the village commune – that is worth preserving.*[1225]

In contrast to the inclusive Slavic exceptionalism of Herzen was the more exclusive nationalist rhetoric developed by historians Sergey Solovyev and Vasily Klyuchevsky. As would become typical with Russian 'national' development narratives, it was founded in reaction to the Catholic

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[1221] Burbank, Thinking, *op.cit.,* p. 198.
[1222] Ronald Suny, "Nationalities in the Russian Empire", *Russian Review,* Vol. 59, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), p. 488.
[1223] Leonid Gorizontov, "The 'Great Circle' of Interior Russia: representations of the Imperial Centre in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries", in J. Burbank, M. von Hagen & A. Remnev (eds.), *Russian Empire. Space, People, Power, 1700-1930* (Bloomington, IN, 2007), p. 67, also see Paul Bushkovitch, "What is Russia? Russian National Identity and the State, 1500-1917," in A. Kappeler, Z. E. Kohut, F. E. Sysyn & M. von Hagen (eds.), *Culture, nation, and identity. The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter, 1600-1945* (Edmonton, 2003), pp. 144-161, who gives a great summary overall on the development of the concept of 'what was Russia.' For the period in question here, see pp. 154-161.
[1224] A.I. Herzen, "Eshche variatsiya na staruyu temu', *Sobranie sochineniy v tridtsati tomakh*, vol. 12 (Moscow, 1857), pp 425-431, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.,* pp. 140-142. Emphasis in the original.
[1225] *Ibid.*

Poles. For example, the Ukraine was meant to return to Russia to protect it from the Poles. A story was created whereby the inhabitants of the Ukrainian lands prior to the Mongol invasions were Russian, and it was tribes from the Carpathians who inhabited the then-vacant lands after the Mongol withdrawal.[1226] History would work in concert with the fomenting of national pride through romanticist literature and the news media, although this was still mostly elite chatter.[1227] As with many examples of ideological national development, there was considerable overlap and debate between these positions.

Two events helped spur on Russian nationalism (and by association, Pan-Slavism) – the Alexandrian reforms and the Polish disturbances that began in 1861 and morphed into a full-blown revolt in 1863. As Mikhail Dolbilov has argued, "it is precisely the *empire*-wide dimension of the 1861 Emancipation that gave a strong impetus to a nationalist mode of thinking".[1228] To this could be added the nature of the reforms: instigating institutional reform that would provide both the ideological space and the foundational tools for development and dissemination of national narratives. A final group with vested interests would become involved in organising the imperial space and delineating the Russian space within it – imperial economists. They required segmentation for matters of efficiency and resource distribution, and when for example the Alexandrian reforms were being withheld from non-Russian borderlands, or administrative Russification programmes needed support, the perhaps unintended result was the identifying of a Russian 'heartland'.[1229]

At the forefront of the new 'Russianness' devolved in opposition to the Poles was the historian and publisher Mikhail Katkov.[1230] From the early 1860s, he raised fears of a growing federalist movement, both within the government and amongst the minorities (he was off the mark on both counts).[1231] Amongst other ideals he agitated for was the right to criticise government policy, which he often did from the columns of his *Moskovskie vedomosti* (*Moscow News)*, and although his immediate impact was limited, he set the stage for a new openness (and by utilising the new freedoms of the press, he illustrated clearly that the reforms were a double-edged sword, reforms that coincidentally he championed despite his historical image as a reactionary).[1232] He was one of the first to push for a new form of 'nation-empire', with naturally Russia at the front and centre.

Poland offered the perfect bogeyman for the likes of Katkov, and the revolt was the catalyst. In April 1863, the Minister of Public Instruction ruefully told British Ambassador Napier that, "the minds of the educated Russians, recently bent upon measures of liberal

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[1226] Zenon E. Kohut, "Origins of the Unity Paradigm: Ukraine and the Construction of Russian National History (1620-1860), *Eighteenth-Century Studies,* Vol. 35, No. 1 (Fall, 2001), pp. 73-74.

[1227] Lieven, Identities, *op.cit.,* p. 255.

[1228] Dolbilov, *op.cit.,* p. 145.

[1229] Gorizontov, *op.cit.,* p. 90, wrote: "reflecting the obvious regionalization of the imperial economy, late imperial economists also began suggesting a new framework for seeing the empire as a collection of economic regions".

[1230] Renner, *op.cit.,* p. 659. Katkov was editor to *Moskovskie Vedomosti* from 1863.

[1231] Saunders, Regional Diversity, *op.cit.,* p. 153.

[1232] Renner, *op.cit.,* pp. 661 & 671.

improvement, have now been diverted to an absorbing patriotic passion; and […] that their sympathies for Poland and the Poles, which existed among the liberal youth of Russia, have been converted into sentiments of animosity and vengeance".[1233] Indeed, as Attaché Michell reported the following month: "up to the disturbances of Warsaw in 1861, the Liberals of Russia and the whole of the Press were profuse in their sympathies for the amelioration of the conditions of Poland, if not for its entire independence."[1234] Not only had the Poles given the empire an 'other', it helped enhance the romanticist Russian narrative associated, as Dolbilov argued, "with roots, antiquity, authenticity, soil, the mass of the people, and, ultimately, with life and the 'truth'".[1235]

Andreas Renner summarized Katkov well, stating that he "legitimized the repression of the Polish minority by strengthening the self-esteem of Russian public opinion and society, he defended the unity of the Russian empire by polarizing the inhabitants of its parts, and he strove to modernize Russia by revitalizing outmoded autocracy".[1236] One of his core tactics was framing the idea of the multi-national empire at one with the Russian nation.[1237] Concurrent to Katkov's interventions in the press was an upsurge of "loyal and patriotic" addresses to the Emperor by "various public bodies".[1238] For example, the St. Petersburg Nobles Assembly took an anti-Polish position in an April 1863 address to the Tsar, to which Napier commented: "It is expected that the contagion of patriotism will spread all over the Empire, and that the various official and popular bodies will vie with each other in laying their services at the feet of the Emperor".[1239] Katkov in turn ramped up the rhetoric after the above mentioned address, as Michell reported: "The 'Moscow News' inflamed the popular mind with violent articles on the designs of the enemies of the greatness and prosperity of Russia," continuing:

> The Russians secretly feel weak from the effects of the Crimean war, financial and commercial; from a knowledge that the position of things at home is unsettled and uncertain, owing to the great reorganization of society now in progress; they have also to deal with a powerful and ubiquitous enemy at home—the Polish race, which, although scattered over the whole of the Empire, is leagued in a common bond of interest and of hatred to Russia.[1240]

The historian M.P. Pogodin, with a much longer track record of writings, was amongst a number of nationalists who successfully created an 'other' in the Poles by using, quite literally, vampire-like metaphors. One of his more famous passages noted that: "Our enemies have no names. Their whereabouts are unknown. They do not even have a body. They are shadows that

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[1233] BDFA: Napier to Russell. St. Petersburg, April 28 1863, BDFA V1, p. 46-47.

[1234] BDFA: Memorandum of T. Michell on the Public Opinion of Russia in reference to Poland. Enclosure in Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, May 12 1863, BDFA V1, pp. 51-55.

[1235] Dolbilov, *op.cit.*, p. 146.

[1236] Renner, *op.cit.*, p. 681.

[1237] Richard Wortman, "The Tsar and the Empire – Representation of the Monarchy and Symbolic Integration in Imperial Russia", in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.), *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), p. 272.

[1238] TNA: Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, May 6 1863, FO 181/425:317.

[1239] BDFA: Napier to Russell. St. Petersburg, April 15 1863, BDFA V1, pp. 40-41.

[1240] BDFA: Memorandum of T. Michell. Enclosure in Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, May 12 1863, BDFA V1, pp. 51-55.

are emitted at night from some hell-like world and disappear at sunrise."[1241] In demonizing the Poles, he attempted to breach the theoretical contradiction between nationalism and Slavism – by singling out as evil one 'branch' of Slavs (Poles) as dangerous to the greater Slavic body, and positioning Russia as the only natural protector of the Slav ideal against the heretical Poles – thereby placing Russia as the Slavic hegemon.

A further catalyst for the growth of Russian nationalism was the rise of Germany. Fears of German expansion and 'Germanisation' were brought up by the likes of Katkov even before unification in 1871.[1242] At the crux were two issues: the prevalence of ethnic Germans in the court and at the highest echelons of the army, and the numbers of, and power of, the Baltic Germans in the provinces of Livland, Estland and Courland, as exemplified in this Pogodin attack of 1869: "The idea of the Russian language for the Russians – the question itself is already an insult; a Russian must conceal his ancestry and otherwise cannot be heard in Riga, unless he speaks German! […] Would this situation be tolerated anywhere else? In Russia I have to speak a foreign language in court!!"[1243] In the same comment he would go on to betray the emerging feelings of himself and numerous other Russian nationalists, "as regards landowning, the peasants – Latvian and Estonian will have, of course, equal rights with Russian, Polish and Georgian peasants".[1244] Whereas the diatribes on the Poles were tacitly approved by the regime, those on the Germans most definitely were not, as will be analysed in the Baltic section.

The underlying ideology of emerging Russian nationalism wavered between pure Pan-Slavism at one end of the scale and Russian exceptionalism at the other, which made unity of cause elusive, and limited its broad appeal. The Ukrainian leftist political theorist, Mykhailo Drahomanov, who we will see again, commented in 1873 that the "Russian society" feels:

wholly indifferent to nationalism, placing (like almost all societies of the great political units that long ago attained extensive state boundaries, such as England and France) at the forefront socio-cultural questions and the matter of the development and order of one's own house. For this reason, Pan-Slavism, Russophilism, and Ukrainophilism […] are all little valued in Russia.[1245]

Russian nationalism was driven by a new form of conservatism that shed elitism (in principle) and cosmopolitanism, and this would come head to head with the westernising tendency of the conservative intelligentsia that were behind the reforms.[1246] In the words of writer Ivan Aksakov in the late nineteenth-century: "Outside the national soil [*pochva*] there is no firm ground; outside the national there is nothing real, vital; every good idea, every good institution not rooted in the national historical soil or grown organically from it turns sterile and becomes

[1241] Mikhail Pogodin, *Pol'skii vopros. Sobranie rassuzhdenii, zapisok i zamechanii. 1831-*1867 (Moscow, 1867), p. 146, quoted in Dolbilov, *op.cit.,* p. 147.
[1242] Thaden, The Russian Government, *op.cit.,* p. 35.
[1243] M.P. Pogodin, *Ostreyshiy vopros, pismo M. P. Pogodina k professoru Shirrenu* (Moscow, 1869), pp. 6-72, in McCauley & Waldron, *op.cit.,* p. 205.
[1244] *Ibid.*
[1245] Quoted in Bushkovitch, *op.cit.,* p. 155.
[1246] Pipes, Conservatism, *op.cit.,* p. 124.

nought."[1247] The clash between these two groups would dominate Russian national thought until the First World War (and beyond). Agreement on what was worth conserving and using as a platform for growth was at the heart of the matter.[1248] Westernisers were aware of the backward nature of Russian history: that their past would be a hindrance to their development, whereas the likes of Aksakov celebrated the past as the foundation stone for the future of the Russian 'nation' and her empire. [1249]

The divergence was stark amongst emerging Russian nationalists when it came to 'western' ideas such as representative governance. Although the likes of Katkov, with their more liberal foundations, feared federalism far more, many conservatives feared both. To them, any weakening of the monarchy would lead to the formation of organised politics and the formalisation political parties, which would bring forth their greatest fear – the weakening of "national unity".[1250] This was the key – Andreas Kappeler argued that concurrent to intensifying administrative Russification, "Russian nationalism was […] beginning to advocate the unity of the imperial or civic nation and the ethnic Russian nation",[1251] whilst fortifying claims of ethnic Russian privileges over all facets of the realm.[1252]

Russian nationalists would develop grievances, like all other nationalities, as the century progressed. A catalyst came in 1877, with what they considered to be ridiculously modest spoils of their victorious war with the Turks; a feeling made even worse by the fact that it was the other European powers who dictated terms to Russia. This annoyed both Russian nationalists and Pan-Slavs, who were becoming closer to each other in ideology and support for Russian expansionism.[1253] The original treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Russians created an enormous new state (Bulgaria) which almost entirely wiped out Turkey-in-Europe. Bismarck in particular was fearful of such a large Russian client state disturbing the balance-of-power in the Balkans, and the resulting Congress of Berlin saw most of the Turkish territory returned to the Porte, and the Russians came away with very little after a significant victory. Any nationalist 'glow' that came from the battlefield was completely extinguished by the diplomatic disaster that followed. This also helped stir further anti-German feeling in Russia, a feeling that would not recede.

[1247] Ivan Aksakov, quoted in *Ibid.,* pp. 124-125.

[1248] Rogger, Reflections, *op.cit.,* p. 212.

[1249] *Ibid.* Rogger noted: "There was too much of the Russian past that was backward, crude and unjust to seem worth retaining or defending, too little as yet of crass modernity to make the fight against it appear anything but quixotic."

[1250] Pipes, Conservatism, *op.cit.,* p. 126.

[1251] Andreas Kappeler, "The Ambiguities of Russification" *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History,* Volume 5, Number 2, Spring 2004, p. 294, also see Renner, *op.cit.,* p. 670, who stated that the "Unity of Russia" was one of Katkov's regular slogans, although he was happy to accept national self-determination *underneath* Russian political hegemony within the Empire.

[1252] Kohut, *op.cit.,* p. 75, wrote that: "It began with the establishment of a pedigree for the Muscovite dynasty (the *Stepennaia kniga*) evolved into a story of an Orthodox Slavo-Rossian realm (the *Sinopsis*), turned into an account of an evolving and territorially shifting Russian state (Karamzin) and was finally transformed into the national history or Russia and the Russian people."

[1253] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 447.

By the turn of the century, nationalist interpretations of Russia as a state were rising to the surface. For example, leading liberal Petr Struve would consider Russia as a "national Russian state", with "two unassailable appendages – Poland and Finland".[1254] Nationalist parties would do well in the last two Duma elections, although their 'nationalism' was as much an indicator of being on the same, conservative side of the tsar (and their success built upon the new, parochial Duma membership requirements). 'Russia' could represent those true to, and most protective of, the *idea* of the tsar. To Tsar Nicholas II himself, as argued by Richard Wortman, "Russia was represented by the army […] and the peasants, who he believed remained devoted despite the peasant uprisings of 1905 and 1906."[1255]

The *idea* of the tsar and the bond between him and his people had been formalised as religious during the reign of his father, and this connection would continue to be played, although it would begin to wear thin.[1256] Other common symbols of core nationalism became more parochial as the twentieth century marched on, including the army, which was (belatedly, when compared to for example the Imperial German Army) becoming a symbol of 'Russia' as a nation. British Ambassador Nicolson relayed an example from 1907, on the efforts of Prime Minister Golovin to assuage the Minister of War for a perceived insult of the army:

> *If he has appeared more humble than seems fitting in the President of a National Assembly, it must be assumed that a knife has been held to his throat. The incident has further interest than the danger in which it placed the Duma. It has exemplified the new nationalist sentiment which aroused even a section of the Opposition to resent a reflection on the army, in which they see for the first time the embodiment of the nation.* [1257]

7.2. Core nationalism through distributive, authoritative and extensive power

Alexander Motyl has argued that the emergence of the 'nation' left the imperial Russian and German 'cores' in the Russian and Habsburg Empires in a bind. The more they appeared to align with the German and Russian nationality, the less supranational they would appear to elites of different subject nationalities.[1258] The Habsburg solution was Dualism: a withdrawal into a 'pragmatic pluralism' in Cisleithania, and the ending of overt official attempts at Germanisation across both sides of the Leitha. After *Ausgleich*, Germanisation programmes, started in the time of Joseph II and ramped up to a degree in the neo-Absolutist era, became a memory. As noted, the Emperor appeared to have no trepidation offloading the Saxons – German who had lived for

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[1254] Bushkovitch, *op.cit.,* pp. 158-159.

[1255] Wortman, *op.cit.,* p. 283.

[1256] *Ibid.,* p. 276. The elevation and glorification of tsar was furthered by the Pobedonostsev-scribed Manifesto of April 29 1881 – which reconfirmed that "the bond between the tsar and the people was to be religious".

[1257] TNA: Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, May 13 1907, FO 181/906:254.

[1258] Alexander J. Motyl, "From Imperial Decay to Imperial Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Empire in Comparative Perspective", in R. L. Rudolph & D. F. Good (eds.), *Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union* (Minneapolis, 1992), p. 34.

centuries in Transylvania – onto the Hungarians, hardly the act of a nationalist-first regime. Indeed, there was no true officially-sanctioned Germanisation: some ideals held by liberal and nationalist politicians in Vienna, yes, but nothing that justified the frequent cries of Germanisation from the provinces. This meant effecting core nationalism through wielding distributive, authoritative and extensive power was the province of the Russians and the government in Budapest, through policies called Russification and Magyarisation.

The political and cultural forms of these phenomenon could be said to have been driven by fear: fear of claims making and competing voices within the Imperial Power Structure; fear of irredentism and the influence of other European states on their domestic order; and fear of stumbling blocks being thrown up, harming the quest to catch up with the rest of Europe (or in the case of Hungary, to achieve more power within the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure).

This could be seen in, for example, Poland missing out on elements of the Alexandrian Judicial Reforms of 1864, such as trial by jury, as well as the Russification of Polish schools, the elimination of Polish local government organs, and the gradual introduction of the Russian language into all facets of Polish life. In Hungary, this could be seen in the gerrymandering of parliament, cordoning off secondary and tertiary educational opportunities for non-Magyars, and the direct control of primary education in concert with the Catholic Church. Both the governments in St. Petersburg and Budapest, and in the Russian case local and regional governments, and in Hungary the municipalities, were trying to foster ideological power streams in line with those of the respective regimes. As time went on, policies of Russification and Magyarization became harsher and cruder: the more difficult and un-conducive populations were to their measures, the harder they had to try.

7.2.1. Russification

The emergence of Russification was the result of a great convergence – the rise of peripheral nationalism, Russian nationalism, the drive for Russian 'primacy' in the empire, the demands of the state for growth and efficiency, fears of the rise of Germany, and fears that what was happening inside the Habsburg Empire could also happen in Russia. Although Andreas Kappeler and Theodore Weeks have proven that it was not specifically directed by St. Petersburg, often applied at the whim of Ministries and regional governments (the core-in-periphery), [1259] in the context of the perspective of affected nationalities, nothing could change the perception that the Russians, their 'overlords' per se, were trying to dampen or extinguish their national and cultural being. The effect on the local population, and the impressions made on the intelligentsia, would lead to one conclusion – an attempt at political, economic and cultural suppression by *Russians*. Russification also caused a great contradiction. How could an

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[1259] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.*, Weeks, Poland, *op.cit.* and Weeks, Lithuanians, *op.cit.*. Saunders argues that they "go too far in the direction of exculpating the imperial government from the charge of attempting to steamroller the non-Russians." Saunders, Regional Diversity, *op.cit.*, p. 157.

Imperial Power Structure reliant on *nationality-neutral* estates breach such a fundamental tenet by alienating non-Russian elites?

As previously stated, Russification – in its abstract form – was not new but it took a new turn after the Polish rebellion, at different speeds and levels depending on the territory and its population. Due to the 1830 Polish uprising and subsequent war with Russia, the majority of Polish elites had been excluded from the state.[1260] Sergey Uvarov instigated cultural Russification in the western borderlands in the 1830s, exemplified by the transfer of the university at Vilnius to Kiev, as the St. Vladimir University, which was intended, as recounted by Hugh Seton-Watson, "to smooth away those sharp characteristic traits by which Polish youth is distinguished from Russian, and especially to suppress in Polish youth the thought of its own nationality, to bring it ever nearer to Russian notions and morals, to transfer it to the general spirit of the Russian people".[1261] Until the First World War, the Polish question remained of supreme importance.

The response to the 1863 Polish uprising also gave Russia a 'template' which, though malleable, would become well worn by the time of its final introduction into Finland in the 1890s. Accepted demarcation in the long-conquered lands within the empire, where previous power structures had been kept in place and where elites had retained their privileges, was beginning to unwind.[1262] The first bonds broken post-1863 in Poland were between the Polish landowning class and the peasantry. This was achieved by land reform of a boldness the peasants of Russia proper could only dream about. Specifically, the entire platform of the Polish landed gentry was targeted, as the following excerpt from an 1864 British Embassy report outlined: "the surest means of establishing tranquillity […] would be to decrease the numbers and also weaken the position of the Polish land-holders by allowing persons of Russian descent and natives of the Baltic Provinces […] to purchase, without any difficulty and even with some advantage, real property in the Western Provinces".[1263] Getting them to arrive in Poland was another matter entirely, as will become apparent. The previously reduced levels of autonomy were extinguished, and the use of Polish in official transactions with the state, at all levels, was banned. Even the publishing of books in the Polish language was forbidden, and distribution of existing Polish works was severely restricted, although this last stage was to be eased in 1869.[1264]

The historical consensus on Russification is that the regime did not specifically aim to 'eradicate' nations other than the Kingdom of Poland.[1265] Rather, the proponents believed that natural evolution should guide these 'national' groups to come closer to the Russian nation, which

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[1260] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 249.
[1261] Sergey Uvarov, quoted in Seton-Watson *op.cit.,* pp. 269-270.
[1262] Raeff, Patterns, *op.cit.,* p. 39.
[1263] TNA: Translation of Report of Minister of Domains on Sale of Confiscated Lands in Western Provinces, submitted on imperial authority to the Western Committee of the Council of the Empire, in Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, February 7 1864, FO 181/427.
[1264] Miller & Dolbilov, *op.cit.,* p. 449.
[1265] Dolbilov, *op.cit.,* p. 146.

of course they considered superior, in a manner that evoked Herbert Spencer.[1266] That would mean jettisoning customs and language, a process the drivers of Russification believed would be to their benefit.[1267] Russification would generally take three stages. The first was naturally 'administrative', to necessitate the more effective management of imperial space and reforms in general. 'Linguistic' and 'cultural' Russification would follow, and then they would become interdependent, in turn requiring further administrative Russification.[1268]

This included a policy of separation: Russians would in most walks of public life be segregated from non-assimilating Poles, or any influences that might propagate or comfort the latter group. Russian children, for example, were educated separately from Polish children, even those *whose schools were being Russified.*[1269] As for cultural and linguistic Russification, ironically, 'higher' non-native languages were perfectly acceptable. For example, public singing in Western European languages in Warsaw in the 1870s was expressly allowed.[1270] Religion was very definitely in the sights of Russifying officials. To give an illustrative example, Catholic Bishops in the Russian Empire could only communicate (officially) with the Holy See through the Ministry of State.[1271] The Uniate Church, which had survived in the Kingdom of Poland after having been abolished in the rest of the Empire in 1839, was dissolved over 1874 and 1875. The discourse concerning the Uniates from St. Petersburg was revealing, showing that although they believed those subjects had made a grave mistake, retribution was possible within the embrace of the Orthodox Church. For example, as Lord Loftus reported in 1874, the Emperor was convinced that the Uniates, in "abandoning the deplorable errors and the evil instigations which have diverted them from the path of duty will hasten to resume the ancient and regular ceremonies of their church and to show themselves submissive and peaceable as heretofore".[1272]

Outside the Kingdom, Russification was aimed squarely at restricting Polish influence.[1273] Polish elites owned considerable land in provinces occupied by Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belarusian speakers, dating back to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the reintegration of these territories into Poland was a core tenet of the Polish groups who revolted in 1863. Russification at a cultural and linguistic level involving Ukrainians and Belarusians was enhanced in the 1860s, as well as with the Lithuanians, in order to wake them from their "fatal sleep".[1274] This denotes a perceived ignorance that Russifiers considered detrimental to the development of

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[1266] Theodore Weeks contrasts Poland, where: "Russian authorities never claimed that Warsaw or even Lublin were 'ancient Russian cities,' as they definitely did in the case of Minsk, Vil'na and Kiev." Weeks, Defending Our Own, *op.cit.*, p. 542.

[1267] Raeff, Patterns, *op.cit.,* pp. 37-38.

[1268] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[1269] TNA: Mansfield to Granville, Warsaw, September 18 1872, FO 181/499:12

[1270] *Ibid.* Mansfield reported that, as of 1872: "no houses will be granted to tea gardens and 'café's chantants' except where the performances are in Russian or foreign languages".

[1271] TNA: Loftus to Granville, St Petersburg, April 3 1872, FO 181/496:59. They were upset that the Archbishop of Posen, the Prelate of Poland, had contacted the Church in the Kingdom of Poland in secret.

[1272] TNA: Loftus to Derby, St Petersburg, July 21 1874, FO 181/520:257.

[1273] Weeks, Lithuanians, *op.cit.*, p. 99.

[1274] Dolbilov, *op.cit.*, p. 156. In this instance, Polish historian Andrzej Nowak used the term "fatal sleep".

these peoples hitherto under Polish hegemony. The Ukrainian and Belarusian languages were banned and the use of Lithuanian was limited to Cyrillic.[1275] All three of these peoples were considered too close to the Poles and as such those enacting these policies considered them benevolent and protective. The following example from a Ministry of Education official in 1869 bears emphasis:

> *Lithuanians, Latvians and even Jews are eager to get Russified [...] But even if there are those among them who do not speak Russian, then it is they who are obliged to learn the language of government, not vice versa. All these small peoples […] are not some pagans and savages […] while we are not missionaries among savages. We need not come down to their dialects and notions; rather, we should make them get up to our level.*[1276]

The threat of 'Polonism' was either exaggerated or misunderstood – nationalist Polish elites were mostly broken after 1863, and the few true Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalists at the time were hardly well disposed to the Poles. Indeed, the reformer Miliutin advised that it was both "impractical and futile to force the Russian language of Polish schoolchildren."[1277] This 'threat' was magnified by the transmission of Russian national ideology, which as Sviatoslav Kaspe contends, "was no less important for the awakening of local nationalisms than acts of overt repression".[1278] If anything, the rhetoric kept the 'other' of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth elites alive.[1279] It is prudent to note at this point that such language policies were not unique to the Russians – the Germans adopted similar language policies in education in the Grand Duchy of Posen, which effectively shone a beacon on the almost unhindered Polish hegemony in the Austrian province of Galicia.[1280]

The peoples not considered under threat from 'Polonism' were spared for another two decades. However, the restraint that Alexander II showed in the 1860s and 70s with the Baltic Germans would become a memory under the regime of Alexander III. Russian officials would undermine the traditional fraternal relationship between German and Russian elites. Any harm to the productive power of the affected populations of the empire was considered collateral damage. In the 1880s, Minister of Education Ivan Delianov answered a complaint from a Baltic German teacher thus: "This one generation will suffer damage. There's nothing we can do about it. In return, however, the next generation will completely understand the Russian language, and then all difficulties in instruction will cease."[1281] The effects of Russification in the Baltic Provinces, not only with regards to the German elites but also the emerging Latvian and Estonian populations, will be examined in the next chapter.

[1275] Regarding Cyrillic, see Weeks, Lithuanians, *op.cit.,* pp. 110-111.
[1276] Quoted in Dolbilov, *op.cit.,* p. 151.
[1277] N.A. Miliutin, quoted in Thaden, The Russian Government, *op.cit.,* p. 28.
[1278] Kaspe, *op.cit.,* p. 487.
[1279] Dolbilov, *op.cit.,* p. 156.
[1280] Wiltold Molik, "The Poles in the Grand Duchy of Poznán, 1850-1914, A. Kappeler (ed.), *The Formation of National Elites.* Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, Vol VI (Aldershot, 1992), p. 17.
[1281] Haltzel, *op.cit.,* p. 172.

The most intense phase of Russification policies occurred between 1885 and 1905, despite manifest resistance from within elements of the inner core of the Russian Imperial Power Structure. One example is from the chairman of the Committee of Ministers, former Minister of Finance Bunge, whose warning, as relayed by Edward Thalden, was based on implementation, instead of ideology:

> *Forcible administrative and police measures to discourage the use of local languages or to eradicate the historically developed forms of life among non-Russians could only be counter-productive. Instead, Bunge wanted a "cautious and well-considered policy" that would introduce reforms gradually, avoid giving the impression that the government acted under "the pressure of the Russian press" and in accord with the "pretensions of Russian chauvinism," win the "respect and sympathy of the local population," and convince non-Russians of the advantages to themselves of learning the Russian language and establishing closer relations with the rest of the empire.*[1282]

It is fair to conclude that Russification effectively *pulled apart what it intended to bring together*. Part of this was due to the almost punitive nature of elements of the programme. A single example from Poland in 1910 perfectly illustrates this, as relayed by British Consul General Bayley: "In the local Ministry of Finance and Russian schools, Polish members of staff, who have been overheard conversing in Polish during official hours, have been reprimanded and instructions have been issued forbidding the use of Polish in any government department."[1283] In the same despatch he would add that the Hotel Bristol had been fined 300 roubles because the programme of music played in the restaurant was not printed in Russian as well as Polish.[1284]

Russification was bolstered by the Orthodox Church – to which conversion would indicate a successful conversion to the Russian 'nation'.[1285] This was even though the Russian Government never officially equated 'Polishness' to Catholicism.[1286] The sudden rush of liberalism that followed the 1905 revolution would expose as empty many of these conversions to Orthodoxy, as there was a huge wave of conversions back to Catholicism.[1287] At elite level, nationalism would never totally replace feudal bonds between non-Russian elites and the dynasty.[1288] In addition, although 'Russianness' was more defined than in 1852, Russian elites and intellectuals did not generally have the sense of ethnic superiority that the British and French

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[1282] Thaden, The Russian Government, *op.cit.*, p. 55.
[1283] BDFA: Bayley to Nicolson, Warsaw, August 12 1910, BDFA V6, pp. 50-52.
[1284] *Ibid.*
[1285] Dolbilov, *op.cit.*, p. 154. Gorizontnov, and Tagirova, in separate studies, outline just how difficult it was to work out what Russia actually was, indeed 'where' the heartland of the empire was located. See Gorizontov, *op.cit.*, and Nailya Tagirova, "Mapping the Empire's Economic Regions from the Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Century", in in J. Burbank, M. von Hagen & A. Remnev (eds.), *Russian Empire. Space, People, Power, 1700-1930* (Bloomington, IN, 2007), pp. 125-136.
[1286] Weeks, Lithuanians, *op.cit.*, p. 98.
[1287] As an example of a 'nationality' that suffered from conversions, the Baltic German population declined from 180,423 in 1881 to 152,936 in 1897. According to Haltzel, this was due to the "induced" changing of the nationality of half-Germans to Russian, and the return of 'Germanized' Latvians and Estonians to their previous nationality. Haltzel, *op.cit.*, p. 150. See also Weeks, Poland, *op.cit.* p. 545. Even from ex-Uniates, whose church was dissolved in Poland in 1875.
[1288] Renner, *op.cit.*, p. 663.

displayed in abundance in their respective empires.[1289] However, the Russification policies would make enough of an impression to be of damage to the stability of the Imperial Power Structure; a stability which was their intended purpose in the first place.

7.2.2. Magyarisation

After *Ausgleich*, the Hungarians would take an approach almost diametrically opposite to pragmatic Austrian pluralism. 'Magyarisation' was founded upon the belief that non-Magyar peoples would benefit from assimilation to a 'superior' people (a common notion in nineteenth-century state-led nationalism, such as we have seen in Russia), so that their ethnic population would meet up with their geographic borders.[1290] The Hungarians were much more vocal about their intentions than the Russians, brazenly addressing non-Magyar national groups of their obligation, as we will see. Magyarisation was also driven by fear – fear of claims making and competing voices ebbing away at their newly won part of the Imperial Power Structure and fear of irredentism and external influences on their domestic order. It was also a manifestation of, as R.J.W. Evans argued, the Hungarians' "total political and emotional commitment to the historic borders", which were at the core of Magyar identity.[1291]

The model for the Hungarian state post-*Ausgleich* was France, and they adopted the same philosophy of homogenisation through assimilation, even taking as their slogan the words of the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre to the National Assembly in 1789: "There cannot be a nation within a nation."[1292] In Marius Turda's words, they believed "a unitary Magyar nation needed a unitary Magyar state".[1293] The Hungarians strove to limit access to all four sources of social power to non-Magyar peoples, initially through legislation. They would become the second European country – after Switzerland – to attempt to solve a nationality issue via legislation, passing the the "Nationality Act" of 1868 (Law XLIV).[1294] Whilst this enshrined an individual's right to culture and language use, schooling in a child's mother-tongue, and the formation of some non-political 'national' bodies, such as banks, it noticeably neither allowed for 'national' political institutions, nor the building blocks of those institutions, such as collective political representation.[1295] Politically, as Emil Niederhauser noted, "only one nation existed in Hungary."[1296] The Magyar desire for a model 'western' nation-state may well have

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[1289] Lieven stated: "In 1914 Europeans commented that Russian peasants seemed to have no sense of cultural or racial superiority to non-whites and that even Russian officers treated natives in a less cold and superior fashion than was the custom among their European peers." Lieven, Dilemmas, *op.cit.*, p. 180.

[1290] Evans, Frontiers and National Identities, *op.cit.*, p. 495. He wrote: "they aimed … to extend the ethnic frontier until it met the territorial one."

[1291] Evans, Frontiers and National Identities, *op.cit.*, p. 495.

[1292] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.*, p. 195.

[1293] Marius Turda, "The Idea of National Legitimacy in Fin-de-Siecle Hungary", www.users.ox.ac.uk/~oaces/conference/papers/Marius_Turda.pdf, last accessed 4 December 2014, p. 4.

[1294] Frank, *op.cit.,* p. 255.

[1295] *Ibid.* Also see Niederhauser, *op.cit.,* p. 259.

[1296] Niederhauser, *Ibid.*

been achievable using their available political power, however, a liberal dose of romanticist history, coveting the reconstitution of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen as a linguistically Magyar kingdom, would make their objectives elusive in a territory with such large non-Magyar populations.

As with Russification, Magyarisation would develop over time. The Hungarians cut their teeth with their Croatian subjects between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and 1848.[1297] In effect, this was a trial run for the post-*Ausgleich* era. They had mandated the use of the Hungarian language in all official business, and its teaching alongside Croat in the few schools in the province of Croatia and Slavonia. The wounds of the revolution, when the Croats, Serbs and Romanians rose against the Hungarians, in part on behalf of the beleaguered dynasty, in part for their own ends, and in part in violent reaction to years of Hungarian hegemony, would harden the Hungarian resolve to Magyarise when the time came. An ominous portent for the non-Magyar inhabitants of the Kingdom could be found in the first point of the 1849 Hungarian Declaration of Independence: "The territorial unity of this state [Hungary] is declared to be inviolable, and its territory to be indivisible."[1298]

Magyarisation, as a 'state-led' nationalism programme, required Hungarian political control in the Kingdom, and that would come to pass with *Ausgleich*. Initially, there were voices in the post-*Ausgleich* Hungarian government that saw Magyarisation as a process whereby of assimilation into the Hungarian 'nation' needn't mean the subjugation of non-Magyar culture and language. Ferenc Deák was at the forefront of this philosophy. For example, he would argue in parliament for a secondary school for Serbian speakers in Novi Sad,[1299] and in November 1869 supported a request by the Serbian National Theatre – in the same town – for a government subsidy, similar to that granted to the Pest Hungarian National Theatre, stating that: "it is not fair that the state [...] merely and exclusively would support only one language and nationality from the common tax. In my view, either all or none."[1300]

The notion that Hungarian 'nation' required Magyar linguistic purity only took off in the 1880s. In the the words of Tibor Frank, in the beginning, "official government policy concentrated on supporting voluntary Magyarisation in place of a programme called 'grammatical Magyarization,' compulsory learning of the languages".[1301] The programme became more "forceful" during the latter years of administration of Kálmán Tisza (1875-1890) and continued to harshen until the First World War.[1302] The patriarchal attitude of the Hungarian elites to non-Magyar races would also inflame the nationalities, even though the underlying message remained the same. For example, former Hungarian Prime Minister Count Tisza, speaking in

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[1297] Alex J. Bellamy, *The Formation of Croatian National Identity. A Centuries Old Dream* (Manchester, 2003), p. 42.
[1298] Hungarian Declaration of Independence, *op,cit.*, p. 9 of 10.
[1299] Niederhauser, *op.cit.*, p. 260.
[1300] Quoted in László Katus, "József Eötvös and Ferenc Deák: Laws on Nationalities", in I. Romsics & B.K. Király (eds.), *Geopolitics in the Danube Region. Hungarian Reconciliation Efforts, 1848-1998* (Budapest, 1998), pp. 143-144.
[1301] Frank, *op.cit.*, p. 255.
[1302] *Ibid.*

1910, decreed that: "our citizens of non-Magyar tongue must, in the first place, become accustomed to the fact that they belong to the community of a national state, of a state which is not a conglomerate of various races."[1303] As British Attaché Phipps noted in 1890: "The latent but main object of their reforming policy was the checking or suppression of local disintegrating forces or in other words the subversion of the influence of the Slavs and Roumanians and Germans in certain districts and the maintenance of the Magyar predominance."[1304]

That being said, Magyarisation programmes were moulded by liberal ideologies that were mostly absent from Russian 'core'. For one, being Jewish did not prohibit one from joining the Magyar elite, indeed the belated explosion in the capitalist class after 1900 propelled a huge number of Jews into the noble classes.[1305] Hungarians didn't really employ racism or care about ethnic ancestry in the classical European sense.[1306] They respected property rights, and generally followed their Constitution, which meant that until the eve of the First World War, primary school education in the Romanian and Slovak languages continued, albeit under pressure from teaching the Hungarian language. They were also hindered by the continued common use of German in certain elite circles, which would only decline in the late-nineteenth century (German had only replaced Latin as the language of the elites in the eighteenth century). The decline would not be so marked as to change the status of the German language *Pester Lloyd* as one of Hungary's leading newspapers.[1307]

As opposed to the rights of the individual, non-Magyar national organisations were strongly discouraged. So the Hungarians proceeded with a Magyarisation programme by the strict rules of the Constitution, preferring to try to entice non-Hungarian speakers with the utopic promise of belonging to the Magyar nation. In the words of Cohen, after 1867:

> *The Hungarian interior ministry and the administrative officials it sent to the counties used their authority to restrain, harass, and occasionally jail leaders of the non-Magyar nationalist formations and of the radical lower-class movements that they found most obnoxious. All this was done, though, under the cover of laws and ministerial decrees; and the Hungarian government generally recognized political and legal limits to the measures it used against political opposition.*[1308]

The Hungarians worked to limit the seats available for the peripheral nationalities in parliament by a level of gerrymandering impressive even for the standards of the times. For example, when the first parliament sat after *Ausgleich*, there were a grand total of three Slovak

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[1303] Quoted in Gerald Stourzh, "The Multinational Empire Revisited: Reflections on Late Imperial Austria", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 23 (Jan., 1992), p. 15. Two years previously, another former Prime Minister, Kálmán Széll, said that "we have only one single categorical imperative and we must demand that every citizen should acknowledge it and subject himself unconditionally to it." *Ibid.*

[1304] TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, October 1 1890, FO 120/683:259.

[1305] McCagg, Bourgeoisie, *op.cit.*, p. 67. He outlined that of the 346 ennobled Jews in Hungary between 1824-1914, 220 of them acquired their titles after 1900, and this was due to the growth of modern industry.

[1306] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 363, wrote that "Magyar national policy was free from racism in so far as it did not base the unequal treatment of minorities on ethnic ancestry but on the demand to give up national identification and accept unconditional conversion to Magyarism." Also see Lieven, Dilemmas, *op.cit.*, p. 186.

[1307] Bruckmüller, Habsburg Society, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

[1308] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.*, p. 253.

deputies who were never given the opportunity to address the Parliament; considerably less than the forty-five they would have had, had the seats been divided fairly amongst the population.[1309] This would only get worse, by a mechanism explained by A.J.P. Taylor:

> *Constituencies inhabited by Magyars were enormous, often with 10,000 voters; the constituencies inhabited by the national minorities were tiny, with as few as 250 electors, and since few of these could understand Magyar the decision rested with half a dozen officials. Thus the system of Magyar monopoly was maintained by means of 'rotten boroughs', inhabited by non-Magyars.[1310]*

These tactics stood the test of time. For example, in the 1906 parliament, 387 out of 412 seats were represented by Magyar parties or independent members, as opposed to 7 by Slovaks, 16 by Romanians and just 2 by Serbians.[1311] This was under cover of the laws of suffrage, which also discriminated against most Hungarians, stopping them from participating as well (indeed, only about 6 per cent of the overall population could vote).[1312]

The Hungarian Government also aimed to restrict education in non-Magyar languages. For example, the number of Slovak primary schools was cut to 365 from 1,716 between 1880 and 1913, whereas over that same period the Romanians lost nearly 800 primary schools and the number German primary schools effectively halved.[1313] The situation at upper levels was considerably worse. Before 1914, out of 205 accredited *Gymnasia* and *Realschulen*, only sixteen used languages other than Hungarian.[1314] There was no instruction at all at this level in Slovak or Ukrainian, nor at any universities or technical colleges.[1315] In league with restriction to education was Magyarisation of the Transleithanian civil service, which in William Jenks' words, led to "the greatest families filled the leading state positions, while the gentry's sons poured into the less exalted central offices and practically monopolized the direction of local affairs".[1316] Further details on the suppression of non-Magyar language education will be examined later.

For nationalities, the carrot to the stick was the promise of full integration into the Magyar brotherhood if they chose assimilation. Many took up this offer – it has been estimated that 2.2-2.4 million non-Magyars were assimilated, including almost 1.1 million Saxon Germans.[1317] Between 1880 and 1914 alone, some 400,000 Germans, 200,000 Jews, 80,000 Serbs and Croats and 50,000 Romanians are estimated to have become Magyars.[1318] This indicated that the middle classes and elites were by far the most likely to assimilate, for example

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[1309] Sugar, *op.cit.,* pp. 13-14. Things were no better at the level of county administration: "consequently the Slovaks had no opportunity to develop a political life or parties or to express their views as the Czechs did".
[1310] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 207.
[1311] Zsuppán, *op.cit.,* p. 65: Slovak numbers are for the Slovak National Party, Romanian for the Romanian National Party, and for Serbs the Serbian National Party.
[1312] Sugar, *op.cit.,* p. 8.
[1313] Hanak, *op.cit.,* p. 38.
[1314] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* p. 263.
[1315] *Ibid.*
[1316] Jenks, *op.cit.,* p. 54. Not surprisingly, as Jenks added, this hardly endeared the Hungarian civil service to non-Magyar communities.
[1317] Hanak, *op.cit.,* p. 38.
[1318] Zsuppán, *op.cit.,* p. 67.

the Saxon Germans were already a dominant class in their region in Transylvania, whereas the Romanians were almost entirely of the lower and peasant classes. It was almost entirely an urban phenomenon, as well.[1319] Indeed, a number of assimilated Germans and Jews – in particular – were at the forefront of implementing Magyarisation policies, further alienating those nationalities further down on the modernisation 'ladder', such as the Serbs.[1320]

As with Russification, Magyarisation intensified over time, and its tactics became cruder. As Turda noted, what started as a reasonably "tolerant and liberal *Gesellschaft*" in 1867 turned into an "illiberal and exclusivist *Gemeinschaft*" by the turn of the twentieth century.[1321] Naturally, some believed they did not go far enough: Béni Kállay, Joint Imperial Minister of Finance for 21 years, was one. He would complain with an overconfident and perhaps delusional remark that if former Prime Minister Tisza would had been more forceful, the order of the Empire would have become: "the State of Hungary, alias Austria-Hungary".[1322]

In conjunction with this was a flowering of a Magyar national bravado, no better illustrated than at the 1896 Millennium Exhibition, organised to trumpet one thousand years of Hungarian 'dominance' in the region.[1323] These festivities would cause demonstrations as far apart as Prague and Transylvania; as noted in a dispatch to the Marquis of Salisbury, the Hungarians: "are incapable of checking the tendency to exaggerate their own position in the Empire, just as they are prone to indulge as a nation in the extravagance which has always been characteristic of their private life."[1324] The Exhibition very loudly placed the Magyars at the very core of the Hungarian half of the empire, in a display that would not have been out of place in 1930s Europe. As Turda explained:

> The ideas of Hungarian national and cultural superiority were reified by the architecture and physical arrangement of the exhibition. "The Nationality Street," for example, was where each "nationality" of Hungary was represented. As an illustration of the "peaceful cohabitation" of the "Magyar nation" with the "non–Magyar races," the "nationality street" reflected, as one contemporary proudly observed, "the ardent desire of the nation, that the different races inhabiting this country may always live in peace and harmony side by side, united in the love of the common fatherland."[1325]

Magyarisation also poisoned any new relationship the Croats may have hoped for in the wake of the *Nagodba* of 1868. The *Nagodba* was on paper a 'miniature' *Ausgleich* between the Croats and Hungarians, but in effect it would soon turn into a rubber stamp for Hungarian hegemony, as well as an insurance policy against the formation of a Croat-led Triune Kingdom

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[1319] Rusinow, *op.cit.,* p. 253.
[1320] Zoran Janjetovíc, "A Short Survey of the Relations between the Yugoslavs and Ethnic Germans", http://www.drustvosns.org/nemacka%20manjina/janjetovic/Z.%20Janjetovic,%20A%20Short%20Survey%20of%20the%20Relations%20between%20the%20Yugoslavs%20and%20Ethnic%20Germans.pdf, last accessed 1 December 2014, p. 3.
[1321] Turda, *op.cit.,* p. 5.
[1322] Bení Kallay, quoted in Okey, Trio, *op.cit.,* p. 148.
[1323] Turda, *op.cit.,* pp. 6-7.
[1324] TNA: Dispatch to Salisbury, Vienna, May 14 1896, FO 120/724: 160.
[1325] Turda, *op.cit.,* pp. 6-7.

within the Habsburg Empire. The Romanians too, began to look across the Danube, even though for the most part they still looked to Vienna for salvation (to Franz Ferdinand in particular). Growing nationalist agitation by the turn of the twentieth century would cause the Hungarian authorities to come down hard. For example, numerous Slovaks and Romanians would be arrested for such crimes as abusing the Hungarian flag.[1326]

The nationalities in the Budapest parliament strove to use that forum as a pulpit, and against the odds could sometimes make enough noise to engender Government responses. Consul Clarke reported on fascinating debates early in the life of the Coalition Government. On the floor, Interior Minister Andrássy (younger) responded to the:

almost daily charges brought by members of the Nationalist Party, that the Hungarian State or Government was oppressing the nationalities and was endeavouring to magyarize them by force, was contrary to the truth. Had such a policy been pursued, the Nationalist deputies would not now be sitting in the Chambers, nor would they have been so strong in number as at present.[1327]

On answering a proposal on making Transleithania a confederalist state, like Switzerland, he continued, bringing Balkan cross-border politics into account:

Such a scheme not only constitutes a crime against the State but also one against your own brethren. You pursue a dangerous policy, you arouse mistrust against the Hungarian State and against Hungarian society, and you provoke chauvinistic outbursts against your brethren […] You do harm not only those related to you in this country but you incite the Nationalities in Servia[sic] and Roumania against Hungary.[1328]

Notable in the Count's speeches was an almost dumbfounded Magyar exceptionalism. In a previous sitting he would proclaim bewilderment as to why other nationalities weren't playing along: "Everyone in Hungary, without distinction of nationality, could fill offices and receive honours," and denial: "my policy as regards Nationalities can be summed up in one sentence:– Justice towards the Nationalities in general, but prosecution of agitators with unrelenting vigour."[1329] The Minister of Justice, Polónyi, would go on to address charges that:

Hungarians only acknowledge "political unity" and not "unity of races." The reply to such a complaint was that he was not aware that the Rumanes, Slovaks, and other nationalities had ever been united amongst themselves. According to him such unity could not be established, either on the basis of common religion – the nationalities all being of different religions – or on the basis of language – which is also different in each case. "Only one bond really united them and that was hatred of the Hungarian National State and of the Magyar race."[1330]

[1326] Sked, Historians, *op.cit.,* p. 186.

[1327] TNA: Clarke to Boothby, Budapest, November 27 1906, FO 371/8/94.

[1328] *Ibid.*

[1329] *Ibid.* He also said that: "as Minister of the Interior he would instruct 'all administrative officials not to inquire as to any one's mother tongue or as to any one's origin, but only as to whether the individual himself was or was not a good citizen'".

[1330] TNA: Clarke to Boothby, Budapest, December 7 1906, FO 371/8/98.

Some of the ruling elite realised that they may have gone too far (just as they had such epiphanies over Quota standoffs). Negotiations were entered into with Romanian leaders in 1908, and would continue after the fall of the Wekerle Government in 1910, although nothing would come of it, except perhaps the delaying of any agitation by the Romanians whilst negotiations were underway. Although there was a degree of outreach, as we will see, cultural Magyarization remained on the table. Alas, as Solomon Wank concluded: "Magyar policies only served to intensify the nationalism of the non-Magyar peoples." Taking a vastly different path to Austria's pragmatic pluralism would achieve exactly the same end result.[1331]

7.3.   The Enemy within? Austrian German and Hungarian 'liberal nationalism'

Even before *Ausgleich*, many ethnic Germans from Cisleithania – hereafter called Austrian Germans – believed they deserved a privileged position within the Habsburg Empire. The Hungarians had begun to claim hegemonic rights in the Magyar Kingdom, as was displayed at times during the revolution. *Ausgleich* would change everything – creating dilemmas for both peoples. For the former, how could they maintain 'German' as the dominant language and ethnicity in 'their' half of the Empire; in a system which was intentionally fostering ethnic pluralism? Especially when their sovereign – their 'co-national' – was determined to rule as patriarch over all of his peoples. For the latter, *Ausgleich* gave them their desired regional hegemony, and a degree of privileges in the Imperial Power Structure that the other nationalities could only dream about, but this was not enough: how could they maximise their power and influence in an Empire of which they believed themselves to be an equal managing partner (at least)? This section will look at the rise of Austrian German and Hungarian nationalism from a liberal platform: working in opposition to the imperial core, other German and Hungarian elements, and the traditionally conservative but pragmatic Emperor himself.

7.3.1.   Austria

Although many Austrian Germans (indeed, German speakers from across Cisleithania) felt a strong link to their ethnic brethren to the west, and some would feel a distinct superiority to the non-German speakers in the empire, nationalist activism in the empire would turn out to be anticlimactic, especially after 1879. In the period from 1867 to 1914, there was no true attempt at Germanisation from above in the empire. For Franz Josef, international standing was all-important, and he was pragmatic enough to ignore nationality if required. 'German' programmes and movements were then consigned to mimic those of the other nationalities, in that they would qualify as 'state-seeking' nationalism as per Tilly's typology, and fit into Hroch's Phase C.

The words and deeds of their 'German' Kaiser, during and after *Ausgleich* should have been abundantly clear and far from encouraging for Austrian German nationalists – in his

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[1331] Wank, Nationalities, *op.cit.,* p. 11.

empire, maintaining 'great power' status would trump collective German nationalism every day of the week. Also, the nature of Austrian German political thought was not conducive to the emergence of a strong 'core' national movement. From *Ausgleich* until the late 1870s, liberalism – nationalism's sometime enemy and sometime uncomfortable partner – dominated. However, as with Magyar liberalism, it would evolve a nationalist anchor, especially after 1879. From this year, conservatism in line with the emperor's ideology would dominate politics until the First World War, and due to the nature of the Imperial Power Structure in Cisleithania, Austrian German conservatives could just not afford, and were not inclined, to alienate their reactionary brethren in Bohemia and Galicia.

In the *Reichsrat* there were periodic attempts to introduce bills making German the state language, from Austrian German liberals. This divided the body, annoying the German conservatives and giving more ammunition to non-German members. The former's objections could be summarised in two parts: that there would be more problems by introducing yet another initiative that could be controversial and open to interpretation, and that it would put the Emperor in a difficult position as he would have to rule over disenchanted non-German speaking subjects.[1332] The objection of the nationalities was well summed up by the Young Czech leader Dr. Gregr, who in Paget's words: "accused the Liberals of the wish to Germanize the country […] The Germans he said must give up the idea that in Austria one nationality must reign supreme while others are destined to be oppressed".[1333]

Still, there would be numerous calls for unification with Wilhelmine Germany, but these never amounted to much. Some Austrian Germans believed that preferences were being given to the "countenances" of the Slavs of Cisleithania, which on top of the perceptions of Magyars made them feel persecuted.[1334] As for the status of Germans within the empire, the most famous of proclamations was the Linz Programme of 1882, drawn up by the liberals Georg von Schörnerer, Victor Adler and Heinrich Friedjung. It asked for an alliance of Austria and Germany based around a customs union (not unlike the existing customs union between both halves of the Habsburg Empire), the enshrining of the German language as the official language of state, and formal union of all of the German speaking Crownlands, amongst other things. Hungary, ironically, was to be reduced to the status of sharing a sovereign, reverting to dynastic union only – a position that a fair few Hungarians would likely have loved, especially the Independence Party.[1335] To A.J.P. Taylor, the Linz Programme was an admission of German weakness in Austria, that they could not extend hegemony over the Empire as it stood, on their own. [1336]

They failed to gain too much traction, especially amongst the political classes in the Iron Ring era. Noticeably, this coincided with the gradual extension of the franchise. Bismarck would

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[1332] TNA: Paget to Granville, Vienna, January 27 1884, FO 120/627:38.

[1333] *Ibid.*

[1334] TNA: Paget to Salisbury, Vienna, November 20, 1888, FO 120/661:360.

[1335] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 422.

[1336] Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 176. He wrote that this was a confession that "the German Austrians had neither the strength nor the cultural superiority to maintain their monopoly in Austria".

offer no help whatsoever – the Linz Programme position went against all of his geopolitical strategy for the region. For one, Bismarck was wary of a 'Greater Germany', which would be too large for the Prussian Junkers to dominate; he was also worried that a Germany that was too strong would force the other European powers to join up against it.[1337] The Austrian German nationalist position was automatically contradictory, as they envisaged Bohemia being incorporated into a newly German-dominant crown land, although by this time it was without any doubt a majority Czech-speaking province. The declaration went on to impress that the German 'nature' of not only Bohemia, but also Moravia, Slovenia, the Italian and Silesian provinces, which had to be fortified to raise them to the level of 'Germanness' required.[1338] It was a playbook, romanticised rear-view vision of the Empire, when the Habsburgs held sway in Italy, and as such picked up nowhere near enough support to be influential. The Poles, the strongest supporters of the Government in the Reichsrat, would hardly have been happy to be transferred to Hungarian tutelage, for example.

As the turn of the century approached, Schönerer's radicalised Pan-German movement would struggle for relevance, suffering a backlash from the spite it directed towards the dynasty and the Catholic Church. Jean Bérenger may have been correct to state that "le catholique autrichen n'était pas un fanatique", but the church was still close to the heart of its subjects.[1339] Predictably, Schönerer's calls for splitting the Austrian Catholics from the Holy See – his *Los von Rom* (Away from Rome) movement – caused indignation, as did his desire to break with the dynasty.[1340] However, apart from drawing Karl Lueger into the uncomfortable territory of directly protecting the Church, it was probably just influential enough to bring further attention to Schörnerer, the most charismatic of the German nationalists (especially in the academy).[1341] Not long after the Linz Programme declaration, he began sprouting racial anti-Semitic dogma, to such a degree that Adler and Friedjung (both Jewish by birth) would shun him and Hitler, in Mein Kampf, would admire him.[1342] Even before this, however, German nationalists were already sidelining Schönerer and his followers, as well as other radicals. For example, there would be a major *Reichsrat* manifesto from Austria's German opposition released in 1896, which was made without consultation from Schörnerer.[1343]

Declarations that came in the wake of Linz, such as the Whitsun Programme of 1899, were far less adventurous, merely focussing on defence of the German language and 'Germanness' within the empire, displaying what John Boyer called a "new fortress

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[1337] *Ibid.*

[1338] Berger & Miller, *op.cit.,* p. 321.

[1339] Bérenger, *op.cit.,* p. 330.

[1340] With regards to the "Away from Rome" moniker, see Zöllner, *op.cit.,* p 213. Also see Sked, Decline & Fall, *op.cit.,* p. 226, & John W. Boyer, *Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna. Christian Socialism in Power, 1897-1918* (Chicago, 1995), pp. 42-44.

[1341] Boyer, Culture, *op.cit.,* p. 43. Also see Ernst Bruckmüller, "The national identity of the Austrians", in M. Teich and R. Porter (eds.), *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context* (Cambridge, UK, 1993), p. 216.

[1342] Kann, *op.cit.* pp. 434-434.

[1343] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, February 3 1899, FO 120/750:39.

mentality".[1344] They also were driven by a widening dislike of Schönerer, and strove to avoid anything that could be linked to his radicalism. Ambassador Rumbold correctly called it "a compromise and to some extent colourless".[1345] Whilst German nationalist movement within the empire would never return to the front foot, they would organise (from the liberal spectrum) movements based on ensuring a fair share of imperial influence for Germans overall, and specifically in places such as Bohemia.[1346] They could still make waves, such as how their concerted opposition to Slovene classes in a gymnasium in Cilli (Celje) led to the aforementioned overthrow of the Windishgrätz cabinet in 1895.[1347]

Ironically, they were now on a par with the other nationalities in the realm: arguably the *last* of to reach out for a piece of the 'pie'. They would (as John Boyer has outlined) face a dilemma, if they sought:

> *Something more than the negative, defensive attrition of the age of programs: could one protect the "Germans" as a national and ethnic group in the Monarchy not by guaranteeing to them a greater relative level of separate and discrete juridical resources or special territorially based political privileges but, rather, by strengthening the competitive and regulatory institutions of the state, seen as an independent locus of power beyond (yet based on) national prerogatives?*[1348]

The reason for the lack of traction was outlined by Ernst Bruckmüller, who argued that: "the overwhelming majority of the nationally conscious German Austrians wished to preserve the Habsburg monarchy together with their relatively privileged position within it".[1349]

7.3.2. Hungary

We have already looked at Magyarisation in theory, and will examine it in practice later in this section, using examples of its effect on specific nationalities. This section will look at the growth of Hungarian nationalism at imperial level: its relationship with, and role in, the overall Habsburg Imperial Power Structure. It is prudent to highlight that Hungary did not share the sharp divisions between Austrian German liberalism and conservatism over national questions. Much of this could be attributed to the nature of the revolutions in Vienna and Hungary in 1848/49. Nationalism went hand-in-hand with 'revolutionary' liberalism in Hungary to a degree

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[1344] Boyer, Old Regime, *op.cit.,* p. 164.

[1345] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, May 25 1899, FO 120/750:130.

[1346] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 361. They claimed that: "By the 1890s, a majority of Austrian liberals had gravitated towards 'Germanness' and the defence of German language as a foundation of political mobilization." Whilst correct, this raises two important questions: 1) how many Austrian Germans were actually liberal?; 2) just how many Austrian Germans would have to mobilise to force the Kaiser to change direction?

[1347] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 439. Cilli would become like many towns in Bohemia, "a traditional German town whose German hegemony was no longer accepted and was being challenged by the construction of alternate institutions, associations and possibilities", Jonathan Kwan, *Liberalism in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1861-1895* (Basingstoke, 2013), p. 183. For an excellent background to the controversy, and how it built up over a number of years, see Kwan, *op.cit.,* pp. 182-183.

[1348] Boyer, Old Regime, *op.cit.,* p. 163.

[1349] Bruckmüller, National Identity, *op.cit.,* p. 216.

not seen in Vienna. This contrast can be seen when comparing the nature and philosophy of the Kremsier Constitution of Austria with both the Hungarian April 15 Laws (1848) and the Hungarian Declaration of Independence. The April 15 laws displayed a similarly liberal spirit to the Kremsier Constitution that followed it by almost a year (e.g. the Robot was abolished, freedom of the press declared, and the nobility had numerous privileges stripped) whilst displaying strong Magyar 'gentry' nationalism of a type missing from the Austrian declaration.[1350] Hungary changed notably between March 1848 (the genesis of the Laws of April 15) and April 1849, when the Hungarian Declaration of Independence – driven by the now virtual dictator Kossuth – dispensed with overt liberalism to resemble the exceptionalist nationalist diatribes that would become the norm in Europe later in the century.[1351] Although Hungarian liberalism would be ascendant in Transleithania after *Ausgleich*, it would mostly converge with Hungarian conservatism with regards ideology on nationalism and the 'nation' (if anything, the liberal stance was merely a *less extreme* version of the conservative position, and both sides were boosted by the other). With respect to the Imperial Power Structure, liberalism was as prominent in Magyar nationalism as conservatism, even during the coalition era of 1906-1910.

A distinction should be made between the traditional nature of the nobility in Budapest, 'being' Magyar and the everyday use of the Hungarian language. In the eighteenth century, many of the high Hungarian nobility were not actually ethnic Magyars, and the language for official business, as well as interaction between elites, was Latin.[1352] They had only been part of the Habsburg dynasty since the early 17th century.[1353] As for their capital, it was still a primarily German-speaking city at the time of the 1848 revolution, after 1900 Hungarian was by far the dominant language of the population.[1354]

It is very difficult to categorise whether the Hungarians fit as a typical periphery nationality. As for nominating Hungary as a periphery, if we refer to the four sources of social power, they definitely fell down in the military sphere – they had limited military power; limited to the ability to withhold funding or human resources for the joint imperial army, or nurturing their *Honvédség* as a mechanism of ideological power as much as an effective militia. Without a true military they were at the mercy of the dynasty, which nearly came to fruition during the constitutional crisis of 1905-06. However, in Transleithania, they would become a 'pseudo-core'. They began the period in question on the back foot, and not in the good graces of the Emperor. As British Ambassador Loftus wrote in 1859:

> *The Emperor considers them in the light of subjects of a revolted Kingdom now reduced to a mere province, and he maintains that, whatever rights or privileges they possessed were forfeited by their*

[1350] Regarding the Kremsier Constitution, see Kann, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-312. For a good summary of the Laws of April 15, see László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century. Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective* (Leiden, 2012), pp. 207-208.

[1351] Hungarian Declaration of Independence, *op.cit.*

[1352] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

[1353] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

[1354] Niederhauser, *op.cit.*, p. 261.

act of rebellion and that all they now possess or may hereafter possess emanates solely from His Will and good pleasure.[1355]

Ten years of subjugation under neo-Absolutism began to wear on the Hungarian elites. The subject of taxation was especially sharp, as was conscription: both symbols of lost control.[1356] The October Diploma of 1860 and the February Patent of the following year did nothing to assuage the Hungarians.[1357] It would take *Ausgleich* to formalise a new arrangement, if not calm the Hungarian elites. *Ausgleich* would enable the belated coronation of Franz Josef as King of Hungary to take place. Hungarian elites, in the spirit of compromise, crowned a man who in 1849 had gone as far as to ask the 'hated' Russians to help quash their revolt. In turn, the stillborn constitution of 1848 became a beacon for the resurgence of Hungarian nationalism. "We consider the laws of 48 as the basis from which we cannot separate ourselves", remarked Ferenc Deák in 1861, a revolutionary who would become a key player in the *Ausgleich*, whilst being at pains to ensure the Pragmatic Sanction should be honoured.[1358]

Many of these elites were romantically tied to the ethos of the revolutionary Hungarian constitution, as well as to the Magyar exceptionalism of the Hungarian Declaration of Independence. The latter, to put it mildly, was incendiary toward the ruling house of their own King. [1359] What was in it for them, however, was pseudo-nationhood and perhaps more importantly, money. The common market had already given Hungarian estate owners plentiful access to markets – without this they would have had to deal with considerable tariff barriers. Now, as a viable political bloc, they would be able to exploit that, and a sense of 'almost' independence could be felt.[1360] They had been given reign over the traditional crown lands of St. Stephen, and they would make it as loyal to the Magyar cause as possible.[1361]

[1355] TNA: Loftus to Russell, Vienna, October 13 1859, FO 120/372:720.

[1356] TNA: Loftus to Russell, Vienna, December 1 1859, FO 120/372:807. He cited the content of a banned pamphlet, which states that: "this discontent may be in great part attributed to the pressure of the taxes, the annoying system of guardianship and to wounded national pride". Also see Bloomfield to Russell, Vienna, October 24 1861 120/395:551

[1357] TNA: Bloomfield to Russell, Vienna, February 14 1861, FO 120/392:35. Bloomfield recalled a conversation with a Hungarian noble: "Nothing, said Baron Nay, would induce them to accept a state of things proposed by the Edict of the 20th October and nothing would satisfy them but the entire restoration of the laws of 1848." Bloomfield also reported: "The great grievances of the Hungarians are the amount of taxation and debt imposed on them by the Austrian Government and the military conscription; they no longer attempt to conceal their determination to become independent and they look to Norway as the example they have to follow."

[1358] TNA: Bloomfield to Russell, Vienna, February 7 1861, FO 120/392:24.

[1359] For example, the Declaration stated: "The house of Austria has publicly used every effort to deprive the country of its legitimate independence and constitution, designing to reduce it to a level with the other provinces long since deprived of all freedom, and to unite all in a common link of slavery. Foiled in this effort by the untiring vigilance of the people, it directed its endeavor to tame the power, to check the progress of Hungary, causing it to minister to the gain of the provinces of Austria, but only to the extent which enabled those provinces to bear the load of taxation with which the prodigality of the imperial house weighed them down; having first deprived those provinces of all constitutional means of remonstrating against a policy which was not based upon the welfare of the subject, but solely tended to maintain despotism and crush liberty in every country of Europe." Hungarian Declaration of Independence, *op.cit.,* p. 2 of 10.

[1360] Bruckmüller, Habsburg Society, *op.cit.,* p. 2.

[1361] Kohn, Viability, *op.cit.,* p. 38.

The joint imperial army budgets were subject to renegotiation every ten years as a condition of the *Ausgleich*, and as such became such a political football as to render the negotiations for the Quota almost untenable. The army would become, in Peter Hanák's words, the "Achilles Heal of Dualism".[1362] The Hungarians were unimpressed with the concessions they garnered, although reasonably generous for an empire. Apart from the *Honvédség*, they would force the final dissolution of the Military Border in Croatia and Slavonia. The Military Border was rightly suspected by Andrássy of having a secondary purpose – as a buffer against Hungarian aggression within the Empire (it was from the Military Border that Jelačić launched his invasion of Hungary in 1848). Andrássy called the Border "an ever present tool for the reactionary circles in Vienna to demolish, at the first opportunity, the new state of affairs in Hungary."[1363] Andrássy also successfully tied any disbandment of the Border to the "bogey of South Slav nationalism".[1364]

Another noticeable development from *Ausgleich* was that politically at least, the magnates would be outmanoeuvred by "gentry-paupers". Taylor put it that the magnates thought:

that Dualism would provide them with high places of glory and profit […] they regarded government appointments as a system of out-relief for the aristocracy. Instead, their places were taken by gentry-paupers, more industrious and less exacting in their demands; and the magnates were altogether excluded from office. No magnate was Prime Minister after Andrássy left office in 1871 […] The magnates had intended to cooperate with the Emperor to impose themselves on the Emperor; instead the gentry cooperated with the Emperor to impose themselves on the magnates. [1365]

However, the gentry would impose themselves on both the magnates and the emperor, as would become apparent in the Delegations and during Quota negotiations. Both would fight back from time to time, as we will see.

Concessions such as the granting of a Hungarian militia and the abolition of the Military Border only served to whet the Hungarian appetite for more, especially as they benefitted from stability of government that was worlds away from the situation in Vienna, at least until the turn of the century.[1366] In 1878 they expressed their displeasure at the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, fearful of how it would cause a "dangerous upsetting" of the balance of Slavs with them and the Germans in the realm,[1367] and from the 1888 Quota negotiations their demands became bolder and more laden with ideology and symbolism. We have already seen how they were held up until the designation of the army was changed from *k.k.* to *k.u.k.* When the negotiations for the Quota came up again in 1898, a form of anti-

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[1362] Peter Hanák, "Die Stellung Ungarns in der Monarchie", in F. Engel-Janosi & H. Rumpler (eds.), *Probleme der Franzisko-Hosephinischen Zeit 1848-1916* (Vienna, 1967), p. 84, quoted in Sked, Historians, *op.cit.*, p. 183.

[1363] Quoted in Rothenberg, Struggle, *op.cit.*, p. 70.

[1364] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[1365] Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 207.

[1366] TNA: Paget to Granville, Vienna, October 3 1884, FO 120/628:266. For example he commented on the 1884 elections, in which Tisza was elected as Prime Minister for the fourth time, winning over 50% of the seats.

[1367] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 281.

modernist agrarian conservatism rooted in nationalism had come to prominence in Hungary,[1368] so destabilising that no resolution would be achieved for over eight years – eight years with improvements to military funding in limbo, at a time when the other great powers were exponentially increasing their military expenditures.

Things changed when Baron Bánffy became Prime Minister in 1895. His parliamentary methods made governing more difficult, despite having an absolute seat majority. A strict constitutionalist and believer in *Ausgleich,* his government had to face a wave of opposition based upon the Quota negotiations which began in 1898. British Consul in Budapest, Gerard Lowther, reported an example of Bánffy's novel methods, which only exacerbated the situation, in 1899:

> *I hear, from a good source, that Baron Bánffy's <u>personal</u> idea was to solve the question of Parliamentary obstruction by a process of physical exhaustion, namely to select the three senior members of the Chamber, who would preside over its sittings which should continue uninterruptedly day and night, for a month or more, if necessary, until the most important legislation had been carried through. As two of the three oldest members of the chamber are over eighty years of age, it is to be presumed that the process of physical exhaustion would be more likely to reduce the numbers of the House than the obstruction of the Opposition.*[1369]

We have already examined the constitutional crisis and how it was illustrative of the dilemmas facing the empire and how destabilising such a strong periphery was to the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure. Ironically, the Hungarians would adopt the similar legal precedence used by the Emperor during that crisis in their dealings with Croatia and Slavonia, for example by appointing rulers favourable to their position (they had appointment powers for the Ban), suspending the *Sabor* on numerous occasions (as we will see), and passing legislation concerning the province in Budapest.[1370] This second level of core-periphery relationship would only destabilise the empire more, with the Croatians unable to appeal to Vienna – left to their own devices, they would take measures into their own hands.

The recalcitrance of the Hungarians with regards to Quota negotiations, when combined with Magyarisation programmes, also put them in a bind. Hungary's success was intrinsically tied to the Empire, which the Hungarians were paradoxically profiting from and challenging from the inside. Two British correspondents – Henry Wickham Steed from *The Times* and Robert Seton-Watson from *The Spectator* offered the most salient status reports from the time of the constitutional crisis. Wickham-Steed wrote that "Hungary can have no future as a great power when standing alone [...] If Hungary gives the signal for Austrian disintegration, she will do as grave a disservice to the balance of power as to herself."[1371] In short, the Hungarians should be

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[1368] Hanák, *op.cit.,* p. 34. Peter Hanák calls it "Anti-modernist (agrarian) neo-conservatism and a similarly new type of conservative nationalism."

[1369] TNA: Lowther to Rumbold, Budapest, January 13 1899, FO 120/754:7. Emphasis in original.

[1370] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* p. 258.

[1371] Henry Wickham Steed, Saturday Review, 4 March 1905, quoted in László Péter, "R.W. Seton-Watson's Changing Views on the National Question of the Habsburg Monarchy and the European Balance of Power", in *The Slavonic and East European Review,* Vol. 82, No. 3 (Jul 2004), p. 664.

careful how far they push. Seton-Watson focused instead on internal harmony and that they were, perhaps unknowingly, caught in a pincer movement between the imperial core on the one hand and their own emerging nationalities on the other. He wrote that:

The Magyar dream of replacing the Ausgleich by a personal union can only be realised if the entire nation without distinction of race presents a united front to the outside world. Internal harmony is impossible so long as one half of the nation makes the absorption of the other half its main object in life, – so long as one race retains a monopoly of political and administrative power; and until this harmony is secured Hungary will never be strong enough to stand alone. The Magyars can use Vienna against the nationalities, or the nationalities against Vienna; they cannot resist them both together.[1372]

The 1905 Hungarian election was a game changer.[1373] Prime Minister István Tisza, who like his father Kálmán was a pro-*Ausgleich,* pro-concessions moderate, came to feel that he was "unable to compete with the claptrap of the magnates", thereby forcing an election that he would lose.[1374] The Emperor, who had power over the appointment of Hungarian ministers, sidestepped the winning Independence Party by appointing General Fejerváry – the head of the Emperor's Hungarian bodyguard – as Prime Minister, which inflamed the situation even more. The Independence Party refused to serve under him, unless the army was split in two. Their intransigence resulted in the clearing of the Parliament by *k.u.k.* soldiers in February 1906, and the suspension of the constitution. A.J.P. Taylor's rather pointed comment that "after forty years of constitutional life, Hungary returned to the absolutism of Beck and Schmerling"[1375] can be discounted as an exaggeration – Hungary was hardly returned to direct rule from Vienna, and yet, if ever a reminder was needed that this was an empire (and that regardless of strength, Hungary was a periphery *with respect* to the imperial project), this was it. Eventually, the Independence Party would accept a junior position in the Wekerle government, and the crisis would finally pass. Notably, this was after the capitulation of two famous sons, Kossuth and Andrássy, who accepted a secret offer from the sovereign with numerous, far reaching conditions, including that they would "raise no military issues".[1376]

Often the Hungarians would realise the delicacy of their position but still run headlong into difficulties. The status of the Austro-Hungarian Bank offers an example. During the constitutional crisis, a campaign began to break up the bank and form an independent Hungarian national bank cartel.[1377] Hungarian bankers were wary of losing their mostly unfettered access to Vienna's money market, whilst the magnates saw this as a precursor to the dissolution of the customs union, which would bring back restrictive tariffs for the likes of

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[1372] R. W. Seton-Watson, well know as a supporter of a federalist empire. The Spectator, 29 September 1906, quoted in *Ibid.,* p. 671.
[1373] F.R. Bridge, *The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers, 1815-1918* (Leamington Spa, 1990), p. 255.
[1374] In A.J.P. Taylor's words. Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 222.
[1375] *Ibid.,* p. 223.
[1376] Jeszensky, *op.cit.,* p. 281.
[1377] Flandreau, Logic, *op.cit.,* pp. 11-12.

Hungarian grain. They would go along with cartel proposals nevertheless, until they were vetoed by Franz Josef on 25 April 1909.[1378]

When surveying the Hungarian attempts to bolster all four sources of social power (economic, political, military and ideological) within the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure, it is prudent to note that they wielded influence far beyond the officially sanctioned arenas of the Delegations, the joint imperial ministries and imperial bodies such as the Austro-Hungarian Bank. Indeed, much of the instability of Cisleithanian politics and society could be laid at the feet of Hungary, even though Cisleithania was entirely outside of their remit. Notably, their influence in Vienna – both direct and indirect – was in excess of what could be wielded in Budapest by *Reichsrat* politicians. An early example played out during the fraught negotiations for the Galician compromise in 1870: Andrássy, who after supporting Austrian Minister-President Leopold Hasner von Artha, grew tired of the problems in Vienna and withdrew all support, which resulted in the resignation of the Hasner government.[1379] Far more significantly, Hungarian influence would come to bear on the failed negotiations for a Bohemian compromise, which will be examined later.

Indirectly, Hungarian foot dragging in the Delegations could at times force normally adversarial parties and players in Cisleithanian politics to form tactical alliances, as noted by Ambassador Goschen in 1906: "The irritation felt in Austria against Hungary […] has produced the unwonted spectacle, one might almost say miracle, of the presence in the same Cabinet of representatives of the various Austrian nationalities, men who for years have been opposing each other tooth and nail on nearly every subject under the sun."[1380] Their treatment of nationalities that traversed the Leitha also had a residual effect on 'affected' or associated parties in the Vienna *Reichsrat*. For example, on the Hungarian suspension of the Croatian Constitution in 1912, the lower chamber became the scene of impassioned declarations by the Croatian-Slovene Club, the Czechs and the German Social Democrats demanding the Government "take sides to protect the interests of the other States of the Monarchy affected by the events in Croatia".[1381]

Whether directly or indirectly, Hungarian 'liberal' nationalism would have a dramatic effect on the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure as a whole, and on the 'domestic' scene in Cisleithania. They were the most powerful of imperial peripheries, fuelled by its pseudo-core status in Transleithania. It can be argue that on an imperial level, they were an enemy within: working against the greater wishes of their sovereign. However, there was one large difference between Austrian German and Hungarian liberal nationalism, regardless of how big a thorn in the side of the Empire they could be. The Hungarians, with a demarcated and very real power

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[1378] *Ibid.*, pp. 11-13.
[1379] TNA: Bloomfield to Clarendon, Vienna, April 5 1870, FO 120/483:108. He reported that Hasmer "and his friends in office, have, for the present occasion, been completely abandoned by Ct. Andrássy, who appears to be finally convinced of the impossibility of any longer sustaining on this side of the Leitha, an edifice so thoroughly undermined as the Hasmer Administration".
[1380] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, June 12, 1906, FO 371/6:68.
[1381] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, April 20 1912, FO 120/895:48.

base in Budapest, could simultaneously practice – in Tilly's parlance – 'state-led' and 'state-seeking' nationalist tendencies. Although for the most part Hungarian elites wanted the most *from* the Empire from the inside, being somewhat hostile but overall loyal, the special nature of their relationship meant that when they threw their weight around, it was much more effective, and much more destabilising to the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure.

Chapter 8

8. **The effect of the 'nation' on the imperial sub-core and periphery**

8.1. **Periphery Nationalism**

There were four major stumbling blocks to the rise of effective national movements in the Habsburg and Russian Empires. To start, 'state-seeking' national movements had to balance the desire for greater national power with the fear of 'going it alone' in the cauldron of nineteenth-century Europe. The greatest fear of almost all Hungarian and many Czech elites was the Russians.[1382] Poles on both sides of the imperial border were well aware of the pitfalls of how vulnerable an independent Poland would be to a Hohenzollern European Order.

Second, it was sometimes difficult, especially at the level of the elites, to actually identify someone's true nationality, by the parameters in vogue at the time. To give but one example: Joachim Remak remarked that, "through assimilation and intermarriage, through choice and chance, many a line was crossed or blurred. What for instance was Hugo von Hofmannsthal's 'nationality' – his paternal great grandfather a Jew from Bohemia, his paternal grandmother Italian, his mother's father Swabian?"[1383] The same question could be asked of the numerous ethnic Baltic Germans in the imperial Russian officer corps, such as for example Admiral Nikolai Essen, whose family (which had notable Swedish ancestry) had served the tsars for generations. He was clearly serving Russia when fighting the German navy in the Baltic before his death in 1915.

Self-identification would often make things more complicated: For example, Gustav Mahler, who converted to Catholicism because Jews weren't eligible to be director of the Vienna Court Opera, considered "himself a Bohemian, an Austrian, a German and a Jew".[1384] That some towns and regions were almost beyond 'labelling', added further complication. The population dynamics of towns such as Riga and Kiev changed so quickly that it was difficult to assign an 'identity; to them – for example, after half a century of immigration and industrialisation, was the Riga of 1900 a Latvian city, or a mixed city, or was it still at heart the same Baltic German city that had changed hands from Swedish to Russian sovereignty in 1721? Perhaps the most dramatic example was provided by Trieste of the turn of the twentieth century. It was at once Austria's economic lifeline to the sea, was a hotbed of Italian irredentism and Czechs striving for economic power, and Slovenes rising up through greater education and by their involvement a cultural society (*Slovenska matica*) that had notably

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[1382] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 175.
[1383] Remak, *op.cit.,* p. 134. To give further examples, he also noted that the creator of the Yugoslav academy in Zagreb, Bishop Strossmayer, had the Slovene first and second names Josip Juraj and the German surname Strossmayer, and that Heinrich Fügner co-founded the Czech Sokol movement in Prague. p. 135.
[1384] Brix, *op.cit.,* p. 13.

received substantial funding gifts on establishment by the likes of the leading Croat nationalist (of Styrian ancestry), Josip Strossmayer, and the 'German' emperor, Franz Josef, himself.[1385] The majority of the population spoke Italian, but they were of Slovene ancestry.

The third was a question of choice – did those elites integral to the imperial systems (arguably institutionalised within them), actually want to be associated with nationalist movements? It is true that many elites did identify with the non-core nationalist movements, or played both sides of the fence, however in both empires it can be argued that many of those with court connections remained loyal to their monarch and preferred to identify with the regime, not their nationality. Austrian German nobles, in particular, remained loyal to the dynasty and mostly above Pan-German movements within the empire.[1386] They preferred their existing power arrangements. For example, Count Jaroslav Wiśniewski, secretary of the Habsburg legation to Italy, had a famous discussion with the Queen of Italy where he refused to reveal his nationality despite being asked more than once.[1387] Loyalty to the Kaiser could be paramount, as this example relays:

> *While taking a cure at Karlsbad one year, a French statesman asked Count Leopold Berchtold which nationality he considered himself— German, Hungarian or Czech. Berchtold replied that he was a Viennese. Not satisfied by this answer, his interlocutor pressed the issue, asking which side he would take in the event of open conflict between the nationalities. To this Berchtold confidently replied, 'the side of the emperor'.[1388]*

Indeed, how did one judge elite 'ethnic' assimilation – take for example, the last Romanov ambassador to the Court of St. James (1903-1917), Alexander Konstantinovich Beckendorff? Was he Russified because he represented the Tsar? Was he Russified because he married a Russian Countess? Or was he at heart a Baltic German?

Fourth was the general difficulty that national activists had in fostering enough extensive and intensive power to create a critical mass of ethnic 'kin'. For many 'rank and file' subjects, this would mean breaking long standing personal ties to the monarch. Many were confused how to label people with a certain 'ethnicity', or how one could have a single identity in a multi-national empire with split loyalties?[1389] Noted historian Hans Kohn reported a greater loyalty to the dynasty amongst Czech students at his university (Karl-Friedrich German University in Prague)

[1385] Notably, Strossmayer's donation of 1,000fl was twice that received from the Emperor. Stanley B. Kimball "The Austro-Slav Revival: A Study of Nineteenth-Century Literary Foundations", *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 63, No 4 (1973), p. 68. Kimball called the founding of *Slovenska Matica* "the single most influential step toward the institutionalizing of the Slovene National Movement.", p. 67.

[1386] Zöllner, *op.cit.*, p, 219.

[1387] Bruckmüller, Habsburg Society, *op.cit.*, p. 4. & William D. Godsey, jr., *Aristocratic Redoubt: The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the Eve of the First World War* (West Lafayette, IN, 1999), p. 162: The conversation purportedly went as follows: QUEEN: "Are you Polish?" COUNT: "I am from Galicia, Your Majesty." QUEEN: "But surely that is Poland?" COUNT: "It is the Austrian province of Galicia."

[1388] Godsey, Quarterings, *op.cit.*, p. 89.

[1389] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 364. They wrote that "nationalities could only get so far in convincing people to think and act within the limits of [a] single distinctive nation, and most political activists were striving for a better—their own—kind of empire, not for its end."

at the beginning of the century, than to the Czech cause.[1390] The Russophile branch of Ukrainian nationalism on both sides of the Habsburg-Russian imperial border arguably showed more loyalty to the tsar than to the Ukrainian cause. There were residual loyalties to both emperors amongst the peasant classes that did not break with the onset of broader education. In many instances the intensity of Czech fervour, for example, could not make up for a shortfall of dedicated adherents: indeed, it could be a repellent.

It is prudent to note that in almost all cases in both the Russian and Habsburg Empires, nationalist agitation rarely strove for secession, although it may have been an ideological utopia; rather their struggle was to achieve more influence within the power orbit they inhabited.[1391] In the words of Remak regarding the Habsburg Empire: "What the nationalities wanted was not the breakup of the monarchy but the achievement, on a group level, of what the individual was capable of obtaining."[1392] The problem for the Habsburg Empire was that once organised groups had had a taste of influence, a share of available domestic power within the Imperial Power Structure, they would become hungry for more. Robert Kann summarised this well, noting that, "in many cases privileged national groups were unwilling to yield advantages, nor were they compelled to do so. In other instances underprivileged national groups asked in theory for nothing but equality, but as soon as it seemed to be achieved or within reach, this attitude changed to implied demands for national predominance in some areas".[1393] In short, those with influence wanted to protect it, and those receiving 'a taste of it' found that they wanted more. This phenomenon was similar in the Romanov realms, although the circumstances were different. Before 1905, it was much like post-*Ausgleich* Hungary – it was groups losing any semblance of administrative, cultural or linguistic agency that hungered to change the tide. After 1905 the scene began to resemble Austria, in that these groups had finally imperially-sanctioned access to a degree of political power, as well as having the shackles of cultural Russification removed – at least for a brief time. This would change dramatically in 1907, although things would never go back as far as how they were before the 1905 revolution.

In his general analysis of empires, Charles Tilly claims that "state-led nationalism activated the formation, mobilization, and claim-making of ethnic groups. It did so by legitimating the potent principle of correspondence between people and state".[1394] The Habsburg and Russian Empires provide the most typical examples of this, and the effects of it on the rise of internal peripheral groups. In effect, the rise of nationalism within these two empires would become a competition for how much intensive, collective and diffused power could be converted

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[1390] Hans Kohn, "The Viability of the Habsburg Monarchy", *Slavic Review,* Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1963), pp. 37-38.

[1391] Wank contends that this observation "confuses short-term strategies for long range goals." Wank, Nationality Question, *op.cit.,* p. 4.

[1392] Remak, *op.cit.,* p. 140. Examples of this abound. For example, in his memoirs written after the First World War, Edvard Beneš recalled how his return to Prague from abroad in 1908 strengthened in his conviction that Austria Hungary was by far the best option for the Czechs, p. 141.

[1393] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 438.

[1394] Tilly, States and Nationalism, *op.cit.,* p. 142.

into a greater degree of power from within the existing Imperial Power Structures of both empires. At the same time, in the words of Andreas Kappeler regarding the Russian Empire: "the protest movements on the periphery made a significant contribution to the destabilization of the social and political system, and tied down a large section of the military".[1395]

8.1.1. The Habsburg Empire

What is particularly interesting about the Habsburg scenario is that two entirely different ideological approaches to managing the nationality issue were undertaken after 1867 in Cisleithania and Transleithania, respectively. Yet, whether it was the carrot of the Austrians or the stick of the Hungarians, neither managed to quell national claims making, dissent and destabilisation to the Imperial Power Structure. The different forms of 'interest management and/or accommodation' gave enough incentive to peripheral national groups – even in Hungary – to make it worthwhile to fight for betterment within available parameters.[1396] Post-*Ausgleich*, the route taken by the Kaiser in the western half of the empire would see non-German nationalities strengthened, fomenting a rise in literacy, economic enterprise and political activity.[1397] Indeed, ethnicity became a legal basis, intensified after 1880 by the question of language in the four Habsburg censuses.[1398] From 1867 all citizens could organise and operate within the bounds of legality, opening schools with classes in their own tongue or starting Chambers of Commerce or banks. In the words of Karen Arens: "a fact of everyday life turned into a legal bargaining chip; a characteristic that was a largely passive organizer of social-national space turned into a heuristic (an active national narrative) for civil rights and modern national struggle".[1399] However, not all wanted to play along – an example to be highlighted later in this chapter concerns the rights of Czech parents to send their children to German schools.

Although nationalism had been an issue before and during the 1848/49 Revolutions, the discourse was rooted in a narrow band of the population. The history books may tell of the Hungarian uprisings, but these were, as argued by Mann, "either reinforced by the class cohesion of the old regime of a province – as among the Magyar nobility – or it indicated recent Habsburg rule, feebly institutionalized into civil service (as in Italy)".[1400] The presence of a feudal nobility class and bourgeoisie was the nominal determining factor behind why for example Poles, Hungarians and Croats were organisationally involved in the Revolutions.[1401] The outliers were the Romanians, and in their case their intervention could be traced to a feudal relic, a pre-modern style tributary contribution in defence of their protector-emperor; the Ruthenes, who managed to

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[1395] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.,* pp. 332-333.
[1396] Hüglin, *op.cit.,* p. 32.
[1397] Kohn, Viability, *op.cit.,* p. 39.
[1398] Arens, *op.cit.,* p. 24.
[1399] *Ibid.*
[1400] Mann, Vol II, *op.cit.,* p. 337.
[1401] Hanak, *op.cit.,* p. 37

organise despite their tiny nobility and bourgeoisie, with Polish encouragement; and the Slovaks, who revolted in specific reaction to Hungarian measures.

Once groups – whose subjects were now legalised as imperial citizens[1402] – were given access to the political systems at an imperial level (as opposed to the feudal, regional Diets), they would begin to work within the system for their own ends. As British diplomat Milbanke reported in 1884: "The great object which the various nationalities strive at the present moment is to be placed on the same footing as the German Race, to have their language only recognized by the state (as has been the case in some provinces) for official and educational purposes."[1403] Ironically, around this time, some Austrian Germans would begin to feel they were no longer on equal footing with the other nationalities, and their movement would in essence become a periphery, in respect of the Imperial Power Structure. The nature of formalised political organisation also led to factionalism within groups, weakening peripheral unity at the very time when their opportunity for presenting a unified face to the Empire was at its greatest.[1404] It could be argued that the incorporation of political representation in Austria in 1868 and Russia in 1905 had the knock on effect as a tool for imperial 'divide-and-rule', a situation that never truly occurred in Hungary. Austria was the classic test case for divide and rule. Phipps noted in 1891:

> Prudence is inculcated on the Galician Poles by the existence of 3 million Ruthenes. The Slavs in Bohemia and Moravia are kept in check by the 40 per cent in the former and the 26 per cent in the latter province of Germans. A similar equilibrium influences the Slovenes in Carinthia and Carniola just as Pan Serbism and Pan Croatism neutralise each other in Croatia and as the Irredentism of the Romanians in Transylvania is influenced by the large numbers of Czeklers and Saxons with whom they are mixed.[1405]

The nature of parliamentary representation in Vienna would turn what were once Czech nationalists, nobles and bourgeoisie with reasonably consistent positions, into Old Czechs, and then Young Czechs, and then a myriad of parties including the Czech National Socialist Party (socialists). Every connection of spokes on Motyl's analytical wheel, for example when Polish and Czech conservatives allied in support of the Iron Ring government, would be offset by the fracturing of the spokes themselves. Mark Twain, in his aforementioned 1898 essay, attempted to capture the mood:

> Broadly speaking, all the nations in the empire hate the government – but they all hate each other, too, and with devoted and enthusiastic bitterness; no two of them can combine; the nation that rises must rise alone; then the others would joyfully join the government against her, and she would have just a fly's chance against a combination of spiders.[1406]

[1402] A "risky" move, according to Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper. Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 367.

[1403] TNA: Memorandum of Milbanke, in Paget to Granville, Vienna, April 20 1884, FO 120/627:121.

[1404] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 364: In their words, causing: "divisions within groups that nationalists claimed to be united".

[1405] TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, 23 November 1891, FO 120/691:253.

[1406] Twain, *op.cit.*

The 'nations' would even fight over meaningless plots of land, as the *Fremden-Blatt* described in 1902, when the International Arbitration Court assigned 348 out of 365 hectares of an uninhabited piece of Neumarkt Province to Galicia, over Hungarian claims, after a *century* of dispute: "The two States were fighting only for the beauties of nature, and for the right to embody in their national history the fables and legends connected with this portion of the Empire."[1407]

In addition, combining 'divide-and-rule' (even if it was incidental) with willing participants in an imperial process in effect both legitimised that process and created the environment in which to jockey for power and influence within the existing Imperial Power Structure, which we have seen they were already pre-disposed to do. Fighting within the existing political space at once destabilised it and made it essential. Stefan Zweig remarked about this spirit in late nineteenth-century Vienna; in contrast to Twain: "In the old Austria they still strove chivalrously, they abused each other in the news and in the parliament, but at the conclusion of their ciceronian tirades the selfsame representatives sat down together in friendship with a glass of beer or a cup of coffee, and called each other Du."[1408]

Ausgleich also showed the other peripheral nationalities what was possible, although thinking they could rise to the level of Hungarians would turn out to be naïve. Even the more radical parties, such as the Czech National Socialists, still looked for solutions under the tutelage of the emperor – most subjects, even in their fieriest political manifestations, were still loyal to the dynasty itself.[1409] Indeed, the intensity of nationality disputes would change with the winds, at least before 1900. Phipps would write that these disputes would "burst into prominence whenever there is a lull in foreign politics and the nearer the danger is to the frontiers of the monarchy the less is heard of Roumanian or Saxon-German Irredentism in Transylvania; of Czech or Ruthene grievances; or Pan Serbism and Pan Croatism."[1410]

This apparent identity paradox: loyalty to a sovereign representative of an institution that was a barrier to the final fruition of national ideologies, was manifest throughout the final fifty years of the empire. Take for example the ritual of the imperial visit: immaculately planned and stage managed, and mostly received reverentially, regardless of occasional threats and violence. Local populations could reaffirm their affinity and affection for the dynasty, whilst elites would

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[1407] TNA: Plunkett to Lansdowne, Vienna, September 18 1902, FO 120/783:227. Quotation from enclosed *Fremden-Blatt* September 16, 1902.

[1408] Stefan Zweig, quoted in Ebeling, *op.cit.*, p. 11. He would go on to note that: "The hatred of country for country, for nation for nation, of one table for another, did not yet jump at one daily from the newspaper, it did not divide people from people and nations from nations." Regarding the press, there was always nationalist rhetoric – the *Neue Freie Presse* was notorious for its anti-Slavic and anti-Hungarian polemics (see Robin Okey, Neue Freie Presse, *op.cit.*), however the frequency and intensity would increase after 1900.

[1409] Cohen, Nationality, *op.cit.*, p. 276, stated: "Before the outbreak of World War I, it was not surprising then that few nationalist politicians within the monarchy expected it to disappear from the map any time soon or, apart from small fringe groups such as the Serbian radicals in the recently annexed Bosnia, were working actively toward that end. For most of the general population, national loyalties continued to coexist until well into World War I with strong allegiances to the laws and institutions of the Habsburg state. Throughout the realm after the 1860s, the public showed great respect and affection for Emperor Francis Joseph as the embodiment of a state to which they felt genuinely attached."

[1410] TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, May 3 1887, FO 120/653:170.

use these occasions as a political tool to impress on the Emperor, hopefully opening a channel of influence.[1411] The 1898 and 1908 Jubilee celebrations for Franz Josef offered a case-in-point.[1412] With the former, the Hungarians were wary: how could they balance celebrating *their* sovereign with the continued ill-feeling going back to when that same sovereign quelled their national aspirations during the Revolution of 1848/49?[1413] Ten years later, the Hungarians still mostly ignored them – and there was a notable Czech boycott,[1414] and yet they were drowned out in the ideological space by other peoples jockeying for the monarch's pleasure. Daniel Unowsky gave an example from Galicia in that year, when: "Ukrainian and Polish nationalists competed to persuade Galicia's rural population to purchase transparent likenesses of Franz Josef with titles in Latin or Cyrillic characters", resulting in "millions of Galicia's inhabitants set the transparent images in windows lit by candles."[1415] He went on to contend that this suggested that "there was a wide-spread belief that real interests lay with a stronger and reorganized state that preserved diversity in unity and guaranteed peace and economic progress".[1416]

Another consideration was the status of the German language throughout the empire. German in the Habsburg Empire has much in common with English in the many multi-lingual British colonies, for example India. It was a pathway to betterment, in the civil service in particular. This is why it was difficult for Czech nationalists to convince Czech parents to stop teaching their children German, as we will see. As Ernst Bruckmüller noted:

One way or another, it was possible to get by in German in most corners of the monarchy. In non-German areas, one would come across former soldiers with a basic knowledge of German, public officials, or people of bourgeois standing for whom German—in addition to their native language—would be a kind of class language [...] German was a common language even in the monarchy's Hungarian half.[1417]

[1411] Cohen, Nationality, *op.cit.,* pp. 276-277.

[1412] Daniel Unowsky, "Dynamic Symbolism and Popular Patriotism – Monarchy and Dynasty in Late Imperial Austria", in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.) *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), p. 255. For example, in 1908: "The Bohemian Czech delegation boycotted the procession over a dispute concerning performances of the Czech National Theatre in Vienna. Galicia's Polish delegation threatened to join the boycott when they learned that the historical group depicting the 1683 siege of Vienna would have Jan Sobieski, the King of Poland who had come to Vienna's rescue, ride behind Emperor Leopold I. Eventually it was agreed that King Sobieski and Emperor Leopold would ride side by side, diffusing this petty conflict. Ruthenians complained about the over-representation of Poles in the delegations, which they viewed as yet another attempt by the Polish elites to portray Galicia as a Polish province."

[1413] Stourzh, *op.cit.,* p. 16.

[1414] R.J.W. Evans, "Communicating Empire: The Habsburgs and their Critics. 1700-1919," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* (Sixth Series), Vol. 19, Dec, 2009. https://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=6598812&jid=RHT&volumeId=19&issueId=-1&aid=6598804&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=, last accessed 12 January 2015, pp. 4 of 7.

[1415] Unowsky, *op.cit.,* p. 256.

[1416] *Ibid.,* p. 257.

[1417] Bruckmüller, Habsburg Society, *op.cit.,* p. 13.

Comments by Austrian German politicians that it would be worthy for subjects across the Empire to learn German, would open up the floodgates, bring embittered responses from the nationalities, and would filter across multiple regions, bringing up interrelated grievances.[1418]

Attempts to redesign the concept of nationality within the empire would intensify after the turn of the century, driven by Austro-Marxism, the core tenet of which was "independently together".[1419] At the lead was a remarkable (for its time) proposition by Dr Karl Renner. He argued that nationality be considered a 'personal' issue, decided upon by the individual, who would then (unlike in the imperial censuses) register their nationality.[1420] This primacy of personal autonomy would not stop the formation of national organisations – far from it. Each signatory to a 'nationality' would band together to form a single association, which would look after the cultural and educational needs of its people, which it could fund by taxation which, in this instance would quite literally be 'membership fees'. This would work in concert with a radical change at local government level, with the regions divided into homogenous districts as much as possible.[1421] Although these would never get off the ground, this shows that federalism wasn't the only possible solution.

Finally, it must be considered that the imperial system created a network of vested interests, which were too important to the component groups in the imperial power structure to threaten – an effect that had not as yet taken place in the Russian Empire. For example, as we have seen, many historians have commented that the nationality morass in the Habsburg Empire didn't actually stop the empire from working. It was a symptom, rather than a cause. Staedler explains it as such:

> *The advantages of the great internal market, the division of labour between the different regions, and the integration of all these activities into a balanced whole, made up for obvious disadvantages of difficult communications, fierce national rivalries, and considerable differences in levels of skill and opportunity.*[1422]

As A.J.P. Taylor noted, the empire was never "a device for enabling a number of nationalities to live together".[1423] It just needed to work well enough to carve out a 'great power' niche in Europe without alienating allies, and containing who they considered the key regional peripheries within their Imperial Power Structure – the Hungarians and to a lesser extent the Poles in Galicia. Of

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[1418] TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, 23 November 1891, FO 120/691:253. For example, as Phipps reported, "The Minister of Education Herr v Gautsch, during a speech delivered on a matter regarding the Slovene Schools in Carinthia, made the reasonable remark that every educated person in this Empire should make it his business to learn the German language. This caused a storm from the members of the Slovene nationality, who thus at once became possessed of the support of the turbulent Young Czech party […] This was further complicated by a motion brought forward by the Polish Ruthenians to the effect that their own rights had been persistently excluded in Poland."

[1419] Andrei S. Markovits, "Introduction: Empire and Province" in A.S. Markovits & F.E. Sysyn (eds.), *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism. Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, MA, 1982), p. 12.

[1420] Kann *op.cit.*, p. 442 & Kogan *op.cit.*, p. 213. Hüglin *op.cit.*, p. 38, explains that "This was the concept of *Kulturgemeinschaft* (cultural community) in contrast to that of *Siedlungsgemeinschaft* (settlement community)."

[1421] Kogan, *op.cit.*, p. 213.

[1422] Stadler, *op.cit.*, p. 185.

[1423] Quoted in Sked, Historians, *op.cit.*, p. 192.

course, keeping allies confident would be a difficult task, as long as they could see that nationalities were on the surface struggling to 'live together'. As pointed out by the British Embassy in Vienna in 1896: "It is manifest that the want of cohesion among the different elements and nationalities of which this heterogeneous monarchy is comprised can not but be a matter of concern to her allies, impairing as it must naturally on the strength and the prestige of the Austro Hungarian monarchy as a Great European Power."[1424]

8.1.2. The Russian Empire

The Russian Empire never had a 'nationalities problem' as all pervading as that in the Habsburg Empire. At the same time, it is important not to understate the issue of nationality and its importance in the history of the late Russian Empire, which saw the proliferation of peripheral groups, including those of several 'nations' that hitherto had not existed as historic units. In addition, it could be argued that before 1905 the Empire had another nationality problem – a 'Russian' one. Just how much of this growth was the result of imperial Russian policies, and how much did the (comparative) liberalisation after 1905, following decades of encroaching Russification, make this issue more volatile? Especially when, after two Dumas noted for their brevity and radical demands for federalism, many of the pluralistic gains seen by the nationalities would be wound back under the direction of Prime Minister Stolypin.

Foreigners at the elite level had been granted rights and representation in Russia since the time of Peter I, during the first phase of westernisation.[1425] Many would adopt Russian culture, as would those feudal nobles who had been incorporated into the empire during the various territorial expansions to the west and south west of the empire.[1426] They would retain their rights even through the periods of reaction to westernisation that would occur in waves. These rights would be wound back in Poland in the eras of Nicholas I and Alexander II, in the Baltic provinces during the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II, and in the Grand Duchy of Finland in the ten years leading up to the 1905 revolution. Nationalities emerging under the yoke of Polish and Baltic German hegemony – speakers of Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Belarusian, would at times be co-opted into the 'fight' against 'Polonism' and the Baltic Germans, but would be subject to the similar Russifying tendencies. In effect, these groups would grow in concert with Russification, by developing their national awareness at a time their children would begin to attend primary school en masse for the first time, and when their slowly developing bourgeois classes and urban migration would bring them into contact with the effects of administrative Russification.

The challenge for the empire after 1905 was to accommodate these different groups into an expanded Imperial Power Structure: to give them a platform whilst ensuring that they would

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[1424] TNA: Dispatch to Salisbury, Vienna, November 26 1896, FO 120/725:371.

[1425] Fleischhauer, *op.cit.*, p. D1067.

[1426] Saunders, Regional Diversity, *op.cit.*, p. 155.

remain loyal to the dynasty. It would be a far brisker task (and learning-curve) in the Russian Empire than in Austria and Hungary after 1867, because the Romanov regime would have to address a new phenomenon: "Increasingly strident voices from groups that hitherto hardly exhibited national self-consciousness or demands."[1427]

The various national grievances across the Empire would manifest in their mass involvement in the 1905 revolution, often aligned to the various uprisings in the factories, on the docks and on the land. Andreas Kappeler conveys that in 1905: "In the predominantly non-Russian periphery in the west a considerably higher percentage of workers mobilized than in the Russian centre. The only exception was St. Petersburg, though it also lagged behind Warsaw, Lodz and Riga."[1428] Naturally a large reason for this was that this was where the industry was located – however, as we will see, there were national dimensions underlying much of the unrest. Mass migration to the cities of former peasants over the previous generation, to fuel the growing industrialised state, would provide numerous members of various organisations representing workers. An example of this would be what happened in Riga with the Latvians, where the disturbances were particularly ferocious.

Non-Russians had many avenues into these groups, for example liberals and Marxists sympathised with them and their manifestos included promises to respect their rights, and in some cases, a greater degree of autonomy within the empire. Even the Marxists, whose platform represented a proletariat without borders, supported the right of the minorities to work toward self-determination, as long as it supported the broader aims of the proletariat international.[1429] Other worker and peasant groups were based on nationality. In addition, many national movements took the opportunity to propose variations of federalist manifestos with differing degrees of imperial control. For example, Estonian liberals would push for the use of the Estonian language in a new, ethnically homogenous province of the empire, with the Diet subject to universal franchise.[1430] The one nationality under-represented amongst the opposition was the Germans. Their traditional ties to the dynasty, their conservative nature, and their disdain for other nationalities such as Latvians, was in general incompatible with the goals of the opposition. It was clear amongst the revolting Latvian worker groups of 1905 that the Baltic Germans were as much, if not more, of a problem as the Russians, as we will see.

8.2.   Autonomous elites and the irredentist bogeymen: the Baltic and Adriatic provinces.

The Habsburg and Russian Empires had in common two sophisticated peripheries that were remarkably similar with respect to their roles in the respective Imperial Power Structures – the Germans in the Baltic and the Italians on the Adriatic coast. The Germans were historically

[1427] Weeks, Poland, *op.cit.,* p. 549.
[1428] Kappeler. The Russian Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 333.
[1429] Zelnik, *op.cit.,* p. 219.
[1430] Tiit Rosenberg, "From National Territorial Autonomy to Independence of Estonia: The War and Revolution in the Baltic Region, 1914-1917", in K. Matsuzato (ed.), *Imperiology* (Sapporo, 2007) p. 204.

the dominant peoples of the Baltic region, although they had been part of the Romanov realm for well over a century. German elites had served in the inner circle of the tsar with distinction, and in return the Russians generally left them alone in the Baltic. During the nineteenth century, they were faced with a national 'pincer movement' – the development of the Latvian and Estonian 'nationalities' from underneath, who had traditionally been subservient to them, and the increasing intrusion of the Russians from above. Their ethnic kin to the west had finally moved past centuries of piecemeal existence to be guided under Prussian leadership into a unified German Empire, a move that frightened the Russians, who also became (as it turned out to be, without foundation) fearful of German irredentism. There were also significant ethnic German populations in other parts of the Empire.

The Italians were historically the dominant people of the Adriatic coastal regions, and some Italian populations had been under ultimate Habsburg sovereignty for centuries. As with the Baltic Germans, Italian elites had also served with distinction in imperial court, and had generally been left to their own devices. They also faced their own nineteenth-century national 'pincer movement', having to deal with the growth of Slovene, Croat and Serb 'nationalities' from underneath, and the increasing intrusion of the Austrian Germans from above. Their ethnic kin to the west had also moved past centuries of piecemeal existence to unify the Kingdom of Italy under the Savoyard crown, a move that frightened the Habsburgs, who also became (rightly) frightened by Italian irredentism. There was another Habsburg province with a large Italian population – indeed Italian speakers constituted the majority in the southern half of the Tyrol.

8.2.1. The Baltic

The similarity ends when it comes to the respective responses of the Governments in Vienna and St. Petersburg. Whereas the Austrians would mostly leave the Italians in Trieste, and the Littoral (if not Dalmatia) to their own devices, the Russians would gradually impose Russification policies on the one hand, and both encourage Latvian and Estonian national growth, whilst trying to contain it through the same Russification policies, on the other. Many of the Baltic Germans could trace their ancestry back to the Teutonic Knights of the later middle ages. It was the nature of the conquest of Livland and Estland in 1710 by Peter the Great, and the terms of the Treaty of Nystad in 1721 that ceded these territories to Russia, that was the foundation for the continued German hegemony over the region.[1431] Indeed, it was the due to the pretence of restoring their ancient feudal rights that had been withheld by the Swedes that the Baltic Germans assented to Russian rule.[1432]

Their hegemony over the Baltic provinces was early-modern in style, in that the territory was split into four feudal knighthoods (*Ritterschaften*) – Livland, Estland, Kurland and Ösel –

[1431] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.*, pp. 471-472. Reconfirming the privileges given the Baltic nobles when they were under Polish domination, – the *Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti* (1561). Fleischhauer, *op.cit.*, p. D1074.
[1432] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.*, p. 471.

each with their own, very restrictive, Diets (*Landtage*). The jurisdictions of these knighthoods did not match those of the Russian administrative units with which they had to coexist (*gubernii*).[1433] The Baltic Germans had almost complete control over the politics, economics and cultural life of their lands,[1434] and had traditionally more rights within the Empire than Russian (non-elite) subjects.[1435] They underestimated the nascent languages and cultures that were slowly developing underneath them. In the words of Andrejs Plakans: "Baltic German opinion had watched the appearance of educated Latvian speakers generally without hostility, fully confident that such individuals would be assimilated to the German-speaking intelligentsia as a matter of course."[1436] This was an attitude that the Russians would eventually adopt with regards to the very same languages and peoples.

Alexander II made sure the Baltic provinces were spared the worst of the early Russification. The religious persecution and conversion programmes that would soon occur in the western borderlands were off limits, regardless of the nationality. For example, an 1866 request by Kurland Governor Pashchenko, to: "prepare the Latvians for union with Orthodoxy", was met by a firm rebuttal by Alexander II: "All this is like some kind of Orthodox propaganda; I do not allow that this is a good thing. The movement to Orthodoxy must be spontaneous, on the personal initiative of the Latvians, without any pressure of the government."[1437]

He was also livid at the incendiary anti-German press rhetoric that began in the same decade. The Tsar would tell the Baltic nobility in October 1867 that he "spat on this press, which was trying to place it on the same level as the Poles",[1438] the 'it' being the Baltic Germans. Criticism of Germany would only increase after 1871, based on the question of whether ethnic Germans could be tolerated inside the empire. Iurii Samarin made this argument in his multi-volume work *Borderlands of Russia*, for which he received a summons to appear before the Governor General of Moscow so he could issue Samarin with a personal rebuke from the Tsar himself.[1439] Amongst other claims, as Michael Haltzel relayed, he "warned that the question of Estland, Livland and Kurland could easily become at any time 'the younger brother of the Schleswig-Holstein question'".[1440] The imperial rebuke did not stop him, which exemplifies the delicate situation the Tsar found himself in: his loyalty and honour would not allow ill words be spoken of the German elites who had served the empire so well, but neither could a well-followed Russian nationalist be silenced completely either. Alexander

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[1433] Rosenberg, *op.cit.*, p. 201. Indeed, Ösel was part of the Livonia *Gubernii*, and because of this, and that it was a relatively small island, it is often overlooked in broader histories of the region.
[1434] Plakans, Peasants, *op.cit.*, p. 448. He expanded: "In all three provinces, Lutheranism had the status of a state religion, the nobility enjoyed patronage rights over local congregations, and the High Consistory at Dorpat oversaw the activities of the provincial clergy and passed on the admission of new members to its ranks."
[1435] Fleischhauer, *op.cit.*, p. D1067.
[1436] Plakans, Peasant, *op.cit.*, p. 458.
[1437] Quoted in Thaden, The Russian Government, *op.cit.*, p. 69.
[1438] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.*, pp. 257-58.
[1439] Seton-Watson, *op.cit*, p. 413.
[1440] Haltzel, *op.cit.*, p. 141.

II held steady: throughout his reign, the only major change in the region was the adoption of Russian municipal institutions (1877).[1441]

There was another dimension to the Baltic 'question'. Since mid-century, Latvian and Estonian nationalism, mostly without precedence, had begun to blossom, in the case of the latter in particular, driven by village schoolteachers.[1442] Latvians and Estonians were almost negligible amongst the upper classes: for example at the German University of Dorpat, there had been only 33 Latvian names on the graduates register for the entire first half of the nineteenth century, out of a population that reached around 1.2 million Latvian speakers in the region by 1850.[1443] Their leaders, who had benefitted from education in German language schools, [1444] were encouraged by the Russian authorities to organise Latvian and Estonian speakers, which caused a split between a pro-German wing, seeking improvement within the German system, and pro-Russians.[1445] The latter became the stronger, at least into the reign of Alexander III – for example Estonian nationalists would request Russian administrative bodies in order to challenge the power of the Baltic Germans, as well as a limited cultural Russification, for "practical and tactical reasons."[1446] That the Baltic Germans did not want to share power with Estonians and Latvians suited the Russians perfectly.[1447] Peasants in the region were almost entirely Latvian and Estonian speakers, however the ability to buy land from the 1840s, and then inherit as whole plots, unlike what happened after Russian emancipation, led to an increasing prosperity.[1448]

Although permission for two Estonian language newspapers was granted in the 1850s, it was not until the 1860s and 70s that the first strong signs of national consciousness became apparent amongst speakers of Estonian and Latvian in the provinces.[1449] To reach the broader audience, national song festivals became a popular tool.[1450] The first true Estonian language political newspaper began publishing in 1878 – *Sakala*. The editor, K.R. Jakobson used this vehicle to take aim at the German elites; a recurrent campaign of the paper was full equality of Estonians with Germans within the confines of the empire, which it must be stressed was seen as a protector, with the Tsar a figure of great reverence, not unlike how the emerging nations viewed Franz Josef in the Habsburg Empire. Jakobson had hoped *Sakala* would be a tool to

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[1441] Thaden, The Russian Government, *op.cit.,* p. 52.

[1442] Hroch, Social Preconditions, *op.cit.,* p. 82.

[1443] Plakans, Peasants, *op.cit.,* p. 455.

[1444] Edward C. Thaden, "Traditional Elites, Religion and Nation-Building in Finland, the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania, 1700-1914", in M. Branch, J. M. Hartley & A. Maczak (eds.), *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A Comparative Study* (London, 1995), p. 3.

[1445] Toivo U. Raun, "The Estonians", in E.C. Thaden (ed.), *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914* (Princeton, 1981), p. 298.

[1446] *Ibid.,* p. 297. In addition, in 1881 they sent a declaration to Alexander III asking for *zemstvos* and Russian judicial and police reforms. *Ibid.,* p. 301.

[1447] Haltzel, *op.cit.,* p. 182. Indeed they would become repressive themselves, barring Latvian and Estonian nationalists from jobs, even seeking to exile the most radical nationalist leaders. Plakans, Peasants, *op.cit.,* p. 459.

[1448] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 221.

[1449] Raun, *op.cit.,* pp. 295-296.

[1450] Thaden, Traditional, *op.cit.,* p. 5 & Kappeler, National Organisations, *op.cit.,* p. 297.

garner Russian support for the Estonian cause.[1451] Previously, he had set up a national framework very typical of nineteenth-century ideologues: writing in 1868 his "Three Fatherland Speeches": breaking down the three eras of Estonian history, 'light' before German conquest, 'dark' under German rule and 'dawn' after emancipation, from the reign of Alexander I onwards.[1452] Ultimately, his audience were mostly peasants with a few teachers and non-secular intelligentsia: Hroch outlined the rarity of a peasant-heavy Estonian national movement being 'Phase B', likely due to access to the Baltic education systems.[1453]

Balss (The Voice) was the first Latvian language political newspaper. Published by Krisjanis Valdemars, it was a daily with an almost identical editorial position as *Sakala*.[1454] Again, this was a pro-Russian vehicle – Valdemars, a graduate of the German language university at Dorpat, had contributed articles warning against Germanisation to Katkov's *Moscow News*. He saw, in Plakans words, "no conflict between Russia's imperial goals and Latvian self-interest".[1455] He built upon the ideology that the Latvian speakers of Kurland and Livonia provinces, with little in common except dialect, should unite as a single Latvian 'nation' to challenge the German position,[1456] just as new and previously unheard of economic opportunities were becoming available to them. This included a life in the navy, training in naval schools that he himself helped establish.[1457] In addition, the growth of the language coincided with access to printing in Latvian. In 1865, as reported by Ambassador Buchanan, "the measures have been adopted at Wilna for introducing the use of the alphabet in printing works in the Lettish language," and that the "Gazette of the Russian Academy expresses a wish that the practice should be extended to schools in the Baltic Provinces founded by persons of the Lettish race."[1458]

The peasant population, which had been purchasing land from Baltic German landowners since the 1840s,[1459] also began urbanising as factory workers and shopkeepers, helped by a huge change in the Latvian national narrative, from the "orphan people, subsisting on the cultural crumbs that fell from the full tables of the Baltic German overlords" to the "guardians of the East".[1460] To use Riga as an example, mass immigration of Latvian former peasants changed what was a German city with a Russian and Latvian worker minority, to a multi-ethnic town in

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[1451] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 414.

[1452] Raun, *op.cit.,* p. 297.

[1453] Hroch, Social and Territorial, *op.cit.,* p. 262. Perhaps with 90.4 per cent of Estonian speakers in 1881 still on the land, this makes sense. Raun, *op.cit.,* p. 294.

[1454] Valdemars had (beginning in 1862) co-published a St. Petersburg based nationalist Latvian publication called *Péterburgas Avizes*. The Baltic German censors were powerless to stop them, as they published outside of the Baltic provinces. Andres Kasekamp, *A History of the Baltic States* (Basingstoke, 2010), p. 78.

[1455] Andrejs Plakans, "The Latvians", in E. C. Thaden (ed.), *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914* (Princeton, NJ, 1981), p. 221 & Thaden, The Russian Government, *op.cit.,* p. 221.

[1456] initially supported by the Russians – Berger & Miller, *op.cit.,* p. 321.

[1457] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 414.

[1458] TNA: Buchanan to Russell, St Petersburg, April 18 1865, FO 181/435:159.

[1459] Matsumura, *op.cit.,* p. 166. Between removing the bar on peasants buying land and the end of the century, an enormous amount of Baltic farmland had passed into peasant hands. As an example, 60.7 per cent of such land in Kurland was peasant held by 1900.

[1460] Plakans, Peasants, *op.cit.,* pp. 473

just fourteen years, from 1867 to 1881. The Latvian population of Riga more than doubled in that time.[1461] The demands of these new communities were also notable − equality with the Germans under Russian control. The nature of this demand would evolve as both the Latvians and Estonians began to realise that Russian hegemony was no better than that of the Germans, in no small part due to their collective dissatisfaction at Russification policies that would envelop them from the 1880s onwards.[1462] What would be designed as restrictions on the use of the German language in official business, for example, would equally restrict their own growing 'nations'. They would also be repeatedly disappointed − for example in the 1880s, after Estonian nationalists collected enough money to open an Estonian high school, the charter for the Estonian Alexander School was finally granted. The drive for the school began as far back as 1862, with the intention that instruction would be in Estonian.[1463] It opened in 1888 as a Russian language institution. However, even though the curriculum was in Russian, it would still prove to be helpful for the national movement.[1464]

Russification policies stepped up a gear in the Baltic from the ascension of Alexander III. On September 14, 1885, for example, the Russian language was made compulsory for mixed crown estate offices, the police and most of the judiciary.[1465] Every 'Russifying' move would act as a lightning rod for the German community and some of the German elites began to question their role in the empire and fight for the protection of their rights as a nationality for the first time.[1466] In effect, the opposite of the effect the policy was intended to induce. A letter from Baron Meyendorff in 1888 illustrates the effects on the Baltic German psyche, and much more, questioning whether:

> We can dare to appear outwardly as Russians and inwardly to remain German with the entire force of our being [...] I say: no!!! Other fragments of peoples could perhaps undertake this, like e.g. the Pole and the Jew, because they possess in a special way the ability to put on and wear a coat that one forces upon them. We Balts cannot do it, and therefore our way of acting must correspond to our inner nature.[1467]

1887 saw the Russian Ministry of Education take control of the Baltic school system (even mandating the continued funding and administration of the now Russified education system by Germans, Latvians and Estonians). Russian became the compulsory language of

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[1461] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* pp. 414. In 1867, the city's population included 43,980 Germans, 24,199 Latvians and 25,772 Russians. In 1881 those numbers stood at 52,232 German, 49,974 Latvian and 31,976 Russian.
[1462] Between 1875 and 1885, Latvian nationalism generally kept to an anti-Baltic German theme. Plakans, The Latvians, *op.cit.,* p. 227.
[1463] Kasekamp, *op.cit.,* p. 79. The original impetus for the school came from rural activists.
[1464] Thaden, Traditional, *op.cit.,* p. 5 & Raun, *op.cit.,* p. 329.
[1465] Haltzel, *op.cit.,* p. 154. Regarding the courts, it only applied to mixed and crown courts. Elective courts, Town courts, Communal courts and Peasant courts were exempt, except when communicating with external governments; in which case they would have to provide Russian translations of documents. TNA: Temporary Supplementary Regulations for the Administration of the Elementary Schools in the Provinces of Livland, Kurland and Estland, May 17 1887, in Raby to Grosvenor, Riga, November 2 1885, FO 181/666:9.
[1466] Haltzel, *op.cit.,* especially pp. 168-170.
[1467] *Ibid.,* p. 183.

instruction in all non-private schools. Religion and its associated classes (church singing for example) would be the only official arenas for instruction in German, Latvian and Estonian.[1468] More was to come: in 1889 Dorpat University went the way of the Polish Main School in Warsaw and was completely Russianised, a fate suffered in the same year by the court system and the police – a mere four years after the Russian language was mandated in these institutions. The Russians were mostly open about their intentions: for example in 1886 Grand Duke Wladimir visited the town and received university delegates, as well as the local nobility and townspeople, in order to reaffirm the commitment to Russification in the region.[1469] He was blunt:

> *There exists in the cultivated population of these lands some doubts on the duration of the measures taken in view of the unification of the borders of the Baltic with our dear common fatherland. I then declare to you that all measures of this nature, in terms of willingness, unwavering in our autocratic Sovereign, are and will be applied with firmness, without recourse and in the direction of your most tight reconciliation with the Russian family.*[1470]

After Dorpat was Russified, many Baltic Germans would seek their university education in Germany, thus depriving the Russian elite class of some of the intellectual talent that had traditionally fed their ranks. The Baltic German component of the student body of the University post-Russification dropped from 82 per cent in 1880 to 16 per cent in 1900.[1471] By this stage, the Germans had even lost the name of their university town, which was renamed Yuryev in 1893.

Although the Russification template for the Baltic provinces was taken from Poland after the 1863 revolt, the Russians hadn't learned from that experience when it came to dealing with the Latvian and Estonian peasantry. Their attempts in the 1860s to win over the Polish peasantry by playing them off against the Polish nobility had backfired, as such tactics would again do so in the Baltic, although this time with a twist – there were some Latvian and Estonian peasant and nationalist conversions to Orthodoxy, purely for political reasons, but by the late nineteenth century the peasantry turned against the Russians *and* the Germans.[1472] It became more than apparent that the Russians were disinterested in regional participatory politics (although the more local Baltic municipal governments introduced by the Russians in 1877 did give Latvians and Estonians something to aim for.) [1473] In turn, until the 1905 revolution the Germans tried to both communities against the Russians (not by devolution of any powers, per se, but by appealing to common Lutheran bonds).[1474] The Russian authorities changed position again after Nicholas II

[1468] *Ibid.,* p. 169.
[1469] TNA: Morier to Rosebery, St Petersburg, July 16 1886, FO 181/672:251.
[1470] TNA: *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, July 1886, attachment to *Ibid.* Author's translation.
[1471] Haltzel, *op.cit.,* p. 177. As the total number of students increased from 1015 to 1709.
[1472] Troy R. E. Paddock, *Creating the Russian Peril: Education, the Public Sphere, and National Identity in Imperial Germany, 1890-1914* (Rochester, NY, 2010), pp. 143-146. The Berlin-based conservative German newspaper *Kreuzzeitung* reported a revolutionary chant of "Kill the Germans! Kill the tsar!", *ibid.,* p. 144.
[1473] Raun, *op.cit.,* pp. 306-307.
[1474] Paddock, *op.cit.,* p. 144.

came to the throne, to try to somewhat placate the Baltic Germans whilst retaining Russification policies, at the expense of Latvian and Estonian nationalists. [1475]

Around the turn of the century, dissent intensified. Latvian activists were, as Plakans noted, "summarily arrested, jailed and expelled from the Baltic provinces for a time", adding that it "had the effect of turning large numbers of Latvian intelligentsia against the government and its policies".[1476] Another issue was the nature of the stewardship under Russians, as Embassy Secretary Spring Rice noted after the beginning of open revolt in 1905:

> Since however the Russification of the country was seriously undertaken by the Government all this has been changed. Corrupt Russian officials have been substituted for the German magistrates, the schools are subject to every sort of interference on the part of the State in order to put them at a disadvantage in comparison with the inefficient but patriotic teaching-institutions inaugurated by the Holy Synod.[1477]

In 1905, full-blown strikes hit the Baltic hard.[1478] They were not the black-and-white national agitations that the Habsburg Empire was notorious for. However, as driven by economic and labour issues as the strikers were, there was strong national resentment underlying their position, as there was with Lithuanian strikers in Vilnius, Poles across the western provinces etc. The German socialist newspaper *Vorwärts* summarised their grievances well: "Although both small peoples, the Estonians and the Letts, inhabit the provinces, they are still not the real owners of their land; they still do not have the same rights as other inhabitants, but instead are the slaves of the German Junkers, the German bourgeoisie, and the Russian bureaucracy."[1479]

There were industrial strikes in Estland, specifically at Reval (Tallinn),[1480] however the largest flashpoint was Riga. As Ambassador Hardinge reported in February 1905:

> It is stated that the strike in Riga was a political movement, organized by agitators, and largely assisted by the students and professors in the Polytechnic. In support of this statement it is reported that the demands of the workmen were not put forward until several days after the strike had begun, and it was then done to remove the political nature of the movement and to give it an industrial character.[1481]

It is no surprise that social democrats were behind the workers disturbances in Riga.[1482] With them were a group calling themselves the Lettish Democratic Workman's Party, whose textile factory workers committee manifesto of August 1905 notably supported other strikers in the

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[1475] Thaden, The Russian Government, *op.cit.*, p. 70.
[1476] Plakans, Latvians, *op.cit.*, p. 259.
[1477] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St. Petersburg, December 19 1905, FO 181/828:787.
[1478] Gildea, *op.cit.*, pp. 397-398.
[1479] Quoted in Paddock, *op.cit.*, p. 143.
[1480] BDFA: Hardinge to Lansdowne, St Petersburg, February 1 1905, BDFA V3, p. 21.
[1481] BDFA: Hardinge to Lansdowne, St Petersburg, February 2 1905, BDFA V3, pp. 25-26.
[1482] Plakans, Latvians, *op.cit.*, p. 261.

Empire, and where they were specifically located: "At present order the fight for liberty has begun and many thousands have fallen in the streets of Odessa, Warsaw, Lodz."[1483]

These disturbances straddled the urban/rural divide, with particularly vicious agrarian violence complementing that in the factories. Latvian peasants had understandable grievances: not in the least the enormous imbalance in land ownership.[1484] To highlight the multi-faceted nature of the unrest, there were an astonishing number of labourers striking in 1905: 316,459. On top of this, peasants illegally forested, occupied manorial buildings, and even destroyed 365 manor farms and 119 landowners' dwellings.[1485] Theirs was certainly not a specific single unified national movement. Although it was the effects of Russification that unified the Estonian intelligentsia, which was hitherto divided between Germanophiles and Russophiles, and had similar effects on the Latvians,[1486] the primary focus of the agrarian revolt in 1905 was against the German nobility. The revolting Latvian and Estonian farm labourers even set up "systems of revolutionary self-government".[1487]

Indeed, it can be stated that the ferocity of the farm revolts actually brought the Baltic nobles and the Russian government closer together.[1488] For a start, the Russian army would work in concert with German landowner militias in fighting the revolutionaries.[1489] Eventually, it took a strong incursion by imperial troops to quell the uprisings, both industrial and agrarian.[1490] The Russian change of heart was so strong that there were early rumours that the Baltic Germans would receive favourable treatment at Court when it came to compensation for their considerable material losses, as outlined by Spring Rice just before Christmas in 1905.

> *The German proprietors, who have suffered so severely from the excesses of the native population, have great influence at Court and it is believed that they have successfully urged their claim to compensation, a compensation which the Government has absolutely refused to accord to sufferers from similar disorders in other parts of the Empire.*[1491]

He added one week later that "whether this is true or not, there is evidently growing a bitter feeling on the subject in Russian circles".[1492] This manifested in the press, due of course, to the

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[1483] TNA: Translation of the Manifesto of the Riga Committee of the Lettish Democratic Workman's Party, attachment to Woodhouse to Hardinge, Riga, August 3 1905, FO 181/848:11.

[1484] Abraham Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905: Russia in disarray* (Stanford, 1988), p. 160. At the time of the revolution, around 1,500 German nobles owned some 2.5 million desiatinas of land, some half a million more than 1,300,000 Latvian peasants combined. There were two types of desiatina that were used in Imperial Russia. 1 'treasury' desiatina = 10,925.4 square metres, and 1 'proprietor's' desiatina = 14,567 square metres. Ascher did not specify to which type he referred, but this does not change the overall point: proportionally Germans equating to 0.001% of the number of Latvian landowners owned 25% more land overall.

[1485] Plakans, Latvians, *op.cit.*, p. 261. The latter figure covered the Latvian section of Livland and Kurland.

[1486] *Ibid.*, pp. 259-260. There was a retreat from Russification of Latvian schools in early 1905 but it was too late.

[1487] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.*, p. 331. Farmers also refused to pay their taxes.

[1488] *Ibid.*, p. 334.

[1489] Plakans, Latvians, *op.cit.*, p. 266.

[1490] Ascher, *op.cit.*, p. 160.

[1491] BDFA: Spring Rice to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, December 20 1905, BDFA V3, pp. 287-288.

[1492] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St. Petersburg, December 28 1905, FO 181/828:809.

more relaxed censorship rules that since the Alexandrian reforms rendered publishers free to belittle a third-party.[1493]

When it came to the land, Spring Rice outlined how earlier Russian policies with regards to the Estonians and Latvians came back to haunt them, and the German landowners: the Russian 'intrigue' meant that their constant support of the Latvian and Estonian peasants had fatally turned many of them against their employers, the German Barons. By destroying their previous respect for their landowners, Spring Rice argued, "all respect for law and order in any form" was badly damaged. So much so that: "instead of accepting with joy the Russian deliverer they are now contemplating separate and independent governments".[1494] It should be noted that not all nationalists turned against the Russians – the Latvian National Party, for example, still looked toward the Russians as protection against the German landowners.[1495] Their slogan was "unifying the cause of the Latvian nation with the cause of the Russian state and government".[1496]

The Duma would give non-Russian nationalities new access to power, which the Latvians and Estonians took to enthusiastically. The Baltic Germans were less enthused about the new body, although they would become heavily involved with the conservative Oktobrists, forming their own branch of the party.[1497] Although they were in effect seeking to retain "a kind of oligarchical local government" in the Baltic,[1498] they would never get back their cultural, political and economic primacy in the region.[1499] The liberals in the Duma disliked the Baltic Germans, as they were seen as being connected to what they considered some of the greatest ills of the Empire. In short, this was because they were traditional conservatives who persecuted non-revolutionary liberals that they dealt with Baltic revolutionaries in a repressive manner, and for their number, and influence, in the Imperial General Staff.[1500] The decline of influence during the reign of Alexander III had been reversed to a degree, allowing some Baltic nobles, called "exaggeratedly loyal" by an Oktobrist Senator, to return to their traditional position as servants of the autocracy.[1501] As Bernard Pares wrote in 1907, "Their policy has been twofold: on the one side most of them seem to have worked for a completely independent control in their own

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[1493] *Ibid.* For example, Spring Rice reported that: "The liberal papers naturally take sides with the revolutionary party and ascribe their proceedings to the bitterness engendered by the cruel and tyrannical treatment of the Slav or Estt [Estonian] population at the hands of the German 'Barons'. On the other hand the conservative papers, true to the traditions of Katkoff [*sic*], are urgently calling on the Government not to put itself into the hands of the 'foreign Colony' which has for so long exploited Russia."
[1494] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St. Petersburg, December 19 1905, FO 181/828:787.
[1495] Plakans, Latvians, *op.cit.*, p. 261.
[1496] *Ibid.*
[1497] Although barely any were elected to the first two Dumas, Memorandum on the Dissolution of the Duma and on the Electoral Law of June 3 (16), 1907, enclosure of Pares to Foreign Office, Liverpool, July 9 1907, BDFA V5 pp 3- 29. Also see Henriksson, *op.cit.*
[1498] BDFA: Memorandum on the Third Duma, including a Sketch of Developments in Russia from June 3, 1908, B. Pares, Tver Province, BDFA V5, pp. 149-170.
[1499] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.*, p. 482.
[1500] BDFA: O'Beirne to Grey, St Petersburg, June 8 1908, BDFA V5, pp. 132-133.
[1501] BDFA: Memorandum on the Dissolution of the Duma and on the Electoral Law of June 3 (16), 1907, enclosure of Pares to Foreign Office, Liverpool, July 9 1907, BDFA V5, pp. 3-29.

provinces; and, on the other, they have all done everything that is possible to restore the full autocratic authority in Russia."[1502]

In the Baltic itself, they would attempt to reassert their former cultural hegemony, as British Attaché Scott noted in 1906:

The local papers in the Baltic Provinces are drawing the attention of the authorities to a new step on the part of the Germans for Germanizing the provinces, viz., their attempts to obtain control of the village schools and the education of the village children. In Lower Courland the Germans are energetically agitating for the opening of German private schools in districts in which, with the exception of the landed proprietors, there are no Germans. It is therefore inferred that all children living on the estates will be obliged to attend the schools.[1503]

They were empowered by an edict that allowed private education to be undertaken without interference from St. Petersburg or the local Russian authorities. Such schools would be allowed to teach in the specific local language, including German, Latvian or Estonian.[1504]

In 1906 the Estonian and Latvian Duma deputies joined the Union of Autonomists,[1505] an example of the Duma bringing peripheries together. There were also Russophile Latvians and Estonians who participated in the Russian Dumas, and their position was enlightening as it reveals such a contrary position. Riga Lawyer Janis Zalitis, in the Fourth Duma, said:

We regard Russia as our motherland and recognize that the basis for our welfare and existence is unification of the Russian nation. Latvians and Estonians have never had, nor do they have now, a desire to separate from Russia: they have never had a significant past, they have never had their own separate countries, and because of their small size they now have little incentive to long after autonomy.[1506]

He would go on to correctly infer that there had never been a proper separatist movement in the province, although this was disingenuous,[1507] as many nationalists were seeking autonomy. For example, in addition to the aforementioned Latvian examples from the revolution, the All-Estonian Congress in November 1905 specifically called for autonomy – the unification of Estland and northern Livland as a self-governing province – with control over education (including introducing Estonian chairs and instruction at the the now University of Yuryev).[1508]

The rise of the German Empire was more problematic as it put the spotlight on Baltic Germans. They were still mostly loyal and intertwined in the 'core', not only in the Army

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[1502] *Ibid.*
[1503] BDFA: Report by Mr Ernest Scott on the Internal Condition of Russia for the Fortnight ended December 19, 1906, BDFA V4, pp. 273-276.
[1504] TNA: Woodhouse to Grey, Riga, April 20 1906, FO 181/878: Number 1 Treaty.
[1505] Raun, *op.cit.*, p. 312 and Henriksson, *op.cit.*, p. 350.
[1506] Plakans, Latvians, *op.cit.*, pp. 272-273.
[1507] *Ibid.* He added: "All the rumors, whispers, and comments about Latvian and Estonian separatism are spread by people who do not know the conditions of life in the Baltic area, or by those who are our former lords, who held us in slavery for six hundred years and who now, when because of the high-mindedness of our Russian sovereign we have been able to escape from the claws of our oppressors, still seek to retain us under their overlordship and identify us in the eyes of the government as separatists."
[1508] Raun, *op.cit.*, p. 320.

General Staff but also as diplomatic representatives of the tsar (for example, between 1812 and the end of the Romanov dynasty, Baltic Germans were Ambassadors to the United Kingdom for 93 of 105 years).[1509] Russification programmes in the Baltic provinces would lead some (but by no means all) Baltic Germans to spur government service, and one by one institutions which were dominated by Baltic Germans would either be 'Russified' or, with municipal governments, be captured by the growing Latvian and Estonian populations. This included some very large scalps, the biggest being the Reval (Tallinn) town hall, which was taken by Estonians, in partnership with Russians, in 1904.[1510] One by one the institutional signs of German dominance in the region were being eliminated – cut off by the very same barriers that would strangle the development of the Latvian and Estonian national movements from below. The Baltic *Landtage* and their subordinate organs were the only institutions that in their entirety retained German as an official language.[1511] Demographics were against them as well: on the eve of the First World War, the urban populations of Latvians and Estonians had risen to 40 and more than 20 per cent of their 'national' populations respectively. [1512] At the same time, economics made it imperative that the Russians had a modicum of control over the provinces. By now, Riga's industry had grown so large that it only lagged in size behind St. Petersburg and Moscow, across the entire Empire.[1513] The Baltic ports handled around 30 per cent of imperial foreign trade, with the monetary value of Riga's trade alone exceeding that of St. Petersburg by the turn of the First World War.[1514] The Baltic was a vital economic lifeline for the Russian Empire, not unlike the Turkish Straits to the south, and the Adriatic with regards the to Habsburg Empire.

8.2.2. The Adriatic

The continuity of the Italian-majority coastal settlements in Istria and Dalmatia could be traced back to medieval Venetian settlements and beyond (indeed, Italian nationalists emphasised their 'Roman' origins), which empowered the projection of an unbroken cultural character in the region.[1515] Politically, Trieste had placed itself under Habsburg rule as far back as 1382 in order to escape Venetian suzerainty, [1516] whereas the Istrian Coast and Dalmatia were much later additions, in 1797 and 1815 respectively.

[1509] Haltzel, *op.cit.,* p. 151.
[1510] Rosenberg, *op.cit.,* p. 202. Wolmar municipal government was the first organ of its type to be taken by Latvians, in 1897. In addition, Latvians and Estonians would also enter successful coalitions, for example, the town of Welk in 1901. Haltzel, *op.cit.,* p. 158. Raun, *op.cit.,* p. 308, noted that by 1914, six out of the ten major towns in the Estonian speaking regions were controlled by the Estonian bourgeoisie.
[1511] Haltzel, *op.cit.,* pp. 155 & 158.
[1512] Thaden, The Russian Government, *op.cit.,* p. 56.
[1513] Kasekamp, *op.cit.,* p. 89.
[1514] Thaden, *op.cit.,* p 56. In 1913, the value of trade through Riga was 77 million roubles larger than St. Petersburg. By this stage, Riga had become the world's top ranked export port for timber, and continued to export other primary products (such as wheat and flax) as it had done for many years. See Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* pp. 380-381, & Kasekamp, *op.cit.,* p. 89.
[1515] Klabjan, *op.cit.,* p. 20.
[1516] Kohn, Viability, *op.cit.,* p. 40.

There was a unique relationship between the Habsburg Empire and the development and unification of Italy proper. Many of the early revolutionary movements (and successes) in 1848 were in then-Habsburg Milan and Venice. Unlike the Baltic Germans, however, once the movement for the unification of Italy began, some Adriatic Italians were vocal of their eventual desire to re-join their brethren in the Kingdom of Italy, although they would have to balance this against the benefits of being the dominant nationality in their region. These overlapping desires would intensify with the 'return' of the Habsburg provinces of Lombardy (1859) and Venetia (1866) to Italy, and the knowledge of the less advantageous economic and political conditions of the Italian speakers in the Habsburg province of the Tyrol (where there was a limited Italian autonomy based on language borders, of the type that could never get up and running in Bohemia).[1517] The pull from the new Kingdom of Italy itself was strong – they would consider the Littoral and Trieste as naturally theirs, far more than the German Empire would the Baltic.[1518]

Overall, the Italians in the Empire covered the gamut of the Imperial Power Structure. They were the regional hegemon in Trieste and the rest of the Littoral (but not Rijeka/Fiume, which was under Hungarian control), a 'pseudo-core' in Dalmatia that would become a periphery over time, and a true periphery in the Tyrol. The Croats, Slovenes and Serbs of the region were still for the most part peasants. Prosperity would differ considerably along the Adriatic: Trieste, the primary Habsburg port, was quite modern, whereas parts of Dalmatia were as backward as any region in the Empire, with extremely low literacy rates, even in the large towns like Split (Spalato).[1519] The Italians had a strong entrepreneurial middle class based on trade, as did the Germans in the Baltic.[1520] It is arguable whether the Habsburg Italians wanted to see the Empire dissolve; rather the predominant ideological goal was the eventual reunification with the Kingdom of Italy. As Dominic Lieven has noted, most "got on with pressing daily business which on the Adriatic coast included defence of their traditional pre-eminence".[1521] In Dalmatia, where Italians made up less than 3 per cent of the population by the 1870s, their overall hegemonic position would prove untenable.[1522] The port of Trieste, where their position was as the Baltic Germans in towns like Riga, was a temptation that would prove too strong for other nationalities to ignore.[1523] Overall, they were never interested in, or offered, compromises of the like that the Polish elites arranged with the dynasty in 1869.

[1517] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 177.

[1518] Bérenger, *op.cit.,* p. 326.

[1519] Mirjana Gross, *op.cit.,* p. 279. Dalmatian figures were 89.3% illiteracy in 1890 and 78% in 1900, and Split had +90% illiteracy in 1880.

[1520] Kent Roberts Greenfield, "The Italian Nationality Problem of the Austrian Empire", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 3, Issue 02 (Jan., 1967), p. 500. He wrote: "The Italians were the seafarers, and theirs was the maritime language of the empire. They were the predominant national element in the political, economic, and cultural life of the Adriatic region."

[1521] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 177.

[1522] Lampe, *op.cit.,* p. 75. Although aware of the rising tide of Croat nationalism, they would build alliances with the local Serb population, see Macartney, *op.cit.,* p. 558fn.

[1523] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 351.

Vienna was always suspicious of the Kingdom of Italy's motives with regards to the Habsburg Adriatic possessions. The precedent was set by the likes of Mazzini, who in 1866, in the words of Kent Roberts Greenfield, "issued the fiery manifesto in which he declared that the Italians would lay themselves open to 'dishonor and ruin' if they failed to make good their right to the Trentino and the Littoral".[1524] As early as 1870, Andrássy had to warn Rome that: "at the first sign of an Italian annexation policy, Austria-Hungary would attack."[1525] The addition of the Kingdom of Italy to the Double Alliance never assuaged the regime's fears of Italian irredentism, not did it quell Habsburg suspicions of the Kingdom. Fears of irredentism were not unwarranted – Hans Kohn, the famous historian who lived through the Empire's last decades, stated that it was "of the most violent and worst kind".[1526]

Irredentism, although strong in urban areas of the Tyrol, was at its most intense in Gorizia and Trieste, and the other Istrian ports.[1527] A British Embassy memorandum of 1899 wrote that:

In Italy there has always been a school of politicians who aspired to unite everything Italian to the mother country. The question of the "Italia Irredenta" thus arose so to speak of itself, & since 1866 numerous associations have been formed in Italy and have fomented the revolutionary spirit in the Italian provinces of the Austrian Empire.[1528]

This phenomenon had variable effects across the Italian populations, and notably, there was no cooperation between Tyrolean and Littoral Italians until the 1880s.[1529] Dalmatia had mostly fallen out of the Italian nationalist orbit by this time, and would, from the 1870s, become subject to a long line of Croat Governors.[1530] Of the urban areas, only Zara (Zadar) would remain under ethnic Italian control.[1531]

The Government had to deal with more than just irredentism: the straight-up refusal of the Italians to cede any notion of influence to Slavs in regional Diets was legendary. This was a double-edged sword for Vienna – the traditional Italian elites of Trieste (unwittingly perhaps) helped the regime by being equally as obstructionist to the Socialist Party there (where it had a foothold due to that city being home to the only major Habsburg port) as to the Croats and Slovenes.[1532] Labour problems in the port city never reached the lows of those of Riga in 1905. The Italians would prove the source of much grievance to the Slavic peoples of the empire, through their defensive tactics in politics, economics and culture. After *Ausgleich,* the Italians on

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[1524] Kent Roberts Greenfield, *op.cit.,* p. 501.
[1525] *Ibid.,* Also see Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy, *op.cit.,* p. 153.
[1526] Kohn, Viability, *op.cit.,* p. 40.
[1527] TNA: Memorandum to Salisbury, Vienna, May 6 1899, FO 120/750:110.
[1528] *Ibid.*
[1529] Kent Roberts Greenfield, *op.cit.,* p. 502.
[1530] TNA: Memorandum to Salisbury, Vienna, May 6 1899, attachment to FO 120/750:110.
[1531] Mirjana Gross, *op.cit.,* p. 286.
[1532] Kohn, Viability, *op.cit.,* p. 40.

the Trieste council wasted no time in ignoring the spirit of the rights enshrined within, going as far as to not record in the council minutes any speech made in a language other than Italian.[1533]

One characteristic that differentiated the region from the Baltic was the absence of large numbers of co-nationals of the sovereign. There were just not that many Germans in the region, and as such, Vienna may have taken its eye off the ball, on occasion. The Earl of Kimberley received a dispatch in 1894 remarking that with huge disturbances in Istria over amendments to the provincial Shield of Arms, the Austrians may have marched blindly into the difficulty, due to "how antipathetic the Italians and Slavs were to one another, there being no local German element upon which they could vent their animosity".[1534] This did not stop unrest one iota: the Istrian Diet, for one, would become the scene of frequent disturbances that would not have been out of place in the darkest days of the Vienna *Reichsrat*. This example was relayed to the British Foreign Secretary in 1895; note the chant of loyalty to Franz Josef:

> *The Commissary of the Govt attempted to address the members; but although he began to speak in Italian he was met immediately by such a clamour that he had to desist; and finally the delegates left the Hall in a body. In the second and third sittings of the Diet resolutions condemning of the Govt and indicating the exclusive use of the Italian language were unanimously passed; and whenever the Commissary attempted to interfere he was met with a stream of protestations, mingled with cries of "Get out" ("Fuori") so that finally he declared the Diet closed; upon which the deputies separated with three cheers for the Emperor.[1535]*

A street demonstration followed, with the crowd cheering the delegates, and calling for "Italian Istria".[1536]

By the late nineteenth century, the Italian populations across the Empire began to co-ordinate more, and it becomes difficult to separate the Adriatic story from the Tyrolean. The Italians showed a double standard when it came to provincial rights, as seen in 1896, when the Italians walked out of the Tyrol Diet after failing to achieve from the Austrian German majority more autonomy, whilst their refusal to make like concessions to Croat deputies in the Istrian Diet resulted in a Croatian walk-out.[1537] The following year, after further attempts at autonomy in Innsbruck were thwarted (including the allowance for a separate Italian curia for that body) they walked out again.[1538] Amongst all this, the Italians never withdrew their members from the Vienna *Reichsrat*.[1539]

An attempt was made on the life of the Emperor in 1882, when Franz Josef was visiting Trieste. A young man called Guglielmo Oberdan tried to assassinate him and was executed for the crime, afterwards becoming a martyr to the Italian cause in the Adriatic,[1540] a reputation aided

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[1533] Kent Roberts Greenfield, *op.cit.,* p. 504.
[1534] TNA: Dispatch to Kimberley, Vienna, October 28 1894, FO 120/708:255.
[1535] TNA: Dispatch to Kimberley, Vienna, January 15 1895, FO 120/715:14.
[1536] *Ibid.*
[1537] TNA: Dispatch to Salisbury, Vienna, January 30 1896, FO 120/723:38.
[1538] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, March 7 1899, FO 120/750:67.
[1539] TNA: Memorandum to Salisbury, Vienna, May 6 1899, attachment to FO 120/750:110.
[1540] Kohn, Viability, *op.cit.,* p. 40.

by his final, shouted, proclamation from the gallows: "Viva Italy! Viva Trieste liberated! Out with the foreigner!" [1541] The situation there got a lot worse as the world moved toward World War, and often education was at its heart. There were disturbances across Istria in the final years of the century against the provision for a Slovenian language *gymnasium* in Pazin (Pisino/Mitterburg).[1542] Innsbruck, although outside the Adriatic, offered a scene particular to Habsburg Austria: a huge riot in 1904 began when Italian law students marched through the town, only to be attacked by fellow German students. It would spiral out of control:

> To restore order the Statthalter, Baron von Schwartzenann was compelled to ask for the assistance of the military. Unluckily the troops which appeared on the scene belonged to a regiment which is recruited in the Italian provinces […] The mob […] became infuriated, got completely out-of-hand, and proceeded to attack and wreck all houses in the town bearing Italian inscriptions.[1543]

The Innsbruck disturbances would end up being hugely significant to the most prominent and volatile 'Italian national' debate within the Habsburg Empire in the final years before the War – where to locate a dedicated Italian legal faculty. This issue would come to emphasise the bizarre national bartering of Cisleithanian politics, and the dangers of having nationalities on both sides of the imperial Habsburg border.

A *Reichsrat* bill was introduced in 1908 to open an Italian law faculty at the University of Vienna. The next year the Italian *Reichsrat* deputies objected to the location, citing the aforementioned difficulties in Innsbruck, plus the fact that students would need to complete part of their curriculum in the German language.[1544] They preferred Trieste, a preference understood but not conceded by Foreign Minister Aehrenthal, although he was worried how this may affect Habsburg-Italian relations. [1545] German liberals argued for Trieste, which was unacceptable to the Croats and Slovenes, who felt Trieste was more a Slav city than an Italian one. In turn, Slovenes used the debate to their own university at Laibach (Ljubljana), which then inspired the Czechs to resume their demands for a second Czech university at Brno. The Pan-Germans were opposed to the idea outright.[1546] The Italians threatened the passage of the Government budget, which led to a particularly Habsburg type of compromise – its temporary establishment at Vienna for three years, with classes only in the Italian language, then moving to another location in the Italian speaking provinces. [1547] As Ambassador Cartwright would remark: "It is hoped that the establishment of the new University will also bring greater cordiality into the relations between this country and Italy, where it has long been felt that the Italians in Austria had a distinct grievance in being without a university of their own."[1548]

[1541] Kent Roberts Greenfield, *op.cit.*, p. 508.
[1542] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, January 20 1899, FO 120/750:26.
[1543] TNA: Plunkett to Lansdowne, Vienna, November 7 1904, FO 120/809:226.
[1544] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, January 20 1909, FO 120/864:11.
[1545] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, January 30 1909, FO 120/864:15.
[1546] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, March 19 1910, FO 120/874:42.
[1547] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 16 1910, FO 120/874:92.
[1548] *Ibid.*

Typical for Austrian politics, two years later the location was still being debated. Cartwright wrote: "As the German parties object to Vienna, the Italians to Prague or Cracow, and the Government to Trieste or Capodistria (either of which would satisfy all parties) there appears to be little chance of any satisfactory solution of this question."[1549] By 1913, the Government were insistent that the faculty would proceed, having in Cartwright's view, "given their word that a University should be created, and they considered themselves bound to honour to redeem their pledge unless the Italians themselves should release them from it".[1550] He would go on to remark that if Trieste became the home of an Italian university, they "would probably find themselves confronted with a Slav demand for it to be made bi-lingual".[1551]

The attitude in the Kingdom of Italy remained of great interest to the Austrian Government, especially as there were still calls for the Empire's Italian provinces to be united with the Kingdom. As an example, in 1906 British diplomat Boothby conveyed that the former Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: "expresses the hope that at some future date Austria-Hungary may cede her Italian provinces to Italy, in return for Italy's support in the Balkan States".[1552] One can see why the regime was careful with their Italian subjects, and why any disturbances were worrying for them. Norman Stone quoted a comment from the Austrian War Minister to the Hungarian Minster of the Interior in 1909, that "Fiume (Rijeka) is a principal centre of Italian irredentism; the police force is utterly inadequate and, since the town council and municipal police are entirely in the hands of the Italians, also quite unreliable."[1553] The Italian defence of their interests, at least in some Adriatic towns, had clearly worked. There was little the empire could do: Fiume was an important imperial port and home to the Imperial Navy College. Like Fiume, Trieste had become too important a lifeline for the empire: in the early twentieth-century, the Koerber government drastically increased investment in the port, which expanded at such a rate that the tonnage handled doubled between 1909 and 1913, an astonishing rate of growth.[1554]

Apart from subduing the socialist parties in the region, the actions of the Adriatic Italian communities would at times divert the attention of the Slavs away from imperial anxieties and towards themselves; local Slav populations were often focussed on Italian oppression more than Austrian Germans in Vienna. An early example was the rear-guard action fought by Dalmatian Italians in the 1860s, which united some Serbs and Croats to form the People's Party to challenge the Italians in the first Dalmatian Diet in 1861 (unsuccessfully, as the franchise was so low that the Italians, with their elite and middle classes, easily outnumbered the other electors). That they

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[1549] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, March 29 1912, FO 120/895:38.
[1550] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, February 28 1913, FO 120/906:34.
[1551] *Ibid.*
[1552] TNA: Boothby to Grey, Vienna, November 15 1906, FO 120/831: (no number). The Italian in question was Dr. Baccelli. In the *Neue Freie Presse* the following month, Italian statesman Luzzarti was quoted as saying: "The noisy irredentism of the streets has almost subsided in Italy. In Austria-Hungary on the contrary affronts to Italian patriotic sentiment have increased." Boothby to Grey, Vienna, December 8 1906, FO 371/8:206.
[1553] Stone, Army, *op.cit.,* p. 102.
[1554] Kent Roberts Greenfield, *op.cit.,* p. 517.

managed briefly to unite Catholic Croats with Orthodox Serbs, something that on a larger scale was not achieved until well into the twentieth-century, is saying something. This was the spark for the People's Party to overcome an unbalanced franchise, win the Diet in 1876, and never relinquish it.[1555] The victor required imperial approval, which was duly received, alienating the Italians who had hitherto expected preferential treatment. The complementary appointment of the first Slav governor of the province would also happen in the same year.[1556]

Italian hegemony in Trieste and Istria also helped drive the development of the Young Slovene Party. In 1869, the Slovene newspaper *Jadranska zarja* would describe the local Italian liberal-national party as a "tapeworm drinking life from the body of our country".[1557] Second, Trieste had become more than just the connection of the imperial economy to the world, but also economic space for Czech capital that doubled as an outlet for ideological transfer. When the Slavic movements are included, the city became "a prize for which everyone was ready to contend."[1558] This only intensified after the turn of the century: the growing port facilities and second train line to Vienna (1901) led to enormous growth of the city, and the Slovene population therein.[1559] Czech capital helped establish a Slovene banking system – *Ljubljanska Banka* opened in 1901 and *Jadranska Banka* in 1905, supported by *Zivnostenská* investors.[1560] The spokes of Motyl's wheel were again forming a rim.

Slovene and Croat nationalists would also stress their own continuous historical narrative in the region. Indeed, they would go further back than the Italians, linking themselves to the Illyrian tribes that occupied the region well before the Romans. They would attempt to trump the Italians by primordialism.[1561] There was a divergence between Slovenes and Croats that would affect how they would deal with the Italians (and Austrians). The Croats had brethren over the demarcation line with Hungary, with the nobles represented in the *Sabor* in Zagreb since 1273, although that Croat noble class was practically non-existent in Istria and Dalmatia. Croat nationalism had been reawakened during the time of the Napoleonic Illyrian Provinces. The Slovenes, on the other hand, did not have such an organisational history, and their national awakening, stirred by the Napoleonic Wars, would have to wait for inspiration from the atmosphere of 1848.[1562] Both Croats and Slovenes would fight within the available Austrian political space without having too much success, as they were too small to compete with the interests of German, Czech and Polish conservatives. Ironically, many Croats and Slovene deputies would hold equally, if not more conservative, positions. Italian and Romanian parties

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[1555] Lampe, *op.cit.,* p. 68

[1556] Okey, Neue Freie Presse, *op.cit.,* p. 86. The gubernial appointment also alienated many in Austria itself, which was through the press beginning to exhibit a new degree of Slavophobia. The *Neue Freie Presse* condemned the appointment as appeasement.

[1557] Klabjan, *op.cit.,* p. 3.

[1558] Kent Roberts Greenfield, *op.cit.,* p. 504.

[1559] Lampe, *op.cit.,* p. 74.

[1560] *Ibid.,* p. 75.

[1561] Klabjan, *op.cit.,* p. 20.

[1562] Janjetovic, *op.cit.,* p. 3. Ideologically they would look at the unification of Slovene lands, but they would settle for equal status of the Slovene language to German in all official transactions (schools, judiciary etc.).

would also form a conservative bloc in the Reichsrat. – *Unio Latina* – which was in opposition to encroachment from Slavs.[1563] They would seek solace on the conservative side.

8.3.   The Polish paradox: Poles in the Russian and Habsburg Empires

The Poles had a unique position amongst peripheries within both the Habsburg and Russian Empires. Not only did their populations traverse the imperial border, as did the Ukrainians, but they also did so with a storied history that had only relatively recently been interrupted by three territorial surrenders, the last of which was the decision of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to divide what remained of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth between three 'great powers': Russia, Austria and Prussia. Having been at the helm of an early-modern imperial system also meant that there were Polish and Polish-speaking elites and landowners spread wide over the territories carved up by 1815 (including Lithuania, Silesia, and modern day Belarus and the Ukraine. Polish elites never pretended to be happy about the arrangements, and most nationally aware Poles romanticised of the day of reunification as an independent nation.

Their practical objectives and strategies differed on both sides of the imperial border however – as did those of the imperial 'core'. Their trajectories would diverge accordingly. Starting in 1815, it would be fair to conclude that the Poles on the Russian side of the border had a far stronger 'national' situation than the Poles in Austria. They were still the "Kingdom of Poland", albeit under Russian suzerainty; they were virtually independent (they even retained an army).[1564] Galicia may have had the Sejm of the Estates, but they were toothless, a feudal rubber stamp for the Habsburg Emperor in its life from 1775 to 1845.[1565] The change in fortunes would begin in 1830, come to fruition in the 1860s, and the convergent trajectories only reversed slightly in the 1900s, with the convocation of the Imperial Duma and universal suffrage in Cisleithania. In this period, the Poles in the Russian Empire would lose all their autonomy and their name (replaced by the nationally-nondescript "Vistula Land"), whereas in Austria the Polish nobility would dominate the peasant populations of Galicia with little interference, and play a vital role in Cisleithanian governance in numerous coalitions, most notably Taaffe's Iron Ring.

It can be argued that the Galician Poles (more correctly the elites) would become the most successful periphery in the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire whereas the Poles in the Kingdom under Russian rule (or the 'Vistula Poles') the most impactful. For example, the Galician Poles were patient (especially during the neo-Absolutist era) and when greater access to it was granted, would learn to play the Imperial Power Structure well. Across the border, the Poles were twice impatient and this was detrimental to their strength as an imperial periphery. However, many would take advantage of the residuals of losing autonomy, such as the removal of tariff walls and the

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[1563] Höbelt, Parties, *op.cit.,* p. 49.
[1564] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 489.
[1565] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 176. Kann surmised the Diet, which was established by Maria Theresa, thus: "by this time the bow to tradition represented no more than an empty shell of former power".

Polish *zloty*, which drove entrepreneurial Poles further into the Russian system. Over time this helped further grow the bourgeoisie, lower middle and working classes, as well as the intelligentsia. Indirectly, the 'Vistula Poles' were impactful as the primary Russian 'other'.

8.3.1. The Poles of the Kingdom of Poland

The details of the 1830-31 revolt in the Kingdom of Poland (which followed Europe-wide strife that led to the overthrow of Charles X in France and the separation of Belgium from the Netherlands)[1566] fall outside the scope of this work, but it bears emphasising that the Poles would revolt just months after Nicholas I had pledged allegiance to the constitution of the Kingdom.[1567] For the Tsar, this was pure betrayal, as he expressed in a blunt address delivered directly to the Poles in 1835: "Emperor Alexander has done for you more than a Russian emperor should have done (I am saying this because I mean it); he showered you with favours, he was more attached to you than to his own subjects, he made you a prosperous and most happy nation, and you paid him back with the blackest of ingratitude."[1568]

The punitive Organic Statute that followed the revolt dissolved the independent Polish army (the first obvious step, as the revolt turned into a full scale war with the Russians) and Diet, and a gradual loss of financial and budgetary independence followed.[1569] Poles were still allowed a separate legal system, lower levels of governance and participation in the imperial government with respect to questions relevant to the Kingdom. Numerous nobles lost their titles and became commoners.[1570] In effect, this was nascent Russification, although it differed from the concurrent Usamov inspired cultural programmes in the western borderlands.[1571] The rebellion raised the spectre of Polish recalcitrance within the regime, especially as they were a more-western leaning 'nation' with experience of being a power themselves, with more developed industry, sizeable bourgeoisie and genuine economic power.[1572] Nicholas I showed none of the forgiveness he showed the Baltic Germans after the 1825 Decembrist Revolt.

Alexander II, on his accession to the imperial throne in 1856, would warn the Poles, "Pas de rêveries, Messieurs."[1573] This was ignored: a full-blown revolt would begin in January 1863.

[1566] Norman Davies, *Gods Playground. 1795 to the Present. A History of Poland.* Vol. 2 (New York, 2001), p. 145.

[1567] Mirinov, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

[1568] Quoted in Strakhovsky, *op.cit.*, p. 490. Hans Rogger, *Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution 1881–1917* (Harlow, UK, 1983), pp. 190-91, outlined just how far Alexander I did go: "Alexander I had agreed to this partial restoration of Poland as a buffer state. After defeating Napoleon, he went further. In a tacit admission of the injustice committed in the partitions of Poland and of its greater readiness for self-government, he granted what he denied his own people: a kingdom of which the Emperor of Russia was the constitutional monarch. The Polish constitution was one of the most liberal in Europe."

[1569] For details see Ekaterina Pravilova, "From the Zloty to the Ruble: The Kingdom of Poland in the Monetary Politics of the Russian Empire", in J. Burbank, M. von Hagen and A. Remnev (eds.), *Russian Empire. Space, People, Power, 1700-1930* (Bloomington IN, 2007), pp 315-316.

[1570] 64,000 were made commoners in the 1840s alone. Pipes, Old Regime, *op.cit.*, p. 181.

[1571] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.*, pp. 489-490.

[1572] Davies, *op.cit.*, p. 149.

[1573] Quoted in Gildea, *op.cit.*, p. 184. Authors translation "No dreaming, gentlemen."

After a number of years of low-level destabilisation, a series of demonstrations in Warsaw in February 1861 turned lethal; five people died, which convinced the Agricultural Society to forward political demands to the Tsar.[1574] Although rejected, the Tsar acknowledged he was considering reform, but elements of Polish society were simmering – enough that the National Party began working to avert "extreme measures being taken by either the authorities or their own countrymen."[1575] They would recommend peaceful protesting, whilst at the same time holding out hope for intervention from the European powers.[1576] The imperial response was most unhelpful for the situation: a decree for a new *Administrative* Constitution was described by Ambassador Napier as "not a very generous charter of popular rights", adding that "it scarcely does more than recognize the elementary principles of a regular Government in which the essence of absolute authority is deposited with competent and acceptable functionaries and in which the wishes and hopes of the peoples are permitted to reach the Sovereign through representative channels".[1577]

Symbolic disturbances would begin. For example, the banned national song was sung at a service celebrating the birthday of the Russian Empress, and Polish women took to wearing mourning clothes on conspicuous national anniversaries, such as the union of Poland and Lithuania.[1578] The latter anniversary was pertinent – the Polish nationalist movement would consider Lithuania and the Ukraine as eternally theirs.[1579] A declaration made in Chelmo in October 1861 began thus: "We the Delegates of the various Polish Provinces represented in the town of Horodlo A.D. 1413 by our ancestors who then and there signed and verified the Act of indissoluble Union of Poland, Lithuania and Ruthenia."[1580] It would go on to state boldly that: "Having been prevented by the Russian troops from entering Horodlo we hereby renew the Union of three peoples effected here of old and we protest against the violation of our liberties,

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[1574] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 372. The Agricultural Society was founded in 1858, to raise "the level of agriculture, conduct a tenant rent reform and, at a later date, to enfranchise the peasants". Lech Trzeciakowski, "Towards a Modern Society: Economic and Cultural Activity as a Political Programme, 1800-1914", in M. Branch, J.M. Hartley & A. Maczak (eds.), *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A Comparative Study* (London, 1995), p. 148.

[1575] TNA: White to Russell, Warsaw, February 28 1861, FO 181/392:9. Prince Gorchakov would receive several of their deputations.

[1576] TNA: White to Russell, Warsaw, March 11 1861, FO 181/392:16. White recalled a discussion with Zamoyski, the "acknowledged leader of the Moderate National party", in that "they believe and hope Europe will not allow them to be kept in their present state of degradation, or the nation any longer to be sacrificed to the prejudices of Russian despotism".

[1577] TNA: Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, April 5 1861, FO 181/387:54.

[1578] TNA: Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, August 19 1861, FO 181/393:64.

[1579] TNA: For example, see the address of the 'Polish National Government' to the people of Poland, July 31 1863, in Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, August 3 1863 FO 181/419:66. It would state: "There can be no Poland without Lithuania and Ruthenia, as there can be none without the kingdom, their history is common, as are the conditions of their political and social existence. It is an indivisible entity."

[1580] TNA: Translation from Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, October 10 1861, FO 181/393. Delegates were listed as "The Deputies of the ancient Palatinates of Posen, Kalisz and those of the various Chapters and Monastic Orders, Scientific and Literary Societies, Universities, of the Medical Academy of Warsaw, the Editors of various Polish and Ruthenian newspapers and also representatives of the various trader guilds and other Corporations together with several thousand persons of all Creeds."

against the tyranny of these Governments, we protest against the violent partition of Poland and claim her independence."[1581]

The new Polish Head of a Commission on Religion and Education, Margrave Alexander Wielopolski, who sought a restoration of pre-1830 Polish powers, offered an olive branch to the dynasty, based upon investigating how much of the 1815 constitution would still be viable in the current imperial structure. The Tsar would be offered eternal rule in Warsaw in return for some autonomy, which in principle was agreed. The Council of State was restored, as was local democratic self-government and responsibility for education.[1582] The response was mixed: according to Kaspe, the middle class: "was so much in the grip of nationalist sentiment that it could not be satisfied with a middle-of-the-road program".[1583] Wielopolski had much difficulty convincing that sector of the population.[1584]

British Consul Stanton was incredulous that the Poles might reject such an offer, considering the overall situation of Poles in Europe:

> *Although the restoration of Poland as an independent kingdom with its ancient limits, is probably the dream, and cherished object of the educated classes of the Kingdom, still I do not believe that this vision has taken such possession of their minds, that they would not be able to see that, in refusing to accept such a concession from the Emperor, and in maintaining their opposition until the whole of their project might be accomplished, they would be throwing away the substance of material welfare, and grasping only the shadow of an independence which they must know can only be obtained by a combination of circumstances hardly to be anticipated.*[1585]

To help calm the unrest, the Tsar appointed his brother Grand Duke Constantine as Viceroy. A key driver of reform in Russia, he was widely respected; however Polish nationalists saw it as a sign of further concessions, something the Tsar was at pains to instruct his brother were not on the table: "*There can be no question of such concessions, in particular no constitution and no national army. I will not permit these in any form.* To agree to this would be to give up Poland and recognize her independence, with all its fatal consequences for Russia."[1586]

Conditions on the ground would worsen, and towards 1863 Wielopolski cracked down, ordering the conscription of Polish men into the army in the hope of depriving the insurgents of manpower. This was a huge misstep, leading to a mass exodus of those who escaped the

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[1581] *Ibid.*

[1582] Hubert Izdebski, "Government and Self-Government in Partitioned Poland", in M. Branch, J. M. Hartley & A. Maczak (eds.), *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A Comparative Study* (London, 1995), p. 84.

[1583] According to Kaspe, *op.cit.*, pp. 463-464.

[1584] TNA: White to Napier, Warsaw, June 11 1862, FO 181/407 (no number). He would write: "Of the Marquis's energy and determination I have not the slightest doubt but he is very often haughty with his own Countrymen who are great children in a great many things and very troublesome children no doubt."

[1585] TNA: Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, January 10 1862, FO 181/407:1.

[1586] The Tsar's Instructions to his Viceroy in Poland, the Grand Duke Constantine, in 1862, 'Perepiska Imperatora Aleksandra II-go s velikim knyazem Konstantinom Nikolaevichem za vremya pobyvaniya ego v dolzhnosti Namestnika Tsarstva Polskogo v 1862-1863 gg.' *Dela i dni*, vol. 1 (1920), pp. 123-125, in McCauley & Waldon, *op.cit.*, pp. 200-201. Emphasis in original.

draft to the countryside, into the arms of what was becoming a full-blown rebellion.[1587] As Napier reported, the conscription order was ostensibly at once to "conciliate the landed proprietors and peasantry", whilst seizing "upon the most obnoxious persons in the urban population" and subjecting them to the 'prison' of the imperial army.[1588] Overall, this defensive form of imperial 'divide-and-rule', he added, was a "design to make a clean sweep of the revolutionary youth of Poland, to shut up the most energetic and dangerous spirits in the dismal restraints of the Russian army. It was simply a plan to kidnap the opposition, and carry it off to Siberia or the Caucasus".[1589]

The position of the nobility was tenuous – even though this was mostly a middle-class driven revolt – as the Government distrusted them and were mostly unable or unwilling to protect their properties from the peasants, who would revolt against their masters under encouragement from the revolutionaries, who in turn considered the nobles traitors for not joining them in the national struggle. [1590] The Polish nobles did not misread the reform spirit in Russia like the revolutionaries, of whom Michell reported, "saw Russia prostrate after the Crimean war; the recoil of despotism threatened to overturn the existing institutions of the Empire, and to cause its dissolution". [1591] The Tsar correctly relayed to British Ambassador Napier in 1863 that the revolutionaries would only be satisfied with the complete restoration of eighteenth-century Poland, which was well beyond what Wielopolski and many Polish nobles sought.[1592] The revolutionaries were certainly hoping for revolt to spread to the Polish territories in the Habsburg and Prussian lands,[1593] and that the ferocity of the Russian response, which contributed to a general anti-Russian feeling across the Kingdom, would be the siren. Such neighbouring revolts did not happen, although there was considerable movement of revolutionaries across the porous borders with Galicia and the Grand Duchy of Posen, which had a lower percentage of Polish nobles than Galicia and the Kingdom (an estimated 6,000-7,000 insurgents joined the revolt from Posen).[1594] The outrage at the severity of Russian response would remain most ferocious on the Russian side of the border. Warsaw Consul General Stanton stated that the situation was irreversible: "The feeling against Russia amongst all classes of the inhabitants of this country, with perhaps the exception of the peasants, is now so strong that I fear, my Lord, any offer of political liberty short of actual independence, if made by Russia herself, would not satisfy the Poles, or be sufficient to pacify the country."[1595] The Russians had lost all "moral sympathy".[1596]

[1587] see Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* pp. 374-375.

[1588] BDFA: Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, January 26, 1863, BDFA V1, pp. 13-14.

[1589] *Ibid.*

[1590] BDFA: Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, February 6, 1863, BDFA V1, pp. 19-20.

[1591] BDFA: Memorandum of T. Michell. Enclosure in Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, May 12 1863, BDFA V1, pp. 51-55.

[1592] BDFA: Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, March 16 1863, BDFA V1, pp. 26-30.

[1593] BDFA: Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, February 16, 1863, BDFA V1, pp. 21-22.

[1594] Molik, *op.cit.,* p. 21. Also see TNA: Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, January 19, 1864, FO 181/430:7; February 16 1864, FO 181/430:10 & August 19 1863, FO 181/419:70.

[1595] BDFA: Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, April 7, 1863, BDFA V1, pp. 36-37.

[1596] BDFA: Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, February 7, 1863, BDFA V1, pp. 16-18.

After some time the rebellion was quelled, but not without extreme suppression by the Russians (especially in the provinces not in the Kingdom of Poland, where the Russian government had more legal authority),[1597] and not without giving the Russian government such a fright as to put the wheels in motion for a sustained campaign of Russification that would gradually build in scope and scale until the 1905 revolution. They would fail to learn the lesson from the conscription ordinance, and would make the same mistake in Finland two generations later. Napier, who was mostly scathing of the Polish revolutionaries, was only slightly less critical of the Russians: "The Russian Government ought to reflect indeed that, by the arbitrary attempt to recruit the Russian army by violence, they were in a manner the aggressors, and struck the first open and conspicuous blow against the public peace."[1598] As for Wielopolski, his desire for the conditions of pre-1830 Poland spectacularly misread the mood on both sides: he was "blamed by his own countrymen for his wish to reconcile them to Russia and for his advising them to try to improve the Russian rule in Poland instead of attempting to overthrow it and by the Russians for his endeavours to please his own countrymen on terms of equality with them."[1599]

The Russian authorities would try to drive a wedge into the Polish 'nation' by creating what they hoped would be a peasant population grateful for their 'release' from the twin evils of the Polish land owner and the Catholic Church (who could no longer levy tithes on them, as church lands were confiscated). The Church was placed at the very heart of the revolt by the Russian authorities, as reported by the *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg* in June 1863:

> *the Catholic clergy took the most active share in the people's uprising, by reading inflammatory manifestos in the churches, by making an oath to newly recruited insurgents and taking their place in the middle of bands, of which time and again catholic priests with weapons at hand would also command bands in person.*[1600]

In addition, many Polish peasants had turned on the revolutionaries (similar to what had happened during the Galician revolt in 1846)[1601] and there was little sympathy for the travails of the Polish landowners who had suffered from the peasants who joined the revolt. Emancipation was far more generous to the peasant than in Russia,[1602] and the regime made it crystal clear who released them from their bonds. The Proclamation began thus: "Peasants of the Kingdom of Poland. I announce to you joyful tidings of a great favour from your sovereign."[1603]

[1597] For an example outlining the brutality of the response, see TNA: Proclamation to the Inhabitants of the Governments of Wilna, Grodno, Kovno and Minsk, attachment to Napier to Russell, June 30 1863, FO 181/416:451.

[1598] BDFA: Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, July 27 1863, BDFA V1, pp. 69-75.

[1599] TNA: White to Russell, Warsaw, 6 December 1864, FO 181/431:4.

[1600] TNA: *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, 5/17 June 1863. Author's translation:

[1601] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.*, p. 217. TNA: The *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, February 8 1864, in Napier to Russell, St. Petersburg, FO 181/414 77, outlined a report from January 1864: "The attitude of rural populations is becoming more and more hostile to the revolutionary party, and a most regrettable incident […] proves that the abuses, the depredation and the violence of all kinds committed by the ringleaders of the insurgency are beginning to tire the patience of the people." Author's translation.

[1602] Miller & Dolbilov, *op.cit.*, p. 446. Plot sizes allocated were more generous, as were the acquisition terms.

[1603] TNA: Translation of Ukase in Stanton to Napier, Warsaw, March 10 1864, FO 181/430:6.

British Consul-General Maude reflected on the nature of the policy some twenty years later:

> *It has been universally admitted to me, even by Russian officials, that the Ukase was conceived and administered in a very different spirit in Poland from that which obtained in the rest of the Empire. Following as it did immediately after the unhappy and insane insurrection of 1862–63, the shape which it took was decidedly of a penal nature. The compensation given to Nobles in "letters of liquidation" […] was notoriously inadequate. And the peasants were treated, in their demands for pasturage and woodcutting, in many cases, with an indulgence which almost amounted to the spoliation of the Nobles.[1604]*

Whilst land was even assigned to peasants that had not previously been worked by them,[1605] the compensation measures for Polish nobles were far worse than comparable measures in Russia. They would be paid far below value over *sixty* years, and those payments would be taxed.[1606]

Another *Ukase* of February 1865 ensured compensation for the widows and orphans of peasants killed by insurrectionists, as a reward for "their loyalty to the Emperor". Peasants from the families of the murdered men were exempted from conscription (totalling one peasant exempted for each peasant killed).[1607] The peasantry took full advantage of their windfall. As Maude considered, since the *Ukase*:

> *they have been bringing out their hoards, at first consisting of almost every conceivable coin, mostly, however, of silver; and this they have put into land, purchasing sometimes from one another, but principally from those of the Nobles who found themselves brought to ruin by the deprivation of the labor on which they have been accustomed to depend.* [1608]

Although the peasantry had no qualms about benefiting at the expense of the nobles, these moves eventually backfired. Once possessing land, Polish peasants started to feel a national pull towards the Polish 'nation', and they no longer needed the Russians to protect them from their landowners. They were now 'invested' in Poland. Again, Russification had helped foster competing ideological and diffused power. Although large class differentiation remained, they began to see eye-to-eye with Polish elites and landowners, arguably for the first time, as a 'nation', so in effect these policies only served to boost Polish national unity.[1609]

The 1861 constitution was never fully enacted, including its local government provisions, having in Stanton's words "long ceased to be anything more than a dead letter, all vestiges of the existence of these councils having disappeared in the insurrectionary flood".[1610] The Imperial regime was in no mood for reconciliation. On the first visit to Warsaw after the revolt of a member of Tsar's family, Grand Duke Nicholas refused to even receive any Polish nobles, in spite

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[1604] BDFA: Report of Maude on the Condition of the Peasantry in Poland, as the result of the Imperial Ukase of 1864, Warsaw, December 31, 1885, BDFA V2 pp. 114-122.

[1605] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 218.

[1606] BDFA: Report of Maude, Warsaw, December 31, 1885, BDFA V2 pp. 114-122.

[1607] TNA: Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, March 8 1865, FO 181/437:2.

[1608] BDFA: Report of Maude, Warsaw, December 31, 1885, BDFA V2 pp. 114-122.

[1609] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 377.

[1610] TNA: Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, March 24 1865, FO 181/437:3

of the great and humbling effort they made with their reception.[1611] Within two years, the organisational and educational redistribution of the Kingdom had begun. In 1867, Poland was divided into *guberniya*, and the Warsaw School District, directly responsible to the Ministry of Education, was set up.[1612] Teachers were given two years to learn Russian and then had to complete a doctorate at a Russian university in order to be allowed to return to teaching. Teachers of Russian descent were encouraged to work in Polish schools.[1613]

Warsaw University was converted to a Russian institution in 1869, and 1872 saw the symbolic prohibition of mourning clothes without special permission.[1614] Russification would continue apace, but in the early 1870s the Tsar began to mix in some soft power tactics, moving on from the retributive attitude of the previous decade. For example in 1874, when the post of Viceroy was abolished and replaced by a Governor General[1615] (and the persecutions of the Greek Uniates was at its height), the Tsar, on a visit to Warsaw, requested and received a performance in the Polish language, and watched a Polish ballet – complete with traditional Polish dances and national costumes.[1616] By this stage, Polish elites had taken advantage of the removal of trade barriers with Russia, as well as their new protection under higher Imperial tariffs from European imports, to vigorously industrialise.[1617] The growth of the intelligentsia followed.[1618] Mansfield would report in 1874: "the enormous material progress, which is being made in this country, while [...] the moral and intellectual development is scarcely less remarkable", comparing the Kingdom exceptionally favourably to Austrian Galicia, where the industries "have to compete with the entire intelligence of Austria".[1619]

During the Russo-Turkish War, Polish elites declined to take advantage of a distracted Russia, having "to a man seriously made up their minds, that they will not risk their persons and property in another insurrection".[1620] Maude would comment that: "There is a sole contingency [...] under which all classes in this country would be willing to risk everything for an overthrow of the Russian yoke, and that would be the presence of an Austrian army upon Polish soil."[1621] As proven in 1863, the Poles understood well that this would never happen, that it was a pipe-dream. Regardless of the new calm, Russification policies would continue to expand. The key actors here were General Gurko, Governor General from 1883, and Alexander Apuktin, who became curator of the Warsaw educational district in the same year. Soon they pushed through

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[1611] TNA: Mansfield to Russell, Warsaw, September 2 1865, FO 181/437:3.
[1612] Miller & Dolbilov, *op.cit.,* p. 447.
[1613] *Ibid.* & Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 410.
[1614] TNA: Mansfield to Granville, Warsaw, January 2 1872, FO 181/499:1.
[1615] Izdebski, *op.cit.,* p. 85. Also see Loftus to Granville, January 24 1874, FO 181/519:39.
[1616] TNA: Mansfield to Stanley, Warsaw, July 13 1874, FO 181/521:14. They also introduced a modicum of peasant self-government, to continue to drive a wedge between Polish nobles and peasants. The powers of this institution were severely curtailed when it became clear it was not working as planned. see Izdebski, *op.cit.,* p. 85.
[1617] Kochanwicz, *op.cit.,* 132 & Davies, *op.cit.,* p. 149.
[1618] Hroch, Social and Territorial, *op.cit.,* p. 263. In this respect, intelligentsia means "all those who attained a certain (not necessarily academic) advanced education and earned their living by professional activities".
[1619] TNA: Mansfield to Granville, Warsaw, January 8 1874, FO 181/521:1.
[1620] TNA: Maude to Stanley, Warsaw, April 27 1877, FO 181/561:6.
[1621] *Ibid.*

an edict that the only Polish instructions in primary schools would be for Polish language lessons and classes on the Catholic religion.[1622] Russian Poland had an inordinately large intelligentsia for Central and Eastern Europe, growing since the 1863 revolt, a fact that terrified the regime. By their response, the Russians had helped create a single enemy out of fragments (nobles, bourgeoisie and peasants). At the same time, Poles would remain indispensible – ethnic Poles still constituted around 50% of the bureaucracy in Vistula Land by 1900: there were just not enough qualified Russians in the regions to run such a large civil service.[1623]

Under the surface, it was still hazardous for Polish groups to accept concession. For example, the Governor General in 1900 introduced a Polish language newspaper for the lower classes, which "called forth the wrath of the 'Old Russians' who regard it as a concession to the Poles that it is printed in their language and the bitterest antagonism amongst the Polish nationalists who see in it in a way of influencing the lower classes in favour of Russia".[1624] In effect, the Russians were 'damned if they did, and damned if they didn't'. Symbolic national gestures reappeared, as they had in the years leading up to the 1863 revolt. It would come as no surprise that Poles would participate heavily in the events of the 1905 revolution, although their nature was considerably different to 1863. Early incidents were industrial strikes like those occurring across the Empire, and the British Consul made pains to highlight that these were not 'national' in nature. From January 1905: "These strikes, both at Warsaw and Lodz, are avowedly merely a workmen's demonstration to show sympathy with the strikers at St. Petersburg, and are not in any way a Polish national movement, although the Polish party of Socialists are trying to make capital out of it."[1625] His weekly report two weeks later continued that:

> It is worthy of note that there is not the slightest tinge of Polish nationalism in the strike movement, that is to say, no yearning for anything in the direction of a Poland as distinct from Russia; nothing beyond a natural desire on the part of the workmen to use their native language, and this not as against Russian, but instead of German, which is the language used in the factories here.[1626]

As there was a demand for the use of the national language, there was *very definitely* a national element. In addition, strikers were known to air political as well as economic grievances.[1627]

This demand would be common. For example, strikers on the Warsaw-Vienna railways also focussed on the use of Polish.[1628] Notably, the Catholic Church, in reaction to a school strike, read out in all Polish churches a directive for the strike to end, which was largely ignored.

[1622] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 488.

[1623] Miller & Dolbilov, *op.cit.*, 447. Fell from about 80% in the late 1860s.

[1624] TNA: Murray to Salisbury, Warsaw, January 29 1900, FO 181/766/3-5: No 1 Political.

[1625] BDFA: Murray to Lansdowne, Warsaw, January 28 1905, BDFA V3, pp. 15-16.

[1626] BDFA: Murray to Lansdowne, Warsaw, February 11 1905, BDFA V3, pp. 27-29.

[1627] Ascher, *op.cit.*, p. 157. He wrote: "Significantly, in Poland, the strikers immediately emphasized political as well as economic demands. A police official reported on January 31, 1905, that workers in Lodz carried placards inscribed with the slogans 'Down with the autocracy! Down with the war'!"

[1628] TNA: Hardinge to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, August 15 1905, FO 181/831:499. For the railways in particular, the Resolution of the Meeting of The Central Committee of the Strikers' Association of the Railway Employees in the Kingdom of Poland, October 31, 1905 enclosure in St. Clair to Lansdowne, Warsaw, November 4, 1905, BDFA V3, p 236, asked for much more: A Constitution for the Kingdom.

As Consul Murray noted, "a large section of the Poles are more devoted to their political plans than to the Church and the effect of the letter has been to weaken the hold of the Church over them more than to put an end to the strike".[1629] A schism developed between workers and nationalists, who tried to 'nationalise' the strikes. When the Imperial Council of Ministers decided to grant concessions to the Poles in August 1905, about 300 leading Poles signed a protest against their issue, as reported by Murray: "The most striking points about the protest are that the Polish National Party, for it is the leaders of this party who signed the protest, admit the possibility of good relations with Russia without independence, and the boldness with which they expressed themselves to the Russian Government."[1630]

Indeed, less than two weeks later, Murray expressed incredulity at the inability for the various Polish factions to unite:

Were it not for their past history one would hope that they would abandon their dissentions and unite to take advantage of the present disposition of the Russian Government to obtain greater freedom for their nationality but in view of their past and of the way in which they are now squabbling it appears that relaxed control only means to them increased opportunity for dissensions amongst themselves.[1631]

By this stage, lukewarm concessions from the Russians, which had included the reintroduction of Polish language instruction in scripture classes, and the introduction of numerous chairs at the University of Warsaw, with teaching in Polish courses such as literature and history, had been withdrawn.[1632] Over time, the nationalist element began to strengthen amongst the people, so much so that Witte was moved to warn a delegation of Polish lawyers in November that: "The Government will grant you a large measure of self-government, but no independent autonomy; that is impossible, and neither the Government nor the Russian nation would agree to it."[1633]

By December, a Catholic clergy meeting with representatives from Lithuania, Belarus and the Ukraine decided to join the national movement, demanding Polish autonomy, a national parliament in Warsaw and the abolition of the use of Russian in Church offices.[1634] Consul General Murray would remark on Boxing Day 1905:

To all outward appearance Polish nationalism is the chief anti-government movement here at the present time, Polish eagles, Polish costumes, and Polish national songs, hitherto forbidden, are on all sides, but this movement, although the most apparent, embraces only a small section of the population, chiefly the lower-middle classes, and is encouraged and supported to some extent by the real revolutionists only in order to embarrass to some extent the Russian authorities and distract attention from themselves.[1635]

[1629] TNA: Murray to Hardinge, Warsaw, July 29 1905, FO 181/848:35.
[1630] TNA: Murray to Hardinge, Warsaw, August 5 1905, FO 181/848:36.
[1631] TNA: Murray to Hardinge, Warsaw, August 18 1905, FO 181/848:37.
[1632] Ascher, *op.cit.,* p. 158.
[1633] BDFA: St. Clair to Lansdowne, Warsaw, November 15 1905, BDFA V3, pp. 245-246.
[1634] TNA: Enclosure in St. Clair to Lansdowne, Warsaw, December 18 1905, FO 181/827: No 45 Political.
[1635] TNA: Attachment in Murray to Lansdowne, Warsaw December 26 1905, FO 181/827:76.

The post-1905 imperial environment offered Poles both opportunity and disappointment. They would become the most vocal non-Russian nationality in the four Dumas that followed; making the most of this rare opportunity to make their case heard in an imperial body, with a membership coming from across the realm. For example, the leader of the Polish deputies in the Third Duma, (and future Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs after independence) Roman Dmowski, stated on the Duma floor that: "The Polish nation will never be reconciled to the position of citizens of second rank and will never make peace with a state in which only such a place is reserved for it."[1636] Nationalists hoped to use the Duma as a platform for rights recognition,[1637] although it was uncertain at the beginning whether nationalists or socialists would appeal more to the lower classes. Overall, the nationalist won – using patriotism and religion to swell support.

The conservative Dmowski, who was more wary of Germany than Russia, and thought Russia better able to protect the Poles than the Austrians,[1638] intended to use the Duma to achieve local government for Poland, and perhaps a National Assembly, but was not interested in pushing for a separate army or currency. As reported by Bernard Pares,

> *He believes that it is at present quite impossible for Poland to stand alone. He believes that far more can be obtained from Russia than from Poland; prefers to remain inside the Russian Empire because he fears the strength of German culture; believes that Polish culture is far stronger than Russian, and can therefore be left to take care of Polish interests in Lithuania, which he would make no attempt to reclaim; and thinks that if Russia conceded Polish liberties, Prussia will have to follow suit for fear of alienating the Prussian Poles.*[1639]

Notably, Dmowski was the founder of the prohibited *All Polish Review*, which was published in Galicia and had a wide readership amongst all three of the dismembered Polish communities.[1640] His party, the National Democrats, were autonomists, with wide support of Polish peasants and a considerable number of workers, having "practically scotched the political importance" of the Polish socialists, a rare group in the Imperial Power Structure that not only espoused independence ideology, but also actively tried to achieve it.[1641]

The Polish deputies would also push a Polish School Bill, and made it clear that they would block the imperial budget if they were not satisfied, something they could hope for in the

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[1636] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 491. To which Stolypin replied: "Unite first in an all-national spirit, and then ask us for autonomy. Adopt first our point of view, recognize that the greatest blessing is to be a *Russian* citizen, make that calling as lofty as it was in the times of Rome – then you will make yourselves citizens of the first rank and enjoy all the rights."

[1637] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St. Petersburg, February 14 1906, FO 181/866:129.

[1638] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 665.

[1639] TNA: Notes respecting the Second Duma, Mr B. Pares, in Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, April 18 1907, FO 181/893:212.

[1640] *Ibid.*

[1641] *Ibid.* Also see Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 665, who wrote that "with the defeat of the revolutionary movement in Russia, the left wing of the PPS [Polish Socialist Party] lost ground within the party, and the extreme left SDKPL [Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania] lost ground among the workers". In effect, the 'national-first' sentiment had won out – the PPS split in 1906, with the Revolutionary Faction throwing their lot in with Austria, with the goal of reviving independent Poland in the event of a Russian defeat in war.

First and Second Dumas due to their numbers.[1642] It is striking how similar the Polish elites in the Russian Empire now resembled the Galician Poles; exemplifying just how important sanctioned access to political power could be. Fearing the possible dissolution of the Second Duma, and a less favourable Duma, they aimed for the stars – introducing a Home Rule Bill, with provisions for a ethnic Polish Governor General, a Secretary of State for Poland sitting on the Council of Ministers, a separate Diet, Polish control over administration within the Kingdom, and control of the judiciary and finances. Foreign affairs, the military, the Orthodox Church and the imperial bureaucracy would be left to St. Petersburg. It was their *Ausgleich* – without hope of success, but a statement of intent.[1643]

Their fears for the future were correct: their representation for the Third and Fourth Dumas would be drastically reduced. Polish provinces would now only provide 3.2 per cent of the total Duma complement of representatives,[1644] just over half of the pro-rata percentage of Polish speakers in the empire. They would continue to make themselves heard in the Duma, most treading the line between accommodation and passive revolt.[1645] The balance between striving for progress through official channels and agitating for change on the ground was a difficult one, especially in face of varying (and sometimes confusing) degrees of repression from the Russians in the Kingdom. For example, martial law was abolished in most of the Kingdom of Poland on October 14 1908, just one day after the proclamation of a state of "Extraordinary Protection" in Warsaw. Ostensibly a relaxing of martial law in the capital, in reality "Extraordinary Protection" was a recalibration of certain martial law restrictions, aimed specifically at radical groups fomenting a general school boycott, threatening university professors and committing "direct and indirect violence […] on school boys attending Russian schools".[1646] Many Poles were unwilling to be seen to be supporting the boycott, and its associated violent undertones. The following comment in the *Kuzjar Warszawski* contained a reminder that censorship regulations were still restrictive.

> *Poles in general will continue to strive for the rights that they justly demand, by constitutional means but as is even recognized in the Governor General's proclamation, they cannot be held responsible for the acts of individuals or isolated groups. The Press, the only true exponent of public opinion, is so hampered by restrictions that its influence does not reach those sections of the criminal classes who above require proper guidance in these matters.*[1647]

The Polish boycott of education facilities was considerable. The Russian language Warsaw University, for one, was badly hit – in 1908 only 30 of around 700 of the student body

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[1642] BDFA: Memorandum on the Dissolution of the Duma and on the Electoral Law of June 3 (16), 1907, enclosure of Pares to Foreign Office, Liverpool, July 9 1907, BDFA V5, pp 3-29.

[1643] TNA: Nicolson to Grey, St. Petersburg, May 13 1907, FO 181/906:254.

[1644] Tsiunchuk, *op.cit.*, p. 381.

[1645] BDFA: Memorandum on the Third Duma, including a Sketch of Developments in Russia from June 3, 1908, Mr B. Pares, Tver Province, BDFA V5, pp 149-170.

[1646] TNA: quoted in Bayley to Nicolson, Warsaw, October 28 1908, FO 181/921:28.

[1647] *Ibid.*

were Polish.[1648] The Russian response, as usual, was not subtle. In the same year, General Skalon, the Warsaw Governor-General, closed schools and libraries servicing 600,000 students that were under the auspices of the Polish National Organisation. In October he would go on to threaten that "unless the boycott is raised he will gradually close all Polish schools throughout Poland".[1649] Dmowski, for one, was incredulous as to Russian motivations. Ambassador Nicolson commented in 1910 that it baffled Dmowski as to "why the Russian Government did not appreciate the risk of having on their western confines a discontented people, and why they did not endeavour to conciliate a race who in certain eventualities might be, according to their disposition, either a danger or a support".[1650] Adding to their discontent was the final removal of the name "Kingdom of Poland" with the ten Governments of the "region of the Vistula".[1651] The Russians could be a symbolic in their gestures as the Poles.

8.3.2.   The Poles in Austrian Galicia

The Poles followed an almost diametrically opposite trajectory in the Habsburg Empire, bearing in mind that the number of Poles under Hungarian rule was negligible. Their territory was only fairly recently acquired by the Habsburgs – Galicia province by 1795 and Krakow as late as 1846. They didn't rock the boat after the *Ausgleich*, indeed accepted an amended version of that compromise that saw their elites formalise their regional hegemony over the province of Galicia, in line with the historical dominance of a nobility stretching back to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[1652] Peter Sugar has gone so far as to state that they had "for all practical purposes a state of their own within the monarchy."[1653] It didn't hurt that their elites had a similar ideological bent and a like ideological background to the Austrian right: conservative and Catholic. The Austrian nobility of this era, although less 'landed', once represented the same type of landed aristocracy as the Poles still did.

Robert Kann made the point that Polish landowners were convinced an independent Poland could only come to fruition by concurrent and coordinated action between all three sets of Polish populations – in Germany, Austria and Russia, which was not likely to happen any time soon.[1654] They chose the path of accommodation instead, achieving the best results in terms of obtaining as much a share of imperial power as was available. By playing the system and taking advantage of conditions the opposite of Russification in the Kingdom of Poland, and Germanisation in the Grand Duchy of Posen, the Poles would become the most successful periphery in Cisleithania.[1655] At the same time, there was a strong enough sub-periphery in the

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[1648] TNA: Bayley to Nicolson, Warsaw, October 3 1908, FO 181/921:26.
[1649] TNA: Nicolson to Grey, St. Petersburg, November 9 1908, FO 181/919:507.
[1650] BDFA: Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, February 15 1910, BDFA V6 pp. 3-4.
[1651] BDFA: Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, May 29 1909, BDFA V5 pp. 287.
[1652] Hanak, *op.cit.*, p. 37.
[1653] Sugar, *op.cit.*, p. 15.
[1654] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 295.
[1655] TNA: Memorandum of Milbanke, in Paget to Granville, Vienna, February 3 1885, FO 120/635:25.

province – the Ruthenes – to ensure that under Cisleithanian conditions after 1869, (and through deft imperial divide-and-rule politics), they would not have everything their own way.[1656] Due to this Polish-Ruthene dichotomy, this section will be shorter than that of the Kingdom of Poland, which did not have that dynamic. Further Galician phenomenon will be dealt with the Ruthene/Ukrainian section.

With regard to the partitions of Poland, Galicia was the poorest region – far different to the territory absorbed by Prussia and Russia. It was a land of the large feudal estate, with a modest, oligarchical nobility class, whose, "manipulations of the provincial Diet", in Norman Davies' words, were "a standing joke".[1657] That would not change after *Ausgleich*: the Galician compromise of 1869 was an arrangement of landowners, whose regional power wasn't disturbed by the crown, in a very similar manner to how the Russians had originally dealt with the elites of their new Baltic territories in the eighteenth century.

Getting to the compromise was difficult, and caused much irritation amongst the other nationalities on both sides of the Leitha. After *Ausgleich*, a federal programme was raised in the Lemberg (Lviv) Diet, declaring that, in the words of British diplomat Alfred Bonar: "the Dualistic system and the new Constitution [are] absolutely inadmissible. It proposes the division of the Empire into separate states or groups […] and calls upon the Polish Deputies to withdraw both from the Provincial Diet and the Reichsrath as at present constituted".[1658] This call for federalism echoed those made by Polish nobles during the neo-Absolutist era.[1659] Typically for Austrian politics, the Ruthenes would use the same opportunity to propose a diametrically opposite programme in the same body.[1660] A despatch to Lord Stanley in 1868 outlined the difficulties faced by the Government if they acceded to Polish demands, which spoke volumes of the difficulties the regime would face time and again: "not only would the existing Dualistic basis be thereby overthrown, but after such a precedent the then just pretentions of Bohemia could never be satisfied, and probably moreover each one of the score of rival Provinces which still constitute the Empire of Austria would insist upon similar separate Institutions".[1661]

In the end, the Poles got pretty much everything they wanted. The Diet would receive powers over local commercial affairs and the police, chambers of commerce, banks and financial institutions (without issuing authority), and non-state schools.[1662] This would however reinforce the old grievances of the peasants against their landowners – in this case Polish and Ukrainian peasants alike were more favourable to the government in Vienna and the administration in Lviv than to their landowners, who were generally considered enemies.[1663] In this instance, the

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[1656] Wandycz, *op.cit.*, p. 71.
[1657] Davies, *op.cit.*, p. 150.
[1658] TNA: Bonar to Stanley Vienna, September 22 1868, FO 120/468:121.
[1659] Henryk Wereszycki, "The Poles as an Integrating and Disintegrating Factor", *Austrian History Yearbook,* Volume 3, Issue 02, January 1967, pp 300-301.
[1660] TNA: Bonar to Stanley Vienna, September 22 1868, FO 120/468:121.
[1661] TNA: Bonar to Stanley Vienna, October 13 1868, FO 120/468:151.
[1662] TNA: Bloomfield to Clarendon, Vienna, March 17 1870, FO 120/483:93.
[1663] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 294.

Austrians did not try and drive them to their side like the Russians did with the Polish peasants in their Polish provinces. Over time, the Polish peasantry in Galicia province, who made up most of the three-fifths of the Polish population of that province, would come to feel more 'Polish', in a way that could be attributed in part to the almost blanket use of their language in courts and schools of all levels. German was reserved for imperial ministerial communications only.

Meanwhile, despite its position at one of the crossroads of Europe, Galicia remained relatively calm. The Polish 'luck' did cause resentment amongst other groups in the empire: for example the Czechs and the Ruthene peasantry, who would begin to reform their national message under Polish domination (helped in part by the setting up of chairs for instruction in Ukrainian at Lemberg University, a positive residue from the liberal language regulations of the Austrian constitution), [1664] and from most other nationalities, who saw Polish supporting government bills in the Reichsrat in Vienna against their wishes. They came to be seen as stooges of Austrian conservatism. The Poles were well rewarded not only by having their regional hegemony strengthened, but their nobility were also trusted in the inner workings of the Habsburg Empire.[1665] Indeed, three common ministers (Counts Agenor Goluchowski sr. and jr, and Leon Ritter von Bilinski) came from the Polish nobility,[1666] not to mention Count Badeni, Minister-President of Cisleithania during the crisis of 1897.

Shoots of Polish cultural expression for which the landowning elites had hitherto shown little interest, began to blossom after *Ausgleich*. Norman Davies explained that a "relaxed and nonchalant atmosphere gave scope for cultural enterprise. In the re-Polonized universities of Cracow and Lwow, in the Polish Academy of Learning (1872), in the mildly censored theatres and publishing houses, in the Polish School Board, the 'organic work' of the Poles in Galicia redeemed the constrictions on Polish culture in Prussia and Russia."[1667] This would have natural barriers, of course, the most significant one being the continued domination of large landed estates, which deprived the economy of the educated urbanised workforce it would need to modernise. Indeed, almost three-quarters of the Galician workforce was still in the agricultural sector in 1910, an amount that even dwarfed that in Hungary.[1668]

The first real challenge to the Polish position in Cisleithania came from the 'Five Guilder Men' franchise extension in 1883, on which Paget commented the following year: "There are some who consider that the special interests of Galicia have been sacrificed to the general advantage of the monarchy and who would be inclined to adopt a more independent attitude."[1669] Franchise extensions, as we have already seen, would always be contentious with conservative Polish politicians in Vienna and Lviv, however, their support remained essential to governments

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[1664] *Ibid.,* p. 439.

[1665] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 169.

[1666] Sugar, *op.cit.,* p. 16.

[1667] Davies, *op.cit.,* p. 150.

[1668] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.,* p. 283. By 1900, Galicia, although it had nearly 1/5 of the imperial population and 1/5 of the area of Cisleithania, had only 9 per cent of industries, with only 100,000 employees in total. Wandycz, *op.cit.,* p. 87.

[1669] TNA: Paget to Granville, Vienna, September 30 1884, FO 120/628:263.

in Vienna and they would continue to garner concessions for that support.[1670] For their part, respective Vienna governments would often turn a blind eye, such as with attempts to declare Polish as the *only* official language of Galicia. Phipps highlighted the contradiction in 1887, writing that it "illustrated Polish notions of equality; and shows that the Poles claim for their own tongue the position of a State language, one which they are unwilling to accord to the German language for the Empire itself".[1671] When the government of the day took a position contrary to the wishes of the Polish Club, it would become a worrying sign, as they held so much power. For example, Taaffe opposed the wish of the Poles in 1891 to place jurisdiction for the Galician railways with the Lemberg Diet was damaging at a time when he was leaking support, after more than a decade of patching alliances together.[1672]

Galician Poles always kept an eye over the imperial borders to their kin under Russian and German domination. They noticed how good their lot was in comparison, and although deep down they never lost their utopic vision of a reunited Polish realm, they knew it was unlikely to happen in a long time, if at all. Hence, they committed to operate within the available constraints. As outlined in a despatch to Secretary Kimberley in 1894:

The devotion of the Poles to their language, to the development of their art, their literature, their education and their culture, whether under Austrian, German, or Russian sway, demonstrates their insuperable belief in the vitality of their nationality, and in their future independence. They wish to be good and loyal subjects of the Emperor Francis Joseph; but they argue that state organisations are not eternal nor insurmountable […] they will not make the sacrifice of their belief in their future national independence.[1673]

Notable scenarios would cause concern in Vienna. For one, Warsaw was still the 'spiritual' home of the Polish nation, so what would happen there was significant. Rumours would frequently jump the border; such as that the Russians would devolve some power back to the Poles in Warsaw, and these rumours could be attractive to some in Galicia, especially economically speaking. At times, taxation was often much heavier in Galicia (depending on the specific sector and type of tax/levy) and the trade advantages within the protections of the imperial Russian tariff system made some industrial and manufacturing businesses more fruitful a proposition on the Russian side of the border.[1674]

Overall, Galician Polish nobles maintained a strong loyalty to Franz Josef, whilst remaining strong Polish nationalists – indeed, their nobility class, as a whole, was unique in the

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[1670] TNA: Memorandum of Milbanke, in Paget to Granville, Vienna, February 3 1885, FO 120/635:25. He noted that the Taaffe Ministry "is greatly dependent upon them, and in order to secure their votes special concessions have more than once been given them".

[1671] TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, November 16 1887, FO 120/654:418.

[1672] TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, October 26 1891, FO 120/691:216.

[1673] TNA: Monson to Kimberley, Vienna, October 4 1894, FO 120/708:233.

[1674] TNA: Dispatch to Salisbury, Vienna, October 11 1897, FO 120/734:336. It was reported that: "The state of affairs in Galicia itself is also far from satisfactory […] a Polish politician told me himself, the taxation is three or four times as heavy as it is in Russian Poland." The dispatch added however that there was no "indication whatever of disaffection among the Emperor's Polish subjects".

Empire for such a dichotomy of passionate nationalism and utilitarian dedication.[1675] However, by the turn of the century, some Poles began to become concerned that the Emperor "shrinks too much from bringing his personal will and influence to bear towards a restoration of concord between the conflicting races and classes in his dominions."[1676] They were not unlike the Pan-Germans in this respect. They would differ, however, in how they reacted to the German Empire, specifically regarding the treatment of 'Posen Poles'. At times, Galician anti-German demonstrations made enough noise to hasten Imperial apologies for the behaviour. In 1901, for example, Goluchowski was forced to apologise profusely to the German Ambassador in Vienna for the insulting behaviour of Galician Poles, who protested the poor treatment of Polish children in a small Prussian town.[1677]

Polish power in Vienna barely diminished as the new century began, even taking into account the expansion of the franchise and the noticeable increase in Ruthenian influence. However, the spectre of universal suffrage was one step too far: the Poles were strong enough to help topple a Minister-President over the issue – Baron Gautsch in 1906. His resignation can be attributed directly to Polish manoeuvres. As Ambassador Goschen reported: "The immediate cause of his resignation was the attitude of the Polish party towards the Universal Suffrage Bills," adding that although it was looking positive:

> *The Polish party held a general meeting, of which the result was that their leaders submitted to the Government proposals with regard to the number of mandates to be allotted to Galicia, and also respecting a larger measure of autonomy for that province, which Baron Gautsch found himself unable to accept. As the Polish leaders made the Polish vote dependent on the acceptance of these proposals, and as, without that vote, it would be impossible for him to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority for his Bills, Baron Gautsch had no alternative but to resign.* [1678]

As Europe inched closer to War, the regime in Vienna could count on Polish loyalty. Cartwright opined that, "people had everywhere declared that they would fight for Austria against Russia, because only in Austria was the economical development of their country possible". There was pro-Russian feeling in the province, he continued, ascribing it to Polish teachers based in Ruthenian village schools, "Russophile" priests appointed by Polish landowners, and general support by Polish authorities.[1679] These were features of Polish efforts against the Ukrainian wing of the Ruthene national movement, which will be examined in more detail. Suffice to say the threat outlined by Cartwright was a little overblown. Another feature at this time was a minor yet noticeable move away from the traditional dominance of the conservative Polish landowners in Lviv. Indeed, the appointment of a 'moderate' as *Statthalter* (Governor) in 1913 – Witold Korytowski – after a curia for peasants was added to the provincial franchise, was a notable change. The *Neue Freie Presse* commented that this appointment was "a rebuff to the

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[1675] Wereszycki, *op.cit.,* p. pp 301-302.
[1676] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, July 18 1899, FO 120/751:174.
[1677] TNA: Plunkett to Lansdowne, Vienna, December 18 1901, FO 120/772:285.
[1678] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, May 4 1906, FO 371/7:50.
[1679] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, January 8 1913, FO 120/906:8.

Polish Conservatives and a determination on the part of the Central Government to give an energetic reply to the combination of Conservatives and Episcopate against the electoral reform proposals".[1680] Even in this eleventh hour of empire, divide-and-rule was as strong as ever.

8.4. Geography and demography count: the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Kingdom of Bohemia.

Two peripheries completely flipped the Polish paradox on its head – Finland and Bohemia. There are obvious commonalities between the two: the one with the most resonance was the existence of a historical dynamic of a strong, traditional minority (Swedish and German speakers, respectively) dominating the majority population (Finn and Czech, respectively). In turn, both majority populations had not yet, by mid-nineteenth century, completely established, or re-established, their 'national credentials'. Indeed it was only during the early half of the nineteenth century that both cultures began to grow *into* Phase A activities, according to the Hroch scale. Finland had been dominated by Swedes, both when part of the Kingdom of Sweden, and then after 1809 under the overall sovereignty of St. Petersburg, whereas the Czechs in the Kingdom of Bohemia had been dominated entirely by its German population since the Thirty Years War. That being stated, it must be remembered that such concepts as 'national minority' or 'ethno-linguistic domination' were alien to all but a handful of activists and theorists, until well into the nineteenth century. Hence, even though Czech and Finnish language use at an official level was almost non-existent, and on an inter-cultural level in Finland as well, this would not become an issue until the time frame covered in this work.

Both territories were vital to the defence of the geographic cores of the respective empires – Vienna and St. Petersburg – whilst being dangerously close to them. Bohemia provided a geographic buffer between Vienna and both Prussia and Russia, as the Austrians would find out with a devastating consequence in 1866. Finland, although in a less precarious position after the decline of the power of the Kingdom of Sweden in the nineteenth-century, stood at the very gates of the Russian imperial capital. In addition, neither the Czechs (at least until the very last during the First World War) nor the Finns would actively work to secede from their respective empires. Unlike the Poles and the Ruthenes/Ukrainians, whose strategies differed dramatically across the border, the Czechs and Finns displayed a similar form of organised, growing, long-term (and sometimes violent) resistance. Both groups became adept at utilising what avenues and tools were open to them; granted to them through their arrangements with the respective empires. The major reason for this similarity was the special status afforded the Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire.

This highlights a stark difference: Finland had a special status that Bohemia, as one of the historic Habsburg crown lands, did not (although the Czechs would have access to the

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[1680] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 16 1913, FO 120/906:89.

machinations of power at the heart of the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure). The Finns were mostly interested in going about their own business, trying to reverse centuries of domination from the local ethnic Swedish domination within their Grand Duchy, and then from the late nineteenth century, holding off Russian incursions. Conversely the Czechs grew to chase as much power and influence as they could under the Habsburg yoke. Bohemia would also industrialise at a far greater pace than Finland. Finally, the aforementioned Swedish and German minorities in both territories had to face a demographic time bomb. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Finns were growing at a faster rate than the Swedish population, and were the Czechs with respect to the Germans in Bohemia.

Why then did the inhabitants of Finland, for the best part of the time of this study, maintain an almost aloof separation from the machinations in Poland and the western borderlands, whilst the Czechs in Bohemia could not get the space they desired? One large part of this was an accident of geography. Finland was located to the north-west of Russia's border, bordering onto Sweden, a declining power no longer a threat to the Russians and far outside the continental theatre, whereas Bohemia stood at the crossroads of Europe, like Poland at the junction of the three great conservative empires, the German, the Austrian and the Russian. Another was demography: the Russian speaking population of the Grand Duchy was never significant, whereas the German speaking population of Bohemia, although steadily decreasing, would remain a significant minority. Finally, the German Empire took a special interest in Bohemia, dictating terms to the Habsburgs that the empire could only work as a dualist system and to not compromise the power balance of Central Europe by divesting further power to the Czechs, whilst opposing radical German nationalism in Bohemia – in essence a continuation of Bismarck's vision for the region.[1681]

It is important at this juncture to qualify what is meant by the term Bohemia and its derivatives. Bohemia can refer to the Habsburg province, but has also been used to cover the lands the Crown of St. Wenceslas, or the *Lands of the Bohemian Crown* (which included Bohemia, Moravia and parts of Silesia). In addition, the term 'Bohemian' is sometimes interchangeable with Czech. For this work, the term 'Bohemia' refers to the Kingdom of Bohemia in the Habsburg Empire and the term 'Bohemian' refers to people/activities of that Kingdom, without reference to language or nationality. When making an ethno-linguistic distinction, the terms 'Czech' and 'Bohemian German' will be used here. With regards to Finland, history has left us with confusing terminology. In order to keep this as clear as possible, in this work the term 'Finnish' refers to the ethno-linguistic designation *and* organisational bodies and their outcomes (Finnish Diet, Finnish Senate, Finnish laws, Finnish surplus etc.) and 'Finns' to the overall population of the Grand Duchy, unless otherwise specified (e.g. when contrasting or comparing the Duchy's 'Finns' and 'Swedes'). Notably. the Russians would often use the term 'Finn' to refer to all the peoples of the Grand Duchy.

[1681] Koralka, The Czech Question, *op.cit.,* p. 258.

8.4.1. The Grand Duchy of Finland

Finland was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1809 as a spoil of the last of many Russo-Swedish Wars. In pre-Napoleonic times, the Grand Duchy had been the springboard for numerous Swedish incursions into Northern Russia. Swedish power had been waning by the nineteenth century, and Russia invaded in 1808 to force Sweden to comply with the Continental Blockade, which they themselves were enforcing on behalf of France.[1682] Although annexation was not an original goal, the Tsar desired it, and soon he would announce to the Finns that they would now benefit from forever being a part of Russia.[1683] He would authorise the convocation of the Diet in 1809, after much pressure from a deputation of the estates of Finland, in advance of which he agreed to maintain all the existing privileges of the nobility. On 16 March 1809, at the opening of the Diet, he announced: "I have promised to maintain your constitution, your fundamental laws; your presence here is a guarantee of my promise."[1684] The Manifesto of 5 June 1809 made Finland a permanent part of the Russian Empire, with "a place among those nations which belong under the Sceptre of Russia and of which the Empire is composed".[1685] It also made him, and his successors, the Grand Duke of Finland.

For the next fifty plus years, the Diet would not meet but the Finns were not hindered from above. It must be remembered that during the events of 1808/1809, the nobles that dealt with the Tsar were ethnic Swedes – there were no native Finnish nobles at this time.[1686] Nicholas I would set the province apart as a model periphery: "Leave the Finns in peace. Theirs is the only province in my great realm, which during my whole reign has not caused me even a minute of concern or dissatisfaction."[1687] Finnish culture was slowly seeping into the echelons of elite society, with the introduction of lectures in the Finnish language at Alexander University in Helsinki (Helsingfors) in 1828.[1688] As Kappeler has argued, by around 1850, a Phase B Finnish national movement had begun.[1689] There were seeds of national disputes around 1860. For example, students at the university in Helsingfors (Helsinki) objected to the fact that they had to pass a Russian language test to graduate, regardless of the degree. The Tsar quickly relented, so

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[1682] Osmo Jussila, "How did Finland come under Russian Rule?" in M. Branch, J.M. Hartley & A. Maczak (eds.), *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A Comparative Study* (London, 1995), p. 61.

[1683] *Ibid.* p. 62 & Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 474. Regarding affirming old feudal privileges in 1808, see Robert Schweitzer, "Government of Finland: Russia's Borderland Policy and Variants of Autonomy" in M. Branch, J. M. Hartley & A. Maczak (eds.), *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A Comparative Study* (London, 1995), p. 94.

[1684] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 474.

[1685] Jussila, *op.cit.,* p. 63.

[1686] Sergei A. Romanenko, "National Autonomy in Russia and Austria-Hungary: A Comparative Analysis of Finland and Croatia-Slavonia" in R. L. Rudolph and D. F. Good (eds.), *Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union* (Minneapolis, 1992), p. 117.

[1687] Quoted in Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 215.

[1688] Klinge, *op.cit.,* p 328.

[1689] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 222.

that only students wishing to go on to work in the office of the Governor General or the Finnish Ministry in St. Petersburg need take this test.[1690]

Finland bucked the trend of growing Russification – indeed it could be argued that the twenty-year period from 1860 saw a period of almost 'Finnification'. In terms of loyalty, if not affluence or social standing, the Russians saw the Finnish people and their ethnic Swedish overlords in the same light as the Baltic Germans, and it was far enough away from the European mainland to make it a more secure borderland. The Grand Duchy was even granted their own currency – the Finnish Mark – in 1860, the opposite of what happened in Poland, which lost its currency independence entirely.[1691] Alexander II allowed the Diet, mothballed since 1809, to meet again in 1863, a session which saw them pass legislation concerning finances, railway building and most importantly, the use of the Finnish language in the Grand Duchy.[1692] This was after the notable antipathy and lack of support and sympathy shown in Finland for the Poles during the Polish revolt of 1863.[1693]

This offers an example of the development of peripheries by handing social and national groups more power and responsibility, in a way similar to what happened when the *zemstva* were created. It also showed divide-and-rule characteristics, with the Russians favouring Finnish speakers over the Swedes. The likely inspiration for the 'soft' actions of the Russians in Finland was three fold. First, Alexander II saw Finland as a sort of 'anti-Poland', a loyal quasi-independent province that did everything right after acquisition, as opposed to the Poles. For example, the Committee of Deputies (of the estates) was allowed, in 1862, to debate and frame the proposals to be debated at the Diet; encouraged by the Emperor to address those most important to them first, including many that would never be allowed such consultation in the rest of the Empire.[1694] Second, the ability of the Russians at the time to take more control of Finland was limited – they literally did not have the resources and felt comfortable allowing the locals to run their territory in the manner of a national *zemstvo*. They would prove to be unable to repopulate the Polish civil service with Russians, even with similarity of language, so they would hardly be able to do the same in Finland. Finally, if the Russians saw any threats in the Grand Duchy it was from their borders with the Kingdom of Sweden. However, a long animosity between both states could not conceal the fact that Sweden would never be a threat to Russia again – that ship had long sailed.

[1690] TNA: Woodfall Crowe to Napier, Helsingfors, 12 April 1861, FO 181/394 (no number).

[1691] For a complete summary of this juxtaposition, see Pravilova, *op.cit.,* pp. 295-319.

[1692] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 415. The Language Ordinance (1 August 1863) mandated that the Finnish language should be equal with Swedish for all government business by 1883.

[1693] Schweitzer, *op.cit.,* p. 99.

[1694] TNA: Woodfall Crowe to Napier, Helsingfors, 3 February 1862, FO 181/408:1. For an example of just how different their scope was, one of their proposals was freedom of movement regulations that would be the envy of the lower classes across the River Neva. They "proposed that all Finnish subjects of whatsoever degree might own vessels, and send them on foreign voyages". TNA: Woodfall Crowe to Napier, Helsingfors, 12 March 1862, FO 181/408:4.

Diet preparations were mostly positive, although five members of the Finnish Senate –the administrative cabinet and court of the Grand Duchy – protested a vote of thanks to the Emperor. What followed was a spontaneous, very nationalist demonstration: "a large concourse of people of all classes, to a number of 5 to 600, visited the various houses of these members, where the Students and apprentices sang several national Airs, and the people cheered and shouted 'Long Life to the Fundamental Laws of Finland'."[1695] These Fundamental Laws would frame the debates that intensified some forty years later.

The Emperor's inaugural address to the Diet on September 3 1863 (written by a local senator, I.W. Snellman) made clear that: "It is to you, the representatives of the grand-duchy, to show by the dignity and moderation of your debates, that liberal institutions in the hands of a wise people ready to collaborate with its monarch, far from being dangerous, become the guarantee of order and prosperity."[1696] One major reform pushed through the Diet was a mandate for the Finnish administration to become bilingual (Swedish and Finnish language) by 1883 – the time lag an acknowledgement that if change were immediate, there would not be enough Finnish-speaking officials to operate the machinery of government.[1697] By that year, all government officials dealing directly with Finnish speakers had to master Finnish, and all laws had to be issued in the Finnish language.[1698]

Although a legislative success, the Diet was notable for a small clique of dissenters, who saw Russia's role in the Grand Duchy far exceeding what was agreed when the Diet was reconvened. The Emperor's speech closing the Diet in 1864, delivered by the Governor General, made note of this, in a veiled warning exemplified by its delivery in Russian:

> *I thank you for the expressions you on several occasions have made on the part of the Finnish people of loyalty toward my person, but at the same time I cannot but deplore that some debates during this Diet, have given cause to misconception as to the Grand Duchy's position towards the Russian Empire.*[1699]

The contrast with Franz Josef, who at least made a minimal effort to address the Prague public and Diet in both Czech and German, is notable. Especially when expressing official gratitude.[1700]

Whether Finland constituted a true periphery at this time within the Russian imperial power structure is questionable. It does appear more an *adjunct,* similar to a British settler colony like New Zealand, without the settlers. However the gentle imperial hand was feeding the Finnish national appetite. Finnish language and Finnish language education continued to

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[1695] TNA: Woodfall Crowe to Napier, Helsingfors, 24 April 1861, FO 181/394:7.

[1696] Quoted in Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 484.

[1697] TNA: Annual Report of the British Consulate in Wilborg, 1864, to Napier, Helsingfors, April 19 1864, FO 181/430.

[1698] *Ibid.*

[1699] TNA: Woodford Crowe to Napier, Helsingfors, April 16 1864, FO 181/430:1.

[1700] TNA: Paget to Salisbury, Vienna, 29 September 1891, FO 120/691: 192, reported that the 1891 "visit of the Emperor to Prague has afforded the occasion for an outburst of enthusiastic loyalty on the part of H. I. M's Bohemian subjects […] For the addresses presented by the authorities, on His arrival, the Emperor expressed his thanks in the Czech as well as the German language".

grow, preceding a rise in their collective, intensive and diffused power. For example, elementary schools grew exponentially, from a mere 15,000 students in 1874-75 to over 125,000 in 1900 out of a population of roughly two and a half million, and Finnish language high schools began to appear.[1701] By the time the regime changed its course on Finland in the 1890s they faced a formidable, confident young 'nation' that very quickly shifted from a friendly to a hostile periphery.

Numerous economic reforms were also undertaken in the Grand Duchy. The Gold Standard was adopted in 1878, notably more than a decade before the Russians, and the new mark, tied to the French franc, began production in 1880.[1702] The conscription process in Finland was considerably different than the rest of the empire, with a programme including three years of active service, for the small number of subjects chosen by ballot. Those not chosen would spend nineteen years in the *Landwehr*.[1703] The Diet was still consulted on administrative issues, indeed a language use information request, in 1887. As reported by Robert Morier, it gave some interesting results:

> *A circular has not long since been sent by the Russian Govt to the higher local authorities of Finland, to impose their views on the subject. Although there can be no doubt that Russia tends to favour the native Finnish element rather than the Swedes, the answers received up till up to now have been generally in the opposite sense – The majority of officials and public bodies consulted have declared themselves in favour of Swedish.*[1704]

The reasons behind the late surge of Russification in the Finland are much debated in the history, with no true consensus having emerged. There were a few small moves in the reign of Alexander II, who was normally very protective of the Grand Duchy. For example, Russian language became compulsory in elementary schools in 1872.[1705] A possible catalyst was economics – Russian industrialists had been jealous of the success of enterprises in Finland, and lobbied for a protective tariff wall, which was enacted in 1885.[1706] In addition, the higher Russian tariffs made it profitable for Russian business to import through Finland, then transport into Russia along the enormous border.[1707]

The emerging recalcitrance of the Finnish Diet, and in direct dealings with the Imperial administration in Helsingfors (Helsinki) was another, as was the manner in which the Diet adhered to the 'Fundamental Laws'. For the former, imperial backed laws became more and more difficult to pass through the Diet throughout the 1880s, frustrating the new Tsar, who

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[1701] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 415.

[1702] Romanenko, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

[1703] TNA: Campbell to Loftus, Helsingfors, January 31 1877, FO 181/561: (no number). For those chosen, it was 3 years active, 8 years reserve and 8 years in the *Landwehr*.

[1704] TNA: Morier to Salisbury, St Petersburg, May 7 1887, FO 181/683/2:162.

[1705] TNA: Campbell to Ford, Helsingfors, February 16 1872, FO 181/499: (no number).

[1706] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 498. Finnish income per capita was 25% higher than in Russia in 1860, 60-70% higher by 1913. Pihkala, *op.cit.*, p. 153. In addition, terms of trade (1860 to 1913) were very much in Finland's favour. See Pihkala, *ibid.*, p. 157.

[1707] The Statute of 1859 stated that: "most Finnish goods could be exported to Russia duty free or by arrangement reducing the countervailing duties". Pihkala, *ibid.*, p. 153.

until 1886 had the exclusive right of formally initiating legislation.[1708] The process of change was long: it was in his opening address to the 1882 Diet that the Tsar broached trying to change the demarcation of law making in Finland, announcing that: "A bill will be submitted to the Diet proposing to grant to it the right to initiate all the legislative questions which may require its concurrence, with the exception of those which H.I.H. may consider it right to reserve the initiative."[1709] According to Hroch, this was the decade where the Finnish people completed their transition to a Phase B movement.[1710] The Diet members were skilled politicians, and knew how to bargain with the imperial authorities, especially frustrating for the Russians as there was no specific governing party to deal with. Although the Tsar was the ultimate arbiter of laws, and of appointments, he was only able to approve or reject entire bills.[1711] He could not amend what was presented to him, until this was changed in 1886, a move seen as a breach of the Fundamental Laws.

This coincided with changes in the nature of the Diet itself, which was still a bi-lingual body, with nobles using Swedish and clergy and the peasantry Finnish.[1712] British Consul Cooke reported in 1888 that the Finnish people were until recently mostly from "the agricultural classes; but, thanks to the rapid development of education, which is now practically universal, they no longer consent to be considered as cyphers in the government of the land, and we see that their party is becoming more powerful day by day".[1713] He would go on to warn of the "Probable Extinction of the Swedish Element" within a generation, which he followed with a perceptive warning that would come to pass, stating that "there can be little doubt that the Russians will turn on their quondam friends, and insist on their adopting the Russian language and institutions, as is now being done in the Baltic provinces".[1714] This would begin in earnest from around 1890.

The historian Viljo Rasila dates its genesis to the spring of 1891, with Russian appropriation of land legislation, traditionally the responsibility of the Diet. He wrote: "rumours began to spread through rural Finland that with the introduction of Russian law, the land would be divided equally among the whole population".[1715] Further noises about circumventing the Diet came from the Bunge Commission the following year, which stated that Finland could operate as normal, so long as it was guaranteed that empire-wide legislation, or laws specifically about Russian interests in the Grand Duchy, could be passed without Finnish Diet consent.[1716] The

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[1708] Schweitzer, *op.cit.,* p. 101.

[1709] TNA: Thornton to Granville, St. Petersburg, January 30 1882, FO 181/653/1:36. As per convention, the Governor General delivered the speech.

[1710] Hroch, Social Preconditions, *op. cit.,* p. 63.

[1711] Pihkala, *op.cit.,* p. 153.

[1712] BDFA: Report of Vice-Consul Cooke on the Composition of the Diet and General Characteristics, Helsingfors, October 6, 1888, BDFA V2, pp. 234-235.

[1713] *Ibid.*

[1714] *Ibid.*

[1715] Viljo Rasila, "Agrarian Problems in Finland", in M. Branch, J. M. Hartley & A. Maczak (eds.), *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A Comparative Study* (London, 1995), p. 173.

[1716] Schweitzer, *op.cit.,* p. 103.

Diet began to feel persecuted and fell back on the Fundamental Laws. For example, the Senate made a point of order on proposals for unification of the tariff systems and coinage of the Empire and the Grand Duchy, invoking a furious response from Alexander III, who commented: "I have read this [...] memorial and am *astonished* as to what it is all about – a part of the Russian Empire or about a foreign state? What is Russia, finally? Does it belong to or is it a part of Finland or does the Grand Duchy of Finland belong to the Russian Empire?"[1717]

Alexander III was much more involved in the affairs of the Grand Duchy than his father. For example he used his decree powers to block the passage of a Finnish penal code. As couldn't make contextual changes, he just postponed its implementation and sent it back to the Diet to make the changes he desired.[1718] C. Leonard Lundin believes that part of the problem was that the Finnish Diet, specifically liberals, were overreaching, almost tempting draconian responses from the imperial authorities. They certainly appeared more interested in making laws limiting Russian agency in the Grand Duchy, rather than addressing the needs of the population, from whom the elites were disconnected.[1719] St. Petersburg was well aware of this disconnect, and would attempt to exploit it as Russification sped up in Finland.

Although well disposed to the people of the Grand Duchy when coming to power in 1894, before long Nicholas II would show little of the restraint or respect to the Finns as his father, and none of his grandfather's.[1720] Nicholas II has a reputation in the historical record of being weak-willed and indecisive, but he could be just as ruthless as his predecessors, as he would prove with regards to Finland.[1721] His reign coincided with a general desire for uniformity across the realm, and a groundswell of Russian nationalism. Adding fuel to the fire was the grievances of the Russian elites from St Petersburg who had holiday homes in Finland. Robert Schweitzer argued that they felt "treated as foreigners" when holidaying, "which set the public debate on Finnish statehood ablaze".[1722]

Edward Thaden recounts the example of Kesar Ordin, who he called an "anti-Finnish polemicist". Ordin was a member of the large colony of St. Petersburg officials who summered in Finland; aggrieved by perceived discrimination from local authorities, and aggrieved that they had no recourse – as Russians they did not enjoy full rights of citizenship within the Grand Duchy.[1723] His articles found a natural home in the *Moscow News* that helped bring a "Finnish question" to the fore in Russian debates, just as that newspaper had with the "Polish question" and the

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[1717] Quoted in C. Leonhard Lundin, "Finland" in E. C. Thaden (ed.), *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914* (Princeton, NJ, 1981), pp. 370-371. Emphasis in original.
[1718] Schweitzer, *op.cit.*, p. 102.
[1719] Lundin, *op.cit.*, pp. 432-432. He described, after the 1906 Finnish Diet elections that were held under the new rules, that the "revelation of seething discontent among the peasants was a great shock to middle-class and upper-class Finns".
[1720] Although Alexander III actually increased the powers of the Diet in 1886. Strakhovsky, *op.cit.*, p. 485.
[1721] Indeed Esthus noted how much the weak image of him was mistaken regarding negotiations to end the Russo-Japanese War. See Esthus, *op.cit.*
[1722] Schweitzer, *op.cit.*, p. 102.
[1723] Thaden. The Russian Government, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

"German question".[1724] It is worth noting that at the time, Russians only made up around 0.2% of the population of Finland.[1725]

In 1898, under imperial guidance, the Governor General in Helsinki, General Nikolay Bobrikov, mandated five-year military service for all able-bodied men, with the added proviso that they could be drafted into solely Russian units. This energised the Finns, who raised objections that they were promised by Alexander I that the integrity of the Constitution and the Fundamental Laws would be honoured.[1726] The following year, Nicholas II introduced a manifesto that overrode those Fundamental Laws completely, giving himself the power to make laws concerning the Grand Duchy without Diet consent.[1727] Previously, the State Secretary for Finland – who Russian Ministers were obliged to deal with if their initiatives affected Finland – was the conduit to the Tsar.[1728] This naturally caused much discontent, and the Finns argued that it was an illegal move in contravention of the constitution, whereby "No Decree can become law of the land without the knowledge and sanction of the Diet of Finland."[1729]

In 1900 Russian was made the official language of the Grand Duchy although, in a rare reversal, two years later they would allow institutions in towns to use the language of the majority.[1730] The previous year, in a classic divide-and-rule manoeuvre, the Tsar ordered that two million marks from the Finnish state surplus be used to buy land for non-landowners, knowing full well of the chasm between the elites and the masses.[1731] Bobrikov was also tasked with further integrating all Finnish military into the Russian, including Russian conscription laws. The Diet rejected this, only to be overruled by the Russian Imperial Council.[1732] The vestige of military power possessed by the Finns had been extinguished, in a manner similar to how they were constantly curtailed in Hungary with respect to the *k.u.k. Armee*. The Diet was deeply offended, and Russian policies managed to unite the Finnish people with their previously hated minority Swedish population – for the first time,[1733] reminiscent of how the Italian hegemons in the Adriatic and the Hungarians had at times managed to reconcile the Croats and the Serbs as a result of their policies. In response, the Finns practiced a form of 'work-to-rule', striking and defying attempts to keep the public services operating efficiently. Bobrikov then had to import

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[1724] *Ibid.,* p. 78.

[1725] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 290.

[1726] As we have seen, their fundamental rights were guaranteed by Tsar Alexander I in his opening speech to the Assembly on March 16, 1809, Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 474.

[1727] Romanenko, *op.cit.,* p. 119. An 1899 February Manifesto declared that: "Finnish authorities (the Estates) were required to submit only their opinion so far as the preparation of laws concerning Imperial interests was concerned. On the other hand, it explicitly stated that the Finns had the right to decide in internal matters." Jukka Kekkonen, "The Main Trends in Finnish Legal History during the Period of Autonomy" in M. Branch, J.M. Hartley & A. Maczak (eds.), *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A Comparative Study* (London, 1995), Kekkonen, pp. 117. Also see Thaden. The Russian Government, *op.cit.,* p. 82.

[1728] Schweitzer, *op.cit.,* p. 91

[1729] TNA: Memorandum of John Michell, St. Petersburg, July 3 1900, FO 181/766/3-5: No. 16 Political.

[1730] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 499 & Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 486.

[1731] Raisal, *op.cit.,* p. 173.

[1732] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 486.

[1733] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 499.

Russians to pick up the slack, which enflamed the situation further – a move due in no small part by the tiny Russian population in Finland, merely 7,000 (non-garrisoned) in 1900, as opposed to 2.5 million Finns and Swedes.[1734]

The Russians then aimed to eliminate specific units considered dangerous to the unity of the imperial army.[1735] Attempts to enforce registration for Russian military service for Finnish males was widely resisted, as it was in Poland some forty years previously.[1736] Finally, the Finnish Senate lost its decision-making powers to the Governor-General in 1902, and on March 20 1903, Bobrikov was granted dictatorial powers.[1737] The Finnish constitution was suspended one month later. The resistance armed itself, and Bobrikov was shot in June 1904.[1738] It was almost the Polish rebellion of 1863 all over again. The summons of the 1904 Diet was notably authorised by the Tsar to meet "under the condition that quiet prevail in Finland".[1739] Disturbances carried over into the revolutionary year of 1905, especially notable for its 'street mobs'.[1740] Ambassador Hardinge made a point of highlighting that: "Whereas the disturbances in Russia owe their origin to industrial distress, the discontent in Finland is to be attributed entirely to political causes,"[1741] although industrial unrest would spread from St. Petersburg along the railway.[1742]

In 1905, to exemplify how extreme the changes had been in the Grand Duchy and the Empire in the previous 10 years, the famous Life Guards Battalion, which had fought Polish rebels in 1830/31 and with distinction against the Turks in 1877-78, was dissolved.[1743] The imperial regime was hurt by the fact that when a call went out to fight in the Russo-Japanese War, there was not one single volunteer across all ranks. The battalion, formed by Nicholas I, which had had Alexander II as battalion Chief when still a Grand Duke (1845), and had both Alexander III and as the current Emperor as members before they ascended to the Russian throne, had lost all feelings of loyalty to the regime it was built to serve.[1744]

In conjunction with concessions in Poland, concessions in the Grand Duchy began flowing toward the end of 1905. The Diet was reopened, which gave the peasantry, in the words of Cecil Spring Rice, an opportunity to express their gratitude for change "which remove the causes of sorrow and anxiety which like a heavy burden, have lain on existence of the Finnish people during late years".[1745] The Imperial Fundamental Laws of 23 April 1906 would return

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[1734] TNA: Memorandum of Mitchell to Salisbury, St Petersburg, July 3 1900, FO 181/766/3-5: No 16 Political.
[1735] Romanenko, *op.cit.*, p. 118.
[1736] Screen, *op.cit.*, p. 264.
[1737] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.*, p. 486.
[1738] For a succinct summary see Moss, *op.cit.* p. 475.
[1739] TNA: Scott to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, September 25 1903, FO 181/795:296.
[1740] BDFA: Cooke to Hardinge, Helsingfors, January 31 1905, BDFA V3 pp. 22-23.
[1741] BDFA: Hardinge to Lansdowne, St Petersburg, February 1 1905, BDFA V3 pp. 21-22.
[1742] TNA: Cooke to Spring Rice, Helsingfors, November 8 1905, FO 181/827:16.
[1743] Screen, *op.cit.*, p. 264 & 269.
[1744] TNA: Cooke to Hardinge, Helsingfors, August 31 1905, FO 181/848: 10 Political.
[1745] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, December 30 1905, FO 371/121/821.

limited self-rule to the Finns.[1746] Notably, out of well over 100 articles, the article specific to Finland was Article 2: "The Grand Duchy of Finland, while comprising an inseparable part of the Russian state, is governed in its internal affairs by special decrees based on special legislation."[1747] Finland would remain 'separate', excluded from the Imperial Dumas. [1748] Women were given the vote as were all citizens over the age of twenty-four, arguably another attempt to bring the lower classes of a non-Russian 'nation' onside.[1749] However, the Finns would remain suspicious of the Russians and their reconciliation plans would struggle from the start.[1750] Initial concerns were based upon whether the Russians and their local allies would live up to the promise of universal suffrage for the new unicameral parliament.[1751] A general strike was threatened if the Finnish Council, which was preparing the electoral law, refused "to accept the proposal for the widest form of suffrage". The Russians took the threat seriously enough to send more troops to the Grand Duchy.[1752] In addition, the Tsar continuously instructed the proroguing of the body, with the sometime help of local elites.[1753]

Although the peasantry were grateful to the Tsar, the machinations of the past ten years had solidified the political cooperation of the Finns and their former hegemons, the Swedes, in the Diet.[1754] Indeed, as Klinge identified, around 200,000-300,000 of the roughly 2.5 million population of the Grand Duchy "changed their Swedish family names into Finnish in 1906 as a demonstration of political-social identification", which was impressive when considering that the 1897 Census reported only 340,000 Swedes in the entire realm.[1755] This was a mostly middle-class phenomenon, as this was the social strata of most Swedes. Notably, workers and the small upper class remained mostly disinterested in nationalist movements. This new alliance would have much work to do when Stolypin came to power and Russification picked up steam again.[1756] Stolypin himself didn't object to Finnish autonomy, per se, but was worried enough about Finland being a "haven for revolutionaries" to push for more imperial control.[1757] Stolypin was adamant of Finland's place in an interview with Ambassador Nicolson in March 1908, making the point that Finland was "not an entirely independent country […] nor was it even in the position of Hungary." [1758]

[1746] It read "The grand-duchy of Finland, though constituting an inaliable part of the Russian state, is governed in its internal affairs by special establishments on the basis of special laws." Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* 470.

[1747] The Russian Fundamental Law of 1906, http://community.dur.ac.uk/a.k.harrington/fundlaws.html, last accessed 10 January 2015.

[1748] Schweitzer, *op.cit.,* p. 104.

[1749] Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernisation, *op.cit.,* p. 191.

[1750] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 487.

[1751] Kekkonen, *op.cit.,* p. 118.

[1752] BDFA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, March 28 1906, BDFA V4, pp. 39-41.

[1753] Kekkonen, *op.cit.,* p. 118.

[1754] Romanenko, *op.cit.,* pp. 123-124.

[1755] Klinge, *op.cit.,* pp. 330-331. Regarding census figures, see Strakhovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 470. The Census of 1897 counted 2,235,000 Finns and 340,000 Swedes. It is important to note that having a 'Swedish surname' did not automatically place one in the latter category.

[1756] See Thaden, The Russian Government, *op.cit.,* pp. 84-85.

[1757] Schweitzer, *op.cit.,* pp. 104-105. He was not far off the mark with his fears.

[1758] BDFA: Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, March 3 1908, BDFA V5, pp. 118-119.

By 1908 the situation was spiralling out of control again, so much so that Consul Cooke was moved to comment in February that: "This new page will be a bloody one, many people going so far as to say already 'finis Finlandiae'; as the Poles said 'finis Polonaie' some generations ago."[1759] The Finns would refuse to vote for a tribute for military service exemption, which challenged Stolypin to force them to supply recruits to the Russian army in lieu.[1760] Allies of the late Bobrikov were encouraging the Tsar to assert more control over Finland,[1761] enflamed by virulent press reaction in Russia. The *Novoe Vremya*, in praising further Russification measures,[1762] outlined the frustration at an "anomalous condition of affairs under which a small people act always in a hostile manner towards the Empire of which they form an indissoluble portion, and give shelter to persons avowedly plotting the assassination of the Empire's rulers and administrators."[1763] Bernard Pares would report in June 1908:

The Russians consider that Finland is endeavouring to secure a larger autonomy than has been granted to her, and to create a State with merely a personal union, while the Finns believe that Russia regrets the liberties which she has accorded to Finland and would be willing to incorporate her into the Empire as a simple province.[1764]

The Diet's reopening in August 1908 (after suspension) showed neither side willing to concede anything. The reading of Nicholas II's address included the following:

On the discussions of the Diet opened by Our command at the commencement of February this year, vent was repeatedly given to utterances disclosing the existence of entirely perverse notions concerning this country's position within Our realm and the obligations incumbent upon the population of Finland in consequence of its said position.[1765]

This caused uproar in both the Diet and in the press. The formal reply of the Speaker (and future President of independent Finland) Pehr Evind Svinhufvid pointed out that "a number of late measures have aroused serious misgivings with the people and the vivid desire of the people is that in this respect a position answering the fundamental laws may be strengthened".[1766] As with so many examples in this work, he made a point to convey this was no slight on the emperor, by concluding: "I beg Your Excellency to convey to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and Grand Duke of Finland the expression of the Diet's loyal reverence and fidelity."[1767]

[1759] TNA: Cooke to Nicolson, Helsingfors, February 28 1908, FO 181/920:3.
[1760] BDFA: Nicolson to Grey, St Petersburg, March 3 1908, BDFA V5, pp. 118-119.
[1761] BDFA Memorandum on the Third Duma, including a Sketch of Developments in Russia from June 3, 1908, Mr B. Pares, Tver Province, BDFA V4, pp. 149-170.
[1762] Schweitzer, *op.cit.*, p. 105. For example: "By 1908, all Finnish affairs had to be presented to the Tsar in the form of a Protocol of the Council of Ministers."
[1763] BDFA: Nicolson to Grey, St. Petersburg, February 22 1908, BDFA V5, pp. 117-118. It would continue: "The general tone of the articles which I have seen is violent, perhaps imprudently so, and it is pointed out that 'Russian bureaucracy' has received a powerful ally in the third Duma, which asserts itself as an 'Imperial Patriotic Assembly'."
[1764] BDFA: Annual Report for Russia for 1908. British Embassy, St. Petersburg, BDFA V5, pp. 194-271.
[1765] TNA: Cooke to O'Beirne, Helsingfors, August 6 1908, FO 181/921:18.
[1766] *Ibid.*
[1767] *Ibid.*

Also in common was the local press reaction – as usual, they were not so circumspect. Whereas *Nya Pressen* on August 6 1908 took issue with the 'perverse notions' comment, pointing out the "dejection and apprehension" it caused, [1768] an editorial in *Hufvudstadsbladet* strove to remind Russia why it needed Finland in the first place:

> *It is well known that only strategical reasons caused by the Russian Emperors of yore to covet the acquisition of Finland. The country was neither so rich, nor so abundantly endowed by nature, nor so cultivated and densely populated that its possession in itself should be a temptation to those swaying the sceptre over a world-wide Empire. But Russia stood in need of a protecting wall for its metropolis, a territory in the north-west, where she could freely develop her military power. This was acknowledged by Alexander I, when he conquered Finland and united it with Russia.*[1769]

The following year the Tsar declared, when seeking the annual military tribute of 10,000,000 Finnish marks of military tribute for 1908 and 1909, that such questions were now solely the province of the imperial administration, a move that Consul Cooke commented was "the most deadly blow to the constitution of Finland, which, de facto therefore, can be said to be practically abolished".[1770] A further law enacted in June 1910 rendered the Finnish Diet a purely advisory body on general imperial questions;[1771] conditions were such that the retired Witte remarked to Embassy Secretary O'Beirne that: "he believed that the history of Russian administration in Poland would be repeated in the Grand Duchy."[1772]

The Finnish question played an enormous part in the business of the Third Duma, and Poles in the Duma made it clear what future Finland was facing, as Pares stated in 1909:

> *As a Pole said very well (Zukowski), the Poles know best what will happen to Finland, because they have it at home; it is an utterly monstrous regime there, and the extinction of all culture, whatever kind promises the champions of the Bill might give; the fact that this regime is being made rather worse than better for the western provinces (with a Polish gentry) shows well enough how the present people will carry out their changes in Finland.*[1773]

The eventual Stolypin reforms would leave most governance in the Grand Duchy subject to the Imperial Duma; in return Finns would sit in the Duma and State Council (all of *four* and *two* members respectively), a bitter pill to mask the loss of all autonomy.[1774] By 1912 the Russian authorities resolved to replace Finnish officials with Russians, or "Finlanders prepared to obey

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[1768] TNA: Cooke to O'Beirne, Helsingfors, August 7 1908, FO 181/921:19.

[1769] TNA: Cooke to O'Beirne, Helsingfors, August 17 1908, FO 181/921:20. The same paper was even more incensed after the Russians fortified the 'Harakka' fort from the landside to protect it from rifle fire from urban areas of Helsingfors; "When the revolutionists, during the disturbances at Sveaborg, in August 1906, threatened to bombard the town, this was considered a sign of inhuman savagery, even on the part of irresponsible mutineers. Now the proper military authorities contemplate the same measures! No, that seems too fantastic." In Cooke to Nicolson, Helsingfors, November 24 1908, FO 181/921:29.

[1770] BDFA: Cooke to Nicolson, October 15 1909, BDFA V5, pp. 311-312.

[1771] Thaden, The Russian Government, *op.cit.,* p. 86.

[1772] BDFA: O'Beirne to Grey, St Petersburg, June 29 1910, BDFA V6, pp. 46-47.

[1773] BDFA: News Letter communicated by Pares, June 16, 1910, BDFA V6, pp. 39-41.

[1774] BDFA: Russia. Annual Report 2010. Enclosure in Buchanan to Grey, St Petersburg, March 22, 1911, BDFA V6 pp. 98-145. See also Rogger, *Russia in the Age of Modernisation* p. 191.

orders", which led to all Governors being replaced.[1775] By the First World War, the Finns still had nominal control over tariffs, currency and their budget, with varying degrees of control influenced by St. Petersburg, and little else.[1776]

8.4.2. The Kingdom of Bohemia

The relationship between the Czechs and the Germans in eighteenth-century Bohemia resembled that of the Swedes and the Finns in the Grand Duchy. Germans had dominated the Bohemian aristocracy since 1620, when Czech nobles were exiled or executed after defeat in the Battle of White Mountain, early in the Thirty Years War.[1777] From this date, the Czech language became the province of the lower classes – the 1770 Prague Census revealed that only the bottom social strata had a predominance of Czech surnames.[1778] Derek Sayer outlined that although the language survived at village level, it "had largely ceased to function as a language of learning or state; indeed, as a written language it was in a condition of apparently terminal decline".[1779] Jean Bérenger argued that: "the presence of German settlers, who would arrive from the thirteenth century, and the Germanised of the ruling classes in the eighteenth century posed a serious problem, the rivalry between Czechs and Germans".[1780] In other words, the rivalry was a long time in the making. Czech national renaissance began slowly in the late 1780s amongst a small cabal of intellectuals, helped by the censorship reforms of Joseph II, which permitted Czech literature and some expressions of Czech patriotism.[1781] They would start Czech newspapers and their own theatres.[1782] From these seeds it would take another fifty years before any true Czech national movement could be said to have existed, in literary salons and private balls, away from the prying eyes of the Metternich-era Austrian police.[1783] They harked back to the bygone days of the Hussites (fifteenth century) and the Přemyslid dynasty that ended in 1306.[1784] Future progressions of Czech nationalism would not be so sluggish.

[1775] BDFA: Memorandum respecting Political Situation in Finland, Helsingfors, January 24 1912, BDFA V6, pp 188-189.

[1776] Schweitzer, *op.cit.,* p. 105.

[1777] Grassl & Smith, *op.cit.,* p. 5. They wrote that the Bohemian aristocracy "hardly included a single figure of genuinely Czech descent".

[1778] It was specifically "confined to the peasantry and the urban poor". Arnost Klima, "The Czechs", in M. Teich & R. Porter (eds.), *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context* (Cambridge, UK, 1993), p 232 & Sayer, *op.cit.,* 186.

[1779] Sayer, *op.cit.,* p. 187.

[1780] Bérenger *op.cit.,* 323. Author's translation.

[1781] Sayer *op.cit.,* 187.

[1782] *Ibid.,* p. 188. The first Czech language newspaper started in 1789, and its publisher founded the first Czech language publishing house, *Ceska expedice*, the following year.

[1783] Albright, *op.cit.,* p. 76. Very few nobles at this time identified with the Czech national movement. Koralka, The Czechs, *op.cit.,* p. 82. Indeed, he called them more "regional patriots".

[1784] Gerhard Brunn, "Historical Consciousness and Historical Myths" in A. Kappeler (ed.), *The Formation of National Elites.* Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, Vol. VI (Aldershot, 1992), pp. 333-335.

Before 1840, as summarised by Koralka, most persons involved in Czech cultural activities were "priests, university students, civil servants and officials, 'particularly among the last those working on large country estates'". They would be joined before the revolution on 1848 by a greater number of professionals, as well as artisans and tradesmen, and even peasants.[1785] The most prominent theorist was Palacký, who was heavily influenced by Herder, who had thought the Czechs a peaceful people.[1786] Palacký tried to form a Czech historical continuity in his history of the Czech people, *Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a v Moravě I–V* (published 1836-1867) which as noted, was written in German (German title: *Geschichte von Böhmen*) because at the time he considered the Czech middle class would prefer to read it in German (indeed Palacký spoke German at home).[1787] Chief amongst his romanticist theories was that the struggle between Slav democratic principles against the authoritatism of the Germans was the key to Czech history.[1788] However, politically, he was a realist, believing that Bohemia had a place in a voluntary union "of diverse nationalities in the territory between Germany, Russia and the Ottoman empire".[1789] In other words, if Bohemia *voluntarily* belonged to the Habsburg Empire, that Empire, and Bohemia's place within it, would be *legitimate*.

Emperor Ferdinand approved a petition from Czech intellectuals in April 1848, which would allow autonomy for Bohemia within the Habsburg Empire replete with equality for the Czech and German languages, and the removal of the *Stände* and Robot. Pressure from Bohemian Germans ensured the former of the reforms would never see the light of day.[1790] Open revolt in Prague followed in June, the first time since the seventeenth century there was a revolt driven by political demands.[1791] Notably, Czech nationalists were still more proficient in written German than Czech, as German was the language of secondary and higher education and of commerce. As an example, recounted by Koralka, Prague University students had to appeal to Palacký to write the Czech version of their bilingual political demands in 1848, as they were not competent enough in written Czech.[1792]

Palacký was also behind the Czech boycott of the Frankfurt Diet of 1848 – and their subsequent involvement in a counter meeting in Prague, where the Czech delegation stressed that the best chance for the Slavs in Central Europe was with neither the Germans nor the Russians but as a part of the Habsburg Empire.[1793] It was he that made the famous comment that "if the Austrian empire had not existed for ages, it would be necessary, in the interest of Europe, in the

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[1785] Koralka, The Czechs, *op.cit.,* p. 83.
[1786] John A. Hall, *op.cit.,* p. 10, Also see François Fejtö, *Requiem Pour un Empire Défunt. Histoire de la destruction de l'Autriche-Hongrie* (Paris, 1988), p. 138.
[1787] Sayer, *op.cit.,* p. 189 & 194.
[1788] Brunn, *op.cit.,* p. 334.
[1789] Koralka, The Czechs, *op.cit.,* p. 85.
[1790] Klima, *op.cit.,* pp. 237-238.
[1791] Koralka, The Czechs, *op.cit.,* p. 85.
[1792] *Ibid.,* p. 87.
[1793] John A. Hall, *op.cit.,* p. 11.

interest of mankind itself, to create it with all speed".[1794] The Czechs would almost always stand firm to this position, regardless of how heated intra-empire relations would become later in the century. As Remak put it: "The Czechs, too, were no exception to the rule that what each group, in essence, wanted was greater privileges for itself within the monarchy, and not the destruction of the monarchy."[1795] Also influential was journalist Karel Havlíček Borovský, who espoused as much freedom under the imperial crown as possible.[1796] Cynical of the possible integrative power of Pan-Slavism, he would later go on to be an inspiration to the Young Czech party.[1797]

During the neo-Absolutist era, the Germans and Czechs of Bohemia would work together to oppose absolutism,[1798] even though the province had been reorganised into new districts (*Bezirke*) during the 1850s, essentially to assuage the Czechs by promoting bilingualism in mixed regions.[1799] The Czechs would grow to rely on the tactic of geographic division into linguistic districts. This benefitted the Czech populations, which were growing much faster and migrating to centres of industry in greater numbers.[1800] This population growth would fuel the emergence after 1860 of a network of national associations, such as *Sokol*, which would become the largest growing Czech organisation.[1801] Due to the high quality nature of Czech mass industry, artisans proliferated, and they would become influential in Phase B Czech national activities – the only case which Hroch identifies.[1802]

As early as 1861, Czech leaders such as Palacký and František Rieger became worried about the potential development of dualism.[1803] It was *Ausgleich* that at once energised and disappointed Czech nationalists, and would determine their trajectory within the Empire until the First World War. In 1865, Palacký warned that dualism would bring about a situation that might cause the Slavs in the empire to say: "We existed before Austria existed, and we will continue to exist after Austria disappears."[1804] They felt they deserved the status within the Imperial Power Structure that Hungary had been granted, and would agitate for a similar

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[1794] František Palacký, *Gedenkblätter* (Prague, 1874) pp. 149-155, quoted in Remak, *op.cit.*, p. 132. This has also been attributed to Jelačić.

[1795] *Ibid.*, p. 137.

[1796] See Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 293. He was a journalist reporting from Ireland and often drew the connection between the situations of the Irish and the Czechs, see Jan Havránek, "The Development of Czech Nationalism", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 3, Issue 02 (Jan., 1967), p. 240. Havlíček took over the editorship of *Prazke noviny* (Gazette of Prague) in 1846, Koralka, The Czechs, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

[1797] Kohn, Collapse, pp. 251-252.

[1798] Albrecht, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

[1799] Evans, Frontiers and National Identities, *op.cit.*, pp. 498-499.

[1800] *Ibid.*, p. 499.

[1801] Koralka, The Czechs, *op.cit.*, p. 89. *Sokol* had 10,516 members in 1871 (44 clubs in Bohemia, 5 in Moravia and 1 in Lower Austria), rising to 43,870 in 1897 (367 in Bohemia, 93 in Moravia and Silesia and 6 in Lower Austria). As Hugh Agnew noted: "The Czech Sokol cultivated the physical and moral health of the nation through gymnastics and other patriotic activities." He also noted that the Sokol uniforms and banners were designed in a folk style, "and other Slavic peoples rapidly established similar groups." Hugh Agnew, *The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown* (Stanford, 2004), p. 132.

[1802] Hroch, Social and Territorial, *op.cit.*, p. 261.

[1803] Klima, *op.cit.*, p. 241

[1804] Quoted in Havránek, *op.cit.*, p. 247. After the passage of *Ausgleich*, Palacký would also warn that it would "become the birthday of Pan-Slavism in its least desirable form". Whiteside, *op.cit.*, p. 176.

compromise from the very beginning. *Ausgleich* seemingly provided their catalyst; resentment at the preferential treatment of the Hungarians grew at a timely juncture when romantic notions of the ancient Kingdom of St. Wenceslas spread across Czech elites.[1805]

Riots in Prague in 1868 brought retributive measures such as the replacement of the Provincial Governor, and a decree suspending rights of association and the freedom of the press.[1806] That year alone would see more than 700 Czechs given sentences for political offences.[1807] There was pushback in the new *Reichsrat* (which was boycotted by the Bohemian Diet) of a nature that would be repeated time and again into the future. For example, German delegate Dr. Schindler, in 1870, asked, with a pointed insult at the end: "As regards Bohemia, what traces are there to be discovered of a state of culture, which would entitle the Czech Kingdom in assuming a position of equality as regards the already existing countries, if you don't forget that Charles V the Luxemburger introduced German culture into Bohemia!"[1808] Minster President Beust expressed considerable frustration with the Czech position, as relayed by Bloomfield:

> *To reason with the Bohemians was […] utterly impossible; they refused to recognize the principles on which the Constitution was based although the Government had expressed their willingness to make several important concessions and give them an increased autonomy. They would listen to no accommodation. They pretended that the limits of their ancient kingdom must be restored, that the Crown lands of Moravia, of Silesia and even parts of Hungary should be given back to them and their position made independent, as was that of Hungary. To such demands it was impossible to listen.[1809]*

However, a compromise was brokered and very nearly came to pass – the Czechs countered *Ausgleich* with their own Fundamental Articles based on the Hungarian model, which were presented to the Emperor in 1871.[1810] The policy, worked out after discussions with Czech political leaders and the co-operation of the Bohemian Diet, would have established an independent Bohemian Diet, with Bohemians being excluded from the Vienna *Reichsrat*, a situation similar to the Finnish Diet.[1811] In essence this was devolution, complete regional autonomy within the empire, leaving all economic decisions for the province to be the responsibility of the Diet. Also included was the redrawing of the *Bezirke* to ethically homogenous zones, with the Czech language being recognised as official where 20 per cent of people spoke Czech as their mother tongue.[1812] Franz Josef was at first impressed, noting in

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[1805] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 440.

[1806] TNA: Bonar to Stanley Vienna, October 13 1868, 120/468:146.

[1807] Havránek, *op.cit.,* p. 248. He added that "more Czech opposition leaders were persecuted during the first years of constitutional government in Austria than at any other period since the 1848 revolution".

[1808] TNA: Bloomfield to Clarendon, Vienna, February 1 1870, 120/483:30. This handwritten reference to Charles V actually refers to Charles IV, who was known as Charles of Luxembourg. He was the Bohemian King (1346-1378) and Holy Roman Emperor (1355-1378), who built up Prague and opened up the city's university. He is known in some Czech circles as the father of the nation.

[1809] TNA: Bloomfield to Clarendon, Vienna, May 26 1870, 120/483:167.

[1810] Palmer, *op.cit.,* p. 168.

[1811] Kann, *op.cit.,* pp. 358-359.

[1812] *Ibid.,* p. 359.

September of that year in a message to the Bohemian Diet that "we gladly recognise the rights of the Kingdom and are prepared to renew that recognition in a coronation oath" (as with Hungary, his formal coronation as King of Bohemia was a sticking point).[1813] A Royal Rescript was prepared, which also included "expressions of the Emperor's readiness to be crowned at Prague as King of Bohemia, accompanied by a pledge intended to reassure H.I.H.'s German subjects of his intention not to disregard the constitutional concessions embodied in the October Patent and the Laws of 1861 and 1867".[1814]

The Bohemian Diet accepted the rescript and proposed modifications that had implications for the entire empire, reaffirming the primacy of the Pragmatic Sanction – the "indivisibility of the personal union" of all Habsburg states.[1815] As British Embassy Secretary Lytton commented at the time, "hitherto the invariable mistake of all Constitutional experiments in Austria has been the adoption of Constitutional textbooks, and adapted to homogeneous communities, but hopelessly inapplicable to the social and historical facts of this Empire".[1816] The reaction across the Empire was mixed, bringing forth rioting in Vienna (by university students), in Silesia (whose Germans were fearful of being sacrificed to the Czechs like the Saxon Germans and Romanians were to the Hungarians), and in Galicia. Conversely, the Diets of Carniola, Moravia and Tyrol were vocal in their support.[1817] However it was the Hungarians who derailed it: Andrássy, fearful that this was the first step to a federal empire,[1818] raised the spectre of civil war, warning the Emperor through Austrian Minister-President Hohenwart: "Are you willing to carry through the recognition of Bohemian state rights with cannon?"[1819]

Unsurprisingly, Andrássy and the Hungarian parliament bore the brunt of the ill feeling caused by the failure of the proposal, especially in the eyes of the non-Magyars of Transleithania.[1820] Czech leaders, conversely, received a huge boost in Bohemia and Moravia. When Rieger returned to Prague after the collapse of negotiations, he was "received with popular ovations. Amidst cheers for the Hohenwart Ministry and cries of 'Down with Beust' the Doctor's carriage was drawn through the streets by the students". Rieger then: "exonerated the Hohenwart Cabinet from all imputation of bad faith; and he reminded his hearers, that their king being Constitutional Sovereign of other territories is not an entirely free agent […] he had been badly advised, but the day must come when better Counsels will prevail".[1821] Once again, with regards to national disappointment in both empires, the sovereign was exonerated for failure at the 'core',

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[1813] Palmer, *op.cit.,* p. 168.
[1814] TNA: Bloomfield to Clarendon, Vienna, September 28 1871, FO 120/490:299.
[1815] TNA: Lytton to Granville, Vienna, October 12 1871, FO 120/490:18.
[1816] *Ibid.*
[1817] TNA: Lytton to Granville, Vienna, October 28 1871, FO 120/490:34.
[1818] Kann, *op.cit.,* pp. 358-359, thereby neutering the Hungarian powers gained through *Ausgleich.*
[1819] Palmer, *op.cit.,* p. 168 & Taylor, *op,cit.* p. 160.
[1820] TNA; Lytton to Granville, Vienna, November 6 1871, FO 120/490:42. Regarding Andrássy: "The part unavoidably played by him in the recent crisis, has exposed him to a great increase of enmity in the part of all the Hungarian Slavs, to whose animosity every stimulant will now be applied by the Czechs."
[1821] TNA: Lytton to Granville, Vienna, November 6 1871, FO 120/490:43.

complete with a gushing of loyalty. To add to Czech wounds, the Galician Compromise of later that year effectively established Polish hegemony over that region.

Czech movements would begin looking at areas where they could exploit the nature of the system. Initially, that would not be through the *Reichsrat* in Vienna or the Bohemian Diet, which they would boycott for just shy of twelve years. Rieger, the leader of the Czech National Party, or 'Old Czechs' (which had not yet lost the 'Young Czech' faction), ostensibly mandated this to emphasise their national difference,[1822] though it was also a retribution for their perceived snub, and that the government in Vienna was far too liberal for the Czech elites. In effect, the granting of a degree of economic, political and by association cultural power to Hungary, and the Czech failure to attain the same, spurred competition for diffused, intensive and collective power in the province that would continue to escalate.

The reactions amongst Czech politicians to the failure would cause an enormous schism in the political Czech national movement, one that would dominate Czech politics in the Bohemian Diet and the Czech Club in Vienna after they returned to the both bodies. In 1873 the Czechs decided to continue their boycott the chamber in Prague as well, although this was contentious, as only a small majority passed the motion.[1823] As described by Ambassador Buchanan:

> There has been a complete rupture between the old and the young Bohemian Tcheques, twenty-nine of the latter voted at a meeting of a general Tcheque Club that the members of that party returned to the Diet should take their seats but this proposal was rejected by a small majority. The young Tcheques have consequently published a declaration of their intention to submit to the decision of the Club, but to resign their seats as they cannot use them in the support of the interests of the Country in conformity with what they believe to be the wishes of their constituents.[1824]

Indeed, the more integrated into the Cisleithanian political process the Czechs would become, the greater this fracture grew. Politically, there was less national unity before the First World War than in 1867.[1825] The Czech national movement had reached Phase C on the Hroch scale.[1826] Arguably, the failure of the Bohemian compromise planted the seeds of an inadvertent 'divide-and-rule' scenario, which would be exploited by the Government time and again, especially after Taaffe's ascension to power. To whit, the split in the Czech National Party between the landowner-dominated Old Czechs, who strove for the historic Crown of St. Wenceslas, separate and autonomous but under the overall leadership of the dynasty, with the Young Czech Party, which broke free in the 1874 to form the National Liberal Party, would never be resolved. The Young Czechs had a similar overall goal, but very different ideas of how to

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[1822] Palmer, *op.cit.,* p. 167. In Palmer's words: "to emphasize their distinctive 'West Slav' nationality".

[1823] TNA: Buchanan to Granville, Vienna, November 26 1873, FO 120/502:331.

[1824] TNA: Buchanan to Granville, Vienna, December 1 1873, FO 120/502:338.

[1825] For an excellent summary, see Sugar, *op.cit.,* p. 13.

[1826] Kappeler, National Organisations, *op.cit.,* p. 299. Differentiation among political organisations usually took place in Phase C – the 'mass movement phase' – as the actualities of political claims making had to take into account the different social and political objectives of multiple strata of society. Hence, after the transition from Phase B, which indicated a mass acceptance of a common national identity, factionalism would normally develop.

achieve it, and after 1879 were far less prepared to barter with the authorities in Vienna or the Emperor.[1827] They were notable for their overall middle-class, bourgeois nature – an indication of the status of Bohemia as the industrial heartland of the empire – and a far broader appeal than the Old Czechs.[1828]

The Young and Old Czechs differed on whether small or large concessions should be fought for. The Young Czechs were (initially) openly positive about integration, believing the Old Czech boycott of the Bohemian Diet and the *Reichsrat* in the 1870s both counterproductive and selfish: their split from the parent party in 1874 came about not long after seven Young Czech deputies decided to take their seats in the Prague Chamber.[1829] After 1879 they would often lambast the Old Czechs for compromising the Czech people, for siding with the German and Polish conservatives in the *Reichsrat,* or for being unable to engender progress towards Bohemian state rights.[1830] Both parties emphasised interdependence, as Rieger would clarify during debates on a new army law in 1888: "Bohemians stood on the same basis as the House of Habsburg: outside this Empire Bohemia has no future; just as that House has no future apart from Bohemia."[1831] Unfortunately for the Old Czechs, a private remark of Rieger's along the lines that the Czechs would need to be satisfied with the breadcrumbs from the table, was published by the Young Czech organ *Národní listy*, causing great embarrassment for the Old Czechs, which in turn was quickly followed by the final Young Czech split from the Czech parliamentary club in Vienna.[1832]

There would be compromise coming the Czechs' way after the formation of Taaffe's 'Iron Ring' Government in 1879. Rieger was swayed by Taaffe's offer of making both Czech and German the official languages for contact between state employees and the public in 1879. This not only brought them into the *Reichsrat* but also into government.[1833] They would work towards institutional dominance and further linguistic separation in the Bohemian lands, and strive for greater economic and ideological power within the empire, as well as supporting the Austrian government in return for concessions. Some of Taaffe's early initiatives included dividing the University of Prague into German and Czech sections (which occurred without the problems that would beset similar initiatives), and the language ordinances of 1880 that allowed the Czech language to be used when government officials were communicating with the public, and before

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[1827] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 349. Albrecht, *op.cit.,* p. 77, highlights early differences between the two factions.
[1828] Sugar, *op.cit.,* p. 12. The Young Czech movement was particularly popular with small farmers, especially on 'language borders', Cornwall, *op.cit.,* p. 925,. Stanley B. Winters, "The Young Czech Party (1874-1914): An Appraisal", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), p. 428, noted that their supporters came from "petty tradespeople, lawyers and similar professionals, progressive intellectuals, teachers and university students, some leaders in the Sokol gymnastic organisations, and middling farmers hurt by Hungarian and increasing North American competition".
[1829] Winters, *op.cit.,* pp. 427-428.
[1830] Kwan, *op.cit.,* p. 173.
[1831] TNA: Paget to Salisbury, Vienna, November 20 1888, FO 120/661:360.
[1832] Kwan, *op.cit.,* p. 173.
[1833] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 170.

the courts.[1834] Alas, every concession, it seemed, came accompanied by a *Reichsrat* crisis. For example Ambassador Elliot reported that a terse Minister of Justice would argue that the 1880 ordinances were "intended not to promote a feeling of separate nationality in the provinces but simply to give the Czech populations every proper facility and advantage before justice."[1835] Taaffe would find it more advantageous to keep the Old Czechs on side than to pander to the Young Czechs in Bohemia or the German liberal party in the *Reichsrat*.[1836]

The language question was enormously delicate, especially the granting 'official language' status. Attaché Phipps was correct in 1887 when he warned that if the Czechs were granted such status, other nationalities throughout the realm would start jockeying for the same, with the result being a "Tower of Babel".[1837] Hence, changes were made at administrative levels, as opposed to symbolic ones. For example, when the Young Czech party won 37 seats in the 1889 Diet election, state examination procedures were amended, as noted by Paget: "It is a curious coincidence that simultaneously with the result of the first successes of the young Czech party becoming known an ordinance of the Ministry of Public Instruction appeared in the Vienna Law Students Gazette allowing [students] in Bohemia to pass their State examinations in the Czech language."[1838]

However, even Count Taaffe's juggling act that was struggled to keep competing interests at bay, and the Bohemian Diet was no easier to manage. For example, after the aforementioned Dr. Gregr proposed an address to the Emperor on both a Prague coronation and Bohemian independence: "As the result of the voting became apparent a violent scene took place. The public in the Gallery greeting the majority with all kinds of abusive epithets; the tumult spread to the body of the house; the members were seen shaking their fists in others faces."[1839] The Bohemian Germans were more often than not the instigators of difficulties in the Diet. In 1890, in an effort to end their own three-year boycott of the Bohemian Diet, the 'Vienna Agreement' was proposed after negotiations between the Taaffe government and the Old Czechs. Ostensibly a 'mini-*Ausgleich*', the bill would protect German speakers from Czech encroachment by re-dividing the Kingdom again, this time along firmer linguistic borders. Almost everything would be divided between Czechs and Germans, including chambers of commerce, judicial districts, agricultural councils and school boards, and elections would adhere to a strict national curia.[1840] The Young Czechs easily thwarted this proposal (they were not party to its development),[1841] as they were by now a much stronger presence in the Bohemian Diet and the *Reichsrat*. By 1895,

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[1834] Albrecht, *op.cit.,* p. 78.

[1835] TNA: As recounted in Elliot to Granville, Vienna, May 13 1880, FO 120/587 (no number).

[1836] The Young Czechs were consistently a thorn in his side in both Vienna and Prague. When the Germans members withdrew from the Bohemian Diet in 1887, they were unwilling to support attempts at negotiating their return, and openly expressed their "satisfaction" at their failure. TNA: Dispatch to Salisbury, Vienna, January 25 1888, FO 120/660:25.

[1837] TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, April 30 1887, FO 120/653:167.

[1838] TNA: Paget to Salisbury, Vienna, July 7, 1889, FO 120/672: 199.

[1839] TNA: Paget to Salisbury, Vienna, November 10 1889, FO 120/672: 317.

[1840] Cornwall, *op.cit.,* p. 916, Albrecht, *op.cit.,* p. 79 & Agnew, *op.cit.,* p. 139.

[1841] Kwan, *op.cit.,* pp. 174-175.

they were the dominant Czech faction, having almost wiped out the Old Czech party entirely.[1842] They would begin to agitate for policies they believed (as it would turn out incorrectly) would be to their benefit, such as universal suffrage.[1843]

In 1897, Prime Minister Badeni went far further than anyone before in pushing language ordinances making Czech mandatory for state officials in all parts of Bohemia, not only when officially communicating with Czech subjects, but also inside the Bohemian bureaucracy itself.[1844] Governments in Vienna were reticent to use Paragraph 14 of the special fundamental law to set language policy in Bohemia, although they would often threaten it,[1845] so Badeni decided to use the channel of parliamentary debate. This would appease the Young Czechs, but caused terrible problems with both the Germans in the *Reichsrat* and those living in Bohemia. Indeed, the *Reichsrat* would descend into frequent violence, and other nationalities would become involved, such as the Poles. One incident, as reported by Rumbold:

> *The Poles and Czechs came to actual blows with the German Radicals and the authority of the President, who, owing to the defective character of the standing orders of the House, is practically powerless, was set at defiance in the most shameful manner. The fight for the Presidential bell was a scandalously grotesque incident of these disorderly proceedings which will remain memorable in Austrian Parliamentary annals.*[1846]

Typically, a Czech civil servant would have had to be proficient in German, but not the other way around. There had never been a real need for Bohemian German speakers to learn Czech.[1847] The ordinance would change this in four short years, making it more difficult for the Germans to qualify for what were perhaps some of the most sought after jobs in the entire monarchy.[1848] Striving for a "principle of the complete parity" in Bohemia for the German and Czech languages would heavily contribute to the Badeni's government falling, and a further impasse for compromise in Bohemia.[1849]

After 1897, multiple party formation took off, and radical nationalism would also grow, spurred on by the campaign for universal suffrage provisions so championed by the Young Czechs – new political formations would follow the lead of the Old and Young Czechs and compete with other Czech parties.[1850] By this stage, leading Czech ideologist and future first president of independent Czechoslovakia, Tomáš Masaryk, had split from the Young Czechs,

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[1842] Agnew, *op.cit.,* pp. 150-151. Old Czechs remained in the Upper House and retained some influence at local government level, in the Moravian Diet, and in some economic, cultural and scientific institutions.

[1843] TNA: Dispatch to Kimberley, Vienna, February 19 1895, FO 120/715:55.

[1844] Albrecht, *op.cit.,* pp. 81-82 and Taylor, *op.cit.,* pp. 196-197.

[1845] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, March 29 1899, FO 120/750:82. For example, Rumbold reported on a 1899 conversation with Minister-President Thun: "Should, however, this last attempt at a friendly understanding prove a failure, he was justified to issue, under the powers vested in the Crown by Paragraph 14 of the constitution, a new law regulating the whole language question (*ein Sprachengesetz*)."

[1846] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, November 24, 1897 FO 120/734:395.

[1847] Albrecht, *op.cit.,* p. 81.

[1848] *Ibid.*

[1849] TNA: Rumbold to Salisbury, Vienna, January 20, 1898 FO 120/741:12.

[1850] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* p. 267 & Agnew, *op.cit.,* pp. 150-151.

with whom he was involved with his Realist faction co-founder, Karel Kramář.[1851] The latter, having stayed to become leader of the Young Czechs, became a proponent of 'positive politics' (as opposed to 'passive acceptance') around the turn of the century, however such engagement alienated many Czechs, who saw this as detrimental to long-term policy goals.[1852] At this time the Czech Social Democratic Party was growing, their platform of rejecting the historic Crownlands of St Wenceslas was ironically closer to the dynasty's position than the Czech conservatives that had propped up the Vienna government.[1853] This phenomenon would intensify after the introduction of universal suffrage in 1907, with only two common positions retained amongst the splintered Czech groups – remaining in the empire, and varying degrees of displeasure at dualism.[1854] By this time, the Young Czechs had transformed into a conservative party, quite different from the party that inspired like movements amongst the Slovenes and Ruthenes.[1855] The 1907 election saw the Young Czechs soundly defeated by the Social Democrats and the Agrarians: Stanley Winters argued that: "it was now stripped of its claim to be the true spokesmen of the Czech people".[1856]

Concurrent to these political developments, the socio-economic profile of the Czech-speaking population had begun to 'catch up' with that of the German-speaking population, eventually overtaking them in a number of areas. As noted, the middle classes in particular grew impressively – the share of agricultural workers in the Bohemian labour pool fell under 50% by 1870.[1857] This would forever change the makeup of Prague. A bilingual city of around 150,000 inhabitants in in 1850 would change to an overwhelmingly Czech city of over half a million by the turn of the century.[1858] The battle over languages presented on Prague street signs shows that Czech leaders had learned, after the failures of 1871, to pick the right fights.[1859] By 1882 there were no German members left on the Prague town council, and Czechs achieved majorities in the most important chambers of commerce in the next two years.[1860] Taking control of municipal councils was another fruitful avenue for them, and it further fuelled the

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[1851] Agnew, *op.cit.*, pp. 143 & 147. They had merged with the Young Czech movement in 1890, Winters, *op.cit.*, p. 432.

[1852] Albrecht, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

[1853] Kogan, *op.cit.*, p. 209. They sought instead national institutions within the empire, in a form of federal arrangement. In this they were different to the Habsburg regime.

[1854] Koralka, The Czech Question, *op.cit.*, p. 251.

[1855] Klabjan, *op.cit.*, pp. 2-3 & Höbelt, Parties, *op.cit.*, p. 48.

[1856] Winters, *op.cit.*, pp. 429-430.

[1857] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.*, p. 285. In Moravia, this threshold was passed around 1890.

[1858] Sayer, *op.cit.*, p. 196. This demographic change would intensify. By 1910, Germans made up only 6 per cent of the population of the city. Mason, *op.cit.*, p. 13

[1859] *Ibid.*, p. 169: A good example were the fights over the symbols on street signs. Sayer wrote: "From 1893 they were in Czech only, with the black-on-yellow lettering of the Habsburg empire replaced with the Czech national colours of red and white. From 1787, when the indefatigable Josepf II made the display of street-signs mandatory, they had been in German and Czech, with the German name first. The order of preference was reversed by Prague city council in 1861, the year Czechs gained a majority for the first time in over two centuries and Czech was made an official language of all city offices."

[1860] Koralka, The Czechs, *op.cit.*, pp. 88 & 89. Majorities were achieved in 1883 in České Budějovice /Budweis and Plzeň /Pilsen, and 1884 in Prague.

growth of Czech economic (business) and ideological power (for example Czech arts and architecture).[1861] By the turn of the century, the national majority on municipal councils had come to correspond more closely with the linguistic majority of the local population. As Jeremy King has uncovered, "municipal electoral politics had become nationalized in ethnic fashion. In Bohemia, by 1900, only 23 of 7,743 municipalities (21 led by Germans, 2 by Czechs) counted as exceptions".[1862]

It bears emphasising that Czechs' lot was hardly bad, in nineteenth-century terms. They had growing economic power, access to political power, and growing ideological power. This was partly thanks to imperial government policy, which when combined with court rulings and civic initiatives, would also allow the Czech-language educational system to come to rival the German-language one. Formerly firm links between social advancement and command of German were loosened. The Bohemian media was also robust and very open; from a small base in the post February Patent-era, Czech periodicals would boom.[1863] By 1875, their number had reached parity in Bohemia with German publications (99 out of 195) and they would continue to grow their advantage. Out of the 418 periodicals in 1890, 253 were in the Czech language.[1864]

This decade also saw huge growth in the number of Czech language primary schools. Between 1879 and 1888, for example, 1,459 Czech primary schools were built for just 784 German.[1865] The 1880s would also see Czechs add four secondary schools, whilst the Germans would lose the same number.[1866] With regards to higher education, it would take a little longer for Czech enrolments to come close to parity in per capita terms: they had surpassed the Germans in technical colleges by the late 1870s, although they would never reach parity at university level.[1867] Czechs also began operating their own nationalist 'societies', such as the Central School Society (*Ustredni Matice Skolska*), which caused the Germans to counter with their own (*Deutsche Schulverein*), fortifying competition between the two nationalities in the education sphere.[1868]

Bohemian Germans and Czechs would battle on the distinction between *Landessprache* (language of the land) and *Landesübliche Sprache* (customary language). The Germans wanted the

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[1861] King, *op.cit.*, p. 108.
[1862] *Ibid.*, p. 102.
[1863] Sayer, *op.cit.*, p. 198. The ground-breaking periodicals of the 1860s included *Cas* (Time), *Potrok* (Progress) and *Národní listy* (The National). The latter was under Young Czech leadership from 1863, see Koralka, The Czechs, *op.cit.*, p. 90.
[1864] Sayer, *op.cit.*, p. 198. In addition, Rerup, *op.cit.*, p. 321 comments that the circulation of one of the largest papers, *Národni Politika*, rose from 8,000 in 1883 to 17,399 in 1890 and then to 32,000 in 1895.
[1865] Zeman, *op.cit.*, p. 36. Between 1869 and 1878, they were almost equal: 666 Czech schools and 682 German schools were built.
[1866] *Ibid.* Czech secondary schools increased from 49 to 53, German decreased from 68 to 64.
[1867] Cohen, Politics of Access, *op.cit.*, p. 5 of 24. He added, "as late as the winter semester 1909-10, the German-speaking elements' representation in the universities relative to their total population (1.12 students per 1,000) was still 60 per cent higher than the Czechs' rate (0.702). In the technical colleges during that same semester, however, the Czech rate of enrolment relative to their total population (0.517 students per 1,000) slightly exceeded the German elements' rate, irrespective of religion (0.467)".
[1868] Albrecht, *op.cit.*, p. 78.

former, in order to protect their existing status, whereas the Czechs would demand sole official language status in the entire crownland.[1869] This sticking point would make peaceful solutions difficult at best, although some institutional separation had been achieved peacefully, for example the separation of the Prague school boards in 1890.[1870] Czechs would focus on what Mark Cornwall calls "the language border," the imagined line separating German and Czech speaking communities, trying to extend it and link up the Czech speaking parts of Bohemia that had hitherto been surrounded or divided by German speaking municipalities.[1871] They also strove to establish Czech strongholds within German speaking territory.[1872] Much of this was intertwined with efforts to manipulate the education of children, driven by the highly politicised census.

The Czechs used the imperial censuses to deftly back up claims when results were to their advantage, whilst condemning the same censuses as deeply flawed and biased when results didn't go their way (these tactics were common amongst Bohemian Germans as well). The lightning rod in the censuses was the designation of *Umgangssprache* (language spoken every day) to quantify resource allocation for schools etc., intensified by the fact that people were asked to self-categorise. [1873] Czechs thought that their co-nationals could not become 'German' by circumstance or force, hence *Umgangssprache* could not collect the true number of 'organic' Czechs.[1874] As Dominique Arel argued that:

> there is little doubt that much of the Umgangssprache data reflected actual linguistic assimilation [...] not just confusion about what the concept was supposed to mean. The Czech nationalists could not accept that assimilation to German was legitimate, while German nationalists in Bohemia were increasingly anxious about potential Czech linguistic encroachment into 'their' territory.[1875]

Czech nationalists would try to pressure ethnic Czech parents to send their children to Czech schools. This 1899 warning to parents issued by the Czech National Socialist Party vividly illustrated the tone of such tactics: "Czech parents! Remember that your children are not only your own property, but also the property of the nation. They are the property of all of society and that society has the right to control your conduct!"[1876] In their eyes, the censuses laid bare their respective progress like a scorecard. However, many Czech families felt there were more advantages for their children to attend German schools, a belief that Czech nationalists would set set out to change.[1877] In addition, separating children in Bohemia went against long standing

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[1869] Kann, *op.cit.*, pp. 439-440.
[1870] *Ibid.*, p. 439.
[1871] Cornwall, *op.cit.*, p. 941.
[1872] *Ibid.*, p. 926. For example, he quoted a 1902 Czech encyclopaedia comment that Václav Parik, the long-term mayor of Trebenice, "created out of an insignificant town smothered by Germanization, a progressive Czech town which is a firm bastion against the Germanization creeping towards the centre of the kingdom".
[1873] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.*, p. 261.
[1874] Kertzer and Arel, *op.cit.*, p. 26
[1875] Dominique Arel, "Language Categories in censuses: backward- or forward-looking?", in D. I. Kertzer and D. Arel, *Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses* (Cambridge, UK, 2002), p. 102.
[1876] Zahra, *op.cit.*, p. 501.
[1877] *Ibid.*, pp. 504-505.

traditions of fraternity, for example Czech children summering with German families and vice versa (included in these children was the future Chancellor of Austria, Karl Renner).[1878]

The level of hyperbole was extraordinary, however for a movement that professed a desire to be in "a position akin to that of Hungary",[1879] this is not surprising – Hungarian education policy completely emphasised the Magyar language and its role at the heart of the Magyar nation. One 1909 brochure demanded that: "If you really love your children, allow them to be educated only in their mother tongue!"[1880] A nationalist journal – *Menšinový učitel* – even tried to incite a moral panic that Germans were driving through the streets: "A mother herself reported that one driver on Spitalská street washed her child, dressed him, combed his hair, gave him a bag of candy, and according to the stupefied mother, led him away to be registered in the German school."[1881] Czech literacy rates would grow higher than the Germans in Bohemia around 1900 (albeit both were over 90 per cent). However, many Czech parents just didn't feel this strongly about the national issue, in that they didn't really 'feel' Czech, and it was very difficult to convince them that bilingualism was not the best for their child, as has been noted. It also infringed on parents' rights, as court cases will attest.[1882]

Economic power was a huge issue for the Czechs. We have seen how Czech capital expanded to the south of the Empire, with the residual objective of promoting 'slavic solidarity'.[1883] Borut Klabjan, quoting from *Český list*, a Czech newspaper in Zagreb, has demonstrated just how important a Czech presence in the Adriatic:

> *Trieste/Trst, today fought over by Slavs [and Italians] and where German expansion is gravitating, has to be the Czech outlet to the sea […] The Adriatic Sea is the only favorable future opening for our merchandise to the Balkans. To ensure future economic connections with the Balkans order must be restored in this volcanic corner of Europe.*[1884]

As would often happen, economic power arrangements between disparate groups would lead to political cooperation – in the last years before the First World War, further peripheral

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[1878] *Ibid.,* p. 505. Said Karl Renner, "The Czech child called my parents '*Vater*' and *Mutter*,' and we boys called the Czech parents '*otec*' and '*matka*' […] Our entire lives the two families and the individual *Tauschkinder* remained the best of friends."
[1879] TNA: Barrington to Rosebery, Vienna, 24 November 1892, FO 120/698:213.
[1880] Zahra, *op.cit.,* p. 505.
[1881] *Ibid.,* p. 508. Zahra adds, Czech parents who sent their children to German schools were sent highly threatening letters that display the siege mentality of this discourse vividly: "With great regret we have discovered that you send your child to a German school. We are only fulfilling our duty to those who have offended our national feelings and consciousness when we amicably inform you of the consequences of your perverted, nonsensical behaviour […] we are calling upon you one last time: if you want to be called a Czech, send your child to Czech school! And if you do not, we will consider you a German and there will be no place for you in Czech society." *Ibid.,* p. 509.
[1882] *Ibid.,* p. 513. For example: "Josef Hubacek, whose child was reclaimed for a German school in Zabreh/Hohenstadt, argued in a complaint to the Supreme Court in 1912, 'I consider in my right alone to provide for my child and to make decisions about the schools in which I want him to be educated. I consider the interference of the Czech School Board to be an infringement on my free discretionary rights over my child, which appears to have no legal justification whatsoever'."
[1883] Klabjan, *op.cit.,* p. 3.
[1884] *Ibid.,* p. 4. This comment was written in 1911.

engagement would occur on the floor of the Reichsrat, with Czech deputies forming the "Slavic Union" with Southern Slav deputies in 1909/10.[1885]

When all is said and done, what did the Czechs really want? Masaryk, one of the ideological leaders of the Czechs from the turn of the twentieth century, followed Palacký's lead, adding further demands along the way without changing the overall ideological goal.[1886] Amongst other things, he saw a federal version of the empire as a "bulwark against Pan-Germanism and Pan-Russianism".[1887] The Czechs were rarely at ease with the Russians and the Pan-Slavic programme. In 1908 he wrote, "as regards the relation of the Czech lands to the Austrian state, I regard [Palacký's] idea of the Austrian state, in spite of all the constitutional changes, as a still reliable guide […] I express my political experiences in the worst that our policy can not be successful if it is not supported by a true and strong interest in the fate of Austria".[1888]

Gary Cohen had argued that the most radical Czech parties of the pre-War era, such as the National Socialists and the State-Right Radicals, for all their anti-imperial rhetoric, still attempted to work the system to their advantage. In effect, they too had become embedded in the political system of Cisleithania.[1889] They benefitted from universal suffrage, and they knew it. Edvard Beneš, another future president of Czechoslovakia, lauded universal suffrage's benefits in his 1908 doctoral dissertation from the University of Dijon:

Universal suffrage is thus a good omen for the future. Austria enters into a new stage of its evolution […] nationality struggles will in part be replaced by economic struggles. People often have spoken of the dissolution of Austria. I do not believe in it at all. The historic and economic ties, which bind the Austrian nations to one another are too strong to let such a thing happen.[1890]

The Young Czechs, still strong but diminished after universal suffrage, remained tied to a policy of divested federalism, and would work the imperial system they were so scurrilous about. In 1907, Goschen reported that the Young Czech leader Kramář remarked that: "It was true that the Czechs tried to get their compatriots into the central Government offices in Vienna but this was done with the object of depriving the system of centralisation of its German character and of this attacking it at its weakest point."[1891] His 1910 Reichsrat speech managed to preach Bohemian essentialism whilst still declaring loyalty to the crown.

The only patriotism we know is a Bohemian patriotism. For centuries we have been loyal to Bohemia and to those who wore the Bohemian crown, and you cannot demand any other patriotism from us. There is no such thing as 'Austria': there is only 'Austria-Hungary', and we Czechs entirely refuse to

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[1885] Höbelt, Parties, *op.cit.,* p. 49.
[1886] Kann, *op.cit.,* pp. 443-444.
[1887] Kohn, Viability, *op.cit.,* p. 41.
[1888] *Ibid.,* p. 41-42.
[1889] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* p. 242.
[1890] Edvard Beneš, *Le problème autrichien et la question tcheque* (Paris, 1908), pp. 3-4, quoted in Remak, *op.cit.,* p. 141.
[1891] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 7 1907, FO 120/840:20. Naturally they would make the standard demands, such as establishing a University of Moravia, extension of Provincial Autonomy, augmentation of the Provincial Diets, making the Governor responsible to the Diet etc.

feel an Austro-Hungarian patriotism [...] Austria must not be Slav, nor must she be German, neither internally nor externally. It is the people who speak of the 'Wacht an der Donau und am Rhein' who undermine the foundations of this State. We Slav peoples are not here to serve as a 'Wacht am Rhein'. We are ready to support this State, but not foreign interests.[1892]

The Czechs, like the Hungarians, would also settle for symbolic international recognition where they could. For example, they participated in the Olympic Games, even marching in 1908 in alphabetical order (as did Hungary) between Belgium and Brazil, under their 'national' red and white flag with the Bohemian lion on their shirts.[1893] They were also represented at the Second International as an independent state, and participated in other international sports bodies, as well as science and technology fairs.[1894] Czech activists would also increase their periodic rioting and military dissent in the years before the War, intensified when feelings of 'slavic solidarity' intersected with a general resentment of imperial policy and the perceived hegemony of the Empire's German speaking population.[1895] In the end, a compromise was finally reached, but not in Bohemia – but Moravia, in 1905, where the issues of language borders and mother tongues never really reached the heights that they did in Bohemia, partly due to the demographic spread of that province.[1896] This did not stop the compromise being attacked from Bohemia. As A.J.P. Taylor wrote: "The Czechs of Moravia were indeed attacked from Prague for deserting the unity of the historic 'lands of St Wenceslaus'; the Germans of Moravia were accused of neglecting their historic mission."[1897]

The Moravian Compromise of 1905 included partitioning of local school boards along national boundaries.[1898] It also regulated language use at administrative level, whereby councils could choose their official language of business, although, for example, submission in the other language (German or Czech) had to be accepted.[1899] With regards to schools, students were tested on language proficiency before admission, in a manner that would soon adopt the heavy-handedness that dominated the process in Bohemia. Their tests would often pit primary school children before committees of school board members, politicians and even gendarmes.[1900] To

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[1892] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, March 4 1910, FO 120/874:32.

[1893] Wank, The Nationality Question, *op.cit.*, p. 4 & Koralka, The Czech Question, *op.cit.*, p. 259.

[1894] Wank, *ibid.*, p. 4.

[1895] Stone, Army, *op.cit.*, p. 101, gave an example from 1908 when Habsburg foreign policy intensified feelings of 'slavic solidarity'. As he put it, "when Aehrenthal annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Czech crowd stoned his palace on the Wenceslas Square in Prague; thereafter, when reservists were sent to the Balkans for a possible war with Serbia, Czechs appeared for duty carrying black flags and shouting pro-Serbian slogans; some of the reservists refused to call *Hier* on parade, using instead the Czech *Zde*". Also see J.F.N. Bradley, "Czech Pan-Slavism before the First World War", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 40, No. 94 (Dec., 1961), pp. 184-205, for numerous examples of these dynamics. He makes an extremely important differentiation between the notion of 'slavic solidarity' – as used in this work – and Pan-Slavism as a movement, which he argues, despite its ideological attraction to almost all Czech national leaders (notably excepting Masaryk), "proved an empty word in Bohemia", *ibid*, p. 204.

[1896] Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 214.

[1897] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

[1898] King, *op.cit.*, p. 107.

[1899] *Ibid.*

[1900] Zahra, *op.cit.*, p. 511.

give an example of the intensity of these processes, in Brno in September 1913, 926 children were 'reclaimed'. [1901]

Negotiations on a Bohemian compromise would continue until the end. There was a close call in 1912, when a preliminary agreement based on "minimum securities" for the Bohemian Germans was scuttled by the Czechs at the last minute on the old question of language use in state institutions. [1902] As Ambassador Cartwright noted, "all the previous proposals as regards to the language had ben grounded on the principle that Prague, as the capital of the country, must be bi-lingual. The Czechs however now objected to this and also demanded that the postal service of Bohemia should be divided linguistically into two departments, a German and a Czech." [1903]

8.5.   Cross border periphery formation: the rise of Ukrainian/Ruthene nationalism

In addition to the Poles, Ruthenian/Ukrainian speakers straddled the imperial border: Unlike the Poles before, there had never been a 'true' Ukrainian nation, although there were Cossack antecedents. Their populations on both sides of the Habsburg/Russian border were almost entirely made up of peasants, and there their national awakening, at mid century, was originally consigned to a tiny intelligentsia class. Both populations were significant – the Great Russian Census of 1897 found that there were 22.4 million Ukrainians in the Empire, the second largest group in the realm. [1904] Their numbers were far lesser in the Habsburg Empire (3,997,831 in 1910), but they formed a large percentage of the Galicia province throughout the term of this work.

It is difficult to consign them an agreed title. Generally, historians use Ukrainian for the population in the Russian Empire, whereas historians of the Habsburg population tend to favour the Ruthene designation. It was not until the 1890s, for example, that the Ukrainian faction of the Galician Ruthenes started using the term "Ukrainian". [1905] To add to the confusion, the Russians would often call the Galician Ruthenes "Russian", as the Russophiles of the same province would sometimes call themselves. [1906] The Russians in the period of this study would *never* call the territory or population on either side of the imperial border Ukrainian, rather *Malorossiya* (Little Russia) and its derivatives, although occasionally "Ruthene" was used as well. The 'Little Russian' distinction found its way into western discourse (indeed, A.J.P. Taylor still

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[1901] *Ibid.* In addition, more than 60 cases regarding "contentious reclamations" of Moravian children were heard by the Imperial Supreme Administrative Court between 1906 and 1914.

[1902] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, February 28 1913, FO 120/906:34.

[1903] *Ibid.*

[1904] Kappeler, Ukrainians, op.cit., p. 106.

[1905] Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia Under Austrian Rule" in A.S. Markovits & F.E. Sysyn (eds.), *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism. Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, MA, 1982), p. 51.

[1906] TNA: Memorandum in Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 27 1910, FO 120/874:100, noted that "the Old Ruthenes are entirely Russian in sentiment and sympathies, and indeed actually call themselves 'Russians'".

called them "Little Russians" in the 1964 edition of *The Habsburg Monarchy*).[1907] Confusion was never far from the surface. For example, in 1912, the *Times* of London remained perplexed: "The Ruthenes are in reality Little Russians, and are designated in the Polish language as 'Russians,' though for Austrian political reasons they have always been called by the Latinized name 'Ruthene' […] Linguistically and ethnically they are identical, save for differences of dialect."[1908] To keep in line with the majority of the historiography, this work will use the "Ukraine" and its derivatives for the Russian Empire, and "Ruthene" and its derivatives for the populations in the Habsburg Empire.

8.5.1.   Ukrainians in the Russian Empire

The Russians had designs on the Ukrainian territories since the fourteenth century.[1909] Centred on both sides of the Dnieper River, the Cossack Hetmanate united with the Muscovites in 1654, seeking protection from both the Ottoman Turks and the Poles. Notably, the Cossacks were promised the same protections of existing feudal rights (by Tsar Alexis) that Peter I gave the Baltic Germans some fifty years later, but his envoys would not swear to that effect.[1910] Tsarist absolutism was a world away from what the Cossacks were used to, from the power that had influenced them most: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[1911] Indeed, from this time the Russians began to call the Cossacks '*cherkasy*' and their land as '*Ukrainia*', which means 'border' in Russian.[1912] It was the Cossack times, bridging the agreement with the Muscovy tsars, which would provide the 'golden era' for the Ukrainian national story, at least on this side of the imperial border.[1913] Indeed, it was under Peter I that their 'protected' rights would first be impinged upon, and although these would be reinstated, Catherine II would then end them for good.[1914] A small cultural nationalist movement began in the 1820s,[1915] which did not stop the removal of all vestiges of Ukrainian law and administration by the 1840s.[1916] They were slowly being absorbed into 'Greater Russia'.

By the mid-nineteenth century, almost all Ukrainians in the empire were still peasants of low formal education, at the mercy of both Russian and Polish landowners. Attempts to build on the nascent Phase A national activities, supported by the small remnants of the noble class, and to

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[1907] Taylor, *op.cit.*

[1908] *The Times*, June 18, 1912, in Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 19 1912, FO 120/895:90. Also see Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 162.

[1909] Lieven, Dilemmas, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

[1910] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.*, pp. 470-471.

[1911] Kohut, *op.cit.*, p. 70 – especially their "elected monarchy, autonomous nobility, and well developed corporate and regional rights".

[1912] Bushkovitch, *op.cit.*, p. 148.

[1913] Brunn, *op.cit.*, p. 333 and Kappeler, The Ukrainians, *op.cit.*, p. 112.

[1914] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.*, p. 477. Peter's move was in response to the Cossack Hetman, Ivan Mazepa, allying himself to Charles XII of Sweden.

[1915] Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernisation, *op.cit.*, p. 184. This movement would lead to the secret Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius (1846).

[1916] Lieven, Dilemmas, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

establish nationalist movements in the Ukrainian regions were tried in the 1840s revolutionary wave, and during emancipation, but never really took off. [1917] They tried to develop a continuity based on the memory of the Hetmanate.[1918] The University in Kiev, moved there from Vilnius in the 1830s, did not spur the growth of a Ukrainian intelligentsia class, primarily because most of the students at this time spoke Polish.[1919] In 1835, the *starshyna* – the caste of Ukrainian Cossack officers – was subsumed into the Russian nobility, removing a potential beacon for the Ukrainian 'nation', at least as active participants.[1920] However, there were seeds of a Ukrainian national periphery in 1840s Russia (the secret Society of St Cyril and St Methodus), with the impetus quite unsurprisingly coming from across the porous border in Galicia.

The relationship with the Poles did the Ukrainians no favours, and this was especially true during the Polish revolt of 1863. It would spread to territories populated with Ukrainian peasants (there were numerous calls for fraternal struggle from Polish nationalists)[1921] and the Russian authorities identified a "Ruthenian cause" amongst the uprising, although overall this was more anti-regime than 'pro-Ruthenian', as the Polish national leaders envisaged the return of the Ukrainian territories to Polish national sovereignty.[1922] One of the chief agitators was identified by the imperial authorises as a "Ruthene" amongst the key "secretaries and clerks" of the movement. [1923]

Although their involvement as an organised 'national' Ukrainian movement was ultimately limited, it was just enough to frighten the Imperial Government, who became concerned about them gaining access to education in their own language if legal constraints on them were removed.[1924] Pyotr Valuev, Minster of the Interior during the Alexandrian reforms, would outline the potential danger to the empire of an educated Ukrainian subject population:

> *Proponents of the Little Russian nationality have turned their attention to the uneducated mass, and under the pretence of disseminating literacy and enlightenment, those of them who are striving to realize their political designs have set about publishing elementary readers, primers, grammars, geography books, and so on.*[1925]

There grew a difference of ideology between the likes of D.A. Miliutin, who wanted punitive action taken against the Ukrainian population, and Valuev, who believed that assimilation would

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[1917] Kappeler, The Ukrainians, *op.cit.*, p. 112.

[1918] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 225.

[1919] Kappeler, The Ukrainians, *op.cit.*, p. 112.

[1920] Olga Andriewsky, "The Russian-Ukrainian Discourse and the Failure of the 'Little Russian Solution,' 1782-1917", in A. Kappeler, Z. E. Kohut, F. E. Sysyn & M. von Hagen (eds.), *Culture, nation, and identity. The Ukrainian–Russian Encounter, 1600-1945* (Edmonton, 2003), p. 201.

[1921] TNA: Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, 27 January 1863, FO 181/418:5. Stanton reported on one of many proclamations, from the "National Committee of Warsaw" which emphasized: "To Arms then ye Poles, ye Lithuanians, ye Ruthenians, the hour of our common deliverance has struck."

[1922] TNA: Official Journal. Stanton, Warsaw, 4 August 1864, FO 181/431.

[1923] *Ibid*. The rolls of convicted revolutionaries included "For the Ruthenian cause: Marjan Dobiecki, teacher of the third district school of Warsaw a noble from the Govt of Vilna aged 26."

[1924] David Saunders, "Russia and Ukraine under Alexander II: The Valuev Edict of 1863", *The International History Review*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), p. 27. Also see Miller & Dolbilov, *op.cit.*, p. 449.

[1925] Pyotr Valuev, quoted in Saunders, Valuev, *op.cit.,* p. 31.

help build loyalty to the dynasty.[1926] Valuev would prevail, and he would focus on subjugating the Ukrainian language in order to help with assimilation. A ban of new fiction and poetry published in the Ukrainian dialect came in 1863, taking the position that it was just a mild variation of Russian and that its speakers were actually Russian. He noted that: "There has never been, there is not, and there will never be such a thing as the Ukrainian language."[1927] How this was not 'punitive' is open to debate – it did, however, do untold harm to the growth of a viable Ukrainian national movement, indeed national 'elites', in the Russian Empire.[1928] Certainly punitive was the accompanying censorship of any terms that might invoke a "distinct political past", such as 'Ukraine' and 'Hetmanate'.[1929]

The Russians had nothing against the Ukrainians as a people per se, taking on a paternalistic attitude to their assimilation. However, further screws were being put on the Ukrainian language. Alexander II created a commission to investigate Ukrainian separatism in 1875, which led to the complete prohibition of printing publications in the Ukrainian language the following year. The same regulations prohibited the use of Ukrainian on stage or by teachers in the classroom. [1930] Every barrier to integration, forced or otherwise, was being removed, so that the "Little Russians", "Western Russians" or "Malorossians" – terms which sometimes included Belarusians and Lithuanians – could return to the Russian fold.[1931] At the same time, however, they expanded primary education in the Ukraine faster than in the rest of Russia, in order to stem any possible Polish influence.[1932] It was also genuinely thought that their populations would – after rudimentary education – recognise that they were Russian and gravitate towards their 'natural' kin. In addition, they believed that permitting the creation of a special literature for the common people in the Ukrainian dialect would signify Moscow was "collaborating in the alienation of Ukraine from the rest of Russia".[1933]

These regulations would encourage the traffic of nationalist materials and ideas from across the imperial border in Galicia, where freedom of expression was much more liberal. This was needed, as there was a definite lack of a common Ukrainian national continuity. Notably, both sides of the Ruthenian national debate in Galicia traversed the border, including Russophiles, making Ukrainian continuity of purpose and narrative as difficult to achieve in the Russian Empire as it already was in the Habsburg.[1934] After *Ausgleich*, Lviv would become an important city for the Ruthene/Ukrainian national movement on both sides of the imperial border, due in no small part to the stringent Russian restrictions on Ukrainian language, in

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[1926] Wortman, *op.cit.*, p. 275
[1927] Strakhovsky, *op.cit.*, p. 479.
[1928] Kappeler, The Ukrainians, *op.cit.*, p. 126.
[1929] Andriewsky, *op.cit.*, p. 211.
[1930] von Hagen, Federalisms, *op.cit.*, p. 503 and Kappeler, The Ukrainians, *op.cit.*, p. 113.
[1931] Kaspe, *op.cit.*, p. 470.
[1932] Saunders, Valuev, *op.cit.*, p. 35.
[1933] Lieven, Dilemmas, *op.cit.*, p. 185. This was from an 1867 governmetn memo, which continued: "to permit the separation [...] of thirteen million Little Russians would be the utmost political carelessness, especially in view of the unifying movement which is going on alongside us in the German tribe."
[1934] Berger & Miller, *op.cit.*, p. 325.

particular.[1935] The border was just too porous, especially after the linking of both sides with the completion of a railway crossing in 1871, to stop the transmission of ideas.[1936]

Any opportunities for national expression in the Russian Empire came under the umbrella of Pan-Slavism. For example, a meeting of the "Slav Antiquarians" in Kiev in 1874 – a movement suspicious of attempts from Russia to foment a political pan-Slavism under Russian hegemony[1937] – picked up on the schism in Ruthenian nationalism that was mostly taking place in Galicia, between the Ukrainophiles and Russophiles. British Consul in Warsaw, Mansfield, remarked on the very open declarations of the Ukrainians that could only occur in a Pan-Slavist forum: "The Ruthenians of Galicia and the Ruthenians or 'Russinians' of 'Little Russia' […] wished it to be clearly understood, that they disavowed all intimate connection with the so-called Russian or Muscovite civilization, propaganda etc., and that they would not admit any Muscovite pre-eminence over the Sclave *[sic]* races".[1938] What followed was a particularly racial, exceptionalist definition of the 'Little Russian': "They maintained, that they come of a more ancient stock, and are of a purer race; that they have a distinct dialect, which is the parent of all Sclave languages, a national literature etc."[1939] He continued: "The 'little Russians' are of a far finer type than the central Russians, and of a marked higher intelligence, but how far a collection of simple native aims, in respect of music, and an unusually rich number of ballads, fables, and legends give them the claim to a distinct literature is of course open to discussion."[1940]

The Russians' treatment of the University of Kiev historian Mykhaylo Drahomanov illustrated how threatened they were about the uncovering of alternate histories. As Mark von Hagen would outline, Drahomanov, having already aroused the suspicion of the authorities through his treatment of a 'reader', would become a collector of Ukrainian folklore, which escaped the clutches of Valuev's 1863 edict. On a research trip to Europe between 1870-1873, he "began writing critical articles for liberal journals about Russian policy toward non-Russian peoples. After more accusations of separatism (such as calls for federalism and political and cultural decentralisation), he travelled to Galicia, which led to his dismissal from the university".[1941] In effect, his exile freed him to help develop Ukrainian nationalism from the other side of the easily broachable border – out of Russia's clutches.

Ironically, Drahomanov never advocated the separation of the Ukraine from the empire; indeed, he was ever careful to emphasise the role of the tsar at the pinnacle in a constitutional,

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[1935] Kappeler, The Ukrainians, *op.cit.*, pp. 120-121.

[1936] Patricia Herlihy, "Ukrainian Cities in the Nineteenth Century", in I. L. Rudnytsky (ed.), *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 144-145.

[1937] Mackenzie, Russia's Balkan Policies, *op.cit.,* p. 228. An example of such Russian exceptionalism and expected hegemony amongst Slavs came from the diplomat Ignatyev, who reflected that: "All my activities in Turkey among the Slavs, 1861-1877, were inspired by […] the view that Russia alone could rule the Balkan peninsula and the Black Sea so that Austria-Hungary's expansion would be halted and the Balkan peoples, especially the Slavs, would direct their gaze exclusively to Russia and make their future dependent upon her."

[1938] TNA: Mansfield to Stanley, Warsaw, September 10 1874, FO 181/521:21.

[1939] *Ibid.*

[1940] *Ibid.*

[1941] Von Hagen, Federalisms, *op.cit.,* p. 503

federalised empire.[1942] In this respect, he was in tune with co-nationals in the Habsburg Empire, in that he was trying to improve the Ukrainian position within *both* Imperial Power Structures.[1943] A generation later came the Chair of Ruthene history at Lviv from 1894, the Russian born exile Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Author of the ten volume *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, his bitter anti-Russian attacks were influential on both sides of the border, even more so after 1905.[1944] That he would even be to hold such a chair and have such influence speaks volumes of the difference on both sides of the border for the Ukrainian periphery.

Since the 1830s, St. Petersburg had been encouraging Russian immigration to Kiev – including workers, students and artisans, which in turn stimulated industrial growth, leaving the town with a mixed ethnic composition, so much so that it was difficult for the Ukrainian intelligentsia to gain traction there (unlike for example, Latvians in Riga). For example, by 1874, nearly 40 per cent of Kiev's population declared themselves native Russian speakers, 8 per cent more than declared speakers of Ukrainian.[1945] Indeed, by 1897, Ukrainian speakers would make up only around one third of inhabitants in all cities in the region. Kiev had become a mostly Russian enclave.[1946] This can be partly attributed to voluntary assimilation of urban Ukrainians. Many of the socially mobile Ukrainian speakers assimilated, with the working and peasant classes unresponsive and the small body of Ukrainian intelligentsia resisting.[1947] This dynamic was very similar to what happened in Transleithania – middle/professional classes assimilating, intellectuals resisting, and peasantry mostly indifferent. There was a difference with artisans and the merchant classes, which in the Ukraine were the province of the Jews. This Ukrainian movement was never very large, and as Kappeler pointed out, the first true national party for Ukrainians was only founded in 1900 – the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party – inspired by the convergence of nationalism and industrialisation.[1948] Hence, the Russian Ukrainian intelligentsia turned to the countryside, and the Ukrainian nationalist movement would first become a peasant / intelligentsia alliance, with the working classes much later to join.[1949] They would try to circumvent the regulations by focussing on plays about the Cossacks – performed in Russian. The 1880s and 90s saw more than thirty theatre companies founded for this specific purpose.[1950]

When the Great Russian Census finally occurred in 1897, the Ukrainians were in a bind – yes, there was a category for them, *Malorossy*, but it denoted a junior relationship to Greater

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[1942] *Ibid.*, p. 504.
[1943] *Ibid.* As von Hagen stated, Drahomanov "saw himself as part of a movement to reclaim the legacy of Pan-Slavism from the tsars and insisted that the idea was born among the nationalities who had lost their status as sovereign states; he traced the connections of Ukrainians with their counterparts in the Serbian, Polish, Czech, and other branches of Pan-Slavism".
[1944] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 492.
[1945] Herlihy, *op.cit.*, pp. 137-140 (figures on p. 138).
[1946] *Ibid.*, pp. 135 & 140.
[1947] Kappeler, The Ukrainians, *op.cit.*, p. 125.
[1948] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.*, p. 226.
[1949] Hroch, Social and Territorial, *op.cit.*, p. 263 & 268.
[1950] Rerup, *op.cit.*, p. 316.

Russians, making them vulnerable from incorporation from above, which is exactly what happened after the census results were collated. As Dominic Lieven has pointed out,

If the three East Slav peoples could be developed into a single modern nation, that core nation would constitute over two-thirds of the imperial population. If one disregarded the inorodtsy as aliens, believed that the smaller Christian peoples preferred Russian rule to that of the Ottomans and Germans, and reflected on the extremely high Slav birth rate, this two-thirds East Slav empire began to look like a nation state.[1951]

The first step in this process was appropriating the people the Russians felt were closest to their 'nation', who coincidentally were by far the second largest linguistic group in the Empire.[1952] The Census would also show little movement in socio-economic status: over 90% of Ukrainians were still peasants, of which 87 per cent were illiterate. Indeed, of all Ukrainian speakers over 10 years old, 76 per cent were illiterate.[1953] This fit the stereotype in Russia that the Ukrainians were "harmless peasants".[1954] As with the Czechs in Bohemia, Ukrainian nationalists would try to 'correct' census results or publicise 'mitigating' evidence, although on a much smaller scale. For example, the monthly *Kievskaia starina* would argue that many Ukrainian speakers would have answered Russian out of habit, thinking it referred to the moniker Russians had given them, "Little Russian". They claimed such a 'Russian' response would be counted by the census-taker as "Great Russian".[1955]

By 1905, there were three organised Ukrainian parties. Two of them, the Radical-Democratic Party and the People's Party, met in June 1905 and demanded an autonomous legislative assembly based at Kiev that would be responsible for Ukrainian matters.[1956] After the revolution, in which Abraham Ascher noted the Ukrainian "nationalist movements were relatively docile",[1957] there were some small gains – the language prohibitions in place for over forty years were dissolved, and Ukrainians were elected in good numbers to the First and Second Dumas (63 and 46 respectively).[1958] The Duma delegates would ally with the natural party of the nationalities, the Kadets.[1959] As with other parts of the Empire, reaction returned under the Stolypin administration, and most Ukrainian national publications and organisations were banned, including in 1910 *Prosvita*, which was based on the flourishing Galician organisation of the same name.[1960] By 1913, the remaining nineteen Ukrainian language periodicals only had a

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[1951] Lieven, Dilemmas, *op.cit.*, p. 185.
[1952] There were 22,415.000 Ukrainian speakers, over fourteen million more than the next largest group – Polish speakers. Strakhovsky, *op.cit.*, p. 470.
[1953] Kappeler, The Ukrainians, *op.cit.*, p. 109.
[1954] *khokhly* in Russian. Kappeler, Mazepintsy, *op.cit.*, p. 173.
[1955] Cadiot, Searching for Nationality, *op.cit.*, p. 449.
[1956] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 608. The third party was the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party.
[1957] Ascher, *op.cit.*, p. 160.
[1958] Kappeler, The Ukrainians, *op.cit.*, p. 113.
[1959] Kappeler, National Organisations, *op.cit.*, p. 305.
[1960] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.*, p. 346 & Kappeler, The Ukrainians, *op.cit.*, p. 113. Seton-Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 608 wrote that *Prosvita* was set up in 1905, based on Galician organisation. "It published books and periodicals in Ukrainian, founded libraries, bookshops, and public reading-rooms and offered prizes and scholarships for students as well as for adult writers and scientists."

combined circulation in the low thousands.[1961] It was still a small movement, although growing – a peasant movement driven by the intelligentsia, with the working classes beginning to identify with the Ukrainian 'nation'.[1962] However, Franz Josef's Galician Vice-Consul was spot-on when he called the decree of 1905 that furnished those initial gains "a dead letter."[1963]

8.5.2. Ruthenes in the Habsburg Empire

The Ruthenes, although having a well-established peasant vernacular, didn't have the long-standing historical continuity of some other non-German nationalities in the Habsburg Empire. In true nineteenth century fashion, they would strive to uncover one. They had a head start, thanks to the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. In the 1770s, the Austrian authorities distinguished Galician Ruthenes from Russians, and helped kick-start their cultural awakening by introducing the Ukrainian vernacular into all regional elementary schools in 1877.[1964] In addition, they established the Uniate "Barbreum" seminary in Vienna in 1775 (many Austrian Ruthenes were Greek Catholic) and "Studium Ruthenium" at Lviv University in 1787, the first modern schools specifically for higher learning for Ruthenes.[1965] Even though these were dissolved in the early nineteenth century,[1966] it is no wonder that the Galician Poles would often remark in the following one hundred and twenty five years that the Habsburgs "invented" the Ukrainians.[1967] In return, the Ruthenes became known for their loyalty to the dynasty – the 'Tyrolians of the East'.[1968]

The first Ruthene texts of a nationalist nature arrived in the 1830s, only to hit a dead end in the latter *Vormärz* era. The new 'perennial' texts that emerged during the troubles of 1848 – sweeping up the very few educated Ruthenes in the revolutionary tide – bore no resemblance to their 1830s antecedents,[1969] evoking as Andrej Zayaremuk called "long gone princely times," of which the Ruthenes were "its scattered remnants".[1970] Their lack of a nobility class, and a weak bourgeoisie, meant the early Ruthene nationalist movement needed considerable guidance from primary schoolteachers and the church, just as it had in Russian Ukraine.[1971] 1848 saw the first flowering of organised Ruthene nationalism, highly impressive considering its short gestation period. Ironically, Polish "political-nationalist romanticism" influenced this initial spurt; indeed,

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[1961] Kappeler, The Ukrainians, *op.cit.,* p. 123. In Habsburg Galicia, there were 66 Ukrainian periodicals published in the same year.
[1962] Rerup, *op.cit.,* p. 322 & Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* pp. 667-668.
[1963] TNA: Memorandum in Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 27 1910, FO 120/874:100.
[1964] Magocsi, Subordinate, *op.cit.,* p. 98.
[1965] *Ibid.*
[1966] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 392.
[1967] Magocsi, Subordinate, *op.cit.,* p. 99
[1968] Mason, *op.cit.,* p. 15.
[1969] Zayarnyuk, Obtaining History, *op.cit.,* pp. 123-125. The vast majority of Ruthenes in the Habsburg Empire were former Robot peasants.
[1970] *Ibid.,* p. 124.
[1971] Hanak, *op.cit.,* p. 37.

before 1848 Poles actively helped get the movement started.[1972] This year saw the formation of the Supreme Ruthenian Council, the newspaper *Zoria halytska*, the cultural societies *Galician Rus' Matytsia* and National Home, the Ruthenian National Guard and the Sharpshooters Battalion – all first for the Ruthenian people.[1973] They were organised enough to send a national petition to Vienna.[1974] Common with much of the Empire, Ruthene nationalism stagnated during the neo-Absolutist era, although they would have arguably been satisfied that the Galician Poles had lost their political hegemony in the region with the suspension of the Lviv (Lemberg) Diet.

In the period between 1848 and *Ausgleich*, the economic balance of Galicia province changed little, and the resultant stagnancy of the Ruthene population hindered further national awakening. This would change after the Galician compromise, which formalised the traditional Polish hegemony over the Ruthenes at a time when organised Ruthene parties would have access to a platform in the *Reichsrat* for the first time. They would further benefit from the change to direct *Reichsrat* elections in 1873. Having increased their representation from two to nine members,[1975] they began to use the pulpit effectively:

> *In the House of Deputies a Ruthenian member complained bitterly that 2 million and a half of Ruthenians in Galicia are oppressed and are deprived of their rights with respect to the education of their children the exercise of their religion and administrative questions generally, and he appealed to the Reichsrath for protection of their language and their literature.*[1976]

The dynasty had correctly calculated that in the post-*Ausgleich* world, they needed the Polish votes in the *Reichsrat* considerably more than the support of mostly-disenfranchised Ruthenes. Another cross-border characteristic was the split between the 'Russophile' branch, who favoured a reintegration into greater Russia, and the 'Ukrainophile' working toward a united Ukrainian 'nation' free from Russian control. This schism came complete with competing social organisations, the *Kachkovskii* Society (Russophile) and *Prosvita* (Ukrainian). This rendered redundant the national stories written for 1848, the second such change in the brief history of the national story.[1977] The Russophile bent was given a shot in the arm by *Ausgleich*, in turn inspiring the Ukrainian side to counter them.[1978] Over time, the Ukrainophiles – politically manifest as the Young Ruthenes – would wear down Russophile support. By 1890, the Young Ruthenes were by far the dominant sect, although there was always a residue of Russophile support.[1979]

Another reason for the rise in Ukrainophile support was their appeal to the slowly growing numbers of younger literate Ruthenes, who benefited from Cisleithanian education

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[1972] Wereszycki, *op.cit.,* p. 307.
[1973] Magocsi, Subordinate, *op.cit.,* pp. 98-99.
[1974] Rudnytsky, *op.cit.,* p. 30. Sent on April 19, 1848. Included in its demands were equality with the Poles in the province, and a recognition of their unique nationality.
[1975] TNA: Buchanan to Granville, Vienna, October 23 1873, FO 120/502:289.
[1976] TNA: Buchanan to Granville, Vienna, November 28 1873, FO 120/502:326.
[1977] Zayarnyuk, Obtaining History, *op.cit.,* p. 128.
[1978] Rudnytsky, *op.cit.,* p. 45. For a brief background of both sides, see Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Language Question as a Factor in the National Movement in Eastern Galicia" in A.S. Markovits & F.E. Sysyn (eds.), *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism. Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, MA, 1982), pp. 221-222.
[1979] Rudnytsky, *op.cit.,* p. 48.

policies. Due to the freedoms enshrined in the Austrian Constitution of 1867, they were also allowed to meet and to publish in their own language. Although far smaller in number than the Russian Ukrainians, the Ruthene national movement developed with much greater freedom in Galicia and Bukovina.[1980] In 1872, a Ruthenian history book for fourth grade students appeared,[1981] and Ruthene instruction (including history) was available at the Polish University of Lviv.[1982] That town would become the operational heart of the Ukrainian 'nation' for Ukrainophiles on both sides of the border.

The contrast with Kiev is stark: both towns in the mid-nineteenth century had barely evolved. Lviv, for example, had only *nine* industrial concerns.[1983] Both towns would industrialise, although Kiev would far outpace Lviv. This brought demographic changes due to industrial migration: the Ukrainian population in Kiev (1897) was 22 per cent, whereas the Ukrainian population of Lviv was around 18 per cent in 1900,[1984] many of them Polish speakers.[1985] However, due to the aforementioned freedoms, it was Lviv that provided the opportunities for national advancement, although to corral a mass of followers, nationalists would have to look further afield, to the countryside.[1986] 'National' commercial enterprises began to spring up in the 1880s.[1987] Publications in the Ukrainian language soared, from 15 in 1875 (none daily) to some 41 in 1900, including two dailies,[1988] and memberships of *Prosvita* also soared, driven by peasants. For example, in 1874 there were two village reading clubs affiliated with *Prosvita*, by 1908 that number had grown to 2,048.[1989]

This emboldened the Ruthene population with regards to Polish hegemony at a local level – there are examples of Ruthenes fighting for German instruction in schools instead of Polish, where there was no Ruthenian option, as for example in the trade outpost of Brody in Bukovina. Borries Kumanzy quoted an activist in Brody, who argued that: "we Ruthenians have to protest strongly against the transformation of the gymnasium into a Polish one. If already our brethren are forced to study in a foreign language, then they should do so at least in a language of

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[1980] Kuzmany, *op.cit.,* p. 70.

[1981] Zayarnyuk, Obtaining, *op.cit.,* p. 132.

[1982] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 439.

[1983] Herlihy, *op.cit.,* p. 143. Making matches, textiles and beer.

[1984] *Ibid.,* p. 144 & Kappeler, The Ukrainians, *op.cit.,* pp. 120-121

[1985] John Paul Himka, "Voluntary Artisan Associations and the Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia (the 1870s)", in A.S. Markovits & F. E. Sysyn (eds.), *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism. Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, MA, 1982), p. 187. He gives the example of the Lviv's 'industrial' (artisanal) population, of which only around 5% declared their language as Ukrainian.

[1986] *Ibid.* p. 194.

[1987] Herlihy, *op.cit.,* p. 144. For example, Lviv was headquarters of a Ukrainian retail co-operative, a federation of credit unions, and the *Dnister Mutual Fire Insurance Company.*

[1988] John Paul Himka, "Young Radicals and Independent Statehood: The Idea of a Ukrainian Nation-State, 1890-1895", *Slavic Review,* Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer, 1982), p. 234.

[1989] *Ibid.* Also see Rudnytsky, *op.cit.,* p. 54. That number would continue to grow, up to 77 branches and almost 3,000 local reading halls by 1914.

culture."[1990] At times, however, there would be reconciliations in the pursuit of common goals, just as would happen periodically in Bohemia with the local Czech and German populations. The 1870s saw the beginnings of cooperation between left wing Poles and Ukrainians, opposed to the Polish conservative hegemony.[1991] A leading Ukrainian liberal was Ivan Franco, who noted in 1883: "We wish the Poles complete national and political liberty. But there is one necessary condition: they must, once and for all, desist from lording it over us: they must once and for all, give up any thought of building a 'historical' Poland in non-Polish lands, and they must accept, as we do, the idea of a purely ethnic Poland."[1992]

Overall, the Polish dominance in Galicia led the Ruthenes to turn to Vienna, a tactic in which they became quite proficient. British Embassy Secretary Phipps noted in 1887 that the Ruthenes, "whose share of political power is far from corresponding to their numerical strength complain bitterly of persistent attempts on the part of the Poles to deprive them likewise of their religious rights and privileges and they have on more than one occasion appealed to the Emperor for protection".[1993] They even managed to foster an agreement in 1892 between the government in Vienna, who were on the lookout for national compromise, and the Galician Diet, to ensure phonetic orthography for the Ruthenian language taught in Galician schools. This was a battle in both the so-called "phonetic war" – between Latin and Cyrillic letters – and the language war to 'decide' the national Ukrainian language – between spoken Galician Ukrainian (favoured by the Young Ruthenes) and Russian (favoured by the Old Ruthenes, who had previously favoured Old Church Slavonic).[1994]

For this 1892 agreement, they vowed to support government legislation in both the Diet and the *Reichsrat*. Although this deal collapsed in a hurry, it helped push the Ukrainian branch further away from the Russophiles, who had protested its introduction with great effect, and impressive organisation, considering their overall lot in the province.[1995] The Ukrainophiles were already gaining ascendency in Cisleithania after the introduction of a codified Ukrainian-German dictionary, published from 1882-1886.[1996] The Young Ruthenes then turned to Lviv, and the next year would have success with the Galician provincial school board. Ironically a Polish dominated body made the final decision on the common national language of the Ruthenes: vernacular Galician Ukrainian won;[1997] and as the Ukrainian dialect was suppressed in the Russian Empire, and national ideas had to be imported from Galicia, this decision would settle the discussion for Russian Ukrainians as well.

[1990] quoted in Kuzmany, *op.cit.*, p. 82. He continued: "Furthermore this school should employ teachers with complete command of the German language and free of any chauvinism, in order to prevent the school from becoming a political institution."

[1991] Rudnytsky, *op.cit.*, p. 41.

[1992] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[1993] TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, Jul 11 1887, FO 120/653:257.

[1994] Magocsi, Language, *op.cit.*, p. 231-235 & 238.

[1995] Zayarnyuk, Andriy, "Mapping Identities: The Popular Base of Galician Russophilism in the 1890s", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 41 (2010), pp. 121-122.

[1996] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[1997] Magocsi, Subordinate, *op.cit.*, p. 99.

Still dissatisfied with the Polish conservatives, sparked by electoral irregularities in the 1895 elections, the Ruthenes famously took their grievances to the Emperor in Vienna. The delegation made a huge impression, all two hundred and twenty of them: a mix of peasants, clergy, small business owners and a few Diet deputies. Franz Josef refused to see them until they selected a quorum to see him – eventually the delegation whittled itself down to six members. The British Embassy described the meeting where a Ruthene memorandum was presented:

> *The Emperor was curt in his answer. H.M. said that the allegations would be examined, and if verified justice would be done: that he accepted with pleasure their protestations of loyalty: that he knows that he could count upon the devotion of the Ruthenians: that the deputation might be well assured that the Ruthenian nation was as near to his heart as any of his subjects.*[1998]

He would then list out his displeasures, some general and some specific, including that they had expended so much money bringing so many people there. He dismissed them with "Adieu, Gentlemen."[1999] That such a delegation could be received highlights the considerably different attitude to 'second-level' national groups under their auspices. The tsars would never receive a Ukrainian national delegation, nor admit that such people were a 'nation'; indeed the same could be said for Belarusians and Lithuanians. However, the Romanians from Transylvania would try the same tactic with far less success, as we will see.

By the twentieth century, the Young Ruthenes completely dominated the "Ruthenian Club", except for in a few regions, spouting a pro-federalist programme uncannily similar to that of the Young Czechs (so much so that they were accused of plagiarism by the Old Ruthenes).[2000] They had made themselves felt too: Professor Zaloziecki, British Vice Consul, would describe the Young Ruthenes "as obnoxious to the Russians as they are to the Poles".[2001] There was also a small undercurrent of independence ideology that began around 1890; coming from the same ideological space as the Polish Socialist Party, it would never amount to much.[2002] Most leftist radicals wavered on pushing for complete independence, as there would be no guarantee that Ukrainian peasants in an independent Ukrainian state wouldn't be exploited.[2003] The 1891 platform of the Radical Party at once committed to striving for political independence whilst at the same time guaranteeing the integrity of the Habsburg Empire.[2004]

The Young Ruthenes would go on to win a far greater number of seats at the 1907 Reichsrat, the first election with universal suffrage, and were a party to the Galicia compromise between them and the Poles (agreed for 1914) that was never enacted due to the First World

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[1998] TNA: Dispatch to Salisbury, Vienna, December 17 1895, FO 120/717:373.

[1999] *Ibid.*

[2000] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 445.

[2001] TNA: Memorandum in Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 27 1910, FO 120/874:100.

[2002] Himka, Young Radicals, *op.cit.*, p. 219. Iulian Bachyns'kyi was the first to outline an independent Ukraine in 1895 in *Ukraina irredenta*, although there were discussions about it in nationalist circles for several years previously.

[2003] *Ibid.*, p. 228. Leading radicals Ivan Franco and Mykhailo Pavlyk – inspired by and in league with Drahomanov – would argue this.

[2004] *Ibid.*, p. 222. Indeed, they deftly managed to call for the "political independence of the Ruthenian nation, for its organization in the form of a state in the modern sense […] without infringing on the integrity of Austria".

War.[2005] Overshadowing their efforts, to a degree, was a spike in violence. For example, when Governor Potocki was murdered by a Ruthene in 1908, it was reported that "the Young Ruthenians or Ukraines – the extremists of the party – openly rejoice at the fate of the Governor and have lit bonfires and given other public evidences of their approval of the murder".[2006] Indeed, although "the President of the Ruthenian Club, Herr Romanczuk, in the name of his party condemned the murder in the most emphatic manner", he still used the opportunity to push the Ruthene agenda through a telegraph to the *Neue Freie Presse*:

> *The cause of the attack on the Governor is to be found in the present political system in Galicia, the long confirmed oppression and the unendurable tyranny of the government. The Ruthenian members of Parliament have often drawn attention to the dangerous popular excitement but no attention was paid to their warnings.* [2007]

In 1910, Zaloziecki described well the Young Ruthene objectives, that they: "endeavour to throw off the oppressive yoke of the Poles and to form an independent Ruthenian community whose rights within the Austrian Empire shall receive juster recognition that is now the case under the present Polish rule in Galicia".[2008] He went on to describe them as a "vigorous and progressive party, increasing in number," who had become "a constant source of trouble to the Polish Provincial Government, which views their advance with apprehension".[2009] He then turned to how the Old Ruthenes were much favoured by the Polish authorities, who were willing to lean toward their old Russian foe in order to drive 'divide-and-rule' politics in their province. He continued:

> *The Russian movement subsists on appeals on radical, sentimental and religious grounds to the Ruthenes, who are represented as being separated from their true countrymen the Russians. The Ruthenes must, however, be singularly blind to what goes on beyond the frontier if they listen to these representations. Their compatriots in Russia are even more oppressed by the Russians than are the Ruthenians in Galicia by the Poles.*[2010]

Professor Zaloziecki would conclude that the "whole Russophil movement in Galicia is largely artificial, and would entirely drop if not kept up by Russian money,"[2011] adding an ironic twist to the common Polish belief that the Habsburgs invented the Ruthenes.

As the pre-War period drew to a close, the Ruthenes in Vienna grew in confidence even more, and the results were commensurate. When trying to pass a Canal Bill in 1912, which would have provided strong economic benefit to the Poles in Galicia, the Minister-President had to offer consideration for a Ruthene university in order for the Ruthenes to drop their objections

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[2005] For compromise details, see Rudnytsky, *op.cit.,* pp. 64-65. Young Ruthene to Old Ruthene *Reichsrat* representation was more than 4 to 1 in 1907 and more than 10 to 1 in 1911, Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 445.

[2006] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, April 15 1908, 120/851:62.

[2007] *Ibid.*

[2008] TNA: In Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 27 1910, FO 120/874:100.

[2009] *Ibid.*

[2010] *Ibid.*

[2011] *Ibid.*

to the Committee stage.[2012] Debates for the Military Service Bill in the same year saw a Ruthene deputy deliver a filibuster for over thirteen hours – a record as the longest speech in the history of the *Reichsrat*, which in itself was quite an achievement. Just to make a point, immediately after the speech, the Ruthene delegates withdrew their objection and the bill passed.[2013] Young Czech mentoring was being used to great effect. As Ambassador Cartwright took up the story, after a rare note of pleasure from Franz Josef to the Ruthene deputies became public:[2014]

> *The Ruthenian party […] in a state of the highest gratification at the Imperial message, which they look upon as a recognition of their racial claims, have at once decided to abandon all obstruction to the Army Bill in the plenary sittings in Parliament, and to vote for its second and third readings. One object has thus at any rate been obtained by the sensational publication of the Emperor's views […] It is, however, thought that the Government have taken this step for another reason as well – namely, to apply pressure upon the Poles to show a more conciliatory attitude on the question of the Ruthenian University.*[2015]

The Government had an ulterior motive for pushing the university: they saw that annoying the Poles in this instance was a worthy price for helping build buffers against any possible growth of Russophilism in the province.[2016]

They had little to worry about, if domestic considerations were taken into account. Of course, being Galicia, with the imperial border with the Russian Empire, in the dangerous times after 1910, this became an international consideration. The Old Ruthenes had all but died out by this time; in the previous *Reichsrat* election, there were 24 Young to only 2 Old Ruthenes elected.[2017] There had been unsuccessful Russian efforts to convert Galician Ruthenes to Orthodoxy, which was a step too far even for the Poles, enabling them to forget their own differences in their common hatred of Russia.[2018] By 1913, the Galician Poles were just becoming even more wary of the Russians. As for the Galician Ruthenes, in the face of the Russians they were demonstrating just why they were regarded as the 'Tyroleans of the East', forming

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[2012] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, March 29 1912, FO 120/895:38. He quite tellingly continued: "The unfortunate Count Stuergkh was indeed not in a position to refuse their requests: for any failure to pass the Canals Bill through its first reading would cost him the support of the Poles." With respect to the University, Cartwright wrote that they demanded it be located at Krakow, almost certainly mistaking this for Lviv (Lemberg) – in all other sighted correspondence he had declared that Lemberg was the location preferred by the Ruthenes.

[2013] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 19 1912, FO 120/895:90.

[2014] TNA: *The Times*, June 18, 1912, in Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 19 1912, FO 120/895: 90 It reported that the Emperor had "noticed with especial satisfaction that the Ukraine (or Ruthene groups) has fallen into line at the right moment, and has decided in favour of a special tactical attitude corresponding to the gravity of the question at issue".

[2015] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 19 1912, FO 120/895: 90.

[2016] *Ibid.* He reported that: "The new University will form a centre of Ruthenian culture and activity which will, it is thought, prevent the Ruthenes of Galicia from glancing across the frontier to their co-nationals the Little Russians." It should be noted that there was already considerable Ruthene activity at the University at Lemberg, including 10 Ukrainian Language chairs by 1914. Rudnytsky, *op.cit.,* p. 62.

[2017] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, June 19 1912, FO 120/895:90.

[2018] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, February 28 1913, FO 120/906:34.

gymnastic societies to prepare Ruthene men as an armed force to defend their land and empire. These societies would eventually number around 120,000 men.[2019]

The time for the Galician compromise to take effect was closing in. The compromise would have guaranteed 27.2 per cent of the seats in the Lviv Diet to Ruthenes, and would set the stage for the construction of a Ruthene university.[2020] There had already been a successful compromise in Bukovina in 1910,[2021] which would have given the Ruthenes a level of authority just short of that of the Poles in Galicia, showing that they had quite successfully managed to increase their share of the imperial power structure without ever really agitating for complete independence. Although, as with the Moravian compromise, the more balanced national profile of Bukovina made reaching compromise easier.[2022]

8.6. Consigned to the bottom of the food chain: Lithuanians in the Russian Empire and the Romanians in Transleithania

By mid-nineteenth century, the Lithuanians in the Russian Empire and the Romanians in the Habsburg Empire, two peoples with substantial cultural and political histories, but rarely in complete control of their own destiny, found themselves in a similarly peculiar position within their respective Imperial Power Structures. The Romanians in Transylvania (whose numbers dwarfed those in Bukovina) were dominated on two levels: overall by the 'pseudo-core' – the Hungarians – and regionally by a third people – Saxon Germans. Their nobility and bourgeoisie classes were small. The Lithuanians in the western borderlands were also dominated on two levels: overall by the 'core' – the Russians – and regionally by the Polish nobility. Their nobility and bourgeoisie were also small. The Romanians (and Saxon Germans) would end up feeling the full brunt of Magyarisation in Transylvania, as the Lithuanians (and Poles) would with regards to Russification in their territory. Even though they both had strong, contiguous cultural histories, their further development was blocked. Amongst the educated classes, their national movements weren't starting from low 'bases', such as the Ruthenes and Slovenes. However, they were mostly unable to access the opportunities that allowed those peoples to flourish from the second half of the nineteenth century. In addition, Romanians were predominantly Orthodox in a Catholic Transleithanian state apparatus, whereas Lithuanians were predominantly Catholic in a hyper-Orthodox Russian Imperial Power Structure.

There were differences in their historical record. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was a junior partner in an entity that in some ways resembled the dualist structure of the post-*Ausgleich* Habsburg Empire – the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, from the mid-sixteenth century to the late eighteenth. Its partner had by far the larger economy, there were three-to-four times as

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[2019] *Ibid.*
[2020] Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.,* pp. 224-225.
[2021] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 442. The compromise was agreed to by the four main national groups in the province – Romanian, Ruthene, German and Jewish.
[2022] Sugar, *op.cit.,* p. 18.

many Poles as Lithuanians, and whilst the Polish language was official, Lithuanian was most definitely not. The Grand Duchy retained a government, army and financial system, although it must be emphasised that these institutions were of their time. Even within the Grand Duchy itself, Polish superseded the elite's use of the Lithuanian language in the last one hundred years of the Commonwealth. With regards to the Romanians in Transylvania, there too was a semi-independent state there, the Principality of Transylvania (1570-1711). This principality was under the joint suzerainty of Hungary and the Ottomans. Here, Romanian people and the Romanian language represented the lowest strata of the population.

There was of course one major difference – across the Danube, after 1878, sat an independent Kingdom of Romania. Although sharing an overall language, there were enormous cross-border differences. The people to the south were Wallachian Romanians, who spoke a different dialect, and although under differing degrees of Ottoman control for centuries, had maintained a strong feudal organisation, including a Ban, and a court in Bucharest. They had witnessed periodic incursions from the Habsburgs and Russians from the eighteenth century, and formed a political unit with Moldavians called the Danubian Principalities from 1774, under mild oversight from Constantinople. The aforementioned Principality of Transylvania had far less autonomy, and the relevant developed political classes were mostly absent, amongst the Romanian populations at least.

8.6.1.   Lithuanians in the Russian Empire

Since the 1830 Polish Revolution, the Lithuanian situation had been intrinsically tied to the 'Polish question' and by association the role of the Catholic Church in society. This was no surprise – since the sixteenth century the Lithuanian nobility began to identify with the Polish "national consciousness", even more so after their lands were absorbed into the Russian Empire in 1815.[2023] Indeed, it can be argued that there would not have been a Lithuanian 'situation' without the Poles. After 1830, preliminary administrative Russification began in the Lithuanian provinces. Similar to what happened with Ukrainian administration and laws, codified Lithuanian laws dating back to 1529 – the Statues of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – were replaced by Russian law in 1840.[2024] Ironically, this was after the University in Vilnius was relocated to Kiev in 1834. In addition, the government stopped using the name 'Lithuania' as an official designation.[2025]

It is important to note that, due to their complicated history, Lithuania did not necessarily mean ethnic Lithuanians, or even Lithuanian speakers. One can find numerous examples of 'Lithuania' in reference to the general region of the old Grand Duchy, and 'Lithuanian' for its inhabitants. For example, there were considerable disturbances in support of the Polish

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[2023] Hroch, Social Preconditions, *op.cit.,* p. 86.
[2024] Kasekamp, *op.cit..,* p. 73.
[2025] *Ibid.*

movement in Lithuania in 1861, which caused the imperial government to enact martial law in Vilnius, Kiev and Minsk.[2026] The Lithuanian speaking population of Vilnius, the current capital of the Republic of Lithuania, was almost non-existent, in part because the majority of Lithuanians were rural peasants. The population was primarily Polish or Jewish.

As with the Ukrainians, Lithuanians were subject to numerous calls to revolt from Polish nationalists in 1863, and many would participate.[2027] The backlash that followed turned out to be harsher for many Lithuanians than Poles, for three reasons. First, large populations of Lithuanian speakers were in the Russian Kovno and Vilna provinces (as opposed to the Lithuanian speakers in what would become the Suwałki governate, which was in Poland), therefore under direct imperial rule. Two, the Russians were disappointed by a perceived slight by the Lithuanians – the Russians had since the 1830 Polish rebellion been quietly supportive of Lithuanian nationalism in the hope of fighting Polish influence in the area. Finally, they were concerned that many Polish nationalists still claimed the territory as Polish, as manifested with frequency during the revolt.[2028] In Vilna governate alone, hundreds of Lithuanian rebels were executed and thousands more sent to Siberia.[2029] 1863 was a tipping point for Lithuanian nationalism, which would thereafter develop to resist "Polonization" as well as Russification.[2030]

Lithuanians were recognised by many Russian theorists as a 'branch' of the Russian people, and this has been shown to be behind the Russian moves to ban the use of the Lithuanian language in Latin letters in the middle of the nineteenth century (it was still allowed, indeed encouraged, in Cyrillic).[2031] Indeed, Lithuania fit typical nineteenth century stereotypes of being small enough and yet 'related enough' to the core nationality that they would eventually accept assimilation by the larger kin.[2032] It was due to these perceived bonds, hopes for Lithuanian 'assimilation' into the Russian nation, and (primarily) that they could be 'saved' from 'Polonism', that the Lithuanians didn't face the full brunt of Russification as the century wore on.[2033] Lithuanian peasantry in the borderland province of Suwałki would even benefit from the generous emancipation provisions in the Kingdom of Poland of 1864.[2034] That being said, for the pillars of the Lithuanian nation, it was hardly 'soft'. 'De-Poloniasation' and suppression of the Catholic Church was of paramount importance.[2035] As Consul Stanton noted in 1864, "there is

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[2026] TNA: Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, September 2 1861, FO 181/393:67.

[2027] TNA: Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, January 27 1863, FO 181/418:5.

[2028] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 376 & Berger & Miller, *op.cit.,* p. 321.

[2029] Kasekamp, *op.cit.,* p. 75

[2030] Merkys, *op.cit.,* p. 275. Also see Weeks, Lithuanians, *op.cit.,* p. 107 & Kasekamp, *op.cit.,* p. 75, who noted that after the Polish revolt of 1863, "the paths of Lithuanian and Polish patriots diverged".

[2031] Weeks, Lithuanians, *op.cit.,* pp. 110-111. In 1865, it became illegal to import any Lithuanian printed material in the Latin alphabet, and and further injunctions in 1872 extended this to ban Gothic type. Merkys, *op.cit.,* p. 277

[2032] In the 1902-03 report, the Governor General of Vilna, Prince P.D.Sviatopolk-Mirskii, argued that the Lithuanians would ultimately "be absorbed into the general population of Russia" - in the short run they would liberate themselves from the Polish influence but then they would assimilate over time into Russia. Weeks, Lithuanians, *op.cit.,* pp 109-110.

[2033] *Ibid.,* pp. 99-100.

[2034] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 224. They received the same land grants.

[2035] Kappeler, Ambiguities, *op.cit.,* pp. 295-296.

reason to believe that religious persecution is in that part of the Russian Empire added to the other measures that have been adopted for repressing the insurrectionary movement". [2036] Catholics that had been exiled after the revolt were offered pardons in exchange for disavowing the Church, so that Orthodoxy could fill the void.[2037] The Russians had the right target: it was the Church that would keep Lithuanian language in Latin letters alive, opening underground schools, and distributing smuggled texts.[2038] The artisans and merchants who dominated Phase B nationalist activities were not much present here – as in the Ukrainian provinces these sectors were dominated by Jews.[2039]

This is not to underplay the effect of the Russification policies on the burgeoning Lithuanian national movement. The ban on Latin letters was compounded by the mandated instruction in Russian for all primary education. Alexsandr Potapov, Governor General of the Northwestern Krai province between 1868 and 1874, outlined the philosophy to remove Polish and Catholic influences whilst easing a population into the Russian fold: "Only education of the younger generation in the Russian spirit and with Russian speech can promote somewhat the uniting of the people and the removal of harmful influences that, under unfavourable influences, can lead to confusion in the minds of the underdeveloped and credulous masses."[2040] The Russians were exceptionally good at stopping latinate Lithuanian where they could. Vytautas Merkys found that in over forty years, only sixty-six Lithuanian language works appeared in Russia's Lithuanian provinces.[2041] Regardless of these efforts, the authorities would find it difficult to manage the complexities of programmes that conflated language and ethnicity with religion.[2042]

As the century progressed, Lithuanians would turn out to be content with neither Polish nor Russian hegemony.[2043] The forced use of Cyrillic letters was a very important issue to the Lithuanian intelligentsia, who saw it as a clear tool of subjugation. Indeed, this is a good example of one relatively 'moderate' policy of Russification backfiring and helping embolden a new periphery, intensified by much of the Lithuanian populations being situated near the German border. For example, Lithuanian in Latin letters survived partially due to the amount of illegal literature that was printed in East Prussia from the 1880s onwards, where over 100,000 Lithuanians were living.[2044] At the head of this transfer was the newspaper *Auszra* (Dawn), printed there between 1883 and 1886 by Jonas Basanavičius, who would become in Thaden's eyes

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[2036] TNA: Stanton to Russell, Warsaw, 31 October 1864, FO 181/431:37.
[2037] *Ibid.*
[2038] Thaden, Traditional, *op.cit.,* pp. 8-9.
[2039] Hroch, Social and Territorial, *op.cit.,* p. 261.
[2040] Quoted in Weeks, Lithuanians, *op.cit.,* p. 106.
[2041] Merkys, *op.cit.,* p. 277.
[2042] Cadiot, Searching for Nationality, *op.cit.,* p. 446.
[2043] Weeks, Lithuanians, *op.cit.,* p. 107.
[2044] *Ibid.,* pp. 111-112.

the "patriarch of the new, secular Lithuanian resistance".[2045] Basanavičius had been heavily influenced by Czech nationalism, having previously lived and worked in Prague.[2046]

As with the Poles and the Ukrainians, the border was also a bridge for the Lithuanians. This promulgation of literature was a catalyst for Lithuanian nationalists in Russia, helping add intellectuals to the peasantry and the Church in resistance.[2047] As the century came to a close some Russian officials began to lobby St. Petersburg to overturn the ban – the belief that having Lithuanians more onside with the dynasty would outweigh the need to turn them into Russian speakers.[2048] The arrest of some three thousand Lithuanians, mostly peasants, for smuggling or distributing these materials, did not help.[2049]

When the ban was finally overturned, in the early 1900s, it was too late. Formal political parties began in 1895 with the founding of the local Social Democratic party, followed by a more specific national Liberal Democratic party in 1902.[2050] The movement had progressed to a point where it would remain an annoyance to the Russians until into the First World War. There would be mass state schools boycotts, with schools in private homes taking up the education of Lithuanian children, a situation not unlike that in Poland.[2051] For example, by the time of the 1897 Census, there were less than 7 per cent of school age children in the Kaunas district in state schools – even excepting that primary education was not compulsory this was an extraordinarily low figure for a people with a growing national awareness, in a region which ranked fifth in imperial literacy rates, after Estonia, Latvia, and the *guberni* of St. Petersburg and Moscow.[2052] Weeks has argued that "ironically the combination of repression and neglect in Russian policy toward the Lithuanians helped assure precisely the opposite outcome than that desired: the establishment of a strong, independent Lithuanian national movement",[2053] not unlike all of the periphery nationalities analysed here. This would become apparent after the liberalisation of freedom of religion in the wake of the 1905 revolution. As with the other (non-Orthodox) borderlands, there was a huge reconversion to Catholicism amongst 'Russified' Lithuanians.[2054]

The Lithuanian provinces were not spared the revolution and, as per other uprising hotspots, a national element would build after taking somewhat of a backseat to industrial strikes before the October Manifesto. By this stage, there were two Lithuanian parties appealing to peasants, the Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic League.[2055] They were gaining traction and taking matters into their own hands. By December 1905, for example, Acting

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[2045] Thaden, Traditional, *op.cit.,* p. 8.
[2046] Kasekamp, *op.cit.,* pp. 81-82.
[2047] Merkys, *op.cit.,* pp. 277 & 278. A resistance that called for a national school curriculum and a "free Lithuanian press".
[2048] Weeks, Lithuanians, *op.cit.,* p. 110.
[2049] Merkys, *op.cit.,* p. 279.
[2050] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 227.
[2051] Merkys, *op.cit.,* p. 278.
[2052] *Ibid.*
[2053] Weeks, Lithuanians, *op.cit.,* p. 114.
[2054] TNA: St. Clair to Lansdowne, Warsaw, December 4 1905, FO 181/827:42.
[2055] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 610.

Consul St.Clair reported that: "Russian teachers in village schools and Russian officials are being removed from their posts and are replaced by Poles or Lithuanians."[2056] The *Journal de St.Petersbourg* reported that: "they destroyed schools and public buildings everywhere, with assaults against the employees who fled in panic".[2057] Indeed, Lithuanian nationalists were very active, and took the opportunity to differentiate themselves from the Poles. As reported by Cecil Spring Rice in December 1905:

> *Some time ago the Lithuanian population of the Governments of Grodno, Kovno and Wilna petitioned the Cabinet that they might receive recognition as a separate nationality and should not be confounded with the Poles. The Lithuanians are not a very important section of the subjects of Russia and little or no attention was paid to their demand. It now appears that the Lithuanians have broken out into open insurrection and are engaged in destroying the Russian Churches and in driving the Russians out of Lithuania.*[2058]

After several months of fraught preparations, a Lithuanian Diet was held at Vilnius on 4 and 5 December – the *Didysis Vilniaus Seimas,* which would definitively separate them from both the Russians and Poles, although not the empire, per se: collectively they sought autonomy rather than independence. The Diet's remit was as broad as its declarations: apart from autonomy, they agreed on making Lithuanian an official language in their provinces and a regional constituent assembly – elected via universal male suffrage – that would have jurisdiction over non-Imperial matters across the unified Lithuanian provinces, many of which of course had considerable Russian, Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish populations.[2059]

The willingness of the local authorities to follow national directives to the letter – a symptom inherent in Russia throughout the period of this study – was inconsistent. British Consul Murray reported that the concessions made the Lithuanians less "anti-Russian and anti-Government, although the action of the local authorities, in placing every restriction and hindrance that they can invent in the way of the people's profiting by these concessions, as to language, race, and religion, have done much to cause bad feelings against themselves".[2060] The local Russian authorities certainly knew how to feed the religious issues between the Poles and Lithuanians, as Murray continued: "There is a certain amount of bad feeling between the Poles and the Lithuanians, chiefly caused by the refusal of the priests of each nationality to admit the language of the other, which causes a good deal of friction, as the population of almost all parishes is mixed."[2061]

[2056] TNA: Enclosure in St. Clair to Lansdowne, Warsaw, December 18 1905, FO 181/827: No 45 Political.

[2057] TNA: *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*, December 1, 1905. Author's translation.

[2058] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, December 17 1905, FO 181/828:774.

[2059] Kappeler, The Russian Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 335 & Thaden, Traditional, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

[2060] BDFA: Report on the political feeling in the Consular District of Warsaw in June 1906, Alex Murray, enclosure in Murray to Grey, Warsaw, June 25 1906, BDFA V4, pp. 103-105.

[2061] *Ibid.*

The Duma would also give Lithuanians a pulpit and a claims-making forum. Demands such as those from the *Didysis Vilniaus Seimas* would be made on an empire-wide stage. As was becoming the norm, this was in response to Polish machinations, as a report from 1907 outlined:

> *A meeting at Vilna, organized by the Lithuanian members of the Duma, was also held last week. It was decided to draw up a scheme for autonomy for Lithuania for presentation to the Duma whenever the Lithuanian Delegates thought expedient. That, in the event of Poland's getting any measure of self-government, the Lithuanian Delegates should require the exclusion of the government of Suwalki, the inhabitants of which are almost all Lithuanians, from the limits of what might be recognised as "Poland".* [2062]

What began as an attempt in the 1860s to assimilate the Lithuanians with the protective 'glove' of the Russian nation would end with yet another emerged internal periphery, and yet more complication to the Russian Imperial Power Structure.

8.6.2.   The Romanians of Transylvania

Transylvania province was incorporated in the Habsburg Empire in 1691, taken from the Ottomans who had held parts of the territory since the fourteenth century. The Romanians would become a steady bulwark against the declining Turkish menace, and would help the dynasty in its fight to suppress the Hungarians in 1849. The other large population in the province – the Saxon Germans – predated Habsburg (and indeed Ottoman) rule, being invited into the region as settlers as far back as the twelfth century by Hungarian kings.[2063] After falling under Habsburg control, the Saxon Germans would come to dominate commerce and localised manufacture, complementing the Hungarian landowners.[2064] This left the Romanian population – speaking a Romance language holdover from either Dacia province of the Roman Empire, or from Vulgar Latin as spoken in the later Byzantium Empire (this is in dispute) – almost entirely at the lowest strata of society, the peasantry.

The small group of Transylvanian Romanian elites would petition Leopold II in the early 1790s for equal rights and recognition in the province with the Hungarians and Saxon Germans, only to be rejected by the Transylvanian Diet. They would remain on the margins, focused on maintaining the Transylvanian cultural movement (with enormous help from the Romanian Orthodox Church) that would support the "Field of Liberty" protest against the Hungarian 'takeover' through forced union of Transylvania in 1848.[2065] They would go on to raise a national guard of 10,000 men to fight the Hungarians.[2066]

[2062] BDFA: Murray to Nicolson, Warsaw, May 18 1907, BDFA V4, pp. 363-365.

[2063] Katherine Verdery, "The Unmaking of an Ethnic Collectivity: Transylvania's Germans", *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 12, No 1 (Feb. 1985), p. 70.

[2064] *Ibid.*

[2065] Andrei Oțetea, "The Rumanians and the Disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 3, Issue 02 (Jan., 1967), pp 457-458.

[2066] Gildea, *op.cit.*, p. 103.

In return, they petitioned Franz Josef at Olmütz, on 25 February 1849, with a list of demands, including unifying Romanian speaking peoples in both the Austrian and Hungarian jurisdictions of the Habsburg Empire into one 'nation', with a degree of autonomy and the official use of the Romanian language "in all affairs relating to Romanians", as well as representation in any post-revolution parliament in Vienna.[2067] A few months later, a growingly desperate Kossuth promised two liberal Romanian revolutionary leaders significant rights for Romanians in the Kingdom, in return for the raising of a Romanian force to fight with the *Honvéd*, but it was too late (although providing a reminder that loyalties could be divided in peripheral nations, even when a majority of key actors favoured one side).[2068] Not unlike the Croats and Poles who came to the Empire's rescue, the reward for the Romanians would be neo-Absolutism, which had an unexpected side-benefit, in that it took them out of Budapest's orbit for more than ten years. The slow growth of Transylvanian Romanian nationalism was boosted by the first Romanian language journal in the province, *le Telegraful român*, which was launched in 1853 and managed to skirt the difficult censorship regulations of the period.[2069]

The six years before *Ausgleich* would turn out to be a progressive period for Transylvanian Romanians. The October Diploma of 1861 promised a restoration of the Transylvanian constitution, and a Diet was directed by the Imperial authorities to assemble at the town of Karlsburg (the modern town of Alba Iulia), so that "their labours may be carried on at that place with more advantage to the interests of the Empire than at Klausenburg, where the Magyar population and influence predominate."[2070] The Diet would eventually convene in nearby Sibiu (Hermannstadt/Nagyszeben) in 1863 and, thanks to a broader franchise, would vote to raise the Romanians to equal status in the province with the Hungarians and Saxon Germans – a huge change from the traditional power balance within the province.[2071] *La Diete de Nagyszeben*, which sat over 1863-1864, saw a majority of Romanian deputies returned. They had 57, as opposed to 54 Hungarian and 34 Saxon Germans.[2072] Eventually, the Hungarian delegates boycotted and the Romanians and Saxons would vote to leave Hungary.[2073]

If 1863 was the political high point for the Romanians in the province, 1867 would become their nadir. Franz Josef reconvened the Transylvanian Diet in 1867, this time with a tighter franchise. This resulted in 89 Hungarian delegates (from 29 per cent of the population of the province) facing merely 13 Romanian delegates (from 54 per cent of the population).[2074] Two years later, the Diet voted for union with Hungary, rendering the Diet unnecessary; in the words

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[2067] Fejtö, *op.cit.*, p. 122. Author's translation.

[2068] Deák, The Revolution, *op.cit.*, p. 232.

[2069] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

[2070] TNA: Bloomfield to Russell, Vienna, September 19 1861, FO 120/395:509.

[2071] Oţetea, *op.cit.*, p. 462 and Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 355.

[2072] Fejtö, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

[2073] Niederhauser, *op.cit.*, pp 256-257.

[2074] Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.*, p. 212.

of Robert Kann, it promptly "voted itself out of existence".[2075] *Ausgleich* had subjected the Romanians to the full reintegration of Transylvania into Hungary; existence under Hungarian hegemony, although this time they were left without official recourse to Vienna.[2076]

The gerrymandered Hungarian Parliament would mean that after reforms in 1874, Romanian speakers never had a chance of even token representation in Budapest.[2077] After parliaments of the 1870s sat without any Romanian representation, their 1880s numbers were so artificially small as to render them moot. Indeed, the single Romanian deputy in the Budapest Parliament of 1887 (Trajan Doda) was imprisoned for two years for raising Romanian grievances on the floor of the house.[2078] After this point, the Romanian National Party (formed in 1881 by the merger of Romanian parties in Transylvania and the Banat) turned to a strategy of passive resistance.[2079]

Romanian elites would also periodically turn to Vienna in an effort to go above their Hungarian overlords, for whom they had an understandable "deep feeling of animosity", as stated by British Embassy Secretary Paget.[2080] After five years of planning, a 300 strong delegation of protest was sent to Franz Josef in 1892. He refused to meet with it and referred to the Budapest authorities. This was followed by a trial of Romanian national leaders in Cluj in 1894, which the Emperor tacitly approved.[2081] This resulted in:

> *a demonstration of complete solidarity between the mass of the Rumanian people of Transylvania and their political leaders. During their entire journey from Sibiu to Cluj, the authors of the memorandum and their supporters were greeted everywhere in a festive manner. From all corners of Transylvania, the Banat, Crisana, and Maramures crowds of people flocked to Cluj to be present for the trial.*[2082]

This was a turning point in the creation of a broad base of national solidarity, and according to Andrei Oţetea, "produced widespread repercussions in international public opinion, which protested vigorously against the policies of the Hungarian government toward the non-Magyar nationalities".[2083] Although they had learned their lesson concerning the Kaiser, they would continue to appeal to the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand, who gave them a more sympathetic hearing, if not results.[2084]

The Transylvanian Romanians showed no real desire join their brethren in the Kingdom of Romania, itself strongly allied with the Habsburgs since 1883.[2085] This was because

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[2075] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 355. A petition signed by nearly 1,500 prominent Transylvanian Romanians had no effect. Oţetea, *op.cit.,* pp. 462-463.

[2076] Sugar, *op.cit.,* p. 12. He wrote: "The three old ruling nations took the absence of Vienna's restraining hand and made every effort to put the Rumanians 'into their rightful place' once more."

[2077] Sked, Decline and Fall, *op.cit.,* p. 212.

[2078] *Ibid.,* p. 25.

[2079] Oţetea, *op.cit.,* p. 464.

[2080] TNA: Paget to Salisbury, Vienna, 27 May 1891, FO 120/691:102.

[2081] Oţetea, *op.cit.,* pp. 465-466 & Sugar, *op.cit.,* p. 27.

[2082] Oţetea, *op.cit.,* pp. 465-466.

[2083] *Ibid.* p. 466.

[2084] Keith Hitchens, "The Nationality Problem in Hungary: István Tisza and the Rumanian National Party, 1910-1914", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Dec., 1981), especially p. 626.

[2085] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 172.

independent Romania was populated of mostly Wallachian Romanians, traditionally the elites amongst the Romanian populations under Ottoman control. No matter how many complaints they had about the empire, and the Hungarians in particular, most Transylvanian Romanians still preferred it to being controlled by Bucharest.[2086] Their notable frustrations with their lot in the empire had not diminished their loyalty for the Emperor.[2087] That they were considered a weak, disempowered kin by the Wallachian Romanians did not help. British diplomat Phipps would note in 1887:

> *The attempted Magyarization of the Roumanian populations in Transylvania often causes irritation in Roumania but as that Kingdom is separated from Transylvania by a natural frontier I do not much feel any sensible person contemplates the possibility that any portion of that province could be separated from Hungary.*[2088]

The Saxon Germans would also remain a thorn in the side of the ethnic Romanians, through their commercial domination at the local level.[2089] Ironically, when a nascent Romanian 'unionist' programme finally began to be felt, it was in Bukovina province – a Cisleithanian province where the Romanian population, demonstrably smaller than that in Transylvania, had protected national rights under the Austrian constitution, fair representation in the Vienna *Reichsrat*, and a great deal of power in the local Diet, enhanced by the aforementioned Bukovina compromise.[2090]

They would resort to taking advantage of the protections written into the Hungarian Constitution and enshrined in Law XLIV of 1868, creating organisations such as banks to help finance their own national development, and strengthening their schools through the Church.[2091] The Romanian Orthodox Church in Transylvania ran its own school network of elementary schools and *gymnasia*,[2092] which would mostly remain out of reach from Magyarisation programmes, at least until the turn of the century. Romanians would also prosper in the legal profession and independent business, and would garner some low administration posts, but the majority remained on the land or in the factories, working for the Saxons and Hungarians.[2093] Indeed, towards the turn of the century many Romanian peasants in Transylvania were still obliged to provide up to 30 days of labour service, in order to secure living accommodations, with

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[2086] Stephen-Fischer Galati, "The Rumanians and the Habsburg Monarchy", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 3, Issue 02 (Jan., 1967), p. 445, argued that they understood that "life with Francis Joseph and Tisza was still preferable to life with Carol, Carp, or Brătianu". Carol was Romanian King, Carp and Brătianu were Prime Ministers in Bucharest. Also see Remak, *op.cit.*, p. 136.

[2087] Fischer-Galati, *op.cit.*, pp. 441-442.

[2088] TNA: Phipps to Iddesleigh, Vienna, January 8 1887, FO 120/653:10.

[2089] Verdery, *op.cit.*, p. 71. She also noted that: "Saxon appeals to Vienna were usually aimed not at increasing the Saxon role in politics or administration but at winning trade concessions." p. 72.

[2090] Fischer-Galati, *op.cit.*, p. 447.

[2091] Hitchens, *op.cit.*, p. 619.

[2092] Lieven, Dilemmas, *op.cit.*, p. 186.

[2093] Verdery, *op.cit.*, p. 72. To give an example of breakdowns per industry in Transylvania, Romanians, who made up 55% of the population, made up 26% of lawyers, 24% of notaries, and 28% of "independent owners in industry" in the 1910 census, all quite impressive for an emerging periphery in the Hungarian system and well ahead of the Saxon Germans. However, in the category "Functionaries in industry", for example, the Romanian share was all of 3% (as opposed to 62% Hungarian and 35% Saxon German).

further wage-paying labour also required.[2094] This effectively extended the spirit of the Robot that had officially been abolished for half a century.

In 1893, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the ethnic Transylvanian Count Kálnoky, outlined the frustration felt by the Transylvanian Romanians:

It is a pity that the Magyars are so intolerant, and make every administrative detail a question of nationality. The oppression which they undoubtedly practice might perhaps be justifiable if they were dealing with such reactionaries as the Czechs of Bohemia, but as a matter of fact there is no parallel between the two cases; and he could not but think that the display of a little political tact and moderation would dissipate much of the existing difficulty. Thus, however, it seems useless to expect from such Chauvinists as the Magyars.[2095]

The next year Kálnoky charged the Hungarians with "egotism and want of tact",[2096] whilst praising the Romanians across the Danube for "having consistently acted with perfect propriety".[2097] Magyar 'egotism and want of tact' was to take on a new intensity under what would be called the "Bánffy terror" – an intensification of Magyarisation in Transylvania that was highlighted by brutal repression of Romanian nationalist rallies.[2098] Henceforth, the Romanian 'question' would join the Croatian as serious matters of national tension in Hungary, and Romanians would begin to campaign for European support.[2099] The treatment of Hungary's Romanian population had already been noticed by the Bucharest press, who began to highlight their predicament. For example, when a Romanian consulate was established in Bukovina in 1893, the press contrasted the favourable conditions of the Romanians in that province (for example, they had the largest representation in the Diet, and other "liberty and privileges") with those in Transylvania, which they bemoaned.[2100]

Imperial Finance Minister Kállay (an ethnic Magyar) gave an example of Hungarian difficulties in the province when reflecting on a conciliation mission of the Hungarian Interior Minister Hieronymi in 1894. As recalled by Budapest Consul-General Millbanke:

His visit has had no success whatsoever; as the only inducement which he could hold out towards a better state of feeling was the suggestion of assimilating the electoral system to that of the Magyars; while he was very emphatic as to the determination of the present Govt, and the certainty of a like determination in any future Govt to repress sternly and decisively the aspirations of the Roumanians for a more complete recognition of their individual nationality.[2101]

[2094] Milward & Saul, *op.cit.*, p. 276.
[2095] TNA: Dispatch to Rosebery, Vienna, December 19 1893, FO 120/702:258.
[2096] TNA: Dispatch to Kimberley, Vienna, July 24 1894, FO 120/708: 186.
[2097] TNA: Dispatch to Kimberley, Vienna, September 20 1894, FO 120/708: 218.
[2098] Freifeld, Nationalism and the Crowd, *op.cit.*, p. 283. She claimed that this cost fifty-one Romanian lives.
[2099] *Ibid.*
[2100] TNA: Hardinge to Rosebery, Bucharest, December 13 1892, FO 120/698:142. The Consulate was in Gernowitz.
[2101] TNA: Dispatch to Kimberley, Vienna, July 24 1894, FO 120/708: 186.

Opposition politician Count Apponyi, who started that the Romanian question was of "grave importance" in conversation with the British Ambassador that same year,[2102] would become a central player in 1907, when he was in government as Minister for Religion and Education. Growing fears of Romanian irredentism came to the surface in the wake of the education law named after him, which forecast grave penalties on church schools – schools that helped keep the Romanian dialect alive – that did not reach a competence in Hungarian language.[2103] Eventually, Romanian elites and the Hungarian government made it to the negotiating table. What the Romanians wanted was like every other nationality, a greater autonomy and cultural recognition within their part of the Empire.

Although the negotiations would bear no fruit by the commencement of the First World War, both sides recognised that something needed to be done. Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza saw the need for more peaceful relations with all the non-Magyar peoples under Hungarian tutelage, and specifically chose the Romanians as he considered them as providing stronger resistance to assimilation than the Slovaks and more politically organised than the Serbs.[2104] The Romanians still believed the Empire offered them greater security than independent (and Wallachian) Romania. As Keith Hitchens wrote:

> *As long as the chance for a federalisation of the Monarchy existed, Mainu [initial Romanian negotiator] and company were prepared to accept a solution to national aspirations within existing frontiers. Tisza himself was not averse to compromise; he went farther than any of his predecessors in putting together a combination of concessions that might weave the Rumanians (and later, the other minorities) into the general fabric of Hungarian society.*[2105]

The best intentions could not overcome their wildly differing starting points for negotiations, nor the core objective that drove the Hungarians to negotiate – the desire of Budapest to better 'control' the nationalities,[2106] thus the Romanians, like the Lithuanians, had to wait until after the War to be positioned to take power into their own hands.

One of the numerous Romanian demands was proper representation in the Hungarian parliament. As noted, after universal suffrage was introduced in Cisleithania in 1907, the 250,000 Romanians of that half of the empire had the same number of seats in the Vienna *Reichsrat* (five) than the roughly 3,000,000 Romanians who lived in Transleithania.[2107] If seats had been allocated by population ratios, the Transylvanian Rumanians would have had sixty-eight deputies in the lower house in Budapest.[2108] Although impressive gains had been made in some economic sectors, the Romanians were still very much a dominated periphery in Transleithania. There was no Romanian language university, a mere five high schools with exclusive Romanian language

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[2102] *Ibid.*

[2103] Hitchens, *op.cit.,* p. 620.

[2104] *Ibid.,* p. 621.

[2105] *Ibid.,* p. 650.

[2106] *Ibid.,* p. 622.

[2107] Sugar, *op.cit.,* p. 25.

[2108] *Ibid.*

instruction (only three of these actually had language exclusivity to matriculation) and, although kept alive through Orthodox Church networks, only one primary school for every 13,000 Romanians. Only 28 per cent of the Romanian speaking population was literate.[2109]

8.7.   Overlap and confusion: Croats in Transleithania and the Southern Slav question

Historians have frequently analysed the empire's Serb and Croat populations together for two reasons: 1) ethno-linguistic similarity, matching the categories used in the imperial censuses and still seen frequently on ethnographic and ethno-linguistic maps, and 2) resulting from how Croats and Serbs would go on to dominate the post-War Yugoslavia that rose out of the ashes of the Habsburg Empire. However, the peculiar nature of the long Croatian relationship with Hungary and the Habsburg sovereigns – partially as an accident of geography – makes theirs a unique case.

Connections with Hungary arguably dated back to the twelfth century and there remained significant Croat populations in both halves of the post-*Ausgleich* empire.[2110] The Croats had been a typical pre-modern periphery for centuries – with a small nobility class with autonomy serving the sovereign, underscored by a large mass of peasants. The language of the elites was German, and would remain so well past 1850.[2111] Historically, the Croats had a parliament – the *Sabor* – which had been meeting since the thirteenth century. It was the *Sabor* that chose in 1527 to submit to Habsburg protection. Under Habsburg rule in 1848, Croatian speaking elites had a degree of autonomy in the provinces of Croatia-Slavonia, were politically subservient to Italians in Istria and Dalmatia, and populated the military frontier as personal indentured soldiers of the Emperor. Taken as a whole, they were at once near the top, in the middle and at the bottom of various imperial subsystems. In addition, numerous Croats remained under Ottoman rule in Bosnia & Herzegovina. This section will examine the Croats of Hungary whilst only referring to Serbs, Slovenes and the Croats of Cisleithania on a secondary level.

All Croat (and Serb) boys born in the Military Border would grow up to be *Grenzers*, a feudal relic ostensibly charged with defending the Empire against Turkish attacks. Historically, the Croats (Catholic) and Serbs (Orthodox) were adversaries in the Balkans,[2112] and this was at its strongest and most bitter on the Military Border.[2113] Adding to this national antagonism was that the Serbs could point to their own 'glorious' national past earned on the battlefields against the

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[2109] *Ibid.* There were 2,257 Romanian language primary schools.

[2110] Bellamy, *op.cit.,* p. 37. The argument was that Croatian nobles signed an agreement in 1102 with Koloman, King of Hungary, in which Koloman was granted the Croatian throne in return for "respecting the laws and customs of Croatia." This is historically disputed, not least because a fourteenth century transcript of the agreement – the *Pacta Conventa* – was a fake.

[2111] For example, Croatian theatre was exclusively German language until 1840, when the first Croatian company staged a performance in Croatian. Okey, Central Europe, *op.cit.,* p. 112.

[2112] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 205.

[2113] Charles Jelavich, "The Croatian Problem in the Habsburg Empire in the Nineteenth Century," *Austrian History Yearbook*, (Vol. 3, Issue 02 (Jan., 1967), p. 103. It was in the Military Border that "at the same time […] produced some of the strongest advocates of Yugoslavism".

Turks – via their stalemate battle at the Field of the Blackbirds (Battle of Kosovo) in 1389, when Prince Lazar temporarily halted the Ottoman advance into Europe. The majority of Croats and Serbs would look down upon each other until almost the eve of the First World War, searching for alternate scenarios for a 'southern Slavic union' that would leave one or the other in the ascendancy. It is true, however, that the machinations of the Habsburg empire managed to bring certain sections of their elites together with a common ideological goal of Yugoslavia.

After becoming Ban in 1848, Josip Jelačić tried to break ties with Hungary, and he would be heavily involved at the forefront of numerous battles with the Hungarians until the end of the Revolution. From this time forth the Hungarians, who had already held a deep suspicion of Croatian intentions, became even more wary. Jelačić had hoped that his loyalty to the dynasty would be repaid with the lifting of Croatia to the level of Hungary within the empire, alas, rewards would not come the way of the Croats, and for his belief he would become known as a 'tragic hero'.[2114] Indeed, a popular joke of the time stated that what: "Croatia received as a reward from the Habsburgs what the Magyars received as a punishment."[2115]

During this neo-Absolutist era, the *Sabor* was suspended, however the Croatian Catholic Church was made independent of the Hungarian church.[2116] When the *Sabor* reconvened in 1861, the Croatians would again demand separation from Hungary.[2117] Although loyal to their sovereign, the *Grenzer* favoured joining the Military Border to Croatia and sitting in the *Sabor*.[2118] The Emperor decreed in March of that year their exclusion from participation in the Provincial Diet of Croatia-Slavonia, reasoned by the widely differing character of the administration of the Military Border from that of the Provincial Administration.[2119] In effect, he was worried about the military and politics mixing, and the *Grenzer* losing their purely military character. He was also unprepared to incorporate the border population into the Croatian political orbit, as they would play a role in political decisions that would not affect them.[2120]

In a familiar story, a Croatian delegation went to Vienna in 1861 to present their grievances to their "good emperor" only to be dismissed, which led to them joining the nationalists in the *Sabor*.[2121] After *Ausgleich*, the Hungarians came to what was purported to be a similar compromise with the Croats in Croatia-Slavonia. Andrássy persuaded the *Sabor* that in return for agreeing to a compromise (*Nagodba*), he would pressure the Emperor to join the

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[2114] Bellamy, *op.cit.*, p. 42.

[2115] *Ibid.* Sugar, *op.cit.*, p. 21, tells of a Hungarian noble telling a Croatian friend: "What we received as punishment you got as a reward". This comment – and its sentiment – appears in numerous histories of the Habsburg Empire, and has also been attributed to Ferenc Pulszky, member of the Hungarian Diet during the revolution, and colleague-in-exile of Kossuth. In the words of László Kontler, "as Ferenc Pulszky […] put it with irony, what the national minorities received for their anti-Hungarian stand in 1848-1849 as a reward did not differ from what was meted out to the Hungarians as punishment". Kontler, *op.cit.*, p. 265.

[2116] Lampe, *op.cit.*, p. 46 and Jelavich, *op.cit.*, p. 96.

[2117] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 330.

[2118] Rothenberg, Struggle, *op.cit.*, pp. 65-66. Indeed, for the first time, *Grenzer* representatives sat in the *Sabor*.

[2119] TNA: Letter of Franz Josef to the Ban of Croatia, in Bloomfield to Russell, Vienna, March 7 1861, 120/392:83.

[2120] *Ibid.*

[2121] Rothenberg, Struggle, *op.cit.*, p. 68.

Military Border to Croatia, and would allow the formation of Croatian units in the *Honvédség* (*domobran*) – in effect, a militia within a militia.[2122] The *Nagodba* agreements were written with political purpose for both sides. For example, the original 1868 text referred extensively to Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia as components of a Triune Kingdom, although Dalmatia was under the control of Vienna and had never truly been connected with Croatia-Slavonia.[2123] This was at once a sop to Croat nationalists and a brazen Hungarian signal as to their wish to transfer Dalmatian territory to Transleithania. The Emperor had deftly declared that he would only accede to Dalmatia joining a Triune Kingdom if the Diet in Zara (Zadar) voted for it, knowing full well that the Italians, who dominated the chamber at the time, would never assent to the Triune Kingdom or Hungarian rule.[2124]

Although other articles more specific to administration and finance reverted to Croatia-Slavonia, these undertones would resurface from time to time, such as in an amendment from 1889 that highlighted what might happen "should the administrative territory of Croatia and Slavonia be increased by the actual reincorporation of Dalmatia or by the administrative union of the Military Frontiers."[2125] There would be four dedicated Croatian sections in the Hungarian government ministries covering finance, trade and industry, agriculture, and public works, but as the Hungarian parliament would vote on common issues such as taxation, defence and conscription that affected the province, it left them at the mercy of the Hungarians in these areas.[2126]

Many Croats would soon regret the compromise: they had not heeded Ferenc Deák's polemic of 1866, in which he called the Croatians a "non-political people".[2127] Indeed, the National Party, hitherto in the majority in the *Sabor*, did not support the compromise at all.[2128] The *Sabor* became a local government organisation only, looking after education and the judiciary, and the Ban was only proclaimed on approval of the Hungarian parliament, resulting in a string of Budapest puppets.[2129] The 40 Croat deputies in Budapest were swamped and could be outvoted easily,[2130] as could the Croat who was Minister without Portfolio (a position reserved for Croats from 1870).[2131] It did not take long for the first new Ban, Levin Rauch, to begin persecuting opponents of the compromise.[2132]

[2122] Rothenberg, Toward, *op.cit.*, p. 813.

[2123] "The Hungaro-Croatian Compromise of 1868", (*Nagodba),* http://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/1813/1445/1/Hung_Croat_Compr_1868.pdf, last sourced 16 December, 2014, pp. 1-3 of 6. The Triune Kingdom had been a project of Croat nationalists since before the 1848 revolution. See Bogdan Krizman, "The Croatians in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 3, Issue 2, (1967), *op.cit.,* p. 122.

[2124] Macartney, *op.cit.,* p. 558.

[2125] Nagodba, *op.cit.,* pp. 3-6 of 6. (quotation on p. 4 of 6).

[2126] Romanenko, *op.cit.,* p. 116 & Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 363.

[2127] Lampe, *op.cit.,* p. 59. Deák was leader of the Hungarian liberals.

[2128] Jelavich, *op.cit.,* p. 100.

[2129] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 363.

[2130] *Ibid.,* p. 363.

[2131] Bérenger, *op.cit.,* p. 317.

[2132] Krizman, *op.cit.*, p. 131.

There would be immediate consequence felt within the Kingdom, two of which would have repercussions that would extend to the First World War and beyond. The first was closer relations with Slovenes across the imperial demarcation line, specifically by the People's Party, which led to the first joint political programme for South Slavs, issued from a December 1870 meeting in Laibach (Ljubljana).[2133] The following year, there was a rare *Grenzer* revolt on the Military Border, directly as a consequence of the *Nagodba*.[2134] The Croats suffered as so many nationalities in both empires did, in that their nationalist movement was highly educated but narrow and ill-representative of the Croat people; and they gave little regard to improving the lot of the Croat masses, of whom 90 per cent were illiterate peasants at mid-century.[2135] Even by 1890, there were less than 10,000 workers in enterprises with more than 20 staff in all of Croatia-Slavonia – the population was slow to develop a bourgeoisie.[2136]

The situation with the Hungarians grew steadily worse during the 1870s and 1880s. The 1883 appointment of an ethnic Hungarian Ban, tasked to increase the use of Hungarian in the administration, set off riots across the territory, including the tearing down of new Hungarian inscriptions that had just been placed on public buildings.[2137] Agitation for separation from Hungary would continue to grow.[2138] It was Magyarisation that helped Croatian national parties to grow – in line with the growth of Serbian nationalism in the Banat. There had already been mention of a united Yugoslavia going back to the 1860s, as an autonomous federal branch of the Empire. Indeed, the first mention of the word 'Yugoslavia' was made in conjunction with a federalist diatribe from Josip Strossmayer, although Serbia was not even considered as a possible component of this by him until 1866.[2139] Strossmayer was a rarity in Austrian nationality politics in two ways: first, he was a cleric whose ideology was underlined by a desire to reunite the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, and second; he was unafraid to be contrary to the Emperor, even to his face. When he publicly sent a gushing telegram to the rector of St. Vladimir University in Kiev for the 900th anniversary celebrations of Christianity in Russia, the Emperor reprimanded him in public.[2140] Franz Josef said, "the Bishop appeared not to have known what a

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[2133] Krizman, *op.cit.,* p. 132.

[2134] Rothenberg, Struggle, *op.cit.,* p. 77, noted that: "on October 7, 1871, two Croatian national fanatics, Eugen Kvaternik and Ludwig Bach, proclaimed the establishment of an independent Croatian state at Rakovica, a village in the Ogulin regiment. They called on all Croatians to rally against the 'Swabian dogs' who had sold the country to the Magyars and hinted that aid from France and other powers could be expected".

[2135] Lampe, *op.cit.,* p. 46. Indeed, considering the size of the franchise, only 2% of the Croatian population were allowed to vote until 1910. Romanenko, *op.cit.,* p. 115.

[2136] Okey, Neue Freie Presse, *op.cit.,* p. 84.

[2137] Lampe, *op.cit.,* p. 62 & Okey, Neue Freie Presse, *op.cit.,* p. 91.

[2138] TNA: Memorandum of Milbanke, in Paget to Granville, Vienna, October 13 1885, FO 120/635:336. He reported that: "Croatia has for the past 2 years been a centre of disorder and agitation […] It was hoped that the recent visit of the Emperor to that province would have calmed the general agitation, but the disorders that have taken place in the Provincial Diet within the last fortnight and the insults that have been offered to the Ban, the Representatives of the Government, have shown how futile these hopes were."

[2139] Lampe, *op.cit.,* pp. 58-59.

[2140] Željo Karulka, "The 1888 Bjelovar Affair: The Theory Behind the (Yugo)Slavic Idea and the Unification of Churches, *Transcultural Studies*, 2-3 (2006-2007), pp. 96 & 98. The most, although not only, contentious part of the telegram read thus: "God bless Russia and give it, through living faith, exemplary life, the help from above and

step he had taken against the Church and the State", adding "you cannot have been in your senses when you did such a thing".[2141] As Augustus Paget relayed the reports from newspapers in Pest, "The Bishop […] is reported to have replied 'your majesty my conscience is clear' whereupon the Emperor turned his back before him."[2142]

The major issue with the idea of a union of southern Slavs remained the seemingly unbreachable chasm between the catholic Croats and the orthodox Serbs. Embassy Secretary Phipps recalled an event in the Dalmatian Diet in 1889 that underscored these difficulties (emphasis in the original):

> *About 24 members of that Diet who had constituted the "National Club" have reformed themselves into a "<u>Croatian</u> National Club" and presented a formal proposal to the Govt in favour of the annexation to a "<u>Great Croatia</u>" of not only those territories formerly belonging to that Country but of Bosnia and The Herzegovina the coast from Spizza* [modern day Sutomore, in Montenegro] *to Bosnia and Novi Bazar* [Novi Pazar]. *The organ of the Servian Party in Dalmatia declares in reply to this that the Serb nation which freed Dalmatia from the Turks achieved the same […] without the shelter of Croatian "State Rights" which have never been nor will be recognised by Serbs. The Dalmatian Serbs know by experiences what was understood by "Croatian Individualising" "Croatianisation of the Schools". Such phrases; and the new Programme […] forebodes new provocation and a fresh struggle will be resisted by the Serbs by every possible means.*[2143]

Hence most of the effort of the Croat nationalist parties, such as Ante Starčević's Party of Rights or Josip Frank's Party of Pure Rights, was to pursue a trialistic programme that would have seen Croatian hegemony over any Slavic union within the empire.[2144] Starčević would "deny the Serbs and Slovenes the right to an independent national existence", considering the term "Serbian" not worthy of a national or ethnographic designation.[2145] Hardening Magyarisation, coupled with the change of dynasty in Serbia in 1903, when the Serbian King Alexander, a Habsburg client, was replaced by the Pan-Slavic Peter I, brought tensions to a head and helped edge the two parties together.[2146]

The Hungarian Government, already 'under siege' in Budapest, would dig in, and unrest would become worse. Heavy rioting saw military intervention and the suspension of the constitution in 1903.[2147] These disturbances frightened not only the Hungarians but also the Austrians back in Vienna – *Die Zeit* commenting that: "If those four million ever begin to act under a united leadership, that could be even more threatening to the state as a whole than

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Christian heroism, with all its other duties, that great of all worldly duties, destined by God's providence to be fulfilled with fortune, salvation and triumph."

[2141] TNA: Paget to Salisbury, Vienna, September 13, 1888, FO 120/661:294.

[2142] *Ibid.*

[2143] TNA: Phipps to Salisbury, Vienna, 18 September 1889, FO 120/672: 260. Emphasis in original.

[2144] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 447.

[2145] Krizman, *op.cit.,* p. 447.

[2146] *Ibid.,* p. 411.

[2147] Pleterski, p. 77.

the Bohemian quarrel ever was for the Austrian half."[2148] However the opposition parties in Zagreb and Budapest would come to an understanding: the Croats were upset that the Emperor refused to intercede on their behalf with the Hungarian Government. To garner the support of the Croats, the opposition Independence Party in Budapest promised liberal and democratic reforms.[2149]

A conference in Fiume (Rijeka) in 1905 followed this up, whilst breathing new life into the notion of the Triune Kingdom. The Rijeka Resolution would formalise an *in-principle* agreement between Croatian opposition in Zagreb and the Independence Party in Budapest. It was a very liberal declaration that would not have been out of place in 1848, complete with calls for improvements in civil liberties. It would attempt to force the Hungarians to abide by the constitution, whilst issuing a number of bold demands. Indeed, like so many 'resolutions' or 'manifestos' from internal peripheral 'nations', it was exceptionally conciliatory to the core. For example, the manifesto included the following:

> *The Croat deputies consider it to be their duty to fight side by side with the Hungarian nation for the fulfilment of all constitutional rights and liberties, in the conviction that the said rights and liberties will be of advantage to the Croatian and Hungarian nations: and thus will be laid the basis of a lasting understanding between the two nations.*[2150]

As for demands, they also had a familiar, western-liberal tone, including calls for "Complete press freedom", "Freedom of Assembly and Association and free expression of opinion", and "Realization of judicial independence."[2151]

The Resolution of Zadar followed two weeks later, whereby Dalmatian Serb deputies in Cisleithania gave in principle support to the Rijeka Resolution. The Resolution included references to a potential union of southern Slavs, "if, namely, the Croats give a binding recognition of the equality of the Serb and Croat peoples".[2152] Although further meetings would take place, this time between Croat and Serb deputies, in order to ensure they would work together in their common interest, these movements would split Croatian movements – for example they gained no traction amongst the Peasant Party or traditional Croatian nationalist leaders such as Starčević and Frank, who still saw Croatia at dominant.[2153]

[2148] *Ibid.*, p. 78. The editorial was in Die Zeit, vol. XXXV, Nr. 452, Wien, 30 May 1903.

[2149] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 447.

[2150] "The Rijeka Resolution", October 4, 1905, (Extracts), pp. 1 of 2, http://www.istrianet.org/istria/history/1800-present/ww1/fiume-question1.htm, last sourced 16 December, 2014.

[2151] *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2 of 2. Other elements of note included: "the abolition of objective proceedings and the introduction of juries for political and press offences"; "the guarantee to every judge that he cannot be removed or held responsible for his judicial acts"; "Organization of the special institution of a court of constitutional law for the protection of the interests and political rights of the citizens against the arbitrary action of the authorities" and perhaps most notable; "Organization of a special court for the criminal responsibility of all public officials for violation of the law."

[2152] "The Zadar Resolution", October 4, 1905, (Extracts), pp. 1 of 2, first sourced 13 September 2011, from http://www.h-net.org/~habsweb/sourcetexts/zadar.htm, (broken link). Hard copy available on request, or can be sourced from R.W. Seton-Watson, *The South Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy* (London, 1911), pp. 395-396.

[2153] Kann, *op.cit.*, p. 447.

Croat hopes were raised with the accession of Wekerle to the Prime Ministership in Budapest, heading a coalition with the Independence Party. Consul Clarke would write that:

The chief organ of the Croatian National Party [People's Party] *concluded a recently published article, as follows: – "We wish the new Minister President—in the interests of the Crown, and of the State, all success in his difficult undertaking. We are sure that the Croatian National Party will […] support him in his endeavours to restore a normal order of things, (disturbed by obstruction, and by the late crisis), having no doubt but that the programme of a Government, at the head of which is Wekerle—will fully secure to us our position, as a State, and the autonomous rights of the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia.*[2154]

The opposition party signatories to the Rijeka Resolution also welcomed Wekerle, having promised to support the Independence Party in 1905, a move that created a dangerous degree of hope amongst the Croats. [2155] Resistance came from the Croatian Peasant Party, whose programme included Stjepan Radić's 1902 proposal for a greater Croatia incorporating all Southern Slav imperial territories. [2156] The opposition Croat Serb Coalition Party would win the 1906 *Sabor* elections for the first time. Hopes were raised for the introduction of the Croatian language in Croat regiments, and even the possible reunion of Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia and a broadening of the terms of the *Nagodba*. [2157] There had already been an understanding between Wekerle and the People's Party for the use of Croatian in the Croatian administration and in Croatian railway branches.[2158]

However, such hope faded quickly. Budapest politics was itself in crisis. In 1907, the Independence Party leader, Ferenc Kossuth, the Trade Minister in the Coalition Government, tried to make Hungarian the sole language of the railways across Transleithania – including Croatia-Slavonia. This turn was like a dagger to the heart of the Croatian government; it is the belief of A.J.P. Taylor that this was what ultimately pushed Croats and Serbs together to try and work together politically as 'Southern Slav partners.' [2159] In protest, the ruling Croat Serb Coalition Party in Zagreb instigated a wave of obstructive protest in the Budapest parliament: instructing the forty deputies from Croatia-Slavonia to direct their protest in the Croatian language, to boot.[2160] Diet elections followed in 1908, which saw the governing party extend their dominance in the *Sabor*. This also further alienated the Ban, who had no support in the body.[2161] Ambassador Goschen highlighted the vitriol directed at Kossuth from inside Hungary: "The Opposition Press in Hungary holds Kossuth and his friends largely responsible for the result of

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[2154] TNA: Clarke to Goschen, Budapest, April 19, 1906, FO 371/6/53.

[2155] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 447.

[2156] Krizman, *op.cit.,* p. 140. He wrote that his vision for Croatia was contained within a 1902 "treatise on The Slav Policy in the Habsburg Monarchy", where "Radić advocated the establishment of a Danubian federation with its capital in Vienna. This federation was to be composed of the Alpine, Czech, Galician, Hungarian, and Croatian lands of the Habsburg Empire."

[2157] TNA: Clarke to Goschen, Budapest, January 28, 1906, FO 371/6/59.

[2158] *Ibid.*

[2159] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 227.

[2160] Jeszensky, *op.cit.,* p. 282.

[2161] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 19 1908, FO 120/851:40.

the elections, alleging that in his efforts to strengthen the Hungarian Coalition he had also consolidated the Croat Serb Coalition party, which would now make use of its strength against the National Party in Hungary."[2162] The *Sabor* was prorogued,[2163] and further suspensions in 1911 and 1912 left the provinces ruled by decree; eventually István Tisza attempted conciliation on his return as Prime Minister in June 2013, as he had done with the Romanians.[2164] This was after the Balkan Wars, from which a stronger and bellicose Serbia emerged. In a sign of their growing influence, the Serbian government gave the go ahead to the Croat Serb Coalition Party for their negotiations with Tisza that year, that would enabled the Coalition to take full control of the Diet in late 1913.[2165]

The suspension of the Diets meant that no Croat delegates were available for the Delegations, which was in breach of at the very least convention, as the complete political territory of Hungary was not represented. In the 1912 Finance Committee meetings, the leader of the Austrian Southern Slavs, Dr. Šušteršič, claimed that the Hungarian delegation was "legally incomplete".[2166] In the *Reichsrat*, Masaryk charged that the Hungarians, by violating the Constitution, were getting involved in Austrian politics, where they didn't belong.[2167] During the same debate, the Dalmatian Party leader Dr. Čingrija, made another appeal to end Dualism couched with a strong warning:

> *Croats and Serbs had in the past always been true to the Dynasty and the Empire and they had confidently hoped to find a place in the sun in that Empire. That hope however was now beginning to disappear and he therefore demanded the autonomy of the nations concerned. With this object in view it was above all things necessary to put an end to the Dualistic system and to proceed to a revision of the constitution.*[2168]

For every step the Serbs and Croats took to work together, another step was taken to pull them apart. For example, in contrast to the Croat and Serb deputies in the Hungarian parliament joining together as a block in response to Kossuth's Railways Act,[2169] in 1912 Croatian and Slovene conservatives in Cisleithania released the Declaration of Ljubljana, which was a recipe for a Croatian/Slovene union entirely excluding the Serbs.[2170] For the most part, the Croats had considered the Serbs as their lesser neighbours [2171] and overall were only drawn to a working relationship beyond idealism by shocks like the aforementioned Railway Act and Zagreb show trials. According to Charles Jelavich, "there is no conclusive proof that even a simple majority of the Croats" supported the implications of Yugoslavism as late as 1914. In addition, even in this

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[2162] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 2 1908, FO 120/851:24.
[2163] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 19 1908, FO 120/851:40.
[2164] Cohen, Nationalist, *op.cit.,* p. 254.
[2165] Krizman, *op.cit.,* p. 143. In Charles Jelavich's words, the Coalition used the Balkan Wars "to its own advantage", Jelavich, *op.cit.,* p. 112.
[2166] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, May 4 1912, FO 120/895:57.
[2167] *Ibid.*
[2168] *Ibid.*
[2169] Taylor, *op.cit.,* p. 227.
[2170] Kann, *op.cit.,* p. 449.
[2171] *Ibid.* pp. 448-449.

hotbed of the Empire, almost all activists did not want complete withdrawal from the Empire.[2172] An illustrative example of this concerns Radić, co-founder of the Croatian Peasant Peoples Party, who was in a group who burned a Hungarian flag in protest at Zagreb railway station in 1895. He insisted to his colleagues that they burn it using alcohol and not oil, as he felt this would be softer and "temper their disrespect for Franz Josef who was then visiting Zagreb".[2173] The monarchy was still seen as the lesser threat, indeed as embodied by the Emperor, it was still the subject of reverence.[2174]

8.8.   Non-national periphery formation – the *zemstva* phenomenon

This section will briefly focus on the *zemstva* in the Russian Empire, as they were embedded as a pillar in the Russian Imperial Power Structure, specifically designed by the government itself; at once an indispensible tool of the core and an emerging periphery. They were the essential, non-central government link between the nation-state ideological frameworks and the people. Although the result of government reform policies, they too would 'bite the hand that fed them'.

We have outlined the introduction of the *zemstva* in Chapter 5. Here we will pick up their development as a periphery. Almost from their introduction, the *zemstva* continued to grow in boldness and confidence, in line with the success they had in transforming their specific regions. It soon became clear to some in the Government that they had gone down a dangerous path. The Government began to push back against them as soon as 1866 (whilst they were effectively in their infancy), curtailing their taxation powers, and this was followed in June 1867 by a decree that forbade different *zemstva* from consulting each other on matters of national or common interest, and charged Governors with the power to censor *zemstva* meeting minutes as well as official publications. In effect, they were trying to stop *zemstva* meetings becoming forums to transmit ideas.[2175] This was designed to dampen any talks of a national *zemstvo* assembly. In essence this was a strategy typically employed by empires throughout history to keep peripheries apart; a way for an imperial government to hinder the development of a more extensive form of diffused power. However, such measures did not stop them growing at an extraordinary rate – for example total expenditures grew from 5.6 million roubles in 1865 to 24 million roubles in 1870, and the number of people directly employed by the *zemstva* also showed exceptional growth.[2176] The regime's hands were now tied; yes, they could pull back at the edges, or threaten even more, but the role they were filling had become an invaluable part of Russia's quest for growth.

[2172] Jelavich, *op.cit.,* p. 85. As Jelavich wrote, "to them [Croats] the very word "Balkan" stood for backwardness, poverty, corruption, violence, and injustice".

[2173] Lampe, *op.cit.,* p. 78-79.

[2174] Pleterski, *op.cit.,* p. 84, wrote that they were a lesser evil than "Greater Germany for the Czechs and Slovenes, Tsarist Russia for the Poles and Romanians, and Italian irredentism for the South Slavs on the Adriatic coast".

[2175] Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p 383.

[2176] *Ibid.,* p. 384.

The *zemstva* may have taken on similar tasks to the municipal governments in the Cisleithania, but collectively they were ideologically quite different. The municipal governments in Austria never worked together as one coherent voice to achieve a greater share of power across the imperial realm outside of their 'national orbits' – the municipal councils had regional Diets as well as elected representatives in the Vienna parliaments to deal with. Second, they were too focussed working out how to serve the empire and local constituents whilst working on behalf of their represented 'nationality'. This was due to the municipal governments in Cisleithania working mostly on behalf of a nationality that a single, national body of municipal governments could never happen. Nor would it need to, with parliamentary representation. In this context, the *zemstva* were non-national.

Suppressing their growth would hinder *zemstva* efforts to fulfil their remit, as did an overbearing central bureaucracy, and they would often complain to the tsar accordingly. The Tver *zemstvo*, three years after quizzing Alexander II as to why he was consenting to a liberal constitution for Bulgaria, would in 1881 passionately request that his son make administrative reform – in other words, to further decentralise. They passed a resolution by 145 votes to 5, to "present His Majesty the Emperor with an address urging the necessity of the adoption of measures of reform for the internal administration of the Country".[2177] In the words of Embassy Secretary Hugh Wyndham, central to their grievance was that: "all initiation of local measures the Tver Zemstvo urges is rendered impossible by the Central Authorities, and free expression of opinion with regard to local requirements is as severely condemned and repressed as henceforth".[2178]

Although further restrictive measures were introduced in the 1880s, such as the introduction of Land Captains by the Ministry of the Interior, the *zemstva* continued to step up their campaign for more of a say in the affairs of empire. Not long after Nicholas II ascended the throne, they petitioned him to consider changes such the relatively minor request to include them when considering policy, only to be rebuked in no uncertain manner:

> *I am informed that recently in some zemstvo assemblies voices have made themselves heard from people carried away by senseless dreams about participation by representatives of the zemstvo of the affairs of the internal government; let all know that I, devoting all my strength to the welfare of the people, will uphold the principle of autocracy as firmly and as unflinchingly as my late unforgettable father.*[2179]

The government mouthpiece *Novoe Zemaya* was quick to assert there was room for change, as long as the autocratic prerogative of the sovereign remained supreme. As recounted by Attaché Lascelles: "There have […] been instances, in the last reign and in less recent Russian history, of representatives of various groups of society being called in to advise on questions of

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[2177] TNA: Wyndham to Granville, St Petersburg, July 14 1881, FO 181/640:368.
[2178] *Ibid.*
[2179] Quoted in Seton-Watson, *op.cit.,* p. 549. His reply was given on 17 January 1895.

administration; and there is room for an advance in this direction, without fear on the prerogative of the Autocratic Power."[2180]

By this stage, *zemstvo* professional employees, whose numbers continued to swell, had begun to radicalise. They had latched onto the now thriving industry sector associations, for example those of doctors, lawyers, academics and journalists – outlets for like-minded professionals to join together and form a platform for lobbying. Gregory Freeze has argued that the *zemstva* were the unofficial leaders of liberal 'opposition', until the disparate movements converging at this time became too numerous for one group to take the head.[2181] Liberal editor of *Osvobozhdenie* (and former Marxist), Peter Struve would note in 1902 that, "we need a new organization [because] from our point of view the zemstvo is only one field of activity (to be sure, an important and valuable one) for our party, which should comprehend all Russian life in the name of the great national goal of liberation".[2182] When these disaffected *zemstva* employees were added to radical student groups, disaffected nobles, liberals, subjugated minority nationalities, and of course the growing working classes, the Empire was faced with a tinderbox largely of their own making.

The liberals tried to be the unifying force for all these groups. Struve would write: "Our goal is not to divide but to unite. The cultural and political liberation of Russia cannot be exclusively or primarily the cause of a single class, a single party, or a single ideological system. It must become a national or 'all-nation' cause," adding that "the struggle for freedom may triumph only as a wide national movement".[2183] However they were not overly successful in unifying opposition, and this disunity, and the disparate variety of 'causes' amongst the 'opposition', would became all too apparent in 1905. Most notably, the diversity and disorganisation displayed by the revolutionaries showed – in Geoffrey Hosking's words – characteristics of the "beginnings of a pluralist society, with various groups pursuing their own purposes, and only agreed on the need to end unlimited autocracy."[2184] They lacked a "coherent ideological and organizational foundation for challenging monarchical absolutism."[2185]

During the disturbances in June 1905, the *zemstva* sent another delegation to the tsar, to which he could only reply, as Hardinge stated, "his earnest desire was for co-operation, as of old, between the Czar and his people".[2186] This time, there would be action, although the *zemstva* delegation would be the least of the sovereign's worries. In December, after preparations for the proclaimed Imperial Duma were being considered, another Congress representing both the towns and *zemstva* would meet and, having seen the first true relaxation of the autocratic grip in Russia's history, they were hungry for more. They would focus on the separation of Poland in a

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[2180] TNA: Lascelles to Kimberley, St Petersburg, January 31 1895, FO 181/729/2:31.
[2181] Freeze, Liberalism, *op.cit.*, pp. 82-84.
[2182] *Ibid.*, p. 89.
[2183] *Ibid.*, p. 85,
[2184] Hosking, Stolypin, *op.cit.*, p. 138.
[2185] Hamburg, Nobility, *op.cit.*, p. 73.
[2186] BDFA: Hardinge to Lansdowne, St Petersburg, June 21 1905, BDFA V3, pp. 126-127.

manner not unlike Finland, or Hungary in the Habsburg Empire, declaring that it "should immediately be formed into a separate autonomous unity […] preserving its sovereign union with the Empire" and adding that it should be "with a rectification of the frontiers of the kingdom of Poland, taking from it those portions compactly inhabited by Little-Russian and Lithuanian populations, and incorporating with it those parts of the neighbouring governments containing a solid Polish population".[2187]

They believed that an autonomous Poland would help keep the Empire together most effectively.[2188] Count Witte presented to the Assembly the reply of the Council of Ministers to the declaration – an unsubtle reminder to not to push their luck too far:

> *The First duty of the Council of Ministers consists in loyally carrying out the programme contained in the Imperial Manifesto of the 30 October. To deviate from the path thus marked out for them is impossible. In consequence there can be no question of carrying out the various extensions and limitations of the principles laid down in the Manifesto which are now advocated. Similarly until the Duma meets there can be no question of an alteration of clause three of the Manifesto which define the attributes and the prerogatives of the representative assembly.*[2189]

One of the great impacts of the *zemstva* on the Imperial Power Structure after 1905 was its large representation in the constitutional State Council. Indeed, their fifty-six members consisted a majority of the elected part of the upper house (there were 200 seats, half of which were elected and the other half were imperial appointments). The other was their participation in the founding of the empire-wide Duma party that was most serious about addressing the demands and grievances of the various national groups in the realm – the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets).[2190] Since their formation in the 1860s, the *zemstva* would prove a thorn in the side of the tsars, provide a beacon for tempered opposition and agitation for change, and yet perform exceptional work on the ground, to ensure that Russian society could make the steps required for a modernizing empire. They were the clearest sign of a group working in the service of the core and as a sanctioned, organised periphery.

[2187] TNA: Segment of programme of the Zemstvo Congress, enclosed with Clarke to Hardinge, Moscow, September 26 1905, FO 181/848:80.

[2188] BDFA: Memorandum by Lord Cranley respecting proceedings of the Representatives of the Zemstvos and Towns in Congress and Moscow, St. Petersburg, December 1, 1905, enclosure in Spring Rice to Lansdowne, St Petersburg, December 1, 1905, BDFA V3, pp. 262-263. They stated that: "it would be the most effective means of welding the Empire together".

[2189] TNA: Dispatch to Grey, St Petersburg, December 16 1905, FO 181/828:769.

[2190] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, February 3 1906, FO 181/123:93.

9.   Sixty Year Situation Report

9.1.   The Habsburg Empire in 1914

Naturally any body as complex as the Habsburg Empire is going to change considerably over 60 years, especially in the European environment of that time. With regard to alliances, Austria's relationship with the Russian Empire never truly recovered from the slight of offending the Russians during the Crimean War. By 1914, irrespective of a couple of German-driven initiatives to reunite the post-Napoleonic conservative order (Austria, Prussia and Russia), and some cooperation at times in the Balkans, the Habsburg Empire found itself in a difficult situation – sharing a border with a Russian Empire that was now in a formal alliance with Britain and France. This was balanced against an iron clad yet dependent alliance with the German Empire. Defeat to the Prussians in 1866 briefly had the Emperor thinking of revenge; reality drove him into the Hohenzollern orbit, which was exactly what Bismarck had hoped.[2191] On alliances at least, the Habsburg Empire of 1914 was still in the 'great power' game.

As noted, the empire also held roughly 13% of Europe's population and about 10% of its GDP, remaining integral to the European economy and at a strategically vital crossroad in Central and Eastern Europe.[2192] The life of empire was dominated by the 'nationality question' – it had seeped into every nook and cranny of life across the realm, including that of the Austrian Germans, who for example in Cisleithania paid two-thirds of direct taxes to the imperial treasury, *far* in excess of their population.[2193] National movements had mostly shunned, or put on ice, independence ideology. Alan Sked may have exaggerated when he stated that "in 1914 no one in the Habsburg Monarchy, save for a few hot-headed students who lacked popular support, was in favour of breaking it up or dismantling it,"[2194] however he was not far off. Much of this could be put down to the overall popularity of the sovereign, especially with the middle classes and peasants: a popularity that led Hans Kohn to call Franz Josef "a grandfather figure".[2195]

The Empire remained beset by enormous variations in economic output from within the empire, which (we have seen) were both beneficial and detrimental, depending on the specific analytical perspective being used. The core regions of the Habsburg Economy – the Austrian

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[2191] Omre, *op.cit.,* p. 107. As, (in his own words) crushing Austria would mean "the weakening of an empire in which I saw our best and safest ally for the future".

[2192] Schulze & Wolff, Borders, *op.cit.,* p. 2.

[2193] Whiteside, *op.cit.,* p. 163.

[2194] Alan Sked, "The European Empires: A Case of Fall Without Decline?" in E. Brix, K. Koch, & E. Vyslonzil. (eds.), *The Decline of Empires* (Vienna, 2001), p. 151.

[2195] Kohn, Collapse, *op.cit.,* p. 253.

Crownlands, Bohemia and parts of Moravia, and Western Hungary – were growing faster than England from after 1910.[2196] The peripheral economic regions, however, including Transylvania, Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, were falling behind within the Empire.[2197] The European 'great power' dynamic that had caused the Habsburg Empire to initiate strategies to catch up in the mid-nineteenth century, was arguably repeated (save the military aspect) within the *very same* imperial structure.

What brought the empire to this point, in sixty years? What had changed in the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure, and was this affecting how well the imperial project was operating? For a start, by 1914, the Habsburg Empire effectively had another form of empire – or 'imperial body' – contained within it. Another way to look at it was that it was a supranational state (the empire) with imperial power, which it also exercised over the Austrian half of the empire (Cisleithania), but it also had a quasi-independent, imperial-styled entity still ultimately under the tutelage of the Emperor (Transleithania). The Empire was effectively an 'umbrella' covering both halves of the realm. By 1914 this 'umbrella', represented the sovereign, the army and navy (represented by an imperial Ministry of War), foreign affairs and diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and an imperial common market, financial system, currency, and after 1878 the administration of the former Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ministry of Finance). The Sanjak of Novi Pazar had been surrendered in 1908.

9.2.   Habsburg Imperial Power Structure of 1914

In short, the Imperial Power Structure of the Austrian Empire in 1914 can be summarised thus: the Core was the Emperor Franz Josef, who was, despite the enormous increase in representative institutions (and their remit) over the previous sixty years, still the final arbiter. His stature had increased enormously since 1854, although it took some subjects a very long time to get used to his role in a constitutional system.[2198] He was still genuinely in the belief that he was the 'father' to all his different peoples, regardless of disturbances and destabilisation. He was far more prone to wear this emotion on his sleeve than the Russian tsars, and this did not go unnoticed across his subject populations. For example, when Crown Prince Rudolf died in 1889, he wrote a moving open letter "*An Meine Völker!*" which included passages like:

[2196] David F. Good, "Economic Transformation in Central Europe: The View from History", Working Paper 92-1, January 1992, http://www.cas.umn.edu/assets/pdf/WP921.PDF, accessed 25 September 2010, last accessed 29 November 2014, p. 5.

[2197] *Ibid.*

[2198] TNA: Lytton to Granville, Vienna, October 28 1871, FO 120/490:34. He wrote: "The fact is, most of the Austrian populations look upon the Emperor as a Tribal Chief, the natural guardian of local interest and national traditions which have been treated without sympathy or discrimination by the German Bourgeoisie Governments and Parties at Vienna. These populations have no parliamentary experience and cannot accustom themselves to regard the Emperor as a Constitutional Sovereign having no Government initiative or direct personal relations with his people."

With a feeling of deepest thankfulness I feel that the bonds of mutual affection and loyalty which unite me and my house with all the peoples of my monarchy but gain in strength and firmness in the hour of heavy trial, and therefore in my own name and in that of the Empress and Queen my beloved Consort, and in the name of my deeply afflicted daughter in law I feel impelled to return thanks from a full heart for all these manifestations of affectionate sympathy.[2199]

The Emperor was supported by the Inner Court; selected members of the great noble families, which in the time from *Ausgleich* to 1914 numbered about 474, according to research undertaken by William Godsey. They were mostly counts and princes.[2200] Access to the court was still policed, with extreme diligence, by the Court Bureaucracy and the Grand Chamberlain. Indeed, not one person was admitted to court during the reign of Franz Josef primarily on the basis of their standing in finance or business.[2201] Supporting the Emperor were Imperial Ministers and the Army High Command.

So far, this looks all too similar to the Imperial Power Structure of 1854. The higher nobility, although less influential in certain arenas such as the Army High Command, had in itself barely changed. To give an illustrative example that could be repeated across the empire – of the top ten largest aristocratic families (and by association courtiers in Vienna) in Moravia in 1875, only one had dropped out of this select group nearly forty years later.[2202] The 'sub-core' included the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic corps. Although still mostly from the nobility, the lists of imperial ambassadors and envoys would include many Hungarians and others from across the Empire.[2203] Of the nobles, most were still landowners; only five were industrialists. [2204] They were delicately split between diplomats from both sides of the Empire – if the top post in the Foreign Ministry was occupied from a diplomat from Cisleithania, the next most-senior post would be filled from Hungary, and so on.[2205] Slowly, the nationality footprint was being broadened. [2206]

The imperial bureaucracies of the three joint ministries can be included here, as can the Upper House in Vienna who, as a peer body, should be highlighted as they were a vital link in the chain connecting the laws passed in these bodies with the imperial sanction needed for them to take effect. [2207] Efforts to broaden the footprint of the Upper House in Vienna would fail in 1906 but were fairly forward thinking for the time, as it included a large number of life peers who put

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[2199] TNA: Paget to Salisbury, Vienna, February 2 1889, FO 120/671:37. Translation from *Wiener Zeitung*, February 5 1889.

[2200] Godsey, Aristocratic Redoubt *op.cit.*, p. 62. Nobles could attend court provided they could "provide twelve noble quarterings", p. 66. Although new applicants had to prove sixteen aristocratic ancestors, *ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

[2201] *Ibid.*, 87.

[2202] *Ibid.*, 85.

[2203] Bruckmüller, Habsburg Society, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

[2204] Godsey, Aristocratic Redoubt, *op.cit.*., p. 61.

[2205] *Ibid.*, p. 130. All had to be competent in German, *Ibid.*, p. 157.

[2206] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, February 2 1911, FO 120/883:24. Cartwright reported that in 1911, Count Aehrenthal "drew attention to the fact that last year more Slavs than Germans were admitted to the Consular Academy".

[2207] Höbelt, Parties, *op.cit.*, p. 50.

the body many decades ahead of like similar assemblies such as the House of Lords in the United Kingdom.[2208] Finally, ministerial bureaucrats, still heavily 'German', can be found both here, and in the 'core-in-periphery', depending on their geographic remit.[2209]

The 'core-in-periphery' had changed little. The presence of imperial army garrisons, and the imperial bureaucracy in all territories had intensified their pivotal role in the Imperial Power Structure and remained a constant reminder to the likes of the Hungarians, as we have seen. Where change becomes more noticeable is in the lower 'sub-core', and the 'higher and lower periphery'. The governing classes in the *Reichsrat* in Vienna and the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest also belong at this level, due to their specific relationship with the Emperor, and their propensity to work against the interests of the Empire at the same time. In effect, as *overall* bodies if not individual people, they straddled the 'sub-core' and 'higher periphery'. This includes the Delegations that came from these bodies, to whom the imperial ministers were subject to "for the proper discharge of their functions",[2210] as well as the governing classes in the Cisleithanian Diets, who had more peripheral tendencies, and the municipal councils in Cisleithania. Lower house politicians were also part of this group; non-existent until 1867, by 1914 they were answerable to a broad electorate.[2211] With power came responsibility, especially with the national voting registers in Cisleithania, which meant that Czechs would vote for Czech parties only, and so on.[2212] Finally, the Hungarian parliament was multi-faceted. Although at the centre of the Transleithanian core, with respect to the overall Imperial Power Structure they were part 'core-in-periphery' (as they were ultimately responsible to the emperor), part 'sub-core' and part periphery. The Polish governing clique in Lviv was similar.

The position of the Catholic Church, however, is difficult to ascertain. Although there were still ten archbishops and seven bishops in the Upper House[2213] and the Emperor was never shy in appropriating religious symbolism such as the annual Corpus Christi procession,[2214] the Church had lost influence after the aforementioned revocation of the Concordat due to the Declarations of Papal Infallibility in 1870.[2215] Habsburg monarchs has used the Corpus Christi procession since the early seventeenth century to portray a "reverence of the Eucharist", building

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[2208] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, January 25, 1906, FO 371/6/6. Minister-President Gautsch wanted to incorporate mayors of provincial capitals, provincial Diet presidents, and representatives from Chambers of Commerce and large landowners.

[2209] Whiteside, *op.cit.,* p. 164. In 1914, across fourteen central ministries in Vienna, including the three joint imperial ministries, 80 per cent of officials were 'German'.

[2210] TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 8 1907, FO 120/840:22.

[2211] *Ibid.* He reported that: "All Austrian male subjects are entitled to vote who have completed their 24th year, are in possession of their civil rights and have been domiciled at least one year in the electoral district in which their vote is recorded."

[2212] *Ibid.*

[2213] *Ibid.*

[2214] Martin Schulze Wessel, "Religion, Politics and the Limits of Imperial Integration – Comparing the Habsburg Monarchy and the Russian Empire" in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.) *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), p. 346.

[2215] Johnstone, *op.cit.,* p. 56.

an unbreakable link between the Church and the dynasty.[2216] Ostensibly in return for pious service (and reverence) for the Church, the dynasty was rewarded with divine sanction.[2217] By the Jubilee year of 1898, however, the Emperor had superseded the Church at the event. In the words of James Shedel, "by 1898 it had evolved from a popular religious festival into a highly structured dynastic ceremony in which the Church played a secondary, supporting role. The emperor had become the center of attention."[2218]

In addition, as Ernst Bruckmüller has argued, their "integrative power" had been lost as well – collateral damage stemming from the rise of collective national groups.[2219] Politically, the Holy See was often as much an annoyance as an ally. Ambassador Cartwright reported on the low influence of the Papal Nuncio in Vienna from 1904-1911, a formerly very powerful position:

> *The Papal Nuncio leaves Vienna without having had the Cardinal's berretta placed upon his head by the Emperor, and apparently without having received official intimation from the Pope that his holiness intends to confer the dignity of a Cardinal upon him. This is generally taken here as an indication of the strained relations which at present exist between the Austro-Hungarian Government and the Vatican.*[2220]

Although arguably jettisoned as organised foci in the Imperial Power Structure due to individual alliances and clerical membership, the Church arguably survived in the 'sub-core/higher periphery' ideologically through the likes of Karl Lueger's *Christlichsoziale Partei*. Even then, as John Boyer has argued with regards the party in Vienna: "the party wore its religion lightly – it was as much 'Christian' as it was 'Catholic'" – in short, it was a party in service of German *speaking* 'Christians'.[2221] Indeed, Catholicism overall arguably indicated more of an ideological connection than loyalty to the Vatican, and even then, as Erich Zöllner noted, "only a part of the Catholic populace, not a small one, to be sure, advocated views which might be labelled as 'political Catholicism'".[2222]

With regard to Hungary, the official state powers of the Catholic Church (including control over primary education), came face-to-face with a general wave of anti-clericalism that grew worse over time – by the 1890s Taylor called it "the latest sounding board for Magyar chauvinism." [2223] Just how entrenched this anti-clericalism was could be seen in 1895, when the Imperial Foreign Affairs Minister, Kálnoky paid with his job after trying to stem anti-clericalism

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[2216] James Shedel, "Emperor, Church, and People: Religion and Dynastic Loyalty During the Golden Jubilee of Franz Josef", *The Catholic History Review*, Vol. LXXVI, No. 1 (Jan., 1990), pp. 77-78.

[2217] *Ibid.* p. 77. He also argued that: "the Corpus Christi procession was the link between the past and the present of Habsburg legitimacy". p. 78.

[2218] *Ibid.*, p. 78. He added that: "although Franz Josef took the adoration of the Eucharist seriously, he saw it as a cherished opportunity to show himself to the people".

[2219] Bruckmüller, Habsburg Society, *op.cit.*, p. 10. Friedrich Engel-Janosi, "The Church and the Nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy", *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. 3, Issue 03 (Jan. 1967), p. 82, concluded that there were grievances within the Empire concerning the Church "taking a partisan attitude in national questions".

[2220] TNA: Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, January 5 1911, FO 120/883:4.

[2221] Boyer, Culture and Political Crisis, *op.cit.*, pp. 164-165.

[2222] Zöllner, *op.cit.*, p. 225.

[2223] Taylor, *op.cit.*, p. 195.

in Hungary. [2224] Overall, Martin Schulze Wessel claims that Russia and Austria had been diverging in the role of formal religion in the empire since the nineteenth century, with Austrians showing "an increasing indifference towards the state religion," and Russia shifting towards a "nationalization of religion". [2225]

The higher, or organized/sanctioned peripheries included distinct national groups of, Czechs, Italians, Ruthenes, Slovenes, as well as Austrian Serbs, Croats and Romanians. Joining them were Social Democrats (who, unlike their international brethren, had a moderately strong national bent) and German nationalists/Pan-Germans. The Croats of Croatia-Slavonia sit here because of their particular relationship with the Hungarians due to the *Nagodba*. Due to the limitations for effective national organisation, the other major national groups in Transleithania arguably sat a lower level, straddling the 'general periphery' – Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs, joined by the subjects of Bosnia & Herzegovina. The masses of all nationalities made up the rest of the 'general periphery'.

Some groups which had been at the 'core' of historic sub-systems saw these revived and maintained after *Ausgleich* – for example Italians in the Adriatic Littoral, with Slovenes and Croats as their peripheral peoples, and the Poles in Galicia over the Ruthenes. Finally, it is quite clear that there was a significant external influence (direct and indirect) on the Imperial Power Structure – from all bordering powers large or small, and France and the United Kingdom to boot. In short, the number and strength of the lower sub-core and peripheries (and groups that straddled both levels) in the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure was the most significant change to occur over this sixty-year period, closely followed by the introduction of legitimized political space at multiple levels across the empire.

The dynasty still naturally commanded distributive, extensive and particularly authoritative power, and a greater degree of diffused power. In the Imperial Power Structure of 1914, the dynasty still exercised considerable military power, with the same issues from 1854 remaining – local power over the supply of soldiers and funding. The degree of dynastic control here had ebbed away somewhat, although this as much from an expansion of the overall footprint of available military power (for example, in concessions such as the *Honvédség*) as from changes in the power ratios between the core and the peripheries. The dynasty held considerable economic and political power, but far less than it had in 1854. However, due to the modernisation of the state through the importation of nation-state ideological frameworks, the intersections of sources of social power were stronger than in 1854. For example, there was less scope for (mostly) independent economic power than before. The imperial hold over ideological power stood fast. Where disdain would increase for the Empire itself, the ideological bonds to the person of the Emperor were far stronger than they had been. [2226] This loyalty would generally traverse class and

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[2224] *Ibid.*
[2225] Wessel, *op.cit.,* p. 357.
[2226] Of Frederich Engel-Janosi's father: "If a decree were to order that every Austrian had to wear black and yellow socks, I would still go into the street today with black and yellow socks on". Quoted in Bruckmüller, Habsburg Society, *op.cit.,* p. 6.

nation – the bourgeoisie that had grown enormously under his rule were a case in point. In addition, the Empire's Jewish population was fiercely loyal to their Emperor. There were now numerous poles of ideological power, some intersecting, all overlapping to some degree to the dynasty, and the concept of the empire itself.

Diagram 4: Approximation of the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure, 1914

9.3.   The Russian Empire in 1914

In some areas, the Russian Empire had changed even more than the Habsburg over the previous 60 years. On the eve of the First World War, the Russian Empire was a member of the Triple Entente (with France and Great Britain); its old, traditional links to the reactionary German states (including Austria) had been broken – in part due to fears about the rise of the German Empire, in part due to a sense of betrayal from Austria dating back to the Crimean War. Tensions with the Habsburg Empire periodically reignited, as happened in 1908 over the Bosnian Crisis. Since the Crimean War, Russia had arguably also undertaken a bolder series of reform than Austria, as the Russian Empire had an even higher mountain to climb. Russia was still a great power, like Austria, and unlike the Habsburgs (Bosnia excepted), it had continued to expand, both in Central Asia and the Far East. Russian nationalism and the notion of 'Russianness' had developed from an intellectual debate topic, but remained intrinsically tied with Orthodoxy.[2227] Finally, it bears repeating that since August 1881, the empire had been living under the shadow of Pobedonostev's "Temporary Regulations" – in essence a permanent state of emergency.

Paul Kennedy was right when he summarised that "Russia in the decades prior to 1914 was simultaneously powerful *and* weak."[2228] Powerful, in that their human, resource and industrial potential (not to mention actual population and geographic scale) was at the very top of the 'great power club'. The imperial population was well beyond the 125 million plus reported by the 1897 Census, with an average per annum population growth of around 1.5% between 1867 and 1913, estimated to be double the rate of the previous fifty years.[2229] This population was becoming somewhat healthier and more educated, and the (industrial) economy had boomed since the early 1890s (with an expected downturn around the 1905 revolution). Weak, in that although the economic boom showed growth rates comparable to the other 'great powers' over the same time period, this would be tempered by the fact that they had not caught up enough. Indeed, by the parameters that they were judging themselves, such a catch up would be impossible in the time before 1914, even at the high rates their economy was growing. In addition, their societal structure was fragile, as would be proven during the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. Whether because of circumstance, the nature of the head start they had conceded, the natural Russian turn to 'reaction', or through how they had implemented reforms, on all other indicators – education, military reform, social mobility, not to mention in the political arena – they could not reach the level of progress required to approach comparative parity with the 'great power' with whom they were most wary of by this time, the Hohenzollern German Empire. Yet, they *had* made discernable progress and, further political shocks excepted, would have continued to do so if not for the First World War.

[2227] Wessel, *op.cit.,* p. 357, noted that "in the late nineteenth century religious identities were predominantly considered according to their relationship to the Russian national identity."
[2228] Kennedy, *op.cit.,* p. 300.
[2229] Hoch, Numbers, *op.cit.,* p. 58

9.4.   Russian Imperial Power Structure of 1914

In short, the Imperial Power Structure of the Russian Empire in 1912 can be summarised thus: the Core was the Tsar Nicholas II, supported by reactionaries in the Inner Court, who as reported by Bernard Pares were "the most serious enemies of Constitutionalism".[2230] A 1907 British Embassy report gave the opinion that the Grand Dukes had seen their influence lessened, as had other court officials, although they still had the ear of the royal family.[2231] The report also reported that:

The Court officials may have opportunities of which they take advantage, of placing glosses on the information with which the Emperor is supplied, and of putting matters in the light which they may think desirable; but I do not believe that any Court official is in the position of an occult Councillor, or that the Emperor would turn to them for advice and guidance.[2232]

"Emperor" plus "occult councillor" in the same sentence evokes the legend that was Rasputin, although he was not a court 'official', per se.

The 'sub-core' included Imperial Ministers, the Army General Staff and the Orthodox Church – who had six seats guaranteed on the Council of the Empire.[2233] Indeed, the position of Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod still carried enormous prestige, although not to the degree it had under Pobedonostev. The State Council was still a part of the 'sub-core' – even during such nationalistic times and after decades of Russification, at least 12% of its pre-War membership weren't Orthodox, which of course denoted 'Russian'.[2234] In its pre-War form, half of its members were elected by separate curia including clergy, nobility, *zemstva*, universities, bourses and chambers of commerce, and regional governments without *zemstva*.[2235] Complementing them was the Senate and the Council of Ministers, which had in 1906 evolved from the Committee of Ministers. The latter body was transmogrified from an organisation with an extraordinary hodge-podge of members, to a true, streamlined ministerial council.[2236]

The leadership of the Imperial Duma, especially the person of the Prime Minister, belongs on this level. We have seen how much power Prime Minister Stolypin (in particular) of the Third Duma would wield when he forced Nicholas II into accepting his Western Zemstvo

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[2230] BDFA: Memorandum on the Third Duma, including a Sketch of Developments in Russia from June 3, 1908, Mr B. Pares , Tver Province, BDFA V5, pp. 149-170.

[2231] BDFA: Report of the British Embassy in St. Petersburg. January 1907, BDFA V4, pp. 281-303.

[2232] *Ibid.*

[2233] TNA: *Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg, Ukase* of 20 February, 1906. Three were from monastic orders, and three were secular clergy.

[2234] Of the 215 State Council members who sat in the twenty years before the First World War. Mirinov, *op.cit.,* p. 4.

[2235] BDFA: Report of the British Embassy in St. Petersburg. January 1907, BDFA V4, pp. 281-303.

[2236] TNA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, May 9 1906, FO 371/125/305. It had previously included "all the Ministers, but it also comprised six Grand Dukes, the President of the Council of the Empire, the Procurator of the Holy Synod, all the Presidents of the various Standing Committees of the Council of Empire, the Director of the Empress Marie's Charities, the Viceroy of the Caucasus, the Controller of the Empire and the Secretary of the Empire […] it has often contained other officials such as the Secretary of State for Finland, and even the Director of the Imperial Studs."

plan in 1911. The leadership of the Duma lower house belongs here as well, although their position was tenuous – whereas the State Council was mostly a Government rubber stamp, with a "large element subservient to the bureaucracy",[2237] the lower house – apart from being subject to prorogue on imperial whim, could have proceedings "made secret by the arbitrary will of any Minister" and were subject to prosecution for criticizing the government, even on the floor.[2238] Finally, the imperial bureaucracy remains on this level. As with the Habsburg Empire, if there were bourgeois industrialists within this tier, it was primarily due to their noble status.

The new political landscape also saw the rise of lobby groups, such as United Nobility, representing landowners who had perceived the focus of the government change to the peasantry.[2239] They belonged in at once the 'sub-core' and the 'periphery', as did the remaining great landowners, who were slowly losing their influence – landed estate holders, by 1903, made up 'only' 46 of State Council members, 10 of 24 ministers, and 85 of 183 Senators, which may sound like a high number but represents a dissolution of power over the previous sixty years.[2240] Although the overall body of nobles was increasing, the number of Russian speaking hereditary nobles remained remarkably low for such a Russifying empire – between 1861 and 1904, for example, only 53% of hereditary nobles spoke Russian, whereas still over 28% spoke Polish.[2241]

The 'core-in-periphery' was comprised of regional Governors General and Governors of *Guberniyas*, and the standing army and navy. Governors General had waned in influence in some areas and increased in others. In some regions, they often, in Mark von Hagen's words, "combined civil and military rule in one person".[2242] The Orthodox Church could also be considered a part of the 'core-in-periphery' as well, in a way that the Catholic Church could never be in post-*Ausgleich* Austria. However, their standing amongst the masses was on the decline. As Attaché Michell reported as early as 1888, "it appears to be losing, except in matters of religious superstition, the slight hold it formerly had on the respect of the people."[2243]

Also on this level could be considered Land Captains, introduced during Alexander III's reign to police the *zemstva*. Those bodies, and the city councils, had evolved into at once a 'sub-core', in that they were regional bodies enacting the policies required by the core, and a 'periphery', in that they had formed into contrasting power poles to the core. Ideologically, they

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[2237] BDFA: Spring Rice to Grey, St Petersburg, March 14 1906, BDFA V4, pp. 11-12.
[2238] *Ibid.*
[2239] Hosking, Stolypin, *op.cit.,* pp. 140-141. The Council of United Nobility was a strong supporter of retaining the *Soslovie* system. Freeze would write that "as the records of the council's congresses show, its members were not blind to the erosion in the estate system but believed that, at least in rural Russia, the *sosloviia* [singular] still provided the primary form of social identification." Freeze, Soslovie, *op.cit.,* p. 34.
[2240] Hamburg, Nobility, *op.cit.,* p. 14.
[2241] *Ibid.,* pp. 11. Hereditary nobility grew by almost 63% between 1870 and 1897, and the non-hereditary nobility grew by around 54%, according to a study by A.P. Korelin. *Ibid.,* p. 10
[2242] von Hagen, Russia, *op.cit.,* p. 62.
[2243] BDFA: Memorandum by Michell on the Present Economic State of Russia, St. Petersburg, September 21 1888, BDFA V2, pp. 218-232. This comment was prefaced by: "The attempt to induce the clergy to educate the masses has frequently been made in Russia, but never with any real success. The clergy has always shown indifference and laxity in that direction, and it does not even now possess that moral standing which would enable it to exercise a wholesome influence over the peasantry."

would swing toward 'peripheral' the closer they came to 1905. The Baltic *Landtage* and the Diet of Finland had seen a similar trajectory since the 1880s and 1900 respectively, without much counter-balance after 1905. This level also saw some intelligentsia, non-noble industrialists and financiers, the growing trade associations, and right wing Duma representatives – on whom the Tsar was relying in the Third and Fourth Dumas in particular. Other Duma parties fell into the higher periphery over time.

In 1854 there were no true 'higher peripheries', but by 1914 this level was bursting at the seams. It included national elites or 'leaders' of all national groups in European Russia excepting the Baltic Germans, Ukrainians and Belarusians; the former as they straddled the sub-core, and the latter two due to their treatment as 'Little Russians' and 'White Russians', which meant they did not have the organisational opportunities of the other national communities. The Finnish nobility and Polish landowners in 'Vistula Land' and the western borderlands, who maintained a lesser, but real, degree of localised hegemonies, sat at this level, as did organised peasant movements, and the socio-political movements that (for the most part) boycotted the Duma, including Social Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks. The 'general periphery' was enormous, consisting of workers, students, (some) intellectuals, and peasants (who were breaking their ideological tie with the Tsar) of all nationalities.

As with Austria, the Russian Empire was still a traditional, elite-based, non-national Imperial Power Structure. Typical of such empires, the power of the regime was distributive rather than collective and extensive rather than intensive. Notably in this instance, there was also a delicate balance between authoritative and diffused power – the latter represented by the shared (although waning) belief sets and practices of the imperial peasantry, that the person of the tsar was their intermediary with god. This diffused power was wavering. The structure was noticeable for an enormous increase in competing collective, intensive and diffused power at the level of 'sub-core', and even more so in the higher and general periphery, many having developed within the last generation, bringing the Russian Imperial Power Structure closer into line with the Habsburg system, where such competing power poles emerged a generation earlier.

In the Imperial Power Structure of 1854, the dynasty held the predominant share of military power, and with respect to formalised violence for the needs of the state, their share was almost absolute. The only element that stopped the tsar from controlling state military power entirely, since universal conscription, was the power of the Duma and regional bodies such as the *zemstva* to withhold resources to the imperial army. The Revolution in 1905 had proved, just as the 1848/49 Revolutions had done for Austria, that the potential for losing a share of imperial military power was immense.

At the imperial level, the imperial regime held practically absolute economic and political power. On the regional and local level, elements of economic and political power were in the hands of semi-autonomous bodies and persons, however, this again is standard for such a traditional system. Overall, the political space had increased dramatically after 1905 – therefore most groups (and all 'national') strove for a greater piece of it. The imperial hold over ideological

power was modest, and growing ever more so. In addition, the Tsar did not enjoy the growing (and glowing) admiration that Franz Josef received from the multitude of groups in the Habsburg Empire – if anything; the trajectory for the Romanov dynasty went in the other direction. Nor could the Tsar be the 'binding agent' that helped hold the imperial Russian polity together, that Franz Josef was for Austria-Hungary.[2244]

Diagram 5: Approximation of the Russian Imperial Power Structure, 1914

CORE	Tsar Nicholas II

| **SUB-CORE** | • Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod   • Imperial Chancery
• Inner Court

• Orthodox Church   • Imperial Ministers   • State Council
• Great Nobility   • Council of Ministers   • Senate
• Army High Command

• State Bureaucracy   • Duma leadership | **CORE-IN-PERIPHERY**
• Governors General
• *Guberniya* governors
• Imperial army garrisons
• State Bureaucracy

• Baltic German elites |

| **SUB-CORE / PERIPHERY** | • *zemstva*/city councils   • Large landowners
• Nobles associations   • Intelligentsia (some)
• Trade associations   • Right wing Duma representatives
• Industrialists/financiers (non noble) |

| **ORGANISED / SANCTIONED PERIPHERY** | • Centre/Left/National Duma parties
• Peasant organisations

Nationalities (all factions)
• Polish   • Latvian
• Lithuanian   • Finnish
• Estonian | • Finnish Diet

• Polish landowners outside the Kingdom
• Nobles in Finland |
| | • Social Revolutionaries • Bolsheviks | Nationalities (all factions)
• Ukrainian • Belarusian |

| **GENERAL PERIPHERY** | • Peasants
• Workers
• Soldiers
• Students
• Intelligentsia (some) |

[2244] Ebeling, *op.cit.,* p. 5. In his words: "What held the Austro-Hungarian Empire together was its Emperor, Francis Joseph."

9.5. Comparing Imperial Power Structures, 1854 to 1914

Diagram 6: The Habsburg Imperial Power Structure: 1854 vs 1914

1854

1914

Diagram 7:   The Russian Imperial Power Structure: 1854 vs 1914

1854

1914

9.6.   Introducing the Ottoman Empire

This section will introduce as a third entity – the Ottoman Empire – to this work in order to further examine the imperial condition at the intersection of the 'nation' and empire. Of all of the imperial entities of the period examined in this work, it was the Ottoman Empire that was closest to the Habsburg and Russian Empires in two areas: they too had to manage the dynamic of the growth and effect of the 'nation' on its Imperial Power Structure, and needed to 'catch up' ('keep afloat' would be more appropriate for the Ottomans) with the European 'great power' club. It will be noted for brevity, intended to provide a comparative marker to the Habsburg and Russian Imperial Power Structures at the same point, and ideally to test whether the fundamental principles of this work out are viable for investigating the broader family of historical empires.

The most notable feature of the Ottoman Imperial Power Structure in the mid-nineteenth century was the lack of a 'classic' core/periphery relationship that historiography associates with modern empire. However, utilising the core/periphery model subtleties developed in this work theirs was a more extreme, earlier version of the mid-century Russian model. The geographic imperial core was Constantinople, demonstrably so, as the focus of Ottoman ideological power, and the geopolitical core of the empire was the Balkan Provinces, due to its sensitive location as a buffer to the capital, its wealth relative to the rest of the empire, and hundreds of years of being the primary arena for battles with European armies.[2245] In this respect, the Balkans resembled the Kingdoms of Poland and Bohemia in the Russian and Habsburg Empires respectively.

When it came to the sovereign, there was a divergence. The Sultan, although still standing at the peak of the system, could never establish the level of power concentration and blanket loyalty from powerful members of the 'sub-core' that so supported the tsars and the Emperor after the resignation of Ferdinand in 1848 (indeed, of the four Sultans that reigned in the period between 1861 and the First World War, Abdülaziz I, Murad V and Abdülhamid II were deposed, and the fourth, Mehmed V, ruled as a figurehead after the Young Turk uprising of 1908). Two common conditions of empire stand out for the Ottomans: First, they were classic status group creators and divide-and-rule practitioners, and as the events of the nineteenth and early twentieth century proved, they were entirely sensitive to, and reliant on geopolitics, as this section will make apparent.

 Ottoman elites did not feel Turkish; indeed they believed 'Turk' was a provincial, derogatory term.[2246] This was similar, albeit more extreme, to how some elites in the Russian Empire considered being 'Russian' at mid-nineteenth century – as previously noted the notion of what it actual meant to be 'Russian' was still being formulated at this time. Overall, with regard to emerging nationalities, the Ottomans were more like the Austrians, in that they had to manage acute problems on numerous 'fronts' that in a way became the imperial *modus operandi*; with

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[2245] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* pp. 130-132.
[2246] *Ibid.,* p. 133.

regards to internal political structures, they were more like the Russians. They looked to the west earlier (out of grave necessity) and yet were much slower to have numerous reforms bear fruit. Their traditional system of managing their diverse population was founded upon the 'Millet', a segmentation system based on religious rather than ethnic allegiance that allowed considerable autonomy on the one hand, and imposed specific restrictions on different populations on the other.[2247] For Christians this meant a special taxation and legal discrimination, as well as travel restrictions that evoked controls on Russian serfs.[2248] In turn, it traditionally meant a 'light hand' from Ottoman authorities. The Millet produced a ready-made divided and defined societal structure to face the waves of nationalism that would sweep across the empire. In effect, the framework for internal national peripheral development was far more set than that in Austria, and much more than that in the Russian Empire. At the same time, the Christian communities in the empire were economically the strongest (and growing stronger still), and had the support of the European powers, often used as a geopolitical football, as we saw during the Crimean War.

Sultan Selim III drove the initial reach out to the west during the Napoleonic era, resulting in French-inspired reforms regarding weaponry and military tactics, and the opening of military academies, although these initiatives were short lived. Richard S. Horowitz called them the earliest attempt to "adapt indigenous institutions to the new situations followed by much more systematic efforts to use European models".[2249] The Sultan also attempted financial and administrative reform, and opened permanent missions in London, Paris, Vienna and Berlin, exposing young Ottoman diplomats to new ideologies.[2250] This was followed by the dissolution by Mahmud II of the Janissary Corps in 1826, complete with administrative centralisation, further military reform and peasant conscription, as well as Western European training programmes.[2251] They also showed a willingness to engage with data science, conducting a census in Anatolia and the Balkans in 1831, in essence to establish how many non-Muslims should pay the poll tax and how many Muslim men could be enlisted into military service.[2252]

In addition, they were loosening their grip on certain strategic Balkan territories, such as those that would become independent Serbia and Romania later in the century.[2253] The regime had realised that the Ottoman army was becoming out-dated, a feeling heightened by Mohammad Ali's incursions during the 1830s (which caused a shock similar to Crimea for the

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[2247] Wayne S. Vucinich, "The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Dec., 1962), pp. 605-606.

[2248] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 151.

[2249] Richard S. Horowitz, "International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century, *Journal of World History*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), p. 459.

[2250] Yapp, *op.cit.,* pp. 99-100..

[2251] The Janissary end was brutal, with as many as 6,000 executed empire-wide, see *ibid.,* p. 104. Also see Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 342, who noted that the removal of the Janissaries was the prelude to a move toward a more direct, centralised high command structure.

[2252] Mehmet Hacisalihoglu, "Borders, Maps and Censuses – The Politicization of Geography and Statistics in the Multi-Ethnic Ottoman Empire", in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.) *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), pp. 174-175.

[2253] 1829 saw Ottoman control over Romania, already quite loose, become mostly symbolic, and Serbia was granted full autonomy the following year. See Yapp, *op.cit.,* pp. 61-63.

Russians and Königgrätz for the Austrians), which led to another reform push, with further administrative centralisation, including a broader remit for the imperial bureaucracy and the ministries. They were aiming to bypass the traditional imperial intermediaries, by growing the civil service, in a manner practised in Western Europe, and the Austria of Maria Theresa and Joseph II.[2254]

The 1830s also saw bold education reforms including a formalised school infrastructure and instruction overseen by European experts (with instruction in French), with a primary aim of increasing the number of educated medical doctors and military officers. Officials who had been encouraged to travel to Europe were behind these initiatives. [2255] The *Tanzimat* (the Reorganisation, 1839-1871) followed, which although liberal and influenced by eighteenth-century rationalism, were in fact driven by bureaucratic challenges. [2256] Sultan Abdulmecid I introduced them to help better prepare the Empire to face the challenges from Russia and Europe. In the words of Burbank and Cooper, he "issued an edict guaranteeing the security of subjects' lives, honor, and property, declaring that they would be taxed according to their means and proclaiming all subjects, of whatever religion, legal equals".[2257] It was also hoped this would lessen the traditional chasm between the central state and imperial subjects.[2258]

At the same time, further centralisation would ideally control regional magnates, who were: "*local* in the true sense of that word. Their wealth depended largely upon their exploitation of the weaknesses of the centre in the localities. They were never able to and/or were interested in translating their economic power into central political power".[2259] Notably these reforms were introduced over a much longer time frame than those in Russia and the Habsburg Empire. What they shared with their imperial kin was the driving role of the imperial bureaucracy, and with respect to Russia, a similar cyclical pattern of reform and reaction. Indeed, the strong reactionary wave caused by the *Tanzimat* would even lead later Sultans to retreat into court.[2260] These empires also shared the need for information. Further (albeit still limited) censuses, were undertaken in 1840 and from 1844 to register households, and as with Russia in 1897, there was resistance from parts of the populace, who were fearful they were a prelude to new taxes.[2261]

The 1840s saw moves to centralise education, with the formation of a Ministry of Education (1847). [2262] European influence was heavy in the new Commercial Codes (1850), with

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[2254] *Ibid*, p. 106 & Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 343. The imperial bureaucracy grew from around 2,000 at the end of the eighteenth century to near to 35,000 in 1908.

[2255] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 343.

[2256] Metin Heper, "Centre and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century, *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Studies in System Transformation (1980), p. 91. Also see Yapp, *op.cit.,* p. 119 & Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 136.

[2257] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 343.

[2258] Heper, *op.cit.,* pp. 91-92. He wrote that: "the political conception underlying the Tanzimat […] was that of a direct and identical relationship between the government and each of its citizens".

[2259] *Ibid.,* p. 96. Emphasis in original.

[2260] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 136.

[2261] Hacisalihoglu, *op.cit.,* pp. 175-176. The questions were limited, as was the geographic footprint. The census that began in 1844 took over ten years to complete.

[2262] Yapp, *op.cit.,* p. 112.

tribunals administered by European as well as Ottoman judges, and the new Penal Code in 1856, which was taken directly from the French model.[2263] Both in education and legal reform, they were which ahead of curve when compared to Russia. All subjects were granted full citizenship in 1856, causing grievances across the board. In general, Christians became wary of their lost autonomy, and Muslims irate at being placed on a par with non-Muslim subjects.[2264] To make the gap between people and the state even smaller, male citizens were given equal rights to hold property just two years later.[2265] In addition, sultans began to cultivate an imperial public image, after a history of relative seclusion, by making ceremonial appearances – for example at the opening of grand buildings and institutions. This also helped close of the gap between subjects and central state, however symbolic.[2266] Finally, "model provinces" were designated as testing beds for reforms, which if successful would be taken to other regions.[2267]

In a manner all too common to the sovereigns in Vienna and St. Petersburg, the *Tanzimat* would instigate a 'pincer-movement' of grievances. Added to the reactionary criticisms was a pushback in the 1860s from liberals who had benefited from a generation of modern education and frequent exposure to European ideals, often first hand – the Young Ottomans. As Fatma Müge Göcek argued, "these Western-educated officials tried to remodel the Ottoman state along Western lines of political and economic centralization, a policy that was not congenial to autonomous provinces".[2268] For them, the reforms did not go far enough, and like many claims making groups in the Habsburg and Russian Empires, they would call for a representative assembly.[2269] From this point on, tensions between reformers and reactionaries would hinder the ability of the Empire to change.

Change was still coming, with a national bank – the *Banque Impériale Ottomane* – chartered in 1863. The Bank had a long and painful gestation period, resembling the difficulties in forming the Austro-Hungarian Bank some fifteen years later.[2270] A programme of further judicial and administrative reorganisation was enacted in 1864, on which Jun Akiba commented:

[2263] *Ibid.*

[2264] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 154.

[2265] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 343.

[2266] Hakan T. Karateke, "From Divine Ruler to Modern Monarch – The Ideal of the Ottoman Sultan in the Nineteenth Century", in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.) *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), pp. 292-293. They also changed their tour routes throughout the empire, to ensure they were travelling where their predecessors had never been, and went far beyond where former Sultans would hazard to travel. For example, Abdülaziz would become the first Sultan to visit Egypt *since it became an Ottoman territory.*

[2267] Jun Akiba, "Preliminaries to a Comparative History of the Russian and Ottoman Empires: Perspectives from Ottoman Studies", in K. Matsuzato (ed.), *Imperiology* (Sapporo, 2007), p. 38.

[2268] Fatma Müge Göcek, "Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Society, *Poetics Today*, Vol. 14, No. 3, Cultural Processes in Muslim and Arab Societies, Modern Period I (Autumn, 1993), p. 533.

[2269] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 344. They noted that: "they called in their London-based newspaper for a constitution and a parliament". This was another reminder of how important Britain and her influence was to the Balkans and the Near East.

[2270] For details see Michelle Raccagni, "The French Economic Interests in the Ottoman Empire", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (May, 1980), pp. 339-376.

It is an interesting coincidence that in exactly the same year both the Russian and Ottoman Empires embarked on a reorganization of local administration and judicial systems. In fact, it was not a mere coincidence because both reforms were directly related to the consequences of the Crimean War. Perhaps the Ottoman counterpart of the Russian system of Zemstvo was the local administrative council set up in each administrative unit, consisting of the local officials and elected members from among the local notables.[2271]

There was a notable attempt in 1869 to introduce primary schools for all different Ottoman communities, which they could run themselves, and quarnic instruction was encouraged for Muslim children.[2272] The similarities with Austria after *Ausgleich* are stark. By 1870, at the beginning of a decade that portended poorly for the future of the empire, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was granted autonomy.[2273] This had long-term repercussions, as the church became a beacon for growing Bulgarian national feeling, a similar dynamic that occurred with various nationalities in Russia and the Habsburg Empire. Indeed, the Bulgarian church began to work in concert with teachers and intellectuals, and Russian agents, in fomenting Bulgarian nationalism and the revolt in 1876.[2274] In addition, this opened up a schism with the Greeks, who were scattered amongst the Empire in a manner (geographically and socio-economically) not too dissimilar from the Poles in the Russian Empire. This dynamic would last to the First World War and beyond. The Ottoman authorities even experimented with a form of 'faith-federalism', making Lebanon an autonomous region with a multi-faith power structure in 1861. This had mixed results, highlighted by endemic disagreement leading to revenue shortfalls. That the initiative happened at all was an indication of success, yet as Dominic Lieven noted, "the local communities could not agree on sufficient levels of tax and conscription to sustain basic order and public services. Lebanon therefore depended on an Ottoman subsidy".[2275] Which defeated the entire purpose of the reform.

In 1876, during the troubles with Serbia and Montenegro, Sultan Abdülhamid II introduced a constitution with a parliament with considerable non-Muslim membership, arguably as a means of controlling peripheries.[2276] However, the Sultan would withdraw the constitution within two years, dissolve parliament, and turn to absolute rule.[2277] During its brief sitting period, there was much criticism of the imperial government from the floor, although just as with the Austrian and Hungarian Parliaments and the Russian Duma, representatives were seeking further rights and privileges *under the auspices* of the empire. The imperial constitution may have blinded the British when it came to settling the dispute between the Ottomans and the

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[2271] Akiba, *op.cit.,* p. 39.

[2272] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 345.

[2273] *Ibid.,* p. 358.

[2274] Craig, *op.cit.,* p. 252.

[2275] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.,* p. 155.

[2276] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 344-345..

[2277] Caglar Keyder, "The Ottoman Empire" Section: Collapse of Empires: Causes, in K. Barkey and M. von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire. Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, 1997). pp. 34-35.

Serbs in 1876, which directly preceded the Russo-Turkish War. After the Turks were forced to negotiate, the British, confident of Ottoman constitutional reforms, pushed the new Sultan, Abdülhamid II, to challenge the Great Power Constantinople Conference meeting to discuss Balkan reforms. The Sultan acceded to the British wishes in January 1877.[2278]

Of course, this added fuel to the Balkan fire, and war inevitably broke out with the Russians, as we have seen in Chapter 4. The subsequent Ottoman defeat led to a further reactionary turn, although they had to be careful with managing the nationalities, which were nominally under 'external protection'. Behind this stood widespread unease with the regime's turn to the west. In addition to the aforementioned import of nation-state ideological frameworks, the enormous reliance on western capital – both loans and investment capital – that had been building since the 1850s,[2279] fuelled reactionary grievances. This was further exacerbated by an imperial economy that had barely changed – overall, it still resembled a European colony: driven by the export of primary goods and import of manufactured goods.[2280] Indeed, they would lose control over their finances after the set up of the Public Debt Administration in 1881 by the British and the French, after imperial bankruptcy.[2281] The Public Debt Administration:

> *Assisted by three major foreign controlled banks, the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the Deutsche Bank and the National Bank of Turkey, strongly directed by political representatives in these persons of the British, French and German Ambassadors. These institutions practically ran the government under the pretext of safeguarding the interests of the creditors.*[2282]

Attempts to better map the potential subject revenue base began in the same year, with a decade long census, for the first time registering females. Indeed, it was notable that they did not ask language questions – ethnicity was still an accepted way to segment the Ottoman population.[2283]

In the period leading to the twentieth century, Abdülhamid turned towards the Muslims of the empire to help build up a new supporting legitimacy. For this, he turned to his other arm of imperial power – the Caliphate. In the words of Azmi Özcan: "the caliphate was the key to the implementation of much of his domestic and foreign policies".[2284] When faced with disputes to this legitimacy, "and to popularize his position as true caliph, many books and pamphlets were published that contained verses from the Qur'an and sayings of the Prophet. The same strategy was employed by newspapers".[2285] It was their version of the Russian strategy of falling back on a

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[2278] Craig, *op.cit.*, p. 253.

[2279] Horowitz, *op.cit.*, p. 473. The first loan was for 55 million Francs in 1851. Manfred Pittioni, "The Economic Decline of the Ottoman Empire" in E. Brix, K. Koch & E. Vyslonzil (eds.) *The Decline of Empires* (Vienna, 2001), p. 33.

[2280] Sevket Pamuk, "The Ottoman Empire in the "Great Depression" of 1873-1896", *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), pp. 108.

[2281] Horowitz, *op.cit.*, p. 473 & Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.*, p. 154.

[2282] Pittioni, *op.cit.*, p. 36.

[2283] Hacisalihoglu, *op.cit.*, p. 179. It was still only a partial overview, as it captured only about 3/5 of the total population, with no data from the provinces in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

[2284] Azmi Özcan, "Imperial Legitimacy and Unity – The Tradition of the Caliphate in the Ottoman Empire", in J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen (eds.) *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, 2012), p. 380.

[2285] *Ibid.* pp. 380-381.

'state' religion. Whilst generally successful in developing a general opinion, the overall situation was becoming critical. The parliament was still suspended and the Ottoman regime found itself juggling the emergence of Pan-Turkish feeling, Arab nationalism (naturally) and the fully-fledged national movements in the Balkans, on top of the traditional/reactionary and European/liberal dichotomy pervading Ottoman elites. Something had to give, and that something would be the Young Turk revolt, in 1908. Not only were the Young Turks an educated, urban middle class movement, supported by the European-trained and styled officer corps, they were notably pluralistic and multi-ethnic.[2286] Their dilemma, as outlined by C.A. Bayly, was that:

> Pan-Turkish feeling was, as yet, not very widespread, though a number of literati had begun to write passionately of Turkish language and culture. The young military officers, who took power in 1908 and restored the constitutions, were in a dilemma. They felt that they needed to consolidate the empire and make it more like a European state. Most of them were still Ottoman patriots at heart, rather than Turkish nationalists.[2287]

They forced the Sultan to restore the moribund constitution, evoking the similar success of the Hungarians with Franz Josef in 1867. From this point, however, the Turkish/Muslim element bubbled to the surface, much as it did in Russia with the Russian 'nation' and Orthodoxy. In effect, the liberalism of the Young Turks was very similar to both Hungarian and Austrian liberalism, in that it developed a nationalist edge once exposed to political power. This can partly be attributed to the fine line they had to navigate: they could not be seen as *too* Turkish, and yet they needed to switch their attention toward Anatolia, as their European possessions were under threat. They also needed to keep Christians on side (for the health of the economy, and for geopolitical reasons),[2288] as well as Arabs, whilst remaining 'essential' to their diverse subject populations. At the same time, in attempting to free the empire from the burden of French loans and the resultant loss of decision-making power, the Young Turks courted the Germans, who in turn began to help reorganise the Ottoman Army, to the chagrin of the French, British and Russians, who were extremely fearful of German influence in the Ottoman military.[2289]

After winning the 1908 elections, which they forced upon the Sultan,[2290] they attempted further centralisation, through trying to introduce Ottoman Turkish as a state language, reforming the bureaucracy, circumventing local intermediaries, and the removing of censorship. They were most concerned about the backwardness of rural populations, in particular.[2291] Arguably, they were trying to formalise a more implicit imperial core/periphery relationship.

[2286] Gildea, *op.cit.,* p. 413, with a membership including Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Armenians, Slavs and Jews.

[2287] C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914* (Oxford, 2004), pp. 213-214.

[2288] Göcek, *op.cit.,* pp. 517, wrote that "for example, to the 1885 statistics on the distribution of professions in Istanbul by religious affiliation, minorities comprised over 60 per cent of the merchants and artisans of the city, but fewer than five per cent were in the service of the Ottoman state".

[2289] Pittioni, *op.cit.,* p. 37 & Kennedy, *op.cit.,* p. 326.

[2290] Keyder, *op.cit.,* p. 36. A result of forcing the revival of the constitution.

[2291] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.,* p. 359.

These moves would alienate the Arabs and Christians, causing claims making on behalf of these populations for Arabic, Greek and Armenian to become equal state languages.[2292] Notably, opposition to the regime and the system could now come out into the open, legally protected, and supported by the new phenomenon of a relatively free opposition press in Constantinople.[2293]

After a counter-revolution in 1909, they prevailed and deposed the Sultan.[2294] What followed was a pushback from opponents who considered the new regime was pushing a form of 'Turkification'.[2295] Dominic Lieven noted that for the Young Turks, in an analysis that could be mistaken for a pastiche of late nineteenth century Russian reformers, liberals and nationalists:

> *Their great enemy was their country's backwardness, which they blamed on the Ottoman regime and, usually, on religion, which they saw as the main cause of the people's ignorance, sloth and conservatism. Their own creed was a rather crude belief in science and materialism, combined with a linguistic and ethnic Turkish nationalism based on European models. They were populists but also great Jacobin elitists, convinced that it was the new Westernized elite's duty to lead the nation to prosperity and power.*[2296]

There was a concurrent liberal movement in parliament between 1909 and 1912, which not unlike liberalism in the Russian Empire (and at various times in the Habsburg Empire, especially during the 1848 revolution) was federalist in outlook.[2297]

The Ottomans, who had a much more complicated, traditional structure, with a larger gap between state and subject (and a far larger gap than Austria) had a much higher mountain to climb. They were at least a century further into their comparative decline. Some elements of the Ottoman elite began pushing for reforms in the eighteenth century, which although bold on their own, would take far longer to implement and bear fruit. It can be argued that the Young Turk movement had its genesis before the *Tanzimat*. Over this long time period, internal peripheries that had been delineated by the Millet system had developed an enormous amount of all four sources of social power, including most importantly, and uniquely amongst these three realms, military. Western interference, the transfer of ideologies,[2298] and considerable Russian military incursions provided a relentless 'feed line' to the emerging nationalities,[2299] who managed to convert their intensive, diffused and collective power into extensive, authoritative and distributive power, as seen in the various uprisings and wars that led to the eventual demise of 'Turkey-in-Europe' between 1877 and 1912. The pre-existing segmentation has been given as the reason

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[2292] *Ibid.*, p. 360.
[2293] Nader Sohrabi, "Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Russia, 1905-1908", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 100, No. 6 (May, 1995), p. 1400.
[2294] Gildea, *op.cit.*, p. 413.
[2295] Burbank & Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 359.
[2296] Lieven, Empire, *op.cit.*, p. 134.
[2297] Keyder, *op.cit.*, pp. 38-39.
[2298] Horowitz, pp. 456. Notably, the Ottoman legal system was modelled on the French and they strove to 'Germanize' the military.
[2299] Suppan, *op.cit.*, p. 50. He wrote that: "Repeated European interventions gave rise to a deep-seated belief on the part of the non-Muslim populations of the Empire that one day Christian Europe would bring them national independence."

behind the Ottoman educational paradox: both minorities and the Young Ottomans and Young Turks, with western-style education, formed political movements, and yet, as Göcek outlined, "while the political outcome of the first group's efforts took the form of independence movements, the second group changed Ottoman political rule by deposing the sultan".[2300]

Such a dynamic never occurred in the Russian and Habsburg Empires after 1854: these two regimes managed to retain their essentialism in a manner that the Ottomans could not. The Ottomans also constantly changed course which, as we have seen with Russia in particular, was difficult to pull off once the doors to the Imperial Power Structure had been opened to more actors and groups. Indeed, they had never had as much control over their Imperial Power Structure, especially at the lower ends of the scale, so they were more vulnerable to the dynamics outlined in this work. They were more vulnerable to international pressure, more vulnerable to the effects of introducing nation-state ideological frameworks, and certainly more vulnerable to the rise of the 'nation'. Arguably the longer gestation period and the state of the Imperial Power Structure at the beginning of the dynamic, was the key. If anything, the Ottoman experience was an even more intense and acute reaction to the convergence of imperial and national space.

[2300] Göcek, *op.cit.,* p. 508.

~ *Concluding remarks* ~

The fundamental changes that occurred in the Habsburg and Russian Empires between 1854 and 1914 bring a number of paradoxes into play. The first involves the very condition of their respective Imperial Power Structures. On the one hand, the traditional gap between imperial state and imperial subject closed drastically and exponentially as the First World War approached. This was both a goal and a residual effect of a modernising state, demonstrated through deeper and wider governance (and increased awareness of any governance *deficit*), coupled with the greater need for resource extraction. On the other hand, this occurred concurrently with the multiple formation and *formalisation* of peripheries, and a greater number of diverse organisations ostensibly supporting the core from lower levels (yet acting like peripheries on occasion). This can be called the *distance paradox*: the closer groups became, the further they pulled apart.

The second paradox is related to the first. To 'catch-up' with the nation-states to the west, which would enable them to remain 'great powers', and therefore necessary to their diverse subject populations, both imperial regimes felt *obliged* to import and implement nation-state ideological frameworks. However, this very act would threaten their essentialism, by empowering disparate groups to search for a greater share of the imperial pie, and dream for even more. In the words of Jürgen Osterhammel: "often, modernizing reforms […] opened up new spaces for claims, the articulation of interests and the formation of new identities and alignments."[2301] This paradox can be called the *essentialist paradox*: in order to remain essential, these Empires had to enact programmes that would threaten that essentialism.

The third paradox, which stems from the 'distance' and 'essentialist' paradoxes, is centred around how governments dealt with national groups. Actively pursuing core nationalism through employing authoritative, collective and extensive power (through programmes of Russification and Magyarisation)[2302] would help spur on peripheral development just as much as the 'soft power' pluralism shown in Cisleithania.[2303] In this respect, it is no surprise that both Empires could seem 'damned if they did, and damned if they didn't'. This can be called the *national paradox*: incentive *and* disincentive to organise as a common people would lead to the same overall result.

These three lead to the fourth, and by far most important paradox for this work – the *balance paradox* – which came about when the aforementioned need to 'catch-up' intersected with the rise of the 'nation', with all its manifestations and ideologies, in a geopolitical system. When the Habsburg and Russian empires began to 'fall behind' the European 'great power' nation-states to the west, they had to *adapt* by integrating as much of the 'nation' that they, and their Imperial

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[2301] Osterhammel, *op.cit.,* p. 476.

[2302] Wank, The Nationality Question, *op.cit.,* p. 10. He stated that Magyarisation intensified non-Hungarian nationalism in Transleithania.

[2303] To use a term made famous by Joseph P. Nye. Joseph Nye, "Limits of American Power", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 117, No. 4, Winter 2002-2003, pp. 552-553. Hans Kohn put this bluntly: "The spread of democracy, literacy, and economic well-being in the western half of the monarchy after 1867 strengthened the non-Germanic nationalities there at the expense of the former political, cultural and economic predominance of the Germans." Kohn, Viability, *op.cit.,* p. 39.

Power Structures, could stomach, as noted above. This was *destabilising* to the Imperial Power Structure, which in turn had to be managed by further adaption, which in turn was destabilising, and so on. It represented a non-teleological cyclical paradox: a cycle without a *discernable* end. This was the clearest challenge that these empires would have to face in the period in question, outside of an unexpectedly vicious World War. The balance of adaption and destabilisation had to be managed whilst their remit for managing imperial space was also growing exponentially. If these empires understood and properly managed this balance, as imperial entities and states they could progress. In this respect, we can see why the House of Habsburg stood a stronger chance of survival in the counter-factual world where the First World War didn't happen.

Franz Josef changed the course of the Empire in 1867, at a time when the intersection of empire and nation was not *too* intense (as compared to 1914) and their imperial space was relatively manageable. From this point, with respect to the Habsburg Imperial Power Structure, they 'stayed the course'. Their pragmatic sovereign was devoted enough to do what had to be done to manage the 'balance paradox', including integrating well-worn tools from the imperial 'kit bag', such as status-group creation and use of 'divide-and-rule'. He was also cognisant enough to realise that walking back on an empire-wide scale, in dramatic fashion, would be catastrophic. He was never short of advisers recommending just that in times of crisis, but he held his nerve. Staying on course encouraged peripheral elites to not only remain part of the whole, but to strive for more influence and power under imperial sanction, whilst most of the rest of the imperial subjects wanted to stay tied to their sovereign, which they were encouraged to do in spades. Almost all groups wanted *in* as opposed to *out*, even if their ultimate ideological utopia was independence. In effect, they wanted *'in' for the foreseeable future*.

Russia began the period with enormous promise but never seemed comfortable going all in with 'adapting' – indeed some adaption was of the reactionary kind. In a number of areas, the years between the accession of Alexander III and 1905 represented a very definite reversal, however, broader ideologies had not yet matured, nor had enough groups had developed a 'taste of it' just yet. After the shocks of 1905, the Romanov dynasty went back on the 'balance paradox' course, but alas this was to come crashing down with the dissolution of the Second Duma in 1907. This was a reversal at a time when the intersection of empire and nation was far more intense than it was at the time of *Ausgleich*, as was the geopolitical system. This role of the sovereign as the bulwark keeping competing groups interested enough to participate in the imperial project with enthusiasm was now battered, if not broken. This should be read not to over-emphasise the problem: peripheral elites in the Russian Empire still wanted *in*, for the most part, however many of the remaining imperial subjects lost their devotion to their sovereign. Ironically, the latter group were also unintentionally encouraged in this, through the reactive action of their sovereign and his clique.

This study makes it clear that these empires could not go back to the old ways, a lesson the Habsburg Emperor learned well after the neo-Absolutist era of the 1850s. At the same time, they could only go so far with the new, as they were still empires in a 'great power' system of nation-

states. What they had to do was stay the course, or at the very least not turn back once parameters had been set. The later in the period before the First World War, the more difficult it would be to recover from a dramatic reactive change, due to specific international conditions and the inexorable rise of competing collective identity. In light of this, it bears considering how the Hungarians (who never opened their sub-imperial power system anywhere near as much as the Russians) managed to stay the course. Indeed, as shown in this work, the trajectory of change in Transleithania was rather slow and steady, with the upheavals of the early twentieth century mostly confined to the upper end of their sub-structure. Once the 'Magyar' path was set, people knew what they could and could not achieve, and where there were deficiencies. To give an example, the draconian Apponyi education laws of 1907, whilst disastrous for Romanian, Croat, Serb and Slovak communities, were hardly unexpected. They were just another nail in the forty-year coffin of competing nationalities in Hungary. These groups were losing access to important building blocks, but they were not building blocks *granted them* by the Hungarians, per se: the Magyar action was an escalation, not a withdrawal. Perhaps the greatest Hungarian withdrawal was the turning back on promises made to the *Sabor* Coalition Government in 1907, which although not an 'empire-wide' issue, were harmful enough to help push some Croat and Serb nationalists together for the Yugoslav cause. The change in the Duma laws in Russia the very same year – whilst only slightly less surprising when looking back as a historian – was a deliberate reversal of access for multiple groups of subjects to the Imperial Power Structure; access curtailed a mere *two years* after their granting by the imperial core.

In short, after the 1860s, the Austrians gave their subjects an avenue of opportunity and never took that away and the Hungarians rarely pretended to give them such, other than 'benevolent assimilation'. However, the Russians, after vacillating between reform and reaction for decades, gave with the one hand in 1905/06 and took away with the other in 1907, with much fanfare. The international and domestic environment of the 1860s, when Transylvanian Romanians had seen the 'spoils' of the neo-Absolutist thaw extinguished by *Ausgleich,* was forgiving enough to enable reasonable management of grievances on a regional level. The same environment of 1907 was most certainly not forgiving enough to make up for the empire-wide disappointment of turning the promise of the Imperial Russian Duma into a trojan horse for reactionary government.

Amongst the dramatic changes to their respective Imperial Power Structures, the nature of the 'peak' of the system remained as important as it had been for empires throughout history. The value of the consistency and character of the Habsburg sovereign should not be underestimated. Much pilloried in the historiography, in some instances deservedly so, Franz Josef can be praised for his role in the survival of his Empire, and indeed for managing the first real instance of a modern, multi-faceted, multiple-nationality state. One of the biggest differences between both empires comes down to this: The Austrian and Hungarian sovereign, after a rough start, became the glue that held the empire together, whereas for the Romanovs their integrative power remained based upon the *idea* of the tsar. Hence, when things became more difficult for Nicholas

II after 1900 and again after 1907, the visage of devotion to the *idea* of a person was badly exposed. To answer one of the questions raised at the beginning of this work, empires require a degree of subject civic identity and loyalty, even if that is only manifest in the agency of a sovereign. Of course this brings into question whether the Habsburg edifice would have crumbled after Franz Josef passed. Alas even though many historians have postulated this very question, it is impossible to ascertain due to the fact that the imperial transition to Charles I/IV occurred during the First World War.

In Austria-Hungary, a high degree of political and economic power, some ideological power, and even a modicum of military power was divested to the people, to differing degrees depending on the region. In regions where this was weak, specifically in Hungary, seeing this divestment across the River Leitha provided incentive: that it *was* possible, that there was hope. This would manifest in appeals and envoys to the Kaiser and Franz Ferdinand, for example. This intersected with a rise in collective, intensive and diffused power amongst organisational groups within the Imperial Power Structure. Both would then feed each other. Russia would go down the same path at times, in much tighter time frames and in more precipitous international conditions, but they then tried to take that power away.

When looking at the Habsburg and Russian Imperial Power Structures, it becomes immediately clear that although the top still resembled a traditional imperial system with some subtle changes, the further one goes down, the more dramatic the changes. Another noticeable characteristic was their far larger spatial footprints, which when considering the relatively minor territorial changes in both the Habsburg Empire and European Russia over the period, was even more impressive. In spite of this, and the Habsburg advantage in managing the 'balance paradox', both empires were still working well enough to have expected to survive, if not for the War, at least the *foreseeable future.* Their eventual fate was due to the innate destabilisation potential in their imperial power structures – this was the ultimate reason they found themselves in the condition they were in when they marched to War, the world historical event that sealed their fate.

When one removes the prism of comparative advantage, neither the Habsburg nor Russian Empires were in decline, although of course they had a multitude of problems. It is imperative not to underestimate just how *difficult* it was for them to manage the 'balance paradox', far more so than the nation-state power structures to the west in the same overall environment. On some indicators, they appeared to be going backwards (highly public displays, such as political decorum, head the list), and on others, they seemed stuck in a dead end. And yet, to follow on with this political example, that there was enough political space to have appalling political decorum was in itself an enormous advance on 1854. Yes, things could look messy: this is arguably an indicator of modernity. In a way, it remains surprising that historians, living in a world where such behaviour is an everyday occurrence in numerous countries, can still look back aghast at the floor of the *Reichsrat* or Duma – two entities that again bring the nature of management to the fore.

To that point, to answer some further core questions of this work, their fall was not inevitable – they had control of their destiny, dependent on how they managed the 'balance

paradox'. In addition, and to put it bluntly, the 'nationalities problem' did not need a specific solution, it needed deft handling of expectations and resources. The 'nationalities', like other groups in the Imperial Power Structure, needed enough incentive to ensure their wilful participation in the imperial project. Just how many nationality 'issues' have had a true solution since the rise of the phenomenon – a solution that stood the test of time? In the scheme of history, just how bad were the nationality problems in these empires? With respect to the Habsburg and Russian Empires, this work would argue that the absolutely worst instances of national strife in this period were actually in the Russian Empire, during the Polish revolt of 1863, with the crises in Finland from 1900 to 1905 and the 1905 revolution coming next. Russia was more prone to sudden shock, whereas Austria was prone to more continuous low-level destabilisation, and Hungary somewhere in between. Arguably, this was due to the different paths taken by both empires (and Hungary).

Acting upon the 'balance paradox' could ensure that these empires could import nation-state ideological frameworks, and indeed survive within a nation-state system. Indeed, the brief flowering of the maritime empires after the First World War, as well as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia also show that imperial systems, or systems that appear imperial, could survive in a nation-state system. This affected the question on whether centralisation and/or confederation were viable options. Regarding centralisation: this was viable as long as there was sufficient devolution underlying centralisation, as there was in Austria and Russia (with regard *zemstva*, city council and municipal governance, in the regions where it was allowed). We never saw a working form of federalism in these empires, and true confederalism was impossible as long as the imperial core retained it vice-like grip over military power, in particular. The competition that was fuelled by Cisleithania's move to political pluralism after *Ausgleich* (and to a lesser extent, in Russia after 1905) indicates that formalised federalism might have made little overall difference to the trajectories of these empires, indeed the more formalised, demarcated structures may have encouraged even more intense national power competition. One thing this study has shown time and again is that once a national group achieves a new level of power and influence, objectives are recalibrated and those national groups become hungry for even more.

It must be remembered that these dynasties *had* to take the initiatives they did, creating the paradoxes in the process. Was it worth it? Gregory Freeze, in referring to the Russian Empire, argued that importing nation-state ideological frameworks caused "the awakening of unfulfilled expectations, the unleashing of liberal and revolutionary movements, and the powerful, implosive impact of borderland minorities on politics in the central heartland".[2304] However, this destabilisation was *innate* – if they didn't undergo change, they would be sitting targets if and when a major war finally arrived. Although their reform programme was longer in the making (and overall never as effective) even the Ottoman Empire proved it was not a complete pushover during the First World War. Coincidentally, the Ottomans took a major U-turn unravelling

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[2304] Freeze, Reform, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

constitutional government in the 1870s. This was an abandonment of the 'balance paradox', that fuelled the discontent that led to the Young Turk revolt and the overthrow of the Sultan.

To return to Michael Mann, it's prudent to recall that no one source nor mode of power can operate in isolation. There is extensive overlap. In terms of regime priorities, and perceptions, they were different for external audiences and the domestic Imperial Power Structure. Internationally, the logical order was military, perceived or otherwise, followed by economic – increasingly as the requirements for foreign finance and trade grew – and political, through alliances and diplomacy, and finally, ideological, which carried little weight outside of the empire, except for borderland nationalities that straddled the three central/eastern European empires. Domestically, however, priorities were flattened during the period in question – all four sources were of equal importance. The convergence of the 'nation' meant that the respective dynasties could no longer survive on a predominance of one source (or one combination) of social power over the others. Especially when peripheral groups were developing forms of all four sources of social power, which, in Mann's words, "conferred social significance on both linguistic communities (sometimes on religious communities) and regional political institutions, welding them together into 'nations'".[2305]

In short, exercising imperial power (being an empire) threatened that power, causing increasing destabilisation and emboldening (and helping increase the number of) groups within society. The more these empires exercised their imperial power, the more difficult it became to control their power structures, hence how they managed the 'balance paradox' was crucial – even more so when 'historical and geographical chance' is taken into account. Neither the Habsburg nor Russian Empire could command anywhere near the collective, diffused and intensive power that so characterised the workings of the German Empire. The latter had also mastered 'state-led' nationalism, utilising a common historical culture and continuity and language as a social mobilisation tool after unification; driven both from above and below. The Romanovs and Habsburgs would be so lucky.

By using Mann's paradigm, an ideal imperial system becomes visible. Such an empire would hold practically absolute control over military power and effective control over political, economic and ideological power – the nature of the latter three due to the spatial diversity and/or geographic scales of empires. Its power would be more extensive than intensive, more distributive than collective, and more authoritative than diffused, but it would contain discernable amounts of all six forms. The ideal empire would be doomed to never truly manifest as soon as competing power poles emerged, as it was inherently susceptible to the growing weight of nationalism and other group formation, which would develop competing collective, diffused and intensive power, in turn eating away at the core's control over economic and ideological (and by association political and military) power. However, due to enormous extension of the spatial footprint of their Imperial Power Structures, this was not necessarily fatal – the innate destabilisation of empire could be managed.

[2305] Mann, Vol. II, *op.cit.*, p. 336

Mann lays the fall of the Habsburg Empire squarely at the feet of the imperial core: "The disintegrating power of regional nationalism had […] been exaggerated; it was more the creation than the creator of Habsburg difficulties […] they did not move the citizenship appropriate to a modern society."[2306] He added that: "the Habsburgs developed only particularistic, inconsistent solutions to class and nation […] because these military dynasts chose war, this was not doom but hubris, self-inflicted".[2307] This work would argue that, due in no small part to the person of Emperor Franz Josef, such particular, inconsistent solutions were actually necessary tools for managing the 'balance paradox' in such a complex, diverse Imperial Power Structure. However, Mann's overall premise stands strong. Put simply, the Habsburg fate was down to the strategies and actions of the core, and in the Habsburg Empire the core, for all intents and purposes, *was* the Emperor. These same words would perfectly fit the Romanov dynasty as well.

This study will ideally provide a platform for analysis of other historical empires from the nineteenth century onwards, after the development of the modern conception of the 'nation', as well as entities that are sometimes considered imperial, including those of the modern day. Concepts raised in this work would provide a starting point, for example the different perspective of the core-periphery model, the enormous growth of peripheries / 'sub-core', imperial condition, imperial causality, and indeed the 'balance paradox'. Merely a cursory look at two of the empires with most modern day resonance – the British and the French – shows us enough common characteristics to inspire a comparison. These geographically immense, extremely diverse empires were noted for their asymmetric core/periphery relationship, distinct ethno-linguistic core exceptionalism (far more than the Habsburg and Russian Empires), direct and indirect rule, use of status group creation and divide-and-rule policies, militarism and sensitivity to geopolitics. Indeed, lesser global powers such as the Portuguese Empire displayed these as well, as did hybrids like the Japanese and of course the Ottoman. If one were to follow through with the Cold War rhetoric of the 'Soviet' or 'American Empires', one would find a number of valid comparisons, starting with what look like on first glance modern versions of Imperial Power Structures, varying on the concepts of territoriality and core sovereignty. This is not to suggest that using Imperial Power Structures as analytical tools will flatten the imperial family onto a level playing field – they will remain distinct and often very different historical and contemporary entities. Rather, it offers a strong platform to form a larger picture of the imperial condition, and enables new comparisons to be made. It might even result in a more concrete and widely accepted definition of empire, one that would define which entities throughout history, and possibly into the present day, would qualify as empires.

[2306] *Ibid.*, pp. 332-333
[2307] *Ibid.*

~ *Appendix* ~

British Diplomatic officials cited in this work (cited by surname/ennobled name)

Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs:

1859-1865	The Earl Russell
1866-1868	The Lord Stanley
1868-1870	The Earl of Clarendon
1870-1874	The Earl Granville
1874-1878	The Lord Stanley
1878-1880	The Marquess of Salisbury
1880-1885	The Earl Granville
1885-1886	The Marquess of Salisbury
1886-1886	The Earl of Rosebery
1886-1887	The Earl of Iddesleigh
1887-1892	The Marquess of Salisbury
1882-1894	The Earl of Rosebery
1894-1895	The Earl of Kimberley
1895-1900	The Marquess of Salisbury
1900-1905	The Marquess of Lansdowne
1905-1916	Sir Edward Grey

Ambassador to Austria-Hungary (Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Emperor of Austria before 1867):

1858-1860	Lord Augustus Loftus
1860-1871	John Bloomfield, Baron
1871-1877	Sir Andrew Buchanan
1877-1884	Sir Henry Elliot
1884-1893	Sir Augustus Paget
1893-1897	Sir Edmund Monson
1897-1900	Sir Horace Rumbold
1900-1905	Sir Francis Plunkett
1905-1908	Sir Edward Goschen
1908-1913	Sir Fairfax Cartwright

Ambassador to the Russian Empire (Minister to Russia before 1860):

1858-1861	Sir John Crampton
1861-1864	The Lord Napier
1864-1871	Sir Andrew Buchanan
1871-1879	Lord Augustus Loftus
1879-1881	The Lord Dufferin and Claneboye
1881-1884	Sir Edward Thornton
1884-1893	Sir Robert Morier
1894-1895	Sir Frank Lascelles
1895-1898	Sir Nicholas Roderick O'Conor

1898-1904	Sir Charles Stewart Scott
1904-1906	Sir Charles Hardinge
1906-1910	Sir Arthur Nicolson

Secretaries of Embassy and Consul-Generals in Budapest:

1865-1868	Alfred Bonar (Secretary of Embassy in Vienna)
1868-1872	The Earl of Lytton (Secretary of Embassy in Vienna)
1885-1892	Sir Constantine Phipps (Secretary of Embassy in Vienna)
1892-1896	Sir William Barrington (Secretary of Embassy in Vienna)
1905-1907	Sir Brooke Boothby (Secretary of Embassy, Vienna)
1860-1868	John Lumley (Secretary of Embassy in St. Petersburg)
1871-1872	Sir F. Clare Ford (Secretary of Embassy in St. Petersburg)
1881	Hugh Wyndham (Secretary of Embassy in St. Petersburg)
1885-1886	Thomas Grosvenor (Secretary of Embassy in St. Petersburg)
1903-1906	Sir Cecil Spring Rice (Secretary of Embassy, St. Petersburg)
1906-1913	Hugh O'Beirne (Secretary of Embassy, St. Petersburg)
1893-1896	Ralph Milbanke (Consul-General, Budapest)
1898-1899	Sir Gerard Lowther (Consul-General, Budapest)
1899-1902	Charles Thornton (Consul-General, Budapest)
1905-1909	Frederick Clarke (Consul-General, Budapest)

Miscellaneous (and dates of reference notice)

~1861~	Sir William A.White (Acting Consul-General, Warsaw)
~1861-1865~	General Edward Stanton (Consul-General, Warsaw)
~1865, 1874~	Charles Edward Mansfield (Consul-General, Warsaw)
~1877~	Francis C. Maude (Consul-General, Warsaw)
~1890, 1892~	Henry Grant (Consul-General, Warsaw)
~1900~	Alexander Murray (Consul-General, Warsaw)
~1900~	Sir John Oliver Wardrop (Acting Consul-General, Warsaw)
~1905~	Edmund Alexander Bower-St.Clair (Vice-Consul, Warsaw)
~1908~	Charles Clive Bayly (Consul-General, Warsaw)
~1861, 1865~	Henry Woodfall Crowe (Consul, Helsingfors)
~1872, 1877~	William Campbell (Consul, Helsingfors)
~1905~	Charles J. Cooke (Vice-Consul, Helsingfors)
~1885~	Arthur Raby (Consul, Riga)
~1905~	Arthur Woodhouse (Consul, Riga)
~1905~	Henry Clarke (Acting Consul, Moscow)
~1906~	Charles S. Smith (Consul, Odessa)
~1906~	V.H.C. Bosanquet (Consul, Nicolaev)
~1910~	Professor Roman Zaloziecki (Vice-Consul, Lemberg)
~1896~	Lt. Colonel Waters (Military Attaché, St. Petersburg)
~1905~	Lord Cranley (Embassy official, St. Petersburg)
~1906~	Lt. Colonel Napier (Military Attaché, St. Petersburg)
~1906~	Harold Norman (Clerk, Foreign Office)
~1906~	Sir Ernest Stowell Scott (British Diplomat, location undefined)
~1907~	Bernard Pares (Consultant: University of Liverpool)

~ *Maps* ~

The Habsburg Empire, 1914 [2308]

▥ Austrian control (Cisleithania)		▧ Imperial control (Bosnia & Herzegovina)		▨ Hungarian control (Transleithania)	

[2308] Sourced, amended and drawn, utilising original source map: "General Map of the Empire", in Sked, Decline, *op.cit*, pp. 280-281.

The Habsburg Empire, ethno-linguistic map, c.1910 [2309]

|			
Germans	Czechs	Poles	Slovenes	Romanians
Hungarians	Slovaks	Ruthenes/Ukrainians	Croats and Serbs	Italians

[2309] "Distribution of Races in Austria-Hungary" from the Historical Atlas by William Robert Sheppard (New York, 1911, Henry Holt and Company), sourced from Wikimedia commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Austria_Hungary_ethnic.svg, last accessed 1 April, 2015. Map redrawn, with minor amendments.

European Russia, map of *Guberniya*, 1914[2310]

SWEDEN

FINNISH PROVINCES

OLONETS

VOLOGDA

Helsinki (Helsingfors)

BALTIC SEA

St. Petersburg

Tallinn (Reval)

ESTLAND

ST. PETERSBURG

NOVGORD

Novgorod

YAROSLAVL

KOSTRONA

Dorpat

LIVLAND

PSKOV

TVER

Tver

VLADIMIR

NIZHNY NOVGOROD

Riga

KURLAND

KOVNO

VITEBSK

SMOLENSK

Smolensk

Moscow
MOSCOW

Riazan

RIAZAN

Kanaus (Kovno)

VILNA

Vilnius (Vilna)

Minsk

MOGLIEV

KALUGA

TULA

Orel

OREL

TAMBOV

GERMANY

GRODNO

MINSK

CHERNIGOV

Kursk

KURSK

Voronezh

VORONEZH

Warsaw

Łódź

POLISH PROVINCES

VOLHYNIA

Kiev
KIEV

POLTAVA

Kharkov

KHARKOV

DON COSSACKS

HABSBURG EMPIRE

PODOLIA

BESSARABIA

KHERSON

Nicolaiev

Odessa

EKATERINOSLAV

Rostov-on-Don

KUBAN

CRIMEA

Sevastopol

ROMANIA

BLACK SEA

2310 Sourced, amended and drawn, utilising two original source maps: "Provincial Structure of European Russia in 1900", in Moss, *op.cit.*, pp. 442 & "The provinces of European Russia", in Freeze, Russia, A History, *op.cit.,* p. 427.

European Russia, ethno-linguistic map, c.1910 (approximation)[2311]

Russians	Finns	Swedes	Estonians	
Tatars	Latvians	Germans	Poles	
Ukrainians	Lithuanians	Romanians	Belarusians	

[2311] Composite map with original demarcations. Existing ethnographic reference maps of the Russian Empire showed enormous variations, and there was no consensus amongst all of the located examples. A number of source maps were used to compile this: J. Gabrys "Carte Ethnographique de L'Europe", Librairie Centrale des Nationalités rue Caroline, Lausanne (1918); "The Dismemberment of Western Russia", supplement to the National Review, April, 1918; "Carta Etnico-Linguistica Dell'Oriente Europeo", Instituo Geografico de Agostini – Novara (1918); and https://www2.bc.edu/~heineman/maps/ethnic.jpg, from Professor John L. Heineman's map collection at Boston College, last accessed 1 April 2015.

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The National Archives of the United Kingdom **(TNA)** London, United Kingdom

Foreign Office (FO)

Please note – Footnote reference (example):

TNA: Goschen to Grey, Vienna, March 8 1907, FO 120/840:22.

In order, from left to right:

TNA	Goschen…	Vienna	March 8…	FO	120	840	22
Archive	Name	Location sent from	Date	Collection	Collection number	Book/folder /carton no.	Document number

The Habsburg Empire: FO 120
General Correspondence from Embassies to the Foreign Office, and from Consuls to Embassies and/or the Foreign Office (includes regular and irregular dispatches, periodic reports, notifications, news clippings and telegrams)

298; 372; 382; 392; 395; 460; 462; 468; 483; 490; 502; 527; 540; 554; 574; 627; 628; 636; 644; 653; 654; 660; 661; 671; 672; 677; 691; 698; 683; 662; 685; 693; 702; 708; 715; 716; 717; 723; 724; 725; 732; 734; 740; 741; 750; 751; 754; 770 772; 783; 793; 795; 809; 831; 840; 851; 864; 874; 883; 906

General Correspondence (FO 371): 6; 7; 8

The Russian Empire: FO 181
General Correspondence from Embassies to the Foreign Office, and from Consuls to Embassies and/or the Foreign Office (includes regular and irregular dispatches, periodic reports, notifications, news clippings and telegrams)

374; 392; 393; 394; 387; 388; 390; 405; 406; 407; 408; 414; 415; 416; 417; 418; 419; 420; 427; 429; 430; 431; 435; 437; 496; 499; 500; 507; 519; 520; 521; 534; 538; 558; 559; 561; 640; 641; 653/1; 672; 682/1; 683/2; 688; 697; 724; 728; 729/2; 741; 766; 795; 827; 828; 831; 848; 856/1; 857/5; 866; 869; 878; 893; 906; 919; 920; 921

General Correspondence (FO 371): 121; 123; 125; 128

Note (1): *Journal de Saint Pétersbourg* articles, as well as citations from *The Times*, were located amongst these archives, as attachments to original documents (usually as clippings).

Note (2): Some handwritten original documents are not numbered. This has been reflected in the footnotes where relevant.

Note (3): With regards to consulates: Each consulate had its own document numbering system. For example, a document from British Consul in Helsingfors may have a lower reference number than another from the Consul in Warsaw that was dispatched on an earlier date. In addition, some incoming Consul-Generals began numbering their dispatches from 1, regardless of when in the year that they took up their posting.

Note (4): A few handwritten dispatches were neither signed, nor was the name of the writer indicated. In these instances, handwriting matches have been attempted to identify the writer. Where this was not possible, the sender's name is left off the footnote reference.

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Zusammenfassung (German)

Geschichtswissenschaftliche Arbeiten zu Großreichen nehmen diese selten als solche in den Blick und jene, die es tun tendieren dazu den ‚imperialen Zerfall' als Ausgangspunkt ihrer Analyse zu wählen. Der ‚imperiale Ist-Zustand', also die Frage was es bedeutet ein Großreich zu sein [und als ein solches zu agieren], wird dagegen oft übergangen. Ein singulärer Fokus auf den ‚imperialen Zerfall' als Folge unvorhergesehener weltgeschichtlicher Ereignisse kann folglich den Blick darauf verstellen, wie sich Großreiche während ihres Bestehens tatsächlich verhielten und so die historiographische Betrachtung verengen. Dies wird besonders bei den Großreichen Habsburgs und Russlands deutlich. Durch eine Untersuchung dieser beiden Großreiche *als* Großreiche von 1854 bis 1914 versucht die vorliegende Arbeit diese Lücke zu schließen und gleichzeitig den ersten Weltkrieg als determinierenden Faktor [dieser Zeit] zu neutralisieren. Als Beispiel hierfür sei angeführt, dass beide Großreiche bereits weit vor dem Krieg zunehmend in eine scheinbar unausweichliche Spirale der Destabilisierung geraten waren, welche mit dem Krieg, der ihr Ende besiegeln sollte, nichts zu tun hatte.

Gestützt auf global- und weltgeschichtliche Methodologie kombiniert die multidisziplinäre Arbeit geschichtssoziologische, sowie wirtschafts- und, politikwissenschaftliche Ansätze mit traditioneller geschichtswissenschaftlicher Forschung. Dominic Lievens Aufforderung folgend, diplomatische Archive für mehr als nur Diplomatiegeschichte zu verwenden, wurden Britische diplomatische Korrespondenzen herangezogen, um Berichte von engagierten Beobachtern ausfindig zu machen, deren Analyse wiederum auf einer breit angelegten Literaturbasis erfolgte. Die imperiale Machtstruktur wird hierbei als analytische Brille verwendet, um ein klares Bild des Ist-Zustands der jeweiligen Großmacht zu gewinnen und somit eine interne Diagnose zur Beschreibung von Entwicklungsmuster und -pfad zu liefern.

Um die Destabilisierung der jeweiligen imperialen Machtstrukturen verstehen zu können, wird die Annährung von ‚Nation' und Großmacht eingehend untersucht. Die Rolle des Imports nationalstaatlicher Ideologie-Konstrukte und die wachsende Bedeutung von Zentrum- und Peripherie-Nationalismus werden hierbei besonders betont. Des Weiteren werden grundsätzliche Fragen zu beiden Großmächten – sowie ‚Großmachttum' an sich – beantwortet, u.a. ob das Habsburgische und Russischen Reich sich jeweils tatsächlich im Untergang befanden, ob Großreiche tragfähige Konstrukte im Nationalstaatensystem darstellten, ob die Peripherien sich tatsächlich um Anschluss oder Abspaltung bemühten und ob imperialer Verfall somit unausweichlich war.

Der Hang zur Destabilisierung war imperialen Machtstrukturen inhärent, weshalb ihre Steuerung und Kontrolle an erster Stelle stand. Beide Regime mussten sich mit einigen zentralen Paradoxien auseinandersetzen, um sich im ‚Großmachtsystem' behaupten zu können, so zum Beispiel mit der massenhaften Formierung und Formalisierung von Peripherien bei gleichzeitig exponentieller Ausweitung der Steuerungs- und Kontrollanforderungen in ihren wachsenden Reichsgebieten. Eine Konzentration auf imperiale Machtstrukturen ermöglicht die Untersuchung solcher Phänomene und stellt somit ein Werkzeug zur Verfügung, mit dem nicht nur Großreiche ab dem 19. Jahrhundert erforscht werden können, sondern auch ähnliche Strukturen in der Gegenwart. Schlussendlich kann dieser Ansatz auch dabei helfen zu bestimmen, welche historischen Instanzen als Großmächte gelten bzw. als imperial beschrieben werden können.

Abstract (English)

Historical works on empires rarely focus on them *as* empires, and those that do tend to start from the premise of 'imperial fall'. Imperial condition – the effect of *being* an empire – is often overlooked. Imperial fall caused by unprecedented world historical events can mask how empires were actually performing, as well as cloud the historiography. This is acute with the Habsburg and Russian Empires. Through examining these entities between 1854 and 1914, this work aims to fill a gap, analysing them *as* empires, whilst neutralising the First World War as a determining factor. For example, well before the War, both Empires could appear increasingly 'damned if they did, and damned if they didn't', seemingly prone to endless internal destabilisation. The War that would topple them had nothing to do with it.

Based on world and global history methodology, this multidisciplinary work combines historical sociology, economics, political science and traditional historical research. British diplomatic correspondence was mined to locate the reports of vested outsiders, taking on Dominic Lieven's challenge to use such archives for more than diplomatic history. This was complemented by a broad literature base. The Imperial Power Structure is established as an analytical tool to obtain a clear picture of the health of empires; an internal diagnosis uncovering pattern and trajectory.

To understand the destablisation to their Imperial Power Structures, the convergence of 'nation' and empire is examined. The effects on both Imperial Power Structures of importing nation-state ideological frameworks, and the rise of core and periphery nationalism, are strongly emphasised. Fundamental questions concerning both empires – and *empire* – are addressed, including: whether the Habsburg and Russian Empires were actually in decline; whether empires were viable in the nation-state system; whether peripheries actually wanted *in* or *out*; and whether imperial dissolution was inevitable.

Destabilisation was innate to Imperial Power Structures, therefore its management was paramount. Both regimes needed to contend with a number of key paradoxes in order to sustain themselves in the 'great power' system, against a backdrop of the mass formation and formalisation of peripheries whilst the remit for managing imperial space was growing exponentially. The Imperial Power Structure enables the investigation of such phenomenon, and ideally could become a tool to examine empires from the nineteenth-century on, and for examining contemporary bodies that resemble them. It could also help identify which entities could be considered empires, or imperial.

Academic Curriculum Vitae

Education

PhD Candidate

University of Vienna, Department of Social and Economic History   2009-current
Supervisor: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Peer Vries

European Master of Global Studies (EMGS)
MA (Global Studies)

Universität Wien   2007-2008
Universität Leipzig   2006-2007
Thesis: One World? The Importance of World History in Modern Geopolitical Discourse.

Master of Arts (Modern History)

Macquarie University (Sydney)   2004-2005
Thesis: Grounds for Reconsideration: The Historiography of the Decline of Universal History

Bachelor of Arts (History, Politics)   1990-1992
Macquarie University (Sydney)

Teaching experience

Design and delivery of block seminar courses (ECTS rated) for Masters level students:

"Empires, Finance and Great Leaders in History" *(with Justin Brown)*
University of Wroclaw   2010
University of Leipzig   2011

"Empire and Imperialism. A paradigm for yesterday, today and tomorrow?"
University of Wroclaw   2011

"Empires, Power and Great Leaders in History"
University of Wroclaw   summer semester 2012
University of Wroclaw   winter semester 2012

"Oswald Spengler, HG Wells and Arnold Toynbee.   Winter semester 2010, 2011
The Bridge to World and Global History?"   Summer semester 2011
University of Vienna

"Empire and Power"   2012
University of Vienna

"Culture and society in Global Sydney, 1890s"   2011
EMGS Winter School, Payerbach, Austria.

"The Digital Age: DVD"   2005
For HIST243: History on Film
Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

Design and delivery of curriculum workshops for EMGS Programme students:

EMGS Winter School, in Sobotnya, Poland, on how to effectively and persuasively   2010
communicate, using the importance of the creative brief, and developing the single-minded
proposition as a teaching model.

EMGS Winter School, in Payerback, Austria   2012
"Empires as a form of social organisation"

Conference Presentations

Presenter at the Third European Congress of World and Global History,   2011
London School of Economics.
"Empires caught between worlds. Nationalism, nation-state ideological frameworks
and the destabilisation of imperial power structures"

Presenter and Panel Convenor at the Fourth European Congress   2014
of World and Global History
École Normale Supérieure, Paris
Panel: "Borders and Transnational Peripheral Formation"
Paper: "The role of imperial borders in shaping peripheral 'nations'. The case of the Poles and
Ukrainians in contrasting late-nineteenth century imperial space"

Workshop Presentations

Presenter at University of Cambridge Doctoral Colloquium on World History.   2012
"Imperial Power Structure as a World Historical Approach to Empires and Imperial Systems"

Awards and Prizes

Vice-Chancellor's Commendation for postgraduate coursework,
Macquarie University,   2004-2005.
EU Erasmus Mundus full scholarship holder   2006-2007.

Languages

English: native
French: intermediate (reading)
German: basic

Contact

Name: Ashley Hurst
Contact: Flat 2 Building 48 Marlborough Road
                 Woolwich Arsenal, SE18 6RE, United Kingdom
                 Email: ashleyinleipzig@yahoo.com
D.O.B: 20 March, 1971