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“Analysis of Carroll’s Pyramid of CSR Model and Determinants of CSR in Austrian Franchise Networks”

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Hatice Aksoy

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Betreuer:	ao. Univ. Prof. Mag. Dr. Josef Windsperger

Acknowledgment

“I would like to start by thanking my mother and my sister. They made it possible for me to live and study in the beautiful city of Vienna. I would also like to show my appreciation towards my family, my friends and my supervisor Prof. Windsperger for their support and kindness.”

To the love of my mother Esma Strub and my sister Elif Aksoy

“Science is the most reliable guide in life”

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Atatürk, 1927)

Abstract

After the second half of the 20th century, corporate social responsibility became a major factor for the business world where franchising, as one of the most well-known business formats and market entry modes, also has an important place.

The aim of my thesis is to investigate CSR within the franchising systems. The first part of the thesis provides CSR and franchising literature to clearly understand these main topics. The methodology, which follows the research design, defines measurements and presents the results of the research analysis. The main concern of the analysis section is to first examine the relation of CSR to four company responsibility types (Economic Success, Legal Compliance, Ethical Business, and Philanthropy), which are described in Carroll`s Pyramid of CSR Model. In addition the relationship between CSR and three determinants (Brand Name Value, General Trust and Competition) are considered, and the potential effects of these determinants on CSR are examined.

The end of the thesis presents the results of the research as well as its limitations and the findings of the hypotheses are discussed in the conclusion.

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Franchising, Carroll`s Pyramid of CSR Model, Brand Name Value, General Trust, Competition.

Contents

Table of Figures

List of Tables

Abbreviations

AFA Austrian Franchise Association

CED Committee for Economic Development

COO Country of Origin

CC Corporate Citizenship

CG Corporate Governance

CR Corporate Responsibility

CS Corporate Sustainability

CSP Corporate Social Performance

CSR Corporate Social Responsibility

EU European Commission

IFA International Franchise Association

MUF Multi Unit Franchising

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

ÖFV Österreichischer Franchise Verband

RMHC Ronald McDonald House Charity

SUF Single Unit Franchising

TBL Triple Bottom Line

UN United Nations

WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development

1 Introduction

In recent years the relation of business to society has become an important subject in the business world. Furthermore the relationship of these factors began to be discussed within the greater topic of Corporate Social Responsibility (Klonoski, 1991).

Today, firms tend to behave in a socially responsible way by caring about their responsibilities to society (Welford & Frost, 2006) as well as trying to create high profits through their business in the global markets. Among the most popular market entry modes, franchising systems care about CSR as much as other business organizations (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).

This thesis presents an overview regarding the relation of CSR to Carroll`s Pyramid of CSR Model, and investigates the three major determinants - brand name value, trust and competition - of CSR activities of Franchising companies in Austria. To accomplish this aim quantitative research, which includes sending questionnaires to the 311 franchising companies in Austria, will be carried out. The thesis aims to first test the relationships between CSR and the economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibilities of the companies, presented in Carroll`s Pyramid of the CSR Model (Carroll, 1991) and subsequently to examine the impact of three major determinants (Brand Name, General Trust and Competition) on the CSR activities of franchising companies in Austria.

The first part of the thesis surveys the literature of CSR and Franchising. The methodology part presents the research design, measurements and the outcomes of the research analysis. Afterwards, the discussion of research results including the limitations of the thesis will be presented and the findings for all hypotheses will be discussed in the conclusion. The structure of the thesis is illustrated as follows. Please see Figure 1.



Figure 1: Outline of the Thesis

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

- Definition Of CSR
- History of CSR
- Other Concepts related to CSR
- Most Important Theories of CSR
- Most Important Models of CSR
- CSR in Austria
- Brand Name, Trust and Competition as factors impacting upon CSR

2 CSR

2.1 Definition of CSR

The modern way of thinking about social responsibility started with Howard R. Bowen in 1953. Social responsibility is defined in Bowen`s book; "Social Responsibilities of the Businessman" as the liabilities of businessmen who should perform activities, which are beneficiary for society (Bowen, 1953). Later in this time period many academics created new definitions and literature about social responsibility. This process also helped the establishment of the CSR concept during the following years. After the second half of the 20th century, CSR alongside sustainable development and other corporate social implementations became one of the key points for economic performers. According to Carroll business is the main economic factor in the community and businesses have a fundamental responsibility to generate products and services, because companies make a profit by selling these products and services according to the demands and willingness of the community (Carroll, 1979).

Carroll claims that the social responsibilities of businesses aim to meet not only the economic but also the legal, ethical, and discretionary expectancies of the community (Carroll, 1979). Frederic adds that CSR describes the relationship between businesses and the community by redefining the act and liabilities of businesses in society (Frederic, 1994). According to Fischer business corporations also use corporate social responsibility to protect and enhance their society (Fischer, 2004) and Baker says that CSR is a management process used to create a positive influence on the community (Baker, 2004).

2.1.1 CSR Definitions of Organizations

The Commission of the European Communities defines CSR as;

> *"a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in the interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis"*
>
> (Commission of the European Communities, 2002, p. 3).

The United Nations (UN) characterizes CSR as concerned with understanding the social, environmental and economic mandates of a business while, at the same time, meeting the expectations and willingness of shareholders on a voluntary basis. In addition, the organization indicates that CSR is a strategic business management concept, which reduces poverty by creating additional values (United Nations, 2007).

Moreover WBSCD specifies that CSR activities are important to the economic development as well as to the life quality of society, which also includes the workforce as well as their families (WBSCD, 1998).

2.2 History of CSR

2.2.1 Before the 1950s

There is not much information about CSR, before the 1950s, but it doesn't mean that this period did not include corporate social attempts and activities. Throughout this period of rapid commercial development emerging businesses had a high importance and attempted to create more productive workers. But today it is still difficult to differentiate between organizational activities made for social or for business reasons (Carroll, 2008).

2.2.2 1950s

According to Carroll the 1950s are a crucial period of time for the first literature of CSR (Carroll, 2008). In 1953 the book "Social Responsibilities of a Businessman" was published by Howard R. Bowen. After the publication of the book, Bowen had a major role in the the modernization of CSR and created the first CSR definition (Carroll, 2008).

According to Frederick there are three main ideas about the development of CSR in the 1950s. The first idea claims that business executives are trustees of the welfare of the community. The next argument claims that managers should equate the competition for the sources of the firms and the final idea is about the evaluation of philanthropy as a core element of business assistance which can create great results (Carroll, 2008).

2.2.3 1960s

During the 1960s "sustainable economic growth" became an important issue and was supported by policies created by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2001). Additionally according to Carroll this time period focused mainly on the meaning and definition of CSR. Moreover Carroll represents Keith Davis, Clarence Walton and William C Frederick as the most important authors regarding the evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility literature in the 1960s time period (Carroll, 2008).

2.2.4 1970s

This decade had many contributors such as Morrell Heald, George Steiner, Harold Johnson, Clarence Walton and many more writers, who helped the development of CSR literature. As an important milestone in 1971 "Social Responsibilities of Business Corporations" was published by the Committee for Economic Development (CED). The main aim of this study was to satisfy society by working to meet their needs and being conscious of several responsibilities to society. In other words in this model CED focused on wider responsibilities and human values for society (Carroll, 2008).

The Model was created by using three concentric circles, which represent three kinds of social responsibilities. The interior circle indicates the primary responsibilities for the productive implementation of economic functions in firms such as production. The intermediate circle represents the social values and preferences and the last third outer circle shows that the companies should increase their involvement in society and assume their needs (CED, 1971). Please see figure 2.



Figure 2: Three Concentric Circles Model of CED (CED, 1971)

The study of CED developed a new perspective regarding social responsibility by defining the social contract between business and society (CED, 1971).

The 1970s focused basically on the academic side rather than the business side of CSR. During this time period many important articles about CSR were written and different aspects of corporate social responsibility were discussed (Carroll, 2008).

In 1979 Carroll created the Corporate Social Performance (CSP) Model by defining four different social responsibilities; economic, legal, ethical as well as discretionary responsibility types. In addition the CSP model began to be evaluated as a major model of CSR (Carroll, 1979). Please see figure 3.



Figure 3: Social Responsibilities of the Corporate Social Performance Model (Carroll, 1979, p. 499)

The CSP model consists of social responsibilities, issues and a response philosophy. The model was created to help managers to define and to think about the key social issues and improve social performance in business areas (Carroll, 1979).

2.2.5 1980s

Until the 1980s academics created different new or refined definitions for CSR, but in the 1980s, research became more important for business ethics, stakeholder management, corporate social responsiveness and performance, as well as other similar topics. The researches helped researchers find answers for different questions related to different aspects of CSR (Carroll, 2008).

In 1980 the world conversation strategy was created as an important development, which focused on the conceptualization of sustainable development representing a prominent improvement for CSR during 1980s (Tilbury & Wortman, 2004).

Thomas M. Jones was one of the major contributors in the 1980s and he reported that CSR is not only about consequences and added that it is a process. The author also mentioned that the benefits of CSR are only vaguely understood (Jones, 1980). According to Carroll during the 1980s the relationship between CSR and company profitability became an important issue (Carroll, 2008).

Additionally in the 1980s, the 3p Model, which is an extended version of Carroll's 3 dimensional model, was created by Steven Wartick and Philip Cochran. The model includes three main categories such as policies, principles and processes. The policies include social issues management, a combination of the principles of CSR and the corporate social responsiveness process (Wartick & Corchran, 1985). Please see figure 4.

Principles	**Processes**	**Policies**
Corporate social Responsibilities	*Corporate Social Responsiveness*	*Social Issues Management*
• Economic	• Reactive	• Issues Identification
• Legal	• Defensive	• Issue Analysis
• Ethical	• Accommodative	• Response Development
• Discretionary	• Proactive	
Philosophical Orientation	*Institutional Orientation*	*Organizational Orientation*
• Social Contract of Business	• The capacity to respond to changing societal conditions	• Minimizing Surprises
• Business as a moral Agent	• Managerial approaches to Developing Reponses	• Determining Effective Corporate Social Policies

Figure 4: 3P Model of Steven Wartick and Philip Cochran (Wartick & Corchran, 1985, p. 767)

2.2.6 1990s

During the 1990s philanthropy, in other words, discretionary activities of companies in terms of CSR became an important topic for firms like Ben & Jerry's, Johnson and Johnson and The Body Shop also started to take an active role in CSR activities (Carroll, 2008).

During the 1990s the 3P Model of Steven Wartick and Philip Cochran was recreated by Wood (Moir, 2001) and in 1991 Carroll published his well-known Pyramid of Social Responsibilities Model which includes an explanation of the economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic business responsibility types in CSR (Carroll, 1991). For the corporate social performance model of Wood please see figure 5.



Figure 5: The corporate social performance Model of Wood (Moir, 2001, p. 13)

2.2.7 21st Century

Companies had already started to create their own CSR practices in the 1990s and during the 21st century the interest in CSR increased to the stage where CSR movements became a driving factor for companies in support of their businesses (Carroll, 2008). During this time period according to Carroll one of the most prominent books is “Corporate Social Responsibility: Doing the Most Good for Your Company and Your Cause”, belonging to Kotler and Lee. In this book the authors provide 25 practices to help companies regarding their CSR programs and strategies (Carroll, 2008). These examples are taken from the best CSR practices of companies as Johnson and Johnson, Ben & Jerry’s, The Body Shop, (Kotler & Lee, 2005). Moreover in 2003 the three domain of corporate social responsibility model was created by Schwartz and Carroll. The model eliminates the philanthropic category and includes and examines only the relationships between economic, ethical and legal responsibility types (Schwartz & Carroll, 2003). Please see figure 6.



Figure 6: The Three Domains of CSR Model (Schwartz & Carroll, 2003, p. 509)

During the 21st century CSR became an important issue alongside sustainable development, socially responsible actions, business ethics and other similar topics, not only for the academic and the business world, but also for global organizations such as OECD (OECD, 2001).

2.3 Other Concepts related to CSR

This part includes other exterior and interior institutional actions, which support the welfare of community and other concepts related to corporate social responsibility.

2.3.1 Corporate Governance

CG could be defined as a scope of trust, eternal truths, ethics and reliance for society, government and the corporate sector (Aras & Crowther, 2009). CG is a concept, which influences all the operating processes in all types of companies and organizations, no matter if they are incorporated under civil law or not (Turnbull, 1997).

Good governance is related to good corporate and company performance. According to Aras and Crowther better governance consists of various principles, such as clearness, responsibility, accountability, and justice, which are indirectly related to CSR (Aras & Crowther, 2009).

Corporate governance equalizes the firms` economic and social goals. CG includes the roles of the company in the social environment, efficient use of resources and the accountability of the firm and leads to creating sustainable value. Aras and Crowther report that good corporate governance can also lead to some other opportunities such as efficient and effective management, credibility, efficient risk management, a responsive and accountable corporation, control and internal auditing, performance control, distribution of fair responsibility, information for stakeholders and sustainable performance (Aras & Crowther, 2009).

2.3.2 Corporate Citizenship

During the 1980s the idea of corporate citizenship was presented to the community and business world by its innovators and became more popular after 1990. The concept, called by Dion a social contract, mainly examined the rights and responsibilities of business organizations to society (Garriga & Melé, 2004).

Corporate Citizenship was separated into three different categories such as

- Limited CC,
- Equivalent to Corporate Social Responsibility CC,
- Extended CC,

The limited corporate view is related to social investments, institutional philanthropy or specific responsibilities to the local society (Matten, et al., 2003).

Second, the equivalent to corporate social responsibility level is very common regarding the responsibilities of business to the local community (Matten, et al., 2003).

The last extended corporate citizenship view occurs when the government fails regarding the protection of its citizens. In this case another corporation can replace the government in the concept of CC (Matten, et al., 2003).

2.3.3 Corporate Social Performance

CSP is a concept, which is first examined in detail in Carroll`s three dimensional model (Carroll, 1979).

In other words Carroll`s Corporate Social Performance (CSP) Model consists of three principles;

- Definition of social responsibility,
- List of subjects, which are related to social responsibility,
- Characterization of the social responsiveness (Carroll, 1979).

From this point of view Wartick and Cochran (1985) describe CSP as emphasizing the interactions between the concepts of social responsibility, social issues and social responsiveness (Wood, 1991).

2.3.4 Sustainable development and Corporate Sustainability

In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WECD) brought out "Our common future", which defines sustainable development as meeting the needs of today without jeopardizing the competence to meet the requirements of the future (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). So, on the same point of view the corporate social sustainability could be also described as the meeting of the needs of all stakeholders; customers, shareholders, employees, suppliers and other members, who play a role in business operations. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) claims that sustainable development balances the economic, environmental and social assessments in the long run. (Garriga & Melé, 2004).

In addition Dyllick and Hockerts separately examine corporate sustainability from an economic, social and environmental view. If it is focused on the economic corporate sustainability (ECS) and the social corporate sustainability (SCS) of companies, the authors define ECS as a guarantee of sufficient cash flow in time to meet shareholders` expectations regarding economic capital. On the other hand SCS is defined as creating an additional value for the community with human capital and social capital. Human capital represents activities such as employee motivation and employee loyalty, on the other hand social capital consists of social operations such as education systems or public services (Dyllick & Hockerts, 2002).

2.3.5 Business Ethics

Ethics is able to be described as the study of morality, which includes morals, norms and codes of conduct to distinguish between wrong or right decisions. Business ethics also guides companies' behavior with the help of the mentioned moral principles, standards and rules in the international business world so as to increase the positive influence, and decrease the negative effect of corporations on society (Dimitriades, 2007).

According to Carroll, business ethics are also related to CSR. In his pyramid of CSR model, four different responsibility categories are shown as businesses major responsibilities` to society. One of these responsibilities, ethical responsibility is also a prominent part of his model, which represents the behaviors or activities expected of businesses by society (Carroll, 1991).

2.4 The Most important Theories of CSR

2.4.1 Friedman: Neo-Classical View

The Neoclassical approach claims that the main goals and responsibilities of a company are maximizing its revenue and profit for their shareholders and at the same time as a business organization, providing goods and services related to customer needs and willingness. According to the Neo classical view these two actions, which create an economic value for the community, are the core responsibilities of the business organizations (Keinert, 2008).

In one sense, the Neoclassical view of CSR gives importance to maximizing revenue and profits, on the other hand Friedman mentions that firms should also pay attention to the rules of the game, namely the rules of society, which are supported by laws. Additionally the companies should also act in accordance with the ethical norms of society (Keinert, 2008).

2.4.2 Freeman: Stakeholder Theory

Freeman published his book; Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach in 1984. As a consequence, stakeholder management has become an ethics based theory in the literature. The authors of this time period claimed that this kind of management can be beneficial for the integration of social demands with business organizations (Garriga & Melé, 2004).

Freeman defines the Stakeholder as a person, who has an influence in the process of the organization's activities, such as workers, suppliers, shareholders, clients of the firm who is responsible for the business operations in corporations. Additionally Freeman also specifies that the activities of CSR can create a beneficial value for the corporations and as well as for their non financial stakeholders (Freeman, 1984).

According to Preston and Donaldson (1995) the stakeholder theory consists of two main ideas; The first idea says that stakeholders are a group or a person, who plays a role with their interests in corporate activities, because shareholders are identified with their interest in the business organizations. In addition, the second idea states that the interests of all participants have a common value , because each shareholder group cares about their own interests, due to other possible interest groups, such as shareowners (Garriga & Melé, 2004).

According to the Shareholder theory a company, which cares about CSR in their business, should give the same level of importance and protection to the legal interests of all stakeholders. Thereby the organizations can create a balance not only for the interest of stockholders, but also between the diversity of interests in the company (Garriga & Melé, 2004).

2.4.3 Porter: Competitive Advantage Theory

In 1980, Porter claimed that the creation of competitive advantage has a core importance for business organizations to create a competition power in the markets. He also adds that companies should use their resources to create a competitive value in their business areas. The author determined that the competitive advantage consists of two main parts; cost and differentation advantages (Porter, 1980).

According to Porter and Kramer Corporate Social Responsibility creates strategic advantages regarding competition by the acceptance of corporate philanthrophy in business organizations. Corporate philanthrophy leads to a significant cost effective opportunity for companies to contribute their competition power in their business markets (Porter & Kramer, 2002). Moreover, having a strong competitive advantage can also help firms differentiate each other from other competitors in the business areas (Porter, 1980).

2.4.4 CSR-Continuum View

Pirsch et al explain Corporate Social Responsibility as a continuum by defining two main Promotional and Institutional CSR Programs (Pirsch, et al., 2007).

The institutionalized CSR programs provide an extensive approach to generate CSR policies and programs for all stakeholders. These kinds of CSR programs support companies to increase their customer loyalty and positive attitudes. On the other hand the programs also decrease consumer uncertainties and aim to create long term customer relationships. In addition institutionalized CSR programs consist of caring, synergetic and holistic drivers (Pirsch, et al., 2007).

Secondly, promotional CSR programs care about profits and create purchase intention by focusing on the companies' sales. Promotional programs create short-term relationships and short term effects. These programs basically give more importance to the satisfaction of shareholders in the business organizations. (Pirsch, et al., 2007). The drivers of promotional CSR programs are compliance driven and profit driven activities. Please see figure 7.



Figure 7: CSR Continuum Concept (Larson, 2011, p. 12)

Redman shows the relation of social responsibility to the companies' profits in the following figure. The author categorizes the importance of CSR for the organizations as;

- CSR Skeptic Companies; see the social responsibilities as outside their domain of business.
- True CSR Believer Companies; give equal importance to the social, financial and environmental goals.
- Companies which are in the middle of the continuum, see CSR a necessary or a strategic way to increase their profits (Redman, 2005).



Figure 8: The CSR Continuum (Redman, 2005, p. 73)

According to Redman, the explanations and definitions of CSR do not sufficiently define the relationship between social goals and profits for corporations. Therefore an examination of the relationship between these two items helps better comprehend the concept, as well as role of the CSR activities for the business corporations (Redman, 2005). Please see figure 8.

2.5 The Most important Models of CSR

This part of the thesis will attempt to explain the following four Models related to the evolution of CSR.

- A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance
- Pyramid of CSR Model
- Triple Bottom Line Model
- Five Spiral Dynamics Model of Marrewijk

2.5.1 Carroll: A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance

This Model was created by Archie B. Carroll in 1979 and focuses on three main questions:

- What does CSR include?
- What are the social issues of companies?
- What are the philosophy and the social responsiveness of companies?

In this Model Carroll defines social responsibility with four types of responsibility categories. These are economical, legal ethical as well as discretionary responsibilities. The author reports that these categories explain CSR in a more exhaustive manner. The Model includes social responsibilities, social issues and a response philosophy. In addition the aim of the study is to help managers define and think about key social issues and improve social performance in business areas (Carroll, 1979). Please see figure 9.



Figure 9: Three dimensional conceptual model of CSP (Carroll, 1979, p. 503)

2.5.2 Carroll: The Pyramid of CSR Model

In 1991, Carroll reviewed his first three dimensional conceptual model of CSP and subsequently created the Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility Model. The four categories, which are also defined in his three dimensional Model; economic, legal, ethical as well as philanthropic responsibility types of the companies, were depicted in a pyramid. (Carroll, 1991). Please see figure 10.

According to Carroll by that time, the importance of these categories changed and he claims that the ethical and philanthropic responsibility types became much more crucial in 1991 than in the past (Carroll, 1991).



Figure 10: The Pyramid of CSR (Carroll, 1991, p. 42)

Economic Responsibilities are the main responsibilities of companies, because before anything else, companies are core economic elements which create economic entities, provide goods and services; additionally they create an economic value by selling these produced units to society.

Carroll reports that firms not only have responsibilities to the wellbeing of society. The companies should also realize their own business responsibilities, which are maximizing their profits, reaching high level of efficiency and profitability (Carroll, 1991).

Legal responsibilities are the second most important category of the pyramid of CSR Model. Even though the firms' main responsibility is maximizing their profits, companies must carry out their activities under the rules and regulations defined by the federal government and the state. According to Carroll these responsibilities are viewed as a social contract between companies and society. These contracts are also called codified ethics and companies care about these regulations to try to be good corporate citizens of society (Carroll, 1991).

Ethical responsibilities are the third important category of Carroll's pyramid. This category includes moral and ethical standards, which represent society's expectations from companies. The distinction among legal and ethical responsibilities is that these standards are not imperative such as legal regulations and they are not codified into law. Civil and consumer rights can be given as well-known examples for ethical responsibilities (Carroll, 1991).

Philanthropic responsibilities are the last part of Carroll's pyramid. These responsibilities represent the company activities related to the needs or willingness of society. Additionally these corporate actions mostly care about the wellbeing and welfare of the people to seem to be good corporate citizens in the public eye. Community and education can be given as examples for these activities (Carroll, 1991).

The distinction among philanthropic and ethical responsibility types is that philanthropic activities are not expected by society and companies do not care about the moral and ethical sense. Companies organize these voluntary based actions, only when they want to and to seem to be good corporate citizens. However on the other hand there is always an expectation from society regarding caring about this kind of responsibilities for the community by the companies (Carroll, 1991).

In my thesis, I tried to measure the importance of the relationship between all these responsibility types and CSR for franchising companies in Austria. Therefore, the importance level of these responsibility categories and their relationships with CSR will be discussed and made available in the analysis part.

2.5.3 Triple Bottom Line Model

In the middle of the 1990s John Elkington created the Triple Bottom Line to measure sustainability. The Triple Bottom Line Model (TBL) consists of three aspects of performance, which are social, financial and environmental dimensions (Spaler & Hall, 2011).

According to Elkington, as time went on, companies started to also care about environmental and social dimensions besides their financial profits. The author reports that the financial situations of the companies are not enough to measure their success in the business areas. Therefore Elkington tried to explain the sustainability goals of organizations by using the 3Ps; People, Planet and Profits dimensions with the TBL Model (Spaler & Hall, 2011).

In 2002 Business Society Management at the Erasmus University claimed that there is a relationship between CSR, CS and 3Ps, by evaluating CSR and its 3Ps dimensions, Planet, People and Profits under the Corporate Sustainability concept. (Please see figure 11) In addition, the EU Commission also defined CSR as a contribution for the Sustainable development of Companies (Marrewijk, 2003).



Figure 11: Relationship between CS, CSR and 3Ps (Marrewijk, 2003, p. 101)

2.5.4 The Five Spiral Dynamics Model of Marrewijk

Marcel van Marrewijk reports that Corporate Sustainability (CS) involves the Corporate Responsibility concept which includes three kinds of dimensions: Environmental, Economic and Social responsibilities. For the model please see figure 12.



Figure 12: General Model of CS/CR (Marrewijk, 2003, p. 102)

According to Marrewijk, nowadays Corporate Sustainability and the Corporate Social Responsibility concept are regarded as synonym concepts and both include the social activities of companies in their definitions (Marrewijk, 2003).

The author separates the definition of CS and CSR into five levels.

Compliance Driven CS; supports the idea that companies should be aiding the community by obeying the rules and regulations in their business lives. On the other hand, firms should also carry out charity activities and behave correctly to society (Marrewijk, 2003).

Profit Driven CS; affirms that firms should integrate their programs with social, ethical and ecological business operations and should also be profitable and financially strong in markets (Marrewijk, 2003).

Caring CS; implies that companies should create a balance between social, economic and ecological activities and, by going beyond the legal regulations, they should care and create something good for the public welfare (Marrewijk, 2003).

Synergistic CS; shows that firms should create a synergy and functional solutions for all their stakeholders to realize a win-win situation by giving much more importance to economic, social and ecological CSR activities in their business operations (Marrewijk, 2003).

Holistic CS; indicates that each organization has a universal responsibility to the world and all humanity. According to Marrewijk companies should care and create their operations for a better life quality for society in the close future (Marrewijk, 2003).

In addition the main CSR part of the questionnaire consists of all these five corporate sustainability levels from the study of Marrewijk (2003).

2.6 CSR in Austria

2.6.1 History

In the 1980s sustainable development and CSR became a major subject of argument in Austria. Afterwards, during the 1990s the environment and its protection became an important topic for Austrian companies. Additionally, during this time period they cared about being nature friendly, however the consideration of the sustainability concept was accepted and started being discussed not during the 1990s, but in the early 2000s by the business organizations in Austria (Strigl, 2004).

After understanding sustainability, the companies started to add this concept to their business operations and management strategies. At the same time business managements began to present sustainability reports in business areas. In recent years, the concepts of corporate citizenship, business ethics and corporate governance also became major topics which began to be discussed alongside the CSR concept. In 2002 "Initiative CSR Austria", which is an initiative about the Lisbon strategy and the sustainable development concept, was carried out by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour. In addition, after 2003, the "Austrian Chamber of Commerce" started to support CSR in Austria as well (Strigl, 2004).

The important activities of CSR and Corporate Sustainability in Austria from 1992 until 2004 are shown below in figure 13;



Figure 13: The Activities of CSR and CS in Austria (Strigl, 2004, p. 3)

2.6.1.1 Three development steps of CSR in Austria

Initiative CSR Austria represents the main attempt for CSR in Austria, and was carried out by core industry members in Austria and the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour in 2002. It has a major role for the evolution of the CSR concept in Austria (Strigl, 2004).

According to Strigl there are three main levels regarding the evolution of CSR in Austria. The first level started in 2002-2003 with discussions about the CSR concept, its advantages and the generation of a common comprehension for the meaning of CSR (Strigl, 2004).

After the board arguments about CSR, the survey related to "Corporate Societal Responsibility of Austrian Companies" and the results of the research helped the creation of the first step of Austrian CSR Guiding Visions for Companies in 2003 in Austria (Strigl, 2004).

In the second stage; the formulation of the guide was carried out by considering Green Paper (OECD) as well as the needs or willingness of Austrian Companies and society. The CSR Guiding Austria was formulated with 16 principles of Austrian Industry. The list of these 16 principles is listed in figure 14 as follows;

CSR – Austria Guiding Vision: "Economic Success. Responsible Action."

Corporate Social responsibility means

...successful economic action:

1. reliable and trustworthy
2. long-term, value-oriented decisions
3. fairness in a competitive environment
4. playing a role model

…involving others:

5. employees are partners
6. promoting social integration
7. taking into account the concerns of stakeholders
8. helping to improve the situation in other countries

…orientation towards the environment and the future:

9. observing the precautionary principle
10. economic solutions for ecological challenges
11. taking consumer interests into account
12. encouraging sustainable development at global and regional levels

…a committed implementation effort:

13. adopted principles are a frame of reference
14. transparency through information policy
15. cooperating in a spirit of partnership
16. further development of promising measures

Figure 14: CSR guiding vision with 16 CSR principles for the Austrian Industry (Strigl, 2004, p. 11)

Finally the third important step for the evolution process of CSR in Austria is focusing on the future development of the CSR concept and continuing to guide Austrian firms regarding the application of their CSR activities in Austria (Strigl, 2004).

2.7 Brand Name, Trust and Competition as factors impacting upon CSR

This part of the thesis principally examines the relations of three factors; Brand Name Value, General Trust and Competition with CSR.

2.7.1 The relationship between Brand Name Value and CSR

In recent years, brands have stood out with their emotional, rather than their rational dimensions. Today the consumer's decisions to buy depend on their emotional engagement with the product as well as its quality or services. A brand represents a form of communication and possesses with emotional and symbolic characteristics which differentiate it from other brands (Van de Ven, 2008). In this regard CSR has an influence on Brand value, because the social activities of firms have an important effect on the customer perceptions regarding the company's brand value (Özdemir, 2009).

In other respects, according to Rust et al ethical and social activities improve the brand value (Özdemir, 2009). In addition Ribeiro and de Melo specify that they found strong evidence of the positive effect of CSR on brand value and corporate reputation. According to the results of their research, the authors report that brand value can be used to increase the effectiveness of CSR (Ribeiro & De Melo, 2010). Jobber describes a brand as consisting of a name, design, symbol, packaging and some other combinations of these items, which differentiates the brand from others (Jobber, 2010). According to this definition, it is possible to report that CSR also has a positive influence on brand name value, besides other items of the brand. Additionally these associations influence the customer's evaluations about products and their brand loyalty as well (Singh, et al., 2008).

On the other hand Lewis reports that CSR activities should be supported by the brands (Lewis, 2003). In the study of Polonsky and Jevons, the authors define CSR branding as a concept, which claims that CSR is the main part of the brand and the CSR activities are related to characteristics of the brands (Polonsky & Jevons, 2006). Accordingly, Jobber defines brand value, as the characteristic of a brand and the brand name, as one of the main parts of the brands (Jobber, 2010). Consequently, there also must be a relationship between brand name value and CSR. Hence corporations should create their CSR activities by caring for their brands (Lewis, 2003), their brand characteristics (Polonsky & Jevons, 2006), in other words their brands and brand name values (Jobber, 2010).

2.7.2 The relationship between CSR and General Trust

According to Hardin, trust is encapsulated interest. He believes that X trusts Y, when Y`s interest is related to X`s interest and a trust relationship can be developed, when both sides evaluate each other as trustworthy (Hardin, 1998).

Barber defines general trust as expectations about continuity and execution of the moral and natural orders. Moreover the author specifies that the people trust each other depending on dominant standards and norms (Barber, 1983). According to Fukuyama, social values, morals and norms influence the form of trust in society (Der Lou, 2005). Therefore, it is possible to report that general trust and relationships in society are formed with social norms and morals.

Today many global corporations attach importance to activities regarding CSR to win the trust of their employees, customers, suppliers, shareholders, etc. (Idowu, et al., 2013). Levy says that customers reward the firms for their support of social programs (Levy, 1999). According to Brown and Dacin, there is a relationship between social initiatives and positive customer responses. (Brown & Dacin, 1997). In addition CSR has an effect on the trust of the employees as well. According to the research of Hansen et al employee perceptions of CSR influence turnover intentions and organizational citizenships. (Please see figure 15). The authors also mention that the opinions of employees and CSR activities play a key role in their trust and behaviors (Hansen, et al., 2011).

On the other hand Rochte claims in his report, which is created based on the Edelman Trust Barometer 2009, that trust is a major factor for business connections and relationships. Moreover, the author remarks that trust plays a key role for corporation's corporate sustainability and CSR. According to Rochte, in the long term companies' corporate sustainability and CSR are affected by the trust level of the relationships between customers, shareholders, employees, distributors, partners and other members in the business operations. In other words CSR depends on the relationship of trust between all stakeholders as well (Rochte, 2010). Thus, it is also possible to report that there is a relation between general trust and CSR.



Figure 15: The impact of employee CSR-perceptions on turnover and Organizational Citizenship (Hansen, et al., 2011, p. 30)

2.7.3 The relationship between Competition and CSR

According to Porter and Kramer today CSR is an inescapable priority for all companies around the world. The fact is, CSR activities can give the firms many advantages to benefit society and these kinds of activities of the firms can also be an important opportunity for their competitive advantage in the international business markets (Porter & Kramer, 2006). Porter and Kramer also add that CSR provides strategic competitive advantages with corporate philanthrophy to the business corporations (Porter & Kramer, 2002).

The authors also specify that the firms should focus on CSR activities for their development strategies and competitive positions, due to significant influences of social issues on companies` competitiveness in the markets. Finally they report that the social dimensions of the competitive context require a strategic CSR to create a successful competitive power by using these CSR strategies (Porter & Kramer, 2006).

On the other hand the effect of competition on CSR and their positive relationship is supported by several studies in the literature. According to the study of Fernandez-Kranz & Santalo (2010), companies in highly competitive markets give more importance to CSR activities. Fischman (2008) also adds that CSR activities are more beneficial and important in more competitive markets (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Consequently, we can report that there is a relationship between competition and CSR as well.

FRANCHISING

- Definition of Franchising
- Three Main Theories of Franchising
- Types of Franchising
- Forms of Franchising
- Benefits of the Franchising Business System
- Franchising in Austria
- CSR in Franchising
- CSR determinants in a Franchising System

3 Franchising

3.1 Definition of Franchising

Historically speaking, Franchising first took place in France and the meaning of the name franchising is “to be free from servitude”. The business format came to Europe in the first half of the 1970s and became a very popular market entry mode in the US by creating over one-third of US retail sales. At the same time this ratio in Europe was only 11% (Young, et al., 1989, p. 111).

The US department of Commerce defines Franchising as a contract between the franchisee and the franchisors, which consists of not only products, services or trademarks, but also a complete concept with the plans and strategies of the business (Lafontaine, 1992). According to Jobber, Franchising is a legal agreement between franchisor and franchisee, who agree to each party’s obligations and rights (Jobber, 2010, p. 636).

As reported by the International Franchise Association (IFA) a Franchise is an agreement between legally independent parties: Franchisor and Franchisee.

- The Franchisor is a group or a person, who owns the trademark or name and provides rights and support against a fee from the Franchisee regarding financial, marketing and operations methods as well as training issues (IFA, 2010).

- The Franchisee is a group or a person, who uses the trademark and pays fees for that by developing its business with the franchisors support (IFA, 2010).

Hollensen defines franchising as a marketing oriented method, in which a business service is sold to an independent investor with capital and but not much business experience in the business areas. This agreement covers everything from the brand name to the total business concept. (Hollensen, 2011, p. 361).

Additionally, Franchising is a business format market entry mode which includes a relationship between franchisor and franchisee. The contract between both sides consists of items such as brand name, design, copyrights, specific knowhow, patents, etc. (Hollensen, 2011, p. 363).



Figure 16: Franchising Agreement (IFA , 2001, p. 1)

3.2 Three Main Theories of Franchising

3.2.1 Resource Scarcity Theory

According to Katz and Owen, it is difficult for new and small companies to increase their capital for the growth of their business just from current operations, local knowledge, existing managerial resources and traditional financial markets (Katz & Owen, 1992).

On the other hand the resource scarcity theory, which was developed in 1969 by Oxenfeld and Kelly, indicates that one of the most important reasons for companies to use the franchising system is to benefit from economies of scale, which cannot be reached with their own resources. Oxenfeld and Kelly report that accessing economies of scale through franchising systems also provides franchising companies with a rapid growth chance to solve their problems regarding managerial and financial resources (Oxenfeld & Kelly, 1969).

3.2.2 Agency Theory

According to this theory, there is a business relationship between agent and principal. In other words, the agent works for another principal with a contract, which shares the risk between both parties. Such as in the franchising business system, the franchisee works for the franchisor and shares the risk with him by using an agreement (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

Eisenhardt reports that there are two problems regarding the relationship between agent and principal. The author reports that these problems are mainly caused by uncertainty and insufficient information between these two parties. The first problem is related to the opportunistic behavior of the principal. When the principal only cares about his self-interest, this problem can cause conflicts between the agent and principal. The second problem is that it may be not easy for the principal (franchisor) to monitor the agent (franchisee) and control its behavior. On the other hand there is also a related risk sharing problem with different risk attitudes and understandings of the parts (Eisenhardt, 1989).

3.2.3 Synergistic View of the Franchising (Plural Organization Theory)

In 1997 Bradach created the plural organization theory, which argues for a mix of company owned and other franchising ownerships under the same brand in franchising business formats. In other words, according to Bradach the plural organization structures gives companies an important competition power with their systems, which are totally company owned and franchised. In addition, the author reports that today many franchising chains use this plural organization structure. Because franchising chains have two main important reasons to choose plural organizations. The first reason is that there could be several establishments, which are more suitable for one form of ownership than other type of ownerships and the second reason, outlets may positively affect and motivate each other (Bradach, 1997).

According to Bradach, company owned structures should create *uniformity*. Uniformity indicates that a company owned structure needs to have a common image, common design and standard service quality along the same brand. On the other hand the author also reports that franchised structures should generate *adaptation.* Adaptation suggests that a franchised company needs to adapt itself to alterations in the business markets to gain advantages by creating new opportunities. For the market adaptation, there are two necessary factors to consider, first local market knowledge and second, continual innovation (Bradach, 1997).

3.3 Types of Franchising

Hollensen reports that there are two different franchising types: one is "*product and trade name*" (distribution) franchising, the other one is "*business format-package*" franchising. (Hollensen, 2011, p. 361).

3.3.1 Product (Distribution) Franchising

In product (distribution) franchising, the products of the franchisor are sold to the customers by the franchisee and the franchisor supports the franchisee with its trademark, logo, name, etc. However in this kind of franchising system, the franchisor does not provide a system, where the franchisee can run its business. In addition this system could ensure both parties a high number of retail sales. For example; Coca-cola, Ford or Goodyear Tires work with product distributor franchising systems (IFA, 2010).

3.3.2 Business Format Franchising

In this system, franchisees use not only the franchisor's trademark, logo name and products, but also the main operation systems to completely combine and integrate their business into the franchisor`s business. This is the most common and well known type of franchising system in the world (IFA, 2010).

3.3.3 Social Franchising

This is a new type of franchising and a combination of commercial franchising systems with a social concept, in which the franchisor provides successful social concepts to the franchisee by using a tested reliable system to create a social benefit for the brand name. In other words, social franchising is a system which consists of the same structure as a commercial franchising system to create social goals (Tracy & Jarvis, 2007). In addition there are several main differences between traditional and social franchising systems.

Social Franchising systems differ from other franchising types by having a different mission, different concept, different target groups, different franchising units and different values revenue (Volery & Hackl, 2010).

The detailed information about the differences is below;

- A different mission; they care not about profit, but about social successes.
- A different concept; social concept instead of business programs.
- Different target groups; beneficiaries in place of customers as target groups.
- Different franchise units; not business people but social enterprises.
- Different Values; care about helping instead of profits and revenue (Volery & Hackl, 2010).

3.4 Forms of Franchising

The basic franchising contracts consist of Single Unit (SUF) - Direct and Multi Unit (MUF) - Indirect forms.

3.4.1 Single Unit Franchise

In this type of franchising form, franchisees are supported and served directly by franchisors from home markets. Single Unit Franchising systems are able to manage only one single unit, however according to the success of the single unit franchisee in the market, the conditions can be changed and if the franchisee would be successful enough, then it can gain the right to run other outlets in the market. Consequently, there is always a chance for the single unit (direct) franchisees to catch up the multi-unit (indirect) franchisees in the business markets (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996).

3.4.2 Multi -Unit Franchise

This form represents a contract between the franchisor and an intermediary in the host market. In this type of franchising form the franchisees organize and operate their business in a foreign market and they are served in an indirect way by the franchisor. In addition, multiple unit franchisees also have the possibility to run several outlets in the market. This is the most important advantage for MUF (indirect) in comparison to SUF (direct) and the main difference between these forms (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996).

Three Multi Unit Franchising Forms;

- Sub-franchising/Master Franchise
- Area Development Multi Unit Strategy
- Sequential Multi Unit Strategy

3.4.2.1 Sub-Franchising /Master Franchise

This is also an indirect form of franchising in the local markets, in this form of the franchising the master franchisee can behave as the franchisor of sub-franchisees in the business markets. In this situation the master franchisee is seen by the franchisor as a sub-franchisor, which operates its franchisees in the host markets (Mumdziev, 2011). Please see figure 17.



Figure 17: The Structure of Master Franchisee, SUF and MUF (Mumdziev, 2011, p. 48)

3.4.2.2 Area Development Multi Unit Strategy

According to Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt, this kind of multi-unit contract form requires, in a certain period of time, the opening of a certain quantity of units by the Franchisee in a specific area, designated by the franchisor (Grünhagen & Mittelstaedt, 2000).

3.4.2.3 Sequential Multi-Unit Strategy

Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt claim that by contrast with the area-development multi-unit strategy form which requires a contract necessity between the Franchisee and Franchisor, the sequential multi-unit strategy form, makes it possible to establish other business units and expand the business in the market without a contract between both parties (Grünhagen & Mittelstaedt, 2000).

3.5 Benefits of the Franchising Business System

3.5.1 From the perspective of the Franchisee;

Owning a franchise gives several advantages to Franchisees. One of the most important benefits of a franchise system for a franchisee is to have a chance to work and do business with the experience and support of the Franchisor. In other words this support involves the training, advertising, operating system, management support, management assistance, etc. Additionally the franchising agreements allow the franchisees a certain level of independence in their business. Moreover a franchise system can decrease the total business risks of the Franchisee and provide a market, where the franchisee can run its business operations with the support of the franchisor (IFA, 2010).

Another important advantage for Franchisees is lower startup costs and brand name value with customer recognition. This is a very important issue, because being a well-known and valued brand can lead to customer loyalty for the franchisees in the markets. Moreover, it is quite difficult to create a strong and well-known brand in a short time period. According to Ghodeswar a brand evolves over time in the eye of customers (Ghodeswar, 2008).

Consequently, it is possible to report that there is also a time advantage for the franchisees regarding the brand value in the market. In addition entering a market without experience and knowledge can lead to high risk for firms, but, in a franchising system, franchisees benefit from the Franchisors` proven products, methods and systems which provide a standard quality of goods and services for the customers (IFA, 2010).

3.5.2 From the Perspective of the Franchisor;

According to Hollensen, a franchisor with a Franchising agreement gains low risk and low cost advantages to enter new markets, because the franchisees wait for the franchisor in the local market with their local knowhow, necessary equipment support, local business experience, etc. Therefore a franchising business format provides lower start-up costs with a competitive cost structure and lower business risk to develop their business in international areas more quickly (Hollensen, 2011, p. 377).

On the other hand, by creating several business units franchisors can also benefit from economies of scale. Moreover through quick expansion of the business and rapid penetration, companies can overcome their cash flow problems. Furthermore, the franchisor also receives the initial fees from the franchisees. Therefore it is possible to report that a franchising system can provide the franchisors with higher profitability and a stronger competitive advantage level than their competitors in the market. In other words by using the franchising business format the franchisor enter different foreign countries more quickly and also make direct investments in these countries. This advantage makes a major contribution to the globalization of the companies as well as their brands (Hollensen, 2011). Furthermore, due to the advantages of the system, companies can stay in the markets for a long time by using the franchising business format (Shane, 1996).

3.6 Franchising In Austria

Despite the franchising system's appearance in Europe in the 1950s, the business format did not become as popular in Europe as in the US. During the 1970s time period the importance of franchising systems increased and franchising became the most popular business format in Austria. For instance, the operations of several important franchising companies such as Palmers, Almdudler, and Julius Meinl were started in this time period. In 1975 the European Federation and in 1986 the Austrian Franchise Association was established. Over time the importance of the franchising business format and consequently the number of franchisees increased from 70-280 to 2500-3900 in Austria (Alexander, et al., 2004).

From 1994 to 2006 the development of the franchising system is shown in figure 19 below. As seen in the graphic, the importance of the Franchise systems continued to increase significantly between the years 1994 and 2006 in different sectors in Austria (AFA, 2007). Please see figure 18.



Figure 18: Development of Franchising System in Austria (AFA, 2007, p. 3)

In 2012, there were 445 Franchise systems, 7,150 franchise partners with 8,720 outlets and 66,000 employees in Austria. According to the statistics of the Franchising Association of Austria, the distribution of market share percentages in the industry type in Austria is as follows: manufacturing 6%, commercial 43%, gastronomy 11%, service 40 % (AFA, 2013). Please see figure 19.



Figure 19: Industry Distribution of Franchising Firms in Austria (AFA, 2013)

The distribution of the country of origin in the franchising companies in Austria is; 51 % local, 29% Germany, 11% other EU countries, % 6 Canada & US and last 3% of the franchising firms from other countries (AFA, 2013). Please see figure 20.



Figure 20: COO-Distribution of Franchising Firms in Austria (AFA, 2013)

3.7 CSR in Franchising

In the last years, corporate social responsibility activities and sustainable development concepts have become important issues for the economic success of business corporations. According to Davis, the firms seek the social benefits of CSR, which can also create traditional economic gains for the companies besides economic, technical and legal necessities, therefore the importance of CSR increases day by day in the business life (Davis, 1973).

The literature includes two important papers, which analyze the topic of CSR in the case of Franchising in 2008 by Kaufmann et al and in 2011 by Ehrmann and Meiseberg (Perrigot, et al., 2013). According to research made by Ehemann and Meiseberg with a sample size of 76 German Franchisors, CSR activities depend on company size, multi unit (indirect) franchising form, company-specific factors and the CSR experience in a franchising system (Ehrmann & Meiseberg, 2011). In addition Kauffmann also concluded that 29 % of franchising companies had CSR activities from sample size of 100 companies in the US market (Kaufmann, et al., 2008).

These two main researches show that Franchising companies also care about their CSR activities as much as other business forms. Additionally, there are many franchising companies, such as McDonald's that operate their CSR activities in the global markets as well as in Austria.

3.7.1 An example of the CSR activities of Mc Donald`s Austria

Mc Donald’s is a global fast food company with over 35,000 locations in more than 100 countries and over 80% of restaurants are managed by independent Franchisees. According to company`s report the daily customer number of the company is nearly 70 million people around the world (Mc Donald`s, 2014).

One of the most important CSR activities of McDonald`s Austria, Ronald McDonald House Charities has been supported by Mc Donald’s since 1987 in Vienna, Salzburg, Graz and Innsbruck (Ronald Mcdonald Kinderhilfe Österreich, 2014).

Ronald McDonald House Charity

RHMC is a nonprofit organization. The main goal of this organization is to find out, generate, and help the programs, which can make better the well-fare and health of children. In addition RMHC has a global network with 58 countries under the main programmes: The Ronald McDonald House, Family Rooms, and Care Mobile, additionally Grants and U.S. Scholarships as well (Ronald McDonald House Charities , 2014).

3.8 CSR determinants in a Franchising System

3.8.1 Brand Name Value in Franchising

According to Frazer et al. most investors prefer to work with a franchising company, which has a well-established brand name (Frazer, et al., 2007). However, Ghodeswar reports that it is difficult to create a strong brand in a short time period and the author adds that a brand evolves over time (Ghodeswar, 2008).

Demoradan supports Frazer`s remark by specifying that a well-known brand name can provide a franchisee several advantages, such as customer loyalty and awareness and higher prices to gain higher profit than other companies and other franchise systems in the business markets (Damodaran, 2012, p. 767).

According to Gorovaia and Windsperger the power of brand name creates an important competitive advantage for the franchisees with client brand recognition in comparison to other competitors in the market (Gorovaia & Windsperger, 2013). Therefore the advantage of a well-known brand name, such as Mc Donald’s can create an agreement to pay higher fees for the benefit of the brand name by franchisees to create other alternative advantages. Moreover, the value of a brand name continues to increase along with the advertisements operated by the franchisor (Damodaran, 2012, p. 767). Thus, we can say that the Brand name value and franchising business format are relatively related to each other.

3.8.2 General Trust in Franchising

Mayer et al. describes Trust as the admission of the one party`s activities by another party based on an expectancy that the other party operates its actions, which are significant for the trustor, without the trustor`s competence to check or monitor the other party (Mayer, et al., 1995).

In addition, people may have a relationship with other people, even if they have no experience and knowledge about them. They can simply have a positive view of other people and consider them as trustworthy (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). In other words, general trust does not include a history related with the trustee and trustor such as in the knowledge based trust.

The Trust level of the relation between trustee and trustor is based on the trustor`s culture and individual characteristics (Jarvenpaa, et al., 1998). Mayer specifies that the level of trust and the perceived trustor`s trust influence the trustor`s decisions (Mayer, et al., 1995).



Figure 21: Proposed Model of Trust (Mayer, et al., 1995, p. 715)

3.8.2.1 Factors of perceived Trustworthiness

3.8.2.1.2 Ability

According to Mayer et al, one of the factors of trustworthiness, ability, includes three sub-factors, which are skills, characteristics and competencies. These three items can influence the level of trust to trustees, due to specific the abilities of the trustees in some specific areas (Mayer, et al., 1995).

3.8.2.1.3 Benevolence

Benevolence is about the trustee`s willingness to help the trustor, even though there is no necessity to help the trustor by the trustee and no indirect benefit for the trustee. It can create a positive perception of the trustor for the trustee (Mayer, et al., 1995).

3.8.2.1.4 Integrity

This factor represents some of the trustee`s principles, which are found acceptable by the trustor; for instance the perception of the trustor regarding the trustee's intense sense of justice (Mayer, et al., 1995).

3.8.2.1.5 Predisposition to trust

Finally propensity explains the willingness of the trustor regarding trusting other people in general. This factor can change the trust level of the relationship between the trustee and trustor. In addition, several main sub-factors may influence propensity such as experiences, culture and personality (Mayer, et al., 1995).

3.8.2.2 General Trust between Franchisee and Franchisor

The definition of Trust from the perspective of Mayer et al. can be translated from the general meaning to the specific meaning for the franchising system as the acceptance of the franchisor`s activities by the franchisee depending on a hope that the franchisor operates certain activities, which are substantial for the franchisee, without the franchisee's skill to control or monitor the franchisor (Mayer, et al., 1995).

Davies et al. also defines trust from the perspective of the franchisee as the positive expectation of the franchisee regarding the behaviors of the franchisor and acceptance of defenselessness to the activities of franchisor (Davies, et al., 2011). Moreover, in the relation of the Franchisor with the Franchisee, the trust level of the franchisee can be evaluated using the franchisee`s trust in the franchisor`s profitability in a franchising system, etc (Croonen & Brand, 2013). In addition, the level of general trust in this relationship can make sense for the franchisor, with low risk, low monitoring and agency costs, etc in the system (Griessmair, et al., 2014). Therefore it is also possible to report that general trust also has a major role in the relationship of the franchisee and franchisor in the franchising business format.

3.8.3 Local Market Competition in Franchising

The market power of firms depends on their economic situations and the performance of franchisees in the original franchise systems. A franchisee represents the franchisor in the local market and tries to create a standardization of the service and goods in the same system; consequently, the success of the franchisee depends on its product and service quality, which are produced in the host markets (OECD, 1994).

In addition, the franchising system provides many advantages which are already mentioned in previous parts of this thesis, to the franchisor and franchisee. For instance, the franchisor can increase its competitive market power by using the knowhow and experiences of the franchisee; on the other hand, franchisees benefit from the support, expertise and well-known brand of the franchisor in the market against their competitors. (IFA, 2010). Additionally all units of the system decrease the costs by creating economies of scale and increasing productivity, which also gives another important privilege to the firms in comparison to other competitors in the business areas (Shane, 1996).

3.8.3.1 Potential to increase Market Competition

The franchising system has a potential to increase market competition for franchising companies as well as other business formats. The competitors could be from other business forms or it is also possible to have the type of competitors, who could be other alternatives for the customers in the same franchising system, such as distributors, suppliers, retail outlets etc. Consequently these internal competitor units can increase the whole potential market competition and create an extra internal competition threat for franchising own systems by using, selling and benefiting from the same franchise brand, products and services. Additionally there could also be other competitors from other franchising systems or other business formats in the same market, such as other distributors, suppliers, outlets, etc with the similar products and service categories in the same business markets. (OECD, 1994). Therefore, we can say that the internal and external competitors of the franchising systems can increase the market competition.

3.8.3.2 Potential to decrease Market Competition

Franchising systems also have a potential to decrease market competition in their own system by using a resale price strategy in the market, because this strategy avoids high price settings, by controlling and reducing the risk of cheating in the system. Resale pricing strategy does not allow the franchisors to use secret price settings. Namely wholesale prices cannot be decreased without, decreasing controlled and detected retail prices. Thereby franchisors cannot profit by cutting wholesale prices secretly. Another important issue regarding the pricing system is that the resale prices reduce the uncertainty of change in retail prices (OECD, 1994). In this system all price definitions are related to each other, for example if the franchisor decreases the wholesale price, then the franchisee can also decrease the retail prices, which also reduces the profit of the franchisor (Telser, 1960).

Moreover market barriers, which are created by the Franchisor, can also decrease the competition in the market. In the long term the franchisor can protect itself from the other strong competitor franchisors by creating long term agreements with his franchisees. Another barrier is that the high market share of the Franchisor benefitting from of economies of scale can decrease the competitive power of other companies in the market. On the other hand, if there is an insufficient or limited supply problem for the franchisor in the market, then the franchisor can decrease market competition by deciding to only work with some franchisees in the long term (OECD, 1994).

4 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

4.1 Theoretical Framework

This thesis first tests Carroll`s Pyramid of CSR Model, then the relationships between three CSR determinants and CSR.

Accordingly four main and four sub hypotheses were examined in this report. The first hypothesis includes the positive relation of CSR with the four different responsibility types of the companies, which are defined in the Carroll`s Pyramid of CSR Model (Carroll, 1991). The second hypothesis researches the positive relationship between Brand Name Value and CSR, the third hypothesis includes the positive relationship between General trust and CSR, the last hypothesis questions the positive relationship between Competition and CSR.

As seen in the following, the first model of the thesis includes and presents; the relationship between main CSR part and the responsibilities of Carroll`s Pyramid of CSR Model, namely Economic Success, Legal Compliance, Ethical Business and Philanthropy. Please see figure 22.

The Second model consists of the Corporate Social Responsibility (dependent variable), Brand Name Value, General Trust, Competition (independent variables); along with Industry Type and COO (control variables). Please see figure 23.



Figure 22: Theoretical Framework- Model 1



Figure 23: Theoretical Framework- Model 2

4.2 Hypotheses

The research questions as well as four main and four sub-hypotheses of the thesis are shown below;

The Research questions;

"Does Carroll`s Pyramid of CSR Model have any relationship with CSR activities of Franchising Firms in Austria?"

"Do Brand Name Value, General Trust and Competition have positive influence on CSR Activities of Franchising Companies in Austria?"

The Four Main Hypotheses;

H1: *The responsibility types of Carroll`s Pyramid model have a positive relationship between CSR activities for Franchising Firms in Austria.*

H1a: *Economic Success has a positive relationship with CSR.*
H1b: *Legal Compliance has a positive relationship with CSR.*
H1c: *Ethical Business has a positive relationship with CSR.*
H1d: *Philanthropy has a positive relationship with CSR.*

H2: *Brand name value has a positive effect on the CSR activities for Franchising Firms in Austria.*

H3: *General trust has a positive influence on the CSR activities for Franchising Firms in Austria.*

H4: *Competition has a positive effect on the CSR activities for Franchising Companies in Austria.*

METHODOLOGY

- Research Design
- Measurements
- Results

5 Methodology

In this part of the thesis, first research design, which consists of the questionnaire, sample size, data collection and response rate, will be discussed. Afterwards, the measurements will be defined and lastly the results of the research will be presented in regards to the analysis of the relationships between CSR and all determinants.

5.1 Research Design

This part first includes the preperation of the questionnaire created by Prof. Windsperger and Dr. Christina Keinert Kisin. Following the initial preparation of the questionnaire a modified pre-test version was created after which the quantitative research was begun. Later on, the questionnaire was presented on the Sosci Online Survey platform, which was available for respondents on the internet address;

https://www.soscisurvey.de.

Upon completing this step, the list of franchising companies in Austria was received from the Austria Franchising Association. The final versions of the questionnaires were sent with three types of reseach methods, which will be discussed in the following sections.

5.1.1 Questionnaire

The questionnaire has six parts, which consist of open answer and closed questions with Seven Likert Scales under the topics; Franchising, Corporate Social Responsibility, Decision Making, Performance, Regulations, Company Information and their following sub topics. For the six different parts of questionnaire, please see figure 24.



Figure 24: The Six Parts of the Questionnaire

The first part of Franchising consists of brand name, general & knowledge based trust, behavioral & environmental uncertainty and intensity of the competition for the Franchising Companies in the Austria market.

The second part of the questionnaire, the CSR part, includes five ambition levels of corporate sustainability items, generated by Marcel van Marrewijk (Marrewijk, 2003).

The third section of the survey provides the items regarding the centralized or decentralized decision making process of the franchising systems in Austria.

The fourth part has questions related to the perceived performance of the franchising companies.

The fifth part includes the sub-topics of contract rules, regulations about franchising agreements and the last part involves questions to reach the necessary general information from companies about their industry type, company size, company age, franchising fee, outlet numbers and training times. Please see appendix 1 for the questionnaire.

5.1.2 Sample Size and Data Collection

This thesis conducts a quantitative research, which can be defined as the data collection from a large number sample size with numerical calculation results (Parasuraman, et al., 2004, p. 195). Thus, a survey was used to gather the primary information from 311 respondents in franchising companies in Austria. The data collection process consists of three research methods; which are mail, online and e-mail surveys (Blankenship & Breen, 1993). After receiving the list of franchising companies from the Austria Franchising Association and making the online questionnaire ready for respondents to answer on the Sosci web page, the link for the online survey was sent dispatched to the 311 e-mail adresses of the respondents from franchising companies in Austria. In addition we also provided an additional download option of the questionnaire for the respondents, on the University of Vienna`s international management department`s web page. Moreover, besides the link of the online questionnaire, the questionnaires were sent and resent via e-mail as an online document to several Franchising systems in Austria.

The data collection of the research was mainly split into four stages. In the first phase the link of the questionnaire was sent to 311 respondents. In the second phase, three weeks later, the questionnaires were sent to companies once again as a reminder via e-mail. In the third phase, after another three weeks the questionnaires were printed and the printouts were sent to the 311 franchising companies by post as well and one week later, in the last step of the research, the phone numbers of the all companies were gathered and contact attempts were made by calling the key persons in the 311 companies.

5.1.2.1 After the Data Colection

After the data collection we realized that 31 franchising companies do not have a franchising system anymore, therefore number of respondents decreased from 311 to 280. At the end of the data collection process 50 responses could be gathered and the whole process of data collection took place from the 14th February until the 17th June 2014. Please see the methodogical design of the research in figure 25.



Figure 25: Methodical Design of the Research

5.1.3 Response Rate

Only 50 responses from 280 corresponding franchising companies in Austria were evaluated in our research which is neither too small, nor too high a response rate (Field, 2013). The distribution of these 50 responses, which are gathered from the mail survey (12) online survey (35), and e-mail survey (3), is shown in the following graphic. Please see figure 26.



Figure 26: Response rate from three different survey types

According to Hollensen online and e-mail surveys are much faster concerning data collection than mail surveys (Hollensen, 2011, p. 186). As seen in figure 24, we reached similar results regarding the number, costs and other characteristic of the answers from the survey types.

In other words we received speedy answers with lower costs from online surveys in comparison to other email and mail survey types as Hollensen reported (Hollensen, 2011, p. 186).

5.2 Measurements

5.2.1 CSR

To measure the main part of CSR, 27 variables, created using a 7 point likert scale, were employed. The range of the scale starts with strongly disagree, 1 point and ends with strongly agree, 7 points. For the variables and detail information, please see the questionnaire in appendix 1.

5.2.2 Carroll`s Model

To measure the four responsibility types of the Carroll`s Pyramid Model, the percentiles were divided for each responsibility type.

5.2.3 Independent variables

Brand Name Value with 4 variables, General Trust with 3 variables and Competition with 2 variables, was submitted as independent variables. Each category's variables were created with use of a 7 point likert scale which starts with 1 strongly disagree and ends with 7 strongly agree answer options.

5.2.4 Control Variables

Industry Type

According to Ehemann and Meiseberg CSR activities are more extensive in franchising companies than in other business sectors. The authors also report that the CSR activities of franchising firms are related to the industry in which they operate (Ehrmann & Meiseberg, 2011). Consequently we used the industry type of the franchising companies as a control variable by measuring with a close question, which includes 4 answer options; Production, Retail, Service and Social Franchising.

COO

According to Strike et al there is a relation between the Country of origin and CSR in franchising firms. The authors claim that the CSR activities of corporations can help the global companies to develop their local knowledge (Strike, et al., 2006) as well as the competition power of franchising companies in the market (Welter, et al., 2012, p. 114). Due to the relationship between COO and CSR in franchising companies, COO was used with an open answer question in the questionnaire and as a control predictor in the research analysis. Additionally according to the answers of our respondents, after the data entry process, the COO was divided into four different countries, which are; Austria, Germany, USA and other countries.

5.3 Research Results

5.3.1 Test of the Hypothesis 1

"The responsibility types of Carroll`s Pyramid model have a positive relationship between CSR activities for Franchising Firms in Austria."

H1a: *Economic Success has a positive relationship with CSR.*

H1b: *Legal Compliance has a positive relationship with CSR.*

H1c: *Ethical Business has a positive relationship with CSR.*

H1d: *Philanthropy has a positive relationship with CSR.*

5.3.1.1. Descriptive Statistics of Carroll`s CSR of Pyramid Model

The importance level of the responsibility types, which Carroll defines in his Carroll`s Pyramid of CSR Model (Carroll, 1991), are illustrated below. Here you see the results of our research regarding the priorities of the four responsibility types for the 50 franchising companies in Austria.

Figure 27: Research Results and Carroll`s Pyramid of CSR Model

Field defines the mean value as an average score and a central tendency of the variables (Field, 2013, p. 23). In our research the mean values for the importance levels of responsibility types were measured in SPSS to find the average percentage of each category for all respondents. The frequency analysis was used to see the distribution of the scores (Field, 2013, p. 19). The output of the Frequency table is available in table 1. Figure 27 provides similar results with Carroll`s Pyramid of CSR Model (Carroll, 1991) regarding the importance level of the responsibility types from the bottom to the top of the Pyramid and, as seen, the results show that the most important category was the economical, followed by other three legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibility types determined for the 50 Franchising Companies in Austria.

As already mentioned the mean values in the frequency table (Table 1) show the average scores of the answers and the other measurement; the median explains the middle value between the above and below value of the observations. Another measurement for central tendency, mode, defines the value, which occurs most frequently in the data set (Dillon, et al., 1994, p. 400).

In addition, the Standard deviation investigates the distance of the values from the mean value for each category. For instance Economic Success has the largest distance between minimum and maximum values from its mean value in our data set, thus, the value of the standard deviation increases automatically. According to Field, the small standard deviations show that the respondents are similar and the data point is close to the mean value, on the other hand, large standard deviations indicate that the respondents are not giving similar answers and the point of data is not close to the mean (Field, 2013, p. 27).

Statistics

		Economic Success	Legal Compliance	Ethical Business	Philanthropy
N	Valid	50	50	50	50
	Missing	0	0	0	0
Mean		51.86	22.20	17.22	8.82
Median		50.00	20.00	15.00	10.00
Mode		30	20[a]	10	10
Std. Deviation		17.247	9.996	8.641	5.677
Minimum		25	5	1	1
Maximum		87	50	35	25

a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

Table 1: Frequencies for the Responsibility types of Carroll`s Pyramid Model

5.3.1.2 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables

Before running a multiple regression analysis, we checked the frequency statistics of the control variables; Industry type and COO to count how many times the sub categories of these variables appear in the data set (Burns & Bush, 2005, p. 444).

<u>Industry Type</u>

In our research we see that our 26 respondents are from the service industry, 20 respondents from the retail industry and the last 2 respondents from the production and social franchising sectors (Burns & Bush, 2005).

The frequency output of the industry type is below;

Industry Type

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Production	2	4.0	4.0	4.0
	Retail	20	40.0	40.0	44.0
	Service	26	52.0	52.0	96.0
	Social Franchising	2	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	50	100.0	100.0	

Table 2: Frequency of Industry Type

COO

As seen in the Country of origin table 3, Austria has the highest frequencies with 36, Germany is second with 9, USA is third with 3 and finally other countries have 2 respondents with a different country of origins (Burns & Bush, 2005).

Please see the following frequency table of COO below,

COO

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Austria	36	72.0	72.0	72.0
	Germany	9	18.0	18.0	90.0
	USA	3	6.0	6.0	96.0
	Others	2	4.0	4.0	100.0
	Total	50	100.0	100.0	

Table 3: Frequency Table of COO

5.3.1.3 Bivariate Correlation

Second of all, a bivariate correlation analysis was used for the first hypothesis to test the relationship between variables with two metric data types. But before the Pearson correlation, the assumptions of the bivariate correlation analysis, normality and linearity, were checked first (Field, 2013, p. 271).

To test the normal distribution of the data, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used (Field, 2005, p. 94) and the results show that the CSR variables have non-significant results, which means that the data has a normal distribution. On the other hand, the variables; Business Success, Legal Compliance, Ethical Business und Philanthropy had significant results, which shows that data is not normally distributed. In addition, we created scatter plots to see the linearity between variables (Field, 2005).

Finally the results of the assumptions show that all variables are not normally distributed and assumptions are not met. For the results of normal distribution and linearity please see appendix 2.

According to Bühl and Zöfel if there is a problem with normality of the data (Bühl & Zöfel, 2005, p. 324) and Field adds if the sample size is also small, then Spearman`s Rho test should be used to measure bivariate correlations between variables, instead of Pearson Correlations (Field, 2013, p. 271). However we also checked the Pearson correlations between variables and saw that there are no big changes between results. The Pearson correlations are available in appendix 2. Spearman`s Rho tests are illustrated for each Category of responsibility type below;

Correlation between Economic Success and CSR

*"**H1a:** Economic Success has a positive relationship with CSR."*

Correlations

			CSR_Mean	Economic Success
Spearman's rho	CSR_Mean	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.421**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.002
		N	50	50
	Economic Success	Correlation Coefficient	-.421**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.
		N	50	50

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4: Bivariate Correlation between Economic Success and CSR

The results, shown in table 4, present the correlation between Economic success and the CSR relationship. According to the bivariate correlation test the relationship between these two items are negatively related (r= -0.421), which means the variables; Economic success and CSR are moving in opposite directions (Field, 2013, p. 270). According to the significant results (p= 0.002<0.05) (Parasuraman, et al., 2004, p. 429) we can report that, on the one hand the Franchising Companies in Austria give the most importance to the "Economic Success" (See figure 26), but on the contrary the firms are not conducting their CSR activities for their economic success. In other words, we can say that the hypothesis 1a is not supported, because the results show that CSR and Economic Success are not moving in the same direction (Field, 2013).

Correlation between Legal Compliance and CSR

*"**H1b:** Legal Compliance has a positive relationship with CSR."*

Correlations

			CSR_Mean	Legal Compliance
Spearman's rho	CSR_Mean	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.341*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.015
		N	50	50
	Legal Compliance	Correlation Coefficient	.341*	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.015	.
		N	50	50

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 5: Correlation between Legal Compliance and CSR

The significant results, (p= 0.015<0.05) in table 5 show that the relationship between Legal Compliance and CSR is positively correlated (r= +0.341) (Field, 2013, p. 270). In other words, the variables are moving in the same direction. According to these results, it can be reported that the 50 Franchising Companies in Austria apply and develop their CSR activities by caring about Legal compliance and the hypothesis 1b is supported by results.

Correlation between Ethical Business and CSR

*"**H1c:** Ethical Business has a positive relationship with CSR."*

Correlations

			CSR_Mean	Ethical Business
Spearman's rho	CSR_Mean	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.258
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.070
		N	50	50
	Ethical Business	Correlation Coefficient	.258	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.070	.
		N	50	50

Table 6: Correlation between Ethical Business and CSR

The output of the correlation test, which is used to see the relation between Ethical Business and CSR, shows that there is a positive correlation (r= +0.258), but weak significant relationship (p=0.07>0.05) between the Ethical aspects of Business and CSR. Therefore, it is seen that hypothesis 1c is weakly supported by the results (Field, 2013).

Correlation between Philanthropy and CSR

*"**H1d:** Philanthropy has a positive relationship with CSR."*

Correlations

			CSR_Mean	Philanthropy
Spearman's rho	CSR_Mean	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.395**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.005
		N	50	50
	Philanthropy	Correlation Coefficient	.395**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.005	.
		N	50	50

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 7: Correlation between Philanthropy and CSR

The output of Spearman`s Rho test, which is provided in table 7, shows that Philanthropy and CSR have a significant positive relationship, because of the r value (r= +0.395), which is higher than 0 (Field, 2013, p. 270) and the p value 0.005 is lower than 0.05 (Aaker, et al., 1998, p. 467). Therefore according to the outcome, it is possible to report that Philanthropy and CSR are moving in the same direction and the 50 Franchising companies in Austria decide their CSR activities by also caring about Philanthropy. Hence hypothesis 1d is supported by the results of the analysis.

5.3.1.4 Multiple Regression

In this section of the thesis the results of a multiple regression analysis are presented. For each regression analysis an equation was created, consisting of a criterion (Economic success), predictor (CSR, Dummy Industry and Dummy COO) and dummy variables (Green & Salkind, 2004).

Economic Business

Economic Business = βo + β1* CSR + β2 Industry_dummy + β3 COO _dummy

Before reporting the results of the model, the assumptions of multi regression analysis were checked. According to the outputs the value for autocorrelation, is 1. 501. This figure allows us to report that there is no problem with autocorrelation, since the result of the Durbin Watson test is between 0 and 4. Second when we look at the ANOVA table, there is a significant p value ($F_{(3,46)} = 4.408$; $p = 0.008 < 0.05$), therefore it is possible to interpret the R square, in other words the outputs of the regression equation. Finally to test the multicolliniarity the VIF values were checked and all values are smaller than 10, which is good, because they should not be higher than 10. According to the results, it is possible to report that our assumptions are met; therefore, we can continue to interpret the main results. (Field, 2013).

As seen in the model summary, our model can explain the effect of our independent CSR variable with Industry and COO control variables on Economic Success for only 22.3 % of the variance ($R^2 = 0.223$). Furthermore, as it is presented in the coefficient table, there is only a significant and negative relation between Economic success and CSR ($p=0.001<0.05$). The other control dummy variables, Industry ($p=0.671>0.05$) and COO ($p=0.862>0.05$) have non-significant results and no influence on Economic success. Hence it is possible to report that according also to the outputs of regression model the CSR and Economic success are negatively related (Field, 2005). Please see the tables 8 and 9.

The model with the results of regression analysis is presented below;

Economic Business = 99.762+ (-9.231 CSR) + (-1.959Industry_dummy) +(-0.924 COO _dummy)

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.473[a]	.223	.173	15.688	1.501

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

b. Dependent Variable: Economic Success

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	3254.567	3	1084.856	4.408	.008[b]
	Residual	11321.453	46	246.119		
	Total	14576.020	49			

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Success

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

Table 8: Multiple Regression- Economic Success 1

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	99.762	15.282		6.528	.000		
	CSR_Mean	-9.231	2.620	-.476	-3.523	.001	.926	1.080
	Industry_dummy	-1.959	4.589	-.057	-.427	.671	.936	1.068
	COO_dummy	-.924	5.293	-.024	-.175	.862	.871	1.148

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Success

Table 9: Multiple Regression- Economic Success 2

Legal Compliance

Legal Compliance= βo + β1* CSR + β2 Industry_dummy + β3 COO _dummy

According to the assumptions, there is no problem with auto correlation (Durbin Watson = 1.926) and with multicolliniarity (VIF values are < 10). Moreover when we look at the ANOVA table, there is also significant result to interpret R square. (F (3,46)= 2.956; p= 0.042<0.05). Therefore it is possible to say that the Legal Compliance dependent variable is explained by our model only in 16.2 % of the variation ($R^2 = 0.162$). According to the outputs it is possible to say that only legal compliance has a significant positive relation with CSR (p=0.018<0.05). Other control variables have no relation and no impact on Legal compliance (Field, 2005). Please see the following tables 10 and 11.

The model with the values from the regression analysis is presented below;

Legal Compliance = 2.551+ (3.884 CSR) + (2.687Industry_dummy) + (-1.655COO _dummy)

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.402[a]	.162	.107	9.446	1.926

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

b. Dependent Variable: Legal Compliance

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	791.391	3	263.797	2.956	.042[b]
	Residual	4104.609	46	89.231		
	Total	4896.000	49			

a. Dependent Variable: Legal Compliance

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

Table 10: Multiple Regression-Legal Compliance 1

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	2.551	9.201		.277	.783		
	CSR_Mean	3.884	1.578	.345	2.461	.018	.926	1.080
	Industry_dummy	2.687	2.763	.136	.973	.336	.936	1.068
	COO_dummy	-1.655	3.187	-.075	-.519	.606	.871	1.148

a. Dependent Variable: Legal Compliance

Table 11: Multiple Regression-Legal Compliance 2

Ethical Business

Ethical Business = βo + β1* CSR + β2 Industry_dummy + β3 COO _dummy

The outputs of assumptions point out that there is no problem with auto correlation (Durbin Watson = 1.722) and with multicolliniarity (VIF values are < 10). However, when we look at the ANOVA table, there is a non-significant p value to comment on R square. (F (3,46)= 1.872; p= 0.148>0.05). Therefore it is not possible to report the results regarding the relations of Ethical Business between CSR and control variables (Field, 2005). Please see the tables 12 and 13.

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.330[a]	.109	.051	8.419	1.722

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

b. Dependent Variable: Ethical Business

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	398.058	3	132.686	1.872	.148[b]
	Residual	3260.522	46	70.881		
	Total	3658.580	49			

a. Dependent Variable: Ethical Business

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

Table 12: Multiple Regression-Ethical Business 1

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients B	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-.922	8.201		-.112	.911		
	CSR_Mean	3.259	1.406	.335	2.318	.025	.926	1.080
	Industry_dummy	-.251	2.463	-.015	-.102	.919	.936	1.068
	COO_dummy	2.714	2.841	.142	.955	.344	.871	1.148

a. Dependent Variable: Ethical Business

Table 13: Multiple Regression-Ethical Business 2

Philanthropy

Philanthropy= βo + β1* CSR + β2 Industry_dummy + β3 COO _dummy

The assumptions of the analysis show that there is no problem with multicolliniarity (VIF values are < 10) and auto correlation (Durbin Watson = 2.551). However as it is shown in the ANOVA table, there is also non-significant p value to interpret the model of Philanthropy (F (3,46)=1.821; p=0.157>0.05). Consequently, we cannot comment on the relations between variables (Field, 2005). Please see the tables 14 and 15.

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.326[a]	.106	.048	5.540	2.551

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

b. Dependent Variable: Philanthropy

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	167.668	3	55.889	1.821	.157[b]
	Residual	1411.712	46	30.689		
	Total	1579.380	49			

a. Dependent Variable: Philanthropy

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

Table 14: Multiple Regression-Philanthropy 1

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients B	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-1.155	5.396		-.214	.831		
	CSR_Mean	2.053	.925	.321	2.218	.032	.926	1.080
	Industry_dummy	-.438	1.621	-.039	-.271	.788	.936	1.068
	COO_dummy	-.102	1.869	-.008	-.055	.957	.871	1.148

a. Dependent Variable: Philanthropy

Table 15: Multiple Regression-Philanthropy 2

5.3.2 Test of other Three Hypotheses

Brand name value

General trust *has a positive influence on the CSR activities for Franchising Firms in Austria.*

Competition

5.3.2.1 Reliability Check

Before testing the relationship between CSR and other determinants, we tried to be sure about the reliability of the measurement, thus, the 7 point Likert scale in the questionnaire. Field reports that a measurement should reflect an equal meaning for each respondent as clearly as possible, therefore we tested the reliability of our scale with one of the measurements of the Reliability analysis, Cronbach`s alpha (Field, 2005, p. 667). Please see the reliability check with the results for Cronbach Alpha in table 16.

	Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
CSR	.914	27
Brand name Value	.776	4
General Trust	.823	3
Competiton	.814	2

Table 16: Reliability Statistics of CSR and Determinants

Field reports that an acceptable value for Cronbach`s alpha needs to be greater than 0.7 or 0.8 to be determined as reliable. As seen in table 6, the values for Cronbach`s alpha in each category is higher than 0.7, hence we can claim that CSR, Brand Name Value, General Trust and Competition are reliable, in other words, the 7 point Likert scale presents a clear meaning to our respondents in each category and that makes it possible for us to measure, exactly what we wanted to measure with our variables (Field, 2005, p. 668).

5.3.2.2 Factor Analysis

After the reliability check, we ran the Factor analysis to test the three categories of the franchising part in the questionnaire with the composite measures of Brand name Value with 4 variables, General Trust with 3 Variables and Competition with 2 Variables. Thus the variable categories were created by generating composite measures of variable groups. Because these groups of variables are not categorized in the questionnaire clearly, it is necessary to know the measurability of the variables to examine each hypothesis (Field, 2005).

Before reporting the outputs for the factor analysis, we first checked the assumptions of factor analysis; sampling adequacy, sphericity and multicolliniarity. The KMO is used to examine the sampling adequacy of variables and it is acceptable, when the value is as close to 1 as possible (Field, 2005, p. 640). Second, a Sphericity test is applied to see the correlation between variables, which are under the same construct, according to the significant ($p<0.05$) result of Barlett`s test. If the result is significant, then it is possible to report that the variables are correlated to each other and the factor analysis makes sense. Finally we checked the multicolliniarity problem between the variables of each category, because according to Field, there should not be perfect linear relationships between variables. In other words, the variables under each concept should be correlated, but not too highly, otherwise highly correlated variables can cause multicolliniarity problems. Hence, for the low risk of high correlation between variables, the R matrix should be higher than 0.00001 for each group of variables (Field, 2013).

Brand name Value

According to the results of assumptions, the value for the KMO test is 0.678, which is good when it is above 0.5 and the results of Barlett`s test is significant ($p<0.05$). Moreover for this data, the correlation matrix`s determinant is 0.254, which is higher than 0.00001. Thus, we can report that there is no problem with adequacy, correlation and multicolliniarity between variables under the Brand name value category. Additionally, as seen in the total Variance table below illustrated, only one factor`s eigenvalue greater than 1 (2.442) and moreover this factor explains Brand name value 61% of variance (Field, 2013). Please see tables 17 and 18.

Correlation Matrix[a]

a. Determinant = .254

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.678
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	64.196
	df	6
	Sig.	.000

Table 17: Factor Analysis, Brand Name Value 1

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.442	61.044	61.044	2.442	61.044	61.044
2	.858	21.458	82.503			
3	.386	9.653	92.156			
4	.314	7.844	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 18: Factor Analysis, Brand Name Value 2

General Trust

The assumptions of General Trust show that the result of the KMO is 0.696>0.5, second Barlett`s test shows significant ($p<0.05$) result and third the determinant for the Correlation Matrix is 0.300, which is higher than 0.00001. Thus, we can report that the variables under the General trust category have no problems with adequacy, correlation and multicolliniarity between variables. The following total Variance table shows that there is just one factor`s eigenvalue is greater than 1, (2.237) and this factor explains the General trust 74.5 % of the variance (Field, 2013). Please see the table 19 and 20.

Correlation Matrix[a]

a. Determinant = .300

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.696
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	56.840
	df	3
	Sig.	.000

Table 19: Factor Analysis, General Trust 1

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.237	74.554	74.554	2.237	74.554	74.554
2	.490	16.330	90.884			
3	.273	9.116	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 20: Factor Analysis, General Trust 2

Competition

The results of Competition show that the KMO is equal to 0.5, which is not bad, because the value is not under 0.5. Second, Bartlett`s test gives significant results ($p<0.05$) and last the value for the R matrix is 0.511 (> 0.00001). Therefore, we report that the variables under the Competition category also have no problem with adequacy, correlation and multicolliniarity. In the table 22 you can see that there is just one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (1.700) and it explains the competition 84.9 % of the variance (Field, 2013). Please see table 21 and 22.

Correlation Matrix[a]

a. Determinant = .511

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.500
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	31.933
	df	1
	Sig.	.000

Table 21: Factor Analysis, Competition 1

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.700	84.981	84.981	1.700	84.981	84.981
2	.300	15.019	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 22: Factor Analysis, Competition 2

5.3.2.3 Bivariate Correlations

In previous parts we used the same test to see the correlations of the variables in order to test the first hypothesis. We ran the same bivariate correlation analysis for the other three hypotheses too, by starting to check the normality and linearity assumptions (Field, 2005, p. 129). The results show that except for CSR, the other three determinants; Brand name value, General Trust and Competition do not have a normal distribution. Therefore, we again used the Spearman`s Rho instead of the Pearson correlation for the two metric data types, first because of the small sample size (Field, 2013), second due to the not normally distributed data (Bühl & Zöfel, 2005, p. 324). The results of the assumptions are available in appendix 2.

Brand name Value and CSR

Correlations

			CSR_Mean	Brandnamevalue_Mean
Spearman's rho	CSR_Mean	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.424**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.002
		N	50	50
	Brandnamevalue_Mean	Correlation Coefficient	.424**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.
		N	50	50

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 23: Correlations between Brand name Value and CSR

According to the results we can assume that Brand Name Value and CSR are significantly and positively correlated. In other words the companies, who care about brand name value, also care about CSR activities. Positive (r= +424) and significant (p= 0.002<0.05) correlations show that these two variables are moving in the same directions (Field, 2005, p. 112) and the hypothesis 2 is supported by the result of the analysis.

General Trust and CSR

Correlations

			CSR_Mean	Generaltrust_Mean
Spearman's rho	CSR_Mean	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.200
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.164
		N	50	50
	Generaltrust_Mean	Correlation Coefficient	.200	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.164	.
		N	50	50

Table 24: Correlation between General Trust and CSR

Although the correlation coefficient of r is positive and higher than 0 (r=+ 0.200) (Field, 2013, p. 270), the results for the correlation between General Trust and CSR cannot be commented on. Because there is no significant results for the correlation between both variables, in other words the p value (0.164) is neither smaller than 0.05 (Aaker, et al., 1998, p. 467) nor close to 0.05. Hence we can say that our results cannot support hypothesis 3, namely the positive relationship between CSR and General trust.

Competition and CSR

Correlations

			CSR_Mean	Competition_Mean
Spearman's rho	CSR_Mean	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.003
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.986
		N	50	50
	Competition_Mean	Correlation Coefficient	-.003	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.986	.
		N	50	50

Table 25: Correlation between Competition and CSR

The Correlation between Competition and CSR is also uninterpretable, due to the non-significant result for p value ($p = 0.986 > 0.05$), which is quite higher than 0.05 (Aaker, et al., 1998, p. 467). Therefore hypothesis 4 cannot be supported by the result of our analysis.

5.3.2.4 Multiple Regression

In the fifth part of the analysis, we used the multiple regression analysis to measure the relations and the causalities between our one dependent (CSR) variable and the other independent variables by creating a conceptual model. In other words, we tried to predict the dependent variable CSR by using different independent variables (Burns & Bush, 2005, p. 554). Furthermore, for the regression analysis we also created dummy variables from our nominal variables to see the impact of independent predictors on the dependent CSR variable with Industry type and COO as dummy control variables in different models (Field, 2005, p. 157).

Brand Name Value

The model for the second hypothesis, in other words the relations between CSR (dependent) and Brand name value (independent) with two dummy control variables; Industry and COO as below;

$$\textbf{CSR} = \beta o + \beta 1^* \text{ Brand Name Value} + \beta 2 \text{ Industry\_dummy} + \beta 3 \text{ COO \_dummy}$$

Before interpreting the main results, we checked the assumptions of the multiregression analysis. First we started with the Durbin Watson test, which shows the autocorrelation between variables. The value of the test should be between 0-4 and it is even better if it is close to 2. When we looked at our results the value of Durbin Watson is 1.973, which is close to 2 and good for autocorrelation. Second, we checked the p value in the ANOVA table, which is significant ($F(3,46)=5.086$; $p=0.004<0.05$), thus, we continued to interpret the results for the R square in the model summary table and finally the VIF values were controlled to check the multicolliniarity, which should not be higher than 10. According to these results, we can report that our assumptions are met; hence, we can continue to interpret the main results of the analysis (Field, 2013).

In the model summary, R square, which has a value of 0.249, shows that our model can explain the effect of our independent variable with control variables on CSR for only 24.9 % of the variance ($R^2 = 0.249$). Moreover, in the coefficient table we see that only Brand Name Value has a significant positive relationship with CSR ($p=0.002<0.05$). The other control dummy variables, Industry ($p=0.492>0.05$) and COO ($p=0.378>0.05$) have no significant effect on CSR. So, we can report that, when we checked the relationship between Brand Name Value and CSR with control variables, we saw that Industry and COO have no effect on CSR and on the relation of CSR with Brand Name Value in our model. However the result of the analysis supports Hypothesis 2 (Field, 2013).

In addition, after multiple regression analysis our specific model with values is seen as follows;

CSR= 2.802+(0.394 Brand Name Value)+(0.173 Industry_dummy)+(-0.244 COO_dummy)

The outputs of the SPSS analysis is shown in table 26 and 27.

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.499[a]	.249	.200	.79495	1.973

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, Brandnamevalue_Mean

b. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	9.643	3	3.214	5.086	.004[b]
	Residual	29.069	46	.632		
	Total	38.712	49			

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, Brandnamevalue_Mean

Table 26: Multiple Regression, Brand Name Value 1

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	2.802	.857		3.269	.002		
	Brandnamevalue_Mean	.394	.120	.464	3.274	.002	.814	1.229
	Industry_dummy	.173	.249	.098	.693	.492	.816	1.225
	COO_dummy	-.244	.274	-.125	-.890	.378	.832	1.201

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Table 27: Multiple Regression, Brand Name Value 2

General Trust

The model for the third hypothesis;

CSR = βo + β1* General Trust + β2 Industry_dummy + β3 COO _dummy

According to the assumptions, there is no problem with multicolliniarity (VIF values are < 10) and auto correlation (Durbin Watson = 1.701). However there is no significant result in the ANOVA Table (F (3,46)= 1984; p= 0.129>0.05). Therefore, it is not possible to interpret R square and the results of model concerning the positive relations between CSR (dependent) and General Trust (independent) with control variables; Industry and COO (Field, 2013). So, we can say that the outputs of the regression model do not support and confirm hypothesis 3.

Please find the outputs of SPSS in table 28 and 29 below.

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.339[a]	.115	.057	.86322	1.701

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Generaltrust_Mean, Industry_dummy

b. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	4.436	3	1.479	1.984	.129[b]
	Residual	34.277	46	.745		
	Total	38.712	49			

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Generaltrust_Mean, Industry_dummy

Table 28: Multiple Regression, General Trust 1

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	4.753	.573		8.298	.000		
	Generaltrust_Mean	.163	.112	.205	1.450	.154	.966	1.035
	Industry_dummy	-.064	.255	-.036	-.251	.803	.916	1.092
	COO_dummy	-.499	.282	-.255	-1.767	.084	.927	1.079

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Table 29: Multiple Regression, General Trust 2

Competition

The model for the fourth hypothesis;

CSR = βo + β1* Competition + β2 Industry_dummy + β3 COO _dummy

The assumptions of the analysis show that there is no problem with multicolliniarity (VIF values are < 10) and auto correlation (Durbin Watson = 1.857). However as presented in the ANOVA table, there is also a non-significant result (F (3,46)=1.228; p=0.310>0.05) in interpreting the R square. Consequently, we cannot comment on this model and the relationships between dependent and independent predictors (Field, 2013). Accordingly we can report that the outputs do not confirm the positive relation of CRS with Competition, namely Hypothesis 4. Please see the following results for the regression analysis in table 30 and 31.

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.272[a]	.074	.014	.88271	1.857

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Competition_Mean, Industry_dummy

b. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2.870	3	.957	1.228	.310[b]
	Residual	35.842	46	.779		
	Total	38.712	49			

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Competition_Mean, Industry_dummy

Table 30: Multiple Regression, Competition 1

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	5.489	.576		9.535	.000		
	Competition_Mean	-.004	.090	-.006	-.044	.965	.953	1.050
	Industry_dummy	-.127	.263	-.072	-.484	.631	.904	1.107
	COO_dummy	-.552	.289	-.281	-1.907	.063	.924	1.082

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Table 31: Multiple Regression, Competition 2

Analysis of all variables

The model for the relationship of the dependent and all independent variables with two control dummies is shown below;

CSR = βo + β1* Brand Name Value + β2* General Trust + β3 *Competition +β4 Industry _dummy+ β5 COO _dummy

The assumptions show that there is no problem with multicolliniarity (VIF values are < 10) and auto correlation (Durbin Watson = 1.758). Furthermore there are also significant results (F (5, 44)=3.594; p= 0.008<0.05) in the Anova table, thus we can interpret the R square, in other words the impacts of the Brand name value, General trust and Competition (independent) with control variables on CSR (dependent) (Field, 2005). According to the results, the model explains the influence of independent variables with control dummies on CSR for only 29 % of the variance (R^2= 0.290). In addition, the coefficient table shows us that only Brand Name Value has a significant positive effect on CSR (p=0.002<0.05), because the other independent (General Trust, Competition) and control variables (Industry, COO) have no significant effect on CSR (p> 0.05). Additionally they also have no significant positive relationship with CSR (Field, 2013).

The model with results is shown as following;

CSR =1.893 + (0.399 Brand Name Value) + (0.157 General Trust) + (0.034 Competition) +(0.255 Industry _Dummy) + (-0.176 COO _Dummy)

Please find the outputs of the analysis in table 32 and 33.

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.538[a]	.290	.209	.79038	1.758

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Generaltrust_Mean, Competition_Mean, Brandnamevalue_Mean, Industry_dummy

b. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	11.226	5	2.245	3.594	.008[b]
	Residual	27.487	44	.625		
	Total	38.712	49			

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Generaltrust_Mean, Competition_Mean, Brandnamevalue_Mean, Industry_dummy

Table 32: Multiple Regression-All Variables 1

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1.893	1.110		1.705	.095		
	Brandnamevalue_Mean	.399	.121	.470	3.295	.002	.794	1.260
	Generaltrust_Mean	.157	.103	.197	1.522	.135	.965	1.036
	Competition_Mean	.034	.081	.055	.420	.676	.929	1.077
	Industry_dummy	.255	.258	.145	.989	.328	.754	1.326
	COO_dummy	-.176	.279	-.090	-.633	.530	.796	1.256

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Table 33: Multiple Regression-All Variables 2

6 Discussion and Limitations

6.1 Discussion

The result for Hypothesis 1 depends on the results of its sub hypotheses, which are H1a, H1b, H1c and H1d. When we look at the outputs of the analysis, Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 1d have significant and positive results. In other words the variables are significantly and positively correlated to each other. On the other hand, the results for Hypothesis 1a show that the variables are significantly but negatively correlated. In addition there are weakly significant results to confirm Hypothesis 1c.

The results for Hypothesis 2 are supported by positive and significant results; which confirm the positive relation between Brand Name and CSR. However according to the outputs of the analysis it is not possible to confirm Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. Please see table 34.

H1: The responsibility types of Carroll`s Pyramid model have a positive relationship between CSR activities for Franchising Firms in Austria.	**Insufficient Supported**
H1a: Economic Success has a positive relationship with CSR.	Not Supported
H1b: Legal Compliance has a positive relationship with CSR.	Supported
H1c: Ethical Business has a positive relationship with CSR.	Weakly Supported
H1d: Philanthropy has a positive relationship with CSR.	Supported
H2: Brand name value has a positive effect on the CSR activities for Franchising Firms in Austria.	**Supported**
H3: General trust has a positive influence on the CSR activities for Franchising Firms in Austria.	**Not Supported**
H4: Competition has a positive effect the on CSR activities for Franchising Companies in Austria.	**Not Supported**

Table 34: The Results of Hypotheses

6.2 Limitations

Several limitations were faced during the formation process of this thesis. In the research part of the study, we had some difficulties regarding data collection from the respondents. These problems are called non-response bias and errors. Non-response bias presents an error regarding the inability to contact the respondents and the respondants' failure to provide the requested information. On the other hand the non-response errors explain the respondents' unwillingness to provide data (Aaker, et al., 1998, p. 762). During the process of quantitative research we had 14 returned mails, 12 respondents with no interest in our research and 16 non-connectable respondents, who do not work in the same company anymore. Consequently, due to these kinds of problems, we encountered a smaller response rate. The main reason for these problems could be the questionnaire length or the question types. According to Dillman et al the response rate can be improved with a shorter questionnaire design and respondent friendly questions in future research (Dillman, et al., 1993).

Another important difficulty concerns the normality and the non significant results of our analysis. According to Field the outputs, namely significance values and normality, could be different, if the sample size was larger (Field, 2013).

The final limitation is about the absence of other unused factors, which could be related to CSR. Hence, it would be a good reason to add these other factors and also examine other relations to CSR in future research.

7 Conclusion

The first part of the study discussed the literature of CSR and Franchising to understand these main topics clearly. The methodology part started to explain the research design, consisting of the following sub-topics; questionnaire, sample size, data collection and response rates. Thus, after we defined the measurements for the analysis and determined the hypotheses, in the research part of the report, we conducted tests to analyze the hypotheses of the Corporate Social Responsibility activities of the 50 Franchising companies in Austria.

In this thesis, it was first tried to focus on the relationship between CSR and the responsibility types of Carroll`s Pyramid Model with its sub categories, (Economic success, legal compliance, ethical business and Philanthropy). Afterwards an investigation of the relations between CSR and three determinants (Brand Name Value, General Trust and Competition) was carried out. The test included an assessment regarding the effects of the determinants on the CSR activities of the 50 franchising companies in Austria.

According to the results of the first hypothesis, it is possible to say that companies care about their economic success most, but when we look at the relationship of Economic success and CSR, it is seen that they are not moving in the same direction, which could mean the firms do not plan CSR activities to increase their economic success. On the other hand, companies evaluate legal responsibilities to be of greater importance than ethical responsibilities and ethical responsibilities to be more important than philanthropic responsibilities. (Please see figure 27). According to the results, we can say that there is a weakly significant relation between Ethical Business and CSR, due to slightly significant results. However regarding Legal Compliance and Philanthropy, we can state that companies care and conduct their CSR activities according to these two responsibility types.

The results for Hypothesis 2 show that Brand name and CSR have a significant positive relationship, thus, it is possible to claim that franchise firms' decisions for CSR activities may be influenced positively by the companies' Brand Name Value. Our respondent franchising companies pursue strategies which incorporate the idea that a strong brand name value leads to a higher level of CSR. However, the influence of Trust and Competition on CSR are not significant.

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Appendix 1

Questionnaire

Brand Name Value

A. Nehmen Sie bitte zu folgenden Fragen als Franchisegeber Stellung:	Trifft überhaupt nicht zu		Trifft teilweise zu			Trifft vollständig zu	
Unsere Marke ist sehr stark im Vergleich zu unseren Systemwettbewerbern.	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	6 ☐	7 ☐
Die Qualität unseres Franchisesystems ist sehr gut im Vergleich zu unseren Systemwettbewerbern.	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	6 ☐	7 ☐
Unser Franchisesystem ist sehr anerkannt im Vergleich zu unseren Systemwettbewerbern.	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	6 ☐	7 ☐
Unser Markenname ist sehr wichtig, um einen Wettbewerbsvorteil zu erzielen.	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	6 ☐	7 ☐

General Trust

Die meisten Menschen vertrauen den Anderen.	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	6 ☐	7 ☐
Die meisten Menschen sind vertrauenswürdig.	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	6 ☐	7 ☐
Die meisten Menschen verhalten sich kooperativ, wenn man ihnen vertraut.	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	6 ☐	7 ☐

Competition

Die Wettbewerbsintensität auf den lokalen Märkten ist sehr groß.	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	6 ☐	7 ☐
Die Anzahl der Wettbewerber auf den lokalen Märkten ist sehr groß.	1 ☐	2 ☐	3 ☐	4 ☐	5 ☐	6 ☐	7 ☐

CSR

B. Nehmen Sie bitte auch zu folgenden Fragen als Franchisegeber Stellung:	Trifft überhaupt nicht zu	Trifft teilweise zu	Trifft vollständig zu
Compliance (Regeltreue) in Bezug auf Gesetze und sonstige Regulierungen in sämtlichen Rechtsordnungen, in denen unser Franchisesystem operiert, stellt eine Notwendigkeit dar.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Compliance mit geltenden Gesetzen ist ein Muss unabhängig von staatlicher Sanktionierung des Verhaltens.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Soziale und Umweltfragen beeinflussen unternehmerisches Handeln ausschließlich im Rahmen der Gesetze.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Zur Sicherstellung der Beachtung geltender Gesetze hat unser Franchisesystem ein Compliance-System implementiert.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Unser Franchisesystem hält Grundwerte hoch, die in Ethik-, Verhaltenskodizes oder ähnlichen Dokumenten definiert sind.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Compliance der Franchisenehmer in tätigen Märkten sicherzustellen, ist eine große Herausforderung.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Es wird von Franchisenehmern erwartet, sich definierten Grundwerten des Systems gemäß zu verhalten.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Wohlverhalten von Franchisenehmern in Einklang mit Systemwerten wird in unserem Franchisesystem überprüft.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Wohlverhalten von Franchisenehmern in Einklang mit Gesetzen wird in unserem Franchisesystem überprüft.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Verstöße von Franchisenehmern gegen Systemwerte werden innerhalb unseres Franchisesystems sanktioniert.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Verstöße von Franchisenehmern gegen Gesetze werden innerhalb unseres Franchisesystems sanktioniert.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Ein Franchisesystem soll eine proaktive Stellung gegenüber sozialen und Umweltstandards einnehmen und über das gesetzliche Mindestmaß hinausgehen.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Gesellschaftliche Interessen über das gesetzliche Mindestmaß hinaus sollen in Einklang mit sonstigen wirtschaftlichen Interessen verfolgt werden.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Ein Franchisesystem sollte seine Positionierung und sein Engagement in sozialen und Umweltfragen öffentlich kommunizieren.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Die Reputation unseres Franchisesystems wird durch ausgewiesenes Engagement in sozialen und Umweltfragen befördert.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Franchisegeber mit ausgewiesenem Engagement in sozialen und Umweltfragen stellen bevorzugte Vertragspartner dar.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Franchisenehmer mit ausgewiesenem Engagement in sozialen und Umweltfragen stellen bevorzugte Vertragspartner dar.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Gemeinsame Werte können in Franchise-Beziehungen vertrauensbildend wirken.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Engagement in sozialen und Umweltstandards über das gesetzlich Notwendige hinaus soll sich auch an gesellschaftlichen Bedürfnissen orientieren.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Die Integration von sozialen und Umweltinteressen in die Unternehmensstrategie sehen wir als Verpflichtung eines Corporate Citizen („Unternehmensbürgers").	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Als Corporate Citizen („Unternehmensbürger") sehen wir Engagement für gesellschaftliche Anliegen als Selbstzweck, unabhängig von wirtschaftlichen Interessen.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Sollten sich ökonomische und soziale Ziele in unserer Geschäftstätigkeit widersprechen, versuchen wir, eine Balance zwischen beiden herzustellen.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐
Die Einbindung von Umwelt- und sozialen Interessen in unsere Unternehmensstrategie erfolgt aus der Motivation, das Richtige zu tun.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐	4 ☐ 5 ☐	6 ☐ 7 ☐

Alle erhobenen Daten werden streng vertraulich behandelt und nur in aggregierter Form verwendet. Anhand des Datenmaterials können keine Rückschlüsse auf einzelne Unternehmen gezogen werden. 3

Durch nachhaltiges Wirtschaften schaffen wir Fortschritt für die gesamte Gesellschaft.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐
Unser Franchise-System strebt danach, sowohl wirtschaftlichen, als auch sozialen und ökologischen Mehrwert durch die Geschäftstätigkeit zu schaffen.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐
Soziale und Umweltinteressen sind in sämtliche Prozesse und Entscheidungen unseres Franchise-Systems integriert.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐
Wirtschaftliche, soziale und ökologische Überlegungen stehen einander gleichberechtigt gegenüber.	1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐
Wenn Sie ein Kontingent von **<u>100 Punkten</u>** zur Verteilung auf die genannten Themenschwerpunkte haben, wie verteilen Sie dieses? Wirtschaftlicher Erfolg .... Punkte Rechtliche Compliance .... Punkte Ethisches Wirtschaften .... Punkte Philanthropie (Wohltätigkeit und gemeinnützige Aktivitäten) .... Punkte	

Indusrty Type and COO

C. Bitte machen Sie folgende Angaben zu Ihrem Unternehmen:			
Welche Art von Franchising betreibt Ihr Unternehmen?			
☐ Produktion	☐ Vertrieb	☐ Dienstleistung	☐ Social Franchising

In welchem Land wurde das Franchisesystem gegründet? Land:

Appendix 2

Output of Analysis

Normality

CSR

Tests of Normality

	Kolmogorov-Smirnov[a]			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
CSR_Mean	.092	50	.200*	.986	50	.808

*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Carroll`s Pyramid

Tests of Normality

	Kolmogorov-Smirnov[a]			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Economic Success	.122	50	.063	.932	50	.007
Legal Compliance	.147	50	.009	.935	50	.008
Ethical Business	.198	50	.000	.929	50	.005
Philanthropy	.278	50	.000	.858	50	.000

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Independent Variables

Tests of Normality

	Kolmogorov-Smirnov[a]			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Brandnamevalue_Mean	.170	50	.001	.910	50	.001
Generaltrust_Mean	.189	50	.000	.938	50	.011
Competition_Mean	.143	50	.012	.952	50	.040

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Linearity















Pearson Correlations

Carroll`s Pyramid of CSR Model and CSR

Correlations

		CSR_Mean
Economic Success	Pearson Correlation	-.469
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001
	N	50
Legal Compliance	Pearson Correlation	.365
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.009
	N	50
Ethical Business	Pearson Correlation	.298
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.036
	N	50
Philanthropy	Pearson Correlation	.324
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.022
	N	50
CSR_Mean	Pearson Correlation	1
	N	50

Brand Name, General Trust, Competition and CSR

Correlations

		CSR_Mean
CSR_Mean	Pearson Correlation	1
	N	50
Brandnamevalue_Mean	Pearson Correlation	.467
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001
	N	50
Generaltrust_Mean	Pearson Correlation	.232
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.106
	N	50
Competition_Mean	Pearson Correlation	.031
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.832
	N	50

Reliability

CSR

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.914	.915	27

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
CSR: Compliance (Regeltreue) in Bezug auf Gesetze und sonstige Regulierungen in sämtlichen Rechtsordnungen, in denen ...	6.20	1.245	50
CSR: Compliance mit geltenden Gesetzen ist ein Muss unabhängig von staatlicher Sanktionierung des Verhaltens.	5.76	1.858	50
CSR: Soziale und Umweltfragen beeinflussen unternehmerisches Handeln ausschließlich im Rahmen der Gesetze.	3.26	1.712	50
CSR: Zur Sicherstellung der Beachtung geltender Gesetze hat unser Franchisesystem ein Compliance-System implementiert.	3.96	2.138	50
CSR: Unser Franchisesystem hält Grundwerte hoch, die in Ethik-, Verhaltenskodizes oder ähnlichen Dokumenten definiert...	5.62	1.713	50
CSR: Compliance der Franchisenehmer in tätigen Märkten sicherzustellen, ist eine große Herausforderung.	4.96	1.399	50
CSR: Es wird von Franchisenehmern erwartet, sich definierten Grundwerten des Systems gemäß zu verhalten.	6.28	.809	50
CSR: Wohlverhalten von Franchisenehmern in Einklang mit Systemwerten wird in unserem Franchisesystem überprüft.	5.24	1.559	50
CSR: Wohlverhalten von Franchisenehmern in Einklang mit Gesetzen wird in unserem Franchisesystem überprüft.	4.64	1.816	50
CSR: Verstöße von Franchisenehmern gegen Systemwerte werden innerhalb unseres Franchisesystems sanktioniert.	5.10	1.446	50
CSR: Verstöße von Franchisenehmern gegen Gesetze werden innerhalb unseres Franchisesystems sanktioniert.	4.52	1.961	50
CSR: Ein Franchisesystem soll eine proaktive Stellung gegenüber sozialen und	5.16	1.646	50

CSR: Gesellschaftliche Interessen über das gesetzliche Mindestmaß hinaus sollen in Einklang mit sonstigen wirtschaftl...	5.46	1.373	50
CSR: Ein Franchisesystem sollte seine Positionierung und sein Engagement in sozialen und Umweltfragen öffentlich komm...	5.48	1.282	50
CSR: Die Reputation unseres Franchisesystems wird durch ausgewiesenes Engagement in sozialen und Umweltfragen befördert.	4.58	1.991	50
CSR: Franchisegeber mit ausgewiesenem Engagement in sozialen und Umweltfragen stellen bevorzugte Vertragspartner dar.	3.74	1.838	50
CSR: Franchisenehmer mit ausgewiesenem Engagement in sozialen und Umweltfragen stellen bevorzugte Vertragspartner dar.	3.66	1.912	50
CSR: Gemeinsame Werte können in Franchise-Beziehungen vertrauensbildend wirken.	6.20	.904	50
CSR: Engagement in sozialen und Umweltstandards über das gesetzlich Notwendige hinaus soll sich auch an gesellschaftl...	5.04	1.442	50
CSR: Die Integration von sozialen und Umweltinteressen in die Unternehmensstrategie sehen wir als Verpflichtung eines...	4.82	1.438	50
CSR: Als Corporate Citizen (? Unternehmensbürger?) sehen wir Engagement für gesellschaftliche Anliegen als Selbstzweck...	4.54	1.446	50
CSR: Sollten sich ökonomische und soziale Ziele in unserer Geschäftstätigkeit widersprechen, versuchen wir, eine Bala...	5.22	1.542	50
CSR: Die Einbindung von Umwelt- und sozialen Interessen in unsere Unternehmensstrategie erfolgt aus der Motivation, d...	5.26	1.724	50
CSR: Durch nachhaltiges Wirtschaften schaffen wir Fortschritt für die gesamte Gesellschaft.	5.94	1.077	50
CSR: Unser Franchise-System strebt danach, sowohl wirtschaftlichen, als auch sozialen und ökologischen Mehrwert durch...	5.64	1.509	50
CSR: Soziale und Umweltinteressen sind in sämtliche Prozesse und Entscheidungen unseres Franchise-Systems integriert.	4.56	1.875	50
CSR: Wirtschaftliche, soziale und ökologische Überlegungen stehen einander gleichberechtigt gegenüber.	4.34	1.649	50

Brand Name Value

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.776	.786	4

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
7: Unsere Marke ist sehr stark im Vergleich zu unseren Systemwettbewerbern. (Brandname Value 1)	5.76	1.271	50
7: Die Qualität unseres Franchisesystems ist sehr gut im Vergleich zu unseren Systemwettbewerbern. (Brandname Value 2)	5.96	1.212	50
7: Unser Franchisesystem ist sehr anerkannt im Vergleich zu unseren Systemwettbewerbern. (Brandname Value 3)	5.28	1.727	50
7: Unser Markenname ist sehr wichtig, um einen Wettbewerbsvorteil zu erzielen. (Brandname Value 4)	6.28	1.126	50

General Trust

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.823	.828	3

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
7: Die meisten Menschen vertrauen den Anderen. (General Trust 1)	3.34	1.394	50
7: Die meisten Menschen sind vertrauenswürdig. (General Trust 2)	3.64	1.453	50
7: Die meisten Menschen verhalten sich kooperativ, wenn man ihnen vertraut. (General Trust 3)	4.92	1.007	50

Competition

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.814	.823	2

Item Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
7: Die Wettbewerbsintensität auf den lokalen Märkten ist sehr groß.(Competition 1)	5.00	1.414	50
7: Die Anzahl der Wettbewerber auf den lokalen Märkten ist sehr groß.(Competiton 2)	4.74	1.712	50

Factor Analysis

Brand Name Value

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.678
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	64.196
	df	6
	Sig.	.000

Correlation Matrix[a]

		7: Die Qualität unseres Franchisesystems ist sehr gut im Vergleich zu unseren Systemwettbewerbern. (Brandname Value 2)	7: Unser Franchisesystem ist sehr anerkannt im Vergleich zu unseren Systemwettbewerbern. (Brandname Value 3)	7: Unser Markenname ist sehr wichtig, um einen Wettbewerbsvorteil zu erzielen. (Brandname Value 4)	7: Unsere Marke ist sehr stark im Vergleich zu unseren Systemwettbewerbern. (Brandname Value 1)
Correlation	7: Unsere Marke ist sehr stark im Vergleich zu unseren Systemwettbewerbern.(Brandname Value 1)	.484	.459	.604	1.000
	7: Unser Franchisesystem ist sehr anerkannt im Vergleich zu unseren Systemwettbewerbern. (Brandname Value 3)	.669	1.000	.347	.459
	7: Unser Markenname ist sehr wichtig, um einen Wettbewerbsvorteil zu erzielen. (Brandname Value 4)	.308	.347	1.000	.604
	7: Die Qualität unseres Franchisesystems ist sehr gut im Vergleich zu unseren Systemwettbewerbern. (Brandname Value 2)	1.000	.669	.308	.484

a. Determinant = .254

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.442	61.044	61.044	2.442	61.044	61.044
2	.858	21.458	82.503			
3	.386	9.653	92.156			
4	.314	7.844	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

General Trust

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.696
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	56.840
	df	3
	Sig.	.000

Correlation Matrix[a]

		7: Die meisten Menschen vertrauen den Anderen. (General Trust 1)	7: Die meisten Menschen sind vertrauenswür dig.(General Trust 2)	7: Die meisten Menschen verhalten sich kooperativ, wenn man ihnen vertraut. (General Trust 3)
Correlation	7: Die meisten Menschen vertrauen den Anderen. (General Trust 1)	1.000	.726	.558
	7: Die meisten Menschen sind vertrauenswürdig. (General Trust 2)	.726	1.000	.566
	7: Die meisten Menschen verhalten sich kooperativ, wenn man ihnen vertraut. (General Trust 3)	.558	.566	1.000

a. Determinant = .300

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.237	74.554	74.554	2.237	74.554	74.554
2	.490	16.330	90.884			
3	.273	9.116	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Competition

KMO and Bartlett's Test

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.500
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	31.933
	df	1
	Sig.	.000

Correlation Matrix[a]

		7: Die Wettbewerbsi ntensität auf den lokalen Märkten ist sehr groß. (Competition 1)	7: Die Anzahl der Wettbewerber auf den lokalen Märkten ist sehr groß. (Competiton 2)
Correlation	7: Die Wettbewerbsintensität auf den lokalen Märkten ist sehr groß.(Competition 1)	1.000	.700
	7: Die Anzahl der Wettbewerber auf den lokalen Märkten ist sehr groß.(Competiton 2)	.700	1.000

a. Determinant = .511

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	1.700	84.981	84.981	1.700	84.981	84.981
2	.300	15.019	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Multiple Regression

Economic Success

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.473[a]	.223	.173	15.688	1.501

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

b. Dependent Variable: Economic Success

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	3254.567	3	1084.856	4.408	.008[b]
	Residual	11321.453	46	246.119		
	Total	14576.020	49			

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Success

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	99.762	15.282		6.528	.000		
	CSR_Mean	-9.231	2.620	-.476	-3.523	.001	.926	1.080
	Industry_dummy	-1.959	4.589	-.057	-.427	.671	.936	1.068
	COO_dummy	-.924	5.293	-.024	-.175	.862	.871	1.148

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Success

Coefficient Correlations[a]

Model			COO_dummy	Industry_dummy	CSR_Mean
1	Correlations	COO_dummy	1.000	.252	.272
		Industry_dummy	.252	1.000	.071
		CSR_Mean	.272	.071	1.000
	Covariances	COO_dummy	28.018	6.125	3.775
		Industry_dummy	6.125	21.060	.857
		CSR_Mean	3.775	.857	6.866

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Success

Collinearity Diagnostics[a]

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Condition Index	Variance Proportions			
				(Constant)	CSR_Mean	Industry_dummy	COO_dummy
1	1	3.319	1.000	.00	.00	.03	.02
	2	.493	2.595	.00	.00	.63	.15
	3	.175	4.351	.02	.05	.31	.64
	4	.012	16.476	.98	.95	.04	.19

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Success

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	35.58	73.88	51.86	8.150	50
Residual	-27.229	30.218	.000	15.200	50
Std. Predicted Value	-1.998	2.702	.000	1.000	50
Std. Residual	-1.736	1.926	.000	.969	50

a. Dependent Variable: Economic Success

Legal Compliance

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.402[a]	.162	.107	9.446	1.926

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

b. Dependent Variable: Legal Compliance

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	791.391	3	263.797	2.956	.042[b]
	Residual	4104.609	46	89.231		
	Total	4896.000	49			

a. Dependent Variable: Legal Compliance

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	2.551	9.201		.277	.783		
	CSR_Mean	3.884	1.578	.345	2.461	.018	.926	1.080
	Industry_dummy	2.687	2.763	.136	.973	.336	.936	1.068
	COO_dummy	-1.655	3.187	-.075	-.519	.606	.871	1.148

a. Dependent Variable: Legal Compliance

Coefficient Correlations[a]

Model			COO_dummy	Industry_dummy	CSR_Mean
1	Correlations	COO_dummy	1.000	.252	.272
		Industry_dummy	.252	1.000	.071
		CSR_Mean	.272	.071	1.000
	Covariances	COO_dummy	10.158	2.221	1.369
		Industry_dummy	2.221	7.635	.311
		CSR_Mean	1.369	.311	2.489

a. Dependent Variable: Legal Compliance

Collinearity Diagnostics[a]

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Condition Index	Variance Proportions			
				(Constant)	CSR_Mean	Industry_dummy	COO_dummy
1	1	3.319	1.000	.00	.00	.03	.02
	2	.493	2.595	.00	.00	.63	.15
	3	.175	4.351	.02	.05	.31	.64
	4	.012	16.476	.98	.95	.04	.19

a. Dependent Variable: Legal Compliance

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	11.40	31.42	22.20	4.019	50
Residual	-17.101	24.194	.000	9.152	50
Std. Predicted Value	-2.688	2.293	.000	1.000	50
Std. Residual	-1.810	2.561	.000	.969	50

a. Dependent Variable: Legal Compliance

Ethical Business

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.330[a]	.109	.051	8.419	1.722

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

b. Dependent Variable: Ethical Business

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	398.058	3	132.686	1.872	.148[b]
	Residual	3260.522	46	70.881		
	Total	3658.580	49			

a. Dependent Variable: Ethical Business

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-.922	8.201		-.112	.911		
	CSR_Mean	3.259	1.406	.335	2.318	.025	.926	1.080
	Industry_dummy	-.251	2.463	-.015	-.102	.919	.936	1.068
	COO_dummy	2.714	2.841	.142	.955	.344	.871	1.148

a. Dependent Variable: Ethical Business

Coefficient Correlations[a]

Model			COO_dummy	Industry_dummy	CSR_Mean
1	Correlations	COO_dummy	1.000	.252	.272
		Industry_dummy	.252	1.000	.071
		CSR_Mean	.272	.071	1.000
	Covariances	COO_dummy	8.069	1.764	1.087
		Industry_dummy	1.764	6.065	.247
		CSR_Mean	1.087	.247	1.977

a. Dependent Variable: Ethical Business

Collinearity Diagnostics[a]

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Condition Index	Variance Proportions			
				(Constant)	CSR_Mean	Industry_dummy	COO_dummy
1	1	3.319	1.000	.00	.00	.03	.02
	2	.493	2.595	.00	.00	.63	.15
	3	.175	4.351	.02	.05	.31	.64
	4	.012	16.476	.98	.95	.04	.19

a. Dependent Variable: Ethical Business

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	10.60	23.28	17.22	2.850	50
Residual	-12.123	19.698	.000	8.157	50
Std. Predicted Value	-2.321	2.126	.000	1.000	50
Std. Residual	-1.440	2.340	.000	.969	50

a. Dependent Variable: Ethical Business

Philanthropy

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.326[a]	.106	.048	5.540	2.551

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

b. Dependent Variable: Philanthropy

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	167.668	3	55.889	1.821	.157[b]
	Residual	1411.712	46	30.689		
	Total	1579.380	49			

a. Dependent Variable: Philanthropy

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, CSR_Mean

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	-1.155	5.396		-.214	.831		
	CSR_Mean	2.053	.925	.321	2.218	.032	.926	1.080
	Industry_dummy	-.438	1.621	-.039	-.271	.788	.936	1.068
	COO_dummy	-.102	1.869	-.008	-.055	.957	.871	1.148

a. Dependent Variable: Philanthropy

Coefficient Correlations[a]

Model			COO_dummy	Industry_dummy	CSR_Mean
1	Correlations	COO_dummy	1.000	.252	.272
		Industry_dummy	.252	1.000	.071
		CSR_Mean	.272	.071	1.000
	Covariances	COO_dummy	3.494	.764	.471
		Industry_dummy	.764	2.626	.107
		CSR_Mean	.471	.107	.856

a. Dependent Variable: Philanthropy

Collinearity Diagnostics[a]

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Condition Index	Variance Proportions			
				(Constant)	CSR_Mean	Industry_dummy	COO_dummy
1	1	3.319	1.000	.00	.00	.03	.02
	2	.493	2.595	.00	.00	.63	.15
	3	.175	4.351	.02	.05	.31	.64
	4	.012	16.476	.98	.95	.04	.19

a. Dependent Variable: Philanthropy

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	4.29	12.38	8.82	1.850	50
Residual	-10.000	13.942	.000	5.368	50
Std. Predicted Value	-2.448	1.923	.000	1.000	50
Std. Residual	-1.805	2.517	.000	.969	50

a. Dependent Variable: Philanthropy

Brand Name Value

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.499[a]	.249	.200	.79495	1.973

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, Brandnamevalue_Mean

b. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	9.643	3	3.214	5.086	.004[b]
	Residual	29.069	46	.632		
	Total	38.712	49			

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Industry_dummy, Brandnamevalue_Mean

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	2.802	.857		3.269	.002		
	Brandnamevalue_Mean	.394	.120	.464	3.274	.002	.814	1.229
	Industry_dummy	.173	.249	.098	.693	.492	.816	1.225
	COO_dummy	-.244	.274	-.125	-.890	.378	.832	1.201

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Coefficient Correlations[a]

Model			COO_dummy	Industry_dummy	Brandnamevalue_Mean
1	Correlations	COO_dummy	1.000	.336	.340
		Industry_dummy	.336	1.000	.365
		Brandnamevalue_Mean	.340	.365	1.000
	Covariances	COO_dummy	.075	.023	.011
		Industry_dummy	.023	.062	.011
		Brandnamevalue_Mean	.011	.011	.014

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Collinearity Diagnostics[a]

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Condition Index	Variance Proportions			
				(Constant)	Brandnamevalue_Mean	Industry_dummy	COO_dummy
1	1	3.304	1.000	.00	.00	.02	.02
	2	.499	2.572	.00	.00	.56	.12
	3	.187	4.206	.01	.04	.19	.62
	4	.010	17.928	.99	.96	.23	.24

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	3.9113	5.7298	5.0067	.44362	50
Residual	-1.52696	1.57244	.00000	.77023	50
Std. Predicted Value	-2.469	1.630	.000	1.000	50
Std. Residual	-1.921	1.978	.000	.969	50

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

General Trust

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.339[a]	.115	.057	.86322	1.701

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Generaltrust_Mean, Industry_dummy

b. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	4.436	3	1.479	1.984	.129[b]
	Residual	34.277	46	.745		
	Total	38.712	49			

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Generaltrust_Mean, Industry_dummy

Coefficient Correlations[a]

Model			COO_dummy	Generaltrust_Mean	Industry_dummy
1	Correlations	COO_dummy	1.000	.124	.258
		Generaltrust_Mean	.124	1.000	.164
		Industry_dummy	.258	.164	1.000
	Covariances	COO_dummy	.080	.004	.019
		Generaltrust_Mean	.004	.013	.005
		Industry_dummy	.019	.005	.065

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	4.753	.573		8.298	.000		
	Generaltrust_Mean	.163	.112	.205	1.450	.154	.966	1.035
	Industry_dummy	-.064	.255	-.036	-.251	.803	.916	1.092
	COO_dummy	-.499	.282	-.255	-1.767	.084	.927	1.079

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Collinearity Diagnostics[a]

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Condition Index	Variance Proportions			
				(Constant)	Generaltrust_Mean	Industry_dummy	COO_dummy
1	1	3.285	1.000	.00	.01	.03	.02
	2	.499	2.565	.00	.00	.63	.13
	3	.187	4.188	.02	.13	.20	.67
	4	.029	10.699	.98	.86	.14	.18

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	4.5158	5.6120	5.0067	.30088	50
Residual	-1.98487	1.90402	.00000	.83637	50
Std. Predicted Value	-1.631	2.012	.000	1.000	50
Std. Residual	-2.299	2.206	.000	.969	50

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Competition

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.272[a]	.074	.014	.88271	1.857

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Competition_Mean, Industry_dummy

b. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2.870	3	.957	1.228	.310[b]
	Residual	35.842	46	.779		
	Total	38.712	49			

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Competition_Mean, Industry_dummy

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	5.489	.576		9.535	.000		
	Competition_Mean	-.004	.090	-.006	-.044	.965	.953	1.050
	Industry_dummy	-.127	.263	-.072	-.484	.631	.904	1.107
	COO_dummy	-.552	.289	-.281	-1.907	.063	.924	1.082

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Coefficient Correlations[a]

Model			COO_dummy	Competition_Mean	Industry_dummy
1	Correlations	COO_dummy	1.000	.136	.263
		Competition_Mean	.136	1.000	.200
		Industry_dummy	.263	.200	1.000
	Covariances	COO_dummy	.084	.004	.020
		Competition_Mean	.004	.008	.005
		Industry_dummy	.020	.005	.069

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Collinearity Diagnostics[a]

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Condition Index	Variance Proportions			
				(Constant)	Competition_Mean	Industry_dummy	COO_dummy
1	1	3.276	1.000	.00	.01	.03	.02
	2	.501	2.556	.00	.00	.62	.13
	3	.193	4.120	.02	.14	.17	.66
	4	.030	10.431	.98	.85	.18	.20

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	4.7828	5.4733	5.0067	.24202	50
Residual	-2.21412	1.67871	.00000	.85526	50
Std. Predicted Value	-.925	1.928	.000	1.000	50
Std. Residual	-2.508	1.902	.000	.969	50

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Analysis of All Variables

Model Summary[b]

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.538[a]	.290	.209	.79038	1.758

a. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Generaltrust_Mean, Competition_Mean, Brandnamevalue_Mean, Industry_dummy

b. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	11.226	5	2.245	3.594	.008[b]
	Residual	27.487	44	.625		
	Total	38.712	49			

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

b. Predictors: (Constant), COO_dummy, Generaltrust_Mean, Competition_Mean, Brandnamevalue_Mean, Industry_dummy

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1.893	1.110		1.705	.095		
	Brandnamevalue_Mean	.399	.121	.470	3.295	.002	.794	1.260
	Generaltrust_Mean	.157	.103	.197	1.522	.135	.965	1.036
	Competition_Mean	.034	.081	.055	.420	.676	.929	1.077
	Industry_dummy	.255	.258	.145	.989	.328	.754	1.326
	COO_dummy	-.176	.279	-.090	-.633	.530	.796	1.256

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Coefficient Correlations[a]

Model			COO_dummy	Generaltrust_Mean	Competition_Mean	Brandnamevalue_Mean	Industry_dummy
1	Correlations	COO_dummy	1.000	.105	.176	.354	.374
		Generaltrust_Mean	.105	1.000	-.031	-.019	.136
		Competition_Mean	.176	-.031	1.000	.156	.235
		Brandnamevalue_Mean	.354	-.019	.156	1.000	.381
		Industry_dummy	.374	.136	.235	.381	1.000
	Covariances	COO_dummy	.078	.003	.004	.012	.027
		Generaltrust_Mean	.003	.011	.000	.000	.004
		Competition_Mean	.004	.000	.007	.002	.005
		Brandnamevalue_Mean	.012	.000	.002	.015	.012
		Industry_dummy	.027	.004	.005	.012	.066

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Collinearity Diagnostics[a]

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Condition Index	Variance Proportions					
				(Constant)	Brandnamevalue_Mean	Generaltrust_Mean	Competition_Mean	Industry_dummy	COO_dummy
1	1	5.122	1.000	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.01
	2	.512	3.162	.00	.00	.00	.00	.57	.07
	3	.239	4.634	.00	.01	.02	.03	.12	.63
	4	.072	8.442	.00	.01	.33	.63	.00	.00
	5	.048	10.301	.01	.24	.55	.12	.01	.01
	6	.007	26.182	.99	.74	.09	.21	.30	.28

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

Residuals Statistics[a]

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	3.9990	5.8586	5.0067	.47864	50
Residual	-1.44341	1.60730	.00000	.74897	50
Std. Predicted Value	-2.105	1.780	.000	1.000	50
Std. Residual	-1.826	2.034	.000	.948	50

a. Dependent Variable: CSR_Mean

German Abstract

Gegen Ende der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhundert gewann Corporate Social Responsibility eine immer größere Bedeutung in der Wirtschaftswelt. Ein weiteres sehr bekanntes Geschäftsmodell ist das Franchising, dessen Einsatz vor allem beim Eintritt in neue Märkte eine wichtige Rolle spielt.

Die Zielsetzung dieser Arbeit besteht darin, die Einwirkung von CSR innerhalb von Franchise-Systemen zu erforschen. Der erste Teil dieser Arbeit führt die zentralen Konzepte von CSR und Franchising ein, um diese zentralen Themen verständlich zu machen. Das Methologie-Kapitel, das der Erläuterung des Forschungsdesigns folgt definiert die Messinstrumente und präsentiert die Ergebnisse der Analysen. Das Hauptaugenmerk im analytischen Teil liegt dabei auf der Prüfung der Beziehung von CSR zu den vier verschiedenen Verantwortungsbereichen von Unternehmen, die der Ansatz der CSR-Verantwortungspyramide von Carroll beschreibt: Wirtschaftlicher Erfolg, Rechtliche Compliance, Ethisches Wirtschaften und Philanthropie. Anschießend richtet sich der Fokus auf die Beziehung zwischen CSR und den drei Determinanten: Wert des Markennamens, Generelles Vertrauen und Konkurrenz, sowie die möglichen Auswirkungen, die diese Determinanten auf CSR haben.

Zum Schluss werden die Ergebnisse sowie die Einschränkungen dargestellt. Die abschließende Konklusion diskutiert die Ergebnisse, die die Hypothesen hervorgebracht haben.

Stichwörter: Corporate Social Responsibility, Franchising, CSR Verantwortungspyramide
Modell von Carroll, Wert des Markennamens, Generelles Vertrauen und Konkurrenz.

Curriculum Vitae Hatice Aksoy

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth : 29 October 1986

Place of Birth : Adana/Turkey

EDUCATION

10/2011 – 2014	Master Degree University of Vienna International Business Administration Specialization: International Marketing and International Management
09/2004 – 05/2009	Bachelor Degree University of Mersin Tourism and Hotel Management

ACADEMIC AWARDS

14.06.2013	International Marketing / University of Vienna International Marketing Strategy Simulation Country Manager/ Best Team Award
25.01.2013	International Marketing / University of Vienna International Marketing Research MAM Project/ Best Team Award
18.05.2009	Bachelor Degree/ University of Mersin Tourism and Hotel Management Best student of the year 2009

LANGUAGE SKILLS

Turkish (Native Language)

German(Fluent)

English (Fluent)

Italian (Intermediate)

Russian (Elementary)

COMPUTER SKILLS

MS Office, SPSS, Photoshop, Basic level-html, Mysql and Php