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Framing **Definitions and Findings Across Various Approaches**

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Declaration of Authorship

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- This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University.
- Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated.
- Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed.
- Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work.
- I have acknowledged all main sources of help.
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Abstract

Since the introduction of the concept of framing a lot of research has been done and a lot of different theories and approaches have been established. How situations or a issues are perceived by an individuals depends on their perspective or – in other words – on the frame. These different perspectives can be described as framing. The same situation can either be described in a positive or a negative way, relative to the favored outcome. Framing is categorized into two dimensions: cognitive and interactional framing. Cognitive framing deals with an individuals' perception and biases. Interactional framing on the other hand addresses a more dynamic perspective. Both dimensions can be classified into “what is it that gets framed”. That classification includes issue frames, identities and relationship frames and processes frames. Established categories of cognitive issue framing are risky choice framing, attribute framing and goal framing. Especially risky choice framing is well-known for the Asian Disease Problem. Whereas cognitive framing relates to memory structures or “rules of thumb”, interactional framing focuses on communication. Both perspectives influence negotiations. To understand how a negotiation is shaped by cognitive and interactional framing, both perspectives are explained in detail in a first step and in further consequence are connected to negotiation. Due to the plethora of published research papers that address framing, it is not easy to keep track of the different framing definitions, framing effects or influence factors. Hence, this thesis categorizes the different approaches in terms of their theoretical backgrounds as well as in terms of their application areas and strives for providing a framework for improving the understanding of framing. The thesis reveals consistent findings across the different framing categories and highlights inconsistencies and various other issues that indicate a need for further research.

Zusammenfassung

Seit der Einführung des Framing-Konzepts wurde eine Vielzahl an unterschiedlichen Theorien und Ansätzen erforscht. Werden Botschaften oder Nachrichten unterschiedlich formuliert, kann dies zu einer Beeinflussung des Verhaltens des Empfängers führen, vorausgesetzt der Inhalt der Nachricht bleibt gleich. Eine Nachricht kann daher positiv oder negativ “gerahmt” sein, je nachdem welches Ergebnis erreicht werden soll. Framing Theorie wird grundsätzlich in zwei Dimensionen eingeteilt: kognitiv und interaktionell. Kognitives Framing setzt sich mit der Wahrnehmung des Einzelnen auseinander. Diese Wahrnehmung ist von Erfahrungen und so genannten Urteilsverzerrungen geprägt. Interaktionelles Framing beschäftigt sich hingegen mit der dynamischen Perspektive, die sich durch Interaktionen ergeben. Beide Dimensionen können nach dem Framing-Subjekt kategorisiert werden. Diese Klassifizierung beinhaltet das Framing-Thema, Framing-Identität und -Beziehung sowie den Prozess-Frame. Im Bereich der kognitiven Framing-Theorie hat vor allem Risky Choice Framing, durch das Asian Disease Problem, einen hohen Bekanntheitsgrad erlangt. Sowohl kognitives als auch interaktionelles Framing beeinflussen Verhandlungen. Um zu verstehen wie dieses Zusammenspiel von beiden Framing-Dimensionen wirkt, werden diese in einem ersten Schritt analysiert und in weiterer Folge auf den Verhandlungsprozess übergeleitet. Um aufzuzeigen in welchen Bereichen Framing wirkt, werden Studien aus unterschiedlichen Forschungsgebieten präsentiert. Aufgrund der hohen Anzahl an wissenschaftlichen Publikationen zum Thema Framing, die oft nicht aufeinander oder untereinander abgestimmt sind, ist es schwierig einen Überblick über die unterschiedlichen Definition, Framing-Effekte oder beeinflussende Faktoren zu behalten. Diese Arbeit teilt die unterschiedlichen Ansätze nach ihrem theoretischen Hintergrund und ihrem Anwendungsbereich ein um ein besseres Verständnis für Framing zu schaffen.

Contents

Declaration of Authorship	i
Abstract	iii
Zusammenfassung	v
List of Figures	ix
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Definition and Origins of Framing	1
1.2 Thesis Structure	3
2 Cognitive Frames	5
2.1 Cognitive Issue Frames	7
2.1.1 Risky Choice Framing	8
2.1.2 Attribute Framing	14
2.1.3 Goal Framing	20
2.2 Cognitive Identity and Relationship Frames	23
2.3 Cognitive Process Frames	25
3 Interactional Frames	27
3.1 Interactional Issue Framing	29
3.2 Interactional Identity and Relationship Framing	30
3.3 Interactional Process Framing	31
4 Negotiation	33
4.1 Cognitive Frames	34
4.2 Interactional Frames	37

4.2.1	Frame Categories Approach	37
4.2.2	Issue Development Approach	37
4.3	Comparison of Framing Approaches	38
4.4	Cognitive Framing in Negotiations	39
4.5	Interactional Framing in Negotiations	56
5	Summary and Conclusion	77
	Bibliography	81
	Curriculum Vitæ	89

List of Figures

1.1	Types of Frames	3
2.1	Selected heuristics and biases (Schwenk, 1988 , p. 44)	6
2.2	Cognitive Frames	7
2.3	Typology of Cognitive Issue Frames (Levin et al., 1998 , p. 151)	8
2.4	Risky Choice Framing Paradigm (Levin et al., 1998 , p. 152)	9
2.5	Attribute Framing Paradigm (Levin et al., 1998 , p. 158)	15
2.6	Attribute Groups and Attributes (Howard and Salkeld, 2009 , p. 355)	19
2.7	Attribute Frames (Howard and Salkeld, 2009 , p. 355)	19
2.8	Goal Framing Paradigm (Levin et al., 1998 , p. 167)	20
2.9	Processes of Cognitive Issue Framing Types (Levin et al., 1998 , p. 175)	24
3.1	Cognitive and Interactional Paradigms in Research Framing (Donohue et al., 2011 , p. 9)	28
4.1	Approaches of Framing (Putnam et al., 1992 , p. 143)	39
4.2	Two-person Social Dilemma for Gain and Loss Frames (De Dreu and McCusker, 1997 , p. 1094)	43
4.3	Social Dilemmas used in Experiments 1-3 (De Dreu and McCusker, 1997 , p. 1097)	45
4.4	Payoff Charts for Gain Condition in Experiment 2 (Bottom, 1998 , p. 104)	54
4.5	Abstract of a Transcript (Drake and Donohue, 1996 , p. 299–300)	57
4.6	Abstract of a Transcript (Drake and Donohue, 1996 , p. 306–307)	61
4.7	Abstract of a Transcript (Drake and Donohue, 1996 , p. 306–307)	62
4.8	Comparison of Different Conflict Characteristics (Brummans et al., 2008 , p. 29)	70
4.9	Definitions of Framing Categories (Brummans et al., 2008 , p. 34)	73

Chapter 1

Introduction

“Any particular event, situation, or issue can be understood and represented in very different ways, by approaching it from different perspectives”

— [Dewulf and Bouwen \(2012, p. 169\)](#)

1.1 Definition and Origins of Framing

The well-known expression “*Is the glass half empty or half full?*” can be considered to be the prime example for explaining the essence of *Framing* to the layman. Obviously, both answers describe exactly the same situation (i.e., a glass’s particular fill-up quantity), but, depending on one’s point of view, a statement about this situation can either be framed positively (i.e., “the glass is half full”) or negatively (i.e., “the glass is half empty”).

The term “framing” has been used in various disciplines like psychology, communication, sociology or management. Consequently, a plethora of definitions exists ([Dewulf et al., 2009](#)). Not only is the definition of framing not uniform, but also the effects of framing are not homogeneous. Data shows that the effect sizes are heterogeneous. There are various factors that lead to this heterogeneity but not all of them are identified ([Kühberger, 1998](#)).

[Tversky and Kahneman \(1981\)](#) for example define framing as “*the decision maker’s conception of acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice. The frame that a decision maker adopts is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision maker*” ([Kühberger, 1998, p. 24](#)). Furthermore, with regards to the authors, the

notion of framing can either be used in strict or a loose way. The strict definition of framing refers to identical problems that can be expressed in different ways, like the “Asian Disease Problem” which will be explained later on. The loose definition is related to framing that is caused by semantic manipulation as well as other individual factors (Kühberger, 1998).

Chong and Druckman (2007, p. 104) connect framing to *“the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue”*.

Entman (1993, p. 52) describes framing as *“selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”*.

In summary, it can be stated that there is no single, universally accepted definition of framing.

The origins of framing can be traced back to two main approaches. On the one hand it is rooted in the context of communicational science. For instance, Bateson (1954) states that framing can be understood as a manual for interactions or rather how an interaction should be interpreted. This particular notion of framing has been incorporated by anthropologists and sociologists (Tannen and Wallat, 1987). On the other hand Minsky (1974) argues that framing describes how people handle incoming information in relation to already existing schemes. This explanation is known as cognitive frame theory. He defines framing as *“cognitive representations of knowledge that are stored in memory and then retrieved and applied to new situations”* (Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 160). This kind of frame characterizes work in artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology and linguistic semantics (Tannen and Wallat, 1987).

The main difference between the above-mentioned approaches lies in the perspective. The cognitive approach focuses on memory structures, which ensure that incoming perceptual information fits into prebuilt imagination about reality. Contrary to this, the interactional approach is a more dynamic process within a negotiation or dispute. Hence the frame has to be adapted through the whole process (Dewulf et al., 2009). From a cognitive point of view framing arises if *“thematic perceptual dispositions increase the salience of frame-relevant information and decrease the salience of frame-irrelevant information”* (Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994, p. 194). From a communicational point of view framing can be described as a change in an

Nature of frames	What is it that gets framed		
	Issues	Identities & Relationships	Process
Cognitive Frames	Cognitive issue frames	Cognitive identity & relationship frames	Cognitive process frames
Interactional Frames	Interactional issue frames	Interactional identity & relationship frames	Interactional process frames

Figure 1.1: Types of Frames

individual's choice or decision making if underlying information changes ([Tversky and Kahneman, 1974](#)).

In summary it can be stated, that cognitive frames or knowledge schemes are related to structures of expectation about people, objects and settings. Interactive frames, however, focus on alignments and communication within an interaction ([Dewulf et al., 2009](#)).

Apart from the distinction shown above, frames can also be differentiated between the elements that get framed. [Dewulf et al. \(2009\)](#) provide a model that includes both the nature of frames, that is the distinction between cognitive and interactional framing, as well as the elements that get framed like issues, identities and relationships and process shown in Figure 1.1.

Framing is omnipresent in everyday life. There is evidence that framing affects medical and clinical decision making, perceptual judgments, consumer choices and in bargaining behaviors as well as in social dilemmas ([Levin et al., 1998](#)). Particular importance of framing concepts is given for research regarding conflicts and negotiations. In this context the effects of framing can influence the denouement of these conflicts or negotiation. More precisely framing effects do not only affect the type and quality of an agreement, furthermore they can also affect the duration and solution of a conflict ([Dewulf et al., 2009](#)).

1.2 Thesis Structure

Over the last years, numerous framing studies and analysis have been produced. This paper tries to highlight the most common definitions of framing as well as the most important application areas. Furthermore the aim of this present work is to class the high amount of papers with the categorization provided by [Dewulf et al.](#)

(2009), [Levin et al. \(1998\)](#) and [Dewulf and Bouwen \(2012\)](#) with the objective to compare findings, emphasize the most important framing effects as well as factors that moderate and influence framing effects.

This thesis is structured as follows. This chapter introduced the most common definitions of framing as well as its origins. Chapter [2](#) analyzes framing effects in a cognitive context. Chapter [3](#) examines framing effects in an interactional context. Subsequently, theories and empirical results of framing effects in Negotiation are provided in Chapter [4](#). Finally, Chapter [5](#) summarizes the most important theories and results and concludes this thesis.

Chapter 2

Cognitive Frames

“Cognitive frames are scripts that are among the cognitive structures we think with”

— [Ravven \(2013, p. 303\)](#)

Individuals believe that they make most of their decisions on the basis of the facts that are available. Additionally individuals are convinced that their brain stores only that kind of memory that is the result of actual experience. However, the truth is that everyone’s thinking and everyone’s memory is influenced by cognitive biases. There are a lot of different biases like the availability bias, anchoring and adjustment and the framing effect, which represents the most important part of this work. Psychologists and behavioral economists came to the conclusion that cognitive biases keep individuals from making rational decisions because they influence their judgment. Cognitive biases therefore persuade individuals to behave in a certain way ([Rispo, 2015](#)).

Cognitive studies with regards to framing have shown that frames influence and shape people’s understanding. Researchers came to the conclusion that people’s experiences, interpretation, processing and representation, relationships and interactions in conflict settings are distorted by biases ([Dewulf et al., 2009](#)). Such cognitive biases can be described as “rules of thumb” used by decision makers to facilitate problems and situations. On the one hand biases can be used as short cuts in processing information, on the other hand biases can lead to errors in decision making. Figure 2.1 shows those biases and their effects, which are deemed to influence strategic decision making ([Schwenk, 1988](#)).

[Shmueli et al. \(2006\)](#) argue, that individuals create frames to simplify every kind

Bias	Effects
Availability	Judgments of probability of easily-recalled events distorted.
Selective Perception	Expectations may bias observations of variables relevant to strategy.
Illusory correlation	Encourages belief that unrelated variables are correlated.
Conservatism	Failure sufficiently to revise forecasts based on new information.
Law and small numbers	Overestimation of the degree to which small samples are representative of populations.
Regression bias	Failure to allow for regression to the mean.
Wishful thinking	Probability of desired outcomes judged to be inappropriately high.
Illusion of control	Overestimation of personal control over outcomes.
Logical reconstruction	“Logical” reconstruction of events, which cannot be accurately recalled.
Hindsight bias	Overestimation of predictability of past events.

Figure 2.1: Selected heuristics and biases ([Schwenk, 1988](#), p. 44)

of situation. Through these frames key aspects in these situations are detected, interpreted, understood and in further consequence forwarded to other individuals. Such cognitive structures are used to facilitate high amounts of information, store it and apply it to new situations. Frames therefore serve as filters to individual's perceptions and also influence them.

[Schwenk \(1988\)](#) came to the conclusion that biases also might interact with each other and also intensify each other. As an example he highlighted the availability bias which is able to increase the illusion of control in successful executives. Therefore executives refer to their past experiences of success more easily than to experiences of fail when evaluating new strategies. Cognitive heuristics and biases influence decision makers' perception of strategic problems and therefore are a part of a decision makers' frame of reference. Researchers found evidence that the biases listed in this paper are likely to influence strategic decision making because such biases are a reaction to the cognitive limitations of humans to simplify complex situations. The understanding of cognitive structures, processes and biases leads to an understanding of how decisions are made by decision makers and how decision can be influenced.

In the context of cognitive framing there are two important approaches that have characterized further framing research. The first one was provided by Minsky, an artificial intelligence researcher, in 1975. He stated that frames can be seen as




Figure 2.2: Cognitive Frames

information stored in people’s memory that can be called up in familiar situations or if necessary adapted to unknown or new situations (Dewulf et al., 2009). Tversky and Kahneman contributed the second one, the so-called “Prospect Theory” which shows that due to the framing of decision alternatives, choices can be influenced. This approach will be specified in Chapter 2.1.1 in correspondence to risky choice framing (Fagley et al., 2010).

As time went by, further adaptations of these findings have lead to different approaches like those of Dewulf et al. (2009). They classified cognitive frames according to “what it is that gets framed” and to the “Nature of frames” as highlighted in Figure 2.2. That can be issues, identities and relationships or processes.

In the next section, cognitive issue frames will be explicated in more detail.

2.1 Cognitive Issue Frames

For this categorization, Levin et al. (1998) identified three types of framing, namely risky choice framing, attribute framing and goal framing. The first of these types is based on Tversky and Kahneman’s “Asian disease problem”. Risky choice framing refers to a decision people make according to whether a choice is presented as loss or as gain although the outcome is equal (Kim et al., 2014). The second type of cognitive issue framing is called attribute framing. In contrast to risky choice framing, where a set of options gets framed, attribute framing focuses on a special attribute or characteristic to be manipulated. Goal framing refers to that kind of framing, in which the goal of a certain behavior or action gets framed (Levin et al., 1998).

Framing Type	Object of Framing	Purpose of Framing
Risky Choice Framing	Set of options with different risk levels	Risk preference
Attribute Framing	Object/Event attributes or characteristics	Item evaluation
Goal Framing	Consequence/Implied goal of a behavior	

Figure 2.3: Typology of Cognitive Issue Frames (Levin et al., 1998, p. 151)

Figure 2.3 presents an overview of these 3 types of framing which includes the object of framing. In the next three sections these types will be explained in more detail.

2.1.1 Risky Choice Framing

The foundation for risky choice theory was laid by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) with the so called Prospect Theory and the “Asian disease problem”. Tversky and Kahneman conducted an experiment in which they pretend that the U.S. has to prepare for an outbreak of an Asian disease. The participants of this experiment could chose between two options, which were objectively equivalent. On of these options was certain, the other one was presumable. Both of them were either positively (“people will be saved”) or negatively (“people will die”) framed. For such a decision problem, Tversky and Kahneman use the term “decision frame”. This term refers to the acts and options between individuals have to choose, to the outcomes and consequences such acts and options bring along and to the uncertainties of such acts and options. An individuals chosen frame is in some extend influenced by habits, norms and the personality of the individual. Decision problems can be framed in different ways. The effects of these different formulations are illustrated by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in the following two problems in relation to the above mentioned Asian disease problem:

Problem 1. The authors create a scenario in which the U.S. has to prepare itself for the outbreak of an Asian disease. This disease is likely to kill about 600 people. There are two different possibilities to deal with the disease, namely program A and B. The adaption of program A will save 200 people (i.e., 72%). Program B offers a $\frac{1}{3}$ probability of saving 600 people but a $\frac{2}{3}$ probability of saving no one. Analysis of this problem show, that the majority of the 155 respondents




Figure 2.4: Risky Choice Framing Paradigm (Levin et al., 1998, p. 152)

are risk averse. They prefer the certain option instead of the uncertain one although the expected values are equal.

Problem 2. Another group of respondents was presented the same problem in a different formulation. Therefore with program C 400 people will die. Whereas the adaption of problem D will lead to a $\frac{2}{3}$ probability that none of the people will die, and a $\frac{2}{3}$ probability that all of the 600 people will not be saved. In consequence of the change of the formulation, the majority of respondents comes out as risk taking. As an explanation for this behavior the authors argue, that the certain loss of 400 people is unacceptable compared to the $\frac{2}{3}$ probability of losing 600 people.

Tversky and Kahneman (1981) came to the conclusion that the certain option is chosen if it is framed in a positive way whereas the risky option is preferred when a negative frame is given (Kim et al., 2014; Fagley et al., 2010). Whereas Problem 1 is illustrated by the lives saved, Problem 2 is illustrated by the lives lost.

The explanation for this choice reversal can be offered by their prospect theory. This approach explains the effect with the value function of a subject, which is concave in case of gains and convex in case of losses (Levin et al., 2002).

In their experiment Tversky and Kahneman (1981) showed, that decision makers can be influenced by framing the decision alternatives and that different frames persuade people to view the different options from different perspectives. In other words, framing affects people's perception towards the outcomes (Fagley et al., 2010).

Since then the theory of [Tversky and Kahneman \(1981\)](#) of choice reversal prediction has been extended by many studies. Most of the studies focus on a hypothetical decision scenario with two decision choices. This decision scenario includes one riskless option on the one hand and on the other hand a two-outcome all-or-none risky option. Whereas the positive framed options are both outlined as gains, in case of the negative frame both options are presented as losses. All in all it can be evidenced that there is a tendency for people to rather choose a risky option if losses are expected than if gains are expected. If such an effect of risky choice framing occurs, it typically appears in form of a choice reversal or choice shift ([Levin et al., 1998](#)).

In their work [Tversky and Kahneman \(1974\)](#) examined heuristics and biases that influence people's decisions. They argue that people use heuristics to estimate the probability and value of an uncertain event. The authors identified the following three heuristics:

Representativeness. For decisions with regards to probabilities people bank on representativeness heuristic. These are questions like *“What is the probability that object A belongs to class B?”* ([Tversky and Kahneman, 1974](#), p. 1124). Within this context probabilities are valued by the amount of similarity between A and B. In other words, if there is a high similarity between A and B, there is also a high probability that A has its genesis in B and vice versa. For a better understanding, Tversky and Kahneman illustrated an example of such a representativeness heuristic situation. In this example the authors portray a situation in which someone describes his neighbor with words like very shy, withdrawn, invariably helpful with little interest in people and a need for order and structure. In further consequence they analyze how people would attribute a particular occupation to the above-described neighbor, for example farmer or librarian. The probability of people thinking that the neighbor is a librarian is dependent on how much the description fits to the stereotype of a librarian. People therefore do not distinguish between probability and similarity. This leads to errors due to the reason that probabilities are affected by several factors whereas similarity or representativeness is not.

Availability. People also evaluate probabilities of certain events by looking for information about such events in their memories. For example people may classify the risk of a heart attack among middle-aged people by the occurrences among

the circle of acquaintances.

Adjustment and Anchoring. This kind of heuristic influences peoples estimation of probabilities. Starting point is an initial value or reference point, in other words the anchor, which is then adjusted until the estimate is reached. The starting point could either be the result of the phrasing of the problem itself or the result of a computation. However, the adjustment is insufficient in both cases because anchoring occurs in both cases. For a better understanding a study, carried out by Tversky and Kahneman, illustrates this anchoring effect. Two groups of high school students were given a numerical expression, which had to be estimated within 5 seconds. One group had to estimate $8 \times 7 \times 6 \times 5 \times 4 \times 3 \times 2 \times 1$ and the other group had to estimate $1 \times 2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5 \times 6 \times 7 \times 8$. Due to the short time span the students had not enough time to calculate the whole expression and therefore had to make an estimation. That group which had to estimate the sequence that started with a small number was expected to judge the expression smaller than the other group and the same way round. Actually the median estimate for the sequence that started with a small number was 512 whereas the median estimate for the other sequence was 2250. The correct solution is 40320.

Additionally, [Tversky and Kahneman \(1974\)](#) come to the conclusion that even researchers are not invulnerable to heuristics and biases and that this is not a phenomenon that is only restricted to laymen. Also researchers, that are familiar with this research area are also liable to the same biases if decisions are made instinctively.

Application and Studies

In his work, [Kühberger \(1998\)](#) gives an overview of 15 years of research within the scope of the framing phenomenon. Furthermore he tries to give an answer to the question if there is a framing effect and which instances are particularly suitable to generate or encourage such an effect. After collecting relevant studies essential elements were identified that possibly influence framing effects. These elements can be assigned to the categories risk, task and participant characteristics. These are so called moderator variables. With reference to the risk characteristics the author distinguishes between “risk manipulation by reference to a risky event” and “risk manipulation by outcome salience”. The first term refers to a risky event that occurs

or occurs not with a certain probability. The Asian disease problem is an example for this kind of risk manipulation. Within a certain scenario one of two options occurs, taking account of some risky event. However the risk notion can also be applied to a present state instead of a future risky event. In this case the present state is described in different ways. Either a positive or a negative frame is used. As an example Kühberger cites an example from health care. On the one hand there is a chance for someone to develop a special disease with the probability of 10% (negative frame). On the other hand someone has a chance of 90% to keep well and fit (positive frame). This is the “risk manipulation by outcome salience”. For this purpose both aspects of one alternative, the positive as well as the negative one, are made differently salient. Additionally, Kühberger (1998) points out that within framing research risk also differs in the number of risky events and in the configuration of options offered. The majority of researchers in the framing domain offers two options, a sure one and a risky one. But there are researches that only offer risky options that feature different degrees of risk.

All in all, Kühberger (1998) comes to the conclusion that risk may vary in different ways namely:

- Risk manipulation (by reference to a risky event or outcome salience)
- Quality of risk (sure and risky option or only risky options)
- Number of risky events (only one risky event or multiple risky events)

The term task characteristics refers to the nature of the framing manipulation. One method is to portray one problem in two different ways and point out gains and losses explicitly. Another method is to show up losses and gains in an implicit way by influencing the framing of a certain situation by characterizing it as either a commons-dilemma or as a public-goods situation. Kühberger therefore makes a distinction between frame manipulation by explicit gains/losses and task responsive wording. Also belonging to this category of task characteristics he mentions the response mode, which differs in making a choice and making a judgment or rating. Furthermore by analyzing the underlying papers Kühberger identified two types of comparison, in particular between-subjects designs and within-subjects designs (Kühberger, 1998). Furthermore he adds the unit of analysis to this kind of characteristics, which distinguishes between individual participants or groups as

subject to the experiment. Finally there is to clarify which domain is the subject to the analysis, like health domain, business domain or gambling domain (Kühberger, 1998).

The last category of possibly relevant characteristics is the level of expertise. Analysis showed up the differentiation between participants that are from student sample and those are from target samples (Kühberger, 1998).

Kühberger (1998) comes to the conclusion that risk manipulation and the response mode seem to be relevant for the framing effect. Within this category only the reference point manipulations was likely to produce a framing effect. As regards the response mode Kühberger came to the conclusion that the choice mode, in contrast to the judgment or rating mode, creates strong reference point effects.

Zickar and Highhouse (1998) tried to examine yet unexplained issues in the context of framing and risky choices namely about the role of framing, the item context and the preference of risk. The authors argue that this is necessary to understand how framing items interact with risk taking behavior. As unresolved issues, they bring in:

The importance of individual differences. Instead of analyzing only on the consequences of positive versus negative frames, some researchers have focused on how individual differences in risk-taking tendencies affect, or in other words moderate, framing effects. For example Frisch (1993) and Wang (1996) stated the assumption that the weaker the risk attitude of a decision maker, the stronger the framing effect. This means that there should be stronger framing effects if the preference for risk is moderate.

The response consistency across frames. It is a leading opinion that it is possible to reason from someone's choice among framing options to someone's risk preference. However Schneider (1992) argues that this is only true for the sure partial-gain option in the context of the positive frame. In case of the negative frame this consistency could not be observed because individuals did not always chose the uncertain option. In her experiment she provided various alternatively framed items, different item arenas and different levels of risk within the uncertain option. Schneider assumed that this inconsistency originates from the fact that a choice between negatively framed options cannot lead to satisfaction.

The effects of the framing arena. The term framing arena describes the scenario in which framing takes place. While prospect theory did not consider the scenario arena, other researchers are much more interested in how the scenario arena influences risk preferences. [Fagley and Miller \(1997\)](#) determined that individuals were more willing to chose the more risky option when they are faced with life versus death choices instead of choices that involve monetary loss or loss of property.

In their experiment [Zickar and Highhouse \(1998\)](#) presented the following four different framing arenas:

- an educational system with a large student dropout problem;
- an Asian disease that is threatening the United States;
- possible changes in the tax laws and
- a manufacturer faced with impending plant closings.

The experiment supported Frisch's hypothesis that the stronger the risk attitude of an individual, the weaker the framing affect. With regards to the interaction of framing and the risk attitude the authors argue that framing is more effective if individuals have moderate risk attitudes. Referring to Schneider's assumption, there was only moderate evidence. In terms of the item arena the Asian Disease item differed from the other items. As already mentioned, one explanation for this result could be that individuals make different decisions in cases of lives than in cases of other outcomes. It is also possible that individuals apprehend lives as irrevocable whereas other outcomes are replaceable. Referring to the findings that the Asian disease item shows irregularities compared to the other items, further research has to be conducted because these results indicate that this mostly used item has only limited validity to other choice arenas.

2.1.2 Attribute Framing

In contrast to risky choice and goal framing, attribute framing represents the simplest case of framing and is therefore more suitable to examine the influences of positive and negative framing. This kind of framing affects only one single attribute that is




Figure 2.5: Attribute Framing Paradigm (Levin et al., 1998, p. 158)

manipulated. For the evaluation of objects or items, ratings of favorability or yes or no judgments are common. Whereas risky choice framing involves the choice between independent options, which means that the analysis of one option does not give any information about the other option, attribute framing only provides evaluation information. Furthermore attribute framing differs from risky choice framing with regard to the framed object. In case of risky choice framing the information that is manipulated is the output. In case of attribute framing the information framed is the “attribute” or the characteristic (Levin et al., 1998).

But attribute framing can also be used to describe a situation either in the way of success or failure rates. As shown in Figure 2.5 one alternative is represented in a positive way, in terms of success or in a negative way, in terms of failure. This type of framing has been applied to analyze the evaluation of job placement programs, industry project teams, medical treatments and condom use. All studies had in common that the positively framed alternative was valued more favorably than the negative described alternative. This can also be applied for studies that deal with surgeries or medical treatments. Examples of such studies will be described in a later section.

Moreover Levin et al. (1998, p. 164) allege that “*encoding differences based on positive or negative framing*” could lead to stimulus-response compatibility effects. As an explanation for this effect they suggest that an individuals perception of the positively or negatively framed attribute causes different reactions. This can also be described as the connection between a stimulus and its response. The higher the level of stimulus-response compatibility, the shorter the time of reaction. A low level of

stimulus-response compatibility implicates a longer reaction time ([Schmidt and Lee, 1988](#)). [Levin et al. \(1998\)](#) argue that this different kind of cognitive representation, namely a positive or negative one, of the underlying attribute is likely to change subjective scale values. As a result attribute framing makes it possible to manipulate the encoding and representation of information in associative memory ([Levin et al., 1998](#)).

Moderators

[Levin et al. \(1998\)](#) also mention factors that moderate the effects of attribute framing namely strongly held attitudes, high personal involvement and dealing with extremes. As an example for high personal involvement the authors adduce the study of Marteau in which medical students have to deal with the medical decision of treatment or no treatment. He came to the conclusion that students were more likely to perform surgery if it was described by survival rates instead of death rates.

Application and Studies

A study by [Levin and Gaeth \(1988\)](#) revealed that attribute framing is often related to consumer product judgments. Subject matter of this analysis had been ground beef that was framed as either 75% lean or 25% fat. In their experiment they examined attribute framing effects before and after a test group tried the ground beef. Consumers had to evaluate the product by several scales like greasy/greaseless, good tasting/bad tasting and high quality/low quality. Before trying the beef, consumers preferred the 75% lean labeled product. In a second step the consumers were given a sample of the beef and also got the description percent-lean or percent-fat. The objective of this procedure was the manipulation of the consumer's experience to analyze the effects of framing the product information and personal product information. The order of framing and tasting was varied. Therefore some of the participants tasted the product before evaluating it and vice versa to show how the framing of the attribute information would influence the decision of the participants. In one scenario participants get the product information before tasting the product and hence without personal experience with the product. In the second scenario the consumers already have personal experience before getting product information.

However the study showed that framing the attribute information affected con-

sumer's evaluation in both ways. However the framing effect was mitigated when the participants had personal experience with the product or when they tasted the product. The conclusion of this study confirms the results of previous studies regarding hypothetical purchases. Former studies also came to the conclusion that the combination of two sources of information reduces the effect of one information source. Levin and Gaeth came to the conclusion that personal experience weakens the effects of the attribute framing. If the consumer perceives the taste of the product as terrible a strong positive frame will not change the consumers judgment (Levin and Gaeth, 1988).

This kind of framing is also common in health communication. Bigman et al. (2010) analyzed attribute framing effects with regard to the human papillomavirus (HVP) vaccine. The purpose of this paper was to learn if differences in the presentation of information lead to differences in perceptions of HPV vaccine as well as related outcomes, beliefs and policy. In case of health related themes attribute framing should get people to be more openly toward medical prevention or treatment. In this context attribute framing can be used to describe efficacy rates, side effects for surgical treatments and vaccines or for example medications. Regarding efficacy rates, these can be framed either in terms of success or in terms of failure to protect individuals against a disease. Therefore medication can be presented as "effective against strains that account for 70% of cases of a disease" on the one hand or as "ineffective against strains that account for 30% of cases". For example the HPV vaccine has mostly been presented as 70% effective. But sometimes the HIP vaccine has been presented as 30% ineffective. This is a so-called mixed frame, which is commonly used in news articles.

Researchers assume that this mixed-frame strategy is suitable to influence people's perception of HPV vaccine. Because of the findings of former research concerning attribute framing, it was assumed that the group of participants that was presented the positive attribute frame, namely that the vaccine is 70% effective, would rate the vaccine more favorably as the participant group which was presented the negative attribute frame. Furthermore it was supposed that there would be differences in the results between positive and negative attribute framing with the tendency that the positive attribute frame would lead to higher mean rates of HPV vaccine effectiveness. Additionally to the positive and negative frame the authors included two mixed conditions. This fact caused the questions if the order of frames

matters and if the outcomes that result from the mixed frames differ from the positive or negative frame.

Results showed that the hypothesis that the positive frame results in higher mean rating of HPV vaccine effectiveness could be corroborated. In terms of the mixed frame it can be said, that people that got information regarding the vaccine effectiveness in a negative-positive order evaluated the vaccine more favorably than people that read the positive information first and then got the negative information. (Bigman et al., 2010).

Another example for attribute framing in the health sector is presented by Howard and Salkeld (2009). In their study they tried to examine if attribute framing is able to influence the willingness to pay for screenings for colorectal cancer. Assuming that attribute framing is suitable to affect the utility depending on the presentation of the information, the authors examined a discrete choice experiment. Howard and Salkeld (2009) analyzed the literature that dealt with this kind of health issue to determine the most important attributes for the target group. Their review revealed the following attribute groups, namely test sensitivity (1), test specificity (2), out of pocket costs (3), dietary and medication restrictions required (4) and how the stool sample is collected (5). Figure 2.6 shows the attributes and the related attribute group. The framing of the attributes for cancer and large polyps is illustrated in Figure 2.7.

1920 subjects received a two-alternative unlabeled experiment with the four different and randomly allocated frames illustrated in Figure 2.7 that refer to test sensitivity and five different attributes groups shown in Figure 2.6. 1157 individuals sent back the questionnaire. As a result, the authors came to the conclusion that attribute framing is able to influence the willingness to pay. Participants willingness to pay to identify an extra cancer increased significantly when the test specificity attribute was expressed as number of people who have unnecessary colonoscopies. The authors argue that individuals tend to “trade off potential harms against one unit of increased benefit” (Howard and Salkeld, 2009, p. 358). In relation of test sensitivity, participants accepted 22.8 more unnecessary colonoscopies if framed in terms of "cancers found" for every extra cancer that was discovered by the test. When test sensitivity was framed in terms of "cancers missed", the rate of unnecessary colonoscopies decreased to 10.4 for every fewer cancer missed. Howard and Salkeld (2009) explained this behavior as an “over-weighting of a positive outcome

Attributes	Attribute Group
How many cancers the test will find	1
How many cancers the test will miss	1
How many large polyps the test will find	1
How many large polyps the test will miss	1
The number of people who are correctly reassured that they do NOT have cancer	2
The number of people who have unnecessary colonoscopies	2
Cost	3
Dietary and medication restrictions	4
How the sample is collected	5

Figure 2.6: Attribute Groups and Attributes ([Howard and Salkeld, 2009](#), p. 355)




Figure 2.7: Attribute Frames ([Howard and Salkeld, 2009](#), p. 355)




Figure 2.8: Goal Framing Paradigm (Levin et al., 1998, p. 167)

and under-weighting of a negative outcome”.

2.1.3 Goal Framing

This kind of cognitive issue framing involves manipulations that lead to a specific outcome or to a favored goal. This can either be implemented through a positive or a negative frame. In case of a positive frame potential benefits or gains will be highlighted. In case of a negative frame the attention will be focused on the avoidance of a possible loss. Figure 2.8 shows the illustration of the two cases of the manipulation (Levin et al., 1998).

In contrast to attribute framing, in the context of goal framing both positive and negative framing lead to the same goal (Krishnamurthy et al., 2001). Goal framing is very common in studies of persuasive communications (Levin et al., 1998). Though the majority comes to the conclusion that negative goal framing is more effective than positive goal framing, Levin et al. (1998) point out that these findings are not solid. But they emphasize studies that show more effectiveness for negative goal framing. As a reason for this circumstance motivation is cited. Krishnamurthy et al. (2001) argue that people are more likely to avoid loss than to obtain gain of equal extent.

Application and Studies

A popular study analyzing goal framing has been carried out by Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987). They examined the influence of goal framing and breast self-examination. In their study the authors tested if a brochure that only points out the

negative consequences of failing to do breast self-examination would be more convincing than pointing out the positive consequences. For that purpose college-aged women received a loss-frame brochure, a gain-frame brochure or a no-arguments brochure that contained information about the importance and the techniques of breast self-examination. To evaluate which frame influences the behavior of the subjects, attitudes toward breast self-examination and intentions to perform breast self-examination (BSE) were assessed directly after the intervention and again after 4 months. As predicted those subjects that got the loss-framed brochure showed more positive attitudes, intentions and behaviors regarding breast self-examination than the other subjects. These results are in line with prospect theory, which argues that risk-seeking behavior is much more pronounced with loss frames. Since performing BSE could result in finding a lump what represents a risk, emphasizing the losses that could be the consequences of not performing BSE could possibly outweigh the risk and encourage women to perform BSE (Meyerowitz and Chaiken, 1987).

Also Rothman et al. (1993) were able to show that negative frames rather lead to a favored goal. In their study about sun tanning and skin cancer they carried out two experiments investigating performing health behaviors either to prevent or detect skin cancer. In Experiment 1 (Rothman et al., 1993, p. 410) male and female participants got information about skin cancer that was either positively or negatively framed, as shown below.

Positive Frame. *“If a cancerous growth is detected, 19 of 20 growths are the less deadly non-melanoma cancer.”*

Negative Frame. *“If a cancerous growth is detected, 1 of 20 growths are the more deadly non-melanoma cancer.”*

After reading the information the subjects’ behavior towards obtaining skin cancer detection examination as well as skin cancer prevention was measured. In case of the positively framed example the positive consequences of a skin cancer examination were highlighted where as in case of the negative frame the negative consequences of a skin cancer examination were emphasized. This type of framing manipulation is denoted as different consequences framing. As a contrast same consequences framing expresses the same consequences of performing or not performing a special behavior, as illustrated in Experiment 2.

In Experiment 2 ([Rothman et al., 1993](#), p. 410) the participants received positively or negatively framed brochures about skin cancer and also were given postage-paid postcards through which they can request sunscreen and additional information about skin cancer prevention.

Positive Frame. *“If you have skin cancer examination, a cancerous growth can be detected before it becomes life threatening.”*

Negative Frame. *“If you do not have a skin cancer examination, a cancerous growth cannot be detected before it becomes life threatening.”*

Experiment 2 obviously focused more on the preventive behavior with regards to skin cancer. Therefore the authors examine the influence of message framing on detection behavior as well as prevention behavior in relation to health behavior. In case of the positive frame the positive consequences of having an examination are highlighted. In case of the negative frame the positive consequences that cannot be achieved because an examination has not been carried out are underlined. Which type of framing is used, depends on the type of information that should be presented. Whereas same consequences framing is applicable to any kind of information, for different consequences framing the type of information has to meet certain requirements. The information that gets framed has to offer negative and positive consequences like success vs. failure or life vs. death ([Rothman et al., 1993](#)).

Findings regarding message framing and health behavior differ in the type of manipulation and therefore possibly result in contradictory findings. While some authors used different consequences manipulations in which the positive frame was more effective, others used a same consequences manipulation like [Meyerowitz and Chaiken \(1987\)](#) in which the negatively framed information leads to the desired behavior. [Rothman et al. \(1993\)](#) suppose one reason for these contradictions in the nature of the promoted behavior. Within health problem studies three different behaviors have been examined namely those which detect a health problem, those that prevent one and those that can ease a health problem. Therefore it could depend on the features of the different types of behavior if the positive or negative message framing is more effective.

As the study on BSE by [Meyerowitz and Chaiken \(1987\)](#) shows, in case of message framing with regards to detection behaviors negatively framed information was more

effective than the positive one. As a contrast studies that have dealt with prevention behaviors indicate, though showing some contradictions, that positive framing may be more effective. Rothman et al. (1993) therefore allege that positive message framing encourages prevention behavior whereas negatively framed messages promote the performance of detection behavior.

They came to the conclusion that the level of issue involvement, or if the issue involvement is high or low, moderates the framing effect. Experiment 1 showed that women are more concerned about skin cancer and therefore have a higher issue involvement. As a result they are more likely to get skin examination after receiving the negatively framed information than men, which are less concerned about skin cancer. Experiment 2 confirmed the assumption that positive message framing encourages preventive behavior and showed that high involvement is an additional advantage (Rothman et al., 1993).

Figure 2.9 shows how goal framing effects differ from risky choice or attribute framing effects. The graphic clearly shows that regardless of how the message is framed, both lead to the same outcome (Levin et al., 1998).

2.2 Cognitive Identity and Relationship Frames

Within frames as cognitive representations the nature of frames can also be classified into cognitive identities and cognitive relationship frames. Individuals tend to categorize their social environment using frames about themselves, other individuals as well as relationships. Such frames about other individuals can have the form of stereotypes or characterization forms. These are positive, negative or neutral descriptions of other people or disputants. Those depictions serve to describe and judge people and also make assumption how people should behave.

The task identity frames refers to how individuals perceive themselves and their role within social groups. Established identity frames are hard to change the longer they endure and the more they have been confirmed in the past, a circumstance that is conducive for already existing conflicts (Dewulf et al., 2009). Referring to Lewicki et al. (2002) there are special framing patterns, which appear supportive for existing conflicts like stakeholders that have “*strong identity frames that define a core aspect of who they see themselves as*” (Gray, 2004, p. 167). Such strong identity frames are likely to hamper finding an appropriate solution for all involved parties. For




Figure 2.9: Processes of Cognitive Issue Framing Types (Levin et al., 1998, p. 175)

these stakeholders actions and positions of other parties seem as a threat to their own identity. [Gray \(2004\)](#) calls this circumstance a lack of common identity frames, which reinforces conflicts and leads to conflict escalation.

As individuals generate frames about identities, they do the same about relationships. Relationship frames can be classified into power frames and trust frames. Power frames refer to expectations about status or in more detail if they are superior or inferior to other individuals. As mentioned above for identity frame, strong power frames are also not conducive for conflict resolution. Trust frames deal with the question if a relationship is seen as trustworthy or untrustworthy ([Dewulf et al., 2009](#)).

2.3 Cognitive Process Frames

Individuals use schemes for specific situations or actions. Those cognitive representations of interaction equip individuals with a specific behavioral script for processes like shopping or conflict situations ([Dewulf et al., 2009](#)). Behavioral scripts are like an owner's manual for behavior. A script can be described as a *"chain of actions that a person believes is appropriate for a given context"* ([O'Connor and Adams, 1999](#), p. 136).

According to [Schank and Abelson \(2013\)](#), people behave in a certain way because they make use of knowledge about their environment. This knowledge has two manifestations namely general and specific knowledge. General knowledge is used in standard situations to understand the standard needs of the opponent, like if someone asks for a glass of water it is clear why he does it. The second type of knowledge is the specific knowledge used in situations that people have been through very often. One popular example of such a special knowledge script is called the restaurant script. This script describes how someone has to behave in a restaurant like entering, ordering and eating. Once a script is internalized, the correct behavior is easy to implement without giving too much thought. A script can either be designed by own experiences or by external information obtained by other sources. Hence scripts for particular situations can be available in an individuals mind although this individual has never been in such a situation before ([O'Connor and Adams, 1999](#)).

Such scripts also exist for conflicts, which are used by individuals to understand conflict situations ([Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994](#)). According to [Golec and Federico](#)

(2004, p. 751) conflict schemes are “*learned social constructs that define (a) what kinds of social situations may be regarded as conflicts, (b) when and how a conflict starts and how it should end, and (c) the most desirable ways of dealing with such conflict*”. Those process frames influence the way and duration of a conflict resolution because of prefabricated biases that limit the room for solution (Dewulf et al., 2009).

Chapter 3

Interactional Frames

“The interactive notion of frame refers to a definition of that is going on in an interaction, without which no utterance or movement or gesture could be interpreted”

— Tannen and Wallat (1987, p. 206)

According to Tannen and Wallat (1987) the interactional framing concept refers to the way in which an interaction should be interpreted. Movements or gestures can have different meanings depending on the situation they are used in. As stated in Bateson’s monkey example a push from another monkey can either be meant as an invitation to play or as a challenge. To appreciate a situation in the right way someone has to know in which context it has to be understood. In contrast to cognitive framing, the interactional approach is a dynamic ongoing process in interactions (Dewulf and Bouwen, 2012).

The table depicted in Figure 3.1 provides distinctions between both approaches and has been presented in Donohue et al. (2011). The main distinction can be linked to the root metaphor. While in the cognitive approach people are labeled as lay-scientists, the interactional approach labels people as lay-rhetoricians. Furthermore the two approaches can be differentiated from a language point of view. In terms of cognitive framing language can be characterized as a system of symbols that is used to display the world. In terms of interactional framing, language has an active part in forming a frame, therefore framing arises out of the use of language. Additionally whereas the cognitive perception of the displayed world is biased, the interactional perspective considers that frames design the meaning of a situation individuals are dealing with (Donohue et al., 2011).

	Cognitive Paradigm	Interactional Paradigm
Root metaphor	People as information processors or lay-scientists. Social reality consists of individuals processing and representing information about their world.	People as conversationalists or lay-rhetoricians. Social reality consists of people interacting in varying and recurring constellations co-constructing the meaning of their world.
What are frames?	A conflict frame is a cognitive representation that guides expectations about the conflict situation.	Conflict framing is an interactional process in which the meaning of conflict situation is co-constructed through mega-communicational aspects of discourse.
What is meaning?	Meaning is located in the mind (between the ears), and ultimately depends on one's private understand.	Meaning is located in the discourse (between the noses) and ultimately depends on the reactions of others.
What is language?	Languages as representation—a system of symbols used to represent the outer world and people's inner worlds.	Language as action—a system of symbols used to enact social interactions. Language is the substance out of which frames are made.
Relation of frames to reality	Frames are biased representations of the external world. Frames capture what people believe is external reality.	Frames are perspective-based co-constructions of the meaning of the external world. Framing constructs the meaning of objects it addresses.
Research focus	Focus mostly on information representation and processing, with a focus on variance between individuals.	Focus mostly on interaction processes, with a focus on variance between specific points or episodes in conflict interaction.
Frame change	The criterion for frame change lies in the cognitions. Existing frames remain relatively stable over long periods of time.	The criterion for change lies in the interaction. Framing changes over the course of the interaction, as interactants react to each other's framings.
Methodological preferences	Rely on various kinds of data from which frames are interfered (experiments, tests, interviews, observations etc.).	Rely predominantly on analyzing (recorded and transcribed) observations of interactions.

Figure 3.1: Cognitive and Interactional Paradigms in Research Framing ([Donohue et al., 2011](#), p. 9)

The two approaches can also be differentiated in how knowledge is created and organized. With regards to cognitive framing, research focuses on the understanding of how frames influence a conflict or negotiation. This also includes the understanding of how information is illustrated and handled. To gather such cognitive information they use interviews, tests, experiments or observations. In comparison, interactional framing theory focuses on verbal interaction processes and analyzes observations of such interactions to aggregate data (Donohue et al., 2011). In the case of cognitive framing researchers are interested in the *“variance of frames between individuals or groups of similar individuals”* whereas in case of interactional framing attention is given to the *“variance between episodes in a sequence of interactions - or the ways that the same individuals might frame a conflict at different times in diverse ways”* (Donohue et al., 2011, p. 10–11).

There are also two different ways in which the approaches deal with the change of frames within a conflict situation. As regards cognitive framing research try to evaluate how different information leads to changes in frames, considering that existing cognitive frames are not easy to change and usually exist over long time periods. However interactional framing theory concentrates on if and how frames change during an interaction as the involved parties react to each other's arguments (Donohue et al., 2011).

These sections will only provide a short overview of the interactional framing concept because all three categories of interactional framing will be explained in more detail in Chapter 4.

3.1 Interactional Issue Framing

As mentioned above the interactional framing approach starts with individuals trying to understand a complex situation and furthermore trying to make sense of equivocal contents within a conversation. This is aggravated by the fact that the meaning of certain issues differs depending on who people are talking to. This emphasizes the aspect of communication within framing, since it is possible to change the meaning and implications of events. Therefore it depends on the perspective in which way issues are understood. This circumstance has gained attraction within different research fields like communication, decision making, leadership, change management as well as conflict and negotiation (Dewulf and Bouwen, 2012).

According to Dewulf et al. (2009, p. 170) the term interactional issue framing refers to *“how parties negotiate the meanings of issues in social interaction”*. In this context framing characterizes the purport of an issue and the issues itself matches with the content of the negotiation. Those ambiguous issues are part of conflicts and discusses by different parties. As stated in the previous paragraph, how issues are understood depends on the perspective, therefore different parties act different in issue framing. How individuals interpret such issues depends on the information that is given away, on the questions asked and the style of arguing within the conflict. The configuration of these elements of a conflict determines the meaning of the issues (Dewulf et al., 2009). But different disputants will interpret the meaning of these questions and information in a different way and as a result will find different solutions (Dewulf et al., 2004). During a conflict issue framing changes and new issues arise, hence interactional issue framing is a dynamic process and not a static concept (Dewulf et al., 2009).

3.2 Interactional Identity and Relationship Framing

This type of interaction framing deals with the role of identities and relationships within a negotiation process. In other words, individuals represent their identities and relationships in social interactions. Those identities that are created for interactions can be accepted or denied by others (Dewulf et al., 2009). Identities and relationships are constructed through communication, by exchanging statements.

With regards to Bartel and Dutton (2001) identity work can be seen as *“a collaborative effort to give meaning to one’s self and others in a given context”* and furthermore they state that *“an identity that is socially negotiated exists as a discursive object produced in and through conversations, rather than as a cognitively held belief”* (Hardy et al., 2005, p. 61). While constructing an identity individuals join one group and refuse belonging to another one. Such a group affiliation contributes to the collective identity that arises among members of a group. Within a group, members use observable linguistic patterns that marks their interactions and characterizes their identities. For a better understanding Dewulf and Bouwen (2012) state an intractable conflict over environmental issues as an example. In such conflicts it is common practice that stakeholders slip into the role of victims and with this role characterize themselves as voiceless in a conflict. As a result, their opponents were

characterized as oppressors ([Donohue et al., 2011](#)).

3.3 Interactional Process Framing

Interactional process framing refers to a procedure through which participants construct the meaning of an interaction with arguments, discussions or conflicts. Due to changes during interactions, new possibilities for interpretation emerge. Process framing can be described as dynamic, social and reflexive. The dynamic aspect can be explained by the circumstance that frames are established by reacting to each others arguments. The interpretation of the social part of process framing can change during a conversation depending on how a negotiation proceeds. Reflexiveness refers to the nature of messages within a negotiation which form and describe process frames. Interactions can get patterned, codified and embedded in communication modes and context markers. That constitutes an ease for participants to frame social interactions ([Donohue et al., 2011](#)).

Patterns of interactions can be divided into three different types, namely meta-communication, sequences of communication and communicator's footing. The term meta-communication can be understood as the communication about the communication. This can happen either in a explicit or implicit way, depending on the fact if the social interaction is obviously labeled by the participant or if there are only hints that indicate how a situation should be interpreted.

As an example [Dewulf and Bouwen \(2012\)](#) state a job interview. On the one hand it could obviously be labeled as "job interview" but on the other hand it could indirectly be called "a discussion about job openings during lunch". Another example should illustrate how frame shifts occur. A conversation between mother and daughter about the daughter's college plans can lead to two different scenarios. Either the daughter interprets the discussion as supportive or she conceives it as blame or evaluation depending on which way of speaking the mother chooses and therefore shifts the process frame.

The second type of process framing is called sequences of interaction and is related to message-feedback-response patterns. This kind of framing is expanded by participants responding to each others cues what defines the further course of action. The third type of process frames is called footing and declares the relationship between communicator and delivered message. The communicator can either be the

author of the message, a principal or simply the messenger. The author as the possessor of the message selects the words. The principal is the person that's thought is expressed through the message. and the messenger is the one that delivers the message. The wording in a message gives indication of the relationship between sender and message. For a better understanding the following example should illustrate the different relationships. "*The manager wants us to document our telephone use by tracking all incoming and outgoing telephone calls*" (Donohue et al., 2011, p. 27). In this statement the deliverer of the message shows that he is not the owner of the message by the use of the third-person perspective. "*I think we should document our telephone use*" (Donohue et al., 2011, p. 27) however suggests that the deliverer of the message is also the author and principal. Interactional process framing therefore analyzes how individuals deal with social interactions (Donohue et al., 2011).

Chapter 4

Negotiation

“Negotiation is a process through which two or more parties who disagree or are in conflict seek to reach agreement.”

— Olekalns and Weingart (2003, p. 2)

As the previous chapters have shown, framing has a broad range of application and various manifestations. This chapter will analyze how framing influences and shapes negotiations. Although a lot of individuals believe or perceive negotiation as a business interaction like contract negotiations or sales negotiations, it can be said that negotiation is everywhere. Negotiation happens with superiors, colleagues, family or friends or even between nations. Therefore negotiation can be described as a process that tries to adjust different preferences between different parties. Depending on the relation between the negotiating parties they will be more or less willing to concede (Neale and Bazerman, 1992).

As the environment in which negotiations take place are often predetermined as well as the participating parties and the involved issues, the possibilities to improve performance is limited. Nevertheless Neale and Bazerman (1992) argue that a negotiator is only able to enhance his performance if he is able to estimate the behavior of the other party. Additionally the negotiator has to use the available information to his advantage and reach more rational agreements.

Negotiation focuses on reaching a settlement namely that settlement from which both parties benefit. Such beneficial settlement should be reached through focusing on interest instead of positions, engaging in problem solving, through avoiding conflict escalation and through team as well as trust building (Putnam et al., 1992).

Follett et al. (1986) argued that integration exposes differences and therefore puts in motion a process of revaluation. Within this process the involved parties re-frame their basic attitude towards an issue. According to Follett et al. (1986), integration means the comparison of differences and interests or desires. They argue that the consensus is not a result of compromise but a result of “*getting the desires of each side into one field of vision*” (Follett et al., 1986, p. 39). This so-called “field of vision” is nowadays known as the concept of bargaining frame and is very important for negotiation research. Both parties involved in the conflict come to the negotiation with “fields of vision” or frames of reference that allow every bargainer to create meaning of a situation (Putnam et al., 1992).

4.1 Cognitive Frames

Literature distinguishes between the classical cognitive frame theory which can be credited to Minsky (1974) and the interactional approach formulated by Bateson (1954). Whereas cognitive frame theory is connected with individualized cognitive constructs, the interactional framing approach in contrast can be characterized as “*sense making, conducted through language-in-action and interaction-context*” (Donohue et al., 2011, p. 7). Within the cognitive framing approach individuals, faced with a new situation, recall remembered frameworks and adjust them to the new environment. However interactional framing has a meta-communication aspect that guides and states how an interaction should be interpreted (Donohue et al., 2011).

There are three different approaches linked to negotiation literature namely cognitive heuristics, frame categories and issue development. Whereas the cognitive heuristics approach is embedded in cognitive framing, the two other approaches fit into interactional framing. Subsequent all three approaches are explained and finally compared in Section 4.3.

Cognitive Heuristics Approach

The cognitive heuristics approach is embedded in prospect theory, which has already been explained in Chapter 2, and in behavioral decision theory. Behavioral decision theory alleges that the bargaining parties share a zone of agreement or have targets and resistant points at command but still are unable to reach an agreement (Putnam et al., 1992).

Neale and Bazerman (1985) affiliate this problem to reach an agreement to systematic bias in negotiation. In their paper they analyze the possible influence of two biases, framing of conflict and negotiator overconfidence. They state the assumptions that in a bargaining situation positive frames will lead to results and additionally ordinary confident individuals will perform more successful than overconfident ones. As the consequences of positive or negative frames already have been explained, only the overconfident bias will be explained in more detail. This bias decreases desired behavior and also reduces a negotiator's success to reach an agreement.

The main target of a negotiation is to convince the other party or parties of the practicability of the own offer and infeasibility of the others offers. Within this process negotiators also tend to convince themselves that their own offer is more equitable and therefore has to be chosen by the opponent. If the negotiator is unable to slip in the opponent's shoes, he will underestimate the value of the opponent's offer or position and this will lead to overestimation. And additionally the more the negotiator overestimates his own position, the less cooperative he will be. Neale and Bazerman (1985) also acknowledged that overconfidence is standard. Due to the reason that overconfidence leads to a decreasing concession as well as to a decrease of compromise the authors suggest that overconfidence leads to less successful outcomes and to lower resolution rates.

With regards to the two biases that are analyzed in this paper, namely framing of conflicts and overconfidence Neale and Bazerman (1985) state the following assumptions: First they assume that negotiations that are framed in terms of losses will result in less successful outcomes and will be scarred by less concessionary processes than negotiations that are framed in terms of gains. The second hypothesis states that overconfident individuals will achieve less successful outcomes and will use less concessionary strategies than individuals with realistic confidence.

For their experiment they asked 100 participants to negotiate a five-issue contract. Neale and Bazerman (1985) wanted to reveal in which way individuals' judgment influences the process and outcome of the negotiation. Findings showed that the frame of negotiation as well as the level of confidence affect the outcome and the process of bargaining. Actually both biases have a major influence on the choice between risky option of arbitration rather than accepting a settlement. But these two biases can not explain the amount of variance, hence there have to be other influential factors that go beyond these two. With regards to the frame of negotiation, the

authors came to the conclusion, that in case of loss-framed outcomes both negotiation parties become risk-seekers. As a result impasse is likely to be reached and arbitration is requested. In contrast, in terms of gain-framed outcomes, individuals tend to behave risk-averse and additionally are more likely to reach a negotiated settlement (Neale and Bazerman, 1985).

In sum, those individuals that apprehend their outcomes as gains are more willing to make concessions and perceive the negotiation outcomes as more equitable than those individuals that view their outcomes as losses. Furthermore, within positively framed negotiations more transactions are finalized and all in all higher profits are obtained. Negative frames in contrast are more likely to lead to an escalation of conflict, potential impasse, strike and third-party intervention (Putnam et al., 1992). Often linked to the overconfidence bias is the availability bias. As already explained in Section 2.1.1 this bias can also be applied to the negotiation process. Brief, availability refers to that kind of information that can easily be requested because it is concrete or readily available. Northcraft and Neale (1986) bring in out-of-pocket-costs and opportunity costs to illustrate the availability heuristic in negotiation. As out-of-pocket-costs are tangible they are considered more often in financial decision than opportunity costs because they seem kind of an abstract possibility. Hence out-of-pocket cost are more tangible to negotiators and therefore affect their judgment.

Another heuristic that influences the frame a negotiator chooses is the selection of a reference point or anchor. As already mentioned in Section 2.1.1 an anchor serves as starting point to evaluate whether an offer is a gain or a loss. Within a negotiation process these reference points have to be adjusted. Otherwise, if negotiators fail to adjust their initial offers if necessary, agreements will not be reached despite the existence of a positive bargaining range. As an example for anchoring in negotiation Neale and Bazerman (1991) quote a contract negotiation between union and management. The union may use last year's contract as an anchor or reference point or for example the management's initial offer. The setting of such reference points or in other words initial goals influences the expectations and actions.

Finally within the cognitive heuristics approach Putnam et al. (1992) mention the isolation effect. This effect occurs when individuals go through their options in a decision making process. When making decisions one major attribute is determined, alternatives that do not fit to this attribute are sorted out.

Therefore if bargainers make gains or fail to make gains depends on how they

evaluate their alternatives (Putnam et al., 1992).

4.2 Interactional Frames

As mentioned in Section 4.1, interactional framing has a meta-communication aspect that guides and states how an interaction should be interpreted (Donohue et al., 2011). The following two sections provide an overview of the two approaches that define framing as dynamic and therefore fit into the interactional framing category (Putnam et al., 1992).

4.2.1 Frame Categories Approach

This approach is denoted as “Frame Categories”. It tries to link cognitive views of framing with linguistic analysis. Putnam et al. (1992, p. 136) categorize types of cognitive frames by using linguistic patterns. They call this a combination of “*a top-down view of frames, informed by research from the bargaining literature, with a bottom-up notion of frames as linguistic cues*”. Re-framing in this context can be understood as the change of frame categories during a negotiation, the change of interpreting a conflict and it also includes the ambiguity that affects these changes. Central to this approach is the choice of frames disputants use to interpret a conflict, the interpretation by itself and how often frames and the kind of interpretation change. Problems arise when bargainers do not share the same frames because this incongruity can cause conflicts. There are three different sources caused by mismatches in framing namely the use of different types of frames, different content for the same frames and inferences that negotiators make at different levels of abstraction. Additionally to escalation or impasse, mismatches in framing can result in re-framing or frame alignment which in turn can result in conflict resolution.

Communication carries great weight connected with the framing categories approach. Not at least because the language used by a negotiator can give some indication of the frame category applied. Furthermore language gives an insight into a negotiators experience as well as perception of the negotiation (Putnam et al., 1992).

4.2.2 Issue Development Approach

Center of this approach is the change of issues during a conflict and also includes a communication perspective. Therefore it rather focuses on the modification of

conflicts. It assumes that this modification happens through changing frames. Issue in this context is defined as the concern or the subject of the dispute (Putnam et al., 1992).

With regards to Felstiner et al. (1980) issues are not objective negotiation points but constructed through naming, blaming and claiming as the bargainers discuss them. Naming refers to the case in which a situation is denoted as a problem. Blaming addresses those individuals or circumstances that caused the problem. And claiming occurs when the blamed party is confronted by those who have the problem. Even all individuals involved in a dispute have their own notion regarding the problem, arguing with others influences its definition. That's why frames in this case are not only cognitive, they are rather co-constructed by the bargainers or influenced by how the involved parties define the problem and by the chosen approach. Frames in the context of the issue development approach can be characterized by three elements namely bargaining context, process of shaping issues and re-framing. Bargaining context refers to the perspective the parties have towards the issue. The process of shaping issues is related to change of the initial perception of the underlying problem. Re-framing can be explained as the conversion of the problem itself (Putnam et al., 1992).

4.3 Comparison of Framing Approaches

Putnam et al. (1992) criticize that the above mentioned and explained approaches omit to offer overall and adequate representation of frames in negotiation. Nevertheless differences, strengths and weaknesses are emphasized as shown in Figure 4.1.

While the definition of the three approaches doesn't differ that much, major differences lay in their characteristics. From the cognitive perspective framing is defined as stable or static, whereas the frame categories and issue development approach define framing as dynamic. The dynamic aspect can be explained through the shifting of the form, content and abstraction of frames revealed through language. Though all three approaches conceive frames as "constructing negotiator experience".

In case of the cognitive heuristics approach framing has its roots within perceptual biases of negotiators. In case of the frame categories approach framing resides in language and frame categories. Issue development framing is created through the interpretation of the involved parties arguments. Meaning is constructed through

	Cognitive Heuristics	Frame Categories	Issue Development
Definition	Perception of biases associated with choice	Categories and interpretive schemes	Conceptualization of a problem
Nature	Stable perceptual biases	Hierarchically arranged categories	Dynamic interaction processes
Reframing	Correction of biases	Shifts in frame categories and meanings	Transformation of understandings
Role in Negotiation	To identify and overcome barriers to rationality	To develop identical frames	To further joint problem solving

Figure 4.1: Approaches of Framing ([Putnam et al., 1992](#), p. 143)

people themselves in the cognitive approach, through the kind of interpretation of the bargainers in the frame categories approach and in case of the third approach through interaction between the bargainers. Re-framing is characterized as a correction of biases in the first approach, as shifts in frame categories and meanings in the second approach and as transformation of understandings in the third approach. In contrast to the cognitive perspective, which defines frames as parameter of bargaining behavior and outcomes, the other two approaches define frames as descriptive schemes for a better understanding of strategies and outcomes.

Although the three approaches provide an explanation for the understanding of a bargaining situation, there are limitations like the non-consideration of nonverbal communication, the reflexivity of frames and the production and reproduction of frames in social context ([Putnam et al., 1992](#)).

4.4 Cognitive Framing in Negotiations

[Pinkley and Northcraft \(1994\)](#) argue that before a solution for a conflict can be worked out, a conflict must be defined and acknowledged. This is the point where problems arise because the conflict issues do not always correspond across the participants since the perception of the subject-matter can differ due to participant's experience or framing of the conflict. Therefore the subjective perception of the disputants defines the conflict for them. Disputants tend to focus only on some features of a conflict whereas others are ignored. Therefore it can be said that frames direct disputants' behavior in a conflict through influencing his perception and interpreta-

tion of the available information.

Researchers agreed that cognitive frames have reliable dimensions. Pinkley (1990) provided three different dimensions that should explain disputants' cognitive interpretations of conflicts, namely the relationship/task dimension, the emotional and intellectual dimension and the cooperate/win dimension. The first dimension refers to the negotiators relevance of the ongoing relationship with parties involved in the conflict versus money and profit. The second one pictures the extent to which the negotiator appreciates feelings over facts and actions. The last one, the cooperate/win dimension, refers to the negotiators preference for joint gains over a solely individual gain. These three dimensions provide insight into how disputants perceive a conflict and why the same conflict can be perceived in different ways.

In their paper, Pinkley and Northcraft (1994) try to figure out, based on Pinkley's conflict dimensions, how these dimensions influence conflict processes and their outcomes. Donnellon and Gray (1990) argue that in the same way as past experiences form and influence cognitive frames, new experiences that occur during a conflict also influence conflict frames. Hence as more and more information is shared between the involved parties, cognitive frames should assimilate during a conflict. The first hypothesis of Pinkley and Northcraft (1994, p. 195) therefore reads:

Hypothesis 1: *“Disputants’ conflict frames will converge, or become more similar, during negotiation”*

With regards to the relationship between conflict frames and negotiation outcomes the authors focus on post-negotiation frames of disputants for their second prediction. According to authors negotiation leads to changes in frames and in a further consequence from conflict to resolution. Pinkley and Northcraft (1994) construct hypotheses around four elements of conflict outcome namely monetary gain, relationship between disputants, disputant satisfaction and issues included in the settlement. The second hypothesis (Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994, p. 195) is:

Hypothesis 2: *“Disputants whose post-negotiation cognitive frames are relationship-focused will include in final settlements more relationship-maintenance issues than will task-focused disputants”*

The third hypothesis (Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994, p. 195) is:

Hypothesis 3: *“Disputants whose post-negotiation cognitive frames are emotion-*

focused will include in final settlements more methods for reducing the negative affect arising from disputes than will intellectually focused disputants”

As typically for conflicts, disputants have complementary preferences, outcomes can only be maximized by cooperating and through trading issues, unimportant ones for important ones. Furthermore prioritizing relationship-maintenance over task-related considerations could decrease the chances of conflict resolution. What is more, prioritizing emotions could entail suboptimal decisions. Also a winning-oriented attitude decreases the chances of maximizing outcomes due to the reason that those disputants are not able to make integrative trade-offs. The fourth hypothesis (Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994, p. 195) is:

Hypothesis 4: *“Disputants who are relationship-focused, emotion-focused, or winning-focused after negotiation will achieve lower joint monetary outcomes than, respectively, task-, intellect-, or cooperation-focused negotiators because of their failure to find integrative monetary trade-offs”*

The fifth and last hypothesis (Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994, p. 195) refers to personal monetary outcomes:

Hypothesis 5: *“Disputants who are relationship-focused, emotion-focused, or winning-focused after negotiation will achieve lower personal monetary outcomes than, respectively, task-, intellect-, or cooperation-focused negotiators”*

These aforementioned hypotheses were tested in a salesperson conflict scenario with 150 master of business administration degree candidates. They were randomly divided in twos, one got the role of the long established experienced salesperson, the other one got the role of the new one in the company but the one with the highest sales. The conflict started with multiple disagreements between them. The role play was arranged in a score-able way because settlements were measurable in actual dollar values. Therefore outcomes could be calculated for both salesmen. Within the scenario, integrative trade-offs were possible and those trade-offs increased joint outcomes. The experiment consisted of four phases which are described below.

In Phase 1 the participants received the role-play materials and acquainted themselves with their role descriptions and the scenario. In Phase 2 they received a pre-negotiation questionnaire that they had to fill out. This questionnaire (Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994, p. 197) contained the following three questions:

1. *Briefly tell me what you think this conflict is really about?*
2. *What do you think is at the heart of this conflict?*
3. *What do you want to come out of this conflict? That is, how would you like to see this conflict settled?*

These question served to evaluate how the participants initially framed the situation. Phase 3 represented the role-play that lasted 45 minutes in which the participants negotiated in dyads. In Phase 4 the participants again received a questionnaire (Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994, p. 197) that contained four questions with regards to the participants:

1. *Post-negotiation descriptions of the conflict.*
2. *Descriptions of the settlement obtained, if any.*
3. *Satisfaction with the settlement, measured by responses to a single seven-point Likert-scale item.*
4. *Perceptions of how the negotiation affected their relationship.*

Results imply that the more the initial frames differ, the more they converge during a conflict negotiation. But these results have to be treated with caution. With regards to processes and outcomes of conflicts, the results imply that highest monetary value is achieved through integrative trade-offs in combination with task or cooperation frames instead of relationship or winning frames following a negotiation. However relationship-framing should not be underestimated because it provides a basis for long-term and improved working relationships. Cooperation frames lead to higher monetary value than winning frames. The emotional/intellectual dimension did not show any correlation whether to individual nor to joint monetary gains. But this dimension was the only one that established a relationship to the outcome satisfaction of the disputants. As a result of this study, the relationship/task and cooperation/win dimensions are related to type and value of an outcome and the emotional/intellectual dimension is related to the disputants' outcome satisfaction. Furthermore the study shows that different conflict frames lead to different conflict focuses what implies that the conflict focus influences the type of issues included in the settlements. Integrative bargaining is based on the assumption that the valuation

Other person	Gain Frame		Loss Frame	
	Participant cooperates	Participants defects	Participant cooperates	Participants defects
Social dilemma without loss aversion				
Cooperates	3/3	0/4	-1/-1	-4/0
Defects	4/0	1/1	0/-4	-3/-3
Social dilemma with loss aversion				
Cooperates	3/3	0/4	-2/-2	-8/0
Defects	4/0	1/1	0/-8	-6/-6

Figure 4.2: Two-person Social Dilemma for Gain and Loss Frames (De Dreu and McCusker, 1997, p. 1094)

of two components in a settlement differs between the involved parties. It is also possible that disputants value different issues in a settlement. As an example, one disputant may frame the disputable issue in terms of relationship and therefore will be likely to trade task related issues because they are not as valuable to him as relationship issues. In contrast to this situation, a disputant who frames the conflict in the task dimension would proceed complementary. Hence it could be advantageous for managers to understand those conflict frames to influence settlements and conflict processes and to increase outcomes (Pinkley and Northcraft, 1994).

De Dreu and McCusker (1997) put the loss aversion theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1991) in the context of a social dilemma in which cooperation leads to a maximization of joint outcomes and defection to the maximization of personal outcomes. Figure 4.2 illustrates a two-person social dilemma. The table shows that in case of cooperation joint outcomes are maximized and in case of defection personal outcomes are maximized. Therefore from the point of view of a participant, the dominant strategy has to be defection, due to the reason that this strategy maximizes his personal gains and vice versa minimizes his personal losses. Such social dilemma scenarios are often adapted to business situations, to neighboring nations or intimate partners.

From the standpoint of an individual defection is the dominant strategy. De Dreu and McCusker (1997) argue that loss aversion reinforces that and vice versa, one could assume that in case of loss aversion defection is strengthened and cooperation

mitigated. This theory could not be confirmed by research. They came to the conclusion that although gain frames in contrast to loss frames lead to cooperation more often, in some cases they lead to the same or lower extend of cooperation.

Nevertheless there are some inconsistencies that suggest that there is no relation between cooperation and frame. These inconsistencies can not be explained by the two research paradigms social dilemma and negotiation, nor by different decision tasks used. The authors give a possible explanation by highlighting interdependence theory and drawing the attention to the individual's social motive. A social motive describes an individuals preferred distribution of outcomes between himself and the other party. Additionally social motives lead to outcome transformation. Due to this, [De Dreu and McCusker \(1997\)](#) argue that cooperators are more likely to cooperate when expecting losses while individualists and competitors are less likely to cooperate under loss frames. Three conducted experiments confirmed the authors predictions. In the forefront participants were presented the prospect of winning one of three 50-guilder prices, based on a lottery.

The first experiment consisted of two parts. In the first part of this experiment participants were given three different options of outcome to choose from that were distributed between them and a hypothetical other person. This part should asses the social value orientation of the participants. Option 1 represented an individualistic option because of the higher outcomes compared to Option 2 and 3. Option 2 constituted a competitive orientation because it lead to a higher outcome compared to Options 1 and 3. The third option represented a pro-social orientation because of its larger joint outcomes in comparison with Options 1 and 2.

The second part of the experiment focused on decision making in groups. In course of the experiment participants got the information that the points they got for their decisions within the experiment, will be transferred into lottery tickets. In further consequence, the participants were separated into gain-frame and loss-frame groups. The gain-frame group was told that they will start with zero point, but have the option to get points by making decisions. The loss-framed group was told that they already have 22 points and that they will lose points by making decisions. After that the participants filled in the social dilemma questionnaire. The questionnaire contained social dilemmas in which the participant either cooperated or defected. Figure 4.3 shows the underlying social dilemmas ([De Dreu and McCusker, 1997](#)).

As a result, 33 of the 35 loss-frame participants indicated correctly that their de-

Other person	Dilemma 1		Dilemma 2		Dilemma 3		Dilemma 4	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Gain-framed social dilemma								
Cooperates	3/3	0/4	4/4	1/5	5/5	2/6	6/6	3/7
Defects	4/0	1/1	5/1	2/2	6/2	3/3	7/3	4/4
Loss-framed social dilemma								
Cooperates	-1/-1	-4/0	-2/-2	-5/-1	-3/-3	-6/-2	-4/-4	-7/-3
Defects	0/-4	-3/-3	-1/-5	-4/-4	-2/-6	-5/-5	-3/-7	-6/-6

Figure 4.3: Social Dilemmas used in Experiments 1-3 (De Dreu and McCusker, 1997, p. 1097)

cisions included losses and in case of the gain-frame participants, 35 out of the 39 participants answered correctly that their decisions included gains. Nevertheless social value orientation did not influence the feedback. Therefore, the frame manipulation can be thought of as successful. With regards to cooperation it can be said that pro-social-minded participants were more likely to cooperate than individualistic-minded participants and competitors. There was an interaction between frame and social value orientation, though it was not significant. Referring to coherence between social value orientation and framing the experiment showed that pro-social-minded participants were more likely to cooperate within a loss frame than within a gain frame. In contrast individualistic-minded participants were more likely to cooperate within a gain frame than within a loss frame. For the competitive-minded participants no effect could be determined.

Experiment two was equivalent to the first one but instead of analyzing the social value orientation, the social motive was manipulated. Participants were given information about their chances to win the lottery money dependent on their social motive. Under pro-social circumstances participants got the information, that their earnings depend on the sum of their own points and on that of their opponent. Under individualistic circumstances participants were told their earnings are independent of the points achieved by third-parties. And under competitive conditions participants got the information that earnings were made up of their own points shortened by the points of the opponent. The frame manipulation as well as the social motive manipulation was successful. With regards to the cooperation aspect, under cooperative

circumstances participants were more likely to cooperate under a loss than a gain frame. In case of individualistic conditions participants tended to cooperate more often with a gain frame than with a loss frame. And finally under a competitive motive condition the extend of cooperation did not differ between both frames. The results confirm that there is an interaction between the social motive and frame to prognosticate cooperation in a social dilemmas.

Experiment three differed from the first experiment because the workplace was changed. The participants had to fill out the questionnaire in a large classroom instead of a private cubicle. Referring to the frame manipulation it can be said, that participants with a loss frame seemed to be more concerned with losses than gain-framed participants. The social motive manipulation was again successful. The findings of experiment three give some indication of the correlation between frames, social motive and the prediction of cooperation with the exception of the competitive motive condition ([De Dreu and McCusker, 1997](#)).

Summarizing, the results of the three conducted experiments are generally in accord with the in the beginning mentioned transformational analysis. To put it in a nutshell, cooperators were more likely to cooperate under a loss frame and individualists were more likely to cooperate under a gain frame. There was no confirmation for the assumption that competitors should defect more under a loss frame than under a gain frame. Research showed, that there is an interaction between frame and social motivation. Additionally, transformational analysis explained some inconsistencies away. [De Dreu and McCusker \(1997\)](#) come to the conclusion, that interdependent decision making cannot be explained adequately through the immediate self-interest of participants in a social dilemma. Additionally their social motives, the individual's gain or loss frame and the individual's loss aversion play an important role to be able to understand interdependent decision making ([De Dreu and McCusker, 1997](#)).

Literature shows, that negotiator frames are likely to influence bargaining behavior as well as the negotiated outcomes. But there are different concepts to classify those negotiator frames, namely reference frames which refer to the referent's perception and conflict frames, that bear on a multi-dimensional orientation with respect to conflict. In their paper [Schweitzer and DeChurch \(2001\)](#) show the connection between those two frame categories and how those two influence each other.

Reference frames have been presented by [Tversky and Kahneman \(1981\)](#) as part of their prospect theory value function. According to this individuals evaluate potential

outcomes either as losses or gains based on an in advance determined reference point. The value function is either concave in relation to gains and convex in relation to losses, what implies a risk shift. Additionally it is steeper in terms of losses than in terms of gains, what leads to the assumption that losses are appraised more than equal gains. In the context of negotiation this loss aversion and the shift of risk affect a negotiators behavior. Shown by several studies a negotiator's behavior seems to be more argumentative in terms of a loss-frame because those negotiators tend to have higher claims, are less willing to make concessions, are less cooperative and are more likely to accept reaching an impasse.

In case of multiple transaction studies, analysis showed that loss frames lead to fewer completed transactions. Researchers like [Neale and Bazerman \(1992\)](#) therefore suggest, that for reaching agreements managers should try to encourage others to switch from loss to gain-frames. Such a shift can be reached by manipulation through communication as shown by [De Dreu et al. \(1994\)](#). They carried out an experiment in which they coupled participants with computers that were programmed to produce statements to communicate a gain or a loss frame. Those statements were *"I cannot accept small gains and profits"* or *"I cannot accept big losses and expenses"* ([Schweitzer and DeChurch, 2001](#), p. 101). They came to the conclusion that in case of the counterpart is using a loss frame, the opponent is more cooperative than in the case of a gain frame. This circumstance was conducive for a frame adoption ([Schweitzer and DeChurch, 2001](#)).

Conflict frames describe how negotiators perceive conflicts and are associated to them. Conflict frames affect the perception and organization of information. Additionally they characterize a disputant's attitude towards a conflict. [Pinkley \(1990\)](#) analyzed conflict frames and came to the conclusion that there are three orthogonal dimensions namely the relationship/task dimension, the emotional/intellectual dimension and the cooperate/win dimension which have already been explained on page 37. With their paper [Schweitzer and DeChurch \(2001, p. 104\)](#) tried to prove the following three hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *"Reference frames influence the adoption of conflict frames."*

Hypothesis 2: *"Loss-framed negotiators are more likely to adopt a win frame than gain-framed negotiators."*

Hypothesis 3: *“Loss-framed negotiators are more likely to adopt a task-orientation than gain-framed negotiators.”*

After they conducted a study with 231 under-graduated students they got the following results. Their first and second hypothesis could be corroborated. The results for third one were only marginally significant whereas the results for differences in the three conflict dimensions were not significant at all. All in all it is obvious that conflict frames affect behavior as well as the negotiated outcomes.

Furthermore they suggest that contextual and individual factors operate as moderators relating to the conflict frame adoption process. As an example of contextual factors they mention negotiation context and perceived future interdependence. Possible future interdependence can influence a negotiators behavior. As a result, negotiators that look forward to a future interdependence are more willing to adopt a relationship than negotiators that perceive low future interdependence. Individual factors like risk attitude and social value orientation can influence the relation between framing manipulations and conflict frame adoption. High social value oriented individuals are more willing to cooperate than people with an opposing value orientation ([Schweitzer and DeChurch, 2001](#)).

[Schweitzer and DeChurch \(2001\)](#) refer to the opportunities as well as to the threats that framing effects bring along. In a positive way framing effects can be used in negotiations and mediation to reach agreements and solutions. But in a negative way, negotiators can unintentionally adopt frames that do not match their goals. Therefore frames are important for the process of a negotiation and for the choice of strategy in a negotiation and moreover for resolving conflicts.

[Bottom \(1998\)](#) criticizes that most studies do not consider the impact of uncertainty or risk in negotiation to the full extent. To look closely at complex negotiations disputants usually have to make decisions under uncertainties. However, settlements reached under such uncertainties sometimes can turn out to be very costly. Forecasts, on which agreements were based, proved wrong and did not lead to the expected gains. Like future cash flows of a company, likely to be acquired, were evaluated too optimistic and turn out to be much lower. From the viewpoint of the acquiring firm a seemingly profitable purchase could in the end turn out to be a losing bargain. Also governments have to deal with such uncertainties as an example of the U.S. shows. In the 1960s and 1970s the U.S. government negotiated with the

Iranian government about the sale of weapons. Seeming to be mutually beneficial at this time, it became a threat to the U.S. when the government was replaced by an Islamic fundamentalist that referred to the U.S. as "the Great Satan".

Though uncertainties are not neglected in all empirical studies, in most cases agreed payoffs are determined. But [Bottom \(1998\)](#) argues, that rational agents are faced with uncertainties in case of optimal decision rules and contracting. Uncertainties result from own cognitive resources because of heuristics and rules of thumbs. These heuristics have already been explained in Chapter 2. To which extent biases influence the negotiation process depends on the kind of uncertainty during the negotiation. [Bottom \(1998\)](#) brings in the following three sources of uncertainties:

Strategic Risk. Strategic risks refers to the set of tactics negotiators have on hand.

Such tactics contain issuing warnings, threats or information sharing and brainstorming. But certain tactics go hand in hand with certain risks and could fail if not weighing in the possible reaction or tactics of the other party. Such strategic risks can perfectly be illustrated by an ultimatum bargaining game. A basic ultimatum bargaining game consists of two players. One player has to propose how a fix amount is divided and the other player is only allowed to accept or reject the offered share. If the second player rejects, none of the players get anything. However, players often reject offers with the consequence that both parties are worse off. As a result, even in such non-complex bargaining games, strategic risk is present and losses are taken.

BATNA Risk. The term BATNA was introduced by [Fisher and Ury \(1981, p. 93-94\)](#) and means "Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement". A negotiator tries to pass off his BATNA as the best alternative and therefore tries to create bargaining power. In some cases the BATNA can be valued, in other cases substantial uncertainty can be linked to its value. A scene from the car sale business serves as a good example. A car dealer is negotiation for a car sale but is not willing to close the deal. He does not hesitate because he has another potential buyer but he is not willing to concede because he thinks there could be a more attractive offer. As a consequence of rejecting this offer he runs the risk of not selling the car and the risk of additional costs by not selling the car. A solution to a conflict or impasse often includes the intervening of a third party. The uncertainty aspect is here given through the third parties judgment

that can not be influenced by the disputants. From the point of view of a risk-averse person this could be an incentive to come to an accommodation and settle. Example for that kind of conflict solutions are common in legal disputes, product liability claims or divorce proceeding but also is common in small disputes between colleagues within a company. In this case a supervisor could probably dictate a resolution to the dispute or could also ignore it. So the disputing colleagues have to weigh up if an intervention is more beneficial than a settlement. Accepting BATNA instead of coming towards the downside risk has to be considered. A risk-averse bargainers' BATNA will be less attractive than the BATNA of a risk-seeking person because he is in a weaker bargaining position.

As result, to avoid to end up in court or in the office of the supervisor, gain-frame negotiators will make more concessions. [Farber et al. \(1990\)](#) conducted an experiment and showed that the higher the risk aversion, the more concessions are made. Furthermore fewer conflicts end in an impasse when the BATNA was given as a form of conventional arbitration. [Neale and Bazerman \(1985\)](#) came to same conclusion with a BATNA in form of a final offer arbitration.

Contractual Risk. There are two different kinds of risks integrated in a negotiated settlement. An agreement is valued differently by the involved parties because they dignify an agreement in different ways. As an example, an agreement between two companies can on the one hand be a chance for both but on the other hand pose a competitive disadvantage. [Das and Teng \(1996, p. 12\)](#) identified two types of risk namely behavioral uncertainty (Type I risk) and exogenous hazards (Type II risk). Type I risk describes a situation with *"the possibility that the partners in an alliance do not fully commit themselves to joint effort"*. Type II risk occurs if, although the partner committed, it can not be guaranteed that the other party honors or values this agreement in the same way as the other party because there are factors that can not be controlled or anticipated by them. Outside factors can be governmental regulations, consumer demand or manufacturability of technology. As an example, an acquired technology could either be a valuable possibility or instead worthless due to the non-manufacturability.

[Roth and Rothblum \(1982\)](#) introduced non-deterministic bargaining games which are appropriate for the research of Type II contractual risk, the ternary lottery bargaining game. This bargaining game consists of three possible monetary prizes, a_i , b_i and d_i for a Player i , under the restriction $a_i > b_i$ and $a_i > d_i$. Central to the bargaining are not the prices but the probabilities p_1 and p_2 . Player i gets a_i with the probability p_1 and b_i with probability p_2 . If an agreement can not be reached before time runs out, both players get d_i . If prizes are ordered like $a_i > d_i > b_i$ there is a nonzero probability, equal to p_2 , that the players are better off with an impasse than finding an agreement and receive b_i .

[Roth and Rothblum \(1982\)](#) came to the conclusion that the order of prizes influences the extend of risk aversion. If prizes are arranged like $a_i > b_i > d_i$ risk aversion increases and in consequence agreements get less favorable, as in games with no contractual risk. In contrast if prizes are ordered like this $a_i > d_i > b_i$ risk aversion also increases but has the contrary effect.

[Murnighan \(1991\)](#) explained this as follows: *"people who are more risk averse will . . . particularly want to avoid a lottery that has a chance of giving them a worse outcome than if they don't agree at all. Thus, they can drive a harder bargain here than the less risk-averse bargainers who don't mind the risks of the lottery so much"* ([Bottom, 1998](#), p. 96). [Murnighan et al. \(1988\)](#) came to the conclusion that under the restriction that all payoffs are framed as gains and prizes are ordered like $a_i > d_i > b_i$, more risk averse bargainers reach more valuable agreements than less averse bargainers ([Bottom, 1998](#)).

[Schuur \(1987\)](#) already has examined such contractual risk elements in 1987. He conducted an experiment in which teams, one with a gain frame (net profits) and one with a loss frame (expenses), had to negotiated for the quality level of three different commodities. Each commodity includes seven quality levels. If an agreement on a quality level is reached, the outcome was determined by a lottery. The quality level represents the chances of profit of receiving the high payoff. If no agreement is reached, both teams get a profit that lies between the two possible lottery payoffs. Schuur's experiment can be understood as a ternary lottery game because of its structure $a_i > d_i > b_i$. Results were consistent with other differential risk preference hypotheses. Gain-framed in-

dividuals were able to reach agreements with higher values than loss-framed individuals and accounted for reservation prices on quality level issues. But this result disagreed with the concession aversion hypothesis.

Nevertheless the study of Schuur (1987) has not been considered within negotiator framing effect research because of some constraints included in his study. First the participants had no explicit incentive to go the extra mile in the negotiation. Secondly, during the negotiation Schuur only paired a gain-framed participant with a loss-framed participant. This combination makes it impossible to examine the effect of reference points on impasse rates. As a third limitation, although three different issues were offered, actually it was a distributive game that did not offer the possibility to create joint gains. Besides Schuur was not able to emphasize the differences between his experiment and deterministic bargaining cases (Bottom, 1998).

The first experiment of Bottom (1998) tries to compensate three of the above mentioned weaknesses namely the incentive problem, the mono-frame pairs problem and the conceptual limitation. Bottom constructed hypothesis with regards to two categories. The following set of hypotheses (i.e, Hypothesis CA₁₋₃) refers to Concession Aversion (i.e., outcomes below the reference point). This connection is independent of the negotiators' risk attitude and the source of risk.

Hypothesis CA₁: *"The rate of impasse will be highest among loss pairs."*

Hypothesis CA₂: *"In mixed pairs, the expected value of contracts will favor the loss-framed party."*

Hypothesis CA₃: *"Gain-frame pairs will take less time to negotiate a settlement."*

The remaining set of hypotheses (i.e, Hypothesis VRP₁₋₃) refer to Variable Risk Preference. Bottom (1998) argues that individuals that negotiate over losses are more likely to take a risk and should also be more likely to concede.

Hypothesis VRP₁: *"The rate of impasse will be highest among gain pairs."*

Hypothesis VRP₂: *"In mixed pairs, the expected value of contracts will favor the gain-framed party."*

Hypothesis VRP₃: *“Loss-frame pairs will take less time to negotiate a settlement.”*

In the first experiment bargainers were paired randomly to one of three possible frames namely both gain, both loss or mixed. The participants were promised a \$10 compensation and they were ensured, that their decisions in the experiment will influence this compensation. If no agreement was reached the participants only got \$ 3.50 in cash. Participants that were able to reach an agreement received a compensation that depended on the roll of a 100-sided die. If the winning number of a participant turned up on the die he would receive \$ 10 in cash. Otherwise they received \$ 0. The winning numbers could be chosen by the participants themselves, the amount of winning numbers depended on the kind of agreements they negotiated. The payoffs of this ternary lottery game looked as follows: $a_i > d_i > b_i$. Within the gain-frame directions were organized to cause a reference point of zero. If no settlement could be achieved, participants received \$ 3.50. If a settlement was achieved the amount of money, whether noting or \$ 10, the participants received was determined by the die roll. Within the loss-frame instructions were organized to cause a \$10 reference point. Every participant got a folder that contained 10 one dollar bills and a quiz. If the participants were not able to reach an agreement they had to return \$ 6.50. If a settlement could be reached, the die roll should determine if the participant could keep the whole amount or had to return it.

To the procedure of the experiment itself, participants did not see each other at any time of the negotiation. Each of them communicated through a computer. The bargaining sessions lasted 10 minutes each and they communicated through written messages only in which they negotiated how to divide 100 numbers. As a result, ten pairs were not able to settle and came to no agreement on how to divide the 100 numbers which lead to a overall settlement rate of 71%. Mixed and loss-framed pairs reached high settlement rates, namely 91% whereas gain-framed pairs only reached a 50% settlement rate. The impasse across framing condition backed up the variable risk preference predictions but violated concession aversion.

To sum it up, Experiment 1 supported the variable risk preference predictions referring to contractual risk on the one hand but discounted the concession aversion predictions on the other hand.

The second experiment represented a bargaining game that consists of contractual

Market 1		Market 2		Market 3	
Structure Options	Probability of success (%)	Structure Options	Probability of success (%)	Structure Options	Probability of success (%)
Player A					
A	90	A	90	A	90
B	85	B	85	B	85
C	80	C	80	C	80
D	70	D	70	D	70
E	60	E	60	E	60
F	50	F	50	F	50
G	40	G	40	G	40
H	30	H	30	H	30
I	20	I	20	I	20
J	15	J	15	J	15
K	10	K	10	K	10
Success=	10.000 pts.	Success=	5.000 pts.	Success=	9.000 pts.
Failure=	0 pts.	Failure=	0 pts.	Failure=	0 pts.
BATNA=	2.000 pts.	BATNA=	1.000 pts.	BATNA=	1.500 pts.
Player B					
A	10	A	10	A	10
B	15	B	15	B	15
C	20	C	20	C	20
D	30	D	30	D	30
E	40	E	40	E	40
F	50	F	50	F	50
G	60	G	60	G	60
H	70	H	70	H	70
I	80	I	80	I	80
J	85	J	85	J	85
K	90	K	90	K	90
Success=	5.000 pts.	Success=	10.000 pts.	Success=	9.000 pts.
Failure=	0 pts.	Failure=	0 pts.	Failure=	0 pts.
BATNA=	1.000 pts.	BATNA=	2.000 pts.	BATNA=	1.500 pts.

Figure 4.4: Payoff Charts for Gain Condition in Experiment 2 (Bottom, 1998, p. 104)

risk and integrative potential. Figure 4.4 shows how the payoffs were assembled. The participants were randomly assigned to the role Player A or B as well as to the condition mixed-pair, gain-pair or loss-pair. In contrast to Experiment 1, the pairs communicated with each other in person in an isolated room. They received a folder that contained the instructions, the payoff chart, a quiz and additional paper to make notes and calculations. They had two options. They could agree on a partnership structure or they came to the conclusion that they would not form a partnership for a certain market. Each market represented a ternary lottery. The structure chosen by the negotiators determined their chances for successful entry through forming a joint venture.

The framing aspect did not differentiate that much from Experiment 1. The participants were informed that the points they were able to earn in the experiment are exchanged into real money at an exchange rate of 1000:1. Content of the experiment was to negotiate a partnership that enabled the participants to enter different markets, namely market one, two or three. If an agreement towards a structure, characterized by the letters A to K in the payoff chart, was reached the participants had the possibility to enter this market. Success was consistent with a_i in a ternary lottery. If no agreement was reached, both received the BATNA that is shown in the table and which was consistent with d_i in a ternary lottery. As can be seen in the payoff chart, the experiment contained three ternary lotteries in which a_i represented the largest prize in market 1 for Player A and in Market 2 for Player B. If they chose Structure F, both had a 50% of success in each lottery. This choice would lead to joint value of 24,000 points. If the negotiators chose the structure preferred by Player A, namely Structure A, in lottery one and the structure preferred by Player B, namely Structure K in lottery two, the value both would receive increased to 28,000 points. Market 3 displays equal values for both, therefore it would be a distributive issue.

As a result it can be said that there is a significant influence of framing on the joint expected value of the agreements. Loss and mixed-framed pairs were able to negotiate agreements with a higher joint expected value than did gain pairs. Inside the mixed pair arrangement, the gain-frame negotiator received greater value than the loss-framed negotiator. Negotiators with a gain-frame, in contrast to the other frames, disagreed over contracting in any of the markets. Trade-offs between lottery one and lottery two lead to joint expected value between the loss-framed participants.

Both experiments conducted by [Bottom \(1998\)](#) emphasized the importance of sources of uncertainty in negotiation. Before making an assumption regarding the influence of biases to a negotiation, someone has to understand the risks a negotiator is confronted with. If a contract is concluded within a very uncertain environment, what is expected for most of significant business transactions, then Bottom argues that greater risk taking related to high reference points goes along with more cooperative bargaining and a better chance of making agreements. However if uncertainties are related to strategy choices or BATNA, more riskier strategies will be pursued by those parties that negotiate over losses. But if there are high uncertainties among different contracts, riskier strategies are appealed by gain-frame negotiators.

Nevertheless there are some limitations. First the whole experiment occurred only in a laboratory environment. In contrast to real life negotiations executives and diplomats have to face, participants in the experiment knew the extent of possible outcomes of the lottery. Furthermore negotiators often have to depend on external data or advisers to estimate the whole amount of uncertainty.

Additionally Bottom only focused on the influence of contractual risk of valuing outcomes relative a reference point. However, there are more heuristics negotiators are confronted with when dealing with uncertainties. Such biases are for example anchoring or overconfidence that make it more difficult for negotiators to achieve agreements in deterministic payoff games. Bottom recommends to also examine heuristics in the context of games with non-deterministic settings ([Bottom, 1998](#)).

4.5 Interactional Framing in Negotiations

[Drake and Donohue \(1996\)](#) analyzed 21 transcribed divorce mediation disputes to support the heuristic and pragmatic value of the framing concept. They analyzed the framing concept and tried to highlight how it could contribute to communication research in conflict resolution. Therefore they first analyzed leading perspectives on framing and in a second part of this paper adapted the communicative framing perspective to negotiated order theory, speech act theory and speech accommodation theory. They tried to emphasize and forecast how such framing patterns influence integrative processes. Within conflicts professionals try to promote integrative processes to find a solution. But problems arise the more emotional conflicts are, like hostage negotiations or marital disputes. Researchers recommend that professionals

Wife:	I don't want (my son) to go into that kind of an environment.
Husband:	See what I mean, sit here and argue about the neighborhood, I mean, it's really silly.
Wife:	No, it's not. It's very important to me. You don't pay no support. You've only hit my mom upside the head.
Husband:	I did not.
Wife:	You did too and you know it. And you kidnapped JR from me, you've hit me, you've tried to kill me.

Figure 4.5: Abstract of a Transcript ([Drake and Donohue, 1996](#), p. 299–300)

have to strengthen communicative skills to foster integrative negotiations. [Drake and Donohue \(1996\)](#) tried to apply the framing concept to conflict resolution. Communication has a central role in negotiation processes because participants express and manage disagreements through communication. The term management in this context refers to the ability to use communication to create integrative processes and avoid distributive ones. Control is also an important factor within negotiations. Especially in very intense bargaining situations like hostage negotiations or divorce disputes it is hard to be in control. The role of professionals within such intense bargaining situations is to shift the dispute from crisis to normative bargaining and furthermore from coercion to problem-solving. There are different strategies to implement this like slowing down interaction, limiting alternatives or building trust. Problems arise when negotiators fail to perceive when control is important. As a consequence disputants disturb integrative interactions through distributive tactics as for example fault-finding, hostile demands and topic changes. This circumstance increases stress, reduces participant's ability to argue rationally and in the end encourages more distributive tactics. The example shown in Figure 4.5 illustrates such an interruption of an integrative discussion.

As can be seen the wife starts with an integrative discussion but changes her discussion behavior in utterance three (i.e., "No, it's not. It's very important to me. You don't pay no support. You've only hit my mom upside the head.") after the husband refuses her concerns. As follows, an attack-defend cycle gets started which has to be stopped before it turns into an regressive spiral. [Drake and Donohue \(1996\)](#) refer to three research perspectives – originally introduced by [Putnam et al. \(1992\)](#) – regarding framing that have already been explained in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2. In a further step they analyze pros and cons of these perspectives. They argue that the

framing perspective enables to understand the non-substantive aspects that create conflict within a conflict. If participants in a negotiation enter the negotiation with different frames, or in other words if their frames do not match, the conflicts gets more complicated. As can be seen in the above shown dialog between a husband and a wife, the husband and the wife's interpretative frames do not match. She thinks that he wants to punish her while he sees his concern to see his children more often as his responsibility to take care of his family. The absence of coordination and convergence lead to an impasse and possibly prevented an agreement between them. With regards to the three perspectives it can be said that none of them is suited to connect communication and integrative processes in a sufficient way. Merely the issue development perspective is able to connect communication with framing even if the connection between framing and integrative processes. In the context of the issue development perspective frames are described as *"transient communicative structures disputants build around conflict issues during each turn at talk"* (Drake and Donohue, 1996, p. 302).

Central to issue development is the change of issues during a conflict and the line of arguments. When the involved parties come to the negotiation table they a firm perception of the problem that is going to be discusses. But as the negotiation proceeds and reasons are alleged, each party will reconsider its issues because new considerations are raised. Frame in this context therefore represents a disputant's verbally described issue. Thus language plays an important role as it is likely to change the quality of the topic by changing the language. As an example Drake and Donohue (1996, p. 302) describe a dispute which addresses a child support conflict. The first statement of a wife *"I buy them new school clothes every fall, out of my own pocket. The least you can do is buy their shoes!"* aims for equity. The first part of the statement is framed in terms of value because the wife considers that her husband also has to add something to their children's clothes needs. But there is also another frame in this statement. The second part however addresses a relational issue. The question is if the wife's comment is a value or a relational frame. Drake and Donohue (1996, p. 303) argue that every communication consist of both a content based issue as well as a relational issue and that one of them is the dominant one. To show that a dominant frame can be identified the authors state an example with regards to children's needs again with a wife's statement: *"I get paid the last working day of every month. After paying for day care and prescriptions, I'm broke by the time the*

court delivers his check on the 20th. So, I don't have much money to pay for the kids shoes". This statement expresses how difficult it is for the wife to buy new shoes for her children accentuated in a factual frame.

Thus frames are used to address a certain domain within a topic, while neglecting other domains that could be important. According to [Drake and Donohue \(1996\)](#) individuals decide upon one dominant frame to shape their issue. To analyze which frame is or which frames are dominant, they first examined possible domains. During their analysis of divorce conflicts they identified four domains, namely a factual, interest, value and relational one.

Factual frames associated with conflicts refer to the evaluation of reality, presence or past. In more detail factual frames aim at current, objective and unbiased factors of an issue. As an example they state a husband's statement: *"My attorney tells me I have legal custody"* ([Drake and Donohue, 1996](#), p. 303). Those statement contains information about legal aspects about custody in a factual framework.

Interest-based conflicts involve expectations or wishes for the future like increased visitation time in the context of divorce conflicts. Another example of a future wish is highlighted by the following example, *"I'd like the kids to be with me on their birthdays"* ([Drake and Donohue, 1996](#), p. 304). Although the subject of debate is visitation time, this statement focuses on a future desire.

Value-based conflicts grapple with discordance over what is right and wrong due to a moral or rational basis. Value frames involve statements that refer to someones values or moral beliefs within the topic of the dispute. The topic custody can therefore be framed in value terms as an examples shows: *"Me and him are still the boys' parents and we have to work this stuff out, whether she likes it or not"* ([Drake and Donohue, 1996](#), p. 304). In this statement the so-called *"she"* is the husband's current wife. According to the ex-wife the current wife has to tolerate the weekly contact between the two divorced to the benefit of the children.

Relational-based conflicts focus on the emotional relationship between disputants. In contrast to the prior mentioned domains, relational disputes do not refer to the issue or topic but concern outside factors like trust, control or past intimacy. Related to the divorce topics an example would be mutually accusations with regards to the failed marriage. Such frames are characterized by a type of language that emphasizes the emotional, historical or accusatory part of the topic.

This communicative frames contribute indirectly to negotiations because they

influence an interactional context. [Strauss \(1978\)](#) argues, that a social reality is built through communication. Negotiation is a process that consists of proposing, accepting and rejecting interacting. For example during a formal business merger one party might negotiate in an informal way, maybe during a break. This change in communication represents a proposing for the change from formal to informal. If others agree in an informal way, the proposing is accepted. If not, the proposing is rejected. That implies that negotiation takes place at different levels at the same time. Furthermore there are limits like formality, intimacy, proximity or disclosure. These limits depict a framework for an interactant's communication. Additionally, frames in communication can be used to guide a communication in a certain direction or to a certain focus. Communicative framing theory implies that through the choice of language the domain as well as the frame limits can be influenced ([Drake and Donohue, 1996](#)). To create integrative bargaining climate it is important to understand how frames converge or diverge interaction contexts, namely if they support or prevent cooperative interaction. The term convergence explains how participants in a negotiation adapt the opponents behaviors and values. Divergence emphasizes the differences between oneself and others. Convergence on the other hand contributes to a positive relationship as well as to social approval, perceptions of attractiveness, predictability, communication efficiency and interpersonal involvement. Framing offers a possibility to turn divergence into convergence. Professionals therefore keep control within a negotiation by taking part actively in the negotiation of frames. The better a negotiation is organized, the better stress can be reduced and productivity can be improved. Figure 4.6 shows a transcript which should illustrate the explanation above.

In this negotiation cooperativeness dominates when a wife and her former husband argue about child support. The mediator in this case supports them by keeping their discussion within the frame limits. In contrast to this discussion that is characterized by convergence, a conversation that is shaped by divergence is illustrated by Figure 4.7:

In this conversation it is obvious that all three participants frame the issue in different ways. The husband focuses on the telephone problem and to the problem of his son being rejected by his wife and denying him to his daughter. The husband therefore argues on a factual and a relational domain. The wife concentrates on the facts only. She argues that she has no money to buy a phone. The mediator partly

Wife:	<i>I need some help with college. Our son will be in his fourth year at IU and a daughter will be starting next year. I would like some stipulation like half the finances for college taken care of by him. Then support, we've been divorced for 7 years and the support has not raised. I would like that done.</i>
Mediator:	<i>Does that sound like what you want? Is that your view, also, of what the issues are?</i>
Husband:	<i>Yes, basically I think that's what the issues are. I guess my position is that certainly I'm willing to pay half of both Melissa's and Mark's education until they're finished. Also, I'm agreeable to pay additional support on a monthly basis. However, my understanding is that I would pay half of the college tuition while they were in school, then I would pay the monthly support payments, whatever that is.</i>
Mediator:	<i>And how do you feel about that?</i>
Wife:	<i>I'm not willing to drop support during that time. mark is in college and Melissa will be, 7 months out of the year. I would not want support totally dropped during those 7 months. I'm still providing the clothing, spending money...</i>
Mediator:	<i>And extra food, etc.?</i>
Husband:	<i>This past year Mark has worked. I have not asked that he work the first 2 years. But he needs additional food, spending money, so I would not agree to complete abandonment of support during that time.</i>
Mediator:	<i>Do you feel any obligation or willingness to contribute to some of those expenses?</i>
Husband:	<i>Ah, I would be willing, a reasonable amount.</i>
Mediator:	<i>So what we need to do is try to identify what you're willing to pay as a reasonable amount.</i>

Figure 4.6: Abstract of a Transcript ([Drake and Donohue, 1996](#), p. 306–307)

addresses the factual domain. But all three of them try to take over control and therefore an integrative discussion is not working.

Based on this theoretical elucidations [Drake and Donohue \(1996\)](#) summarize communicative framing theory in three statements. First they argue that all participants within a conflict chose one dominant frame to declare their issues. Secondly, every frame negotiated by the participants illustrates a proposal to deal with an issue in a specific way. Finally the authors argue that frame convergence increases the possibility of reaching an agreement in a conflict. This last statement also illustrates the empirical aspect of this work. It should be analyzed if frame convergence correlates with reaching substantive agreements in conflicts. After analyzing 21 divorce mediation transcripts to research the plausibility of communicative framing theory the authors came to the conclusion that the collected and analyzed data supports their theory. Participants proposed a frame by alleging a topic in a factual, interest, value or relational domain. If others accepted the same frame a basis for an interaction was provided and the disputants discussed the substantive issues. But if the same frame was not adopted and therefore rejected, what followed were unresolved issues

Husband: She's got one, I know. At least it's in the house.
Wife: Can I just explain the situation?
Mediator: Sure. I suggest you explain it to him and I'll just listen.
Wife: There is a number, he can call my attorney any time and she will take a message over visitation. If there's an extreme emergency, I gave him the sheriff's number.
Husband: There's no reason I should bother them. I have asked her for either a neighbor, or she can call me on Wednesday collect at 7 o'clock. But the problem is that he is living in the same house with her and I can't have contact with my daughter. You said you were going to get a phone.
Wife: I said when I get the money. I'm still on ADC and if you would pay the installation, I would get a phone.
Husband: There's just a bunch of problems with the environment you've chosen to live in.
Mediator: Well, we're kind of getting off track here and I can see that it's all pushed together.
Husband: See, what she does with her life is strictly up to her it does not matter to me. But when it affects my children... This past weekend was mine, and my lawyer called me and said that she claimed it was hers.
Wife: I told you I'm sorry.
Husband: So my lawyer calls me on Friday and says she wants them, so I was going to let her have them. I generally don't tell David. She hasn't seen David for a year and he's really been rejected.
Wife: Oh, that's not true.
Husband: So I agreed she could have them. I told David, now mom's going to come and get you, and the she didn't show up. If I would have had her telephone number, I could have called her to see what was going on. her situation is creating a situation in our lives too.
Mediator: Well, let me just say from having worked with a lot of families, it does seem important to be able to have access to one another when you need it.

Figure 4.7: Abstract of a Transcript ([Drake and Donohue, 1996](#), p. 306–307)

and discussions that were out of control because the disputants alternated between the frames.

These results support the assumption that disputants choose one dominant frame within a conflict, which seems to be the factual frame. Additionally results provide evidence that frames are negotiated by proposing different frames to address different issues in different ways. Finally it seems likely that frame convergence is linked to the participants ability to obtain an agreement. Disputants that negotiate within converged frame show higher chances to settle conflicts and find solutions. Therefore [Drake and Donohue \(1996\)](#) found evidence for the assumption that frame convergence contributes to forge agreements. Furthermore they recommend that framing patterns can be used by professionals to increase conflict resolution. They recommend that future research should examine if frame convergence can be connected to other outcome influences, especially in the case of communicative and cognitive frames.

[Donohue and Hoobler \(2002\)](#) used Relational Order Theory to analyze the relational context that lead to the 1995 Oslo II accords and furthermore to analyze the ethical sanctions of this negotiation. The American and Western foreign policy in the Middle east is characterized by achieving peaceful solutions through negotiation. Underlying the consideration that the more communication the better, independent of the relationship of the parties. Based on the assumption that all kinds of relational differences can be resolved at the negotiation table. However, this assumption can not be applied to every kind of negotiation context. Such inappropriate negotiation contexts are divorce or hostage negotiations. During a hostage negotiation for example it is important not to push substantive proposals but to build trust. Therefore the right moment has to be awaited to start a negotiation. As a result parties should not be brought together for a negotiation too early but nor too soon. [Zartman \(2000\)](#) suggests a ripeness perspective as one approach to find the right moment to negotiate. There are two conditions that are necessary but not enough to recognize if a negotiation should be started.

The first condition implies that both parties perceive the situation as mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), this enables them to sit together because they are aware of the fact that no negotiation will make the situation much worse than avoiding each other. For the second condition a mutually enhancing opportunity (MEO) has to be given. That means that the disputants prefer an attractive outcome to a

stalemate. One example of MEO includes *"a view of perceived victory more cheaply through negotiation than less diplomatic means"* (Donohue and Hoobler, 2002, p. 144). Additionally Zartman (2000) argues that the absence of MEO brings along truncated and unstable negotiations, even though an agreement is reached. The purpose of this article is to analyze the ethical value of encouraging substantive negotiations if ripeness is not given. Respectively, it there is a need to encouraging parties to establish MEO for a more stable relationship between the opponents. To analyze issues of relational ripeness, Donohue and Hoobler (2002) concentrate on the pre-negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis before the Oslo II agreement in 1995 which followed the Oslo agreement from 1993. The concept of the relational negotiation, which will be explained below and represents the framework for the rest of the analysis.

Relation Negotiation

The situation in the Middle East, the ongoing conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, represents a perfect case to analyze a negotiation process. The negotiation style between Yasir Arafat and Ariel Sharon range from heated and aggressive to accommodating and affiliative. With an increasing escalation of the situation at the ground, so did their negotiation style. Therefore foreign nations, for example the United States, offered mediation to stop violence. This conflict got a lot of medial attention and the negotiation parties were willing to give interviews to the media. As a result the negotiation process is well documented. Therefore it is possible to analyze how the exchanged messages redefine and renegotiate the relational parameters. Donohue and Hoobler (2002) identify interdependence (power) and affiliation as the central issues to understand how negotiations progress or how negotiations fail to progress. By means of Relational Order Theory they examined the first Oslo negotiations.

Relation Order Theory consists of two dimensions that are mostly connected with negotiations, namely interdependence or power and affiliation. Interdependence and power refer to the extend to which disputants influence or control each other. The second dimension affiliation describe how disputants communicate liking, trust, acceptance and partnership. The interaction of these two dimensions leads to four relational orientations of frames:

1. Competition/aggression (high interdependence, low affiliation)
2. Isolationist peace (low affiliation, low interdependence)
3. Conditional peace (high affiliation, low interdependence)
4. Unconditional peace (high affiliation, high interdependence)

With these orientations the negotiation process can be analyzed. Whereas short-term negotiations for example diplomatic summit or hostage negotiation usually pass the interdependence dimension, negotiation on the affiliation dimension lasts for months or even years. [Donohue and Hoobler \(2002\)](#) argue that in every conflict situation, whether they are international or national, the language used by the disputants beyond the negotiation also influences or frames the communication at the negotiation table. Through the choice of a certain language disputants highlight some issues of a conflict whereas they de-emphasize others. The kind of language or frame choice made by the disputant also gives indication of the disputants substantive, strategic and/or relational attitude. If these communicative frames influence outcomes of a negotiation depends on the extend of power of communication to create and maintain social reality. The authors argue that it is of importance how the dimensions power and affiliation are framed beyond the negotiation table to create the negotiation context. One way of identifying the extend of power of affiliation used by the disputant, is to analyze the motive imagery used in language. Motive imagery means *“an action (past, present, future or hypothetical), a wish, a concern, or some other internal state that is communicated”* ([Donohue and Hoobler, 2002](#), p. 150). This motive imagery should reveal the disputants’ attitude towards the conflict.

The Oslo II Process

The Oslo II agreement was subscribed in Egypt on September 28, 1995 by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on September 28, 1995 in Washington D.C. This agreement contained an extension of interim Palestinian autonomy. Both parties fixed terms to withdraw Israeli military from Palestinian. This agreement also contained terms for the transfer of autonomy to Arab residents, for elections of a Palestinian legislative council and for security arrangements for Israeli settlements. The Oslo II process was designed for establishing an independent

Palestinian state. But Oslo II signing was overshadowed by various outbreaks and attacks. Members of the Palestinian Hamas bombed a bus in Tel Aviv that killed five Israelis and injured 33. Negotiations between Arafat and Rabin continued, despite this attack. Though Rabin reacted with closing the border to Palestinian traffic for a limited time. Nevertheless the public was not that understanding and able to move forward. After a month another bombing happened. Again five Israelis were killed and 100 injured. As before negotiations continued and the public was shocked. Rabin again reacted, albeit with only closing Palestinian establishments in Jerusalem. Nonetheless the agreement was signed. A lot of people indicated this agreement as a failure because a few or even any of the agreed issues have been implemented seven years later. In 2001 and 2002 the conflict again aroused in a dramatic way (Donohue and Hoobler, 2002).

Donohue and Hoobler (2002) also analyzed the ethical approach of framing. Therefore they adapted a taxonomy of ethical ideologies by Forsyth (1980) that consists of two dimensions: relativism and idealism. The authors argue that a highly idealistic and highly relativistic position measures up to the precepts of a ripeness perspective. This position is described as *“a contextually-centered morality drawing from a high degree of concern for self and other in a manner best fitting the situation at hand”* (Donohue and Hoobler, 2002, p. 151). As a result they verify a situation as ethic if there is *“a concern for the good and welfare of both or multiple sides to a dispute and contextually-centered in the situation at hand, from which to draw an ethical evaluation of foreign policy and conflict negotiation behavior”* (Donohue and Hoobler, 2002, p. 151). In context of ripeness theory this encourages the opportunity for the conflict parties to find a conflict solution from an integrative position instead of reaching a zero-sum framework or reaching an impasse.

With their analysis the authors try to integrate relational communication strategies as well as theories into conflict negotiation processes. They analyzed the data collected with regards to the Oslo II negotiation to whether they are affiliation-oriented or more power and domination-oriented. Furthermore they tried to understand the relational frames that arise through the negotiation. Through their analysis, Donohue and Hoobler (2002, p. 152) tried to answer the following research questions:

- *Do Palestinian and Israeli representatives differ in their use of language in*

terms of power and affiliation imagery prior to the Oslo II agreements?

- *Do Palestinians and Israelis differ in Power Intensity and Affiliation Intensity? Intensity tracks the amount of imagery used relative to the number of sentences used in a particular message. More images relative to a given number of sentences is more intense.*
- *Are there distinct patterns in the use of power and affiliation images exercised by both parties as influenced by unique events (bombing, riot, etc.)?*
- *When translated into Relational Order Theory, do differences emerge in Palestinian and Israeli rhetoric regarding the kinds of relational frames speakers use?*
- *To the extent that differences emerge in relational frames, are there ethical issues associated with (a) how mediators might approach the dispute, and (b) how parties might approach the dispute bilaterally?*

To answer these questions ([Donohue and Hoobler, 2002](#)) analyzed 18 documents from Palestinian side and 20 from Israeli side. To score these documents, they applied a coding scheme proposed by [Winter \(1973\)](#). This scheme consists of three dimensions namely power, affiliation and achievement. For this analysis the authors only focused on power and affiliation. The affiliation dimension shows four basic forms:

- *The expression of positive, friendly or intimate feelings such as warmth, sharing and mutuality.*
- *Sadness or other negative feelings about separation or loss or relation or wanting to restore relations.*
- *Affiliative or companionate activities.* ([Donohue and Hoobler, 2002](#), p. 154)
- *Friendly, nurturant acts.*

The power dimension shows six basic forms :

- *Strong, forceful action(s) that impact another person or entity.*
- *Control or regulation, including checking up on or otherwise gathering information.*

- *Attempts to influence, persuade, convince, argue, etc. or affect others.*
 - *Giving unsolicited help, advice, teaching or support.*
 - *Seeking to impress others, through mention or concern over fame, prestige or reputation.*
 - *Any strong emotional reaction, positive or negative by entity toward another.*
- (Donohue and Hoobler, 2002, p. 154)

After analyzing the documents it can be said that until the Oslo II agreement was signed, the relation context changed extremely while the disputants forged their negotiation perspectives. Nevertheless the attacks showed effects on both sides. Before the first suicidal attack Israeli rhetoric was characterized by a decrease in power intensity an increase in affiliation intensity. A characteristic behavior looking forward to a successful agreement. But this behavior changed after the suicide attacks. Power intensity increased extremely accompanied by antagonistic rhetoric. The parties failed to adapt a more affiliative rhetoric that would have enabled them to reach out to each other. This behavior can be explained by a lack of individualistic/moral concern for the other party, therefore the parties were not able to reach and supportive and enhancing approach.

These insights illustrate the importance of the negotiation context because it indicates the ripeness to negotiation. Furthermore it shows how relationship management offside the table influences the negotiation at the table. Data also indicates that negotiations that occur in the context of violence and retaliation also have to deal with the additional burden of power struggles. To be regarded as ripe, a negotiation has to be perceived as a mutually-hurting stalemate. Mutually-hurting can be referred to loss of life, public sense of peace and security and economic pressure.

Compared to Relational Order Theory the results showed that Israelis and Palestinians proposed different relational frames. The Israelis used more affiliation messages, accentuated with low affiliation messages. Consequential, the rhetoric that is used by the Israeli revealed a higher commitment to relational frames that investigated the full range of orientations. In contrast, the Palestinians reached out with a low affiliation attitude and fluctuated between high and low power messages. This attitude matches with a crisis orientation which is also consistent with a hostage negotiation context. Thus, prior from the point of view of a hostage negotiator is to

find a counterbalanced combination of affiliation messages and the development of consistent relational frames between the parties.

Except for ripeness, also the surrounding conditions influence the outcomes of a negotiation. As in the case of Oslo II where parties already sat at the table to negotiate, relationship building and maintaining among citizens and politicians would have been useful for the peace process. As can be seen it is not always the best way to find a resolution as soon as possible because if the solution is not satisfying for both parties it could lead to a major throwback or even create a hostile environment. Also the relationship building should not be underestimated (Donohue and Hoobler, 2002, p. 154).

In their paper Brummans et al. (2008) try to explain how framing brings groups together or tears them apart from those people that participate in the same conflict but determine it differently. The authors criticize that most framing research concentrates on interpersonal conflict or negotiation. To overcome this restrictions they consider framing from a different perspective namely from a collective sense-making perspective. This perspective derives from observations of James (1950). He states that the world can be perceived as: *“a buzzing, pulsating, formless mass of signals, out of which people try to make sense, into which they attempt to introduce order, and from which they construct figures against a background that remains undifferentiated”* (Brummans et al., 2008, p. 28). In other words framing in this context categorizes and labels experiences to make sense of them.

Furthermore it can be seen as a communicative process through which people emphasize certain aspects of an experience and ignore others. After that they use categories and labels to *“develop coherent stories of what is going on and make decisions about what should be done given those unfolding stories”* (Brummans et al., 2008, p. 28). This so-called framing repertoire of categories and labels arises out of recognizing similarities between experiences to make sense of life that consists of continuously changing interactions. As an example they allege the Iraq and US conflict. Whereas the Iraqis take the current situation in Iraq as a national conflict and request to stop the US intrusion, US politicians on the other hand perceive it as an international conflict that affects Iraqis, US citizens, Iranians, Al-Qaeda members and also others and therefore refuse to withdraw US troops. This example illustrates how participants of a conflict frame a situation in different ways. Such accounts determine how a situation is handled. With the argumentation that frames lead to

	Ohio	Drake	Voyageurs	Edwards	Total
Type of conflict	Water regulation	Toxic waste	Natural resource	Natural resource	
Duration of conflict (years)	3,0	4,5	39,0	40,0	
Number of stakeholder groups	4	4	7	8	
Number of stakeholders	21	24	40	68	153
Farmers	0	1	0	11	12
Business and industry people	10	0	12	7	29
Environmentalists	7	7	6	8	28
Citizen activists	0	0	6	4	10
Elected officials	0	5	5	8	18
Government agency officials	2	11	7	26	46
Media affiliates	0	0	3	2	5
Neutrals	2	0	1	2	5

Figure 4.8: Comparison of Different Conflict Characteristics ([Brummans et al., 2008](#), p. 29)

a mutual belief system, [Brummans et al. \(2008\)](#) refer to a premise by [Weick and Kiesler \(1979\)](#) which implies that although people share the same experiences they do not have to share the same categorizing and labeling. So they do not have to share the same meaning.

As a result it can be said that although disputants perceive the conflict in the same way, they apply framing repertoires to make sense of what distinguishes them from others. This fact leads to a formation of various clusters of disputants with similar repertoires.

To analyze how these framing repertoires are applied in a conflict, the authors examined framing patterns in four different multi-party environmental conflicts namely water anti-degradation issues in Ohio, the clean-up of the Drake Chemical Superfund site in Pennsylvania, land use in Voyageurs National Park in Minnesota and the allocation and regulation of underground water in the Edwards Aquifer in Texas. Figure 4.8 gives an overview of the four conflict domains.

Issue of the first conflict was the water regulation in Ohio. Different stakeholder groups should negotiate new rules for water pollution policies. The negotiations lasted 3 years, included threats to stop negotiation and recurring disputes about the rules the two parties agreed on 43 rule revisions.

The second conflict centered on the clean-up of a former chemical plant and involved the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The conflict extended

over a period of four and a half years but the issue itself lasted over 40 years because Drake Chemical polluted the nearby lagoons over this period. Due to the reason that Drake Chemical was not able to comply with the new environmental rules for disposal of chemicals, it went bankrupt in 1981. After that the EPA stated this area as Superfund site and began clean-up operation through incineration. However a local environmental group, called AIR, apprehended health risks to the local community caused by the emission of the incineration process. Nevertheless incineration was continued after two years of lawsuits, which constituted a setback for the local environment group.

The third conflict focused on the use of Voyageurs National Park in Minnesota. This conflict involved seven different groups of stakeholders and has lasted for 39 years. It included public protests, lawsuits and even an effort to shut the park down increased the conflict potential. Also mediators failed and an agreement has not been reached since then.

The fourth conflict had its roots in the late 1950s, during the drought in Texas. Participants in this conflict negotiated about the regulation and allocation of the Edwards Aquifer which crossed six counties and was thought of as private property by state law. The conflict reached its peak between the late 1980s and 1990s including efforts to rename the aquifer as an underground river, lawsuits with regards to species protection in this area and threats of federal takeover of the aquifer. In the end, following a federal edict, a regional water agency, the Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA), was developed. Authorization included the setting of pumping limits, issue permits and the development and enforcement of rules for use and protection of the aquifer ([Brummans et al., 2008](#)).

In their experiment [Brummans et al. \(2008\)](#) conducted interviews with 153 participants which corresponds to the number of stakeholders. The interviews lasted 60 to 120 minutes. The 153 participants were categorized according to Figure 4.8 as follows: 12 farmers, 29 business and industry people, 28 environmentalists, 10 citizen activists, 18 elected political officials, 46 government agency officials, 5 media affiliates, and 5 mediators or other neutral third parties. After recording and transcribing the interviews, data was analyzed in four steps.

1. Qualitative analysis of the interview transcripts to reveal the main angles of disputants' framing.

2. Development of a typology of framing categories and quantitative content analysis.
3. Employment of a cluster analysis and classification of the disputants frames.
4. Re-analysis of the transcripts for a better understanding of the framing repertoire.

After analyzing the transcripts with the help of a computer program five main categories were identified namely identity, characterization of others in the conflict, conflict management, social control and power. Referring to the identity category [Crane and Livesey \(2003\)](#) provided evidence for identity framing while arguing that disputants have the desire to belong to a group. Either in a social, professional or ethnic way. The category that refers to the characterization of others in the conflict complied with the research of [Sherif et al. \(1961\)](#) and the research of [Tajfel and Turner \(1979\)](#) that came to the conclusion that participants in a conflict categorize others as in-group or out-group members and either label them as allies or opponents. With regards to the conflict management category, support came from [Keltner \(1994\)](#) who found out that disputants either look at a conflict from a collaborative or non-collaborative point of view. The term social control refers to the dependency on other when making decisions. [Wildavsky and Dake \(1990\)](#) distinguish between hierarchist control, which means high dependency on others and prefer low self ownership, egalitarian control which refers to high dependency on others and high self ownership or individualist control that means low dependency on others and high self ownership. Differences in power can be expressed through statements about expertise, authority, voice, force, threat or coalitional strength. Figure 4.9 shows the definitions of the underlying frame categories ([Brummans et al., 2008](#)).

The analysis of the transcripts on the basis of these ten framing categories lead to a four cluster solution.

Cluster 1. Cluster 1 (*Stories of Victim-hood*) included disputants that prefer a negative characterization repertoire to describe their conflict situation. These participants displayed strong emotional persuasions with vivid adjectives and keywords that represented anger, hurt, mistrust and sentiments of unfairness, especially towards other conflict parties. Disputants in Cluster 1 reviewed their conflict situation as emotionally scary, bruised or burned. Furthermore they

Framing category	Definition
Positive identity	Foregrounding of oneself or one's own group in a praiseworthy or optimistic way, seeing oneself or one's group as constructive, valuable, etc.
Negative identity	Foregrounding of oneself or one's own group in a derogatory, pessimistic or diminishing way, seeing oneself or one's group as antagonistic, destructive, etc.
Positive characterization	Foregrounding of other person or group in a praiseworthy or optimistic way, seeing the person or group as constructive, valuable, etc.
Negative characterization	Foregrounding of other person or group in a derogatory, insulting or diminishing way, seeing the person or group as antagonistic, destructive, etc.
Collaborative conflict management	Foregrounding of collaborative ways to manage the conflict such as conducting research to determine facts, letting authority decide after consultation, or joint problem solving through dialogue and trying to reach consensus.
Noncollaborative conflict management	Foregrounding of noncollaborative ways to manage the conflict such as the use of adjudication, avoidance or passivity, appeal to political action, appeal to let the market "decide" what is best or struggle, sabotage or violence.
Hierarchist social control	Foregrounding of societal decision making through experts (high dependency on others, low self ownership).
Egalitarian social control	Foregrounding of societal decision making in a democratic way that involves entire communities or groups (high dependency on others, high self ownership).
Individualist social control	Foregrounding of societal decision making on an individual basis (low dependency on others, high self ownership).
Power	Foregrounding of oneself or other (or one's own group or other group) as having (or should having) particular kinds of powers based on authority or position, resources, expertise, personal traits, coalition, sympathy or vulnerability, force or threat, law or policy, morality or ethics or communicative dexterity (e.g. being able to represent a group or act as a spokesperson for a particular cause).

Figure 4.9: Definitions of Framing Categories ([Brummans et al., 2008](#), p. 34)

tended to represent themselves as victims and represented others to be in the wrong. The used framing repertoire was characterized by non-collaborative conflict management as well as a negative characterization of the other parties. All in all these disputants showed a rather pessimistic way of describing the conflict. As a result Cluster 1 disputants perceived any alternate conflict resolution as a “necessary evil”. These disputants also seemed to have a lot of experience with conflicts.

Cluster 2. Disputants in Cluster 2 (*Stories of Dispassion*), compared with Cluster 1, are not likely to exchange their personal stories. As regards the used framing repertoire the participants tended to highlight positive identity and to characterize others in a positive way. The representatives of this cluster showed strong organizational ties. Furthermore Cluster 2 representatives seemed to be more emotionally independent from the conflict and negotiated from an institutionally point of view rather than from a personal point of view. Members of Cluster 2 also relied more on authorities than on individuals. Summarizing, disputants in Cluster 2 could be characterized by dispassion, institutional loyalty, rationality and diplomacy.

Cluster 3. Members of Cluster 3 (*Stories of Optimism and Hope*) could be described as very optimistic people that preferred collaborative approaches. They also could be characterized by the desire to end the conflict as soon as possible. Nevertheless they were not able to implement this desire into actions. Additionally to these optimism they characterized other in a positive way and displayed moderating qualities in discussion. As a result Cluster 3 disputants favored collaborative approaches to conflict management. Although they acted as central players during the conflicts, they were not able to forward the conflict to a resolution.

Cluster 4. Cluster 4 (*Stories of Power and Powerlessness*) could be characterized by disputants that described the conflict as a fight between the powerful and the powerless. They also were likely to be moralistic, as were disputants in Cluster 1. They also emphasized how parties abused forms of power like position, coalition or resources. Therefore they had a huge amount of distrust against large organizations that distributed power among parties like the EPA

in Drake. They believed that such organization only safeguard their own interests. Hence cluster 4 disputants were notoriously miss-trusting other parties and authorities what lead to cynicism among those people. They perceived the conflict as an arena for power struggles. To sum it up, members of Cluster 4 had a main role in each conflict. Their long involvement in the conflict showed deep commitments and their framing repertoire contained power and powerlessness. From their point of view it the conflicts were a battle between morality against immorality, equity against inequity and “underdogs” against “top dogs”.

Conclusively, stakeholder of the same group can differ from each other due to the reason that they frame the same conflict in different ways. Disputants share or are categorized to the same cluster because they have in common how they behave towards their opponents, how they would like to manage the conflict or how it should be managed, by whom societal decisions should be made and who is or should be in possession in power. People could therefore have similar experiences but emphasize different aspects when adding up. As a result such repertoires which allocates people to the same cluster displays a pattern of how people make sense of an ongoing experience ([Brummans et al., 2008](#)).

Chapter 5

Summary and Conclusion

This literature review demonstrated the diverse variety of definitions and concepts of framing. It gave an insight into the large interest of research in framing and negotiation. Out of this variety of analyzes [Dewulf et al. \(2009\)](#) provided an alternative approach by categorizing framing into six approaches. Due to the fact that researchers are facing one another with criticism, it is important to offer distinctions to provide a common basis for further research. [Dewulf et al. \(2009\)](#) looked at framing from two different perspectives, namely “*what it is that gets framed*” and the “*nature of frames*”. The first dimension deals with what is chosen as most significant within the framing process like framing issues, identities and relationships or processes. The second dimension deals with how framing is perceived, either as a cognitive representation or a interactional co-construction ([Dewulf et al., 2009](#)).

Cognitive framing deals with an individuals’ perception that is distorted by biases. The different kinds of biases have been explained in the Chapter 2. The cognitive paradigm was additionally separated into cognitive issue frames, cognitive identity and relationship frames and cognitive process frames. The cognitive issue frames category was furthermore divided into risky choice frames, attribute frames and goal frames. Risky choice framing dates back to [Tversky and Kahneman \(1981\)](#) and their Prospect Theory and since their research a lot of studies have been built up on it. The second type of cognitive issue framing, attribute framing is common in studies regarding the health sector and is likely to investigate the influence of positive or negative framing in its simplest way. The third kind of cognitive issue framing, goal framing, deals with a kind of manipulation that leads to a special outcome or goal.

Whereas in case of risky choice and attribute framing positive frames are equal to desirable outcomes and negative frames are equal to undesirable outcomes. In contrast to this, in case of goal framing the outcome or behavior should not be change but the framing manipulation should determine how convincing the message will be. As a result, regardless of whether the frame is positive or negative both frames support the same result ([Levin et al., 1998](#)).

Cognitive identity and relationship frames are a way for individuals to categorize their social environment. Based on such frames or descriptions individuals pass judgments on other individuals and make conjectures about others. Furthermore they also categorize relationships as either superior or inferior (power frames) or as trustworthy or untrustworthy (trust frames) ([Dewulf et al., 2009](#)).

Schemes are also applied for processes and can be understood as screenplays for special situations. Cognitive process frames distinguish between two types of knowledge. General knowledge, that is applied to standard situations like understanding if someone requests a glass of water, it is clear for the opponent that he is thirsty without mentioning it. And specific knowledge that is applied to frequently experienced by individuals like going to a restaurant ([Schank and Abelson, 2013](#)). Cognitive process frames have a major influence on how long a conflict lasts and how the conflict proceeds ([Dewulf et al., 2009](#)).

In contrast to cognitive framing, interactional framing is a dynamic process. As in the case of the cognitive framing paradigm, also the interactional approach is divided into interactional issue framing, interactional identity and relationship framing and interactional process framing. Interactional issue framing describes how participants in a conflict make sense of the negotiation. This sense making is shaped and changed through a conflict due to the reason that it is dynamic.

As mentioned before for cognitive identity and relationship framing, the same holds true for interactional identity and relationship framing but put into a negotiational context. During a conflict the participants allot themselves roles which also can change during a negotiation.

Interactional process framing describes the dynamic, social and reflexive aspect that arise out of the fact that during a conflict the arguments of the participant influence the conflict progress and shape the conflict with each argumentation. It is an indicator for how individuals handle social interactions ([Donohue et al., 2011](#)).

In conclusion, this thesis provides a broad literature overview of cognitive and

interactional framing as well as a transition to negotiation. Therefore a considerable number of publications have been evaluated. In a further consequence these papers have been classified into the categorization provided by [Dewulf et al. \(2009\)](#), [Levin et al. \(1998\)](#) and [Dewulf and Bouwen \(2012\)](#). Furthermore the most important application areas have been pointed out.

Chapter 2 identified biases that influence and moderate framing effects concerning risky choice framing, attribute framing and goal framing. Risky choice framing analysis showed that an individuals' risk taking ability increases if outcomes are framed in a negative way. Avoiding losses leads to a more risk taking behavior [Tversky and Kahneman \(1981\)](#) Attribute framing, in contrast, is more effective if the key attribute is depicted within a positive frame as the examples of fat vslean (beef) or effectiveness vsineffectiveness of a vaccine (HPV) showed ([Bigman et al., 2010](#)) ([Levin et al., 1998](#)). After analyzing goal framing studies, it can be said that in case of prevention measures in the health care area, positively framed messages were more successful. On the other hand negatively frames were more successful if researches wanted to raise awareness of certain illnesses among already ill people ([Meyerowitz and Chaiken, 1987](#)).

Negotiations go along with uncertainties and negotiators have only limited possibilities to influence their performance. This analysis worked out important factors that affect negotiations, or in other words, factors that are decisive for a solution or an impasse. Such factors are the ability to estimate the opponents behavior and to use the available information to someones own advantage ([Neale and Bazerman, 1992](#)). Furthermore social motives should not be underestimated within a negotiation as well as a negotiators risk attitude ([Schweitzer and DeChurch, 2001](#)). [Pinkley \(1990\)](#) detected three different dimensions of conflict frame that affect the outcome of a negotiation, namely the relationship/task dimension, the emotional/intellectual dimension and the cooperate/win dimension. These dimensions characterize a negotiator's attitude within a conflict. Another factor that has to be considered is the change of frames during a negotiation. Different frames emphasize different issues and one frame is the dominant one. For the opponent it is important to detect the dominant frame and in a further consequence converge their frames to increase the chances of a solution ([Drake and Donohue, 1996](#)). The last important factor is time or ripeness of a conflict. It is important to wait for the right moment to start a negotiation. Starting a negotiation too early could lead to unsatisfying solutions and

major setbacks ([Zartman, 2000](#)).

As this thesis has shown, the interactional framing approach is suitable to influence and improve conflict management. Therefore, further research in this area should be conducted.

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